Contents introduction part one The Origins of a Buddhist Heresy 1 Hsin-hsing—A Buddhist Heretic?
part two The Rhetoric of Decline
vii 1 3 31
2 The Beginning: Decline as Polemic
36
3 The Chinese Systematization: Decline as Doctrine
55
4 Hsin-hsing: Decline as Human Nature
76
part three Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood
95
5 The Refuge of the Universal Buddha
99
6 The Refuge of the Universal Dharma and Universal Sangha
123
part four The Economy of Salvation
149
7 Practice for the Degenerate: The Inexhaustible Storehouse
153
8 The Suppressions of the Three Levels Movement
189
9 Time, Transcendence, and Heresy
223
part five Texts
245
A P’u fa ssu fo: The Refuge of the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma
247
B Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo: Abridged Explanation of the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse
257
C Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih: Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe
264
D Reproduction of the Tun-huang Texts
289
selected bibliography
313
index
325
3. Introduction
T
he symbiotic relationships between charismatic religious individuals, the communities and institutions that grow around them, the society in which they live, and the state that seeks to control them have always been among the more revealing in Chinese history. Buddhism, with an arguably transcendent doctrine of individual perfection (the awakening of the individual in Buddhahood) as well as an emphasis on altruistic practice within the world (the practice of the bodhisattva) presents a particularly rich ³eld for the investigation of these relationships. This book is concerned with the teachings of one such charismatic religious leader, Hsin-hsing =‘ (540–594), the popular and inµuential new religious community that formed around him (the San-chieh X‰ or Three Levels movement), and the persistent of³cial proscription that they encountered. The focus of the study is not, however, the suppressions of Hsin-hsing’s teachings or the purely historical setting of his community; rather it is the way in which he drew from the wider context of normative Buddhist ideals in order to forge new soteriological opportunities and institutional practices that he believed uniquely resonated with that historical setting. Anyone interested in the San-chieh teachings or related areas of Buddhist doctrinal and institutional history must begin with Yabuki Keiki’s epochal Sangaikyõ no kenkyð published in the 1920s; unfortunately, most research ends there as well.1 Until now there has been no book-length study of the San-chieh materials in any language since Yabuki’s work more than a halfcentury ago, and precious few articles.2 The paucity of research should not, however, lead scholars to assume that Yabuki’s solitary study said it all—on the contrary, his study can only whet the intellectual appetite of the curious and patient student, for many questions remain unanswered. For example, what does it mean when a tradition that insists on a universal and abiding truth predicts its own demise? Is the decline tradition a teaching about external 1
Yabuki Keiki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1927; reprint, 1974).
Just as I finished this manuscript Nishimoto Teruma’s outstanding new book Sangaikyõ no kenkyð (Tokyo: Shunjðsha, 1998) appeared; I have endeavored to incorporate his research where appropriate. 2
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historical events, or is it concerned with the internal, the moral condition of humankind—or, as I will suggest, something rather different altogether? How does this notion develop in China; what are its terms, texts, and dates, and what are the parameters of its discussion? What are the forms of the tradition (narratives, polemics, etc.)? How is it introduced and by whom? Is there a difference in understanding between the Chinese “consumers” of the idea of the demise of the dharma and the Indian “producers” of this idea? What spurred the Chinese to decide that the prophesied time of the destruction of the Buddha-dharma had actually arrived, and with what did they respond? What is the relationship of the three levels of Hsin-hsing’s teaching to the doctrine of three distinct periods of the Buddha Š„kyamuni’s dispensation: the true doctrine (cheng fa ±À), semblance doctrine (hsiang fa …À), and ³nal doctrine (mo fa =À)? Is mo fa an Indian Buddhist concept or solely a creation of the Chinese, an “apocryphal word,” as some have alleged? What was the political and institutional import of such a pessimistic assessment of one’s contemporaries? Given the importance of the doctrine of mo fa in East Asian Buddhism and signi³cant new research on this topic, all of these questions, and more, demand thorough answers. The same can be said of the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature, a teaching that, like the decline motif, undergirds much, if not all, of East Asian Buddhism. Unlike the apophatic terms of the Madhyamaka or the analytic approach of the Yog„c„ra, the universal capacity of all living beings for Buddhahood is an extremely positive teaching that has even been labeled “devotional.” How does Hsin-hsing’s expression of this doctrine as the refuge of the Universal Buddha compare to those of other teachers and schools, such as the Ti-lun, She-lun, or the later Hua-yen? What impact did his teachings have on other more rebellious movements of the time? How was the idea of the Universal Buddha realized in the institution of the sangha and what did this mean for the observance of the monastic regulations? The San-chieh teachings denied the Buddha-nature of the non-sentient, as did the later Hua-yen but T’ien-t’ai did not; is there any relationship between these schools on this matter? The topics of tathagatagarbha and Buddhanature are receiving considerable attention these days, as new research re³nes the textual and doctrinal developments of the idea at the same time that more philosophically and critically motivated essays condemn it as a non-Buddhist resurgence of monism linked to nativism, social injustice, gender discrimination, and more. Does the San-chieh doctrine of the Universal Buddha similarly reµect the uncritical acceptance of an indigenous “topological” viewpoint? The institutional is another area of the San-chieh movement that warrants closer investigation—for example, the support it enjoyed among the highest levels of the Sui and T’ang courts and the relationship of that support to
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doctrinal arguments, liturgical cycles, and institutional presence. Related aspects include the emphasis on d„na and the above-mentioned eschatological orientation; the ³ve suppressions of their teachings and practices over a two-hundred-year time span and, heuristically, questions of orthodoxy and church-state relations; their reformulation of Vinaya rules and bodhisattva practices as an institutional organ of social welfare (the charitable foundation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse [¦á, the forerunner of the pawnshop and other mutual aid societies in China and Japan); the fact that Hsin-hsing, the founder, abandoned his precepts yet continued to live a monastic life (obviously an important precedent for East Asian Buddhism); the emphasis on the dhðta and other ascetic practices, including begging and “sky burial” (i.e., leaving the dismembered corpse out under the open sky as an offering of food to the denizens of the animal and preta realms), topics more often discussed in the context of Southeast Asian forest monks yet very popular among the monks of the Northern dynasties (cultivated by Chih-i, among other luminaries of this period); their formulation of a graded system of doctrinal tenets and its relationship to the other such emerging systems of the Sui-T’ang scholastic schools, especially the Hua-yen (and thereby issues of imperial patronage also become interesting); the confessional and repentance practices of the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma, Thirty-³ve Buddhas, the fang teng ¾f, and other aspects of daily practice and liturgy, and their relation to T’ien-t’ai and Pure Land con³gurations of these widespread practices; questions of community membership and rules; the reliance on the Shih lun ching Ys÷ and K¤itigarbha devotion, and the political implications of both; the cult of the sixteen arhats (especially Pi«^ola) and their inµuence on the sixteen practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse; and more. Particularly in light of the research of the last thirty years in the areas of the Tun-huang manuscripts, Ch’an and Hua-yen history, epigraphy, legal and administrative history, messianic Buddhist movements, and the like, it is necessary to re-present the history and doctrine of the San-chieh movement in order to open new directions of research as well as to reevaluate Yabuki’s pioneering work. Though I do not presume to answer all of these questions, I do hope to show why they remain important questions and thereby to stimulate further research on Hsin-hsing and the San-chieh movement.
Methodological Considerations The accurate investigation of religious phenomena demands that they be viewed both in terms of their effect on the situations with which they articulate (i.e., as an independent variable) and in terms of the way that they are affected by the setting in which they are found (i.e., as a dependent vari-
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able). In this approach Buddhism is neither merely a body of doctrines undergoing change and reformulation according to individual revelation and intellectual dispute, nor is it simply an institution swaying in the winds of social change and functional response to those changes. This approach to the study of Buddhism thus af³rms the rhetorical value and agency of the insight claimed by the tradition at the same time that it encourages discussion of the institution’s relation to that agency and its functional interaction with the world. Therefore my research is concerned with that place at which the rhetorically ahistoric religious insight of the individual comes together with the social, historical world, and the religious doctrine and institutions born thereof. This also means that, although not primarily a study in rhetoric per se, this work tends to look at San-chieh doctrine in terms of its rhetorical function, that is, as a public and social practice aimed at arguing a point or convincing an audience, and its institutions as attempts to embody that rhetoric in response to particular social contexts. More and more we see how the literary tradition that has dominated scholarship represents a form of rhetoric not necessarily evidenced in institutional or cultic reality. So far, however, these insights have largely been received as “setting the record straight,” debunking the rhetoric, setting up an opposition between rhetoric and reality, or theoretically problematizing the use of literary materials as sources for studies of historical institutions. Of course, the monk of the (rhetorically) iconoclastic and anti-authoritarian Zen tradition that daily participates in the ritual invocation of the names of all the members of his lineage, prostrating in front of various icons of that lineage (which lineage itself is little more than rhetorical fabrication) sees no opposition, feels no contradiction, and, should he think of the issue, would probably be hard put to feel that his practice was “problematized.” This is not because of a blindness on the part of the monk but because rhetoric has always had its own functional role the world over, a role rarely restricted or tied to accurately depicting historical or institutional fact. It is well known to New Testament scholars, for example, that the gospels are just that: the “good news,” that is, evangelical or preaching documents, not to be taken as trying to record historical or biographical fact; to treat them otherwise says more about our understanding (or lack thereof) of rhetorical device than it does about the historical veracity of the New Testament. It is to be lamented that in the post-Cartesian West the study of rhetoric has largely been displaced by a positivist and scienti³c historicism, in which “the facts are to speak for themselves,” as Max Weber put it, for although the study of rhetoric has lagged, its deployment surely has not. I am ³rmly convinced that without a sophisticated analysis of the forms and styles of religious rhetoric, much of the world’s contemporary religious language, a language increasingly bellicose and activist, will never be understood adequately, much
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less engaged fruitfully. Thus too this study is unabashedly “Buddhological,” which is to say that I treat San-chieh doctrine, practice, and institutional con³guration largely in terms of the synchronic and diachronic vicissitudes of the Buddhist tradition, especially the doctrinal tradition. This is not because I am ignorant of or resistant to current scholarly fashion that ³nds this to be theoretically indefensible and often historically false, but more simply because it is the self-understanding of Hsin-hsing and his followers.3 That is, however much we know the Buddhist “tradition” to be an elusive, ever-changing, and usually self-serving construct, it nonetheless remains the construct deployed by Buddhists themselves. Hence it seems to me at least as reasonable an interpretive framework as the equally contingent and selfserving constructs of late-twentieth-century academics. As an example we may cite the persistent concern over the question of the “sini³cation” of Buddhism, which might, for example, interpret Hsin-hsing’s attempts to harmonize the teachings of degenerate capacity and innate Buddha-nature as a reµection of the ancient Chinese debate between Mencius and Hsün-tzu regarding the inherently good or evil nature of humanity. The fact remains, however, that this question was also vigorously debated in Indian Buddhist texts, and it is these Buddhist scriptures and not the indigenous Chinese texts that Hsin-hsing uses in his own arguments. So, too, I have very purposefully left the history of the suppressions of the Three Levels movement until the end—on the one hand because I do feel that human agency is involved in the creation of institutions (for better or, more often, for worse) and hence the worldviews and particularly the doctrinal propositions that help form those worldviews are an important factor in institutional history. On the other hand, before I present the facts of their suppression I want to present those aspects of their doctrine most frequently cited as their cause in order to show just how mainstream the Three Levels teachings were. In other words, as with cults and new religious movements in the contemporary world, it is the novelty, uniqueness—the deviations—that are most often cited in regard to the heretical status of Hsin-hsing’s ideas. When we look more closely at these ideas, however, we ³nd little not in evidence elsewhere in the Buddhist tradition. A secondary orientation of my work, born of the ³rst, is that religious movements virtually always preclude overly simplistic labeling as “popular,” “elite,” “cult,” “shamanistic,” etc. The San-chieh movement was born of many causes and conditions and exhibited many different sides during its 3 For a broader treatment of these issues see Jamie Hubbard, “Premodern, Modern, and Post-modern: Doctrine and the Study of Japanese Religion,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 19/1 (1992): 3–27; Jamie Hubbard, “New Religions, Embarrassing Superstition, and the Academic Study of Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 66/1 (1998): 59–92.
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one-hundred-³fty year history; economic questions, concern for social welfare and reform, theological sophistication, soteriological subtlety, liturgical innovation, institutional novelty, sectarian stridency, a cult of the founder, and more all played a part in the history of the movement. Any attempt to reduce it to a single framework necessarily discloses only part of that story and thereby does injustice to the organic integrity (or contradiction) of the whole. For example, the charitable efforts, the emphasis on the degenerate conditions of humanity, and the inclusion of Hsin-hsing’s works in the apocryphal sections of the sutra catalogues have led many scholars to evaluate his community as primarily a “practice” oriented movement, an opening of the Buddhist path to the “masses,” and thus too in the light of Pure Land teachings, though the facts clearly do not warrant such a one-dimensional categorization. Institutionally, for example, they found support among the highest levels of the government and society, from the Sui statesman Kao-chiung to the Empress Wu. On the doctrinal side, Hsin-hsing’s ideas shared af³nities with the universalism and syncretism characteristic of the T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen schools, which are usually labeled “academic” and “elite,” as much as with the Pure Land. All of this supports the thesis that the history of the San-chieh, as with most religious movements, is much too complicated to be subsumed under broad, sweeping generalizations. For all of the broad guidance that these considerations have imparted to my work, the primary approach remains that of documentary history that aims to understand how San-chieh teachings inµuenced practices and institutions. It was, after all, the discovery of manuscripts in a cave that provided the opportunity and impetus for this study, and scholarship has not yet moved far beyond this initial stage. Because of the many suppressions and the inclusion of its scriptures in the apocryphal section of the scripture catalogs (which determined the normative Buddhist canon in China), the San-chieh movement was literally excised from Chinese Buddhist history. Until the discovery of a number of the movement’s texts at the beginning of this century in Tun-huang and Japan, almost all knowledge of them came from the mere listings of text titles in the early scripture catalogs or the odd polemic by their contemporaries. Although this changed dramatically when the movement’s texts were discovered in a cave in the Central Asian oasis of Tun-huang, the researcher still faces an inordinate number of complex questions of dating, authorship, reading, and, because of the fragmentary and often damaged condition of the texts, even physical reconstruction. Again, owing to the frequent suppressions, the textual tradition never was able to really stabilize, so that, for example, many catalogs simply refer to the tui ken ch’i tsa lu ÏÍ|FÆ, “miscellaneous record of practice in accord with the capacity” in over thirty scrolls, whereas other catalogs break this
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“miscellany” into twenty-two or thirty-³ve separate works. This often makes even the identi³cation of the extant texts tentative at best. In addition, we must account not only for their preservation at Tun-huang, far from their institutional headquarters in Ch’ang-an, but also for their transmission to Korea and Japan. Although no texts have been discovered in Korea to date (they were, however, recorded in the Korean Sinp’y®n chejong kyojang ch’ongnok4), San-chieh texts were transmitted to Japan as early as the seventh century and continued to be copied as part of the normative canon as late as 1180, almost half a millenium after their ³nal suppression in China. How and why this should have been the case is not yet fully answered—it was only in the past few years, for example, that such questions were raised anew when a manuscript copy of the of³cial Chinese canon containing a number of San-chieh texts was discovered at the Nanatsu-dera temple in downtown Nagoya!5 Perhaps, however, the most vexing problem in understanding the Sanchieh texts is working in a total vacuum of commentarial literature to aid in their interpretation. This requires working in a virtual void of self-conscious commentarial reµection, that is to say, an interpretation handed down over the years within a given tradition as it reµects on its doctrines both synchronically and diachronically. Thus often the only way to understand a technical term or phrase in the San-chieh materials is through its use in other traditions, obviously as dangerous a practice as it is cumbersome, massively enlarging the scope of one’s research just as it greatly increases the possibility for serious misinterpretation. We can only sympathize with the medieval Tõdaiji scholar-monk Gyõnen !5 (1240–1321), who wrote of his encounter with the San-chieh texts, “Within the canon is the Sangaishðroku X‰TÆ in ³ve chüan. It establishes its teachings by quoting directly from the various scriptures and commentaries, but the context is dif³cult and the beginnings and endings are confused; it is therefore hard to ascertain the meaning and dif³cult to understand their import.”6 The ensuing centuries have not seen much improvement in the situation. Yet, at the same time, this lack of a commentarial tradition also proves to be a blessing for somewhat the same reason—there is no later tradition or lineage whose interpretations color one’s own.
4 T #2184, 55.1178b; see also Jamie Hubbard, “Salvation in the Final Period of the Dharma,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986), 188–89. 5 See Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of Nanatsu-dera: A Recently Discovered TreasureHouse in Downtown Nagoya. With related remarks by Makita Tairyõ and Antonino Forte. Translated and edited by Silvio Vita, Occasional Papers Series, no. 3 (Kyoto: Italian School of East Asian Studies, 1991). 6
T #2339, 72.383a.
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For all of these reasons I am acutely aware of the shortcomings of my work, particularly in the area of the speci³c Chinese context of San-chieh organization, doctrine, and practice. I hope that these same shortcomings will spur others to a more conclusive accounting of the textual tradition and thereby to an understanding of the more subtle nuances of the movement. Thus, too, the context that I provide is much larger in scope than I would like, and no doubt my presentations of this wider Buddhist context will strike many as overly simpli³ed and others as unnecessary. For this very reason, then, the research presented here must be considered introductory, hopefully yielding aspects of the San-chieh movement that scholars working in other ³elds may use to provide greater context for their own endeavors, rather than properly presenting it in the more exact context of Chinese Buddhist religious or social history. For these reasons also (and especially in light of the Nanatsu-dera and other recent manuscript discoveries), I have decided to postpone to a separate volume the study of the textual history of the San-chieh manuscripts, including a discussion of their vacillating “apocryphal” status in the catalogs, transmission to and copying in Japan, external testimonium, and the like. This book is divided into four parts. Part one, “The Origins of a Buddhist Heresy,” presents what we know of Hsin-hsing’s life and practices as found in the biographical sources with a particular aim of demonstrating how he is more representative of than deviant from the monastic tradition of his time. Part two, “The Rhetoric of Decline,” examines the notion of the demise of the dharma and the San-chieh systematization of that teaching. The majority of studies of the decline tradition see it as one way or another a moral indictment of corrupt sentient beings (including, most conspicuously, the sangha) that implies a moral failure of the ruler as well. Because I have a rather different view of the decline tradition, I have spent more space than is perhaps expected outlining its original production and early Chinese development in order to provide a framework for the later discussion of the rhetorical strategies and subsequent suppression of the San-chieh texts and practices. Thus chapters 2 and 3 discuss what I see to be the origins of the notion of the demise of the dharma (sectarian skirmishing over the issue of orthodoxy) and the early Chinese expansion of this tradition into a hermeneutic of soteriological and sectarian opportunity (p’an chiao |*). Chapter 4 then recounts Hsin-hsing’s description of three different capacities for practice and realization, in particular our decayed capacity and the soteriological problem posed by such a belief. In a general sense this corresponds to Hsinhsing’s central teaching of “recognizing evil” as the constitutive reality of each individual’s personal existence. Part three, “Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood,” is concerned with the other side of the coin, the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature that underlies the teaching and practice of “universal
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respect” for the inherent perfection of all sentient beings other than oneself. Accordingly chapter 5 is an outline of the San-chieh teaching of the refuge of the Buddha appropriate to the third level, a teaching based on the doctrines of tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature that provided the theoretical basis for their practices. The refuge of the Universal Dharma and the universal community of practitioners, that is, the “doctrine and practice in accord with the capacity,” which offers a solution to the obstacle imposed by our lowered capacity, is discussed in chapter 6. Having outlined the soteriological problem in part two and the theoretical basis of the solution in part three, part four, “The Economy of Salvation,” presents the movement’s implementation of that theory in the practice of the charitable institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Chapter 7 presents the theory of this practice while chapter 8 details the institutional history of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, mostly centered around the Hua-tu ssu in Ch’ang-an, framed in terms of the issues surrounding the many suppressions of the San-chieh texts and practices. Finally, chapter 9 attempts to put Hsin-hsing’s teachings into a wider context in order to ask more general, comparative, and critical questions about the relevance of his teaching on the degenerate nature of humankind as a kind of eschatological, millennial, or apocalyptic doctrine on the one hand and on the other hand to look at his practical response to the degeneracy of humankind, that is, the doctrine of the “practice that arises in accord with the capacity” as a hermeneutic strategy. Translations of three key manuscripts from the Tun-huang caves form the appendices. Appendix A contains a translation of the P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM (The Refuge of the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma, Stein #5668), the basis of Hsin-hsing’s universalism, and Appendices B and C contain translations of the two manuscripts most important to a study of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, the Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo [ ¦ á À F ‰ (Abridged Explanation of the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, Stein #190) and the Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih Ø/Àƒ[¦áÀt (Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe, Stein #721).
Acknowledgments I am pleased to be able to acknowledge the people who have contributed in one way or another to this study. First and foremost I am indebted to family and friends —my mom and dad, who encouraged me as I sel³shly followed my own path and interests in the study of Buddhism; my brother, Dr. J Macoubrey Hubbard, whose critical and analytic spirit prodded me to demonstrate that Buddhism is not an irrational µight into the mystical; Dr.
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John Haugh, who early on taught me the importance of independent thinking; and my wife, children, and friends, whose love and support provide the many distractions and diversions that make the life of an academic somewhat tolerable—they all give the lie to the notion that we have entered the era of mo fa. I would also like to thank Professor Okabe Kazuo of Komazawa University, who initiated me into the study of Chinese sutra catalogs, apocryphal scriptures, and the San-chieh texts. I am particularly thankful for the gracious help and gentle encouragement offered over the years by Dr. Antonino Forte, whose meticulous studies in the history of Chinese Buddhism are a constant inspiration; as always, I can only apologize for not measuring up to the same standards. Elizabeth Kenney offered trenchant critiques, sharp insight, and a friendly ear during a recent bout with the manuscript, and she, Jan Nattier, and Daniel Stevenson all went far beyond the call of duty in reviewing the manuscript, correcting errors egregious and minor, and suggesting innumerable improvements. Leyla Ezdinli’s encouragement with an earlier draft of the manuscript is fondly remembered. In addition to the invaluable information and extensive research provided by Nishimoto Teruma’s own study of the San-chieh movement, I am also grateful for his assistance in getting the photographs of the Tun-huang manuscripts reproduced here. Finally, I must acknowledge Paul Swanson and James Heisig, my editors and friends at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture—their patience over the many years in which I occupied myself with everything but this manuscript is deeply appreciated. An earlier version of Chapter Five appeared as “Perfect Buddhahood, Absolute Delusion: The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao” in Paul J. Grif³ths and John P. Keenan, eds., Buddha Nature (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International, pp. 75–94). The translation included in Appendix A was originally published as “A Heretical Chinese Buddhist Text: The Refuge of the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma,” in Donald Lopez, ed., Buddhism in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press). I am grateful to both publishers for permission to use that work here. The photographs of the Tun-huang manuscripts from the Stein collection of the British Library were provided by Tõyõ Bunko.
Conventions In dealing with Sanskrit terminology I have followed in principle the list of Sanskrit words found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary kindly provided by Roger Jackson.7 I have not, however, chosen Roger Jackson, “Terms of Sanskrit and Pâli Origin Acceptable as English Words,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5/2 (1982): 141–42. 7
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to follow Jackson’s suggestion regarding the use of diacritical marks with these terms, the same not being part of the English language (unless, of course, such words appear with diacritics in the titles of cited works or quotations). The romanization of Chinese follows the MLA style sheet, modi³ed by the guidelines adopted by the Library of Congress, which basically is the Wade-Giles system without hyphens (except in the case of proper names such as San-chieh, Hua-yen, Chih-i, and the like) or the breve and circumµex diacritics.8 Chinese characters have been added in the text, when thought useful, at the first occurrence of a name or term. To avoid excessive clutter, additional Chinese characters have been added to terms in the index rather than to each term in the text.
8 Cataloging Service Bulletin (The Library of Congress—Processing Department) 42 (1957): 12; Cataloging Service Bulletin (The Library of Congress—Processing Department) 118 (1976): 35–36.
1. Hsin-hsing — A Buddhist Heretic?
T
here is no question that the of³cial hostility towards Hsinhsing’s teachings and institutions is the most conspicuous aspect of their history. Although Hsin-hsing advocated no revolution, led no peasant mobs in uprising, and left behind no track record of immoral behavior by his community, within six years of his death in 594 the propagation of his texts was prohibited, and over the next 125 years four more edicts were issued banning various aspects of his followers’ practice and organization. Part and parcel of the same program, his writings were declared heretical and banished from the canon as spurious—among the few scriptures so designated for reasons other than false attribution to an Indic original. Having gradually passed out of circulation, their rediscovery in a cave in a Central Asian oasis town a century ago was a momentous occasion, and served to refocus attention on Hsin-hsing’s ideas and practices. Because of the heretical status of Hsin-hsing’s writings there has been a persistent tendency to discuss the uniqueness, innovation, or creativity of his teachings and movement—in other words, to see them as existing outside the mainstream. Perhaps the ³rst example of this is Fei Chang-fang, writing shortly after Hsin-hsing’s death in 594, who noted that “[Hsin-hsing’s teaching and practice] are different from the virtues, understandings, and practices of old”;1 this point is also picked up in Hsin-hsing’s of³cial biography in the Hsü kao seng chuan a¢’Œ: “[Hsin-hsing’s] understandings and interpretations were unlike those of old.”2 The extreme example of this treatment is the later branding of his teachings as heretical. While we should not downplay the original µavor of Hsin-hsing’s teaching and practice, it is also important to recognize just how much the ingredients that he used were common to other Buddhist teachers of his time, both in the north (such as Tao-ch’o, for example, central in the development of the Chinese Pure Land tradition, or the Ti-lun master Ling-yü) as well as in the south, including those associated with the founding of the Sui dynasty (such as Chih-i, founder of the T’ien-t’ai tradition). Hsin-hsing, too, likely would be quite 1
T #2034, 49.105b.
2
T #2060, 50.560a.
3
4
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hsin-hsing— a buddhist heretic?
surprised to ³nd his teachings and practices considered unusual or unique, for, as with all Buddhist teachers that I have ever known or studied, he himself took great pains to locate his doctrine and practice in the mainstream of normative Buddhism. In this chapter, then, I would like to introduce what we know of Hsin-hsing’s life, and the practices that he cultivated, in order to set the stage for the fuller discussion of his teachings and institutions that follows in parts two through four.
History Hsin-hsing Hsin-hsing (540–594) was a native of Northern China who spent the last years of his life in Ch’ang-an, the capital of the newly uni³ed Sui empire. The earliest records of his life come from his own writings, in particular the epistolary testimony of the Hsin-hsing i wen =‘kk,3 reliquary inscriptions (including an inscription perhaps composed in 594, the year that Hsin-hsing died),4 and the Li tai san pao chi catalog of scripture issued in 597 (but emended through at least 600) that includes the ³rst of³cial record of his writings as well as the ³rst record of the suppression of Hsinhsing’s teachings.5 Of a later date is his biography in Tao-hsüan’s Hsü kao seng chuan (Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks), compiled in 645, some ³fty years after the death of Hsin-hsing.6 Still, because Tao-hsüan resided on Chung-nan shan $Ç[, the site of reliquaries for Hsin-hsing and many of his followers, and because of the generally acknowledged reliability of the Hsü kao seng chuan, this is an important source for the study of the San-chieh. As usual, Tao-hsüan relied on earlier source material in his biography of Hsin-hsing, in particular the account of his writings and the ³rst suppression of his movement recorded in the Li tai san pao chi (ca. 600), miracles stories, and tomb inscriptions.7 Finally, there is a biographical sketch of 3
Stein #2137, included in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, appendix, 1–7.
See Jamie Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions and the San-chieh-chiao,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 14/2 (1991): 254–63; Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 26–32. 4
5
T #2034, 49.105b–c.
Hsin-hsing’s biography is contained in the section on monks who practiced meditation together with the biographies of three of his followers: P’ei Hsüan-cheng ¨éB, Pen-chi ûK, and Seng-yung ’æ. 6
7 At the end of his biography of Hsin-hsing and the attached biography of P’ei Hsüancheng, Tao-hsüan added that there is yet another biography in the Li tai san pao chi, a fact
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Hsin-hsing contained in the Tales of Miraculous Retribution (Ming pao chi, ca. 655)—signi³cant because the author, T’ang-lin Nr (600–659), was the grandson of Kao Chiung ¢Â, Hsin-hsing’s main patron in the capital, and often visited the Chen-chi ssu ³ù±, Hsin-hsing’s residence in Ch’ang-an.8 Little is known of Hsin-hsing’s family background other than that he was from Wei-chün 2u (in the area of modern Anyang HR in Henan province),9 and his family name was Wang ÷.10 Other documents record his starting a community in Yeh R (also just north of modern Anyang), the capital of the Eastern Wei (534–550) and the Northern Ch’i (550–577), and also place him nearby in Hsiang-chou o? (near his birthplace in Weichün) in 583 and 587 (see below). Although nothing further is known of his family origins, we are thus able to locate his area of activity from the time of his birth until he was invited to Ch’ang-an in 589 in one of the most vibrant and dynamic areas of Northern China at the time, home to many inµuential Buddhist leaders and communities, as well as a destination for travelers bringing news and ideas from South and Central Asia. This geographical con³rmed by his own generous borrowing from the same. Although there are no other extant, veri³able sources for Hsin-hsing’s biography in the Hsü kao seng chuan, it is almost certain that Tao-hsüan saw the memorial stele composed for him by Pei Hsüan-cheng at Chung-nan shan (cf. T #2060, 50.560a.26–27 and T #2060, 50.560b.2–3 and below, p. 14), and therefore it is possible that much of the biography that is not taken from the Li tai san pao chi is taken from this stele; cf. my “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions.” 8 Ming pao chi, T #2082, 51.788a–c; see also the translation and study by Donald E. Gjertson, Miraculous Retribution: A Study and Translation of T’ang-lin’s Ming pao chi (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1989), esp. 157–60. The Ming pao chi also contains stories about his follower Hui-ju ½Ø (T #2082, 51.788c). 9 Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.559c; cf. the Li tai san pao chi, T #2034, 49.105b and the Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 7), both of which give Wei-chou 2?. According to the Sui shu, however, in K’ai-huang 3 (583) Wen Ti abolished all of the military commanderies in an effort to break the power of local governments that had encroached upon the power of the central government. However, for much the same reason, his successor, Yang Ti, changed back to chün again at the beginning of his reign (604–617); cf. Sui shu, ch. 3, p. 8b, ch. 28, pp. 22b–23a and 32a; Woodridge Bingham, The Fall of the Sui (Baltimore, Waverly Press, 1941), 12; Wright, The Sui Dynasty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 99; Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 20, n. 21. All in all the geographical names of these records are confusing because of frequent name changes; e.g., the Hsiang-chou of the T’ang corresponds to the Wei-chün of the Sui, the Wei-chou of the T’ang corresponds to the Wu-yang chün !îu of the Sui, etc. What is important is that the general area of Hsin-hsing’s birth and activity before he was invited to Ch’ang-an was in the area around the capital city of Yeh in the north, roughly corresponding to the northern tip of contemporary Henan and the southern tip of contemporary Hebei. The Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei adds that Hsinhsing was a “man of Wei Kuo” ƒç (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 7), near modern-day Daming Øe and Qingfeng #! in Hebei province. 10 Perhaps Wang Shan-hsing ÷3‘ of Wei-chou and Wang Shan-hsing ÷3§ of Chao-chou, the two “spiritual companions” mentioned in the Hsin-hsing i wen (see below), were relatives?
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locus is an important fact that helps to put his teaching and practice in context. In describing Hsin-hsing’s life, the Hsü kao seng chuan reµects a typical concern for the didactic message of karmic retribution and tells us that although his mother had long been without child, after sincerely praying to the Buddhas she had a dream in which a spirit promised her a child. Indeed, upon waking she felt somehow different and discovered that she was pregnant. The Ming pao chi account is more speci³c, noting that his mother, grieving that she had not been able to have a child, happened to meet a monk who encouraged her to pray to Avalokitešvara. This she did day and night, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of Hsin-hsing.11 The story as told in the Ming pao chi ³ts in well with the popular Chinese miracle tales centered around the bodhisattva Avalokitešvara, whose benevolence and power were well known from the Lotus Sutra, in which the Buddha describes how Avalokitešvara will aid those who call upon him.12 Among other assistance promised by the Lotus, if a woman desires a baby boy and worships and make offerings to Avalokitešvara, she indeed will be rewarded with a wise and virtuous son.13 True to Avalokitešvara’s promise, Hsin-hsing was “exceptional from birth,”14 and “as a child was intelligent and wise, and well versed in the sutras and sastras,”15 perhaps referring to the fact that Hsin-hsing’s writings are typically described as consisting of citations from Buddhist scripture (a fact actually attested to in the extant manuscripts). His early compassion and even-mindedness is likewise commented on: When [Hsin-hsing] was four years old, he saw an ox-cart in the road mired in the mud, straining and pulling. This aroused his sorrow and he cried and cried, wanting to push it out of the mud. If he came across a calf separated from its mother, or encountered thieving and deception, by nature he understood that all were equal and was not given to attachments and aversions. At eight years of age he was already showing signs of being extremely bright, clever, and out of the ordinary.16
Hsin-hsing’s interest in the religious life does appear to have developed early, for in the Hsin-hsing i wen he declared that “when young I suffered 11
Ming pao chi, T #2082, 51.788b.
12
Gjertson, Miraculous Retribution, 13–14.
13
T #262, 9.57a.
14
T #2060, 50.559c.
15
Ming pao chi, T #2082, 51.788b.
16
T #2060, 50.559c.
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because of a troubled mind, and was un³t for sitting meditation or chanting the scriptures. From [age] seventeen onward I sought spiritual friends.”17 Although there is no mention of when or where Hsin-hsing actually left home or received the precepts,18 the Hsü kao seng chuan biography of Huitsan ½w, a well-known master of meditation and Vinaya, records that a novice named Hsin-hsing Ü‚=‘ came to study with him seeking the ten precepts. Hui-tsan turned him down, after which he studied under Huitsan’s disciple Ming-yin gˆ before returning to Yeh R (the capital city of the Wei and Eastern Ch’i in Hsiang-chou o?) and beginning his own congregation (pu chung HL).19 It is hard to know what to make of Hsin-hsing’s seeking to receive the ten precepts from Hui-tsan or what period of his life this refers to. Hui-tsan, born in Ts’ang-chou ô? (in contemporary Hebei, approx. 280 kilometers southeast of Beijing), was active in the north until approximately 577, when, as a result of Emperor Wu’s persecution, he left for the south; in 580 he returned to the area around Chao-chou “? (in Hebei, approx. 170 kilometers north of modern Anyang) and some ten years later resided at the Kai-hua ssu ˆ5± in Ping-chou W? (near Taiyuan °ã in Shanxi, app. 270 kilometers northwest of Anyang). Hence this could refer to some time before Hui-tsan went to the south and before Hsin-hsing received the full precepts. On the other hand, as Michibata avers, it could also refer to the period after he returned from the south, from 581 to 583, possibly indicating that Hsin-hsing, who would have been over forty at this point and presumably would have been returned to lay status during the persecution of 574–577, was seeking to re-establish his precepts.20 But if already a novice, why would he be seeking the ten precepts? This also seems strange in view of the fact that only a few short years later he discards the full precepts (see below).21 Given, too, that Hsin-hsing is reported to have founded his own
17
Hsin-hsing i wen, 7.
The Li tai san pao chi relates that “when he [Hsin-hsing] was small, he abandoned his pursuits [%ô=%,, i.e., to become a monk?] and extensively studied the scriptural collections” (T #2034, 49.105b). This parallels the later Ming pao chi : “as a child [Hsin-hsing] was intelligent and wise, and well versed in the sutras and sastras” (cited above), which makes no mention, however, of Hsin-hsing’s “abandoning his affairs”; his biography likewise omits any reference to when or where he received the precepts. 18
19
T #2060, 50.575b.
Michibata Ryõshð, “Dõshaku to Sangaikyõ,” in Chðgoku Jõdokyõshi no kenkyð (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1980), 125. 20
A thorough discussion of Hsin-hsing’s attitude towards the precepts should also take into account the Teaching on Receiving the Eight Precepts (Shou pa chieh fa 1kwÀ, Pelliot 2849R); see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 197–98, 578–600. 21
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congregation after leaving Hui-tsan’s disciple Ming-yin, this would seem to be a record of a later event in his life. Perhaps the record of Hsin-hsing’s disciple Pen-chi is relevant, for this biography notes that in the ³rst year of K’ai-huang (581), when Pen-chi was eighteen years old, he heard of Hsinhsing’s founding a new sect (i pu bH) and joined him.22 In any case, it does indeed seem likely that Hsin-hsing would have sought out Hui-tsan, for there is no question that Hui-tsan’s rigor, dhðta practice, and interest in the Vinaya, meditation, and penitential rites are reµected in Hsin-hsing and the practice of his community. Signi³cantly, Hui-tsan was also Tao-ch’o’s teacher, and we can perhaps see his inµuence in the passing on to both Taoch’o and Hsin-hsing the practice of the fang teng repentance (fang teng ch’an fa ¾fHÀ).23 Like Hsin-hsing, Hui-tsan was invited to Ch’ang-an (in 602), and he also spent a good deal of time on Chung-nan shan, the site of Hsinhsing’s reliquaries. Though we have little information on where or from whom Hsin-hsing received the monastic precepts, his biography tells us that he discarded the full monastic precepts (she chü tsu chieh ãS˜w) at the Fa-tsang ssu in Hsiang-chou oCÀá±, personally engaged in manual labor, made offerings to the Fields of Compassion and Respect (suffering sentient beings and the Three Jewels, respectively; see below, 28), and paid reverence to monks and laity alike.24 Reminiscent of Shinran’s claim to a status of “neither monk nor layman,” the record of this event in the earlier Li tai san pao chi notes that: [Hsin-hsing] discarded the two hundred and ³fty precepts and lived below the position of a full monk but above that of a novice.25
Although we do not know when Hsin-hsing discarded the precepts, a testimonial in the Hsin-hsing i wen indicates that in 583, when he was 44 years old, and possibly as late as 587, he still considered himself a monk: 22
T #2060, 50.578a.
On San-chieh monks, Hui-tsan, and the fang teng repentance see Daniel Stevenson, “The T’ien-T’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi and Late North-South Dynasties, Sui, and Early T’ang Buddhist Devotionalism,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1987, 170–72 and 181–87; on Hsin-hsing and Tao-ch’o see also David Chappell, “Tao-ch’o (562–645): A Pioneer of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1976, 63–70; Yamamoto Bukkotsu [ûM¿, “Shingyõ to Dõshaku no kõshõ =‘o‡&uHÍ,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 6/2 (1958): 540–43. 23
24
T #2060, 560a.
25
T # 2034, 49.105b.
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In the 3rd year of K’ai-huang (583) the monk Hsin-hsing of Kuang-yen ssu MÕ±’=‘ in Hsiang-chou, for the sake of the emperors,26 … teachers, parents, and all sentient beings of the past, future, and present, abandoned body, life, and possessions, entrusting himself to all of the teachings of the sixteen kinds of eternal, joyous, self [and pure practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse].… On the tenth day of the ³rst month of the seventh year of K’aihuang (587) the sramana Hsin-hsing of the Kuang-yen ssu Mձܖ=‘ in Hsiang-chou said to the patron and governor of the Prefecture ?FªAÎ: “When young I suffered a troubled mind and was un³t for seated meditation or chanting the scriptures. From [age] seventeen onward I sought spiritual friends, and until now, at age 48, thirty-two full years have accumulated, I have only found four people who have vowed to reject life and treasures and to immediately arrive at Buddhahood: the monk Hui-ting of the Kuang-yen ssu in Hsiang-chou o?MÕ±’½Ï; the monk Tao-chin of the Yen-ching ssu in Hsiang-chou o?Õϱ’‡Ç; the [layman] Wang Shan-hsing of Wei-chou 2?÷3‘ … and the [layman] Wang Shan-hsing of Chao-chou “?÷3§. Continuously practicing in this way without interruption will bene³t the nation and pro³t the masses of living beings, and so I respectfully ask that you report this to the Imperial throne that I may receive their gracious permission.”27
If these records are accurate, they tell us that in 587 Hsin-hsing was still in Hsiang-chou, residing at the Kuang-yen ssu. It might also be signi³cant that in the ³rst instance Hsin-hsing refers to himself as a monk ’ but in the second as a sramana Ü–, and that two of his four companions appear to be laymen.28 One of Hsin-hsing’s important disciples, P’ei Hsüan-cheng (d. ca. 634), is also described by Tao-hsüan as having been formerly a monk but in the end wearing layman’s clothes.29 As with much in Hsin-hsing’s biography, it is hard to know exactly what to make of this record of his discarding the complete precepts and living “below a monk but above the laity.” The natural tendency is to see him initiating a new sort of ecclesiastic position analogous to Shinran’s “neither monk nor laity” mentioned above. Such an explanation appears particularly promising given the San-chieh emphasis on the tradition of the decline of 26
The text is damaged here; three characters are missing.
Hsin-hsing i wen, 3 and 7 (I have emended the reading slightly in line with the same list of spiritual friends given in the Hsin-hsing i wen, 5); see also Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 11–14. 27
28 On the basis of a colophon to a San-chieh manuscript in the lost Li Sheng-to 5µé collection of Tun-huang manuscripts composed in 586 at the Fa-tsang ssu in Hsiang-chou, Nishimoto has surmised that it was between 583 and 587 that Hsin-hsing discarded the precepts (Sangaikyõ, 56). 29
T #2060, 560a; see also below, p. 15.
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the dharma and insistence that the sangha was composed of corrupt monks who break the precepts and harbor false views (see chapters 4 and 6, below). Thus in considering this and other aspects of Hsin-hsing’s teachings in his study of the suppressions of the San-chieh movement Mark Lewis writes that “we must conclude that the Three Stages sect celebrated the reversion of monks to secular life as one expression of proper religiosity.”30 At the same time, however, this explanation goes against what we know of the rigor of Hsin-hsing’s cultivation of a strict monastic regimen, including the austerities of the dhðta practices, penitential rites, liturgies, meditation, and especially the stern life of San-chieh communities, the regulations of which go so far as to bar membership to any who have even considered discarding the precepts (see chapter 6, 143–44).31 Considering his seeking ordination from Hui-tsan, a Vinaya master noted for his strict vigilance of the precepts, it seems hard to conclude that Hsin-hsing was attempting to eliminate the institution of monasticism. Other possible explanations, then, for Hsin-hsing’s discarding the precepts could perhaps include his high regard for the precepts and a desire not to break them, either because he felt that as an evil person he could no longer be faithful to his vows or perhaps because of his desire to engage in manual labor and develop the social welfare enterprises that led to the creation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (see chapters 7 and 8).32 Then again, perhaps this is simply a record of his abandoning the precepts during the general persecution of Buddhism by Emperor Wu that lasted from 574 to 577. Although most of Hsin-hsing’s life was thus spent in the area of the Northern Ch’i capital, his last years were spent in Ch’ang-an, the capital of the newly uni³ed Sui empire. According to his biography, he was of³cially invited to the capital in the beginning of the K’ai-huang period (581–600), and the famous statesman Kao Chiung established a subtemple (yüan Š) for him in the Chen-chi ssu ³ù±.33 Because Kao Chiung was still busy in the various campaigns to conquer the South, and because the Chen-chi ssu was not established until 583, this date should be emended to K’ai-huang 9 (589), following the Hsin-hsing i wen records (noted above) of Hsin-hsing’s continued presence in Hsiang-chou in 587 and the biography of Hsin-hsing’s disciple Seng-yung: “In K’ai-huang 9 (589) Hsin-hsing received an invitation to 30 Mark E. Lewis, “The Suppression of the Three Stages Sect,” in Robert Buswell, Jr., ed. Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 220. 31 There is a grandfather clause to this rule that excepts anybody who had already abandoned the precepts; perhaps this clause was for Hsin-hsing himself, or perhaps for others forcibly returned to lay life during the persecution of 574–577. 32
Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 56.
33
T #2082, 51.788a; for details see chapter 8.
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the capital and he went together with Seng-yung; after his arrival in the imperial capital monks and laity alike all received his teachings.”34 According to his biography, once in the capital Hsin-hsing composed three works in more than forty chüan: the Practice that Arises in Accord with the Capacity (Tui ken ch’i hsing Ï͘‘), the Collected Works on the Three Levels (San chieh chi lu X‰TÉ), and the Assorted Rules for Community Regulation (Chih chung shih chu fa £Lª”À).35 The early records of Hsinhsing’s writings are not entirely consistent, in part because they were originally given orally and only subsequently written down by one of his disciples, and of course in part because of their proscription in 600.36 This state of affairs is alluded to in the Li tai san pao chi, the earliest catalog of Hsinhsing’s writings, which, after recording the “miscellaneous records of practices that arise in accord with the capacity” (tui ken ch’i hsin tsa lu Ï͘‘ FÉ) in thirty-two chüan, notes that, although these “miscellaneous records” are made up of accurate citations from the sutras and commentaries, the titles of the individual works (in the miscellaneous records) are not ³xed. Nonetheless, there is a general consensus of nearly forty chüan of writings that seem to have been loosely gathered under two rubrics, a longer work dealing with the “practice in accord with the capacity,” and a shorter work dealing with the three levels. Although not speci³cally mentioned in the earliest records, the third text mentioned in Hsin-hsing’s biography, the 34
T #2060, 50.584a.
T #2060, 50.560a. The Chih chung shih chu fa was actually written “east of the mountains” (shan tung [X) referring not to modern Shandong province but to the area east of the T’aihang Mountains, in modern-day Shansi province. The only other mention of anything composed “east of the mountains” is the Chi lu TÉ, which, lacking a text, Hsin-hsing taught orally to his disciple Pen-chi ûK (T #2060, 50.578a); according to the biography appended to Hsin-hsing’s, the disciple P’ei Hsüan-cheng ¨éB actually penned all of Hsin-hsing’s writings (þšqo„W[¨é]BÙ). 35
The Li tai san pao chi lists two works, the San chieh wei pieh chi lu X‰RƒTÉ in three chüan and a Tui ken ch’i hsing tsa lu ÏÍ|‘PÉ in thirty-two chüan, and Hsin-hsing’s reliquary inscription mentions two works, the Tui ken ch’i hsing chih fa ÏÍ|‘îÀ in over thirty chüan and a San chieh fo fa X‰MÀ in four chüan. The Ta t’ang nei tien lu, also composed by Tao-hsüan (author of Hsin-hsing’s Hsü kao seng chuan biography), only lists two works attributed to Hsin-hsing, the San chieh wei pieh chi lu X‰RƒTÉ and the Tui ken ch’i hsing tsa lu chi ÏÍn‘FÉT. T’ang-lin’s Ming pao chi generally con³rms this early literary tradition of Hsin-hsing, giving his works as a thirty-six-chüan Jen chi lu ^TÉ and a fourchüan San chieh fa X‰À. For an overview of the San-chieh literary tradition see Hubbard, “Salvation in the Final Period,” 171–260; Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 141–92; Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 155–238; Hubbard, “The Teaching of the Three Levels and the Manuscript Texts of the San chieh fo fa,” in Nanatsu-dera koitsu kyõten kenkyð sõsho Vol. 5: Chðgoku Nippon senjutsusho (Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 2000); Nishimoto Teruma, “‘Sangaibuppõ’ shohon no seiritsu to denpan ni tsuite,” in Nanatsu-dera koitsu kyõten kenkyð sõsho Vol. 5: Chðgoku Nippon senjutsusho (Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 2000). 36
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Assorted Rules for Community Regulation, is found in later catalogs that detail the titles of the individual works that comprise the more than thirty chüan of the Practice that Arises in Accord with the Capacity. 37 Because the San-chieh texts were later banished from the of³cial canon and the community itself eventually died out, these works have been lost for the better part of a millennium, with only their titles remaining in the catalogs. This situation changed dramatically with the discovery of their texts at Tun-huang and in Japan nearly one hundred years ago, though many problems of identi³cation, physical reconstruction, dating, and interpretation remain. Although the full presentation of the textual history of Hsin-hsing’s writings lies outside the scope of this study, it is notable that they are—as virtually all early sources agree—primarily composed of citations drawn from a wide reading of scripture. As a fragment of the San chieh fo fa X‰ MÀ (Buddha-dharma of the Three Levels, Stein #2684) recovered from Tunhuang puts it, “The San chieh fo fa is entirely comprised of scriptural passages (ching wen ÷k), excluding only nine words written by human beings (jen yü ^B): ‘the ³rst level’ (ti i chieh Ùs‰), ‘the second level’ (ti erh chieh Ù̉), and ‘the third level’ (ti san chieh ÙX‰).”38 Indeed, although this is a bit of an overstatement and the rules for citation in Hsin-hsing’s day were not quite the same as those imposed within contemporary academic writing, within the 30 leaves of this fragment of the second chüan of the San chieh fo fa (approximately 10 Taishõ pages), for example, there are over 130 references to 35 different canonical sources, including the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra (31 references), Dašacakrak¤itigarbha-sðtra (16 references), the Saddharmapu«^ar‡ka-sðtra (17 references), as well as the Hua-yen Sðtra, K„šyapaparivarta-sðtra, Šr‡maladev‡-sðtra, Ekottar„gama, Dašabhðmika-sðtra, and numerous other sutras and sastras. Interesting, too, is the careful separation of the words of the composer (jen yü ^B) and scripture (ching wen ÷k). Could it perhaps reµect a sense of de³lement of the commentator and therefore a wish not to pollute sacred writings by mixing them with the profane— thereby equivalent, perhaps, to the grievous offense of slandering the dharma? Or is Hsin-hsing simply showing that although he knows his arrangement of the Buddha’s teachings into three levels is arti³cial and not found in the texts themselves it is undeniably based on scripture? Regardless of the reason, Hsin-hsing was indeed zealous in his recourse to scriptural authority. After only ³ve years in the capital Hsin-hsing’s health began to deteriorate, though his rigorous and diligent practice did not: 37
E.g., the Ta chou lu, T 2153, 55.475a and the K’ai yüan lu, T #2154, 55.678c.
38
San chieh fo fa, 12; see also the Japanese text of the San chieh fo fa, 415.
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Toward the end his illness became severe, but he struggled with all of his strength in the Buddha-hall, contemplating the image [of the Buddha]. When his energy had gradually waned, he had the image brought into his room and while lying on his side gazing at it he died. He had ³fty-four springs and autumns [i.e., he was 54 years old].39 This took place on the fourth day of the ³rst month of the fourteenth year [of K’ai-huang, that is, 30 January 594].40 After seven days his corpse was escorted from the Hua-tu ssu 5E±41 to the Ch’ih-ming fu zk@ of Chung-nan shan $Ç[, and the wailing voices of monks and laity shook the capital.42
At Chung-nan shan they “abandoned his body,” the so-called “sky burial” in which one’s body is left in the open as a food offering to the wild beasts— a ³nal and ³tting act for one who, as noted above, had vowed to abandon body, life, and possessions for the sake of all sentient beings. Although not a common practice, sky burial was far from unknown among Hsin-hsing’s contemporaries.43 Tao-hsüan’s biography adds that when they later collected his bones, they discovered that his ears were directly across from each other! This curious note is explained by an episode in the tale of Hsin-hsing recounted in the Ming pao chi, which relates that after Hsin-hsing’s death, some of the teachers in the capital had misgivings about his teachings. After discussing the matter among themselves, they recalled that, according to the Fu fa tsang ching, if a person has heard the true dharma in the past then their ears would be directly across from each other. Upon checking Hsin-hsing’s skull, they discovered that his ears were indeed directly opposite each other and so they all were contrite and admitted their lack of faith.44 Considering that the ³rst suppression of the San-chieh movement took place only a few short years after Hsin-hsing’s death (in 600), it is interesting that the basic 39 Hsin-hsing’s age should be emended to 55 as given in the Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 9); on Hsin-hsing’s age see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 40–41. 40 This date later became important for the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse; see below, chapters 7 and 8. 41
The Chen-chi ssu was renamed the Hua-tu ssu in 620 (see chapter eight).
42
T #2060, 50.560a.
A cursory check through the indices for the Hsü kao seng chuan turns up thirteen references to other monks who “abandoned their body” at death; nuns were also noted in this regard, as for example Hui-ch’iung ½ø, who speci³cally requested that her disciples leave her body as an offering for wild animals (T #2063, 55.930b); Chien-hsing Ç‘ is a San-chieh nun buried at the site of Hsin-hsing’s reliquary whose disciples also gave her a sky burial (Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 82–84). 43
T #2082, 51.788c; see also Gjertson, Miraculous Tales, 159. The Fu fa ts’ang yin yüan chuan $Àáƒ+Œ was probably composed in China and ³gures in the tradition of the decline of the dharma; the story about the ears is found at T #2058, 51.322b. 44
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point of this story, related in two biographies composed in the 650s, is to con³rm that the doubts of the teachers in the capital had been allayed and that Hsin-hsing’s teachings were indeed the “true dharma.” After gathering his remains, his followers erected a reliquary and put up a memorial stele, which, according to Tao-hsüan, was composed by Pei Hsüan-cheng ¨éB and is at the foot of the mountain.45 Chung-nan shan was a popular spot among Sui and T’ang Buddhists, and also served as a reliquary site for many. A number of other San-chieh followers also had steles and stupas erected near Hsin-hsing, and in 767 the name of the site was changed from the Hsin-hsing ta-yüan =‘OŠ to the Pai-ta ssu ßO±, perhaps indicating that Hsin-hsing’s reliquary stupa was no longer the focus of the site.
Community Hsin-hsing left behind a substantial community of followers (t’u chung 6L) and institutional presence after his death.46 He appears to have been a charismatic teacher and to have attracted followers from early on. As noted above, he was reported to have founded a congregation (pu chung HL) in Yeh after leaving Hui-tsan, and, in support of the idea that Hsinhsing’s community began at least as early as the K’ai-huang era, his reliquary inscription (likely composed in 594, the year of his death) records that a group of followers (t’u chung 6L) three hundred strong had been together with Hsin-hsing as “spiritual companions” (shan chih shih 3FÆ) for over twenty years, following his deeds of body, mind, and speech as “comrades in awakening” (p’u t’i chih yu ¬Øîº). As noted above, Pen-chi is recorded as having joined Hsin-hsing’s “new sect” (i pu bH) in 581, and Seng-yung, another important disciple who led the community after Hsin-hsing’s death, joined him at approximately the same time.47 Hsin-hsing’s charisma and skill at winning converts is mentioned in many of the records of his life; for example, Tao-hsüan records that adepts came from the four directions to his gate to question him, and because Hsin-hsing was always straightforward and never devious in his replies all who heard him believed him and were
45 T #2060, 50.560a. The various memorial steles done in memory of Hsin-hsing and his followers form one of the more interesting and important sources of information for the study of Chinese Buddhism in general and the San-chieh movement in particular; for an introduction to these sources see Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions.” 46
For a complete listing of his disciples and followers see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 77–119.
47
T #2060, 50.584a.
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converted.48 The Ming pao chi likewise notes that all the “bold and determined scholars of the empire (t’ien hsia yung meng ching chin chih shih ú4¹{·Çîw) took Hsin-hsing as their master.”49 Though these references seem to be but borrowed or shared literary tropes, they ³t in well with other indications that Hsin-hsing was a charismatic leader around whom a founder’s cult developed. Because of the emphasis on the decline of the dharma, the decay of human potential, and the mass appeal of Hsin-hsing’s charitable enterprise, there has been a persistent tendency to see his community as a popular movement that antagonized elite notions of orthodoxy. In fact, evidence of elite support is more forthcoming in the historical record.50 We can cite, for example, the of³cial invitation to teach in the capital and the patronage of the powerful minister Kao Chiung. Hsin-hsing’s appeal to the elite is perhaps also indicated by the stature of his disciples. Attached to the biography of Hsin-hsing, for example, is the biography of his disciple P’ei Hsüan-cheng (d. circa 634). Although originally a monk, P’ei is said to have worn layman’s clothes towards the end of his life. That he was of a relatively high station in life is evident from the fact that he is referred to as a “retired gentleman” Êw, that he compiled Hsin-hsing’s works, and that he composed not only Hsin-hsing’s memorial but his own as well!51 As a “retired of³cial” or “gentleman,” it is possible that P’ei was of the great P’ei family of Ho-tung, which produced many literati and high of³cials during the T’ang dynasty (e.g., P’ei chü ¨M, P’ei Chü-tao ¨Ê‡, etc.) Other members of the P’ei clan, such as the wife of P’ei Hsing-chien ¨‘š, one of the highest of³cials of the early T’ang, were also buried at the Pai-t’a ssu ßO±, the place where the steles for Hsin-hsing, Seng-yung, P’ei Hsüan-cheng, and other San-chieh followers were erected, and there is even a record to the effect that a P’ei-kung ¨N donated the land for the Pai-t’a ssu.52 If it is true that P’ei Hsüan-cheng came from such a powerful family, it would help to explain both the early power of the San-chieh and their revival in the early T’ang dynasty. In any case, Hsin-hsing’s biography lists ³ve San-chieh temples in the capital: the Hua-tu ssu 59±, the Kuang-ming Mg, the Tz’u-men ²–, the 48
T #2060, 50.560a.
49
T #2082, 51.788a.
This is particularly true in the epigraphical record; see Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions.” 50
51 There is also a record in the Pao k’e ts’ung pien, chüan 7, p. 19, of a memorial that Pei composed for Ching-ming Ïe, a disciple who is mentioned together with Seng-yung in the Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei; cf. Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 255. 52
Tsukamoto, “Sangaikyõ shiryõ zakki,” Shina Bukkyõ shigaku, 1/1–2 (Shõwa 12), 99.
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Hui-jih ½Õ, and the Hung-shan e3. Writing at roughly the same time as Tao-hsüan, the author of the Ming pao chi notes that from these ³ve temples his followers proliferated and spread out, but they were still known as the “meditation masters of the ³ve temples.”53 Indicating that Hsin-hsing had followers in other temples as well, the biography adds, “In addition to these, the other temples as well followed their regimen of offering veneration at the six periods and begging for food.”54 The widespread inµuence of the movement that Hsin-hsing began is also evident from records of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, which both attracted throngs from all over the empire as well as established branches throughout the provinces (see chapter 8). From its origins in the rigorous communities of monastic Buddhist practice of the north to its establishment in the imperial capital, and in spite of the of³cial hostility that it encountered, the religious community founded by Hsin-hsing µourished in Ch’ang-an for well over one hundred years, and continued to exist perhaps as late as the tenth century (see chapter 8). At this juncture we might pause brieµy to ask what sort of social organization best characterizes Hsin-hsing’s community. As we have seen, the earliest references to Hsin-hsing’s community are i pu bH (“new sect, branch, faction, division, or offshoot”), pu chung HL (“congregation, society, group, community”), t’u chung 6L (“group of followers, supporters”), shan chih shih 3FÆ (“spiritual companions”), and p’u t’i chih yu ¬Øîº (“comrades in awakening”). As such, I tentatively believe that we could use the term “sect” to describe the San-chieh movement. That is, I think that Hsin-hsing and his followers share some of the features typically associated with sectarianism as de³ned by Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Bryan Wilson, and others, namely, a slightly separatist group of exclusivist true believers focusing on personal rather than institutional charisma and more concerned with personal fellowship than with secular power. To consider Hsin-hsing’s community in terms of sectarian movements, then, has obvious heuristic value. Still, before “sect” or “school” can be used with any degree of accuracy more work on the basis and con³guration of membership is needed. In any case, what we do not ³nd is “School of the Three Levels” (San-chieh tsung X‰;) or “Teaching of the Three Levels” (San-chieh-chiao X‰*). Although the latter designation in particular has become the standard name in English, in fact it is not attested until quite late (ninth century) and in reality is more an appellation made popular by Yabuki Keiki’s pioneering research early in the previous century, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð. For this reason I refer to the “San-chieh movement,” the “San-chieh teachings,” the “San53
T #2082, 51.788c.
54
T #2060, 50.560a.
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chieh community,” or “the teachings of Hsin-hsing” in order to avoid using “San-chieh-chiao” as a proper name.
Teaching Although the various accounts of Hsin-hsing’s life recounted above must be understood as a particular variety of religious or hagiographical writing, they do make clear that the majority of his life was spent in Northern China in the vicinity of the capital city of Yeh. He was thus born amidst the civil war so endemic to sixth-century China and no doubt experienced ³rsthand the decadent conditions of the monasteries and the attendant imperial suppression of Buddhism in 574, in which over two million monks and nuns were reportedly laicized. Such conditions had already given rise to a pervasive apocalyptic mood in China, a mood further kindled by translations that reµected the persecution of Buddhism in northwest India at the hands of the conquering Huns only slightly earlier. These historical events, combined with the spirit of eschatological expectation that had prevailed for several centuries in indigenous Chinese thought and practice, prompted many to teach that sentient beings were no longer capable of practicing the traditional Buddhist path. This dark period of history was variously known as the “latter time” or “³nal age” (Chinese mo shih =›, Sanskrit pašcimak„la), or the time of the “destruction of the true teachings” (Chin. fa mieh Àn, Skt. saddharma-vipralopa) and its development into a full-blown doctrinal statement occupied many of the important Buddhist thinkers of the Sui and T’ang and had far-reaching consequences in the history of East Asian Buddhism. Hsin-hsing’s systematization of this idea is found in his doctrine of the “three levels,” the unique organization of spiritual capacity that is the hallmark—and the name—of his movement. For Hsin-hsing the important lesson of the decline tradition was that sentient beings were ensnared by bias and prejudice, a foundational bias that prevented discernment of truth and falsity, ultimately leading to the grave offense of slandering the dharma and cutting off all chance for awakening. Such a bias at the very core of their experience characterizes the beings of the third level, and it was to them that Hsin-hsing’s teachings were directed. At the same time that the notions of mo shih and fa mieh were gaining currency, however, a much more positive understanding of the human condition was also having a profound impact on Chinese Buddhists. This, the teaching of universal Buddha-nature, proclaimed that all living beings, no matter how degenerate or sinful, were fundamentally of an awakened nature and would one day realize that enlightened nature. Thus the situation presented an interesting dilemma—on the one hand the universal capacity for
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Buddhahood proclaimed an equal and ultimate human potential, yet on the other hand there is the decayed capacity for realization of that potential. Hsin-hsing, as with many others, transformed this dilemma into an opportunity for advocating new doctrinal and institutional con³gurations of traditional Buddhist practice. He did so under the banner of the “practice that arises in accord with the capacity” (tui ken ch’i hsing fa ÏÍ|‘À), a reformulation of the pragmatic Buddhist dictum to make the cure ³t the disease, the doctrinal privileging inherent in the Buddhist rhetoric of teaching according to the capacity of the disciple (up„ya), and the Chinese tradition of organizing the Buddhist teachings according to various chronological and pedagogical schemes (p’an chiao |*). Thus, far from closing off the Buddhist path, the teaching of the latter age opened up a door of opportunity for doctrinal innovation, an opening that coincided with the great political and economic opportunities blossoming throughout the empire. In many ways San-chieh doctrines and institutions can be best understood as a calculated response to those opportunities. Hsin-hsing’s biographies are strangely silent on the speci³c topic of the three levels, although his key doctrine of teaching according to the spiritual capacity is noted. Tao-hsüan, for example, wrote in the Hsü kao seng chuan that Hsin-hsing “considered the teachings in conjunction with the era and investigated humanity in accordance with its afµiction.”55 The Ming pao chi elaborates: [Hsin-hsing] taught that what was contained in the Buddha’s sutras was for the purpose of salvation; some [scriptures] taught the path according to the basic nature and some determined the teaching in accordance with time and the situation. Now we are very far from the sage and [human] nature at this time is very different. If an inferior person practices the superior teachings the teaching will not match the capacity and they will easily be confused and mistaken. Thereupon [Hsin-hsing] collected passages from the sutras and commentaries, closely examining them in order to discover the dharma appropriate for people to study.… The purport [of his teachings is to] encourage people [to cultivate] universal respect (p’u ching 3’) [of others] and recognition of [one’s own] evil (jen o ÞÕ) nature, contemplate the [universal] Buddha-nature, and dispense medicine in accord with the afµiction. It is a sudden teaching of the One Vehicle.56
This passage aptly summarizes Hsin-hsing’s teachings: human nature is no longer capable of practicing the superior dharma of the sages, and to 55
T #2060, 50.559c–560a.
56
T #2082, 51.788b.
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attempt to do so will only bring harm. Therefore we must take “medicine in accord with the afµiction,” that is to say, cultivate the “practice that arises in accord with the capacity.” As the Ming pao chi notes, the gist of his teachings is to be found in the complementary practices of seeing all sentient beings in terms of their essential Buddha-nature and therefore universally respecting all while at the same time seeing oneself solely in terms of our basically evil nature. For Hsin-hsing, the medicine dispensed in accord with the afµiction—the afµiction of bias and prejudiced views of reality— means cultivating a variety of contemplative, penitential, liturgical, and ascetic practices, practices that for the most part were staples in the monastic regimen of his day. The full description of the evil nature of the third level of living being and the essentially enlightened nature of all living beings—absolute delusion and perfect Buddhahood—constitute the bulk of parts 2 and 3; here let me brieµy introduce some of the other practices of the San-chieh community as they are mentioned in Hsin-hsing’s biographies.
Practice Although Hsin-hsing’s writings give the best picture of his synthesis of Buddhist doctrine, the biographical materials contain many references to his practice and that of his community. In general we can say that these practices are typical of the time; dhyana and other contemplative exercises, the ascetic dhðta practices, liturgical practice of the six-period pðj„, and the penitentiary fang teng rite—all well-known practices of the time—are each mentioned. Practices more unique to Hsin-hsing—practices that form the bulk of this study—include the universal veneration of all sentient beings as Buddhas, the sixteen practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, and of course the teaching of the three levels themselves. Although the full presentation of the contemplative and liturgical life of the San-chieh communities lies outside the scope of the present work, a brief introduction is in order; let me begin with those practices that seem to have been widespread in the milieu of late sixth-century Chinese Buddhist communities.
Dhyana Although Hsin-hsing himself noted that when he was young he “suffered a troubled mind and was un³t for seated meditation or chanting the scriptures,”57 either this was a rhetorical humility (perhaps born of his 57
Hsin-hsing i wen, 7.
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teaching of “recognizing evil,” described below) or he overcame his dif³culties when he got older, for concentration practices, contemplative exercises, and the cultivation of various samadhis were an important part of Hsinhsing’s regimen. To begin with, we should remember that Hsin-hsing’s biography in the Hsü kao seng chuan is contained in the section reserved for ch’an shih ,‚, “masters of meditation.”58 The Ming pao chi, too, reports that Hsin-hsing “exerted his strength in order to concentrate his mind, emptying the physical and bringing wisdom to maturity.”59 The Hsin-hsing i wen gives brief but strict instructions for the practitioner of seated meditation, tersely summed up as: “sit constantly day and night, never lying down.”60 Many of the San-chieh texts recovered from Tun-huang also mention seated meditation (tso ch’an â,) and meditative concentration (ch’an ting ,Ï),61 and a large portion of the Chih fa manual of San-chieh monastic practice is devoted to detailed instructions on seated meditation practice, about which it states bluntly: “Seated meditation alone should be the foundation [of practice] for all the evil monks of the evil world after the Buddha’s extinction.”62 The speci³c content of the exercises vary in the San-chieh literature,63 from the “contemplation of form and nothingness” (wu hsiang san mei kuan [oX*Ö), reported in the Chih fa64 to the more mundane practice of calming the mind in order to keep it from being distracted by the love of fine food when engaged in begging alms.65 The Practice that Arises in Accord with the Capacity (Tui ken ch’i hsing fa ÏÍ|‘À), an early and central Sanchieh text, includes detailed instructions on the ssu nien ch’u o vçÐÕ, the “mindfulness of the four evil places,” including contemplation of one’s actions, body, breath, movements, corpse, etc.; 66 the p’ing teng kuan ´fÖ, 58 The biographies of Hsin-hsing’s disciples Seng-yung (T #2060, 55.583c–584a) and Pen-chi (T #2060, 55.578a–578b) are also in the section reserved for ch’an shih. 59
T #2082, 51.788b.
60
Hsin-hsing i wen, 6.
A cursory check of the extant manuscripts reveals well over ³fty references to tso ch’an and ch’an ting. 61
62 Chih fa, 581; underscoring its importance, the Chih fa states that the monk appointed to oversee San-chieh communities—though regarding himself as evil and others as virtuous— was expected to cultivate the seated meditation of the “formless samadhi” (wu hsiang san mei [oX*). Chih fa, 579. 63 See Nishimoto Teruma, “Sangaikyõ no kanhõ ni tsuite,” Õkurasan ronshð 44 (1999), 85–121. 64
Chih fa, 579, 582.
65
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 123 (cf. ibid., 142); see also chapter 5.
66
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 117–20.
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the “contemplation of equality” in which the practitioner of d„na sees neither giver nor recipient, neither precept holder nor precept breaker;67 and the wu men kuan 2–Ö, “the ³ve gates of contemplation,” including the “contemplation of the four Buddhas” (ssu fo kuan vMÖ), the “contemplation of all [sentient beings] as one’s relative (p’u ch’in kuan 3VÖ), the “contemplation of the impurity of one’s food” (shih pu ching kuan 7#ÏÖ), the “contemplation of emptiness and formlessness” (k’ung wu hsiang kuan W[[ü]oÖ), and the “contemplation of impermanence” (wu ch’ang kuan [[ü]øÖ).68 The ³rst gate, the contemplation of the four Buddhas, was particularly important in San-chieh practice and is detailed in a separate text translated in Appendix A, the P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM (Stein #5668).69 The importance of contemplative practice is underscored in Hsinhsing’s biography that reports that even as he was dying Hsin-hsing devoted himself to contemplation of the Buddha image; and in the suppression edict of 699 (see chapter 8, 205–206) seated meditation is one of the San-chieh practices permitted to continue.70
Fang-teng As mentioned above, it seems likely that Hsin-hsing studied with Hui-tsan, a Vinaya and meditation master also known for his cultivation of the dhðta and the fang teng ¾f penitentiary rite. The fang teng retreat was widely popular in Northern Chinese Buddhist circles and particularly important in T’ien-t’ai practice.71 Whether because of Hui-tsan’s inµuence or simply because of its widespread popularity is unclear, but Hsin-hsing and his followers also practiced the fang teng rite, a complex and lengthy (one week was standard, but longer periods are also provided for) ritual retreat consisting of extensive physical puri³cation, offerings to and veneration of the Buddhas, confession of sins, circumambulation while chanting dh„ra«‡, and seated meditation designed to remove obstacles and purify the mind. 67
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 145.
68
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 152.
The P’u fa ssu fo is the subject of chapter 5 and is translated in Appendix A, below; see also Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 205–16 and 609–22. Another text that details San-chieh contemplative exercises is Pelliot 2268, to which Nishimoto has given the title The Abridged Teaching on the Contemplation of the Three Levels (San chieh kuan fa lüeh shih X‰ÖÀFt); see Sangaikyõ, 216–19 and 623–49. 69
70
T #2153, 55.475a.
Hui-ssu, Tao-ch’o, and Chih-i are only a few of the prominent teachers associated with the Fang teng rite; see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi,” 82–94, 175–88; see also 538–96 for a translation of Chih-i’s Fang teng san mei hsing fa ¾fX*‘À. 71
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According to the Li tai san pao chi, the puri³catory fang teng repentance was practiced by all of Hsin-hsing’s disciples,72 and the primary text for the rite, the Ta fang teng t’o lo ni ching ؾf¼øÍ÷, is cited often in works attributed to Hsin-hsing.73 As with much else in Hsin-hsing’s life, his interest in this rite of confession places him well within the context of northern practice, where it was popular from the mid-sixth century onwards. It also ³ts in well with the overall tenor of contemplative and devotional cultus in Hsinhsing’s community, for as Stevenson noted in his study of T’ien-t’ai devotional and liturgical practice, the fang teng (a) tends to be used in conjunction with the practice of dhyana, as either a preliminary method of purifying the mind or as supplementary confessional practice; (b) is related also to liturgies of veneration that involve reciting rosters of Buddha-names; and (c) is connected to a precept ceremony tradition, all of which ³t in well with the practice of Hsin-hsing and the San-chieh community as well.
Devotional liturgies at the six daily periods In addition to longer and more intense forms of veneration and repentance ritual such as the fang teng retreat, Tao-hsüan also recorded that at the San-chieh temples in the capital everybody performed “devotional rituals at the six periods and begging for food (liu shih li hsüan ch’i shih ´/ øF7).”74 Rituals performed at the six periods (three during the day and three periods at night) seem to have primarily involved the rites of the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Ch’i chieh fo ming ̉Me) and related liturgies of veneration and repentance (li ch’an /H), numerous manuals of which were discovered at Tun-huang.75 In addition to worship at the six intervals there 72
T # 2034, 49.105b.
The Ta fang teng t’o lo ni ching is mentioned often in the San chieh fo fa, for example pp. 313, 316, 334, 341, 363, and 368. 73
74
T #2060, 50.560a; see also the Ming pao chi, T #2082, 51.788b.
The K’ai yüan lu attributes to Hsin-hsing both an Extensive Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Kuang ch’i chieh fo ming c̉Me) and an Abridged Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Lüeh ch’i chieh fo ming F̉Me); T #2154, 55.678c. The rosters of Buddhas in these texts were drawn from sutras such as the Fo shuo Kuan Yao-wang Yao-shang erh p’u sa ching M‰Öæ÷ æî̬O÷ (T #2161) and the Fo shuo chüeh ting pi ni ching M‰·ÏÈÍ÷ (T #325); the importance of the former is indicated by its incorporation into the title of the Chi chieh fo ming in several catalogs (e.g., the K’ai yüan lu, T #2154, 55.678c, and the Jen chi lu tu mu, included in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, appendix 221). The original study of the Ch’i chieh fo ming was done by Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 512–36; subsequently a greatly detailed study of the rite and the numerous manuscripts was done by Hirokawa Akitoshi, “Tonkõ shutsudo nanakai butsumyõkyõ ni tsuite,” Shðkyõ kenkyð 251 (1982): 71–105. Tokiwa Daijõ has cited Hsin-hsing’s use of the Ch’i chieh fo ming rite as evidence that he studied with Ling-yü [È (518–605), the 75
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were also provisions for longer periods of continuous practice over the six periods (liu shih hsüeh hsiang hsü tso yeh ´·oa6%), and, reminiscent of the importance of physical purity and ablutions in the fang teng rite, the Hsin-hsing i wen tells us that “one who would venerate the Buddha (li fo /M) should don clean robes and wash three times in the day and three times at night; excluding a brief rest after midnight and a meal during the day, they should engage in constant veneration night and day with no rest.”76 The veneration of various rosters of Buddhas as an integral part of a ritual complex carried out over the six watches of the day was a common feature of the monastic regimen of the time, cutting across different communities and traditions. Though these liturgies varied considerably in detail, their general format is well known throughout Mahayana Buddhist practice to this day from such practices as the Seven-Limbed Puja (saptapðj„)77 and includes many of the same structures as the fang teng rite: veneration of the Three Jewels, offerings of incense and µowers, chanting and hymns, praising the Buddha’s merits, veneration of speci³c Buddhas (seven rosters of Buddhas, sometimes expanded with yet other lists), confession of sins and the cultivation of virtuous mental attitudes, dedication or transference of merits accrued through the ritual, further verses of praise of the Buddha’s merits, and taking refuge in the Three Jewels.78 As with the rites of the fang teng, the veneration and repentance of the buddhan„ma and other liturgies function on many different levels, and Hsin-hsing’s procedural manuals recognize that the practice and result will
famous Ti-lun master, because the unique con³guration of Buddhas that comprise the seven rosters of Hsin-hsing’s rite are also recorded precisely in Ling-yü’s cave temple engravings; Ling-yü also shared Hsin-hsing’s forebodings about the decline of the dharma; see Tokiwa Daijõ, “Sangaikyõ no bodai toshite no Hõzan-ji,” Shðkyõ kenkyð 4/1 (1927), 44–47; Stevenson’s study of T’ien-t’ai meditation and liturgical manuals includes detailed descriptions of the rite and liturgical manuals and vividly shows how well San-chieh practice ³ts in with what was done by other teachers of his time (The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi, 270–81; passim); see also the section on the “veneration of the Buddhas at the six periods” in the Chih fa (585–586) and the invocation of the Buddha rosters in the Shou pa chieh fa precept manual (595–596). 76
Hsin-hsing i wen, 6.
The saptapðj„ is a later Mahayana rite that became nearly ubiquitous in Tibetan practice and thereby is increasingly popular in Western Buddhist circles as well; it includes:( 1) prostration; (2) offerings; (3) confession; (4) rejoicing; (5) requesting the Buddhas to teach; (6) entreating the Buddhas to remain in the world until all are awakened; and (7) dedication of merit. 77
Hirokawa, “Tonkõ shutsudo nanakai butsumyõkyõ ni tsuite,” 78–82; for a detailed description and comparative analysis of Chinese and Indian liturgical procedures see Stevenson, The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi, 249–464c. 78
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vary with the capacity of the practitioner.79 We can think, for example, of the simple and settling inµuence of the physical training gained by circumambulation and prostration (prostration was also a frequently assigned punishment for infractions of meditation hall rules; see chapter 6); developing humility and respect through ritual ablutions, cleansing and adorning the ritual site, and building the altar; cultivating the power of concentration through offering, chanting, and visualization; and, of course, fostering an acute awareness of the unavoidable nature of sin through confession and repentance. There is even questioning the ultimate nature of sin and virtue, leading in turn to an awareness of emptiness through seated meditation. Chih-i’s procedural manual for the fang teng rite states, for example, “de³led and pure comprise a single continuum wherein there is no purity to be found, no impurity to be found. It is like open space. This is known as ‘ultimate purity.’”80 Thus, broadly speaking, the practice of veneration and confession is not simply a magical “forgiveness of sins” nor a mere preliminary exercise in moral character building through remembering and confessing of sin and thereby coming to fear it (although both of these elements are present). Rather, it functions as a graded path of practice involving body, mind, and speech at every step, combining to effect a liminal experience in which the performer is transformed from sinner to Buddha. Stevenson’s structural analysis of the “intimate relationship between devotional/confessional liturgy and meditative discernment” shows us how the repentance rite “orchestrates … a threshold or moment of liminality, where the participant is stripped of the possibility of remaining in his former condition and has no recourse but to step into the new.”81 This is important to remember for, as in all ritual, the formulaic nature of liturgical rite does not stiµe individual participation and spiritual experience but fosters it.
Dhðtas Between the Hsin-hsing i wen entries dated 583 and 587, Hsin-hsing recorded a request for permission to engage in four practices: I request permission to cultivate the four inexhaustible practices;82 I request permission to rejoice in the happiness of others and to help them by practicing 79
Chih-fa, 582–83; see also chapter 6.
Fang teng san mei hsing fa ¾fX*‘À, T #1940, 945a, cited in Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi,” 91–92. 80
81
Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms of Sam„dhi,” 416.
82
The ³rst four of the sixteen inexhaustible practices; see below and chapter 7.
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giving; I request permission to beg for food according to the twelve dhðta; I request permission to cultivate the practice of the [bodhisattva] Never Despise as found in the Lotus Sutra.”83
As noted above, Hsin-hsing’s biography also commented on the practice of begging for food. Although begging for food was perhaps the sine qua non of the early monastic lifestyle, this faded as the main means of support as the community became more settled, leaving it among the more ascetic practices known as the twelve dhðta mentioned here.84 Probably one of the most frequently mentioned practices of Hsin-hsing and his followers is that of the dhðta w¼, ascetic practices better known today from the forest traditions of Southeast Asia than from Chinese monasticism.85 The dhðta practices are sociologically interesting as well, as they are generally seen to represent a radical impulse to ascetic renunciation and solitary practice in contrast to the even stronger tendency in the Buddhist community toward the settled life of the vihara. That is to say that they represent an extreme lifestyle and as such they have always been controversial. Representing the voice of the mainstream (the “middle path”), for example, Š„kyamuni is depicted as having denied Devadatta’s request to make ³ve of the dhðta practices mandatory.86 So, too, it was not long before Š„kyamuni’s “community of the four directions” came to dwell in permanent structures as corporate landowners, and it is primarily this cenobitic institution that is represented in doctrinal and institutional documents. Still, in all Buddhist cultures there has always been an interest in ascetic extremes. As sociologists and historians of religion have long recognized, the ascetic has also always been vested with great authority by lay supporters because they are seen as the site of true Buddhist spirituality and thereby also associated with reform movements that seek to curb monastic laxity in urban temples.87 This broader context is perhaps relevant to the San-chieh movement, given the frequent attacks by the authorities as well as other Buddhists that they experienced. Still, we should not be too hasty to think of Hsin-hsing as a radical ascetic and reformer, for although it is true that the practice of dhðta in China has 83
Hsin-hsing i wen, 7.
On begging generally see Jean Rahder, “Bunne,” Hõbõgirin II (1929–1930), 158–69; on begging and dhðta practices in China see John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk: Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagiography (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997), 33–35. 84
85
Dhðta-gu«a (=dhuta-gu«a, Pali dhutaªga or dhðtaªga).
Cullavagga, VII.3.14, in Vinaya Texts (trans. by T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg, Sacred Books of the East, 1885, Motilal reprint, 1975), Part III, 250 ff. 86
Cf. E. G. Kemper, “Buddhism Without Bikkhus: The Sri Lanka Vinaya Vardena Society” in Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka, ed. by Bardwell L. Smith (Chambersburg: Anima Books, 1978), p. 216. 87
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not been as well commented on as the Buddhist involvement in ³nancial activities, economic enterprise, military operations, and the like, Chinese monks have also often been noted for their dhðta practice. Chih-i and his disciples, for example, are well known for advocating the practices, as is Huitsan, mentioned above in connection with Hsin-hsing’s seeking to receive the novice ordination. Indeed, the dhðta practices are mentioned in over thirty other biographies in the Hsü kao seng chuan, including those of Fatsan Àr, Chih-tsang Já, and P’u- yüan 3é.88 The Hsü kao seng chuan, though not speci³cally mentioning the dhðta, notes that Hsin-hsing “wore simple clothes and was sparing in his food in a manner exceptional for the times; he lived during the winter as though it were summer, zealously surpassing what was customary” and, as noted above, that at the San-chieh temples in the capital and elsewhere there were “none that did not perform devotional rituals at the six daily periods or beg for food.”89 Two texts attributed to Hsin-hsing in the K’ai yüan lu are concerned with the dhðta and begging food,90 and several San-chieh texts recovered from Tun-huang also deal with the subject.91 There are many different lists of dhðta practices, typically made up of either twelve or thirteen practices that deal with clothing, food, and shelter. The Practice that Arises in Accord with the Capacity gives twelve practices: 1 Eating only what is received as alms; 2 Not being selective in seeking alms (begging from house to house in order); 3 Eating only one meal a day; 4 Eating sparingly (eating only two-thirds, one-half, one-third, or one-fourth of your food); 5 Not eating after noon; 6 Always sitting and not reclining; 7 Sitting on whatever is offered; 8 Sitting in a cemetery; 9 Sitting at the foot of a tree (“forest dwelling”); 88
T #2060, 50.506c; T #2060, 50.587a; T #2060, 680b, respectively.
T #2060, 50.560a; Fa-tsang (637–714) is another San-chieh monk who cultivated the dhðta (see ch. 8). 89
90 The Tan t’ou t’o ch’i shih fa w¼F7À and the Ming ch’i shih pa men fa gF7k–À, T #2154, 678c. 91 E.g., the Ch’i shih fa F7À (a portion of Pelliot 2849R) identi³ed by Nishimoto (edited and included in Sangaikyõ, 592–95; see also 586–88); begging for food is also mentioned in the Hsin-hsing i wen (pp. 3, 6, 7); see also the discussion of how to give to the sangha in the Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse translated in Appendix C.
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10 Sitting in the open; 11 Wearing only donated robes; 12 Wearing only the three robes.92 The fact that the various practices relating to food come ³rst reµects a central concern with the rules for receiving alms and eating in the San-chieh community, and, inasmuch as I have no knowledge of Hsin-hsing or his followers practicing the dhðta relating to dwelling, perhaps indicates a preferential order as well. The Li tai san pao chi, for example, notes that “all of [Hsin-hsing’s] disciples cultivate the dhðta, begging for food and eating only one meal a day.”93 That this sort of austerity continued to be an important San-chieh practice is indicated by the fact that begging for food, abstaining from grains, and prolonged fasting are among the San-chieh practices permitted to continue in the suppression edict of 699.94
Universal respect The practices described so far—various forms of meditative exercise, penitential rites, regular periods of daily worship, and the ascetic practices of the dhðta—all serve to locate Hsin-hsing in the general context of Buddhist practices popular in the northern dynasties during the late sixth century. Other practices mentioned in the biographical records, however, are more unique to Hsin-hsing and the San-chieh community. On the basis of the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature, for example, the Ming pao chi cited above referred to the doctrine of “universal respect,” the concrete practice of which is described in the Li tai san pao chi : Wishing to emulate the Bodhisattva Never Despise in the Lotus Sutra they revere everybody they meet on the road, regardless of whether the person was a man or a woman.95
In addition to the Lotus Sutra, the basis for Hsin-hsing’s universal reverence is to be found in the teaching and contemplation of the four Buddhas mentioned above. On the basis of the teaching of tathagatagarbha, Buddhanature, and the holistic vision of the Hua-yen Sðtra, these four Buddhas were taught to be four aspects of the “Universal Buddha” inherent in all sentient
92
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 121–24.
93
T #2034, 49.105b.
94
T #2153, 55.475s; see chapter 8, 205–208.
95
T # 2034, 49.105b. On Universal Respect see also Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 319–20, 326–27.
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beings.96 In these teachings (detailed in part 3) the all-pervading truth of the dharmadh„tu is seen to be the reality of all phenomena and all sentient beings, even as they exist in samsara; hence they are to be revered as Buddhas at this very moment. Universal reverence was not only a devotional form of greeting—it was also realized more concretely through offerings of material goods in the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Tao-hsüan’s biography of Hsin-hsing in the Hsü kao seng chuan tells us that after he abandoned the precepts “he made offerings to the various [Fields of] Respect and Compassion, venerating renunciants and laity alike.”97 The “Field of Compassion” (pei t’ien «,) refers to sentient beings, the fertile ³eld in which the bodhisattva sows seeds of compassion that come to fruition for the bene³t of all; the “Field of Respect” (ching t’ien ’,) refers to the Three Jewels, the fertile field in which sentient beings sow seeds of respect that come to fruition in the form of merit. Of course, both types of “seeds” are metaphorical, and what the biography is referring to is charity (d„na) and Hsin-hsing’s practice of giving equally to ordinary sentient beings and to the Three Jewels. Although in the traditional model material d„na remained the provenance of the laity and was entirely uni-directional—the laity supported the sangha with material gifts in return for the spiritual rewards of merit and teachings—by Hsin-hsing’s time numerous factors had begun to effect a change in this central doctrine. While standing squarely in the middle of these developments, the scope and success of Hsin-hsing’s implementation of the doctrine of d„na in terms of a concrete practice were unprecedented. I am referring to the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (detailed in part 3 of this study), a massive and wildly popular charitable lending institution born of a blending of Vinaya rules governing the receipt of material goods and the Mahayana doctrine of the “inexhaustible storehouse” of the bodhisattva’s compassion. In Hsin-hsing’s vision this spawned an empire-wide practice that materially bene³ted the poor and downcast while providing a model of spiritual practice taught to equal that of the great Ekay„na bodhisattvas. Conceived in terms of the sixteen eternal, joyous, true self, and pure practices to which Hsin-hsing committed himself at age 43 and whose material bene³t was as inexhaustible as their spiritual bene³t (see the testimonial cited above), it was this practice of universal giving that opened his community of dhðta-practicing monks to the participation of 96 It should be noted that this is identical to the practice of tangyõraihai ñ‘ˆ0, “to solely practice veneration,” cultivated today by members of the Nipponzan Myohoji denomination of the Japanese Nichiren tradition; they greet all whom they meet with a deep bow in veneration of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings and with recitation of the daimoku, “Namu myohõrengekyõ.” 97 T
#2060, 50.560a.
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all sentient beings, that is to say, all sentient beings of the third level. These then were the main practices that Hsin-hsing cultivated himself and fostered in the communal practice of his “spiritual friends.” As an example of the latter we may perhaps cite the disciple Te-mei …Ë (575-637).98 Te-mei became a monk at age nineteen, and shortly after met and studied with Hsin-hsing’s close disciple Seng-yung. He traveled to the capital, where he met Mo Ch’an-shih †,‚, another of Hsin-hsing’s disciples, with whom he studied for over ten years. He continued his teacher’s legacy of cultivating the “universal Field of Merit” (p’u fu t’ien 3t,), an inclusive term referring to both Hsin-hsing’s teaching of the Universal Buddha inherent in all living beings as well as the two ³elds of merit, that is, the ³eld of respect (the Three Jewels) and the ³eld of compassion (suffering sentient beings). Accordingly, Te-mei cultivated the practice of the Bodhisattva Never Despise from the Lotus Sutra, publicly reverencing all members of the Buddhist community, and used the donations of clothing and food that he received for both the ³elds of respect and compassion. In addition to universal reverence and charitable work, Te-mei is also known to have practiced the various austerities and liturgies discussed above, including the fang teng rite, yearly observance of the Pratyutpanna walking meditation (he is reported to have “walked without sitting for the entire summer”), penitential rites comprised of buddhan„ma liturgies, maintaining silence for three years, and being sparing in his food (eating only one part in four). Te-mei thus well exempli³es the values and practices that Hsin-hsing sought to instill in his followers. After his death his body was abandoned at the spot of Hsin-hsing’s “sky burial,” and his bones were later collected and enshrined in a stupa. In summary, Hsin-hsing’s community took shape largely during the turbulent years of the late sixth century, a time of great adversity as well as great opportunity for Chinese Buddhists. The tumultuous centuries of warfare and cultural change prior to the uni³cation of the Sui and establishment of the imperial capital at Ch’ang-an saw both large-scale suppressions of Buddhism as well as the development of indigenous forms of Buddhist doctrine, practice, and institution. Indeed, it was one of the most fertile epochs in Chinese Buddhist history, setting patterns for the more formal systematizations of later dynasties. Hsin-hsing incorporated many of these currents into his own teaching and left behind a prospering community of like-minded practitioners. Hsin-hsing’s teachings and practices, then, can best be understood as reµecting his milieu rather than as unique or deviant. As the biographies, catalogs, and other records show, his ideas and the practices that he cultivated can be found elsewhere as well, including his concern for 98 T #2060, 696c–697a; Te-mei also cultivated Pure Land devotional practices, and is said to have died with his “hands folded, invoking [Amida’s] name.”
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fa mieh (the destruction of the dharma), sentient beings “blind from birth” and the attendant teaching of the decayed capacity of sentient beings; the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature; meditation; confession and repentance liturgies; the ascetic dhðta practices and rigorous monastic training; emphasis on the precepts and precept ceremonies, both for lay people and renunciants; buddhan„ma litanies; preference for sutra teachings over commentaries and particular interest in the universalism of the Nirvana Sutra, Lotus Sutra, and Hua-yen Sutra. Similarly there is little in the social organization of his movement that is not evident in other ³gures and monastic institutions, including high levels of of³cial patronage, lay participation and sponsorship of lay organizations, and development of institutions of social welfare. At the same time we cannot deny that Hsin-hsing’s con³guration of these various elements—the practices that he stressed, the institutional organizations he designed, and the way that he derived them from the scriptural tradition—are unique. It is to this—the way in which Hsin-hsing drew from the normative scriptural tradition in order to “dispense the medicine in accord with the afµiction”—that we now turn.
Cira½ Ti¦¦hatu Saddhammo! (May the true Dharma endure for a long time!) from the frontispiece to the Sixth Council edition of the Sa½yutta-nik„ya1
T
here is little question but that the Buddhist tradition of its own decline was at the core of Hsin-hsing’s teaching. He argued that all living beings faced a very practical crisis in such a situation, each and every one beset by attachments to false or perverted views and incapable of accurately distinguishing true from false. Yet his teachings also embraced the nonduality of the Hua-yen, the Ekay„na, and tathagatagarbha traditions that proclaimed the Buddhahood of those same living beings. Based on these two seemingly contradictory ideas, Hsin-hsing taught the “universal doctrine” (p’u fa 3À), an all-encompassing vision that looked to the ultimate Buddha-nature of all things and refused to discriminate that ultimate truth from its conventional manifestation, thereby eliminating the distinction 1 Nid„navagga-¦‡k„ and Khandhavagga-¦‡k„, volume 33 in Dhammagiri-P„li-Gantham„l„ (Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1994). This compilation of the canon was undertaken from 1954 to 1956 by 2,500 monks and scholars in Yangon, Myanmar. As with the other councils, the purpose of this Sixth Council (Cha¦¦ha Saªg„yana) was to “preserve the original word of the Buddha”; thus, in addition to the exhortion cited here, the frontispiece also cites two passages from the suttas concerning the preservation of the saddhamma: “There are two things, O monks, which make the Truth-based Dhamma endure for a long time, without any distortion and without (fear of) eclipse. Which two? Proper placement of words and their natural [correct] interpretation. Words properly placed help also in their natural interpretation” (from the Aªguttara-nik„ya, 1, Dukanip„ta, 21); “…the dhammas [truths] which I have taught to you after realizing them with my super-knowledge, should be recited by all, in concert and without dissension, in uniform version collating meaning with meaning and wording with wording. In this way, this teaching with pure practice will last long and endure for a long time…” (from the D‡gha-nik„ya 3, P„s„dikasutta, 177); see below, 41–48.
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between true and false, demons and Buddha. In the face of the all-inclusive scope of this universal doctrine, Hsin-hsing labeled all attempts to distinguish true from false and the various hierarchies of doctrinal statements as “particular doctrines” (pieh fa ƒÀ) and warned that such attempts at discrimination on the part of beings “blind from birth” would only make matters worse, perhaps even leading to slandering the true by mistaking it for the false. Relying on the ultimate truth value of all things was the only safe path for those congenitally incapable of accurate discrimination. Appealing as this argument for an all-embracing truth might have been in the troubled climate of Hsin-hsing’s day or even in our own rancorous times, it is nonetheless equally incoherent, as is often the case with propositional claims of universal inclusivism. Simply put, Hsin-hsing’s universal doctrine is as much a “particular doctrine” as any of the others that he criticized. The cry of universalism is, in the view of all those who do not embrace it, particular and exclusive. Indeed, in Chih-sheng’s condemnation of Hsinhsing’s teachings as heretical he speci³cally mentions their pieh hsing ƒ‘, “particular practices,”2 Empress Wu denounced as heretical their pieh kou ƒ¬ “separatist establishment” (or “particular arrangement [of the doctrine],”3 and the Pure Land leader Huai-kuan critiqued the divisions of three levels as arti³cial, unique to Hsin-hsing, and not evidenced in the scriptures.4 Thus perhaps the absolutism and “one-way” orientation of the San-chieh movement, so often cited as a reason for its suppression, is but the flip side of its rhetoric of universalism. In addition to the polemic intent disclosed by this self-referential incoherence, there is also a rhetorical function revealed by the continued access to practice and realization indicated by the very proclamation of the universal doctrine. That is, in Hsin-hsing’s teaching of the demise of the dharma the teaching is never really gone nor is our potential attainment really denied—we simply need to open our eyes to the particular ef³cacy of the universal truth. Thus the rhetoric of decline should be seen less as logical argument demanding internal coherence and more as a public performance aimed at convincing an audience of a particular doctrine. Realizing that the universalism of the Three Levels was equally a polemic arguing for its own particular solution to the decline tradition, as well as a rhetorical device aimed at convincing an audience, compels a reassessment of the original currents of the Buddhist vision of decline as well. Such a reassessment looks not so much at the philological evolution of the terms or 2
T #2154, 55.679a; see also chapter 8, 216–17.
3
T #2153, 55.475a ; see also chapter 8, 205.
4
T #1960, 47.49b.
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even the timetables of decline as at the rhetorical context, a context that reveals a similar polemic or sectarian discourse more interested in establishing a particular orthodoxy of “true teaching” than in voicing historical predictions of actual decline, prophetic warnings of moral failings, or existential statements about humankind’s capacity for realization. In fact, the beginnings of the Buddhist tradition of decline are best understood as a rhetoric of orthodoxy that marks the appearance of doctrinal differentiation in the Buddhist community. The elements of this argument can be found throughout the various canons, but always in the sense of an exhortation to adhere to the true teachings lest the predicted decline actually come to pass. It was not until the plethora of Indian texts was transmitted to China that the many discrete units of the decline tradition were systematized as doctrine in much the same way, for much the same reason, and at much the same time as other, equally disparate, traditions were melded into the great Chinese doctrinal classi³cation schemes (p’an chiao |*). This served to make a doctrinal tenet out of what had been a much more simple trope in an intrareligious polemic. It was also in China that we ³rst encounter individuals convinced that the predicted demise had actually arrived, due in part to a preexisting and pervasive indigenous discourse of decline. In an interesting twist, the dominant use in China of the Buddhist polemic of orthodoxy was to legitimize new teachings, of which the Three Levels is one example. An important reason for this was that the decline came to be seen in terms of a decline in human nature, a claim about the corrupt existential condition of living beings rather than a decline of time or doctrine. In what way was the tradition of the decline of the dharma really a rhetoric or polemic of orthodoxy? How did a polemic of orthodoxy change into an existential doctrine of decay? Why was this rhetoric amenable to the Chinese recon³guration? In order to answer these questions and to fully appreciate Hsin-hsing’s contribution to the development of the decline tradition, in part two I look briefly at the earlier traditions of decline that the Chinese inherited as well as the Chinese context of decline in which the Three Levels flourished, and then I proceed to examine the teaching of the Three Levels.
2. The Beginning: Decline as Polemic
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he buddhist tradition of its own decline is a vision of a world in which chaos and strife would reign where the Buddha-dharma had once flourished. This vision is well represented in the Nik„ya, Ãgama, Vinaya, commentaries, Mahayana, and tantras, and it later helped to fuel both the doctrine of the Pure Land schools and the millenarian hopes of Buddhists throughout Asia. One of the most fascinating aspects of this strain of Buddhist thought is the view it affords of the interplay between religious doctrine and historical environment, for in the situations that gave rise to these ideas we can see many of the struggles of the early Buddhist communities, both for doctrinal purity as well as for simple survival in the face of hostile war-lords and monarchs (although even the latter is used to underscore the importance of doctrinal purity). Though Buddhism is arguably individualist in terms of its path to the ultimate goal of wisdom and relentless in doctrinally subsuming other considerations to that ultimacy (hence even the Buddha should be metaphorically “killed” along the path to awakening), Buddhists are of course quite literally “in” a social, political world and naturally are concerned with the historical realities of their situation. First and foremost among those concerns has always been the construction and preservation of the tradition. A study of the development of the Buddhist doctrine of its own decline reveals one of the ways in which complex doctrinal systems with profound soteriological, social, and institutional signi³cance have evolved in response to rhetorical and polemic positions. Because of the importance of this topic in East Asian Buddhism, a good number of studies have treated the various scriptural traditions regarding the decline, generally focusing on the temporal schemes of deterioration, the historical factors, the internal and purportedly external causes, and, most recently, the textual development of the terms of decline.1 Although an 1 The most thorough and up-to-date treatment is found in Jan Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1991). Other important studies include Yamada Ryðjõ, “Mappõ shisõ ni tsuite,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 4/2 (1956): 361–70; David W. Chappell, “Early Forebodings of the Death of Buddhism,” Numen 27 (1980): 122–53; Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1958), 210–22; Kumoi Shõzen ²mÅ3, “Hõmetsu
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untangling of the scriptural sources has constituted the indispensable bedrock of prior studies (by sixth-century Chinese monks as well as by contemporary scholars), here I am interested in the function of the concept of the decline, which shows it working as a rhetoric of orthodoxy (in Nik„ya and Mahayana Buddhism) or as a stylistic device legitimating new interpretations of the teachings (for tantra, Hsin-hsing, and the preachers of the Pure Land path). I see the initial scriptural expressions of the tradition of decline not as the anti-intellectualism or moral indictment of a practiceoriented faith as claimed by many (that is, a cry of dismay that the Buddhist truth or essence is being eclipsed by arid and sterile dogma, orthopraxy versus orthodoxy),2 but rather as conservative attempts to secure an orthodoxy that subsequently generated an entire narrative tradition replete with numerous tropes that in turn functioned in China, ironically, as doors of interpretive opportunity, allowing or even demanding new doctrine, or at least new interpretations of doctrine. In this sense the East Asian systematization of the decline teaching is best understood as an interpretive strategy similar in sectarian function and soteriological purpose to the Chinese organizational systems of p’an chiao (grading the teachings) and utilizing the same underlying hermeneutic of up„ya. Given the general representation of Buddhism as a non-dogmatic “philosophy of assimilation,” such an emphasis on orthodoxy or dogma might seem surprising. Indeed, we must acknowledge another Buddhist rhetoric that prefers experience over scripture to the extent of even denying the latter validity as a means of knowledge; yet we must also recognize that speci³c Buddhist traditions have all developed myriad ways of ensuring their own legacy, and in the face of this rhetoric of transcendence one ubiquitous method was the ideology of saddharma (Pali saddhamma), the “true teaching” or “true doctrine.” There is a dynamic tension between the rhetoric of an unbounded, atemporal truth (dharmat„, Pali dhammat„) and the representation shisõ no genryð Àn„`uèH,” in Õchõ Enichi, ed., Hokugi Bukkyõ no kenkyð (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1970), 287–97; Mizutani Kõshõ, “Daijõnehankyõtengun ni arawaretaru kiki shisõ,” Bukkyõ Daigaku kenkyð kiyõ 37 (1953): 9–46; for Japan see Hubert Durt, Problems of Chronology and Eschatology: Four Lectures on the Essay on Buddhism by Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–1746) (Kyoto: Scuola di Studi sull’Asia Orientale, 1994); Kazue Kyõichi, Nihon no mappõ shisõ (Tokyo: Kõbundõ, 1961); Robert Rhodes, “Saichõ’s Mappõ-tõmyõki,” The Eastern Buddhist, n.s., 13/1 (1980): 79–103; Jackie Stone, “Seeking Enlightenment in the Last Age: Mappõ Thought in Kamakura Buddhism,” The Eastern Buddhist, n.s., 18/1 (1985): 28–56 (Part I) and 18/2 (1985): 35–64 (Part 2); Michele Marra, The Aesthetics of Discontent (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1991), esp. 76–100. Cf. Mark Lewis, “The Suppression of the Three Stages Sect: Apocrypha as a Political Issue,” in Robert E. Buswell, Jr., ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 210, 212. 2
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of that truth as the teachings of a historical person, and within the latter, that is, within Buddh-ism, the teaching in the world, there were de³nite disagreements over whose teaching was the true teaching. Thus we should note from the very beginning that it was never the teaching conceived as the causal uniformity of all things (dhammat„) that was believed to decline or disappear. As is well known, dhammat„ will remain the same whether the tathagatas were to arise or not to arise.3 Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592), for example, lamenting the lot of the Buddhist church at the hands of Emperor Wu, is reported to have said, This is the fate of our time … it is truly lamentable that we are unable to attend [the Buddha-dharma] at this time, but the dharma is actually not annihilated [ÀÄ#n]! I ask that you virtuous ones please understand this and not be overly grieved.4
This point is more important than has usually been recognized, for it directs our attention to the lived tradition as the locus of the timeless, ahistorical truths that more often are the focus of our study. In particular it highlights the importance of the teachings, and we shall see that the spirited rivalry over who maintains the correct teachings is at the core of both the production of the decline traditions as well as their later sectarian use. Thus, rather than a transcendent “truth of the teaching” it was the speci³c teaching of a speci³c Buddha as taught, practiced, and realized by sentient beings that was conceived as declining; in China, however, even this was changed to mean that although the teachings themselves continue to be present the realization of their truth is no longer possible. This is succinctly stated by K’uei-chi (632–682) with regard to the three periods of the teaching: After the nirvana of the Buddha there are three times of the teaching, namely the true, semblance, and the ³nal. When the three aspects of teaching (chiao *), practice (hsing ‘), and attainment (cheng B) are all present it is called the true teaching; when there is only the teaching and practice it is called the semblance teaching, and when only the teachings remain without the other [aspects] it is termed the ³nal teaching.5 3 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, trans., The Book of the Kindred Sayings (London: The Pali Text Society, 1982), part II: 21. 4
Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.490c.
T #1861, 45.344b. This exactly parallels the threefold taxonomy preserved in the Pali tradition of (a) authoritative teaching (pariyatti), (b) practice (pa¦ipatti), and (c) attainment (adhigama); from the Manorathapðra«‡, cited in John Ross Carter, Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations, A Study of a Religious Concept (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1978), 131–35. 5
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This meant that in addition to the question of the true teachings the issue of people’s capacity for realization of those teachings also arose, an important shift in the growth of this tradition.
Cosmological and Millennial Traditions Cosmological and millennial currents are especially conspicuous in the Buddhist tradition and have often been cited in comparative studies of eschatology, apocalypticism, and millennialism.6 Although these traditions have many similarities to the traditions of decline, and in many cases incorporated or were incorporated by theories of decline, they nonetheless do not ³gure prominently in the writing of Hsin-hsing (nor of the Pure Land preachers, in either China or Japan). Why is this? It is perhaps in part because the cosmological traditions are not primarily interested in humanity or our historical situations.7 Perhaps the mythic 6 See, for example, Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., Maitreya, the Future Buddha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Daniel L. Overmeyer, Folk Buddhist Religion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Millenarianism and Peasant Politics in Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); and Millenial Movements in East and Southeast Asia, a special issue of Japanese Religions 23/1–2 (1998). New traditions are also making inroads as the global culture allows wider borrowing of apocalyptic prophecy— see Robert Kisala, “Nostradamus and the Apocalypse in Japan,” Inter-Religio 32 (1997): 47–62; Benoit Vermander, “Religions in Taiwan: Between Mercantilism and Millenarianism,” InterReligio 32 (1997): 63–75. 7 This is not, however, to say that the cosmological and cosmogonic traditions did not have or come to have a historical context of their own. For example, the early Buddhist tale of cosmogony in the Aggañña-sutta, like the Vedic telling of a caste structure derived from the very body of the cosmos, includes a social ordering that places the khattiya caste above the Brahmins—no doubt reflecting the changing social realities of the times—and the bhikkhu and arhat above all, reflecting the Buddhist stake in that changing society; Aggañña-sutta (D‡gha-nik„ya, suttanta 27); English translation by T. W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, Part III (London: Pali Text Society, 1921, 1977 reprint), 77–94, especially 88–94; see also Rupert Gethin, “Cosmology and Meditation: From the Aggañña-sutta to the Mahayana,” History of Religions 36/3 (1997): 183–217. These cosmogonic/cosmological stories probably evolved out of a context quite similar to that of the sectarian context of the decline motif, i.e., a concern with order and regularity in the cosmos and, by extension or mimicry, in the community. Hence after the Aggañña-sutta explains the origin of each social group, it concludes with the refrain, “The norm’s the best among this folk, both in this world and in the next.” The Aggañña-sutta is also interesting for its parallels and divergences with the Vedic system; for example, the king is called Mah„sammata, “chosen by the whole people,” and is paid for his work, reflecting a contractual notion of government and concern with exchange seen in the role of monk and laity as well; on the urban, mercantile background of early Buddhism, see Romila Thapar, “Ethics, Religion, and Social Protest in the First Millennium B.C. in Northern India,” Daedalus (1975): 119–32; and Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, “Early Buddhism
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context of cosmogonic speculation kept such theories from becoming human-centered, or, more likely, the temporal aspect of theories that emphasize the regularity of change on a cosmic scale make them dif³cult to relate to the irregularity of speci³c human history.8 The Buddhist traditions of decline, on the other hand, are expressly interested in the decline of the teachings of a particular historical teacher—Š„kyamuni. Related to this is the fact that these cosmological events, including the oscillations of the kalpas and the complete lack of a historical presence of the teaching during some periods, are essentially beyond our control, while the trope of decline taken up in East Asian Buddhism is precisely the result of human failings.9 The millennial tradition, best known in the context of the future Buddha Maitreya, is clearly related to the cosmological tradition. Beginning with the enumeration of past Buddhas,10 at an early stage the list of past enlightened ones was expanded to encompass Buddhas-yet-to-come.11 Although Maitreya is also included among these future Buddhas, for the most part his era is so far distant (some 5.6 billion years off) that it took some time before he came to be re³gured in millennial terms of world renewal. Most importantly for any discussion of Hsin-hsing and his teachings, however, is that even after this re³guring takes place, the later millennial traditions that incorporate the Maitreya motif contain an expectation of a future utopia, occurring within history, that is not found in the Three Levels or the Pure Land traditions. and the Urban Revolution,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5/2 (1982): 7–22. Finally, among the three kinds of Brahmins, the “repeaters,” i.e., those who compile the Vedas and teach the sacred recitation to others, are graded lowest, below the ascetics and the meditators, with the comment, “At that time [of the origin of the social classes] they were looked upon as the lowest; now they are thought the best.” Nattier records that even in Mongolia this tale is usually told “with a focus on the idea of kingship,” indicating that its early ideological context was preserved in its later use (Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 18). 8 As Nattier notes, the cosmologies found in the Aggañña-sutta, the Cakkavatti-s‡han„dasutta, and Abhidharmakoša “are singularly devoid of Buddhist imagery. In particular, it is striking that not one of these texts includes any reference to the historical Buddha Š„kyamuni.… One is tempted to conclude that even the life of an enlightened being is simply dwarfed by events on this scale” (Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 18). 9 The Tsa a han ching, for example, notes that, while the failings of humankind that bring about the demise of the saddharma can be avoided, the corruptions attending the end of a kalpa cannot be avoided (T #99, 2, 226c2 ff); see below. 10 Mah„pad„na-suttanta (D‡gha-nik„ya, suttanta 14), English translation by T. W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II (London: Pali Text Society, 1910, reprint 1977), 1–41. 11 Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 21–26. This sort of cosmic Buddhology becomes an important feature of East Asian Buddhism not only in Maitreya-based apocalypticism but also in the form of Buddhan„ma liturgies, that is, the chanting of the names of all of the Buddhas, among which the “seven roster Buddhan„ma” of the Three Levels may be counted.
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As one sociologist put it, “The messianic doctrine is essentially a statement of hope … the doctrine always envisages a restoration of earthly values.”12 While there is no question that the broadly messianic, millennial, and apocalyptic climate in pre-T’ang China provided the background for the development of Hsin-hsing’s teachings and the other Buddhist movements that emphasized the decline of the teaching, it is yet noteworthy that it was not future expectations of a reform or regeneration but rather the concern with the degenerate beings of the world in which they lived that ³gure in his teachings. In this sense the eschatological dimension was eclipsed by the existential, a development that had far-reaching consequences in the history of East Asian Buddhism. In terms of rhetorical topoi, however, the cosmological and millennial traditions did, perhaps, lend a mood of fatalism to the later decline traditions inasmuch as “forever” is implied in the unimaginably long cosmic cycles, that is, the ten-thousand year duration of the ³nal teaching.
The Early Rhetoric of Orthodoxy: the disappearance of the true teaching All religions face a turning point after the passing of the founder, when the sectarianism implicit in the founding of a new movement manifests itself internally but the followers may no longer turn to the founder’s authority for ultimate understanding.13 The strains and tensions of such a period can usually be traced in a church-oriented redaction of tradition and the same is true of the early Buddhist texts. Although disputes over the understanding of the teachings arose during the lifetime of the Buddha, the question of interpretation grew much more acute after his passing. It was the need for a standardized body of teachings that led to the ³rst “recounting” of the teachings (sa½g‡ti, usually translated as “council”) after the passing of the Buddha, and institutionalized questions of interpretation again and
12 Barber, Bernard, “Acculturism and Messianic Movements” in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds., A Reader in Comparative Religion, 3rd edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 513.
See, for example, the poignant story in which Ãnanda, who is credited with having recited all of the Buddha’s discourses from memory at the ³rst council, attempts to correct the mistaken recitation of a monk; failing to correct his recitation, Ãnanda concludes, “There is no one who can get him to change. The Buddha’s disciples Š„riputra, Maudgaly„yana, and Mah„k„šyapa have all entered nirv„«a; to whom could I now turn to as an authority? I shall also enter nirv„«a”; cited in John Strong, The Experience of Buddhism (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995), 89. 13
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again carved new communities and movements out of the original sangha.14 Betraying the concern for orthodoxy, the Aªguttara-nik„ya, for example, tells us that we must guard not only against those who would claim, “as utterances of the Tath„gata, what he never said or uttered, and he who denies what was said or uttered by the Tath„gata,” but also against the one “who proclaims as already explained a discourse which needs explanation (neyattha): and he who proclaims as needing explanation a discourse already explained (n‡tattha).”15 Guarding the authenticity of the teachings (i.e., those teachings “uttered by the Tath„gata,” buddhavacana) and determining the interpretation of those teachings (neyattha, n‡tattha) were important elements in the early rhetoric and constitution of orthodoxy. It is no doubt in such a doctrinally competitive context that the concept of the “true teaching” (saddhamma) arose, though perhaps the ³rst usage of saddhamma was to distinguish the truth as the domain of Š„kyamuni’s teachings vis-à-vis those of other teachers.16 That is to say, although saddhamma can simply mean a good or auspicious thing (as, for example, in the “seven saddhamma” of faith, shame, appreciation of consequence, learning the teachings, vigor, mindfulness, and wisdom), within the rhetoric of the decline of the saddhamma it refers exclusively to in-house orthodoxy vis-à-vis its natural enemy, internal dissension. Another sutta from the Aªguttara-nik„ya that shows a concern for literal orthodoxy warns against “the wrong expression of the letter (of the text) and wrong interpretation of the meaning of it,” which would lead to the “confusion 14 As with the New Testament, such evidence of sectarianism can be used to judge later material in the canon, indicating as it does the existence of conflict over different interpretations of the teachings. Cf. Govind C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism (Allahabad: University of Allahabad, 1957), who judges the Aªguttara-nik„ya passages considered here late for just this reason, i.e., the evidence of sectarian disputes (236). It should also be noted, however, that actual schisms were not occasioned by doctrinal dispute but by regulatory (Vinaya) dispute, a fact that does not lessen the import of doctrinal dispute. 15 The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Aªguttara-nik„ya), translated by F. L. Woodward (London: The Pali Text Society, 1979), vol. 1: 54 (cf. T #2, 592c–593a); see also Ronald Davidson, “Standards of Scriptural Authenticity,” in Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), who notes that the complementary attitude is that the dharma is more than the literal words of the Š„kyamuni Buddha and encompasses all that is spoken from the vantage point of the truth per se (dharmat„) or that is conducive to its realization, including the teachings of previous Buddhas as well as his enlightened disciples (294–97). Still, the tendency has been to try to validate a teaching by somehow or another giving it the legitimacy of the more literal meaning of buddhavacana; cf. J. P. McDermott, “Scripture as the Word of the Buddha,” Numen 31 (1984), 30–31; Davidson, “Standards,” 303–305. 16
Carter, Dhamma, 156; Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time , 66.
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and disappearance” of the true teaching, for “if the letter be wrongly expressed, the interpretation of the meaning is also wrong.” On the other hand, “if the letter be rightly expressed, the interpretation of the meaning is also right” and this leads to the “establishment, the non-confusion, to the non-disappearance of true Dhamma.”17 Here we are clearly (and quite “literally”) told that it is the letter of the law and not the spirit (“interpretation of the meaning”) that is of central importance in the preservation of the teaching.18 The chapter on “True Dhamma” (saddhamma) from the Aªguttaranik„ya similarly warns that a careless attitude towards hearing, mastering, contemplating, analyzing, and practicing the dhamma would lead to its disappearance.19 The order—hearing and mastering ³rst, practice last—clearly indicates the priority of orthodoxy over orthopraxy. A concern for canonical orthodoxy, therefore, is part and parcel of the teaching of the demise of that same orthodoxy, or, more accurately, is the main thrust of that teaching. As noted above, maintaining such an orthodoxy in an oral tradition demands great attention to the “words and letters,” or the forms in which the tradition is heard and taught, for the performance of a tradition becomes in good part the tradition itself. Thus the Aªguttaranik„ya continues by elaborating the forms of the teaching, warning that not mastering the “sayings, psalms, catechisms, songs, solemnities, speeches, birth-stories, marvels, [and] runes … leads to the confounding, the disappearance of Saddhamma,” as does not teaching it in detail to others “as heard, as learned,” and not speaking or repeating it in detail “as heard, as learned.”20 In the same way that the particular literary forms of the tradition must be safeguarded, popular literary forms are to be eschewed, for the study of “discourses that are made by poets in the poetical style, with embellished sounds, overlaid with ornament, and spoken by profane auditors” will cause the discourse of the Tathagata to disappear.21 17
The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Aªguttara-nik„ya), vol. 1: 53.
The countervailing attitude is found in the Buddha’s well-known injunction against formalizing the language of the teaching, preferring instead, for example, regional dialects (Davidson, “Standards,” 292–93). 18
19 The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Aªguttara-nik„ya), translated by E. M. Hare (London: The Pali Text Society, 1973), vol. 3: 132. See also ibid., 180–81, 239–40, and vol. 4: 49–50. 20
The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 3: 133.
The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sa½yutta-nik„ya), part II, 178–79; quoted here from E. Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts through the Ages (London: Harper & Row, 1964), 45; Pande judges this passage to be late because these forms “indicate a good deal of previous literary activity” (Pande, Studies, 209). See The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 3: 85 for the same pericope. It is interesting, of course, to speculate on who might have been guilty of producing such “poetical styles,” though the producers of the Mahayana clearly thought they were the targets (see below, p. 48, n. 37). 21
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Of course it is not only straying from doctrinal orthodoxy that is warned against; desires for comfort, ³ne food, fame, and numerous disciples, laziness, speaking ill, and other defects are occasionally mentioned as well. There are many voices speaking in these texts, responding to different pedagogical, institutional, economic, sectarian, and spiritual demands, and vastly more attention to the forms, redaction, style, etc. is needed before we can make more than general statements. As an example of this variety we can cite the Aªguttara-nik„ya, which, in the sutta mentioned above, tells us that the mastery of the dhamma, teaching it in detail, speaking it in detail, repeating it in detail, and thinking about it in detail, are the keys to the “stability of saddhamma, to its being unconfounded, to its non-disappearance,” while another sutta in the same Aªguttara-nik„ya presents the identical formula in a rather denigrating manner, telling us that such mastery, teaching, repetition, and analysis is not “living by dhamma,” and instead exhorting the monks to meditation.22 Representing the age-old debate of practice versus study (more often observed in rhetoric than in reality), this combination and recombination of discrete tradition-units cautions us against assuming anything as simple as a single stream of thought or doctrine of “the demise of the teaching.”23 Nonetheless, doctrinal differences, institutional (Vinaya) differences, and questions of meditation versus study all ³t into the pattern of a competitive spirit or tension among the various traditions, each attempting to assert the supremacy of its own teaching. Interestingly, the rhetoric of orthodoxy is reflexive as well, including the spirit of sectarian rivalry as one of the primary causes of the decline of the Buddha’s teachings,24 known most commonly as the grievous offense of saªghabheda.25 22 The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Aªguttara-nik„ya), 3: 71–72 (actually, the text leaves out “speaking in detail” and ³lls out the list of ³ve with the “monk who masters Dhamma: the sayings, psalms and so forth, and spends not the day in that mastery, neglects not to go apart and devotes himself to calm of purpose of the self. Verily, monk, such a monk is one who lives by Dhamma.” See also Woodward, The Book of the Kindred Saying (London: The Pali Text Society, 1979), 5: 151–53; The Book of the Kindred Sayings, 5: 172, and 173, where we are told that lack of attention to the “four stations of mindfulness” is the reason for the teaching not lasting long after the passing of the Tathagata. 23 This debate continues even today, across time and cultures, as in Stuart Smithers’s claim that the tradition of the decline of the teaching was occasioned by a shift in emphasis from liberation to precepts, the “rhetoric of morality and ethics over and against liberation and freedom” and that “Buddhism is de³ned not as much by an orthodoxy ... as it is by an orthopraxis” (Stuart Smithers, “Freedom’s Just Another Word” in Tricycle 2/1 [Fall 1992], 38–39). 24
See, for example, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 3: 134.
One of the ³ve deadly or grievous offenses (pañca-abhi¦h„na-kamm„ni), saªghabheda is listed in the second category of offenses (saªgh„disesa, offenses requiring suspension) in the p„timokkha and is cause for expulsion in the Mah„vagga, I.67 (Vinaya Texts, part I: 221), and was even condemned by Ašoka in the edicts at S„ñch‡ and Sarnath; see N. A. Nikam and 25
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As noted above, the theories of decline are for the most part concerned with the worldly fate of Buddhist scripture („gama) rather than either truth per se (dhammat„) or attainment of that truth (adhigama), and so the tradition has tended to af³rm the centrality of “authoritative teachings” over and above practice as the arbiter of saddhamma, perhaps not surprising inasmuch as our documents are those preserved in the canon. Buddhaghosa’s commentary on the Aªguttara, for example, claims that the saddhamma will not disappear so long as the “authoritative teachings” (pariyatti) remain, because “truly, even if a hundred or a thousand monks were found to undertake the practice of meditation, without learning there would be no realization of the Noble Path.”26 As John Ross Carter puts it, the P„li tradition claims that “the words of the Buddha as they had been passed down from generation to generation (pariyatti) and not practice (pa¦ipatti) formed the basis with regard to the Teacher’s instruction.”27 Thus we should note that the examples I have given are arguing more for the very notion of an orthodoxy (saddhamma) rather than for the speci³cs of that orthodoxy. In other words, the rhetoric of decline is not used to establish which doctrines are true and which are false but rather the importance of orthodoxy as a category in and of itself. Another well-known and obviously sectarian account of the disappearance of the true teaching is found in the Sa½yutta-nik„ya’s discussion of the counterfeit teaching (saddhamma-pa¦irðpaka), the advent of which causes the “obscuration and disappearance of the true doctrine” just as the acceptance of fool’s gold would cause the devaluation of real gold.28 This text also explicitly separates the decline of the teaching from the Buddhist cosmology of world ages (kalpas) and their oscillation, as it rejects the notion that any
Richard McKeon, The Edicts of Asoka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 67–68. Still, the inevitable fact of quarrels is indicated by the inclusion of an entire section dealing with how to handle schism in the Vinaya (Mah„vagga X). Many questions naturally arise from this, but we must be careful in our assessment of sectarian activity in Buddhist India. Our contemporary image, perhaps influenced by the violence of the European Reformation or medieval Japanese Buddhism, certainly does not ³t the Indian or Chinese case. While heartily disagreeing over points of doctrine and monastic rule, and considering schisms a serious business, nonetheless monks of different nik„ya could share lodging, study multiple traditions, engage together in ritual practice, and the like; see Hubert Durt, Daijõ, in Hõbõgirin 7 (1994): 767–801. 26 From the Manorathapðra«‡, translated by John Strong in The Experience of Buddhism, 227–28. 27 Carter, Dhamma, 131–32. Similarly, Davidson notes that “knowledge of the Abhidhamma supplanted a more speci³cally meditative orientation, seen in the earlier literature, as the criterion for validation as a ‘preacher of dhamma’” (Davidson, “Standards,” 305). 28
The Book of the Kindred Sayings, part II: 151–52.
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of the physical elements will bring about the decline, saying instead that “here in the Order itself futile men arise, and it is they who make the true doctrine disappear.” The Sarv„stiv„da parallels preserved in the Chinese canon even more clearly separate the cosmological traditions from this tradition of decline by adding that, unlike the end of a kalpa, in which the earth-element, water-element, heat-element, and air-element bring about destruction and thus make it irreversible, the disappearance of the true teaching is caused by members of the sangha and is reversible.29 Again, it is interesting to speculate on who might be the target of this charge of counterfeiting, and of course the Mahayana comes most readily to mind. One more noteworthy type of reference to the destruction of the teaching, the “Kauš„mb‡ prophecy,” has often been understood to attribute the decline to external cause rather than to internal disorder or sectarian differences.30 According to this tradition, one thousand years after the passing of the Tathagata evil kings will arise and destroy stupas, murder monks, and destroy the teaching. The evil kings will eventually be defeated by a monarch from Kauš„mbi, who later hosts a great feast to which all of the sangha is invited. When the entire sangha is brought together, however, dissension breaks out, resulting in monks killing each other and their teachers. In the end, the last scholar will kill the last arhat, bringing about the disappearance of the “ultimate saddharma” (§–±À), only to be killed in turn by the disciples of the arhat, thus signaling the end of the “conventional saddharma” (›š±À) as well.31 Although the various recensions differ as to the details, the kings in the story are taken to represent the Saka (Ch. Shih-chia t‹, Skt. šaka), the Parthian (Ch. Po-lo-p’o lø( Skt. pahlava), the Greeks (Ch. Yeh-p’an-na œæº, Skt. yavana), and the Kushan (Ch. T’ou-sha-lo ÜÜø, Skt. tu¤„ra),32 and their destructive acts are generally taken to depict the events surrounding their invasions of the Gangetic basin from approximately the second century b.c. to the ³rst century a.d. Recounted in a number of different texts with slight variations, one version, the Candragarbha-sðtra, had an enormous impact on East Asian notions of the decline. Even in this 29 T #99, 2.226c7 and T #100, 2.419b–c. Cf. Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 66–89; Hubbard, “Review of Jan Nattier’s Once Upon a Future Time,” The Eastern Buddhist, n.s., 26/1, 140–41. 30 See Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time (Chapters 7–10), for a thorough discussion of all the many versions of the story. 31 See the more optimistic interpretation of these events in the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, which declares that the “true teaching does not really perish”; in a discussion of the duration of the teachings slightly earlier in the text the sutra declares that, though the conventional teaching (›À) can be destroyed, the ultimate dharma (Ùs–À) cannot (T #374, 12.472a). 32
Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 152 and 288–89.
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story, however, the demise of the teaching is not caused by the invading forces; rather, it occurs well after they are dispelled, a result of quarrelling within a sangha enjoying the “muni³cence of a well-intentioned Buddhist king” who has called the entire sangha together for an imperial feast!33 It is conspicuous that in all of the stories the threats to the true teaching come from some sort of dissension within the sangha, especially bickering about the transmission and interpretation of the teaching.34 It is also noteworthy that, almost without exception, after the dire words about the possible decline of the teaching in the future there is always an exhortation to the monks to be diligent now, lest such an unfortunate situation actually come to pass. Both points indicate the polemic that underlies the prognostications, and the second point also tells us that the decline of the teaching was spoken of more in the sense of admonishment, a means of urging the sangha to adhere to an authoritative interpretation of doctrine—in other words, a conservative reaction to increasing diversity of interpretation and institutional organization.35 It is commonly suggested that, given the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, it was inevitable that the Buddha’s teachings would also come to be seen as declining and disappearing.36 While this is doctrinally plausible, it seems rather pious in its assumptions about what is essentially an otherdirected critique. The critique in the rhetoric of decline is not doctrinally 33
Ibid., 227.
A major exception to this is the well-known tradition that women entering the homeless life will shorten the reign of the true teaching from one thousand years to ³ve hundred years (Vinaya Texts, 320 ff.). Alan Sponberg argues that this text reflects a later (ca. 200 b.c.) “institutional androcentrism,” born not of the sectarian spirit I see as the basis of the decline motif but rather of “reconciliation … a compromise negotiated between several factions of the order, including the nuns and their male supporters” (“Attitudes toward Women and the Feminine in Early Buddhism,” in José Ignacio Cabezón, ed., Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender [Albany: SUNY Press, 1992], 16); see also Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 28–33. 34
35 This sense of warning and exhortation ³ts well with the tone of the prophetic genre in Hebrew literature, and can be seen to offer “not consolation but criticism of its own religious community, and not encouragement but exhortation” (Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 284). For further discussion of the applicability of the notion of prophetic warning to the Buddhist tradition, see the numerous messages on the Buddha-L electronic discussion list, 25 June –15 July 1993 (
[email protected]).
This would also render the decline motif functionally analogous to Judeo-Christian eschatological rhetoric, which Stephen D. O’Leary has described as “strategies of transcendence, in which the seemingly contradictory realities of phenomenal, practical experience [e.g., different versions of the True Dharma within the same canon] are uni³ed through the temporizing of essence in relation to the future or the past [that is, even the true teachings— essence—are impermanent]” (Stephen D. O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 26). 36
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self-referential but ideologically other-referential; the point of view is that of the upholders of the true teaching versus those who do not faithfully learn, retain, and transmit it. Perhaps more accurately, the rhetoric of the polemicist is directed in both directions—towards the other as the cause of decline, and towards oneself as the upholder and guarantor of saddhamma. The context that gave rise to the teaching of the decline of the teaching was not a discussion of impermanence but rather the concern for the perpetual duration of the tradition, tradition de³ned as the teachings handed down over the ages. The point of view of these prognostications is ³rst and foremost that of upholding an orthodoxy or even the notion that an orthodoxy is central to the Buddhist tradition rather than permitting or legitimizing new interpretations simply because “all things must change.” As we shall see, however, the Mahayana and East Asian use of the concept of decline turns this on its head to argue that it is precisely the time of dissension and decline that makes necessary a “new dispensation,” a new orthodoxy.
The Later Rhetoric of Legitimacy: the mahayana polemic of the book The ³rst step toward the eventual use of the decline motif as legitimizing a new “dispensation” of the teaching was the Mahayana transformation of the terms of its deployment. That is, while the Mahayana continued the strategy of claiming a literal form of orthodoxy (buddhavacana) for their traditions and texts (for example, the story of N„g„rjuna’s recovery of the Perfection of Wisdom texts), they also re³gured the decline motif in such a way as to change its meaning from a time when the teaching would be gone or supplanted by false teaching to a time when its own superior teaching would not merely still be available, but, as proven precisely by its persistence, tested and certi³ed in its superiority. No doubt the Mahayana writers were both aware that the most common timetables of decline described the time of their own activity as well as sensitive to the charge of creating a “new” or “counterfeit” teaching; hence we ³nd that one of the most prominent uses of the decline motif in the Mahayana is as a “proof metaphor” to stylistically indicate its own superior truth value, even in such a time.37 SelfA similar and equally self-conscious response may be seen in the Mahayana anticipation of the stylistic attack on their scriptures noted above (n. 21): “At some future time bhik¤us and bodhisattvas who are conceited, who have not cultivated their bodies, not cultivated their minds, not cultivated morality, not cultivated wisdom, who are immoral, do not accept the precious de³nitive meaning (Skt. n‡t„rtha) of the True Dharma … will say … ‘Sðtras like this are fabrications, they are poetic inventions; they were not spoken by the Buddha’” (Paul Harrison, The Sam„dhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present [Tokyo: The 37
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conscious in its reaction to the conservative nik„ya attempt to preserve the tradition, this strain is both highly speci³c (“this text is the saddharma and will be uniquely ef³cacious in such troubled times”) and at the same time ³rm in claiming the high ground of the universal, hearkening more to dharmat„ than its historical encapsulation; like the Buddha himself, the buddhavacana is eternal.38 The Vajracchedik„, for example, in speaking of the “the future time, in the latter age, in the latter period, in the latter ³ve hundred years, when the True Dharma is in the process of decay,”39 exhibits little concern with such a period as a historical reality of declining capacity: “Even at that time, Subhuti, there will be bodhisattvas who are gifted with good conduct, gifted with virtuous qualities, gifted with wisdom, and who, when these words of the Sutra are being taught, will understand their truth.”40 The Vajracchedik„ speaks of the “latter ³ve-hundred years, when the true teaching is in the process of decay” only as an opportunity to contrast its own continued ef³cacy. It thereby co-opted the topoi of the nik„ya rhetoric, asserting its superiority not simply on the basis of a claim to represent
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1990], 55–56). See also E. Conze, translator, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 392. In a more general fashion the Mahayana scriptures regularly embrace the claim that they are not, in fact, the word of the Buddha as a deliberate preemptive strategy; see Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, “The Conflict of Change in Buddhism: the H‡nay„nist Reaction,” Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 9 (1996–1997): 233–54. 38 Davidson, in discussing the Mðlasarv„stiv„da-vinaya, calls the criterion of “not contradicting reality (dharmat„)” an “intrusion, for the ³rst time, of a philosophical argument into the criteria [for authenticity],” a concern that he sees as dominating later discussion, especially in the Mahayana (300–301). This is not to say, of course, that Mahayana texts did not also claim to be buddhavacana in a more literal sense (Davidson, “Standards,” 305–12), but, generally, as Matthew Kapstein nicely sums it up: “any text meeting the normative doctrinal criteria for buddhavacana must be genuine buddhavacana taught by the historical Buddha Š„kyamuni himself” (“The Puri³catory Gem and Its Cleansing: A Late Tibetan Polemical Discussion of Apocryphal Texts,” in History of Religions, 28/3 [1989], 225). Of course, because the doctrinal criteria were (and are) fluid, this development allows for the full unfolding of the later sectarian approach to the saddharma. 39 Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 36 (correcting the translation by Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970], 30); see also 33–37, 91–94, 106 n. 111 for a discussion of the Sanskrit and Chinese variants of this phrase in this text and the Lotus Sutra (the translation of Kumaraj‡va, T #235, 8.749a, does not contain the phrase saddharma-vipralopak„le [Chin. fa mieh Àn], “at the time of the destruction of the true dharma”); other texts of the Prajñ„p„ramit„ corpus that use substantially the same formula include The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, 328 (minus the reference to “the latter ³ve-hundred years”) and the Suvikr„ntavikr„mi-Parip£cch„ Prajñ„p„ramit„-Sðtra (ed. by Ryðshõ Hikata, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1983), 124 (Chinese translation 565 by Upašðnya, T #231, 8.231b). 40
Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 33; cf. p. 57.
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historical orthodoxy (buddhavacana) but also on the basis of truth value and hence a relevance even in a time of decay, a time for which the “Hinayana” had already prophesized its own lack of ef³cacy.41 The polemic origins of the term saddhamma were not lost on the redactors of the Saddharma-pu«^ar‡ka-sðtra, a text that extols the most inclusive ideal of the Buddhist tradition at the same time that it is almost combative in its claim to alone represent the “true teaching.” This text combines the same sort of sectarian perspective found in the Vajracchedik„ with a distinctly cosmic and cyclical view of the universe, containing many references to the twenty minor kalpas of the true teaching followed by twenty intermediate kalpas of the semblance, or forty kalpas of each, or thirty-two kalpas of each, etc.42 Although not in the same place or even in the same context as its references to the two periods of true and semblance teaching, the Lotus, like the Vajracchedik„, also speaks of the time “after the Tath„gata’s ³nal nirvana, in the latter age, the latter period, the latter ³ve-hundred years, when the true teaching is in decay.”43 The Chinese translation by Kum„raj‡va even uses the term “mo fa,” possibly the ³rst occurrence of the term.44 Given the presence of these elements of the decline tradition and the popularity of the Lotus Sutra in East Asia, many are tempted to see it as a primary source for the elaboration of the chronological and/or tripartite schema of decline. Although, as discussed below, I do think that the Lotus Sutra contributed greatly to the “hermeneutics of orthodoxy” that is so much a part of the decline traditions, we need to be very careful in assessing its contributions to the chronological orderings of decline. That is, its usage of the two periods of the teaching are more likely drawing on the cosmological traditions than the topos of decline, which explains why the settings in 41 The Pratyutpannabuddhasa½mukh„vasthitasam„dhi-sðtra even claims that it will disappear until the latter period of decay (Harrison, The Sam„dhi of Direct Encounter, 96 ff)! 42
E.g., T #262, 9.20c, 21a, 21c, 29c, passim.
Skt: tath„gatasya parinirv£tasya pašcime k„le pašcime samaye pašcim„y„½ pañc„šaty„½ saddharma-vipralope vartam„ne, from Saddharmapu«^ar‡ka-sðtra, edited by U. Wogihara and C. Tsuchida (Tokyo: Sankibõ Book Store, 1958), 241. 43
T #262, 9.37c–38a. The Chinese passage does not correspond exactly to the (substantially later) Sanskrit. The Chinese translation reads “After the extinction of the Tathagata, in the later teaching, those desiring to teach this sðtra” ØZn9ê=À_ò‰¡÷. As I noted in my original study of the Three Levels movement, here mo fa is simply used in the sense of “after the Buddha is gone” and thus is not really a translation of the saddharma-vipralopa found in the Sanskrit edition (Hubbard, Salvation, 21n; see also Yamada Ryðjõ, “Mappõ shisõ ni tsuite,” 362; “Rengemenkyõ ni tsuite,” 122 n. 1); Kum„raj‡va’s biography of Ašvagho¤a also uses the term mo fa (see below, chapter 3, p. 65). A. Yuyama discusses variants of this passage found in other texts in “Pañc„sat‡, ‘500’ or ‘50’? With special reference to the Lotus Sðtra,” in Heinz Bechert, editor, The Dating of the Historical Buddha, part 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 208–33. 44
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which the periods of the true teaching and the semblance teaching appear are so exaggerated (forty kalpas of each, etc.). Thus, too, the cyclical nature of these descriptions, in which, after the two periods of a tathagata’s teaching, a tathagata of the same name will appear, as many as “twenty hundred thousand myriads of kotis of Tathagatas” of the same name.45 Further, and most telling, none of these descriptions is of the duration of the historical Buddha’s teaching, whereas the instances of the decline motif are always represented as the decline of Š„kyamuni’s teaching.46 Finally, although in these instances the Lotus presents a clear two-period scheme in which the semblance teaching follows and is, at least chronologically, distinct from the period of saddharma, which is also chronologically distinct from the lifetime of the various tathagatas, there is no sense here of a qualitative difference between the two periods. The two periods are not spoken of in terms of decay or sequential loss of capacity but rather, as discussed above, this use of the semblance teaching indicates precisely that period after the death of the Buddha when his teachings were available, hence there is no qualitative differentiation between the periods of saddharma and saddharma-pratirðpaka. But even this is not the real point of this topos: the two periods of the teaching as described in the Lotus Sutra are related to the grand cosmic drama of the Tathagata’s immeasurable lifetime, the basic theme of the sutra, and not the theme of decline.47 Hence, in typical Indian rhetorical style, the Lotus bolsters this drama with incomprehensible numbers (such as “forty intermediate kalpas”) and cyclical recurrence (the “eternal return”). Given, too, that the periods of saddharma and saddharma-pratirðpaka are not used in the same context with saddharma-vipralopa or “latter 500 years,” it is thus not unreasonable to assume that we have two entirely different traditions coming together in the same text. Aside from the textual evidence that the two represent different topoi, there is also the rather glaring doctrinal inconsistency in the notion of a period of the destruction of the teaching following the Buddha’s extinction, given the Lotus Sutra’s insistence on the immeasurable lifetime of the Buddha. Although the Lotus never became a major source in the early Chinese development of the decline tradition, it is ³lled with reference to decay, the “latter 500 years,” and the like in the context of doctrinal persecution, sectarian concern, and a polemic assertiveness about its own message, and it is 45
E.g., T #262, 9.50c.
46
Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 85–86; Yuyama, “500 or 50?”, 228.
Even in China it seems that the settings and descriptions of the two periods in the Lotus are so far beyond any sense of actual human history that they did not inculcate any sense of historical or social foreboding, since the Lotus is not mentioned in the standard lists of decline texts; see below, chapter 3, p. 60, n. 17. 47
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in this that I believe we can see the signi³cance of its use of the decline motif.48 Much like the Vajracchedik„, that is, the Lotus uses the theme of decline as an opportunity to assert that even in such a period, due to the power of the sutra itself, there will still be those who will gain innumerable merits and enter into nirvana if they recognize its truth.49 Indeed, it is not stretching things to say that, alongside the doctrine of the immeasurable lifetime of the Buddha Š„kyamuni, the polemic of saddharma is the central theme of the Lotus. In this way, and as with the earlier traditions, the Mahayana rhetoric of decline became an established and readily usable topic deployed not to condemn moral decay but rather to assert legitimacy of speci³c texts in the period following Š„kyamuni’s passing.50 Thus, as with the earlier tradition, the teaching is still quite available, as long as you know which dharma is saddharma. As a side effect, by not predicting the total demise of the teaching and by specifying a particular text as valid even in such a time of decay, these Mahayana “polemics of the book” perhaps served as prototypes for the Chinese strategy of arguing the need for a new dispensation. That is, whereas the earlier traditions had actually predicted the disappearance or end of the teaching, the Mahayana allows it to continue, albeit solely within particular texts. Nonetheless, and this is a crucial point, reflecting the overriding concern for the preservation of the true teachings, at this stage it is the teachings per se that are predicted to decline or disappear; in Hsin-hsing’s teachings it is the capacity of sentient beings to realize those teachings that has decayed. A ³nal effect is that, whereas the conservative approach attempted to preserve a facade of unity or orthodoxy in the face of obvious divergences and schisms, the Mahayana approach implicitly admits the existence of the doctrinal divergences predicted as characteristic of the latter days.
48 Of course, the most obvious example of this is the use of saddharma as the title of the text. For a further discussion of these issues, see J. Hubbard, “Buddhist-Buddhist Dialogue? The Lotus Sutra and the Polemic of Accommodation,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 15 (1995): 119–36. 49 E.g., T #9, 10b, T #9, 31a, T #9, 38c, etc. Virtually all references to the age of decay are accompanied by some sort of declaration of the continued ef³cacy of the Lotus, a vow to spread and teach it even in such a period, the abuse that its defenders need be prepared to face in such a period, the merit that will accrue from its teaching, etc. See J. Hubbard, “A Tale of Two Times: Preaching in the Latter Age of the Dharma,” Numen 46 (1999): 186–210. 50 Similarly, Nattier notes that in the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra use of a seven-hundredyear timetable of decay, “Though certain moral failings (especially on the part of the monks) are mentioned, issues of doctrine are given greater attention” (Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 39).
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Summary These, then, are some of the sources and views concerning the decline of the Buddha-dharma. Most likely originating in a spirit of sectarian competition regarding the correct interpretation of the teachings after the passing of the founder and continued in the Mahayana as a means of doctrinal legitimization, the decline tradition functioned primarily as a rhetoric, a series of topoi that could be marshaled to argue for and defend both the notion of orthodoxy as well as particular orthodoxies. As a conservative reaction to diversity, the non-Mahayana use of the rhetoric of decline did not really address the question of what one would do in such a world; the point, rather, was to prevent its arrival. The Mahayana use of the decline topoi, on the other hand, substantially changed this by indicating that the truth would still be available during the period of decline as long as you knew where to ³nd it. Signi³cantly, by introducing the notion of truth into the rhetoric (albeit as a defensive measure), the notion of decline is freed from historical concerns just as it makes possible a shifting index of orthodoxy, one determined by individual revelation and insight rather than historical literalness. Given the rhetoric of orthodoxy that underlies the deployment of the decline trope, it is not surprising that this move away from the historical context of its birth and the literal terms of its argument reflects the same direction taken in the overall Mahayana argument for the authenticity of its scriptures, that is, a shift away from “history and philology as the answer to questions of authenticity” to “ahistorical elements, where accordance with reality is the ultimate and ³nal criterion.”51 Hence, too, the fact that the Mahayana use of the decline trope is exclusively concerned with doctrinal legitimization indicates that, in spite of the occasional moral critique found in the earlier texts, in either case the rhetoric of decline cannot be separated from the rhetoric of orthodoxy and legitimization. When, however, these same prophecies came to be accepted as describing contemporaneous events and fused with the doctrine of up„ya, an entirely new function of the decline traditions was born: not used to simply plea for an orthodoxy or as a trope to vouchsafe one’s legitimacy, the decline of the teaching came to be used to argue the need for a new teaching, a new “dispensation” appropriate to the degenerate times. As part of the same process the Indian trope 51 José Ignacio Cabezón, “Vasubandhu’s Vy„khy„yukti on the Authenticity of the Mah„y„na Sðtras,” in Jeffrey R. Timm, Texts in Context (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 234.
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of decline became the Chinese doctrine of decline, a doctrine that could serve as an interpretive aid and provide a hermeneutic framework for ordering the Indian scriptures and teachings. Let us now turn to the Chinese context that so facilitated this development.
3. The Chinese Systematization: Decline as Doctrine
H
ow did the argument for orthodoxy described in chapter 2 play in China, where neither the process nor the specifics of the Indian doctrinal and institutional developments were well understood? Among the striking features of the Chinese evolution of the Buddhist tradition of decline are, on the one hand, the development of the ahistorical cosmological and Buddhological traditions into the messianic and apocalyptic Maitreya-based movements so often accused of fomenting revolt and, on the other hand, the development of the rhetoric of orthodoxy/decline into the belief that the time of decline had actually arrived. The latter is a particularly important development, for if it is significant that the massive interest in and use of the rhetoric of decline in China coincided with the time of the introduction and assimilation of Buddhism, it is equally significant that the systematization of the notion occurred under the Sui and T’ang, a golden period of Chinese Buddhism and an era that saw the emergence of grand doctrinal systems. But why the interest in the first place? There are a number of reasons for the Chinese interest in the Buddhist traditions of decline. First we must note the strong and persistent eschatological and messianic hopes for the advent of the King of the Great Peace (t’ai p’ing °´) and reunification of the empire, hopes that resonated well with Buddhist cosmology and the related Maitreya traditions. It is often remarked that two of the main reasons for Buddhism’s immediate popularity in China were some similarities to the Taoist ideas and language of transcendence and the shared status of not being tainted by the ideology of the failed Han dynasty (the Confucian tradition). To this must be added the resonance of the eschatological traditions. Conversely, this meant that Buddhism, newly arrived to Chinese soil as Taoism was newly arrived to the world of institutional power, competed with the Taoists for the terms of that power. Hence the development of Buddhist messianism is perhaps also related to a competitive marketplace of ideologies. How did Hsin-hsing’s teaching reµect these indigenous traditions while contributing to their development in Buddhist terms? 55
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In addition to the strong native eschatological or millennial tradition, the translations of such important texts as the Ãgamas of the Sarv„stiv„da, the Sarv„stiv„da-vinaya, the Lotus Sutra, Diamond Sutra, and other major Prajñ„p„ramit„ texts, the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra and other naturally eschatological texts of the nirvana corpus, the Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra, numerous dh„ra«‡ texts, and others supplied the canonical basis, the variant concepts, and necessary terminology for innovative Chinese developments. These canonical descriptions also came together with the indigenous traditions to produce numerous scriptures that served to prepare an orthodoxy for the various doctrinal systematizations of the decline tradition, including the p’an chiao of the San-chieh movement. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Chinese landscape of the latter half of the sixth century must have appeared remarkably similar to that described in this scriptural tradition in terms of social unrest, warfare, and monastic corruption. The two largescale persecutions of Buddhism at the hands of the Northern Wei and Northern Chou dynasties could only appear to verify the scriptural predictions. On top of all this, Mihirakula’s attacks on Buddhist communities in India were known to the Chinese, both from written accounts and from the descriptions related by the many Indian monks who µed to China from Northern India about this time. Thus the translations of the Indian scriptural sources for the decline tradition found a ready audience in the Chinese, prepared by both indigenous traditions of messianic and apocalyptic expectation as well as the social, political, and economic conditions that had fueled those expectations. Yet, ironically, it was only on the eve of the unification of China that the strong belief in the immanence of the latter teaching was advocated as a doctrinal tenet, and it was really only after unification of the Sui and T’ang that the idea became entrenched as doctrinal orthodoxy. From the latter half of the sixth century the idea swept through the Buddhist community. Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592), Chi-tsang (549–622), Fei Chang-fang (late sixth century), Tao-hsüan (596–666), Tao-ch’o (562–645), Hsin-hsing (540–594), and Ling-yü (517–605) are only a few of the eminent monks who wrote of the decline of the teaching. Two movements fixed the teaching as their doctrinal foundation (the Pure Land and the San-chieh), and it proved to have great appeal among people of all ranks. Thus the systematization of the decline tradition and its broad acceptance are coterminous with the golden systembuilding period of Chinese Buddhism as a whole, a period during which there developed as well the ideological and institutional basis for the eventual widespread diffusion of Buddhism in Chinese society, politics, and general culture. This is perhaps exactly the reason that the idea of the decline became such an important doctrine in Chinese Buddhism. In addition, like the findings of chapter 2, it also points us towards the rhetorical function of
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the decline as having more significance than its descriptive function. What, then, were the elements of the indigenous eschatological traditions?
Indigenous Messianic and Apocalyptic Traditions China has a long tradition of sacred kingship that has served variously as a source of legitimization in times of dynastic change, as an ideology of morality and righteous governance in times of prosperity, and as a rallying point in times of unrest. From the time of the fall of the Han in the latter part of the second century b.c. through the founding of the T’ang in the early sixth century, this tradition was often called to labor in the contests for heart and territory that were so conspicuous a feature of those times. Although the sacred ruler and the longing for an earlier golden age is familiar even in classical Confucian and Taoist terms,1 investigations of Taoist messianic yearnings show the particularly wide appeal of these notions during the period coincidental with the major inµux of Buddhist thought, practice, and institutions.2 The basic terms of the Taoist apocalyptic are not unfamiliar to the Western reader: social and political upheaval, aspirations for a return to power on the part of the recently displaced, equality of justice for those chronically displaced, and the expected arrival of a great spiritual power who will realize these goals.3 This native tradition of messianic thought, repeatedly linked to Lao-tzu as the messiah and often spilling over into outright rebellion, continued to have strong inµuence through the founders of the T’ang 1 The notion of charismatic moral power, the mandate of heaven, and jen are all familiar examples of the trappings of the sacred ruler. On the importance of the Mandate of Heaven and other religious themes (including the Buddhist notion of kalpa), see Yðji Muramatsu, “Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies,” in Arthur F. Wright, ed., The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 241–56; Anna Seidel, “The Image of the Perfect Ruler in Early Taoist Messianism: Lao-tzu and Li Hung,” History of Religions 9/2–3 (1969–1970), 216–47; on jen in the T’ai p’ing ching, see Max Kaltenmark, “The Ideology of the T’ai-P’ing Ching,” in Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel, eds., Facets of Taoism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 34. 2 Seidel, “Image”; see also Anna Seidel, “Taoist Messianism,” Numen 31/2 (1984): 161–74. Seidel suggests that, paralleling the general upsurge in Taoist influence following the discredited Confucian state of the Han, the primarily “Confucian ideal of social harmony,” t’ai p’ing °´, became the focal point of Taoist messianic hopes as “a popular Taoist religion became the alternative, not to the Confucian teachings but to the literati regime that subscribed to it” (Seidel, “Messianism,” 165).
For a comparative overview of Chinese apocalypticism, see Livia Kohn, “The Beginnings and Cultural Characteristics of East Asian Millenarianism,” Japanese Religions 23/1–2 (1998): 29–51. 3
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dynasty, who appropriated the messianic ideology in their claim to be direct descendants of Lao-tzu.4 In terms of rhetoric, many of the topoi of Taoist apocalyptic thought and action parallel the Buddhist traditions, and in this light the growth and Taoist amalgamation of the Maitreya movements seems natural.5 Socially, as with the later Three Levels and Pure Land teachings of decline, Chinese messianic belief cut across class lines and appealed at times to the aristocracy as much as to the marginal.6 And, just as Buddhism furnished both the terms of an apocalyptic ideology that was often suppressed as heretical as well as an acceptably orthodox soteriology of decline, we should also note the considerable difference between the rebels who expected their divine savior to actually appear on earth (for example, the Yellow Turbans) and the political compromise effected by the Celestial Masters (t’ien shih ú‚), who, preferring perhaps to share rather than usurp power, taught that the sage “no longer descended to earth in human guise” and thus functioned to legitimize the political authority of the ruler rather than contest it.7 This ³ts the general tenor of apocalyptic movements, as O’Leary notes that “the apocalyptic myth is broad and expansive enough to provide symbolic resources for both the legitimation and the critique of religious and secular power.”8 The latter’s lack of impetus to messianic rebellion ³ts in well with the development of a Buddhist ideology of decline that, rather than fomenting popular uprising, talked instead of inner decay and heavenly reward. So, too, the Celestial Masters’ exhortation to a pure morality and almost ascetic lifestyle is reminiscent of the conservatism of the early Buddhist rhetoric of decline as well as the later practices of the San-chieh 4 Li Yüan’s claim was further strengthened by being given “the ³rst Han emperor’s title Kao-tsu.… Li Yüan may well have felt himself to be the ful³llment of the messianic hopes that … had reechoed throughout the whole Six Dynasties: a Lord Li, emissary of Lao-tzu, was to be ruler,” Seidel, “Image,” 244. 5 On the intermingling of the two traditions see Erik Zürcher, “Buddhist Influence on Early Taoism,” T’oung Pao 66 (1980): 84–147; Christine Millier, Une apocalypse taoïste du Ve siècle: Le livre des Incantations divines des grottes abyssales (Paris: Mémoires de l’Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 31, 1990), especially chapter one. 6 Michel Strickmann, “The Mao Shan Revelations: Taoism and the Aristocracy,” T’oung Pao 63 (1977): 1–40, and “On the Alchemy of T’ao Hung-ching,” in Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel, Facets of Taoism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 185–92; see also Tsukamoto Zenryð, A History of Early Chinese Buddhism from its Introduction to the Death of Hui-yüan (Tokyo: Kodansha International., 1985), 411. Strickmann also suggests that “the presence in the Mao Shan revelations of references to the stage-properties of Indian apocalypse, the succession of kalpas, and the three ultimate calamities (san tsai Xó), indicates that the [Buddhist] message had been heeded by the old, established families of the region” (“Alchemy,” 186). 7
Seidel, “Image,” 228.
8
O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse, 57–58.
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movement; the Celestial Masters’ practice of confession and penitence in particular is resonant with Northern Dynasties monastic practice.9 The literary form of prophecy used in the Buddhist teaching of decline also ³ts well with the indigenous tradition of divination, prophecy, and omen-reading. In terms of form, both traditions (perhaps obviously) use the method of ex post facto prophecy to exhort their particular message. Like the Buddhist tradition of saddharma, Taoist messianic literature also focused in large part on the purity of the texts and teachings, using the voice of revealed scripture as a vehicle to condemn “false texts” (hsieh wen îk).10 The T’ai p’ing ching, for example, describes three ages of progressive decay (san ku Xò, the “three antiquities”), of which the characteristics of the last age— doctrinal bickering and false texts, a new teaching appropriate to the times, etc.—are remarkably similar to the Buddhist tradition. 11 Also like the Buddhists, this discourse took the form of intrareligious polemic as often as interreligious—indeed, competition with other Taoists seems to have been a conspicuous feature of the movements. Of course, as with the Buddhist discussion, part of the reason for the intrareligious polemic is competition for control or establishment of orthodoxy, particularly consequential for the new or heterodox (as with the Mahayana). Finally, as Zürcher has shown, we should also take note of the overlapping dating of the Taoist apocalypse and Buddhist timetables of decline.12
Translations of the Indian Sources As Steven O’Leary has pointed out, millennial and messianic movements do not simply appear according to chaotic social circumstances (for 9 Tsukamoto, A History, 35–36, 411; see also Howard S. Levy, “Yellow Turban Rebellion at the End of the Han,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 76 (1956), 215. 10 Kaltenmark, “Ideology,” 24–29; in the Celestial Masters’ movement all teachers above a certain rank were required to have memorized the complete text of the Tao te ching; see Tsukamoto, A History, 411. 11 Kaltenmark, “Ideology,” 22–23. According to this text, society and government will successively devolve from the time of “high antiquity” (shang ku îò), through middle antiquity (chung ku _ò), until the lowest age (hsia ku 4ò), when it realizes “the extreme of decadence (hsia chi 4)) with a proliferation of ³ckle and harmful doctrines.” At this point the Confucian rites are no longer capable of ensuring order, and false texts (hsieh wen îk) will claim to be the truth. The situation will demand a new dispensation. For this, the Celestial Master (T’ien shih ú‚) will appear and reveal a sacred text that is uniquely ef³cacious for the times, harmonizing and choosing from among the texts revealed earlier in accord with lesser capacities. 12 Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight: Messianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism,” T’oung Pao 68 (1982), 3, 20–21.
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those are unfortunately common to all cultures and all times), but require as well “a textually embodied community of discourse founded in the accepted canon.”13 This was provided the Chinese Buddhists not only by indigenous religious discourse but by the Indian scriptures as well. The Chinese knew of the many and various traditions that spoke of the demise of the teaching, its counterfeit rivals, and the attendant social, political, cosmic, and spiritual chaos from almost the beginnings of the transmission of Buddhism to China and continuing through the systematization of the Chinese schools.14 In addition to the Sarv„stiv„din versions of some of the suttas and Vinaya texts mentioned in chapter 2, the terminology and tradition-units were transmitted in some of the most important texts in the development of Chinese Buddhism (e.g., Vinaya in Ten Parts,15 Vajracchedik„,16 Lotus Sutra,17 Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra18) and are attributed to some of the most inµuential émigré missionaries and translators in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Among these we can count An Shih-kao (mid-second century), who transmitted the 13
O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse, 10.
It must be emphasized, however, that although the various elements can be traced to India, a coherent doctrinal tradition of the decline of the teaching only emerged in China of the sixth and seventh centuries. See Yamada, “Rengemenkyõ ni tsuite”; Yðki Reimon ºô|l, “Shina Bukkyõ ni okeru mappõshisõ no kõki †º[îrPWš=À„`uö|,” Tõhõ gakuhõ 6 (1936): 205–16; Yabuki Keiki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 199–231; Takao Giken ¢Í–Ç, “Mappõ shisõ to Zui: Tõ shoka no taido =À„`oØN™BuÇE,” Shina Bukkyõ shigaku 1/1 (1937): 1–20 and s1/3 (1937): 47–70. 14
15
T #1435, 23.385c (relating the pericope of the counterfeit teaching); cf. chapter 2, note 28.
16
See chapter 2, 49.
See above. The opinions of some scholars notwithstanding (e.g., Richard Robinson and Willard L. Johnson, The Buddhist Religion [Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 3rd edition, 1982], 166), it is curious that this sutra never became a major source in the early development of Chinese doctrines of decline. The Fa yüan chu lin (668), for example, the great encyclopedia of Buddhist doctrine compiled by Tao-shih, devotes one entire section to the “extinction of the law” and, although it gives over ³fteen references to sources ranging from the Ãgamas and the Vinaya to Mahayana sutras and sastras, the Lotus Sutra is not mentioned (T #2122, 53.1005 ff); neither does Chi-tsang mention it in his summary of the decline tradition (T #1824, 42.17c–18c), nor even Hui-ssu, the ³rst to systematize the three periods (T #1933, 46.786c) and a patriarch of the T’ien-t’ai, a school premised on the ³nal truth of the Lotus. 17
See Mizutani “Daijõnehankyõtengun”; see Hubert Durt, Problems of Chronology, chapters 3 and 4, for comments on the eschatological orientation of texts dealing with the Buddha’s nirvana and the formation of a corpus of nirvana texts. Hence stupa cultus would seem a natural locus for the development of the decline idea; see H. Durt, “The Meaning of Archaeology in Ancient Buddhism,” Commorative Volume Celebrating the Eightieth Year of Dongguk University, esp. 1239–1240. For intriguing references to the “latter age” =› and “latter teaching” =À in ³fth-century stupa inscriptions see Hubert Durt, Krishn„ Riboud, and Lai Tung-hun, “A propos de ‘stðpa miniatures’ votifs du Ve siècle découverts à Tourfan et au Gansu,” Arts Asiatiques 40 (1985), 103. 18
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story of the shortening of the teaching’s duration as a result of the entrance of women into the cenobitic path;19 Dharmarak¤a (ca. 230–310), probably responsible for the Chinese popularity of the terms hsiang fa (semblance teaching) and mo shih (latter age);20 Dharmak¤ema (385–433), translator of the eschatological Nirvana Sutra; 21 as well as Fa-hsien (active early 19 See the one-thousand-year timetable in the Chia she chieh ching (translated by An Shihkao between 148 and 170), related to the tradition of women entering the cenobitic path (T #2027, 49.6a). On An Shih-kao see the fascinating study of Antonino Forte, The Hostage An Shigao and his Offspring (Kyoto: Italian School of East Asian Studies Occasional Papers 6, 1995). 20 E.g., Tang lai pien ching (T #395, 118a–c); his translation of the Lotus Sutra (T #263); the Hsien ch’ieh ching (T #425); Fo shuo fa mieh chin ching (T #396, likely a Chinese composition of the early or mid-³fth century), etc. In her study of the Chinese usage of the terms hsiang fa (semblance teaching) and mo shih (³nal or latter age), Nattier has concluded that “it seems quite safe to assume, then, that it was primarily through the translations of Dharmarak¤a that Chinese Buddhists ³rst became acquainted with the term hsiang-fa” (Once Upon a Future Time, 71 n. 19) and “credit for the popularization of the expression mo-shih clearly goes to Dharmarak¤a” (Once Upon a Future Time, 101 n. 106).
See, for example, his translation of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra (T #374) and the Pei hua ching (Karu«„-pu«^ar‡ka-sðtra, T #157, 3.211b). Whalen Lai suggests that Dharmak¤ema was at the center of a kind of popular Buddhism in Liang-chou that emphasized an “eschatological element” (“Dating the Hsiang-fa chueh-i ching,” Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute 4 [1986], 74–76); see also Kamata Shigeo, Chðgoku Bukkyõshi vol. 3 (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1984), 36–55. An intriguing reference to Dharmak¤ema’s involvement in transmitting the decline tradition is found in Li Shan’s commentary on the well-known “Inscription of the Dhðta Monastery” w¼±· composed by Wang Chien-ch’i ÷6− (Wang Chin ÷2, d. 505). The text of the inscription reads, “The true teaching has already disappeared, and the semblance teaching is gradually declining ±Àjö…*hV.” Li Shan’s commentary of 658 notes that “T’an-wu-lo-ch’an says that Šakyamuni’s true teaching will abide in the world for ³ve hundred years, the semblance teaching for one thousand years, and the ³nal [period of the] dharma for ten thousand years.” Both the text of the Dhðta Monastery Inscription and Li Shan’s commentary are contained in a later edition of the Wen hsuan of Hsiao T’ung (d. 531), chüan 59, pp. 826–33 (Taipei: Yi wen yin shu kuan edition, 1979); for a study of the inscription and English translation see Richard B. Mather, “Wang Chin’s ‘Dhðta Temple Stele Inscription’ As an Example of Buddhist Parallel Prose,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 83 (1963): 338–59. If Li Shan’s attribution is correct and Tan-wu-lo-ch’an ·[øQ refers to Tan-wu-ch’an ·[Q, that is, Dharmak¤ema, then we would have here the earliest reference to the three periods of the dharma in China (as asserted by T’ang Yung-t’ung in his Han Wei liang chin nan pei ch’ao Fo chiao shih [Taipei: Taiwan shang wu yin shu kuan, 1968], 818). I have found no such periodization in Dharmak¤ema’s works, however, and assume Li Shan’s commentary to be a gloss based on Dharmak¤ema’s translation of the Pei hua ching (which contains the ³ve hundred/one thousand year schemes) and the subsequent development of the tripartite scheme; I am grateful to Antonino Forte for his help in tracking down this citation. See also Forte’s “A Literary Model for Adam: The Dhðta Monastery Inscription,” in Paul Pelliot, L’inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-fou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte (Italian School of East Asian Studies and Collège de France, Kyoto and Paris, 1996), pp. 473–87. 21
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³fth century),22 Kum„raj‡va (344–413),23 and Narendrayašas (516–589), the missionary from Kashmir whose translations and compositions were particularly inµuential in transmitting the traditions of decline.24
22 Fa-hsien was the translator of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra among other texts. Concerning Fa-hsien’s role in the transmission of the decline tradition, Michel Strickmann has noted, “It seems signi³cant that Fa-hsien, scarcely an apocalyptic personality, should be responsible for bringing to China some of Buddhism’s most influential apocalyptic material,” (“The Consecration Sðtra” in Robert E. Buswell, Jr., editor, Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha” [Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990], 114, note 33). 23 See chapter 2, 49–50 for comments on his translation of the Lotus Sutra, and below, 65, for his use of the timetables of decline for dating various Buddhist teachers. 24 Narendrayašas translated several texts concerned with the decline of the teaching, including the Ji tsang fen (#14) and the Yüeh tsang fen (#15) portions of the Ta chi ching (T #397, Mah„sa½nip„ta-sðtra), both quite influential in the development of the decline tradition in China. He also transmitted the Lien hua mien ching (T #386), which includes a portrayal of the reign of the Hð«a ruler Mihirakula and his harshly anti-Buddhist activities. For a study of Narendrayašas’ translations, their relationship to Mihirakula, and place in the development of Chinese notions of the decline, see Yamada, “Rengemenkyõ ni tsuite,” in Nagao Gadgin, ed., Yamaguchi hakase kanreki kinen Indogaku Bukkyõgaku ronsõ (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1955), 110–23. A good overview of the sources and traditions regarding Mihirakula is found in Ojha, K. C., Foreign Rule in India (Allahabad: Gyan Prakashan, 1968), 165 ff. See also the R„jataraªgi«‡ of Kalhana (edited and translated by Sir M. A. Stein [New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint, 1979]) and the travel records of Hsüan-tsang (T # 2087, 51.888b), translated by S. Beal, Buddhist Records of India (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1941), 202 ff. See also Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904), 288 ff. Another text which mentions Mihirakula is the Fu fa tsang yin yüan chuan (T #2058, 50.321c ff., translation attributed to Kekaya, 472). The compilation date of this text makes the chronology a problem, and H. Maspero, in his “Sur la date et l’authenticité du Fou fa tsang yin yuan tchouan,” Mélanges d’Indianisme (Paris, 1911), 129–49, concluded that it is actually a Chinese composition of the mid- to late sixth century; see also Hubbard, “Salvation,” 25–32. The theme of decline in the Yüeh tsang fen and its various recensions are thoroughly treated in Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time and in Nattier, “The Candragarbha-sðtra in Central and East Asia” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1988); for a discussion of the plausibility of Yamada’s thesis regarding Narendrayašas’ translations and the Chinese development of the decline tradition see Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 110–17, and Hubbard, “Review,” 142–43. See also S. Lévi, “Notes Chinoises sur l’Inde,” BEFEO V (1905): 253–305 for a discussion of contemporaneous geographical references in the Candragarbha-sðtra, lending credence to the theory that Narendrayašas interpolated freely in his translations. One such interpolation in Narendrayašas’ translation of the Fo shuo te hu chang che ching discusses the travels of the Buddha’s almsbowl in the ³nal era of the teaching, eventually arriving in the country of the “Great Sui,” where an incarnation of “Prince Moonlight” will rule and reestablish the teachings (T #545, 849b–c, translated in Zürcher, “Eschatology and Messianism in Early Chinese Buddhism” in Leyden Studies in Sinology (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 47. The Yüeh teng san mei ching is another translation by Narendrayašas that contains the prophecy of Prince Moonlight (T #639, 15.567a–b) as well as references to “the evil world of the latter age Õ›=Ö” and “in the evil world of the latter age, in the time when the true precepts and the true teachings disappear ê=ÖÕ›_±w±À8O´” (T #639, 15.573c, 574a, etc.).
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The basic texts related to Maitreya had also been translated and gained substantial indigenous, eschatological elements in the process.25 Another tradition from India that became important in East Asia is that of the arhat Pi«^ola, related to the eschatological traditions of the “latter teaching” (mo fa) and the Buddha’s deathbed pronouncements on the coming age and the fate of his teachings, the practice of charity, the asceticism of the proper monk (the dhðtaªga practices), the “lion’s roar” of unimpeachable truth which allays doubts about the teaching during the long years of decline, and especially to the idea that a seemingly corrupt monk might actually be an enlightened being, all concerns found in the San-chieh teachings.26 In addition to these texts, there are a profusion of texts that elaborate on these themes in different ways, the most common being the development of the two periods of the teaching in line with the emerging Chinese organization or systematization of timetables.27
Social, Political, and Monastic Decline In terms of the social landscape, Hsin-hsing, the founder of the Three Levels movement, was born in the latter half of the sixth century and
25 Zürcher, E. “Eschatology and Messianism,” 34–56; Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight”; Sponberg and Hardacre, eds., Maitreya, the Future Buddha, especially pp. 51–170. 26 See the Ta a lo han Nan-t’i-mi-to-lo so shuo fa chu chi (T #2030, 49.13a–13c) and the Ch’ing Pin-t’ou-lu fa (T #1689, 32.784b). John S. Strong’s excellent article on Pi«^ola draws together these themes; see his “The Legend of the Lion-Roarer,” Numen 26/1 (1979): 50–88; see also Sylvain Lévi and Edouard Chavannes, “Les Seize Arhat protecteurs de la loi,” Journal Asiatique (1916): 205–75. The connection of Pi«^ola and the begging bowl, representing his “gluttony” for offerings and corresponding role as a “storehouse” of merit for those who offer, and the story of his display of magical powers in which he flies up into the air to grab the begging bowl off the top of a pole, also call to mind the tradition that associates the destruction or disappearance of the Buddha’s begging bowl with the disappearance of the teaching; cf. Lien hua mien ching, T #386; Fa yüan chu lin, T #2122, 53.1007b ff; Strickmann, “The Consecration Sðtra,” 113 n. 33; P. Mus, “Hiuan-tsang et ses ‘stðpas d’Ašoka’,” Actes du XIXe Congrès International des Orientalistes, Rome (1935): 356–58; Zürcher, “Eschatology and Messianism,” 47; Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight,” p. 21 n. 37, pp. 25, 29–32. See also Chapter 6, pp. 138–39. 27 Nattier has shown, for example, that the following texts contain emendations in order “to conform with new developments in the understanding of saddharma-pratirðpaka”: the Bhadrakalpika-sðtra, which speaks of ³ve hundred years of the true teaching and ³ve hundred years of the semblance teaching (T #425, 14.21a, Chinese translation by Dharmarak¤a ca. 300 a.d.); the Karm„ vara«apratiprasrabdhi-sðtra (T #1493, 24.1094a, Chinese translation ca. 585–600); and the Karu«„-pu«^ar‡ka-sðtra, which speaks of one thousand years of the true and ³ve hundred years of the semblance teaching (T #157, 3.211b, Chinese translation a.d.s 414–421 [cf. T #158, 3.270a]); see Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 82–85.
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no doubt was inµuenced by the continuous war and social upheaval of his times, as well as by the ³nal uni³cation of the North and South under the Sui in 589. Within the North, the strife between the Eastern and Western Wei dynasties was long and fractious, and enmities ran deep on both sides— geographic, ethnic, ideological, and familial disputes had continuously rent the social fabric of the North from the fall of the Later Han in 222. These various tensions grew ever greater during the ³fth and sixth centuries, erupting in the civil war of 524–534 and the resultant establishment of the two Wei dynasties. These two states then continued to suffer internal wars until the 577 fall of the Northern Ch’i (changed from the Eastern Wei in 550). In 581 Yang-chien usurped the throne of the child emperor and declared the Sui dynasty, and in 589 his armies united the North and South for the ³rst time in over three hundred years. Within the Buddhist sangha, the wholesale suppression of 574–577 was a culmination of reaction against the abuse of privilege that seems to have characterized much of Buddhism during the Northern dynasties. In addition to the frequent charges of “foreignism” leveled by the Taoist clergy and Confucian of³cials alike, the Buddhist church was often attacked for being exempt from taxation at the same time that it carried out extensive commercial activities, for becoming sanctuaries for those wishing to escape corvée labor or criminal prosecution, as fraudulent estates set up by the landed gentry in order to avoid taxation, and the like. Reµecting the situation of the Buddhist institutions in this period, for example, the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, an important sutra of Chinese composition (whose ideas about the relationship between charity and monastic institution will be considered in more detail in chapter seven) describes the clergy this way: Sons of good family! Why in future generations will all the lay followers slight and look down upon the three jewels? It is precisely because monks and nuns do not conform to the dharma. While their bodies may be robed in the garment of the dharma, they belittle principle and trivialize conditionality. Some, furthermore, will engage in trade in the marketplace to support themselves. Some, furthermore, will tread the roads conducting business to seek pro³t. Some will engage in the trades of painters and artisans. Some will tell the fortunes of men and women, and divine various types of auspicious signs and evil omens. They will consume alcohol and under its inµuence become disorderly, sing, dance, or play music. Some will play chess. Some monks will preach the dharma obsequiously and with distortion in order to curry favor with the people. Some will recite magical spells to cure others’ illnesses. Some will, furthermore, practice meditation, but since they cannot focus their minds, they will employ heterodox methods of meditation in order to divine fortunes.
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Some will practice acupuncture and moxibustion (moxa cautery) and various other types of medicine as a means of seeking clothing and food.28
Although the internecine nature of the critique ³ts well with the tenor of the Indian tradition of decline (if the moral critique does not), the case was much more pressing in China, where the authorities, in apparent agreement with the above sentiments of the sangha, conducted wholesale suppressions of Buddhism.29
Finding One’s Time in the Decline Reµecting the traditional Chinese concern for history, an awareness of their physical and temporal distance from the Buddha,30 and, more importantly, their role as consumers of the decline tradition, we begin to ³nd the Chinese using these traditions to locate their own place in such a history. Kum„raj‡va, for example, whose translations often use the categories of “later ages,” “semblance teaching,” and even the ³rst use of the term mo fa,31 wrote in response to Hui-yuan’s lament of contemporary events that “a sutra says that in the end (=9) there will be in the East a bodhisattva who protects the dharma [referring to Hui-yuan?].”32 More speci³cally, Kum„raj‡va’s 28 T #2870, 85.1337b-c; English translation by Kyoko Tokuno, “The Book of Resolving Doubts Concerning the Semblance Dharma,” in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., editor, Buddhism in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 267; see also Kyoko Tokuno, “A Case Study of Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha: The ‘Hsiang-fa chüeh-i ching’,” (M.A. thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1983); Whalen Lai, “Dating the Hsiang-fa chueh-i ching,” 80–83; and chapter 7, below. 29 Indeed, the Northern Wei and Northern Chou persecutions of Buddhism were understood to give truth to the dire words of the canonical warnings, as Fei Chang-fang, laicized during the Northern Chou persecution, noted in his ruminations on the various predictions in his famous catalog of the scriptures, the Li tai san pao chi (T # 2034. 49.107b). Fei Changfang also assisted in the work of Narendrayašas, whose translations are so often cited in conjunction with the Chinese understanding of the decline (see above, note 24). 30 This was especially important in the ³fth and sixth centuries because of questions related to the “foreign-ness” of Buddhism and dating the Buddha’s lifetime (and hence the antiquity of Buddhism) in relation to Lao-tzu and Confucius; for an overview see Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China; The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1959), chapters 5 and 6, and “Prince Moonlight,” 18–19; see also Whalen Lai, “Dating the Hsiang-fa chueh-i ching” for a discussion of this issue in the context of the two periods of true and semblance teaching. 31
T #262, 9.37c; cf. the “reworked” edition of Jñ„nagupta and Dharmagupta, T #264, 9.172b.
T #2059, 50.359c. The Chinese =9 is more clearly related to the “latter age” or simply “the end” than the “last period of the dharma,” as rendered by Zürcher (Conquest, 247). 32
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biography of Ašvagho¤a recently discovered at the Nanatsu-dera in Nagoya makes use of a number of different traditions to locate Ašvagho¤a three hundred years after the demise of the Buddha, and also clearly mentions “approaching the end of the true teaching C±Àî=,” “the latter ³ve hundred years (92ßæ) when Nagarjuna will appear,” and “latter dharma (mo fa =À).”33 Even Emperor Kao-tsu (reigned 472–499), in an edict issued in 493, dated his era to the latter part of a thousand-year period of semblance teaching.34 Perhaps it was even this use of the timetables of decline for dating historical events that began a process that inevitably led to the belief that the time of decline was at hand as well as the eventual systematization of the timetables.35
33 Ochiai Toshinori %§pø, “Memyõ Bosatsuden” +k¬OŒ, Materials for the Fifth Meeting of the Nanatsu-dera Research Group, 2 (privately distributed manuscript); see also Ochiai Toshinori, “Kõshõjibon ‘Memyõ bosatsuden’ ni tsuite” ö¸±ûC+k¬OŒD rkJm, in Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 41/1 (1992): 293–99. 34
T #2103, 52.272b.
Other examples of dating historical personages according to the timetables of decline include T’an-ching, who, in a preface to the Chung lun recorded in the Ch’u san tsang chi chi (515), writes that N„g„rjuna lived during the latter period (mo yeh =è) of hsiang chiao …î, a period of conflict when humankind’s faculties are too diminished to see the truth (T #2145, 55.77a), and Seng-jui (355–439), who writes in the preface to the Ta chih tu lun that Ašvagho¤a was born during the balance of the true teaching and N„g„rjuna at the end of hsiang fa (T #1509, 25.57a–b). See the Chu san tsang chi chi record of this preface (T #2145, 55.74c–75b) translated in Robinson, Early M„dhyamika in India and China (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass reprint, 1976), 23–26 (mixing up the pagination of the two Taishõ entries); T’an-luan records that Vasubandhu lived during the “semblance teaching of the Tath„gata Š„kyamuni” (T #1819, 40.827a); Chih-i records the Bodhisattva Ašvagho¤a in the “sixth century” and N„g„rjuna in the “seventh century [after the Buddha]” (T #1705, 33.285b). See the Mah„m„y„-sðtra (Mo ho mo yeh ching, translation attributed to end of ³fth century), which reports that Ašvagho¤a will appear six hundred years after the Buddha, when the “ninety-six heretical paths and false views compete in the destruction of the Buddha-dharma,” but N„g„rjuna will appear one-hundred years after, “lighting the torch of the true teaching” (T #383, 12.1013c, attested by Chi-tsang, T #1824, 42.18b, T #1827, 42.233a, and T #1852, 45.6b). In his commentary on the Po lun (Šatakaš„stra) Chi-tsang also notes that the sutras and biographies do not agree about the dating of N„g„rjuna, listing among his sources the Preface to the Satyasiddhi of Seng-jui, which gives 350 years after the Buddha or “the end of the true teaching” as the time of Ašvagho¤a, and 530 or “the end of the semblance teaching” for N„g„rjuna; the Fa p’u t’i hsin yin yüan of Emperor Wu of the Liang, which gives the time of the true teaching for the time of Ašvagho¤a and the semblance teaching for N„g„rjuna; and the Mah„m„y„-sðtra as described above (T #1827, 42.233a–b, translated in Robinson, Early M„dhyamika, 23; cf. Ta sheng hsüan lun, T #1853, 45.72b). Chi-tsang also mentions the three periods of true, semblance, and ³nal teachings in the Shih erh men lun shu, T #1825, 42.179b; see also Étienne Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalak‡rti (translated by Sara Boin; London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1976), XCIV–XCVII; Chappell, “Early Forebodings” 37–39. 35
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Indigenous Scriptures We have seen that the writers of the Mahayana scriptures appropriated the notion of the decline of the true teaching (and possibly the idea of the “counterfeit” teaching) to their own scriptural agenda and began to produce sutras that self-consciously spoke to the decline trope. The Chinese also incorporated the idea of the decline into texts depicting the particularity of their situation in order to present their ideology of salvation for such a situation.36 In addition to the simple fact of producing “whole-cloth” buddhavacana, there is, indeed, much in the Chinese approach that parallels Mahayana sutra production. For example, the texts are often associated with an “underground” tradition,37 that as Michel Strickmann has noted, constitutes “a pristine tradition that has not been deformed or distorted by long prior transmission among men … both close to the thought of the Founder and particularly suitable for contemporary conditions.”38 Like their Indian and Taoist counterparts, indigenous Chinese scriptures anticipate the hostility of the entrenched orthodoxy, predicting the misfortune of those who would slander their message and the great merit of those who uphold it. It is 36 This is a vast topic that is only just beginning to make a substantial impact on our understanding of Chinese Buddhism. For more information I refer the reader to the standard works on indigenous Chinese scriptures: the doyen of apocryphal studies, Yabuki Keiki, published many of the earliest studies of Chinese apocrypha, including his Sangaikyõ no kenkyð; Meisha yoin (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1930); Meisha yoin kaisetsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1933); “Shina Bukkyõshi to genzon gikyõ,” Shðkyõ kenkyð, special volume, “Gendai Bukkyõ no kenkyð,” 1931. See also Makita Tairyõ’s ñ,áV epochal Gikyõ kenkyð ”™ÓÁ (Kyoto: Jinbun kagaku kenkyðjo, 1976); for a discussion of the recent discoveries at Nanatsu-dera, including the oldest extanct Chinese apocrypha and texts of the San-chieih-chiao, see Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of Nanatsu-dera; many important studies can be found in R. E. Buswell, Jr., ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha; for stimulating and provocative comments and resources dealing with apocrypha and eschatology see especially Michel Strickmann, “The Consecration Sðtra;” see also Kamata Shigeo, Chðgoku Bukkyõshi vol. 2 (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1983), 169–273; Antonino Forte, Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century (Naples: Istuto Universitario Orientale, 1976); and Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight.” 37 For example, the bodhisattvas springing up from the ground in the Lotus (which Minoru Kiyota used to liken to “underground cells of revolutionaries”), the entrusting of the Mahayana scriptures to the n„ga kings, the tradition that the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra will vanish into the earth, and Tibetan gter-ma. Among the Chinese scriptures that pick up this theme we can cite the Fa mieh chin ching, which predicts that the teaching will ³nally disappear when all the texts vanish into the earth (T #396); we can also note that Ching-wan, who carved the entire canon in stone in order to protect it, literally buried the canon underground in a cave and left a message at the entrance that the cave contained a copy of the Nirvana Sutra to be removed after the Buddha’s teaching disappeared (see below, 71–72). 38
Strickmann, “The Consecration Sðtra,” 89.
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perhaps this same association that renders the ³nal words of the Buddha such an obvious inspiration for apocrypha, reµected in the many texts of the nieh pan (nirvana) Ãæ tradition. The discovery of so many lost apocrypha at Tun-huang that include strong eschatological belief indicates as perhaps nothing else just how prevalent these ideas were, and, indeed, their “going underground” served to safeguard them for our later age—a “subterranean spring of symbolic resources.”39 Among the best known of these texts we can count the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching quoted above, a text widely cited by the most inµuential Buddhist writers of the Northern Dyanasties, the Sui, and early T’ang. Another text discovered at Tun-huang that was particularly inµuential in the formulation of Hui-ssu’s ideas about the decline of the dharma (discussed below) was the Miao sheng ching ting U§Ï÷, a text that similarly catalogs the bickering and worldliness of the sangha, the laity’s loss of respect, social disruption, and eventual chaos and upheaval.40 The exhortation of this text, as with so many of this period, is to leave society behind for the deserted mountains and forests, where an increased rigor in meditation, repentance, and puri³cation practices will yet enable advance. In spite of the many advances and new research in the ³eld of indigenous scriptures, much more work is needed before a comprehensive and detailed history of the Chinese interest in and development of the decline tradition can be attempted. What is undeniable, however, is just how common this interest was.
Systematization: the decline is now All those who toil through the plethora of Buddhist texts, concepts, and dating schemes relating the decline of the teachings can well appreciate the similar task faced by the Chinese some ³fteen hundred years ago, and it is to this labor that we owe the well-known scheme of the “three periods of the teaching.”41 If we are looking for a motive for the creation of the tripartite 39
O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse, 55.
On the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching see note 28 above; the Miao sheng ching ting was listed in the K’ai yüan lu as an apocryphal text, Tripitaka Koreana #1062, 31.1237a; for a study of the Miao sheng ching ting see Sekiguchi Shindai, Tendai shikan no kenkyð (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 379–402. 40
41 Chi-tsang is among the eminent scholars of this period who gathered materials on the traditions of decline in his Chung kuan lun shu, including a reference to a scheme from the Ku nieh p’an ching system of true teaching, 1,000 years, semblance teaching, 1,000 years, and ³nal teaching, 10,000 years (T #1824, 42.18a–c, T #1852, 45.6b); for other references see Fei
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scheme, we should probably begin with the simple need for harmonizing (or at least making sense of) the various schemes that presented themselves in translated texts, exactly the same need that fueled the great systematization of the p’an chiao systems. Indeed, it is my contention that the various systems of organizing the teachings along a continuum of decline should be seen as but another variant of p’an chiao, including the polemic and/or apologetic hermeneutics of such organizing schemes. That is to say, in the Indian “production” stage of the decline tradition, we are dealing with disparate units of oral and literary tradition deployed in a polemic fashion and not with a coherent or systematized doctrine of decline. In China, however, things change. As with so many other discrete tropes, texts, and individual teachers from the Indian tradition, in China the disparate units of the decline tradition were combined and organized until they coalesced and came to be thought of as a coherent system or doctrine of decline. Nonetheless, perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that it is not the tripartite system per se that is important—indeed, as I argue in Chapter Four, I doubt that this particular system was nearly as widely accepted during the Sui and T’ang as we have come to think, and even the Three Levels movement was not based on the system of the three periods of the dharma. If not the tripartite system itself, what, then, is important? It is simply that the combining of the discrete tropes of the polemic of decline into a doctrine of decline elicited a response that, while not precluding the earlier impulse to conservation and preservation, often demanded entirely new systems of doctrine and practice. It is this imperative (or license) to respond that is new and different in both China and Japan. Although by no means the only or even the most important systematization of the decline teaching, the ³rst scheme of three periods of the dharma is attributed to Hui-ssu (515–577), the second patriarch of the T’ien-t’ai school, in the Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih yüan wen.42 He is also among Chang-fang, T #2034, 49.23a; Tao-shih, in his encyclopedic Fa yüan chu lin (688), lists over ³fteen sources of the decline tradition, T #2122, 53.1005a–1013a; Wonch’uk (613–696), in his commentary on the Jen wan ching, organizes the material in terms of the three periods of the teaching (T #1708 33.425b–426b); Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592) also lists the three stages of true (500 years), semblance (1000 years), and ³nal (10,000 years) in his Wu liang shou ching i shu (T #1745, 37.116a), as does Chih-p’an (1258–1269) in his Fo tsu t’ung chi (T #2035, 49.299b ff). T #1933, 46.786b ff. (compiled 558). The authorship of this work has been the subject of some controversy since Etani Ryðkai ˆúNw ³rst raised questions in “Nangaku Eshi no rissei ganmon wa gisaku ka” ÇÀŠ„uC½Xkv‡6Q, Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 6/2 (1958): 524–27; see also Paul Magnin, La vie et l’oeuvre de Huisi Š„ (515–577), (Paris: EFEO, 1979), 104–17; more recently Wakae Kenzõ has argued anew the authenticity of Hui-ssu’s authorship in “Chðgoku ni okeru shõzõmatsusanji no nendaikan,” Tõyõ Tetsugaku Kenkyðjo kiyõ 5 (1989): 1–23. 42
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the earliest advocates of the arrival of the latter age of decay. Apparently inµuenced by his personal experience of the turmoil in Northern China and the corruption of his fellow monks43 (as well, of course, as the many scriptural traditions of decline), Hui-ssu set forth a system of the duration of the teaching as follows: true teaching, ³ve hundred years; semblance teaching, one thousand years; ³nal teaching, ten thousand years.44 Hui-ssu conceived the ³nal period of the dharma (mo fa) to have begun in a.d. 433 (434)45 and so calculated that it would last until a.d. 10433.46 Thus, in relating the events of his life in the Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih yüan wen, Hui-ssu always prefaced the entry with the date and year of the mo fa period that it related to, for example: “At age 43, the 124th year of the mo fa era, in the state of Nan-ting.” 47 This text is signi³cant not only for the tripartite system that it bequeathed to future generations and the strong sense that the decline predicted in the “textually embodied community of discourse founded in the 43 His beliefs were no doubt influenced by the repeated attempts made on his life at the hands of religious rivals; cf. T #1933, 46.787b. 44 T #1933, 46.786c. The source of his tripartite scheme, as well as the source of his strong belief in the immanence of the decline, remains unclear, as the texts that are usually mentioned in connection with this theory, the Ji tsang fen and the Yüeh tsang fen, were not translated until some years after Hui-ssu wrote his Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih yüan wen. Yamada has argued the possibility that Hui-ssu was on familiar terms with Narendrayašas, the translator of the texts, who arrived in the capital city of Ye in 556 (Yamada, “Mappõ shisõ ni tsuite,” 55) but still, neither of these texts puts forth a three-period theory of mo fa. Nattier has dismissed the possibility of a meeting between Hui-ssu and Narendrayašas as merely hypothetical (Once Upon a Future Time, 110–17), although another text attributed to Hui-ssu, the Chu fa wu cheng san mei fa men, cites the Ta chi ching (perhaps corresponding to the extant Ta chi ching, T #397, 13.236b, translated by Narendrayašas) regarding the Buddha’s prophecy to King Bimbis„ra about evil monks who will appear in the future (T #1923, 46.638c), which Wakae takes as proof that Hui-ssu did in fact see the Ta chi ching (if not actually meet with Narendrayašas). The Miao sheng ching ting mentioned a few pages above is an indigenous scripture centrally concerned with monastic corruption, social chaos, and the demise of the Buddha-dharma that had a great influence on Hui-ssu; see Sekiguchi, Tendai shikan no kenkyð. For further biography of Hui-ssu see also Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i (538–597): An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese Buddhist Monk, Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 12 (1960–62): 86–99; and Magnin, La vie et l’oeuvre de Huisi. 45
Wakae, “Chðgoku ni okeru shõzõmatsusanji no nendaikan,” 12.
T #1923, 46.786b–c. Calculated from the date of the Buddha’s parinirv„«a, which Hui-ssu ³gured to have been in 1068 b.c., thus making 1067 b.c. the ³rst year of the saddharma. 46
47 T #1923, 46.787b. During the period of mo fa Hui-ssu believed that one must work harder than ever for emancipation, working tirelessly for the salvation of all sentient beings. Thus the Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih yüan wen contains a long series of vows in which he pledges to work for the salvation of all living beings (e.g., T #1923, 46.787c, 790c, etc.). See also his biography in the Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.562c, “In my heart I said to myself that in Šaka’s ³nal teaching I have received the teaching of the Lotus.”
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accepted canon” is here and now, but also for its invention of the ten thousand–year ³nal period of the teachings. Given the “all” or “everything” connotation of the number ten thousand in the Chinese scheme of things (e.g., wan wu ©] “everything,” or wan sui ©ñ “long life,” “forever”) the use of ten thousand years for the ³nal period once again clearly indicates that the purport of the decline tradition is not a matter of lamenting the loss of the teaching but rather its continued presence. Certainly one of the most striking responses to the belief in the arrival of the age of decline was the carving of the sutras on stone slabs to preserve them through the long dark age.48 In 605 a disciple of Hui-ssu, Ching-wan _ ÷=, built the Yung-chu ssu ²Ê± at the foot of the Shih-ching hill, approximately seventy-³ve kilometers southwest of modern-day Beijing. He then began the project of carving the entire Tripi¦ika in stone. As his record of 628 states: The true teaching and the semblance teaching will last 1500 years. Now, this 2nd year of the Chen-kuan period (628) corresponds to the 75th year of the period of the ³nal teaching. In the future, when the teachings of the Buddha have been totally destroyed, may these sutras carved in stone appear and be made known in the world.49
48 The impulse to preserve texts is limited to neither the past nor the Buddhist tradition, as shown by the fund-raising project of Terrence Cunningham, a Unitarian who wants to build a rocket ship to deposit “an indestructible copy of the Holy Bible on the moon for safekeeping” to ensure that “the Bible would be preserved against tampering or in case civilization is destroyed on Earth from plagues, wars, or, in his words, ‘acts of God’,” according to Chuck Shepherd, “News of the Weird,” Valley Optimist, September 14–20 (1995), 34. Buddhists, too, continue their efforts, according to Sharon Salzberg, who noted that on one of her visits to Burma, “somebody took us to a place where they had donated a great deal of money to construct an area for stone slabs on which the entire Tripitika (the original Buddhist canon) was being engraved. It was like a graveyard, stone slab after stone slab, with people etching out every word in order to preserve the dharma. On a deeper level the dharma is preserved only through the realization of beings. It’s not preserved as a body of knowledge but in the buddhahood of each realized being,” Tricycle 2/3(Spring 93), 22; note that her comments reflect the orthopraxy over orthodoxy bias discussed in chapter 2. 49 Quoted in Michibata Ryõshð, Chðgoku Bukkyõshi (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1939), 104. Although Ching-wan was not able to complete his task of carving the entire Tripitika, the project was continued until the Ming dynasty, with a total of 1,031 texts in 3,474 chüan carved on 15,143 separate stone slabs entombed as a precaution against the disappearance of the Buddha-dharma. See Li Jung-hsi, “The Stone Scriptures of Fang-shan,” Eastern Buddhist 12/1 (1979), 104; and Lewis R. Lancaster, “The Rock Cut Canon in China: Findings at Fang-shan,” in Tadeusz Skorupski, ed., The Buddhist Heritage (Tring, U.K.: The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989); see especially 154–56 for an assessment of the value of this canon for Buddhist textual studies. See also Kamata Shigeo, Chðgoku Bukkyõshi vol. 5 (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1994), 504–510 for other examples of scriptures carved in stone.
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The staggering enormity of the task aside, these texts, as their purpose dictated, now serve scholars as an unequalled source of information about the Chinese canon, unadulterated by the interpolations and redactions of later ages. Another monk of a slightly earlier date who felt the same impulse to preserve the teaching in stone was Ling-yü [È (518–605). In 589 Ling-yü established a monastery atop Pao-shan and proceeded to carve a Buddha image and to engrave the walls with sections from well-known sutras such as the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, the Lotus Sðtra, and the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra. His sense of foreboding is clearly indicated by the prominent position given the chapter on the “Destruction of the Teachings” from the Yüeh tsang fen.50
Tao-ch’o and the Decline of the Teaching Most often cited in conjunction with the tradition of decline, of course, are those who taught the Pure Land path, and it is also their use of the tradition that is most consonant with Hsin-hsing’s teachings.51 The ³rst Pure Land teacher to incorporate the doctrine of decline with his Pure Land teachings was Tao-ch’o (562–645), a Northern monk who possibly shared a preceptual lineage with Hsin-hsing. Tao-ch’o used the ³vefold theory of the Yüeh tsang fen as well as the theory of the three periods in his teachings.52 Two of the several interpolations in Tao-ch’o’s version of the Yüeh tsang fen 50 Michibata, Chðgoku Bukkyõshi, 106. After an on-site study of these caves, Tokiwa Daijõ concluded that Hsin-hsing, if not an actual disciple of Ling-yü, was at least in his “doctrinal lineage” (Tokiwa Daijõ, “Sangaikyõ no bodai toshite no Hõzanji,” 35–56); see also chapter 1. 51 As with the tripartite scheme, however, we probably will need to adjust our dating of this concern as well as the organizing schemes. Kenneth K. Tanaka, for example, in his study of Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592), ³nds no “evidence of concern for this eschatological doctrine of the Last Period of Dharma in the Commentary [on the Visualization Sutra], the Wu liang shou ching i shu or Hui-yüan’s other commentaries” (Tanaka, The Dawn of Chinese Pure Land Buddhist Doctrine [Albany: SUNY Press, 1990], 111); see also p. 43. Hui-yüan is, however, at least aware of the tripartite scheme of true, semblance, and ³nal teaching, as his commentary Wu liang shou ching i shu shows (T #1745, 37.116a). The same lack of concern with the tripartite system and mo fa is also evident in Shan-tao’s works, where neither appear often.
T #1958, 47.13c. According to the “³ve ³ve-hundreds” timetable found in the “Chapter on Jambudv‡pa” in the Yüeh tsang fen, in the ³rst ³ve hundred years after the Buddha’s nirvana the understanding of the Buddha-dharma will remain strong; in the next ³ve hundred years the practice of meditation will remain ³rm; in the next ³ve hundred years the monks will remain strong in the reading and chanting of the sutras; in the fourth ³ve hundred year period the practice of building stupas will remain ³rm; and in the ³nal ³ve hundred years the true teaching will degenerate and only chaos and disharmony will remain ³rm (T #397, 13.363a–b); on Tao-ch’o and the decline of the dharma see David Chappell, “Tao-ch’o (562–645): A Pioneer of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University 1976), esp. 138–212. 52
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are particularly interesting for the light they shed on the apologetic purposes of his use of the decline tradition. The ³rst is that to the ³fth 500 years he has added “the good teaching will faintly exist”53 where the Yüeh tsang fen has simply “in the last ³ve hundred years they will be quarrelsome and contentious, causing the pure teaching to sink, and then only chaos and destruction will remain ³rm.”54 Although Kazue Kyõichi has noted that this sounds more like a description of the period of the semblance teaching than of the ³nal teaching, when the true teaching is supposed to be totally extinct,55 we must remember that the “latter time” (pašcimak„la) rarely (if ever) meant a time of no teaching. We should rather see here the attempt to integrate the ³ve ³ve-hundreds notion of a time in which the teaching is completely gone with the notion of a “latter time,” in which things may be tough, but the teaching is still available, as long as you know which teaching is the appropriate teaching. Thus, in the Sutra on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life, the Buddha states, “In the future world the sutras will become extinct but out of my compassion and pity I will cause this sutra [the Sutra on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life] to remain for one hundred years. Living beings who encounter this sutra will all be able to realize salvation in accordance with their aspirations.”56 The purpose of Tao-ch’o’s interpolations is even clearer in his redaction of the fourth ³ve hundred years, where he has added the practice of “meritorious confession” to that of building stupas as appropriate practices for the time. Tao-ch’o then comments: “Reckoning the time of the present-day sentient beings, the age in which they live corresponds to the fourth 500 years after the Buddha left this world. Truly this is the period in which confession and the cultivation of merits is none other than the calling of the Buddha’s name.”57 This also echoes the Mahayana use of the decline tradition as a rhetoric of legitimization for a particularly or even uniquely ef³cacious teaching, explaining how the teachings of the Pure Land would still be viable even in the ³nal age of the teaching.58 Although Tao-ch’o’s attempts to ³t the various periods of the teaching to his own times and visions are interesting, for our purposes more important than the actual division is the assertion of the fundamental folly of sentient 53
T #1958, 47.4b.
54
T #397, 13.363b.
55
Kazue Kyõichi, Nihon no mappõ shisõ (Tokyo: Kõbundo, 1961), 123.
56
T #360, 12.279a.
57
T #1958, 47.4b.
See the An lo chi, T #1958, 47.5c and 47.18b for his contextualization of the three periods of the dharma, the ³ve corruptions, the ³ve periods, and the like. 58
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beings and the rhetoric of doctrinal legitimization that frames Tao-ch’o’s division of the Buddha-dharma, clearly echoing Hsin-hsing’s teachings. This is unlike the earlier Mahayana polemic, which took its teachings to be particularly ef³cacious in the time of decline due to their superior truth value, and also unlike the Hua-yen system of graded teachings or a Tibetan siddh„nta text. That is to say, it is not that the Pure Land teachings are considered propositionally more sophisticated or true than any others, taught in the pristine and uncompromised moment of the Buddha’s initial experience or culminating insight, but that they were practically or soteriologically more appropriate because more dif³cult teachings, taught to bodhisattvas and beings of superior capacity, could not guarantee salvation for the degenerate beings of the current age. Thus Tao-ch’o stated that, “if the teaching is appropriate [lit. ‘attends’ fu ?] to the time and capacity the practice is easy and understanding is easy. If the capacity, teaching, and time are opposed then practice is dif³cult and entrance is dif³cult.”59
Summary Although the terms, level of interest, and systematization differ from one text to the next and from one monk to the next, the great impact of the Indian rhetoric of decline in the already apocalyptically inclined Chinese context is undeniable. The similarity of content, literary form, and polemic intent is striking, although the millennial and messianic currents of the indigenous traditions were largely lacking in the Indian Buddhist texts. At the same time that these native currents had a huge impact on the Buddhist teachings (transforming Maitreya from a Buddha of the impossibly distant future into a messianic beacon of revolutionary fervor), the rhetoric of decline as a polemic of orthodoxy also began a slow evolution. Though the decline of the Buddha’s teachings was originally conceived neither as a doctrinal tenet nor as an issue of religious or social practice, the Chinese, as consumers of this rhetoric of orthodoxy clothed in the language of decline and argued in the form of prophecy, took it to be buddhavacana and thus could not help but try to understand its place in the overall scheme of Buddhist doctrine. Thus, outside the polemic or rhetorical context of its birth, the idea of decline did become a speci³c doctrinal tenet, demanding the same attempts at organization and systematization within the totality of the received scriptural tradition as did other doctrines—hence the various organizational schemes, including the three periods of true teaching, sem59 T #1958. 47.4a; for a comparison of other Sui-T’ang responses to the doctrine of the destruction of the teachings see David Chappell, Tao-ch’o, 200–12.
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blance teaching, and ³nal teaching. Doing the math on the chronological tables, Chinese Buddhists also came to believe that the predicted age had arrived. At the same time, however, the import of the apologetic or polemic rhetoric was not lost on the Chinese. Drawing from the Mahayana tradition that allowed the full presence of the truth of the teaching even during the so-called time when the “saddharma is in the process of decay” (or at least particular expressions of that full presence) together with the equally powerful rhetoric of the skill in means of the Buddha as teacher, the decline tradition opened the door for new interpretations and practices that would be properly suited for degenerate sentient beings not capable of practicing the dif³cult path of the Buddhas. That is to say, it became a measure by which to interpret the multitude of scriptures and provided a pragmatic or soteriological rationale for so doing. Thus the rhetoric of orthodoxy and decline combined with the rhetoric of up„ya to allow, or even demand, new horizons of religious doctrine and institution. Let us now turn, then, to the San-chieh-chiao vision of those horizons.
4. Hsin-hsing: Decline as Human Nature
W
ithout question the corrupted capacity of sentient beings for religious practice and realization is the single most important theme in Hsin-hsing’s doctrine and practice. Hsin-hsing was born in 540 and began his spiritual quest at a young age, about the same time as Emperor Wu began his wholesale persecution of Buddhism and Hui-ssu composed the Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih yüan wen stating his strong belief that the age of decline had arrived. No doubt the same conditions that motivated Hui-ssu, in combination with scriptural predictions and warnings, prompted Hsin-hsing to formulate his division of sentient beings into three levels according to their capacity for practice and realization. As Wei Shu yo wrote in the eighth century, “[Hsin-hsing] said that there are three grades (san teng Xf) of people: the wise, the stupid, and those in-between (the ordinary). Because of these teachings it is called the Three Levels (san chieh X‰).”1 Hsin-hsing believed that the living beings of his world were primarily of the third level, which is to say ensnared by perverted views and hence incapable of achieving a correct understanding of the Buddha-dharma. Although the powerful implications of the decline tradition were equally evident to some of Hsin-hsing’s contemporaries, notably the preachers of the Pure Land path such as Tao-ch’o and Shan-tao, we shall see that the means by which Hsin-hsing felt one could achieve liberation were diametrically opposed to those espoused by the followers of the Pure Land path.
The Three Levels and Mo fa As mentioned above, Hsin-hsing’s three levels were primarily based on divisions of human capacity, divisions that do not really correspond to the three periods of the true, semblance, and ³nal dharma as described by Hui-ssu and other Buddhist thinkers. The three levels of the San-chiehchiao correspond more to humankind’s capacity or potential than to three 1 Wei Shu, Liang ching hsin chi (8th century), in the Pai pu ts’ung shu (Taipei: I wen yin shu kuan, 1965–1971), chuan 3, p. 14.
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stages of time or the dharma’s persistence. Still, a conformity between the three periods and the three levels and particularly between the third level and mo fa, the third and ³nal period of the dharma, has been assumed by virtually all who have written on the subject of mo fa or the San-chieh movement (including me).2 Because this correspondence would indicate the widespread diffusion of the concept of mo fa and the three periods during the Sui and early T’ang, numerous studies have further used it as a reference for the dating of texts, authors, and other traditions (including, for example, the writing of Hui-ssu described in chapter 3). Recently, however, I studied the extant texts of the Three Levels movement more thoroughly and discovered, rather to my chagrin, that mo fa barely ³gures in them at all, and the three periods of the dharma not at all. The “three levels” have nothing to do with the “three periods”!3 Separating the levels of Hsin-hsing’s teachings from the chronological periods of the dharma is thus important in understanding the more existential thrust of his understanding of the rhetoric of decline. What do I mean when I claim that mo fa barely ³gures at all in Hsinhsing’s writings? When we search through the extant texts attributed to him or his followers, amounting to nearly two hundred thousand Chinese characters (roughly equivalent to some one hundred and twenty pages of the printed Taishõ canon), we ³nd only nine occurrences of the term and not a single usage in the context of the last or ³nal of three periods or stages of the dharma’s decline. Indeed, there is only one occurrence that even links mo fa to the third level (in the San chieh fo fa mi chi, a later commentary), and, interestingly, this sole linkage to sentient beings of the third level is in the context of those with the capacity of the ³rst level recognizing the evil of those of the third level, indicating that both can exist at the same time, which would be impossible, of course, if the three levels described a strictly chronological decline.4 As a further indication that the three levels are not linked to the three periods of the dharma, the other two terms of the three-period systematization, cheng fa (saddharma) and hsiang fa (saddharma-pratirðpaka), 2 For example, in the title of my dissertation, “Salvation in the Final Period of the Dharma: The Inexhaustible Storehouse of the San-chieh-chiao”; see also pp. 2, 3, 59, passim; Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 283–382. 3 The textual details of my argument can be found in Hubbard, “Mo fa, the Three Levels Movement, and the Theory of the Three Periods,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 19/1 (1996): 1–17. I have also investigated the text of the Chih fa, a manual of monastic regulations written by Hsin-hsing, which also contains one instance of the term mo fa (Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, p. 597), but its usage is no different from the few other San-chieh uses of mo fa and does not affect my conclusions. 4
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 95; cf. Hubbard, “Mo fa, the Three Levels Movement,” 10.
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never appear together with mo fa in the extant texts.5 Finally, none of the uses of mo fa in these texts assigns it a speci³c duration, much less the ten thousand years that is the hallmark of East Asian mo fa teaching. With regard to Hsin-hsing’s use of mo fa, then, we ³nd that it: does not indicate any awareness of a prior or commonly used three-part
timetable of the dharma’s decline; is not used in the San-chieh texts as part of such a three-part timetable of decline; is not used in conjunction with saddharma or saddharma-pratirðpaka, the other two components of the three-period scheme;6 is never used in the San-chieh texts with any timetable of speci³c duration or to denote a speci³c term of the dharma’s duration/decline;7 is not used to create a new three-part timetable or schema; is not even used to identify its own third level, with the single exception of the later commentarial work, the San chieh fo fa mi chi.
We must conclude, therefore, that the levels of the Three Levels are not based on or even related to the tripartite scheme, in spite of the similarity of name and the three periods having been systematized in Northern China at roughly the same time as Hsin-hsing’s movement took shape. This in turn has a number of implications for our study and understanding of the development of this important doctrine, ³rst and foremost of which is simply that in the late sixth century the system of the three periods of the dharma was not as widely accepted as scholars previously thought, perhaps not widely known at all. Hence, the dating of the widespread acceptance of this system even in China should be reconsidered. Inasmuch as the dating of many 5 Similarly, though the term hsiang fa appears some thirty-four times in San-chieh texts, only two are in the context of the two periods of cheng fa and hsiang fa. 6 Not only do they not appear together, but, like mo fa, these terms are virtually never used with regard to speci³c time-spans for the duration of the dharma. Hsiang fa, for example, occurs almost exclusively within the title of the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, its derivative text, the Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching, or referring to the Lotus Sutra chapter on the Bodhisattva Sad„paribhðta, and only once with an accompanying duration (Hsin-hsing k’ou chi chen ju shih kuan ch’i hsu =‘ST³ØÄÖ˜Ÿ [Stein #212; Giles #5858; Pao-tsang 2.276a–280a; in Yabuki Keiki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974 reprint], 198). This ³ts very well with Jan Nattier’s conclusions about the Indian usage of hsiang fa and mo fa (or the latter’s variant mo shih); see Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 95–110.
I have also not found any example of a speci³c duration for the third level: although there are several different times given to mark the beginning of the time when sentient beings with the capacity of the third level will dominate, there is nothing to indicate that this is a period of ³xed duration. Also (and tellingly in a search for indications of the three-period scheme), there is no use of the 10,000-year motif. 7
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translations (e.g., those of Narendrayašas), indigenous scriptures (e.g., the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching), and historical ³gures and their writings (e.g., Huissu) are often tied to dating the advent of this scheme, much of this, too, will need to be rethought if my conclusions are correct. How, then, is mo fa used in the San-chieh texts? According to the texts cited (the Lotus Sutra, Nirvana Sutra, and Dašacakra Sutra), mo fa is used not to refer to a particular period in a formal system of time periods but to mean simply the “after years,” the time following the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana, e.g., “after the Buddha has left the world the preachers of the latter dharma (mo fa fa shih =ÀÀ‚) will explain many teachings.”8 In other words, mo fa =À is a cognate for mo shih =› or hou shih 9›. It is important to remember, however, that although mo fa is not used as part of a threeperiod scheme of the dharma’s decline, the “latter age, after the Tath„gata’s extinction,” whether called mo fa, mo shih, or hou shih, is nonetheless rhetorically envisioned as the “time of the destruction of the true dharma” (Chin. fa mieh Àn; Skt. saddharmavipralope vartam„ne).9 In other words, I am not denying the connotative resonance of Hsin-hsing’s usage of mo fa (or mo shih) as “latter dharma” with mo fa as the “³nal dharma” of three periods of the dharma vis-à-vis the destruction of the dharma, but more simply the presence of this latter scheme—and its sense of temporal periodization—within the texts of the Three Levels movement. If the three levels are focussed on the rhetoric of decline but not theoretically concerned with the speci³c time spans of the three periods, what then are they concerned with? Two themes dominate the discussion of the three levels: (1) capacity (ken chi Ín), the fundamental determinant of the different levels; and (2) the teachings appropriate to each level or capacity, i.e., the “Buddha-dharma of the ³rst level,” the “Buddha-dharma of the second level,” and, most importantly, the “Buddha-dharma of the third level” (ti san chieh fo fa ÙX‰MÀ). Because the differing levels of capacity determine the appropriate teachings, in a sense the teachings are dependent on the capacity, and the idea of the “teachings appropriate to the capacity” is also related to the sense of legitimization found in the Mahayana use of the decline motif. Because, however, the Lotus Sutra and the like did not proclaim the actual advent of the time of decline, the reasoning is quite different.
8
Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 159.
See, for example, T #262, 9.38c: “In the latter ³nal age, at the time when the dharma is about to perish ê9=›Àòn´”; see chapter 2, note 44. 9
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The First Level The ³rst level corresponds to that of the living beings who have the capacity for the teachings of the Ekay„na, the one vehicle. Because Hsinhsing’s emphasis was on potential for realization rather than a strictly de³ned chronological schema and because the most important part of Hsinhsing’s teaching was that of the third level, we ³nd little discussion in the extant texts regarding the time of the ³rst level. Rather, most references to temporal divisions are indirect and refer rather to the extinction of sentient beings with the capacity for correct views. For example, the following passages give completely different times for each of the levels: By way of these various illustrations it should be known that all of the sages and living beings with good roots for the true, the virtuous, and correct views will be completely extinguished either [a] after the Buddha’s extinction, or [b] ³ve hundred years after the Buddha’s extinction, or [c] one thousand years after the Buddha’s extinction.10 There are three time divisions. When the Buddha is in the world the Buddha himself maintains and upholds the Buddha-dharma; this level is determined as the First Level.11 All of the Buddha-dharma of the ³rst level … belongs to the ³rst 500 years after the Buddha’s ³nal enlightenment.12 The time when persons of correct views will appear in the world is while the Buddha is in the world and within 1500 years after his nirvana.13
Generally, however, the distinction is not temporal but between the appearance in the world of beings with the capacity for correct views and everything subsequent; as seen above, this places the emphasis on the capacity of sentient beings, especially the capacity of those in the de³led world in which Hsin-hsing believed he lived. Nishimoto Teruma has recently argued that even this adaptation of the levels to a temporal scheme is a development of the later San-chieh tradition, not evidenced in the earlier writings, which were more strictly concerned with level as capacity.14 Considering the diversity 10
San chieh fo fa, 303.
11
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75.
12
San chieh fo fa, 302.
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 129; cf. Kimura Kiyotaka, “Shingyõ no jikikan to sono igi,” Nippon Bukkyõ gakkai nenpõ 49 (1982), 174. 13
14 Nishimoto Teruma, “Sangaikyõtenseki ni okeru ‘kai’ no yõhõ,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 40/2 (1992): 86–89.
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of the sources regarding the various stages of the dharma as seen in chapters 2 and 3 and Hsin-hsing’s emphasis on the teachings and practice appropriate to the capacity, the lack of concern with an actual time frame does not seem odd. Usually, therefore, the time of the “level of sages and sentient beings with correct views” is µexible, lasting either 500 or 1000 years after the nirvana of the Buddha; more importantly, however, is the fact that it is discussed only in reference to the passing of such a time. All beings of the ³rst level are said to have the capacity for the Ekay„na doctrines. Though some may transgress the precepts, all have the good roots for correct views, clinging to neither the extreme view of existence nor to the extreme view of emptiness: It is taught that within the Buddha-dharma of the ³rst level are all bodhisattvas who have the capacity for the Ekay„na: sages (sheng jen ¸^) who have perfected the correct views and possess all of the good roots for keeping both the precepts and the views; ordinary people (fan p’u þ&) who have perfected the correct views and have all of the good roots [necessary] for the true and the virtuous, and transgress neither the precepts nor the views; and ordinary people who have perfected the correct views and have the good roots for not transgressing the views [i.e., do not have false views] though they may go against the precepts.15
The place of the ³rst level was conceived to be the Pure Land in which there are no de³lements and the Ekay„na doctrines are ceaselessly preached; although there are Ekay„na bodhisattvas, sages, and ordinary people, there are no sravakas or pratyekabuddhas. The place of the ³rst level is the world of the Ekay„na, which is also called the Pure Land or the World of the Store of Lotus Flowers. It is eternally pure and, though buddhas and bodhisattvas dwell therein, there are no sravakas or pratyekabuddhas.16
Interestingly enough, the place of practice is said to be quiet retreats in mountains and forests as well as amidst the hustle and bustle of the cities: 15 San chieh fo fa, 267–68. The two terms used within the San-chieh texts to denote capacity or ability to receive and understand the dharma are ken chi Ín and li ken 2Í. Although the latter term, translated as “keen roots” or “good roots,” usually includes a positive qualitative nuance, within the San-chieh literature it is used simply to mean capacity, as seen in the oft-used expression for the beings of the third level, those with “the keen roots for the capacity [for attachment] to the views of existence and emptiness.” 16
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75.
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The second section clari³es the reasons that the places of liberation are not the same for the three levels; this has three sections. The ³rst section concerns the place from which the ordinary people and bodhisattvas of the ³rst level, who have the capacity for the Ekay„na, enter the path. Without question of city or town, mountain or forest, in both the quiet and the confused, they gain the path. Why is this? Because from the beginningless past they have studied the universal practice.17
That is, for those of proper understanding and practice (“universal practice”), it is all right to either isolate oneself from others or to practice amid the distractions of urban life because, as discussed in chapter 5, both methods partake equally of the ultimate truth of nonduality.
The Second Level The teachings appropriate to the second level are those of the three vehicles, the Triy„na, because the beings of the second level are able to understand and practice those speci³c doctrines. The duration of this level is also listed as 500, 1000, or 1500 years, depending on the source, though this level is frequently lumped together with the ³rst level in contrast to the third level. This is best seen as reµecting Hsin-hsing’s lack of concern with the temporal, reinforcing the interpretation of “level” as more concerned with capacity and teachings appropriate to that capacity than time periods. For example, [The world of] one thousand ³ve hundred years after the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana is determined to correspond to the second level, because there will be sages and ordinary people with the good roots for the perfection of the correct views who will maintain and uphold the Buddha-dharma.18 The level belonging to one thousand years after the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana … is the Buddha-dharma of the second level.19
The place of the second level is the de³led world (hui t’u JF) with the ³ve de³lements or impurities that appear in a degenerate age. The place of the second and third levels is the same, that is, the world of the Triy„na. It is also called the world of the ³ve de³lements20 and various evils, 17
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 125.
18
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75.
19
San chieh fo fa, 302.
The ³ve impurities that appear during a degenerate period: decay of kalpa, life span, kleša, d£¤¦i, and living beings. 20
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the Sah„ world, the world of blindness, the three worlds of the burning house … this is none other than [the world] of sentient beings with the [attachment to] the view of emptiness and the view of existence. It is also called the world of the ten evils and sentient beings [with the capacity for] the Triy„na.21
As for the place of practice the Practice in Accord with the Capacity states: The sentient beings of the Triy„na capacity of the second level enter the path only in quiet places and not in the cities and towns. Why is this? Because from the time when they entered the Buddha-dharma onward they have always studied [and cultivated] the roots for meditative calm; therefore they are only able to develop the path in a quiet place.22
In other words, the meditative traditions of the Triy„na require a calm and quiet environment and are not suitable for the profane world of the marketplace. The beings of this level are those who have the good roots and capacity for the Triy„na, and, as in the ³rst level, though there may be those who break the precepts, all have correct views. It is taught that all within the Buddha-dharma of the second level are sentient beings with the capacity for the Triy„na: sages who have perfected correct views and have all of the good roots [necessary] for transgressing neither the precepts nor the views; ordinary people who have perfected the correct views and have all of the good roots [necessary] for the true and the virtuous and transgress neither the precepts nor the views; and ordinary people who, though they may transgress the precepts, have perfected the correct views and have the good roots for not transgressing the views.23 The second section clari³es the ranks of all of the sentient beings of good roots within the second level of the Buddha-dharma—there are two types of sentient beings. The ³rst is known to be of one kind, the same regardless of whether they are ordinary people or sage, Mahayana or Hinayana—all are universally of the one kind of sentient being that has perfected correct views and transgresses neither the precepts nor the views.… The second is known to be of one kind, the same regardless of whether they are Mahayana or Hinayana—all are universally of the one kind of common sentient being that has perfected correct views and though they may break the precepts do not transgress the views.24 21
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75.
22
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 125.
23
San chieh fo fa, 268.
24
San chieh fo fa, 377.
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The Third Level The third level was the one with which Hsin-hsing was most concerned. Usually conceived to have begun either 1000 or 1500 years after the nirvana of the Buddha,25 in this level there are no longer any sages and all sentient beings are degenerate and lack the capacity for either the Ekay„na or the Triy„na. For Hsin-hsing this appears to have been an obvious fact, therefore the problem was not one of organizing a coherent chronological system as proof but rather one of knowing how the weak and degenerate beings of his day were to gain salvation. As Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga put it: “The chronology is not important, for the soteriological signi³cance of mappõ (mo-fa) lies in its subjective application to the individual.”26 Thus we have the following differing statements regarding the time of the third level: The Buddha-dharma of the third level belongs to the period one thousand years after the ³nal nirvana of the Buddha.27 One thousand ³ve-hundred years after the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana the precepts, meditation, and wisdom of sentient beings with the good roots for particular understanding and particular practice—all [of their understandings] will be completely false. This time corresponds to the third level.28 Sixteen hundred years after [the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana] is the time when persons of false views will appear in the world.29
Displaying Hsin-hsing’s penchant for quoting widely from textual sources, the San chieh fo fa at one point quotes different timetables from the Mah„m„y„-sðtra, the Yüeh tsang fen, the Fo ts’ang ching, and over ten other works, all with regard to the level of lowered capacity.30 The San chieh fo fa makes no attempt, however, to organize or systematize these timetables. The awareness of differing chronologies for the levels of the dharma, the lack of concern with the ³rst two levels, etc.—all of this simply reinforces the thesis that it was not scriptural timetables alone that gave rise to Hsin-hsing’s ideas. 25
San chieh fo fa, 263.
Matsunaga, Alicia and Daigan Matsunaga, Foundations of Japanese Buddhism (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International, 1974), 222. 26
27
San chieh fo fa, 302.
28
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75–76.
29
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 129.
30
San chieh fo fa, 262 ff.
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What we see instead is a subtle shift to include a more existential notion of the decline, or, to put it more precisely, the rhetoric of decline is driven by a vision of human nature as debased, dissolute, contentious, and quarrelsome rather than a conclusion on the basis of chronological mathematics. The place of the third level was the same as that of the second level, i.e., the de³led world, replete with the ³ve impurities that must have seemed so much a part of the chaos that continuously rent the fabric of life in sixthcentury China.31 In line with this, the place of practice was in the cities and towns, as opposed to the quiet forests and mountains. The reason for this is the karmic relationships that exist among sentient beings living in urban settings, all of whom embody the pure Buddha-nature: The third item clari³es the place of liberation for the sentient beings of the third level, [sentient beings that are attached] to the views of emptiness and existence. They are able to attain [the path] only within the cities and towns and not in the calm and quiet of the mountains or forests. Why is this? Because from the beginningless past they have established the deepest [karmic] bonds with the [beings who embody] the Tathagatagarbha Buddha, Buddha-nature Buddha, and the Image Buddha; hence they will only attain [the path] in the cities and towns and are not able to attain cultivation of the path in the mountains and forests.32
Just as compassion cannot be cultivated in the absence of objects of enmity, so too the central practice of universal respect (see chapters 1 and 5) cannot be practiced without people, and Hsin-hsing admonished his disciple Sengyung for sel³shly practicing in the mountains, urging him to leave his mountain retreat.33 Establishing the place where beings of the third level “enter the path” as the cities and towns is also related to the institutional locus of San-chieh practice in the mutual aid society of the Inexhaustible Storehouse as well as that institution’s cultic function as the headquarters of the movement. It is also possible to see this emphasis on the urban milieu of religious practice as an attack on the separation of monks from society or, expressed more positively, an exhortation to return to a preceptual community such as that envisioned by T’an-yao in the late ³fth century, an issue that I explore in chapter 7. Equally possible, however, is that it simply represents an emphasis on the need for training within a community of fellow31
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75.
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 125; see chapter 5 for a discussion of the Tathagatagarbha Buddha and the Buddha-nature Buddha; I am as yet unsure of the use here of “Image Buddha” (hsing hsiang fo †…M), a term used often in this text but not in the context of the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma described in chapter 5. 32
33
T #2060, 50.584a.
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practitioners as opposed to solitary practice in the seclusion of the forests and mountains, a stress on the communal life of the meditation hall seen in Hsin-hsing’s monastic regulations as well.34 Indeed, the importance of seeking “virtuous companions” (shan chih shih 3FÆ), and the value of “fellow practitioners” (t’ung hsing che |‘ˆ) are constant refrains in Hsin-hsing’s writing, indicative of his emphasis on the need for a supportive community for the biased and undisciplined sentient beings of the third level, an emphasis elucidated more theoretically in his teaching of the continuous and shared circuit of merit in the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse.35 Of course, the importance of the community of practitioners has long been recognized in Buddhist monasticism. Certainly in Chinese Buddhist history Hsin-hsing is not the only one to have emphasized the bene³ts of collective practice, however, and Chih-i is but one example of a contemporary who likewise wrote of the importance of “fellow practitioners” and the need of the supportive community life for those of lower capacity.36 In a manner strikingly similar to Hsin-hsing, for example, Chih-i wrote that, The basic capacities are not all the same. Some attain the path by practicing alone, while others attain liberation by relying on a community.37
Thus, Chih-i also recognized that the differing capacities required different practices, and for the bene³t of those of inferior capacity he recommended the support of communal practice. The most important part of Hsin-hsing’s formulation of the three levels lay in his estimation of the beings of the third level. Unlike the ³rst two levels, there were no beings of the third level with correct views: Within the ³rst two levels there are two types of sentient being, those who neither break the precepts nor have extreme views, and those who, though they violate the precepts, do not harbor extreme views. Both types are capable of realizing correct views. However, within the Buddha-dharma of the third level there is only the one type of perverted sentient being who destroys the practice, 34
Chih fa, 581–82, passim.
35
See chapter 7, 173–76; see also Hsin-hsing’s testimonial, the Hsin-hsing i wen, 3–6.
Like Hsin-hsing, Chih-i also wrote of three types of “virtuous companions” who aided one’s practice: the “fellow practitioner (t’ung hsing |‘),” “outside protector/attendant (‘!),” and “teacher (*4);” see the Mo ho chih kuan, T #1911, 46.43a–b. On their support role in T’ien-t’ai samadhi and repentance practices see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 76–77. On Chih-i’s prescription of communal monastic practice for those of inferior capacity—interestingly, those of the third and lowest of three levels of practitioner—see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 40–44. 36
37
Li chih fa, T #1934, 46.793c; see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 44.
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smashes the essence, and completely destroys the precepts as well as holding extreme views.38
It is interesting that the overwhelming majority of references to our decayed capacity in the San-chieh literature refer to our lack of correct views, our inability to discern truth from falsity, and our clinging to views of existence and emptiness. Strongly echoing the original concern for orthodoxy and the rhetoric that ascribed the cause of the extinction of the Buddha’s teachings to a murderous dissension amongst the sangha, and no doubt propelled by the chaotic conditions of the sixth century, particularly in the temples and monasteries, Hsin-hsing taught that everybody in the third level was ensnared by sectarian views and attachments to the extreme views of existence and emptiness. The various names and characteristics of this degenerate being are found throughout Hsin-hsing’s writings, and I will quote here only a few representative examples: The text of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra39 explains that the “worldly meaning” (shih chien erh i ›!î–) is taught for the sake of all of those within the Buddha-dharma of the third level, all those sentient beings who have the good roots to be afµicted with the views of existence and emptiness, who have severed all virtuous roots, are all universally and entirely icchantika.40 1000 years after the Buddha’s enlightenment all of the sages and persons of true virtue and good roots for the realization of correct views have entirely disappeared, and only sentient beings with the good roots for attachment to the views of existence and emptiness remain.41
Quoting from a wide variety of sutras, the San-chieh-chiao literature lists many different names and descriptions of the evil beings of the third level, e.g., the ninety-six classes of heretics, the sentient beings with “worldly roots,” the twelve classes of sentient beings with upside-down views, etc.42 The most common characterization of the sentient beings of the third level, however, is that they are beset by yu chien/k’ung chien (ÀØWØ), the views of existence and emptiness, whereas the absence of these two heterodox views describes the sentient beings of the ³rst and second levels. This is interesting in light of the well-known fact that in the Kacc„yanagotta-sutta the two views that are considered extreme or heterodox are those of existence 38
From the San chieh fo fa, 333–34.
39
T #374, 12.560b–c.
40
San chieh fo fa, 257.
41
San chieh fo fa, 262.
42
E.g., San chieh fo fa, 332–33.
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(Pali, atthit„, Ch., yu À) and nonexistence (Pali, natthit„, Ch., wu yu [À) and the middle path between these two views is taught to be co-arising. The Madhyamaka also adhered to this opinion, with the further quali³cation that co-arising was equivalent to šðnya, which was of course not the same as nonexistence or natthit„, nor was emptiness ever considered one of the two extreme views (though, of course, emptiness wrongly understood could be deadly). Yet in Chinese texts (such as those of Chi-tsang and Hsin-hsing among others) one often ³nds the two extreme views given as yu chien/k’ung chien rather than yu chien/wu yu chien. We cannot think that at this late date the technical term used for translating emptiness would be mistakenly used in place of the term for nonexistence, as happened in much earlier translations and commentaries. How, then, did yu chien/k’ung chien come to serve as the category for extreme views? Is this perhaps the inµuence of the Taoist “two-fold mystery” (ch’ung hsüan bé) exegesis that sought to go beyond not only attachment to being and attachment to non-being, but ultimately to go beyond even that nonattachment?43 Or could it perhaps be the inµuence of a more simple, yet equally Taoist-inspired attack on all views and all learning, that is, a critique of the differentiation and discrimination of named or bounded realities (namely, the ³rst chapter of the Tao te ching: “the name that can be named is not the true name”) in favor of the unbounded and unnamed chaos of the in³nite (the “mysterious beyond mysterious”) and an attendant denigration of rationality and accumulative knowledge (“views”)?44 Or yet again an inµuence of Chih-i’s teaching of the middle between the two truths of (impermanent) existence and emptiness? Both a properly textual study of this issue as well as a comparative philosophical study would no doubt be quite interesting. Another interesting endeavour would be to contextualize Hsin-hsing’s understanding of extreme views as the root problem in terms of the traditional understanding of the extreme views (the second of the ³ve wrong views, pañcad£¤¦i), eliminated through the “path of insight” (daršanam„rga), and the pañcakleša (greed, anger, stupidity, annoyance, and doubt), eliminated subsequently through the “path of cultivation” (bh„van„-m„rga).45 In any case, the overall impression that one gets while working through 43 See Robert H. Sharf, “The ‘Treasure Store Treatise’ (Pao-tsang lun) and the Sini³cation of Buddhism in Eighth Century China,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of Michigan, 1991), 34–60 and 186–190. 44 The ³rst chapter of the Tao te ching is also the source of the “twofold mystery;” see also chapter 48 on “subtracting and yet subtracting” in order to reach the Tao.
For a discussion of these hindrances in the East Asian context, see Charles Muller, “W®nhyo’s Doctrine of the Two Hindrances (Ijangui Ìì–),” http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/ijangui/AAR1998-sjis.htm. 45
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Hsin-hsing’s writings is that the primary characteristics of the third level are bias, partiality, and the prejudice inherent in doctrinal squabbling. As we shall see in chapters 5 and 6, the antidote to all such partiality is the universality of the nondual truth of all phenomena and the universality of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings. This bias that is the root problem is clari³ed in an interesting fashion in what appears to be the one exception to the overwhelming preponderance of sentient beings of the third level afµicted with the views of existence and emptiness. The San chieh fo fa opens with the following lines: Within the Buddha-dharma of the third level, all of the sentient beings of good roots are entirely and universally all of those sentient beings with the good roots for the [attachment to the] views of existence and emptiness, only excluding all the sentient beings of the dullest faculties, [that is to say,] the two kinds of monks who are like mute sheep.46
Who are these monks, these monks not afµicted with the views of existence and emptiness? They are monks who are completely dull and obtuse, representing a congregation described as being like “mute sheep”—silent, docile, unassuming, and without ambition of any sort.47 Of particular note is that, according to other writings of Hsin-hsing, they are also none other than those who are quali³ed to be kaly„namitra, the virtuous friends or spiritual companions of the third-level capacity sentient beings, and they are also the monks who are to lead the monastic congregation. What sort of spiritual companion or monastic leader is to be found in this “congregation of mute sheep monks” (ya yang seng chung Ýæ’L), and how are they different from other sentient beings of the third level?
The Congregation of Mute Sheep Monks As noted above, the supportive community of practitioners was of particular importance for Hsin-hsing. Categorized as both “fellow practitioners” and “virtuous companions,” Hsin-hsing himself wrote in a testimonial document of his search for kaly„namitra, lamenting his dull faculties and noting that by age forty-eight he had been able to ³nd only four people 46
San chieh fo fa, 257.
The scriptural source for the “mute sheep monks” is the Dašacakra Sutra (Shih lun ching), oft-quoted in Hsin-hsing’s writings. According to the Dašacakra Sutra mute sheep monks do not even know what an offense is, they cannot tell if they have committed an offense or not, whether something is a serious or a light matter, what is good or evil, that they should fear sin, and the like; cf. T #410, 703a–b. 47
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whom he could truly call his good or virtuous companions.48 His manual of monastic regulations also reµects the concern for collective practice and communal life made up of fellow practitioners and virtuous friends, and both the theory and organization of the Inexhaustible Storehouse depend upon this community. Indeed, “seeking virtuous companions” is the ³nal of seven items describing the appropriate path for each of the three levels of sentient being taught in the Practice in Accord with the Capacity, and it is here that we ³nd the description of the two types of monks who are like mute sheep: The seventh item clari³es the exhaustive seeking of virtuous companions; there are three [sorts of people who can be considered virtuous companions]. The ³rst is the monk who is like a mute sheep, understanding neither text nor meaning. The second is the monk like a mute sheep who may understand the text but does not understand the meaning. How is one to know these two types of virtuous companions, [these two types of] monks who are like mute sheep? It is necessary to investigate according to the teachings to determine whether [a person] is or is not [one of these two types of virtuous companion]. Within this there are six characteristic [traits]. 1. From birth they are peaceful of nature in the three karmic acts [of body, speech, and mind]; they never think to get angry with others or strike another, or even to dislike another. 2. By nature they are self-effacing; if a householder he would never become the family head or [seek of³ce as a] government of³cial.49 3. By nature they are fearful of committing sin and refrain from the ten evil actions and do not break the precepts. 4. From the time that they enter the sangha it is their nature to keep the precepts and avoid sin. 5. From the time that they enter the sangha it is their nature to be self-effacing and not think to become prefect or the monk in charge of the teachings. 6. They delight in the practice of the twelve dhðta and always are happy to receive inferior and bad things. If they are complete in all six aspects from birth until they enter the sangha, then, together with the community they can be relied on as virtuous companions. If, having broken a precept, they are ³lled with remorse and do not try to cover it up; if, though committing an infraction of the rules in the end they do not commit the offense a second time and their other practices are as above— such a person may also be counted on as a virtuous companion. 48
Hsin-hsing i wen, 5; see above, chapter 1, p. 9.
49
Emending Æ to 4.
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The third person who can be considered a virtuous companion along the renunciant path is the one who, among those of good roots, has thoroughly studied the seven teachings and the six teachings in accord with the capacity, and, in the same way as the above-described monks that are like mute sheep, thoroughly fears committing offense.50 Again, it is clari³ed that studying with a virtuous companion and thoroughly cultivating the same practices [as they do] for the ³rst time enables the fellowship of the congregation and the practice of the path in mutual support of one another.51
These characteristics of the monk who is like a mute sheep—fearful of breaking the precepts, self-effacing, and not striving for position either in private, public, or monastic life, not wanting to offend others and avoiding conµict, humble and content with the inferior, striving diligently and cultivating the dhðta practices, and, most importantly, unable to understand either the text or, if perchance able to understand the text, not able to understand the meaning—are also described in the Chih fa manual of monastic regulations.52 It appears, then, that it is precisely these qualities that set them apart from the sentient beings attached to the views of existence and emptiness. The mute sheep monks are so unassuming and dull that they do not even rise to the challenge of discriminating the true from the false, and so they are not likely to make the mistake of bias and slander, to confuse the true for the false or vice-versa. Deeply convinced of their own sinful nature, they are so fearful of offense that they do not even have views or opinions, much less are they attached to such arcane matters as views of existence and emptiness. As will be explained in chapters 5 and 6, the dominant characteristic of the sangha of the third level is a complete inability to tell the true from the false. As one text puts it, for the blind to draw the bowstring and loose the arrow at a target is purely harmful for they cannot but miss and thereby kill innocent bystanders. For this reason the dull, docile, communally-oriented monks who are like mute sheep make ideal spiritual companions because they will not lead one astray since they are not inclined to even attempt to discriminate true from false—indeed, the ³rst group cannot even understand the words of the texts! Here, too, we seem to get an echo of the teachings of the Tao te ching, teachings that prize a docile citizenry, a citizenry so content that they are not given to visit their neighbors though they know of their existence, a community with bellies full and minds empty. 50 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 113–24; on the “six teachings” and “seven teachings” see the Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 126. 51
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 124–25.
52
Chih fa, 578–79; cf. Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 416–17; chapter 6, 142–47.
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A ³nal aspect of the three levels that bears scrutiny is the division of the teachings appropriate to each group, i.e., the division of the teachings into “separate,” “distinct,” “particular,” or “exclusive” teachings (pieh fa ƒÀ) and “universal,” “pervasive,” or “inclusive” teachings (p’u fa 3À), an issue detailed more fully in the following chapters.53 Brieµy, however, this division constitutes their grading of the teachings (p’an chiao), according to which the Ekay„na and Triy„na teachings are grouped together as particular or exclusive teachings appropriate for those whose faculties are sharp enough to discern truth from falsity. Thus the ³rst and second level are categorized as particular, or the level of sentient being with the capacity for the particular teachings. The third level, by contrast, is called “universal” or the level of the “universal teachings” because the deluded, bickering sentient beings of the third level capacity, unable to discern true from false, have no choice but to rely on the universality of truth in all phenomena rather than its manifestation in particular phenomena that might be either true or false. Chart 1 summarizes these various aspects of the three levels.
Summary The three levels taught by Hsin-hsing are thus unrelated to the three periods of the decline of the dharma as systematized by Hui-ssu and others, the systematization of the decline that came to dominate Japanese Buddhist thinking. Rather, the three levels are concerned with the capacity of sentient beings for realization of correct views. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the eighth-century Wei-shu made no mention of chronologies or eras when he wrote that “[according to Hsin-hsing] there are three grades of people, the wise, the stupid, and those in-between (the ordinary); because of these teachings it is called the Three Levels.”54 Beings of the ³rst level, then, are characterized as those of the Ekay„na who are capable of correct views though the ordinary people among them may transgress the precepts. Reµecting the inclusive surround of the Ekay„na, they are also capable of practice in either isolated places or amidst the bustle of an urban milieu. The beings of the second level of capacity are those with the good roots for 53 Given the similarity of terms it is important to distinguish Hsin-hsing’s use of pieh fa from Chih-yen or Fa-tsang’s use of the same term; see Robert Gimello, “Chih-yen (602–668) and the Foundations of Hua-yen Buddhism,” Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University, 1976), 369–92; Kimura, Shoki Chðgoku Kegon shisõ no kenkyð (Tokyo: Shunjðsha, 1977), 430–41; Kimura, “Chigon-Hõzõ to Sangaikyõ,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 27/1 (1978): 100–107; Yabuki, Sangaikyõ, 351ff. 54
Wei-shu, Liang ching hsin chi, 8th century, chüan 3, p. 14.
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chart 1. Characteristics of the Three Levels First Level
Second Level
Third Level
Classi³cation:
Particular
Particular
Universal
Doctrine:
Ekay„na
Triy„na
Universal
Capacity:
bodhisattvas; sages and ordinary people who both keep the precepts and have correct views; ordinary people who have correct views though they may break the precepts.
sages and ordinary people who both keep the precepts and have correct views; ordinary people who have correct views though they may break the precepts.
icchantika; sentient beings attached to the views of emptiness and existence who harbor false views and break the precepts.
Place:
within the quiet of the mountains and forests as well as in the noise of cities and towns.
only within the quiet of the mountains and forests.
only within the noise and bustle of cities and towns.
Time:
variously during the lifetime of the Buddha; 500, 1000, or 1500 years after his ³nal nirvana.
variously after the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana or for 1000 or 1500 years after his ³nal nirvana.
commencing 1000, 1500, or 1600 years after the Buddha’s ³nal nirvana; no duration or endpoint given.
the practices of the various and distinct paths of the Triy„na, and, perhaps reµecting the more monastic aspect of the Triy„na, they are only capable of practice in quiet and secluded spots. In an inverted return to the inclusivism of the Ekay„na, the sentient beings of the third-level capacity are universally declared icchantika, sentient beings who can neither maintain the precepts nor realize correct views. Attached to the extreme views of existence and emptiness, sentient beings of the third-level capacity are only capable of practice within community, that is to say, within cities and towns. Although in this way Hsin-hsing’s doctrine is perhaps less concerned with time and history than previously thought, in another way nothing has really changed—his teaching is still focused on the rhetoric of decline. The decline, itself, however, has changed in three signi³cant ways: (1) what was merely a trope in polemic and apologetic discourse came to be organized as a coherent doctrine; (2) in place of a predicted future the decline is understood as the actual present, and, most signi³cantly, (3) rather than a decline of time,
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era, or the teachings the decline has been re³gured as a matter of human nature or the existential reality of sentient beings with no capacity for the practice and realization of truth. Although in a way this last change hearkens back to the occasional moral critique found in the early decline rhetoric, the implications of the “here and now” aspect of the San-chieh doctrine meant that the exhortation to a conservative orthodoxy could no longer be the function of the rhetoric. But did Hsin-hsing’s insistence on the blinkered, biased, and corrupted capacity really mean that sentient beings were incapable of practice or realization? No, no more than the Indian tradition of the dharma’s decline really denied the persistence of the Buddha-dharma. Just as in these earlier traditions, the issue was not the absence of the teaching but rather assent to the true teaching (saddharma), or, more precisely for Hsinhsing, assent to the teaching correctly in accordance with the capacity. If that teaching was accepted and cultivated, practice and realization remained a possibility even for beings of the third level. Let us now turn to that teaching, the teaching correctly in accordance with the corrupted capacity of sentient beings.
5. The Refuge of the Universal Buddha
I
have argued that viewing the decline tradition as a rhetoric of orthodoxy opens up hitherto unexplored aspects of the San-chieh teachings. That is, I believe that we should understand this tradition not in terms of its putative claims about history or morality but rather as an argument about the need to adhere to an orthodoxy or perhaps even an argument for the validity of such a notion in the face of an equally persuasive argument for a complete deconstruction of all doctrinal authorities in favor of individual experience. This is nowhere more obvious than in the sort of response that the decline tradition called for. That is to say, the admonitions regarding the disappearance of the true dharma were never meant to inculcate despair, hand-wringing, or giving up over the futility of practice but rather adherence to the (literal) letter of the law—saddhamma in the Pali tradition—or conversion to a new law—equally saddharma— in the Mahayana. Of course, the response expected by the producers of the decline rhetoric did not necessarily correspond to the actual response of the consumers of that tradition. Hence for those who took the eschatological mood of the decline as a decline in the potency of the teachings of a historical Buddha, the promise of the imminent arrival of another Buddha offered a solution to the dilemma of that decline. Buttressing similar indigenous traditions, the expectation of and preparation for messianic intervention became a prominent theme in Chinese Buddhist history. For those who saw the decline primarily in terms of the existential condition of sentient beings themselves, however, a different solution was called for, as the problem was not understood in social or world-historical terms. However, just as this does not deny the historical reality of the decline, such a response also does not in any way eliminate the underlying concern with the category of doctrine. Thus the response to the belief that the capacity of sentient beings had completely degenerated was not to give up on Buddhist doctrine but rather to ask the question of “which doctrine and which practices could possibly be effective for such sentient beings?” Of course, an awareness of ignorance and suffering as the fundamental human plight has always been the starting point of the Buddhist path, and in this sense, perhaps, there is little that is different in Hsin-hsing’s perspective 97
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other than the force with which he argued it and the universality of its scope. Yet this stridency and persistence is possibly of great importance in understanding Hsin-hsing’s popularity, for “evil” and the sinner who commits evil is just as powerful a paradigm of human nature as “goodness” and the religious virtuoso who manifests that goodness. Thus, the relating of suffering to the basic human condition has traditionally been employed as a means of convincing people of the need to search for relief, depicted as the very starting point of Š„kyamuni’s path as of all others who would follow him. Thus, too, the metaphorical trope of the Buddha as the doctor means that a person seeking relief from suffering needs a skilled physician, powerful medicine, and the rehabilitative ministrations of a caregiving community. Across the Buddhist world it has always been taught that such relief is uniquely found within the curative sanctuary of the Three Treasures, that is, the refuge of the Buddha, the dharma, and the community of practitioners. Yet we have seen how Hsin-hsing taught that “even one thousand buddhas are not able to save those sentient beings with the nature to be attached to the views of existence and emptiness,” and, indeed, as we shall see below, for such obtuse beings to rely on speci³c buddhas or their teachings was considered to lead to the heinous offense of slandering all other buddhas and their dharma. For this reason as well as the need for “practices that arise in accordance with the capacity,” Hsin-hsing re³gured the traditional notions of the Three Treasures and in place of speci³c Buddhas, speci³c doctrines, and the noble community of renunciant monks and nuns of correct understanding he proffered the universality of the dharmadh„tu as the matrix of both ignorant sentient beings and enlightened Buddhas. This radical equality not only validated the inherent truth-value of all phenomena in the abstract but saw that truth in the actual world as well: the evil demon M„ra was seen as equal to the buddhas, the false teachings of the heterodox were considered the equal of the Buddha-dharma, and the monks and nuns of false views who break all precepts were seen as the true teachers of the dharma. Although this teaching was as much a reaction to certain institutional changes in the legal structures of the sangha as it was a reaction to the (related) expanding doctrinal horizons of the Buddhism in the North and under the Sui and T’ang dynasties, here I wish to consider it primarily in its doctrinal context, leaving a discussion of institutional considerations for chapter 7. What is the Universal Buddha and how does that teaching speak to the sentient beings unable to be saved by even one thousand Buddhas?
5. The Refuge of the Universal Buddha
H
sin-hsing’s teaching of the essential equality of all things is based on the universal non-duality of the buddha-dh„tu (realm of the Buddhas) and the sattva-dh„tu (realm of sentient beings) found in such texts as the Hua-yen Sutra and the promise of universal realization of the Lotus Sutra; it is presented as the refuge of the Universal Buddha, dharma, and sangha, which is to say the triple refuge uniquely appropriate for the third level. Among these three, the refuge of the Universal Buddha is essentially Hsin-hsing’s synthesis of the teachings of universal Buddha-nature and tathagatagarbha, teachings that had gained widespread popularity during the ³fth and sixth centuries, though not without controversy. Indeed, although the teachings of Buddha-nature (buddha-dh„tu, fo hsing M§) and tathagatagarbha are widely discussed in Indian, Tibetan, and East Asian Buddhism, they continue to be controversial, as the following quotations indicate: The Essence of the Buddha [tathagatagarbha] in a sentient being represents an eternal, immutable (asa½sk£ta) element, which is identical with the monistic Absolute and is unique and undifferentiated in everything that exists. (Eugéne Obermiller)1 Tath„gata-garbha thought is not Buddhist.… It is a form of dh„tu-v„da … the object of Š„kyamuni’s criticism. (Matsumoto Shirõ)2
These two statements aptly characterize the problem at the heart of this frequently contested issue, a problem pertinent to Hsin-hsing’s teaching of the Universal Buddha. In the second quotation, Matsumoto, deliberately provocative, is calling attention to the similarity between the extremely positive language and causal structure of enlightenment found in the tathagatagarbha 1 Obermiller, The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, being a Manual of Buddhist Monism, The Work of Ãrya Maitreya with a Commentary by Ãry„saªga (Acta Orientalia 9, 1931), 104.
Matsumoto Shirõ, “The Doctrine of That„gata-garbha is not Buddhist,” in Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson, eds., Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997), 172. 2
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literature and that of the substantial monism found in the atman/Brahman tradition. Matsumoto, of course, is not the only one to have noted this resemblance. Many of the most eminent scholars of Buddhism have in one context or another noticed monist tendencies in the Mahayana. Takasaki Jikidõ, for example, the preeminent scholar of the tathagatagarbha tradition, sees monism in the doctrine of tathagatagarbha and the Mahayana in general,3 and Stcherbatsky is well known for his notions of the “radical pluralism” of the abhidharma and the “radical monism” of the Mahayana, in particular so characterizing the Madhyamika concept of emptiness.4 Obermiller wedded this notion of a monistic Absolute to the tathagatagarbha literature in his translation of and comments to the Ratnagotra, which he aptly subtitled “a Manual of Buddhist Monism.” Others, for example Lamotte and Frauwallner, have seen the tathagatagarbha doctrine as diametrically opposed to the Madhyamika and representing something akin to the monism of the atmanBrahman strain,5 while yet others such as Nagao, Seyfort Ruegg, and Johnston (the editor of the Ratnagotra) simply voice their doubts and state that it seems similar to post-Vedic forms of monism.6 Yet another camp, represented by Yamaguchi Susumu and his student Ogawa Ichijõ, is able to understand tathagatagarbha thought without recourse to Vedic notions by putting it squarely within the Buddhist tradition of conditioned causality and emptiness, which, of course, explicitly rejects monism of any sort.7 Obviously, the question of the monist or absolutist nature of the tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature traditions is complex.8 Cf. Takasaki Jikidõ, A Study of the Ratnagotravibh„ga (Uttaratantra) (Rome: Istituto Italiano Per il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), 28; Nyoraizõ shisõ no keisei (Tokyo: Shunjðsha, 1974), 761–63; “Hosshin to ichigenron,” in Hirakawa Akira Hakase kanreki kinen ronshð (Tokyo: Shunjðsha, 1976). 3
4 Cf. Theodor Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirv„«a (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977 reprint), 3, 59; The Central Conception of Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 reprint), 73; Buddhist Logic (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), 509. 5 Cf. Étienne Lamotte, trans. Sarah Boin, The Teaching of Vimalak‡rti (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), LXXVI–LXXXXI; Erich Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1956), 256. 6 Nagao Gadjin, “What Remains in Sunyata,” in M. Kiyota, ed., Mahayana Buddhist Meditation (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1978), 81, note 35; D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tath„gatagarbha et du gotra (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1969), 2, 4, 366ff; E. H. Johnston, ed., Ratnagotravibh„ga-Mah„y„nottaratantra š„stra (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), xii–xiii. 7 Yamaguchi Susumu [S Ê, Hannya shisõ shi “ø„`t (Tokyo: Hõzõkan, 1956), 86–87; Ogawa Ichirõ, Nyoraizõ busshõ no kenkyð (Kyoto: Bun’eido, 1969), 18–21, following the commentary to the Ratnagotra by rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen. 8 Other recent works on this subject include S. K. Hookham’s The Buddha Within: Tath„gatagarbha Doctrine According to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga
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A related problem, not as often discussed in contemporary studies of tathagatagarbha but of direct relevance to the teachings of Hsin-hsing is that the emphasis on the positive and all-pervasive essential nature of the tathagata tends to create a gulf of non-relation between the realms of enlightenment and deluded existence: whereas the truth of the tathagatagarbha is said to exist as the highest perfection of bliss, permanence, self, and purity, the de³lements are of a different character altogether, unrelated in any way, merely “adventitious” („gantukakleša). In other words, the problem is not monism but dualism. Whereas in a transformative model of spiritual development a person is gradually changed through religious training until a complete transformation of the very basis of the person occurs in the moment of perfection, in the tathagatagarbha model of personhood the basis of the real person is the purity that is revealed by the elimination or subtraction of the dross and impure. Hence, in this latter model, there is no radical change that takes place in the person, as there is not a change from impurity to purity but rather a return to or revelation of that which has always existed. Therefore, in the language of the Buddhist texts, in enlightenment there is neither increase in purity nor decrease in impurity. Now, as with all such absolute bifurcation, this raises the dif³cult question of how movement between the two states is possible: in terms of the Buddhist goal, how can a person living in a deluded state ever give rise to non-deluded aspiration, much less reach a state of purity? Thus, too, the status of the individual and her acts prior to enlightenment is questioned: if authentic existence is admitted solely of the fully realized realm of enlightenment, in what meaningful sense can we speak of historical individuals, their social and economic differences, personal psychologies, emotional struggles, and religious path or transformation? In other words, is the decayed capacity of the sentient beings of the third level but a ³ction, an illusion that masks the true reality of a fully enlightened Buddha? In explicating the Buddha Nature Treatise, for example, Sallie King writes, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991) and Brian Edward Browne’s The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tath„gatagarbha and Ãlayavijñ„na (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991). An excellent comparative study that brings out many of the implications and tendencies of the Buddhist tradition’s development of and reaction to the tathagatagarbha tradition can be found in D. Seyfort Ruegg’s Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1992). See also the various essays in Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Grif³ths and John P. Keenan (Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990), in which a portion of the present chapter also appeared; for a discussion of the philosophical and ethical issues raised by Matsumoto and his colleague Hakamaya Noriaki see Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree.
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In sum, as presented in the BNT [Fo hsing lun, T #1610], the person (human being) in the deluded existential mode is not a person as we ordinarily use the term in the popular Western sense. There is no real historicality or individuality accruing to the person and precious little freedom. What we consider to be the basis of individual personhood is written off as unreal. What is real is the universal sameness of Buddha nature; in this sameness, individual personhood, as we ordinarily use the term, cannot be found. Thus, before “conversion” and while in the existential mode of delusion, a person is not a person.
After enlightenment, however, as King continues, history and individuality, which were lacking in the deluded existential mode, enter the constitution of the person.… The particular behaviors, mannerisms, and even the personality of the person now possess reality and value.9
In this reading of the tradition, a reading that I believe to be accurate, of what concern is the nonreal behavior, mannerisms, and personality of the deluded nonperson? What validates the practice of the deluded? This transcendentalism, in turn, underlies the dualistic view of humanity and perfection of the so-called “sudden teachings” of the Chinese schools as well as the existential conundrum presented in the teachings of Hsin-hsing, the Buddhism for the third level, the level of sentient beings characterized by inescapable delusion.10 How can a path of practice traverse such mutually disjunctive states as the purity of the Tathagata and the de³lement of beings evil by nature? All that remains is a leap, as sudden as it is ineffable, or the “other-power” of salvi³c grace, as soteriologically necessary as it is necessarily external. This conundrum has driven many a Buddhist thinker to search for a bridge or means of relating the two conditions. Hsin-hsing, fully engaged with the existential predicament of deluded sentient beings, likewise attempted to validate the conventional, preenlightened practice of these deluded sentient beings within this context of the absolute purity of the tathagatagarbha. How did he go about this? 9 Sallie B. King, “Buddha nature and the concept of person,” Philosophy East and West 39/2 (1989), 164; see also her Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 146–47.
The disjunction between practice and realization is most often raised in terms of the socalled “sudden/gradual debate.” Good discussions of the issues involved can be found in the essays included in Peter Gregory, editor, Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1987). Tao-sheng, for example, perhaps best known for his insistence on the universality of Buddha-nature, is also known as the ³rst to advocate a theory of sudden enlightenment. Whalen Lai argues, however, that it was not the Buddha-nature theory but the Ekay„na thought of the Lotus Sutra that spurred Taosheng’s subitism; see Whalen Lai, “Tao-sheng’s Theory of Sudden Enlightenment Re-examined,” in Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual, 191. 10
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The Refuge of the Universal Buddha The San-chieh has long been considered a practice-oriented Buddhist movement, similar in many ways to the Pure Land movement as well as other Northern traditions that emphasize seated meditation, austerities, repentance liturgies, and the like. As we have seen, Hsin-hsing’s assessment of humankind’s capacity and nature is indeed comparable to that of the Pure Land—both teach that sentient beings are incapable of traditional bodhisattva practice. However, just as the masters of the more abstract philosophical systems of Buddhist thought also taught meditation practices, so also San-chieh doctrine emerged within the general theoretical context of Sui-T’ang Buddhism, particularly, I believe, the Ti-lun. This background, as well as Hsin-hsing’s unique expression of that theoretical context, is clearly expressed in their teaching of the refuge of the Universal Buddha (p’u fo 3M). The teaching of the Universal Buddha is less well known than that of the three levels or capacities described in the previous chapter and is more clearly related to the teachings of the T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, and San-lun. In short, together with the radically pessimistic outlook present in the doctrine of the decline of capacity, Hsin-hsing taught a universalism that emphasized the nondual relationship of the dharmadh„tu and all phenomena. One aspect of this is the basic identity of sentient beings and the Buddha, and this identity was called the “Universal Buddha.” In this we also ³nd the basis for Hsinhsing’s soteriology, the “universal practice” of the “Universal Dharma,” the practice deemed suitable for sentient beings of the third level. As with other schools of Sui-T’ang Buddhism, then, we see in Hsin-hsing’s teachings a link between doctrine and practice that precludes the all too often encountered division of Chinese Buddhism into “practical” and “theoretical.” The Universal Buddha is described in a number of different contexts in the San-chieh texts, for example as the ³rst of eight items in the teaching of universal respect, giving the theory underlying the practice of public veneration of all sentient beings.11 The refuge of the Universal Buddha is also taught as the ³rst of seven items that describe the practices appropriate for 11 Cf. Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 131–32; San-chieh fo fa, 56–57. The Kegon monk Chih-yen quotes the Practice in Accord with the Capacity teaching on universal respect in his Hua-yen wu shih yao wen ta (T #1869, 45.532b ff). The eight teachings are: (1) the four aspects of the Universal Buddha (described below); (2) the universally true and correct Buddha-dharma; (3) the nameless and mark-less Buddha-dharma; (4) the essential Buddha-dharma that removes all views; (5) the Buddha-dharma that entirely eliminates the way of verbal activity; (6) the Buddha-dharma of one person and one practice; (7) the Buddha-dharma of no person and no practice; (8) the Buddha-dharma of the ³ve nonoppositions. All of these items basically enjoin one to look at the essence and the unity rather than the outward appearance of diversity; see also Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 314–31.
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each of the three levels: (1) the refuge of the Buddha; (2) the refuge of the dharma; (3) the refuge of the sangha; (4) the practice of saving all sentient beings; (5) the practice of eliminating evil; (6) the practice of cultivating virtue; and (7) the practice of seeking virtuous friends (kaly„namitra).12 The ³rst item, the refuge of the Buddha, is taught differently for each of the three levels. For the ³rst-level sentient beings with the capacity for the Ekay„na, the refuge of the Buddha is said to be threefold: (a) the truth body of the Ekay„na Buddha; (b) the assumed body of the Ekay„na Buddha; and (c) the images (statues, etc.) of the Buddha.13 For sentient beings of the second level, sentient beings with the capacity for the Triy„na, the refuge of the Buddha comprises (a) the assumed body of the Triy„na, referring to the various incarnations of the Buddha, including Š„kyamuni Buddha, and (b) the images of the Buddha.14 There are ³ve kinds of buddhas that are appropriate refuges for the third level, for the sentient beings whose capacity for practice and realization is virtually nil. Among these ³ve are to be found both false saviors and the true essence of Buddhahood. It is the latter that gives validity to the former: 1. The ³rst [refuge] is the image of the Buddha. Only with your eyes open can they be seen; after closing your eyes and they are gone the distinction between true and false cannot be made; it is as taught in the Kuan fo san mei hai ching ÖMX*}÷.15 2. The false M„ra buddhas taken as refuge by the twelve types of sentient beings who are fully accomplished in the twelve types of false views, widely explained in texts such as the Chiu shih liu chung i hsüeh tao ching GYÂ)b·‡÷ and the Tsa lei shen chou ching F{ä2÷.16 12 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 111 ff. The ³rst three are taught to be the refuge and the last four are said to correspond to the “four universal vows of the bodhisattva” (Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 114–16). The ³rst six are also the same as the ³rst six of the Sixteen Practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 174); see also Okabe Kazuo, “Sangaikyõ no Buddakan,” Nihon Bukkyõ gakkai nenpõ 53 (1980): 261–73. 13
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 111.
14
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 113.
T #643, 15.690a–693a (translated in the early ³fth century by Buddhabhadra). This is a reference to the meditation on the Buddha’s image, taught for those sentient beings who live after the Buddha’s extinction, a time when no Buddha would appear in the world. I have not been able to ³nd this reference in the Taishõ text, although virtually every visualization ends with the line, “If the visualization is thus, it is a correct visualization; if it is different, it is called a false visualization,” which would actually seem to contradict the San-chieh-chiao position; see also the Chih fa (581–583) on different meditations for practitioners of different levels. 15
16 Although no longer known to be extant, the apocryphal section of the Ch’u san tsang chi chi records a GYÂ)‡ in one fascicle (T #2145, 55.39a), and a GY2)‡F{ä2÷ in one
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3. The true buddhas taken for refuge by the sentient beings who are perfect in the twelve types of correct views, as extensively explained in the Ta Fo ming ching ØMe÷ and in the various Mahayana sutras.17 4. All of the false M„ra buddhas [who teach] the views of existence and emptiness, and that are produced by all of the various buddhas and bodhisattvas in accommodation [to the needs of sentient beings]; these are extensively taught in the various Mahayana sutras as the accommodation bodies. 5. The universally true and universally correct Buddha, which is explained in four sections: a. Tathagatagarbha Buddha (Ju-lai-tsang fo ØZáM), as extensively taught in the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra, the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, and the Nirvana Sutra. b. Buddha-nature Buddha (Fo-hsing fo M§M), as extensively taught in the Nirvana Sutra. c. The Future Buddha (Tang-lai fo HZM), as taught in the Lotus Sutra. d. The Perceived Buddha (Fo-hsiang fo M`M), as taught in the Huayen Sutra and the Dašacakra Sutra.18 Why are the false saviors on equal footing with the true buddhas? Simply put, it is because the sentient beings of the third level are incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, true from false. The San-chieh literature frequently enjoins the practitioner to abandon sectarian distinctions, and their position may be summed up by saying that sentient beings of the third level dare not attempt judgments about either doctrinal or practical matters—far better to rely on the universal Dharma and celebrate everything as sacred. As noted below, for the ignorant beings of the third level, picking and choosing among the Buddha’s teachings is seen as akin to a blind person wielding a dangerous weapon—he or she is bound to hit innocent bystanders, cause great injury, and incur great harm.19 This, of course, opposes the path fascicle was recorded in the second fascicle of the Chung ching mu lu (T #2146, 55.125b); see also the K’ai yüan lu, T #2154, 55.674a. 17 There are many different versions of Buddhan„ma-sðtra in the Taishõ canon—e.g., the Fo shou fo ming ching M‰Me÷ in twelve fascicles (T #440), the Shih fang chian wu pai fo ming ching Y¾æ2ßMe÷ in one fascicle (T #442), and the Fo ming ching Me÷ in sixteen fascicles recently discovered at the Nanatsu-dera in Nagoya; see Makita Tairyõ and Ochiai Toshinori, eds., Nanatsu-dera koitsu kyõten kenkyð sõsho vol. 3 (Tokyo: Daitõ Shuppansha, 1995); see also the Ch’i chieh fo ming ching ̉Me÷ in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix 177–88. 18
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 114–15.
19
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 139–40.
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elucidated by those who taught refuge in the Buddha’s Pure Land, concentrating effort on the saving power of a single Buddha. Hsin-hsing taught that superior beings with the capacity for the Ekay„na or Triy„na could make such distinctions without harm, but for sentient beings of the third level the result of exclusive reliance on a single Buddha as the most ef³cacious was to slander all of the other Buddhas as less so, thereby causing harm rather than pro³t; hence the appropriate refuge is the Universal Buddha. The four aspects of the Universal Buddha are further detailed in a text recovered from Tun-huang, the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma (P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM).20 This text takes a number of well-known Mahayana sutras as scriptural authorities, including the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, the Ghanavyðha-sðtra, the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra, the Lotus Sutra, and the Dašacakra-k¤itigarbha-sðtra.
Ju-lai-tsang Fo ØZáM Of these texts, the Four Buddhas lists the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, the Ghanavyðha-sðtra, and the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra as its scriptural authorities for the teaching of Ju-lai-tsang Fo, the Tathagatagarbha Buddha. Another text that was probably inµuential is the Awakening of Mahayana Faith, but, possibly because of the exclusive reliance upon sutras as references in the San-chieh-chiao literature, this text is not mentioned. The Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra21 is clearly one of the most important texts in the history of tathagatagarbha thought. A text that expounds the Ekay„na, it is a major source of the Ratnagotravibh„ga, a primary systematization of tathagatagarbha thought. Among the doctrines taught in the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra 20 Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma, included in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix, 201–206; translated below in Appendix A. This text (Stein #5668) is known to have been composed some years after the death of Hsin-hsing (594) by its reference to the Ghanavyðhasðtra, which was not translated until the latter half of the seventh century. However, though this particular text is a later composition, the four aspects of the Universal Buddha and the texts that they are based on (except, of course, the Ghanavyðha-sðtra) are mentioned in other works considered by most scholars to be the writings of Hsin-hsing, for example, the Hõryðji MSS of the San chieh fo fa, 293–95, the Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 131–32, the Tunhuang MS of the San chieh fo fa, 22, etc. The portion edited by Yabuki and titled Four Buddhas is only that portion of the manuscript dealing with the Universal Buddha, extracted from a discussion of the eight aspects of universal respect; for a reconstruction of the complete manuscript see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 609–22. 21 The Four Buddhas relies on the Gunabh„dra translation of the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra made in 436 (T #353, 12.217–223). In particular this text quotes from the “Chapter on the Dharmak„ya,” the “Chapter on Intrinsic Purity,” the “Chapter on the One Truth,” and the “Chapter on the One Refuge.”
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that bear upon the San-chieh teaching of the Universal Buddha are the pure and impure aspects of the mind,22 the garbha as šðnya and ašðnya (devoid of kleša but endowed with the “Buddha-dharmas” that are inseparable from the dharmakaya),23 and the dependence of both samsara and nirvana upon the garbha.24 With regard to this last point, Takasaki observes that the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra gives no explanation of how or why the adventitious kleša come to obscure the garbha, and this in turn leads to the question of what is meant by this relationship of dependence between samsara, nirvana, and the garbha.25 This is a problem to which I shall return below. Among the many theories taught in the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra26 two are related to the concept of the Tathagatagarbha Buddha: (1) as above, the Laªk„vat„ra teaches that all paths of existence are generated by the tathagatagarbha;27 and (2) it teaches that the tathagatagarbha is the same as the „layavijñ„na.28 This second point is shared by the third text quoted, the Ghanavyðhasðtra,29 wherein it is taught that the „laya manifests the myriad dharmas30 and that the „laya and the tathagatagarbha are neither the same nor different.31 As might be expected from the sources utilized, as well as from its name, the Ju-lai-tsang fo is the San-chieh teaching of tathagatagarbha, and within the Four Buddhas we ³nd the two doctrines mentioned above, namely that all phenomena are dependent on the tathagatagarbha and that the tathagatagarbha and the „laya are identical. Within scholastic circles of Chinese Buddhism theories of the „laya and its nature as well as theories concerning Buddha-nature and the tathagatagarbha were continuously being put forth, argued, and re³ned, particularly during the Sui-T’ang period. Though it is within this context that the San-chieh theories originated, my study here is limited to presenting their theory as related to their concept of the Universal 22 Prak£tiparišuddhicitta and upakli¤¦acitta, comparable to cittaprak£ti and agantukakleša in the Ratnagotravibh„ga (Takasaki, A Study, 37). 23 Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, T #353, 12.221c. This relates to the entire positive thrust of the tathagatagarbha literature, which is critical of excessively negative understandings of emptiness and emphasizes instead the positive existence and virtues of Buddhahood. 24
T #353, 12.222b.
25
Takasaki, A Study, 38.
The Four Buddhas used the 4-chüan Laªk„vat„ra (T #670, 16.479–514) translated by Gunabhadra in 443, in particular the “Chapter on All The Buddha’s Words.” 26
27
T #670, 16.510b.
28
T #670, 16.512b.
29
T #682, 16.776a.
30
T #682, 16.751 ff.
31
T #682, 16.766 ff.
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Dharma and practice of universal respect.32 As noted above, Takasaki feels that the notion of the identity of the „layavijñ„na and the tathagatagarbha was the result of the inability of the theory as stated in the Ratnagotravibh„ga to satisfactorily account for the relation between the tathagatagarbha and the “adventitious” de³lements that were nonetheless dependent upon it.33 Where do these de³lements come from? What is their source or origin? If the original nature of mind is pure, radiant, and without blemish, what gives rise to impurity? This so-called “weak point” in the theory was then recti³ed by the incorporation of the „layavijñ„na into the tathagatagarbha theory. There were certain similarities that facilitated such a “merger.” That is, just as within the Vijñ„nav„din tradition the „layavijñ„na was seen to be the base („šraya) of all phenomena, so, within the theory of the tathagatagarbha, the tathagatagarbha itself was considered to be the base („šraya) of all phenomena. The important difference, of course, was that in the Vijñ„nav„da the „laya was transformed in wisdom and no longer remained, while the tathagatagarbha tradition tends to speak in terms of an “arithmetical subtraction” of adventitious de³lements, a subtraction that reveals the purity that has always existed.34 Another difference was that in the classic formulation of Yogacara by Asaªga and Vasubandhu, the „laya was capable of supporting both pure and impure dharmas but could only originate the impure, necessitating the “perfuming” of the „laya from outside via the “outµow of the pure dharmadh„tu” (višuddhadharmadh„tu-ni¤yandatva).35 The two doctrines did come together in such texts as the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra and the Ghanavyðha-sðtra. From a reading of the appropriate sections in the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra36 it appears that when the tathagatagarbha is in a state of de³lement, involved in the discriminating function of the manas, it is called the „layavijñ„na. The „laya, though fundamentally pure,37 because Given the perennial Chinese interest in the question of human nature, including whether it is innately “good” or otherwise, it is tempting to see the great impact that Buddha-nature and tathagatagarbha thought had in China as an example of sini³cation. Still, the fact is that these same issues were subjects of doctrinal elaboration in India as well. 32
33
Takasaki, A Study, 59–60.
34
Nagao, “What Remains,” 75–77; Takasaki, A Study, 59–60.
For an excellent discussion of this issue in the classical Yog„c„ra tradition see Hakamaya Noriaki, “The Realm of Enlightenment in Vijñaptim„trat„: The Formulation of the Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3/2 (1980): 21–41. John Keenan offers an interpretation of an earlier Yog„c„ra problematique as centrally concerned with the notion of a pure mind in “Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yog„c„ra,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5/1 (1982): 7–18. 35
36
E.g., T #670, 16.510b.
37
T #670, 16.510b.
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of the individuating function of the manas, is also the source of false discrimination, the hallmark of samsara. Thus the Four Buddhas states: The matrix of enlightenment and the conditions and forms have no beginning or end, and thus truth and untruth are dependent upon each other, neither separate nor distinct. Therefore the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra states in a simile that “the storehouse consciousness is like the expansive ocean and waves.”38
This is a reference to the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra that compares the relation of the „laya and phenomena to the ocean and waves: The Blessed One said this to him: Mahamati, the tathagatagarbha holds within it the cause for both good and evil, and by it all forms of existence are produced. Like an actor it takes on a variety of forms, and (in itself) is devoid of an essence and what belongs to it.… Because of the inµuence of habit-energy that has been accumulating since beginningless time, what here goes under the name of the „layavijñ„na is accompanied by the seven vijñ„nas which is like a great ocean in which the waves roll on permanently but the (deeps remain unmoved; that is, the „laya) body itself subsists uninterruptedly, quite free from fault of impermanence, unconcerned with the doctrine of ego-substance and thoroughly pure in its essential nature.39
The ocean-wave analogy, together with the statement that the “tathagatagarbha produces all forms of existence,” bring us to the second point with regard to the Tathagatagarbha Buddha, that is, the relation of the tathagatagarbha to the phenomenal world. Scholars and exegetes alike consider the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra, the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, and the Awakening of Mahayana Faith together the locus classicus of what is referred to in the Hua-yen commentarial tradition as arising by suchness or tathagatagarbha.40 This theory teaches the dependence of all phenomena upon tathat„ or tathagatagarbha, and Yabuki believes that the theoretical construct of the San-chieh doctrine of the Ju-lai-tsang fo is precisely the same.41 The San chieh fo fa, too, invokes the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra cited above in order to explain this: 38
Four Buddhas, 202.
D. T. Suzuki, tr., The Laªk„vat„ra Sðtra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966 reprint), 190; although his translation is taken from the Sanskrit, it agrees with the Chinese; cf. T #670, 16.510b. 39
40 Ju lai hsing ch’i ØZ§˜; chen ju hsing ch’i ³Ø§˜. Cf. Takasaki Jikidõ, “The Tath„gatopattisa½bhava-nirdeša of the Avata½saka and the Ratnagotravibh„ga with special reference to the term tath„gata-gotra-sa½bhava,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 7/1 (1958), 48 ff. 41
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyü, 406.
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The tathagatagarbha is explained according to the fourth chüan of the fourchüan Laªk„vat„ra-sðtra. The tathagatagarbha is like an actor, and the various roles of the actor are like the sentient beings [dwelling] in the six destinies. Know that just as the roles of the actor are entirely created by the actor, all of the sentient beings in the [six] destinies, including all of the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and tathagatas, are entirely produced by the tathagatagarbha.42
In addition to the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra, the Four Buddhas quotes two passages from the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra that are often cited as authority for this theory: “The Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra teaches that samsara is dependent on the tathagatagarbha”43 and “the tathagatagarbha is the foundation, the support and the substratum 44 (of the Buddha-dharmas as well as the worldly dharmas).”45 The Practice in Accord with the Capacity utilizes ³ve metaphors to explain this relationship, likening it to clay and tiles, water and wave, actor and roles, gold and the ornaments made from it, and eight rivers that µow from the same lake: The tathagatagarbha is the essence of all the buddhas, bodhisattvas, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and all of the sentient beings in the six destinies.… [I]n a simile it is like the great Anavatapta Lake from which µows eight great rivers. Although the rivers are all distinct, the essence of the water is not different. Although there are differences between the sages and ordinary people and they are not the same, the garbha that is their essence is not different.46
Although I have doubts that the theory of the Universal Buddha is functionally equivalent to the Hua-yen doctrine of arising via suchness,47 traditionally this is taken to mean simply that the tathagatagarbha, being equivalent to sunyata, is the “base” or “foundation” of phenomena inasmuch as it is sunyata, that is to say, the absence of svabh„va, that allows the possibility of co-arising (prat‡tyasamutp„da). In this understanding there is no “substance” out of which phenomena arise, and in spite of the analogy of the 42
San chieh fo fa, 56.
43
Four Buddhas, 201; cf. Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, T #353, 12.222b.
This passage is also quoted in the Ratnagotravibh„ga (Takasaki, A Study, 292); for the Sanskrit equivalents of foundation i S, support ch’ih ³, and substratum chien li ÉC, Takasaki gives nišraya, „dh„ra, and prati¤¦h„, respectively. 44
45
Four Buddhas, 202; cf. Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, T #353, 12.222b.
46
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 130.
There are many problems involved in the use of ju lai hsing ch’i to describe the San-chieh theories, not the least of which is that it is a later theory. If Yabuki is correct, however, then the inµuence of Hsin-hsing on the Hua-yen school must be reevaluated. 47
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ocean and the wave, the tathagatagarbha is not a material cause of co-arising. This analogy is simply trying to explain the nondual nature of the relationship between phenomena and truth; it is not trying to postulate a ³rst cause or material cause of co-arising.48 Thus it is declared that the two aspects of the pure and the impure, the true and the false, or the tathagatagarbha and phenomena are, like the ocean and the waves, interdependent, neither different nor the same. In this context the Four Buddhas states: Although separated from attachments, the truth of the universe produces the untruth of the universe; therefore, untruth is dependent upon truth. But truth is not independent, because it is forever dependent on untruth; neither does untruth arise independently, because it is necessarily dependent upon truth. Again, the matrix of enlightenment and all of samsara, the essence and the forms, are also like this [that is, neither the same nor different]. Like gold and the ornaments made from gold, the essence and forms are forever the same. Again, the matrix of enlightenment and the phenomenal forms of the universe, the essence and forms, are forever different, as dust and moisture are always distinct; thus they are neither different nor not different.49
The theory of the Tathagatagarbha Buddha is hence basically the San-chieh view of the relation between the realm of truth and the realm of delusion, a relationship expressed in conventional Buddhist terms of nonduality. Signi³cant dif³culties remain, however, with this structure of nonduality (if nonduality can be said to have a structure): where, for example, do the waves come from, inseparable from the ocean though they may be? Usually they are said to arise from the “winds of ignorance,” but then, if the “winds of ignorance” are not included within the nonduality of water and waves, from where do they come? In other words, postulating purity as the essence of human nature eliminates the problem raised above, namely, how purity can arise within a deluded sentient being, but thereby inverts the problem: where does delusion come from if the original or primordial condition is purity? This leads to the conundrum faced by all forms of substantival monism: why or how does a stable, noncontingent purity initiate movement of any sort, especially as movement is of an essentially different nature from stability? What moves the unmoving?
48 The question of substantive monism arises here, and, as pointed out above, many scholars have discussed the tathagatagarbha in terms of a monistic theory. Using the gold/ornament analogy employed so often to support a theory of material unity (e.g., Ch„ndogya Upani¤ad, VI.1) makes one question if such a nondual, Madhyamaka interpretation of tathagatagarbha was truly widespread, especially in China. 49
Four Buddhas, 201.
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Fo-hsing Fo M§M The San-chieh theory of the “Buddha-nature Buddha” (Fo-hsing Fo) is for the most part based on the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra,50 a pivotal text in the Chinese development of the concept of the potential for enlightenment in all sentient beings.51 The Four Buddhas teaches that there are no fundamental differences between the concept of the Buddha-nature Buddha and that of the Tathagatagarbha Buddha: Related to the former concept of the matrix of enlightenment, just as “observe” and “watch” are different words [but both mean “to see”], with regard to conditions there is a slight difference in meaning [between the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment and the Buddha as the nature of the Buddha in all living beings].52
What is meant by “with regard to conditions there is a slight difference in meaning”? It would seem that whereas the Tathagatagarbha Buddha refers to the relation between the essential truth of the dharmadh„tu and the phenomenal world in general, the Buddha-nature Buddha describes the dharmadh„tu more speci³cally as identical with the basic nature of the sattvadh„tu; this fundamental nature of sentient beings is characterized as “pure, without kleša, truly abiding, and unde³led by kleša.”53 As articulated in the Four Buddhas, the Buddha-nature Buddha corresponds to the teaching of cheng yin fo hsing ±ƒM§, the “true cause” Buddha-nature as found in the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra. Among the many different characterizations of Buddha-nature in that sutra, one of the more common is that which speaks of two kinds of Buddha-nature, the true cause and the associate cause.54 The Buddha-nature Buddha corresponds to the true cause: 50 The Four Buddhas relies on the 40-chüan version, translated by Dharmak¤ema ca. 420. T #374, 12.365 ff. 51 Cf. Matsumoto, who points out that “all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature” in the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra is not the same as “all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood” in the Lotus Sutra; see Matsumoto, “Tath„gata-garbha is not Buddhist,” in Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 167-68; see also Matsumoto, “The Lotus Sutra and Japanese Culture,” in Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 393–98. 52
Four Buddhas, 203.
Four Buddhas, 203; in early usage buddha-dh„tu (most often the Sanskrit original for Buddha-nature, fo hsing) was interchangeable with tathagatagarbha; cf. William Grosnick, “The Zen Master Dõgen’s Understanding of Buddha-nature in Light of the Historical Development of the Buddha Nature Concept in India, China, and Japan” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1979), 22–26. 53
54
For example, Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, T #374, 12.531b, 532b, 535b, etc.
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The second item is the Buddha that exists within all living beings as the nature of a Buddha. Some texts talk of this Buddha-nature as a principle (li hsing 7§), while others speak of it as something acquired through practice (hsing hsing ‘§).55 Some speak of this nature as the cause of enlightenment (yin hsing ƒ§) and others as a result (kuo hsing F§). Now, in clarifying this we only rely on the 38th book of the Nirvana Sutra, which illuminates the Buddhanature as the “true cause” (cheng yin fo hsing ±ƒM§).56 Therein it states that all of the living beings of the universe, ordinary persons as well as sages, have this nature, as do all of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.57
Thus, in the more theoretical expositions of San-chieh doctrine, the emphasis was on the universal basis or nature of all sentient beings rather than their individual or particularly acquired nature. Indeed, the text later quotes the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra to the effect that the Buddha-nature Buddha is none other than “the emptiness of ultimate meaning” (param„rtha-šðnyat„), which is the middle path between the empty (šðnya) and the non-empty (ašðnya).58 Buddha-nature was conceived as equally the nature of the buddhas and ordinary sentient beings, and it existed in an 55 No doubt as a result of the ambiguity of the sources, Chinese scholars endlessly debated different schemata of Buddha-nature, and if the systematization was conceded, they continued to debate, with equal fervor, what actually corresponds to the primary nature (the mind, or perhaps sentient beings themselves), the secondary cause, and so forth. Chi-tsang’s Ta sheng hsüan lun, for example, lists eleven different theories current in the North-South periods; see Koseki, Aaron, “Chi-tsang’s ‘Ta-ch’eng-hsüan-lun’: The Two Truths and the Buddha-nature” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1977), pp. 202 ff, and Mochizuki Shinkõ ݽ=Ø, Bukkyõ daijiten M*Øùø (Tokyo: Seikai Seiten Kankõ Kyõkai, 1974 edition), p. 4456. Just as earlier discussions of Buddha-nature probably reµected the Chinese need to harmonize the disparate teachings of emptiness, “inherently pure mind,” etc., later the concepts of li fo hsing 7M§ and hsing fo hsing ‘M§ were advocated by K’uei-chi (632–682), the founder of the Fa-hsiang school, most likely as a solution to the contradiction between the concepts of gotra and Buddha-nature. This is similar to the relation between the “gotra existent by nature” (prak£tistha-gotra) and the “gotra acquired through efforts” (paripu¤¦a or samud„n‡ta-gotra) found in the Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra and elsewhere. See especially Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra III.4 and bh„¤ya thereto: Sylvain Lévi, Mah„y„na-Sðtr„la½k„ra: exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système yog„c„ra (2 vols., Paris: Honoré Champion 1907–1911), I.11. 56
A mistake for the 28th book, e.g., T #374, 12.531b–c, 532b, etc.
Four Buddhas, 203; cf. Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 132: “The Buddha-nature is the cause of all ordinary people as well as sages—all ordinary people as well as sages mature because of Buddha-nature. In a simile [from the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra] it is like the milk that is the cause of cheese.” 57
Four Buddhas, 203–204. Cf. T #374, 12.523b. Chi-tsang and Chih-i also taught a middlepath interpretation of Buddha-nature; see William Grosnick, Dõgen’s Understanding, 130–35; see also note 12, above. 58
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unde³led state, eternal and pure.59 However, the situation is subtler, as the text continues: From the side of the result the name is established as Buddha-nature, however this Buddha-nature is neither cause nor result—within the cause it is [termed] cause, within the result it is [termed] result.60
What this probably means is that the “emptiness of ultimate meaning,” conceived as the nondual relation of the middle path, the emptiness of self and dharmas, or as tathat„,61 is the true cause of the attainment of the fruits of Buddhahood. This is because emptiness is both the object of wisdom and enables all change, therefore allowing the transformation of the basis from ignorance to wisdom.62 However, as the dependent nature of truth in all sentient beings (as also represented by the Tathagatagarbha Buddha described above), this applies to icchantika as well as buddhas, and so, unaffected by its environment, Buddha-nature is really neither cause nor result—that is, the principle or attribute of emptiness is not the same as either the Buddha that realizes that principle or as the attendant virtuous qualities of practice that enable such a realization.63 So the section of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra that 59 The Four Buddhas also borrows from the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra and the Mah„parinirv„«asðtra in attributing to the Buddha-nature the four gu«ap„ramit„ of permanence (nitya), pleasure (sukha), self (atman), and purity (šubha). These four perfections, depicting the positive character of the tathagatagarbha or dharmakaya, represent one of the more interesting developments of Indian Buddhist thought. Clearly intended to differentiate the af³rmative nature of the tathagatagarbha teaching and the negative teachings of the four vipary„sas (impermanence, suffering, non-self, and impurity), the gu«ap„ramit„ are a standard feature of the texts of the tathagatagarbha and buddha-dh„tu tradition and are no doubt part of the same general criticism of what was seen as a tendency to nihilism on the part of the šðnyav„dins; cf. Takasaki, A Study, op. cit., 38, 209, 301, 306–307; Nyoraizõ shisõ no keisei (Tokyo: Shunjðsha, 1974), 166 ff; Four Buddhas, 203 (Appendix A, 252). 60 Four Buddhas, 203. A reference to the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, T #374, 12.524a. See also the Southern version, T #376, 12.768b. 61
Four Buddhas, 205.
This is the traditional exegesis of tathagatagarbha in terms of emptiness found in the Ratnagotra, the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, and other texts of the tathagatagarbha tradition. It of course begs the question of whether or not the emptiness (or non-emptiness) as taught in the Ratnagotra was the same emptiness as that taught in the Prajñ„p„ramit„ literature, in N„g„rjuna’s works, and in other early Madhyamaka works—the long-running debate over whether to classify the tathagatagarbha doctrines as ney„rtha or n‡t„rtha is but one indication of structural ambiguity. 62
63 Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 417. Chi-tsang (549–622) also taught that Buddha-nature was neither cause nor result, though he had a different view as to whether nonsentient phenomena possess Buddha-nature; see Koseki, Chi-tsang’s Ta-cheng’ hsüan-lun, 209–17 and 379. Chi-tsang’s avowal of non-sentient Buddha-nature might simply be a matter of terminology,
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discusses “neither cause nor result” actually states that ultimate truth is analogous to a cause when considered as Buddha-nature, but comparable to a result when considered as nirv„«a.64 It is also likened to the twelve links of co-arising, each of which is both cause and result (depending on where one starts in the chain).65 Finally, the Buddha-nature Buddha was taught to be restricted to sentient beings: All of the living beings of the universe, those of base and noble spirit alike, all possess this nature [of a buddha], excluding only the grasses, trees, walls, broken tiles, and so on.66
The text then cites a passage from the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra in support of this contention: The sutra teaches the difference between those things without Buddha-nature and those with Buddha-nature and that which is without buddha-nature is the earth, trees, tiles, and rocks; that which is distinct from these nonsentient things are all said to have Buddha-nature.67
The question of the Buddha-nature of non-sentient things was the center of much debate during the Sui-T’ang period, and in the manner of denying Buddha-nature to nonsentient things the Four Buddhas seems to agree with the conclusions generally ascribed to the Hua-yen school.68 However, if we recall that the non-dual relation between truth and phenomena in general, with no distinction made between sentient and non-sentient, was articulated in the concept of the Tathagatagarbha Buddha, we can see that this distinction, like much in San-chieh doctrine, should probably be understood in terms of its soteriological meaning. That is, Fo-hsing fo refers to that which
though, as he did distinguish the capacity of the sentient for realization of that principle. Also see Koseki, ibid., 226 ff. 64 T #374, 12.524a. The discussion of cause and result was not unique to the Chinese tradition. Classical Indian and Tibetan masters as well as modern scholars have extensively discussed the cause/result structure of the tathagatagarba and buddha-dh„tu concepts, especially with regard to the “three svabh„va” that the Ratnagotra adduces to explain the statement, “All sentient beings possess the tathagatagarbha”; see, for example, Ogawa Ichijõ, Nyoraizõ busshõ no kenkyð, 75–79 and Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie, 291–96. 65
T #374, 12.524a.
66
Four Buddhas, 205.
Four Buddhas, 205; cf. Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, T #374, 12.581a and T #376, 12.828b; also see below, Appendix A, n. 27. 67
68
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 418–20.
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has the potential for realization of Buddhahood.69 It is in this context, I believe, that some scholars would even translate the term Buddha-nature as “enlightenment potential.” Although an understanding of Buddha-nature in terms of emptiness leads inexorably to af³rming the Buddha-nature of the nonsentient, the origins of the concept in theories of an inherently pure mind and the Ekay„na tradition, concerned as this latter is with the nature and scope of the realization of Buddhahood, bespeak a tradition concerned fundamentally with the nature of the sentient, and only by implication with the nature of all phenomena. Thus, from a soteriological point of view (and without doubt Hsin-hsing’s primary concern was articulating doctrine and implementing practice for sentient beings of inferior capacity) a schema that separates the capacity for enlightenment of sentient beings from that of nonsentient beings is entirely appropriate. The de³lements that obscure the purity of mind are a problem with relevance only to sentient beings and so a discussion of the potential for enlightenment of nonsentient objects can never be more than idle talk. Indeed, as pointed out by the San-lun master Chi-tsang, the nonsentient is, perforce, not deluded.70 Hence the teaching of the potential for Buddhahood (i.e., Buddha-nature) is directed primarily at those for whom a discussion of salvation has meaning, i.e., sentient beings. The many discussions of the “how” of Buddha-nature were always grounded in the main concerns of the various schools arguing the point. It is not surprising, then, that just as the San-lun tended to see Buddha-nature primarily in terms of the middle path (and so af³rmed the Buddha-nature of the nonsentient), Hsin-hsing saw Buddha-nature primarily in terms of its meaning for the sentient beings of the third level and so in describing the relation between sentient beings and truth the operative refuge for them is the Buddha-nature Buddha, meaning “potential for enlightenment” (or even, as we shall see, “actualized potential for enlightenment”); this term embraces the ignorant as well as the wise, though it excludes the world of nonsentient objects.
69 This is similar to Hui-yüan’s distinction between “the nature that knows” and “the nature that is known”; see Grosnick, “Dõgen’s Understanding,” 138 ff. Grosnick further speculates that it was confusion stemming from misunderstanding the original of fo hsing M§ as buddhat„ and thus as somehow contrasting with dharmat„ (fa hsing À§) that gave rise to this distinction (p. 139); see also “Busshõ” in Hõbõgirin vol. 2, 185a–187b. 70
Koseki, “Chi-tsang’s Ta-ch’-eng-hsüan-lun,” 226.
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Tang-lai Fo HZM So far we have been discussing the principles that describe the relation between tathat„ and all phenomena and tathat„ and the realm of sentient beings. Continuing to become ever more concrete in the articulation of this relationship (as well as ever more brief in its explanation), the Four Buddhas uses the Lotus Sutra as the basis for the Tang-lai Fo, or the “Future Buddha.” The Future Buddha refers to the inevitable realization of Buddhahood by all sentient beings: The essence gives rise to the conditioned, and the practices are pursued according to the conditions—all are the practices of the matrix of enlightenment, the practices of the Buddha-nature. The tree includes the bud and truth includes untruth, thus all practices are those of the universal bodhisattva of the One Vehicle. With the full completion of the practices the fruits of Buddhahood are realized. Because the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment and the Buddha as Buddha-nature exist within the bondage of ignorance and the realm of causality, there is likewise the future realization of Buddhahood.71 Therefore, this aspect is termed the “future buddha.”72
Thus we have moved from the theoretical aspect of the relationship between tathat„ and phenomena to an articulation of the inevitable realization of Buddhahood in this world. Since all sentient beings possess Buddhanature, all are one day assured of realizing Buddhahood, and this has been termed by the San-chieh-chiao Tang-lai fo. We rely on the Lotus Sutra, which teaches that the Bodhisattva Never-Despise [Sad„paribhðta] worshipped all among the four classes of beings, that is, monks, nuns, male and female lay devotees, as the same because they possess the true essence of the matrix of enlightenment and Buddha-nature. Therefore he told them, “You all practice the path of the bodhisattva and in the future will become Buddhas,” hence this aspect of the refuge of the universal Buddha is termed the “Future Buddha.”73
The practice of the Bodhisattva Never-Despise is also the inspiration for the actual practice of publicly venerating all beings so often described in the
71 Though the terms “Buddha-nature” and “tathagatagarbha” are not actually used in the Lotus Sutra, its message of universal attainment has long been interpreted as synonymous with tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature theories. 72
Four Buddhas, 205; see also Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 132; San chieh fo fa, 56.
73
Four Buddhas, 205; cf. the Lotus Sutra, T #262, 9.50c.
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biographies and other records of Hsin-hsing and his disciples, for example the Li tai san pao chi: Wishing to emulate the Bodhisattva Never Despise in the Lotus Sutra they revere everybody they meet on the road, regardless of whether the person was a man or a woman.74
Fo-hsiang Fo M`M This fourth and ³nal aspect of the refuge of the Universal Buddha is based on the Hua-yen Sutra75 and the Dašacakra k¤itigarbha-sðtra76 and is termed Fo-hsiang Fo, or the “Perceived Buddha.” This aspect refers to the fact that although all sentient beings are destined to realize Buddhahood in the future, viewed in terms of their ultimate nature, that is, their Buddhanature, they are already Buddhas. The Four Buddhas states: Because all living beings in the universe are none other than the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment, the Buddha as the Buddha-nature, and the Future Buddha, the forms of living beings are not different from the true Buddha. This is called the “Perceived Buddha.”… Although we may talk of the difference between holding the precepts and breaking the precepts, because the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment is the same as the Buddha-nature and the Future Buddha, they are one and not two. Therefore, you should respect all, perceiving them as true buddhas, and this is termed “Perceived Buddha.”77
More bluntly, the Practice in Accord with the Capacity states: “The perceived Buddha is the perception of all sentient beings as the Buddha.”78 Rejecting all distinctions based upon limited understanding and criteria such as whether or not one keeps the precepts, we are told to respect all sentient beings as no different from the Buddha. On the basis of the implications of the doctrine of tathagatagarbha presented in the various scriptural sources, Hsin-hsing moved from the abstract theory of the relationship between tathat„ and phenomena to the very concrete view of all sentient beings as present Buddhas. The practical innovation of his teaching is 74
T # 2034, 49.105b; see chapter 1, 27–28.
T #278. Speci³cally, this refers to a passage from the “Chapter on Clarifying the Dharma,” T #278, 9.459c. 75
76
T #410.
77
Four Buddhas, 205–206.
78
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 132.
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precisely this very concrete understanding of the sentient beings in terms of the Future Buddha and the Perceived Buddha, while their exposition of the difference between the Tathagatagarbha Buddha and Buddha-nature Buddha reµects the discussion of these issues in the debates of their time.
Universal Respect It was also this doctrine of universality that gave rise to the practice of universal respect, a practice believed to be uniquely suited to the capacity of the sentient beings of the third level and, together with the practice of “recognizing evil,” the hallmark of the San-chieh movement. Hence the four facets of the Universal Buddha are also taught as the ³rst aspect of the practice of universal respect.79 A good example of how this is understood is found in the Practice in Accord with the Capacity: The ³rst item [which explains the two environments of liberation] is the universality of the essence and refers to the Tath„gatagarbha, Buddha-nature, [the Future Buddha, the Perceived Buddha,] and the eightfold Buddha-dharma.80 The second item, the universality of the practice, has seven sections, the ³rst of which is the universality of the ordinary person (fan [fu] þ[&], Skt. p£thagjana) and the sage (sheng ¸, Skt. „rya) which means that without questioning whether somebody is common or sage both [should be seen as] producing the understanding of the sage. Why is this? Because all of the true buddhas and bodhisattvas of the Ekay„na manifest in response to the myriad types of sentient beings; all of the ordinary people of the Ekay„na who have perfected correct views and violate neither the views nor the precepts give rise to the vow to manifest [in response to] the myriad types of sentient being; and all of the common beings of the Ekay„na who have perfected correct views, who violate the precepts but not the views, actually appear as every type of sentient being. Therefore both should be seen as producing the understanding of the sage, without question of whether they are ordinary people or sages. Thus this is called the universality of the sage. Regarding the universality of the ordinary people, all of the false demons transform their appearance and manifest as the image of the various buddhas and bodhisattvas—but the common person is blind from birth and cannot discriminate [between the true and the false]. He or she can only hope to treat all sentient beings as the same and respect them equally as the Tath„gatagarbha [Buddha], Buddha-nature [Buddha], Future Buddha, and the Perceived Buddha. They do not dare to try to distinguish which is the true Buddha. Why 79
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 131–32.
80
See above, n. 11.
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is this? Because the common person is ignorant and unable to distinguish between [the true buddhas and] the false demons. Therefore it is termed the universality of the common person.81
As with the refuge of the fourfold Buddha, this means that from the absolute point of view all beings are manifestations of the “universality of the essence.” For the sentient beings of the third level, those sentient beings trapped by twisted delusions of righteousness, purity, morality, and virtue, the proper course of action demands that all beings be viewed as this essential nature because (a) on the absolute level all things essentially partake of the true nature of the dharmadh„tu and (b) on the phenomenal level we are incapable of distinguishing good from evil, hence it is better to avoid the danger of false slander. As already pointed out, Hsin-hsing taught that it is better not to give weapons to the blind, reasoning that is clearly spelled out in his teaching of the refuge of the Universal Dharma discussed in chapter 6 below. As noted above, the doctrines of the fourfold Universal Buddha and universal respect led San-chieh followers to emulate the Bodhisattva NeverDespise in the practice of revering all living creatures they met as buddhas, even dogs and other animals. Thus the biography of one San-chieh teacher records that he would say of the insects and animals that “gathered around his dwelling like disciples” that “I clearly know that these are all incarnations of the Buddha who have entered into the practice [of the Way]. They ought to be deeply reverenced; one cannot disparage them.”82
Summary Thus the San-chieh-chiao simultaneously af³rmed the essentially deluded nature of sentient beings and their ultimate destiny of Buddhahood. The latter doctrine, the doctrine of the Universal Buddha, basically represents their innovative interpretation of the tathagatagarbha and Buddhanature theories that had already gained currency in Chinese Buddhist circles. As indicated above, the teaching of tathagatagarbha has always been debatable, for it is fundamentally an af³rmative approach to truth and wisdom, offering descriptions of reality not in negative terms of what it is lacking or empty of (apophatic description, typical of the Perfection of Wisdom corpus 81
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 129–30.
Pelliot #2550; Tun-huang pao-tsang vol. 122, 58-62; cited in Mark Lewis, “The Suppression of the Three Stages Sect: Apocrypha as a Political Issue” in Buswell, Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, 215. 82
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and the Madhyamika school) but rather in positive terms of what it is (catophatic description, more typical of the devotional, tantric, Mah„parinirv„«a and Lotus Sutra traditions, and, it should be noted, the monistic terms of the orthodox Brahmanic systems). Nonetheless, and in spite of the numerous technical details that continued to be debated, that the Buddhanature model of human nature came to dominate Chinese Buddhist thinking is well documented. In this climate Hsin-hsing’s insistence that the deluded too partake of the fully enlightened nature of a Buddha is therefore not that unusual. In a manner strikingly similar to Hsin-hsing, for example, the Fo hsing lun M§Ç puts it this way: By the omnipresence [of the Buddha-nature] is meant that there is no difference in the [essential] nature of the ordinary person, the sage, and the Buddha. Within these three ranks [of sentient beings] the ³rst [that is, the ordinary person] is perverse and deluded; the second [that is, the sage] follows the holy path without faltering; and the third [that is, the Buddha] is ultimately pure in the four virtues. Nevertheless, these three stations are equal and mutually related because all accord with the principle of the omnipresence [of Buddha-nature]. It is just as the empty space in a clay, silver, or gold vessel is pervasive, equal and non-discriminated, so too is the dharmadh„tu of the Tathagata [equal and non-discriminated] in the three ranks [of beings].83
And of course the Nirvana Sutra, so very popular in Northern Dynasties Buddhism, formulates the most famous af³rmation of the universality of Buddha-nature, including even the very enemies of the Buddha’s teachings, those who have severed all capacity for virtue, the icchantika. The Tun-huang fragments of the Three Levels manuscript that I have examined gives a description of this ultimate reality that moves from a rather abstract discussion of the nonduality of enlightenment and delusion within the universe of all things (dharmadh„tu) to the very concrete practice of looking upon all beings at this very moment, in their phenomenal nature, as fully enlightened buddhas, no different from their ultimate natures. Along the way it makes use of many of the more common descriptions of this very positive description of ultimate reality, such as the four perfected qualities (gu«ap„ramit„) of permanence, bliss, great self, and purity—traits descriptive of what truly exists or is not empty (ašðnya), that is, nirvana, but not applicable to what is empty (šðnya), that is, samsara. Thus Buddha-nature is both “truly empty” (of all de³lement) and at the same time “profoundly existent,” both in terms of being truly real as well as the truly real virtues it possesses. In such a degenerate world as ours, we are told, this ultimate reality is like a treasure house that causes our liberation. As degeneracy no less than 83
T #1610, 31.806b.
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liberation is relevant only to suffering sentient beings, the Four Buddhas also claims that the nonsentient do not have this enlightenment potential, a position generally repudiated in East Asian, especially Japanese, Buddhism. As noted, the larger context of this teaching of the “Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma” is the San-chieh doctrine of the appropriate refuge for the third, degenerate level of human capacity. Just as the doctrine and practice appropriate for the living beings of each capacity differ, so too does the refuge of the Buddha. Thus, for example, although a being of superior wisdom of the ³rst level may successfully take refuge in a single Buddha (Amitabha, for example), for beings of no wisdom at all of the third level this would be tantamount to slandering all the other buddhas as less than effective! Hence the appropriate sanctuary is that of the “universally true and universally correct Buddha.” The Buddha-Jewel for the third level, therefore, consists not only of all buddhas, but also of all the false buddhas, demons, and M„ra, who are no different in their basic nature from fully enlightened buddhas. For people of degenerate capacity, unable to accurately distinguish truth from untruth, this universality of the Buddha-nature was deemed the appropriate place of refuge, the refuge of the Universal Buddha. The insistence that living beings blinded by delusion must look only to the purity and truth-value of the nonduality of nirvana and samsara is the basis of the Three Levels’ concept of universality. The idea of a universally pervading purity and truth is the hallmark of their teachings and, to a certain extent, an idea shared with both the T’ien-t’ai and the Hua-yen schools. Taking into account our prejudices, ignorance, and greed, the Three Levels movement declared that we have no hope of discerning particular or relative levels of truth and falsity and so it is necessary to rely on the universality of truth declared in the scriptures, that is, the premise of nonduality. This nondual or universal truth that undergirds their teaching of the Buddha-Jewel is also extended to the other two jewel-refuges as well, and thereby becomes an important link in the East Asian development of the doctrine of the salvation of the sinner, most well-known in the teaching of Shinran, as, for example, in his notion of akunin shõki, the “true capacity of the evil person.” Let me turn, then, to the nonduality of the Dharma and the evil nature of the sangha.
6. The Refuge of the Universal Dharma and Universal Sangha
J
ust as the refuge of the Universal Buddha emphasizes the need to look to the essential truth that suffuses all phenomena, the Sanchieh doctrine of the refuge of the teachings and community appropriate for sentient beings of the third level emphasizes the universality of the essential truth underlying or permeating all speci³c instances of the teachings or individual members of the community. Why? Because the blinders of our prejudices render a narrow, speci³c view or practice a source of harm rather than merit. Thus again it was the point of view of the sentient beings who would study and cultivate the doctrine that fueled Hsin-hsing’s efforts at systematization rather than a chronology of the Buddha’s sermons or doctrinal evaluation of the content of the scriptures; this put the focus on the needs of the sentient beings hearing the teachings now as the arbiter of validity.1 One can easily follow the reasoning of this hermeneutic—if you buy into the notion of the decline of our capacity to receive, understand, and uphold the dharma, then the emphasis in doctrinal classi³cation must shift away from such traditional norms as whether one or another scripture transmits the full and perfect wisdom or is merely an “accommodated” teaching, that is, away from teachings that are de³nitive (n‡t„rtha) versus teachings in need of interpretation (ney„rtha) and the yardstick of truth by which this is determined; the evaluation must be centered on sentient beings and their needs.
The Teachings in Accord with the Capacity of the First and Second Levels As is usually the case with Hsin-hsing’s teachings, the doctrine appropriate for the sentient beings of the ³rst and second levels reµects their For an overview of other Buddhist approaches to grading the teachings see the essays in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988). For an excellent overview of the radically “universal” rhetoric of the three levels see Mark Lewis, “The Suppression of the Three Stages Sect,” 213–25; for a discussion of his analysis of the suppressions of the three levels movement see chapter 8 below. 1
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ability to accurately discern truth and falsity, hence the capacity to bene³t from particular teachings; more speci³cally, however, as discussed in chapter 4, it represents the difference between Ekay„na scriptures such as the Hua-yen Sutra and the sutras, Vinaya, and commentaries of the Triy„na: [For sentient beings of the ³rst level] exhaustively taking refuge in the complete teaching is comprised of two items: (1) [taking refuge in] the Mahayana teaching of the sudden doctrine such as the Hua-yen Sutra and the many Mahayana sutras; and (2) [taking refuge in] the Mahayana teaching of universal understanding, that for the purpose of eliminating the malady of discrimination universally sees the Mahayana without question of non-Buddhist or Buddhist scripture, superior and inferior. [For sentient beings of the second level] exhaustively taking refuge in the complete dharma is comprised of the single category of the sutras, precepts, and commentaries of the Triy„na.2
Reµecting the usual attitude of Hsin-hsing, the refuge of the dharma for sentient beings of the ³rst and second level is to be found in the scriptures, precept texts, and commentaries of the Mahayana and the Triy„na. What, however, about those whose faculties were not up to accurate discernment, accurate discrimination of true from false?
The Universal Teaching of the Third Level One of Hsin-hsing’s important teachings is that because the dharma is taught for the purpose of liberation it must be suited to the capacity of the practitioner. This doctrine is embodied in a phrase found throughout the literature and the title of one of Hsin-hsing’s important works, the Tui ken ch’i hsing fa ÏÍ|‘À, the “teaching on the practice that arises in accord with the capacity.” Simply put, Hsin-hsing taught that the speci³c or particular teachings and practices appropriate for the capacities of the ³rst two levels were not appropriate for the capacity of the third level.3 The San chieh fo fa tells us why, quoting from a wide variety of sutras to conclude that living beings of the third level cannot be saved by ordinary means; indeed, the buddhas cannot help, nor can all of the scriptures: 2
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 112.
The “practices that arise in accord with the capacity” is an oft-repeated phrase found throughout San-chieh literature, and is, of course, based on such traditional Buddhist ideas as “graduated teachings” (anupubbikath„, see below), up„ya, etc. The most detailed reasoning for this claim is given in the 24 sections of the San chieh fo fa, 291–304. 3
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The ³rst item is as explained in the K„šyapa-sðtra, which teaches that even one thousand buddhas are not able to save those sentient beings with the nature to be attached to the views of existence and emptiness. The second item is as clari³ed in the Fo ts’ang ching, which teaches that even a hundred-thousandmillion-trillion buddhas would not be able to save these sentient beings who are attached to the views of existence and emptiness.… The ³fth item is as made known in the Nirvana Sutra, where it teaches that all of the sutras in their entirety are not able to convert those sentient beings whose nature it is to be attached to views of existence and emptiness.4
Why is it that “a hundred-thousand-million-trillion buddhas” or “all of the sutras” cannot help sentient beings of the third level? The basic answer is that, whereas the Ekay„na and Triy„na doctrines were suited for the sharper faculties of the ³rst and second levels, respectively, for the third level they were viewed as causing one to slander the dharma rather than bringing bene³ts.5 According to the San-chieh doctrine this is so because as long as correct views prevail in the world, a specialized, particularistic view, concerned with only one aspect of the dharma, will enable one to realize the fruits of liberation, but in an era when all of the sages and beings of true views have disappeared and sentient beings are pulled and swayed by their attachments to various viewpoints and dogmas, to emphasize only one aspect of the dharma as true is, by its very exclusiveness, to slander all the rest of the dharma. One common description of the beings of the third level is “blind from birth.”6 That is, for those of us in the third level with no eyes to perceive the 4
San chieh fo fa, 257.
“Slandering the true dharma” (Skt. saddharma-pratik¤epa) is a phrase found frequently in Mahayana texts and most likely had a sectarian rhetorical function during the birth and early articulation of the Mahayana scriptures, similar to the sectarian concerns voiced in the scriptures cited in chapter 2. Interestingly, the Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra speci³cally excludes those who slander the dharma from the saving power of Amitabha (T #12, 268a). In the history of Chinese Pure Land thought we see a movement from Tan-luan (476–542), who accepted this limitation, to Tao-cho (562–645) and Shan-tao (613–681), who, based on the Kuan Wu-liangshou ching, included even the “lowest of the low” in their soteriology. It is very possible that this was a doctrinal reaction to the teachings of Hsin-hsing (540–594) which were speci³cally aimed at the icchantika who slanders the dharma, especially as Tao-ch’o and Hsin-hsing both studied under the same teacher Hui-tsan (see Chapter One); on the San-chieh and Pure Land generally see Michibata Ryõshð, “Dõshaku to Sangaikyõ” and “Zendõ to Sangaikyõ,” in Chðgoku Jõdokyõshi no kenkyð (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1980); Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 536–77. Also see Kenneth Tanaka, The Dawn of Chinese Pure Land, 62–64 for a discussion of who is included in the “lowest of the low.” 5
This term (Skt. j„tyandha) is often employed in Buddhist scriptures to indicate that ignorance is the fault of the perception not of the object (as, for example, in the ³rst chapter of theVimalak‡rti); it is also used to denote the icchantika, as in the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra. This 6
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correct dharma, beset as we are by attachments to our views of existence and emptiness, our prejudices and sectarian bickering, to practice one aspect of the dharma, viewing it as the best or superior dharma, will inevitably cause us to slander the rest of the dharma. Thus, for sentient beings of the third level to practice the Ekay„na or Triy„na dharma when they are swayed by attachments and petty bickering is rampant is to cause harm rather than good, and instead of upholding the dharma one ³nds that one is committing the grievous offense of slandering the dharma. This is well stated in the Practice in Accord with the Capacity: Question: Why is it that within the same Buddha-dharma the study of the universal teaching is purely bene³cial and without harm while the study of the particular teaching is both bene³cial and harmful? Answer: It is because the capacities [of sentient beings] differ. This has two meanings: (1) the universal teaching is without fault; (2) the particular teaching [must be] in accord with the capacity. That the universal teaching is without fault means that the essence of the universal teaching is the tathagatagarbha [Buddha], the Buddha-nature [Buddha], etc. All of the commonordinary people and the sages, the false and the true, without regard to superior or inferior capacity, can study this same one essence, which has no distinctions and is only the [universal teaching of the] tathagatagarbha and [therefore they can] be without fear of mistake [because it is] purely bene³cial and without harm. There are two reasons that the particular teaching [must be] in accord with the capacity. The ³rst clari³es why, [if the particular teachings] are in accordance with the capacity it is purely bene³cial and without harm: it is only those of the Ekay„na and Triy„na, those of the ³rst and second levels, who pro³t through the exaltation and study of the teachings of the sutras. This is because they have the capacity for the particular and thus their capacity is in accord with the study of [these sutras]; therefore it is purely bene³cial and without harm. The second [reason] is that if one whose capacity is not in accord [with the particularized teaching] studies the particularized teaching there is purely harm and no pro³t. Why is this? Because it is not in accordance with the capacity of the inferior person to cultivate the practice and teachings of the superior person.… To use a metaphor to explain these two items, for the perverted sentient beings [of the third level] to make distinctions and thereby incur harm is like a blind person shooting an arrow—because he cannot see, he will not hit what is another instance of the San-chieh teachings being aimed at a class of beings even lower than those to whom the teachings of the Pure Land were aimed. See, for example, the Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching, wherein the meditation on the Pure Land is directed towards those who “if not blind from birth have eyes and are able to see the setting sun” (T #365, 12.342a).
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he shoots at and will [accidentally] kill people, which is purely harmful and without pro³t. [On the other hand,] for the perverted sentient beings [of the third level] to study the Universal Dharma, reaping only bene³t without harm is like a blind person shooting an arrow at the ground—all of the arrows will hit [their target] and nobody will be [accidentally] killed. This is purely bene³cial and without harm.7
The actual differences between the particular dharma and the Universal Dharma are found listed throughout the San-chieh literature.8 However, these differences can be summed up by saying that living beings of the third level cannot be trusted to make distinctions between true and false, good and bad, etc., and so they must look to the universality of the essence rather than the distinctions of the manifestation. Thus all of the teachings of the ³rst and second levels are labeled pieh fa ƒÀ, particularized, limited, partial, or exclusive teachings, teachings that make distinctions in the dharma. This pieh fa is declared to be unsuitable for the liberation of the sentient beings of the third level, and it was taught that they must take refuge in the p’u fa 3À, the Universal Dharma, the totality of the dharma, the dharma that corresponds to the capacity of the weak, ignorant, and blind beings of the third level.9 What is most interesting, however, is not that the teachings of the Buddha were given universal and equal validity and relevence but that this same value was given to literally all teachings, even heresies. Because of their inability to discern speci³c truths and the emphasis on the universal nature of truth, the San-chieh followers were taught the eightfold refuge of the dharma appropriate for the third level: 1. the teachings of the sutras; 2. the teachings of the greatest evil; 3. secular teachings; 4. teachings that subvert the good; 5. the teachings of those who adhere to the twelve perverse views; 7
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 139–40; cf. ibid., 133.
The overall structure of the ³ve sections of the Practice in Accord with the Capacity is to give the speci³c reasons that “the path is not the same in the three stages; reasons that the place is not the same,” etc. 8
It is also interesting to compare the San-chieh usage of pieh fa and p’u fa with the categories of pieh ƒ and t’ung ° in the p’an chiao of Chih-yen and Fa-tsang; see Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 350–72; Gimello, Chih-yen, 369–92; Kimura, Shoki Chðgoku Kegon, 430–41, and his “Chigon–Hõzõ to Sangaikyõ,” Indogaku Bukkyõgaku kenkyð 27/1 (1978): 100–107. 9
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6. the teachings of those who adhere to correct views; 7. the teachings given in accommodation to the extreme views of nihilism and eternalism [i.e., the teachings of eternalism and nihilism]; 8. the Mahayana teaching of universal scope [or “the Mahayana teachings of the perception of the universal,” i.e., the teachings of the Sanchieh].”10 Indeed, the San-chieh even went so far as to say that in this evil age, well past the time of knowledge and learning, it is precisely the propensity to acquire knowledge that creates the views of nihilism and eternalism because the age for extensive learning is past.11 As the San chieh fo fa mi chi puts it, The station of the third level is that of the attainment of false views, ³xed, unchangeable, and not able to be saved by the ³ve divisions. This is also called the attainment of false understandings and false practices. The Nirvana Sutra teaches that the bhiksu Shan-hsing read, recited, and expounded the twelve divisions of the scriptures, meditated and obtained the Buddhist path of the four dhyanas, but he did not understand the meaning of even a single phrase or word. He was without even the slightest good roots and hence could not avoid slandering the Buddha.12
The part of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra cited here comes in a section in which K„šyapa has asked the Buddha why he has declared the monk Shanhsing even lower than icchantika, irremediable and destined to remain in hell many aeons. He further asks why the Buddha does not teach Shan-hsing the saddharma: “If you cannot save the bhiksu Shan-hsing,” K„šyapa concludes, “how can you be called one of great compassion and powerful skill in means?” In reply the Buddha illustrates his purpose with a number of stories that divide the merit of children, ³elds, utensils, and the like into three ranks, each of which are likened to the bodhisattva, the sravaka, and the icchantika, respectively. In each case the Buddha declares that the superior of the ³rst level takes precedence over the inferior of the third level (icchantika) because, like seeds sown in a rocky and thorny ³eld, teachings given to the 10 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 115; as we have seen, the “Mahayana teaching of the universal scope” is also included within the teachings for the sentient beings of the ³rst level. 11
San chieh fo fa, 263, 265.
San chieh fo fa mi chi, 75, citing the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, T #374, 12.561c: “Although the bhiksu Shan-hsing recited the twelve divisions of the scriptures and attained the four dhyanas he did not understand the meaning of a single verse, a single phrase, or even a single word. Drawing near to evil friends he lost the four dhyanas; losing the four dhyanas he gave rise to evil and false views, teaching that there is no Buddha, no dharma, and no nirvana” (cf. the 36 chüan Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, T #375, 12.808a). 12
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icchantika will not come to fruition. The Buddha then proceeds to tell a number of stories about the bhiksu Shan-hsing that illuminate his incorrigible nature, his attempts to disrupt the sangha, and the like.13 This chapter of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra (one of the more frequently cited chapters of one of the most frequently cited proof-texts in Hsin-hsing’s writings) is very interesting for its discussion of the icchantika as third in a threefold division of merit or capacity as well as for the interesting discussion of why Shanhsing was allowed to remain in the sangha; perhaps this is related to the discussion of the character of the sangha of the third level discussed below. As with the sentient beings of the third level, the bottom line is that because of his evil nature Shan-hsing cannot help but pervert even the Buddha-dharma that he hears, twisting it until he ends up espousing heretical views. For these reasons Hsin-hsing placed little value on detailed doctrinal organization and ranking, instead stating that de³led discourse on the dharma was characteristic of the evils of the third level; moreover, the retribution one could expect from such discourse was equivalent to that of killing all of the sentient beings in the Three Thousand Great Chiliocosms.14 There are many similar injunctions throughout the literature, but again they may all be summed up by saying that sentient beings of the third level dare not attempt judgements about doctrinal matters—far better to remain silent and rely on the Universal Dharma. Following this hermeneutic to its natural conclusion, San-chieh followers were even enjoined to silence just as they were well-known for taking the practice of the Bodhisattva Never-Despise to heart, greeting everybody that they met with a bow of reverence for their essentially enlightened nature and their future realization of that nature. This prohibition against speech is vividly described in the biography of a later San-chieh teacher contained in the Pelliot collection of Tun-huang texts (Pelliot no. 2550). This text is particularly concerned to admonish the sentient beings of the third level against speech of almost any sort, based on the logic that if the ignorant and degenerate speak they cannot do so without committing slander and abuse. Hence we are told that when the master presented the dharma and [rules of] conduct to his disciples, he forbade them all to open their mouths and had them remain silent like dead men. Even if it reached the point that they were beaten or killed, even if they passed through a thousand deaths, ten thousand deaths, or a million deaths, they could not speak to defend themselves. If subjected to all sorts of punishments, they could not speak to defend themselves. The only exception was that
13
T #374, 12.561a ff.
14
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 115–16.
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they could open their mouths to eat. This continued to the ends of their lives, and then they died like wild beasts.15
Thus too the same text tells of another follower who would not speak except to emulate the Bodhisattva Never-Despise, crying out to those that he met, I deeply reverence all of you and do not dare to disparage you. You are all walking the Way of the bodhisattvas and will become Buddhas.16
The Pure Land One Way It is interesting to note that, faced with this same dilemma of practice in the age of the decline of the dharma, the Pure Land master Tao-ch’o emended a text to show that whereas all other teachings would be ineffective in the time of the latter dharma, the practices advocated in the Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra would still be ef³cacious and “the good dharma will faintly remain,” thus ensuring the ef³cacy of at least one text and one Buddha, thereby also raising both to a position of ultimate importance.17 As mentioned in chapter 3, Tao-ch’o was responsible for wedding the theory of mo fa to that of the Pure Land. Given the direction of the Pure Land teachings from the beginning, such a union was natural, and Tao-ch’o was quick to see the af³nity of the two teachings. Possibly inµuenced by the teachings of Hsin-hsing, Tao-ch’o too taught that the practice must be suited to the time and capacity of the practitioner. Then, basing himself on the Yüeh tsang fen and the Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra, Tao-ch’o stated that the path that corresponded to the time and capacities of the living beings of his age was the path of the Pure Land: Question: If all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, and all have undoubtedly met many Buddhas in the numberless kalpas since the distant past, why is it that up until the present time they continue to revolve in samsara, and are not able to leave the burning house? 15 Cited in Lewis, “Suppression,” 223–24; an edition and study of this text was published by Õtani Shõshin in his ”Sangai bõzenji gyõjõ no shimatsu ni tsuite,” Keijõ Teikoku Daigaku bungakkai ronsan 7 (1938): 247–302. Lewis further notes that “‘Died like wild beasts’ may refer to dying in silence, or it could refer to the sect’s practice of exposing corpses in the wild to allow animals to feed on them” (p. 236 n. 48)—that is, the practice of “sky burial” discussed in chapter 1. 16
Lewis, “Suppression,” 224.
17
Tao-ch’o in the An lo chi, T #1958, 47.4b; see also chapter 3.
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Answer: Depending on the teachings of the Mahayana sages, it is because they have not yet gained the two surpassing teachings by which one escapes birth and death [samsara]. What are these two? One is called the Holy Path and the other is called Birth in Pure Land. The Holy Path [or Path of the Sage] is dif³cult to obtain in this age because we are far removed from the Great Sage [Š„kyamuni] and because the doctrines are deep and our understanding weak. Thus the Ta chi yüeh tsang ching [fen] states that in the time of mo fa, although myriads of sentient beings will cultivate the practices of the path, there will not be one who will obtain [the fruits]. Now the present age is the age of mo fa, the world of the ³ve de³lements. There is only the one gate of the Pure Land through which sentient beings can pass and enter upon the road. Thus the Larger Sutra explains: “If there is a sentient being who throughout his life commits evil actions, and who, at the end of his life, for ten thoughts continuously calls my name—if he is not born [into my Pure Land] may I not obtain enlightenment.”18
It is interesting to see the different answers given to the same question by the two movements most concerned with the Buddhist rhetoric of its own decline. The capacity of sentient beings is virtually nil and the traditional, heroic path of the sages is not a possibility. There was no question about that, and the evidence seemed to be in abundance everywhere. Yet, at the same time, the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature was also widely acknowledged—the question, then, was how to realize this enlightened nature. The answer of the Pure Land preachers was to accept the promise of salvation extended by the Buddha Amitabha, and they taught that it was only through such an acceptance that one could attain salvation—all other paths were far too dif³cult for the puny minds and capacities of the sentient beings living in the time of the decline of the dharma. On the other hand Hsinhsing extended the Pure Land critique (or, rather, his esteem) to all texts and all Buddhas and so stressed that for icchantika and beings blind to the truth—beings of the third level—the acceptance of and dependence on only one aspect of the Buddha-dharma was to imply that all of the other teachings and buddhas were less than effective and hence to commit the offense of slandering the dharma. Therefore, as with the Universal Buddha, they emphasized the essential and nondual truth of the dharmadh„tu underlying all scriptures and doctrines. Thus we should take refuge in all buddhas, regardless of whether they are true buddhas or false demons; we should take refuge in all of the teachings without distinction, heresies and secular teachings as well as canonical texts; and, as we shall see, we should take refuge in the sangha of all sentient beings, whether monks or laity and whether they 18
T #1958, 47.13c.
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keep the precepts or break the precepts.19 In other words, whereas the Pure Land teachers taught a particular Buddha and dharma, Hsin-hsing advocated a universalized response to the question of practice for sentient beings of lowered capacity. Of course, the rhetorical nature of Hsin-hsing’s universalism—a particular or speci³c universal—must not be forgotten.
The Refuge of the Sangha Perhaps more doctrinally interesting and institutionally inµuential than the doctrine of the universal nature of the Buddha and the dharma was the stance regarding the nature of the sangha of the third level. As we have seen, Hsin-hsing’s view of the sentient beings of the third level was clearly negative, and this extended to the sangha as well—the monk who breaks the precepts as well as holds perverse views is characteristic of the third level. Hsin-hsing himself renounced the precepts. What did this mean for his followers and for the institutional practice of his movement? Was his movement an attempt to eliminate the distinction between sangha and laity, between the sacred and secular? If so, does that also mean that the Three Levels movement can best be understood in the context of Chinese lay Buddhist associations? Could this denial of the sanctity of the sangha have been the cause of the suppressions of his teachings? Let me begin to answer these questions with a brief look at how the texts describe the sangha of the ³rst two levels.
The Sangha of the First Level The Practice in Accord with the Capacity, in the “seven sections that explain why the paths of liberation are not the same in each of the Three Levels,” describes the refuge of the sangha for each of the different levels: The third [of the seven practices that lead to salvation] clari³es exhaustively taking refuge in all of the sangha [of the First Level]. There are three types within [this sangha]: 1. The sangha of all the noble bodhisattvas of the Ekay„na; 2. The sangha of the commonordinary bodhisattvas of the Ekay„na who have perfected correct views and transgress neither [the precepts nor the views]; 19
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 114–15.
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3. The sangha of commonordinary bodhisattvas who have perfected correct views and, while they may break the precepts, do not transgress the views.20
The Sangha of the Second Level Typically, having described the ³rst level largely in terms of the Ekay„na, the text describes the second level largely in terms in the Triy„na: The third [of the seven practices leading to salvation] clari³es exhaustively taking refuge in all of the sangha [during the Second Level]. Within this there are twelve types: 1. The sangha of all noble bodhisattvas of the Triy„na; 2. The sangha of all noble pratyeka[buddhas]; 3. The sangha of all noble sravakas; 4. The sangha of all commonordinary bodhisattvas of the Triy„na who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views; 5. The sangha of all commonordinary pratyeka[buddhas] who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views; 6. The sangha of all commonordinary sravakas who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views; 7. The sangha of all commonordinary bodhisattvas of the Triy„na who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views; 8. The sangha of all commonordinary pratyekas of the Triy„na who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views; 9. The sangha of all commonordinary sravakas of the Triy„na who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views; 10. The sangha of all Triy„na bodhisattvas, both true and false; 20 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 112–13. The next item, the practice of saving sentient beings of the ³rst level, further describes the capacities of this level: “The fourth [of the seven practices that lead to salvation] clari³es exhaustively saving all sentient beings [within the First Level]. There are seven types [of beings to be saved]: (1) The noble bodhisattvas of the Ekay„na; (2) the commonordinary bodhisattvas of the Ekay„na who have perfected correct views and transgress neither the precepts nor the views; (3) the commonordinary bodhisattvas [of the Ekay„na] who have perfected correct views and, while they may break the precepts, do not transgress the views; (4) all of the sentient beings of the hells; (5) all of the sentient beings of the preta [realm]; (6) all of the sentient beings of the animal [realm]; and (7) all of the sentient beings of the asura realm” (Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 113).
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11. The sangha of all commonordinary pratyekas, both true and false; 12. The sangha of all commonordinary sravakas, both true and false.21
The Sangha of the Third Level As one would expect given the description of the sentient beings of the third level, the sangha of the third level is comprised of both monks of correct views as well as those monks who have thoroughly “mastered” perverted and false views. The third section clari³es exhaustively taking refuge in the monastic community; within this section there are six types: 1. The sangha that has taken the tonsure and wears the robes. 2. The sangha that is complete in the twelve kinds of perverted, false views. 3. The sangha that is complete in the twelve kinds of correct views. 4. The sangha, manifestations of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, that is attached to the views of emptiness and existence. 5. The sangha of the universal family.22 6. The Mahayana sangha of the universal scope.23
Similarly, the sentient beings of the third level to be saved include those sentient beings that have mastered the perverted and false views as well as those of correct views.24 As noted in chapter 4, whereas breaking the precepts is 21 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 113–14. The text continues with saving sentient beings of the second level: “There are sixteen [types] within the explanation of saving all sentient beings: (1) noble bodhisattvas; (2) noble pratyekas; (3) noble sravakas; (4) commonordinary bodhisattvas who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views; (5) pratyekas [who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views]; (6) sravakas [who have perfected correct views and violate neither the precepts nor the views]; (7) commonordinary bodhisattvas who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views; (8) pratyekas [who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views]; (9) sravakas, [who have perfected correct views and who, while they may violate the precepts, do not violate the views]; (10) the commonordinary bodhisattvas of the Triy„na, both true and false; (11) pratyekas, [both true and false]; (12) sravakas, [both true and false]; (13) sentient beings of hell; (14) sentient beings of the preta [realm]; (15) sentient beings of the animal [realm]; (16) sentient beings of the asura [realm],” Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 113–14. 22 Referring to the idea that, through countless aeons of transmigration, all sentient beings at one time or another have been our relatives. 23 Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 115. As with the “Mahayana teachings of the universal scope” of the ³rst and third levels, this seems to refer to the practice of seeing all sentient beings as belonging to the Mahayana.
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 115; to the list of six types of sangha-refuge are added the beings of the hungry ghost, animal, and asura realms. 24
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common to all levels, breaking the precepts and harboring false views are the hallmark of sentient beings of the third level. But how can monks and nuns who are unable to keep the precepts and espouse views that oppose the teachings of the Buddha really be considered the jewel-like treasure of the monastic community whose very existence bene³ts all living beings? In what sense can we even talk about the refuge of the sangha as a spiritually distinct community and hence appropriate refuge for beings of the third level? In asserting that the sangha of the third level includes the monks of perverted and false views, some have asserted that Hsin-hsing was attempting to blur the line between sangha and laity, an important consideration given the continued development of this trend in Japan. Indeed, there is much in his teachings that supports such an interpretation. Among the elements that comprise this tradition we should take note of the general Mahayana rhetoric that honored the bodhisattva ideal over that of the arhat, included the laity among the audience of the Mahayana scriptures, and the like.25 Along with the various aspects of the Mahayana usually cited in this regard, though, it is particularly the practice of d„na, or giving, that was important to the San-chieh movement, as discussed below in chapter 7. D„na, of course, had traditionally been the exclusive practice of the laity, the practice whereby they supported the renunciant sangha and thereby attained merit that would result in a superior rebirth. In the Mahayana, however, d„na is understood to be the ³rst of the six perfections that the bodhisattva cultivates, and the recipient was not necessarily the monastic community but included the poor and suffering as well. Hence, as the outµow of the bodhisattva’s compassionate desire to aid sentient beings, d„na in its many forms was elevated from an inferior merit-generating practice to a practice that manifests the bodhisattva’s inexhaustible wisdom qua inexhaustible compassion. In addition to this generalized Mahayana teaching, the practice of d„na was given a unique systematization in the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, a scripture of Chinese origin that is one of the most oft-cited in the San-chieh manuscripts.26 One of the unusual (though not unprecedented) claims in the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching is that the proper object of religious tithing is not the monastic community but the poor, orphaned, sick, and destitute.27 25 The relationship between this rhetoric and the institutional reality is as yet a controversial topic; hence I think it prudent to discuss the “lay” component of early Mahayana in terms of its rhetorical, polemic, or literary thrust rather than as necessarily indicating an institutional reality. As with the San-chieh movement, it appears that most of the proponents of the “lay” ideals were in fact precept-following monks. 26 T #2870, 85.1335c–1338c; see also Tokuno, “A Case Study of Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha and ‘The Book of Resolving Doubts’.” 27 Perhaps inµuencing the San-chieh practice of revering even animals as future buddhas, the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching also asserted that “Even if a person, over an in³nite number of
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Hsin-hsing seized upon this idea as the foundation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, the famous charitable institution that I discuss in the next two chapters. Here I will only note that the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, centered around the converted mansion of Kao Chiung, statesman and ³nance minister of the Sui dynasty, attracted laity as well as members of the renunciant community, including members of the powerful P’ei family and Empress Wu. Finally, it should be remembered that, although Hsin-hsing was given a place in Tao-hsüan’s Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks, he had in fact renounced the precepts though he continued to live as a monk.28 Still, as we shall see, Hsin-hsing did not really attempt to eliminate the distinction between monastic and lay—rather, he came from a strong Vinaya tradition and was adamant about the need for strict vigilance of the precepts. Why, then, does the sangha of the third level include those who both break the precepts and maintain false views? As with Hsin-hsing’s emphasis on d„na, this harshly critical estimation of the sangha of the third level may simply be the natural outcome of believing that the predictions of the decline of the dharma (discussed in chapters 2 and 3) had actually come to pass, replete with the various signs of moral, institutional, and doctrinal decay that those sources predicted. In the Ašoka-avad„na versions of the disappearance of the teaching, for example, the head of the sangha laments the dif³culty of ³nding anybody who can fully maintain the precepts in the time after the Buddha’s passing.29 The depictions of the sangha found in the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching were particularly inµuential in guiding Hsin-hsing’s reaction to the monastic decay of the times, especially that text’s criticism of the practices of “special invitations” (singling out individual monks as private or individual recipients of the donor’s muni³cence) and donating new buildings and images to the sangha rather than repairing the old. The Hsiang fa chüeh i ching and other texts criticized the monks who were lax in their discipline rather than af³rming them as the refuge, and thus still represent the production strata of the decline tradition anxious to restore proper discipline. Hsin-hsing, however, teaching the reality of the decline, proclaimed those very monks and nuns incapable of keeping the precepts to be the actual refuge of the sangha, the refuge appropriate for third level. As lives, were to make offerings to all the buddhas of the ten directions, and all of the bodhisattvas and disciples, it would not be as good as a person giving a mouthful of food and drink to an animal. The merit accruing therefrom is superior to the former by one million or ten million times, immeasurably and in³nitely.” T #2870, 85.1336a, cited in Tokuno, “The Book of Resolving Doubts,” 262. 28 See Mark Lewis, “Suppressions,” 216–21, for his analysis of how the San-chieh teachings “removed the distinction between monk and layman.” 29
T #99, 2.179a–b; T #2042, 50.127b–c.
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with the refuge of the dharma for the sentient beings of the third level, the rationale was that at the essential level all partake of the enlightened nature of the noble community of buddhas and bodhisattvas, and at the conventional level sentient beings of the third level are not capable of distinguishing the true monk from the false. Thus the Three Levels teaching on how one is to tithe to the monastic community, one of the sixteen practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, claims that donors should not only contribute to the corrupt monks but they should do so ³rst: The third [of the sixteen practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse] is the study of making inexhaustible offerings to the sangha; this consists in universally making offerings without questioning whether the members observe the precepts or transgress the precepts. Commentary: This means universally offering in one moment, not only to those who hold the precepts but also to those who break the precepts. According to the Ta chi yüeh tsang fen ching it is also necessary to make offerings ³rst to those who break the precepts or are without the precepts.30 The teaching of the Meditation Master [Hsin-hsing] led the donors, teaching them to ³rst give to the community of monks who give offense and later offer to the monks who request [offerings]. Why is this? The community of offending monks does not rely on the precepts, and this means that it is breaking the precepts. If the donor is not able to give to the community of monks who offend in their practice of the Buddha-dharma, then this is [not] the superior [practice].31 If [the monks] desire to receive [the offerings of] the alms-giver and request [that they receive offerings] ³rst, [you should] inquire as to whether or not they have taken in the offending community [of monks]. If not, [then you should] say that you cannot [make offerings to them] and you should not receive their requests.32
As radical as this might seem, it is neither without precedent nor without inµuence beyond Hsin-hsing’s community. Hsin-hsing’s position actually forms but one link in a chain of argument that sought to explain or excuse the presence in the sangha of monks who were less than stellar exemplars of purity, probably as a defensive move in the face of criticism from various quarters, lay supporters no less than secular authority.33 Another Buddhist 30
See Appendix C, note 63.
This is a tentative translation. The text is damaged at this point, indicating one missing character preceding ch’ao • “to go beyond,” which I have rendered as “superior.” 31
32
Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 176; see Appendix C.
For an interesting description of a sort of self-regulating mechanism whereby the sangha itself, due to its recruiting successes, tried to control the number of monks who sought tonsure purely for worldly gain, see Torkel Brekke, “The Early Sa½gha and the Laity,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 20/2 (1997): 7–32. 33
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tradition that seemed to support this rationalization was that of the gluttonous monk Pi«^ola, well known in China from such texts as the Ch’ing Pint’ou-lu fa,34 the Ta a lo han Nan-t’i-mi-to-lo so shuo fa chu chi,35 and other texts and traditions translated from Indian originals as well as texts composed in China.36 John Strong has shown how Pi«^ola, one of the sixteen arhats whose mandate was to remain as a ³eld of merit during the period of the decline of the dharma, represents both ascetic tendencies and the appearance of gluttony, attracting meritorious donations and thereby serving as a pi«^a„laya, a “storehouse for alms-food” and an unsurpassed source of merit.37 This is well symbolized by the constant presence of his begging bowl in his representations as well as the empty seat prepared for him in the refectory and his role in the pañca-v„r¤ika sponsored by Ašoka.38 Related also to his reputation for gluttony is the well-known story of his breaking the monastic precepts through a display of his superpowers, speci³cally µying through the air to grab a begging bowl from atop a high bamboo pole.39 A ³nal aspect of his legend that relates to the San-chieh movement is the fact that Pi«^ola, prohibited from entering nirvana and enjoined to remain as a Field of Merit during the latter dharma (=À),40 is identi³ed as one willing and able to dispel doubts about the dharma, iconographically symbolized by the book that he carries and the appellation “Lion-Roarer.” In other words, the dharma persists in Pi«^ola even during the latter teaching, much as the Lotus allows continued access even in the time of the destruction of the dhama. According to Strong, then, the various legends of Pi«^ola address the fact that “some individuals in the Sangha could hardly be said to be paragons of monastic discipline and restraint … [thus] the thrust of the story … is to enjoin the making of offerings to monks who, whatever their reputation or appearance, are actually worthy recipients of d„na.… [The] intent is to combat the doubts of those who, in this profane age, would question the qualities of the bhik¤u.… [T]he ³nal claim is that despite appearances, Pi«^ola (and Buddhist monks after him) are possibly already powerful enlightened individuals and hence ³t foci for devotion.”41 The elements of the Pi«^ola 34
T #1689, translation attributed to Hui-chien in the ³fth century.
35
T #2030, translated by Hsüan-tsang in 654.
Cf. John Strong, “The Legend of the Lion-Roarer,” 52 ff. for discussions and English translations of these scriptures; see also above, chapter 3, n. 26. 36
37
Strong, “The Legend of the Lion-Roarer,” 66.
Strong, “The Lion-Roarer,” 81 ff; see below for the history of “maigre feasts” sponsored at the Hua-tu ssu. 38
39
Strong, “The Lion-Roarer,” 71 ff.
40
T #1689, 32.784b.
41
Strong, “The Lion-Roarer,” 67-68, 75.
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story—the age of decline, the seemingly corrupt monk who is in reality an enlightened being, the focus on d„na and the monks’ begging for alms-food, and Pi«^ola’s association with asceticism—all ³t extremely well with Sanchieh teachings, especially with their doctrine of the Universal Buddha that sees all sentient beings as enlightened buddhas even though they break the precepts and harbor false views. Indeed, just as followers of the San-chieh bowed to all they met and declared their Buddhahood, Ašoka is reputed to have exclaimed upon meeting Pi«^ola, “Seeing you now, I see the Tath„gata and by this sight my faith has been doubled.”42 There are also, of course, a number of important differences between the Pi«^ola tradition and the Sanchieh assertion that it is the corrupt and false monks who comprise the sangha of the third level, the most important of which is that Pi«^ola is, after all, an arhat who only appears to be gluttonous and breaking the precepts, whereas the San-chieh taught that the sangha of the third level actually is thoroughly corrupted.43 Of course, this is a moot point, considering that the prejudices of the sentient beings of the third level prevented them from accurate discernment in either case. Nonetheless, the rhetorical point had been scored: in the time of the decline of the dharma it is not necessarily an outward appearance of rigorous adherence to the precepts that is the determiner of the true renunciant—the reality is much more subtle. This “logic” was carried even further in the Japanese tradition, however, especially as seen in the Mappõ tõmyõki. Going the other way in both time and geography, the Mappõ tõmyõki, “The Candle of the Latter Dharma,” is a text attributed to Saichõ that played an important role in the formation of the decline tradition in Japan and was quoted extensively by Hõnen and Shinran (and criticized by Nichiren and Eisai).44 Quoting from many of the same canonical sources deployed by Hsin-hsing, the text argues that it is really “only in the time of the True Dharma [that] the bhik¤u who breaks the precepts de³les the pure sangha” because in the time of the decline of the dharma the monks and nuns will not be able to keep the precepts and will be renunciants in name only. During the time of the latter dharma, therefore, the “monks who break the precepts and the monk without the precepts are both True Treasures [i.e., the true sangha-refuge].”45 Another echo of Hsin-hsing’s teachings is found 42
From the Ašoka-avad„na, cited in Strong, “The Lion-Roarer,” 85.
Interesting in this regard is the Chinese version of the Kauš„mb‡ story, which uniquely contains an injunction to give to the monastic community even if they break the precepts; cf. Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, p. 182. 43
44 For a tranlsation and discussion of the Mappõ tõmyõki see Robert F. Rhodes, “Saichõ’s Mappõ Tõmyõki,” The Eastern Buddhist (New Series) 13/1 (1980): 79–103. 45
Ibid., 94.
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in the Mappõ tõmyõki’s critique of the monastic practices of alms-seeking and receiving special invitations from the laity.46 Finally, similar to Hsinhsing’s decision to abandon the precepts while living as a monk, “commentaries by Shin sect scholars agree that the teaching that the monk without the precepts is the true monk of the Latter Dharma expressed in the Candle of the Latter Dharma was inµuential in Shinran’s decision to openly marry and declare himself ‘neither monk nor layman’.”47 One of the most intriguing aspects of the Mappõ tõmyõki is that it is apparently a reaction to various imperial edicts aimed at controlling the sangha, leading me to wonder what, if any, similar motivations informed Hsin-hsing’s rhetoric of the corrupt monks as the true refuge? Of course, as with the legend of Pi«^ola, we need to exercise due care in assessing the inµuence of or continuities between the teachings of the San-chieh and the Mappõ tõmyõki, especially given their differing origins and systematizations of the decline tradition. Still, as consumers of a decline tradition that prophesied the advent of a corrupt sangha, both did take the logical next step when they proclaimed such to be the reality of the monastic order, but the less obvious move of declaring such a corrupt sangha to be the true refuge as well perhaps indicates the inµuence of San-chieh teachings in Japan. Did this mean, then, that the members of the Three Levels communities lived a thoroughly secular or hedonistic lifestyle, doing what they wanted and ignoring all of the monastic rules, free to do as they wished with neither remorse nor retribution? Indeed, given such a characterization of the true monk, the true refuge of the sangha, why would anybody even make an attempt to follow the precepts?
The Sangha of the Third Level: recognizing evil and practicing virtue One of the most common problems for any religious system that would posit such a thorough nonduality or identity of the true and the profane is how to validate the need for religious practice, practice that can only be based on the recognition or discrimination of differences in purity and impurity and moral judgements about good and evil. The nondual—that is, the not-one, not-two relation described in the refuge of the Universal Buddha—is not a simple, unidirectional reductionism. Non-duality is not monism. For example, as we have seen, at the same time we are exhorted to revere all sentient beings with the thought that they are fully enlightened buddhas, we are also told to “save all sentient beings,” activity that would 46
Ibid., 102.
47
Ibid., 84.
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not be necessary if the phenomenal fact of suffering sentient beings were lost in a monistic blur of absolute truth.48 Thus, at the same time that the universality of the pure nature is proclaimed, the particulars of the manifestation, that is to say, the degenerate sentient beings of the third level, are not overlooked.49 So in an interesting turn Hsin-hsing taught that the complement of universal respect and the universally pervasive Buddha-nature is the “recognition of evil” (ÞÕ).50 This is to say that, while the practitioner of the third level was told to view others as none other than buddhas, they were to view themselves as thoroughly evil, recognizing their own capacity as inferior to all other sentient beings. One list therefore gives universal respect as the ³rst of the practices appropriate for the third level, followed by the recognition of evil. In further clari³cation the text then explains that universal respect is for everybody other than oneself: The sixth item is the Buddha-dharma of one person and one practice. One person refers to seeing oneself alone as an evil person. One practice is as taught in the Lotus Sutra, wherein the Bodhisattva Never-Despise only cultivated one practice, that of respecting everybody other than himself as the Tathagatagarbha [Buddha], Buddha-nature [Buddha], Future Buddha, and Perceived Buddha.51
Thus the teaching of “recognizing evil” is but the other side of universal respect, the side that validates religious practice, the side that returns to the negative estimation of the degenerate beings of the third level described in chapter 4: the docile, silent, and community-oriented “mute sheep” monks. Hence the Chih fa, a recently discovered manual of Three Levels’ community regulations, states that the head of the community is to be a monk who, in addition to other quali³cations (discussed below) should always see himself and speak of himself as thoroughly evil, and never think of himself or speak of himself as virtuous; he should, however, always see others and speak of others as virtuous, and never think of others or speak of others as evil. Why is this? It is because all of the perverted sentient beings who have realized false views take all of the truly virtuous people, teachings, understandings [true liberative practices that people teach?] and practices as false people, teachings, understandings, and practices and take all of the false people, 48
Okabe, “Buddhakan,” 270.
The San-chieh notion of the Universal Dharma, however, did not lend itself to such a recognition of the relevance of particular teachings, and the strident criticism inherent in their “one-way” hermeneutic is often cited as a reason for their suppression. 49
50
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 131–32.
51
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 132–33.
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teachings, understandings, and practices to be truly virtuous people, teachings, understandings, and practices.52
In other words, it is the biased views that people hold that will prevent them from accurate discrimination of true from false, right from wrong even with regard to self and other—those of the third level cannot even be trusted to accurately judge themselves! The implications of this for the actual practice of Hsin-hsing’s communities are fascinating and constitute another remarkable facet of the San-chieh chronicle that, as with so much of their doctrine, places them not outside of the orthodoxy but squarely within the main currents of late Northern Dynasties, Sui, and T’ang Buddhism. What sort of practices did Hsin-hsing and those who subscribed to his ideas do in their day-to-day training? Just what did these evil sentient beings of the third level actually do? From the scant records we have it would seem that they did pretty much what most Chinese Buddhists of the time did, that is, live in a regulated monastic setting in which they engaged in a daily regimen of liturgy (typically including veneration of the buddhas, offerings, repentance, taking refuge, dedication of merit, and vows), practiced seated meditation (on such esoteric topics as the “emptiness that is the emptiness of nonexistence and the emptiness of form”), begged for food and cultivated other austerities (the dhðta practices), interacted with the laity (including bestowing lay precepts), studied the scriptures, and composed texts. The full study of this fascinating aspect of Hsin-hsing’s communities is beyond the scope of the present work; a brief introduction to the subject is, however, in order.
The Pure Practice of Corrupt Monks Our sources for the study of the actual life of the Three Levels communities are sparse, consisting primarily of the various biographies of Hsinhsing, his followers and sympathizers, secular records relating to the Inexhaustible Storehouse and its headquarters in the Ch’ang-an temple of the Hua-tu ssu (detailed in chapter 8), the various handbooks of San-chieh liturgical, confessional, and penitential rite (different recensions of the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma), contemplation manuals, and, most importantly, Pelliot #2849, the above-mentioned Chih fa, perhaps authored by Hsin-hsing himself.53 52 Chih fa, 579; lest one get the impression that such a head monk would be of little use in guiding the community, it should be noted that the Chih fa speci³cally notes that these warnings do not apply when he is admonishing the monks or administering discipline. 53 An overview of many of the biographical sources can be found in Jamie Hubbard, “Salvation in the Final Period,” 320–330; see also Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions”
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On a perusal of these materials, the ³rst thing that becomes apparent is that in spite of the rhetoric of the debased sangha and in spite of Hsinhsing’s own example of abandoning the precepts, the fact of the matter is that Hsin-hsing and his followers highly respected the monastic institutions and were strict in their observance of codes and punishment of infractions. No doubt this partly reµects what Jan Nattier has dubbed the “we-try-harder” response to the lowered capacity for practice, for such a situation “requires additional efforts by would-be Buddhist practitioners (efforts that fall within traditional frameworks) if there is to be any hope at all of reaching the goal.”54 Probably at least as important, however, is the simple fact that Hsinhsing inherited a Buddhist tradition of practice that itself emphasized precepts, austerities, and monastic rigor, not uncommon in Chinese Buddhism of the time. He sought the precepts from Hui-tsan, for example, a teacher noted for his seated meditation practice, study of the Vinaya, strict vigilance of the precepts, and cultivation of the fang teng repentance rite, all characteristics of Hsin-hsing and his followers as well as of Chih-i, Tao-ch’o, and others of the time.55 Likewise, Hsin-hsing’s return to lay status should probably be seen not as an indication that he wished to eliminate the difference between renunciant and lay but rather as a sign of his respect for the precepts, either because he felt that if he could not follow the precepts he should abandon them or, as Nishimoto has recently suggested, because of his propensity for labor and desire to bene³t both the Field of Merit (the Buddha, dharma, and sangha) as well as the Field of Compassion (needy sentient beings).56 Thus, too, the majority of Hsin-hsing’s followers and those later associated with the movement were monks whose eminence is indicated not only by the simple fact and Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð,, esp. 34–45; the most up-to-date and complete account of these biographical materials is in Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 25–154. Perhaps the most remarkable evidence for the actual practices of the Three Levels comes from a recently discovered Sanchieh manuscript (Pelliot 2849) containing three separate texts: a manual of San-chieh monastic regulations, the Chih fa £À in one chüan, rules for begging food (Ch’i shih fa F7À), and a manual for receiving the eight precepts (Shou pa chieh fa 1kwÀ) in one chüan. My attention was ³rst drawn to this remarkable manuscript by Daniel Stevenson, who brieµy discussed it in “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 278–80; since then, Nishimoto has also studied the text and published an edition of the manuscript; see Nishimoto Teruma, Sangaikyõ, 407–74 and 578–601. 54
Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 137; see also Lewis, “Suppressions,” 210–13.
T #2060, 50.575b; see also chapter 1, 7–8 and 24. On the practice of the fang teng repentance see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 82–94; on the role of fang teng in preceptual traditions see ibid., 186–88; on repentance in the San-chieh eight-precept ceremony see the Shou pa chieh fa, 595–99; Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 459–66. 55
56
Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 56.
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that their biographies were recorded, but also because many, such as Sengyung and Pen-chi, were given the title Ch’an shih ,‚, “Master of Meditation,” while others, such as Ching-ming, are referred to as Fa shih À‚, “Master of the Teaching,” and yet other San-chieh monks were accorded the title of Ta te Ø…, “Great Virtue” (Skt. bhadanta), one of the highest monastic titles in the land.57 According to the Chih fa the monk appointed to oversee San-chieh communities—though regarding himself as evil and others as virtuous—was in fact required to be virtuous himself, to cultivate the dhðta practices and the seated meditation of the “formless samadhi” (wu hsiang san mei [oX*), and to have never violated the precepts since becoming a monk. Similarly, those appointed to oversee the Inexhaustible Storehouse were always said to be well known and, in one rather ironic case, was a monk reputed to be “diligent in the cultivation of the precepts.”58 Laxness in the community was clearly not permitted; being late to the practice hall, speaking out of turn or during practice, or breaching the etiquette of hierarchy were all singled out as punishable offenses, and expulsion from the community was deemed appropriate for some infractions (see below, 145–47, and note 64). None of this indicates a belief that traditional monastic practices, particularly observance of the precepts, were no longer thought to be possible.59 Although Hsin-hsing returned to lay status, the regard in which he was held by his followers led them not to abandon the precepts but rather to be strict in their observance. Indeed, the Chih fa manual of San-chieh community regulations speci³cally prohibits those who have discarded the precepts from even joining the community and requires the expulsion of any who might have already done so or may simply be thinking about doing so.60 The preceptual tradition was apparently important for lay followers as well, and the Chih fa advocates 57 For Seng-yung see T #2060, 50.583c; for Pen-chi see T #2060, 50.578a; Hui-liao and Fatsang were two San-chieh monks accorded the title of Ta te; see chapter 8 and Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 267–69. 58
See chapter 8, 202–203.
59
Chih fa, 579.
Chih fa, 588–89. An important distinction is made for those who abandoned the precepts prior to the promulgation of the Chih fa regulations, provided that they did so according to the Vinaya and under the direction of a monastic teacher (shih seng ‚R, preceptor?)—an exception made, perhaps, by Hsin-hsing for himself or for others forcibly defrocked in the persecution of 574–577? Compare the diametrically opposed rhetoric in the biography of the “anonymous Meditation Master” of the San-chieh whose teachings led his followers to abandon their precepts, although here too it was clearly not the denigration of the precepts but rather the weight or importance attached to the precepts that led to the monks’ feeling impure or unworthy of lay d„na and hence felt that they should return to lay status—that is, they felt that they were not worthy to be “one who receives offerings,” the literal meaning of bhiksu; Pelliot 2550, Tun huang pao tsang, 122.60a; see also the edition in Õtani Shõshin, “Sangai bõzenji,” lines 93, 131, 144, 212. 60
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fellowship with those who have taken the ³ve precepts, the eight precepts, the two hundred and ³fty precepts, and the bodhisattva precepts; the same manuscript also contains the Shou pa chieh fa 1kwÀ in one chüan, Hsinhsing’s manual for administering the eight precepts to the laity.61 So, too, the constant association of San-chieh followers with the austerities of the dhðta, various liturgical, repentance, and meditation practices (“in the evil world after the Buddha’s extinction all of the evil home-departed ones should only take seated meditation as their foundation”)62 belies the notion that they forsook the disciplined life or saw no distinction to be made between monastic and lay life or among different practitioners; these practices also place them well within the norms of Northern Dynasties Buddhist practice.63 But should we not expect that the institutional organization of the Three Levels would eliminate distinctions and ranking not only between lay and monastic but also among the various practitioners themselves, based upon either the doctrinal rhetoric of universal Buddha-nature or, conversely, the universal degeneracy of the third level sentient beings? After all, are not all sentient beings either already enlightened buddhas or else monks in name only, monks who are more characterized by their infractions and prejudice than by their virtue? Although we might think that these doctrines would lead to a utopian or egalitarian community characterized by a removal of distinctions or µattening of difference among the practitioners, such does not appear to be the case with the organizational structure of the Three Levels movement. In fact—and in keeping with the rhetoric of the p’u fa that was as exclusive or particular as the pieh fa—the institutional practice of the Three Levels seems rather to have enforced distinctions according to ability, hierarchies or ranks according to practice, and separation of community members according to capacity and training as well as for punitive purposes.64 61 Chih fa, 581; see also the Shou pa chieh fa, 595–600; the manual actually includes nine precepts; see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 459–65. 62 Chih fa, 581; a large portion of the Chih fa is devoted to detailed instructions on seated meditation practice. 63 Regarding the dhðta practices, for example, a perusal of the historical records quickly reveals that Chih-i and Hui-tsan are only a few of the many monks said to have cultivated the dhðta practices; many questions remain, however (for example, did they actually practice all twelve or thirteen dhðta or only a subset)—in other words, did dhðta function less literally and more as a trope to signify “rigorous practice,” etc. A more thorough study of these practices in the Chinese context would no doubt be very revealing. For similarities between the liturgical and prayer/meditation practices of Hsin-hsing, Chih-i and other contemporaneous Buddhist monks see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 170–72, 182–88, 264–81, passim; T’ang Yung-t’ung has also shown how San-chieh ideas and practices in general reµect the Buddhism of the Northern Dynasties; see his Han Wei liang chin nan pei ch’ao Fo chiao shih, 817–20. 64 For a comparison of the San-chieh and T’ien-t’ai disciplinary procedures and other community regulations see Nishimoto’s study of the Chih fa manual of San-chieh community
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Thus, as with the opening lines of Chih-i’s manual of community regulations,65 the opening lines of the Chih fa declare that because there are distinctions in the noble teachings, the communities must henceforth be distinguished according to understanding and practice; accordingly, the monks of the San-chieh community are to be separated from the community of monks of wisdom and they are not to come together as an entire assembly except for the twice-monthly recitation of the precepts and “universal gatherings” (p’u chu 3´).66 It is perhaps here that we see the origins of the Sanchieh subtemples or cloisters whose existence was prohibited in 725.67 Because sentient beings of the third level are not all of the same capacity there are distinctions in the way that meditation is to be practiced within the San-chieh community: The capacities of the ordinary people who live after the extinction of the Buddha, the evil sentient beings of the evil time and the evil world, are not the same. There are those of the superior [capacity], middle, and the lowest of the low; because there are differences in capacity there are likewise differences in the practice of visualization (kuan hsing Ö‘).68
The text proceeds to outline the various differences in visualization practice for the different capacities before moving on to proper decorum for the Visualization Hall (Kuan Fo t’ang ÖM}), guidelines for the hall monitor, liturgical forms for offering and repentance ceremonies, procedures for begging, rules for receiving visitors, and instructions on observing the proper hierarchies in seating arrangements as well as in the well-known San-chieh practice of greeting people according to the practice of the Bodhisattva Never-Despise (even in this greeting of universal homage the regimen and regulations in Sangaikyõ, 407–73, esp. 452–59. See also Stevenson, “Some Con³gurations of Devotional Cult Usage,” 11–20, who also shows how the organizational structure of San-chieh community life resembles that of the T’ien-t’ai community. Although the Chih fa has given us some sense of San-chieh cultus-based organization, we are still lacking a good sense of San-chieh ecclesiastic structure. 65
Li chih fa, T #1934, 46.793c.
The Three Levels monks are referred to as the “congregation of mute sheep monks” (ya yang seng chung ÝæRL; Chih fa, 578); see above, chapter 4, 88–91. I take this injunction to separate the Three Levels monks from the monks of wisdom to be referring to the practice of maintaining separate San-chieh quarters (cloisters or subtemples, San-chieh yüan X‰Š), in which the monks of the “mute sheep” community lived; the monks of wisdom would then refer to the larger temple community; the whole of the Chih fa seems to be addressing the monks of the “mute sheep” community. On the San-chieh yüan see chapter 8, 214–15; on “mute sheep” see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 308, 410–12, 414–17. 66
67
See chapter 8, 214-15.
68
Chih fa, 582.
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hierarchy of superior and inferior must always be observed). As with the other procedures detailed in the Chih fa, the penalty for not observing the proper hierarchy in greeting is also given, in this case segregation or removal from the congregation to a different place of practice, regardless of whether the offender is a monk or a layperson.69 Other discipline to be meted out for infractions of the regulations include: added prostrations for being late for practice; 100 “penalty prostrations” (fa li pai pai s r/sß0) for talking in the Visualization Hall and, after three infractions, removal from the hall; 100 prostrations for not entering or leaving the Hall according to the proper etiquette; 100 prostrations for being out of line when doing prostrations; expulsion from the community for speaking of the faults and merits of others.70 In short, the overwhelming impression conveyed by the regulations of the Chih fa is that the San-chieh community was very much in step with other monastic communities of the time, which is to say rigorous in its attitude towards precept and practice. In any case, San-chieh teachings certainly did not advocate slighting the precepts or the monastic community, abandoning the regulated life of the monastery, or eliminating the distinctions of monastic hierarchy.
Summary One of the frequent charges leveled against the notion that “all sentient beings possess the nature of a Buddha” is that it leads to precisely the sort of position taken by Hsin-hsing, i.e., all beings are buddhas at this very moment. Such a position was seen to deny the facts of ignorance and suffering and thereby obviate the need for practice, resulting in a lack of integrity at the personal, institutional, and social levels. Hsin-hsing, however, seems to argue that nonduality does not at all entail a µight into a thoroughly nonspeci³c realm but fully and simultaneously includes the world of discriminated phenomena, the realm of ignorance, the reality of the suffering incurred by sentient beings due to that ignorance, and the various and different capacities and inclinations of those sentient beings. Hence there are numerous different practices offered within the San-chieh community to accord with a variety of different needs. The nonduality of the dilemma— the pure Buddha-nature that is the reality of each and every sentient being of the third level while yet they are simultaneously characterized as thoroughly evil—is refracted as the duality of the solution: “universal respect” for the essentially enlightened nature of all phenomena while yet “recognizing the 69
Chih fa, 588–89.
70
For a comparison with T’ien-t’ai disciplinary measures see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 452–54.
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evil” of one’s own deluded existence. Recognition of one’s own de³ciencies is what allows for the possibility, indeed, the necessity, of religious practice. In the case of Hsin-hsing and his followers this practice looked to an increased awareness of the need for rigorous monastic practice, and particular emphasis was placed on renunciation and charity. Thus, just as their leveling of all doctrine in the “Universal Dharma” (p’u fa) should be understood not as actually denying doctrinal distinctions (pieh fa) or actually af³rming all teachings as equal but rather a rhetorical strategy aimed at legitimating their own particular and speci³c doctrine so, too, their teachings on the monk who neither holds the precepts nor has a correct understanding of the dharma did not mean that their own communities were lacking in traditional monastic regimen, including strict observance of the precepts, seated meditation, and liturgical rite, or that they disregarded different levels of understanding or were egalitarian or bereft of hierarchy in their social organization. Interesting, though—and perhaps in keeping with the parallel structure of universal respect and recognizing evil—is that at the same time that Hsin-hsing taught a rigorous monastic life for his own community he also offered an “easy path” for the commonordinary people of the third level. Based on the radical relation of all beings and all phenomena as described in the Hua-yen Sutra, this easy path was given institutional form as the Inexhaustible Storehouse, one of the more spectacular examples of a Buddhist charitable institution. What was the Inexhaustible Storehouse, how was it doctrinally and institutionally constituted, and how did it work to provide access to an “economy of salvation” for sentient beings of the third level? These questions are the subject of part four.
7. Form is Emptiness, and Emptiness Sucks
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arts one, two, and three of this study have considered Hsinhsing’s teachings in terms of the eschatological mood so dominant in Northern Chinese Buddhism and the universalism that became a prominent feature of Sui-T’ang Buddhism. Although both of these aspects ³rmly root his teachings in the concerns of the times, nothing more clearly indicates how representative they are than the doctrinal and institutional history of the Inexhaustible Storehouse and the chronicle of its home, the Hua-tu Temple in the capital city of Ch’ang-an. The Inexhaustible Storehouse, founded during the short-lived Sui dynasty, functioned as a charitible lending institution for people in need and a site of San-chieh cultus and institution; it was also the focus of several of the imperial suppressions that they experienced ³ve times before the year 725. Historical records tell us that people µocked from all over the empire and vied for the chance to donate goods to the Storehouse. These goods were then lent to the needy at no interest and with no receipt, to be returned when the recipient was able. How did the Inexhaustible Storehouse ³t into the doctrinal structure outlined above? At the doctrinal level, the Inexhaustible Storehouse was an ingenious answer to the soteriological dilemma of sentient beings of the third level through a concrete practice of the universalism of the Hua-yen Sutra notion of the Bodhisattva’s inexhaustible storehouse of compassion and the nonduality of the Vimalak‡rti’s skillful activities on the behalf of suffering beings. Of course, no religious doctrine or practice exists outside of social context, and so, on a more institutional level, the Inexhaustible Storehouse utilized certain monastic regulations contained in the Vinaya to realize a charitable foundation in the general Chinese tradition of social welfare yet articulated within the framework of ultimate Buddhist concerns, a blending that proved extremely popular. On a cultic level, the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu provided a focus for the practice of the Hsin-hsing’s followers, a cultic center apparently not amenable to a different physical or charismatic location as even Empress Wu’s attempts to duplicate its success ended in failure. At a yet broader level, the Inexhaustible Storehouse can be seen as a response to certain developments in the organization of Buddhist temples and patrons that reµect the tensions born of structural changes in the newly 151
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urban, currency-based economy of the North in the ³fth and sixth centuries. Particularly within this latter aspect we are able see many of the techniques of organization, both legal and cultic, that Hsin-hsing employed but that were not unique to his teachings. These issues are the subject of chapter 7. Finally, chapter 8 gives a history of the institutional base of the Inexhaustible Storehouse in the capital city temple of the Hua-tu ssu, the one-time home of the Sui ³nance minister, and later in the “family ancestral temple” of Empress Wu in Loyang, both sites bespeaking another level of a movement more typically thought to be aligned with the Pure Land movements as a movement “of the people.” Here, too, I attempt an answer to (or evasion of) the question of why they were labeled “heretical” and proscribed by imperial edict.
7. Practice for the Degenerate: The Inexhaustible Storehouse
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s with the apocalyptic strain already described, the pious gift that supports religious institutions and guarantees their expansion has been a feature of virtually all societies throughout history. Indian religions in general and Buddhism in particular have been no exception to this rule. The Buddhist scriptures abound with stories of such charity and the rewards it brought, and history has left us ample evidence of the muni³cence with which the Buddhist faithful supported the sangha. The well-known grove of Jetavana, the magni³cent temple-complex of Borobudur, the lavish temples of Pulguk-sa near Kyongju, and the modernistic headquarters of the Reiyðkai in downtown Tokyo all evince the power of the Buddhist model of donating to the sangha as well as to the fervor with which the pious Buddhist gave. Although we have generally moved beyond the Weberian legacy that considered Buddhism a form of mysticism outside of worldly concerns, we still tend to be surprised by the extent of the normative approbation for economic activities as both the immanent goal of proximate religious practice and even, as in Inexhaustible Storehouse, the locus of ultimacy. Where the historical fact of such economic activity is noted, both within the tradition and within contemporary scholarship, it is often accompanied by a moral judgement or observation that such “worldly” concerns do not represent the monastic ideal or are just cause for state intervention. A clearer understanding of the place of wealth within a generally ascetic Buddhist soteriology will help our understanding of these economic activities. A second point of interest is the speci³cs of Hsin-hsing’s institutionalization of an “economy of salvation” based on the practice of charitable giving. The basic model is not much different from that found in most religions, that is, tithing to the corporate church in return for individual religious merit; the corporate body in turn uses the tithes for pursuit of religious goals, including self-preservation and propagation, just as the merit accruing to the individual is believed to support the realization of his or her religious goals. Although the normative model governing the Buddhist attitude toward the exchange of material goods for religious merit and teaching has remained basically the same to this day, many different expressions of that 153
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attitude have been acted out on the stage of Buddhist history, reµecting both doctrinal evolution and differing historical circumstances. 1 The Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu, a combination of the Mahayana bodhisattva ideal, institutional elements from the Vinaya of the nik„ya orders, and the changing economic institutions of the sixth-century sangha, occupies a unique place in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Although we know that the teachings and practices of the San-chieh suffered several suppressions in its three-hundred-year history, we also have records of people vying for the privilege of donating to the Inexhaustible Storehouse, streaming to the headquarters in Ch’ang-an from across the empire and abandoning carts of money and silks at its gates (see chapter 8). What is more, Empress Wu, instigator of one of the suppressions, was also a patron of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Why was the Inexhaustible Storehouse such an unquali³ed success? What was it that attracted throngs from the far-µung corners of China, all wishing to associate themselves with the Inexhaustible Storehouse? Although the Inexhaustible Storehouse is without question an institutional response to the particular social conditions of its time, I believe that the answer to the question of its popularity lies not only there but also in Hsinhsing’s doctrine concerning d„na (charity or liberality).2 Basically it was a model of d„na that allowed even the corrupt sentient beings of the third level to communally participate in the bodhisattva’s practice of d„na and thereby reap the same rewards as the virtuoso bodhisattva. Hsin-hsing’s elucidation of the practice of d„na is thoroughgoing, and the Inexhaustible Storehouse was the mechanism whereby ordinary sentient beings could participate in that practice on a level equal to that of the great Ekay„na bodhisattvas. Let me begin, however, with a brief overview of the salient features of traditional Buddhist attitudes towards d„na, both institutional and doctrinal.3 1 For an extensive discussion of the Therav„din model of d„na and merit see Melford Spiro, Buddhism and Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 66–148; for a more nuanced treatment of wealth in soteriological context see Donald Swearer and Russell F. Sizemore, editors, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990). 2 Kyoko Tokuno has shown that the ef³cacy of giving in general was a popular theme in other native Chinese works of this period; see her “A Case Study of Chinese Buddhist Apocryph,” 18 ff and her “The Book of Resolving Doubts,” 258–60.
The secondary sources on the Inexhaustible Storehouse include: Michibata Ryõshð, Tõdai Bukkyõshi no kenkyð (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1957), 514–45; Michibata Ryõshð, Chðgoku Bukkyõ to shakai fukushi jigyõ (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 1967), 107–21; Tsukamoto Zenryð, “Shingyõ no Sangaikyõdan to mujinzõ ni tsuite,” Shðkyõ kenkyð 3 (1926): 571–86; Yabuki Keiki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 12–17, 115–18, 501–12, 619–37. See also Yang Lien-sheng “Buddhist Monasteries and Four Money-raising Institutions in Chinese History,” HJAS 13 (1950): 174–91; Kenneth Ch’en, The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 3
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The Early Model: DÃna, Puñña, and the Vinaya There are two aspects of early Buddhist doctrine that are relevant to a discussion of the Inexhaustible Storehouse: (1) the concept of giving, which provided for the needs of the sangha, and the related teaching concerning merit that provided the normative incentive for the laity to donate things to the sangha; and (2) the Vinaya rules that governed the receipt and use of such gifts. With regard to the ³rst point, the tradition that the monk was supported by the faithful laity goes back to the very beginnings of the Buddhist movement, if not earlier. The religious ascetic, stripped of possessions and begging for his needs, is an ancient phenomenon in India—very probably indigenous, pre-dating the Vedic culture4— and the Laws of Manu and the rules given by Gautama also include instructions regarding poverty and begging.5 In the Buddhist case, this support was considered to be one of the most ef³cacious means whereby the laity could participate in a doctrine directed primarily toward the ideal of the monk. Though there is always a social nexus for any movement, even a movement that renounces society (as the Bhagavad-g‡t„ so eloquently tells us), we still should not lose sight of the fact that Š„kyamuni and the Buddhist community he founded were part of the sramana movement away from social action (karma) and norms (dharma). Thus, although the laity could partake in varying degrees in the practices enjoined upon the renunciant, it was nonetheless recognized that daily occupations were a hindrance: “A householder’s work I will also tell you, how a S„vaka is to act to be a good one; for that complete Bhikkhu-dhamma cannot be carried out by one who is taken up by (worldly) occupations.”6 Thus 158–65; and especially Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic History from the Fifth to the Tenth Centuries, translated by Franciscus Verellen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 210–17, passim and Gregory Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the Mðlasarv„stiv„da-Vinaya,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 114/4 (1994): 527–54. For a description of a Tibetan institution very similar to the Inexhaustible Storehouse see Robert J. Miller, “Buddhist Monastic Economy: The Jisa Mechanism” in Comparative Studies in Society and History 3/4 (1961); André Bareau, “Indian and Ancient Chinese Buddhism: Institutions Analogous to the Jisa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 3/4 (1961): 443–51. 4 Cf. Govind C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism (Allahabad: University of Allahabad, 1957), 251 ff. 5 Laws of Manu, in S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 177 ff.; Georg Buhler, The Sacred Laws of the Aryas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 192 ff.. 6 V. Fausboll, trans., The Sutta-nip„ta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973 reprint), 65; see also H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (New York: George Braziller, 1970), 121.
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the basic model is understood as follows: although prajñ„/paññ„, the wisdom or insight that is the key to nirvana, is best realized through the practices engaged in by the mendicant, not everybody was suited to such a life. For those whose circumstances (economic, social, intellectual, etc.) prohibited the life of a mendicant, there existed other practices that, though not as ef³cacious as those cultivated by the bhikkhu (but also not necessarily opposed to the practices of the bhikkhu), would nonetheless bring the practitioner favorable consequences (vip„ka) in the future. This, of course, is intimately related to the doctrines of karma, causality, etc., which themselves are far beyond the scope of the present discussion. It is instructive, however, to note in passing the general practices assigned to the householder and the retribution that attaches to those practices. Examples of teachings directed to the householder may be found in various parts of the Nik„ya and Ãgama literature. The laity are instructed, for example, to observe the pañca-š‡la (restraints against killing, stealing, sexual conduct, lying, and alcohol), to develop “con³dence” in the Three Jewels, to practice almsgiving (d„na), to understand causality, including the Four Noble Truths, etc.7 The well-known Sig„lov„da-sutta is often quoted in relation to the duties of the householder and signi³cantly emphasizes property and worldly rewards.8 Other texts tell of the bliss obtained through riches achieved honestly and give instructions on how to avoid the sorrows of losing such riches through gambling, addiction to sensual pleasures, and the like.9 Although it is fashionable today to cast Buddhism as an antimaterialist, anticapitalist, nonsexist movement of social reform that appealed to the lowcaste elements of society in its rejection or condemnation of wealth and the wealthy, such appears to be far from the milieu of the Buddhist community at almost any stage of its development.10 7 The teachings concerning refuge in the Three Jewels and the various formulations of the four, ³ve, eight, or ten precepts that make up the practice of š‡la are well documented and do not warrant further discussion here; cf. Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1958), 74 ff. 8 Dialogues of the Buddha, Part III, trans. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society, 1965); cf. A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), 180–86. 9 E. M. Hare, trans., The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 4, 187; T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. 2, 75 ff. 10 On this point see especially the theoretically stimulating essays in Swearer and Sizemore, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation; as they summarize the contributor’s feelings about an ascetic monasticism versus a materialist laity, “all of the authors in this volume … believe not only that Buddhism gives at least a provisional af³rmation to material prosperity, but that there are many instances in which wealth is highly praised and there are many norms for handling wealth which intimately link lay and monastic society” (p. 1). On the urban milieu of early Buddhism see Romila Thapar, “Ethics, Religion, and Social Protest,” and Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, “Early Buddhism and the Urban Revolution.”
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Now, in spite of the fact that even sophisticated practices such as understanding causality and developing wisdom were occasionally taught as part of the domain of the householder, it is well known that the Buddha advocated adjusting the teachings to the level of person receiving them, and this was particularly so when the recipient was a householder. For example, in the Aªguttara-nik„ya the Buddha states that the desire to give “graduated” or “progressive” teachings (anupubbikath„, i.e., teachings that were appropriate to the hearer and could lead him or her to higher truths) was one of the ³ve qualities one should have when instructing the laity.11 Thus it is not surprising that one of the most frequently used pericopes with regard to the teaching and conversion of the laity involves the Buddha’s exposition of a “graduated” teaching: Then Yasa, the young man of family … approached the Lord; having approached, having greeted the Lord, he sat down at a respectful distance. As he was sitting down at a respectful distance, the Lord talked a progressive talk to Yasa, the young man of family, that is to say, talk on giving (d„na), talk on moral habit (š‡la), talk on heaven (sagga), he explained the peril, the vanity, the depravity of pleasures of the senses, the advantage in renouncing them.12
This same formula is repeated several more times in the Vinaya, in the Ud„na, the D‡gha-nik„ya, Majhima-nik„ya, and Aªguttara-nik„ya, as well as in their Ãgama counterparts preserved in Chinese.13 Only after these teachings, when Yasa’s mind was “free from obstacles,” did the Buddha teach the Four Noble Truths. The Mah„vastu of the Mah„sa½ghika school also refers to the “gradual teachings:” Now this is what the graduated discourse of exalted Buddhas is, namely, a discourse on charity, a discourse on morality, a discourse on heaven, a discourse on merit and a discourse on the fruition of merit.14 11
Pañcaka-nip„ta in E. M. Hare, trans., The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 3, 183–84.
Mah„vagga, trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac & Company, 1951), 23; cf. Vinaya Texts, part I, 104. Both traditional commentators and scholars who have studied practicing Buddhists indicate that sagga refers to the rewards of a heavenly rebirth rather than the ending of the cycle of rebirth in nirvana; cf. Dhammap„la, The Commentary on the Peta-Stories, trans. U Ba Kyaw and annotated by Peter Mase³eld (London: Pali Text Society, 1980, 11); Spiro, Buddhism and Society, 92ff. 12
13 Rhys Davids and Oldenberg,Vinaya Texts, Part I, 106, 109, 111, 112, etc.; Ud„na, in F. L. Woodward, trans., The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon, Part II (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1948), 58; D‡gha-nik„ya, T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., Dialogues of the Buddha, part II, 135 (Ambattha Sutta) and 185 (Ku¦adanta Sutta); Majjhima-nik„ya, I. B. Horner, trans., The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (London: Luzac & Co., 1957), 45 (Up„lisutta) and 330 (Brahm„yusutta); The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 128 and 143; T #99, 24a–b, etc. 14
The Mah„vastu, trans. by J. J. Jones (London: Luzac & Company, 1956), 246.
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Although other prescriptions of the layman’s path are to be found throughout the canon, the main emphasis seems to have centered around belief in the Three Jewels, the practices of š‡la and d„na, and the rewards generated thereby. These actions are usually referred to as puñña-kiriyavatthð«i or “merit-producing actions.” “Merit” (Pali puñña) is a rather ambiguous concept, and while it is of major importance in the lives of practicing Buddhists, it is not very clearly de³ned in the early texts, possibly reµecting a monastic bias. The Pali Text Society dictionary de³nes puñña as “… merit, meritorious action, virtue. Always represented as the foundation and condition of heavenly rebirth & a future blissful state, the enjoyment (& duration) of which depends on the amount of merit accumulated in a former existence.”15 The fact that it is “always represented as the foundation of heavenly rebirth” means that accumulation of merit was mildly, though not necessarily, opposed to the practices designed to take one out of the cycle of birth and death. Thus while the Itivuttaka states that the three practices of a monk are š‡la, samadhi, and paññ„, the next verse gives d„na, š‡la, and bh„van„ as the three “merit-producing actions” (puñña-kiriya-vatthð«i) that cause favorable rebirth.16 Further, although both š‡la and d„na are cited as chief among meritorious practices,17 because the formulation of š‡la is generally in negative terms (i.e., don’t kill, don’t lie, etc.) the emphasis there is on the avoidance of demerits rather than the accumulation of merit. This leaves giving or offering as the most conspicuous means of gathering merit for the laity. In addition to the puñña or merit acquired through the practice of d„na (implicit in the term puñña-kiriya-vatthu«i), the householder also received teachings of the Buddhist dharma from the monks.18 Although 15 Rhys Davids, T. W. and Williams Stede, eds., Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary (Surrey: Pali Text Society, 1921–25), part 5, 86. 16 Itivuttaka, in Woodward, Minor Anthologies, 154; although bh„van„ (“cultivation”) is typically rendered “meditation,” the translator states that in this context it means “causing to become or grow those good qualities not yet attained” (154, note 3). Cf. Hare, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 4, 165. Spiro, however, in his study of modern Burmese Buddhism, has rendered bh„van„ as “meditation,” the meaning given to it today (Spiro, Buddhism and Society, 94); it is interesting to note that he found that those laymen who do engage in meditation, a practice usually left to the monks, are often criticized as being arrogant (Spiro, Buddhism and Society, 96). 17 That š‡la and d„na came to be the focus of lay practice is well attested to by modern studies of Buddhism in Therav„din countries and the writings of Therav„din masters. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, passim; Winston L. King, In the Hope of Nibbana (LaSalle: Open Court, 1964), 54, 139 ff; H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (New York: George Braziller, 1970), 116 ff; Sunthorn Na-Rangsi, The Buddhist Concepts of Karma and Rebirth (Bangkok: Mah„makut Rajavidy„laya Press, 1976), 231 ff. 18 See, for example, Itivuttaka, in Woodward, Minor Anthologies, 193; I. B. Horner, trans., The Book of Discipline (London: Pali Text Society, 1969), vol. 5, 206.
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these references are outweighed in number by references to material or heavenly rewards, the exchange nature of the transaction remains the same.19 It should not surprise us, perhaps, that a this-worldly focus on material giving and its equally worldly reward formed such an important part of the practices of the laity, for, although Buddhism is primarily a renunciant movement, philosophically it denies a transcendent absolute and af³rms the interdependently originated world. In fact, Buddhism was largely a movement of urbanites, both in terms of the participants (those who became renunciants as well as those who supported those renunciants) and the locus of its institutional and cultic activity—fully 83 percent of the places mentioned in the Pali texts refer to a total of ³ve cities, and less than one-half of 1 percent refer to the countryside.20 It is in this context of a newly emergent urban, mercantile pro³t economy that we ³nd the social nexus for the Buddha’s teachings, and within this context the idea of the gift is conspicuous, a gift that binds a contractual relationship, a gift that is exchanged for merit and the teachings. Thus, in return for securing the livelihood of the social renouncers, those within society obtained religious merit, the stuff of better rebirth, and teachings on the dharma, a good portion of which selfreµexively concerned the value of giving itself. Although to the cynic it might seem that the tangible goods of the laity are exchanged for a much less “real” form of property and as such the entire teaching of d„na in exchange for more teachings on the virtues of d„na was solely of “pro³t” to the sangha, we must remember that, as Gernet has pointed out, this economy of religious exchange “was faithful to the Indian conception of the word as a source of particularly ef³cacious power—an exalted good—a conception that regarded the ‘gift of the Law’ (dharmaty„ga) as the noble counterpart to the ‘gift of material goods’ („mi¤aty„ga).”21 There are many places in the nik„yas that speak of giving and the rewards to be gained thereby. The Aªguttara-nik„ya, for example, tells us that the difference between one who is “unbelieving, mean, miserly, cross-grained” and one who is “a believer, a master-giver, delighting in constant giving” is that the arhats will have compassion for the latter, will visit the latter, receive 19 Borrowing from Victor Turner’s ideas about community and ritual puri³cation, Mavis Fenn has also suggested that because “wealth is necessary but polluting” for the sangha, “the spritualization of giving in d„na allows the saªgha to accept wealth without compromising its purity”; see “Two Notions of Poverty in the P„li Canon,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 3 (1996), 115. 20 Gokhale, “Early Buddhism,” 10; the possibility that this close nexus of locations is a result of rhetorical or mnemonic constraints should also be considered. 21
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 217.
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alms from the latter, and teach the dharma to the latter, and the good reputation of the latter will be spread abroad, he will have con³dence in approaching any group, and upon death he will arise in the “happy heaven world.”22 The Aªguttara-nik„ya also enumerates many bene³ts of giving, such as the eight rebirths: among the wealthy, among the Four Royal devas, devas of the Thirty, Yama devas, Tu¤ita devas, and the like.23 Other bene³ts include the “eight yields,” i.e., faith in the Three Jewels and abandoning the ³ve evil actions (killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, and drinking).24 The same collection of texts clearly shows the position of d„na with regard to prosperous and happy rebirths in the “teaching to Suman„.” Therein it tells of the different rewards accorded disciples who are alike in faith, virtue, and insight but who differ with regard to the practice of d„na: the person who practices almsgiving surpasses the other in every state (i.e., when reborn a deva, a human, a monk, etc.), except that when they both reach the state of arhat there is no difference, i.e., it is within the realm of karma, the cycle of birth and death that the bene³ts of giving are realized.25 Further references to the rewards of giving may be found throughout the canon, especially in texts that were popular among the laity such as the Jataka tales. Throughout all of these sources the general tenor of the message is the same: giving is a practice unequaled for gathering merit, which in turn guarantees the prosperity of future existences. One other point to note in our discussion of d„na is that it was taught that there exists a de³nite hierarchy of recipients of the act of d„na, and the higher the status the greater the accumulation of merit. Thus not all giving reaps the same fruits, and, as might be expected, it is giving to the monastic community that yields the greatest pro³t, as the monks, in turn, bring the greatest pro³t—happiness in this world and the next—to the greatest number of people. Hence monks in general and arhats in particular are referred to as “the world’s unsurpassed Field of Merit” (puñña-kkhetta).26 One text tells of the successfully greater fruits of offering to the once-returner, non-returner, etc., up to the arhats and Buddhas; nonetheless, the greatest fruits come 22
Hare, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 4, 46.
23
Ibid., 164.
24
Ibid., 168.
25
Ibid., vol. 3, 24.
For example, see Hare, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 3, 103, 124, etc. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary de³nes puñña-kkhetta as “³eld of merit, especially of the Sangha or any holy personalities, doing good (lit. planting seeds of merit) to whom is a source of future compensation to the benefactor. Usually with adj. anuttara unsurpassed ³eld of merit” (p. 87). Spiro has shown that this hierarchy is still quite operative in Burmese Buddhism today (Buddhism and Society, 106 ff). 26
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from achieving the thought of impermanence, indicative of the fact that although one might achieve great merit in the realm of samsara through the path of d„na, of even greater value is the path that leads to nirvana.27 The contractual arrangement between the monks and the laity and their institutional relationship is very clearly brought out by the terms used for “layman/laywoman” (up„saka/up„sik„) and “nun/monk” (bhik¤un‡/bhik¤u): the former term refers to “one who serves” while the latter term means “one who receives alms.” It was never taught that the accumulation of merit, the goal of the laity, would, in and of itself, lead to nirvana. This is so because merit and the fruits of merit are a product of conditions and so, as with all other conditioned states, subject to the law of impermanence. In short, karma, whether good or bad, is still karma, and karmic seeds that have been sown will inevitably come to fruition, thus tying one to the cycle of birth and rebirth. No matter how noble or heavenly the rebirth, rebirth means birth within the six gati, the vicious cycle of samsara.28 However, it was possible that the future rebirth would lead to the acquisition of circumstances favorable to the renunciation of the life of a householder and thus to the practices that would eventually lead to nirvana.29 It is, of course, a moot point as to whether the laity had this theoretical construct in mind when they considered 27
Hare, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol. 4, 264–65.
This fact has led Spiro (Buddhism and Society, 11–13) to make a distinction between “nibbanic” Buddhism (normative soteriological Buddhism) and “kammatic” Buddhism (nonnormative soteriological Buddhism). However, as both are sanctioned within the scriptures as religiously valid practices, by his own de³nition both are equally “normative.” This is obviously true if one considers that practice within Buddhism is more often than not conceived in terms of a path (m„rga) system. It seems to me that his otherwise excellent discussion is marred by this attempt to categorize it in terms of “great tradition and little tradition.” 28
29 There is yet another model of d„na, however, in which religious giving is understood as the paradigmatic act of self-denial (i.e., renunciation generally or, in the Buddhist case, giving up the self) and hence as both karmically ef³cacious as well as leading to nirvana; cf. John Strong, “Rich Man, Poor Man, Bhikkhu, King: Ašoka’s Great Quinquennial Festival and the Nature of D„na,” in Sizemore and Swearer, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, 107–23. It is also interesting to think about this relationship between d„na and renunciation in light of Hsinhsing’s cultivation of the dhðta practices and the bi-directional nature of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (see below); that is to say, how does this bi-directional nature affect the ritualized puri³cation process mentioned above? If renunciation is but another form of giving or charity in which, ultimately, even life and selfhood are offered to the goal of Buddhahood, is the San-chieh emphasis on austerities thus linked to their understanding of d„na? Surely their emphasis on self-denial in the practice of begging, for example, ³ts in well with this, for not only are they enjoined to strictly observe the precepts dealing with begging and eating but they are also encouraged to give away to others the food given to them, to endure their hunger with patience so that the less fortunate may eat, and the like; cf. Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 121–24; Lewis, “Suppressions of the Three Stages Sect,” 217–19.
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the prospect of rebirth as a great king or powerful deva. What is important to note here is the exchange of gifts, material goods, for merit that would in turn bring the one who possessed it rewards beyond his or her dreams. It was basically this doctrine that laid the groundwork for the economic development that is so distinctive a feature of Buddhist history, and it was this same concern that led, in some instances, to the sangha’s involvement in the capital-intensive practice of endowments and lending at interest.
Vinaya Rules Governing the Receipt of Alms The rapid development of the institution of Buddhism posed many different sorts of problems relating to the social interactions of the renunciant, both within their own community and in their dealings with the laity. One such situation, engendered by the model of d„na described above, was how to handle the gifts which the laity so lavishly bestowed on the sangha? The religious zeal of the laity and the ef³cacy of the d„na/merit model is suggested by council called at Vaiš„l‡ to discuss points of Vinaya, the main point in question being whether the monks are allowed to receive gold and silver.30 The different Vinaya in Pali, Sanskrit, and Chinese preserve many of the varying solutions offered with regards these gifts. For example, the individual monk was not allowed to handle gold or silver, but all such contributions were to be given to a layperson to be used for the good of the whole monastic community.31 Thus the sangha as a whole was able to bene³t from that which was forbidden to the individual; put another way, because the profane nature of certain goods was not seen to be inherent in the goods themselves, communal, or “displaced,” ownership was allowable. Again, if that which was received exceeded the immediate needs of the sangha, it could be deposited in such a way as to earn interest, which was then to be used for the various needs of the sangha according to the original intent of the donor.32 Goods deposited in this way were termed “inexhaustible goods” 30 Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, Vinaya Texts, vol. III, 386 ff. Cf. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 208ff; Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, 143 ff. 31 For a description of the development of the Vinaya in this regard see Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 65–79 and 153–66; see also R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979), esp. 53–136; see also Robert J. Miller, “Buddhist Monastic Economy.”
From the Vinaya of the Mðlasarv„stiv„dins, T #1442, 23.743b; from the Vinaya of the Mah„sa½gika, T #1425, 22.310c–312c; from the Sarv„stiv„din Vinaya, T #1435, 23.415c; see also Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 65–73 and 153–66; for an extensive study of the Mðlasarv„stiv„da case see Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord.” Ironically, the desire to provide an endowment that would provide for the upkeep of the donated buildings that 32
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or “perpetual endowments” (Skt. ak¤aya-n‡v‡, *ak¤ayanik„, *ak¤ayanik„d„na; Chin. wu chin tsai [¦(), “inexhaustible” having a dual meaning that is central to the exchange calculus involved in d„na: the investment itself is not exhausted inasmuch as the principle is not actually used and thus, insofar as the interest so generated provides for the ongoing assignment of merit to the donor, the merit is likewise unexhausted.33 Although usually enjoined to entrust their management to the laity, at least two of the extant Vinaya (those of the Mah„sa½ghika and Mðlasarv„stiv„da) appear to allow monks to manage such funds.34 Thus allowed, investment, commerce, and agriculture all came to be widely practiced by the various sangha in India. Indeed, this model of d„na provided such strong incentives for giving that by the end of the ³fth century the monks in India lived more off their land holdings and interest gained from various investments than they did from begging daily alms. 35 Representing the fruits of increased agricultural productivity and an accompanying growth of trade, circulation of currency, and the contractual exchange economy of an urban and mercantile religious base, the legal instrument of interest-bearing investments for the ³nancial/religious bene³t of the sangha can also be seen as an incipient form of investment capitalism in which the donor “invests” in the merit-bank of d„na, expecting a much larger return on investment in the future. This is of course paralleled by the “investment” of the ascetic renunciant and not unlike the rational ascetic restraint often cited in the rise of Western capitalism. These practices and the normative theories behind them were carried to China where, with a few modi³cations, they became so highly developed that they both enabled the widespread growth of Buddhism throughout East Asia but are also often cited as the prime cause of its various suppressions to this very day.36 Schopen discusses is remarkably similar to the growing interest among academic institutions in soliciting “maintenance endowments” from alumnae to supplement more traditional building endowments—academic managers are catching on to ancient Buddhist innovations! 33 On the term ak¤aya-n‡v‡ see Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord,” 532–35; on the continued assignment of merit to the donor see ibid., 546, passim. It should also be noted that, in the case Schopen studied, it was precisely the need to use the funds donated in perpetuity that prompted the Buddha to permit lending at interest—that is, perpetual or inexhaustible merit does not accumulate if the endowment is not actually used. 34 For example, T #1425, 22.311c; see also Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 164–66; see Gunawardana, Robe and Plough, for details of the Sinhalese approach to this property-management issue. 35
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 77.
The contemporary Chinese criticism and prohibition of expensive funerals, offerings of “hell money” and other “superstitious practices” are good examples of this censure. 36
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DÃna and Merit in the Mahayana Although this basic model of d„na and the merit acquired through its practice has remained intact through the centuries, there have been several modi³cations in theory that have made the practice of d„na even more appealing. One of the more notable developments is the elevation in status of the practice of d„na.37 Whereas in the Pali texts and their Chinese counterparts d„na is considered to be a practice for the less spiritually adept, in the Mahayana texts it is considered an essential part of the bodhisattva’s practice and the Buddha’s enlightenment. Some have considered this to be the result of a desire to incorporate the practices of the householder into an ethic formulated in part as a reaction against the ossi³ed monachism of the traditional schools,38 though this should be tempered by recent research that shows that most, if not all, elements of the early Mahayana had, in fact, been equally concerns of the renunciant, including d„na and merit-making.39 In any case, the early relationship between the renunciant as the one who receives and the lay follower as the one who serves was changed, at least theoretically and rhetorically, in the Mahayana. Thus, d„na, a practice originally within the domain of the householder, comes to be a practice of the bodhisattva as the ³rst of the six practices or “perfections” that de³ne their path.40 No doubt the growth of the J„taka literature, which emphasizes the bodhisattva’s practice of d„na, is related to the incorporation of d„na into the “nibbanic” path structure. Probably also as a result of the inµuence of the J„taka literature, the direction of the gift is no longer ³xed in the favor of the renunciant—the “Field of Merit” comes to include the family and, notably, the poor and needy. Thus, too, at least in the Mahayana rhetoric, the status 37 For a general discussion of d„na in Mahayana literature, though somewhat dated, see Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975 reprint), 165–92. 38 Akira Hirakawa, “The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas,” The Memoirs of the Tõyõ Bunko 22 (1963), 73 ff. 39 Gregory Schopen, “The Phrase ‘ap£thiv‡pradešaš caityabhðto bhavet’ in the Vajracchedik„: Notes of the Cult of the Book in Mahayana,” Indo-Iranian Journal 17/3-4 (1975): 147–81; a handy overview of the issue can be found in Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 20–26; see also Gregory Schopen, “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit,” Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 10 (1984): 9–47.
A glance through the Mah„vyutpatti (Bonzõkanwa Shiyakutaikõ, Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 4th edition, 1970) shows that d„na or ty„ga is also included in many other prescriptions of the bodhisattva’s practice, underscoring its importance: as one of the six remembrances—ty„g„nusm£iti—(Mah„vyutpatti, 87); the ³rst of the “four means of attraction” (catv„ri-sa½graha-vastðni, ibid. 71), etc. 40
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of the recipient is no longer seen to be as important in determining the amount of merit received as the nature of the act itself or the mind of the giver. The Prajñ„p„ramit„ literature, for example, frequently reminds us that the wisdom-mind of the practitioner is of prime importance, hence the proper gift is one in which there is nowhere any substantial or essentialized gift, giver, or recipient. Although still considered to be a practice that begets merit and thus is tied to samsara, meritorious acts themselves come to be seen as essential for full enlightenment. Asanga states: Charity (d„na) and morality (š‡la) Make up the store of merit; Discriminating awareness (prajñ„) Makes up [the store] of knowledge. The other three perfections belong to both stores.41
And: The unsurpassable stores of Bodhisattvas are merit (pu«ya) and knowledge (jñ„na); The one makes them succeed in samsara [i.e., merit], And the other [i.e., knowledge] allows them to pass through it without stain.42
In the Mahayana tradition both merit and knowledge are thus considered the “equipment of the bodhisattvas” (pu«ya-sa½bh„ra and jñ„na-sa½bh„ra, respectively) and one without the other is never considered full enlightenment. In this way both d„na and the accumulation of merit have come to be part of the bodhisattva’s practices. This is usually seen to be a reµection of the conceived necessity of the practice or implementation of knowledge or wisdom, related to the ideal of compassion that is itself rooted in the teachings of sunyata, and below I will discuss the importance of this theoretical relationship to the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu. In any case, the central idea is that the Buddha’s compassion necessarily µows to the realm of the ignorant and suffering, usually (but not always) in the form of teachings that lead to the end of all sufferings, i.e., as the Buddha-dharma. The Mah„y„nasa½graha, for example, speaks of the teachings of the Mahayana as the “outµow” of the pure dharmadh„tu (višuddha-dharmadh„tuni¤yandatva),43 the tantric Mah„vairocana-sðtra speaks of the ni¤yanda-k„ya, 41
Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra, XVIII, 39, Lévi, Mah„y„na-Sðtr„la½k„ra, vol. 2, 235.
42
Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra XVIII, 38, Lévi, Mah„y„na-Sðtr„la½k„ra, vol. 2, 235.
Étienne Lamotte, trans., La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asanga (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1973), Part II, 121. 43
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the aspect of the dharmakaya that enters the six destinies to bene³t sentient beings,44 and the tathagatagarbha literature also frequently speaks of the outµow of the dharmadh„tu (dharmadh„tu-ni¤yanda) as the cause for the attainment of the dharmakaya.45 In the Mahayana full enlightenment is characterized by both the internalized cultivation of wisdom and the externalized practice of that wisdom. The concrete form of this compassionbased practice, the outµow of the dharmadh„tu, takes various forms, but it is in this sense that for the bodhisattva d„na is considered to be the practice or implementation of wisdom, so that the direction of the d„na has also changed, at least theoretically if not in terms of actual institutional practice, for the gift of the Buddha’s teaching continued to be seen as the primary d„na of the renunciant. In China, however, the monastic institution itself came to be seen as an appropriate agent of charitable acts, so that on a number of occasions the monasteries functioned as relief agencies, mutual aid societies, and other organs of social welfare. This is the context in which the Inexhaustible Storehouse was conceived, and so it is not surprising that the indigenous Hsiang fa chüeh i ching (The Sutra on Resolving Doubts in the Semblance Dharma), which deals extensively with the bodhisattva’s practice of d„na, should have played such an important part in their ideas. This text, thought to have been composed sometime in the early part of the sixth century,46 presented the idea of the renunciants’ d„na in more radical terms than had been seen before, not only in its positive exhortation to give material goods to the poor and destitute rather than to the Buddha, dharma, and sangha, but also in its negative criticism of the religious charity of the day, both lay and renunciant (see below). These themes were picked up by Hsin-hsing, whose texts extensively cite the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching. Unlike Hsin-hsing’s teachings, however, the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching is part of a tradition of “precept texts” and thus criticizes those who neglect the precepts—lay as well as monastic—rather than seeing them as precisely the appropriate refuge for the degenerate times that we have seen described as the universal refuge of the third level in chapters 5 and 6.47 Whalen Lai sees in this criticism a censure of the emerging city-based piety of the North that was coming to displace an earlier precept-community orientation prevalent during the late 44 Minoru Kiyota, Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice (Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1978), 64; see also Minoru Kiyota, Tantric Concept of Bodhicitta: A Buddhist Experiential Philosophy (Madison: University of Wisconsin–Madison, South Asian Center, 1982), 92 and 107. 45
See, for example, Takasaki, A Study of the Ratnagotravibh„ga, 196–98.
46
Whalen Lai, “Dating the Hsiang-fa chüeh-i ching,” 83; Tokuno, A Case Study, 45–47.
47
Tokuno, A Case Study, 48–57.
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³fth and sixth centuries.48 The teachings of the San-chieh, then, would be a development of this same criticism, but one that accepts both the preceptbreaking monk as the true monastic refuge of the times as well as the cities as the appropriate place of practice. Before turning to the Inexhaustible Storehouse, however, we should brieµy consider one more development relevant to the institutionalization of the bodhisattva’s practice of d„na, namely the concept of the transference of one’s merit to another simply by so dedicating it (Pali, patti or pariva¦¦a). Basically, this doctrine is understood to mean that the merit gained from any virtuous act may be transferred to anybody else simply by so wishing it. Although developed most highly within the Mahayana, this doctrine is sanctioned in the Pali texts as well and is widely believed in and practiced in Therav„din countries to this day.49 Believed by some to have arisen in reaction to the harshness of a strictly individual account of moral responsibility,50 the Therav„din gives normative backing to this doctrine by stating that the recipient of the merit-transfer gains merit because of the feelings of joy and jubilation (anumodan„) aroused upon witnessing the selµessness and pure conduct of the person who had made the offering of merit.51 Thus one’s 48 Whalen Lai, “The Hsiang-fa chüeh-i ching and the Economics of Salvation: tensions and reform within the sangha (5–7th cent. China),” unpublished manuscript, n.d. 49 See the “Without-the-Walls Discourse” in Bhikkhu Nanamoli, trans., The Minor Readings (London: Luzac & Co., 1960), 7–9 and the commentary by Buddhaghosa, the Paramatthajotik„, included in the same volume, 223–41. See also G. Malalasekera, “‘Transference of Merit’ in Ceylonese Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 17/1–4 (1967), 85 ff; Richard Gombrich, “‘Merit Transference’ in Sinhalese Buddhism: A Case Study of the Interaction between Doctrine and Practice,” History of Religions 11/2 (1971), 203 ff; Gregory Schopen, “Two Problems,” esp. 36–47. 50 As seen, for example, in the opening verse of the Dhammapada: “All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage.” From The Dhammapada, translated by F. Max Müller (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1973), 3. This strictly individual accounting of moral responsibility presents a problem for contemporary activists who would ³nd a “social gospel” in the Buddha’s teachings, as there is little notion of collective responsibility or reward in the Buddhist understanding of karma. See also Kajiyama Yðichi, “Transfer and Transformation of Merits in Relation to Emptiness,” in Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers) (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. Ltd., 1989).
Cf. Gombrich, “Merit Transference,” 215; Spiro, Buddhism and Society, 124 ff. This presents another case where Spiro’s categories of “normative” and “nonnormative” fail. Although he admits this teaching of merit-transfer to be canonical, he still obviously does not consider it “normative.” Although I am sympathetic to the philosophical/doctrinal problems inherent in the doctrine of merit-transfer, I believe it equally hazardous to measure legitimate religious expressions against a mythic “original” Buddhism and to impose Western concepts of “higher” or “greater” on traditions that themselves explicitly reject such labels. 51
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dedication of merit is rendered less a case of transfer of one’s own merit and more like providing a catalyst for the other’s self-generation of merit, as is seen in the fact that through the act of dedication the donor’s merit actually increases rather than decreases. In the Mahayana the doctrine of the transference of merit was, like the teachings on giving and merit, ultimately grounded in the doctrines of sunyata and the interrelatedness of all aspects of existence, of which I have more to say below. Thus, too, “the merit of the act in Mahayana inscriptions is always said to be intended speci³cally for the attainment of anuttarajñ„na.”52 Regarding the difference between Mahayana and non-Mahayana goals of merit transference, Schopen writes that “in none of our Mahayana inscriptions is merit ever transferred to deceased parents, or for such things as conferring health or granting long life. These seem to have been—at least epigraphically—exclusively H‡nay„na ideas.”53 In any case, the “dedication of merit” is ubiquitous in Mahayana texts, and the teaching of merit-transfer is one of the fundamental doctrines of the Pure Land schools, which teach that our salvation is essentially due to the powers of Amida’s merits that he transfers to sentient beings. We shall see how the teachings of Hsin-hsing, based on the Hua-yen teachings of interpenetration and mutual identi³cation, propose a doctrine better described as merit sharing than as merit transference.
The San-chieh Inexhaustible Storehouse Hsin-hsing, the founder of the Three Levels movement, was born in Northern China just after the fall of the Northern Wei in 534, and was invited to Ch’ang-an in the beginning of the Sui dynasty. The movement that he started thus has its roots in the Buddhism of the north, both through the scriptures held important (such as the northern, “eschatological” corpus of Nirvana Sutra texts, including Dharmak¤ema’s translation of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra and the indigenous Hsiang fa chüeh i ching) but also in its tradition of close ties to the state through various legal and bureaucratic agencies, particularly the charitable institutions set up for the bene³t of the sangha, the people, and the state known as “sangha households” (seng ch’i hu ’•ú). At the same time, however, the Three Levels movement is well informed by the intellectual traditions in vogue in the south such as that of the Vimalak‡rtisðtra and the universal Buddha-nature stressed in the southern tradition of 52
Schopen, “Two Problems,” 39.
53
Schopen, “Two Problems,” 43.
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Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra scholarship, and it tapped into the incipient holistic visions more commonly associated with the T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen traditions that emerged in the uni³ed realm of the Sui and T’ang as well. The Inexhaustible Treasury represents a coming together of these various legal and state functions, scriptural traditions, and the social changes of the times. In order to fully understand the doctrine of the Inexhaustible Storehouse we must remember that it was conceived to be an answer to the dilemma— social and soteriological—posed by the combined acceptance of the teaching of the demise of humankind’s capacity for religious and moral cultivation and the teaching of universal Buddha-nature. Like those of the Pure Land teachers, Hsin-hsing’s teachings were basically an elucidation of the means whereby a sentient being of the meanest and most vile nature could yet hope to gain the liberation that is promised in the doctrine of universal Buddhanature. That is, how could sentient beings, deeply trapped within the vicious cycle of birth and rebirth and lacking any capacity to understand the dharma, ever hope to achieve the liberation promised in the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature? The karmic dilemma of sentient beings of the third level is clearly stated at the beginning of a San-chieh manuscript discovered at Tun-huang, the Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe (Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih Ø/À}[¦áÀt, hereafter the Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, translated in Appendix C), which, after listing the inevitability of our evil actions as administrators, merchants, farmers, artisans, and the like, rhetorically asks how we could ever hope to exhaust such karmic debts as we have thus incurred over the vast millennia if we thought to repay them one at a time. The likening of our karmic debt to economic indebtedness must have surely resonated with the poor and impoverished for whom perpetual indebtedness was a likely fact of life, one that also likely reµected the view that a person’s ³nancial and worldly attainment was their just karmic retribution.54 And the never-ending spiral of karmic debts does not end with death. What to do? The practitioner who now gives rise to the charity of the Inexhaustible Storehouse immediately puts an end to the [karmic] debts incurred from the beginningless past and no longer need fear the debt-master [i.e., karma]; moreover, obstacles of the path, karmic obstacles, and the obstacles of retribution are all immediately vanquished and his father and mother, brothers, and the
On the conµation of sin and debt, see Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 246–47; it is of course also pertinent that loans not repaid to the sangha could lead to more unfortunate rebirths than loans not repaid to secular agencies. 54
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six classes of relatives will all immediately be freed from the three evil paths—is this not great pro³t?”55
Indeed, one must agree with the author of the text, presumably in much the same way as did the followers of the San-chieh, that the pro³ts attached to the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse were very great. In order to understand how it was possible that this one practice was capable of such great returns we must examine the function of the practice as conceived by Hsin-hsing. In doing so it quickly becomes evident that in spite of the similarity of name, his idea of the Inexhaustible Storehouse is not solely derived from the concept of “inexhaustible goods” as found in the Vinaya but also from the concept of the inexhaustible dharmadh„tu as taught within the Mahayana. “Inexhaustible” as conceived within the Mahayana has nothing to do with money or the lending of goods for interest. Rather, it refers to emptiness and the practices that µow from an insight into that emptiness. Thus the A¤¦as„hasrik„-prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra states that like space, emptiness is in³nite, without limits, and “inexhaustible” (ak¤aya).56 It also states that “inexhaustible” is an attribute of the dharmadh„tu57 and of tathat„, “suchness.”58 The Perfection of Wisdom is declared to be the “inexhaustible storehouse of the dharma.”59 According to Fa-tsang, inexhaustible refers to the teachings contained in the Hua-yen Sutra: “All of the teachings contained within the Perfect Teachings are nothing but those of this inexhaustible dharmadh„tu.”60 Indeed, the Hua-yen Sutra does use the word “inexhaustible” often to describe the interpenetration of all dharmas. It also teaches several different schema of Inexhaustible Storehouses that the bodhisattvas possess, all of which refer to the in³nite capacity of the bodhisattvas for practice, practice which is in turn based on their insight into and participation in the inexhaustible dharmadh„tu.61 The same theme is sounded in the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra: “Called “exhaustible” (k¤aya) is the conditioned (sa½sk£ta); called “inexhaustible” 55 Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 163. The six relatives are father, mother, elder brother, younger brother, wife, and child. The three evil destinies are hell, animal, and hungry ghost (preta). 56 Translated by Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and Its Verse Summary (Berkeley: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 211. 57
Ibid., 174.
58
Ibid., 177.
59
Ibid., 268.
60
Quoted in Mochizuki Shinkõ, Bukkyõ daijiten, 4832.
61
For example, see T #278, 9.474c–478c; T #279, 10.96c–97a.
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(ak¤aya) is the unconditioned (asa½sk£ta). A bodhisattva can neither exhaust the conditioned nor abide in the unconditioned.”62 The text then goes on to explain that to not exhaust the conditioned means to continuously work for the salvation of all sentient beings. To not abide in the unconditioned means that, despite a knowledge of the unconditioned, the bodhisattva nonetheless abides in samsara to work for the bene³t of all sentient beings. This close relationship between the inexhaustible realm of the dharmadh„tu and the practice of the bodhisattva is echoed in many places throughout Mahayana literature. Indeed, it is not too much to say that it is the foundation of bodhisattva practice as conceived within the Mahayana. This same idea of “inexhaustible” is found in the Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse: By “Great” is meant broad, long, profound, and never-retreating; by “Vehicle” is meant conveyance. Within the dharma of the Hinayana only self-pro³t is taught, but within the Mahayana dharma both self-pro³t and pro³ting others [are taught.] Therefore the bodhisattvas rely on the mind of great compassion and establish the [teaching] of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Of the six paramitas the d„na paramita is ³rst; of the four means of attraction giving is chief. It [giving] is the same as the various buddhas—within, it corresponds to the dharmakaya, without, it pro³ts sentient beings and exhausts their poverty. When the dharmadh„tu and the sattvadh„tu are exhausted, then this [Inexhaustible] Storehouse will be exhausted; because the dharmakaya is inexhaustible the practice of d„na is without exhaustion. Therefore practice in the phenomenal world always continues and thus it is established as inexhaustible. Ultimate, profound, and broad, it includes everything and is therefore called “storehouse.” This storehouse has rules and principles, therefore it is called “dharma.” Thus it is called the “Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Great Vehicle.”63
Herein we see two aspects of the Inexhaustible Storehouse: the one in which it is equated with the dharmakaya and the other based on the bodhisattva’s compassion and the necessary outµow of wisdom into practice in which the Inexhaustible Storehouse bene³ts sentient beings. These two aspects of the Inexhaustible Storehouse are paralleled by the two functions of the Inexhaustible Storehouse: “Above it is called the Field of Respect [which corresponds to the Three Jewels] and below it is called the Field of Compassion [which corresponds to sentient beings].”64 In connection with 62
Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalak‡rti, 229.
63
Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 164.
64
Ibid., 165.
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the Field of Respect the text then quotes the Hua-yen Sutra: Again, a light called the “jewel manifestation” is emitted; Which causes the impoverished to obtain the Jewel-store. By means of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of giving to the Three Jewels, The light called “jewel manifestation” is gained.65
In other words, through giving to the Three Jewels the illumination that enables one to obtain the treasure (enlightenment) is obtained, which would seem to be a standard reference to the exchange mechanism described above (support of the sangha in return for merit and teachings). The function of the Inexhaustible Storehouse with regard to the Field of Compassion is then explained with a quote from the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra: Where there are the poor and impoverished, the Inexhaustible Storehouse is manifested. It encourages them and causes them to produce the bodhi mind.66
Thus the Inexhaustible Storehouse encompasses d„na that is directed both to sentient beings and to the Three Jewels. A passage that clearly brings this out is found in the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, a work that, as mentioned above, presents several unique twists to the idea of d„na and was very important to Hsin-hsing: Sons of good family! Everywhere in the sutras I have taught about giving, for I wish to enable both monks and laymen to cultivate the compassionate mind and give to the poor, the impoverished, the orphaned, even to a starving dog. However, my disciples did not understand my meaning, and only offered gifts to the Field of Respect and did not give to the Field of Compassion. When I speak of the Field of Respect, I refer to the [Three] Jewels of the Buddha, dharma, and the sangha. When I speak of the Field of Compassion, I refer to the poor and the impoverished, the orphaned, the aged, and even the ant. Of these two types of ³elds the Field of Compassion is the superior.67
The Hsiang fa chüeh i ching also states that we should give to both ³elds equally, reminiscent of the Three Levels teaching that we should give equally, regardless of whether one holds the precepts or not. Thus we see here that the act of giving has become bi-directional: on the one hand, giving to the 65
Ibid., 165, citing the Hua-yen Sutra, T #279, 9.437c.
66
Ibid., 165, citing the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra, T #474, 14.530c.
67
T #2870, 85.1336a–b.
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Field of Respect enables one to “gain the light” (discussed below); on the other hand, the bodhisattvas give to poor and needy sentient beings, which nurtures and encourages them and enables them to produce the mind of enlightenment. This last aspect in particular represents a dramatic shift in emphasis and a restructuring of the traditional uni-directional model of material d„na.68 It also seems to have been a motivating factor in Hsinhsing’s own practice, for his biography records that after he discarded the precepts he made offerings to both the Field of Compassion and the Field of Respect, and reverenced renunciant and laity alike.69 However, the practitioners of the Inexhaustible Storehouse as outlined in the Vimalak‡rti and the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching are the great bodhisattvas, the Ekay„na bodhisattvas; there is nothing new or innovative in this description of their practices. The question to be answered is how do the degenerate sentient beings of the third level gain liberation? Of what use to them is such an exalted doctrine of bodhisattva practice? It is in the answer given to this question that we see the inµuence of the Hua-yen Sutra on their doctrines and how it was combined with the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching. Indeed, it is the Hua-yen Sutra that is quoted most often in the exposition of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. The one word that best describes the teachings of Hsin-hsing is “universalism.” And, like the other schools based on such teachings (T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, the Yðzð Nenbutsu of Japan), Hsin-hsing taught that no one person’s actions are isolated—rather, all are part of the interrelated whole and affect all others mutually. This was the basis for his concept of merit-sharing (rather than merit-transfer). The Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse quotes the Hua-yen Sðtra to this effect: In accordance with the original practice the illumination of the light is gained. All fellow-practitioners of the past who have established a karmic link, All those whose karma from the practices which they have cultivated is the same, And who have practiced jubilation and dispersed their merits Having seen or heard of the bodhisattva’s pure practices— Those persons are able to see the illumination of the light.”70
Thus anybody who has established a “karmic link” by (1) cultivating the same practice, (2) rejoicing at those practices, or (3) seeing or (4) hearing of those practices will gain the same illumination of the light (the “light called 68
See also note 29, above.
69
Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.560a.
70
Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 164, citing the Hua-yen Sðtra, T #279, 9.436a.
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‘jewel manifestation’” quoted earlier) as the practitioner of superior capacity who originally engaged in it. In another place it states that the “fellowpractitioners” need not have the same quality of practice or spiritual attainment as those bodhisattvas with whom they establish a karmic link, nor do they actually have to practice with that bodhisattva directly: In accordance with the teaching, one only needs to give to the Inexhaustible Storehouse and by so doing he will enter into the Universal Inexhaustible Storehouse of the dharma-realm of the Dhyana Master Hsin-hsing. Again, one not only engages in the same practices together with the Dhyana Master Hsinhsing, but together with all of the Ekay„na bodhisattvas of the past, present, and future in all of the lands in all of the dharma-realms of the ten quarters of space—this one practice is the same. Because Hsin-hsing and all of the bodhisattvas are correct, those of the four ranks [that is, those who engage in] the same practice, [those who] rejoice [at those practices], [and those who] see or hear [those practices] are also correct.71 It is like putting a snake into a bamboo tube—the tube is straight and so the snake also becomes straight.”72
This is perhaps one of the more interesting and revealing passages in the text. In addition to the main concept of merit-sharing (sort of the reverse of the old adage, “one bad apple spoils the barrel”), one can see elements of a cult of the founder in the fact that it is the Inexhaustible Storehouse of Hsinhsing in which we participate. Although his practices are said to be the same as all other Ekay„na bodhisattvas’ practices, both here and in other places in the text the emphasis is clearly on Hsin-hsing as the founder and the most important ³gure of the movement. This is also seen in the fact that the donations to the Inexhaustible Storehouse were particularly intense on the day that commemorated Hsin-hsing’s death (see chapter 8, below). This cultic aspect of the Inexhaustible Storehouse is also found in the teaching that if the sixteen inexhaustible practices (discussed below) are cultivated at the Hua-tu ssu founded by Hsin-hsing they complete the perfections of the “eternal, joyous, self, and pure,” but if they are practiced in the provinces these perfections are not achieved. Nonetheless, reµecting both ease of access to the community of San-chieh practitioners (for, as discussed below, it is the communal nature of the practice that guarantees its ef³cacy) as well as the wide-spread popularity of the movement, for those who cannot practice at the Hua-tu ssu, “merit of³ces [kung te ch’u O…Ð] are established Cf. the Hsin-hsing i wen, 5, which, in addition to clarifying that these “fellow practitioners” will all gain the sixteen kinds of gu«ap„ramit„ fruits, adds a ³fth category, that of the person who “receives the offering.” 71
72 Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 171–72 (see also p. 164); cf. Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 119–21 for a discussion of Hsin-hsing’s apotheosis.
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throughout the prefectures and counties for the Ullamb„na festival on the 15th of the seventh month—all [who cultivate the sixteen inexhaustible practices there] will gain assistance in universal emancipation, spontaneous jubilation, and perfection. It is not necessary to bring [contributions] to the Hua-tu ssu.”73 This is also related to another element of Hsin-hsing’s teaching, the community of practitioners. It was taught that in order for the practice of giving to be truly effective it had to be done communally; individual practice of d„na would not bring the same rewards. In addition to the ritualized elements of communal giving that function to create a community, this of course also had the effect of centralizing all of the offerings in one place, an obvious institutional advantage. This is clearly related in the following passage to the point that Gregory Schopen has made regarding the merit accrued to the donor of a material thing: the gift must be used for merit to accrue, and hence the merit of participating in the Inexhaustible Storehouse, from which things are lent out or used continuously, is Inexhaustible.74 It would seem, too, that the merit is derived from the participation in the Inexhaustible Storehouse rather than the thing given, as, for example, in the case of a gift of a candle, which itself would not last forever. The Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse bases this teaching on the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching: If somebody has an abundance of property and practices giving by himself from birth to old age, his merit will be very little. It is not like having many people [practicing giving] as a group, without question of rich or poor, noble or low, monk or layman. If each person produces some small thing and collects [these things] in one place so that it will continue without interruption, giving them as appropriate to the poor and destitute, orphans and aged, the evil, the sick, and the diseased, the troubled and the afµicted, the merit of this will be very great. Even if one does not give at all times [lit. “in each and every thought”] the merit of giving [communally] will arise ceaselessly and without exhaustion. If one has the mind of faith and is joyous when others experience good fortune then the merit acquired will also be like this.75 [In comparison to this] the merit of practicing giving individually is very small.76 73
Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 173.
74
See above, note 33.
The two italicized phrases are from the Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa chien ching, a composition of the San-chieh created in part from the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching (Yabuki, Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa chien ching, 238 and 239, respectively). For a discussion of this text see Antonino Forte, “The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy in Chinese Buddhism: Chih-sheng’s Indictment of Shih-li and the Proscription of the Dharma Mirror Sðtra” in Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, 239–49. 75
76 Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 166, citing the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, T #2870, 85.1336b; see also the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, T #2870, 85.1336a. The Practice in Accord
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The teaching of the merit generated by Inexhaustible Storehouse was thus premised on the traditional calculus of merit exchange, including the notion of the continuous generation of merit through the continued use of the original gift. The innovation appears in the psychology of this calculus, which appears here as a psychology of communal giving, in which participation in a group allows one’s small or sporadic giving to take on the greater signi³cance of the collective.77 Interestingly, records also indicate that donations were made anonymously (see chapter 8), meaning that while functioning to generate inexhaustible merit the gift-giving itself also accomplished the selfeffacement of the bodhisattva’s Inexhaustible Storehouse of moral qualities. The actual means whereby one would be able to participate in the practice and merit of the Ekay„na bodhisattva was conceived in terms of sixteen practices. These practices, found in several places in San-chieh literature, are called the “Sixteen Inexhaustible Practices.” The Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse lists them as: 1. Inexhaustible offering to the Buddha; this consists of worship of the Buddha, etc.; 2. Inexhaustible offering to the dharma; this consists of reciting sutras, etc.; 3. Inexhaustible offering to the sangha; this consists of universally offering [to the sangha] without question of whether they maintain the precepts or break the precepts; 4. Inexhaustible offering to sentient beings; this consists of universally offering to all sentient beings of the six paths without question of whether they practice or do not practice; the six paths are (a) heavenly beings; (b) humans; (c) ³ghting demons; (d) hell beings; (e) animals; (f) hungry ghosts; 5. Inexhaustible separation from all evil; 6. Inexhaustible cultivation of all virtue;78 7. Inexhaustible giving of incense; 8. Inexhaustible giving of light (candles); 9. Inexhaustible giving of bathing materials; 10. Inexhaustible giving of sound (bells, etc.); 11. Inexhaustible giving of clothing; with the Capacity also notes that the alms collected by many, from many, and distributed to many will produce more merit than those of an individual (Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 123–24). 77 Both the institutional and the doctrinal aspect of this emphasis on community are seen in later developments in East Asia, such as, for example, temple-based mutual aid societies (including the pawnshop), communities of karmicly bound practicitioners (kechienshu »ŠL), and the yðzð nenbutsu practice in Japan.
Cf. the Hsin-hsing i wen, which gives the sixth item as “vowing to give the [cultivation] of the twelve ascetic practices (dhðta) inexhaustively, each and every day without interruption, until obtaining Buddhahood,” Hsin-hsing i wen, 4. 78
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12. Inexhaustible giving of shelter; 13. Inexhaustible giving of bedding; 14. Inexhaustible giving of eating utensils; 15. Inexhaustible giving of charcoal and ³re. 16. Inexhaustible giving of food and drink.79
This list of offerings is interesting in several regards, and it is to be hoped that further research will clarify its origin and structure. Two noteworthy aspects involve offerings not included, that is, cash or money and medicine, the latter even being one of the “four requisites” of a monk (food, clothing, shelter, and medicine).80 Although we possess several lists of these sixteen practices, because of the damaged condition of the commentary, the Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, we only have a detailed exposition of the ³rst two practices. With regard to the ³rst practice, then, in addition to worship we are told that “inexhaustible offering to the Buddha” consists of repairing images and stupas. Perhaps owing to a rather material approach to the construction of religious buildings at the time, we are told to ³rst repair all the old and only when that is exhausted to build new ones. The San-chieh texts share this orientation toward repairing the old before constructing the new with the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, as is shown in their paraphrase of that text: Again, good sons, in the future generations there will be sentient beings who will see broken stupas, broken temples, damaged sutras, and damaged images of earlier times, fallen down and ruined, but they will not have any mind to repair them. There are those who practice diligently but will say: “These were not built by myself, my ancestors, or my relatives—why should I repair them? I would prefer to build new ones myself so why should I ³x these?” Good sons, you should know that the essential merit obtained through the repair [of the old and broken] cannot be gained through building anew, it is far superior in virtue. Therefore the merit of constructing new [images, stupas, and temples] is not like that of repairing [them], which is limitless and boundless.81
One can imagine the sort of situation that gave rise to this idea, as the social mobility and opportunities of the sixth century gave birth to new cities and the attendant need for temples, statues, and other accoutrements 79
Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 155–56.
See, however, the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (155), which mentions “daily giving sixteen shares of cash.” 80
81 Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching, 237; cf. T #2870, 85.1336a and 1337b. See also Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching, 245 and T #2870, 85.1337b for a description of people “competing” with one another to build temples, halls, and images, so much so that they ³ll the valleys, roadsides, and even “noxious, fetid and evil places.”
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of the religious life, largely ³lled through the private donations of individuals and their families, and the attendant patronage of individual monks and nuns. Perhaps this also created tensions with the traditionally corporate distribution structure of the sangha, as well as leading to greed and abuse on the part of the monastic community so favored. More than anything, though, it seems to represent a new direction in the understanding of merit acquisition, for if the merit of the building and use of a stupa accrues to the original donor, of what “merit” is its repair? 82 Inasmuch as the control of privately sponsored temples and their furnishings presumably rested with their donors, this could also reµect a criticism of the secularization and privatization of the sangha not at all uncommon in East Asia. This is also perhaps part of the reasoning behind the censuring of “private invitations” mentioned below. In any case, the Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse tells us that the rewards for repairing images and stupas will be the complete extinction of all karma relating to having plundered from or otherwise having offended the Buddha or his stupas. In addition, in the future one will meet various buddhas, cause all sentient beings to worship the Buddha, travel from one Buddha-land to the next worshipping and making offerings to the buddhas and converting sentient beings. According to the text one will eventually attain Buddhahood in such a fashion.83 The second practice is much like the ³rst. Repairing old sutras before copying new ones, one will eliminate all karma that results from having offended the dharma in the past; in the future one will hear the dharma expounded and immediately gain an understanding of it and eventually attain Buddhahood.84 Although these are the only two items for which we have the complete commentary, there is nothing too unusual about the karmic rewards or gains for practicing d„na—it is rather in the mechanism by which they are gained that we see Hsin-hsing’s innovation. The third practice, inexhaustible offerings to the sangha, contains an interesting comment on the spiritual and moral condition of the sangha of the time. In commenting on the passage that says “universally offering without questioning whether [the recipients] observe or transgress the precepts”85 we are told to ³rst offer to the monks who go against the precepts because 82 Concerning the donor’s continued rights of ownership over donated property in the Mðlasarv„stiv„da see Gregory Schopen, “The Lay Ownership of Monasteries and the Role of the Monk in Mðlasarv„stiv„din Monasticism,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 19/1 (1996): 81–126. 83
Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 174–75.
84
Ibid., 175–76.
85
Ibid., 176.
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“if the d„napati is not able to give to the community of monks who offend in their practice of the Buddha-dharma it is not a superior practice.”86 The text goes on to criticize the practice of extending invitations to speci³c monks, telling us that there is superior merit in universally inviting all of the monks. This is supported with a quotation from the Fan wang ching ¤}÷: Good sons, if there is a bodhisattva, whether renunciant or householder, and a d„napati desires to invite the monks of the Field of Merit [to ascertain what they desire], he should go to the monastery and ask the director of affairs [karmad„na] regarding the proper way to do this, saying, “I now wish to invite the monks to tell me what they want.” The administrator should then announce the order in which the monks will be invited; thus will the sages and saintly monks of the ten quarters receive [the invitations of the d„napati]. If a person of the world individually invites ³ve hundred arhats, bodhisattvas, or monks, this is not like inviting a monk or one ordinary monk whose turn it is. If an individual monk is invited it is the practice of the heretics; the teaching of the seven buddhas does not include individual invitations, and [individual invitations] do not conform to the path of obedience.87
A criticism of the attitude which lay behind such “individual invitations” can also be found in the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching: [When] a d„napati arranges a gathering and invites the monks, he will send men to guard the doors so as to keep away the [uninvited] monks and not allow them entrance. If destitute beggars desire to enter to beg food he will prevent them from gaining admittance. Arranging a gathering like this wastes food and drink and is completely without any bit of virtue.88
This, of course, represents a criticism of the traditional hierarchy of giving discussed above, in which in³nitely more merit is generated by offering food to monks than to beggars because the former impart so much more to so many more. As Lai has noted, it is also a common enough sight at any Buddhist temple in the world, where visitors will always give more inside the temple than to the beggars at the gate.89 No doubt the Inexhaustible Storehouse is partly rooted in a criticism of this sort of religious favoritism and 86
Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 176, citing the Fan wang ching, T #1484, 24.1007a (partially emended from the Taishõ edition). Private maintenance of the temples was apparently a problem for the state as well, as in 444 an edict was issued prohibiting such support or patronage; see Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 149. 87
88
T #85, 1336a. See also Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching, 237.
Whalen Lai, “Chinese Buddhist and Christian Charities: A Comparative History,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 12 (1992), 11. 89
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consumerism, the hierarchy of which is altogether eliminated in the reductive framework of the Hua-yen doctrine of absolute and unobstructed equality that was adopted as its basis as well as the teaching of the Universal Buddha and universal sangha. Indeed, based on the criticisms of luxury, tax-evasion, etc., that frequently led to the persecution of the Buddhist church in China, one can imagine the rich life that many enjoyed in the monastery and the lack of any religious dimension to the practice of giving as it was carried out by the wealthy and privileged. We can also probably see here the tension engendered by an individualism or personal favoritism that naturally develops between the laity and charismatic or powerful renunciants but nonetheless runs contrary to the self-denying ethos and corporate structure of the Buddhist monastic ideal, especially the communalism of the Three Levels movement. From the injunctions given to the monks in both texts of Hsin-hsing and texts such as the Fan wang ching it would also seem that the attitude of the monks towards the charity upon which they were supposed to live was less than completely wholesome. The Practice in Accord with the Capacity description of practicing virtue in the third stage, for example, focuses on giving and it includes many cautions to the mendicants regarding how their desire for ³ne foodstuffs kindles the µame of desire, and thus it charges them to give away the good food received through begging and eat only the bad, give away three-fourths and keep only one portion for oneself, etc.90 In this self-denial we can also see the practical side of the San-chieh doctrine of the recognition of one’s evil nature as opposed to the Buddha-nature of all others, as well as the San-chieh attitude towards anything individual or particular rather than communal and universal (see chapter 5).
The Inexhaustible Storehouse and Buddhist Money-Lending One ³nal consideration in this look at the Inexhaustible Storehouse is the question of what position it occupied vis-à-vis other, similar Buddhist institutions in China. Although such a comparative study is well beyond the scope of the present work, the general area of Sui-T’ang Buddhism, particularly with regard to economic function, has received a fair amount of scholarly attention and a reading of these sources can give one a good overview.91 During the T’ang dynasty the Buddhist sangha was involved in almost all 90
Practice in Accord with the Capacity, 121–24.
See Michibata, Chðgoku Bukkyõ to shakai fukushi jigyõ; see also the updated bibliography in Jacques Gernet’s Buddhism in Chinese Society, 401–23 and Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 523–26, for a basic bibliography of works dealing with this subject. 91
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aspects of Chinese life—from providing tax havens for the rich to aiding the poor, from political activism to offering peaceful sanctuaries for public of³cials grown weary of the public arena—all these and many more found a place within the Buddhist communities. The Buddhist church ³gured particularly prominently in the economic sphere, and the immense estates, industrial operations, and lending institutions of the Buddhist sangha all played important roles in Chinese history from the Northern dynasties through the Sui and T’ang. To begin with, it should be noted that the fervent practice of charity on the part of the aristocracy was not at all uncommon in this time—from the emperor on down, conspicuous giving was a staple of the times. The biography of Chi-tsang, Hsin-hsing’s contemporary in Ch’ang-an, also mentions an Inexhaustible Storehouse that seemed to function much the same as that of the Hua-tu ssu: Members of the great families and noble houses all exhausted their wealth in offerings. The faithful and religious alike were pleased with their endeavours. Chi-tsang’s work of conversion to the dharma was unceasing, and so the donations of material goods piled up. They were accordingly distributed in order to establish the Field of Merit. Anything that remained was put into the ten Inexhaustible Storehouses for T’an-hsien to use for the assistance of the [Fields of] Compassion and Respect.92
It is within this general context of institutionalized Buddhist charity that the Inexhaustible Storehouse functioned. As Gernet notes, “the development of the doctrinal concept of charity and of charitable works in practice was particularly appreciable in the sixth century,” precisely the time when Hsinhsing formulated his “inexhaustible” doctrine of Buddhist charity. One such institution that no doubt played an important part in creating an accommodating climate for monastic and public institutions of social welfare was the so-called “sangha household” mentioned above.93 Sangha households were established after T’an-yao petitioned the throne in 469, asking that certain households annually donate grain to the sangha, which would in turn distribute it as relief grain in times of famine.94 Clearly, however, these sangha 92 T #2060, 50.514a; adapted from Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 216; an Inexhaustible Storehouse is also mentioned in the biography of Hui-hui ½y (T #2060, 50.642c). 93 This discussion largely relies on Gernet’s Buddhism in Chinese Society, and Whalen Lai, “The Hsiang fa chueh i ching and the Economics of Salvation.” Tsukamoto Zenryð was among the ³rst to present the fascinating details of these institutions; see his “Shingyõ no Sangaikyõdan to mujinzõ ni tsuite.” 94 The same petition asked for the creation of Buddha households consisting of non-propertied criminals and slaves to help out with cleaning and other custodial duties. This perhaps
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households followed a pattern that was designed with other purposes in mind as well, including the opening up of new agricultural areas and the support of the monastic community itself.95 In China the sangha households were comprised of families captured in war and deported to outlying areas, where they were then expected to contribute sixty hu of millet annually, perhaps as much as half of their yearly harvest. Still, there were advantages to such an arrangement, for although the members of the sangha households were clearly a class of serfs indentured as the agricultural labor of the temples, as “households owned in perpetuity” (ch’ang chu po hsing øWߥ)96 by the sangha they were provided with both land and the tools necessary for cultivating that land and were also exempt from other duties, including corvée labor.97 The sangha also was an obvious bene³ciary, and the sangha households contributed to the growth and wealth of the temples during this period. Like the Inexhaustible Storehouse, the procedural precedent for the sangha households can be found in monastic regulations that speci³ed that persons could be employed as servants of the sangha or Buddha and when a “village of monastery attendants” („r„mika-g„ma) was created for this purpose.98 Although the purpose of the sangha households was clearly stated in T’anyao’s petition to be that of providing relief in times of famine, it seems equally clear that from early on the grains that they provided were more often used for the support of the temples through lending practices, for there is a decree of 511 that already criticizes the exorbitant interest and other rapacious practices of the sangha and orders an inquiry into their operation and a complete inventory of their holdings. A fragmentary manuscript preserved at Tun-huang records the sangha’s indignation at such measures, complaining that The religious buildings in our district were founded by imperial order or were completed and embellished by sages (i.e., emperors). The dwellings, mansions, estates, and the ³elds within [the monasteries] and without, all derive from pious donations. Our peasant families (hu k’ou úS) and domestic servants (chia jen B^) were offered to us by great donors (t’an yüeh AÎ, Skt. d„napati, echoes the separation between the property of the sangha-jewel and the Buddha-jewel alluded to by Lai (cf. below). 95
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 99–116.
96
Ibid., 105.
Ibid., 101. Of course, one could also argue that they performed corvée labor “in perpetuity” to the sangha as an imperial endowment. 97
Gregory Schopen, “The Monastic Ownership of Servants or Slaves: Local and Legal Factors in the Redactional History of Two Vinayas,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 17/2 (1994), 150; Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 102. 98
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“titular benefactors”) and intended to ³ll our buildings in perpetuity, as a hereditary endowment. Those who live in the world congratulate and glorify us. We must not be robbed of our property, nor must it be appropriated; on the contrary, our prosperity must be increased and furthered and [our buildings] embellished. This prosperity neither declines nor is exhausted. It is known as permanent (ch’ang-chu øW). All this accords with the ancient rules [of discipline].99
In addition to asking for a return of their “property held in perpetuity” the document also decrees that members of these households are not to marry outside of their class, but if a child should be born of such a liaison the child becomes part of the monastic property held in perpetuity. Although the creation of sangha households might be thought of as a unique Chinese institution and therefore evidence of the “sini³cation” of Buddhism, as noted above, “villages of monastery attendants” were provided for in the Vinaya, and they also bear a striking resemblance to the donation of “maintenance villages” (bhogag„ma) to the sangha in Sri Lanka from the early fourth century onwards.100 Just as the “sangha households” in China came to be considered the property of particular temples rather than belonging to the sangha as a whole,101 in Sri Lanka also disputes arose over the particular ownership of such lands and their tenants, no doubt marking again the tension between the communal monastic ideal and the fact of property ownership—as well, perhaps, as the issue of how and by whom merit is acquired. As Gunawardana puts it, The acceptance of property introduced a new concept into the organization of the saªgha. The earliest donations, mostly of caves, were made “to the saªgha of the four directions, present and absent” or, in other words, to the entire saªgha. It is very likely that donations of other types of dwellings, situated in parks, were of a similar character, but donations of sources of income [e.g., endowments, inexhaustible goods] were made from the start to individual monasteries. As a result of this practice the monastery came to represent not merely a group of resident monks but also a corporate property-owning institution. The boundary disputes between the major monasteries at the capital and, in particular, the objections raised by the Mah„vih„ra to other monasteries being erected on what it considered its own grounds reveal how strongly the inmates of these monasteries felt that the land attached to their monasteries belonged to them alone.102 99
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 106.
100
Gunawardana, Robe and Plough, 54–60.
101
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 103; see also Schopen, “Monastic Ownership,” 159–62.
Gunawardana, Robe and Plough, 56; see also Schopen, “The Lay Ownership of Monasteries,” 116–22. 102
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As noted above, the children born to a member of a sangha household in China were considered part of the inalienable monastic property, even if one parent was not part of a sangha household, and “human resources” were usually part of the village endowments in Sri Lanka and could be offered separately as well; slaves were also owned by the monasteries.103 Of course, the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu did not primarily involve land grants or human resources,104 but sangha households were only one of many Buddhist relief and lending agencies. In a most interesting essay Whalen Lai has argued that the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, the text cited most often by Hsin-hsing with regard to the importance of charity directed to the “Field of Compassion,” represents a tension between a precept-based lay piety, focused on the sangha as the mediator of the precepts, and a Buddha-centered devotionalism focused on images and the stupa.105 This tension thus includes that between the private, lay ownership of the stupas and the corporate ownership and distribution characteristic of the sangha, possibly deriving from the distinct and separate functions and legal status of the two spheres (sangha and stupa) in India as well as demographic changes in Northern China, in particular the demise of the community-supported monastic estates (“sangha-households” seng ch’i hu R•ú), the expansion of urban centers, and the accompanying growth of individual or private patterns of economic piety. “This work,” he writes of the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, “was a defense of the sangha-household experiment of T’an-yao, who had created such monastic manors as ‘³elds of poverty’ in 462. Clerical corruption in the handling of the sangha grain in 511 spurred the HFCIC’s [Hsiang fa chüeh i ching] protest. The protest was also directed against the proliferation of Buddha images since about 450 and of Buddha temples, especially at Loyang since 495. The conspicuous consumption of the latter was draining monasteries’ funds for helping not just the rural but even more the urban poor. Thus, the same concern that moved post-Ašokan sectarians in India and moves Buddhadasa now in Thailand motivated this text in 517–520: how best to redistribute donations so that those in greater need would receive a more just share.”106 103 Schopen, “Monastic Ownership,” 162–63, 171–72; Gunawardana, Robe and Plough, 88, 97–98, and 120–22. 104 On Empress Wu’s intention to endow the Inexhaustible Storehouses with land grants, see Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 212. 105
Lai, “The Hsiang fa chüeh i ching and the Economics of Salvation,” 21 ff.
Lai, “Chinese Buddhist and Christian Charities,” 11–12; it should also be noted that a readily deployable Confucian social criticism was to bemoan the growth of urban centers and trade activities and the accompanying collapse of an agricultural-based society; for examples of this critique in the Latter Han see Tsukamoto, A History of Early Chinese Buddhism, 34–35. 106
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This thesis is intriguing (particularly in light of Hirakawa’s argument regarding the role and legal status of the stupa in the beginnings of the Mahayana), and it is to be hoped that more work will be done in this area in the future. Whether or not Hsin-hsing’s movement ³ts into this picture is hard to say. On the one hand it was clearly part of a precept-centered form of Buddhism, both in the strict vigilance with which the monastic members of the movement were expected to maintain the discipline and in the practice of administering the precepts to the laity—the “fellow practitioners” and kaly„namitra so important to Hsin-hsing were not necessarily renunciants, but they were expected to observe the precepts.107 Nonetheless, and in spite of their reliance on the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, it does not seem that it was a question of private sponsorship or sangha versus lay control (sangha-jewel versus Buddha-jewel) that drove Hsin-hsing. After all, the Hua-tu ssu—the headquarters of the Inexhaustible Storehouse—was in the private mansion of Kao-ch’iung, ³nance minister of the Sui dynasty. Similarly, although Sanchieh practice does evince the strict morality and redoubled effort characteristic of new religious movements, we must also remember that their view of the refuge of the sangha was precisely that of the monk who broke all of the precepts, making it hard to imagine them deploying the rhetoric of the precept-based sanctity of the sangha. This, too, is not so simple, however, for as we have seen, their rhetoric of the debased sangha of the third level did not mean that they attacked the centrality of the sangha or permitted infractions of the rule, but rather that they argued that biased, narrow-minded, and ignorant sentient beings were not able to distinguish the true holder of the precepts from the corrupt transgressor—as with the arhat Pi«dola discussed in chapter 6, appearances may be deceiving. In the context of the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, then, their critique does in fact seem to be aimed at the “conspicuous consumption” of the temple building and image making of the day and a restructuring of the “private” nature of merit in keeping with the holistic vision of the Hua-yen. At the same time, of course, the Inexhaustible Storehouse did merge the Field of Merit and the Field of Compassion, so that giving to one would accomplish giving to the other, and thereby also achieve the corporate and equal distribution that Lai discusses. This subject could well bear more investigation. In another context, the emphasis on the founder, communal practice, lack of social or class discrimination, and the need to practice at the centralized location of the Hua-tu ssu in order to make the offerings work “without interruption” all serve to bring to mind the role of Buddhist lay associations in Chinese history, especially as corporate patrons of works of piety, vegetarian banquets, festivals, monastic building, and artistic endeavors, that is, 107
See chapter 6.
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groups such as the i i (–Ë), i hui (Ëy), and i she (Ëç).108 As Hsin-hsing discarded the monastic precepts and one of his most important followers was not an ordained monk, it is tempting to identify the San-chieh movement, or at least the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, with this phenomenon. The emphasis on the collective is also reminiscent (again) of the Celestial Masters, whose members were enjoined to contribute materially to the community, who regularly held communal feasts (on the “no-barrier festivals” held at the Hua-tu ssu, see below, 208–10), and who organized social welfare institutions and hostels throughout their territory.109 Although the San-chieh movement and the Inexhaustible Storehouse may have many functional similarities with such associations, at this point I would nonetheless refrain from such an identi³cation primarily because it would obscure many other facets of the movement that are equally important; in this connection, it is this writer’s belief that any religious organization will pass through many different phases, sometimes simultaneously,110 and the label of “lay association” carries so much baggage that it would need to be very narrowly de³ned, both temporally and functionally, to have any meaning, which would also thereby render it inapplicable to the San-chieh movement. This does not mean, however, that such a background is meaningless in the discussion of San-chieh practice and institution. Finally, because of the similarities of name and function several scholars have grouped the San-chieh Inexhaustible Storehouse with other types of lending institutions that µourished during the T’ang and after. Probably the earliest example of this is found in the Shih shih yao lan compiled in 1019 by Tao-ch’eng.111 Tao-ch’eng mentions “long-life treasuries” and “inexhaustible treasuries” (speci³cally those of the San-chieh founded by Empress Wu in the two capitals) as all stemming from the concept of the inexhaustible goods found in the Vinaya. More recently, Kenneth Ch’en, Yang Lien-sheng, and Tsukamoto Zenryð have also put the San-chieh Inexhaustible Storehouse in the same category as the “long-life treasuries” and other Buddhist institutions that existed for the purpose of the ³nancial security of the monastery, as with the function of the “inexhaustible goods” of the Vinaya.112 These institutions, however, clearly had economic motives before 108 On the economic activities of these organizations see Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 259–77. 109
Tsukamoto, A History of Early Chinese Buddhism, 35, 411.
The White Lotus Society, for example, could be classi³ed as a popular religious movement, a secret society, a lay association, or a group of militaristic heretics, depending on which period of their development we look at. 110
111
T #2127, 54.304b.
112
Ch’en, Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 158–71. Ch’en mentions several other
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those of the “Field of Compassion.” This is obvious when one examines the kind of lending practices that these organizations engaged in. On the basis of the evidence provided by Gernet, Ch’en, and others, it seems that not only were the interest rates exorbitant but the contracts were also always very detailed, usually including the phrase “This contract is drawn up because of the fear that there will be a lack of faith.”113 This stands in sharp contrast to the image one obtains of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of Hsin-hsing as preserved in secular sources such as the Liang ching hsin chi and the T’ai p’ing kuang chi (discussed in chapter 8), a fact that has led several other scholars to reject the attempt to categorize it as a type of lending institution.114 Lending with no written records required, no interest charged, etc. indicates that in spite of the fact that the Inexhaustible Storehouse bears a certain semblance to the general lending practices of the Buddhist sangha, the doctrinal basis was not the considerations of the Vinaya for ³nancial security. It is rather the Mahayana ideal of bodhisattva’s inexhaustible storehouse of compassion manifested in the context of Chinese social welfare practices. So, too, the reported wealth of the Inexhaustible Storehouse did not come from interest earned (as in the case of the inexhaustible goods of the long-life treasuries) but rather from the attractive and voluntary nature of its cultus, which provided a communal economy of salvation. Of course, it should be cautioned that separating the ³nancial security of the sangha from purely “religious” purposes is more representative of a modern mindset than a Buddhist critique, for surely the ³nancial well-being of the sangha in and of itself has always been considered a properly religious goal. Nonetheless, it would seem that if a distinction were to be made, the proper area for further discussion of the Inexhaustible Storehouse would be Chinese Buddhist social welfare activities in the context of sangha, community, and state economic institutions.
institutions known as “inexhaustible storehouses,” which were obviously set up to provide for monastic ³nances. Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, “Buddhist Monasteries,” 174–78; Tsukamoto Zenryð, “Shingyõ Sangaikyõdan,” 76–77. 113 Michibata, Tõdai Bukkyõshi no kenkyð, 532–536; Ch’en, Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 165–71. In these contracts one is strongly reminded of the strictures given by the Buddha regarding loans in the Mðlasarv„stiv„din Vinaya: after a loan was defaulted on by a poor person, the Buddha said that all loans must be guaranteed by a pawn two times greater in value than the load; it must be detailed in a contract with names and dates recorded, and the names of the head monk as well as the monks in charge of the transactions must also be recorded; cf. Michibata, Tõdai Bukkyõshi, 522–23; Schopen, “Doing Business,” 536–41, is especially interesting for the parallels that Schopen is able to draw with Indian dharmaš„stra literature. 114 See, for example, Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 211; Michibata, Tõdai Bukkyõshi, 519; and Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 635.
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Summary The Inexhaustible Storehouse of the San-chieh is thus a combination of many different elements into a unique institution of Buddhist social welfare and salvi³c agency. Among the Buddhist elements we can count the doctrine of the religious gift and its merit, the Vinaya regulations that governed the receipt of those gifts and allowed the creation of endowments that simultaneously secured the ³nancial well-being of the sangha and provided for the continuous accumulation of the donor’s religious merit, and the changed understanding of both the function and direction of charity and merit in the Mahayana. Among the indigenous concerns reµected in the Inexhaustible Storehouse we can number the traditional role of communal social welfare activities, the criticism of individual piety and merit in favor of the collective, and particularly their vision of universal and shared merit. Interestingly, the articulation of this ideal of social welfare in terms of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-yen Sutra provided exactly the same sort of cosmological model that the state often deployed as a strategy of legitimization through its patronage of the universalist Buddhist doctrines of the T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen schools. That is, it is a model of a sacred society thoroughly integrated with a charismatic leader (Hsin-hsing) and a sacred center (the Hua-tu ssu) that provided for the people’s welfare and was both the cultic focus and institutional center, thus providing an economy of salvation truly ³t for the new times of a reuni³ed China. This, I believe, was the cause of the great popularity and success of the San-chieh Inexhaustible Storehouse during the Sui and T’ang; perhaps it also was the cause for its numerous suppressions. Let us now, ³nally, turn to the history of that institution and its suppressions.
8. The Suppressions of the Three Levels Movement
T
he bulk of this work has been concerned with describing Sanchieh doctrines and attempting to place them within the broader context of Indian and Chinese Buddhist thought and practice. From this it should be clear that, whatever else may be said about their religious ethos, their doctrine and its institutionalization was far from unusual and can be described as well within the norms of Chinese and even Indian Buddhist doctrine. Given that new religious movements typically expend a great deal of energy explaining their relationship to the norm, this is not surprising. Nonetheless, the San-chieh drew imperial ire and sanctions no less than ³ve times over a period of approximately one hundred and ³fty years, leading to the eventual loss of their texts until the beginning of this century. This chapter, then, examines the possible causes for those suppressions in the context of the implementation of their economy of salvation, the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu Temple.
The Hua-tu Ssu and the Founding of the Inexhaustible Storehouse The San-chieh practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse described in chapter 7 was largely tied to a particular temple, the Hua-tu ssu 5E± (Temple of Conversion and Salvation) in the cosmopolitan capital of the newly united empire, Ch’ang-an. A review of the history of that temple suggests that many aspects of the movement need to be reevaluated, especially regarding the source of their support and the causes of their suppressions. In terms of the former, in spite of the fact that the San-chieh is generally characterized as a movement oriented towards the masses, a review of the institutional record of the Inexhaustible Storehouse makes it clear that the movement also received considerable support from the highest levels of Chinese society from its founding in the Sui throughout the T’ang dynasty. Once this becomes clear, new interpretations of their suppressions also are suggested. Because of their emphasis on the doctrine of decline the persecutions have 189
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consistently been seen in light of doctrinal issues and their implications, that is, as the rulers’ response to the implications of the doctrine of decline or the rulers’ bowing to pressure from other schools and movements offended by the exclusivism of the San-chieh universalism. The belief in the lowered capacity of sentient beings is seen as reµecting poorly on the emperor’s reign and his or her ability to institute just rule or to proclaim the truth and appoint the guardians of that truth. Or again the decline doctrine is seen to be linked to millennial and apocalyptic movements of mass unrest and therefore a threat to the social fabric. Thus it is assumed that the rulers’ political and social concerns were somehow threatened or undermined by the implications of the decline doctrine. While this seems to be a reasonable assumption, I hope to indicate some of the shortcomings of this view and suggest that, in reducing historically complex situations to a single explanation, it invests those situations with a homogeneity not actually evident. Further, although in one sense this approach seeks to point out the ideological side of religious doctrine, because of its reductive nature it does so at the expense of the political nature of politics. Although I cannot offer a neat and easy alternative to this explanation, I suggest that ³delity to the complex and often obscure nature of the historical record leaves us no choice and is, if not the happiest of conclusions, the methodologically preferable approach.
Previous Explanations Although the San-chieh enjoyed periods of great popularity, their teachings or practices were proscribed ³ve times over a span of roughly two hundred years: in 600 by Sui Wen Ti, in 694 and 699 by Empress Wu, and in 721 and 725 by Emperor Hsüan-tsung. Because of this their texts were also often (but not always) excluded from the of³cial canon of Buddhist scriptures. Most accounts of these suppressions follow Yabuki Keiki, the pioneering scholar of the San-chieh, and attribute them to the belief in the decline of the dharma and the attendant pessimistic evaluation of living beings’ capacity to receive, practice, and realize the Buddha-dharma. From this is drawn the conclusion that in periods when a strong patron of Buddhism is in power the implications of the doctrine of decline cast aspersions on the ruler’s ability to exercise divine rule, manifest the virtues of benevolent leadership, bring peace and prosperity to the land, and in general realize harmony during the rulers’ reign.1 1 Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 133–35; Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 300; Ch’en, The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 164. One problem with this ascription is that it assumes that the
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A more sophisticated version of this explanation has recently been offered by Mark Lewis, who argues that it was not the doctrine of decline per se that angered the monarchs but rather the doctrine of the Universal Dharma that the San-chieh based on it that caused the suppressions.2 As discussed in chapter 6, the doctrine of the Universal Dharma taught that the capacity of sentient beings of the third level to discern the truth was virtually nil; rather than risk the offense of slandering the dharma by presumptuously picking and choosing among the various teachings of the Buddha, we are told to recognize the essential truth value of all teachings, heresies as well as orthodox Buddhist doctrine. By eliminating the distinctions in the teachings and severing the link between text and authority (a link implicit in the very term for the Buddhist scriptures),3 “the Three Stages sect challenged the rulers’ right to declare the supreme truth and to justify their rule through the defense of that truth and the elevation of its presumptive masters.”4 Thus the implications of both the doctrine of decline and the Universal Dharma are seen as tantamount to treason. To these explanations is sometimes added that the insistence of the San-chieh on possessing the “sole formula for salvation during the decay of the dharma did not meet with the approval of other schools.”5 The underlying thesis in these arguments is that it was doctrinal concerns that caused the suppressions of the San-chieh. This point, for the most part, is well taken: the actions against the San-chieh were directed against religious texts and practices, not rebels.6 Leaders were not executed nor followers exiled; rather, texts and practices were banned. This points to the difference between apocalyptic uses of the Buddhist doctrine of decline seen in many of the Maitreya groups, and the soteriological orientation of the San-chieh. Although messianic and apocalyptic movements usually incorporate the doctrine of decline into their teachings, they also contain an expectation of a San-chieh is based on the doctrine of mo fa and the three periods of the dharma, an assumption that, as detailed in chapter 4 above, turns out to be unwarranted; I do not think, however, that this changes the basic logic of the argument. 2 Lewis, “The Suppression of the Three Stages Sect,” 207–38. Lewis’s study is a superb exposition of many different aspects of the San-chieh, and though I disagree with his analysis of the suppressions of the San-chieh, I am indebted to his study for clarifying many other points. 3 Ching ÷, meaning the “warp” of a fabric, has long been understood as that which gives order, and the duty of the Chinese emperor is to correctly implement the meaning of the “text” or “canon” and thereby manifest order and harmony in their rule; cf. Lewis, “Suppression,” 208–10. 4
Lewis, “Suppression,” 228.
5
Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 300.
6
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 135; Lewis, “Suppresion,” 230–31.
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future utopia occurring within history that is not found in the San-chieh. That is, it was precisely the concern with the degenerate conditions of the times in which they lived that motivated the teachings of the Three Levels and Pure Land masters, not future expectations of a reform or regeneration. Thus both Yabuki and Lewis have noted that it was precisely during the reign of vigorous patrons of the of³cial Buddhist church that the San-chieh was attacked,7 inasmuch as their doctrines reµected poorly on the abilities of a Buddhist ruler. This was especially true for Empress Wu (who brieµy assumed the title of Maitreya, the future Buddha who would usher in an age of peace and spiritual realization) because she needed the textual support of the Buddhist canon to validate her claims and thus could not tolerate the doctrine of the Universal Dharma. In pondering the arguments presented by these scholars, I was struck ³rst of all by their a priori nature—that is, these arguments can be put forth without investigating the actual, particular circumstances of the suppressions. In fact, because the suppressions occurred in widely varying contexts, if one wishes to give a single, sweeping reason for the suppressions perhaps this is the only avenue open. But could it possibly be that the historical context played no part in the actions that the state took against the San-chieh? The second anomaly that occurred to me is similarly related to what I feel to be the reductionist nature of the argument—inasmuch as the San-chieh never, to my knowledge, actually advocated revolt or disrespect of the ruler,8 if it was solely the doctrine of decline or its implications for doctrinal hermeneutics that were so repugnant, why is it the ruler did not take action against all who propounded this view, particularly the Pure Land teachers? Tao-ch’o (562–645), for example, also believed that he lived in a period in which the traditional practices were completely ineffective; like Hsin-hsing, he argued that “if the teaching is appropriate to the time and capacity, the practice is easy and understanding is easy. If the capacity, teaching, and time are opposed, then practice is dif³cult and entrance is dif³cult.”9 Instead of the universality of the Buddha-dharma Tao-ch’o advocated a single practice, the “one gate of the Pure Land,”10 and the criticism of all who do not follow 7
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 133; Lewis, “Suppression,” 228.
Indeed, as both Yabuki (Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 133–34) and Lewis (“Suppression,” 56–57) have pointed out, the San chieh fo fa contains prescriptions for disciplinary actions that a “ruler who follows the dharma” may take during the decline of the dharma, including taking lives during war, censuring the monastic community, etc. San chieh fo fa, 273 ff; as pointed out in chapter 6 it was also the case that Hsin-hsing’s communities did not tolerate monks who were lax in their discipline, and expulsion was mandated for numerous offenses, particularly lack of respect. 8
9
T #1958, 47.4a.
10
T #1958, 47.13c.
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this “one way” is explicit, as it always is in schemes of doctrinal evaluation and grading (siddh„nta, p’an chiao). Indeed, inasmuch as the single practice of the nien fo is, at least on the surface, more exclusive than the inclusive enfold of Hsin-hsing’s Universal Dharma, it would seem the former might be a more logical target if impugning the emperor’s prerogative to declare truth were the central issue. Although it might be suggested that in recognizing the continued ef³cacy of at least one Buddha and one sutra in the dark period of the ³nal dharma the Pure Land patriarchs were less extreme and hence less threatening, we must remember that in point of fact the San-chieh did advocate a particular teaching or dharma suited to the times, that is, the Universal Dharma: (1) their texts are literally ³lled with quotations from Buddhist sutras (the San chieh fo fa, for example, in a short 30 leaves contains over 130 references to thirty-³ve different canonical sources); (2) their practice included the constant repetition of the “seven roster Buddhan„ma” liturgy, which included chanting the names of over one hundred individual buddhas; (3) they also cultivated the dhðta ascetic practices and other aspects typical of the monastic regimen; and (4) they were ³rmly part of a preceptual tradition, emphasizing the precepts for both renunciant and lay followers. All this simply underscores the fact that they did teach, they did worship the Buddhas, and they did cultivate normative Buddhist practices (the founder, Hsin-hsing, is even included within the section of the Hsü kao seng chuan reserved for “those who practice meditation”). Related to this is the fact that, as pointed out in part two, the decline of the teaching was not really concerned with society at large: whether in its Indian origins as a polemic of “orthodoxy” or its Chinese manifestations as a doctrine of existential failure, the criticisms were virtually always directed inward, at the failure of the monastic community to apprehend the true dharma rather than society at large or the ruler. Further, if the cause of imperial ire is to be sought in the implied criticism inherent in the doctrine of the universal teaching, we should expect that all rulers would always suppress all teachings that do not accord with their own understandings or political needs, for all differing doctrinal systems, which of course claim to be true, implicitly if not explicitly deny the validity or superiority of all other teachings. 11 Yet the shifting winds of imperial patronage did not typically include the suppression of those not the current court favorite. See also Stanley Weinstein’s discussion of the political use of Buddhist teachers and teachings, “Imperial Patronage in T’ang Buddhism,” in Perspectives on the T’ang (New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1973), 265–306. 11
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In order to explain the “on again, off again” aspect of the suppressions (which must be accounted for if a single cause of the suppressions is accepted) I have mentioned that several scholars claim that it was precisely in the time of strong patrons of Buddhism that the ideological threat of the San-chieh was felt most acutely. This, however, simply does not accord with the facts. To characterize Hsüan-tsung an ardent backer of Buddhism is impossible— after all, he laicized tens of thousands of monks and nuns, imposed sharp curbs on ordination and temple construction, and, as with other T’ang rulers, elevated Taoism above Buddhism. Although he did patronize Buddhist establishments to some degree, it is questionable whether his support should be seen as greater than that which T’ai-tsung (who did not suppress the San-chieh) afforded the great translator Hsüan-tsang. It is equally doubtful that a Taoist would take offense at one Buddhist sect claiming doctrinal supremacy but not at others equally sure of their claims to the highest truth.12 Much the same can be said of Sui Wen Ti and even Empress Wu, both of whose policies of legitimization made conspicuous and highly selective use of rituals, doctrines, and institutions of Confucian and Taoist origin as well as Buddhist. In the end, the Universal Dharma is little more than one of many Buddhist sectarian polemics, and the hermeneutical enterprise of sectarian doctrinal evaluation is a weak basis for the active suppression of those schools that engaged in such evaluations. This simple explanation, giving a single cause for the downfall of the San-chieh, also does not seem to be able to explain the fact of the continued survival and even patronage of the sect at the highest levels of T’ang orthodoxy, including support by the imperial family. Another possible consideration for the suppressions is the highly visible success of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the San-chieh. It is often commented upon that Buddhist institutions frequently prospered at the economic expense of the state, thus contributing to many of the large-scale suppressions of Buddhism. Once again, however, we can easily ³nd many examples of temples and sects that possessed vast estates and engaged in entrepreneurial activities on a much greater scale than the San-chieh. Indeed, the usual source of monastic economic power, landed estates, is conspicuously absent in the case of the San-chieh movement, again forcing us to ask why the San-chieh alone would be the target of imperial sanctions if economic issues were the heart of the matter. These and other, similar, inconsistencies have forced me to reevaluate the previous explanations for the suppressions of the San-chieh and conclude that doctrinal issues were probably never more than contributing causes. The direct causes are more likely to be found in simpler, historical events of 12 For example, the Hua-yen teachings, closely linked to Empress Wu and clearly of political import.
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a realpolitik nature. Because the obvious doctrinal factors do not seem to give satisfactory answers, let us look at each of the suppressions in context.13
The Suppression of 600 The ³rst suppression of the San-chieh occurred in the year 600 and is recorded in several catalogues of Buddhist scripture: In the year K’ai-huang 20 (600) an imperial order prohibited the propagation [of these texts]. A warning concerning their ideas was also [given].14
This edict was given a mere six years after the death of Hsin-hsing, the founder of the San-chieh, and only eleven years after he had been invited to the capital of Ch’ang-an to reside at the Chen-chi ssu ³ù± (later known as the Hua-tu ssu 5E±), a temple established by the Sui statesman Kao Chiung ¢Â: In the beginning of K’ai-huang he [Hsin-hsing] was summoned to the capital; Vice Minister Kao Chiung invited him to dwell in the Chen-chi ssu and a subtemple was established there.15
Although the name of the sub-temple is not given, the only sub-temple ever mentioned as being within the precinct of the Hua-tu ssu at this time was that of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, as in this record from the Ch’ang-an chih (the section on the I-ning fang –âÖ) in the northwest part of Ch’ang-an: East of the South Gate: Hua-tu ssu Originally the Chen-chi ssu, and house of Kao Chiung, the Duke of Ch’i, Vice Minister of the left of the [Department] of State Affairs. In the third year of 13 In a response to my analysis of the suppressions, and unwilling to give up the doctrinal link to mo fa, Masatoshi Nagatomi has suggested that perhaps something is to be found in the Dašacakra k¤itigarbha-sðtra (T #410 and #411) and its understanding of the age of decline, especially in its teaching that monks and nuns should not be criticized (oral comments given at The Historical Legacy of Religion in China, Harvard 1988). This connection is indeed possible, as this text was very important to Hsin-hsing (he is reputed to have written a number of commentaries on it and it is often quoted in extant San-chieh texts). Without any mention of mo fa, the decline theory, or the Dašacakra in the suppression edicts or other solid evidence, at this point I still ³nd the doctrinal explanation unsatisfying; see John MacRae, et. al., “Special Report: The Historical Legacy of Religion in China,” Journal of Chinese Religion 17 (1989): 61–116, esp. 68–71. 14 Li tai san pao chi, T #2034, 49.105c; cf. the Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.560b, and Ta t’ang nei tien lu, T #2149, 55.278a. 15
Hsü kao seng chuan, T #2060, 50.560a; cf. the Ming pao chi, T #2082, 51.788b.
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K’ai-huang [583] Chiung abandoned his house and petitioned to have it established as a temple. In the second year of Wu-te [21 Jan. 619–8 Feb. 620] the name was changed to Hua-tu ssu. In the temple was the sub-temple of the Inexhaustible Storehouse.16
And from the Liang ching hsin chi: East of the South Gate: Hua-tu ssu In the third year of K’ai-huang [583], Kao Chiung, Duke of Ch’i and Vice Minister of the [Department of] State Affairs of the Sui, abandoned his house and petitioned to have it established as a temple. At that time there was a sramana Hsin-hsing who came from east of the mountains,17 and Chiung established a subtemple [for him]. There he composed a San chieh chi X‰T in more than thirty chüan, which, for the most part, emphasized perseverance, hard work, and forbearance. He said that there are three grades of people, the wise, the stupid, and those in-between [the ordinary]; because of these teachings it is called the Three Levels. Because of the emphasis on conversion this temple is called the Temple of Conversion and Salvation [Hua-tu ssu].18
Kao Chiung, of course, was the famous general, statesman, and ³nancial advisor to Wen-ti, the ³rst emperor of the Sui.19 Although he eventually fell from favor and was executed during the reign of Yang-ti, during his tenure he was no doubt among the most powerful men in the government, if not the most powerful. In addition to his military accomplishments, Kao Chiung is credited with the reforms in tax registration and civil administration that greatly increased the stability of the new dynasty.20 Kao Chiung, like many of the Northern aristocrats, appears to have been a devout Buddhist, and he is reported as saying “I am now old. After I retire from the court, I wish only to live a pure life and read the Buddhist scriptures.”21 It is 16 Sung Min-ch’iu [þ¼, Ch’ang-an chih ˜Hƒ (circa 1080), in Takeo Hiraoka, ed., Chõan to rakuyõ shiryõ (Kyoto: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyðjo, 1956), chüan 10, p. 9; cf. Hsu-sung, T’ang liang ching ch’eng fang k’ao (ca. 1810), in Hiraoka, Chõan to Rakuyõ shiryõ, chüan 4, p. 24. 17 “East of the Mountains” refers to the area east of the T’ai-hang Mountains, in modernday Shanxi Province, not to the modern province of Shandong. 18
Liang ching hsin chi, Wei Shu, 8th century (included in Pai pu ts’ung shu), chüan 3, p. 14.
For Kao Chiung’s biography, see Wei Cheng et al., Sui shu (Beijing: Chung hua shu chi, 1965), chüan 41, pp. 1179 ff; see also Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge, 1979), vol. 3, part 1, 66–70. 19
Wei Cheng et al., Sui shu, chüan 24, p. 681; cf. Étienne Balazs, “Le Traité économique du ‘Souei-chou’,” T’oung Pao 42 (1953), 154; A. Wright, “Formation of Sui Ideology, 581–604,” in John K. Fairbanks, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 80. 20
21 Wei Cheng et al., Sui shu, chüan 41, 1182. Kao’s wife also donated a house to be used as a Buddhist temple; cf. Ch’ang-an chih, chüan 10, p. 9 (Chõan to Rakuyõ shiryõ, 120).
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unfortunate that more is not known of his relationship to Hsin-hsing and the San-chieh, in particular whether or not the Inexhaustible Storehouse was part of the Hua-tu ssu while he was still alive. Still, as the chief patron of the founder and donor of their main temple, the fortunes of the San-chieh must have been closely tied to those of Kao Chiung, perhaps fatally so. That is, keeping this relationship in mind, it seems quite plausible that the prohibition of San-chieh texts in 600 is related to the “rusti³cation” of Kao Chiung the year before. Although arguably the most important statesman of the Sui, Kao had frequently incurred the wrath of the empress as she grew older. Besides other grievances, she was particularly angered at his opposition to her plan to depose the crown prince Yang Yung (Kao’s daughter was Yang Yung’s concubine) and elevate Yang Kuang (the second son) as heir to the throne—a feat that was accomplished in 600, the year of the suppression of Hsin-hsing’s writings. The possibility that this was related to Kao’s loss of status is increased in light of the fact that one of the supposed charges against Kao is that he was informed of the impending “demise” of the emperor by Buddhist clerics, perhaps seeming to echo Buddhist prophecies of the demise of the dharma.22 In any case, Kao Chiung was demoted in 599 and executed in 607.23 While all of this is simply circumstantial, given the charges against Kao in 599 and the intrigue accompanying the elevation of Yang Kuang to crown prince in 600, it is not hard to imagine that the edict proscribing San-chieh literature was also intended to curb any growing base of support that their most important patron might look to. This would be particularly signi³cant if the Inexhaustible Storehouse existed at Kao Chiung’s home/temple during this period, so let us look brieµy at the origins of that institution.
Hsin-hsing and the Founding of the Inexhaustible Storehouse There are only two sources that actually mention the origins of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, the Liang ching hsin chi, early eighth century, and the T’ai p’ing kuang chi, a work of the late tenth century. From the Liang ching hsin chi: Within the [Hua-tu] Temple there was a subtemple [called] the Inexhaustible Storehouse [Wu chin tsang yüan [¦áŠ] that was founded by Hsin-hsing. 22
Sui shu, chüan 41, 1183.
Sui shu, chüan 41, 1184; A. Wright, The Sui Dynasty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 73–75, 166. Another monk whose practices were similar to Hsin-hsing’s and who was also invited to the capital by Kao Chiung was Tao-cheng ‡±; his practices were also censured (T #2060, 50.559a). 23
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After [its foundation], the donations made by the people of the capital grew greater and greater. After the Chen-kuan period [23 Jan. 627–6 Feb. 650] the money, silks, and golden embroideries that had been collected there were beyond measure. Well-known monks were always appointed to watch over this treasury. The goods in the Storehouse were always used to repair monasteries24 without causing the slightest diminution of funds. People came from as far away as Yen à [Sichuan], Liang ^ [Gansu], Shu 8 [Sichuan], and Chao “ [Hebei] to borrow funds. The amount loaned out each day was dif³cult to calculate. Some who borrowed money did so without any kind of written documents—when the time period was up they would simply repay the loan.25
A slightly different account is given in the T’ai p’ing kuang chi: During the period of Wu-te [18 May 618-1 Jan. 627] there was a sramana named Hsin-i =– who practiced meditation according to the teachings of the Three Levels. In the Hua-tu Temple he established the Inexhaustible Storehouse.26 After the Chen-kuan era the money, silks, gold, and jewels which had been given to this Storehouse were beyond calculation. Monks were always appointed to watch over this treasure, which was divided into three parts: one part was offered for the repair and expansion of temples throughout the land; one part was used to give to all of the suffering and downcast of the Field of Compassion; and one part was used for un-obstructed offerings. Men and women of good society would come in repentance of their offenses and vie with one another in their donations so that order could not be maintained. They would abandon entire carts of money and silks, and after having donated their valuables and silks they would leave without even making their names known.27
Reviewing these two entries, we ³nd that they both agree that the Inexhaustible Storehouse was founded at the Hua-tu ssu, and that after the Chen-kuan period it µourished. However, they disagree on the founder of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, with the Liang ching hsin chi giving Hsin-hsing and the T’ai p’ing kuang chi listing a Hsin-i as the founder. 24 Cf. the Kamakura edition used in Chõan to Rakuyõ shiryõ (p. 192), as well as the edition used by Yabuki (Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 115) and Gernet (Buddhism in Chinese Society, 210); this passage would be better rendered as “The goods offered [to the Inexhaustible Storehouse] were used for the repair of the monasteries throughout the empire. People came from as far away as Yen, Liang, Shu, and Chao to take the funds offered to the storehouse for the repair of monasteries throughout the land.” 25
Liang ching hsin chi, chüan 3, 14.
According to the edition that I used, the original gives the character wu shu tsang [–á; Yabuki also emended this to wu chin tsang [¦á; cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 48. 26
27 Li Fang, T’ai p’ing kuang chi, ca. 977–83 (Tainan: P’ing p’ing ch’u pan she, 1974), chüan 493, p. 4047.
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Inasmuch as Hsin-hsing, the founder of the San-chieh movement, died at the Hua-tu ssu in 594, well before the Wu-te period (618–620) mentioned in the T’ai p’ing kuang chi, the possibility that Hsin-i is a simple mistake for Hsin-hsing must be ruled out. Although none of the other biographies, memorial steles, catalog records, or historical sources mention Hsin-hsing as the founder of the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse at the Hua-tu ssu, as we saw in Chapter One there are other records that show Hsin-hsing to be a likely founder of the sixteen practices of inexhaustible giving and the idea of the Inexhaustible Storehouse if not the actual institution founded at the Hua-tu ssu. For example, a Ta sheng wu chin tsang fa (The Teaching on the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana, likely related to the texts translated in Appendices B and C below) in one chüan, attributed to Hsin-hsing, is mentioned in several catalogs.28 In addition, several of the texts recovered from Tun-huang give further weight to the consideration of Hsin-hsing as the founder. The ³rst of these is an epistolary testimonial that Yabuki has titled the Hsin-hsing i wen, which Yabuki believes written by Hsin-hsing himself or at least preserves his words accurately. According to this text, in 583 Hsin-hsing, at that time forty-four years old and resident in the Kuangyen ssu in Hsiang-chou, abandoned “life and possessions” to entrust himself to the “sixteen types of eternal, joyous, self, and pure activities,” i.e., the sixteen practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse described in chapter 7.29 Another text, the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, gives almost the same list of sixteen inexhaustible acts of d„na.30 Yet another fundamental San-chieh text attributed to Hsin-hsing, the San chieh fo fa, also discusses the superior merits to be gained from the repair of temples as opposed to the construction of new temples, one aspect of the Inexhaustible Storehouse that is mentioned in the Liang ching hsin chi.31 There is thus a fair amount of evidence that, if not directly linking Hsin-hsing to the foundation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse at the Hua-tu ssu, certainly makes it plausible that he would actualize his theories in such an institution. The monk Hsin-i, on the other hand, is only mentioned in texts that draw on the T’ai p’ing kuang chi for their information and are of an even later 28 Cf. the Ta chou k’an ting chung ching mu lu, T #2153, 55.475a; K’ai yüan shih chiao lu, T #2154, 55.678c; Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu ÌâGÏt*‡É (Ryðkoku MS), included in Yabuki Keiki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix, 228; Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu (Nanatsu-dera MS), included in Makita Tairyõ and Ochiai Toshinori, Nanatsu-dera koitsu kyõten kenkyð sõsho (Tokyo: Daitõ Shuppansha, 1998), vol. 6: 111–12; and the Jen chi lu tu mu, included in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix, 221. 29
Hsin-hsing i wen, 3–4. See also Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 10–17, 190.
30
Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 155–59.
31
San chieh fo fa, appendix, 303.
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composition, thus providing little help in answering this question.32 If it were not for the fact that in addition to a different name this text also gives a different date (the Wu-te era, 618–627) we could perhaps take Hsin-i as a simple scribal error for Hsin-hsing. The T’ai p’ing kuang chi is itself based on the Pien i chih ò”ƒ33 and the Liang ching hsin chi,34 so it would not be stretching things too far to posit that although Li-fang saw the entry in the Liang ching hsin chi that gives Hsin-hsing, he purposely changed it to Hsin-i, on the basis of the Pien i chih. It is strange, though, that a Hsin-i is not mentioned in either the historical records or the biographies of monks, which one would expect if he were that important a follower of Hsin-hsing.35 In any case, the records of the µourishing Inexhaustible Storehouse make it clear that the sanctions of 600 had little effect. First of all, we should remember that both the Li tai san pao chi and the Ta T’ang nei tien lu recorded Hsin-hsing’s works in the canonical catalog. Secondly, as we have seen, it was popular with people from across the empire—indeed, the Ta T’ang nei tien lu record of the suppression adds that, “Although [the circulation of these texts was suppressed in 600] the followers of this tradition extend to the seas and heights of the land.”36 Chih-sheng’s record of this in the K’ai yüan lu likewise notes that, “although their practices were prohibited, the followers had spread further and further; practicing together they helped each other and grew ever greater in number.” In an interlinear note Chih-sheng adds an interpretation from his own standpoint of orthodoxy: 32 The ³rst of these is the Chin shih ts’ui pien, which, in a record of a memorial stele for the San-chieh follower Tao-an (607–668), mentions that as Tao-an became a monk and studied the San chieh chi lu at a young age, he would have been of the same period as the monk Hsini, who was recorded in the T’ai p’ing kuang chi as having studied the San-chieh teachings during the Chen-kuan period (Wang-ch’ang, Chin shih ts’ui pien, [1805, included in the Shih k’e shih liao, Taipei: I wen shu kuan, 1966], chüan 57, 19.) The record goes on, however, to say that according to the Shan-hsi t’ung chih Hsin-hsing was a monk of the T’ang, and then wonders whether they were of the same period or even one and the same person (ibid., 20). Lo Chen-yu also noted the records of the Chin shih ts’ui pien and the Shan-hsi t’ung chih, but states that as Hsin-hsing was a monk of the Sui period he could not be the same as Hsin-i; cf. Lo Chen-yü øF*, Hsueh t’ang chin shih wen tzu pa wei ²}!Ík°œÅ, 11 (unpublished mss, Otani University Library). In another record, that of Fa-tsang’s stele, Lo Chen-yü mentions Hsin-i as the founder of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, but again bases his entry on the T’ai p’ing kuang chi and so does not add anything to the discussion (Lo Chen-yü, Hsüeh t’ang, 11). 33
T’ai p’ing kuang chi, 4048.
The T’ai p’ing kuang chi has extensively quoted the Liang ching hsin chi elsewhere, as, for example, in chüan 250. 34
35 The San kuo i shih Xçkª, a Korean work, does mention a Hsin-i, but it seems unlikely that this corresponds to the Hsin-i of the Hua-tu ssu; T #2039, 49.998c and T #2039, 49.1000a. 36
T #2149, 55.278a.
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“Hsin-hsing was the leader of the teaching (chiao chu *ü); his particular practices were heterodox (pieh hsing i fa ƒ‘bÀ) and no different from the false Three Jewels begun by Devadatta (T’ien-shu ú4).” Nonetheless, the power and popularity of those false teachings is again attested, as he goes on: “Although Wen [Ti, Emperor] of the Sui, banned their propagation he was unable to eliminate their roots.”37 And so Hsin-hsing’s teaching and the Inexhaustible Storehouse that he founded continued to thrive.
The Subsequent History of the Inexhaustible Storehouse Thus, although we cannot say with certainty who actually founded the Inexhaustible Storehouse or when it began, we do know that it was started at the Hua-tu ssu as a function of the San-chieh; we also know that in spite of the proscription of 600 it was a µourishing institution from at least the beginnings of the T’ang dynasty through the latter half of the seventh century (that is, “after the Chen-kuan period,” 627–650). So, too, the records of the Liang ching hsin chi and the T’ai p’ing kuang chi tell us that the Inexhaustible Storehouse was popular across the empire and not only with the poor who took advantage of its interest-free loans—the fact that “men and women of good society” also µocked to the temple in order to donate goods indicates the appeal of the movement among the elite as well as the power of its model of communal charity. Although Chinese temples were not yet organized along strictly sectarian lines, it is also certain that for some time after Hsinhsing’s death the Hua-tu ssu continued as a center of San-chieh activity. Seng-yung (543–631), for example, is described by Tao-hsüan as arriving in Ch’ang-an together with Hsin-hsing in 589, and taking charge of more than 300 disciples after Hsin-hsing’s death in 594. Seng-yung himself died at the Hua-tu ssu in 631.38 Other San-chieh followers associated with the Hua-tu ssu during the seventh century include Hui-ju ½Ø (d. 618),39 Ching-ming 37 T #2154, 55.679a; for more on Chih-sheng’s note see also Antonino Forte, “La secte des trois stades et l’hérésie de Devadatta,” Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême–Orient 74 (1985): 469–76.
T #2060, 50.584a. This record actually states that Seng-yung died at the Hua-tu ssu yüan, or the “Hua-tu ssu Subtemple.” Seng-yung’s memorial, the Hua-tu ssu ku Seng-yung ch’an shih t’a ming, on which the Hsü kao seng chuan is based, simply gives the Hua-tu ssu (cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 41). 38
Hui-ju’s biography is included in the Ming pao chi (T #2082, 51.788c), where it says that he died in the beginning of the Wu-te era (22 Dec. 618–22 Jan. 627) at the Chen-chi ssu, that is, the Hua-tu ssu. 39
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Ïe (d. 620),40 P’ei Hsüan-cheng ¨éB (d. ca. 634),41 and Seng-hai ’} (599–654).42 Another indicator of continued San-chieh presence at the Hua-tu ssu is found in the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, composed sometime after the death of Hsin-hsing, which, as noted in Chapter Seven, states that the practice of d„na, one of the most important San-chieh activities, was more ef³caciously carried out at the Hua-tu ssu than in provincial centers.43 Probably the best-known reference to a monk of the Inexhaustible Storehouse in the Hua-tu ssu is the story of embezzler P’ei Hsüan-chih ¨éJ: During the Chen-kuan period [627–649] there was a P’ei Hsüan-chih who was diligent in his cultivation of the precepts.44 He entered the temple [Hua-tu ssu] and cleaned for more than ten years; the community in the temple [saw] that his practice was without fault and made him the guardian of the [Inexhaustible] Storehouse. Afterwards he secretly began to steal gold, but the monks were not aware of it and did not know how much was taken.45 When the monks sent him [on a mission] from which he did not return, they were surprised and suspicious, so they looked in his sleeping room [and found] a verse: Putting sheep before the jaws of a wolf, Placing a bone in front of a dog; I am not enlightened [lit. “an arhat”], How could I avoid stealing? No more was ever known of him.46 40 Little is known of Ching-ming; other than a mention in the Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei as one of Hsin-hsing’s “spiritual friends” (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 9), the only other mention of him is a record of a stele, the T’ang Hua tu ssu Ching ming ch’an shih Reliquary Inscription, compiled by P’ei Hsüan-cheng in the third year of Wu-te (9 Feb. 620–27 Feb. 621); Pao k’e ts’ung pien (Sung dynasty, included in Shih k’e shih liao [Yen Kengwang, ed.], chüan 7, p. 19; cf. Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 255.
According to Tao-hsüan (T #2060, 50.560a–b), P’ei Hsüan-cheng was originally a monk at the Hua-tu ssu, although he later wore layman’s dress. 41
42 Hua-tu ssu Seng-hai ch’an shih fen chi 5E±’},‚bz, recorded in the Yung chou chin shih chi !?!Íz, included in the Hsi yin hsüan ts’ung shu È‹ÛU–, in the collection Pai pu ts’ung shu (Taipei: I wen yin shu kuan: 1965–1971), box 58, nos. 20–21, chüan 2, p. 9; Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 54–55; Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 268. 43
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 117 and 507.
Perhaps mimicking the Vinaya requirement that a “pure” monk oversee the storehouse; see Schopen, “Doing Business,” 540–41. 44
45 Cf. the Liang ching hsin chi, chüan 3. p. 14, which would read “but the accumulation was so great [in the Inexhaustible Storehouse] that the monks did not realize [that he was stealing].”
T’ai p’ing kuang chi, 4047–4048; the story is also in the Liang ching hsin chi (chüan 3, 14), although somewhat less complete; this story reminds me of the lament in the Kauš„mb‡ 46
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P’ei Hsüan-chih truly proved his worth as a man of the third level! In any case, we can thus safely assume that the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Sanchieh µourished at the Hua-tu, probably through the entire seventh century. Still, because Chinese temples were not strictly sectarian, there are other monks mentioned in connection with the Hua-tu ssu who in some cases seem to have no connection with the San-chieh and in other cases are remembered as followers of other traditions.47 Fa-ch’ih À³ and Chih-lien Jš, for example, are both mentioned as dwelling at the Hua-tu ssu and yet both cultivated practices related to Amida.48 Two of Kao Chiung’s great grandchildren, Li-ching C’ and Li-lan C1, are also said to have studied the Lotus and the Diamond sutras at the Hua-tu ssu under a monk named Ming-tsang gá during the Chen-kuan period (627–650).49 Another monk, Fa-chieh Àƒ, is mentioned in a dated (676) colophon to a Tun-huang manuscript of the Lotus Sutra as the ³rst, second, and third “checker” of the text, yet there is no evidence that he was related to the San-chieh.50 In addition to the Hua-tu ssu, local branches of the Inexhaustible Storehouse appear to have been organized in the provinces throughout China,51 although the Hua-tu ssu in the capital was clearly the cultic and institutional focus.
Empress Wu and the Inexhaustible Storehouse The reign of Empress Wu is interesting in the history of the Inexhaustible Storehouse because there is evidence of her support of the Storehouse as well as suppression of San-chieh practices and literature. Although this might be interpreted as indicating the institutional independence of the Inexhaustible Storehouse and the San-chieh, the fact that a Sanchieh monk was appointed controller of the Storehouse tells us that such prophecy noted above (chapter 6), “If even I [the head of the sangha] cannot keep the precepts, how can anybody else?” 47 Cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 129 ff. for a list of various monks recorded as having been at the Hua-tu ssu at one time or another. 48 From the Fo tsu t’ung chi, T #2035, 49.279a and T #2035, 49.289c, respectively; cf. the Wang sheng chi, T #2072, 51.134c and T #2072, 51.135c, respectively. 49
T #2067, 51.42a–b. Cf. Donald E. Gjertson, Miraculous Retribution, 89, n. 27.
Stein No. 1456, Giles No. 2818 (Giles, 77). Although Yabuki had doubts about whether the year given in the colophon, shang yuan 3, referred to 676 or 762 (Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 663), the “dyer,” Hsieh-chi, is mentioned in several other MS of the same sutra (e.g., Giles nos. 2298, 2411, 2569, 2631, 2449, 2705, etc.), of which at least two (2449 and 2705) give dates in the Hsien-heng era (670–673). 50
51
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 212.
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was not the case (see below). Let me begin, then, with the records of the Empress’s support of the Inexhaustible Storehouse: The Empress Wu moved the Storehouse to the Fu-hsien ssu tå±in the Eastern Capital (Loyang). In the end, [however,] the products of the empire did not again accumulate [at this new location] and it was moved back to the original location.52
The Fu-hsien ssu was originally a private temple founded by Empress Wu at her mother’s residence and at her own expense, prompting Forte to call it a “‘Buddhist ancestral temple’ of the Wu family.”53 Originally called the T’ai-yüan ssu °ã±, the name was changed to Fu-hsien ssu in the second year of T’ien-shou (6 December 690–25 November 691), suggesting that it was sometime after early 691 that she moved the Inexhaustible Storehouse. This is borne out by a memorial for the San-chieh monk Fa-tsang Àá of the Ching-yü ssu Ïo±, who is said to have been appointed “controller” (9p) of the Inexhaustible Storehouse at the Fu-hsien ssu in the 1st year of Ju-i (22 April–22 Oct. 692); he was later appointed controller of the Inexhaustible Storehouse at the Hua-tu ssu during the Ch’ang-an period (15 Nov. 701–29 Jan. 705).54 Fa-tsang appears to have been a relatively important monk of this period, for in addition to his appointments as controller of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, his memorial tells us that he was also declared “Bhadanta” (Ta te Ø…) of the Chien-fu ssu during the same period.55 Although the tributes written in a memorial stele must always be received with a grain of salt, the mention of Fa-tsang’s being “superior in the [ascetic practice] of the dhðta,” “not eating food that was not [received] from begging,” and the like bespeak of a virtuous monk engaged in traditional San-chieh practices.56 This in turn reinforces Forte’s assertion that “even in the case of the foundation of the … Fu-hsien ssu, which was called 52 Liang ching hsin chi, chüan 3, 14 (Chõan to Rakuyõ Shiryõ, 192); cf. Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 367 n. 77. Most of the information concerning the Fu-hsien ssu may be found in Antonino Forte, “Il <<Monastero Dei Grandi Chou>> A Lo-yang,” Annali dell’Istituto Orientale di Napoli 33 (1973), 425 ff. Although this record in the Liang ching hsin chi gives one the impression that the Storehouse was actually moved to the Fu-hsien ssu and subsequently returned to the Hua-tu ssu, another record indicates that they both existed at the same time, inasmuch as it prohibits giving to the Inexhaustible Storehouse of both the Hua-tu ssu and the Fu-hsien ssu (see below); see also Antonino Forte, “Daiji” in Hõbõgirin 6 (1983), 695. 53 Antonino Forte, Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century (Napoli: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1976), 97. 54 Ching-yü ssu ku ta te Fa-tsang ch’an shih t’a ming Ïo±ûØ…Àá,‚Oj, included in the Chin shih ts’ui pien, chüan 71, 2; the text is also in Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 69–71. 55
Ching- yü ssu ku ta te Fa-tsang ch’an shih t’a ming, in the Chin shih ts’ui pien, chüan 71, 2.
56
Ibid., 2.
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T’ai-yüan originally, founded in 675 by Wu Chao in honor of her mother, who had died ³ve years earlier, Wu Chao took care to choose monks for her monastery from amongst the most eminent of the time.”57 In other words, the most elevated personage of the realm chose, according to the standards of the time, an appropriately eminent and orthodox monk as preceptor for her “family ancestral temple.” The Inexhaustible Storehouse at the Fu-hsien ssu apparently continued for some time, as an edict of 721 prohibits giving to both the Storehouse at the Hua-tu ssu as well as the Storehouse at the Fuhsien ssu (see below, 211–12). At the same time, however, the Ta chou k’an ting chung ching mu lu, compiled in 695 at imperial request, is the ³rst catalog to include the San-chieh materials in the section of apocryphal texts: A benevolent imperial edict was received in the ³rst year of Cheng-sheng (23 Nov. 694–21 Oct. 695); it ordered that the various apocryphal writings(wei ching “÷) and sundry books of fortunetelling, etc., be established and sent to the Department of National Sacri³ces for keeping. The doctrines in the above items [i.e., the San-chieh texts] are opposed to the Buddha’s intent, and their unique doctrines (pieh kou ƒ¬)58 constitute a heresy (i tuan b2). Thus they are within the boundary of apocrypha and sundry books of magic.59
The catalog goes on to record another edict aimed at restricting Sanchieh practices: Further, based on an imperial edict of the second year of Sheng-li (8 Dec. 698–26 Nov. 699) the followers of the Three Stages are only permitted to beg Forte, Political Propaganda, 113. In this section of his work Forte examined the background of the various monks involved in the Commentary on the Meaning of the Prophecy about Shen-huang in the Ta yun ching (previously thought to be an apocryphal version of the Ta yun ching) in order to show that they represented the orthodoxy of the time. One of the thrusts of his study is to show that the Buddhism of Empress Wu’s time cannot be considered the heretical impulses of a woman infatuated with a “false monk,” as has been the traditional interpretation. Although Forte has suggested (p. 166) that the suppression of the San-chieh during Wu’s reign indicates her concern with orthodoxy (the San-chieh being heretical), it seems to me that her patronage of the Inexhaustible Storehouse and Fa-tsang indicate that the San-chieh was considered part of the orthodoxy and, as with the other suppressions, we must look elsewhere for the cause of her two suppressions. 58 An interesting play on Hsin-hsing’s claim to teach not “distinct teachings” (pieh fa) but the Universal Dharma (see chapters 4 and 6). 59 T #2153, 55.475a. This and the following are adapted from the translations in Forte, Political Propaganda, 166–67; see also Antonino Forte, “Some Considerations on the Historical Value of the Great Zhou Catalogue” in Chðgoku-Nihon kyõtenshõso mokuroku, vol. 6 of the Nanatsu-dera koitsu kyõten kenkyð sõsho (Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 1998), 22–24; Tokuno, “The Evaluation of Indigenous Scriptures in Chinese Buddhist Bibliographical Catalogues,” in Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, 51–52. 57
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for food, fast, go without grains, hold the precepts, and practice seated meditation. All other practices are opposed to the dharma [or, “against the law, wei fa jÀ”].60 Fortunately, we have received clear edicts which rectify the mistakes of the past. It is inadmissible that, on the basis of the old compilations, [the works of the San-chieh] would be in the catalog. Thus it is agreed to exclude them [from the catalog of the canon] as a message for the future.61
It is hard to know exactly what to make of these edicts. To begin with, the ³rst edict makes it appear that the San-chieh texts were not the primary target but were caught in a wider sweep. Secondly, we should note that the San-chieh followers per se were not outlawed or jailed; indeed, they were permitted to continue basic San-chieh practices such as the dhðta and seated meditation. Secondly, both edicts were issued between the dates on which Fa-tsang was appointed controller of the Inexhaustible Storehouse at Loyang (692) and Ch’ang-an (701–705), indicating that the central San-chieh institution and source of popular support, the Inexhaustible Storehouse, continued uninterrupted and was even patronized by Wu into the eighth century. Again, although one might think that this points to the functional independence of the Inexhaustible Storehouse and the San-chieh movement, Fatsang’s memorial stele leaves no question that he was a follower of Hsinhsing and the tenets of the San-chieh.62 Further, Forte noted a reference to a “subtemple of the Three Levels” (San-chieh yüan X‰Š) in the Fu-hsien ssu,63 thus indicating that the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse must have been associated with the San-chieh at the Fu-hsien ssu just as it was at the Hua-tu ssu.64 This vacillation in Wu’s attitude is accordingly dif³cult to 60 Following the Sung, Yuan, and Ming editions. One would like to know speci³cally what the “other practices” are that are here deemed illegal; Forte has also advanced the thesis that the Sheng-li proscription targeted Christianity as well as the Three Levels movement (“Some considerations,” 30–34). 61 T #2153, 55.475a. This rendering follows the Sung, Yuan, and Ming editions. The Taishõ edition reads “It is inadmissible that false compilations exist in the catalog.” As Forte has rightly pointed out (Political Propaganda, 166–67), this does not change the basic meaning and “the mistakes of the past” and “old compilations” are clearly references to the inclusion of the San-chieh works in the of³cial canons of the Li tai san pao chi and the Ta t’ang nei tien lu. 62 Apparently Empress Wu did support the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse generally, as she is recorded as having ordered “Take the property accumulated by my father and mother, use the old appanages of the two capitals, all that does not serve the construction of monasteries (chao t’i chih yü [ÀØî”], dwellings of the sangha of the Four directions) and let all this be paid into the Inexhaustible Treasury (Treasuries?),” T #2127, 54.304b, cited in Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 212.
Li tai ming hua chi, chüan 3, 19a (included in the Pai pu ts’ung shu, box 46), noted in Forte, “Il Monastero,” 426–27. 63
64 This is also indicated by the edict ordering the abolition of the two storehouses (from the Ts’e fu yüan kuei, see below, 212), which notes that the donations that both temples received
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explain, and may perhaps be due to a natural antagonism between the doctrines of the San-chieh that emphasized the utter decay of spiritual capacity and the apocalyptic ideology surrounding the empress which taught on the one hand that the world was still in the period of the semblance dharma (hsiang-fa) and on the other hand that Empress Wu was a great bodhisattva, future Buddha, and world savior.65 Still, one yearns for something more concrete than theological differences of opinion about a date. It seems to me, for example, that even more ideologically charged might have been her failure to duplicate the charisma of the San-chieh Inexhaustible Storehouse within her family temple in Loyang, for if the ruler’s right to declare abstract truth was important, even more so was the prerogative to provide for the well-being of the subjects, including providing charitable relief. Hence it is possible that her failure to duplicate the success and popularity enjoyed by the Three Levels even in her “family temple” might have seemed an affront to her authority. On the other hand, given that the edict speci³cally prohibits all San-chieh practices other than begging, fasting, abstaining from grains, holding the precepts, and meditation yet the most conspicuous practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse continued, it might also be that the edicts were simply for show, satisfying some faction or political expediency, and were never actually enforced. When we turn to the historical record, however, we ³nd evidence that at least one important follower of the San-chieh, Li Chen 5Ì, was actively opposed to the reign of Empress Wu. Li Chen was a rather insigni³cant son of T’ai-tsung and far overshadowed in history by his brother Kao-tsung. In 643 he was appointed governor of Hsiang-chou, a post he held until 653, and after a period as military governor of An-chou he again served as governor of Hsiang-chou from 670 to 674.66 One can easily surmise that it was here, in Hsin-hsing’s homeland, that Li Chen encountered the teachings of the Sanchieh, for he is said to have composed at least two and possibly three memorial steles for Hsin-hsing.67 Apparently dissatis³ed with the doings of Empress on the anniversary of Hsin-hsing’s death were particularly intense; thus, although the new Inexhaustible Storehouse did not µourish, it would seem that there was at least an attempt to transfer or mimic the Three Levels cultus of the founder at the Fu-hsien ssu. Perhaps the reason that it did not work out is to be found in the doctrine that speci³ed that the Inexhaustible Storehouse was concretely manifested as the perfections of the “eternal, joyous, self and pure” solely at the Hua-tu ssu (see chapter 7, 174–75). 65
Forte, Political Propaganda, 155–58.
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 26–27, 32, 69; see also Antonino Forte, “The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy in Chinese Buddhism: Chih-sheng’s Indictment of Shih-li and the Proscription of the Dharma Mirror Sðtra,” in Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, 240 and 247, note 4. 66
67
Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 263–65.
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Wu, Li raised the banner of revolt in 688 and died the same year. Hsüeh Chi (649–713), the man responsible for the calligraphy on one of the steles that Li composed for Hsin-hsing, was quite well known, and, because of his involvement in the forging of the Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching, may tentatively be considered a follower or at least a San-chieh sympathizer.68 Interestingly, Hsüeh Chi was forced to commit suicide following the failure of a plot to poison Hsüan-tsung in 713 (the date ascribed by one text to Hsüan-tsung’s ³rst proscription of the Inexhaustible Storehouse; see below).69 Thus, although the evidence is again merely circumstantial, the fact that so important a rebel was a follower of Hsin-hsing perhaps played a part in the suppressions. Empress Wu’s actions toward the San-chieh may have also been inµuenced by shifting attitudes towards Buddhism in general, especially after the disastrous ³re that destroyed her treasured Ming-t’ang in 694. Indeed, regardless of Wu’s special treatment of the Buddhist church, it is often commented upon that she also made judicious use of the symbols of all three major traditions, and especially in the face of the anti-Buddhist rhetoric and intense political intrigue following the ³re she turned towards Confucian titles, names, and rites as a way of mollifying her enemies.70 So the Three Levels was not the only Buddhist group that, previously favored, came to be of³cially proscribed after the ³re. Perhaps, then, her vacillating stance towards the Three Levels movement reµects her need to respond to the general attacks on Buddhism that escalated after the burning of the Ming-t’ang complex. The point is that all of these scenarios refer to speci³c and localized causes for the proscriptions rather than transhistorical, doctrinal quarrels.
No-Barrier Festivals One more sign of the continued favor that the Hua-tu ssu enjoyed is their hosting of imperially sponsored “no-barrier festivals.” Given that the Hua-tu ssu was the locus of the San-chieh practice of d„na embodied in the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, it is not surprising that we ³nd records of wu che ta hui [ìØy, “no-barrier festivals,” held there in the
68 On the San-chieh involvement in the composition of this text see Forte, “Relativity,” 239–49. 69
Twitchett, Cambridge History, 345.
For a detailed study of Wu’s Ming-t’ang see Antonino Forte, Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of the Astronomical Clock (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente and Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1988), especially chapter 4. 70
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early eighth century.71 Although these festivals, usually held by imperial command, have taken on many different forms over the years, they were basically an act of universal d„na on the part of a muni³cent benefactor and were thus a good match for the San-chieh doctrine of inexhaustible giving. Several of the best-known examples of this kind of festival are from India. Ašoka, for example, at one time convened a great assembly of monks and was forced into a “bidding” competition with his son, who repeatedly countered Ašoka’s donation with largess of his own. In the end Ašoka made an offering of his entire kingdom, only to ransom it back with an additional 400,000 pieces of gold. 72 The stories of equally thoroughgoing charity recounted by the Chinese pilgrims Fa-hsien and Hsüan-tsang are also well known.73 In China the stories of Wu Liang Ti’s giving are famous and fairly numerous. Wu frequently convened assemblies in which all could participate (as many as 50,000 people reportedly participated in these assemblies, hence “no-barrier festivals”); one part of the festival was the emperor’s donation of his own person to the monastery, to be duly ransomed by his ministers.74 Although these are the best-known examples, such gatherings were apparently not infrequent in China, usually centering around the preaching of the dharma and a vegetarian feast, a staple of Chinese temple life.75 Several interpretations of these festivals have been given, ranging from the symbolism of the “Buddha’s own divestment of the accouterments of royalty”76 in the Indian case to the “undeniable inµuence of the concept of charity 71 Nakamura gives pañca-v„r¤ika as the Sanskrit equivalent (Nakamura Hajime, Bukkyõgo Daijiten MîBØÂø [Tokyo: Tõkyõ Shoseki, 1981], 1327); cf. S. Beal, Chinese Accounts of India (ed. 1957, Calcutta: Susil Gupta, Ltd, 1957 reprint), 115, who gives Moksha Mahaparishad, “also called Panchavarshika parishad.” The usual explanation of the festivals is that they were held every ³ve years, hence pañca-v„r¤ika, although other sources say that the name stems from the practice of the king giving away all of the treasures accumulated over a ³ve-year period. For a general discussion of the pañca-v„r¤ika see John S. Strong, The Legend of King Ašoka, A Study and Translation of the “Ašok„vadana” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 89 ff, and John Strong, “Rich Man, Poor Man, Bhikkhu, King: Ašoka’s Great Quinquennial Festival and the Nature of D„na” in Sizemore and Swearer, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, 107–23. 72
Strong, Ašoka, 265–68.
73
T #2084, 51.837c and T #2087, 51.873b.
74
T #2035, 49.350b, 351b.
Cf. Michibata Ryõshð, Tõdai Bukkyõshi no kenkyð (Kyoto: Hõzõkan, 3rd edition, 1981), 411–12; see also Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 283–84 and Ch’en, The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 276–83. Such feasts and/or fasts (chai +) were also regularly accompanied by repentance rites and formed part of Taoist practice as well. 75
76
Strong, Ašoka, 94.
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rendered to the impoverished of the Field of Compassion” in the case of China.77 No doubt there were many different motivating factors in China, among them the desire to emulate the Ašokan ideal in order to establish one’s claim as the Universal Monarch, the need to establish a solid relationship with a temporally powerful sangha, as well as, in the case of China, the tradition of state social welfare activities. Perhaps most important of all, though, was the establishment of the emperor as a member of the sangha and thus ruler of the religious world, just as prior to his ultimate act of d„na (and after his reinvestiture) he was ruler of the temporal world. This act of “transformation and renewal” thus formed an important and public display of the seamless unity of the realm and the ruler’s authority within that realm. No doubt the site of such a display was chosen very carefully, for it implied the full weight and sanction of the sacred and political charisma of the Dragon Throne; hence, too, the chosen site shared in that charisma. There are four records of “no-barrier festivals” held at the Hua-tu ssu, three of which probably refer to the same event.78 The Fo tsu t’ung chi (ca. 1296), under the 4th year of the Ching-lung era (710), records an imperial mandate to hold a wu che ta hui,79 and the same work records that Chung Tsung (705–710) ordered a wu che ta hui to be held at the Hua-tu ssu.80 The Chiu T’ang shu (ca. 945) notes that in the 4th year of Ching-lung, 1st month, 3rd day (6 February 710) a wu che ta chai [ìØ+ was held at the Hua-tu ssu.81 That these festivals were held at the Hua-tu ssu underscores the fact that this temple continued to be an important and well-patronized center of Buddhist life in Ch’ang-an, even after Empress Wu’s edicts. This continued importance as a site for enacting the drama of imperial and sacred charisma of the no-barrier festival, taken together with Wu’s continued support of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, make it dif³cult to assess the signi³cance of her proscriptions. Was even imperial authority not enough to curtail San-chieh activities? Was their charitable institution too popular a force to be easily or quickly eliminated? Or do these reversals perhaps represent the changing winds of other religio-political situations, such as Wu’s abdication in 705 or Jui-tsung’s accession to that throne in 710, the year of the no-barrier festival at the Hua-tu ssu? We probably will never know. 77
Michibata, Tõdai Bukkyõshi, 411.
I have not been able to locate the reference for the second festival that Yabuki has listed as held in 708 (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 26). 78
79
T #2035, 49.372c.
80
T #2035, 49.451a.
Chiu T’ang shu /N– (reprint of the Wu Ying Tien edition, Liu Hsü G+ [887–946], ed., Taipei: Chung hua shu chu, 1965), 104. 81
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Hsüan-tsung and the Dispersal of the Inexhaustible Storehouse After Hsüan-tsung took over the reins of power in 712 he embarked on a series of reforms, and the Buddhist church became a target for his changes. Private temples, a traditional means of avoiding taxes and corvée labor, were forbidden; unauthorized ordinations were prohibited and tens of thousands of monks and nuns defrocked; new temple building was forbidden; and even the religious activities of the monks were a subject of reform. Similar measures continued to be introduced throughout his reign, evidence of both the need to control a church grown luxuriant during the previous years of lavish state support and of Hsüan-tsung’s well-known preference for Taoism (although Taoist establishments were also the target of these measures).82 In this context we ³nd several records dealing with the dismantling of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. The Liang ching hsin chi record of the Inexhaustible Storehouse cited above continues: In the ³rst year of K’ai-yüan [22 Dec. 713–30 Jan. 714], [the Inexhaustible Storehouse] was destroyed by imperial order. The cash and cloths that had been kept there were offered to the various temples of the capital for repairing the broken and destroyed; these affairs [of the Inexhaustible Storehouse] were thereupon stopped.83
There are other records, however, which, while recording a dispersal of the goods of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, give 721 as the date of the action. The T’ang liang ching ch’eng fang k’ao (1810), for example, states: East of the Gate: Hua-tu ssu Originally the Chen-chi ssu and house of Kao Chiung, the Duke of Ch’i, viceminister of the left of the [Department] of State Affairs. In the third year of K’ai-huang [583] Chiung abandoned his house and established the temple. In the second year of Wu-te [22 Dec. 618–10 Jan. 620] the name was changed to Hua-tu ssu. In the temple was the sub-temple of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. On the name plate is written Hua-tu ssu.… Empress Wu moved the Inexhaustible 82 In 711, for example, Hsin T’i-fou memorialized that Buddhist establishments controlled 70 to 80 percent of the empire’s wealth (T’ang hui yao, quoted in Ch’en, The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 129; on Hsüan-tsung’s support of Taoism see Twitchett, Cambridge History, 361–62, 411–12; Tonami Mamoru, “Tõchðki no Bukkyõ to kokka,” in Chðgoku chðsei no shðkyõ to bunka (1982), 632–33, who points out that these measures were applied to Buddhists and Taoists equally. 83
Liang ching hsin chi, chüan 3, 14.
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Storehouse of this temple to the Fu-hsien ssu in the Eastern capital [Loyang]. After many days it gradually diminished and subsequently was moved back to the original sub-temple. In K’ai-yüan 9 [1 Feb. 721–21 Jan. 722] the excess was dispersed to the various temples in the capital. The temple was extinguished.84
The most complete descriptions of this dispersal are found in the Ts’e fu yüan kuei (1013) and the Ch’üan t’ang wen (1814), both of which record two separate occasions on which action was taken against the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Although the Ch’üan t’ang wen gives no dates (the records are put in the section containing proclamations of Hsüan-tsung) the Ts’e fu yüan kuei, upon which it is based, dates both proclamations. The ³rst proclamation follows an edict dated the ninth year of K’ai-yüan (1 Feb. 721– 21 Jan. 722): Fourth month, 39th cyclical day [26 May 721]. It is proclaimed! The delicacy of the scriptures has only one mark as its import, though the sublime truth of the Mahayana reveals the two gates. The monks of the San-chieh [chiao] at the Hua-tu ssu and Fu-hsien ssu have established Inexhaustible Storehouses, and each year on the 4th day of the ³rst month85 the gentlemen and ladies throughout the empire donate money [to these Inexhaustible Storehouses]. This is called the “protection of the dharma” and is said to succor the impoverished and the weak. [However,] there is a great amount of debauchery and fraud and things are not proper or upright. Therefore it is appropriate that [this practice] is prohibited. The money in the Storehouses will be given to the Censorate in the districts of Ching-chao and Ho-nan.86 [When] these affairs are known and an accounting is made they shall be clari³ed in a record book, awaiting their subsequent disposition.87
Unlike the heretical ideas or the prohibited but unspeci³ed practices attacked in the earlier proscriptions of San-chieh texts, in this proclamation Hsüan-tsung speci³cally prohibited giving to the Inexhaustible Storehouse, the same Inexhaustible Storehouse that was supported by Empress Wu and 84 T’ang liang ching ch’eng fang k’ao, chüan 4, 24 (Hsu-sung, 1810, included in Chõan to Rakuyõ shiryõ, 51). 85
I.e., the anniversary of Hsin-hsing’s death.
Ch’ang-an and Loyang, respectively. These names reµect popular usage and refer back to when these cities were the centers of the commanderies named Ching-chao and Ho-nan. 86
Wang Ch’in-jo, et al., Ts’e fu yüan kuei, chüan 159, 15 (1013, Taipei: Chung hua shu chu edition, 1924). Cf. the Ch’üan t’ang wen 6Nk, chüan 28, Tung Kao lô, ed., 11–12 (Ch’in ting ch’üan t’ang wen edition, Taipei, Hui wen shu chu, 1961, 380). The Ch’üan t’ang wen adds the title “Proclamation Prohibiting the Gentlemen And Ladies of Good Society from Donating Money to the Buddhist Temples.” 87
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survived her proscription of San-chieh ideas and texts. Here there is no mention of heretical ideas, apocryphal prophecy, or dangerous ideology. Rather, this edict alludes to debauchery and fraud, recalling the episode discussed above in which a monk, tempted by the treasures of the Storehouse as a “wolf in front of whose jaws a sheep has been placed,” could not help but embezzle funds. At the same time it is a rather empty accusation with no substance provided whatsoever, and as such it should most likely be taken as one of many such measures designed to gain control of the ³nances of the empire, not ideological opposition to the doctrine of decline or Universal Dharma. Rather than doctrinal issues, of which the proclamation makes no mention, it was the fraudulent administration (bookkeeping? tax-evasion? theft? skimming? laundering?) that called for legislative intervention. The proclamation also calls for an accounting of the goods for “subsequent disposition,” and the following edict tells us the nature of this disposition: On the 24th cyclical day of the 6th month [10 July 721] it is proclaimed that the goods, land, houses, and the six kinds of livestock of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu are to be be divided equally among the Taoist and Buddhist establishments. First [these goods] will be used for the repair of the broken statues, halls, and bridges. If there is anything remaining it will be put into the permanent goods [of the monastery] and will not be divided amongst the monks’ private quarters.88 Begin distribution [of these goods] from the poor Taoist and Buddhist establishments.89 88 That is, will be given to the monastery as a whole and not to individual monks. The nagging question, however, is which monastery or monasteries? 89 Ts’e fu yüan kuei, chüan 159, 15. The same proclamation, with the title “Proclamation Disposing of the Goods of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Hua-tu ssu” is contained in Ch’üan t’ang wen, chüan 28, 15 (in the Ch’in ting ch’üan t’ang wen, 382). As mentioned above, there is some confusion about the dates of this dissolution, with the Liang ching hsin chi giving 713 while the T’ang liang ching ch’eng fang k’ao and the Ts’e fu yüan kuei both give 721. The context of Hsüan-tsung’s reign gives us no clues, as he issued similar proclamations concerning the property of the monasteries and governing the monks within the monasteries during both periods; see Ch’en, Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 116–17 and 133–34, for examples. As Tonami has pointed out, most scholars have followed Yabuki and given 713 as the date of the proclamation, but this should most likely be rejected in favor of 721 (Tonami, “Tõchðki no Bukkyõ,” 635). The most unusual instance is found in Gernet’s work on Chinese Buddhist institutions (Buddhism in Chinese Society, 211–12), where he cites both the Ch’üan t’ang wen and the Ts’e fu yüan kuei, and states that the decrees are dated 713 in the former. Aside from the fact that the Ch’üan t’ang wen did not actually assign dates to the decrees, there was no 4th month of the ³rst year of K’ai-yüan, which began in the 12th month of the civil year and ended one month later. Although Tonami has pointed to this discrepancy, he is wrong in stating, rather stridently, that Buddhist scholars have in general ignored the Ts’e fu yüan kuei and in particular not yet corrected the dates of the dispersal of the Inexhaustible Storehouse (p. 636), as Kenneth Ch’en had already corrected the date to 721 on the basis of the Ts’e fu yüan kuei (Ch’en, Chinese Transformation of Buddhisms, 163, n. 113 and 164).
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Many aspects of this edict are interesting, including the nature of the con³scated goods (the ³rst mention of land and buildings in connection with the Inexhaustible Storehouse) and the ecumenical nature of their disposal. It is also interesting to note that the use of the goods of the Inexhaustible Storehouse for the repair of religious buildings, statues, etc. and the dispersal of the remainder to the monastic community rather than to individuals are both in line with the San-chieh practices detailed in chapter 7. Another suppression of the San-chieh during the reign of Hsüan-tsung is recorded in the K’ai yüan lu; in this suppression San-chieh literature was prohibited and the walls of the “San-chieh yüan” in the various temples are ordered removed and the followers are enjoined to live together with the other monks. Knowing that they are contrary to truth and incite falsehood an edict was issued prohibiting them: on the third day of the sixth month of the thirteenth year of K’ai-yüan [725] an imperial edict was issued to all of the subtemples of the Three Levels X‰Š ordering the barriers [separating them from the rest of the community] removed. [The followers of the Three Levels] will live together with the community of monks in the main temple; separate dwellings are not permitted. The collected works TÉ90 of [Hsin-]hsing are all prohibited and should be destroyed. If these edicts are not heeded, these practices will prejudice people. Therefore those who do not comply will be returned to lay life.91
Following the dismantling of the primary San-chieh institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, this edict records the further suppression of Sanchieh institutional life as well as the banning and destruction of San-chieh texts. It is hard to know what to make of these San-chieh yüan; rather than seeing this as evidence of a separatist tendency or utopian communitarianism, it is entirely possible that these San-chieh subtemples or cloisters grew from their liturgical practices of the pratyutpanna or fang teng rites, both of which required separate or isolated rooms or halls for practice, or other forms of ascetic retreat, including perhaps modi³ed forms of dhðtaªga practice.92 Although there is no recorded support of the San-chieh by Hsüan-tsung, the fact that he waited some nine years after assuming power to act against 90 A common name for Hsin-hsing’s writings, e.g., the San chieh chi lu X‰TÉ, T #2153, 55.474c or the Jen chi lu ^TÉ , T #2082, 51.788b; cf. chapter 1, 11–13. 91
T #2154, 55.679a.
Ch’ang Yen-yüan’s Li tai ming hua chi also mentions several San-chieh yüan (Li tai ming hua chi, chüan 3, 12, 16, and 17). On the need for separate quarters for repentance and other liturgical practice see Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 55, 76; on the separation of San-chieh followers from the main monastic community see chapter 4, 90–92. 92
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them seems to argue against strictly ideological motivation. Most likely in this case the reason is as found in the proclamation of 721, that is, “there is a great amount of debauchery and fraud and things are not proper or upright.” Added to this was a need to set the ³nances of the empire straight after the largess of Empress Wu to the Buddhist community. His actions, then, should be seen as directed primarily against the institutional base of the sect, in other words, the Inexhaustible Storehouse and the separate dwellings of the followers. The “separate dwellings” of the San-chieh bear closer scrutiny in this regard, considering that Buddhist temples were generally not divided along sectarian lines at this point. While I do not believe that the doctrinally sectarian nature of their Universal Dharma would be any more offensive than any other school’s claim to doctrinal supremacy, the institutional embodiment of that doctrine—physically removing the monks from other monks in the temples—might seem a move more calculated to achieve regulatory independence, and hence a move intolerable to other Buddhists as well as the government. If, however, as I have suggested in chapter 6, the separate cloisters were created out of liturgical need, as was not uncommon in Chinese monasteries, it is hard to consider this evidence of incipient separatism. Another factor that might have contributed to the dissolution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse is the emperor’s desire to regain control of the imperial prerogative to act as the medium of charitable merit for his subjects. That is, just as Mark Lewis has argued that the Universal Dharma “challenged the rulers’ right to declare the supreme truth and to justify their rule through the defense of that truth and the elevation of its presumptive masters,”93 Whalen Lai has recently argued that Buddhist charitable institutions usurped the “prerogatives of the ruler, who had the obligation of providing a minimal livelihood for his subject.… At a time when only the ruler should claim that obligation, any private party presuming to feed the poor would be stealing loyalty from the sovereign and could be perceived as challenging his right to rule,… to usurp that prerogative amounted to his being disloyal to his lord.”94 In this connection it is perhaps especially signi³cant that a Sung Ching wrote a memorial to the emperor on exactly this point (citing Confucius as his authority) in 717, the second decade of Hsüantsung’s rule and only a few years before his suppression of the San-chieh charitable institution.95 In any case, it is certainly true that Hsüan-tsung’s 93
Lewis, “Suppression,” 228.
Whalen Lai, “Chinese Buddhist and Christian Charities: A Comparative History,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 12 (1992), 7. 94
95
Lai, “Chinese Buddhist and Christian Charities,” 7.
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outlawing the public and popular Inexhaustible Storehouse, the San-chieh community-based dwellings (“San chieh cloisters”), and ordering their texts banned and destroyed was a much more thoroughgoing attack than anything seen previously. This was shortly followed by a canonical condemnation. In 730, a few short years after the orders dismantling the Inexhaustible Storehouse were issued, the famous K’ai yüan shih chiao lu was compiled by Chih-sheng. This catalogue of Buddhist scriptures, widely regarded as one of the most authoritative and comprehensive catalogues ever compiled, has been immensely inµuential to this day, passing on its seal of orthodoxy to even the Taishõ compilation of the canon used by scholars and temples throughout the world.96 Chih-sheng followed the precedent established by the Ta chou lu and included the San-chieh texts in the section of false or spurious texts. After he listed the titles of the texts, he also added a lengthy note drawing on the reports in the previous catalogues as well as noting the 725 proscription of individual Three Levels dwellings cited above. This catalogue and Chih-sheng’s judgement of the San-chieh is especially telling in terms of the vacillating status of the San-chieh, as has been recently detailed by Antonino Forte in his examination of the Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching or the Dharma Mirror Sutra, a text forged by Sanchieh followers.97 The Dharma Mirror Sutra was admitted to the of³cial canon with recommendations from the highest levels of the Buddhist orthodoxy in July of 712, one month before Hsüan-tsung ascended the throne and eight years before he banned the Inexhaustible Storehouse and con³scated its holdings. The San-chieh clearly enjoyed support at the highest levels of the empire at this time, for in addition to the San-chieh monk Shih-li, a board comprised of ten members of an imperial committee examined and certi³ed the text, and “all but one of these were scholars from the imperial College for the Glori³cation of Literature (Chao-wen kuan ÅkI).”98 In addition, the preface to the text named Bodhiruci and Manicintana, easily two of the most important monks of the time, as the translators of the text.99 Yet in 730, less than twenty years after this ringing endorsement, Chih-sheng condemned the text as a “deception on top of a deception” perpetrated by Shih-li. Leaving aside the question of the content of the scripture in order to 96 On this catalog and its judgements of orthodoxy see Kyoko Tokuno, “The Evaluation of Indigenous Scriptures in Chinese Buddhist Bibliographical Catalogues,” in Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, 52–58. 97
Forte, “The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy,” 239–49.
98
Forte, “The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy,” 239.
On Manicintana see Antonino Forte, “The Activities in China of the Tantric Master Manicintana (Pao-ssu-wei: ?–721 c.e.) from Kashmir and of his Northern Indian Collaborators,” East and West 34 (1984): 301–45. 99
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focus on this verdict, Forte has shown how what changed between 712 and 730 was not the text or the members of the committee, but rather the ideology of orthodoxy, or perhaps more speci³cally the status of the San-chieh within that ideology. That is, prior to Hsüan-tsung’s proscription of the Inexhaustible Storehouse the San-chieh was powerful and inµuential—thus enabling Shih-li to sponsor the Dharma Mirror Sutra and have it accepted into the of³cial canon. After Hsüan-tsung’s actions, however, and in light of the Ta chou lu’s judgement of San-chieh materials, Chih-sheng had to be sure that this San-chieh text was clearly and unequivocally excised from the canon. Related to this “particularization” of the notion of orthodoxy, of course, are the connections between some members of the committee and the failed plot to assassinate the emperor. That is, in addition to Hsüeh Chi’s involvement noted above, another member of the committee, Ts’ui Shih, also participated in the conspiracy to poison the new Emperor Hsüan-tsung and also committed suicide in 713. As Forte has reasoned, “If Shih-li was closely associated with certain members of that conspiracy, it would not be surprising for Hsüan-tsung to take action against Shih-li and his sect once he had consolidated his power.”100 We can thus understand the suppression of the Inexhaustible Storehouse and the exclusion of their texts from the of³cial canon as the products of speci³c historical situations involving speci³c (and changing) notions of orthodoxy and legitimacy, themselves dependent more on palace intrigue than on religion or doctrinal issues. After these suppressions we can ³nd no more records that directly link the Hua-tu ssu and the Inexhaustible Storehouse. There is, nonetheless, continued evidence of the popularity of the San-chieh and the importance of the Hua-tu ssu, as well as the continued presence of a “San-chieh yüan” within the Hua-tu ssu. The Pao k’e ts’ung pien, for example, lists stone pillar carvings of the Tsun sheng t’o lo ni ching ¨§¼øÍ÷ done in 801 and in 842 at the “San-chieh yüan of the Hua-tu ssu.”101 That the Hua-tu ssu continued to be an important temple in Ch’ang-an is also evident from the fact that ceremonies and lectures were held there during the reign of T’ai-tsung (763–779) that involved the famous monk Amoghavajra;102 that the emperor donated a golden name tablet to the temple ca. 825 without feeling the need to change the name of the temple in spite of its close association with the San-chieh;103 that memorial steles for Hsin-hsing continued to be erected during the 100
Forte, “The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy,” 246.
Pao k’e ts’ung pien, chüan 7, 32–33 and chüan 7, 36; the Tsun sheng t’o lo ni ching ¨§¼øÍ÷ probably corresponds to the Fo ting tsun sheng t’o lo ni ching M™¨§¼øÍ÷, Taishõ #967 and #971, translated in 683 and 710, respectively. 101
102
T #2120, 52.834c–835a; T #2120, 52.835c; T #2120, 52.841b–c.
103
Ch’ang-an chih, chüan 10, p. 9.
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eighth and early ninth centuries;104 that the San-chieh texts were once again included within the of³cial canon in Yüan-chao’s catalogue of 800, the Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu;105 and that the Hua-tu ssu was one of the ³rst temples restored after the general persecution of Buddhism in 845 (renamed the Ch’ung fu ssu ‡S±).106 The Tun-huang collections also contain ninth- and tenth-century manuscript copies of the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Ch’i chieh fo ming ̉Me), an important San-chieh liturgical manual (see chapter 1),107 and San-chieh texts continued to be copied as part of the of³cial Buddhist canon in Japan through the twelfth century.108 All this speaks of the great inµuence of the San-chieh throughout almost the entirety of the T’ang period as well as of the support it received from the highest levels of society, which in turn belies the narrative of the San-chieh as a form of popular Buddhism that ran afoul of the authorities because of its doctrine of decline or the implications of that teaching for the authority of the Buddhist canon. It also means that, rather than having been ³nally stamped out of existence because of any one edict or a cataloger’s branding Hsin-hsing’s writings heretical and banishing them to the spurious section of the canon, the San-chieh teachings and institutions are better described as slowly disappearing from the scene. Hence the “rise and fall of a Chinese heresy” of the subtitle to this book might better be cast as the “the rise and slow fade of a Buddhist community.” As Nishimoto has suggested, their eventual demise might just as well be a result of the cult of the founder that grew up around Hsin-hsing at an early date and the attendant lack of attention to lineage successions,109 in other words, a failure to routinize the charisma of the founder in successive generations.
Summary The teaching of the Three Levels, begun by Hsin-hsing in the years immediately prior to the Sui dynasty, their texts, practices, and institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse were the target of ³ve separate edicts aimed at eliminating them. The ³rst, during the reign of Sui Wen Ti in the year 600, 104 Two memorials were composed by Yüan-chao; cf. Hubbard, “Chinese Reliquary Inscriptions,” 265–66. 105
Cf. Hubbard, “Salvation in the Final Period of the Dharma,” 180–88.
106
Chiu T’ang shu, Liu Hsü, ed., 80b.
107
Hirokawa, “Tonkõ shutsudo,” 76–77.
108
See Hubbard, “The Teaching of the Three Levels.”
109
Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 116–21.
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simply states that the circulation of their texts was prohibited and a warning about their ideas was issued. The next two suppressions, almost a full century later, took place during the reign of Empress Wu, who was also a supporter of their Inexhaustible Storehouse. The ³rst, in 695, declared that the Sanchieh doctrines are heresies, opposed to the Buddha’s teaching, and the second, four years later, prohibited practices other than begging, fasting, holding the precepts, and meditation and reiterated their exclusion from the canon. The ³nal two edicts were issued under the reign of Hsüan-tsung, and they dismantled the Inexhaustible Storehouse in 721 because of fraudulent practices and in 725 eliminated the separate dwelling of San-chieh followers and ordered their texts destroyed. Between the various suppressions there are records indicating the continued popularity of the San-chieh, even after the edicts of Hsüan-tsung and perhaps continuing as late as the tenth century. What, then, of the idea that it was the emphasis on the decline of the dharma or the espousal of its remedy, the Universal Dharma, that caused the suppressions? First of all, we need to keep in mind the simple fact that neither the decline doctrine nor the Universal Dharma is mentioned in any of the edicts. Secondly, what we do ³nd in the historical record is a great variety of actions taken against the San-chieh community—sometimes texts are targeted, sometimes practices, and yet in other cases institutions are the target. Sometimes there seems to be an attempt to destroy the movement, other times to curb their spread, and other times simply to bring them in line. The situation of the protagonists likewise varied considerably—from the Buddhist rulers at the beginning of the Sui to Taoist rulers in the middle of the T’ang. To put it simply, the great variety of factors evidenced in the historical record combined with the lack of any direct reference to the doctrine of decline or any other speci³c doctrine makes it dif³cult to reduce the actions taken against the San-chieh community to any single cause, and certainly not to a single doctrine. Indeed, I do not think that all of the actions taken against the San-chieh communities are even best described by the singular term “suppression,” and would prefer to see developed a more nuanced taxonomy that would allow this diversity to be highlighted. On a more theoretical level, I simply do not think that the suppressions of the San-chieh can be attributed to their doctrinal stance because, in the ³rst place, the doctrine of decline and the “one-way” exclusivity of the associated teachings “relevant to the times” were also propounded by numerous others, as we have seen in chapter 3. As I have argued, the very origins of the doctrine of decline are to be found in a concern for an orthodoxy of dharma (saddharma) in the face of increasing diversity of dharma, and so too all scriptural hermeneutics (p’an chiao) of Hsin-hsing’s time were implicitly if not explicitly critical of other systems—p’an chiao includes, after all,
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“judgement” of the teachings within its scope. When all is said and done, the San-chieh doctrine of Universal Dharma is simply one more p’an chiao, one more way of grading the teachings so that one’s own teachings come out on top. For all of their posturing about the inability of the dharma to save and the like, the San-chieh teachers still did teach dharma—why would a ruler be any more worried about their claims to doctrinal supremacy than those of the myriad others claiming a similarly exclusive grasp of the “truth”? Although the level or even the content of their rhetoric might have been a contributing factor, it cannot be adduced as the sole or underlying cause of the suppressions. Stanley Weinstein has argued “[the fact] that each of these schools [T’ient’ai, Fa-hsiang, and Hua-yen] came to the forefront among the Buddhist elite at the time that it did was attributable not so much to the momentum of its own inner doctrinal development as to the close connection that existed between the de facto founder of the school and the imperial family.… The philosophical schools were not formulated by monks who were immured in remote monasteries, but rather reµected, to a considerable degree … the political needs of their imperial patrons.”110 Although this close connection between doctrine and politics meant that the favored school changed several times over the Sui-T’ang period, never did it mean that the out-of-favor school was suppressed. That is, doctrine, so closely linked to imperial patrons, was not enough in and of itself to warrant action against the sect that held any particular doctrine not in favor at the moment. The theologically sectarian nature of Buddhist doctrinal systems did not call down the wrath of the rulers. The imperial patron of the Hua-yen teachings did not feel compelled to suppress the T’ien-t’ai school, which put its own teachings atop those of the Hua-yen in the p’an chiao heap. Without denying that Buddhist ideas are as much ideology as theology, and perhaps contrary to the wishes of Buddhists themselves, Buddhist rulers do not seem to have often felt their power threatened by subtle points of Buddhist doctrine. Related to this, too, is the fact that in every case there is evidence of the continued existence and even support of San-chieh institutions at the highest levels, militating against accepting a singular cause for all of the suppressions. On the other hand, I think that the danger of being close to power is clearly demonstrated in the ³rst suppression of the Three Levels movement immediately following the downfall of their powerful patron as well as their treatment under the rule of Empress Wu and Emperor Hsüantsung. We need to remember that, in spite of the mass popularity of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, Hsin-hsing and the community that he founded were supported at every turn by the highest levels of the elite—indeed, even 110
Weinstein, “Imperial Patronage in T’ang Buddhism,” p. 305.
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the Inexhaustible Storehouse was patronized by “men and women of good society” and Empress Wu. In other words, I think that we can turn Weinstein’s observations about the rise of particular schools to understanding the demise of the San-chieh movement: the fact that the San-chieh teachings fell from favor among the elite and were eventually banned was attributable not so much to the momentum of its own inner doctrinal development as to the close connection that existed between the highly placed followers of the school and the imperial family. Finally, the notion that the “on-again, off-again” nature of the suppressions is due to the “strong Buddhist patronage” of a given reign is simply insupportable. First of all, we have to remember that in the case of Sui Wen Ti and Empress Wu both rulers initially supported Hsin-hsing or the Sanchieh institutions. What made them change their minds? To my knowledge nothing in Hsin-hsing’s teachings changed between 589, the time that he received an imperial invitation to Ch’ang-an, and 600, the year that his teachings were banned. Secondly, as I mentioned, it is hard to characterize the reign of Hsüan-tsung as ardently pro-Buddhist—as with most of the T’ang rulers, his preference was for Taoism. On the other hand, it has been clearly shown by many scholars that imperial patronage of Buddhism by Sui Wen Ti and Empress Wu was part of a larger pattern of legitimation that in every case utilized elements of Confucianism and Taoism as well as of Buddhism. In the case of Empress Wu, for example, Guisso has written that “the inµuence of Buddhism in Wu’s legitimation was … not negligible but neither was it predominant.”111 This is especially true in the year of her ³rst suppression of the San-chieh (695), when, after the burning of the Mingt’ang, she responded to the hostile atmosphere by turning to an increased support of Confucian symbols (in 695 she dropped the title of Maitreya, among other things).112 Thus the religious preferences of the ruler seem an unlikely cause of their ire. What do I have to offer in place of the rich fare of religious doctrine as political power? Unfortunately little—the thin taste of the historical record is not overly satisfying. Although I do believe that what is doctrine for a Buddhist monk may simultaneously constitute ideology for monk and ruler alike, I also believe that we need to look at actual and discrete historical events rather than doctrinal/ideological issues if we wish to ³nd the causes of the suppressions of the San-chieh—events such as the loss of rank of the important San-chieh patron Kao Chiung, the involvement of San-chieh followers in uprisings against Empress Wu and Hsüan-tsung, fraudulent 111 Guisso, R. W. L., Wu Tse-t’ien and the Politics of Legitimation in T’ang China (Bellingham: Western Washington University, 1978), 68. 112
Forte, Mingtang, 254–55; Twitchett, Cambridge History, vol. 3, part 1, 312–33.
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accounting practices, their “separatist” institutional base, and the like. Such isolated yet important events are more likely causes of imperial action than disputes over the correct interpretation of the Buddha-dharma. Needless to say, such an approach will not satisfy the urge for a neat, allinclusive answer to the question of “why.” Worse still, the details that would give us solid information about the circumstances of the suppressions are more than likely lost forever. On the other hand, this approach avoids the trap of historical reductionism, which, as in this case, tends to create more problems of interpretation than it solves. I also believe that concentrating on their teaching of decline or Universal Dharma as the sole cause of their proscription—in spite of their never having been so labeled in any source— gives the notion of “the orthodox” a uniformity and constancy that it does not in fact possess. Finally, it has served to focus attention on the uniqueness of Hsin-hsing’s teachings, a uniqueness that fades rather quickly when those teachings and practices are put into context. In sum, the suppressions of Hsin-hsing’s teachings and practices were born of discrete historical and political situations unrelated to doctrinal issues or the intent to abrogate the authority of church or state. The sustained popularity of the movement between the suppressions and its lingering presence into the ninth and tenth centuries indicates that even the eventual demise of Hsin-hsing’s teachings should be sought outside the singular effect of the proscriptions. With this as background, then, let me turn in the ³nal chapter to asking larger questions of the meaning of the study of the Sanchieh movement.
9. Time, Transcendence, and Heresy
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hat, then, do we make of Hsin-hsing’s teachings, his community, and the institution of the Inexhaustible Storehouse? Are they heretical? Are they as unique and different as usually thought? The ³rst thing that occurs to me is precisely how well they ³t the general tenor of the times: the belief in the lowered capacity of sentient beings, the need for new doctrines and practices appropriate to those sentient beings, the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature, and the holistic vision of the Hua-yen Sutra all were widely shared among his contemporaries. So, too, the scriptures on which Hsinhsing relied: the Lotus Sutra, the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, the Hua-yen Sutra, Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra, Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, and the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching; these were among the most widely quoted scriptures of the day. Likewise, Hsin-hsing’s emphasis on the precepts, dhðta practice, cultivation of dhyana and samadhi through seated meditation, repentance rites, and buddhan„ma liturgies are all representative of, not exceptions to, the monastic regimen of Chinese Buddhism from the sixth century onwards. The same can be said of what little we know of their institutional organization; from the apparent involvement of lay precept groups to the social welfare activity of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, all ³ts in well with the trends of the times. Indeed, even Hsin-hsing’s urge to create a unique organization of grading the teachings and practices ³ts in well with the drive to organize the Buddha-dharma that was so typical of the Sui and T’ang in the form of p’an chiao systems. One conclusion, then, might be that Hsin-hsing and the Sanchieh movement are better studied as representative of sixth-century Chinese Buddhism than as a deviant or heretical movement. To put it in a contemporary idiom, just as the study of new religious movements often reveals that the various elements of doctrine and practice that constitute the movement are not, in fact, new, so Hsin-hsing and the community he founded turn out to be more representative than novel and more normative than radical or unique. Yet, given the undeniable fact of their suppression, another conclusion might well be that demonstrated by Forte, that is to say, that while the fortunes of the Three Levels movement well demonstrate the importance of orthodoxy in Chinese Buddhism, they also illustrate the capricious and relative nature of that orthodoxy. 223
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These are both reasonable conclusions to draw and perhaps I would do well to stop here. Still, in this ³nal chapter I would like to step back and address Hsin-hsing’s doctrines in a wider context—a foolishly wider context—in order to ask if there are any lessons to be learned from the study of Hsin-hsing’s teachings that might perhaps be applicable to contemporary issues and problems in religious thought. In addition to a personal interest in trying to ³nd some contemporary relevance for my efforts, I do this for two reasons. First of all, I wish to address more theoretically the persistent tendency to see the Three Levels as an apocalyptic or millennial movement whose bellicose doomsday scenario naturally incurred the wrath of the authorities; this is of particular interest as I write this on the eve of the millennium, and Chinese authorities round up more and more religious groups accused of just such seditious practices (as do their American counterparts). Secondly, I wish also to return to the issue of the rhetorical nature of Hsinhsing’s doctrine of the “Universal Dharma” that I raised in part two. So, in this conclusion I will examine the San-chieh use of the doctrine of the decline of the dharma in the context of Buddhist thinking about (a) time and history and (b) interpretive strategies: that is, on the one hand as a sort of eschatological thinking and on the other hand as the hermeneutic principle underlying Hsin-hsing’s evaluation of scripture and propounding of the “Universal Dharma” appropriate for that eschatology. To begin with the question of Buddhist thinking about time, perhaps the most common interpretation of the tradition of the decline of the teachings is that it represents a sort of Buddhist eschatology and is, with quali³cation, similar to eschatological thinking in the Judeo-Christian traditions.1 Hsinhsing’s teachings are often mentioned as examples of this sort of Buddhist eschatology. To attempt, then, to place the San-chieh movement into such an interpretive framework is especially germane given the frequent appearance of apocalyptic and messianic movements in Chinese religious history, the of³cial persecution that Hsin-hsing, his teachings, and his institutions 1 The literature on eschatology and apocalypticism is, needless to say, vast. Among others I have consulted O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse; Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (London: Secker and Warburg, 1974); the various articles in Paul D. Hanson, Visionaries and Their Apocalypses (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); John Hanson and Richard Horsley, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity (New York: Crossroad, 1984); Ithamar Gruenwald, “Apocalypse: Jewish Apocalypticism to the Rabbinic Period,” in Encyclopedia of Religion 1: 336–42; R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, “Eschatology,” in Encyclopedia of Religion 5: 148–51; Thomas Altizer, Oriental Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961); and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Theology of Altizer: Critique and Response (Philadelphia: Westminster Press: 1970).
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faced during the course of their history, and the regular linking of that persecution to his advocacy of the ³nal period of the dharma (mo fa) and its social/political implications. The primary eschatological elements noted in this comparison are, of course, a sense of linear time and its ful³llment, usually in a world renewal or dawning of a new age in this world. In this vein, a comparison to the apocalyptic and messianic aspects of eschatological thinking is not uncommon, and among the usual features of these systems we can count the following: 1. a linear sense of time in which events take place only once and have singular value; 2. a strong periodization of that linear time, usually 3. divinely ordained and leading to 4. a ³nal moment in which a new age is established, typically after 5. the destruction of a thoroughly evil world; 6. the presence of messengers (e.g., angels) that convey the divine will, interpret omens, impart visions, and the like, signaling a familiar relationship between the deity and 7. a group of followers that safeguards this revelation and prepares for the end/new beginning and 8. will uniquely enjoy the splendors and glories of the new world; this elect group is 9. typically comprised of the disenfranchised and marginal, and 10. is formed in a time of crisis and/or social dislocation caused by war, rapid social, industrial, or technological change, or contact between radically disparate cultures; 11. the group typically draws upon a “subterranean spring of symbolic resources” usually in the form of a “textually embodied community of discourse founded in the accepted canon and occasionally augmented by the production of new revelations and interpretive strategies”;2 12. usually, but not always, the elect group engages in strong and vigorous preaching about the evils of the current world and 13. predicts the appearance of the savior who will usher in the new age; this in turn leads to 14. a separation or isolation from mainstream society in a new society following its own moral ideal and oftentimes strict rules, frequently followed by 15. conµict and a clash with the dominant authority that 16. attempts to eliminate the movement; ³nally, 17. all of this can continue long after the initial impulse has vanished (or been vanquished), the various elements reµexively coming to form part of an 2
O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse, 10, 31.
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ever-evolving “tradition” of symbolic and textual resources deployed by later individuals and movements, often entirely unrelated to the originators.
Of course, all these elements are not necessarily present in a single group and any one element can have numerous variations, and so this list indicates possibilities of shifting patterns rather than ³xed or necessary categories. How does the San-chieh movement ³t into such a discussion? Can it be called messianic or apocalyptic in a broad, comparative sense? What features does it share with other apocalyptic movements in Chinese history? Could such teachings be responsible for their suppression? Related to these questions is the larger question of how their use of the decline tradition reµects a concern for speci³c historical events. That is, the Chinese Buddhist traditions are often said to have a more developed historical and historiographical focus than their Indian counterparts, yet I have argued that the three levels are related to capacity rather than temporal periods—what does this tell us about the role of their eschatology in the development of a Buddhist historical consciousness?
Millennial or Apocalyptic? To begin with the question of whether or not the San-chieh represents a form of apocalyptic or messianic movement similar to either indigenous Chinese movements or other such movements that have appeared throughout the world, the answer would have to be no. To be sure, certain features of these movements are found in Hsin-hsing’s teaching and community—things such as the importance of an eschatological discourse rooted in a shared textual tradition and the literary forms of that tradition, certain aspects of communal life and charitable practice, a kind of egalitarianism in the teaching of the Universal Buddha, and especially the exhortation to a moral and nearly ascetic lifestyle. Still, these things are not exclusively features of messianic or millennial movements, and most are part of the broad mainstream of Chinese Buddhism from Chih-i in the South to Hsin-hsing in the North. So, too, many of the more signi³cant features of messianic and apocalyptic movements seem to be lacking in Hsin-hsing’s movement. As seen in both their institutional participation and sponsorship, for example, they appealed to powerful patrons as well as to the poor bene³ciaries of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, to the orthodox monastic practitioner as well as to the precept-holding laity, and cannot be said to have been dominated by disadvantaged or marginalized population groups. Although we can de³nitely see elements of a cult of the founder in the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, this is still a far cry from the ideology of a savior, a messiah, or god who will either personally initiate the new age or come to rule after his
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followers prepare the way. Similarly, although their institutional practice of living in separate quarters bespeaks some separatist tendencies, this seems at least as related to a common Buddhist ethos of communal and liturgical practice as to an ideology of themselves as the special elect or chosen few whose relationship to the savior guarantees both their survival as well as their power and glory in the new age to come. Indeed, the doctrines and practices of “recognizing evil” and “universal respect” would seem to be diametrically opposed to the notion of a privileged elect that would raise the banner of truth and justice and carry the struggle to society in order to purge it of its evil. Perhaps for this same reason there are no records directly linking Hsin-hsing and his followers with revolution, revolt, or other social disturbances.3 Another signi³cant difference between the San-chieh and most messianic and millennial movements is the overall lack of importance attached to temporal or chronological boundaries, the end of time, and the coming of a new age. As I have argued, for example, once we realize that their three levels are not tied to the three periods of the dharma or to the incipient doctrine of mo fa it also becomes clear that they did not attach very much importance to a signi³cant segmentation of history. Although they made some use of the various timetables of the dharma’s decline available to them, that use was both inconsistent and lacked any impetus to chronological organization— the organizing features of the three levels being rather capacity and the teachings appropriate to capacity. Finally, and most importantly, Hsinhsing’s writings betray no expectation whatsoever of a utopian outcome to their situation, whether in the immediate present or distant future—indeed, it seems that even the promise of the Western Pure Land was largely absent in his teaching. Likewise he had no sense of an impending end to history. Hence, too, inasmuch as the level is a level of capacity rather than a period of time, there is no duration given for the third level but rather never-ending lists of the evils of the third grade of sentient being. Lacking both a prophetic end of time and the declared imminence of a “new beginning,” it was the teaching of the third-level capacity of sentient beings that drove the Sanchieh movement and thus they never made the move to a genuine apocalypticism, that is, prophetically or otherwise offering the chronological and logistic details of the impending end of time or the dawn of a new age. If, then, the San-chieh movement cannot easily be linked to the more typically millennial, messianic, or apocalyptic currents in either a comparative 3 As noted in chapter 8, one possible San-chieh follower, the prince Li Chen, was involved in a revolt against Empress Wu; to the best of my knowledge, however, neither San-chieh teachings nor apocalyptic ideology were cause for his revolt and this connection was never mentioned in any record dealing with the San-chieh community.
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or Chinese context, does it nonetheless ³t into a more general eschatological framework? That is, did the use of the decline motif provide a framework in which historical events and context have a signi³cant, if not fully messianic or apocalyptic, meaning in the overall context of their teachings and practices? Again, although such speculation is perhaps so general as to be presumptuous, given the regular linkage of mo fa, historical awareness, and the suppressions of the San-chieh movement, some attention to this question is in order. Let me begin, then, with some brief comments on the most important feature of eschatological thinking, linear versus cyclical time.
The Three Levels and Buddhist Eschatology: linear and cyclical time Long-held assumptions dictate a fundamental difference between Western and Eastern Asian notions of time and history: whereas the former are linear and ³nite, giving human history a particularistic reality and even urgency, the latter are cyclical and in³nite, rendering human history, and hence human action—ethical action—within that history inconsequential. The Judaic messianic tradition and its Christian recon³guration as eschatological promise/ful³llment are taken as superb examples of the linear orientation, premised as they are on one-time events that erupt into human history and change it (or end it) forever, teleologically and inevitably moving to a ³nal perfection.4 This eschatological promise of ³nal perfection is contrasted with a cyclical Indic cosmogony that renders the notion of a ³nal end to world history meaningless, lost to the greater signi³cance of cosmic repetition. In this vision there is no ³nal end to history, no world telos, and, therefore, ultimately no progress at all. We should note that it is the fate of humanity qua society that is seen to be at stake here, with the Western, linear vision of time functioning as a theodicy that, based upon the belief in a perfected and ³nal future, engenders as well the speci³cs of a forward-moving and historically speci³c soteriology through which it may be or must be effected. More importantly for our purposes, however, is the ethical importance attached to human action in such a “one chance only” view of history, an emphasis that is lacking in a transcendent or existential view of time. Thomas Altizer, for example, has been one of the strongest advocates of the need for a historical reading of Judeo/Christian eschatology, for in a spiritualization of the revolutionary impulse of that view of time “Jesus is detached In a recent work, Norman Cohn has argued for the Zoroastrian origins of this innovation in cosmic/temporal thinking; see Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos, and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 4
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from history and viewed as an ‘existential’ Word” and thereby “faith ceases to be rebellion and becomes, instead, either escape or submission,” whereas “genuine Christian existence must be directed to a rebellious attack upon the ‘realities’ of profane existence, and it is to just this attack that Jesus’ ethical message calls the disciple.”5
The Eternal Return Buddhism, on the other hand, is seen as transcendent and suprahistorical. Heinrich Zimmer characterized the Indic approach decades ago as exactly individual and transcendent rather than social and historical, leading to a “fundamentally skeptical attitude toward social progress.” He writes: This viewpoint [of world history] from on high is not to be shared by the chorus of actors, by the gods and demons, engrossed by their roles, but is achieved through the supreme aloofness of the ascetic renunciation of Šiva, and through his attitude of spiritual indifference. To reach this perfection of his, is, among men, a privilege reserved for single, outstanding individuals, saints, ascetics, and yogin, who transcend the M„y„ of phenomenal existence by their own efforts; but the world-process as a whole is not meant for a gradual progress toward perfection. It is the peculiar glory of Western idealism, with Christianity broadening into progressive humanitarianism, to have conceived such a goal, and to foster an ardent faith which embarks again and again, after each setback, on its quest for collective perfection.6
Perhaps the best-known proponent of this contrast has been Mircea Eliade, whose comparative studies of cosmogony and eschatology led to his elaboration of the “Eternal Return,” a primitive view of time and history characterized by cyclical accounts of the countless beginnings and ends of world time. To these “countless beginnings and ends” he contrasts an “innovation of the ³rst importance,” the Judeo-Christian doctrine of a singular beginning, linear progression, and a triumphal endtime that represents the forsaking of “the circular Time of the Eternal Return [to] become a linear and irreversible Time … [that] also represents the triumph of a Sacred History.”7 On ³rst reading one is tempted to simply identify the many nineteenthand early twentieth-century Eurocentric constructions that inform this 5
Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, 102, 110–11.
Henry R. Zimmer, “The Hindu View of World History According to the Pur„«as,” The Review of Religion, 6/3 (1942), 168. 6
7
Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 64–65.
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understanding, including an evolutionary or teleological view of history/ humankind with Christianity the developmental highpoint, an historical positivism or realism, and a somewhat facile Weberesque view of the “East” as embodying an otherworldy form of asceticism that precludes ³nding meaning or value in worldly participation and social development. Still, and in spite of the many alternative readings that have been offered of this generalization (e.g., the myth of eternal return breeds equanimity and optimism not resignation and despair, Judeo-Christian eschatological thinking has also “suffered” a transcendental inversion, the postmodern West is likewise freed from historical positivism and linear history, etc.), by and large the general scheme of linear time and world-historical eschaton versus a cyclic cosmos and transcendent, ahistorical salvation, with its various nuances, has been upheld.8 Altizer, for example, one of the few Christian theologians to give Buddhist eschatological thinking serious and sympathetic consideration, concluded that even the Zen negation of “Buddhist trancendentalism … [that] fully parallels the radical Christian negation of transcendence” represents “a form of ‘apocalypticism’ in which nothing actually happens, in which there is neither world- nor self-transformation.”9 Similarly, the Buddhologist Roger Corless has written that history is an academic discipline that has developed in the western hemisphere. The western hemisphere has been strongly inµuenced by the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) and their conception of time as something created by God in and through which God manifests himself. On this view, time is meaningful. It has a beginning and an end, and the end is a goal, so that there is development, a progressive achievement of the goal.… History as a secular discipline has many of the features of the Abrahamic tradition’s view of time;… the assumption that time is meaningful and that development is real does not seem to have been given up by even the most radical critics of the philosophy of history. Buddhism, on the other hand, sees things as changing over time, but it does not see things as becoming more meaningful as they change. Change, for Buddhism, is a primary characteristic of cyclic existence (samsara), and history is just a lot of change. All that we can say about history, Buddhistically, is that as time goes on we get more of it.10
Buddhism is thus likewise seen to be concerned with individual liberation to a timeless truth in which sequential time is overshadowed by cyclical 8 Winston King, “Eschatology: Christian and Buddhist,” Religion 16 (1985), 177, 181; O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse, 29–30. 9 Thomas Altizer, “Response to Winston L. King’s ‘Zen and the Death of God’,” in Cobb, The Theology of Altizer, 229–30. 10
Roger Corless, The Vision of Buddhism (New York: Paragon House, 1989), xix.
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recurrence and the historical past by the predicted future appearance of the Buddha Maitreya, whose appearance is yet so many billions of aeons in the future as to render it meaningless in terms of current events. Thus Buddhists, following the cyclical model and lacking a world-historical eschaton, are seen to de³ne the end of all things not as a consummation of world history but rather as individual liberation from it, as with Zimmer’s Šiva. Winston King, for example, sums up this attitude in comparison with the “world-shattering events” of Western eschatologies, noting that Buddhism points to the individual-existential situation as being more truly eschatological, i.e., as having to do with the truly ultimate [Nibb„na].… Nibb„na was essentially non- or super-historical, available limitedly in even the worst ages.… It has essentially nothing to do with historical events but is human being face to face with Ultimate Ineffable Being, a state that fully and ³nally transcends historical and cosmic event[s] and individual life and death.11
Specific Time in Buddhist History Leaving aside for the moment the validity of the overall generalization as well as the prescriptive evaluation of Zimmer and Eliade, we can of course ³nd any number of traditions, persons, and historiographies within Buddhism that would seem to present, at the very least, minor counterpoints of concern for speci³c and social historicism to the overall theme of recurrence and individual transcendence, if not a fully world-historical eschaton. The apocalypticism of the K„lacakra (“Wheel of Time”), the historiography of Jien’s Gukanshõ, the dispensationalism inherent in the “Three Turnings of the Wheel,” the various Buddhist national narratives, and other examples may be cited in this regard. Another such counterpoint that is frequently cited is the Buddhist tradition of the decline and/or demise of its own teaching, a tradition often considered to parallel Judeo-Christian eschatological thinking. As seen in part 2, the stories that relate these traditions, most of which are patently ex post facto descriptions of actual events cast in the form of prophecies, evince a strong concern for speci³c history, linear timetables, the location of historical ³gures within those linear chronologies (usually equally much a means of locating oneself within the same chronologies), and, most conspicuously, a great concern for the temporal relationship between the present time and the past time of the historical Buddha. Thus Jan Nattier argued that, at least in these traditions, “the question of ‘what time it is’ has mattered, and at times has mattered very much, to a 11
King, ”Eschatology,” 182.
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substantial proportion of Buddhist believers.”12 Does Hsin-hsing’s use of the decline motif match this description? Did time matter to him? And, by extension, can his ideas be considered an example of Buddhist eschatological thinking?
“Level” Means “Capacity” To answer this question, we must ³rst of all remember that even in its most basic semantic meaning the decline of the dharma is not, of course, synonymous with Judeo-Christian eschatology—the latter refers to the doctrine of the end whereas the former refers to the end of the doctrine (fa mieh or mo fa). And, as we have seen, the discussion of the end of the dharma begins with the passing of the historical Buddha whereas the roots of Judeo/Christian eschatology are rather more diffuse. Hence, if we are to use the term in the Buddhist case we should keep in mind that, as Hubert Durt writes, Buddhist “eschatology starts with the extinction (parinirv„«a) of the Buddha.”13 Secondly, I have argued that the original production of the decline tradition was occasioned by a concern for orthodoxy in the face of an everincreasing doctrinal diversity within the Buddhist community. Although that in itself is an indication of a historical awareness of sorts (“things are different now from what they once were”) and these traditions often made use of timetables of decline, still, it would be hard to say that chronology, historical veracity, or the signi³cance of time qua history is the issue at stake. The real point, I have argued, was rather to maintain the true teachings in perpetuity; with but rare exceptions even the predictions of the complete destruction of the dharma contained an exhortation to its proper preservation. It was a polemic or rhetoric of orthodoxy, a point to which I will return below. The ³rst point, then, to note regarding the San-chieh use of the decline rhetoric is that it, too, was not primarily concerned with time per se, its passage, or its signi³cance. I have argued that the meaning of san chieh X‰ is not three periods or chronological stages in the devolution or disappearance of the teachings but rather three levels or grades of endowment, ability, or capacity to correctly understand the teachings. The decline was understood as a degeneration or disappearance of capacity, not of the teachings and much less of “time.” This itself marks a signi³cant change from the original strata of the decline motif, in which it really was the teachings that were said 12
Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time, 141.
13
Durt, Problems of Chronology and Eschatology, 41.
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to be in danger of extinction; as time passed, however, and the predicted era arrived, not only did the timetable for the demise of the teachings get extended (not unusual for failed prophecy) but the basic thrust changed— the teachings remained, but attainment ceased. 14 If, as I have suggested, beings of different levels could coexist at the same time (and clearly Hsinhsing taught that different capacities intermingled in the monastery), then “level” would perhaps be closer, at least conceptually, to “nature” or even, perhaps, gotra—as implied when the San chieh fo fa declares all sentient beings of the third level to be icchantika who have severed all virtuous roots.15 Because the three levels or grades of capacity are unrelated to the three periods of the dharma, the third level denotes not a “³nal” period or time of the teachings but a deplorable lack of capacity for correct views and actions. Beings of the third level capacity were thus characterized by their inability to maintain the precepts and their adherence to the extreme views of essential existence and ruinous nihilism. This was not presented as an unfortunate state of affairs wrought by the passage of time but rather as the intrinsic characteristic of sentient beings, the very nature or de³ning trait of the third-level capacity. It is perhaps for this reason that Hsin-hsing’s writings contain virtually no discussion of contemporary events, including the massive persecution of the Buddhist church in 574 that he must have personally experienced. This is not in any way to deny the importance of the historical context, the sitz im leben, in stimulating Hsin-hsing to see sentient beings as devoid of capacity for religious practice—there is no question but that he was heir to the eschatological and even apocalyptic mood of sixth-century China. I want to argue more simply that his insight drove him to think not about time and history but about human nature—and for Hsin-hsing that human nature was fatally corrupt. Hsin-hsing taught that this decayed nature was an existential reality with which sentient beings must contend. Because this was not primarily a temporal issue, then, there is no eschaton presented in the San-chieh literature, no culmination of time that provides a gateway to a new beginning or new age, no culminating moment of history—just the inescapable fact of depravity with no end in sight. Similarly, there is no talk of decisive historical beginnings, ends, or events—in Hsin-hsing’s writings our karmic situation is rather described in terms of the “beginingless past.” Since San-chieh literature lacks a great interest in historical events, linear time, and its climactic end, I therefore ³nd it dif³cult to say that Hsin-hsing’s teaching of the three levels should be seen as eschatological in the sense of referring to the end of time. I also cannot ³nd myself agreeing that he was even much concerned 14
See chapter 2, 38.
15
San chieh fo fa, 257.
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with history or time in general, as either abstract categories or as conceptual tools for organizing and systematizing the received teachings. As we have seen, his use of the various timetables in the received scriptural tradition was loose and evinces no urgency to systematization. He might have known what time it was, but he didn’t really care. What he cared about was capacity—or rather the lack of capacity—for practice and realization. The organizing framework of his p’an chiao was not temporal division but capacity. It is in this, then, that I ³nd the signi³cance of Hsin-hsing’s teaching of the nil capacity of sentient beings, for it is a teaching that speaks to a fundamental intuition about human nature, an intuition of congenital failure, constitutive evil, or, in Christian terms, original sin. For Hsin-hsing it was a premise that living beings were unable to uphold monastic vows and too stupid to understand the scriptures; spiritually “blind from birth,” followers of the Buddha-dharma were hence utterly incapable of discerning the truth among the various teachings that his fellow monks squabbled about so incessantly. Existential rather than historical, and essential or constitutive of human experience rather than acquired and hence avoidable or alterable, Hsin-hsing’s view of the basic human condition as utterly bereft of virtue and necessarily inclined to perverted views of the Buddha’s teachings thus forms an important link in the development of this doctrine in East Asian Buddhism—perhaps, as I have suggested, directly inµuencing Tao-ch’o and Shan-tao in the development of their more radical estimation of human nature and their accordingly revised estimate of the reach of Amit„bha’s compassion to include even the “lowest of the low” in its scope. It is also signi³cant, I believe, that Hsin-hsing saw that basic problem not in terms of morality or adherence to the precepts but rather in terms of bias and attachment to perverted views. The doctrinal disputes of the famous masters, the wrangling over scriptural sources, and the grand system building of the national teachers—all of this Hsin-hsing took as evidence of our blindness, prejudice, and attachment to over-specialized teachings (pieh fa) rather than a sign of spiritual realization. It was this attachment to views rather than moral failure that Hsin-hsing took to be the source of our ills. Thus, too, there is not a contradiction in his rigorous demands to observe the precepts and monastic regimen while simultaneously decrying our inability to escape the evil of our perverted views. The widespread acceptance of such a radical pessimism is, to my understanding, unique to East Asian Buddhism and it is also fundamental to Japanese Pure Land thinking. Thus the Shinshð scholar Taitetsu Unno writes that Shinran “saw the particular evils of the age of mappõ as revealing the very ground of self-existence. For Shinran, evil, though particularized in the individual, forms the essence of humanity in samsara.… Mappõ was no longer a particular period of history but the fundamental reality of life itself,
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embracing all ages, past, present, and future.”16 So, too, the Kyoto School philosopher Tanabe Hajime discussed the radically evil nature of humanity as “the tenacity of egoity [that] can never be avoided in any act brought about directly by will,… [a] radical evil.”17 For Tanabe, then, this radical or essential evil is a “negative determination of our being itself that lies at the foundation of human existence in general.”18 Of course, the very nature of constitutive or foundational evil logically demands an “other” to effect salvation, for every good that a radically evil being might attempt will be tainted by de³nition. Hence, as with original sin, both Shinran and Tanabe require the saving power of an outside agent, something other than a wholly evil human agency. In the Pure Land tradition this wholly other agent of salvation is the dharmakaya, an a-historic, timeless, and transcendent truth represented, notably, by the Buddha of “Immeasurable Life.” For Hsin-hsing and his followers it is the power of the bodhisattva’s Inexhaustible Storehouse that is manifested in their midst and the in³nitely shared merit of the bodhisattva’s practice of d„na. Unlike the cenobitic ideal of the Indian monastic institution, such a community-centered understanding of salvation is not, of course, an unusual credo in Chinese religious thinking, for it is representative of Confucian social ideals and witnessed in numerous communitarian movements throughout Chinese history. It is as a part of a shift towards this understanding of human nature and our participation in a community of salvation, then, that I would locate the signi³cance of Hsinhsing’s teachings regarding the third level. Now, inasmuch as this shift represents a return to what Winston King referred to as the “more truly eschatological” concern for the transcendence of the “individual-existential situation,” a return to the “true” emphasis of the Buddhist tradition (as in Zimmer’s transcendent view of the Hindu tradition), it can also be seen as a private or individual eschatology that is severed from history, and thereby also severed from the apocalyptic and prophetic aspects of eschatology; if this is true, it is thereby also analogous to the transcendental inversion that Altizer has criticized in Christian eschatological thinking. Ironically, however, and in a fashion perhaps similar to that of the Christian recon³guration of Jewish messianic expectations regarding the realized Kingdom of God, precisely because of its severance from historical particularity this existential understanding possesses a theoretical universality and deep resonance with the human experience of evil 16
Taitetsu Unno, “Mappõ,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, 9, 185.
Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 1986), 188; see also Takeuchi Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism (New York: Crossroad, 1983) for another contemporary Shin-inspired reading of the decline of the dharma. 17
18
Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics, 4.
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that allows it to persist long beyond whatever crisis attended the historical moment of its birth. So it is that even today, when the social conditions in Japan could hardly be called chaotic and few people would ascribe to a literal cosmology of devolving world ages, the teaching of the decline and the Pure Land and Nichiren movements based on that doctrine remain vitally relevant to millions of followers.19 Hence, too, the “spiritual eschaton” of the third level did not, in fact, mean that opportunity for religious practice and development was closed off—quite the contrary: the existential dilemma of the third level opened the path up to include all sentient beings equally, from those who break the precepts and harbor false views on down to the insects and animals that reportedly attended Three Levels teachings. That the Three Levels was not an apocalyptic or millennial movement in the traditional sense also makes it dif³cult to see their advocacy of the decline doctrine as the cause for the sporadic hostility of the government. As Altizer noted in the case of the Christian spiritualization of the eschaton, in such an existential view of decay “faith ceases to be rebellion” against the “ ‘realities’ of profane existence,” and the practitioner concerned with inner decay, adherence to the precepts, and penitential liturgies, poses little threat to the state.
The Rhetoric of the Appropriate Teachings Although I ³nd the signi³cance of Hsin-hsing’s use of the decline motif to be his intuition of a pervasive and debilitating bias at the core of the human condition, the emphasis on correct teachings that was at the root of the early production of the trope of decline was not lost on him either. Thus the decline of human capacity led to his insistence that the teachings and practices be in accord with the capacity (tui ken ch’i hsing fa). The doctrinal background of this notion has, of course, a long history in the Buddhist tradition, including the notions of up„ya and anupubbikath„ discussed in It is perhaps equally ironic that it was the notion of periodic decline and ascent of both world ages and saviors found in the cosmological and Buddhological traditions, developing largely from astronomical speculation rather than historical context, that matured into a social eschatology directed towards this world—a social eschatology fully apocalyptic, messianic, and oriented towards the revolutionary establishment of an earthly utopia. As with the idea of a congenital decay of human capacity, these remain a distinction of East Asian traditions of decline to this day, and are also largely limited to East Asia; see the sources cited in chapter 2, note 6. The major exception to the East Asian provenance of these movements is, of course, found in the Kalacakra tradition, which, although it contains a vision of the apocalypse (the end of our era and world renewal), did not inspire mass movements as did Maitreya in East Asia. 19
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chapter 7. Though Hsin-hsing’s teaching of “practices in accord with the capacity” is clearly a variant of up„ya, the point of view is slightly different. That is, when up„ya is used as a means of doctrinal legitimization (in the Lotus Sutra, for example), it is used not to justify its own teaching as an up„ya but rather to explain away other teachings as examples of the Buddha’s skillful means. The Lotus Sutra never calls its own teachings up„ya—that is reserved for previous teachings, the teachings suitable for the immature beings of inferior capacity. Far from being up„ya, the teachings of the Lotus Sutra are deemed “subtle, pure, and peerless, with nothing superior in all the worlds.”20 The Universal Dharma of the Three Levels, on the other hand, is itself precisely the teaching in accord with the capacities of the inferior. Because the Chinese understood the future prophecy of decline to be a present reality, this switch in vantage point vis-à-vis up„ya might represent nothing more than the difference between the way that an idea is rhetorically deployed by its producers and the way that it must be used by later consumers. Hence the mechanics too have changed: it is not the literal claims to the status of buddhavacana nor its propositional truth value nor even the time of its teaching that gives the Universal Dharma its place in Hsin-hsing’s p’an chiao but rather the capacity of the sentient beings to whom it is taught. Still, the fundamental function of doctrinal legitimization remains the same—the doctrine of practices in accord with the capacity validates the Universal Dharma as the best dharma. Thus, Hsin-hsing’s teaching well reµects the tendency of his time, an inclination to doctrinal system building that can be termed “inclusive apologetics.” Although the fourfold Universal Buddha, the Universal Dharma, and the universal sangha of the third level seem to be an all-inclusive, positive, and af³rmative doctrine, we must remember that the corollary was that to take refuge in any other Buddha or teaching was to slander the dharma. Thus, too, although they advocated a blurring of the traditional boundaries between those who keep the precepts and those who break the precepts, they nonetheless built walls between themselves and others inside the monasteries in order to pursue their own con³guration of the path, including a strict adherence to the precepts. This sort of exclusivism (in the name of inclusivism), together with their insistence on the sole relevance of their doctrine of the Universal Dharma, is often cited as a major reason for the frequent suppressions that they incurred, yet perhaps it should be rather seen as more characteristic of Sui-T’ang Buddhism than unique to Hsin-hsing and the Three Levels movement—after all, who ever really argued the inferior nature of their teaching? In the end, while advocating a practical solution to the bifurcation of truth and phenomenal reality, the theoretical structure of that 20
T #262, 9.15a.
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solution remained typically particular and exclusive. Thus we return to the point made in chapter 2, that the apparent inclusivism of the “Universal Dharma” is in fact a rhetoric that is just as exclusivist as the so-called “particular dharma” (pieh fa) that it opposed. So, too, it is perfectly in keeping with the original intent of the decline trope, that is, arguing a particular version of the true dharma, the orthodoxy. Although this interpretation might not accord with popular Western notions of Buddhism as a non-dogmatic “philosophy of accommodation,” on the contrary it seems to me utterly incomprehensible to imagine that Buddhists were not interested in advocating, teaching, and preaching their understanding of the truth, particularly in light of the role of the “gift of the dharma” in the bodhisattva’s practice of compassion. Bodhisattvas are to be preachers of the dharma (dharmabh„«ika), preachers of the true dharma, for that, of course, is what conduces to the elimination of suffering. Throughout history and across cultures doctrinal competition has been both af³rmed as soteriologically relevant and energetically pursued. Other than being an interesting example of the Buddhist interpretive enterprise, does Hsin-hsing’s doctrinal assessment have any broader implications for Buddhist methods of textual interpretation or current problems in the study of religion? The issues involved in the study and interpretation of texts have always been an important part of both traditional Buddhist doctrine and practice as well as modern Buddhist studies. In recent years, many of the issues involved in traditional Buddhist approaches to their texts have also been examined in light of modern critical methodologies. Perhaps because the Buddhist attitude towards their textual tradition has always been one of “experience over report,” the issue often raised in Western studies regarding the reproducibility of the author’s intention (Gadamer’s “romantic endeavor”) has never been considered overly problematic precisely because that aspect has always been af³rmed as far and away the most important aspect of the interpretive enterprise, in fact the very reason for the teachings. Inasmuch as wisdom is assumed to be the starting point of the Buddha’s teachings as well as the ³nal goal of the practitioner, the interpreter has always been told to enter into a conversation with scripture in order to ³nd the original mind of the author, that is to say, the mind of the Buddha.21 Perhaps because of this reliance on an ultimately transcendent wisdom, the related teaching of up„ya has been seen by many to offer a model for the interactions of different religious faiths, appearing as it does to foster tolerance and harmony in place of the more rigid exclusivism of proposition-based claims to truth; cf. Jamie Hubbard, “Buddhist-Buddhist Dialogue?” 21
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Thus Buddhist interpretive schemes can be thought of as primarily soteriological in orientation and ultimately legitimized in the wisdom of Buddhahood.22 Hence the interpretive framework of the “four reliances,” for example, important in Hsin-hsing’s writings and taught in such scriptures as the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra and the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, culminates in wisdom as the highest interpretive authority.23 Hence, too, Buddhist interpreters seem to have been long aware of the interpretive conundrums caused by temporal, cultural, and linguistic distance between the author and reader—and, as José Cabezón has recently argued, the ultimate rejection of historical criteria is not due to naïveté but represents a sophisticated approach to interpretation.24 Although in this way the Buddhist approach can signi³cantly contribute to the contemporary study of religious hermeneutics, this approach has caused problems as well. This is so because the arguably individual encounter with the text (the experience or the interpretation of the text), even if occurring on the level of Buddhist wisdom, also gives rise to interpretative systems that attempt to put the text into a historical and philosophical framework consonant with the deeper framework of meaning discerned by the individual interpreter. This is the level of the siddh„nta and p’an chiao systems, including Hsin-hsing’s twofold classi³cation of particular and universal. The majority of research done in the area of Buddhist hermeneutics has tended to focus on such systems and the few central themes that always form the interpretive ridgepole—up„ya, direct (n‡t„rtha) versus indirect (ney„rtha) meaning, and the critical yardstick with which one determines whether the meaning is direct or indirect. As with the four reliances mentioned above, the critical yardstick itself is rooted in the idea of the Buddhist notion of ultimate truth, so that, as 22 John Powers, Hermeneutics & Tradition in the Sa½dhinirmocana-sðtra (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 100–102; Lamotte, “The Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism,” in Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Donald Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988), 23. 23 The four reliances are: (1) Rely on the teaching, not the teacher; (2) rely on the meaning, not the letter; (3) rely on the de³nitive teaching (n‡t„rtha), not the indeterminate (ney„rtha); (4) rely on wisdom (jñ„na) not ordinary consciousness (vijñ„na). T #376, 12.879b–c; cf. Etienne Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalak‡rti (London: Pali Text Society, 1976), 261–63; Robert Thurman, “Buddhist Hermeneutics,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46/1 1978), 23 ff. On the four reliances in the San-chieh teachings see Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 418. See also the critique of this as an ultimately transcendent or esoteric epistemology that entails the denial or denigration of language in Hakamaya Noriaki, “Shie (catu¤-pratisara«a) hihan kõ josetsu” vS−|†Ÿß, in Hongaku Shisõ Hihan û·„`−| (Tokyo: Daitõ Shuppan, 1989), 184–208.
José Ignacio Cabezón, “Vasubandhu’s Vy„khy„yukti on the Authenticity of the Mah„y„na Sðtras,” in Jeffrey R. Timm, ed., Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 233–35. 24
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Cabezón has pointed out, the ³nal description may well be summed up by saying “all that is true is [understood to be] the word of the Buddha.”25 In any case, Hsin-hsing took this concept to a logical extreme and emphasized the nondual relationship between all phenomena and their essential “truth” value based on his own experience of the biased, contentious, and essentially µawed nature of sentient beings. According to his own understanding, then, he graded sentient beings according to three levels and thereby decided which Buddhas and which teachings were appropriate for each. In so doing, however, he succeeded in an interpretative scheme that erased all distinguishing features of the Buddha’s teachings (including truth and falsity), except, of course, that of the “Universal Dharma” as the sole teaching appropriate for the third level. Thus the apparent inclusivism turns out in fact to be exclusive. Worse, it has not logic but only the charisma of its champion to recommend it. Is this really so different, though, from the traditional method that, governed by the hermeneutic of up„ya and relying on one’s personal experience of ultimacy, eliminates all contradictions among scriptures in favor of a graded system of textual understanding that puts one’s own teachings as supreme?26 I think not. Like the contemporary fashions of inclusivism and pluralism as models of religious interaction, it rather seems that if up„ya and soteriological concerns are the sole criterion for slicing up the dharma pie, then the doctrinal puree that results remains necessarily sectarian. Hence the all-inclusive embrace of the p’u fa, the Universal Dharma, the “practice that arises in accord with the capacity,” is, in fact, pieh fa, a particular or exclusive teaching—indeed, particular and exclusive to Hsin-hsing and his followers. While the notion of “practice in accord with the capacity” or up„ya represents a powerful, if perhaps common-sense, pedagogical method (from the vantage point of a Buddha), an effective structuring of the path (from the vantage point of ignorant sentient beings attempting to cultivate that path), and an idea that allows for an encounter with the scriptural tradition as an open-ended process (that should preclude dogmatism), it nonetheless remains less than satisfying philosophically and historically. Philosophically, it seems based on a notion that language, reason, and the texts that employ language and reason to make claims about “the way things are” have only a pragmatic, subjective meaning—once their stated differences are properly “interpreted” they will vanish; an added dif³culty is that up„ya presupposes the Buddha’s omniscience, the perfect knowledge of what will be uniquely 25 José Cabezón, “The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 4/1 (1981), 7. 26
Cabezón, “Vasubandhu’s Vy„khy„yukti,” 233.
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ef³cacious for each unique individual and situation.27 Historically speaking, although the rich and complex p’an chiao of Chih-i and Fa-tsang may be the product of spiritual and hermeneutic genius, a more realistic historical, textcritical and philosophical-critical approach to the Buddhist teachings allows a far more reliable and, to my mind, interesting understanding of the development of the tradition. To me, the fact that the Mahayana scriptures are not literally the word of the historical Buddha does not relegate them to the status of forgeries to be avoided, but rather fills them with historical, philosophical, and religious signi³cance. The practical problems of the traditional approach are easily demonstrated within the Buddhist tradition by looking at the treatment given the Sa½dhinirmocana-sðtra, in which the Buddha explicitly declared certain teachings to be “unsurpassed, not provisional, of de³nitive meaning.”28 Candrak‡rti, however, who could neither deny the validity of the sutra nor hold to the views expressed therein as having de³nitive meaning, retorted that what the sutra called de³nitive was really meant to be understood as “in need of interpretation” and vice-versa.29 Indeed, it was precisely this point that constituted one of the major Pure Land critiques of Hsin-hsing’s teaching, that is, that his interpretive scheme of three levels is purely his own invention, a subjective and whole-cloth scenario not evidenced within the scriptures. Similarly, although the logic as well as, perhaps, the soteriological relevance of Hsin-hsing’s universalism is easy to see, there is yet something disturbing about it, for it remains largely a sectarian apologetic with little recourse to anything other than internal logic. And, indeed, inasmuch as the truth need be served from within the tradition as well as from without, up„ya is also not ultimately satisfying even as an apologetic, for it is so far from social-historical fact that it tends to relegate the systems built upon it to the realm of sectarian posturing. 27 This is a signi³cant and philosophically problematic issue in any discussion of “buddhalogy,” for while the non-Mahayana traditions generally denied the Buddha’s omniscience, the Mahayana, perhaps driven precisely by the intuition of the Buddha’s maximal salvi³c agency (up„ya), generally af³rmed it; see Paul Grif³ths, On Being Buddha (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), esp. chapters 4, 5, and 7; John J. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), esp. chapters 5 and 13. 28 Donald S. Lopez, Jr., “On the Interpretation of the Mah„y„na Sðtras,” in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics, esp. 56–60; see also Robert Thurman, “Buddhist Hermeneutics,” 26. 29 Donald S. Lopez, Jr., “On the Interpretation of the Mah„y„na Sðtras,” 60; Thurman, “Buddhist Hermeneutics,” 28–29, 33–34; Powers, Hermeneutics & Tradition, 155–57. The tathagatagarbha theory is another example of a teaching which has been understood as “in need of interpretation,” though declared in the Ratnagotravibh„ga Mah„y„na-uttaratantraš„stra, the major text of the tradition, to be the “highest (uttara) teaching”; cf. William Grosnick, “Dõgen’s Understanding,” 80.
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It is perhaps for exactly this reason that Buddhist polemics based on the rationale of up„ya were rarely, if ever, convincing to the opponent—the many Chinese p’an chiao systems simply existed side by side, and their proponents were typically preaching to the already converted.30 Of course, not all Buddhists have relied solely on this notion in interpreting texts—the great Tibetan philosopher Tsong kha pa, for example, in commenting on the problems presented by the Sa½dhinirmocana-sðtra, stated that in interpreting textual statements it is ultimately necessary to rely on “non-mistaken reasoning itself.”31 More recently, scholars in the Zen tradition have also begun to call for a critical approach to Buddhist doctrinal systems, an approach that will reject conµicting claims as false rather than accommodate them as lesser truths.32 Thus, while “practice in accord with the capacity,” as with up„ya, makes for a powerful pedagogical and soteriological tool, and as an apologetic principle allows for the strength, continuity, and innovation of the institution in the face of a rich and divergent textual and doctrinal tradition, we need to question its validity as a hermeneutic principle. In this day and age, when religions are beginning to seriously grapple with the fact of diversity and the need for interreligious dialogue looms large, the traditional Buddhist approach has more often served to mask the fact of diversity within the tradition and discourage intradenominational dialogue in favor of dogmatic assertions of homogeneity, of which Hsin-hsing’s theory of the “Universal Dharma” is but one explicit, albeit extreme, example. But this is where things get interesting (and complicated). That is, we must keep in mind that the Universal Dharma is, in spite of the nomenclature, a speci³c dharma, a particular teaching associated with a particular school that was deployed in the competitive arena of Buddhist doctrinal schemes in late sixth-century China. It was an argument for a particular truth clothed in the guise of the universal. Once we realize that Hsin-hsing’s p’u fa was no less a pieh fa than that of the other teachers and schools, his doctrine can be appreciated in a different light, in the light of polemic and apologetic strategies rather than as describing a literal or logical “universal” or harmony of all teachings. 30 This is not, of course, to deny that some thinkers and worldviews came to have more or less followers or power in the world, but rather to claim that when two or more such views were in direct competition the more typical outcome was increasingly agile feats of interpretation; cf. John Powers, Hermeneutics & Tradition, where he gives more weight to the capacity of interpretive schemes such as that of the Sa½dhinirmocana to inµuence “power” relations. 31
Cabezón, “The Concepts of Truth and Meaning,” 10.
32
Cf. Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree.
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Like all Buddhists, Hsin-hsing was interested in arguing the truth of his understanding of the scriptures and the world, and he was interested in converting people to his vision of the path—he was a missionary to sentient beings of the third level. Hence his universal was rhetorical in nature and typically missionary in purpose. The same can be said of his doctrine of the universal Buddha-nature of all sentient beings, taught as the present Buddhahood of all living beings, for this was restricted to other living beings; one’s own faults were to be recognized, austerities and charity were to be vigorously cultivated, and his community was rigorous in obeying the precepts and observing the monastic regimen. Thus, while on the one hand Hsinhsing’s doctrines look to an ultimate, nondiscriminated level of existence as the basic reality or basic truth of all things, they also advocated a variety of speci³c practices for the biased, intolerant, and quarreling beings of the third level. In other words, Hsin-hsing’s universal was a rhetorical universal. He argued the perfection of the universal, but observed the delusion of the particular.
A. P’u fa ssu fo The Refuge of the Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma
As noted in the Introduction, the study of the texts of the San-chieh movement form one of the most exciting yet exacerbating tasks that any researcher faces. Exciting, because the story of their disappearance over one millennium ago and their rediscovery in the early twentieth century presents opportunities for the sorts of textual detective work that traditionally has been at the heart of the discipline of Buddhist studies; exacerbating, though, for the sheer scope of the opportunities so provided. The goodly number of extant manuscripts combined with the dearth of scholarship since Yabuki’s pioneering work in the twenties and thirties means that the editing and translation process will be slow and arduous—given the loose-yet-frequent use of prooftexts, for example, it is often dif³cult or even impossible to track down the citations that Hsin-hsing so liberally scattered throughout his writing. This means that at this stage little more than overviews and vague approximations of the full context of these texts can be attempted, and it is to be hoped that future authors will be able to correct the misreadings and deepen and broaden the contextual base of the translations offered here.1 The P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM is a portion of a manuscript discovered at Tunhuang (Stein #5668) and sent to Britain by Sir Aurel Stein.2 Although brief, 1 As my discussion of Hsin-hsing’s teachings on Buddha-nature and the Inexhaustible Storehouse is the subject of parts two, three, and four, as a rule notes to the translations are con³ned to textual matters. 2 Yabuki assigned the title on the basis of the content; my translation is based on Yabuki’s edition (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 201–206 (itself based on Yabuki’s articles “Sangaikyõ no fuhõ ni tsuite,” Tetsugaku zasshi, vol. 33 (1918) nos. 373 (pp. 334–65) and 374 (pp. 449–74). Recently Nishimoto Teruma has re-investigated the original manuscript in its larger context and has proposed the title Ti san chieh fo fa kuang shih ÙX‰MÀct; Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ, 205-216; an edition of the full text of Stein #5668 is included in Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ 609–22; see also Hubbard, “Perfect Buddhahood, Absolute Delusion,” and “A Heretical Chinese Buddhist Text.”
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the section of this text translated here preserves the most detailed explanation of the very important doctrine of the fourfold refuge of the Universal Buddha, the San-chieh teaching on tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature. Because the fragment preserves no title we cannot trace it in any of the various catalogues. However, we do know it is a later composition because it quotes the Ghanavyðha-sðtra, a text ³rst translated in 765.3 The text also quotes from other standard texts of the tathagatagarbha tradition such as the Laªk„vat„ra and the Šr‡m„l„dev‡. It further mentions several contemporaneous theories of Buddha-nature and is thus important for contextualizing the Sanchieh doctrine of tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature. The text is described in Giles’s Descriptive Catalogue of the Chinese Manuscripts from Tunhuang as follows: 5938. Buddhist *doctrinal handbook.* Booklet of loose numbered leaves with hole in the middle for string: ff. 7-10, 12-14 (in a different hand), 36-39. Small neat handwriting. Smooth yellow paper. 13 x 16.5 cm. S. 5668.4
The Buddha as the Matrix of Enlightenment [Truth and untruth] are neither different nor the same. [Nonetheless, truth and untruth] are one as well as different, while being neither one nor different. Although separated from attachments, the truth of the universe produces the untruth of the universe; therefore, untruth is dependent upon truth. But truth is not independent, because it is forever dependent on untruth; neither does untruth arise independently, because it is necessarily dependent upon truth. Again, the matrix of enlightenment and all of samsara, the essence and the forms, are also like this [that is, neither the same nor different]. Like gold and the ornaments made from gold, the essence and forms are forever the same. Again, the matrix of enlightenment and the phenomenal forms of the universe, the essence and forms, are forever different, as dust and moisture are always distinct; thus they are neither different nor not different. The Scripture [of the Lion’s Roar of Queen Šr‡m„l„] says: “If there is no doubt about the matrix of enlightenment when it is covered by 3
T nos. 681–682 (the latter was translated by Amoghavajra).
4
Giles, Descriptive Catalogue, 185.
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the innumerable stores of de³lements, then there will be no doubt concerning the body of truth that is free of those innumerable stores of de³lements.”5 Further, the Scripture of the Lion’s Roar of Queen Šr‡m„l„ teaches that “the matrix of enlightenment is the basis of the repeated cycles of birth and death; because of this matrix of enlightenment the original limits are taught to be unknowable. Because the matrix of enlightenment is the basis, we speak of the cycle of birth and death, and this is well spoken. There is birth and death because of worldly convention, but neither birth nor death is found in the matrix of enlightenment. The matrix of enlightenment is the matrix of the universe, the matrix of the truth-body, the supreme matrix of the transcendent, the matrix whose self-nature is pure.”6 It is wholly quiescent, truly ultimate, and forever separated from all false thoughts and delusion. Yet the untruth of the universe continues to be dependent upon the truth of the universe. The phenomenal forms of the universe continue to be dependent upon the matrix of enlightenment, just as water is the basis of the many waves. Because there is the matrix of enlightenment there are the phenomenal forms of the universe, as there are many waves because of the water. The matrix of enlightenment has the form of samsara, the repeated cycle of birth and death. “Birth” is the arising of new phenomenal form; “death” is the extinction of old phenomenal form. As with the water and the waves, [the matrix of enlightenment and the repeated cycles of birth and death] arise together and end together. Nonetheless, the water neither arises nor comes to an end. Dependent upon the water, the form of the wave arises and falls. When the new wave arises, the old wave ceases. The phenomenal forms of the universe, therefore, are none other than the matrix of enlightenment, and there is no other essence outside of this essence and these forms. It is like the waves that are nothing other than the water, yet outside of those waves there is no other water. However, the myriad phenomenal forms of the universe arise because of good and evil actions, not because of the matrix of enlightenment, as the true cause of the arising of the many waves is the wind, not the water. Again, the virtues of the matrix of enlightenment function throughout the universe together with the phenomenal forms as their base, support, and foundation.7 It is like the virtue of the water whose essence and function permeate the waves as the basis of all of the waves. Nonetheless, the matrix of enlightenment is different from the myriad phenomenal forms that arise dependent upon it—the matrix of enlightenment alone is the essence, the phenomenal forms are not the essence, as the essence of water is different from the many 5
T #353, 12.221b.
6
T #353, 12.222b.
7
Cf. the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, T #353, 12.222b; above, chapter 5, p. 109, note 44.
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waves. Only the water is water, the waves are not the water. Similarly, the truth of the essential nature of the matrix of enlightenment both functions and does not function in relation to the myriad phenomenal forms. It is like the purity of the essence of the water, which both functions and does not function with respect to the waves.8 Again, this essence is called the storehouse consciousness. Therefore the last book of the Ghanavyðha-sðtra says, “the Buddha has taught the matrix of enlightenment as the storehouse consciousness. Delusory thinking cannot know that this matrix is the storehouse consciousness.”9 There are two basic explanations with regard to this, that of the principle and the mind. The matrix of enlightenment is the principle, and worldly consciousness is the mind. The matrix is true, and consciousness provisional. It is also called the four unconditioned noble truths:10 although suffering and its cause are destroyed, nothing is actually destroyed. Although the truths of extinction and the path are obtained, nothing is actually obtained. Therefore, because nothing is actually destroyed or obtained, there is neither increase nor decrease. It is also called the one truth because it is ultimate and true, with neither destruction nor attainment.11 It is also called the one foundation because it is the unsurpassed foundation of all practice and understanding in the universe.12 It is also called suchness in itself, because it is equal and nondual. It is also called the totality of the universe because there is neither increase nor decrease. It is also called the store-consciousness because it appropriates and stores all the various phenomena. The matrix of enlightenment and the conditions and forms have no beginning or end, and thus truth and untruth are dependent upon each other, neither separate nor distinct. Therefore the Laªk„vat„ra Sutra states in a simile that “the storehouse consciousness is like the expansive ocean and waves. Because of violent winds the great waves arise, which roll ceaselessly over the depths. The ocean of the store-consciousness is eternally abiding, and that which is aroused by the wind is the world of objects. It is the waves of consciousness that arise, jumping and dancing about.”13 Sometimes the true is changed into the untrue, like a multitalented actor.14 Sometimes the 8 In other words, insofar as all waves arise from and consist of water, the water functions vis-à-vis the waves, yet it is the wind that actually causes the waves to arise, and not the water per se. 9
T #682, 16.776a; cf. T #681, 16.747a.
10
T #353, 12.221c.
11
T #353, 12.221c.
12
T #353, 12.221c, 222b.
13
T #670, 16.484b; cf. T #671, 16.523b, T #672, 16, 594c.
14
T #670, 16.510b–c; 508c; cf. T #671, 16.557a.
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untrue is transformed into the true, like a golden ornament [that can return to its original state of pure gold]. The true cause [that is, matrix of enlightenment] and the conditioned cause [that is, conditioned phenomena] are both the same and different like milk, cream, and clari³ed butter. Truth and untruth both take shape within the same matrix, like the ocean and the waves. The One Vehicle [of the Buddhas] and the Three Vehicles [of the bodhisattva, the šr„vaka, and the pratyekabuddha] are both the same and different, like the Anavatapta Lake and the eight rivers that µow from it.15 All of these causes and conditions are thoroughly explained in various similes within the sutras. Therein it is taught that the matrix of enlightenment gives rise to the cause and fully ripens the fruit, changing the small into the great and transforming the common into the noble. All this is due to the ef³cacious power of the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment.
The Buddha-Nature Buddha The second item is the Buddha that exists within all living beings as the nature of a Buddha. Some texts talk of this Buddha-nature as a principle, while others speak of it as something acquired through practice. Some speak of this nature as the cause of enlightenment and others as a result. Now, in clarifying this we only rely on the thirty-eighth book of the Nirvana Sutra, which illuminates the Buddha-nature as the “true cause.”16 Therein it states that all of the living beings of the universe, ordinary persons as well as sages, have this nature, as do all of the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Thus, from the perspective of the result, the name is established and called Buddha-nature. However, this Buddha-nature is neither cause nor result. Existing as the cause it is termed cause, existing as the result it is termed result. Related to the former concept of the matrix of enlightenment, just as “observe” and “watch” are different words [but both mean “to see”], with regard to conditions there is a slight difference in meaning [between the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment and the Buddha as the nature of the Buddha in all living beings.] Buddha-nature is so called because it includes the permanence of the fruits of Buddhahood throughout the universe as well 15 The analogy is from the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, T #353, 12.219b; cf Tui ken ch’i hsing fa, 130: “The tathagatagarbha is the essence of all the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and all of the sentient beings in the six destinies;… in a simile it is like the great Anavatapta Lake from which µows eight great rivers. Although the rivers are all distinct, the essence of the water is not different. Although there are differences between the sages and ordinary people and they are not the same, the garbha that is their essence is not different.” 16
A mistake for the twenty-eighth book, e.g., T #374, 12.531b–c, 532b, etc.
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as the permanence of the causes of Buddhahood throughout the universe. Wholly embracing everything from the fruits of Buddhahood down to its causes, it is termed the Buddha as Buddha-nature. Book thirty-six of the Nirvana Sutra says that the Buddha-nature is not one thing, nor ten things, nor one hundred, one thousand, nor even ten thousand things, nor up to the as-yet-unattained highest perfect enlightenment; the totality of the good, evil, and neutral are all called Buddhanature.17 Buddha-nature is the perfection of the four qualities: the truly permanent, truly blissful, truly self, and truly pure. Eternal because it never changes, pure because it is without de³lement, true because it is self-abiding. Because Buddha-nature is unsullied by de³lements, while revolving and changing in samsara according to conditions it remains unsullied though in the midst of de³lements. Within the person of an ordinary being it is mixed with de³lements, like bloody milk—the sravakas [disciples] are like milk, the pratyekabuddhas [solitary buddhas] like cream, the bodhisattvas like yogurt, and the various buddhas and tathagatas like clari³ed butter. Although the level of practice of the commoner and the noble differ, with regard to the quality of the nature of the true cause of Buddhahood they do not differ but are the same. Although the Buddha-nature abides due to its essential nature, this nature is yet without essence. Emptiness is none other than existence, and existence none other than emptiness; neither momentary nor eternal; one nor different; removed from the bifurcations of subject and object, it transcends the four logical alternatives and the eight negations [of N„g„rjuna]. In the twenty-eighth book of the Nirvana Sutra the bodhisattva Sinhan„da asked about the meaning of the Buddha as Buddha-nature.18 The answer is that the seeds of all of the buddhas, the highest perfect enlightenment, and the middle path are called Buddha-nature. The sutra also says that “the Buddha-nature is called the emptiness as the ultimate meaning and emptiness as the ultimate meaning is wisdom. One who merely talks about emptiness sees neither the empty nor the nonempty, but the wise one sees both the empty and the nonempty. Empty are all things in samsara, but the nonempty is great liberation. When one sees everything as empty but does not see that which is not empty, it is not called the middle path. Self and no-self are also like this. For these reasons the middle path is called Buddha-nature. Because the Buddha-nature is without change, it is eternal.”19 The Nirvana Sutra further says: “The sravakas and pratyekabuddhas only see emptiness, 17
T #374, 12.580c; cf T #375, 12.828a; the same passage is quoted in the San chieh fo fa, 56.
The Nirvana Sutra does not, of course, actually discuss “the Buddha as Buddha-nature” but simply “Buddha-nature”; cf. T #374, 522b ff. 18
19
T #374, 12.523b.
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but they do not see that which is not empty—this is not called the middle path.”20 Further, Buddha-nature is called the truth of ultimate meaning, because it dwells eternally without change. Because it is separated from all phenomenal forms, it is as well called the emptiness of ultimate meaning. Because it is separated from all delusion and darkness it is also called wisdom and illumination. Ungraspable and unrestricted, yet one can realize it. One should not rely on a person with wordy explanations but no insight. Buddha-nature is also called the diamond-like contemplation, because it cannot be destroyed. Buddha-nature is also called nirvana, because it neither arises nor ceases. It is also called Buddha-nature because it is the realization of enlightenment. It is also called the dharma-nature, because it is that which upholds the norm. It is also called the principle of the sangha because it is without error. The sutra says that if a person only has faith in the three jewels of Buddha, doctrine, and community without having faith in the one nature of these three jewels, it is called incomplete faith. Because it is not simply nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit, it is called truly empty; yet because it is not simple nothingness like vacuous space, it is also profoundly existent. Again, the Hua-yen Sutra calls it formless because it is the unobstructed wisdom in sentient beings. It is also called the “mind’s gateway to suchness,” because it is intrinsically unchanging. It is also called the “unborn and the unceasing,” because the nature of the true conditions and true manifestations of the physical and mental (that is, Buddha-nature) dwells eternally. It is also called the “Buddha-nature that abides of its own nature,” because the nature of original enlightenment is uncaused. It is also called the self-nature of nirvana because it is intrinsically quiescent. It is also called the self-nature of wisdom because the self-nature is originally pure and removed from ignorance. It is also called the limit of reality, because the essence of the [Buddha-]nature is true and not false. It is also called suchness in itself, because the nature of the principle is without change. It is not to be found in the ³ve psycho-physical components, the eighteen bases of existence, or in the twelve entrances of cognition, yet neither is it to be found separated from the ³ve psycho-physical components, the eighteen bases of existence, or the twelve entrances of cognition. It is not to be found within living beings nor separate from living beings. It is neither permanent nor impermanent, because it contains both the permanent and the impermanent. It is also called the king of wonderful medicines, because it is able to remove the disease of living beings’ passions. It is also called the treasure house that bene³ts living beings, as the Nirvana Sutra teaches with a simile about a rich man who, in a time of famine, when wealth is hard to come by, opens his treasure house and shares it with all—so, too, within this world of passions 20
T #374, 12.523b.
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in the time of the semblance doctrine, when living beings are totally perverse and the pure doctrine is exhausted, when the extreme evil of the ³ve heinous crimes increases, leading to the lowest hell of no respite, when perverted views arise and everybody is quarreling with one another and living beings who hold the twelve heterodox views are everywhere, when the dharma is endangered, this, the treasure house of the Buddha doctrine is opened and shared by all—this is what is meant by the Buddha-nature as the “true cause.” All of the living beings of the universe, those of base and noble spirit alike, all possess this nature [of a Buddha], excluding only the grasses, trees, walls, broken tiles, and so on. The sutra teaches the difference between those things without Buddha-nature and those with Buddha-nature and that which is without Buddha-nature is the earth, trees, tiles, and rocks; that which is distinct from these nonsentient things are all said to have Buddha-nature.21 It is only because of ignorance that the gold within the dross is not discovered. If one wishes to have insight, then through emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena one must dispel belief in the ego-self and the self of things; when ³xed in equanimous quiescence, clearly illuminating the identity of principle and phenomena, thoroughly mastering essence and form,22 and when the mind that follows the object is suppressed, then one will eliminate the self and identify with others. Hearing this without hearing, seeing this without seeing, this is well-seen.
The Future Buddha The third is the Future Buddha. The essence of the above-described Tathagatagarbha Buddha and Buddha-nature Buddha is the true cause of wisdom and the foundation of the truth body.23 Therefore the essence gives rise to the conditioned, and the practices are pursued according to the conditions—all are the practices of the matrix of enlightenment, the practices of the Buddha-nature. The tree includes the bud and truth includes untruth, 21 T #274, 12.581a: “That which is without Buddha-nature are all of the nonsentient things such as walls, fences, tiles, and stones; everything other than such nonsentient things is called Buddha-nature”; ÀM§ˆ‹isש|éÍ[Ãî]?Ø¡f[Ãî]¡eM§; cf. T #275, 12.828b. As my colleague Elizabeth Kenney pointed out to me, the slight differences of this sort that are common to so many other scholar-monks of the time indicates a more µexible standard for citing authorities than we are used to today. For a full discussion of these issues, see Paul Swanson, “What’s going on here? Chih-i’s use (and abuse) of scripture,” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 20/1 (1997): 1–30. 22
Emending ôòîo to Áòîo (following Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 617).
The first twenty-seven characters of this section are added from Tun-huang pao-tsang, 44.297; see also Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 617. 23
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thus all practices are those of the universal bodhisattva of the One Vehicle. With the full completion of the practices the fruits of Buddhahood are realized. Because the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment and the Buddha as Buddha-nature exist within the bondage of ignorance and the realm of causality, there is likewise the future realization of Buddhahood.24 Therefore, this aspect is termed the “Future Buddha.” We rely on the Lotus Sutra, which teaches that the bodhisattva NeverDespise [Sad„paribhðta] worshipped all among the four classes of beings, that is, monks, nuns, and male and female lay devotees, as the same because they possess the true essence of the matrix of enlightenment and Buddhanature. Therefore he told them, “You all practice the path of the bodhisattva and in the future will become buddhas,” hence this aspect of the refuge of the universal Buddha is termed the “Future Buddha.”25
The Perceived Buddha The fourth is the Perceived Buddha. Because all living beings in the universe are none other than the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment, the Buddha as the Buddha-nature, and the Future Buddha, the forms of living beings are not different from the true Buddha. This is called the “Perceived Buddha.” According to the “Chapter on Clarifying the Dharma” in the eighth book of the Hua-yen Sutra,26 the superior and inferior levels of living beings are all to be thought of as the Buddha. Although we may speak of the many levels of living beings and their differences, from the point of view of their essence they are all the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment, the Buddha as the Buddha-nature, and the future Buddha; they should, therefore, all be respected with the thought that indeed they are buddhas. According to the fourth book of the Dašacakra Sutra, we are taught to respect equally the three kinds of monks, that is, those with no precepts, those who break the precepts, and those who keep the precepts, with the thought that they are the true buddhas.27 Although we may talk of the difference between holding the precepts and breaking the precepts, because the Buddha as the matrix of 24 The Lotus Sutra does not, of course, use either term, although its message of universal attainment has long been interpreted in light of tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature theories. 25
T #262, 9.50c.
26
T #278, 9.459c.
I was unable to find this reference; in line with the discussion of the Perceived Buddha in the San chieh fo fa (p. 56), perhaps it refers to the third chüan of the Dašacakra Sutra, e.g., T #410, 13.694a, passim. 27
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enlightenment is the same as the Buddha-nature and the Future Buddha, they are one and not two. Therefore, you should respect all, perceiving them as true buddhas, and this is termed “Perceived Buddha.”28 The essence of the above four Buddhas is all the same, and according to the teachings of the individual sutras all are the perception of the Buddha. The Laªka and the Scripture of Queen Šr‡m„l„ call it the Buddha as the matrix of enlightenment, the Nirvana Sutra calls it the Buddha as Buddhanature, the Lotus Sutra calls it the Future Buddha, and the Hua-yen Sutra and the Dašacakra Sutra call it the Perceived Buddha.29 Therefore these four buddhas comprise a single Buddha, and thus these four buddhas clarify the essence of the eightfold doctrine.30
28
Cf. Tui ken ch’i hsing fa, 132.
Emending o to `. The first two sentences of this paragraph are added from Tun-huang pao-tsang, 44.297; see also Nishimoto, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 617–18. 29
30
See chapter ³ve, p. 103, n. 11.
B. Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo Abridged Explanation of the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse
The Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo [¦áÀF‰ is in the Stein collection (Stein No. 190, Giles No. 6617), and a fragment of the last part of this text is also found on the same scroll as the Hsin-hsing i wen, another important San-chieh text. Similarly titled texts found in the sutra catalogues include the Ta sheng wu chin tsang fa Ø/[¦áÀ in one chüan listed among Hsin-hsing’s works in the Ta chou k’an ting chung ching mu lu,1 and a Ming ta sheng wu chin tsang gØ/[¦á recorded in the K’ai yüan lu,2 the Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu,3 and the Jen chi lu tu mu.4 The latter two catalogs add the information “four pages” and “six pages” respectively, and the ³rst three catalogs attribute the work to Hsin-hsing. As it is partially contained on the same scroll as the Hsin-hsing i wen and both texts contain the same list of “sixteen eternal, joyous, self, and pure practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse,” we can assume that it belongs to the early strata of San-chieh literature, if Hsin-hsing did not himself actually compose this text. Although originally comprised of eleven sections, because the ³rst part of the text is damaged only six of eleven sections are preserved (sections six through eleven). The ³rst ³ve sections are preserved, however, in a commentary to this work, the Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih Ø/Àƒ[¦áÀt (translated below), and together with the Hsin-hsing i wen we are thus able to get a good picture of this important practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Unfortunately, portions of the text, in particular the eleventh section, are very terse (as the title of the text forewarns) and do not easily yield to
1
T #2153, 55.475a.
2
T #2154, 55.678c.
3
Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 228.
4
Ibid., 221.
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interpretation. The text is described in Giles’s Descriptive Catalogue of the Chinese Manuscripts from Tunhuang as follows: 6617. *[beginning damaged] Rules of monastic training. A work of the Three Stages sect. Very good MS. of 7th cent. Good, bright yellow paper. On a roller. 6 ft. S. 190.5
The sixth6 clari³es the ease and dif³culty of perfecting the dharma realm practices: the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the eternal, joyous, self and pure virtues7 can be perfected in a few places, not in many places. The suffering, empty, and impermanent Inexhaustible Storehouse may be obtained equally in many or few places, according to the place. The seventh clari³es the relation between the great [i.e., Mahayana] and small [i.e., Hinayana] practices of the dharma realm. If both types of practice, the eternal and joyous as well as the suffering and empty, are exhaustively cultivated, then it is the Mahayana. If only the partial practices of the empty and suffering [are cultivated] without exhausting the permanent and joyous then this is determined as belonging to the Hinayana. The eighth clari³es and manifests the study of the many and the few. Although it is taught that the dharmas are as numerous as grains of sand, the general teaching has sixteen [items]; if the general and the speci³c are taught together then there are more than thirty. There are also two kinds of giving: (1) only the general, daily giving sixteen shares of cash; (2) both the general and the speci³c, daily giving thirty shares of cash. The characteristics of the general and the speci³c are extensively explained below. 1. The study of inexhaustible offering to the Buddha; this is worshipping the Buddha, etc. 2. The study of inexhaustible offering to the dharma; this is reciting sutras, etc. 5 Giles, Descriptive Catalogue, 209; my translation is based on Yabuki’s edition in his Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix, 154–59; see also Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 619–37; above, chapter 7; below, Appendix C. 6 This fragment of the “Abridged Explanation of the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse” begins from the sixth item (see chapter 7) and concludes after enumerating a total of eleven subjects. The items from one through ³ve can be found in the commentary, the Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih, preceded by the phrase “The original says.…” The Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih contains commentary on items one through eight. 7 The four gu«ap„ramit„: eternality (nitya); bliss (sukha); self (atman) or great self (mah„„tman); and purity (šubha); cf. chapter 5, note 57.
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3. The study of inexhaustible offering to the sangha; this consists of universally making offerings [to the sangha] without question of whether they observe the precepts or transgress the precepts. 4. The study of inexhaustible offering to sentient beings; [that is,] universal offering to sentient beings of the six paths as though one, without question of whether they practice or do not practice. The six paths are (a) heaven, (b) humanity, (c) asura, (d) hell, (e) animal, (f) hungry ghost. 5. The general clari³cation of the inexhaustible separation from all evil. 6. The general clari³cation of the inexhaustible cultivation of all virtue. 7. The study of the inexhaustible giving of incense. 8. The study of the inexhaustible giving of light; this consists of candles. 9. The study of the inexhaustible giving of bathing [materials]. 10. The study of the inexhaustible giving of sound; this consists of bells, etc. 11. The study of the inexhaustible giving of clothing. 12. The study of the inexhaustible giving of shelter. 13. The study of the inexhaustible giving of bedding. 14. The study of the inexhaustible giving of eating utensils. 15. The study of the inexhaustible giving of charcoal and ³re. 16. The study of the inexhaustible giving of food and drink. Inexhaustible [donations of] food has many divisions: (a) ordinary rice; (b) glutinous rice; (c) µour; (d) oil; (e) maize; (f) lentils; (g) soy beans; (h) fuel [for cooking]; (i) cooks; (j) salt and vinegar; (k) honey; (l) ginger and pepper [i.e., spices]; (m) sesame seeds; (n) juices; (o) vegetables and various fruits.8
This concludes the presentation of the sixteen types of general and speci³c inexhaustible dharmas. Again, there is the giver: with regard to the above sixteen dharmas some give generally and some give speci³cally. [Both] are universally proclaimed to be donors (d„napati); without question of whether the donation is general or speci³c all are made with the intention of being used universally, sometimes circulating and sometimes decreasing.9 That is to say, the offerings to the Buddha, the dharma, the sangha, and the other thirteen up to and
8 This list is also contained in the Hsin-hsing i wen, (pp. 3–4), although there are slight differences; see also chapter 7, above.
The reading of this passage is tentative. I take the import to be that the intention is the determination of the universal, not whether the giving is actually “general” or “speci³c.” Sometimes the donation circulates (i.e., it is “inexhaustible” because it is lent and repaid ad in³nitum), and sometimes it naturally decreases (e.g., things that diminish through use such as candles or incense). This is also discussed in the Hsin-hsing i wen, 4, under the heading “Clarifying the materials used for the practice of the sixteen eternal, joyous, self, and pure dharmas.” It is also possible to interpret this to mean that although one sometimes practices the donation of food more than the giving of sutras, it doesn’t make any difference because all sixteen practices are interrelated. 9
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including food sometimes circulate and sometimes decrease. The ³fteen communal functions are also like the sixteen [inexhaustible practices] that permeate and exhaust the practices of the dharma realm: sometimes they circulate and sometimes they decrease. The manner of the mutual functioning of the two types of Inexhaustible Storehouse, namely, the permanent and joyous and the suffering and empty, is also like this.10 One should also completely know the teaching of the many and the few practices of the two types of Inexhaustible Storehouse—it is not a question of whether the valuables and things given are many or few, together they perfect and perpetuate the permanent and joyous Inexhaustible Storehouse; moreover, once the other practices have all been ³nished the cultivation of the eternal and joyous cannot be abolished. If the suffering and empty is practiced ³rst and each of the sixteen items is given separately it is not known as “mutual functioning.” The one-sided desire to gain merit according to one’s karmic connections does not enable the communal functioning [of the donations as does practicing together] in one place.11 Again, it is declared that by these inexhaustible good roots each and every donor will enable all sentient beings to naturally and fully complete the sixteen types of inexhaustible fruits.12 The ninth clari³es whether the pro³t of those sentient beings who are saved is shallow or deep; there are ³ve ranks: 1. The inexhaustible gaining of the sixteen dharmas by those who cultivate the same practice; 2. The inexhaustible gaining of the sixteen dharmas by those who follow in jubilation [the acts of the Inexhaustible Storehouse]; 3. The inexhaustible gaining of the sixteen dharmas by those who see [the acts of the Inexhaustible Storehouse]; 4. The inexhaustible gaining of the sixteen dharmas by those who hear [of the acts of the Inexhaustible Storehouse]; 10 Though this passage is dif³cult (unfortunately the commentary ends before this point), I take the basic idea to be that within the community of practitioners all of the activities and bene³ts are shared inasmuch as all participate in the same overall practice, much like the teachings of the Yðzð Nenbutsu school in Japan. 11 Although it is also possible to construe the meaning of this passage to be “³rst practice the suffering and empty,” I have chosen this reading because of the common theme in San-chieh literature of “³rst practice the universal (i.e., the eternal, joyous, etc.) and then practice the particular” (cf. the Practrices in Accord with the Capacity, 137). The reference to “one place” is taken up in several other works and means that goods donated and collected in one place have a greater ef³cacy and power than those scattered about (cf. Commentary on the Inexhaustible Storehouse), 166. 12 This is a reference to the “shared merit” of the Inexhaustible Storehouse as detailed in the following ³ve ranks.
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5. The inexhaustible gaining of the sixteen dharmas by those who receive offerings [from the Inexhaustible Storehouse].13
The tenth clari³es the many and few seeds of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. This teaching has two [aspects]: (1) the ³elds are inexhaustible; this is the Buddha, dharma, and sangha [the Field of Respect], and sentient beings [the Field of Compassion] to whom are made daily, continuous, and uninterrupted offerings, and (2) the seeds are inexhaustible, which refers to the giver who donates daily and continuously and so the Inexhaustible Storehouse is not exhausted. The eleventh clari³es whether the offering and withdrawal of the person who participates in the Inexhaustible Storehouse is with offense or without offense. Within this there are two subsections: 1. The ³rst clari³es the production of speci³c merit, which only involves offering and not withdrawal. What does this mean? Speci³c merit is not shared among self and others and there is thus offense in offering and withdrawing. 2. The second clari³es the universal merit of offering and withdrawing in accordance with the person. In offering virtue is obtained and withdrawing is without offense. Why is this? The essence of universal merit is shared by self and others but withdrawing is only in one direction and hence without offense. This, however, excludes the retreating of the bodhi-mind, which, although it retreats, is nonetheless superior and originally non-produced.
Again, if you do not use those things that are discarded and turn them over to others there are two errors: the ³rst is the error of discarding the permanent and joyous and entering the suffering and empty; the second is that it is the error of going against faith. The inner meaning of the text of these eleven sections only clari³es the meaning of existence and does not clarify emptiness. However, the follower who understands the meaning, sees existence, and penetrates emptiness knows the many [meanings] of both. The meaning of the universal and the particular is also like this: the inner [meaning] of the various Mahayana sutras only clari³es the universal practice and dharma and does not give rise to the particular. The universal dharma is like the four embracing [virtues], etc., of the Mahayana sutras, which extensively explain the dharma of universal giving.14 The 13 As explained in chapter 7, the concept of “jubilation” (anumodan„) developed together with that of transforming merit; the concept that fellow practitioners as well as those who merely see, hear, or receive the offerings of another’s practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse also gain a measure of the merit of the original practitioner seems to be a development of this same idea; see Kajiyama Yðichi, “Transference and Transformation of Merits.” 14
E.g., T #310 (23), 11.504b; T #310 (43), 11.633a; T #310 (44), 11.638b.
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particular dharma universally pervades all of the sutras; in short it is taught in a few divisions. Some teach good and evil as the same state and the differences in harm and pro³t; they teach that those who hold the precepts and those who break the precepts have the same karma, and neither will be able to escape hell. Others teach that those who hold the precepts do not drink the water of the same river as those who break the precepts. Others teach that those who hold the precepts are not respected or worshipped by those who break the precepts. As the Nirvana Sutra explains, some teach the dharma of [keeping] the evil at a distance, the virtuous close, and the deluded apart.15 [They] teach sentient beings that knowledge of [keeping] the evil distant is like being afraid of anger, the thief [who harms life and spirit]; [keeping] close to the virtuous is the knowledge that (a) suffering and joy are the same, that (b) life, property, and the like are not to be begrudged, and (c) [one’s] relations are not to be begrudged. As the Ãgama Sutras teach, with regard to the distant and close there are the four dharmas of [keeping] the evil distant and the virtuous nearby.16 This is [equivalent to] quickly running and avoiding [the evil] by one hundred yojana. One yojana is forty li, and one hundred yojana equal four thousand li. The four dharmas are (1) evil friends, (2) evil communities, (3) much talk or much idle gossip, (4) anger and quarrelling. Why is this? It is understood as illuminating the relation between light and heavy offenses. It is better to cut in half all of the sentient beings of the three thousand worlds than for the bodhisattva to arouse a mind of anger within the ³rst production of the [bodhi] mind. Again, non-attainment [in the present] is explained by the past of the home-departed ones and others. The future [possibilities] are as extensively explained in the teaching of the thirty-³ve kinds of dharmas of protecting the precepts in the Fang teng ching.17 Again, the Ratnamegha-sðtra does not 15 A cursory look at the various versions of the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra and the Taishõ daizõkyõ sakuin does not show any use of the terms yüan o æÕ, chin shan ¢3, or ch’ih chi IÕ, though there are frequent references to the bene³ts of good friends and the dangers of evil friends, e.g., T #374, 561c; T #375, 808a. The latter term could also be rendered “the slow and the quick.” In light of the reference below to the “Chapter on the Peaceful Life” in the Lotus Sutra I have translated it to mean the general Buddhist teaching concerning one’s relationship to virtuous and evil people. 16 Possibly this is a reference to the “four dharmas of becoming” found in several of the Ãgamas, e.g., T #1, 1.57c, T #1, 1.53b. 17 The Fang teng ching refers to the Ta fang teng t’o lo ni ching (T #1339), one of the sources for the popular liturgies of repentance and confession that is frequently connected with initiatory and preceptual puri³cation, as in the Li tai san pao chi record of the practices of Hsin-hsing’s congregation: “His disciples all practiced the puri³catory fang teng [repentance], the dhuta, and begging for food, and eating only one meal a day” (T #2034, 49.105b); see also Stevenson, “The T’ien-t’ai Four Forms,” 175, 182–83, passim; The “thirty-³ve kinds of dharmas
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allow for the tendency to break the precepts concerning begging food from homes.18 Again, the Chapter on the Four Peaceful Practices in the Lotus Sutra teaches that after the Buddha has left the world, the preachers of the latter dharma (mo fa) will explain many dharmas; within this the meaning of avoiding evil [persons] and drawing near to [persons of] virtue is illuminated most fully.19 In general this is extensively taught in the various scriptures and Vinaya works. The best illustration of how the common person [fan p’u, p£thagjana) of the latter dharma (mo fa) will study discarding the false and entering the true nirvana, discarding the evil and entering the virtuous, and discarding the small and entering the great is found in the Shih lun ching.20 This concludes the “Abridged Explanation of the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse.”
of protecting the precepts” most likely refers to the thirty-³ve buddhas of confession found in the San shih wu fo li ming ch’an wen (T #326), translated during the T’ang by Amoghavajra) or the Chüeh ting p’i ni ching (Up„liparip£cch„, T #325, 12.37c–39a, translated in the latter half of the 3rd century); cf. the list of names quoted in Š„ntideva, Šik¤„-samuccaya (translated by Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass edition, 1971), 165–66. The Thirty-³ve Buddhas also ³gure in the San-chieh practice of the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 528 ff). I take this passage to refer to our sinful past which keeps us from attaining the higher stages of the path and the future that we can anticipate if we practice the Seven Roster Buddhan„ma. 18
Ratnamegha-sðtra (translated 503), T #658, 16.231b–c, passim.
This chapter, chapter 14 in the Kum„raj‡va translation (T #262, 9.37a), discusses “dwelling in the four dharmas,” or the “four peaceful practices” in the time of the latter dharma, i.e., the peaceful practices of body, mind, speech, and vow. Although these practices (and in particular the ³rst) do, in general, concern themselves with the topic of one’s relation to various groups, as in the above reference to the Nieh p’an ching, the terms yüan o, chin shan, and ch’ih chi are not speci³cally used; on the use of “latter dharma” see Hubbard, “Three Periods.” 19
20 The Ta fang kuang shih lun ching (T #410), translator unknown, listed in the Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu as a different version of the Ta sheng ta chi ti ts’ang shih lun ching recorded in the Pei liang lu (ca. 397–439; T #2157, 55.917b), is a work often referred to in San-chieh-chiao literature (more than twenty-³ve references in the two fragments of the San chieh fo fa recovered from Tun-huang). Hsin-hsing is also reported to have written two commentaries on this text, the Shih lun i i li ming in two chüan , and the Shih lun lüeh ch’ao in one chüan (K’ai yüan shih chiao lu, T #2154, 55.678c).
C. Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe
The final translation is from another manuscript in the Stein collection of Tun-huang texts (Stein No. 721, Giles No. 5563), the Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih Ø/Àƒ[¦áÀt, a commentary on the Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo (Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse) translated above. The text is divided into four sections, the ³rst of which is largely lost, as is a good portion of the end, which promises to interpret the “meaning of the text” of the Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo in eleven sections. Although only the ³rst eight of the eleven sections are preserved, we can restore the remaining three sections from the Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo; unfortunately, however, the “abridged” nature of that text means that we are missing the commentary for most of the sixteen individual practices of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. The manuscript fragment translated here was used to piece together a roll for a commentary on the Diamond Sutra (contained on the other side of this MS) that is dated 8 July 764. Giles’s Catalogue simply says “(4) Fragment of the Three Stages teaching. End mutilated.”1
[Text fragment begins in the middle of section I:] Next is the light case, [in which one will] receive the body of an ox or a horse, a donkey or a mule, etc. Pulling a heavily laden cart, hooves rent and wearing a collar— thus will your debt to others be repaid.2 In the lightest case you [will be reborn as] a slave. Your garments will not cover your body, and there will Giles, Descriptive Catalogue, 169; my translation is based on Yabuki’s edition, included in his Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, appendix, 161–76; see also ibid., 619–37, chapter 7 and Appendix B, above. 1
2
In light of the following quote I have emended Yabuki’s “earth” (ti G) to “others” (t’a ¬).
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not be enough food to ³ll your mouth. Your chest will be whipped and your back µogged; wearing manacles, your body branded—thus you will repay the strength of others. Therefore the Ti yu ch’uan G¹Œ says, “The reward for burdening another a single coin is an entire life in the body of a slave, repaying the strength of others.”3 This is the meaning. In this way your past debts are measured throughout your entire life. Families and relatives live off each other in pursuit of money and wealth. Others use their power and authority as of³cials in judgement of things in order to bend the law and take wealth. Some prosper in the marketplace and are contemptuous of small aspirations. They engage in an excess of lies and cheat and extort pro³ts from others. Still others, farmers, burn the mountains and marshes, µood the ³elds, plough and mill, destroying nests; they let their cows and donkeys wander everywhere, destroying others’ sprouts and grains; they peel the cocoons [of the silkworms] and reel off the silk, smoke out the bees and take their honey, and they kill the musk deer for their perfume. Again, [consider] artisans who steal the sutras and images, who steal the Buddha’s gold and the paper and ink [used for copying] the sutras. There is little merit yet a great price to pay in visiting the teacher during the daily periods [only] to eat communally in the monk’s kitchen, thus plundering and harming the Three Jewels. In this way there is no avoiding the fact of our past debts, and it is dif³cult to comprehend the number of separate lives [it would require to repay these karmic debts] if you wanted to repay them one by one. Even if one understands the situation there is nothing that will alleviate it. Without giving rise to the aid of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, how can one be pardoned the burden of such [karmic] debts [incurred] from the non-beginning onward in even a hundred heavenly rebirths, or a thousand, a hundred kalpas or a thousand kalpas of such rebirths? The practitioner who now gives rise to the charity of the Inexhaustible Storehouse immediately puts an end to the [karmic] debts [incurred] from the beginningless past and no longer needs fear the debt-master [i.e., karma]; moreover, obstacles of the path, karmic obstacles, and the obstacles of retribution are all immediately vanquished, father and mother, brothers, and the six classes of relatives will all immediately be freed from the three evil paths—is this not great pro³t?4 3 An apocryphal sutra (no longer extant) listed in the K’ai yüan shih chiao lu ˆât*Æ (T #2154, 55.673b) and the Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu ÌâGÏt*‡Æ (T #2157, 55.1017c). This section seems to refer to the karmic debt one incurs by “using” others, i.e., slaves, servants, beasts of burden, etc. 4 The six relatives are father, mother, elder brother, younger brother, wife, and child. The three evil paths are hell, animal, and hungry ghost (preta). This section has succinctly presented the
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Question: If every day you leave one-tenth of a coin s_¦ in the Inexhaustible Storehouse or one ko of grain s§F, in one year there are no more than thirty-six coins or three tou 7 six sheng © of grain—how does this aid in putting an end to one’s debts [accumulated] since the non-beginning and liberate one from suffering?5 Answer: In a parable it is like a poor man burdened by a debt of one thousand strings of coins to another person. He always suffers from this debt, and the poor man is afraid whenever the debt-master comes to collect. [Therefore] he visits the rich man’s house and confesses that he is beyond the time limit and begs forgiveness for his offense, [because] he is poor and without station in life. [He tells him] that each day that he makes a single coin he will return it to the rich man. On hearing this the rich man is very pleased and forgives him for being overdue; moreover [the poor man] is not dragged [away to jail], and avoids the suffering of the criminal’s chains. Is this not avoiding a great hardship with only a little giving? Giving to the Inexhaustible Storehouse is also like this.6 How can one arouse mind of bodhi and, through the same practices as [those cultivated by] the bodhisattvas, produce the causes and conditions for salvation? If you cultivate this one same practice [of the Inexhaustible Storehouse], then together with the Meditation Master Hsin-hsing and all of the Ekay„na bodhisattvas of all the realms, you will produce the causes and conditions for salvation. The Ekay„na bodhisattvas of all realms perfect the two practices of merit and wisdom within all thoughts, achieve Buddhahood, and emit the light that calls those who have a karmic connection. Even if you have committed such offenses so as to fall into the three evil destinies as far down as the Av‡ci hell, because of this one same practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse you will have a karmic [connection] with the many buddhas and bodhisattvas. Therefore you will receive the Buddha’s light and illumination and be plucked from the three evil paths. You will be born as a human being or in heaven, and in a transformation body hear the dharma and gain the fruits— these are the bene³ts. As Š„kyamuni Tathagata taught in the Mah„prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra and the Nirvana Sutra, the emitting of the light illuminates heart of both the problem, i.e., the debt of karma incurred over the years is for all purposes insurmountable through traditional practice, and the solution, i.e., the practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, which will immediately free the practitioner and his relatives as well; the rationale is given in the following section. 5
A ko was equal to approximately one-tenth of a pint.
This makes it appear that the karmic bene³ts of giving to the Inexhaustible Storehouse are to be understood in an accumulative sense, although the following text explains that such is not the case. 6
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the three evil destinies down to the Av‡ci hell and sentient beings all hear the dharma and pro³t.7 Therefore the verse in the Hsien shou Bodhisattva chapter of the Hua-yen Sutra says: In accordance with the original practice the illumination of the light is gained. All fellow practitioners of the past who have established a karmic link, All those whose karma from the practices which they have cultivated is the same, And who have practiced jubilation and dispersed their merits Having seen or heard of the bodhisattva’s pure practices— Those persons are able to see the illumination of the light.8
This is the signi³cance of the second item. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the Inexhaustible Storehouse.
7 This is a reference to opening scenes in sutras such as the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra (T #12.365c) and the so-called Larger Prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra (T #221, 8.1b). The passage from the Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra reads: “At that time, early in the morning, the World Honored One emitted many and various rays of light from his forehead. These rays were bright and of various hue: blue, yellow, red, white, crystal, and agate. [This light] illuminated three thousand great chiliocosms of Buddha-lands as well as the ten quarters. The offenses and passions of the sentient beings in the six destinies who met with this light were completely eliminated.” The “emitting of the light and illumination of the ten quarters” is an oft-used device for introducing the preaching of a sutra. Indeed, the Chinese title of Larger Prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra cited above is The Light Emitting Wisdom Sutra ½M“ø÷, referring to the opening paragraphs of the text.
T #278, 9.438a. The original has one verse not quoted here: “In accordance with this is the illumination of the light emitted; this is called the self-abiding of the great sage’s wisdom.” See also the eighty-chüan version, T #279, 10.77b; San chieh fo fa, 415. In the above paragraphs we are presented with the rationale of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, which is in turn the solution to the karmic dilemma given previously. The “one same practice” refers to the Inexhaustible Storehouse, which is said to be the same practice that all bodhisattvas cultivate. By cultivating this same practice, or, according to the passage from the Hua-yen Sutra, being jubilant at seeing or hearing of the bodhisattva’s practice (cf. the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, 157 and the Hsin-hsing i wen, 5), one achieves the status of “fellow-practitioner” and establishes a “karmic link” with the bodhisattvas. The karmic connection assures one of meeting with “the illumination of the light” that in turn guarantees salvation. It is yet not stated what this salvation actually consists of, simply “hearing the dharma in a transformation body.” A birth by transformation is a well-known concept in early Buddhism (generally with the meaning of the ³rst birth in the form realm of a new kalpa) as well as in Mahayana Buddhism, where it frequently is used to describe birth in a Pure Land; cf. the Wu liang shou ching (Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra), T #360, 12.278a–b. Another interesting aspect of this passage is the cultic tendency that it reveals, i.e., it states that the “one practice” is cultivated together with Hsin-hsing, the founder of the Sanchieh-chiao, and “all Ekay„na bodhisattvas.” 8
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II. Investigating the Name By “Great” is meant broad, long, profound, and never-retreating; by “Vehicle” is meant conveyance. Within the teaching of the Hinayana only self-pro³t is taught, but within the Mahayana teaching both self-pro³t and pro³ting others [are taught]. Therefore the bodhisattvas rely on the mind of great compassion and establish the [teaching] of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Of the six perfections the perfection of charity is ³rst;9 of the four means of attraction10 giving is chief.11 It [giving] is the same as the various Buddhas—within, it corresponds to the truth-body (dharmakaya), without, it pro³ts sentient beings and exhausts their poverty. When the dharma realm and the realm of living beings are exhausted, then this [Inexhaustible] Storehouse will be exhausted; because the truth-body is inexhaustible the practice of charity is without exhaustion. Therefore practice in the phenomenal world always continues and thus it is established as inexhaustible. Ultimate, profound, and broad, it includes everything and is therefore called “storehouse.” This storehouse has rules and principles, therefore it is called “dharma.” Thus it is called the “Mahayana Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse.”
9
Implying a qualitative ranking to the traditional ordering of the six perfections.
The four means of attraction (Catur-sa½graha-vastu/catv„ri-sa½graha-vastðni) are: 1. giving, 2. kind words, 3. pro³table conduct (for others), and 4. being adaptable, all intended to draw others near and make them comfortable so as to be able to lead them to the truth. 10
11 Cf. the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, T #2870, 85.1336b–c: “Good sons, I have now obtained Buddhahood because in past kalpas I practiced [the perfection] of d„na, seeking to save the poor and impoverished sentient beings. The many Buddhas of the ten directions also obtained Buddhahood through giving. Therefore in all of the sutras that I have taught giving is always placed ³rst among the six perfections. Good sons, it is like a man with two broken legs. [Even if] he has the desire to walk a great distance, he is unable to do so. Monks are also like this. Even if they practice the ³ve perfections for kalpas as numberless as the sands of the Ganges they will be unable to reach the other shore of nirvana. Good sons, if you do not practice giving then the precepts are not complete; if the precepts are not complete, then there is no compassionate mind; without compassion patience is not possible; without patience there is no enthusiastic perseverance; without enthusiastic perseverance there is no dhyana; without dhyana there is no wisdom. Without wisdom there will always be the adventitious de³lements. Good sons, the dharma-gate of giving has [always] been highly regarded by the Buddhas of the three times; therefore, among the four means of attraction the one concerned with material [giving] is supreme.” The Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra has a similar passage: “If giving is not practiced, then the perfection of charity is not completed; if the perfection of charity is not completed, then realization of the highest complete enlightenment is not possible” (T #374, 12.454c; cf. T #375, 12.696c).
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III. Establishing the Meaning Traditionally the Master taught an abbreviated ³ve meanings: A. The relation between above and below; B. The relation between universal and speci³c; C. The relation between self and others; D. The relation between permanent and impermanent; E. The relation between cause and effect.
A. The Relation between Above and Below “Above” refers to the Field of Respect; below refers to the Field of Compassion. According to the Hua-yen Sutra it is taught: Again, a light called the “jewel manifestation” is emitted; Which causes the impoverished to obtain the Jewel-store. By means of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of giving to the Three Jewels, The light called “jewel manifestation” is gained.12
In other words this refers to the Inexhaustible Storehouse of giving to the Three Jewels, and this is the Field of Respect. Again, the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra says: Where there are the poor and impoverished, the Inexhaustible Storehouse is manifested. It encourages them and causes them to produce the bodhi mind.13
By this is clari³ed the Field of Compassion. This [the Field of Compassion] has two meanings: the ³rst is that through the Inexhaustible Storehouse of giving material things to poor and impoverished sentient beings you are able to give to many and thus encourage them to produce a virtuous mind—this is easy to accomplish. The second is teaching the poor and destitute that [even if they contribute only] things of small value nonetheless it is the same as the Inexhaustible Storehouse of giving of the other bodhisattvas and causes [sentient beings] to gradually produce the bodhi mind.14 The Hua-yen Sutra 12
T #278, 9.437c; cf. T #279, 10.77a.
T #474, 14.550b. Lamotte has translated this verse from the Tibetan version (Õtani Kanjur Catalogue No. 843) as: “For the poor, they are inexhaustible treasures; by giving them gifts, they cause them to produce the thought of enlightenment.” Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalak‡rti, 186. Cf. the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching (T #2870, 85.1336a) which evaluates donations to the Field of Compassion higher than those made to the Field of Respect. 13
14 This is the traditional view of giving that places the teachings that liberate sentient beings from samsara above mere material gifts and was the basis of exchange by which householders
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states that teaching the true dharma for the sake of the impoverished causes the obtaining of the various pure storehouses of the bodhisattvas.15 The above two sutras clarify the two ³elds of compassion and respect, therefore it is called the relationship between above and below. B. The Relation between Universal and Speci³c According to the Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra it is taught: Oh Bhagavan, from today until I arrive at enlightenment I will not receive any property for my own sake, but everything that I receive will be for the sake of maturing the poor and suffering sentient beings.16
This is the meaning of the relation between the universal and the speci³c—discarding the speci³c and taking up the universal.17 [This means] not relying [for one’s salvation] on the property that people from the beginingless past have accumulated only for themselves and their relatives nor on charity done for the sake of people’s gratitude and the power of [having people] indebted to you rather than for the sake of maturing all sentient beings. The bodhisattvas’ practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse is to give without looking to the rich, poor, good, evil, false, true, big, small, hate, or love within the three ages [of the past, present, and future]; rather they give everything, universally and equally. Why is this? Because the riches and poverty, etc. of the three ages are undetermined, [as are the other items] up to hatred and love. Each one of these is extensively explained. Again, the Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra says: An assembly [gathered for the sake] of the giving of the dharma consists of offering to all sentient beings in a single moment. If the donor’s mind is impartial and he gives to the lowest beggar just as though he were the mark of the
were encouraged to support the sangha. In the teachings of the Three Levels, however (as well as in the Vimalak‡rti), it was recognized that material gifts to the poor allowed the conditions under which practice could develop: “During the kalpas of thirst and hunger, they manifest themselves and produce food and drink; ³rst succoring their hunger, later they teach the Dharma to beings” (Vimalak‡rti-sðtra, T #475, 14.550a.) The difference, of course, is that here the act of giving is performed by the bodhisattvas. This elevation of the status of material gifts is also seen in the above quote (n. 11) from the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching (T #2870, 85.1336c). 15
T #278, 9.734c.
T #353, 12.217c (following the Gu«abhadra translation). Diana Paul, in her translation of this passage, has indicated that the Bodhiruci translation (T #310 [48], 11.673b) has “not seeking reward for (my own kindness)” in place of “not for my own sake,” but this difference is actually in the next, the seventh, vow. “A Prolegomena to the Šr‡m„l„dev‡ Sðtra and the Tath„gatagarbha Theory” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1974), 197. 16
17
That is, the speci³c refers to oneself whereas the universal represents all sentient beings.
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Tathagata’s Field of Merit, [if he gives] without discrimination, equal in great compassion and without seeking rewards, this, then, is called the complete giving of the dharma.18
C. The Relation between Self and Others It is as taught in the Ti ch’ih lun G³Ç: Those of the bodhisattva lineage eliminate the self and perfect the other in all of their karmic acts.19
The “karmic acts” that are spoken of are precisely the meritorious acts of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, because one destroys the self through practicing with others. Thus the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching states: If somebody has an abundance of property and practices giving by himself from birth to old age, his merit will be very little. It is not like having many people [practicing giving] as a group, without question of rich or poor, noble or low, monk or layman. Working together, each person producing some small thing and collecting [these things] in one place and giving them as appropriate to the poor and destitute, orphans and aged, the evil, the sick, and the diseased, the troubled and the afµicted—the merit of this is very great. Even if one does not give in each and every thought [i.e., at all times] the merit of giving [communally] arises ceaselessly, without exhaustion.20
This is as extensively explained below. Why is this? The practice of self-pro³t is narrow and short. This is because an individual does not pervade the dharma realm and thus too that which is produced only for the sake of oneself will never pervade [the dharma realm]. The practice that bene³ts others, [however], is wide and long. The reason is that living beings do pervade the dharma realm and the sixteen karmic acts produced for their bene³t will [thus] universally pervade [the dharma realm].21 Again, the practice of self-pro³t is very harmful and the errors many—the householder destroys his home, those in temples destroy the temple, at the level of the kingdom one destroys the country, and within the path one destroys the bodhi mind. Why? Because the practice of self-pro³t is taking 18
T #474, 14.543c–544a. This quote is an abridged version of the original.
19
T #1581, 30.888c.
20
T #2870, 85.1336b.
The “sixteen karmic acts” refer to the sixteen kinds of giving to the Inexhaustible Storehouse; see chapter 7 above. 21
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what one likes and giving to others what one dislikes, which is destructive throughout all existences and places. Again, [one’s] evil will not be exhausted for a long time. Why is this? Because one’s desires will not be exhausted for a long time due to stealing what others like and making it one’s own and not giving what one likes to others. Getting rid of what one does not like by giving it to others, unwilling to take in what others do not like—thus one’s anger will not be exhausted for a long time. The pro³ts of the practices that bene³t others are exactly the opposite of this. D. The Relation between the Permanent and the Impermanent According to the teaching of the Nirvana Sutra: If you practice always giving this is called ‘the perfection of charity’ (d„nap„ramit„). If the giving is only sporadic then this is called giving, but not the perfection [of charity].22
“Always giving” means continuous [giving], thus you should know that “always” does not [mean] permanently abiding, frozen or ³xed. Therefore always giving should be understood in contrast to sporadic giving, which is not continuous day after day. “Paramita” means arriving at the other shore, like crossing a river or going from the eastern bank to the western bank. That which is called reaching the other shore is said to be the perfection [of a thing]. Reaching the other shore is when the practitioner goes from this shore of samsara to the other shore of nirvana. Therefore it is called “paramita.” E. The Relation between Cause and Effect Within this there are six items: (1) The cause and effect of seeking but not gaining; (2) the cause and effect of seeking and gaining; (3) the cause and effect of spontaneity; (4) the cause and effect of maturation; (5) the cause and effect of identity; (6) the cause and effect of full perfection. 1. The cause and effect of seeking but not gaining. If somebody comes begging but you are not willing to give, then in future lives when you seek position and wealth you will not be able to obtain them. This is called the cause and effect of seeking but not gaining.
I was unable to ³nd this exact quote in any of the versions of the Nirvana Sutra, although the general idea is voiced in the section on giving in chüan 15 of the Northern version (T #374, 12.454b ff.); see also the Hsin-hsing i wen, 4 ff. 22
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2. The cause and effect of seeking and gaining. The Nirvana Sutra teaches that if you see a beggar and then give, it is called giving but not the perfection [of giving].23 If you open your heart and give of yourself to someone who is not begging, then this is called the perfection of giving. If you begin to give only after somebody has come begging, in future lives [because of] the strength of your merit you will necessarily receive property and status, [although] in a small way. This is called the cause and effect of seeking and gaining. 3. The cause and effect of spontaneity. If when you see another’s merits you have no discrimination, produce the things of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, share in their joy, and aid them to mature, then in future lives you will gain clothing spontaneously as you seek, with no waiting, like a cakravartin king, Indra, the Emperor of Heaven, or Brahma, the King of Heaven, etc., whose clothing, food, seven-jeweled palaces, etc., are all spontaneously obtained according to their thoughts. This is called the cause and effect of spontaneity. 4. The cause and effect of maturation. When a beggar comes seeking cloth, silk, etc., with which he desires to make clothing, one should manifest the Inexhaustible Storehouse and give him already made clothing. Again, if someone asks for rice, desiring to make food and drink, then one should give already made rice cakes, etc. In future lives others will offer ³nished clothes, food, etc., without any intention of seeking gratitude; this is thus called the cause and effect of the completed. 5. The cause and effect of identity. In short, this is composed of the sixteen kinds of inexhaustible causes that return to affect one as the sixteen kinds of inexhaustible fruits, as is extensively explained below. 6. The cause and effect of full perfection. How can something be not fully perfect and yet be termed fully perfect? It is like a man with long life, without sickness, respectable and astute, [but nonetheless] poor, without clothes and food. This is called complete but not fully [complete]. Again, having food and clothing but a short life with much sickness and deformities, crude and stupid—this also is not fully perfect. If you gain a pleasing body, life, and wisdom but the objects of your thoughts are food and clothing rather than the Buddha, dharma, and sangha, this also is not fully perfect; if one does not receive, support, and accept the Buddha, dharma, and sangha, does not receive the offerings of those close to one, or 23
Cf. note 22.
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does not acknowledge the cutting off of evil and practicing of virtue [when he sees it], this also is not fully perfect. If you make offerings of incense but not lamps, or lamps but not incense, up to having one but missing many of the sixteen types [of offering], or having many but missing [one]—this is, as extensively taught, termed not fully perfect. That which is called fully perfect means that from before the beginning of samsara, always and in each birth [body] one obtains the inµuence of the sixteen kinds of effects that are identical [to the sixteen kinds of offerings]. It is just this that is the meaning of the cause and effect of the fully perfect. This has two types: The ³rst is the receiving of the eight fully perfect results of the inner body, which are (a) full perfection of form; (b) full perfection of strength; (c) full perfection of life; (d) full perfection of sincere speech; (e) full perfection of one’s relatives; (f) full perfection of wealth; (g) full perfection of power and authority; (h) full perfection of knowledge and wisdom. The second is the fully perfect result of the outer jewel, as clari³ed by the fully perfect reward of the wealthy Dharmaratnacðd„ in the Hua-yen Sutra, which states: At that time the rich man took Sudhana’s hand and returned to his home. “Good son, see now my home.” Thereupon Sudhana looked all around his house, which was the color of the golden sands of Jambu (jambun„da-suvar«a) and completely encircled by walls of the seven jewels. Wheels of precious gems adorned the innumerable pillars, and red pearls and jewels were spread out on the Lion Throne. Above the Lion Throne jeweled canopies and curtains of vaidurya stone were unfurled; nets made of wish-ful³lling gems (cint„mani) and ropes were thrown over the top, adorned with innumerable jewels. There was an agate jeweled pond, ³lled with the waters of the eight virtues, and all of the gardens were surrounded with jeweled trees. The house was magni³cent, with ten stories and eight gates. Thereupon Sudhana looked at the lowest level [of the house], and there were repasts being given in wisdom to all. He saw at the second level the giving of all kinds of jeweled clothing, and at the third the compassionate giving of tools, adorned with all manner of jewels. At the fourth level he saw the giving of all the actions of good conduct and skill in speech to relatives; at the ³fth level he saw bodhisattvas up to the tenth bhðmi, gathered among the clouds, assembling the True Dharma, separated from worldly pleasures and producing all variety of sastras, dharanis, samadhis, dharma-signs, discriminating samadhis, wisdom, compassion, and illumination; he saw that the sixth level was ³lled with bodhisattvas who had fully obtained the perfection of wisdom, endowed with very deep wisdom and quiescence, illuminating the unobstructed dharma-gate of the storehouse of wisdom and compassion, transcending the three limited worlds, [the worlds of objects] with unobstructed thoughts of the non-dual dharma. Having completed the teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom they discriminatingly
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elucidate it—although ineffable, these are the adornments of that assembly of bodhisattvas. He saw that the seventh level was ³lled with bodhisattvas approaching [the perfection of] patience, producing skillful means, wisdom, and compassion, able to hear and hold all of the Dharma Clouds of the Buddhas. He saw that the eighth level was completely ³lled with ever-abiding bodhisattvas, endowed with various superpowers and pervading all ³elds, illuminating all sentient beings and all dharma worlds with their fully perfect dharma bodies—visiting the various Buddhas, unobstructed, they are able to receive and uphold all of the Buddha-dharma. He saw that the ninth level was ³lled with bodhisattvas who would soon take their place [as buddhas]. He saw that the tenth level was ³lled completely with tathagatas, who, from the time they had aroused the mind [of bodhi] cultivated the practices of the bodhisattva, transcended samsara, and completely perfected the great vow, superhuman powers, and self-abiding. Manifesting, abiding, and holding [the dharma] in all of the Buddha-³elds, they turned the pure wheel of the dharma for their followers, converting and saving sentient beings. When Sudhana saw all of these rare and special things he asked, “Great Sage, I have never before seen such a great and pure assemblage. In the past where were the various good roots planted that today you have gained such surpassingly wonderful fruits as a reward?” The rich man answered, “Good son, I remember in past kalpas, at the time when the Tathagata named King Universally Adorned with Unlimited Light appeared. That Buddha entered the city, and I joyously offered perfumed µowers to him. Holding these good roots, I turned them to the three places, namely the extinction of all poverty and suffering, always seeing various buddhas, bodhisattvas, and spiritual friends, and always hearing the true dharma. Thus have I gained these rewards.”24
This is the meaning of the cause and effect of fully complete, based on the examination of the text. The fully perfect inner fruits, gained after departing samsara and obtaining the complete inner and outer fruits of the full perfection of Buddhahood, are explained in short [as follows]. The Buddha has thirty-two marks, or, again, eighty-four thousand marks. It is also taught that the great marks of the Buddha are equal to the number of grains of sand in the oceans of the ten lotus-store worlds,25 with all of the wonderful jewels in his limbs as adornments. Again, there are eighty minor 24
T #278, 9.706c ff.
25
The world created through the practices of Vairocana; cf. T #278, 9.412 ff.
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marks, or, explaining each mark one by one, each has eighty-four thousand minor marks. Each of the Buddha’s great marks [equal to the] number of grains of sand of the oceans of the ten lotus-store worlds has minor marks, and thus the numbers may be known. The ten powers26 and the four fearlessnesses,27 the great compassion, the three places of mindfulness,28 the three pure karmas,29 etc.—[in this way] the merits of the Buddha’s one hundred forty unique dharmas30 are limitless and boundless. In an even more abridged explanation, there are two types of adornments: merit and wisdom. The adornment of merit is clari³ed according to the Wu shang i ching [îS÷ 31 [which teaches that] if all of the sentient beings of the ten directions were to practice the ten virtuous actions, and if their merit were to increase a hundredfold, it would equal the merit of the mark of one hair of the Buddha. The merit of one of the Buddha’s minor marks is equal to one hundred times the merit of the marks of all of his hair; the merit of one of the Buddha’s greater marks is one hundred times that of the merit of all of his minor marks; and the merit of the mark of the white tuft of hair [surrounding his wisdom eye] is one thousand times that of the merit of all of the greater marks. Again, the merit of the Buddha’s u¤«‡¤a is one hundred thousand times greater than the merit of the Buddha’s hair tuft, and the merit of the mark of the Buddha’s heavenly voice, whereby he causes the voice of one sound to permeate throughout the limitless worlds of the ten directions, preaches the dharma, and pro³ts sentient beings, each according to their 26 The ten knowledges of the Buddha: knowledge of (1) right and wrong; (2) the relation between action and its result; (3) meditation, liberation, insight, and concentration; (4) the capacity of sentient beings; (5) the desires of sentient beings; (6) the state of all things; (7) rebirth; (8) the past; (9) the birth and death of sentient beings; and (10) the destruction of all afµictions. 27 (1) No fear of error (i.e., the Buddha is omniscient); (2) no fear of the obstacles (i.e., the Buddha has extinguished all kleša; (3) no fear of the teaching (i.e., the Buddha has taught the overcoming of the obstacles; and (4) no fear of liberation (i.e., the Buddha has taught the path to liberation). 28 Whether sentient beings (1) have faith in the Buddha, (2) do not have faith in the Buddha, or (3) both have faith and do not have faith in the Buddha, he calmly abides in correct thoughts and wisdom. 29 Lit. “the three that are unguarded,” i.e., the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha are pure and do not need to be guarded against de³lement. 30 The 140 unique characteristics of the Buddha consist of the 32 major marks, 80 minor marks, four purities, ten powers, four fearlessnesses, three places of mindfulness, three pure karmas, great compassion, never forgetting past mistakes, severing obstacles, and omniscience.
T #669, 16.474c, translated by Param„rtha, ca. 557; the version cited here differs signi³cantly from the Taishõ version as far as language is concerned, though the meaning is essentially the same. 31
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type, is ten thousand billion times the merit of the mark of the Buddha’s u¤«‡¤a. The adornment of wisdom is explained by the Ta chi ching [which states that] the wisdom perfected by all of the sentient beings in the three thousand great chiliocosms does not equal one one-hundredth part of the wisdom of a person who practices according to faith, nor even one one-thousandth part, so much so that you can not even calculate [the relationship] in a simile. If you take all of the wisdom perfected by such people as those who practice according to faith in all of the three thousand great chiliocosms, it would not be equal to the wisdom of one person who practices according to the dharma. In this way one can compare the wisdom of those who practice according to the dharma in the great chiliocosm to the wisdom of one person [who has achieved] the eight k¤„nti [and it does not equal one one-hundredth or one one-thousandth, so much so that it cannot be calculated even in a simile].32 In such a way the wisdom of all those who have [achieved] the eight knowledges [that emanate from the eight patiences on the path of seeing],33 in the great chiliocosm is [not] equal to the wisdom of a single stream-winner (srot„panna), and the comparison can be continued on up to a once-returner (sak£d„g„min), never-returner (an„g„min), arhat, and pratyekabuddha. If you took all of the wisdom of the pratyekabuddhas of the three thousand great chiliocosms it would [not] equal the wisdom of one kalpa-šata bodhisattva.34 The comparison can be continued in this manner for the bodhisattvas who have gained patience, the never-retreating bodhisattvas, on up to the bodhisattvas in their last birth—it does not equal one one-hundredth or one one-thousandth [of the next higher rank], to the point that it cannot be measured in a simile. If all of the sentient beings of the innumerable and boundless worlds were to have perfected wisdom such as that of a bodhisattva in their last birth, still it would not equal one one-hundredth or one one-thousandth of the Tathagata’s wisdom of discerning truth and nontruth,35 indeed so much so that the difference cannot be measured in a simile.36 32 The eight k¤„nti refer to realizations obtained on the daršana-m„rga with regard to each of the four noble truths in (a) the desire realm and (b) the form and formless realms. 33 The knowledge, based on the preceding patience, with regard to each of the four noble truths in each of the realms. On beginning this stage one is considered to be approaching the fruit of the stream-winner; upon the sixteenth moment (which completes the eight forebearances and eight knowledges) the practitioner abides in the fruit of stream-winner and simultaneously approaches the fruit of once-returner. 34 A bodhisattva who has ³nished the practices of the three limitless kalpas and is perfecting the practices that result in the 32 major marks of a Buddha. 35
One of the ten powers described above.
36
T #397 (12), 13.193a.
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All of the above comparisons of the differing degrees of wisdom concern the adornment of the Buddha’s wisdom. As explained before, the degree of merit and wisdom is called the full perfection of the inner reward. The full perfection of the outer reward is as the Hua-yen Sutra teaches: The bodhisattva Samantabhadra vowed: “When I have attained a Pure Land all of the adornments of the Three Worlds will be manifested therein.”37
This is the meaning of the full perfection of the outer rewards. Again, the Hua-yen Sutra generally explains the meaning of the degree of the completion of the Buddha’s merits: If all of the sentient beings in the ten directions All at one time gained true enlightenment, Each of those various enlightened [beings] Would have an indescribably pure and profound body. The Tathagata’s head on each of those Pure and wonderful bodies would also be indescribable. Each of those Tathagata’s heads would have An indescribably broad and long tongue, And each of those broad and long tongues Would speak with an unlimited pure and wonderful voice. Even with this wonderful voice They would not be able to [fully] Praise the Buddha in one kalpa. Nor would they be able to [fully] praise and proclaim The Buddha’s merits in all of the kalpas. Nor would they be able to [fully praise the Buddha’s merits] if they exhausted the kalpas, Because the praise of the Buddha’s merits is without exhaustion.38
The above comprises the sixth point, namely the cause and effect of full perfection. What follows is the fourth section, the interpretation of the text [of the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse].
37
T #278, 9.416a.
38
T #278, 9.589a.
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[IV. Interpretation of the Text] The text [of the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse] illustrates the meaning within eleven sections. As the text extensively enumerates them we will not take the trouble to completely list [all of them here]. [1. The Initiator of the Practice] Text: The ³rst item clari³es the initiator of the practice—this refers to Hsin-hsing. Commentary: This refers to the bodhisattva with the capacity for the Ekay„na and is complete in three meanings:39 1. Understanding the true. 2. Practicing the profound. 3. Reducing the afµiction. “Understanding the true” means to discriminate the identity of emptiness and existence, great and small, de³led and pure, disagreeable and agreeable, false and true, good and bad, the six paramitas, etc., on up to and including the identity of the dharmadh„tu and the dharma40 that is also like this; this is the understanding of the true. The “practice of the profound” refers to the practice of the virtuous and harmonious: that which should be severed is completely severed and that which is to be cultivated is completely cultivated. This is the practice of the profound. “Reducing the afµiction” means that upon hearing of the various light and heavy evils [that stem from] a deluded mind such as [one afµicted by] the ten evils,41 the ³ve fears,42 or the three sicknesses,43 or upon hearing in this fashion of the identity of the shallow and deep with regards to practice based on false understanding, or upon hearing of the deluded attachment to harm and pro³t, or upon hearing of the judgement of the false and true, many and few, or, again, hearing of the degrees of confusion about the 39
Cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 501 and 505 ff. See also the Hsin-hsing i wen, 6.
This could also be read as “… up to and including the dharmadh„tu. The identity of the dharmas is also like this.” 40
41 Killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, slander, idle talk, improper speech, greed, anger, and wrong views. 42 Fear of (1) giving everything; (2) losing one’s reputation; (3) death; (4) evil; and (5) speaking to a group. 43
Greed, anger, and ignorance.
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dharma, or hearing in this fashion of the light and heavy evils [that come from a deluded mind]—upon hearing [of any of these things] they are permanently severed. Again, [if the practitioner] is able to discard that of small merit upon hearing of it and cultivate that of great merit upon hearing of it, this is what is meant by reducing the afµiction. Question: If this is so, then why are not all those who have established the Inexhaustible Storehouse already [complete] in the three meanings of understanding the true, practicing the profound, and reducing the afµiction? Answer: In accordance with the teaching, one only needs to give to the Inexhaustible Storehouse and by so doing he will enter into the Universal Inexhaustible Storehouse of the dharma-realm of the Meditation Master Hsin-hsing. Again, one not only engages in the same practices together with the Meditation Master Hsin-hsing, but together with all of the Ekay„na bodhisattvas of the past, present, and future in all of the realms in all of the dharma-realms of the ten quarters of space, this one practice is the same. Because Hsin-hsing and all of the bodhisattvas are correct, those of the four ranks, [that is, those who engage in] the same practice, [those who] rejoice [in those practices], [and those who] see or hear [those practices] are also correct.44 It is like putting a snake into a bamboo tube—the tube is straight and so the snake also becomes straight. Because the same practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse [is cultivated] together with Hsin-hsing and the other [bodhisattvas], and because the [practice that] is the same is correct, the person who cultivates that same practice is also correct,45 and [one need] not fear false distortions. Again, the Inexhaustible Storehouse aids in repaying one’s past debts as [it aids in repaying] the burdens of the present; if those are repaid, how can one fear falseness? Repaying [one’s debts] is [therefore] the antidote [for falseness]. [2. The Times of Practice] Text: the second [item] is making the vow in all of the times of one’s practice from this life forward until obtaining Buddhahood. Commentary: According to the understanding of the Inexhaustible Storehouse, reject the interpretation of the teaching that contrasts the long and the short. However, from the beginningless past onward that which has been studied and practiced has had the nature of the short and hurried. [One should] now arouse the [bodhi] mind and cultivate the same practice together with those bodhisattvas [of the Ekay„na], discard the short and 44
Cf. the Hsin-hsing i wen, 5.
That is, because the practice, “that which is the same,” is correct, so is the practitioner, “he who cultivates the same.” 45
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hurried, and take a long time until achieving Buddhahood.46 [3. The Wide and the Narrow] Text: The third clari³es the wide and narrow—the universal is all. Commentary: This is called the relation between the wide and the narrow because from the beginningless past onward one’s actions were narrow and inferior, only for the sake of oneself and not others; for the sake of fathers, mothers, wives, children, and relatives and not for the sake of those who make requests [of one]; for the sake of that which is agreeable, our friends, and what we know rather than for the sake of what is disagreeable, those who have a grudge against our family, or those to whom we are indebted; or [again, one’s actions were] for the sake of rank, possessions, or power rather than for the sake of the poor. [Such actions] do not permeate the dharma realm and therefore are called narrow and inferior. Now, the practitioner should discard resentment, [abandon] the narrow and inferior, and draw close to that which is evenly and universally for the sake of all of the sentient beings of the dharma realm. [4. Discussion of the Practice] Text: The fourth clari³es the divisions of many and few of the dharma realm practices. In general there are two: (1) the Inexhaustible Storehouse [that is the perfection of the] eternal, joyous, self, and pure, and (2) the Inexhaustible Storehouse [that perfects the] suffering, empty, and impermanent. Commentary: The text is fully explained in the next item. [5. The Reasons for the Eternal and the Impermanent] Text: The ³fth clari³es the reasons for the eternal and the impermanent practices of the dharma realm. If any of the following three conditions obtain then the dharma realm practices are not fully complete and are impermanent: (1) the wide and narrow are undetermined; (2) the long and short are undetermined; (3) progression and retreat are undetermined. When each of the following three conditions obtain then the dharma realm practices are fully perfect and eternal: (1) they are wide and great like the dharma realm; (2) they [continue] day by day without break, exhausting the 46 The short and hurried refers to practices that bene³t only oneself; the “long” refers to bodhisattva practices for all sentient beings (see above, “The Relation between Self and Others.” As Yabuki has noted (Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 627), this is an application of the idea of the co-extension of self and others to the realm of temporal concerns. Therefore, inasmuch as the bodhisattva vows to reach Buddhahood only together with all sentient beings, it will require a long time.
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future limits; (3) there is no retreating until life is exhausted. Commentary: These three meanings are also called the meaning of the wide, long, and deep; because one has completely discarded life and possessions,47 never retreating until the ultimate is reached, it is called deep. These three meanings are taught according to the Mah„y„nasa½graha-[bh„¤ya], in which they correspond to the four practices:48 1. The wide and great dharma realm corresponds to what the Treatise teaches as the practice with no remainder. This is cultivating all of the myriad practices, numerous as grains of sand, without which one is not cultivated. 2. The ultimate, like space. This corresponds to what the Treatise teaches as the practice of respecting all. This is to exhaust the principle in each practice and penetrate the origin, with the highest degree of zeal, utmost strength, exhausting one’s life, never avoiding suffering and evil, and practicing with an untainted mind. 3. Exhausting the future limits is explained by the Treatise as the practice of a long time. That is, each practice extends through the three great asa½khyeya kalpas. 4. Without rest is explained by the Treatise as practice without interval. This is the mind continuing without a moment of interruption. When each of these practices is complete the three meanings and four practices are called the [perfection of the] eternal, joyous, self, and pure practices. They are also called the Ekay„na and Mahayana practices. If 47 Cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 507, on “discarding life and possessions.” The “wide, long, and deep” refer to sections B. and C.; see above, pp. 270–72.
Param„rtha’s translation simply states: “The Treatise says ‘Cultivating myriad practices throughout unlimited, innumerable, hundreds of thousands of kotis of mah„kalpas.’ Commentary: The text illuminates the three wisdoms [hearing, thinking or reµection, and practice] and completes the four kinds of practice. Because it cannot be known by simile, it is ‘unlimited’; because it cannot be known through counting it is ‘innumerable’; ten billion equals one koti; because it is not one koti it says one thousand; again, because it is not one thousand [kotis] it says one hundred [thousand]; because it is not a small kalpa it says mah„[kalpa]; this therefore clari³es the practice of the long time. ‘Cultivating myriad practices’ illuminates the three cultivations of the uninterrupted [practice], the [practice of] respect, and the [practice] with no remainder” (T #1595, 31.209a). The text itself does not mention the four practices, nor does Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the text. Cf. the Koša and its explanation of the Buddha’s perfected virtues of cause, effect, and bene³ting others: “The ³rst, the perfected merit of cause, has four types. The ³rst is practice with no remainder, [socalled] because the two equipments of merit and wisdom are cultivated with nothing left over; the second is [called] the practice of a long time because the practice [continues] through innumerable great kalpas without µagging; the third is [called] the practice of nointerval because the practitioner is vigorous and courageous in every instant without ceasing; the fourth is [called] the practice of respect because that which is studied is respected without hesitation and the practitioner is without any sloth” (T #1558, 29.141b). 48
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they are not fully perfect then the three meanings and four practices are called the suffering, empty, and impermanent practices, as well as Triy„na and Hinayana practices. [6. The Completion of the Practices] Text: The sixth item clari³es the ease and dif³culty of perfecting the dharmarealm practices: the eternal, joyous, self, and pure Inexhaustible Storehouse can be perfected in a few places, not in many places. The suffering, empty, [and impermanent] Inexhaustible Storehouse may be obtained equally in many or few places, depending on the place. Commentary: The permanent and joyous Inexhaustible Storehouse is the same as the collection of practices of the perfected suchness body of the various buddhas and necessitates the full completion of the three meanings and four practices; thus it is only possible in a few places and cannot be developed in many places. Therefore it is called dif³cult.49 One must be in the capital, at the Hua-tu ssu. Because of the people at this great location the completion of the sixteen items is possible and one does not need to fear delusion because it is continuous with the truth of the Meditation Master [Hsin-hsing]. Below, the suffering and empty Inexhaustible Storehouse is the same as the collection of practices of the perfected accommodation body of sentient beings; it does not complete the three meanings and four practices. Thus it may be obtained equally in many places or few places, depending on the place, and is termed easy. These are such places as the merit of³ces O…Ð established throughout the prefectures and counties for the Ullamb„na Festival on the 15th of the seventh month—all [who participate in these] gain assistance in universal emancipation, spontaneous jubilation, and perfection. It is not necessary to bring [contributions] to the Hua-tu ssu.50 [7. The Great and the Small] Text: The seventh clari³es the relation between the great and small practices of the dharma-realm.51 If both types of practice, that is to say, the permanent and joyous as well as the suffering and empty, are perfected and exhausted, then it is the Mahayana. If only the partial practices of the empty and suffering are cultivated without exhausting the permanent and joyous, then this is determined as belonging to the Hinayana. 49
Cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 117, 507; Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 213.
Cf. Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 508, 628. We can easily surmise the institutional motivation behind declaring the Hua-tu ssu to be a superior place of practice. 50
51
Emended according to the Abridged Explanation of the Inexhaustible Storehouse.
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Commentary: The great includes within it the small and therefore completes both practices. The small does not include the great and therefore it is limited to the suffering and empty. It is like the sravaka Vinaya, which is itself included within the collection of precepts in the bodhisattva’s three collections of [pure] precepts.52 [8. The Many and the Few] Text: The eighth item illuminates the study of the many and the few. Although it is taught that phenomena are as numerous as grains of sand, the general teaching has sixteen [items]; if the general and the speci³c are taught together then there are more than thirty. There are also two kinds of giving: (1) only the general, daily giving of sixteen coins; (2) both the general and the speci³c, daily giving thirty coins. The characteristics of the general and the speci³c are explained at length below. Commentary: According to the Hua-yen Sutra it is taught that all of the practices of the dharma realm are [contained in] this Inexhaustible Storehouse; in short, this sutra teaches the ten kinds of Inexhaustible Storehouse dharma practices of faith, precepts, hearing, shame, etc.53 Eighty meanings of the dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse are taught according to the Ta chi ching;54 because the cause to the effect is taught, it is [called] the dharmarealm practice, and this is also the meaning of the Inexhaustible Storehouse. Within this [practice of the Inexhaustible Storehouse], the sixteen kinds of inexhaustible effects that return to inµuence one are obtained because of the practice of the sixteen kinds of inexhaustible causes. This is explained at length below. 1. Text: The ³rst is the study of making inexhaustible offerings to the Buddha—this consists of worshipping the Buddha, etc. Commentary: Within this [practice] material assistance in the worship of the Buddha is appropriate—repairing stupas, images, etc. This also includes the building of stupas and images, [but] ³rst repair the old and only after that has been exhausted build anew. Therefore the Sðtra says, “Building new [images and stupas] is not like repairing the old, whose merit is very 52 As taught in the Hua-yen Sutra, Bodhisattvabhðmi, etc., the three collections are: (1) precepts to prevent evil (the traditional precepts of the Vinaya); (2) precepts to encourage virtue (actions of body, mind, and speech that promote virtuous merit); and (3) precepts aimed for the salvation of all sentient beings (all of the bodhisattva practices bene³cial to sentient beings). See also Paul Groner, “Saichõ and the Bodhisattva Precepts” (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1979), 346 ff. 53
T #278, 9.474c ff.
This refers to the various inexhaustible practices of the Wu chin i p’u sa ching (Ak¤ayamati[nirdeša]-sðtra), T #397 (12), 13.210b. 54
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great.”55 Again [the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching] says, Repairing the old and not pretending to erect anew—that person’s merit is inconceivable.56
Because of this [inexhaustible] storehouse [of merit obtained through the repair of images, etc.], the practitioner immediately obtains the complete repayment of all offenses that prevent him from seeing the Buddha, such as stealing or damaging the Buddha’s things or the things of the stupa. In the future they will see various Buddhas, and because of causing all sentient beings to cultivate the worship of the Buddha, in the future they will go from one Buddha-land to the next Buddha-land, worshipping the various buddhas, converting sentient beings in those majestic and pure Buddha-lands until obtaining Buddhahood. [Upon obtaining Buddhahood they will have] a physical body subtle and pure, emitting inexhaustible rays of light that bene³t all. Thus the verse in the Hsien-shou chapter of the Hua-yen Sutra explains: Again, a light called “the adornment of the jewel” is emitted. That light awakens all of the multitudes, [Causing] them to obtain the surpassing jewel-store that can never be exhausted To offer to the various World-honored Ones. With the jewel offering to the buddhas, stupas and temples, As well as giving to all of the impoverished, With myriads of rare [things], offering the unsurpassed— This causes the perfection of the light [called] “adornment of the jewel.”57 Again, a light called “joyous” is emitted. That light awakens all the multitudes, Gladdens them and makes them take joy in the bodhi of the Buddha. Arousing the mind of joy and seeking the teacherless jewel, Establishing the image of the Tathagata’s great compassion, Seated on lotus, with the major and minor signs fully perfected, Proclaiming the unsurpassed merits Causes the perfection of the light [called] “joyous.”58 55 From the Hsiang fa chüeh i ching, T #2870, 85.1336a. This is also found (slightly revised) in the apocryphal work composed by the San-chieh-chiao monk Shih-li and others, the Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching (Yabuki, Sangaikyõ no kenkyð, 237); cf. the San chieh fo fa, 303 and the Liang ching hsin chi, chüan 3, 14. 56 T #2870, 85.1337b. The order of the two clauses is reversed in the Taishõ, i.e., “That person’s merit is inconceivable, [who] repairs the old and does not pretend to erect anew.” 57
T #278, 9.437b; cf. T #279, 10.76c.
58
T #278, 9.436b; cf. T #279, 10.75c.
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Again a light called “purity of the body” is emitted. Full perfection is caused by destroying the various [de³led] roots; Worshipping the various buddhas, stupas, and temples Causes one to obtain and perfect the light [called] “purity of the body.”59
2. Text: The second item is the study of making inexhaustible offerings to the dharma; this consists of reciting sutras. Commentary: In copying sutras, etc., one should also ³rst repair the old sutras and then make new [copies]. Through this [practice of the Inexhaustible] Storehouse one gains the immediate repayment of the offenses of stealing and harming all the things of the dharma and obstructing the dharma. Again, in the future one will be able to personally hear the Buddha preach the sutras of the twelve divisions and one will be able to understand much though hearing only a little. Being mindful and thoughtful, as it is taught, [one will] cultivate the practices that pro³t sentient beings. Again, the fruit of obtaining, hearing, and holding the dh„ra«‡ is that hearing it once, it is understood and never forgotten. As it is taught in the Hsien yu ching,60 Ãnanda, formerly a rich man, made offerings of reciting the scriptures for the monks, and this enabled him to gain the personal transmission of the complete Buddha-dharma with nothing left out, like water poured from one vessel into another. Thus is the meaning. Because the light is emitted through the perfection of Buddhahood, the Hsien-shou [chapter of the Hua-yen Sutra] says in a verse: Again, a light called “joy in the dharma” is emitted; That light awakens all of the multitudes. Hearing the dharma explained, copying the scriptures, And always taking joy within the true dharma; Able to hold and protect the Buddha-dharma when it is about to perish, [It] causes the seeker of the dharma to be satis³ed. Enthusiastically persevering and cultivating the practice of the true dharma of the Buddha Causes the obtaining of this light [called] “joy in the dharma.”61 Again, a light called “dharma mastery” is emitted; That light awakens all of the multitudes. [And enables them to obtain] the storehouse of dh„ra«‡ that cannot be exhausted, And to uphold all of the Tathagata’s dharma. Respecting and making offerings to the upholder of the dharma, 59
T #278, 9.437c; cf. T #279, 10.77a.
60
T #202, 4.349a-445a.
61
T #278, 9.437b; cf. T #279, 10.76c.
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Protecting and defending the assemblies of sages, And the limitless dharma of giving to sentient beings— These are the causes of obtaining the light [called] “mastery.”62
3. Text: The third [practice] is the study of making inexhaustible offerings to the sangha; this consists in universally making offerings without questioning whether they observe the precepts or transgress the precepts. Commentary: This means universally offering in one moment, not only to those who hold the precepts but also to those who break the precepts. According to the Ta chi yüeh tsang fen ching, it is also necessary to make offerings ³rst to those who break the precepts or are without the precepts.63 The teaching of the Meditation Master [Hsin-hsing] led the donors, teaching them to give ³rst to the community of monks who give offense and later offer to the monks who request [offerings]. Why is this? The community of offending monks does not rely on the precepts, and this means that they are breaking the precepts. If the donor is not able to give to the community of monks who offend in their practice of the Buddha-dharma, then this is [not] the superior [practice].64 If [the monks] desire to receive [the offerings of] the almsgiver and request [that they receive offerings] ³rst, [you should] inquire as to whether or not they have taken in the offending community [of monks]. If not, [then you should] say that you cannot [make offerings to them] and you should not receive their requests. The dharma of offering itself has three gates: (1) clarifying the dharma of inviting monks; (2) clarifying the dharma of making offerings; (3) clarifying the dharma of giving. 62
T #278, 9.436c; cf. T #279, 10.76a.
The only passage that I can ³nd that appears to support this reference comes right after the explanation of the “³ve ³ve-hundred” year periods of the Buddha-dharma: “Although there will be those who shave their heads and don the monastic robes, they will destroy the precepts and not practice according to the dharma; they will be falsely called bhiksus. If there is a d„napati who gives to such bhiksus—[who are bhiksus] in name only and break the precepts—if he makes offerings to them, protects and supports them, I declare that this person will obtain limitless and numberless collections of great virtuous merits. Why is this? Because he is generous and brings pro³ts to many sentient beings.… In all the world the Buddhajewel is unsurpassed. If there is no Buddha-jewel then the pratyekabuddha is unsurpassed. If there is no pratyekabuddha then the arhats are unsurpassed [etc. on up to] if there are none who hold the pure precepts then those who hold the sullied precepts are unsurpassed; if there are none who hold the sullied precepts then those who have shaved their heads and donned the monastic robes but are monks in name only are the unsurpassed jewel.” T #397 (15), 13.363b. 63
This is a tentative translation, based on the context of the passage. The text is damaged at this point, indicating one missing character preceding “to go beyond,” which I have rendered as “superior.” 64
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The ³rst [of the three gates], clarifying the dharma of inviting monks, also has three types: (a) clarifying the harm of individual invitations; (b) clarifying the pro³t of universal invitations; (c) clarifying the dharma of receiving the invitations. The ³rst [aspect of] clarifying the harm of individual invitations has ten catagories: (1) stealing the monks’ things; (2) decreasing the merit of the giver; (3) dharma of the heterodox paths; (4) not following the ³lial path; (5) rapid destruction of the Buddha-dharma; (6) obstructing the four Aryan fruits; (7) not seeing the Buddha in the future; (8) not understanding the faith of giving; (9) spirits; (10) ³nding fault with the sages. As the Brahmaj„la-sðtra teaches: Never, good sons, receive individual invitations nor pro³t and support for oneself. The pro³t and support belong to the monks of the ten quarters; if you accept individual invitations then you take the things belonging to the monks of the ten quarters for yourself. Good sons, if there is a bodhisattva, whether renunciant or householder, and a donor desires to invite the monks of the Field of Merit he should go to the monastery [to ascertain what they desire] and ask the director of affairs [karmad„na] regarding the proper way to do this, saying, “I now wish to invite the monks to tell me what they want.” The administrator should then announce the order in which the monks will be invited; thus will the sages and saintly monks of the ten quarters receive [the invitations of the donor]. If a person of the world individually invites ³ve hundred arhats, bodhisattvas, or monks, this is not like inviting a monk or one ordinary monk whose turn it is. If an individual monk is invited it is the practice of the heretics; the teaching of the seven buddhas does not include individual invitations, and [individual invitations] do not conform to the path of obedience.65
65
T #1484, 24.1007a; the translation of the quote is partially restored from the Taishõ.
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Index
Abhidharmakoša, 40
An lo chi HðT, 73, 130 Anumodan„, 167, 261 Anupubbikath„, 124, 157, 236 An-yang HR, 5, 7 Apocalypticism, 17, 39–40, 55–60, 62, 68, 74, 153, 190–91, 207, 224–28, 230–31, 233, 235–36 Apocryphal scriptures, 67–68, 205 Asanga, 165 Asceticism, 25, 27, 30, 40, 58, 63, 138–39, 163, 193, 204, 214, 226, 229–30 Ašðnya, 107, 113, 121 Ašoka, 44–45, 63, 138–39, 161, 209 Ašoka-avad„na, 136, 139 Úraya, 108 Assorted Rules for Community Regulation (Chih chung shih chu fa £Lª”À), 11–12, 20, 23, 77, 86, 91, 104, 141–47 A¤¦as„hasrik„-prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra, 170 Austerities, 10, 27, 29, 142–43, 145, 243 Awakening of Mahayana Faith, 106, 109
Abridged Explanation of [the Dharma of] the Inexhaustible Storehouse (Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo [¦áÀ F‰), 79, 176–77, 199, 202, 257–64, 267, 276–79 Abridged Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Lüeh ch’i chieh fo ming F̉Me), 22. See also Seven Roster Buddhan„ma Abridged Teaching on the Contemplation of the Three Levels (San chieh kuan fa lüeh shih X‰ÖÀFt), 21 Absolutism, 34, 100, 240–92 Adhigama, 45 Adventitious de³lement, 101, 107–108, 268 Ãgama Sutras, 262 Agantukakleša, see Adventitious de³lement Aggañña-sutta, 39–40 Ak¤aya, 170–71 Ak¤ayamati[nirdeša]-sðtra, 284 Ak¤aya-n‡v‡, ak¤ayanik„, ak¤ayanik„d„na, 163 Akunin shõki Õ^±n, 122 Ãlayavijñ„na, 107–109, 138, 158 Ambattha Sutta, 157 Amida, 29, 168, 203 Amitabha, 122, 125, 131 Amoghavajra, 217, 248, 263 Aªguttara-nik„ya, 33, 42–44, 157, 159–60
Begging, 16, 22, 25–26, 63,
138–39, 143, 146, 155, 161, 163, 179–80, 204–205, 207, 219, 263, 270, 272–73 Bhadanta, 144, 204 Bhadrakalpika-sðtra, 63 Bh„van„-m„rga, 88 Biographies of Eminent Monks, 4, 136 Bodhiruci, 216, 270 325
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Bodhisattvabhðmi, 284 Bowl, begging, 62–63, 138 Brahm„yusutta, 157 Buddhabhadra, 104 Buddhadasa, 184 Buddha-dharma of the Three Levels. See San chieh fo fa Buddha-dh„tu, 99, 112, 114–15 Buddhaghosa, 45, 167 Buddhan„ma, 22–23, 29–30, 40, 193, 218, 223, 263 Buddhan„ma-sðtra, 105 Buddha-nature, 17–19, 27–28, 30, 33, 85, 89, 99–102, 107–108, 112–22, 130–31, 141, 145, 147, 168–69, 180, 223, 243, 247–48, 251–56 Buddha-nature Buddha (Fo-hsing fo M§M), 85, 105, 112–13, 115–16, 119, 126, 141, 251, 254 Buddhat„, 116 Buddhavacana, 42, 48–50, 74, 237
Cakkavatti-s‡han„da-sutta, 40 Cakravartin, 273 Catu¤-pratisara«a, 239 Catur-sa½graha-vastu / catv„risa½graha-vastðni, 164, 268 Ch„ndogya Upani¤ad, 111 Ch’ang-an chih ˜Hƒ, 195–96, 217 Charity, 28, 63, 153–54, 157, 165–66, 169, 180–81, 184, 201, 209, 265, 268, 270, 272. See also d„na Chen-chi ssu ³ù±, 5, 10, 13, 195, 201, 211 Cheng fa ±À, 77–78. See Saddharma Chen ju hsing ch’i ³Ø§˜, 109 Chen yüan hsin ting shih chiao mu lu ÌâGÏt*‡É, 199, 218, 257, 263, 265 Chia she chieh ching ‹èº÷, 61 Ch’i chieh fo ming ̉Me. See Seven Roster Buddhan„ma Ch’i chieh fo ming ching ̉Me÷. See Seven Roster Buddhan„ma
Chih chung shih chu fa £Lª”À, 11 Chih fa £À. See Assorted Rules for Community Regulation Chih-lien Jš, 203 Chih-sheng JÃ, 34, 175, 200–201, 207, 216–17 Chih-tsang Já, 26 Chih-yen J§, 92, 103, 127 Ching-ming Ïe, 15, 144, 201–202 Ch’ing Pin-t’ou-lu fa −ûw¨À, 63, 138 Ching wen ÷k, 12 Ching-wan _÷=, 67, 71 Ching-ying Hui-yüan Ϲ½æ, 38, 56, 69, 72 Ching-yü ssu Ïo±, 204 Ch’i shih fa F7À, 26, 143, 214 Chi-tsang Ÿá, 56, 60, 66, 68, 88, 113–14, 116, 181 Chiu shih liu chung i hsüeh tao ching GYÂ)b·‡÷, 104 Chiu T’ang shu /N–, 210, 218 Chronologies and temporal schemes, 18, 50, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84–85, 224, 227, 232, 236 Ch’üan t’ang wen 6Nk, 212–13 Chüeh ting p’i ni ching ·ÏÈÍ÷, 22, 263 Chu fa wu cheng san mei fa men ™À[ùX*À–, 70 Chung ching mu lu L÷‡É, 105, 199, 205, 257 Chung kuan lun shu _ÖÇE, 68 Chung lun _Ç, 66 Chung-nan shan $Ç[, 4–5, 8, 13–14 Ch’u san tsang chi chi mXázT, 66, 104 Cittaprak£ti, 107 Collected Works on the Three Levels. See San chieh chi lu Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe (Ta sheng fa chieh wu chin tsang fa shih
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Ø/Àƒ[¦áÀt), 26, 137, 169–71, 173–75, 177–78, 260, 264 Community life, 14–17, 85–86, 134–47 Concentration, 20, 24, 276 Confession, 21–24, 30, 59, 73, 262–63 Confucian, 55, 57, 59, 64, 184, 194, 208, 221, 235 Confucius, 65, 215 Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks. See Hsü kao seng chuan Corvée labor, 64, 182, 211 Cosmogony, 39–40, 228–29 Counterfeit teaching, 45, 48, 60 Cullavagga, 25
D„na, 21, 28, 135–39, 144, 153–67, 171–79, 199, 202, 208–10, 235, 268 Dašacakra[-k¤itigarbha] Sutra, 79, 105, 118, 195, 255–56 Dh„ra«‡, 21, 286 Dh„tu-v„da, 99 Dhammapada, 167 Dhammat„, 37–38, 45. See also dharmat„ Dharmak¤ema, 61 Dharma Mirror Sutra. See Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching Dharmarak¤a, 61, 63 Dharmat„, 37, 42, 49, 116 Dhðta, 8, 10, 19, 21, 25–27, 30, 61, 90–91, 142, 144–45, 161, 176, 193, 204, 206, 223 Dhðta-gu«a, 25 Dhðtaªga, 25, 63, 214 Dhyana, 19, 22, 174, 223, 268 Diamond Sutra, 56, 264. See also Vajracchedik„-sðtra D‡gha-nik„ya, 33, 39–40, 157 D£¤¦i, 82
Emptiness, 21, 24, 100, 105, 107, 113–14, 116, 142, 170,261, 279; as an extreme view, 81, 83, 85, 87–89, 91, 93, 98, 125–26, 134, 252–54
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Eschatology, 41, 47, 55–63, 67–68, 72, 151, 168, 224–36. See also apocalypticism Eternalism, 128 Exclusivism, 190, 237–38
Fa-chieh Àƒ, 203 Fa mieh Àn (Skt. saddharmavipralopa), 17, 30, 49, 61, 67, 79, 232 Fan wang ching ¤}÷, 179–80 Fang teng [ch’an fa] ¾fHÀ, 8, 19, 21–24, 29, 143, 214, 262 Fang teng ching ¾f÷. See Ta fang teng t’o lo ni ching Fang teng san mei hsing fa ¾fX*‘À, 21, 24 Fa p’u t’i hsin yin yüan ‹¬ØDƒ+, 66 Fa shih À‚, 79, 144, 169, 257–58, 264 Fa-tsang Àá (Hua-yen patriarch), 82, 127, 170, 241 Fa-tsang Àá (Three Levels monk), 9, 26, 92, 127, 144, 200, 204–206 Fa yüan chu lin Àä(n, 60, 63, 69 Fei Chang-fang ¾˜Û, 56 Field of Compassion, 28, 143, 171–73, 184–85, 187, 210, 261, 269 Field of Merit, 29, 138, 143, 160, 164, 179, 181, 185, 271, 288 Fo-hsiang fo M`M, 105, 118. See also Perceived Buddha Fo hsing M§, 99, 102, 112–13, 116, 121. See also Buddha-nature Fo-hsing fo M§M, 105, 112, 115. See also Buddha-nature Buddha Fo hsing lun M§Ç, 102, 121 Fo shuo chüeh ting pi ni ching M‰·ÏÈÍ÷, 22, 263 Fo shuo fa mieh chin ching M‰Àn¦÷, 61, 67 Fo shou fo ming ching M‰Me÷, 105 Fo shuo Kuan Yao-wang Yao-shang erh p’u sa ching M‰Öæ÷æî̬O÷, 22
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Fo shuo shih so fan che yü ch’ieh fa ching ching (Dharma Mirror Sutra) M‰½š‹éî8Àù÷, 78, 175, 177, 179, 208, 216, 285 Fo shuo te hu chang che ching M‰¨D˜é÷, 62 Fo ting tsun sheng t’o lo ni ching M™¨§¼øÍ÷, 217 Fo ts’ang ching Má÷, 84, 125 Fo tsu t’ung chi MHjw, 69, 203, 210 Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma (P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM), 21, 106, 122, 247 Fu fa ts’ang ching $Àá÷, 13 Fu fa tsang yin yüan chuan $Àáƒ+Œ, 13, 62 Fu-hsien ssu Så±, 204–207, 212 Future Buddha (Tang-lai fo HZM), 39–40, 63, 105, 117–19, 141, 192, 207, 254–56 Gotra, 100, 113, 233 Gukanshõ, 231 Gunabhadra, 107 Gu«ap„ramit„, 114, 121, 174, 258
Hsüan-tsang éh, 62, 282 Hsüan-tsung é;, 190, 194, 208, 211–17, 219–21 Hsü kao seng chuan a¢’Œ, 3–7, 11, 13, 18, 20, 26, 28, 38, 70, 173, 193, 195, 201 Huai-kuan ;û, 34 Hua-tu ssu 59±, 13, 15, 138, 142, 151–52, 154, 165, 174–75, 181, 184–86, 188–89, 195–208, 210–13, 217–18, 283 Hua-yen TÕ, 33, 74, 92, 103, 105, 109–10, 115, 118, 122, 124, 148, 151, 168–69, 172–73, 180, 185, 188, 194, 220 Hua-yen Sutra, 12, 30, 99, 105, 124, 148, 151, 172–73, 223, 253, 255–56, 267, 269, 274, 278, 284–86 Hua-yen wu shih yao wen ta TÕ2Yê“g, 103 Hui-hui ½y, 181 Hui-jih ssu ½Õ±, 16 Hui-ju ½Ø, 5, 201 Hui-ssu ½„, 21, 60, 68–71, 76–77, 79, 92 Hui-tsan ½w, 7–8, 10, 14, 21, 26, 125, 143, 145 Hui-yüan ½æ, 38, 56, 58, 69, 72, 116 Hung-shan ssu e3±, 16
Heresy, 205, 223–24, 228, 230, 234,
Icchantika, 87, 93, 114, 121, 125, 128–29,
Ghanavyðha-sðtra, 106, 108, 248, 250
238, 240, 242 Hsiang fa …À, 61, 64, 66, 68, 77–79, 135–36, 166, 168, 172–73, 175, 177, 179, 181, 184–85, 223, 268–71, 285. See also Semblance teaching Hsiang fa chüeh i ching …À·”÷, 64, 68, 78–79, 135–36, 166, 168, 172–73, 175, 177, 179, 184–85, 223, 268–71, 285 Hsieh-chi mT, 203 Hsien ch’ieh ching Ú¥÷, 61 Hsien yu ching ÚT÷, 286 Hsing fo hsing ‘M§, 113 Hsin-hsing i wen =‘kk, 4–10, 19–20, 23–26, 86, 90, 174, 176, 199, 257, 259, 267, 272, 279–80 Hsin-hsing k’ou chi chen ju shih kuan ch’i hsu =‘ST³ØÄÖ˜, 78
131, 233 Inexhaustible goods, 162–63 Inexhaustible Storehouse, 28, 85–86, 104, 136–37, 144, 148, 151–56, 158, 160–62, 164–78, 180–82, 184–89, 194–208, 210–21, 226, 257–58, 260–62, 264–71, 273, 280–81, 283–85 Itivuttaka, 158
Jen chi lu ^TÉ, 11, 22, 199, 214, 257. See also San chieh chi lu Jen chi lu tu mu ^TÉ@‡, 22, 199, 257 Jen wan ching _÷÷, 69 Ji tsang fen Õá_, 62, 70 Ju-lai-tsang fo ØZáM, 105–107, 109. See also Tathagatagarbha Buddha
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K’ai yüan [shih chiao] lu ˆât*É,
Mah„m„y„-sðtra, 66, 84
12, 22, 26, 68, 105, 199, 200, 214, 216, 257, 263, 265 K„lacakra, 231 Kacc„yanagotta-sutta, 87 Kaly„namitra, 89, 104, 185 Kao Chiung ¢Â, 5, 10, 15, 136, 195–97, 203, 211, 221 Kao-tsung ¢;, 207 Karm„-vara«apratiprasrabdhi-sðtra, 63 Karu«„-pu«^ar‡ka-sðtra, 61, 63 Kuan fo san mei hai ching ÖMX*}÷, 104 Kuang ch’i chieh fo ming c̉Me, 22. See also Ch’i chieh fo ming Kuang-ming ssu Mg±, 15 Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching Ö[gV÷, 125–26 Kuang-yen ssu MÕ±, 9, 199 Kung te ch’u O…Ð, 174 Ku nieh p’an ching òÃæ÷, 68 Ku ta Hsin-hsing ch’an shih ming t’a pei ûØ=‘,‚jO·, 5, 13, 15, 202 Ku¦adanta Sutta, 157
Mah„pad„na-suttanta, 40 Mah„parinirv„«a, 87 Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra, 12, 46, 52, 56, 61–62, 67, 72, 112–15, 125, 128–29, 168–69, 223, 239, 262, 267–68. See also Nirvana Sutra Mah„prajñ„p„ramit„-sðtra, 266 Mah„sa½nip„ta-sðtra, 62 Mah„vagga, 44–45, 157 Mah„vairocana-sðtra, 165 Mah„vastu, 157 Mah„y„nasa½graha, 165, 282 Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra, 113, 165 Maitreya, 39–40, 55, 58, 63, 74, 99, 191–92, 221, 231, 236 Majhima-nik„ya, 157 Mappõ tõmyõki =Àagz, 139–40 Merit, 153–68, 172, 174–79, 181, 188, 260–61, 265–66, 271, 273, 276–78, 280, 282–85, 288 Miao sheng ching ting U§Ï÷, 68, 70 Mihirakula, 56, 62 Ming ch’i shih pa men fa gF7k–À, 26 Ming pao chi d³z, 5–7, 11, 13, 15–16, 18–20, 22, 27, 195, 201 Ming-tang g}, 208, 221 Ming ta sheng wu chin tsang gØ/[¦á, 257 Ming-tsang gá, 203 Ming-yin gˆ, 7–8 Mo Ch’an-shih †,‚, 29 Mo fa =À, 50, 63, 65–66, 70, 72, 76–79, 130–31, 191, 195, 225, 227–28, 232, 263 Mo ho chih kuan #äŒÖ, 86 Mo ho mo yeh ching #ä#œ÷, 66 Moneylending, 180 Mo shih =›, 17, 61, 78–79 Mðlasarv„stiv„da-vinaya, 49, 155
Laªk„vat„ra Sutra, 105–106, 108–10, 250 Laws of Manu, 155 Li chih fa C£À, 86, 146 Lien hua mien ching ¥Ts÷, 62–63 Ling-yü [È, 3, 22–23, 56, 72 Li tai ming hua chi }ÖeEz, 206, 214 Li tai san pao chi }ÖXÊw, 4–5, 7–8, 11, 22, 27, 65, 118, 195, 200, 206, 262 Liu shih li hsüan ch’i shih ´/øF7, 22 Lotus Sutra, 6, 25, 27, 29–30, 49–52, 56, 60–62, 78–79, 99, 102, 105–106, 112, 117–18, 121, 141, 203, 223, 237, 255–56, 262–63 Lüeh ch’i chieh fo ming F̉Me, 22. See also Abridged Seven Roster Buddhan„ma
N„g„rjuna, 66 Nan yüeh ssu ta ch’an shih li shih
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yüan wen Ç6„Ø,‚C½Xk, 69–70, 76 Narendrayašas, 62 Ney„rtha, 114, 123, 239 Neyattha, 42 Nirvana Sutra, 30, 61, 67, 79, 105, 113, 121, 125, 128, 168, 251–53, 256, 262, 266, 272–73. See also Mah„parinirv„«a-sðtra N‡t„rtha, 48, 114, 123, 239 N‡tattha, 42 Nitya, 114, 258 No-barrier festivals. See Wu che ta chai
Pañca-v„r¤ika, 138, 209. See also Wu che ta chai P’an chiao |*, 18, 35, 37, 56, 69, 92, 127, 193, 219–20, 223, 234, 237, 239, 241–42 Pao-shan Ê[, 72 Pariyatti, 38, 45 P„s„dikasutta, 33 Pašcimak„la, 17, 73. See also mo shih P’ei Hsüan-cheng ¨éB, 4, 9, 11, 15, 202 P’ei Hsüan-chih ¨éJ, 202–203 Pei hua ching «T÷, 61 Pei liang lu ë^É, 263 Pen-chi ûK, 4, 8, 11, 14, 20, 144 Penitence, 59 Perceived Buddha (Fo-hsiang fo M`M), 105, 118–19, 141, 255–56 Persecution, 7, 10, 17, 51, 65, 76, 144, 180, 224–25, 233 Pieh fa ƒÀ, 34, 92, 127, 145, 148, 205, 234, 238, 240, 242 Pi«^ola, 63, 138–40, 185 Po lun ßÇ, 66 Practice [that Arises] in Accord with the Capacity (Tui ken ch’i hsing Ï͘‘), 11–12, 18–21, 26–27, 80, 82–85, 90–91, 103–106, 110, 113, 117–20, 124, 126–29, 132–34, 141, 161,
176, 180, 240, 242, 260. See also Tui ken ch’i hsing fa Prak£tiparišuddhicitta, 107 Prak£tistha-gotra, 113 Prat‡tyasamutp„da, 110 Pratyutpannabuddhasa½mukh„vasthitasam„dhi-sðtra, 50 P’u fa 3À. See Universal Dharma P’u fa ssu fo 3ÀvM, 21, 106, 247. See also Four Buddhas of the Universal Dharma P’u fo 3M. See Universal Buddha Puñña, 158. See also merit Puñña-kkhetta, 160. See also Field of Merit Pu«ya, 165. See also merit
Ratnagotravibh„ga, 100, 106–109, 241 Ratnamegha-sðtra, 262–63 Repentance, 8, 22–24, 30, 68, 86, 103, 142–43, 145–46, 198, 209, 214, 223, 262
Sa½dhinirmocana-sðtra, 239, 242 Sa½yutta-nik„ya, 43, 45 Saªghabheda, 44 Saddhamma, 33, 37, 42–45, 48, 50, 97. See also Saddharma Saddharma, 12, 37, 40, 46, 49–52, 59, 70, 75, 77–78, 94, 97, 128, 219 Saddharma-pu«^ar‡ka-sðtra. See Lotus Sutra Saddharma-vipralopa, 17, 50–51 Samadhi, 20, 86, 144, 158, 223 San chieh chi X‰T, 196, 200, 214 San chieh chi lu X‰TÉ, 11, 200, 214 San chieh fa X‰À, 11 San chieh fo fa X‰MÀ, 11–12, 22, 77–85, 87, 89, 103, 106, 109–10, 117, 124–25, 128, 192–93, 199, 233, 247, 252, 255, 263, 267, 285 San chieh fo fa mi chi X‰MÀOz, 77–78, 80–85, 128 San chieh kuan fa lüeh shih X‰ÖÀ Ft. See Abridged Teaching on the Contemplation of the Three Levels
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San chieh wei pieh chi lu X‰RƒTÉ, 11 San ku Xò, 59 San kuo i shih Xçkª, 200 San shih wu fo li ming ch’an wen XY2Me/Ik, 263 San tsai Xó, 58 San-chieh-chiao X‰*, 16–17 Sangha household, 181, 184 Saptapðj„, 23 Sarv„stiv„da-vinaya, 56 Šatakaš„stra, 66 Scripture of the Lion’s Roar of Queen Šr‡m„l„. See Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra Semblance teaching (hsiang fa …À), 38, 50–51, 61, 63, 65–66, 68, 70–71, 73. See also hsiang fa Seng-hai ’}, 202 Seng-jui ’µ, 66 Seng-yung ’æ, 4, 10–11, 14–15, 20, 29, 85, 144, 201 Seven Roster Buddhan„ma (Ch’i chieh fo ming ̉Me), 22, 40, 142, 193, 218, 263 Shan-tao 3‚, 72, 76, 125, 234 Shih erh men lun shu YÌ–ÇE, 66 Shih fang chian wu pai fo ming ching Y¾æ2ßMe÷, 105 Shih lun ching YÇ÷, 89, 263 Shih lun i i li ming YÇS–Ce, 263 Shih lun lüeh ch’ao YÇF¿, 263 Shih shih yao lan t’êÔ, 186 Shih-li ‚2, 175, 207, 216–17, 285 Shinran V°, 8–9, 122, 139–40, 234–35 Shou pa chieh fa 1kwÀ, 7, 23, 143, 145 Siddh„nta, 74, 193, 239 Sig„lov„da-sutta, 156 Šik¤„-samuccaya, 263 Š‡la, 156–58, 165 Spiritual companions, 9, 14, 16, 86, 89–91 Šr‡m„l„dev‡-sðtra, 72, 105–107, 109–10, 114, 223, 248–49, 251, 270
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Sukh„vat‡vyðha-sðtra, 56, 125, 130, 267 Sutra on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life, 73
Ta a lo han Nan-t’i-mi-to-lo so shuo fa chu chi Ø%ø+ÊÎP−øš‰ ÀWz, 63, 138 Ta chi ching ØT÷, 62, 70, 277, 284 Ta chih tu lun ØJEÇ, 66 Ta chi yüeh tsang ching ØT½á÷, 131 Ta chi yüeh tsang fen ching ØT½á_÷, 137, 287. See also Yüeh tsang fen Ta chou [k’an ting chung ching mu] lu Ø:îÏL÷‡É, 12, 199, 205, 216–17, 257 Ta fang kuang shih lun ching ؾcYs÷, 263 Ta fang teng t’o lo ni ching ؾf¼øÍ÷, 22, 262 Ta Fo ming ching ØMe÷, 105 T’ai p’ing °´, 55, 57, 59, 187, 197–202 T’ai p’ing kuang chi °´cz, 187, 197–202 T’ai-tsung °;, 194, 207, 217 T’an-ching ·¹, 66 T’ang Hua tu ssu Ching ming ch’an shih Reliquary Inscription N5E±Ïe,‚O·, 202 T’ang hui yao Nyê, 211 Tang-lai fo HZM, 105, 117. See also Future Buddha Tang lai pien ching HZï÷, 61 T’ang liang ching ch’eng fang k’ao N²ÙôÖ†, 196, 211–13 Tan t’ou t’o ch’i shih fa w¼F7À, 26 Tan-luan ·°, 125 T’an-wu-lo-ch’an ·[øQ (Dharmak¤ema), 61 T’an-yao ·Þ, 85, 181–82, 184 Tao-an ‡H, 200 Tao te ching ‡…÷, 59, 88, 91 Tao-ch’o ‡&, 3, 8, 21, 56, 72–74, 76, 125, 130, 143, 192, 234
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Tao-cheng ‡±, 197 Tao-chin ‡Ç, 9 Tao-hsüan ‡è, 4–5, 9, 11, 13–14, 16, 18, 22, 28, 56, 136, 201–202 Taoism, 55, 57–58, 194, 211, 221 Tao-sheng ‡´, 102 Tao-shih ‡›, 60, 69 Ta sheng fa chieh wu ching tsang fa shih. See Commentary on the Dharma of the Inexhaustible Storehouse of the Mahayana Universe Ta sheng hsüan lun Ø/éÇ, 66, 113 Ta sheng ta chi ti ts’ang shih lun ching Ø/ØTGáYs÷, 263 Ta sheng wu chin tsang fa Ø/[¦áÀ, 199, 257 Ta T’ang nei tien lu ØN»øÉ, 11, 195, 200, 206 Ta te Ø…, 144, 204 Tathagatagarbha, 27, 33, 85, 99–102, 105–12, 114–15, 117–20, 126, 166, 241, 248, 251, 254–55 Tathagatagarbha Buddha (Ju-lai-tsang fo ØZáM), 85, 105–107, 109, 111–12, 114–15, 119, 126, 254 Tathat„, 109, 114, 117–18, 170 Ta yun ching ز÷, 205 Te-mei …Ë, 29 Ti ch’ih lun G³Ç, 271 T’ien shih ú‚, 58–59 Ti san chieh fo fa kuang shih ÙX‰MÀct, 247 Ti yu ch’uan G¹Œ, 265 Tripartite, 50, 61, 68–70, 72, 78 True dharma, 13–14, 33, 47–49, 79, 97, 125, 139, 193, 238, 270, 274–75, 286. See also Saddhamma, Saddharma Tsa a han ching F%L÷, 40 Tsa lei shen chou ching F{ä2÷, 104 Ts’e fu yüan kuei ¹,âì, 206, 212–13 Tsun sheng t’o lo ni ching ¨§¼øÍ÷, 217
Tui ken ch’i hsing fa Ï͘‘À, 11, 18, 20, 124, 236, 251, 256. See also Practice that Arises in Accord with the Capacity Tui ken ch’i hsing tsa lu ÏÍn‘FÉ, 11 Tui ken ch’i hsing tsa lu chi ÏÍn‘FÉT, 11 Tz’u-men ssu ²–±, 15
Ud„na, 157 Universal Buddha (p’u fo 3M), 27, 29, 95–122, 123, 131, 139–40, 180, 226, 237, 248, 255 Universal Dharma (p’u fa 3À), 85, 103, 105–106, 120, 122, 123–48, 191–94, 205, 213, 215, 219–20, 222, 224, 237–38, 240, 242, 247–48, 250, 252, 254, 256, 261 Up„liparip£cch„, 263 Up„lisutta, 157 Up„ya, 18, 37, 53, 75, 124, 236–42 Vajracchedik„-sðtra, 49–50, 52, 60 Vasubandhu, 53, 66, 108, 239–40 Vimalak‡rtinirdeša-sðtra, 172, 223, 239, 269–70 Vinaya in Ten Parts, 60
Wen-ti kÐ, 196 Wu che ta chai [ìØ+, 208–10. See also pañca-v„r¤ika Wu chin i p’u sa ching [¦[¬O÷, 284 Wu chin tsai [¦(, 163 Wu chin tsang [¦á, 169, 197–99, 257–58, 264, 267, 278–79, 283 Wu chin tsang fa [¦áÀ, 199, 257–58, 264, 267, 278–79 Wu chin tsang fa lüeh shuo [¦áÀF‰. See Abridged Explanation of [the Dharma of] the Inexhaustible Storehouse Wu liang shou ching [gV÷, 69, 72, 267
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Wu liang shou ching i shu [gV÷–E, 69, 72 Wu men kuan 2–Ö, 21 Wu shang i ching [îS÷, 276
Ya yang seng Ýæ’ (“mute sheep monks”), 89, 146
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Yang-ti J^Ð, 196 Yeh R, 5, 7, 14, 17, 23, 66 Yüeh teng san mei ching ½bX*÷, 62 Yüeh tsang fen ½á_, 62, 70, 72–73, 84, 130, 137, 287 Yðzð Nenbutsu ΧçM, 173, 176, 260
