Adapting Institutions Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience What can we learn about the governance of...
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Adapting Institutions Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience What can we learn about the governance of uncertainty and change? How can we adapt and even transform existing institutions towards social–ecological resilience? â•… While theories about governance continue to evolve, the context of global environmental change poses unique challenges to the management of networked ecosystems, cities, organisations and institutions. Written by an international team of experts, this book provides cutting-edge insights into adapting institutions for building resilience and adaptive governance of complex social–ecological systems. Through a set of case studies, it focuses on the social science dimension of ecosystem management in the context of global change in a move to bridge existing gaps between resilience, sustainability and social science. â•… Using empirical examples ranging from local to global levels, it integrates a variety of disciplines including political science, anthropology, resilience science and adaptation, and will provide an important resource for scholars, policy-makers and students. E m i l y B o y d is a Reader in environmental change and human communities in the department of Geography and Environmental Science and Director of the Human Environments research group at the University of Reading. She is also a Research Associate at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. Her current research and teaching focuses on climate change and development, environmental governance, resilience and human communites. C a r l F o l k e is Director of the Beijer Institute, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and Science Director of the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, and is among the founders of the Resilience Alliance. His research emphasises the role that living systems at different scales play in social and economic development, and how to govern and manage for resilience in interdependent social–ecological systems.
Adapting Institutions Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience Edited by
emily boyd Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, UK and Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Sweden carl folke Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Sweden, The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden
 cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521897501 © Cambridge University Press 2012 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2012 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Adapting institutions : governance, complexity, and social–ecological resilience / [edited by] Emily Boyd, Carl Folke. p.â•… cm. Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 978-0-521-89750-1 1.╇ Environmental management–Social aspects.â•… 2.╇ Ecosystem management–Social aspects.â•… 3.╇ Sustainable development–Environmental aspects.â•… 4.╇ Environmental policy.â•… 5.╇ Globalization–Environmental aspects.â•… 6.╇ Global governance.â•… I.╇ Boyd, Emily.â•… II.╇ Folke, Carl. GE300.A33 2011â•…â•…â•… 333.7--dc23 2011026295 ISBN 978-0-521-89750-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To our children
Contents
List of illustrations List of contributors Foreword by Elinor Ostrom Acknowledgements List of acronyms and abbreviations
1
Adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity: an introduction
page ix xii xvii xix xx
1
emily boyd and carl folke
Part I Adapting local institutions, networks, leadership and learning 2
Knowledge, social networks and leadership: setting the stage for the development of adaptive institutions?
9
11
beatrice crona and örjan bodin
3
Adaptive capacity of local indigenous institutions: the case of the taboo forests of southern Madagascar
37
maria tengö and jacob von heland
4
Adapting to change: tracing farmers’ responses to disturbances in irrigation systems in Nepal
75
ingela ternström
5
Creating incentives for increased public engagement in ecosystem management through urban commons
101
johan colding
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Contents
╇ 6
Part II Adapting and governing public institutions for uncertainty and complexity
125
Adaptive capacity and the ecostate
127
andreas duit
╇ 7
Food systems and adaptive governance: food crisis in Niger
148
sirkku juhola
╇ 8
9
Public–private partnerships in the provision of environmental governance: a case of disaster management emma l. tompkins and lisa-ann hurlston
171
Part III Adapting multi-level institutions to environmental crisis
191
Double complexity: information technology and reconfigurations in adaptive governance
193
victor galaz
10
Adaptive governance and natural hazards: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the governance of coastal ecosystems in Sri Lanka
216
alison ashlin
11
Adapting to global climate change: evaluating resilience in two networked public institutions
240
emily boyd
12
Conclusions: adapting institutions and resilience
264
emily boyd and carl folke
Index
281
Illustrations
figures
╇ 2.1 Map of the coastal seascape in focus page╇ 13 ╇ 2.2 Multidimensional scaling plot showing the social network structure of relations among groups based on predefined occupational categories 20 ╇ 2.3 Relative difference in local ecological knowledge among different occupational groups operating in the target 23 community ╇ 2.4 Degree centrality for the combined networks of knowledge exchange and sharing of fishing gear 28 ╇ 3.1 Androy, southern Madagascar. Taboo forest patches clearly visible on LandSat image 43 ╇ 3.2 Classification of forest cover change between 1986 and 2000 45 ╇ 4.1 Floods and landslides flowchart 81 ╇ 4.2 New users flowchart 84 ╇ 4.3 Offer of external support flowchart 88 ╇ 4.4 Implementation of external support flowchart 91 ╇ 5.1 The proportion of people living in one- and two-dwelling buildings decreases successively with population density 105 ╇ 6.1 The emerging ecostate 136 ╇ 6.2 Policy diversity in 24 countries 140 ╇ 7.1 Ranking of Niger in the UNDP Human Development Index 155 ╇ 8.1 Formal government hurricane preparedness and response strategy 179 10.1 The decrease in mangrove forest area in Sri Lanka 223 between 1980 and 2008 ix
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List of illustrations
10.2 The distribution of funds for coastal environmental initiatives 10.3 A flowchart mapping the different pathways used to fund, facilitate and implement coastal ecosystem initiatives in Sri Lanka before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 10.4 A flowchart mapping the different pathways used to fund, facilitate and implement coastal ecosystem initiatives in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 10.5 A comparison of the mechanisms employed for implementing coastal ecosystem initiatives in pre-tsunami and post-tsunami Sri Lanka
225
226
227
228
tables
╇ 2.1 Sociomatrix based on occupational groups ╇ 2.2 Summary of local ecological knowledge (LEK) of different occupational groups ╇ 3.1 Summary of sources of adaptive capacity in the taboo forest governance system ╇ 4.1 Disturbances and actions ╇ 4.2 Sources and effects of disturbances ╇ 5.1 Bundles of property rights associated with positions ╇ 5.2 Ecosystem services provided by community gardens and allotment areas ╇ 7.1 Projections of food and hunger indicators by region ╇ 7.2 Adaptive governance principles in relation to the Niger crisis of 2004–05 ╇ 9.1 Adaptive reconfigurations in high-reliability organisations (HROs) ╇ 9.2 Simplified adaptive reconfigurations in emerging infective disease (EID) governance 10.1 Environmental legislation and regulation from 1885 to 2003, as applicable to coastal ecosystems in Sri Lanka 11.1 Features of ecological, social–ecological and institutional resilience 11.2 Syntheses of potential resilience criteria and indicators for evaluating adapting institutions
19 21 64 93 98 105 117 151 165 201 210
222 245 247
List of illustrations boxes
5.1 7.1 8.1
Ecological values of allotment areas Relevant institutions and early warning systems in the Sahel Section 4 of the Emergency Powers Law (1997)
118 157 180
xi
Contributors
Alison Ashlin has a doctorate from the Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK. To date her research has concentrated on the opportunities for socio-ecological change after a natural disaster. Her doctoral thesis specifically focused on the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on the management of coastal ecosystems in Sri Lanka. Before studying for her doctorate Alison worked in the communications sector, and as a result she is also interested in discourse and the media representation of science. Örjan Bodin is an Associate Professor at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and at the Department of Systems Ecology at Stockholm University, Sweden. His current research focuses on aspects of information and knowledge sharing in collaborative governance of ecosystems, and in studying ecological consequences of habitat fragmentation. He is particularly interested in using network analysis to study various aspects of ecosystems governance. Emily Boyd is a Reader in environmental change and human communities in the department of Geography and Environmental Science and Director of the Human Environments research group at the University of Reading. She is also a research associate at the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Previous positions have included deputy director of the Leeds University Centre for Global Development in the School of Politics and International Studies, research leader at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and Leverhulme/James Martin 21st Century Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. Her current research and teaching focuses on climate change and international development, environmental governance, resilience and human communities.
xii
List of contributors
Johan Colding is Assistant Professor at the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Stockholm, and theme leader for urban research at the Stockholm Resilience Centre. His research covers both basic and applied ecological problems, with an emphasis on building resilience in urban social–ecological systems. His areas of expertise include governance of social–ecological systems, institutions and property rights, resilience science, ecological economics, biodiversity conservation, land-use planning and landscape design, land and water resources, and landscape analysis. Beatrice Crona is an Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, and an affiliated research fellow at the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, UK. Her work is structured around three themes: learning and knowledge systems in natural resources governance, social networks in natural resource governance, and social–ecological feedbacks and traps, with a particular focus on small-scale fisheries. Much of her work has been in East Africa, but current research is expanding in the Baltic region and in the semiarid southwest of the United States. Her publication record ranges from ecological studies to work on science-policy interactions and social networks of communication, linked to natural resource management. Andreas Duit works in the field of comparative environmental Â�politics, with special focus on governance and complexity, institutional theory and the role of the state in addressing environmental problems. He is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and a research fellow at the Stockholm Resilience Center, both at Stockholm University. Carl Folke is Director of the Beijer Institute, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and Science Director of the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University and is among the founders of the Resilience Alliance. His research emphasises the role that living systems at different scales play in social and economic development, and how to govern and manage for resilience in interdependent social–ecological systems and has written extensively on those issues. He is editor-in-chief of Ecology and Society and an elected member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and serves as advisor to research institutes, policy processes and the Swedish government. He received the 1995 Pew Scholar Award in Conservation and the Environment, and in 2004 he was awarded the Sustainability Science Award of the Ecological Society of America.
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List of contributors
Victor Galaz is a researcher and research theme leader at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. His current research and teaching focuses on adaptive governance and global governance of complex environmental risks such as pandemics and planetary boundaries. He has published extensively on institutional dimensions of resilience. Lisa-Ann Hurlston is the Manager of the Sustainable Development Unit at the Cayman Islands Government Department of Environment. As co-chair of the National Climate Change Committee, she was instrumental in formulating an adaptation policy for the Cayman Islands. She advises on adaptation and mitigation issues relevant to UK Overseas Territories in international climate negotiations. Her continuing efforts include integrating climate-change impacts into local environmental assessment processes and advising public and private sectors in practical applications of adaptation and mitigation measures. She has published papers on adaptation to climate change in the Cayman Islands and an adaptation guidebook for small islands. Sirkku Juhola is a researcher at the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Aalto University, Finland. Her current research focuses on governance of climate change in both developed and developing countries, with particular emphasis on cross-scale interaction. Sirkku is also the Deputy Chief Scientist of the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Strategic Adaptation Research (NORD-STAR), which is funded by the Norden Top-level Research Initiative sub-programme ‘Effect Studies and Adaptation to Climate Change’. Maria Tengö is a researcher at the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Her work concerns how people organise themselves and interact with ecosystems at different scales to navigate change in the social–ecological system. She is interested in human-dominated systems, with a focus on agriculture, and her research is based on field work in Tanzania, Madagascar, Sweden and Canada. Ingela Ternström is an independent consultant working on aid, environment and development issues. She has a doctorate in economics and was previously a researcher at the Beijer Institute. Her research focuses on natural resource management, especially common-pool resource management, and how resource users react and adapt to various disturbances such as natural disasters, migration, economic development and HIV/AIDS.
List of contributors
Emma L. Tompkins is a Reader in environment and development at the University of Southampton. She is a lead author for the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and a subject editor for Ecology and Society, and she sits on the Advisory Board of the UK Climate Impacts Programme. She has recently been on secondment to the UK Department for International Development, providing advice on climate-change adaptation in developing countries. Her research and teaching focuses on risk, decision-making, resilience, climate-change adaptation, small islands and coastal areas. Jacob von Heland is with the Natural Resource Management Group, Department of Systems Ecology, and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. He works with livelihood issues in southern Madagascar, exploring the relations between ecological anthropology and social–ecological systems. He has also followed the discourse formation and formalisation in the drafting of the Madrid Action Plan aimed to guide UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere programme.
xv
Foreword elinor ostrom
Emily Boyd and Carl Folke have brought together an important set of studies of adaptive institutions, covering diverse scales from local to global. While many of the cases analysed are local and give the reader rich theoretical and empirical overviews of the multiple challenges faced by small- to medium-sized populations in Madagascar, Nepal and urban areas around the world, the book also reaches up to include studies of the Indian Ocean tsunami and global climate change. A potential reader might wonder about the substantial range of empirical studies in the book and ask, why should I read about all these different problems when I specialise in problem X in region Y? The answer is that Boyd and Folke introduce a core puzzle facing all of us in today’s world: How can we analyse our current institutions that have developed over time to cope with a particular set of problems and address how likely they are to cope effectively with changes in the complex social and ecological worlds around us? This is one of the fundamental questions of our times! We must stop being complacent about humanly designed systems that have worked relatively well for solving X, Y and Z problems in settings A, B and C. We must recognise that all social–ecological systems face new challenges over time, and understand how and why some are adaptive and survive substantial threats of diverse origins, and others do not continue to generate positive outcomes and collapse. Static analysis is useful when one wants to know how a particular social–ecological system operates. And it may take substantial effort just to understand how a complex system operates in an unchanging world. Static analysis of particular types of systems is the first requirement, and a tough one, when dealing with complex systems. But without serious efforts to identify changes that can occur within the system itself (a part wears out in a mechanical system, or a political leader or party xvii
xviii
Foreword
exhausts the relevance of an agenda to solve maturing problems), and in the environment in which the system operates, static analysis is the first step but is not sufficient for gaining effective systems knowledge in an ever-changing world. In one volume, Boyd and Folke have brought together resilience thinking (which initially related to ecological systems operating over time), the analysis of changing social–ecological systems, the problems of fit and the need to understand adaptive governance of resilient systems. As they state, ‘Resilience is the ability to reorganise following crisis, continuing to learn, evolving with the same identity and function, and also innovating and sowing the seeds for transformation’ (Chapter 12). Their cases are all written by knowledgeable scholars and focus on how diverse systems coped with gradual or abrupt changes and how institutions did or did not adapt to these changes over time. Each chapter is worth serious reading and reflection. This is not a book to be read rapidly in a few evenings for casual recreational enjoyment. I did enjoy reading the chapters of this book, but each requires one to think hard about what one can learn about change in complex systems before one moves on to a different problem and region of the world. Thinking about the chapters is more important than just reading them! One of the most important lessons to be learned from this book is that contemporary scholars should not reject the analysis of complex systems on the incorrect notion that good science is a method for simplifying systems, and thus efforts to represent complexity analytically are not scientific. I will assert that the widespread presumption among many social scientists, that one cannot do good scientific work unless one reduces all systems to the simple interplay of a few variables, is a dangerous approach. Oversimplification reduces our resilience in coping with changes in our complex world. One should not make the analysis of any system more complex than needed for understanding how and why it works (or does not work). Assertions that ‘my case is unique’, however, are not scientific and reduce our capabilities for discovering ways of analysing and adapting systems to improve them over time. Boyd and Folke do derive a number of important lessons from the empirical studies in the last chapter of this book. For doubters, I recommend reading the last chapter first and then several times again alongside the excellent empirical chapters. This strategy will enable the reader to gain maximum understanding while thinking about a fascinating array of individual studies.
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the inspiration and help of a handful of people, in particular colleagues at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and at the Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University, who have shared their ideas and insights throughout the writing of this book. We are thankful to Formas, the Kjell and Märta Beijer Foundation, the Leverhulme Trust and the James Martin 21st Century School at Oxford University, who provided support for the work. The research has also been supported by the Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research, Mistra, through a core grant to the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Special thanks are extended to Â�chapter reviewers, especially Stephan Barthel, Henrik Ernston, Thomas Hahn, Bo Kjellén, Annette Löf, Nicholas Moss, Henny Osbahr, Andy Stirling, Maria Tengö, Frank Thomalla and Richard Walters. For their patience we thank the Cambridge University Press editorial and production team, in particular Lynette Talbot. Thanks are extended to Jerker Lokrantz for the illustrations and figures, Fredrik Moberg for the cover and Ann Grand for her improvements on the manuscript. The real thanks, however, go to the chapter authors, for contributing their time and effort to advance our understanding of adapting institutions and the human dimensions of global environmental change.
xix
Acronyms and abbreviations
AGRHYMET ALNAP BBC CBO CCD CDC CDM CID CIFS CILSS CIRC CPR CRED CZMP DEFRA DERT DFID DNPGCA EAC ECDC ECLAC EGR xx
Agricultural, Hydrological and Meteorological programme Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action British Broadcasting Corporation Community-based organisation Coast Conservation Department (Sri Lanka) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USA) Clean Development Mechanism (Kyoto Protocol) Common-interest development Cayman Islands Fire Services The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (Sahel) Cayman Islands Red Cross Common-pool resource Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters Coastal Zone Management Plan (Sri Lanka) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK) District Emergency Response Team Department for International Development (UK) Food Crisis Prevention and Mitigation Mechanism (Niger) Environmental Audit Committee European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Environmental governance regime
List of acronyms and abbreviations
EID EOC ERS EU EWS FAO FCO FCPNS FEWSNET GEC GECAFS GIEWS GIS GOARN GPHIN HDI HRO ICT IDS IFPRI IGO IMO INGO IPCC IUCN LEK LoGB MA MAP MDGs MFF MGO MLA MSF NAREP NEAP NGO
Emerging infectious disease Emergency operations centre Essential relief services European Union Early warning system Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Food Crisis Prevention Network of the Sahel Famine Early Warning System Network funded by USAID Global environmental change Global Environmental Change and Food Systems Global Information and Early Warning System Geographical information systems Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network Global Public Health Intelligence Network Human Development Index High-reliability organisation Information and communications technology Institute for Development Studies (University of Sussex, UK) International Food Policy Research Institute Intergovernmental organisation International membership organisation International non-governmental organisation Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Union for the Conservation of Nature Local ecological knowledge Leader of government business Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Mangrove Action Project Millennium Development Goals Mangroves For the Future (Sri Lanka) Metropolitan gardening organisation Member of the Legislative Assembly (Cayman Islands) Médecins Sans Frontières Natural Resources and Environment Policy (Sri Lanka) National Environmental Action Plan Non-governmental organisation
xxi
xxii
List of acronyms and abbreviations
NHC OCHA OECD OFDA OIE PPP RCIP SAM SARS SES SIEC SWAC TAFREN UNDP UNEP UNFCCC UNICEF USAID WFP WHO WWF
National Hurricane Committee (Cayman Islands) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance World Organisation for Animal Health Public–private partnership Royal Cayman Islands Police Special Area Management (Sri Lanka) Severe acute respiratory syndrome Social–ecological system Sister Islands Emergency Committee (Cayman Islands) Sahel and West Africa Club Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka) United Nations Development Programme United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Children’s Fund United States Agency for International Development United Nations World Food Programme World Health Organization World Wide Fund for Nature
1 Adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity: an introduction emily boyd and carl folke
People shape the planet and at the same time depend on its functioning. Global environmental change is currently occurring at a rate faster than humans have ever experienced and may result in potentially devastating consequences at the planetary scale (Rockström et€al. 2009). The well-being of people on the planet faces two dominant global environmental crises: climate change and the loss of the world’s ecosystem services. Following the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 the global community also faces turbulent times in terms of economic development. These crises are complex and all are interlinked (Young et€al. 2006, Walker et€al. 2009a). Human actions are having serious consequences on the earth’s climate system and on the capacity of landscapes and seascapes to generate important ecosystem services upon which societal development rests (Daily 1997). We take guidance from those who argue that economic systems are not separate from ecological systems (e.g. Jansson et€ al. 1994). We draw on the understanding that all of the materiality of societies is inherently based on the availability of renewable resources and the capacity of the biosphere to generate and sustain those. The environment is not just an externality, but our societies are part of the biosphere, ultimately dependent on its functioning and at the same time shaping it. Such interdependence of social and ecological Â�systems has been illustrated in many ways, from community-based and multi-level resource management (e.g. Berkes et€al. 2003) to political shocks triggering shifts towards ecosystem stewardship (e.g. Adapting Institutions: Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience, ed. Emily Boyd and Carl Folke. Published by Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press 2012.
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Emily Boyd and Carl Folke
Gelcich et€al. 2010). We acknowledge that markets cannot be decoupled from social–ecological systems, and in fact these are deeply nested concepts (Harvey 2006). New approaches across the social and natural sciences are needed to further our understanding of how to govern the rapid and unpredictable change that characterises these crises, from local to global. Insights are required that are based on empirical observations of the features of the institutional responses to sudden and slow-onset shock at local, national, regional and global levels. In particular, there is a need for better understanding of the specific and general resilience of systems to cope with sudden change and the ways that people’s leadership and expectations are negotiated around uncertainty, abrupt change and shifts from one state or trajectory to another. Some societies show resilience in the face of shock and surprise: they adjust, reorganise and develop without significant impairment of their function. Others suffer and have difficulties in coping with change, and may shift into or deepen a pathway of unsustainable development. Resilience can be seen in the ways that communities respond to a crisis and progress their pathways of development (Chapin et€ al. 2010, Folke et€al. 2010). Societies can increase their resilience by developing mechanisms and institutions that enable them to remember past events, put early warning systems in place, create buffers against the impacts of change and learn how to better prepare for future events. Having resilience allows for novelty and innovation, often triggered by a shock or a sudden change. These events may open up new options for taking on new directions, for learning and adapting, and for transitions and transformations towards new paths of development. Resilient social– ecological systems have the ability to turn crisis into opportunity for a prosperous future, but they may not mobilise it (Gunderson and Holling 2002, Folke 2006). Planetary resilience is paramount to the world’s ability to cope with the multiple changes that are taking place at both global and local levels. Planetary Stewardship and Global Sustainability are emerging concepts in this context (e.g. Power and Chapin 2009, Reid et€al. 2010). As yet, we have little idea of how people will cope with environmental change in the long term, but we can look back and consider what changes have happened in response to loss of ecosystem services and what adjustments have been made as a result of the small (0.75â•›°C) global temperature rise. As the planet faces increasing pressures, evidence suggests that there are adaptations occurring in practice
Adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity
(Osbahr et€ al. 2008, Tompkins et€ al. 2010). Furthermore, institutions in developed and developing countries€– public, private and community/voluntary organisations€– are building adaptive capacity (Adger et€al. 2009, Armitage and Plummer 2010, Boyd and Osbahr 2010, Boyd et€al. 2011, Pelling 2011). There are also important insights emerging about lock-in, shifts and transformations in Â�social–ecological systems (Olsson et€al. 2006, Biggs et€al. 2009, Walker et€al. 2009b, Gelcich et€al. 2010). It is in this context that we approach adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity. We view the world from a complexity angle, where people and nature are truly intertwined and interdependent (hence social–ecological systems); where linear relations and stable conditions do exist but are partial in time and space and do not properly capture the dynamics of complex systems; where periods of gradual change and abrupt change dynamically interact across levels and scales and influence resilience, adaptability and transformability of social–ecological systems. Institutions are about the ‘rules of the game’ that arise from formal and informal norms and rules, and organisational structures, and adaptation is about actors and agency, networks and governance. Adapting institutions, as we define it for the purpose of this book, concerns the capacity of people, from local groups and private actors, to the state, to international organisations, to deal with complexity, uncertainty and the interplay between gradual and rapid change. Some of the responses may be about coping with complexity and change in the short term; others may be about adaptability in a general sense or even maladaptive responses from a longer-term sustainability perspective (e.g. Cinner et€al. 2010). We are interested in exploring and understanding social–ecological features involved in adaptations that may help societies move towards global sustainability. In particular, this book is about the challenge of how to match the social with the ecological to improve stewardship of natural resources and ecosystem services for human well-being and sustainability€– referred to as the problem of fit (Folke et€al. 1998, Young 2002, Galaz et€ al. 2008). Still, most research looks either at the ecological, treating people as external to the ecosystem, or at the social, largely disconnected from ecosystem feedbacks. The social dimensions that provide bridges or create barriers to ecosystem stewardship need to be further explored (Gunderson et€ al. 1995), including the interplay between institutions at multiple levels and scales affecting the dynamics of cross-scale and cross-level interactions (Cash et€al. 2006). In a situation of converging trends of global interconnectedness and increasing
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Emily Boyd and Carl Folke
pressure on social–ecological systems, a resilience approach to governance issues enables a more refined understanding of the dynamics of rapid, interlinked and multi-scale change (Duit et€al. 2010) The analytical framework of adaptive governance of social–Â� ecological systems is an extension of the challenges posed by the problem of fit, recognising the need for flexibility in the governance structure to allow for ecosystem-based management and stewardship of dynamic landscapes and seascapes (Dietz et€ al. 2003, Folke et€ al. 2005, Ostrom 2009). Adaptive governance is a useful concept to understand how agents and institutions respond to crisis in new ways or are constrained by resistance to change, and how these responses and constraints interact across levels and scales (e.g. Boyd 2008, Termeer et€al. 2010). This book aims to examine the complexity of adapting institutions and governance and how it relates to the problem of fit in a globalised world. Institutions in this context relate to the flexibility of adapting norms and rules in the short term, and to long-term challenges of deep legacies and belief systems as barriers and bridges for adaptation. We look in particular at adapting institutions and sources of social–ecological resilience such as the networks, partnership and leadership that are taking shape as a result of changes in temperature and in ecosystem services. We ask, what can we learn about adapting institutions and governance in relation to rapid change and uncertainty, and what are the enabling conditions for adapting or transforming? The book looks at the features of change, such as shocks and surprises, to assess what adaptations have emerged at local, state and global levels. What is unique about this book is the focus on adapting institutions and governance across multiple levels in relation to ‘adaptiveness’ of social–ecological systems, and the move in ideas towards the need for transformations, or new pathways of development, to make a prosperous future for humanity possible. In particular, this book focuses on the social science dimension of social–ecological resilience in an effort to bridge gaps between resilience thinking and the practice of resilience in terms of management and governance. This book brings together resilience thinking and research on governance, complexity and adaptation. Through carefully selected case studies we examine different contexts of challenges for social– ecological systems in transition, actor and network functions, and how politics is shaping complex interrelationships between adapting institutions, adaptive capacity and governance of social–ecological systems. Through the book, we provide examples where there is evidence
Adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity
of some form of change and adaptive responses, slow or rapid, occurring across governance scales. The book is divided into three parts. The first part, Adapting local institutions, networks, leadership and learning, consists of four place-based chapters. The first, by Beatrice Crona and Örjan Bodin, analyses adaptive institutions in a coastal fishing community in southern Kenya, focusing on the role and interaction of knowledge, social networks and leadership in dealing with a fluctuating local environment. The next chapter, by Maria Tengö and Jacob von Heland, takes us into deep norms, values and culture on the island of Madagascar, capturing the essential role of belief systems and religion in adapting institutions. In particular, the authors focus on how a forest taboo institution that sustains ecosystem services is adapting in the face of human migration due to erratic rainfall and the spread of Christianity. In the next chapter Ingela Ternström, focusing on irrigation systems in Nepal, captures diverse social responses, essential in institutional persistence, and the role of leadership among farmers in the face of diverse and sometimes unexpected disturbances. The last chapter in this part, by Johan Colding, draws on examples from urban systems and green areas worldwide to suggest how to build new adapting institutions for social–ecological resilience through public engagement in urban commons. The second part, Adapting and governing public institutions for uncertainty and complexity, starts with a chapter by Andreas Duit on adaptive capacity and the ecostate. The chapter uses cross-national data to consider how the adaptive capacity of states can be conceptualised and measured, and introduces the notion of the ecostate and the environmental governance regime. The next chapter, by Sirkku Juhola, considers the complexity of food systems, reviewing the current state of the world’s food insecurity and what responses to counter such insecurity have been developed, internationally and nationally. The 2004–05 food crisis in Niger serves as an illustrative example of the need for adapting institutions internationally. The last chapter of this part, by Emma L. Tompkins and Lisa-Ann Hurlston, shows how adaptive governance through public–private partnerships can work in practice. Using the emergence and transformation of the Cayman Islands’ National Hurricane Committee as an example, they analyse the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of disaster mitigation, early warning systems, disaster response and post-impact reorganisation.
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The final part, Adapting multi-level institutions to environmental crisis, sets out with an explorative chapter by Victor Galaz, asking whether state and non-state actors really can govern complex social–ecological systems, with complex governance systems, in times of rapid unexpected global environmental change. He refers to this challenge as ‘double complexity’, and discusses the features and modes of governance able to deal with both slow and rapid change at multiple scales. Adaptive governance in the face of natural hazards is the focus of the next chapter by Alison Ashlin, with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami hitting Sri Lanka as a telling example. She asks if the governance of coastal ecosystems in Sri Lanka was adaptive in its approach, and what changes occurred in governance institutions following this social–ecological shock. The next chapter, by Emily Boyd, takes us into adapting institutions in relation to global climate change, focusing on whether two networked policy institutions are adapting beyond business-as-usual and how resilient their responses are to climate change. The institutions in question are two UK government departments that play a central role in delivering development aid and security to public and civil society actors and communities in the global South. We end the book with a concluding chapter in which the editors discuss adapting institutions, the problem of fit and adaptive governance challenges in a resilience and complexity context, drawing out lessons from the ten preceding contributions to this volume. Much of the literature on environmental governance fails to capture the adaptive nature of social–ecological systems. This book strives to take on this challenge, exploring the capacity of people, from local groups and private actors to the state and international institutions, to deal with complexity, uncertainty and the interplay between gradual and rapid change. We hope the reader will enjoy the book, and at the same time find within its pages many enriching insights and inspiration on adapting institutions, adaptive governance, complexity and social–ecological resilience.
references
Adger, W. N., Lorenzoni, I., and O’Brien, K. L., eds. 2009. Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armitage, D., and Plummer, R., eds. 2010. Adaptive Capacity and Environmental Governance. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Adapting institutions, adaptive governance and complexity Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C., eds. 2003. Navigating Social–Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Biggs, R., Carpenter, S. R., and Brock, W. A. 2009. Turning back from the brink: detecting an impending regime shift in time to avert it. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 106, 826–831. Boyd, E. 2008. Navigating Amazonia under uncertainty: learning from past and present forms of environmental governance. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 1911–1916. Boyd, E., and Osbahr, H. 2010. Resilient responses to climate change: exploring organisational learning in networked development organisations. Environmental Education Research, 16, 397–411. Boyd, E., Street, R., Lonsdale, K., et€al. 2011. Leading the UK adaptation agenda: a landscape of stakeholders and networked organisations for adaptation to climate change. In Ford, J., and Berrang-Ford, L., eds., Climate Change Adaptation in Developed Countries: From Theory to Practice. Series: Advances in Global Change Research, Vol. 42. New York, NY: Springer. Cash, D. W., Adger, W., Berkes, F., et€al. 2006. Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance and information in a multilevel world. Ecology and Society, 11(2), 8. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8. Chapin, F. S. III, Carpenter, S. R., Kofinas, G. P., et€al. 2010. Ecosystem stewardship: sustainability strategies for a rapidly changing planet. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 25, 241–249. Cinner, J. E., Folke, C., Daw, T., and Hicks, C. 2010. Responding to change: using scenarios to understand how socioeconomic factors may influence amplifying or dampening exploitation feedbacks among Tanzanian fishers. Global Environmental Change, 21, 7–12. doi:10.1016/ j.gloenvcha.2010.09.001. Daily, G., ed. 1997. Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems. Washington, DC: Island Press. Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., and Stern, P. C. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302, 1902–1912. Duit, A., Galaz, V., Eckerberg, K., and Ebbesson, J. 2010. Governance, complexity, and resilience. Global Environmental Change, 20, 363–368. Folke, C. 2006. Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses. Global Environmental Change, 16, 253–267. Folke, C., Pritchard, L., Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Svedin, U. 1998. The problem of fit between ecosystems and institutions. International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP). IHDP Working Paper No. 2. www.unibonn.de/IHDP/public.htm. Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., and Norberg, J. 2005. Adaptive governance of social–ecological systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30, 441–473. Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., Walker, B. H., et€al. 2010. Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 20. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20. Galaz, V., Olsson, P., Hahn, T., Folke, C., and Svedin, U. 2008. The problem of fit among biophysical systems, environmental regimes and broader governance systems: insights and emerging challenges. In Young, O., Schroeder, H., and King, L. A., eds., Institutions and Environmental Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 147–186. Gelcich, S., Hughes, T. P., Olsson, P., et€al. 2010. Navigating transformations in governance of Chilean marine coastal resources. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 107, 16794–16799.
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Emily Boyd and Carl Folke Gunderson, L., and Holling, C. S., eds. 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC : Island Press. Gunderson, L., Holling, C. S., and Light, S., eds. 1995. Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Harvey, D. 2006. Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. London: Verso. Jansson, A. M., Hammer, M., Folke, C., and Costanza, R., eds. 1994. Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability. Washington, DC: Island Press. Olsson, P., Gunderson, L. H., Carpenter, S. R., et€al. 2006. Shooting the rapids: navigating transitions to adaptive governance of social–ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 11(1), 18. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art18. Osbahr, H., Twyman, C., Adger, N. W., and Thomas, D. S. G. 2008. Effective livelihood adaptation to climate change disturbance: scale dimensions of practice in Mozambique. Geoforum, 39, 1951–1964. Ostrom, E. 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social– ecological systems. Science, 325, 419–422. Pelling, M. 2011. Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation. London: Routledge. Power, M. E., and Chapin, F. S. III. 2009. Planetary stewardship. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 7, 399. Reid, W. V., Chen, D., Goldfarb, L., et€al. 2010. Earth system science for global sustainability: grand challenges. Science, 330, 916–917. Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., et€ al. 2009. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature, 461, 472–475. Termeer, C. J. A. M., Dewulf, A., and van Lieshout, M. 2010. Disentangling scale approaches in governance research: comparing monocentric, multilevel, and adaptive governance. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 29. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art29. Tompkins, E. L., Adger, W. N., Boyd, E., et€al. 2010. Observed adaptation to climate change: UK evidence of transition to a well-adapting society. Global Environmental Change, 20, 627–635. Walker, B. H., Barrett, S., Polasky, S, et€al. 2009a. Looming global-scale failures and missing institutions. Science, 325, 1345–1346. Walker, B. H., Abel, N., Anderies, J. M., and Ryan, P. 2009b. Resilience, adaptability, and transformability in the Goulburn-Broken Catchment, Australia. Ecology and Society, 14(1), 12. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art12. Young, O. R. 2002. The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay and Scale. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Young, O. R., Berkhout, F., Gallopin, G. C., et€al. 2006. The globalization of socioecological systems: an agenda for scientific research. Global Environmental Change, 16, 304–316.
Part Iâ•…Adapting local institutions, networks, leadership and learning
2 Knowledge, social networks and leadership: setting the stage for the development of adaptive institutions? beatrice crona and örjan bodin
2. 1╇
introduction
Institutions, be they formal or informal (North 1990, Ostrom 1990), guide the behaviour and interactions of people. This is a fact of particular importance when studying local-level collaborative management of common-pool resources (that is, co-management: e.g. Carlsson and Berkes 2005). However, given the inherent unpredictability of natural systems (Levin 1998), institutions need to be flexible enough to deal with ecological changes and surprises. In effect, the institutions need to be adaptive€– an insight permeating the chapters of this book. Social networks are increasingly cited as instrumental in enabling communities to adaptively respond to environmental change and to initiate and sustain successful co-management of natural resources (e.g. Olsson 2004a, Folke et€al. 2005). Social networks are, for example, one factor determining the flow of information within communities and, as such, are important in determining possibilities for continuing learning and making sense of environmental feedbacks. They also offer a valuable tool for identifying social groups, influential actors and patterns of communications. This chapter will explore different features of social networks and how they affect the local institutional context for governance of natural resources. We will discuss how social networks for communication of local ecological knowledge (LEK) among actors affect knowledge distributions and perceptions of change in the ecosystem. Furthermore, we will analyse networks to map social groups in the Adapting Institutions: Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience, ed. Emily Boyd and Carl Folke. Published by Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press 2012.
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community and the level of communications within and between these groups. Based on analyses of social positions in the networks, social networks also provide the ability to identify informal opinion leaders who could be instrumental in initiating collective action (see Kopller 1984 for a review of the concept). By analysing the personal characteristics of these individuals, in combination with analyses of contextual issues of importance, such as incentive structures, one can develop hypotheses regarding the abilities of these individuals to engage in initiating, coordinating and facilitating collaborative management efforts. The discussion centres on a case study of a coastal fishing community in southern Kenya. The chapter starts with a look at the case-specific cultural and institutional context, followed by a brief description of methodology and the Social Network Analysis approach. We then proceed to discuss the role of social position and network structure in governance of ecosystems and how this may affect incentives for changed behaviour among resource users. 2. 2╇
the case
The social–ecological system which forms the basis for the analysis in this chapter is a rural fishing village on the south coast of Kenya. It has approximately 200 households and an estimated 1000 inhabitants. The ecological system is characterised by mangroves, covering 615 ha, with mudflats and seagrass meadows in the shallow part of the lagoon, in turn sheltered from wave impact by shallow reefs at the mouth of the bay (Figure 2.1). The use of resources in the village is centred on fishing and, to some degree, the use of mangroves for poles and firewood. Other non-forest products are taken from the mangroves, but government restrictions, in the form of a cutting ban, have periodically impeded extraction of wood products by locals (Dahdouh-Guebas et€ al. 2000). The majority of households depend primarily on fishing for their livelihood. The local artisanal fishery is based on gear such as seine nets, different types of gill nets, spearguns and handlines, methods which have been found to be spatially separated (Obura et€al. 2002) (Figure 2.1). The local fishery focuses on finfish but also includes various crustaceans and molluscs, such as juvenile penaeid shrimps, fished only by women and sold at local markets. The East African climate has alternating wet and dry seasons, with two pronounced rainy times; a period of heavy rains from
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
Figure 2.1â•… Map of the coastal seascape in focus. The respective distribution of mangroves, seagrass beds and reefs is indicated. The area of primary fishing effort for each fishing-related occupational category is marked with dotted lines. Adapted with permission from Crona (2006).
April to June (southeast monsoon) and a period of lighter rains from October to November (northeast monsoon). The fishery is thus characterised by annual seasonal fluctuations caused by monsoon winds, with calm waters and intense activity during the southeast monsoon and lower fishing pressure and catches during the northeast monsoon, a pattern also documented in other areas (de la Torre-Castro and Rönnbäck 2004). The reason for this lowered activity lies primarily in the nature of the fishing vessels available, which cannot withstand rough seas and strong winds. During the southeast monsoon, the higher catches are largely attributable to the calm weather, which allows fishing using low-technology gear in the entire reef areas as well as in the lagoon. Twenty-four per cent of households in the village are recent immigrants. The majority originate from Tanzania, to which they regularly return. Many Tanzanian fishermen reside in the village semipermanently, returning to their homeland in seasons of low fishing activity. Migration is linked to both economic factors and kinship ties. In the high season, migrating fishermen return to the study area to fish and are often assisted with travel expenses and permits by local
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middlemen (fishmongers) operating from the village. Kinship ties also play a significant role in recruiting crew for the season. 2.2.1╇ Fishing activities and management over time The coastal population of Kenya comprises two main ethnic groups: the Mijikenda, of Bantu origin, and the Swahili, of mixed Bantu, Asian and Arabic descent. The Mijikenda comprise nine tribes; in the study area, Digo is the predominant ethnicity. Historically, the Mijikenda were farmers; they started their relationship with the Swahilis as traders of agricultural products. In consequence of colonial land access policies and early-twentieth-century politics, the Digo were forced to abandon traditional shifting cultivation and convert to Islam, which led to a need to diversify their livelihood (Ng’weno 1995). This resulted in the gradual development of dependence on fishing. In the early to mid twentieth century, a combination of factors, including the Kenyan government’s striving to develop the marine fishing industry, the parallel rise of coastal tourism attracting large numbers of unskilled labour, and skilled, knowledgeable fishermen abandoning fishing for more lucrative ventures, contributed gradually to undermine local institutions for managing common fisheries (Glaesel 2000). The vast majority of newcomers (primarily young men) seeking employment were not absorbed by the tourist industry. This group turned to self-employment in speargun fishing (Glaesel 1997). Speargun fishing required low capital investment in gear and was free from the apprenticeship and kinship ties traditionally associated with other gear types. Another strain on the traditional management system was the dramatic influx of Tanzanian fishermen after the 1964 overthrow of the Zanzibar/Pemba government, resulting in large seine-net crews establishing more or less semi-permanent operations along the Kenyan coast (Glaesel 1997). Records show that, although currently classified as illegal, spearguns and seine-net fishing have increased in proportion to other fishing methods in the area (McClanahan et€al. 1997, Glaesel 2000). The gradual weakening of traditional governance structures, coupled with a national top-down view of legislation, with a heavy focus on regulatory measures but without sufficient capacity for enforcement (Government of Kenya 1991, 2001), has led to the inshore fishery along the southern Kenyan coast becoming almost open access (Alidina 2005). This has led to overfishing and depletion of inshore stocks (Ochiewo 2004). Mangroves have also suffered: intensive mangrove
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timber extraction reached a maximum in the 1970s, leading the government to impose an irregularly enforced mangrove-cutting ban. The lifting of this ban is currently under review (Kwale District Forestry Officer, personal communication). Under the Forest Act (Government of Kenya 1994), community involvement in management of resources is suggested as a future goal.
2. 3 ╇t h e o r e t i c a l
perspective and methodological
approach
2.3.1╇ Theoretical perspective It is becoming increasingly clear that even rather small communities often display quite complex patterns of interactions between different user groups (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Crona and Bodin 2006). In general, in a given community, there is rarely one single group of local stakeholders; rather, communities are defined by complicated patterns of subgroups with different perceptions, interests, resources and amounts of influence (e.g. Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Nygren 2005). This structural and relational perspective on social systems has, over a considerable time, developed into a broad trans-disciplinary scientific field (Social Network Analysis: see www.insna.org) and has proven a useful tool in studying and explaining social phenomena (e.g. Freeman 2004). Among other things, it has been used to study information diffusion (e.g. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997) and group structures and their possible social consequences (e.g. Johnson et€al. 2003). Thus, the social network perspective is an interesting framework to apply in studying the social side of ecosystem governance. In recent years, the interest in social networks in resource management contexts has increased (e.g. Lansing 1991, Schneider et€ al. 2003, Baker 2005, Crona and Bodin 2006, Ernstson et€al. 2008, Bodin and Crona 2009, Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009). This is a positive development, but we still have a limited understanding of how outcomes of ecosystem governance are associated with particular structural features of the social networks among the various resource users, beneficiaries and governmental agencies in a community. A reasonable hypothesis is, however, that desirable outcomes are associated with how these complex pattern of interactions are structured (Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Bodin et€al. 2006, Carlsson and Sandström 2006). This argument is further strengthened by numerous studies showing that the existence of informal social networks among and
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between various stakeholders and groups is very important in successful cases of bottom-up community-based natural resource management (e.g. Gunderson 1999, Folke et€al. 2003, Olsson 2003, Pretty 2003). What we intend to highlight, in this research context, is that not all social networks are created equal. Different structural characteristics of social networks give rise to different outcomes with respect to the governance of natural resources (Bodin et€al. 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009; Bodin and Prell 2011). By applying a network-oriented research approach to studying this issue, some of these patterns of dependencies and their consequences for governance can be revealed, quantified and analysed (as we intend to demonstrate in this chapter). 2.3.2╇ Methods In this subsection, we briefly explain some methodological issues of importance in applying a social network research approach. For more in-depth description of the methodological issues in general, see, for example, Marsden (1990) and Wasserman and Faust (1994). For details of the specific case study discussed here, see Crona and Bodin (2006) and Bodin and Crona (2008). In many cases, defining the boundaries of the population within which the social interactions of the actors are to be measured and analysed is not trivial. Since everyone in some sense can be considered as being connected to everyone else (although via others), one has carefully to define reasonable system boundaries, given the research question at hand. Fortunately, in the case discussed here, the population is, a priori, quite well defined; that is, it consists of all households in the fishing village. Given a reasonable definition of the population, the next step is to measure the different social networks of interests among the actors. Often, relational data are gathered using interviews and/or questionnaires. Collection of relational data can either be done using recall (that is, the respondent generates a list of his or her relations) or recognition (that is, the respondent picks individuals from a list of all individuals in the studied population). We used an ‘unaided’ or ‘free’ recall approach to elicit information (see, e.g., Marsden 1990, Wasserman and Faust 1994). Using a set of questions related to different kind of relations, for example ‘with whom do you discuss important matters?’, each head of household in the village was asked about his/her different social relationships (see further details in Crona and Bodin 2006). All interviews were conducted in the native language (Kiswahili), either in
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
the respondent’s home or in a public place. Since many respondents were not comfortable reading or writing, the enumerator noted the information, with the help of an interpreter. A nearly complete (83%) network dataset was gathered, based on interviews with the heads of 171 households, resulting in a total of approximately 1500 reported relations. Social ties elicited by the recall method tend to be frequent in interaction, intense and recent. That is, they can be seen as the strongest and most influential at any particular time (see Marsden 1990 and references therein). Given that one of the aims of this chapter is to link LEK distribution in the community to network structure, a methodological note is warranted: we conceptualise local ecological knowledge as the body of knowledge which resource users draw on to understand the marine environment, upon which the majority depend, to various degrees. This body of knowledge can, for the sake of simplicity, be seen as comprising two subsets. The first relates to relatively simple information, such as knowledge of different species of fish or other organisms and how to differentiate them. The second is more complicated and relates to complex relationships and ecological processes. The simpler type of knowledge could, arguably, be shared through relatively weak ties, while the latter is more akin to tacit knowledge, which has been argued to require stronger relational ties (Cross et€al. 2001). Since our main interest lies in the knowledge of more complex ecological processes, our focus is accordingly on the stronger social ties. Network analyses were used to assess quantitatively the level of communication within and between subgroups existing within the realm of the village’s social networks. Our main objective with this subgroup-oriented analysis was to investigate if group structures, and patterns of communications among them, could help explain distributions of LEK, as well as give some insights into the community’s social structures. For the purpose of this study, we divided respondents into subgroups based on occupational categories (henceforth referred to as ‘occupational groups’). Nine different occupational groups were identified, based on respondents’ reports of primary income: farmers, businessmen (local entrepreneurs), middlemen (fishmongers) and six categories of fishermen, based on primary gear type and fishing technique. Once respondents had been classified into an occupational group, the relationships of individuals were used to analyse the aggregated pattern of relations among and within these occupational groups (see further details in Crona and Bodin 2006).
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In addition, using the relational data, structural network measures based on network position were used to identify the most influential individuals of the community. This assessment is based on the assumption that the possibility for social influence and leadership is closely tied to a person’s structural position in a network (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994). A range of network centrality measures, with specific relation to influence and possibility for leadership, are available. We chose the following measures of influence: degree centrality (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994), betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979) and Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972). For a detailed description of the applied analyses, see Bodin and Crona (2008). 2. 4╇s o c i a l
networks: the fabric of collaborative
management
Theories on common-pool resource management build on the idea that stakeholders can come together and devise rules for how to use a specific resource. For this to happen, groups of stakeholders need to have a shared understanding of how the natural system works, as well as some degree of consensus about the resource problem (Ostrom 1990, 2005). For example, is overfishing causing decline in catches, or is the decline an effect of eutrophication and untreated sewage flowing into the bay? In a social–ecological system in which no collective action for any kind of resource management has been instigated, despite apparently declining and degrading resources (McClanahan and Mangi 2001, Maina et€al. 2008), pertinent questions must be: What understanding of ecosystem dynamics exist in the community? Among which community members? How is such understanding created, maintained and shared? Has lack of understanding suppressed collective action or could there be other explanations? 2.4.1╇ Networks and knowledge distributions The network of communication of knowledge and information related to resource extraction among occupational groups in the village is shown in Figure 2.2, while Table 2.1 shows the relative frequency of relations among and between occupational groups. As seen in Figure 2.2, there are several links between these subgroups, but Table 2.1 reveals that respondents within most of these subgroups communicated more with each other than they did with members of other subgroups. In Figure 2.2, we also see that certain
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
Table 2.1╇ Sociomatrix based on occupational groups using data obtained from the social network of information/knowledge exchange. Numbers in cells represent the ratio of the measured versus the expected number of relational ties, assuming a random distribution of ties. A ratio above 1 means that communication within occupational groups is higher than if occupational membership had no effect on relational preferences. Reprinted with permission from Crona and Bodin (2006)
Seine Deep Gill net Businessman Farmer sea net Seine net 6.13 Businessman Farmer Deep sea Gill net Middleman
0 0.92
0 0.21 1.64
1.02 0 0.19 0 0.13 1.15 2.79 1.23 9.2
Number of group Middleman members 0.29 0 0.58 0.72 0.46 5.11
16 27 8 45 10 10
groups, such as the group of deep-sea fishermen, are more central compared to more peripheral groups like the seine netters, farmers and businessmen.1 When we studied LEK in the village, it became apparent that there were significant differences in terms of the level and content of ecological knowledge of farmers and businessmen compared to the majority of resource-extractor categories (Figure 2.3). Knowledge common to most groups included the acknowledgement of the central role played by mangroves in coastal protection, nursery habitat and water quality. Farmers and businessmen showed consistently poorer knowledge of all coastal habitats as well as a poor understanding of related ecological processes (Table 2.2). LEK held by fishermen using various gear types revealed a range of knowledge, from detailed accounts of the feeding of certain target species to acknowledgement of large-scale climatic changes affecting shrimp stocks and mangrove coverage. The seasonal rains and related freshwater pulse affecting shrimp and fish migrations were also recognised by all types of fishermen. Knowledge specific to certain occupational groups of fishermen included recognition that sea urchin aggregations could affect the dynamics of Detailed analysis and description of methods of the social network analysis can
1
be found in Crona and Bodin (2006).
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Farmer
Gill net
Businessman
Middleman
Deep sea
Seine net
Figure 2.2â•… Multidimensional scaling plot showing the social network structure of relations among groups based on predefined occupational categories. The size of each node is proportional to the group size, and the thickness of the links is proportional to the strength of the inter-group relations, i.e. the ratio of the observed versus expected number of relations (thin line <â•›0.5, medium line <â•›1, thick line >â•›1). It is worth noting that no direct exchange between fisher categories seine net and gill net occurs. The distance between the nodes indicates how similar each group is in terms of the types of links they have to other groups. Fishermen are generally closer because they all report relations to other fishermen, while businessmen report few such ties, instead communicating mostly within their own group. Reprinted with permission from Crona and Bodin (2006).
seagrass meadows and associated fauna (seine netters) and a notion of regional fish-stock migrations related to wind patterns and currents (middlemen, deep-sea fishermen and, to some degree, seine-net fishermen). Deep-sea fishermen had knowledge of currents and links between the three ecosystems shown in Figure 2.3 (mangroves, seagrasses and reefs), at a scale surpassing that of other fishing groups. In other words, they had a more holistic perception of the seascape, compared to the other groups. In addition, their notion of fish migrations spanned a larger geographical scale than that of seine netters, since they acknowledge that pelagic stocks move up and down the
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Table 2.2╇ Summary of local ecological knowledge (LEK) of different occupational groups using different gear types and operating in distinct but overlapping subsystems of a coastal seascape in Kenya. The knowledge is classified and related to the ecological principles defined by Dale et€al. (2000). Occupational groups are based on main gear type used, and groups are listed in this column according to the ecological knowledge they were found to possess. Adapted with permission from Crona (2006)
Ecological principle
Knowledge of resource users reflecting each principle
Time Ecological processes A clear understanding of the effects function at different of clear-cutting of mangroves on time scales, some related systems. long, some short; and ecosystems change over time. Notions among respondents that fish stocks migrate along the coast and that such patterns are affected by seasonal monsoons. Species Particular species and networks of interacting species have key, broadscale ecosystemlevel effects.
Knowledge of the keystone function of mangroves in coastal biological, hydrological and geomorphologic processes in the form of nursery habitats, water filtration and sediment stabilisation.
Occupational group
Shrimpers Deep sea Speargun Gill net Middlemen Farmers* Businessmen* Deep sea Seine net Gill net
Shrimpers Deep sea Speargun Handline Seine net Gill net Middlemen Notion of trophic cascades due to Farmers changes in abundance of sea Businessmen urchins, leading to over-grazing of Speargun seagrasses with potential effects on Seine net inshore fisheries.
Place Local climatic, Acknowledgement by respondents hydrologic, edaphic that seasonal climatic changes and geomorphologic affect the distribution and factors as well as abundance of shrimp and finfish biotic interaction in the area: strongly affect ecological processes and the
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Table 2.2 (cont.) â•… abundance and distribution of species at any one place.
Disturbance The type, intensity and duration of disturbance shape the characteristics of populations, communities and ecosystems.
Seasonal monsoons and the resulting freshwater outflow attract juvenile shrimps into the mangrove system.
Shrimpers Deep sea Speargun Handline Seine net Gill net Middlemen Farmers* Businessmen* Seasonal monsoon-related wind patterns Deep sea and currents affect fish migrations Seine net along the regional coastline. Middlemen Notion among some fishing groups that sea urchin aggregations can affect the dynamics of seagrass meadows and associated fauna. Acknowledgement that historical and present land uses, such as mangrove cutting, will cause changes in the distribution and abundance of associated species (crabs, shrimp, fish) and ecosystem functions such as soil stabilisation, water movement, nursery habitats, nesting areas and wind breakers. Notion among some fishing groups that changes in climate (timing of the monsoon rains and El Niño phenomena) have occurred recently resulting in an effect on the artisanal shrimp fishery as well as mangrove coverage.
Speargun Seine net
Shrimpers Deep sea Speargun Seine net Gill net Middlemen Farmers* Businessmen* Shrimpers Deep sea Speargun Seine net Gill net
Landscape The size, shape and Awareness of the nursery function Shrimpers spatial relationship provided by mangroves for fish Deep sea of land-cover and shellfish residing part of their Speargun types influence life outside of the mangrove habitat. Seine net the dynamics Shows a notion of the positive Gill net of populations, spillover effect of such functions on Middlemen communities and coupled ecological subsystems such Farmers* ecosystems. as seagrass beds and coral reefs. Businessmen* * Groups exhibiting much less detailed understanding of links and processes.
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
Relative difference (∆) in detail of knowledge
Higher level of knowledge
Lower level of knowledge
Mangrove
Seagrass
Reef
Seine net
Deep sea
Shrimpers
Handline
Middlemen
Gill net
Speargun
Farmers
Businessmen
Figure 2.3â•… Relative difference in local ecological knowledge among different occupational groups operating in the target community. Knowledge is divided into three categories based on the three recognised sub-components of the coastal seascape: mangrove, seagrass and reef. Knowledge of different groups for each sub-component is represented as the relative difference of their level of knowledge compared to an estimated average level of knowledge for all groups (the baseline in the figure). Thus the bars represent each group’s knowledge in relation to other groups, and bars below the horizontal line indicate less than average knowledge. Amount of knowledge, for each occupational category, is ranked based on the expressed level of detail of ecological components and processes. Although groups may be represented as having equal levels of knowledge in terms of detail, the actual content of the knowledge may at times be related to different species, depending for example on which species are primarily targeted by a specific group. Reprinted with permission from Crona (2006).
coast on a regional scale (Table 2.2).2 The categories shrimpers, speargun and handline are explored in more depth in Crona (2006) but are not discussed here. Shrimpers are female, and as this is a predominantly Muslim community such knowledge is not shared between men and women. The categories speargun and handline were not well enough represented in the social network.
Because a detailed account of the LEK is beyond the scope of this chapter, the
2
reader is referred to Crona (2006) for more detailed analysis.
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Relating the social network structure to the distribution and content of LEK among studied groups suggests a fair agreement. Qualitatively comparing knowledge content and distribution with the network structure showed that groups with strong links, that is, fishermens’ groups, tended to have similar knowledge. The two categories not directly involved in marine resource extraction (farmers and businessmen) had a much poorer understanding of associated ecological components and processes. Furthermore, deep-sea fishermen had a more holistic perception of the seascape than other groups, which could be attributed to their central position in the network, which connects them to all other groups (Figure 2.2). Seine netters, on the other hand, were more distanced. That is, they had fewer ties to the tight cluster formed by middlemen, deep-sea and gill-net fishermen. As tacit or complex knowledge transfer is thought to require frequent and intense interactions (Hansen 1999, Reagans and McEvily 2003) only fairly tight groups are likely to develop complex group-specific knowledge. If communication links are more diversely distributed among actors, as observed among the other fisherman categories, the possibility to maintain group-specific knowledge is reduced. Seine-net fishermen reported that approximately two out of three relations were with other seine netters, which to some degree explains why certain group-specific knowledge was maintained within this group. In summary, it appears that the network structure can help explain knowledge distribution. Given the crucial importance of LEK in natural resource management, an inevitable conclusion is that by measuring and analysing social networks, important insight into understanding successes and failures in natural resource management can be achieved using a network approach. To understand the effect of network structure on knowledge distribution it is important to examine theories of identity and knowledge transfer. Social psychologists and sociologists argue that individuals are most influenced by the people with whom they frequently engage or interact (Cooley 1909, Festinger et€al. 1950, Homans 1950, Kadushin 1966). Homogeneity refers to the tendency for people to have more connections to others of their own kind, whether kind is defined by characteristics such as gender, race and social class, or by other attributes. This implies that individuals are likely to develop an understanding of the status of a natural resource similar to that of other members of the same stakeholder group. Here, we observe such homogeneity through occupational categories (Table 2.1). Shared social characteristics are presumed not only to reduce conflict but also to facilitate communication, due to common background and shared
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
life experience (Reagans and McEvily 2003). Homogeneity is therefore a factor thought to enhance tacit knowledge transfer (Cross et€al. 2001), although high levels of it could also reduce diversity and limit access to distant resources (Krackhardt and Stern 1988). It is important to point out that sampling a network only once in time (as we did), makes it impossible to say anything about the robustness of these ties over longer time periods. Hence, although our discussion of LEK and network structures is based on the existence of strong social ties, we cannot say anything about the long-term robustness of the ties measured here. If we assume that the development and dissemination of tacit knowledge require ties to be not only strong but also long-lasting, the proposed links between the network structure and the distribution of LEK might appear coincidental. However, even though individual ties may change over time, it is quite unlikely that the overall pattern of relationships among and within occupational groups will change very much. A deep-sea fisherman will continue to communicate more frequently with deep-sea fishermen than with other types of fishermen, even though the particular deep-sea fishermen with whom he chooses to communicate might change. As a result, the build-up of complex knowledge is maintained within the group of deep-sea fishermen. We argue that the proposed relation between the network structure and the distribution of LEK, as we present here, is not invalidated despite the fact that we did not assess the duration of the reported ties. There are also other aspects of social network structure that, in different ways, affect the social processes and features deemed important for natural resource management (Bodin et€al. 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009). For example, structural position in a network will affect not only a person’s access to information but also the degree to which he or she can control information flow to other groups (Burt 1992). Consequently, the following section will discuss issues of natural resource governance based on several structural features of social networks: structural position and how it affects actors’ incentives to change behaviour (and vice versa), and the relationship between structural position and leadership in resource management. 2.4.2╇Social brokers or blockers: positions and incentives In this case, the communication network observed was fairly centralised (at the subgroup level: see Figure 2.2). Experiments in social
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psychology have shown that centralised networks (that is, when one or a small cluster of actors are very centrally positioned, leaving others in the periphery) perform simple tasks more efficiently than decentralised ones (Leavitt 1951, Shaw 1981). However, they have also shown that decentralised structures perform better at complex tasks. The underlying logic is that contributions to a solution from all members provide diversity of information and knowledge in solving the problem. If we put this into the context of adaptive resource management, which can be considered a rather complex task, decentralised structures may, arguably, be preferred. However, central groups or individuals can play an important role. In social network literature they are often referred to as ‘brokers’ (Gould and Fernandez 1989, Burt 2004). In this case, deep-sea fishermen emerge as a group structurally positioned as brokers. The brokers, merely by their structural position, gain access to many pieces of group-specific information captured inside the different groups, allowing them to synthesise a large knowledge pool and act as a bridge between groups not otherwise connected. In addition, through their position, brokers learn about the inner life of many of the different groups and therefore achieve an advantage in knowing with which groups or individuals to connect or not, how to connect with them and when (Burt 2004). Brokers can thus be powerful actors, in the sense that they can control the behaviour of social groups and the information flow between groups in the network to a higher extent than can other actors (cf. Crona and Bodin 2010). Burt (2004) points out that, with early access to critical information, brokers often create new understandings and see new opportunities that other actors never recognise. Consequently, the bridging role of brokers can be critical for adaptive governance of natural resources. However, in our observed case, the group most favourably positioned to instigate collective action has not done so. The interesting question to ask is: why not? In answering this question we need to examine the personal attributes of the actors involved, to understand how incentives are created which make potential brokers potential blockers. Incentives are created through many different processes. Certainly, one important process is understanding the ecosystem. This allows a person to read and interpret signals from the natural environment, which may indicate changes that may affect livelihoods, such as fishing or mangrove harvesting. The scale at which different categories of fishermen operated in the seascape had a distinct effect on the scale at which they recognised ecological processes (Table 2.2). For example, women
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fishing shrimps recognised only dynamics occurring near the mangrove fringe. This fringe was the geographical limit of their operations, induced by cultural aspects of labour division that dictated that women should not be involved in fin fishing, nor (commonly) be taught to swim. Fishermen commonly acknowledge fish migrations at larger, yet variable, geographical scales. Deep-sea fishermen, for example, recognised and targeted pelagic stocks moving over larger spatial scales, which were potentially less vulnerable to overfishing at the local scale of extraction. Consequently, in their view, catches had not changed significantly, reducing their perceptions of the fishery as over-exploited, at least in relation to their own operations (Crona 2006). But knowledge is, as stated above, not the only factor driving incentives. Mobility, or more specifically the ability to move or expand the area of fishing, also played a role in defining the incentives of the fishing groups. Deep-sea fishermen were, to a large extent, semi-migrant fishermen from northern Tanzania, who tended to return home during seasons of low fishing activity or temporarily to relocate if fishing was perceived to be better elsewhere. This is an important factor affecting the acuteness with which overfishing was viewed by different groups. Stationary crews were much more acutely attuned to the problems of destructive fishing gears and local overfishing in the bay than the migrant fishermen. Their reduced sense of place and higher mobility markedly affected the way in which they spoke about issues of overfishing and the urgency with which they perceived the matter. Consequently, although the deep-sea fishermen as a group held a position in the network favourable for the instigation of collective action, their incentives were largely reduced by higher mobility and a reduced sense of place and urgency. 2.4.3╇ Leadership and influential individuals In discussions of factors that affect the success of natural resource management and governance, leadership is often suggested as an essential. Several descriptions of how such leadership has contributed to successful resource governance exist, from places as widespread as fishing communities in Brazil (Seixas and Berkes 2003) and watershed and wetlands management in Sweden (Olsson et€ al. 2004b). In settings where leaders have played a significant role in furthering a transformation towards a situation with more inclusive governance or sustainable ecosystem management, this is often attributed, in part, to the existence of cross-scale linkages for communication and learning
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Figure 2.4â•… Degree centrality (i.e. an individual’s number of relations) for the combined networks of knowledge exchange and sharing of fishing gear. The higher the level of degree centrality that a villager possesses in the network, the more centrally positioned the person becomes in the figure. Identified key individuals are marked with large circles, whereas others are marked with smaller circles.
at various levels of governance (Seixas and Berkes 2003, Olsson et€al. 2004b). If we leave the relational ties among occupational groups for a moment and instead focus on the individuals making up these groups, we see that there are individuals in the network of communication who appear significantly more connected than the average villager in general (Figure 2.4). These key individuals3 appear central to the network not only because others come to them to exchange information but also because they often rent out necessary fishing gear or mediate We chose to call them key individuals, as opposed to leaders, as the concept of
3
leadership carries many different meanings. These individuals were not necessarily leaders at the time of the study, but occupied network positions that could potentially enable them to become leaders of opinion in matters that concern natural resource management in the area.
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
business transactions (such as the selling of fish, gear etc.).4 In the analysis of these key individuals, presented in detail elsewhere (Bodin and Crona 2008), two features emerged as interesting: the composition of key individuals in terms of their ethnicity and occupation versus the composition of the whole village, and their ties to external agencies and governance hierarchies. First, the composition of key individuals in terms of ethnicity and primary occupation was strikingly skewed, compared with the general population. In a village where over 46% of the population is of Digo tribal descent and only 11% is Bajuni, the ethnic composition of the key individuals was almost inverted (10% Digo vs 50% Bajuni). Furthermore, deep-sea fishermen were highly Â�over-represented in terms of professions of key individuals compared to other villagers (60% vs 25%). The implications of this relate to the ability of these individuals to synthesise and use knowledge for sustainable resource management. Although many villagers were aware of declining fish stocks (Crona 2006), interviews showed that the majority of key individuals did not take the intellectual leap and recognise this as a threat to future livelihoods. Over-representation of deep-sea fishermen explains this lack of internalisation of the problem (see our earlier discussion of their mobility and possible lack of sense of place). The consequence, however, is that in a broader perspective, homogeneity among these potential opinion leaders is likely to reduce their collective ability to perceive and synthesise new information and knowledge of different kinds (e.g. Reagans and McEvily 2003, Oh et€ al. 2004). It therefore reduces their ability to adapt to new circumstances (for example, decline of fish stocks), potentially contributing to lowering the community’s adaptive capacity (e.g. Berkes et€ al. 2003) and ability to respond to change and disturbances. The second feature was that, as a group, key individuals were fairly well connected to external agencies, with the exception of financial institutions and markets other than the trade of fishing gear (Bodin and Crona 2008). Literature suggests that such cross-scale links (which in a hierarchical organisational context could be thought of as vertical) should enhance a community’s ability to successfully respond to different challenges and opportunities (Krishna 2002, Note that the centrality of these individuals was measured using several different
4
networks and network centrality measures, hence the reference to purchase of fish and gear exchange.
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Berkes 2006), as well as the resilience of the whole social–ecological system (Berkes et€al. 2003, Seixas and Berkes 2003, Olsson et€al. 2004a). Yet this case suggests that the importance of knowledge-sharing and consensus regarding resource status may be a prerequisite for these cross-scale links to be fully used for the benefit of sustainable resource governance. One final point of interest is found in looking more closely at the internal network of communication among the key individuals. First, it is interesting to note that neither the elected chairman of the fishermen’s beach committee5 nor the formally appointed village sub-chief qualified for the list of key individuals identified through centrality criteria (Figure 2.4; see also Bodin and Crona 2008). Thus the sub-chief, as the only leader in the village formally appointed by government, appears quite loosely attached to informal networks of communication of important matters and exchange of information and knowledge about the natural environment. In contrast, the village chairman, elected but not officially authorised, is firmly embedded in the village social networks. In terms of information transfer, the village chairman has a central and powerful position and is the only link to the government-appointed sub-chief. This is not unusual in the formal hierarchical structure of government in Kenya, but it creates a situation in which the chairman obtains a disproportionate amount of power, in the sense that he can both decide which issues to bring forward to the sub-chief (that is, set the agenda) and become a block for information flow and agency if he perceives the issue to be unimportant or in conflict with personal interests. From a different perspective, possible benefits of the current structure are that initiation and coordination of action can be greatly enhanced because the chairman is firmly embedded and centrally positioned in both the community social networks (Crona and Bodin 2006) and the network of key individuals. He can act on behalf of the villagers, vis-à-vis the sub-chief, through a direct link; that is, he has the ability to link the whole community to external authorities. However, the chairman may be constrained in his capacity to act by numerous social ties if consensus for course of action is not reached among his reported contacts (compare Frank and Yasumoto 1998).
The beach committee is a body formed locally by fishermen to organise them-
5
selves in matters that regard fishing rules, regulations, rules for fish landings and mediation of conflict related specifically to fishing. The beach chairman is elected each year to head this group.
Knowledge, social networks and leadership
2. 5╇
summary and outlook
Looking at the social component of this social–ecological system from the aggregate level of resource-user groups, we see a body of fishermen who are heterogeneous with respect to their knowledge and understanding of the ecological processes and the scales at which these occur. Communication of resource-related information occurs primarily within occupational groups (defined by gear type or occupation), and certain groups are more central in the communication network, putting them in an advantageous position for synthesising knowledge and instigating and coordinating collective action. However, the most central group (deep-sea fishermen) is characterised by low incentives to conserve the inshore fishery, as a function of their low sense of place and high mobility. At the level of individuals, potential opinion leaders are those who occupy central positions in the social network. However, in this case we note that among these key individuals, the majority belong to the central group of deep-sea fishermen, which is characterised by low incentives (low sense of place) and consequently does not perceive overfishing as a problem. Despite the existence of important crossscale links to external hierarchies of government bodies or other agencies, collective action for the benefit of sustainable resource management has not been achieved. These two main points, in combination, illustrate the importance of understanding the intricate interplay between structural features of the social network. On the one hand, high centralisation promotes coordination but potentially leaves the system open to the strong influence of single actors (Crona and Bodin 2010). On the other hand, decentralisation promotes diversity of knowledge and experience, potentially at the cost of reduced coordination and risk of knowledge fragmentation. It is here that the contribution of this chapter lies, in relation to adaptive institutions and adaptive governance. Adaptive institutions are those which allow flexibility in response to some perceived change in, for example, the ecosystem and resource base on which villagers depend. This is one of the basic premises of adaptive governance. Decisions about responses to a changing environment can arguably be improved through the integration of different knowledge systems because they provide, among other things, diversity of memories of past experiences and responses (Barthel 2008) and knowledge at different, often complementary, scales (Moller et€ al. 2004). Therefore, diversity of knowledge is likely to increase the range of
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possible responses which are explored, and it can be argued to contribute to more flexible and adaptive institutions. However, as stated above, being able to respond to changing environments requires some kind of coordinated action among different actors. Using a social network perspective, one can identify the distribution of different types of actors and their knowledge in a community. This could be translated into a concept of the social system or ‘social landscape’ as being uneven instead of ‘flat’ (that is, homogeneous). This means that social or institutional entrepreneurs (Maguire 2004), with the ability to navigate and tie together this uneven landscape, are crucial in the pursuit of connecting disparate subgroups, facilitating communication and, hopefully, improving governance. For good or ill, the community studied here seems to be highly dependent on central actors for initiating collective action of any kind. The vulnerability or reduction of resilience of a social–ecological system and its institutions lies in this dependency, and on the impact the personal characteristics and interests of a single person or central group has on prioritisation and decision-making. This is perhaps an inevitable side effect associated with boundary-spanning leadership and an issue that should be accounted for when arguing for the benefits of such kinds of leadership.
acknowledgements
This research was funded by SIDA (Swedish International Development and Aid), Formas, Vetenskapsrådet and Mistra, who have contributed funding to the authors during different phases of developing this chapter. Gratitude is also extended to the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, to which one of the authors (B. Crona) is affiliated. We thank all respondents for participating in this study, and acknowledgements also go to the work of the field assistants P. Kimani and A. Rashid, without whose work and organisational skills this study would not have been possible. We also thank Lennart Bodin for assistance with some of the statistics.
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3 Adaptive capacity of local indigenous institutions: the case of the taboo forests of southern Madagascar maria tengö and jacob von heland
3. 1 ╇
introduction
We stand before a great challenge of transforming ecosystem governance towards sustainability in a world characterised by human domination and global change (Steffen et€al. 2007). The conservation movement has been, and still is, one of the major responses to human exploitation, trying to limit its impact on the ecosystems of the world. Until recently, there has been a strong focus on ‘charismatic’ species, and conservation solutions have revolved around creating reserves or parks to protect nature from humans (Adams and Mulligan 2003). Most parks of the world, especially in developing countries with weak nation-states, are poorly protected and have not been able to adapt to the challenges of internal ecosystem dynamics or socioeconomic drivers such as demands for land and migration of people (Borrini-Feyerabend et€al. 2004, Duffy 2006). The expanding branch of conservation recognises that local people establish and sustain self-organising institutions with positive outcomes for the protection of biodiversity (Berkes 2004, Gibson et€al. 2005, Hayes 2006). While numerous studies document the content, functioning and role of such institutions in conservation and social–ecological resilience (Berkes et€al. 2000), there is still a lack of understanding of their dynamics and their capacity to deal with external drivers. Our chapter addresses how local institutions valuable for forest conservation in southern Madagascar adapt to religious and climatic drivers of change. It is based on the work on common property and social–ecological systems (SES) that has emerged as a reaction to Adapting Institutions: Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience, ed. Emily Boyd and Carl Folke. Published by Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press 2012.
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‘blueprint’ conservation schemes, with simplified views of the relationship between local and indigenous people and the ecosystems in which they reside (e.g. Ostrom 1990, Berkes and Folke 1998, Murphree 2002). Three key points are central for our chapter. First, the ecosystems that are to be shielded from people have often been shaped in coevolution with human activities. Thus a separation of humans and nature is artificial and arbitrary, and an understanding of the feedbacks of the integrated social and ecological system is essential for sustaining ecosystems and ecosystem functions (Berkes and Folke 1998). Second, contrary to assumptions based on theories of the tragedy of the commons, people have a capacity to create rules, norms and institutions that regulate human use of ecosystems, and in many places people have sustained resource use over long periods (Feeny et€ al. 1990, Ostrom 1990, Dietz et€ al. 2003). Third, such local institutions, such as ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom 1990), are developed and adjusted along with local ecosystem dynamics, building resilience of the linked social–ecological system (Berkes et€al. 2000). In many cases, in particular in indigenous communities, the institutions are inseparable components of a knowledge–practice–belief complex (Gadgil et€al. 1993). Hence, aspects of indigenous institutions that are desirable from a Western conservationist’s perspective coexist with notions of sacredness and understandings of nature as enchanted. Colding and Folke (2001) raised the awareness of the role of social taboos as ‘invisible’ institutions with a potential overlap with conservation objectives, and argued that local rules such as taboos lower the transaction costs of monitoring and enforcement of species and habitat protection from the conservation perspective of either the state or the formal manager. Forests, lakes or other ecosystems with an ascribed sacred or spiritual value have been identified in most parts of the world and present a potential asset for biodiversity conservation. However, indigenous cultures and the institutions that underpin the protection of sacred areas or taboo habitats are often described as in decline and threatened by economic and cultural drivers, indicating a lack of capacity to adapt or otherwise resist modern challenges to their continued existence (Schoffeleers 1979, Sheridan and Nyamweru 2008). Sheridan (2008) describes the challenge of maintaining the intricate local links of sacred forest systems in a world of organised religion, globalised capitalism and climate change. For example, the local authority over the sacred kaya forest along the Kenyan coast has been weakened by the impacts of Islam, Christianity and national policies and is increasingly overruled by strong local and national economic
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
drivers (Kibet and Nyamweru 2008). Furthermore, the step to securing functioning stewardship of protected ecosystems such as taboo forests or sacred groves and linking it to governmental conservation schemes through decentralisation and co-management projects has also proven a long stride (e.g. Berkes 2004). On the other hand, in a review of the literature on sacred forests in Africa, Sheridan (2008) concludes that they are not static entities but institutions that over time have adapted and developed through economic, political and ecological drivers of change. Rather than dismissing the role of indigenous institutions for conservation and ecosystem governance based on a perception of them as static and brittle, we need to investigate the dynamics of indigenous rules and norms in relation to social and ecological, internal and external sources of change, and identify mechanisms for adaptive capacity (Sheridan and Nyamweru 2008). In this chapter, we use a case study in which indigenous locally created and maintained institutions successfully protect forests in southern Madagascar. We do this to address sources of adaptive capacity in forest governance at the local scale and the potentials and limits of the indigenous governance system to mediate change. More specifically, we assess how the forest taboo institution is adapting to two key drivers: (1) migration as a response to erratic rainfall, and (2) the growth of Christianity. We first outline how local institutions, in particular habitat taboos, may contribute to adaptive capacity in social–ecological systems, and we present the taboo forests of southern Madagascar in a social and ecological context. We then analyse the adaptive capacity of the governance framework to deal with the two drivers of change, based on interview data and GIS analyses carried out between 2003 and 2007. We conclude with a broader discussion of the mechanisms in the taboo systems that create space for navigating change, and of the central challenges facing co-management of forests and biodiversity. 3. 2 ╇
local institutions and adaptive capacity
Institutions can be described as the rules and norms of the game or the framework within which human interaction takes place, and may be purposefully designed as well as evolved (North 1990, pp. 2–4). Furthermore, a well-functioning institution should be common knowledge to those directly involved, as well as monitored and enforced to some extent (Ostrom 1990). The stewardship and formation of institutions by individuals or groups, from the state, the society or the economy, we refer to as governance (Hyden et€al. 2004, Batterbury and
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Fernando 2006). The forest taboos of Androy can be seen as a governance system, which will be further elaborated below. Crawford and Ostrom (1995) define institutional development using three dependent steps.1 The first is agreeing on a shared strategy, including when, how and to whom it applies. The second is a norm that states (1) what is forbidden (proscriptions), (2) what is permitted (permissions) and (3) what is obligatory (prescriptions). The third step is to specify what sanctions apply for non-compliance. We do not dwell on the distinction between formal and informal institutions. The taboo institutions in Androy are not written down, which is often a criterion for informal institutions, but they do have specified procedures for sanctions and enforcement, which are often Â�criteria used to define a formal institution. In this chapter, we address all three steps in relation to the adaptive capacity of the local taboo institutions to handle drivers of change. The role of local taboos in ecosystem conservation and management has been analysed as a complementary alternative to conventional natural resource management and policy suggestions based on nation-state or expert-devised governance arrangements (Gadgil et€ al. 1993, Colding and Folke 1997, Cinner 2005, Tengö et€al. 2007). In a literature review on threatened species, taboos were found to fill an important role in their protection and possibly to function as ‘invisible’ systems of resource management (Colding and Folke 1997, 2001). However, these studies have focused on the outcomes of taboo systems in conservation terms. So far, little has been written about the dynamic or adaptive aspects of taboo systems. In the context of taboo institutions we define adaptive capacity as the capacity of the institutional system to handle change and reconfigure itself without significant decline in crucial functions (cf. Folke 2006). Aspects of adaptive capacity have been suggested as an ability to learn and store knowledge, and flexibility in problem-solving (Scheffer et€al. 2000). 3. 3╇
taboos as local institutions
‘Taboo’ comes from the Polynesian word tapu and is generally described as synonymous with a kind of prohibition: ‘you shall not’. In many
With ‘indigenous’ in this context means people living on a land according to cus-
1
tomary institutions that precede colonists and states (ILO, 1989, Art.1).
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
parts of the world, concepts with equivalent or similar meanings have been found, for instance, the Malagasy word fady or faly (Ruud 1970). The taboo has been a subject of anthropological studies on social, political and religious organisation in weak nation-states or non-Western settings (e.g. Frazer 1913, Durkheim 1963, Douglas 1966, Valeri 2000), which provide valuable insights for addressing the taboo as an institution for forest governance. As rules and norms, taboos can concern individuals, families, groups or societies (Lambek 1992). They are known to exist for different reasons: biological (for example, avoiding poisonous plants), religious (as in respecting forest spirits) or political (as in upholding a social structure) (Valeri 2000). But taboos also take on a moral and existential dimension, as they are used by people individually and socially in making sense of and establishing order in the world. Hence to violate a taboo also means to violate something of oneself (Valeri 2000). Often it is difficult clearly to establish a single underlying reason for a taboo; rather, several reasons are held to be inseparable€– for example both religious and ethical (Valeri 2000). In terms of enforcement, violating a taboo is associated with danger, malediction and social exclusion. To avoid such consequences requires rituals or ceremonial purification of the wrongdoer and the tabooed domain, often involving an element of animal sacrifice. Taboos are continually violated, purified, renewed or reinterpreted (Douglas 1966). 3.3.1╇ Taboos in Madagascar Tourist guidebooks inform travellers to be careful while in Madagascar, especially in the countryside, to avoid violation of any of the omnipresent taboos. The taboos are stipulated by the ancestors, and it is the duty of the living to respect and to bear them. The legitimacy of the taboos resides in the recognition that human existence is conditioned by ancestral benevolence (e.g. Bloch 1968, Ruud 1970, Lambek 1992). The taboo tradition thus binds the living to a constantly revived past: ‘The ancestors’ power is in the taboos … This is the dynamics of the tradition reflected in the thought and actions of the individual’ (Ruud 1970, p. 272). Matters of taboos are discussed and reinterpreted by male elders in councils regulated by customary speech, kabary (Hanson 2007). The authority of the elders is determined by age and social status, or by properly evoking the words of the ancestors in the kabary (Ruud 1970; but see also Bloch 1975). Middleton (1997) declares that ‘taboos are far
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from static proscriptions€– rather, as a kind of cultural practice, they will change, mutate and be re-invented as people redefine their identities and their perceptions of the past’. Violation of taboo puts the taboo-breaker in a state of guilt, hakeo, which creates a barrier between him and normal life: he is polluted. If the violation has been severe, it also affects his family and clan. To cleanse the person from this state a ritual sacrifice is necessary, usually of an ox. After this purification, the person is reinstated in society. The severity of the offence and the necessary actions for purification are determined by the village or clan council (Ruud 1970). 3.3.2╇ Forest and taboos in Androy Androy, in southern Madagascar reveals a pattern of agricultural fields and pasture, interspersed by patches of forest (Figure 3.1). An initial glance suggests increasing isolation and fragmentation of forests, raising concerns for the protection of the endemic flora and fauna. However, this interpretation of the landscape misses a key piece of the puzzle: the role of local taboos. The protection of these forest patches is strong. Most have almost complete entry restrictions, no resource extraction is allowed and rule enforcement functions well (Tengö et€al. 2007). In spite of the well-recognised conservation values of the region, very few formal reserves currently exist in the dry spiny forest region that Androy is part of (Fenn 2003). This implies that the taboo forests in Androy, which have experienced limited anthropogenic disturbance, some for a very long time, represent unique habitats for biodiversity conservation. Androy is one of the poorest regions in the country and the most drought-stricken. The dominant social group is the Tandroy, whose principal economic activity is pastoralism, closely followed by agriculture, especially in the south-central parts. The landscape south of the main road (RN 10) between the regional capital Ambovombe and Ambondro (stretching about 40 km) is marked by human practices. It is a flat landscape, dominated by grass, with sandy soils and strong, mostly southern winds from the ocean only kilometres away. The Tandroy have staked out the land and the forests that they own by planting cactus hedgerows (Opuntia spp.) along the borders of their fields. These fields generally grow cassava or sweet potatoes with intercroppings of maize, pumpkins, melons and beans. Scattered among the fields are distinct patches of dense forest that are clearly visible from satellite images.
Antanimor
45°40’E
Ambondro
45°50’E
46°0’E
Ambovombe
Ifotaka
46°10’E
0
5
10 15 20km
N
Amboasary Sud
46°20’E
Figure 3.1â•… Androy, southern Madagascar. Taboo forest patches clearly visible on LandSat image south of National Route 10 between Ambovombe and Ambondro.
Fort Dauphin
Tulear
Antananarivo
Madagascar
25°50’S
25°40’S
25°30’S
25°20’S
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Maria Tengö and Jacob von Heland
This study is based on a series of two- to three-month field-work periods in Androy between 2003 and 2007. The main source of data is semi-structured deep interviews with key informants (Kvale 1996), such as clan elders and taboo forest stewards, local state officials, church representatives, state official forest managers, governmental and non-governmental organisations (n = 25) and semi-structured surveys of taboo forest managers (n = 40). Burial and taboo purification rituals have been attended, and a structured school survey has been carried out in four different schools and locations. The geographical focus is on the core area of Androy in the south, but research was also carried out in three other areas of Androy, selected on the basis of a GIS analysis of patterns of forest dynamics (Figure 3.2; Elmqvist et€al. 2007, Tengö et€al. 2007). In the next section, we introduce the reader to Androy and go through key ecological and social components, as well as key social–ecological interactions that are relevant for local forest governance. 3.3.3╇ The ecological context The dry forest of the semi-arid south and southwest harbours the highest level of endemic plants in Madagascar (Koechlin 1972) and is listed as one of the 200 most important ecological regions in the world (Olson and Dinerstein 1998). Arid conditions have led to livelihoods based on pastoralism and agriculture low-input, low-intensity. Natural fires are infrequent (Koechlin 1972). Since the early 1970s, the dry forest cover has been reported to be declining, principally due to clearing for agriculture, cattle herding, timber harvest and charcoal production (Sussman and Rakotozafy 1994, Sussman et€al. 2003). A recent study detected only a marginal change in total forest cover in Androy over a 15-year period (1984–2000), which contrasts to reductions of up to 59% of forest cover in southwestern Madagascar during the same time (Casse et€al. 2004, Elmqvist et€al. 2007). The forest patches in southern Androy range from less than 1 ha in size to a few of almost 100 ha. The characteristic species are woody species of euphorbia (Euphorbia decorsei, E. stenoclada) and Commiphora humbertii. Species diversity of the forest patches is not very high (Shannon–Weiner diversity index 2.8), but all woody species are endemic. Species composition differs between unprotected and protected forests, indicating unique habitat (Tengö et€al. 2007). It was not possible for the researchers to enter the forests but according to local informants, they are inhabited by lemurs (ring-tailed lemur
Figure 3.2╅ Classification of forest cover change between 1986 and 2000. Adapted from Elmqvist et€al. (2007).
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(Lemur catta), Verreaux’s sifaka (Propithecus verreauxi) and mouse lemurs (Microcebus spp.) as well as birds (for example the endemic blue coua (Coua caerulea) and helmeted guineafowl (Numida meleagris), the endangered radiated tortoise (Geochelone radiata), snakes (e.g. Boa madagascarienses) and occasional wild boars. The forest patches are spread throughout the agricultural landscape. Despite the fragmented forest cover, the configuration of patches in the landscape allows for the generation of essential ecosystem services, such as crop pollination and seed dispersal (Bodin et€al. 2006). Forest patches are important habitats for crop pollinators and presently the modelled cover of pollination services in the landscape is almost complete. Studies of the dry spiny forests in Androy indicate that there is ecosystem resilience in the landscape. The forests appear to have the capacity to self-organise and regenerate if the appropriate conditions exist. Elmqvist et€ al. (2007) detected a significant increase of forest cover dominated by native endemic species between 1984 and 2000, and point to the capacity of the dry forest to spontaneously regenerate, which contrasts with the common assertion that dry tropical forests have a low regeneration potential. The taboo forests represent potential source areas for regeneration following local disturbance, such as a cyclone or human logging. Connectivity for a species that is able to move around 1000 m or more, such as the ring-tailed lemur and the forest birds that are also potential seed dispersers, was found to be high (Bodin et€al. 2006). However, the functioning of the studied ecosystem services is vulnerable to loss of forest patches (ibid). Androy is characterised by semi-arid climatic conditions with irregular rainfall averaging less than 500 mm per year. The annual rainfall declines from north to south and from northeast to southwest (Battistini and Richard-Vindard 1972). Livelihood insecurity associated with recurrent droughts is a serious concern for the inhabitants of Androy. Elmqvist et€al. (2007) report a declining trend of precipitation locally; southern Madagascar has experienced declining precipitation since the 1970s and recurrent drought conditions, which have almost become chronic, since 1981 (Casse et€ al. 2004). Particularly severe droughts affected the region in 1981, 1992 and 2003 (EM-DAT: the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be). The large-scale spontaneous regeneration of forest in some parts of Androy appears to be a result of a combination of changes in precipitation, migration patterns and decreased human population and livestock grazing pressure under conditions of maintained and welldefined property rights (Elmqvist et€al. 2007). In conclusion, ecosystem
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
resilience in the Androy region is closely associated with human activities and the effectiveness of local institutions. 3. 4 ╇
social context
Archaeological excavations around the oldest taboo forests in the south of Androy suggest that the land has been inhabited by Tandroy clans since the sixteenth century (Pearson and Godden 2003). Currently, the density of people and settlement is highest in this area (around 100 people per km2), whereas further north density is generally less than 10 people per km2 except in the urban centres. During the twentieth century, the inhabitants of Androy, the Tandroy, have gone from mobile and few to sedentary and many (G. Heurtebize, personal communication, 2005). Presently, around 650 000 people are estimated to live in Androy (SAP 2005). Seasonal migration with their cattle, the zebu, is still a key component of local livelihoods, in response to rainfall variability. Although most Tandroy farm the land today, the zebu has a very special role, economically as well as socially and culturally. A herd of zebu is a bank account and provides the insurance for periods of crop failure and drought. Furthermore, the zebu is the most important sacrificial animal in ceremonies that settle human interactions, as well as religious ceremonies. The social status of a person is strongly related to the number of cattle his or her family owns. The spiny forest fills important functions for local livelihoods as well as for Tandroy culture. The Tandroy use the forest as a source of fodder for livestock, supplementary food such as tubers and fruits (especially during food shortages), material for construction and tools, and wood for fuel. Households usually cook using firewood, but dry wood is also cut for the production of charcoal, sold in the urban centres. The Tandroy have a patrilineal clan structure. The oldest living male in the main clan blood line is the clan priest or ritual leader, mpisoro. The mpisoro resides by the ancestral stake, hazomanga, which embodies the potency of the clan. This is also where important rituals and ceremonies are held.2 The forests present a key link between people and the ancestors. Spirits reside in trees and deep forest, and burying the dead in the forest is a common practice among the Tandroy, in particular in the However, as Middleton (1997) has pointed out, many Tandroy clans have aban-
2
doned the mpisoro and the hazomanga elements of the ancestral cult.
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south. As the forests grow with the spirits of the ancestors, the wellbeing of the community becomes tied to the integrity of the forest. The burial forests, ala kibory, tie the clan or lineage to the ancestral land, tanin-drasana. The descendants continue to bury in the same forests as long as they stay in the area and in numerous cases return to bury there even if the family has migrated elsewhere. The funeral is a central cultural ritual in which people restate their relationship to the deceased and one another through gifts, enga (Fee 2000), as well as reinforce their connection with the forest. The two-day funeral will include the sacrificial spearing of at least four zebu bulls: one when the corpse leaves the house, one as it is placed in a pre-burial forest, ala salata, one at the opening of the ancestral tomb in the burial forest, ala kibory, and one upon closing the tomb (Fee 2000). The breath of the animal goes to the ancestors, the blood to the land and the meat to the living. During a rich man’s funeral, more than 30 zebu may be slaughtered. The most important duty that children have towards their parents is to provide a proper burial (Fee 2000). These responsibilities and presentations during the funeral play an important part in defining the social organisation of Tandroy society and the relationships within and between clans (Fee 2000). In addition to the mpisoro, other relevant positions in the society are the ombiasa, the diviner, and the tsimahaivelo, the (clanspecific) person in charge of the funeral ceremony. 3. 5╇
the taboo forest institutions
Madagascar has developed an ambitious conservation programme since 2000, involving a tripling of the country’s conservation area, legal frameworks for decentralising forest management and a stated openness to including types of protection that do not rule out human use of protected ecosystems.3 Further, Madagascar has a system that formally recognises local rules based on customary institutions, fokonolona, such as taboos, as bylaws that can be devised and enforced locally (Hanson 2007). Technically, in Madagascar, all non-private forest land is state property. However, the traditional land claims inherited from the ancestors, tanin-drazana, related to clans and lineages are still effective See Duffy (2006) for an analysis of the the Durban Vision Initiative for expanding
3
conservation areas and Raik (2007) for a description of community-based forest management approaches in Madagascar.
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
in Androy, representing a common property regime with collective owners who organise to exclude or regulate non-owners and their use of resources. What we describe here is mainly the customary side of forest governance. There are also local and regional rules for forest management, but in practice the forest officials are few and have very small means of enforcing governmental rules (Tengö et€al. 2007). Land that is not cultivated belongs to a clan, a lineage or a subclan rather than to an individual. The elders set the rules for resource use on clan land and grant access to visitors or newcomers to graze their livestock or establish new settlements. The influence of the ancestors is manifest in the lilin-drazana, a set of rules or laws handed down from the ancestors. There is also the fomban-drazana, which refers to custom and habit and is less strict. Both sets are preserved orally in the memory of the elders of each clan, who, together with the mpisoro, are responsible for the ancestral law. The taboos, or faly, meaning forbidden, among the Tandroy are prescribed in the lilin-drazana and are central to Tandroy identity (cf. Lambek 1992). One example is the taboo on consuming the meat of the radiated tortoise, which is specific to the Tandroy (Lingard et€ al. 2003). The violation of a taboo may lead to negative consequences for the individual, but often also for the whole community, as it displeases or angers the ancestors (Ruud 1970, Lambek 1992). Here, we focus on the taboos that are place-specific, in particular those concerning forest or forest patches, the ala faly (forbidden forest). The owners of the taboo forest, ala faly, are a clan or lineage.4 For all taboo forests, the faly implies a ban on damaging or showing a lack of respect for the area. This includes burning, cutting and polluting the area through defecating, urinating or sexual activities. There are different types of ala faly, depending on their history and use (Tengö et€ al. 2007). The most common type, and the category that includes all patches larger than 5 ha in southern Androy, is the burial forest, ala kibory. The taboo does not in itself imply entrance restrictions, but in practice it is only possible for anyone to enter an ala kibory on burial day, following the sacrifice of zebu that opens up the borders and makes the area safe to enter. Evidence of human presence in or nearby an ala kibory could lead to allegations if damage to the forest is found in conjunction with the visit or later (Tengö et€al. 2007). If the people living near an ala faly are not the owners, they are often held We found a few examples of private taboo groves. They were small and used for
4
honey production (Tengö et€al. 2007).
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accountable for damage to the forest. In case of violation of taboos, they are required to identify the violators and hand them over to the owner of the forest (Tengö et€al. 2007). In some instances, there is an agreement between the local inhabitants and the owners in which the former guard the forest in exchange for benefits. The order of the taboo has a supernatural component and is not perceived to be established by humans only. The dead clan members who are buried in the forest and whose laws and customs direct the life of the Tandroy have the capacities and rights to intervene in any way they see fit. Hence, when a taboo forest is violated, both the dead and the living need to be appeased. Through ritual speech, kabary, and sacrifice, sorona, the living enter into communication with the ancestors. At the kabary, the forest owners and other people concerned convene to establish guilt and settle the punishment. Each lineage has a representative at the meeting and all give their opinion before a decision is made and the verdict agreed by consensus. If there is a suspect who does not confess, the owners may call for an ordeal, sangy, a ritual process to establish guilt. If a person does not follow what is decided in a kabary, the local police can be involved and the person can ultimately be brought to the district court. The kabary is recognised by the formal authorities as a problem-solving arena. We recorded two cases in which a person was brought to the regional court in Fort Dauphin. The taboo violation implies a pollution that needs to be purified. This restoration of order requires some kind of blood sacrifice by the guilty party. Most often a zebu, but in some instances a smaller animal, may be enough. The sorona ritual is organised by the clan priest, mpisoro. A sorona purifies the relationship between the living and the supernatural powers, it compensates what has been broken down and reinstates the offender into society, thus restoring normal conditions (Ruud 1970). The number of zebu required is proportional to the damage caused, but for the burial forests there is a minimum of one. The stories tell of requirements of up to 30 zebu, but demands for more than three seem to be rare (Tengö et€al. 2007). The sorona ritual is the crux for the outcome of social change related to the influence of Christianity. 3. 6╇
drivers of change and local adaptive capacity
Our data suggest that forest protection and stewardship relies strongly on the legitimacy of ownership and institutions, and on adequate and maintained enforcement. Two important drivers affecting these
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
processes are (1) recurrent drought conditions leading to seasonal and permanent emigration, and (2) cultural changes related to modernisation and expanding Christianity. In the following section, we will present data on responses to these two drivers and explore how adaptive capacity is expressed in the social–ecological system to deal with these challenges, with particular regard to taboo forests. 3.6.1╇ Erratic rainfall and migration The high variability of rainfall has always been a key factor in the social–ecological system of Androy, and mobility has been the main mechanism for dealing with it. Today, migration occurs over different temporal and spatial scales: (1) seasonal migration across ecological zones with zebu herds to improve access to fodder within Androy, (2) seasonal labour migration to urban centres, mainly Tulear and Fort Dauphin, (3) semi-permanent or permanent migration within Androy to find new or better farmland and pasture, and (4) semi-permanent or permanent migration to other parts of Madagascar for better farmland and pasture or alternative livelihoods. Kottak (1971) argues that the Tandroy were transhumant pastoralists until French rule led to increased settlement. The Tandroy have been described as reluctant to move beyond their home area despite the hardships experienced there (Réau 2002). A person who has left Androy is referred to as motso (lost) and, according to the customs, rituals are required when repatriating a returning migrant into the community. Migrants are considered definitely lost if they do not return for the funeral of a parent (Fee 2000). However, the demands of the developing colonial agricultural sector during the early twentieth century enforced labour migration out of Androy. In particular, the famine of the late 1920s, whose massive impact on human and livestock lives was to a large extent caused by the eradication of the Opuntia cactus by the introduced cochineal (Dactylopius coccus), pushed Tandroy workers into migration. Over the following decades the Tandroy, who were considered sturdy and good workers, provided cheap labour, especially on the plantations in the north (Middleton 1999). According to Réau (2002), migrants tended to congregate in family groups in smaller settlements. Today, Casse et€al. (2004), for example, report increasing Androy permanent migration north of Tulear, in the west. In addition to the harsh living conditions and recurrent droughts in Androy, Réau (2002) brings forward two reasons why tens of thousands of Tandroy live as migrants in other
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regions. The first is the desire to increase social and economic status, primarily by earning money to buy zebu. The ancestral ceremonies, as an arena for displaying status, are said to play a key role. The second is family disruption related to inheritance of, and access to, land to create a livelihood. The trend of increasing aridity, and in particular increased frequency of droughts, was of central concern to all our informants. It has altered the temporal and spatial patterns of migration. Farmers in the south reported either that they kept their cattle at home and fed them Opuntia leaves during the dry season, or that they had to go much further than before to find pasture. Social networks are indispensible for access to resources in new areas, so access to grazing outside Androy can be challenging. Connections with relatives and friends are also essential for temporary and permanent migration, as also noted by Réau (2002). Through a set of case studies, we analyse adaptive capacity for forest governance, expressed as the outcome of migration as a response to erratic rainfall. The case studies are characterised by three patterns of forest cover change over the 14 years between 1986 and 2000: deforestation, stable forest cover and forest regeneration (Figure 3.2). We address past events as well as current adaptation to increasing aridity. Western Androy: deforestation 1986–2000 Until the early twentieth century, this area was inhabited by the Afomarolahy, a clan thoroughly studied by Heurtebize (1986). The Afomarolahy were the legitimate owners of the land, tompon-tany, according to the ancestral law. Following a period of droughts and crop failure they moved 50 km north, where their main settlements are today. They left behind at least two large ala kibory and a small settlement to guard the burial grounds. The present inhabitants belong to a different clan that settled around the 1950s. In an analysis of aerial photos from this period, the forest is described as regenerating in abandoned fields (Clark et€al. 1998). According to local informants and forest officials, during the 1980s forest clearing was particularly used to secure individual land rights. This land-grabbing is similar across Africa and is related to the independent government overruling customary tenure systems while lacking the capacity to enforce the new rules (Duffy 2006). As collective rights to land were not acknowledged, the only formal way to claim
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
land was to turn it into farmland. The limits to the amount of land cleared per family could easily be overruled, as officials had only very limited means of enforcement. In other parts of Androy, the effects were limited, as the customary tenure system was still well enforced. In western Androy, the inhabitants who had arrived since the 1950s had no ancestral legitimacy for their rights to the land. The outcome was a transition from regenerating forest to cleared or partly cleared land as a response to insecure property rights. Several recent clearings and signs of extensive cutting were observed in May 2003 and January 2004 (Elmqvist et€al. 2007). It is interesting to note that population density in the area is fairly low, around 50 people per km2, which is much lower than in the south of Androy. Furthermore, the old large ala kibory that are legitimate property of the Afomarolahy clan are still well enforced, although they are no longer used for burials. North and central Androy: stable and regenerating forest cover 1986–2000 North and central Androy is characterised by stable or regenerating forest cover. Settlements are currently small and scattered and population density is lower than 10 people per km2. The forest is used as a seasonal resource for cattle herding by the inhabitants as well as by people from the more densely populated south and southwest. At least three clans are tompon-tany, the owners of the land, and still live in the area. Seasonal dwellers pay respect to the tompon-tany, and informants reported that permission to cut a tree is required from government as well as customary authorities, that is, the elders of the tompon-tany. Generally, the people who are permitted grazing rights have an established relationship with the owners, such as marriages between the clans, or fatidra, an institutionalised kinship relation between non-relatives. This makes it possible for the owners to hold the visitors accountable for their actions. However, settlements are small and scattered and informants claimed that it is difficult to monitor what is going on in the forest; undetected logging and unauthorised grazing do occur. One village has turned to the government forest authorities for help in keeping outsiders out of the forest and clarifying the village boundaries. One of the dominant species in the areas characterised by regenerating forest (Figure 3.2), Cedrelopsis grevei, has an economic value, mainly as a source wood for charcoal production.
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Despite this, the forest cover has remained intact or is regenerating in the area during the study period. The context of forest regeneration is unclear, but data indicate that the pressure on forest resources has declined. The main driver is the severe droughts during the period, in particular during 1982 and 1990–92, which caused deaths among both people and cattle and extensive emigration. The continuing pattern of recurrent droughts has also caused alterations in the patterns of seasonal migrations, as zebu herds are moved much further north to find water and are kept away for longer periods of time than was previously customary (G. Heurtebize, personal communication, April 2005), thus alleviating the pressure on the forests. The core of Androy in the south: stable forest cover 1986–2000 In southern Androy, with a high population density of more than 100 people per km2, the forest cover was stable during the study period. Comparison with older maps shows that the pattern of forest patches has remained more or less the same since the 1950s (Elmqvist et€al. 2007). All the patches larger than 5 ha, as well as many of the smaller ones, are ala kibory, burial forests. For each patch, the ownership is well established and recognised. There are a few examples in which a burial forest was initially used by a certain group of people but was later taken over by another clan. In the south, more than 20 clans are settled, of which most own one or a few forest patches. Transgressions do occur in taboo forests, although they are not frequent. For most patches we could record a story of an incident occurring during the previous 10 years in which the culprit was identified and punished and a sorona ceremony held to purify the forest. Of 76 mapped ala kibory, nine were found to be no longer active for burials. Two of these were abandoned, that is, the owners no longer monitored or enforced the physical sanctions. Stories of recent transgressions indicate that there were more incidents in these forests compared to well-enforced ones, and informants also said that they were less respected. We found one case in which lost respect in a taboo forest was reinstated. The owners of the forest moved away a long time ago and no one was monitoring the forest. When signs of cutting were found by some relatives of the ancestors buried there, they held the villages nearby responsible. The villagers refused to say who did it and the
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
relatives of the owners decided to sacrifice one zebu and one sheep, to repair the damage and show concern for the forest. The clan representatives for the nearby villagers also contributed one zebu, to display support and an intent that they would continue to protect the forest in the future. These three cases illustrate that the taboos provide protection for certain forest patches for a long time, and that legitimate and enforced land ownership were present in areas that had stable and regenerating forest, in spite of the high number of people moving in the landscape. Extensive forest loss was characterised by unclear property rights. Taboo forests were found also in north-central and western Androy, either as isolated patches as in the south or embedded in forest, although no complete mapping was carried out (Tengö et€al. 2007). According to the informants, they were generally respected, in spite of the fact that many were out of sight of settlements. As in the south, there were stories of transgression followed by sanctions. The feet of a sacrificed animal tied to a pole were often seen at the border of a taboo forest, demonstrating the rule enforcement of the forest. Informants reported that transgressions were more common during droughts or difficult periods, and stated that forests no longer used for burial had weaker protection. Two forests in which the taboo was no longer enforced, as the owners had left, could be visited, and evidence of human disturbance, such as cutting of smaller trees and traces of digging for tubers, was visible. An additional example of reinstated and reinforced taboo protection was found further west. A local non-governmental organisation (NGO) wanted to create a forest reserve, partly to secure good-quality wood for a carpentry workshop. Part of the area was an ala faly. When they gathered the villages involved to declare the reserve, a number of zebu cattle were sacrificed, contributed by the organisation and the villages, to give the whole reserve a strong protection. This indicates that the taboo can be applied as a rule in different contexts. Further evidence for this is the different types of taboo forests, in particular in the south, such as honey groves, memorial groves and ceremonial forest, embracing functions other than spiritual. One indication of the maintained strength of the taboos is that external actors operating in Androy often comply with the forest taboos. For example, in the food-for-work programme run by
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Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM, World Food Programme), the participants carry out road repairs along National Route 10. It happens that the work concerns the periphery of taboo forests located right next to the road. In such cases, PAM ensures availability of necessary sacrifice for taboo purification, so that, as described by a representative, the axes of the workers will not slip in their hands and injure them. The Daiho Company, a Japanese pipeline engineering company stationed in Tsihombe, followed a similar procedure when laying pipes near the village of Marokalo. The route of the pipes went under an ala fitofoa, a taboo site where the corpse rests during a burial procession. A village council established the necessary sacrificial presentation that Daiho needed to make, after which they could proceed with their work. 3.6.2╇ Christianity and social change In this section we address how Christianity, as a growing religious practice and belief system within Tandroy communities, changes the context of the indigenous taboo forest institutions. In particular, we analyse the role of the blood sacrifice, the sorona ceremony, as the key feature dividing Christians and the followers of the indigenous ancestor-belief system. The existence of Christianity in traditional African cultures is still associated with missionaries, who often collaborated successfully with colonial projects through combinations of rhetoric, ideology, technology and force.5 Indeed, it has been taken for granted that Western religion, politics and economy have had, and continue to have, eroding effects on local, traditional and indigenous societies (Sponsel 2001, Sheridan and Nyamweru 2008). However, others suggest that contemporary sub-Saharan African Christianity is neither ‘colonial’ nor ‘Western’. Very often these Christianities are blends between Christianity and local historical practices and beliefs (Shorter 1977, Page et€ al. 2010). Most Malagasy people believe that humans are born into a meaningful existence in a created world. Before Christianity, the ancestral cults accounted for a number of supernatural beings including a creator, ancestral spirits and spirit mediums. The Christian sacred€– saints, Jesus and God€– could be accepted into No one has perhaps told this story as powerfully as the Nigerian Nobel Prize-
5
winning author Chinua Achebe in Things Fall Apart (1958), but for a southern Malagasy context see, for example, Middleton (1997).
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
the plurality of Malagasy spiritual life. The monotheistic element of Christian (or Islamic) theology is therefore many times less strict than in other parts of the world, and syncretic and hybrid practices are common (Lambek 1992). However, there are features in the ancestral belief system that are hard to embrace while being a Christian. Central among them is the sacrifice of animals, which is declared in the Bible to be a sin.6 Long histories of missionary activity exist in the south of Madagascar, under the flags of Norway, France and the USA (Dahl 1934, Ruud 1970, Benolo 1998). The first congregations were established in the early twentieth century. The Joshua Project, a local Christian organisation based in Ambondro, has compiled data on the current presence of Christianity in Androy. Of the 650 000 inhabitants of Androy (2000 census), around 18% identify themselves as Christians. However, only 9% affirm Jesus to be ‘the One and Only Saviour’, and 91% of the total population identify themselves as following the ancestral religion of their individual clan. In Androy, there are 150 Roman Catholic congregations (65 000 adherents), 63 Lutheran congregations (50 000 adherents) and 25 recently established Pentecostal congregations (1500 adherents) (Joshua Project 2000). Our field work suggests that people who are mainly urban-based, young (less than 40 years old), with or aspiring to a high-school qualification or university degree and employed by the government or NGOs are more likely to be Christian. It also seems that Christianity is more common among women than men. The faith is less common among people with positions in village councils or in customary institutions, such as elders or mpisoro and tsimahaivelona. Attitudes and tensions: Christianity and ancestral believers In a written survey of students in Ambonaivo Middle School (n = 54, ages 9–16), 54% of students stated that they were Christian. The same Â�survey conducted in the high schools of the urban centres of Ambovombe, Tsihombe and Beloha (n = 273, ages 16–19) showed 97% of the students stating they were Christian (von Heland 2005). During the ensuing discussions, the students were careful to avoid misrepresenting or showing a lack of respect for the customs or traditional belief system of their New Testament, Corinthians I, 8.
6
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clans. However, some general issues of concern with the Tandroy culture were brought up. The teachers who facilitated these discussions divided the class into two camps: ‘education + modern + Christian’ arguing against ‘local + traditional + pagan’. However, the students did not fully admit to such a divide. They stressed that while one may be Christian, one is also Tandroy. This meant that one had to respect ancestral customs as well as follow the word of the Bible. Concerns about the ancestral culture brought up by young Tandroy students concerned traditional livelihood practices, some of the elements of taboos, customs and ritual (especially the blood sacrifice) and the role and behaviour of the ancestral priest (mpisoro). Traditional Tandroy livelihoods revolve around cultivation and the breeding and selling of cattle and other livestock, learned from an early age as part of village activities. By attending high school, these students and their parents invest in a different education, hoping that it will lead to a different kind of work, such as a driver, teacher, doctor, nurse or politician. A clear divide that emerged from the classroom survey was how students related to ancestral rituals, such as the funerary celebration for the recently deceased (havoria) and the blood sacrifice (sorona). In the school survey, 81% (n = 173) of the respondents wished to be buried inside the ancestral tomb in the forest. However, 43% of the students added two crucial reservations: they did not want a traditional funerary festivity (havoria), and they did not want to have blood sacrifice (sorona). Hence, while most students wanted to be buried in the ancestral tomb, a majority objected to practices that are part of the customary funerary ritual (von Heland 2005). Their main reasons were that they perceived the havoria, a two-day funeral festivity, as wasting precious wealth, as well as being inappropriately boastful, and the sorona sacrifice as being sinful from a Christian point of view. Catholics, Lutherans and Pentecostals within the Tandroy Christian community all question the blood sacrifice (sorona) component of the ancestral belief system, which some informants referred to as a taboo for Christians:7
In her study about the abandonment of the hazomanga cult in several neighbour-
7
ing Karembola clans, Karen Middleton makes a similar observation of a reuse of the concept of taboo, in a non-ancestral cultist sense (Middleton 1997). In this case, the rituals and social roles (for example the mpisoro) attached to the hazomanga were described as having become taboo for the people to engage with.
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar No one in my family is a gentlis [belonging to the ancestral cult]. Hence, we do not do sacrifice, do sorona. I refuse to participate during such ceremonies. (Lutheran Pastor active in the urban centres of Ambovombe town) I respect our traditional culture. I participate in everything that my community does, except for blood sacrifice, the sorona. As a Christian I can only worship the blood of Jesus. However, all the other ancestral commands and customs I follow. (Chaplain of a Catholic church in the rural commune of Ambonaivo) I follow the Tandroy customs in all that is not conflicting with the Bible. It is taboo to Christians to be present during a sacrifice. If there is a ceremony with blood I walk away from there … Everything else I respect. The taboos and the sacred forests … and the tortoises taboo. The church and the gentlis live in mutual respect. (Lutheran catechist in the rural commune of Ambonaivo)
These quotes illustrate the fact that the Tandroy Christians wish to be part of the two parallel belief systems (ancestral and Christian) and do so, as far as possible. However, the churches are clearly against sacrifice; consequently, this is where Christians draw the line for their participation in community and village life. With regard to forest governance, this has implications for (1) decision-making with regard to public and collective matters, such as the burial forests, (2) enforcement of violation of forest taboos, and (3) Christian burial. We were informed that in some cases it is acceptable for a Protestant to participate in rituals where blood sacrifice is practised, when attendance is necessary. However, instead of being sprinkled with blood, as is customary during such ceremonies, Christians will instead be sprinkled with water. Decisions in the community are often made through the practice of kabary, where speeches result in a consensus, often settled through sacrifice. Our data indicate that Christian members of a community hold their own conflict-resolution meetings, often hosted by church representatives. One rural Catholic chaplain states that one of the main things his church does is help settle disputes among Christians in the community. Similarly to the kabary, a guilty party will have to pay a goat, possibly even a zebu, but there is no sacrifice. The outcome is partly parallel arenas for conflict resolution and decision-making, which means Christians are not involved in making decisions of concern for them. Regarding the enforcement of the forest taboos, Christians share the responsibility for monitoring the taboo forests and concern for the peace of ancestors buried in the forests with other clan members.
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However, as described above, they cannot accept the mechanisms underlying the enforcement and the role of sacrifice in purifying the forest and restoring order, and many refuse to participate in the ceremonies. The taboo forests are sacred because of the ancestral presence and stake in these forests. The reason for sacrifice is to establish the link with the ancestors, to evoke and to please them as well as the living. To refuse to make a sacrifice would essentially mean to refuse to settle matters the way the ancestors want it.
Funerals, forest burial sites and Christianity According to ancestral norms, to die as a poor man who possesses no cattle, or to have behaved in such a way that your clan no longer recognises you as one of them and leaves you ‘to bury yourself’, are two great fears for the Tandroy, as well as for Christians. Both may imply that you cannot be buried among your relatives in the ancestral tomb. According to ancestral law, to get the corpse safely into the tomb, it is necessary to perform sacrifice during the burial ceremony. Children who fail to conduct a proper funeral will receive moral blame, hakeo, and consequent righteous wrath from the ancestors. Entire lineages have been known to die out from hakeo, as your children will later fail to bury you, and so on. Hence no expense is spared for funerary ceremonies, especially for the deaths of powerful men (Fee 2000). For the Christians, blood sacrifice is a key dilemma that cuts deep into the Tandroy identity€– they cannot perform the sacrifice but they still want to be in the ancestral tomb. My experience is that Catholics are not strict the way Protestants are … my father who was Catholic was buried in the ancestral tomb according to ancestral practices … But when I die my Lutheran pastor will not tolerate that I bury in the ancestral tomb, with zebu sacrifice. This will in turn create problems for my children and family that will wish to bury me inside the tomb. I do not know if I can trust that they will respect my wish to be buried outside, in a Christian cemetery. (Tandroy NGO worker in Ambovombe) I am a Protestant. To us it is forbidden to participate in any ceremony where we pray to the [indigenous] gods or the ancestors. I can never participate in a sorona ceremony. Therefore I cannot be buried in the family tomb. It is a dilemma for my family that I will be buried outside the family tomb. Traditionally it is only the poor or the outcasts that are not placed in the family tomb with a traditional funeral. (Tandroy anthropologist in Ambovombe)
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
We present three different responses to this dilemma that were identified in our interviews in three communities, represented by three clans (von Heland, unpublished). We refer to them as the Conservative, the Liberal and the Polarised clans. (1)
(2)
(3)
The Conservative clan. In this clan there exist only a few Christians. Their main burial forest will not allow the burial of anyone who does not follow the full ancestral protocol with sacrifice and havoria, the ceremonial burial feast. Hence, Christians bury at the periphery of the forest. They can also bury in a separate area where babies and poor people are buried. It is a taboo forest but as you do not need to sacrifice cattle to be buried there, the area has a lower status and is not really a forest but rather a bundle of trees. The elders of the clan say that if a majority of the clan members become Christian as time goes by, they may have to reconsider what role the forest should have. Currently, in this clan, there is limited conflict, as Christians are few and without strong influence. The Liberal clan. In this clan there are both Christians and ancestrals. Since both groups want to bury inside the main funeral forest of the ancestors, they have established two sections in the forest, one for the burials of each group. The current mpisoro, the clan high priest, was a Christian before his predecessor passed away but nonetheless accepted the role as the clan living ancestor: ‘This was my duty to my people and I could not refuse it.’ The strong Christian group in the clan includes the village mayor. He tries to make sure that both groups are pleased with the changes that affect clan arrangements. So the ancestors are not upset when people bury without making the proper sacrifice. A woman in the household of the mpisoro stated that ‘we pick a bit from both religions’. In further support of this, the mayor, who was also present, cited a proverb: ‘The ancestors who do not see to the best for the living, should be dug up to make space for cultivating sweet potatoes.’ In essence, this means that an ancestor who does not support the current life of the descendants is not worth paying tribute to. The Polarised clan. In this clan, Christian clan members wanted to bury in the same tomb as their ancestors, so they went ahead and placed a dead Christian in the family tomb, in the taboo forest, without spearing any bulls (the sorona ceremony). The elders in the community were upset. A village council, a kabary, was
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arranged, during which the Christians argued that they have equal rights as other clan members to the family tomb. The conflict was severe and could not be settled within the clan, so it was brought to the District Commissioner (DC) in Ambovombe. The DC reasoned that since it was only the ancestrals who had a problem with the incident, they should supply the bulls necessary to purify the forest. The ancestrals refused, since they did not want to pay for an offence of the Christian group. The DC saw no other solution than to divide the burial forests of the clan in two: one section where only Christians can bury and one where only ancestrals bury, each group respecting the other’s practices. The outcome of this arrangement is, so far, unclear. Many informants from this clan expressed relief about having converted to Christianity, as it is a less strict religion. The funerals are less expensive, the way of life is more flexible and there are fewer taboos to fear or follow. The clan no longer has a clan priest, nor an ancestral stake (hazomanga). The Christian informants claim that before the last clan priest passed away he was not well respected. The strong control of the ancestors is a past thing. In this case, the tensions are apparent and open and there is as yet no settling of the issue. In summary, all participants in Tandroy society hold the taboo forests to be important and worthy of respect, but the Christian taboo against blood sacrifice represents a delicate dilemma. The resolving strategies within different clans in the society generate different outcomes that are likely to have consequences for the future of the taboo forest institutions and the capacity of forest conservation in Androy. 3. 8╇
discussion
In contrast to sacred forests in many other parts of Africa (Sheridan and Nyamweru 2008), our study shows that the taboo institutions remain central for forest conservation in Androy, in spite of environmental and cultural change. The forest taboos in Androy are well-enforced, legitimate rules-in-use and provide good protection for the forest (Tengö et€ al. 2007). For the local community to adapt and maintain common property resources such as forests for the future, the indigenous institutions embedded in culture and belief systems play a key role. The taboos and other forest-related institutions have been able to
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
deal with fluctuating flows of seasonal migration and high population density in areas where tenure is well established and the local rules are well monitored and enforced. This corroborates well with other studies of local forest governance, for example the review of 55 forests in Nepal by Nagendra (2007). The forest taboos are regularly violated, but the taboos are also purified according to custom, and the forests continue to enjoy strong protection. The ceremonies reinforce and publicly display stewardship of the forest and the link between the people and the forest, which is widely respected in society. However, in parallel with this we also find an ongoing questioning and probing within the community concerning the role of taboos, ancestral beliefs and forests. The tensions in society between Christians, to some extent representing the modern, urban and educated, and the traditional organisation of society are made explicit during the ceremonies and rituals in which the taboos are evoked. Along with Sheridan and Nyamweru (2008) and others, we view local institutions such as the taboos as dynamic and constantly changing in response to sociopolitical and ecological drivers of change. In our analysis of two central drivers, migration and the spread of Christianity, we identify a number of mechanisms (summarised in Table 3.1) that contribute to the adaptive capacity of the taboo institution and forest protection in Androy. 3.8.1╇ The link between land and people A history of maintained connection between the people and the land appears to be key to adaptive capacity. Periods of erratic rainfall have led to movements of people locally and regionally, with different implications for forest governance, depending on the context. Historical migration and land abandonment have led to institutional failure of forest patch protection as well as land management at a larger village scale in western Andoy, where the present inhabitants lack ancestral legitimacy for their land claims. On the other hand, emigration and decreased pressure on natural resources also allowed for forest regeneration in north Androy, but this was under conditions where local institutions are active and enforced. Forest protection in Androy is rooted in a strong, institutionalised link between the owners, tompontany, and the land. The ala faly constitutes an important symbol of the legitimacy of land ownership. The link is reinforced and revitalised through the enforcement of the rules, and through the ceremonies
63
Well-defined boundaries of ecosystems and ownership with legitimate authority and wellrecognised rules and sanctions
Close fit between institution and ecosystem
Purification as a mechanism for starting over
The sorona ceremony cleanses forest from pollution and re-establishes order
Place-based stewardship Burial in the forest ties the ancestors and the living to the place and the wellbeing of the community to the forest. Manifest through ceremonies and publicly demonstrated stakes Arena for conflict Kabary as a forum for dynamic and flexible resolution interpretation of existing rules where all stakes can be heard
Sense of shared Cultural identity, norms and values align with ancestry as culturally clan membership organising principle
Description
Source of adaptive capacity
Formal tenure may overrule customary and common property systems
Institutions developed for localised interactions between local actors imply limited capacity to deal with cross-scale or novel drivers Reliance on shared values implies limited capacity to deal with cross-scale or novel drivers
Limitation
Allows for continued coexistence among different groups
Involves procedures that restrict Christian participation
Problem-derived decision-making Knowledge restricted to the based on best knowledge ancestral law. Settling of generated through public debate conflicts involves procedures that restrict Christian participation
The values underpinning the taboos are shared by members of clans and community irrespective of religious beliefs Provides legitimacy for rule enforcement that is well respected in the region
Tight feedback loop for recognising and acting in response to change
Implications for responding to change
Table 3.1╇ Summary of sources of adaptive capacity in the taboo forest governance system
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
and rituals (for example, enga, sorona, havoria) related to the sacred forest that publicly display the stewardship of the forest. Migration leading to new settlements may disrupt local institutions in the sending as well as the receiving areas. While historically, migratory patterns occurred primarily within Androy, today the continued trend of increasing aridity has changed migration patterns, forcing people out of Androy to find pasture or sell their labour, as well as extending their stay. This cross-scale migration may have a number of potential effects on the forest taboo institutions. First, fewer people are left to perform the functions required to uphold the taboo. Our data indicate that failure to fully manifest ownership can lead to lost respect for the taboos, as well as lost control over land use. Thus, the presence of people to monitor the forest, respond to new events and engage in the ceremonies is a prerequisite for forest protection. Second, increased distance and longer periods of absence may weaken the perceived link to the land. The awareness among the Tandroy that people who stay away for too long lose a connection with place is illustrated in the motso institution (Fee 2000). A cut-off point may be when someone in the family dies and is buried in the new area. Third, migrants are exposed to alternative world-views that may change their attitudes towards Androy life and customs, which are often referred to as simple and backward in other parts of the country. For example, we found examples of tensions concerning clan forest management between rich urban settlers and rural clan elders, who may be poor and lack status outside their community. On the other hand, a returning migrant may also bring new ideas and knowledge that can contribute to novel approaches of responding to change and solving problems. The taboo forest institution has evolved in a setting where there is high mobility of people in the landscape, which may be one reason why the punishment of taboo violation is so strict. Sheridan (2008) describes how migration has been part of the social dynamics that have shaped the sacred groves in Africa. The institution may be well equipped for dealing with local interactions, where forest owners are recognised as legitimate and powerful, but have limited capacity to deal with external actors, such as loggers or mining companies, which are not limited by their local dependence. The cases of the PAM and the Japanese pipeline company illustrate how visitors are monitored, informed of and held accountable for local rules-in-use, suggesting a capacity to deal with external agencies. However, these actors rely on good collaboration with the local population, and the situation may be different with companies based outside Madagascar.
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Compared to the sacred kaya forests of Kenya, where strong direct drivers of forest loss, such as sand-mining, logging of valuable trees and demand for land for agriculture and speculation exist (Kibet and Nyamweru 2008), such drivers do not have a strong impact on the taboo forests in Androy. These forests are located in a remote and inaccessible region where, so far, few resources of external economic interest have been discovered or exploited. In Androy, as in coastal Kenya, it may be the slow processes of cultural change that are eroding the protection of sacred groves, but in Kenya they are interacting with fast drivers such as market opportunities and tourism, resulting in more immediately pressing conditions for the forest. This illustrates the need for cross-scale institutions that may kick in where local institutions fail. The flip side of stewardship based on a strong territorial bond is that norms and rules that contribute to sustainable use of forest in one place are not automatically applicable in a new area. Several papers describe how Tandroy migrants to the west and north of Androy are key drivers of deforestation and disruption of local institutions (Réau 2002, Horning 2003, Casse et€al. 2004). The issue of heterogeneous local communities following immigration is a central challenge for establishing local counterparts when decentralising forest governance, and one that has not been sufficiently recognised in Madagascar (Raik and Decker 2007). 3.8.2╇ The link between people, ancestors and forest A further component of the adaptive capacity of the taboo institution in Androy is the strong value ascribed to the forest, deeply embedded in society and strongly related to the local belief system. Religious conversion to Christianity in Androy does not seem fundamentally to change how people value the burial forests; respect for ‘the tombs of the ancestors’ is still high. Similarly, Sheridan and Nyamweru (2008) argue that sacred groves in Africa have remained a strong symbol in spite of significant social changes. They are likely to continue to do so, although the interpretation of the symbol may change over time. However, if the taboo forests are to keep their strong taboo status, they need to keep their sacred value. Durkheim suggests that one of religion’s first tasks was to help humans relate to the mystery of death philosophically, as well as practically (Durkheim 1912). While the ancestral cultists were there first, there are also now Christians who share the same ancestors and also have stakes in the forest. The
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
taboo forest governance context has become more complex. For the Tandroy as ancestral cultists, and Christians, to continue to bury inside the taboo forests, it is necessary that both parties feel that they can engage in the rituals and practices they consider necessary to fulfil the expectations of the supernatural powers. In the present, the capacity of the taboo as an institution to adapt its framework to a community in which a significant proportion is Christian appears limited. Currently Christians are excluded from the institution, as described by Crawford and Ostrom (1995), in matters of access, defining underlying norms and rules and sanctions. They may be described as owners, as they belong to the clan that has the right to make decisions concerning a forest patch, but they do not have access as long as they do not perform sacrifice. They are increasingly alienating themselves from the decision-making bodies for sanctioning and altering and interpreting the norms and rules. Furthermore, they do not participate in the ceremonies that reinforce and manifest the forest protection, which appear to be a key component of upholding the taboo, at least for specific forest patches. The Christian reluctance to perform sacrifice runs through all of these. In the long run this raises a number of complications. First, Christians are alienated from decision-making, so that they have little say in the matters of the taboo forests. This can give rise to conflict, as well the loss of sense of ownership. Second, the forest conservation institutions grow weaker as they lose membership. As Christianity grows among the young Tandroy, it seems that over time the institutions will grow gradually weaker. Third, and perhaps most important, the adaptive capacity of the taboos resides in the capacity of the social–ecological systems to renew themselves and erase past errors. Purification provides a mechanism to make amends, forgive and heal and provide a new starting point. To do so, the living people need the permission and the benediction of the ancestors. This can only be obtained through ancestral ritual, including sacrifice. In other words, the institutional adaptations are sanctified by sacrifice. For example, the elders of a clan may choose between adapting by purification or transforming by removing a certain ancestral taboo that is felt to be too burdensome. This has been found to happen both in specific places and for activities or features, such as the use of iron ploughs (von Heland 2005). Hence, if the Christian taboo on sacrifice becomes dominant in a clan, the people will no longer be able to establish the link to the ancestors that, according to the belief system, is necessary to decide how to navigate the future.
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The three cases of Christian burial practices suggest different pathways for change. The ceremonies may remain the same, including sacrifice, and the Christians assigned a place to bury, as in the Conservative clan. With two parallel systems, this may marginalise the taboo forests if the ancestral cult is declining in importance. Or the forest may be shared, as in the Polarised clan. However, the enduring conflict suggests that this may not be a long-term solution. The Liberal clan represents a different path, where both parties seem prepared to be flexible and more open to a solution. This may indicate a potential for compromise and perhaps reorganisation of the role of the forest towards something that can accommodate Christian as well as ancestral concerns. An alternative interpretation is that as Christians become more powerful in a clan, they may take over forest institutions, ending the sacrificial component altogether. Thus, the link to the ancestors, as embedded in the ancestral belief system, is lost. Individual clans or taboo forests do not exist in isolation. It remains to be seen to what extent tensions with Christians will be the concern of individual clans and burial forests or a matter for wider society. In the present, Christianity exists in parallel to the ancestral cult in Androy, presenting alternatives for the Tandroy in constructing their identity. In relation to Christianity, the ancestral cult is felt to contain a strict and burdensome regime of taboos. Ancestral dependence may in the long run result in the slow erosion of the collectivity and the social fabric of the Tandroy ancestral cult, including the forest protection. One indication of this is the high proportion of women converting to Christianity, which gives them more equality. An interesting question is if and how a Christian majority would respond to a potential increase in taboo forest violation following a collapse of the traditional rules. What is the capacity of the Tandroy communities to reconfigure themselves in relation to forest governance, perhaps using other principles that have been brought by migration, education or religion? Our findings on the sources of adaptive capacity within the taboo forest institutions are summarised in Table 3.1. It is clear that the taboo forest governance system embraces mechanisms for responding adaptively to change, but also that there are limitations to locally devised rules that makes them vulnerable. It is essential to recognise these inherent dynamics when evaluating the potential for community-based conservation or decentralisation of forest management. Furthermore, they may also provide mechanisms for more flexible and adaptive management that may be required when, for example,
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
dealing with climate change and migration of people, but they are often missing in externally devised rules or governance structures. Much criticism of the structures for decentralising management of forest resources in Madagascar and Africa revolves around a simplified view of the community and their needs and the nature of the rights that are actually transferred to the local community. For example, Antona and colleagues (2004) report that the legal structure for decentralisation of forest resources in Madagascar has mainly involved transfer of exclusion rights, not access or management rights that may be essential in the eyes of the people who perceive themselves as the rightful owners of the forest. Colding and Folke (2001) argue that embracing taboos in conservation schemes may lower transaction costs related to monitoring and enforcement. It is important to note that this comment is written from the perspective of the state or an external manager; the costs for the local community for rule enforcement may still be significant. Development or conservation initiatives in Androy and similar areas need to fully acknowledge local practices and values if they are to be effective in reaching the desired targets. This was illustrated in an interview with a Tandroy development entrepreneur active near Tsihombe, west of our study area, in 2006. He explains that nowhere in Madagascar does he achieve as much work as here, in his homeland. Currently he is involved with a development/conservation project that needs to create a safe boundary around 30 ha of land. He knows he can establish such a boundary: ‘I have connections here to the community, it is my area and I am respected by the people.’ He emphasises that if you work in Androy you need to respect that social values are more important than technical standards or development. Therefore, it was very frustrating to this entrepreneur to have to justify to the investor from London why he used project money to buy four zebu oxen to throw a party. ‘Okay man, we do not have barbed wire here like in the Wild West to encircle our land’, the entrepreneur comments, ‘I offer the people four zebu, not as a “party” but as a contract, a warrant for success.’ Although sacred groves or taboo forests offer a wide overlap between the views of conservationists and a local community, there are also significant differences. We have argued elsewhere that to maintain the conservation value of the taboos in Androy, it is essential to provide space for the local governance systems to selforganise in response to change, recognising the adaptive capacity within them (Tengö et€al. 2007). This case makes explicit the dynamic
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cultural context in which decisions are made and rules constructed, including aspects of values and belief systems that may not easily be incorporated into formal conservation schemes. Paradoxically, the conservationists’ interest in taboo forests is derived from the perception that they are comparatively undisturbed by human activities, while they can also be described as manifestations or a symbol of a linked social–ecological system, with very strong perceived feedback mechanisms between people and forest. These feedbacks have been described as mediated in a knowledge–practice–belief complex (Gadgil et€al. 1993, Berkes 1999), as we have described for the Tandroy in this chapter. This complex is at the core of the local adaptive capacity to deal with change, but, as we have shown, it is also itself subject to change. 3. 9╇
conclusions
For practical as well as ethical reasons, it has become clear that the conservation paradigm cannot follow a formula where the problem is articulated by biologists and implemented by national or state officials. We therefore need to explore alternatives that acknowledge the valuable but often unseen or underestimated role of local stewards, civil society and other non-state actors, and the norms, values and world-views that they hold. From such a governance perspective, the Tandroy taboos that protect biodiversity-rich forest patches and forestgenerated ecosystem services are one example of a valuable, long-lasting and well-functioning institution that is non-science and non-state. In contrast to the academic literature that describes taboo and sacred groves as in decline or rapidly disappearing, Androy stands out as an exception. At this point, it is difficult to speculate to what extent the absence of strong external drivers contributes to the relative uniqueness of Androy in the larger context of indigenous institutions, traditional knowledge and sacred groves. In the Androy context, we identified several aspects of the governance of the taboo forests that serve as sources of adaptive capacity and contributors to the resilience of the taboo forests and the communities that rely on them. These include (1) a short feedback loop between people and ecosystems, (2) a place-based cultural identity that is shared across religious and clan geographical divides, and (3) mechanisms for conflict resolution and reorganisation following violation or fault. However, we also found an expanding cleft in society between ancestral cultists and Christians, which presents a
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar
significant challenge for the future of the taboo institution, if not a direct threat to the forests themselves. To deepen the understanding of how and through what means taboo forest institutions remain dynamic and functionally adaptive, it would be interesting for future research to compare the Tandroy taboo forests with other sacred groves in Madagascar, as well as on the African continent. Our findings emphasise that taboo forests in southern Madagascar are not static and easily damaged entities. Rather, the forests and the associated belief system need to be seen as part of the Androy–Tandroy social–ecological system, in which their existence dynamically and relationally responds to social, political, economic and ecological changes from outside as well as within the Tandroy world. However, as with any complex system, there are path dependencies and scale constraints that restrict opportunities for adaptation. Thus, indigenous or locally devised institutions are no guarantee for conservation or resilient management of ecosystems, but represent an important, valuable and perhaps critical contribution to governance of ecosystems in practice€– as well as providing insights for the understanding of social–ecological systems in general. references
Achebe, C. 1958. Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann. Adams, W. M., and Mulligan, M., eds. 2003. Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era. London: Earthscan. Antona, M. Bienabe, E. M., Salles, J.-M., et€al. 2004. Rights transfers in Madagascar biodiversity policies: achievements and significance. Environment and Development Economics, 9, 825–847. Batterbury, S. P., and Fernando, J. L. 2006. Rescaling governance and the impacts of political and environmental decentralisation: an introduction. World Development, 34, 1851–1863. Battistini, R., and Richard-Vindard, G., eds. 1972. Biogeography and Ecology in Madagascar. The Hague: Junk. Benolo, F. 1998. Variétés des sacrifices traditionnels dans l’Androy. In Gueunier, N. J., and Solo -Raharinjanahary, eds., Raki-pandinihana. Fianarantsoa: SaintPaul, pp. 257–268. Berkes, F. 1999. Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management. London: Taylor and Francis. Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking community-based conservation. Conservation Biology, 18, 621–630. Berkes, F., and Folke, C. 1998. Linking Social and Ecological Systems. Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C. 2000. Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. Ecological Applications, 10, 1251–1262. Bloch, M. 1968. Tombs and conservatism among the Merina of Madagascar. Man, 3, 94–104.
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Maria Tengö and Jacob von Heland Bloch, M. 1975. Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society. London: Academic Press. Bodin, Ö., Tengö, M., Norman, A., Lundberg, J., and Elmqvist, T. 2006. The value of small size: loss of forest patches and ecological thresholds in southern Madagascar. Ecological Applications, 16, 440–451. Borrini–Feyerabend, G., Pimbert, M., Farvar, T., Kothari, A, and Renard, Y. 2004. Sharing Power: Learning By Doing in Co-Management of Natural Resources Throughout the World. Teheran: IIED and CEESP/IUCN. Casse, T., Milhoj, A., Ranaivoson, S., and Randriamanarivo, J. R. 2004. Causes of deforestation in southwestern Madagascar: what do we know? Forest Policy and Economics, 6, 33–48. Cinner, J. 2005. Socioeconomic factors influencing customary marine tenure in the Indo-Pacific. Ecology and Society, 10(1), 36. www.ecologyandsociety.org/ vol10/iss1/art36. Clark, C., Garrod, S., and Pearson, M. 1998. Landscape archaeology and remote sensing in southern Madagascar. International Journal of Remote Sensing, 19, 1461–1477. Colding, J., and Folke, C. 1997. The relations among threatened species, their protection and taboos. Conservation and Ecology, 1(1), 6. www.consecol.org/ vol1/iss1/art6. Colding, J., and Folke, C. 2001. Social taboos: ‘invisible’ systems of local resource management and biological conservation. Ecological Applications, 11, 584–600. Crawford, S. E. S., and Ostrom, E. 1995. A grammar of institutions. American Political Science Review, 89, 582–600. Dahl, N. 1934. Stories from Madagascar. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg. openlibrary.org/b/OL6304905M/Stories_from_Madagascar (accessed 15 January 2010). Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., and Stern, P. C. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302, 1907–1912. Douglas, M. 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge. Duffy, R. 2006. Non-governmental organisations and governance states: the impact of transnational environmental management networks in Madagascar. Environmental Politics, 15, 731–749. Durkheim, E. 1912. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Durkheim, E. 1963. Incest: The Nature and Origin of the Taboo; translated, with an introduction, by Edward Sagarin. New York, NY: Lyle Stuart. Elmqvist, T., Pyykönen, M., Tengö, M., et€al. 2007. Patterns of loss and regeneration of tropical dry forest in Madagascar: the social institutional context. PLoS ONE, 2(5), e402. Fee, S. 2000. Enga: further descriptive notes on Tandroy funerary presentations. In L’extraordinaire et le quotidien. Paris: Karthala, pp. 523–550. Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B., and Acheson, J. 1990. The tragedy of the commons: 22 years later. Human Ecology, 18, 1–19. Fenn, M. 2003. The spiny forest ecoregion. In Goodman, S. M., and Benstead, J. P., eds., The Natural History of Madagascar. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1525–1530. Folke, C. 2006. Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses. Global Environmental Change, 16, 253–267. Frazer, J. G. 1913. The Golden Bough, Part II, 3rd edn. New York, NY: Norton. Gadgil, M., Berkes, F., and Folke, C. 1993. Indigenous knowledge for biodiversity conservation. Ambio, 22, 151–156.
Adaptive local institutions: taboo forests in Madagascar Gibson, C. C., Williams, J. T., and Ostrom, E. 2005. Local enforcement and better forests. World Development, 33, 273–284. Hanson, P. 2007. Governmentality, language ideology and the production of needs in Malagasy conservation and development. Cultural Anthropology, 22, 244–284. Hayes, T. 2006. Parks, people and forest protection: an institutional assessment of the effectiveness of protected areas. World Development, 34, 2064–2075. Horning, N. 2003. The cost of ignoring rules: how Madagascar’s biodiversity and rural livelihoods have suffered from institutional shortcomings. Paper presented at the International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests and Biodiversity. Bonn, Germany 19–23 May 2003. Hyden, G., Court, J., and Mease, K. 2004. Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. International Labour Organization, ILO 1989. Convention C169. Article 1. In Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. Geneva: United Nations. Joshua Project. 2000. People-in-Country Profile: The Tandroy of Madagascar. Colorado Springs, CO: Joshua Project. Kibet, S., and Nyamweru, C. 2008. Cultural and biological heritage at risk: the case of the Rabai Kaya forests in coastal Kenya. Journal of human Ecology, 24, 287. Koechlin, J. 1972. Flora and vegetation of Madagascar. In Battistini, R., and Richard–Vindard, G., eds., Biogeography and Ecology in Madagascar. The Hague: Junk. Kottak, C. P. 1971. Cultural adaptation, kinship and descent in Madagascar. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 27, 129–147. Kvale, S. 1996. Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Lambek, M. 1992. Taboo as cultural practice among Malagasy speakers. Man, 27, 245–266. Lingard, M., Raharison, N., Rabakonandrianina, E., Rakotoarisoa, J., and Elmqvist, T. 2003. The role of local taboos in conservation and management of species: the radiated tortoise in southern Madagascar. Conservation and Society, 1, 223–246. Middleton, K. 1997. Circumcision, death and strangers. Journal of Religion in Africa, 27, 341–373. Middleton, K. 1999. Who killed ‘Malagasy cactus’? Science, environment and colonialism in southern Madagascar (1924–1930). Journal of Southern African Studies, 25, 215–248. Middleton, K. 2001. Power and meaning on the periphery of a malagasy kingdom. Ethnohistory, 48, 171. Murphree, M. 2002. Protected areas and the commons. Common Property Resource Digest, 60, 1–3. Nagendra, H. 2007. Drivers of reforestation in human-dominated forests. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 104, 15218–15223. North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, D. M., and Dinerstein, E. 1998. The global 200: a representation approach to conserving the earth’s most biologically valuable ecoregions. Conservation Biology, 12, 502–515. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page, N. V., Qureshi, Q., Rawat, G. S., and Kushalappa, C.G. 2010. Plant diversity in sacred forest fragments of Western Ghats: a comparative study of four life forms. Plant Ecology, 206, 237–250.
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Maria Tengö and Jacob von Heland Pearson, M. P., and Godden, K. 2003. In Search of the Red Slave: Shipwreck and Captivity in Madagascar. Stroud: History Press. Raik, D. 2007. Forest management in Madagascar: an historical overview. Madagascar Conservation and Development, 2, 5–10. Raik, D., and Decker, D. 2007. A multisector framework for assessing community–based forest management: lessons from Madagascar. Ecology and Society, 12(1), 14. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art14. Réau, B. 2002. Burning for zebu: the complexity of deforestation issues in western Madagascar. Norwegian Journal of Geography, 56, 219–229. Ruud, J. 1970. Taboo, 2nd edn. Oslo: Oslo University Press. SAP. 2002. Données structurelles concernant la sécurité alimentaire. Report, Système d’Alerte Précoce, Union Européene, Ambovombe. Scheffer, M., Brock, W., and Westley, F. 2000. Socioeconomic mechanisms preventing optimum use of ecosystem services: an interdisciplinary theoretical analysis. Ecosystems, 3, 451–471. Schoffeleers, J., ed. 1979. Guardians of the Land: Essays on Central African Territorial Cults. Gwelo: Mambo Press. Sheridan, M. J. 2008. The dynamics of African sacred groves – ecological, social & symbolic processes. In Sheridan, M. J., and Nyamweru, C. eds., African Sacred Groves: Ecological Dynamics and Social Change. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, pp. 9–40. Sheridan, M. J., and Nyamweru, C.. eds. 2008. African Sacred Groves: Ecological Dynamics and Social Change. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Shorter, A. 1977. African Christian Theology: Adaptation or Incarnation? Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. Sponsel, L. 2001. Human impact on biodiversity: overview. In Levin, S. A., ed., Encyclopedia of Biodiversity, Volume 3. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 395–409. Steffen, W., Crutzen, P. J., and McNeill, J. R. 2007. The Anthropocene: are humans now overwhelming the great forces of nature? Ambio, 36, 614–621. Sussman, R., and Rakotozafy, A. 1994. Plant diversity and structural analysis of a tropical dry forest in southwestern Madagascar. Biotropica, 26, 241–254. Sussman, R. W., Andrianasolondraibe, O., Soma, T., and Ichino, I. 2003. Social behavior and aggression among ringtailed lemurs. Folia Primatologica, 74, 168–172. Tengö, M., Johansson, K., Rakotondrasoa, F., et€al. 2007. Taboos and forest governance: informal protection of hot spot dry forest in southern Madagascar. Ambio, 36, 683–691. Valeri, V. 2000. Forest of Taboos: Morality, Hunting and Identity. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. von Heland, J. 2005. To pray for rain: a case study about the food-generating taboos of the Tandroy (SES) and the impact of religious and climatic change. Honors thesis, Department of Systems Ecology, Stockholm University.
4 Adapting to change: tracing farmers’ responses to disturbances in irrigation systems in Nepal ingela ternström
4. 1 ╇
introduction
This chapter takes the analysis of common-pool resource management one step further by looking closely at how users adapt to disturbances. Using data from farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal, the processes triggered by disturbances are traced and the actions taken by the users to counter them identified. These actions, highly consistent over time and space, can be grouped into decision-making, reconstruction activities, rule-changing, conflict management, change of leadership and more extensive changes in institutional structure. Many of the activities are undertaken or initiated by leaders. The disturbances that lead to the most extensive change are those that alter user-group composition or directly affect the institutional structure. The analysis provides insights regarding how to analyse and promote adaptability in social–ecological systems. The most important conclusion is perhaps that we need to broaden our theoretical horizon if we are to fully understand how people adjust to change in social– ecological systems. The analysis takes us inside the social side of the system and looks at what the users do to adapt to disturbances. I follow the processes triggered by different kinds of disturbances in irrigation systems in Nepal and trace the ways the farmers have acted to adapt to them. While providing insights into the reality of resilience and adaptation, the chapter also contributes to the literature on commonpool resource management. The irrigation systems under study are Adapting Institutions: Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience, ed. Emily Boyd and Carl Folke. Published by Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press 2012.
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farmer-managed, that is, managed and in most cases constructed by the farmers themselves. As such, they are examples of common-pool resources (CPRs), defined as natural or human-made resources with indivisibility in the resource stock but subtractability in the resource yields and combined with limited entry (Ostrom 1990). The fact that a substantial part of the poor in developing countries depend on common-pool resources for their livelihood is proof that users are able to manage them in a sustainable way.1 The material presented here shows us how this is accomplished in practice. It differs from a large part of the literature on common-pool resources in that it takes a dynamic and process-oriented approach. Much of the knowledge about how common-pool resources are managed builds on static analysis, which is a good way of identifying common characteristics of functioning systems but misses the processes that have led to the existing situation. The literature on resilience in social–ecological systems takes a more dynamic approach more or less by definition, as resilience is defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks (e.g. Berkes and Folke 1998, Gunderson and Holling 2002, Berkes et€al. 2003, Walker et€al. 2004). Adaptability describes ‘the capacity of actors in a system to influence resilience’ (Walker et€al. 2004). This chapter shows that farmer-managed irrigation systems are extremely resilient€– it is very hard to find disturbances from which these systems do not adapt and regenerate€ – and describes in detail how the users accomplish this. The approach used is to go inside the social side of the system and look at what the users do to adapt to disturbances and hence maintain the function, structure and identity of their irrigation systems. This provides insights into what are the most crucial components of adaptability. Before proceeding, let me present a generalised picture of the irrigation systems under study. A typical irrigation system consists of an irrigation canal with its intake in a river. The water may be divided into several branches and sub-branches before reaching the farmers’ fields. The amount of water each farmer obtains depends on the amount of water in the river and on how much reaches his Cavendish (2000) found that in Zimbabwe 35% of income is based directly on
1
CPRs, 40% for the poorest quintile. Jodha (1986) showed that poor families in arid India got 15–25% of their income from CPRs.
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
fields, which in turn depends on the state of canals and intakes and on how water is allocated among the farmers. The canals must be repaired and desilted more or less frequently, the intake may have to be rebuilt or repaired annually or after floods, and the water must be distributed among farmers’ fields. To accomplish this, farmers need to cooperate with each other and coordinate their actions on numerous occasions, including making decisions on whether and where to build an irrigation canal, distributing the construction and maintenance work, allocating water among the farmers, collecting cash for skilled labour or materials, monitoring canals and fellow users, punishing those who do not follow agreed-upon rules, adapting rules to changing conditions and so on. There is often an intricate set of rules for everything from contributing labour and distributing water to punishing rule-breaking and changing rules. These rules are referred to as the institutional structure of the system; they may be a written constitution, an unspoken set of customs or anything in between. An irrigation system thus consists of institutional as well as physical structures. However, as this study illustrates, both physical and institutional structures depend crucially on the leadership of the system. The leaders of these irrigation systems are often highly appreciated people, who devote much of their time and effort to maintaining and developing both the physical and the institutional structures of the irrigation system. The analysis in this chapter uses historical data from 10 farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal. The irrigation systems are located in the same geographical area, use the same kind of resources and technology and have similar histories. The 10 systems have, over time, been exposed to a number of similar or identical disturbances, the most frequent being floods and landslides, immigration of new users and external support for infrastructure improvements. In some cases, the disturbances have led to severe conflicts among the users or to complete changes in the institutional structure, while in other cases adjustment to the effects of the disturbance has left almost no trace. In Section 4.3, the processes and reactions triggered by these disturbances will be traced through the history of the irrigation systems and illustrated in flowcharts, and the actions taken by the farmers analysed and categorised, so that the most common tools for dealing with disturbances can be pinpointed. Examples are given throughout to provide a picture of the intricate processes that trigger the disturbances and the challenges they pose to the farmers.
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The actions taken by the farmers to solve or avoid the problems form a fairly limited set of activities: decision-making, physical reconstruction work, conflict management, change of operational rules, change of leadership and change of institutional structure. Many of these activities are carried out by certain individuals, the leaders. The disturbances that cause the largest and most long-lasting change in the irrigation systems are those that change the composition of the group of users, so that it becomes more heterogeneous, and those that directly affect the institutional structure. Interestingly, despite the amount of damage they cause, floods and landslides seem to be the easiest disturbances for the users to handle. A relevant difference is that while floods and landslides are unusual events, the more serious disturbances are also unexpected events. The next section provides background information about the area and the irrigation systems and discusses data and methodology. Section 4.3 describes disturbances, processes and actions, and Section 4.4 analyses the actions taken and the effects of the disturbances. Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of the results. 4. 2╇
data and methodology
The data used in this study were collected in 10 irrigation systems in three neighbouring districts (Chitwan, Makwanpur and Nawalparasi) in the Terai region of Nepal. This area was covered by jungle until malaria was eradicated in the 1950s. Until then, it was uninhabited except in a few places where the original inhabitants, an ethnic group called Tharus, had developed settlements and irrigation canals in the mid nineteenth century. The eradication of malaria, the construction of the East-West Highway and the government’s resettlement and land titling programmes in the 1950s and 1960s caused rapid population growth due to immigration from other parts of Nepal. There has been a series of large-scale, often internationally funded, government and non-government organisation programmes for improving the irrigation system infrastructure in the area.2 The criteria for the selection of the systems studied were that they were farmer-managed, located in areas with similar geographic and ecological conditions and had a fairly long history. This means For example the Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC), the Nepal Irrigation Sector Project
2
(NISP), the Farm Irrigation and Water Utilisation Division (FIWUD) and the East Rapti Irrigation Project (ERIP).
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
the sample only includes systems that are functioning at present and have been functioning for some time.3 The irrigation systems included in the study are: Baireni Kulo, Baise Kulo, Beltari Kulo, Chipleti Kulo, Jayashree Kulo, Mahadevtar Kulo, Nawalpur Tallo Tal Kulo, Pithuwa Sinchai Subyastha Samiti (branch no. 10), Shivpur Martal Kulo and Tarauli Kulo. For a more thorough presentation and a statistical analysis of the irrigation systems, see Ternström (2002). The data were collected by a team at the Water Management Study Program (WMSP) at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Tribhuwan University in Rampur, Nepal. Data were collected in discussions with groups of key individuals in each system (Ternström 2002). The process of collecting information started with developing a time-line of major events and asking for information about a number of physical, institutional and socioeconomic factors for each of these points in time. As no written records existed, considerable effort was put into getting the respondents to explain as much as possible about the background to the answers. The purpose was both to obtain as accurate a picture of the processes shaping the history of the irrigation systems as possible and to have a way of verifying the credibility of the information given by the respondents. The result is a dataset that contains not only figures but also a large amount of background information and a very detailed description of the intricate connections between different variables throughout the history of the irrigation systems. This narrative information has enabled me to trace processes through the history of the irrigation systems. After identifying the most common types of disturbances in the data I trace their effects in the narrative information. When collecting the data, major events in the history of the irrigation systems were used as reference points. The description of these events includes causes and consequences. When there were changes in the irrigation systems over time, the respondents were asked to explain the reasons for these changes. By linking events and changes for various variables in the data, I have been able to trace the effects of disturbances over time. The results are illustrated in flowcharts, one for each disturbance and described in more detail in Section 4.3. I make the distinction between disturbances, the processes they trigger and the actions the users take to adapt to the disturbance and maintain the functions of the irrigation system. However, very few irrigation systems in Nepal have ceased functioning
3
altogether€– they are simply too valuable a resource to be allowed to fail.
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I define disturbances as ‘unusual events’ (Scheffer et€ al. 2002) and focus on exogenous disturbances. That is, I exclude disturbances or changes that are initiated internally, such as decreased landholding sizes resulting from the distribution of land among the sons of households and improvements to the irrigation system that are initiated by the users themselves (even if they include some externally mobilised support). When tracing the effects of a disturbance, I look for the initial effect, the processes that are triggered, the actions that are taken by the users and who takes the actions. Often it is not the disturbances per se that cause a need for action but rather the various processes they trigger. The processes or reactions triggered by one disturbance carry over to other aspects of the irrigation system, and often several different actions are triggered by the same disturbance. By tracing the effect of disturbances to actions, and to the individuals that take action, it is possible to get a good picture of the social responses that are most likely to be significant in adaptive management. 4. 3╇
tracing disturbances, processes and reactions
The 10 irrigation systems have been exposed to a large number of disturbances, both natural (such as floods, landslides and droughts) and socioeconomic (such as massive immigration, road construction, increased market access, external support for infrastructure improvements, greater income inequality, decreased landholding size and democratisation). The most frequently occurring disturbances are floods and landslides, immigration or inclusion of new users, and offers and implementation of major external support. Below I discuss each of these disturbances, providing examples and descriptions of the processes and actions it triggers. Because of its two-sided nature, external support is presented as two separate disturbances: the offer of support and the implementation of support. 4.3.1╇ Floods and landslides A flood or a landslide affects the physical structures of an irrigation system in a rather abrupt way. Canals, intakes and division structures may be washed away, damaged or blocked, reducing the flow of water severely. Figure 4.1 shows some of the key processes and actions arising from floods and landslides.
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
Flood or landslide
Damage to physical infrastructure
Repair now?
No
Decreased irrigation
Decreased harvest
Yes Use internal resources
Repair how?
Use external resources Mobilise external resources
Mobilise internal resources
External support Damage repaired
Damage repaired and irrigation improved
Inclusion of new users
Attraction of new users
See Figure 4.2 Figure 4.1â•… Floods and landslides flowchart.
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Example 1.╇ In the Baireni irrigation system there were severe floods in 1949, 1954 and 1970. The floods damaged the canal and intake, threatening the supply of water to the farmers’ fields. In all instances, the damages were repaired more or less immediately, sometimes with help from farmers in a neighbouring irrigation system. The local landlord, the Zamindaar, was the leader in all aspects of village life, including the irrigation system, and he mobilised the users and the neighbouring farmers, initiating and coordinating the repair and reconstruction work. Example 2.╇ In Mahadevtar a flood washed away almost half the irrigated area. Despite extensive repair work, it took several years before the entire area was reclaimed. Years later a flood control dike was constructed with the support of the District Irrigation Office. The immediate damage caused by floods is washed away or damaged intakes, damaged canals, changes in the water level or course of rivers and washed away fields. Landslides, especially where they pass through hilly terrain, damage canals and are sometimes large enough to destroy whole fields. If nothing is done, decreased crop productivity and reduced harvests will follow. To avoid this, users need to repair the damaged structures. They either do this at once or after some time has passed, and with the mobilisation of internal and sometimes also external resources. Minor damage can be repaired more quickly and with fewer resources than major damage. Sometimes, the farmers take the opportunity to make improvements to the physical structures while repairing them. This leads to increased irrigation, which makes the area more attractive to new settlers and can result in a new disturbance in the form of immigration (see below). Changes in the physical structure sometimes lead to a need for new methods and hence new rules for repair and maintenance and for water distribution. The first action is to decide when and how to repair: now or later, with or without making improvements, using which resources? The next step is to mobilise the resources, which implies informing the users, motivating them to come to the right place at the right time and coordinating their actions in the physical reconstruction work. If external sources of resources are to be used (for example, local authorities or NGOs), they have to be located, contacted and persuaded to contribute. Finally, it has to be decided whether the old rules have become inappropriate and if so, how they should be changed. If there is a need for it, new rules must be developed and accepted by the users.
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
In most cases, the leader (zamindaar or water users’ association chairperson) is the person who makes decisions about emergency repair. The leader is often a well-connected person, who also contacts and mobilises external resources. The actual physical work is carried out by the users under the supervision of the leader. Sometimes the secretary of the water users’ association assists the leader in these tasks. Although there are rules, for example stating that the general assembly is the body that decides about changes in operational level rules or improvements to the canals, such changes are initiated or suggested by the leader.
4.3.2╇ New users New users are included in the irrigation systems either by acquiring land within the irrigated area or by extension of the irrigation canals to cover new areas. Depending on the way new users are included, and on their background, this can have quite extensive effects on the management of the irrigation systems (Figure 4.2). Example 3.╇ The original inhabitants of Baireni Kulo, the oldest system in the study, were Tharus, living under the rule of their zamindaar in all aspects of village life. The zamindaar’s word was, with very few exceptions, obeyed and the people trusted him to make good decisions. Rule-breaking was promptly punished but rarely occurred€– the farmers recalled just one person having to move to another village as a consequence of breaking a rule. In 1970, the first Hill migrants came to settle in the area, starting a 25-year-long period of immigration. The Hill migrants had a different cultural and ethnic background, with other traditions of both leadership and rules for sharing burdens and benefits. For example, Tharu traditions prescribe that every able male from every household should join the repair and maintenance workforce, but the Hill migrants view landholding size as the basis for labour contribution. As more people from the Hills moved in, the strength of the Tharu majority decreased and rulebreaking and conflicts increased. In 1981, a water users’ association was formed to make the system eligible for external infrastructure support from the Farm Irrigation and Water Utilisation Division (FIWUD) programme. This water users’ association was active mainly for construction purposes, and the zamindaar continued to be the actual
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Land survey and titling
Road construction
Immigration Increased number of users Increased demand for irrigation
Increased heterogeneity of users
Decreased support for traditional leadership
New views on rules for labour distribution
Increase irrigation?
Increased rulebreaking and conflicts
Yes Increased irrigation Changed maintenance methods
Change leader?
Change rules?
Yes
Yes Attraction of new users
Change institutional structure New institutional structure New leadership
Figure 4.2â•… New users flowchart.
leader of the system. In 1990, Nepal became a democracy and the support for the traditional feudal system decreased further. In 1995, another water users’ association was formed in connection with another major infrastructure support programme, the East Rapti Irrigation Project (ERIP). This time, there was a shift in leadership from the zamindaar to the water users’ association. The period from 1981 to 1995 can thus be characterised as a prolonged leadership transition period, with quite high levels
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
of rule-breaking and conflicts and steadily decreasing support for the persisting zamindaari system. The change in leadership coincided with infrastructure support, which increased water availability and decreased the need for maintenance labour to an eighth of the previous level. Thus, both the scope for rulebreaking and the cause for conflicts decreased, and it is difficult to judge the effect of the leadership change per se. The immediate nature of the disturbance depends crucially on who the individuals entering the system are and on how they enter the system. If they are culturally and economically similar to those already there and they enter by buying land that is already irrigated, the only effect seems to be to increase the number of users. If, however, they belong to a different ethnic group, with different traditions, there may be severe problems. There is often a difference in leadership traditions and in rules for labour mobilisation. When new users have less respect for the existing leadership, they are less hesitant to break rules. They protest by refusing to contribute labour to maintenance work and by not paying the fines for refusal. This has led to conflicts and even violence between new and old users. The authority of leadership is challenged and the institutional structure becomes weaker. When the new and old users differ in economic or educational status, this is also reflected in a difference in preferences, for example about whether contributions to maintenance should be made in cash or as labour. When an increase in the number of users leads to smaller landholding size, this leads to insufficient food. The most efficient way to increase harvest sizes is to increase the availability and reliability of irrigation. After an improvement of the irrigation system, rules and maintenance methods often become inappropriate and need to be adjusted. Furthermore, even more new users may be attracted to move in to the area. When new users settle on land that was not previously irrigated by the canals but is within the command area of the system, issues about canal extension and rights to water are raised. There may also be a need to change the organisation of the water users’ association or its executive committee to better represent the new users. Obviously, decisions must be made on a number of matters to allow for the various difficulties that result from the entrance of new users. Where physical work on the canals is part of the solution, this involves the same actions as after floods and landslides. There is often a need for conflict resolution between new and old users. Sometimes it
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is sufficient to change the operational rules to accommodate the new users, but sometimes more extensive changes are required. If the old leadership becomes too inefficient, there may be a shift in leadership or a more large-scale change in the institutional structure. Many of these actions are carried out by the leader of the irrigation system, be it the zamindaar or the chairman of the water users’ association. The leader has the key role in making decisions and plans about improvements to the canals, as well as in leading the actual construction work. However, for more substantial work, a specialist in, for example, canal digging may be called in to develop technical plans. The other users usually supply the manpower to do the physical work, and sometimes also make cash contributions for purchase of materials. The leader is most often the one to mediate in the conflicts between old and new users. On a few occasions the scale or type of conflict has been such that an outsider, for example the chief district officer, has been called in to help the users solve conflicts. The leader also seems to be the key person in implementing changes of operational rules, although the demand may come from subgroups of users and the formal decision may be made by the general assembly, if one exists. There seems to be more involvement of the executive committee and general assembly of the water users’ association when it comes to major changes in the institutional structure and change of leadership. However, it is not uncommon for an incumbent leader to be the key person in proposing and implementing these changes. 4.3.3╇ Offers of infrastructure support I have defined as ‘exogenous’ irrigation infrastructure development support given in the name of substantial programmes, offered by government or non-government agencies to a large number of irrigation systems in an area. Under these programmes, support is offered on certain conditions, almost always including the organisation by the farmers of a water users’ association with a written constitution, registered with the appropriate agency. I have not included external support that the farmers themselves have taken the first step to get, such as when they approach the District Irrigation Office to get emergency support to reconstruct their canal after a flood. Such support is on a very small scale, often at most a few ten thousands of rupees, while the support under the larger programmes can amount to several million rupees.
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
Example 4.╇ The farmers in Chipleti Kulo were offered substantial help to improve the infrastructure of their irrigation system. The offer led to discussions about whether the command area should be extended to include new areas and through whose fields the new canal should run. The farmers disagreed, the disagreement turned into a conflict between the users, and the conflict escalated to violence. The offer of support was withdrawn. Example 5.╇ When Baise Kulo was offered external support, one condition was that there had to be a registered water users’ association. Although the irrigation system had been functioning for quite some time, it had not been formally registered. A water users’ association was registered and the irrigation system granted support. However, it later transpired that the person registered as chairman was not the de facto leader of the system. The result was that he and his water users’ association were seen by the local authorities as the rightful users and leaders of the irrigation system. In practice, this did not work well, and some 10 years after the offer and implementation of the external support, the users of Baise Kulo got tired of the situation and brought charges against the chairman. The immediate disturbance caused by the offer of a potentially huge investment in an irrigation system has several outcomes. First, there is a chance to improve irrigation and thereby food production for all users of the irrigation system. Second, there is a chance to increase irrigation and power even more for those who have canals running through their land. Third, there is a chance of making a lot of money as a contractor by being awarded the contract to carry out the physical construction work.4 Fourth, there is an opportunity to change the leadership, the institutional structure and the distribution of power. A number of processes are triggered, mainly related to the institutional rather than physical structures of the irrigation systems (Figure 4.3). The first task is to agree whether to accept the offer. This process involves agreeing on what to apply for, where the improvements A contractor refers to a person contracted by the organisation or authority offer-
4
ing support to implement the physical construction work. A contractor can be an outsider or one of the farmers in the irrigation system. Being awarded the contract to do construction work in an irrigation system provides an opportunity for making large profits.
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Figure 4.3â•… Offer of external support flowchart.
or new physical structures are to be located and how to mobilise the required input. Once the users agree to accept the support, they need to draw up a constitution and get the water users’ association registered. Here, the path is divided among those systems that write their own constitution and those that have help from the staff of the project or local authority in drawing one up. In the second case, a ‘blueprint
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
constitution’ may be used, which often seems to lead to confusion about whether to let the old ways or the new constitution rule. Sometimes the users are bypassed in deciding whether to accept or not€ – an opportunistic individual may simply fill in the required forms and get the support going without involving the actual users. This is probably what happened in Baise Kulo (Example 5). The result is an improved canal but also two parallel institutional structures: one mainly a paper product used for dealing with the authorities and for construction purposes, the other real but unofficial and perhaps invisible to the authorities. This situation undermines the authority of the traditional rules and leadership and may result in improved physical structures but deteriorating institutional structures. The most frequently needed action is to make decisions: about whether to accept the offers, what procedures to follow, what to do about parallel institutional structures and so on. Furthermore, the offer of support often results in conflicts and confusions that have to be resolved. The water users’ association must produce a written constitution and use it to register with the local authorities. This requires frequent contact with authorities and project staff. If a new constitution is drafted, there must be extensive discussions and negotiations among the users. Alternatively, existing rules must be written down. If a contractor seizes the opportunity, the same actions will be taken but by different individuals. If the new constitution causes confusion or increased rule-breaking and conflicts, the conflicts must be resolved and rules changed. After a period of parallel institutional and leadership structures the farmers often reorganise the management structure, change leadership or change the whole institutional structure.
4.3.4╇ Implementation of infrastructure support The second part of infrastructure support is the construction work. How this is done, and the effect it has on both physical and institutional structures, depends on the outcome of the offer of support but also, to a large extent, on the way the support is perceived by the users. Example 6.╇ When the Jayashree irrigation system was improved it was also extended, bringing new users into the system. This resulted in management problems and later a change of
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organisational structure. It also affected the frequency of meetings: after the reconstruction, new methods and materials were required for the maintenance work on the canal structures. This led to an increase in the frequency of meetings of the executive committee but decreased interaction among the other users, as the amount of labour needed for repair and maintenance decreased drastically. Example 7.╇ When the canals of Nawalpur Tallo Tal Kulo were extended to irrigate a new area, the new users argued that it was unfair to let the labour contribution for maintenance be household-based. These were poor farmers, with small landholdings, who would logically prefer contributions to be based on landholding. After they had argued their point for quite some time, the rules were changed. Example 8.╇ The irrigation canals of Shivpur Martal Kulo were greatly improved under a large-scale irrigation system Â�development programme. One immediate effect was an increase in the availability and reliability of water for irrigation, but later the system experienced management problems. The users felt it was no longer their system but the government’s, so why should they put their labour into annual repair and maintenance and why should they come to the meetings? The attendance at the general assembly became so low that it did not meet the requirements for making decisions. The executive committee members, including the founder and chairman of 30 years, grew tired of the situation and wanted to retire from their positions but could not: there was no one to take the decision to replace them. The rules did not work because of a low attendance at meetings, and the low attendance made it impossible to change the rules. After registering the water users’ association, two more things are usually required before the users (or contractor) are eligible for support: a certain amount of the total construction cost has to be supplied by the users as cash, and they have to agree to contribute some labour to the actual construction work. If the process is driven by a contractor, he usually supplies the cash without involving the farmers. Otherwise, cash is collected from the farmers, mostly on the basis of landholding size. The money is deposited in a bank account, often in the name of the water users’ association. Labour is supplied either on a household basis or on a landholding-size basis, and the
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
Users collect required cash
or
Contractor supplies required cash
Users contribute required labour
External support Improved and/or extended canal
Extended command and/or irrigated area
Increased availability and/or reliability of irrigation
Changed maintenance methods
Less labour required for maintenance
Decreased interaction
New users (Figure 4.2) De/Increased scope for water stealing
Decreased scope for rulebreaking
Increased crop productivity
Increased labour supply
Change rules? Yes
Increased outside incomes
Change institutional structure
Increased food sufficiency
New institutional structure
Increased income sufficiency
Decreased dependency on irrigation
Figure 4.4â•… Implementation of external support flowchart.
work is often carried out under the direction of an engineer or project personnel. The processes after construction is completed run along four paths (Figure 4.4). The most prominent change is often less need for labour for regular repair and maintenance of the systems. In Chipleti, the need decreased from 3500 to 1500 man-days per year; in Baireni
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from 1700 to 400, and later to 200. This obviously makes the old rules for labour contribution obsolete but also results in more labour being available to pursue income from other sources. This in turn increases total incomes and decreases the relative dependency on irrigation, although it should be emphasised that agriculture is often said to be the preferred source of income. Furthermore, it also weakens the link between the users’ cooperative efforts and decreases the scope for their interaction. A second effect is to change the maintenance methods needed, for example a change from using manual labour to de-silt the canals to using cement to repair them. This increases the need for cash contributions, making it more difficult for poorer users to contribute their share. Third, when irrigation availability and reliability increases, farmers can diversify their crops and use improved seeds, increasing harvests. The increased availability and reliability of irrigation also affect the extent of water stealing, in some cases increasing it and in other cases decreasing it. Fourth, when canals are extended new areas are included in the irrigation systems and when irrigation is improved new users are attracted into the area. The first thing to decide is often the basis for cash and labour contributions. Someone has to collect the cash and mobilise and coordinate labour. New rules must be developed and implemented to accommodate changes in maintenance methods and water supply. If the frequency of maintenance meetings decreases, there may need to be new arenas for discussions and problem-solving. The decision about the basis for contributions seems to be taken by the general assembly, and the actual collection of money is often made by the secretary of the water users’ association. The physical work is quite extensive and requires specialist knowledge; usually an engineer leads the work. After the completion of the physical improvements, decisions to change the rules are taken either by the leader alone or by the executive committee or general assembly of the water users’ association, depending on the institutional structure. Changes in maintenance practices are mainly decided by leaders or executive committees. Finally, making accommodation for the wishes of new users is often done by the leader. 4. 4╇
analysis
The data presented give insights into the immediate and long-term effects of the disturbances, the actions taken by users to counter these effects and who takes these actions. There is limited variation in the
X
X X
(X) (X) (X)
X
Reaction
X X
X
X
X
X
(X) (X)
X
X
X (X)
X
Change Reconstruction Conflict-solving Change rules Change leader institutions
X
X X
Decision-making Repair
X, action triggered by primary process; (X), action triggered by secondary process.
Floods and landslides New users: same socioeconomic status New users: different socioeconomic status External support: offer External support: implementation
Disturbance
Table 4.1╇ Disturbances and actions
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actions taken, and they can be arranged into seven groups. Table 4.1 illustrates which actions are triggered by which disturbances. 4.4.1╇ Actions and actors Quite naturally, decision-making is the most frequently taken action. Among the irrigation systems covered here, there are two common types of decision-making entities: the single leader and the water users’ association. In the old days, in the Tharu-dominated systems, the zamindaar was the single leader, making more or less all the decisions, although sometimes after consulting with the other farmers. In practice, there is also often a single leader in systems that have a water users’ association. Many statements in the narrative data point to a dependence on one individual: for example, ‘Without this person the system would not work.’ An important aspect of decision-making is that the decision is implemented; that is, the decision has to be accepted by those who are supposed to implement it. In the systems originally constructed by Tharus, this became a particular challenge after migration brought new users, with different traditions, to the area. As long as all users were Tharus, the authority of the zamindaar was unquestioned and often appreciated. The Hill migrants, coming from another culture, were not as ready to follow the word of the zamindaar. In other cases of personal leadership the situation seems to be similar to that in the Tharu communities, in which people listen to and willingly follow the words of the leader. The repair and reconstruction work after floods and landslides involves planning what should be done, how, by whom and when, motivating the farmers and, if needed, gathering external resources to contribute labour and cash. When it is time to carry out the work, the resources have to be coordinated and used according to plan. The leader (zamindaar or chairman of the water users’ association) usually both organises and coordinates the repair and reconstruction work. The role of the other users is to carry out the physical work and make cash contributions for materials when needed. Solving minor conflicts between a few users, for example regarding water distribution, is part of the leader’s responsibility. More serious conflicts, which involve many users or large subgroups, often have their origin in cultural differences of opinion, such as conflicts about the basis for labour contribution. The conflict is often old versus new users, but sometimes small versus large, poor versus rich or upstream
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
versus downstream farmers. The categories often coincide: for example large, rich, upstream farmers against poor, downstream smallholders. If they also coincide with Tharu versus Hill migrants, the conflicts tend to be about more fundamental issues and often develop into conflicts about leadership and institutional structure, that is, about the distribution of power. Changing operational-level rules is a way of adapting to changes in social or physical conditions in the irrigation system. One example is when new Hill users cause the rule for labour contribution to be changed from household- to landholding-based, which is fairer according to their customs. Triggers for change in operational-level rules are usually either changes in the physical characteristics of the irrigation system or changes in the composition of its users. Although the demand for change may come from a subgroup of users, the decision to change the rules is made either authoritatively by a single leader, by the executive committee or at the general assembly, that is, what Ostrom refers to as ‘collective-choice arrangements’ (Ostrom 1990, p. 90). There is a close connection between leaders, leadership and institutions. Thus changing leadership often implies changing the institutional structure. When zamindaars were replaced with other leaders, this implied changing the institutional structure of the irrigation systems. Similarly, the users of one system formed a water users’ association and introduced democratic elections to replace a bad leader (a ‘contractor-chairman’). The data show that there is great concern about the need to have good leaders but there are few instances of power struggles between individuals for leadership. When a dedicated individual steps forward and shows willingness to take on the task of leadership, the other users often willingly accept him as leader. Changing the institutional structure of an irrigation system may seem more fundamental than changing the leadership, and in some cases this is supported by the data, such as when the zamindaari system was abolished and the leader replaced. However, in other cases, changes in the institutional structure have been initiated by changes in leadership. The ways that institutions change show great variation: in the traditional Tharu systems the zamindaar held power, but as his power was solidly based in the traditional institutional structure, he could not make overly extensive changes without risking his position. In other ‘one-man show’ irrigation systems, the leaders had the power to
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implement substantial changes in the institutional structures. There are also systems in which the users themselves created water users’ associations, controlled by a general assembly of the users and run by an executive committee. These irrigation systems most closely resemble the irrigation systems described by Ostrom (1992) but are by no means the only long-lasting ones. Institutional changes arising from external causes, such as the contractor that made himself chairman of a ‘fake’ water users’ association, or when blueprint constitutions offered by external agencies were used in place of the users’ own rules, were the ones least likely to last. 4.4.2╇ A link to business organisations Looking at the list of actions taken by users, the resemblance to other kinds of organisations is striking. Decision-making, physical repair or reconstruction and, to some extent, conflict resolution can be compared to the activities involved in the daily management of a business organisation or project management. Changing rules, leadership and institutional structures can be interpreted as organisational development activities. Managing or solving the larger-scale conflicts that evolve from the incorporation of users with a different culture is similar to a merger between two business corporations with different organisation cultures. Foss (2001), quoting sources from organisation theory, describes the essence of organisation as a coordinated response to volatility. This statement fits well with what seems to be most important to the farmers of the irrigation systems€– to keep their irrigation systems working despite disturbances.5 The fact that many of the actions are carried out by one or a few individuals is another similarity to business organisations, in which the leaders and management are recognised as crucial to the success of the organisation (Mintzberg 1973, Milgrom and Roberts 1992). This suggests that we need to explore organisational theory, and particularly theories about leadership, in order to understand what makes the actors in social–ecological systems able to adapt to disturbances. One step in this direction is taken by Westley (2002), who describes the struggle of an individual manager in a series of resource management challenges. Westley, citing Gunderson et€ al. (1995), concludes that individuals and small groups of individuals Foss (2001), who refers to Galbraith (1973) and Thompson (1967).
5
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
exert extraordinary influence by performing certain distinct roles within and outside institutions as the key to the reality of the adaptive management of complexity. 4.4.3╇ Causes, immediate impacts and long-term effects The long-term effects of a disturbance seem to depend on what part of the system’s structure they hit: floods and landslides have an immediate impact on the physical structures but little effect in the long run, except when the damage is very extensive or when farmers take the opportunity to improve the canals and this attracts new users. The inclusion or immigration of new users changes the composition of user groups and affects social structures. If the new users come from a different socioeconomic background, the long-term effect is often extensive changes in the institutional structure. The offer of external support has both immediate and long-term effects on institutional structure and seems to be the disturbance to which users have most difficulty adapting. While the implementation of external support improves the physical structure, it often requires some adjustment of the institutional structure. By tracing the disturbances backwards, we can divide them into being caused by the natural environment, by population growth and by government policies. Floods and landslides are caused by heavy rainfall and are regarded mainly as acts of nature, although they also have a human component.6 The immigration and inclusion of new users can be traced further back to the push and pull factors that make people move into the area. While population growth in the Hill areas is the main push factor, the government’s resettlement, land title and malaria eradication programmes are pull factors. The external infrastructure support programmes result from a combination of government policies and financial support provided by NGOs. Table 4.2 shows that government policies have had the most extensive impact on irrigation systems. Natural disturbances are the easiest to adapt to, perhaps because while floods and landslides may be unusual events, they are not unexpected. Both immigration and The users of several irrigation systems commented on the increased frequency of
6
floods after 1943 and connected it with increased upstream deforestation. In one of the systems the farmers organised a forest user group to protect and regenerate the forest upstream of their canal.
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Table 4.2╇ Sources and effects of disturbances. Source
Effect
Natural
Physical structure Floods Landslides Social structure Institutional structure
Population growth
New users New users
Government policies and NGO support External support: implementation New users External support: offer and implementation
external support, at least on this scale, are more difficult to anticipate and can be regarded as both unusual and unexpected events. Thus we may conclude that the extent to which an event is unusual is perhaps less important than the extent to which it is unexpected. 4. 5╇
conclusions
The actions that farmers take to solve or avoid the problems caused by disturbances can be summarised as a fairly limited set of activities: decision-making, physical reconstruction work, conflict management, changing operational-level rules, changing leadership and changing the institutional structure. These issues are regularly dealt with in other human organisations, such as businesses. Hence one conclusion is that we should take a closer look at theories of organisational development and management if we wish to understand fully how people in social–ecological systems adapt to changes. Many of the actions identified as important in the present analysis are carried out by single individuals; leaders. There is an intricate link between change of leadership and institutional change. Change in institutional structure is sometimes preceded by or is simultaneous with a change of leadership, and often institutional changes are initiated and implemented by leaders. Thus, one of the most crucial characteristics of a system that is able to adapt to disturbances seems to be a well-functioning leadership. The disturbances that cause the largest and most long-lasting change in the irrigation systems studied are those that change the composition of the group of users so that they become more heterogeneous, and those that directly affect the institutional structure. Looking at the origin of the different disturbances, we find that, sadly,
Adapting to change: irrigation systems in Nepal
the most serious disturbances are caused by government interventions. This gives cause for caution when designing government policies. For example, when designing infrastructure support programmes, the effect on institutional structures should be carefully considered to avoid damage. The results are in line with and provide explanations for the results of previous statistical analyses of the data (Ternström 2002), which indicated that having a single leader and a homogeneous group is strongly correlated with the level of cooperation among the users. The results also give empirical support and explanations for why heterogeneity (in terms of economic inequality or cultural differences) has a negative effect on cooperation (Ternström 2002).7 The present analysis has dealt with the internal reactions to external disturbances. Of course, there are many other disturbances that could have more devastating effects and other irrigation systems that are less able to counter the effect of disturbances. However, irrigation is such a crucial input in farming that it is very hard to find irrigation systems that have actually failed. Perhaps this makes them less suitable study objects for analysing resilience, as the dependency may simply be too high to allow failures. Or perhaps they are an excellent choice, as they simply have to have adaptive capacities. Without irrigation, many of these farmers would find it very difficult to make a living.
acknowledgements
I am grateful for the support the users of the irrigation systems studied have given by granting me access to their time, files and memories, and to the team at the Water Management Study Program (WMSP), Tribhuvan University, for collecting the information. I am grateful for comments from Carl Folke and an anonymous referee. A previous version of this chapter was presented at the WOW3 conference at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University; comments from participants are gratefully acknowledged. This work was supported by the Swedish Council for Forestry and Agricultural Research and by the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning.
See Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) for
7
another approach to heterogeneity.
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references
Alesina, A., and La Ferrara, E. 2002. Who trusts others? Journal of Political Economy, 85, 207–234. Bardhan, P., and Dayton-Johnson, J. 2002. Unequal irrigators: heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research. In Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolšak, N., et€al., eds., The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Berkes, F., and Folke, C., eds. 1998. Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C., eds. 2003. Navigating Social–Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cavendish, W. 2000. Empirical regularities in the poverty-environment relationship of rural households: evidence from Zimbabwe. World Development, 28, 1979–2003. Foss, N. 2001. Leadership, beliefs and coordination: an explorative discussion. Industrial and Corporate Change, 10, 357–388. Galbraith, J. 1973. Designing Complex Organizations. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Gunderson, L., and Holling, C. S., eds. 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC : Island Press. Gunderson L., Holling, C. S., and Light, S., eds. 1995. Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jodha, N. 1986. Common property resources and the rural poor. Economic and Political Weekly, 21, 1169–1181. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. 1992. Economics Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Mintzberg, H. 1973. The Nature of Managerial Work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E. 1992. Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, San Francisco, CA: ICS Press. Scheffer, M., Westley, F., Brock, W., and Holmgren, M. 2002. Dynamic interaction of societies and ecosystems: linking theories from ecology, economy and sociology. In Gunderson, L., and Holling, C. S., eds., Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island Press. Ternström, I. 2002. The management of common-pool resources: theoretical essays and empirical evidence. Stockholm Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics. Thompson, J. 1967. Organizations in Action. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Walker, B., Holling, C., Carpenter, S., and Kinzig, A. 2004. Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 9(2), 5. www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5. Westley, M. 2002. The devil in the dynamics: adaptive management on the front lines. In Gunderson, L., and Holling, C. S., eds., Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island Press.
5 Creating incentives for increased public engagement in ecosystem management through urban commons johan colding
The ‘commoners’ of the past are the ‘stakeholders’ of the present and future. Bonnie J. McCay (2000)
5. 1 ╇
introduction
Over half the world’s population currently lives in urban areas; by 2030, nearly five billion people are expected to live in cities (Ash et╯al. 2008). Between 2010 and 2030, the amount of the built mass on the earth is predicted to double, creating ever-greater demands on the services that nearby and distant ecosystems provide (Grimm et╯al. 2008). With a greater proportion of humans living in metropolitan areas,1 urban ecosystems will experience increased land-use and land-cover change. Currently, urbanisation endangers more species and is more geographically ubiquitous than any other human activity; urban sprawl is rapidly transforming critical habitats of global value, such as the Atlantic Forest Region of Brazil, the Cape of South Africa and coastal Central America (Elmqvist et╯al. 2008). Urbanisation leads not only to increased homogenisation of fauna and flora (McKinney 2002) but also to an impoverished biology in metropolitan areas, which Metropolitan areas are defined as ‘extended urbanised zones that are demo-
1
graphically, economically and socially interconnected, … and include a variety of urban forms, such as high-density residential and commercial areas, lowerdensity suburbs and lower-density peri-urban sites that are often still used for agricultural production’ (Solecki and Leichenko 2006). Adapting Institutions: Governance, Complexity and Social–Ecological Resilience, ed. Emily Boyd and Carl Folke. Published by Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press 2012.
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arguably serves as a constant reminder of the presumed unimportance of biodiversity and so may contribute to ‘environmental generational amnesia’ among the greater public (Miller 2005). To gain the much-needed broad-based public support for a sustainable use of ecosystems, both within and outside cities, the places where people live and work need to offer opportunities for meaningful interactions with functioning ecosystems (Rosenzweig 2003, Miller 2005, Andersson et╯al. 2007, Colding 2007). In this respect, and to help mitigate the growing disconnection of urban residents from nature (Pyle 1978, 1993), the dynamics of property rights determining human relationships to land can have powerful ramifications and be worthy of scholarly analysis to provide propositions about both the manner in which land ownership in cities evolves (Webster 2003) and its potential outcomes, such as the provision of the ecosystem services critical to human well-being (Daily 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). It is increasingly recognised that today’s institutions match current changes in ecosystems and their dynamics poorly (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Folke et╯al. 2007). The UN-supported Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) concluded that globally, ecosystem services are diminishing alarmingly and putting such strains on the environment that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted. The MA showed that, with appropriate actions, it is possible to reverse the degradation of many ecosystem services, but also that the required changes in policy and practice are substantial and not currently happening. Furthermore, urban settings represent a priority area for the increased actions needed for capacity building of ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). In this chapter, I argue that urbanisation results in an increasing proportion of people becoming landless. Two critical outcomes result: first, ecological illiteracy among people may increase as direct human interaction with the land diminishes, and second, prospects for ecosystem management, which depends on local stakeholder involvement, are further limited. As outlined here, the dynamics of property rights act as one of the most prominent causes behind the observed pattern of ecosystem (or green area) loss in urban areas. Urbanisation in market-driven, industrialised countries inevitably leads to a scarcity of land, accompanied by a rise in land prices and an increasing subdivision of land, which favours the growth of private land ownership (for example, club goods). The current shift to private organisations for providing and managing urban services is so pervasive that some
Creating incentives through urban commons
property-rights scholars regard it as a global phenomenon, independent of a country’s wealth or political ideology (Webster 2003, Lee and Webster 2006). As a result, lands in the public domain increasingly become enclosed by private land and often part of urban development, further reducing opportunities for the majority of city residents to have meaningful interactions with their ecosystems. While it may make economic sense for governments to sell public land to private actors, this may not always provide desirable social–ecological outcomes in cities. In this context, I bring forward the notion that common property rights regimes offer important institutional arrangements for providing a range of ecosystem services in urban settings, as well as for promoting ecological literacy and environmental stewardship among urban citizens. In common property rights regimes, management rights to natural resources are held by an identifiable community or group of users that may craft their own institutions for resource management within given legislative forms of society (Ostrom 1990, Berkes and Folke 1998, Berkes et╯al. 2003). I refer to such systems as ‘urban commons’, representing Â�social–ecological urban landscape areas in which natural resources are commonly governed and managed by many individuals (e.g. Ostrom 1990). The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides descriptions of some general land characteristics of urban settings. Section 5.3 describes how the dynamics of property rights provide powerful explanations for much of the land development patterns in urban areas; the theoretical underpinnings for this argument are largely based on work by Webster and colleagues (Webster 2002, 2003, Lee and Webster 2006). Section 5.4 deals with examples of ‘urban commons’ from various parts of the world, based on a literature review, covering community gardens in the USA, allotments in Europe and some emerging forms of collectively managed land. In Section 5.5, I suggest ways in which urban commons could contribute to sustainability in metropolitan areas, including promoting ecosystem services, and discuss their applicability in urban ecosystem management. The chapter ends with a summary of the broader insights generated in this chapter. 5. 2 ╇u r b a n
land characteristics and implications for
land interaction
While quantitative data on urban land cover do not always come readily to hand, a key characteristic of urban land is that, to a greater extent than any other landscape type, it comprises built-up patches. The proportion
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of built-up land differs, of course, between cities, with the size of cities and where, along a rural–urban continuum, the analyses are made. For example, in a land-use survey of Leicester, UK, residential and commercial areas accounted for 65% of land cover (Carr and Lane 1993); in Brussels, about 50% of the land area consisted of built-up areas (Gryseels 1995); in the heart of London, open spaces made up only some 7.5% of the urban landscape, of which nearly half was regarded as ‘green’ (Plummer and Shewan 1992); in Berlin, vegetation cover ranged from 32% in the built-up areas of the city to 95% in the outer suburbs (Sukopp et╯al. 1979). Often, however, when semi-natural lands are taken into account (Kendle and Forbes 1997), the actual coverage of urban green space is considerably greater than official estimates would suggest. For example, private gardens in residential areas in and around Stockholm comprise over 16% of the total land area but are officially registered as built-up land in land classification statistics (Colding et╯al. 2006). Ownership of land in cities differs markedly from ownership patterns of other land types. As one moves from rural settings towards metropolitan areas, and especially into urban core areas, the proportion of landless people increases, because they live in multi-family dwellings without associated land (Figure 5.1). In city centres, green spaces tend to be owned by state authorities, such as a local municipality, or by powerful private organisations; examples include public parks, churchyards, alleys and various types of green space associated with large organisations, such as that surrounding schools, hospitals and industrial parks (Kendle and Forbes 1997). As one proceeds outward from the city centre, suburban green patches cover quite extensive and cohesive chunks of the metropolitan area, with a progressively increasing amount of green areas located in the semi-rural urban fringe (Colding et╯al. 2006). An increase in the proportion of per capita ownership of land often also follows this progression. For example, at 5–7 km from the centre of Stockholm, the proportion of people living in one- and two-dwelling buildings with domestic gardens increases quite substantially. Different bundles of property rights are associated with ownership of land (Ostrom and Schlager 1996), of which rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation are the most prominent (Table 5.1). While green spaces in urban cores mostly allow public access, not all do.2 For instance, over a third of the open land in the more central parts of London is closed Access refers to ‘the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtrac-
2
tive benefits’ (Ostrom and Schlager 1996).
Creating incentives through urban commons
Table 5.1╇ Bundles of property rights associated with positions
Owner Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation
X X X X X
Proprietor X X X X
Claimant X X X
Authorised Authorised user entrant X X
X
The five property rights in the table are independent of one another, but are frequently held in the cumulative manner arranged as shown. They include the rights of access (i.e. ‘the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive benefits’); withdrawal (‘the right to obtain the resource units or “products” of a resource’); management (‘the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements’); exclusion (‘the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred’); and alienation (‘the right to sell or lease either or both of the above collective-choice rights’) (Ostrom and Schlager 1996, p. 133). The bundles of property rights are held by individuals with different positions and named accordingly. Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992, p. 252).
Figure 5.1â•… The proportion of people living in one- and two-dwelling buildings decreases successively with population density, with major, larger cities typically having the lowest proportion. Examples derived from Sweden. Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån (2007).
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to the public (Plummer and Shewan 1992). While public green spaces may exist in densely populated neighbourhoods of multi-family dwellings, residents are often denied both withdrawal rights and management rights over these lands. Hence, much of the urban population is removed from the opportunity to own land, to have an input into the use of urban land and, arguably, the ability to understand or have concern for land conservation outside and within their cities (Rhode and Kendle 1997). Instead, most bundles of property rights associated with green space tend to be vested in governmental authorities, such as traditional local authority maintenance staff or private contractors, who favour simple, structurally monotonous land use, with large tracts of uniform grass, either with or without planted trees, characterised by Kendle and Forbes (1997) as ‘green deserts’. The emphasis in such management practice is on aesthetic ideals of cleanliness and tidiness rather than ecological ideals (Colding 2007). 5. 3╇
dynamics of property rights in urban areas
Descriptive accounts of urban areas seldom consider the dynamics of property rights as an explanatory factor in land change and loss of green areas in growing metropolitan regions. It has, however, been proposed that the same mechanisms that operated in the transformation of common land in Great Britain are also common to the land development pattern observed in many cities in market-driven, industrialised countries. This ultimately plays out as a game of propertyrights change. Formerly, in rural Britain, a substantial amount of common land existed. A historical change in agricultural land value occurred in the sixteenth century, as the demand for wool rose quickly and sheep farming consequently became the most profitable form of agriculture (Lee and Webster 2006). With the rising value of land driven first by national and then by international trade, common land became increasingly more scarce and private property rights increasingly prevailed throughout England and Wales (Lee and Webster 2006). Technological and economic development led to a significant change in land yield.3
The social costs of the enclosure of common land in Britain adversely affected the
3
welfare of the landless, but many of the displaced peasants and their descendants became, in the longer run, co-beneficiaries of rural land enclosure, which yielded long-term gains for society as a whole (Lee and Webster 2006).
Creating incentives through urban commons
Central to this economic property-rights argument is that as the value of land increases there is an inescapable trend towards the subdivision of property rights, with common rights giving way to private rights (Barzel 1997, Lee and Webster 2006), and a further likelihood of subdivision proceeding within an organised system of exchange (North 1990). Clearer boundaries (for which, read ‘privatisation’) make for more efficient exchange, equating to a lowering of transaction costs€– or the costs of creating and policing contracts that establish ownership over a commodity such as land (Webster 2002). A fundamental proposition behind the property-rights argument made by Lee and Webster (2006) is that ‘the more accessible land is, the more scarce it is and central land becomes increasingly scarce as the city grows’. They use the growth of Manhattan as an illustrative example: Prior to the Dogan Charter of 1686 which conferred on the municipality ownership of all land in Manhattan, no land was granted or sold to individuals. Under municipal ownership, however, land became the ultimate source of funds required to manage the municipality and to maintain its famous low taxes. Parcels of common land, whose boundaries were still irregular, were sold to individuals during this period. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, private ownership had become prevalent in parts of the island.
Privatisation of land still helps push New York’s economy. Today, more housing units are being built in New York City than at any time since the height of the post-World War II boom in the early 1950s, with large sections of the former industrial waterfront in Brooklyn and Queens being rezoned for residential development (Solecki and Leichenko 2006). Urban spatial order can also emerge spontaneously without explicitly planned government control over land use (as was the case in Manhattan), through