A World Without Values
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES VOLUME 114
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer Editor Stephen Hetherington, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia Senior Advisory Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A. Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, U.S.A. Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA U.S.A. Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A. Marian David, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, U.S.A. John M. Fischer, University of California, Riverside, CA, U.S.A. Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A. Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University, NSW, Australia François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris, France Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin, TX, U.S.A. Stuart Silvers, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, U.S.A. Barry Smith, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, U.S.A. Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR, U.S.A. Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, U.S.A. For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6459
Richard Joyce · Simon Kirchin Editors
A World Without Values Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory
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Editors Richard Joyce University of Sydney Department of Philosophy Sydney NSW 2006 Australia
[email protected]
Simon Kirchin University of Kent Department of Philosophy School of European Culture & Languages Cornwallis North West Canterbury, Kent United Kingdom CT2 7NF
[email protected]
ISBN 978-90-481-3338-3 e-ISBN 978-90-481-3339-0 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2009939617 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Contents
Against Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John P. Burgess
1
Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem . . . . . . . . . . . Charles R. Pigden
17
Patterns of Objectification Richard Joyce
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
Mackie’s Internalisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
55
Mackie’s Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief . . . . . . . . . . . Jamie Dreier
71
Mackie on Practical Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Phillips
87
The Argument from Moral Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Don Loeb
101
Beyond the Error Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Smith
119
Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Copp
141
A Tension in the Moral Error Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Simon Kirchin
167
Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Caroline West
183
The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Graham Oddie and Daniel Demetriou
199
Abolishing Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Richard Garner
217
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
235 v
Contributors
John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, USA. David Copp Department of Philosophy, UC Davis, USA. Daniel Demetriou Department of Philosophy, University of Minnestota, USA. Jamie Dreier Department of Philosophy, Brown University, USA. Richard Garner Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, USA. Richard Joyce Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Australia. Simon Kirchin Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, UK. Don Loeb Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, USA. Graham Oddie Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, USA. David Phillips Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, USA. Charles R. Pigden Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Department of Philosophy, Duke University, USA. Michael Smith Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, USA. Caroline West Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Australia.
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Introduction Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin
Just as history is written by the winners, so too is moral philosophy written largely by the believers. Although moral skepticism has been a theoretical presence in Western philosophy for as long as anyone can discern, the position has nearly always been presented by its opponents. Callicles was probably a historical figure, and Thrasymachus certainly was, but it is unlikely that the lines that Plato placed in their mouths are remotely close to a sympathetic transcript of anything they ever asserted; their role in the dialogue is to fall silent as Socrates bullies his way to inevitable victory. This pattern repeats through the centuries: Moral skepticism is wheeled on to the stage for the sole purpose of the audience witnessing its crushing defeat. However, unlike the explanation for the paucity of historians from losing sides, the absence of the skeptic’s voice from the dialectic of moral philosophy is not due to his having been defeated (either militarily or intellectually). Indeed, the very fact that moral skepticism needs to be countered again and again – centuries of novel stratagems and ingenious arguments – indicates a foe that cannot be defeated easily, implying that there must exist significant considerations in its favor. The real explanation for the dearth of real-life moral skeptics plying their wares in the philosophical marketplace may be nothing more insidious than a natural process of self-filtration: Those who are drawn to moral philosophy sufficiently to publish works on the topic are more likely than not to be antecedently hostile towards moral skepticism. By analogy, consider theology. One need not believe in God in order to be a capable theologian, but how many atheistic theologians does one really expect to find in the profession? The average atheist, as a matter of contingent fact, simply has little interest in the practice. Similarly, perhaps, the average moral skeptic tends to expend her intellectual energies elsewhere. We suspect that moral skepticism enjoys a higher proportion of support among philosophers in general than it does among moral philosophers in particular.
R. Joyce (B) University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia S. Kirchin (B) University of Kent Cantesbury, Kent, UK
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Of the handful of exceptions to this trend – of the handful of able-minded moral skeptics publicly championing the position – John Mackie must figure high on the list. His 1977 book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, continues to challenge and motivate metaethicists in a way to which few books from that era can claim. Despite the fact that it is a slim book with modest production values, despite the fact that its contents have provoked far more disagreement than concurrence, and despite the fact that few readers explore beyond Chapter 3, it must surely be acknowledged as one of the landmark texts of 20th-century metaethics. If it accomplished nothing more than staking out an extreme position that moral philosophers can use as an effective foil in the course of more “positive” theory-building, it would be an important book. Yet we think that it is much more than just a useful foil; it advocates a metaethical position to be taken very seriously, and employs arguments in favor of that position that, for all the intense critical scrutiny to which they have been subject, remain alive. The past 30 years have seen a great deal written about Mackie’s book, but more often than not the treatment reflects the history of moral skepticism mentioned above: His view is acknowledged only to be summarily dispatched, allowing the dialectic to proceed to other matters. However, Mackie’s metaethical standpoint deserves discussion of a more focused and sustained sort – an end to which this anthology aims to contribute. Readers will note that we have not selected papers that eulogize or even concur with Mackie’s views; some of the contributions barely even explicitly mention them, and, of those that do, a good many are robustly opposed. It is a testament to the fecundity of Ethics that it leads to philosophical encounters that Mackie did not explore, and that it continues to inspire lively and noisy critical debate. Although we have been referring to Mackie as a “moral skeptic,” it should be noted that he is not a skeptic in the classical sense of the term: He does not maintain that we cannot know whether moral claims are true and therefore ought to withhold passing judgment on the matter (as Pyrrho and his coterie held as a global position). Of the ancient trio of views – dogmatist (believer), nihilist (disbeliever), and skeptic (in a perpetual state of uncertainty) – Mackie’s so-called skepticism actually has much more of the flavor of nihilism. He does not merely doubt morality, he denies it. This denial takes the form of arguing for a moral “error theory” – the view that (A) moral discourse has the aim of securing the truth, but that (B) it systematically fails to do so. In arguing for (A), the error theorist contrasts with the noncognitivist, who claims that moral discourse is not even in the market for truth (because, for example, it consists of commands veiled in the indicative mood); in arguing for (B), the error theorist contrasts with the “success theorist,” in whose ranks appear all advocates of moral realism. There is nothing terribly complicated, esoteric, or unfamiliar in the idea of taking the error theoretic stance towards a problematic subject matter. It is, after all, simply the attitude that atheists take towards religion, and that devotees of one religion take towards any other non-equivalent religion. It is the attitude that sensible persons take towards phlogiston, astrology, the Loch Ness monster, and the existence of reliable causal relations between severed rabbits’ feet and episodes of good luck. Whenever people talk about a range of objects, relations, or properties for which a temptation
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arises to declare that the world doesn’t contain the elements necessary to render their assertions true, we face the option of endorsing an error theory. Given that such temptations arise for an enormous range of perennial philosophical puzzles, the relevance of the error theoretic option is ubiquitous. We find it, thus, somewhat surprising that it was not until 1977 that the possibility of a moral error theory became a well-defined metaethical contender. Of course, moral nihilism antedates Mackie’s book. Mackie himself had advocated the view in his little-read 1946 article in the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (soon to drop the “. . .Psychology and. . .”). Bertrand Russell articulated the idea in the 1920s (see Pigden, this volume). And one can trace its origins back as far as one pleases in Western moral philosophy, at least to Anaxarchus of the 4th century BC.1 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that it was not until Ethics that the option became clearly delineated in the minds of modern metaethicists.
Understanding the Moral Error Theory Mackie introduces the term “error theory” by saying that most people’s moral judgments involve an implicit claim “to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive,” but “these claims are all false” (1977, p. 35). As far as trying to understand the error theoretic stance in general terms goes, the part about “objective prescriptions” can be put aside as optional; one would just as surely be advocating an error theory if one asserted, say, that most people’s moral judgments involve an implicit claim to the existence of pure autonomy, and all such claims are false. In light of this, let us say, as a first approximation, that one way of being an error theorist about morality is to hold that most people’s moral judgments involve implicit claim X, and all such claims are false. This needs to be refined in various ways. First of all, it is presupposed by nearly all subsequent discussions of the moral error theory that the reference to “most people” is a mistake. What is distinctive about the error theoretic stance is that there is something faulty about moral judgments per se, not merely most people’s moral judgments. Were it just a matter of most people being at fault, then there would be room for these people to revise their ways into line with the faultless moral judgments of the minority, and thus the error theorist’s key claim that there is something wrong with morality per se would evaporate. Indeed, it is often put forward as an objection to Mackie’s view that even if it is true that most people imbue their moral judgments with a problematic kind of objective force, this is a dispensable aspect of moral discourse; a morality stripped of this flawed element would still deserve to be called a “morality.” (See Dreier, Kirchin, West, this volume.) Mackie expresses the stronger and more metaethically interesting view when he asserts that the claims of objective prescriptivity are “part of what our ordinary statements mean: the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary 1 See
Warren (2002, p. 81).
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man as well as of the main line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value” (1977, p. 35). Second, it may be prudent for the error theorist to say that the problematic claims in question are all untrue, rather than all false. To see why, consider that other paradigm of an error theoretic stance: atheism. The atheist thinks that the predicate “. . .is a god” has an empty extension (at least at the actual world), hence all sentences of the form “X is a god” are false. So far so good. But the word “god” functions not only as a count noun, but is often capitalized into the proper noun “God,” and what does the atheist say of the sentence “God is omnipotent”? It is not so obvious that this should be considered false. Peter Strawson’s well-known (though rather old-fashioned) view is that the atheist should consider the sentence neither true nor false (Strawson 1950). Sometimes noncognitivism is described as the view that sentences of the target discourse are neither true nor false – a characterization that leads to the embarrassing implication that, if Strawson is right, the atheist is a noncognitivist about (some) religious discourse. It is preferable to distinguish the noncognitivist from the error theorist by saying that the former denies, and the latter affirms, that moral utterances are assertions. Thus the atheist will not be a noncognitivist about “God is omnipotent,” since the sentence is typically used assertorically, even if Strawson is correct about its truth value. We then distinguish the error theorist from the success theorist (e.g., the moral realist) by saying that the former, but not the latter, claims that moral utterances are all either false or (hedging her bets on Strawson’s views) neither true nor false – a disjunction that can be captured by the claim that moral utterances are all untrue. (See Dreier, this volume, for possible problems with this taxonomy.) This way of distinguishing the error theorist from the noncognitivist also reveals what is mistaken about the widespread (though, in truth, fairly innocent) tendency to express the error theory in ontological terms: as the view that X doesn’t exist. The problem with this expedient is that noncognitivist also holds that the items in question do not exist (discounting the linguistic permissions that may be achieved via the quasi-realist program). The problem is circumvented if we insist that, when speaking carefully, the error theoretic claim is made of a discourse, not any cluster of objects, properties, or relations. We are not error theorists about ghosts, we are error theorists about ghost discourse. The common expression “an error theorist about morality” harmlessly fudges this distinction. To hold that moral judgments are all untrue is not to hold that every sentence containing a moral term is untrue. The atheist doesn’t think that every sentence involving the count noun “god” or the proper noun “God” is untrue. Consider “No gods exist” or “Augustine believed in God.” Rather, the error theorist focuses on a proper subset of sentences containing the problematic terms: those that seem to imply or presuppose the instantiation of a moral property. “Stealing pears is morally wrong” will be such a sentence; “Augustine believed that stealing pears is morally wrong” will not be. (See Pigden, this volume.) Not only is endorsing a moral error theory consistent with the continued use of moral terms (as in “Nothing is morally wrong”), it is even consistent with the continued use of atomic moral claims (such as “Stealing pears is morally wrong”).
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It is typically assumed that the moral error theorist must be a moral eliminativist: advocating the abolition of all atomic moral sentences. But in fact what the error theorist decides to do with the erroneous moral language is a matter logically independent of the truth of the moral error theory. Perhaps the moral error theorist will carry on asserting moral judgments although she believes none of them – in which case she will be lying to her audience (assuming her audience consists of moral believers). But if lying is a fault only in a moral sense, then the moral error theorist may remain unperturbed by this state of affairs. Or perhaps the moral error theorist carries on uttering moral sentences but finds some way of removing assertoric force from these utterances, in which case she need not be committing a moral or epistemological sin any more than does an actor reciting the lines of a play. The error theorist who advocates maintaining moral language in this way is endorsing a kind of fictionalism (a view which is further described towards the end of this introduction). Although one could be a moral error theorist by implication – either because one endorses a radical global error theory (thus being skeptical of morality along with modality, colors, other minds, cats and dogs, etc.), or because one endorses an error theory about all normative phenomena – typically the moral error theorist thinks that there is something especially problematic about morality, and does not harbor the same doubts about normativity in general. The moral error theorist usually allows that we can still deliberate about how to act, she thinks that we can still make sense of actions harming or advancing our own welfare (and others’ welfare), and hence she thinks that we can continue to make sense of various kinds of nonmoral “ought”s, such as prudential ones. (See Joyce 2007.) Thus we may observe the moral error theorist assert a claim like “One ought not harm others,” adding that it is not a moral “ought” that is being employed. (In the same way, an atheist can assert that one ought not covet one’s neighbor’s wife, so long as it clear that this isn’t an “. . .according to God” prescription.) There is a certain kind of opponent to the error theory who finds this dubious. If so much normativity is conceded to be non-erroneous (the opponent maintains) – if one can make good sense of practical reasons, prudential norms, altruistic desires, and so forth – then the error theoretic position simply collapses, for these things are the very warp and weft of morality. The opponent might go so far as to say that so long as it is allowed that there are decisions to be made about how we shall live together, then the error theoretic position fails, for to engage in such a decision procedure is to endorse a moral point of view. This dispute concerns the definition of “morality.” An opponent may complain that the error theorist’s definition is far too restrictive; the error theorist will respond that the opponent’s definition is too liberal. We will discuss Mackie’s particular way of defining morality below, but it is worth foreshadowing here. When discussing the point of morality, Mackie suggests that it is a mechanism for counteracting our limited sympathies (1977, p. 107). However, it seems unlikely that he intends to define “morality” by reference to a distinctive subject matter. Rather, what Mackie thinks is distinctive about morality is not its content but rather the unusual nature of its norms: an authoritative normativity that purports to bind agents “from the
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outside,” irrespective of their desires, projects, or interests. (This will be described in more detail later in this introduction, and it is of course a theme that arises repeatedly in the papers in this volume.) Since there is no reason to doubt that a given action might be valued or prescribed by two or more different normative systems at once, it follows that we might not be able to “read off” whether a judgment counts as moral from its subject matter or surface form. Consider a token of the sentence “You must not take the rook.” It might express a norm of chess (because taking the rook is an impermissible move), or a norm of prudence (because taking the rook is a poor move and you’d like to win the game), or a norm of etiquette (because taking the rook would be impolite), or even a moral norm (because you’ve made a nontrivial promise not to take the rook). It depends on the force with which it is uttered, of which the intentions of the speaker are surely an important component. (And, indeed, the speaker may be somewhat undecided, leaving the matter indeterminate.) In any case, because Mackie, like most other moral error theorists, wishes to damn morality while tolerating other forms of normativity, then he must not only convince us that this special kind of practical authority is irredeemably flawed, but also show us that it is not also a characteristic of the kinds of normativity that he endorses. Even in advance of the outcome of that debate, however, one related point is clear and worth emphasizing: There are no grounds for assuming that the moral error theorist must be a sociopathic cad. The point is particularly worth stressing since much of the opposition to the moral error theory is motivated (we suspect) by an inchoate practical fear of what might happen should moral skepticism be widely adopted. Two thousand years ago, Aristocles of Messina asked “What evil deeds would he not dare, who held that nothing is really evil, or disgraceful, or just or unjust?”2 Paraphrasing Dostoyevsky, one might declare “If there is no moral truth, then everything is permitted.” And Dr Johnson memorably said of the moral skeptic: “If he does really think that there is no distinction between virtue and vice, why, sir, when he leaves our houses let us count our spoons.” Such rhetoric, however, does not withstand careful scrutiny. There are no grounds for assuming that the moral error theorist must be tolerant of those actions that would usually be opposed on moral grounds; her skepticism does not (in any obvious way) exclude the possibility of her being motivated by compassion, love, and altruism. There are many entirely nonmoral considerations that speak against sneaky nastiness against one’s fellows, even when the chips are down.3 Thus the moral error theorist need not be embarrassed by the common rhetorical trick of asking (in a tone of outraged wonderment) something along the lines of: “So you don’t think that strangling babies is morally wrong?!” The best response is: “No, but nor do I think that strangling babies is morally good or morally acceptable either. I don’t think it is morally anything. Putting aside that 2 Quoted
by Eusebius of Caesarea in Praeparatio Evangelica, book 14, c. 313–324/1903. incidentally, indicates what is confused in the pseudo-Dostoyevskyan slogan. What kind of permission does the paraphraser of Dostoyevsky intend to invoke? It cannot be moral permission, for if there are no moral facts then nothing is morally permitted. But if it is some other kind of permission, then one needs a reason for thinking that the non-existence of moral facts will affect it. (An analogous dilemma faces the real Dostoyevskyan dictum, concerning the death of God.)
3 This,
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whole bankrupt conceptual scheme, the thought of someone strangling a baby sickens me and I oppose such behavior with every fiber of my being.” In the context of everyday conversation, to deny that there is anything morally wrong with X implies that one thinks that X is morally good or morally permissible – but a conversational context in which radical moral skepticism is live contender is precisely one where that implication breaks down. Attempts to discomfit the error theorist by forcing him to admit that he doesn’t think that there is anything morally wrong with [insert your favorite horrible transgression here] trade on equivocating between these contexts. The fear that moral skepticism will lead to a breakdown of social cohesion presupposes that our moral commitments are the only thing keeping us well-behaved (and the only thing that could keep us well-behaved), which, ironically, reveals just the kind of pessimism about the human spirit that the moral skeptic is often accused of indulging in. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that morality plays some kind of role in motivating prosocial behavior, and thus becoming a moral skeptic can be predicted to have some kind of proportionate impact on one’s motivations. (See West, Garner, this volume.) We think that the starting point for making progress on this matter is the recognition that the cluster of relevant questions – what is the role of moral belief in motivation? what would be the practical impact of removing those beliefs? might some alternative available psychological mechanism(s) serve these ends just as well? – are all empirical issues, not to be pronounced upon with any confidence from one’s armchair.
Arguing for a Moral Error Theory It is important to keep separate in one’s mind the error theoretic view and the arguments that Mackie employs in his attempt to establish that view. Yet again, it is useful to compare the atheist: What it takes to be an atheist is one thing (disbelief in any god); one’s grounds for being an atheist are something else. There are many such grounds possible – some more plausible than others – and it is clear that defeating one kind of pro-atheist argument hardly proves the existence of a god. Yet we find in much of the metaethical literature a tendency to assume that exposing the flaws of Mackie’s arguments in favor of the moral error theory provides a sufficient basis for the wholesale rejection of moral skepticism. This is not so; Mackie articulates just some of the considerations that might speak in favor of a moral error theory. Nevertheless, it is understandable that opposition to the moral error theoretic position has focused heavily on Mackie’s two arguments in favor of that viewpoint: the Argument from Relativity and the Argument from Queerness. Before introducing these arguments, let us consider the strategy of arguing for an error theory in more general terms. Such an argument typically has two steps: the conceptual and the ontological. First the error theorist may establish that moral discourse is centrally committed to
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some thesis X (or some theses X, Y, . . . , n 4 ). The phrase “centrally committed” is supposed to indicate that to deny X would be to cease to participate competently in that discourse. Imagine a phlogiston theorist who, upon hearing of the success of oxygen theory, claims that his theory has been vindicated; he asserts that he has been talking about oxygen all along but just by a different name. When the important differences between the two substances are pointed out to him (that phlogiston is stored in flammable materials and released during combustion, while oxygen combines from the atmosphere with flammable materials and is destroyed during combustion), he admits that he’s had some false beliefs about the nature of the substance in question, but remains adamant that he was still talking about oxygen all along. This seems unacceptable, roughly because the thesis about being stored and released is a “central commitment” of phlogiston talk; to deny this thesis with respect to some substance is to cease to talk about phlogiston. The ontological step of the error theorist’s argument is to establish that thesis X (whatever it may be) is false. This may be achieved either through a priori means (demonstrating X to be incoherent, say), or through a posteriori methods (investigating the world and coming to the conclusion that nothing satisfies X). Which method is appropriate depends on the nature of the error that has been attributed to moral discourse. Sometimes the moral error theorist will hold that there is something impossible or incoherent about moral properties, such that the error theory is necessarily true. But it suffices for being an error theorist to hold that the non-instantiation of moral properties is a merely contingent affair. Mackie is often interpreted in the former way, but in certain moods (at least) he prefers the latter. In an oftenoverlooked passage he concedes that if theism were true, then “a kind of objective ethical prescriptivity could be introduced” (1977, p. 48). Though an avowed atheist, Mackie did not, apparently, maintain that theism is necessarily false, and thus on the basis of this passage we must conclude that he took the moral error theory to be only contingently true. The two steps of the error theoretic argument produce two kinds of opposition: the “concessive” response and the “head-on” response. The challenger may concede that the putatively defective attribute that the error theorist assigns to morality really is irredeemably defective, but deny that this attribute is an essential component of morality; a normative framework stripped of the troublesome element will still count as a morality. Alternatively, opponents may accept that the putatively defective attribute is a non-negotiable component of anything deserving the name “morality,” but deny that it really is problematic; they embrace the challenge headon of making sense of the prima facie puzzling aspect. So, for example, if the error theorist is claiming that moral properties require a kind of pure autonomy which the universe does not supply, then one type of opponent will insist that morality requires
4 We
will drop this qualification in what follows, simply for brevity. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the moral error theorist might accuse moral discourse of a number of faults – any one of which would be insufficient to ground an error theory, but the sum total of which is sufficient.
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nothing of the sort, while another will insist that the universe does indeed contain such autonomy. The error theorist must be prepared to defend herself on both fronts. Mackie offers two arguments for his metaethical position. The first, the Argument from Relativity (often more perspicaciously referred to as “the Argument from Disagreement”), begins with an empirical observation: that there is an enormous amount of variation in moral views, and that moral disagreements often seem unusually intractable. Mackie argues that the best explanation of these phenomena is that moral judgments “reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life” (1977, p. 36). This, at least, is a better explanation than the hypothesis that there is a realm of objective moral facts to which some cultures have inferior epistemic access than others. The example he uses is of two cultures’ divergent moral views regarding monogamy. Is it really plausible, he asks, that one culture enjoys access to the moral facts regarding marital arrangements whereas the other lacks that access? Isn’t it much more likely that monogamy happened to develop in one culture but not in the other (for whatever cultural or anthropological reasons), and that the respective moral views emerged as a result? Opposition to the Argument from Relativity can, broadly speaking, take two forms. First, one might deny the empirical premise, arguing that moral disagreement is not really as widespread as it is often made out to be, or at least arguing that much of the conspicuous disagreement masks extensive moral agreement at a deeper level pertaining to more fundamental moral principles. Mackie makes some brief remarks in response to this argument (1977, p. 37). Second, one might accept the phenomenon of moral disagreement at face value but deny that the best explanation of this favors the error theory. Often both strategies are deployed side by side. Mackie’s second skeptical argument, from Queerness, has two strands: one metaphysical and one epistemological. The first states that our conception of a moral property is essentially one of a very unusual kind of property, such that countenancing its instantiation requires us to posit in the world “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” (1977, p. 38). The second states that in order to track such weird properties we would need “some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (ibid.). These are not independent arguments, since we are forced to posit weird epistemological equipment only if it has already been established that the properties in question are weird. Thus really it is the metaphysical strand of the Argument from Queerness that is load bearing. The Argument from Queerness may be taken to refer to Mackie’s specific version or may be considered in a generic sense. In the generic sense, whenever one argues (A) that morality is centrally committed to some thesis X, and (B) that X is bizarre, ontologically profligate, or just too far-fetched to be taken seriously, etc., then one has presented a kind of Argument from Queerness. (Arguments for the moral error theory need not take this form; one might, for example, simply discover that X is empirically false.) This is generic since “X” could denote any of an open-ended
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range of options. But even understanding the Argument from Queerness in a nongeneric sense is no straightforward matter, since it is not entirely clear what Mackie puts in place of “X.” Mackie says that for moral properties to exist would require the existence of “objective values” and “objective prescriptions,” and it is evidently these values and prescriptions that he finds metaphysically queer. He claims that in denying the existence of such values he is denying that any “categorically imperative element is objectively valid” (1977, p. 29). A categorical imperative is an imperative (“Do φ”) that is applied to a subject irrespective of that person’s ends. It is to be contrasted with a hypothetical imperative, which does depend on a person’s ends. Thus “Go to bed now” is usually understood to be tacitly conditional, depending on something like “. . .if you want to get a decent night’s sleep.” If it turns out that the person lacks this desire (and any other desire that promises to be satisfied by following the advice), then the imperative should be withdrawn. By contrast, the categorical imperative “Don’t murder children” cannot be begged off by the addressee explaining that he really enjoys murdering children, that he lacks any desires that will be satisfied if the imperative is obeyed; it is not a piece of advice at all. Note that it does not appear to be categorical imperatives per se that trouble Mackie, but categorical imperatives that purport to be “objectively valid.” Quite what he means by this restriction, however, remains the subject of debate. He gives two concrete illustrations of what he has in mind – of what the world would have to be like in order for these putatively weird moral properties to be instantiated. First, he mentions Plato’s account of the Form of the Good, which is such that the mere comprehension of the fact that something participates in the Form (i.e., is good) somehow automatically engages the motivation to seek that thing. The Good, for Plato, has a kind of magical magnetism built into it. Second, Mackie mentions Samuel Clarke, who in the early 18th century argued for (in Mackie’s words) “necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such-and-such an action somehow built into it” (1977, p. 40). The fact that these two illustrations are subtly but importantly different is responsible for at least some of the confusion surrounding the putative source of queerness. The Plato example suggests that the weirdness resides in properties the recognition of which compels motivation; the Clarke example suggests that the weirdness resides in properties that demand action (and thus motivation). The latter is arguably the more charitable interpretation, and also seems to fit better with comments made elsewhere by Mackie concerning the role of practical reasons in the Argument from Queerness. (See Garner 1990; though compare Sinnott-Armstrong, this volume.) He writes that “to say that [objective prescriptions] are intrinsically action-guiding [which is one way Mackie sometimes describes the queerness whose existence he is denying] is to say that the reasons that they give for doing or for not doing something are independent of that agent’s desires or purposes” (Mackie 1982, p. 115). It would make sense if Mackie were, then, simply to deny the existence of such “desire-transcendent” reasons (in the vein of Williams 1981); but his position is characteristically more nuanced than this. He allows that we often legitimately
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employ talk of reasons regarding persons who have no desires that will be satisfied by performing the action in question. If another individual is suffering, for example, and there is some course of action I can take to relieve that suffering, then “it would be natural,” Mackie says, to claim that these sufferings “constitute some reason. . . independent of any desire that I now have to help these other people” (1977, pp. 78–79). Though Mackie doesn’t attempt to discredit appeals to such desire-transcendent reasons, what he does insist on is that such reasons talk is made legitimate only by the presence of an institution: What allows the transition from “There is a stranger writhing in agony before me” to “I have a reason to help” is a cluster of institutional facts, not brute facts. Examples of institutions, given by Mackie, include the rules of chess, social practices such as promising, and the thoughts and behaviors associated with the idea of a person’s identity persisting through time. Such institutions have rules of conduct which guide the behavior and speech of adherents, and transgressions of which are condemned. Importantly, such requirements “are constituted by human thought, behaviour, feelings, and attitudes” (1977, p. 81), and thus any such requirements are, in a central sense, mind-dependent. This, perhaps, provides insight into why Mackie objects not to categorical imperatives per se, but to objective categorical imperatives: It is categorical imperatives that profess to transcend all institutions, that purport to depend for their legitimacy on “requirements which simply are there, in the nature of things” (1977, p. 59), that are singled out as erroneous. As with categorical imperatives, so with reasons: It may not be false to claim “Anyone has a reason to ease the suffering of others,” but its truth is guaranteed only by invoking an institutional way of speaking – an institution of which one may or may not be an adherent. (Mackie writes that one is never “logically committed” to offer allegiance to an institution.) It is only when such a reason claim purports to transcend all institutions – when it is imbued with ambitions of objectivity – that it oversteps the mark. In light of these observations, the error theory arises because (Mackie thinks) moral discourse is pervaded through and through with aspirations to robust, institution-transcendent objectivity.
Preview of This Book In 2007, to mark the 30th anniversary of the publication of Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, we edited a special issue of the journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice in which six papers were presented. The one element of that project with which we were disappointed was its modest length. We therefore decided to have another run at the project, this time as a full-length anthology. We here reproduce the six original chapters (Burgess, Demetriou and Oddie, Garner, Loeb, Phillips, and Pigden), plus five more invited contributions, and two additional papers from the editors. We believe that the rich and varied result indicates the enormously fruitful influence that Mackie’s work continues to have on contemporary metaethics.
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At more or less the same time as Mackie was putting the finishing touches on Ethics, John Burgess (better known for his prolific work in logic and philosophy of mathematics) was penning an essay arguing for a position called “anethicism” – which turns out to be equivalent to the moral error theory. Burgess’ chapter was not published at that time – partly because Mackie beat him to the punch – but it was informally circulated for decades, especially among Princetonians with an interest in metaethics. Publication had to wait until the 2007 special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, by which time, of course, certain anachronisms of terminology had become apparent (e.g., a seemingly odd use of “cognitivism”) and many illustrative examples (e.g., references to Nixon and Jackie Onassis) had become charmingly dated. Despite these extrinsic qualities – which, in our opinion, add to the “time capsule” appeal of the paper – the case that Burgess develops remains highly relevant to the modern debate, so much so that we judge that whatever made it fitting to open that special issue with Burgess’ chapter provides warrant for doing so again. The second chapter begins by examining one of the historical antecedents of Mackie’s metaethical view – namely, Nietzsche’s convoluted moral philosophy. Charles Pigden argues that Nietzsche was indeed an error theorist, and in doing so he counters an objection that may be made to moral nihilism in general – an objection that Pigden finds articulated in the work of Crispin Wright and Simon Blackburn. The final sections of Pigden’s chapter help us to formulate the error theory more carefully. Mackie described the view as holding that all moral claims are false, which, Pigden notes, leads to trouble (the “Doppelganger Problem”). If “X is P” is a false moral claim, then “It is not the case that X is P” must be true (by classical standards); but if the latter claim also counts as moral, then it cannot be that all moral claims are false. Pigden provides a tidy solution to the problem. There follow three chapters that can be loosely grouped as attempts to analyze Mackie’s argument or the status of its conclusion. (Of course, all chapters in this collection do this to a certain extent; it’s a matter of focus.) Richard Joyce is interested in the logical relation between Mackie’s skepticism and Mackie’s “objectification thesis”: the idea that moral judgments are the result of our having “projected” our affective attitudes onto our experience of the world. Rather than just being an explanation for where this huge flaw in human moral thinking comes from (for the curious, as it were), the objectification thesis plays an important live role in Mackie’s case for moral skepticism. Though he has defended moral skepticism on several occasions before, Joyce’s position here is officially neutral; his objective is to understand the argument rather than advocate it. So too with the next chapter, from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Most modern commentators share the view that some thesis or other going by the name “internalism” must play some kind of important role in Mackie’s argument for moral skepticism; yet opinions differ as to how most properly to formulate this thesis – both with regard to Mackie’s intentions and concerning the construction of the best argument for moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong draws attention to the many variables hidden in “internalism” and proceeds to tease apart an almost-bewildering array of internalist theses. Many of these are rejected as far-fetched or as not serving
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Mackie’s ambitions, and in doing so Sinnott-Armstrong homes in on those theses that might be both defensible and useful for Mackie. Jamie Dreier’s opinion is considerably less sympathetic towards the moral error theory, but nevertheless the principal goals of his chapter are largely neutral. He first presents the jaw-dropping claim that Mackie was in fact a moral realist, and then spends most of the paper trying to convince us of this startling contention. Dreier’s case begins with the recognition that the rise of quasi-realism and minimalist accounts of such notions as truth, property, and assertion have made it increasingly difficult, in recent decades, to distinguish the moral antirealist from the realist. Dreier offers a new way of drawing the boundary, pertaining to whether, in our attempts to explain philosophical puzzles surrounding morality, we look to properties in the world (as the realists think) or look to moral concepts and the relations among them (as the anti-realists think). The surprising outcome is that when the boundary is drawn using this criterion, Mackie’s view seems to come out as realist (though this need not be true of the moral error theorist in general). The fifth and sixth chapters of the anthology return to the actively supportive attitude towards the moral error theory that was evident in Burgess and Pigden. David Phillips provides a penetrating analysis of Mackie’s neglected view of practical reason, and illuminates the role of practical reason in the Argument from Queerness. Phillips contrasts Mackie’s position on practical reason with that of Bernard Williams, and argues that the former is superior in several respects. (Incidentally, one of the editors of the present volume is the target of some of Phillips’ admonition, and hereby acknowledges that he finds the critique generally convincing.) Don Loeb critically confronts an argument that is frequently leveled against the moral skeptic, which he calls “the Argument from Moral Experience.” It consists of two premises: (1) that the phenomenology of moral experience is in line with the moral realist’s perspective, and (2) that this creates a burden of proof that the moral skeptic has to work harder to overcome. In other words, the world’s seeming to be a moral way creates a presumption in favor of the world’s being a moral way. Loeb questions both premises. Should our moral phenomenology be characterized in the way that moral realists typically paint it? And, even if it should, is the moral realist justified in thinking that this favors her case? Following Phillips’ and Loeb’s essentially pro-Mackie stance come four contributions from the opposition – from Michael Smith, David Copp, Simon Kirchin, and Caroline West. Both Smith and Copp respond to Mackie’s Argument from Queerness in what was described earlier as a “head-on” manner: They attempt to show that objective prescriptions are not mysterious within a naturalistic framework, after all. Smith argues that Mackie’s moral skepticism would be defused if we were able to make sense of “ends that are absolutely prescribed by reason.” He outlines several attempts to provide the goods, settling ultimately (though tentatively) on the view that there may be certain desires the having of which is constitutive of being rational, and, thus, Mackie’s challenge is answerable.
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Like Smith, Copp investigates the possibility of opposing Mackie “head-on” by making sense of actions prescribed by reason, actions that it would be irrational to refrain from performing. Copp maintains that it is only if one comes to the puzzle with an instrumentalist theory of practical rationality in hand that such actions seem so problematic; but such a theory is strictly optional. He uses his “society-centered theory” of moral properties as an illustration of a kind of moral naturalism that (A) provides reasons for actions that it would be irrational to ignore, but (B) does not involve any dubious metaphysical excesses. Kirchin’s opposition to the Argument from Queerness can, by contrast, be classified as of the “concessive” type. Perhaps objective prescriptions of the kind outlined by Mackie would be too weird to countenance, but who says that ordinary moral discourse is committed to that? Kirchin argues that moral discourse is in reality a messy business, with speakers’ commitments far more nebulous, inchoate, and varied than the error theorist typically acknowledges. But this very messiness counts against the plausibility of the error theory, since it counts against the likelihood of our locating “non-negotiable moral commitments” which can then be successfully charged with error. West’s position also makes limited concessions to Mackie. She agrees with Mackie’s (apparent) claim that moral discourse is committed to some thesis of internalism, and she thinks that the internalism in question is untenable. As evidence for this commitment, she explores several pragmatic uses to which we put our morality (why do we have it at all?), explaining how a belief in internalism would be crucial for each practical purpose. But if we really are in such a predicament, then how should we proceed? West outlines several options, without firmly taking sides. At least one of these options concedes the whole game to the error theorist (fictionalism), whereas others hope to resurrect a kind of moral realism from the situation. It is on the strength of her sympathetic description of a “revisionary moral realism” that we categorize West’s chapter as charting a route for the concessive opponent to the error theory. Though morality may heretofore have committed us to some strong internalist thesis – a thesis that is false – it is possible that this commitment was never “non-negotiable”: perhaps a weakened internalism can be embraced in good faith while still underwriting enough of the pragmatic purposes to count literally as a (revised) morality. While the latter sections of West’s chapter address the question of how we might proceed if the error theorist turns out to be largely correct, the final two contributions of this collection deal entirely with the aftermath of a triumphant moral error theory. What should we do with our moral talk and thought if we were to become convinced that Mackie is correct? There are broadly two camps. Until recently the assumption was that the error theorist should also be an abolitionist (a.k.a. eliminativist): eschewing moral talk in the same way as we all now eschew positive talk of, say, witches. Thus, it has been supposed, if we catch a professed moral error theorist employing moral language, we can gleefully cry “Aha!” (Any such accusation would be an argument not against the moral error theory but against the theorist – showing her to be a hypocrite, disingenuous, in bad faith, or vacillating between belief and disbelief. To suppose that this somehow undermines the possibility of the
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moral error theory being true is to commit an ad hominem fallacy.) But the increasingly popular alternative (or, at least, the increasingly discussed alternative) is that the error theorist might adopt the fictionalist stance: a commitment to continue to make moral utterances and have moral thoughts, while withholding assertoric force from the utterances and withholding doxastic assent from the thoughts. On the assumption that morality is in various respects useful when it is asserted and believed, eliminativism will (ceteris paribus) constitute a practical cost. The fictionalist option, therefore, becomes attractive if and only if it promises to recoup some of these costs. The advocate of fictionalism holds that some of these losses may be recovered by adopting a policy of employing moral language, engaging in moral deliberation, and being moved by moral emotions, but throughout it all remaining disposed to deny the truth of any moral proposition if pressed in an appropriately serious manner (e.g., when in the philosophy classroom), thus not really believing any of it and thus not violating any epistemic norms.5 The debate between the fictionalist and the abolitionist is one of the more intriguing recent legacies of Ethics, yet it is hard to discern Mackie’s own thoughts on the topic. On the final page of the book he hints that morality might continue with the status of a “useful fiction” – but one searches in vain for any discussion of how he thinks this might be supposed to work. Taking the moral fictionalist Mark Kalderon as their principal target, Graham Oddie and Dan Demetriou (in a joint chapter) raise a serious challenge for the fictionalist (and not just the moral fictionalist), which they call the “acceptancetransfer problem.” They argue that, as with the well-known Frege-Geach challenge to noncognitivism, there is a worry about how there can be any rational transfer between various claims in a piece of everyday moral reasoning (say, moral modus ponens) if the attitude taken by the speaker towards one of the premises (the moral claim) is something unlike belief and more akin to make-belief. In the thirteenth and final chapter of this issue, Richard Garner – a firm supporter of moral skepticism – puts the case for abolitionism most forcefully, reminding us of the reservations that Mackie himself had about the institution of morality (voiced not in Ethics but in Hume’s Moral Theory of a few years later). Garner has grave doubts about the fictionalist program: doubts about its psychological viability, doubts about its touted pragmatic pay-offs. He makes a strong case that abolitionism may be the most honest and practical attitude for the moral error theorist to adopt.
5 The
kind of fictionalism being described here is revolutionary and noncognitivist. In being revolutionary it contrasts with hermeneutic fictionalism, according to which we are already doing something like engaging with a fiction when we make moral judgments. In being noncognitivist it contrasts with cognitivist fictionalism, according to which moral judgments are truth-evaluable assertions whose content concerns some fiction (e.g., “X is morally wrong” = “According to fiction F, X is morally wrong”).
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References Eusebius of Caesarea. 1903. Praeparatio evangelica. Trans. E. H. Gifford, 313–324. Oxford: Clarendon. Garner, Richard. 1990. On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137–146. Joyce, Richard. 2007. Morality, schmorality. In Morality and self-interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield, 51–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, John L. 1946. A refutation of morals. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24: 77–90. Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Mackie, John L. 1980. Hume’s moral theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mackie, John L. 1982. The miracle of theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1950. On referring. Mind 59: 320–344. Warren, James. 2002. Epicurus and Democritean ethics: An archaeology of ataraxia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Bernard. 1981. Internal and external reasons. In his Moral luck, 101–113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Against Ethics John P. Burgess
’ε´ γ νων, α’ ν ε´ γ νων,
κατ ε´ γ νων – Julian
The familiar theories of ethics can be divided into two classes. Cognitivist theories (for example, utilitarianism and intuitionism) maintain that there is a body of fact about right and wrong, good and evil, which it is the business of moral philosophy to uncover. According to linguistic theories (for example, emotivism and prescriptivism), proper analysis shows moral judgments to be meant not as assertions about an alleged realm of objective values, but as some quite different type of “speech act.” Could it be that both types of theory are wrong? Anethicism (or moral skepticism) maintains that they are: Ordinary people’s moral judgments are meant as statements of impersonal fact about absolute values, but there are no such objective values, so moral thinking involves a fundamental mistake and illusion. Anethicism is to ethics as atheism is to theology. Many philosophers are aware of the existence of the anethicist position. Indeed Thomas Nagel has gone so far as to say (personal communication) that “fear of it has I think been the unspoken motive of most of the recent contortions in metaethics.” Yet until the recent appearance of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics (1977), it has been hard to find even one expression of the anethicist position in print. (It has been hard to find an argument against linguistic theories of ethics that did not end by endorsing cognitivism, and vice versa.) I hope the discussion that follows may help bring further attention to this neglected position.
1 When Archbishop Lefebvre says, “To Hell with the Pope!” he gives vent to emotion. When he says, “Vatican II was inspired by Baalzebub,” he means to assert something. When Muhammad Ali says, “Eating pork is against my religion,” he J.P. Burgess (B) Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_1,
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says something he knows would be false coming from Oral Roberts or Reverend Ike. When he says, “Allah forbids pork,” that is supposed to be impersonally true. If Baruch Korff says, “Zen is an old religion,” we have to pick up from context whether he means something like “by American standards” or “compared to Mormonism and Christian Science,” which would make his statement true, or something like “by Far Eastern standards” or “compared to Taoism and Shinto,” which would make it false. If he says, “Buddhism is a false religion,” his statement is not relative in this way. Billy Graham takes comfort in the thought that the angels of the Lord encamp round about all them that fear Him. But he does not believe this thought is true because it is comforting. Its truth is supposed to derive from the actual carryings-on of supernatural beings, and to be in a strong sense a matter of objective fact. Slippery philosophers of religion, super-subtle theologians, William Jameses and Paul Tillichs, may imagine that in reciting traditional creeds they are performing some quite extraordinary speech act. The ordinary belief has always been that, however poorly even King James English reflects celestial mysteries, church dogma embodies objective, absolute, and supremely important truths. I hold that ordinary people, leaving aside a few hyper-sophisticated moral philosophers, similarly mean their moral judgments as objective, non-relative assertions. That moral judgments are meant as any kind of assertion at all is denied by the once-influential theories of emotivism and prescriptivism. According to the former, “Abortion is immoral” is just an expression of emotion, akin to “Down with abortion!” According to the latter, it is a species of imperative, amounting to something like, “Let no one ever procure or perform an abortion!” The by-now familiar difficulties these theories encounter are worth reviewing. We grew up, most of us, acquiring a tangle of ethical concepts whose complexity philosophers are just beginning to appreciate. Among them were those of an immoral or wicked act, of an act one morally shouldn’t or oughtn’t commit, of a course of action less good than some alternative, of an act deserving blame or punishment, of a violation of rights or obligations, of a morally depraved or reprobate character, of a vice.We learned to deploy these concepts not merely in categorizing acts as right or wrong, but also in such dicta as: “Conscience is a very fallible guide to right,” “It is easier to denounce the shortcomings of others than to amend one’s own vices,” “Good people seldom keep bad company,” “Nice guys finish last.” We learned to reason with these concepts in arguments like the following (the first of which I borrow from Peter Geach): If it is wrong to do a thing, it is equally wrong to induce someone else to do it. But tormenting the cat is wrong. Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is wrong.
Uncle Sam believes arson for profit is morally permissible. But it isn’t. Therefore, you can’t always take Uncle Sam’s word for it that a thing is morally permissible.
If moral judgments are seriously taken to be in any halfway literal sense expressions of emotion, or imperatives, it is impossible to account for the sorts of things that are actually said by perfectly ordinary people who have never opened a volume of moral philosophy in their lives. “If let no one engage in a practice, then let no
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one ever induce anyone else to engage in it!” is gibberish. Neither R. M. Hare nor anyone else has ever explained how the antecedent of a conditional could sensibly be regarded as affected by the force of an imperative. “Even though Uncle Sam does not agree with down with a practice, it may still be that down with it!” is likewise ungrammatical. One can’t even begin to formulate an emotivist or prescriptivist reading of “Virtue is its own reward.” Emotivism and prescriptivism deny things ordinary speakers tend to say about moral judgments. Talk of knowledge of good and evil, familiar from Genesis and the M’Naughton Rules, occurs every day when parents scold, “Since you knew it was wrong, why did you do it?” One who says, “Abortion is as wicked as murder,” may meet with the response, “I doubt that very much!” or “Do you sincerely believe that?” or “Do you realize the implications of such a stand?” or “You’re completely off the wall!” Ordinary people in ordinary situations speak of moral judgments as things that can be known, believed, doubted; that can be certain, likely, or improbable; that can contradict or imply each other; that can be true or false. In matters of meaning, you can fool some of the people (philosophers) all of the time, and all of the people some of the time (in idioms), but you can’t fool all of the people all of the time. Emotivism and prescriptivism, by denying that what ordinary speakers regularly treat as assertions are genuine assertions, merely deprive the term “assertion” of its sense. Now, if moral judgments are meant as assertions, might they not still be meant as subjective, relative ones, mere expressions of personal preference? This was not the view of the philosopher who wrote: When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love. . . . But when he bestows on any man the epithets vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language. (Hume, Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, IX, 6)
Calling Nixon evil means more than adding him to a personal or parochial or partisan enemies list. At least, that is my “linguistic intuition.” One indication that I’m right is the fact that one can speak of, say, Hirohito and Paul IV as having contradictory opinions as to the morality of suicide. In a case of mere subjective tastes, as when the Emperor says, “I like raw fish,” and the Pope replies, “I don’t,” one could not speak of contradiction. Another indication is that people laugh at the relativist analysis of moral judgments. The Devil’s Dictionary of Ambrose Bierce contains the following entry: MORAL, adj. Conforming to the local and mutable standard of right.
This can’t be an accurate transcription of the literal sense of the word, else how could it amuse? Rather, moral judgments are in theory supposed to make objective, absolute claims. The wit of the “definition” lies in its dramatic revelation of the gap between theory and the practice of Bierce’s Victorian contemporaries, who had no firmer basis for their (double) standards than superstition and prejudice. It is rather like another definition in the same work: SELF-EVIDENT, adj. Evident to one’s self and to nobody else.
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The few positive arguments that have been advanced in favor of relativism are far from conclusive. To take a recent example, consider Gilbert Harman’s distinction between “inner” and “outer” judgments (Harman 1975). He notes there is something odd in saying that Hitler or Attila morally oughtn’t to have killed so many people, while there’s no oddity in calling them evil men. It’s not just that “ought not” is too weak in view of the enormous numbers slain. Rather, it’s somehow out of place in view of the inconceivability of either of these gangsters being influenced by the kind of moral considerations that influence, say, readers of the Philosophical Review. Harman accounts for such puzzling restrictions on the sensible use of “morally ought not” by postulating that moral judgments are meant to be relative to some set of principles of conduct which must be specified, however tacitly and implicitly, in the context of their utterance, and that normally when X tells Y that Z ought to have done A, the principles to which X means his judgment to be relative to are those common to X, Y, and Z. If this relativist analysis is accepted, it is clear why “ought not” judgments are out of place when Z shares few principles with X and Y. Yet one who, like me, holds that moral judgments are meant absolutely, can equally well explain the restrictions on “morally ought not” by, say, attributing to “Z ought not to have done A” the logical form, “Doing A was wrong according to principles whose truth Z himself recognizes.” (Here “recognize” is used in the strong sense in which recognizing the truth of p presupposes p is true.) True, this does not explain why “ought” judgments, unlike “evil” judgments, should be restricted to cases where Z has some correct moral beliefs. But neither does Harman explain why “ought” judgments, unlike “evil” judgments, should be relative to principles shared by X, Y, and Z, and not just those common to X and Y. If there is any explanation, it must be sought in features of “ought” and “should” common to both moral and non-moral uses. One feature, noted by many writers, is the strong advice-giving component of “ought” and “should” judgments. Such judgments answer “shall I?” questions. Saying what Hitler morally ought to do might be likened to vicariously advising him what to do in order to be moral. One doesn’t have to be a relativist to see why such advice would be out of place in the case of someone who is not interested in being moral (or who considers the adviser’s moral opinions so erroneous as to be not worth listening to). Even a Thomist could understand that. “Hitler morally oughtn’t to have killed so many people” is odd, and “Hitler was very evil” quite in order, for the same reason that “Capone legally should not have killed so many people” is odd, and “Capone was a great criminal” in order. In short, the restrictions on the sensible use of “morally ought not” judgments discovered by Harman have more to do with “ought” than with morality, and so are explicable without any special assumptions (relativist, Thomist, anethicist, or what have you) about the nature of morality. I know of no other linguistic arguments for relativism more compelling than Harman’s. The main negative argument that has been raised by relativists against the view that moral judgments advance objective, absolute assertions is that if accepting a moral principle is “merely agreeing about a fact,” then it is impossible to explain the power of moral judgments to motivate. This objection requires careful consideration, and a section to itself.
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2 Many philosophers have insisted that some link with emotion and motivation is part of the very meaning of ethical concepts. Consider a patient who, after a normal upbringing, suffers something like a lobotomy. Imagine that the patient says, in all apparent sincerity, that various practices are morally wrong, and yet habitually engages in them without hesitation or regret, without signs of inner struggle or violent passion. The place of “right” and “wrong” in such a patient’s mental life would be far from the norm. Many philosophers would say the patient no longer possessed the standard moral concepts at all. According to prescriptivism, moral judgments are imperatives, so “accepting” a moral principle can only amount to resolving to obey the imperative it represents. According to the relativist theory developed by Harman, belief that an act is morally wrong amounts to belief that it goes against the way people in one’s group are trying to live. Thus these linguistic theories provide a transparent link between moral judgment and motivation, between “reasons” for a course of action in the two senses of “evidence of its moral rightness” and “motivation considerations in its favor.” But is it necessary to accept a theory according to which accepting a moral judgment reduces to having a certain intention, in order to explain how moral judgments motivate? I will argue that it is not – that a strong, even an analytic, link between moral judgment and motivation is compatible with the thesis I have been defending, that moral judgments advance claims about what are supposed to be matters of absolute, objective fact. It may help to consider the concept of religious duty and of violation of that duty, or sin. Surely belief that an act is a sin has a strong inhibitory effect. Indeed, we would hardly know what to make of someone who in all apparent sincerity insisted that contraception was a sin, and yet habitually engaged in it without hesitation or regret. One might be tempted to say such a person did not possess the standard concept of “sin,” just as one was tempted to say the lobotomized patient did not possess the standard concept of “wrong.” And yet belief that an act is a sin surely does not simply amount to intending not to commit it. All sorts of beliefs about what are supposed to be matters of objective fact are involved: belief that God opposes such acts, that He has revealed His will in the matter, and so on. Actually, there should be no mystery about how religious and moral judgments can acquire a double role, both motivating action and making assertions. A child who scribbles on the wall is normally both told that it is naughty, and punished for its naughtiness. The child simultaneously learns to assent to the statement that wallscribbling is bad, and to refrain from scribbling on the wall. It is rather like one of those Suzuki children learning to play the violin: the child simultaneously learns to recognize which notes are properly called “in tune” and learns to play in tune. Nor is it surprising that moral judgments should be clothed in the form of assertions, rather than, say, imperatives, even if, as many philosophers have claimed, the whole point of moral discourse is to guide action. It is not a practical method of conduct-training to wait for children to exhibit each form of undesirable behavior
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and then “condition” them against repeating it. The usual strategy is quite different. “Negative reinforcement” of such acts as wall-scribbling establishes a tendency for the categorization of an act as “wrong” to induce an inhibition against performing it. Then children can be trained not to, say, commit tax fraud, by telling them it is wrong. Moreover, it is not just particular categorizations such as “Tax fraud is wrong,” but also general admonitions such as “If it is wrong to do a thing, it is equally wrong to induce someone else to do it” and “It is more important to correct one’s own faults than to point out the shortcomings of others,” that have their place in normal conduct-training. And such forms, as we have seen, are only available when moral judgments take the form of assertions. The fact that moral judgments take the form of assertions makes it possible for gaps to develop between even the sincerest belief that an act is a duty and an actual intention to carry it out. As W. V. Quine puts it: It is one thing to learn the difference between right and wrong, and another to suit the action to the word. The one is a matter of learning . . . to talk; the other is a matter of learning . . . to behave. The similarity basis for learning the word “good” is reward, or impunity, and the basis of moral training is the same, but still the lessons learned are different. The child may go on properly applying the word “good” even after the training has stopped. . . . The individual stands to gain nothing from private linguistic deviation. . . . But he may stand to gain much from wicked behavior, once the sanctions are dropped. (Quine 1974, p. 51)
We are all familiar with the existence of such gaps between moral belief and action. A good many people can, like Oscar Wilde, resist anything but temptation. They constantly find themselves doing things “they just know they shouldn’t.” Again, there are episodes, common in adolescence and not unheard of in later life, when angry, rebellious people do things they believe to be wrong because they are wrong. It is bad psychology to deny that people can deliberately and knowingly do things which they believe at the very moment they are doing them to be without qualification wrong. It is a contradiction in terms to say that people can deliberately and knowingly do things which at the very moment they are doing them they unqualifiedly intend not to do. Thus any linguistic theory of ethics which identifies moral judgment too closely with intention must be rejected. The motivating power of moral judgment must not be exaggerated. On the other hand, it would be quite abnormal for the motivating power of moral judgments established in earliest childhood ever to fade away completely. As Quine continues: It is remarkable how successful we often are in training the young to police themselves against their own selfish interests; surely there is a native amenability at the bottom of it all, and it has been favored by natural selection because of its survival value for the race taken collectively. (ibid.)
For the connection between moral belief and action to be entirely erased would be so unusual that I have no quarrel with philosophers who claim it would imply a departure from the conventional “meaning” of “right” and “wrong.”
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I have argued that moral judgments can both motivate and be meant as assertions. But why are these assertions taken absolutely and not relatively? Well, all assertions that do not explicitly involve personal pronouns will be taken impersonally and objectively unless it is specifically taught that they are meant otherwise. Even aesthetic judgments are at first taken absolutely, and beauty taken for an objective quality. In sophisticated societies one eventually learns (often not until fairly late in one’s education) that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that chacun a son goût. There is simply no parallel in moral education to this last phase in aesthetic education. Society has much to gain from encouraging people to tolerate harmless differences of taste, but little to gain from encouraging people to condone wrongdoing in others. Hence the relativity of aesthetic standards becomes part of the standard concept of “taste,” while the relativity of moral standards is no part of the standard concept of “right.” Switching from behaviorist to Freudian jargon, there is another strong reason why moral judgments will be taken objectively. The moral judgments of children, especially, are to a large extent based on the dictates of conscience. Conscience, or “superego,” is a specialized part of the mind, created by “internalization” of parental scolding. It is quite alien to the “conscious ego”; it is not recognized as part of the self. To children, “superego” and “id” are rather like those little angels and devils that whisper in the ears of cartoon characters. All unsophisticated persons tend to “project” the products of their own minds on to the universe. The tribeswoman who dreams of a dead ancestor believes she has had a communication from a ghost; the neurotic relieved of some of his psychosomatic symptoms by suggestion at a faith healing service thinks heavenly powers have cured him. In the same way, hearing the voice of conscience is mistaken for perceiving an external reality through a “moral sense.” As one of the few philosophers who have defended anethicism puts it: We have only moral feelings, but objectify these and think we are recognising objective facts and qualities. (Mackie 1946, p. 90)
Many philosophers have claimed that the whole point of moral discourse is to guide action; and I suppose in some sense this is true. What the foregoing psychological speculations are meant to show is that, even if this is the point of moral discourse, a natural, almost inevitable, process will lead to that discourse taking the form of assertions that are understood absolutely and objectively.
3 When Madelyn Murray O’Hair hears someone say that there are two natures in the incarnation, or that Jackie Onassis is in a state of grace, she doesn’t agree. Yet it would be misleading at best to say that she believes there are not two natures in the incarnation, or that Jackie is not in a state of grace. The famous opponent of school prayer is not a monophysite heretic like Haile Selassie, nor does she harbor a secret suspicion that Jackie has committed a mortal sin. Rather, her belief is that
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there never was any incarnation, and she rejects the concepts of sin and grace. If the theosophists or the Jehovah’s Witnesses are right, the Hassidim and the Jesuits have many erroneous ideas about God. But if the atheists are right, many of those groups’ beliefs cannot even be called false. I similarly maintain that moral judgments are without truth-value. I regard the question of whether abortion is immoral in the same way that Ms. Murray regards the question of whether it is against God’s law. I have no more use for the concept of moral turpitude than she has for the concept of sin. My reason is this: It is part of the normal understanding of moral judgments that what truth-value they have is supposed to be independent of the person by whom, and the circumstances in which, they are uttered. Yet though each speaker may have quite definite (albeit unconscious) criteria for applying the term “moral,” there is not enough common to all speakers’ criteria to provide “Abortion is immoral” with a speaker-independent truth-value. The relativity of morals is not unlike the relativity of simultaneity. No one, I hope, will pretend that even back in Newton’s day there was lurking in the “deep structure” of statements about the temporal order of events a hidden personal pronoun, a relativization to somebody’s frame-of-reference, that does not appear on the surface. No, such statements were always understood impersonally. Only a close analysis of the actual criteria applied in arriving at such judgments, an analysis first carried out by Einstein, revealed that the criteria of observers in relative motion disagree in their consequences. The discrepancies are too small to be noticed in everyday life; they don’t make people miss appointments. They would become obvious if motion at speeds approaching that of light were feasible. Similarly, I reject the suggestion that even back in Calvin’s day moral judgments carried the connotation of being merely personal and subjective. It was those moral Einsteins, the philosophes of the eighteenth century, who discovered, by analyzing the sources of moral beliefs, that they are commonly derived from conscience and moral sentiment, and that conscience and moral sentiment, alas, dictate quite different things to different people. This could not be noticed by people living in small, isolated, homogeneous, stable communities. Travel to distant lands and life in big cities have enabled a minority, consisting of philosophers, anthropologists, and some other unbiased observers, to detect the relativity of morals. The spectacle of the diverse moral codes left us by stern Moses, gentle Buddha, and a thousand others, makes it apparent that there is not enough common to different people’s criteria for what counts as right and wrong to make any answer to the question, “Is abortion immoral?” the right one. About virtue and justice I would say what Karen Blixen’s character says about God: “Thus,” he said, “with the general human idea of virtue, justice, or, if you will, of God. If anybody were to ask me what was the truth about these things, I should answer: ‘My friend, your question is without meaning. The Hebrews conceived their God like this; the Aztecs of America, about whom I have just read a book, like that; the Jansenites, again, like that. If you want the details of the various views I shall be pleased to give them, having devoted a certain amount of my time to this study. But let me advise you not to repeat your question in intelligent company.’ But at the same time I should be, for this superior view of mine, in debt
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to the naive people who have believed in the possibility of obtaining a direct and absolutely truth idea of God, and who were mistaken. For had they made it their object only to create a special Hebrew, Aztec, or Christian idea of God, where would the presupposition of the observer have been found?. . . Indeed, my friend, while the fools could have done without us, we are dependent on the fools for our better knowledge.” (Blixen 1934, p. 383)
It is not hard to understand why people’s criteria of right and wrong differ. Let us imagine that at some remote period the moral principles of each society were calculated to promote some intelligible goal – the survival of the society, say. What would happen as time went on and conditions changed? Values that were once conducive to survival would no longer be so; for example, sexual practices that produced stability in times of low population pressure and high infant mortality could produce disaster under altered circumstances. Yet there is a strong conservative tendency in morals. Even “swinging” parents, we read, often bring up their children the way they themselves were brought up, with old-fashioned, traditional values. Like all human traits, this conservativeness will run stronger in some family lines than in others. After some time it could be expected that a rift would develop between reactionaries bent on clinging to the old ways at any cost, and progressives willing to change their customs in order to promote the old goal of survival under changed conditions. Moreover, different societies would always have had different values, for the character traits that sustain a farming community will not do for a tribe that lives by plundering its neighbors, and the values appropriate for a nomadic existence won’t work in big cities. By the time complex societies developed, absorbing people of the most diverse origins, it would not be the least bit surprising to find people who believe divorce-and-remarriage is as wicked as murder living next door to people who believe monogamy is obsolete. This is what we do find in the modern world. Yet there are some philosophers who insist that au fond everyone from Angela Davis to Phyllis Schlafly shares the same basic criteria of right and wrong. Differences of opinion over abortion, meat-eating, homosexuality, usury, vivisection, censorship, and war are attributed by these philosophers to the difficulty of working out the consequences of shared criteria in concrete cases, and to differences of opinion on matters of non-ethical fact. On this view, we do all share enough common criteria for what counts as right and wrong to make one side in each of these debates objectively the right side. Yet the application of our common criteria may require settling many difficult questions (about, say, the long-range effect of euthanasia or pornography on human survival and happiness) on which at present there is little reliable evidence. If we all do share the same ultimate criteria of right and wrong, it ought to be possible to say what those criteria are; and some philosophers have tried to do just that. The analytic utilitarians, for instance, hold that calling an act morally right means no more than that it promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Unfortunately, objections going back to G. E. Moore show the principle of utility is not a very plausible candidate for the ultimate criterion of morality. For consider the following views:
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J.P. Burgess Even if it’s true that most people are always going to be unhappy in this world, still it wouldn’t be right for the politicians to put us out of our misery by blowing up the planet. Animals have just as much right as human beings not to be caused suffering. A society in which those who contribute most to human happiness are honored and rewarded is better than one in which the most benefits go to lazy idlers who contribute nothing to their fellow creatures, even if people on the whole are as happy in the one society as in the other. However content the citizens of the Brave New World may be, it would be evil to create such a society.
If analytic utilitarianism is right, then these views are not just mistaken, but are in a class with belief in married bachelors and round squares. I doubt whether even a philosopher would seriously want to maintain that. Other proposed definitive criteria of “good” – for example, “what is most highly evolved,” or “what we desire to desire” – are subject to similar objections. Indeed, there are two very general reasons for believing no universally shared ultimate defining criteria of morality exist. The first is that many people take some quite particular moral judgments as axiomatic or self-evident, and don’t in their own minds deduce them from anything more basic, whatever rationalizations they may offer others. For example, many people find certain sexual practices aesthetically disgusting, and some of them believe that they are, besides, morally wrong, though there is no way to deduce this from general principles. True, such people sometimes say they are against these practices “because they cause blindness,” or “because God is opposed.” Still it would be a misunderstanding of the psychology of these people to suppose that overwhelming medical evidence has convinced them of the deleterious effects of the practices in question on vision, and that therefore they oppose them, or that close textual analysis of the scriptures has convinced them that God opposes these acts, and hence they do. Rather it is their conviction that the practices are evil and deserve to be punished that leads them to give credence to quite unsubstantiated reports about their medical effects. They believe God opposes these practices not because the Bible tells them so – it is shockingly lacking in condemnations of, for example, polygamy – but because they themselves do so. A great many moral judgments seem to have the status of primitive principles in the minds of those who accept them. It is hard to view disagreement over such judgment as disagreement over how to apply some general criterion. All this was noted long ago by Bertrand Russell: The appeal to reason [in Aquinas] is, in a sense, insincere, since the conclusion to be reached is fixed in advance. Take, for example, the indissolubility of marriage. This is advocated on the ground that the father is useful in the education of the children, (a) because he is more rational than the mother, (b) because, being stronger, he is better able to inflict physical punishment. A modern educator might retort that (a) there is no reason to suppose men in general more rational than women, (b) that the sort of punishment that requires great physical strength is not desirable in education. He might go on to point out that fathers, in the modern world, have scarcely any part in education. But no follower of St. Thomas would, on that account, cease to believe in lifelong monogamy. (Russell 1945, p. 462)
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A second indication is that both advocates and opponents can be found, right here in our modern, developed, Western, industrial, capitalist society, for some extremely general principles. Jeremy Bentham in all apparent sincerity defended the principle of utility, which nearly every other important moral philosopher has rejected. Lewis Carroll held that people have an absolute right to take the lives of animals, but not to cause them pain. Animal liberationists dissent from the first part of Carroll’s thesis, and all those who are not anti-vivisectionists dissent from the second part. Russell attached supreme importance to the preservation of the human species. Patriots of the better-dead-than-red school think otherwise. It is hard to picture these fundamental disagreements as disagreements over how to apply some still more sweeping, universal criteria that everybody shares. Surely the burden of proof is on those who believe there are such cosmic moral principles to come up with some plausible examples; to show how basic disagreements over whether, say, plants or animals or zygotes have rights, can be viewed as disagreements over how to implement some still more basic agreements; to show how kinky views about, say, sexual matters, can be regarded as derived from general principles. Mere optimistic talk by philosophical Pollyannas cannot conjure away the very real differences in ideals and standards that exist in our present divided world and society.
4 Some French philosophers of the last century, we read, were so appalled by the idea of a person without a religion, that they would say to all the atheists they met, l’athéisme c’est donc votre religion. Imbeciles have confused atheism with paganism and Satanism. People who ought to know better sometimes label whatever beliefs an atheist holds most dear his or her “religion”; thus we hear Marxism, psychoanalysis, surrealism described as “religions.” Atheists themselves sometimes resort to quasi-religious terminology in describing their deepest feelings, trying to give secular senses to “mystic” and “sacred.” The correct thing to say about those who reject every form of supernatural belief from Anabaptism to Zoroastrianism is that they have no religion. In the same way, I have no moral beliefs. There are some people, called sociopaths, who lack all conscience and community feeling. They are delinquents and criminals and are generally held in low esteem by law-abiding citizens. Yet one school of moral philosophers think we should all be like them. These are the nihilists, whose motto is “Fais ce que voudras!” A related school, the immoralists, urge doing whatever prigs and prudes find shocking. “Épatez le bourgeois!” is their slogan. Those who adopt anethicism, the view I have been defending, by no means agree with nihilists and immoralists. Indeed, only the sort of people who confuse atheism with Satanism could mix up anethicism with nihilism or immoralism. There is no reason why anethicists should not have personal ideals and standards without the intellectual baggage of moral belief that usually accompanies them. The atheist Russell, after all, could share a number of attitudes and character traits with
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Quakers and Buddhists, without sharing their theology. Indeed, he approached much more closely to the ideals of these religions than the ostensible believers Nixon and Lon Nol. What anethicists like me object to is the language of morals. I am willing to speak of personal ideals and standards, and of group mores and ethos, but not of morality and ethical conduct. The ethical vocabulary, I believe, carries an implication, or at least an inevitable suggestion, of a claim to objective and absolute, or at least intersubjectively valid and impersonal, backing for one’s standards. Nobody has such backing. If some day people all over the world came to share the same values and goals, we could begin to assign “right” and “wrong” speaker-independent, intersubjectively valid extensions. Until that day, those of us who have appreciated the relativity of morals have several options: (1) We might use “right” and “wrong” in a least common denominator sense, calling “immoral” what nearly everybody’s standards forbid, and “permissible” what nearly everybody’s standards allow. (2) We might, each of us, use “right” and “wrong” relative to his or her personal standards, while explicitly repudiating any intention to universal, impersonal claims when using these words. (3) We might drop the terms “right” and “wrong” from our vocabularies. Similarly, after Einstein one might use “earlier” and “later” either for relativistic causal time, or use them relative to one’s own proper time, or drop them entirely, speaking always of “intervals” rather than distances or durations. In ethics, course (1) would require us to grant that abortion, for instance, is neither immoral nor morally permissible. We might be able to say that it would be immoral to induce abortion in a case where the woman involved did not desire it and would be medically damaged by it, and the fetus if allowed to come to term would become a normal, healthy infant, and there was no danger of overpopulation. We might be able to say that if abortion were morally permissible in one case, it would be equally permissible in every similar case. For that much might be common to everybody’s notions of morality. But we certainly could not hope to get a verdict of “immoral” or “permissible” on abortion in general. In physics, the course of using “earlier” and “later” relative to one’s own timeframe can be safely adopted outside the laboratory, because the differences between frames of reference for people moving at normal speeds on the surface of the earth are negligible. In ethics, the situation is rather different. On course (2) we would have to be constantly reminding ourselves that those of us who say abortion is wrong, and those who say it is all right, are not contradicting each other. Either course (1) or (2) would be bound to cause great confusion so long as the majority has not appreciated the relativity of morals. And I doubt whether today more people are aware of that relativity than understand Einstein’s theory. Moreover, it is really rather incongruous to go on speaking of “right” and “wrong” once one realizes there are no absolute standards. It is rather like a convert to atheism continuing to speak of those who die as “going to meet their Maker.” Therefore I advocate course (3), giving up ethical vocabulary. In any case, I emphasize that adopting either course (1) or (2) would be a major departure from the way in which the ethical vocabulary has conventionally been understood.
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Music critics don’t write for the sort of people who prefer muzak to music, Bacharach to Bach. Nor need moral philosophers write for those who take no interest in human survival and happiness. For those of us who do, adding the epithets “vicious” or “depraved” to a factual account of Nixon’s or Hitler’s career adds nothing, or nothing but a misleading suggestion that the universe disapproves of these thugs as much as we do. The human race has no agreed-upon purposes, aims, goals – no, not even its own survival – no common values and ideals, no shared principles and standards. Nor does the universe take sides in human affairs. There’s no use kidding ourselves.
Postscript (2007) I had, while a student, read the standard writers on metaethics from the first half of the last century. Personal experience as an adolescent in the 1960 s left me disposed to find the cognitivist theories very dubious, and the linguistic theories quite absurd. I knew that those making moral judgments meant them as statements of fact, but after having changed my own mind so many times, and having encountered so many so passionately convinced of so widely divergent views, I very strongly doubted that there were any facts to be stated. It seemed to me, however, that the linguistic theorists had sufficiently refuted the cognitivists, and vice versa, so that there was nothing left to add. Shortly after I arrived in Princeton in the fall of 1975, Gil Harman received and distributed to his colleagues reprints of his 1974 article on moral relativism. I at once recognized that his position, though one I would class as a sophisticated member of the linguistic family, was one member of that class that escaped, among others, Geach’s objections to Hare. I still could not accept the view, but I did not think the existing literature from the other side contained a refutation of it, so I concluded that it might be worthwhile for me to write out a statement of my own reservations. A semester’s leave in the fall of 1977 gave me an opportunity to complete a draft. But as I did so, youthful indiscretion carried me beyond my original intention of writing just a response to one recent article, and led me to produce a position paper or manifesto vigorously stating, and sketchily indicating arguments for, a view I thought unrepresented in the literature, one rejecting of cognitivist and linguistic theories alike. I had no sooner completed a draft that satisfied me than I came across Mackie’s Ethics in a book store. So the view was represented in the literature after all, and actually had been so, as I learned, since before my birth, with Mackie’s 1946 article “A Refutation of Morals.” I at first felt Mackie’s work made my own efforts entirely superfluous, but in the end I concluded that there were enough differences between Mackie’s more thoroughly worked-out position and my own sketchy one to leave some role for my paper, though naturally it had to be revised to include at least some citation and quotation of Mackie. My senior colleagues Gil Harman and Tom Nagel both (being perhaps more amused by the now-dated topical humor than edified by the philosophy) encouraged
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me to publish the revised version. Over the next few years I made several attempts to do so, and accumulated several rejection notices before I gave up. (I became the more content to do so when I came into communication with Ian Hinckfuss, and knew that he was working to get his To Hell with Morality into print. He eventually succeeded, though the work appeared only after much delay and under a tamer title.) I also accumulated third and fourth and nth drafts of “Against Ethics,” since I revised between each rejection and the next submission. I returned to metaethics briefly about 10 years after my original effort. In the late 1980s I gave a talk under the title “Ethics as an Intellectual Discipline” at Princeton and a couple of other places. I will not outline the talk here, except to say that I began with the claim that the important issue is not the existence of moral facts. This already represented a shift, at least in angle of attack, since “Against Ethics,” and I have shifted more since. To protect myself from the temptation to waste time trying to publish, I never reduced the notes from which I spoke to the form of a paper. By now I have lost even the notes, and retain only a fading outline in memory. By now I have lost also all versions of “Against Ethics” except that reproduced above, and even for it the last page, with the footnotes identifying the sources of quotations, was missing and had to be reconstructed. I believe it to be my second draft, the first produced after Mackie’s book came to my attention and the first to be submitted to and rejected by a journal. If so, it should date from 1978. But my aging memory is very fallible. Despite changes of view on my part, I have never refused requests for copies of the paper, so other versions may be in circulation. I remember one with a different epigraph, an untranslatable French pun, in place of the Apostate’s “I read, I understood, I condemned”; I remember one, possibly the same one, with a three part thesis-antithesis-synthesis structure; and I remember one, again possibly the same one, with an explicit statement of the Puritan syllogism, to illustrate how moral predicates may be used in intermediate steps of deductions from non-moral premises to non-moral conclusions: “Whatever causes pleasure without hard work is evil. Whatever is evil in the end is injurious to health. Ergo, whatever causes pleasure without hard work in the end is injurious to health.” I would appreciate hearing from anyone who may have a copy of any of these alternative versions. Again despite changes of view on my part, I am content to have the paper appear in print at last in the present venue. Though I would probably have declined any other offer to publish had I received one, how could I refuse to contribute to a volume in honor of Mackie? My own occasional historical research has convinced me of the badness of the practice of altering papers when reprinting, and even though the present appearance of my old paper is not exactly a reprinting, I have made no changes in transcribing my one remaining old manuscript, except to correct typos, eliminate the rather eccentric capitalization, and regularize the punctuation. As to the doctrines the paper contains, I would today still defend the principle, illustrated in the paper with a quotation from Bierce, that a definition that strikes people as a joke is unlikely to be a correct analysis.
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References Blixen, K. (pseud. Isak Dinesen). 1934. The poet. In her Seven gothic tales. New York: Random House. Harman, G. 1975. Moral relativism defended. Philosophical Review 84:3–22. Mackie, J. L. 1946. A refutation of morals. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24:77–90. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Quine, W. V. 1974. The roots of reference. La Salle: Open Court. Russell, B. 1945. A history of western philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem Charles R. Pigden
1 Introduction Let me start with two claims: (1) I am a moral nihilist, (2) so was Nietzsche. The first claim is not particularly controversial. Absent brain injury or massive selfdeception, I am the best authority on what I believe, and I can assure you that I believe something that can reasonably be described as “moral nihilism,” namely a minor variant of the error theory of J. L. Mackie. It is otherwise with the second claim. Some say Nietzsche was a nihilist, indeed a perfect, complete or uninhibited nihilist.1 Some say that this is all a horrible misunderstanding and that Nietzsche was nothing of the kind.2 I shall argue that he was a nihilist in much the same sense as I am, but variously a diagnostician, an opponent, and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism.3 Then, with Nietzsche’s aid, I shall defend the moral nihilism that we both believe (metaethical nihilism or the error theory) against a common line of criticism that nihilism can’t be true because if it were we would have to give up morality or, at least, moralizing. I then raise a problem (the Doppelganger Problem) for metaethical nihilism, reinforce the problem, and solve it by reformulating the doctrine. Thus although I think that trying to get Nietzsche right is a worthwhile intellectual enterprise, the real point of the paper is to vindicate the error theory (of which Mackie was the foremost defender) against certain kinds of criticism. For the record, I agree with (what I take to be) Nietzsche’s metaethic but disagree with his ethic of Calliclean self-assertion. I also think that there are lots of historical, psychological and philosophical insights scattered through Nietzsche’s works (mixed with a good deal of silliness) though they don’t always repay the effort of putting up with his big-noting, his button-holing, and his “Hi Ma! Look at Me!” style of writing.
C.R. Pigden (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand 1 See
Ansell-Pearson (1994), especially Chapter 10; Danto (1965), pp. 22, 30, 31. (1995, Chapters 2 and 3). 3 Thus my interpretation is broadly in accord with that of Brian Leiter (2002). 2 Schacht
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_2,
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2 Metaethical Nihilism So, in what sense am I a moral nihilist? I think (as a first approximation) that moral judgments, specifically moral judgments concerning the thin moral concepts (“good,” “right,” “ought,” “wrong,” etc.), are propositions, that they are (in the current jargon) truth apt. And I think that they are all false.4 For there are no such properties as goodness, badness, wrongness or obligatoriness. You can’t do genuinely good deeds since there is no such property as goodness for your deeds to instantiate: at best they can be good in some watered down or ersatz sense. With the thick moral concepts (“honest,” “kind,” “spiteful” or “loyal”) the situation is more complex. Judgments such as “Abigail is honest” can be true so long as they are construed factually as describing Abigail’s propensity to tell the truth, refrain from falsehood, and stick to her word. If Abigail does indeed have these characteristics, then “Abigail is honest” is true just as “George Bush is honest” is not (since the illustrious President has a free and easy way with the facts). But “Abigail is honest” is false if it is taken to imply that being honest is a good thing, virtuous, or how one ought to be, and hence that Abigail is good, virtuous, or that she does what she should. In other words, judgments involving the thick moral concepts can be true so long as the thin coating of evaluative content is scraped away. But if such judgments are freighted with thin evaluative content they too are condemned to falsehood. Moreover, judgments involving the thin and the thick concepts can both be true, so long as they are construed sociologically or in an “inverted commas” sense. It is true (I hope) that Abigail is a good girl since she conforms (on the whole) to my paternal ethic. It is true that Achilles is agathos, even though he procures the defeat of his own side because of a quarrel about a slave girl, since his actions still conform to the heroic code. But Abigail is not absolutely good nor is Achilles absolutely agathos: Abigail is good-according-to-her-Dad and Achilles is agathos-according-to-the-heroic-code. These pedantic and R. M. Hare-ish distinctions are quite useful when it comes to deciphering Nietzsche’s thought. For example, when he says that to become moral is not itself moral (Nietzsche 1881, §97/1982, p. 59), what he means is that the motives and characteristics which induce people to subscribe to a morality (like the methods people use to propagate a morality) may qualify as moral failings according to that very morality. One’s commitment to virtue may be due to an “inverted commas” vice. To the best of my knowledge, the first clear formulation of metaethical nihilism or the error theory in the twentieth century was due to Bertrand Russell who propounded it at a meeting of the Cambridge Apostles in 1922: “There seems to me no doubt that our ethical judgments all claim objectivity; but this claim, to my mind, makes them all false” (Russell 1922/1999, p. 123). Since “the Society” (as the Apostles were known) was a secret society, Russell’s paper did not have much of an
4 Though
as we shall see, this has to be carefully qualified to avoid self-refutation.
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impact at the time. The true champion of metaethical nihilism in the twentieth century was J. L. Mackie. “Although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim . . . to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false” (Mackie 1977, p. 35). His “Refutation of Morals” (1946) put nihilism on the agenda, and his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) reminded people that it had not been dealt with. Since then, numerous efforts have been made, so much so that Michael Smith’s recent anthology Metaethics (1995) largely consists of desperate attempts by various philosophers to find facts that will make moral judgments true. (In the circumstances, Smith’s omission of Mackie makes the book not so much Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, as Hamlet without the ghost.)
3 Nietzsche and Nihilism But was Nietzsche a nihilist? Well, absent brain injury or massive self-deception, he was the best authority on what he believed, and he certainly said he was a nihilist – indeed, “the first perfect nihilist in Europe” (Nietzsche 1883–1888/1968, p. 3). But this does not prove the point. To begin with, in his case, we cannot altogether discount the possibility of brain injury. He wrote these words about a year before his descent into madness, and the syphilis was beginning to undermine his intellect (the conceit and the megalomania were becoming more pronounced, the style less ironic and more abusive). Moreover, he often says things that suggest that he is not a nihilist. In Twilight of the Idols, “Maxims and Arrows,” he quotes Flaubert’s “One cannot think or write except when seated,” and exclaims “There I have caught you nihilist! Sitting still is the very sin against the Holy Spirit!” (Nietzsche 1889, II.34/2005, p. 160). Since Nietzsche had his best ideas whilst wandering lonely as a cloud through Alpine holiday resorts, the conversational implicatum would appear to be that, unlike Flaubert, Nietzsche was not a nihilist. Even Nietzsche’s claim to be the perfect nihilist is rather equivocal since his “perfection” consists in the fact that he has lived through nihilism and come out on the other side, “leaving it behind, outside himself.” In other words, the reason he is the perfect nihilist is that he is not a nihilist any more. Against this, Nietzsche’s writings are peppered with passages that suggest, imply or express metaethical nihilism. Daybreak §103 is explicit: “To deny morality” . . . can mean to deny that moral judgments are based on truths. Here it is admitted that they really are motives of action but that in this way it is errors which, as the basis of all moral judgments, impel men to their moral actions. This is my point of view.
The Genealogy of Morals is, in part, an attempt to demonstrate that since the current “slave” morality would have been believed even if it were false, the fact that it is widely believed gives us no reason to think it true. But the same argument quite obviously applies to the aristocratic morality that Nietzsche evidently prefers. That too was believed because it suited the needs of the aristocracy; hence the fact that it was believed affords no argument for supposing it to be true. But since moral claims purport to be truth apt, it follows that if they are not true (which is what Nietzsche
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seems to suggest) then they are false. Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols expresses the same idea in less metaphorical language: There are absolutely no moral facts. What moral and religious judgments have in common is the belief in things that are not real. Morality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena or (more accurately) a misinterpretation. (1889, VIII.1/2005, p. 182)
So how do we reconcile the rejection of nihilism with these nihilistic sentiments? Nietzsche was in my sense a metaethical nihilist – that is, an error theorist in the style of John Mackie – but the nihilism he claimed to have survived, the nihilism he regarded as a menace, the nihilism he hoped to transcend, was not just the belief that moral judgments are all false but the psycho-social malaise caused by this belief. “Scepticism regarding morality is what is decisive,” says Nietzsche, adding “The end of the moral interpretation of the world which no longer has any sanction after it has tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. ‘Everything lacks meaning’” (1883–1888/1968, p. 7. my emphasis). Obviously, if moral skepticism leads to nihilism it cannot be identical with the thing that it leads to. To be a nihilist, then, is not just to believe in the error theory but to believe in the error theory and to feel bad about it. Thus Nietzsche has ceased to be a nihilist (or has perfected his nihilism) not because he has ceased to be an error theorist but because he has ceased to feel bad. His project is the revaluation of all values, the reconstruction of a new morality, the morality of the overman, which, though equally false, will be more bracing, more life-enhancing and more conducive to the “higher” type of man. It will have a higher utility (given Nietzsche’s elitist and eccentric ends), but, since there are pernicious truths and useful (even life-enhancing) falsehoods, the fact that it is useful won’t make it true. Morality for Nietzsche is like mathematics for Hartry Field (1989): it does not have to be true to be good – in the sense of being good-for-something (though of course he believed that current moralities are neither true nor good, at least not good for anything which Nietzsche himself valued). If we believe (or make-believe) in this new morality, the world will be re-enchanted; it will become meaningful again. For as Zarathrustra makes plain, meaning is not something to be discovered but something to be imposed, and it is imposed by our moral beliefs: Only man placed value in things to preserve himself – he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself “man” which means “the esteemer” . . . without esteeming the nut of existence would be hollow. (1883, I “On the thousand and one goals”/1954, p. 171)
So if the nut of existence seems to be hollow, if we suffer from a malaise of meaninglessness induced by moral skepticism, the solution is to forget our doubts (except perhaps when we are doing metaethics) and to create a new morality by “esteeming” a novel collection of goods. Of course the new morality will be immoral according to current norms, which is why Nietzsche calls himself an immoralist. But a new morality is not no morality, nor is it any less of a fiction because it conduces to the (rather vague) ends that Nietzsche has set himself.
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4 Schacht’s Objections Richard Schacht (1995, pp. 49–61) will have none of this. In his view, Nietzsche can’t have been an “axiological [or metaethical] nihilist.” Nietzsche may have been an “immoralist” but he was also a moralist, the advocate of a new, more healthy ethic based on the “will to power.” He felt that unless this new “interpretation” were adopted, European civilization was moribund. He “held that this must not happen and that life [presumably the life of the European elite] ought to flourish, ought to be enhanced and ought to continue to develop” (Schacht 1995, p. 53). Nietzsche could not have “held” this if he thought all moral judgments (including his own) were false. Schacht’s argument is interesting since it is closely related to a family of arguments designed to prove, not that Nietzsche was not a nihilist, but that nihilism in its metaethical form is false. As I understand it, it goes something like this: S1 If anyone thinks that all moral judgments are false he must (a) give up moralizing (i.e., making and defending moral claims, adopting moral beliefs) and (b) give up morality (i.e., acting on the basis of moral beliefs). S2 Nietzsche did not give up either moralizing or morality. On the contrary, he was a dedicated advocate of the ethic of the overman. Therefore: S3 Nietzsche was not an axiological nihilist: he did not believe that all moral judgments are false. Now, the problem with this argument is that premise S1 is clearly untrue. Some metaethical nihilists – such as Richard Garner (1994 and this volume) and Ian Hinckfuss (1987) – give up (or profess to give up) both moralizing and morality, and some – such as Mackie, Richard Joyce (2001), and myself – do not. (Strictly speaking, what Joyce recommends is that we continue to act morally and to think in moral terms whilst abandoning belief in the propositions of morality.) The latter part of Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong is largely devoted to moralizing, and Mackie is described by his erstwhile neighbor, George Cawkwell, as one of the most duteous persons he had ever met (Cawkwell 1985, pp. 219–220). And though Mackie missed out on the Chair at the University of Tasmania because of his nihilistic metaethical opinions, it was his successful rival, the moralistic Sydney Orr, who was later dismissed from the post for “gross moral turpitude” (Pybus 1993, pp. 206–207). As for me, I am not only addicted to moralizing but I sometimes even act on my principles, which means that I too am a counterexample to S1. But perhaps I have misconstrued Schacht’s argument. The “must” in S1 is not an alethic but a deontic operator. It is not that the nihilist must give up both moralizing and morality (that he cannot help himself, as it were) but that in some sense he ought to do so. Really the argument should start from:
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S1 If all moral judgments are false then we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. But of course this premise is at a considerable distance from Schacht’s desired conclusion. For even if S1 is true, Nietzsche may not have realized it, and even if he did realize it, the fact that he did not give up moralizing does not prove he was not a nihilist. For he may not have done what he thought he ought to do. Still, if we assume that S1 is obvious to all philosophically sensitive persons we might arrive at the following: S2 Nietzsche thought that if moral judgments were all false, he ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Then, if we assume that Nietzsche generally did what he thought he ought to do, the fact that he did not give up either moralizing or morality indicates that he did not think he ought to do so. In which case he did not believe that all moral judgments were false. The trouble is that S2 itself is palpably false. For Nietzsche did not believe that, in general, people should give up or cease acting upon false beliefs: The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment. . . . The question is to what extent it is life preserving, species preserving, perhaps even species cultivating. And we are fundamentally inclined to think that the falsest judgments (which include synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us. . . . To recognize untruth as a condition for life – that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way. (1886, §4/1968, pp. 201–202)
But if untruth can be a condition for life – if falsehoods can be indispensable – then Nietzsche would probably have rejected S1 . For if falsehood is not necessarily an objection to beliefs in general – if indispensability (for certain purposes) is an excuse for falsehood – then it may be a sufficient excuse for moral beliefs. So long as they are “species preserving” and all the rest of it – which Nietzsche’s overman ethic was supposed to be – moral beliefs need not be given up. Hence Schacht’s objection collapses.
5 Wright, Blackburn, and the Hoi Polloi But even if Schacht fails to prove that Nietzsche was not a nihilist he may provide the makings of an argument against nihilism proper. For many people think that if nihilism is true, then we ought to give up either moralizing or morality. And this is somehow supposed to be an objection to nihilism, i.e., a reason to think that it is false. Sophisticated philosophers such as Simon Blackburn and Crispin Wright focus on the alleged duty to give up moralizing, whereas simple folk focus on the duty to give up morality. To give up moralizing is to give up the practice of moral discourse as currently constituted: to give up making, defending and arguing for moral claims and to give up our distinctively moral beliefs. To give up morality is to give
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up our moral beliefs and to give up acting (and getting other people to act) on the basis of moral beliefs. It is not or not necessarily to give up the practices sanctioned by morality. There may be other reasons for not coveting my neighbor’s ox besides the alleged fact that it is morally wrong. (For instance: coveting leads to theft, and theft is illegal, and illegal actions risk punishment, thus coveting is imprudent.) But the simple folk are surely right in supposing that if our beliefs suffered such a seachange our practices would not remain unaltered. If considerations of duty ceased to motivate I would not do quite the same things as I do now, even if I refrained from the excesses of a Sid Vicious. Morality is not a redundant institution. However, Blackburn seems to suppose that we could give up moralizing without giving up morality. For he seems to think that we might substitute “shmoral” beliefs for moral beliefs and “shmoral” claims for moral claims, and that this “shmorality” might play much the same role as morality does at present (though, as we shall see, he regards such a substitution as silly). Thus giving up moralizing does not entail giving up morality but only altering it by replacing moral beliefs with shmoral beliefs. According to Blackburn: If a vocabulary embodies an error [especially, he seems to think, an error which infects it with falsehood] it would be better if it were replaced by one that avoids the error. . . . Surely it would be better if we avoided moral (erroneous) views altogether and contented ourselves with some lesser, purged commitments that can be held without making metaphysical mistakes. . . . The puzzle is why, in the light of the error theory, Mackie did not at least indicate how a moral vocabulary would look and why he did not himself go on to shmoralize not to moralize. And in my view this is enough of a puzzle to cast doubt back on to the original diagnosis of error. In other words, it would be a silly thing to do, to try to substitute some allegedly hygienic concepts for the moral ones; but that in itself suggests that no error can be incorporated in mere use of those concepts. (1993, pp. 149–150)
Blackburn’s argument then is this: B1 If moral judgments are all false, we ought to give up moralizing (and shmoralize instead). B2 But it is not the case that we ought to give up moralizing (and shmoralize instead). This would be “silly.” Therefore: B3 It is not the case that all moral judgments are false. Blackburn goes on to contend that the reason moral judgments are not all false is that strictly speaking they are neither true nor false (since their true purpose is to express attitudes) even though (for various subtle and complicated reasons) it is OK to call them true or false in common parlance. However, I am not concerned with Blackburn’s defense of quasi-realism but only with his critique of nihilism. Crispin Wright has something similar in mind: The great discomfort with such an [error theoretic] account [either about morality, maths or “the comic”] is that, unless more is said, it relegates discourse about the comic to bad faith. [Not such a calamity in the case of the comic, one is inclined to say!] . . . [A]s soon as
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The obvious and unkind comment is that a man who doesn’t have a problem taking himself seriously when engaged in reasoned appreciation and debate about the comic need not fear that even nihilism will induce a lapse of seriousness when it comes to moral issues. But satire aside, Wright does have an argument, though it would appear to be one rung below Blackburn’s on the logical ladder. For Blackburn’s argument, whatever its faults, is at least formally valid. The same cannot be said for the argument that Wright propounds. Wright’s first premise is much like Blackburn’s: W1 If moral judgments are all false, we ought to give up moralizing (and take our moral commitments a lot less seriously). But his second premise is simply this: W2 Giving up moralizing would be a real calamity. We could not take our moral commitments seriously. And from this nothing in particular seems to follow. At best W1 and W2 when taken together provide us with a reason for wishing that nihilism were not true but not with a reason to think that it is not true. However, we can patch up Wright’s argument by substituting W2 for W2: W2 It is not the case that we ought to give up moralizing (for it would lead to a loss of moral commitment). And W1 and W2 do indeed entail the desired conclusion: W3 It is not the case that all moral judgments are false.
6 Nihilism and its Consequences Having carefully distinguished between the two philosophers and the hoi polloi, and between one philosopher and the other, in what follows I am going to run them all together. What is wrong with this line of argument does not depend on the details we have distinguished, so the premise I start with combines three lines
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of thought: that of Blackburn, that of Wright, and that of the simple folk. It is this: 1 If all moral judgments are false then we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. The rest of the argument runs as follows: 2 It is not the case that we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Therefore: 3 It is not the case that all moral judgments are false. This argument is formally valid. But is it sound? This depends upon which “ought”s we have in mind. Let us take premise 1. Is it true? Not if the “ought” is moral, such that 1 becomes: 1 If all moral judgments are false then we morally ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. For if all moral judgments are false, then there is nothing that we morally ought to do, including giving up moralizing or giving up morality. So on this interpretation the argument fails. But not all “ought”s are moral “ought”s so this does not settle the matter. Let’s try again. Suppose we treat the “ought” in 1 as a hypothetical “ought” so that it expresses what we ought to do if we want to achieve some end. And let us suppose to that this end has something to do with rationality. (When Blackburn says that if Mackie were right, it would be “better” to give up moralizing in favor of shmoralizing, he seems to mean rationally better. Similarly his justification for the second premise is that shmoralizing would be silly – i.e., irrational. As for Wright, he explicitly says that “the reasonable response” to an error theory is to give up making the erroneous claims.) One such end is truth. Rationality is often defined with respect to truth so that a rule or procedure is rational if it tends to result in true beliefs either in fact or under the appropriate conditions. So perhaps the idea behind premise 1 is that if all moral judgments are false, we rationally ought to give up both moralizing and morality, i.e., that we ought to give them up if we want to have true, as opposed to false, beliefs. This gives us: 1 If all moral judgments are false, then if we want our beliefs to be true (and not false) we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Even if, like Nietzsche, we do not regard truth as the supremely rational end, if nihilism is true, we must still give up moralizing and give up morality if we are to achieve truth. For if truth demands that we give up moralizing – which means giving up our moral beliefs – it also demands that we give up acting on our moral beliefs
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since we won’t have any moral beliefs to act on. But of course, the truth of 1 does not settle the matter. The second premise – revised so as to maintain validity – has to be true too: 2 It is not the case that if we want our beliefs to be true (and not false) we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Now, 2 might be true. It might be that it is not the case that if we want our beliefs to be true (and not false) we ought to give up both moralizing and morality. But 2 will only be true if nihilism is false. For if nihilism is true then we can’t have moral beliefs without having false beliefs. Conversely, if we can have moral beliefs without having false beliefs then nihilism is not true. Indeed, so long as moral judgments are truth apt, the truth of 2 is tantamount to the falsehood of nihilism and vice versa. Thus 2 begs the question. It cannot provide an independent reason for supposing nihilism to be false since it more or less amounts to the negation of nihilism. Hence, this version of the argument is valid and may even be sound, but it is not rationally persuasive since it begs the question against nihilism. Perhaps we should try another tack. It is not that if moral judgments are false we ought rationally give up moralizing, where rationality has something to do with truth or consistency. Rather, if all moral judgments are false we ought pragmatically to give up moralizing. The idea is that there are ends, perhaps human ends, that are best achieved by giving up both moralizing and morality. This is in fact the view of Hinckfuss and Garner (and briefly, perhaps, of Bertrand Russell (1922/1999, pp. 184–188)). They are what I call “humanistic amoralists.” They don’t just think that moral judgments are false – they think that they are pernicious falsehoods which serve as a prop to tyranny and an excuse to torturers. Whether the humanistic amoralists are right and giving up morality would lead to a bonanza of tolerance, freedom and equality is a decidedly moot point. But there are presumably some ends that would be furthered by giving up morality and moralizing. Never mind what they are, let us just designate them as X. Then 1 will be true (indeed true by fiat): 1 If all moral judgments are false, then, if we are to achieve ends X, we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. But the trouble is that this is trivially true, not just in the sense that we have defined ends X as the ones that would be achieved by giving up morality, but because the conditional is true in virtue of its consequent alone. The falsehood of all moral judgments has nothing to do with the fact that abandoning morality would be conducive to ends X. The “if” expresses no dependency of the consequent on the antecedent. Which means that 2 is simply false: 2 It is not the case that, if we are to achieve ends X, we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality.
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Hence, this version of the argument is valid but unsound. My conclusion is that the 1, 2, 3 line of argument cannot be made to work. If the “ought” is moral, the first premise is false. If the “ought” is rational, the first premise may be true, but the second premise presupposes the falsehood of nihilism which means that the argument begs the question. If the “ought” is pragmatic then the first premise may be true, but if so, it is true in virtue of its consequent, which means that the second premise, which consists in denying the consequent, is false. In my view, the argument derives its appeal from an unconscious equivocation. Premise 1 is read with a rational or truth-related “ought” but premise 2 is read with either a moral or a pragmatic “ought” (thus if all moral judgments are false we ought rationally to shmoralize rather than moralize, but shmoralizing would be pedantic and inconvenient and hence silly, i.e., something we are not pragmatically obliged to do). Appealing as it is, this line of argument does not show that nihilism is false.
7 The Doppelganger Problem So far, so good. Metaethical nihilism has survived the objections of Blackburn and Wright. But we now come to another problem: the Doppelganger Problem and its supercharged variant, the Reinforced Doppelganger. The Doppelganger Problem in its simple form is this: It seems that not all moral judgments can be false, for (in many cases at least) the negation of a moral judgment, X, is itself a moral judgment. And if X is false, its negation not-X must be true. But the error theory is precisely the thesis that all moral judgments are false (at least with respect to their core moral contents). So the error theory or metaethical nihilism is false; indeed, incoherent. The problem is a general one, which afflicts error theories of all sorts. According to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s famous taxonomy (1986), a realist about a domain of discourse K is someone who believes two things: (a) that K-statements express propositions (that is, are truth-apt) and (b) that some of them are literally true (that is, true when construed literally). Conversely, an antirealist about a domain K is someone who either (a) denies that K-statements are really propositions, truth-apt, true-or-false (at least with respect to their core meanings) or (b) insists that all of them are false. Thus with respect to ethics, emotivists and other noncognitivists are type-a antirealists, and nihilists or error theorists are type-b antirealists. SayreMcCord rather hoped that his taxonomy would be not only neutral but fair in a certain sense; it was designed to map out a series of positions that could be consistently (if not sanely) held. But if type-b antirealism is not such a position then his taxonomy is in deep trouble. And the Doppelganger Problem suggests precisely this. For it seems to show that there are not, or at least, that there should not be, any type-b antirealists about any domain (including ethics). And the reason is that typeb antirealism is incoherent, and thus collapses into straightforward Sayre-McCord realism.
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Here’s why: If the membership of a domain of discourse K is closed under negation, then, if X is a statement of kind K, its doppelganger ~X is a statement of kind K. But if X is false, ~X is true. So it cannot be the case that all judgments of kind K are false. If we were not dealing with potentially infinite domains we would have to say that at most half the statements of kind K are false. The rest of them – their negations, their doppelgangers – must be true. But the thesis that judgments of kind K are truth apt and that some of them are true is realism, not antirealism, according to Sayre-McCord’s taxonomy. Thus type-b antirealism does not mark out a coherent class of theories. Error theories as such seem to be self-refuting.
8 Solutions to the Doppelganger Can the Doppelganger Problem be solved? Perhaps. But it is not clear that the problem can always be solved or that the same solution will work for every domain. When Field says that mathematics is false he means that every mathematical statement that quantifies over abstract objects is false. Now, the negation of a statement that quantifies over abstract objects does not quantify over abstract objects. Hence the Doppelganger Principle – that if X is a statement of kind K, ~X is a statement of kind K – does not apply within this domain. And if the Doppelganger Principle does not apply within a domain the Doppelganger Problem is dissolved. Thus Field’s type-b antirealism does not collapse into realism. Can we make the same move within metaethics? I think not. For though the negation of a moral proposition is not always a moral proposition, it seems to me that sometimes and in some contexts it is. (Consider “We ought to keep our marriage vows,” and its doppelganger “It is not the case that we ought to keep our marriage vows.” The latter, like the former, might have a considerable impact on our conduct if it came to be widely believed.) In other words, the Doppelganger Principle applies but intermittently. Even so, it scuppers metaethical nihilism as I have described it. For if the negations of some moral judgments are moral judgments, then it cannot be the case that all moral judgments are false. Thus metaethical nihilism needs to be reformulated. I suggest the following: All non-negative atomic moral judgments are false. This requires elucidation. First we specify a range of primitive “thin” moral predicates: “good” (morally good), “bad,” “right,” “wrong” “ought to” etc. (there may be a problem about this, as some of them are interdefinable). We then define an atomic moral judgment as a proposition ascribing an n-place moral predicate to n specific items. As defined these are nonnegative, i.e., not governed by the negation operator, but we redundantly specify that they are non-negative for the sake of clarity. Nihilism now amounts to the claim that all non-negative atomic moral propositions are false. And the argument is the standard nihilistic argument that there are no moral properties or relations corresponding to the moral predicates and thus no moral facts. Although this new formulation of nihilism is much more restricted than the original doctrine, it captures the spirit, though not the letter of the original thesis. It captures the spirit, since moral facts are
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denied and error ramifies through the great systems of morality, rendering them systematically false. But it rejects the letter, since some items that might reasonably be described as moral judgments will come out true (material conditionals with atomic moral judgments for their antecedents, disjunctions in which one disjunct is moral and the other not, etc.). But a myth does not cease to be a myth because it contains a few random truths, and what might be called “restricted nihilism” converts morality into a collection of myths. Does this deal with the Doppelganger Problem? Apparently yes. For the negation of a non-negative atomic moral proposition is never a non-negative atomic moral proposition. And where the Doppelganger Principle does not apply, the Doppelganger Problem does not arise. There is a general lesson here. Error theories as characterized by Sayre-McCord are only viable on one condition. We can only say that all propositions of kind K are false if the negation of a kind K proposition is never itself a proposition of kind K. Thus the error theorist must be very careful about defining his kind K if he is to escape self-refutation. Nietzsche omits this precaution. In The Will to Power 15, he flirts with what might be called “Global Metaphysical Nihilism” or “the Global Error Theory”: “The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there simply is no true world. [This form of nihilism] would be a divine way of thinking.” Divine or not, it is absurd. For it amounts to the thesis that all propositions are false. Here the kind K of propositions is the kind of propositions as such. This kind is closed under negation since the negation of a proposition is itself a proposition. Hence it cannot be the case that all propositions are false. We may be able to save Nietzsche’s bacon as a metaethicist by restricting his thesis to non-negative atomic moral propositions, but the “divine way of thinking” seems to be beyond redemption.
9 The Reinforced Doppelganger I come now to the Reinforced Doppelganger, a particular problem for metaethical nihilists. Let us take a specific act (say the slaying of Caesar on the Ides of March, 44 BC) performed by specific actors (Brutus and Cassius for convenience, though of course other conspirators were involved). Then, according to revised metaethical nihilism, proposition B Brutus and Cassius’ slaying of Caesar was wrong is false. And this, in turn, entails: ~B It is not the case that Brutus and Cassius’ slaying of Caesar was wrong. But, given that the slaying of Caesar was a deliberate action, ~B would appear to entail:
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Br Brutus and Cassius’ slaying of Caesar was right (in the sense of “morally permissible”). Generally speaking, “Action X is not wrong” appears to entail “Action X is right” and “Action X is not right” appears to entail “Action X is wrong.” Call these the “RD” (for “reinforced Doppelganger”) principles: RD1 “It is not the case that action X is wrong” entails “Action X is right.” RD2 “It is not the case that action X is right” entails “Action X is wrong.” But if either of these principles is correct, my solution to the Doppelganger Problem fails. For the falsehood of a non-negative atomic moral proposition entails its negation and, in some cases at least, the negation of one non-negative atomic moral proposition entails the truth of another. So it can’t be the case that all non-negative atomic moral propositions are false. If all actions are not wrong then all actions (at least, those which exist) are right or morally permissible. And if all actions are not right or morally permissible then all actions (at least, those which exist) are wrong. Either way we have moral truths – non-negative atomic moral truths – in abundance. It seems that the only alternative to moral realism (in Sayre-McCord’s sense) is noncognitivism, after all. There is only one way out for the nihilist. He has to deny the RD principles. “Action X is not wrong” does not entail that action X is right (in the sense of morally permissible) nor does “Action X is not right” entail that action X is wrong. But is this bold and blunt assertion anything more than the desperate response of the cornered nihilistic rat? No, because (I think) it can be motivated. A entails B if it cannot be the case that A is true and B false. Or A entails B if there is no conceivable situation (possible world) in which A is true and B false. Is there a conceivable situation in which ~B is true and Br false? Yes: the situation in which there are no moral properties or relations, and specifically no properties of rightness, wrongness or obligatoriness, which attach themselves to acts. In such a situation, Brutus and Cassius’ slaying of Caesar won’t have the property of wrongness, but it won’t have the property of rightness (moral permissibility) either. It won’t have any moral properties at all. Now this situation is precisely the situation that nihilists think obtains. Thus the RD principles cannot provide independent evidence against nihilism. For they rest on the thesis not only that nihilism is false but that it is necessarily false. The point can be expressed with the aid of the following two diagrams (Figs. 1 and 2). Figure 1 represents logical space (for deliberate actions) as presupposed by the RD principles. Figure 2 represents logical space (for deliberate actions) as represented by nihilists. (Of course, nihilists believe that all actual acts are in the doubly shaded area.) Nihilists believe, as RD theorists do not, that it could be that actions are neither right nor wrong (indeed, they argue that this is not just the way it could be but the way it is). RD theorists effectively deny even the possibility of nihilism. But to say that nihilism is impossible – that it is absolutely inconceivable
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Fig. 1 Logical space (for deliberate actions) as presupposed by the RD principles
Fig. 2 Logical space (for deliberate actions) as represented by nihilists
that neither moral rightness nor wrongness attach to actions – is to make a large and implausible claim. Yet if this claim is not true, the RD principles are both false. Thus metaethical nihilism (somewhat revised) can survive both the Doppelganger and the Reinforced Doppelganger Problems. It is perhaps worth stressing that the RD principles are not analytic since another famous attempt to refute the error theory (along with many other forms of moral antirealism) rests on the claim that they are. In his famous paper “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it” (1996), Ronald Dworkin argues that wholesale or Archimedean moral skepticism of the kind advanced by Mackie (and in my view by Nietzsche) is fundamentally incoherent. You can’t be a skeptic about all moral claims, since if you think that abortion is not wrong – or if you think that it is not full-bloodedly true that abortion is wrong – you are committed to the first-order view that abortion is morally permissible. But that only holds if you subscribe to something like RD1 – that the claim that actions of kind X are not wrong entails that actions of kind X are right (in the sense of morally permissible). But nihilists (if they have any sense) reject such claims. Dworkin might reply that this is like people who believe both that Oscar is round and that Oscar is square but absolve themselves from the charge of inconsistency by rejecting the thesis that what is round is not square (and vice versa). The problem with this is that it really is analytic (or at least necessarily true) that what is round is not square, but it is not analytic that actions
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that are not wrong are morally permissible. For it does not hold in worlds where there are no moral properties, which is precisely that kind of world that nihilists think we inhabit. Dworkin is like the citizen of a mighty empire in which everything is legal unless the emperor forbids it; taking this to be an analytic truth, he concludes that outside in the Badlands, where the writ of the emperor does not run and nothing is forbidden, everything is legal. “Those who adopt the second-order view that the Badlands are lawless are in fact committed to the first-order view that everything in the badlands is legal! For they admit – nay, they insist – that in the Badlands nothing is forbidden by the emperor!” But where there is nobody with the authority to permit or forbid, the fact that something is not forbidden does not entail that it is permitted.
10 Unfinished Business In §§5–6, I discussed a family of arguments derived, in part, from Blackburn and Wright, which criticize the nihilistic view that moral judgments are all false. These arguments fail, but perhaps they do better against the amended form of the error theory that I have been defending in §§7–9. Premise 1 transforms into premise 1∗ : 1∗ If all non-negative atomic moral judgments are false then we morally ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Is 1∗ true? Surely not. It is not quite clear how the consequent of 1∗ should be analyzed, but it is most naturally rendered as a universal quantification: For any person x, x morally ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Thus, for the consequent of 1∗ to be true there must be a relation of obligation between each individual and the act-types of (a) giving up moralizing and (b) giving up morality. But if all non-negative atomic moral propositions are false, because there are no such things as obligations, then it will not be true of each individual that he/she ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. Thus, if the antecedent is true, the consequent will be false, which means that the conditional itself is false. Thus the first variant of the argument (with the “ought”s interpreted as moral) is unsound. What about the other two? In the second variant of the argument in which the “ought”s are read as hypothetical imperatives indexed to some truth-seeking project, premise 1 transforms into premise 1∗ : 1∗ If all non-negative atomic moral judgments are false, then if we want our beliefs to be true (and not false) we ought to (a) give up moralizing and (b) give up morality. 1∗ appears to be true, but premise 2 , which does not need to be amended, is just as question begging in this version as it was in the earlier argument, since it is tantamount (in context) to the claim that not all non-negative atomic moral judgments
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are false. As for the third variant (pragmatic “ought”), the uniform substitution of “non-negative atomic moral judgments” for “moral judgments” makes no difference to its status. The arguments fail against the older version of the error theory and they are just as unsuccessful against the amended version.
11 Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that Nietzsche was a certain sort of nihilist, i.e., an error theorist about ethics, defending my interpretation against Schacht. I then defended this more or less Mackian position against Blackburn, Wright, and the hoi polloi. Morality does not have to be true to be good (in the sense of good for something), thus if it is good for something and even worth persisting with, this does not show that it is composed of truths. I raised and solved both the Doppelganger Problem and the Reinforced Doppelganger Problem, amending the error theory along the way. In order to escape self-refutation, error theorists like Nietzsche and Mackie must pull in their horns. The claim should not be that all moral judgments are false but only that non-negative atomic moral judgments are all false. Thus we can move from the non-existence of moral properties to the systematic falsehood of morality without adopting the incoherent idea that everything that might reasonably be regarded as a moral judgment is condemned to error. But my aim has been to vindicate the error theory against certain objections, not to establish its truth. The error theory may be in error, but I hope I have shown that it is a lot less silly than some have supposed.
References Ansell-Pearson, K. 1994. An introduction to Nietzsche as a political thinker: The perfect nihilist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blackburn, S. 1993. Errors and the phenomenology of value. In his Essays in quasi-realism, 149–165. New York: Oxford University Press. Cawkwell, G. 1985. A memorial address. In Morality and objectivity: A tribute to J. L. Mackie, ed. T. Honderich, 219–222. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Danto, A. 1965. Nietzsche as philosopher. New York: Macmillan. Dworkin, R. 1996. Objectivity and truth: You’d better believe it. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 87–139. Field, H. 1989. Realism, mathematics and modality. Oxford: Blackwell. Garner, R. 1994. Beyond morality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hinckfuss, I. 1987. The moral society: Its structure and effects. Canberra: Australian National University. Joyce, R. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leiter, B. 2002. Nietzsche on morality. London: Routledge. Mackie, J. L. 1946. A refutation of morals. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24: 77–90. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Nietzsche, F. 1881. Daybreak, Trans. R. Hollingdale. 1982. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Nietzsche, F. 1883. Thus spake Zarathrustra. In The portable Nietzsche, Trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann. 1954. New York: Viking Penguin. Nietzsche, F. 1883–1888. The will to power, Trans. R. Hollingdale and W. Kaufmann; ed. W. Kaufmann. 1968. New York: Vintage. Nietzsche, F. 1886. Beyond good and evil. In The basic writings of Nietzsche, Trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann. 1968. New York: Modern Library. Nietzsche, F. 1887. The genealogy of morals, Trans. C. Diethe; ed. K. Ansell-Pearson. 1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. 1889. Twilight of the idols. In The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And other writings, Trans. J. Norman; eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman. 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pybus, C. 1993. Gross moral turpitude: The Orr case reconsidered. Melbourne: William Heinemann. Russell, B. 1922. Is there an absolute good? In Russell on ethics, ed. C. Pigden. 1999, 119–124. London: Routledge. Sayre-McCord, G. 1986. The many moral realisms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(suppl.): 1–22. Schacht, R. 1995. Making sense of Nietzsche. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Smith, M. ed. 1995. Metaethics. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Patterns of Objectification Richard Joyce
John Mackie thinks that the “objective prescriptivity” with which our moral discourse is essentially but so fatally imbued is the result of our “tendency to read our feelings into their objects” (1977, p. 42). He invokes Hume’s famous projectivist image of the human mind’s “great propensity to spread itself on external objects,” and, indeed, it is in his book-length analysis of Hume’s moral theory (Mackie 1980) that the topic receives a more careful discussion than in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. In both books he musters some considerations in favor of the objectification thesis, and reveals to us that he thinks that “it is very largely correct” (1980, p. 72). But what is the relation between Mackie’s objectification thesis and his thesis of moral skepticism? Is the error theory a premise in an argument to establish the objectification thesis? Or vice versa? Or are they logically unrelated? On the face of it, the objectification thesis appears to entail the error theory, but if this is so then one is left wondering why, in his 1977 book, this thesis is described straight after the argument from queerness, for if Mackie took himself to have some arguments in favor of moral objectification, then might it not have been strategically viable for him to establish the thesis of objectification first and then by implication argue for the moral error theory? Wondering whether Mackie might have chosen to establish his moral error theory on the basis of the thesis of objectification is just my dialectical point of departure. My principal goal in this paper is to try to get a firmer handle on just what the thesis of objectification really is, and to investigate what evidence might support it and what conclusions may follow from it. I will disambiguate two forms of the thesis. One does trivially imply moral skepticism but cannot be established independently of that skepticism, whereas the other may well be substantiated on independent grounds but is neutral on the matter of moral skepticism. First, some terminological clarifications. I will use “moral skepticism” and “moral error theory” interchangeably, reflecting Mackie’s own practice. I will also interchangeably use the verbs “objectify” and “project” – and the associated nouns “objectification” and “projection,” and “the thesis of moral objectification” and R. Joyce (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_3,
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“moral projectivism.” Mackie does this himself, in both his 1977 and 1980 books.1 In this terminological vein, let us start by distinguishing “objectification” from some similar notions. Hypostatization (a.k.a. reification) is the practice of taking something abstract and speaking of it (or thinking of it, or treating it) as if it were concrete (e.g., “Religion was his guiding light,” “Justice is blind”). As a literary device or simply as a metaphorical manner of speaking, there is obviously nothing objectionable about the tendency; we do it constantly. If, however, one began to accept such propositions literally, at face value, then that would be a kind of error. Sometimes, though, it may be the subject of dispute whether an instance of this is an error. When philosophers try to provide a concrete explication of a seemingly abstract concept – like set or number – then some will treat this as an admirable extension of the naturalistic program while others will consider it a misguided blunder. Anthropomorphism is often said to be a special type of hypostatization, wherein aspects of the inanimate world are imbued with human qualities. This taxonomy cannot be quite correct, however, since the subject of anthropomorphism need not be abstract. “Nature abhors a vacuum” attributes a human quality (abhorrence) to an abstract entity (nature), whereas “That stretch of road is treacherous” attributes a human quality (treachery) to a concrete entity (the road). As before, there is nothing wrong with anthropomorphism as a literary device or figure of speech, but one commits a kind of straightforward error if one really believes, of something incapable of human qualities, that it has such qualities. And, as before, there are areas of dispute, such as what kind of mental attributions can be made to animals or computers. In Modern Painters, John Ruskin gave the name the pathetic fallacy (from “pathos”) to a certain anthropomorphic tendency in writers and poets. He derided tired and uninspired anthropomorphic devices (“it is only the basest writer who cannot speak of the sea without talking of ‘raging waves,’ ‘remorseless floods,’ ‘ravenous billows,’ etc.” (Ruskin 1856/1908, p. 65)), but thought that some anthropomorphisms may be aesthetically justified when they reveal something genuine about the emotional life of the poet, despite being packaged with a false surface expression. (Still, Ruskin thought that the very best poets should be able to do away with such devices altogether.) Ruskin’s anachronistic ruminations on aesthetics need not detain us; I mention the pathetic fallacy here because Mackie explicitly refers to it himself. He says that his thesis of moral objectification is analogous to the pathetic fallacy (1977, p. 42). It is not obvious in what sense, exactly, the two are supposed to be analogous, but it is certainly important to observe a disanalogy. Witness what Mackie goes on to say immediately following, supposedly explaining the pathetic fallacy: “If a fungus, say, fills us with disgust, we may be inclined to ascribe to the fungus itself a nonnatural quality of foulness” (ibid.; he uses the same example in his 1946 article). This is actually not a good example of the pathetic fallacy (though it may be a good
1 The
disjunctive phrase “projection or objectification” appears on p. 42 of Mackie (1977), and twice on p. 72 of Mackie (1980).
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example of what Mackie is really driving at). The pathetic fallacy proper would occur if one ascribed to the fungus the human trait of being disgusted – which one would do, obviously, only in the context of joking or speaking metaphorically. By contrast, to attribute to the fungus the quality of foulness (irrespective of whether that property is non-natural or non-existent) is not a piece of anthropomorphism at all. In this example, a certain feeling – disgust – has caused the person to experience the world as containing a certain quality – foulness. It seems pretty clear from context that Mackie will say that this foulness is not a real quality of the fungus; we think that it is only because our disgust somehow leads us to experience matters this way. Thus, to the extent that the fungus-foulness example exemplifies Mackie’s notion of objectification (which I think it does), objectification is not an instance of anthropomorphism. Contrary to the quote given in the opening paragraph, the process of objectification is not one by which we “read our feelings into their objects” – we do not see the inanimate world as being disgusted, being angry, being sad, (the waves as raging, the floods as ravenous), and so forth.2 Rather, the process is one by which our feelings cause us to read into their objects qualities that we would not otherwise judge them to have – that (it is tempting to say) they do not really have at all, that nothing has. In his 1980 book, Mackie uses the vague but more accurate phrase: that we “read some sort of image of [our] sentiments” into the actions and characters that arouse them (p. 71): the foulness is “some sort of image” of our disgust; the wrongness is “some sort of image” of our disapproval; and so on. In his much earlier 1946 article, he writes that “in objectifying our feelings we are also turning them inside out. . . . The feeling and the supposed quality are related as a seal or stamp and its impression” (pp. 81–82). Note that the characterization of objectification just given has several components. First, there’s a complicated claim about our experience of the world and what has caused that experience (a claim I will attempt to make more precise in due course); second, there’s a metaphysical claim that the quality we are experiencing the world to have is not really instantiated at all. One might think that if this is objectification, then the error theory would indeed follow by implication. But that is not quite so, for the characterization just given does not exclude a noncognitivist interpretation of the matter. Let noncognitivism be the metaethical view that moral utterances are not assertions. The characterization of objectification says nothing, nor implies anything, about the nature of the speech acts that one might use to communicate one’s experience. Suppose, for example, that we experience Xs as having the property Q, but in fact nothing instantiates Q – our experience is brought about by some emotional mental state E. This characterization is neutral regarding what is going on when we utter the sentence “X is Q.”
2 Cf.
Barry Stroud’s discussion of Humean projectivism: “We do not think that the sequence of events on the billiards table – the one ball’s striking the others and the second ball’s moving – itself has a feeling or impression like the feeling Hume says we humans get when we observe it. . . . Nor do we think that an act of willful murder itself has a feeling of disgust or disapprobation, any more than we think that a painting on a wall has a sentiment of pleasure or awe” (Stroud 2000, p. 22).
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Perhaps we are asserting that X is Q (in which case an error theory holds) or perhaps we are merely expressing the emotion E (in which case noncognitivism holds). Thus, in order to have a characterization of objectification that implies an error theory, we would have to add a further clause: that our utterances about the subject matter in question are assertions (or that they are false, or that they are erroneous, or something else along such lines). It is possible that Mackie did have in mind such a complex account of objectification, though it is difficult to say with confidence. He several times states that the qualities that are projected “are fictitious” (1980, p. 71), but one cannot tell whether he intends this to be a defining component of objectification itself or just an additional point that follows from other things that he has argued. (I suspect the matter was not precisely demarcated in his thinking.) The point to which I should like to draw attention is this: If one does have in mind the complex account of moral objectification – the one that does imply the moral error theory – the one that consists of (i) a complicated claim about our experience of the world and what causes that experience, (ii) the metaphysical claim that the quality we are experiencing the world as having is not really present at all, and (iii) the cognitivist claim that our associated utterances are assertions – then whatever arguments one employed to establish this thesis would already be entirely sufficient to establish moral skepticism. The moral error theoretic position, after all, just is the conjunction of components (ii) and (iii). Therefore, if we are using this complex account of objectification, then the argumentative strategy mentioned at the start of this paper – of establishing the moral error theory on the basis of the thesis of objectification – turns out not to be dialectically viable, after all. Suppose, alternatively, that we worked with a less complicated version of objectification. Suppose we stripped away both the cognitivist subthesis (iii) and the metaphysical claim (ii), leaving just (i) a claim about our experience of the world and what causes that experience. Elsewhere (Joyce 2009a) I have called this remaining theory “minimal projectivism”; here, in line with Mackie’s preferred terminology, let us call it “minimal objectification.” Would it be viable to argue for moral skepticism on the basis of minimal objectification? In order for a positive answer, minimal objectification must imply moral skepticism, but it must do so non-trivially – it cannot be that making the case for minimal objectification would require first making the case for moral skepticism. Before proceeding, we must be more precise regarding this “claim about our experience of the world and what causes that experience.” This claim is the heart of objectification; it is the part that is supposed to capture, in literal terms, the whole idea of something mental being projected onto the world. It is not my intention here to offer a general account of objectification, for that poses a number of complications that are surprisingly challenging to overcome and the effort is not necessary on this occasion. I am satisfied to sketch an account of a pertinent proper subset of objectification: minimal affective objectification.3 3 For
the curious, I will quickly outline the difficulties of providing a general account of minimal objectification (or “projectivism” as I will call it in this footnote, since I will relate it to subjects for
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S’s experience of X as P is an instance of minimal affective objectification if and only if: (1) S experiences P as an objective feature of X, and (2) this experience has its immediate causal origin in some affective attitude (e.g., the emotion of disapproval) rather than a perceptual faculty.
Call (1) the phenomenological thesis and (2) the causal thesis.4 We experience the fungus as objectively foul, but this experience is the immediate result not of perceiving the property of foulness, but rather of our emotion of disgust. Naturally, perception is involved prior to our feeling disgust: we see the fungus, we smell the fungus, and so forth. It is in acknowledgement of this prior engagement of perceptual faculties that the causal thesis claims that the experience (e.g., of foulness) has its immediate origin in an affective attitude rather than a perceptual faculty. (That this is a vague and potentially problematic qualification does not escape me.) This appearance of “immediate” is designed also to exclude non-projection cases where some affective state, such as emotional arousal, guides subsequent perceptual processes, such as focusing one’s attention on aspects of the world that might otherwise escape notice. An intensely jealous person, for example, might notice something in the body language of another that she otherwise would not have seen. Let us say that the body language is real: The other person really is (say) sitting with uncrossed legs. And the jealous party experiences this body language as an objective aspect of the world (thus satisfying the phenomenological thesis). And were she not jealous, she would not have noticed it. However, her experience is not an instance
which the latter term is more familiar). An adequate general account of projectivism should cover at least the following cases: (1) moral projectivism, (2) causal projectivism, (3) psychopathological projectivism, and (4) color projectivism. In the interests of illustrating the difficulties of achieving a general account, let me sketch, in the most provisional terms, what these four theories might look like. In moral projectivism, something in the world prompts one to feel disapproval (say), which leads one to experience the thing in the world as forbidden. In causal projectivism, a regularity in the world prompts one to have an expectation, which leads one to experience the world as containing a causal relation. I am not confident that I can give a general account of all forms of psychopathological projectivism, but examples are not hard to come by: A person’s poor selfimage leads her to interpret her parents as being overly critical or demanding. So far we have three mental states that serve as “intermediaries” between the world and one’s experience of the world: disapproval, expectation, and a poor self-image. Yet it is hard to come up with an overarching category for these three that will not end up capturing too much. And in the case of color projectivism, it is challenging even to come up with an analogous intermediary mental state. The idea is (roughly) that one’s visual experience of color owes its quality to the nature of one’s sensory apparatus rather than to the real nature of objects’ surfaces (even though the sensory apparatus is sensitive to real properties of surfaces). It is not obvious what mental activity is supposed to be getting projected in the creation of one’s visual color field. (Visual qualia?) My hunch is that color projectivism can be articulated only as a metaphysical (non-minimal) thesis. It is in light of these kinds of complications that I have sidestepped the delicate task of trying to unify this family of stock examples (and others besides) with a general account, though I confess to harboring the hope of yet doing so in the future. Perhaps in the end there is no entirely satisfactory general account of minimal projection in the offing. 4 See Joyce (2009a), where some features of this account (e.g., what might be meant by “objective”) are discussed in more detail.
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of minimal affective projection because it does not flow immediately from the affective attitude of jealousy: rather, the jealousy has guided the subsequent engagement of her perceptual faculties. In the case of foul fungus, by comparison, the disgust does not lead one to see the fungus as foul via channeling one’s perceptual attention to aspects of the fungus (though it may incidentally direct perceptual attention as well); the relation between the disgust and the foulness – the relation that Mackie described as the latter being “some sort of image of” the former – is more direct than that. In order to articulate the thesis of minimal moral affective objectification we need do nothing more than stipulate that “P” (as in “. . .experiences X as P”) stands for a moral adjective. I cannot think of a theory of moral projectivism for which the mental state putatively “projected” in the creation of moral experience is supposed to be anything other than an affective attitude (e.g., disapproval, subscription to a normative framework, etc.), so in what follows I shall drop the “affective” qualification. Clarity requires, however, that we keep the “minimal.” I do not suppose that every philosopher who has spoken of “moral projectivism” or “moral objectification” over the years has really had in mind, even tacitly, the minimal variety. Both the phenomenological thesis and the causal thesis appear to be psychological claims. Quite how we would go about empirically testing them for the case of morality (or any other case) is a nice question (into which I won’t delve on this occasion), but it seems pretty clear that, on the face of it, whatever methods of empirical psychology we employed would not require us first to establish that moral properties do not exist, or that moral judgments are uttered with assertoric force. Therefore one desideratum of the strategy of arguing for moral skepticism on the basis of minimal objectification appears to be satisfied: The latter does not imply the former trivially. The other desideratum, however, is not satisfied. Minimal moral objectification does not imply moral skepticism at all, for it is metaethically neutral. Not only is it silent on the cognitivist/noncognitivist debate, it is also silent on the metaphysical debate over the existence or non-existence of moral properties. It is, therefore, compatible with moral realism and thus does not imply moral skepticism. Let me explain. Note, first, that there is a prima facie pressure in favor of maintaining this compatibility, based simply on the observation that were the phenomenological and causal theses to be confirmed by empirical inquiry (as they very well might be), it would surely be astonishing if the moral realist were to roll over and concede the game to the skeptic. It may nevertheless clarify matters to explore this compatibility in more specific terms. A simple example will suffice to get the compatibility on the table, and then I will develop a more satisfactory example for the moral case. Consider an everyday usage of the notion of projection. Suppose that a person tends to experience others she encounters in social situations as critical and reproachful; but in fact this is due to her own meek and self-doubting nature. It would not be at all peculiar for us to describe this person as projecting her sense of her own inadequacy onto others. Now suppose that on a given occasion this person encounters a man who really is unusually critical and reproachful. Let it be stipulated that he has not yet indicated to the woman, even in the most subtle fashion,
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that he has such a personality; she simply assumes that he does, just as she does with everyone else that she meets. The woman’s judgment “This man is critical and reproachful of me” is just as much a projection on this occasion as ever it is; and this conclusion is not undermined by the fact that the judgment happens this time to be true. Even if the woman often encountered critical and reproachful persons, her subsequent negative judgments about them (which will now often be true) might nevertheless remain instances of her projecting her sense of inadequacy, so long as we specify that she would have formed these same judgments even if these critical and reproachful persons’ personalities had been otherwise. An analogous situation in the case of moral judgment would suffice to show the compatibility of minimal moral objectification and moral realism. We can imagine a scenario in which, on the one hand, moral judgments are acts of minimal objectification/projection, while, on the other hand, these judgments (when uttered) are assertions that are often true. According to one influential view, satisfying the latter conditions suffices for moral realism (Sayre-McCord 1986). Some would prefer to add a further clause to moral realism: that the assertions in question are true in virtue of some objective state of affairs. (See Joyce 2007 for discussion of the definition of “moral realism.”) Let it be so; imagining the scenario in such a way that this additional clause is also satisfied will not spoil the example by undermining the projectivist stipulation. But one may remain unsatisfied with this demonstration of compatibility, for the example had the projection-derived judgments turning out true by coincidence. The example shows minimal objectification and moral realism to be compatible according to the letter of the law, but perhaps not the spirit. Can we eliminate this aspect of accidentality from the demonstration of compatibility? I believe that we can. Return to Mackie’s example of foul fungus. Assume the minimal affective objectification account holds true: A person experiences the fungus as having an objective quality of foulness, and this experience has its immediate origin in the person’s disgust. Now let us see whether realism about foulness might also hold true. There is certainly nothing to exclude us holding that when the person makes public her judgment via the utterance “That fungus is foul!” she is making an assertion. It is the other realist elements that might be deemed troublesome: that the assertion (A) is true, (B) is true in virtue of an objective fact, and (C) is non-accidentally true – i.e., is made in a way dependent on the truth-rendering fact. (Whether (B) is really a necessary aspect of realism is moot, and that (C) is a necessary part of realism seems doubtful, but let us add these components for the sake of argument.) Consider a response-dependent account of the property of foulness. (See Casati and Tappolet 1998; Johnston 1989, 1992, 1993; Wright 1988.) Foulness, on this account, is a disposition to produce a certain kind of psychological response R in a certain kind of subject S in a certain kind of circumstance C. It would be no challenge to specify these variables R, S, and C in such a way that certain items in the actual world – such as bits of fungus – have this disposition, thus rendering assertions of the form “X is foul” true. The account can also claim to satisfy an important kind of objectivity. (See Pettit 1991.) The disposition in question will be understood
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in modal terms, such that the fungus would prompt R if apprehended by S in C. Thus the fungus may have the disposition even if no Ss have ever been in C, even if no Ss have ever experienced R, even if no Ss ever have existed or ever will exist. Thus the disposition does not depend on the existence of any particular psychological state, or even the existence of psychological states generally. (One might point out that the disposition is nevertheless conceptually mind-dependent – since it cannot be adequately described without reference being made to psychological state R – but it is not at all obvious that realism requires “conceptual mind-independence.” It certainly doesn’t require every form of mind-independence. One would like to be a realist about domesticated dogs, despite the fact that they are causally minddependent entities: existing only because of generations of intentional behavior on the part of humans.) In order to emphasize the fact that satisfying these realist conditions has not undermined the projectivist assumptions that we started with, let us specify R in such a way that the psychological response in question is in fact an act of objectification. In other words, suppose that foulness is the disposition to prompt Ss (when in C) to feel disgust and to objectify this disgust in their experience of the world. This appears to build the satisfaction of the minimal objectification thesis (i.e., the satisfaction of the phenomenological and the causal theses) into the response dependent account. We are thus in a position to see that the judgment that is derived from a process of objectification – “That fungus is foul!” – does indeed manifest a dependence relation on the truth-supplying fact; it is not merely coincidentally true: Were the fungus not to have been foul, the observer would not have made the judgment.5 One might worry that in striving to satisfy the dependence relation the account has undermined the causal thesis. If there is this dependence relation in place – if the counterfactual that ends the last paragraph holds true – then isn’t the person’s experience of the foulness (the foulness that we are here supposing to objectively exist) a case of perception, after all? And if so, then the causal thesis is undermined, in which case my attempt to show the compatibility of minimal moral objectification and realism will have failed. I respond not by offering a full account of perception (which I have neither the space nor the expertise to do), but by observing that the counterfactual dependence mentioned is certainly not a sufficient condition for perception. A couple of simple examples will suffice. Consider learning something from reading a book: Suppose 5 Needless
to say, Mackie himself won’t buy the response-dependent account of moral properties. He criticizes such views in general terms in his 1980 book (Chapter 5); and in his 1973 book (Chapter 4) he doubts even the existence of dispositional properties. It is also doubtful that Hume’s multifarious uses of the projectivist metaphor are supposed to be compatible with realism. Stroud (2000) emphasizes how, in Hume’s account, the content of projectivist experience – be it causal connection, beauty, color, or virtue – is something that could not even be intelligibly predicated of items in the world. Immediately following the famous Treatise projectivist image of the mind’s “great propensity to spread itself on external objects,” Hume declares that sounds and smells “really exist no where” (Hume 1739–1740, 1.3.14.24/1978, p. 167) – and context makes it reasonable to think that he will say the same of color and necessary connection. I discuss the error theoretic commitments lying behind Hume’s views in Joyce (forthcoming).
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one learns for the first time that Napoleon lost Waterloo. The book, we are supposing, is an accurate one, in the sense that had Napoleon not lost Waterloo, the book would not have contained the claim that he did lose. And we will also suppose that the reader judges that Napoleon lost Waterloo solely on the basis of reading this reliable history book. This judgment thus manifests the appropriate counterfactual relationship with the relevant fact, but we would not on this basis conclude that the reader perceives Napoleon losing Waterloo. The second example concerns someone judging that a certain object instantiates a dispositional property. Suppose someone works out that a vase is fragile by some means other than breaking it. Perhaps she smashes a lot of similar vases, or perhaps she asks some authoritative people. We will suppose that whatever means she employs is reliable, in the sense that had the vase not had the disposition, she would not have come to make the judgment about its fragility that she does make. But, though her true judgment (“The vase is fragile”) manifests a dependence relation on the truth-rendering fact (the vase’s being fragile), we would not say that she has literally perceived this vase’s fragility. Thus, in striving to come up with a realistic account of foulness that satisfies the desideratum of the judgment being dependent on the truth-supplying fact (along with satisfying all the other realist criteria, too), we have not undercut our starting projectivist assumption that the experience has its immediate origin in an affective attitude rather than a perceptual faculty. And what goes for foulness here can go for moral qualities, too. I conclude, therefore, that minimal moral objectification is compatible with moral realism – even a fairly robust version of moral realism.6 Whatever may seem surprising or counter-intuitive about this conclusion probably stems from the fact that non-minimal versions of objectification are more familiar to us, both in vernacular settings and in the philosophy classroom. We are more likely to describe the case of psychopathological projection in terms such as: “Her sense of her own inadequacy makes her see others as overly critical when really they’re not.”7 We are more likely to describe moral objectification in terms such as: “Our feelings of disapproval and aversion lead us to see the world as containing moral qualities that it does not really contain.” It is not my intention to condemn such non-minimal, metaphysically-committed uses of objectification; they may, indeed, be the more natural and useful formulations in most circumstances. My point has been, rather, to show that in order to establish the truth of any such metaphysically-committed objectification thesis one would need to have already shown that the quality in question does not exist, and so the strategy of supporting moral skepticism by means of first establishing a metaphysically-committed version of moral objectification is unworkable. We have also seen that the strategy of supporting moral skepticism solely on the basis of establishing a minimal version
6 There
is precedence for seeing projectivism and realism as compatible in the Humean literature. See Craig (2000) and Sainsbury (1998). 7 Freud, remember, categorized this sort of projection as a kind of delusion – indicating an antirealist construal.
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of moral objectification is also unworkable, for the minimal version is silent on the debate between the moral realist and the moral skeptic. As to this last claim, one might object that of course minimal objectification should be silent about these metaethical claims, for the whole point, after all, is that it should not imply moral skepticism trivially; it should imply it only in conjunction with some other premises. Minimal objectification may well be consistent with moral realism, but perhaps these other premises will serve to narrow the range of possibilities so as to exclude realism along with every other theoretical possibility bar the error theory. One or more of these additional premises may function to knock noncognitivism out of the running. (Mackie does, recall, develop several arguments against the noncognitivist in both his 1977 and 1980 books.) Other additional premises may serve to establish the non-existence of moral properties. Perhaps when we add up all of these premises we end up with an argumentative route from minimal objectification to the moral error theory. At first blush, the problem with this objection appears obvious. The additional premises adverted to would appear to be sufficient to establish the moral error theory; they would be doing all the work, and the thesis of minimal objectification would be entirely superfluous in this argument. Therefore, we seem to see once more that the strategy of establishing the moral error theory on the basis of the thesis of minimal objectification turns out not to be viable. On closer inspection, however, the objection has more merit. Consider the passage with which Mackie introduces the topic of objectification, immediately after presenting his arguments from relativity and queerness: Considerations of these kinds suggest that it is in the end less paradoxical to reject than to retain the common-sense belief in the objectivity of moral values, provided that we can explain how this belief, if it is false, has become established and is so resistant to criticisms. (1977, p. 42)
The thesis of objectification is supposed to satisfy this “proviso.” In other words, Mackie has exposed a theoretical option: We can either “reject. . . the commonsense belief in the objectivity of moral values” or we can “retain” it. The thesis of objectification is evidently supposed to function as the tie-breaker, making rejection the reasonable choice. We are forced to conclude that (Mackie thinks that) without the thesis of objectification, retaining the commonsense belief would remain a live option. Objectification functions as an explanation of where the massive error embodied in morality comes from, in such a way that without that explanation there remains doubt that it is an error at all. There is a tempting alternative reading of Mackie, which accords the thesis of objectification a lesser role. According to this alternative, by the end of the section in which he presents the argument from queerness (Section 9, Chapter 1) Mackie has established the moral error theory to his own satisfaction. A reader might at that point accept the moral error theory but then be naturally curious to know where this widespread systematic human error has come from, and the thesis of moral objectification is supposed to satisfy this curiosity. According to this reading, the thesis
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of moral objectification does not function to satisfy a proviso, but is, rather, a supplement to the completed skeptical argument: an interesting explanation but strictly dispensable in establishing the case for moral skepticism. The above-quoted passage, however, indicates that this alternative reading is incorrect. The case for moral skepticism (embodied in the arguments from relativity and queerness) is plainly considered incomplete until the thesis of objectification is put forward. But what role precisely does the thesis of objectification play in Mackie’s case for moral skepticism? The answer, I believe, lies in Mackie’s almost-tacit acceptance of some kind of epistemological conservatism. Just prior to presenting the arguments from relativity and queerness, he has admitted that since moral skepticism “goes against assumptions ingrained in our thought and built into some of the ways in which language is used, since it conflicts with what is sometimes called common sense, it needs very solid support” (1977, p. 35). Mackie appears to be acknowledging that the counterintuitiveness of moral skepticism in itself represents a burden of proof that the error theorist must strive to overcome – that the error theorist’s arguments need to be even more convincing than those of his opponent if he is to win the day. That Mackie is an epistemological conservative may seem an unexpected conclusion, considering how accustomed we have grown to seeing the moral realist reach for the principle of epistemological conservatism as one the main weapons in the anti-skepticism arsenal. (See, e.g., Huemer 2005; Brink 1989, pp. 23–24; Dancy 1986, p. 172.8 See Loeb, this volume, for discussion.) But it is apparent that Mackie does indeed consider the “intuitiveness” of a philosophical thesis a valid consideration in deciding whether to endorse it. All else being equal, an intuitive theory is to be preferred over a counter-intuitive one; in other words, the very fact that a belief is held supplies it with a certain prima facie epistemological justification. And that there are intuitions in favor of morality is hardly to be denied; any error theory worth arguing about is, ex hypothesi, counter-intuitive. Mackie’s arguments in favor of moral skepticism, then, must overcome these standing intuitions. The vital role of the thesis of objectification is to explain away the content of these pro-morality intuitions by providing an account of their origin that does not imply or presuppose their truth. Such a genealogical explanation serves to defeat or block whatever prima facie justification these intuitions might otherwise have been granted. The skeptic does not deny or doubt the principle of conservatism; he takes it seriously. In particular, the skeptic attends to the principle’s “all else being equal” clause. “When are things not equal?” the skeptic wonders. When are intuitions defeated, and under what conditions might they not even be accorded prima facie epistemic status? One answer (among many, no doubt) is that things are not equal if one has a plausible, or even empirically confirmed, theory of where the intuitions in question come from that is consistent with their being false.
8I
offer some criticisms of this line of argument – and of Michael Huemer’s version of it in particular – in Joyce (2009b).
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The moral skeptic, then, needs two lines of reasoning. The first attempts to show that there is something fishy about moral facts. (For Mackie, this is achieved by the conjunction of the arguments from relativity and queerness.) But the conclusion of this reasoning is, all parties agree, counter-intuitive. A principle of epistemological conservatism threatens to allow our pro-morality intuitions to override the skeptic’s case. So the skeptic offers a second body of evidence: explaining away the content of those pro-morality intuitions by revealing them to be the product of an unreliable process of formation. The second move aims to show “how even if there were no such objective values people not only might have come to suppose that there are but also persist firmly in that belief” (1977, p. 49). The skeptic thus discharges the burden of proof with which he is lumbered – not by bolstering his initial argument (presenting more evidence in support of premises, devising new argumentative moves, etc.), but by casting into a doubtful light those very intuitions that promised to give the conservative principle traction. (Moreover, nor can these same pro-morality intuitions be raised as a consideration against the argument for objectification, since it is a corollary of the objectification thesis that such intuitions will be in place.) My claim that the intent of Mackie’s two skeptical arguments (relativity and queerness) is merely to show that there is something “fishy” about morality might itself seem fishy; surely, one might object, these arguments are supposed to be more decisive than that. If these are sound arguments (the objection continues), then they need no extra argument to act as a tie-breaker; and if they are not sound arguments, then why should we pay them any attention? However, I think this dilemma does not succeed in undermining the interpretation being offered. Let us briefly consider Mackie’s two skeptical arguments in turn. The argument from relativity takes the form of a competition between two hypotheses: the phenomenon of moral disagreement may be explained either by the supposition that some parties have privileged epistemic access to the realm of moral facts (the realist’s hypothesis) or by the supposition that there are no moral facts at all (the skeptic’s hypothesis). Among the many criteria that we might employ in deciding between these two hypotheses, a comparison of their levels of mesh with our intuitions may well figure. Certainly the epistemological conservative allows it to figure. Therefore putting forward evidence (such as the thesis of objectification) that explains away the content of intuitions in favor of one hypothesis is both strategically permissible and potentially determinative. The same point is slightly less obvious in the case of the argument from queerness, for here, it might seem, we have an argument that purports to stand soundly on its own: Premise 1 is a piece of conceptual analysis (that moral discourse is centrally committed to the existence of objective prescriptions) and premise 2 is an ontological claim (that there exist no objective prescriptions). However, it is, I think, slightly naive to suppose that Mackie considers the argument from queerness to be a sound argument with demonstrably true premises. It is more realistic to think of it as providing a firm consideration in favor of moral skepticism, its premises having the status of hypotheses on whose acceptability many factors may have a
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bearing. There may, for example, be considerations to be raised in support of the claim that there exist no objective prescriptions, but also considerations to be raised in support of the claim that there do exist objective prescriptions. No impartial spectator who has been paying attention to the debate could seriously doubt this; it is a complex and nuanced discussion that leaves plenty of wriggle room for competing interpretations of key elements (as some of the contributions to this volume demonstrate). The epistemological conservative allows that if there are standing intuitions in favor of view that objective prescriptions exist (as it seems reasonable to suspect), then these may be accorded a role in weighting the debate against premise 2 and thus against the argument from queerness. Therefore, again, the strategy of raising evidence (such as the thesis of objectification) that casts into doubt those very intuitions that speak against the argument from queerness – showing that they arise from a potentially unreliable source – is entirely legitimate and may very well swing the argument the skeptic’s way. We have seen, then, that the two lines of reasoning need each other. The case for moral skepticism is not achieved by the arguments from relativity and queerness alone; evidence to explain away the counter-intuitiveness of the conclusion (or individual premises) is also required in order to overcome the challenge from epistemological conservatism. And the thesis of objectification alone will not provide a skeptical conclusion. The minimal version of the thesis is metaethically neutral, and to employ a metaphysically-committed version to this end would simply beg the question. Thus far I have been concerned entirely with the role that the objectification thesis plays in Mackie’s overall strategy for establishing moral skepticism, but we have not yet examined any of the arguments he provides to convince us that the thesis is actually plausible. I will close by running through the considerations in support of the objectification thesis that Mackie offers in his 1977 and 1980 books.9 In the interests of clarifying the structure of the argument we should first acknowledge that it was open to Mackie to eschew the task of mustering evidence in favor of the objectification thesis, and instead simply present the thesis as a coherent and possible hypothesis of the genealogy of moral judgment according to which these judgments are not, or might not be, true. But it is evident that this is not Mackie’s attitude towards the thesis – and it is as well that it is not, for this strategy would place the objectification thesis in the same category as a host of other skeptical hypotheses that lack any real plausibility but which have the (dubious) virtue of thwarting all attempts at falsification. (Brains in vats and deceiving demons spring to mind.) The objectification thesis plainly isn’t supposed to function in this disappointing way – merely as a skeptical hypothesis that might, for all we can prove to
9 Space
does not permit an examination of Mackie’s arguments for moral objectification found in his 1946 paper. I do not think any of the arguments found there are superior to those problematic ones which I shall discuss.
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the contrary, hold true. It is supposed, rather, to be a serious hypothesis for which we can marshal solid evidence. Nevertheless, in my opinion, Mackie misses much of the opportunity to establish the plausibility of the thesis by looking for supportive evidence in the wrong places. The few pages devoted to this in his 1977 book (pp. 43–48) are uncharacteristically somewhat obscure. In particular, he does not do an adequate job, in my opinion, of distinguishing between the thesis that moral experience is the result of our having objectified affective attitudes (feelings, wants, and demands are mentioned by him) and the thesis that we simply have false beliefs about the objective status of moral properties. That we should recognize such a distinction seems highly desirable. Consider something that we would ordinarily consider a non-objective matter – say, what counts as polite behavior at meal times. A person might foolishly believe that the propriety of keeping one’s elbows off the table is an utterly mindindependent affair, and that all those other cultures that allow alternative rules of etiquette are simply mistaken. This person has a false belief about the objectivity of something. But must it be an instance of objectification? It might be, of course, but it also seems reasonable to suppose that it might not be. Objectification essentially involves a certain sort of psychological operation that leads to belief (or, speaking more carefully, that leads to a certain quality of experience). “Objectify” is a transitive verb; there must be something that gets objectified. But one can have a (false) belief about the objectivity of something without any operation of objectification having occurred. Mackie’s failure to attend to this distinction undermines the force of many of the considerations he raises in support of the objectification thesis. For example, Mackie begins by pointing out that a widespread belief in objective moral properties might fulfill certain human needs: Such properties (if they existed) would have a kind of practical authority over human affairs such that a widespread belief in their instantiation would regulate interpersonal relations in an effective way. This is a complex but broadly plausible claim. Yet it doesn’t obviously provide any evidence in favor of the objectification thesis as opposed to the “false-beliefs-aboutobjectivity” thesis. And even as evidence for the latter it is weak: The consideration merely shows that we might have a motive for believing in objective moral properties, which falls short of demonstrating that we do so believe. One might try to wring from this some (proportionally weak) support for the objectification thesis by pointing out that if we have a motive for believing in an objective morality, and this motive does lead us to belief, then we have objectified that motive, thus satisfying the criteria of the objectification thesis. But this is a problematic line of argument. What it is to “have a motive” is a complicated and indeterminate matter. On one reading it means that there is a reason to do something, even if one is unaware of this fact. (“The Romans had a motive for ceasing to line their aqueducts with lead.”) A more robust reading requires making reference to an agent’s desire. (“Romeo had a motive for climbing to Juliet’s balcony.”) This indeterminacy creates a fatal dilemma for the argument under consideration. Suppose, first, that when we say that humans “have a motive” for believing in an objective morality, we are using “motive” in something like the former sense, to mean that, as a matter of fact, things will go better for us (each of us, let’s say) if we
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all have this belief. This, however, may be true while we all remain utterly ignorant of the fact, showing that such a motive might not exist in our psychological profile in any sense, and therefore is not there to be objectified. The item which we are calling “the motive” might nevertheless have causal powers. That fact that things go better for organisms with X than organisms without X can lead to change – through a process of natural selection, for example. I admitted that it is broadly plausible that things will go better for groups of humans if they believe in an objective morality, and we can thus imagine this belief becoming fixed in a population through some process of cultural (or biological) evolution. All this would make it permissible to claim: “Humans have a motive for believing in an objective morality, and this motive brings it about that they do so believe.” But at no point need we maintain that the “motive” in question is psychologically represented by/to humans – let alone as an affective attitude – and therefore the criteria for objectification are not satisfied. Alternatively, we could understand “motive” in the latter sense, to mean that humans (generally) do desire to believe in an objective morality, and this desire brings it about that they do so believe. This would satisfy the criteria of the objectification thesis, but only at the cost of being a fantastic empirical claim. Bearing in mind that we are using “desire” in the sense of occurrent, affective attitude (something that has causal powers within an individual’s psychological economy), it is wildly implausible that humans typically desire to believe that moral properties are objective. I conclude, therefore, that while it might be true that humans “have a motive” for believing in an objective morality, and that this fact might have had (and continue to have) an important causal role in bringing it about that we do so believe, this does not provide grounds for claiming that this belief is the product of our having objectified that motive. The next strategy explored by Mackie (1977, pp. 43–44) in seeking support for the objectification thesis is to give some specific examples of moral objectification, which he designates “patterns of objectification.” Sometimes we desire something for perfectly sound (non-moral) reasons, but then we “confuse” this basis for our desire (the item’s “subjective value”) with the idea that the item in question has objective value. Sometimes we think that someone ought to do something for instrumental reasons, but then we suppress the instrumental conditional clause and claim that she ought do it simpliciter. We might do this because expressing it in this way is more likely to lead to compliance. Later (p. 47), another kind of confusion is mentioned: when we muddle a descriptive and objective sense of the goal of humans (as in what we in fact pursue, or what posited goal will confer sense upon our actual actions) with a normative but subjective sense of that goal (as in what we ought to be pursuing). These might very well be cases of objectification, and it is not at all implausible to suppose that Mackie is accurately describing some real human phenomena. But if his goal is to provide evidence that human moral judgment is typically (always?) the product of a process of objectification, then these examples hardly count as strong evidence. After all, I doubt that anyone (apart from some philosophers who worry in
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their characteristic manner about the details of the thesis of projectivism) will deny that moral judgment is sometimes the product of projected desires, emotions, and moods. Therefore, exposing some cases of moral objectification does not suffice to explain how the (putatively) false intuitions in favor of morality have “become established” and are “so resistant to criticisms” (p. 42). By analogy, suppose one were to doubt the existence of human character traits, and sought to explain away those strong intuitions we seem to have that such traits do indeed exist. One potential explanation would be the projectivist one: Our tendency to see others as instantiating stable character traits is the result of our projecting aspects of our own mental lives onto them. In providing evidence for this projectivist thesis, it would clearly not suffice to point out some instances of this kind of projectivism – such as the example I employed earlier of someone’s sense of her own inadequacy leading her to see others as critical and reproachful. All parties (we can suppose) accept the existence of the phenomenon of psychopathological projection, but much more evidence would be needed to show that this phenomenon somehow generalizes in unexpected ways. By referring in the plural to “patterns of objectification,” Mackie might hope to give the impression of a systematic and widespread tendency here (as in “There is a pattern emerging!”), but in reality he has not provided evidence sufficient for his purposes. A further strand in Mackie’s case for the objectification thesis is broadly historical. Once upon a time a lot of our moral language was embedded in an ontological framework that included an all-powerful, all-seeing, loving deity doling out rewards and punishments. Mackie concedes that if “this theological doctrine could be defended, a kind of objective ethical prescriptivity could be introduced” (p. 48).10 He looks with some sympathy upon Elizabeth Anscombe’s conjecture that “modern moral philosophy” (à la mid-twentieth century) consists of trying to make sense of a family of normative concepts “outside the framework of thought that made [them] really intelligible” (Anscombe 1958, p. 6). However plausible this “conceptual residue theory” may be (and I agree with Mackie that there is surely something to it), it nevertheless seems to have little to do with the psychological process of objectification. Anscombe may have explained the origin of a widespread but false belief in the objectivity of morality (and therefore does provide resources upon which Mackie can draw), but the hypothesis does not fit with the desired model of this belief being the result of our having “spread” our wants and demands onto “external objects.” I conclude, then, that the case for the objectification thesis in Mackie’s 1977 book is very weak. We find a more structured and clear argument for the objectification thesis in 1980’s Hume’s Moral Theory. Here Mackie claims that it is the only theory that can properly make sense of three phenomena: (i) that the evidence seems to favor metaethical cognitivism, (ii) that moral statements are taken to be intrinsically 10 Incidentally, this comment reveals that Mackie believes that so long as there exists some possible
world at which the requisite kind of supernatural being is real, then the error in morality is but a contingent matter. In his forceful case for atheism in his 1982 book, Mackie repeatedly declares the existence of God to be “improbable” (pp. 100, 130, 252–253) – not impossible.
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action-guiding (i.e., not to rely on subjects’ ends and goals for their legitimacy), and (iii) that “the essential fact of the matter, which underlies moral judgments. . ., is that people have various sentiments” (1980, p. 72). Though the last is stated rather clumsily, it is apparent to what Mackie is referring. In the preceding chapter he has identified nine arguments used by Hume to press the negative view that moral judgments are not the product of reason, and then he has provided a number of wellknown passages from Hume variously stating the positive “plain hypothesis”: “that morality is determined by sentiment” (Hume 1751, appendix 1.10/2006 p. 160). Mackie assesses various specifications of this positive hypothesis – one of which is the objectification thesis – and it is precisely because he wants to characterize the sentimentalist hypothesis in a way that leaves open a range of theoretical options that he words (iii) so formlessly. Mackie thinks that (i)–(iii) jointly knock out all rivals to the objectification thesis as follows (very roughly): Noncognitivist offerings fail to satisfy (i). Versions of “subjectivism” according to which moral utterances make reference descriptively to some real or hypothetical agent’s emotions (such as the ideal observer theory) fail to satisfy (ii). Various forms of moral rationalism, intuitionism, and naturalistic realism – theories that do not accord emotion a central role in our apprehension of moral truths – fail to satisfy (iii). By contrast, the objectification thesis is supposed to pass the test. According to this thesis, moral judgment begins with humans responding to certain actions and characters in the world with affective attitudes (thus satisfying (iii)), which we then project onto our experience of the world, reading “some sort of image” of the attitude into the item that prompted it, seeing (for example) the action as categorically required (thus satisfying (ii)); and we are, by and large, fooled by this operation into thinking that the normative property really is instantiated, in which case our language for discussing it is, naturally, assertoric and propositional (thus satisfying (i)). To assess this argument for the objectification thesis would require a comprehensive metaethical investigation. We would have to evaluate whether all these rivals do indeed fail to satisfy the desiderata that Mackie claims they fail; we would have to assess whether the objectification thesis really does satisfy the three desiderata; we would have to consider whether any theory other than the objectification thesis promises to satisfy the three desiderata; we would need to investigate whether these three desiderata really are that (that a theory’s failure to satisfy one of these criteria really does represent a reason for rejecting the theory); and we would need to reflect on whether there might exist additional desiderata (ones, perhaps, that the objectification thesis fails to satisfy). Needless to say, such an assessment is not going to be attempted here. The point I want to observe is the general one that here Mackie is seeking to establish the objectification thesis via a metaethical route – and a long and controversial metaethical route at that. It is clear that this argument for objectification is not independent of pivotal elements of his other arguments for moral skepticism. For example, it is a central plank of the argument from queerness that moral judgments are imbued with “objective prescriptivity” – “something that involves a call for action or for the refraining from action, and one that is absolute, not contingent
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on any desire or preference or policy or choice” (1977, p. 33). But note that this premise in the argument from queerness is really nothing more or less than desideratum (ii) employed in the argument for the objectification thesis. Many critics of the argument from queerness complain that moral discourse is committed to nothing so extravagant, and if they are correct then the argument will clearly collapse. Whatever grounds these critics of the argument from queerness have for their view are grounds for denying that (ii) is a criterion of theory acceptance. Another class of critic of the argument from queerness will maintain that this quality of “objective prescriptivity” can indeed be satisfied by (clusters of) naturalistic properties. But saying this is nothing more or less than denying Mackie’s claim that moral naturalism cannot satisfy (ii). That Mackie’s argument for the objectification thesis shares central premises with the argument from queerness is not a problem in the context of his 1980 book, for the objectification thesis is not there functioning to satisfy a proviso to another argument. But it does mean that we cannot lift the argument for the objectification thesis found in the 1980 book and use it to help establish the objectification thesis in the context of the 1977 argument. The interpretation I have offered of the 1977 dialectic has acceptance of the arguments from relativity and queerness held in abeyance until the objectivity thesis steps in as a tie-breaker, rendering it “less paradoxical to reject than to retain the common-sense belief in the objectivity of moral values” (1977, p. 42). But this strategy plainly will not work if whatever doubt hangs over the arguments for moral skepticism also hangs over the argument that would convince us of the thesis that would satisfy the proviso. I conclude that Mackie’s use of the objectification thesis in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong is a reasonable idea that is poorly executed. The general strategy of overcoming epistemic conservatism by showing moral intuitions to be the product of an unreliable process of formation is a sound one. Seeing moral experience as the product of an operation of projection or objectification is one prominent example of this strategy (among others) that might very well succeed. But the objectification thesis necessary and sufficient for the job is the minimal psychological thesis, to be established (if at all) by empirical investigation independent of any metaethical arguments. By muddling up psychological hypotheses with metaphysical commitments (whereby objectification involves “false belief in the fictitious features” (1980, p. 72)), Mackie makes it impossible for himself to use the objectification thesis in support of moral skepticism in a non-question-begging way.
References Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy 33: 1–19. Brink, D. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Casati, R. and C. Tappolet. eds. 1998. European review of philosophy 3: Response-dependence. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
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Craig, E. 2000. Hume on causality: Projectivist and realist? In The new Hume debate, eds. R. Read and K. Richman, 113–121. London: Routledge. Dancy, J. 1986. Two conceptions of moral realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60(suppl.): 167–187. Huemer, M. 2005. Ethical intuitionism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hume, D. 1739–1740. A treatise of human nature, eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. 1978. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume, D. 1751. An enquiry concerning the principles of morals, ed. T. L. Beauchamp. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Johnston, M. 1989. Dispositional theories of value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62(suppl.): 139–174. Johnston, M. 1992. How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies 68: 221–263. Johnston, M. 1993. Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism. In Reality, representation, and projection, eds. J. Haldane and C. Wright, 85–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joyce, R. 2007. Moral anti-realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-anti-realism/. Accessed 17 October 2008. Joyce, R. 2009a. Is moral projectivism empirically tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12: 53–75. Joyce, R. 2009b. The skeptick’s tale. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78: 213–221. Joyce, R. Forthcoming. Expressivism, motivation internalism, and Hume. In Hume, motivation, and virtue, ed. C. Pigden. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Mackie, J. L. 1946. A refutation of morals. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24: 77–90. Mackie, J. L. 1973. Truth, probability and paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume’s moral theory. London: Routledge. Mackie, J. L. 1982. The miracle of theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pettit, P. 1991. Realism and response-dependence. Mind 100: 587–626. Ruskin, J. 1856. Modern painters, vol. III. Excerpt in Selections from the work of John Ruskin. 1908. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Sainsbury, R. M. 1998. Projections and relations. Monist 81: 133–160. Sayre-McCord, G. 1986. The many moral realisms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(suppl.): 1–22. Stroud, B. 2000. “Gilding or staining” the world with “sentiments” and “phantasms.” In The new Hume debate, eds. R. Read and K. Richman, 16–30. London: Routledge. Wright, C. 1988. Moral values, projections, and secondary qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62(suppl.): 1–26.
Mackie’s Internalisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
1 Mackie’s Basic Argument When Mackie calls certain judgments “queer,” he seems to mean that they differ from other judgments in some way that makes them dubious. Each version of the argument from queerness then picks out a different way in which moral judgments are supposed to differ from other judgments. Since Mackie’s goal is an error theory, he also needs to show that the differences between moral judgments and the other judgments make moral judgments dubious in such a way that they are never true in the same way as the other judgments. The version of queerness based on internalism claims that moral judgments are queer because some special force is internal to moral judgments but not to other judgments. This argument can be presented in steps: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Moral judgments have some special force built into them. Other judgments do not have that special force built into them. Therefore, moral judgments are unlike other judgments. If moral judgments are unlike other judgments in this way, then they are never true (in the same way as the other judgments). 5. Therefore, moral judgments are never true (in the same way as the other judgments). This overall argument works only if Mackie can specify some special force that (a) moral judgments have, (b) other judgments lack, and (c) is important enough in some way that supports Mackie’s skeptical conclusions. Mackie, thus, needs to argue for some kind of internalism in his first premise, and he also needs the right kind of internalism to make the rest of his argument follow. Comparison to other judgments, though suggested by Mackie’s label “queer,” might not be essential to Mackie’s argument. Sometimes (e.g., 1977, p. 35) W. Sinnott-Armstrong (B) Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
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Mackie seems to argue simply that moral judgments would need to be both objective and prescriptive. To call them “prescriptive” is, presumably, to say that they have some kind of special force built into them. If this internal prescriptivity conflicts with some kind of objectivity that is also essential to moral judgments, then this conflict could make moral judgments dubious, regardless of whether other judgments resemble moral judgments in these respects. To make this argument work, Mackie would need to specify a special force that (a) moral judgments have and (b) conflicts with a kind of objectivity that (c) moral judgments also have. As with the first interpretation of Mackie’s argument, the trick is to specify and defend a kind of internalism that fits into the rest of the argument. My goal in this chapter is to distinguish several versions of internalism and then to ask which are defensible and which might fit into Mackie’s argument. I will not try to determine whether any version of internalism really does conflict with objectivity or whether objectivity really is built into moral judgments. Instead, I will focus exclusively on Mackie’s premise that some special force is built into moral judgments. The rest of Mackie’s argument will have to wait for another occasion. Mackie’s first premise deserves this special attention, because Mackie’s argument cannot even get started until he tells us precisely which special force is supposed to be built into moral judgments. It is not clear which kind of internalism Mackie has in mind, because he runs together several distinct claims. Here is his canonical presentation of this argument: Plato’s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because this end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Or we would have something like Clarke’s necessary conditions of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such-and-such an action somehow built into it. (1977, p. 40)
This quotation contains a lot to unpack. We need to distinguish reasons from motivations, overriding motivations from influences, facts from judgments, moral judgments from other normative judgments, and various relations between judgments and special forces. Only after drawing all of these distinctions can we ask whether any kind of internalism could make Mackie’s argument work.
2 Which Special Force? Motivation vs. Reason My phrase “special force” is supposed to be ambiguous enough to cover reasons as well as motivations. Which is Mackie discussing? In the quoted passage, Mackie sometimes refers to “to-be-pursuedness.” To say that something is “to be pursued”
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is, presumably, not to predict that it will be pursued but, instead, to make a normative judgment that it ought to be pursued or that there is a reason to pursue it. Similarly, when Mackie (following Clarke) suggests that moral judgments are related to a “demand,” this claim seems to be about a certain kind of reason instead of motivation, since an act can be demanded even if the agent who is subject to the demand is not at all motivated to do the demanded act (perhaps because the agent is unaware of the demand). If Mackie’s notions of “to-be-pursued” and “demand” refer to reasons, then he would seem to be claiming some form of reason internalism: Reason internalism: Moral judgments have reasons built into them.
In other parts of the quoted passage, however, Mackie refers not to reasons but instead to a “motive,” and he suggests that judging something good “makes him pursue it.” He also mentions “influence” in the following paragraph (quoted below). At these points, Mackie seems to claim some form of motivation internalism: Motivation internalism: Moral judgments have motivations built into them.
Reason internalism and motivation internalism are distinct if reasons differ from motivations. (On these distinctions and more below, see Brink 1989, pp. 37–42.) Whether reasons differ from motivations depends on what counts as a reason. We need to distinguish reasons for agents to do things (called justificatory reasons or justifications) from reasons why people do things (called explanatory reasons or explanations). An act is justified by citing some fact about the act or the situation (such as that the act prevents some harm or fulfills a promise), whereas an act is explained by citing some fact about the agent (such as the agent’s beliefs and desires). A justificatory reason for an agent to do something (such as because he promised to do it) need not explain why the agent did it (since the agent might do the promised act out of some independent desire to do it). Conversely, an explanatory reason why someone did something (such as because he wanted to harm a hated rival) might not be any justificatory reason at all. Explanatory reasons are tied closely to motivation if an explanatory reason why an agent does an act is always some motive of the agent. This universal claim is questionable, but let that go for now. The crucial point here is that a justificatory reason for the agent to do an act need not be related in any way to the agent’s motives. An agent can have a justificatory reason to buy milk simply because he promised to buy milk, even if he has no motivation at all to buy milk, because he forgot that he promised to buy milk. Similarly, imagine that pushing on the brake pedal of my car is necessary to avoid running over Jim, and I want to harm Jim and have no motivation to avoid running over Jim. I can still have a justificatory reason to push on the brake pedal and to avoid running over Jim, because the fact that pushing on the pedal is necessary to avoid harming Jim would justify that act if I were to do it. Williams (1981) and his followers deny this point and claim that no reasons are external roughly in the sense of independent of desire and motivation. However,
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Williams’ claim seems to depend on a demand that all reasons be explanatory. Once we distinguish explanatory reasons from justificatory reasons, it becomes clear that justificatory reasons need not always be based on desire or motivation (or any other mental state of the agent). In any case, Mackie admits that justificatory reasons can be independent of motivation, even though he goes on to suggest that such reasons depend on institutions (1977, pp. 78–79), so I will assume that independence here. Thus, if reason internalism claims only that justificatory reasons are built into moral judgments, this view is distinct from motivation internalism. In contrast, if reason internalism claims that explanatory reasons are built into moral judgments, this view might not be separable from motivation internalism. Hence, for the sake of clarity, the former, justificatory version is what I will mean by reason internalism from now on. This kind of reason internalism does not seem queer in any way that should raise doubts about objective values or moral facts. After all, Mackie analyzes “ought” in terms of reasons: A first attempt at a general equivalent of “a ought to G” might be “There is a reason for a’s G-ing.”. . . We could then say that different uses (not different senses) of “ought” introduce different kinds of reason. (1977, pp. 73–74)
Hence, it is analytic that, if a morally ought to G, then there is a ( justificatory) moral reason for a to G. Given this analysis, Mackie cannot claim that there is anything queer about moral judgments having justificatory reasons built into them internally. These reasons are simply what the judgments are about. There still might be a separate problem with objective justificatory reasons themselves (cf. Mackie 1977, p. 79). That problem might even be the basis for an independent argument that moral judgments are never true. However, such a problem for objective justificatory reasons could not be shown by pointing out that moral judgments imply objective justificatory reasons. Conversely, the fact that moral judgments imply objective justificatory reasons also cannot show that there is anything dubious about objective justificatory reasons. The reasons themselves are distinct from the relation between moral judgments and reasons. The argument by Mackie that is our topic here concerns the relation between moral judgments and a special force. Even if objective justificatory reasons were dubious on independent grounds, the relation between moral judgments and reasons still would not be what makes moral judgments queer or dubious. To appreciate this point, compare a non-normative case: “son” has “male” built into it, and nothing else does, unless it is also analytically connected to “son,” since every male is a son. This relation does not show anything queer about being a son that would raise any suspicions about whether sons exist. Of course, if the property of being male were suspect, that other suspicion would transfer to being a son, but the relation of “son” to “male” still would not be suspect and would not be the source of suspicion about being a son. Analogously, even if “ought” has “reason” built into it, and nothing else does, unless it is analytically connected to “ought,” that relation between moral judgments and reasons does not show anything queer
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about oughtness that should raise doubts about whether oughtness exists or whether any moral judgments about what ought to be done can be true. Of course, if reasons are seen as necessarily motivating, as in the case of explanatory reasons, then reason internalism still might support queerness and skepticism. However, that is not because of reasons, but because of motivation. Thus, the only kind of internalism that could help Mackie’s argument here is motivation internalism. On this view, moral judgments would be queer, because one kind of mental state (a motivation) is built into an apparently very different kind of mental state (a judgment). Moral judgments seem to be cognitive appraisals of the moral status of acts or agents, whereas motivations involve a separate part of the brain and mind that concerns action rather than cognition. Cognition might be necessary for action, but it is not clear how action or motivation to act could be necessary for or built into cognition. We will discuss some possibilities below. The point for now is only that motivation internalism captures a kind of queerness that might make Mackie’s argument work.
3 How Much Motivation? Some vs. Overriding Motivation Motivations conflict and come in degrees. In the passage quoted at the start, Mackie refers to “an overriding motive.” He adds, “something’s being good. . . makes him pursue it,” and a motive does not make a person act unless it is overrides all conflicting motives. This suggests that Mackie has in mind something like this: Overriding-motivation internalism: Moral judgments have overriding motivations built into them.
In other passages, however, Mackie mentions less than overriding motivation. Consider the paragraph right after the one quoted initially: The need for an argument of this sort [that is, for motivation to be built into objective values] can be brought out by reflection on Hume’s argument that “reason”—in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning—can never be an “influencing motive of the will.” Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent on desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, we would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. (1977, pp. 40–41)
The last sentence refers to the epistemological part of Mackie’s argument from queerness. The relevant point here is that an “influencing motive” need not always be overriding. Hence, this passage suggests that the problem of queerness arises even for a weaker view: Some-motivation internalism: Moral judgments have some motivation built into them.
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Of course, a motivation need not be overriding, so some-motivation internalism is much weaker than overriding-motivation internalism. This weaker view is also more plausible. People normally act on their overriding motives, so overriding-motivation internalism makes it hard to see how anyone could ever do what they know is morally wrong or bad. Overriding-motivation internalism can also be refuted by common examples. Consider a conflict between self-interest and moral judgment. Even if I judge that it is wrong to steal some money, I might go ahead and steal the money because my desire for the money (and what it can buy) overrides the motivation from my moral judgment. My moral judgment provides some impartial motivation not to steal, but that motivation might not be as strong as my conflicting selfish or partial motivation to get the money. This kind of example refutes overriding-motivation internalism, but it is compatible with some-motivation internalism. Some-motivation internalism is also strong enough for Mackie’s argument if nonnormative judgments do not have any motivation at all built into them. Since an argument is better when its premises are weaker and more plausible, Mackie’s argument is better if we interpret him as claiming only some-motivation internalism. So that is what we will do, despite some passages to the contrary.
4 What has Special Force? Facts vs. Judgments So far internalism has been formulated in terms of judgments, but that word is ambiguous. People who talk about judgments sometimes refer to a mental state or act of making a judgment, but sometimes they refer instead to the content of the judgment, which is an abstract proposition. When that content is true, it represents a fact. It is not clear, then, whether it is facts or mental states that are supposed to have a special force, according to Mackie. Mackie sometimes says that “something’s being good” or a “course of action” or a “situation” has some special force built into it. These formulations suggest that what has the special force is separate from the mental state of the person who makes the moral judgment. At other times, in contrast, Mackie says that “knowledge” of the Good or being “acquainted” with a good provides such a special force. These formulations suggest that what has the special force is partly a mental state of the person who makes the moral judgment. These pictures point toward very different forms of internalism: Fact internalism: Moral facts have some special force built into them. Judgment internalism: Moral judgments (as mental states or acts) have some special force built into them.
To see the difference between these views, consider an agent who chooses between two possible actions in a situation where one of the actions is immoral, but the agent does not judge (or know) that the action is immoral. Fact internalism implies that not-to-be-pursuedness is built right into the situation or possible action, so not-to-be-pursuedness should be present in this example. In contrast, judgment
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internalism does not imply any not-to-be-pursuedness in this case, because no judgment about immorality is present. Conversely, if an agent judges an action to be immoral when it really is not immoral at all, then judgment internalism implies notto-be-pursuedness, but fact internalism lacks that implication. As Mackie presents them in the initial quotation (1977, p. 40), Clarke is a fact internalist, whereas Plato is more of a judgment internalist (or knowledge internalist). Since these views are so different, we need to separate them. Mackie might seem to be unable to distinguish fact internalism from belief internalism, because he is an error theorist who denies normative facts. However, Mackie is here characterizing the commitments of his opponents, and they claim normative facts. Hence, he needs to distinguish these kinds of internalism in order to specify what his opponents are supposed to be committed to. The plausibility of these versions of internalism depends on whether the special force involves reasons or motivations. Fact internalism for motivations would claim that moral facts have motivations built into them. It is hard to see how a person’s motivation could be affected by a fact of which the person has no awareness at all. That really would be queer. A fact can still provide a justificatory reason to do an act even when the agent is not aware of the fact, such as when the agent forgot that he promised to do the act. Thus, fact internalism is plausible for reasons but not for motivations. In contrast, judgment internalism makes little sense if the claimed special force involves reasons, because the judgment might be false or even unreasonable, and then it cannot provide a justificatory reason. Judgment internalism seems more plausible if the special force involves motivation instead of reasons, since then it claims that people who accept moral judgments are motivated to act accordingly, and the truth or falsity of such judgments does not seem to affect their motivational force. Thus, judgment internalism fits better with motivations than with reasons. Since we already suggested that Mackie should have in mind motivation (as opposed to reason) internalism, he should also have in mind the judgment (as opposed to fact) version of motivation internalism. Mackie does not, however, explicitly mention judgments in the quotation at the start (from 1977, p. 40). Instead, he discusses knowledge in the second quoted sentence, and then his third sentence refers to being acquainted with an objective good. These topics are distinct, because knowledge does not require acquaintance, even if acquaintance guarantees knowledge (which is questionable, even if Mackie assumes it). If knowledge is justified true belief or more, then it is not clear whether the special force of moral knowledge is supposed to be built into the belief itself, into the justification for the belief, or into whatever it is that makes some beliefs knowledge. Thus, we need to distinguish at least these versions of internalism: Knowledge internalism: Moral knowledge has some special force built into it. Acquaintance internalism: Acquaintance with moral facts has some special force built into it. Justified-belief internalism: Justified moral beliefs have some special force built into them.
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These views have distinct implications for the presence of the special force in cases where people have knowledge without acquaintance or acquaintance without knowledge, or where people have knowledge without justified belief or justified belief without knowledge. All of these views are distinct from judgment internalism, as defined above, insofar as people can make normative judgments that are not justified, do not count as knowledge, and are not based on acquaintance. Knowledge internalism, acquaintance internalism, and justified-belief internalism do not imply any special force in such cases, but judgment internalism does. What turns a judgment into knowledge or acquaintance or justified belief seems to be something external to the judgment itself, such as the truth (or facts), the cause of the judgment, the reliability of a method, or maybe coherence with other beliefs. It is again hard to see how such external factors could be what guarantees motivation. The more plausible claim, then, is that moral judgment includes motivation regardless of whether that judgment is justified or knowledge or based on acquaintance. Thus, Mackie’s argument is best interpreted as resting on judgment internalism rather than knowledge, acquaintance, or justified-belief internalism. Judgment internalism itself, however, still needs to be clarified. The term “judgment” is intended to cover both beliefs and thoughts (and possibly also attitudes). An occurrent thought, such as when I momentarily direct my attention to the fact that Mars is a planet, is more active and more temporally restricted than a standing belief state with the same propositional content. On one account, the belief state consists in a disposition to assent to the claim that Mars is a planet, if one thinks about it; and that dispositional state can exist even while I am not thinking at all about Mars or planets. This distinction between beliefs and thoughts applies as well to moral judgments: I can believe that torture is immoral even at a time when I am not thinking about torture or morality. This distinction yields two possibilities: Thought internalism: Normative thoughts have some special force built into them. Belief internalism: Normative beliefs have some special force built into them.
If the special force involves reasons, and if I can have a reason to do something even while I am not thinking about it, then thought internalism seems too narrow, and belief internalism (or, rather, justified-belief internalism or knowledge internalism) might be a more natural view. However, if the special force involves motivation, then belief internalism would imply that I am motivated to keep my promise even when I am asleep or not thinking about my promise at all, but that seems implausible, assuming that motivation is occurrent rather than dispositional. Thus, if the special force involves motivation, then the natural views would seem to be that moral thoughts contain motivation and that moral beliefs (as dispositions to have such thoughts) contain only dispositions to be motivated. It might not, however, be all moral thoughts that contain motivation, since not all moral thoughts are equally perspicuous. Some acts, such as rape, immediately strike me as immoral. In other cases, it takes a trusted authority or a long train of reasoning to convince me that something is wrong. Suppose I could get away with
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claiming a deduction on my taxes, and I believe that I ought to be allowed to take this deduction, but I also know that it violates a silly tax rule that happens to be in force. Is it immoral for me to claim that deduction? I think it is, but taking this deduction still does not strike me as immoral in the immediate way that rape strikes me as immoral. After inferring or being told that the tax deduction is wrong, I might come to see and feel that it is wrong, but I might not. Thus, I can believe, think, and even know that some acts are wrong, on the basis of trusted testimony or long argument, even though they do not immediately strike me as wrong or appear or seem wrong to me. My situation then resembles the Müller-Lyer illusion. In that illusion, I believe and even know that the lines are the same length, but the lines still do not appear or seem to have the same length. In the analogous moral case, an act does not seem immoral to me even after I come to think that it is immoral. Although I can believe what does not seem to me to be true, and I can fail to believe what does seem to me to be true, sometimes I do endorse what seems true, and then I believe or think that it is true. The mental state that occurs when a beliefcontent seems or appears to be true can be called an appearance or seeming (see Tolhurst 1998). A belief or thought occurs when the seeming is endorsed. It is not clear whether the special force claimed by internalism is supposed to be built into the seeming or into the endorsement of the seeming, so an internalist has these options: Seeming internalism: Moral seemings have some special force built into them. Seeming-judgment internalism: Moral judgments that seem true have some special force built into them.
These versions have different implications when an act seems wrong but that seeming is not endorsed. Imagine that you were raised to believe that dancing is immoral, but now you have reached the conclusion that dancing is not immoral after all. Dancing still might seem immoral (just as the lines still seem different lengths in the Müller-Lyer illusion). Your mental state must then include the special force (or motivation) according to seeming internalism but not according to seeming-judgment internalism. On either version, moral thoughts that do not seem true need not have any special force, but all moral thoughts that do seem true to us must have that special force. One way to describe the difference between believing and seeming might be to say that when a wrong act seems wrong to me, then I am acquainted with its wrongness. In contrast, when a wrong act does not seem wrong to me, then I am not acquainted with its wrongness, even if I know its wrongness in some other way, such as by testimony or inference rather than by acquaintance. If Mackie means something like this by “acquainted” when he says, “An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it” (1977, p. 40), then his premise in this argument is something like seeming internalism or seeming-judgment internalism. Seeming internalism and seeming-judgment internalism are weaker and, thus, easier to defend than judgment internalism, because some purported counterexamples to judgment internalism are not counterexamples to seeming internalism or to
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seeming-judgment internalism so long as the judgment in the purported counterexample does not seem true to the person who lacks motivation to act accordingly. Nonetheless, if non-moral judgments do not have any special force built into them, even when they seem true, then seeming internalism and seeming-judgment internalism are still strong enough to show that moral seemings are unlike those non-moral seemings. Mackie still needs to show why this difference raises doubts about the existence of objective values or about the truth of moral judgments, but the best premise for getting Mackie’s argument started is some form of seeming internalism or seeming-judgment internalism.
5 Which Judgments? Normative vs. Moral The versions of internalism defined so far apply only to moral judgments, so they are all versions of: Moral internalism: Moral judgments have some special force built into them.
However, if what gives moral judgments their special force is something shared by other normative judgments, then internalists might endorse this broader claim: Normative internalism: Normative judgments have some special force built into them.
A more restricted version is suggested when Mackie introduces queerness while talking about normative judgments that claim objectivity: Objective-normative internalism: Normative judgments that claim objectivity have some special force built into them.
These last two internalisms imply moral internalism if moral judgments are normative and claim objectivity, as Mackie argues. He specifies that his view is supposed to apply not only to moral judgments but to all normative (and evaluative) judgments, or at least to those that claim objectivity (1977, p. 15), so he seems to endorse not only moral internalism but also either normative internalism or objective-normative internalism. It is hard to see any rationale for objective-normative internalism, however. Why would normative judgments that claim objectivity have motivation built into them if normative judgments that do not claim objectivity lack such special force? Without an answer to this question, anyone who endorses objective-normative internalism would have just as much reason to endorse the broader view of normative internalism. A claim to objectivity might conflict with having motivation built into a judgment, and that conflict might be what makes moral judgments dubious, but the claim to objectivity does not seem to be what generates the motivation. In any case, some normative judgments that claim objectivity do not seem tied to action or motivation in the same way as moral judgments. One example is epistemic judgments. The fact that I have a certain kind of visual experience in certain
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circumstances can make me justified in believing that my car is red. This epistemic judgment is normative insofar as it affects what I ought to believe, but it need not motivate me to act in any particular way, such as to seek or avoid the car or its color or to say out loud that my car is red, even if asked. (I might want to keep its color secret.) Thus, if the special force claimed by internalism involves motivation to act, then it is hard to see why internalism should be extended to all normative judgments or even to all normative judgments that claim objectivity, since either of these extensions would include epistemic judgments. In contrast, if the special force claimed by internalism involves only reasons and not motivation, then it is easier to understand how all normative judgments that claim objectivity might seem to have such special force. After all, when my visual experience makes me justified in believing that my car is red, I have a reason for that belief, even if I have no motivation to do anything about it. Thus, normative epistemic judgments will be just as queer and suspect as normative moral judgments if what makes moral values queer and suspect is their relation to reasons. However, as we saw, their relation to reasons does not make moral values queer. In contrast, if it is their relation to motivations that makes moral values queer and suspect, then there might be nothing queer or metaphysically suspect about epistemic facts or judgments, even if those epistemic judgments are normative, and even if moral facts and judgments are queer and suspect, as Mackie claims. It is also not clear whether normative aesthetic judgments have any special motivation built into them (or whether they make the same claim to objectivity as moral judgments). Mackie (1977, pp. 15, 43) includes aesthetic judgments, but it is not clear why I cannot judge that a modern painting (or piece of music) has the positive aesthetic quality of being creative, even though I have no desire at all to see it (or hear it played). If moral judgments have motivation built into them, that would seem to be because they are practical – that is, because they are related to action in a certain way that needs to be specified. Then all other practical judgments, including some non-moral ones (such as judgments about what we ought to do for self-interested reasons), would also be implicated in Mackie’s claim. We cannot tell exactly which normative judgments have motivation built into them until we determine what relation to action is needed in order to make a judgment practical and which judgments are practical in that way. All we can say for now is that it would be natural for internalists to claim that all practical judgments have motivation built into them, where practical judgments include more than moral judgments but less than all normative judgments. Practical judgments include a special kind of overall judgment. When I say that an agent ought to do an act, this might sometimes mean that there is most reason overall for that agent to do that act, considering all reasons of all kinds (moral, selfinterested, aesthetic, etc.). If such overall practical judgments have motivation built into them, it might seem to be overriding motivation, because there is no reason that is not considered which could provide any other motivation to override the motivation to do what one judges one overall ought to do.
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However, not all practical judgments are overall judgments. Practical judgments often consider a limited class of reasons. They also often claim only prima facie reasons or reasons that are overridden. That is why practical judgments in general have at most some motivation and not necessarily overriding motivation built into them. Besides, overall practical judgments refer to moral reasons among others, and sometimes these moral reasons determine what someone ought to do overall. Suppose someone overall ought to do something because doing it is morally required, even though it conflicts with that person’s self-interest. For example, as above, imagine that I judge that it is morally wrong for me to steal some money, but I steal the money anyway, because my desire for money (and what it can buy) overrides the motivation from my moral judgment. My impartial moral motivation is overridden by my selfish desire for the money. Then, even if I have some motivation to do what I judge that I overall ought to do, I do not have overriding motivation to do it. Thus, even overall practical judgments need not guarantee overriding motivation. At most some motivation is built into even overall practical judgments. Internalism might be defended by limiting it not only to practical judgments but, further, to a subset of practical judgments. After all, practical judgments vary along several dimensions that might affect their relation to motivation. First, practical judgments can be very general or very specific (or even particular), and the precise relation to motivation varies accordingly. People might make a general judgment that it is morally wrong to break promises even if they themselves never make any promise, so they are never motivated by their judgment to do anything in particular. They are at most conditionally motivated to keep a promise if they make one. The same point applies to particular judgments about hypothetical situations. People can judge that a certain act is morally wrong even if they never could do that act, such as when a Catholic male judges that it would be morally wrong for him to get an abortion in a specific set of circumstances, such as if he were in a female friend’s situation. Such a Catholic male is not motivated to avoid an abortion, except maybe conditionally, and he also might not be motivated to do anything to women who get abortions or to prevent anyone from getting an abortion. This point applies also to third-person moral judgments. I can judge that you morally ought to pay your debts without feeling any motivation to pay your debts for you or to do anything to you if you do not pay your debts. Perhaps I need to be motivated to pay my debts if I were in a similar situation, but that is another kind of conditional motivation. The conditional nature of such motivations matters because conditional motivation need not be detectable by introspection or by observation. The point is not about motivations that arise only in hypothetical situations but is instead about actual motivations with conditional content. Such conditional motivations need not produce any feeling, behavior, or skin conductance response, as far as we know. Hence, the absence of a feeling or skin conductance response cannot be used to show that no such motivation is present. (Pace Roskies 2003, 2008.)
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The situation is different when someone makes a first-person “in situ” judgment about a concrete action that he or she is able to do at present, such as when I judge that right now I morally ought to go pick up my son, because I promised to do so at this time. (See Kennett and Fine 2008.) Then the motivation is not just conditional. This non-conditional motivation still might not be associated with any introspectible feeling or observable behavior or skin conductance response, but it seems more natural to expect some introspectible or observable difference when such non-conditional motivation is present than with only conditional motivation. What about first-person judgments of acts that I cannot do now but will be able to do in the future? Suppose I judge at 3:00 p.m. that I morally ought to pick up my son at 4:00 p.m. What is built into this judgment, according to internalism, is the judgment that I am motivated at 3:00 to pick up my son at 4:00. The judgment and the motivation have matching content (Smith 2008). Since I do not have any motivation right now to do anything right now, I need not currently feel any tug towards any particular behavior (unless I need to do something now in order to get ready to pick him up at 4:00). Thus, even if internalists are committed to some motivation at 3:00 in this case, they need not predict that this motivation will be detectable either by introspection or by any external means, such as behavior or skin conductance response. The weakest version of internalism limits its claim to first-person present-tense (in situ) moral thoughts that seem true. It is hard to see why internalists would limit their claim this much except to make it easier to defend. Nonetheless, this minimal internalism is strong enough to support Mackie’s skepticism about moral values if no motivation is contained in the corresponding non-normative judgments, and if Mackie or his supporters can show why this feature of moral judgments is relevant and important enough to cast doubt on the existence of objective moral values or truths.
6 What is it to be “Built in”? A final metaphor that needs to be unpacked is that of being “built in.” To claim that motivation (or reason) is built into normative (or moral) judgments (or facts) is to claim some strong relation between what is built in and what it is built into. One possibility is universal material implication: Universal internalism: Every person who makes a moral judgment has some motivation to act accordingly.
For judgments that an act is good or required, to act accordingly is to do the act. For judgments that an act is bad or wrong, to act accordingly is to avoid doing the act. Although universal, this view is not strong enough for Mackie’s purposes. One reason is that some non-normative judgments might also be related to motivation in this way. It might be true (that is, it is true in some possible worlds) that, whenever
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a person judges that an act is such that whoever does it will die, then that person is at least somewhat motivated not to do that act. However, the judgment that an act is such that whoever does it will die is simply a prediction and not a normative or moral judgment. Hence, universal internalism would not show that moral judgments must be unlike all non-normative judgments, much less that they are queer in any way that would cast suspicion on the existence of objective normative values or truths. The same point applies if the relation to motivation holds by psychological or physical necessity based on the nature of our species or our brains. Perhaps all people who are not motivated to do what they judge to be good would have to be mutants whose bodies and brains are not wired in the way that is normal to the human species. This connection between judgment and motivation might be as much a part of human nature as the fact that eyes are normally connected to brains in the human species. However, this physical or psychological necessity would still not make moral, practical, or normative judgments unlike all non-normative judgments, since it also might be a part of human nature that all normal people have some motivation to avoid acts such that people who do them die. Mackie recognizes the need for a stronger relation when he writes: “An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end” (1977, p. 40). He refers in the next paragraph to the power of values “when known, automatically to influence the will.” The adverb “automatically” does not, however, help much here. My fire alarm goes off automatically when it detects smoke, but that is still just a matter of physical necessity based on the nature and structure of the alarm. To say that it is automatic is just to say that it happens without further steps such as me pushing a button or pulling a lever, as is required to set off some other fire alarms. Internalists are claiming more than that normative judgments lead to motivations automatically, if all that means is that the motivation arises without further steps such as conscious thought. They are claiming that motivation is somehow built into the judgment itself. Hence the name “internalism.” To see what this means, imagine a car coming at you fast. If you see it, that will influence your choice to move out of its way. It might even happen that every human is structured by human nature to have some desire to move out of the way. Nonetheless, it won’t be conceptually necessary that everyone who believes that a car is coming at them will be motivated to move, since there is no inconsistency in imagining a person who wants to be hit and hurt. Thus, moral beliefs still differ from such non-normative beliefs if the relation between moral judgments and motivation is conceptual necessity or something like that: Conceptual internalism: It is conceptually necessary that every person who makes a moral judgment has some motivation to act accordingly.
This version, of course, implies universal internalism, but it would be denied by externalists who claim that it is a contingent fact about human nature that all normal humans are motivated not to do what they judge to be wrong.
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Conceptual internalism is descriptive in the sense that it does not imply any negative normative judgment about anyone (except the judgment that those who deny it are wrong). Some philosophers (such as Smith 1994), in contrast, formulate internalism as a normative claim like this: Rational internalism: It is conceptually necessary that every person who makes a moral (or practical) judgment has some motivation to act accordingly or else that person is irrational.
This view allows that people can judge that an act is morally required but still not be motivated at all to do that act. Instead of ruling out such people as impossible, rational internalism admits their possibility but deems them irrational. This version is very different from the kinds of internalism that we have discussed so far. It is also easier to defend, because it cannot be refuted by hypothetical or actual counterexamples without establishing controversial claims about rationality. It is not completely clear, however, why it must always be irrational to make an impartial moral judgment without having any desire to be impartial. Consider, as before, someone who judges that it is morally wrong to steal some money, perhaps because he recognizes that he would favor a public rule against stealing if he were impartial. He could still not care about public rules or about being impartial. Then he might not have any motivation at all not to do the act that he judges to be morally wrong. His only motivation is a selfish desire to get the money for himself. However, since that desire is not irrational, it is hard to see why we would have to count him as irrational. Defenders of rational internalism might respond by limiting their view to judgments about what ought to be done overall, not just morally. However, as mentioned above, moral reasons sometimes determine what one overall ought to do. In such cases, our agent could judge that stealing is morally wrong and conclude that it is overall morally wrong, while still not caring or being motivated to act accordingly. It is not clear that he could fail to care if the overall judgment seems or appears true to him, but that unclarity is largely because the notions of seeming and appearance are themselves not determined precisely enough for this issue. Thus, rational internalism might or might not be defensible if limited to overall normative judgments that seem true. In any case, rational internalism cannot help Mackie, because it need not show any essential difference between normative and non-normative judgments. Consider the judgment that anyone who does a certain act will suffer severe pain and then die. Anyone who makes this judgment but is not motivated to avoid doing that act could plausibly be deemed irrational. This might even seem conceptually necessary by virtue of our concept of rationality (see Gert 2005). However, this judgment is not normative. It simply predicts what will happen to anyone who does act. Hence, rational internalism is not enough to show that normative judgments are queer, much less that they are queer in any way that would support Mackie’s skepticism.
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7 Conclusions We have arrived at the end of our discussion, but where is that? I argued first that reason internalism would not support Mackie’s argument, so he needs some form of motivation internalism. Then I argued that overriding-motivation internalism is too strong to be plausible, but Mackie could rest his argument on some-motivation internalism. Third, I argued that fact-internalism about motivation is implausible, as are knowledge internalism, acquaintance internalism, and justified-belief internalism about motivation, so Mackie is best read as claiming judgment internalism or, even better, seeming or seeming-judgment internalism. Next, I suggested that internalism could be made even easier to defend by limiting it to first-person present-tense (in situ) moral thoughts that seem true. Finally, I argued that internalists still need to claim a strong conceptual relation between these judgments and motivation in order to end up with a version that could support Mackie’s conclusion. I have not determined whether any version of internalism is true. Instead, I have only been trying to clarify what internalism is, or which internalisms there are. The eventual goal is to determine whether any version of internalism is both plausible and strong enough to support Mackie’s conclusion. Reaching that goal will have to wait for another time, but I hope that this chapter has clarified some of the issues and options. Acknowledgments Thanks to Adina Roskies, Richard Joyce, and Simon Kirchin for helpful comments on drafts of this chapter.
References Brink, D. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gert, B. 2005. Morality: Its nature and justification, Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Kennett, J. and C. Fine. 2008. Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and “acquired sociopaths.” In Moral psychology, volume 3: The neuroscience of morality, ed. W. SinnottArmstrong, 173–190. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Roskies, A. 2003. Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy.” Philosophical Psychology 16: 51–56. Roskies, A. 2008. Internalism and the evidence from pathology. In Moral psychology, volume 3: The neuroscience of morality, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 191–206. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Smith, M. 1994. The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, M. 2008. The truth about internalism. In Moral psychology, volume 3: The neuroscience of morality, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 207–216. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Tolhurst, W. 1998. Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 293–302. Williams, B. 1981. Internal and external reasons. In his Moral luck, 101–113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mackie’s Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief Jamie Dreier
This chapter is about John Mackie’s moral realism, and so part of its task will be to convince the reader that Mackie was a moral realist. Even if it fails in this task, I hope the main idea will be plausible enough to make the discussion worthwhile. That idea is to present the metaethical issues of realism and antirealism in a certain way and think about how some familiar notions about Mackie’s view look different in the new light. It sounds perverse to call Mackie a realist, but I am not doing it just to be perverse. We could start with the thought that an atheist is not an antirealist about God, or better, about God-talk (“religious discourse,” let’s say).1 The antirealists are those who think that there is no fact of the matter of God’s existence, that attributing holiness, or sacredness, or blessedness, to things, people, actions is not a matter of positing special objects and properties but rather a matter of taking a certain stance, a spiritual stance as it were, toward the same objects we can and do take an ordinary stance toward.2 Atheists think that judgments about spiritual matters are plain judgments (only maybe not about plain things), which can be true or false. They are all false (at least the ones with existential import). But they are truth-apt. Then we might be quite happy with the implication that Mackie’s “error theory,” which is surely analogous to atheism, is also a realist theory, according to which moral judgments are plain judgments of unplain (queer) facts, all truth apt, and all false (again, it’s really just the moral judgments with existential import that are false). I’ve managed to convince myself that this implication is a happy one; maybe I can convince the reader.3 J. Dreier (B) Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA 1 John
Bigelow first explained to me why we might think of atheism as a kind of realism about religious discourse, in conversation in 1994. 2 Think of A. J. Ayer on religious discourse in Language, Truth and Logic (1946) Chapter 6 – the same chapter that offers his conception of ethical discourse. 3 Oddly enough, Mackie does on one occasion seem to endorse Bigelonian antirealism: “One way of stating the thesis that there are no objective values is to say that value statements cannot be either true or false” (1977, p. 25). He rejects this as misleading, but not on the grounds that moral
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_5,
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In the first section, I’ll do some metametaethics, starting off with just a bit of metaphilosophy. Then I’ll work through some Mackie exegesis. In the third section, I’ll try to show why, according to my metametaethics, Mackie was a realist. The fourth section explains a mistake central to a well-known literary plot, and in the end I will argue that Mackie made a parallel mistake in plumping for realism.
1 Metametaethics Some people think of antirealism as a metaphysical thesis, and some think of it as a thesis about language.4 (I mean that each sort of antirealism, whether in ethics, mathematics, modality, and so on, can be thought of as either a thesis about the metaphysics of a certain domain of objects and properties or else as a thesis about the semantics of a certain section of language.) There’s no reason that there couldn’t be two realist/antirealist distinctions, presumably related – two ways of dividing up philosophical theories, perhaps, that don’t draw the same boundaries, and no serious question about which way is correct. More plausibly there are different classification schemes each more illuminating for some purposes. At a first pass, then, semantic theorists are more interested in classifying theories according to whether they count sentences (of a certain kind) as “truth apt,” while metaphysicians are more interested in classifying theories by their ontology. So I could finesse the difficult task of convincing you to think of Mackie as a realist simply by pointing out that philosophy of moral language is an important topic and noting that Mackie’s view does count moral sentences as true or false. But I’m a little more ambitious than that. I’m going to try to give a reason that we should concentrate on a certain way of drawing the line. If we draw it that way, Mackie falls on the realist side. This will show us something about Mackie, and something about realism.
1.1 The Problem of the Boundary Drawing the boundary between realist metaethics and antirealist metaethics is a problem of metametaethics. The metametaethical problem I’m particularly interested in is one that was raised a couple of decades ago and is becoming more familiar
statements are false; rather, he follows what was the standard view that “relative” statements of value can be straightforwardly true or false, where the relativization is to the speaker or agent’s desires. But later, in any case, Mackie puts the matter the way he should, the way one would expect given his arguments: “[T]he denial of objective values will have to be put forward not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘error theory,’ a theory that although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false” (1977, p. 35). 4 This section recaps and explores my metametaethical suggestions in Dreier (2005, pp. 23–24) and Dreier (2006).
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nowadays as well as more pressing. It’s the problem of distinguishing sophisticated antirealists, like Simon Blackburn (1984, 1993), Allan Gibbard (1990, 2003), and Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (2006), from some of the more extravagant moral realists, the Mooreans, among whom I include Russ Shafer-Landau (2003), Robert Audi (1997), and there are probably others. The problem arises, we all know, because, the sophisticated antirealists take it as part of their project to vindicate all of the realist-sounding language of ordinary moral conversation and debate; they are quasi-realists, as Blackburn says. It is made more acute because of the attractiveness and recent successes of deflationary philosophy of language, especially minimalism about truth and allied semantic notions. I think this problem and the way that the two trends (quasi-realism and minimalism) contribute to it are fairly well known, so I will just explain briefly. Quasi-realism presumably needs no introduction, but in case it does, here is Blackburn’s 1984 statement. Mackie, Blackburn notes, held that the “expressive” origin of our moral judgments, when properly understood, shows ordinary moral thinking to be in error. But perhaps there is no mistake. I call the enterprise of showing that there is none—that even on antirealist grounds there is nothing improper, nothing “diseased” in projected predicates—the enterprise of quasi-realism. The point is that it tries to earn, on the slender basis, the features of moral language (or of other commitments to which a projective theory might apply) which tempt people to realism. (Blackburn 1984, p. 171)
On the other side, minimalism about truth helps make it easier to earn some realist-sounding features of moral language. Truth-talk comes free when expressive language has the right grammatical features, as it plainly does, since calling a sentence true is equivalent to asserting the sentence (or at least to what seems on the surface to be asserting; if we can adopt a minimalist conception of assertion then anything with the grammar of assertion will just be assertion). Talk of propositions and facts, and of properties and reference, also follow in the wake of proper grammatical, propositional structure. The result is a kind of fading away of the metaphysical (facts, properties) and semantic (truth, reference) distinctions that once seemed so starkly to divide expressivists from realists. Here is Gibbard’s recent mention of the elision: Does this mean that there are no facts of what I ought to do, no truths and falsehoods? Previously I thought so, but other philosophers challenged me to say what this denial could mean. In this book, I withdraw the denial and turn non-commital. In one sense there clearly are “facts” of what a person ought to do, and in a sense of the word “true” there is a truth of the matter. That’s a minimalist sense, in which “It’s true that pain is to be avoided” just amounts to saying that pain is to be avoided—and likewise for “It’s a fact that.” Perhaps, as I used to think, there are senses too in which we can sensibly debate whether ought conclusions are true or false. Nothing in this book, though, depends on whether there is any such sense. (2003, p. x)
Similarly, the line drawn between the kinds of mental states that moral judgments expressed has been erased by the minimalist, deflationary conception of belief. One hopeful way to explain why expressivism isn’t a kind of realism is to say that the former takes the state expressed to be something other than belief. But Crispin Wright
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notes: “assertion has the following analytical tie to belief: if someone makes an assertion, and is supposed sincere, it follows that she has a belief whose content can be captured by means of the sentence used” (1992, p. 14). Horgan and Timmons adopt this line, insisting that the state expressed must obviously be a belief since it has all logical and grammatical features of a belief. Their “cognitive expressivism” is supposed to have the same metaphysics and same explanatory scheme as the noncognitive versions, differing in that it counts (minimalistically) the state of mind expressed by moral judgment as a belief. Quasi-realism advances, since we do quite ordinarily speak of moral belief, and the prospects for spelling out why expressivism isn’t a kind of realism recede.
1.2 Drawing the Boundary by Type of Explanation All of this quasi-realism and creeping minimalism doesn’t mean that we should give up on the metaphysical division of theories. The semantic criteria are in about as much jeopardy as the metaphysical ones. For just as we can’t pick out antirealists for their denial of the existence of moral facts or properties (since they may be happy with the minimalist versions and doubtful about what the more inflated versions might amount to), we find also that truth, proposition, and reference are also all of them common ground (at least the minimalist versions, and again we’ll have a hard time saying what else there is to want). Instead, I want to say that the difference between the types of theories resides in how they take certain special, “puzzling” or philosophically problematic phenomena to be explained and accounted for. As I’ll try to make clear, this is a metaphysical distinction after all. There are some features of moral language and thought that make its objects seem ripe for philosophical worry. These include the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, especially combined with some sort of irreducibility5 ; and famously the “internalist” feature or “practicality requirement” linking moral judgment to motivation (or perhaps to reasons for action), along with possibly independent worries about how moral expressions might get their reference.6 Different sorts of metaethical theories have different explanations of these features. I’ll take Gibbard’s 2003 Thinking How to Live as my example of how expressivists try to explain. “Begin with the slogans I’ve been proclaiming,” Gibbard says. “Questions of what we ought to do are questions of what to do. Finish your deliberation, conclude what to do, and you’ve concluded what you ought to do” (2003, p. 19). The practicality requirement, that moral (or more generally, normative) judgment should show some specially intimate connection to a decision to act, is explained by the
5 See
Schroeder (2005) for a recent, clear-headed discussion of what might be at issue here. Horgan and Timmons’ assortment of “Moral Twin Earth troubles” papers; e.g., (1991), (1992a), (1992b).
6 See
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hypothesis that the most fundamental sort of judgment of what we ought to do is a decision – or, as Gibbard says, a plan – for what to do.7 He continues: “these crude sayings will, of course, need qualification, but the distinctive claim of an expressivist is that dicta like these, suitably worked out, account for the subject matter of ethics.” This is Gibbard’s own idea about what distinguishes a view like his from a realist metaethical view. Then he adds: “If a self-avowed realist agrees, the two of us may have no quarrel. I don’t, however, know of any ‘ethical realist’ who accepts slogans like these explicitly.” Nor do I. The realist view, I suggest, is that the explanation goes the other way around: it’s the special subject matter of ethics that explains why and in what way moral judgment is essentially practical. This may seem unlikely. Practicality, one might think, is a feature of judgment that is explained by its role in deliberation, and not by its content.8 So the antirealist mark of expressivism, it appears, is that it explains the practicality requirement by some functionalist account of the nature of moral (or normative) concepts9 and not by the special objects of moral judgment. My example was Gibbard’s theory, but I could just as well have used Blackburn’s (see, e.g., Blackburn 1984, Chapter 6). And, I boldly conjecture, a similar line could be drawn by examination of the explanations that metaethical theories give of supervenience. The main idea, again, is that realists will say something about what properties moral predicates pick out, and what natural properties underlie them, and then say how it is that the moral properties are tied to the natural ones. By contrast, antirealists (expressivists are my paradigms) will say something about how moral concepts work and then show how concepts like these must be applied alike to objects that are alike in the underlying respects. The commonality among realists is that they will think that it’s the properties, or facts, that do the explaining; expressivist explanations will make no use of moral properties or facts, though expressivists may be happy to speak of such things “at the end of the day” (as Blackburn says).10 Let me give a very brief and schematic sketch of why it turns out that atheists are realists about religious talk. I am not the best person to identify puzzling features of religious discourse, but a plodding example may serve well enough. Suppose we are wondering why it is that thoughts and talk about God simultaneously fill people
7 I’m
not defending or advocating Gibbard’s explanation here. This is a paper on metametaethics. Defending a particular metaethical view is no more a part of my aim than defending a particular first order normative moral scheme is Mackie’s aim in (the first part of) Ethics. 8 But compare Peter Railton’s views (1993, p. 282). And Michael Smith (1994) also argues that the right sort of content can explain a moral belief’s role in practical reasoning. 9 This idea is elaborated by John O’Leary-Hawthorne and Huw Price (1996). 10 Compare a currently popular view about conditionals, especially indicative conditionals, according to which they have no truth conditions. The motivation for this view has its source in doubts, supported by powerful technical arguments, that the cognitive and inferential role of the state of mind of accepting a conditional can be explained by finding a special kind of proposition or truth conditions that indicative conditionals state. The upshot is that there couldn’t be any special kind of conditional fact whose nature and structure explain why our conditional judgments behave the way they do. See Adams (1975), Edgington (1991), Bennett (2003, especially Chapter 7, 94–113).
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with a sense of comfort and a kind of fear. A realist explanation will appeal to the kind of being that God is: infinite in benevolence but omniscient and perfectly just, a judge from whose court none can escape. The atheist accepts this explanation, in the sense that she agrees that precisely that content (we may suppose) is responsible for the fearsome comfort of thinking and talking about God. What would an antirealist philosophy of religious matters be, then? Maybe a kind of Freudian expressivism, according to which by speaking of which actions are blessed or of what God wants, we are expressing our longing to regain both the authority and the security provided by our parents in our childhood.11 Now we can return to Mackie.
2 Mackie Exegesis When I teach Mackie in my metaethics course, I find that students are strangely attracted to the view. I say this is strange because so few professional philosophers find Mackie’s arguments convincing. Personally, I feel quite confident that Mackie made a mistake in his arguments.12 Most professional philosophers who bother to argue against Mackie are moral realists (see, e.g., Brink 1984); those who are more sympathetic toward his views tend to be antirealists (e.g., Horgan and Timmons). The interesting question always seemed to me to be: Why do metaethical philosophers of an antirealist bent not share Mackie’s conclusions? Speaking loosely, many who do, or would agree with Mackie that there are no objective values, are reluctant to follow him into an “error theory.”13 What is the further premise that Mackie believes and most contemporary antirealists deny? In one sense, the answer is fairly clear. As Mackie puts it, there are two questions one can ask about the objectivity of morality. One is conceptual or semantic, the other is metaphysical. Mackie agrees with hyperrealist philosophers like Moore and Plato (those are the realists he mentions repeatedly) about the conceptual and semantic questions, but he joins antirealists in answering the metaphysical, ontological questions. This is what he says, and it’s what I teach students, and it’s not wrong. But it’s not the most illuminating answer, I now think. Rather, Mackie joins the realists in his conception of central metaphysical questions, and in the way he thinks they have to be answered. For example, he accepts the practicality requirement, and he thinks it is to be explained by some feature of moral properties or facts. That, in a nutshell, is what he thinks is so “queer” about moral goodness: that its nature must explain the internal connection between moral judgment and action.
11 I
am about equally uncomfortable with serious philosophy of religion and serious Freudian psychology. 12 So, yes, here, and when I explain the mistake, I am abandoning my haughty metametaethical position, and stooping to a bit of actual metaethics. 13 Richard Joyce, an editor of this volume, is a notable exception. See Joyce (2001).
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Before I develop this point, which seems to me to be the absolutely crucial one for understanding how Mackie turned out to be an error theorist rather than an expressivist (or some sort of contextualist or relativist), let me run through a more standard reading of why he doesn’t agree with expressivism.14 Mackie first puts his own metaethical thesis like this: There are no objective values. (1977, p. 15)
Alternatively, he notes, we could say that values “are not part of the fabric of the world” (ibid.). But Mackie is aware that that this “moral scepticism” is not enough to distinguish what he’s trying to say from what some of his contemporaries are saying, and he does want to distinguish: It is true that those who have accepted the moral subjectivism which is the doctrine that moral judgements are equivalent to reports of the speaker’s own feelings or attitudes have usually presupposed what I am calling moral scepticism. It is because they have assumed that there are no moral values that they have looked elsewhere for an analysis of what moral statements might mean, and have settled upon subjective reports. (1977, p. 18)
Mackie remarks on what he calls the “multiplicity of second order questions,” and in particular that there are metaphysical (“factual”) questions that are not equivalent to conceptual or linguistic questions. His main claim is the metaphysical one, but he also has a linguistic/conceptual view which differs from the “subjectivists” and expressivists. Answers to one of the second order questions don’t entail answers to the others, he insists, though he thinks others will disagree: Recent philosophy, biased as it has been toward various kinds of linguistic inquiry, has tended to doubt this, but the distinction between conceptual and factual analysis in ethics can be supported by analogies with other areas. (1977, p. 19)15
So according to Mackie, we understand the difference between subjective value and objective value well enough to distinguish them. And moral value concepts are objective. If second order ethics were confined, then, to linguistic and conceptual analysis, it ought to conclude that moral values at least are objective: that they are so is part of what our ordinary moral statements mean: the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. (Mackie 1977, p. 35)
14 Actually,
the “nonfactualist” interlocutor that most interests Mackie is R. M. Hare; for my purposes, Hare is close enough to an expressivist to make no difference. 15 Mackie has a difficult, uncharacteristically opaque dispute with R. M. Hare over the question of whether there are any factual questions remaining once the linguistic and conceptual ones are resolved. For Hare’s side, see his “Nothing Matters” (1972, p. 47). Hare writes: “Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same things – there is no difference in the ‘subjective’ concern which people have for things, only in their ‘objective’ value. Now I ask, ‘What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds?’ Can any answer be given except ‘None whatever’?” Mackie gives his side in Ethics, pp. 21–22.
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This means that Mackie ends up with commitments that split across the battle lines of his contemporaries. On the conceptual question he is on the side of Moore (and, he thinks, Plato and Kant, though nowadays we’d have a very hard time thinking of Kant as holding that morality is part of the “fabric of the world”), but he is with Stevenson and Hare on the metaphysical question. [T]he denial of objective values will have to be put forward not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an “error theory,” a theory that although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false. (ibid.)
So far, so good. But why does he agree with Moore about the concept if he’s with the subjectivists on metaphysics? An error theory is extremely uncharitable as an interpretation of ordinary thought and talk. And notoriously Mackie goes on, in Ethics, to vindicate quite a lot of ordinary moral thinking, at least so far as to use sentences that any of us would use to state our own moral views, and to use them sincerely, in his own voice. When he says these things, he naturally thinks of himself as free of the incorrect metaphysics that he takes to be presupposed by the moralizing of hoi polloi (and by that of his more metaphysically extravagant colleagues). If he can argue for qualified deontological principles against both pure consequentialism and “absolutist” deontology without committing the Error, then why can’t we?16 The simple answer is that he just thinks the “claim to objectivity” is built into moral concepts as people actually use them: [O]bjectivism about values . . . has also a firm basis in ordinary thought, and even in the meanings of moral terms. No doubt it was an extravagance of Moore to say that “good” is the name of a non-natural quality, but it would not be so far wrong to say that in moral contexts it is used as if it were the name of a supposed non-natural quality, where the description “non-natural” leaves room for the peculiar evaluative, prescriptive, intrinsically action-guiding aspects of this supposed quality. (Mackie 1977, p. 32)
Now, Mackie does give some reasonably good argument for why ordinary thought includes the “claim to objectivity,” but these arguments do not seem to show that the “claim” figures in ordinary thought as a kind of presupposition or as part of the content. Granting his points, that is, it still seems open for a subjectivist, prescriptivist, or expressivist critic to reply that although ordinary thinking may somehow include whatever is the best way to capture objectivity, this extra thought is just an add-on. It could be false. And, obviously, Mackie thinks that in a way it is false: there are no such properties. So why does this mean that nothing at all is morally right or wrong, rather than meaning that plenty of things (those
16 I
think this criticism of Mackie is overblown. In both Ethics and his later work, Mackie is much more apt than most to speak of what follows from this or that moral premise, of what commitments are incurred by adopting a principle, and of what we might be willing to say or accept, than most philosophers writing about ethics. When occasionally he slides back into the natural idiom of first-order ethics with existential commitment, it seems fair to allow him the façon de parler.
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things we ordinarily think are morally right and wrong) really are, only the fact that they are is partly constituted by our thinking so, or by our sentiments, or that these are only facts in the pleonastic, minimal, deflated sense in that saying that they are facts is merely repeating our own moral commitments? Why couldn’t we be correct in our first-order moral thinking but incorrect in the metaphysical interpretation we give this thinking? Compare ordinary thinking about physical properties and relations like solidity or simultaneity. A sophisticated understanding of the physics that underlies these features of the world shows that they are not all that we think they are. Solid objects do not uniformly fill the space they occupy with undifferentiated matter; rather, they are mostly space, they are (constituted by) crystalline lattices of atoms held together by electromagnetic forces. Simultaneous events, furthermore, take place “at the same time” only relative to a frame of reference; there is no absolute simultaneity. But sophisticated physics does not tell us that there are no solid objects and it does not say that everybody’s judgments about which events are simultaneous are false. The theoretic gloss on our ordinary judgments is not properly understood as infecting every first-order judgment with false presupposition. Why, then, should false metaphysics infect our moralizing? It’s true that plenty of ordinary concepts turn out to be empty – uninstantiated – and that we come to be error theorists about them because of increasing theoretic sophistication, or more mundanely by finding things out about the world. There aren’t any witches, we know now. It’s not that we discovered that witches aren’t magic, or that magic is really just sleight of hand. When we see that what we took to be magic is accomplished by prestidigitation, we conclude that it wasn’t magic after all, and when we discover that eccentric women cannot use incantations to cause people to become sick, we conclude that there are no witches. Sometimes the theoretical or commonsense baggage is so woven into the ordinary concept that it cannot be discharged without abandoning the expressions. It isn’t absurd to suppose that the claim to objectivity is to moral wrongness as magical power is to witchiness, so Mackie’s combination of positions on the conceptual and metaphysical questions certainly makes sense. My question is why we are supposed to think that wrongness is like witchiness, rather than like simultaneity. Mackie never explains.
3 Queerness I now, finally, turn to my own explanation of why Mackie is a realist. In my sense, expressivism is marked off from all kinds of realism, remember, by the type of explanation that it offers for the odd, puzzling features of an area of thinking and language – in the present case, moral thinking and language. Mackie’s explanation is of a piece with Moore’s and other paradigm realists’. My account also shows why Mackie doesn’t adopt the conceptual part of the “subjectivist” view. I don’t want to go so far as to say that my way of looking at things makes everything about Mackie’s
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big picture perfectly clear and comfortable; I just say that it illuminates some dark corners. Unsurprisingly, I think the main textual focus has to be on Mackie’s infamous Argument from Queerness. I’ll be concerned with the metaphysical version. Mackie says also that the epistemology of moral values would have to be queer. Insofar as this is really a separate argument, I believe it rests on the conclusion of another argument – namely, Mackie’s argument about the supervenience of the moral. I say “insofar as” it is separate because Mackie himself says that the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral is itself an element of the queerness of moral properties.17 In any case, the point that I want to make is about metaphysical queerness, so I’ll just be focusing on that, without committing myself here to the stronger claim that metaphysical queerness is what’s really behind the error theory. Here is the telegraphic version of the argument. Moral values, if they were to exist, would have to be very queer sorts of things. It is hard to believe that anything so queer, or queer in this way, exists; nothing really is that way, as far as we can make out when we reflect on things soberly and clearly. So moral values don’t exist. One obvious shortcoming of this version is that it fails to say what would be so queer about moral properties. Mackie does say a number of things about why they would be queer. They would have to have a certain queer feature, which he variously calls “objective prescriptivity,” “built in to-be-pursuedness,” “absolute action-guidingness.” In one nice passage, he admits that there is a sense of the word “justice” in which it is quite objective whether something is just or not; we know of paradigm cases of injustice, like when a judge fails to apply the law, or when a competitor is given a lower score even though he does better measure up to the actual standards. But the statement that a certain decision is thus just or unjust will not be objectively prescriptive: in so far as it can be simply true it leaves open the question whether there is any objective requirement to do what is just and to refrain from what is unjust, and equally leaves open the practical decision to act in either way. (Mackie 1977, pp. 26–27)
Some facts can be prescriptive, and some can be objective, but none could be objective and prescriptive at once. But moral facts would have to be both. That’s queer. Still, this does leave us with the question of just what exactly “objectively prescriptive” means. It does sound queer: the facts themselves telling us what to do. But maybe that’s just a peculiar description of something ordinary and explicable. We need a more explicit version.
17 “Another
way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. . . . The wrongness must be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies?” (Mackie 1977, p. 41).
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[T]he main tradition of European philosophy from Plato onwards has combined the view that moral values are objective with the recognition that moral judgements are partly prescriptive or directive or action-guiding. . . . In Plato’s theory the Forms, and in particular the Form of the Good, are external, extra-mental, realities. . . . But it is held also that just knowing them or “seeing” them will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations. (Mackie 1977, p. 23)18
This passage provides one of the two most explicit developments of the nature of the queerness of moral properties. Here is the other: Plato’s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness built into it. (Mackie 1977, p. 40)
The queerness of moral properties, I think it’s clear, is a direct product of the “internalist” feature of moral judgment, the “practicality requirement.” Glossing his own argument, he writes: The considerations that favour moral skepticism are: first, the relativity or variability of some important starting points of moral thinking and their apparent dependence on actual ways of life; secondly, the metaphysical peculiarity of the supposed objective values, in that they would have to be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating. (Mackie 1977, p. 49)
Mackie endorses a very strong version of the requirement – much stronger, I think, than any metaethicist, even one strongly sympathetic to the thesis, would endorse today. I doubt that his argument needs such a strong version. There are all sorts of ways of weakening it without seriously damaging the argument, but I’ll stick with the strong version. I do need to clarify one thing, though, so as to disambiguate (or maybe correct) Mackie’s statement of the requirement. Mackie speaks of knowledge of and acquaintance with moral good; it is these that he says provide the agent automatically and by their own force, these that will not merely tell us what to do but ensure that we do it. One version of internalism does indeed hold that it is knowledge or acquaintance with moral facts that must motivate. But I don’t think that’s the one Mackie had in mind. Notice that he attributes to “the European tradition” “the recognition that moral judgements are partly prescriptive or directive or action-guiding” (my emphasis). It’s the act of judging that is bound to motivation, and not some further contact with the facts judged. And it’s belief internalism, or judgment internalism, that figures in the argument. Here’s how I interpret the argument when the queerness of moral judgment is made fully explicit.
18 Though Plato is his favorite, because Mackie thinks Plato faced up to queerness more forthrightly
than other philosophers, he adds Kant and Sidgwick in this passage as having held essentially the same view.
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Q1
Moral goodness would have to be a property, G, such that judging that something is G entails having an overriding motivation to pursue it. Q2 But for no property P does judging that something is P entail having a motivation to pursue it. (What a queer sort of property that would be!) Therefore: Q3
There is no such property as moral goodness.
This is the argument that makes Mackie a realist. He subscribes to the realist style of the explanation of the internalist feature of moral judgment. For morality to be vindicated, according to Mackie, the moral properties themselves would have to account for the internal, necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation. I did say that my account would not exactly make absolutely everything clear, and I have to admit that I find it odd that Mackie should have thought that it was the moral properties that would have to explain the internal connection. One reason I find it odd is that it just seems like a mistake to me. It seems to me that Q1 and Q2 are natural grounds for expressivism, although an expressivist would put the same premises somewhat differently. E1
Judging that something is morally good entails having an overriding motivation to pursue the thing. E2 But there is no belief the having of which entails having any motivation. (What a queer belief that would be!) Therefore: E3
Judging that something is morally good is not a belief.
This version strikes me as much better. It is, surely, the belief that is supposed to be queer, according to internalism, and not the property – the property gets its own queerness in a rather irrelevant and relational way, if we absolutely insist on the Q version of the argument. Mackie seems to have mislocated the queerness. When I lay things out this way, his mistake seems very strange. But Mackie is not alone, actually. There is a group of literary characters who are guilty of an analogous mistake.
4 Queer Pigs In E. B. White’s novel Charlotte’s Web (1952), Wilbur the Pig, saved from early slaughter as runt of the litter by the pleading of the tender hearted Fern Arable, is getting dangerously fat. The danger is rather different for him than it would be for us: Fern’s uncle Homer Zuckerman has visions of pork chops and bacon. Fortunately
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for Wilbur, he has friends in high places, especially Charlotte A. Cavatica, the grey barn spider who has spun her web in the doorway of the barn, directly over Wilbur’s pen. Charlotte conceives a plan to save Wilbur’s life: “The way to save Wilbur’s life is to play a trick on Zuckerman. If I can fool a bug,” thought Charlotte, “I can surely fool a man. People are not as smart as bugs.” (White 1952, p. 67)
That night, she sets about executing her trick, and by morning the trap is set: The web glistened in the light and made a pattern of loveliness and mystery, like a delicate veil. Even Lurvy, who wasn’t particularly interested in beauty, noticed the web when he came with the pig’s breakfast. He noted how clearly it showed up, and he noted how carefully built it was. And then he took another look and he saw something that made him set his pail down. There, in the center of the web, neatly woven in block letters, was a message. It said: SOME PIG! Lurvy felt weak. He brushed his hand across his eyes and stared harder at Charlotte’s web. (White 1952, p. 78)
Charlotte’s trick is having the desired affect. Lurvy tells Mr. Zuckerman, owner of farm and pig: “I think you’d better come down to the pig pen,” he said. “What’s the trouble?” asked Mr. Zuckerman. “Anything wrong with the pig?” “N-not exactly,” said Lurvy. “Come and see for yourself.” The two men walked silently down to Wilbur’s yard. Lurvy pointed to the spider web. “Do you see what I see?” he asked? Zuckerman stared at the writing on the web. Then he murmured the words “Some Pig.” Then he looked at Lurvy. Then they both began to tremble. Charlotte, sleepy after her night’s exertions, smiled as she watched. (ibid.)
Lurvy and Mr. Zuckerman confirm Charlotte’s low opinion of men. Struck by the miracle of English writing in a spider’s web, they are in the process of mislocating the miraculous object: they think it’s Wilbur. They think it must be the subject matter of the incredible, inexplicable writing, rather than something about the writing (or author). E. B. White may have a better opinion of women than Charlotte has of men. Mrs. Zuckerman is not so easy to hoodwink: “Edith,” [Mr. Zuckerman] said, trying to keep his voice steady, “I think you had best be told that we have a very unusual pig.” A look of complete bewilderment came over Mrs. Zuckerman’s face. “Homer Zuckerman, what in the world are you talking about?” “This is a very serious thing, Edith,” he replied. “Our pig is completely out of the ordinary.” “What’s unusual about the pig?” asked Mrs. Zuckerman, who was beginning to recover from her scare. “Well, I don’t really know yet,” said Mr. Zuckerman. “But we have received a sign, Edith– a mysterious sign. . . . [Mr. Zuckerman described the scene in the barn.] A miracle has happened and a sign has occurred here on earth, right on our farm, and we have no ordinary pig.” “Well,” said Mrs. Zuckerman, “it seems to me you’re a little off. It seems to me we have no ordinary spider.” “Oh no,” said Zuckerman. “It’s the pig that’s unusual. It says so, right there in the middle of the web.”
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Zuckerman tells his minister that a miracle has occurred on the farm. The minister’s assessment of the situation is no better than the farmer’s: “Don’t tell anybody else,” said the minister. “We don’t know what it means yet, but perhaps if I give some thought to it, I can explain it in my sermon next Sunday. There can be no doubt that you have a most unusual pig. I intend to speak about it in my sermon and point out the fact that this community has been visited with a wondrous animal.” (White 1952, p. 82)
In the weeks to come, Charlotte repeats her scheme, using words she finds in magazine advertisements. She describes Wilbur in turn as TERRIFIC, RADIANT, and HUMBLE. The victory is unqualified: Wilbur lives though holiday dinners, wins a special prize at the state fair and in the end looks forward to a long, if swinish, existence. “Ladies and Gentlemen,” said the loudspeaker [at the fair], “we now present Mr. Homer L. Zuckerman’s distinguished pig. The fame of this unique animal has spread to the far corners of the earth, attracting many valuable tourists to our great State. Many of you will recall that never-to-be-forgotten day last summer when the writing appeared mysteriously on the spider’s web in Mr. Zuckerman’s barn, calling the attention of all and sundry to the fact that this pig was completely out of the ordinary. This miracle has never been fully explained, although learned men have visited the Zuckerman pigpen to study and observer the phenomenon. In the last analysis, we simply know that we are dealing with supernatural forces here, and we should all feel proud and grateful. In the words of the spider’s web, ladies and gentlemen, this is some pig.” (White 1952, p. 157)
5 Conclusion: The Web of Belief Zuckerman and cohorts are guilty of an amusing mistake, one that requires some good-natured suspension of disbelief for readers to swallow. But John Mackie, quite a lot smarter than Zuckerman, Lurvy, or any bug (pace Charlotte), was guilty of a parallel mistake. In the presence of words in a spider web, Lurvy turned his gaze in the wrong direction, toward the subject matter of the words instead of to the nature of the web and words themselves. “Some pig,” he thought, instead of “Some spider.” “What a queer pig that must be, to be the subject of spider remarks! No pig that I’ve ever seen has been of such a terrific, radiant, extraordinary nature as to have a spider web advertisement be about him. It seems hard to believe in such a pig! And yet, there it is.” I hope this makes it clear how Mackie’s mistake is parallel. Moral beliefs are like a spider’s web with words. They are very queer indeed. It is not their subject matter that we should wonder about, be skeptical about, consider queer; it’s the beliefs. Those are some beliefs you have there, you moralizers. Our community has been visited, to paraphrase the minister, not by a wondrous property or pig, but by a wondrous and suspicious belief. It seems odd that Mackie would make the mistake I attribute to him. Mackie was no Lurvy. Still, I am pretty confident that he did make that mistake. Mackie was
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right, at least given his premise of internalism, to find queerness in the domain of moral talk and thought, but he located it in entirely the wrong spot. What would Edith Zuckerman say? He should have kept his eyes on the miraculous nature of moral belief and doubted that there could be any such thing, instead of attributing it to the subject matter of the beliefs. At least so it seems to me; and here I have shown my metaethical hand. For it’s realists who expect to explain the queer (or anyway, philosophically puzzling) aspects of moral judgment by way of the moral facts and properties themselves, antirealists who try to explain them by other, functional or non-representational aspects of our words. (Spiders, maybe?) I’ve been trying to convince the reader that Mackie was a realist, but I don’t have to put my conclusion in such a provocative way. Let me recap. In the first section, I argued that traditional ways of drawing the boundary between realist and antirealist metaethical theories are no longer adequate, because deflationary or minimalist accounts of some of the concepts employed in carving the distinction render them useless for the purpose. I suggested that what makes expressivism antirealist and Moorean non-naturalism realist is that expressivists explain the special, puzzling features of normative thought and talk by means of features of our concepts and our language, while Mooreans look for the explanation in the subject matter, that is, in some special nature of moral properties and ought-facts. Since Mackie agrees with Mooreans on this question, he counts as a realist. The key to categorizing Mackie is found in his ideas about the queerness of moral properties and facts: they would have to be such as to explain the odd, intrinsically motivational features of beliefs about them. Notice that it isn’t the error theory per se that makes Mackie a realist, according to my scheme, but his reasons for subscribing to it. Maybe other error theorists have different reasons, and if they do maybe those reasons are antirealist reasons.19 Of course, I shouldn’t insist on my terminology. “Realism” and “antirealism” are bits of philosophical jargon, not terms of ordinary language, and philosophers are entitled to use them however they like. If a metaphysician declines my invitation to draw the boundary by reference to the location of explanations of the special features of thought and talk, I won’t really complain. Instead I can put my point about Mackie in a terminologically neutral but still polemical way. Mackie shares with Mooreans and Lurvy the view that it’s the pig that’s queer; expressivists are on the side of Edith Zuckerman in thinking that it’s the spider. Acknowledgments I gave a version of this paper at the APA Central Division meetings in Chicago, April 2005. Thanks very much to Terence Cuneo for the critical comments he gave at the symposium, and also to Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin for their advice, both philosophical and editorial.
19 Thanks
to Richard Joyce for getting me to see this point.
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References Adams, E. 1975. The logic of conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel. Audi, R. 1997. Moral knowledge and ethical character. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, truth and logic. 2nd ed. New York: Dover. Bennett, J. 2003. A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the word. New York: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press. Brink, D. 1984. Moral realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 111–125. Dreier, J. 2005. Metaethics and the problem of creeping minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23–44. Dreier, J. 2006. Was Moore a Moorean? In Metaethics after Moore, eds. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, 191–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edgington, D. 1991. Do conditionals have truth conditions? In Conditionals, ed. F. Jackson, 176– 201. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking how to live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hare, R. M. 1972. “Nothing matters”: Is “the annihilation of values” something that could happen? In his Applications of moral philosophy, 32–47. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons. 1991. New wave moral realism meets moral twin earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16: 447–465. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons. 1992a. Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The open question argument revived. Philosophical Papers 21: 153–175. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons. 1992b. Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived. Synthese 92: 221–260. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons. 2006. Cognitivist expressivism. In Metaethics after Moore, eds. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, 255–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joyce, R. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. and H. Price. 1996. How to stand up for noncognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 275–292. Railton, P. 1993. What the noncognitivist helps us to see, the naturalist must help us to explain. In Reality, representation, and projection, eds. J. Haldane and C. Wright, 279–300. New York: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, M. 2005. Realism and reduction: The quest for robustness. Philosopher’s Imprint 5: 1–18. Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral realism: A defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, M. 1994. The moral problem. London: Blackwell. White, E. B. 1952. Charlotte’s web. New York: Harper Collins. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mackie on Practical Reason David Phillips
My topic in this chapter is John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason. I will argue that his approach is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I will argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams.1 This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral skepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of Mackie’s view by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. While Joyce does a nice job in a number of ways of framing Mackie’s argument, I shall argue that it is a serious mistake to invoke instrumentalism in its defense. I will begin with interpretive issues, arguing that Mackie develops a view of practical reason significantly different from Williams’. I will then turn to philosophical assessment, arguing that the view I attribute to Mackie is significantly more plausible than Williams’ view. Finally, I will ask what this shows about how to understand Mackie’s arguments for moral skepticism.
1 Mackie and Williams on Practical Reason Begin with Williams, who develops the most famous recent version of the view that all reasons are desire-based. He distinguishes internal from external reasons, and argues that the only true or genuine reasons are internal. The simplest account of internal reasons, as he notes, is one according to which “A has a reason to φ if A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his φing” (Williams 1981, D. Phillips (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA 1 Williams’ views are developed in four places. “Internal and External Reasons” was first published
in 1979 and appeared in his Moral Luck (1981). He returned to the topic in “Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame” (which was first published in 1989 and appears in his collected papers (1995a)) and then in “Replies” (1995b). His final reflections on the topic are to be found in “Postscript: Some further notes on internal and external reasons” (2001).
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_6,
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p. 101). Williams’ account of internal reasons goes beyond this simple “subHumean” model in two major respects: the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” S, can contain more than just desires, and deliberation is not restricted to straightforward means-ends calculation. He then considers whether there are any genuine or correct external reasons statements, and concludes that there are not: The sort of considerations offered here strongly suggest to me that external reason statements, when definitely isolated as such, are false, or incoherent, or really something else misleadingly expressed . . . The formulation in terms of reasons does have an effect, particularly in its suggestion that the agent is being irrational, and this suggestion, once the basis of an internal reason claim has been clearly laid aside, is bluff. (Williams 1981, p. 111)
In “Internal and External Reasons,” Williams argues for his view by focusing on a case from Henry James, that of Owen Wingrave. As Williams describes the case, Owen’s father claims that Owen has a reason to join the army, but there is nothing in Owen’s S such that if he deliberated he would be motivated to join the army. The argument begins with the following (internalism) constraint: In considering what an external reason statement might mean, we have to remember the dimension of possible explanation. If something can be a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an explanation of that action. (Williams 1981, p. 106)
The argument then goes as follows: No external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of someone’s action (because, ex hypothesi, it can be true independently of the agent’s motivations). So external reasons statements must explain action in conjunction with some “psychological link” (Williams 1981, p. 107). The obvious candidate to be that psychological link is belief. One possibility is that the distinctive explanatory role of external reasons statements is played by explanations invoking a person’s belief that a particular consideration constitutes a reason. But this possibility must be rejected, because a person who had such a belief “appears to be one about whom . . . an internal reason statement could truly be made” (Williams 1981, p. 107). So the distinctive explanatory role of an external reason statement “will have to be revealed by considering what it is to come to believe such a statement” (Williams 1981, p. 108, italics in original). But Williams argues that this possibility too must be rejected: Given the agent’s earlier existing motivations, and this new motivation, what has to hold for external reason statements to be true, on this line of interpretation, is that the new motivation could be in some way rationally arrived at, granted the earlier motivations. Yet at the same time it must not bear to the earlier motivations the kind of rational relation which we considered in the earlier discussion of deliberation—for in that case an internal reason statement would have been true in the first place. I see no reason to suppose that these conditions could possibly be met. (Williams 1981, p. 109)
For current purposes, the key feature of Williams’ position is this: he gives a very special status to internal reasons claims. They can, he claims, be true or correct in a way that no other reasons claims can be.
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Mackie’s treatment, I shall suggest, contrasts with Williams’ in this key respect. For Mackie, internal reasons claims have no such special status and in particular are not specially authoritative. The story about their authority is ultimately the same as the story about the authority of other normative claims: they are authoritative only when a certain background is presupposed; they lack the special authority that, Mackie the moral skeptic thinks, nothing in the world has. To show that this is Mackie’s view, begin by noting the common features of an approach to moral terms and concepts found in a number of places in the first three chapters of Ethics. On this approach, moral claims (or, more generally, value claims) can be assessed as true or false only when certain normative items (standards, requirements, desires, ends, etc.) are presupposed. For this reason, employing a term Mackie does not employ, I will call it “the presupposition approach.” It makes an early appearance in Section 5 of Chapter 1: One way of stating that there are no objective values is to say that value statements cannot be either true or false. But this formulation, too, lends itself to misinterpretation. For there are certain kinds of value statements which undoubtedly can be true or false, even if, in the sense I intend, there are no objective values. Evaluations of many sorts are commonly made in relation to agreed and assumed standards. (Mackie 1977, pp. 25–26)
Consider next what Mackie says in introducing the (familiar) notion of a hypothetical imperative: “If you want to do X, do Y” (or “You ought to do Y”) will be a hypothetical imperative if it is based on the supposed fact that Y is, in the circumstances, the only (or the best) available means to X, that is, on a causal relation between Y and X. The reason for doing Y lies in its causal connection with the desired end, X; the oughtness is contingent upon the desire. (Mackie 1977, pp. 27–28)
Then notice Mackie’s proposed “general definition of ‘good’”: Such as to satisfy requirements (etc.) of the kind in question. (Mackie 1977, pp. 55–56, italics in original)
Mackie goes on to suggest that context tells us what kind of requirements are in question. Finally, notice Mackie’s account of the meaning of “ought” and of the different kinds of “ought”-claims. His “first attempt at a general equivalent of ‘a ought to G’” is: There is a reason for a’s Ging. (Mackie 1977, pp. 73–74)
Then he allows for several different sorts of reasons with which to fill in this formula: hypothetically imperative reasons, institutional reasons, epistemic reasons, prudential reasons, reasons provided by the wants and needs of others. He also mentions the kind of “intrinsic requirements” in which, of course, he disbelieves. I suggest that in these different passages there is a common general idea: that value claims can be true or correct only when some normative item is presupposed. Care is needed in seeing just what follows from Mackie’s development of this presupposition approach. One of Mackie’s themes is that too much of the moral philosophy contemporary with the writing of Ethics wrongly focuses on linguistic and semantic issues, excluding important and independent metaphysical issues. Thus
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we should not expect Mackie directly to infer anything metaphysical from these linguistic or conceptual claims. He thinks that the truth of these linguistic or conceptual claims is compatible with the falsity of moral skepticism. Indeed, the structure of his case for his error theory requires that he distinguish, in Michael Smith’s terminology (Smith 1994, pp. 63–66), rationalism as a conceptual claim (which Mackie accepts) from rationalism as a substantive claim (which he rejects). Nonetheless, there is an important lesson suggested by Mackie’s embrace of the presupposition approach: that there is nothing special about hypothetical imperatives or internal reasons. Hypothetical “ought”-claims or internal reasons claims are true contingently on certain desires, in just the same way as institutional “ought”-claims (e.g., involving promising) are true speaking from within the institution of promising, and in just the same way as claims about the goodness of apples are true given presupposed standards or requirements that apples must meet. In none of these cases are normative claims true or correct in a presupposition-independent way. Mackie will go on to argue, in effect, that no normative claims are true or correct in a straightforward, or presupposition-independent way. Again, though, this further claim is the product of independent arguments against the existence of categorical imperatives (specifically, the arguments from relativity and from queerness); Mackie certainly does not take it to follow just from the presupposition approach itself. Read this way, Mackie’s view is importantly different from Williams’. Mackie does not pick out hypothetical imperative or internal reasons claims as having a special kind of authority or validity, as Williams does. They are in central respects just like other familiar evaluative claims; and in no such cases (he will go on to argue) is there this kind of authority.
2 Why Mackie’s Treatment is Better The presupposition approach is philosophically superior to Williams’ approach. The problem with Williams’ approach can be developed as a dilemma. To articulate the dilemma, begin by distinguishing between debunking and non-debunking accounts of normative practical reasons claims. Non-debunking accounts seek to capture the ordinary meaning of such claims. Debunking accounts take it instead that the ordinary meaning of such claims involves some metaphysical error, and so seek to offer instead the best non-erroneous reconstruction of such claims. In outline, the dilemma is this: Either Williams offers a non-debunking account of normative practical reasons claims, or he does not. If, as most interpreters suppose,2 2 Scanlon
is quite explicit in interpreting Williams as developing a non-debunking view. In What We Owe to Each Other, he writes: “I will assume that [Williams’] claim that there are only internal reasons does not reflect skepticism about reasons in the standard normative sense” (p. 365). Parfit is equally clear that he sees Williams as developing a reductive, but not a debunking or eliminativist, account of normative practical reasons (Parfit 1997). Korsgaard, however, may take Williams to be developing a debunking view; her celebrated critique of his work comes, after all, in an article entitled “Skepticism about Practical Reason.”
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he offers a non-debunking account of practical reasons claims, then Williams faces three problems: first, that each person’s own (contingent, idiosyncratic) subjective motivational set is made a source of authority, a role it is ill-suited to play; second, that his view conflicts with firm intuitions about the reasons people have; and third, that his view conflicts with the phenomenology of deliberation. If, contrary to most interpreters, Williams is read as offering a debunking account of practical reasons claims, then the problem is that there are better debunking accounts available, including Mackie’s account, which allows us to make sense, in a way Williams’ account does not, of external reasons judgments. To develop the argument more fully, begin with the first horn of the dilemma. Suppose that we read Williams as offering a non-debunking account of practical reasons claims. The first problem then is that Williams makes the agent’s subjective motivational set the source of authority; and, on reflection, that is a role that subjective motivational sets are, in themselves, ill-equipped to play. The idea of a normative practical reason is the idea of an authoritative consideration applying to an agent. Williams’ view has no problem with application to an agent. But it does have a problem with authority. What someone’s desires are is, to a significant extent, an arbitrary, contingent fact about her. Why are her desires therefore a source, or the only source, of authority? The second problem is that Williams’ view conflicts with firm intuitions about the reasons we have. Any number of possible examples can be used to illustrate this point. Consider two. First, suppose that Alice wants to smoke cigarettes. She does not enjoy smoking cigarettes. She knows about the likely deleterious consequences for her health. But her desire to smoke cigarettes would, for all that, survive the kind of procedurally rational reflection for which Williams’ view allows. He is then compelled to say that Alice has a reason to smoke cigarettes. Her desire is itself a source of authority. But surely the mere fact that Alice has this desire, and that procedurally rational reflection would not cause her to lose the desire, does not show that she has a good reason to smoke cigarettes. Second, consider a famous example from Derek Parfit: the example of the person who is future-Tuesday-indifferent (Parfit 1984, pp. 123–124). She cares equally about pains and pleasure in the future, except that she doesn’t care at all about pain or pleasure on future Tuesdays. So she would prefer agony on a future Tuesday to mild discomfort on any other day of the week. She understands that the days of the week are just conventional calendar divisions, and has no other bizarre metaphysical beliefs in the light of which her attitude to Tuesdays would be more comprehensible. Her indifference to pain on future Tuesdays would survive procedurally rational reflection. Again, Williams’ view compels us to say that this person has no reason to care about pains on future Tuesdays. Again that conflicts with our firm intuitions about the reasons this person has. Someone might respond that almost all normal people will turn out to have elements in their subjective motivational sets such that, on Williams’ view, they do have reason to care about pain on future Tuesdays. But Parfit’s point is that we think that even people who (by hypothesis) lack any such element nonetheless do have reason to care about pain on future Tuesdays.
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The third problem is that Williams’ view conflicts with the phenomenology of deliberation. When we deliberate, we typically do not take the value of the options about which we deliberate to depend on our desires. Instead, we take the desires to be responses to the value. Let me quote two recent characterizations of this problem. The first is from Stephen Darwall, who invokes (and criticizes) terminology introduced by Philip Pettit and Michael Smith (1990): What a deliberating agent has in view is rarely his own will or desires as such, even if taking something as a reason is intimately tied to desire. Someone who wants to escape a burning building doesn’t evaluate her options by considering which is likeliest to realize what she wants or wills. She is focused, rather, on her desire’s object: getting out alive. The fact that a successful route would realize something she wants is apt to strike her as beside the point or, at best, as a trivial bonus. . . . This point is sometimes put by saying that desires are in the “background” rather than the foreground, of the practical scene a deliberating agent faces. The metaphor is somewhat misleading, however, since an agent’s desires are normally not so much in the background of her deliberative field as outside of it altogether. If we must locate them spatially, a better place might be within or behind the standpoint from which the agent views her alternatives rather than towards the back of the scene she views. (Darwall 2001, pp. 129–130)
The problem is also articulated by Scanlon: If I take myself to have reason to do something because it is worthwhile—to work to alleviate some people’s suffering, for example, or to prevent the destruction of some great building—this reason does not seem to depend on my seeing it as a reason. Rather, I think that I would be mistaken not to see that it is worthwhile or excellent, and mistaken not to care about such things . . . . Consequently, the claim that the reasons they give me derive solely from my desires, or from what I care about, seems deflationary. (Scanlon 1998, p. 42)
It is important to be clear about the exact character of this problem. The problem is not that Williams’ view requires deliberation to have the wrong focus. An agent who accepts Williams’ view need not focus on her subjective motivational set when deliberating. She can properly focus on the options between which she has to choose and the values of those options. On her view these values are ultimately the product of her subjective motivational set; but that does not mean that, while deliberating, she must focus on that fact or on her subjective motivational set. The problem is, rather, that (as the quotation from Scanlon suggests) a serious commitment to deliberation cannot easily coexist, in many normal agents, with acceptance of Williams’ view. Deliberation need not focus on the source of value. But some accounts of the source of value, including Williams’, seem to undermine much normal deliberation, in the sense that normal agents, in deliberating, assume their falsity, and would think such deliberation pointless if they came to accept these accounts. Given these very serious problems, there would have to be very powerful arguments on the other side to persuade us to accept Williams’ view. But his arguments have no such power. The argument explicitly offered in “Internal and External Reasons” trades on the internalism constraint identified earlier: If something can be a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an explanation of that action. (Williams 1981, p. 106)
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Williams takes this to show that the only genuine reasons are internal in his favored sense, that they derive from the agent’s subjective motivational set. But in doing so he fails to see that the internalism constraint might just as well be formulated instead as Christine Korsgaard formulates it: Practical-reason claims, if they are really to present us with reasons for action, must be capable of motivating rational persons. (Korsgaard 1986, p. 11)
On this reformulation, it does not follow from the internalism constraint that someone’s failing to be motivated by a consideration shows that it is not a reason for her. For there is always an alternative diagnosis available: the person is irrational. Hence no argument from the existence of an internalism constraint supports the idea that all genuine reasons are internal in Williams’ favored sense that they depend on elements of the agent’s subjective motivational set. Relatedly, Williams’ writing sometimes suggests that he supposes that the only alternative to his broad assimilation of normative to motivating reasons is the implausible supposition that there is no connection between the term “reason” as used of motivating reasons, and the term “reason” as used of normative reasons. In “Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame,” Williams makes more explicit than in “Internal and external reasons” this general reason for accepting the internalism constraint: the internalism constraint should be accepted because there must be a connection between normative and explanatory reasons, and the internalism constraint characterizes such a connection. As he puts it: The first point is the interrelation of explanatory and normative reasons. It must be a mistake simply to separate explanatory and normative reasons. (Williams 1995a, pp. 38–39)
But this again is a mistake. It is perfectly possible to explain the connections between the two senses of “reason” without supposing that normative reasons are constructible out of the agent’s current or appropriately corrected motivations. Roughly, the connection is this: to say that I have a motivating reason to φ is to say that I have some belief and desire that will together motivate me to φ; to say that I have a normative reason to φ is to say that there is a belief-desire pair which would, if I had them, motivate me to φ, and where both belief and desire are correct. Such an account makes the connection between normative and motivating reasons appropriately non-accidental, but does not entail that normative reasons are constructible out of current motivations. At this point, despite the general view among Williams’ interpreters that he intends to give a non-debunking account of normative reasons, we might be tempted to try the other option. What if Williams does not really suppose that there are any normative reasons? What if he is really trying just to make the best sense he can of normative reasons claims on the assumption that none are ever straightforwardly true or correct? Here, though, we encounter a different problem. The problem is that Williams’ proposed account is not the best debunking account of normative practical reasons claims. It is not the best debunking account for a reason Williams’ argument emphasizes: it forces us to understand external reasons statements as false, or incoherent,
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or something of the sort. But, given that we really make external reasons statements, it is an undesirable feature of a debunking account that it make no sense of them. If we are anyway in the business of interpreting normative reasons claims on the assumption that there are no valid norms of practical reason, then there are better ways to treat external reasons statements. To see this more concretely, consider again the Owen Wingrave case. Instead of interpreting Owen’s father’s claim that there is a reason for Owen to join the army as problematically or incoherently invoking Owen’s subjective motivational state, we can better interpret it as invoking the values of family honor and military duty to which Owen’s father is indeed committed. Doing this gives a unitary semantics to reasons statements. The difference between internal and external reasons claims is then a matter of what gets invoked: standards or aims constructed out of the agent’s own subjective motivational states in the case of internal reasons statements, other contextually indicated standards and aims in the case of external reasons statements. Williams’ account of a subjective motivational set can then, indeed, supply a model for the kind of set of standards, or, as we may say, “normative set,” that can be used to interpret external reasons statements. Much of what Williams says about subjective motivational sets can usefully be transmuted into parallel and more general claims about normative sets. He says that S will typically contain much more than desires; correspondingly, normative sets may contain much more than norms having the very straightforward structure of desires. He says that it may be somewhat vague just what S does contain and that S will be revisable in the light of deliberation. Much the same can be said of normative sets like the standards of family honor and military duty invoked by Wingrave senior’s external reasons claim. And there will be a parallel between the kind of verdicts that subjective motivational sets and normative sets give about reason claims. According to Williams’ account of an internal reason claim, an agent has an internal reason to φ if she would be motivated to φ given full information. According to the parallel account of external reasons claims, an agent has an external reason to φ if the normative set invoked, after full deliberation, recommends φing. But the crucial point is that it is not sensible to employ the model only when in interpreting internal reasons statements. In an obvious modified form, the model can be applied to external reasons statements too. So supplemented, Williams’ view starts to sound much more like Mackie’s, and becomes much more attractive. But to interpret and supplement Williams in this way is to lose what is distinctive in his position. We can now explicitly make the comparison between Williams’ view and the presupposition view which (I argued) is to be found in Mackie. The comparison is very much to Mackie’s advantage. On the standard, non-debunking, reading, Williams admits that there are true normative reasons claims, but takes the only source of authority to be the agent’s subjective motivational set. His position then faces the three serious problems we identified: that it gives an inadequate account of the authority of normative reasons, that it conflicts with intuitions about the reasons we have, and that it conflicts with the phenomenology of deliberation. On the debunking reading, Williams’ treatment of external reasons statements, whereby no
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straightforward sense can be made of them, is again unnecessarily costly. By contrast, Mackie’s position is a consistent debunking view. It treats all practical reasons claims in a unitary way. They can be true or correct only relative to certain assumed aims, purposes, ends, or norms, which cannot themselves be straightforwardly true or correct. The prominence of Williams’ view, and the relative inconspicuousness of Mackie’s view, in discussions of skeptical views of practical reason, reflects a quite mistaken estimate of their relative plausibility.
3 How to Argue for Moral Skepticism Mackie’s error theory is generated by the combination of two claims: (1) that ordinary moral judgments presuppose the existence of objective values, and (2) that there are no objective values. Focus for now only on the argument for (2), the thesis Mackie calls “moral skepticism.” Mackie distinguishes two different arguments for moral skepticism, the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. In introducing the argument from queerness, he says it is “even more important” and “more generally applicable” than the argument from relativity. Mackie gives an illuminating summary of the case for moral skepticism as he sees it. In the summary the first consideration is the argument from relativity; the second, third, and fourth are elements of the argument from queerness: The considerations that favour moral scepticism are: first, the relativity or variability of some important starting points of moral thinking and their apparent dependence on actual ways of life; secondly, the metaphysical peculiarity of the supposed objective values, in that they would have to be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating; thirdly, the problem of how such values could be consequential or supervenient upon natural features; fourthly, the corresponding epistemological difficulty of accounting for our knowledge of value entities or features and of their links with the features on which they would be consequential; fifthly, the possibility of explaining, in terms of several different patterns of objectification . . . how even if there were no such objective values people not only might have come to suppose that there are but also might firmly persist in that belief. (Mackie 1977, p. 49)
There are important ways in which Mackie’s presentation of the case for moral skepticism can be improved. About two of these ways, I take myself to agree with Joyce. First, I think that the argument from queerness and the argument from relativity have a common target, a view about practical reason. According to this view, there are categorical imperatives, authoritative norms of practical reason. The argument from queerness and the argument from relativity are supposed to give us reason to suppose that there are no such authoritative norms. Thus it is a mistake to suggest, as Mackie’s writing sometimes does, that it is distinctively moral norms, rather than authoritative norms of practical reason more generally, that are his target. Secondly, I think it is a mistake to think (as Mackie sometimes suggests, for instance in the second item in the quotation above) that the problem with categorical imperatives is a motivational problem. As David Brink (1984, 1989) and others have argued, it is
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possible to make moral judgments objective without thinking that they necessarily motivate; and as Korsgaard and Smith have argued, the most sensible construal of the necessity in motivational internalism is as rational necessity: that such judgments will motivate you if you are rational. When motivational internalism is understood in this way, it is queer only if rationality itself is queer. It is a mistake to suppose that motivational necessity would have to be automatic in a way that would bypass an agent’s rationality (see Garner 1990). But in a crucial way, I think Joyce’s reconstruction of the case for moral skepticism is mistaken. Joyce devotes Chapter 5 of The Myth of Morality, entitled “Internal and External Reasons,” to a defense of a variant of Williams’ view. At the end of the chapter, summarizing the ways in which he differs from Williams, Joyce writes: I would not in fact go as far as to say bluntly that any use of an external reason is false. We must recall the discussion of institutional reasons from Chapter 2: reason claims that are legitimated by the rules of an institution, and which may well be external in nature. My objection is only with external reason claims that do not know their place–that overstep themselves by claiming to transcend all institutions. Such, I have argued, are moral reasons. Williams’ constraint on reason claims–that a reason must be a potential motivator–is best construed as a necessary condition of normative reasons. (Joyce 2001, p. 133; italics in original)
In this passage Joyce recognizes, in effect, the problems on the second horn of the dilemma we presented for Williams. But he shows no recognition of the problems on the first horn. But it is not just that, as we have already seen, Williams gives a very problematic account of normative practical reasons claims. Using Williams’ account of normative reasons to support Mackie is a grave strategic error. Mackie wants to offer naturalistic objections to the existence of genuine requirements of reason. If, like Williams, you allow that there are genuine requirements of reason (albeit requirements derived from an agent’s desires), the whole strategy of principled naturalistic objection to straightforwardly true normative practical reasons claims is undermined. The critic is perfectly placed to respond: you too admit that there are authoritative reasons. So you cannot launch a naturalistic objection to the notion of authoritative reasons. And once you have admitted that there are authoritative reasons, we can show you (by rehearsing the kind of problems discussed in Section 2) why you should reject the view that such reasons are derived, or solely derived, from the agent’s desires.
4 Objections A first objection is that there is really no difference between holding (as Williams and Joyce do) that the only real or genuine reasons are internal, and holding (as I suggest Mackie does) that categorical imperatives are problematic while hypothetical imperatives are not. But there is an important difference. There are two very different ways to develop the idea that hypothetical imperatives are unproblematic. One way is Williams’ and
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Joyce’s way. It is to take there to be genuine reasons grounded in agent’s desires. The desires are the source, the only source, of genuine practical reasons. This line of thought faces the three problems we have already identified. The second way to develop the idea that hypothetical imperatives are unproblematic – which, I suggested, is Mackie’s way and is much more sensible – is to take it that the key idea in hypothetical imperatives is the idea of hypothesis, or presupposition. Such imperatives bind only on a certain hypothesis, the hypothesis involved in having a desire, that a certain end is good. But then we are in a position to see that an agent’s desires are not the only possible source of such hypotheses. Such hypotheses may derive from presupposed frameworks, institutions, or contexts, which are not the product of the desires of the agent. This latter way of understanding hypothetical imperatives is clearly superior, I suggest. For it does not involve an arbitrary privileging of the agent’s own current desires, and does not require the supporter of hypothetical imperatives to admit the problematic idea that there are framework- or presupposition-independent good practical reasons. Darwall develops the contrast I have in mind in an illuminating way: It is a familiar thought that instrumental reasoning issues “hypothetical” rather than “categorical” imperatives. However, care is required in interpreting this idea . . . . What we should say is that the imperatives or prescriptions that follow from instrumental reasoning are imperatives of practical consistency. They tell the agent either to take the means or to give up the end or the belief that the means in question is the only means. They do not tell the agent, If A is your end, and B the only means, then you should do B. There is a sense in which they do recommend B hypothetically, but in this sense B is recommended conditionally on a “hypothesis” that the agent assumes in having A as her end, namely, that A is to be done. The imperatives, then, do not recommend doing B simply on the condition that the agent has A as end. In this way, they are just like hypothetical theoretical reasoning. (Darwall 2001, pp. 141–142)
A second objection is that my comparison between Williams’ view and the view I attribute to Mackie is unfair, because, in developing the first horn of the dilemma for Williams, I take Williams to be in a more demanding and difficult business than Mackie: the business of analyzing or offering a non-debunking account, rather than revising or offering a debunking account, of normative practical reasons claims. In response to this objection, I would argue first that the comparison is not unfair. What I have argued is that Williams account fails whichever way you read it, while Mackie’s is a plausible debunking account. This matters in two ways. First, it matters in the general context of debates about practical reason. Williams’ aim appears in part to be to develop an alternative to the view of the “external reasons theorist,” a character Williams introduces towards the end of “Internal and External Reasons.” Williams characterizes the external reasons theorist initially as someone who “wants to oppose Hume’s general conclusion and to make a lot out of external reasons statements” (Williams 1981, p. 108). Mackie’s alternative to the view of the external reasons theorist is clearly superior to Williams’ alternative, and ought to be taken much more seriously in debates about practical reason. Second, the superiority of Mackie’s view over Williams’ view matters in the particular context of arguments for moral skepticism, the thesis that there are no objective values. Given
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that superiority, it is a mistake to burden arguments for moral skepticism with the peculiar costs of Williams’ view. There is, however, a further possibility. Mackie famously embraces an error theory. He thinks that the (mistaken) idea that there are objective values is built not only into philosophical theory but also into ordinary language. As he puts it: Objectivism about values is not only a feature of the philosophical tradition. It also has a firm basis in ordinary thought, and even in the meanings of moral terms. (Mackie 1977, p. 31)
But we might reject this idea. We could then ask how Mackie’s view of normative practical reasons claims would fare as a non-debunking view. In particular, we could ask how well it would fare against the three objections brought against Williams’ view on the first horn of the dilemma. Here again, Mackie’s presupposition approach is clearly superior to Williams’ approach. Consider in turn the three problems for Williams. First there is the problem that desires seem too arbitrary and contingent to be sources of authority. The presupposition approach would take the sources of authority to be assumed or presupposed standards, ends, criteria, etc. These are better sources of authority than desires. On the presupposition approach, none of them is straightforwardly or presupposition-independently correct. In that sense their authority is not complete. But they can be whatever standards, ends, criteria, etc., we most standardly take to be relevant and appropriate in particular normative contexts. In this way they are better sources of authority than desires. Second, there is the problem of conflict between Williams’ view and our intuitive judgments about what we have reason to do, as exemplified by the cases of the irrational smoker and the person who is future-Tuesday-indifferent. Again, the presupposition approach does better than Williams’ view. It does not force us to deny that the future-Tuesday-indifferent person has reason to care about pain on future Tuesdays. Rather, it tells us that this claim will be true when interpreted presupposing the norms we are most likely to invoke here – norms of prudence. If common sense tells us that these norms of prudence are themselves presupposition-independently correct, then common sense in this respect conflicts with the presupposition approach. But unlike Williams’ approach, the presupposition approach can do a reasonable job of accommodating the ordinary intuition that future-Tuesday-indifference is irrational, by understanding this intuition as invoking norms of prudence. Third, there is the problem of conflict between Williams’ view and the phenomenology of deliberation, the problem that much normal deliberation would be undermined by accepting Williams’ view. Again, Mackie’s presupposition approach does better. It is not in the same way incompatible with serious deliberation. In deliberating we often assume that the values of options are not the product of our subjective motivational sets; we assume that the options have value independent of our subjective motivational sets. It is not nearly so clear that we assume a more specific positive view: that that value is built into the fabric of the world, rather than built into normative systems which we accept. So, again, Mackie’s looks a
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more promising non-debunking approach to normative practical reasons claims than Williams’. Normal deliberation does not obviously assume that the presupposition approach is mistaken, while much normal deliberation does assume that Williams’ view is mistaken. Thus, I suggest, Mackie’s approach to practical reason is not only superior to Williams’ as a debunking approach, it is also superior as a non-debunking approach. But this result, while interesting, is not directly relevant to the question how best to reconstruct Mackie’s case for moral skepticism. For Mackie holds that ordinary moral thought involves a commitment to objective values, and hence has to develop an error theory.
5 Conclusions Mackie’s approach to practical reason is distinctive and unjustly neglected. It is much superior to Williams’ more famous view. And it is a serious mistake, for both general and more particular strategic reasons, to reconstruct Mackie’s argument for moral skepticism with Williams’ view as a premise. Acknowledgments Many thanks to Carl Feierabend, Bredo Johnsen, Bill Nelson, an audience at the University of Houston, and the editors of this volume for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
References Brink, D. 1984. Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 111–125. Brink, D. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Darwall, S. 2001. Because I want it. Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 129–153. Garner, R. 1990. On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137–146. Joyce, R. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, C. 1986. Skepticism about practical reason. Journal of Philosophy 83: 5–25. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Parfit, D. 1997. Reasons and motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71(suppl.): 99–130. Pettit, P. and M. Smith. 1990. Backgrounding desire. Philosophical Review 99: 565–592. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, M. 1994. The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell. Williams, B. 1981. Internal and external reasons. In his Moral luck, 101–113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 1995a. Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame. In his Making sense of humanity, 35–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 1995b. Replies. In World, mind, and ethics, eds. J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison, 186–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 2001. Postscript: Some further notes on internal and external reasons. In Varieties of practical reasoning, ed. E. Millgram, 91–97. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
The Argument from Moral Experience Don Loeb
1 Introduction: The Pervasiveness of the Argument It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it. There are two ways in which experience of this sort has been thought relevant to the central questions of metaethics. The first involves the traditional idea that moral experience – especially our dispositions to use the moral vocabulary in various ways – is among the best evidence we have about what it is we are (thinking and) talking about when we talk about morality: We are, it is claimed, talking about a realm of (putative) fact.1 The second way is not inconsistent with the first. It involves an inference from morality seeming a certain way (or our practices somehow presupposing it to be that way) to the reasonableness of a presumption that it is that way. It is widely thought that the objective-seeming nature of our moral experience supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of non-relative facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories such as Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). The presumption can be defeated, it is claimed, only if arguments against objectivist theories prove successful. I will call the argument that our moral experience supports objectivist theories the Argument from Moral Experience, or the AME for short. In some form or other, the AME (or at least the presumption it is said to ground) has played an important role in the debate over moral realism.2 Many of those accepting it consider themselves to be moral realists and take the AME to sup-
D. Loeb (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA 1 Mackie
(1977, pp. 30–35, 50–63) embraced this traditional idea. See also Smith (1993) and Jackson (1998). 2 For convenience, I’ll omit “or at least the presumption. . .” in what follows. It seems fair to assume that those employing the presumption are at least implicitly relying on the AME. Otherwise they owe us an alternative defense of the presumption, and it is hard to imagine what that could be.
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_7,
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port their realism.3 Thus, Jonathan Dancy claims that a version of the AME is “the main argument for moral realism” and even “perhaps the only argument for realism, remaining thoughts being used for defence/offence” (Dancy 1986, pp. 172, 175). He describes “the simple form of the argument” as follows: [W]e take moral value to be part of the fabric of the world; taking our experience at face value, we judge it to be the experience of the moral properties of actions and agents in the world. And . . . we should take it in the absence of contrary considerations that actions and agents do have the sorts of moral properties we experience in them. This is an argument about the nature of moral experience, which moves from that nature to the probable nature of the world. (op. cit., p. 172)
According to David Brink, the “presumptive case in favor of moral realism. . . shift[s] the burden of proof to the moral antirealist” (1989, p. 36). David McNaughton puts it even more forcefully, saying “The realist’s contention is that he has only to rebut the arguments designed to persuade us that moral realism is philosophically untenable in order to have made out his case” (1988, pp. 40–41).4 This assignment of the burden of proof helps to explain why so much of the debate over moral realism has centered on arguments against it, and far less has focused on arguments in its favor. If the negative arguments can be defeated, it is widely thought, then moral realism wins by default. But those who view themselves as moral realists cannot appropriate the AME as readily as they have often claimed, for it can be argued that our moral experience does not presuppose that moral realism is correct, but at most that morality is objective in the sense that there are non-relative moral facts, truths, properties, or correct answers to our moral questions.5 All moral realists are objectivists, but many objectivists do not consider themselves to be moral realists. For example, most Kantians and Kantian constructivists would agree that a claim of objectivity is implicit in our moral thinking, and that this supports objectivism about ethics. But they would not agree that ordinary moral experience thereby supports moral realism. On their views, certain moral judgments are practically correct even though moral properties are not real and the correctness of moral judgments does not consist in correspondence between our statements and the world.6
say “. . . consider themselves to be moral realists” because it has become less and less obvious that we can find a satisfactory account of what it is to be a moral realist. (See Dreier, this volume.) Among the many in this category who appear to accept some version of the AME are: Bloomfield (2001), Brink (1989), Dancy (1986), Lovibond (1983), McNaughton (1988), Nagel (1986), ShaferLandau (2003), Smith (1994), and Wiggins (1988). 4 See also Nagel (1986): “[I]t is very difficult to argue for such a possibility [as value realism] except by refuting certain arguments against it” (p. 143). 5 For simplicity’s sake, I’ll speak simply of morality as a (possible) realm of fact. 6 See, for example, Korsgaard (1996, pp. 35–37, 44–48, 112). Although Korsgaard denies that there are moral facts, she nevertheless holds that there are correct answers to moral questions. 3I
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Even those in the broadly noncognitivist7 camp, who hold that moral utterances are (primarily) something other than straightforward assertions of putative fact, often claim it an advantage that their theories can accommodate (or so they maintain) the most important features of our objective-seeming moral experience. For example, Simon Blackburn says that “the most forceful attack” faced by the moral projectivist “is that he cannot accommodate the rich phenomena of moral life,” but goes on to argue that his “quasi-realism” can indeed accommodate these phenomena (Blackburn 1993, p. 158).8 The near universal acceptance of the AME helps to explain why the error theory has had so few adherents in recent years. The error theory, made famous by Mackie (1977), combines cognitivism, the view that the central function of moral utterances is to make factual assertions, with the view that all (positive) assertions of this sort are false.9 Thus it is a prime example of an anti-objectivist theory. A weak, burden-shifting, presumption in favor of objectivist theories would not be sufficient to explain why the error theory is held in such low regard, however. Instead, a much more ambitious version of the AME seems to be in play, one which holds that there is an overwhelming presumption in favor of objectivist theories. If the error theory is true then it is not a fact that torturing infants for fun is morally wrong. Antiobjectivist implications like this are not merely taken to place the burden of proof on error theorists, but to make that burden extremely strong. Indeed, Mackie himself was in the grip of an ambitious version of the AME. Mackie was convinced that “ordinary moral judgments include a claim to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values” (Mackie 1977, p. 35). This was the basis for the cognitivist component of his error theory. But he also believed that in virtue of this claim views like his faced an uphill climb: But since this is an error theory, since it goes against assumptions ingrained in our thought and built into some of the ways in which language is used, since it conflicts with what is sometimes called common sense, it needs very solid support. It is not something we can accept lightly or casually and then quietly pass on. (Mackie 1977, p. 35)
I agree with Mackie that objectivism should not be rejected lightly or casually. If objectivism is needed in order to validate common sense, then it might be very disturbing to find out that it is wrong. But that in itself gives us no reason to believe that objectivism is correct. In what follows, I ask, first: In what sense is it true that we experience morality as a realm of fact? Although this is largely an empirical question, I argue that evidence we already have suggests that things are much messier than objectivists 7 Some
prefer the etymologically more revealing “descriptivism/non-descriptivism” to the more common “cognitivism/noncognitivism.” See Timmons (1999, p. 19). 8 For related views, see Timmons (1999) and Wright (1992). See also Gibbard (1990, especially Chapters 8–13), who employs a number of ingenious strategies for accommodating what he calls the “objective pretensions” of moral thought and language. For earlier noncognitivist attempts to capture some of this seeming objectivity, see Stevenson (1950) and Hare (1981). 9 More recent error theorists include Garner (1994), Joyce (2001), Greene (2002), and Lillehammer (2004). For a related view, see Schiffer (1990).
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have supposed. Second: What support does our moral experience give to the claim that morality is such a realm? I argue that even if moral experience were to display morality as a realm of fact (or presuppose that it is), that would not in itself support objectivism. The stakes are high. If I am right, then, at a minimum, the playing field should be leveled. One might even have thought that those defending an existence claim should themselves accept the burden of proof. If so, and if, as Dancy claims, the AME is the only argument for objectivism, then its failure would mean that anti-objectivist views like the error theory have the upper hand.
2 Do We Experience Morality as a Realm of Fact? In what sense is it true that we experience morality as a realm of fact? To begin, “our moral experience” is not as uniform as that expression suggests.10 (See Kirchin, this volume.) Undoubtedly there are both cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences. Still, there are some obvious commonalities for many of us, and perhaps we can base a reasonable gloss on “our moral experience” on these. Brink (1989, pp. 25–29) presents one of the fullest cases for the claim that our moral experience has an objective-seeming character. Moral utterances, he points out, are often in the declarative mood, and thus appear to be statements of fact. Our beliefs that “one should not be held responsible for actions one could not have known were wrong,” that “goodness deserves reward,” and so on, contain implicit references to moral properties, facts, or knowledge, he argues. Furthermore we often wonder what morality requires, and when we do, “we often deliberate as if there is a correct answer to the question before us.” We disagree with those whose moral views seem mistaken. We recognize that we have been mistaken in the past (and might be now), but we also believe that we can be right.11 McNaughton (1988, pp. 19, 48, 56) adds other elements, centered on the phenomenology of our moral experience. Morality seems to be in the world apart from our happening to encounter it, not something that depends for its existence on our subjective inputs. We seem to have moral perceptions, which, although not strictly analogous to visual perceptions, nevertheless are like them in that they seem to be of something outside of us. We seem to see conduct as right or wrong. And when we are moved to act morally, it seems to be in virtue of our recognizing morality’s authority over us.12 This appears to be an impressive case for the claim that we experience morality as a realm of fact. Of course, few non-philosophers have thought about the issue in terms that make explicit reference to moral facts, and it seems illegitimate to
10 Indeed,
even what counts as “experience” will be disputed. Here I use the term very broadly. distinguishes features of our moral experience he thinks count against noncognitivism from those he thinks count against constructivism. 12 For another litany of objective-seeming features, followed by an extended discussion of one of them, see Timmons (1999, pp. 74–106). 11 Brink
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attribute much metaethical theory to most people. But most people do seem to recognize a distinction between realms of fact and others (such as fashion) in which normative facts are not thought to play a central role. Perhaps they would be disposed on reflection to place morality in the former category. Or perhaps our moral practice and thought in some more inchoate way presuppose objectivism. For example, the claim that we can reason about moral questions can be true, it might be claimed, only if morality is objective. Our moral beliefs and practices might be appropriate if objectivism is correct, but not if it is incorrect. But is it clear that even this more limited presupposition is present? It is surprising how often philosophers are willing to generalize about complex, subtle, and largely empirical matters like this based merely on their own experience and intuitions. The evidence may well take us in more than one direction. People’s beliefs and presuppositions, especially about philosophical matters, are often intrapersonally inconsistent, and interpersonal and cross-cultural differences surely complicate things. Thus, even if we find substantial evidence of a commitment to objectivity, we may also find evidence against such a commitment. Indeed, certain features of common moral experience do suggest that we experience morality as something that is not objective.13 For example, just as we talk about moral beliefs, we often talk about moral feelings and attitudes as well, and in other contexts these words typically signify something other than beliefs. In fact, people often say things that seem quite incompatible with objectivism, such as that in ethics “it’s all relative,” or that what it is right for a person to do depends on that person’s own decisions. We cannot dismiss such statements as the products of confusion merely because they appear to conflict with views we think widely held.14 There are other problems for the claim that we experience morality as a realm of fact. In particular, anti-objectivists claim that their theories can accommodate many of the features often cited as pointing towards objectivism. Unless ordinary people have metaethical views inconsistent with that claim, we need a reason for thinking that their experience presupposes objectivity, and such a reason has not been supplied. Mackie, for example, thought it entirely appropriate to reason about questions of value, even though he denied that values are objective. Barring the implausible assumption that ordinary people think reasoning is only appropriate when it comes to objective matters, ordinary moral reasoning could be of just the sort Mackie endorses. Or it might fail to reflect either an objectivist or an anti-objectivist presupposition. Similarly, because Mackie thought of morality as something to be made and not discovered, it is not at all surprising to find him writing about values in the declarative mood. Similar things can be said about disagreement on questions of value, and even, perhaps, about the doubting and wondering mentioned by Brink. Once again, 13 Christopher Hookway (1986, p. 190) expresses doubts about the objective-seeming nature of our
moral experience. See also Nichols (2004, Chapter 8). (1988, pp. 3–4) himself begins his book with a discussion of “two contrasting feelings about our moral life that all of us share to some extent,” one of which “appears to lead to the view that there is nothing independent of our moral opinions that determines whether or not they are correct.”
14 McNaughton
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unless we have reason to believe that ordinary people are in the grip of a metaethic incompatible with Mackie’s, proponents of the AME need to say more if they are to make persuasive the claim that ordinary moral practices presuppose objectivity. In fact, much of the evidence cited in favor of the objectivist reading of moral experience – for example, that we tend to express our moral thoughts in the declarative mood – seems weak. We talk about matters of taste in the declarative mood (saying, for example, that chocolate is better than vanilla), but ordinary people would find “gastronomic objectivism” about such matters utterly implausible. Similarly, the fact that we seem to have perceptions of morality does not strongly support the claim that we experience it as objective, since we seem to have perceptions of the (comparative) goodness or badness of some foods’ tastes but many would find odd the claim that we experience the taste of food as in fact good or bad or that we typically presuppose objectivism about gastronomic value.15 Indeed, even if Mackie and other anti-objectivists are wrong about the reasonableness of ordinary people’s practices and beliefs (on the assumption that there are no moral facts), it may still be inappropriate to treat such people as presupposing moral objectivity, at least if by “presuppose” we mean to imply a sensitivity to the rightness or wrongness of these metaethical claims. The rightness or wrongness of those claims is unlikely to have had an impact on ordinary people’s thought. Still, if anti-objectivists are wrong about these matters, perhaps there is another sense in which ordinary people’s views and practices could be said to presuppose some form of objectivism: Their views would not be right and their practices would not make sense unless objectivism were correct.16 Presupposition in this second sense might be relevant to some (but not all) versions of the AME. But whether ordinary people’s views and practices in this second sense presuppose some form of objectivism is an important issue in the debate over moral objectivity. It is inappropriate to make a burden-setting presumption in that very debate rest on a particular resolution of a matter at issue between the two sides. Undoubtedly, much more could be said about these questions (see Loeb 2008). But it should already be clear that our moral experience is much more varied and complex than proponents of the AME have assumed. Rather than continue to investigate these matters here, I shall set them aside and ask whether experience of the sort gestured at above, even interpreted in a way reasonably favorable to objectivists, would by itself support objectivism. The answer, I will argue, is that it does not. To supplement it, objectivists would need a favorable resolution of certain issues already central to the debate over moral objectivity. That being so, a presumption in favor of objectivist theories is not warranted.
15 For
a sustained discussion of the parallels between gastronomic and moral realism, see Loeb (2003). 16 By analogy, if Kant’s arguments were sound, then human experience of objects would presuppose, in this second sense, that we have a priori concepts that correctly apply to things. The existence of these a priori concepts would be a necessary condition of our experience of objects; however, the claim that they exist is one very few people would even recognize to be true.
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3 Is the Presumption Justified? Does a presumption even require a justification? It is by now a philosophical commonplace that we have to start somewhere. But we are not being asked to view the objectivist presumption as itself a philosophical starting point. We argue for the presumption on the basis of our moral experience, experience that is thought to be evidence for objectivism. That being the case, it seems fair to ask how the evidentiary support is supposed to work. Of course, we could make a further presumption here, that our moral experience is evidence for objectivism (even if we can’t explain how this evidence is supposed to work). However, that would seem rather ad hoc, to say the least. And, although those who appeal to moral experience often seem to be taking the evidentiary link for granted, there are hints of various attempts to support it. In what follows, I consider four related strategies for supporting the presumption. Although these appear to be the most promising, I argue that none of them is in fact successful.
3.1 The Best Explanation The most prominent approach suggests that objectivism allows us to best explain the nature of our moral experience. For example, Brink argues that we can most readily explain our moral thought and behavior on the hypothesis that moral inquiry is directed at discovering independently-holding moral facts, and that this supports moral realism: [G]eneral considerations about the nature of inquiry and considerations about moral inquiry in particular are most easily explained on the assumption that moral inquiry is directed at discovering moral facts that obtain independently of our moral beliefs and at arriving at evidence-independent true moral beliefs. I take this to establish a presumptive case in favor of moral realism and to shift the burden of proof to the moral antirealist. (Brink 1989, p. 36)
But the claim that moral inquiry is directed at discovering moral facts, even if true, does not by itself support the claim that such facts exist, any more than the fact that prayer is directed at God supports theism. The most obvious way to supplement it would be with a second explanatory claim – that the best explanation for the direction of moral inquiry involves the hypothesis that realism (or objectivism) is true. Brink may have something of this sort in mind when he suggests that “features of actual and possible moral inquiry are hard to understand on antirealist assumptions and much easier to understand on realist assumptions. Realism and realism alone,” he says, “provides a natural explanation or justification of the way we do and can conduct ourselves in moral thought and inquiry” (1989, p. 24). This argument, however, seems to run explanation and justification together. The fact that we need to understand our moral experience does not support the claim that we must show it to make sense. But conflating explanation and justification is fairly common, and this may misleadingly boost the appeal of the AME. It is often
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facilitated by speaking of the need to “make sense of” our moral experience.17 We do need to understand that experience. But the claim that our moral practices are most naturally justified on the hypothesis that moral realism (or objectivism) is true is controversial, and, even if correct, could not support moral realism (objectivism) – not, that is, without the added premise that our practices are typically justified, or something of that sort. Such a premise would be question-begging in this context since anti-objectivists believe that insofar as these practices presuppose that morality is a realm of fact they are not justified. What then of the claim that our moral practices can be explained more naturally or easily on the assumption that moral realism is true? Brink seems to be assuming that what he calls a more natural or easier explanation is a better explanation, and thus that we can best explain our moral practices, experiences, and beliefs on the assumption that moral realism is true. But he does not spell out how such an argument would proceed. One possibility (expressed in terms of objectivism) is as follows: If we experience morality as a realm of fact, there must be some explanation for that. The easier and more natural (and thus best) explanation is that morality is such a realm and that we are familiar with it as such. We think moral beliefs can be mistaken or correct because they can be mistaken or correct; we deliberate because there are answers. And so on. But if we are to accept the objectivist’s explanation as best, we need more than the mere claim that we experience morality as objective because it is objective. We need to know how its being objective can explain our having the experiences we do.18 Or at least we need some good reason for thinking that its being objective would explain why our experience turns out as it does. But such a reason has not been given in the context of this argument, and we cannot simply assume that one is available. More importantly, whether moral facts help to explain our moral experience is a special case of one of the central controversies in metaethics: whether moral facts figure in the best explanation of anything.19 It is inappropriate to make a presumption in favor of moral objectivity depend on the outcome of a major controversy in the debate over whether morality is objective. If the explanatory claim were to succeed then we would be beyond the point where we needed the presumption, and if it were to fail then the presumption could not be grounded on its success. It might be tempting to think that a demand that moral facts be shown to figure in best explanations sets the bar too high for a mere presumption. The presumption is only meant to set the burden of proof, not to establish that objectivism is correct. 17 For example, Dancy (1986) says that “we abandon moral realism at the cost of making our moral
experience unintelligible,” and that we can “make satisfactory sense of our experience of the moral properties of objects” only on the assumption that moral realism is correct (p. 173). See also Nagel (1986, p. 146), McNaughton (1988, pp. 16 and 52), and Smith (1994, pp. 5, 11). Timmons’ term, “accommodate,” is ambiguous in this way as well (Timmons 1999, p. 12). 18 Gilbert Harman (1986) makes a similar point. See also Blackburn (1993, p. 154). 19 The locus classicus of this debate is Harman (1977, Chapter 1), and Sturgeon (1984). For a recent attempt to put this debate into perspective, see Loeb (2005).
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Shouldn’t a showing that a particular explanation is the most initially appealing be sufficient? Perhaps that is what Brink has in mind when he says that realism provides an easier and more natural explanation for our moral experience. The easier and more natural explanation, he could argue, is good enough to support a presumption in realism’s favor. But it could be overridden if a better explanation were ultimately to be discovered. The problem with this line of thinking is that whether or not realism provides the most initially appealing explanation is itself at issue between objectivists and anti-objectivists. First, it is not agreed that realism (or objectivism) does provide an easier and more natural explanation of our moral experience. Second, even assuming that easiness and naturalness are explanatory virtues, they are certainly not the only such virtues. Anti-objectivists are likely to point to others – such as parsimony, or fit with the best current psychological or evolutionary theory – as supporting their own explanations.20 Here again, the presumption cannot be grounded in a claim that reflects an unresolved issue in the debate.
3.2 Epistemic Conservatism Another possible ground for the presumption focuses mainly on one particular aspect of our moral experience – our beliefs. Many philosophers have felt that, other things being equal, we should favor the theory that requires us to give up as few of our current beliefs as possible.21 It is not clear, however, that the conservative strategy could work here, even in its own terms. If it is admitted that ordinary people are not explicit objectivists, then for them at least, a belief in objectivism itself is not available for conserving. Still, ordinary people do have beliefs objectivists might think cannot be true unless objectivism is true. And, it could be argued, objectivism allows us to conserve more of these beliefs than do anti-objectivist approaches such as the error theory. For example, most people believe that our moral thinking is fallible. Objectivists often allege that there is no room for this to be true within an anti-objectivist framework. If this allegation were correct, then a principle of conservatism might have us grant some credibility to objectivism, since objectivism would follow in some sense from things we already believe – things the conservative approach tells us to treat as having some credibility. Likewise, the objectivist could argue, our moral beliefs themselves cannot be correct unless objectivism is correct. If we are to conserve these beliefs, they could say, we must accept some form of objectivism. But the principle of conservatism is quite controversial, and for good reason. It is implausible that the mere fact that we already believe something should by
20 See
Mackie (1977, pp. 42–48). For a more recent, and much more detailed, suggestion along these lines, see Joyce (2006). 21 This is (roughly) Quine’s (1951) formulation of the principle of conservatism. Other formulations have been put forward, but the differences do not affect the argument given here.
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itself give that belief any warrant, quite apart from any other beliefs we might have about the reliability of the processes that led to the formation of that initial belief. Suppose I believe that the next Lotto number drawn will be even, but suppose further that I have no actual evidence for that hypothesis. I should believe that the odds are 50/50, in spite of the fact that I find myself with the ungrounded belief that they are not. That I do believe the number will be even gives me no warrant whatsoever for believing it. Indeed, even if I knew that most ordinary people had the same belief, this too would not by itself give me any evidence that it is true.22 Conservatives might try to restrict the range of beliefs to be conserved, so as to avoid counterexamples of this sort, for example by pointing out that we cannot see any way that my belief about the Lotto could be explanatorily connected to its own truth. In other cases, we can see such a connection. For example, I believe that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, though I cannot remember my evidence for this belief. Still, I have reason to maintain the belief since it is likely that it was produced by a reliable process (such as my having read a history book). But such a reason is lacking in the case of my belief about the Lotto. Perhaps, then, we should conserve only those beliefs for which a plausible credibility-imparting explanatory story regarding their provenance can be told. Anti-conservatives will no doubt argue that to adopt an approach like this is to abandon conservatism entirely. But we need not enter into that debate here, for, returning to our previous examples, the restricted conservative strategy would require us to find a credibility-imparting explanation for the widespread belief in moral fallibility, or for our moral beliefs themselves – a showing that these beliefs are plausibly explained by the states of affairs that make them true. And that is just another instance of the question of whether moral facts figure in the best explanation of anything. As we have just seen, resolving this question cannot be a prerequisite for grounding an independent presumption in favor of objectivism. There may be other ways of restricting the range of beliefs to be conserved in order to avoid the implausible implications of wholesale conservatism. But if so, and if proponents of the AME wish to rely on them, they need to produce them. And they must show us that these approaches are not themselves disguised versions of the inference to the best explanation strategy.
3.3 The Principle of Credulity A third suggestion relies on another principle it is sometimes thought we must accept if we are to avoid falling into skepticism. This principle, often referred to as the Principle of Credulity, holds that we are entitled to presume that things are
22 For a persuasive critique of the principle of conservatism, see Christensen (1994). My discussion
here has benefited greatly from that paper and from conversations with its author.
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pretty much as they seem to be, unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary.23 Just as the appearance of an external world is sometimes thought to entitle us to presume that there is such a world, the appearance that there are moral facts is thought to entitle us to believe that there are such facts.24 Even if we needed such a presumption in order to deflect external-world skepticism, however, this would not by itself give us reason to adopt a similar, but distinct, presumption to get us out of moral skepticism. Perhaps external-world skepticism is so implausible that we would never be satisfied unless we were to deny it. But that would not establish that moral skepticism involves a price high enough to make its avoidance imperative as well. (Indeed, most anti-objectivists think that the price is nowhere near as high, if there is any price to be paid at all.) Instead, the suggestion seems to be that a very general presumption that things are as they appear (barring substantial evidence to the contrary) is necessary for avoiding external-world skepticism, and that the very same presumption also has implications for the moral case. Now, given the implausibility of attributing a belief in objectivism to most nonphilosophers, it would be inappropriate to claim that morality seems objective to the average person. So here again we may feel compelled to rely on other prephilosophical beliefs thought by objectivists to be best accommodated within an objectivist framework. For example, since it seems as though we can reason about morality, we might be entitled to believe that we can reason about it, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. If objectivism in fact does best accommodate this belief and others like it, a reasonable extension of the strategy might hold that we are entitled to accept it, at least provisionally. If morality is not a realm of fact, the argument would go, then things are not as they appear. Many people would find the kind of anti-skeptical strategy described above very unappealing, however, even in the external world case. If there are arguments against skepticism that are not based on the Principle, they would say, then we can examine them. But if they are unsuccessful, then we should let the chips fall where they may. Unless the Principle has some significant appeal beyond the avoidance of skepticism, they would argue, we are not entitled to adopt it for that purpose alone. By itself, the Principle seems question-begging as a response to skepticism. In fact, the Principle of Credulity is implausible for precisely the reason conservatism (likewise commonly defended as necessary for avoiding skepticism) is implausible. Seemings in and of themselves give us no more warrant than mere believings. And just as the scope of conservatism’s reach would have to be restricted in order to avoid counterexamples such as my belief about the next Lotto number, 23 Paul
Bloomfield reminded me of this version of the argument. McNaughton (1988, pp. 39–41, ff.) relies on it and cites the discussion of the Principle in Swinburne (1979, pp. 254–271). A classic source of the Principle is Reid (1785/1975). 24 Even before the publication of Reid’s “Essays” in 1785, Richard Price (1758/1948, p. 45) offered something like this version of the argument: “Is there nothing truly wrong in the. . . misery of an innocent being? – ‘It appears wrong to us.’ – And what reason can you have for doubting, whether it appears what it is?”
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so the Principle of Credulity would have to be restricted as well. Suppose it seems to me that the next Lotto number drawn will be even. Unless there is a plausible credibility-imparting explanation for things seeming this way – a showing that this seeming is explanatorily related to the truth of the beliefs it generates – there is no reason to treat it as providing any epistemic warrant whatsoever. In the moral case it would have to be shown that moral facts figure in the best explanations of these seemings – a matter, as before, at issue between objectivists and anti-objectivists. Such a showing cannot be a prerequisite for an independent presumption in favor of objectivism. The anti-objectivist about morality can take no comfort in the defeat of a more general anti-skeptical strategy, however. For, as objectivists often point out, moral skepticism is interesting only if it is a distinctive form of skepticism. It would be no victory at all for the anti-objectivist to show that there is no more reason for believing in moral facts than there is for believing in an external world! What is wanted is some justification for treating moral properties differently. This suggests a familiar constraint for anti-objectivists: They should not rely on arguments that provide as much support for external-world skepticism as they do for moral skepticism. But there is an asymmetry here. For it would not be unreasonable to hold that even if external-world skepticism turns out to be false there is still no good reason for believing in moral facts. For example, even if we believe that the best explanation for the appearance of an external world is that there is an external world, nothing about the moral case follows. Thus anti-objectivists can reject the unrestricted Principle of Credulity as a way out of either sort of skepticism, remaining agnostic (at worst) about external-world skepticism. It could be claimed that any route out of external-world skepticism would apply equally well to moral skepticism. But that claim would need to be defended, and such a defense has not been produced, nor does it seem obvious that it could be. In fact, the unrestricted Principle of Credulity is not the only anti-skeptical strategy worth considering. For example, a more modest presumption that our senses and memory are reasonably reliable would still allow us to avoid external-world skepticism but it would not have the implication that morality is as it appears to be, since the appearances relied upon in the moral case do not result (primarily) from the operation of these faculties.25
3.4 Wide Reflective Equilibrium A final strategy, also closely related to conservatism, relies on a more general epistemic principle having to do with considerations of theoretical coherence. It is hard to see how we could avoid appealing to such considerations in evaluating theories. Just as it is often thought that good moral thinking involves a search for “wide reflective equilibrium” (WRE), good reasoning in general seems to involve such a 25 For
an anti-skeptical suggestion along these lines, see Chisholm (1977).
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search as well. We appear to have no choice but to start off with the beliefs we have, not all of which cohere with one another. Our aim, it is often thought, should be to bring our beliefs into a coherent balance after careful consideration. Arguably, such a balance provides the best sort of justification available to us. How might this approach to justification favor a presumption of objectivism, given the nature of our moral experience? Here again the focus is primarily on our beliefs. It might seem as though the approach commits us to the view that even our pre-reflective beliefs about the nature of morality (such as our belief in the possibility of moral reasoning) have some initial warrant, warrant they carry with them into the balancing process. After all, it could be asked, how could beliefs that have no warrant, even when made coherent upon reflection, produce beliefs that are warranted? Such an argument would not rest on the false assumption that nothing can have properties different than the properties of its parts. Instead, it would be an application of what is sometimes called the “garbage in, garbage out principle” (GIGO). Unless the beliefs we start out with have some warrant, the argument would go, they have nothing to pass on to the beliefs that emerge in WRE. Their initial warrant, on this view, might be outweighed. But all of our initial beliefs – including those thought by objectivists to be most compatible with objectivism – have some warrant, since the beliefs that emerge in WRE have warrant. This argument seems highly suspect, however, for it opens a back door to epistemic conservatism by once again treating mere belief as sufficient for warrant. According to this approach, I should again treat my belief that the next Lotto number picked will be even as having some warrant, because the WRE approach requires me to treat all of my initial beliefs as having some warrant. Yet the claim that belief is sufficient for some degree of warrant is just as implausible when put in terms of WRE as it was when put in terms of conservatism. Once again, the mere fact that many of us have beliefs about the possibility of moral reasoning (and the like) does not in itself show those beliefs to have any warrant. Is there any other way in which WRE might be brought in to support the presumption? A hint may be found in Ronald Dworkin’s response to Crispin Wright’s claim that realism about a particular domain has the burden of proof: Unlike an argument in a court of law, however, the course of a philosophical investigation is fixed not by any free-standing methodological postulates, like Occam’s razor which Wright cites, but by how opinion stands when the investigation begins. No skeptical argument can succeed, for anyone, unless it brings him skeptical conviction, and that means that none of us can accept such an argument unless we find its premises convincing even when we grasp their skeptical import. We must find these premises more plausible than what they require us to abandon. (Dworkin 1996, p. 117)26
Expanding on Dworkin, we might argue as follows: Either our current moral beliefs (some of them, at least) are justified (enough to be presumptively true) or they are not. If they are justified, then objectivism must be justified as well, since the beliefs
26 For
an argument similar to Dworkin’s (which acknowledges that connection), see Nagel (1997, Chapter 6, especially pp. 110–112, 115–118, and 125).
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can’t be right unless objectivism is right. If they are not justified now, then once we have gotten appropriately close to WRE, our web of belief will either contain those moral beliefs or not. If it doesn’t, that will be because there appeared to us to be some reason to take them out. But that is just to say that our moral beliefs (and hence objectivism) are presumptively true. We are entitled to accept them, the argument would go, unless there is some reason for rejecting them. Such a reason would indeed defeat the presumption in favor of objectivist theories, but in its absence, the presumption holds. Such an argument, however, would be in one sense too strong, and in another too weak. If it were meant to show our initial moral beliefs to have some (defeasible) epistemic warrant, it would fail. For it is true of all of our current beliefs that we would not abandon them, upon reflection, absent a (putative) reason for doing so. But that does not mean that each of our beliefs is presumptively true. To think otherwise is once again to allow conservatism to sneak in, since it is to hold that any belief is to some degree warranted merely in virtue of being held. Alternatively, if the argument is not meant to show that these beliefs have warrant, then it cannot show that the burden of proof is on the anti-objectivist, as proponents of the AME claim. On this reading, what looked like an argument is merely a description of what many people happen to believe (and perhaps a prediction that they are unlikely to give most of those beliefs up in response to philosophical arguments). It would be an overstatement to call such beliefs presumptively true. At best, we could say that they have been presumed to be true. Indeed, Dworkin himself denies that the considerations he points to show where the burden of proof lies or “that our convictions are right just because we find them irresistible, or that our inability to think anything else is a reason or ground or argument supporting our judgment” (Dworkin 1996, p. 118). No doubt most people do have moral beliefs, and it would take a reason (or at least a putative reason) for them to give these beliefs up. But if we reject conservatism, we will hold that this alone does not give those beliefs any positive epistemic status. Whatever else is needed in order for them to earn that status is needed by both our current beliefs and any competitors. There is no asymmetry. Still, while it is implausible to think that individual beliefs have warrant merely because they are held, perhaps we have no alternative but to treat as warranted certain theories that unify and accommodate those beliefs. Where else could we look for justification? If objectivism does indeed unify and accommodate the various theoretical and substantive beliefs about morality that in part constitute our moral experience, then perhaps we should provisionally accept it. Conservatism, however, is no more plausible at the level of theories than it is at the level of individual beliefs. Suppose, to take a silly example, the theory that this bus has been commandeered by Martians nicely unifies and accommodates my beliefs about each of the various passengers — that they are non-human and that they are from a nearby planet, for example. If the beliefs about the passengers are unwarranted (as they would be if their only warrant came from my holding them), then a theory that unifies and accommodates them is (without more) unwarranted as well.
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But how, without lapsing into complete skepticism, can those employing the method of WRE avoid holding that sooner or later coherence with mere beliefs is warrant conferring? Is there a way to look at the WRE strategy that does not have conservatism’s implausible implications? Perhaps. Our initial beliefs represent the beginning of our search for WRE, not the end point. Often, these initial beliefs will have to be modified or rejected if the entire corpus of our beliefs is to be made coherent. Thus arguably we should treat only those beliefs that are able to survive significant reflection as having some degree of warrant, and not those that merely appeared plausible before we began to think things through more carefully. If this is correct, then acceptance of the WRE framework would not automatically allow us to treat an initially appealing theoretical gloss on our moral beliefs as warranted. The claim that it is warranted would depend, on this approach, on whether it could survive the minimally necessary process of reflection. How then should we envision this process of reflection? One answer, similar to a proposal gestured at above, begins with the claim that we have justified beliefs about the reliability of the processes that led to our beliefs. These beliefs about reliability might be thought to have a bearing on the question of how much credibility the initial beliefs should be given. For example, if a person’s commitment to the existence of angels stems entirely from dogmatically accepted religious beliefs he now sees reason to abandon, he may also have reason to avoid giving his belief in angels any weight in WRE. In contrast, arguably we should see our perceptual beliefs as warranted when they are made under normal circumstances, since we are justified in believing that perception is normally a reliable belief producer. If this is correct, then the WRE strategy cannot yet support objectivism, since it would be questionbegging to assume that our beliefs about morality (and our moral beliefs themselves) are the products of similarly reliable mechanisms. In any case, this approach to WRE seems problematic since it is not immediately clear how our beliefs about reliability themselves get justified. An alternative might be to look for justification in the way our beliefs fit into our larger explanatory picture. Thus, we might treat as warranted only those beliefs whose existence can plausibly be explained in a way that supports the claim that they are true. Finding a plausible explanatory theory is often thought to be the point of WRE. On such a view, the coherence of a set of beliefs is constituted in part by the beliefs’ fit into such an explanatory picture.27 How would the beliefs we have been discussing fare under this proposal? My belief that the next Lotto number drawn will be even cannot plausibly be thought to be best explained on the hypothesis that the number will in fact be even, nor can it be supported by any other aspect of a plausible explanation for my coming to have it. 27 On
most views of this sort, the justification would not depend upon anyone’s having actually gone through such a process, but on the availability of an explanatory picture of the kind gestured at here. Thus we might not currently be in a position to know (or be justified in believing) that certain of our beliefs are justified, even if they are. Still, if we are not in such a position, then we should not presume that those beliefs are justified until our explanatory theory improves.
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The same is true of my beliefs about my fellow bus passengers, and the theory that unifies and accommodates these beliefs. What about the everyday beliefs pointed to by those employing the AME? These would give objectivism some measure of warrant only if the best explanation for our holding them makes it more probable that objectivism is true. But, once again, whether such an explanation is available is merely a special case of the question of whether moral facts figure in the best explanation of anything, a question not appropriately considered in this context. Presumably, other ways of looking at the WRE strategy are available, and perhaps some of them can also avoid the implausible implications of conservatism, either at the level of beliefs or at the level of theories that purport to accommodate those beliefs. But however we interpret it, the WRE strategy should not treat our beliefs – and a fortiori should not treat controversial theories that attempt to explain those beliefs – as having warrant simply because the beliefs are held. Instead, the strategy should hold that the reflective process itself (or at least, the availability of such a process) is what confers warrant on some, but only some, of those initial beliefs. Whether it does so in the case under consideration here is a question that has not yet been answered.
4 Conclusion The AME has exerted an enormous influence on the debate between objectivists and anti-objectivists. Yet its underpinnings have never been carefully examined. If I am right, objectivists have unfairly attempted to shift the burden of proof to antiobjectivists, and anti-objectivists like Mackie have been all too quick to accept this burden. Unless someone does a better job of defending the AME, we should treat objectivism and anti-objectivism as, at a minimum, starting on an even footing. Acknowledgments For their comments, encouragement, criticism, patience, and generosity, I am grateful to Paul Bloomfield, Sin yee Chan, David Christensen, Stephen Darwall, Tyler Doggett, Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin, Hilary Kornblith, Arthur Kuflik, William Mann, Mark Moyer, Derk Pereboom, Seth Shabo, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. I wish to thank the Dean’s Office, College of Arts and Sciences, The University of Vermont for providing modest grant support for an initial draft of this chapter. I am also grateful to the attendees at a colloquium at Brandeis University, a number of undergraduate students at Vermont (forced to read various drafts), and several anonymous referees (likewise). As always, my wife, Barbara Rachelson, suffered through many, many drafts and conversations about this chapter and was a tremendous help to me. I started work on this chapter so long ago that I am sure I have forgotten many others to whom thanks are due. You know who you are. Thanks.
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Chisholm, R. 1977. Theory of knowledge. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Christensen, D. 1994. Conservatism in epistemology. Noûs 28: 69–89. Dancy, J. 1986. Two conceptions of moral realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60(suppl.): 167–187. Dworkin, R. 1996. Objectivity and truth: You’d better believe it. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 87–139. Garner, R. 1994. Beyond morality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greene, J. 2002. The terrible, horrible, no good, very bad truth about morality and what to do about it. Dissertation, Princeton University. Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Harman, G. 1977. The nature of morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harman, G. 1986. Moral explanations of natural facts: Can moral claims be tested against moral reality? Southern Journal of Philososphy 24(suppl.): 57–68. Hookway, C. 1986. Two conceptions of moral realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60(suppl.): 167–187. Jackson, F. 1998. From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joyce, R. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joyce, R. 2006. The evolution of morality. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Korsgaard, C. 1996. The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lillehammer, H. 2004. Moral error theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 95–111. Loeb, D. 2003. Gastronomic realism: A cautionary tale. Journal of Theoretical Philosophical Psychology 23: 30–49. Loeb, D. 2005. Moral explanations of moral beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 193–208. Loeb, D. 2008. Moral incoherentism: How to pull a metaphysical rabbit out of a semantic hat. In Moral psychology, vol. 2: The cognitive science of morality, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lovibond, S. 1983. Realism and imagination in ethics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. New York: Penguin. McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Nagel, T. 1986. The view from nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press. Nagel, T. 1997. The last word. New York: Oxford University Press. Nichols, S. 2004. Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. Price, R. 1758. A review of the principal questions in morals, ed. D. D. Raphael. 1948. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Quine, W. V. 1951. Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review 60: 20–43. Reid, T. 1785. Essays on the intellectual powers of man. In Inquiry and essays, eds. Ronald B. and Keith L. 1975. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Schiffer, S. 1990. Meaning and value. Journal of Philosophy 87: 602–614. Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral realism: A defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, M. 1993. Objectivity and moral realism: On the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience. In Reality, representation, and projection, eds. J. Haldane and C. Wright, 235–255. New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, M. 1994. The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell. Stevenson, C. L. 1950. The emotive conception of ethics and its cognitive implications. Philosophical Review 59: 291–304. Sturgeon, N. 1984. Moral explanations. In Morality, reason and truth, eds. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, 49–78. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld. Swinburne, R. 1979. The existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Timmons, M. 1999. Morality without foundations. New York: Oxford University Press. Wiggins, D. 1988. Truth, invention, and the meaning of life. In Essays on moral realism, ed. G. Sayre-McCord, 127–165. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Beyond the Error Theory Michael Smith
In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, published just over 30 years ago, John Mackie famously argued for the error theory (Mackie 1977). Though the argument initially met with considerable skepticism (see, e.g., Blackburn 1993; McDowell 1985), in the years that followed many theorists came to the conclusion that Mackie had things more or less right (see e.g., Lewis 1989; Garner 1994; Joyce 2001). But which of these views is correct? Should we all be error theorists? Or is the renewed admiration for Mackie’s argument itself mistaken? To anticipate, my somewhat tentative suggestion will be that Mackie’s argument fails. Since I have been tempted to believe the error theory myself in the past (Smith 2006), this represents something of a shift in my own thinking.
1 An Outline of Mackie’s Argument Mackie’s argument for the error theory proceeds in two stages. He begins by pointing out that our concept of a moral value is the concept of a feature of things that is at once both objective and prescriptive. But, he then goes on to argue, general reflections of a metaphysical and epistemological kind show that nothing has such a feature: The concept of an objective and prescriptive feature isn’t instantiated. As we will see, the reasons he offers make it seem that the conclusion would have to be necessary, so the upshot, if the argument works, is not just that nothing has moral value, but that nothing could have such value. As even this briefest of outlines makes clear, the real power of Mackie’s argument is that it is addressed to people who are antecedently engaged in ordinary moral thought and talk in blissful ignorance of the error that it is the aim of his argument to lay bare. His strategy is to get those people to agree first to the conceptual claim – this fixes what it is that they are thinking and talking about – and then to the substantive reasons he offers for supposing that there could be nothing like that. M. Smith (B) Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
R. Joyce, S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Philosophical Studies Series 114, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_8,
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Mackie’s argument is thus an internal critique of morality: It purports to show that someone who is committed to morality shouldn’t be so committed, and it purports to show this on terms that that person can himself recognize. Let’s consider the two stages of the argument in more detail. Mackie’s defense of the conceptual claim consists in a rehearsal of what he sees as “the main tradition of European moral philosophy from Plato onwards,” a tradition which, he tells us, . . . has combined the view that moral values are objective with the recognition that moral judgments are partly prescriptive or directive or action-guiding. Values themselves have been seen as at once prescriptive and objective. In Plato’s theory the Forms, and in particular the Form of the Good, are eternal, extra-mental, realities. They are a very central structural element in the fabric of the world. But it is held also that just knowing them or “seeing” them will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations. . . . Similarly, Kant believes that pure reason can itself be practical, though he does not pretend to be able to explain how it can be. Again, Sidgwick argues that if there is to be a science of ethics—and he assumes that there can be, indeed he defines ethics as “the science of conduct”—what ought to be “must in another sense have objective existence: it must be an object of knowledge and as such the same for all minds”; but he says that the affirmations of this science “are also precepts,” and he speaks of happiness itself as “an end absolutely prescribed by reason.” (Mackie 1977, pp. 23–24)
Though Mackie seems to think that these diverse formulations are all in some sense equivalent, in what follows I will focus on just one of them, namely, Sidgwick’s. In Sidgwick’s terms, Mackie’s claim that our concept of moral value is the concept of an objectively prescriptive feature of things amounts to the claim that to conceive of (say) happiness as a moral value is to conceive of happiness itself as having the feature of being an end that is absolutely prescribed by reason. Mackie’s argument from this conceptual claim about moral value to the conclusion that there is no such value is brevity itself. He dubs it “the argument from queerness” and he tells us that it
. . . has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore, who spoke of non-natural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a “faculty of moral intuition.” Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: Intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premises or forms of argument or both. (Mackie 1977, p. 38)
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Though Mackie goes on to consider various replies to this argument, he doesn’t really say anything more to spell it out beyond what he says in this passage. So what exactly is the argument? Let’s begin by restating Mackie’s argument in Sidgwickian terms. Though we believe that happiness has the feature of being an end that is absolutely prescribed by reason, Mackie seems to be saying, the idea that happiness is such an end is both metaphysically and epistemologically queer. Why is it metaphysically queer? Mackie doesn’t explicitly say, but we can imagine what he is thinking. Ends are the sorts of things that each of us has, in so far as we aim at, or desire, different things. But while it is therefore true that some of us have happiness as an end, as some of us do desire happiness, the claim that happiness has the feature of being an end absolutely prescribed by reason, “the same for all minds,” would have to be made true by some further fact about happiness, a fact beyond this purely descriptive psychological fact. Yet what further fact is there? At this point, Mackie seems to just throw up his hands. He cannot se