A Textbook of Christian Ethics, 3rd Edition

A TEXTBOOK O F CHRISTIA N ETHIC S Third editio n

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A Textbook o f Christia n Ethics Third edition ROBIN GILL

t&t dark

Published b y T&T Clark A Continuum imprint The Towe r Building , 1 1 York Road, Londo n SE 1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane , Suite 704, New York , NY 1003 8 www. tandtclark. com All rights reserved. No part o f this publication ma y be reproduced o r transmitted i n any form or by any means , electroni c o r mechanical , includin g photocopying , recordin g o r an y informatio n storage o r retrieva l system, withou t prio r permissio n i n writin g from th e publishers . Robin Gil l has asserte d hi s righ t unde r th e Copyright , Design s an d Patent s Act , 1988, to b e identified a s the Autho r o f this work . Copyright © Robi n Gill , 2006 First editio n 198 5 Second editio n 199 5 Reprinted 200 2 This editio n publishe d 200 6 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogu e recor d fo r thi s book i s available fro m th e Britis h Library. ISBN 0-567-03111- X (hardback ) ISBN 0-567-03112- 8 (paperback ) Typeset b y Dat a Standard s Ltd , Frome, Somerse t U K Printed o n acid-fre e paper i n Grea t Britai n by MPG Book s Ltd , Bodmin, Cornwal l

Contents

Preface x

i

INTRODUCTION Structure 1 System o f Analysi s 2 The Texts : Augustine , Aquina s an d Luthe r 1

8

The Extract s 2

9

Method o f Stud y 3

0

Section 1 METHODOLOG

Y

Introduction t o Methodolog y 3 Text I Augustin

5

e 'God' s Foreknowledg e an d Huma n Free-will '

from Th e City o f Go d 4

1

s 'Natura l Law ' fro m Summa Theologica 4

Text I I Aquina

r fro m Treatise o n Good Works 5

Text II I Luthe

Analysis o f Extract s 1- 7 6 Extract 1 Bonhoeffe r 'Ethic s an d Christia n Ethics ' fro m Ethics 7 r fro m Situation Ethics 7

Extract 2 Fletche Extract 3 Coplesto Extract 4 Joh Extract 6 Cupit Extract 7 Porte

7 5 1 6

n 'Objection s t o Natura l Law ' fro m Aquinas 8

n Pau l I I 'Th e Crisi s of Mora l Truth ' fro m Veritatis Splendor 8

Extract 5 Fiorenz

9

a 'Ethic s an d Feminis t Theology ' 9 t 'Post-Realis t Ethics ' fro m Solar Ethics 9 r 'Virtu e Ethics ' fro m Moral Action and Christian Ethics 10

Critique o f Extract s 10

1 7 1 6 0 4

Section 2 POLITICS , ECONOMIC S AN D JUSTIC E Introduction t o Politics , Economic s an d Justic e 10 Text I V Augustin Text V Aquina Text V I Luthe

e Th e Earthl y and Heavenl y Cities' fro m Th e City o f Go d 11

9 4

s fro m On Princely Government 122 r fro m Trade an d Usury 13

0 V

CONTENTS

Analysis o f Extract s 14 Extract 8 Bart h 'God's Judgment o n Politica l Revolutions ' from Th e Epistle t o th e Romans 15 Extract 9 Berdyae v 'Politic s and th e Spirit ' fro m Freedom an d the Spirit 15 Extract 1 0 Niebuh r 'The Conflict Between Individua l and Socia l Morality ' fro m Moral Ma n an d Immoral Society 15 Extract 1 1 Templ e fro m Christianity an d th e Social Order 16 Extract 1 2 Joh n XXII I 'Toward s a Worl d Government ' fro m Pacem i n Tern' s 17 Extract 1 3 Mirand a 'Justic e an d Almsgiving ' fro m Marx an d th e Bible 17 Extract 1 4 Hollenbac h 'Th e Common Goo d an d Globalisation ' fro m Th e Common Good an d Christian Ethics 18 Critique o f Extract s 18

3 0 6 9 4 0 8 4 7

Section 3 WA R AN D PEAC E Introduction t o Wa r an d Peac e 19 Text VI I Augustin e 'The Just War ' from Reply t o Faustus th e Manichaean 19 Text VII I Aquina s 'War, Christians an d th e Clergy ' fro m Summa Theologica 20 Text I X Luthe r fro m Whether Soldiers, too, Ca n b e Saved 21

3 9 6

Analysis o f Extract s 22 Extract 1 5 Welt y 'Wars o f Aggressio n an d Defence '

5

from A Handbook o f Christian Social Ethics 23

Extract 1 6 Ramse y fro m Wh o Speaks fo r th e Church? 23 Extract 1 7 U S Catholi c Bishop s fro m Th e Challenge o f Peace 24 Extract 1 8 Hauerwa s 'Pacifism : Som e Philosophica l Considerations ' 25 Extract 1 9 Bonin o 'Liberatio n Theolog y an d Peace ' fro m Revolutionary Theology Comes o f Age 25 Extract 2 0 O'Donova n 'Discriminatio n an d Double-Effect ' fro m Th e Just Wa r Revisited 26 Critique o f Extract s 26

4

0

6 2 0 6 1 5

Section 4 TH E ENVIRONMEN T Introduction t o th e Environmen t 27 Text X Augustin

Text X I Aquina Text XI I Luthe

1

e fro m Th e Literal Meaning o f Genesis 27

s 'Creatio n an d Divin e Providence ' fro m Summa Contra Gentiles 28 r fro m Commentary on Genesis (1.26-31) 29

Analysis o f Extract s 29 Extract 2 1 Whit e 'The Theological Root s of our Ecologica l Crisis ' 30 Extract 2 2 Gregorio s 'Ecolog y an d th e Worl d Counci l o f Churches' 31 vi

6

5 3 9 3 0

CONTENTS

Extract 2 3 Abraha m 'Liberatio n an d Eco-Justice ' 31 Extract 2 4 Clar k 'Christia n Responsibilit y for th e Environment ' 32 Extract 2 5 McFagu e 'A n Earthl y Theological Agenda ' 33 Critique of Extract s 33

8 5 1 6

Section 5 HUMA N LIF E AN D INTERPERSONA L RELATIONSHIP S Introduction t o Huma n Lif e an d Interpersona l Relationship s 34 Text XII I Augustin e 'Suicide' fro m Th e City o f Go d 34 Text XI V Aquina s 'Fornication an d Marriage ' fro m Summa Contra Gentiles 35 Text XV Luthe r fro m O n th e Jews an d Their Lies 36

1 8 6 7

Analysis o f Extract s 37 Extract 2 6 Kün g 'Euthanasia' fro m A Dignified Dying? 38 Extract 2 7 Quake r Grou p fro m Towards a Quaker View o f Se x 38 Extract 2 8 War e 'Marriag e and Divorce - a n Orthodox Perspective ' 39 Extract 2 9 Pau l V I 'Birt h Control ' fro m Humanae Vitae 40 Extract 3 0 Cahil l 'Bioethic s an d AIDS ' 40 Extract 31 WCC 'Churche s Agains t Racism ' 414 Extract 3 2 Ruethe r 'Wester n Christianit y and Zionism ' 41 Critique o f Extract s 42

5 1 8 3 2 9

Select Bibliography i n Christian Ethics 43

3

Indices 44

3

vii

9 8

Alan Morton Gill 1909-85 paternus adjutor et doctus lector

Acknowledgements

I a m mos t gratefu l t o th e followin g for permissio n t o us e copyright passages: Penguin Book s Lt d (City o f Go d and Copleston : Aquinas) Prior Provincial , OP , S t Dominic's Priory , London (Summa Theologica) Fortress Pres s (Luther's Works an d Bonino : Doing Theology i n a Revolutionary Situation) Basil Blackwell (Aquinas: Selected Politica l Writings) William B . Eerdmans (Nicene an d Post Nicene Fathers) Doubleday (Summa Contra Gentiles) Macmillan an d SC M Press (Bonhoeffer : Ethics) SCM Press (Cupitt : Solar Ethics) Continuum an d SC M Press (Kiing : A Dignified Dying?) Oxford Universit y Press (Barth : Th e Epistle t o th e Romans) Geoffrey Ble s Lt d (Berdyaev : Freedom an d th e Spirit) Charles Scribner' s Son s (Niebuhr : Moral Ma n an d Immoral Society) Shepheard-Walwyn and SPC K (Temple: Christianity and Social Order) Catholic Trut h Societ y ( Veritatis Splendor, Pacem i n Terris an d Humanae Vitae) Orbis Book s and SC M Press (Miranda : Marx an d th e Bible) Orbis Book s (Ruether : Faith and th e Intifada) Verlag Herder (Welty : A Handbook o f Christian Social Ethics) The Westminster and SC M Press (Fletcher : Situation Ethics) Abingdon Pres s and Marci a Wood (Ramsey : Wh o Speaks fo r th e Church?) US National Conferenc e of Catholi c Bishop s (The Challenge o f Peace). Faith and Philosophy (Hauerwas : 'Pacifism' ) Paulist Pres s (Augustine : Th e Literal Meaning of Genesis). Science/AAAS (White : 'Theological Root s o f our Ecologica l Crisis ' World Counci l o f Churches (Gregorios : 'Racism i n Theology'). United Theologica l College , Bangalor e (Abraham : 'Liberation an d Eco-Justice') Modern Churchpeople' s Unio n (Clark : 'Christian Responsibilit y fo r the Environment' ) The Christian Centur y Foundatio n (McFague : 'An Eathl y Theological Agenda' ) The Downside Review (Ware: 'Marriag e and Divorce' ) Concj/mm/T&T Clar k (Fiorenza : 'Ethics and Feminis t Theology') Concordia (Luther : Lectures on Genesis) Cambridge Universit y Press (Porter : Moral Action and Christian Ethics Hollenbach: Th e Common Good an d Christian Ethics; and O'Donovan : Th e Just Wa r Revisited) Journal o f Religious Ethics (Cahill: 'Bioethic s and AIDS' ) Quaker Hom e Servic e ( Towards a Quaker View o f Sex) IX

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Preface t o th e Third Editio n

It is now two decades since this Textbook was first published an d a decade since it was last revised. In th e meantime Christia n ethic s has continued t o chang e and t o flourish. The emphasis upo n ecolog y an d th e natura l environment , note d especiall y i n th e previous edition, ha s continue d strongly . Feminis t Christia n ethic s ha s als o continue d t o gro w with a significant number of feminist theologians now firmly established in the front rank of modern theology. Biblical interpretation and postmodern approaches t o theology hav e also continued t o challenge more traditional forms of theology and Christia n ethics. And issues i n science , bioscience , genetic s an d healt h hav e raise d seriou s an d fascinatin g ethical issues . Thes e remai n excitin g time s fo r student s o f Christian ethics . This new edition ha s sought to respond t o these changes with six entirely new Extracts and on e old one (Towards a Quaker View o f Sex) reinstated . I was gently scolded by quite a number o f colleagues for dropping the latter i n the previou s revision. They convinced me that i t does stil l make an important contributio n i n helping students t o understan d the scop e an d diversit y o f Christia n ethics . However , a s before, th e syste m o f analysis remains - bu t this had already been well tested over generations of students at Edinburgh University, at Newcastle University and no w at Canterbury (an d by colleagues in several other academic centres) . In my very first Preface I mentioned that writing bega n o n th e Textbook whil e I wa s o n sabbatica l i n Zambi a i n 1980 , continue d whil e teachin g a t Dartmouth College , Ne w Hampshire , an d effectivel y finishe d whil e teachin g a t th e United Theologica l College , Bangalore , i n 1984 . Sinc e the n i t ha s bee n increasingl y difficult t o keep track of all the students and faculty members around the world who have helped t o shap e th e contents . Howeve r I woul d particularl y lik e t o than k m y ow n students who have acted a s guinea-pigs on the various Texts and Extracts. Without the m I would never have known which to discard an d which to include . My former colleagues at Edinburg h - Dunca n Forrester , Ia n McDonal d an d Michae l Northcott , a s well as Simon Robinso n - al l gave mos t generousl y of their tim e i n helping to mak e the 199 5 revisions. And my current colleagues - Jerem y Carrette and Chris Deacy - hav e given me invaluable hel p with th e present revision. I am immensely gratefu l t o all of them and t o the ongoing generations of students who still point out my errors and mistakes with great glee! Befor e the y mentio n i t again , th e spelling s i n th e Text s an d Extract s follo w th e conventions o f the books fro m whic h the y hav e bee n draw n - sometime s Britis h and sometimes American . But then th e Textbook i s intended fo r both audiences . Readers wil l soo n b e awar e o f th e fac t tha t Christia n ethic s i s a highly pluralistic discipline. Fundamenta l difference s ar e apparen t i n th e presuppositions , methods , an d conclusions o f th e variou s writer s represente d here . I t migh t hav e bee n possibl e t o produce a book on moral issue s tha t ignore d thi s pluralis m an d diversity - bu t not a serious Textboo k o f Christian Ethics . A mature understandin g o f the disciplin e cannot XI

PREFACE T O TH E THIR D EDITIO N

bypass diversity . Phili p Wogama n argue s helpfull y tha t thi s diversit y 'woul d b e scandalous i f one though t of th e traditio n a s a deposi t o f trut h "onc e fo r al l delivered to th e saints". But if one thinks rathe r o f the tradition as a witness t o th e transcendent reality of the living God, then i s there not roo m fo r growth an d ne w insight?' (Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction, p . 270) . If diversity is admitted, where is the unity in Christian ethics to be found? A superficial reading might conclude that it is wholly absent - th e diversity appears overwhelming. But that would , I believe, be a superficial reading . At certain ke y points a unity is suggested, mainly in certain biblically consonant value s held i n tension. Whil e remainin g critical of simplistic attempts to derive individual values from th e Bible, it is a feature of most o f the exponents o f Christia n ethic s represente d i n thi s Textbook tha t the y see k t o hol d i n creative tensio n value s that ar e consonan t wit h distinctivel y Christian , an d particularl y biblical, resource s (recognizin g tha t thes e resource s themselve s represen t a variet y o f tensions). So 'love' (agape) as an isolated value is not usuall y seen as a sufficient Christia n resource, bu t 'love ' i n tensio n wit h 'justice ' is . Differin g exponent s o f Christia n ethic s emphasize thi s particula r tensio n i n varyin g ways , bu t fo r mos t i t i s a n essential , irreducible and creative tension - and , indeed , a crucial poin t o f unity i n an otherwis e diverse discipline . At variou s point s a numbe r o f thes e tension s wil l b e note d betwee n 'peace ' an d 'justice', betwee n 'compassion ' an d 'mora l indignation' , an d finall y betwee n wha t i s termed i n th e fina l page s th e adeodati c axio m an d th e agapisti c axiom . Tha t thes e tensions ar e essentia l an d irreducible derive s fro m th e natur e o f Christianit y itself . As theologians suc h a s Augustine (wit h his notion o f the tw o cities ) an d Luthe r (wit h hi s notion o f th e tw o kingdoms ) wer e wel l aware , Christianit y i s always a mixtur e o f th e 'now' an d the 'not yet' . Indeed , th e Synoptic concep t o f the Kingdo m o f God seem s t o contain bot h presen t and futur e elements . To reflect this , a degree of creative tension wil l always b e a crucia l featur e o f a n adequat e understandin g o f Christia n ethics . Precisel y because it is structured aroun d essential , but elusive , tensions Christia n ethics will always be subjec t t o popula r misrepresentatio n an d reduction . I t i s only to o eas y t o presen t 'Christian values ' simplisticall y an d wit h scan t regar d t o thei r role-in-tensio n withi n Christianity. I will be content if this Textbook i s able to contribute even a little to a mor e mature understandin g o f Christian ethics . Finally I would like to thank my family and especiall y my wife and best friend , Jenny. I remain relieve d tha t mos t o f my famil y neve r rea d m y books. Howeve r m y father , wh o died in May 1985 just months before the Textbook was originally published, no t only read my book s bu t meticulousl y correcte d thei r spellin g (befor e th e day s o f spell-checks) , grammar an d sometime s logic . To him I continue t o ow e a special debt .

xn

Introduction

STRUCTURE

The structur e o f thi s Textbook i s built aroun d a systemati c compariso n o f text s wit h extracts. These two terms are used simply for convenience to distinguish between classical excerpts fro m Augustine , Aquinas and Luthe r an d present-da y (i.e . withi n th e las t 80 years) excerpt s - th e first being terme d Text s an d the secon d Extracts . Thi s structure differs significantl y fro m th e historica l approac h o f Wald o Beac h an d H . Richar d Niebuhr's Christian Ethics (1973 ) an d o f Arthu r F . Holmes'Wa r an d Christian Ethics (1975) i n a number o f ways: (a) i t doe s no t attemp t t o presen t a selection of historical writings in Christian ethics - a n important undertaking successfully achieved in these and other books , bu t on e tha t doe s lea d t o th e reproductio n o f repetitiv e material ; (b ) i t stresses the value of the comparativ e approach as an importan t mean s of learning; (c) it provides a systematic means of analysis for each Text an d Extract , which in turn makes comparative stud y mor e possible ; (d ) i t place s an emphasi s upo n th e relevanc e of th e discipline today. This last point is certainly a feature o f a number of readers in Christian social ethics , includin g m y ow n Readings i n Modern Theology (1995) , bu t fro m th e perspective of the theological teacher they often lac k historical and analytical dimensions and ar e in any case readers and no t textbooks . This book is designed to be a textbook and , at the end of this introduction, a method of using it as such is suggested. The fac t tha t i t is a textbook an d no t simpl y a reader has determined th e choic e o f Texts and Extracts . After man y experiments i t was decided t o limit the Texts to three key theologians in the belief that this gives more coherence to the five Sections and brings out better the main options and variables within Christian ethics. Naturally, a t times , reference s ar e mad e t o Churc h Father s earlie r tha n Augustin e (particularly Tertullian, Origen an d Ambrose), to Scholastic s other tha n Aquinas and t o Reformers othe r tha n Luthe r (notably Calvin) and i t was tempting to includ e texts fro m them all. But that would seriously have distorted the aims of this as a textbook and might have turned i t instead int o a historical reader. B y confining th e Texts to thes e three key theologians, i t i s hoped tha t th e studen t wil l be encourage d t o focu s clearl y upo n th e differences betwee n the m an d t o distinguis h thei r differin g effect s upo n present-da y Christian ethics . No t onl y d o the y represen t thre e o f th e mos t powerfu l post-Ne w Testament influence s o n Christia n theology , bu t the y als o represen t th e thre e distinc t phases of Western Christianit y - th e Undivided Catholi c Church , th e Medieval Roma n Church an d th e Protestant/Reforme d Church . The Extracts, too, hav e been chose n with the need s of a textbook an d no t simpl y of a reader in mind. They are not necessaril y 'the best' from recen t Christian ethics . Some are intended simpl y to represen t position s tha t have influenced th e contemporary churches . It ha s been ou r experienc e i n teachin g the subjec t tha t student s ca n learn fro m weake r 1

A TEXTBOO K O F CHRISTIA N ETHICS

Extracts a s well a s fro m thos e tha t ar e mor e intellectuall y sophisticated , althoug h th e balance i s intende d t o b e i n favou r o f th e latter . A s wil l b e explaine d presently , th e Extracts hav e bee n chose n t o represen t a wid e rang e withi n an d betwee n differin g Christian traditions . The book i s divided into five Sections with the three Texts and a t least five Extracts in each. Th e firs t Sectio n i s concerne d wit h methodologica l issue s an d th e subsequen t Sections wit h substantiv e issue s i n Christia n ethics . Section s 2-4 ar e mainl y concerne d with issue s in social ethics and Sectio n 5 with personal o r 'statu s of life' ethics , althoug h these division s sometime s becom e somewha t arbitrar y (e.g . marita l issue s ar e clearl y personal issues , but , a t leas t withi n th e Judaeo-Christia n tradition , the y als o hav e a relationship wit h societ y a t large) . Th e Section s ar e self-containe d an d contai n man y cross-references to other Section s and therefore can be studied i n any order. Each Section is preface d b y a n introductio n t o th e mai n issue s raise d withi n i t a s the y relat e t o Christian ethics . Eac h Tex t an d grou p o f Extract s i s preface d b y a six-fol d syste m o f analysis an d a t th e en d o f each a critique is given. SYSTEM O F ANALYSI S The six-fol d system o f analysis introducing eac h Text an d grou p o f Extracts consists o f (1) Backgroun d (2 ) Ke y Issues (3 ) Ethica l Arguments (4 ) Base s o f Christia n Ethic s (5 ) Social Determinant s an d (6 ) Socia l Significance . The critiqu e a t the en d o f each forms a seventh part . I n mor e detai l the y are as follows: 1. BACKGROUND This part of the analysis suggests relevant biographical details and identifies the documen t from whic h the Text o r Extrac t has been taken. Sinc e part o f the presen t introductio n i s concerned wit h comparin g Augustine , Aquinas an d Luther , it wil l no t b e necessar y t o repeat thes e biographica l detail s ever y tim e a Tex t i s introduced . Unti l th e centra l differences between the three theologians become clearer , a student would be well advised to kee p referrin g bac k t o thi s par t o f th e introduction . I n thi s Textbook a stron g assumption i s that biographical detail s are , at times, directl y relevan t t o an understanding of th e though t o f a particula r theologian . Thu s som e knowledg e o f Berdyaev' s lif e i s considered t o be essential fo r an adequat e understandin g of Extract 9 . 2. KE Y ISSUES The overall introductio n t o eac h Section seek s to provid e a summary of the mai n issue s arising from th e Texts and Extracts within it. But here secondary issues will also be raised and i t will be indicate d ho w th e specifi c Tex t o r Extrac t in question relate s to th e mai n issues. The aim of this part of the analysis is to help students t o isolate specific issues fro m the Text or Extract so that they can relate them to the other Texts or Extracts. One of the surprising features of examining, i n detail, even quite a short excerpt fro m a given author, is t o discove r ho w man y o f hi s o r he r characteristi c idea s occu r withi n it . Thus , i f examined thoroughly , eve n a shor t Tex t fro m a theologia n a s comple x a s Aquina s contains quite a number o f his assumptions and ideas . Again from experienc e of teaching Christian ethics, Texts or Extracts need not be lengthy to be instructive; they must merel y be studied wit h care and attention . 2

INTRODUCTION

3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS A vital feature of analysis i n Christian ethics involve s th e identificatio n o f differing type s of ethica l argument . A n important distinctio n mus t b e mad e betwee n mora l decision making an d ethica l analysis . Insofa r a s i t i s a n academi c discipline , ethics , an d wit h i t Christian ethics , i s usually considere d t o be concerned mor e wit h th e secon d tha n wit h the first. It is concerned wit h examining the nature of prescriptive language, the grounds on whic h moral belief s ar e held, th e virtue s they embody, th e type s of argument which those who hold them us e to promote them, th e types of moral characte r tha t foste r them and th e consequence s tha t the y involve . I f decision-making i s involved , thi s i s usually achieved o n th e basis of a systematic or develope d theory . Ethics , or mora l philosophy , understood in this way is clearly related t o intelligent mora l decision-making , bu t i s not identical wit h it . Similarly , Christia n theolog y i s not usuall y considered t o b e identical with Christia n belief : i t i s a n intellectual , theoretica l an d second-orde r discipline . So, whereas all Christians ma y make moral decision s an d hold certain religiou s beliefs , only some are exponents o f Christian ethic s and o f Christian theology . I t i s in this sense that the terms will be used here , even though elsewher e the term s 'theology' and 'ethics ' are often use d i n a broader and les s academic sense . It would be inappropriate to attempt an outline of general ethics or moral philosophy. Instead good introduction s ca n be found i n the following : Phillippa Foot (ed.) , Theories of Ethics (1967) ; A . Maclntyre , A Short History o f Ethics (1966) ; P . H . Nowell-Smith , Ethics (1957) ; G . J . Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (1966) ; Mar y Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (1978). I n addition , A . V . Campbell' s Moral Dilemmas i n Medicine (1972) provides a clear an d readabl e accoun t o f the classica l approache s t o ethic s usin g medical issues as case-studies. Ia n C . M. Fairweather and J . I. H. McDonald's Th e Quest for Christian Ethics (1984) gives a more detaile d accoun t o f the approaches . An d Alba n McCoy's A n Intelligent Person's Guide t o Christian Ethics (2004 ) give s a n accessible , briefer account . For the purpose of this Textbook three basic types of ethical argument should be clearly identified - deontological , consequential, and personalist: (a) Deontological ethical arguments

It i s a featur e o f deontological argument s - derive d fro m th e Gree k for 'necessary' o r 'imperative' - tha t by nature they are absolutist. On e cannot argu e beyond them . So , if one maintain s tha t murde r i s wron g an d i s aske d t o giv e a reason , a deontologica l response would be: 'Because it is against the law of nature', or 'Becaus e it is against God's will', o r 'Becaus e i t break s th e Sixt h Commandment' , o r eve n 'Becaus e i t i s simpl y wrong'. Such responses merel y refer th e other perso n t o some nor m o r absolute beyond which there can be no furthe r argument . There i s no attempt her e to argu e that i t is the consequences of murder tha t mak e it wrong; indeed, murder i s seen as wrong regardless of it s consequences . O f course , ther e ma y b e situation s i n whic h tw o o r mor e norm s conflict (a s in euthanasia - se e Extract 26) and further argumen t is then required in order to determine moral prioritie s (sometimes termed 'casuistry') , but values, as such, cannot be justified othe r than b y reference to the norm fro m whic h they are derived. Immanuel Kant's (1724-1803 ) concep t o f th e categorica l imperativ e i s a classi c exampl e o f deontological ethics , whereb y moralit y i s regarde d a s autonomous , categorica l (i n th e sense that it is a 'given' of the human mind - i t is not a human invention and requires no 3

A TEXTBOO K OF CHRISTIA N ETHIC S

proof), imperativ e (i t i s t o b e obeyed , no t argue d with ) an d universal . Fo r Kan t th e categorical imperativ e o f moralit y command s tha t w e ac t onl y o n th e maxi m tha t w e would wish our behaviou r to become a universal law: morality is an end in itself and no t a means to somethin g else. As will be seen, it is quite different fro m utilitarianis m which is essentiall y conditiona l an d a mean s t o a furthe r en d (e.g . pleasur e o r happiness) . A more recen t exampl e o f deontologica l ethic s i s th e wa y th e concep t o f 'rights ' i s sometimes use d - a s in the 'right to life' o r 'the right of the woman t o choose' position s often use d o n opposit e sides o f the abortio n debate. Again, one can argue about whethe r or not a given situation reall y constitutes a clearcut moral case. So, although murder might be considered alway s to be wrong, one migh t still argu e about whethe r a particular situatio n doe s o r doe s no t involv e murder. Thus , many of those who believe that murder i s wrong, but tha t killing in war can be justified, argue that the latter does not involv e the former (e.g . since war does not involv e privately motivated killin g - se e Aquinas' Tex t VIII). Others, usin g a conflict theory , migh t argue that althoug h killin g i n wa r i s wrong , i t i s overridde n b y th e greate r wron g o f no t defending one's country when called on to do so. In both instance s a deontological stanc e is still taken o n th e issu e o f murder. It wil l b e see n i n th e variou s Section s tha t bot h Augustine' s an d Luther' s biblica l arguments ar e predominantl y deontological . Indee d deontolog y i s als o a featur e o f Aquinas' mora l arguments , eve n thoug h hi s commitmen t t o Aristotle' s maxi m tha t 'happiness is the chie f good' tend s t o pus h hi m toward s consequentialism . Man y would argue that , i n som e form , deontolog y i s a n essentia l featur e o f al l Christia n ethics . However, this is an issu e which will be debated a t lengt h throughou t thi s Textbook. (b) Consequential ethical arguments It i s a featur e o f consequential argument s - sometime s terme d teleologica l argument s although the two can be distinct - tha t the y treat morality , no t as autonomous o r as an end in itself, but a s a means to something else. At its simplest, one is enjoined to be good so that one may receive some reward - eithe r in the form o f some present o r near futur e state, such as 'pleasure' or 'happiness', or in the more distant form of an earthly Utopia or of a transcendent eterna l life . T o retur n t o reason s fo r believing tha t murde r i s wrong , consequential response s typicall y might be : 'Becaus e murder , i f allowed, woul d destro y society', or 'Becaus e murder doe s not contribut e to general happiness' . In each respons e murder i s thought to b e wrong, not becaus e i t is wrong i n itself , bu t becaus e it leads t o something els e whic h i s though t t o b e wron g o r perhap s jus t undesirabl e - e.g . th e breakdown o f society , th e absenc e o f genera l happiness , o r th e receptio n o f eterna l punishment. I f thi s 'somethin g else ' i s itsel f though t t o b e wrong , the n clearl y consequential arguments eventuall y d o have a deontological basis. On the other hand, if this 'something else' is thought to be no more than undesirable, it may have no such basis (and fo r this reason som e maintai n tha t therefor e i t i s not a mora l argumen t a t all) . In addition t o th e objec t varying, in consequentia l arguments , th e recipien t envisaged als o varies. In some forms of the argument, it is the agent whose ends are considered, wherea s in other s i t i s those o f societ y as a whole. However , i n all , mora l conduc t i s judged i n terms o f it s goal s o r consequence s (teleologica l argument s stres s mor e th e first , an d consequential arguments mor e the second). Various type s o f ethica l utilitarianis m an d pragmatis m constitut e form s o f conse quential argument . Fo r lerem y Bentha m (1748-1832 ) moralit y wa s concerne d wit h 4

INTRODUCTION

attempting t o increase the total pleasure of humankind an d the avoidance o f pain - a n explicit for m o f hedonism , albei t no t calculate d o n a n individualisti c basi s (i.e . i t concerns, no t th e specifi c pleasur e of the agent , but th e greates t amount o f pleasure for the greates t numbe r o f people) . Fo r Joh n Stuar t Mil l (1806-73 ) moralit y shoul d b e empirically based, ascertaining first what people really find 'desirable' and then arranging society so that as much as possible (quantitativel y as well as qualitatively) of what people desire ca n be obtained, by as many as possible, i n a n orderl y an d cooperativ e way. In som e form s o f th e Christia n traditio n consequentia l argument s hav e assume d a strongly eschatologica l character . Fo r example , i n th e sixth-centur y Rul e o f Benedict , monks were told: 'If we wish to escape the pains of hell and attain to eternal life we must hasten t o d o suc h things onl y as may profit u s for eternity, now , while there i s time for this and we are in this body and ther e is time to fulfi l al l these precepts by means of this light' (The Rule o f Benedict, Prologue, trans . W . K . Lowther Clarke , 1931) . A more immediat e for m o f consequentialism, roote d clearl y in deontology, i s evident in th e followin g paragraph fro m th e Didache: My son, flee from al l wickedness and from everythin g like it. Do not become angry, for anger leads to murder. Do not become jealous, or quarrelsome, o r irritable, for it leads to fornication . And do not us e obscene language , or le t your eye wander, for from al l these come adulteries ... My child, do not be a liar, because a lie leads to theft; be not greedy of money or empt y glory, for fro m al l this com e thefts. M y child, d o no t b e a grumbler, becaus e i t lead s t o blasphemy , d o no t b e prou d o r malicious , fo r from all these arise blasphemies. (Didache, v , from Ludwi g Schopp (ed.) , Th e Apostolic Fathers, vol. 1 , Th e Fathers o f th e Church) Whatever i s thought o f th e logi c o f th e link s i n thi s ver y earl y (possibl y early secondcentury) documen t - ange r lead s t o murder , jealous y lead s t o fornication , grumblin g leads to blasphemies, and so forth - thei r consequentia l natur e i s evident. On e thing is considered wron g because it leads to (or it might even derive from) something else which is already known t o be wrong - i n this instanc e because murder, adultery , stealin g and blasphemy ar e known t o b e wrong fro m th e Decalogu e (i.e . the Te n Commandments) . Consequential argument s will be seen alongside deontological arguments in a number of the Texts and Extracts . Utilitarianism i n the mor e formal , philosophica l sens e will be seen t o b e present i n Fletcher' s Extract 2. (c) Personalist ethical arguments It i s a featur e o f personalis t argument s tha t the y vie w morality , no t a s obedienc e t o autonomous, absolut e principles or as a means to something else, but a s an expression of individual feeling , conscience or love. It is frequently argued b y exponents of personalis t ethics that moral dilemmas cannot b e resolved in advance of particular situations. Thus, it make s n o sens e t o argue , a s an abstrac t principle , abou t whethe r o r no t murde r i s wrong. Onl y i n particula r situation s whe n th e individua l i s confronte d wit h th e possibility o f murder , ca n tha t individua l determin e whethe r o r no t i t i s wrong . Confronted wit h th e prospec t o f murdering one' s siste r now , th e personalis t ca n repl y that this murder is wrong: 'Because I feel that it is wrong', or 'Because my conscience tell s me that it is wrong', or 'Because it would contradict my love for her or my respect for her as a person'. In these response s i t can be seen that ther e are elements of both deontolog y 5

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and consequentialism . Feelings, conscience, love and respec t for persons are all treated as normative an d onl y i n relatio n t o the m ar e action s considere d t o b e righ t o r wrong . Nonetheless, the emphasis is individualistic and situational . It is conceivable that, given a change i n the situation o r in the persons involved , a n individual migh t reac h th e verdic t that t o murde r one' s siste r would be right. It might be war-time and th e sister might be discovered t o be working for the enemy. The deontologist coul d fee l impelle d t o murde r the siste r i n thes e circumstances, but woul d ten d t o argue , eithe r tha t i t was not reall y murder in this instance, or, that it was murder and was therefore wrong, but tha t it would be a greater wron g t o allo w one' s country t o b e betrayed. The consequentialist, on th e other hand , migh t argu e that th e happiness o r well-being of society determines tha t th e murder o f all traitors is right. I n contrast to th e deontologist, the personalist may argue that thi s actual murder i s right, even if it is still thought t o be murder. In contrast t o th e consequentialist, th e personalist argue s that general pronouncements abou t traitor s bein g murdered shoul d no t b e made i n advanc e o f particular situations. Thi s doe s no t mea n that societ y should no t mak e laws on issue s like this (i n orde r t o discourag e traitor s i n war-time i t may feel obliged t o do so), but suc h laws should not be confused wit h moral laws. B y definition, the latte r canno t b e codified. The position s o f the deontologis t an d the consequentialis t ca n be an d frequentl y hav e bee n codifie d (bot h Bentha m an d Mil l sought t o influenc e law-makin g a s wel l a s mora l philosophy) . Bu t th e mos t tha t th e personalist ca n offe r ar e general moral guidelines , whic h can be overridden i n particula r situations. Personalism, i n one for m o r another , ha s proved t o b e very attractive to a number o f recent mora l philosopher s an d theologians . Ther e ha s bee n a widesprea d los s o f confidence i n natura l la w theorie s an d th e mor e sophisticate d form s o f utilitarianism seem t o many to involv e tortuous , unrealisti c o r eve n unjus t mora l calculations . Withi n moral philosoph y emotiv e theorie s o f ethic s (criticize d in Copleston' s Extrac t 3) hav e been popular. It is interesting that even a critic of these theories like R. M. Hare based his own theor y o n th e Golde n Rul e (do-as-you-would-be-done-b y or , i n mor e explicitl y Christian terms, 'Love your neighbour as yourself). Theologian s hav e additional reason s for findin g personalis t theorie s attractive : (i ) th e anti-legalis m o f Pau l (an d possibl y Jesus) seems to conflic t wit h some form s o f deontology; (ii ) personalism fit s i n well with the Dominica l Command s t o Love ; (iii ) the aim s o f some forms of utilitarianism see m distinctly un-Christian (e.g . the sol e pursuit of 'pleasure', as distinct fro m 'happiness ' in Aquinas' sense) . In th e Extracts , Fletcher's theory o f Situations Ethics i n Extrac t 2 seeks t o combin e a general personalis t ethica l theor y wit h a specificall y Christia n positio n aroun d th e concept of agape. Although Bonhoeffer's Extrac t 1 explicitly rejects secular ethics, his own approach base d solely on th e 'Cal l of Christ' does have similarities to Fletche r (see below, p. 38) . Fletcher's positio n ha s bee n th e subjec t o f considerabl e debat e i n Christia n ethics . Arguments abou t it s strength s an d weaknesse s wil l occu r a t severa l point s i n thi s Textbook. However , i t i s importan t t o not e her e that , althoug h Augustine' s overal l position wa s undoubtedly deontological , ther e wa s also a strong emphasi s upo n lov e i n his writings. To claim that he was actually a situationist would be to claim far too much . Nonetheless, hi s celebrated sayin g 'Love God, an d d o what you want' sums up a t least a part o f what be believed. Hi s sermon s als o revea l a repeated emphasi s upo n love : 6

INTRODUCTION

If deed s den y him , withou t doub t deed s als o declar e him . N o man , therefore , says, 'Jesus is Lord', whether with mind, word, deed, heart , mouth , o r work, no ma n says, 'Jesus i s Lord', but i n the Hol y Spirit ; and n o ma n say s so but h e who loves him .. . What therefor e we have now to learn is that h e who loves already has the Hol y Spirit, and tha t hi s presen t possessio n entitle s hi m t o a large r possessio n an d th e large r possession to a larger love . (Joh.Ev.Tractatus 74.1-2 ) It will be evident that these three approaches to ethics - deontological , consequential, and personalist - ar e not entirel y separable . I t migh t b e more accurat e to describ e them as emphases rathe r tha n a s discret e theories . But , howeve r interrelated , a n abilit y t o distinguish thei r differin g characteristic s i s importan t fo r th e analysi s necessar y i n Christian ethics . 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS The question 'I n what way is Christian ethics different fro m genera l ethics?' is one that is central to Christian ethic s and, as a result, recurs frequently in this Textbook. Apart from the Extract s cited, a number o f books wil l be foun d usefu l i n thi s context: Peter Baelz , Ethics an d Belief (1977) ; Kieran Cronin, Rights an d Christian Ethics (1992) ; George W . Forell, History o f Christian Ethics (1979) ; Jame s M. Gustafson , Can Ethics b e Christian? (1975) an d Theology an d Ethics (1981) ; Michae l Keeling , Th e Foundations of Christian Ethics (1990); Enda McDonagh, Invitation and Response (1972) and Gift an d Call (1975); John Mahoney, Th e Making of Moral Theology: A Study o f th e Roman Catholic Tradition (1987); Jea n Porter, Moral Action an d Christian Ethics (1995) ; Keith Ward , Ethics an d Christianity (1970 ) and Th e Divine Image (1976) ; J. Philip Wogaman, Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction (1994). I n addition , a n extremel y useful resourc e fo r student s is provided b y James Childress an d Joh n Macquarri e (eds), A Ne w Dictionary o f Christian Ethics (198 6 and 2007) , my ow n Th e Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics (2001), and Willia m Schweike r (ed.) , Th e Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (2005) . If the questio n o f Christian distinctiveness is asked at an empirical level, the answe r to the abov e questio n ma y be tha t i n th e Wes t Christia n an d non-Christia n ethic s diffe r hardly a t all . I n al l fiv e Section s a considerabl e amoun t o f disagreemen t betwee n Christians i s eviden t - seemingl y almos t a s muc h a s disagreement s betwee n non Christians. Thi s poin t ca n be exaggerated (Section s 2- 5 wil l each conclud e wit h point s that unit e Christians) , but , grante d a transpositio n theory , i t ma y hav e som e basis . According to this theory, Western values are still largely the product of a Christian past . Even though they may no longer be formally nourished by the churches, values in society at larg e hav e bee n mainl y transpose d fro m Christianity . No t surprisingl y then , i t i s argued, th e result s o f Christia n ethic s an d mora l philosoph y i n th e Wes t ofte n stil l coincide. Certainly , Miranda's Extract 13 and Bonino' s Extrac t 19 see an affinit y betwee n Christian an d explicitly Marxist values, an affinity tha t som e see as related to the indirect influence o f Christian value s on Mar x himself. However, i f the question 'In what way is Christian ethic s different fro m general ethics?' is asked at a more theoretica l leve l a number o f answers are possible. Thes e range fro m the nea r identificatio n of the tw o i n Fletcher' s Extrac t 2 to th e denia l o f any similarity between the m i n Bonhoeffer' s Extrac t 1 . However, Bonhoeffer' s positio n i s difficul t t o maintain an d i t will be seen that ther e are reasons for doubting whether , in fact , h e di d 7

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maintain i t consistently. At the ver y least, it i s evident tha t th e thre e ethical approaches outlined abov e occur i n both disciplines . One way of approaching the question is to isolate the specifically Christian appeals that are characteristicall y made withi n Christia n ethics . O f these , fou r i n particula r ca n b e isolated (although , i n practice , the y are ofte n mad e together) : appeal s t o th e Bible , t o Christian tradition , to Christia n experience , an d to Christia n belief . (a) Appeals t o th e Bible

Of all the specifically Christian appeals, within Christian ethics, this has become the mos t complex. While all Christians affor d th e Bible an important role, the combined disputes generated, first in the sixteent h centur y by the Reformatio n and the n i n th e nineteent h century by the adven t o f biblical criticism , hav e ensured tha t th e relationshi p betwee n Christianity an d th e Bibl e i s no w considerabl y mor e varie d than , fo r example , th e relationship between Islam and the Qur'an. Biblical hermeneutics - examinin g differen t and sometime s contradictor y way s i n whic h th e Bibl e ha s bee n interprete d fro m on e culture to another an d from on e age to another - ha s also increased this complexity. At several point s i n thi s Textbook thi s hermeneutical complexit y wil l be noted. Appeals to the Bible, within Christian ethics now face a number of serious problems, of which th e followin g have been suggeste d i n th e literatur e referred t o a t th e en d o f this sub-section: (i) I t ha s alway s been eviden t tha t man y passage s i n th e Bibl e can b e interprete d i n more than one way. It will be seen presently that Augustine varied in his interpretation of Genesis 3 , his earlier allegorica l interpretation s giving way to literalisti c ones . Section 3 will sho w that Tertullia n gav e a thoroughgoin g pacifis t interpretatio n o f Matthe w 5.39 ('turn the other cheek'), whereas Augustine repudiated thi s interpretation wit h the claim that 'wha t i s here require d i s not a bodily action , bu t a n inwar d disposition ' (se e Text VII.8). Biblica l criticis m increase d thi s proble m enormously . Redactio n criticism , fo r example, requires one to recognize that the gospel is a multi-layered phenomenon an d is considerably more pluralistic than was generally realized in the pas t (e.g . see James D. G. Dunn's Unity an d Diversity i n th e New Testament (1977)). (ii) Debate s abou t th e authorit y of the Bibl e are among th e mos t vexe d i n Christia n theology. Th e problem s raise d b y th e Reformatio n have prove d particularl y serious . While befor e Luthe r most Christian s would hav e assumed th e infallibilit y o f th e Bible, particular tension was caused by his stress on the Bible as the sole source of authority for Christian ethic s and belief . This tension i s still evident i n th e Extract s that follow , a s is also the issue of whether or not Christia n traditio n and/or experienc e shoul d b e allowed in Christia n ethic s a s separat e source s o f authorit y i n additio n t o th e Bible . For mos t Roman Catholi c theologians , an d fo r man y Anglica n theologian s (followin g i n th e tradition o f Hooker, who insiste d that God's la w is operative, not onl y in the Bible , but also in human reason and conscience), Luther' s sola Scriptura [Scriptur e alone] emphasis, however understandabl e i n the contex t o f sixteenth-century Europe , i s too theologicall y restrictive. Again , biblical criticis m ha s further aggravated thi s situation. Once th e litera l infallibility o f ever y verse i n th e Bibl e i s rejected , an d contradiction s an d factua l an d moral errors , anachronism s an d inconsistencie s are claimed, th e exponen t o f Christia n ethics ca n n o longe r adequatel y bas e mora l claim s o n particula r proof-text s i n th e manner of Augustine, Luther and, eve n at times, Aquinas. As a result, differin g concept s of the authority of the Bible will be evident in the various Extracts. It would, of course, be 8

INTRODUCTION

ridiculous to criticize Augustine, Aquinas or Luther for themselves treating the Bible in a pre-critical manner. But, once the changed social context brought about by the advent of biblical criticis m i s taken int o account , th e exponen t o f Christia n ethic s i s confronte d with formidabl e problems . I t i s no t th e ai m o f thi s introductio n t o resolv e thes e problems, bu t rathe r t o poin t t o th e variou s way s they hav e change d th e present-da y discipline. (iii) It is difficult fo r even the most literalistic biblicist no t t o be operating in practice a 'canon within the Canon' . That is , it is difficult t o trea t al l parts o f the Bibl e with equal seriousness and attention an d not to be biblically selective. It will be seen later that, in this sense, Luthe r wa s selective . A n overvie w o f th e histor y o f Christia n theolog y migh t suggest tha t eac h ag e 'rediscovers' som e aspec t o f th e gospe l an d forget s others . I n th e twentieth century , throug h th e stimulu s o f Weis s an d Schweitzer , theologian s 'rediscovered' th e concep t o f th e Kingdo m o f Go d an d th e eschatologica l notion s associated wit h it , an d rejecte d th e 'live s o f Jesus ' o f th e previou s century . Doubtles s future centurie s wil l judge the twenty-firs t t o b e a s guilty of neglecting othe r aspect s of the gospel. Again, when the diversity of the Bible generally and of the gospels in particular is accepted , som e degre e o f selectivity seem s inevitabl e - i f only th e sor t o f selectivity involved in isolating 'the central message of Jesus' or 'the gospel'. Yet this clearly creates problems, sinc e many forms of selectivity, themselves based on extra-biblical criteria, are possible. Th e inde x a t th e en d o f this Textbook clearl y show s a stres s o n Matthe w and Romans i n man y of the Text s an d Extracts . (iv) A major difficult y for Christian ethics has always been determinin g the degre e to which the Jewish Bible - o r 'the Old Testament' as Christians term it - shoul d be taken as seriously a s the Ne w Testament. Tension s betwee n Ol d Testamen t mora l precept s an d Christian teachin g are already present in the New Testament (e.g . on the issues of fasting or retribution) an d continue today. I n Section 3 it will be seen that attitude s to the issue of war ar e affecte d b y the relativ e weigh t give n t o th e Ol d an d Ne w Testaments, sinc e pacifism i s clearl y no t envisage d i n th e forme r whereas , i n th e latter , arguabl y i t is . Nowhere i s thi s issu e mor e crucia l tha n i n th e rol e give n i n Christia n ethic s t o th e Decalogue. Differences o f attitude to the Ten Commandments wil l be noted i n the Texts between Aquina s an d Luther . An d today, despite thei r continued us e in man y liturgie s and their plac e in Western fol k religion , some theologians woul d maintai n that the y are largely irrelevant to present-day Christian ethics. For them the discipline cannot be based upon a series of largely negative moral injunctions , which do no t envisag e many of the most importan t modem mora l dilemmas (suc h as war in a nuclear age or th e problem s created by technology, genetics and biotechnology) an d which are too closely related to a traditional Jewish culture (e.g. not pronouncin g the name of God and keeping the Jewish Sabbath). Thi s issu e will recur later i n thi s Textbook. (v) Related to this is the problem of how much weight should be afforded t o the words and action s of Jesus himself. Mos t Christian s might agree , i n principle, that the words , actions and idea s of Jesus, once established , shoul d b e given a central plac e in Christia n ethics. So there has been considerable discussion over the centuries o n whether Matthe w 5.32 permit s divorc e - wit h th e Roma n Catholic , Orthodo x an d Anglica n Churche s reaching a wide variety of conclusions (see Ware's Extract 28). However, biblical criticis m again greatly complicates the issue . The so-called quest for the historical Jesus, even afte r more tha n on e hundre d years , show s fe w signs o f ending , an d th e constructio n o f a n account o f Jesus', as distinct from th e early church's, though t an d lif e has become one of 9

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the mos t difficul t an d risk y undertakings i n Ne w Testament studies . So , while ther e i s now a good dea l of agreement abou t Jesus ' use of the concep t o f the Kingdo m o f God, there is little agreement abou t hi s use of the equall y crucial concept o f the So n of Man. The depth o f research necessary and th e tentativeness of the eventua l conclusions i s well illustrated by a study of attitudes to wealth and povert y in the Gospels, David Mealand' s Poverty an d Expectation i n the Gospels (1980) . Mealand outlines fou r layer s - redaction , sources, oral tradition and Jesus' own teaching and action - i n the Synoptic Gospels, each with a different attitud e toward s wealt h and poverty and each related t o a different sociopolitical context. Alongside such research, the biblical claims of the Texts and some of the Extracts ma y appear highl y simplistic. I n addition, the christological assumption s of the exponent o f Christian ethic s will affect th e relativ e weight that i s afforded t o Jesus ' own words, action s an d ideas . Th e more importanc e tha t som e o f the Extracts attac h t o th e humanity of Christ, th e mor e incline d the y may be t o se e him a s an exampl e for othe r human beings: on the other hand , a relatively 'high' Christology may be more inclined t o see Christ as the law-give r (the position mor e o f the Texts) . (vi) Th e nineteenth an d twentieth centurie s initiated considerabl e debat e amon g New Testament theologian s abou t ho w fa r the teachin g of Paul ca n be reconcile d wit h what can b e know n abou t th e teachin g of Jesus. Since Paul, a s will be seen , playe d suc h a n important rol e i n th e writing s of both Augustin e and Luther , thi s questio n canno t b e ignored. This issue was particularly important fo r Schweitzer. His detailed studies , first of the eschatologica l teaching of Jesus an d the n o f the mystica l world o f Paul's concep t o f being 'in Christ', led him to conclude that they were difficult t o reconcile, both with each other and with the modern world . Some of the present differences between Reforme d and Catholic theologian s ma y be due to th e relativ e importance th e forme r give to Paul . (vii) Finally , a number o f the most crucia l present-da y mora l dilemma s - particularl y in th e area s o f technology , biotechnology , genetic s an d medicine , a s wil l b e see n i n Sections 4 an d 5 - wer e neve r envisage d i n biblica l times . O f course , w e can mak e inferences from injunctions that do exist in the Bible, but suc h inferences are notoriousl y hazardous. Further, if, as is widely accepted by New Testament scholars , it is believed tha t Jesus and hi s most immediat e follower s confidently expected th e parousia to arriv e very soon, i t is hardly surprising that they apparently showed little interest i n social ethics. As a result , Augustine , face d wit h a radica l chang e i n th e socio-politica l statu s o f Christianity, was confronted wit h a ne w moral situatio n fo r whic h the Ne w Testamen t provided fe w clear answers . Th e proble m her e i s a doubl e one : i n th e Ne w Testament some issue s are treated , bu t onl y ambiguousl y and fleetingly, as befits thos e livin g i n a soon-to-be-destroyed world , wherea s other s ar e ignore d o r simpl y no t envisaged . Together they present seriou s difficulties fo r a form o f ethics based upon th e Bibl e alone. Stated so baldly this may appear excessively negative. There have in fact been a number of importan t attempt s t o fac e thes e variou s problem s i n Christia n ethics . J . I . H . McDonald's Biblical Interpretation an d Christian Ethics (1993 ) give s a ver y usefu l overview of the differin g way s the Bibl e has been use d i n the histor y of Christian ethics. These seve n sets of problems shoul d b e studied carefull y in relation t o eac h of the Text s and Extracts. While an overview of the latter demonstrates tha t the Bibl e still plays a vital role in most traditions of Christian ethics , this role is now extremely complex an d varied . A study of the ethic s of the Ne w Testament itsel f reveals some o f this complexity, a s the following suggest : J. L. Houlden, Ethics and th e New Testament (1973); Joh n Knox, Th e Ethics o f Jesus i n th e Teaching o f th e Church (1961) ; Barnaba s Lindars, 'Th e Bibl e an d 10

INTRODUCTION

Christian Ethics', Theology, 76 , 1973; T. W. Manson, Ethics and th e Gospel (1960) ; Jack T. Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament (1975). I t is compounded furthe r b y a study of th e way i n whic h th e Bibl e is use d b y Christians ; fo r thi s see : James Barr, Th e Bible i n th e Modern World (1973) ; C. H. Dodd, The Authority of th e Bible (1960); D. E. Nineham, Th e Use and Abuse of the Bible (1976). (b) Appeals t o Christian Tradition The way s i n whic h churche s appea l t o Christia n traditio n revea l som e o f th e mos t important historica l difference s betwee n them . I n ver y broad terms , Orthodo x appea l only t o th e decision s o f th e historica l Ecumenica l Councils; Roma n Catholic s includ e appeals even to th e most recen t Papal Encyclicals; Anglicans make only a general appeal to Christian tradition; and Lutherans subordinate all such appeals to the principle of sola Scriptura. However , today these generalizations can be made with less accuracy. Interna l opposition t o a stric t interpretatio n o f papa l infallibilit y i n present-da y Roma n Catholicism, Anglica n division s betwee n Liberals , Anglo-Catholic s an d Evangelicals , and an increased catholicity amongs t man y Reformed theologians, have made traditiona l divisions les s clear-cut tha n the y migh t onc e hav e appeared. A study of th e Text s an d Extracts reveal s many o f these difference s an d area s of overlap . In the Texts, Aquinas' Tex t VIII shows his use of Augustine as an authority. The latter also ha d a profoun d influenc e o n Luther . Bu t Tex t II I show s th e exten t o f Luther' s acceptance of the notio n o f justification by faith alon e and hi s radical rejection of papal authority, papa l councils an d long-accepte d tradition s o f Catholic piety . In the Extracts, Welty's Extract 15 shows a traditional approach o f Roman Catholics to papal authority. In contrast, Miranda's Extract 13, Fiorenza's Extract 5, Kiing's Extract 26 and Ruether's Extract 32 show far more radical Roman Catholic approaches. The issue of papal authority ha s been most seriousl y tested fo r many Roman Catholics toda y by Paul VI's Extrac t 2 9 an d wa s a n abidin g issu e fo r Joh n Pau l I I (see his Extrac t 4) . Th e traditional Orthodox appeal to Christian tradition i s seen in Ware's Extract 28, whereas a more independen t voic e i s raise d i n Berdyaev' s Extrac t 9 . A compariso n o f Fletcher' s Extract 2 and Cupitt' s Extrac t 6 with Temple' s Extrac t 11 , O'Donovan's Extract 20 and Clark's Extrac t 2 4 reveal s ver y differen t Anglica n assumption s abou t th e authorit y o f tradition. Finally , a comparison o f Bonhoeffer's Extrac t 1 with Niebuhr's Extrac t 1 0 and then McFague' s Extract 25 also reveal s very different assumption s within th e Reformed tradition. A number of questions ca n be isolated unde r this heading: What constitutes Christian tradition? Is Christian tradition self-authenticating? What happens if Christian tradition conflicts wit h itsel f o r wit h biblica l evidence ? I s Christia n traditio n stil l i n formatio n today? Th e Extract s show that, o n al l of these questions, ther e i s disagreement amongs t Christians. I n addition , th e followin g book s sho w somethin g o f th e rang e o f thi s disagreement: G. R. Dunstan, Th e Artifice o f Ethics (1974) an d Duty and Discernment (1975); James M. Gustafson , Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (1978) ; V. T. Istavridis , Orthodoxy and Anglicanism (1968) ; Han s Kiing , Infallible? (1971) ; Pau l Lehmann , Ethics i n a Christian Context (1963); Edwar d LeRo y Long , Jr , A Survey o f Christian Ethics (1967); James P . Mackey , Power an d Christian Ethics (1994) ; Ia n S . Markham , Plurality an d Christian Ethics (1994). 11

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(c) Appeals t o Christian Experience An appeal to conscience, in some form, constitutes an element in many types of Christian ethics, includin g thos e o f Luthe r (see Texts V I an d IX ) an d Aquina s (see Copleston's Extract 3) . At least fou r attitude s toward s conscienc e ar e evident i n th e discipline : (i) A n appeal to th e conscienc e of all people, whether Christia n o r not . A t times, thi s seems to be the position of the Quakers as seen in Extract 27 - i.e . if only they will listen carefully t o th e voice of conscience, al l people hav e the trut h alread y in their hearts . (ii) A n appea l t o specificall y Christia n conscience . Thi s appear s t o hav e bee n th e position o f Georg e Fo x himself . Hi s Journal suggest s tha t h e believe d i n a litera l understanding o f Genesi s 3 an d therefore , apar t fro m Christ , i n inescapabl e huma n sinfulness. T o th e jur y a t Lancaste r Assizes i n 166 4 h e said : ' I wa s a ma n o f tende r conscience, and i f they had an y sense of a tender conscience , they would consider tha t it was in obedienc e t o Christ' s command s tha t I could no t swear ' (p . 231) . Yet there was also a universal element in his Christology and, with it, in a radical appeal to conscience . In 165 3 h e wrote : 'T o tha t Go d i n you r conscience s I speak ; declar e o r writ e you r dissatisfactions t o an y one o f them who m yo u cal l Quakers, that Trut h ma y be exalted , and al l may come to th e light, with which Christ ha s enlightened ever y one that comet h into th e world' (p . 90). This seem s neare r t o positio n (i) . (iii) A belief tha t conscienc e i s but on e importan t elemen t o f th e mora l lif e o f th e individual, provided that this conscience is instructed by other elements, such as the Bible or Christia n tradition . Thi s i s th e positio n o f Copleston' s Extrac t 3 , o f Roma n Catholicism generally, and o f those section s o f Anglicanism which follow i n th e Hooke r tradition (see , for example , Kennet h E. Kirk's Some Principles o f Moral Theology, 1920) . Exponents o f thi s positio n ofte n insis t that , fo r a numbe r o f reasons , individua l conscience canno t b e treate d a s th e sol e sourc e o f authorit y fo r Christia n ethics : (a ) conscience i s affecte d b y si n an d thu s i t i s ofte n distorted ; (b ) i t i s influence d b y psychological an d sociologica l factor s an d therefor e canno t b e regarde d a s full y independent; (c ) i t ca n to o easil y b e confuse d wit h prejudic e o r convention , s o tha t individuals can have consciences about trivial matters, such as the length of their hair; (d ) consciences are often ambivalen t and, on that account, unable adequately to judge what is right i n particula r situations . O n th e othe r hand , thes e exponent s usuall y insis t tha t without individual free will and conscienc e the moral lif e would not b e moral. In short, it is an essentia l componen t o f morality i n Christianity , bu t i t i s not it s sole base . (iv) A radical rejection of conscience. Thi s i s apparently the positio n o f Bonhoeffer' s Extract 1 . Conscience is seen as an element o f secular ethics that is rejected by the radica l 'Call o f Christ' t o th e individual . Th e Christia n moral lif e i s seen, not a s an attemp t t o distinguish right from wron g and then to follow right, but rathe r as a life obedient to th e 'Call o f Christ' . Again , it wil l be argue d late r tha t Bonhoeffer' s positio n wa s no t full y consistent. I t i s eve n possibl e tha t hi s understandin g o f lif e i n Chris t wa s simila r t o position (ii). Appeals to Christia n experienc e may also appea r in othe r forms . Fo r example , som e forms o f agapeism may be generated by an initia l experience i n Christ of agape; mystical experience may be linked with morality in Christianity (see Berdyaev's Extract 9); and, in religious ethic s generally , numinou s experience , involvin g a s i t doe s a mixtur e o f attraction, aw e an d fear , ha s obviou s relevanc e (see Rudolf Otto's Th e Idea o f th e Holy, 1917). I n addition , mos t understanding s o f Christia n ethic s toda y woul d regar d

12

INTRODUCTION

existential commitment , o n th e par t o f th e individual , a s a n essentia l elemen t o f th e moral life : tha t is , a n individua l i s regarde d a s moral , no t simpl y becaus e o f actin g morally, bu t als o because of intending t o ac t morally . One concept tha t i s particularly relevan t i n this context i s that o f Vision'. Under th e influence o f writers such a s Iris Murdoch (see he r Th e Sovereignty o f th e Good, 197 0 an d also article s b y he r an d Ronal d Hepbur n i n I . T . Ramse y (ed.) , Christian Ethics an d Contemporary Philosophy, 1966 ) moralit y i s see n primaril y i n term s o f vision : th e individual is invited to 'see' or 'perceive' the world and social relationships in a particular way. Thi s idea has been imaginatively employed i n Christian ethics by Stanley Hauerwas (see hi s Extrac t 18) . Th e followin g books ar e useful : Jame s Gustafson and J . T. Lame y (ed.), On Being Responsible (1969) ; David B. Harned, Grace and Common Life (1971 ) and Faith an d Virtue (1973) ; Stanley Hauerwas , Vision an d Virtue (1974 ) an d Character and the Christian Life (1975) ; C . A . Pierce , Conscience i n th e Ne w Testament (1955) . I n addition, th e difficultie s face d b y classical theories o f conscience are usefully discusse d in H. D . Lewis ' article in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. (d) Appeals t o Christian Belief There is a real danger in a textbook o f Christian ethics of giving the impression that it is a thoroughly pluralistic discipline, with disagreements eviden t i n all its aspects. Indeed, an important feature of analysis in any academic discipline should involve an appreciation of the rang e o f disagreements withi n it . Appeal s to Christia n traditio n an d t o individua l conscience ten d t o divide , rathe r tha n unite , Christians . However , appeal s t o th e Bibl e and t o Christia n belief s i n principl e shoul d unit e them , eve n i f i n practic e differen t understandings o f th e Bibl e an d o f Christia n belie f aboun d withi n Christianity . Nonetheless, a numbe r o f exponent s o f Christia n ethic s hav e argue d that , howeve r internally varied , thes e latte r appeal s d o differentiat e Christian s fro m non-Christians . Keith War d ha s argued , i n hi s Th e Divine Image, tha t th e doctrin e o f creatio n give s Christians ground s fo r takin g ethic s mor e seriousl y tha n non-believers , sinc e the y ar e given grounds for believing that the moral lif e an d the lif e o f the world generall y are no t fortuitous bu t th e product s o f a loving God . Fo r the theist , moralit y and cosmolog y are necessarily related t o eac h other . Sometimes thi s contention has been use d as the basis for Christian apologetics, as it is in th e followin g passag e fro m A . E . Taylor' s 192 6 Giffor d Lectures , Th e Faith o f a Moralist: I shoul d infe r tha t .. . th e mora l lif e itself , a t it s best , point s t o somethin g which , because i t transcend s th e separatio n o f 'ought ' fro m 'is' , mus t b e calle d definitel y religion an d no t morality , a s the sourc e an d inspiratio n o f what i s best i n moralit y itself, and that the connection betwee n practical good living and belief in God is much more direc t tha n Kan t was willing to allow . I canno t doub t tha t moralit y ma y exist without religion . An atheist who has been taught no t t o steal or lie or fornicat e o r th e like is , probably , n o mor e no r les s likely , i n averag e situations , t o ear n hi s livin g honestly, to speak the truth and to live cleanly, than a believer in God. But if the atheist is logical and i n earnest in his professed view of the world, and th e believer equally so with his , I thin k I kno w whic h o f th e tw o i s mor e likel y t o mak e irreparabl e an d 'unmerited' grievou s calamit y a mean s t o th e purificatio n an d enrichmen t o f personality. (Vol . 1 , pp. 155-6 ) 13

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In different ways , John Paul II's Extract 4, Temple's Extrac t 11, Gregorios' Extrac t 22, and Clark's Extrac t 24 , illustrat e thi s approach . Th e metho d o f derivin g Christia n ethic s systematically from th e Christian doctrin e o f creation, whic h to some exten t i s a feature of all these Extracts, raises important possibilities that go well beyond their own premises. After all , a doctrin e o f creatio n unite s Christians , Jew s an d Muslims , an d a syste m o f ethics derived from i t can be highly relevant to inter-religiou s dialogue and cooperation . However, a central difficult y i s raised by Temple: th e particularization of general ethica l principles, themselves derived fro m genera l Christian beliefs, notoriousl y divide s rather than unite s Christians. I n order t o overcome thi s problem, Templ e develope d th e notion of 'middl e axioms ' use d i n th e Lif e an d Wor k Movement . The difficultie s confrontin g this notio n will be discussed i n relatio n t o Temple' s Extrac t 11 . Clearly, Christia n beliefs canno t b e regarde d a s th e onl y sourc e o f Christia n ethics , since the y themselve s ar e dependent o n othe r source s - suc h a s the Bible , Christia n tradition an d eve n Christian experience. Yet, it is possible that they form th e parameters of the discipline, parameter s tha t giv e it a degree o f unity - a unity o f general attitud e rather tha n specifi c conten t (although , occasionally , eve n a specifi c conten t ca n b e isolated). Th e term 'moral theology', frequently used in the past by Roman Catholic an d Anglican theologians, served to emphasiz e this but i s little used here since its scope was often regarde d a s including , i n additio n t o ethics , pastora l theolog y an d ecclesiastica l practice. However, this approach t o Christian ethic s must face an important criticism . I f ethical prescriptions ar e derived, even in part , fro m Christia n doctrines, i t migh t seem tha t a n 'ought' i s being derive d fro m a n 'is'. This criticis m ca n be raise d i n relatio n t o specific Extracts, even if it is initially conceded that the 'ought' and th e 'is' are not alway s wholly separable (see Hele n Oppenheimer , 'Ough t and Is' , Theology, 76 , 1973) . 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS It ha s already been claimed that biographical details are relevant to a n understandin g of the thought o f a particular theologian . However , an analysis of the social determinants o f theological positions (and a subsequent analysis of their social significance), goes beyond this claim. It assumes that ideas can be related to social structures - a n assumption whic h is central to th e sociolog y of knowledge. That is , the belie f that theologica l an d ethical ideas may be influenced by society (i.e . socially determined) an d may, in their turn, have an influence upon society (i.e. socially significant). Within highly cognitive approaches to theology an d philosophy , i t i s ofte n assume d tha t idea s fro m on e socia l o r historica l context ca n straightforwardly b e compared wit h those from another . So , ideas from th e Texts ca n b e compare d directl y wit h idea s fro m th e Extracts . But , fo r a mor e sociologically minde d approach , suc h direc t comparison s ignor e th e degre e t o whic h specific idea s ar e relate d t o specifi c socia l contexts . Accordin g t o thi s approach , comparisons shoul d b e mad e onl y afte r socia l analysis . It i s thi s approach whic h this Textbook aim s to encourage by including in the system of analysis an examination first of social determinant s and the n o f social significance . A number o f theologians hav e attempted t o appl y social analysi s to idea s i n theolog y and Christia n ethics . Erns t Troeltsch' s The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (1919) and H . R. Niebuhr's Th e Social Sources of Denominationalism (1929) have prove d to b e o f abidin g interest , no t onl y t o theologian s but als o t o sociologist s o f religion . Dietrich Bonhoeffer' s ver y early work, Sanctorum Communio (1930), als o demonstrate d 14

INTRODUCTION

an interest in sociology. Among sociologists, Max Weber, particularly in his seminal The Protestant Ethic an d th e 'Spirit' o f Capitalism (1901) , showe d a considerabl e interes t i n and knowledge of theology, as do present-day sociologists such as Peter Berger and David Martin. Recen t examinations o f the methodological problem s facin g attempt s to analys e theology sociologicall y ca n b e foun d i n th e following : Gregor y Baum , Religion an d Alienation: A Theological Reading o f Sociology (1975) ; Robin Gill , Th e Social Context o f Theology (1975) , Theology an d Social Structure (1978 ) an d (ed. ) Theology an d Sociology (1996); D . Martin , J . Orme-Mill s an d W . S . F. Pickerin g (ed.) Sociology an d Theology: Alliance and Conflict (198 0 and 2004) . A number o f points mus t b e made: (i) A n analysis of social determinants to o easil y gives ris e to a suspicion of an overal l social determinism. I t would be false to assume that all those who attempt to uncover the social determinant s o f somethin g ar e committe d t o a positio n o f thoroughgoin g an d mechanistic determinism . However , i t will be argue d i n Sectio n 1 that th e latte r would probably be disastrous to all but th e most strictl y 'Lutheran' understandings of Christian ethics. I f free will in some form i s essential to Christia n ethics (see especially Augustine's Text I) , a thoroughgoin g sociological , psychologica l o r biologica l determinis m woul d appear particularl y destructive . Indeed , i t wil l b e see n tha t theologica l determinism , based, fo r example , o n a rigi d predestinarianism , face s th e sam e problem. Som e o f th e serious logical difficulties involve d i n thoroughgoin g theorie s o f social determinis m ar e amusingly isolated i n Pete r Berger' s A Rumor o f Angels (1969) . Most obviously , there is the statu s o f th e theorie s themselve s - presumabl y the y ar e themselve s sociall y determined - an d on this account Berge r suggests the task of 'relativizing the relativizers'. It shoul d emphaticall y b e stresse d tha t i n thi s Textbook socia l determinis m i s no t consciously assumed . (ii) Socia l scientists ar e nonetheles s committe d t o providin g a s total explanation s o f social phenomen a a s possible. Just as 'god of the gaps' argument s ar e discouraged i n the physical sciences, so social scientists, in so far as they are acting as social scientists, should not be expected to account fo r religious phenomena i n anything other tha n social terms. After all , it is their task to do so, even if they happen to be religious people in their private life. Berger , i n hi s Th e Social Reality o f Religion (The Sacred Canopy, 1969) , ha s terme d this attitud e methodologica l atheism . Thi s shoul d no t b e confuse d wit h actua l o r ontological atheism or with sociological imperialism. Rather, it assumes that separate and seemingly self-contained accounts of human behaviour ca n be built u p fro m a variety of perspectives - sociological , psychological , physiological, biochemical, theological , and so on. Wherea s i t migh t b e difficul t t o for m an y overall pictur e o f particular moment s o f interpersonal behaviour usin g al l the perspective s simultaneously , i t would b e wrong t o assume that onl y one o f the perspective s may provide a 'legitimate' explanation . I n th e past it was the theologian who tended to be imperialistic in this way, but today it is more likely t o b e th e physica l o r socia l scientist . Again , i t shoul d b e underline d tha t thi s Textbook doe s no t intentionall y subscrib e t o an y such imperialism. (iii) Relate d t o thi s point , a confusio n i s sometime s mad e betwee n 'explainin g something' an d 'explainin g somethin g away' . Th e fac t tha t Marx , Durkhei m o r Freu d explained religiou s phenomena i n social terms does no t necessaril y mean that the y were 'explaining away' these phenomena. Durkhei m and Freud , at least, were usually aware of this distinction . A n exposure o f the origin s of particular idea s tells u s nothing logically about their validity (the genetic fallacy), although, o f course, the y may be psychologicall y 15

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distressing t o believers. Thus, eve n if it is agreed tha t religiou s belie f may be the produc t of a neurotic perpetuation of childhood fantasies , it i s still open to th e believe r to claim that Go d act s throug h thes e fantasies . However , i f one alway s sees religiou s claim s a s linked t o thes e fantasies, psychologicall y one migh t find it difficul t t o remai n convinced of their truth. Such a Freudian explanation ma y well appear as a threat to the believer, but it i s no t strictl y a logica l threat. Indeed , a n elemen t i n Christia n theolog y ha s alway s stressed th e 'oddness' or even absurdity of Christian belief. It is important tha t this poin t should be kept in mind, especially when examining the social determinants of the ideas of people a s psychologically interestin g a s Augustine or Luther . (iv) Behind the attempt in this Textbook t o isolate the social determinants of particular ideas an d position s i s th e belie f tha t suc h analysi s produce s a sharpe r critica l understanding of the Texts and Extracts . Thus, it will be maintained that it is important to know that Augustine' s theological understandin g o f the relation betwee n Churc h an d State was developed at a time of very considerable political upheaval, or that his concept of the 'just war' coincided wit h a newly established politica l status for Christianity. Again, it should be emphasized that such analysis does not thereb y invalidate Augustine's ideas, or render the m anachronistic fo r present-day Christia n ethics . But it does entail that the y should b e compared point-for-poin t wit h the latte r only with considerable caution . (v) A ful l appreciatio n o f th e socia l determinant s o f an y o f th e Text s an d Extract s would b e beyon d th e scop e o f thi s Textbook, bu t i t i s hope d tha t th e studen t wil l be encouraged t o develop the m further . Considerable selectivit y i s inevitable. I n relation t o the Texts, different point s will be raised in the context o f the various contributions fro m each of the three authors. Further , it is usually easier to suggest the social determinants o f much-studied classica l authors tha n i t i s of th e Extract s of recen t authors. A complete understanding o f their socia l determinants woul d involv e a consideration, a t one end of the spectrum , of the psychologica l peculiarities of particular authors, their family , early training, socialization an d later development and , at the other end of the spectrum, of the overall politica l structure an d cultur e o f th e ag e in whic h they lived . I n addition , th e various level s of influence of these differin g factor s would hav e to be recorded i n term s ranging fro m th e looses t coincidenc e to th e tightes t causal relationship. Eve n if such an ideal version of the sociology o f knowledge could be achieved, it is clearly not appropriat e here. However , a s th e followin g demonstrate , thi s tas k ha s alread y begu n i n ethic s generally: loh n H . Barnsley , Th e Social Reality o f Ethics (1972); J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1971); Alasdair Maclntyre, A Short History o f Ethics (1966), Against the Self-images o f th e Age (1971) , an d especiall y After Virtue (1981) ; Mari a Ossowska , Social Determinants of Moral Ideas (1971) ; and account s of the sociology of knowledge are summarized in my Theology an d Social Structure (1978) and ca n be studied in : J. E. Curtis and J . W . Petra s (eds) , Th e Sociology o f Knowledge: A Reader (1972) ; Peter Hamilton , Knowledge an d Social Structure (1974); Peter Berger and Thoma s Luckmann' s Th e Social Construction o f Reality (1966) ; and, mor e combativel y in Joh n Milbank' s Theology an d Social Theory (199 0 and 2006) . 6. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE An interactionis t account o f knowledge requires an examination , no t jus t o f th e socia l determinants o f particular ideas , bu t als o o f their socia l significance . It maintain s tha t ideas may act both a s dependent an d independent variable s within society - bot h being shaped b y societ y and , i n turn , helpin g t o shap e it . Th e fac t tha t a particula r ide a o r 16

INTRODUCTION

position ha s bee n structure d b y societ y doe s no t preven t i t fro m havin g a subsequen t influence upo n tha t society , o r indee d upo n a quit e differen t society . On e ha s onl y t o think of the influence of the Nicene Creed in order to realize this. Church historians have no difficult y i n showin g tha t som e o f th e centra l term s use d i n thi s Cree d ow e thei r existence to a particular social context an d to the polemics of the fourth-century church. However, once accepte d by the Church , the Cree d soo n had , and indee d stil l has, a very considerable influenc e upon th e wa y in which Christologica l issue s hav e been debated . A two-way process is thus presupposed. Ideas , influenced by a number of social factors, may also be seen to hav e their own influence i n a variety of ways. Clearly, this i s the cas e with th e Texts . Whateve r socia l determinant s ma y be identified , the idea s of Augustine, Aquinas an d Luthe r hav e obviousl y ha d a profound effec t upo n theologians , upo n th e churches and upo n Wester n idea s in general. By systematically comparin g the Texts with the Extracts , som e o f this profoun d influenc e should becom e evident . Naturally , it will often b e more difficul t t o assess the social significance of the Extracts, but eve n here some immediate points ar e possible . A number o f qualifications mus t b e made : (i) The interactionist analysi s required wil l sometimes b e extraordinarily complex . So, while Luther's influence upon the Reformation may be relatively clear, his relationship to the Renaissanc e i s not . I t ha s prove d extremel y difficul t t o asses s t o wha t exten t th e Reformation wa s influenced by th e Renaissanc e an d wha t wa s the relativ e influenc e of each upo n subsequen t Wester n culture . I t i s eve n difficul t t o determin e thei r relativ e influence upo n th e churches . (ii) A full analysis of the social significance of particular Texts or Extracts would also be a very lengthy undertaking, requiring several levels of analysis and a range of causal terms. At leas t fou r level s o f analysi s ca n b e isolated : th e influenc e o f particula r idea s an d positions upo n theologian s i n a n academi c context ; thei r influenc e upo n thos e wh o preach o r teach i n a more popular context ; their influence upon la y Christians wh o listen directly to th e preacher s o r teachers ; an d thei r influenc e upo n societ y a t large . It i s to o easy to assum e tha t thes e levels of influenc e will always be broadly simila r (i n Theology and Social Structure, for example , I argue d tha t differen t level s o f influenc e ca n b e detected i n th e differin g response s t o Honest t o Go d in th e earl y 1960s) . Considerabl e selection is again inevitable . (iii) I t i s importan t t o stres s tha t a n analysi s o f th e socia l significanc e o f idea s i n Christian ethics is not a n attempt t o belittle the theological importance o f these ideas. For example, i f Weber's contention s ar e accepte d (tha t Luther' s concept s o f electio n an d predestination an d his attack on monastic asceticism had a profound influence upo n th e rise of the spirit necessar y for the development o f Western Capitalism ) i t does not follo w that Luther' s theology is thereby belittled. I t could stil l be maintained tha t the theological significance o f these idea s was even greate r than thei r socio-economi c significance . The former i s not, o f necessity, enhanced o r belittled b y the latter. However, Weber's analysis might giv e a theologia n lik e Bonino , i n Extrac t 19 , additional reaso n fo r distrustin g traditional Lutheranis m - bu t thi s woul d ste m fro m hi s ow n prio r politica l an d theological commitments . 7. CRITIQUE At the en d of each Text and group of Extracts a brief critique is appended. Thi s structure is deliberate, no t because critiqu e i s considered unimportant, bu t rathe r becaus e analysi s 17

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must be as full and informed as possible befor e a serious critique ca n be made. O f course, students shoul d b e encourage d t o mak e thei r ow n critique . I t i s a n essentia l par t o f learning. In each case an attempt i s made to suggest some of the strengths an d weaknesse s of the particular excerpt, not only in relation to the internal ideas of the work from which it is taken, but als o i n relation t o th e ideas an d theorie s o f other exponents of Christia n ethics. FURTHER READING Books suggeste d a s furthe r reading , i n relatio n t o eac h Tex t an d se t o f Extracts , ar e intended t o provide a stimulus to the student. Although a fairly ful l bibliograph y (which includes th e publishin g detail s o f book s cite d earlier ) i s supplie d a s a n Appendix , n o attempt ha s been made to supply an exhaustive reading list. Since repetition of suggested reading woul d hav e bee n tedious , especiall y i n relatio n t o th e Texts , referenc e shoul d constantly be made back to thi s Introduction . Naturally , the Text s and Extract s should never be regarded a s substitutes fo r referring back to the original books , but, ideally, the y should provoke enough interest in students to do this for themselves. The further readin g suggested consists , first, of relevant book s by the autho r himsel f o r hersel f and , then , of bibliographical o r theologica l books abou t th e autho r o r abou t th e issu e in question . THE TEXTS : AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS AND LUTHER In any understanding o f Christian theolog y o r ethics, Augustine, Aquinas and Luther are three of the most importan t figures. Each stood a t a pivotal moment i n Christian history and eac h ha s had a n abidin g influenc e upon Christia n thought . Together , the y cove r a very broad spectrum of possibilities within Christian ethics. An analysis of the difference s between the m reveal s man y o f the centra l difference s tha t ar e still eviden t today . Of course, there is a real danger in comparing the idea s of these theologians, especially in the light o f the type of social analysi s already discussed . Eac h stood within a radicall y different socia l context , eac h presuppose d a differen t politica l situation , an d eac h ha s influenced differen t section s of the churches - althoug h i t will be seen that , i n a mor e ecumenical age, their separate influences are now less clear-cut than they were in the past. Since it has already been insiste d tha t socio-politica l difference s shoul d neve r be ignored , it would obviously be odd t o compare these three theologians' ideas point-for-point, as if they wer e alway s writin g abou t th e sam e things , albei t fro m differen t perspectives . Nonetheless, th e ver y fac t tha t thei r primar y writing s ar e stil l widel y use d i n contemporary ethica l decision-makin g b y Christians make s some comparison inevitable , if only to reveal differences betwee n their situations and our own. Most obviously, as seen in Section s 2 and 3 , the political and economic views of Augustine, Aquinas and Luthe r have ha d a majo r influenc e upo n Christia n though t an d continu e t o shap e attitude s today. At the same time, it is soon realize d that thei r thoughts wer e developed i n politica l and economic contexts which have little relation to present-day, Western, post-industrial society. I n thi s situation , th e tas k o f distinguishin g betwee n perennia l an d ephemera l problems i n Christia n ethic s can be seen a s highly important . AUGUSTINE (c.354-430 ) wa s born a t Thagaste , a small inlan d tow n i n Proconsula r Numidia i n Nort h Afric a (th e modern Tunisi a an d easter n Algeria). His mothe r wa s a devout an d somewha t asceti c 'Catholic ' Christian , bu t hi s father , a relativel y impover ished citize n of curia l rank , remaine d a 'pagan ' fo r mos t o f hi s life . Augustin e was a catechumen i n his youth, bu t wa s not baptize d unti l he was 33. He became a student at 18

INTRODUCTION

Carthage a t 1 6 and a followe r of Manichaeis m a t 19 . He remaine d a followe r fo r nin e years, wrestling fo r much o f this time with the problem of evil, which the radical dualis m of Manichaeis m seeme d t o solve . H e finally abandoned thi s for m o f religio n when th e celebrated Manichaean bishop, Faustus, failed t o answer his questions to his satisfaction. Subsequently, he became increasingly impressed with the sermon s and argument s of the Catholic bisho p o f Milan , Ambrose . H e ha d a son , Adeodatus , bu t despit e a long standing relationshi p wit h th e boy' s mother , h e neve r marrie d her . Brillian t at debate , rhetoric and logic he became a professor of rhetoric, founding his own school at Rome in 383. After hi s break with Manichaeism and a period o f contact wit h Ambrose, he finally became a 'Catholic' Christian afte r a conversion experience a t Milan. He was profoundly influenced b y neo-Platonism an d wa s baptized by Ambrose i n 387 . H e returned, wit h a small grou p o f famil y an d friends , t o lea d a monasti c lif e i n Afric a but , wit h grea t reluctance, wa s soon ordaine d pries t an d the n electe d a bisho p o f Hipp o i n 396 . H e remained ther e a s bishop fo r 3 4 years, living in community an d writin g extensively. He died as the Vandals were laying siege to Hippo . Indeed , he lived at a crucial stage in th e collapse o f the Roma n Empire, albeit i n the relativ e isolation o f North Africa . H e wrote The City o f God in order t o rebuf f th e charg e that the officia l adoptio n o f Christianity by Constantine wa s th e reaso n fo r thi s collapse . H e wa s force d t o wor k ou t afres h th e implications o f thi s adoptio n fo r Christianit y an d fel t impelled , a t variou s stages , t o defend 'Catholic ' Christianit y agains t Manichaeans , Donatist s an d Pelagian s - eve n enlisting the help of the civil authorities to suppress th e latter. Through his many writings he gav e Christianit y a new intellectual dept h an d statu s an d ha d a profoun d influenc e upon bot h Aquinas and Luther. AQUINAS (c.1225-74) was born at the castle of Roccasecca at Aquino, between Naples and Rome . Th e so n o f a count , h e wa s sen t t o th e abbe y o f Mont e Cassin o fo r hi s elementary schooling an d i n 123 9 went to universit y at Naples. There, much against the wishes of his father, h e entered th e Dominica n Order . H e studied unde r the Dominica n Albert the Great at Paris and then at Cologne and, in 1252, returned to Paris as a lecturer, becoming a regula r professo r o f theolog y i n 1256 . Fro m 125 9 t o 126 9 h e taugh t successively at Amagni, Orvieto , Rome and Viterbo , before again returnin g to Paris . In 1272 he went to Naples and in 127 4 he was summoned b y Pope Gregory X to take part in the Council of Lyons, but on the way there he died an d was buried at Toulouse. Toward s the en d o f his life h e had a number o f mystical experiences and, fou r month s before hi s death, after a n experience whilst saying Mass, he stopped work on his Summa Theologica, saying that 'all I have written seem s to me like so much straw compared with what I have seen an d wit h wha t ha s bee n reveale d t o me' . H e wrot e thi s monumenta l wor k a s a systematic exposition o f theology for 'novices'. His other mos t importan t work , Summa Contra Gentiles, wa s writte n earlie r i n orde r t o comba t th e 'naturalistic ' thinkin g o f Graeco-Islamic philosophy. I n both work s he was concerned t o sho w that th e Christia n faith rest s upon a rational foundatio n and tha t philosoph y (largel y in the for m o f newly rediscovered Aristotelianism ) an d theolog y ar e no t mutuall y exclusiv e types of activity. Aquinas lived at the tim e of the greates t power an d influenc e o f the Catholi c Church in the West. A t this stage of medieval history , the Catholic Church cam e nearest t o being a Universal Churc h - a phenomeno n tha t ca n be traced bac k t o th e ag e of Augustine. Aquinas ha s continue d t o hav e a profoun d effec t upo n Roma n Catholi c mora l an d systematic theology, reinforced by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter of 1879, Aeterni Patris, declaring his to be the 'perennial philosophy'. 19

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LUTHER (1483-1546 ) wa s born a t Eislebe n i n Saxony . A miner's son , h e wen t t o school a t Mansfeld , Magdeber g and Eisenac h and entere d universit y at Erfur t i n 150 1 to study law. However, afte r a profound experienc e durin g a thunderstorm, he abandoned his legal studies at the age of 21 and, despite parental disapproval, entered an Augustinian monastery at Erfurt. Ther e he led an extremely ascetic life. H e was sent to th e University of Wittenberg and eventually became professor of biblical studies there. Convinced o f the necessity of seeking his own salvation by keeping the biblical commandments, h e became gradually persuaded o f his own inability to d o this . I n 150 7 he underwent a conversio n experience, reputedly whilst climbing the Scala Santa at Rome and, in 1517 , as legend has it poste d hi s celebrate d 9 5 These s agains t th e abuse s create d b y th e Church' s sal e o f indulgences (authorize d by Pope Le o X, in par t t o pa y fo r th e buildin g o f St Peter's i n Rome) on the door of the Castle Church i n Wittenberg. He refused t o retrac t in front o f the papal legate, Cardinal Cajetan, and appealed directly to the Pope and then in 151 9 to the ne w Emperor, Charle s V, who wa s himself o f German extraction . Excommunicate d by Leo X in 152 0 and tried by Charles V at Worms, Luther was placed under imperial ban by the Edict of Worms of 1521. His break with Rome was now complete and he spent the rest o f his lif e (albei t with the vital support o f a number o f German princes) translating the Bible , revisin g th e liturgy , writin g hymns , preachin g an d writin g book s o n man y aspects of the Christia n life, an d reorganizin g churches in defiance o f Rome. Luther lived in a n ag e o f ver y considerabl e socia l an d politica l change , whic h sa w th e declin e o f medieval Christendom and the rise of early capitalism and of new forms of nationalism in Europe. He witnessed a major rebellion o f the Germa n peasants i n 152 5 and die d i n th e year i n which war broke out between Reformer s an d Catholics - a war that ende d onl y with the Treaty of Augsburg, 1555, which allowed the German princes to choose to follo w Catholicism o r Lutheranis m an d t o coerc e thei r subject s accordingly. Himsel f a highly influential figur e i n al l thes e changes , Luthe r ha s continue d t o b e on e o f th e mos t significant theologian s withi n Reforme d or Protestan t form s o f Christianity . From thes e brief biographies a number o f key points o f contrast ca n be drawn . Each theologian represented widel y different culture s - Nort h African, Italian and German - in radically differen t ages . And , eve n thoug h bot h Aquina s an d Luthe r wer e deepl y influenced b y Augustine, temperamentally the y were very different fro m each other an d tended to emphasize different element s in his writings. It is sometimes held that, whereas Aquinas was heir mor e to the ecclesiastical sid e of Augustine's writings , Luther , with his rejection o f Augustinian monasticism, wa s heir mor e t o Augustine' s Paulin e theology . Nonetheless, i t is possible t o mak e some comparison s betwee n them, finding similarities - betwee n Augustine and Aquinas, between Augustin e and Luther, and sometimes eve n between Aquina s and Luther - provided , o f course, tha t thei r radicall y different social , political an d cultura l contexts ar e kept i n mind : (1) Bot h Augustine and Luthe r live d i n age s of revolution . Augustin e witnessed th e gradual declin e o f th e Roma n Empire , dyin g a s Hipp o itsel f wa s unde r siege . Luthe r witnessed th e decline of medieval Catholic Europe and als o died surrounded by war. Yet neither ma n wa s himself a revolutionary. Augustin e wrote t o defen d Christian s agains t the charg e that the y were responsible fo r Rome' s collapse an d h e remaine d a Roman i n much of his thinking. He even enunciated a just-war theory, in contrast to the pacifism of previous generation s o f Christian s (see Text VII) . An d Luther , t o thei r amazement , bitterly rejecte d th e caus e o f the revolutionar y peasant s (see Text IX) . Aquinas live d a t what might, at first, appear to have been one of the most settled ages in European history. 20

INTRODUCTION

But the seeds of the Renaissance were already present i n the thirteenth century , with the art o f Giott o (c . 1266-1337), celebratin g th e lif e o f Franci s of Assisi , an d th e poetr y of Dante (1265-1321) , reflectin g part s o f Aquinas ' Sumtna Theologica, soo n t o chang e cultural understandings in a manner relevan t eventually to th e Reformation . By looking forward t o th e Renaissanc e an d eve n t o th e Reformatio n an d backward s t o th e newl y established relationshi p between th e Churc h and Stat e in the fourt h an d fifth centuries, Aquinas stands a s a pivot betwee n th e two . (2) I n term s o f clas s or socia l stratification , the origin s of th e thre e men wer e quite distinct. Aquinas' origin s were the most aristocratic, Augustine' s were those of a relatively impoverished middl e clas s i n a n ag e of rapi d inflation , and Luther's , althoug h b y n o means totall y impoverished , wer e unmistakabl y lowe r class . Viewe d fro m a mor e dynamic perspective, only Luther's family wa s upwardly socially mobile, movin g from a situation o f working as miners to owning mines and then being able to send their son to university to stud y law. While all three belonged t o th e minorit y of university-educated writers and thinkers, Luther' s socially mobile background mad e him the most suitabl e to be a n agen t o f radica l socia l change , whil e Aquinas ' comparativel y stati c socia l background mad e hi m th e least suitable . Amon g the upwardl y socially mobil e i t is also not uncommo n to find an antipathy towards those belonging to the class of their origins: a tendenc y t o radica l innovatio n ca n be combine d wit h a dismissiveness o f those o f a lower socia l class. It i s possible that Luther' s rejection of the writing s and action s of th e revolutionary peasant s ma y have owed somethin g t o this factor . His tendency t o side, at times, with th e ruler s over and agains t the rule d i s seen particularly in th e wa y he, like Augustine befor e him , enliste d th e hel p o f the ruler s t o suppres s dissensio n an d eve n 'heresy'. However, the fac t tha t al l three me n wen t t o universit y and becam e monasti c Catholic priests means that there is also a strong similarit y of socialization betwee n them . (3) All three experienced celibacy and som e form o f ascetic monasticism. Nonetheless, their experience s her e wer e distinct . Aquinas , highl y cerebra l an d evidentl y rathe r corpulent, becam e a Dominica n a s a youn g ma n an d remaine d on e unti l hi s death . Augustine, havin g rejecte d Christianit y fo r s o long, becam e extremel y asceti c onl y afte r his conversion - althoug h there can be little doubt that he was always serious-minded and intense an d by no means th e sensual youth h e is sometimes though t t o hav e been. Even his celebrated amorous relationship was long-standing, apparently faithful, lovin g and i n accord wit h contemporary Roma n mora l practice . I n contrast, Luther was fiercely ascetic only before hi s radical break with monasticis m an d Rome . Both Augustine and Luther were fathers, but only Luthe r married - Augustin e painfull y broke of f his relationship , while Luthe r marrie d a former nun , seemingl y out o f duty, thoug h h e soon discovere d great happines s i n marriage . (4) In terms of religious psychology, both Augustine and Luther had what is sometimes called a 'twice-born' and Aquinas a 'once-born' type of religious temperament. Augustin e and Luthe r ha d almos t classi c Paulin e conversio n experience s and , no t surprisingly , thereafter showe d a particula r affinit y fo r th e Paulin e epistles . Lik e Paul , Luthe r wa s 'converted' fro m a lif e o f legalisti c pietis m t o on e o f entire dependenc e upo n grace . Augustine, on the other hand, was 'converted' from a relatively free-thinking attachmen t to Manichaeis m to asceti c 'Catholic' Christianity . Befor e thei r 'conversions' , bot h me n experienced a considerable perio d o f emotional an d psychological turmoi l - displayin g what some psychologists would undoubtedly identif y a s obsessive religious personalities, and, afte r thes e conversions , comparativ e calm . A numbe r o f psychologica l an d 21

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sociological studies of conversion woul d sugges t that thi s comparativ e cal m hid a goo d deal o f continuin g doubt , uncertaint y an d marginality/liminalit y - an d thi s ma y be another point o f contrast between these two men and Aquinas. Certainly, whilst Aquinas was concerne d t o defen d 'orthodoxy ' agains t 'heresy ' (as , fo r example , i n th e Summa Contra Gentiles, se e below, p. 128) , there i s little i n hi s writing s to equa l th e polemics , scorn and , sometimes , vitriol , particularl y of th e late r Augustin e and Luthe r (se e Text XV). O f th e three , Aquina s wa s by fa r th e mos t conciliator y i n style , appealin g mor e consistently t o reaso n tha n t o emotion , although , a s ha s bee n seen , hi s lif e wa s no t without mystica l experience. Indeed, the very rationality of Aquinas has given offence t o some. I n contrast , Boo k VIII of Augustine's Confessions, writte n 1 2 years after th e event , gives his classic, and highly influential, account o f conversion, containin g man y of the key empirical feature s o f a conversio n experience : extrem e anxiety , voices , a sens e o f th e 'numinous', a rando m openin g o f th e Bible , a n instrumenta l tex t (i n thi s cas e Rom . 13.13—14), sexual remorse, catharsi s and withdrawal . These fou r set s o f psychological an d sociological variable s - politica l context , socia l stratification, marita l statu s an d religiou s psycholog y - ar e al l vita l t o a n adequat e understanding of the difference s betwee n th e three theologians an d shoul d b e examined carefully i n relation t o the Texts. Again it needs t o be emphasized tha t a preparedness t o take the m seriousl y doe s no t necessaril y reduc e th e significanc e give n t o interna l theological factor s determining thei r thought. In addition, three other point s of contrast can be made fro m th e biographica l sketches: (5) It is often pointe d ou t tha t whereas Augustine did much t o relat e Platonic or neo Platonic ideas (books were so scarce in his day that he only knew of Plato's idea s through the wor k o f Plotinus ) t o 'Catholic ' orthodox y an d thereb y rendere d Christianit y mor e intellectually respectabl e t o hi s contemporaries, Aquinas achieve d a simila r correlatio n with th e newl y rediscovered Aristotelia n idea s o f hi s time . Luther , on th e othe r hand , might hav e regarde d an y suc h undertakin g wit h stron g suspicion : fo r hi m i t wa s th e Scriptures which must form th e main axiom fo r theology. But, as so often i n his writings, Augustine wa s ambivalent i n thi s correlation , simultaneousl y bein g attracte d b y som e Platonic notion s an d repelle d b y other s suc h a s polytheis m (e.g . se e Th e City o f God VIH.9f). I t wil l be see n fro m th e Text s tha t Aquinas ' understandin g o f the relationshi p between philosophy an d theology is more consistent tha n that of Augustine and it was his thought which was instrumental in the eventual triumph, in Roman Catholic theology, of Aristotelianism ove r Platonism . Th e mor e naturalisti c Aristotelianis m seem s t o hav e provided hi m wit h a mor e congruou s rational/natura l basi s tha n transcendenta l Platonism fo r th e supernatura l overla y o f Christia n belief . Precisel y becaus e Platonis m locates th e 'reall y real ' i n a transcenden t realm , outsid e everyda y experienc e an d th e everyday world , i t present s thos e followin g Aquinas wit h a potentiall y mor e damagin g challenge tha n Aristotelianism . I f Platoni c transcendentalis m an d biblica l revelatio n conflict, an y real correlation betwee n the m break s down , sinc e the conflic t appears as a conflict betwee n tw o supernatural view s of the world. I n contrast, a correlation betwee n Aristotelian naturalis m an d Christia n supernaturalis m considerabl y reduce s thi s ris k of conflict. (6) Both Augustine and Luther were church leaders of very considerable contemporar y influence. A s a bisho p o f Hipp o fo r 3 4 years , Augustine' s pastoral , a s wel l a s hi s theological, influenc e extende d fa r beyond th e provincia l confines o f North Africa . An d Luther's contemporary fam e an d influenc e wer e even greater. Apart from hi s key role in 22

INTRODUCTION

sparking th e Reformation , he was engaged fo r ove r 2 5 years in a n astonishin g rang e of activities aimed a t reforming the Germa n churches. It is difficult t o fin d anothe r churc h leader wit h a comparabl e rang e o f gift s an d versatility . Onl y Aquina s remaine d th e academic tha t th e othe r tw o ha d onc e bee n an d too k ver y littl e par t i n ecclesiastica l politics. Ironically , h e die d o n hi s wa y to a churc h council . Regarde d a s a dangerou s theological innovato r b y som e o f hi s contemporaries , hi s wor k graduall y becam e established i n th e Roma n Catholi c Church , receivin g it s fina l endorsemen t i n 1879 . However, a s th e 'perennia l philosopher ' o f hi s church , hi s wor k ha s had , unti l ver y recently, a position o f primacy afforded t o fe w in othe r churches . (7) Al l three were voluminous writer s and eve n present-da y collections o f their work require multi-volume editions. Fo r Augustine alone there are extant 11 3 books an d over 200 letter s an d 50 0 sermons . Amon g present-da y theologian s onl y Kar l Eart h i s comparable. But, perhaps inevitably , volum e fits uneasily with consistency . Of the three , Aquinas was by far the most consisten t an d systematic, but change s can be traced even in some o f his ideas. Generalizations abou t their ideas must be carefully qualified and, with Augustine and Luther, it is often importan t t o relate their ideas to the particular point in their live s i n whic h the y wer e expressed . A s writers, however , thei r overal l task s were distinct. Augustin e wrote extensivel y to defen d th e Catholi c Christianit y to whic h h e returned agains t attacks from 'pagans ' and fro m 'heretical ' Christians. Aquinas wrote his Summa Theologica a s a systemati c expositio n o f Christianit y fo r 'novices ' withi n Catholicism. Luthe r wrote many of his books to restate the gospel in contrast to what he regarded a s the corruption s o f contemporary Catholicism . Of course, in othe r respect s there are similarities between their writings. Aquinas wrote his Summa Contra Gentiles as well a s hi s Summa Theologica and , i n thi s respect , wa s lik e Augustine . An d bot h Augustine an d Luthe r hav e bequeathe d t o u s volume s o f sermons . Ye t thei r overal l distinctiveness as writers remains . With these seven points o f contrast i n mind, a number o f key theological comparison s between thei r respectiv e theologica l notion s ca n b e made . Other s wil l emerg e fro m a detailed stud y o f th e Texts , but , i n vie w o f thei r importanc e fo r Christia n ethics , th e following deserv e special attention : 8. THEIR USES O F TH E BIBLE

In compariso n t o man y o f th e Extracts , Augustine, Aquinas and Luthe r have much i n common wit h eac h other , since : (a ) thei r ethica l prescription s ar e regularl y relate d t o biblical texts ; (b ) th e Bibl e is regarde d b y the m a s normativ e i n Christia n ethic s an d theology; (c ) th e Bibl e i s use d i n a pre-critica l an d literalisti c manner . Al l three, fo r example, might hav e understood Genesi s 3 to be literal history (even though Augustine, in his early writings, attempted an allegorical interpretation of this passage - se e De Genesi ad Manichaeos 2.15) . In contrast t o Fletcher' s Extrac t 2, they would al l have stressed th e normative rol e o f th e Bibl e i n Christia n ethics . Th e contrast , i n thi s respect , betwee n present-day Christia n ethic s an d tha t o f the Text s i s well illustrate d b y th e attitud e of Augustine an d Luthe r to polygam y (see below, p. 345.) . I n part s o f the Ol d Testament , polygamy i s clearl y accepted , s o Augustine coul d no t brin g himsel f t o sa y that i t was ethically wrong an d eve n Luther , a t on e point , conclude d tha t i t woul d b e bette r fo r Philip o f Hesse to tak e a second wife , lik e the Ol d Testament patriarchs , rather than g o against Matthew' s prohibitio n o f divorce . I n thi s respec t Augustine' s argument s ar e particularly interesting. I n seeking to defen d th e Bibl e against Faustus' attacks he wrote: 23

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Jacob the so n o f Isaac is charged with having committed a great crime because he ha d four wives . Bu t her e ther e i s no groun d fo r a crimina l accusation : fo r a pluralit y of wives wa s no crim e when i t wa s the custom ; an d i t i s a crim e now, becaus e it i s n o longer th e custom . Ther e ar e sin s agains t nature , an d sin s agains t custom , an d sin s against th e law . In which, then, o f these sense s did Jaco b sin i n havin g a plurality of wives? A s regards nature , h e use d wome n no t fo r sensua l gratification , bu t fo r th e procreation o f children . Fo r custom , thi s wa s the commo n practic e a t tha t tim e i n those countries. And for the laws, no prohibition existed. The only reason of its being a crime now t o d o this , i s because custom an d th e law s forbid it . (Reply t o Faustus th e Manichean, XXII.47) Aquinas would no t hav e seen polygamy as consonant wit h nature (see Text XIV), but, i n spite of its offence t o their contemporary sensitivities, the fac t that it is condoned i n parts of the Ol d Testament le d both Augustine and Luthe r to vie w it a s ethically neutral . Despite thi s overall agreement , Augustine , Aquinas and Luthe r might hav e disagree d with each other about the extent to which the Bible is to be used as the sole arbiter within Christian ethics. Luther might have been the more emphatic: the Bibl e is the only arbiter of Christian faith (hi s emphasis upon 'Scripture alone' [sola Scriptura]: on e of the guiding principles o f the Reformation) . The importanc e h e gave to translatin g an d expoundin g the Bible naturally follows fro m this . Even though it will be noted that , at times, there are appeals t o conscienc e and natura l la w evident i n hi s Texts , hi s intende d sola Scriptura stress remains. It is important t o emphasize the word 'intended'. Occasions will be noted when Luther' s positio n goe s clearl y beyon d th e biblica l evidence . Nevertheless , i n hi s mind, h e was always attempting to be faithful t o the Bible - i n contrast t o th e Roman Catholic Churc h whic h had , i n hi s view , constructe d a n entirel y extra-biblical , an d therefore illegitimate , structure. Augustine, too, wa s emphatic abou t th e key role o f th e Bible i n th e Christia n life , a s hi s sermon s clearl y demonstrate . Nonetheless , h e mad e frequent appeal s to churc h tradition , sa w convergences, a t times , betwee n neo-Platoni c and Christia n value s and eve n sometimes (a s will be see n in Sectio n 3 ) borrowed fro m 'pagan' philosoph y when th e Bibl e faile d positivel y to resolv e mora l dilemmas . A sola Scriptura stres s migh t hav e mad e leas t sens e t o Aquinas . Give n hi s understanding o f natural la w (see Tex t II) , reason i s able to ascertai n mora l truth s tha t can also be known through biblical revelation. Aquinas' method o f using the Bible is seen very clearly in Tex t XIV: his argumen t i s based upo n natura l law and logica l reasonin g and biblica l evidence is only quoted onc e that argument i s completed. Thus , the Bibl e is seen to confirm what can already be known through a proper us e of reason. As a result of this method an d understanding , he was able to borro w freel y fro m Aristotle , Augustine, and church tradition generally provided, of course, that such borrowings did not seem to conflict wit h th e Bible . I n overall , an d perhap s to o schemati c terms , wherea s Luther normally intended t o start from th e Bible and use other evidence only if it was congruent with it , Aquina s tended t o star t fro m natura l reaso n an d demonstrat e tha t i t wa s i n accord with , or at least did not conflic t with, the Bible. It will be seen that these differen t methods wer e linked t o thei r differen t understanding s o f grace. It i s possibl e tha t ther e i s anothe r tendenc y whic h Augustin e an d Luthe r ha d i n common. Both had a strong disposition towards the Pauline Epistles. In the light of what has alread y bee n suggeste d concernin g thei r 'twice-born ' religiou s temperaments , thi s disposition i s ver y understandable . Further , th e earl y Luthe r wa s suspiciou s o f th e 24

INTRODUCTION

theology implicit in James and Revelation. As a result, some have claimed that their use of the Bibl e was unwittingly determine d b y some 'cano n withi n th e canon' - a perennial difficulty facin g al l emphaticall y biblica l approache s t o Christia n ethics . Th e sam e difficulty wil l b e raise d i n th e contex t o f som e o f th e present-da y Extracts , suc h a s Miranda's Extrac t 13 . The mor e pluralisti c th e Bibl e i s though t t o b e i n th e ligh t o f modern critica l scholarship , the mor e thi s difficult y i s increased . 9. THEIR THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIES Augustine, Aquina s an d Luthe r migh t hav e agree d o n severa l point s tha t differentiat e them fro m a numbe r o f th e Extracts : (a ) the y assume d tha t th e Fal l wa s (t o us e a n anachronism fo r th e moment ) a n 'historica l event' ; (b ) a s a result , apar t fro m Christ , humans ar e in a state o f original sin ; (c ) original si n is not simpl y a propensity toward s sin, bu t involve s concupiscenc e whic h itsel f involve s actua l guilt ; (d ) a s a result , apart from Christ , non e ca n b e saved . However , thei r theologica l anthropologie s ca n b e differentiated fro m eac h other by the way in which these points were interpreted by them. In Augustine, there is a stress upon the 'original righteousness' of Adam: he is sometimes portrayed, before th e Fall , as an idea l athlete, philosophe r an d sain t (see Tex t X). But, in Aquinas, Adam's original righteousness consists, quite explicitly, in supernatural qualities (donum supernatural o r sometime s donum superadditum), s o the Fal l represent s a fal l from a supernatural to a natural level: Adam, and through him humanity subsequently, is still human and not a beast, still rational and possessing th e properties belongin g properl y to huma n natur e (pura naturalia). Fo r him , then , th e Fal l i s a privatio n rathe r tha n a deprivation. There is considerable debate abou t ho w far these scholastic notions o f Aquinas can be applied t o Augustine , whose theologica l anthropolog y ofte n appear s somewhat ambivalent, bu t the y certainl y canno t b e attribute d t o Luther . Luthe r rejecte d th e notio n o f donum supernaturale an d tende d t o se e the Fal l rathe r a s a fal l fro m th e huma n t o th e sub-human. No t surprisingly , h e tende d t o mistrus t huma n independen t rationa l abilities, a capacit y t o kno w Go d apar t fro m revelation , an d eve n fre e wil l i n mora l decision-making - thre e huma n characteristic s tha t Aquina s woul d hav e considere d essential. The ambivalenc e o f Augustin e i s demonstrate d b y hi s belie f tha t humankin d constitutes a singl e 'lum p o f sin ' (massa peccati o r massa perditionis) lackin g freedo m (libertas) bu t stil l possessin g free-will (liberum arbitrium) - a n extraordinaril y difficul t distinction that he sometimes made. I n Text I it will be seen tha t h e combined a stron g emphasis upo n th e prescienc e o f Go d wit h a belie f tha t sinfu l humanit y doe s hav e genuine fre e will . However , h e doe s littl e t o resolv e th e tensio n betwee n thes e tw o positions - bu t perhap s som e degre e of tension i s inevitable i n al l serious theologica l discussion. There is a growing recognition today that assumptions about theologica l anthropolog y have a profound effect upo n th e res t of theology. I f this is so in theology, i t must be th e case par excellence in Christia n ethics . Th e difference s her e between Augustine , Aquina s and Luther are still of considerable relevance to the Extracts and hel p to explain some of the crucial differences betwee n such Extracts as Hauerwas' Extract 18 and Welty's Extract 15 an d betwee n Earth' s Extrac t 8 , Berdyaev' s Extrac t 9 , Niebuhr' s Extrac t 1 0 an d Hollenbach's Extract 14. 25

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10. THEIR SOTERIOLOGIES All thre e migh t hav e agree d that : (a ) God' s revelatio n i n Jesu s Chris t i s essentia l t o salvation; (b) God's laws can be known, in part at least, from a n inspection of the natural world, but tha t knowledge of these laws does not o f itself lead to salvation; (c) those who reject Jesu s Christ are damned. Yet when these points are elaborated, differences betwee n them immediatel y arise, and agai n some o f the Extract s would dissen t eve n fro m thes e general points. So, Bonhoeffer's Extrac t 1 seems to deny the initial assumption i n (b) that the natura l worl d ca n revea l anythin g abou t Go d an d man y migh t fee l uneas y abou t taking (c ) a s literally as do th e Texts . Eve n on (a ) ther e is an eviden t difference betwee n the exclusiv e Christologies of Earth's Extract 8 and Bonhoeffer' s Extrac t 1 and th e mor e inclusive Christologie s o f Temple' s Extrac t 11 , Abraham' s Extrac t 2 3 an d McFague' s Extract 25 , let alon e th e non-realis m o f Cupitt's Extract 6. Aquinas and Luther present the clearest and most sharply differentiated account s of the relations between nature and grac e and between reason and revelation . If, for the former, these relation s wer e continuous , fo r th e latte r the y wer e discontinuous . Fo r Aquinas, 'natural' religion and morality were crowned by revelation: natural reason could establish the existenc e an d som e o f the attribute s of God, but onl y revelation coul d establis h th e triune nature of God. I n short, grace completes o r crowns nature and revelatio n add s t o what ca n be know n throug h reaso n an d make s u s fi t fo r salvation . Thus , fait h i s not a contradiction o f reason as it appears to be, at times, in a theologian like Kierkegaard, but rather is a stage beyond reason, albeit a necessary stage for salvation. However, for Luther, what ca n be establishe d throug h reaso n o r natura l la w can, at best, simpl y show u s th e impossibility o f achievin g moral perfectio n throug h ou r ow n efforts . Humanit y i s s o embedded i n original sin and throug h this concupiscence is such a powerful force i n th e world that, at worst, the apparent 'good deeds' o f non-Christians are really sins. Even the Ten Commandments ca n do little more o n thei r ow n than convic t u s of our sinfulness : We have in the Ten Commandments a summary of divine teaching. They tell us what we are to d o to mak e our live s pleasing to God . They show us the true fountain fro m which, and the true channel in which, all good works must flow. N o deed, no conduc t can be good an d pleasin g to God , however worthy or preciou s i t be in the eye s of the world, unless it accord with the Te n Commandments. No w let us see what our note d saints fin d t o boas t i n thei r hol y order s an d th e grea t an d difficul t task s the y have invented fo r themselves , a t th e sam e tim e neglectin g th e commandment s a s i f they were to o trivia l or ha d lon g ag o been fulfilled . M y opinion i s that w e shall hav e ou r hands ful l i n keeping these commandments - i n practising gentleness, patience , lov e towards our enemies , chastity, kindness, and whatever other virtue s they may include ... Poor, blind people! They do not see that no one can perfectly observe even so much as one of the Ten Commandments; but th e Creed and th e Lord's Prayer must help us. Through the m w e mus t see k an d beseec h th e grac e o f obedience , an d receiv e i t continually. (Fro m Th e Large Catechism, conclusio n t o th e Te n Commandments , trans. Joh n Nichola s Lenker , Luther O n Christian Education: Luther's Catechetical Writings.) For Luther, then, salvation is achieved emphatically not through human efforts, but solely through God' s action. The notions of election an d justification b y faith wer e central t o 26

INTRODUCTION

this positio n and , indeed , t o th e Reformatio n as a whole. Go d alone chooses who m t o save and people in turn are saved, not through any works of their own, but solel y by faith, that is , by faith itsel f given to people by God. For Luther, God 'foresees, determines and actually doe s al l things , b y hi s unchangeable , eterna l an d infallibl e will . B y thi s thunderbolt th e whole idea of free will is smitten down and groun d to powder' (De Servo Arbitrio 1.10). He would have flatly denied the advice of Th e Rule of Benedict that: 'If ou r wish be to have a dwelling place in his Kingdom, let us remember i t can by no means be attained unless one run thither by good deeds' (from th e Prologue, trans. W. K. Lowther Clarke, 1931) . Yet Luther refraine d fro m th e mor e strictly logical Calvinis t doctrin e of double predestination , accordin g t o whic h th e lo t o f bot h th e save d an d thos e t o b e eternally damned ar e predestined b y God . In Augustine , man y o f thes e idea s sa t togethe r uneasily . H e hel d a doctrin e o f predestination, but i t was relatively uninfluential compared with Luther's doctrine, being known mainly , no t t o ordinary churchgoers but t o scholars . He frequently emphasize d grace and maintained that his own efforts t o find God through the gnosis of Manichaeism had bee n disastrous . H e knew and use d Paul' s notion o f justification b y fait h and , like Luther, was convinced that all those who were not justified, even unbaptized infants who died, wer e damned . I n contrast , Aquina s argued tha t unbaptize d infant s g o t o limbo , where they certainly would not be punished. On the other hand, it has already been seen that Augustin e did no t rejec t free wil l o r rational/philosophica l argumen t an d tha t h e used natura l la w positively, although no t a s systematicall y as Aquinas. Further , he di d write, at times, about the Christian seekin g moral perfection - bu t even Paul, despite his stress on grace, could also say that God 'will render to every man according to his works' (Rom. 2.6) . I f th e bia s o f Augustine' s soteriolog y i s i n Luther' s direction , i t i s no t a consistent bias . Most complicated o f all is Augustine's concept o f 'grace'. For him, grace was essential, both to enable people to act rightly in the first place and to allow them to continue to act rightly (cf . the scholasti c distinctio n betwee n prevenien t an d cooperan t grace) . Grace appears t o b e irresistibl e but , a t th e sam e time , i t doe s no t destro y fre e will . Further , through its operations some who are still damned ar e enabled to d o certain good works (i.e. Jews, 'heretics' and schismatics, but not complete 'pagans'), some are foreordained to become Christian s throug h baptism , but backslid e an d ar e also damned , an d other s are elected, no t jus t to b e Christians , but als o t o receiv e the gif t o f final perseverance and, eventually, that o f eternal lif e i n heaven (cf . the scholasti c distinction between sufficien t and efficaciou s grace) . The issues raised here go to the very heart of some of the present-day differences within Christian ethic s an d constitut e som e o f th e mos t intractabl e problem s facin g th e discipline. They also have strong resemblances to som e of the key problems facin g mora l philosophy generally, notably those concerned with the issue of free will versus biological or socia l determinism , tha t o f reaso n versu s emotion, an d tha t o f subjectivis m versus objectivism withi n ethical analysis (see Joh n Paul II's Extract 4). 11. THEIR DOCTRINES O F CHURCH AN D STATE It is often hel d that their doctrines of Church and Stat e are readily distinguishable since: Augustine regarde d Churc h an d Stat e as entirely separate realms, with th e Churc h a s a temporary and somewha t uneasy resident in the State; Aquinas regarded them simply as different sphere s of a single society, wit h the Churc h having primacy of authority; while 27

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Luther regarde d the Churc h a s always subordinate t o th e authorit y o f the State . Thes e positions ar e the n frequentl y compare d wit h Calvin' s concep t o f theocrac y an d th e Anabaptists' radica l rejectio n o f the State . But these superficia l contrasts (whic h are well in evidenc e i n Text s IV-VI ) disguis e more subtl e difference s an d similaritie s betwee n their positions . I n relatio n t o thei r socio-politica l contexts , Aquina s an d Luthe r wer e closer t o eac h othe r tha n t o Augustine . Augustine was writing at th e beginnin g of th e attempt b y Christians t o com e t o term s wit h th e State and t o mak e sense o f the mora l problems confronting , no t jus t th e individua l withi n th e State , bu t th e Stat e itself . Constantine's adoptio n o f Christianity - fo r whatever persona l motive s - presente d Christians wit h ne w problems , o r problem s fro m a ne w perspectiv e whic h Ambros e almost alone , before Augustine, had begun seriously to tackle. It is hardly surprising tha t Augustine did no t presen t a thoroughly consistent theor y of the Stat e or o f the relatio n between Churc h an d State . No r i s it surprisin g that , i n vie w o f th e State' s paga n an d sometimes anti-Christia n past , h e remaine d war y of identifying th e Churc h too closel y with th e State . Yet , despit e hi s sometime s vivi d contrast s betwee n th e earthl y an d heavenly cities, Text I V shows that Augustine did se e a relationship between earthly and heavenly peace , whil e Tex t VI I show s how , a t th e ris k o f contradictin g centurie s o f Christian pacifism , h e adapted t o th e moral perspective created by altered Church/State relations. The socio-politica l contexts o f Aquinas and Luthe r were quite differen t fro m tha t o f Augustine. The thirteenth centur y witnessed th e climax of the close relationshi p betwee n the Stat e and th e Catholi c Church , an d Aquina s never appeare d t o regar d th e overal l relationship a s problematic. Th e boundaries betwee n th e two were boundaries o f power and authority , no t o f opposin g aims , value s an d socia l orders , an d eve n Luther' s challenge wa s concerne d primaril y wit h th e forme r rathe r tha n th e latter . Neithe r Aquinas no r Luthe r conceive d o f anythin g resemblin g th e nineteenth - an d twentiet h century notions of the 'secula r State'. From thi s latter perspective , Calvin' s Genev a an d Rome i n Aquinas ' time appea r remarkabl y similar. I t i s significant to o tha t Luther , in Text VI, is still basically a medieval in his underlying economic assumption s - despit e the possibility that h e may have been instrumenta l in underminin g these assumptions . If these socio-political factor s are taken seriously - an d in this area of Christian ethics , at least, they surely must be taken seriously - i t is dangerous to assume that when Barth in Extract 8 appealed t o Roman s 1 3 his presuppositions, idea s and language were the sam e as those o f Luther or Augustin e when they appealed t o th e sam e passage. And non e of them ma y hav e ha d muc h i n commo n wit h th e eschatologicall y fragil e worl d o f Pau l himself. Th e task of distinguishing between thes e various socio-political factor s an d th e underlying Christia n principle s essentia l t o a n adequat e theologica l understandin g o f Church-State relationship s toda y i s on e o f th e mos t difficult , bu t important , facin g exponents o f Christian ethics . It is also a task that directly affects one' s understanding o f the problem s raise d i n th e Extract s in Section s 2-5 . I n thi s sense , thes e are , indeed , perennial problems . Students o f Augustine , Aquinas an d Luthe r ar e wel l serve d b y thes e readabl e an d authoritative studies : Pete r Brown , Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (1967 ) (hi s Religion and Society i n th e Ag e o f Saint Augustine (1972) i s als o ver y useful) ; F . C . Copleston , Aquinas (1955 ) (se e als o hi s History o f Philosophy, 1976) ; Rolan d H . Bainton , Here I Stand: A Life o f Martin Luther (1950). Although ther e i s no substitut e fo r going back to thei r primar y writings , othe r book s 28

INTRODUCTION

will be recommended i n relation to particular Texts. In attempting to make comparisons between thei r theologica l concept s o f grac e an d origina l sin , i t i s wort h recallin g th e important works of Williams: N. P. Williams: Th e Ideas o f the Fall and o f Original Sin, the 1924 Bampton Lectures, and Th e Grace of God (1930), a much slighter, but stil l readable, book. THE EXTRACTS The Extracts have been chosen to represen t a wide spectrum of approaches within recent Christian ethics . S o eac h Sectio n attempt s t o offe r a rang e o f Extract s fro m Roma n Catholic, Orthodox , Anglica n and Reforme d traditions . I n addition , th e Extract s fro m each o f thes e tradition s hav e bee n chose n t o represen t differin g interna l emphase s (themselves sometime s a s great a s differences betwee n traditions) . Thus, th e Roma n Catholi c Extract s contai n part s o f thre e papa l encyclicals , John XXIII's Pacem i n Tern's , Paul VI's Humanae Vitae, and Joh n Paul II's Veritatis Splendor, Extracts 12 , 29 and 4 (themselve s of very different emphasis) , traditionalist position s i n Copleston's Extrac t 3 an d Welty' s Extrac t 15 , reformis t position s i n th e U S Roma n Catholic Bishops ' Extrac t 17 , Hollenbach's Extrac t 14 , Porter's Extrac t 7 an d Cahill' s Extract 30 , an d radica l position s i n Fiorenza' s Extrac t 5 , Miranda's Extrac t 13 , Kiing's Extract 2 6 an d Ruether' s Extract 32 . Miranda i s evidently influence d by th e Reforme d tradition and , possibly , ha s mor e i n commo n wit h non-Roma n Catholi c liberatio n theology tha n wit h traditiona l Roma n Catholi c mora l theology . Certainl y h e compare s interestingly with the Methodist Bonino' s Extract 19. Ruether now sits only ambiguously within th e Roma n Catholic traditio n at all . The Anglica n Extract s var y fro m th e modifie d natura l la w positio n o f Templ e i n Extract 11 , through th e philosophicall y and theologicall y oriented approache s o f Clark's Extract 2 4 and O'Donovan' s Extrac t 20 , to th e iconoclas m o f Fletcher' s Extrac t 2 an d Cupitt's Extract 6. Anglican 'comprehensiveness' i s well in evidenc e in thes e Extracts. The Reformed Extracts also show considerable variety and internal divisions. Niebuhr's Extract 1 0 has similarities in style to the modified natural law approach of Temple. At the other end of the spectrum is the radica l rejection of secular ethics of Bonhoeffer's Extract 1, Earth' s Extrac t 8 an d Hauerwas ' Extrac t 18 . A combination o f Reforme d Christia n ethics and radicalism can be found in both Bonino's Extract 19 and McFague's Extract 25. And Extrac t 27 serves to illustrat e the distinctiv e Quake r approach. The Orthodo x tradition i s represented i n Berdyaev' s Extract 9, Gregorios' Extrac t 22 and Ware's Extract 28. Ware represents a traditionalist approach to marriage and divorce, whereas Gregorios ' offer s a uniqu e Indian/Orthodox approac h t o technolog y an d th e environment. Berdyae v was clearl y influence d by hi s Russia n Orthodoxy , bu t h e wa s always too independen t a philosopher t o res t firmly in any single tradition. Hi s mystical individualism was most evident i n his understanding of sexuality. For him, the sexual act 'shackles man to that decadent orde r of nature, where reigns the endless relay of birth and death'; true love is 'a tormenting search for the androgynous image, for cosmic harmony', with mal e and femal e nature s mystically fused int o the androgynou s image of God ( The Meaning o f the Creative Act, p. 193) . Overall, the stron g Orthodox stres s upon th e Spirit and th e spiritua l i s apparent i n al l three Extracts. The interna l variation s apparen t withi n thes e tradition s mak e inappropriat e an y simplistic identificatio n o f particula r ethica l approache s o r stance s wit h particula r Churches. Naturally , ther e alway s hav e bee n interna l difference s withi n th e Roma n 29

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Catholic, Orthodox , Anglican or Reformed Churches. However , ecumenism and , with it, the growing tendency of professional theologian s to rea d widely in traditions othe r tha n their own, make these differences considerabl y mor e complicate d t o analyse. A t the same time, they make comparative analysis all the more interesting. Aquinas and Luther can no longer be describe d a s the propert y o f particular churches. METHOD OF STUDY The fac t tha t thi s is a textbook an d no t simpl y a reader require s that i t shoul d b e used systematically. The System of Analysis, already outlined, requires particular attention an d the description o f it should be re-read as study of the Texts and Extracts progresses. There are three vital phases of a systematic study of these Texts and Extracts - comprehension , comparison, an d critique - whic h should alway s be undertaken in that order . C 1. COMPREHENSION A student shoul d rea d eac h Text an d Extrac t several times carefully , firs t t o understan d the genera l argumen t an d the n t o b e able t o comprehen d i t i n term s o f the Syste m of Analysis. At this stage, there is often a danger of becoming too involved in the substantive issues i n question , o r o f making prematur e comparison s o r criticisms . Comprehensio n must tak e priority.

2. COMPARISON The main comparison, around which this Textbook ha s been constructed, is that between Texts and Extracts. The System of Analysis is designed to make this comparison easier . In addition, th e introductio n t o eac h sectio n make s a numbe r o f overal l comparison s between the Texts and the Extracts within it . It has already been thoroughl y emphasize d that comparisons between documents coming from ver y different age s and socio-politica l contexts should onl y b e made wit h caution . Further , i t shoul d be emphasize d tha t th e thoughts o f one theologia n shoul d onl y be compare d wit h thos e o f another i n all their complexity. I t i s precisely thi s that has caused som e o f the greates t difficultie s alread y i n comparing the ideas of Augustine, Aquinas and Luther. Their views on a given issue were not alway s consisten t throughou t thei r writings . Fo r example , Augustine' s view s o n sexuality were , a t som e stages , mor e Manichaea n an d dualis t tha n a t othe r stage s an d Luther ma y hav e becom e mor e anti-Semiti c a s h e gre w older . Comparison s betwee n Texts and Extract s should kee p in mind comparison s betwee n the Text s or Extract s of a single author, represented elsewher e in thi s Textbook. A thir d typ e of comparison ca n als o b e made, i.e . tha t betwee n th e variou s Extracts. This can be done in three separate ways: by comparing differing view s on the substantive issue in question; by comparing the approaches of different traditions ; an d by comparing approaches fro m th e sam e traditio n bu t fro m differen t Section s o f th e book . Al l these comparisons will be made, at times, in the System of Analysis accompanying th e variou s Texts an d Extracts. 3. CRITIQUE This is the most importan t phase , but it should be the last. An attempt should be made to assess the strengths and weaknesses of particular Texts and Extracts. Reference shoul d b e made bot h t o th e metho d use d an d t o th e substantiv e issue s raise d an d shoul d b e concerned bot h wit h th e interna l consistenc y o f an author' s argument s and wit h thei r

30

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external consistenc y wit h th e argument s o f othe r authors . I t wil l als o sometime s b e important to rais e question s about the socia l effect s o f a particular author' s ideas . As already mentioned, th e five Sections o f this Textbook ca n be studie d i n an y order . Nonetheless, these three phases of study and their relative order should alway s be used in whichever Sectio n i s to b e studied .

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SECTION 1

Methodology

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Introduction t o Methodology

Fundamental difference s ar e eviden t amon g exponent s o f Christia n ethic s o n bot h external an d interna l question s abou t th e natur e o f thei r discipline . An d th e followin g Texts an d Extract s hav e bee n chose n t o illustrat e som e o f thes e differences . The y ar e evident on th e external question of the distinctivenes s of Christian ethics vis-a-vis secular forms o f ethics. The y are also evident o n th e internal question of the relativ e importance to be given, withi n th e discipline, to th e distinctivel y Christia n appeal s t o th e Bible , to Christian tradition , t o Christia n experienc e and/o r t o Christia n belief . Ye t answers t o these question s hav e a crucia l effec t upo n th e wa y the disciplin e o f Christia n ethic s is conceived and practised. It will be the object of this introduction t o focus upo n these two questions. The external question abou t th e distinctivenes s o f Christia n ethic s vis-a-vi s mora l philosophy is , i n part , a moder n problem . I t wa s Kant , afte r all , wh o insiste d s o emphatically tha t ethic s i s a n autonomou s disciplin e (eve n thoug h h e subsequentl y advanced a moral argument fo r the existenc e o f God). An d the separat e attack s of Kant and Hume on an assumed bond betwee n Christian ethics and Christian dogma did more than anythin g else to produc e th e present-da y gul f between Christia n ethic s an d mora l philosophy. Ou r moder n assumptio n tha t mora l philosoph y can , i n principle , b e conducted without referenc e t o Go d is a clear product o f eighteenth-century rationalism and a sharp departure from the medieval assumptions of Aquinas or from thos e of Luther (and on e that i s increasingly questione d toda y i n Christian ethic s - se e Extracts 1 8 and 24). Eve n Augustin e wa s primaril y concerne d wit h contrastin g Christia n ethic s wit h 'heresy' an d 'paganism ' rathe r than with atheis m (althoug h se e Text 1.8) . Nonetheless, th e fac t tha t Aquina s was so concerned t o explor e correlation s betwee n Aristotelian ethics and Christia n ethics makes his work highly relevant to a discussion of the externa l question . I t does , a t least , provid e a clea r answe r t o th e proble m o f th e relationship between Christian ethics and moral philosoph y (a s presented i n Copleston' s Extract 3) . Fo r Aquinas , ther e wa s n o inheren t conflict betwee n Aristotelianis m an d Christianity, since th e first was primarily concerned with what coul d be known throug h natural reason, whereas the second relied, in addition, upon supernatural revelation. As it was the same God who created the natura l world, who established it s laws, and was then revealed i n Jesu s Christ , ther e coul d b e n o inheren t conflict betwee n reaso n an d revelation an d thus , surely , n o inheren t conflic t betwee n Christia n ethic s an d mora l philosophy. O f course , particula r mora l philosopher s migh t mak e mistake s i n thei r reasoning, o r the y migh t eve n be wilfull y pervers e in thei r reasonin g and this , i n turn , might lea d t o a conflic t betwee n th e tw o disciplines . But , inherently , o n Aquinas ' assumptions, there need be no conflict . In terms of the presupposition s derive d fro m Luther , conflict appear s distinctly more 35

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likely. Bonhoeffer' s shar p contras t betwee n ethic s an d Christia n ethic s whil e owin g something, a s wil l b e argued , t o hi s particula r socia l context , i s consisten t wit h hi s Lutheranism. Any individual quest for moral perfection, especially one guaranteed by the ministrations o f th e clerg y or o f th e papacy , wa s rejecte d b y Luthe r i n favou r o f th e doctrine of justification b y faith. Moralit y is essentially a product o f faith, not a means to faith, an d certainl y no t a n autonomou s entit y apar t fro m faith . Whil e Luthe r clearly recognized th e nee d fo r societ y to mak e laws in mora l area s and, indeed , continue d t o make appeals to natura l law and t o conscienc e when i t suite d hi s argument, his overall position wa s quite different fro m tha t o f Aquinas (see above, pp. 26f.) . Human natur e is far to o corrupte d by sin for it to be a reliable source of ethical judgement. B y somewhat extending Luther' s position , Bonhoeffe r maintain s tha t eve n evidenc e o f huma n conscience is , in fact , evidenc e o f huma n disunio n wit h God . Whe n someon e aspire s to b e a moral person , whil e ignoring Christ, tha t perso n i s actually sinful. However , fo r Niebuhr, such a conclusion would be quite untenable. Although his Extract 10 in the nex t Section show s a frequen t stres s upo n si n an d a n attac k o n wha t Niebuh r regarde d a s unrealistic Christian utopianism, nonetheless he argued later in life that each person does have, naturally , som e knowledg e o f th e goo d and , indeed , tha t withou t this , 'fait h i n Christ coul d fin d n o lodgin g plac e in th e huma n soul ' (The Nature and Destiny of Ma n (1949), vol. 1 , p. 281) . In relatio n to th e external question, bot h o f these overall positions ca n find echoes in Augustine's writings. In Tex t I h e emphasizes th e realit y of human free will , despit e it s evident conflic t wit h God' s prescience . But , elsewher e h e wa s no t s o consistent . Fo r example, whe n expositin g Roman s 9.10 , h e wrot e that , 'i n thi s enquir y w e laboure d indeed on behalf of human free will: but th e grace of God won the day' (Retractions 2.1) . More illuminatingly, elsewhere he could write that, 'to will or not to will is in the power of the man who wills or wills not, only in such a way that it does not imped e God's will or vanquish hi s power' (De Con. et grat. 14.43). But even here he could disconcertingly add that, 'God has men's wills more in his power than they themselves have their wills in their own power ' (14.45) . Sinc e th e realit y o f huma n free wil l i s a prerequisit e o f Aquinas ' understanding o f mora l decision-making , bu t seem s irrelevan t t o tha t o f Luther , thi s ambivalence i s highly significant. It i s also a n ambivalenc e that stil l affect s present-da y exponents o f Christian ethics . Serious doubts abou t the realit y of human fre e wil l stem fro m thre e distinct, although frequently interrelated , considerations . Th e firs t i s a belie f i n th e omniscienc e an d omnipotence o f God . Thi s wa s on e o f Augustine' s mai n problems : i f Go d know s everything in advance and indeed create d everything that exists , how is it that people can be said to choos e anything on the basis of human volition, sinc e even the will to choos e has bee n create d b y Go d an d al l it s content s ar e know n t o Go d a t th e momen t o f creation? The second concern s the corruption o f humans and i t was this that was one of the central focuse s of Luther's thinking. If humans, through Adam, live in a constant state of sin, so that even the 'best * aspirations are corrupted b y sin, it is difficult t o se e how, in any real sense, the huma n wil l remains 'free' . Indeed , from this perspective (viewing the Fall as a deprivation and not simply as a privation - se e above, p. 25), an insistence upo n free wil l raises suspicions o f Pelagianism. The thir d consideratio n involve s socia l an d physica l determinism . I f ful l accoun t i s taken o f th e sociological , psychological , biologica l an d geneti c factor s determinin g human behaviour, it becomes notoriously difficul t nonetheles s t o maintai n that humans 36

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do posses s fre e will . The present-day explosio n o f knowledge about th e huma n genom e adds considerabl y t o thi s problem . Onc e suc h determinin g factor s ar e relate d t o a n individual's ac t of moral decision-making i n a concrete situation , littl e roo m ma y have been lef t fo r fre e will . I n fact , eve n thos e philosopher s wh o stil l clai m tha t human s d o possess free wil l tend t o admi t tha t i t i s considerably mor e restricte d tha n i s popularly imagined (e.g . H. D. Lewis in Philosophy o f Religion, 1965). In most situations one act s in one way rather than another becaus e one is genetically shaped to do so, because one has been brought u p to do so, because one is expected to do so by others, and so forth - no t because on e consciousl y an d freel y choose s t o d o so . Although , o f course , h e kne w nothing o f Freudian , Weberian , o r geneti c analysis , Augustine' s critiqu e o f astrolog y shows that h e kne w something o f these various factors (see The City o f Go d V.2). There are obvious connections her e with other highly intractable problems in theology and philosophy . Th e proble m o f evi l (theodicy) , i n th e contex t o f Christianity , i s intensified b y an insistence upo n th e omnipotence an d omniscienc e of God. And one of the 'solutions' offered b y Christian theodicy is precisely that, if God were to give humans free will, then Go d must also have allowed humans the possibilit y of moral evil as well as moral goo d - sinc e th e secon d make s n o sens e withou t th e first. In thi s respec t 'th e problem o f evil ' an d 'th e proble m o f good ' ar e interconnected , thoug h equall y intractable. Again , i f a Luthera n such a s Bonhoeffe r i s tempte d t o distinguis h 'better ' secular regimes from other s (a s he appears to do elsewhere in Ethics) h e may be in danger of reintroducing thos e secula r ethical categorie s that h e has methodologically rejected . If a tension i s often fel t i n theology between God' s omnipotence an d omniscienc e and human fre e wil l an d mora l evil , th e tensio n i n philosoph y betwee n fre e will , self determination an d physica l an d socia l determinis m i s jus t a s severe . A numbe r o f philosophers today , sometime s terme d Compatibilists , hav e argue d tha t fre e wil l an d thoroughgoing determinis m ar e compatible. I n various ways, they maintain tha t the fac t that people can reason and then act morally is sufficient evidenc e of free will, even if their moral decision s ar e entirel y predictable . S o a n abilit y t o predic t accuratel y th e mora l behaviour of particular individuals, or an ability to identify the antecedent cause s of their moral reasoning, do not belittle th e reality of their moral decision-making. Indeed , there is a clear difference betwee n a n individual such as a so-called 'psychopath ' or 'sociopath' who i s incapable o f mora l reasoning , an d a n individua l who i s so capable , eve n i f it i s entirely predictable ho w both wil l behave. An adapted version of Compatibilism could also be used to resolve some of the tension between God' s omnipotenc e an d omniscienc e an d huma n fre e will . So , i t coul d b e maintained tha t th e fac t tha t Go d ha s create d individual s whos e action s ar e alread y known befor e thei r birt h doe s no t o f itsel f invalidat e thei r mora l reasoning . Th e ke y difference her e between thi s version of Compatibilism an d philosophica l Compatibilis m is that the determinan t (God ) is already aware of what is determined. Bu t this, in itself, is a very crucial differenc e an d i s considerably complicate d b y the fac t tha t term s suc h as 'know' and even 'create' are used of God only analogically. If people could understand, in any literal sense, what i t means for God to 'know ' everything in advanc e they would, of course, b e God and no t people . Both versions o f Compatibilism wil l seem unsatisfactor y t o some . Th e notio n o f fre e will offere d b y Compatibilist s i s clearl y no t strong , particularl y i f th e ac t o f mora l reasoning itsel f i s though t t o b e determined . An d i n philosophica l Compatibilis m i t might see m tha t a n ontological, rathe r than simpl y methodological, determinis m i s too 37

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often assume d (see above, pp. 14f.) . In most recen t understanding s o f Christian ethics , a rather stronge r notio n o f free wil l would see m t o b e required. I t migh t even be possible for th e Christian apologis t t o argue that i t is the fac t that one believes i n a created, rathe r than fortuitous, world and i n people within that world who are created in the image of a loving God - a God possessing free wil l - tha t one is given grounds for belief that peopl e do hav e real free will . Thus, without a doctrine o f creation one migh t fin d i t difficul t t o escape th e conclusio n tha t huma n action s ar e wholl y determine d b y a n ultimatel y fortuitous world . I t i s no t necessar y t o dra w fro m thi s argumen t th e additiona l conclusion that secular ethics is a worthless undertaking, as Bonhoeffer might . The theist can stil l maintai n tha t fre e will , whic h i s though t t o b e necessar y b y som e secula r moralists, is made possible by a loving God - whethe r or not the non-theist knows this. The internal question concerning the relative importance to be given to the distinctively Christian appeal s t o th e Bible , Christia n tradition , Christia n experienc e an d Christia n belief, revea l just as many differences betwee n the Texts and th e Extracts in this Section . The single-minded focus upon the Bible in Luther is apparent i n all his Texts. In contrast, there are more appeals t o tradition and to Aristotle tha n t o the Bible in Aquinas' Tex t II. Interestingly, though , Luther' s Text II I opens wit h th e criterio n tha t i f one find s one' s 'heart confident tha t it pleases God, then the work is good' (III.l). Augustine, in Text I, is more philosophical tha n exegetical. However, their differing approache s to the Bible have already bee n discusse d (see above, pp. 23-5) . Within th e Extracts , one o f the mos t importan t difference s i s caused by the claim s of situation ethics . Fletcher' s boo k Situation Ethics (1966) , coincidin g wit h th e radica l writings an d utterance s o f Bisho p John Robinso n i n Britai n and o f Bisho p Pik e in th e United States , proved remarkabl y influential i n th e 1960 s and earl y 1970s. Its somewha t anecdotal and superficia l styl e reads oddly in comparison wit h the other Extracts, but it s position cannot be ignored. Indeed, few works in Christian ethics have been written since its publication withou t makin g som e referenc e to it . It s iconoclasm ha s irritate d man y and it will shortly be observed that its criticisms of 'legalisrn' fail to take fully into account Aquinas' comple x theor y o f exceptions . Further , man y hav e argue d tha t Fletcher' s characteristic metho d o f arguin g fro m idiosyncrati c paradigm s (see 2.18f ) distort s Christian ethic s - jus t as, at the secular level , no nation can construct a legal system on the basi s of exceptions. Fletche r tends t o writ e as if no on e ha d eve r thought seriousl y about exception s befor e him . However , whe n al l thes e point s hav e bee n made , hi s thoroughgoing stress upon agape and his overall personalist approac h to Christia n ethics have undoubtedl y foun d importan t sympathizers . Fo r them , personalis m an d agapis m accord mor e full y wit h present-da y consciousnes s tha n Aquinas ' theor y o f natural law. There ar e als o obviou s similaritie s betwee n Fletcher' s an d Bonhoeffer' s account s o f Christian ethics . Fo r Bonhoeffer , too , th e disciplin e i s predominantl y personalis t (see 1.13f) an d i t is based upon a single criterion, the 'Call of Christ'. Further, both men justif y their positions in relation to what they take to be the central thrust of the New Testament (see 2.9-10) . Bu t i n relatio n t o th e externa l questio n mentione d earlie r the y ar e quit e different. Bonhoeffe r see s a sharp divide between ethic s and Christia n ethic s whereas, for Fletcher, Christian and non-Christia n situation ethics differ onl y in the summum bonum (highest good ) regarde d a s their standar d (see 2.11) and , i n practice , h e move s almos t imperceptibly fro m on e disciplin e t o th e other. Fletcher' s approvin g quotatio n fro m Bonhoeffer (2.5 ) ignore s thi s crucia l differenc e betwee n them . Fletcher's difference s wit h othe r Anglican s also emerg e i n Extrac t 2 . H e specificall y 38

METHODOLOGY

rejects th e notio n o f 'middle axioms' tha t Templ e an d other s withi n th e Lif e an d Wor k Movement in the 1930 s believed to be so important. In part, his rejection i s based upon a semantic quibbl e (2.13) , but i n par t i t may be based upo n a correct realizatio n tha t th e notion o f 'middl e axioms ' assume s a modifie d natura l la w theory - itself , o f course , assumed b y Temple. Th e Church o f Scotland's war-tim e 'Baillie Commission' accurately described thi s notion: It is ... th e duty of the Church in our day and place to guide the individual, within ... limits of its competence ... what to do with his vote and in what directions to exercise his influence . Th e requisit e principle s fo r th e implementin g o f thi s dut y ar e full y available t o u s i n th e Ne w Testament . N o ne w principle s ar e necessar y o r ar e permissible, bu t onl y th e applicatio n o f th e dominica l an d apostoli c teachin g t o a situation different fro m tha t in which ou r Lor d and Hi s first disciples were ever calle d upon t o stan d ... It is clear, however, that th e carrying out o f such a task will involve the formulation , i n each case , of certain secondar y an d mor e specialise d principle s to the particula r field of action i n which guidanc e i s needed. 'Middl e axioms' the y have been calle d .. . The y ar e not suc h a s to b e appropriat e t o ever y time an d plac e and situation, but the y are offered a s legitimate and necessary applications o f the Christia n rule of faith an d lif e t o th e specia l circumstances i n which we now stand . ( God's Will for Church an d Nation, p . 445) This understandin g o f Christia n ethic s adhere s mor e strictl y t o a us e onl y o f thos e principles tha t ca n b e derive d fro m th e Bible , tha n d o traditiona l understanding s o f natural la w theory. I t clearly wishes to avoi d th e sor t o f casuistry and comple x theor y of exceptions als o associate d wit h th e latter . Nonetheless , i t seek s t o tak e bot h genera l principles and th e exigencie s of particular situations seriousl y by developing, admittedl y fallible, secondary principles for these exigencies. It is in this sense that it can be identifie d as a modified natura l la w theory an d i t i s probably i n thi s aspec t tha t i t i s most sharply differentiated fro m Fletcher' s situatio n ethics . Fletcher's case-stud y on abortio n ca n be compared wit h Paul VI's Extract 29 (and th e latter, i n turn , wit h Fiorenza' s Extrac t 5) . Th e substantiv e issue s wil l b e discusse d i n Section 5 , bu t fo r th e momen t i t i s wort h comparin g Fletcher' s supposition s abou t 'legalist' position s wit h thos e o f Pau l VI . Again , i t appear s tha t Fletche r ha s blurre d distinctions an d oversimplifie d positions . Nonetheless , i t i s perhap s hi s positio n o n abortion tha t mor e closel y represent s th e positio n o f man y Christian s today . Take n together wit h th e radica l non-realism o f Cupitt's Extrac t 6, both poin t t o th e pluralis m that increasingl y characterized Christian ethic s a t the tur n o f the millennium . I t wil l be noted i n th e critiqu e a t th e en d o f thi s Sectio n tha t eve n whe n position s i n Christia n ethics ar e asserte d stridentl y - a s they ar e i n Joh n Pau l II' s Extrac t 4 an d Fiorenza' s Extract 5 - whe n set side by side they paradoxically become example s of moral pluralism within Christianit y (and , i n this instance , o f pluralism withi n Catholicism) . Even Cupit t i s no t immun e fro m suc h stridency . A s it stand s hi s Extrac t 6 offer s a strong assertion of non-realism. However, i t can also be seen a s a sharp exampl e o f one form o f Christian postmodernism, wit h Hauerwas' Extract 18 representing another form . They hav e i n commo n a postmodernis t assumptio n tha t a n increasingl y fragmente d society no longer shares a convincing rational discourse. I t is only particular communitie s that hav e shared beliefs an d values. Both are also sceptical of the universa l aspirations of 39

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moral philosophy . Bu t the y diffe r radicall y fro m eac h othe r i n thei r respons e t o traditional forms o f Christian communities. Cupitt clearly believes that we need to mov e beyond the m t o for m new , non-realis t communities . Hauerwas , i n contrast , a s will be seen i n Sectio n 3 , champions a move back to them .

40

TEXT I

AUGUSTINE God's foreknowledge and human free-will 1. BACKGROUND This Text comes fro m Th e City o f Go d V.9-11 (Pelican Classics, trans. Henr y Bettenson (ed.) Davi d Knowles, Penguin, 1972 , pp. 190-6) . Consisting altogethe r o f 22 books, Th e City o f Go d was Augustine' s mos t substantia l wor k an d a vita l sourc e fo r hi s matur e theology. I t wa s inspire d b y Alaric' s sackin g o f Rom e i n 41 0 an d i n i t h e se t ou t t o demonstrate tha t this event was a punishment fo r Rome's paganism and not the result (as 'pagans' claimed ) o f th e Emperor' s adoptio n o f Christianity . T o achiev e thi s demon stration h e attempte d t o expos e a numbe r o f ke y 'pagan ' notion s (e.g . 'fate' ) an d t o ridicule the whole idea tha t th e 'paga n gods' had, in any way, protected Rom e from he r enemies. I n contras t t o this , Augustin e elaborate d th e concep t o f th e heavenl y city , founded an d ruled alone by God revealed in Jesus Christ (see further, Tex t IV). He started the work in 413 , but di d no t finis h i t unti l 426 , writing Book V in abou t 416 . H e later described i t a s follows: 'The first five books refut e thos e wh o attribut e prosperit y an d adversity to the cult of the gods or to the prohibition of this cult. The next five are against those wh o hold tha t ill s ar e never wantin g to men , but tha t worshi p o f the god s help s towards th e futur e lif e afte r death . Th e secon d par t o f the wor k contain s twelve books . The first four describ e the birth of the two cities, one of God, the other of this world. The second four continue their story, and the third four depict their final destiny' (Retractions 2,43,2). I n relatio n t o th e followin g Text, i t i s importan t t o realiz e tha t th e Pelagia n controversy was taking place then, but despit e its obvious relevanc e to th e them e of fre e will, it i s seldom mentione d i n the work . Cicero' s O n th e Nature of th e Gods, which ha d been an important influence on Augustine in his Manichaean phase, however, is explicitly attacked here . 2. KE Y ISSUES Augustine is concerned i n this Text to defend both God' s prescience and human free will. He is fully awar e of a potential conflict between th e two, but reject s Cicero's resolution o f this conflict i n terms of denying God's prescience (1.2-3). For Augustine, God 'knows all things before they happen', but thi s does not impl y either a notion o f 'fate' o r a denial of human free will (1.4). Distinguishing betwee n 'natural ' and 'voluntary' causes, he regard s God as the author o f the first, but insist s that God still allows humans the second (1.6-8) . So huma n wil l ha s 'onl y a s muc h powe r a s Go d ha s wille d an d foreknown ' (1.9) . Augustine also seeks to refut e the Stoic understanding o f 'necessity' as a limitation which abolishes freedo m fo r Go d o r human s (1.10-11) . Fre e wil l i s not invalidate d b y God' s foreknowledge, bu t rathe r in , th e ver y fac t tha t Go d doe s forekno w huma n fre e wil l

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demonstrates its genuine existence - sinc e otherwise there would be nothing to foreknow (1.12-13). Go d ha s indee d create d human s fre e (1.14) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS There i s a stron g deontologica l emphasi s throughou t hi s refutatio n o f Cicer o an d th e Stoics. Augustin e treat s bot h God's prescience an d huma n fre e wil l as given an d simpl y accuses hi s opponents o f 'profanity ' an d 'impudence ' (1.4) , potentia l atheis m (1.8 ) an d 'blasphemy' (1.12) . Fo r him , thei r positio n i s manifestl y wron g an d i t i s sufficien t t o demonstrate tha t the y den y eithe r prescienc e or fre e will . Natura l law assumptions are also apparen t i n th e Text, notabl y i n his claim tha t 'evi l wills do no t procee d fro m hi m because the y ar e contrar y t o th e natur e whic h proceed s fro m him' : th e natural , fo r natural la w theory , i n itsel f i s alway s goo d (1.7) . A mor e consequentia l argumen t i s introduced in 1.12-13: the reality of human free will, prayer, exhortations and sin can be derived fro m th e fac t tha t Go d foresee s them , since , if they did no t exist , God could no t foresee them . 4. BASES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS Augustine's two uses of the Psalms in this Text illustrate two different use s of the Bible. In 1.4 the Psalms play a central role in his argument, but i n 1.8 they merely provide a flourish at the en d o f the argument . However , i t i s the doctrin e o f creation whic h provide s th e central basi s o f Augustine's positio n (especiall y in 1.14) . H e i s particularly offende d b y Cicero, sinc e he believes tha t hi s contentions undermine th e very basis o f God as creator (1.8). In his defence of the latter, he is convinced tha t 'pagan ' notions, suc h as fate, mus t be refute d b y the Christia n a s 'profane an d irreveren t impudence ' (1.4) . 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS Various facets of Augustine's pre-Christian life have influenced the argument in this Text. Cicero's notion s ar e single d ou t fo r particula r attac k an d Augustine' s ow n previou s interest in , an d subsequen t rejectio n of , astrolog y i s evident. Fre e will i s defended but , above all, he stresses the power of God: his own rejectio n of Pelagianism is clear, as is the strong conviction o f the convert tha t it is God who is triumphant. Augustine , the forme r rhetorician, i s also strongly in evidence (althoug h this is even more th e cas e in his muc h earlier O n th e Free Choice of the Will). I t might even be claimed that a defence of free will comes mor e naturall y t o on e fro m th e middl e classe s tha n one , lik e Luther , wh o ha s known at first hand the social constraints upon th e agrarian working classes. In addition , in hi s arguments abou t th e ver y notions of 'prescience' and 'fre e will' , Augustine show s that h e was heir mor e t o th e Graeco-Roman worl d tha n t o th e Hebrai c world: eve n his declaration of faith (i n 1.14) uses the non-biblical notions of'omnipotence ' and 'soul' (see further, p . 20 0 below). 6. SOCIAL

SIGNIFICANCE

Augustine's twin stresse s upo n th e prescience/omnipotenc e o f Go d an d th e fre e wil l of humans ha d a ver y considerabl e effec t upo n subsequen t theolog y an d upo n Wester n thought. Hi s correlation betwee n neo-Platoni c an d biblica l notion s prove d enormousl y influential an d serve d t o giv e Christianit y a ne w intellectua l credibility . H e als o bequeathed a sometimes puzzlin g combination o f Graeco-Roman an d Hebrai c notions , particularly i n th e area s of Christian anthropology an d eschatology . 42

METHODOLOGY FURTHER READING In additio n t o th e primar y reading fro m O n th e Free Choice o f th e Will an d Th e City o f God an d th e secondar y readin g suggeste d i n th e Introductio n o n Augustine , N . P . Williams' Th e Ideas o f th e Fall an d o f Original Si n (1924 ) i s particularly important .

TEXT I AUGUSTINE God's foreknowledge and human free will I.I For our part , whatever may be the twists and turn s o f philosophical dispute and debate , we recognise a God who is supreme and true and therefore we confess his supreme power and foreknowledge . We ar e no t afrai d tha t wha t w e do b y a n ac t o f will ma y no t b e a voluntary act, because God, with his infallible prescience, knew that we should do it. This was th e fea r tha t le d Cicer o t o oppos e foreknowledg e an d th e Stoic s t o den y tha t everything happen s b y necessity , althoug h the y maintaine d tha t everythin g happen s according to fate .

1.2 Now what was it that Cicer o so dreaded i n prescience of the future , tha t h e struggled to demolish th e ide a by so execrable a line of argument? H e reasone d tha t i f all events are foreknown, they will happen in the precise order of that foreknowledge ; if so, the order is determined i n the prescience of God. If the order of events is determined, so is the causal order; for nothing can happen unless preceded by an efficient cause . If the causa l order is fixed, determining all events, then all events, he concluded, ar e ordered b y destiny. If this is true, nothin g depend s o n u s an d ther e i s no suc h thin g a s free-will. 'Onc e we allow this,' he says, 'all human lif e is overthrown. There is no point i n making laws, no purpose in expressing reprimand o r approbation, censur e or encouragement; there is no justice in establishing reward s for th e goo d an d penaltie s fo r the evil. ' 1.3 It i s to avoi d thos e consequences , discreditabl e an d absur d a s they are, an d perilou s t o human life , tha t Cicer o refuse s t o allo w an y foreknowledge . An d h e constrain s th e religious sou l t o thi s dilemma , forcin g i t t o choos e betwee n thos e propositions : eithe r there is some scope for our will, or there is foreknowledge. He thinks that both canno t be true; t o affir m on e i s t o den y th e other. I f w e choos e foreknowledge , free-wil l i s annihilated; i f w e choos e fre e will , prescienc e i s abolished . An d so , bein g a ma n o f eminent learning , a counsellor o f wide experience an d practise d skil l in matters affectin g human life , Cicer o chooses free will. To support this , he denies foreknowledge and thus , in seekin g t o mak e me n free , h e makes the m irreverent . Fo r the religiou s min d choose s both, foreknowledge as well as liberty; i t acknowledges both, and support s bot h i n pious faith. 'How? ' ask s Cicero . I f there i s prescience o f th e future , th e logica l consequence s entailed lea d t o th e conclusio n tha t nothin g depend s o n ou r fre e will . An d further , i f anything does so depend, then, by the converse logical process, we reach the position tha t there i s no foreknowledge . The argumen t proceed s thus : i f there i s fre e will , everything

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does not happe n by fate; if everything does not happe n by fate, there is not a fixed order of all causes; if there is not a fixed order o f all causes, there is not a fixed order o f events for th e divin e prescience, fo r thes e events cannot tak e place unless preceded b y efficien t causes; if there is not a fixed order for God's prescience, everything does not happe n as he has foreknown them as due to happen. Thus, he concludes, if everything does not happe n as foreknown b y God, the n ther e i s in hi m n o foreknowledg e o f all the future . 1.4 Against such profane an d irreverent impudence we assert both tha t God knows all things before the y happe n an d tha t w e d o b y ou r fre e wil l everythin g that w e fee l an d kno w would not happe n without our volition . We do not sa y that everything is fated; in fact we deny that anything happens by destiny. For we have shown tha t the notion o f destiny, in the accepte d sense , referrin g to conjunctio n o f stars a t the tim e o f conception o r birth, has no validity , since it assert s something which has no reality . It i s not tha t w e deny a causal order where the will of God prevails; bu t w e do not describ e it by the word 'fate' , unless perhaps if we understand fat e t o b e derived from fari (speak) , that i s from th e ac t of speaking. We cannot i n fact den y that i t is written in Scripture, 'God has spoken once , and I have heard those two things: that the power belongs to God; and that mercy belongs to you , Lord , and yo u rende r t o eac h i n accordanc e wit h hi s works ' [Ps . 61. 1 If]. Th e words 'has spoken once' mea n 'he has spoken immovably', tha t is , unalterably, just a s he knows unalterably all that is to happen and what he himself is going to do. For this reason we should b e able t o us e the wor d 'fate' , derivin g i t fro m fari, excep t tha t thi s wor d i s generally used in a different sense , a sense to which we should not wish men's hearts to be directed. 1.5 Now if there is for God a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing depend s on ou r fre e choice . Ou r will s themselves are i n th e orde r o f causes , which is , for God , fixed, and i s contained i n hi s foreknowledge, sinc e huma n act s o f will are the cause s o f human activities . Therefore h e who ha d prescienc e o f the cause s of al l events certainl y could not b e ignorant of our decisions , which he foreknows as the causes of our actions . 1.6 Cicero's ow n concessio n tha t nothin g happen s unles s precede d b y a n efficien t caus e is enough to refute hi m in the present question. I t does not help his case to assert that while no even t i s causeless, no t ever y caus e i s the wor k o f destiny, sinc e ther e are fortuitou s causes, natural, and voluntary causes. It is enough that he admits that every event must be preceded b y a cause . Fo r ou r part , w e d o no t den y th e existenc e o f cause s calle d 'fortuitous' (fro m th e same root a s the word 'fortune') ; onl y we say that they are hidden causes and attribut e them t o th e will , either o f the tru e God , or o f spirits of some kind . The 'natural' causes we do not detac h from th e will of God, the author and creato r of all nature. The Voluntary' causes come fro m God , or fro m angels , or men, o r animals - i f indeed on e can appl y th e notio n o f will to th e movement s of beings devoi d o f reason, which carr y out action s i n accordanc e wit h thei r nature , t o achiev e som e desir e o r t o avoid some danger. By the wills of angels I mean both the wills of the good angels of God, as we call them, and of the evil 'angels of the devil', or even 'demons'. The same applies to the will s of men; ther e ar e those o f good men , an d thos e o f evil. 44

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This implie s tha t th e onl y efficien t cause s o f event s ar e voluntar y causes , tha t is , they proceed from that nature which is the 'breath of life'. ('Breath' also refers to the air or the wind; but sinc e that i s corporeal, i t i s not th e 'breat h of life'.) Th e breath o f life, whic h gives life to everything , and i s the creator of every body an d every created spiri t (breath), is God himself, the uncreated spirit. In his will rests the supreme power, which assists the good wills of created spirits, sits in judgment on the evil wills, orders all wills, granting the power o f achievement t o som e an d denyin g i t t o others . Jus t a s he i s the creato r o f all natures, so he is the giver of all power of achievement, but no t o f all acts of will. Evil wills do no t procee d fro m hi m becaus e the y are contrary to th e natur e which proceed s fro m him. Bodie s are mostly subject to wills, some to our wills - tha t i s to the wills of mortal beings, the wills of men rather than o f animals - th e others to the wills of angels. But all bodies ar e subjec t abov e al l to th e wil l o f God , an d t o hi m al l wills als o ar e subject , because the onl y power the y have is the powe r that Go d allow s them . 1.8 Thus th e caus e whic h i s caus e only , an d no t effect , i s God . Bu t othe r cause s ar e als o effects, a s are al l created spirit s an d i n particula r th e rationa l spirits . Corporea l causes , which ar e mor e acte d upo n tha n active , ar e not t o b e counte d amon g efficien t causes , since al l they can achiev e i s what i s achieved throug h the m b y the will s o f spirits. Ho w then doe s th e orde r o f causes , whic h i s fixe d i n th e prescienc e o f God , resul t i n th e withdrawal o f everythin g fro m dependenc e o n ou r will , whe n ou r act s o f wil l pla y an important par t i n that causa l order ? Le t Cicero disput e wit h thos e who assert tha t thi s causal order i s decided b y destiny, or rathe r who give that orde r th e name of destiny, o r fate - a positio n whic h shock s u s particularl y becaus e o f tha t wor d 'fate' , whic h i s generally understood i n a way which corresponds t o nothing i n the real world. But when Cicero denies that the order o f all causes is completely fixed and perfectly known to God' s foreknowledge we execrate his opinion eve n more than do the Stoics. For either he denies the existenc e o f God , whic h indee d h e ha s bee n a t pain s t o do , i n th e perso n o f a disputant i n hi s treatis e O n th e Nature o f th e Gods; o r else , i f h e acknowledge s God' s existence whil e denying hi s foreknowledge , he i s even s o saying , i n effect , exactl y what 'the fool has said in his heart'; for he is saying, 'God does not exist' [Ps . 14.1]. For a being who does not kno w al l the futur e is certainly no t God . 1.9 Thus our will s have only as much powe r a s God has willed an d foreknown ; God, whos e foreknowledge i s infallible , ha s foreknow n th e strengt h o f ou r will s an d thei r achievements, an d i t i s fo r tha t reaso n tha t thei r futur e strengt h i s completel y determined an d their future achievement s utterly assured. That i s why, if I had decided t o apply the term 'destiny' at all, I should be more ready to say that the destiny o f the weak is the will of the stronger, wh o has the weak in his power, tha n t o admi t tha t destiny , i n the Stoic sense of 'the causal order' (a use peculiar to Stoics, in conflict with the generally accepted one ) doe s away with th e fre e decisio n of our will .

1.10 There i s no need , then , t o drea d tha t 'necessity' , through fea r o f which th e Stoic s too k such pains to distinguis h between th e cause s of things, withdrawing some o f them fro m 45

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the sway of necessity, subjecting others to it, and classing our wills among the causes they wished t o emancipat e fro m necessity , fo r fear , I suppose, tha t the y would no t b e fre e i f subject to it. Now if, in our case , 'necessity' is to be used of what is not i n our control , of what achieves its purpose whethe r we will or no - th e 'necessity' of death, for example then it is obvious that our wills , by the exercise of which we lead a good lif e or a bad, are not subjec t t o a necessity o f this kind. We do a great man y thing s whic h we should no t have done i f we had no t wishe d to. I n the first place, our willin g belongs t o thi s class of acts. If we so wish, it exists; i f we do not s o wish, it does not; fo r we should no t will , if we did no t s o wish.

1.11 If, o n th e othe r hand , we define 'necessity' i n th e sens e implie d whe n w e say that i t i s necessary a thing should be thus, or should happen thus, I see no reaso n to fea r tha t thi s would ro b u s of free-will. We do no t subjec t th e lif e an d th e foreknowledg e o f God t o necessity, i f w e sa y tha t i t i s 'necessary ' fo r Go d t o b e eterna l an d t o hav e complet e foreknowledge; no r i s hi s powe r diminishe d b y sayin g tha t h e canno t di e o r mak e a mistake. Th e reason why he cannot i s that, if he could, his power would certainly be less; and h e i s rightl y calle d 'all-powerful' , althoug h h e ha s no t th e powe r t o die , o r t o b e mistaken. 'All-powerful ' mean s that h e does wha t h e wills, an d doe s no t suffe r wha t h e does not will; otherwise he would be by no means all-powerful. It is just because he is allpowerful that there are some things he cannot do. The same applies when we say that it is 'necessary' that when we will, we will by free choice . That statement i s undisputable; an d it doe s no t mea n tha t w e ar e subjectin g ou r fre e wil l t o a necessit y whic h abolishe s freedom. Ou r will s are our s an d i t i s our will s that affec t al l that w e do b y willing, an d which would no t hav e happened i f we had no t willed . Bu t when anyon e ha s somethin g done to him agains t his will, here, again, the effectiv e powe r is will, not hi s own will, bu t another's. Bu t the power of achievement comes fro m God . Fo r if there was only the will without th e power o f realisation, that will would hav e been thwarte d b y a more powerful will. Even so, that will would have been a will, and the will not o f another, but o f him who willed, although it was incapable of realisation. Hence, whatever happens to man against his will is to be attributed not t o the wills of men, or angels, or any created spirits, but t o the wil l of him wh o give s the powe r o f realisation . 1.12 It does not follow , then, that there is nothing in our will because God foreknew what was going t o b e i n ou r will ; fo r i f h e forekne w this , i t wa s no t nothin g tha t h e foreknew. Further, i f in foreknowin g what would b e i n ou r will , he forekne w something , and no t nonentity, i t follow s immediatel y tha t ther e i s somethin g i n ou r will , eve n i f Go d foreknows it . Hence we are in n o wa y compelled eithe r t o preserv e God's prescience by abolishing ou r fre e will , or t o safeguar d ou r fre e wil l b y denyin g (blasphemously ) th e divine foreknowledge . W e embrac e bot h truths , an d acknowledg e the m i n fait h an d sincerity, the one for a right belief, the other for a right life. And yet a man's life cannot b e right withou t a righ t belie f abou t God . Therefore , le t u s neve r drea m o f denyin g hi s foreknowledge i n the interest s of our freedom ; for it is with his help that we are, or shal l be, free . 46

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1.13 By the sam e token , i t i s not tru e tha t reprimands , exhortations , prais e an d blam e ar e useless, because God ha s knowledge of them before; they are of the greates t efficacy i n so far a s h e ha s foreknow n tha t the y woul d b e effective . An d prayer s ar e effectua l i n obtaining al l that Go d forekne w that h e would gran t i n answe r to them ; an d i t i s with justice tha t reward s ar e appointe d fo r goo d action s an d punishment s fo r sins . Th e fac t that Go d foreknew that a man woul d si n does no t mak e a man sin ; on th e contrary , i t cannot b e doubted tha t i t is the man himsel f who sins just because he whose prescienc e cannot b e mistake n ha s foresee n tha t th e ma n himsel f would sin . A man doe s no t si n unless he wills to sin; and if he had willed not to sin, then God would hav e foreseen that refusal. 1.14 Thus God is the supreme reality, with his Word and the Holy Spirit - thre e who are one. He is the God omnipotent, Creato r and maker of every soul and every body; participation in him bring s happiness to al l who are happy in trut h and no t i n illusion ; he has made man a rational animal, consistin g of soul an d body ; an d when ma n sin s he does not let him go unpunished, no r doe s he abandon hi m without pity. He has given, to good me n and bad alike, the existence they share with the stones; he has given man reproductiv e life which he shares with th e plants , th e lif e o f the senses , which he shares with the animals, and the life o f the intellect, shared onl y with the angels. Fro m him derives every mode of being, every species, every order, all measure, number, and weight. He is the source of all that exist s i n nature , whateve r it s kind, whatsoever it s value, and o f the seed s of forms , and th e form s o f seeds , an d th e motion s o f seed s an d forms . He ha s give n to fles h it s origin, beauty, health, fertilit y i n propagation, the arrangement of the bodily organs, and the healt h tha t come s fro m thei r harmony . H e has endowed eve n the sou l o f irrational creatures with memory, sense, and appetite, but abov e all this, he has given to the rational soul thought , intelligence , an d will . H e ha s no t abandone d eve n th e inne r part s o f th e smallest an d lowliest creature, or the bird's feather (to say nothing of the heavens and the earth, th e angel s an d mankind ) - h e ha s not lef t the m withou t a harmon y o f thei r constituent parts , a kind o f peace. I t i s beyond anythin g incredible that h e should have willed th e kingdom s of men, thei r domination s an d thei r servitudes , t o b e outside th e range o f the law s of his providence . CRITIQUE It ha s alread y been see n tha t th e tensio n betwee n ascribin g prescience/omnipotence t o God and free will to humans is a serious one - i n Christianity, Judaism and Islam. If God is seen a s all-powerful, all-knowing an d all-loving , then i t i s difficult t o se e why there is evil i n th e worl d an d ho w human s ar e reall y abl e t o hav e fre e will . Augustin e solved neither problem . At one level, his argument in 1.12-13 appears to work. If George is able to foretell what Stephen is going to will in a particular situation, this fact doe s not diminish Stephen's fre e will. It might impl y a notion of 'fate' apparentl y incompatibl e wit h rea l fre e will , but hi s own foreknowledge as such does not do so. But the difference betwee n George and God is that one is creature and the other creator. If it is the creator, who has given existence to all that is, including Stephen' s very will, who is the one to know, in advance, what Stephen is to will, his free wil l appears considerably more problematic. The greater the stres s on th e 47

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power o f God, the more people appear a s automata create d b y God. Further , Augustin e only vaguely considers th e possibilit y that, whil e God ma y kno w o f al l the million s o f human potentia l choice s a t th e momen t o f creation , nevertheless , God' s lovin g condescension migh t allow humans t o mak e the actual choices. Naturally, it is no criticism o f Augustine to say that he did not full y resolv e al l of these major problems . Man y exponents o f ethics, whethe r Christia n o r not , woul d insis t tha t free wil l i s a prerequisit e o f mora l behaviou r and , a s a result , the y ar e force d int o th e tensions mentioned earlier . Indeed, there is something curiously circular and nonsensica l about thoroughgoing theories of social, biological or even theological determinism: for , if they are true, then we cannot properl y know them to be true, since presumably both the y and our perception s of them ar e themselves completely determined an d possibly thereby distorted (see further, Extrac t 4) .

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AQUINAS Natural law 1. BACKGROUND This Tex t come s fro m Summa Theologica, Ia2ae , 94 , 4-6 (Vol . XXVII I o f th e English Dominican translation, Blackfriar s wit h Eyr e and Spottiswoode , London , an d McGrawHill, Ne w York, 1966) . Aquina s wrote this , hi s majo r but unfinishe d work, fro m 126 5 until his mystical experience of December 1273 , shortly before his death. I t is designed as a textboo k fo r 'theologica l novices' - henc e it s style of starting with a question, raisin g objections an d counter-objections , an d the n givin g a repl y and conclusions . A s befits a textbook, Summa Theologica i s liberally sprinkle d wit h quotations , fro m Aristotl e (e.g . Ethics in II. 1.2), the Bible, Cicero, the early Fathers, Augustine (see particularly Text VIII) , Isidore (o f Seville , d.636 , whos e Etymologies wa s th e mai n encyclopedi a o f classica l learning fo r the Middl e Ages, in II . 1 and 8.3 ) an d mor e recen t authoritie s like Gratia n (whose Decretum o f 1141 , reviewin g existin g legislatio n i n th e Wester n Church , wa s regarded a s seminal in th e Middl e Ages, along with Lombard' s Sentences in theology, in II.l.l, 7. 1 and 8) . The text come s fro m th e majo r sectio n i n Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, which, together with Secunda Secundae, deals with Christian ethics. The initial section, Prima Pars (cite d i n II . 11.2), i s mainl y concerne d wit h th e existenc e an d attributes o f God , whil e th e las t section , Tertia Pars, deal s wit h Christolog y an d ecclesiology. Aquinas has distinguished fou r type s of law - eternal , natural , human and divine. For him 'law is nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a complete community' . God is indeed a sovereign an d i t ca n be held tha t 'th e whole community o f the universe i s governed b y God's mind'. This governance i s eternal law. However, this law can be known properly only to God and those who have seen God. As intelligent creatures , humans can join i n and mak e this eternal law their own and, in so far as they do, this is natural law: 'natural law is nothing other tha n the sharing in th e eternal law by intelligent creatures' . Huma n laws , themselves derive d fro m natura l law, are also necessary, because of the limitation s o f human reason. And finally, divine law is essential fo r salvation : human s hav e bee n designe d fo r 'a n eterna l happines s ou t o f proportion t o thei r natura l resource s .. . an d therefor e mus t nee d b e directe d b y a divinely give n law above natura l an d huma n la w ... Although through natura l law the eternal law is shared in, according to the capacity of human nature, nevertheless in orde r to be directed to their ultimate supernatural en d men have to be lifted up' (S.T. , Ia2a e 91). Hence the need for revelation. Thus, grace can be seen to crown nature and fait h ca n be seen to crow n reaso n (see above, pp. 26-7) .

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2. KE Y ISSUES In thi s Text , Aquina s focuse s specificall y upo n natura l la w an d respond s t o thre e questions: (a) I s natural law the sam e for all ? Despit e empirical indication s to th e contrar y (see further Copleston' s Extrac t 3) , Aquina s i s convince d tha t natura l la w i s ubiquitou s i n humans. Followin g Aristotle, he believes tha t human s hav e a natura l tendenc y toward s happiness or well-being (eudaimonia), leadin g ultimately, for the Christian , to a beatifi c vision o f God . Thi s i s the 'end ' o f humans (i n bot h senses ) an d i s the mai n spu r fo r morality i n al l people. Moralit y is to b e discerne d throug h th e us e o f 'practical reason ' whereas 'science' is to be discerned through theoretic reason . But , of course, humans are fallible i n their use of practical reason - eve n more fallibl e tha n i n their use of theoretic reason (II.4) . But the genera l principles of both type s of reason remain th e sam e for all people, whethe r they actually recognize them o r not. Secondar y principles, derived fro m the general principles of morality, are also the same for most people . Bu t here, error, sin or bad customs may distort these secondary principles (II.6) . (b) Ca n natura l la w be changed ? General principle s ar e unalterable , bu t secondar y principles ma y occasionall y b e altered . Lik e Augustin e (see above, p . 23) , Aquina s believed, on th e basis of the Ol d Testament, tha t Go d can sometimes g o against natural law (II . 11.2). I n addition , althoug h human s canno t contradic t natura l law , the y ca n sometimes ad d t o i t (II . 11.3). (c) Ca n natura l la w be abolishe d fro m th e huma n heart ? Again, genera l principle s cannot be destroyed i n any person, although, in particular situations, lust and passion can override them (11.13) . Secondar y principles, i n contrast , ca n b e effectivel y destroye d b y error, sin and bad customs. 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS The Aristotelian framework to Aquinas ' theory o f ethics tends t o giv e it a consequentia l bias. The telos, finis or 'end' of humans provides the spur for morality and, as will be seen in the substantiv e Texts, ultimately directs hi s ethical analysis of particular issues . Thus, for him , 'the objects to which men have a natural tendency are the concern of natural law, and among such tendencies it is proper to man to act according to reason' (II.2). But, as can als o b e see n fro m thi s quotation , ther e i s a stron g deontologica l assumptio n underlying it : an understanding of human natur e reveal s huma n mora l obligations. An identification i s made between description an d prescription: people 'are' created thus and also 'ought ' t o behav e thus . Further , th e precept s o f natura l la w ar e als o containe d (prescriptively) i n divin e law (II.7.1). 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS The Bibl e i s seen t o b e i n keepin g with natural law, although i t add s t o i t (II . 7.1) and , sometimes, produce s exception s t o i t (II.11.2) . Significantl y and, perhap s erroneously , Aquinas views Romans 2 in the light of natural law theory (II. 12.1). As already noted, h e characteristically refer s t o a larg e bod y o f Christia n an d pre-Christia n traditio n and , through Aristotle, to the natural rational 'experience ' of humans. Further, just as humans perceive th e genera l principle s o f theoretic reaso n throug h intellectus, they perceive th e general principle s of practical reason throug h synderesis (no t quit e 'conscience', but stil l an innat e huma n faculty) . 50

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5. SOCIAL

DETERMINANTS

Aquinas derive d thi s theor y o f natura l la w fro m a numbe r o f classica l an d Christia n sources (see P. M. Farrell, 'Sources of St. Thomas' Concept o f Natural Law', Th e Thomist, 20: 3, 1957). Aristotle distinguished between natural justice and conventional , or written, law, an d Aquina s extensivel y use d an d adapte d hi s theor y o f knowledge . I n addition , Aquinas use d Roma n lega l thinking , ofte n mediate d throug h Cicero , an d Augustine' s concept o f eternal law. The whole balance that he achieved between the fou r type s of law may well reflect th e confidence and 'balance' of medieval Christendom. Certainly , it is far removed fro m th e radica l discontinuitie s o f Augustin e and o f Luther , i n thei r age s of revolutionary change . I n addition, the 'once born' religious personality o f Aquinas migh t possibly b e compare d wit h th e liminalit y o f Augustine' s an d Luther' s conver t personalities. Correlatio n an d inclusivenes s characterize d bot h hi s theoretica l positio n and hi s personality . 6. SOCIAL

SIGNIFICANCE

Through moder n Thomis m an d neo-Thomism , Aquinas ' theor y o f natura l la w ha s continued t o have a considerable effec t upo n theology . Even Reformed theologians , such as Niebuhr in his later writings, have been significantl y influence d by it. There are signs, too, tha t Aquinas ' wor k continue s t o b e o f interes t amon g som e mora l philosophers . Although he borrowed extensivel y from previou s sources, his achievement in producing a system of moral, theological and metaphysical concepts is unique. In this respect, he both reflected an d surpasse d th e ambition s o f thirteenth-century Catholicism . FURTHER READING S.T. Ia2a e 90-7 is the basic primar y sourc e fo r Aquinas' natura l la w theory. Copleston's Aquinas (Extract 3) offers a sympathetic guide to his theory and D. J. O'Connor's Aquinas and Natural Law (1967) provides a critical account of it in the light of present-day moral philosophy. N . D . O'Donoghue' s articl e 'Toward s a Theor y o f Exceptions' , Irish Theological Quarterly, Sept . 1968 , provide s a clea r accoun t o f Aquinas ' theor y o f exceptions i n the light of the situation ethic s debate - ther e will be further discussio n of this i n relatio n t o Extrac t 3, Text VII I and Tex t XIV . For an analysi s of the wide r legal, political and ethica l aspects of natural law theory, see A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction t o Legal Philosophy (1951) . Fo r a recen t sympathetic , bu t mor e radical , approach t o Aquinas , se e Porter's Extrac t 7.

TEXT I I AQUINAS Natural law Is natural law the same for all? II. 1 OBJECTIONS: i. Apparently natural law is not the same for everybody. It is stated in the Decretum that 'the natural law is that containe d i n the Law and the Gospel'. Taken so it is not commo n

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to everybody; it is said i n Romans, 'Al l do not obe y the Gospel' [Rom . 10.16]. Therefore natural law is not th e sam e fo r everybody. ii. According to the Ethics, 'All lawful acts are said to be just acts'. Yet in the same work it is remarked that nothing i s so just for all as not t o vary for some. Natural law, then, is not identica l fo r all . iii. Or put th e matter like this, it has been said that objectives sought because of man's very constitution belon g to natural law. These are different i n different men , fo r by their constitution som e are moved b y desire for pleasure, others by ambition fo r honour, an d others by other incentives . Therefor e ther e i s not on e natura l la w for all . ON TH E OTHER HAND Isidore says , Natural right i s common t o al l nations .

II.2 REPLY: As we have shown , th e object s t o whic h me n hav e a natura l tendenc y ar e th e concern o f natural law, and amon g such tendencies i t is proper t o ma n t o ac t according to reason . No w a characteristi c o f reaso n i s t o procee d fro m commo n principle s t o particular conclusions: this is remarked in the Physics. However the theoretic reaso n an d the practica l reaso n se t abou t thi s somewha t differently . Th e busines s o f th e theoreti c reason i s with natural truth s tha t canno t b e otherwise , an d s o without mistak e i t find s truth in the particular conclusions it draws as in the premises it starts from. Wherea s the business o f th e practica l reaso n i s wit h contingent matter s whic h ar e th e domai n o f human acts , and althoug h there is some necessit y in genera l principles the mor e we get down t o particula r cases the mor e w e can be mistaken . II.3 So then in questions of theory, truth is the same for everybody, both a s to principles an d to conclusions, thoug h admittedl y al l do not recognise trut h in the conclusions, bu t onl y in thos e principle s whic h ar e calle d 'commo n conceptions' . I n question s o f action , however, practica l trut h an d goodwil l ar e no t th e sam e fo r everybod y wit h respec t t o particular decisions, but only with respect to common principles ; and even those who are equally in the right on some particular cours e of action are not equally aware of how right they are. II.4 So then i t i s evident that wit h respec t t o genera l principles of both theor y an d practic e what is true or right is the same for all and i s equally recognised. With respect to specifi c conclusions of theory the truth i s the same for all, though al l do not equall y recognise it, for instanc e som e ar e no t awar e that th e angle s o f a triangl e togethe r equa l tw o righ t angles. With respect to particular conclusions come to by the practical reason there is no general unanimit y about what i s true or right, and even when there is agreement ther e is not th e sam e degree of recognition . II.5 All hold that it is true and right that we should act intelligently. From this starting point it is possible t o advanc e the specifi c conclusion , tha t goods hel d i n trust ar e to be restore d to their owners. This is true in the majority of cases, yet a case can crop up when to retur n the deposit would be injurious, and consequently unreasonable, as for instance were it to 52

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be required i n order t o attac k one' s country. Th e more you descend int o th e detai l the more i t appears how the genera l rule admits of exceptions, s o that yo u hav e to hedg e it with cautions and qualifications. The greater the number of conditions accumulate d th e greater the numbe r o f ways in which the principle is seen to fal l short, so that all by itself it canno t tel l you whether i t be right to retur n a deposit o r not .

II.6 TO SU M UP: as for it s first common principles, her e natura l la w is the sam e fo r al l in requiring a righ t attitud e toward s i t a s wel l a s recognition . A s fo r particula r specifi c points, which are like conclusions draw n from common principles , here also natural law is th e sam e fo r mos t peopl e i n thei r feeling fo r an d awarenes s o f wha t i s right . Nevertheless i n fewe r case s eithe r th e desir e o r th e informatio n ma y b e wanting . The desire to do right may be blocked by particular factors - s o also with physical things that come t o b e an d di e awa y ther e ar e occasiona l anomalie s an d failure s du e t o som e obstruction - an d the knowledge als o of what is right may be distorted by passion or bad custom o r eve n by racial proclivity; for instance , a s Julius Caesar narrates , the Germans did no t conside r robber y wicked , though i t i s expressly agains t natura l law . II.7 HENCE: i. The text should no t b e taken to mean that everything in the Old and Ne w Laws is of natural law, since many things there imparted are above our nature. It means that natural law precepts are ther e full y covered . S o when Gratia n says that 'natura l righ t is what is contained i n th e Ol d an d Ne w Laws' he explain s himsel f a t once , an d adds : 'B y which everyone i s commande d t o d o t o other s wha t h e woul d hav e don e t o himself , an d forbidden t o do to others what h e would no t hav e done to himself . ii. Aristotle's statemen t shoul d b e understoo d t o refe r t o thing s whic h ar e naturally just, not merely according to general principles, but als o according to certain conclusions drawn from them . In most cases these are rightful, yet in a few cases they fail to meet th e situation. iii. Sinc e mind i n ma n dominate s an d rule s hi s othe r powers , s o their natura l urges should be subordinated t o mind . Henc e it is generally held that i t is right for all human tendencies to be directed accordin g t o intelligence . Can natural law be changed? II.8 OBJECTIONS: i. It seems that natura l law can be changed. For on th e tex t of Ecclesiasticus, 'He gave instructions and the law of life' [17.9] , the Glos s comments, 'H e willed the document o f the Law to be written i n order to correct natural law'. Now what is corrected i s changed. Therefore natura l la w can b e changed. ii. Moreover, th e killin g o f the innocen t is against natura l law , and s o is adultery an d theft. Yet you find God changing these rules, as when he commanded Abraham to put hi s son t o death , th e peopl e o f Israe l t o spoi l th e Egyptians , and Hose a t o tak e a wif e o f harlotry. Natural law, then, ca n be altered . iii. Furthermore , Isidor e say s tha t 'commo n ownershi p o f propert y an d th e sam e 53

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liberty fo r al l ar e o f natura l law' . Huma n la w seem s t o chang e al l this , an d therefor e natural la w can be changed . ON THE OTHER HAND it i s said i n the Decretum, 'Natural law dates fro m th e ris e of rational creation, an d doe s no t var y according to period , bu t remain s unchangeable' .

II.9 REPLY: A change can be understoo d t o mea n eithe r addition o r subtraction . A s for th e first, there is nothing against natural law being changed, for many things over and abov e natural law have been added, by divine law as well as by human laws, which are beneficial to socia l life . 11.10 As for change by subtraction, meaning that something that once was of natural law later ceases to be so, here there is room fo r a distinction. The first principles of natural law are altogether unalterable. Bu t its secondary precepts, which we have described a s being like particular conclusion s clos e t o firs t principles , thoug h no t alterabl e i n th e majorit y of cases where they are right as they stand, can nevertheless be changed on som e particular and rar e occasions , a s w e hav e mentione d i n th e precedin g article , becaus e o f som e special caus e preventing their unqualifie d observance. 11.11 HENCE: i. Th e writte n La w is said t o hav e been fo r th e correctio n o f natura l la w because i t supplied wha t wa s wanting there , o r becaus e part s o f natura l la w were decaye d i n th e hearts of those who reckoned tha t som e things were good whic h by nature are evil. This called fo r correction . ii. All men without exception, guilty and innocen t alike , have to suffe r th e sentence of natural deat h fro m divin e powe r becaus e o f original sin, accordin g t o th e words , 'Th e Lord kill s an d bring s t o life ' [ 1 Sam . 2.6] . Consequentl y withou t injustic e God' s command ca n inflic t deat h o n anybod y whether h e b e guilt y or innocent . Adulter y is intercourse wit h a woma n t o who m yo u ar e no t marrie d i n accordanc e wit h divinel y given law; nevertheless to go unto any woman by divine command i s neither adultery nor fornication. Th e same applies to theft , th e taking of what belongs to another , fo r what is taken b y God's command , wh o i s the owne r o f the universe , i s not agains t th e owner' s will, and thi s is of the essenc e of theft. No r i s it only in human affair s tha t whatever God commands i s just , bu t als o i n th e worl d o f nature , fo r a s state d i n th e Prima Pars, whatever Go d doe s ther e in effec t i s natural. iii. You speak o f something being according to natura l righ t i n tw o ways. The first is because natur e i s se t tha t way ; thu s th e comman d tha t n o har m shoul d b e don e t o another. The second is because nature does not bid the contrary; thus we might say that it is of natural law for man to be naked, for nature does not giv e him clothes; these he has to make b y art . I n thi s wa y common ownershi p an d universa l libert y ar e sai d t o b e o f natural law , becaus e privat e propert y an d slaver y exist b y huma n contrivanc e fo r th e convenience of social life, and not by natural law. This does not chang e the law of nature except b y addition . 54

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Can natural law be abolished from the human heart? 11.12 OBJECTIONS: i. It would seem that natural law can be abolished fro m th e human heart, for a text i n Romans speaks of the Gentiles 'who have not th e law' [2.14] . The Gloss comments, 'Th e law of justice blotted ou t b y fault , i s engraved o n man' s hear t whe n h e i s restore d b y grace'. The la w of justice is natural law , and this , therefore , can be abolished . ii. Again, the law of grace is more powerful tha n the law of nature. Yet it can be wiped away by sin, and this therefore, and with all the more reason, can happen to natura l law. iii. Besides , what i s establishe d b y la w i s se t fort h a s bein g just. No w man y huma n statutes have been enacted against natural law. Therefore natural law can be destroyed i n men's hearts . ON TH E OTHE R HAND Augustine says, 'Thy la w is written i n men' s hearts , an d n o wickedness can effac e it' . This is natural law, and i t canno t b e effaced . 11.13. i REPLY: As we noticed when speaking of what belongs to natura l law, to begin with there are certai n mos t genera l precept s know n t o all ; an d next , certai n secondar y an d mor e specific precept s which are like conclusions lying close to th e premises . As for these first common principle s i n thei r universa l meaning, natura l law cannot b e cancelle d i n th e human heart , nevertheless it can be missing from a particular course of action whe n the reason is stopped fro m applyin g the general principle there, because of lust or some other passion, as we have pointed out .

11.14 As fo r it s othe r an d secondar y precepts , natura l la w ca n b e effaced , eithe r b y wron g persuasions - thu s als o error s occu r i n theoretica l matter s concernin g demonstrabl e conclusions - o r by perverse customs an d corrupt habits ; fo r instance robber y wa s not reputed t o b e wron g amon g som e people , no r even , a s th e Apostl e mentions , som e unnatural sin s [i.e . Rom. 1.24] . 11.15 HENCE: i. Sin cancels natural law on som e specific point, not a s to it s general principles, unless perhaps with regar d to secondar y precept s i n th e manne r w e have touched on . ii. Though grace is more powerful tha n nature, nevertheless nature is more essential to man, an d therefor e mor e permanent . iii. This argumen t i s true o f secondary precepts of natural law, against which human legislators have sometimes passe d wrongfu l enactments . CRITIQUE In view of the historical and moder n importanc e of Aquinas' natural law theory, it is not surprising that i t has generated extensive analyses and critique s (see further o n Tex t XIV, which provide s a strikin g illustratio n o f the theory) . Seriou s criticisms can b e mad e of each o f the replie s he give s to th e thre e questions i n the Text : (a) 7 s natural la w th e same for all? Both the existenc e of a ubiquitous natural law an d 55

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the mora l us e t o whic h Aquina s put s i t hav e bee n questioned . I n vie w o f th e extraordinary mora l difference s betwee n group s o f human s reveale d b y socia l anthro pology, it may be more difficult toda y to maintain that these differences ar e simply due to the distortions cause d by error, sin or bad custom (thoug h see Extracts 3 and 7). Further, as D. J. O'Connor asks, 'what is there in common between a human being of the capacity of Newto n o r Shakespear e an d th e brie f sub-anima l existenc e o f a monstrou s birth? ' (Aquinas an d Natural Law (1967), p. 30). But, even if such a natural law is accepted, can one derive , a s Aquina s does , huma n mora l end s legitimatel y fro m huma n natura l tendencies? Fo r many, thi s seem s a pre-Humean confusio n o f the 'ought ' wit h th e 'is' : description i s conflated wit h prescription. Thi s i s still a particularly contentious are a i n moral philosophy, but i t raises important issue s in Christian ethics (see above, p. 14) . For example, if ethical precepts are derived fro m th e theory of evolution, as they are in som e forms o f evolutionary ethics, this criticism clearl y applies: evolutionar y 'development' is not simplisticall y to b e identifie d wit h moral 'progress' , unles s a category error i s to b e made (se e A. G. N. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics (1967)). But, if such an undertaking wer e to be made from th e explici t perspective of a world create d by God, it is not s o clear that a category error would be involved. Granted a belief in the Christia n God, it might well be assumed tha t natura l huma n tendencie s accor d wit h th e wa y Go d wishe s peopl e t o behave - unless , o f course, on e accepts Luther' s (an d especiall y Calvin's) positio n tha t these tendencies have become thoroughl y distorted b y si n (see further, below, p. 123) . (b) Ca n natural la w b e changed? Aquinas' distinction betwee n genera l and secondar y principles raise s man y problems . Th e relationship betwee n the m i s by no mean s alway s clearly specifie d an d man y hav e foun d th e genera l principle s to b e s o genera l a s to b e vacuous (e.g . the principle tha t good ough t to be done and evil avoided). The question of whether general principles can be usefully specifie d wil l recur in Section 3 in relatio n t o just-war theory. Furthermore , the notion tha t humans can sometimes add to natural law (II. 11.3), now seems particularly dangerous in view of the way Aquinas used i t to justif y the existenc e of slavery. Again, as O'Connor asks , 'if slaver y can be excused i n this way, why not contraceptio n o r abortion or euthanasia? ' (p . 64) . (c) Ca n natural law be abolished from th e human heart? For Aquinas, it is synderesis that enables human s t o apprehen d genera l principles , i t i s reason tha t human s mus t us e to derive secondar y principle s fro m thes e genera l principles , an d i t i s conscienc e (conscientia) tha t prompt s human s t o ac t o n them . Th e natur e an d existenc e o f thi s innate disposition, synderesis, unfailingl y abl e to apprehen d genera l principles, ha s been the subjec t of debate amon g Thomist scholar s and mora l philosophers . Clearly , this has similarities t o th e wider debat e abou t conscienc e in Christia n ethic s (see above, pp. 12 13). Further, Luther (and again especially Calvin) might have responded tha t si n and th e Fall have radically reduced th e significance of natural law and that, in any case, the whol e attempt to build a system of morality from i t distorts the doctrine of justification by faith. This poin t leads naturally to th e nex t Text.

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TEXT II I LUTHER Treatise on good works 1. BACKGROUND This Text comes from th e Treatise o n Good Works o f 152 0 (from Luther's Works, Vol. 44, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1966 , trans. W. A. Lambert and rev. James Atkinson, sections 4-6, 8, 12 , 13-14 an d 16) . This year was crucial for Luther , coming between th e Leipzi g Disputation o f 151 9 (when he debated hi s new radical position i n public with John Eck, appealing i n the sam e year unsuccessfully to th e Pop e an d then , later , t o th e Emperor) and th e Die t of Worms o f 1521 . The latter finally placed Luther under th e Imperia l ban and forbad e th e publicatio n o f hi s works , o r th e proclamation , o r defence , o f hi s opinions. Luther spent th e respit e (betwee n Leipzi g and th e arriva l of Pope Leo X's Bull excommunicating him, in October 1520 ) writing in great haste. Believing himself to be a doomed man , he was determined t o write as much as possible. Both the Treatise on Good Works and Th e Appeal t o the German Nobility came from thi s period, a s did Th e Papacy a t Rome, Th e Babylonian Captivity an d Th e Freedom o f th e Christian Man. Together , they sealed Luther's decisive break with Rome. Begun as sermon materia l for his congregation, Treatise o n Good Works soo n gre w int o a smal l book . I n it , Luthe r wa s particularl y concerned t o refut e th e criticism that a stress upon justification by faith alon e leads to a neglect of good works and to genera l antinomianism. H e elaborated his argument in the context of a discussion of the Decalogue - thi s Text comes from th e opening sections on the firs t Commandment . I n th e wor k a s a whole , th e medieva l distinctio n betwee n 'religious' goo d work s (fasting , praye r recitations , attendanc e a t mass , almsgivin g etc.) and 'secular ' goo d works , i s challenged . Fo r Luthe r i t wa s just a s importan t tha t a n individual shoul d b e a good father , i n faith , a s that h e shoul d d o 'religious ' works , i n faith. Howeve r trivial i t migh t see m t o others , whateve r i s done i n fait h i s pleasing t o God. I t i s faith alone tha t i s vital. 2. KEY ISSUES Luther's centra l argument, th e very touchstone of the Reformation, come s ou t clearl y in this Text . I t i s fait h alon e tha t matters : 'good ' works , withou t faith , ar e wors e tha n worthless, the y ar e actuall y sin . Monasteries , an d th e Churc h generally , ar e deepl y implicated i n this sin. Paul's notion of justification by faith i s seen to refut e conventional understandings of morality and piety . In the sequence presented here , the argument is as follows: Wor k without fait h i s sin (III.l). Faith has been turne d int o just another virtu e and eve n a wor k (III.2) . Bu t i n fait h al l works becom e equa l (III.3) . Fait h need s n o instruction (III.4) , bu t i s rathe r lik e th e spontaneit y o f lov e i n marriage , whic h i s destroyed by efforts t o win favour (III.5) . The Christian does things that need to be done, 57

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not to gather merit, but simply to please God (III.6). So no amount o f fasting, confession , intercessions, monasterie s o r churche s ca n functio n withou t fait h i n Go d (III.7) . Outward works , without fait h - suc h as papal bulls, seals, flags and indulgences (III.9 ) lead onl y t o idolatr y and hypocris y (III.8). Of course, fait h doe s no t forbi d goo d works : the vital thing i s that fait h shoul d alway s come firs t (III . 10). Indeed, i f everyone lived by faith, there would b e no need fo r laws or ceremonies (III . 11 - se e further Tex t VI) . Faith can eliminat e all sins - eve n the most deadl y (111.12) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS In on e sense , Luther' s positio n i s strongl y anti-ethical . Th e mora l calculation s o f hi s contemporaries ar e condemne d a s the followin g o f 'blin d reaso n an d heathe n way s of thinking' (III.2) . An unequivocall y theologica l stanc e i s taken agains t ethica l argument . But, in another sense , there is an evident personalism involve d in his position, both i n his initial appea l t o th e inspectio n o f an individual' s feeling s (III.l ) an d i n th e analog y o f married lov e (III.5) . Indeed, th e clai m tha t ' a Christia n ma n livin g i n thi s fait h ha s n o need o f a teacher o f good works , bu t h e doe s whateve r th e occasio n call s for ' (III.4 ) i s characteristically personalist . I t i s eve n possibl e tha t natura l la w ha s influence d hi s analogy i n III. 5 (cf. VI.5). The exampl e o f marrie d lov e (h e di d no t himsel f marr y fo r another five years) gains greater strength i f there i s actually an analogia entis — that is , if the affinit y betwee n husband-and-wif e lov e an d God-and-human s lov e actuall y result s from th e way the worl d i s created b y God . 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS The principle o f sola Scriptura i s well in evidence: all but fou r o f the paragraph s contai n direct biblica l quotations . No t surprisingly , a stron g affinit y fo r Pau l i s apparent , bu t there ar e als o severa l quotation s fro m th e Ol d Testamen t an d fro m th e Gospels . I n contrast to Aquinas, n o reference is made t o Christian tradition, other than to disparage contemporary papa l practices . Luther' s appea l to the feeling s o f the individua l Christian has already been note d an d th e whole Text is clearly dominated b y a theological concer n for faith . 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS At the psychological level , Luther's deb t t o Paul (possibly throug h Augustin e - se e above, p. 27 ) i s apparent i n hi s centra l notio n o f justificatio n b y faith . But , as with Paul , i t i s important t o se e his stres s upo n thi s i n th e contex t o f hi s persona l experienc e o f th e failure of 'legalism'. He came to identif y hi s own struggles as a monk with Paul's life a s a Pharisee: increase d 'works ' serve d onl y to precipitat e their crise s o f faith . And , a s with Augustine, the converted Luthe r characteristically despised hi s pre-conversion life . At the more socia l level, the undoubted excesse s of the sixteenth-century Catholi c Church , with its sometime s astonishingl y corrup t papacy , bot h provoke d an d confirme d Luther' s rejection o f contemporary practice s and beliefs. As his personal rif t with Rome deepened , so hi s animosit y toward s i t an d hi s identificatio n o f th e Pop e wit h th e 'anti-Christ ' increased. At the political level, it is often argue d that a growing German nationalism was also relevan t t o thi s rift . 58

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6. SOCIA L SIGNIFICANCE Luther's writings of 1520 were crucial to the subsequent development of the Reformation. In attacking papal indulgences and insistin g so forcefully o n individua l faith, Luthe r was instrumental i n effectin g a radica l chang e i n churc h structur e an d i n Wester n consciousness. Fe w theologians ca n eve n approximat e t o th e vas t influenc e h e ha s ha d upon bot h th e Western Churc h an d Wester n society . The challenge to papa l authority, evident i n this Text, caused lasting repercussion s i n the West. The already ailing power of Rome would neve r agai n be able to dominat e Europe . And th e 'new ' understandin g of Christian living, vocation an d fait h woul d encourag e a new consciousness whic h Weber saw as related t o th e ris e o f Western capitalis m (see above, p. 17) . The consequence s o f Luther's understandin g o f fait h ar e tha t 'al l work s becom e equal ' (III.3 ) an d tha t th e person o f faith 'ha s no nee d of a teacher' (III.4) , of ecclesiastical intermediaries, or even 'of the laws of the church and of the state' (III.l 1). In short, the new European must work out her/hi s ow n individua l relationshi p t o Go d an d t o others . Th e individualistic , business entrepreneur i s but on e produc t o f this radical shif t o f consciousness . FURTHER READING In additio n t o thi s primar y sourc e an d t o th e secondar y source s referre d t o i n th e Introduction, a number o f books wil l be foun d useful . Ma x Weber's theor y i s found i n The Protestant Ethic an d th e 'Spirit' o f Capitalism (1901 ) an d i n hi s Th e Sociology o f Religion (1920) . Criticism s o f this theory are numerous, bu t se e especially Michael Hill' s A Sociology o f Religion (1973) for a review of some of the sociological discussion of it. For interpretations of Luther's theological notions here , see George W. Forell's Faith Active in Love (1954 ) an d History o f Christian Ethics (1979 ) an d Gusta v Wingreen's Luther o n Vocation (1957 ) and Th e Christian's Calling (1958).

TEXT II I LUTHER Treatise on good works III. 1 Now everyone can notice and fee l fo r himself when he does what is good an d wha t is not good. If he finds his heart confiden t tha t it pleases God , then the work is good, even if it were so small a thing as picking up a straw. If the confidence is not there , or if he has any doubt abou t it , then the work is not good , even if the work were to raise all the dead an d if the man were to giv e his body to be burned. Thi s is the teaching of St Paul in Romans 14[.23], 'Whatsoeve r i s not don e o f fait h o r i n fait h i s sin.' I t i s from fait h a s the chie f work and fro m n o othe r wor k that w e are called believers in Christ. A heathen, a Jew, a Turk, a sinne r ma y als o d o al l other works ; bu t t o trus t firml y tha t h e please s God i s possible only fo r a Christian who i s enlightened an d strengthene d b y grace. III.2 That these words seem strange, and that some people call me a heretic because of them, is due to the fac t tha t they have followed blind reason an d heathe n way s of thinking. The y have se t fait h no t abov e but besid e othe r virtues . The y hav e mad e fait h int o a kind o f 59

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work of its own, separated from al l works of the other virtues, althoug h fait h alone makes all other work s good, acceptable , an d worthy because it trusts God and never doubts tha t everything a man does in faith i s well done in God's sight. In fact, they have not le t fait h remain a work but hav e made it a habitus, as they call it, although the whole of Scripture gives th e nam e good , divin e wor k t o n o wor k excep t t o fait h alone . Therefore , i t i s no wonder tha t the y have become blind an d leader s of the blind. An d this fait h soo n brings along with it love, peace, joy, and hope. Fo r God gives his spirit immediately to him who trusts him, as St Paul says to th e Galatians , 'You hav e received th e spiri t no t fro m you r good work s but becaus e you hav e believed th e wor k o f God' [Gal . 3.2]. III.3 In thi s fait h al l works becom e equal , an d on e wor k i s lik e th e other ; al l distinction s between work s fall away , whether they be great, small, short , long , many, or few . For the works are acceptable no t fo r their own sake but because of faith, which is always the sam e and live s and works in each and ever y work without distinction , howeve r numerou s an d varied thes e work s alway s are, just a s all the member s o f the body live, work , an d tak e their nam e fro m th e head , an d withou t th e hea d n o membe r ca n live, work, o r hav e a name. III.4 It furthe r follow s fro m thi s tha t a Christia n ma n livin g i n thi s fait h ha s n o nee d o f a teacher of good works, but h e does whatever the occasion call s for, and all is well done. As Samuel sai d t o Saul , 'Yo u shal l becom e anothe r ma n whe n th e spiri t enter s you ; do whatever your hand finds to do, for God is with you' [ 1 Sam. 10.6-7]. So also we read of St Anna , Samuel' s mother . Whe n sh e believe d th e pries t Eli , who promise d he r God' s grace, she went hom e i n joy and peac e [ 1 Sam. 1.17-18], an d fro m tha t tim e pace d th e floor no longer: this means that whatever happened t o her was all the same to her. St Paul also says , 'Where th e Spiri t o f Christ is , there al l is free' [Rom . 8.2] . Fo r fait h doe s no t permit itsel f to be bound to any work or to refuse any work, but, as the first Psalm says, 'it yields it s frui t i n it s season ' [Ps . 1.3], that is , in th e norma l cours e o f events . III.5 We ma y se e thi s i n a n everyda y example . Whe n a husban d an d wif e reall y lov e on e another, hav e pleasure i n eac h other , an d thoroughl y believ e i n thei r love , wh o teache s them how they are to behave one to another, wha t they are to do or not to do, say or not to say, what they are to think? Confidence alone teaches them all this, and even more than is necessary. For such a man ther e i s no distinctio n i n works. H e does th e grea t an d th e important a s gladly as the smal l and the unimportant , an d vice versa. Moreover, h e does them al l in a glad, peaceful, an d confiden t heart, an d i s an absolutely willing companio n to the woman. But where there is any doubt, h e searches within himself for the best thing to do; then a distinction of works arises by which he imagines he may win favour. And yet he goes abou t i t with a heavy heart an d grea t disinclination . He is like a prisoner, mor e than hal f i n despair , an d ofte n make s a foo l o f himself. III.6 Thus a Christian ma n wh o lives in this confidenc e toward Go d knows al l things, can do all things , venture s everythin g tha t need s t o b e done , an d doe s everythin g gladl y an d 60

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willingly, not tha t h e may gather merit s and goo d works , but becaus e i t is a pleasure for him t o pleas e Go d i n doin g thes e things . H e simpl y serve s Go d wit h n o though t o f reward, content that his service pleases God. On the other hand, he who is not at one with God, or is in a state of doubt, worries and starts looking about fo r ways and mean s to d o enough an d t o influenc e Go d wit h hi s man y goo d works . H e run s of f to S t James, t o Rome, to Jerusalem , hither an d thither; h e prays St Bridget's prayer, this prayer and tha t prayer; he fasts on this day and that day ; he makes confession here and make s confession there; h e questions thi s ma n an d tha t man , an d ye t he finds no peace . H e does al l this with grea t effor t an d wit h a doubting an d unwillin g heart, s o that th e Scripture s rightly call such works in Hebrew aven amal, that is , labour an d sorrow. And even then the y are not goo d work s and are in vain. Many people have gone quite crazy with them and their anxiety ha s brought the m int o al l kinds o f misery. O f these i t i s written i n Wisdom (o f Solomon) 5[.6] . 'We have wearied ourselves in the wrong way and hav e followed a hard and bitter road ; bu t God' s way we have not acknowledge d an d th e sun o f righteousness has not risen upo n us ' ... III.7 As I have already said, I have always praised fait h an d rejecte d all works which are don e without suc h faith i n this way in order t o lead men fro m th e false , pretentious , pharisai c good work s don e withou t faith , wit h whic h al l monasteries, churches , homes , an d th e upper an d lowe r classe s are overfilled, and to lea d the m t o th e right , true , genuine , real works of faith. Nobod y strive s agains t m e i n thi s excep t the unclea n beast s who d o no t part th e hoo f (a s the la w of Moses decrees ) an d wh o will tolerate n o distinctio n o f any kind betwee n goo d works , bu t g o lumberin g along . I f onl y the y pray , fast , establis h endowments, g o to confession , an d d o enough , everythin g i s supposed t o b e al l right, although i n al l this the y hav e ha d n o fait h i n th e grac e of God an d n o certaint y o f his approval. In fact, they regard these works most highl y when they have done a great many major ones for a long time, without any such confidence, and they look for good only after the works have been performed. And so they build thei r confidenc e not o n God's favour , but on the works they have done. That is building on sand and water, and in the end they must fall , a s Christ sai d i n Matthe w 7[.26-7] . This goo d wil l and favour , o n whic h ou r confidence rests, was proclaimed b y the angels from heave n when they sang on Christma s morn, 'Glory be to Go d on high, peace on earth, goo d wil l to men' [Luk e 2.14] ... III.8 See fo r yoursel f wha t a differenc e ther e i s betwee n th e fulfilmen t o f th e firs t commandment with outwar d work s an d fulfilment wit h inwar d trust . For it is the latter which makes true, livin g children o f God; the forme r make s for a wretched idolatr y an d the most perniciou s hypocrite s o n earth, who with their great show of righteousness lead countless folk into their way, yet they leave them without faith. So these folk are led astray pitiably and bogged down i n external wailing and show. Christ speaks of their kind when he said in Matthew 24[.23], 'Beware then i f any one say s to you, "Lo, here is the Christ!" or "Ther e he is!"' Or again, Joh n 4[.21-3] , ' I say to you, the time will com e when you shall no t worshi p Go d eithe r o n thi s mountai n o r i n Jerusalem , fo r th e Fathe r seek s spiritual worshippers.' 61

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III.9

These an d passage s like them hav e moved m e (an d ough t t o mov e everybod y else ) t o repudiate th e ostentatiou s displa y o f bulls, seals , flags, and indulgences , b y whic h th e poor peopl e ar e led to buil d churches , to give , endow, an d pray . Eve n then fait h i s not mentioned a t al l an d i s eve n suppressed , fo r sinc e fait h make s no t distinctio n amon g works, then where faith i s present such trumpeting and urging of one kind of work above another canno t exist. Faith desires to be the only way of serving God, and will allow this name an d honou r t o n o othe r work , except i n so far as faith impart s it, as it does when the work is done in and by faith. Thi s perversion is indicated i n the Old Testament whe n the Jews left th e Temple an d sacrifice d a t other places , in gardens and o n the mountain s [Isa. 65.3, 66.17] . These men d o exactl y the same . They are zealous to d o al l works, bu t this chie f work of faith the y never have any regard for a t al l .. . 111.10 Therefore, when some people say, as they do, that when we preach faith alon e good works are forbidden, it is as if I were to say to a sick man, 'If you had health you would have the full us e of all your limbs, but withou t health the works of all your limbs are nothing', and from thi s he wanted t o infe r that I had forbidden th e works of his limbs. Whereas on the contrary I meant that the health must first be there to work all the works of all his limbs. In the same way faith mus t be the master-workman an d captain i n all the works, or they are nothin g a t all .

III. 11 You might ask, if faith doe s everything through the first commandment, wh y then do we have so many laws of the churc h and o f the state , and s o many ceremonies o f churches, monasteries, an d hol y places , whic h urg e an d temp t me n t o d o goo d work s throug h them? The answer: simply because we do not all have or heed faith. If every man had fait h we would need n o mor e laws. Everyone would o f himself do goo d work s all the time, as his faith show s hi m ... 111.12 But you say, how can I be absolutely sure that al l my works are pleasing to God, when at times I fall, talk, eat, drink, an d slee p too much , or otherwise transgress in ways I cannot avoid? Answer : This questio n show s tha t yo u stil l regar d fait h a s a work amon g othe r works and d o no t se t it above all works. It i s the highes t work because it blots out thes e everyday sins and stil l stands fas t b y never doubting tha t Go d i s so favourably dispose d toward you that he overlooks such everyday failures and offences . Yes , even if a deadly sin should aris e (which, however, never or rarely happens to those who live in faith an d trust in God) , nonetheles s fait h alway s rises agai n an d doe s no t doub t tha t it s si n i s already gone. As it is written in 1 John 2[.1-2], 'My dear children, I am writing this to you so that you ma y not sin ; but i f any one doe s sin , we have an advocate befor e God , Jesu s Christ, who is the forgiveness for our sins' . And Wisdom [o f Solomon] 15[.2] , 'And though we have alread y sinned , w e ar e stil l thine , an d kno w tha t tho u ar e great' . An d Proverb s 24[.16], ' A righteous ma n ma y fal l seve n times , but h e alway s rises u p a s many times' . Yes, this confidence and fait h mus t be so high and stron g tha t a man know s that al l his life and works are nothing but damnabl e sin s in the judgment o f God, as it says in Psalm 143[.2], 'For n o ma n livin g i s found righteou s before thee' . H e must despai r entirel y of 62

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his works, an d believe that the y cannot b e good excep t through this faith whic h expects no judgment but onl y pur e grace , favour, kindness , an d mercy . CRITIQUE There ar e element s i n Luther' s understandin g o f th e doctrin e o f justificatio n b y fait h which almost al l Christians today might accept . Most would agre e that th e Christia n lif e is primarily about pleasin g God and no t seekin g to gathe r merit (III.6 ) and that , for the Christian, fait h shoul d b e regarde d a s primar y an d work s a s secondar y (III . 10). They might even agree that i f everyone lived by faith there would be no need for laws (III. 11 see further, below, pp. 131-2) . However, i t i s important t o recogniz e tha t Aquina s would als o hav e accepte d thes e propositions. So, just because Luther's contemporaries appeared to reject the m and were, in a number o f cases, highly corrupt, a n acceptanc e of them doe s no t commi t on e t o a rejection o f Catholicis m a s such . Argument s agains t a corrup t papac y an d a corrup t Church ar e not necessaril y argument s agains t papac y an d Catholicis m - a poin t tha t Luther sometime s appeare d t o forget , particularl y as , i n late r life , hi s writing s became more irascible. Aquinas would have insisted that good works do not on their own achieve salvation (grac e bein g essentia l fo r that ) but , nonetheless , the y ar e stil l importan t prerequisites for salvation: works are necessary, but no t sufficient , fo r salvation. Whatever merits ar e achieve d b y works , salvation , a s such , mos t certainl y i s not . No r woul d Augustine have accepted suc h a Pelagian position: for him , grac e was essential, bot h t o enable people to act rightly in the first place and to allow them to continue to act rightly (see above, p. 26) . Further, man y hav e argue d tha t ther e i s a dangerou s antinomianis m inheren t i n Luther's arguments. At first, Augustine's dictum 'love God, and do what you want' might seem to have similarities to Luther's position, particularl y when it is used in conjunction with Paul' s notio n o f justificatio n b y faith . Bu t Augustine' s positio n wa s les s single minded tha n that o f Luther: like Paul himself, he could stil l talk about 'merit ' (see above, p. 27) . I t i s possibl e tha t th e sor t o f single-minde d stres s o f Luther , o f Bonhoeffe r i n Extract 1 , or of Fletcher in Extract 2, does less than justice to Christia n ethics. I n the case of al l three , i t wil l b e see n late r tha t the y ma y brin g mor e presupposition s t o mora l decision-making tha n the y realize (for Luther, see the analysi s of Text IX). Finally, there ma y be a dangerous exclusivism inheren t i n Luther's position. For him, all goo d work s withou t fait h i n Chris t ar e nothin g bu t sin . Th e shockin g attitud e h e adopted toward s th e Jew s i n Tex t X V i n late r lif e wa s consisten t wit h thi s position . Indeed, ther e ma y alway s be a dange r i n drawin g negative conclusions fro m a positiv e position o n faith . So , to clai m tha t fo r th e Christia n fait h i s primary an d work s onl y secondary, o r eve n that work s only flow fro m faith , i t i s not necessar y to claim , at th e same time, that the good works of those who do not share this faith ar e entirely without virtue. Augustine shrank from thi s negative conclusion, i n at least some of his works (see Text IV). And, clearly, it would no t accor d with Aquinas' theory of natural law. Whereas the notions of 'empty works' and hypocrisy are obviously important for Christians toda y (thanks i n par t t o Luther) , th e complet e denigratio n o f th e mora l action s o f al l bu t explicit Christian s migh t be accepte d b y comparatively few.

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EXTRACTS 1- 7

BONHOEFFER, FLETCHER , COPLESTON , JOHN PAU L II, FIORENZA , CUPITT an d PORTER 1. BACKGROUND Dietrich Bonhoeffer' s Extrac t 1 comes fro m hi s Ethics (SCM Press, 1978 , pp. 3-6 and 9 13); Joseph Fletcher' s Extrac t 2 from hi s Situation Ethics (SC M Press, 1966 , pp . 26-30 , 30-3 an d 37-9) ; F . C . Copleston' s Extrac t 3 fro m hi s Aquinas (Harpe r an d Ro w and Search, 1976 , pp . 22-35) ; Pop e Joh n Pau l II' s Extrac t 4 come s fro m hi s Encyclica l Veritatis Splendor (Catholi c Trut h Society , 1993 , section s 31-7 , pp . 51-60) ; Elisabet h Schiissler Fiorenza' s Extrac t 5 comes fro m 'Women : Invisible in Churc h an d Theology' , Concilium (T&T Clark, 1985 , No . 182 , pp. 6-12) ; Don Cupitt' s Extrac t 6 from hi s Solar Ethics (SCM Press, 1995, pp. 6-9, 13 , 16, 19-20 an d 45); and Jean Porter's Extrac t 7 from her Moral Action and Christian Ethics (Cambridg e University Press, 1995 , pp . 182-8) . The chapter in Ethics from whic h the Bonhoeffe r Extrac t comes, 'The Love of God an d the Deca y o f th e World' , ca n b e date d t o th e perio d 1939-4 0 an d i s thu s almos t contemporary wit h hi s Th e Cost o f Discipleship o f 193 7 an d Reinhol d Niebuhr' s Th e Nature an d Destiny of Man. Obviously , thi s was an extremel y turbulent perio d fo r bot h theologians. Niebuhr wrote in his preface that 'these lectures were given in April and May of 193 9 whe n th e cloud s o f wa r wer e alread y hoverin g ominousl y ove r Europe' . Bonhoeffer ha d alread y joined th e Confessin g Church an d ha d returne d i n 193 5 fro m America t o Hitler' s Germany . Whil e i n America , Bonhoeffe r (1906-45 ) studie d a t th e Union Theological Seminary, where Niebuhr had been Professor of Christian Ethics since 1928. Niebuhr later recollected tha t Bonhoeffe r ha d sai d at this critical stage in his life, 'I shall have no righ t to participat e in the reconstructio n o f Christian lif e i n Germany afte r the war if I do not shar e the trials o f this tim e with my people' (quote d i n the prefac e t o The Cost o f Discipleship, SC M Press , 1978 , p . 11) . A t th e tim e o f writin g thi s Extract , Bonhoeffer wa s still hea d o f the Colleg e o f the Confessin g Church a t Finkenwalde . Joseph Fletche r (1905-92 ) was , lik e Bonhoeffer , a pasto r befor e h e becam e a n academic. H e wa s appointe d a s Professo r o f Socia l Ethic s at th e Episcopa l Theologica l School, Cambridge , Massachusetts , i n 194 4 (from wher e he wrote Situation Ethics) an d taught finall y i n th e Universit y of Virginia . B y 1955, whe n h e firs t publishe d Aquinas, Copleston, a Jesuit and Oxford-traine d philosopher , wa s Professor of Metaphysics in th e doctorate cours e at the Gregorian University in Rome. He was appointed Professo r of the History of Philosophy at Heythrop College in 193 9 at the age of 28, retired in 197 4 from a chair in London Universit y and was author before his death o f the multi-volume History of Philosophy. Cardina l Karo l Wojtyla o f Polan d wa s elected Pop e Joh n Pau l II i n 197 8 and die d i n offic e i n 2005 . His Encyclica l Letter Veritatis Splendor wa s first published i n 1993, expressin g th e titl e in hi s opening word s (reflectin g Gen . 1.26) : 'The Splendor o f 65

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Truth shines forth i n all the works of the Creator and, in a special way, in man, created in the imag e and likenes s of God.' Elisabet h Schussler Fiorenz a is also a Roma n Catholic , albeit one considerably more radical and feminist than Pope John Paul II. She has worked as both a New Testament schola r an d a s a modern theologia n an d i s currently Kriste r Stendahl Professor of Divinity at the Harvard Divinity School. Her best-known books are In Memory o f Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction o f Christian Origins (1983) an d Discipleship o f Equals: A Critical Feminist Ekklesialogy o f Liberation (1993) . Sh e ha s als o edited severa l volume s o f Concilium (from whic h thi s Extrac t i s taken) . Do n Cupit t (b.1934) was , unti l hi s retirement , Lecture r i n th e Philosoph y o f Religio n i n th e University of Cambridge and remain s a Fellow of Emmanuel College . Ordaine d a pries t in th e Churc h o f England i n 1959 , h e i s a prolifi c autho r and , sinc e publishing Taking Leave of God in 198 0 and Only Human i n 1985 , has often bee n regarded as controversial . Jean Porte r i s Professo r o f Mora l Theolog y an d Christia n Ethic s at th e Universit y of Notre Dame , Indiana . A Roman Catholic and exper t o n Aquinas, sh e has also publishe d The Recovery o f Virtue (1990 ) and Natural and Divine Law (1999) . 2. KE Y ISSUES Bonhoeffer highlight s the differenc e betwee n ethic s and Christia n ethics: unaided ethical deliberations an d conscienc e merel y reflec t a disunio n wit h God . Humanit y wa s originally created in the image of God, with a knowledge of an origin in God but, through the Fall, this knowledge has been reversed, so that people are now thought to be their own creators and originators of good and evil (1.1-4). Human conscience (1.10) and quest for self-knowledge (1.11 ) bot h illustrat e thi s reversal , sinc e the y falsel y tr y t o reac h Go d through interpersona l relationships : i n contrast , Jesus ' ethic s star t fro m hi s unit y wit h God (1.15) . Fletcher has criticized legalist and antinomian approaches to Christian ethics earlier in his book and now, in Extract 2, seeks to defend a third approach, that of situation ethics. In this, ethical maxims ar e treated as illuminators (bu t not a s rules or laws) in particular situations: if love is better served, they can be compromised or set aside (2.1 and 12) . Like natural law , situatio n ethic s accept s reaso n i n mora l decision-makin g (2.2 ) an d eve n involves rationa l calculatio n (2.12f : elsewher e i n Situation Ethics h e accept s th e ter m 'utilitarianism' t o describ e thi s function) . Bu t i t reject s th e 'objectivity ' o f natura l law (2.2) an d accepts only one summum bonum - o r 'highest good ' - a s law (2.10-11). For the Christian situationist , this summum bonum is agape (2.10) : only th e commandment to love, for the Christian, is categorically good: and only general 'principles', not rule s or laws, ca n be derived fro m thi s summum bonum (2.3-9). Copleston's concern s i n Extrac t 3 ar e mor e philosophica l tha n theological . H e i s concerned t o clarif y Aquinas ' natura l la w theory i n th e ligh t o f moder n relativis t an d emotive theorie s o f ethic s (3.13) . I n contras t t o relativis t objection s t o a theor y o f unalterable mora l precepts , h e point s ou t tha t empirica l difference s o n mora l issue s between people do not, of themselves, disprove Aquinas' theory (3.3-5). With emotivists, he agree s tha t Aquinas ' theor y i s no t simpl y rationalisti c - mora l decision-makin g involves rational and prudentia l reflection on huma n nature a s known in experience (3.8 : an importan t poin t t o compar e wit h Fletcher' s criticism s o f 'legalism') . Agains t emotivists, however , h e point s ou t tha t Aquinas ' positio n assume s a n objectiv e mora l relationship: whils t feeling s ar e importan t i n mora l decision-making , the y ar e to o subjective t o for m th e basis of morality (3.12) . 66

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John Pau l II's Extract 4 is concerned with the tensio n betwee n secular conceptions of personal freedom and autonomy and traditional natura l law theology. H e notes that there is a heightene d sens e o f freedo m an d autonom y i n th e moder n worl d (4.1-3) , ye t h e believes tha t thi s i s sometime s exalte d t o a n absolut e statu s - individua l conscienc e becoming the supreme tribunal o f moral judgement (4.4). In the process any notion o f a universal mora l trut h i s lost : individual s posses s onl y thei r ow n relativ e truth s (4.5) . Ironically, som e o f th e behavioura l science s questio n th e realit y o f individua l huma n freedom, renderin g morality highly relativistic (4.7-8). For Catholic theology morality is in contras t objectiv e an d right s an d obligation s ar e relate d t o eac h othe r (4.9) . Som e Catholic mora l theologian s hav e themselve s bee n wrongl y influence d b y secula r subjectivism (4.10-11) . Vatica n I I insiste d tha t huma n freedo m i s not unlimite d sinc e people are called to accept the moral law given by God which both protects and promote s that freedo m (4.12-14). Catholic mora l theology which forgets thi s is misleading (4.1520). Fiorenza's Extrac t 5 sets ou t th e challeng e of feminis t theology . Sh e admits tha t thi s theology i s influence d b y th e women' s liberatio n movement , a s well a s by churc h an d theological institution s (5.1) . Feminist theology seeks to chang e the patriarchal state and church and , indeed , al l intellectual institution s (5.2-3) . Lik e othe r form s o f liberatio n theology, i t seek s t o recove r an d reconstruc t theologica l symbol s an d expression s fo r a discipleship of equals (5.5). A variety of approaches are evident within feminist theolog y (5.6-7), but togethe r the y offer a challenge to androcentrism (5.8) . This does constitute a distinctive theologica l method , base d upo n dialogue , participatio n an d non-hierarch y (5.10-11). Sexism, racism and militaristic colonialism all have roots i n patriarchy, which feminist theolog y seek s to oppos e (5.13-17). Cupitt's Extrac t 6 sets out an d celebrates the non-realist 'sola r ethics' position tha t he now holds. H e criticizes moral philosoph y for 'clingin g to mora l realis m or objectivism long afte r tha t belie f ha s becom e manifestl y untenable ' (6.4) . Instea d h e believe s tha t ethics should , lik e th e Sun , simpl y b e 'it s ow n outpourin g self-expression ' (6.6) . Fo r Cupitt ther e is 'no objective mora l order' (6.12) and 'the entire vocabulary of the rationa l soul, conscience , th e will , the mora l la w and s o on i s dead (6.20) . In contrast , Porter' s Extrac t 7 seek s to defen d a n understandin g o f Christia n virtue ethics tha t depend s bot h upo n sociall y constructe d communitie s an d upo n huma n nature. Unlike Aquinas, she argues that self-regarding and other-regarding virtues are not entirely distinct. Fo r he r th e other-regardin g [feminine? ] virtue s of 'empathy, care, and concern fo r others cannot b e separated so neatly, either from th e virtues of self-restrain t and courage, or from a commitment t o justice' (7.5). Moral agency requires the former as much as the latter (7.7) , as does the human need for intimacy (7.9): an absence of human feeling fo r other s may , then , resul t fro m socia l factor s (7.10 ) o r fro m a failin g o f th e intellect (7.11) . Properl y understoo d 'ou r concept s o f sel f an d other s ar e inextricabl y bound together ' (7.12) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS It has already been argued that there are obvious similarities and difference s betwee n the personalism o f Bonhoeffe r an d th e situationis m o f Fletche r (see above, p . 38) . Bonhoeffer's personalis m i s evident als o i n hi s earlie r writings. A s an assistan t ministe r in Barcelona , he wrote i n 192 9 that, 'ther e ar e not an d canno t b e Christia n norm s an d principles o f a mora l nature ; th e concept s o f "good " an d "evil " exis t onl y i n th e

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performance of an action, i.e. at any specific present , and henc e any attempt t o lay down principles is like trying to draw a bird i n flight' (N o Rusty Swords, Fontana, 1970 , p. 36) . And again , 'ther e ar e no action s whic h ar e bad i n themselve s - eve n murde r ca n be justified — there i s only faithfulness t o God' s will or deviatio n fro m it ' (p . 41). Thus, 'w e can giv e n o generall y vali d decision s whic h w e migh t the n hol d ou t t o b e th e onl y Christian one , becaus e in s o doing w e are onl y setting ou t ne w principles an d comin g into conflic t wit h th e la w of freedom. Rathe r we can onl y see k t o b e brought int o th e concrete situatio n o f the decisio n an d to sho w one of the possibilities of decision which present themselve s at that point' (p. 42). Affinities wit h situation ethic s are evident here . But, i n th e sam e lecture , ther e i s als o eviden t hi s radica l divisio n betwee n ethic s an d Christian ethics. In addition, unlike Fletcher, it is the 'will of God', rather than agape, that he regard s a s central i n Christia n ethics : for hi m 'ther e i s no othe r la w than th e la w of freedom' (p . 40) : agape canno t b e treated a s law: 'the new commandments o f Jesus can never b e regarde d merely as ethical principles' (p . 41) . Clearl y this positio n i s differen t from tha t o f Fletcher in 2.10 . The Extract s o f Copleston , Joh n Pau l II , Fiorenz a an d Porte r diffe r fro m thos e o f Bonhoeffer an d Fletche r i n tha t the y al l postulat e a stron g for m o f deontology . Interestingly, Coplesto n conclude d a critica l review of Situation Ethics by insistin g tha t 'belief tha t i n Christia n ethic s lov e i s th e suprem e valu e seem s t o m e unquestionabl y valid' (quoted in the third impression of Situation Ethics). Nonetheless both Extract 3 and Extract 4 offe r clea r defence s o f traditiona l natura l la w theory . Fo r Joh n Pau l II , i n complete contras t t o Cupitt , natura l la w offers a for m o f moral objectivis m whic h ha s been considerably eroded in secular morality. Extract s 5 and 7 , although no t based upo n traditional natura l law , ar e stil l clearl y deontological . Fiorenz a simpl y assume s tha t feminist theolog y i s rightly concerne d wit h th e 'transformatio n o f th e patriarcha l stat e and church' (5.2 ) and that 'academi c institutions need t o be redefined and transformed ' (5.3). She also regards sexism, racism and militaristic colonialism a s self-evidently wrong. And Porter argues at length for the virtues of caring, regarding moral agency as deficient without them . Extract 6 seems t o b e the mos t puzzling . While rejectin g moral realis m i n an y form , Cupitt argue s almost a s a proselyte for 'solar ethics', even using the collective 'we' to d o so. Descriptive and normativ e feature s appea r to intermingl e i n this extract . 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS This point leads naturally to the next part of analysis. Only in Bonhoeffer's Extrac t 1 and John Paul II's Extract 4 is the Bible used as the basic resource of Christian ethics. Fletcher does use the New Testament in 2.9 and Cupitt in 6.8, yet their discussions appear dictated more b y appeals t o Christia n tradition . I n Copleston' s Extrac t 3 and , t o a n exten t i n Porter's Extrac t 7 , th e discussio n i s rathe r dictate d b y philosophy . Indeed , Coplesto n wrote his Aquinas primarily 'to make it easier for the reade r to conside r sympathetically his style of philosophising an d his interpretation o f the world' (p. 17) , not t o defend his theology as such, and Fiorenz a starts Extract 5 by acknowledging her debt t o the secular women's movement . Despit e hi s earl y interes t i n sociolog y an d psycholog y (e.g . i n Sanctorum Communio), i t i s doubtful whethe r Bonhoeffe r woul d hav e considere d suc h philosophical or secular concerns to be worthwhile undertaking s in Christian ethics. They belong mor e t o th e tradition o f Augustine and Aquina s than t o tha t o f Luther. Appeals to Christian experience ar e made, at times, by all seven theologians. In Extract 68

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1 Bonhoeffer appear s to rejec t conscience , but late r i n Ethics, he claims that 'i t can never be advisabl e t o ac t agains t one' s ow n conscience ' (p . 211) . This , i t woul d seem , i s conscience whic h ha s alread y bee n informe d b y Christia n faith , rathe r tha n a n innat e human faculty . Eve n Fletcher has a puzzling reference to 'problem s of conscience' in 2.8 . However, Bonhoeffer' s rejectio n o f secular conscienc e is complicated by the fac t that , as the Germa n Churc h becam e increasingl y divide d i n th e wa r an d a numbe r o f secula r liberals started t o stand ou t agains t Hitler, he began to note a n affinity o f 'consciousness' of values between thei r positio n an d tha t o f his own. I t became clear to hi m tha t 'i t was not the Church that was seeking the protection an d alliance of these concepts; but, on the contrary, it was the concepts that had somehow become homeles s and now sought refug e in the Christian spher e ... The children of the Church, who had become independent and gone their own ways, now in the hour of danger returned to their mother' (Ethics, pp. 38 9). However, thi s 'consciousness' may still not be an innate human facult y or tendency: i t may, instead , be better understoo d i n term s o f a transposition theor y (see above, p. 7) . 5. SOCIAL

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These Extract s represen t fou r distinc t phase s o f Wester n theology : th e late-1930s , th e mid-1950s, th e mid-1960s , an d th e 1990s . Th e firs t phas e wa s dominated b y th e neo orthodox reactio n o f Barth an d other s agains t theologica l liberalis m an d b y impendin g world war . Th e secon d wa s a perio d o f som e optimis m an d attempt s a t theologica l construction. Th e thir d wa s characterize d b y theologica l fermen t an d radica l self criticism. And the fourth seem s to be characterized by increasing pluralis m - wit h sharp divisions emergin g between radical s and neo-conservatives . Both Niebuh r an d Bonhoeffe r wer e heir s t o th e Barthia n theologica l revolution . The early Niebuhr , eviden t i n Extrac t 10 , rejecte d theologica l liberalis m an d h e alway s remained critical of 'Christian utopianism'. Ye t his mature theological writings showed a considerable hostilit y toward s a rigidl y neo-orthodo x approac h t o Christia n ethics . Bonhoeffer, i n contrast , remaine d firml y attache d t o thi s approac h an d show s th e considerable influenc e o f Bart h i n Extrac t 1 . In som e respects , bot h h e an d Bart h ar e more Lutheran than Luther: for instance, residual elements of natural law theory (present in Luther's own writings) are consciously denied b y them. Thei r negativ e understanding of humanit y apar t fro m Chris t ma y ow e much t o thei r experienc e o f political collaps e and chao s i n th e 1920 s an d 1930s . Indeed , thei r suspicio n o f natura l la w ma y ow e something t o thei r observation s o f its misuse in Naz i Germany. This contrasts with the tentative attempt a t reconstruction offered b y Copleston in the 1950s. Hi s tentativenes s i s doubtles s a respons e t o th e sever e stricture s o f Englis h philosophy i n th e 1930 s an d 1940 s agains t theolog y an d metaphysic s and , characteris tically, h e seeks to 'clarify ' rathe r than defend . I n contrast again, th e radica l innovation s of th e 1960 s ar e strongl y reflecte d i n Fletcher' s iconoclasm . Som e hav e suggeste d tha t there i s a stron g middle-class , Wester n intellectua l assumptio n i n Situation Ethics (an d perhaps i n Cupit t a s well), that th e individua l i s capable of making unstructure d mora l decisions fro m on e situatio n t o th e next . I n part , Pau l VI' s Extrac t 2 9 was a reactio n against thi s assumption . The fourth phase is evident in the contrast between the Catholic theologians here: John Paul II's Extract 4 contrasting sharply with both Fiorenza' s Extract 5 and Porter's Extract 7. And all of these contrasting even more sharpl y with Cupitt' s Extract 6 . Extract 4 offer s a forcefu l Christia n apologeti c agains t th e characteristi c assumption s o f secularism ,

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Extract 5 a feminist critique o f assumptions withi n bot h Christianit y an d th e worl d a t large, an d Extrac t 7 dissent s fro m traditiona l Catholi c attitude s t o sexua l behaviou r (especially 7.2). Despite the evident conviction o f these extracts, se t side by side they serve to reinforc e th e considerabl e pluralis m tha t i s characteristi c o f bot h theolog y an d intellectual lif e generall y in th e 1990s . Man y depict thi s a s th e postmoder n contex t o f present-day theolog y (see further m y Readings i n Modern Theology). Cupitt' s Extrac t 6 offers a radica l postmodern, non-realis t alternative. 6. SOCIALSSIGNIFICANCE All o f thes e theologian s hav e ha d a n influenc e upo n Christia n ethics . Interes t i n Bonhoeffer's writing s was inevitably sharpened b y his martyrdom, bu t hi s books remai n important fo r theology in their own right. Copleston, unti l his death i n 1992 , established himself throug h hi s History o f Philosophy a s th e mos t influentia l Roma n Catholi c philosopher i n England. His Aquinas successfully presente d hi s subject as one to be taken seriously b y present-da y philosophers , wh o migh t otherwis e den y hi s theologica l an d biblical presuppositions . Fletcher' s Situation Ethics, a s alread y noted , ha s ha d a majo r effect upo n Christia n ethic s an d fe w within th e disciplin e fai l t o tak e i t into account (i f only t o den y it s premises) . Pop e Joh n Pau l I I prove d himsel f t o b e on e o f th e mos t forceful an d remarkabl e Popes o f the twentiet h century . Hi s considerabl e us e of powe r within the Roman Catholic Church was a significant featur e of his ministry and i s plainly evident in Extract 4 in his attempt to constrain Catholic moral theologians (e.g . 4.15—20). Fiorenza remains a Catholic, albeit with the freedom to teach outside Catholic structures , and i s now one o f the most significan t feminis t theologians. He r boo k I n Memory o f Her has been extremely influential. Porter's influence as a modern re-interprete r o f Aquinas is increasing an d Cupitt' s positio n a s th e enfant terrible of moder n theolog y i s no w wel l established. Ther e is even an annual conference in Britain for people inspired b y Cupitt's non-realist religion . FURTHER READING Bonhoeffer ha s been th e subjec t of many studies, but amongs t thes e Eberhar d Bethge's Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1970 ) an d Joh n D . Godsey' s Th e Theology o f Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1960) are still amongst the most important. Comparison s of Niebuhr's and Bonhoeffer's ethical method s ar e containe d i n Edwar d LeRo y Long , Jr's A Survey o f Christian Ethics (1967). Suggeste d readin g o n natura l la w theory ha s alread y bee n give n i n relatio n t o Aquinas' Text II . Fletcher's Situation Ethics has been subjecte d to considerabl e criticism , including J . C . Bennet t (ed.) , Storm Over Ethics (1967) , G . R . Dunstan , Th e Artifice o f Ethics (1974) , and Stanle y Hauerwas , Vision an d Virtue (1974) . Fletcher responde d t o some o f th e earl y criticis m directe d a t hi m i n hi s Moral Responsibility (1967) . Jea n Porter's articl e o n virtu e ethic s i n m y Th e Cambridge Companion t o Christian Ethics (2001) provide s usefu l additional reading . An d Susa n Parsons ' Feminism and Christian Ethics (1996 ) provides a n influentia l ma p o f differin g understandings .

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EXTRACT 1 BONHOEFFER Ethics and Christian ethics 1.1 The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection. The first task of Christia n ethic s i s t o invalidat e thi s knowledge . I n launchin g thi s attac k o n th e underlying assumption s o f al l other ethics , Christia n ethic s stand s s o completel y alon e that it becomes questionabl e whether ther e is any purpose i n speaking of Christian ethic s at all. But if one does so notwithstanding, that can only mean that Christian ethics claims to discuss the origin of the whole problem o f ethics, and thus professes to be a critique of all ethics simply as ethics.

1.2 Already in th e possibilit y o f the knowledg e of good an d evi l Christia n ethic s discerns a falling awa y from th e origin . Ma n a t his origin knows only one thing : God. I t i s only in the unity of his knowledge of God that he knows of other men , of things, and of himself. He knows all things only in God, and Go d i n all things. The knowledge of good an d evi l shows tha t h e is no longe r a t one with thi s origin . 1.3 In the knowledge of good an d evil man doe s not understan d himsel f in the realit y of the destiny appointed i n his origin, but rathe r in his own possibilities, his possibility of being good or evil. He knows himself no w as something apar t from God , outside God, and thi s means that he now knows only himself and no longer knows God at all; for he can know God only if he knows onl y God . Th e knowledge o f good an d evi l is therefore separatio n from God . Onl y against God ca n me n kno w good an d evil . 1.4 But man canno t be rid of his origin. Instead of knowing himself in the origin of God, he must now know himself a s an origin. He interprets himsel f accordin g to his possibilities, his possibilities of being good o r evil, and he therefore conceive s himself to be the origin of good an d evil . Eritis sicut deus. 'Th e ma n i s become a s one o f us , to kno w good an d evil', says God (Gen . 3.22). 1.5 Originally man wa s made i n the imag e of God, but no w hi s likeness to Go d i s a stole n one. As the image of God man draws his life entirely from hi s origin i n God, but th e ma n who has become lik e God has forgotten ho w he was at hi s origin an d ha s made himself his ow n creato r an d judge . Wha t Go d ha d give n ma n t o be , ma n no w desire d t o b e through himself . But God's gift i s essentially God's gift. It is the origin that constitutes this gift. I f the origi n changes , th e gif t changes . Indee d th e gif t consist s solel y i n it s origin . Man a s the imag e o f Go d draw s his lif e fro m th e origi n o f God, bu t th e ma n wh o ha s become lik e Go d draw s hi s lif e fro m hi s ow n origin . I n appropriatin g th e origi n t o himself ma n too k t o himsel f a secre t o f Go d whic h prove d hi s undoing . Th e Bibl e describes thi s event wit h th e eatin g o f the forbidde n fruits . Ma n no w knows goo d an d

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evil. This does not mean that he has acquired new knowledge in addition to what he knew before, bu t th e knowledg e o f goo d an d evi l signifie s th e complet e reversa l o f man' s knowledge, which hitherto ha d bee n solel y knowledge of God as his origin . I n knowing good and evil he knows what only the origin, God Himself, can know and ought to know. It is only with extreme reserve that even the Bible indicates to us that God is the One who knows o f goo d an d evil . I t i s the firs t indicatio n o f th e myster y of predestination , th e mystery of an eternal dichotomy whic h has its origin in the eternally One, the mystery of an eternal choice and electio n b y Him i n whom ther e i s no darknes s but onl y light. To know good an d evi l is to know oneself as the origin of good an d evil, as the origi n of an eternal choice and election. How this is possible remains the secret of Him in whom there is no disunion because He is Himself the one and eternal origin and the overcoming of all disunion. This secret has been stolen from Go d by man in his desire to be an origin on his own account . Instea d o f knowin g onl y th e Go d wh o i s goo d t o hi m an d instea d o f knowing all things in Him, he now knows himself as the origin of good and evil . Instead of acceptin g th e choic e an d electio n o f God, ma n himsel f desire s t o choose , t o b e th e origin o f th e election . An d so , i n a certai n sense , h e bear s within himsel f the secre t o f predestination. Instea d of knowing himself solely in the reality of being chosen an d loved by God, he must now know himself in the possibility of choosing and of being the origin of goo d an d evil . H e ha s becom e lik e God , bu t agains t God . Herei n lie s th e serpent' s deceit. Ma n know s good an d evil , but becaus e he is not th e origin , because he acquires this knowledge only at the price of estrangement from th e origin, the good an d evi l that he knows are not th e good an d evil of God but goo d and evil against God. They are good and evi l o f man' s ow n choosing , i n oppositio n t o th e eterna l electio n o f God . I n becoming like God man ha s become a god agains t God . 1.6 This finds its expression in the fac t tha t man , knowing of good an d evil , has finally torn himself loose from life , that is to sa y from th e eternal life which proceeds from th e choice of God. 'And now, lest he put fort h his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for eve r ... he drove out th e man ; and h e placed a t th e eas t of the garde n o f Eden Cherubims, an d a flaming swor d which turned ever y way, to keep the way of the tree of life' (Gen . 3.2 2 an d 24) . Ma n know s goo d an d evil , agains t God , agains t hi s origin , godlessly an d o f his ow n choice , understandin g himsel f accordin g t o hi s ow n contrar y possibilities; and h e is cut of f from th e unifying , reconcilin g life i n God , and i s delivered over t o death . Th e secre t whic h ma n ha s stole n fro m Go d i s bringin g abou t man' s downfall. 1.7 Man's life i s now disunion wit h God , with men , with things, and wit h himself. 1.8 Instead o f seein g Go d ma n see s himself . 'Thei r eye s wer e opened ' (Gen . 3.7) . Ma n perceives himself in his disunion wit h God and with men. He perceives that he is naked. Lacking th e protection , th e covering , which Go d an d hi s fellow-ma n afforded him , h e finds himself laid bare. Hence there arises shame. Shame is man's ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement fro m th e origin ; it i s grief for thi s estrangement, an d th e powerles s longing to return to unity with the origin. Man is ashamed because he has lost something

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which i s essential t o hi s origina l character , to himsel f as a whole; h e i s ashamed o f hi s nakedness. Just as in the fairy-stor y the tree is ashamed of its lack of adornment, so , too , man i s ashame d o f th e los s o f hi s unit y wit h Go d an d wit h othe r men . Sham e an d remorse are generally mistaken fo r one another . Ma n feel s remors e when he has been a t fault; an d h e feel s sham e becaus e h e lack s something . Sham e i s mor e origina l tha n remorse. The peculiar fact tha t we lower our eye s when a stranger's eye meets our gaz e is not a sign of remorse for a fault, but a sign of that shame which, when it knows that it is seen, i s reminded o f somethin g tha t i t lacks , namely, the los t wholenes s of life , it s ow n nakedness. T o mee t a stranger' s gaz e directly , as i s required, fo r example , i n makin g a declaration of personal loyalty, is a kind of act of violence, and i n love, when the gaz e of the othe r is sought, it i s a kind o f yearning. In both case s it i s the painfu l endeavour t o recover the lost unit y by either a conscious and resolut e or else a passionate and devote d inward overcomin g o f shame as the sign of disunion .. . 1.9 In sham e man i s reminded o f his disunion wit h Go d and wit h other men ; conscience is the sig n o f man' s disunio n wit h himself . Conscienc e i s farthe r fro m th e origi n tha n shame, i t presuppose s disunio n wit h Go d an d wit h ma n an d mark s onl y th e disunio n with himsel f o f th e ma n wh o i s alread y disunite d fro m th e origin . I t i s th e voic e o f apostate life whic h desires at least to remai n on e with itself . I t i s the cal l to th e unit y of man wit h himself . This i s eviden t alread y fro m th e fac t tha t th e cal l o f conscienc e i s always a prohibition 'Tho u shal t not' . 'Yo u ough t no t t o have' . Conscienc e i s satisfie d when th e prohibitio n i s no t disobeyed . Whateve r i s no t forbidde n i s permitted . Fo r conscience life fall s int o two parts : what is permitted an d wha t is forbidden. There is no positive commandment. Fo r conscience permitted i s identical with good, and conscience does not registe r the fact, that even in this, man i s in a state of disunion with his origin. It follows fro m thi s also that conscienc e does not, like shame, embrac e the whole of life; i t reacts only to certain definite actions. I n one sense it is inexorable; i n forbidden actions it sees a peril to lif e a s a whole, that i s to say , disunion wit h oneself; it recalls what is long past an d represent s thi s disunio n a s somethin g whic h i s alread y accomplishe d an d irreparable, bu t th e fina l criterio n remain s precisel y tha t unit y wit h onesel f whic h i s imperilled onl y i n th e particula r instance s i n whic h th e prohibitio n i s disobeyed. Th e range o f experienc e o f conscienc e doe s no t exten d t o th e fac t tha t thi s unit y itsel f presupposes disunio n wit h Go d an d wit h me n an d tha t consequently , beyon d th e disobedience t o th e prohibition , th e prohibitio n itself , a s the cal l o f conscience , arise s from disunion wit h the origin. Thi s means that conscienc e i s concerned no t wit h man's relation t o Go d and t o othe r me n but wit h man's relatio n t o himself . But a relation o f man to himself, in detachment fro m hi s relation to God and to other men, can arise only through man' s becoming lik e God in the disunion .

1.10 Conscience itself reverses this relation. I t derives the relation to God and to men from th e relation of man to himself. Conscience pretends to be the voice of God and the standard for th e relation to other men. It is therefore from his right relation to himself that man is to recove r the righ t relatio n t o Go d and t o othe r men . Thi s reversa l is the clai m o f the man wh o ha s become lik e God i n his knowledge of good an d evil . Man ha s become th e origin o f goo d an d evil . H e doe s no t den y hi s evil ; bu t i n conscienc e ma n summons 73

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himself, who has become evil , back to hi s proper, better self, to good. This good, which consists i n th e unit y of man wit h himself, i s now t o b e th e origi n o f all good. I t i s th e good o f God , an d i t i s th e goo d fo r one' s neighbour . Bearin g withi n himsel f th e knowledge of good and evil, man has become judge over God and men, just as he is judge over himself .

1.11 Knowing o f goo d an d evi l i n disunio n wit h th e origin , ma n begin s t o reflec t upo n himself. Hi s lif e i s now hi s understandin g o f himself , whereas a t th e origi n i t wa s hi s knowledge o f God . Self-knowledg e is now th e measur e and th e goa l o f life . Thi s hold s true eve n when man presse s ou t beyon d th e bound s o f hi s ow n self . Self-knowledg e is man's interminabl e strivin g t o overcom e hi s disunio n wit h himsel f b y thought ; b y unceasingly distinguishin g himsel f fro m himsel f h e endeavour s t o achiev e unit y wit h himself. 1.12 All knowledge is now based upo n self-knowledge . Instead o f the origina l comprehension of God and of men and of things there is now a taking in vain of God and of men and of things. Everything now is drawn in into th e process of disunion. Knowledge now means the establishment o f the relationship t o oneself; it means the recognitio n in all things of oneself and o f oneself in al l things. And thus , for man wh o i s in disunion wit h God, all things are in disunion, what is and wha t should be , life an d law , knowledge and action , idea an d reality , reaso n an d instinct , dut y an d inclination , convictio n an d advantage , necessity an d freedom , exertio n an d genius , universa l an d concrete , individua l an d collective; eve n truth, justice, beauty and lov e com e int o oppositio n wit h on e another , just as do pleasure and displeasure, happiness and sorrow. One could prolong the list still further an d th e cours e o f human histor y add s t o i t constantly . Al l these disunion s ar e varieties of the disunion in the knowledge of good and evil . 'The point of decision of the specifically ethical experience i s always conflict.' Bu t in conflict the judge is invoked; an d the judge is the knowledg e of good an d evil ; he i s man. 1.13 Now anyon e wh o read s th e Ne w Testament eve n superficiall y canno t bu t notic e th e complete absenc e o f thi s worl d o f disunion , conflic t an d ethica l problems . No t man' s falling apar t fro m God , fro m men , fro m thing s an d fro m himself , bu t rathe r th e rediscovered unity , reconciliation , i s now th e basi s o f th e discussio n an d th e 'poin t o f decision o f th e specificall y ethica l experience'. The lif e an d activit y of me n i s not a t all problematic or tormente d o r dark : it i s self-evident, joyful, sur e and clear . 1.14 It i s i n lesus' s meetin g wit h th e Pharise e tha t th e ol d an d th e ne w ar e mos t clearly contrasted. The correct understandin g o f this meetin g i s of the greates t significanc e for the understanding of the gospel as a whole. The Pharisee is not a n adventitious historical phenomenon of a particular time . H e is the man t o whom onl y th e knowledge o f good and evi l has come to be of importance in his entire life; i n other words, h e is simply the man of disunion. Any distorted picture of the Pharisees robs Jesus's argument with them of it s gravit y and it s importance . Th e Pharise e i s tha t extremel y admirable ma n wh o 74

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subordinates hi s entire life t o hi s knowledge of good an d evi l and i s as severe a judge of himself a s o f hi s neighbou r t o th e honou r o f God , who m h e humbl y thank s fo r thi s knowledge. Fo r th e Pharise e ever y momen t o f lif e become s a situatio n o f conflic t i n which h e ha s t o choos e betwee n goo d an d evil . For th e sak e of avoidin g an y laps e hi s entire though t i s strenuousl y devote d nigh t an d da y t o th e anticipatio n o f th e whol e immense range of possible conflicts, to the reaching of a decision in these conflicts, and to the determinatio n o f hi s ow n choice . Ther e ar e innumerable factor s t o b e observed , guarded against and distinguished. Th e finer the distinctions th e surer will be the correct decision. Thi s observatio n extend s t o th e whol e o f lif e i n al l its manifol d aspects . Th e Pharisee i s not opinionated ; specia l situation s an d emergencie s receiv e specia l consid eration; forbearanc e and generosit y are not exclude d b y the gravit y of the knowledge of good an d evil ; the y ar e rathe r a n expressio n o f thi s gravity . An d ther e i s n o ras h presumption here, or arrogance or unverifie d self-esteem . The Pharisee is fully consciou s of hi s ow n fault s an d o f hi s dut y o f humilit y an d thankfulnes s towards God . But , of course, there are differences, whic h for God's sak e must not b e disregarded, between th e sinner and the man who strives towards good, betwee n the man who becomes a breaker of the law out o f a situation o f wickedness and th e ma n wh o does s o out o f necessity. If anyone disregards these differences, i f he fails to take every factor int o account in each of the innumerabl e case s of conflict, he sins against the knowledg e of good an d evil .

1.15 These me n wit h th e incorruptibl y impartial an d distrustfu l vision canno t confron t any man in any other way than by examining him with regard to his decisions in the conflict s of life . An d so , even when the y come fac e t o fac e wit h Jesus , they canno t d o otherwis e than attempt t o forc e Him , too, int o conflicts and int o decisions i n order t o see how He will conduc t Himsel f i n them . I t i s this tha t constitute s thei r temptatio n o f Jesus. One need onl y read th e twenty-secon d chapte r o f St Matthew, with th e question s about th e tribute money , th e resurrectio n o f the dead an d th e first and grea t commandment , an d then the story of the good Samarita n (Luke 10.25) and the discussions about the keeping of the Sabbat h (Matt . 12.11) , and on e will be most intensel y impressed by this fact. Th e crucial point abou t al l these arguments is that Jesu s does not allo w Himself to be drawn in into a single one of these conflicts and decisions . With each of His answers He simply leaves the cas e of conflict beneat h Him . When i t i s a matter o f conscious malic e on th e part o f the Pharisee s Jesus's answer is the stil l cleverer avoidance of a cleverly laid trap , and as such it may well have caused the Pharisees to smile. But that is not essential . Just as the Pharisees cannot do otherwise than confront Jesus with situations of conflict, so, too, Jesus canno t d o otherwis e tha n refus e t o accep t thes e situations . Jus t a s the Pharisees ' question an d temptatio n arise s from th e disunion o f the knowledge of good an d evil , so, too, Jesus's answer arises from unit y with God, with the origin, and fro m th e overcoming of th e disunio n o f ma n wit h God . Th e Pharisee s an d Jesu s ar e speakin g o n totall y different levels . That is why their words so strikingly fail to make contact, and that is why Jesus's answers do not appea r to be answers at all, but rathe r attacks of His own against the Pharisees , which i s what they , in fact , are .

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Situation ethics 2.1 A thir d approach , i n betwee n legalis m an d antinomia n unprincipledness , i s situatio n ethics. (To jump from one polarity to the other would be only to go from th e frying pan to the fire). The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed wit h the ethical maxims of his community an d its heritage, and he treats them wit h respect as illuminators of his problems. Jus t the same he is prepared i n any situation to compromis e them o r se t them asid e i n th e situation if love seems bette r serve d b y doing so .

2.2 Situation ethic s goe s par t o f th e wa y wit h natura l law , b y acceptin g reaso n a s th e instrument o f moral judgment, whil e rejecting the notio n that the goo d i s 'given' in th e nature o f things , objectively . I t goe s par t o f th e wa y with Scriptura l la w b y acceptin g revelation a s the sourc e o f the norm while rejecting al l 'revealed' norm s or law s but th e one command - t o lov e God in the neighbour. Th e situationist follow s a moral la w or violates it according to love's need . Fo r example, 'Almsgivin g is a good thin g //...' The situationist neve r says , 'Almsgivin g i s a goo d thing . Period! ' Hi s decision s ar e hypothetical, no t categorical . Onl y th e commandmen t t o lov e i s categoricall y good . 'Owe no on e anything , excep t t o lov e on e another ' (Rom . 13.8) . I f help t o a n indigen t only pauperise s an d degrade s him , th e situationis t refuse s a handou t an d find s som e other way . He makes n o la w out o f Jesus' 'Giv e to ever y one wh o begs fro m you.' I t is only on e ste p fro m tha t kin d o f Biblicis t literalis m t o th e kin d tha t cause s wome n i n certain sects to refuse blood transfusions even if death results - eve n if they are carrying a quickened fetu s tha t will be lost too . Th e legalist says that eve n if he tells a man escape d from a n asylu m where his intende d victi m is , if he finds and murder s him , a t least onl y one si n has been committe d (murder) , no t tw o (lyin g as well)! 2.3 As Brunner puts it, 'The basis of the Divine Command i s always the same, but it s conten t varies wit h varyin g circumstances. ' Therefore , th e 'erro r of casuistry doe s not li e in th e fact tha t i t indicate s th e infinit e variet y o f form s whic h th e Comman d o f lov e ma y assume; it s error consist s i n deducing particula r laws from a universal law ... as though all coul d b e arrange d beforehan d .. . Love , however , i s fre e fro m al l this predefinition ' (The Divine Imperative, pp . 132f) . W e might say , from th e situationist' s perspective , that it is possible to derive general 'principles' from whateve r is the one and only universal law (agape for Christians , something els e for others), but not law s or rules . We cannot mil k universals fro m a universal ! 2.4 William Templ e pu t i t thi s way : 'Universa l obligatio n attache s no t t o particula r judgments o f conscience bu t t o conscientiousness . Wha t act s are righ t ma y depend o n circumstances .. . bu t ther e i s a n absolut e obligatio n t o wil l whateve r ma y o n eac h occasion b e right ' (Nature, Ma n an d God, p. 405) . Ou r obligatio n i s relativ e t o th e

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situation, bu t obligatio n i n th e situatio n i s absolute . W e ar e onl y 'obliged ' t o tel l th e truth, fo r example , i f th e situatio n call s fo r it ; i f a murdere r ask s u s hi s victim' s whereabouts, ou r dut y migh t be t o lie . Ther e i s in situatio n ethic s a n absolut e elemen t and a n elemen t o f calculation , a s Alexander Mille r onc e pointe d out . Bu t i t woul d b e better to say it has an absolute norm and a calculating method. Ther e is weight in the old saying that what is needed i s 'faith, hope and charity'. We have to find out what is 'fitting' to be truly ethical, to us e H. R. Niebuhr's word for it in his Th e Responsible Self. Situatio n ethics aims at a contextual appropriateness - no t the 'good' or the 'right' but the fitting . 2.5 A cartoon i n a fundamentalist magazine once showed Mose s scowling, holding his stone tablet wit h it s graven laws, all ten, an d a n eage r stonecutter sayin g to him , 'Aaro n said perhaps you'd let us reduce them t o "Ac t responsibl y i n love"'. This was meant a s a dig at th e situationist s an d th e ne w morality, bu t th e legalisti c humou r i n i t merel y states exactly what situatio n ethic s call s for ! With Dietric h Bonhoeffe r w e say, 'Principles ar e only tools in God's hands, soo n to be thrown awa y as unserviceable' (Ethics, p . 51) . 2.6 One competent situationist , speakin g to students , explaine d the position thi s way. Rules are 'like "Punt on fourt h down" , or "Take a pitch when the count i s three balls". These rules are part o f the wis e player's know-how , an d distinguis h him fro m th e novice . But they are not unbreakable . The best player s are those who know when to ignor e them. I n the game of bridge, fo r example, ther e is a useful rul e which says "Second hand low" . Bu t have you eve r played wit h anyon e who followe d the rul e slavishly? Yo u say to hi m (i n exasperation), "Partner, wh y didn't yo u play your ace? We could have set the hand." And he replies , unperturbed , "Secon d han d low! " Wha t i s wrong? The sam e thin g tha t wa s wrong when Kant gave information to the murderer. He forgot th e purpose of the game ... H e n o longe r though t o f winning the hand , bu t o f being abl e t o justif y himsel f by invoking the rule.' 2.7

This practical temper of the activist or verb-minded decision maker, versus contemplative noun-mindedness, i s a major Biblica l rather tha n Hellenisti c trait . I n Abraham Heschel' s view, 'The insistence upon generalisation at the price of a total disregar d of the particular and concret e is something which would be alien to propheti c thinking. Prophetic words are never detached fro m th e concrete, historic situation. Theirs is not a timeless, abstract message; it always refers t o a n actual situation. Th e general is given in the particula r and the verificatio n o f the abstrac t is in th e concrete ' (God in Search o f Man: A Philosophy of Judaism, p. 204). A 'leap of faith' i s an action decision rathe r than a leap of thought, for a man's fait h i s a hypothesis tha t h e takes seriousl y enough t o ac t o n an d liv e by. 2.8 There ar e various name s fo r this approach : situationism, contextualism , occasionalism , circumstantialism, eve n actualism. Thes e label s indicate , o f course, tha t th e cor e o f th e ethic they describe is a healthy and primary awareness that 'circumstance s alter cases' i.e., tha t i n actua l problems o f conscience th e situationa l variable s are to b e weighed as heavily a s the normativ e o r 'general ' constants . 77

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2.9

The situational factors are so primary that we may even say 'circumstances alter rules and principles'. It i s said tha t whe n Gertrud e Stein lay dying she declared, 'I t i s better t o ask questions than to give answers, even good answers. ' This is the temper of situation ethics . It i s empirical , fact-minded , dat a conscious , inquiring . I t i s antimoralisti c a s wel l a s antilegalistic, fo r i t i s sensitiv e t o variet y an d complexity . I t i s neithe r simplisti c no r perfectionist. I t i s casuistry (case-based) in a constructive and nonpejorativ e sense of the word. We should perhaps call i t 'neocasuistry'. Like classical casuistry , i t is case-focuse d and concrete , concerne d t o brin g Christia n imperative s int o practica l operation . Bu t unlike classica l casuistry , thi s neocasuistr y repudiate s an y attemp t t o anticipat e o r prescribe real-lif e decision s i n their existential particularity . It works with two guidelines from Paul : 'The writte n cod e kills , bu t th e Spiri t give s life' ( 2 Cor . 3.6) , an d 'Fo r th e whole la w is fulfille d i n on e word , "Yo u shal l lov e you r neighbou r a s yourself' (Gal . 5.14) .. .

2.10 Christian situatio n ethic s ha s onl y on e nor m o r principl e o r la w (call i t wha t yo u will ) that i s bindin g an d unexceptionable , alway s goo d an d righ t regardles s o f th e circumstances. That i s 'love' - th e agape o f the summary commandmen t t o lov e God and th e neighbour . Everythin g else without exception , al l laws and rule s an d principle s and ideal s and norms , ar e only contingent, only valid i f they happen t o serv e love in an y situation. Christia n situatio n ethic s i s not a system or progra m o f living according t o a code, but a n effort t o relat e love to a world of relativities through a casuistry obedient t o love. I t i s the strateg y of love. Thi s strateg y denies tha t ther e are , a s Sophocles thought , any unwritten immutabl e law s of heaven, agreein g with Bultman n that al l such notion s are idolatrous and a demonic pretension. 2.11 In non-Christia n situatio n ethic s som e othe r highes t goo d o r summum bonum will, of course, tak e love' s place a s the one and only standar d - suc h a s self-realisation i n the ethics of Aristotle. But the Christian is neighbour-centred first and last. Love is for people, not fo r principles ; i.e . i t i s persona l - an d therefor e whe n th e impersona l universa l conflicts with the personal particular , the latter prevail s in situation ethics. Because of its mediating position, prepare d t o ac t on mora l law s or i n spite o f them, th e antinomian s will cal l situationist s sof t legalists , an d legalist s wil l call them cryptoantinomians . 2.12 It i s necessary to insis t tha t situatio n ethic s i s willing t o mak e ful l an d respectfu l us e of principles, t o b e treate d a s maxim s bu t no t a s law s o r precepts . W e migh t cal l i t 'principled relativism' . T o repea t th e ter m use d above , principle s or maxim s o r general rules ar e illuminators. But they ar e not directors. The classi c rul e of moral theolog y ha s been t o follo w law s but t o d o i t a s much as possible according t o lov e and accordin g t o reason (secundum caritatem e t secundum rationem). Situation ethics, on th e othe r hand , calls upon u s to keep law in a subservient place, so that only love and reaso n really count when th e chip s are down ! 78

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2.13

Situationists have no invariable obligatio n to what are sometimes called 'middl e axioms', logically derived as normative propositions based on love. An example of what is meant is the propositio n tha t lov e o f th e neighbou r i n practic e usually mean s puttin g huma n rights befor e propert y rights . Th e ter m 'middl e axiom' , first used b y J.H. Oldha m an d William Temple , an d notabl y b y Joh n C . Bennet t i n America , i s wel l mean t bu t unfortunate, sinc e an axio m is a self-validating, nonderivativ e proposition an d i t cannot stand i n the 'middle' between something logically prior to it and a subsequent derivative. Middle-axiom theorist s mus t bewar e les t they , too , sli p int o th e erro r o f derivin g universals fro m universals .

2.14 There are usually two rules of reason used in moral inquiry. One is 'internal consistency', and nobod y ha s any quarrel with i t - a proposition ough t no t to contradic t itself . The other i s 'externa l consistence ' (analogy) , th e principl e tha t wha t applie s i n on e cas e should appl y in all similar cases. It is around thi s second cano n that the difference s arise . Antinomians rejec t analog y altogether , wit h thei r doctrin e o f radica l particularity . Situationists ask, very seriously, if there ever are enough case s enough alik e to validate a law or to suppor t anythin g mor e tha n a cautiou s generalisation . In Edmon d Cahn' s puckish phrase , 'Ever y case is like every other case , and n o tw o case s are alike. ' 2.15 There is no rea l quarrel here between situationis m an d a n ethic of principles, unless the principles ar e hardened int o laws . Bisho p Robinso n says : 'Such a n ethi c [situationism ] cannot but rely , in deep humility, upon guiding rules, upon the cumulative experience of one's own and othe r people' s obedience . I t is this bank of experience which gives us ou r working rule s o f "right" an d "wrong" , an d withou t the m w e could no t bu t flounder ' (Honest t o God, pp . 119-20) . Nevertheless , i n situatio n ethic s eve n th e mos t revere d principles ma y be thrown aside if they conflict i n an y concrete cas e with love. Eve n Kar l Earth, who writes vehemently of 'absolutely wrong' actions , allow s fo r what he calls the ultima ratio, th e outsid e chanc e tha t lov e i n a particula r situatio n migh t overrid e th e absolute. Th e instance he gives is abortion. 2.16 Using terms mad e popular b y Tillich an d others, we may say that Christia n situationis m is a method tha t proceeds, so to speak, from (1 ) its one and only law, agape (love) , to (2 ) the sophia (wisdom ) of the church and culture , containing many 'general rules' o f more or less reliability, to (3 ) the kairos (moment o f decision, the fullnes s of time) in which the responsible self i n the situation decides whether the sophia can serve love there, or not. This is th e situationa l strateg y i n capsul e form . T o legalist s i t wil l see m t o trea t th e sophia without enoug h reverenc e and obedience ; t o antinomian s i t wil l appear befuddle d an d 'inhibited' b y the sophia. 2.17 Legalists make a n ido l o f the sophia, antinomian s repudiat e it , Situationists use it. They cannot giv e to an y principle les s tha n lov e mor e tha n tentativ e consideration , fo r the y know, with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 'Th e question o f the good is posed and i s decided in the 79

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midst of each definite, yet unconcluded, uniqu e and transient situation of our lives, in the midst o f ou r livin g relationship s wit h men , things , institution s an d powers , i n othe r words i n thei r mids t o f ou r historica l existence ' (Ethics, p . 185) . An d Bonhoeffer , o f course, i s a modern Christia n ethicist who wa s himself executed fo r tryin g to kill , even murder, Adolf Hitle r - s o far did he go as a situationist ... Abortion - a situation 2.18 In 196 2 a patient i n a state mental hospital rape d a fello w patient , a n unmarrie d girl ill with a radical schizophrenic psychosis. The victim's father , learnin g what had happened , charged th e hospital with culpable negligence and requeste d tha t a n abortion t o end th e unwanted pregnancy be performed at once, in an early stage of the embryo. The staff an d administrators o f th e hospita l refuse d t o d o so , o n th e groun d tha t th e crimina l law forbids al l abortion excep t 'therapeutic' ones when the mother's life is at stake - becaus e the moral law , i t i s supposed , hold s tha t an y interferenc e wit h a n embry o afte r fertilisation i s murder, i.e . th e takin g of an innocen t huma n being' s life .

2.19 Let's relat e the thre e ethical approaches to thi s situation . The rape has occurred and the decisional questio n is: May we rightly (licitly ) terminat e this pregnancy, begun in act of force and violence by a mentally unbalanced rapist upon a frightened, mentall y sick girl? Mother and embryo are apparently healthy on all the usual counts. 2.20 The legalists would sa y NO. Their positio n i s that killin g is absolutely wrong, inherentl y evil. I t i s permissibl e onl y a s self-defenc e an d i n militar y service , whic h i s hel d t o b e presumptive self-defenc e o r justifiabl e homicide . I f th e mother' s lif e i s threatened , abortion i s therefore justified, but fo r n o othe r reasons . (Man y doctors tak e a n elasti c view o f 'life ' an d thereb y justif y abortion s t o sav e a patient' s mental lif e a s wel l a s physical.) Eve n i n case s wher e the y justif y it , i t i s onl y excused — it i s stil l hel d t o b e inherently evil. Many Protestants hol d thi s view, an d som e humanists . 2.21 Catholic mora l theolog y goe s fa r beyon d eve n th e rigi d legalis m o f th e crimina l law , absolutising their prohibition o f abortion absolutely, by denying all exceptions and calling even therapeutic abortion wrong . (They allow killing in self-defence agains t malicious, i.e. deliberate, aggressor s bu t no t i n self-defenc e agains t innocent , i.e . unintentional , aggressors.) Thus, if it i s a tragic choice of the mother' s lif e o r th e baby's , as can happen in rar e cases, neither ca n be saved . 2.22 To this ethica l nightmare legalism replies: 'It i s here that th e Churc h appear s merciless, but sh e i s not . I t i s her logi c whic h i s merciless ; an d sh e promise s tha t i f the logi c i s followed th e woma n wil l receiv e a rewar d fa r greate r tha n a numbe r o f year s o f life. ' Inexplicably, shockingly , Dietric h Bonhoeffe r says the same thing: 'The life of the mother is i n th e han d o f God , but th e lif e o f the chil d i s arbitrarily extinguished . Th e questio n 80

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whether the lif e o f the mothe r o r th e lif e o f the chil d i s of greater value can hardl y be a matter fo r huma n decision ' (Ethics, p . 150) .

2.23 The antinomians - bu t who can predict wha t they would say ? Their ethi c is by its nature and definitio n outsid e th e reac h o f eve n generalities . W e ca n onl y guess , no t unreasonably, tha t i f th e antinomia n live s b y a lov e norm , h e wil l b e ap t t o favou r abortion i n thi s case . 2.24 The situationists , i f their nor m i s the Christia n commandmen t t o lov e the neighbour , would almost certainly in this case, favour abortion an d support the girl's father's request. (Many purely humanistic decision makers are of the same mind about abortio n following rape, and afte r inces t too.) The y would i n al l likelihood favou r abortio n fo r th e sak e of the patient' s physica l and menta l health , no t onl y i f it were needed t o sav e her life . I t is even likel y the y woul d favou r abortio n fo r th e sak e o f th e victim' s self-respec t o r reputation or happiness or simply on the ground that no unwanted and unintended baby should eve r be born . 2.25 They would, on e hopes, reaso n tha t it is not killing because ther e i s no person or huma n life i n a n embry o a t a n earl y stag e o f pregnanc y (Aristotl e an d S t Thoma s hel d tha t opinion), o r eve n i f i t were killing , i t woul d no t b e murde r becaus e i t i s self-defenc e against, in this case, not one but tw o aggressors. Firs t there is the rapist, who being insan e was morall y an d legall y innocent , an d the n ther e i s th e 'innocent ' embry o whic h i s continuing th e ravisher' s origina l aggression ! Eve n self-defenc e legalis m woul d hav e allowed th e gir l t o kil l he r attacker , n o matte r tha t h e wa s innocent i n th e foru m o f conscience because of his madness. The embryo is no more innocent, no less an aggressor or unwelcome invader! Is not th e most loving thing possible (the right thing) in this case a responsibl e decisio n t o terminat e th e pregnancy? 2.26 What thin k ye?

EXTRACT 3 COPLESTON Objections to natural law

3.1 Aquinas' theor y o f th e natura l mora l la w give s ris e t o a numbe r o f questions . I ca n comment, however , only very briefly o n a fe w selected questions . An d I begin wit h th e one which i s perhaps most likel y to presen t itsel f to th e reader' s mind .

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Aquinas believed that action s which are contrary to th e natural moral law are not wron g simply because God prohibits them ; they are prohibited b y God because they are wrong. Suicide is wrong and eating meat on Friday when one is bound by the ecclesiastical law of abstinence i s als o wrong . Bu t whil e there i s nothing wron g i n itsel f i n eatin g mea t o n Friday, s o tha t t o d o s o i s wron g onl y whe n an d becaus e i t i s forbidden , suicid e i s contrary to the natural moral law and s o is wrong in itself. Ecclesiastical precepts like the law of abstinence on Friday s can be suspended or changed, but th e natural moral law is unalterable. I t i s tru e tha t Aquina s distinguishe s betwee n primar y an d secondar y precepts, derive d from th e first, and say s that th e last can be 'changed' for special reason s in a fe w particula r cases . Bu t wha t h e mean s i s tha t i n som e particula r case s th e circumstances o f a n ac t ma y b e suc h tha t i t n o longe r fall s unde r th e clas s o f action s prohibited by the precept. For instance, we can say in general that if someone entrust s his property t o u s for safe keeping and ask s for it back we ought t o retur n it . But no sensibl e man would sa y that i f someone entrusts us with a knife or a revolver an d asks for it back when he is in a state of homicidal mani a we are obliged t o retur n it . In its general form , however, the precept remain s valid. And we can say with truth that Aquinas believed i n a set of unalterable moral precepts . 3.3 The questio n arises , however , whether thi s theor y i s compatible wit h th e empirica l fac t that differen t peopl e an d differen t socia l groups hav e held divergen t mora l convictions . Do not th e empirica l fact s sugges t that th e mora l la w is not unalterabl e bu t changeable ? Or, t o us e th e value-language , d o no t th e empirica l fact s sugges t tha t value s ar e historically relativ e an d tha t ther e ar e n o universa l an d absolut e values ? Believin g in a human natur e which i s constant Aquina s wa s led to postulat e a n unchangeabl e moral law; but som e o f the precepts which he regarded a s forming par t o f its content hav e no t been regarde d b y many people i n the past an d ar e not no w regarded b y many people as moral precepts at all. Is it not reasonabl e to conclude that Aquinas simply canonized, a s it were, the moral conviction s an d standard s o f his time or a t least o f the society t o which he belonged ? 3.4 This i s a far-reachin g problem , an d I mus t conten t mysel f with makin g th e followin g relevant point , namel y tha t difference s i n mora l conviction s d o no t b y themselve s constitute a disproo f o f th e theor y tha t ther e i s an unchangeabl e mora l law . Fo r ther e might be an unchangeable moral law and at the same time varying degrees of insight int o the conten t o f this law, these difference s bein g explicable in term s o f the influenc e o f a variety o f empirica l factors . T o us e th e value-language , ther e migh t b e objectiv e an d absolute value s and a t th e sam e tim e differen t degree s o f insight int o thes e values . I d o not mea n to imply either that the existence of an unchanging moral la w was for Aquinas an uncertain hypothesis or that the explicability o f differences i n moral conviction on the theory tha t ther e i s such a la w proves o f itsel f that th e theor y i s true. M y point i s that differences o f opinion abou t moral precepts and moral values do not constitute a proof of the relativis t position . An d thi s poin t i s one tha t shoul d b e taken int o consideratio n i n any discussio n o f the problem .

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Aquinas himsel f wa s not ignoran t o f th e fac t tha t differen t group s hav e hel d differen t moral convictions . Accordin g t o hi m al l me n ar e awar e o f th e mos t fundamenta l principles in their most genera l form. All men would agree that in some sense good i s to be pursued and evil avoided. If a man denies this principle he is probably denying not th e principle itself but tha t what another ma n or a given society calls good is good. But when we come to les s general and mor e particular conclusions, derive d fro m th e fundamental principles, ignoranc e i s certainly possible . 'I n th e cas e of some th e reaso n i s blinded b y passion o r b y ba d habit s o r b y physica l conditions . Fo r example , accordin g t o Juliu s Caesar robber y use d no t t o b e considere d wron g amon g th e Germans , althoug h i t i s expressly agains t th e natura l law ' [i.e . II. 6 above}. A fortiori ther e ca n b e difference s o f opinion abou t th e applicatio n o f precept s t o particula r cases . Conscienc e ma y b e erroneous, whether throug h our ow n fault o r through some caus e fo r which we are no t responsible. An d if our conscienc e tells us that we ought to perfor m a particular act, it is our mora l dut y to perfor m it. 'Every conscience, whether it is right or wrong, whether it concerns things evil in themselves or things morally indifferent, obliges us to act in such a way that he who acts against his conscience sins' (Quodlibetum, 3,27). This does not mean that ther e i s no suc h thin g a s right reaso n an d n o suc h thin g a s an objectivel y correct moral conscience ; bu t ignoranc e an d mistake s ar e possibl e i n mora l matters , an d th e nearer we come to particular s the greate r is the field for error . 3.6 But though the reader may be prepared t o admit that differences in moral convictions do not by themselves alone constitute a disproof of Aquinas' theory of an unalterable moral law, he may easily feel that the latter's whole approach to the subject of moral precept s is extremely artificial and excessively rationalistic. Fo r Aquinas talks as though peopl e derive or deduce less general from mor e general moral precepts and then procee d to apply these precepts to particula r actions. Bu t surely, it may be said, this picture does not represen t the facts . Mora l precepts seem to be ultimately reducible to th e expressio n o f feelings of approval o r disapprova l o f certai n action s o r o f certai n type s o f action . True , w e d o enunciate genera l moral precepts ; and mora l philosopher s hav e not unnaturall y tried t o rationalize their ow n mora l conviction s o r thos e o f the grou p o r societ y to whic h they belonged. But feeling comes first: it is the whole basis of ethics. It may indeed appear that ethical dispute s ca n b e settle d b y rationa l argument , an d i n a certai n sens e the y ca n sometimes b e s o settled . Fo r example , i f two me n ca n agre e on a definition of murde r they can discuss in a rational manner whether the action of killing someone who is dying from a painful an d incurabl e diseas e falls unde r th e definitio n or not . Eac h ma n point s out t o th e othe r feature s o f the actio n i n questio n whic h h e think s tha t th e othe r ha s overlooked, an d i t i s at an y rate possible that i n the en d on e will succeed i n convincin g the other. Bu t rational argument is possible onl y when there is already a certain measure of mora l agreement . I s i t no t a notoriou s fac t tha t i f tw o peopl e disagre e abou t fundamental mora l issue s o r defen d sharpl y oppose d set s o f values , neithe r ca n b e convinced simpl y by the arguments advance d b y the other? They will either agree to diffe r or they will end in anger and even abuse. Moreover, the function o f any arguments which may be advanced by one of them seems to be that of facilitating a change of feeling o r of emotional attitude . An d perhap s th e sam e ca n b e sai d o f discussion s concernin g th e moral qualit y of particular actions o r type s of action whe n thes e discussions canno t b e

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reduced t o a quasi-logica l proble m o f classification . I f tw o me n discus s th e questio n whether so-called 'mercy killing' is right or wrong, the one maintaining that it is right, the other that it is wrong, the function o f drawing attention to aspects of the action which the one man believe s to hav e been overlooke d b y the other seem s to be that o f facilitating a change of emotive reactio n i n the other. Th e one man desire s to substitut e in the othe r man a feeling of approval for a feeling of disapproval o r vice versa, as the case may be; and the arguments and appeals to reason which are employed ar e techniques used to facilitat e this change of emotive response. In fine, morality i s 'more properly felt than judged of, to use Hume's word s (Treatise, 3,1,2) . 3.7 It ca n hardly be denied tha t Aquinas' languag e sometimes seem s to impl y an extremel y rationalistic interpretation o f the wa y in which people for m thei r mora l judgments. But we have to loo k a t what he means by the statement s whic h he makes. H e compares, for example, th e precep t tha t goo d i s to b e pursued and evi l avoide d wit h th e propositio n that th e whol e i s greate r tha n an y on e o f it s parts . An d whil e h e though t tha t thi s proposition i s known t o al l human being s onc e the y hav e ha d experienc e o f materia l things he did not mea n to sa y that ever y human bein g explicitly enunciates it to himself in so many words, even though he would certainly assent to it if it were proposed t o him. 'In the cognitive powers there can be inchoate habits ... And the understanding of [first ] principles is termed a natural habit. For it i s owing to th e very nature of the intellectua l soul that once a man knows what is a whole and what is a part he knows that ever y whole is greater than any one of its parts, though he cannot know what is a whole and what is a part excep t throug h idea s derived fro m images ' (S.T., la , Ilae, 51,1). Directly a huma n being ha s experience of material wholes he recognizes immediately the relatio n between whole and part, and that he knows this can be seen by the fac t tha t he never assumes that any part i s greater than th e whole of which it is a part. Bu t it does not necessaril y follow that he ever says to himsel f i n so many words that a whole is greater than any one o f its parts. Similarly , a huma n bein g obtain s th e ide a o f good , o f a thin g considere d a s perfecting o r a s satisfyin g hi s natur e i n som e way , onl y throug h experienc e o f actua l objects of desire and sources of satisfaction. Bu t because of his innate inclinations to th e good i n thi s sens e h e immediatel y apprehends i t a s something t o b e pursued, whil e h e apprehends evil , considere d a s tha t whic h i s oppose d t o hi s natur e an d natura l inclinations, as something to be avoided. The fact that he does apprehend the good or the perfection a s something to be pursued an d th e evil , that which is opposed t o o r thwart s his natural inclinations , a s something t o be shunned an d avoide d i s shown by the whol e of hi s conduct . Fo r ever y huma n bein g naturall y shun s whateve r appear s t o hi m a s opposed to his nature. But it does not necessaril y follow that he ever explicitly enunciate s to himsel f th e propositio n tha t goo d i s t o b e pursue d an d evi l avoided . On e ma y b e tempted t o sa y that al l this belongs t o th e instinctiv e level and th e level of feeling rathe r than th e leve l of rationa l apprehension . Bu t Aquinas would doubtles s commen t tha t a man does not shun death, for example, simply in the same way that an animal can be said to do so. For he shuns it not only instinctively but because and in so far as he apprehend s it with his reason a s destructive of his nature. And since he shuns it and avoid s it as evil, knowledge tha t evil is to be shunned and avoide d i s implicitly presupposed. Though we could hav e no ide a o f evil except throug h experienc e o f things opposed t o ou r natura l inclinations, apprehensio n o f th e principl e tha t evi l i s t o b e avoide d i s logicall y 84

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presupposed by recognition o f the fac t tha t thi s particular thing is to be avoided because it i s evil. 3.8 As regards deduction, Aquinas did not think that we can deduce th e proposition that t o have sexual intercourse with someone else' s wife i s wrong from th e precep t tha t goo d is to b e pursue d an d evi l avoided simpl y by contemplating, a s it were, this latte r precept. We can no more do this than we can deduce from th e principle of non-contradiction th e proposition tha t a thing which is white all over cannot a t the sam e time be red al l over. We obtain our idea s of whiteness and rednes s from othe r source s than a n analysis of the principle o f non-contradiction. A t the sam e time we reject th e proposition tha t a thing can b e simultaneousl y whit e al l ove r an d re d al l ove r precisel y becaus e i t involve s a contradiction. Similarly, we do not obtai n our idea s of other people and of wives and of sexual intercours e simpl y by analysin g the precep t tha t goo d i s to b e pursue d an d evi l avoided. Bu t once we have obtained thos e idea s we reject, if we do reject, the propositio n that i t is right to have sexual intercourse wit h someone else's wife because we apprehend actions of this sort as being evil. The word 'deduction', therefore, can be very misleading; and what Aquinas actually says is that other precept s of the natural law are 'founded on ' or 'based on' the precept that goo d is to be done and evil avoided. The concrete good for man ca n be known onl y by reflection o n huma n natur e as known i n experience. 3.9 It has been sai d abov e that w e reject, 'i f we do reject' , th e propositio n tha t i t i s right t o have sexua l intercours e with someon e else's wife becaus e w e apprehend action s of this sort a s bein g evil . A s w e hav e seen , Aquina s though t tha t th e neare r w e com e t o particulars th e more possibl e becomes ignoranc e o r error concerning the objectiv e good for man , an d s o concerning th e particula r precept s o f the natura l moral law . But some particular types of action ar e practically always apprehended a s evil, as opposed i n som e way or other t o human nature. Fo r example, even at the lowest level of civilization some acts will be immediatel y 'felt ' t o b e destructiv e o f socia l cohesio n i n th e grou p and s o opposed t o huma n natur e considere d unde r it s socia l aspect . An d the y wil l awake n disapprobation i n a quasi-instinctiv e manner . I hav e pu t th e wor d 'felt ' i n inverte d commas an d I hav e spoke n o f a 'quasi-instinctive ' manne r becaus e I thin k tha t whil e Aquinas might agree that th e term 'feel ' ha s a use in drawing attention t o th e differenc e between, say , a primitive man' s apprehension of an act as evil and a moral philosopher' s reflective appreciation of its moral quality he would still maintain that the primitive man mentally apprehends the ac t as evil and tha t the term 'feel ' i s inappropriate in so far as it suggests the absenc e o f any mental activity .

3.10 One ca n put th e matte r i n thi s way perhaps. Aquina s thought tha t al l men shar e som e very vagu e ideas abou t th e goo d fo r man , precisel y becaus e the y ar e me n an d posses s certain natura l tendencie s an d inclination s i n common . Fo r instance , me n se e tha t knowledge of the truths required for life should b e sought for. And if one wishes to draw attention t o the immediac y of the perceptio n one might perhaps say that they 'feel' this . But Aquinas woul d doubtles s insist that mental activity is involved an d that some wor d like 'apprehend' o r 'understand ' i s more appropriate . 85

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3.11

But when it comes to apprehendin g what are the truths necessary for life and, in general, to determinin g i n a concret e wa y what i s th e goo d fo r ma n an d t o formin g mora l judgments which are less general than wha t Aquinas calls the primar y principles of th e natural la w in their wides t form , ther e i s room for prolonged reflectio n an d discussion . There i s roo m als o fo r th e interventio n o f a variet y o f factor s othe r tha n rationa l reflection, whic h ca n exercis e a n importan t influenc e i n th e formatio n o f man's mora l outlook an d se t of determinat e values . And thes e factor s ca n b e internal , physiologica l and psychological , as well as external, lik e upbringing and socia l environment .

3.12 Finally, when there is the questio n o f applying principles to individual cases , of deciding whether a given action belongs t o thi s class or tha t class , and i s right or wrong, Aquinas recognizes (cf . hi s commentar y o n Ethics, 2 , c.2 , lectio 2 ) tha t thoug h th e mora l philosopher ca n provid e som e help , b y drawin g attention , fo r example , t o differen t features o f the action, he cannot settl e a person's perplexity b y a process o f sheer logica l deduction. Ultimatel y a man has to make his own decision. And Aquinas observes that a man's actual decisio n ma y be perfectly correct even though th e abstract proble m has not been satisfactorily settled. Perhaps we might say that in such cases the man 'feels ' that th e action is right or wrong, as the case may be, in order to emphasize the difference betwee n the immediac y of the judgmen t and a piece o f logical or mathematica l deduction . Bu t Aquinas would doubtless say that the virtue of 'prudence' often enable s a man t o discern the objective moral quality of an action eve n when he is unable to giv e adequate reasons, which would satisf y a moral philosopher, fo r saying that the action is right or wrong. An action is right or wrong for Aquinas in virtue of its relation to the good fo r man, and this relation i s discerned b y the mind , even though the immediac y of the discernin g may be such a s to inclin e on e t o us e th e wor d 'feeling' . An d th e (o r a t leas t a ) fundamenta l difference betwee n Aquinas' theory and a purely emotive moral theory is that the forme r asserts an objective and determinabl e relationshi p i n virtue of which action s ar e good or bad, righ t o r wrong, whereas the latter doe s not . 3.13 In this section I have mentioned idea s suggested by the relativist and emotive theories of ethics. My purpose i n doing so, however, was clarificatory rathe r than polemical , an d t o avoid misunderstandin g I want t o explai n thi s point . I t wa s no t m y intentio n t o 'expound' these theories; an d therefor e I have carefully avoide d mentioning th e name of any philosopher sav e that o f Hume, who was mentioned a s the autho r o f a propositio n which i t i s usua l t o quot e o n thes e occasions . No r wa s i t m y intentio n t o refut e th e theories b y means of Aquinas' philosophy . M y purpose wa s simply that o f using some ideas suggested by these theories to clarify th e latter's position, The chief plank on which the relativisti c theory of morals rest s is probably th e empirica l fac t tha t differen t peopl e have hel d divergen t view s abou t mora l matters . An d a s fact s ar e fact s whateve r conclusions ma y be drawn fro m them , i t i s important t o as k whether Aquinas had an y idea of these fact s and whether hi s ethical theor y i s capable o f accounting fo r them o r of allowing fo r them . Similarly , in th e mora l lif e o f ordinar y peopl e deduction , a s thi s i s understood i n logic an d mathematics, doe s no t see m t o pla y any very conspicuous role , whereas somethin g tha t migh t plausibl y b e describe d a s 'feeling ' appear s t o b e a n 86

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important factor . It is therefore a pertinent questio n t o ask whether Aquinas thought that everyone form s hi s o r he r mora l conviction s b y a proces s o f logica l deductio n an d whether his theory can account fo r the factor o f immediacy in our mora l and valuational judgments. In other words, my purpose was simply that of making a brief contribution t o the clarificatio n o f Aquinas ' positio n wit h th e ai d o f idea s suggeste d b y late r ethica l theories.

EXTRACT 4 JOHN PAU L I I The crisis of moral truth 'You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free' (Jn. 8.32)

4.1 The huma n issue s mos t frequentl y debate d an d differentl y resolve d i n contemporar y moral reflectio n are al l closely related , albei t i n various ways , to a crucial issue: human freedom. 4.2 Certainly peopl e toda y hav e a particularl y strong sens e of freedom . As the [Vatica n II] Council's Declaration o n Religiou s Freedo m Dignitatis Humanae had alread y observed , 'the dignity of the human perso n i s a concern o f which people of our tim e are becoming increasingly more aware'. Hence the insistent demand tha t peopl e be permitted to 'enjo y the use of their ow n responsible judgment an d freedom , an d decid e o n their action s o n grounds of duty and conscience, without external pressure or coercion'. In particular, the right to religiou s freedom an d to respec t fo r conscience on it s journey towards the truth is increasingly perceived as the foundatio n of the cumulativ e rights of the person . 4.3 This heightened sens e of the dignit y of the huma n perso n an d o f his or he r uniqueness , and o f th e respec t du e t o th e journe y o f conscience , certainl y represent s on e o f th e positive achievement s o f modern culture . Thi s perception , authenti c a s i t is , has bee n expressed i n a numbe r o f more o r les s adequat e ways , some o f which howeve r diverge from th e trut h abou t ma n a s a creatur e an d th e imag e o f God , an d thu s nee d t o b e corrected an d purifie d in the ligh t o f faith . 4.4 Certain current s o f moder n though t hav e gon e s o fa r a s to exal t freedo m t o suc h a n extent tha t i t becomes an absolute, which would then be the sourc e of values. This is the direction taken b y doctrines which hav e lost the sens e o f the transcendent or which ar e explicitly atheist. The individual conscienc e i s accorded th e statu s of a supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about good and evil. To the affirmation that one has a duty to follow one's conscience is unduly added th e affirmation tha t one' s moral judgmen t i s true merel y by the fac t tha t i t ha s its origin i n 87

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the conscience . Bu t in this way the inescapabl e claim s o f truth disappear , yieldin g thei r place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and 'bein g at peace with oneself, so much so that som e hav e come t o adop t a radically subjectivisti c conceptio n of moral judgment . 4.5 As is immediately evident, the crisi s of truth i s not unconnecte d wit h this development. Once th e ide a o f a universal truth abou t th e good , knowable by human reason , i s lost, inevitably the notion of conscience also changes. Conscience is no longer considered in its primordial reality as an act of a person's intelligence, the function o f which is to apply the universal knowledg e of the goo d i n a specifi c situatio n an d thu s to expres s a judgment about th e righ t conduct to be chosen here and now. Instead, there is a tendency to grant to the individua l conscience the prerogative of independently determining the criteria of good an d evi l an d the n actin g accordingly . Suc h a n outloo k i s quit e congenia l t o a n individualist ethic , wherein each individual is faced with his own truth, different fro m th e truth of others. Taken to its extreme consequences, this individualism leads to a denial of the very idea o f human nature . 4.6 These differen t notion s ar e a t th e origi n o f current s o f though t whic h posi t a radica l opposition between mora l law and conscience , and betwee n natur e an d freedom . 4.7 Side by side with its exaltation of freedom, ye t oddly in contrast with it, modern cultur e radically questions th e ver y existence of this freedom. A number o f disciplines, grouped under th e nam e of the 'behavioura l sciences' , have rightly drawn attention t o th e man y kinds o f psychologica l an d socia l conditionin g whic h influenc e th e exercis e o f huma n freedom. Knowledg e of these conditioning s an d th e stud y the y have received represen t important achievement s which hav e found applicatio n i n variou s areas, fo r exampl e i n pedagogy o r th e administratio n o f justice . Bu t som e people , goin g beyon d th e conclusions whic h ca n b e legitimatel y draw n fro m thes e observations , hav e com e t o question or eve n deny the ver y reality o f human freedom . 4.8 Mention shoul d also be made here of theories which misuse scientific researc h about th e human person . Arguin g fro m th e grea t variet y o f customs , behaviou r pattern s an d institutions present i n humanity, these theories en d up, i f not wit h an outrigh t denial of universal huma n values, at least with a relativistic conception o f morality . 4.9 'Teacher, what good mus t I do t o hav e eternal life?' Th e questio n of morality, to which Christ provide s th e answer , canno t prescin d fro m th e issu e o f freedom . Indeed , i t considers tha t issu e central, for there ca n be no moralit y without freedom : 'It is only in freedom tha t ma n ca n tur n t o wha t i s good'. Bu t what sor t o f freedom ? Th e Council , considering our contemporaries who 'highly regard' freedom and 'assiduously pursue' it, but wh o 'ofte n cultivat e it i n wron g ways a s a licence t o d o anythin g they please, even evil', speaks o f 'genuine' freedom: 'Genuin e freedom i s an outstandin g manifestation o f the divine image in man. For God willed to leave man "i n the power of his own counsel" , 88

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so that h e would see k his Creato r o f his ow n accor d an d woul d freel y arriv e at ful l an d blessed perfectio n b y cleaving to God ' (Dignitatis Humanae). Althoug h eac h individua l has a right to b e respected i n his own journey in search o f the truth, ther e exists a prior moral obligation, and a grave one at that, to see k the truth and to adhere to it once it is known. A s Cardina l Joh n Henr y Newman , tha t outstandin g defende r o f th e right s o f conscience, forcefull y pu t it : 'Conscience ha s right s because i t ha s duties'.

4.10 Certain tendencie s in contemporary moral theology , under the influence of the current s of subjectivis m an d individualis m jus t mentioned , involv e nove l interpretation s o f th e relationship o f freedo m t o th e mora l law , human natur e an d conscience , an d propos e novel criteri a fo r the mora l evaluatio n o f acts. Despite thei r variety , these tendencie s are at on e i n lessening or eve n denying th e dependenc e o f freedom o n truth . 4.11 If we wish to undertake a critical discernment o f these tendencies - discernmen t capable of acknowledging what is legitimate, usefu l an d o f value in them, whil e at the sam e time pointing out their ambiguities, dangers and errors - w e must examine them in the light of the fundamenta l dependence o f freedom upo n truth , a dependence whic h has found it s clearest an d mos t authoritativ e expressio n i n th e word s o f Christ : 'Yo u wil l know th e truth, an d th e trut h wil l set you free ' (Jn . 8.32). Freedom and law 'Of the tre e of the knowledg e o f good an d evi l you shal l not eat ' (Gen. 2.17)

4.12 In the Book of Genesis we read: 'The Lord God commanded th e man, saying, "You may eat freely of every tree of the garden; but o f the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall no t eat , for i n th e da y that yo u ea t of it you shal l die"' (Gen . 2.16-17). 4.13 With this imagery, Revelation teaches that the powe r to decid e what is good an d what is evil does not belon g to man, but t o God alone. The man i s certainly free, inasmuc h as he can understand an d accept God's commands. And he possesses a n extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat 'of every tree of the garden'. But his freedom i s not unlimited : it must hal t before the 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil', for it is called t o accept th e moral la w give n b y God . I n fact , huma n freedo m find s it s authenti c an d complet e fulfilment precisel y i n th e acceptanc e o f tha t law . God , wh o alon e i s good , know s perfectly what is good fo r man, and by virtue of his very love proposes this good t o ma n in th e commandments . 4.14 God's la w does no t reduce , muc h les s do awa y with human freedom ; rather , i t protect s and promote s tha t freedom . I n contrast, however , some present-day cultura l tendencie s have give n ris e t o severa l current s o f though t i n ethic s whic h centr e upo n a n allege d conflict betwee n freedo m an d law. These doctrine s would gran t to individual s or socia l 89

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groups the right to determine what is good or evil. Human freedom would thus be able to 'create values' and would enjoy a primacy over truth, to the point that truth itself would be considered a creation of freedom. Freedom would thus lay claim to a moral autonomy which would actuall y amount t o a n absolut e sovereignty.

4.15 The modern concer n for th e claim s of autonomy has not faile d t o exercis e an influenc e also i n th e spher e o f Catholi c mora l theology . Whil e th e latte r ha s certainl y neve r attempted t o set human freedom against the divine law or to question the existence of an ultimate religious foundation for moral norms, it has, nonetheless, been led to undertake a profoun d rethinkin g abou t th e rol e of reason an d o f faith i n identifyin g mora l norm s with referenc e t o specifi c 'innerworldly ' kinds of behaviour involving oneself, other s and the material world. 4.16 It mus t b e acknowledge d tha t underlyin g thi s wor k o f rethinkin g ther e ar e certai n positive concerns which to a great extent belong to the best tradition of Catholic thought. In response to the encouragement of the Second Vatican Council, there has been a desire to foster dialogu e with modern culture , emphasising the rational - an d thus universally understandable and communicable - characte r of moral norm s belonging to the sphere of the natural moral law. There has also been an attempt to reaffirm th e interior character of th e ethica l requirement s derivin g fro m tha t law , requirement s whic h creat e a n obligation fo r the wil l only because such an obligatio n wa s previously acknowledged b y human reaso n and, concretely, by personal conscience . 4.17 Some people, however, disregarding the dependence of human reason on Divine Wisdom and th e need, given the present state of fallen nature, for Divine Revelation as an effectiv e means for knowing moral truths, eve n those of the natura l order, have actually posited a complete sovereignt y o f reaso n i n th e domai n o f mora l norm s regardin g th e righ t ordering o f life i n this world. Suc h norms would constitut e th e boundaries fo r a merely 'human' morality; they would be the expressio n of a law which man i n a n autonomou s manner lay s down fo r himself and which has its source exclusivel y in human reason . In no way could Go d be considered th e Author of this law, except in the sens e that huma n reason exercise s it s autonomy in setting down laws by virtue o f a primordial and tota l mandate give n t o ma n b y God . Thes e trend s o f though t hav e le d t o a denial , i n opposition to Sacre d Scriptur e (cf . Mt. 15.3-6 ) an d th e Church' s constant teaching , o f the fac t tha t th e natura l mora l la w has Go d a s its author, an d tha t man , by the us e of reason, participate s i n the eterna l law , which it i s not fo r him t o establish . 4.18 In thei r desire , however , t o kee p th e mora l lif e i n a Christia n context , certai n mora l theologians have introduced a sharp distinction , contrary to Catholic doctrine, betwee n an ethical order, which would be human in origin and o f value for this world alone, and an orde r of salvation, fo r which onl y certai n intention s and interio r attitudes regardin g God and neighbour would be significant. Thi s has then led to an actual denial that there exists, i n Divin e Revelation , a specifi c an d determine d mora l content , universall y vali d 90

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and permanent . Th e wor d o f Go d woul d b e limite d t o proposin g a n exhortation , a generic paraenesis, whic h th e autonomou s reaso n alon e woul d the n hav e th e tas k o f completing with normativ e directive s which are truly 'objective', tha t is , adapted t o th e concrete historica l situation . Naturally , an autonomy conceived i n this way also involves the denia l o f a specifi c doctrina l competenc e o n th e par t o f th e Churc h an d he r Magisterium with regard to particular moral norms which deal with the so-called 'huma n good'. Such norms would not be part of the proper content o f Revelation, and would no t in themselve s be relevan t fo r salvation .

4.19 No on e ca n fai l t o se e that suc h a n interpretatio n o f th e autonom y o f huma n reaso n involves positions incompatibl e wit h Catholi c teaching . 4.20 In such a context i t is absolutely necessary to clarify , i n the ligh t of the word of God an d the livin g Tradition o f the Church , th e fundamenta l notions o f human freedo m an d o f the mora l law, a s well as their profoun d an d intimat e relationship . Only thu s wil l it be possible t o respon d t o th e rightfu l claim s of human reaso n i n a way which accepts th e valid element s presen t i n certai n current s o f contemporar y mora l theolog y withou t compromising th e Church' s heritag e o f mora l teachin g wit h idea s derive d fro m a n erroneous concep t o f autonomy .

EXTRACT 5 FIORENZA Ethics and feminist theology 5.1 Feminist theolog y seek s to unmas k th e oppressiv e function [of ] patriarchal theology . I t explores women's experienc e of oppression an d discriminatio n i n society and religio n as well a s our experience s o f hope , love , an d fait h i n th e struggl e fo r liberatio n an d well being. Feminis t theolog y ha s a dua l parentage : th e women' s liberatio n movemen t i n society and churc h a s well a s the academ y and theologica l institutions .

5.2 Feminist studies and theology are proud t o be the daughters of the women's movemen t and at the same time ambivalent about thei r origin and setting in the academy. Whereas in the last century the women's movemen t sough t access for women to the academy and the ministr y by pointing t o women' s specia l 'feminine' contributions , i n thi s century it did s o by claiming women's ful l personhoo d an d 'equa l rights.' However, women began to realize that it does not suffic e t o argue for a special sphere or domain fo r women or t o integrate wome n int o male-dominate d societ y an d church . Wha t i s necessar y i s th e transformation o f the patriarchal state and church into institution s tha t allow for the ful l participation o f women a s well a s men i n societ y and church .

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In the last century women gained access to academic work and theological studies at first through specia l course s o r seminarie s fo r women . The n wome n wer e admitte d t o ful l academic an d theologica l studie s i f they coul d prov e tha t the y wer e a s good as , if no t better than , thei r mal e colleagues . Althoug h wome n scholar s hav e fulfille d al l th e standards of academic excellence, only a very few have achieved faculty status or scholarly influence. Today feminist theologians no longer seek merely to become incorporated int o the androcentri c academ y an d theologica l institutions . Rather , wome n scholar s hav e come to realiz e more and more that all intellectual institution s and academic discipline s need t o b e redefine d an d transforme d if they are to allo w women t o participat e full y a s subjects o f academi c researc h an d theologica l scholarship . Feminis t studies , therefore , seek to engender, in the words of Thomas Kuhn, a paradigm shift fro m th e male-centere d scholarship tha t i s produce d b y th e patriarcha l academ y an d churc h t o a feminis t comprehension o f the world , huma n life , an d Christia n faith . 5.4 Just a s feminis t studie s i n genera l hav e affecte d al l area s o f academi c inquiry , s o als o feminist theolog y has worked for the transformation of theology. I t seeks to integrat e the emancipatory struggle s fo r ending societa l and ecclesia l patriarch y wit h religiou s vision , Christian faith , an d theologica l reflection . I f theolog y i s 'fait h seekin g understanding ' [Anselm] the n feminis t theolog y is best understoo d a s the reflectio n o n Christia n faith experiences in the struggle against patriarchal oppression. I f theology, as Karl Rahner puts it, has the vocatio n t o engag e the whole church i n self-criticism, then feminis t theolog y has the tas k t o engende r ecclesia l self-criticism , no t jus t o f the church' s androcentris m but als o of its historical patriarchal structures. 5.5 Feminist theolog y thu s begin s wit h th e experienc e o f wome n strugglin g agains t patriarchal exclusio n an d fo r liberatio n an d huma n dignity . Jus t a s othe r liberatio n theologies s o a critica l feminis t theolog y o f liberatio n understand s itsel f a s a systemi c exploration an d 'secon d order ' reflectio n o n thi s experience . It s method s ar e therefore critical analysis , constructiv e exploration , an d conceptua l transformation . A s a critica l theology feminist theology identifies no t onl y the androcentric dynamics and misogynist elements of Christian Scriptures , traditions , and theologie s but als o those structures of the church that perpetuate patriarchal sexism as well as racism, classism, and colonialis m in an d outsid e th e church . As a constructiv e theology feminis t theologica l studie s seek both t o recove r and reconstruc t all those theological symbol s and expression s that reflec t the liberative faith experiences of the church as the discipleship community of equals, the experiences o f the peopl e o f God who are women . 5.6 However, i t mus t b e note d tha t feminis t studie s articulat e emancipator y struggles and liberatory perspective s i n differen t way s and wit h th e hel p o f varyin g philosophical o r sociological-political analyses . Whil e libera l feminisms , fo r example , emphasiz e th e autonomy an d equa l right s o f th e individual , socialis t o r Marxis t feminism s se e th e relationship between socia l class and gende r within Western capitalis m as determinative of women' s societa l oppression . Thir d Worl d feminism s i n tur n insis t tha t th e

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interactions o f racism , colonialism , an d sexis m ar e definin g women' s oppressio n an d struggle fo r liberation . Suc h a variety of analyse s and theoretica l perspective s result s i n different conception s o f feminism , o f women's liberation , an d o f being huma n i n th e world. 5.7 A diversit y i n approac h an d polyphon y i n feminis t intellectua l articulation s ar e als o found i n feminist theology and in feminist studies in religion. It is therefore misleading to speak of feminist theolog y in the singular or of the feminist theolog y without recognizing many differen t articulation s an d analyse s o f feminist theologies. Thes e articulation s no t only share in the diverse presuppositions an d theoretical analyses of women's experienc e but als o wor k withi n divers e theologica l frameworks , e.g . neo-orthodoxy , libera l theology, proces s theology , evangelica l theology , o r liberatio n theology . A s theologica l articulations the y are rooted i n diverse ecclesial visions and plurifor m political-religious contexts. I hav e define d m y ow n approac h a s a critica l theolog y o f liberatio n tha t i s indebted to historical-critical , critical-political , and liberation-theological analyse s and is rooted i n experience and engagemen t as a Catholic Christian woman. 5.8 Insofar a s feminist theology does not begi n with doctrines abou t Go d and revelatio n bu t with th e experienc e of women strugglin g for liberation fro m patriarcha l oppression, it s pluriform visio n i s articulate d b y th e voice s o f wome n fro m differen t races , classes , cultures, an d nations. These theological voices challeng e androcentric forms of liberatio n theology t o articulat e th e preferential 'option' for the poor an d oppresse d a s the optio n for poo r an d oppressed women, because the majority of the poor an d exploited today are women and children dependent o n women fo r survival. As the African theologia n Mercy Amba Oduyoy e has pointed out :

[Feminist theology] is not simpl y a challenge to the dominant theolog y of the capitalist West. I t is a challenge to th e malenes s of Christian theolog y worldwide, togethe r with the patriarcha l presupposition s tha t gover n al l ou r relationship s a s wel l a s th e tradition; a situation i n which men (mal e human beings) reflecte d upo n th e whole of life o n behal f o f the whol e community of women an d men , youn g an d old . 5.9 If the primar y theological questio n fo r liberation theolog y is not 'Ho w can we believe in God?' bu t 'Ho w ca n th e poo r achiev e dignity? ' the n a critica l feminis t theolog y o f liberation mus t articulat e the quest fo r women's dignit y and liberation ultimatel y as the quest fo r God . Th e hermeneutica l privileg e o f th e poo r mus t b e articulate d a s th e hermeneutical privileg e o f poor women. Liberatio n theologie s of all colors must addres s the patriarcha l dominatio n an d sexua l exploitation o f women.

5.10 In short , feminis t theologian s d o not limi t themselves either to studie s about wome n o r to th e academy . The y d o no t see k to articulat e a theology o f woman no r restric t thei r questions t o women . Rather , they understand themselve s as charting a different metho d and a n alternativ e perspective for doing theology . Therefore, a critical feminist theolog y 93

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of liberatio n construct s theolog y neithe r i n term s o f th e traditiona l taxonomie s an d dogmatic topoi o f theolog y suc h a s God , Christ , creation , church , sacraments , o r eschatology, nor i n terms of an academic religious studies approach. Both approaches are valuable and necessary; but the y attempt t o chart new visions and roads with the help of the ol d maps of doctrinal or academi c theology.

5.11 Instead, a critica l feminis t liberatio n theolog y seek s t o adop t a n interdisciplinar y approach an d framewor k tha t doe s no t reinscrib e professiona l division s amon g th e various theological discipline s but use s their method s a s tools for investigating women's theological questions. I t does not envisio n theology as a doctrinal system but a s an active theological reflection on liberation struggles, as an emancipatory way of 'doing' theology. Hence feminist theological studie s seek dialogic, participatory, non-hierarchical processe s of doing researc h an d teachin g that cultivat e the gift s an d talent s of everyone. I n short , feminist studie s deman d no t jus t th e admittanc e o f wome n t o th e academ y an d th e recognition o f women's intellectua l contributions i n the pas t an d th e present . The y also require a reconceptualizatio n an d revisio n o f accepte d theoretica l assumption s an d frameworks tha t unti l ver y recentl y hav e bee n base d entirel y o n th e experience s an d studies o f 'educated' men . 5.12 A critical theolog y o f liberation calls for a paradigm shif t i n theological and ecclesia l self understanding. I t insist s tha t th e androcentric-clerica l theolog y produce d i n Wester n universities an d seminarie s no longer ca n claim to b e a Catholic Christia n theolog y i f it does no t see k to becom e a theology inclusiv e of the experience s o f al l members o f th e church, women an d men , lay and clergy . Dominant theolog y canno t eve n claim to be a Christian theology proclaiming the 'goo d news ' o f salvation i f it does not tak e seriously its call to b e a theology subversive of every form o f sexist-racist-capitalist patriarchy. 5.13 As a critical theology of liberation feminis t theolog y conceives of feminism no t jus t as a theoretical worldview and analysis but as a women's liberation movement fo r societal and ecclesial change. Patriarchy in this view is not jus t a 'dualistic ideology ' o r androcentri c world-construction i n language, not just the domination o f all men over all women, but a sociocultural politica l syste m o f grade d subjugation s and dominations . Sexism , racism, and militaristic colonialism are the roots and pillars of patriarchy. Sinc e the silence and invisibility o f Catholi c wome n ar e generate d b y patriarcha l law s an d structure s o f th e church an d maintaine d b y androcentric, i.e. , male-defined , theology, a critical feminis t liberation theolog y seeks to investigat e in wha t way s androcentric language , theoretica l frameworks, an d theologica l scholarship sustain and perpetuat e patriarchal structures i n society an d church . 5.14 The ter m 'patriarchy ' i s ofte n use d interchangeabl y with 'sexism ' an d 'androcentrism. ' However, thes e feminis t analytica l categorie s mus t b e distinguished . Androcentris m o r androcentric dualis m i s t o b e understoo d a s a world-constructio n i n language . I t indicates a framework , mindset , o r ideolog y tha t legitimate s patriarchy . Patriarch y i n

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turn i s a societa l syste m o f dominatio n an d exploitatio n tha t i s structure d b y heterosexism, racism , nationalism, an d classism .

5.15 Patriarchal sexism is enforced by female 'sexua l slavery' that cut s across all lines of race, class, an d culture . Wherea s patriarcha l racis m define s certai n peopl e a s subhuma n i n order t o exploi t thei r labor , patriarcha l sexis m seek s t o contro l women' s procreativ e powers an d labor . Violenc e against wome n an d childre n i s increasin g a t a tim e when women clai m the ful l huma n right s and dignit y accorded t o mal e citizens. The political Right's attac k o n feminism , it s battl e fo r th e recriminalizatio n o f wome n an d thei r doctors, an d it s rhetori c fo r th e 'protectio n o f th e Christia n family ' see k t o reinforc e women's economi c dependency ; t o strengthe n th e patriarcha l control s o f women' s procreative powers , an d t o maintai n th e patriarcha l famil y a s th e mainsta y o f th e patriarchal state . Sexua l violence agains t women an d childre n i n an d outsid e th e hom e sustains the patriarcha l orde r o f male dominance : Anonymous verbal and bodily assault: rape - rap e in general, racia l rape, marital rape , wartime rape , gan g rape, chil d rap e - wif e an d women battering ; abortio n an d birth control laws ; involuntar y sterilizations ; unnecessar y hysterectomies ; clitoridectomie s and genita l mutilations ; prostitutio n an d femal e slavery ; sexua l harassmen t i n employment; aggressiv e pornography. [Rut h Bleier's Science an d Gender]

5.16 All thes e an d mor e ar e form s o f sanctione d violenc e agains t women . Wherea s sociobiologists vie w rap e a s a natural , biologica l tendenc y i n males , a s a biological imperative, feminis t studie s hav e documented tha t rap e an d othe r form s o f institutionalized violence agains t women ar e a social imperative necessary to uphol d patriarch y by force. 5.17 The struggle against the violence and dehumanization of societal and religious patriarchy in Western societie s i s at the hear t o f all liberation struggle s against racism, colonialism , militarism, an d poverty . Feminis t theolog y doe s no t jus t reflec t o n thes e struggles ; it is also shaped by them and i n turn inspire s them. Androcentric legitimations of patriarchal domination and victimization become more pronounced an d forceful wheneve r claims to equality and self-determinatio n gai n public recognition an d broad acceptance . Feminist thought i s labelled extremist , subversive , irrational, o r abnorma l because i t seeks to pu t forward a n alternativ e t o patriarch y a s the basis of Euro-American societ y o r church . It demystifies an d reject s cultura l o r religiou s value s o f mal e dominatio n an d subordin ation, which are the very standard o f reasonableness, veracity , and knowledge .

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EXTRACT 6 CUPITT Post-Realist Ethics 6.1 'Solar ethics' will be an attempt t o mak e a fresh star t i n moral philosophy; an d i t should not b e difficul t t o establis h th e clai m tha t a fresh star t i s needed .

6.2 For consider: modern societ y is repeatedly swept by waves of moral anxiety - abou t crime and socia l disorder , abou t 'standards ' i n th e medi a an d i n publi c life , abou t perceive d decline of moral institution s such as marriage and family , about the intractable and ofte n violent moral disagreements that nowadays surround almos t al l matters of life and death , about ou r treatmen t o f animals o r th e environment , an d s o on an d on . When a moral panic i s at it s height ther e i s much handwringin g an d muc h nostalgi a fo r a supposedl y simpler pas t whe n th e rule s wer e cleare r an d fol k fo r th e mos t par t abided b y them . People seize gratefully upo n the suggestion that all would be well with us if we would bu t return t o Tradition . The y may forge t tha t th e value of Tradition ca n easily be tested b y looking a t the many small communities of people in our cities who haven't yet lost touc h with it. These communities mostl y come from th e Middle East and fro m Asia . They cling determinedly to their ancestral languages, their social structure, their customs, beliefs and values. But many or mos t o f them lac k the technica l an d socia l skill s that woul d enabl e them t o pla y a full par t i n modern life , s o that they are caught in a sad circle. They cling to Traditio n an d it s values , becaus e i t alon e ca n consol e the m fo r th e povert y an d exclusion - tha t thei r clingin g t o i t i s also , sadly , causin g them . I f w e ar e thinkin g seriously of going back to Tradition , w e should loo k a t the ghetto s an d coun t th e cost . 6.3 Tradition is now way beyond an y possibility of revival or recovery; but (yo u may suggest) there is one obvious alternative to it. Moral philosophy, founde d by Socrates, is arguably the oldest and grandest 'academic ' subject (it s only serious riva l being cosmology , which much concerne d th e philosopher s wh o precede d Socrates) . Th e literatur e o f mora l philosophy an d ethics is huge, and to this day hundreds - mayb e thousands - o f people are employe d i n teachin g it . Ye t thi s grea t traditio n remain s curiousl y di m an d ineffectual, unconsulte d b y journalists and unknow n t o the public. It is felt t o be boring: it makes little or no impact . Onl y a handful o f writers from th e great tradition ar e still of any rea l interes t t o us , and onl y no w an d agai n doe s a modern write r suc h a s Alasdair Maclntyre write about the m i n a way that briefl y succeed s in attracting public attention . 6.4 Why has moral philosophy faile d - or , why is it failing? Why aren't people interested i n it? Because, we will reply, it has been too protective of the received moral order, and in its own curiou s wa y almos t a s traditionalis t a s Traditio n itself . I t ha s sough t t o justify morality, clingin g t o mora l realis m o r objectivis m lon g afte r tha t belie f ha d becom e manifestly untenable . Mora l philosopher s hav e bee n th e dogmati c theologian s o f morality, endlessl y tryin g t o postpon e a long-overdu e revolutio n withi n thei r ow n

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subject. Too often, i n ethics as in theology, the tradition is studied and commented upo n not because it is interesting but merel y because it is there, as the syllabus is studied merely because i t i s th e syllabus . Amazingly , moral philosoph y wa s th e las t subjec t o f al l t o become truly critical, in the work of writers like Nietzsche and Foucault. That is very late; and it is arguable that much of English-language moral philosophy has still not absorbe d their legacy. 6.5 What went wrong ? At the beginnin g of this century, reacting against Idealism, Bertran d Russell an d G. E. Moore attempte d t o reviv e Realism - a realism o f sense-data and , in Moore's case, also a form o f moral realism: in moral experience one directly intuited th e presence of non-natural mora l qualities. Thi s bizarre doctrine someho w appeale d to th e popular feelin g that realis m i s 'commonsense' and occupie s the hig h ground ; and s o it has remained influentia l for generations. Peopl e felt tha t yo u had a moral dut y to tr y t o find arguments for moral objectivism or realism; and as for emotivism, it was regarded as the last refug e t o which you might find yourself being reluctantly driven, but i t was not a position that anyone in their right min d would embrac e gladly and i n good conscience. Even otherwis e robus t character s like Russel l and Aye r fel t the y must pu t o n a show of being rather apologetic about being unable to do much better than endorse some form of emotivism i n ethics . Sola r ethic s i s quite different . I t make s n o bone s abou t bein g (i n traditional terms) a form of emotivism o r expressivism. But in order t o escape from tha t wretched high-ground problem we shall be turning many things upside-down and insideout - an d not making any apology at all for doing so. Like theologians, philosophers have got to giv e up bein g lackeys of the establishe d order . 6.6 So, if you agre e that Traditio n ha s failed , an d tha t mora l philosoph y a s we have been doing it has been addressing itself to all the wrong questions; and if you further agre e that we need a moral philosoph y bette r fitted to our cosmology and our culture - the n you may be ready for solar ethics. The Sun sees no reason at all to apologize fo r making suc h an exhibition o f itself all the time; it simply is its own outpouring self-expression. It puts on a good show . I t ha s no 'inwardness' ; that is , it i s not inwardl y subject to somethin g unseen tha t i s authoritativ e ove r it . I t doe s no t experienc e th e mora l orde r a s bein g something distinct fro m itsel f and its own activity. It is not driven, either by anxiety or by resentment: it is purely and only affirmative. I t coincides completely with its own joyous, headlong proces s of self-exteriorization - an d what's wrong with that? A powerful mora l need nowaday s drive s peopl e t o see k just suc h a n ethi c o f self-declaration . They want publicity, they want t o demonstrate ; the y want t o com e ou t o f the close t an d int o th e open. I think they are right. The public realm is the only real world, and public-ization is real-ization, both for our value s and fo r our selves . Yes, why shouldn't we go on a moral spending-spree, burning u p no t merel y our mone y but ou r selves ? 6.7 The olde r tradition , th e grea t traditio n tha t prevaile d a t leas t fro m Augustin e t o Kierkegaard, use d t o see k mora l an d religiou s Trut h b y a fligh t t o th e interior . Th e movement wa s always inwards, from societ y to solitude, fro m expressio n to recollection , and from oute r appearanc e to inne r reality. Perhaps such a turn inwards made sense in a

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period whe n people believed tha t anothe r worl d was more rea l than thi s world. Bu t not now: s o here we reverse the movement , settin g out instea d a solar ethi c of uninhibite d self-publication. I say flatly that ther e is no inne r space within the sel f through which we have access to another world mor e real than this one, an d indeed there simply isn' t any other world than this one, the common publi c world that is generated by our expression s and ou r symboli c exchanges. We do, w e must, come out to live. 6.8 Do you se e what i s emerging? Everythin g i s immanent, everything come s dow n t o on e level. There i s no transcenden t mora l order , ther e is no inne r world withi n the self , an d there is no othe r spher e o f action bu t thi s common worl d o f ours. Ther e i s nothing lef t for ethic s t o b e bu t tha t w e should lov e lif e an d pou r ou t ou r heart s - an d tha t i s emotivism, o r sola r ethics . A s the ma n says , 'Yo u ar e the ligh t o f the world ' (Matthew 5.14). Fo r solar ethics i s a version o f Christian ethics, if one may say so .. . 6.9 By solar ethics I mean an ethic or lifestyle o f all-out religiou s expression, th e best kind o f life tha t on e coul d hop e t o live.

6.10 I hav e describe d th e expressionis t visio n o f th e worl d elsewhere . I t i s a ver y thoroughgoing for m o f naturalism . Th e worl d i s see n a s a continuousl y outpouring , self-renewing strea m o f dancin g energies-read-as-signs , i n whic h ou r lif e i s wholl y immersed. Metaphorically, i t is a broadcast world, like a firework display. Everything is so evenly transient a s to creat e an effec t almos t o f stillness, a very strongly aesthetic effect . Hence the image s of the fountain , the Sun , and th e slow-motio n explosion . 6.11 Against such a background, we can see why people's most deeply-felt ethical desire today is fo r pur e expressiv e freedom . The y see k a styl e o f livin g tha t completel y escape s o r disregards, or goes beyond, the traditional binar y contrasts i n terms of which our culture and ou r world-view have been constructe d i n the past ... 6.12 We liv e at a time whe n ou r outloo k i s becoming completel y immanen t o r naturalistic . Everybody is beginning t o suspec t th e truth, whic h is that th e suppose d 'inne r space' of subjectivity was only ever a cultural construct, a manner o f speaking. There i s no more real privat e worl d insid e us . There i s no objectiv e moral order . Ther e i s no more-Rea l world above , an d no objective orde r of Reason. Outsidelessly, ther e is only the solar flux of creatio n an d destruction , th e outpourin g self-renewin g strea m o f dancin g an d scattering energies-read-as-signs. And i n thi s context, sola r ethics i s a religious ethic fo r the world an d fo r life a s we now know it to be. If you wish to live not b y Tradition bu t simply i n th e truth , sola r ethics is for you. 6.13 Solar living replaces traditional idea s of Transcendence an d self-transcendence , and I am also suggestin g tha t i t doe s mor e tha n that . I t consummate s them . Beyon d th e 98

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distinctions ther e i s a furiou s sola r jo y that fulfil s olde r idea s o f Transcendence; an d i n purely expressive living , by sola r self-outing , there i s a new for m o f self-transcendence. So, burnl ...

6.14 Solar living, then, starts after th e end o f metaphysics and afte r th e Deat h of God, and i t is therefore relativel y unconcerne d abou t th e theism/atheis m issue . On e need no t thin k in such ways . And similarly , thos e wh o hav e learnt ho w t o fin d eterna l happines s i n th e purely contingent an d outsideles s flux of life ar e delivere d fro m th e fea r o f death. I t n o longer seem s i n the leas t unnatura l o r disgusting . 6.15 Happily, peopl e ar e already changing. In th e Anglica n poet Joh n Betjema n on e see s the old realistic type of religious belief decaying, and producing a phobia abou t th e flesh and death. Maggot s chew eyeballs, mouths ar e filled with clay , and finger bones stic k out o f finger-ends. Suc h i s the patholog y o f the 'ol d moth-eate n brocade' , the typ e of religion that i s now passin g away. 6.16 A more recent and healthier response to death is illustrated by a very-frequently recurrent dream o f 1993 . ' I a m i n a slender an d heavily-insulate d spacecraft, travellin g across th e orbits of Venus and Mercury , and then , plunging straight down int o th e Sun . I am lying down becaus e of the gravit y problem, bu t I can se e out a little. The whit e fur y outsid e grows stronger. Soo n it will break in - an d I will welcome it. I feel grea t jubilation at the thought o f 'being utterly consumed, ver y soon.' 6.17 Why the jubilation; and is this a traditionally religious dream? Perhaps it is, for one of the strongest impulse s in religio n is the desir e to becom e securel y lodged i n or unite d with the cosmic Centre. This Centre is always seen as the sourc e of all 'light', or intelligibility. It i s an intens e concentratio n o f energy and i t i s the give r of al l life. S o in th e Bible , i n ancient Egyp t and i n Greece there ar e very strong traditions o f solar symbolism , an d i n both th e Ol d and th e Ne w Testaments Go d is pictured a s a consuming fire. 6.18 Admittedly, the Su n is only a creature. An encounter with God would be infinitely mor e terrible tha n droppin g int o a mer e twenty-million-degre e furnace . Bu t i n term s o f th e history o f religiou s symbolis m deat h b y plunging into th e Su n doe s see m t o b e a clear metaphor fo r unio n wit h God . Th e mystic s have indeed spoke n o f being consumed b y fire and of'dissolving in God' (a Russian phrase). And the metaphor is made all the mor e attractive by the fac t tha t th e Sun' s dail y course across the sk y from sunris e to sunse t is everywhere seen also a s a metaphor fo r human lif e ... 6.19 A traditio n goin g bac k throug h Kan t t o S t Pau l represent s old-styl e mora l realis m a s picturing the univers e as a school, the Moral Law as the school rules , and huma n beings as scruffy schoolboys . But this metaphor i s somewhat tendentious, fo r it reminds us that 99

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eventually w e will leave school , an d s o implie s tha t mora l realis m i s only a temporar y arrangement. I t woul d b e faire r t o se e moral realis m a s claiming that huma n socia l lif e will always need a fixed moral framework to giv e it stability and dignity . Without suc h a framework, societ y in th e en d break s down .

6.20 Our ethica l emotivism-expressivis m i s rathe r different . W e say : moral realis m jus t ha s died. Sorr y about that ; but i t simply has happened. The entire vocabulary of the rationa l soul, conscience , th e will , th e mora l la w and s o o n i s dead. Th e word s ar e fallin g int o disuse. I t now appears that we humans are animals, social animals who must co-operate , but wh o find ourselve s to b e bundles o f discordant impulses . To get ourselves together, and t o procur e enoug h co-operatio n fo r survival , w e mus t g o ou t int o symboli c expression. S o w e mus t togethe r generat e th e Symboli c Order , th e so-calle d 'Idea l Culture' o f language , religion , moralit y an d art . Th e communally-generate d Symboli c Order supplie s each an d al l of u s wit h form s o f expressio n throug h whic h w e ca n ge t ourselves togethe r individuall y an d socially , an d conjur e u p ou r variou s vision s o f redemption. I n ar t an d religio n w e expres s ou r longin g fo r satisfaction , wholeness , holiness, idea l beauty . Bu t i n thes e 'post-realist ' time s ou r expressio n ha s t o b e solar — which, b e i t understood , her e mean s 'full y disintereste d an d objective' . On e mus t b e content to have produced a n art-image, or a religious image, of a holiness and integratio n that will never become a finalized achievement. Solarity is a queer kind of post-sainthood , achieved onl y i n passing, only in loss .

EXTRACT 7 PORTER Virtue ethics 7.1 There i s a .. . seriou s difficult y i n Aquinas ' treatmen t o f justice seen i n relatio n t o th e other virtues ... In developing his distinction between the virtues of the passions, that is, temperance and fortitude, an d justice considered as a virtue of the will, Aquinas treats the former a s being primaril y self-regarding, wherea s justice is seen a s being wholl y other regarding. This division makes sense in terms of his account of the passions and the will, and understoo d i n thos e term s i t i s cogent. Bu t i t create s difficultie s fo r hi m whe n h e attempts t o deal with those virtues (and vices) which are clearly other-regarding, and yet also hav e a stron g passiona l component , suc h a s mercy and mildnes s (whic h h e treat s together; see II-II 157 , especially II-II 157.1,3) , ange r (II-I I 158 , especially II-II 158.1,2) , or patienc e (II-I I 136) . 7.2 This difficulty is particularly apparent when Aquinas considers the virtues of self-restrain t and appropriatenes s in sexual matters, together with the associated vices (II-II 151-154) . He treats the virtue of chastity as if it were primarily a capacity to moderat e one's desire and enjoymen t o f physica l pleasure , rathe r tha n seein g i t a s a capacity for appropriat e feeling an d actio n with respect to othe r people (II-II I 151 ; especially see II-II 151.3) . As a 100

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result, th e centrall y importan t persona l dimension s o f sexua l desir e an d pleasure , th e complex ways in which sexuality mediates relation s between persons , ar e almost entirel y hidden fro m hi s view. Thi s help s t o explai n hi s notoriou s rankin g o f th e sin s o f lust , according to which homosexual intercours e i s a graver sin than adultery or rape (at least, considered qu a sins of lust; II-I I 154.12) . 7.3 The margina l positio n o f other-regardin g virtue s suc h a s kindnes s withi n Aquinas ' analysis i s partiall y a reflectio n o f th e stricture s o f hi s fault y psychology . H e find s i t difficult t o kno w ho w t o interpre t o r classif y virtue s such a s mercy or mildness , which appear to straddl e a double line , between will and passions , an d between what concern s another, an d wha t concerns oneself . 7.4 It i s also the cas e that, fo r Aquinas, the warmer , less determinate capacitie s for care an d responsiveness do not hav e a central role to play either in the agent's pursui t of her own aims, or in her life in society. Rather, what is central, on Aquinas' view , is the formatio n of her fundamental capacitie s for desire and aversion, in such a way that her passions and her wil l ar e i n accordanc e wit h he r overal l conceptio n o f th e huma n good . I t i s no t essential t o thi s proces s tha t th e perso n attai n som e capacitie s fo r empath y an d fel t concern fo r others, althoug h i t woul d obviousl y be a good thin g i f she did. Considere d from th e standpoin t o f someon e wh o pursue s he r ow n individua l aims , th e virtuou s individual must attain some degree of self-restraint and courage, but a capacity to care for others is not essential to this process. Similarly, considered a s a person in community, the individual mus t orien t hersel f i n suc h a wa y as to desire , an d consistentl y t o seek , th e common good ; moreover, sh e must be committed t o respecting the general or particular claims of others. Here again, however, it is not necessar y that she feel particularl y kind o r merciful o r lovin g o r benevolent . I t i s enough tha t sh e consistentl y choose the correc t other-regarding cours e o f action . 7.5 However, th e affectiv e other-regardin g capacitie s fo r empathy , care , an d concer n fo r others cannot be separated s o neatly either from the virtues of self-restraint and courage, or fro m a commitment t o justic e ... some degre e o f empathy fo r others i s a necessary condition fo r understandin g th e basi c mora l notions . Moreover , a s Mea d argues , th e emergence o f th e individua l a s a huma n person , possesse d o f distinctiv e capacitie s for rational actio n an d speech , presuppose s som e capacitie s fo r internalizin g the behavio r and the reactions of other people. Someon e who is incapable of even this minimal degree of empath y fo r other s (a s a seriousl y handicappe d chil d migh t be ) woul d als o b e incapable o f functioning a s a rational agen t a t all . 7.6 It doe s no t follo w tha t a n individua l mus t acquir e a genuin e concer n for , and fellow feeling with, others in order to be capable of action. Unfortunately, we are all too familia r with Functioning , rational individual s who are insensitive, boorish, rude , callous, or just plain mean . Furthermore , ther e d o see m t o b e persons , fortunatel y not ver y man y of them, who combine a considerable abilit y to predict others ' behavio r an d reactions , and 101

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to control them based on those predictions, with a near-total lack of concern for others as human beings. The so-called psychopath, who combines a capacity for manipulation with murderous indifferenc e t o huma n life , ma y represen t a n extrem e cas e o f thi s phenomenon. 7.7 None th e less , even th e boor , th e bastard , o r th e psychopat h need s som e capacitie s for empathy fo r other s t o functio n a s a human perso n a t all . Jus t a s the individua l who i s altogether deprived o f the capacitie s for self-restrain t and courag e crosses th e lin e fro m vice (o r addiction ) t o outrigh t insanity , s o th e perso n wh o ha s n o capacitie s at al l for fellow-feeling wil l be incapable of any but th e mos t rudimentar y kinds o f actions. Thus, while it is not necessar y to posses s the virtues of concern for others, sympathy , kindness, and th e lik e in orde r t o functio n as an agent , none th e less , this famil y o f virtues draw s upon, an d perfects , qualitie s whic h ar e essentia l t o th e functionin g of th e agent , qu a agent. It would be reasonable to assum e that these sorts of virtues are desirable, are, in a broad sense , beneficial, t o th e agen t herself , a s well as to thos e aroun d her . 7.8 Does ou r experienc e bear ou t thi s assumption ? That is , do w e find that th e callou s o r cruel o r indifferen t individua l i s in som e wa y worse of f than th e perso n wh o i s caring about others? The answer to this question i s complex, becaus e the virtues of care, like all other virtues , involv e intellectua l a s wel l a s affectiv e components . Tha t is , th e carin g individual describe s th e worl d differently , an d desire s differen t things , tha n doe s th e callous individual. Someone who is really indifferent t o the well-being of others may well be perfectly content with her life. She will probably not notic e the suffering o f others, and, if she does, i t will not caus e her muc h distress. S o long as her lif e i s filled with he r ow n interests an d pursuits , sh e may not fee l th e lac k of genuine human connections . Lik e a cat, self-sufficient an d complete , sh e lives her own life , neve r deliberately injuring others , but neve r seekin g dee p involvemen t i n th e live s o f others , either . I f sh e i s missin g something, which many of us feel t o be profoundly important, sh e does not fee l th e lack or suffe r o n it s account. W e may not lik e such a person, bu t ca n we honestly pit y her? 7.9 At thi s point , th e compassionat e individua l may be driven back to a version o f the ol d rhetorical question: i s it better to be Socrates unsatisfied, or a pig satisfied? I s it better t o be a caring person, engage d i n th e joy s and sorrow s o f others, eve n i f that engagemen t brings some sorrow along with it, or i s it better to be self-satisfied, callous , and content? The forc e o f this sort o f appeal is not likel y to b e felt b y those who reall y are thoroughly callous and content , who cannot conceiv e of what they are missing and therefor e d o no t regret their lack. Rather, this sort of rhetorical appeal depends for its force on the fact that most peopl e are not quit e pigs; most people do retain some desire for a dignified huma n life, whic h include s som e opennes s t o learnin g an d aestheti c experienc e fo r thei r ow n sakes, and, similarly, most people do care, at least a little, about some other persons, and want t o b e open t o th e presenc e of others i n their lives . If someone reall y does no t car e about thes e sorts of goods at all, there is no way to prove to her that sh e is wrong, but i t does seem to be the case that mos t o f us would find such a person repugnan t or pitiable , and would do what we could to avoid becoming like her. The completely callous person, 102

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in particular , woul d see m t o b e deprive d o f an y capacit y t o for m bond s o f intimat e closeness with other persons. And, since intimacy with others seems to be a basic human need, which almost all persons experience to some degree, this fact alone would suffic e t o give most person s som e repugnanc e for callousnes s and relate d vices.

7.10 If it is the case that the virtues of care for others are internally connected i n some ways to the goo d o f th e agen t herself , a s well as being o f benefit t o others , the n w e would no t expect t o fin d man y people wh o ar e reall y indifferent t o others ' feeling s an d needs . Yet surely, i t will be said, tha t i s not th e case ; there are more callou s and unfeelin g person s than the other kind. Perhaps this is true. Certainly, there are many uncaring people in the world, and even the best of us are subject to fal l into callousness or unkindness from tim e to time. The question that mus t b e asked, however , i s why this shoul d be the case . I t is impossible to answer this question with any certainty, but it seems at least likely that most persons ar e no t jus t indifferen t t o othe r persons , withou t qualificatio n o r remainder . When w e encounter someon e wh o genuinel y has no feelin g fo r others, w e tend t o loo k back int o he r childhood , o r int o he r histor y a s a n adult , o r he r circumstance s i n th e present, in search of some trauma, some history of dehumanization inflicted by others, by which we can account fo r thi s deformity. 7.11 More often, callousnes s (lik e other similar vices) i s grounded i n a failure o f the intellect , rather tha n i n a complet e lac k o f feeling s fo r others . I n othe r words , th e failin g i n question i s likely to b e a failin g o f th e min d an d imagination , rathe r tha n a defec t i n sensibility; once again, we find that we cannot fully account for a class of virtues except in terms o f their interconnection s wit h prudence . It i s all too possibl e fo r someon e t o b e kindly and thoughtful in her relations with her family, friends , an d colleagues, and yet to be unaware, and therefore unfeeling, about the lives of persons who do not come into her direct experience. This unawareness may well extend beyond an indifference t o those who are suffering far , far away, to include persons whom she sees every day, but does not think of as each having his o r he r ow n inne r world o f feeling s an d concerns . I t i s part o f th e pathos o f the huma n conditio n tha t non e o f us could functio n withou t som e degre e of this unawareness , to insulat e u s fro m th e enormou s pai n an d nee d tha t i s a part o f the human condition . I t i s difficul t t o preserv e this psychi c skin withou t fallin g int o som e degree of blameworthy callousness sometimes, s o difficult tha t probably only the greatest saints manag e to d o s o while still retaining their sanit y and integrity . 7.12 If i t i s true tha t th e virtue s of caring are internall y connected t o th e goo d o f the agen t herself, on e consequenc e i s tha t w e canno t dra w a shar p distinctio n betwee n self regarding and other-regardin g virtues. This distinction ha s some merit, in that there are some virtues that do seem to have the agent's own immediate needs and situation as their primary reference, whereas others are intrinsically directed to the good of others. But this distinction shoul d no t be interpreted a s an absolute line among different sort s of virtues. Even th e mos t basi c virtues, without whic h no on e coul d functio n a t all , are practically inseparable fro m other-regardin g concerns , particularl y a t th e stag e o f thei r firs t inculcation ("Don' t b e greedy ! Shar e wit h you r sister. " "Wha t d o yo u mean , you'r e 103

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scared? Do you want to let down the team?") Similarly, the other-regarding virtues have a self-regarding dimension . I t i s perfectly reasonabl e to attemp t t o b e more giving , mor e attentive to others , mor e open , becaus e one want s to b e a caring person, an d want s t o avoid becomin g calloused.

7.13 Someone who i s concerned t o be a person of this sort ma y well build thi s self-regardin g concern int o he r action s an d allo w i t t o mov e he r i n a directio n tha t sh e migh t no t otherwise take. For example, a woman migh t have serious misgivings about th e value of giving money to panhandlers , o n th e grounds , perhaps, that sh e is thereby participating in their own self-destructive actions. Yet she may still reasonably choose to give to them, because sh e judges that otherwis e she risks becoming a callous person, an d tha t dange r seems to her to be more immediat e and serious - fo r her, anywa y - tha n th e possible danger that sh e is enabling someone else' s addictions an d vices by supporting them. This sort o f judgemen t i s no t withou t it s ow n problems , an d on e coul d easil y imagin e someone els e comin g t o a n opposit e decisio n o f policy , withou t thereb y becomin g callous. But, whatever may be said about this woman's choice, surely it would be unfair t o charge he r wit h simpl e indifferenc e t o th e need s o f others , o r t o a narcissisti c preoccupation with herself. It is true that she is concerned abou t herself , in that she does not wan t he r hear t t o becom e hardene d b y th e experienc e o f continually ignorin g th e needs of others, bu t tha t i s not quit e like a desire t o b e rich o r beautiful , o r eve n to b e noble o r good i n the abstract. Someone who really does not wan t to be calloused wants , in part, to be the sort of person who cares for other persons , and, if this desire cannot b e separated neatly from ou r desires to behave and to respond i n certain ways to others, this is surely because our concept s o f self an d other s ar e inextricabl y bound together . CRITIQUEE An internal comparison o f the Extracts will generate a number of important criticism s e.g. b y comparing Copleston' s and Fletcher' s theories o f exceptions (th e last sentenc e in 2.2 i s clearly an oversimplification) . In addition , a numbe r o f specifi c criticism s can b e isolated: Bonhoeffer's Extrac t must fac e crucia l questions: (1 ) I f we have no prio r knowledge of God or of morality, how do we accept the truth of Christianity in the first place? (2) Does Bonhoeffer altogethe r avoi d genera l ethica l categories ? At variou s point s i n hi s lif e h e appeared to hold deontological views on such issues as pacifism an d abortion. Further he shared thes e view s wit h som e non-Christian s over-and-agains t othe r Christian s (see, particularly, Ethics, ch . 3) . (3 ) I n thei r stan d agains t Hitler , doe s h e sometime s allo w secular moralists some relative value? A parallel point will arise in relation to Augustine's Text I V and al l these questions mus t be addresse d i n relatio n t o Earth' s Extract 8. Most exponents of Christian ethics might agree that agape is a central concept, but few might agre e wit h Fletche r tha t i t i s a sufficien t concep t (see below, pp . 431-2) . Empirically, i t ca n be aske d whether man y o f u s are sufficientl y fre e o r stron g t o mak e continuous mora l decisions , withou t knowing , i n advance , an y o f th e requirement s o f agape. A similar criticis m ca n be mad e of Cupitt's 'sola r ethics' . And, at th e theoretica l level, it would seem that Fletcher himself does, at times, assume criteria other than agape in hi s example s o f moral decision-making . Fo r example, i n 2.2 4 he suggests the groun d that 'n o unwante d an d unintende d bab y shoul d eve r b e born' : but , clearly , man y 104

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'unwanted an d unintended ' babie s ar e stil l loved , s o som e othe r facto r seem s t o b e contributing t o thi s ground . And , in 2.25 , the forc e o f his argument depend s upo n th e prior belie f tha t 'murder ' i s wrong an d tha t 'insanity ' relieve s the individua l o f mora l responsibility. Copleston's Extract does not answe r some of the most seriou s problems already raised in relation t o Aquinas' Text II. So, even allowing for human error, custom o r sin, he does not specify the positive evidence needed to suggest that there are moral precepts common to al l human beings . Whil e evidenc e o f empirica l difference s o n mora l issue s betwee n people ma y no t actuall y disprov e Aquinas ' theory , unles s ther e i s als o som e positiv e evidence in its favour i t must undermine ou r confidenc e in it. Even Porter is quite vague, at times , i n her claims about 'whe n we encounter someon e ... ' (7.10) . It has already been observe d that , despite their stron g deontological claims , John Paul II, Fiorenza , Porte r an d eve n perhap s Cupitt , mayb e unwittingly , provid e strikin g examples of the pluralism of present-day theology. There are hints i n Fiorenza that there are division s withi n feminis t theolog y itsel f (5.6-7 ) an d th e polemica l ton e o f part s o f Veritatis Splendor indicate s tha t ther e ar e eviden t division s withi n present-da y Catholi c theology (4.10-11 an d 15-18) . However, the characteristi c mode of these theologians in dealing with suc h division s tend s t o b e simpl y that o f assertion . In contrast , Catholi c mora l theologian s suc h as Joh n Mahone y argu e for a muc h franker admissio n of diversity within Catholicism. He maintains that 'there cannot be any doubt .. . that th e Roma n Catholi c Church' s teachin g ove r th e centurie s an d i n recen t decades has changed markedly in many respects - a s in the field of biblical studies; in the possibility of salvation for unbelievers outside the Catholic Church; in ecumenism; in the matter an d for m o f th e Sacramen t o f Orders ; i n recognizin g th e mora l possibilit y i n marriage of birth-control throug h periodi c abstinenc e fro m intercourse ' ( The Making of Moral Theology, 1987 , pp. 325-6) .

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SECTION 2

Politics, Economics and Justice

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Introduction t o Politics , Economics and Justic e

Within recen t Christia n ethic s th e cluste r o f issue s surrounding th e overal l theme s o f politics, economics and justice have proved particularl y important. Th e rise of liberation and political theology, especially, have made apparent some o f the difference s withi n the discipline, just as the inter-war political crisis revealed crucial theological differences fo r a previous generation . Th e proble m o f th e relationshi p o f Christianit y t o th e politica l order, an d t o th e issue s o f socia l an d economi c justice , i s no t simpl y o f theoretica l interest, bu t o f considerable practica l importance . A t the individua l level , the Christia n attempts t o arriv e a t a n understandin g o f th e implication s o f her/hi s fait h fo r involvement i n political realities. At the corporate level, ecclesiastical institutions attemp t to decid e ho w fa r the y ar e t o b e involve d i n specificall y politica l institution s an d i n detailed politica l decision-making . Th e focu s o f thi s Sectio n wil l sometime s b e o n th e individual level and sometime s o n th e corporate one . I n some o f the Texts and Extracts attention i s given to overal l political structures, whereas in others i t is the specifi c issue s of economi c o r socia l justic e tha t ar e o f primar y concern . However , i t shoul d b e emphasized at the outset that eac h of the Texts or Extract s must be set in its own sociopolitical contex t befor e i t i s (anachronistically ) relate d t o other s withi n th e Section . I t must not be assumed to o readil y that the various authors all attach the same meaning to their socia l or politica l terms . One way of demonstrating th e variety of positions i n Christian ethics in this area is to compare possibl e answer s to th e followin g questions: (1) Ca n specific political structures, ideals or programmes be derived unambiguously from th e gospel? (2) Ho w fa r ca n th e Churc h b e identifie d wit h specifi c politica l regimes , ideals o r programmes? (3) Shoul d th e individua l Christia n b e totally obedien t t o specifi c politica l regimes, ideals o r programmes? If a positiv e respons e i s give n t o (1) , th e tw o othe r question s ma y appea r relativel y unproblematic: th e Churc h ca n identif y full y wit h suc h politica l regimes , ideal s o r programmes and, likewise , th e individua l Christian clearl y should b e obedient t o them . But, of course, even for those who would accept (1), most might acknowledge that actual politicians o r politica l regime s seldom adopt unsullie d Christia n ideal s o r programmes . Even i f they disagree with th e dichotom y tha t Niebuh r advanced i n Extrac t 10 , between individual Christia n ethic s an d politica l mora l practice , the y migh t stil l agre e tha t Christian ethics makes demands upon politicians and political regimes that are frequently ignored. If , however , a negativ e respons e i s give n t o (1) , eithe r becaus e th e gospe l i s 109

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thought t o b e to o ambiguou s o n man y politica l issues , o r becaus e i t i s thought t o b e uninterested i n them , an y clos e identificatio n o f th e Churc h wit h specifi c politica l regimes, ideals or programmes would seem to be precluded. Fo r many, total obedience of the individual Christian to specifi c politica l regimes, ideals or programmes would also be thereby precluded. Bu t to some, as will be seen, it would still be required, on the grounds that politica l regime s ar e alway s divinel y appointed , eve n whe n the y conflict wit h Christian ideal s and principles . Within this broad framewor k i t is possible to locate the overall positions o f the authors of th e Text s an d Extract s in thi s Section . A very broad acceptanc e o f (1 ) i s evident i n Aquinas and Joh n XXIII. In very different ways , it is also evident in Miranda. A rejection of (1) , on th e ground s of the lack of interest of the gospe l in specific politica l matters , is evident a t times in Augustine and Berdyaev . And a n extreme wariness o f (1), combined with a rejectio n of (2) , but a n insistenc e o n (3) , is evident i n Luthe r and Earth . Thes e three clusters of possibilities must each be examined separately: like all such clusters, they may reveal similarities, but blu r rea l differences . Aquinas' us e o f natura l la w is very eviden t here : 'i t woul d see m bes t t o deduc e th e duties of a king from th e examples of government in nature' (V.I). He believed that fro m nature h e could both justif y an d understan d monarchical , hierarchica l government. But, as always, the Bibl e was thought to accor d with this justification an d understanding ; th e latter could be derived fro m direc t analogical argument from Genesi s 1.3. I f this positio n is accepted , i t migh t see m t o follo w tha t th e Churc h ca n b e identifie d wit h specifi c political regimes , ideal s and programmes , an d tha t th e individua l Christian does hav e a general duty to be obedient to them. Naturally, this position is further reinforce d by the peculiarities of the Church/State relationship in thirteenth-century Europe. It has already been note d (see above, p. 28 ) that thi s consisted o f boundaries o f power an d authority , rather than of opposing aims, values and social orders. Indeed , only in the Extracts is the concept o f the secula r Stat e assumed . Aquinas' derivatio n o f politica l monarch y fro m natura l la w and fro m biblica l base s compares interestingl y with Calvin' s justificatio n of democrac y (albei t i n th e change d context o f sixteenth-centur y middl e Europe) . Calvin' s Institutes declared emphaticall y that som e for m o f government wa s essential an d h e was sharply critical of any for m o f Christian anarchism : 'som e fanatic s wh o are pleased wit h nothing bu t liberty , o r rathe r licentiousness withou t an y restraint , d o indee d boas t an d vociferate , that sinc e w e are dead with Christ to the elements of this world and , being translated int o the kingdom of God, si t among the celestials , i t is a degradation t o u s and fa r beneath ou r dignit y to be occupied with those secular and pure cares which relate to things altogether uninterestin g to a Christian man' (Institutes III.2) . In contrast, he maintained that political government and the reign of Christ 'are in no respec t at variance with each other'. He even admitte d that, i f on e compare s differin g type s o f governmen t - monarchy , aristocrac y o r democracy - 'thei r advantages are so nearly equal that i t will not be easy to discover of which th e utilit y preponderates' . Nonetheless , onc e h e ha d analyse d the m i n term s of their dysfunctions , he did decid e for democracy : It is true that the transition i s easy from monarch y to despotism ; i t is not muc h mor e difficult fro m aristocrac y to oligarchy , or th e factio n o f a few; but i t is most eas y of all from democrac y t o sedition . Indeed , i f these thre e form s o f governmen t whic h ar e stated b y philosopher s b e considere d i n themselves , I shal l b y n o mean s den y tha t 110

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either aristocrac y or a mixture o f aristocracy and democrac y fa r excels all others; an d that indee d no t o f itsel f bu t becaus e i t ver y rarel y happen s tha t king s regulat e themselves so that their will is never at variance with justice and rectitud e ... The vice or imperfectio n o f me n therefor e render s i t safe r an d mor e tolerabl e fo r th e government t o b e i n th e hand s o f many , tha t the y ma y affor d eac h othe r mutua l assistance and admonition , and tha t i f anyone arrogat e t o himsel f more than i s right, the many may act as censors and masters to restrain his ambition. This has always been proved by experience, and the Lord confirmed it by his authority when he established a government o f this kind amon g th e peopl e o f Israel, wit h a view to preserv e them i n the most desirable condition til l he exhibited i n David a type of Christ. (Institutes III.8) The difference s betwee n Calvi n an d Aquina s (separate d b y differin g culture s an d centuries) ar e instructive . O n fac e value , Aquinas migh t hav e agree d wit h th e openin g sentence o f thi s quotation , bu t fro m i t h e woul d hav e derive d th e convictio n tha t monarchy accords mos t closel y with natural law. He might als o have agreed with the last sentence: natura l experience accords with biblical revelation. However , the central sectio n of th e quotatio n clearl y differentiate s thei r positions . Calvin' s suppor t fo r democrac y appears here as a negative support: i t i s the least dysfunctional for m o f government an d offers th e greatest hope of checking sin. Nonetheless, from thi s position h e did then go on to insist that a properly functioning government doe s require the obedient suppor t o f the individual Christian . Variants o f Aquinas ' positio n ca n b e see n i n Joh n XXIII' s Extrac t 1 2 and Temple' s Extract 11 . Both are written from the modern perspectiv e of the secular State and, in this sense, diffe r radicall y from Aquinas . Yet, both also contai n a mixture o f natural law and biblically base d arguments ; bot h believ e tha t th e gospe l doe s impl y specifi c politica l structures, ideal s and programme s an d that , a s a result, the Churc h shoul d b e identifie d with them ; an d bot h believ e tha t thi s confront s th e individua l Christia n wit h specifi c duties. Pop e John's Pacem i n Terris is a detailed expositio n o f the right s and dutie s bot h of the individual and of the State on the major issue s threatening the peace of the world . Unlike Niebuhr , h e apparentl y see s n o difficult y i n movin g fro m th e individua l t o th e social leve l o n ethica l issues . Th e fascinatin g and importan t challeng e o f Joh n XXIII' s Extract is that i t enlarges categories usually used i n theological debate , i n order to justif y the righ t o f individual nation s t o surviva l and self-determinatio n an d i n orde r t o argue for th e necessit y of some for m o f world government . Temple' s canvas is smaller and les s directly dependen t o n Aquinas , seekin g t o distinguis h betwee n genera l politica l principles, whic h ca n an d ough t t o b e adopted , bot h b y th e Churc h an d b y th e individual Christian , and particular politica l policies, which will be more divisive and are more subjec t to specialis t judgement . The positions o f Luther and Earth, in relation to these central political questions, diffe r sharply from thos e alread y mentioned. Luther' s T o The Christian Nobility o f 152 0 was a passionate attac k on the medieval concep t o f the relationship betwee n Churc h an d Stat e and specificall y o n th e contro l o f the forme r ove r th e latter . I n advancin g hi s positiv e theory of the relative autonomy o f the political order (thoug h not, of course, the concept of the secular State), he frequently insisted tha t i t is the individual Christian wh o shoul d be obedien t t o th e Stat e an d no t th e Stat e tha t shoul d b e obedien t t o th e individua l Christian o r to the Church. In the next Sectio n i t will be seen that, fo r Luther, obedience to th e appointe d rule r wa s crucial , eve n i f th e latte r wa s a tyran t an d thoroughl y 111

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unchristian (se e IX.llf). Luthe r was resigned to the belief that there would sometimes be a very considerable ga p between th e moral behaviou r of the Christia n an d tha t o f either the rule r o r o f th e majorit y o f peopl e i n societ y (se e VI.23f) . Hi s notio n o f th e Tw o Kingdoms - th e spiritual and the temporal Kingdom s of God - sometime s accentuate d this ga p stil l further . Nonetheless , th e obedienc e o f the individua l Christia n wa s always required - a s indeed i t seems to be in Earth's early writings. Here again there i s a crucial difference fro m Calvin . Th e latter' s overal l position wa s similar t o tha t o f Luthe r and Earth' s Extrac t 8 : governmen t i s essentia l t o society , i s appointed b y God, and should be obeyed by the individual. So, in his exegesis of Romans 13, Calvin argued: 'The reason why we ought to be subject to magistrates is because they are constituted by God's ordination. Fo r since it pleases God thus to govern the world, he who attempt s t o inver t th e orde r o f God , an d thu s t o resis t Go d himself , despises hi s power; since to despise the providence of him who is the founder of civil power is to carry on wa r wit h him ' (Commentary o n th e Epistle t o th e Romans 13.1) . Thi s differ s fro m Earth's analysis of the same passage only in its reference to sixteenth-century magistrates. But, crucially, Calvin believed that there were circumstances when authorities shoul d b e resisted, particularly when what they were doing was inimical to the gospel. For example, in commentin g o n Daniel' s civil disobedience, h e wrote : We must remember tha t passag e of Peter, 'Fear God, honour th e king' [ 1 Peter 2.17]. The tw o command s ar e connecte d together , an d canno t b e separate d fro m on e another. The fear of God ought to precede, that kings may obtain their authority. For if anyone begins hi s reverenc e of an earthl y prince by rejectin g that o f God, h e will act preposterously, since this is a complete perversion of the order of nature ... For earthly princes la y aside all their power when they rise up agains t God, an d ar e unworth y of being reckone d i n th e numbe r o f mankind. W e ought rathe r utterl y t o def y tha n t o obey them whenever they are so restive and wis h to spoi l Go d of his rights, and, a s it were, t o seiz e upo n hi s thron e an d dra w hi m dow n fro m heaven . (Commentary on Daniel, Lecture 30) In the Institutes the emphasis is somewhat different: privat e individuals must be obedient and suffe r unjus t rulers , but magistrate s hav e a positiv e dut y t o oppos e them . Indeed , there, Calvi n insiste d tha t i f magistrates 'conniv e a t king s i n thei r oppressio n o f their people, suc h forbearanc e involves th e mos t nefariou s perfidy becaus e they fraudulentl y betray th e libert y o f th e people , o f whic h the y kno w tha t the y hav e bee n appointe d protectors b y the ordinatio n o f God' (Institutes 111.31) . Ironically, despite this crucial difference betwee n Calvin and Luther , the latter was not particularly obedient, i n practice, to civil authorities. Luther spent a life of constant strif e with a numbe r o f civi l an d ecclesiastica l authorities : hi s civi l obedienc e wa s a t bes t selective. Interestingly , too, th e growt h of Nazism presented Eart h wit h both a personal and a theological crisis: the shar p contrasts o f Romans became more ambivalen t a s th e 1930s proceeded . Here , pa r excellence, th e influenc e o f socio-politica l realitie s upo n theological positions is evident. Many o f thes e issue s an d position s ca n b e foun d i n th e ver y varie d writing s o f Augustine. Mor e tha n mos t othe r theologian s Augustin e wa s forced , i n a n ag e o f immense transitio n i n th e socia l statu s o f Christianity , t o agoniz e over th e positio n o f Christianity i n relatio n t o politica l realities . Confronte d b y th e confusio n create d b y 112

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Christianity, o n th e on e hand havin g been adopte d i n the previou s centur y as the Stat e religion and, o n the other, by it being attacked a s the cause of the State's present demise , Augustine's views were highly ambivalent. O n th e issue of war, he came to accept (albeit reluctantly) a defence of the State's position (see Text VII): on tha t of sexuality, his views usually diverge d sharpl y fro m th e dominan t etho s o f Roma n cultur e (see Section 5) . Within Th e City o f God, his understanding of the relationship between the two cities - th e earthly an d th e heavenl y - ofte n appear s strained . H e was always emphati c tha t th e heavenly city is by far and awa y the mos t important , but h e appears to oscillat e between regarding th e earthl y cit y a s a sourc e o f relativ e good an d seein g i t simpl y as a painfu l necessity. Neo-Platoni c and Manichaea n tendencie s were never entirel y eliminated fro m his writings. An emphati c stres s upo n th e primac y o f th e spiritua l an d th e consequen t relativ e unimportance o f the political, is also found (i n a somewhat differen t form ) i n Berdyaev's Extract 9 . Despit e livin g through momentou s politica l upheavals , firs t i n revolutionar y Russia and then in German-occupied Paris , his writings were often remarkabl y apolitical. Even whe n h e considere d explicitl y Marxis t theme s (whic h ha d bee n particularl y important t o hi m as a young man), this generall y remained th e case . Describing himself as a 'Christian theosophist' an d eve n as a gnostic, th e spiritua l always takes considerabl e precedence ove r th e tempora l and , i n thi s respect , h e appears eve n mor e Platoni c tha n Augustine. Quite apar t fro m difference s i n socio-politica l contex t (which , obviously , mus t b e given especial attention i n this Section), a number o f theological factor s appea r to affec t the response o f particular theologians to political issues . The relative balance given to th e spiritual and the temporal (o r however this is to be expressed i n less Hellenistic terms) is clearly crucial . Th e acceptanc e o r rejectio n o f som e notio n o f 'natura l law ' o r 'natura l order' is also crucial. The extent t o which political realities are seen as inherently sinful is also a factor. Biblica l exegesis is also very important an d ha s become considerabl y mor e complex i n th e ligh t o f recent critica l scholarship. Fo r man y i t ha s become increasingl y difficult t o deriv e detailed an d unambiguou s structures , ideal s o r programme s fro m th e New Testament . Late r Section s shoul d serv e t o reinforc e thi s point . However , i t i s perhaps in liberation theology , an d i n recent response s t o liberation theology , tha t thes e differences hav e becom e mos t crucial . A s an approac h t o theolog y i t i s unifie d i n it s attempt t o adop t a positio n alongsid e al l those deeme d t o b e oppressed , bu t i t i s less unified i n the actual methods o r policies that it adopts. In addition, i t is an approach that interestingly cut s acros s division s betwee n churches , a s Extrac t 1 9 from th e Methodis t Bonino i n th e nex t Section , an d Extrac t 1 3 from the Roma n Catholi c Mirand a i n thi s Section demonstrate . Hollenbach's Extrac t 1 4 suggests another , increasingl y popular , wa y fo r theologian s across differen t churche s t o fin d commo n caus e i n th e politica l domain . I n a n ag e of increasing globalization , th e notio n o f th e 'commo n good ' i s developed a s one wa y of achieving this .

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TEXT I V AUGUSTINE The earthly and heavenly cities 1. BACKGROUND This Tex t come s fro m Th e City o f Go d XIX . 14-17 (Pelica n Classics , trans . Henr y Bettenson an d ed . David Knowles , Penguin, 1972, pp. 872-9) . Book XIX opens th e fifth and fina l sectio n o f Th e City o f Go d and wa s thus writte n i n th e perio d o f C E 420-6 (see above, p. 4) - wel l over 20 years after Tex t VII . At last Augustine could se t out wha t he saw a s th e destinie s o f th e earthl y an d heavenl y cities . Agains t 'pagan ' critic s o f Christianity, suc h a s Porphyry, Augustine insisted tha t hi s was not a narrow, parochia l religion whic h was incapable of making sens e of world history . T o th e culture d Roma n 'pagan', Christianity appeared to be just that: it lacked any serious historical an d cultural roots and , sinc e it s adoptio n a centur y befor e b y Constantine , ha d demonstrabl y contributed t o the demise of Rome. However, Augustine saw the concept o f the two cities as on e whic h coul d no t onl y mak e sens e o f history , bu t als o giv e clarit y t o th e extraordinarily difficul t relationshi p o f Churc h t o State . Fo r bot h persona l an d intellectual reasons , h e coul d neithe r totall y identif y Churc h wit h Stat e no r totall y separate them. Th e concept o f the tw o citie s was used t o clarif y thi s relationship , bu t i t was no t identica l wit h i t — it wa s much broade r an d mor e far-reaching : Although ther e ar e man y grea t people s throughou t th e world , livin g unde r differen t customs in religion and moralit y and distinguished b y a complex variety of languages, arms, and dress, it is still true that ther e have come into being only two main divisions , as we may call them, i n human society: and we are justified i n following the lead of our Scriptures and calling them tw o cities. There is, in fact, one city of men who choose t o live by the standard o f the flesh, another of those who choose to live by the standard of the spirit . The citizens of each of these desire their ow n kind o f peace, an d whe n they achieve their aim , tha t i s the kin d o f peac e in whic h the y live. (City o f Go d XIV. 1) Here, th e concep t o f th e 'cities ' (civitates) represent s no t particula r institution s o r locations but, rather, basic human divisions and differentiating loyalties . Whatever point s of contact undoubtedl y exis t between th e tw o cities, their ultimat e aim s and aspiration s are thoroughly distinct: the one concerned wit h the temporal an d even demonic an d the other wit h th e divine . 2. KEY ISSUES This passag e expresse s ver y clearl y the quit e differen t aspiration s an d aim s o f th e tw o cities. The end of the earthly city is earthly peace, consisting of concord between body and 114

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soul an d a n ordere d lif e an d health , wherea s that o f th e heavenl y cit y i s eternal peac e (IV. 1). Insofar a s they have rational souls, mortal human s are in need of divine direction and assistance (IV.2). The latter is evident i n the two chief precepts, love of God and love of neighbour. Specifically , earthl y peace and ordere d harmon y involv e obeying th e rule s of no t harmin g anyon e an d helpin g everyon e wheneve r possibl e (IV.3) . Ordere d harmony at the domestic level , however, is not t o be confused with domination. Human dominion applie s t o a dominio n ove r th e natura l worl d an d no t ove r fello w humans : slavery, fo r example , result s mainl y fro m si n o r i s a punishmen t fo r si n (IV. 4 an d 5) . Domestic harmon y o r peac e - betwee n member s o f a famil y an d between maste r and slave - ough t to contribute t o the peace of the city (IV.7). Yet all these versions of peace, domestic or social, appear in the context o f faith as relative to heavenly peace. The person of fait h i s lik e a pilgri m i n a foreig n land : earthl y peac e ha s som e use , bu t i s stil l a temporary an d passin g phenomeno n (IV.8) . Indeed , ther e ar e polytheisti c an d paga n elements i n th e earthl y city that ar e antithetical t o th e heavenl y city, so that th e law s of religion, particularly, cannot b e the sam e in the two cities (IV.9). The heavenly city does not annu l earthl y laws , bu t follow s the m insofa r a s the y d o no t hinde r th e Christia n religion. The pilgrim of the heavenly city makes use of earthly peace and laws, but regard s heavenly peace as the onl y for m o f peace that reall y deserves the nam e o f peace (IV . 10). 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS Augustine's understandin g o f th e valu e o f earthl y peac e seem s t o oscillat e betwee n consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialis m i s particularly evident in IV.8. Here, Augustine maintains tha t th e heavenly city 'must needs make use of earthl y peace 'until this mortal state, for which this kind of peace is essential, passes away', not onl y because it provides for an ordered society , but als o because it provides fo r a 'harmony' between th e two cities . O n thi s understanding , earthl y peace is not accorde d an y merit i n itself , bu t only i n it s usefulnes s t o th e heavenl y city. Othe r paragraphs , however, see m t o impl y a more deontological or natural law understanding o f earthly peace - particularl y IV. 1 and 2 and explicitl y in the first sentence o f IV.4. And ther e doe s appea r t o b e a relationshi p between th e dominical command s o r precepts at the beginning of IV.3 and the two rules for socia l orde r give n i n th e middl e o f th e sam e paragraph . Se t against this , ther e i s a typical Augustinian emphasis upon sin in his understanding of slavery in IV.4 and 5 . This emphasis makes it difficult simpl y to interpret Augustine in terms of a natural law theory: the more wholly corrupt peopl e are thought t o be, the less one can identify thei r natural propensities o r ends . 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS The Bible is used here more frequentl y an d pivotall y than i n Text I , with two direct Ol d Testament quotations , thre e direc t Ne w Testamen t quotation s an d severa l indirec t allusions. Further , the us e of the Bibl e in IV.3 , 4 and 5 is prescriptive and crucia l to th e argument. Th e issu e of slavery, particularly, presents Augustin e with a dilemma an d hi s uneasiness with it is apparent in his discussion in IV.4 and 5. His derivation of servus is in fact mistaken - althoug h it was widely accepted by his contemporaries. An d he avoids the obvious poin t tha t nowher e i n th e Bibl e i s slaver y actuall y condemned. However , hi s overall ai m o f attempting to sho w that hi s understanding o f the tw o cities accords with the Bibl e and make s sense of human histor y i s clear. 115

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5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS The influenc e o f the transitio n o f Christianit y from a sectaria n t o a mor e church-typ e position i n society is evident (see further, o n Text VII). Given the radically changed sociopolitical statu s o f Christianit y sinc e Constantine , an d give n th e criticism s fro m traditionalist non-Christians , Augustine fel t constraine d t o articulat e a n understandin g of th e relationshi p betwee n Churc h an d State . However , a s a resul t o f bot h hi s neo Platonic mode s o f thought an d hi s indebtedness t o th e Bibl e (see above, p. 42) he made his articulation i n the somewha t ethereal terms o f the concep t o f the tw o cities . So , the earthly city cannot be identified with 'secular' society or with the Stat e and th e heavenly city certainly cannot be equated with the extant institutional Church. The overall concept of th e tw o citie s als o reflect s Augustine' s backgroun d i n Africa n Christianity . I n tha t context, i t wa s alread y so commonplac e tha t h e coul d refe r t o i t a t on e poin t a s that 'which everyone brought up i n the traditions o f the holy church should know ' (Enarr. i n Ps. 136.1) . 6. SOCIAL S SIGNIFICANCE It would be difficul t t o exaggerat e the importanc e o f Augustine's position here . Hi s Th e City o f God, written i n ol d age , represented a majo r achievemen t an d presente d th e lat e classical world with it s most sustaine d an d culture d Christian apologetic. I n view of the precarious positio n o f Christianit y i n th e earl y fifth-centur y Roma n world , th e socia l significance o f suc h a n apologeti c i s evident . Eve n i f hi s particula r understandin g o f political realitie s (i t canno t b e claime d tha t h e actuall y advance d a politica l theory ) proved to be too firmly located in the social context of the late Roman Empire, his overall conception o f th e tensio n betwee n th e Christia n visio n an d politica l actualitie s ha s remained importan t i n much contemporar y theology. Th e ways he resolved thi s tensio n varied considerabl y i n hi s writings, but i t i s always apparent. FURTHER READING Important discussion s of Th e City o f Go d will be foun d i n Davi d Knowles' Introductio n to th e Pelica n translation o f Th e City o f Go d (1972), in Peter Brown's Augustine of Hippo (1967) an d i n R . W . Barrow' s Introduction t o S t Augustine: 'The City o f God' (1950) . Augustine's discussions of the concept of the two cities occur particularly in Books XIVXV an d XVIII-XI X o f Th e City o f God.

TEXT I V AUGUSTINE The earthly and heavenly cities IV. 1 We see, then, that al l man's us e of temporal things is related to th e enjoyment of earthly peace i n th e earthl y city; whereas in th e Heavenl y City it i s related t o th e enjoymen t o f eternal peace. Thus, if we were irrational animals, our onl y aim would b e the adjustment of the parts of the body i n due proportion, an d the quieting of appetites - only , that is, the repos e o f the flesh, and a n adequat e supply of pleasures, so that bodil y peac e might promote th e peac e of the soul . Fo r if bodily peac e is lacking, the peac e of the irrationa l

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soul is also hindered, becaus e it cannot achiev e the quietin g of its appetites. Bu t the tw o together promote that peace which is a mutual concord betwee n soul and body, the peace of an ordere d lif e an d o f health. Fo r living creatures show their lov e of bodily peac e by their avoidanc e of pain, an d b y their pursui t o f pleasure t o satisf y th e demand s o f their appetites the y demonstrat e thei r lov e o f peac e an d soul . I n jus t th e sam e way , b y shunning deat h the y indicate quit e clearl y ho w grea t i s their lov e of the peac e in which soul an d bod y ar e harmoniously united .

IV.2 But because ther e i s in man a rational soul, h e subordinates t o th e peac e of the rationa l soul all that par t o f his nature which he shares with the beasts, so that h e may engage in deliberate though t an d ac t in accordanc e wit h this thought, s o that h e may thus exhibit that ordered agreement o f cognition and action whic h we called the peac e of the rationa l soul. For with this end in view he ought to wish to be spared the distress of pain and grief , the disturbance s o f desire , th e dissolutio n o f death , s o tha t h e ma y com e t o som e profitable knowledg e an d ma y order hi s life an d hi s moral standard s i n accordance with this knowledge. Bu t he needs divin e direction, whic h h e ma y obey with resolution , an d divine assistance that he may obey it freely, to prevent him fro m falling , in his enthusiasm for knowledge , a victim t o som e fata l error , through th e weaknes s of the huma n mind . And so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a pilgrim in a foreign land, away from God ; therefore he walks by faith, not by sight. That is why he views all peace, of body or of soul, or of both, in relation to that peace which exists between mortal ma n and immortal God , so that he may exhibit an ordered obedience i n faith i n subjection to the everlasting God. IV.3 Now God, our master , teaches two chief precepts, love of God and love of neighbour; and in them man finds three objects for his love: God, himself, and his neighbour; and a man who love s Go d i s not wron g i n lovin g himself . I t follows , therefore , that h e should b e concerned als o that his neighbour shoul d lov e God, since he is told to love his neighbour as himself; and the sam e is true of his concern fo r his wife, hi s children, for the member s of his household, an d fo r al l other men , s o far a s is possible. And , for th e sam e end, h e will wish his neighbour t o be concerned fo r him, if he happens to need that concern. For this reaso n h e will be a t peace , a s far as lies i n him , wit h al l men, i n tha t peac e amon g men, tha t ordere d harmony ; an d th e basi s of this orde r i s the observanc e o f two rules : first, to d o n o har m t o anyone , and , secondly , t o hel p everyon e whenever possible . T o begin with, therefore, a man has a responsibility for his own household - obviously , both in th e orde r of nature an d i n the framewor k o f human society , h e has easier and mor e immediate contac t wit h them ; h e ca n exercis e hi s concer n fo r them . Tha t i s wh y th e Apostle says , 'Anyone who doe s no t tak e care of his own people , especiall y those i n hi s own household, is worse than an unbeliever - h e is a renegade' [ 1 Tim. 5.8]. This is where domestic peac e starts , th e ordere d harmon y abou t givin g an d obeyin g order s amon g those who live in the same house. For the orders are given by those who are concerned for the interest s o f others; thu s th e husban d give s order s t o th e wife , parent s t o children , masters t o servants . Whil e thos e wh o ar e th e object s o f thi s concer n obe y orders ; fo r example, wives obey husbands, the children obey their parents, the servants their masters. But i n the househol d o f the just man wh o 'lives on th e basis of faith' an d wh o i s still o n pilgrimage, fa r fro m tha t Heavenl y City, eve n those wh o giv e order s ar e th e servants of 117

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those whom the y appear to command . Fo r they do no t giv e orders because of a lust for domination bu t fro m a dutifu l concer n fo r th e interest s o f others , no t wit h prid e i n taking precedence over others , bu t wit h compassion i n takin g care of others . Man's natural freedom; and the slavery caused by sin IV.4 This relationship is prescribed by the order of nature, and i t is in this situation tha t Go d created man. For he says, 'Let him hav e lordship ove r the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky ... an d al l the reptile s tha t craw l o n th e earth ' [Gen . 1.26] . H e di d no t wis h th e rational being , mad e i n hi s ow n image , t o hav e dominio n ove r an y bu t irrationa l creatures, not ma n over man, but ma n over the beasts. Hence the first just men were set up as shepherds of flocks, rathe r than as kings of men, so that in this way also God might convey the message of what was required by the order of nature, and what was demanded by the deserts of sinners - fo r it is understood, o f course, that the condition o f slavery is justly impose d o n th e sinner . Tha t i s why we d o no t hea r o f a slav e anywhere i n th e Scriptures until Noah, th e just man, punishe d hi s son's sin with thi s word; an d s o tha t son deserved thi s name because of his misdeed, no t becaus e of his nature. Th e origin of the Lati n word for slave, servus, is believed to be derived fro m th e fac t tha t those who by the law s of wa r coul d rightl y be pu t t o deat h b y the conquerors , becam e servi, slaves , when the y wer e preserved , receivin g thi s nam e fro m thei r preservation . Bu t eve n thi s enslavement could not hav e happened, if it were not fo r the deserts of sin. For even when a just war is fought i t is in defence of his sin that the other side is contending; an d victory, even when th e victor y fall s t o th e wicked , is a humiliation visite d o n th e conquere d b y divine judgment, either t o correc t o r t o punis h thei r sins . We have a witness to thi s i n Daniel, a man o f God, who in captivity confesses to Go d his own sins and th e sins of his people, and in devout grief testifies that they are the cause of that captivity. The first cause of slavery, then, is sin, whereby man wa s subjected to ma n i n the conditio n o f bondage; and thi s can only happen by the judgment of God, with whom ther e is no injustice , an d who knows how to allot differen t punishment s according to the deserts of the offenders .

IV.5 Now, a s our Lor d above says, 'Everyone who commit s si n i s sin's slave' [Jn . 8.34], an d that i s why, though man y devout me n are slaves to unrighteous masters, ye t the masters they serve are not themselve s fre e men ; 'fo r whe n a man i s conquered b y another h e is also bound as a slave to hi s conqueror' [ 2 Pet. 2.19]. And obviously it is a happier lot t o be slave to a human being than t o a lust; and, i n fact, th e most pitiles s domination tha t devastates th e heart s o f men , i s tha t exercise d b y thi s ver y lus t fo r domination , t o mention n o others . However , i n tha t orde r o f peace i n whic h me n ar e subordinate t o other men, humility is as salutary for the servants as pride is harmful t o the masters. And yet by nature, i n the conditio n i n which God created man , no ma n i s the slav e either of man o r o f sin. Bu t it remains true that slaver y as a punishment i s also ordained b y that law which enjoins the preservation of the order o f nature, and forbid s it s disturbance; in fact, i f nothing had been done t o contravene that law, there would have been nothin g t o require th e disciplin e o f slaver y a s a punishment . Tha t explain s als o th e Apostle' s admonition t o slaves, that they should be subject to their masters, and serve them loyally and willingl y [cf . Eph. 6.5] . Wha t h e mean s i s that i f they canno t b e se t fre e b y thei r masters, they themselves may thus make their slavery, in a sense, free, by serving not with 118

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the slynes s of fear, bu t wit h the fidelity of affection, unti l al l injustice disappear s and al l human lordshi p an d powe r i s annihilated, and Go d i s all in all . Equity in the relation of master and slave IV.6 This being so, even though our righteou s fathers had slaves, they so managed the peace of their household s a s t o mak e a distinctio n betwee n th e situatio n o f childre n an d th e condition of slaves in respec t o f the tempora l good s o f this life; an d ye t in the matte r of the worship of God - i n whom we must place our hope of everlasting goods - the y were concerned, wit h equal affection, fo r all the member s of their household. This is what the order o f nature prescribes , s o tha t thi s i s the sourc e o f th e nam e paterfamilias, a name that ha s become s o generally used that eve n those who exercise unjust rul e rejoice t o be called by this title. On the other hand, those who are genuine 'father s of their household' are concerne d fo r th e welfar e o f al l i n thei r household s i n respec t o f th e worshi p an d service of God, as if they were all their children, longing and prayin g that they may come to the heavenly home, where it will not be a necessary duty to give order to men, because it wil l n o longe r b e a necessary dut y t o b e concerne d fo r th e welfar e o f those wh o ar e already in th e felicit y o f that immorta l state . Bu t until that hom e i s reached, the father s have an obligation t o exercis e the authority of masters greater than th e duty of slaves to put u p wit h their conditio n a s servants.

IV.7 However, i f anyon e i n th e househol d is , throug h hi s disobedience , a n enemy t o th e domestic peace, he is reproved by a word, or by a blow, or any other kind of punishment that i s just an d legitimate , t o th e exten t allowe d b y huma n society ; bu t thi s i s for th e benefit o f the offender , intende d t o readjus t hi m t o th e domesti c peac e fro m whic h h e had broken away. For just as it is not a n act of kindness to help a man, when the effec t o f the hel p is to mak e him los e a greater good, s o it i s not a blameless act to spar e a man, when by so doing you let him fal l into a greater sin. Hence the duty of anyone who would be blameless includes not onl y doing no harm to anyone but als o restraining a man fro m sin or punishing his sin, so that either the man wh o is chastised may be corrected by his experience, or others may be deterred by his example. Now a man's house ought to be the beginning, or rathe r a small component par t of the city , and ever y beginning is directed to some end of its own kind, and every component par t contributes to the completeness of the whol e of which it form s a part . Th e implicatio n i s quite apparent, that domesti c peace contributes to the peace of the city - tha t is, the ordered harmony of those who live together in a house in the matter of giving and obeying orders, contributes to the ordered harmony concernin g authorit y an d obedienc e obtainin g amon g th e citizens . Consequently i t i s fittin g tha t th e fathe r o f a househol d shoul d tak e his rule s fro m th e law of the city, and govern his household i n such a way that it fits in with the peace of the city. The origin of peace between the heavenly society and the earthly city, and of discord between them IV.8 But a househol d o f huma n being s whos e lif e i s no t base d o n fait h i s i n pursui t o f a n earthly peace based o n th e thing s belonging to thi s temporal life , an d o n it s advantages,

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whereas a household o f human beings whose lif e i s based o n fait h look s forwar d to th e blessings which are promised a s eternal in the future, makin g use of earthly and tempora l things like a pilgrim in a foreign land , who doe s not le t himself be taken i n by them o r distracted fro m hi s course towards God , but rathe r treat s the m a s supports whic h hel p him more easil y to bear the burdens of 'the corruptible body which weighs heavy on the soul' [Wisdo m 9.15], they must on no account be allowed to increase the load. Thus both kinds of men an d both kind s of households alike make use of the things essential for this mortal life ; bu t eac h has it s ow n ver y different en d i n makin g us e of them. S o also th e earthly city , whose lif e i s not base d o n faith , aim s at a n earthl y peace , and i t limit s th e harmonious agreemen t o f citizen s concernin g th e givin g and obeyin g o f order s t o th e establishment of a kind of compromise between human wills about the things relevant to mortal life . I n contrast , th e Heavenl y Cit y - o r rathe r tha t par t o f i t whic h i s o n pilgrimage i n this conditio n o f mortality, an d which live s on the basis o f faith - mus t needs mak e use of this peace also, until this mortal state , fo r which this kind o f peace is essential, passes away. And therefore , it leads what we may cal l a lif e o f captivity in thi s earthly cit y a s i n a foreig n land , althoug h i t ha s alread y receive d th e promis e o f redemption, an d th e gif t o f the Spirit as a kind of pledge of it; and yet it does not hesitate to obe y th e law s of th e earthl y cit y by whic h thos e thing s whic h ar e designe d fo r th e support o f this mortal lif e ar e regulated; and th e purpos e o f this obedience i s that, sinc e this mortal condition i s shared by both cities, a harmony may be preserved between them in thing s that ar e relevant to thi s condition .

IV.9 But this earthly city has had some philosophers belonging to it whose theories are rejected by the teaching inspired by God. Either led astray by their own speculation o r deluded by demons, these thinkers reached the belief that there are many gods who must be won over to serv e huma n ends , an d als o tha t the y have , a s i t were , differen t department s wit h different responsibilitie s attached. Thus the body is the department of one god, the mind that o f another; an d withi n the bod y itself , on e go d i s in charge of the head , anothe r o f the neck and so on with each of the separate members. Similarly , within the mind, one is responsible fo r natural ability , anothe r fo r learning, another fo r anger, anothe r fo r lust ; and in the accessories of life there are separate gods over the departments of flocks, grain, wine, oil, forests , coinage, navigation , war an d victory , marriage , birth, fertility , an d s o on. Th e Heavenl y City, i n contrast , know s onl y one Go d a s the objec t o f worship, an d decrees, with faithfu l devotion , tha t h e onl y i s to b e serve d with tha t servic e which th e Greeks call latreia, which is due t o Go d alone . An d the resul t of this difference ha s been that the Heavenly City could not hav e laws of religion common with the earthly city, and in defenc e o f he r religiou s law s sh e wa s boun d t o dissen t fro m thos e wh o though t differently an d t o prov e a burdensome nuisanc e to them . Thu s sh e had t o endur e their anger and hatred , and th e assaults o f persecution; until at length that Cit y shattered th e morale o f he r adversarie s by th e terro r inspire d b y he r numbers , an d b y th e hel p sh e continually receive d fro m God . IV. 10 While this Heavenly City, therefore, is on pilgrimag e in this world, sh e calls out citizen s from al l nations an d s o collects a society of aliens, speakin g all languages. She takes n o account o f an y differenc e i n customs , laws , an d institutions , b y which earthl y peac e is 120

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achieved an d preserve d - no t tha t sh e annuls o r abolishe s an y of those , rather , sh e maintains them an d follow s the m (fo r whatever divergences there are among the diverse nations, thos e institution s hav e on e singl e ai m - earthl y peace) , provide d tha t n o hindrance i s presented thereb y t o th e religio n whic h teache s tha t th e on e suprem e an d true Go d i s to b e worshipped . Thu s eve n th e Heavenl y City in he r pilgrimag e her e o n earth make s us e o f th e earthl y peac e an d defend s an d seek s th e compromis e betwee n human will s in respec t o f the provision s relevan t t o th e morta l natur e of man, s o far as may be permitted without detrimen t t o tru e religio n an d piety . In fact , tha t Cit y relates the earthl y peac e t o th e heavenl y peace , whic h i s s o trul y peacefu l tha t i t shoul d b e regarded a s the only peace deserving the name, at least in respect o f the rational creation ; for thi s peac e i s th e perfectl y ordere d an d completel y harmoniou s fellowshi p i n th e enjoyment o f God, and of each other i n God. When we arrive at that state of peace, there will be no longe r a lif e tha t end s i n death , bu t a lif e tha t i s life i n sur e and sobe r truth ; there will be no animal bod y to 'weig h down th e soul' in its process o f corruption; ther e will be a spiritual bod y with n o cravings , a body subdued i n every part t o th e will. This peace th e Heavenl y Cit y possesse s i n fait h whil e o n it s pilgrimage , an d i t live s a lif e o f righteousness, base d o n thi s faith , havin g the attainmen t o f that peac e i n view in every good action it performs in relation to God, and in relation t o a neighbour, since the life of a cit y is inevitably a social life . CRITIQUE One o f th e grea t strength s o f this Tex t an d o f Th e City o f Go d generally i s that i t take s seriously th e tensio n tha t Christian s shoul d alway s fee l betwee n a visio n o f th e transcendent an d th e expectation s o f th e world . Wherea s th e moder n Ne w Testament scholar woul d ten d t o expres s thi s tensio n i n term s o f th e Synopti c concep t o f th e Kingdom of God - wit h its relevance to, but distance from , th e temporal an d its present and future reference s - mos t migh t maintain tha t some degree of tension i s essential. On this understanding, i t would be equally as wrong to identif y th e Kingdom of God wholly with som e particula r political programme , a s to asser t tha t i t i s totally withou t politica l relevance. Withi n thes e parameters , ther e ar e man y varian t positions , eac h subjec t t o particular weaknesses . The weaknes s o f Augustine' s positio n i n thi s Tex t i s tha t th e heavenl y cit y i s s o marginally relate d t o th e earthl y cit y that i t appear s littl e intereste d i n effectin g change s within it . The pilgrim status of Christians effectivel y mean s that they may simply have to endure injustice rather than attempt t o change it. So, finally, his advice to slaves is that, 'if they cannot b e set free by their masters, they themselves may thus make their slavery, in a sense, free, by serving not wit h the slynes s of fear, but wit h the fidelity of affection, unti l all injustice disappears and all human lordship an d power is annihilated, and God is all in all' (IV. 5 -see also Text X). The individual Christia n i s not encourage d t o oppos e slavery or actively to combat injustice , but rathe r to endure it and wait for the time when 'God is all in all'. A radically different Christia n interpretatio n i s evident i n Miranda's Extrac t 13 and Bonino' s Extrac t 19 . In Augustine , th e marty r understandin g o f Christianity i s still apparent (se e the las t sentence s o f IV. 9 an d VII.8 ) and , indeed , i n hi s battle s wit h th e Donatists i n Nort h Afric a h e sometimes expecte d t o b e martyre d himsel f (while , at th e same time, rejecting the Donatist's own martyr-seeking attitude : cf . Text XIII). Augustine was always more kee n t o comba t wha t h e regarded a s Christian 'heresy ' than t o uphol d social justice.

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TEXT V AQUINAS On princely government 1. BACKGROUND This Text comes from D e Regimine Principum, XII-XIV (O n Princel y Government, fro m A. P. D'Entreves (ed.), Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, Blackwell, Oxford, 1948, trans. J. G. Dawson, pp. 67-77). The authentic parts of De Regimine Principum (mainl y Book I from whic h thi s Tex t i s taken) wer e written durin g Aquinas' tim e o f teachin g i n Ital y (1259-69) as specific advice to the Kin g of Cyprus. Aquinas was not, of course, primarily a politica l theoris t an d hi s writing s o n politica l matter s ar e thoroughl y medieval , hierarchical and theocratic. H e followed Aristotle in arguing that a human is by nature a social an d politica l anima l an d tha t natura l la w requires rul e by kings. Accordingly , he opened D e Regimine Principum a s follows: Our firs t tas k mus t b e t o explai n ho w th e ter m kin g i s t o b e understood . No w whenever a certain end has been decide d upon , but th e means for arriving thereat are still open to choice, some one must provide direction i f that end is to be expeditiously attained. A ship , fo r instance , wil l sai l firs t o n on e cours e an d the n o n another , according to th e winds it encounters, and i t would neve r reach its destination bu t fo r the skil l of th e helmsma n wh o steer s i t t o port . I n th e sam e wa y man, who act s by intelligence, has a destiny to which all life and activities are directed; for it is clearly the nature o f intelligent beings to ac t with som e en d i n view. Yet the diversit y of human interests an d pursuit s makes i t equally clear that there ar e many courses ope n t o me n when seekin g th e en d the y desire. Man , then, need s guidanc e fo r attainin g hi s ends . (D'Entreves, p. 3) On thi s basis, princely government rightl y (according to natura l law) directs individua l lives, but it , in turn, is subordinate to divine law and to the ecclesiastical ministers of this law. Th e latte r crown s th e forme r a s grac e crown s natur e (see above, pp . 26-7) . I n contrast t o Luther' s Text IX , Aquinas maintained tha t th e tyran t nee d no t alway s b e obeyed: Tyrannical law, not bein g according to reason , i s not la w at al l in th e tru e and stric t sense, but i s rather a perversion o f law. It does, however , assume th e natur e o f law to the exten t tha t i t provide s fo r th e well-bein g o f th e citizens . Thu s i t bear s som e relationship to law in so far as it is the dictate to hi s subjects of some one in authority; and t o th e exten t tha t it s object i s the ful l obedienc e o f those subject s to th e law. For 122

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them suc h obedienc e i s good, no t unconditionally , bu t wit h respec t t o th e particula r regime unde r whic h the y live. (D'Entreves , p. 119 , fro m Summa Theologica 1/11.92 ) Insofar a s princely governmen t promote s th e well-bein g o f individuals, i t accord s wit h natural law and provide s th e basis on whic h grace can then act . 2. KE Y ISSUES Having attempte d t o establis h tha t monarch y accord s wit h natur e an d offer s th e bes t form o f government, Aquina s no w consider s th e dutie s o f a king. H e suggest s a stron g analogy between, o n th e on e hand , God' s control ove r th e universe , and , o n th e other, reason's control ove r the individua l an d a king's contro l over society . I f he is faithful t o this analogy , a kin g shoul d b e guide d b y reason , justice , mildnes s an d clemenc y (V.I) . Whereas Go d i s bot h creato r an d governo r o f th e universe , usuall y a kin g i s onl y governor o f a city or kingdom . Yet , in governing, h e ought t o b e aware of the purpose s for whic h the cit y or kingdo m wa s founded (V.2) . Unlike God, th e founde r of a city or kingdom doe s not create from nothing , bu t chooses, fro m a n existing place, a suitable site for hi s cit y o r kingdom , plan s th e position s fo r hi s buildings , order s th e peopl e an d provides for their needs - al l functions which resemble the work of God as creator (V.3). The king, as governor - agai n analogous with God's work - mus t see k to guide his people to thei r appointe d en d an d no t simpl y t o preserv e th e statu s qu o (V.4) . Th e en d o f humans is that final blessedness an d enjoyment of God to be known afte r death (V.5 ) and not merel y some huma n perfectio n which alread y exists (V.6). Since this en d canno t b e attained alon e b y natural huma n virtue , bu t onl y throug h divin e grace , i t ca n onl y be divine rule , rathe r tha n a human government , whic h can lead human s t o i t (V.7) . This divine rul e i s entrusted t o th e Papac y an d to th e Churc h - t o whic h al l subordinate , temporal ruler s must b e subjec t (V.8) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS Analogical arguments , base d upo n natura l law , ar e apparen t throughou t thi s Text . Natural law provides the deontological basis for the discussion (se e Text II). The world of nature reveal s how human societ y should b e ordered an d ho w the kin g should behave . Yet th e wor k o f Go d ca n b e use d a s th e basi c analog y fo r huma n mora l an d socia l behaviour. Fo r Aquinas , th e concep t o f a n analog y o f bein g (analogia entis) betwee n creator an d create d wa s crucial : indeed , precisel y becaus e th e creatur e wa s th e direc t product o f th e creator , th e forme r coul d b e use d t o infe r th e existenc e an d certai n attributes o f the latter , an d th e latte r coul d b e used t o discove r ho w the forme r shoul d live. In much Reforme d theology , si n is thought t o hav e so distorted the creator/create d relationship tha t such analogical argument is impossible. But , for Aquinas, it is the key to his argument . Th e Aristotelian emphasi s upo n th e end or telos of humans - see n here , though, i n term s o f th e beatifi c visio n (V.5 ) - give s th e argumen t a n eventua l consequentialist o r teleologica l bias . 4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS The quotation fro m Genesi s (in V.3) plays an important rol e in this Text. Aquinas derives the principles for founding a city or kingdom analogicall y from it . This kind of analogical interpretation i s obviousl y dependen t o n hi s overal l understandin g o f theolog y an d exegesis. The quotations fro m Paul , however, (i n V.5 and V.7 ) are not use d analogically, 123

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but rathe r t o substantiat e specificall y theologica l points . Aquinas ' assumptio n o f ecclesiastical traditio n an d papa l primac y i s apparen t i n V.8 : thi s traditio n i s simpl y presented prescriptively . 5. SOCIAL

DETERMINANTS

Aquinas' discussio n o f politica l realitie s is , perhaps inevitably , deepl y coloure d b y th e social contex t o f thirteenth-centur y Italy . Thi s i s see n mos t obviousl y i n hi s frequen t mention o f a king of 'a city or a kingdom': it reflects th e world of relatively autonomou s cities, o r autocrati c loca l leader s an d o f small-scale dynasties . I t i s als o apparen t i n hi s assumptions abou t ecclesiastica l traditio n (cf . Text VIII.7-12 ) an d abou t th e structura l unity of Church an d Stat e (see above, p. 28) . Indeed, thi s particular Text i s so evidently dependent o n a specifi c socia l contex t tha t i t ma y appea r toda y a s on e o f th e mos t anachronistic o f the Aquina s Texts. 6. SOCIAL

SIGNIFICANCE

It i s difficult t o kno w whether o r no t D e Regimine Prindpum ha d an y serious influence upon politics . A t the most , i t provide d a legitimation fo r th e statu s qu o o f thirteenth century Italy . Nonetheless , th e specifi c wa y in whic h Aquina s attempted t o deriv e th e duties o f political leaders , both fro m natura l la w and fro m th e concep t o f creation, ha s had a continuin g influenc e upon Catholi c politica l thought . Thi s influenc e i s clearl y present i n Joh n XXIH' s Extrac t 12 , in Joh n Pau l II' s Extrac t 4 , an d eve n i n Temple' s Extract 11 . FURTHER READING The introduction b y A. P. D'Entreves to his Aquinas: Selected Political Writing (1948 ) an d his Th e Notion o f th e State (1967) ar e bot h useful . However , referenc e should als o b e made t o book s concerne d wit h Aquinas ' understandin g o f wa r (se e Section 3 ) an d t o those concerne d wit h his notion o f natural law (see above, p. 51) . Fo r a recen t Catholi c perspective se e James P. Mackey' s Power and Christian Ethics (1994).

TEXT V AQUINAS On princely government The duties of a king; the similarity between royal power and the power of the soul over the body and of God over the universe V.I To complet e what we have so fa r said i t remain s onl y to conside r wha t is the dut y of a king an d ho w h e shoul d compor t himself . And sinc e ar t i s but a n imitatio n o f nature , from whic h w e com e t o lear n ho w t o ac t accordin g t o reason , i t woul d see m bes t t o deduce th e duties of a king from th e examples o f government in nature. Now in nature there is to be found bot h a universal and a particular form o f government. Th e universal is tha t b y whic h al l thing s fin d thei r plac e unde r th e directio n o f God , who , b y Hi s providence, governs the universe. The particular is very similar to this divine control, an d is foun d withi n ma n himself , who, fo r thi s reason , i s calle d a microcosm , becaus e h e

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provides an example of universal government. Just as the divine control i s exercised over all created bodies an d over all spiritual powers, so does the control o f reason extend over the members of the body and the other faculties of the soul: so, in a certain sense, reason is to ma n wha t God i s to th e universe . Bu t because, as we have shown above , man i s by nature a socia l anima l livin g i n community , thi s similarit y wit h divin e rul e i s foun d among men, not only in the sense that a man is directed by his reason, but als o in the fac t that a community is ruled by one man's intelligence; for this is essentially the king's duty. A simila r exampl e o f such contro l i s to b e foun d amon g certai n animal s which liv e in community, suc h as bees, which are said to hav e a king. But in their case, of course, th e control ha s no rationa l foundation , but spring s fro m a n instinc t o f their nature , given them by the supreme rule r who is the author of nature. A king, then, shoul d realis e that he has assumed th e duty of being to his kingdom what the soul is to the body and what God is to the universe . I f he thinks attentively upo n thi s point h e will, on the one hand , be fired with zea l fo r justice, seeing himself appointe d t o administe r justice throughout his real m i n th e nam e o f God , and , o n th e othe r hand , h e wil l gro w i n mildnes s an d clemency, looking upo n th e person s subjec t t o hi s government , a s the member s o f his own body . Further development of this analogy and of the conclusions to be drawn from it V.2 We must now consider what God does in the universe , and thus we shall see what a king should do. There are, in general, two aspects of the work of God in the world. The first is the act of creation; the secon d Hi s governance of it once He has created it. Similarly, the action o f the sou l upo n th e bod y present s tw o aspects . I n th e firs t plac e i t i s the sou l which gives form to the body and secondly it is by the soul that the body is controlled an d moved. I t is the secon d o f these two operations whic h pertains mor e particularl y to th e king's office; fo r all kings are bound t o govern, and i t is from thi s process of directing the government that the term king (rex) i s derived. The former task, however, does not fal l t o all kings; for not ever y king founds th e cit y or kingdom ove r which he rules; many fulfi l their duties in cities or kingdoms which are already flourishing. It must not , however, be forgotten tha t if there had been no one in the first place to establish a city or a kingdom, there would be nothing t o govern : so that th e kingly office mus t als o cover the foundin g of a cit y o r a kingdom . Som e king s have , i n fact , founde d th e citie s ove r whic h the y afterwards ruled , a s Ninus founded Nineveh , and Romulu s Rome. It i s furthermore the ruler's duty to protect what he governs and to make use of it for the ends for which it was intended: but h e canno t b e full y awar e of the dutie s of his offic e i f he fail s t o acquain t himself wit h th e reason s fo r government . No w th e reaso n fo r th e foundatio n o f a kingdom i s to be found i n the example provided by the creation o f the world: in this we must first consider th e creation o f things themselves, and then thei r orderly distributio n throughout th e universe . Then we see how things are distributed i n the various parts of the universe according to their different species ; the stars in the heavens, birds in the air, fishes in th e se a and animal s upo n th e earth . Finall y we note ho w abundantl y divin e providence furnishes eac h species with all that is necessary to it . Moses has described this orderliness show n i n creation wit h grea t car e and subtlety .

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He firs t consider s th e creatio n o f thing s b y th e words : 'I n th e beginnin g Go d create d heaven an d earth' [Gen . 1.1] ; then he notes that all things became, by divine command, distinct accordin g to thei r appropriat e order , a s day fro m night , th e height s fro m th e depths, an d the waters from dr y land. The n he tells how the heaven s were adorned wit h stars, the ai r with birds, th e se a with fishes, and th e eart h wit h animals . Finally , he tells how dominion wa s given to me n ove r th e whol e earth an d th e animal s thereon. A s for plant life , h e say s that i t was given by providence fo r th e us e of both animal s an d men . Now the founde r o f a city or of a kingdom canno t creat e out o f nothing th e me n or th e dwelling places or al l the othe r thing s necessary to life ; h e must us e instead wha t natur e has already provided. Jus t as all other art s find their materials fro m natura l sources ; the smiths working with iron an d th e builder wit h wood an d stone . S o one who is about t o establish a city or a realm must, in the first place, choose a suitable site; healthy, to ensur e the healt h o f th e inhabitants ; fertile , t o provid e fo r thei r sustenance ; on e whic h wil l delight the ey e with it s loveliness an d giv e natural securit y against hostile attack . Where any of these advantages are lacking, the site chosen will be the more suitable to the extent that suc h conditions , o r a t leas t th e mor e indispensabl e o f them, ar e fulfilled . Havin g chosen the site, the next task which confronts the founder of a city or of a kingdom i s to plan the area to mee t all the requirements of a civic life. When foundin g a kingdom, fo r example, one mus t decid e where to buil d th e town s and where to leav e the countrysid e open, o r t o construc t fortifications : centre s o f study , ope n place s fo r militar y training, and markets, all have to be taken into consideration: and similarly for every other activity which goes to make up the life of a kingdom. I f it is a city which i s to be established, sites must be assigned to churches, to administrativ e offices, an d to the workshops o f various trades. Th e citizens then hav e to be grouped i n various quarters of the cit y according t o their calling. Finally, provision mus t be made so that n o person goe s in want, accordin g to hi s conditio n an d calling : otherwis e neithe r cit y no r kingdo m woul d lon g endure . Such, ver y briefly , ar e th e point s a kin g mus t conside r whe n establishin g a cit y o r a kingdom, an d the y can all be arrived a t by analogy with th e creatio n o f the world .

Comparison between the priestly power and that of a king V.4 Just as the creation of the world serve s as a convenient mode l for the establishment of a city o r a kingdom , s o doe s it s governmen t allo w u s t o deduc e th e principl e o f civi l government. We must first have in mind that to govern is to guide what is governed to its appointed end . So we say that a ship is under control when it is sailed on it s right course to por t b y the skil l o f a sailor . No w whe n somethin g i s ordered t o a n en d whic h lies outside itself, as a ship is to harbour, it is the ruler's duty not only to preserve its integrity, but als o t o se e that i t reache s its appointed destination . I f there were anything with n o end beyon d itself , the n th e ruler' s sol e tas k would b e t o preserv e it unharme d i n al l its perfection. Bu t though there is no such example to be found i n creation, apart from Go d who is the end of all things, care for higher aims is beset with many and varied difficulties . For it i s very clear tha t there may be one person employed abou t the preservatio n o f a thing in its present state, and another concerned wit h bringing it to higher perfection; as we see in the case of a ship, which we have used as an example of government. Jus t as it is the carpenter's task to repai r any damage which may occur an d th e sailor's tas k to steer the shi p to port, so also in man himsel f the same processes are at work. The doctor set s 126

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himself to preserve man's life and bodily health; the economist's task is to see that there is no lack of material goods ; th e learned se e to i t that h e knows the truth; and the moralis t that h e should liv e according t o reason . Thus , i f man wer e not destine d t o som e higher end, thes e attention s woul d suffice . V.5 But ther e i s a furthe r destin y fo r ma n afte r thi s morta l life ; tha t fina l blessednes s an d enjoyment o f Go d whic h h e await s afte r death . For , a s the Apostl e say s [ 2 Corinthians 5.6]: 'While we are i n th e bod y we are absen t fro m God. ' S o it i s that th e Christian , fo r whom tha t blessedness was obtained b y the blood of Christ, and who is led to i t through the gift of the Holy Ghost, has need of another, spiritual, guide to lead him to the harbour of eterna l salvation ; suc h guidanc e i s provided fo r th e faithfu l b y th e minister s o f th e Church o f Christ . V.6 Our conclusio n mus t be the same, whether we consider th e destiny of one person or of a whole community. Consequently , i f the en d o f man wer e to b e found i n any perfection existing i n man himself , the final object o f government i n a community would li e in th e acquisition o f suc h perfectio n an d i n it s preservatio n onc e acquired . S o that i f such a n end, whethe r o f an individua l o r o f a community , were lif e an d bodil y health , doctor s would govern. If , on th e other hand, i t were abundance o f riches, the governmen t o f the community coul d safel y b e lef t i n th e hand s o f th e economist . I f it wer e knowledge of truth, th e king , whos e tas k i t i s t o guid e th e community , woul d hav e th e dutie s o f a professor. But the object for which a community i s gathered togethe r i s to liv e a virtuous life. For men consort togethe r that they may thus attain a fullness o f life which would no t be possible to eac h living singly: and th e ful l lif e is one which is lived according to virtue . Thus th e objec t o f human societ y i s a virtuous life . V.7 A proo f o f this lie s i n th e fac t tha t onl y thos e member s ma y be considere d par t o f th e community who contribute jointly to the fullnes s o f social life. If men consorted togethe r for bar e existence , bot h animal s an d slave s would hav e a part i n civi l society . I f for th e multiplication o f riches, all who had common commercia l ties would belong to one city. But i t i s those who obe y th e sam e laws , and ar e guide d b y a singl e government t o th e fullness o f life , wh o ca n b e sai d t o constitut e a socia l unit . No w th e ma n wh o live s virtuously i s destine d t o a highe r end , whic h consists , a s we hav e alread y said , i n th e enjoyment o f God: an d th e fina l objec t o f human associatio n ca n b e n o differen t fro m that o f the individua l man . Thu s the final aim o f social lif e wil l be, not merel y to liv e in virtue, bu t rathe r throug h virtuou s lif e t o attai n t o th e enjoymen t o f God. If , indeed, i t were possible to attai n this object by natural human virtue, it would, i n consequence, be the dut y of kings t o guid e men t o thi s end. W e believe, however, tha t i t i s the suprem e power in temporal affair s whic h is the business of a king. Now government i s of a higher order accordin g to the importanc e o f the ends it serves. For it is always the one who has the fina l orderin g o f affair s wh o direct s thos e wh o carr y ou t wha t pertain s t o th e attainment o f th e fina l aim : jus t a s th e sailo r wh o mus t navigat e the shi p advise s th e shipwright as to the type of ship which will suit his purpose; and the citizen who is to bear arms tells the smit h wha t weapons t o forge . Bu t the enjoymen t o f God i s an ai m which 127

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cannot b e attained by human virtue alone, but onl y through divine grace, as the Apostle tells us [Roman s 6.23]: 'The grace of God is eternal life'. Only a divine rule, then, and no t human government, can lead u s to this end. Suc h government belongs onl y to that King who is both man, and also God: that is to Jesus Christ, our Lord , Who, making men to be Sons of God ha s led them t o th e glor y of heaven. V.8 This, then, is the government entrusted to Him: a dominion whic h shall never pass away, and in virtue of which He is called in the Holy Scriptures, not onl y a priest but a king; as Jeremias say s [23.5]: 'A king shall reign and shal l be wise'. It i s from Hi m tha t th e roya l priesthood derives; and, what is more, al l the Faithfu l o f Christ, being members o f Him, become thus , priest s an d kings . Th e ministr y o f thi s kingdo m i s entrusted no t t o th e rulers of this earth but to priests, so that temporal affair s ma y remain distinct from thos e spiritual: and, i n particular, it is delegated t o th e Hig h Priest, the successo r of Peter an d Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, t o whom all kings in Christendom shoul d be subjects, as to th e Lor d Jesus Chris t Himself . For those wh o ar e concerned wit h th e subordinat e ends o f lif e mus t b e subjec t t o hi m wh o i s concerne d wit h th e suprem e en d an d b e directed b y his command. An d because the paga n priesthood an d everythin g connecte d with th e cul t of pagan gods was directed t o th e attainmen t o f temporal benefits , which form par t o f th e commo n wea l o f th e community , an d whic h li e withi n th e king' s competence, i t was right that paga n priests should b e subject t o thei r kings. Similarly in the Ol d Testament , tempora l benefit s were promised t o th e peopl e i n rewar d fo r thei r faith, thoug h thes e promise s wer e mad e b y th e tru e Go d an d no t b y demons ; s o that under the Old Law we read that the priesthood wa s subject to kings. But under th e New Law there is a higher priesthood throug h which men ar e led to a heavenly reward: an d under Christ' s Law , kings must be subject to priests . V.9 For this reason it came about by the admirable dispensation o f divine providence, that in the cit y of Rom e which God chos e t o b e th e mai n centr e o f Christendom, i t gradually became th e custo m fo r the ruler s of the cit y to b e subject to th e pontiffs .

CRITIQUE The negativ e and dysfunctiona l side o f Aquinas ' understandin g (an d indee d medieva l understanding generally ) o f governmen t appear s elsewher e i n hi s writings . I t wa s theocratic an d thoroughl y intoleran t o f an y for m o f religiou s opposition . A . P . D'Entreves pointed out : The theory of St. Thomas i s the theor y of the orthodo x State . We are apt t o forge t it . We have grown s o accustomed t o th e threa t which comes fro m th e Stat e [D'Entreves was writing in 1948] , that we are only too read y to hail the Church as the champion of freedom. Medieva l intoleranc e ha d a t leas t on e grea t advantag e ove r moder n totalitarianism. It subtracte d entirel y the definitio n o f orthodoxy fro m th e hand s of the politician . I t pu t a ba r o n Erastianism . I t woul d neve r hav e allowe d tha t 'th e General Will is always right'. It was an intolerance of a different an d more noble brand. But i t wa s intoleranc e al l right , an d a thorough , totalitaria n intolerance . (Fro m hi s Introduction t o Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, p . xxii ) 128

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As evidence o f Aquinas' intoleranc e h e cite d hi s advic e in D e Regimine Judaeorum tha t Jews mus t no t b e harme d bu t mus t nevertheles s remai n outcast s i n th e Christia n community and should b e forced t o earn their living in non-usurious ways : 'Jews of both sexes an d i n al l Christia n land s shoul d o n al l occasion s b e distinguishe d fro m othe r people b y some particula r dress ' (D'Entreves , p. 95: see further, Luther' s Text XV) . But, most of all, for Aquinas and his contemporaries, i t was the Christian apostate who was to be treated harshly: 'if it be just that forger s and other malefactors are put t o death without mercy by the secula r authority, wit h how much greate r reason ma y heretics not onl y be excommunicated, bu t als o pu t t o death , whe n onc e the y ar e convicte d o f heres y (S.T. 11.11. Q.ll . Art.3) . Thi s link , betwee n theocrati c an d religiousl y intolerant attitudes , is particularly strikin g i n someone , lik e Aquinas , wh o otherwis e appear s t o hav e bee n a gentle and equabl e perso n (see further, below, pp. 346-7) . More positively, his emphasis upon th e duties o f kings and hi s admission tha t tyrant s need not alway s be obeyed contrasts favourabl y with Luther. Even his ironic observation , that if the main aim of society is really thought to be the acquisition o f an 'abundance of riches, th e governmen t o f th e communit y coul d safel y b e lef t i n th e hand s o f th e economist'(V.6), provide s a n interestin g commentar y o n moder n natio n states !

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TEXT VI LUTHER Trade and usury 1. BACKGROUND This Tex t come s fro m Trade an d Usury (fro m Luther's Works, Vol . 45 , Fortres s Press , Philadelphia, 1966 , trans. Charle s M. Jacobs and rev . Walther I. Brandt, pp. 245-6, 247 54 and 255-60). Luther published thi s treatise in 152 4 together wit h a reprint o f his Long Sermon o n Usury writte n earlie r i n 152 0 (see above, p. 57) . Both works demonstrat e hi s dislike o f what h e regarde d a s commercial gree d (h e was himself alway s uninterested i n personal wealth ) an d hi s basic ignorance of economic realities . Luthe r accepted man y of the medieva l presupposition s abou t financia l matters , notabl y Aristotle' s notio n tha t money doe s no t produc e mone y and the medieva l ecclesiastical condemnatio n o f usury. But he argued that contemporar y practic e failed t o liv e up t o thes e notions and , indeed , failed t o liv e u p t o biblica l norm s o n wealth . I n addition , h e wa s unhappy abou t th e failure of the diets of Niirnberg in 152 2 and 152 4 to deal effectively with the monopolisti c practices of the trading companies. Luthe r was also reacting, in 1524 , against the rigoris t positions of the evangelical preachers Jacob Strauss and Wolfgang Stein , who maintaine d that a debtor i s not eve n oblige d t o repa y his debt t o a usurer, fo r otherwis e h e woul d share in th e usurer' s guilt . The notio n o f surety or propert y insuranc e (VI . 14) was first developed i n the fourteenth century and was held to be non-usurious, excep t when it was used t o guarante e a loan. Despit e th e genera l advic e to trader s a t th e beginnin g o f this treatise, i t become s clea r (e.g . i n VI . 19) tha t Luther' s primar y concer n her e i s wit h Christians in their relation t o wealth and commercia l activity . At this level, the treatise is arguably still relevan t t o Christia n ethics . 2. KE Y ISSUES Even thoug h h e i s pessimisti c abou t hi s advic e being heeded , Luthe r set s ou t wha t h e considers t o b e th e prope r positio n o f th e Christia n merchan t (VI . 1-2). Th e trad e o f essential commoditie s i s necessary i n th e worl d (VLB) . Bu t there ar e abuses - tw o of which are outlined in this Text. Firstly, merchants can become greed y and try to sell their goods a s expensively as possible (VI.5-6) . Instead, the y should sel l them onl y a t a price that i s just an d i n a wa y that doe s n o injur y t o other s (VI.7) . Differing circumstance s render i t difficult t o make rules about just prices, but tempora l authoritie s could appoin t wise an d hones t me n t o d o thi s o r i t coul d b e lef t t o marke t force s (VI.8-9) . I n thi s Christians must ac t according to their conscience (VI . 10-11) and be prepared t o confes s any inadverten t sin s resultin g fro m tradin g (VI . 12-13). Th e secon d abus e arise s fro m merchants standin g suret y fo r individual s (VI . 14). Thi s practic e i s agains t Scriptur e (VI.14-15) and it puts a false trust in humans rather than in God (VI.16-18). In contrast ,

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there ar e fou r specificall y Christia n way s o f exchangin g goods . First , Christian s ca n simply let others stea l their propert y (VI . 19). Secondly, they can give to anyon e i n nee d (VI.20). Thirdly, the y can lend expectin g nothing i n return (VI.21) . But, if followed in a sinful world, these three ways would lead to the breakdown o f trade: in such a world, laws for non-Christian s ar e essential (VI.23-4) . Fourthly, Christians can buy an d sel l i n cash alone, no t relyin g upon credi t o r upo n suret y (VI.26). 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS In contrast t o Text III , this Text contains a variety of explicit forms o f ethical argument. There i s an appea l t o natura l la w (VI.5 ) an d severa l to individua l conscience (VI. 7 and 10-11). Consequentialis m i s eviden t i n VI. 7 and th e argument s i n VI . 13 are distinctl y pragmatic. Bu t there i s an overall deontological basi s to th e position s maintaine d i n th e Text: 'avarice', 'greed', 'robbing' and, indeed , 'injustice' (VI.5 ) are all assumed t o be selfevidently wrong. Standing surety is also believed to be wrong primarily because it offend s against Scriptur e (VI . 14). Eve n popula r Germa n proverb s ar e use d deontologicall y t o reinforce hi s argumen t (VI. 9 and 15) . This Text i s particularly importan t i n illustratin g the clea r dichotom y tha t Luthe r ofte n fel t betwee n th e standard s appropriat e fo r th e Christian and thos e t o be require d o f the non-Christian . 4. BASES OF CHRISTIAN

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Both Ol d an d Ne w Testament s ar e use d throughou t thi s Extract . Indeed , Scriptur e characteristically forms the basis and constant poin t o f reference for Luther's contentions (cf. Text III) . This i s particularly evident i n hi s us e o f Proverbs (VI . 14), Genesis (VI. 18) and Matthew (VI.19). But there is also a strong doctrinal basis to his argument in VI. 1617 and the concept of the counsel of perfection for the clergy (VI. 19) is heavily dependent upon Christia n traditio n rathe r tha n th e Bible . There i s also a n importan t referenc e t o 'Christian love' in VI.6. It might eve n be possible t o argu e that Luthe r was a situationist as far a s Christians wer e concerned : law s were considered necessar y onl y becaus e mos t people were not Christian : if the world consisted onl y of Christians, Christian love would be a sufficient guid e for proper action . Thi s position i s most eviden t in the treatise of the previous year, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should B e Obeyed, tha t h e refer s t o in VI.23 , as the followin g excerpt demonstrates : If all the world were composed o f real Christians, that is , true believers, there would be no nee d fo r o r benefit s fro m prince , king , lord, sword , o r law . They would serv e n o purpose, sinc e Christian s hav e i n thei r hear t th e Hol y Spirit , wh o bot h teache s an d makes them to do injustice to no one, to love everyone, and to suffe r injustic e and even death willingl y and cheerfull y a t the hands of anyone. Wher e ther e i s nothing but th e unadulterated doin g o f righ t an d bearin g o f wrong , ther e i s no t nee d fo r an y suit , litigation, court, judge, penalty, law or sword ... because the righteous man of his own accord doe s al l and mor e than th e law demands. Bu t the unrighteou s do nothin g tha t the law demands; therefore , they need the law to instruct, constrain, an d compel them to do good ... All who are not Christians belong to the kingdom of the world an d are under the law. There are few true believers, and still fewer who live a Christian life, wh o do not resis t evi l and indee d themselve s d o no evil . For this reaso n Go d has provide d for the m a different governmen t beyon d th e Christian estat e and kingdo m o f God. He has subjecte d the m t o th e swor d s o that , eve n thoug h the y woul d lik e to , the y ar e 131

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unable t o practic e thei r wickedness , an d i f the y d o practic e i t the y canno t d o s o without fea r o r wit h succes s and impunit y ... If this were not so , men would devou r one another , seein g that th e whol e world i s evil an d tha t amon g thousand s ther e i s scarcely a single true Christian. N o one could suppor t wif e and child, feed himself, and serve God . The world woul d b e reduced t o chaos . Fo r this reaso n Go d ha s ordaine d two governments : th e spiritual , b y whic h th e Hol y Spiri t produce s Christian s an d righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that - n o thanks to them - the y are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace . (Luther's Works, Vol . 45, pp. 89-90 ) This i s one o f Luther's clearest expressions o f the notio n o f 'the two kingdoms' . 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS The extent to which Luther was dependent upo n medieval notions o f finance ha s already been indicate d an d i s particularl y eviden t i n hi s unworkabl e solutio n i n VI.26 . I n addition, i t might be argued that th e sharp dichotomy tha t h e made between th e ethical requirements fo r Christian s an d thos e fo r non-Christian s wa s exacerbate d b y hi s ow n particular social context. An accompaniment of the empirical phenomenon o f conversion (see above, pp. 21-2) ca n be a subsequent tendency to exaggerate the depravity of the preconversion stat e and those associated wit h it. Certainly, in this Text Luther's estimate of 'non-evangelical Christians ' appear s ver y low . Doubtless , th e excesse s o f part s o f th e sixteenth-century Catholic Churc h als o contributed t o th e dichotom y tha t Luthe r drew (see above, p . 59) . Luthe r attempte d t o maintai n a positio n mid-wa y betwee n th e Anabaptists' rejectio n of Christians participating in politica l and economi c matter s an d the Churc h of Rome's assumption o f all earthly authority within itself . 6. SOCIAL SSIGNIFICANCE It i s ironic that , whil e Luther upheld th e centra l convictions o f medieval Christendo m about the evils of usury, of unrestrained trade based upon maximum profit, and of unjust and unjustifiabl e prices , h e ma y hav e contribute d indirectl y t o thei r propagation . Returning t o Weber' s thesi s o f Th e Protestant Ethic an d th e 'Spirit' o f Capitalism (see above, p. 59) , the ver y success of Luther's challeng e to th e Churc h of Rome's authority , may have helped to remove the sanctions enforced by this authority. Thus, on the issue of usury, Luthe r clearly despised i t an d tragicall y associated th e Je w with i t (see Tex t XV) . Yet one of the social effects o f his theological challeng e may have been to promote a new individualism in Europe and th e structural demise of effective sanction s agains t usury. It would be false to claim either that this was the sole factor i n effecting economi c chang e in Europe or that Luther himself (or Calvin) was directly and consciously responsible for the rise of the spirit of rational capitalism (the so-called 'work ethic'). Weber's thesis depends on neithe r claim . But it is possible t o se e Luther's challenge contributing significantl y t o changes already present i n Europea n society . FURTHER READING Luther's writings of the 1520 s have been th e subjec t of a considerable numbe r o f books. Some of these have already been mentioned i n relation to Text III. They can be compared fruitfully wit h Calvin' s politica l writing s in Joh n T . McNeil l (ed.) , Calvin: O n Go d and

132

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Political Duty (1950) . O n th e issu e of usury , J. T. Noonan , Jr , Th e Scholastic Analysis o f Usury (1957 ) is useful .

TEXT VI LUTHER Trade and usury VI. 1 The hol y gospel , no w tha t i t ha s com e t o light , rebuke s an d reveal s al l the 'work s o f darkness', a s S t Pau l call s the m i n Roman s 13[.12] . Fo r i t i s a brillian t light , whic h illumines the whole world and teaches how evil are the works of the world, and shows the true work s w e ought t o d o fo r Go d an d ou r neighbour . A s a resul t eve n som e o f th e merchants hav e been awakene d an d becom e awar e that i n thei r tradin g man y a wicked trick an d hurtfu l financia l practic e i s i n use . I t i s t o b e feare d tha t th e word s o f Ecclesiasticus appl y here , namely , tha t merchant s ca n hardl y b e withou t si n [Ecclus . 26.29]. Indeed, I think S t Paul's sayin g in the las t chapter of the first epistle to Timoth y fits the case , 'The love of money i s the roo t o f all evils' [ 1 Tim. 6.10] , an d again , 'Those who desire to be rich fall int o th e devil's snare and int o man y useless and hurtfu l desire s that plung e men int o rui n an d perdition ' [ 1 Tim. 6.9] .

VI.2 I suppose that m y writing will be quite in vain, because the mischief has gone so far and has completely gotten the upper hand in all lands; and because those who understand th e gospel are probably able in such easy, external things to judge for themselves what is fai r and wha t i s not, o n th e basi s of their own consciences . Nevertheless , I have been aske d and urge d t o touc h upo n thes e financia l evil s an d expos e som e o f the m s o that , eve n though th e majority may not wish to do right, at least some people - howeve r few they are - ma y be delivered fro m th e gaping jaws of avarice. For it mus t be that amon g the merchants, as among other people, there are some who belong to Christ and would rather be poo r wit h Go d tha n ric h wit h th e devil , a s Psal m 37[.16 ] says , 'It i s better fo r th e righteous to have a little than to have the great possessions of the wicked.' For their sake, then, w e must spea k out . VI.3 It cannot b e denied that buying and selling are necessary. They cannot be dispensed with, and ca n b e practise d i n a Christia n manner , especiall y when th e commoditie s serv e a necessary and honourable purpose . Fo r even the patriarchs bought an d sold cattle , wool, grain, butter, mil k and other goods i n this way. These are gifts o f God, which he bestows out o f the eart h an d distribute s amon g mankind . Bu t foreig n trade , whic h brings fro m Calcutta an d India and such place s wares lik e costly silks, articles of gold, and spices which minister only to ostentation bu t serve no useful purpose, and which drain away the money of land and people - woul d not be permitted if we had [proper] government and princes. Bu t o f thi s i t i s no t m y presen t purpos e t o write , fo r I expec t that , lik e overdressing and overeating , i t will have to sto p o f itself when we have no mor e money . 133

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Until then, neither writing nor teachin g will do any good. We must first feel the pinch of want an d poverty ...

VI.4 It is our purpose here to speak of the abuses and sins of trade, insofa r as they concern the conscience. The matter of their detrimental effec t on the purse we leave to the princes and lords, tha t the y may do thei r dut y i n this regard . VI.5 First. Among themselves the merchants have a common rul e which is their chief maxim and th e basis of all their sharp practices, where they say: 'I may sell my goods as dear as I can.' They think this is their right. Thus occasion i s given for avarice, and ever y window and doo r t o hel l i s opened. What els e doe s i t mean bu t this : I car e nothin g abou t m y neighbour; so long as I have my profit an d satisf y m y greed, of what concern is it to me if it injure s m y neighbour i n ten ways at once? There you se e how shamelessly this maxi m flies squarely in the face not onl y of Christian love but als o of natural law. How can there be anything good then in trade? How can it be without sin when such injustice is the chief maxim and rule of the whole business? On such a basis trade can be nothing but robbin g and stealin g the propert y o f others . VI.6 When once the rogue's eye and greedy belly of a merchant find that people must have his wares, or that the buyer is poor and needs them, he takes advantage of him and raises the price. H e consider s no t th e valu e o f the goods , o r wha t hi s ow n effort s an d ris k hav e deserved, but onl y the other man' s want and need. He notes it not tha t he may relieve it but tha t h e may use it to hi s own advantage by raising the pric e of his goods, whic h he would no t hav e raised ha d i t no t bee n fo r hi s neighbour's need . Becaus e of his avarice, therefore, the goods must be priced as much higher as the greater need of the other fello w will allow , s o that th e neighbour' s nee d become s a s it wer e th e measur e o f th e goods ' worth and value. Tell me, isn't that an un-Christian and inhuman thin g to do? Isn't that equivalent to sellin g a poor man hi s own need i n the same transaction? When h e has to buy his wares at a higher price because of his need, that is the same as having to buy his own need; for what is sold t o him i s not simpl y the wares as they are, but th e wares plus the fac t tha t h e mus t hav e them . Observ e tha t thi s an d lik e abomination s ar e th e inevitable consequence whe n th e rul e i s that I may sell my goods a s dear a s I can. VI.7 The rule ought to be, not, 'I may sell my wares as dear as I can or will,' but, 'I may sell my wares as dear a s I ought, o r a s is right and fair. ' Fo r your sellin g ought no t t o b e an ac t that i s entirely within your ow n powe r an d discretion , withou t la w or limit , a s though you were a god and beholden to no one. Because your selling is an act performed toward your neighbour , i t shoul d rathe r be so governed by law and conscienc e that you d o i t without harm and injury to him, your concern being directed more toward doing him no injury than toward gaining profit fo r yourself. But where are there such merchants? How few merchant s there would be, and ho w trade would decline , i f they were to amen d thi s evil rul e and pu t thing s on a fai r an d Christia n basis! 134

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VI.8

You ask, then, 'How dear may I sell? How am I to arriv e at what is fair an d righ t so I do not tak e increase from a neighbour or overcharg e him?' Answer: That i s something that will never be governed eithe r by writing or speaking ; nor ha s anyone ever undertaken t o fix the value of every commodity, an d t o rais e or lower prices accordingly. The reason is this: wares are not al l alike; one i s transported a greater distanc e tha n anothe r an d on e involves greate r outla y tha n another . I n thi s respect , therefore , everythin g i s and mus t remain uncertain , an d n o fixe d determinatio n ca n b e made , an y mor e tha n on e ca n designate a certain city as the place from whic h all wares are to be brought, or establish a definite cos t pric e for them. I t may happen that th e same wares, brought fro m th e same city by the same road, cost vastly more i n one year than they did the year before because the weather may be worse, or the road, or because something els e happens that increases the expens e a t on e tim e abov e tha t a t anothe r time . No w i t i s fai r an d righ t tha t a merchant tak e a s muc h profi t o n hi s ware s a s wil l reimburs e hi m fo r thei r cos t an d compensate him for his trouble, his labour, and his risk. Even a farmhand must have food and pa y fo r hi s labour . Wh o ca n serv e o r labou r fo r nothing ? Th e gospe l says , 'Th e labourer deserve s his wages' [Luk e 10.7] .

VI.9 But in order not to leave the question entirely unanswered, the best and safes t way would be t o hav e th e tempora l authoritie s appoin t i n thi s matte r wis e an d hones t me n t o compute the costs of all sorts of wares and accordingly set prices which would enable the merchant to get along and provide for him a n adequate living, as is being done at certain places wit h respec t t o wine , fish, bread, an d th e like . Bu t we Germans hav e too man y other thing s t o do ; w e ar e to o bus y drinkin g an d dancin g t o provid e fo r rule s an d regulations of this sort. Since this kind o f ordinance therefor e is not t o b e expected, th e next best thing is to let goods be valued at the price for which they are bought and sold in the common market , or i n the lan d generally. In this matter w e can accept the proverb , 'Follow the crowd and you won't get lost.' Any profit mad e in this way I consider hones t and proper, because here there is always the risk involved of having to suffe r los s in wares and outlay , and excessiv e profits ar e scarcely possible. VI. 10 Where th e pric e o f good s i s no t fixe d eithe r b y la w o r custom , an d yo u mus t fi x i t yourself, here one can truly give you no instructions but onl y lay it on your conscience to be careful no t to overcharge your neighbour, and to seek a modest living , not the goals of greed. Som e hav e wished t o plac e a ceilin g o n profits , with a limi t o f one-hal f o n al l wares; some sa y one-third; other s somethin g else . None of these measures is certain an d safe unles s i t b e s o decree d b y th e tempora l authoritie s an d commo n law . Wha t the y determine i n these matter s woul d b e safe . Therefore , you mus t mak e u p you r min d t o seek in your trading only an adequate living. Accordingly, you should compute and count your cost , trouble , labour , an d risk , and o n tha t basi s rais e or lowe r th e price s o f your wares so that yo u se t them wher e you will be repai d fo r your troubl e an d labour . VI. 11 I would not hav e anyone's conscienc e be so overly scrupulous or so closely bound i n this matter tha t he feels h e must strike exactly the righ t measure of profit t o the very heller. It 135

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is impossibl e fo r yo u t o arriv e a t th e exac t amoun t tha t yo u hav e earne d wit h you r trouble and labour. It is enough that with a good conscience you make the effort t o arrive at wha t i s right, thoug h th e ver y nature o f trade make s i t impossibl e t o determin e thi s exactly. The sayin g of the Wis e Man wil l hold goo d i n you r cas e too: ' A merchant ca n hardly ac t withou t sin , an d a tradesma n wil l hardl y kee p hi s lip s fro m evil ' [Ecclus . 26.29]. If you tak e a trifle to o muc h profi t unwittingl y and unintentionally , dismis s the matter in the Lord' s Prayer where we pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses ' [Matt . 6.12]. Afte r all, no man's life is without sin; besides, the time will come in turn when you get too little for your trouble. Just throw the excess in the scale to counterbalance the losses you must similarly expec t t o take . VI. 12 For example, if you had a business amounting to a hundred gulden a year, and yo u were to tak e - ove r an d abov e al l the cos t an d reasonabl e profi t yo u had fo r your trouble , labour, and risk - a n excessive profit o f perhaps one or two or three gulden, that I would call a business error which could no t wel l be avoided, especially in the course of a whole year's trading. Therefore, you should no t burden your conscience with it, but brin g it to God in the Lord's Prayer as another o f those inevitabl e sins (which cling to all of us) an d leave th e matte r t o him . Fo r i t i s no t wickednes s o r greed , bu t th e ver y natur e an d necessity of your occupatio n whic h forces you int o thi s mistake. I am speakin g no w of good-hearted an d God-fearin g men, wh o woul d no t willingl y d o wrong . I t i s like th e marital obligation , whic h cannot b e performed without sin ; yet because o f its necessity, God winks at it , fo r i t canno t b e otherwise . VLB In determinin g ho w much profi t yo u ough t t o tak e o n you r busines s an d you r labour , there is no better way to reckon it than by computing the amount o f time and labour you have put int o it, and comparing that with the effort o f a day labourer who works at some other occupation an d seeing how much he earns in a day. On that basis figure how many days you have spent i n getting your wares and bringin g them t o you r plac e of business, and ho w muc h labou r an d ris k wa s involved; fo r a grea t amoun t o f labou r an d tim e ought t o hav e a correspondingly greate r return . That i s the most accurate , the best, an d the mos t definit e advic e an d directio n tha t ca n b e give n i n thi s matter . Le t him wh o dislikes it, better it himself. I base my case (as I have said) on the gospel that the labourer deserves his wages [Luke 10.7] ; and Pau l also says in 1 Corinthians 9[.7] , 'He who tends the flock should get some of the milk. Who can go to war at his own expense?' If you have a bette r groun d tha n that , you are welcome to it .

VI.14 Second. A common error , which has become a widespread custom no t onl y among th e merchants but throughou t th e world, i s the practic e of one perso n becomin g surety for another. Although this practice seems to be without sin, and looks like a virtue stemming from love , nevertheless it generally ruins a good man y people an d doe s them irreparable harm. Kin g Solomo n ofte n forbad e it , an d condemne d i t i n hi s proverbs . I n Proverb s 6[.l-5] he says, 'My son, i f you hav e become surety for your neighbour, you have given your hand o n it; you are snared in the utterance o f your lips, and caugh t in the words of your mouth . The n d o this , m y son , an d sav e yourself , fo r yo u hav e com e int o you r 136

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neighbour's power: Go , hasten an d importun e you r neighbour. Giv e your eyes no sleep , and you r eyelid s no slumber . Sav e yourself like a gazelle from the hand , an d lik e a bird from the hand o f the fowler.' Agai n ... 'Take a man's garmen t whe n he has given surety for another , an d tak e a pledge fro m hi m fo r the stranger' s sake ' [Prov . 27.13] . VI. 15 See how strictly and vehemently the wise king in Holy Scripture forbids one' s becoming surety for another. Th e German proverb agree s with him, 'Guarantor s to the gallows'; as much as to say: It serves the surety right when he is seized and ha s to pay, for he is acting rashly and foolishl y in becoming surety . Hence, i t is decreed accordin g to Scriptur e that no on e shal l become suret y for another , unles s he is able and entirel y willing to assum e the debt an d pay it himself. Now it does see m strange that this practice should be wrong and be condemned, althoug h a good man y have learned b y experience that it is a foolis h thing to do , an d hav e had subsequen t misgiving s about it . Why, then, i s it condemned? Let u s see . VI. 16 Standing suret y i s a wor k tha t i s to o loft y fo r a man ; i t i s unseemly , fo r i t i s a presumptuous encroachmen t upo n th e wor k o f God . I n th e firs t place , Scriptur e commands us not to put our trust and reliance in any man, but i n God alone. For human nature i s false , vain , deceitful , an d unreliable , a s Scriptur e say s an d experienc e dail y teaches. He who becomes surety , however, i s putting hi s trust i n a man, and riskin g life and propert y o n a false an d insecur e foundation . I t serve s him righ t when h e fails , falls , and i s ruined . VI. 17 In th e secon d place , th e suret y i s trustin g i n himsel f an d makin g himsel f Go d (fo r whatever a man trust s i n an d relie s upo n i s his god). Bu t his own lif e an d propert y ar e never for a single moment any more secure or certain than those of the man for whom he becomes surety . Everythin g is in th e han d o f God alone . Go d wil l not allo w u s a hair' s breadth o f power o r righ t over the future , no r wil l he let us for a single moment b e sure or certai n o f it . Therefore , h e wh o become s suret y act s i n a n un-Christia n way ; h e deserves what h e gets , because h e pledge s an d promise s wha t i s not hi s an d no t i n hi s power, bu t solel y in God's hands . VI. 18 Thus we read in Genesis 43 and 44 , how the patriarch Judah became surety to hi s fathe r Jacob for hi s brother Benjamin , promising t o brin g him hom e agai n o r bear th e blam e forever [Gen . 43.8—9] . Go d nicel y punishe d thi s presumption , an d cause d hi m t o flounder an d fai l s o that h e could no t brin g Benjami n bac k until h e gave himself up fo r him [Gen . 44.14-34] an d the n wa s barely free d b y grace . Th e punishmen t serve d hi m right, for these sureties act as though the y didn't even have to consult Go d on the matter or giv e though t t o whethe r the y ar e eve n sur e o f a tomorro w fo r thei r ow n lif e an d property. The y act without fea r o f God, as though they were themselves the sourc e of lif e and property, an d these were in their own power as long as they themselves willed it. This is nothing bu t a fruit o f unbelief ... 137

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VI.19

Perhaps yo u wil l say , 'Ho w the n ar e peopl e t o trad e wit h on e anothe r i f suret y i s improper? That wa y many would b e lef t behin d wh o migh t otherwis e ge t ahead.'

Answer: There are four Christian ways of exchanging external goods with others, as I have said elsewhere. The first way is to let them rob o r steal our property , as Christ says in Matthew 5 [.40], 'If anyone takes away your cloak , let him hav e your coa t a s well, and d o no t as k it o f hi m again.' This way of dealing counts fo r nothing amon g the merchants ; besides, i t has no t been held or preached as common teachin g for all Christians, but merely as a counsel or a good ide a fo r th e clerg y and th e perfect , thoug h the y observ e i t eve n les s tha n d o th e merchants. Bu t true Christians observe it, for they know that thei r Fathe r in heaven has assuredly promised i n Matthew 6[.l 1] to give them this day their daily bread. If men were to ac t accordingly, not onl y would countles s abuse s i n al l kinds o f business be avoided , but a great many people would not become merchants, because reason and human nature flee an d shu n t o th e uttermos t risk s and damage s of this sort . VI.20 The second wa y is to give freely t o anyone who need s it, as Christ also teaches in the sam e passage [Matt . 5.42; Luke 6.30]. This too i s a lofty Christian work, which is why it counts for littl e among th e people . Ther e would b e fewe r merchant s an d les s trade i f this were put int o practice. For he who does this must truly hold fas t t o heaven and look always to the hands of God, and not to his own resources or wealth, knowing that God will support him eve n though every cupboard were bare, because he knows to be true what God said to Joshua , ' I wil l no t forsak e yo u o r withdra w m y han d fro m you ' [Josh . 1.5] ; a s th e proverb ha s it , 'Go d stil l has mor e tha n wha t h e eve r gav e away. ' Bu t that take s a true Christian, and he is a rare animal on earth , to whom the world and natur e pa y no heed .

VI.21 The third wa y is lending. That is , I give away my property , an d tak e it back again if it is returned to me ; but I must do without i t if it is not returned . Chris t himself defines thi s kind o f transaction i n what h e says in Luk e 6[.35], 'Lend, expectin g nothing i n return. ' That is , yo u shoul d len d freely , an d tak e you r chance s o n gettin g i t bac k o r not . I f it comes back, take it ; if it does not , i t i s a gift. Accordin g to th e gospe l there is thus onl y one distinction between giving and lending, namely, a gift i s not take n back, while a loan is taken back - i f it is returned - bu t involves the risk that it may become a gift. H e who lends expecting to ge t back something more and somethin g better tha n h e has loaned i s nothing but a n open and condemned usurer , since even those who in lending demand or expect to get back exactly what they lend, and take no chances on whether they get it back or not , ar e not actin g in a Christian way. This third wa y too (i n m y opinion) i s a loft y Christian work ; and a rare one , judgin g by the wa y things are goin g i n th e world . I f it were t o b e practise d generally , trad e o f al l sort s woul d greatl y diminis h an d virtuall y cease. VI.22 These three ways of exchanging goods, then, observ e i n masterful fashion thi s matter o f not presuming upon the future, an d not trusting in any man or in oneself but clingin g to 138

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God alone . Her e al l transactions ar e i n cash , an d ar e accompanie d b y the wor d whic h James teaches , 'I f Go d wills , s o be it ' [Jas . 4.15]. Fo r her e we deal with peopl e a s with those who are unreliable and might fail; we give our money freely, or take our chance s on losing what we lend. VI.23 Now someone will say 'Who can then be saved? And where shall we find these Christians? Why, i n thi s wa y there woul d b e n o trad e lef t i n th e world ; everyon e woul d hav e hi s property take n o r borrowe d away , and th e doo r woul d b e thrown ope n fo r the wicked and idl e glutton s - o f whom th e world i s full - t o take everything with thei r lyin g and cheating.' Answer : I hav e already said tha t Christian s ar e rar e peopl e o n earth . Tha t i s why th e worl d need s a strict , hars h tempora l governmen t whic h wil l compe l an d constrain the wicked to refrai n from thef t an d robbery, and to retur n what they borrow (although a Christian ought neither to deman d no r expec t it). This is necessary in order that th e worl d ma y not becom e a desert, peac e vanish, and men' s trade an d societ y be utterly destroyed; all of which would happen if we were to rule the world according to the gospel, rather than driving and compelling the wicked by laws and the us e of force to d o and allow what is right. For this reason we must keep the roads safe, preserve peace in the towns, enforc e la w i n th e land , an d le t th e swor d he w briskl y an d boldl y agains t transgressors, as St Paul teaches in Romans 13[.4]. For it is God's will that people who are not Christia n b e hel d i n chec k and kep t fro m doin g wrong, at leas t fro m doin g i t with impunity. Let no one think that th e world can be ruled without bloodshed; th e temporal sword mus t an d shal l be re d an d bloody , fo r th e worl d wil l and mus t b e evil , and th e sword i s God's ro d an d vengeanc e upon it . Bu t o f this I have said enoug h i n m y little book o n Temporal Authority. VI.24 Borrowing woul d b e a fin e thin g i f i t wer e practise d betwee n Christians , fo r ever y borrower woul d the n willingl y retur n wha t ha d bee n len t him , an d th e lende r woul d willingly forg o repaymen t i f the borrowe r wer e unabl e t o pay . Christian s ar e brothers , and on e doe s no t forsak e another ; neithe r i s any of them s o lazy and shameles s that h e would no t wor k bu t depen d simpl y o n another' s wealt h an d labour , o r consum e i n idleness another' s goods . Bu t wher e me n ar e no t Christians , th e tempora l authoritie s ought to compel them to repay what they have borrowed. I f the temporal authorities are negligent an d d o no t compe l repayment , the Christia n ough t t o tolerat e the robbery , as Paul say s i n 1 Corinthians 6[.7] , 'Wh y no t rathe r suffe r wrong? ' Bu t you ma y exhort , insist, an d d o wha t yo u wil l t o th e ma n wh o i s not a Christian ; h e pay s n o attentio n because he i s not a Christian an d ha s no regar d fo r Christ' s doctrine . VI.25 You still have a grain of comfort too i n the fact tha t you are not obligate d to make a loan except out o f your surplus and what you can spare from your own needs, as Christ says of alms, 'What you have left over , that give in alms, and everything i s clean for you'. Now if someone wishe s to borro w fro m yo u a n amoun t s o large that yo u would b e ruined i f it were no t repaid , an d yo u coul d no t spar e i t fro m you r ow n needs , the n yo u ar e no t bound to mak e the loan. Your first and greates t obligation i s to provid e for the need s of your wife and children and servants; you must not diver t from the m what you owe them. 139

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The best rule to follow is this: If the amount asked as a loan is too great, just go ahead and give something outright, or els e lend a s much a s you would b e willing to give , and tak e the ris k of having to los e it. John the Baptis t did no t say , 'He who has one coat, let him give it away,' but, 'He who has two coats, let him giv e one to him who has none; and he who ha s food , le t hi m d o likewise ' [Luk e 3.11] . VI.26 The fourth wa y of exchanging goods i s through buyin g o r selling , but fo r har d cas h o r payment i n kind. He who would use this method mus t make up his mind t o rel y not o n something i n the future bu t o n God alone; also, that he will have to be dealing with men , men who will certainly fail and lie. Therefore, the best advice is this: whoever sells should not giv e credit or accep t any security, but sel l only for cash. If he wishes to lend, let him lend to Christians, or else take the risk of loss, and lend no more than he would be willing to giv e outrigh t o r ca n spar e fro m hi s ow n needs . I f th e tempora l governmen t an d regulations wil l no t hel p hi m t o recove r hi s loan , le t hi m los e it . Le t hi m bewar e o f becoming securit y for anyone; let him muc h rathe r give what he can. Such a man woul d be a true Christian merchant ; God would no t forsak e hi m becaus e he trusts properly i n Him an d cheerfull y take s a chance i n dealin g with his untrustworthy neighbours . VI.27 If there was no suc h thing in this world as becoming surety, if the fre e lendin g portraye d in th e gospe l wer e th e genera l practice , an d i f only har d cas h o r ware s o n han d wer e exchanged in trade, then the greatest and most harmfu l danger s and fault s an d failings of trade and commerce would be well out o f the way. It would then be easy to engag e in all sorts of business enterprises, and the other sinful fault s of trade could the more readily be prevented. If there were none of this becoming surety and this lending without risk, many a ma n woul d hav e to maintai n hi s humble statu s an d b e conten t wit h a modest living who no w aspires day and nigh t to reac h a n exalte d position , relyin g on borrowin g an d standing surety. That is why everyone now wants to be a merchant and get rich. From this stem the countless dangerous, and wicked devices and dirty tricks that have today become a joke among the merchants . Ther e are so many of them tha t I have given up th e hop e that trade can be entirely corrected; it is so overburdened with all sorts of wickedness and deception that in the long run i t will not be able to sustain itself, but wil l have to collapse inwardly of it s own weight . VI. 2 8 In what has been said I wished to give a bit of warning and instructio n to everyone about this great, filthy, widespread busines s o f trade and commerce .

CRITIQUE The limitation s o f som e o f Luther' s medieva l economi c concept s hav e alread y bee n noted. Nonetheless, the central thrust of his treatise still has undoubted force . A t a time, in the West, when the division between Christian s and non-Christians, and between the churches an d societ y a t large , is often fel t t o b e increasing , his argumen t assume s fres h relevance. Religious people generally may feel a requirement to distinguish more carefull y than i n a numbe r o f previou s age s an d societie s betwee n wha t sor t o f behaviou r i s appropriate for them and what sort is to be enforced withi n society. In a number of areas 140

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of social ethics this problem ma y not b e acute, but i n the areas of personal ethic s it ofte n is. So , injunction s agains t murde r an d stealing , onc e the y ar e sociall y denned , ar e expected to apply to all. But in areas of sexual morality any attempt at public enforcement has become increasingl y more controversial . I t wil l be see n late r i n Sectio n 5 that eve n this distinctio n (i.e . betwee n socia l an d persona l ethics ) i s difficul t t o maintai n consistently and that there are many issues that might claim to be both (e.g. marriage and abortion). Nonetheless , Luther' s dilemma remain s a real one. There is, indeed, a sense in which ther e woul d b e n o nee d o f laws , courts , prison s an d s o forth , i f everyone lived consistently by the rule of agape: al l would tell the truth, respect the property and person s of others, an d woul d b e self-les s and self-giving . Further , Luther is obviously and sadl y correct in asserting that society is just not constituted b y such agapeistic people - s o laws, courts, prison s ar e essentia l i f socia l chao s i s t o b e avoided . H e woul d hav e mad e a n excellent criti c o f Fletcher's attempt s i n Extrac t 2 to wor k ou t a system of ethics fo r all based solel y upon agape. Th e dilemm a fo r Christia n businesspeopl e remain s broadly as Luther depicted: the y are not workin g in a society composed solel y of sincere Christians and, i f they were to follo w the injunction s o f the Sermo n o n th e Moun t literally , their business would probabl y collaps e (a s it would i f they followed Luther' s advice literally). Some present-da y theologians , suc h a s Mirand a i n Extrac t 13 , would se e this a s goo d reason fo r Christia n businesspeopl e t o abando n Wester n capitalis m altogether . Bu t fo r those who cannot accep t this, tension seem s inescapable. It is a tension eviden t in several of the Extract s in thi s Section . Even i f it i s accepted tha t som e dichotom y betwee n Christia n ethic s an d th e ethica l standards t o b e require d o f societ y i s inevitable , Luther' s depictio n o f thi s ca n stil l b e criticized. Hi s vie w o f hi s contemporarie s wa s blea k an d h e seeme d t o believ e tha t i f people coul d no t b e converte d t o Christianit y they could onl y b e restraine d lik e beasts (see especially VI.23) . No t onl y doe s thi s presen t a highl y exclusiv e understandin g o f Christianity (see above, p. 63), but i t makes no allowanc e for transposed Christia n values having an effec t upo n societ y a t larg e (see above, pp. 7-8) .

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EXTRACTS 8-1 4

EARTH, BERDYAEV , NIEBUHR, TEMPLE , JOHN XXIII, MIRANDA, AND HOLLENBAC H 1. BACKGROUND Karl Earth' s Extrac t 8 come s fro m hi s commentar y Th e Epistle t o th e Romans (Oxfor d University Press , 192 9 edition , o n Rom . 12.2 1 an d 13.1) ; Nicola s Berdyaev' s Extrac t 9 from hi s Freedom an d th e Spirit (Geoffre y Ble s Centenary Press, London, 1935 , pp. x-xiv and xvi-xviii) ; Reinhold Niebuhr' s Extrac t 1 0 from hi s Moral Ma n an d Immoral Society (Scribner's, Ne w York, 1960 re-issue, pp. 257- 9 and 268-75) ; William Temple' s Extrac t 11 fro m hi s Christianity an d Social Order (Shepheard-Walwy n and SPCK , London, 197 6 re-issue, pp . 58-9 , 60-2 , 67-8 , 69-71 , 72-4 , 7 5 and 77) ; Pope Joh n XXIII' s Extrac t 12 from hi s Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (Catholi c Truth Society , London, trans. Henry Waterhouse SJ , 1980, paras 80-96, 130-4 6 and 161-71) ; Jose Porfirio Miranda' s Extract 13 from his Marx an d th e Bible (SCM Press, London, and Orbi s Books, New York, 1977, trans. Joh n Eagleson , pp . 14-22) ; an d Davi d Hollenbac h SJ' s Extract 1 4 from hi s Th e Common Good an d Christian Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 56-60 and 229-31). Extracts 8 and 1 0 represent the views of authors in their radical youth, whereas 1 1 and 12 represent those of church statesmen at the end o f their lives. The Epistle t o the Romans represented Earth' s radica l brea k wit h Christia n liberalis m an d prove d t o b e th e foundation-stone of the neo-orthodo x movemen t i n theology. Bart h (1886-1968) wrot e Der Romerbriefin th e contex t o f the revolutionar y Europe of 1917-19 and, as a result of it, he was soon made a professor, first at Gottingen (1921) , then at Minister (1925) , then Bonn (1930 ) and, finally, on expulsio n b y Hitler, a t Base l (1935) . Niebuhr (1892-1971 ) published Moral Man an d Immoral Society in 1932 , four years after becoming Professor o f Applied Christianity at the Union Theological Seminary, New York, where he stayed until his retiremen t i n 1960 . He , too , wrot e thi s wor k i n th e contex t o f considerabl e socia l ferment, durin g th e America n Depression an d a s a resul t o f hi s pastora l experienc e in industrial Detroit , prio r t o hi s appointmen t a t UTS . Templ e (1881-1944 ) wrot e Christianity an d Social Order at the height of the Second World War, in 1941 , twelve years after becomin g Archbisho p o f York and a fe w months befor e becomin g Archbishop of Canterbury. Unlik e som e o f hi s mor e technica l works , it s styl e was designed fo r non theologians and, indeed, it sold some 150,00 0 copies when first published (re-issued 195 6 and 1976) . John XXIII (1881-1963) was Pope for five years, publishing Pacem in Terris in the yea r tha t h e die d an d onl y month s afte r convenin g th e highl y influentia l Secon d Vatican Council . Extrac t 1 2 clearly reflect s th e libera l concern s o f Joh n XXII I an d th e social change s that characterize d th e 1960s . Berdyaev (1874-1948 ) wrot e Freedom an d th e Spirit i n 1927 , in Paris , five years afte r his expulsion fro m hi s native Russia. Among his other important book s are Th e Meaning of History (1923 ) and Th e Destiny of Man (1931) . I n hi s autobiograph y he describe s hi s 143

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position as a Russian Orthodox Christia n as follows: 'I confess a spiritual religion, I am a free Christian , who has not broke n awa y from th e church.' He died i n Paris as a Russian expatriate an d independen t scholar . Extrac t 13 , i n contrast , reflect s th e present-da y concerns o f Lati n America n liberation theology . Miranda , a Mexica n Roma n Catholic , was traine d i n bot h economic s an d biblica l studie s an d ha s written , i n addition , th e influential Marx Against th e Marxists (1980) . Davi d Hollenbac h i s a Jesui t pries t an d Margaret O'Brie n Flatle y Professor o f Catholic Theolog y a t Bosto n College . Amon g his books ar e Claims i n Conflict: Retrieving an d Renewing th e Catholic Human Rights Tradition (1979) , Nuclear Ethics (1983 ) an d Justice, Peace an d Human Rights (1990 ) influential work s upon th e U S Catholic Bishop s at th e tim e [see Extrac t 17] . 2. KE Y ISSUES Barth argue s that th e existin g order s i n the politica l realm , whethe r democrati c o r not , appear as orders of humanity against God. Rulers and government s seem to be claiming falsely t o posses s a higher righ t over others. Eve n a theocracy would appea r as supreme wrongdoing (8.1) . Political revolution i s born of the perception of the evil that lies in the very existenc e o f government s o f an y sort . Yet , i n th e proces s o f revolution , th e revolutionaries ar e overcome b y evil, since they too confron t other s (ofte n tyrannically ) with a supposed righ t ove r them (8.2) . True revolutio n involve s forgiveness o f sins an d resurrection of the dead, whereas political revolutionaries bring hatred and demolition mere reaction s t o th e presen t orde r rathe r tha n th e intende d ne w orde r (8.3) . Thus , revolutionaries simpl y replace one for m o f temporal powe r with anothe r an d ma y even make remainin g element s o f th e previou s orde r mor e dangerous . The y attemp t t o substitute themselves for God (8.4). But, since it is outside history, God's order cannot b e established i n this way (8.5-7). Indeed, God's orde r stand s i n permanent judgemen t o n human ecclesiastica l an d secula r orthodoxie s an d 'isms ' - includin g legitimis m (i.e . political theor y concerne d wit h establishin g th e legitimac y o f particula r regimes) . Judgement must be left t o Go d alone (8.8) . Powers are to be measured only by reference to God as God, who alone is judge, and the evil of the existing order is to be seen as really evil only in relation to God' s orde r (8.9) . Evi l gives witness to the good an d i t should b e left fo r God alone to judge - vengeanc e is not ours, but God' s (8.10) . Although bot h Bart h an d Berdyae v were, a t times , highl y active an d committe d i n political affair s a s individuals , a s theologian s the y wer e equall y apolitical . Berdyaev' s apoliticism stem s fro m hi s thoroughgoin g stres s o n spirituality . H e see s Christianity as undergoing a crisis in transition fro m a n objective/collective form t o a more subjective / individualistic on e (9.1) . Fo r him , th e collective/democrati c an d th e individualistic / aristocratic types ar e evident throughou t history . Socialist s belon g t o th e firs t typ e an d tend to claim that a privileged minority have exploited the majority, whereas, in fact, they themselves hav e alway s persecute d th e qualitativ e minority , favourin g th e 'average ' person (9.2) . Indeed, conservatives and monarchists also belong to this type, maintaining traditional institutions fo r the majority (9.3). As aristocrats o f the spirit, saints , prophet s and geniuse s d o no t nee d conventiona l politica l structure s (democrati c o r otherwise) . Yet, they still ought not to separate themselves fro m the world, even if they are persecuted by the world (9.4) . Democratic types may have greater talents than aristocrati c types but they ar e les s sensitiv e t o th e world' s uglines s an d barbarit y (9.5) . Th e Gnosti c belong s mainly to the aristocratic type, clashing with democratic orthodox Christianity, but is in a sense closer to the present-day spiritually sensitive person an d to the Russia n concept of 144

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sobornost ( a mysti c concep t ofte n use d b y Russia n theologian s t o denot e th e ide a o f oneness i n togetherness ) (9.6) . Bu t Gnostic s tended , proudl y an d wrongly , t o separat e themselves fro m th e carna l worl d and , i n th e process , prove d unlovin g t o thei r fellows . Yet, th e Church , i n condemnin g Gnostics , elaborate d a n inflexibl e syste m o f theolog y (9.7). Nonetheless, ther e is still roo m i n Christianit y for peopl e wh o ca n reac h spiritual heights, without boastin g an d separating themselve s from th e carnal world - despit e the denial o f this, a t times , b y both th e Churc h an d particula r politica l regime s (9.8) . The problem o f th e Spiri t an d th e spiritua l lif e i s the mai n issu e confrontin g peopl e toda y (9.9). A distinction betwee n th e politica l an d th e religiou s appears, in a very different form , in Niebuhr's early Moral Man and Immoral Society. For Niebuhr, a sharp distinction mus t be mad e betwee n individua l an d socia l ethics , th e forme r requirin g unselfishnes s a s its ideal an d the latter justice (10.1) . They ar e not totally exclusive - fo r instance, insight s from individua l moral conscienc e are essential if society is fully to understan d justice and without the m justic e woul d soo n degenerat e - bu t the y canno t b e full y harmonize d (10.2). Wherea s unselfishnes s is essentia l t o individua l morality , self-assertio n may , a t times, b e essentia l fo r th e surviva l of a particula r societ y (10.3) . Individua l ethic s ha s usually been cultivate d b y religion and appear s thus as the antithesis of political morality (10.4). Attempts to apply such individual ethics to social groups have failed - whethe r in the cas e of the America n blacks , Italia n pacifis t socialists , o r pre-revolutionar y Russians (10.5-7). It would be better to admit a moral dualism than to attempt to harmonize these two form s o f morality. Jus t a s we distinguish between mora l judgement s applie d t o sel f and thos e w e appl y t o others , s o w e mus t distinguis h betwee n thos e w e apply t o th e individual an d thos e w e appl y t o societ y (10.8) . Th e socia l grou p doe s no t posses s sufficient imaginatio n fo r it to be amenable to pure love; particular groups are too selfis h to allow themselves to subject their own interests to some inconclusive social ideal (10.9). But individuals , eve n thos e wh o ar e politicall y involved , ough t stil l t o b e loya l t o th e highest canons of personal morality and, at times, may even have to dissociate themselves from thei r grou p (10.10) . An d individuals , suc h a s leader s o f groups , mus t practis e personal unselfishnes s if they ar e adequatel y t o fulfi l thei r socia l role s (10.11-12) . All of the nex t thre e author s believe that Christianit y ha s a directly politica l role. Fo r Temple, th e Church, as the Church , must be concerned wit h general principles, whereas the individual Christian must seek to particularize these principles (11.1) . Christian faith , by itself , canno t produc e detaile d politica l policie s independen t o f economic an d othe r factors, althoug h i t ca n point t o relevan t principle s (11.2-3) . Th e Churc h eve n ha s difficulties wit h th e notio n o f the 'perfec t socia l order ' - no t leas t becaus e o f huma n imperfection (11.4-5) . Politica l an d economi c system s mus t firs t provid e fo r huma n security eve n befor e providin g fo r justice o r expressin g lov e (11.6) . However , althoug h Christianity does not suggest an 'ideal state', it does supply a number of general principles (11.7-8). So, it supplies the principle of respect for every person a s a child of God and, as a result, people should be given priority over societies and societies should be arranged to maximize th e individual role s o f it s peopl e (11.9-10) . Again, Christianity contain s th e principle of freedom - understood , not simpl y a s an absence of constraint, but a s selfdetermination (11.11-12) . La w exists t o preserv e an d t o exten d thi s freedo m (11.13) . Freedom fo r th e individua l i s freedo m withi n th e contex t o f variou s socia l groups : humans ar e emphaticall y socia l i n th e sens e o f belongin g t o a variet y o f intermediat e groups (11.14-17). The state which values freedom should b e careful t o give such groups 145

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freedom - and , indeed , Britai n ha s derived man y o f its democratic habit s fro m suc h groups as the Trade Unions , themselves owing much t o the Chapel s (11.18-20) . Finally, there i s a principl e o f fellowshi p leadin g t o service ; partl y voluntar y servic e b y th e individual and , partly , the individua l seeing paid occupatio n a s service (11.22^4) . John XXIII's discussion i s also concerned wit h general principles which can be applied to political realities, although he views them in terms of rights and duties (a right entails a duty an d a dut y presuppose s a right) . I n contras t t o Niebuhr , h e maintain s tha t th e natural la w notio n o f mutua l right s an d dutie s applie s a s muc h t o th e relationshi p between state s a s i t doe s t o tha t betwee n individual s (12.1-3) . Thi s perspectiv e recognizing the reality of the moral order and the objectivity of truth, both by individuals and b y states , i n seekin g t o promot e th e commo n goo d (12.5-6) . Grante d suc h recognition, racial and ethnic discrimination an d arrogance, based o n superior talent s or wealth, ca n play no par t eithe r i n individual o r i n communal behaviou r (12.7-10) . The truth als o requires fairness i n the use of mass communication (12.11) . States have a duty to see k justice and no t t o see k their own advantage a t the expens e of others (12.12-13) . When ther e i s a clas h o f interest s betwee n states , peacefu l an d considerat e mean s o f resolving it should b e sought, particularly when ethnic minorities ar e dealt with by states (12.14-17). States are becoming increasingl y interdependent an d i t is vital that attention should b e given to th e universa l common goo d (12.18-20) . Present stat e structure s are inadequate t o dea l with problem s raise d b y such a universa l common goo d (e.g . worl d peace) and this requires the establishment o f some for m o f world government (12.21-5) . Such a governmen t shoul d onl y com e int o bein g throug h universa l consen t - fo r otherwise it might favour one nation over others - an d should be concerned wit h making sure tha t huma n right s ar e uphel d everywher e (12.26-7) . I n addition , i t shoul d b e concerned solel y wit h question s relate d t o th e universa l commo n goo d an d no t wit h those rightly belonging t o individua l state s (12.28-9) . UNO i s a step i n the directio n o f such a government (12.20-3) . Individual Christians should b e particularly concerned t o offer themselve s fo r publi c servic e an d t o see k t o chang e society , no t i n term s o f revolution, bu t gradually , in a spiri t o f dut y an d lov e (12.34-8) . Peac e will come onl y when individual hearts are changed and when it is built on th e firm principles of God in Christ (12.39-45) . Among mor e recen t theologian s i t i s the exponent s o f liberation theolog y wh o hav e argued mos t strongl y tha t Christianit y ha s direc t relevanc e t o politica l issues . The y are represented i n thi s Sectio n b y Miranda an d i n th e nex t b y Bonino. Bot h are convince d that Marxis t theory can illuminate th e biblical understandin g o f humanity and tha t thi s understanding ought to inform ou r interpretation o f political realities. Miranda has been at considerabl e pain s t o demonstrat e tha t th e biblica l understandin g o f wealt h an d poverty an d th e clas s division s tha t hav e resulte d fro m the m coincid e a t man y crucial points wit h Marxis t theory . I n thi s Extract , h e argue s tha t i n th e Ol d Testamen t 'almsgiving' an d 'justice ' ar e synonymou s (13.1-3) . Althoug h thi s ha s frequentl y bee n forgotten by subsequent Christians , the early Church Fathers were clear that 'almsgiving ' was really a restitution tha t people make for something tha t i s not properl y theirs (13.47). Fo r Luke , th e differenc e betwee n 'rich ' an d 'poor ' ('differentiatin g ownership' , i n Marxist terms) cannot b e justified and , indeed, result s from injustic e and violence (13.89). Despite the attempts of some biblical critics to claim that such views are not authentic to Jesus himself, th e evidence is overwhelming (13.10-12). Further, to regar d the biblical position a s 'primitive' is to make a highly suspect, Western value-judgemen t (13.13-14). 146

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The prophets were well aware of the injustice of differentiating ownershi p and it would be a mistake to explain their attitudes in terms of an anti-urban bias (13.14-20). Christianity must retur n t o a fres h awarenes s o f thi s injustic e an d eve n papa l teachin g mus t b e interpreted afres h i n it s light (13.21-3) . Extract 1 4 takes th e discussio n o f th e 'commo n good ' i n Extrac t 1 2 a stag e further . Hollenbach finally argues that it is more complex i n the modern contex t o f globalization and pluralism than John XXIII allows. Hollenbach is critical of Western public policy that is shaped predominantl y b y the value s of tolerance an d non-judgementalis m an d leave s little room , i n addition , fo r th e ide a o f the 'commo n good ' (14.1-2) . H e believe s tha t social issues, such as the provision of adequate health care to all people, require a stronger vision o f th e good s tha t w e shar e i n commo n (14.3-5) . On e possibl e solutio n i s th e worldwide public authority proposed b y John XXIII (14.6) , but Hollenbac h argue s that a proper understanding of interdependence makes demand s upon a whole rang e of local, national an d internationa l communitie s (14.7) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS The clearest ethical arguments are contained i n John XXIII's and Temple' s Extracts . The first is thoroughly based upon natural law and sees a straightforward continuum between the rights and duties of the individual and those of societies. These rights and duties must always be related t o th e 'commo n good' and i t is on thi s basis that, fo r example, he can argue that , 'th e mora l orde r itsel f demand s th e establishmen t o f som e sor t o f worl d government' (12.25) . Hollenbach' s mor e comple x notio n o f th e 'commo n good ' i s critical of the latte r (14.7) . However, John XXIII's deontological positio n i s immediately followed b y a number o f consequential argument s - e.g . that i f such a government were imposed b y force th e 'efficac y o f its action would thereb y be imperilled ' (12.26) . Temple's position , too , i s dependen t upo n som e notio n o f natura l law , albei t i n a somewhat modifie d form . However , h e als o use s a mixtur e o f deontologica l an d consequential arguments . So , havin g enunciate d a genera l principl e o f respec t fo r persons, h e argues, in a style owing something to utilitarianism , that 'societ y must be so arranged a s t o giv e t o ever y citizen th e maximu m opportunit y fo r makin g deliberat e choices' (11.10) . It i s even possible tha t hi s radical stress upo n th e individual , his stress upon th e 'primar y principle ' o f respect fo r persons , an d hi s avoidanc e o f anything bu t general principle s as absolutes, coul d b e see n a s a form o f personalism . Differing deontologica l position s ar e apparent in Niebuhr and Miranda . Fo r the first, the notion s o f lov e an d justic e appea r t o b e accepte d deontologically , whereas , fo r Miranda, it is a strong moral identification (whether in Marxism or in the Bible) with the poor an d the oppressed . However , Niebuhr's criticism s of those wh o have attempted t o apply individua l lov e t o socia l situations , ar e predominantl y consequentialis t (10.4-7 ) and hi s defenc e o f pacifism a t this early stage of his career is entirely pragmatic (10.10). Consequentialism i s als o apparent , sometimes , i n th e fe w ethical argument s o f th e predominantly theologica l Berdyae v and Eart h Extracts . Berdyae v argues that absolut e monarchies an d socialis t republic s 'ar e alik e necessar y t o th e masses ' (9.3) , bu t onl y because they d o no t belon g t o th e 'aristocrac y o f the spirit ' (9.6) . I n a similar negative manner, Bart h maintain s tha t authoritarianis m i n politic s lead s t o tyrann y (8.1) . Nonetheless, Earth' s primary objection to such authoritarianism is theological - i t usurps the positio n whic h should alon e belong t o God .

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4. BASES O F CHRISTIAN ETHICS Only thre e o f th e Extract s mak e an y continuou s us e o f th e Bibl e an d the y diffe r significantly fro m eac h other i n the way that the y do this . Earth' s Extract is obviously a part o f hi s commentar y o n Romans , bu t i t i s quit e unlik e a scholarly , critica l commentary. Hi s remarks frequently have more t o d o with hi s own social contex t tha n that of Paul (as in his discussion o f political revolution). Joh n XXIII quotes both th e Old Testament and th e New Testament (e.g . in 12.4 , 43 and 44) , but th e central thrus t o f his argument doe s no t depen d upo n them . A s in Aquinas , the Bibl e i s use d t o suppor t a position whic h is first developed o n the basis of natural law. Although himself a Roman Catholic priest , Miranda' s us e o f th e Bibl e migh t see m mor e characteristi c o f th e Reformed tradition : i t i s centra l t o hi s argument , owe s muc h t o critical , non-Roma n Catholic scholarship , an d range s ove r both Ol d Testament an d Ne w Testament. Differing appeal s to Christian tradition ar e also apparent i n Miranda, Hollenbach an d John XXIII . Th e las t follow s th e traditiona l Roma n Catholi c approac h (see further, Welty's Extrac t 1 5 an d Pau l VI' s Extrac t 29 ) i n seekin g t o substantiat e particula r positions fro m th e Father s o r fro m th e statement s o f previou s Popes . S o Joh n XXII I quotes Augustin e (12.13 and 39 ) and hi s predecessor Piu s XII (12.6 and 36) . However , Miranda mainl y use s the Father s to substantiat e hi s position (13.4-7) : papal statement s provide hi m wit h obviou s problems . A s one stil l workin g withi n th e Roma n Catholi c tradition, h e is clearly concerned tha t h e contradict, no t direc t papa l teaching , but onl y papal 'suppositions' behind this teaching (13.22-3). However, the Jesuit Hollenbach doe s come nea r t o criticizin g papal teaching (14.7) . Differing theologica l bases are also apparent i n these Extracts. Berdyaev and Bart h ar e both emphaticall y theological i n orientation , bu t th e firs t emphasize s th e Spiri t an d a spiritual for m o f Christianity, whereas Earth's emphasi s i s upon th e judgemen t o f God and upon huma n attempts t o usur p God's position . John XXIII concludes hi s Encyclical with Christolog y (12.45) , wherea s Templ e conclude s hi s discussio n wit h theologica l anthropology (11.26) . I n Miranda , i t i s the concep t of'justice' , derive d throug h Jesu s from th e Old Testament, which is central to his position, whereas for Hollenbach i t is the idea of the 'commo n good'. For all six theologians, i t i s clear that they believe that thei r distinctive approaches to political realities owe much to their initial theological positions. Only Niebuhr' s Extrac t i s relativel y lackin g i n specificall y Christia n bases : indeed , religious fait h appear s in his analysis here as far more relevan t to th e individua l than t o society. 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS The influenc e o f th e particula r socio-politica l context s withi n whic h the y wrot e i s especially eviden t i n Barth , Niebuh r an d Miranda . Th e backgroun d o f revolutionar y Europe o f 1917-1 9 doubl y influence d Barth . O n th e on e hand , th e specificall y socia l repercussions convince d hi m (an d man y of hi s contemporaries) tha t revolutio n le d t o greater tyranny than i t replaced. Throughou t Europ e there was considerable disillusion ment with political attitudes of authoritarianism that had led both to the Great War and to the Russian Revolution. On the other hand, Barth saw the theological liberalism of the pre-war period (whic h he had shared) as disastrously implicated with these attitudes. Hi s rejection bot h of revolutionary politic s an d o f theological liberalis m an d hi s espousal of neo-orthodoxy wer e clearl y relate d t o thi s Europea n politica l context . Similarly , 148

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Niebuhr's ethical dualis m ca n be related to th e America n Depression tha t followe d this war. Hi s experiences i n industria l Detroi t convince d hi m tha t libera l attempt s t o relat e Christian concepts of love to social phenomena were misguided. The ineluctable forces of economic depressio n an d th e consequen t feeling s o f helplessnes s o f individual s caught within tha t depressio n an d withi n th e dehumanizin g structure s o f contemporar y industrialism, mad e a lasting impression o n Niebuhr' s mind. Similarly , the political and economic frustration s o f Sout h Americ a i n th e 1970 s ha s ha d a n eviden t effec t upo n Miranda. He, too, reject s Western theologica l an d politica l liberalism (13.6 , 1 0 and 13 ) and declare s emphatically that 'the time ha s come for Christianity to brea k a long chain of hypocris y an d collusio n wit h th e establishe d powers ' (13.7) . Hi s star k contrast s between 'rich ' an d 'poor ' an d hi s clos e correlatio n o f 'wealth ' wit h 'violenc e an d spoliation', may reflect th e feudal, authoritarian and oppressive socio-political structures of part s o f Centra l America , rathe r tha n wha t migh t b e see n a s the ambiguitie s o f th e mixed economie s o f the West . Berdyaev stand s i n shar p contras t t o thes e thre e theologians . Hi s earl y espousa l o f Marxist theor y i s stil l partiall y eviden t i n thi s Extrac t an d hi s socializatio n i n Russian Orthodoxy als o act s a s a determinant o f his position . Nonetheless , a s has alread y been pointed out , despit e th e revolutionar y contex t withi n which he lived , hi s writings as a whole still appear remarkabl y timeless. John XXIII's, Temple's an d Hollenbach' s Extract s are not s o timeless and clearly reflect the topical political interest s of the contexts within which they were written. The issue of unemployment dominate d muc h o f Temple's politica l though t i n th e 1930 s and occur s spontaneously as an illustration (11.2) . In the period followin g Hiroshima an d Nagasaki, peace becam e a ver y dominant concern , allie d t o a searc h fo r politica l stabilit y i n th e developed an d developin g worlds . Joh n XXIII's Extract clearly relate s strongl y to thes e concerns. Hollenbac h reflect s a t lengt h i n Th e Common Good an d Christian Ethics upon an increasingly globalized society that is also highly pluralistic. It is in this specific context that h e proposes hi s understanding o f the 'commo n good' . 6. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

A number of the works from whic h these Extracts are taken had a real political influence . John XXII I was , perhaps, th e mos t generall y admired o f recent Pope s and hi s effort s t o foster peac e in the world receive d a wide audience, amongst both Roma n Catholics an d others. Th e issue of human rights has remained an important on e in the Western world, even if the specifi c connectio n wit h natural law articulated by John XXIII i s now seldo m discussed. I n th e 1940 s an d 1950s , Niebuh r wa s particularl y influentia l i n th e Unite d States. His ethica l position change d considerably fro m Moral Ma n an d Immoral Society, with hi s ethica l dualis m becomin g les s pronounce d an d a greate r stres s o n 'politica l realism', but hi s central distinctions between love and justice remained highly influential. A numbe r o f ke y politician s an d politica l theorist s wer e directl y influence d b y hi s writings. Temple, in contrast, althoug h he is often regarde d as one of the most respecte d archbishops o f the Churc h o f England i n th e twentiet h century , seldo m ha d th e ea r of prime ministers . Hi s overt socialis m an d tendenc y t o b e outspoke n o n politica l issue s tended t o alienate him fro m politicians , such as Churchill. But, within church circles, his influence wa s ver y considerabl e an d h e playe d a majo r par t i n th e Lif e an d Wor k Movement whic h eventuall y becam e a centra l componen t o f th e Worl d Counci l o f Churches. Many of Temple's distinctions, between general principles, middle axioms (see 149

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above, p . 39 ) an d changin g factors , wer e adopte d b y thes e tw o movements . Withi n present-day Sout h America , liberatio n theolog y no w receive s considerabl e politica l attention. I t ha s radicalized a significant sectio n o f the Roma n Catholic clerg y there and provides a rar e exampl e o f a theologica l movemen t actin g a s a n independen t socia l variable (i.e . a s a socia l factor , such a s 'class', which affect s mas s behaviour). A s noted earlier, amon g th e U S Catholi c Bishop s i n th e 1980 s th e wor k o f Hollenbac h wa s particularly influentia l o n socia l an d politica l issues . Th e influenc e o f Earth' s De r Romerbriefupon theologians , rathe r than upon politicians, was very considerable. I n fact , for man y theologians it has proved t o be one of the most semina l books of the first half of the twentiet h century . Berdyaev' s writings, however , hav e seldo m bee n know n outsid e scholarly circles. FURTHER READING A number of the works of Barth are important for understanding his various approaches to politica l realities, includin g Ho w I Changed m y Mind (1969) , Church Dogmatics III.4 (1961) an d Ethics (1981) . O f th e man y book s writte n abou t Barth , th e followin g ar e particularly useful : Charle s West , Communism an d th e Theologians (1958) ; H . Richar d Niebuhr, Th e Responsible Self (1963)-, an d R . E . Willis, Th e Ethics o f Karl Barth (1971). There hav e bee n a numbe r o f studie s o f Berdyaev , including: Olive r Fieldin g Clarke , Introduction t o Berdyaev (1950) ; Donald A . Lowrie , Rebellious Prophet: A Life o f Nicolas Berdyaev (1960) ; E. L. Allen, Freedom i n God: A Guide t o the Thought o f Nicolas Berdyaev (1960); an d Michae l Alexande r Vallon , A n Apostle o f Freedom: Life an d Teaching o f Nicolas Berdyaev (1960) . For Niebuhr, see C. W. Kegle y and R . W. Bretal l (eds) , Reinhold Niebuhr: Hi s Religious, Social an d Political Thought (1961) ; D . Meyer , Th e Protestant Search for Political Realism (1960); and Richar d Harries (ed.) , Reinhold Niebuhr and th e Issues o f Ou r Time (1986) ; an d especiall y Robi n W . Levin' s Reinhold Niebuhr an d Christian Realism (1995). F . A . Iremonger' s William Temple: Archbishop o f Canterbury (1948) i s still ver y important fo r informatio n abou t Temple : se e also Ronal d Preston' s introduction t o th e 197 6 editio n o f Christianity an d Social Order, an d Ala n Suggate's William Temple an d Christian Social Ethics Today (1987) . Fo r Liberatio n theology , se e below, p. 230 .

EXTRACT 8 BARTH God's judgment on political revolutions 8.1 Be not overcom e o f evil, but overcom e evil with good (Rom . 12.21). The problem o f the victory of right over wrong is presented to u s in a far more essential form i n the existence of human ordinances than i n the existence of the enemy (12.19,20). Must not th e existing order, the order tha t has already been FOUND, seem the very incarnation o f triumphant unrighteousness t o th e ma n wh o i s SEEKIN G afte r Go d an d Hi s Order ? I s no t th e existing order a reinforcement of men agains t God, a safeguard o f the norma l cours e of this worl d agains t it s disturbanc e b y th e grea t ambiguit y an d it s defenc e agains t th e presupposition b y whic h i t i s threatene d o n al l sides ? Are no t th e ordinance s o f me n 150

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simply a conspirac y o f the Man y - fa r too man y - agains t th e On e who manifest s Himself, an d ca n only manifes t Himself , when th e matur e wisdo m an d authorit y of the Many crumble s i n pieces ? Rulers ! What ar e ruler s bu t men ? Wha t ar e the y bu t me n hypocritically engage d i n setting things in order, i n order tha t the y may - coward s tha t they ar e - ensur e themselve s securel y against th e riddl e o f their existence ? Are we not once agai n confronte d b y fool s beggin g a fe w moments' dela y befor e th e sentenc e o f death i s pronounce d upo n them ? Th e invective s tha t hav e bee n hurle d agains t 'Governments' fro m th e day s o f th e Revelatio n o f Joh n t o th e fulmination s o f Nietzsche, from th e Anabaptists to the Anarchists, have not bee n directe d agains t defect s in government bu t agains t the right of governments t o exist at all. That me n should, a s a matter o f course, claim to posses s a higher right over their fello w men , that the y should, as a matte r o f course, dar e t o regulat e an d predetermin e almos t al l their conduct , tha t those who put forwar d suc h a manifestly fraudulent claim should be crowned with a halo of real power an d shoul d b e capable of requiring obedience an d sacrific e a s though the y had been investe d wit h the authorit y o f God, that th e Many should conspir e t o spea k as though the y were the One, tha t a minority or a majority - eve n the supreme democrati c majority o f all against on e - shoul d assum e tha t the y are the community, tha t a quit e fortuitous contrac t o r arrangemen t shoul d b e regarde d a s superio r t o th e soli d organisation o f the struggle for existence and should proclai m itself to be the peace which all men yearn after an d whic h all should respect ; thi s whole pseudo-transcendence o f an altogether immanen t orde r i s the wound tha t i s inflicted b y every existing government even b y the best - upo n thos e wh o are most delicatel y conscious o f what i s good an d right. The more successfull y th e good an d the right assume concrete form , the more they become evi l and wrong - summum ius, sumtna iniuria. Supposing the right were to take the for m o f theocracy , supposing , tha t i s t o say , superio r spiritua l attainmen t wer e concreted int o a n ideal Church and all the peoples o f the earth were to pu t thei r trust in it; if, for example, the Church of Calvin were to be reformed and broadened ou t t o be the Church of the League of Nations; - thi s doing of the supreme righ t would the n becom e the suprem e wrong-doing . Thi s theocrati c drea m come s abruptl y t o a n end , o f course , when w e discove r tha t i t i s th e Devi l wh o approache s Jesu s an d offer s Hi m al l th e kingdoms o f this world. I t ends als o with Dostoevsky' s pictur e o f the Gran d Inquisitor . Men hav e no righ t t o posses s objectiv e right against othe r men . An d so, the mor e the y surround themselve s wit h objectivity , th e greate r i s the wron g the y inflic t upo n others . Others are , it is true, awaitin g the righ t of the One. Bu t when and wher e has the right of the Man y reall y becom e th e righ t o f th e One ? Ha s i t no t bee n alway s an d everywher e acquired fraudulently ? I s there anywher e legalit y which i s not fundamentall y illegal ? I s there anywher e authority whic h i s not ultimatel y base d upo n tyranny? 8.2 There i s a certai n imperfectio n i n th e existin g ordinance s b y whic h w e are enable d t o detect tha t thei r existenc e is , as such, evil. Ther e i s a certain uncontrollabl e tendenc y t o freedom whic h causes both goo d an d bad men to resent the chain which the Many - n o doubt wit h th e bes t intention s - pu t upo n them . Ther e i s a certai n strang e an d penetrating perception whic h sees through th e fiction that lies behind our bondage. Fro m this perceptio n o f th e evi l tha t lie s i n th e ver y existenc e o f th e existin g government , Revolution i s born. The revolutionary seek s to b e rid o f the evi l by bestirring himself to battle wit h i t and t o overthro w it . He determines t o remov e the existin g ordinances, i n 151

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order that he may erect in their place the new right. This is, of course, a wholly intelligible course of action, and one in which we might very well take part; it is, in fact, as intelligible as i s hostilit y agains t th e enemy (12.19 ) an d conflic t agains t ou r fello w men . (Th e revolutionary does not begin by betaking himself to the generally decried shedding blood. He begin s b y simpl y harbourin g a certai n secre t poisonou s resentmen t agains t th e existing order - man y indeed go no further tha n this ; they detest the Power, and become wholly enslaved to feeling s of resentment!) The revolutionary must, however, own that in adopting hi s plan h e allows himself to b e overcome o f evil H e forget s tha t h e i s not th e One, that h e is not th e subjec t of the freedo m which he so earnestly desires, that, fo r all the strang e brightnes s o f hi s eyes , h e i s no t th e Chris t wh o stand s befor e th e Gran d Inquisitor, but is , contrariwise, the Grand Inquisitor encountered by the Christ. He too is claiming what no man can claim. He too is making of the right a thing. He too confronts other men with his supposed right. H e too usurp s a position which is not due to him, a legality whic h i s fundamentall y illegal , a n authorit y whic h - a s w e hav e griml y experienced i n Bolshevism , bu t als o i n th e behaviou r o f fa r mor e delicate-minde d innovators! - soo n display s its essential tyranny. What ma n has the right t o propoun d and represent the 'New', whether it be a new age, or a new world, or even a new - spirit ? Is not ever y new thing, in so far as it can be schemed by men, born o f what already exists? The momen t i t become s a huma n proposition , mus t i t no t b e numbere d amon g th e things that are? What man i s there who, having proposed a novelty, has not propose d a n evil thing? Far more tha n the conservative , the revolutionar y is overcome of evil, because with his 'No' he stands so strangely near to God . This is the tragedy of revolution. Evi l is not th e true answe r t o evil . The sense o f right whic h ha s been wounde d by the existin g order i s not restore d t o healt h when that orde r i s broken. 8.3 Overcome evil with good. What can this mean but th e end of the triumph of men, whether their triumph is celebrated i n the existing order o r by revolution? And how can this end be represented, if it be not b y some strange 'not-doing' precisely at the point where men feel themselve s most powerfull y calle d to action ? The revolutionar y ha s erred. H e really means that Revolutio n which is the impossibl e possibility . He means forgivenes s o f sins and the resurrection of the dead. He means Jesus Christ - H e that hath overcome-who is the true answer to the injury wrought b y the existing order as such. But the revolutionary has chosen anothe r revolution : he has adopted th e possible possibilit y of discontent an d hatred an d insubordination , o f rebellion an d demolition . An d thi s choice i s not better , but much worse than choosing the possible possibility of contentment an d satisfaction, of security an d usurpation ; fo r b y i t Go d i s fa r bette r understood , bu t fa r mor e deepl y outraged. Th e revolutionar y aim s a t th e Revolutio n b y which th e tru e Orde r i s t o b e inaugurated; but h e launches another revolution which is, in fact, reaction . The legitimist, on th e othe r hand , himsel f also overcom e o f evil, aims at th e Legitimis m by which th e true Revolutio n i s inaugurated; but h e maintain s anothe r legitimis m which is , in fact , revolt! And so, as always, what men d o is the judgment upon wha t they will to d o (7.15 , 19). When, however, the revolutionary becomes aware of the judgment, he is dispossessed of his well founded, concrete, justifiable action , and i s turned toward s the action of God. But ho w ca n h e demonstrat e th e actio n o f Go d sav e by dyin g where h e wa s born? b y dying, tha t i s to say , where he firs t perceive d th e evi l of the presen t order . Wha t mor e radical action can he perform than the action of turning back to the original root of'not152

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doing' - an d NOT be angry, NOT engage in an assault, NOT demolish? This turning back is the ethica l factor in the command , Overcome evil with good. There is here n o word o f approval of the existin g order; but ther e is endless disapproval of every enemy of it. It is God wh o wishe s t o b e recognise d a s H e tha t overcometh th e unrighteousnes s o f th e existing order. Thi s i s the meanin g of the commandment ; an d i t i s also th e meanin g of the Thirteenth Chapte r o f the Epistle to th e Romans. 8.4 Let ever y ma n b e i n subjectio n t o th e existin g rulin g power s (Rom . 13.la) . Thoug h subjection ma y assum e fro m tim e t o tim e man y various concret e forms , a s an ethical conception i t i s here purely negative. It mean s to withdra w and mak e way; it mean s to have no resentment, an d not to overthrow. Why, then, does not the rebel turn back and become no mor e a rebel? Simply because the conflict i n which he is immersed cannot be represented a s a conflict between him an d th e existing ruling powers; it is, rather a conflict of evil with evil . Even the mos t radica l revolution ca n d o n o mor e tha n se t what exist s against what exists. Even the most radical revolution - an d this is so even when it is called a 'spiritual' or 'peaceful' revolutio n - ca n be no more than a revolt; that is to say, it is in itself simply a justification and confirmation of what already exists. For the whole relative right o f what exists is established onl y by the relativ e wrong o f revolution i n it s victory; whereas th e relativ e righ t o f revolutio n i n it s victor y i s i n n o wa y establishe d b y th e relative wrong of the existing order. Similarly also, the power of resistance in the existing order i s i n n o wa y broken b y th e victoriou s attac k o f revolution ; i t i s merel y driven backwards, embarrassed, an d compelled t o adopt differen t forms , an d thus rendered th e more dangerous; whereas the energy of revolution is dissipated and rendered innocuous simply b y it s victory . An d s o th e whol e conduc t o f th e rebe l i n n o wa y constitutes a judgment upo n th e existin g order, howeve r much his act of revolution ma y do so . The rebel ha s thoughtlessl y undertake n th e conflic t betwee n God' s Orde r an d th e existin g order. Shoul d h e allo w himsel f t o appea l directl y t o th e ordinanc e o f God, 'shoul d h e boldly and confidentl y storm th e heavens and bring down thenc e his own eternal rights which han g alof t inalienable , unbroke n a s th e star s themselves ' (Schiller), h e betray s thereby perception o f the true 'limit to the tyrant's power', but hi s bold storming of the heavens in no way brings about thi s limitation. H e may be justified at the bar o f history; but h e is not justifie d befor e th e judgment-seat of God. The sequel shows 'the return of the ol d natura l orde r wher e me n oppos e thei r fello w men' . Whe n me n undertak e t o substitute themselve s fo r God , th e proble m o f God , Hi s min d an d Hi s judgment, still remain, but the y are rendered ineffective . An d so, in his rebellion, the rebel stands on th e side of the existin g order . 8.5 Let the existing order - state , Church, Law, Society , &c., &c. - i n their totalit y be:

(abed) 8.6 Let their dissolution b y the Prima l Order of God, by which their totality is contradicted, be expressed by a minus sig n outside the bracket: 153

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—(+a+b+c+d) 8.7 It is then clea r that no revolution, howeve r radical , which takes place within the realm of history, can ever be identical with the divine minus sign outside the bracket, by which the totality o f human ordinance s i s dissolved. Revolutio n ca n do n o mor e than chang e th e plus sign within th e bracket - th e plus, that i s to say, which existing ordinances posses s within th e bracke t becaus e the y exis t - int o a minu s sign . Th e resul t o f a successfu l revolution i s therefore:

—(-a-b-c-d) 8.8

And now we see that for the first time the great divine minus sign outside the bracket has transformed th e anticipatory , revolutionar y minu s sig n int o a genuin e plu s sign . Revolution has , therefore, the effec t o f restoring the ol d afte r it s downfall in a new an d more powerfu l form . (Equall y false, however , i s th e reckonin g o f th e legitimists : false , because they consciously and as a matter of principle - i n their consciousness an d in their appeal to principle lies the arrogant an d titanic element i n Legitim-ISM - ad d a positive sign to the terms within the bracket. But the divine minus sign outside the bracket means that al l huma n consciousness , al l huma n principle s an d axiom s an d orthodoxie s an d -isms, all principality an d power and dominion, are AS SUCH subjected to th e destructiv e judgment of God. Le t every ma n b e in subjection means , therefore , that ever y man shoul d consider th e falsit y o f all human reckonin g a s such. W e are no t competen t t o plac e th e decisive minus sign before the bracket; we are only competent t o perceive how completely it damages our plus and our minus. Accordingly, the subjection her e recommended mus t not b e allowe d t o develo p int o a ne w an d subtl e manne r o f reckoning , whereb y w e reintroduce onc e mor e a n absolut e right . I t i s eviden t tha t ther e ca n b e n o mor e devastating underminin g o f th e existin g order tha n th e recognitio n o f i t whic h i s here recommended, a recognition rid of all illusion and devoid of all the joy of triumph. State , Church, Society , Positiv e Right , Family , Organise d Research , &c. , &c. , liv e of f th e credulity o f thos e wh o hav e bee n nurture d upo n vigorou s sermons-delivered-on-the field-of-battle and upon other suchlike solemn humbug . Deprive them of their PATHOS, and the y will be starved out ; bu t sti r up revolutio n agains t them, and thei r PATHO S is provided with fresh fodder . No-revolution i s the best preparation for the true Revolution; but eve n no-revolutio n i s n o saf e recipe . T o b e i n subjection is , whe n i t i s rightl y understood, a n actio n voi d o f purpose, a n action , tha t i s to say , which can sprin g onl y from obedience t o God. Its meaning is that me n hav e encountered God , and ar e thereby compelled t o leave the judgment to Him . The actual occurrence of this judgment canno t be identifie d wit h th e purpos e o r wit h th e secre t reckonin g o f the ma n o f this world.) 8.9 Upon this background we are able to understand what follows - fo r there is no power but of God ; an d th e power s tha t b e ar e ordaine d o f Go d (Rom . 13 . Ib). Her e a positive , affirmative authorit y seem s t o b e assigne d t o th e existin g government . Thi s would , however, directl y contradic t th e basi s of subjection whic h ha s bee n se t fort h above . I t is therefore eviden t tha t th e emphati c wor d 'God ' mus t no t b e s o interprete d a s t o 154

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contradict the whole theme of the Epistle to the Romans. We must not giv e to the word 'God' the value of a clearly defined, metaphysical entity. What will it profit us if a forma l fidelity to th e meanin g o f a word i s purchased a t th e cos t o f complete infidelity to th e Word? He of whom the power is and by whom every existing authority is ordained i s God the Lord , the Unknown , Hidde n God , Creato r an d Redeemer , the Go d wh o elect s and rejects. Thi s means that th e might y powers that be are measured by reference to God , as are al l human , temporal , concret e things . Go d i s their beginnin g an d thei r end , thei r justification an d their condemnation, thei r 'Yes' and their 'No'. If we adopt an attitude of revolution toward s them - an d this is the attitude adopted i n the Epistle to the Romans, as is shown by the unmistakabl e fac t tha t th e passag e dealing with human rulers follow s immediately after th e passag e dealing with th e enemy and i s prefaced by the quit e clear statement tha t me n ar e to overcom e evil - th e attitud e o f revolutio n is , nevertheless, crossed by the reflection that it is only in relation to God that the evil of the existing order is really evil. God alone is the minus sign outside the bracket that i s able to demolish th e false plu s signs within the bracket - and , moreover, the romanticists of the present order have also t o lear n a s surely that genuin e plus signs can exis t onl y because of the minu s sign o f God .

8.10 We, therefore, have to remember that it is not fo r us to arm ourselves for action with the standard of the measurement of God - a s though He acted through us! The revolutionary must als o renounce th e blue flower of romanticism. I f then evi l be evil in its relation t o God, it i s not a thing o f which we can complain, any more than good i s a thing about which w e ca n boast . Therefore , eve n th e observe r wh o ha s bee n directl y hur t an d wounded b y th e evi l of the existin g orde r mus t bo w befor e Hi m wh o i s so strong an d wondrous a God , hig h abov e al l gods . I f Go d b e th e Judge , wh o ca n shar e i n Hi s judgment? An d i f Go d b e th e Judge , where i s ther e the n not-righteousness ? Wher e i s there then evi l which is not pregnan t with witness to th e good? Where is there then any concrete thin g whic h i s no t pregnan t wit h tha t whic h i s Prima l an d invisible ? Is not , therefore, the existing order a pregnant parable of the Order that does not exist - Fo r the creature was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it in hope (8.20) ? Th e existin g orde r fall s an d passe s t o corruptio n becaus e i t exists. Th e apprehension of this, however, ha s been, as we have seen, the sourc e of revolution. But the existin g orde r i s justifie d agains t revolutio n precisel y at thi s source ; fo r her e th e demand is made that the revolutionary should no t take the assault and judgment into his own hands, but rathe r should recognise that the evil of the existing order bears witness to the good, since it stands of necessity as an order contrasted wit h THE ORDER. Precisely in this contras t th e existin g order bear s involuntar y witness t o TH E ORDER an d i s the reflection of it. The powers that be are, therefore, in the general course of their existence of God; and , i n th e particula r for m i n whic h they constitute a present urgen t problem , especially fo r the revolutionary , the y ar e - ordained o f God. The KRISI S t o whic h th e powers that be are subjected by God renders the possibility of our revoltin g against them far les s advantageous to us than the possibility of our not revolting. In any case revolutio n is thereby deprived of its PATHOS, of its enthusiasm, of its claim to be a high place; it is, in fact, deprive d of all those factor s which are indispensable if the revolutionary is boldly and confidentl y an d properl y t o 'stor m th e heavens' . Vengeance belongeth unto m e (12.19). Our subjectio n means, therefore, no mor e than that vengeance is not ou r affair . 155

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It means that the divine minus before the bracket must no t be deprived o f its potency by a series of anticipatory negations o n our part . (Th e supporters of the present order , wh o may perhap s fee l encourage d b y what ha s been said , must , however , b e reminde d tha t revolution has been ordained a s evil, in order that they may bear witness to the good; and this means , i n orde r tha t the y ma y themselve s b e withou t justificatio n an d utterl y unromantic, i n order, i n fact , tha t the y too ma y turn an d becom e fro m hencefort h disordered.)

EXTRACT 9 BERDYAEV Politics and the spirit 9.1 The religiou s lif e passe s throug h thre e characteristi c stages . Firstl y there i s the stag e o f objective religion which is both popula r and collective, natura l and social. Secondl y there is the subjectiv e stage which is individualistic and psycho-spiritual . I n the third stag e the opposition betwee n th e objective and subjectiv e is transcended an d th e highest degre e of spirituality i s reached . A condition o f th e emergenc e o f Christianit y i s thi s movemen t from a n objective and popula r religio n t o on e which i s subjective and individual . Bu t in actual practic e Christianit y ha s no t develope d i n thi s way ; i t ha s crystallise d int o a religion whic h is at onc e objectiv e and popular , socia l an d collective . I t i s precisely this form o f Christianit y whic h i s undergoin g a crisi s a t th e presen t time . Religiou s lif e i s passing through a subjective and individualistic phase which cannot b e final and which is bound, i n it s turn, t o giv e way to somethin g else .

9.2 There are two types which confront one another al l through th e course of man's history , and the y ar e type s whic h fin d i t har d t o ente r int o an y mutua l comprehension . Th e former belong s t o th e collective , t o th e majorit y o f society , whic h outwardl y predominates i n history ; th e othe r belong s t o th e spher e o f 'spiritua l individuality' , t o the elec t minority , an d it s significance i n history i s much harde r t o discover . Thes e tw o types or states of mind ma y be called, respectively , the 'democratic' and the 'aristocratic'. Now socialist s ar e i n th e habi t o f affirmin g tha t throughou t th e cours e o f histor y th e privileged minorit y ha s exploite d th e disinherite d majority . Bu t ther e i s anothe r trut h which, thoug h a t firs t sigh t les s obvious , i s mor e profound . Th e collective , th e 'quantitative' majority , ha s always oppressed an d persecute d i n histor y th e 'qualitative ' minority, tha t whic h possesse s th e divin e Ero s an d i s compose d o f trul y spiritua l individuals whos e live s ar e directe d toward s th e highes t aims . Histor y work s ou t habitually in favour o f the averag e man, and o f the collective. It is for such that the State, the family , th e law, and ou r educationa l institution s hav e been created , n o les s than th e whole fabric of custom an d conventio n an d the external organisation o f the Church . I t is for suc h tha t knowledg e an d morality , dogm a an d cul t hav e bee n adapted . I t i s th e average man, th e typica l product o f the mass , who has dominated history , an d who has always insiste d tha t everythin g should b e don e fo r hi m an d tha t everythin g shoul d b e brought dow n t o th e leve l of his interests . 156

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9.3 The right wing and the left , conservative s and revolutionaries, monarchists and socialists, all alik e belon g t o thi s collectiv e 'democratic ' type . Th e conservative s an d th e monarchists, wh o ar e th e partisan s o f authority , ar e no t les s 'democratic ' tha n thos e who actuall y bear th e nam e 'democrats' . Fo r thi s socia l collective , fo r mankin d i n th e mass, the hierarchy of authority is maintained an d ancient institutions are preserved. It is for the m als o that they are abolished, an d fo r them tha t revolution s ar e made. Absolute monarchies an d socialis t republic s are alike necessary to th e masses , and ar e equally well adapted to the average man. It is, in fact, the average man who has dominated among the nobility no less than among the middle classes , the peasants, and th e workers. It is never for th e aristocracy of the spirit that governments are established, constitutions elaborated, and system s of learning or th e techniqu e of creation evolved . 9.4 Saints, prophets, geniuses, men, in short, who live on the higher planes of the spiritual life and who are capable of authentic creation, have no need of monarchy or republicanism, conservatism o r revolution , nor ye t of constitutions an d educationa l establishments . For the aristocracy of the spirit does not bear the burden of history for itself. On the contrary it i s made t o submi t t o institutions , reforms , an d system s whether ol d o r new , i n th e name of the so-called people and of the collective, or, in other words, of the happiness of the averag e man. Evidentl y the aristocrac y of the spirit , th e elec t who ar e alive with th e divine Eros, belong to th e falle n rac e of Adam and suffe r i n this way the consequences of the sin which they have to expiate . They cannot isolat e themselves from 'th e world' an d must therefor e bea r it s burden , an d serv e th e universa l caus e o f freedo m an d o f civilisation. One can only deplore the pride of men who, while believing that they share in that whic h i s highest, regard with contemp t lesse r men , an d wil l not hel p th e worl d t o progress. But those wh o belong to th e aristocrac y of the spirit , who ar e not responsibl e for th e qualitie s the y possess, hav e in reality a bitter an d tragi c destiny in the world, fo r they canno t adap t themselve s t o an y o f the socia l conventions an d system s o f thought which belong to averag e men. The y are a race of men wh o hav e always been oppresse d and persecuted. 9.5 Those who are of the 'democratic' type, whose orientation i s towards the masses and th e organisation o f th e lif e o f th e collective , ma y b e endowe d wit h grea t talent s an d ma y number amon g the m grea t men , heroes , geniuses , and saints . O n th e othe r han d thos e who ar e o f the 'aristocratic ' type , whose interest s ar e centre d o n othe r world s an d th e creation o f values which are of no us e to th e averag e man, may be completely lacking in genius and may be less powerful an d talente d tha n me n o f the forme r type . Nevertheless they posses s a differen t spiritua l organisatio n whic h i s a t onc e mor e sensitive , mor e complex, an d mor e subtle than that o f the 'pachyderms ' of democratic breed . Suc h men suffer mor e fro m th e 'world ' an d fro m it s ugliness , barbarity , an d decadenc e tha n th e men whose attention i s focussed upon th e masses and the collective. Even the grea t men of the 'democratic' type possess this simple kind of psychology, which places them unde r the protectio n o f tha t ver y worl d whic h i s s o inimica l t o spiritua l personalitie s les s adapted to it. Cromwell and Bismarck belong to this type, as in a certain sense do all men of action , a s well a s the grea t statesme n an d revolutionaries . Thi s simpl e psychological 157

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make-up can also be found amon g man y of the Doctor s of the Church , who have ofte n belonged t o th e democrati c type . 9.6 From thi s point o f view the Gnostic s are of particular interest . A great number o f them truly belon g t o th e 'aristocracy ' o f th e spirit , bu t the y see m t o hav e bee n unabl e t o reconcile themselve s t o th e 'democracy ' o f th e Christia n Church . Th e questio n i s no t whether the y wer e i n th e right . Th e Churc h ha d profoun d reason s fo r opposin g an d condemning them , for had the Gnostics won the day Christianity would never have been victorious. I t woul d hav e been transforme d int o a n aristocrati c sect . Bu t th e questio n which Gnosticism raises is a profoundly disturbing one which is always with us, and ha s its importanc e eve n today . Revelatio n an d absolut e trut h ar e bot h distorte d an d assimilated, according to the make-up and spiritual development o f the persons receiving them. Are we bound to consider as absolute and unchangeable that for m o f the Christian revelation which was intended fo r the averag e man? Must th e mor e spiritual , complex , and subtl e typ e of man, who ha s i n som e measur e received th e grea t gif t o f Gnosis, b e brought dow n to a lower level and perforce rest content - wit h a reduced spiritualit y for the sak e o f the masses , an d i n orde r tha t h e ma y shar e i n th e fellowshi p of the whol e Christian people? But is it possible t o identif y sobornost with the popular collective ? Can the pat h whic h lead s t o th e acquirin g o f th e gift s o f th e Hol y Spiri t an d t o spiritua l perfection an d holines s b e regarde d a s the sol e criterio n o f spiritua l lif e an d th e onl y source o f religious Gnosis? ... 9.7 The Gnostics di d no t understan d th e myster y of freedom, that is , of freedom i n Christ , any mor e tha n the y understoo d th e myster y o f love . Ther e wa s i n al l thi s a hopeles s dualism which upset the true hierarchy of values. The Gnostics were without a glimpse of the orde r o f value s upo n whic h th e worl d o f th e Christia n rests , wher e th e highes t elements ar e organicall y linke d wit h th e lowes t an d thu s assis t th e proces s o f transfiguration an d of universal salvation. Their interpretation o f the hierarchic principle was a fals e one . Th e suprem e Gnosi s o f 'spiritual' persons i s necessary for th e salvatio n and transfiguration of those who are 'carnal'. 'Spiritual' persons must not remain proudly upon the mountaintops i n separation fro m th e 'carnal' world, but they must devote their energies to it s spiritualisation an d to raising it to the highest levels. Moreover th e sourc e of evi l is spiritual an d no t carnal . Th e Churc h ha s rightl y condemned th e prid e o f th e Gnostics, thei r hopelessl y dualisti c poin t o f view , an d th e unbrotherl y an d unlovin g attitude whic h they displayed toward s thei r fello w me n an d th e worl d a t large . But the consciousness of the Church was absorbed by preference with the problems of the average man, o f th e typica l produc t o f th e mass . Th e Churc h wa s anxious t o guid e arigh t th e ordinary ma n an d wa s preoccupied wit h th e tas k o f effectin g hi s salvation . I n condemning Gnosticism , th e Churc h i n som e measur e affirme d an d mad e lawfu l agnosticism. Eve n th e proble m whic h ha d give n ris e t o suc h sincer e an d tormentin g perplexity amon g the Gnostic s was regarded a s one whic h could no t an d indee d ough t not to be raised. The highest aspirations of the spirit, the thirst for a deeper knowledge of divine an d cosmi c mysteries , were brought dow n t o th e leve l of average humanity. No t only the Gnosi s of Valentinian but als o that o f Origen was regarded a s inadmissible an d dangerous, i n th e sam e wa y a s tha t o f Solovyo v i s today . A syste m o f theolog y wa s 158

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elaborated whic h becam e a n obstacl e t o th e highe r Gnosis . Onl y th e grea t Christia n mystics succeeded i n cuttin g their wa y through thes e well-nigh impregnable defences.

9.8 It mus t b e recognised , however , tha t on e o f th e difficultie s connecte d wit h 'th e highe r knowledge' in those days was that men could not disassociat e it from it s connection wit h the worship of demons, an d here Christianity found itsel f entangled with pagan cults and with th e 'wisdom ' o f paga n religion . An d ye t i t i s possibl e fo r a highe r Christia n knowledge of spiritual things to exist which is at once more penetrating, less exoteric, and less moulded t o th e need s o f the collectiv e than tha t o f the dominan t system s of officia l theology. Ther e i s roo m i n Christianit y no t onl y fo r S t Thomas Aquina s but als o fo r Jacob Boehme, not onl y for the Metropolita n Philare t but als o for Vladimir Solovyov. If spiritual person s ough t no t t o boas t o f the height s the y hav e reached , an d t o separat e themselves from those of the 'natural' and 'carnal' order, i t must not , o n the other hand , be supposed that such men do not exist, nor must the aspirations of their spirit and their almost frenzie d thirs t for truth be denied satisfaction on the grounds that there is no such thing a s ' a highe r spiritua l knowledge' . Thi s woul d b e equivalent , i n a n opposit e direction, t o tha t ver y destructio n o f th e organi c hierarch y o f value s whic h w e hav e noticed alread y in Gnosticism. The world finds it easy to deny and despis e every form o f spiritual life, every aspiration of the spirit, and every sort of higher learning or knowledge. It readil y asserts tha t suc h thing s are a clog upon th e progres s of the worl d toward s it s more complete organisation an d that they can perfectly well be left o n on e side. This is a point of view which is held and expressed by millions. Furthermore, nothing can be more heart-rending than to find the Church itself subscribing to that denial of the spirit which is professed by the State , a denia l whic h a t th e opposit e pol e i n atheisti c Communis m means th e definit e crushin g ou t o f th e spiri t an d th e exterminatio n o f ever y for m o f spiritual aristocracy. 9.9 'Quench no t th e spirit' i t has been said ; but t o den y the problem presente d t o u s by the Christian consciousnes s i s to forge t thi s command. Th e tas k which has a s its object th e enlightenment o f the worl d wil l ask for no diminutio n i n th e qualit y of the spirit . Thus the proble m whic h above all is confronting us today i s the proble m o f the spiri t an d o f the spiritua l life .

EXTRACT 1 0 NIEBUHR The conflict between individual and social morality 10.1 A realisti c analysi s o f the problem s o f huma n societ y reveal s a constant an d seemingl y irreconcilable conflic t betwee n th e need s o f societ y an d th e imperative s o f a sensitive conscience. Thi s conflict , whic h coul d b e mos t briefl y define d a s th e conflic t betwee n ethics and politics , i s made inevitable by the doubl e focu s o f the mora l life. On e focu s i s in th e inne r lif e o f th e individual , an d th e othe r i n th e necessitie s o f man' s socia l life .

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From the perspective of society the highest moral ideal is justice. From the perspective of the individua l the highest ideal is unselfishness. Society must strive for justice even if it is forced t o us e means, such as self-assertion, resistance, coercion an d perhap s resentment, which canno t gai n the mora l sanction o f the mos t sensitiv e moral spirit . The individual must striv e to realis e his lif e b y losin g an d findin g himsel f i n somethin g greate r tha n himself.

10.2 These two moral perspective s are not mutuall y exclusive and th e contradictio n betwee n them i s not absolute . Bu t neither ar e they easily harmonised. Efforts t o harmonis e the m were analysed in the previous chapter. It was revealed that the highest moral insight s and achievements of the individua l conscienc e ar e both relevan t an d necessar y to th e lif e o f society. Th e mos t perfec t justic e cannot b e establishe d i f the mora l imaginatio n o f th e individual doe s no t see k to comprehen d th e need s and interest s o f his fellows. Nor ca n any non-rational instrumen t o f justice be use d without grea t peri l to society , i f it is no t brought unde r th e contro l o f mora l goodwill . An y justice whic h i s onl y justic e soo n degenerates int o somethin g les s tha n justice . I t mus t b e save d b y somethin g whic h i s more tha n justice. The realistic wisdom o f the statesma n i s reduced t o foolishnes s if it is not unde r th e influence of the foolishness of the moral seer . The latter's idealism result s in political futilit y and sometimes in moral confusion, if it is not brought into commerc e and communicatio n wit h th e realitie s o f man' s collectiv e life . Thi s necessit y an d possibility o f fusing mora l and political insights does not, however , completely eliminat e certain irreconcilabl e element s i n th e tw o type s o f morality , interna l an d external , individual and social . These elements mak e for constant confusio n but the y also ad d t o the richnes s of human life . We may best bring our stud y of ethics and politic s t o a close by giving them som e furthe r consideration . 10.3 From the internal perspective the most moral act is one which is actuated by disinterested motives. The external observer may find good i n selfishness. He may value it as natural to the constitution o f human nature and a s necessary to society . But from the viewpoint of the autho r o f an action, unselfishnes s must remai n the criterion of the highes t morality. For onl y th e agen t o f an actio n know s t o wha t degre e self-seekin g corrupt s hi s sociall y approved actions. Society , on th e other hand , make s justice rather than unselfishnes s its highest mora l ideal . It s ai m mus t b e t o see k equalit y of opportunit y fo r al l life. I f this equality and justice cannot b e achieved without th e assertion of interest agains t interest, and withou t restrain t upo n th e self-assertio n o f those wh o infring e upo n th e right s of their neighbours, then society is compelled to sanction self-assertion an d restraint. It may even, as we have seen, be force d t o sanctio n socia l conflict an d violence . 10.4 Historically the interna l perspective has usuall y been cultivate d b y religion. For religion proceeds fro m profoun d introspection an d naturall y makes good motive s the criteri a of good conduct . I t ma y defin e goo d motive s eithe r i n term s o f lov e o r o f duty , bu t th e emphasis i s upo n th e inne r spring s o f action . Rationalise d form s o f religio n usuall y choose duty rather than love as the expressio n o f highest virtue (as in Kantian and Stoi c morality), becaus e i t seem s mor e virtuou s t o the m t o brin g al l impuls e unde r th e 160

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dominion o f reason than to giv e any impulses, even altruistic ones, moral pre-eminence . The social viewpoin t stand s i n sharpest contras t t o religiou s moralit y whe n i t views the behaviour of collective rather than individual man, and when it deals with the necessities of politica l life . Politica l morality , i n othe r words , i s i n th e mos t uncompromisin g antithesis to religious morality ...

10.5 Every effort t o transfer a pure morality of disinterestedness to group relations has resulted in failure. The Negroes of America have practised it quite consistently since the Civil War. They did not ris e against their masters during the war and remaine d remarkabl y loyal to them. Thei r socia l attitude s sinc e tha t time , unti l a ver y recen t date , hav e bee n compounded o f genuine religiou s virtues of forgivenes s and forbearance , and a certain social inertia whic h was derived no t fro m religiou s virtue but fro m racia l weakness. Yet they did no t softe n th e heart s of their oppressor s b y their socia l policy . 10.6 During th e earl y triumph s o f fascis m i n Ital y th e socialis t leader s suddenl y adopte d pacifist principles . One of the socialist papers counselled the workers to meet the terror of fascism wit h the followin g strategy : '(1 ) Creat e a voi d aroun d fascism . (2) Do not provoke; suffer an y provocation wit h serenity. (3) To win, be better than your adversary. (4) D o not us e the weapons of your enemy. Do not follo w in his footsteps. (5) Remember that the blood of guerrilla warfare fall s upo n thos e who shed it . (6 ) Remembe r that i n a struggle betwee n brother s thos e ar e victor s wh o conque r themselves . (7 ) B e convinced that i t is better t o suffe r wrong than to commi t it . (8) Don't be impatient. Impatienc e is extremely egotistical; it is instinct; it i s yielding to one' s ego urge. (9) D o not forge t tha t socialism win s th e mor e whe n i t suffers , becaus e i t wa s born i n pai n an d live s o n it s hopes. (10 ) Liste n t o th e min d an d t o th e hear t whic h advise s you tha t th e working people should b e nearer to sacrific e tha n t o vengeance.' (Quote d by Max Nomad, Rebels and Renegades, p. 294.) A nobler decalogu e of virtues could hardl y have been prescribed. But th e Italia n socialist s were annihilated b y th e fascists , thei r organisation s destroyed , and the rights of the workers subordinated t o a state which is governed by their enemies. The workers ma y live 'on their hopes', but ther e is no prospect o f realising thei r hope s under th e presen t regim e by practisin g th e pur e mora l principle s which th e socialisti c journal advocated . Som e of them ar e not incompatibl e wit h th e us e of coercion against their foes. But inasfar as they exclude coercive means they are ineffectual befor e the brutal will-to-power o f fascism . 10.7 The effort t o appl y the doctrines o f Tolstoi t o the politica l situation o f Russia had a very similar effect . Tolsto i an d hi s disciples felt tha t th e Russia n peasants would have the best opportunity fo r victory over their oppressors i f they did not become stained with the guilt of th e sam e violence whic h the czaris t regime used agains t them. Th e peasant s were t o return goo d fo r evil , an d wi n thei r battle s b y non-resistance . Unlik e th e policie s o f Gandhi, the political programme of Tolstoi remaine d altogether unrealistic. No effort was made t o relat e th e religiou s idea l o f love t o th e politica l necessit y of coercion. It s total effect wa s therefor e sociall y an d politicall y deleterious . I t helpe d t o destro y a risin g protest agains t politica l an d economi c oppressio n an d t o confir m th e Russia n i n hi s 161

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pessimistic passivity. The excesses of the terrorists seemed to giv e point t o th e Tolstoia n opposition t o violence and resistance . But the terrorists and th e pacifists finall y ended in the sam e futility. An d their common futilit y seeme d t o justif y th e pessimis m which saw no escap e from th e traditiona l injustice s o f the Russia n political an d economi c system . The real fact wa s that both sprang from a romantic middle-class or aristocrati c idealism , too individualisti c in each instanc e to achiev e political effectiveness . Th e terrorists were diseased idealists , so morbidly oppressed b y the guilt of violence restin g upon thei r class, that the y imagine d i t possibl e t o aton e fo r tha t guil t b y deliberatel y incurrin g guil t i n championing th e oppressed . Thei r idea s were ethical and , t o a degree, religious, thoug h they regarded themselve s a s irreligious. The political effectiveness o f their violence was a secondary consideration . Th e Tolstoia n pacifist s attempte d th e solutio n o f th e socia l problem b y diametricall y opposit e policies . But , i n commo n wit h th e terrorists , thei r attitudes spran g fro m th e conscienc e o f disquiete d individuals . Neithe r o f the m understood th e realitie s o f politica l lif e becaus e neithe r ha d a n appreciatio n fo r th e significant characteristic s of collective behaviour. The romanti c terrorists faile d t o relat e their isolate d act s o f terror t o an y consistent politica l plan . Th e pacifists , o n th e othe r hand, erroneousl y attribute d politica l potenc y t o pur e non-resistance .

10.8 Whenever religiou s idealism bring s forth it s purest fruit s an d place s the stronges t chec k upon selfis h desir e i t result s i n policie s which, fro m th e politica l perspective , ar e quit e impossible. Ther e is , i n othe r words , n o possibilit y o f harmonisin g th e tw o strategie s designed to bring the strongest inne r and the most effectiv e socia l restraint upo n egoisti c impulse. I t woul d therefor e see m bette r t o accep t a fran k dualis m i n moral s tha n t o attempt a harmony between th e two methods whic h threatens the effectivenes s o f both. Such a dualism would hav e two aspects. It would mak e a distinction betwee n th e mora l judgments applie d t o th e sel f an d t o others ; an d i t would distinguis h between wha t we expect o f individual s and o f groups. Th e firs t distinctio n i s obvious an d i s explicitly o r implicitly accepted whenever the mora l proble m i s taken seriously . T o disapprov e your own selfishnes s mor e severel y than th e egois m o f others i s a necessary disciplin e i f th e natural complacenc y towar d th e sel f an d severit y i n th e judgmen t o f other s i s t o b e corrected. Suc h a cours e is , furthermore , demande d b y th e logi c o f th e whol e mora l situation. One can view the actions of others only from a n external perspective; and fro m that perspectiv e th e socia l justificatio n o f self-assertio n become s inevitable . Onl y th e actions o f the sel f can be viewed from th e interna l perspective ; and fro m tha t viewpoin t all egoism must be morally disapproved. I f such disapproval should occasionall y destroy self-assertion t o suc h a degree as to invit e the aggressio n of others, th e instance s will be insignificant i n comparison wit h the number o f cases in which the moral disapproval of egoism merely tends to reduc e the inordinat e self-assertion of the average man. Eve n in those fe w cases in whic h egois m i s reduced b y religiou s discipline t o suc h proportion s that i t invite s injustic e i n a n immediat e situation , i t wil l hav e socia l usefulnes s i n glorifying th e mora l principl e an d settin g an exampl e for futur e generations . 10.9 The distinction between individual and group morality is a sharper and more perplexing one. Th e moral obtusenes s o f human collective s make s a morality o f pure disinterested ness impossible . Ther e i s no t enoug h imaginatio n i n an y socia l grou p t o rende r i t 162

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amenable to the influenc e of pure love. Nor is there a possibility of persuading any social group to mak e a venture in pure love, except, as in the cas e of the Russia n peasants, the recently liberate d Negroe s an d othe r simila r groups , a morall y dubiou s socia l inerti a should b e compounded wit h th e ideal . Th e selfishnes s o f human communitie s mus t be regarded a s an inevitability . Where it i s inordinate i t can be checked onl y by competing assertions o f interest ; an d thes e ca n b e effectiv e onl y i f coercive method s ar e adde d t o moral and rational persuasion. Moral factors may qualify, but the y will not eliminate, the resulting socia l contes t an d conflict . Mora l goodwil l ma y see k t o relat e th e peculia r interests o f the grou p to th e idea l of a total and final harmony of all life. I t may thereby qualify th e self-assertio n o f the privileged , and suppor t th e interest s o f the disinherited , but i t wil l neve r b e s o impartia l a s t o persuad e an y grou p t o subjec t it s interest s completely to an inclusive social ideal. The spirit of love may preserve a certain degree of appreciation fo r th e commo n weaknesse s an d commo n aspiration s whic h bin d me n together above the areas of social conflict. But again it cannot prevent the conflict. It may avail itself of instruments o f restraint and coercion , through which a measure of trust in the mora l capacitie s o f an opponen t ma y be expresse d an d th e expansio n rathe r tha n contraction o f thos e capacitie s i s encouraged . Bu t i t canno t hid e th e mora l distrus t expressed b y th e ver y us e of th e instrument s o f coercion . T o som e degre e the conflic t between th e pures t individua l moralit y an d a n adequat e politica l policy must therefor e remain.

10.10 The needs of an adequate political strategy do not obviat e the necessity of cultivating the strictest individual moral discipline and the most uncompromisin g idealism. Individuals, even when involved in their communities, will always have the opportunit y o f loyalty to the highest canons o f personal morality . Sometimes , when their group is obviously bent upon evil , they may have to expres s their individua l ideals by disassociating themselves from thei r group. Such a policy may easily lead to political irresponsibility, as in the case of the mor e extreme sects of non-resisters. Bu t it may also be socially useful. Religiousl y inspired pacifists who protest agains t the violence of their state in the name of a sensitive individual conscienc e ma y neve r lam e th e will-to-powe r o f a stat e a s much a s a classconscious labour group. But if their numbers grew to large proportions, they might affec t the policy of the government. It is possible, too, that their example may encourage similar nonconformity amon g individual s in the enem y nation an d thu s mitigate the impac t of the conflic t withou t weakenin g the comparativ e strength o f their ow n community . 10.11 The ideals of a high individual morality are just as necessary when loyalty to the group is maintained an d it s genera l cours e i n relatio n t o othe r group s i s approved . Ther e ar e possibilities for individual unselfishness, even when the group is asserting its interests and rights agains t othe r communities . Th e interests of the individua l are related to thos e of the group , and h e may therefore seek advantages for himself when he seeks them fo r his group. Bu t this indirec t egois m i s comparatively insignificant besid e th e possibilitie s of expressing o r disciplinin g hi s egois m i n relatio n t o hi s group . I f h e i s a leade r i n th e group, it is necessary to restrain his ambitions. A leadership, free of self-seeking, improves the moral e o f the whol e group. Th e leaders of disinherited groups , even when the y are avowed economi c determinist s an d scor n th e languag e o f persona l idealism , ar e 163

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frequently actuate d b y hig h mora l ideals . I f they sough t thei r ow n persona l advantag e they could gai n it more easily by using their abilities to ris e from their grou p to a more privileged one . Th e temptatio n t o d o thi s amon g th e able r member s o f disinherite d groups i s precisely what ha s retarde d th e progres s of their clas s or race .

10.12 The progress of the Negr o race, for instance, is retarded by the inclinatio n o f many able and educate d Negroe s t o striv e fo r identificatio n an d assimilatio n wit h th e mor e privileged white race and to minimise their relation to a subject race as much as possible. The American Labour Movement ha s failed t o develop its full powe r for the same reason. Under th e influenc e o f America n individualism , abl e labou r me n hav e bee n mor e ambitious t o ris e into the class of owners and their agent s than to solidif y th e labourin g class i n it s struggl e fo r freedom . Ther e is , furthermore , alway s th e possibilit y tha t a n intelligent membe r o f a socia l grou p wil l begi n hi s caree r i n unselfis h devotio n t o th e interests of his community, only to be tempted b y the personal prizes to be gained, either within th e grou p o r b y shifting hi s loyalty to a more privileged group . Th e interest s o f individuals are, i n other words , neve r exactly identical with those of their communities . The possibility an d necessit y of individual moral disciplin e is therefore never absent , n o matter wha t importanc e th e socia l struggl e betwee n variou s huma n communitie s achieves. No r ca n an y communit y achiev e unit y an d harmon y withi n it s life , i f th e sentiments of goodwill and attitudes of mutuality are not cultivated . No political realis m which emphasise s th e inevitabilit y an d necessit y o f a socia l struggle , ca n absolv e individuals of the obligatio n t o chec k their own egoism, to comprehen d th e interest s of others an d thu s to enlarg e the areas of co-operation .

EXTRACT 1 1 TEMPLE Christianity and the social order 11.1 The method o f the Church's impact upon society at large should be twofold. The Church must announce Christia n principles and point ou t wher e the existing social order a t any time i s in conflic t wit h them. I t mus t the n pas s on t o Christia n citizens , acting in thei r civic capacity , th e tas k o f re-shapin g th e existin g orde r i n close r conformit y t o th e principles. Fo r a t thi s poin t technica l knowledg e ma y b e require d an d judgment s o f practical expedienc y ar e alway s required . I f a bridg e i s t o b e built , th e Churc h ma y remind th e enginee r that i t i s his obligation t o provid e a really safe bridge; but i t i s not entitled t o tel l hi m whether , i n fact , hi s desig n meet s thi s requirement ; a particula r theologian ma y also be a competent engineer , and, if he is, his judgment o n this point is entitled t o attention ; bu t thi s i s altogether becaus e he i s a competen t enginee r an d hi s theological equipmen t ha s nothin g whateve r t o d o wit h it . I n jus t th e sam e wa y the Church ma y tell the politicia n wha t end s th e socia l orde r shoul d promote ; bu t i t mus t leave to th e politicia n the devisin g of the precis e means t o thos e ends . 164

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11.2

This is a point of first-rat e importance , an d i s frequently misunderstood. If Christianity is true at all it is a truth of universal application; all things should b e done i n the Christian spirit an d i n accordanc e wit h Christia n principles . 'Then' , sa y some , 'produc e you r Christian solutio n fo r unemployment. ' Bu t there neithe r i s nor coul d b e suc h a thing. Christian fait h doe s no t b y itsel f enable it s adherent t o forese e ho w a vast multitud e of people, eac h on e partl y selfis h an d partl y generous , an d a n intricat e economi c mechanism, wil l i n fac t b e affecte d b y a particular economi c o r politica l innovatio n 'social credit' , fo r example . 'I n tha t case, ' say s th e reforme r - or , quit e equally , th e upholder o f the status quo - 'kee p of f the turf . B y your ow n confession you are out of place here.' But this time the Church mus t say 'No; I cannot tel l you what is the remedy; but I ca n tel l yo u tha t a societ y o f whic h unemploymen t (i n peac e time ) i s a chroni c feature, i s a disease d society , an d tha t i f yo u ar e no t doin g al l yo u ca n t o fin d an d administer the remedy, you are guilty before God.' Sometimes the Church can go furthe r than thi s point to feature s i n the socia l structure itself which are bound t o be sources of social evi l because the y contradict th e principle s o f the Gospel .

11.3 So the Church is likely to be attacked from both sides if it does its duty. It will be told that it has become 'political ' when in fact i t has been careful onl y to state principles and poin t to breaches of them; and i t will be told by advocates of particular policies that i t is futil e because it does not suppor t these . If it is faithful t o its commission i t will ignore both sets of complaints , an d continu e s o fa r a s i t ca n t o influenc e al l citizen s an d permeat e al l parties. 11.4 Before going on to state in outline the chief principles of Christian social doctrine, i t may be wise, in th e prevailin g temper o f our age , to ad d a furthe r wor d o f caution. Fo r i t is sometimes suppose d tha t wha t th e Churc h ha s to d o i s to sketc h a perfect socia l orde r and urg e men t o establis h it . But it is very difficult t o know what a 'perfect socia l order' means. I s it the orde r tha t woul d work best i f we were all perfect? O r i s it the orde r tha t would work best in a world of men an d women such as we actually are? If it is the former , it certainly ought not t o be established; we should wreck it in a fortnight. If it is the latter, there i s no reaso n fo r expecting th e Churc h t o kno w what i t i s .. . 11.5 The political problem i s concerned wit h men a s they are, not wit h me n a s they ought t o be. Part of the task is so to order life as to lead them neare r to what they ought to be; but to assum e tha t the y ar e alread y this , wil l involv e certai n failur e an d disaster . I t i s no t contended tha t me n ar e utterl y bad , o r tha t the y ar e mor e ba d tha n good . Wha t i s contended i s that the y ar e no t perfectl y good , an d tha t eve n thei r goodnes s i s infecte d with a qualit y - self-centrednes s - whic h partl y vitiate s it , an d expose s the m t o temptations s o fa r a s the y achiev e eithe r freedo m o r power . Thi s doe s no t mea n tha t freedom o r powe r shoul d b e denied t o them ; o n th e contrary , i t i s fundamental to th e Christian position tha t men should hav e freedom even though the y abuse it; but i t is also to be recognised tha t they certainly will abuse it except so far as they are won by devotion 165

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to truth or to beauty to that selfless outlook, which is only perfectly established in men by love which arises in them i n answe r to th e redemptiv e lov e of God.

11.6 In an y period wort h considering , an d probabl y t o th e en d o f earthly history, statesme n will themselve s be men , an d wil l be dealin g with men , wh o abus e freedo m an d power . Now the most fundamental requirement o f any political and economic system is not tha t it shall express love, though that is desirable, nor tha t it shall express justice, though tha t is the first ethical demand t o b e made upo n it , but tha t i t shall supply some reasonabl e measure o f securit y against murder, robbery , an d starvation . I f it ca n b e sai d wit h rea l probability tha t a propose d schem e woul d i n fact , me n bein g wha t the y are , fai l t o provide tha t security , tha t schem e i s doomed . Christian s hav e som e clue s t o th e understanding o f huma n natur e whic h ma y enabl e the m t o mak e a mor e accurat e estimate tha n other s o f thes e points . Bu t the y wil l not , i f the y ar e tru e t o thei r ow n tradition, approac h the question with rosy-tinted spectacles . Its assertion o f Original Sin should mak e the Churc h intensely realistic and conspicuousl y free fro m Utopianism . 11.7 There is no such thing as a Christian social ideal, to which we should conform our actual society as closely a s possible. We may notice, incidentally , abou t an y suc h ideal s fro m Plato's Republic onwards, that no one really wants to live in the ideal state as depicted by anyone else. Moreover, ther e is the desperate difficulty o f getting there. When I read any description of an Ideal State and think how we are to begin transforming our own society into that , I a m reminde d o f th e Englishman i n Irelan d wh o aske d th e wa y t o Roscommon. 'I s i t Roscommo n yo u want t o g o to?' aske d th e Irishman . 'Yes, ' sai d th e Englishman; 'that's why I asked the way.' 'Well,' said the Irishman , 'if I wanted to g o to Roscommon, I wouldn't b e starting fro m here. ' 11.8 But though Christianity supplies no idea l in this sense, it supplies something of far more value - namely , principle s on which we can begin to act in every possible situatio n ... 11.9 The primary principle of Christian ethics and Christia n politic s must be respect for every person simply as a person. If each ma n an d woman i s a child of God, who m Go d love s and fo r who m Chris t died , the n ther e i s in eac h a worth absolutel y independen t o f all usefulness t o society . Th e perso n i s primary , no t th e society ; th e Stat e exist s fo r th e citizen, not th e citize n for the State . The first aim of social progress must b e to giv e the fullest possibl e scop e fo r th e exercis e o f al l power s an d qualitie s whic h ar e distinctl y personal; an d o f those th e mos t fundamenta l i s deliberate choice . 11.10 Consequently societ y mus t b e s o arrange d a s t o giv e t o ever y citize n th e maximu m opportunity fo r makin g deliberate choice s an d th e bes t possibl e trainin g fo r th e us e of that opportunity . I n othe r words , on e o f ou r firs t consideration s wil l b e th e wides t possible extensio n o f persona l responsibility ; i t i s the responsibl e exercis e of deliberat e 166

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choice whic h mos t full y expresse s personalit y an d bes t deserve s th e grea t nam e o f freedom.

11.11 Freedom is the goal of politics. To establish and secur e true freedom is the primary object of all right political action. For i t i s in an d throug h hi s freedo m that a man make s full y real his personality - th e quality of one made i n the image of God. 11.12 Freedom i s a great word, an d lik e other grea t words i s often superficiall y understood. I t has been said that t o thos e who have enough o f the world's goods th e clai m to freedom means 'Leave us alone', while to those who have not enoug h i t means 'Give us a chance'. This important differenc e o f interpretation rest s on a single understanding of freedom as absence of compulsion o r restraint. Bu t if that is all the word means, freedom and futilit y are likely to be so frequently combined a s to see m inseparable. For nothing i s so futile a s the unhampered satisfaction of sporadic impulses; that is the sort of existence which leads through boredo m t o suicide . Freedo m s o fa r a s i t i s a treasur e mus t b e freedo m fo r something as well as freedom from something . I t mus t be th e actua l ability to for m an d carry ou t a purpose. Thi s implie s disciplin e - a t first external disciplin e t o chec k the wayward impulses before there is a real purpose i n life to control them, and afterward s a self-discipline directe d t o th e fulfilmen t o f the purpos e of life whe n formed. Freedom, in short, i s self-control, self-determination , self-direction . T o trai n citizen s in th e capacit y for freedo m and to giv e them scope for free actio n is the suprem e end o f all true politics. 11.13 But man i s a self-centred creature. He can be trusted to abus e his freedom. Even so far as he win s self-control , h e wil l contro l himsel f i n hi s ow n interest : no t entirely ; he i s no t merely bad; but h e is not altogether good, and any fraction of self-centredness will involve the consequence tha t hi s purpose conflict s t o som e extent with that o f his neighbour. So there must b e the restrain t o f law, as long as men hav e any selfishness left i n them. Law exists to preserv e and exten d rea l freedom. First, it exists to preven t th e selfishnes s of A from destroyin g the freedom of B. If I am left untouche d when I knock my neighbours on the head , thei r freedo m t o g o abou t thei r dutie s an d thei r pleasure s ma y b e greatl y diminished. Bu t th e la w which restrain s an y occasiona l homicida l impuls e tha t I ma y have, by threatening penaltie s sufficientl y disagreeabl e to mak e the indulgenc e of it no t seem t o b e goo d enough , als o protect s m y purpos e o f goo d fellowshi p against bein g violated b y that sam e impulse . I n suc h a case the restrain t o f the la w increases the tru e freedom o f all concerned .. . 11.14 No ma n i s fitte d fo r a n isolate d life ; everyon e ha s need s whic h h e canno t suppl y fo r himself; but h e needs not only what his neighbours contribute to the equipment o f his life but thei r actua l selve s a s th e complemen t o f hi s own . Ma n i s naturall y an d incurabl y social. 167

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Recent political theories have given ostensible emphasis to this truth and have then, as a rule, gon e fa r t o ignor e it . Certainl y ou r socia l organisatio n largel y ignores it . Fo r thi s social natur e of man i s fundamental to hi s being . I am no t firs t som e on e o n m y own account who happens to be a child of my parents, a citizen of Great Britain, and s o forth. If yo u tak e al l thes e socia l relationship s away , ther e i s nothin g left . A ma n i s talkin g nonsense i f he says: 'Well, if I had been the son of some one else... etc'. He is his parent' s son; what he is supposing is not tha t h e should b e someone else' s son , but tha t h e should not exis t an d someon e els e shoul d exis t instead . B y our mutua l influenc e w e actually constitute one another as what we are. This mutual influence finds its first field of activity in th e family ; i t find s othe r field s late r i n school , college , Trad e Union , professiona l association, city , country, nation, Church .

11.16 Now actual liberty is the freedom which men enjoy in these various social units. But most political theories confine attention to the individual and the State as organ of the national community; the y ten d t o ignor e th e intermediat e groupings . Bu t tha t make s an y understanding o f actual liberty impossible; fo r it exists for the mos t par t i n and throug h those intermediate groups - th e family, the Church or congregation, the guild, the Trade Union, th e school , th e university , th e Mutua l Improvemen t Society . (Onl y i n th e nineteenth centur y coul d Englis h peopl e devis e suc h a titl e a s th e las t o r consen t t o belong to a society so named; but th e thing which that name quite accurately describes is very common an d ver y beneficial.) 11.17 It i s the commo n failin g o f revolutionar y politics t o ignor e o r attemp t t o destro y thes e lesser associations . The y are nearly always the produc t o f historical growt h an d d o no t quite fi t an y theoretica l pattern . S o the revolutionary , wh o i s of necessit y a theorist, is impatient o f them. I t was largely for this reason tha t the great French Revolution, which took a s it s watchwor d Liberty , Equalit y an d Fraternity , degenerate d int o a struggl e between Libert y an d Equalit y wherei n Fraternit y wa s smothere d an d Libert y wa s judicially murdered . Fo r th e isolate d citize n canno t effectivel y b e fre e ove r agains t th e State except a t th e cos t o f anarchy. 11.18 Liberty is actual in the various cultural and commercia l an d loca l associations tha t me n form. I n eac h o f thes e a ma n ca n fee l tha t h e count s fo r somethin g an d tha t other s depend on him a s he on them. The State which would serve and guard Liberty will foster all such groupings, giving them freedo m t o guid e their own activities provided thes e fal l within th e genera l orde r o f the communa l lif e an d d o no t injur e th e freedo m of othe r similar associations. Thus the State becomes the Community of communities - o r rather the administrativ e organ o f tha t Communit y - an d ther e i s much t o b e sai d fo r the contention tha t it s representative institutions shoul d b e s o designed a s to represen t th e various groupings o f men rathe r tha n (o r a s well as) individuals ... 168

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11.19 A democrac y whic h i s t o b e Christia n mus t b e a democrac y o f persons , no t onl y o f individuals. I t must no t onl y tolerat e bu t encourag e minor communitie s a s at onc e th e expression an d th e arena of personal freedom ; and it s structure must be such as to serve this end. That is the partial justification of Fascism which has made its triumphs possible. It sins far more deeply against true freedom than i t supports it; yet in the materialist and mechanical qualit y o f th e democrati c movemen t fro m Roussea u t o Kar l Mar x an d hi s communist disciples , i t ha d rea l justification fo r reactin g agains t them . 11.20 It i s impossibl e t o sa y ho w muc h w e ow e i n ou r ow n countr y t o th e schoolin g i n democratic habit s provided , firs t b y the ol d Trad e Guilds , then, when th e fellowshi p o f trade ha d bee n broke n u p b y the releas e of individualis t acquisitiveness , b y th e Trad e Unions, and ever since the seventeenth century by the dissenting congregations. Man y of our most effective Labou r leaders learned their art of public speech as local preachers; and the self-governmen t o f th e loca l Chape l ha s bee n a fruitfu l schoo l o f democrati c procedure. Ou r 'Lef t Wing ' has by no mean s always maintained thi s close association of democratic principle with conscientious worshi p of God! But the historical roo t i s there. And the British tradition o f freedom has probably more o f the element which consists of the claim to obe y God rather than me n an d less of the element of mere self-assertivenes s than ha s th e democrati c traditio n i n mos t othe r countries . Th e elemen t o f self assertiveness is morally bad an d politicall y disastrous; a freedom based upo n i t is only an opportunity fo r selfishnes s and wil l decline through anarch y to disruptio n o f the State ; the claim to obe y God rather than me n is a source both of moral strength, for it inspires devotion t o duty , an d o f politica l stability , fo r suc h freedo m ma y onl y be use d i n th e service o f the whol e fellowship. 11.21 The combinatio n o f Freedo m an d Fellowshi p a s principle s o f socia l lif e issue s i n th e obligation of Service. No one doubts this in so far as it concerns the individual. Whatever our practic e may be, we all give lip-service to thi s principle. 11.22 Its applicatio n t o th e individua l i s pretty clear . I t affect s hi m i n tw o mai n way s - a s regards work and leisure. In England we have depended a great deal on voluntary service given i n leisur e hours. W e want a grea t dea l mor e o f it ; an d w e have a righ t to expec t more tha n w e ge t fro m th e Christia n Churches . Ye t i t i s certai n tha t a ver y larg e proportion o f th e day-to-da y drudger y o f socia l servic e i s done b y Christia n me n an d women i n the inspiration o f their Christian faith. We want more of them; but th e greater part o f what i s done a t al l is done b y Christian folk . 11.23 What i s less ofte n recognise d i n practice is the obligatio n t o mak e of the occupation , b y which a man o r woman earn s a living, a sphere of service. This may be done in two ways. Some young people hav e the opportunit y t o choos e the kind o f work by which they will earn their living. To make that choice on selfish grounds is probably the greatest single sin 169

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that an y young person ca n commit, fo r it is the deliberat e withdrawal from allegianc e to God o f the greatest par t o f time an d strength .. .

11.24 It i s no t onl y individual s wh o must , i f Christianity i s the truth , guid e thei r polic y o r career by the principles o f service; all groupings of men mus t d o the same. The rule here should be that we use our wider loyalties to check the narrower. A man is a member of his family, o f his nation, and o f mankind. I t is very seldom tha t an y one can render a service directly to mankind as a whole. We serve mankind by serving those parts of it with which we ar e closel y connecte d .. . A ma n mus t chiefl y serv e hi s ow n mos t immediat e community, acceptin g as the standard o f its welfare tha t whic h its members ar e ready to accept (thoug h trying, it may be, to lead them nearer to a fully Christian view), but always checking thi s narrowe r servic e b y th e wide r claims , s o tha t i n servin g th e smalle r community h e never injure s th e larger . 11.25 But as a member of each small group - wit h a voice in determining its conduct and policy - e.g . as a Christian Trad e Unionist or Managing Director, or as the Governor of a School - h e will d o al l he can to secur e tha t hi s own group accept s fo r itsel f th e principl e of service and set s its course in the way that will benefit no t onl y its own members i n their own self-interest, bu t als o the large r communit y i n which thi s group is a part. 11.26 Freedom, Fellowship, Service - thes e are the three principle s of a Christian socia l order , derived fro m th e still more fundamenta l Christian postulate s that Ma n i s a child o f God and i s destined fo r a lif e o f eternal fellowshi p wit h Him .

EXTRACT 1 2 JOHN XXII I Towards a world government 12.1 That inter-stat e relationship s involv e mutual rights and duties has been frequently taught by our predecessor s an d this we now confirm. These relationships, too , mus t conform to the norm s o f truth, justice, friendship an d respec t o f freedom. Fo r the sam e natura l law which governs the conduct of individual men applies with equal force to the managemen t of publi c affairs .

12.2 This will be clear to anyon e wh o reflect s tha t ruler s cannot discar d thei r huma n dignit y whilst the y ar e actin g o n behal f o f th e communit y an d attendin g t o it s welfare . The y cannot, therefore , disregar d th e natura l mora l la w which binds the m a s men . 170

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12.3

Nor i s it to be imagined that men are driven to shed their humanity by being elevated to the highes t rank i n the state . O n th e contrar y they have usually been chose n becaus e of their outstandin g gift s an d qualities .

12.4 We hav e seen , too , tha t i t i s th e mora l la w whic h provide s fo r authorit y i n th e community. How then can authority turn round and reject the moral law by which it was constituted? It would lose its foundation and collapse. We have God's own warning in the Book of Wisdom : 'Listen the n king s and understand ; ruler s of remotes t lands , tak e warning; hear this , you wh o hav e thousand s unde r you r rule , wh o boas t o f you r horde s o f subjects . For power i s a gift t o you fro m th e Lord , sovereignty is from th e Mos t High; he himself will probe you r act s and scrutinis e your intentions.' (6.2-4) 12.5 All along th e line , eve n when i t come s t o inter-stat e relations, we have to maintai n th e principle tha t authorit y must see k to promot e th e commo n goo d o f all, fo r tha t i s the reason fo r it s existence . 12.6 But on e o f th e firs t rule s fo r securin g the commo n goo d i s tha t th e mora l orde r b e recognised and its precepts obeyed. 'If order amongst states is to be securely established it must rest on the bedrock of those unalterable standard s of honesty which the Creator has made to appear in nature itself and established irremovably in the minds of men ... These norms ar e guidin g light s t o sho w me n an d nation s th e wa y the y shoul d take . Thei r salutary and provident warnings must be observed if the attempts to build a new order in society ar e not t o en d i n storm s an d ship-wreck ' (Piu s XII, Christmas Broadcast, 1941) . 12.7 First of all then th e links between state s must be forged i n truth. Trut h demand s that i n the creatio n o f these link s racia l o r ethni c discriminatio n shoul d hav e no part : that al l states be regarded as equal in their natural dignity. Each, in consequence, has the right to its existence, to its prosperity and to the aids which these make necessary, and the right to retain fo r itsel f th e responsibilit y fo r securin g al l these . I t ca n likewis e legitimatel y demand t o hav e it s reputatio n respecte d an d t o b e give n th e honour s t o whic h i t i s entitled. 12.8 We know that individual me n diffe r greatl y from on e anothe r i n knowledge, strengt h o f character, talents and the possession of wealth. But this is no reason why those who excel in such things should lord it over others. On the contrary the obligation that falls upon all and sundry to cooperate with others in striving for perfection lies more heavily on thos e with somethin g extr a to contribute . 171

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12.9

In th e sam e wa y som e nation s surpas s other s i n scientific , cultura l an d economi c development. Bu t this superiority, fa r from permittin g them a n unjus t domination ove r others, increases thei r obligatio n to contribut e t o th e common welfare o f all peoples.

12.10 In respect of their human dignity nature makes no men superior to others. Nor does it do so i n th e cas e o f civi l communities , fo r eac h o f thes e i s a bod y whos e member s ar e individual huma n beings. We know, too, well enough, ho w sensitive people are in matter s that touc h a nation's honou r an d with good reason . 12.11 Truth als o call s fo r balanc e an d fairnes s i n th e us e o f th e mean s o f communicatin g information whic h modern technolog y ha s put a t men's disposal and which help nations to lear n mor e abou t eac h other. Thi s does no t mea n tha t a country i s wrong i n givin g prominence t o wha t ca n b e sai d i n it s ow n favour . I t doe s mea n th e rejectio n o f an y spreading of rumours which do violence to truth and justice and damage the reputatio n of another country . 12.12 Relations between states must also accord with justice. This involves mutual recognitio n of rights , mutual fulfilmen t o f obligations . 12.13 We hav e establishe d tha t state s hav e th e righ t t o exist , t o prosper , t o acquir e th e aid s necessary for their developmen t an d t o rel y principally on thei r ow n effort s i n so doing. They have the righ t als o to protec t thei r reputatio n an d t o insis t o n du e honour s bein g paid to them. It follows logically that there is a corresponding obligatio n on all of them t o see that ever y one of these rights is safeguarded and that nothing is done to violate them . For, just as in private life men may not pursu e their own interests in such a manner as to inflict unjus t har m o n others , i n the sam e way states ar e guilty of criminal behaviou r if they see k thei r ow n advantag e a t th e expens e o f injurin g other s o r unwarrantabl y oppressing them. Ho w apt in this connection i s St Augustine's remark: 'Take away justice and wha t ar e kingdom s bu t gang s o f robbers?' (City o f God, IV.4). 12.14 It ca n happen, an d indeed doe s happen , tha t clashe s of interests develo p betwee n states . The solution o f these shoul d b e sought no t i n recours e t o arms , no r i n underhan d an d deceitful ways, but in a manner worth y of human beings: throug h mutua l appreciation o f arguments and attitudes, giving mature consideration t o all points, weighin g them in the balance o f truth an d resolvin g difference s fairly . 12.15 This applies particularl y t o the problem of national consciousness . From th e nineteenth century onward s ther e hav e been increasin g attempt s i n variou s part s o f th e worl d t o make politica l boundarie s coincid e wit h nationa l ones , s o as to giv e self-government t o people o f the sam e ethni c group . Since , fo r a variety o f reasons , thi s canno t alway s be 172

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achieved, it often happens that minorities find themselves hemmed in within the frontier s of a nation comprise d o f people from anothe r stock . Thi s gives rise to serious problems .

12.16 It must be made quite clear that it is a gross violation of justice to do anything to reduce the vigou r an d growt h o f such minorities; al l the mor e s o i f the abominabl e attemp t i s made t o exterminat e them . 12.17 The way to secur e justice in such situation s i s for governments t o tak e effective step s t o improve the human conditions o f these ethnic minorities, particularl y as regards the use of their language, the preservation of their nativ e genius, their ancien t customs and their enterprises an d activities in the economic field ... 12.18 The lates t advance s i n scienc e an d technology , exercisin g a s the y d o suc h a profoun d influence o n men's way of living, are causing people al l over the world t o com e togethe r and join in common enterprises . Th e interchange of goods an d ideas and the amount of travel have all increased considerably. The result ha s been an extensive growt h of contacts across national frontier s betwee n individuals, familie s an d intermediat e bodie s as well as between governments . Al l the tim e the economie s o f the various state s ar e becoming s o interdependent an d graduall y getting so inextricably interwove n tha t ther e already exists a sor t o f worl d economi c orde r forme d b y th e combinatio n o f th e economie s o f th e different nations . Added to this, the social progress, the order, the security and stability of each and ever y state ar e inevitabl y affected b y what i s happening in the others . 12.19 This being so, it is clear that individual states cannot properl y develop and attend to their needs in isolation. For the prosperit y an d progres s o f any nation i s part caus e and par t consequence o f the prosperit y and progres s of the rest . 12.20 There is also a unity in the huma n rac e deriving fro m th e huma n natur e that me n have perpetually i n commo n an d whic h demand s tha t attentio n b e give n t o th e welfar e o f mankind a s a whole: i n other word s to th e universa l common good . 12.21 In forme r time s th e government s o f th e variou s nation s wer e considere d capabl e o f attending sufficientl y t o thi s universa l commo n good . The y did s o either throug h thei r ambassadors o r b y congresse s o r b y drawin g u p treatie s an d conventions . Thes e were ways an d mean s indicate d b y the natura l la w or th e commo n la w of al l peoples o r b y positive internationa l law . 12.22 In ou r da y th e customar y relation s betwee n state s hav e undergon e a prodigiou s transformation. On the other han d th e universal common goo d brings up for immediate attention serious an d comple x problem s whic h hav e to d o with securit y and peac e on a 173

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world scale . O n th e othe r han d nationa l governments , fo r th e ver y reason tha t the y all have equa l status , ar e unabl e t o impos e a solution , howeve r muc h the y multipl y thei r efforts t o wor k ou t appropriat e laws . I t i s no t tha t the y lac k sufficien t goodwill : i t i s simply that th e authorit y they possess i s inadequate fo r the purpose .

12.23 So it is that, in the circumstances in which human societ y finds itself today, both politica l organisations an d politica l authorit y fal l shor t o f th e standar d require d fo r attendin g properly t o the universa l common good . 12.24 Yet i f we have a proper ide a o f the commo n goo d an d a correct understandin g o f th e nature an d functio n o f politica l authorit y w e canno t hel p seein g tha t ther e mus t b e perfect correspondenc e betwee n th e two . Fo r th e mora l orde r whic h demand s th e existence o f publi c authorit y fo r th e commo n goo d o f civi l societ y must , i n doin g so , require also that it be equal to the task. This principle helps us to determine the form an d the degre e o f competenc e wit h whic h t o inves t civi l institutions . Thes e institution s constitute th e mediu m throug h whic h publi c authorit y i s exercise d an d attain s it s purpose o f promoting the common good . If they are to perform this function adequately they mus t hav e th e for m an d th e degre e o f competenc e whic h matc h contemporar y circumstances at an y given time. 12.25 Today, however, the common goo d o f all nations involve s problems whic h affect peopl e all the world over: problems which can only be solved by a public authority which has the power, the form and the agencies competent t o deal with them and whose writ covers the entire globe . W e canno t therefor e escap e th e conclusio n tha t th e mora l orde r itsel f demands th e establishmen t o f some sor t o f world government . 12.26 Such a world government , enjoying a n authority extending t o the farthest corners of the earth and having in its service agencies capable of advancing the universal common good , will nee d t o com e int o bein g throug h universa l consen t an d no t b e impose d b y force. This is because authority of the kind we are speaking of must be able to operate effectivel y and this will involve being fair to all, devoid of favouritism and intent on the welfare of all peoples. I f it were to be forcibly impose d on the rest by the more powerful nations , there would be good reaso n to fea r that i t would serve the interests o f some few only or favou r one nation unduly . The force an d efficac y o f its action would b e thereby imperilled. For, though nation s diffe r considerabl y i n materia l wealth an d militar y power , they all cling tenaciously to their claim for equal rights and fo r the excellenc e of their own way of life . They hav e good reason , therefore , t o objec t t o an y rul e impose d o n the m b y forc e o r arranged withou t thei r participatio n o r t o whic h the y hav e no t give n a spontaneou s assent. 12.27 Just as in the cas e of the commo n goo d o f individual states s o also i n the respec t of the interests of all states taken together, no proper judgment can be made without taking into 174

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consideration th e huma n person . Worl d government , therefore , ha s t o b e speciall y directed towards making sure that human rights are everywhere acknowledged, respected , protected an d given ever wider scope. It can attend t o this by its own direct interventio n where th e situatio n call s fo r it , o r b y creatin g th e condition s whic h enabl e th e governments o f individual state s to perfor m thei r function s mor e efficiently .

12.28 We must add that th e relationships between th e world government an d the government s of individua l nation s mus t b e regulate d accordin g t o th e principl e o f subsidiarity , i n exactly th e sam e wa y a s th e relationship s withi n an y countr y betwee n th e stat e government o n th e on e han d an d th e citizens , families an d intermediat e bodies o n th e other. Thu s i t wil l b e th e provinc e o f suc h a worl d authorit y t o conside r an d settl e questions prompte d b y th e universa l commo n good , whethe r the y touc h o n matter s economic, social, political or cultural. We mean the sort of questions which, by reason of their gravity , thei r widesprea d natur e an d thei r extrem e urgenc y canno t b e deal t wit h satisfactorily b y the government s o f individual states. 12.29 To put i t anothe r way : the worl d authorit y mus t no t arrogat e to itsel f questions which rightly belong t o individual membe r states. On the contrary it must see to it that all over the world thos e condition s prevai l which giv e not onl y to nationa l government s but t o individual citizen s and intermediate bodies a better opportunity to get on with their own business, fulfi l thei r dutie s and vindicat e their rights. 12.30 Everyone know s how , o n 2 6 Jun e 1945 , ther e cam e int o bein g th e Unite d Nation s Organisation - UN O for short. Specialised agencie s composed o f members nominated by the government s t o th e variou s countrie s hav e bee n adde d t o i t since . T o thes e ar e assigned project s o f grea t importanc e an d world-wid e exten t i n socia l an d economi c matters and i n the fields of science, education an d publi c health. But the main purposes of the Organisation are declared to be: i. To maintain international peace and security; ii. To develop friendl y relation s amon g nation s base d o n respec t fo r the principl e of equal rights; iii. To achieve international cooperation i n solving international problems ; iv . To be a centre for harmonising th e action s o f nations . 12.31 It i s t o thi s Organisatio n tha t w e ow e th e Universa l Declaratio n o f Huma n Rights , approved b y the U N Genera l Assembly on 1 0 December 1948 . I n th e Preambl e t o th e Declaration i t i s stated tha t 'th e effectiv e recognitio n an d observanc e o f th e right s an d freedoms' proclaime d i n it are to be 'a common standar d o f achievement for all peoples and nations'. 12.32 We ar e wel l awar e tha t som e peopl e ar e no t entirel y satisfie d wit h som e item s i n th e Declaration, and with good reason. Nevertheless we think i t is a step towards the creation of a lega l an d politica l syste m fo r th e worl d a s a whole , inasmuc h a s i t enshrine s a recognition of the dignity of the human person, asserts the right of every man on earth to 175

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seek trut h i n freedom , t o observ e mora l norms , t o d o wha t justice demands, t o liv e as befits a human bein g and t o enjo y othe r right s consequent upo n these .

12.33 It i s therefor e ou r earnes t wis h tha t th e Unite d Nation s Organisatio n shoul d g o fro m strength t o strength , perfectin g its constitution an d it s agencies t o mee t th e exten t an d grandeur of its tasks. May the time come soon when this Organisation will be able to give effective protectio n to human rights : rights which derive immediately fro m man's dignity as a person an d which , for that reason , ar e all-embracing, on n o accoun t t o b e violated and neve r t o be filched away . There i s all the mor e reaso n for wanting this because me n today are much more active in the public life of their own country, take a keener interest in internationa l affair s an d ar e becomin g eve r mor e consciou s o f belongin g a s living members t o th e whol e family o f mankind . 12.34 This is the plac e to repea t our exhortatio n tha t ou r son s should offe r themselve s readily for servic e in public life and shoul d join with others in working for the good o f the whole human rac e as well a s that o f their ow n country . Profitin g b y the guidanc e which their Christian faith provide s and under the impulse of Christian love, they must work hard t o ensure that whatever plans are formed t o promote economic , social , political or cultural ends are such a s will not hinde r bu t wil l rather help men to develo p i n the supernatura l order a s well as the natural ... 12.35 There are , indeed , generou s soul s who , whe n face d wit h a situation no t completel y o r perhaps no t a t al l consonant wit h justice, burn wit h a desir e t o pu t everythin g right at once and who get carried away by such an ungovernable zeal that their attempt at refor m becomes a sort o f revolution . 12.36 To suc h peopl e w e woul d sugges t tha t i t i s i n th e natur e o f thing s fo r growt h t o b e gradual an d tha t i n human institution s n o improvemen t ca n be looked fo r which doe s not procee d ste p b y step an d fro m within . Th e point wa s well put b y our predecessor , Pius XII: 'Security and justice lie in not completely overthrowing the old order but i n well planned progress . Uncontrolle d passionat e zea l alway s destroy s everythin g an d build s nothing. I t inflames cupidity , never cools it. Since it does nothing but so w hate and ruin , far fro m leadin g t o reconciliation , i t drive s me n an d politica l partie s t o th e laboriou s undertaking o f buildin g anew , o n ruin s lef t b y discord , th e edific e wit h whic h the y started.' [Address, 13/6/42 ] 12.37 Therefore, amongs t th e mos t urgen t issue s facin g seriou s thinker s toda y i s tha t o f working ou t a ne w patter n o f huma n relationship s base d o n truth , justice , lov e an d freedom: relationship s betwee n ma n an d man , betwee n citize n an d state , betwee n on e country and anothe r and , finally, between individuals , families, intermediat e bodies an d states o n th e on e hand , and , o n th e other , th e communit y o f th e whol e famil y o f mankind. Ther e is none, surely, who will not estee m this as a service of the highest order ; 176

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for i t i s that whic h wil l rende r possibl e th e buildin g u p o f true peac e accordin g t o th e pattern whic h Go d has made .

12.38 Such thinkers, indeed , ar e all too fe w to accomplis h everything that require s to be done ; but th e whole of mankind i s deeply in their debt. I t is fitting that w e should pay them a public tribut e o f praise and a t th e sam e time beg them t o pres s on wit h their beneficia l efforts. I t is our constan t hop e tha t thei r number s will be reinforced, especially from th e ranks o f Christians inspire d t o joi n the m b y a sense o f duty an d a spirit o f love; for o n those wh o hav e enrolle d unde r th e standar d o f Chris t ther e lie s a specia l obligation t o bring vision and love to human societ y and to act as leaven in the mass. They will succeed in thi s i n the measur e of their unio n wit h God . 12.39 For no peace can reign over the whole human famil y unless it has first gained sway in the hearts o f individua l men : tha t i s to sa y unless eac h observe s within himsel f th e orde r which Go d ha s prescribed . Som e words o f St Augustine are very appropriat e here : 'Do you want your mind t o be capable of controlling you r passions? Let it bow to a superior power and it will conquer al l beneath itself ; and peace will come to you: true, certain and in righ t goo d order . What order ? Go d commandin g th e min d an d th e min d th e flesh. Nothing coul d b e more i n order' (Miscellanea Augustiniana). 12.40 It i s our burnin g desir e tha t suc h a peace shoul d b e established al l over th e worl d - a desire which i s surely shared b y all men of good wil l - whic h has led us to put forwar d these ideas on the problems which vex human society so sorely today and on the solution of which it s futur e progres s depends . 12.41 We do so knowing that, unworthy as we are of the office, w e represent the One whom the divinely inspired prophe t referre d t o a s 'The Prince of Peace'. It is our bounde n dut y to dedicate ourselve s t o thi s work fo r th e commo n goo d wit h al l the strengt h o f soul an d body. Bu t peac e wil l remai n a mer e drea m i n men' s mind s unles s i t i s built o n th e principles we have, with grea t hopes, sketche d ou t i n this letter: that i s to sa y unless it is grounded o n truth, given a framework o f justice, raised to a lofty heigh t and crowne d by charity, and take s proper accoun t o f freedom. 12.42 To erect so wonderful an edifice is truly beyond th e capacity of man, whatever his natural gifts, i f he relies solely on his own powers. To construct human society in the image of the kingdom o f Go d ther e i s need o f help fro m heaven . 12.43 So, during this Holy Week, we address our prayers to Him who, by His bitter Passion and Death, not onl y wiped awa y sin, th e caus e of all conflicts, miseries and inequalities , bu t led back the human rac e to reconciliation wit h His heavenly Father through the sheddin g of Hi s ow n blood ; thu s winnin g fo r mankin d th e gif t o f peace . 'Fo r h e i s th e peac e 177

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between us , and has made the two into one ... He came to bring the good new s of peace, peace to you who were far away and peac e to those who were near at hand.' [Eph . 2.1417]

12.44 This i s a message which is echoed i n th e Liturg y of this sacred season : 'Jesus , ou r Lord , risen an d standin g i n th e mids t o f his disciples sai d "Peac e be upon you, alleluia" : th e disciples saw the Lor d and wer e glad.' Chris t brought u s peace and bequeathe d i t to us . 'Peace I bequeath t o you, my own peace I give you, a peace the world canno t give , this is my gif t t o you. ' [Jn . 14.27] 12.45 It is this peace brought t o us by our divin e Redeemer which is the object o f our entreatie s in th e prayer s we address t o Him . Ma y H e banis h fro m th e soul s o f me n al l that ca n undermine peace . Ma y He moul d the m al l t o becom e witnesse s o f truth , justic e an d brotherly love . Ma y H e enlighte n al l wh o rul e s o tha t the y provid e fo r thei r subjects , together wit h commendabl e prosperity , th e inestimabl e boo n o f impregnabl e peace . Finally, ma y Chris t inspir e al l me n wit h a determinatio n t o brea k dow n th e barrier s which kee p me n divided , t o strengthe n th e bond s o f mutua l lov e whic h dra w the m together, t o tr y t o understan d other s an d t o fin d forgivenes s fo r thos e guilt y o f wrongdoing. S o that , followin g hi s pla n an d hi s guidance , al l nation s wil l arriv e unfailingly a t a unio n i n brotherly concor d i n which will flourish an d reig n perpetuall y the peac e for which men dream .

EXTRACT 1 3 MIRANDA Justice and almsgiving 13.1 Since a t leas t th e sixt h centur y A.D., a bald fac t ha s bee n systematicall y exclude d fro m theological an d mora l consideration : 'T o give alms' i n the Bible is called 't o do justice.'

13.2 To cite a few of the passages which have resisted all misrepresentation, w e mention Prov . 10.2; Tob. 4.10 ; 12.9 ; 14.11 ; Dan. 4.24; and Matt. 6.1-2. These are not th e only ones, bu t these are unequivocal. When our Western translations say 'almsgiving,' they do not do so in ba d faith . Indee d th e realit y involve d i s wha t w e cal l toda y 'almsgiving, ' an d th e translations ar e mad e fo r th e peopl e o f today . Bu t th e origina l say s sedakah, whic h signifies justice . We migh t als o ad d Ecclus . 3.30, 7.1 0 an d 12.3 , th e origina l Hebre w o f which w e hav e onl y recentl y com e t o know . Previou s centurie s kne w onl y th e Gree k translation, which, like our modern versions, i s 'almsgiving.' With th e same certainty we could als o list Ps . 112.3 , 9; Artur Weiser and H . J . Kraus dogmatically interpret 'justice ' (sedakah i n Hebrew) i n these tw o verses a s 'fidelity-to-the-covenant,' bu t the y hold that the Bible treats no other theme but th e covenant. As we shall see later, however, covenant 178

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theology belong s t o a relatively late perio d i n th e Ol d Testament. I n Ps . 112 , a s in th e other passage s we have cited, th e Bibl e call s 'justice' wha t we call 'almsgiving.'

13.3 Some exegete s hav e trie d t o diminis h th e importanc e o f thi s fact . The y argu e tha t th e Greek translators o f the Ol d Testament, th e famou s Seventy, caused som e confusio n by translating justice (sedakah) a t time s b y eleemosyne 'almsgiving, ' a t othe r time s b y eleos 'compassion,' an d a t other s b y dikaiosyne 'justice. ' But , i n th e firs t place , thi s characteristic o f th e translatio n shoul d no t distrac t u s fro m th e fac t whic h i s disconcerting fo r the Wes t - tha t th e work s whic h w e consider t o b e o f charit y and supererogation ar e i n th e origina l Bibl e text calle d work s o f justice . Thi s i s th e sam e sedakah which th e whole Bibl e considers transgressed when th e worker doe s not receiv e his wage; see, for example, Jer. 22.13. In the secon d place , instead of minimizing the bald fact w e have pointed out, th e Gree k translation emphasized i t eve n more: It means tha t the translator s o f the Septuagin t themselve s wer e disconcerted . 13.4 The act which in the West is called almsgiving for the original Bible was a restitution that someone make s fo r something tha t i s not his . The Father s of the earl y Church sa w this with great clarity: 'Tell me, how is it that you are rich? From whom di d you receive your wealth? And he , whom di d h e receiv e it from ? Fro m hi s grandfather, you say , fro m hi s father. B y climbin g thi s genealogica l tre e ar e yo u abl e t o sho w th e justic e o f thi s possession? O f course you cannot ; rathe r it s beginning and root have necessarily come ou t of injustice.' 'D o not say , "I a m spendin g wha t i s mine; I am enjoyin g what i s mine." In reality it is not your s but another's. ' 13.5 Jerome comments i n this way on Jesus' expression 'money of injustice' (Luk e 16.9) : 'And he very rightly said , "mone y of injustice, " fo r al l riches come from injustice. Unles s on e person has lost, another cannot find. Therefore I believe that th e popular proverb is very true: "Th e ric h perso n i s either a n unjus t perso n o r th e hei r o f one."' Basi l the Grea t thinks the same way: 'When someone steals a man's clothes we call him a thief. Should we not giv e the same nam e to on e who could cloth e th e naked an d doe s not ? The bread i n your cupboar d belong s t o th e hungr y man ; th e coa t hangin g unuse d i n you r close t belongs to the man who needs it; the shoes rotting in your closet belong to the man who has no shoes; the money which you hoard u p belongs t o the poor.' Ambrose teaches the same thing in a formula of unsurpassable exactitude : 'You are not makin g a gift o f your possessions t o th e poo r person . Yo u are handing over t o him what is his. y 13.6 The defender s of private ownershi p hav e used wonder s o f subterfug e an d misrepresen tation t o escap e attack by such a n unequivoca l an d constan t tradition, which wa s only being faithfu l t o Sacre d Scripture . Bu t n o subtlet y i s abl e t o whitewas h thes e explici t teachings of Ambrose an d Augustine: 'Go d willed tha t this earth shoul d be the common possession o f al l an d h e offere d it s fruit s t o all . Bu t avaric e distribute d th e right s o f possession (Avaritia distribuit iura possessionum).' 'lustitia es t i n subveniendo miseris: Assisting the need y is justice.' 179

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13.7

Apologists fo r the status qu o attribute this incontrovertible tradition to the imprecision of preachers . B y this standar d however , w e would als o hav e to eliminat e no t onl y th e entire patristi c traditio n but th e Bibl e as well, fo r there is nothing imprecis e abou t th e statements w e have considered. O n th e contrary , the y demonstrate o n th e par t o f their authors the very clear intention o f formulating a well-deliberated idea . The time has come for Christianit y t o brea k a lon g chai n o f hypocris y an d collusio n wit h th e establishe d powers and decid e if its message is or i s not goin g to b e the sam e a s the Bible's .

13.8 It does us no good to think like the Greeks and say that 'money of injustice' cannot mea n that injustice is inherent in money like quality, like weight or color, and that therefore we do not comprehen d wha t Jesus means by the term an d should le t the question rest . It is obvious that Christ did not mean that, nor did Luke, for the simple reason that neither of them was a disciple of Aristotle. The expression i n question shoul d be understood i n the context o f a society divide d between ric h an d poor. 'How happy ar e you who are poor' (Luke 6.20) and 'Ala s for you who ar e rich' (Luk e 6.24) are not expression s whic h bless the physica l fac t o f not havin g mone y an d condem n the physica l fac t o f having money , and neither are the numerous statements in the Psalter and the prophets o n behalf of the poor an d agains t th e rich . Th e term s 'rich ' an d 'poor ' ar e correlative , an d wha t th e blessing and the corresponding curse attack is precisely the difference betwee n the two. It does not see m to Luk e (nor to Christ) that this difference ca n be justified. I t is 'money of injustice' for, as Jerome understood ver y well in the paragraph we have quoted, 'all riches come from injustic e ... "The ric h person is either an unjust perso n o r the heir of one."' Jesus ben Sirach, who in Ecclus. 5.8 uses 'unjust riches' with the same sense as the term in Luke 16. 9 (an d not, certainly , in a determinative sense, which would need the article tois chremasin tois adikois), wit h astonishin g perspicacit y provide s th e sam e explanation : 'Many have sinned for the sake of profit; he who hopes to be right must be ruthless. A peg will stic k i n th e join t betwee n tw o stones , an d si n will wedge itself between sellin g an d buying' (Ecclus . 27.1-2). 13.9 Let it not be said that the biblical authors did not understan d economics; thi s is the same ben Sirac h who in 3.30, 7.10 , an d 12. 3 in the original Hebrew refer s to 'almsgiving ' and 'justice.' Th e underlyin g convictio n i s that differentiatin g ownership , that whic h makes some rich and some poor within the same society, could not be achieved with the genuine acquiescence o f thos e wh o wer e thereb y disempowered ; i t coul d no t an d i t canno t b e achieved without violence and despoliation . Th e condemnation o f the right in Luke 6.24 and th e expression 'money of injustice' i n Luke 16. 9 are based on the same conviction. If this were not s o the programmatic battle cry which at the beginning of this Gospel Luke puts on the lips of Jesus' mother herself would b e completely incomprehensible: 'He has filled the hungry with good thing s and sent the rich away empty' (Luk e 1.53) . Thi s verse is generall y classified amon g th e incomprehensible , bu t suc h a n alternativ e i s not ver y scientific. I t i s obvious tha t th e statemen t i n questio n presuppose s a definite convictio n about the injustice of differentiating wealth , that is, the wealth which in the same society constitutes som e peopl e i n on e clas s and other s i n another . Th e underlyin g convictio n can be none other than the one we have indicated: It is impossible for this wealth to have 180

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been acquired without violence and spoliation . T o avoid this conclusion regardin g what is at the basis of all these scriptural passages , i t would b e necessary to assert that they do not refe r t o ever y type o f differentiatin g wealth , bu t onl y t o tha t whic h wa s wrongly acquired. Th e passage s would therefor e impl y tha t th e wealt h coul d hav e been rightl y acquired. Bu t th e ver y strengt h o f th e text s i s i n th e intentiona l universalit y o f th e statements, i n th e non-distinction , precisel y i n th e fac t tha t the y d o no t allo w distinctions: 'I t i s easier fo r a camel to pas s through th e ey e of a needle tha n fo r a rich man to enter the kingdom of God' (Mark 10.25; Matt. 19.24 ; Luke 18.25). It is impossible to interpre t thi s statemen t a s directe d agains t th e distributio n o f differentiatin g ownership whic h d e facto prevail s and no t agains t d e iure differentiatin g ownershi p a s such. I t i s impossibl e t o interpre t i t a s directe d agains t th e abuse s an d no t agains t differentiating ownershi p i n itself.

13.10 The effort s o f certai n moder n exegete s to negat e th e authenticit y o f thi s logio n (Mar k 10.25; Matt. 19.24 ; Luke 18.25) a s the words of Christ himsel f only show how greatly the work of interpretation i s influenced by the statu s which Western civilization bestows on the theologia n an d o n Christianit y itsel f a s the officia l religion . O f this entir e teaching they wis h t o retai n a s th e origina l nucleu s onl y Mar k 10.26 , whic h i n substanc e says , 'How difficult i t is to be saved.' They want us to believe that 10.2 5 is one example among many and that it was more or less invented b y pre-Marcan communit y preaching , whic h does no t hav e t o b e take n literally . Bu t wit h thi s maneuve r exegesi s transgresse s th e methodological principle s which i t has scientificall y elaborated durin g many decades of meritorious work. In fact, the absolute impossibility of salvation for the rich is something which no primitiv e Christian community (befor e 7 0 A.D., as Mark's Gospe l was written in 70 or 71 ) would have dared to assert if it were not basing its assertion on the authority of Chris t himself . O n th e othe r hand , 'ho w difficul t i t i s t o b e saved ' i s a theologica l generality which could have been invented by any community or redactor of that time or any other . Therefor e th e mos t seriou s moder n exegetes , fro m th e accredite d Joachi m Jeremias and the authoritative Walter Grundman n t o the very exigent Rudolf Bultmann and Norma n Perrin , hold tha t Mar k 10.2 5 is an authenti c saying of the historica l Jesus. 13.11 Thus the statement s o f Luke 1.53 , 6.24, and 16. 9 could be , as regards their formulation, proper to Luke or to his pre-redactional tradition; as regards the content, however, the y faithfully transmi t t o u s the thinking of Christ himself , which we know from Mar k 10.25 and man y other equall y authentic passages like Matt. 11.5- 6 (Luk e 7.22-23); Luk e 6.20; etc. 13.12 Thus w e ca n retur n t o ou r startin g point : Th e fac t tha t differentiatin g wealt h i s un acquirable withou t violenc e an d spoliatio n i s presuppose d b y th e Bibl e i n it s pointe d anathemas agains t th e rich; therefore almsgiving is nothing more than restitution of what has bee n stolen , an d thu s th e Bibl e call s i t justice . An d w e includ e her e th e Ne w Testament. Matthe w leave s n o roo m fo r doub t whe n h e explain s an d thematicall y attempts t o delineat e wha t justic e is , that is , what make s som e just an d other s not , i n Matt. 25.31-46: 'the just' (w.3 7 an d 46) ; 'And they will go away to eternal punishment , 181

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and the just to eternal life' (v.46) . It all has to do with giving food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, a home to the stranger, clothing to the naked, etc. The list is given four times so that there can be no mistake. It would be difficult t o establish with greater emphasis a definitive an d singl e criterio n t o distinguis h betwee n th e just an d th e unjust . And thi s justice canno t b e reduce d withou t misrepresentatio n t o som e kin d o f Virtue ' o r supererogation, as we see by the fat e which awaits those who do not practis e it: 'Go away from m e wit h you r curs e upo n you , t o th e eterna l fir e prepare d fo r th e devi l an d hi s angels' (v.41) .

13.13 These ar e al l work s whic h th e Wes t call s charity , i n contradistinctio n t o justice . A frequent methodologica l error is to believe that the discrepancy i s verbal or explicable by the allege d imperfectio n o f biblica l morality , whic h di d no t kno w ho w t o distinguis h between justic e an d charity . Th e discrepancy i s a solid, unequivoca l fact . T o brand th e biblical authors as primitive is a value judgment, not objective exegetical work. What is in question is precisely Wester n morality' s alleged superiorit y to biblical morality . To bas e oneself on thi s superiority in order t o reduc e biblica l thought t o Wester n though t i s an extraordinarily unscientifi c methodolog y fo r i t prevent s on e fro m seein g th e differenc e which exists between the thinking and wishing of the investigator and that of the authors being studied . 13.14 We have said that when the Bibl e calls 'justice' what Western cultur e calls 'almsgiving' it is because the private ownership which differentiates th e rich from th e poor is considered un-acquirable without violence and spoliation; th e Fathers of the Church also understood this ver y clearly . Th e causa l dependenc e whic h exist s betwee n th e distributio n o f ownership an d the distribution of income ha d led us, by economics alone , t o th e sam e conclusion. Bu t i t woul d b e erroneou s t o thin k tha t thi s economi c fac t escape d th e biblical authors . Ecclus. 27.1-2, which we have cited, is exceedingly clear: It refers to those who try to enrich themselves through profits, an d i t points ou t ho w this profit occur s in buying an d selling . Whe n i n 3.30 , 7.10 , an d 12. 3 i t refer s t o 'almsgiving ' a s 'justice ' (sedakah), th e thinking is in perfect congruenc e with the economic fact to which we have alluded an d which , to be sure, has escaped Wester n moralist s an d jurists. 13.15 In 22.1 7 Jeremia h condemn s thi s profit , afte r describin g i n v.1 4 th e luxuriou s hom e which King Jehoiakim had built, undoubtedly with such profits. Thus in v.13 the prophe t could specif y of what material the property was made: 'Shame on the man who builds his house by non-justice and completes its upstairs rooms by not-right'. As economic theory demonstrates, profi t i s the tangible concretizatio n o f the differenc e i n incomes. Jeremia h sees very clearly how private ownership arises from this. We refer to the ownership which we have called differentiating . 13.16 Amos is equally penetrating in the causa l relationships h e draws. He , however, refer s t o no perso n i n particular bu t t o th e system itself : 'Well then, sinc e you have trampled o n the poo r man , extortin g levie s o n his wheat - thos e house s yo u have buil t o f dressed 182

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stone, yo u wil l never liv e in them ; an d thos e preciou s vineyard s you hav e planted, yo u will neve r drin k thei r wine . "Assembl e o n Samaria' s mountai n an d se e wha t grea t disorder ther e is in that city, what oppression i s found insid e her." They know nothing of fair dealin g - i t is Yahweh who speaks - the y cram thei r palace s full wit h violenc e and spoliation.' (5.11 ; 3.9-10 )

13.17 Here we have, despite all the appearances o f elegance and luxury , the true consistency of the property o f the rich : violence and spoliation . Thei r palace s and al l that whic h makes them int o a clas s differen t fro m th e res t o f th e populatio n ar e fo r Amo s concretize d oppression, th e accumulate d materializatio n o f violenc e an d spoliation . Whe n h e threatens punishment , Amo s is aware that h e is proclaiming elementary justice. Because they trampled on the poor and extorted from them levies of wheat, they could build thei r houses of dressed stone, but the y would not inhabi t them, for the day of justice is coming. 13.18 Micah (3.9-10 ) allude s t o thi s sam e characteristi c o f differentiatin g ownershi p a s h e contemplates th e mansion s an d building s o f Jerusalem: 'You wh o loat h justic e an d perver t al l that i s right , yo u wh o buil d Zio n wit h blood , Jerusalem wit h injustice. '

13.19 The secon d chapte r o f Habakku k attack s profi t i n bot h it s secon d (w.6b-8 ) an d thir d (w.9-11) stanzas . The n i t speak s o f the crie s of the wall s and th e beam s o f the house s which were built wit h suc h materials : For the stone fro m th e very walls cries out, and th e beam respond s fro m th e framework . And i t continues b y taking up th e word s o f Micah: Trouble i s comin g t o th e ma n wh o build s a tow n wit h bloo d an d found s a cit y o n injustice. (2.11 ; 2.12 )

13.20 It is needless t o dra w out th e list of biblical testimony. Thirt y years ago there were those who trie d t o explai n thi s unanimou s understandin g o f th e essenc e o f differentiatin g ownership b y the rura l an d anti-urba n origi n o f the prophets . Toda y scientifi c exegesi s rejects such subterfuges o f interpretation, o f which the histor y of Christianity is full. An y anecdotal o r psychologica l explanatio n i s ou t o f plac e here , fo r i n th e propheti c anathemas there is a lucid understanding tha t inherited wealth has its economic origin in profit. Moreover , Isaia h an d Hose a thin k th e sam e way as the othe r prophets , an d the y are no t peasant s bu t city-dwellers . Isaia h i s even fro m th e capital , an d prou d o f it . 13.21 Before Christianity became compromised wit h the prevailing social systems, that is, up to the fourt h o r fift h centur y A.D. , there wer e neve r misrepresentation s o r evasion s wit h regard t o th e biblica l testimon y concernin g th e inescapabl y unjus t origi n o r differen 183

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tiating ownership . Th e patristi c passages which w e have cited abundantl y demonstrat e this.

13.22 At th e beginnin g o f thi s chapter , I note d tha t th e papa l encyclicals ' defenc e o f private ownership canno t b e quote d t o bran d a s heterodox wha t I am sustaining . As Allaz an d Bigo hav e demonstrated , th e encyclical s understan d ownershi p a s somethin g ver y different. I now wish to add, although I have already touched thi s in passing, that in their defence th e pope s obviousl y presuppos e thi s provision : tha t th e ownershi p ha s bee n legitimately acquired. Thus the papa l doctrine o n ownership i s on a different level , onto which my considerations i n no wa y enter. Bu t the whole doctrine i s conditioned b y the implicit phrase : provided tha t th e ownershi p has been legitimatel y acquired. 13.23 If i t is objected tha t th e pope s presuppos e tha t legitimatel y acquired ownership de facto does exist, I respond tha t in any case this notion i s not the object of their teaching activity but i s rather a supposition. Thei r teaching s therefore do no t prejudg e th e possibilit y of demonstrating tha t thi s suppositio n i s false . Bot h th e recen t advance s i n economi c science and the understandin g tha t th e Bibl e and the Churc h Father s had o f the matte r demonstrate tha t th e suppositio n i s indeed false .

EXTRACT 1 4 HOLLENBACH The common good and globalisation 14.1 New thinking about issue s such a s urban povert y and emergin g patterns o f world-wide interdependence wil l requir e som e basi c change s i n presupposition s abou t publi c lif e today. W e need t o rethin k th e attitude s an d idea s that shap e th e wa y we live together . Taken together a s a more or less coherent body of beliefs, these attitudes an d ideas can be called ou r publi c philosophy . Michae l Sandel ha s define d suc h a publi c philosoph y a s "the politica l theor y implici t i n ou r practice , th e assumption s abou t citizenshi p an d freedom tha t infor m ou r publi c life." Thi s theor y i s most ofte n taci t i n th e pattern s o f public life , bu t i t i s operative eve n when only partially recognized. It i s the se t of takenfor-granted understandin g o f ho w w e should interac t wit h on e another . I t i s als o th e source o f th e question s w e as k whe n face d wit h nove l socia l situation s requirin g innovative responses . I f these presupposition s prov e incapabl e of providin g satisfactory responses t o pressin g practical questions , th e publi c philosoph y need s t o b e rethough t and revised . Th e issue s o f urba n povert y an d globa l interdependenc e challeng e th e adequacy o f a publi c philosoph y shape d b y th e attitud e o f wariness an d th e value s of tolerance an d non-judgmentalism . W e nee d t o develo p a publi c philosoph y i n whic h social connection s an d th e good s tha t ca n onl y b e achieved throug h thes e connection s play more centra l roles. Thi s will be a public philosophy tha t combine s commitmen t t o the commo n goo d wit h respec t fo r th e equalit y an d freedo m o f al l member s o f th e relevant communities .

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14.2

The prevailing public philosophy o f tolerance presupposes that people are safest when no one can interfere with their pursuit of their own understandings of the good. I t does no t go s o fa r a s t o sugges t tha t peopl e ar e bette r of f when the y ar e alone . Tha t woul d b e absurd. But it does regard communal interaction with suspicion. But we face problems of a ver y differen t kin d fro m thos e tha t mad e toleranc e suc h a deepl y hel d value . Th e situation o f today' s citie s an d growin g globa l interdependenc e sugges t tha t findin g stronger share d vision is required. Buildin g a public philosoph y on warines s toward th e dangers o f the ide a o f the commo n goo d lead s i n th e wron g direction . Contemporar y urban povert y and global interdependence bot h revea l strong social current s that isolate individuals an d threate n the m throug h socia l fragmentation . Suc h threat s wil l b e misinterpreted i f they are forced int o an intellectual Procrustea n bed that was constructed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Where domination o f one group by another is the problem , buildin g defensiv e barrier s agains t th e surroundin g socia l ambianc e can appear a reasonable response . Bu t if isolation an d fragmentatio n ar e among the principal dangers, strategies designed solely to kee p people fro m interferin g wit h one anothe r wil l be misdirected. Inappropriatel y directed fea r o f tyranny can slide into fea r o f any form o f social connectednes s o r interdependenc e o f persons i n society . I t ca n lea d t o response s that actuall y deepen isolatio n an d socia l fragmentation. Wha t i s needed i s to discove r a better wa y to liv e together .

14.3 The problems raise d by urban poverty and global interdependence are admittedly not th e whole story of contemporary socia l life in the United States and the West more generally. But there are other important matters that raise similar questions about the adequacy of a public philosophy o f wariness and tolerance. Among these is the issue of how to provid e adequate healt h car e to al l people whe n technological innovatio n i s relentlessly openin g up ne w treatmen t option s an d drivin g u p costs . Equall y significan t i s th e fac t tha t citizenship has itself become a problematic concep t i n our time . On e author ha s named this problem th e "eclips e o f citizenship". Th e low percentage of Americans who exercise their right to vote is only the mos t visibl e evidence for this eclipse. A strong case can be made, therefore , tha t th e issue s raise d her e ar e representativ e o f significant current s i n contemporary socia l life . The y provid e evidenc e tha t th e liberalis m o f warines s an d tolerance, take n neat , is a way of avoiding rather than addressin g many of the problem s we face today. " I won't bother yo u if you don't bother me " implie s that everyon e would be better of f if people would jus t leave each other alone . Thi s is not a n adequat e stance toward ke y problems in socia l lif e today . 14.4 The growing de facto interdependenc e i n both nationa l an d internationa l lif e require s a stronger vision of the goods we share in common. I t calls for exploration of how the wellbeing o f individua l peopl e migh t b e advance d b y seekin g good s w e mus t shar e i n common i f we are to have them at all. For the suburban middle class, "lifestyle enclaves" often see m t o b e th e onl y for m o f communa l connectio n tha t i s realistically available, with a consequent devaluatio n o f larger forms o f public life. Bu t the social divisions that make enclave s necessar y can b e addresse d onl y b y a renewe d commitmen t t o a larger public good . Addressin g thes e division s als o call s fo r th e discover y o f way s t o dra w 185

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African American male youth out of the detached stanc e that Orlando Patterso n call s the "cool-pose stree t culture" . Corne l Wes t put s thi s mor e positivel y a s th e challeng e of repoliticizing o f blac k workin g poo r an d underclass , alon g wit h increasin g th e involvement o f the blac k middl e clas s in suc h politics . I n bot h th e citie s and suburbs , therefore, publi c lif e needs t o emerg e fro m it s eclipse. Thi s will depend o n revitalizin g a sense of being a citizen linked t o other s i n a common world . A similar and eve n mor e daunting task arises as we contemplate ho w to govern a more interconnected , globalizin g world i n ways that respec t democrati c commitments t o equalit y and self-governance.

14.5 There is considerable irony in the presen t situation. Th e same social conditions tha t set people on guard against too-close connection wit h each other are the very conditions of a qualitatively ne w for m o f objective , structure d interconnectio n amon g persons . Technology, bureaucracy , mobility, an d rapi d communicatio n mak e th e publi c worl d seem alie n and impersonal . At the sam e time thes e factors heighte n th e impac t that th e structures of the public world hav e on the dignit y and meanin g of individual lives. This increased de facto "socialization " o f many domains of human living was identified as one of the principa l "sign s o f the times " by both Pop e John XXIII an d th e Secon d Vatican Council. I n suc h circumstances , th e eclips e o f citizenshi p threaten s t o allo w th e institutions of social life t o sli p from th e contro l o f human freedom o r t o fal l unde r th e direction of powerful elites . Thus at the very time that it has become increasingly difficult to sustain a vision of the common good, it is more urgently important that we find a way to do so .. . 14.6 One possibl e respons e t o th e ne w patterns o f interdependence linkin g peopl e togethe r across th e border s o f nation-state s toda y woul d b e th e establishmen t o f somethin g analogous t o worl d governmen t t o overse e th e pursui t o f the commo n goo d globally . Such a response presumes that international government is needed to secure the common good globally , jus t a s nationa l government s ar e neede d t o secur e th e share d goo d o f people within a geographic territory. Following this line of argument, in 196 3 Pope John XXIII suggeste d tha t a n internationa l syste m compose d o f nation-states wa s no longe r adequate t o secur e well-bein g i n a n increasingl y interconnected world . I n hi s words , "Under th e presen t circumstance s o f huma n societ y bot h th e structur e an d for m o f governments as well as the powe r which public authority wields in all the nation s of the world, mus t b e considere d inadequat e t o promot e th e universa l commo n good" . T o remedy this inadequacy, John XXIII proposed th e establishmen t o f a "public authority , having worldwide power an d endowed wit h the proper mean s for the efficacious pursui t of it s objective " namely , th e world-wid e commo n good . Therefor e h e asserte d tha t normative mora l consideration s requir e tha t a world-wid e "publi c authority " b e established [see Extract 12.25] . Joh n XXIII' s proposa l wa s carefull y qualifie d b y hi s insistence tha t thi s authorit y b e freel y agree d t o b y the people s o f th e world . H e als o asserted that this global authority be regulated by the principle of subsidiarity; the role of nation-states an d other communities an d associations of less-than-global scope must no t be abolished or repressed. John XXIII gave particular endorsement to the founding of the United Nations , wit h it s goal s o f promotin g peac e amon g nation s base d o n mutua l 186

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respect an d o f protecting th e huma n right s of all persons and th e legitimat e right of all nations.

14.7 John XXII I notabl y anticipate d som e o f th e possibilitie s tha t hav e bee n emergin g i n recent year s abou t th e restructurin g o f th e internationa l syste m i n ligh t o f th e ne w linkages o f interdependenc e w e have been considering . Considerabl y mor e need s t o b e said, however , abou t ho w to pursu e normativ e concern s abou t th e commo n goo d an d global socia l justice . Joh n XXIII' s almos t exclusiv e focu s o n a possibl e internationa l "public authority " suggest s tha t somethin g lik e a worl d government , wit h al l hi s qualifications concernin g subsidiarit y presumed , ca n b e th e mai n institutiona l vehicle that carrie s u s towar d a fulle r achievemen t o f share d well-bein g unde r condition s o f globalization. Th e issu e i s more comple x tha n this . Pursui t o f the share d goo d unde r conditions o f interdependenc e wil l mak e normativ e demand s o n nearl y all people an d communities. Thes e rang e fro m intimat e relationship s an d families , throug h local , national, and regional communities that are geographically defined, to historically roote d religious an d cultura l communitie s tha t cu t acros s borders , t o th e growin g numbe r o f new transnational association s tha t includ e both corporation s an d NGOs . The behavior of al l thes e communitie s wil l hav e a n impac t o n whethe r interdependenc e lead s t o common good s o r common bads . Sometimes thes e impacts will be indirect an d remote ; sometimes the y will be direct an d proximate . Bu t in either case, a normative perspective that take s th e commo n goo d seriousl y wil l b e relevan t t o thes e communities ' self understanding an d decisions . A n exclusiv e focu s o n globa l politica l institution s o r authorities lik e th e U N thu s run s th e ris k o f overlookin g som e o f th e importan t normative implication s o f a common goo d ethi c unde r condition s o f interdependence . CRITIQUE The critica l attitud e tha t on e adopt s toward s th e Extract s will partl y depen d upo n th e answer on e give s t o eac h o f th e question s tha t opene d thi s Section : namely : (1 ) Ca n specific politica l structures , ideal s o r programme s b e derive d unambiguousl y fro m th e gospel?; (2) How far can the Church be identified with specific politica l regimes, ideals or programmes? an d (3 ) Shoul d th e individua l Christia n b e totall y obedien t t o specifi c political regimes , ideal s o r programmes ? So , if one answer s 'y es> to 0) > th e differin g positions o f Earth an d Temple would b e unacceptable. An d if one answers 'y es> to tne third only, that of Barth might be acceptable. Nonetheless, apart from thes e (vital) overall criticisms a number o f more interna l criticisms of the individual Extract s can be made . It has already been noted that, by the standards of critical exegesis, much of Earth's Der Romerbrief ma y appear to tel l the reade r as much about Bart h as about Paul . The central difficulty o f thi s Extrac t fo r th e twenty-first-centur y reader ma y b e tha t i t seem s t o demand to o rigid an obedience of the individual t o government an d an acceptance o f the political statu s quo (whethe r tyrannical o r not). Suc h a position seem s much more rigid than tha t o f Calvi n (see above, p . 110 ) and , i n practice , Bart h late r foun d i t t o b e unsustainable i n th e fac e o f Nazism . Nonetheless , a s a theologica l correctiv e o f facil e revolutionary politics , Earth' s contribution remain s important - particularl y since, as an individual, Bart h was himself firmly committed t o a left-wing politica l perspective . Despite th e equall y importan t emphasi s o f Berdyae v o n th e spiritua l i n religion , hi s particular discussio n o f political realitie s will appear to man y to b e fa r too esoteri c an d

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elitist. His grudging allowance o f political structures fo r 'the masses', combined with his avoiding any discussion of how these structures might be evaluated or improved , migh t seem bot h arrogan t an d ethereal . Yet , in hi s defence, Berdyaev might hav e claimed that such attitudes are necessary, given people's persisten t tendency to persecute or ignore the truly spiritual. The centra l difficult y tha t i s usuall y foun d i n Niebuhr' s Moral Ma n an d Immoral Society involve s the moral dualis m that he frankly admitte d and , yet, which he gradually modified durin g hi s life . A s wit h Earth , i t woul d see m tha t a sharpl y define d earl y position, whic h mad e obviou s overal l sense , coul d no t b e sustaine d i n practice . Many critics have argued that suc h a sharp moral dualis m would allo w societies, government s and larg e corporation s t o ac t i n highl y immora l ways . O n thi s argument , th e prevarications o f sa y President Nixon' s governmen t woul d appea r perfectl y acceptabl e and onl y became wrong when they actually sought to obstruc t justice . Although ther e is some forc e i n this criticism, Niebuhr's early position wa s by no mean s a s dualistic a s at first it might appear , sinc e h e did insis t tha t leader s o f social group s mus t stil l adhere to 'the ideals of a high individua l morality' (10.11) . Both Templ e an d Joh n XXIII fac e th e difficultie s confrontin g all natural law theories (see above, pp. 55-6). The problems are, perhaps, less for Temple, since he only propose d general principle s an d wa s carefu l t o sho w tha t thes e deriv e fro m genera l Christia n doctrine. Provide d on e ca n accep t th e latter , the n th e forme r migh t see m t o follo w (although, eve n here , h e showe d hi s ow n bia s i n regardin g respec t fo r person s a s th e primary principl e o f Christia n ethics) . Mor e importan t i s th e criticis m tha t Templ e appeared to believe that the specific application of general principles to political problems by politicians involves only 'technical knowledge' and 'judgments of practical expediency' (11.1). I n fact , man y politica l problem s (a s can b e see n i n th e nex t Section ) involv e a whole range of smaller ethical, political and ideologica l decisions which divide Christians as much a s anyone. Similarly, wit h Joh n XXIII' s Pacem i n Terris, i t i s th e avoidanc e o f thes e sort s o f decisions whic h ma y giv e i t a n ai r o f generalit y an d unreality . Precisel y becaus e bot h authors attempte d t o addres s a s wid e a n audienc e a s possibl e an d sough t a broa d agreement i n thi s audience , thei r discussion s ten d t o lac k th e sor t o f specificit y whic h might make them appear more realistic. The second part of Temple's Christianity an d the Social Order attempted t o remed y this by supplying a detailed and , admittedly , partisa n (and now, of course, dated) serie s of political an d economic proposals. Eve n John XXIII's striking us e of the languag e of 'rights' (oppose d b y earlier Catholi c mora l theologians ) tends to b e rather general. Thi s language i s analysed i n detail in Kieran Cronin' s Rights and Christian Ethics (1992). However, a strength of Extract 12 is that, unlike some secular understandings o f 'rights', John XXIII insist s upo n linking 'rights' an d 'obligations' . For many , liberation theolog y appear s as one o f the mos t stimulatin g movements i n recent theology . I t ha s brough t ne w insight s an d perspective s t o th e disciplin e an d reminded man y o f th e passio n i n th e fac e o f oppressio n whic h shoul d characteriz e Christianity. Perhap s i t woul d b e unrealisti c t o expec t i t t o b e thoroughly defined an d rigorously methodologica l whils t i t i s stil l developing . Nonetheless , th e writing s of , especially, Alfred o Fierr o i n Th e Militant Gospel (1977) , Bonin o an d Miranda , demonstrate tha t i t doe s no t lac k critica l sophistication . Miranda' s Extrac t supplie s a n important correctiv e to th e medieva l concept o f 'almsgiving', which is undoubtedly stil l prevalent i n th e West . Yet , it i s no t itsel f withou t difficulties . Two , i n particular , ar e 188

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crucial. The first is concerned with the adequacy of his exegesis. He concentrates upon the Old Testamen t criticis m o f wealt h an d tend s t o ignor e th e obviou s limitation s o f thi s criticism and the existence of other and quite different strand s within the Old Testament. The (largely prophetic) emphasis upon 'justice' is, of course, only justice for the people of Israel: i t seldo m extend s eve n to Israel' s mos t immediat e neighbours . And , even in th e context o f Israel, sedakah may be more concerned wit h maintaining a lawful societ y than achieving social equity or abolishing 'differentiating ownership' . Further, other strands in the Ol d Testament (particularl y in certain Psalm s and i n the prologu e an d postscrip t of Job) see m to regar d 'wealth' as a reward for, or a n indication of, 'righteousness'. Even in the Ne w Testament, th e variou s redaction s containe d i n Luk e do no t al l see m equall y hostile t o 'wealth ' (see further, Davi d Mealand' s Poverty an d Expectation i n th e Gospels, 1980). Th e secon d difficult y concern s Miranda' s deliberat e us e o f Marxis t theor y (e.g . 'differentiating ownership' ) t o depic t biblica l concepts . Alistai r Kee' s Marx an d th e Failure of Liberation Theology (1990 ) offer s a majo r critiqu e of Mirand a and other s on this crucia l issue. This i s a difficult y whic h will be discusse d furthe r i n th e criticis m of Bonino's Extrac t 19 , since i t i s in tha t Extrac t that th e issu e is explicitly raised. Looking fo r an y points o f unity between thes e Extracts is made mor e difficul t b y th e polemical contexts fro m whic h they mostly derive. So, the contrast s betwee n Eart h an d Miranda appear sharper because neither makes the sor t o f qualifications tha t they do i n their les s combativ e writings . Nonetheless , ther e migh t b e broa d agreemen t wit h th e following point s qualifyin g th e thre e initial questions : (1) Eve n if it is believed that specifi c politica l structures, ideals or programme s can be derived unambiguously from the gospel, the latter cannot be identified wit h them. For the Christian, politica l realities mus t always be set in the contex t o f transcendence. Eve n th e theologian wh o i s mos t ofte n though t t o hav e confuse d th e Kingdo m o f Go d wit h political realities , Walter Rauschenbusch , was emphatic about this : The Kingdo m o f Go d i s divin e i n it s origin , progres s an d consummation . I t wa s initiated by Jesus Christ, in whom the prophetic spirit came to its consummation, it is sustained b y the Hol y Spirit, and i t will be brought t o it s fulfilmen t b y the powe r of God in his own time. The passive and activ e resistance of the Kingdo m of Evil at every stage o f it s advanc e is so great, and th e huma n resource s o f the Kingdo m of God s o slender, that no explanation can satisfy a religious min d which does not se e the powe r of God in its movements ... The Kingdom of God, therefore, is not merel y ethical, but has a rightfu l plac e in theology . ( A Theology Fo r the Social Gospel, 1918 , pp . 139-40) . (2) I f th e Church' s aim s an d aspiration s canno t simpl y b e identifie d wit h politica l realities, mos t Christian s woul d als o argu e that neithe r ca n i t be indifferen t t o them . A notion of the relative worth of political regimes, ideals and programme s (relative, that is, to the Kingdom of God), would suggest that they do serve an important function , but no t one that shoul d b e absolutized. Whereas Christians have always differed wit h each other about th e exten t t o whic h tyrannica l regime s shoul d b e activel y opposed, the y might agree that som e form of political reality is necessary t o preserv e peac e and justice. Pur e antinomianism ha s seldom bee n though t t o b e a justifiable Christia n position . (3) If political realities do have some relative worth for the well-being of society, then it would seem that individual Christians (enjoined, as they are, to love their neighbours) do have a t leas t a genera l responsibilit y fo r obedience . Ther e ar e stil l very real difference s 189

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apparent betwee n Christian s about ho w fa r this obedienc e shoul d go . But, again in th e context of transcendence, this obedience ca n hardly be absolute. The theist, par excellence, should alway s be consciou s tha t i t i s only t o Go d tha t absolut e obedienc e i s properl y given. However , fo r th e present-da y theologian , ther e i s a n additiona l reaso n fo r thi s position o f relativ e obedience. I n th e ligh t o f critical , historica l research , i t shoul d b e evident tha t Christianit y ha s subsiste d i n an d adapte d t o a variet y o f socio-politica l contexts. It is one of the merits of South America n liberatio n theology tha t it has served to remin d Wester n theologian s tha t Christianit y i s not dependen t upo n an y one singl e socio-political system. It should be a function o f Western, critical theologians, in turn, t o remind liberatio n theologian s that the y to o ar e engaged i n a historically relative , albei t vital, attemp t t o unrave l th e riche s o f th e gospel . Implicitly , Hollenbac h provide s a n important wa y of doing just that.

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SECTION 3

War and Peace

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Introduction t o Wa r an d Peac e

War presented th e twentieth centur y with perhaps its most crucial moral problem . Eve n if the issue s of the environmen t an d climat e chang e seem to b e supplanting i t as the key macro-challenges for the twenty-first century, the scale, cost and potential destructivenes s of twentieth-centur y warfar e differentiate s thi s fro m al l previou s centuries . I n th e twentieth centur y fo r th e firs t time : at leas t 5 0 million peopl e die d a s a direc t resul t o f war; in any year, world arm s expenditure became equivalent to th e total expenditure o n basic foodstuff s an d may soon equal the tota l present wealth o f the world; and human s eventually gained th e capacit y to destroy , man y times over, the worl d population . I f for no othe r reason , thes e horrifi c dimension s mak e it appropriate t o hav e a whole Sectio n devoted t o th e substantiv e issu e of war an d it s opposite, peace . However, there are other reason s fo r giving this Section to thi s single issue. Although the dimensions o f warfare were previously quite different fro m thos e o f the moder n era , the issue of war has always raised crucia l problems about th e relationshi p of Christianity to society at large. Empirically, a clear pattern emerge s in Christian responses t o war and this indicates , mor e sharpl y tha n i n most othe r mora l issues , the degre e t o whic h thes e responses are socially determined. An d ethically, divisions between Christian pacifists an d militarists, on this issue, serve to highlight the pluralism within Christianity evident in all of the Section s o f this Textbook . These point s - empirica l an d ethica l - requir e som e initia l distinction s betwee n differing response s t o war . Fou r 'ideal ' type s ma y b e isolate d (fo r these se e further m y Theology an d Social Structure, p. 7If) : (A) Thoroughgoing Militarism — understood a s a willingness to figh t anywhere , at an y time and fo r an y cause. (B) Selective Militarism - understoo d a s a willingness to fight when one's country, or another, declare s tha t th e caus e i s just. (C) Selective Pacifism — understood a s a willingnes s t o figh t onl y whe n on e i s personally convince d tha t th e caus e is just. (D) Thoroughgoing Pacifism - understoo d a s an unwillingnes s to fight anywhere, at any time an d fo r an y cause. These ar e ideal , no t actual , types , so particula r example s ma y be variant s o f them, bu t together they represent the range of options open to the individual, based upo n his or her willingness or unwillingnes s t o fight in war. The words 'i n war' shoul d b e stressed : th e responses ar e not primarily concerned wit h individual killing or violence, but rathe r with the issu e o f fightin g o r no t o n behal f o f other s (see Augustine's Tex t VII.6-7) . No t al l thoroughgoing pacifist s would admit this distinction - sinc e for some of them it is killing 193

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in an y form tha t i s forbidden - bu t i t i s essential to mos t othe r Christia n response s t o war. Thi s distinctio n wil l b e examine d furthe r i n Sectio n 5 i n relatio n t o th e issue s of suicide and euthanasia . For mos t Christians , typ e A is not a Christia n respons e t o war , sinc e onl y the non idealistic or amoral mercenary belongs to i t (though see Luther's IX.26). Further, a moral defence of fighting in war, whether i n terms of type B or type C, requires som e notion of a 'jus t war' : th e differenc e betwee n th e type s dependin g o n whethe r th e individua l concerned decides that the cause is just (or, perhaps better, not unjust ) o r whether he or she simply relies upon th e judgement o f the Stat e or Church . Since these two response s are the majority Christian responses to war, the importance of just-war theory can readily be seen . Naturally , individuals ma y not b e thoroughl y consisten t i n thei r response s t o war: B and C ma y b e mixe d an d man y migh t eve n wish t o avoi d an y notion s o f 'jus t causes', regardin g wa r a s a mournfu l an d ethicall y confuse d fina l resort . Nonetheless , insofar a s war is ever thought to be justifiable, som e notion of justice is required and , i n turn, differin g response s o n th e par t o f the individua l can be distinguished . The fac t tha t type s B and C cover th e majorit y o f Christia n response s t o wa r toda y serves t o illustrat e on e o f th e centra l difference s betwee n th e earl y an d present-da y churches. It is here that a key empirical observation ca n be made about th e relationshi p between Christianity and society at large. A fundamental dichotomy can be seen between the pre-Constantinian an d post-Constantinian churches: if, within the latter, types B and C constitute the majority of Christian responses t o war, in the former it is type D which predominates. Th e historia n Rolan d Bainto n eve n claim s that , 'th e ag e of persecutio n down t o th e tim e o f Constantine wa s the ag e of pacifism t o th e degre e that durin g thi s period n o Christia n autho r t o ou r knowledg e approve d o f Christia n participatio n i n battle': but , 'th e accessio n o f Constantin e terminate d th e pacifis t perio d i n churc h history' (Christian Attitudes Toward Wa r an d Peace, 1960(1961] , pp . 6 6 an d 85) . I n contrast wit h th e earl y church, Christia n pacifism , i n it s thoroughgoin g sense , i s today confined t o a minority of Christians withi n churche s and t o a minority o f sects or ne w religious movements , suc h a s the Amis h Mennonites , Anabaptists , Brethren , Jehovah' s Witnesses an d Quakers . Individua l pacifists, suc h as the Methodis t Stanle y Hauerwas in Extract 18 , often ten d to fee l themselves to be relative outsiders on this issue within their own church . Naturally there wer e differences o f approach t o wa r within th e earl y church an d i t is sometimes difficul t t o decid e whether it is warfare itsel f that was despised or th e 'pagan ' customs surroundin g it . Thes e difference s rang e fro m th e absolutis m o f Tertullia n (c. 160-220), even befor e hi s conversion t o th e rigour s of Montanism i n middle-age, t o the pragmatis m of Origen (c . 185-254). Despite the undoubte d presenc e o f Christians in the Roma n army in the lat e second century , Tertullian's attitude wa s uncompromising: Enquiry i s made abou t thi s point, whethe r a believer may turn himsel f into military service, an d whethe r th e militar y may be admitted unt o th e faith , eve n th e ran k an d file, or each inferior grade, to whom there is no necessity for taking part in sacrifices o r capital punishments . Ther e i s n o agreemen t betwee n th e divin e an d th e huma n sacrament, the standard o f Christ and the standard o f the devil, the cam p of light and the cam p of darkness. One soul cannot be due to two masters - Go d and Caesar. And yet Mose s carrie d a rod , an d Aaro n wor e a buckle , an d Joh n (Baptist ) i s gir t wit h leather, and Joshu a the so n of Nun lead s a line of march; and th e Peopl e warred: if it 194

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pleases you to sport with the subject. But how will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serv e even i n peace , withou t a sword , whic h th e Lor d ha s taken away ? Fo r albei t soldiers ha d com e unt o John , an d ha d receive d th e formul a o f thei r rule ; albeit , likewise, a centurio n ha d believed ; stil l th e Lor d afterward , i n disarmin g Peter , unbelted ever y soldier. (O n Idolatry 19 , from Th e Ante-Nicene Fathers 3 ) Here, unambiguously , i t i s the swor d itsel f an d no t simpl y military 'paganism' whic h Tertullian believe d t o b e inconsisten t wit h Christianity . Similarly , i t wil l be see n late r (below, pp . 342f ) tha t h e too k a n absolutis t stan d agains t abortio n an d an y for m o f individual homicide . Like Tertullian, Origen probably just assumed that killing humans was contrary to th e law o f Christ . Fo r him , Jesu s forbad e altogethe r 'th e puttin g o f me n t o death ' an d 'nowhere teaches that it is right for his own disciples to offe r violenc e to anyone, however wicked' (Against Celsus 3.7). However, more than Tertullian , Orige n was determined t o refute Celsus ' charges that Christians were undermining the state through their pacifism : To this our answe r is, that we do, when occasion requires, giv e help to kings, and tha t so t o say , a divin e help , 'puttin g o n th e whol e armou r o f God' . An d thi s w e do i n obedience t o th e injunctio n o f th e apostle , ' I exhort , therefore , tha t firs t o f all , supplications, prayers , intercessions , an d givin g of thanks , b e mad e fo r al l men; fo r kings, and for all that are in authority,' and the more any one excels in piety, the mor e effective hel p does he render to kings, even more than is given by soldiers, who go forth to fight and sla y as many of the enemy as they can. And to thos e enemies of our fait h who require us to bear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we can reply: 'Do not thos e who are priests at certain shrines, and those who attend o n certai n gods, as you account them , kee p their hand s fre e fro m blood , that the y may with their hands unstained and fre e fro m huma n blood offer th e appointed sacrifice s to your gods; and even when war is upon you, you neve r enlist the priests in the army . If that, then, is a laudable custom , ho w muc h mor e so , tha t whil e other s ar e engage d i n battle , thes e should engag e a s th e priest s an d minister s o f God , keepin g thei r hand s pure , an d wrestling in prayer s to Go d o n behal f of those who ar e fightin g i n a righteous cause, and fo r th e kin g wh o reign s righteously , tha t whateve r i s opposed t o thos e who act righteously may be destroyed!' And we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up war, and lead to the violation of oaths, and disturb the peace, we in this way are much more helpfu l t o the kings than those who go into th e fields to fight for them. And we do tak e ou r par t i n publi c affairs , whe n alon g wit h righteou s prayer s we joi n self denying exercises and meditations, whic h teach us to despis e pleasures, and no t t o be led away by them. An d non e fight better fo r the king than w e do. We do no t indee d fight under him , althoug h h e require it ; but w e fight on hi s behalf, forming a special army - a n army of piety - b y offering ou r prayer to God. (Against Celsus 8.73 , fro m The Ante-Nicene Fathers 4 ) Even allowin g fo r som e specia l pleadin g her e i n th e fac e o f criticism , ther e ar e clea r differences fro m Tertullia n and, indeed, similarities with later Christian responses to war. Augustine, too, wa s concerned t o defen d Christianit y agains t critics who thought i t had undermined the state. Unlike Augustine, Origen developed no just-war theory, but he did admit to a 'righteous cause' in war. And there is a prefigurement of the medieval position, 195

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illustrated i n Aquinas ' clai m (VIII.7f ) tha t th e clerg y should b e exemp t fro m militar y service - a position wit h eviden t pre-Christia n roots . Nonetheless, th e overal l respons e o f both Tertullia n an d Orige n t o wa r was on th e opposite sid e o f the pacifist/militaris t divide t o tha t o f Ambrose an d Augustin e and t o most subsequen t theologians . Firs t Ambros e an d the n Augustin e justifie d th e ful l participation o f Christians i n war and sough t t o distinguis h betwee n 'just ' an d 'unjust ' wars. At times, both men remained critical of the State (more critical than Aquinas in the theocratic thirteent h century) , but sa w military service as a morall y legitimat e for m o f activity for the Christian . I n contrast t o Tertullian , Augustine saw the condemnatio n o f Peter's us e of the sword (i n Matt . 26.52-3) as a condemnation o f acting 'in a hasty zeal' and 'without the sanction of the constituted authority', rather than as a condemnation of the swor d a s such (VII.2) . And, i n contras t t o al l other know n theologian s i n th e pre Constantinian Church , h e interpreted th e comman d t o tur n th e othe r chee k (i n Matt . 5.39) as referring t o 'an inwar d disposition' rathe r than to ' a bodily act ' (VII.8) . For the first time, eve n argument s from silence appea r o n the issue of war - fo r example , tha t Jesus did no t actuall y condem n th e centurio n fo r being a soldier (VII.6 ; se e also X.10). Both Tertullia n an d Augustin e were aware that th e Ol d Testamen t ofte n sanction s wa r (even war s o f aggression) , bu t thei r attitud e t o thi s evidenc e agai n contrasts . Fo r Tertullian, Jesus' disarming of Peter revoked thi s sanction, whereas, for Augustine, Jesus' actions and commands were to be interpreted i n such a way that they did no t contradic t the Ol d Testament evidence . The legac y of Augustine can be seen quit e clearly in this quotation fro m Welt y (who had alread y pointed ou t tha t th e Ol d Testament doe s no t suppor t pacifism) : Concerning wa r th e Ne w Testament mus t b e considere d i n it s entirety . Statement s conditioned b y the circumstance s o f the tim e canno t be regarded a s universally vali d and binding. Neither Christ nor the apostles condemned wa r or military service. Christ was sent int o th e world b y the Fathe r in order t o establis h th e messiani c kingdom of peace. But men rejecte d him an d hi s Gospel, and thereb y forfeited th e promise s tha t were directly linked with the comin g of Christ. ( A Handbook o f Christian Social Ethics, 1960, Vol. 2, p. 396 ) Modern biblica l scholarshi p increasingl y look s t o th e differen t way s th e Bibl e i s interpreted i n Christia n history . A prim e exampl e o f th e importanc e o f thi s stud y i s evident here . I n bot h Augustine' s Tex t VI I an d Welty' s Extrac t 15 , i t i s th e Ne w Testament, rathe r tha n th e Old , whic h i s to b e interprete d an d contextualize d and , i n both, a n argumen t fro m silenc e i s adopted. Sinc e both me n ca n b e literalisti c i n thei r understanding of other aspect s of New Testament teaching , their uneasiness at this poin t is a n importan t indicatio n o f a chang e i n th e socio-politica l contex t o f th e pre Constantinian an d post-Constantinia n churches . I n the first, the position o f the Church was, arguably , more tha t o f sect o r ne w religious movement, wit h a relatively exclusive understanding o f it s membershi p an d doctrin e an d littl e feeling o f responsibilit y fo r society a s a whole or for the working of government. In the second, it is the church-typ e that seem s to predominate: th e Churc h ha s a more inclusiv e understanding o f itself and its boundarie s wit h societ y a t larg e ar e les s clear-cut : now , fo r th e firs t time , wit h th e adoption o f Christianity a s a state religion b y Constantine, i t mus t com e t o term s wit h the mora l dilemma s facin g th e State . I f thi s explanatio n i s accepted , th e empirica l 196

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dichotomy, i n relatio n t o thi s issu e o f war, appear s les s surprising . Indeed , i t become s difficult t o see how a church, as a church, rather than as a sect, can systematically oppose a state on an issue as central to the latter as war: pacifism remain s an option for the sect , particularly i f i t i s alread y deepl y estrange d fro m societ y (a s toda y wit h th e Jehovah' s Witnesses or the Exclusive Brethren), in a way that i t is not a n option for the Church. In Luther's Text IX , with hi s high doctrine o f the State , th e church-typ e position i s well in evidence: hi s ecclesiologica l positio n preclude s hi s espousing , eithe r th e revolutionar y response o f the peasants , o r th e radica l pacifism o f the Anabaptists . This poin t lead s naturally to a consideration o f the ethica l difficultie s confrontin g the church-type response to war. Some form o f the just-war theory has usually been though t to be essential to it - a s Augustine's Text VII, Aquinas' Text VIII, and Welty's Extract 15 all indicate . Bu t i t i s a theor y whic h face s ver y considerabl e difficultie s - a s th e US Catholic Bishop s an d O'Donova n argu e i n Extract s 1 7 and 20 . Th e firs t o f thes e ha s already been note d - th e difficulty o f reconciling the Old and New Testament response s to war. Some theologians, lik e Hauerwas in Extract 18 , maintain that th e whole tenor of the Ne w Testament, a s distinct fro m th e Old , i s in th e pacifis t direction . Th e Scottis h biblical scholar , G . H . C . Macgregor' s Th e Ne w Testament Basis o f Pacifism (1936 ) wa s very influential for a previous generation o n this issue. Secondly, it has proved difficult t o set out a just-war theory which is not tautological: characteristically, that in Welty (15.12) contains withi n i t the concep t o f justice, as does tha t i n Augustine (VII.4). Thirdly, th e distinction between wars of aggression and wars of defence and the notion of a legitimate authority become particularl y difficul t t o maintai n i n th e contex t o f wars o f liberatio n (see 15.20f) . Sinc e the latte r hav e assumed a role o f such grea t importanc e i n th e Thir d World an d i n liberatio n theology , thi s difficult y i s particularly troublesome i n present day Christia n ethics . Fourthly , i n th e contex t o f actual wars , i t tend s t o becom e increasingly difficult consistentl y to apply just-war theories. So , in the light of progressive civilian bombin g i n Worl d Wa r Two , a just-war theoris t suc h a s Temple encountere d very considerabl e problem s i n reconcilin g theor y wit h actua l practice . I t ma y b e a particular featur e o f moder n war s - especiall y twenty-firs t centur y war s agains t 'insurgents' o r 'terrorists ' - that , a s they intensify , s o they becom e les s susceptibl e to moral justification in any recognizably Christian for m (henc e the distinction , eviden t in Extract 17 , between jus t cause s fo r goin g t o wa r - ius a d bellum — and jus t practice s actually within warfare - iu s in bello). Fifthly, nuclear warfare, or even the potential use or threatened us e o f nuclea r weapon s may , i n themselves , excee d th e bound s o f an y Christian just-wa r theor y (see O'Donovan a t 20.5) . This proble m i s exacerbated b y th e connection tha t is becoming increasingly apparent between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, by the proliferatio n of nuclear knowledg e beyond th e Western countries , b y the possibility o f nuclear terroris m an d b y strategic discussions o f limited nuclea r war. The dangers inherent i n all of these 'developments' are so obvious an d s o immense that littl e further justificatio n seems necessary for focusing this Section on th e substantive issues of war and peace . Among historical studie s o f Christian response s t o war , the followin g are particularly important: Roland H . Bainton , Christian Attitudes Toward Wa r and Peace (1960[1961]); Peter Brock, Pacifism i n Europe t o 1914 (1972) and Twentieth-Century Pacifism (1970) ; C. J. Cadoux , Th e Early Christian Attitude t o Wa r (1919) . I n addition , th e followin g historical reader s ar e ver y useful : Arthu r F . Holmes , Wa r an d Christian Ethics (1975); Albert Marrin , Wa r an d th e Christian Conscience (1971). 197

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The sociologica l distinctio n betwee n 'church ' an d 'sect ' ha s bee n th e subjec t o f considerable debat e (see particularly the work of the sociologist Brya n Wilson: e.g . his The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism, 1990) . Th e followin g books , however , al l interpre t varying Christian responses to war in the light of the distinction: Robi n Gill, Theology and Social Structure (1978) and Prophecy an d Praxis (1981); David Martin, Pacifism (1965) ; J. Milton Yinger , The Scientific Study o f Religion (1970) .

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TEXT VII AUGUSTINE The just war 1. BACKGROUND Reply t o Faustus th e Manichaean XXII , 69-76 ( The Nicene an d Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV, Eerdmans , 1956 , trans . R . Stothert). Augustin e firs t me t Faustu s o f Milevi s in 383 , when h e was still himself a sympathizer with Manichaeism . Bu t he was unimpressed b y this largel y self-taugh t leade r o f th e Manichees : fro m hi s ow n classicall y educated , middle-class background , h e wrot e late r that , ' I foun d a t onc e tha t th e ma n wa s no t learned i n an y o f th e libera l studie s sav e literature , an d no t especiall y learne d i n that , either' (Confessions V.vi.ll) . Faustus claimed to be living the life of a 'true' Christian, but Augustine cam e increasingl y t o distrus t hi s attacks o n Catholi c orthodox y an d o n th e Bible, insofa r a s i t diverge d fro m Manichaeism . Augustin e finall y wrot e hi s Reply t o Faustus c.397-8, at about the sam e time a s his Confessions an d shortl y afte r becomin g a bishop a t Hippo. Augustine' s sympathie s with Faustus' understanding o f sexual morality are still evident i n his other writing s of this time (see below, pp. 344f) , bu t hi s doctrina l and exegetica l antipathie s t o Faustus ' view s ar e wel l i n evidenc e i n thi s Text . Lik e Ambrose, his mentor a t the time of his conversion, Augustin e shows himself prepared to defend Ol d Testament militaris m an d to justify the notion of a just war from a Christian perspective, even though, at the end of the Text, he still sees the importance o f the witness of many earlier Christians to war - martyrdom . 2. KEY ISSUES The centra l issu e whic h concern s Augustin e i s th e differenc e betwee n personall y motivated, individual killin g on the one hand, and, on the other, killing on the authority of th e monarc h o r o f Go d himself . Moses ' killin g o f th e Egyptia n (Exodu s 2.12 ) was wrong, becaus e i t wa s without an y authority - a s was Paul's killin g o f Christian s o r Peter's violent actio n i n Gethsemane (VII.2) . But, the spoiling of the Egyptian s (Exodus 7-14) was , in contrast, explicitl y at God's command and , as command, was to be obeyed by Moses (VII.3). If it is objected that a good God could no t giv e such a command, i t can be replied that it is indeed onl y God who could do so; by implication, fo r humanity alone it would certainl y be wrong to d o s o (VII.4) . Thus act , agen t an d authorit y ar e al l very important her e (VII.5) : for individual agents to ac t violently on their own authority and from passio n i s wrong, wherea s killin g i n war , i n obedienc e t o Go d o r t o som e lawfu l authority, is not (VII.6) . For Augustine, monarchs have a right to preserve peace through the us e of warfare an d soldier s hav e a duty to obe y their monarchs , whethe r o r no t th e latter ar e righ t actuall y t o wag e wa r i n particula r circumstance s (VII.7) . Th e fina l 199

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paragraph face s a fresh objectio n fro m Faustu s and allegoricall y interprets Matthe w 5.3 9 in terms o f 'an inwar d disposition ' (fo r a similar stres s upo n intention , se e XIII.2-4). 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS The centra l thrus t o f Augustine' s ethica l argumen t i s clearl y deontologica l - wa r is morally justifiable because, in parts of the Ol d Testament, Go d can be seen t o comman d it. Faustu s was no moder n critica l exegete, but hi s mora l objection s t o Ol d Testamen t warfare woul d fin d a numbe r o f supporter s today . However , Augustin e increasingl y adopted a literalistic acceptance o f the Bibl e (see further. Tex t X) and wa s thus forced t o defend an d mak e sense of the evidenc e from Genesi s and Exodus . As a result, an ethica l position base d upo n th e centra l criterio n o f obedienc e t o God' s command s (howeve r unfathomable) seem s th e onl y on e consisten t wit h bot h Ol d Testamen t militaris m an d previous Christian pacifism/martyrdom. Apart from thi s central criterion, there are also a number of more minor natural law types of argument apparen t - e.g . in the crop analogy (VII.2), i n th e referenc e t o natura l orde r (VII.5 ) an d i n th e referenc e to huma n peac e (VII.7 - se e also Text IV) . Finally, Augustine's distinction betwee n 'cowardl y dislike' and the 'rea l evil s i n war ' (VII.6 ) i s importan t t o hi s argument , althoug h h e give s n o indication o f its ethical basis. It is possible that the latter result s as much from hi s Roman as from hi s Christia n world . 4. BASES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS This las t point raise s importan t possibilitie s abou t th e extra-Christia n source s o f Augustine's just-war theory. Again , i t is clear that th e centra l thrust o f the argumen t i n this Text stem s fro m hi s attempt t o reconcil e th e Ol d Testament response s t o wa r with those confrontin g Christian s a t th e en d o f th e fourt h century . Augustine' s appeal s ar e either t o th e Bibl e or agains t Faustu s and th e Manichaeans . Nonetheless , h e also make s assumptions (e.g . in VII.7) about political leadership and natural justice which go beyond these appeals. At the en d o f the Tex t h e also make s the specificall y Christia n allusio n t o the sufferin g o f martyrs . 5. SOCHI DETERMINANTS If a church/sect typology is adopted, i t is evident that Augustine reflected the transition of Christianity t o a more church-typ e positio n i n society . H e remaine d uneas y abou t thi s position (see especially Tex t IV ) an d wa s wel l awar e o f Christianity' s pacifis t heritag e (VII.8), but h e did stil l sanction th e ful l participatio n o f Christians i n war. Intellectually, Augustine characteristically reflected bot h th e Graeco-Roman and the Hebraic world (see above, p. 42). To the latter, he owed hi s notion of war as obedience t o God's commands , but, to the former, he owed his concepts of'lawful authority' , 'natural order' and 'justice': indeed th e whol e notio n o f a just-war theory i s essentially classica l rathe r tha n biblica l (even though 'justice ' is certainly used in other biblical contexts - se e Extract 11) . At the more persona l level , it i s possible tha t Augustine' s crucia l disappointmen t wit h Faustu s may hav e owe d somethin g t o thei r ver y differen t socia l clas s an d educationa l backgrounds: i t woul d hav e bee n difficul t fo r someon e a s sociall y an d intellectuall y sophisticated a s Augustine to tak e Faustus seriously.

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6. SOCIAL

SIGNIFICANCE

The importance o f Augustine's position on war cannot be exaggerated. Again, in terms of church/sect typology , had he simply affirmed the pacifis t traditio n and convince d othe r Christians t o d o th e same , a seriou s rif t migh t hav e been mad e betwee n 'church ' (or , more accurately , 'sect' ) an d societ y a t large . I t wil l be see n i n Tex t VII I that , fro m hi s arguments, a just-wa r theor y coul d b e develope d b y late r theologian s an d thu s a way could b e foun d t o accommodat e th e awkwardnes s o f th e Ne w Testamen t wit h th e demands o f th e State . Her e agai n Augustine' s particula r blen d o f Graeco-Roma n an d Hebraic notion s ha s ha d a majo r effec t upo n bot h Wester n Christianit y an d societ y generally. FURTHER READING The primar y source s fo r Augustine' s understanding o f wa r an d peac e ar e hi s Reply t o Faustus and hi s later Th e City o f God (see Text IV). For a survey of the relatio n o f classical theories o f just war t o Christia n an d non-Christia n response s t o war , Joh n Ferguson's War an d Peace i n th e World's Religions (1978 ) is useful. Fulle r treatments ca n b e foun d both i n book s alread y mentione d i n th e sectiona l introductio n an d i n th e followin g (though obviousl y the y apply more t o Tex t VIII) : Frederick H. Russell , Th e Just Wa r in the Middle Ages (1975) ; Joan D . Tooke, Th e Just Wa r i n Aquinas and Grotius (1965).

TEXT VII AUGUSTINE The just war VII. 1 Moses ... we love and admire , an d t o th e best o f our powe r imitate , coming indeed far short o f hi s merits , thoug h w e hav e kille d n o Egyptian , no r plundere d an y one , no r carried on an y war; which actions of Moses were in one case prompted b y the zea l of the future champio n o f his people, an d i n th e othe r case s commanded b y God. VII.2 It might be shown that, though Mose s slew the Egyptian , without being commanded b y God, th e actio n wa s divinel y permitted , as , fro m th e propheti c characte r o f Moses , i t prefigured somethin g in the future. Now , however, I do no t us e this argument, but view the actio n a s having no symbolica l meaning. In the light , then, of the eterna l law, it was wrong fo r on e wh o ha d n o lega l authority to kil l th e man , eve n thoug h h e wa s a ba d character, besides being the aggressor. But in minds where great virtue is to come, there is often a n earl y cro p o f vices , i n whic h w e ma y stil l discer n a dispositio n fo r som e particular virtue, which will come when the mind i s duly cultivated. For as farmers, when they see land bringing forth hug e crops, though of weeds, pronounce it good fo r corn; or when they see wild creepers, which have to be rooted out, still consider th e land good fo r useful vines ; and when they see a hill covered with wild olives, conclude that with culture it will produce good fruit : so the disposition o f mind which led Moses to take the law into his own hands, t o preven t th e wron g don e t o hi s brother, livin g among strangers , by a wicked citizen of the country from bein g unrequited, was not unfi t fo r the production o f

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virtue, bu t fro m wan t o f cultur e gav e sign s o f it s productivenes s i n a n unjustifiabl e manner. H e who afterwards, b y His angel, called Moses on Mount Sinai , with the divin e commission t o liberat e th e peopl e o f Israe l fro m Egypt , an d wh o traine d hi m t o obedience b y the miraculous appearance in the bush burning but no t consumed , an d by instructing him i n his ministry, was the same who, by the cal l addressed fro m heave n t o Saul when persecuting the Church, humbled him, raised him up, and animated him; or in figurative words, by this stroke He cut off the branch, grafted it, and mad e it fruitful. For the fierc e energ y o f Paul , whe n i n hi s zea l fo r hereditar y tradition s h e persecute d th e Church, thinking that he was doing God service, was like a crop of weeds showing great signs of productiveness. It was the same in Peter, when he took his sword out o f its sheath to defen d th e Lord , and cu t of f the righ t ear of an assailant, when the Lor d rebuked hi m with something like a threat, saying, 'Put up th y sword into it s sheath; for he that taket h the sword shall perish by the sword' [Matt . 26.52-3]. To take the sword is to use weapons against a man's life, without the sanction o f the constituted authority . The Lord, indeed , had tol d Hi s disciples to carry a sword; but H e did not tel l them t o us e it. But that afte r this si n Pete r shoul d becom e a pastor o f the Churc h wa s no mor e imprope r tha n tha t Moses, after smitin g the Egyptian, should become the leader of the congregation. I n both cases the trespass originated not i n inveterate cruelty, but i n a hasty zeal which admitted of correction. I n both cases there was resentment agains t injury, accompanied i n one case by love for a brother, an d i n the other by love, though stil l carnal, of the Lord. Here was evil t o b e subdued o r roote d out ; bu t th e hear t wit h suc h capacitie s needed only , lik e good soil , t o b e cultivated to mak e it fruitfu l i n virtue. VII.3 Then, a s for Faustus ' objectio n t o th e spoilin g o f the Egyptians , he know s no t wha t h e says. In this Moses not only did not sin , but i t would have been sin not t o do it. It was by the command o f God, who, from Hi s knowledge both of the actions and of the hearts of men, can decide on what every one should b e made to suffer, an d through whose agency. The people a t that time were still carnal, an d engrosse d wit h earthly affections; whil e the Egyptians were in open rebellio n agains t God, for they used the gold , God' s creature, i n the servic e of idols, t o th e dishonou r o f the Creator , and the y had grievousl y oppressed strangers b y makin g the m wor k withou t pay . Thu s th e Egyptian s deserve d th e punishment, an d th e Israelite s were suitably employed i n inflictin g it . Perhaps , indeed , it wa s not s o muc h a comman d a s a permissio n t o th e Hebrew s t o ac t i n th e matte r according t o thei r ow n inclinations ; an d God , i n sendin g th e messag e by Moses , onl y wished tha t the y should thu s be informed of His permission. Ther e may also have been mysterious reason s fo r what Go d sai d t o th e peopl e o n thi s matter . A t any rate , God' s commands ar e t o b e submissivel y received, not t o b e argue d against . The apostl e says, 'Who hat h know n th e min d o f th e Lord ? o r wh o hat h bee n Hi s counsellor? ' [Rom . 11.34]. Whether , then , th e reaso n wa s wha t I hav e said , o r whethe r i n th e secre t appointment o f God, there was some unknown reason for His telling the people by Moses to borro w thing s fro m th e Egyptians , and t o tak e the m awa y with them , thi s remain s certain, that this was said for some good reason , and tha t Mose s could no t lawfull y hav e done otherwise than God told him, leaving to God the reason of the command, whil e the servant's dut y is to obey . 202

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VII.4

But, says Faustus, it canno t b e admitte d tha t th e tru e God, who i s also good , eve r gave such a command. I answer, such a command ca n be rightly given by no othe r tha n th e true and good God, who alone knows the suitable command in every case, and who alone is incapable of inflictin g unmerite d sufferin g o n an y one . VII.5 According t o th e eterna l law , whic h require s th e preservatio n o f natura l order , an d forbids the transgression of it, some actions have an indifferent character , so that men are blamed fo r presumptio n i f the y d o the m withou t bein g calle d upon , whil e the y ar e deservedly praised fo r doing the m whe n required . The act, the agent , and th e authority for th e action are all of great importance in the order of nature. For Abraham to sacrific e his so n o f his ow n accor d i s shocking madness. Hi s doin g so at th e comman d o f God proves hi m faithfu l an d submissive . This i s s o loudl y proclaime d b y th e ver y voice of truth, that Faustus , eagerly rummagin g for some fault , an d reduce d at last to slanderou s charges, has not th e boldness to attack this action. I t is scarcely possible that he can have forgotten a dee d s o famous , that i t recur s t o th e min d o f itsel f without an y stud y o r reflection, an d i s in fac t repeate d by so many tongues, and portraye d i n s o many places, that n o on e can pretend t o shu t hi s eyes or hi s ears to it . If, therefore, while Abraham's killing his son of his own accord would have been unnatural, his doing it at the command of Go d shows not onl y guiltles s but praiseworth y compliance, wh y does Faustu s blame Moses for spoiling the Egyptians? Your feeling of disapproval for the mere human action should b e restrained by a regard for the divin e sanction. Will you venture to blam e God Himself fo r desirin g suc h actions ? The n 'Ge t the e behin d me , Satan , fo r tho u understandest no t th e thing s whic h b e o f God , bu t thos e whic h b e o f men. ' Woul d that thi s rebuk e migh t accomplis h i n yo u wha t i t di d i n Peter , an d tha t yo u migh t hereafter preac h the truth concernin g God, which you now, judging by feeble sense , find fault with ! a s Pete r becam e a zealou s messenger t o announc e t o th e Gentile s what h e objected t o a t first, when the Lor d spoke of it a s His intention . VII.6 Now, i f this explanatio n suffice s t o satisf y huma n obstinac y an d pervers e misinterpretation o f righ t action s o f th e vas t differenc e betwee n th e indulgenc e o f passio n an d presumption o n th e par t o f men, an d obedienc e t o th e comman d o f God, wh o know s what t o permi t o r t o order , an d als o th e tim e an d th e persons , an d th e du e actio n o r suffering i n eac h case , th e accoun t o f th e war s o f Mose s wil l no t excit e surpris e o r abhorrence, fo r i n war s carrie d o n b y divin e command , h e showe d no t ferocit y bu t obedience; an d God , i n givin g the command , acte d no t i n cruelty , bu t i n righteou s retribution, givin g to al l what the y deserved , an d warnin g thos e wh o neede d warning . What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that other s may live in peacefu l subjection ? This is mere cowardly dislike, not an y religiou s feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty , fierce and implacabl e enmity, wild resistance , an d th e lus t of power, and suc h like; and i t i s generally to punis h thes e things, whe n forc e i s required t o inflic t th e punishment , that , i n obedienc e t o Go d o r some lawfu l authority , goo d me n undertak e wars , when the y find themselves i n suc h a position a s regards the conduct of human affairs , tha t right conduct require s them to act, or t o mak e other s ac t i n thi s way . Otherwise John , when th e soldier s wh o cam e to b e 203

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baptised asked , What shall we do? would hav e replied, Thro w away your arms ; give u p the service; never strike, or wound, or disable any one. Bu t knowing that such actions in battle wer e no t murderous , bu t authorise d b y law , an d tha t th e soldier s di d no t thu s avenge themselves , bu t defen d th e publi c safety , h e replied , 'D o violenc e t o n o man , accuse n o ma n falsely , an d b e conten t wit h you r wages ' [Lk . 3.14] . Bu t a s th e Manichaeans are in the habit of speaking evil of John, let them hear the Lord Jesus Christ Himself orderin g thi s money to b e give n to Caesar , which Joh n tell s the soldier s t o b e content with . 'Give', H e says, 'to Caesa r th e thing s that ar e Caesar's' [Matt . 22.21] . For tribute-money is given on purpose to pay the soldiers for war. Again, in the cas e of the centurion who said, 'I am a man unde r authority, and hav e soldiers under me : and I say to one, Go , and he goeth; and to another, Come, an d he cometh; an d to my servant, Do this, and h e doeth it' , Christ gav e due praise to hi s faith [Matt . 8.9-10]. He did no t tel l him to leave the service. But there is no need here to enter on the long discussion o f just and unjus t wars . VII.7 A great deal depends on the causes for which men undertak e wars, and o n th e authority they have for doing so ; for the natural orde r whic h seeks the peace of mankind, ordain s that the monarch should hav e the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties on behalf of the peace and safet y of the community . Whe n wa r i s undertaken i n obedienc e t o God , wh o woul d rebuke , o r humble, or crush the pride of man, it must be allowed to be a righteous war; for even the wars which aris e fro m huma n passio n canno t har m th e eterna l well-bein g o f God, no r even hurt His saints; for in the trial of their patience, and th e chastening of their spirit, and i n bearin g fatherl y correction , the y are rathe r benefite d tha n injured . No on e ca n have any power agains t them bu t wha t i s given him fro m above . Fo r there i s no powe r but o f God [Rom . 13.1], who either orders or permits. Since , therefore, a righteous man, serving it may be under an ungodly king, may do the duty belonging to his position i n the State in fighting by the order o f his sovereign, - fo r in some cases it is plainly the will of God tha t h e shoul d fight , an d i n others , wher e thi s i s no t s o plain , i t migh t b e a n unrighteous command o n the par t of the king, while the soldier i s innocent, becaus e his position make s obedience a duty, - ho w much mor e mus t th e man be blameless who carries on war on th e authority of God, of whom every one who serves Him know s that He can neve r requir e what i s wrong? VII.8 If it is supposed that Go d could no t enjoi n warfare, becaus e in afte r time s it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, 'I say unto you, That ye resist not evil : but i f any one strike thee on the righ t cheek , tur n t o hi m th e lef t also ' [Matt . 5.39] , the answe r is , that wha t i s here required is not a bodily action, but a n inward disposition. Th e sacred seat of virtue is the heart, an d suc h wer e th e heart s o f ou r fathers , th e righteou s me n o f old . Bu t orde r required such a regulation of events, and such a distinction o f times, as to show first of all that eve n earthl y blessing s (fo r s o tempora l kingdom s an d victor y ove r enemie s ar e considered t o be, and these are the things which the community o f the ungodl y all over the worl d ar e continually beggin g from idol s an d devils ) ar e entirely unde r th e contro l and at the disposal of the one true God. Thus, under the Old Testament, th e secret of the kingdom o f heaven , whic h wa s t o b e disclose d i n du e time , wa s veiled , an d s o fa r 204

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obscured, i n the disguis e of earthly promises. Bu t when the fullnes s o f time came for th e revelation o f th e Ne w Testament, whic h wa s hidden unde r th e type s o f th e Old , clea r testimony wa s to be borne to the truth, that there is another lif e for which this life ough t to be disregarded, and another kingdo m for which the opposition of all earthly kingdoms should b e patiently borne. Thus the name martyrs, which means witnesses, was given to those who, by the will of God, bore this testimony, by their confessions , their suffering s and thei r death . CRITIQUE It would be anachronistic t o criticize this Text as if it contained a fully develope d just-war theory. Nevertheless , a numbe r o f tension s ar e eviden t withi n it , resultin g fro m Augustine's attemp t t o reconcil e th e Ol d Testamen t wit h th e Ne w an d wit h classica l understandings of a 'just' war . An immediat e difficult y arise s fro m th e observatio n that , howeve r sanctione d b y Yahweh, a number o f wars in the Old Testament, such as that against Canaan, appear, in classical terms , t o b e war s of aggression and no t o f defence. As a result, Augustin e was prepared t o conced e a n imag e o f Go d whic h make s God , fro m a huma n perspective , morally vulnerable (VII.4). He could, of course, have pointed out , i n this context, that it would indee d hav e been wron g for a human bein g rathe r tha n fo r God to hav e acted i n such a way. This is an importan t poin t tha t i s sometimes forgotte n in discussions o f the problem o f evil or o f the moralit y of particular images of God (see Do n Cupitt' s Crisi s of Moral Authority: The Dethronement of Christianity, 1972) . It i s always dangerous to judge the creator by the moral standards of the creature. Yet, Augustine's concession wil l still be difficult fo r many present-day Christian s to accept . A second difficulty arise s from hi s judgement that war may be fought o n human as well as on divine authority (VII.7). Along with his classical sources, he admitted th e possibility of 'some lawful authority ' waging war, but gav e few indications about what constituted a 'lawful authority' (VII.6). This point will recur in relation to Text VIII and Extract 15, but it is important to note that Augustine did not resolve the issue. Further, his notion of civil obedience i s dangerously unqualifie d in VII.7 . Niirnberg, i n th e twentiet h century , di d not accep t th e notio n o f militar y obedienc e regardles s of th e perceive d injustic e o f a situation. Finally, Augustine's understanding o f the authorit y o f the Ol d Testament ma y appear pre-critical. Increasingly , h e sa w the onl y option s as , eithe r t o accep t th e entir e Bibl e literally, or to treat it in the highly selective way of Faustus. By opting for the first, he was inevitably forced t o defen d th e mora l behaviou r o f th e Patriarchs , bot h i n relatio n t o polygamy (see above, p. 24) and her e in relation t o wars of aggression. However, a more critical understanding o f the Old Testament would have avoided some of these problems .

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TEXT VIII AQUINAS War, Christians an d th e clergy 1. BACKGROUND This Tex t come s fro m Summa Theologica, 2a2ae , 40.1- 2 (Vol . XXX V o f th e Englis h Dominican translation , Blackfriar s wit h Eyr e and Spottiswoode , Londo n an d McGrawHill, Ne w York , 1972) . Taken fro m Secunda Secundae (see above, p . 41 ) Questio n 4 0 considers th e issu e o f war under fou r heading s - 'Ar e som e war s permissible?' , 'Ma y clerics engage in warfare?', 'Ma y belligerents use subterfuge?' an d 'Ma y war be waged on feast days? ' - o f which the first two are reproduced here . Although there was no major war i n norther n Europ e durin g Aquinas ' lifetime , ther e wer e severa l loca l war s an d dynastic struggles, as well as a declining number o f crusades. The struggl e which led t o the downfall of the Hohenstaufens and the establishment of Charles of Anjou i n Naples in 1268 directly affected Aquinas ' ow n family : tw o o f his brothers fough t fo r th e Emperor , but mos t o f his family fough t o n the papal side. Yet, despite this existential involvement , the issu e of war only played a very minor rol e in Summa Theologica an d i s handled very formally in this, the most extensive, discussion o f it. The clerical interests of Aquinas and of hi s intende d audienc e ar e clearl y reflecte d i n th e fou r headings . Lik e man y o f hi s contemporaries, Aquinas seems to have accepted the inevitability of war and, perhaps as a result, discussed remarkably few of the ethical dilemmas that it raises. Other scholars, like Albert th e Great , Bonaventure and Dun s Scotus, did no t discus s them a t all . 2. KE Y ISSUES This Text focuse s upon tw o questions : (a) I s i t alway s a si n t o wag e war ? Aquina s counter s th e obviou s Ne w Testamen t quotations tha t are frequently used to suppor t Christia n pacifism (Matt. 26.52, 5.39 an d Rom. 12.19 ) wit h a summar y o f Augustine' s thre e criteri a o f a 'just ' war : i t mus t b e undertaken o n the authority of God or of the sovereig n (VIII.3 and VIII.6.1); it must be for a just cause (VIII.4 and VIII.6.2); and it must be undertaken wit h a right intention, t o promote th e goo d an d t o avoi d evi l (VIII. 5 and VIII.6.3-4) . (b) Ma y clerics and bishops engage in warfare? H e faces the objectio n that i f warfare is just, par excellence it must be just for the clergy to participate fully i n it. In reply, Aquinas considers tha t verse s lik e Matthe w 26.52 , 2 Timoth y 2.4 , 1 Corinthians 11.2 6 an d 2 Corinthians 10.4 , either directly, or indirectly, preclude clergy from suc h action. For him, the contemplativ e an d sacramenta l role s o f th e clerg y ar e inconsisten t wit h warlik e pursuits (VIH.10-11) ; i t i s 'unbecomin g thei r persons ' (VIII.12.3) ; an d the y mus t b e concerned with 'work s of higher merit ' (VIII.12.4) .

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3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS This text provides an interesting example of Aquinas' attempt to combine an Aristotelian, consequentialist approac h t o ethic s with a normative understandin g o f Augustinian and biblical tradition . Th e notio n o f 'righ t intention ' i s explaine d i n term s o f hi s overal l general principl e o f promoting the good and avoiding evi l (VIII.5): positively, this entails serving 'th e commo n good ' (VIII.6.2 ) and , negatively , i t risk s eterna l punishmen t (VIII.6.1). Hi s consequentialism , base d upo n natura l law , i s eve n mor e eviden t i n hi s claims abou t naturall y establishe d rol e differentiatio n a s i t affect s th e clerg y (VIII.9) . Once again , th e telos of human s provide s th e spu r fo r hi s understandin g o f ethic s (see above, pp. 20-1) , even if this i s combined wit h stron g deontologica l assumptions abou t the legitimac y of war and o f the traditio n whic h justifies war . 4. BASES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS Aquinas' us e of the Bibl e is also particularly interesting. H e avoids Augustine's tendency to suppor t a just-war position fro m th e Ol d Testament an d onl y use s Joshua 6.4 late in his argument, against clerical participation i n warfare (VIII . 12.2). He does not resolv e the awkward Matthe w 5.3 9 an d resolve s Matthe w 26.5 2 onl y b y maintainin g tha t i t i s unauthorized, privat e violence (VIII.6) . And he understands th e quotations i n VIH.8-12 to be concerned onl y with the clergy. In general, hi s source o f tradition i s Augustine albeit i n a rathe r systematize d an d abbreviate d for m an d ofte n mediate d throug h Gratian's Decretum (see above, p. 41). Augustine appears as the authority to settle, beyond reasonable dispute , th e ethica l dilemm a fo r Christians . 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS Augustine, however , i s use d i n a significantl y (eve n i f unintentionally) modifie d form . The socio-political contex t o f Aquinas was quite different fro m tha t of Augustine and th e former show s none o f the latter's suspicion s of the politica l order. As a result, the bone s of Augustine's notion of a just war are adopted, bu t no t th e flesh of his overall distrust of the 'earthl y city' . Further , the notion s of guil t and jus t retributio n tha t forme d an important elemen t i n Augustine' s understandin g o f wa r ar e reduce d b y Aquina s to a single sentenc e (VIII.4) . The stylize d forma t o f th e scholasti c metho d i s onl y partiall y responsible fo r these modifications. In part, they reflect a radically changed social context, in part, a very different religiou s psychology (see above, pp. 21-2), and, in part, a culture which di d no t regar d war as presenting particularl y serious ethica l dilemmas . Thi s final factor i s clearly present i n Aquinas' handlin g o f the questio n o f clerical participatio n i n warfare: i t was simply obvious, t o hi m and to his contemporaries, tha t th e clergy should not participat e fully i n warfare, tha t they were to be considered a s ontologically differen t from th e laity , an d tha t Petrin e verse s referre d specificall y t o the m (VIII.8) . Th e earl y Christian and , indeed , pre-Christia n source s o f thes e assumptions hav e alread y bee n noted i n the sectiona l introduction . 6. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE Aquinas' understandin g o f just-wa r theor y ha s bee n th e majo r influenc e i n muc h subsequent Roma n Catholic thinking on the issue of war - a s can be seen in both Extract 15 an d Extrac t 17 . I n effect , Aquina s reinforce d th e church-typ e respons e t o war , established b y Augustin e and mediate d throug h Gratian . Perhaps , becaus e o f this , an y

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challenge t o conventiona l militaris t assumption s has , unti l ver y recently, com e mainl y from withi n non-Roman Catholi c churches. In a nuclear age, however, it is now eviden t to a number of Roman Catholic moral theologians, that Aquinas' just-war theory canno t provide a sufficien t basi s fo r ethica l decision-makin g o n moder n warfar e (see further, Extract 17) . FURTHER READING There are scattered references to war and killing elsewhere in Summa Theologica and there are also implications tha t can be drawn from work s like De Regimine Prindpum (see Tex t V) bu t S.T . 2a2ae.4 0 remain s th e mos t importan t sourc e fo r hi s ideas . Frederic k H . Russell's Th e Just Wa r i n th e Middle Ages (1975 ) an d Joa n D . Tooke's Th e Just Wa r i n Aquinas an d Grotius (1965 ) bot h provid e excellen t an d detaile d commentarie s o n Aquinas' notions . Thomas R . Heath's Appendi x 2 to th e Englis h Dominican translatio n of S.T 1., Vol . XXXV , als o supplie s importan t historica l information . Recen t Roma n Catholic discussions of the extreme difficulty of reconciling Aquinas' just-war theory with the realitie s o f nuclea r warfar e ca n b e see n i n th e U S Bishops ' Extrac t 1 7 and Roge r Ruston's Nuclear Deterrence - Right or Wrong? (1981) .

TEXT VIII AQUINAS War, Christians and the clergy Is it always a sin to wage war? VIII. 1 OBJECTIONS: i. It would seem that it is always a sin to wage war. Punishments are meted out onl y for sin. But our Lor d named the punishment fo r people who wage war when he said, 'All who draw th e sword will di e by the sword [Matt . 26.52]. Every kind o f war the n i s unlawful . ii. Moreover , whateve r goe s agains t a divin e comman d i s a sin . Bu t wa r doe s that. Scripture says, 'I say this to you, offe r th e wicked man n o resistance ' [Matt . 5.39]. Also, 'Not revengin g yourselves, my dearly beloved, but giv e place unto wrath' [Rom . 12.19] . War i s always a sin then . iii. Beside s the only thing that stands as a contrary to the act of virtue is a sin. Now war is the contrar y o f peace. Therefor e it i s always a sin . iv. Besides, if an actio n i s lawful, practisin g for i t would b e lawful, a s is obvious i n th e practice involved i n th e sciences . Bu t warlike exercises which go on i n tournaments ar e forbidden b y the Church, since those killed i n such trials are denied ecclesiastica l burial. Consequently war appears to be plainly wrong. VIII.2 ON TH E OTHE R HAN D Augustin e says , i n a sermo n o n th e centurion' s son , 'I f Christian teachin g forbad e war altogether , thos e lookin g fo r th e salutar y advice of th e Gospel would hav e been told to ge t rid of their arms and giv e up soldiering. But instead they wer e told , "D o violenc e t o n o man , b e conten t wit h you r pay " [Lk . 3.14]. I f it ordered the m t o b e satisfied with thei r pay , then i t did no t forbi d a military career.' 208

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VIII.3 REPLY: Three things are required fo r any war to be just. The first is the authorit y of the sovereign o n whos e comman d wa r i s waged . No w a privat e perso n ha s n o busines s declaring war; he can seek redress by appealing to the judgment of his superiors. Nor can he summon together whole people, which has to be done to fight a war. Since the care of the commonweal i s committed t o those i n authority they are the ones t o watch over the public affair s o f the city, kingdom o r provinc e in their jurisdiction. And just as they use the sword in lawful defenc e against domestic disturbance when they punish criminals , as Paul says , 'H e bearet h no t th e swor d i n vai n fo r h e i s God' s minister , a n avenge r t o execute wrath upon him that doth evil' [Rom . 13.4], so they lawfully use the sword of war to protec t th e commonwea l fro m foreig n attacks . Thu s i t i s said t o thos e i n authority, 'Rescue the wea k and th e needy , sav e them fro m th e clutche s of the wicked ' [Ps . 81.4]. Hence Augustine writes, 'The natural order conducive to human peac e demands that the power to counsel and declare war belongs to those who hold th e supreme authority' [see Text VII. 7 above]. VIII.4 Secondly, a jus t caus e i s required , namel y tha t thos e wh o ar e attacke d ar e attacke d because the y deserve i t o n accoun t o f som e wron g the y hav e done. S o Augustine, 'We usually describe a just war as one that avenges wrongs, that is, when a nation o r state has to be punished either for refusing t o make amends for outrages done by its subjects, or t o restore what it ha s seized injuriously. ' VIII.5 Thirdly, the right intentio n o f those waging war is required, that is , they must inten d t o promote the good and to avoid evil. Hence Augustine writes, 'Among true worshippers of God thos e war s ar e looke d o n a s peace-makin g whic h ar e wage d neithe r fro m aggrandisement nor cruelty , but wit h th e objec t o f securing peace, of repressing the evil and supporting the good.' Now it can happen that even given a legitimate authority and a just cause for declaring war, it may yet be wrong because of a perverse intention. S o again Augustine says, 'The craving to hur t people , th e cruel thirst fo r revenge, the unappeased and unrelenting spirit, the savageness of fighting on, the lust to dominate, and suchlike all these are rightl y condemned i n wars ' [see Tex t VII.6 above], VIII.6 HENCE: i. Augustine writes,' "To draw the sword" is to arm oneself and to spill blood without command o r permissio n o f superior o r lawfu l authority ' [see Text VII. 2 above]. Bu t i f a private perso n use s th e swor d b y th e authorit y o f th e sovereig n o r judge , o r a publi c person use s it through zeal for justice, and b y the authority, s o to speak, of God, then he himself does not 'draw the sword', but is commissioned b y another to use it, and does not deserve punishment. Stil l even those who d o us e it sinfull y ar e not alway s slain with th e sword. Ye t they will alway s 'die by the sword ' sinc e the y will b e punishe d eternall y fo r their sinfu l us e of it unles s the y repent . ii. These words, as Augustine says, must always be borne in readiness of mind, so that a man mus t alway s be prepare d t o refrai n fro m resistanc e or self-defenc e i f the situatio n calls for it. Sometimes, however, he must act otherwise for the common goo d or even for 209

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the good of his opponents. Thu s Augustine writes, 'One must do many things with a kind of benign severity with thos e who must be punished agains t thei r will. Now whoever i s stripped o f th e lawlessnes s o f si n i s overcom e fo r hi s ow n good , sinc e nothin g i s unhappier than th e happiness of sinners. I t encourages guilty impunity, and strengthen s the ba d will , the enem y inside us. iii. Even thos e wh o wage a just war inten d peace . They are not the n hostil e t o peace , except that evil peace which our Lor d 'did not com e to send o n the earth'. So Augustine again says, 'We do not see k peace in order to wage war, but w e go to war to gai n peace . Therefore be peaceful eve n while you are at war, that you may overcome your enemy and bring him t o th e prosperit y of peace.' iv. Warlike exercises are not completel y forbidden; only those which are excessive and dangerous and end in killing and looting. I n olden times they presented n o suc h danger. So, as Jerome writes, they were called 'practice s of arms' o r 'war s without blood' . May clerics and bishops engage in war? VIII.7 OBJECTIONS: i. I t woul d see m tha t cleric s an d bishop s ma y engag e i n warfare . No w w e hav e just agreed tha t war s ar e lici t an d jus t i n s o fa r a s the y protec t th e poo r an d th e whol e commonweal fro m a n enemy's treachery. But this kind o f activity above all is the dut y of prelates. As Gregory writes, 'The wolf comes down on the sheep. That happens when any scoundrel or marauder tyrannises faithfu l an d humble people. And the man who looke d like a shepherd, but reall y was not, abandone d th e shee p and fled . H e was frightened at the danger to his own skin, and did not dar e to stand u p agains t the injustice. ' I t is licit, therefore, fo r prelate s and cleric s to fight . ii. Moreover Pope Leo writes, 'Since ominous new s had ofte n com e fro m th e Sarace n side, rumour s were circulating that the y would com e t o th e por t o f Rome covertly an d secretly. Fo r this reaso n w e ordered ou r peopl e t o gathe r together an d g o down t o th e shore.' Bishops , therefore, may go to wa r licitly . iii. Again, it would seem to come to the same thing whether a man does something on his ow n o r consent s t o it s bein g don e b y another. Scriptur e says , 'The y who d o suc h things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but the y also that consent t o them tha t do them' [Rom . 1.32]. Now the fulles t consen t lie s in persuading others to d o something; an d bishop s an d cleric s ma y persuad e other s t o fight . W e rea d tha t 'Charlemagne accepte d wa r wit h th e Lombard s a t th e reques t an d entreat y o f Adrian, Bishop o f Rome.' Therefore they are als o allowe d t o fight . iv. Besides, whatever i s virtuous an d meritoriou s i n itsel f is not unlawfu l fo r prelate s and clerics . No w wa r i s sometime s virtuou s an d meritorious . W e rea d [i n Gratian' s Decretum] tha t 'i f a ma n di e fo r th e tru e faith , t o sav e hi s countr y an d t o defen d Christians, h e will receive a heavenly reward fro m God' . VIII.8 ON THE OTHER HAND the words, 'Put your sword back in its scabbard' [Matt . 26.52] were directed to Peter as representing all bishops and clerics. Consequently, they may not fight.

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VIIL9 REPLY: Man y thing s ar e necessar y fo r th e goo d o f huma n society . No w th e differen t functions ar e better an d mor e efficientl y carrie d out b y different people s than by one, as Aristotle shows. And certain occupation s ar e so inconsistent wit h on e anothe r tha t they cannot be fittingly exercise d together. Thus lesser jobs are forbidden those who are given major things to do. Human laws, for example, forbi d soldier s whose business it is to fight to engag e in commerce . No w fightin g i n wa r i s quite inconsisten t wit h th e dutie s of a bishop o r a cleric, and fo r two reasons . VIII. 10 First i s general, namel y tha t th e operation s o f wa r ar e totall y upsetting ; the y seriously prevent th e min d fro m contemplatin g divin e things , praisin g God , an d prayin g fo r people, whic h i s wha t cleric s ar e calle d t o do . S o jus t a s commercia l enterprise s ar e forbidden t o clerics , since they entangle the sou l too much , so also are warlike pursuits. 'No man bein g a soldier t o Go d entangle s himself with secula r business' [ 2 Tim. 2.4]. VIII. 11 The second reaso n is special. All holy Orders are ordained fo r the ministry of the alta r in which th e passio n o f Chris t i s represente d sacramentally . 'Unti l th e Lor d comes , therefore, every time you eat this bread and drink this cup, you are proclaiming his death' [1 Cor. 11.26] . Their office, then , is not t o kill or to shed blood, but rathe r to be ready to shed thei r ow n blood fo r Christ , to d o i n dee d wha t the y portray a t th e altar . Fo r this reason legislation has been enacted making those who shed blood, even if they have done so without sin , irregular. Now no on e given a duty to perfor m can lawfully d o anything which renders him unfi t fo r the office . I t is altogether wrong, then, for clerics to fight in a war, since that i s aimed a t sheddin g blood. VIII. 12 HENCE: i. Prelates ought to resist not only the wolves who bring spiritual death on the flock but also pillagers and oppressors who do physical harm to it . Their arms, however, ought t o be spiritual, not material , as Scripture says, 'Our war is not fough t wit h weapons of flesh, but wit h spiritua l weapons' [ 2 Cor. 10.4] . Suc h are salutar y warnings and solem n plea s and, agains t th e obstinate , sentence s of excommunication . ii. Prelates and clerics may make their presence felt a t war, not b y taking up arms, bu t by spirituall y helping those wh o fight on th e sid e o f justice, exhorting, absolvin g them , and givin g other lik e spiritual assistance . Thus i n the Ol d Testament [i.e . Josh. 6.4] th e priests were commanded t o soun d th e sacre d trumpe t i n battle. This i s why bishops o r clerics were first allowed t o g o to th e front . Bu t fo r an y of them t o tak e up arm s i s an abuse of this permission . iii. We have said that every power, art or virtue directed towards an end has to prepare those element s usefu l fo r th e achievemen t o f tha t end . No w physica l war s shoul d b e considered by Christian people as directed towards a divine spiritua l good a s their end , and to thi s en d clerics are called. Accordingl y they ought t o prepar e and urg e others t o fight in a just war. Clerics are forbidden to fight in war, not because it is a sin, but because it i s unbecoming thei r persons . iv. Althoug h t o wag e a jus t wa r i s meritorious , nevertheles s i t i s wron g fo r cleric s 211

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because they are deputed to works of higher merit. The marriage act, for example, can be meritorious, but fo r those with a vow of virginity it becomes reprehensibl e since they are committed t o a higher good. CRITIQUE Serious criticism s have been mad e o f the tw o set s o f answers that Aquina s give s to th e questions raise d i n thi s Text : (a) 7 s it always a sin to wage war? A number o f modern just-war theorists hav e argued that: (i ) Aquinas ' thre e criteri a for a 'just' wa r ar e inadequatel y expounded an d (ii ) he ignores othe r vita l criteria. Aquinas' firs t criterio n depend s upo n th e 'authorit y o f th e sovereign' (VIII.3) , but th e problems that this form o f authority raises are not discussed : it means, of course, in a general way, that war must be waged by the person o r persons who hol d appropriat e politica l authority , bu t who , i n th e thirteent h century , suc h persons might be, was a rather delicate question needing serious discussion. To assume that the "prince" is meant, in a society so abounding with princes and petty rulers that they might from a n international point o f view be considered rathe r as private than as public entities , whil e i n fac t a n empero r di d exist , wa s paying tribut e to , o r a t leas t acknowledging the existin g state of affair s a s ideal or acceptabl e rather tha n tryin g t o outline a better one. (Joan D. Tooke, Th e Just Wa r in Aquinas and Grotius, 1965, p. 26) Similarly, the criteri a of a 'just cause ' an d a 'right intention ' ar e only ver y formally and abstractly se t out . The y hav e th e additiona l proble m o f bein g tautological , sinc e the y already contain the ethical terms 'just' and 'right' in what purport t o be requirements for determining whether or no t a war i s 'just'. Tautology is also a problem in the following list of criteria for establishing the justice of a war. However, it does have the merit of supplying the additional criteria that are usually considered necessar y by modern just-wa r theorists: For a war to b e 'just' i t must (i ) have been undertake n by a lawful authority ; (ii ) have been undertake n fo r th e vindicatio n o f a n undoubte d righ t tha t ha s bee n certainl y infringed; (iii ) be a last resort, al l peaceful mean s of settlement havin g failed; (iv ) offe r the possibility of good to be achieved outweighing the evils that war would involve; (v) be wage d wit h a reasonabl e hop e o f victor y fo r justice ; (vi ) b e wage d wit h righ t intention; (vii ) use methods that are legitimate, i.e. in accordance with man's nature as a rational being, with Christian moral principles and internationa l agreements . (Fro m T. R . Milfor d (ed.) , Th e Valley o f Decision, Britis h Counci l o f Churches , 1961 ; fo r a similar lis t se e Extract 17.) In Aquinas (iii), (iv), (v) and (vii ) are notably absent. In the context o f nuclear weapons, (iv) and (vii ) have obviously become considerably more important tha n they could have been i n the thirteenth century . But, in terms of (iii), Aquinas shows no awarenes s of the importance o f exhaustin g peaceful arbitratio n befor e goin g t o wa r (see Extract 17) , o r even o f th e importanc e o f determinin g whethe r victor y i s actuall y possible . Explici t reference t o th e difference s betwee n war s o f aggression/offenc e an d war s o f defenc e i s absent fro m bot h Aquinas and th e abov e list (see Extract 15) . While th e latter doe s no t 212

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answer al l th e difficultie s facin g just-wa r theorist s mentione d i n th e sectiona l introduction, i t i s clearly more adequat e tha n Aquinas ' account . (b) Ma y clerics an d bishops engage i n warfare? Aquinas ' defenc e o f hi s positio n raise s many exegetical, ethica l an d theologica l problems . Fe w today workin g i n th e contex t o f critical biblica l scholarshi p woul d suppor t hi s clerica l interpretatio n o f th e Ne w Testament quotation s - eve n the Petrine quotations . Fro m th e scholarly perspective of biblical interpretation , i t i s notabl e tha t Matthe w 26.5 2 meant : fo r Tertullia n tha t Christians shoul d b e pacifist s (see above, pp. 194-6) ; fo r Augustin e tha t unauthorize d private violence was a sin (VII.2) ; and fo r Aquinas that th e clerg y should no t participate fully i n warfar e (VIII.8) . Ethically , Took e argue s that , 'Aquina s overwhelme d Christ' s simple words with natural law morality' (p. 123 ) and, indeed, a s a result of the arguments he used , 'h e cam e extraordinaril y nea r t o forbiddin g Christia n participatio n i n warfar e completely whe n h e forbad e i t outrigh t t o clerics ' (p . 171) . Certainl y i f Luther' s theological attac k o n th e medieva l priest/laity dichotom y i s take n seriously , Christia n pacifism i n some for m or , alternatively , th e ful l participatio n o f clergy in warfare, woul d seem more logical from Aquinas ' position. Ironically , Luther accepted neither alternative : he condemne d th e Pop e an d hi s clergy for engagin g in warfar e an d fo r forgettin g thei r 'spiritual office' (e.g . in O n War Against the Turk) an d supporte d th e right of the state t o wage war and t o compe l it s citizens to fight.

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TEXT IX LUTHER Whether soldiers, too, can be saved 1. BACKGROUND This Tex t come s fro m th e treatis e Whether Soldiers, too, Can b e Saved o f 152 6 (from Luther's Works, Vol. 46, Fortress Press, Philadelphia , 1967 , trans . Charle s M. Jacobs an d rev. Rober t C . Schulz , pp . 96-9 , 104-6 , 107-11 , 115-1 6 an d 130-2) . Afte r year s o f rebellion agains t feuda l Europe , th e Peasants ' Wa r brok e ou t i n 1525 . A numbe r o f reformers, lik e Thomas Miinzer , sided wit h the peasants an d some of the latter appeale d to Luther. He responded, at first, with the conciliatory Admonition t o Peace - urgin g the princes t o tak e th e rebellio n seriousl y and t o acknowledg e thei r par t i n causin g it , an d urging the peasants to avoid violenc e and to submi t t o authority - bu t then, i n May of 1525, h e wrot e hi s notoriousl y violen t Against th e Robbing an d Murdering Hordes o f Peasants. Shocked b y the violence of the peasants an d by their insurrection , h e urged th e rulers to kil l th e rebelliou s peasants , 'fo r rebellio n i s not jus t simple murder ; i t i s like a great fire , whic h attack s an d devastate s a whol e land. Therefor e let everyon e wh o can, smite, slay , an d stab , secretl y o r openly , rememberin g tha t nothin g ca n b e mor e poisonous, hurtful, o r devilish than a rebel. It is just as when one must kill a mad dog ...' (Luther's Works, Vol. 46, p. 50). The scandal that this created forced him, in July, to write An Open Letter on the Harsh Book, attempting to reconcile the views expressed i n the two previous works . H e wa s stil l convince d tha t th e peasant s neede d suppressin g throug h force, bu t maintaine d tha t thi s di d no t excus e th e appallin g cruelt y o f th e ruler s i n putting the rebellio n down . B y 1526, h e had considerabl y modifie d his tone, but no t hi s attitude towards rebellion, submission t o authority or the legitimacy of rulers using force. He wrote this Text in response to a request fro m Ass a von Kram of Wittenberg, wh o was disturbed abou t reconcilin g hi s Christia n fait h wit h hi s professio n a s a soldier . Th e rebellion o f the peasant s an d th e radica l innovations o f the Reformatio n had opene d u p afresh th e issu e o f th e legitimac y of war. Miinzer, an d Zwingl i in Zurich , too k u p th e sword, whereas the Anabaptists renounced violence altogether as thoroughgoing pacifists . Luther, somewhere between the two, defended th e right of rulers to use the sword and t o command thei r subjects to d o s o and urge d th e latte r t o obey . 2. KEY ISSUES This Text i s concerned wit h tw o main mora l issue s - wa r and rebellion : (a) War. Luther argues that war and soldierin g are basically concerned wit h punishing wickedness and keeping peace (IX. 1 and IX.8). Terrible though they may be, they serve to prevent mor e terrible things happening (IX.2). Indeed, God actually institutes war as the Old Testament indicate s (IX. 3 and 6) . The seeming contradiction suggeste d by Matthew 214

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5.39 is to be explained by the fac t that, in the Spirit, Christians are subject only to Christ, but, i n th e bod y an d insofa r a s their propert y i s concerned, the y are subject to worldly rulers and to their commands t o fight in war (IX.9: i.e. Luther's classic notion o f 'the two kingdoms', se e above, pp. 131-2) . (b) Rebellion. Luthe r thoroughly condemn s an y attemp t t o depos e ruler s excep t i n cases of real insanity (IX . 12). The fac t tha t a ruler i s a tyrant i s no reaso n fo r deposin g him: h e canno t hur t a person' s sou l (IX . 16), hi s positio n i s highly insecur e i n societ y (IX.20-1) and, in any case, it is for God to punish him (IX . 19). Luther adds that he does not inten d t o flatte r rulers , sinc e h e regard s the m a s muc h 'subjects ' a s anyon e els e (IX.22-3). If , however, on e i s certain that a rule r i s wrong, the n on e mus t follo w Go d (IX.25). Finally, Luther considers th e questio n o f a soldier's pay and conclude s that , provide d he is not greedy, he may work for pay and even sell his skills as a soldier to more than on e ruler (IX.26) . 3. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS Luther was more acutely aware of the moral dilemmas created by war than Aquinas, but he still seemed to regar d war as an inevitable concomitant o f government. Thus, because individuals are always required t o obey their ruler, they are, at the same time, necessarily committed to war. Nonetheless, Luther did allow a conscience clause (IX.25). Further, he made a number o f implicit (IX . 12) and explici t (IX.21 ) appeal s to natura l law. IX.8 als o illustrates a tendency to consequentialism an d to argue about th e ethics of war from th e ethics of individual behaviour: war i s justified fro m th e preceden t o f the punishmen t of wrongdoers and the paradigm of individual punishment, in turn, becomes the paradigm of social punishment . 4. BASES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS As wit h Augustine' s Tex t VII , the Bibl e play s a crucia l rol e i n Luther' s argument . H e justifies wa r fro m Ol d Testamen t militaris m (IX.6) , fro m Ne w Testamen t figure s lik e John the Baptist and from commands to obey worldly rulers (IX.7). However, his exegesis of John 18.36 seems inverted (IX.6) and hi s interpretation of Matthew 5.39 stands or fall s with hi s notio n o f 'th e tw o kingdoms ' (IX. 9 - se e further, pp . 140-1 , above). Hi s argument, as a whole, is dominated by his theological conviction that obedience to rulers is demanded b y God. 5. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS Luther's genera l attitud e toward s wa r differe d ver y littl e fro m th e medieva l Catholi c position. War was regarded by him a s an inevitable punishment at the disposa l of rulers for wrongdoing - as , indeed, it was by Aquinas. But his own experiences, as a result of the Peasants' War , also clearl y influenced the Text . The y had serve d t o convinc e hi m tha t rebellion brings more evils and suffering than even tyranny (IX.2 and 12) . Further, he had clearly bee n stun g b y th e ver y considerabl e criticis m incurre d a s a resul t o f writin g Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes o f Peasants: for many, he was simply 'a frien d of th e rulers ' (IX.22-3) . Hi s ow n upwar d socia l mobilit y ma y als o hav e had a n effec t upon hi s attitude s her e (see above, p . 21) . On th e othe r hand , th e ver y fac t o f th e Reformation mean t tha t mora l issues , lik e war , had t o b e reconsidere d afresh , eve n though Luther' s conclusions remaine d politicall y conservative .

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6. SOCIAL

SIGNIFICANCE

Luther's church-typ e respons e to war had a majo r influenc e upo n the histor y of Protestantism. H e and other leadin g reformers ensured tha t th e thoroughgoing pacifis m of the Anabaptists remained a minority and sectaria n response . Himsel f protected b y the evangelical Germa n rulers , h e gav e their us e of forc e a new legitimacy and, at th e sam e time, provide d the m wit h a n importan t spu r t o developin g Germa n nationalism . Th e religious, politica l and , indeed , militar y power o f Rom e coul d b e resiste d wit h a clea r Christian conscience . Nevertheless , scholar s ar e divide d a s t o ho w fa r th e atrocitie s committed b y som e rulers , i n suppressin g th e peasant s i n 1525 , wer e influence d b y Luther's writings. FURTHER READING The primary documents hav e all been mentioned unde r Background , except for Luther's On Wa r Against th e Turk o f 1529 . Referenc e shoul d als o b e mad e t o Tex t VI . Th e introductions an d note s t o thes e document s i n Luther's Works Vol . 4 6 are a n essentia l secondary source , as well as works on Luthe r already mentioned i n the Introduction an d in Sectio n 1 .

TEXT I X LUTHER Whether soldiers, too, can be saved IX. 1 Now slaying and robbin g d o not see m to be works of love. A simple man therefor e doe s not thin k it is a Christian thin g to do. I n truth, however , even this is a work of love. Fo r example, a good docto r sometime s find s s o serious an d terrible a sickness that h e mus t amputate or destroy a hand, foot , ear, eye, to save the body. Lookin g at it from th e poin t of view of the organ tha t h e amputates, he appears to b e a cruel and merciles s man; bu t looking a t i t fro m th e poin t o f view of the body , whic h the docto r want s to save , he is a fine an d tru e ma n an d doe s a goo d an d Christia n work , a s fa r a s th e wor k itsel f i s concerned. I n the same way, when I think of a soldier fulfillin g hi s office b y punishing th e wicked, killing the wicked , an d creatin g so much misery , i t seems a n un-Christia n wor k completely contrar y to Christia n love. But when I think o f how it protects the goo d an d keeps an d preserve s wif e an d child , hous e an d farm , property , an d honou r an d peace , then I see how precious and godl y this work is; and I observe that i t amputates a leg or a hand, s o tha t th e whol e bod y ma y no t perish . Fo r i f the swor d wer e no t o n guar d t o preserve peace , everythin g i n th e worl d woul d b e ruine d becaus e o f lac k o f peace . Therefore, suc h a war i s only a very brief lack of peace tha t prevent s a n everlastin g an d immeasurable lac k of peace, a small misfortun e that prevent s a great misfortune .

IX.2 What men write about war, saying that it is a great plague, is all true. But they should als o consider ho w grea t the plagu e i s that wa r prevents . I f people wer e goo d an d wante d t o keep peace , wa r woul d b e th e greates t plagu e on earth . Bu t what ar e you goin g t o d o about the fact tha t peopl e will not keep the peace, but rob , steal , kill, outrage women an d 216

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children, and tak e away property an d honour ? The small lack of peace called war or th e sword mus t se t a limit t o thi s universal , worldwide lac k of peace whic h would destro y everyone.

IX.3 This is why God honours th e sword so highly that he says that he himself has instituted it (Rom. 13.1 ) an d doe s no t wan t me n t o sa y o r thin k tha t the y hav e invente d i t o r instituted it . For the hand tha t wields this sword an d kill s with i t is not man' s hand , bu t God's; an d i t i s not man , bu t God , wh o hangs , tortures , beheads , kills , an d fights . All these ar e God's work s and judgments. IX.4 To sum it up, we must, in thinking about a soldier's office , no t concentrate on the killing, burning, striking , hitting , seizing , etc . Thi s i s wha t childre n wit h thei r limite d an d restricted visio n see when they regard a doctor a s a sawbones who amputates but d o no t see that he does this only to save the whole body. So, too, we must look at the office o f the soldier, o r th e sword , with the eye s of an adul t an d se e why this offic e slay s and act s so cruelly. Then it will prove itself to be an office which , in itself, is godly and a s needful an d useful t o th e world a s eating and drinkin g o r an y other work . IX.5 There are some who abuse this office, an d strike and kill people needlessly simply because they want to . Bu t that i s the faul t o f the persons , no t o f the office , fo r where is there a n office o r a work or anything else so good tha t self-willed , wicked peopl e d o no t abus e it? They are like mad physicians who would needlessl y amputate a healthy hand just because they wanted to . Indeed , the y themselves ar e a part o f that universa l lack of peace which must be prevented by just wars and the sword and be forced int o peace. It always happens and always has happened tha t those who begin war unnecessarily are beaten. Ultimately, they cannot escap e God's judgmen t and sword . I n the end God' s justice finds them an d strikes, as happened t o th e peasant s i n the revolt . IX.6 As proof, I quote Joh n the Baptist , who, excep t fo r Christ , wa s the greates t teacher an d preacher o f all. When soldier s cam e to hi m an d aske d wha t the y should do , h e did no t condemn thei r offic e o r advise them t o sto p doin g their work ; rather, accordin g t o Luk e 3[.14], he approved i t by saying, 'Rob no on e by violence o r by false accusation , an d b e content wit h your wages.' Thus h e praised th e militar y profession, but a t the sam e time he forbade its abuse. Now the abuse does not affec t th e office . Whe n Chris t stoo d befor e Pilate h e admitte d tha t wa r wa s not wron g whe n h e said , 'I f m y kingshi p were of this world, the n m y servants would fight that I might no t b e handed ove r t o the Jews ' (John 18.36). Here , too , belon g al l th e storie s o f wa r i n th e Ol d Testament , th e storie s o f Abraham, Moses , Joshua , the Judges , Samuel, David , an d al l the king s o f Israel . I f th e waging o f war an d th e militar y profession were in themselve s wron g and displeasin g t o God, we should hav e to condemn Abraham , Moses, Joshua, David, and all the rest of the holy fathers , kings , an d princes , wh o serve d Go d a s soldier s an d ar e highly praised i n Scripture because of this service, as all of us who have read even a little in Holy Scripture know well, and ther e i s no nee d t o offe r furthe r proo f o f it here . 217

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Perhaps someone wil l now sa y that the hol y fathers were in a different positio n becaus e God had set them apart from th e other nations by choosing them as his people, and ha d commanded the m to fight, and that their example is therefore not relevant for a Christian under the New Testament because they had God's command an d fought i n obedience t o God, whil e w e have n o comman d t o fight , bu t rathe r t o suffer , endure , an d renounc e everything. This objection i s answered clearl y enough by St Peter and S t Paul, who both command obedienc e t o worldly ordinances and to the commandments o f worldly rulers even unde r th e Ne w Testament [Rom . 13.1-4 ; 1 Pet. 2.13-14] . An d w e hav e alread y pointed ou t tha t S t John th e Baptis t instructe d soldier s a s a Christian teache r an d i n a Christian manner and permitted the m to remain soldiers, enjoining them only not to use their positio n t o abus e peopl e o r t o trea t the m unjustly , an d t o b e satisfie d wit h thei r wages. Therefore even under the New Testament th e sword is established b y God's word and commandment , an d thos e wh o use it properl y an d fight obedientl y serv e God and are obedien t t o hi s word.

IX.8 Just think now! If we gave in on this point and admitted that war was wrong in itself, then we would hav e to giv e i n o n al l other point s an d allo w that th e us e of th e swor d wa s entirely wrong. For if it is wrong to use a sword in war, it is also wrong to us e a sword t o punish evildoer s o r t o kee p the peace . Briefly , ever y use of the swor d woul d hav e to b e wrong. Fo r wha t i s just wa r bu t th e punishmen t o f evildoer s an d th e maintenanc e o f peace? If one punishes a thief or a murderer or an adulterer, that is punishment inflicte d on a single evildoer; but i n a just war a whole crowd of evildoers, wh o are doing harm i n proportion t o th e siz e of the crowd , ar e punished a t once. If, therefore, on e work of the sword i s good an d right , they are all good an d right , for the swor d i s a sword an d no t a foxtail wit h which to tickl e people. Roman s 13[.4 ] calls the swor d 'th e wrath of God'. IX.9 As fo r th e objectio n tha t Christian s have not bee n commande d t o figh t an d tha t thes e examples are not enough , especially because Christ teaches us not to resist evi l but rathe r suffer al l things [Matt . 5.39-42] , I hav e alread y sai d al l that need s t o b e sai d o n thi s matter i n m y boo k Temporal Authority. Indeed , Christian s d o no t figh t an d hav e n o worldly rulers among them . Their government i s a spiritual government, and , accordin g to th e Spirit , the y ar e subject s o f n o on e bu t Christ . Nevertheless , a s fa r a s body an d property ar e concerned , the y ar e subjec t t o worldl y ruler s an d ow e them obedience . I f worldly rulers call upon them to fight, then they ought to and must fight and be obedient, not as Christians, but a s members of the state and obedient subjects . Christians therefore do no t figh t a s individual s o r fo r thei r ow n benefit , bu t a s obedien t servant s o f th e authorities unde r whom they live. This is what S t Paul wrote to Titus when he said tha t Christians shoul d obe y the authorities [Titu s 3.1]. You may read more abou t thi s in my book Temporal Authority. IX. 10 That is the sum and substance of it. The office o f the sword is in itself right and i s a divine and usefu l ordinance , whic h God does no t wan t u s to despise , but t o fear , honour , an d obey, unde r penalt y o f punishments a s St Paul says in Roman s 13[.1-5 ] ... 218

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IX. 11 Suppose that a people would rise up today or tomorrow and depose their lord or kill him. That certainl y could happe n i f God decrees that i t should, an d th e lords mus t expec t it. But that does not mea n that it is right and just for the people to do it. I have never known of a case in which this was a just action, and even now I cannot imagine any. The peasants who rebelled claime d that th e lords would no t allo w the gospel to be preached and tha t they robbed th e poo r peopl e and , therefore, the lords ha d to be overthrown. I answered this by saying that although the lords did wrong in this, it would no t therefor e be just or right to do wrong in return, that is, to be disobedient an d destroy God's ordinance, which is not our s to do. On the contrary, we ought to suffe r wrong , and i f a prince or lord will not tolerat e th e gospel , the n w e ough t t o g o int o anothe r real m wher e th e gospe l i s preached - a s Christ says in Matthew 10[.23] 'When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next.' IX. 12 It is only right that i f a prince, king, or lord become s insane , he should b e deposed an d put unde r restraint, for he is not t o be considered a man sinc e his reason is gone. 'That is true,' you say, 'and a raving tyrant is also insane; he is to be considered as even worse than an insane man, for he does much more harm.' It will be a little difficult fo r me to respond to that statement, fo r that argument seems very impressive and seems to be in agreement with justice and equity . Nevertheless, i t is my opinion tha t madmen an d tyrant s are no t the same . A madman ca n neithe r d o no r tolerat e anythin g reasonable , an d ther e i s n o hope for him because the light of reason ha s gone out. A tyrant, however, may do things that are far worse than the insane man does, but h e still knows that he is doing wrong. He still has a conscience and his faculties. There is also hope that he may improve and permit someone t o talk to him and instruct him an d follow this advice. We can never hope that an insane man will do this for he is like a clod or a stone. Furthermore, such conduct has bad results or sets a bad example. If it is considered right to murder or depose tyrants, the practice spreads and it becomes a commonplace thing arbitrarily to call men tyrants who are not tyrants , and eve n to kil l them i f the mob take s a notion t o d o so. The history of the Roma n peopl e show s u s ho w thi s ca n happen . The y kille d man y a fin e empero r simply because they did not like him or he did not d o what they wanted, that is, let them be lords and make him their fool. This happened to Galba, Pertinax, Gordian, Alexander, and others .

IX.13 We dare not encourag e th e mob ver y much. It goe s mad to o quickly ; and i t is better t o take te n ells from i t tha n t o allo w it a handsbreadth, o r eve n a fingersbreadt h i n suc h a case. And it is better fo r the tyrants to wrong them a hundred time s than fo r the mob t o treat the tyrant unjustly but once . If injustice is to be suffered, the n it is better for subjects to suffe r i t fro m their ruler s than fo r the ruler s to suffe r i t from thei r subjects. The mo b neither ha s any moderation no r eve n knows what moderation is . And every person i n it has mor e tha n fiv e tyrant s hidin g i n him . No w i t i s better t o suffe r wron g fro m on e tyrant, that is , from th e ruler, than fro m unnumbere d tyrants , that is , from the mob ... 219

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My reason for saying this is that God says, 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay' [Rom . 12.19]. He als o says , 'Judg e not ' [Matt . 7.1] . An d th e Ol d Testamen t strictl y an d frequentl y forbids cursin g rulers or speakin g evi l abou t them . Exodu s [22.28 ] says , 'Yo u shal l no t curse the prince of your people.' Paul, in 1 Timothy 2[.l-2], teaches Christians to pray for their rulers , etc. Solomo n i n Proverbs an d Ecclesiaste s repeatedly teache s us to obe y th e king an d b e subjec t t o him . No w n o on e ca n den y tha t whe n subject s se t themselve s against their rulers, they avenge themselves and mak e themselves judges. This is not onl y against th e ordinanc e an d comman d o f God , wh o reserve s to himsel f th e authorit y t o pass judgment an d administe r punishmen t i n thes e matters , bu t suc h action s ar e als o contrary t o al l natural la w and justice . This i s the meanin g o f th e proverbs , 'N o ma n ought t o judge his own case', and, 'Th e man wh o hits back i s in th e wrong.' IX. 15 Now perhaps you wil l say , 'How can anyon e possibl y endure all the injustic e tha t thes e tyrants inflict o n us ? You allow them too muc h opportunity t o be unjust, an d thus your teaching only makes them wors e and worse . Are we supposed t o permi t everyone' s wif e and child , body an d propert y t o b e so shamefully treate d an d alway s to be i n danger? If we have to liv e under thes e conditions, ho w can we ever begin to liv e a decent life? ' M y reply is this: M y teaching i s not intende d fo r peopl e lik e you who wan t t o d o whatever you thin k i s good an d wil l please you. G o ahead ! D o whateve r you want ! Kil l al l your lords! See what good it does you! My teaching i s intended only for those who would lik e to d o wha t i s right. T o thes e I say that ruler s ar e not t o b e opposed wit h violenc e an d rebellion, a s the Romans , the Greeks , the Swiss , and th e Dane s have done; rather , ther e are other way s of dealing with them . IX. 16 In the first place, if you see that the rulers think so little of their soul's salvatio n that they rage and do wrong, what does it matter to you if they ruin your property, body, wife, and child? They cannot hur t your soul, and they do themselves more harm tha n the y do you because they damn their own souls and that must resul t in the ruin of body and property. Do you thin k tha t yo u ar e no t alread y sufficiently avenged? IX. 17 In th e secon d place , wha t woul d yo u d o i f your ruler s were a t wa r an d no t onl y your goods an d wive s an d children , but yo u yourself were broken, imprisoned , burned , an d killed fo r you r lord' s sake ? Woul d yo u sla y your lor d fo r tha t reason ? Think o f al l th e good peopl e that Empero r Maximilian lost i n the wars that h e waged in his lifetime. N o one did anythin g to hi m because of it. And yet, if he had destroye d the m b y tyranny n o more cruel dee d would eve r have been heard of . Nevertheless, h e was the caus e of thei r death, for they were killed for his sake. What is the difference, then , between such a raging tyrant and a dangerous war as far as the many good and innocen t peopl e who perish in it are concerned ? Indeed , a wicked tyran t i s more tolerabl e tha n a bad war , a s you mus t admit fro m you r ow n reason an d experience . 220

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I can easily believe that yo u would lik e to hav e peace and goo d times , bu t suppos e Go d prevents this by war or tyrants! Now, make up your mind whether you would rathe r have war or tyrants, fo r you are guilty enough t o hav e deserved both from God. However , we are the kind of people who want to be scoundrels and live in sin and yet we want to avoid the punishmen t o f sin, an d eve n resis t punishmen t an d defen d our skin . W e shall have about a s much succes s at that a s a dog has when h e tries to bit e throug h steel . IX. 19 In the third place , if the ruler s are wicked, what of it? God is still around, and h e has fire, water, iron , stone , an d countles s way s of killing. Ho w quickl y h e ca n kil l a tyrant ! H e would do it, too, bu t ou r sin s do not permi t it , for he says in Job [34.30], 'He permits a knave to rul e because of the people's sins.' We have no trouble seein g that a scoundrel is ruling. However, no one wants to see that h e is ruling not becaus e he is a scoundrel, bu t because of the people's sin. The people d o not loo k a t their ow n sin; the y think tha t th e tyrant rule s becaus e h e is such a scoundrel - tha t i s how blind, perverse , and mad the world is ! That i s why things happened th e way they did when the peasants revolted. They wanted to punish the sins of the rulers, as though the y themselves were pure and guiltless; therefore God had to show them the log in their eye so they would forget about th e speck in anothe r man' s eye [Matt. 7.3-5] ,

IX.20 In the fourth place , th e tyrants ru n th e risk that, by God's decree, their subjects may rise up, a s has been said , an d kil l them or expe l them. For here we are giving instruction t o those wh o want t o d o wha t i s right, and the y are very few. The great multitud e remai n heathen, godless , an d un-Christian ; an d these , i f Go d s o decrees , wrongfull y ris e u p against th e ruler s an d creat e disaster , a s th e Jew s an d Greek s an d Roman s ofte n did . Therefore yo u hav e no righ t t o complai n tha t ou r doctrin e give s the tyrant s an d ruler s security to d o evil ; on th e contrary , the y ar e certainly not secure . We teach, t o b e sure , that the y ought to be secure, whether they do good o r evil. However, we can neither giv e them thi s securit y no r guarante e i t fo r them , fo r w e canno t compe l th e multitud e t o follow our teachin g if God does not giv e us grace. We teach what we will, and th e worl d does what it wills. God must help, and we must teach those who are willing to do what is good an d righ t so that the y ma y help hol d th e multitude i n check. The lords are just as secure becaus e o f ou r teachin g a s the y woul d b e withou t it . Unfortunately , you r complaint i s unnecessary, since most o f the crowd does not liste n to us. The preservation of the ruler s whom Go d has appointed i s a matter tha t rest s with Go d and i n hi s hands alone. W e experienced thi s in the peasants' rebellion . Therefor e do no t b e misled by the wickedness o f the rulers ; their punishmen t an d disaster ar e nearer tha n you might wish. Dionysius, th e tyran t o f Syracuse , confessed that hi s lif e wa s like the lif e o f a man ove r whose head a sword hung by a silken thread and under whom a glowing fire was burning.

IX.21 In the fifth place, God has still another wa y to punish rulers , so that ther e is no need fo r you to avenge yourselves. He can raise up foreign rulers, as he raised up the Goths against the Romans , th e Assyrian s agains t th e Jews , etc . Thu s ther e i s vengeance, punishment , and danger enough hanging over tyrants and rulers, and God does not allo w them t o be 221

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wicked and hav e peace and joy. He is right behind them ; indeed, he surrounds them an d has the m betwee n spur s an d unde r bridle . Thi s als o agree s wit h th e natura l la w tha t Christ teaches in Matthew 7[.12], 'Whatever you wish that me n would d o to you, do so to them.' Obviously, no father would want his own family to drive him out of the house , kill him, or ruin him because he had done things that were wrong, especially if his family did it maliciously and used force to avenge themselves without previously having brought charges against him before a higher authority. It ought to be just as wrong for any subject to treat hi s tyrant i n such a way ... IX.22 At thi s poin t I shal l hav e to paus e an d liste n t o m y critics , wh o cry , 'Se e here , i n m y opinion yo u ar e flatterin g th e princes . Ar e you no w creepin g to th e cros s an d seekin g pardon? Are you afraid? etc. ' I just let these bumblebees buzz and fly away. If anyone can do better, let him. I have not undertake n here to preach to the princes and lords. I think, too, tha t the y wil l no t b e ver y happ y t o receiv e thi s flatter y an d tha t I wil l no t hav e ingratiated myself with them, because it jeopardises their whole class, as you have heard. Besides, I have said often enoug h elsewhere, and i t is all too true , that the majority of the princes and lords are godless tyrants and enemies of God, who persecute the gospel. They are my ungracious lords and sirs, and I am not very concerned about that. But I do teach that everyone should know how to conduct himsel f in this matter of how he ought to act toward hi s overlord, an d shoul d d o wha t Go d ha s commanded him . Le t the lord s loo k out fo r themselves and stan d o n thei r own feet . Go d will not forge t th e tyrants and me n of high rank. God is able to deal with them, and he has done so since the beginning of the world. IX.23 Moreover, I do no t wan t anyon e to thin k that wha t I have written her e applies onl y t o peasants, a s though the y were the onl y ones o f lower ran k an d th e noble s wer e not als o subjects. No t a t all ! What I say about 'subjects ' i s intended fo r peasants , citizen s of th e cities, nobles , counts , an d prince s a s well. Fo r al l of thes e hav e overlord s an d ar e th e subjects of someone else . A rebellious noble, count, or prince should hav e his head cut off the same as a rebellious peasant . The one should be treated like the other, and no one will be treated unjustl y ... IX.24 A question: 'Suppos e my lord were wrong in going to war.' I reply: If you know for sure that he is wrong, then you should fea r Go d rather than men, Acts [5:29], and you shoul d neither fight nor serve , for you cannot have a good conscienc e before God . 'Oh, no,' you say, 'my lord would force me to do it; he would take away my fief and would not giv e me my money, pay , and wages. Besides, I would b e despised and pu t t o sham e as a coward, even worse, as a man who did not keep his word and deserted hi s lord i n need.' I answer: You mus t tak e tha t ris k and , wit h God' s help , le t whateve r happens , happen . H e ca n restore i t t o yo u a hundredfold , a s he promise s i n th e gospel , 'Whoever , leave s house , farm, wife , an d property , wil l receive a hundredfold', etc . [Matt . 19.29] . 222

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IX.25 In every other occupatio n w e are also exposed to the danger that the rulers will compel us to ac t wrongly; but sinc e God will have us leave even fathe r an d mothe r fo r his sake, we must certainl y leav e lord s fo r hi s sake . Bu t i f yo u d o no t know , o r canno t fin d out , whether you r lord is wrong, you ought not to weaken certain obedienc e for the sake of an uncertain justice ; rather you should thin k th e best o f your lord, as is the wa y of love, for 'love believes all things' and 'does not thin k evil' , 1 Corinthians 13[.7] . So, then, you are secure and walk well before God. If they put yo u to shame or call you disloyal, it is better for Go d t o cal l yo u loya l an d honourabl e tha n fo r th e worl d t o cal l yo u loya l an d honourable. Wha t goo d woul d i t do you i f the world though t o f you a s a Solomon o r a Moses, an d i n God' s judgmen t yo u wer e considered a s bad a s Saul or Ahab ? IX.26 The (next) question: 'Ca n a soldier obligate himself to serve more than on e lord an d take wages or salar y from each?' Answer: I said above that gree d is wrong, whether in a goo d or an evil occupation. Agricultur e is certainly one of the best occupations ; nonetheless , a greedy farmer is wrong and i s condemned befor e God. So in this case to take wages is just and right , an d t o serv e fo r wage s is also right . Bu t gree d i s not right , eve n thoug h th e wages for the whole year were less than a gulden. Again, to take wages and serv e for them is right i n itself; it does not matter whether th e wages come fro m one , o r two, or three, or however man y lords, s o long a s your hereditary lord o r princ e is not deprive d of what is due hi m an d you r servic e to other s i s rendered wit h hi s will and consent . A craftsma n may sell his skill to anyone who will have it, and thus serve the one to whom he sells it, so long as this is not agains t his ruler and hi s community. I n the same way a soldier ha s his skill i n fightin g fro m Go d an d ca n us e i t i n th e servic e o f whoeve r desire s t o hav e it , exactly as though hi s skill were an art or trade, and h e can take pay for it as he would fo r his work. For the soldier's vocation als o springs from th e law of love. If anyone needs me and call s for me, I am at his service, and for this I take my wage or whatever is given me. This i s wha t S t Pau l say s i n 1 Corinthians 9[.7] . 'Wh o serve s a s a soldie r a t hi s ow n expense?' Thereb y Pau l approve s th e soldier' s righ t t o hi s salary . I f a princ e need s an d requires another' s subjec t fo r fighting , th e subject , wit h hi s ow n prince' s consen t an d knowledge, ma y serve and tak e pa y for it . CRITIQUE Perhaps of all Luther's writings, those o n war and rebellio n hav e been subjecte d to som e of the mos t sever e criticism (hi s views on th e Jew s in Tex t X V did no t receiv e the sam e publicity when published) : (a) War. Luther showed none of the abstractness of Aquinas on war. His writings show that he was well aware of some of the mora l dilemmas an d th e sufferin g tha t wa r brings, particularly t o non-combatants , wome n an d children (IX.2) . Nonetheless, h e articulated none of the safeguards that Aquinas and, before him, Augustine, maintained in a just-war theory. If , i n th e ligh t o f moder n warfare , Aquinas ' theor y i s judge d deficient , the n Luther's writings must be judged to be even more deficient. Rulers were, indeed, warned of God's judgemen t (IX.19 ) and o f the socia l insecurit y of their positio n (IX.20-1) , bu t they were given little advic e on ho w they were to determin e whethe r o r no t i t would b e right t o wag e war. O n th e othe r hand , individua l conscienc e wa s allowed ver y clearly (IX.25) an d Luthe r di d attemp t t o com e t o term s wit h Matthe w 5.3 9 (althoug h man y

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today might reject his exegesis). Again, the professional soldier fighting for more than on e ruler wa s lef t wit h fe w guidelines, othe r tha n a prescriptio n agains t gree d (IX.26) . Few medieval scholastic s approved o f mercenaries (se e Frederick H. Russell , Th e Just Wa r i n the Middle Ages, 1975, p. 277), but Luther , superficially at least, appeare d t o giv e them a degree o f legitimation . (b) Rebellion. I t i s interesting t o debat e ho w fa r a Luthera n like Bonhoeffe r actuall y adhered to Luther's requirement tha t only insanity allowed one to depose a ruler. Did he regard Hitler as insane when he became involved in his attempted assassination , or did he reject Luthe r at this point? There is obviously no way of answering thi s question. In any case, i t highlight s th e difficult y o f followin g Luthe r literall y - a difficult y tha t i s particularly poignan t i n th e socia l contex t o f Bonin o (Extrac t 19 ) or Mirand a (Extrac t 13). Eve n thoug h Luthe r di d no t inten d t o flatte r ruler s (IX.22-3) , hi s positio n di d require subjects to be remarkably subservient to them — dangerously subservient, as many might fee l today .

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WELTY, RAMSEY , AMERICAN BISHOPS, HAUERWAS, BONIN G AN D O'DONOVA N 1. BACKGROUND Eberhard Welty' s Extrac t 1 5 comes fro m A Handbook o f Christian Social Ethics, Vol. 2 (Nelson, 1963 , pp. 408-15 and 417-21, trans. Grego r Kirstein and rev . John Fitzsimons); Paul Ramsey's Extract 1 6 comes fro m Wh o Speaks fo r th e Church? A Critique of th e 1966 Geneva Conference o n Church an d Society (Abingdon , 1967 , pp. 113-1 6 and 152-7) ; th e US Catholic Bishops ' Extrac t 1 7 comes fro m Th e Challenge o f Peace: God's Promise an d Our Response: A Pastoral Letter o n Wa r an d Peace (Nationa l Conferenc e o f Catholi c Bishops, Washington DC , and CTS/SPCK, 3 May 1983, paras 85-121, 331-3 an d 338-9); Stanley Hauerwas' Extract 1 8 comes from 'Pacifism : Some Philosophical Considerations' , Faith an d Philosophy (Vol . 2 , No . 2 , Apri l 1985 , pp . 99-104) ; Jos e Migue z Bonino' s Extract 1 9 comes fro m hi s Revolutionary Theology Comes o f Age (SPCK, 1975, pp . 107-9 , 110-12, 112-1 4 and 114-18 ; American title, Doing Theology i n a Revolutionary Situation, Fortress, 1975) ; an d Olive r O'Donovan' s Extrac t 2 0 come s fro m hi s Th e Just Wa r Revisited (Cambridg e Universit y Press, 2003 , pp. 42-7) . The Dominica n Welty' s Handbook wa s publishe d originall y i n Freibur g i n tw o volumes, wit h th e titl e Herders Sozialkatechismus: Grundfragen un d Grundrafte de s sozialen Lebens i n 195 2 (henc e th e focu s give n t o Piu s XII) . I t expresse s clearl y a traditionalist Roma n Catholi c approac h t o mora l issues . Frequen t us e is made o f papal pronouncements i n th e Handbook an d Welt y explains that , 'th e quotation s fro m papa l documents ar e intended primaril y as verifications of the actual answers given'. However, he als o explain s that , 'th e us e o f th e ter m "Handbook " doe s no t impl y tha t i t i s authoritative, but rathe r refer s to the method of question an d answer that has been used' (p. xvi) . Paul Ramse y (1913-88) wrot e Wh o Speaks fo r th e Church? as a direct resul t o f being a n observe r a t th e 196 6 WCC Conferenc e on Churc h an d Societ y in Genev a at a time o f considerable politica l ferment . He was then Harringto n Spea r Paine