Advances in Child Development and Behavior Volume 21

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR Volume 21 Contributors to This Volume Donald M. Baer Ross D. Parke Sid...

Author: Hayne W. Reese

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ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

Volume 21

Contributors to This Volume

Donald M. Baer

Ross D. Parke

Sidney W. Bijou

David A. Parton

Gordon N. Cantor

David B. Pillemer

Joan H. Cantor

Hayne W. Reese

Eugene S. Gollin

Henry C. Riegler

Betty J. House

Charles C. Spiker

Elyse Morgan

Gary Stahl

David S. Palermo

Sheldon H. White

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

edited by Hayne W. Reese Department of Psychology West Virginia University Morgantown, West Virginia

Volume 21

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers

San Diego New York Berkeley Boston London Sydney Tokyo Toronto

ACADEMIC PRESS. INC. Sari Diego. Calilomia 91101

L'fiired Kiti,qtlont Edidiriori puh/ished ACADEMIC PRESS LIMITED 23-2X Oval Road, London N W I 7DX

Contents

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Social Development in Infancy: A 25-Year Perspective ROSS D. PARKE ....... ....................... I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . 11. The Maturing of Infancy Research.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. Major Shifts in Thematic Content and Theory in Infant Social ........... Development Research . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Dimensions of Infant Social Developmen ........... V. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 4

11

33 35

On the Uses of the Concept of Normality in Developmental Biology and Psychology EUGENE S. GOLLIN, GARY STAHL, AND ELYSE MORGAN Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. The First Assumption: The Organism and Environment Are Separable 111. The Second Assumption: Similar Outcomes Imply Similar Routes . . . . IV. The Third Assumption: Science Is Value-Free . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. “Range of Significance” or “Normality”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ VI. Conclusion References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

49

58 62 68 68

Cognitive Psychology: Mentalistic or Behavioristic? CHARLES C. SPIKER Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Structural Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

V

73 74

vi

Contents

111. IV. V. VI .

Methodological Behaviorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cognitive Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Age of Learning Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77 79 87 88 89

Some Current Issues in Children’s Selective Attention BETTY J . HOUSE I . Introduction: A Bit of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Developmental Trends in Discrimination Transfer: Theories of Shift Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Recent Approaches to Stimulus Compounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98 108 114 115

Children’s Learning Revisited: The Contemporary Scope of the Modified Spence Discrimination Theory JOAN H . CANTOR AND CHARLES C . SPIKER

I . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. A Review of Phenomena Explained by the Modified Spence Theory . . . . . . . 111. Discussion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121 124 146 148

Discrimination Learning Set in Children 1. I1. 111. IV. V. VI . VII .

HAYNE W. REESE Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition of “Learning Set”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theories of Learning Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Response Shift in Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Response Shift in Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Developmental Differences in Response Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Developmental Analysis of Rule-Following HENRY C . RIEGLER AND DONALD M . BAER 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1 . A Review of Skinner’s Relevant Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

153 154 156 161 165 175 185 185

191 192

Contents

I11. Instructional-Control Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Developmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii 197 200 214 215

Psychological Linguistics: Implications for a Theory of Initial Development and a Method for Research SIDNEY W. BIJOU Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Initial Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I11. Method for Studying Language Interactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.

221 223 233 238 239

Psychic Conflict and Moral Development GORDON N . CANTOR AND DAVID A . PARTON I . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Three Experiments on Conflict in Children Illustrating the Use of Objective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. Conflict in Piaget’s General Theory of Cognitive Development . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Conflict and Moral Development Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Nunner-Winkler on Negative and Positive Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI . An Empirical Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . ....... .............................

244 246 251 253 258 259 264 265

Knowledge and the Child’s Developing Theory of the World DAVID S . PALERMO Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Children’s Comprehension of Metaphor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Metaphor and the Acquisition of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Nature of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Knowledge and Cognitive Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI . Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I. I1. I11. IV.

269 270 274 281 288 292 293

viii

Contents

Childhood Events Recalled by Children and Adults I. 11. 111. IV. V.

DAVID B. PILLEMER AND SHELDON H. WHITE Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Personal Memories Adult Recollections of Early ................................ Personal Memories Recalled ........... The Emergence of Socially Accessible Memories: An Integration of Research on Children’s and Adults’ Event Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

299 312

324 336

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

...........................

341

Contents of Previous Volumes . . . . . . . . . . .

...........................

351

Contributors Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors’ contributions begin.

DONALD M. BAER

Department of Human Development, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045 (191) SIDNEY W. BIJOU

Departments of Psychology and Special Education and Rehabilitation, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85 721 (221) GORDON N. CANTOR

Division of Psychological and Quantitative Foundations, College of Education, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 (243) JOAN H. CANTOR Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 (12I) EUGENE S. GOLLIN

Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309 (49) BETTY J. HOUSE

Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268 (91) ELYSE MORGAN

Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309 (49) DAVID S. PALERMO

Department of Psychology, Rnnsylvania State University, University Park, Rnnsylvania 16802 (269) ROSS D. PARKE

Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois 61820 (I) DAVID A. PARTON

Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 (243) DAVID B. PILLEMER

Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley,Massachusetts 02181 (297) HAYNE W. REESE

Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506 (153) ix

X

Contributors

HENRY C. RIEGLER

Department of Bychology, Universityof North Carolina at Asheville,Asheville, North Carolina 28804 (191) CHARLES C. SPIKER

Department of Bychology, Universityof Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 (73, 121) GARY STAHL

Department of Philosophy, Universityof Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309 (49) SHELDON H. WHITE

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 (297)

Foreword The Advances series was founded by Lewis P. Lipsitt and Charles C. Spiker, under whom the first volume was published in 1963 with consulting editorship by Icie Macy Hoobler and Howard V. Meredith. Lipsitt and Spiker also edited Volumes 2 and 3. Reese assumed Spiker’s editorial position for Volume 4 and became senior editor for Volume 5 and sole editor for the subsequent volumes except for Volumes 12-17, for which Lipsitt rejoined the series as coeditor. Throughout its history, Advances in Child Development and Behavior has been published by Academic Press with skilled, dedicated editorial supervision. We found, t o our consternation, that these A P editors were never acknowledged in the previous 20 volumes. The first supervising editor was W. Hayward Rogers, who played an important role in initiating the series and in the production of Volumes 1 and 2 (publication in 1963-1965). The subsequent editors were, in sequence, Lawrence Erlbaum, Volumes 2-7 (1965-1972); Richard van Frank, Volumes 7-13 (1972-1978); and Joe Ingram, Volumes 13-present (1978-present). The 21 volumes in the series have included 147 papers by 171 authors. Of 34 authors who contributed more than one paper to Advances, Howard V. Meredith and Charles C. Spiker held the record at the time of this writing with seven papers each. Eight contributed four or more papers, and seven of these eight were associated with the University of Iowa as faculty or as graduates-Joan H. Cantor, Barry Gholson, Howard V. Meredith, David S. Palermo, Hayne W. Reese, Charles C. Spiker, and Sheldon H. White; the exception was Harry Beilin, a graduate of Columbia University. (However, Beilin had a very indirect association with the University of Iowa as the second editor of the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology; its founding editor, Bijou, and its third and fourth editors, Palermo and Reese, were Iowa graduates. Like Advances, JECP has always been published by Academic Press and has just completed 25 years of publication.) This uneven distribution of multiple contributions may reflect the editorship: Spiker and Meredith were Iowa faculty and Lipsitt and Reese were Iowa graduates (Hoobler was a faculty member of the Merrill Palmer Institute and was a graduate of Yale University). Some statistics on publication rates may be of interest: under Reese’s editorship and coeditorship with Lipsitt, 140 authors were invited to contribute. Of these, 43 declined the invitation, 22 accepted but later withdrew, 2 accepted but deferred their contributions to a future volume, and 73 accepted and their xi

xii

Foreword

manuscripts have been published. The currently known publication rate for authors who were invited, who initially accepted the invitation, and who did not subsequently withdraw, is therefore 100% (73 of 73). Given the quality of the invitees, this publication rate is not surprising. During the same period, 98 authors submitted manuscripts or manuscript proposals for consideration; of these, 17 were subsequently withdrawn by the authors, 34 were rejected by the editor, and 47 were published. Therefore, the publication rate for submitted manuscripts and proposals that were not subsequently withdrawn is 58%. This publication rate is very high and may be interpreted to indicate either that the acceptance criterion is easy or that authors who are audacious enough to submit t o Advances are well above average in quality. Over the years, the comments of reviewers of the volumes support the latter conclusion. Hayne W. Reese Lewis P. Lipsitt

Preface This volume commemorates 25 years of publication of Advances in Child Development and Behavior. The history of the series is briefly outlined in the foreword that precedes this preface. For this commemorative volume, 1 solicited contributions from all the living authors and coauthors who had contributed to Volume 1 or 2 of the series. The 17 papers that appeared in these volumes had 20 authors and coauthors. Of these, six have died and three were unable to contribute because of other commitments. Papers by the other 11 appear in this volume. The volume has no other theme than the seniority of the contributors within the series. Each contributor was invited to select his or her own topic and was told that it could be an updating of the topic covered in the original contribution or it could be an entirely new topic. Four contributors updated their original topic (Joan H. Cantor, Betty J. House, Ross D. Parke, and Hayne W. Reese); three extended their original theoretical or empirical approach (or an updating of it) to new topics (Donald M. Baer, Sidney W. Bijou, and Charles C. Spiker); and four covered new topics (Gordon N. Cantor, Eugene S. Gollin, David S. Palermo, and Sheldon H. White). The papers in this volume, therefore, further the aim that Advances has maintained throughout its 25-year history-to provide scholarly technical articles and documented critical reviews serving as reference material in which complexities of knowledge in the field are exposed, recent advances are summarized and integrated, and fresh viewpoints are offered. Like the papers in the preceding 20 volumes, the papers in the present volume should be useful not only to the expert in the area but also to the general reader. I should perhaps explain the ordering of the papers in this volume. It was generated by a complex and subjective system based partly on order of appearance in Volumes 1 and 2, partly on receipt of manuscripts in final form, and partly on a loose topical organization-methodological/philosophical/historical issues, traditional issues in learning, and issues traditionally associated with cognition. As in the past, appearance in future volumes will ordinarily be by invitation, but unsolicited manuscripts will be accepted for review if submitted first in outline form to the editor. All papers-whether invited or submitted-will receive careful editorial scrutiny. Invited papers will be automatically accepted for publication in principle but may require revision before final acceptance. Submitted papers will receive the same treatment except that they will not ...

XI11

xiv

Preface

be automatically accepted for publication even in principle and may be rejected. The Advances series is usually not a suitable place of publication for reports of a single study or a short series of studies, even if the report is necessarily long because of the nature of the research. The use of sexist language, such as he or she as the general singular pronoun, is not acceptable in contributions to the Advances series. The use of he or she (or the like) is acceptable. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the aid of my home institution, West Virginia University, which generously provided time and facilities for the preparation of this volume. I also wish to thank Mrs. Ann Davis for her excellent secretarial services. Hayne W. Reese

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN INFANCY: A 25-YEAR PERSPECTIVE

Ross D . Parke DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS CHAMPAIGN~UKBANA,ILLINOIS 6 I820

I. INTRODUCTION 11. THE MATURING O F INFANCY RESEARCH 111. MAJOR SHIITS IN THEMATIC‘ CONTENT AND THEORY IN INFANT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH A. THE 1960s ERA B . THE 1980s ERA IV. DIMENSIONS O F I N F A N I SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH A . GENERAL THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS B. DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSIONS C. METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS V . CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to document and chronicle the significant shifts that have taken place in the field of infant social development in the last 25 years. This aim will be accomplishcd in several ways. First, changes in the maturity of the study of infancy as a subdiscipline will be reviewed as indicated by shifts in organizational structures and publication patterns. Second, changes in the main content themes that characterize the study of infant social development over the past 25 years will be noted. Third. and most importantly, the paper will dernonstrate how our views about central themes of development which guide infancy theory and research in this area have changed over this time period. 1 ADVANCES IN CIIIIX DEVELOPMENT AND B E H A V I O K . VOI. 21

(‘opyripht I Y X Y by A c a d e m ~Prec,. Inc ,411 right5 ot rcpraduction m any form re\crved

2

Ross D Pnrhe

At any point in the development of a field of inquiry, both theory and research can be organized around a series of themes or dimensions that reflect central concerns. These dimensions can be organized in three major groups. First, general theoretical assumptions that apply to any area of psychological inquiry including developmental psychology will be examined, including such themes as the nature of explanatory models, the aim and scope of the theory, the universality of the theory, the role of secular influences, and the relationship to other disciplines. Second, a group of themes that are of concern mainly to developmentalists are considered. These include such issues as the discontinuous versus continuous nature of development, the period of development of interest (in this case, infancy), the degree of plasticity across development, the directionality of influence, and the unit of analysis. Third, certain methodological themes are of concern to developmental as well as nondevelopmental investigators. These themes include the nature of designs (longitudinal versus cross sectional), experimental versus nonexperimental approaches, choice of the research context, the nature of data collection strategies, and the level of analysis (molecular vs. molar). These dimensions will be defined and examined in terms of their utility for organizing the nature of the changes that have occurred in the past 25 years in the domain of infant social development. Examination of the ways in which the field has shifted in its reflection of these content-free dimensions provides further insight into the status of the field, and moves us beyond a mere content-based description of theory and research in infant social development over the past 25 years. A schematic summary of these dimensions and the associated shifts is provided in Table 1 to orient the reader to the essay.

11. The Maturing of Infancy Research Every subfield within psychology can be characterized by various public indices of organizational maturity. From an organizational perspective, the domain of infancy has clearly been a “growth industry” during the past 25 years. Several advances attest to this growth. First, the amount of research devoted to infant studies in general and to the study of social aspects of infancy in particular has been remarkable. This fact is indexed by the proportion of papers devoted to infancy published in some of our leading journals. For example, in the 19611965 period, 9% of the articles in Child Development were devoted to various aspects of infant development, with 2% devoted to infant social development. In the same period, only 14% of the articles published in the Merrill-Palmer Quarterly were devoted to infancy research and only 7% dealt with social aspects of infancy. In contrast, in the 5-year period from 1982- 1986, 3 1% of the articles in Child Development, 23% in Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, and 28% in Developmental Psychology were devoted to infancy research and 17%, 15%, and 17% were

3

TABLE I Dimensions of Theory and Research in Infant Social Development: The 1060s and the 1980s ~

section

Dimensions

1V.A General theoretical diniensiciii\ I Nature of explanatory models

2 Principal explanatory processe5

3 . Aims of theory 4. Scope of theory 5. Universal versus culture-bound iiattirc of explanations 6. Status of secular influences on ilcvclopment 7 Relationship t o other disciplincs 8. Applied versus nonapplied orientation 1V.B Developmental dimenvions 1. Development as continuous versus dihcontinuous 2. Focal period of development 3 . Role of critical periods 4. Direction of Influence 5 . Unit of analysis 1v.c Methodological dimensions I . Nature of designs: cross-sectional vcrsus longitudinal 2. Experimental versus nonexpcrmeiical 3 . Setting: Laboratory versus field 4. Data collection strategy (self-repoil, ohservations) 5 . Level of analysis

1960s

1980s

Predominantly mechanistic Social, environmental learning principles Prediction and control Very broad Universal

Predominantly organismic Affective. hiological. cognitive. social; interactional processes Explanation and description Limi ted Culture-bound

Limited

Extensive

Limited Iinhj Nonapplied

Many links Both

Both

Continuous

Childhood Accepted Unidirectional Individual

Life span Limited Bidirectional Dyad. triad. group

Cross-sectional

Both

Experinlentdl Laboratory Nonsequential observation\ Molecular

Both Multiple settings Multiple strategies Molar and inolccular

devoted to infant social development research. (Developmental Psychology was not published in the 1961- 1965 semidecade.) A similar pattern emerges froni the programs of the biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development across the same 25-year period. Other indicators can be cited. Maturity of a field is often marked by the creation of specialized interest groups that serve as a forum for exchange of information. A variety of events have transpired in the last quarter century that fit this criterion of growth toward maturity. First, specialized forums often precede the appearance of research in an ctnerging area in general interest journals. In the

4

Ross D . Purkr

area of infant development two series of conferences and related publications appeared in the early 1960s. Between 1962 and 1969 the Merrill Palmer Institute in the United States conducted a series of annual conferences on “Research and Teaching of Infant Development” (Sigel, 1963, 1970). While this conference covered a broad range of infant research from learning and perception to socialemotional development, the CIBA Foundation in Great Britain sponsored a series of study groups devoted more specifically to infant social development in both animals and humans from 1959 to 1965 (see Foss, 1961, 1963, 1965. 1969). Second, beginning in 1967, a small ‘‘club’’ of infancy researchers met prior to the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development. This club evolved into the International Conference for Infant Studies. which is now an independent and thriving organization. Third, two new journals appeared. Infant Behavior & Development began publication in 1978 while the lnfunt Mental Health Journal made its publishing debut in 1980. Both are devoted exclusively to studies of infant development. Fourth, in 1979 the Handbook oflnfunt Development (Osofsky, 1979) appeared-a major work summarizing advances in the field of infancy-and eight years later a revised edition appeared-attesting to its salience (Osofsky, 1987). Finally, interdisciplinary ties between psychologists who study infancy and other specialists whose focus is infancy (e.g., psychiatrists) have also increased, as illustrated by the National Clinical Infant Studies group. These indices clearly suggest that the field has matured and has become a significant subfield in its own right. In sum, organizational indicators clearly converge on the conclusion that infancy has matured as a field. We now turn to an examination of the interest areas within the subfield of infant social development during the period since 1960.

111. Major Shifts in Thematic Content and Theory in Infant Social Development Research Major changes have occurred in the fields of interest that have concerned infancy researchers over the past 25 years. The substantive issues that are viewed in the late 1980s as important are different from those that spurred research and debate in the early 1960s among infancy researchers and theorists. These shifts in content-oriented concerns are, of course, not independent of the noncontent themes that have been outlined and will be discussed below. An example is the difficulty of analyzing the naturalistically occurring interchanges between a parent and infant without advances in either video technology, computers, or stateof-the-art analytic techniques such as time series or spectral analyses. However, assigning primacy either to advances in technique or to changes in research questions is difficult to achieve with any certainty; instead, advances in technique and shifts in the nature of the scientific questions clearly co-occur and function interdependently. What are the changes in content in the field of infant social development‘!

A

THl-, lY60\ ERA

In the period of the early to middle 1960s, the questions in infant social development were largely derived from a continuing interest in the modifiability of selected infant social behaviors, as ii way of evaluating the utility of wellestablished learning principles to the orderly explanation of infant sociability. Therefore studies of reinforcement of infant responses such as crying, vocalizing, and smiling were common ( e . g . , Brackbill, 1958; Wahler, 1967; Weisberg, 1963). A second theme that was of long-standing concern was the effects of inadequate continuity of early ma(ernal cai-c on later social and cognitive development. Examination of the effects of institutionalization was a coinmon approach to this issue. This concern retlects the sustained influence of psychoanalytic theory, which had led to the classic studies of Goldfarb (1943), Kibble (1944), Spitz (194.5), and Bowlby (19.52). I n the 19.50s and the early 1960s the effect of institutionalization was being recast i n terms that were more acceptable to the theoretical views of the time, namely, learning theory. Specifically, in the wake of Pinneau’s (1955) criticism of the methodological and statistical soundness of this early work, Casler ( 196 I , 1967) articulated a reformulation of the issue of the effects of institutionalization not in terms of maternal unavailability but in terms of perceptual deprivation. In other words, he argued that the lack of perceptual and sensory stimulation was responsible for the low levels of intellectual and social functioning of the institutionalized child. The perceptual deprivation position was a compelling one because it had the attraction of pointing the way to readily specifiable stimulus dimensions that are amenable to experimental manipulation, such as the amount, kind. and schedule of tactual, visual, auditory, and kinesthetic input typically received by the institutionalized child. This position led to studies of the effects of stimulation in institutionalized infants that paralleled the social reinforcement studies of noninstitutionalized infants. Exaniples include Casler (1965) on thc effects of tactile stimulation; Schaffer ( 1966) on the effects of self-stimulation on institutionalized infants; and White and colleagues (White, Castle, & Held. 1964) on the effects of visual stimulation o n visually directed reaching. The other major enterprise in infant social development research that was closely related to the concern about the impact of early deprivation on later social functioning was Harlow’s program of research on the effects of different rearing conditions on the social development of rhesus monkeys (Harlow & Zimmernian, 19SY). I3

‘ I H b 1980a ERA

Both similarities and differences can be found in the content concerns of the 1960s and the 1980s. The view of the competence of infants has shifted. As the classic studies of infant perception and learning in the 1960s clearly demon-

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Ross D.Purke

strated, the infant’s cognitive and perceptual capacities are much more advanced than previously assumed. Our knowledge of infant cognitive and perceptual development has become increasingly sophisticated and much more widely accepted (Aslin, 1987).

I.

Social Interaction and Social Relationships Understanding of the cognitive and perceptual capabilities of the organism has become well integrated into our assumptions about the capability of the infant for social development. This was a task that was just beginning in the 1960s (Walters & Parke, 1965). This appreciation of the infant’s early capacities is reflected in three broad themes that characterize research in the 1980s, namely, social interaction, especially the development of parent-infant relationships, the emergence and function of emotions, and the role of biological constraints and opportunities for the understanding of early social development. A prominent issue of the current era continues to be the understanding of social interaction patterns between the infant and hidher social partners. In some ways this interest was anticipated in the earlier concerns with the effects of social feedback on infant social responsiveness. However, the emphasis on the mutual regulation of the partners’ behavior, the descriptive concerns, and the quantification of the tempo and flow of the interactive interchange clearly separates the current work from its earlier antecedents (Cohn & Tronick, 1987; Schaffer, 1977; Stem, 1977). The concern is beyond the process of interaction per se; it includes an interest in using interaction as a window on understanding the nature of social relationships between infants and their social partners (Hartup & Rubin, 1986; Hinde, 1979). The most ambitious theoretical effort to understand the nature of early relationships is reflected in the work on infant-parent attachment. Although the theoretical roots of this work extend back to the 1950s and 1960s in the writings of Bowlby (1951, 1958, 1969), the sustained empirical effort on behalf of this theoretical position took place in the early 1970s (Ainsworth, 1973; Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1972; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) and especially in the late 1970s and 1980s (Main & Weston, 1981; Sroufe, 1979; 1983; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986; Sroufe & Waters, 1977). A wide variety of issues have been investigated, including the longitudinal consequences of infant-parent attachment (Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, Charnov, & Estes, 1984; Waters, 1978), the objects of attachment (Main & Weston, 1981), the measurement of attachment both in the laboratory and in home contexts (Waters & Deane, 1986), the assessment of attachment at other ages (Main & Cassidy, 1988), the antecedent conditions of attachment (Isabella, Belsky, & Von Eye, 1989), the cross-cultural generality of patterns (Grossman, Grossman, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985), and cross-generational continuity (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). (See

Bretherton & Waters, 1985. f o r a review.) Debates have continued about these issues, but this sample illustrates the vigor of the activity surrounding the topic of infant-parent attachment. Of particular importance to social development research are shifts in the identification of individuals who play potentially important roles in the infant’s social development. In the 1960s we largely restricted ourselves to the study of the parent-infant dyad, typically. the mother-infant dyad. The historical and theoretical reasons for this emphasis on the mother-infant relationship are well known (Schaffer. 1971), and arc generally attributed to both our cultural attitudes concerning the mothcr iis primary caregiver and as the first and most important attachment figure. ‘l’he other influence, of course, is our psychoanalytic and our Hullian heritage, both o f which emphasize the importance of the feeding situation as the critical context of the development of social responsiveness (Walters & Parke, 1965).This exclusive emphasis on the mother-infant relationship has been challenged by revised theory and cultural shifts (Lamb, 1977a, 1977b; Parke, 1979b) as well as by empirical findings at both the animal (Redican, 1976) and human lcvcls (Lamb, 1976; Parke, 1981; Parke & Suomi, 1981). These studies clearly indicated that fathers were objects of attachment (Cohen & Campos, 1974; Lamb, 1976, 1977~1,1977b), and that fathers were competent and sensitive to infant behavioral changes, capable of feeding and caregiving infants (Parke & Sawin. 1975, 1976), but differed qualitatively from mothers in terms of their style of interaction. Fathers tend to be more physical, arousing, and unpredictable and to spend a large proportion of time in play; mothers are more verbal, more didactic, more predictable, less arousing, and use toys in their play. Clearly, both contribute to their infant’s development but in different ways. Moreover, the quality of the attachment relationship of infants with mothers and fathers is independent (Main & Weston, 1981). In addition to fathers, other family members now recognized as important are siblings. The issue of siblings. especially sibling rivalry, has a lengthy history, but little attention was paid t o siblings as potential contributors to the development of social behavior. Dunn and Kendrick (1982) have shown both the coniplexities of sibling relationships in infancy and the ways in which siblings can contribute to the emergence of ernotional and social understanding. For example, older and younger siblings play different roles, with older siblings being the target of imitation for their younger brothers and sisters, but also the object of older children’s hostility and aggrcssion. In addition, grandparents are receiving recognition as potentially important but long-neglected agents of social interaction and social support. As Tinsley and Parke (1984a, 1987) have shown, grandparents have both direct and indirect influences on infant social and cognitive development. Grandparents can exert a direct effect by providing stimulation for infants through interaction as well as indirectly through the support that they provide the parents of the infants. Both of

these routes are related to increases in social and cognitive development of infants. Clearly, the range of influence sources viewed as significant for social development in infancy has greatly expanded in the past 25 years. A final shift is the recognition that social interactive processes have implications for cognitive, linguistic, and motor development. Under the resurgence of interest in Vygotskyian theoretical notions, (Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Vygotsky, 1978), there has been a marked increase in research on the ways in which social interactive processes can facilitate the emergence of nonsocial aspects of development.

2.

Emotional Development Perhaps the most dramatic shift in content-based interest in the last 25 years has been the renewal of interest in the development of emotions in infancy. Topics such as social smiling. stranger anxiety, and fear of heights were of interest in the 1960s (Gibson & Walk, 1960; Spitz, 1950), but “the motivation for conducting such studies was to use emotions to index something elseusually perceptual or cognitive process” (Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, & Sternberg, 1983, p. 786). The development of emotions and the role of emotions in social interaction were of little interest. A dramatic change has occurred. Throughout psychology the role of affect is becoming an issue of increasing concern in the 1980s (e.g., Bower, 1981; Zajonc, 1980). The developmental origins of both the production and recognition of emotions as well as the role of emotional expressions in the regulation of social interaction continue to be central concerns of developmental psychologists, especially infancy researchers. Under the guidance of the research and writings of Ekman (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman & Oster, 1979) and lzard (e.g., Buechler & Izard, 1980; Izard, 1977, 1978, 1982), the older assumption that facial response patterns are not specific to discrete emotional states (Sherman, 1927) is being discounted. Evidence suggests that facial expressions may be, at least in part, governed by genetically encoded programs-an implication of the finding of universality of facial expression recognition (Ekman et u l . , 1987). Recent investigators have extended prior work to assess how early facial expressions and discrete emotional expressions are related, and how general are prior findings derived from actor-posed facial displays (Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Oster, 1981). Hiatt, Campos, and Emde (1979) found that 10- to 12-month-old infants yielded some specific facial patterns of emotion, especially happiness and surprise, but less so for fear. Almost all situations, however, elicited blends rather than discrete emotions. These studies represent a general trend toward the use of ecologically valid contexts for the study of emotion (e.g., Izard’s 1978 use of the innoculation situation as a way of studying the development of infants’ emotional reactions to painful stimulation). Developmental tuning of both pro-

duction and discrimination o f emotional states continues beyond infancy (Field & Walden, 1982). The shift toward recognition 01‘ the role of emotional expressions in the regulation of social behavior is one of the most important shifts in recent years (e.g., Camaras, 1977). The extensive studies o f face-to-face interaction of parents and infants (e.g., Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974; Stern, 1977, 1985) illustrate how parents and possibly infants modify their patterns of stimulation in response to each other’s emotional signals. Both the Stem and Brazelton groups have shown how shifts in the interaction intensity of stimulation are modified by infant arousal levels; however, the precise emotional cues that regulate interaction patterns are not yet specified. ‘These patterns are evident in both mother-infant (Cohn & Tronick, 1987; Tronick. 1982) and father-infant (Power & Parke, 1982; Yogman, 1983) interaction. Through experimental modifications of typical affective displays (e.g., I’rown oI still-face presentations), Tronick ( 1982) has demonstrated that infants are sensitive to shifts in affect; infants become agitated, may turn away, or possibly cry in response to these violations of usual affective displays. A number of volumes have been addressed to these issues (Bullowa, 1979; Field & Fogel. 1982; Osofsky, 1987; Schaffer, 1977; Tronick, 1982). Children’s social behavior is modified by affective displays not only in direct face-to-face encounters, but also through observing the emotional expressions of third parties. Using naturally occurring as well as simulated anger and affection displays of others in the home, Cummings, Zahn-Waxler, and Radke-Yarrow (1981) found that 12- to 30-month-old bystanders reacted with distress to anger and with affection and overt signs o f pleasure to affection. Interparent anger occasionally led to intervention efforts by the children. As early as one year of age, children are not only aware o f others’ angry and affectionate interactions but also likely to react emotionally to them. One of the ways in which the mcial regulatory effects of emotions has been demonstrated is through the notion of “social referencing” (Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Feinman & Lewis. 1981: Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1982). “Social referencing” concerns the tendency of a person to seek out emotional information from a significant other in the environment and to use that information to make sense of an event that is otherwise ambiguous or beyond the person’s own intrinsic appraisal capabilities (Klinnert et al.. 1982, p. 12). In support of the construct, investigators have shown that infants’ reactions to novel toys (Klinnert, 1981), the visual cliff (Sorce, Emde, Klinnert, & Campos, 1981), and adult strangers (Feinman & Lewis. 1981). can be modified by the nature of the mother’s facial expressions with positive expressions, such as happiness eliciting approach behavior and ncgative emotional displays such as fear leading to avoidance. A detailed analysis of the developmental course of social referenc-

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Ross D.Parke

ing and the possible requisite skills has appeared (Klinnert et a l . , 1982). Moreover, social referencing is sensitive to the prior relationship that the infant has established with the referencing agent-a further index of the close ties between emotions and social relationships (Dickstein & Parke, 1988). It is evident that there has been a clear resurgence of interest in various aspects of emotional development in infancy, including the role of emotions in the regulation of social behavior.

3 . Biological Busis of lnfunt Social Behavior A further development of considerable importance is the increasing interest in the biological underpinnings of social behavior in infancy. This development assumes a variety of forms. One form is interest in the patterning of psychophysiological responding associated with either different emotions (Field, 1982; Gunnar, 1987; Sroufe, 1979) or different social situations, such as separation from the mother or entry of a stranger (Fox & Davidson, 1987). These studies provide further evidence in support of the specificity of emotion hypothesis as well as provide another index of emotional responsivity in different situations. A second manifestation of the recent upsurge of interest in biology is the renewed interest in behavioral genetics. This work has generally taken the form of determining the possible genetic origins of certain traits, such as extraversionintroversion, as well as the age of onset of emotional markers, such as smiling and fear of strangers. Freedman (1974) and more recently Plomin and DeFries ( 1985) found that identical twins exhibit greater concordance than fraternal twins in the time of onset and in the amount of social smiling. Similarly, identical twins are more similar in social responsiveness than fraternal twins (Lytton, 1980; Plomin, 1986; Plomin & Rowe, 1979). A third manifestation of the biologization of early infant social development is the increasing interest in temperament. Although the role of genetic and biological factors in the emergence of temperament is still being debated, the influence of individual differences in temperament on social behavior is unquestionably of interest. The concern with infant temperament is part of a general interest in isolating stable individual differences in infancy. The following issues represent a current sampling of concerns: ( I ) definition, (2) relative consistency across time, (3) the basic dimensions or dispositions that characterize temperament, (4) the role of experience and context that modify the expression of temperament, and ( 5 ) the biological basis of temperament (Goldsmith et a / ., 1987); see also Campos et al., 1983; Lerner & Lerner, 1983). Differences in temperament have been associated with a variety of social outcomes including parent-infant interaction patterns (Bates, 1980), infant-parent attachment (Crockenberg, 1981), and reactions to novel social situations (Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman, 1987). In summary, a variety of new directions in the content of social developmental

research characterizes the late I %Us, including increased interest in the processes of social interaction, develapment and consequences of social relationships, the emergence and developmental trajectory as well as the social regulatory function of emotions, and the role of biological factors in early social development.

IV.

Dimensions of Infant Social Development Theory and Research

In this section we turn to examination of the major-content-free dimensions that can characterize research i n infant social development in order to provide further illumination of the nature o f the systematic changes over the past quarter century. A.

I. Nature

GENERAL ‘THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS

of Explanatory M o t l ~ l s Developmental psychology in general as well as the study of infant social development in particular, can be characterized by the types of models of development endorsed by theorists. According to Overton (1984; Overton & Reese, 1973) and Reese and Overton (1970), these rival models were termed mechanistic and organismic world views or models and more recently as scientific research programs. The importance of these views flows from the assumption that the choice of explanatory models determines a variety of theoretical decisions and the nature of testable hypotheses. Many of the dimensions that characterize these two positions will be examined in detail below; therefore, only the general nature of the shift in preferred model will be outlined here. The 1960s were dominated by the mechanistic model although the organismic viewpoint also had advocates. Proponents of behavioristic or neobehavioristic theorists (Gewirtz, 1965; Lipsitt, 1963; Rheingold, 1956) were active scientific leaders and producers. Similarly, social learning theories (Bandura & Walters, 1963) predominated in the period, but with some exceptions. Piaget’s theory was beginning to be influential (Flavell, 1963; Hunt, 1961) in American psychology and Kessen (1967), in particular, offered an organismic analysis of infant development. The situation in the 1980s has changed, with various versions of an organismic viewpoint clearly predominating. In the domain of social development, Bowlby’s ethologically oriented attachment theory is a major force (Ainsworth, 1973; Ainsworth et al., 1978; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986; Sroufe, 1983). A second major theoretical development of current importance is the ecological perspective of

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Ross D . Purke

Bronfenbrenner (1979, 1986). This viewpoint has been applied to the infancy domain by Belsky (1984) and is consistent with another general trend toward a systems theory viewpoint (Belsky, Rovine, & Fish, 1989; Ramey. MacPhee, & Yeates, 1982; Sameroff, 1983). All these views are clearly organismic in orientation. The 1980s clearly belong to the organismically oriented theories.

2,

Types of Principal Explanatoy Processes Every era is characterized by different sets of explanatory principles or processes that serve as the centerpiece for explaining the emergence and maintenance of behavior under question. These include biological, cognitive, affective, perceptual, learning, and social interactional processes. Although in every era some attention is obviously paid to all of those processes, some generally preferred processes gain prominence in different periods of investigation. Major shifts have occurred in the processes involved in explaining infant social behavior over the past quarter century. First, the 1960s era was characterized by a major focus on perceptual, sensory, and learning processes. Representative of this period was the work of Lipsitt and his colleagues (Lipsitt, Engen, & Kaye. 1963), who concentrated their efforts on the learning capacities of newborn infants and on their sensory and discrimination abilities. The explanatory processes invoked to explain these demonstrated abilities were mainly couched in terms of stimulus-response learning theoretical terms. However, some early dissenters can be identified. Kessen (1967), for example, argued that conditionability, especially classical conditioning, was limited by the biological unpreparedness of the infant as well as the limited cognitive capacities of the organism (see Sameroff & Cavanaugh, 1979, for an update on this debate). In the realm of social developrncnt, the same learning principles predominated in the early 1960s. One group of researchers (e.g., Gewirtz, 1965; Rheingold. Stanley, & Cooley, 1962; Weisberg. 1963) believed that contingent reinforcement from social agents shapes the form and frequency of social responses such as smiling and vocalizing. Closely related were social interactionists, who believed that similar processes operated under naturalistic conditions. The Schaffer and Emerson (l964a) research exemplifies this viewpoint. Cognitive and affective processes were rarely invoked as explanations in discussions of social developmental achievements. Some attempt to relate recent advances in perceptual development to our understanding of social development was offered by Walters and Parke (1965) in the second volume of this Advances series. The 1980s are more eclectic in terms of the processes that are drawn upon to explain social developmental changes in infancy. Current explanations draw upon a wide range of explanatory processes. First, biological processes are given full recognition. Biological influences assume a variety of forms including concepts of preparedness to respond to social events, concepts of individual dif-

ferences in temperament, as well as notions of genetic determination ofthe forms of social and affective behavior (Bates. 1987; lzard & Malatesta, 1987; Plomin, 1986; Schaffer, 1984). Second, afl‘ective processes are viewed as important modifiers of infant social (and cognitive) development (Barrett & Campos. 1987). Third, both perceptual and cognitive processes are invoked to explain the occurrence of social behaviors (Campos rt u l . , 1983). Fourth, social interactional processes have been given a central explanatory role in the emergence and maintenance of social behavior (Parke & Tinsley, 1987; Schaffer, 1984). Closely related to this development is the emergence of relationship analyses as an important offshoot of this interest in social interactional processes (Hartup & Rubin, 1986; Hinde, 1979). The diversity of explanatory processes is one of the hallmarks of the 1980s era. 3. Aims cf Theory Theories across various disciplines vary in terms of their goals. Within developmental psychology, ethological (Blurton-Jones, 1976; McGrew, 1972) and ecological approaches (Barker, 1968; Bronfenbrenner, 1979) are largely descriptive. Others are aimed at increasing the level of predictability of behavior and/or modifying the extent to which behavior can be brought under control. Skinnerian approaches (Skinner, 1957) as well as behavior modification theories (Baer, 1982; Bijou & Baer, 1961, 1965) have prediction and control as their primary goals. Finally, explanation niay he the goal of the theory. Theoretical positions with this orientation include both the grand theories of Freud and Piaget as well as more recent theories of infant social development such as Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Within the domain of infant social development, the relative emphasis on these three theoretical goals has shifted. In the 1960s a great deal of research activity was devoted to the study of the factors that could exercise control over infants’ social behavior, such its smiling and vocalizing. These experiments involved examining the effects of various types of contingent feedback ( e . g . , social and nonsocial reinforcers) on subsequent shifts in the rate of some social operant behavior such as vocnliriition (Brackbill, 19%; Millar, 1976; Wahler, 1967). Similar work was evident with older children as well (Stevenson, 1965; Walters & Parke, 1964). Thc primary goal was to demonstrate that infant social behavior can be brought under the control of environmental events. The goals of description and explanation received less attention. In the intervening period, concern with both description and explanation has increased. A primary goal of Howlby’s attachment theory was to provide a descriptive account of the ways i n which children manage the naturally occurring events of separation and loss. Similarly, the goal of recent ethologically influenced studies of the emergence 0 1 emotional expressiveness in infancy has been largely descriptive (e.g., bard & Malatesta, 1987). The ecological orientation of

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Ross D Porkr

Bronfenbrenner (1979) has led to an increased concern with a description of social contexts and settings that infants may encounter during development. A large portion of the activity of the 1970s and 1980s in the area of parent-infant interaction has been descriptive. Descriptions of changes in parent-infant interaction as a function of developmental level of the infant, task, and context has been the primary goal of this research activity (see Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Osofsky, 1979, 1987). However, implicit in this work has been the assumption that description is a first step in a multistage process. Explanation follows as a next step in theory development. Explanatory theories of infant social development have emerged and range from psychoanalytically oriented positions (Mahler & Pine, 1975) to psychoanalytic-ethological (Ainsworth, 1973; Bowlby, 1969) to family systems theory (Lewis, 1982) and transactional positions (Sameroff & Chandler, 1975).

4.

Scope of Theory A gradual shift has occurred in the scope of our theories. Theorists in the grand tradition of Freud, Piaget, and more recently the social learning theorists (Bandura, 1977; Bandura & Walters, 1963) assumed that very large domains of social or cognitive development could be accounted for in terms of a limited number of general principles. As Kessen (1982) has observed “at an accelerated rate, child psychologists as a Society of colleagues have moved away from the general process, general-principle specification of’ their intellectual task. More and more we have turned from the search for singular general laws of development” (p. 36). In the past 25-30 years, the degree of specialization has increased sharply; in place of grand theories, a variety of minitheories aimed at limited and specific aspects of development have emerged. In the domain of infant social development, theories and research have been devoted to the emergence of infant-parent attachments (Ainsworth et ~ l . I978), , father-infant relationships (Lamb, 1981; Parke, 1981), and the emergence of and measurement of affect in infants (Izard & Malatesta, 1987). Each of these theoretical developments is highly restricted in its scope and explanatory area. Similar trends are evident in cognitive development (Flavell, 1985). However, there are recent indications that our theories are moving toward increasing cross-content integration, as evidenced by the recognition of links across domains of infancy. For example, the interface between social and cognitive development is captured in work on social cognition (Shantz, 1983), while the recent work on social perception involving face and voice recognition (Nelson, 1987; Spelke & Cortelyou, 1981) suggests the fragility of the boundaries between social and perceptual development. Recent work on the social precursors of language and communication suggest links between social and psycholinguistic domains (Bruner, 1983). Nonetheless, the scope of these recent more integrative theoretical efforts is still highly limited in comparison to the theories of 25 years ago.

Universal versus Culturul Ijound Nutiire of Explanutions To what extent are the theories. findings, and explanations generalizable across cultures or even across subcultures within our own society'? In the 1960s researchers did not address any significant amount of research to this issue and indeed did not show a great deal of awareness of the implications of this question for their theories. To the degree that theories of large scope are available, the predominant assumption is that the theories will be applicable universally. In the 1960s, belief in the universality of our theories was the dominant view. A variety of events have conspired to challenge this implicit assumption. One is a marked increase in cross-cultural work in infancy in general and more specifically in the domain of infant social development (Field, Sostek, Vietze, & Leiderman, 1981; Leiderman, 'I'ulkin, & Kosenfeld, 1977). These studies have served as important reminders that the generalizations concerning infant social development derived from studies of American samples may, in fact, not be valid in some other cultural contexts. Two examples are: In the cross-cultural studies of infant-parent attachment, wide disparities are found in the distribution of infants in terms of their attachment classifications. Although the securely attached infant-mother relationship is evident in 57% of American samples, thc rate drops to 33% in samples tested in Northern Germany (Grossman et d., 1985). Second, a common finding is that the father-infant relationship is often characterized as being dominated by playful interaction-at least in American samples (Lamb, 1977a, 1977b; MacDonald & Parke, 1986; Power & Parke, 1982). However, in recent studies in Sweden, Lamb and his colleagues (Lamb, Frodi, Hwang, Frodi, & Steinberg, 1982) found few differences between mothers and fathers in their level o f playful interaction-a striking lack of confirmation of the American-based work. Nor are the findings of limited generality restricted to cross-national studies. A series of studies in the 1970s by Tulkin and Kagan ( 1972) concerning social class differences in parent-infant interaction seriously challenged the generality of findings even within one cultural or national context. They found clear social class differences in the ways mothers treated their infants; lower class in contrast to middle class mothers were less verbal in their interactions. These findings represent serious challenges to assumptions of universality. and willingness to make such claims has declined in the late 1980s. Modesty of the range of claims is more normative, and sensitivity to the impact of variation in culture has increased.

5.

6 . Status of Secular Influences on Development Just as awareness of the limitations imposed by culture has increased, so appreciation of the role of secular changes in infant social development has shifted. In some ways, this issue i s similar to the cross-cultural generality issue, but with the question phrased in a horizontal rather than a vertical direction. In

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R(JSSD . Porke

other words, how have historical conditions in a variety of spheres-medical, educational, economic, political, social-shifted and, in turn, what impact have these shifts had on infant social development'? According to one view, the underlying processes that govern social development remain unchanged or unaltered (Bijou & Baer, 1961). Another view is that changes occur in rates of certain behaviors or the pace at which certain developmental landmarks are reached, but no change occurs in the organization of underlying processes. Still another view is that secular change is in part responsible for changes in the reorganization of underlying processes of development (Riegel, 1972, 1975, 1976). In the last 25 years researchers (Elder & Rockwell, 1979) have shown a growing awareness of this issue, faced with increasing evidence that secular change is an issue that may, in fact, be important for understanding infant social development. A variety of examples illustrate the point. First, a variety of changes in medical practices and hospital operation have taken place. Less maternal medication is administered during labor and delivery (Brackbill, 1979). The number of Cesarean-section deliveries has increased dramatically (Bottoms, Rosen, & Sokol, 1980), and the survival rates of low-birth-weight infants has risen greatly (Goldberg & DeVitto, 1983). Liberalized hospital visitation practices for fathers and siblings have altered the early context of the mother and newborn. These factors have contributed to marked alterations in the level of father participation in early infancy (Parke & Tinsley, 1984), which, in turn, may produce shifts in the developmental patterns of infants in contrast to those raised more by mothers alone. In the economic sphere, maternal employment has risen sharply, with a consequent modest increase in rates of father participation with infants (Parke & Tinsley, 1984; Pleck, 1985). Closely linked with the change in maternal employment is a rapid rise in the proportion of infants in out-of-home care (ClarkeStewart, 1982). This latter change has altered the social development of infants and children, especially their sociability and interactive competence with peers (Belsky, Steinberg, & Walker, 1982; Phillips, McCartney, & Scarr, 1987). However, evidence is emerging that day care, especially if it begins in infancy, may be associated with shifts in the quality of infant-parent attachment (Belsky , 1986; Belsky & Rovine, 1988). The debate over this issue is not yet resolved (Phillips, McCartney, Scarr, & Howes, 1987). To cite a final example, the timing of the onset of parenthood has shifted. Adolescent parenthood has increased, but so has late-timed parenthood. Both have yielded significant shifts in the development of infants. Infants and children of adolescent mothers and fathers may have greater risk of impaired cognitive (Brooks-Gunn & Furstenberg, 1986) and social development (Brooks-Gunn & Furstenberg, 1986; Hayes, 1986). Although less is known about the effects of late-timed parenthood on infants, shifts toward greater involvement of older fathers indicates a change in rearing context for these infants o f older parents (Parke & Tinsley, 1984).

Together, these shifts in the secular sphere appear to be altering the nature of infant’s social development. O f particular importance is to determine whether secular shifts produce changes in the timing of onset of developmental phenomenon or whether the operation of developmental processes themselves are. in fact, significantly altered. Both of these formulations may be correct but an articulation of the types of secular change events that are likely to produce quantitative (i.e., timing) rather than qualitative (i.e., process-related) changes would significantly advance the debate o n this topic. At this stage, sensitivity to this issue far outstrips our undcrstanding of the ways in which development is altered. Relationship to Other Disciplitws Over time and at different points in the emergence andlor decline of a field, the strength of its ties to other disciplines can fluctuate. Infant social development, in spite of its apparent sharing of common concerns with a variety of other disciplines, especially pediatrics, has not always been closely tied to other disciplines. Nevertheless, interdisciplinary work has gradually increased in the last 25-30 years. In part this shift is a reflection of a similar increase in cross-domain relationships within the discipline o f psychology itself, as indicated by integrations of infant social development with cognitive, linguistic, perceptual, and motor development (See Section IV,A4). The most common link has been to pediatrics, and it has come about by the merging of two distinctive trends. First, to an increasing extent pediatricians ( e . g . , Green, 1985; Parmalee, 1982; Yogman, 1980) have advocated the adoption of normative developmental models as a perspective for viewing infant development, in contrast to disease or medical models (Tinsley & Parke, 1984b). At the same time, an increasing number of pediatricians were being trained within this revised orientation, with a resultant increase in the range of collaborative arrangements between psychologists and pediatricians. A related trend W;IS a rise o f the specialties of pediatric psychology and behavioral pediatrics. Although pediatric psychology is largely devoted to evaluation and assessment of infants anti toddlers, and behavioral pediatrics less so, both new specialties represent increased recognition of the value of interdependent and cooperative ventures between developmental psychologists and physicians. A second general trend was stimulated by a rise of interest on the part of neonatologists, pediatricians, and psychologists in the development of at-risk low-birth-weight and sick infants. As noted earlier (Section IV,A,6), the survival rates of these infants has increased rapidly in the last three decades. The concern about understanding the social and cognitive consequences of prematurity led to a variety of collaborative efforts (Field, Sostek, Goldberg, & Shuman. 1979; Goldberg, 1979; Goldberg & DeVitto, 1983). A third strand has been a rise of developmental psychopathology as a sub7.

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Ross D.Parke

discipline (Sroufe & Rutter, 1984) and consequent increase in collaboration between child psychiatry and developmental psychologists (e.g., Sameroff, Siefer, & Zax, 1982; Stern, 1985). A fourth strand is increased ties to sociology. As a result of interest in such issues as the onset of parenthood, the impact of divorce, and the effects of day care on infant social development, an increase has occurred in collaborative work between developmentalists and sociologists (Hoffreth & Phillips, 1987), with respect to these infant-related issues.

8. Applied versus Nonapplied Orientation Developmental psychology has always had an important stake in applied issues, but the strength of this association has waxed and waned over the years (Sears, 1975). From its early beginnings and especially during the 1920s and 1930s, many developmentalists have had strong interests in applied issues, such as education for child rearing, intervention, and the development of non-normal populations such as handicapped and retarded infants (Gessel, 1928; Watson, 1928). Under the influence of the experimental child psychology movement of the 1950s and 1960s (see Lipsitt & Cantor, 1986), which drew largely on learning theory for its inspiration and problem selection, interest in applied problems of infants and children waned significantly. This situation in the 1980s has changed for a variety of reasons toward more applied research and toward more basic research with applied implications. Some of these reasons are inherent in the nature of the scientific questions and others are due to external and nonscientific factors. First, it is recognized that evaluation of theory is often aided by the utilization of naturally occurring extreme conditions as ways of testing hypotheses. For example, the comparison of high-risk populations such as low-birth-weight infants with low-risk infants can be helpful in evaluating the role of biological and social factors in early infant development. The increased range and variability gained by these population choices provide a more sensitive test of the potential developmental processes. Similarly interventions are ways not only of modifying a relationship or alleviating an undesirable condition; they are tools for theory testing and evaluation. Interventions can be viewed as another type of field experiment-one that can yield clues about infant social development and about our understanding of the limits of plasticity in development (Lerner, 1984; Parke, 1988). This type of “applied” research is basic process-oriented research that by virtue of the nature of the problem, setting, or population may have applied implications. Second, there has been an increase in more traditional applied developmental research. In this case the goal is to alleviate or solve a specific developmental deficit, malady, or problem (e.g., failure to thrive; retarded intellectual development). This increase in interest in applied issues reflects, in part, an increased emphasis on problems of social relevance on the part of federal and private funding agencies since the 1960s. It is important to distinguish between

these two types of research, namely basic process-oriented research with applied implications and more traditional applied research that is oriented toward the solution of problems. Evidence of these shifts has assumed a variety of forms. First, the nature of the problems have shifted to reflect the increased emphases on mental health and social relevance. This is reflected in the rise of interest in stress and coping (Gunnar, 1987), the early roots o f psychopathology (Sroufe & Rutter, 1984), and the impact of being reared by mentally-ill parents (Sameroff et ul., 1982; ZahnWaxler, Cummings, McKnew. C! Katlke-Yarrow, 1984). Second, a shift has occurred in population selection. A variety of at-risk populations such as preterm and handicapped infants have received increased attention, as well as at-risk parental groups such as poor and young mothers (Field, 1987; Kopp, 1983). Third, a shift has occurred in research settings that reflects this more applied orientation. Hospitals, institutions, and day-care centers are increasingly common sites as either a supplement to or replacement of laboratory sites. Fourth. intervention research is increasingly common. The nature of intervention research ranges from more modest small-scale experiments aimed at testing a theoretical proposition (Belsky, 1981; Parke, Hymel, Power, & Tinsley, 1980) to large-scale interventions that oltcn entail a multifaceted approach involving social. cognitive, and medical interventions. Although Head Start is the best known example, it was directed primarily at preschoolers. Other projects such as the Abecaderian project (Ramey, Bryant, Sparling, & Wasik. 1985) is exemplary of this approach in infancy. ‘Ihc focus is largely on outcome with major shifts in cognitive and social devclopnient being the goal of this type of actionoriented research. Process-based aspects of these intervention efforts have received less attention. These shifts in problems, populations, settings, and intervention reflect both a commitment to applied research in the more traditional sense of intervention and problem alleviation as well a s it recognition of the value of using different populations and settings as opportunities for theory testing. These shifts might best be construed as alternate ways of expressing continued interest in basic theoretical and process-related developmental issues rather than a shift toward applied research per se. In the current era we are utilizing a wider range of research opportunities for theory testing than in the 1960s period. Finally, one of the outgrowths of an increase in applied research is the growing interest in the implications of both applied and basic research for the formulation of social policy. This interest is evidenced by the current concerns with such issues as the effects of day care, hospital policies and practices, early education and intervention, paternal leave, infant and child custody, and adolescent pregnancy (Maccoby, Kahn, & Everett, 1983; Stevenson & Siegal, 1984). Although the involvement of students of infant social development in social policy issues is much more evident in the 1980s than in the 1960s. in the earlier era of the 1920s

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and 30s child development research was clearly activist and social policy oriented (Sears, 1975; Smuts & Hagen, 1986). The social policy interest, then, is not so much a new development as a return to earlier concerns of the field. B.

DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSIONS

In this section we turn to a consideration of dimensions that are unique to developmental issues.

I.

Developmentcil Orientation: Continuous versus Disconrinuous Chutzgc. One of the major questions that confronts developmental psychologists is how to characterize the nature of change across development. Some take a discontinuous view in arguing that development occurs in a series of discrete steps or stages, with the organization of behavior being qualitatively different at each new stage. Others view development as a process of steady quantitative change in which development is a continuous process whereby each new event or change builds upon prior experiences in an orderly way (for discussions see Rutter, 1987; Wohlwill, 1973). Generally, advocates of mechanistic models such as learning theorists view development as a continuous process. To the extent that social learning theory characterized the 1960s, we would suggest that this era endorsed a continuous view of development. Piagetian and Freudian theorists, who endorse a discontinuous view of development, were still influential, but in a more minor way. In the 1960s, remnants of psychoanalytic thinking were still evident (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau. & Alpert, 1963, as was allegiance to a modified stage view of development. While the influence of Freudian theory was waning, the impact of Piagetian theory was beginning to be felt once again in developmental psychology in the 1960s, especially in the domain of cognitive development (Flavell, 1963) but also in infant social development (Hunt, 1961) and infant cognitive development (Kessen, 1967). Where are we in the 1980s in terms of the continuity versus discontinuity issue? Developmentalists have retreated from the predominant theoretical positions of Piaget and Freud, and consequently have become less interested in the strong forms of discontinuity that are organized around stage constructs. (Alternatively, the decline in interest in the discontinuity position may have, in part, contributed to the loss of influence of these stage-oriented theorists.) At present the strong forms of the argument have fewer supporters. For example, the stage concept receives less support in current theory among developmentalists (see Flavell, 1982). Second, as noted in more detail below, the concept of critical periods has received less support than in earlier time periods (see Clarke & Clarke, 1976; Rutter, 1981). However, the debate is by no means settled. Instead, the formulation of the issues has been transformed into more than simply a dichotomous debate. The issue has been recast in terms of ( 1 ) the forms of

continuity and discontinuity, ( 2 ) the behaviors that may show one or the other over time, ( 3 ) the mechanisms that are involved, and (4) the role of constitutional factors (Rutter, 1987). As Rutter (1987) noted, “much has still to be learned about what happens to the organism as a result of experiences, and hence much uncertainty remains about the processes involved in continuity and discontinuity” (p, 286). This new openness t o the possibilities is the hallmark o f t h e debate in the 1980s.

2.

Focal Period of Developtnt~rit Each era can be characterized in terms of the period of development that is emphasized. As noted earlier (Section III,B), from the 1960s to the present the infancy period has been rediscovered as an important phase of development. Other periods, especially middle childhood and adolescence, (Brooks-Gunn & Petersen, 1984; Collins, 1984) arc beginning to challenge the emphasis on infancy, but the treatment of infancy 21s an isolated period of development is beginning to shift. Researchers in the late 1980s are coming to take seriously the view of infancy within a life-span perspective (Raltes, 1987). In part, this view emerges from a recognition that the social context provided by caregivers varies as a function of the location of the adults along their own life course trajectory (Parke, 1988). In contrast, the earlier view was that variations in parenting behavior are relatively independent of adult development. Evidence of this shift comes from a variety of sources, including studies o f the impact of the timing of parenthood and the effects of maternal (and paternal) employment, job satisfaction, and involvement on infant development (see Parke & Tinsky, 1984, 1987, for reviews). The timing of role onsets is not important only for parents but for grandparents as well, which place the study of infant social development in a cross-generational framework. As Tinsley and Parke (1988) have shown, the timing of the onset of grandfatherhood is an important determinant of the level of grandfather involvement with his grandinfant. ’three age groups of fathers were compared: 45-50, 50-55, 55-70. Grandfathers in the middle age range were the most involved with their childrens’ infants. For the youngest group the onset of grandfatherhood may be too early i n terms of career demands and expectations of appropriateness of this role. In contrast, the oldest group may have been suffering from ill health and reduced energy which, in turn, would inhibit their involvement, especially as a play partner with their grandinfants. In summary, by a reconceptualization of the family context in a life-span perspective, the infancy period itself is relocated in a longer time frame that goes well beyond the narrow age boundaries of the first few years of development. Role of Critical Periods Developmentalists have long taken a stand on the issue of critical periods. Critical periods refer to periods of increased sensitivity to particular experiences.

3.

In the 1960s considerable evidence supported the critical period hypothesis as it related to infant social development. Several lines of research converged in support of this viewpoint from both animal and human studies. The early studies by Harlow and his colleagues concerning the effects of early environmental deprivation on later social development in rhesus monkeys provided strong support of the critical period viewpoint (Cross & Harlow, 1965; Griffin & Harlow, 1966; Harlow & Harlow, 1962). In these studies young infant monkeys were reared under conditions of social and/or sensory isolation and the impact of these early rearing conditions on later social and emotional development was evaluated. As Sackett (1968) noted, the research indicated "a critical age for exposure to social stimulation at which later qualitative changes in the characteristics of social behavior cannot be produced. . . . This critical age seems to be between 3 to 6 months for qualitative defects and 6 to 8 months for producing complete destruction of social ability" (p. 7 ) . On the human side, evidence from the classic studies of institutionalization lent credence to this position for the social development of human infants. As in the case of the nonhuman primate research, early rearing in an impoverished social environment was linked to deficiencies in social development with the major disturbances centered around interpersonal relationships (Yarrow, 1961 , 1964). The assumption was that limited opportunity for sustained interaction with a single caregiver in the first 6 months of life would be associated with disruptions in social relationships, especially the development of infant social attachment (Ainsworth, 1973). The evidence was not restricted to infant social capabilities. A wave of studies in the 1960s and 1970s concerning the importance of the early postpartum period for the development of parental attachment to their offspring (or bonding) suggested that adults as well as infants are bound by critical periods for their development. Based on earlier work on goats (Hersher, Richmond, & Moore, 1963), Klaus and Kennel1 (1976) suggested that contact between parent, especially mother and the newborn infant, was critical for the adequate development of parent-infant attachment. This suggestion was part of a more general body of evidence that indicated considerable continuity between early experience and later social behavior (Kagan & Moss, 1962). However, in the 25-year interim, important challenges have been mounted that bring into serious question the critical period hypothesis i n regard to the development of infant social behavior. First, later research seriously challenged one of the central postulates of a critical period view of development, namely, that certain periods of development are of particular importance, and that the individual who does not receive an appropriate experience during this phase will suffer permanent deficits (Scott, 1962). Research has strongly challenged this view by showing that monkeys reared in total social isolation for the first 6 months of lifc can be rehabilitated

(Novak & Harlow, 1975; Suonii, Harlow, & McKinney, 1972). The implications are clear: They directly contradict the critical period notion that wcial deficiencies developed in impoverished early rearing ciivironnient\ are necessarily permanent and irreversihle. It is true that spontaneous recovery rarely if ever occurs in an isolate. However. the proper social agents can be dircovered. social rehabilitation is possihle-it (Suomi, 1976, p. 19)

Evidence at the human levcl has continued to accumulate in challenge to the assumption of nonreversibility. Although the early study by Skeels (1966) indicated that subsequent adoption into a nommal home environment could reverse earlier institution-related deficits in social and intellectual development, questions of methodological adequacy have been raised (Scarr & Weinberg. 1983). However, a variety of subsequent studies of rcversibility of the effects of early experience (Clarke & Clarke, 1976) were instrumental in garnering support for a revised view of the impact of early experience. The Kagan and Klein (1973) study demonstrated that social and cognitive deficits in infancy did not have long-term effects on the capabilities of preadolescents. Again the evidence supported the view that behavior is modifiable at a variety of developmental points, and that later behavior is not necessarily determined in a fixed fashion by early experiences. A similar conclusion is evident from more recent studies of infant-parent attachment. A variety of studies have shown that early attachment relationships show a high level of stability across the first few years of life (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). However, other evidence suggests that the classification of attachment in infancy shifts across time as a result of changes in family circumstances. Some infants show a shift from secure to anxious attachment especially if the family level of stress is high; other infants shift toward greater security of attachment over time if the change in family situation is associated with a relief from tension (Lamb e t a / . , 1984; Thompson, Lamb, & Estes, 1982). These findings illustrate the modifiability of attachment relationships. As Vaughn, Egeland, Sroufe, and Waters (1979) noted, “like any other affectional relationship infant-mother attachments arise from interaction, they continue to develop even after an affective bond has been formed and they are responsive to changes in the behavior of either partner” (p. 975). The Direction of Influence: Uriirlirri~tional verms Bidirectional Another noteworthy shift in research and theorizing in the area of infant social development is in the conception of directionality of influence. Traditionally, most approaches to social development included a unidirectional model whereby parents influence their children’s development; the children’s contribution to

4.

their own socialization was rarely recognized. In a second phase, under the influence of Bell’s (1968) classic paper, the historical imbalance was corrected and infants’ contribution to their own socialization came to be widely accepted. In part, this shift occurred because of the experimental analyses of infant competencies of the 1960s, which demonstrated the wide range of capacities as well as the readiness of the infant for social interaction (Schaffer, 1971). A third phase is now being increasingly recognized. In o u r enthusiasm to correct a historical imbalance we focused on the infant’s impact on the parent instead of the more appropriate focus on the reciprocal nature of the interactive process. The current zeitgeist, however, has clearly shifted to study of the reciprocity of interaction; the ways in which parents and infants mutually regulate each other are of central interest (Parke, 1978; Parke & Tinsley, 1987; Schaffer, 1984; Tronick, 1982). 5.

The Unit of Analysis Every era can be characterized by the units of analysis that are preferred for empirical and theoretical work. Individuals. dyads, triads, and polyadic units such as families are possible units that can be utilized. The 1960s and 1980s show marked contrasts in the choice of the unit of analysis. Accounts of psychological development have for thc most part been individual based Their concern has been with the child as such: i t i s the child who IS regarded as the babic unit of study, everything outside his skin being considered extraneous. even antithetical-forces that may have an impact on thc child but that are not an inherent part of his developmental progress. (Schaffer. 19x4. p I I)

This description captures well the 1960s and 1970s, when the unit of analysis was generally the individual. Typically, the infant was examined in order to assess his or her response to input from social agents in the environment. The unit was not simply the individual but often only the infant. Adults, of course, should be expected to behave differently toward infants as a function o f their own developinental progress. However, researchers typically had little interest in how the adult social agents who populate an infant’s world change developmentally, or in how their developmental changes shape the form and frequency of the social input they provide to infants. They were interested in the effects of different kinds of child-rearing practices (Sears et a l . , 1957). but had little interest in the reasons for individual differences across adults in their choices of practices. Shifts in family circumstances, life events, occupational changes, or even simply age differences across adults were rarely examined. The 1960s was an individualistic and infant-oriented period. Moreover, units of analyses beyond the individual were seldom investigated and were rarely the object even of theoretical inquiry. In the 1980s a variety of changes have occurred. First, researchers have an increased appreciation of adult development and how shifts in adult development

shape the course of the adult role as socializer of the infant’s social development (Elder, 1974, 1984; Parke, 19XX). This expansion of the cast of individuals from the infant to the adult was encouraged, in part by the life-span developmental theorists (Baltes, 1987). However, this expansion merely laid the groundwork for the movement from an individual to a dyadic level of analysis, in that the limiting of our analysis of infant social development to individual development even when both child and adult developmental trajectories are considered is viewed as inadequate. In the 1980s researchers cornnionly conceptualize the unit of analysis as dyads within the family system such a s the parent-child dyad, the husband-wife dyad, and the sib-sib dyad (Belsky, 1981; Cowan et ul., 1985; Parke, 1988; Parke & Tinsley, 1982, 1987). Moreover. units beyond the dyad are recognized as important as well. In fact, models that limit examination of the effects of interaction patterns to only the father-infant and mother-infant dyads and the direct effects of one individual on another are now assumed t o be inadequate for understanding the impact of social interaction patterns in families (Belsky, 1981, 1984; Lewis & Feiring, 1981; Kreppner. 1988; Parke. Power & Gottman. 1979; Pedersen. 1980). The full family group must bc considered. Second, parents influence their infants indirectly as well. A parent may influence a child through the mediation of another family member’s impact ( e . g . , a father may contribute to the mother’s positive affect toward her child by praising her caregiving ability). Another way in which one parent may indirectly influence the treatment of the child by other agents is by modifying the infant’s behavior. Child behavior patterns that develop as a result of parent-child interaction may in turn affect the treatment of the child by other social agents. For example, irritable infant patterns induced by an insensitive and impatient mother may in turn make the infant more difficult lor the father to handle and pacify. Thus, patterns developed in intcriiction with one parent may alter interaction patterns with another caregiver. I n larger families. siblings can play a similar mediating role (Dunn & Kendrick. I Y X Z ) . Parents have been shown to behave differently when alone with their infant from when interacting with the infant i n the presence of the other parent. A sizable body of research, with infants of various ages, has indicated that rates of parent-infant interactive behavior decrease in a triadic context in comparison to a dyadic context in both the laboratory (Lamb, 1979), the home (Belsky, 1979; Clarke-Stewart, 1978, 1980; Pedersen, Anderson. & Cain, 1980) and the hospital (2arke & O’Leary. 1976). Other investigators have emphabi7ed the importance of studying the family triad in terms o f the impact of the husband-wife relationship on the parentinfant interaction process. These studies show that the parent-infant relationship (Dickie & Matheson, 1984: 1,anib & Elstcr, 1985) as well as infant social affective development (Dickstein & Parhe. 1988) are affected by the nature of

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Ross D . Purke

the marital relationship. Overall, these studies indicate that parent-infant interaction cannot be understood by a sole focus on the parent-infant dyad (Parke & Tinsley, 1981, 1987; Schaffer, 1984). Beyond the Triad: The Role of Extrafutnilial Support Systems. In the last 25 years, infancy specialists have increasingly recognized that families do not exist as units independent of other social organizations within society. Thus, families need to be viewed within their social context, and recognition of the role of the community as a modifier of family modes of interaction is necessary for an adequate theory of early development (Cochran & Brassard, 1979; Parke & Tinsley, 1982, 1987; Power & Parke, 1984; Tinsley & Parke, 1983). A number of studies have suggested a positive relationship between informal social networks and a family’s adaptation to stressful events, such as divorce (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1982) and job loss (Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1982). Of particular relevance are investigations of the relationship between social networks and mother-child interaction. For example, Crnic, Greenberg, Ragozin, Robinson, and Basham (1983), using samples of both preterm and fullterm infants, reported positive relationships between informal social support relationships and the quality of mother-infant interaction. These investigations suggest that social support may affect infant and child developmental outcomes indirectly through modifying the nature of parent-child interaction patterns. In addition, researchers have begun to recognize the importance of formal support systems as well. In recent years, a number of investigators have recognized the hospital as a provider of social support for parents, and, in particular, the postpartum period as a convenient time point for initiating supportive services for parents of infants. Parents are accessible at this point, and motivation for learning about infant development and caregiving skills is often high during this time. The value of hospital-based programs for mothers is illustrated in the work of Badger, Burns, and Vietze (1981), who found that teenage mothers and their infants profit from weekly intervention classes. Indices of infant social and cognitive development were higher and mothers were physically and emotionally more responsive to their infants than mothers in the comparison group. Similar intervention studies illustrate the role that formal support systems such as hospitals can play in modifying father involvement and father-infant interaction (Dickie & Carnahan, 1980; Parke et u l . , 1980). Other studies illustrate the potential role of health care providers, such as pediatricians, in playing a supportive role for parents of young children (Chamberlin, 1979; Whitt & Casey, 1982). Together, these intervention studies illustrate the ways in which such formal institutions can potentially affect infants through the modification of the skills of mothers, fathers, or both parents.

C.

M E 1 HODOL,OGICAL DIMENSIONS

In this section, we evaluate changes in methodological strategies that have occurred over the last 25 years. As will be evident, a marked rise in the variety of designs, methods, and analytic techniques characterizes the changes over this period. Nature of Designs: Cro.s.s-sc~c~tioiztr1 versus Lorigitudinul In the 1960s, cross-sectional designs were common and longitudinal studies were relatively uncommon. For example, there were a number of studies of the effects of various types of reinforcers on significant aspects of infant social behavior, such as smiling and vocalizing. Weisberg (1963), for example, showed that rates of smiling and vocalizing could be modified by various combinations of visual, tactual, and auditory feedback. Others obtained similar results (Brackbill, 1958; Etzel & GewirtL. 1967; Wahler, 1967). Little interest was evident in issues of stability or change in development across time. One exception was the early charting of the course of infant-parent attachment relationships by Schaffer and Emerson ( 1964,) who studied a group of infants over an 18-month period. In the 1980s, the proportionate use of longitudinal designs increased markedly, in part motivated by an increased interest in issues of developmental stability and change. Two types of longitudinal studies are evident. Short-term longitudinal studies, in which a particular issue is traced over a short time period of a few months to a year are currently popular (Clarke-Stewart & Hevey. 1981; Cohn & Tronick, 1986; Crockenberg, 1 % I ; Fogel, 1981). These studies are of value for detecting short-term stability or for tracking development across a time period of assumed rapid change in an emerging developmental process or structure. Second, many of the current longitudinal studies have a long-term character and have continued from infancy through childhood and into adolescence. For example, a number of investigators have followed families from infancy to the preadolescent or adolescent years (Lewis & Feiring, 1988; Sameroff, 1987; Sroufe, 1983). This strategy has permitted a niore definitive evaluation of a variety of theoretical issues, especially those concerning the impact of early experience, including the role of sensitive and critical periods on later development. This increase in the amount of longitudinal research does not imply that this is the dominant strategy. In fact, due to the expense and difficulty of longitudinal research, cross-sectional designs still predominate among infancy researchers. Often researchers will use both strategies, and i n an area that is not yet well developed either theoretically or enipirically , cross-sectional studies often precede pursuit of an issue longitudinally. A commitment to multiple design strat-

I.

28

Roc.c D . P o r k

egies rather than a near exclusive reliance on a single design is most chardcteristic of the current area.

2. Experimental ver.7u.s None.rperimentu1 Approaches Closely related to reliance on laboratory settings as the sine qua non of the 1960s was a reliance on experimental approaches. Few field experiments, natural experiments, and nonexperimental field studies appeared in the 1960s. Again, this trend had some exceptions, but these were relatively isolated examples outside the main tradition of the times. One notable exception was Rheingold’s (1956) study of the effects of extra mothering of institutionalized infants-an example of a field experimental approach. Another exception was Skeels’ (1966) study of infants who were adopted out of institutions; this can be viewed as an example of a natural experimental strategy, although this work is often criticized for methodological weaknesses. How should we characterize the 1980s-25 years later‘? Again a greater openness to multiple strategies is evident. A variety of approaches can be found, including laboratory-based experimental studies (Kuchuk, Vibbert, & Bornstein. 1986), field-based experimental studies (Parke et ul., 1980; Widmayer & Field. 1980), and a variety of nonexperimental studies (Belsky et d . , 1988; Easterbrooks & Goldberg, 1984). 3. Research Settings: Laboratory versus Field In the 1960s the vast majority of research projects were conducted in laboratory settings. The choice of the laboratory context was consistent with the theoretical focus of the day on the stimulus-response (S-R) framework, which led to testable propositions that could be experimentally evaluated best under controlled conditions. This preference was particularly evident in the experimental child tradition (see Lipsitt &.Cantor, 1986, for a review), but was evident in the social learning theory tradition as well (Bandura & Walters, 1963). The early studies of social reinforcement of infant social responses were generally laboratory based (Rheingold, Genvirtz, & Ross, 1959), as were the influential nonhuman primate studies by Harlow (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959). However, one can find exceptions, such as Schaffer & Emerson’s (1964a) study of the development of attachment in the home and Rheingold’s (1956) investigation of social responsiveness in institutionalized babies. The choice of naturalistic contexts for the assessment of infant behavior has become increasingly evident in the 1980s. What are the origins of this shift‘? In the past two decades, psychologists have become concerned about the limited ecological validity of traditional methodologies, particularly reliance on the laboratory context as the sine qua non for the study of social development and socialization. In fact, a “mythology of childhood,’’ to borrow Baldwin’s (1967) phrase, has evolved in which a set of effects noted in the laboratory is assumed to occur also in naturalistic socialization contexts and to be an accurate account of

how the child develops. One rewlt of this myth has been a confusion between necessary and sufficient causality: the laboratory experiments tell us only that certain variables are possible contributors t o the infant's social-cognitive devclopment. However, the extent to which these hypothesized processes are in fact necessary for adequate socialimtion is left unanswered. To the extent that the aim is a technological one. in which thc most effective techniques for modifying behavior in clinical and educational contexts are sought, the ecological validity can be ignored. Similarly, if thc concern is to evaluate the adequacy of a theoretically derived prediction concerning the operation of a development process. this may not be an issue. However, if the concern is with the generalizability of the hypothesized or observed processes that have been discovered in the laboratory to natural social settings, direct assessment of the extent to which these processes operate in naturalistic cmtexts is necessary. This framing of the ecological validity debate does not deny thc importance of the laboratory context as a highly relevant and useful setting for the testing of hypotheses concerning development. Rather it suggests that the further step of testing laboratory-derived propositions in naturalistic contexts be undertaken before any claims concerning the boundaries of generalizability are made. Under the influence of increasing criticism concerning the ecological validity of laboratory paradigms (Bronfcnbrenner, 1974, 1979; Cole, Hood, & McDermott, 1978; Parke, 1976), as well as an increasingly sophisticated appreciation of the importance of contextual factors for understanding social behavior (Pervin. 1978) and the value of different settings for different research goals (Parke. 1979a), a more eclectic era was ushercd in. Instead of the sole commitment to a single setting, the 1980s is a period i n which multiple contexts are commonly used to investigate infant social development. The laboratory is still a context for the evaluation of well-specified theoretical propositions concerning social development. However, other settings such as homes (Waters & Deane, 1986), hospitals (Parke & O'Leary, 1976), day-care settings (Belsky, 1986; Howes & Olenick, 19861, and physicians offices (Whitt & Casey, 1982) are used as well. Moreover, consistent with earlier eras (Gesell, 1928), a resurgence of interest in controlled naturalistic contexts such as a laboratory apartment that approximates a home situation are in use (Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler, 1985; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1982). This proliferation of settings reflects a recognition of the value of different settings f'or both different research purposes and for different stages of evaluation of a research paradigm. Datu Collrction Strategic.\ One of the most significant shifts in the last 25 years has been in the choice of data collection strategies used to assess social development. Two trends can be detected: ( I ) a return to the use of parent reports and (2) a rise in use of observational strategies.

4.

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Ross D . Purke

a . Parental Reports. There has been a resurgence of interest in the value of parental self-report strategies. These methods assume a variety of forms including parental interviews and questionnaires, parental diaries, and playback techniques (i.e., presenting videotapes of parents’ behavior to them to obtain their responses), as well as new approaches to parental attitudes and beliefs. Under the weight of considerable criticism concerning the limitations of selfreport strategies, especially retrospective accounts, these approaches were relatively unfashionable for the past two decades (see Robbins, 1963). In spite of these criticisms there are clear advantages to these techniques, and many issues of current interest (e.g., nature, extensiveness, and satisfaction with infant’s social networks) cannot be investigated without recourse to these techniques. As Maccoby and Martin (1983) recently wrote: Using parents as informants has great potential advantages. For assessment of behavior that vanes considerably across situations or behavior that is usually not displayed in public, reliable observational data are difficult to obtain and parent interviews are often the only viable alternative. Parents have an opportunity to observe their children and the patterns of interaction in their families over extended penods of time in a broad range of situations. Thus by virtue of their daily participation in the family system, parents have access to a truly unique body of information about the family, and it is reasonable to tap into this infornmation by questioning them. ( p . 16)

A number of significant changes have occurred since the 1960 era that have blunted many of the earlier criticisms. First, parent reports are now used primarily for obtaining concurrent, not retrospective, information about family interaction (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Second, instead of asking parents to make trait attributions such as “dependent” or “difficult,” many researchers ask parents to provide detailed descriptions of specific behaviors, which are presumably less open to subjective interpretation and bias and therefore yield more reliable as well as valid ratings. Radke-Yarrow and her colleagues have used another promising strategy that minimizes the problems associated with parental self-reports. These investigators train mothers as observers and teach them to record behaviors in response to certain critical instances. The mothers provide a narrative report of the eliciting events, as well as the child and parental behaviors and effective responses. The correspondence between observers’ records and maternal reports of similar types of events is quite high, which attests to the reliability of this approach (RadkeYarrow & Zahn-Waxler, 1985). Another approach has involved the use of parental diaries, in which parents record a variety of predesignated parental bchaviors such as diapering, bathing, or feeding over a period of days. Recording sheets are organized into time blocks (e.g., 15 or 30 min) to facilitate the task for parents. Parke and Anderson (1987) reported significant relationships between parental diary records and independent reports of parental behavior for these same behavior categories.

Another major advance that has occurred, in part, because o f our renewed attention to the value of self-report data i s the recognition of the importance of parental belief systems in understanding parent-infant interaction and infant development (Goodnow, 1984; Parke, 1978; Parke & Tinsley , 1987; Sigel. 1985). Parental beliefs are another characteristic of the infant’s care-giving environment, and many researchers havc articulated and demonstrated empirical and theoretical relationships among parent beliefs, parent behavior, and child development. Various studies have confirmed that parent beliefs can affect child rearing, socialization, and the quality of the “home as a learning environment” (Johnson & Martin, 1983; Skinncr, 1985). and subsequently, child language and cognitive and social development (Dix &L Grusec, 1985; McCillicuddy-DeLisi, 1982; Miller, 1985; Sigel, 1985). Parents have complex sets of belief systems concerning child development (McGillicuddy-DeLisi, 1982), and these beliefs appear to guide parents’ behavior with respect to their children. Earlier, Parke (1978) suggested that parents’ reports of their own behavior did not always match investigators’ observations of parent behavior, and that parent report and observational data were two independent sources of data. According to this view, both are necessary to understand the antecedents and consequenccs o f parenting behavior. Recently, researchers have begun to look to parent beliefs and attitudes “as ‘the missing link’ in their accounts of parent-infant relationships” (Goodnow, 1984, p. 193). In summary, self-report strategies are being much more widely used and recent innovations are making these approaches more effective than in earlier eras. b. Obsrrvutional Strutegics. The utilization of observational methods as an approach t o gathering data about infant social behavior has been a growth industry (Bakeman & Gottman, 1086; Sackett, 1979); closely linked with this shift has been an increase in choice of naturalistic contexts for observation of behavior, a shift noted in the preceding section (IV,C,3). Moreover, the sophistication of‘ observational methodologies has increased sharply in the past decade. In part this change resulted from advances in technology that permit collection of sequentially ordered data as well as advances in portable videotape equipment that permit high-fidelity recording in field settings. In addition, advances in both video and computer technology have permitted analysis of behavior at a very microanalytic level. This last kind of advance is clearly evident in work on the development of facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Izard & Malatesta. 1987). Moreover, data coding strategies havc shifted as well. The reliance on frequency counts of parent and infant behavior or the use of time sampling techniques has decreased. Part of the reason for the decline in the use of these approaches is that the data collected in this fashion are not truly interactive

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Ross D Parhe

because they permit no statements concerning the manner in which the infant and parent activities are coordinated. One knows simply that parents and infants behave in certain ways when they are in each other’s presence. The implicit assumption underlying this approach is that the infant or parent is a stimulus for certain partner behaviors, but not in a specific regulatory fashion. Rather, the assumption is that a repertoire of behavior is elicited by the presence of an infant, but the moment-to-moment modifications in either the elements of the behavioral repertoire or the timing or intensity of the behaviors in the repertoire are not specified. A closer examination of interaction is derivable from this type of frequency, by examining either ( 1) correlations between parent and infant behaviors or ( 2 ) the co-occurrence of a parent and infant behavior in the same time interval. Both are hazardous and provide only partial solutions to describing interaction. First, correlations between the frequency of occurrence of parental and infant behaviors indicate only that the overall level of a parent behavior is related to the overall level of infant behavior. No information is yielded concerning how closely the parent and infant behaviors were in fact related in time. Although one may interpret the correlation between infant fussing and maternal rocking as an indication that parental rocking is in response to the infant fussing, this is only a suggestive hypothesis because this type of data yields no information concerning the sequence of the parent and infant behaviors. Instead, to provide more accurate representation of social interactive processes as dynamic and reciprocal, investigators are increasingly utilizing approaches that capture the sequential and time-dependent order of interaction between partners. This approach is increasingly feasible because of the availability of statistical techniques, such as sequential analyses (Bakeman & Gottman, 1987; Sackett, 1987) and time series analysis (Cohn & Tronick, 1986; Gottman, 1981; Lester, Hoffman, & Brazelton, 1985). Another noteworthy trend reflects in part the openness of researchers to multimethod strategies, as opposed to strict adherence to one approach. The use of ratings is increasingly common and in some cases serves as a protective net against failure to detect interesting patterns that may not appear at the microanalytic level. The value of global ratings is coming to be appreciated more fully, and the utility of macro and micro levels of analysis for different questions is being recognized (Cairns & Green, 1979). Evidence, not just speculation, may be driving the field to this new openness to a wide range of methods. A number of researchers have found that ratings of parental behavior yield better prediction of later social behavior (Bakenian & Brown, 1980) and later cognitive assessments (Jay & Farran, 1981) than more microanalytic and more expensive measures of parent-child interaction. Further delineation of the types of questions for which various levels of observational analyses are most useful would constitute a major methodological con-

tribution. In the final analysis. the basis for selecting a data collection strategy and for choosing a level of analysis should be the nature of the problem, the status of theory in the area, and the stage of development of the research program. In the early steps of an investigation or in a theoretically underdeveloped area, a time-sampling strategy may be most appropriate. After preliminary work has been completed, selection of a more detailed and sophisticated but more expensive sequential analytic strategy may be appropriate (Power & Parke, 1982). Clearly, simply moving to a more molecular or more abstract level of analysis should not be the goal: rather. comparative analysis of the usefulness of different strategies for particular problems needs to be carefully done before any particular level or type of analysis is preferentially advocated. Other types of analytic strategies arc changing the type of research that i s being executed in the 1980s. In part to capture the commitment to multimeasure research projects, the use of structural modeling and path modeling approaches has increased (see Connell, 1987, for a review). Similarly, logit analyses are increasingly common (Bakeman, Adamson, & Strisik, 1988; Green, 1988) in developmental psychology in general and in infancy work in particular. Level of Analysis In each era, the choice of level of analysis reflects the types of constructs that are preferred. At some points in time researchers prefer molar constructs, and at other points, molecular constructs. The 1960s was a period in which a molecular level of analysis was in vogue. Small units of behavior that could be easily observed and measured were preferred. Reliance on molecular analysis is consistent with the mechanistic view that was dominant in the period. In contrast, the 1980s can be characterized by endorsement of both molecular and molar constructs. Although the data collection strategies have shifted, a significant commitment to molecular analysis of discrete responses has remained (e.g., vocalizations, changes in facial muscles, direction of gaze), especially in research on social interaction (e.g.. Field, 1982; Osofsky, 1979, 1987; Parke, 1979b). At the same time, there is an intluential move to work with more molar constructs such as attachment (Park & Waters, 1988; Sroufe & Fleeson. 1986; Sroufe & Waters, 1977) and relationships and traits (Hartup & Rubin, 1986). Similarly, in the study of emotions, both molecular and molar levels of analysis are evident (Izard & Malatesta, 1987). Again, the issue is specification of the linkage between these various levels of conceptualization (see Hinde, 1979; Masters & Wellman, 1974; Sroute CYC Waters, 1977, for more on this issue).

5.

V.

Conclusions

This survey has uncovered a variety o f shifts in the conceptual frameworks that guide theory-building and research the domain of infant social development.

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Ross D . P a r k

Table 1 (Section I) provides a schematic summary of the main changes. As this table indicates, several features characterize the current scientific enterprise in the late 1980s in the domain of infant social development. First, there is a proliferation of minitheories rather than a single dominant position or theoretical framework, and each of these smaller scale theories account for only a limited set of issues. This domain-specific nature of theory is one of the hallmarks of this period. The prevelance of minitheories represents a reaction to our disenchantment with grand theories (e.g., Freud, Hull-Spence, Piaget) in the 1960s. Part of the reason for the current proliferation of smaller and more modest paradigms is due to the failure of a new overarching paradigm to emerge to replace the disfavored grand theories. This state of affairs raises serious questions concerning the Kuhnian analysis of paradigm shifts in the history of science. As Bevan (1986) has noted the Kuhnian “view that (a) paradigm shifts represent discontinuities between incomparable explanatory frameworks and that (b) when a given explanatory framework is in force, it brooks no exception” (1986, p. 390) is brought into doubt by current trends not only in experimental psychology generally (Bevan’s focus) but in developmental psychology and infant social developmental work as well. However, there are signs that a new integration may be emerging in the form of a systems perspective that will bring together biological, social, cognitive, and emotional minitheories into a more coherent framework (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Sameroff, 1983). Consistent with this trend is a clear shift toward more utilization of strategies that retlect the view that more cross-system integration is desirable. Several current trends indicate that an empirical foundation is being laid in support of a more complex multiperspective integration. First, investigators are examining multiple domains of behavior in a single study. Second, longitudinal research is flourishing. Third, larger samples are becoming increasingly common that permit more complex interrelationships to be examined with sophisticated multivariate analytic techniques. Third, interdisciplinary research is increasing that allows insights into cross-disciplinary relationships. While there is optimism that a new integration may be forthcoming, it is by no means clear that the current pluralism is unhealthy. The field of infant social development in the late 1980s is vigorous and well. The multiplicity of perspectives, in fact, may better reflect both the realities of the organism and the social context in which the infant exists. A return to these enduring concerns may, in fact, provide the empirical foundation for the emergence of a new integration.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by a National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Grant No. HD 05951 to Ross Parke. and by National Institute of Child Health and

Human Development Training Grant N o HL) 07205 (UP, PI). Thanks to Alan Fogel, Hayne W . Reese, Arnold J . Sanieroff, Ross A . 'l'hornp\on. and Barbara J . Tinsley for their helpful comment\ and to Kathleen Helms, Terry Sturdyvin. and Ginny Ragle for their assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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ON THE USES OF THE CONCEPT OF NORMALITY IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

1. INTRODUCTION

II

THE FIRST ASSUMPTION 1 HI ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT ARE SEPARABLE

111

THE SECOND ASSUMPTION 5IMII A R OUTCOMES IMPLY SIMILAR ROUTES

IV

THE THIRD ASSUMPTION C(’ICNCI: IS VALlJE-FREF,

V

“RANGE OF SIGNIFICAN( I

OK

NORMALITY””

VI. CONCLUSION REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

W e contend that three assumptions, commonly but often implicitly held, affect how the concept of “normality” is used in theories of development and in the conduct of empirical research. The assumptions are: ( I ) organism and environment may be dealt with as separate entities; (2) symptoms or pcrfomiances are invariant expressions of particular processes and functional relationships; and (3) science is value-free. These assumptions play a pivotal role in the formulation and use of the concept

ADVANCES IN (‘tii1.l) L)tVEL.Of‘MI:NT A N D B E H A V I O K . VOI ?I

of normality. Their impact, and the confusion they generate, can be detected in the various ways in which biological and behavioral scientists have used notions of normality (Gollin, 1984b). The following are common usages of the concept of normality: 1 . An authoritative standard 2. An index of health, physical or psychological 3. An index of acceptable physiological function or behavior 4. A statistically defined quantitative feature of some dimension of measurement 5. A species typical pattern of organism-environment relationships 6. A social or cultural group-typical pattern of organism-environment relationships.

We will examine the impact of these usages on theory, research, and practice, and will argue that in many contexts this problem-generating jumble of meanings should be replaced with the notion of range of .sign$cance, which is explicitly defined for the guidance and organization of research in methodologically tight and responsible ways. This usage will be shown to follow from the rejection of the three untenable assumptions presented above. The fact that these three assumptions occur together is no historical accident for, roughly speaking, the first implies the second, and the first two jointly imply the third. The rejection of all three can be seen as the necessary result of taking seriously the idea that the human is a temporal emergent in the processes of phylogenesis, ontogenesis, and cultural history. This focus on time and process leads to a notion of normality seen neither as neutral fact nor as fixed ideal, but as an hypothesis to guide inquiry toward critically revisable goals (Gollin, I98 I ; Johnston. 1985). Put in the broadest historical terms, our epistemological position entails a rejection of what has historically been one of the basic assumptions of the Western world, that is, the belief that knowing is ultimately an act through which a neutral mind sees the fixed norms and essences that constitute the intelligibility of the world. This Platonic ideal has been under heavy, and familiar, criticism since Kant, and the grounds of its rejection are hardly news. But the old ideals and assumptions are so fundamental and ingrained that their effects linger and are sometimes apparent in the work of those who are expressly committed to postKantian notions of inquiry as active, and to post-Darwinian notions of form as emergent and evolving. Thus, the assumptions we challenge may often function in thought not only unintentionally and implicitly, but even at variance with an “official” commitment to their rejection. For this reason we will examine concrete ways in which concepts of normalityfincrion in particular theories, but we will spend no time on the explicit statements of theorists concerning epistemological issues.

Johnston (1987) confronted a similar problem when dealing with the issue of the persistence of dichotomies in the study of behavioral development. He pointed out that the “official view” is that the “nature-nurture” issue is mainly of historic interest while in fact: . . the official view is largely an illusion: Despite the number of changes in the language in which discussions ahout dc\clopinent are typically conducted, the conceptual inadequacies inherent in tlic various dichotomies that pervaded the field SO years ago are still prevalent i n cle\elopmental thinking today. ( p . 150)

11.

The First Assumption: The Organism and Environment Are Separable

Many theorists treat courses of biological and behavioral development as if they were largely independent of environmental variation and other sources of individual differences. In doing so, they implicitly assume that the course and outcome of development are universal and immutable except to the degree that unspecified factors influence the “rate” of progression or the level of final achievement along a predestined course. The focus is on observed regularities that are held to characterize all development. This focus is frequently acconipanied by a neglect of contextual differences and their impact upon development (for fuller discussion, see Gollin, 1981; Toulmin, 1981). Hence, the observed regularities are mistaken for universals, and the construed universals are regarded as indicators of health and developmental adequacy. Tne contrasting focus on contextual factors parallels some of the theoretical and heuristic themes often referred to under the rubric of ‘ ‘life-span’’ approaches (Bakes, 1979; Havighurst, 1973). I t was made explicit by Lerner (19833): . . from this perspective. devclopniental changes occur as a consequence of reciprocal (bidirectional) relation5 between the active organism and the active context. Just as the context changes the individual. the individual changes the context. As such. by acting to change sources of their own development, by being both a product and a producer of their context\. individuals effect their own development. (p IS) ,

Ego-psychological formulations (Blanck & Blanck, 1974; Hartniann, 1958) exemplify the universalist position. Early development is presented as a reciprocal process involving a maturing individual and that individual’s environment, especially as embodied by the mothering figure. Yet in the emphasis on what is labelled the “autonomous ego” and the “conflict free sphere,” the role of environment is undercut by placing “inborn ego apparatuses” inside the developing organism (Blanck & Blanck, 1974). In addition, by positing a course of “nornial” development in which the intrapsychic structures emerging in one stage act as the cause for health or pathology, ego analytic developmental theory

52

Eugene S. Golliti er u l .

effectively removes the organism from its environment for the purposes of diagnostic and therapeutic decisions (Silvern, 1984). This move from a unitary organism-environment system to an independently functioning organism is accomplished by positing the “average expectable environment” (Hartniann, 1958) and the “good enough mother” (Winnicott. 1953). The latter provides the minimum requirements for the actualization of ego functions and their structures. “Motility, intentionality, perception, and the like will follow the innately programmed developmental course, always provided that the mothering person is present and not so grossly interfering that she adversely affects the development of the ego and its functions” (Blanck & Blanck, 1974, p. 31). The concepts of “average expectable environment” and “good enough mother” introduce the first assumption into ego analytic thinking to the extent that these concepts hold the environment constant while attributing to the organism those properties that emerge from interactions with this “average” or “good enough” surround. Even the Piagetian approach (Dasen, 1972), with its emphasis on constructive transactions between child and surround, contains presumptions of a universal developmental course and outcome, and the implicit notion that the normal course is the desirable course. Destinational theories that entail this sort of universality of stage sequencing and developmental outcome have been extensively examined (see Toulmin, 1981). However, evidence is accumulating to show that in many areas of development, for instance, strategies of language acquisition, not only are cross-cultural differences found (Akiyama, I984), but also individual differences in acquisition strategies within a single language domain (Nelson, 1981). This observation applies also to the acquisition of memorial strategies as well as other cognitive abilities (Kearins, 1986). Structural stage theories, then, in practice if not in principle, detach the course of development from both genetic and extragenetic influences. The only exceptions recognized in universalist approaches are those involving genetic anomalies or environmental catastrophes. Save for these extreme categories of events, development is treated as if it were independent of genetic or environmental variation (see Gollin, 1981, for a more extended discussion of this point). Of course, in some research situations “organisms” or “environments” might be assumed, provisionally, to be constants. However, in each instance such a stipulation must be shown-not assumed-not to distort the process of inquiry. Otherwise, the assumption that organism and environment are functionally reciprocating components is lost, as indeed it is in most research work. The inseparability of organism and environment was central for the ethologist Chauvin (1977), who argued that only by varying systematically the environment within which the organism functions can the full range of organismic plasticity be elicited, and hence the full significance of behavioral variation be made intelligible. Chauvin proposed that organisms be presented novel as well as

demanding environmental opportunities in order to provide more accurate assessment of ranges of organismic capacity. The employment of novel arrangements in this sense of the non-normative is fundamental to Baltes’ (1983) insistence that we must consider not only the nomiative age-graded influences that are usually considered in traditional developmental psychology, we must also consider normative history-graded influences that are “fairly general evcnts or patterns experienced by a given cultural unit in connection with biosocinl change.” and that can “vary with historical time and can produce unique cohort-related constellations of influences” (p. 95). An additional class of events t o be considered consists of the non-normative influences on life-span development, namely, “environmental and biological determinants that, although significant in their effects on individual life histories, are not general” (Baltes, 1983. p. 95). Examples include such occurrences as migration, divorce, death of a family member, and illness. These are. for most individuals, novel life situations that will contribute to the revelation of the plastic capacities of individuals. Insisting upon individualizing procedures when evaluating a perceived pathological expression involves recognizing the value of Kurt Goldstein’s ( 1939) strategy for the interpretation o f symptoms: Symptoms must be regarded as attempts by organisms to retain coherence-where coherence is always seen as the coherence of a specific organism with specific resources striving to function in an orderly fashion in a specific surround. This view of perceived pathology illuminates the ways in which pathology is unintelligible as a state apart from the processes-aimed at coherence-out of which it arises. Even the significance and consequent outcome of an established and widespread pathological category may vary as a function of organism-environment contextual relationships. For example, in a discussion of recovery from schizophrenia, Warner ( 1 983) reported: The general conclusion is unavoidable Schiiophrenia in the third world ha\ a coursc and prognosis quite unlike the condition iib we recognize it in the West. The progressive deterioration which Kracpcliri comidered centrdl to his definition of the disease is rare in nonindustrial wcictics. except perhaps under the dehumanizing restrictions of a traditional asylum The ina.jority of the Third World ,chizophrenic\ achieve a favorable outcome. The m)ie urhanized and industrialized the setting. the niore malignant becomes the illnc\s Why should this he so’?( p 203)

The point to be emphasized is that abstracting an individual from historical experience and current context can yield only very limited understanding of the significance of any particular behavior for developmental evaluation. Thus, normative evaluations rendered exclusively in terms of frequency of expression, or in terms of attributed pathology, are both incomplete and obscurant of process and significance (Gollin, 198 I , 19X4b). The systematic methodological reasons for avoiding the uncritical transfer of

the norms of one group to another-so disastrous for therapy and developmental assessment-were spelled out elegantly by Silvern (1984). She emphasized the importance of including in an analysis the fit between a child, or any organism, and the milieu in which it functions. To understand the nature and quality of the “fit” requires insight into the capacities of the child and the resources available from the surround. The nature of this relationship is exemplified by human infants’ preferential attention to visual patterns that resemble faces, and their responsiveness to sound frequencies in the range of hunian speech. Thus, any understanding of attachment behavior (regarded as a reciprocal event between an infant and a caretaker) must be based on a detailed knowledge of infantile receptor-mediator-effector properties and those environmental features that fit these organismic properties (Gottlieb, 1985). From the point of view of the other chief actor in this scenario, the mother (caretaker), the infant’s qualities constitute the extraorganismic pattern of characters. The evaluation of the attachment relationship in terms of health, deviance, or any other dimension must be conducted in terms of the interdefined system components that the attachment pair constitutes. The concept of “fit” is also useful in evaluating a child’s task success. This dimension is particularly significant because children are evaluated continuously within this framework, both with respect to clinical criteria of adequacy and developmental criteria of progress. Task success is dependent upon the degree to which a child acts in conformity with the demands imposed by important life settings, for example, school, peer relationships. and home. Tusk d~fjcicult>..in the child-environment system, is an interdefined property of a child’s resources (capacities) and of expectations (demands) of important persons in the child’s world. Thus, the quality of task accomplishment is a systems property wherein the systems components include a child, other important persons, the demands on the child, and the child’s resources and skills with respect to the demands (Silvern, 1984). This point is substantiated in research o n the measurement of intelligence (Fredericksen, 1986): a given test may not measure the same ability . . . for different people. The evidence rcviewcd ~uggeststhe cognitive proceascs that are involved in taking a test may depend not only on the forniat of the test and [ h u h the mode of responding to a problem but also oil such perwiial characteristics as the level of expertise of the subject in the area of the problems p o d and on the nature o f the setting and situation in which the problems arc presented ( p 451)

These points are underscored i n cross-cultural research. For example. aboriginal children have been found to obtain lower cognitive assessment scores than white Australian children (Dasen, 1972; Kearins, 1986) but higher visual memory scores (Kearins, 1981, 1986). The differences between the groups were ini-

tially thought to reflect genetic differences that were derived from different selective pressure histories. Further examination indicated that the differences in cognitive functioning reflected differences in mnemonic strategies. White children tended to rely heavily on verbal labels and aboriginal children tended to resort to visual rather than verbal rehearsal strategies. In general. aboriginaliwhite differences were most noticeable on the more verbal tasks. Where the items were pictured the differences were much smaller. Kearins concluded, “These observations indicate that Aboriginal children did not ~ 1 7 competence 0 ~ on . . . tests rather than that they do not possess competence” (1986, p. 212, italics added). Additionally, i n the area o f visual memory, when white children were oriented to use visual rather than verbal memorizing strategies, differences between the groups were no longer obwrved (Klich & Davidson, 1983). The importance of task arrangements in the generation of performance scores is also illustrated in a study 0 1 mental image rotation by Sharps and Gollin (1987). Using Shepard and Metller (1971) perspective line drawings, it was shown that the accuracy of elderly respondents was markedly depressed relative to that of young adults when participants were instructed to render judgments as quickly as possible. When the instructions were modified to stress uccurrrcy of performance, or a combination of speed and accuracy, differences in task success between the age groups was no longer significant (Fig. I ) . These research examples indicate clearly that an adequate interpretation of results requires that the organism be seen as embedded in a surround taken to be differentially salient at different times and organismic states (Baltes, 1983; Featherman & Lerner, 1985; Werner. 1937). The issue can also be examined in terms of von Uexkull’s concept of Urnuvlt (1926, 1957). Subject and object. he held. are dovetailed into one another and constitute a systematic whole (1957, pp. 10-1 1). The task of Umwelt research “is to identify each animal’s perceptual cues among all the stimuli in its environment and to build up the animal’s specific world with them” (1957, p. 13). This strategy is as applicable to the exploration of individual differences and cultural differences as i t is to species differences. A clear implication of the concept of Umwelr is that the first assumption, which holds that organism and environment may be dealt with as separate entities, is untenable. Becker (1964) put this point i n the most general and uncompromising terms: “. . . the world that exists o ~ ~ . s rthe d ~ organism, and the experience within the organism, are complementary aspects of one transactional process (p. 18). This position has also been elabor:ited by Johnston (1985), who emphasized that, “Evolution forged the organisti] and its environment into a single integrated system, the ecosystem, and it is the properties of the ecosystem, rather than those of the organism alone, that hold the key to a successful analysis . . . ” (pp. 92-93).

Eujietir S . Golliti er ul

56 l7

r

ACCURACY

SPEED/ACCURACY

SPEED

51

111. The Second Assumption: Similar Outcomes Imply Similar Routes The second assumption. that iiianife4tly similar outcomes develop via identical routes, is, like the first, evident i n theoretical and treatment models that hold that a given organismic state exemplifies optimal qualities for an assigned developmental stage. Just as the first iissumption involves the neglect of contextual considerations, the second assumption involves neglect of the processes by which designated outcomes appear. The single-minded focus on the observed status o f the individual, the fixation on performance or outcome, obscures the transactions that have mediated the emergence of the state. The result is to ignore the fact that a performance, symptomatic manifestation, attitude, or pattern of behavior may come about in a variety of ways in diverse contexts. A clear connection exists between the first and second assumptions. Not surprisingly, the examples employed could be used to illustrate either assumption, for the two assumptions are simply reflections of different aspects of the same nonevolutionary. nondevelopmental way of thinking. Thus, if we deny the first assumption, we ought also cleriy the second. For to say that we cannot give an intelligible account of either organism o r environment in isolation is to say that the significance of any capacity o r actualization is unintelligible apart from the process within which the capacity comes to actualization. The same capacity can manifest quite different sy niptonis or performances through different processes of actualization; in like nianner, the same performances or symptoms nmy have different significances precisely insofar as they are seen as the actualization of different potentialities. But to make this assertion is to deny the second assumption. Concepts of equifinality and niultifinality illustrate this point (Silvern. 1984; Wilden. 1980). Although the fornicr term suggests that the same end can be attained by various means, the latter indicates that the same means can lead to different ends. A good illustratioii is provided by the supposed syndrome o f “hyperactivity,” an ostensibly itlcntical outcome that may reflect a variety of etiological factors (equifinality). Yet thc presence of the same etiological factors clearly does not necessarily lead to manifestation of the syndrome (multifinality). Ignoring these possibilities leads to a systematic conflation of process and outcome. Although the complex of symptoms that is encompassed by the term “hyperactivity” may arise from multiple sources, the “syndrome” is frequently treated as if it were a unitary phenomenon calling for the same clinical strategies regardless of causal agency. Yet treatment plans predicated on one hypothesized route to symptomatic expression may well fail if they are applied to another (Gollin & Stahl, 1985). In this regard, consider the el‘fect of designating central nervous system damage (so-called minimal brain clysfirnc,tion) as the cause of hyperactive behav-

ior. This designation occurs with great frequency and is often accompanied by the prescription of stimulant drugs, or assignment to a regimen of behavioral management. This prescription is given in spite of the fact that the various behaviors that are regarded as constituting the syndrome of hyperactivity may reflect a wide array of causal agents for which drug treatment or behavior modification procedures are not only irrelevant, but may serve to obscure the actual causal conditions. Thus, the problem may lie in the family or in the classroom rather than in the child. Some adjustment of family or educational setting for that child might be more ameliorative than dosing the “sick” nervous system, or trying to get the behavior under instrumental control. The druginduced changes or the managed modifications of behavior may indeed render the problem impervious to correction. The likelihood of successful intervention will clearly be increased by an adequate understanding of the diverse processes that can lead to the outcome to be controlled (see McNew, 1984, for a discussion of the difficulty of attributing hyperactivity or learning disorders to neurological or any other factors; on research design, see Baxley & Leblanc, 1976). The hyperactivity example makes clear the impossibility of separating the understanding of factors that are responsible for behaviors from the decisions on how to intervene in order to modify them. That a behavior is the outcome of a process involving brain damage, rather than of a process of mismatch between the developmental status of the child and the demands of the classroom, is obviously significant for the future of the child and for any treatment of the child. This is a familiar and uncontroversial point. But it does illustrate an important aspect of the second assumption: the impossibility of separating outcome from process is not simply retrospective. The behavior-of whatever sort-that is an outcome of some past process can itself be considered process toward some further outcome. This fact is somewhat masked by the fact that we speak of the causal conditions of the past in verb terms denoting process, but reify the outcome as fixed and noun-like. The fact that some aspects of process or sequence are dubbed “outcome” reflects only our research or intervention focus. Behavior is not a neutral datum that is given as “outcome;” it is taken to be an outcome that has significance from some point of view. What is inevitably involved is some judgment of value-and so we come to the third assumption.

IV.

The Third Assumption: Science Is Value-Free

Very few contemporary researchers would subscribe to the notion that science is value-free, and so consensual is this stance that little thought is given to the issue. That is where the problem lies. Our examination of the issue is aimed at more than a display of examples. We will argue that the third assumption is so closely related to the first two that their denial entails its rejection. More impor-

tant, seeing the basis for this entailment will give us some clues about how to deal with those aspects of value that can now be seen as inevitable. This insight will allow us to reject the situation in which we seem faced with a choice between static norms that lie outside scientific criticism, and a mindless relativism that makes both science and criticism impossible. Our proposals for avoiding this dilemma will be expressed via a heuristic concept labelled “range of significance.” Historically, the assumption that science-or any other form of knowing-is value-free has rested ultimately on the claim that its fundamental statements can be seen as neutral and unmediatetl descriptions of the world, descriptions that reflect nothing of the point o f view o f those that make them. However, if we reject the assumption that the individual and the environment may be dealt with as separate entities, we must also re,jcct the assumption that science is value-free (or at least reject all the standard arguments on which it is based). If no aspect of the environment is intelligible i n itself. but is so only in relationship to the focus or needs of some organism (Goodman. 1984), then no statement of the scientific significance of the world will be intelligible apart from the values involved in the research commitments of the scientific investigator. In von Uexkull’s ( 1957) terms, what becomes a feature of the U r m d r does so at least partially because of the structure, focus, and developmental status of the organism. Data are taken to be data of significance only within some model or focus of attention within which they come to constitute a feature o f the Urnwelt of the knower as figure against some ground (Weiss, 1971, particularly pp. 9-26). indeed, one can describe the shift from classical qualitative science to science as experimental in terms of a rejection of‘ the second assumption (symptoms and performances are the invariant expressions of processes and functional relations) as it affects the data of immediate experience. It is central to the experimental method that, as John Dewey ( 1929) pointed out, “Sensory qualities have their cognitive status and office, not in and o f themselves in isolation, or as merely forced upon attention, but because they are the consequences o f definite and intentionally performed operations” ( p . 1 13). The sensation of blue, for example, has one significance if it is the outcome of a series of chemical operations done to litmus paper, and quite another il’ it happens to reflect the sky. This notion of the knower as active is considered at a higher level of generality in the assertions of Kuhn (1970). and of Toulmin (1971) that all knowledge is affected by particular perspectives, and that direct contact with an unaffected reality is impossible. Kuhn’s analysis o f scientific revolutions underscores the way in which models are world views: “paradigm changes . . . cause scicntists to see the world differently” (1970, p. I 1 1 ) . Toulmin supported this position when he challenged the notion that facts are “self--describing or self-characterizing” ( I 97 I , p. 29). The facts to he explained in a science, Toulniin held, must be framed in terms belonging to that science. And these terms are embedded in -

and unintelligible apart from - the evolving models that make up science at any period in history. These familiar arguments make clear that psychological theorists d o not so much capture human development in their fromulations as they view human development through their fromulations. The very nature of psychological observation is inextricably connected to the specific model employed by the observer. Values necessarily inform developmental models by virtue of the embededness of knowledge within the framework of the knower. If observations can never be free of the paradigm through which they were obtained, then the values contained in the paradigm itself will affect the range and type of data gathered, as well as the criteria in terms of which the “fit” of the theory to the data are determined. The issue is not whether model-and hence value commitmentswill be involved in all scientific investigation, but whether the choices made in constructing and testing models are responsible and self-critical. The use of any model will entail choices with regard to “preformed concepts” that embody the distinctive priorities and modes of organization that give the model its defining focus. But the unavoidable presence of these preformed concepts must be distinguished from the avoidable (in principle, at least) presence of “prejudices,” which reflect the distortions of uncritical subjectivity, and which indeed violate that “spirit of objectivity that has traditionally and correctly been thought to characterize scientific inquiry” (Toulmin, 1961, pp. 100-101). The task is to distinguish between those concepts that are necessary if focused research is to occur, and those explicitly judgmental concepts that are brought in from other areas of concern (see the distinction between “ethics of science” and “ethics of research,” Keese & Fremouw, 1984). Thus, in developmental biology and psychology we can make an important distinction between ( 1 ) concepts that define and identify “stages,” and are necessary to sort physiological or behavioral functions into intelligible patterns, and ( 2 ) concepts that are explicitly evaluative of the stages discerned, and are employed to judge them as being deviant or desirable in comparison to some ideal order. The danger of confusion between these sorts of concepts is increased by uncritical notions of “normality,” where a valued course of development appropriate to one range of conditions is taken as an ideal of development to be applied in other contexts. The difficulties involved in the transcontextual use of a preferred developmental course were discussed by Gordon (1983), who pointed to the ways in which socialization affects gender role as embedded in cultural-ethnic settings. Behaviors such as assertiveness, aggression, and independence, and their valuation, vary as a function of cultural and ethnic conditions. Because judgments about such behaviors are affected by culturally derived expectations, interpretations of normality and pathology must also be constrained by these considerations. The point is also illustrated in the assessment of attitudes about shame and guilt. These attitudes differ markedly from family to family and more sharply

across different cultural settings. Yanianioto ( 1983) reported that in Japan, toilet training is not strict; infantile expressions of sexuality and masturbation are not censured; mothers take their babies into the bath with them; and children often sleep with their parents until about the age of 10 years. Because these experiences undoubtedly affect attitudes toward sexuality, interpersonal relations, and other value and practice systems. knowledge of such culturally inspired rearing experiences and the values they entail is a required first step in understanding behavior. Such behavioral outcomes obviously should not be considered apart from the processes that give them shape and significance, and should not be interpreted to reflect ethical or health judgments derived from different cultural contexts. What is identified here a s inappropriate is not the possibility of examining one culture from the point of view o f another, but of doing so in a way that separates the individual from the context (an instance of the first assumption) or takes “the same” outcome t o have the same significance it would have if produced by way of a different process (an instance of the second assumption). Simply emphasizing the dangers of transferring norms from one context to another is not, however, sufficient. The reason is that this way of putting things still seems to leave open the seductive possibility that, as scientists, we can suspend or postpone these judgments and limit inquiry to a “value-free” understanding of biology and behavior. Instead of bringing in inappropriate norms, we will bring in none at all. But if we deny that organism and environment can be given significance in isolation from one another, and further insist that understanding always involves perspective. then we have effectively excluded the possibility of “value-free” or “value-neutral” inquiry. For the very categories that are used to order data-to take the ostensibly given as significant-and to classify phenomena as meaningful, reflect an inevitable epistemological evaluation. To cite Dewey once again: For in every scientific undertaking thcrc is passcd a constant succession of e\timate\: such as ’It is worth treating these lacts a s data or evidence: it is advisable to try t h i h experiment; to make this observarion. to entertain such and such a hypothesis; to perform this calculation,‘ etc. ( 192U. pp 261 202)

The norms of inquiry constitute, for any discipline at any particular time, an hypothesis about the outcome o f a proposed course of action. Theorists who ignore the hypothetical nature of norms of inquiry and take their norms of inquiry simply as given, are likely to underestimate the impact of subjective mediation on data collection and analysis, and confuse statistical norms with ethical and health norms. For example, dramatically different kinds of aggressive behavior (Chagnon, 1968). and even radical deviations from apparently fundamental biometabolic functions (Gajdusek, 1970), are observable in some non-Western societies. These dramatic variations become comprehensible if the experiential histories. cultural contexts. and general ecological conditions are understood (Collin, 1984a). The question of whether the particular behav-

ioral or biochemical function is normal or abnormal, deviant or typical, frequent or rare, must be asked within the framework of an appropriate and specified comparative domain. Is it intracultural or intercultural, intraspecific or interspecific‘? Are the decisions motivated by social, political, economic, medical, or scientific considerations (Collin, I984b)?

V.

“Range of Significance” or “Normality”?

At the beginning of this essay, we listed six different senses of “normality.” We have subsequently tried to show some of the confusions that result when the concept of normality is not clarified. Each of the senses of normality is, of course, perfectly legitimate in some specific context and under some specific set of assumptions and limitations. Unfortunately, however, the term “normal” does not (normally) trigger the requisite questions about context and limitations; quite the opposite is the case. Using one term to specify so many different ideas is bound to generate confusion. Therefore, we suggest replacing the concepts of normality with that of range of significcince. Range of significance is employed as a heuristic device. As such it is analogous in methodological value to the orthogenetic principle propounded by Werner ( 1957). Significance refers to those meaningful, distinctive, and important perspective-derived macroproperties of a transaction whose components consist of the properties of an organism and of the resources and constraints afforded by a niche. Niche resources are interdefined with organismic properties. The components consist primarily of those plastic functions of the organism that enable it to maintain itself as a subsystem in the face of perturbations, and those features of the niche that constitute either challenges or resources relative to the organism. These organism and niche properties function as components of a larger life system, an ecosystem. Physiology and behavior are durable niacroproperties of the configural patterns that characterize the living system. The definition of significance is explicable in two steps: first. by indicating how it is related to our earlier discussion of the three rejected assumptions; second, by sketching some of the ways in which the definition would contribute to the interpretation and guidance of research. The rejection of the assumption that organism and environment are separately definable entities is essentially equivalent to the idea that physiology and behavior are macroproperties that characterize commerce between organism and environment. No range of organismic functions or range o f resources or deficits can be considered normal or abnormal independently of one another. We cannot talk about the “good enough mother” apart from some changing range of children’s needs, or about “task difficulty” apart from the organism’s capacities and the relevance of the task, or about “normal” body chemistry apart from the spec-

trum of demands that the body must meet in some resource-rich or resourcewanting ecological niche. In each instance. organism and environment are constituents in a configuration that i s s d i w t ,from some observational focus that specifies the functional integrity 01‘ an operating system. The definition of significance in terms of a transaction between organism and environment, where both are seen as aspects of a process, is another way of stating the principle that process and outcome must be taken together as constituting a unit of significance. Neither must be abstracted from the otherexcept for limited and self-conscious research purposes-or be considered as a self-contained entity. Because ;in outcome is simply a segment of process on which we focus, we must be aware that. from another focus, each outcome is itself a process toward some further evcntuality . A recognition of the third methodological point, that science is not value-free, is picked up in the definition of significance through an insistence that the macroproperties of the configuration are salient from the point of view of some research interest or some presumed intention to intervene. These properties are not salient in and of themselves; their salience is not a neutral datum, but a property that emerges in the transaction between the environment and the selective focus given by research o r intervention. Only when understood in this way can the resulting identity and durability of the functioning system be kept in perspective rather than reified into a static ideal or norm. The definition of significance is conditioned by the notion of “constraint.” Constraints include: ( 1 ) those i n q m e d by biology and developmental history; (2) those that inhere in resource availability; and (3) those that derive from developmental ordering principles (Alberch, 1983; Lindenmayer, 1982). The ordering principles govern the transactive character of organism-niche relationships, in that they express physicochemical laws. A major task of research is the specification of the developmental ordering rules that characterize morphogenesis and behavioral devclopment within the framework of these constraining factors. The definition of significance is also conditioned by the notion of “trade-off.” Any modification of configural arrangements in which the constituent parts are organismic properties and environmental resources entails both advantageous and disadvantageous shifts in the quality and character of biological and behavioral adjustments. Simply put, t o get something you must give something (see, as an example, the discussion below of the iiiodifications in physiological functions that are necessitated by living at very high altitudes). Within this framework, significance imposes order upon the variations in the relevant properties of both organisms and niche matrices. Significant patterns are compatible with the maintenance o f the functional integrity and coherence o f a behavioral course, a physiological activity, o r any other systems pattern taken to be significant from the perspective of some observational commitment. The

perspective does not entail crpproval or disupprovul in the “value” sense or in the sense of health or disease or other qualities of variation, but rather a judgment about the degree to which the following systems characteristics are manifested: (a) there are simultaneous interactions of complex variables; (b) there is ongoing and mutual feedback within the system; and (c) the system functions to maintain its own equilibrium. (Thoman. Acebo, & Becker. 1983. p. 65.7)

It is important to note that in systems that are developmental, perturbations in the organism-environment matrix may lead to such significant changes that the equilibrium, once reestablished, constitutes a “new” system. The decision whether to regard the change as a revised older system, or as a new system will depend on the focus of the research. The idea of a system is crucial to our argument. The construction we favor is based on Weiss’ formulation (1971). Weiss arrived at a definition of a system by first considering what constitutes a unit in biology. A unit is a composite that retains sufficient identity over time to warrant a name. It is a conservative array of measurable properties that contrast with erratically changing “background” It phenomena (p. 9). It is perceptible, detectable (measurable), and sign+mr. has two distinct general facets, one descriptive and the other evaluative. The former refers to what is there-or what we think is there-and the latter to what we confer upon it. Examples are “cells” and “developmental stages.” Not all units qualify as systems. A unit does not qualify as a system if it is a haphazard compilation of items or a rigid linkage of pieces or events (p. 13). Units are predictable from information derived from their constituent parts, but a system exhibits the opposite propeiTy- “the stute of rhe whole must be known in order to understand the coordination of the collective behavior of the parts (p. 13).” A simple behavioral test is that displacement or elimination of a subunit yields an essential disfiguration of the unit but does not affect a system-a system retains its integral configuration despite subunit displacements (pp. 13- 14). Thus, the first step is to identify the system by its special unitary property of configural integrity over time and through space despite limited perturbations of its components. As with a unit, this is the descriptive facet of what we take to be perceptible, detectable, and significant. The valuative facet emerges when the system is adjudged in terms of health, ethics, developmental status, adaptive utility, and the like. Some of the most direct, even dramatic, implications of the position we have presented are made explicit in the methodological proposals of the ethologist Chauvin (1977, pp. 47-48) who confronted the problem of understanding animal building behavior (nest building, dam building, etc .): ( I ) The rule ofthe unusual. The more unusual the situation, or the less likely it ib to be met in nature, the more bariable will be the animal‘s behavior and the more likely that its adaptation will rise above the stereotyped behavior of the species. As Lecomte said, the titmouse know.r how to build its nest. but it .scvks the solution to a repair problem

Assuming that Lecomte’s intentionalistic language can be translated into acceptable functional terms, we can view this rule as an emphatic insistence that the significance of even stereotypically “normal” behavior can be evaluated only against the range of alternative behaviors called forth (sometimes as a tradeoff) by the different demands, constraints, and opportunities afforded by the niche. Clearly, the notion of the “unusual” (like that of the “abnormal”) must not be taken merely in a statistical sense, but in terms of what constitutes a perturbation for the equilibrium o f the system. (2)The significance of’rhe p r o h l e m ‘The aniiiial must take an interest in the problem and therefore it must be significant to thc aniinal. (pp. 47-48)

In other words, the significance of any aspect of the surround will vary with the range of capacities and needs of an organism (changing over time). The rules proposed by Chauvin apply to human as well as animal behavior and have implications for the entire range of problems that are of research interest in biology and psychology. If Chauvin’s proposals are employed to guide research, then the contextual dependence of performance becomes clear. The range of functional capacities inherent in organism-environment ecosystems becomes manifest within such a methodological framework. Range, in this usage, includes estimates of system limitations and constraints. However, the estimates are always provisional because knowledge of systems possibilities is incomplete. Let us examine some further examples of the heuristic effect of using range of significance. For instance, the child who is unable to use hisiher hands manages to write by manipulating a pencil held in the teeth. This behavior may be deviant in a statistical sense, but it is certainly not abnormal in the sense of a manifestation of suitable plasticity, of utilizing a new means to accomplish a desired end, in the face of severe organic disability. It is, indeed, an exemplification of Chauvin’s rules, and of the maintenance of functional integrity of the system in the face of massive structural impairment. It fits our notion of significance-it does not carry the burdens associated with the several definitions of normality, that is, the statistical rarity of the behavior is a trivial consideration in terms of the achievement of the functional end by different means by a child with a severe nervous system disorder. The fact that the behavior is deviant in terms of the other definitions of normality recedes in significance in the face of the attainment of the functional end. Still another example is provided by a group of New Guinea highlanders, whose urinary potassium/sodium ratios are often 400 to 1000 times the “normal” Western ratio. These people are not “sick” but rather are showing a suitable metabolic response to a sodium-scarce, water-poor niche (Gajdusek, 1970). At the level of physiological functioning, different means are utilized t o achieve functional coherence and systemic integrity. The concept of significance triggers the notion of trade-off. Variations in biological or behavioral functioning that ( 1 ) deviate from authoritative standards,

(2) fall outside traditional definitions of health, ( 3 ) depart from usual standards of acceptability, (4) are statistically infrequent, or that violate ( 5 ) species typical, or (6) social and cultural typical standards are not necessarily or automatically regarded as non-normal or abnormal, but rather are described and evaluated as trade-offs in terms of systems properties that have significance from the perspective of some defined outcome. A still further instance of trade-off that fulfills the stated criteria of significance was provided by Gould (1977), who described an insect species that is capable of reproducing either sexually or asexually. In the case of sexual reproduction the insects go through a full set of larval and pupal molts and the generation of winged ovipositing imagos; in the asexual condition larvae grow within the larval mother. Gould referred to the sexual mode of reproduction as “nornial.” It occurs under crowded conditions or when the food supply is low: under those conditions the insect undergoes complete metamorphosis into winged fonns capable of sexual reproduction and of travel to less crowded places and new sources of food. When food supplies are adequate and other conditions are appropriate, asexual reproduction prevails. However, referring to these diverse forms of morphology and behavior as significant responses to differing conditions would be less confusing than referring t o them as “normal” and “abnormal.” An elaborate pattern of significant modifications that entail radical trade-offs in form and function is found among the high-altitude dwelling Quechua Indians of Peru and Ecuador. These people show a number of adaptations that are not ostensibly hamiful: larger chest circumference, greater lung capacity. increased metabolic rate commensurate with increased vcntilation rate, and apparent developmentally regulated adaptation to cold of the extremities (Baker & Little, 1976; Frisancho, 1976). Other changes that occur may seem to be damaging abnormalities, but can be so interpreted only facilely-and incorrectly. One of these modifications has to do with birth weight. Children born to the Quechua, and to other peoples dwelling at high altitudes in South America (McClung, 1969) and in the United States (Hass, 1972), exhibit considerably lower birth weights than do the babies of comparable populations living at lower altitudes. Because lower birth weights are associated with increases in neonatal and infant mortality even in alpine Peru (e.g., Mazess, 1965), this modification, if considered in isolation, would appear disadvantageous to the population. In this high-altitude context, however, the limiting factor, a constraint, for survival is hypoxia rather than child mortality from other sources. Thus, low birth weight provides an advantage: a decrease in birth weight-placental ratios provides increases in oxygen flow and other nutrients to the fetus. This arrangement yields more adequate fetal development in settings where air pressure and oxygen partial pressure are less than would be typically available elsewhere (Hoff & Abelson, 1976).

Additional substantial support tor the strategy of interpretation suggested in this paper comes from the work of Beall (1981), who compared two Peruvian groups of comparable ethnicity, one living at an altitude of 3860 m and the other at 600 m. The mean birth weights of the two groups were, respectively, 3 178 and 3401 g . Beall concluded that the optimal birth weight for survival is lower at high altitudes and that birth weight is less selective for mortality at high altitudes. Moreover. among high-altitude infants the death rate of heavy babies equaled that of very light babies (an instance of trade-off); this pattern was not found at lower altitudes, where heavy babies had a clear survival advantage. The case is further strengthened by the observation that the birth weight of infants born to high-altitude mothers who niigrated to low altitudes approximated that of sealevel infants (average, 3420 g). The other major adaptation of the Quechua that works as a c~ompcnsaring trade-off is polycythemia, an increase in total blood volume through an increase in overall erythrocite mass. The lower levels of oxygen at high altitudes requires that cellular and systemic oxygenation mechanisms must be as efficient as possible. In the Quechua, efficiency i s increased by an increase in the number of erythrocytes available for oxygen transport. However, the retention of the functional integrity of the system is not without cost. It entails a number of trade-offs. Significant health hazards accompany polycythemia: increased blood viscosity and hence work load on the heart, venous inflammation, pulmonary edema, and chronic “mountain sickness” (Ganuto, 1976). Here, as in the other examples presented. the notion o f range of significance, with its emphasis on process-in-context, makes the fact of trade-off apparent and intelligible within a systems framework. This view contrasts with most uses of “normality,” which are static and noncontextual. As such they either miss tradeoff aspects by accepting the statistically, medically, or culturally expectable as unproblematically normal, or focus only upon the disadvantageous aspects of trade-off by contrasting then1 to some idealized norm such as “health.” They fail to treat each behavior as both outcome of process and material for further process, where process involves a n oscillatory trade-off dynamic continually redefined in the open-system transaction between organism and environment. This point is underscored in Toulmin‘s ( 1 976) argument that Darwinian understanding requires that we recognire that the condition of an organism in any reallife ecological niche “represents. not a tiorm, but a mean” (p. 21 1). For this reason the characteristics of an organismic system can vary substantially without upsetting “adaptation” or “viability;“ thus, a runge is exhibited within which different characteristics, or combinations of characteristics, are sigriifific~crnt adjustments, and trade-offs are a property of a constrained adjusting system. Thus, the assertion that a physiological activity or a behavior is significant does not entail a claim of norniality in a health sense, nor does it entail an evaluation that the significant activity pattern is acceptable in an ethical sense.

The significance of systems and the trade-offs that are part of it may inspire vigorous efforts to introduce treatment in a therapeutic sense, or censure, or attempts at modification in an ethical, moral, or legal sense. Those actions would be in response to the increased intelligibility of process-context relations and not a consequence of the automatic activation of routine responses to absolute normative standards.

VI.

Conclusion

Central to our analysis of all these examples is the insistence that concepts of normality should be calibrated to the ecosysternic conditions that constitute organism-environment states. The attribute of normality is never a categorical statement in which a fact is simply noted, but is always a theoretically derived hypothesis that directs examination of salient organism-environment transactions that characterize biobehavioral development. In this way we acknowledge that norms are value derived and not neutral transcontextual absolutes. As Baltes (1987) has indicated in a discussion of the metatheoretic status of life-span studies: Indeed, none of the individual propositions taken separately is new, which is perhaps one reason why some commentators have argued that life-span work has little new to offer. Their significance consists instead in the whole complex of perspectives considered as a metatheoretical world view and applied with some degree of radicalism to the study of development. (p. 7)

In a parallel sense, our point lies precisely in the fact that although, taken individually, our three methodological denials are widely accepted, much research and theory still appear to reflect, if only implicitly, acceptance of the assumptions we reject. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The preparation of this paper was supported in part by Grant No. lROl AG05952-OI from the National Institute on Aging to the first author.

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Silvern, L. E. (1984). Emotional-heliaviiir~ldi\oider\: A failure of systems function\. In E. S Gollin (Ed.). Muybrmarions o f dc~ve/o[irrimI. flro/o,urw/ urid p.sWho/ogicci/ .sour-('i'.\ urrd conseqlrence.\ (pp 95-152). New York: Academic I'rcss Thoman, E. B . . Acebo. C . , & Beckei. I' 'I' ( I U X ? ) . Infant crying and \tability in the mother-infant relationship: A systems analysis ( ' l i r l d Uoi.e/opmrnt. 54, 653-659. Toulmin, S. (1961 ) . Foresixlit urid rir&r s/oirti/irtg. New York: Harper & Rov. Toulmin. S. (1971). The concept of "\tiipcs" i n psychological development. In T . Mischel (Ed.). Cognrtiw dewloiiment ~ r ? depicttwrrilryi (pp. 25-60), New York: Academic Press. Toulniin, S. (1976). Ethics and ' ~ s o c i i i l lunctioning". The organic theory reconsidered. In 14. T Englehardt. Jr. & D. Callahan (Ed\ ) , S c ~ i c v r r ~ cvliic..s. ,, ur7d medicinr: V O / . I . 7lir foiirtdiitiori of ethics arid its rr/u/ron.s/iip t o , s c i t v r ( ' c ( p p . Ii)5-150). Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center. Toulmin. S . (1981). Epistemology ;itid tlcveliipnieiilal psychology. In E. s. Gollin (Ed.). f)ei?/opmrritd plusticitv: Behir\~ioru/ uirol / ) i c i / i i , y r ( u! ~ \ [ i i ' ~ t .of s i ~ ~ r i i t t i ~in~ reiri~c~lopinrnr i.~ (pp. 253 267). New York: Academic Pres\ von Uexkull. J. ( 1926). T l i c ~ o r c ~ t /ii~i od/ o K \ . Ncw York: Harcourt. Brace. von Uexkull. J (1957) A stroll through the v.,orld\ of animals and men. A picture book of invisible worlds. I n C. H. Schiller (Ed ) , / r t \ t r r i ( , t i i (, hrhnvior (pp. 5 - 8 0 ) , New York: International Universities Press. Warner. R . (1983) Recovery from \chi/ophrenia in the third world. P~whrcitr\. 46. 197-212. W e i o . P. (1971). The basic concept of hierarchic systems In P. A. Weiss (Ed.). H i e r u i - d i i c t r l l ~ orxurrixvi .sp.strm.\- 1r1 r h ~ ~ o ruyr d / i ~ ( ~ i c .( tp,p 1-33). New York: Hafner Werner. H ( 1937). Process and achievcnienl. A hahic problem of education and developmental psychology. H u r w r - d Educutioriu/ K e t ~ t c w, 7 , 353-368. Werner. H. (1957). The concept of developiiient froni ii comparative and orpanimiic point of \lev. I n . D. B Harris (Ed.). Ttir corrt't'pt I J / ( / ~ i , o , l ( i / ) r r i ( , r i t :At1 r.s.\ue iii the tticciv o# hiimun h d i ~ r i ( i r (pp. 125- 148). Minneapolis. Univcr\ity of Minnesota Press. Wilden. A . ( 1980). S\steni m d w u c trtr-e I.ondi)n: Tavistock Winnicott. D. W . ( 1953).Transitional ohlccls and tran\itional phenomena. /ritc~rrrurionu/Jo~rrrrulof P .s~c.tio-Anci/p,sr.s, 34, 89-97. Yaiiiamoto. J. (1983).Emotional growth oi Jap"iie~e-Americanchildren. In <;. J . Powell ( E d . ) , The pay~.ho.socrul clei~eloprne~~t o/ rrtrrroiriry qr(iIip c+ri/dren (pp. 167- 178). Nev. Yorh: BrunneriMazel.

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COGNlTlVE PSYCHOLOGY: MENTALISTIC OK BEHAVIORISTIC‘?

I. INTRODUCTION 11. STRUCTCJRAL PSYCHOLOGY Ill. METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM

1V. COGNITIVE PSYCHOI.OGY A . THE SCOPE B THE METHODOLOGY C. THE MODELS V

THE AGE OF LEARNING THLiOHlES

VI. SUMMARY

REFERENCES

1.

Introduction

Almost any discussion of modern cognitive psychology seems to lead to controversy of one sort or another. On the one hand, some writers contrast cognitive psychology with behavioristic psychology. In such contexts, cognitive psychology is often described as ;I revolution against behaviorism. An example of this view can be found in il paper by White (1976). Bower (197.5. p. 28) contrasted the “behaviorist’s insistence upon colorless, purposeless movements” with the cognitive psychologist’s recognition of “the intentional actions of a person” in executing “ a p h i which has a particular goal.” Estes (197.5. p. 4ff) contrasted the “behavioral and cognitive approaches,” and seemed to equate the behavioral approach with methodological behaviorism. Among those

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Charley C Sprkrr

who hold this view are a few who have hinted that 19th century structural psychology is at last winning out over behaviorism. On the other hand, other writers contrast cognitive psychology with associationistic stimulus-response (S-R) or stimulus-stimulus (S-S) psychology. (For a discussion of S-S and S-R psychology, see Spence, 1951). Ellis (1978, p. 6) contrasted nonassociationistic cognitive psychology with the associationistic S-S approach, and appeared to see the former as a natural extension of the latter. In a similar vein, Klatzky (1980, p. 1) contrasted “cojinitivrps?,chology and the information-processing appmuch” with the “older, and still viable” approach represented by “stimulus-rc.spotzse (S-R) t h e o n or associutionism. The Kendlers were thus justified in complaining that the “uncritical use of the term behaviorism has done much to confuse discussions of methodological issues in contemporary psychology” (Kendler & Kendler, 1975, p. 192). A methodological analysis of modern cognitive psychology seems warranted. The purpose of the present paper is to present an analysis of the philosophical issues associated with cognitive psychology. I begin with a review of structural psychology, including a brief consideration of its methods and goals. Next, I review the tenets of methodological behaviorism. After a brief synopsis of what cognitive psychology entails, I then analyze the methods, theories, and concepts of cognitive psychology to determine whether they conform with the behavioristic tenets. Finally, 1 consider what, if anything, cognitive psychology is a revolt against. “

11. Structural Psychology Modern psychologists have trouble understanding what the 19th century introspectionistic psychologists were trying to do. There are two main reasons for this difficulty. First, we do not practice introspection professionally, at least not with an analytic set. Second, and more importantly, the goals of the structural psychologists were quite different from those of modern psychologists. They were not concerned with the prediction of future thought or future behavior. They were looking for cross-sectional laws-laws that specify which mental elements go with which mental phenomena. A brief digression on the difference between cross-sectional and process laws is in order. (For a discussion of scientific lawfulness, see Spiker, 1986.) A cross-sectional law does not attribute causal status to any one of the variables. The laws of geometry and trigonometry are cross-sectional laws. We do not think of the size of an angle as being the caiisr of the length of the opposite side, any more than the other way around. Moreover, time as a variable does not occur in cross-sectional laws, because the relations expressed among the variables hold momentarily. A causal law, also known as a process law, describes

changes in a system over time. One of the simplest examples of a process law is the law of the free fall of a body near the surface of the earth. The values of the variables in a process law must be known in order to predict future states of the system. We generally think of those variables as causes of the changes in the system. Moreover, a process law cannot be fully stated without time, however crudely expressed, as one of the relevant variables; that is, relative (not absolute) time makes a difference. With more time, the system travels farther, or becomes cooler, or expands more, etc. I will now try to provide the context necessary for an understanding of classical psychology by describing a hypothetical “experiment.” For example, a psychologist of the Wundtian stripe seats himself or herself before a well-lighted laboratory table and places a large, red apple on the table. The psychologist’s description of the physical arrangement of the experiment is quite the same as that of a modern psychologist. What trtlnspires in the experiment next, however, is entirely foreign to modem laboratories. The psychologist assumes an analytic introspective set and begins t o observe the contents of his or her mind. The psychologist might record: “There is a redness, a roundness, a smoothness, a fresh odor percept, and a faint positive affect.” The descriptive words in the report do not refer to the red, round. smooth properties of the physical apple, but to the properties of the percept the observer is experiencing. The structural psychologists were trained observers; they had been trained in the laboratories of their mentors, who were themselves trained observers. These psychologists observed only their own respective minds and their contents. (Often the professors served as experimenters and their graduate students served as observers. Nevertheless, the professors did not observe the contents of their students’ minds.) What these psychologists hoped to find were cross-sectional laws that would specify what is connected t o what. The idea was that any time a complex mental phenomenon, say a percept. is experienced, it will have coniponents of this type and that type. and these components will have certain attributes. They hoped t o be able to analyze the percept into elementary components that could not be further analyzed. The ultimate goal was to be able to infer the original percept unambiguously, with the aid of the cross-sectional laws, from a description of the percept i n terms of the elementary components alone. Moreover, the classical psychologists were interested in cross-sectional laws of only “normal” minds. Few modern psychologists would find themselves greatly interested in the goals of the 19th century psychologists. Rather, we are interested in the behavior, both mental and physical, of other people. But can we use their methodology? The answer is negative because the introspective methodology of the classical psychologists cannot be used in the study of other persons; it cannot be utilized by untrained persons. Classical psychologists, as scientific observers, would no sooner have permitted an undergraduate from an introductory class to

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collect data by introspective observation than modern investigators of animal learning would permit such an untrained person to collect data in their laboratories. It will be necessary to return to this point again. A common belief among modern psychologists is that introspectionistic psychology was unscientific. Yet methodologists (e.g., Addis, 1982; Bergmann. 1952) have argued that the methodology was sound. Logically, structural psychology might have succeeded; empirically it failed. An important point is that there was no a priori reason why it did not succeed. It failed because psychologists, especially those from different schools, could not agree on what kinds of mental elements were there. Some argued that the mind contains no relational components, or at least that only certain kinds of relations were there, and that all other relations could be analyzed into nonrelational components. Others insisted that none of the relations were analyzable. The most favorable interpretation of structural psychology possible was offered by Titchener (1898), who was nevertheless forced to acknowledge the major disagreements among structuralists. He believed, however, that further research and observation would resolve these disagreements. The reasons for the failure of structural psychology can be seen more clearly in the following imaginary story. An archeologist. working in Africa, has reason to believe that a cave with a very small opening contains artifacts of an important nature. Not wishing to wait for equipment that could be used to enlarge the opening, the archeologist hires two pygmies from a local community. These two observers are sent into the cave at different times to make independent obserqations and reports. Now if both observers independently make the same report, the archeologist can be reasonably confident of the correctness of their account. The probability of their giving the same report independently without actually having observed the same things would be quite low. But if one of them reports, for example, observing a stone hand-ax and the other reports observing a stone hammer, the archeologist has a problem. The resolution of this problem requires an analysis of the situation. There are three possibilities. (a) The two observers may have observed the same things but simply used different words in describing what they saw. (b) One or both of the observers may have been a careless observer, may have forgotten what was seen, may be lying, or may have some other, perhaps sensory, defect. (c) The two observers went to different parts o f the cave and therefore reported different things because they observed different things. The archaeologist can determine whether (a) is the case by independently presenting the observers with an ax and a hammer and asking them to name them. The archeologist may be able to show that (b) is the case by testing the observational accuracy of the observers under public conditions. The elimination of both (a) and (b) leaves (c) as the basis of the conflicting reports. The test options available to the archeologist were not available to the intro-

spectionists. The mental contents o f the introspectors could not be laid out publicly as were the ax and hammer in order to determine whether words were being used differently. Although psychologists had some recognition that different writers used words somewhat differently. the failure to agree on what was there was not generally attributed to semantic problems. Moreover. the structuralists’ commitment to the idea of a normal mind does not appear to have permitted serious consideration of the possibility that the mental contents of different observers were different, particularly under carefully controlled physical conditions. That left only the potentially polemical conclusion that differences existed in the adequacy o f training and the competence of observers: “If you do not find what I find, you are a sloppy, incompetent observer.” The literature of the day indicates that accusations abounded concerning improper training and incompetent observation. The profundity of the difficulty they faced can be thoroughly understood only if some attention is given to an epistemological point. The point is that not every word in a language can be defincd; cvery language must have some undefined terms. The truth of this assertion is obvious from a recognition that no words exist to define the first word. Moreovcr, some words-those that refer to very simple properties and relations o f physical objects and events-defy definition; one can know their meanings only by becoming acquainted with their referents (e.g., colors, tastes, sounds, etc.). Philosophers of science usually refer t o such words as primitive predicates, the undefined words of the language. Among the primitive terms of the structuralists wcre some words that referred to mental data. For the reasons given above, psychologists could not lay out publicly the referents of these terms and make ccrtain that the referents of these words were the same for everyone, thereby making certain that the primitive terms were being used in the same way by everyone. If the structuralists had agreed o n what was there, they might very well have succeeded in their mission. Because they did not agree, and because they could not isolate the reason for their disagreements, they failed for empirical reasons.

111. Methodological Behaviorism In this section, I will provide ;I description of the main tenets of methodological behaviorism. Gustav Bergmann ( 19.56)conducted an extremely helpful and insightful analysis of John B . Watson’s behaviorism, and I follow his account quite closely. Watson surveyed the predicament of his contemporary psychology, noting the failure to agree, and correctly diagnosed the difficulty. The basic problem, as he saw it, was that the disagreements could not be unequivocally attributed to a single cause. The language of structural psychology and, for that matter, of

functional psychology as well, contained some basic terms that had referents that were not publicly observable. The confounding of the three possible problems described i n the preceding section created an insurmountable difficulty. Watson’s solution, though simple, was drastic. It amounted to a specification of a new philosophy of psychology together with a thorough-going redefinition of the goals of scientific psychology. As Bergmann noted, the solution had two pillars. (a) Eliminate all primitive terms that refer to mental phenomena and use only the physicalistic primitive terms that the natural sciences employ (“use consciousness in the same way that other natural scientists employ it.”) This pillar provided most of the new philosophy of psychology. (b) Stop trying to find cross-sectional laws of the mind. Instead, begin trying to find process laws that will permit the prediction of future behavior of individuals, both human and infrahuman. This pillar redefined the goals of psychology. although it had already been proposed by the functionalists before Watson took it up. Together, the two pillars constitute what Bergmann referred to as methodological behaviorism. The ramifications of Watson’s proposal were extensive. For one thing, the field of psychology was no longer to be restricted to humans and their minds. The study of animal behavior would now be legitimate in its own right and not merely legitimized by the light it might throw on the human mind. Moreover, Watson’s argument for the program included statements of his belief that the goals were possible. That is, his argument that consciousness can be ignored was an argument that prediction of human behavior can be accomplished by consideration of environmental, behavioral, and physiological variables alone. Such a claim sounds extravagant; yet, as Bergmann (1954) noted, “everything we know about other minds we know, in fact, from watching the bodies which, as one says, they inhabit” (p. 140). The position that minds do not interact with bodies to determine behavior and, therefore, mental variables can be ignored in predicting behavior, requires an exceptionally difficult philosophical argument that Watson was unable to provide. His attempts to provide the argument have been variously interpreted as a denial of the efficacy of mind, or even as a denial of the existence of mind. The argument that Bergniann ( 1956) provided more than 40 years later has been called psychophysiological parallelism. This ingenious attempt to provide a plausible solution to the mind-body problem has been critically discussed and analyzed, favorably by Addis ( 1982) and unfavorably by Natsoulas (1984). Although a detailed treatment of it is beyond the scope of the present work, it involves the suggestion that mental phenomena enter into cross-sectional laws with physiological (brain) states in such a way that both mental variables and physiological variables are connected with behavior by means of process laws. Thus, either physiological variables or the corresponding mental phenomena can be used to predict behavior. at least in some instances. The strength of this position is that it is consistent with the goals of a scientific psychology and with

the commonsensical perception that the mind is efficacious in controlling behavior. We should note here that Watson’s concern with denying the existence of interacting minds led him to an extreme bias against mentalistic-sounding terminology. He wished to have all such terms banished from the psychological vocabulary. It was Tolman, with a series of papers beginning in 1922, who first showed that mentalistic-sounding terms could be introduced into the psychological language with careful definitions formulated in terms of physicalistic primitive predicates. Moreover, Watson’s concern with the banishment of mentalisticsounding terminology undoubtedly led him also to a preference for peripherally located mechanisms and processes rather than centrally located ones. Neither of these idiosyncratic preferences, however. is dictated by the methodological behaviorism described earlier. Cognitive psychologists often use thc word“behavioristic” to refer to those who employ operant conditioning procedures. By this usage, the “behaviorists” are B. F. Skinner and those who use his operant conditioning techniques. This usage appears to be an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent: concluding A when given B and ! / ’ A thcn B . Skinner is certainly an adherent of methodological behaviorism, as described herein, and so, presumably, are all of those who use his techniques. I t does not follow, however, that all methodological behaviorists are Skinnerians. One may use words as one wishes, of course, but this usage is particularly confusing for a discussion such as the present one. Although Watson wrote extensively about his social philosophy, and even delved into metaphysics, it was only his methodological behaviorism that was nearly unanimously accepted by American psychologists, a fact which Bergmann described with the felicitous statement that methodological behaviorism had “conquered itself to death” (1956. p. 270).

IV.

Cognitive Psychology

No one has yet captured in a simple description the scope of cognitive psychology, not even the cognitive psychologists themselves. To characterize it, we would have to consider its substance (from sensory stores through perception and memory, to language and problem solving.) We would have to deal with its methods (from stimulus presentation through response selection and reaction time measurement to quality of problem-solution and linguistic performances). Finally, we would have to considcr its theoretical predilections (from descrip-

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tions of hypothetical processes through crude information flow diagrams to sophisticated mathematical models of hypothesized processes.) For present purposes, a carefully circumscribed topic is not required. Anyone who has read first-hand research reports in the experimental journals of the 194Os, 19SOs, or even in the early 1960s, knows that things were different then. A word such as “expectation,” as in “sign-gestalt-expectation,” was used gingerly. The “fractional anticipatory goal response” of the Hull-Spence theory was an expectation that was developed in the context of a classical conditioning situation, but it was rarely identified as an expectation. The conceptual scope of cognitive psychology that Estes (1975) provided for his series of edited volumes on cognitive psychology is entirely adequate for the present purposes: the activities involved in storing, retrieving, and using information. Even the more or less intuitive conception that each of us has about the scope of cognitive psychology will suffice for the job at hand, which is to determine whether mainstream cognitive psychology adheres to the two major tenets of methodological behaviorism. B . THE METHODOLOGY

If cognitive psychology were a reversion to classical 19th century psychology, then cognitive psychologists would be routinely examining their consciousness in order to determine its structure or its function. If it were an attempt to return to the 19th century methodology, maintaining the 20th century interest in “the other fellow,” psychologists would be routinely asking their subjects to introspect and to report as data the ongoings of their mental events and processes. Historically, the latter has been called phenomenology or phenomenological psychology. Mainstream cognitive psychologists follow neither of these practices routinely. Probably virtually all psychologists have used introspection in their scientific activities. What distinguished the behaviorists from their predecessors is that the behaviorists did not use the results of their introspection as data. Rather, they used introspection, if at all, as a source of hypotheses to be tested by observing the environments and behavior of others. As will be seen, at least some selfstyled cognitive theorists use their introspective results, as well as those o f others, as sources for theoretical models. Estes (197.5, p. 5 ) commented that cognitive psychologists have been released from inhibitions in using introspective reports from subjects in experimental situations. He then speculated about the reasons for this disinhibition, and suggested that the reasons include “new developments in methodology that help with the problem of verifiability.” A few illustrations of these techniques does much to answer the question of whether mainstream cognitive psychology is still operating in accord with the behavioristic tenets.

The basic character of these tccliniques can be illustrated in the context of a psychophysical experiment involving the method of constant stimuli to determine an absolute threshold f o r an individual. The classical procedure was to instruct the observer to report the prewnce or absence of, say. a sensation of sound in the sensorium on each presentation of a tone that varied in intensity from trial to trial. Because thc observer was aware that a stimulus was actually presented on each trial, classical observers had to beware of the “stimulus error,” which refers to the use of itiformation about the conditions of stimulus presentation in order to draw conclusions about the presence or absence of the sensation. Although classical observers were apparently successful in avoiding the stimulus error. naive observer4 have been found to be sub-ject to such errors. In fact, the absolute thresholds o f naive observers have been found to be manipulable, either up or down, by instri.ictions or by rewards and punishments. An easy way to control for this “response bias” is to use blank or “catch” trials. On a certain proportion ot‘ the trials. no tone at all is presented. The proportion of times that the obscrver reports having had a tone sensation on the blank trials is used as an indication of the strength of the observer’s response bias. This proportion is used to correct the observer’s reports in much the same way that instructors correct for guessing on multiple-choice and true-falsc tests. The use of blank trials i n testing experienced, trained obscrvers would have been insulting to them, although cagey mentors might well have used such techniques to check the progress o f a graduate student in training. It is a technique that clearly indicates that the experimenter does not accept the observer’s report as data and represents the behaviorist’s rejection of the hypothesis that there is a one-to-one correspondcnce between subjects’ reports and the events they purportedly describe. On the contrary, the report must be processed by the experimenter, particularly when conditions exist that might bias the observer’s report. Yet, the introspective task could scarcely be simpler: I s a tone sensation therc in the sensorium’?Neverthele the evidence is unmistakable that untrained observers cannot always perform wccessfully on this simple task. In one of the procedures used b y Shepard and his colleagues (e.g.,Shepard & Metzler. 1981) to measure the tiiiie required to rotate a mental image, a “catch” procedure is also utilized. On each presentation, the subject receives a letter and is required to press one button if the letter is in its normal orientation and to press a different button if it is a mirror image o f the normal orientation. The letters are then presented in both orientations, although many are rotated up to 180 degrees from their upright position. Presuniably . the subject must covertly perform a mental rotation of an image i n order to be able to respond correctly. I n the Shepard and Metzlcr experiment c i ~ e dabove, the purpose was to determine the rotation time as a function of the angular rotation of the stimuli presented. Classical psychologists would havc \imply presented a single figure, asked their observers to rotate it into the upright position, and instructed them to report,

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perhaps by pressing a single button, when the image rotation was completed. The experimenter would have recorded the time between the stimulus presentation and the report of completion of rotation. That this simpler procedure was not used by Shepard and his associates indicates that these experimenters did not use classical procedures and did not consider their subjects to be reliable. trained observers. In contrast to the Shepard technique just described, Paivio (1965) asked subjects to indicate when they had conjured up an image for a given word. The speed with which they reported that an image had been produced was used to define an imagery measure for each word presented. Paivio made no attempt to apply an objective check as to whether the subject had produced an image. The relations found between the imagery measure and other variables, however, were taken as evidence for the validity of the method. For example, the imagery measure of a word was found to be highly correlated with the rated degree of concreteness or abstractness of the word. Moreover, words with high imagery were found to be learned more rapidly than those with low imagery. Cognitive psychologists sometimes refer to this kind of check on their procedures, particularly with respect to phenomenological reports, as “validation checks” or validation through converging operations. That is, the argument is that the phenomenological reports are probably valid because they relate to other variables in ways that the experimenter expects them to. Another familiar method is that of Sternberg (1966) in his research on memory scanning. On any given trial, the subject is presented a list of words, followed by the presentation of a single word that may or may not have been on the list presented. The subject is asked to signal whether that word was on the original list, and the experimenter measures the time between presentation of the single word and the subject’s response. Classical psychologists would more likely have presented only words that were on the original list and would have asked their observers to press a single button when they had verified that the word was on the list. Sternberg’s use of the more complex procedure reflects his felt need for an objective check on the subject’s ability to perform satisfactorily on this task. The dichotic listening and shadowing task, studied intensively by Cherry (1953), also contains a check on the validity of the phenomenological report by the subject. Typically, thxs task is used in the study of attention. Different messages are channeled into the two ears. The subject is required to repeat word for word the message presented in one of the ears while the experimenter manipulates variables having to do with the message in the unattended ear. Any failure of the subjects to attend the ear they were instructed to attend manifests itself immediately in a disruption of the shadowing. Provided such disruption has not occurred, the experimenter concludes that any information obtained from the unattended ear did not require attention. This same technique has also been used to study echoic memory. Requiring overt shadowing is an indication that the

experimenters wish to check on whether the subject is following instructions to attend the designated channel. Classical psychologists would either have introspected to determine what information can be obtained through the unattended ear or else they would have required a trained observer (e.g., a graduate student) to do so. There are other techniques that have commonly been employed by investigators in cognitive psychology that also deny a classical orientation. Research by Posner on attention (e.g., Posner & Mitchell, 1967) involves techniques similar to those of Sternberg. Kosslyn's (e.g., Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978) methods of conducting research on mental maps resemble those of Paivio. The work of Sperling ( 1960), considered by many to represent cognitive psychology's finest hour, resulted in evidence for thc iconic store, an entity that defies detection by the most careful introspective study. There remains a question as to the type of laws that cognitive psychologists seek. Are they looking for the cross-sectional laws of the classical psychologists or the process laws of methodological behaviorism? The answer to this question is unambiguous. Cognitive psychologists. in the main, are attempting to predict the behavior of their subjects. They try t o formulate laws that will permit prediction of what the subjects will remember, what problems they will solve and how they will solve them, how they will perceive various situations presented to them, and so forth. Such predictions cannot be made with cross-sectional laws describing how various mental elements combine to produce complex mental phenomena; they require process laws, o r at the very least, the beginnings of process laws. Like other psychologists, cognitive psychologists usually have to settle for statistical laws at the present time. (A statistical law is one that does not assert that a phenomenon always occurs but rather gives a probability that the phenomenon will occur; see Spiker. 1986, pp. 39-41. Some developmentally oriented cognitive psychologists seek to predict the future behavior of their subjects by means of developmental laws, the sort of law that permits the prediction of the growth of an oak tree given a planted acorn; see Bergmann, 1957, pp. 118-1 19.) These considerations force us to the conclusion that cognitive psychologists do not use introspectionistic methods and do not ask their subjects to do so. Thus, cognitive psychology cannot be characterized in any sense as a return to 19th century structural or functional psychology. c'

THE MODELS

Although cognitive psychologists do not appear to use classical methods of psychological research, certain terms that occur in standard texts in cognitive psychology also occur in classical psychological writings: attention, consciousness, image, primary memory, secondary memory, and many other words

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that can be found in the writings of, say, William James. Moreover, commonly appearing words such as visual register, visual codes, secondary store, memory scan, and others might well have been found in James’s writings if he had lived in the age of modern technology. For most such terms. one may search in vain for “operational definitions. ” If cognitive psychology is truly behavioristic, as we have maintained up to now, how do cognitive psychologists manage to get such introspective concepts into the psychological language‘? The following observation about cognitive psychologists still seems valid, more than a decade after it was published: “a careful reading of their works is generally sufficient to convince one that explicit definitions could be provided upon demand-that they do indeed use patterns of stimulation and behavior in order to decide whether the subject has this cognitive state, is using that cognitive strategy, or is undergoing this cognitive process” (Spiker, 1977, p. 98). One should keep in mind, however, that the use of explicit definitions is only one way to introduce words into the scientific language. A second way is through the use of models, and most cognitive psychologists seem to introduce most of their new words into the psychological language by this device. Explication of this method requires a brief digression to discuss the nature and role of models in science. The scientific use of models has a long and respectable history (Spiker, 1986, pp. 47-49). The conception of air as a “sea” by Evangelista Torricelli, one of Galileo’s students, proved to be a highly fruitful idea that led to numerous advances in the physics of gases (Madden, 1960, pp. 3-7). The conception of gases as composed of a large number of microscopic properties led to the development of the still-current kinetic theory of gases. Mendel’s conception of the mechanism underlying heredity, based on his carefully collected data, was a model consisting of pairs of alleles, one member of each pair contributed by each parent to the offspring. Mendel had not seen the genetic material to which his model referred. Nevertheless, his formulation indicated how an individual comes by its genetic code and what effects different combinations of code would have on an individual’s appearance. Today, geneticists are mapping the locations and functions of genes on the double helix. One of the characteristics of a model is that it typically contains one or more uninterpreted terms. Torricelli conceived of air as having many of the properties of a sea such as weight, density, and depth, but he did not advocate trying to do one’s laundry in air. From the sea model, he extracted only certain properties to attribute to air. Newton suggested the corpuscular model of light by supposing that when we look at a beam of light, there are actually many tiny bodies smaller that we can ever see. If he had left the analogy in that state, it would have come to nothing. But he added, which bodies ohev ihe laws of mechanics. This stipulation made possible several predictions about light beams based on their presumed mechanical properties. Useful models must have this feature. Psychologists have made some use of simple models for many years. Descartes believed that the peripheral nerves are hollow tubes through which animal

spirits flow. The 18th century physician, David Hartley, considered the transmission of messages in the peripheral nerves to be analogous to the vibration of physical particles. Helmholtz represented the nervous system as a telegraph system with the brain as the switchboard. In the last few decades, however, psychologists as a group have found quantitative models highly attractive. The first influential model of this kind was presented by William K . Estes for simple learning situations (Estes, 1950). This model nicely illustrates two o i the properties that any psychological model must have: an anchoring of one part of the model to conditions of stimulation and an anchoring of another part to the behavior of the relevant organisms. As will be seen, it also illustrates in a simple form the idea of uninterpreted concepts. Reminiscent of Newton’s particle theory of light, Estes suggested that when we present a conditioning trial to the subject we really present a sample of tiny stimulus elements drawn from a population of such elements. This principle ties the model to the stimulating conditions. Moreover, if the conditioned response occurs on that trial, all elements in thc sample will be conditioned to the response. By connecting the probability 01‘ occurrence of the conditioned response to the proportion of elements in the population that have been conditioned to that response, Estes was able to deduce from his statistical model the major molar features of classical conditioning. Newton’s tiny particles obeyed the laws of mechanics; Estes’s tiny stimulus elements obeyed the principles of random sampling. Note that Estes connected the model to (i.e., interpreted the model on) both the stimulus and response sides. ‘The tiny stimulus elements were not interpreted in the empirical world and Estes explicitly excluded the possibility of finding empirical instances of these elements. Nevertheless, one cannot apply the model without either talking or writing about the stimulus elements. Thus, although this concept was not “operationally defined,” it will be useful if the model is itself useful. Even Hull (1943). with a quite clil‘lerent style of theory construction. was not immune to the appeal of the modeling technique. He postulated an oscillating inhibitory potential that varies in niagnitude from moment to moment according to the normal distribution function and that subtracts from effective reaction potential to produce momentary eftcctive reaction potential. This device served much the same purpose as Estes’s stimulus elements, permitting Hull to deduce response probabilities. Hull suggested no experimental manipulations that would vary any feature of the oscillating inhibitory potential. Just as Newton never saw his tiny particles in the beam of light. Mendel never saw his alleles, and Estes never saw his tiny stimulus elements. Hull never saw anything that corresponded to whatever was varying according to the normal distribution. In each case, the tenn is uninterpreted. Nevertheless. one cannot apply the model without mentioning the uninterpreted terms. What is important are the relations that the uninterpreted terms have with other terms in the model. As was indicated above, psychological models are useful only if they make connection with both the

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stimulus and the response sides and the relations among the various terms are specified. Not every term in the model need be interpreted. The use of models is the way that terms can be introduced into the scientific language without explicit definitions (Bergniann, 1957, p. 37). An extremely helpful discussion of the role of models in science is given by Brodbeck (1959). Scientific models have many sources. In physics, particle models have been around at least since Democritus in the fourth century BC. Physicists are still populating their models of physical objects with finer and finer elements. Not surprisingly, some psychologists introspect on their own mental processes to produce models that have concepts named with some of the terms that were enumerated at the beginning of this section. Indeed, some modern psychologists have constructed models based on the introspective reports of classical psychologists. One such example is the model of primary memory by Waugh and Norman (1965). These authors were quite explicit about the source of their model, as the following quotation indicates. We shall follow James ( 1890) in using the terins prirnury and srcondury memory (PM and SM) to denote the two stores. James defined these terim introspectively: an event in PM has never left consciousness and is part of the psychological present, while an event recalled from SM has been absent from consciousness and belongs to the psychological past. PM is a faithful record of events ,just perceived; SM is full of gaps and distortions. James believed that PM extends over a fixed period of time. We propose instead that it encompasses a certain number of eventh regardless of the time they take to occur. Our goal is to distinguish operationally between PM and SM o n the basis of the model that we shall now describe. (pp. 92-93)

As Waugh and Norman developed the axioms of their model, the terms primary

memory and secondary memory quite clearly had to be used in any application of the model. Yet, they provided no definitions for these terms and gave them no empirical interpretation. The authors have introduced them into the psychological language for use in the context of their model of primary memory. Unfortunately, it is quite likely that some psychologists lack the level of methodological sophistication that would permit them to recognize the constraints the model places on these terms. These psychologists may begin using the terms outside the context of the model. This practice is the psychological equivalent of attempting to wash one's laundry in Torricelli's sea of air. The thesis up to now is that cognitive psychologists use physicalistic primitive predicates, just as Watson advocated. They scck process laws rather than crosssectional laws, as Watson proposed. They introduce mentalistic sounding concepts into the language in a scientifically respectable method through the use of models. What, then, are they rebelling against'? Is cognitive psychology a revolution, as many authors have claimed'? If so. what is it a revolution against? An answer to this question will require a review of some fairly recent history of psychology.

V.

The Age of Learning Theories

For about three decades between 1935 and 1965, the field of psychology was dominated by the learning theories of 'Tolman, Guthrie, and Hull. The domination was never as complete as inany contemporary psychologists believe it to have been, but an examination of the P.sqc~lzologicu/Review or the Journal of Experimental Psychology for those years will reveal that among the names of both the published authors and those listed on the mastheads were many of the best known of psychologists associatcd with learning theories. The goals of the major learning theorists were approximately the same, although their theories differed i n many important ways. Hull was the most articulate with respect to the theoretical program. He considered classical and instrumental conditioning to be the simplest o f all learning situations. He wanted to begin with the laws of conditioning as the axioms (postulates) in his theory of behavior. These axioms included pi-inciplcs describing the building up of associations (habit), the generalization o f associative strengths, the building up of inhibition, the generalization of inhibition, the development of motivation (drive), and the interaction of associations and motivation. Also among the Hullian axioms were some that are best construed as composition laws-laws that described how habits developed to stimulus elcments could control behavior in the presence of stimulus patterns and compounds comprising these elements. The goal of the learning theorists, then, was partly to verify these conditioning principles by direct experimentation, but especially to deduce from them predictions about the behavior of organisms in other more complex, nonconditioning situations. These other situations included discrimination learning problems, serial verbal learning tasks, paired associate tasks, therapy sessions. and, eventually. all possible settings. h i - convenience, I will refer to theories with conditioning principles for axioms as conditioning theories. The conditioning theorists wanted to explain all behavior in t e r m of laws of conditioning. That is, they wanted to be able to deduce predictions about all behavior from the axioms of their theories. It seems quite likely that their highest respect was reserved for such attempts and they only grudgingly accepted the legitimacy of attempts to formulate theories with axioms more complex than conditioning principles. For the conditioning theorists, genuine explanation started with the laws of conditioning. During this period, the verbal learning literature was dominated by associationistic research and theory (McCieoch & Irion, 1952). The principles of human verbal learning that were considered basic sounded a lot like principles generalized from the conditioning literature. Typical verbal learning tasks involved nonsense syllables in an attempt to control for extraneous variables such as meaningfulness. The standard expcctation seems to have been that explanations for new verbal behavioral phenomena would be couched in terms of the associative principles.

In Hull's theory, several concepts were invented to provide devices that would permit explanations for many instances in which sub.jccts contribute t o the control of their own behavior. Thus, an anticipatory goal response and its corresponding response-produced stiniulus made possible the prediction that a subject's sudden desire for, or anticipation of, a particular goal could instigate specific behavior directed toward achieving that goal. Cue-producing responses provided rich possibilities for explaining human language-controlled behavior and complex problem solving. Many psychologists, however, were impatient with these complex, often tortuous, explanations. For others, such explanations seemed artificial and contrived. Whatever one's view of the conditioning theories, one would err in referring to them as taking a passive view of the organism and in contrasting them with cognitive theories that have an active view of the organism. In this respect, the two types of theories do not differ (Spiker. 1977, pp. 98-100). What the cognitive psychologists rebelled against was the indirect constraint that the conditioning theorists imposed on which phenomena could be studied by insisting that complex phenomena had to be explained in ternis of conditioning principles. Many psychologists found themselves interested in phenomena that were far too complex to be explained, at least for the present, in ternis of conditioning laws. They were interested, f o r example, in how subjects could home in on a specific aspect of the current stimulation. They were interested in how the subject could retrieve some information now, not be able to do so later, and then be able to do so again still later. They were interested in the acquisition of language, not the learning of nonsense syllables. Cognitive psychology was a rebellion against conditioning theories and against theories with axioms that resemble the laws of conditioning. The rebellion has been so successful that a current textbook o n , say, children's learning is hard to find, as is a psychology departnicnt in which the empirical information in McGeoch and Irion's (1952) text is taught. Courses on theories of learning are taught, if at all, by the older members of the faculty because most younger faculty members know little i f anything about them. Many new doctoral students in cognitive psychology have graduated with little or no knowledge of the laws and theories of simpler learning situations, once considered indispensable for all graduate students in experimental psychology.

VI.

Summary

We have examined the question, is modern cognitive psychology a return to classical structural or functional psychology or does it conform to the methodological behaviorism first advocated by John B. Watson'? We began with a brief description of the methods and goals of classical psychology, noting that observations of the mental phenomena were made by highly trained observers

who were themselves scientists (or at least, scientists-in-training). These scientists were searching for cross-sectional laws that connected mental elements with complex mental phenomena. Among the primitive terms of these psychologists were some that referred to simple rncntal events. Classical psychologists failed to reach their goals for empirical reasons; their failure was not due to methodological (logical) inadequacies. We examined methodological hchaviorism and found it to have two main principles. The first is that the primitive terms of psychology should refer to the simple properties of, and simple relations among, physical objects and eventsthe same primitives used in the physicul sciences. The second is that psychologists should look for process laws that permit the prediction of future behavior given knowledge of the physiological, environmental. and other behavioral variables. Next, we analyzed the activities of cognitive psychologists. We found that they do not treat their subjects as il‘ they were trained observers. Rather, they consistently employ ”catch trials” and other checks on the quality of the subjects’ observations. We noted that cognitive psychologists could, but usually do not, provide behaviorally and environmentally based “operational definitions” for many of the mentalistic-sountling terms that they introduce into the psychological language. Many of their terms, however, are introduced through the timehonored use of models. That is. they construct models that are only partially interpreted to the empirical world. Some of the concepts in the model remain uninterpreted, and of these, sonic appear to refer to the mental phenomena that classical psychologists attempted to study and describe. This latter feature is probably what most misleadingly suggests that modern cognitive psychology is a return to classical structural or functional psychology. Finally, we found that cognitive psychology is not, as many believe. a revolution against methodological behaviorism. It is rather a rebellion against the conditioning-based theories that constrained psychologists to the study of the simpler behavioral phenomena.

REFERENCES Addis, L. (1982). Behaviorism and thc philmophy o t the act. N o u s . 16, 39Y-420. Bergniann, ‘2. (1952). The problem of irrliition\ in tcal psychology. Philosoyhc~olQucrrtrrh. 2. (Reprinted in G . Bergrnann, The rnc~/cipliv.\~(~\ of Iogicul p o s i r i I i m (pp. 277-29Y). Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1967) Bergrnann, G . (1954). Bodies, mind\, atid x t s . In G Bergmann. The mcmphy.sic..\ of /o,qicul posifii+.wi (pp. 132-152). Madison lJniver\ily ot Wisconsin Press. 1967. Bergniann, G . ( 1956). The contribution [it John R Watwn. P.s~clto~ugic~ul Rcwew. 63, 265-276. Bergrnann. G . ( 1957). Philosophy ofsc J ~ K CMadison. University of Wisconsin Press. Bower. G . H. (1975). Cognitive psycholog>- An introduction. In W K . Estcs (Ed.). Handhook c~

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learning and cognitive processes: Vol. 1. Introduction 10 mnceprs and issues (pp. 25-80). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brodbeck, M. (1959). Models, meaning, and theories. In I,. Gross (Ed.). Symposium on sociological rheory (pp. 373-403). New York: Harper & Row. Cherry, E. C . (1953). Some experiments on the recognition of speech with one and two ears. Journal of the Acoustical Society (fAmerica. 25, 975-979. Ellis, H. C. (1978). Fundamenluls of human learning. memory. and cognition. Dubuque, IA: Brown. Estes, W. K. (1950). Toward a statistical theory of learning. Psychological Review, 57, 94-104. Estes, W. K. (1975). The state of the field: General problems and issues of theory and metatheory. In W. K . Estes (Ed.), Handbook of learning and cognitrvc processes: Vol. I . Iwtrodriction to concepts and issues (pp. 1-24). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbauni. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Kendler, H. H., & Kendler, T. S . (1975). From discrimination learning to cognitive development: A neobehavioristic odyssey. In W. K. Estes (Ed. ). Hundbook .f Learning and Cognitive Processes: Vol. 1. Ititroductior~t o coweprs uiid issites (pp. I9 1-247). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbauni. Klatzky, R. L. (1980). Human memorv: Structures and processes (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Freeman. Kosslyn, S . M., Ball. T . M., & Reiser. B. J. (1978). Visual images preserve metric spatial inforination: Evidence from studies of image scanning. Jortrrrd cf Experimerrtul Psychology: Hicmun Perception arid Performance. 4, 47-60. Madden, E. H. (1960). The structure of scientific thought: An introductiori to philosoplzy ofscience. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. McGeoch, J . A , , & Irion, A. L. (1952). Thepswhologv ofhimian learning. New York: Longmans, Green. Natsoulas, T . (1984). Gustav Bergmann'a psychophysiological parallelism. Behaviorism. 12, 4169. Paivio, A. ( 1965). Abstractness, imagery, and meaningfulness in paired-associate learning. Journal of Verbul Learning and Verbul Behavior, 4, 32-38. Posner. M. I., & Mitchell, R . F. (1967). Chronometric analysis of classification. Psychological Review. 74, 392-409. Shepard, R. N., & Metrler. J (1981). Mental rotation of three-dimensional objects. Science. 171, 70 1-703. Spence, K. W. (1951). Theoretical interpretations of learning. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Hundbook of Experimental Psychology (pp. 690-729). New York: Wiley. Sperling. G , ( 1960). The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs. 74(Whole No. 498). Spiker. C. C . (1977). Behaviorism. cognitive psychology, and the active organism. In N Datan & H. W . Reese (Eds.), L$ii-,span developmenrul psychology: Dialectical perspectives on erperimenial research (pp. 93-103). New York: Academic Press. Spiker, C. C . (1986). Principles in the philosophy of science: applications to psychology. In L. P. Lipsitt & J . H. Cantor (Eds.), Experimental child psvchologist: Essays and exp'erirnents in honor of Charles C. Spiker (pp. 1-55). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sternberg, S . (1966). High-speed scanning in human memory. Science, 153, 652-654. Titchener, E. B. (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology. (Reprinted in W. Dennis (Ed.). Readings in the history oj' psychologv (pp. 366-376). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948) Waugh, N. C., & Norman, D. A. (1965). Primary memory. P.svchological Review. 72, 89-104. White, S. H. (1976). The active organism in theoretical behaviorism. Human Developmenl. 19, 99107.

SOME CURRENT ISSUES IN CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE ATTENTION

Betty J . House DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY UNIVERSITY 0 1 ; CONNECTICUT STORRS. (’ONNECTICUT 06268

I

INTRODUCTION A BIT OF HISTORY A WHY ATTENTION T H E O R I B ATTENTION THEORY AND INTEI I IGENCE C ATTENTION THEORY IN ANlMAl LEARNING D SOME DEFINITIONS E SUMMARY

11 DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS IN IIISCRIMINATION TRANSFER THEORIES OfSHIFT EFFECTS A THE LEVELS O F FUNCTIONING APPROACH B THE LEARNING RATE HYI’OTHESIS C PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIA1 ION D COMPOUNDS VERSUS COMPONEN rs E PSEUDOREVERSAL AND NONREVERSAL SHIFTS F SUMMARY 111

RECENT APPROACHES TO S rIMULUS COMPOUNDS A DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS IN PLRCEPTION O F STIMULUS COMPOUNDS B COMPOUNDS IN ANIMAI. LEARNING C COMPOUNDS IN ADULT INFORMATION PROCESSING

IV. SUMMARY REFERENCES

I.

Introduction: A Bit of History A.

WHY ATTENTION ‘THEORY?

In the late 1950s the retardation litcrature contained very little information to guide an investigator wishing to study learning in mentally retarded persons. For

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that reason, in searching for suitable experimental methods, David Zeaman and 1 turned to the work of Harlow with monkeys (Harlow, 1945). We believed the tasks would be of suitable difficulty level for severely retarded subjects, and the nonverbal techniques were especially attractive for subjects whose understanding of language was doubtful. We used an adaptation of Harlow’s Wisconsin General Test Apparatus and selected a color-form object discrimination task (i.e.. three-dimensional forms with both color and form relevant), which naive monkeys learn within one or two 25-trial sessions. To our surprise, moderately retarded naive humans ( M A 3 to 5 years) did considerably worse. Of our first group of ten, four subjects learned within 10 days, but the other six continued to perform happily at chance day after day. Although we were firm adherents to Spence’s theory of discrimination learning, as the experiment approached 40 days (1000 trials) with no apparent progress, the notion that each trial was adding an increment of approach strength to the positive stimulus became increasingly implausible. We knew that, theoretically, learning might be masked by stronger differential tendencies to choose irrelevant cues. Nevertheless, our faith in the power of differential reinforcement began to weaken. At about that time, we discovered accidentally that one of our failing subjects was able to pick out “her” two stimuli from a shelf containing the 25 different color-form combinations used in the experiment, seemingly a more difficult task than choosing the correct one of a pair. That told us that the color and form cues were being registered by the subject. Because we were ready to admit defeat and call a halt to the monotonous daily sessions, we decided to take advantage of this apparent ability to discriminate old from new stimuli. For three of the failing subjects, we substituted a new positive stimulus, and for the other three, a new negative stimulus. One subject remained at chance, but the other five showed immediate improvement. Four reached 80% correct or above by the second day, and the fifth reached 75% correct on the third day (Zeaman, House, & Orlando, 1958). (The two slowest subjects were in the novel positive group.) We reasoned that either novelty and familiarity were very salient cues or novelty drew attention to the color and forms. Obviously, one cannot draw strong conclusions from these observations, but they contributed to our feeling that the poor performance of our subjects was not t o be explained by extremely slow growth of differential approach tendencies. Our thinking was heavily influenced by a paper by Wyckoff (1952) which formalized Spence’s (1936) suggestion that a part of learning a discrimination was learning to orient receptors toward the relevant cues. Wyckoff’s observing response model posited a chain-an observing response and an instrumental response-with the probability of a correct response being the product of the probabilities of the two members of the chain. Both members of the chain were assumed to be acquired by Hullian mechanisms, the observing response by secondary reinforcement and the instrumental

response by primary reinforcement. One striking aspect of Wyckoff's model is that, although it was conceptually close to Spence's theory, predicted learning curves were quite different in form and much closer to those actually obtained, characterized by a long period of chance performance before a rise to criterion. Wyckoff showed that such functions could be derived from any theory in which the frequency of effective instrumcntal training trials depends upon the probability of observing the relevant cues and in which the increase in probability of observing is a function of the strcngth o f the instrumental response. Unlike the earlier hypothesis theories of Krechevsky ( 1932) and Lashley (1929), Wyckoff's theory does not necessarily predict zero learning about the relevant cues during the early flat portion of the learning curve. Hence, the presolution reversal data (Spence, 1940), which cast doubt on those early hypothesis theories, are not embarrassing to Wyckoff's position o r similar chaining models. Wyckoff was not the only learning theorist of the 1950s concerned with selectivity in discrimination learning. Two theorists postulated a decreasing effect of irrelevant cues as learning progresses (Atkinson, 1958; Restle, 19SS), and Lawrence (1963) proposed a theory t o account for his ingenious demonstrations of acquired distinctiveness of' cues in rats (Goodwin & Lawrence. 1955; Lawrence, 1950, 1952). Although Lawrence did not refer to attention, his learning schema had many common elements with attention models. It was a twostage chaining model with the instrumental response dependent upon a coding response, an implicit reaction controlled by factors other than the proximal stimulus to produce a stimulus-as-coded (s-a-c). The form of the s-a-c was assumed to be in most instances the result ot learning. In discrimination learning, the s-a-c functioned to eniphasire relevant features and de-emphasizc irrelevant cues. The Zeaman and House model o f I963 was an outgrowth of developments in theories of animal discrimination that emphasized stimulus selectivity. Wyckoff's model seemed most appropriate for our purposes because it allowed for periods of zero learning. Like Wyckoff. we assumed a chain of responses, attention and instrumental, with the second dependent upon occurrence of the first. But the models were different in important ways. Wyekoff's observing response was peripheral, referring t o orientation of receptors. Our attention response was assumed to be central; we had evidence that the relevant stimulus cues were registered; hence, the selection must occur centrally. Unlike Wyckoff's observing response, the attention response was dimensional: selection of a dimension exposed the cues of the dimension, which then acquired approach or avoidance tendencies. The models a l s o had formal differences; the ZeamanHouse model was adapted for simultaneous rather than successive discrimination. and both members of the response chain were strengthened or weakened by the consequences of instrumental responding. We assumed that a single dimension was selected on each trial-but l o r mathematical tractability, not because

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we believed that attention of our subjects was that limited. Indeed, data from House and Zeaman (1963) suggested that retarded subjects attended to more than one dimension on a trial, and later theoretical developments allowed broader attention (Fisher & Zeaman, 1973). Although the model was simple and crude, it yielded strong payoffs. First, it produced the kinds of learning curves we observed in our subjects. Although the stochastic element prevented derivation of group learning functions, computer simulations with “stat-children’’ performing as the model dictated allowed us to explore the effects of various parameter values. Like our subjects, stat-children showed chance performance for varying periods before rapid rise to criterion. Stat-children showed a mid-reversal plateau of chance performance, attributed to extinction of the appropriate attention response before acquisition of the instrumental response. The effect was later confirmed for retarded subjects (Shepp & Turrisi, 1969). Both theory and data showed that stimulus factors such as dimensional salience and numbers of relevant and irrelevant dimensions affected the initial, chance portion of the learning curve rather than rate of approach to asymptote. Transfer effects, such as the relative difficulty of intradimensional and extradimensional shifts, were readily derived from the theory: learning discrimination problem strengthens attention to the relevant dimension, making easier a subsequent problem from the same dimension. Faster reversal than extradimensional shifts could be derived from the theory with certain parameter values. B.

ATTENTION THEORY AND INTELLIGENCE

Having discovered a learning task that was moderately related to intelligence (House & Zeaman, 1960) and a model that could predict performance, we embarked on a program to find parameters o f the model that could be related to intelligence. We found that individual differences in learning speed were related to the length of chance performance before learning began but not to rate of approach to asymptote, at least with our experimental designs (but see Okada, 1978). Thus, the parameter most closely related to intelligence appeared to be the initial probability of attending to the form and color dimensions which were typically made relevant. The finding of an attentional deficit in retarded subjects has sometimes been cited as evidence of “weak” or “limited” attention as a source of retardation. That inference, however, was not made by Zeaman and House (1963). Although initial probabilities of attending to colors and forms appeared to be low for retarded subjects, attention could be fairly easily altered by pretraining or salience manipulations. Thus, it did not seem likely that such a transitory effect could be a structural feature of retardation (see Zeaman, 1973, p. 126). We later relaxed that view in the face of evidence of strong dimensional preferences that

could be temporarily overridden hut that still retained some strength. For example. even after learning a color problem, retarded subjects revert to position responding if a new color problem is too difficult. Prolonged success on a nonposition discrimination does not, apparently, extinguish preference for the position dimension entirely. Zeaman and Hanley ( 1983) presented other evidence of a partially fixed salience hierarchy. The parameters of the Zeaman-House model were too few to offer much scope for speculation abo
A’ITENTION THEORY IN ANIMAL LEARNING

Although interest in stimulus selectivity in animal learning had increased during the 1950s, attention was not often invoked. An instructive exercise is to read the ambitious Psychology: A Stuc!\* of u Science, seven edited volumes sponsored by the American Psychological Association to provide a thorough and critical examination of the status and development of psychology up to that date. Volume 5 , published in the same yea1 (Koch, 1963), as the first of the Advances in Child Development and Behmiot- series. contained four chapters concerned with perception and behavior. Attention was mentioned in only one of the four, and even there somewhat cautiously. Guttinan ( 1963) suggested attentional accounts of certain generalization phenomena. He saw the necessity for separating features that had entered into a trained association from those that had not. and “to make the functional difference clear. we should not blush to use the term ‘attention’ to describe the function” ( p . 164). The 1960s saw an explosion o f research and theory devoted to attentional phenomena in animal learning. Sutherland (1959) developed a model for dis-

crimination learning in octupuses in which “stimulus analyzers” intervened between stimulus input and response attachment. Like the attention responses of the Zeaman and House model, stimulus analyzers acted on dimensions to yield specific cue values. That is, a stimulus analyzer for brightness might yield “black” and “white,” for example. Although the two models were developed independently and involved different terminology, they made highly similar predictions. Sutherland’s theory was later elaborated in Sutherland and Mackintosh’s book (1971), which provides a good history and analysis of attention models. Lovejoy (1968) proposed a two-stage attention model, with general features much like those of Sutherland and of Zeaman and House, but with added properties. The salience of a dimension, which as in the Zeaman and House model was defined as the initial attention probability, was assumed to have two components, fixed and adjustable. The purpose of the dual nature of salience was to accommodate the strong tendency for rats to respond to position cues and for their tendency to revert to position under extinction and too difficult discrimination problems. Lovejoy inferred that salience could not be completely adjustable. Zeaman and Hanley (1983) suggested that a similar feature would be appropriate for models of children’s learning. Lovejoy’s other innovation was to assume that the cue that controlled responding on a trial was not always the cue that was learned. With a small probability, the rat would forget about the controlling cue and select another to be associated with reward. Some evidence favoring that assumption came from House. Hanley, and Magid (1979). They trained retarded subjects on an oddity problem with a new set of picture stimuli on each trial. As is typical, most subjects started with a preference for the odd stimulus of about 75%. Of 12 subjects with a preference, 6 reached 100% within two days, but the other 6 continued near 75% correct for 10 days. Clearly, their behavior was under the control of oddity to some extent, but they did not learn that the odd one was always correct. D.

SOME DEFINITIONS

The term “attention” has been used in such a large variety of ways that it is difficult to define in a way that would be suitable for all contexts. In the models discussed in the preceding section, attention means simply a construct having the properties assigned in each model. which differed somewhat from model to model. More generally, attention is usually taken to mean selection of stimuli for further processing. Most often, such selection is thought to occur during perceptual processing. Mackintosh’s ( 1975) attention model, however, has selection occurring during the associative phase, as does the attention theory of Frey and Sears ( 1978). In some theories, attention is a mechanism that requires effortful, controlled

processing, and nonattentional processing takes place automatically, effortlessly, and in parallel (e.g., Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Attention is frequently assumed to be volitional and under cognitive control. An important point is that in the animal learning theories and i n the Zeaman-House model, attention i s considered as automatic, an inherent aspect of perceptual processing. In summary, attention is a term that serves to delineate roughly an area of research, and I will not attempt to be more precise. Another term that has been used in many different senses i s “dimension.” The term has been used interchangeably with features, attributes, cues, components, variables, and other terms. One writer (E. J . Gibson, 1969) distinguished between features and dimensions. which must be continuous and ordered. but another (Garner, 1978) considered continuous and discrete dimensions as subclasses of dimensions. Yet other writers referred to values of a dimension as features (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).To bypass the definitional problem, Garner ( 1978) considered inventing neologisms defined precisely, but concluded that we do not have as yet “a sufficiently closed system of meanings t o allow us to define a closed system of terms” (p. 100). In the Zeanian-House model, stimuli belong to the same dimension if they have some common property, such as being colored, by which they can be selected although they have different values within the dimension. We gave no rules for specifying dimensions a priori, but did give a defining operation, that of facilitation of an intradimensional shift relative to an extradimensional shift. If learning about cues from a given set facilitates learning about other cues from the same set, the cues have at least one dimension in common. Basically, the theory states that such sets exist and l’ollow the rules of the model. Some theorists have assumed that the term cfimension must refer to a stimulus element. Thus, some have objected t o referring to stimulus compounds as belonging to a compound dimension, as did House and Zeanian (1963). T. S. Kendler ( 1983) remarked that such usage ”diluted” the concept of selective attention (p. 136). But that criticism seems to imply that we know what “true” stimulus elements are. I believe that implication is doubtful. I also doubt that all organisms decompose stimuli in the same way. For these reasons, at the present stage of knowledge the term “dimension” should not be restricted to the elemental aspects of stimuli. Restricting usage to elementary dimensions would also raise awkward questions about such “ditnensions” as color, which is a “compound” of three dimensions yet ix frequently referred to as a dimension for discrimination learning. What aspects of stimuli can be selectively attended to is an empirical matter at present. E.

SUMMARY

Although at the beginning 01 the 1960s. referring to attention seemed a bit daring, by the end of the decade, attention theories had become a major influence

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in animal learning. The theories had a fair amount of success in accounting for phenomena seemingly beyond the power of conventional learning theories, although not without dissent. Riley and Leith (1976) concluded that the existence of attentional mechanisms in animal learning lacked definite proof, although from the context they seem to have been referring only to selectivity during input and not to selectivity at later stages of processing. Later, Riley and his colleagues presented evidence of limited attentional capacity in pigeons (see Riley, 1984).

11. Developmental Trends in Discrimination Transfer: Theories of Shift Effects Perhaps the greatest relevance of attention theory for the developmental literature is its role in the discrimination shift controversy of the 1960s and 1970s. That literature has been thoroughly reviewed (Esposito, 1975; Shepp & Turrisi, 1966; L. S. Tighe & T. J . Tighe, 1966; Wolff, 1967; Zeaman & House, 1974), so instead of a detailed coverage 1 will merely summarize some highlights. Older children differ from younger children in the relative ease of various kinds of intradimensional and extradimensional shifts. Three kinds of explanations have been offered for the developmental trend. These can be related to three types of questions: how does learning take place, what are the relative learning rates of instrumental and attentional responding, and how do children perceive the stimuli? My purpose is to consider each in relation to recent data and theory. However, 1 will be concerned only with the change that occurs between preschool and elementary school. A.

THE LEVELS OF FUNCTIONING APPROACH

H. H. Kendler and T. S . Kendler have argued that a change in how learning occurs underlies the developmental effects in the shift literature. I.

The Theory T. S. Kendler has long been concerned with developmental trends in the speed of learning a reversal shift relative to a nonreversal shift and in the optional shift design, which measures degree of reversal shift preference in each subject. In the optional shift, a discrimination problem with one relevant and one irrelevant dimension is trained. After criterion is reached, one setting has the reward values reversed, posing a problem that can be solved by reversing the original discrimination or learning a new problem on the previously irrelevant dimension. Test trials on the remaining setting reveal which method of solution was chosen. Relative speed of reversal learning and choice of reversal optional shift show an orderly increase with age from preschool children t o young adults. The original

theory was that a reversal shift showed mediation and an extradimensional choice showed nonmediated learning. In the more recent levels offuncrioning theory (T. S. Kendler, 1979, 1983), choice o f a reversal shift is taken to mean a higher level of functioning. In Kendler's theory, two levels are assunied to control discrimination learning. The lower level, which matures more quickly than the upper, involves nonselective stimulus encoding and incremental learning. The higher level involves selective encoding and an hypothesis testing mode of learning. One can hardly deny that human behavior becomes more highly mediated and complex with maturity. However, 1 question the assumption that stimulus selectivity is absent at lower developmental levels. First, as we will see in the next section, even infants show selective attention. Second, the literature on animal learning is pervaded by evidence of stimulus selectivity. Although Kendler's theory was not specifically directed to nonhuman organisms, data from that source can provide useful guidelines for interpreting children's behavior. That is, abilities demonstrated by nonhuman animals should not be taken as evidence of high-level processing in humans.

2 . Selective Attention in Infiriits Evidence has shown that if two films are projected onto the same screen, adults can attend to one film and ignore the other. Bahrick, Walker. and Neisser (1981) showed that infants around 4 months of age can do the same. They first showed that if two films projected side by side, one silent and the other with an appropriate sound track, infants looked more at the sound-compatible film. In the later test with the two films again projected side by side but with no sound, infants showed a novelty preference by looking more at the previously silent film. For a test of selective attention, other infants were shown the two films. with and without sound, projected onto the same screen. Again. silent test trials with the two films side by side showed more looking toward the previously silent film. That result indicated that they must have been attending to the sound film during the joint presentation. Bahrick rt ( I / . concluded that selectivity is "inherent in the act of perceiving from the beginning" ( p . 389). The demonstration by Bahrick cJtt i / . does not mean necessarily that selective attention is involved in discrimination learning. The next section is a summary of data from the infrahurnan literature relevant to selective association. Selective Association in Anirnci1.s The literature on animal learning is pervaded by evidence of stimulus selectivity. In classical conditioning experiments, a stimulus may or may not be conditioned depending upon other stimuli that are present and their history of association with the unconditioned stimulus. In instrumental learning as well, an animal's experience with cues from a given dimension affects new learning of

3.

cues from the same dimension (see Sutherland 8( Mackintosh, 197 I , for a review of such effects). Evidence of stimulus selectivity does not mandate a separate stimulus selection stage preceding association. however, as most attention theorists have proposed. Some theorists have placed selectivity during the association phase itself. For example, T . S . Kendler’s (197 1 ) theory provides for some selectivity even at the lower level of functioning by the assumption that the associative strength of a stimulus is controlled in part by a learning rate parameter specific to each stimulus, which generalizes to other similar stimuli. Thus, some stimuli gain more associative strength on each trial than others. Kendler’s learning rate parameter can account for saliency effects, but it is not affected by experience. Other theorists have been able to account for selective processing at the associative level. One such model was developed primarily to account for the phenomenon of blocking, demonstrated by Kamin ( 1969). Investigation of blocking has dominated a large proportion of research i n classical conditioning during the past two decades. Briefly, if a stimulus A is strongly conditioned before the compound stimulus AB is trained, stimulus B will gain little or no conditioned strength, even though both ‘components of AB would be conditioned had prior training of A not occurred. Clearly, simple pairing of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli is not sufficient to produce conditioning. Kamin suggested that stimulus B is not conditioned because the unconditioned stimulus was expected, i.e., predicted by the A stimulus, and that only unexpected reinforcers strengthen associations. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) formalized the notion in a modified continuity theory (Wagner, 1969) in which the forni of the traditional associative growth function was changed. In Hullian theory, the increment of associative strength to a given stimulus is proportional to the difference between present and maximum strength for that stimulus. In the modified formulation of Rescorla and Wagner. the increment is assumed to be a fraction of the difference between present strength and maximum strength of all stimuli present. Thus, in the blocking situation described above, if conditioning of stimulus A is near maximum, neither A nor B will gain appreciable strength when AB is presented. Rescorla and Wagner also included a stimulus-specific learning rate parameter determined by intensity and salience of a stimulus. The Rescorla and Wagner fonnulation and its applications has been a major influence in modern conditioning theory. It has also instigated other theories of differential associability of stimuli. More recently, Wagner (1981 ) proposed a model involving differential activation of representational nodes just after stimulus presentation. The process is analogous to rehearsal i n short-ten memory, but Wagner called it the Standard Operating Procedure model to emphasize automaticity of the processing. Mackintosh’s (1975) attenlion theory departed significantly from the major premises of previous attention theories. He rejected the notion of a two-stage

model in which the first stage selects stimuli for further processing. Instead, he placed selectivity in the associative phase by a stimulus-specific learning rate parameter, alpha, similar to that of Kescorla and Wagner and of Kendler. But Mackintosh argued that the available evidence demanded that the learning rate parameter be influenced by experience as well as by stimulus properties. In his theory, associability of a stimulus was increased through being relevant in a learning experiment or decreased by being irrelevant. He also assumed generalization of associability to other stimuli along a gradient of similarity. Frey and Sears (1978) also proposed an attention model based on the theory of Rescorla and Wagner, which increased the range of prediction of that model. Mackintosh saw the virtue o f his theory as being closer to traditional S-R theory and as more parsimonious. Zeanian ( I976), however, questioned that evaluation. He showed that Mackintosh's one-stage attention model was formally similar to a two-stage model in that alpha plays the same role in determining learning as probability of attention or strength of a stimulus analyzer in other models. Further, alpha resembles a response in being learnable. extinguishable, and in generalizing to other stimuli. Zeaman questioned the greater parsimony of adding complexity to associative processing relative to a separate perceptual processing stage. Incidentally, T. S. Kendler ( 1979) assessed the differences betwcen her theory and Mackintosh's as "small enough to pose little difficulty for the relatively crude level of analysis at which the theory of mediational development begins" (p. 88). Given that Zeaman (1976) tlemonstrated formal similarity between the Zeaman-House and Mackintosh modcls, Kendler's position and that of Zeaman and House (1963) seem not to be ;IS far apart as has previously been supposed. Summary I have argued that the change i n reversal learning that occurs between preschool age and elementary school i s unlikely to reflect growth of selcctive encoding ability. The animal literature suggests strongly that experience with stimuli affects later learning involving those stimuli. We have seen that some theorists have preferred to build experiential effects into stimulus representations, thus influencing associability. and others have posited a separate selective processing stage. Either type of mechanism is able to accommodate faster reversal than original learning as well as other transfer effects. Apparently, both young children and infrahuman animals have either a selective encoding stage or associative mechanisms that are ecluivalent in effect. Some theorists have argued on rational grounds for stimulus selectivity. Kozeboom (1974). for example, pointed o u t that the environment of the subject is far richer than is reflected i n the experimenter's description of the stimulus situation. After describing the number of possible cues in a simple form learning

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task, he concluded that “a behavior theory which allows every one of the infinitely many logically distinguishable properties of an organism’s environment to acquire stimulus control over his behavior in the fashion envisioned by its learning postulates would yield predictive absurdities” (p. 222). The argument becomes more compelling when one considers that even absence of a stimulus can be a cue for behavior (Hearst, 1984). B . THE LEARNING RATE HYPOTHESIS

Kendler posited a change in kind of learning to account for the developmental trend. In contrast, Zeaman and House assumed the same basic learning laws for all organisms. The Zeaman-House model does not predict a developmental trend in reversal learning, but can accommodate it by adjusting parameter values. From the viewpoint of attention theory, reversal learning is complex because it involves both facilitating and interfering factors. Negative transfer is to be expected because the positive and negative cues are reversed, but positive transfer is expected from the strengthening of the attention response to the relevant dimension. Adding to the complexity, the relevant attention response as well as the now-incorrect instrumental response may be extinguished by nonreward, leaving the organism performing at chance while attending to the wrong dimension. Because of these two opposing factors, current attention theories cannot predict whether reversal will be faster than nonreversal shifts. The outcome will depend upon the relative rates at which the attention and instrumental responses are acquired and extinguished. The learning rate interpretation of the developmental trend in reversal learning is that the extinction rate for the attention response is slower for older subjects. The fact that infrahuman animals and preschool children, unlike older children, find extradimensional shifts easier than reversal shifts has been emphasized as evidence of a change in mode of learning. Others consider the intradimensional versus extradimensional shift problem as a more important source of evidence because it is easier to analyze by attention theories than reversal learning. After learning one discrimination problem, the subject is presented new cues from the relevant and irrelevant dimensions for the shift. Either the same dimension is relevant or the previously irrelevant dimension becomes relevant. Because the design lacks the negative instrumental transfer of a reversal problem, the comparison reflects only the positive transfer of the attention response. Faster intradimensional than extradimensional learning has been reported even for 4-year-old children (e.g., Eimas, 1966), who do not typically show faster reversal than extradimensional shift learning. The effect has also been shown with rats (Schwartz, Schwartz, & Tees, 1971; Shepp & Eimas, 1964), pigeons (Mackintosh & Little, 1969), and monkeys (Rothblat & Wilson, 1968; Shepp & Schrier, I 969). The above results show stimulus selectivity based on previous experience with

the stimuli for young children as well as infrahuman animals. Thus, a change from nonselective to selective mechanisms during early childhood appears doubtful. The evidence has been disputed, however, by H . H. Kendler and Kendler ( 1975). They have criticized the intradimensional-extradimensional shift design because responses learned in the original problem may generalize to the new cues and because novel cues may disrupt preshift mediational responses. However, how such factors could predict intradimensional superiority in the absence of selective attention (whether perceptual or associative) is not clear. Disruption of mediating responses would not favor intradimensional shift learning: and generalization effects would be unpredictable. The new cues taken from the previously relevant dimension might be farther apart in approach strength than those taken from the irrelevant dimension, depending upon their similarity to the original relevant cues. But because positive and negative status is assigned to cues randomly, instrumental transfcr could be either positive or negative. Under such circumstances, instrumental transfer alone would predict small and unreliable transfer, unlike the robust findings of intradimensional superiority at both human and infrahuman levels. Further, a study by A. L. Brown (1970) showed intradimensional facilitation with an oddity learning paradigm. which precluded associations with spccific stimuli. Both kindergarteners (4-year olds) and second graders (7-year olds) showed faster intradimensional than extradimensional learning. Although the intradimensional -extradimensional studies show similar results for children and animals, optional intradimensional-extradimensional shifts, as well as optional reversal-nonreversal shifts, show a developmental trend ( H . H. Kendler, Kendler, & Ward, 1972), which requires explanation. The hypothesis that older children have slower extinction of attention responses can handle developmental trends in both reversal and intradimensional learning. Dickerson, Novick, and Gould ( 1972) tested the learning rate hypothesis fairly directly in a comparison of kindergarten and second-grade children (4 and 7 years of age) on a sequence of discrimination problems. The first was either a size or brightness discrimination with one dimension relevant and the other irrelevant. The second problem was an extradimensional shift with the same stimuli. In the second problem, the previously correct and incorrect cues were randomly reinforced. Thus, subjects who continued to attend to the previously relevant dimension would unlearn the original habit, and those who shifted quickly would not. The third phase of the experiment was designed to assess unlearning of the original habits. Half the subjects were presented the original problem and the other half had the reversal. The 4-year-old children given the original problem relearned faster than those assigned the reversal, but the 7-year olds did equally well on both tasks. The interpretation of Dickerson et ul. was that the younger children extinguished attention to the old relevant dimension during the extradimensional shift faster than did the older children.

I04

C

PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIATION

According to the perceptual differentiation theory of the developmental trend. young children perceive the stimuli as undifferentiated units without abstracting the component dimensions. In a discrimination problem with a relevant and an irrelevant dimension, the two settings of the problem are seen as four relatively independent objects, each associated with reward or nonreward. In a reversal shift, reward values of both settings are reversed: in a nonreversal shift, in contrast, one is reversed but the other remains the same. Young children find nonreversal easier because only one set of responses has to be reversed. Older children isolate the relevant dimension. They treat the settings as two examples of a single problem and learn to choose black. for example, regardless of context. The experimental paradigm that best illustrates the theory is subproblem cznaly s i s . The subproblems are the two settings, which are analyzed separately during reversal and nonreversal shifts. Suppose the settings are large black versus small white and small black versus large white. After training with brightness relevant, black positive, one group is given a reversal shift and the other a nonreversal shift with the same settings as in original learning. Older children. who have abstracted the relevant dimension, should have performance on one setting dependent upon what happens on the other setting. That is, if black is now not rewarded in one setting, the black stimulus will tend to be avoided in the other. But children who have learned ob,ject-reward relations for four distinct objects. should display performance on one setting that is relatively independent of the other. The comparison of most interest is that between the two settings of the nonreversal shift, with large now made positive. Black will remain positive in one setting, but will be incorrect in the other. Complete independence of settings means that performance on the unchanged setting would remain near 100% correct and perforniance on the changed setting should drop to zero. Criteria for independence are little or no decrement on the unchanged setting, and no difference between perfonnances on the changed setting and the standard reversal function. Just such extreme signs of independence have been reported for rats, pigeons, turtles, and monkeys (T. J . Tighe, 1973). Children 4 years of age do not show such extreme patterns, but they show an intermediate degree of independence. In a study by T . J . Tighe, Click, and Cole ( 197 I ) . performance of 4-year olds on the unchanged setting dropped only to 60% correct and remained higher than on the changed setting throughout training. Children 10 years of age, however, showed large drops on both settings. and from the third trial, performances on the two settings were indistinguishable. The more extreme examples of independent subproblem learning shown by some animals cannot be handled by attention theorists who posit that attention t o relevant components of a compound is strengthened and attention to irrelevant

components is decreased. Prool’ of that assertion was offered by Medin ( 1973). who showed, however, that the less extreme performance patterns of 4-year-old children could be derived from attention theory (assuming attention to components only) with certain parameter values. Predictions from differentiation theory are not entirely clear. One version of perceptual differentiation ( J . J . Gibson & Gibson, 1955) holds that undifferentiated stimuli appear more similar t o each other, and that perceptual learning involves discovery of new dirncnsions of difference. Young children are assumed to overgeneralize but thc subproblem analysis data suggest overrliscrimination (i.e., the positive cues 01’ the two settings are not treated as similar stimuli). The view of T. J . Tighc anci Tighe (1968) was somewhat different. They assumed that primary gcner-alization occurs between stimuli that have not been differentiated. This assumption suggests that discrimination learning in young children should follow Spencean principles. 7’. J . Tighe ( 19731, using computer simulation, found that Spence’s theory could predict independent subproblems with certain parameter values. But other aspects of data reported in that paper could not be predicted. T. J . Tighe and Tighe (1978) proposed that young children are less likely to abstract dimension-reward relation ross trial settings even when they are able to respond dimensionally tc; individual stimuli. Behavior was said to be guided both by object-reward relations and by dimension-reward relations with the degree of control a function ot cliniensional salience, experience, and age. Zeaman and House ( 1974) reinterpreted the Tighe’s approach as the compound versus component hypothesis, which is discussed in the next section. D.

COMF’0LINI)S VERSUS COMPONENTS

Subproblem analysis is not the lirst evidence to suggest that combinations of cues may have properties not predictable from the sum of their parts. One approach to such evidence is to trcat a particular pattern or compound itself as a component of the stimulus cotnplcx, as Spence did in accounting for successive discrimination learning (Spence, 1952). Rescorla and Wagner (e.g., Kescorla, 1973; Whitlow & Wagner, 1971) a l s o postulated a unique configurational stimulus corresponding to a particular combination of cues. House and Zeaman (1963) adopted a similar usage in positing that attention could be directed to compounds as well as to components. Independent subproblems can be predicted by attention theory for subjects who attend primarily to the compound per se rather than to components. Zcanian and Hanley (1983) argued that stimulus compounds have greater salience for young children than components. House and Zeaman (1963) t o o k the view that compounds are dimensional aspects of stimuli. Just as color and form are dimensions, so is color-fonn a dimension. Barnes (1978) tested thc notion that compounds behave as dimensions

1 Oh

B e t t y J . House

in a discrimination transfer study. Briefly, subjects were trained with compounds or components relevant and were shifted to the same type of problem with new cues (intrddimensional shift) or to the other type of problem (extradimensional shift). In the color-form compound problem the four combinations of two colors and two forms were used, but no component was differentially rewarded. For example, with green-square versus green-cross, the square might be correct, and with red-square versus red-cross, the cross would be correct. For the component problem, the same forms were presented with ten different colors, constant within settings. Learning by compounds would require learning 10 different pairs of stimuli; therefore, this kind of learning was regarded as unlikely. For low-ability subjects, the compound and component problems were equally difficult, and large intradimensional-extradiniensional differences were found for both types of problems. For higher-ability subjects, however, the component problem was very much easier than the compound problem, and although intradimensional-extradimensional effects were found with compound problems, the component problem was about equally easy for both types of shift. Thus, the developmental trend suggested by T. J . Tighe et al. (1971) was supported by the data in that higherability subjects had trouble with compound problems relative to component problems but lower-ability subjects found compounds no more difficult than components. The data show also that attention to compounds or components can be altered by training, although components appear to be too dominant for the higher-ability subjects to be easily extinguished. House (1979) tested the effect of training attention to compounds or components on subproblem analysis. Retarded subjects were first trained o n a compound or a form component problem of the types described above for Barne’s experiment, Second, they were presented a standard discrimination problem, which could be solved either by compounds or components. Finally, subjects had either a reversal or nonreversal shift with the same stimuli as the standard problem so that subproblem analyses could be done. The groups having been trained first with compounds showed independence of settings; the unchanged setting showed very little loss and the changed setting dropped sharply and resembled the reversal function. The group trained first on a component problem showed greater evidence of dependent functions, although less than for 10-yearold nonretarded subjects. The data tended to confirm the interpretation of T. J . Tighe et al. (1971) in that when subjects were directly trained to respond in the manner inferred by those writers, the expected relations among subproblems were obtained. A different approach to stimulus compounding was taken by Hull (1943) with his afferent neural interaction theory. Spiker (1963) extended and elaborated the notion in his theory of stimulus interaction, in which he assumed that the habit and inhibitory loadings of a component acquired in one compound will be reduced when that component occurs in another compound. Medin (1975), in his

context theory of discrimination. also assumed incomplete generalization of habits trained to a component in one context to the same component in another context. Such theories can handle subproblem independence by limiting generalization between the settings. Medin further speculated that a major developmental shift may involve increased ability to “overcome the effects of particularized contexts on performance” (p. 304). Medin also discussed an extension of his theory including an attention postulate. The extended model could predict the training effects demonstrated by Barnes and House. In summary, the subproblem analysis data show an effect of context on component learning, whether by stimulus interaction or by compound learning, which changes with age in humans and with phylogenetic level. Independence of subproblems can be influenced by training designed to direct attention to stiniulus combinations or components. The models of Spiker and Medin can handle independent subproblems quite elegantly without the assumption of compound learning. However, as will be shown in Section 111, the role of compounds in learning remains an important issue. E.

PSEUDOREVERSAL A N D NONREVERSAL S H I f l S

For the sake of completeness, a more general kind of discrimination transfer should be considered because it most likely contributes to the developmental trend. In a technique introduced by Bogartz ( 1 9 6 3 , discrimination training is given on two settings with four unrelated stimuli; then either both settings are reversed (pseudoreversal) or only one is reversed (pseudononreversal). Adults find pseudoreversal easier than nonreversal (Marquette & Goulet, 1968), but data for children are mixed. Goulet and Williams (1970) found the effect in 6-year olds, but Cole (1973) found n o effect until the age of 9 for rural Mexican children. In Cole’s study, dimensional transfer appeared before nondimensional. Sanders ( 197 1 ) found pseudoreversal faster than nonreversal for 4- and 7-year olds, but not for rats or monkeys. More recent evidence shows, however, that even rats learn pseudoreversals faster than nonreversals if given overtraining on the two original discriminations (e.g., Nakagawa, 1986). Nakagawa’s data also suggested that the two positive and the two negative stimuli become associated, which agrees with evidence from Marquette and Goulet that their stimuli had acquired equivalence on the basis of common learned responses. F

SlJMMARY

Reviews of the transfer shift literature (e.g., Esposito, 1975) have not unequivocally supported one of the three views over the other. When all the data are considered, the developmental trend appears to be multiply determined. I have argued that the change that occurs between preschool and school age

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Bettx J . Hoitrc

children is not likely a shift from nonselective to selective responding, although a change in what children are selecting is a strong possibility. Zeaman and House ( 1974) concluded that the most interesting hypothesis was that compounds have greater salience for young children and that components become more salient with age. The role of stimulus compounds in human and animal learning is considered in the following sections.

111. Recent Approaches to Stimulus Compounds A

DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS IN PERCEPTION OF STIMULUS COMPOIJNDS

The preceding section showed that how children perceive stimuli can affect discrimination performance, as the Tighes have long argued. Questions about children’s perceptions have been the source of a great deal of speculation in the past. The notion that children’s perception bccomcs more highly differentiated as they grow older has much evidence in its favor. In E. J . Gibson’s (1969) review, which brought greater order and clarity to the field, differentiation was regarded as a primary developmental trend. A new source of evidence has come from developmental research based on Gamer’s ( 1978) and others. investigations into perception of stimulus dimensions and their combinations. Two broad classes of stimulus dimensions have been distinguished, which follow different rules of combination. One class is called separable, the other integral, with different operational criteria for identifying them, Separable dimensions form perceptually distinct components when combined; integral dimensions tend to form unitary compounds. For adult humans, the dimensions of color are integral. so that it is difficult to judge saturation, for example, without being influenced by brightness. An example of dimensions separable for adults, but apparently integral for young children, is color and form of a unitary stimulus or color and orientation of an arrow. Gamer’s operational criteria for integrality and separability include differences in direct distance scaling, which yields Euclidean and city-block metrics, respectively, and in speeded sorting tasks. One kind of performance that shows different effects for separable and integral dimensions is speeded sorting of stimuli varying along two or more dimensions. Subjects required to sort stimuli on one dimension while ignoring the others can easily do so when the dimensions are separable. That is, no redundancy gain is obtained when the dimensions are correlated and no interference is obtained when they are uncorrelated. In contrast, when the dimensions arc integral, subjects have difficulty attending to them in isolation; in speeded sorting, both redundancy gains from correlated and interference from uncorrelated dimensions are observed. Although gradations

occur in separability and integrality within classes and sonie asymmetrical interactions occur between dimensions (Garner, 1983), this line of research has contributed greatly to our underscanding of perception. A number of investigators in child development have extended Garner’s methods to children and have found that some dimensions that form separable combinations for adults are integral lor children (e.g., Shepp, Barrett, & Kolbet, 1987). By using operations specified by Garner for distinguishing separable and integral dimensions, these researchers have made the differences between perceptions of older and younger children more explicit and formal than was previously possible. The hypothcsis that pcrceptual development involves an increasing tendency for dimensional structure to take precedence over global similarity has been called the integrality-separability hypothesis (Kemler. 1983b). Research findings supporting the integrality-separability hypothesis are impressive. Some dimensions that show the developmental trend are color and forni, size and brightness, and sire o f circle and angle of radius. The research has been well reviewed in recent publications (Burns. Shepp, McDonough, & Ehrlich, 1978; Kemler, 1983b; Kernler & Smith. 1979; Shepp, 1978. 19x3; Shepp, Burns, & McDonough, 1980; Smith, 1981). Therefore, I will not review them here. Odom and his colleagues (Aschkenasy & Odom, 1982; Cook & Odoni. 1988) have offered an explanation of age effects in classification data in terms of differential sensitivity to stimulus relations rather than a change in perception. In their view, the developmental trend reflects an increased ability to detect relations and in the salience hierarchy oi‘dimensions. Kemler ( 1983a), however, has argued that the “integrality-se~i~ability” hypothesis is more parsimonious in that it accounts for a broad range of findings not explicitly addresscd by Odom’s theory. Zeaman and Hanley (1983) discussed the relation between the integralityseparability hypothesis and the coinpound~component hypothesis of Zeaman and House (1974). They criticized the tern) “global similarity”; as most research has varied just two dimensions, siniilarity along a compound dimension is a more accurate description. However, they did not perceive any serious disagreement between the two positions. We believe that no great v~olcnccI\ drrnu ttr the theory and data related to the separability hypothesis if an idciitit) I \ p r o p o s d The preference for separnblc mode\ of perception IS identical to prohahillties of ;ittention to coniponcnt dimensions: and the preference for integral mode\ of perception I \ identical fo probabilities of attention to compound dimensions (Zc:iiiiaii NC Hanky. 19x3. p. 120)

It is important to note, however. that inany of the phenomena explored by the integrality-separability theorists are outside the range of the Zeanian-House

attention theory.

Betty J . Hoirse

110

B

COMPOUNDS IN ANIMAL LEARNING

In a review of stimulus combination laws, Kehoe and Gormezano (1980) concluded that “the theories appear to be converging into a coherent representation of a compound stimulus as a functionally distinct stimulus that is, nevertheless, lawfully related to its components” (p. 351). In general, performance with a compound stimulus can generally be predicted from a knowledge of performance on the individual components, and vice versa. However, in some instances the relation breaks down. As was noted in the case of successive discrimination, compound stimuli appear to gain approach strength even though the components are not differentially reinforced. In the conditioning literature, patterning studies show similar effects. In “positive patterning,” presentations of a compound are reinforced and presentations of components alone are not. The reverse holds for “negative patterning. ” Successful conditioning under these circumstances suggests that the compound can be trained independently of the components, although other theoretical approaches are possible. Studies of combination laws have generally involved dimensions thought to be separable, such as a light and a tone or distinct visual stimuli. Riley and his colleagues used a match-to-sample technique to study divided attention in pigeons, hoping to find more definite evidence regarding limited attentional capacity than was possible with learning paradigms. The basic design involved presenting either elements or compound stimuli as samples, with elements as test stimuli. After a compound sample, the test elements varied randomly on one or the other of the dimensions in the compound stimulus. Performance was better after an element sample than after a compound sample suggesting that subjects decomposed the compound and processed the two elements separately. This finding also suggests limited processing capacity. Early work by Maki, Leuin, Leith. and Riley (summarized by Riley, 1984; Riley & Leith, 1976) supported stimulus decomposition and limited capacity. Control experiments tended to rule out explanations of the results in terms of generalization decrement or stimulus degradation effects. Later work by Riley and others was concerned with how differing physical arrangements of elements affect performance. The stimuli used in the earlier work were vertical or horizontal white lines on red or blue blackgrounds, which are separable dimensions. Lamb and Riley (1981) compared the effect of differences in spatial separation of two elements, a red or orange patch and vertical or horizontal lines. At one extreme, the two elements were combined into a unified compound, that is, lines differing in color and orientation. For other conditions, the elements were side by side and separated spatially by 0 to 0.8 cm. In that experiment, matching of element test stimuli following a unified compound was found to be almost as good as matching following element samples. Performance declined as a function of distance. Riley (1984) reviewed the evi-

dence and concluded that the cvidcrice clearly indicates compound stimulus decomposition, but that spatial proximity tends to discourage it. Evidence regarding the limited capacity hypothesis is inconclusive at present. M. F. Brown (1987) explored the role of experience in the ability of pigeons to decompose stimulus compounds. He noted that when pigeons are trained to match-to-sample, they are given many presentations of elements alone and in combination. The question he raised was whether such exposures were necessary for decomposition. To answer the question, he used a symbolic match-to-sample task in which the test stimuli were unlike the sample stimuli and were arbitrarily assigned as correct responses. One group of pigeons was trained with elements as sample stimuli, vertical or horizontal white line and red or green colored square. Another group was trained with compound stimuli only, a horizontal or vertical white line 0.4 cm from a red or green patch. Thus, the compound-trained group was never exposed to elements alone during training. For testing, sample stimuli for both groups were elements, unified compounds, and compounds with elements at variable spatial separations. As Brown had expected, birds trained with compounds performed at chance when elements were the sample stimuli, although birds trained with elements transferred easily to compounds. Thus, exposure to isolated elements appeared necessary for development of the ability to decompose compounds. One phenomenon related to compound learning is of particular interest to developmental psychologists because certain results suggest that young rats may be similar to human children by showing a greater tendency to treat components as integral stimuli than do adult rats. The phenomenon in question is called potentiation, and it is the opposite effect from the overshadowing effect. In overshadowing, a stimulus A is conditioned more strongly when trained alone than when trained together with another stimulus AX and tested alone. In potentiation, the A stimulus reveals less associative strength when trained alone than when trained in Combination with X . The effect occurs in aversive taste conditioning. For example, some animals are trained with a banana-flavored drink and others are trained with a banana-saccharin compound, both followed after an interval by a poison. Both groups are tested with banana alone. Those trained with the compound typically show greater aversion to banana alone than those trained with banana alone. (Potentiation has been demonstrated with other taste combinations such as almond or strawberry with sucrose or salt.) Rescorla and Durlach (1981) suggested within-compound conditioning as one explanation. In that account, the banana forms an association with the saccharin taste such that when subsequently presented alone, the banana "borrows" some of the aversiveness of the saccharin. One difficulty with this conditioning theory is that it is contrary to some established properties of conditioning. For example, simultaneous conditioning is usually extremely poor. In response to this objection, Rescorla and Durlach suggested an alternative account in terms of compound

learning; the banana-saccharin compound is not analyzed into its components but rather a unitary representation is formed. Then, when banana is presented alone, it reactivates the banana-saccharin memory, a more powerful stimulus than banana alone. The second hypothesis, called the gestalt explanation by Spear and Kucharski (1984), is of particular interest from a developmental viewpoint because of data showing that unweaned rats show a greater potentiation effect than adult rats. In a series of experiments, Spear and Kucharski showed more potentiation for young rats with several taste combinations and taste-odor combinations. They noted that the findings were contrary to previous studies showing generally weaker conditioning in young rats, especially with long time intervals. They suggested that the finding is analogous to the work with young children showing a greater tendency to treat dimensions as integral than in older children (Kemler, 1983b; Shepp, 1983). In summary, findings from the animal learning literature are compatible with the developmental trend with regard to the influence of stimulus compounds. First, the data support the psychological reality of compounds in that they can enter into associations independently of their components. Second, certain kinds of stimulus experience, and possibly maturity, can decrease the influence of compounds. C.

COMPOUNDS IN ADULT INFORMATION PROCESSING

Work on selective attention with adult humans often takes the form of microanalysis of perceptual processing. Perception of a stimulus is conceived as occurring over a finite time interval with various features extracted from the stimulus array at varying rates. Two stages are often assumed, a preattentive, automatic, parallel processing stage with unlimited capacity followed by a limited capacity, controlled, selective processing stage. Details of just how processing takes place is quite controversial. The controversy most relevant to o u r present concern is whether processing proceeds from a holistic toward an analytic mode or whether local features are extracted first, then integrated; that is, what are the products of the preattentive phase that are presented for selective processing’! At one extreme is the “global precedence” hypothesis (Navon, 1981) that global features are extracted earlier or more rapidly than local features and, hence, may interfere with analytic processing. Similarly, Neisser (1967) assumed that during the preattentive phase, the visual field is segmented into separate objects by certain gestalt properties and that in the following focal-attention phase a particular object is analyzed in more detail. If the conception that global or object properties are perceived earlier is correct, the finding that children’s perceptions are dominated by holistic properties is understandable, and the maturational trend

could be the result of learning to reduce the interference of global processing on dimensional analysis. Although the global to analytic processing sequence seems most compatible with the developmental trend, the weight of evidence at present appears to support the opposite view, such as Treisnian's very influential "feature-integration theory" of attention. In her model. "features are registered early, automatically, and in parallel across the visual field, while objects are identified separately and only at a later stage, which requires focussed attention" (Treisman & Celade, 1980, p. 98). Treisman and co-workers have presented data from several different paradigms supporting the theory. A visual search experiment illustrates how the theory works. The subject's task was to report whether a single target was present or absent in an array including up to 30 distractors. In a color search task, a blue letter (T or X) was the target with brown Ts and green Xs as distractors. The time required t o clecide that the target was absent did not vary with number of distractors. This result suggests parallel processing of all the stimuli in the array. Similar results were obtained for a form search with an S (brown or green) as the target and the same distractors as before. Different results were obtained, however, for a conjunctive condition with target a green T with brown Ts and green Xs as distractors so that the target matched half the distractors in shape and half in color. I n this condition, time required to decide that the target was not present increased linearly with number of distractors, implying a necessity for sequential inspection of each stimulus. Treisman noted that features are not experienced consciously in isolation and suggested that features may become conjoined incorrectly for unattended stimuli, Strong evidence for such illic.sor\ c.onjirnc~tionswas reported by Treisman and Schmidt (1982). As an example, after tachistoscopic presentation of a picture of a living room. stripes from a chair might be perceived as belonging to the rug. Treisman and Schmidt tested perception of colored forms briefly exposed while attention was diverted by another task. About two-thirds of all errors were illusory conjunctions. Similar results were reported for size and shape. Illusory conjunctions would not be expected if objects were perceived before their analysis into components. In an extension of Treisman's work. Nissen (1985) investigated the role of spatial attention in accessing different aspects of a stimulus. Her work suggests that form and color information are registered in separate visual maps, and that spatial attention is required for accessing corresponding information in the two maps. Subjects were asked to select color-form items from a brief visual display. She found that selecting an item by color or form and reporting location was as accurate as selecting by location and reporting color or form. But when subjects selected by color and reported both form and location, accuracy of reporting form depended upon accuracy of localization. She inferred that spatial location is necessary for cross-referencing between maps.

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The converging evidence supporting Treisman’s theory raises the question of where the differences between children’s and adults’ perceptions arise during processing. In Treisman’s theory, feature integration occurs after feature extraction but before conscious recognition. Thus, it is not a cognitive or optional process. Presumably the initial processing is the same for children and adults, and processing differences occur after the feature integration stage. Although dimensional features are apparently separate in the very earliest stages, some evidence also suggests that integral perception precedes dimensional analysis in time. Bums (1987) demonstrated integrality of size and brightness in iconic memory for adults, using Sperling’s partial report technique, although these same dimensions are separable in tasks that don’t require speeded reaction. Treisman’s theory may help clarify the nonmonotonic relation that has been noted between age and holistic perception (Pick, 1983). Data suggest that infants below the age of 4 or 5 months respond to isolated elements rather than to holistic patterns. Treisman suggested three ways by which features may be conjoined to form experienced objects. One way is focal attention; another is placing features detected in parallel in predicted object frames. That method requires familiarity with how given elements are usually combined. The third way is by random conjunction of features. We may speculate that infants must learn to fixate objects in the visual surround and maintain consistent orientation. Also, infants lack the predicted object frames postulated by Treisman. The work of Treisman and others does not offer any simple resolution of questions about children’s perception of compounds. The data place some restrictions on theories that holistic properties become available earlier in processing than dimensional aspects (Burns, 1987; Shepp, in press). If stimulus features of’unitary objects are processed separately prior to object recognition, it follows that competition between holistic and dimensional properties occurs after object recognition. The findings are of limited relevance to formal attention models, which do not generally specify exactly the locus of attentional processing.

IV.

Summary

A large part of the history of learning theory of the last 25 years consists of devising ways to deal with stimulus selectivity. Earlier theories that assumed contiguity of stimulus and response to be a sufficient condition for formation of an association were found wanting. This paper has described some of the ways theorists have attacked the problem. These theoretical solutions were of two general types-two-stage theories with stimulus selection preceding association and theories that altered associative processing. Both types of theories successfully handled selective phenomena, and there is no clear basis at present for preferring one or the other.

A question generally neglected by early attention theorists concerns the nature of a stimulus. How is the stimulus complex available t o a subject divided into cues or elements that can be selectively responded to? Related questions are whether the experimenter's perception of stimulus elements correspond to the subject's view, and whether elements are perceived the same by all subjects. The answer to the last two questions appears to be in the negative. Recent research relative to these questions with children, adults, and nonhuman organisms is reviewed.

REFERENCES Aschkenasy, J . R . . & Odom, R . D. i19x2) Clabsification and perceptual development: Exploring issues about integrality and differential sensitivity. Joumul of E~rperirnentulChild Ps\cho/oxy. 34, 435-448. Atkinson, R. C. (1958). A Markov niodcl lor discrimination learning. Psychorncwiku. 23, 309-322. Rahrick, L. E . , Walker, A. S.. & Neisrer. U (19x1j . Selective looking by infants. Cofimfiw P.vycholofiy, 13, 377-390. Barnes, T . R. (1978). Transfer of conipounds and components in the discriminative learning of retardates. Journal of'Expc~rim~~rirul Child P . s v i . / i o l o g ~25, . 7 1-79. Bogartz, W. (1965). Effects of reversal and nonrevcrs;il shifts with CVC stimuli Journcil of Verbal Learnirifi and Verbal Behavior, 4, 4x4-48X Brown, A . L. ( 1970). Transfer perforineiice in children's oddity learning as a function of dimensional preference. shift paradigm. and overtraining. Journul oj"E.rperimenral Child P.sycholofiy. 9, 307-309. Brown, M. F. (1987). Dissociation of stimulus conipounds by pigeons. Jour~icilqf E.rprrimenrci/ Psvchology: Animul Behavior Prot Burns, B. (19x7). Is stimulus structure in thc mind's eye'? An examination of dimensional structure in iconic memory. Quurterlv Jourritrl of ~,'.~/~~,riin~,iirci/ P.sycholofiy. 39A, 385-408. Bums, B.. Shepp, B. E . , McDonough. D . , & Weiner-Ehrlich. W . (1978). The relation between stimulus analyzability and perceived dimensional structure. In G . H . Bower (Ed.),The pvychology of learning cind morivution (Vol 12. pp. 77-1 15). New York: Academic Press. Cole, M. (1973). A developmental study of factors influencing discrimination transfer. Journul Experimenrul Child PswholoRy. 16, 126- 147. Cook, G. L . , & Odom, R . D. (1988). Pcrceptual wnsitivity to dimensional and similarity relations in free and rule-governed clahhificatioii. Joio-nu/ ofE.xperimc~nlci/Child Psvcho/ofiy. 45, 3 19-338 Dickerson, D. I . , Novik, N.. & Could, S A . (1972). Acquisition and extinction rates as determinants of age changes in discrimination shitt hch;ivior. Joirrriul of Experimental P ~ ~ c h o l o95, g~. 116-122. Eimas. P . D. ( 1966). Effects ofovertrnining and age o n intradimensional and extradimensional shifts in children. Jourriul of E.xperimerirul Child P.\whology, 3, 348-355 Esposito, N. J . ( I 975). Review of diacriinination shift learning in young children. P.svcholofiic~~l Biillerin. 82, 432-455 Fisher. M. A . , & Zeaman, D. (1973). A n attent retention theory of retardate discrimination learning In N . R Ellis (Ed.), Irirrrricifioriul r \c of re.\rurch in mentul retcirdarion (Vol 6. pp. 169-256). New York: Academic t'rc\s. Frey. P. W . , & Sears. R. J . (1978) Model 01 conditioning incorporating the Rescorla-Wagner

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associative axiom, a dynamic attention process and a catastrophe rule. Psychological Revic~u~. 85, 321-340. Garner, W. R . (1978). Aspects of a stimulus: Features, dimensions. and configurations. In E. Rosch & B . B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cogriirion und cateyorixztion (pp. 99-139). Hillsdale, NJ. Erlbaum. Garner, W. R . (1983). Asymmetric interactions of stimulus dimensions in perceptual information processing. In T. J . Tighe & B . E. Shepp (Eds.), Perception. Cognition, and Development Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbauin. Gibson, E. J . (1969). Principles of perceptual learnin8 and dewlopment. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts Gibson, I. J . . & Gibson, E. J . (1955). Perceptual learning: Differentiation or enrichment. Psvchological Review, 62, 32-41. Goodwin, W. R., & Lawrence. D. H. (1955). The functional independence of two discrimination habits associated with a constant stimulus situation. Journal of' Compurutive and P hysiologic-a/ Psvchology. 48, 437-443. Goulet, L. R . , & Williams. K. J . (1970). Children's shift performance in the absence of dimensionality and a learned representational response. Journal OJ' Experimental Child Psvchology. 10, 287-294. Guttman. N. (1963) Laws of behavior and facts of perception. In S. Koch (Ed.). P y c h o l o g y : A study of a science: Vol. 5 . The process areas, the person. and some upplied,furts ipp. 114178). New York: McGraw-Hill. Harlow, H. F. (1945). Studies of discrimination learning in monkeys. V. Initial performance by experimentally naive monkeys on stimulus-object and pattern discnminations. Journal of C m erul Psychology. 33, 3- 10. Hearst. E. (1984). Absence as information: Some implications for learning. performance, and representational processes. In H. L. Roitblat, T . G. Bever, & T. S. Terrace (Eds.), Anrmul cognition (pp. 31 1-332). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. House. B. J . (1979). Attention to components or compounds as a factor in discrimination transfer performance. Journal qf Experimental Child Psychology. 27, 32 1-33 I . House, B . J . . Hanky, M. J . . 8: Magid, D. F (1979). A limitation of the law of effect. American Journal of Mental D
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Shepp, B. E . , & Turrisi, F. I). (1960). lxai-ninp and transfer and niediating re\ponscs in discriminative learning. In N. R. Ellis (Ed.) /nti,rnolionul rcview of rasearch in mental retardutron IVol. 2. pp. 86-122). New York: Academic l'res\. Shepp. B . E . , & Turrisi, F. D . (1969).Effects of over-training on the acquisition of intradimensional and extradimensional shifts. Journul o / b;ipf,rimevitu/ Psyrhology. 82, 46-5 1 Smith, L. B . (1981). Importance of overall similarity of objects for adults' and children's classification. Journal of E.rprrirnentul I - ' ~ ~ i ~ / i o l o qHitrnan \'; Perripion and Performance. 7, 8 I 1824.

Spear, N . E . , & Kucharski, D. (1984). Oiitogeiictic differences in the proceshing of multi-element stimuli. In H. L. Roitblat, T . B. Bcver. 6: 13. S. Terrace (Eds.), Animal cognition (pp. 545568). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Spence, K . W . (1936). The nature of discrimination learning in animals P.sychologirct1 Rei.iew. 43, 427-449.

Spence, K. W. (1940). Continuous veisus iioii-coiitinuous interpretations of discrimination learning Psyhologirul Resiew. 47, 27 I-2XX Spence, K . W . (1952). The nature of reapm\c in discrimination learning. Psychologicul Rei,iew. 59, 89-93.

Spiker. C. C. (1963). The hypothesi\ 0 1 \tiiiiuIu\ interaction and an explanation of stirnuluh compounding. In L. P. Lipsitt & C . C . Spihcr I E d s . ) . Ad\sunce.s in childdevelopment mid hehcivior (Vol. 1. p. 233-264). New York: Academic Press. Sutherland. N. S. (1959). Stimulus analyiing nicchanitnis. In Proceediugs of u .symposium on the mechanization of thought proce. ( V o l . 2 , pp. 575-609). London: H. M. Stationery Office. Sutherland, N. S., & Mackintosh. N . I I197 I ) . Mrdiunisms qfanimul discriminorion learnirig. New York: Academic Press Tighe, L. S . . & Tighe, T . J. (1966). I)i\criiiiination learning: Two views in hihtorical perspective. Psychological Bulletin. 66, 353-370 Tighe, T. J. (1973). Subproblem analy\i\ ( 1 1 dixrimination learning. In G . H. Bower ( E d . ) , The psychology qf learning arid mo/ii,utton (Vol. 7 . pp. 183-226). New York: Academic Press. Tighe. T. J.. Click, J . . & Cole, M . (1971 ) . Subproblem analysis of discrimination shift Icarning. P.sychonomir Science. 24, 159- I60 Tighe. T. J . , & Tighe, L. S . (1968). Ililleientiatioii theory and concept-shift behavior. Psychologicul Bulletin, 70, 756-761. Tighe, T. J . , & Tighe, L. S. (1978). A pcrccptual view of conceptual development. In R. D. Walk & H. L. Pick, Jr. (Eds.), Perceptio,i mid experiencr (pp. 387-416). New York: Plenum. Treisman. A . M . , & Gelade, G . (1980). A Icattirc-integration theory of attention. Cognirive Psvchology, 12, 97-136. Treisman, A. M . , & Schmidt, H. (19x2) Illurory conjunctions in the perception of objects. Cognitive Psycholog!, 14, 107- 14 I Wagner, A . R . (1969). Stimulus selection arid a "modified continuity theory.'' In G . H. Bower & J . T. Spence (Eds.), The psycholog\ of lerirrirrig crndmorivarion (Vol. 3. pp. 1-43). New York: Academic Press. Wagner. A . R. 11981). SOP: A inodel of automatic ineinory processing in animal behavior. In N . E Spear & R . R. Miller (Eds.), Injr~rrnutionprocessing in unimuls: Memory me(-hanisms (pp. S 48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Whiteley, J . H . . Zaparniuk. J . , & Asmundson, G . I . G . (1987). Mentally retarded adolescents' breadth of attention and short-term nieinory processes during matching-to-sample discriniinations. Americun Journal of Mental Lkfirieirc\ , 92. 207-2 12. Whitlow, J . W . , Jr., & Wagner, A R . 11972) Negative patterning in classical conditioning: Summation of response tendencies t o isolable and configural components. Psychonomir Science. 27, 299-301

Wilhelm. H . , & Lovass, 0. 1. (1976). Stimulus overselcctivity: A coiiinion feature in autism and mental retardation. American Joirrnal of' Mc~rrtolDefic.ic~ricy,81, 127-241 Wolff, J. L. (1967). Concept-shift and discriniination-reversal learning in humans. P.syc~/iologicul Bulletin. 68, 369-408. Wyckoff, L. B., Jr. (1952). The role o f observing reywnsea in discrimination learning. Psychological Review. 59, 43 1-442. Zeaman, D. (1973). One programmatic approach to retardation. In D. K . Routh (Ed.). The c.rp<>rimental psychology of niental returdutiori (pp. 78- 132). Chicago. IL: Aldine. Zeaman, D. (1976. August) Sonic commeiits U ~hltic~kintosli's I n e throrv ~ qfatrenrion. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Congress of Psychology. Paris. Zeaman, D., & Hanky. P. (1983). Stimulus preference as structural features. In T. J. Tighe & B. E . Shepp (Eds.). Perception. cognitiori, cirirl rlc\doprm,~it(pp. 103- 128. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum Zeaman. D., & House, B . J . (1963) The role of attention in retardate discrimination learning. In N . R . Ellis (Ed.), Haridhook of mental clc.frc.ie,ic.y (pp. 159-223). New York: McGraw-Hill. Zcaman, D., & House, B . J. (1974). Interpretations of developmental trends in discriminative transfer effects. In A. D. Pick (Ed.), Miurirsottr s~mnposium O I I child psychology (Vol. 8. pp. 144- 186). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Zeaman, D . , & House. B . J . (1979). A review ot attention theory. In N . R . Ellis (Ed.). Haridhook qf menrul deficiency, psychological theory arid rescwrh (pp. 63- 120). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Zeaman. D., House, B . J . , & Orlando. R. (19%). Use of special training conditions in visual discrimination learning with imbeciles. Anirricri,i Jour-nrrl of Mental Deficiency, 63, 453-459

CHILDREN’S LEARNING REVISITED: THE CONTEMPORARY SCOPE OF THE MODIFIED SPENCE DISCRIMINATION THEORY

Joan H . Ctrntor m t l Charles C . Spiker DEI’AK I hlt N r O F f’7YCHOLOCY O N I V I R 5 I I Y Or 1OhA IOWA C‘I I ’I IOWA 52242

I. INTRODUCTION 11. A REVIEW OF PHENOMENA EXPLAINED BY THE MODIFIED SPENCE THEORY

A . THE ORIGINAL SPENCE TI<EORY B. THE HYPOTHESIS OF STIMIJ12US INTERACTION C. DIFFERENTIAL CUE-PRODI!ClN(; RESPONSES 111. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

At the time the first volume o f A d ~ w i c e sin Child Development und Behavior appeared in 1963, one of the niajor interests among experimental child psychologists was the study of learning. Of the 17 papers that appeared in the first two volumes in the series, 1 1 are directly concerned with children’s learning, including one dealing with verbal learning. In contrast, in the two most recent volumes, none of the titles of the 1 I papers contains the word “learning,” although 4 of the papers are centrally concerned with studies of memory in infants and children. As we all know, these changes faithfully mirror changes that have taken place over the past 25 years of the “cognitive revolution” not only in the study of children, but throughout the field of psychology. Strong interest in the study of children’s learning continued through the decade of the 1960s, culminating in the publication of texts such as Reese and Lipsitt’s Experimental Child Psychology ( I970), which contained separate chapters on

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classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, discrimination learning, verbal learning and memory, and transfer of training. In addition, the large learning literature was reviewed by Stevenson (1970) in a chapter in Curmichuel’s Manual of Child Psychology (Mussen, 1970) and later in an undergraduate textbook entitled Children’s Learning (Stevenson. 1972). The past two decades have seen a precipitous decline in the study of learning and an explosion of research on cognitive behavior. In 1976, the Child Develop ment A b s ~ u c t sand Bibliogruphy changed one of their major headings from “Experimental Psychology, including Learning Phenomena” to “Cognition, Learning, and Perception.” Although “Learning” thus still appears in the heading, one is hard-pressed to find any basic learning studies abstracted in current issues. What has happened to children’s learning? Were we so successful in finding the laws of classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and transfer of training that a consensus developed that no additional research was needed’? Or, alternatively, were we so unsuccessful that we gave up trying‘? Did we perhaps come to the conclusion that the simpler forms of learning are not relevant to our understanding of children’s behavior‘? Or were we just bored with the old questions and excited by the new ones? Is it even possible that we are simply failing to recognize that we ure still studying children’s learning, but with new terminology and new theories’? The answers to these questions seem important to us in that they should provide us a better understanding of the changes that have occurred in the past 25 years and a better view of where learning fits in the future of our field. Despite the probable absence of general agreement on all of the answers, we would have a difficult time finding anyone who thinks that we already fully understand the basic laws of learning in children. In fact, some very fundamental questions remain to be answered. For example, at the time when studies of classical conditioning all but disappeared from the literature, controversy still remained concerning the existence of evidence for Pavlovian conditioning in newborns (Fitzgerald & Brackbill, 1976). Even those who answer in the affirmative would have to agree that we know little about the parameters of such conditioning in infants and children, though classical conditioning plays an especially important role in the early years of life. In any event, reports of our current state of knowledge regarding such basic forms of learning are notably absent in current textbooks. The answers to the remaining questions would all appear to be a qualified “yes.” The new questions posed by cognitive psychology were very exciting, and we have seen a huge growth of innovative and productive research that increases our understanding of how children acquire language, solve problems, develop strategies, think quantitatively, and in general acquire knowledge about

the world around them. The oldel questions concerning how children become conditioned, how they generalize that conditioning to new stimuli, and how they learn to discriminate the stimuli in their environment did seem to pale in comparison. The absence of discussions of basic learning over the past IS years probably has convinced some that such processes are indeed unimportant to our understanding of child behavior. To some degree, we also did seem t o reach dead ends in studying learning, sometimes for practical reasons whcn we could not get enough child subjects of the appropriate ages, sometimes for methodological reasons when our paradigms seemed unable to help us settle controversies, and perhaps most often for theoretical reasons when our existing theories seemed inadequate for the task at hand. A good example of the theoretical problems that arose comes from the literature on the development of strategies by children in the context of discrimination learning. The associative theories were not well equipped to handle the development of strategic behavior. and the cognitive theories were not well equipped to handle the pre-strategy learning of younger children (Spiker & Cantor, 1983). Although several promising attempts were made to modify and extend the scope of both types of theory, little empirical work has been done to advance these theories. In certain areas, particularly verbal learning and memory, we have in fact continued to study many of the xanie phenomena, but have traded the language of stimulus-response (S-R) theories (c.g.. associations, verbal mediation) for the language of information-processing theories (e.g., encoding, storage. retrieval). Certainly in the area of short-term memory, we have made enormous progress and built upon existing knowledge. However, problems of long-term memory, or what used to be called verbal learning, have to some extent fallen by the wayside. In our view, the time has conie to return to the study of all types of learning in children. In part this is a call to return to unfinished business, but perhaps just as important is the need to integrate existing information on learning with the important new findings in cognitivc development. We need also to return to a greater emphasis on the developmcnt of theories that will integrate existing knowledge and direct the search l o r new knowledge. Finally, we need to incorporate summaries of existing knowlcrlge of all types of learning in our textbooks so that new investigators will have the benefit of building upon what is already known. We are encouraged to note that increasing attention is being given to learning within the context of cognitive psychology. For example, Stevenson (1983) suggests that cognitive psychologists go beyond describing states of knowledge and begin studying the acquisition o f these states. Also noteworthy is a recent text, Learning in Children, edited by Hisanz. Bisanz, and Kail (1983), in which

Joun H . Cantor uud Charles C. Spikrr

I24

cognitive psychologists discuss the important role played by learning in cognitive theorizing (e.g., Rrainerd, 1983) and in gathering information about cognitive behavior (e.g., Linder & Siegel, 1983). Indeed, Siegler (1983) predicts that learning will be reemphasized in information-processing approaches to development and that “Developmentalists will be in the forefront of this movement because of the inherent connections between learning and development.” (p. 20 1 ) An important first step in renewing our study of learning is to review our state of knowledge about the various types of learning, reassess our successes and failures, and see what additional steps need to be taken to advance our knowledge in these areas, In the remainder of this paper, we will take our own advice and provide such a review with respect to discrimination learning.

11.

A Review of Phenomena Explained by the Modified Spence Theory

In the first volume of Advances in Child Development and Behavior, published 25 years ago, Spiker (1963) presented his first of several extensions of Spence’s 1936- 1937 discrimination learning theory (Spence, 1936, 1937). It seems therefore especially appropriate on this occasion to examine the scope of this theory after two and a half decades. We will not attempt here to provide comprehensive coverage, either with respect to exhausting the theorems that might be deduced from the theory or with respect to the research that bears on any particular hypothesis. Rather, we emphasize the theorems that we consider crucial and we make reference to illustrative experiments bearing on the theoretical hypotheses. We deliberately avoid quantitative derivations. Instead, qualitative descriptions are provided of a range of phenomena that are encompassed by the theory. Although we make some use of equations in stating predictions from the theory, we refer the reader to previous publications for the derivations of equations. The remainder of the paper has four divisions. The first section contains a listing of the original Spence assumptions, together with an overview of the empirical phenomena that Spence explained by means of these axioms. The second section describes modifications of the theory by certain quantitative refinements introduced by Hull (1952, pp. 59-99) and by Spiker’s hypothesis concerning the interaction of components in multidimensional compounds. This section also contains descriptions of the phenomena newly explained by the stimulus interaction hypothesis. The third section treats the introduction of differential cue-producing responses in an attempt to extend the scope of the theory to encompass attentional phenomena and the discrimination learning of articulate subjects, including older children and adults. In the final section, wc provide our

evaluation of the successes and tailure\ of the theory and a view toward future development of the theory. A.

T H I O I I I G I N A I ~SPENCE THEORY

In summarizing the original Spcnce axioms, for the convenience of all concerned, we use teninology from later formulations by Spence or Hull. For example, reference is made to increments in habit and in inhibition rather than to the increments and decrements i n excitatory tendencies to which Spence referred in 1936. 1.

The Basic Axioms

1. If a subject approaches ;I stimulus compound and is reinforced, an increment will occur in the strength o f the habit between the approach response and each component in the compound that is impinging upon the subject's sensory receptors. 2. Similarly, if a subject approaches a stimulus cumpound and is not reinforced, an increment will occur in the strength of the inhibition between the approach response and each component in the compound that is impinging on the subject's sensory receptors. 3. The strength of the habit or inhibition conditioned to a given value on a specific dimension (i.e., component) that generalizes to other (test) values on that dimension is a decreasing function of the distance between the conditioned component and the test values. 4. The excitatory tendency t o approach a stimulus component is the sum of the directly conditioned and generalized habit minus the sum of the directly conditioned and generalized inhibition for that component. (It should be noted that Spence did not formally consider the role of motivation in his earliest treatments of discrimination learning. Thus, the excitatory tendency of a given component is the difference between the total habit and the total inhibition for that component; i.e., E = H I.) 5 . The excitatory tendency to approach a given stimulus compound is the sum of the excitatory tendencies of each of its components. 6. When twc simultaneously presented stimulus compounds tend to elicit mutually incompatible responses, the probability of responding to the compound with the stronger excitatory tendency will be greater than that to the compound with the weaker tendency. When the difference in excitatory strengths of the two compounds exceeds a certain (unspecified) value, the subject will respond with unit probability to the compound with the greater strength (Spence, 1937, footnote 7). ~

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2.

Discussion The titles of the 1936-1937 papers indicated clearly that Spence did not consider his theory appropriate for human subjects. Moreover, he obviously considered it no more than the skeleton of a theory for the discrimination behavior of infrahuman subjects, judging from his explicit consideration, in both text and footnotes, of details of the experimental arrangements not mentioned in the theory. With these apparently simple axioms, nevertheless, he was able to derive an amazing number of phenomena concerned with the behavior of animals in simultaneous discrimination problems. The apparent simplicity of Spence’s axioms, however, is deceptive. Presentday psychologists are fully aware of the difficulties involved in developing a mathematically tractable theory of discrimination behavior that is based on the assumptions that (a) there is a probabilistic occurrence of the correct and incorrect responses and (b) the state of learning is differentially affected by a correct or incorrect response on a given trial. Spence’s theory included not only the assumption that the increment in habit strength resulting from a correct response at a certain stage of learning would most likely be different from the increment in inhibitory strength resulting from an incorrect response at that stage, but also the assumption that the increment in either habit or inhibitory strength is dependent on the stage of learning. As a consequence, the theory permits the prediction of different subsequent performance levels for two identical subjects who have each made rn correct and k incorrect responses, provided that their patterns of correct and incorrect choices differ, a property of models often referred to as “path dependent” (Sternberg, 1959, p. 3 14ff). Despite potential mathematical complications of the theory, Spence was successful in explaining numerous phenomena by means of the theory. making extensive use of geometrical and arithmetical techniques. His general strategy was to show that the selection of certain numerical values for the parameters in the theory would permit the prediction of the correct directions of experimental results. Although he estimated parameters for equations describing performance in classical and instrumental conditioning experiments (Spence, 1956), he apparently did not do so for discrimination learning experiments. Indeed, he does not seem to have worked out general prediction equations for discrimination learning problems that would have permitted the estimation of theoretical parameters. A brief summary of the major phenomena accounted for by the Spence theory will now be presented, as well as a description of the explanatory failures that dictated the need for modification of the axioms. Throughout the remainder of the paper, reference is made to discrimination problems with two alternatives unless otherwise stipulated. u. Simultuneous Discrimination Learning. Spence’s original formulation received its widest application to the type of problem that has come to be known

as the simultaneous discrimination problem. The simultaneous problem is one in which the cues from the relevant dimension ( e . g . , brightness) vary within each setting type (trial) and are differentially reinforced. Typically, the positive cue (e.g., black) from the relevant dimension is reinforced 100%of the time and the negative cue (e.g., white) is never reinforced. The problem is arranged so that all dimensions other than the relevant onc(s) are uncorrelated with reinforcement and, therefore, irrelevant to the solution. In his first publication on the theory. Spence (1936) showed how the theory leads to the prediction that the subject will learn a simultaneous discrimination problem. Through consistent rcinforcenient of the compound that contains the positive cue and consistent nonreinforcement of the compound containing the negative cue, the difference in excitatory tendencies for the two components increases over trials. The Spence theory can also predict that performance improves as the number of redundant relevant dimensions is increased. Furthermore, the axiom that specifies the generalization of habit and inhibition permits the derivation that the rate of acquiring a discrimination will depend on the similarity of the relevant cues, with increased similarity producing a more difficult task. The theory predicts that infrahurnan sub.jects can learn simultaneous problems involving three or more alternatives. provided the cues on the relevant dimension are sufficiently distinctive. Whether the three-choice problem will be more difficult than a two-choice problem depends in part upon the distinctiveness of the relevant cues. In general, multiple-choicc discriminations requiring the selection of an intermediate stimulus are predicted to be more difficult than two-choice problems with comparable similarity of the positive and negative cues. Spence’s theory proved to be an even richer source of hypotheses concerning transfer of training than with respect to original learning. Certainly, the most impressive, powerful uses of the theory have been concerned with transfer. In one of the first applications, Spence (1936) showed that the theory can be used to predict the well-established learning-to-learn phenomenon in discrimination learning; that is, subjects who have had previous experience in such tasks perform better than those without such experience. The theory also predicts that a previously acquired preference for the relevant negative cue will retard the acquisition of a discrimination, provided that the learning of the interfering preference was not accompanied by an equalization of the spatial tendencies. This prediction motivated the series of experiments conducted in the 1930s and 1940s concerned with what is now known as the continuity-noncontinuity issue. Typically, these experiments involved the reversal of reward contingencies in a discrimination task after the subjects had received several trials but before their performance had departed from the chance level. Generally, the findings indicated that the reversal produced a slower acquisition.

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Without question, the most notable achievement of the Spence theory was in providing an explanation for transposition. Spence (1937) showed that the assumption that habit and inhibition accrue to the components of a stimulus conipound, rather than to any relations holding among the compounds, can be used to derive the occurrence of transposition involving two alternatives. Moreover, his theory also predicted that the percentage of transposition would decrease as a function of the distinctiveness between the set of test compounds and the set of compounds on which original training was given. With the same basic assumptions, Spence derived the hypothesis that transposition will not occur for problems requiring choice of the intermediate of three stimuli and presented evidence obtained from chimpanzees to support the prediction (Spence, 1942). Although the preceding discussion does not exhaust the list of phenomena involving simultaneous discrimination learning that are explained by the Spence theory, it includes the most frequently cited and, therefore, perhaps, the most important of them. One of the most serious difficulties encountered by the Spence theory in connection with the simultaneous problem concerns the effects of adding irrelevant dimensions to the problem. For example, in a black-white discrimination problem, the introduction of irrelevant form cues (e.g., circles and squares) that are uncorrelated with reward produces a more difficult problem for both humans and infrahumans. Spence did show that, under certain conditions, the theory would predict the development of systematic and relatively persistent choice of an irrelevant cue, such as the strong position preferences often manifested by infrahuman subjects. Nevertheless, the theory does not in a direct way predict that problem difficulty is an increasing function of the number of irrelevant dimensions and the distinctiveness of the cues on such dimensions. b. Successive and Conditional Discrimination Problems. In contrast to the simultaneous problem, the successive discrimination problem does not have a single dimension that is correlated with reinforcement. For example, in a blackwhite discrimination administered by the successive technique, both stimulus compounds might be black on one setting type and both white on the second type. The subject might be reinforced for selecting the right-hand compound when the black setting is given and for selecting the left compound when the white setting is presented. Under these conditions, neither the spatial nor the brightness dimension is correlated with reward. The conditional discrimination problem is closely related to the successive problem in that no single dimension is correlated with reward. Again, two dimensions are needed to specify a correct choice, but in the conditional problem, both dimensions are nonspatial. For example, the subject might be required to select the large stimulus when both are black. and to select the small stimulus when both are white. Spatial cues are uncorrelated with reward.

As will be explained in the next section, the original Spence theory had to be modified in order to explain the occurrence of learning in these and related problems. B

THE HYPOTHESIS 01-STIMULUS INTERACTION

Teas and Bitterman (1952) deduced from the 1936-1937 Spence theory the interesting hypothesis that the successive discrimination learning problem cannot be learned. The hypothesis was o f interest because it was generally known at that time that several different infrahuman species could solve such problems. The difficulty that the successive problem provides for the theory stems from the fact that no single cue is consistently reinforced in the successive problem. Teas and Bitterman showed algebraically that when such a condition is obtained, the theory predicts that a stable difference will not develop between the strengths of the excitatory tendencies of the two compounds presented on a trial. In an article published only two months before the Teas and Bitterman paper appeared, Spence ( 1952) anticipated the difficulty that they subsequently identified. He proposed that under certain conditions, habit and inhibition accrue to compounds per se. He indicated that the patterning phenomenon will occur “only when no one of the cue members is systematically reinforced more than the other” (Spence, 1952, p. 90). This statement appears to leave the original formulation in effect for simultaneous discrimination problems. Birch and Vandenberg (1955) proposed an extension of Spence’s analysis. They suggested that, in addition t o the components stipulated in the original Spence formulation, there are patterned components. Thus, for a white stimulus in the left position, the components are S,, S,, and S,, the last representing the patterned component. In a simultaneous black-white discrimination, both types of components are differentially reinforced. In the corresponding successive problem, only the patterncd components receive differential reinforcement. This analysis leads to the prediction that the successive problem will be more difficult to learn than the simultaneous problem. Spence did not appear to be entirely satisfied with this two-level theory. He noted that Hull would probably have preterred to analyze the successive problem in terms of the afferent neural interaction hypothesis, and he provided the schema for such an analysis (Spence, 1952. p. 90). Spiker (1963), also dissatisfied with the lack of parsimony of the two-level theory and concerned about the potential complexity of the patterned cornponents o f Birch and Vandenberg, published a modification of Hull’s afferent neural interaction hypothesis, together with some arithmetical demonstrations of the resultant enlarged scope of the theory. The stimulus interaction hypothesis, which will be explicated in detail below, stipulates that the amount of habit or inhibition generalizing from one compound to another along a single dimension is a decreasing function, not only of the dis-

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tinctiveness of the pair of values on the dimension in question, but also of the distinctiveness of pairs of values on all dimensions that the two compounds have in common. The arithmetical demonstrations were designed to show that incorporation of the principle into the Spence axioms permitted the conclusions that the successive problem, as well as other problems involving a conditional reaction, could be learned and that several other compounding or patterning phenomena could be explained by such a theory. The use of arithmetical methods to analyze the role of variables in complex functions is a technique that is treacherous at best. Even with the aid of highspeed computers, we soon became aware that adequate understanding of the implications of the theory would require the development of a version of the theory that was more tractable mathematically. The adoption of a few simplifying assumptions permitted the derivation of some quantitative expressions for discrimination performance that proved to have some rather remarkable properties, including that of relative mathematical simplicity (Spiker, 1970, 1971; Spiker & Cantor, 1973). In the next section, we will attempt to achieve two somewhat incompatible goals. On the one hand, we wish to provide readers who do not already know the details of the theory with a set of molar equations, which we hope will be mnemonically comfortable and user friendly and which they can use to follow the theoretical deductions. On the other hand, we want to ensure that those readers who have previously encountered the theory will be able to identify the new equations with the more molecular equations of earlier publications. Readers in the former category may, therefore. read the next two or three paragraphs without being overly concerned about a possibly limited understanding, whereas readers of the second class may be able to recognize and even recall equations for the earlier context. One of the main tasks in developing a theory of discrimination learning is to find concise ways of discussing the similarity among multidimensional stimuli. In a theory like Spence’s, application of the theory represents a major bookkeeping operation in that one must keep account of the increments of habit and inhibition to each of the dimensional components, as well as the generalization of these increments back and forth among the dimensional components. The notation adopted in the following paragraphs was designed to facilitate this task.

I. Additional Assumptions In this section, s is used to represent the value that a stimulus compound (i .e., a multidimensional stimulus) has on a given stimulus dimension ( e . g . , light gray on the brightness dimension) and d is used to represent the absolute difference between the values that two stimulus compounds have on a given dimension (e.g., the difference between light gray and dark gray). The subscript i refers to the ith dimension. The subscripts, j and k , refer to stimulus compounds. Using

this notation, we can state the principles of primary stimulus generalization and stimulus interaction in Sections 1 ,a and I ,b below. a. Primary Stimulus Generalizatiori. Let sj, represent the value of compound j on dimension i and sik thc value of compound k on dimension i, where the two values lie on the unit interval and are chosen so as to be positively related to the psychophysically scaled values of the two compounds with respect to dimension i. Let d,, be the absolute diffcrence between sli and s,.The principle of stimulus generalization assumes that the amount of habit or inhibition that generalizes between compounds , j and k on dimension i is a linear decreasing function of dijk. b. Stimulus Interaction. The principle of stimulus interaction stipulates that the amount of habit or inhibition that generalizes between two compounds on dimension i is also a decreasing function of the average distinctiveness of the two compounds on all dimensions. Let be the amount of habit that generalizes from compound k to compound j o n dimension i. Let H I , be the amount of habit that has been directly conditioned to dimension i of compound k . Let n be the number of dimensions the two compounds have in common. Then, combining assumptions 1 and 2,

where the first two terms to the right of the equality represent the principle of primary stimulus generalization and the last term represents the stimulus interaction principle. To simplify derivations, we assumed that habit and inhibition generalize according to the same equation. Thus, Eq. ( I ) , with the substitution of I,jA and I,, for HCjhand H,, respectively, is assumed to describe the generalization of inhibition.

c. Performance Rule. The rule used by Spence (1936) to convert a difference between two excitatory tendencies into a probability was not completely explicit. Hull (1952, p. 26) subsequently provided an explicit principle to obtain a normal deviate by dividing the difference between two excitatory tendencies by its standard error. The standard error, in turn, is obtained from the standard deviations of the two distributions of momentary excitatory tendencies. The normal deviate may then be converted to a probability through the normal distribution function. d. Eyuality of Component H u b i t s and Inhibitions. The derivations of performance equations, and the equations themselves, are greatly simplified on the

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assumption that the components in a stimulus compound receive equal increments in habit strength following reinforcement and equal increments in inhibitory strength following nonreinforcement. Unlike the first three assumptions, this one is made only to simplify derivations and is not considered a part of the basic theoretical structure.

e. Constancy qf Motivation. On the assumption that motivation does not vary from group to group in an experiment on discrimination learning, the value of the motivational variable (for Hull, drive) can be set at a constant, unit value. This assumption is solely for convenience in derivations and is not intended to preclude application of the theory to experiments in which motivation is experimentally manipulated. Basic Performance Equations Equation ( I ) gives the amount of habit that would generalize to compound; on dimension i as a result of reinforcing responses to compound k . To obtain the total habit that generalizes from compound k to compound j on all dimensions, Eq. ( I ) must be summed over all n dimensions that the two compounds have in common. Moreover, in a discrimination problem, two or more compounds are reinforced and two or more are not reinforced. To get the total strength of habit generalizing to compound; from all sources, Eq. ( 1 ) must be summed over all K compounds in the problem. The same considerations apply to the computation of inhibitory strength for any given compound. To obtain the total excitatory strength of compoundj, under the assumption of unit motivation, its total inhibitory strength is subtracted from its total habit strength. Finally, to obtain the difference in excitatory strengths of two compounds. say j and f, one of their total excitatory strengths must be subtracted from the other. The result of this final subtraction is shown in the following equation (cf. Spiker, 1970, Eq. 6. p. 501):

2.

in which the various symbols have the meanings assigned in the foregoing discussion. Equation (2a) is a general formula for performance in discrimination problems involving two alternatives. With it, specific performance equations can be derived for several different types of discrimination problems, including the simultaneous problems, and several types o f transfer problems. Interestingly, an equation analogous to Eq. (2a) can be deduced from the theory, ignoring the stimulus interaction term [i.e., the final parenthetical expression in Eq. ( I ) ] . The result, shown below, is the corresponding implication of Spence’s original formulation:

I33

Equation (2b) indicates clearly that the stimulus interaction hypothesis is confined to the last parenthetical expression of Eq. (2a).

3. Implications Given basic performance equations like those of the preceding section, equations can be derived relatively easily t o express clearly the main implications of the theory. These explicit expressions will have been achieved at a price-the simplification will purchase performance equations that do not contain all the implications of the theory. A more detailed discussion of this point will be presented after we have dealt with some of the more obvious implications of the theoretical assumptions, including thc hypothesis of stimulus interaction. The primary emphasis is on those deductions that pertain to well-established phenomena. a . The Simultaneous P rohlcwi. For simultaneous discrimination problems in which the setting types are eclu;illy often presented and for which the theory does not predict differential pcrlornmance on the setting typzs, an additional assumption permits the derivation of the performance equation in an especially simple form. Loosely translated. the umption is that the subject learns as much from the presentation of one setting type as from presentation of any other. More technically, the assumption is that the sum, consisting of the habit strength conditioned to each component of the positive compound plus the inhibitory strength conditioned to each conrponent of the negative compound, is equal for all setting types. When Eq. (?a) is expanded for different types of simultaneous problems, under the special assumption. the result is an equation in n relatively simple, almost intuitive, form. To take advantage of and highlight this simplicity. we will employ a mnemonic set of symbols. Let the sum of a set of (1 values be designated by D . Then the sun1 of all d values for the relevant dimensions for two stimulus compounds will be designated D,,, and the sum of all tt values for the irrelevant dimensions for two stimulus compounds will be designated Di,,. Let the sum of the habit and inhibition conditioned to the two stimulus compounds by trial t be designated by ( H + I),. If the sum of the number o f relevant and irrelevant dimensions that the two compounds have in common is designated by t7, then the equation giving the difference in total excitatory potential for the positive and negative compounds of any setting by trial t is as follows:

This equation was derived in an earlier publication (Spiker, 1970, Eq. 8, p. 503).

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When the original Spence equation (2b) is expanded for simultaneous discrimination problems, thereby omitting the stimulus interaction hypothesis, using the notational system developed above, the equation becomes

where the symbols have the same meanings as in Eq. (3a). Equation (3a) implies that performance on the simultaneous problem should be an increasing function of the number of relevant dimensions and of the distinctiveness of cues on these dimensions. In an unpublished experiment, Lubker (Spiker, 1971, pp. 123ff.) presented evidence for the first expectation and the second prediction is by now well established (e.g., Spiker & Lubker, 1964, 1965). Both predictions are also contained in Eq. (3b), which was derived without the stimulus interaction hypothesis. Equation (3a) also indicates that performance should be a decreasing function of the number of irrelevant dimensions and of the distinctiveness of cues on such dimensions. Lubker (1967, 1969a) found evidence for the first of these expectations. Although Spiker and Lubker (1964, Experiment IV) reported trends favoring the second prediction. the differences were not statistically reliable. In this connection, as already noted, Spence’s original formulation predicted interference from irrelevant dimensions only if the subject had, or developed, a preference for one of the irrelevant cues. Equations (3a) and (3b) both imply that discrimination performance is improved following either a correct or an incorrect choice, because both H and I appear and are summed. G. N. Cantor and Spiker (1954) found that variation in the number of forced incorrect choices affected the performance of preschool children in the predicted manner.

b. The Successive Problem. As previously noted, the successive discrimination problem does not have a dimension that is consistently reinforced. The phrase, “relevant dimension,” therefore, must be given a different meaning for such problems. A relevant dimension in the successive problem is one that, when taken in conjunction with the spatial cues or with any cues confounded with position, can be used to classify the positive and negative compounds. Thus, in a successive discrimination with brightness relevant, the correct choice may be left when both stimuli are white and right when both stimuli are black. The positive compounds are, therefore, white-left and black-right, the negative compounds, white-right and black-left. Another way to look at this type of problem is that one of the cues, position, varies within the trial, whereas the other cue, brightness, varies between trials. Let us use Dw.relto represent the sum of all d values that vary within trials andD,.,, to represent all the cues that vary between trials. Then when

Eq. (3a) is expanded for successive problems, under the same assumptions that we used for the simultaneous problem, the form of the equation is

This equation was derived in an earlier publication (Spiker, 1970, Eq. 10, p. 504) and it indicates that the problem can be solved provided the sums of the d values for the relevant between-trial anti relevant within-trial dimensions are both greater than 0. Furthermore, the more distinctive the values on these dimensions, the faster will performance improve. When an attempt is made to cxpand the Spence equation (3b) for the successive problem, the result is

which confirms the conclusion of Teas and Bitterman ( 1952) that Spence's original formulation predicts that the successive problem cannot be learned by infrahuman subjects. Equation (4) indicates that performance on the successive problem is expected to be an increasing function of the number of relevant between-trial dimensions and of the distinctiveness of cues on such dimensions. Lubker (1969b) provided evidence for the first of these prcdictions. Evidence for the second was obtained by Lipsitt (1961, Experiment 3 ) and by Spiker and Lubker (1965). Performance is also predicted to be an increasing function of the number of dimensions that are confounded with the spatial dimension (i.e., relevant within-trial dimensions) and of the distinctiveness of cues on such dimensions. An experiment by Price and Spiker ( 1967) offers some evidence favoring both predictions. Spiker and Lubker (1965) reported results consistcnt with the second expectation, although the data were not statistically reliable. Analysis of Eqs. (3a) and (4) shows that performance on the successive problem will be inferior to that on the corresponding simultaneous problem (Spiker, 1970, p . 50.5). The empirical evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of this expectation (e.g., Lipsitt, 1961; Spiker & Lubker, 1965). Because Eq. (4) does not contain any reference to irrelevant dimensions, the expectation is that irrelevant cues will not affect performance o n the successive problem, a prediction that is contrary to the only data known t o the writers (Tragakis, 1975). Tragakis used elementary school children as subjects. A comparison of Eqs. (3a) and (4) leads to still another prediction. In the simultaneous problem, the spatial cues, and any cues confounded with the spatial cues, are irrelevant and the distinctiveness of such cues appears in Eq. (33) as an interfering variable. For the successive problem, the same factors appear in the performance equation as facilitating variables. These considerations lead to the

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prediction that the superiority of the simultaneous problem over the successive problem will be a decreasing function of the distinctiveness of the spatial cues, a prediction confirmed by the experiment of Price and Spiker (1967).

c. The Combined Simultatzeous-Succes,~i~ic Problem. One can construct a discrimination problem that has combined features of a simultaneous and a successive problem (Spiker & Lubker, 1964). Such a problem includes at least one relevant dimension in the simultaneous sense, at least one relevant betweentrial dimension, and at least one relevant within-trial dimension. When Eq. (2a) is expanded for such problems. the result is an equation that combines features of Eqs. (3a) and (4):

The derivation of an equation for this problem was given by Spiker (1970, pp. 507ff.). This type of problem was apparently developed by Bitterman and his colleagues (e.g., Teas & Bitterman, 1952), who referred to it as a “two-situational problem.” Bitterman was particularly interested in the transfer that occurred from training on such a problem to performance on the lateral reversals of the settings. because he believed that the nature of such transfer would provide information as to whether such problems were learned on a relational or a configurational basis. Equation ( 5 ) shows that performance on problems involving both relevant simultaneous cues and relevant successive cues is an increasing function of the number and distinctiveness of such cues. Spiker and Lubker (1964) have found performance on these problems to be an increasing function of the distinctiveness of both types of relevant dimensions. A comparison of Eq. ( 5 ) with Eqs. (3a) and (4) indicates that performance on the combined problem should be superior to either the corresponding simultaneous or the corresponding successive problem, a prediction borne out in an unpublished experiment by Lubker (Spiker, 197 I , pp. 123ff.). Spiker ( 1970, pp. 507ff.) has previously shown that the results of experiments testing transfer from the combined simultaneous problem to other situations can be derived from the theory. Research indicates that training on the two-situational problem results in transfer to the lateral-reversal settings such that subjects prefer the originally reinforced position-a phenomenon that has been called cue-position compounding (Spence, 1952). Experiments by Teas and Bitterman (1952), Birch and Vandenberg ( 1 9 5 3 , and Liu and Zeiler (1968) have all demonstrated this phenomenon. Moreover, the tendency toward cue-position compounding is theoretically an increasing function of the amount of training on the

original two-situational problem. a prediction supported in an experiment by Lubker (1964). The amount o f cue-position compounding is expected to be an increasing function of the similarity 01' the within-setting relevant cues, as was demonstrated in an experiment by White and Spiker (1960). Although no relevant evidence exists, the theory also predicts that the amount of cue-position compounding will be an increasing function of the distinctiveness of the cues on the dimension that varies between settings. d. The Conditional Reuction Problem. As noted before, the conditional reaction problem is another problem in which no single cue is reinforced more frequently than any other. For example. when both compounds on a given setting are black, subjects might be reinforced i'or choosing the large one, irrespective of position, and when both compounds are white, they might be reinforced for choosing the small one. The correct compounds may be designated by largeblack and small-white. Expansion of Eq. ( l a ) for such problems gives an equation which resembles that for the successive problem:

The derivation of this equation was also given by Spiker (1970, pp. 506ff.). Equation (6) implies that performance on the conditional reaction problem will depend on the number and the distinctiveness of the relevant cues that vary between settings. In two experiments with children, Moyt (1960, 1962) found performance to be better when the conditional cues were distinctive than when they were similar. N o experiments have been reported, however, in which the number of conditional cues has been manipulated. Equation (6) also implies that pertimilance on the conditional reaction problem will be an increasing function o i the number and the distinctiveness of the relevant cues that vary within settings. Although these factors are expected to affect performance on the conditional reaction problem in much the same way as they affect performance on the simultaneous problem, no direct empirical support can be offered for the prediction at the present time.

4.

Transfer of Training A number of important detluctions from the theory involve the transfer of training from one discrimination task to another. The general form oI the prediction equations applicable to such situations will now be described. In the paradigm of concern here, subjects are trained to perform on a simultaneous black-white problem and then transferred to a successive black-white problem. The compounds would be identical in the two tasks; only the arrangement of compounds into settings and the reinforcement contingencies would differ. According to the principle governing summation of component habit and

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inhibitory strengths, the total excitatory strength of compoundj on trial t of Task 2 is the sum of that which obtained by the end of Task 1 and that developed in Task 2 by trial t. Using the mnemonic symbolism introduced earlier, we can express the difference in total excitatory potential for the positive and negative compounds of any setting by trial t in Task 2 by the formula:

The term on the left-hand side of the equation is the predicted total E difference at any point in the learning of Task 2; the first term on the right-hand side is the E difference that was transferred from Task 1; and the final term is the E difference that has accrued at that point by virtue of training in Task 2. Using the logic of Eq. (7), Spiker (1971, pp. 103-104, 143-147) and Spiker and Cantor (1973) have derived the prediction equations for a number of transfer paradigms. One important set of deductions involves the prediction of differential performance for various types of settings or “subproblems” in a number of discrimination-shift paradigms. Additional implications of the transfer equations will be discussed in a later section.

5. Hidden Implications We noted at the beginning of Section II,B,3 that simplifications of the theoretical deductions were achieved at the price of losing some of the implications of the theory. We will now illustrate what was meant by this assertion. As an example, let us consider the term ( H + I ) , o f Eqs. (3a)-(6). Since both habit strength and inhibitory strength are included in this term, every trial contributes to this sum, either by increasing H or by increasing I . Clearly, therefore, ( H + I ) , increases monotonically across trials. The exact naturc of this function, however, cannot be specified in terms of the theory. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the theory without the simplifying assumptions implies that two identical subjects may perform at different levels following m correct and k incorrect choices, provided only that the patterns of their correct and incorrect choices differ, a property that model builders refer to as “path dependent.” Because the pattern of correct and incorrect choices does in fact affect the level of performance, at least under some conditions, this is an important implication for any theory of discrimination to have, regardless of the mathematical difficulties involved. Although the implication is not explicit in the performance equations, it may be recovered in part by recognizing that the growth of (H + I ) , over trials might be different for two identical subjects who have different patterns of correct and incorrect choices. Some qualitative implications of the theory can be determined simply by analyzing the performance equations. For example, as noted in Section lI,B,3,a, analysis of Eq. (3a) indicates that performance on a simultaneous problem is

expected to be an increasing function of the number of relevant dimensions and of the distinctiveness of cues on such dimensions. Or, again as noted in Section 1I,B,3,c, comparison of Eqs. (4) and ( 5 ) reveals that the combined simultaneous-successive problem is predicted to be easier to learn than is the corresponding successive problem. Other implications of the theory can be determined only if values of the parameters are available. Thus, in an experiment in which one group learns a brightness discrimination and a second group learns a form discrimination, the relative performances of the two groups can be predicted only if the relative distinctiveness of the two sets of cues is known. One way in which the values of the parameters can be obtained is through fitting the theory to the experimental data by parameter estimation. As previously pointed out, Spence often explained a given phenomenon by showing that permissible values of his parameters would permit derivation of the phenomenon in question. The estimation of parameters for the performance equations is viewed as a refinement of that procedure. Given the maximum likelihood or least-squares estimates of the parameters, one can often show that the theory accounts for the main trends in the data. In addition, one can usually make a quantitative assessment of the goodness of fit of the theory to the data. Because the equations are only approximations, having been derived with the aid of simplifying assumptions, the latter goal is obviously of only secondary concern. To illustrate the general nature of thc parameter estimation, suppose simultaneous problems are being used i n an experiment with stimuli varying in size and color, and with different subgroups varying in the similarity of values on these dimensions. Parameters are estimated for the rate of learning and for the distinctiveness of the similar size cues, the dissimilar size cues, the similar color cues, and the dissimilar color cues. These parameter estimates are then used to generate theoretical learning curves for cach group of subjects. Comparison of the theoretical learning curves with the obtained performance curves permits a determination of the percentage o f the observed variability that is accounted for by the theory. Attempts to estimate parameters in this way have succeeded in accounting for impressive proportions of the total variability (Spiker, 1970, 1971; Spiker & Cantor, 1973, 1977a; Spiker, Croll, & Miller, 1972). For example, for two studies in which performance i n simultaneous and successive problems is compared (Price & Spiker, 1967; Spiker & Lubker, 1965), the theory can account for 90% of the variability among the 36 data points in the first study and 96% of the variability among the 56 data points in the second study. The mean absolute deviation between predicted and observed proportions of correct responses is .038 and ,025, respectively (Spiker. 1971). In additional tests of the stimulus interaction hypothesis (Spiker, 1971, Spiker & Lubker, 1964), the theory can account for between 80% and 91% of the variability, with mean absolute devia-

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tions between predicted and observed proportions ranging between ,040 and ,056.

6.

Summary

The addition of the hypothesis of stimulus interaction to the original Spence axioms led to a significant increase in the scope of the theory. Spence’s important derivations were preserved, including the derivation of transposition, and many additional phenomena were explained. The most important of the new theorems are those concerned with the successive discrimination problem, the conditional reaction problem, and stimulus compounding in general. The derivation of an unambiguous interfering effect of irrelevant dimensions on the simultaneous problem is another important consequence of the new axiom. Finally. the quantitative development of the theory greatly increased the precision with which predictions can be made. C.

DIFFERENTIAL CUE-PRODUCING RESPONSES

Despite the increase in scope, several new lines of evidence pointing to the importance of attentional phenomena in both humans and infrahumans indicated that the theory required further modification. One such compelling set of findings indicates that simultaneous problems containing irrelevant dimensions varying within trials are much more difficult to learn than are those containing irrelevant dimensions varying between trials (Lubker, 1967, 1969a; Spiker & Lubker, 1964, Experiment IV). The theory was unable to account for these results, because the simultaneous prediction equation, Eq. (3a), does not differentiate between the two types of irrelevant dimensions. Spiker and Lubker pointed to potential attentional qualities of within-trial irrelevant dimensions as a possible explanation. A second compelling line of research involving such attentional phenomena includes results from a variety of transfer paradigms showing that dimensional responses learned in one task transfer to the learning of subsequent simultaneous discrimination tasks. In one of the earliest experimental investigations of attentional phenomena in infrahuman subjects, Lawrence (1949, 1950) showed that rats perform better on a second discrimination if they have first learned a discrimination involving the same relevant dimension than if they have first learned a discrimination involving a different relevant dimension. The results strongly suggested that some kind of positive dimensional transfer occurs when the same dimension is relevant in the two tasks and that some kind of negative dimensional transfer occurs when the relevant dimensions in the two tasks differ. The same phenomenon, or one highly related, was demonstrated in an experiment with human adults by Eckstrand and Wickens (1954), who showed that they could produce either

positive or negative transfer on a task depending on whether a series of preceding tasks had involved the same o r ;I different relevant dimension. A very large literature on discrimination shift learning originated in a controversy between Buss and Kendlei- (e.g.. Buss, 1953; H. H . Kendlcr & D’Aniato. 1955) within the context of humari concept formation. The initial comparisons of reversal and nonreversal shifts with human adults were followed by studies of infrahumans, children, and adults in ;I wide variety of shift paradigms including optional, intradimensional. and extradimensional shifts (for a review. see Esposito, 1975). Especially convincing evidence of’ dimensional responding is provided by the study of intradimensional and extradimensional shifts (e.g., Kemler & Shepp, 1971; Shepp & Gray, 1971), i n which instrumental transfer is controlled by changing the specific dimensional values between tasks. Speaking somewhat loosely, the evidence indicates that a subject can be trained to attend to the values of the relevant dimension in the first task. If that dimension remains relevant in the second task, second-task peri’orniance is facilitated; if that dimension becomes irrelevant in the second task, pcrformance is impaired. Comparable results come from verbal pretraining studics (Spiker, 1971) in which children are trained to label the values of a dimension that subsequently becomes either the relevant or the irrelevant dimension in ;I simultaneous task. This large accumulation of research provides compelling evidence for the role of dimensional responding of sonic sort, not only for human subjects, but for infrahuman as well. The theory outlined o n the preceding pages does not permit the deduction of the important phenomena associated with dimensional transfer. Accordingly, some revision ot o r addition to the theory was required. One possibility was to include in the theory a concept of attention of the type adopted by several theorists ( e . g . , ‘I’~-ahasso& Bower, 1968; Zeaman & House, 1963). Spiker (1971), however, chose to develop a mechanism that appears to be historically more consonant with the spirit of the original Spence formulation and of Hull-Spence theory in general. Kei’erence is here made to cue-producing responses and their attendant response-produced cues, notions first tnade explicit by Hull (1930). As has been shown elsewhere (Spiker & Cantor, 1973; Spiker er. al., 1972),the concept of attention and the notion of cue-producing responses are not incompatible and, therefore. a mathematical structure can be developed that would permit the use of either. The suggestion is that what some writers refer to as “attending to a dimension” might be translated as “making differential cueproducing responses to the values o f a dimension.” A point that should be stated at thc outset is that the principles concerned with cue-producing responses, to be described in the next section, are incomplete. Although the principles are explicit with respect to the functions served by these responses, and they are at least partially explicit with respect to the conditions of transfer from situation to situation, no extant account explains how the responses

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initially develop. Further research should provide a basis for completing the description.

I.

Assumptions Concerning Cue-Producing Responses

1 . If a subject is able to make discriminative responses to particular values of a given dimension, then the subject’s repertoire includes differential cue-producing responses to these dimensional values. 2. The occurrence of differential cue-producing responses provides the subject with cues that are redundant with those that elicited the cue-producing responses. 3. The response-produced cues, together with cues produced by the discriminanda, combine into a stimulus compound to which other responses may become associated. 4. Cue-producing responses learned in one situation transfer to other situations according to the same laws that govern the transfer of other types of responses. A few comments may help to clarify these assumptions. The first assumption is a recognition that when a subject has learned to respond differentially to a set of cues, these different responses may themselves serve as cue-producing responses. The assumption does not, however, restrict cue-producing responses to those which the experimenter directly observes. Any specification of the topological features of the cue-producing responses is expressly avoided. The second and third assumptions have some immediate implications. If subjects make differential cue-producing responses to the values of the relevant dimension, they have available a redundant set of relevant cues. Similarly, if subjects make differential cue-producing responses to irrelevant cues, they produce a set of redundant irrelevant cues. The third assumption explicitly makes the discriminanda-produced cues a part of the total compound. One implication of this assumption is that some improvement in performance may occur even though the subjects are still making cue-producing responses to irrelevant cues. This prediction is in contrast to the Zeaman-House ( I 963) expectation that no learning occurs until the subject attends the relevant dimension. The fourth assumption provides some basis for making predictions in transfer paradigms. If the stimulus materials in two tasks are highly similar, for example, cue-producing responses established in the first task are likely to transfer to the second task. For human subjects, of course, the transfer may also be effected through verbal instructions. A critical problem concerns the transfer of differential cue-producing responses made to one set of values of a dimension in a first task to a different set of values on the same dimension in a second task. Research on intradimensional and extradimensional shifts indicates that such transfer occurs, at least under

some conditions, for both infrahuman (e.g., Shepp & Eimas, 1964; Spiker & Cantor, 1977b) and human subjects (e.g.. H. H . Kendler, Kendler, & Ward, 1972; Shepp & Gray, 1971). Applying the present formulation to some of the shift problems requires the assumption, as a working hypothesis, that such transfer does occur, but no attempt has yet been made to specify all of the conditions under which such transfer occurs.

2 . Implications of Resyonse-Prorluc~c~(/ CUCJS The introduction of response-produced cues into the formulation does not change the structure of Eqs. (l)-(7). If the response-produced cues are relevant (i.e., elicited by the relevant discriminanda-produced cues), the difference between them is added to the sum o f the relevant-cue differences in Eqs. (3a), (4), ( 5 ) , and (6); if they are irrelevant and the problem is a simultaneous one, the difference is added to the sum o f the irrelevant-cue differences in these equations. As a result, the theory predicts that if the subjects are making differential cue-producing responses to the relevant cues, performance will be facilitated; if they are making differential cue-producing responses to the irrelevant cues, performance on a simultaneous probleni will be impaired. With appropriately designed experiments, estimation of parameters representing the distinctiveness of the response-produced cues is no more difficult than estimating parameters representing the distinctiveness o f discriminanda-produced cues (Spiker, I97 1; Spiker & Cantor, 1973). Considerable evidence supports a working hypothesis that subjects without special training or instruction are niore likely to make cue-producing responses to dimensional values that vary within trials than to those that vary between trials. Given this hypothesis, the theory accounts for the findings that performance on a simultaneous task is impaired more by irrelevant dimensions that vary within trials than by those that vary betwcen trials (Lubker, 1967, 1969a; Spiker & Lubker, 1964, Experiment IV). Moreover, with an added working hypothesis that the subject makes cue-producing responses to the within-trial dimension having the most distinctive cues, the theory accounts for 84% of the variability among subgroup trial-block means in the SpikeriLubker study. Spiker and Lubker (1965) have called attention to the extreme difficulty of the successive problem for children between the ages of 6 and 10 years. This difficulty may well be related to the hypothesis mentioned in the preceding paragraph. That is, if children are unlikely t o make differential cue-producing responses to values of a dimension that varies between trials, the successive problem would be expected to be unusually difficult. Moreover, if irrelevant cues were varying within trials, competition among the sets of cue-producing responses would reduce even more the likelihood that the subject would make differential cue-producing responses to the values of a relevant dimension that varied between trials. Thus, the theory provides an explanation of the Tragakis

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Churles C S p i k r r

(1975) finding that irrelevant dimensions interfere with the learning of a successive problem. The addition of axioms concerning cue-producing responses has been especially helpful in accounting for a variety of transfer phenomena. For example, the effects of verbal pretraining on subsequent discrimination learning are easily predicted. Presumably, giving subjects verbal pretraining on the values of a dimension is one method of maximizing the probability of transferring differential cue-producing responses to that dimension on a succeeding task. On such a presumption, the theory predicts that giving pretraining on the values of the dimension that is relevant in the subsequent discrimination problem will facilitate performance, whereas giving pretraining on the values of a dimension that will be irrelevant in the subsequent task should impair performance. Evidence has been presented for both expectations (Spiker, I97 1). Prediction equations involving response-produced cue dimensions have been derived for all of the major shift paradigms (Spiker & Cantor, 1973). The theoretical implications are rather easily seen for the intradimensional and extradimensional shift paradigms. In the intradimensial shift, subjects are shifted from one discrimination task to a second in which the same dimension is relevant, although the stimulus values have been changed. If differential primary stimulus generalization is controlled, no differential transfer occurs with respect to the instrumental response. Such subjects would be expected to begin the second task with differential cue-producing responses to the relevant dimension. For the extradimensional shift, the dimension relevant in Task 1 becomes irrelevant in Task 2, with new values on all dimensions. These subjects would begin the second task making differential cue-producing responses to the values of an irrelevant dimension. Prediction equations for the shift task would be like the simultaneous equation (3a) with an added relevant response-produced cue dimension for intradimensional shifts and an added irrelevant response-produced cue dimension for extradimensional shifts (Spiker & Cantor, 1973). In a reversal shift, the cue values of the first task appear in the second task without change, although the reward contingencies are reversed for the relevant cues. The theory predicts negative transfer with respect to the instrumental responses and positive transfer with respect to the differential cue-producing responses. The performance equation, based on the logic of Eq. (7), contains two components-one an expression governing learning in the second task and the other a subtractive expression that represents the amount of negative instrumental transfer. The overall transfer predicted for such a paradigm may be either positive or negative, depending on whether the increased rate of learning the second task, as a result of the transfer of relevant cue-producing responses, is sufficient to offset the negative instrumental transfer. In general, the greater the distinctiveness of the response-produced cues, the greater the likelihood that the net transfer will be positive (Spiker & Cantor, 1973).

In the nonreversal shift, with which the reversal shift is often compared, the relevant cues of the first task become irrelevant cues in the second task. These subjects, therefore, begin thc second task with irrelevant cue-producing responses. If the formerly relevant, now irrelevant. cues are made to vary between settings in the second task, no dilfcrential instrumental-response transfer should occur on any setting. But if these cues are made to vary within settings, positive transfer should occur on some settings and negative transfer on other settings. In the first alternative, the performance equation is like that for an extradimensional shift. In the second case, two performance equations are required-one for settings in which negative instrumental transfer is predicted and one for settings in which positive instrumental transfer is predicted (Spiker & Cantor, 1973). In general, whether nonreversal-shift performance is predicted to be superior or inferior to that of the reversal shift depcncls on whether the response-produced cues are highly distinctive or highly similar. These predictions are clearly i i i general agreement with the major empirical findings of the shift research (see Esposito, 1975; Shepp 8( Turrisi, 1966). In addition, the theory has been lit i n detail and with considerable success to the results of three experiments with children, all involving the prediction of setting differences within shift tasks (Spiker & Cantor, 1973). In all of these studies, experimental control of the cue-producing responses was attempted by requiring the subject on each trial, prior to choosing, to say which compound was correct. Some subjects were required to use the names of the irrelevant dimensional values and others were required to use the names of the relevant dimensional values. In the first study (Guldniann. 1972). dimensional labeling was manipulated in both reversal and nonreversal shift tasks. The theory accounted for 88% of the variability among 96 mean proportions. with an average absolute deviation between predicted and observed means of ,053. In the second study (Lundback, 1971), dimensional labeling was manipulated in the shift and test settings of an optional-shift paradigm. The theory accounted for 95% of the variability among 60 mean proportions, with an average absolute deviation of ,052. In the third study (J. H. Cantor & Spiker. 1976), dimensional labeling was manipulated in a reversal-shift paradigm in which differential predictions were made for four types of settings in the shift task. The theory accounted for 82% of the variability among 216 mean proportions, with an average absolute deviation of .062. 3. Summary Differential cue-producing responses and their attendant stimulation appear to provide a useful mechanism for the theoretical treatment of attentional phenomena within the general framework of the modified Spence theory. Axioms that outline the function of these responses have made possible the derivation of several important experimental outcomes, in particular, the major trends of research on the various shift paratlignis. Detailed fitting of the theory to experi-

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Joan H . Cantor und Charles C . Spiker

mental data from shift paradigms has been especially encouraging (Spiker & Cantor, 1973).

111. Discussion and Summary We began this paper by urging a return to the development of learning theory and the study of basic learning processes in children. Our purpose thus far has been to review the current scope of the modified Spence theory. One remaining task is to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the theory in its present form. Perhaps an even more important task that remains is to turn an eye to the future and assess the theory in the context of what has been learned over the past decade during which little theoretical development has occurred. We now turn our attention to these final tasks. The addition of the stimulus interaction principle and the axioms concerned with cue-producing responses has resulted in an encouragingly significant extension in the scope of the theory, making it a reasonably rigorous competitor for any extant discrimination learning theory. It appears to account for a wide range of phenomena involving generalization behavior and discrimination learning. Furthermore, the development of techniques for estimating the values of stimulus parameters in the performance equations provides more precise predictions than are available with most existing learning theories. In spite of its successes, work remains to be done in a number of areas in the context of the existing theory. In its present form, the theory does not provide for systematic change over trials with respect to either the distinctiveness of the response-produced cues or the dimensional values to which the cue-producing responses are made. For example, when subjects are given an extradimensional shift, they have been assumed to continue, throughout the second task, to make differential cue-producing responses to the values on the dimension that was relevant in the first task. A much more plausible assumption is that, although such subjects will persist in responding to the values of the old dimension for a time, they will begin to make cue-producing responses to values on other dimensions, eventually making them to the values of the newly relevant dimension at some time prior to mastering the task. One of the most immediate needs of the theory is a description of the process by which changes in cue-producing responses occur (Spiker & Cantor, 1979). Even if the mathematical complexities are ignored, the problem is still complicated. Two rather different situations appear to be involved. The first pertains to the subject’s initial learning of differential cue-producing responses to a particular set of cues. The second concerns the discovery of a set of cue-producing responses, from among those present in the subject’s hierarchy, that are appropriate for a given task. The laws governing the first acquisition are expected

to be quite different from those that determine the process of discovery. The problem is analogous to that associated with concept formation and concept discovery. One difficulty in formulating principles presumed to govern the establishment of differential cue-producing responses is that the experimenter does not typically observe the trial-and-error process that accompanies the selection of the appropriate set of cue-producing responses. One promising approach involves asking the child for a current hypothesis concerning the problem solution prior to or following each choice response as a means of determining the current set of cue-producing responses (Keniler, 1978; Phillips & Levine, 1975). In one such application (Spiker & Cantor, 1977a), the theory was fit to individual subjects’ learning curves rather than the usual practice of fitting group learning curves. Appropriate cue-producing responses were Included in the prediction equation for each trial block based on the child’s verbalized hypothesis. Estimates of six stimulus parameters were used to fit a total of 648 trial-block means for individual subjects. The theory accounted for 53% of all the individual-subject variability when the child’s verbalizations were used to predict future performance (i.e., on the next trial block) and 65% of the variability when used to predict past performance (i.e., on the preceding trial block). Additional research is clearly needed to follow these promising leads so that principles governing changes in cue-producing responses during the learning process can be incorporated into the theory. Before turning to a more general consideration of needs for future theoretical development, we may find it instructive to consider some of the factors that have drawn the attention of learning theorists away from theory construction in the past decade or so. Clearly, as noted earlier, large numbers of investigators interested in cognitive development have turned to the study of all aspects of memory in children. Those in the field o f discrimination learning have turned their attention in several directions. For example, Medin (1975) developed a theory of context in discrimination learning based on the stimulus interaction principle and has subsequently applied it extensively to the study of classification learning (Medin & Schaffer, 1078) ond the development of categories (Medin, 1983). Others have gone beyond their study of stimulus dimensions in the context of discrimination learning tasks and have done intensive empirical and theoretical work on more general issues in the perception of stimulus dimensions (e.g., Kemler, 1983; Odom & Guzinan. 1972; Offenbach, 1983; Shepp, 1983). One of the major developments in the study of discrimination learning over the past decade and a half has been the investigation of the development of hypothesis-testing strategies in children. Cognitive theories of hypothesis testing ( e . g . , Bower & Trabasso. 1964; Levine, 1975) have had considerable success in explaining the strategic behavior of adults in solving concept identification tasks analogous to simultaneous discrimination tasks. Nevertheless, early studies of

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Joan H . Cantor and Charles C. Spiker

hypothesis testing in children made it clear that these theories as well as the incremental associative theories would require considerable modification to account for the strategic behavior of children (Spiker & Cantor, 1983). Although a considerable amount was learned during this period about the hypothesis-testing behavior of children, a great deal of work remains to be done at the theoretical level. In our view, a return to the study of learning in children necessitates a return to this important unfinished theoretical business, namely, the incorporation of hypothesis-testing behavior in children among the axioms of discrimination learning theories. Some initial attempts in this direction have been made, for example, by T. S. Kendler (1979) and by the authors (Spiker & Cantor, 1979). Kendler proposed the application of the original Spence theory to the learning of younger children, with a gradual shift to the application of a cognitive hypothesis-testing theory for older children. We, in contrast, proposed that the associative processes in the modified Spence theory may be speeded up by means of one-trial acquisition and extinction in order to account for hypothesis-testing behavior. Our proposal was only a general schema, and considerable theoretical and empirical work remains to be done before its potential value can be realized. Our conclusion is that the groundwork has been well laid for continued progress in studying the development of cognitive behavior within the context of traditional learning theory. Although we have written in specific terms about only one area of children’s learning, we want to emphasize that discrimination learning provides just one example of the enormous amount of work that remains to be done before we have a good understanding of basic learning in children. We hope that child psychologists will turn their attention once more to these important problems and build on the foundation of existing knowledge concerning learning and cognition in children.

REFERENCES Birch, D., & Vandenberg, V. (1955). The necessary conditions for cue-position patterning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 50, 391 -396. Bisanz, J . , Bisanz, G . L., & Kail, R. (Eds.). (1983). Learning in children. New York: SpringerVerlag. Bower, G . H . , & Trabasso, T . (1964). Concept identification. In R. C. Atkinson (Ed.), Studies in mathematical psychology (pp. 32-94). Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press. Brainerd, C. J . (1983). Structural invariance in the developmental analysis of learning. In J . Bisanz, G . L. Bisanz, & R. Kail (Eds.), Learning in children (pp. 1-36), New York: Springer-Verlag. Buss, A. H . (1953). Rigidity as a function of reversal and nonreversal shifts in the learning of successive discrimination. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 45, 75-8 1. Cantor, G . N., & Spiker, C. C. (1954). Effects of nonreinforced trials on discrimination learning of preschool children. Journal of Experimental Psvchology, 41, 256-258.

Cantor. J . H . , & Spiker, C . C. (1976). Thc effect\ of labeling dimensional values on setting differences in shift performance of kindergarten children. Memorv & Cognirion. 4, 446-452. Eckstrand, G. A , , & Wickens, D. D. ( 1954). Tiainfcr of perceptual set. Jourrial of Experimenrul P.yholog?;. 47, 274-278. Esposito, N. J . ( 1975). Review of di\criniination shift learning in young children Psychological Bulletin, 82, 432-455. Fitzgerald, H. E., & Brackbill, Y. (1976) Classical conditioning in infancy: Development and constraints. Psvc-hological Bulletiti, 83, 353- 376. Guldmann. H. ( 1972). The crffecrs of d i m r r i t i o r ~ i r l wrhalizurion upoti children's performunee on reversul and extrudimerisional shijr ~ l i s i ~ r i m i r i r r r i oprohlems. ri Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Iowa, Iowa City. Hoyt, J . M . (1960). Efect of'.similari/>of r ul c u e ) o r i learning of successive. .srirnu/u.s reversuls in children. Unpublished master'a thc\i\, Univcrsity of Iowa, Iowa City. Hoyt, J . M. ( 1962). Serial reversal and cotidi/ionul discriminoriort learning in hildren. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, loua City. ul 37, 51 I Hull, C. L. (1930). Knowledge and purpose a s habit mechanism\. P . ~ y < h d o g i c ~Revicw. 525. Hull, C. L. (1952). A behavior sy.srem New Haven. CT: Yale University Press. Kemler. D. G . (1978). Patterns of hypothehi\ testing in children's discriminative learning: A study of the development of problem-solving atrategie5. Dewlo/Jmerital Psycholog!. 14, 653-673. Kemler. D. G . (1983). Holistic and analytic mode\ in perceptual and cognitive development. In T . Tighe & B. E. Shepp (Eds.), I n t i ~ m i . r i o r i u uriulvsc~s: / Perception. cognition, und development (pp. 77-102). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbauiii. Kemler, D. G . , & Shepp, B. E. (1971 ) . Lc:iming and transfer of dimensional relevance and irrele~~ri~l 90, 120- 127. vance in childrcn. Journal of € x p e r i t ? ~ ( ~ Psvchology. Kendler, H . H . , & D'Amato, M. F. (1955) A comparison ofreversal shifts and nonreversal shifts in human concept formation behavior. Jorrrrial of trperimerital Pswhology. 49, 165- I74 Kendler, H. H . . Kendler, T . S., & Ward, J . W . (1972). An ontogenetic analysis of optional intradimensional and extradimensional \hift\. Joiirrial oJ €-xperimentul Psychology, 95, 102109. Kendler, T. S. ( 1979). The development of di\crimination learning: A levels-of-functioning explanation. In H. W . Reese & L. P. Lipsitt (Eds.), Ailvuncc,s ir7 cl7ilddrvelopment und behavior- (Vol. 13, pp. 83-1 17). New York: Academic Prcs\. Lawrence, D. H. (1949). Acquired distincrivencsb of cue\. I . Transfer between diacrimination on the basis of familiarity with the stimulus. Joirr-nu/ of Etperimental P.svchology. 39, 770-784. Lawrence, D. H. (1950). Acquired distinctiveness of cues. 11. Selective association in a constant ririrl 40, 175- 188. stimulus situation. Journal ~ f € . r p c ~ r r r ~ ~ c ~P.\vchology. Levine, M . (1975). A cognitive theon. of l(wrtiirig Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Linder. B. A . , & Siegel, L. S. (1983) The learning paradigm as a technique for investigating cognitive development. In J . Bisan7. C;. L. Hisanz. & R . Kail (Eds.), Learnin,? in children (pp. 37-60). New York: Springer-Verlag Lipsitt, L. P. (1961). Simultaneous and succcbsivc discrimination learning in children. Child Developmerit. 32, 337-347. Liu, S. W . , & Zeiler, M . D. (1968). Indepcndcnce of concurrent discriminations. Journal <$ Comparative and Phwiologicul P s ~ holo,q~'. i 65, 6 1-65, Lubker, B. J . (1964). The effect of training on cuc-po\ition pattcrning in discrimination problems. Journul of €xperimer~/a/Child P.\yi,holo,qy, 1, 135- 144. Lubker, B. J . (1967). Irrelevant stiniulu\ dinicn\ions and children's performance on simultaneous discrimination problems. Child f ~ e i , ( , / ~ ~ / ) ~38, ~ i i ,120t i r , 125.

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Lubker, B . J . (1969a). The role of between- and within-setting irrelevant dimensions in children's simultaneous discrimination learning. Child D e ~ d o p m m t .40, 957-964. Lubker, B. J . (1969b). Setting similarity and successive discrimination learning by children. Journal qf Experintental Child P sychologv, 7, 188- I94 Lundback, E. ( I 97 I ) . The effects ofdirnensionul naming upon children's performance in u modified optional shift problem. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Iowa. Iowa City. Medin, D. L. (1975). A theory of context in discrimination learning. In G. H. Bower (Ed.). The ps)Jchology of learning and motivution (Vol. 9 , pp. 263-3 14). New York: Acadeinic Press. Medin, D. L. (1983). Structural principles in categorization. In T . Tighe & B. E. Shepp (Eds.), Interactional anulyses: P ercqJrion. cqynitiort, and derdopment (pp. 203-230). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Medin, D. L.. & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theoiy of classification learning. Psychological Review, 85, 207-238. Mussen, P. H . (Ed.). (1970). Curmichael'.s rnutinul ofc/tildp.sychology (3rd ed., Vol. 1 .) New York: Wiley. Odom, R . D . , & Guznian, R . D. (1972). Development of hierarchies of dimensional salience. Developmental Psychology, 6, 271-287. Offenbach, S . 1. (1983). The concept of diinenaion in research on children's learning. Society for Research in Child Developinent Monogruph, 48, 204. Phillips, S . , & Levine, M. (1975). Probing for hypotheses with adults and children. Blank trials and introtacts. Journal of Exprrimentul Psvchology: Gerierul. 104, 327-354. Price, L. E., & Spiker, C. C. (1967). Effect of similarity of irrelevant stimuli on performance in discrimination learning problems. Jortrnul of Experitnenrul Child P.sychology. 5 , 324-33 I . Reese, H. W . , & Lipsitt, L. P. (Eds.). (1970).E~perimentnlchild p s ~ ~ c h o l o g New y . York: Acadeinic Press. Shepp, B. E. (1983). The analyzability of multidimensional objects: Some constraints on perceived structure, the developinent of perceived structure, and attention. In T. Tighe & B . E. Shepp (Eds.), Interacrional anulyses: P erception. cognition. ond deselopment (pp. 39-75) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Shepp, B . E.. & Eimas, P. D. (1964) Intradiniensional and rxtradiinensional shifts in the rat. Journal of Comparative arid P hy.siologicul P Shepp, B . E., & Gray, V . A. (1971). Some effects of the variable-within and variable-between irrelevant stimuli on diinensional learning and transfer. Joirmul of Experimental Psychology, 89, 32-39. Shepp, B . E., & Turrisi, F. D. (1966). Learning and transfer of mediating responses in discrimination learning. In N . R. Ellis (Ed.), Internutionul review qfrrseurch in mental returdution (Vol. 2. pp. 86-120). New York: Academic Press. Siegler, R. S. (1983). Information processing approaches to development. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Handbook ojChild Psychology (4th ed., Vol. I , pp 199-209). New York: Wiley. Spence, K . W. (1936). The nature of discrimination learning in animals. Psychological Review. 43, 427-449. Spence, K . W. (1937). The differential response in animals to stimuli varying within a single dimension. Psychological Review. 44, 430-444. Spence, K . W. (1942). The basis of solution by chimpanzees of the intermediate size problem. Journal of Experimental Pswhologv. 31, 257-27 I Spence, K . W. (1952). The nature of the responre in discrimination learning. Psychologicd Review. 59, 89-93. Spence, K . W. (1956). Behuvior theory und conditioning. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Spiker, C. C. (1963). The hypothesis of stimulus interaction and an explanation of stimulus com-

pounding. In L. P. Lipaitt & C . C . Spihcr (k.cis.). Adwmces i n child devrlopnicwt and hehuvior (Vol. I , pp. 223-264). New York: Acadeniic Press. Spiker. C. C. ( 1970). An extension ot Hull-Spence discrimination learning theory. Psychologicul Review, 77,496-5 15. Spiker, C. C. (1971). Application of Hull-Spence theory to the discrimination learning of children. In H. W. Reese (Ed.). Advancr.s i n child d~,veloJpientarid behuLior (Vol. 6, pp. 99-157). New York: Academic Press. Spiker, C . C . , & Cantor, J. H . (1973) Applications of Hull-Spencc theory to the transfer of discrimination learning in children I n H W Reese (Ed.). Adwnces in c.hilil dcivlopni~~rit und brhuvior (Vol 8 , pp. 223-288). New Yorh Academic Press. Spiker, C. C . , & Cantor, J . H. (1977~1). Iiitr-adimen~ion;tland extradimensional shifts in the rat with assessment of differential instruniental gencr;iliration. B u l l d n o f r h r Pwchonomic. S o c i e t ~10, 223-225. Spiker, C. C., & Cantor. J . H . (1977h). Iiitrotacts a\ predictors of discrimination performance in kindergarten children. Journul of I.,'~/"'t-i"i~,tit"l Child P.svchology. 23, 520-538. Spiker, C. C . , & Cantor, J. H. (1979) The Kendler levels-of-functioning thcory Comment, and an alternative schema. In H . W . Reew & 1.. P. Lipsitt (Eda.) Advuncc,s in c h i l d c k v e l o p m m t and hehu\,ior (Vol. 13, pp. 119-135). New Yorh: Academic Press. pp. 119-135. Spiker. C. C.. & Cantor, J . H . (1983). Components in the hypothesis-testing strategies of young children. In T . Tighe & B . E. Shepp ( l i d b . 1. Iirrerudonal unulv.ws: Percqmon. cognition, and development (pp. 163-201 ). Hillsdalc, NJ: hlhauiu. Spiker, C. C . , Croll. W. L.. & Millcr, A . A . (1972). The effects of verbal prctraining o n the multidimensional generalization behavior of children. Joiirnul of Experinientul Child Pyychology. 13, 558-572. Spiker, C . C . , & Luhker, B. J. (1964).Experiiiieiital tests of the hypothesis of stimulus interaction. Journal of Experirnentul Child P \y(.holricqv. I , 256-268. Spiker. C. C.. & Luhker, B. J. (1965) l h e relative difficulty for children of the succcssivc and simultaneous discrimination problems Child I)evcloprnen/. 36, 1091- 1 101. Sternberg. S . H. (1959). A path-dependent linear model. In R. R . Bush & W . K . Estes (Eds.). S t i i d i r s in rnarhrrnuticul leurning thcor-v (pp 308-339). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Stevenson, H. W. (1970). Learning i n children. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Carrnichael'.t mcinuol oJ childpsychology (3rd ed.. Vol. I . pp X49 -083) New York: Wiley. Stevenson, H W . ( 1972). Children'.s l e u t - t i i n g . New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Stevenson, H. W . (1983). How childreii Icam---the quest for a theory. In P. H. Mussen (Ed ), Manual uf!p.hi/dp.sychology(4th ed.. Vol. I , pp. 213-236). New York: Wiley. Teas, D. C . , & Bitterman, M . E. (1952). t'crceptual organization i n the rat. Psychologicul Review. 59, 130-140. Trabasso, T . , & Bower, G . H . (1968). Arrc,rition i n lrurnitig: Theory and research. New York: Wiley. Tragakis, C . J . (1975). The effects of manipulating irrelevant dimensions in succcsbive discrimination problems. Journal of Experirwnrul Child / ' . ~ ~ d i o l o , ~19, y . 3-22. White, B. N . , & Spiker, C . C . (1960) The effect o f stimulus similarity on amount of cue-position patterning in discrimination problems Jortrtiu/ of E.xp?ritnrnla/ Psvchology. 59, I 3 I - 136. Zeaman. D., & House. B. J . (1963). The rule of attention in retardate discrimination learning. In N. R . Ellis (Ed.), Handbook of r t w i i t u l d e f i c i e n c y (pp. 159-223). New York: McCraw-Hill

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DISCRIMINATION LEARNING SET IN CHILDREN

HliJ,rie

W . Reese

D E P A K T M E N I O F f’SYCHOLOGY W E S T VIKGINIA LlNlVERSlTY MOKGANTOWN. W l S I ’ VIRGINIA 26506

I. INTRODUCTION 11. DEFINITION O F “LEARNIN(; SkT”

111. THEORIES OF LEARNING six A . STIMULUS-RESPONSE LEARNIN(; THEORY B . LEARNING SET AS SUPPRESSION O F ‘TRANSFER C. ROLE O F ATTENTION D . LEARNING SETS AS RULES IV. RESPONSE SHIFT IN ANIMALS A . A SAMPLE OF ANIMAI. STUDIES B. INTERPRETATION V. RESPONSE SHIFT IN CHILDKEN A . STUDIES WITH NOVELTY CONTROLLED €3. STRENGTHS O F THE WIN-STAY AND LOSE-SHIFT COMPONENTS C. TWO-MECHANISM THE0RIE.S OF RESPONSE SHIFT VI

DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE SHIFI A STUDIES WITH NOVELTY CONTROLLED B . STUDIES WITH NOVELTY IINCONTROLLED C INTERPRETATION

VII. CONCLUSION REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to review part of the literature on discrimination learning set that has appeared since the publication of my review in the first

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volume of Advances (Reese, 1963). Although the amount of relevant literature is not great, I found that I could not cover all of it in the space allotted to the present paper-the first draft contained 71 pages of text, 12 tables, and 3 figures. I therefore decided to limit the review to one general topic-the nature of learning set-and one research topic- “response shift”-which is theoretically important and has received considerable attention in the research literature. Of course, most psychologists who know anything about learning set know that it reflects the strategy “Win-stay-object and Lose-shift-object,” and if they remember what response shift means, they know it reflects a tendency to respond to novel stimuli. However, as will be seen, these understandings are remarkably incomplete. The paper begins with a definition of learning set and a summary of the theories that have been advanced to account for discrimination learning set, proceeds to a review of research on response shift, and ends with the conclusion that further research on learning set is still needed and still worthwhile.

11. Definition of “Learning Set” The phrase “learning set” (or “learning to learn”) has been used in the research literature in three general senses: ( I ) administration of multiple problems of the same kind; (2) improvement in performance across such problems; and (3) a remarkably high level of performance in such problems. The kinds of problems referred to include: Concept identification (Low, Gronberg, & Sherling, 1975; Miller, 197 I ) , Conditional discrimination (Routh & Wischner, 1970; Williams, 1984), Discrimination learning (many references will be cited in this paper), Discrimination reversal (Kaufman & Gardner, 1969b), Discrimination shifts (Cameron, 1984; Low et al., 1975; Saravo & Kolodny, 1969), Memory (Shapiro & Moely, 1971; Yoshimura, Moely, & Shapiro, 1971), Oddity learning (Butterfield & Butterfield, 1967; Celman, 1969; Neimark & Horn, 1969; Saravo & Collin, 1969), Paired-associate learning (Baller, Wilbur, & Edwards. 1969), Solving anagrams (Di Vesta & Walls, 1968), and Transposition (Yeh, 1970; for a review of this topic, see Reese, 1968, pp. 67-80). Only the kind of “learning set” involving discrimination-learning problems is reviewed herein; the unmodified phrase “learning set” is used to designate this topic in the rest of this paper. Learning set, in this restricted sense, is a remarkably high level of performance resulting from interproblem improvement of performance in discrimina-

tion-learning problems. However, focusing on the outcome-the remarkably high level of performance-can be misleading. As Bugelski (1956) said: The fact of the easy late learning get\ i n thc way o f an understanding by misdirecting attention. The place to look tor ;in explanation is at the other end, the time of difficulty. (p. 401)

The following four points about the acquisition and applicability of learning set should help avoid this misdirection of attention by refining the definition of learning set. ( 1 ) Learning set usually implies a high performance level. A relatively high level of performance is generally used as a criterion indicating that a learning set has been acquired. In some of the animal research and most of the human research, the criterion is performance at or very near the theoretically or empirically determined asymptote, which for learning set (i.e., discrimination learning set) is one-trial learning. However, a high level of performance can come about in more than one way and apparcntly has a different basis depending on how it is acquired. (2) Not all one-trial learning reflects learning set. Menzel and Juno (1982) obtained one-trial discrimination learning in marmosets. Using a social-group testing situation with a successive-discrimination procedure, they found that after a single exposure to stimuli that were or were not associated with food, the marmosets tended to return to the stimuli that had been associated with food and tended not to return to the stimuli that had not been associated with food. Menzel and Juno referred to this perforniance as “win-stay’’ and “loseshift” behavior, but “approach” and “avoidance” would be at least equally appropriate terms. They rejected “the view o f learning-set theory that one-trial learning of visual discriminations requires much training and is a good crossspecies index of intelligence” (Note 4, p . 752; reference index omitted). However, they failed to consider that some one-trial discrimination learning may not reflect learning set, and they ignored evidence of systematic species differences in learning-set formation. For example. they cited a study by Miles and Meyer (1956) as the only prior study o f learning set in marmosets they knew of (it was also the only one in my files); but thcy did not mention that Miles and Meyer found that the marmosets gave only about 75% correct Trial 2 responses in Problems 882-980 and rhesus monkcys gave many more correct Trial 2 responses-almost 90%-with much less training-in Problems 295-392. Marmosets are more primitive primates than rhesus monkeys, and, therefore, the Miles and Meyer finding is consistent with the “view” that learning-set performance is a good cross-species index o f intelligence-or of whatever is reflected by learning-set performance. Menzel and Juno also failed t o consider other evidence for one-trial discrimination learning, including studies o f one-trial learning of “bait-shyness” (Garcia,

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Hankins, & Rusiniak, 1974) or “toxiphobia” (Steinert, Infurna, Jardula, & Spear, 1979). Most of these studies involved associating taste, odor, or visual stimuli with poisoning (e.g., Bernstein & Sigmundi, 1980; Gustavson, Garcia, Hankins, & Rusiniak, 1974; Palmerino, Rusiniak, &Garcia, 1980; Riley, Lotter, & Kulkosky, 1979). However, Jarvik (1953) demonstrated the same phenomenon not with poisons but with tastes that were merely agreeable and disagreeable. Jarvik fed two successive pieces of bread to chimpanzees, spider monkeys, and rhesus monkeys. The first piece had an agreeable taste-no flavoring added or sweetened with saccharin-and the second piece had a disagreeable tasteflavored with dehydrocholic acid (a sour taste), capsicum, or quinine. One piece was colored red and the other green, counterbalanced with taste across subjects. Upon presentation of each piece, the animal immediately began to eat it but spit out the one with a disagreeable taste. The animals were then given 20-25 twochoice discrimination trials with red versus green pieces of bread. On these trials, the bread that was the same color as the agreeable-tasting bread was selected 96% of the time, reflecting “Good taste, approach red,” for example, or “Bad taste, avoid green,” or both. The discrimination did not transfer to red and green stimuli other than bread, and therefore a more accurate designation of the responses would be “Good taste, approach red bread,’’ and “Bad taste, avoid green bread. ” (3) Learning set is not stimulus specific. The findings on one-trial acquisition of a discrimination are strikingly different from findings on learning set in that the former is stimulus specific and the latter is not, as shown, for example, by the Jarvik (1953) study. A hallmark of learning set, in fact, is its generality across a range of stimuli, including most tellingly the laboratory-fabricated “junk” stimuli used in much of the learning-set research with monkeys as well as children. These stimuli vary on many dimensions, and therefore learning set acquired with such stimuli is nonspecific not only with respect to stimuli but also with respect to stimulus dimensions. (4) Learning set is learned, not innate. Taste aversion and analogous kinds of one-trial acquisition may reflect innate species-specific mechanisms rather than the kinds of mechanisms usually identified as “learning.” Be that as it may, the acquisition of a learning set is a slow, gradual process in all species except the human, and it is indexed by interproblem improvement in performance in all species including the human (the documentation had to be omitted; examples are Reese, 1963, 1964, 1965). Exactly what is learned is not clear, however, as shown in Sections V and VI.

111. Theories of Learning Set Interproblem improvement in performance can result from the learning of appropriate orienting or perceptual skills, skills of intraproblem learning such as

attention to the relevant dimension. anti adaptation to the experimental situation (King, 1966; Schrier, 1971; Zeaman & House, 1963). However, these mechanisms do not account entirely for learning set, because learning set “transcends a particular dimension within a sense modality” (Schrier, 1971, p. 180). Learning-set theorists have attempted to explain this transcendence. The major theories of learning set can be divided into four groups on the basis of the primary mechanism assumed to be involved: ( 1 ) stimulus-response learning, (2) suppression of transfer of stimulus-response associations, (3) inhibition of attention to specific stimuli, and (4) “rules” of various kinds. The theories are summarized in the present section. A.

STIMLJLC1s- K ESPONSE LAEARNINGTHEORY

Berman, Rane, and Bahow ( 1970) proposed a stimulus-response account of respcnse shift in children; a description of their proposal is deferred to the section on developmental differences in response shift (Section VI,B,3). I have argued elsewhere that learning set in infrahumans can be explained by stimulus-response learning theory with the addition of a few plausible assumptions (Reese, 1964, 1977), but that it is more plausibly and reasonably explainable by cognitive theory in humans (Reese, 1977). The theory I offered for human performance was hypothesis-sampling theory. As I implied in my 1964 review of learning set in rhesus monkeys-and as Porges and I later stated explicitly, but with only examples of documentation (Reese & Porges, 1976)-discrirnination learning and learning set in rhesus monkeys are affected by the same variables and in the same way by these variables. The effects on discrimination can be accommodated to stimulusresponse learning theory, and therefore learning set can also be explained by stimulus-response learning theory. I outlined such an explanation in the 1964 paper. The basic assumptions were that the training results in wide generalization of excitatory and inhibitory strengths such that stimulus and position preferences are virtually eliminated and the response on Trial 2 depends only on the increment in excitatory or inhibitory strength that results from reward or nonreward, respectively, on Trial 1. For children, i n contrast, the effects of some variables are not the same for discrimination learning and learning set, and therefore the Porgcs, i 1976). Reese and Porges argued that basis may be different (Reese & complex performance is cognitively controlled in children and associatively controlled in even high-level nonhuman primates. B.

LEARNING sEr A S SIJPIJRESSIONOF TRANSFER

Riopelle ( 1953) attributed learning set to suppression of specific transfer, that is, transfer of specific stimulus-response associations. A related kind of theory,

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discussed in Section III,C, refers to suppression (inhibition) of attention to specific kinds of stimuli, and another related kind of theory-Harlow’s error-factor theory (discussed in Section II1,D)-refers to suppression (inhibition) of particular patterns of responses. In a more elaborate version of transfer-suppression theory than Riopelle’s, Restle (1958) attributed learning-set formation to suppression of responses to “type-c” cues, which are irrelevant in all discrimination-learning problems, and to “type-b” cues, which are relevant within a single problem but not across problems. Suppression of responses to these cues leaves only “type-a” cues as possible bases for responding. Type-a cues are relevant both within a problem and across problems. For example, in a series of stimulus-discrimination problems, position is a type-c cue, red might be a type-b cue (that is, the stimulus associated with reward in one problem), and the type-a cues are abstract. The type-a cues can be verbalized as “any stimulus just rewarded” and “any stimulus just nonrewarded,” and they are identifiable on the basis of the outcome of the response on the first trial within any specific problem. Several researchers (e.g., Cameron, 1979; Gelman, 1969) have interpreted learning sets in children consistently with Restle’s theory, and I have suggested (Reese, 1970) that species differences in the speed of learning-set formation depend in part on how rapidly the abstract type-a cues develop, or on how rapidly these cues come to control responding, or both. The same considerations might be relevant to age differences in the speed of learning-set fonnation, but that topic is beyond the scope of the present paper. C.

ROLE OF ATTENTION

Several investigators suggested that attention is an important process in learning set, but few specified the nature of the supposed attentional process. Divgi (1976) and Cameron (1979) were among the few, and both cited Restle’s (1958) theory. Divgi specified attention to “relational” and “inherent” dimensions, on which, respectively, Restle’s type-a and types b and c cues vary. Similarly, Cameron suggested that during learning-set formation, subjects learn to attend to relevant stimuli and to ignore irrelevant stimuli. Schrier (1971) suggested that learning set may involve attention to the relevant dimension, citing Zeaman and House’s ( 1963) theory that discrimination learning involves both attentional and instrumental learning-learning to attend to the relevant dimension as well as learning which values on the relevant dimension are associated with reward and nonreward (see also House, Chapter 4, this volume; House & Zeaman, 1963). According to Zeaman and House, the first phase of discrimination learning involves learning to attend to the relevant dimension, and the second phase involves learning to approach the correct value on

that dimension. The major deficit of mentally retarded persons in discrimination learning is in attention rather than instrumental learning. Schrier and Povar ( 1 978) obtained fairly direct evidence of the involvement of attention in learning-set formation in stump-tailed monkeys: Scanning of the stimuli, as assessed by eye movements. increased during training, and the increase was accompanied by interproblem improvement in performance. In two monkeys the frequency of scanning stayed at its peak, and in two others i t peaked and then decreased to near the minimum of one stimulus fixated per trial. Scanning has also been called “attention,” “observing behavior,” “comparison behavior,” “vicarious trial and error,” etc. It has been found to be correlated with discrimination learning in many species including the human, and the pattern of a peak followed by a decline in frequency has often been observed (for review and discussion of the evidence. see the index term “Comparison” in Reese, 1968). D

1,EARNING SETS AS RULES

0. R. White (1971) attributed learning set to formation of “a concept with respect to the relevant dimensions or cues necessary to solve the discrimination problems” (p. 83). Riopelle’s ( IYS3) and Restle’s (1958) theories (described in Section III,B) fit this interpretation, but without any implication that the concepts are verbally formulated. Concepts are interpretable as rules (e.g., Reese, in press), which may or may not be verbal. Rules can be productive or descriptive; that is, rules can control behavior or can be descriptions o f regularities in behavior. Rules that control behavior are usually believed to be verbal; rules that are descriptions of regularities in behavior are nece l i l y verbal, but the regularities that are fiescribed are not verbal except in the case o f regularities in verbal behavior (e.g., Reese, in press). The attribution of learning sets to rules has been popular and useful. Bourne (1966) attributed learning set t o rule learning (p. IS), defining rules as “generic behavioral principles which are applicable in a variety of problematic situations” (p. 39). Like any rule, a learning set “transcends the relevant stimulus features of any single problem and can be applied to effect the correct combination of attributes in all problems of a given class” (p. 56). The reference to rules as capable of being upplied implies that the rules under consideration are productive-they direct behavior and are not merely descriptions of regularities. Unfortunately, some theorists who interpret learning sets in terms of rules have not been careful to indicate whether the rules are productive or descriptive. and others initially specified that the rules were descriptive but then implicitly reinterpreted them as productive. The descriptive use is implicated in “The problem solution was acquired piecemeal; in all groups, LSh, [i.e.,Lose-shift-

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Hcrvne W . Reere

object] appeared earlier than WSt, [Win-stay-object]’’ (Levinson & Reese, 1967, p. 23); the productive use in implicated in “a strategy is rcsponsiblr f o r one-trial learning” (Schusterman. 1962, p. 422; emphasis added). Harlow (1959) interpreted learning-set formation as the weakening of incorrect rules called “error factors”-incorrect response tendencies such as position preference, stimulus alternation, and “response shift” (see response shift discussion in Sections IV-VI). When error factors have been sufficiently weakened, the problem solution is dominant in the hierarchy of factors, and learning set is exhibited. Other theorists interpreted learning set in terms of rules called “strategies” (Bowman, 1963; Levinson & Reese, 1967; Schrier, 1971) or “hypotheses” (Barker & Gholson, 1984; Deets. Harlow, & Blomquist, 1970; Levine, 1959; Levinson & Reese, 1967; Reese. 1963, 1970; Schrier, 1971). Hypothesis theories are traceable to Krechevsky ’s ( 1932) hypothesis theory of discrimination learning in rats (Barker & Gholson, 1984). Levine’s (1959) labels of the hypotheses involved in discrimination learning have become fairly standard in the learning-set literature; they are listed and defined in Table 1. However, in the rest of the present paper these “hypotheses” are referred to as “strategies” because “strategy” has become the standard term referring to rules of the kind intended and because the nontechnical word “hypothesis” implies a verbal formulation. Also, I have retained Levine’s use of the word “object” in the labels even though “object” sometimes seems to be an inappropriate designation, as when the stimuli are pictures. (Actually, the term is appropriate even for pictures. which can be described as multidimensional planometric objects; but except in the designations of Levine strategies, I usually refer herein to the stimuli as “stimuli.”) Strategies in this sense should not be interpreted as necessarily being cognitive TABLE I Hypotheses Identified in Levine’s Theory“ Hypothesis Problem solution Solution of stirnulusalternation problem Solution of position discrimination problem Solution of positionalternation problem Stimulus preference Stimulus alternation Position preference Position alternation

Components Win-stay-object and Lose-shift-object Win-shift-object and Losc-stay-object Win-stay-position

and L~ose-shift-position

Win-shift-position

and Lose-stay-position

Win-stay-object and Lose-stay-object Win-shift-object and Lose-shift-object Win-stay-position and Lose-stay-position Win-shift-position and Lose-shift-position

oVerbal descriptions can be found in Levinson and Reese ( 1967. Table 1, p. 4).

processes, although Schrier and Povat- ( 1978) referred to learning-set formation in monkeys as involving “changes in cognitive processes (perhaps reflecting hypothesis or strategy behavior)” ( p . 1363). The point is not that strategies cannot be cognitive processes, but that researchers who refer learning set to strategies are not thereby cormrittrd to a cognitive position. Evidence that strategies are productive has been obtained in both chimpanzees and children. Schusterman ( 1962) implicitly interpreted the strategies in Levine’s and Restle’s analyses as productive rather than descriptive, and hypothesized that i f a strategy such as they identified .‘is responsible for one-trial learning it should be possible to establish the strategy under one set of circumstances and transfer it to another” (p. 422). I n agreement with this hypothesis, he found that discrimination-reversal training facilitated the performance of chimpanzees in subsequent discrimination problems. Stimulus-alternation training, which should yield Winshift-object and Lose-stay-object, should not and in fact did not facilitate the subsequent performance. Kaufman and Gardner (196%) tested transfer in the reverse direction in mentally retarded children. The children were given a series of discrimination-reversal problems with or without previous learning-set training. Children in the learning-set group were those who had attained a level of 90% correct Trial 2 responses in a prior study (Kaufman & Gardner, 1969a); the control children had no prior discrimination or learning-set training. Across 48 reversals, the percentages correct responses on Trial 2 were 77% for the learning-set group and 56% for the control group, confirming the predicted transfer.

IV.

Response Shift in Animals

“Response shift” is a tendency to make a correct response more often following an error than following a correct response in discrimination-learning problems (Harlow, 1950). The locus classicus of the response-shift phenomenon is a study by Moss and Harlow (1947). They gave experimentally sophisticated monkeys (7 rhesus and 1 mangabey) training in six conditions (within sub.jects): one versus two trials with the positive stimulus (S ) alone, the negative stimulus (S - ) alone. or both stimuli, followed in each condition by 1 1 test trials with both stimuli (standard two-stimulus discrimination trials). The same one-stimulus conditions have been used in a number of other studies to be reviewed in this section and the next two; for brevity hereafter I refer to these conditions in general as “one-stimulus problem” and designate them specifically as follows: “S problems”: Initial trial or trials with S alone; “S problems”: Initial trial or trials with S - alone. As can be seen in Table 11, on the first test trial the monkeys were much more often correct in S - problems than in S problems, and the effect had disappeared by the second test trial. In Lcvine’s terms, Lose-shift-object was strong+

+

+

-

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Haytic W . Rersr

TABLE II Percentage Correct Responses on the First and Second Test Trials in the M o s and Harlow Study”

S + problem\

Amount of training

S - prohleni\

Standard problem\

93 97

82 97

92 98

92 91

Tcst trial I One training trial Two training trials

14

I9 Test trial 2

95 93

One training trial Two training trials

“From Moss and Harlow (1947, Table la, p 337)

er than Win-stay-object on the first test trial, but the difference had disappeared by the second test trial. Fletcher and Cross (1964) cited and agreed with “Leary’s (1956) lament” that the term response shift had come to rcfer to effects obtained when two stimuli were presented on Trial 1 as well as in one-stimulus problems. However, the issue should be about effects rather than procedures, and in fact the generality of the effect across procedures is an important finding that is the easier to discuss if the effect has a single name. “Response shift” is a convenient and brief name for the effect. Nevertheless, for precise description it is not a desirable name. It implies that responding is the same-a shift-following rewarded and nonrewarded Trial 1 responses, but the Moss and Harlow study clearly showed that the tendency to shijt to the new stimulus on the first test trial was considerably weaker in S + problems than in S problems and in fact it was weaker than thc tendency to stuy with the initially presented stimulus in the S + problems. For precise description, the Levine designations Win-stay-object, Lose-shift-object, etc., are convenient. For example, Moss and Harlow’s group given one training trial can be said to have exhibited the problem solution on the first test trial of the problems, but with Win-stay-object weaker than Lose-shift-object. However, use of the Levine designations as descriptions can be misleading, in that it implies adoption of Levine’s theory. Therefore, I will use herein the less precise but theoretically neutral term, “response shift.” ~

A

A SAMPLE OF ANIMAL STUDIES

Response shift was not obtained in some animal research; for example, Warren (1966) did not obtain it in cats and rhesus monkeys, and Ricciardi and

Treichler (1970) did not obtain i t in squirrel monkeys. In fact, Win-stay-object was stronger than Lose-shift-object in both studies. However, these investigators used a variant of Mo nd I-iarlow's procedure: Two stimuli wcre presented on Trial 1 , with both stimuli baited in half the problems and both unbaited in half (the stimulus chosen on Trial I continued to be baited or unbaited in the respective problem types on subsequent trials, and the stimulus not chosen was assigned the opposite reward value). The pattern of stronger Win-stay-object than Lose-shift-object was the usual l'inding with this procedure in animal studies, presumably indicating that stimulus preferences are not overcome by the niechanism that underlies response shift, whatevcr that mechanism might be (Reese, 1964). The stimulus chosen on Trial I is by definition the preferred stimulus, and on the subsequent trials it becomes S-' in problems with both Trial 1 stimuli baited and S - in problems with both Trial 1 stimuli unbaited. When Moss and Harlow's original procedure was used, failures to obtain response shift in monkeys were rare (Keese. 1964); and response shift was wellenough established to be considered worth studying as a function of several variables. An example is a study by King and Harlow (1962) with rhcsus monkeys. As shown in Table 111, when 25%' or 50% of the problems were S + problems and the rest were S problems, response shift was obtained in the first block of problems and persisted through the last block of problems. The effect was so strong that performance tended to be correct in S problems and incorrect in S problems throughout training for the 25% group and in the first block of training for the 50% group. 'This pattern of performance can be described as a strong Lose-shift-object strategy coupled with a moderate Win-shift-object strategy. Presumably, in S - problems the monkeys learned a shift-object response, or a response to the novcl Trial 2 stimulus, and this response generalized to the S + problems. -

-

+

TABL,E 111 Percentage Correct Response\ o n Tnal 2 in the First and Last Blocks of Problems i n tlic King and Harlow Study" Last block o f probleins<

First block of problein\" Groupd

256 SO% 75%

S

+

problems 40 42 62

S

~

prohlcins 68 60 6.1

S

'

problems 44 67 83

"Mean percentages estimated from King and Harlow ( 1962, Fig. 2. p. 874) hFirst block: Problems 1-144. 1 Last block: Problems 577-720. "Group designations indicate percentage of S problcm5 (the others were S

S

~

problem\

81 81 66

pn)blem\)

164

Huviie W . Rerso

In contrast, when 75% of the problems were S problems and 25% were S problems, the monkeys exhibited the correct strategy, Win-stay-object and Lose-shift-object. An important point, not shown in the table, is that by the third block of problems this group exhibited stronger Win-stay-object than Lose-shift-object, which is the opposite of response shift. Thus, King and Harlow found that response shift is not some kind of inherent strategy but rather must be learned like any other systematic pattern of responding. Furthermore, procedural variations can determine which specific systematic pattern of responding is learned. Another example is a study by Fletcher and Cross (1964). They obtained response shift in 2-year-old rhesus monkeys and even stronger response shift in 4-year-old rhesus monkeys. For the young monkeys the relevant means were about 55% correct Trial 2 responses in S problems and 72% in S- problems; and for the older monkeys, 60% in S problems and 89% in S - problems. The group difference in the strength of response shift (17 vs. 29 percentage points) reflected primarily a difference in the strength of Lose-shift-object. Thus, age affected Lose-shift-object more than Win-stay-object. As will be seen (Section VI), this same developmental difference is found in children trained with one-stimulus problems. (However, in the Fletcher and Cross study, age was confounded with experience-the young monkeys were described as “relatively naive” and the older monkeys were experimentally sophisticated. Furthermore, the group difference in the Fletcher and Cross study was nonsignificant.) In two final examples, response shift was studied as a function of intertrial interval. Boyer (1966) obtained response shift in rhesus, stump-tailed, and squirrel monkeys, and found that the duration of the interval between Trials 1 and 2 (10, 30, 60, 90, 120, and 150 sec) had no significant effect on its magnitude, although overall performance was worse, the longer the intertrial interval. Deets el ul. (1970) also varied the interval between Trials I and 2 (5, 10, and 20 sec), and obtained the same findings in rhesus monkeys except that intertrial interval had no effect even on overall performance in the first two blocks of problems. In blocks 3-5, overall performance was worse, the longer the interval; in the last (fifth) block, overall performance averaged 92% correct with the 5-sec interval, 90% with the 10-sec interval, and 840h with the 20-sec interval (means estimated from Figure 2, p. 503). +

+

+

B.

INTERPRETATlON

Deets er a / . (1970) concluded that the lack of an effect of intertrial interval on performance during the early part of learning-set training supports “hypothesis” theory. They defined hypothesis as “a short-term memory process that relates events from trial to trial. . . . Development of an object-discrimination learning set . . . depends upon the acquisition of an ‘object win-stay lose-shift hypoth-

esis” (p. 501). (As documentation for this assertion, they cited a dissertation by Bessemer, 1968, done at the University of Wisconsin. Both Levine’s and Restle’s theories are directly relevant and had priority, but were not cited.) A problem with this interpretation is that it implies that response shift should decline with increasing intertrial interval, contrary to the evidence cited at the end of the preceding subsection. If a long intertrial interval interferes with shortterm memory of what happened on Trial 1 , it interferes with the basis for response shift: Lose-shift-object cannot be more probable than Win-stay-object if the subject does not remember which stimulus was responded to on Trial 1 and whether this response won or lost. I concluded from my review o f learning set in rhesus monkeys (Reese, 1964) that in two-stimulus problems (i.e., problems with both stimuli presented o n all trials), the increment in excitatory strength resulting from a reward is smaller than the increment in inhibitory strength resulting from a nonreward, and therefore Win-stay-object is acquired more slowly than Lose-shift-object. Moss and Harlow (1947) noted that this umption also explains response shift in onestimulus problems; but 1 theorized that in one-stimulus problems, response shilt in rhesus monkeys reflects a preference for novel stimuli. Harlow (1950) suggested that response shift in monkeys reflects “a tendency to ‘try out’ or ‘explore’ both stimuli in a discrimination problem” (p. 31; see also Harlow, 1959, p. 516). This explanation is applicable to both one- and twostimulus problems; in fact, it can be taken as an explanation of the apparent preference for novelty in one-stimulus problems. However, the lack of an effect of intertrial interval on response shift is inconsistent with the novelty interpretation; if the subject does not remember which stimulus was presented on Trial I , both stimuli are functionally novel on Trial 2. Therefore, the novelty interpretation of response shift in monkeys can be challenged even for response shift with one-stimulus problems.

V.

Response Shift in Children

Response shift was studied fairly extensively in children in the late 1960s and the 1970s. It was often called the “Moss-Harlow effect,” perhaps to acknowledge the priority of Moss and Harlow or perhaps to emulate the use of eponymic designations in the physical sciences. Many “effects” in psychology have been given eponymic designations, but few have been so crucial that they merit this kind of designation. In physics the so-called Michelson-Morley experiment (e.g., Lakatos, 1978, pp. 73-78) merits an eponymic designation, and in psychology the so-called Moss-Harlow effect may merit it. Be that as it may, references nowadays to the Moss-Harlow effect will probably be opaque unless the effect is defined. The substitution of Harlow’s (1950) own term, response

I66

Huvrir W . R w s e

shift, is unlikely to be sufficient without definition, but at least it avoids the pretentiousness of the eponymic designation. Descriptively, learning set has two components, Win-stay-object and Loseshift-object; and in response shift, Win-stay-object is weaker than Lose-shiftobject. The theoretical problem is to explain why these behavior patterns differ in strength. As indicated at the end of the preceding section (IV,B), some theorists proposed single-mechanism accounts of response shift-it reflects a preference for novel over familiar stimuli in one-stimulus problems, or it reflects a tendency to “try out” both stimuli in discrimination-learning problems. In the following subsections, I will show first that the novelty interpretation is implausible (Section V,A), then that any single-mechanism account is implausible (Section V,B), and, finally, that several two-mechanism accounts are plausible, one perhaps more so than the others (Section V,C). A.

STUDIES WITH NOVELTY CONTROLLED

Novelty was controlled in seven studies of response shift in children. They are reviewed in the present section. As will be seen, response shift was obtained in all seven (though it was nonsignificant in one). 1 . Studies with Standard Learning-Set Procedures

In the standard learning-set procedure, both stimuli are presented on Trial 1 as well as the other trials and S is predetermined by the experimenter. The Trial 1 response will win in some problems, by chance, and lose in the others, and therefore response shift can be assessed. Many researchers who used problems of this kind did not assess response shift in them (e.g., Cross & Vaughter, 1966; Greenfield, 1976; Moss & Harlow, 1947); but it was assessed in three studies and was obtained in all three. Levinson and Reese (1967) and Cameron (1979) obtained response shift with the standard learning-set procedure, giving fixed numbers of trials per problem; and Reese (1965) obtained it with training to criterion on each problem. +

2.

Studies with Other Procedures Grabbe and Campione ( 1969) tested the novelty interpretation of response shift by giving young children (24 to 44 years old) eight 5-trial problems with one stimulus or two stimuli on Trial 1 and with the Trial 1 choice rewarded or nonrewarded. That is, in the one-stimulus problems the stimulus on Trial 1 was either S or S - , and in the two-stimulus problems the stimuli on Trial 1 were either both baited or both unbaited. As indicated earlier (Section IV,A), in twostimulus problems of this kind the choice on Trial 1 determines which stimuli are S and S on the subsequent trials (e.g., when both stimuli are baited on Trial I , the stimulus chosen on Trial I becomes S +- on the subsequent trials and the +

+

~

stimulus not chosen becomes S ) . Both variables were manipulated between groups. As shown in Table I V , response shift was obtained on Trial 2 in both the one-stimulus and the two-stimulus problems, but it was statistically significant only in the one-stimulus problems. The condition with two-stimulus problems provided a control for the effect of novelty, in that the children had an opportunity to observe both stimuli throughout each problem. Response shift was significant only when novelty was not controlled, that is, in the one-stimulus problems, and therefore Grabbe and Campione concluded that response shift reflects an effect of stimulus novelty. The differences observed on Trial 2 were transient; the groups were very similar in performance after Trial 2, averaging around 60% correct responses with little if any intertrial improvement. Apparently, because both stimuli were presented on Trial 1 of a two-stimulus problem, neither stimulus was novel on Trial 2. Analogously, after both stimuli were presented on Trial 2 of a onestimulus problem, neither stimulus was novel on Trial 3 and on subsequent trials. Hence, the disappearance of response shift after Trial 2 in the one-stimulus problems is consistent with Grabbe and Campione's conclusion that response shift is attributable to novelty. Nevertheless, the evidence for the conclusion is weakened by the fact that Grabbe and Campione obtained response shift in the trend of the means in the two-stimulus problems, even though the trend was not statistically significant (see Table IV). The conclusion is further weakened by contradictory findings from other studies in which the same kind of two-stimulus problems were used. Berman (1971) studied response shift in children 2; to 6; years old. using procedures similar to Grabbe and Campione's. Like Grabbe and Campione, she varied problem type (one- vs. two-stimulus problems) between groups; however, she varied reward condition within sub,jects. Each child received 24 Trial I reward problems (i.e., with S alone or with both stimuli baited) and 24 Trial I

'TABLE IV Percentage Concct Kc\pon\es o n Trial 2 in the Grabbe and (';implime Study"

Problems

Rew,udetl

Nonrewarded

One-stimulus Two-stimulus

40 0"

69. I hO.0

55 0 ~~

Mean difterence Significant Nonsignificant

~~~~

<'Adapted from Crahhe iuicl Canlpionc (1969. Table I . p. I O X l l Last colunin added "Mean significantly Ie\\ than the chance levcl.

Havne W. Rwsa

168

nonreward problems (S- alone or both stimuli unbaited), with two trials per problem. Contrary to the Grabbe and Canipione results, stimulus novelty did not affect response shift, as shown by the absence of an interaction between problem type and Trial 1 reward, F < 1 .OO. The lack of an interaction does not reflect lack of power, as indicated by the obtained probability ( p < ,005) for the main effect of Trial 1 reward, which has the same error term as this interaction. The main effect of Trial 1 reward reflected a strong response shift-almost 75% correct in nonreward problems and near 50% correct in reward problems. The only other statistically significant effects were problem type ( 1 -stimulus more difficult than 2-stimulus problems) and first versus second half of the problems (performance improved with practice). House and Zeaman (1958) used the same kind of two-stimulus problems with mentally retarded children (mean IQ 28) and obtained response shift. Performance was better in nonreward problems than reward problems (85% correct vs. 45%). Cantrell and Cross (1976) argued that two-stimulus problems of this kind (and by implication the standard learning-set problems described in Section V , A , I ) d o not adequately control novelty because the children handle only one stimulus on Trial 1 in each two-stimulus problem, as in one-stimulus problems, and therefore equal attention to the two stimuli in a two-stimulus problem is not assured. Cantrell and Cross controlled novelty by giving familiarization training in which the children sorted the stimuli on the basis of shape. (The stimuli also differed in color, but attention to color was not required in the subsequent discrimination problems.) The children were then given eight 5-trial problems with one stimulus presented on Trial I (S or S ~, between groups). Nonfamiliarized children were not given the familiarization training; they were given eight 5-trial problems with S presented alone on Trial 1. The group by trial interaction was significant, and follow-up tests indicated that the groups differed significantly only on Trial 2. Table V shows the percent+

~

TABLE V Percentage Correct Respon\e\ on Tridls 2 and 3 in the Cdntrell and Cro\\ Study" Familiarized groups

Trial 2 Trial 3

S + problems

S - problems

4s

63 52

59

Nonfamiliarized group

S

~

probleins 76 59

"Adapted froin Cantrell and Cross ( 1976, Fig 1 , p 280)

age correct responses on Trials 2 and 3 (performance did not vary significantly in any group after Trial 3). The only statistically significant change from Trial 2 to 3 was in the nonfamiliarized group, which became less accurate with practice. As shown in the table, the familiarized S group was inferior on Trial 2 to the two S - groups. Therefore, novelty cannot account for the response shift evident in the between-group comparisons on this trial. That is, response shift was obtained even when neither stiniulus was novel, and the relative frequency of choices of S on Trial 2 of S problems was only slightly and nonsignificantly greater when S was novel (76%’)than when it was familiar (63%;). +-

+

3.

Conclusioii Response shift was obtained in all of the cited studies even though novelty was controlled, more or less adequately; and the strength of response shift was statistically significant except i n the Cirabbe and Campione study. Evidently, then, novelty is not required for the occurrence of response shift. Cantrell and Cross agreed with Harlow’s ( 1959) interpretation of response shift as reflecting an “investigatory tendency”-a tendency to try both stimuli in the test situation. Evidence regarding this interpretation is reviewed in the next subsection. B.

STRENGTHS OF THE WIN-STAY AND LOSE-SHIFT COMPONENTS

When one-stimulus problems arc used. response shift means by definition that perfomiance is worse in S problems than in S problems. Therefore, if performance is better than chance in both kinds o f problems, it must be closer to the chance level in the S + problems. However, if response shift reflects a sZr7glr mechanism-of any kind-thcn performance should be below chance in S problems and above chance in S problems and, furthermore, should be as far below chance in S problems as it is above chance in S problems. For example, if response shift reflected only a shift-object strategy, which would be the perfectly consistent form of a tendency to try out both stimuli in the problem, performance should be as bad i n S ’ problems, in which a shift is incorrect, as it is good in S - problems, in which a shift is correct. The means presented in the present paper indicate that performance was more often above than below chance in S problems, and even when i t was below chance it was usually not as far below chance in S + problems as it was above chance in S - problems. In a study by Cross and Vaughter (1966), children 3; years old exhibited response shift, and their performance in S + problems was 4.4 percentage points below chance. and in S problems it was 42.7 percentage points above chance (the means are prcscntcd in Table VI). Similarly, in a study by Fisher, Sperber, and Zeaman ( 1973). the performance of children with low mental age (MA) was about 4 percentage points below chance in S problems and about 22 percentage points above chance in S problems. The Fisher et al. +

~~

+

+

~

~

+

~

I70

Huvne W Rresr

data were closely confirmed by Greenfield (1976); low MA children were 5 percentage points below chance in S problems and 25 percentage points above chance in S - problems. (The means from the last two studies are presented in Table VII.) Berman (1973) seems to have obtained a similar pattern, but she did not report the relevant means. In the only study I located yielding exceptions, Berman et al. (1970) found that 4-year olds were about equally below and above chance in Session 4 (of six sessions), 6-year olds were farther below than above chance in Sessions 1 and 2, and 8-year olds were farther below than above chance in Session 1 . However, Berman et al. obtained the usual pattern in 4-year olds in Sessions 1, 2, 3, 5 , and 6, in 6-year olds in Session 5 , and in 8-year olds in Session 4. (The relevant means are presented in Figure 2.) Even these exceptions do not support a one-mechanism account of response shift, and therefore the evidence clearly indicates that more than one mechanism is involved. Of course, even the one-mechanism theorists never believed that only one mechanism is involved; rather, they believed that the one mechanism interferes with a mechanism that produces correct responses. Therefore, no one should be surprised by the conclusion, though everyone might be gratified to find that the evidence confirms what they already knew. However, determining just what the mechanisms are is another problem. +

C.

TWO-MECHANISM THEORIES OF RESPONSE SHIFT

Berman and Myers (1971) did a study like King and Harlow’s, and like them found that the strengths of the components of response shift depended on the amounts of experience with the components. [A similar study, by Berman (1973), is reviewed in Section VI,B,3.] Berman and Myers gave 4- and 8-yearold children 2-trial problems with a single stimulus on Trial I . The percentage of problems with S + on Trial 1-2556, 50%, 7556, and 100%-was varied between groups. Performance was analyzed with the number of S problems held constant and the number of S - problems varied, and vice versa. The analyses indicated that performance in S problems was better, the smaller the number of S - problems (with the number of S problems held constant), and was better, the larger the number of S + problems (with the number of S - problems held constant). The 4-year olds had a fairly strong tendency to shift stimuli even in the 100% condition, in which only S problems were given, and the 8-year olds in this condition had some tendency to shift (60%and 89% correct responses in the respective age groups). The tendencies to shift were even stronger in the other conditions (e.g., 39% and 44% correct responses in the respective age groups in the 50% condition). Performance in S problems was good and was not affected by variations in the number of S problems. The Berman and Myers findings can be interpreted as indicating that whatever +

+

+

+

-

+

was learned in the S problems generalized to the S problems, but that whatever was learned in the S + problems did not generalize t o the S - problems. Thus, the study implicates two mcchanisms, one associated in some way with experience in S i- problems and thc othcr associated in some way with experience in S - problems. -

+

I.

Stay versus Shijt Mechutiisms Berman and Myers (197 I ) implicated staying and shifting as the mechanisms underlying their results. They concluded that the experience with S problems “augmented the strong tendcncy to shift choice following reward” but “the tendency to perseverate choice o n nonreward problems was weak, and the ratio of reward to nonreward problems had little effect on lose-shift performance” (p. 132). In other words, a tendency to shift is learned in S - problems, generalizes to S + problems, and interferes with performance. An important point, however, is that even if this conclusion is correct, what is learned in S problems must be shift-object a n d not Lose-shift-object, because shift-object is outcome-independent and can occur i n S as well as S problems, but Loseshift-object can occur only in S problems and therefore cannot generalize to S problems-Win-shift-objcut is not merely another tendency to shift stimuli but rather is a tendency to shift from a rmurded stimulus. -

+

-

+

2.

Excitatorj versus Inhibitor?! Mcchtrriisms Cross and Vaughter (1966) and Maukonen, Tal, and Cross (1969) attributed response shift to a stronger inhibitory than excitatory mechanism, in the context of developmental differences in response shift. Their position is described in the section on developmental differences (Section VI,B, 1-2). As already nientioned, Moss and Harlow (1947) and I (Reese, 1964) attributed response shift in monkeys to greater increments in inhibition than in excitation (Section IV,B). Berman et ul. (1970) proposed a similar explanation, also in the context of developmental differences in rcsponsc shift and also described in the section on developmental differences (Section VI,B . 3 ) . Stimulus preference and positive reinforcement are confounded in problems with both stimuli baited on Trial I , and stimulus preference and nonreinforcement are confounded in problems with both stimuli unbaited on Trial I . Therefore, the occurrence of response shift in these problems must indicate that nonreinforcement has a stronger effect than both reinforcement and stimulus preference. Hull-Spence theory can be used to illustrate the point. The positive and negative stimuli presented on Trial 2 in Positive problems (both stimuli baited on Trial 1) can be designated, respectively, S + and S ~,and in Negative problems (both stimuli unbaited on Trial 1) S+ ’ and S - ‘. In Positive problems the stimulus chosen on Trial 1 becomes the correct stimulus, S + . on Trial 2 and the stimulus not chosen on Trial I becomes the incorrect stimulus, S - , on Trial

2. In Negative problems these relations are reversed: The stimuli chosen and not chosen on Trial 1 become. respectively, S - ' and S + ' on Trial 2. If the tendency to choose one stimulus instead of the other is a direct function of the difference between the habit strengths of the stimuli (strengths of tendency to approach each stimulus), then o n Trial 1 the stimulus chosen had the greater habit strength, which was incremented ( 6 H ) in Positive problems and decremented (61) in Negative problems. Therefore, on Trial 2 the habit strengths should be forS+: H + + 6H, for S-: H - , for S + ' : H + ' , and for S - ' : H - ' - 6I. The relevant differences determine the probabilities of correct responses on Trial 2 of the Positive ( P p o s )and Negative (P,,eg)problems. The differences, with terms rearranged, are

Because the correct stimulus on Trial 2 was, by virtue of the experimental design, chosen on Trial I of Positive problems and not chosen on Trial 1 of Negative problems, the difference between the habit strengths must be positive in Eq. (1) and negative in Eq. (2). Thercfore, whatever the absolute values of the differences between the habit strengths, if Pnegis greater than Ppoa,as it is when response shift occurs, then 61 must be greater than 6 H ; that is, if response shift occurs with this experimental arrangement, then nonreinforcement has a stronger effect than reinforcement. in agreement with the stimulus-response learning theory mentioned in Section 1V.B.

3 . Stimulus Preference versus Leurnitig Fisher et al. (1973) proposed a two-mechanism theory pitting stimulus preferences against learning. Their theory is schematized in Figure 1 . According to the theory: (1) Children have a tendency to respond to the novel stimulus with a probability N , and to the familiar stimulus with a probability F . Because these are the only possible responses and because a response must occur: N + F = I .

(3)

(2) If the initial tendency is incorrect. children have a probability of L (for "learning factor") of shifting to the other stimulus (i.e.. the correct stimulus)

I73

I ~

S+ problems

S- problems

~

PL7 Stimulus

Stimulus

N q

F\(

Start

and a probability of 1 - L of staying with the incorrect stimulus. Therefore, the probabilities of correct responses on Trial 2 in S + problems (PPJ and i n S problems ( f n e g ) are

(I have substituted the symbols P I,o, and PneFfor the symbols used by Fisher et u l . , P, and P N . ) By simple algebraic transformation, Eqs. ( 3 ) - ( 5 ) yield enipirical estimates of L , N , and F c

N = (I

-

P,,,,) + ( I

-

L),

(7)

Although the theory proposed by Fisher c't (11. is both simple and reasonable, it has some problems. One problem is that the L parameter must be assumed to have the same value for S + and S problems; that is. in terms of Levine's theory, Win-stay-object and Lose-shift-object must be assumed to be equally probable. This assumption is contradicted by direct empirical estimates of their probabilities in children (Cameron, 1979; Levinson & Reese, 1967). ~

Consideration of the preceding problem also reveals another problem: Not only must L have the same value for S + and S - problems, but also it must reflect a “learning factor” undifferentiated with respect to Win, Lose, stay, and shift. It therefore cannot reflect a Levine-type strategy, and for the same reason it also cannot reflect excitatory and inhibitory strengths, even though examination of Figure 1 shows that it is actually an interference factor (in S + problems it interferes with novelty preference and in S - problems it interferes with familiarity preference). Still another problem is that the Fisher ef c i l . theory can account for response shift in one-stimulus problems but cannot account for response shift in twostimulus problems because neither stimulus is novel on Trial 2 in two-stimulus problems. As already seen (Section V,A), response shift occurs in two-stimulus problems even though it is opposed by both the effect of reinforcement and the effect of preferences for specific stimuli.

4. A ComprtinX-Strategies Theoty The major findings of the Berman and Myers study are that extra experience with S problems interfered with performance in S problems, but extra experience with S problems did not affect performance in S problerns. Evidently, whatever was learned in S problems generalized to S problems, but whatever was learned in S + problems did not generalize to S - problems. If strategies were learned, the strategy learned in S - problems might be choose-novel or shift-object; this strategy could generalize to S problems because it is specified as independent of whether response to the Trial I stimulus was rewarded or nonrewarded. If the children did not learn to avoid novelty in the S-’ problems, but rather learned Win-stay-object, then no strategy related to novelty would be available to generalize to S problems, and the available strategy-Win-stayobject-logically could not generalize to S - problems, that is, it could not generalize to Lose problems. According to this theory, in S problems a learned Win-stay-object strategy (yielding a correct response) competes with a choose-novel or shift-object strategy (error) generalized from the S problems; and in S - problems, the only operative strategy is choose-novel or shift-object (correct response). Performance in S problems should be better than in S problems-response shiftand the difference should be greater (as in fact it was in the Berman and Myers study) the smaller the ratio of S ~+ problems to S problems, because the relative strengths of the competing strategies in the S problems depend on this ratio. Response shift is obtained even with novelty controlled (as seen in Section V,A). Therefore, either ( 1 ) the strategy that is combined with Win-stay-object is shift-object rather than choose-novel, or (2) children exhibit one combination with novelty uncontrolled (Win-stay-object and choose-novel) and another combination with novelty controlled (Win-stay-object and shift-object). Par-

+

-

+

-

+

+

-

+

-

-

+

-

+

simony favors the first alternative, as does evidence summarized in the next paragraph. Walls and Rude (1975) obtained fairly direct evidence of strong novelty preference in disadvantaged preschoolcrs; and Berman er a / . ( 1970) pointed out that “Children’s preference for novel stimuli has been well documented” (p. 237, citing Cantor, 1963). However, certain details of results obtained by Berman et al. (1970) and Berman (1973) implicate shift-object rather than choose-novel. These investigators found that the performance of 4-year olds improved across S - problems but was consistently below the chance level across six blocks of S + problems. (These studies are discussed further in Section VI.B,3.) This pattern of performance implies that the strategy exhibited in these problems was acquired during the experiment rather than pre-experimentally. I see no reason to assume that shift-object would be acquired pre-experimentally , but choosenovel might well be. The improvement across S - problems implies that the relevant strategy was not the pre-experimentally acquired choose-novel, which would have already been strong at the beginning of training, but rather was the experimentally acquired shift-object. I f one assumes that the 4-year olds were acquiring Win-stay-object in the S ’ problems, then the failure of performance to improve across these problems can be interpreted to mean that the developing Win-stay-object was being offset by the developing competing strategy, shiftobject. Therefore, these findings implicate shift-object as the strategy combined with Win-stay-object. The theory implies that the combination of strategies need not be logically coherent. The theory refers to a combination of one Win component and one component-choose-novel or shift-object-that is independent of outcomes. Such a combination is inconsistent with Levine’s theory, which requires that a strategy have one Win component and one Lose component and that these components be logically related (both refer to object or both refer to position). However, young children in fact exhibit such “illogical” combinations as Win-stayposition and Lose-shift-object (Caineron, 1979; Levinson & Reese, 1967), and therefore might reasonably be expected to exhibit a combination such as the one assumed in the competing-strategies theory. The same evidence indicates that older children exhibit the kinds of logically coherent combinations specified in Levine’s theory, leading to the expectation that they should not combine Winstay-object with choose-novel, shift-ob.ject, or any other outcome-independent strategy. Evidence regarding this expectation is reviewed in the next section.

VI.

Developmental Differences in Response Shift

Developmental differences in response shift with novelty controlled were assessed in five studies with children, and with novelty uncontrolled in one study

with monkeys and eight studies with children (including one of the studies with novelty controlled-Berrnan, 1971). In the study with monkeys (Fletcher & Cross, 1964), older monkeys showed stronger response shift, but the difference was nonsignificant (and anyway age was confounded with experience). In all of the studies with children. significant response shift was obtained. Three of the five studies with novelty controlled and two of the eight studies with novelty uncontrolled revealed no developmental differences in response shift; all the others revealed stronger response shift in less mature children. The studies disagreed as to the pattern of responding in more mature children. A.

STUDIES WITH NOVELTY CONTROLLED

Novelty was controlled in seven studies of response shift in children (reviewed in Section V,A). Two of these studies did not include developmental assessments (Grabbe & Campione, 1969; House & Zeanian, 1958); two of the five studies that included developmental assessments revealed significant developmental differences in response shift and the other three did not. The negative results were obtained by Reese (1965). Berman (1971), and Cantrell and Cross ( 1 976). ( 1 ) Reese used standard learning-set problems, each learned to criterion, and obtained equally strong response shift in younger and older preschoolers (age 3.2-5.5 years, divided at median of 4.7). (2) Berrnan used two-stimulus problems with both stimuli baited on Trial 1 or both unbaited, and obtained equally strong response shift in younger (age 3;) and older (age 5;) preschoolers. (3) Cantrell and Cross controlled novelty with familiarization pretraining and found that although older children (age 54) were perhaps (p = ,052) more accurate on Trials 2-5 than younger children (age 3;), these groups exhibited equally strong response shift. Thus, response shift was obtained in all three studies, but it did not vary with age in preschoolers. The positive results were obtained by Cameron (1979) and Levinson and Reese (1967), both using standard learning-set problems with fixed numbers of trials per problem. ( I ) Cameron found that although 3-, 4-, 5 , and 6-year olds all exhibited response shift, it declined in strength with increasing age because Win-stay-object was acquired more rapidly with increasing age. (2) Levinson and Reese obtained similar effects in comparing preschoolers, fifth graders, and college students: Response shift was weaker with increasing age because of more rapid development of Win-stay-object; and at the fifth-grade and college levels, it appeared only in slower-learning subgroups. (Response shift did not appear at all in elderly persons.) B.

STUDIES WITH NOVELTY UNCONTROLLED

One-stimulus problems with novelty uncontrolled were used in eight studies of developmental differences in response shift in children. No developmental dif-

ferences were obtained in two studies, Berman (1971) and Berman and Myers (1971). Response shift was obtained in both studies; however, because the age differences were nonsignificant, separate means were not reported for the younger and older groups, and therefore trends cannot be identified. Both studies have already been discussed, Berman in Section V,A,2 and Berman and Myers at the beginning of Section V,C. Berman and Myers found that the performance of 8-year olds was better than that o f 4-year olds, but the age by condition interaction was not significant. In contrast, Berinan (1973) obtained a significant age by condition interaction in a similar study, which is discussed later in the present section (Section VI,B,3). The studies in which one-stimulus problems were used with novelty uncontrolled and in which significant developmental differences were obtained are summarized in the following subsections.

I.

Cross and Vuughter Cross and Vaughter (1966) studied response shift in children 3; and 58 years old. The children were given 96 3-trial problems with one stimulus-S for one group and S - for another group-on the first 2 trials and both stimuli on the third trial, or with the standard learning-set procedure of presenting both stimuli on all trials. All groups improved across blocks of problems, and no interaction with blocks of problems was reliable-that is, learning-set acquisition occurred and was equivalent in all groups. Means relevant to response shift are presented in the top part of Table Vi. As +

TABLE VI Percentage Correct Responses in thc Crosa and Vaughter and Maukonen. Tal. and Cross Studies Age (years)

S + problem\

36

45.6 80.7

S$

S

~

piohleins

92.1 67.3

Standard problems

83.4 69.3

Maukonen, Tal. and Cross" 4

7

52 8 60.4

55 3

so

3

"From Cross and Vaughter (1966. Table 11. p. 282). bFrom Maukonen, Tal, and Cross ( 1964, p. 8x2). Maukonen et ul. rcported that these are mean total numbers of correct discrimination trials; but they gave 52 problems of each type. each with six discrimination trials. and unlesa the means are percentages they indicatc that performance was considerably below the chancc level

178

Havtie W. Reese

can be seen, the younger children exhibited response shift and the older children exhibited the opposite pattern-better performance in the S group than in the S - group. Both patterns were statistically significant. (The groups given S problems and standard problems did not differ significantly at either age level.) To explain this age difference, Cross and Vaughter cited a suggestion by D’Amato and Jagoda (1961) that a dominance of inhibitory over excitatory mechanisms would be especially adaptive for phylogenetically primitive and ontogenetically immature organisms. More fully, Cross and Vaughter said: +

~

In an environment with potential danger5 present, learning which stimuli to avoid is adaptive. . . . However, . . . in complex situations mechanisms of inhibition may simply be inefficient. Learning which responses are most appropriate is a more limited task than learning the greater number of responses that eventuate in nonreinforcement. (p. 284)

2 . Maukonen, Tul, and Cross Maukonen et al. (1969) reached a similar conclusion based on their own results. They used one-stimulus problems; but unlike Cross and Vaughter, they gave all children both kinds of one-stimulus problems, and they gave only one one-stimulus trial per problem. As shown in the bottom part of Table VI, 4-year olds exhibited response shift and 7-year olds exhibited no difference in performance in the two kinds of problems. Maukonen et al. concluded that the age difference disagrees with an hypothesis proposed by S . H. White (1965) to explain mediational deficiency (Flavell, 1970; Reese, 1962) in young children. White had hypothesized that young children fail to exhibit mediation because they fail to inhibit whatever response is directly associated with the stimulus that is presented. The occurrence of this response terniinates the trial before the mediational chain has had time to run its course. Maukonen et a / . argued that the “‘inhibition mechanism’ becomes relatively less efficient with age” rather than more efficient, contrary to White’s hypothesis (p. 882). Maukonen et al. apparently reached this conclusion from the occurrence of response shift at age 4 and the nonoccurrence of response shift at age 7. The conclusion-and Cross and Vaughter’s-is justified if response shift means only that Lose-shift-object, which is a sort of “inhibitory mechanism,” I suppose, is stronger than Win-stay-object. However, when the evidence reviewed in Section V is taken into account, response shift is seen to reflect more than only the relative strengths of these two strategies. 1 will return to this point later (in Section VI,C). The conclusion reached by Maukonen et al. can also be challenged from another viewpoint. When the response to the stimulus presented on Trial 1 is rewarded (S+ problems), the tendency to respond to this stimulus should be strengthened; and when this response is nonrewarded (S problems), the tenden~

cy to respond to the Trial I stiniulus should be inhibited. If the “inhibition mechanism” is weak, the response to S may not be inhibited, yielding Trial 2 errors in S - problems. The status of the inhibition mechanism is not relevant in S problems, because inhibition does not occur on Trial 1 of these problems. In the S - problems, which are the only relevant ones for the point under consideration, the older children in the Maukoncn et ul. study exhibited more inhibition than the younger childrcn-that is, the older children made more correct responses in the S - problems than did the younger children. This outcome is entirely consistent with White’s hypothesis. Actually, the Maukonen ef t i / . study does not provide a strong test of White’s hypothesis because the initial responses to S - were forced. Instead of onestimulus problems, a definitive test would involve two-stimulus problems with both stimuli baited or both unbaited. This procedure would allow spontaneous stimulus preferences to detennine Trial I choices-whichever stimulus is chosen is by definition the preferred one. This stimulus theoretically has the greater excitatory strength and therefore should have the stronger associative response, which should be the more in need of inhibition. Thus, this procedure would allow assessment of whether response shift is stronger than these spontaneous stimulus preferences, which would need to be inhibited in order for response shift to occur. Studies in which this procedure was used have already been reviewed (in Sections V,A,2 and VI,A); response shift was obtained in all of the studies (though it was nonsignificant in one-Grabbe & Campione, 1969). Thus, whatever mechanism underlies response shift in this situation, it competes effectively with stimulus preference. +

3. Berman, Rune, und Buhou,; Bcrtmin Berman et ul. (1970) gave 4-, 6-. 8-, and 10-year-old children up to 144 onestimulus problems (training stopped earlier if a learning-set criterion was met), with two trials per problem. For all children, S and S were each presented on Trial 1 of 12 problems per session for up t o six sessions. As can be seen in Figure 2. response shift was obtained at all ages. I t was especially prominent in the 4-year olds, whose performance improved across S - problems but not across S ’~ problems. All other age groups improved across problems of both types, and the 10-year olds attained more than 90% correct responses in both problem types in Session 2 . Berman (1973) also obtained poor performance by 4-year olds in S + problems. The study was similar to the Berman and Myers study (described at the beginnings of Sections V,C and V I , B ) . Berman gave groups of 4- and 8-year olds a series of one-stimulus problems, including either 33% or 67%. S + problems and the rest S problems. She obtained response shift and found that the age groups changed differentially across six blocks of 24 problems. Children of both ages in the 67% condition and the older children in the 33% condition +

-

-

Hayne W . Rerse

180

100

A

P 0-

*-.J

g’

60

t

I-

Y LI:

LI:

0

20

W

2 I-

100

z W

$

t

0

C

80

W

a 60

S s Problems

40

o S - Problems

20

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

SESSION Fig. 2. Mean daily performunce of ( A ) 4.. (BJ 6 ,(C)8.. und ( D ) IO-?;enr olds on S + und S problems i n the Berman, Rune, und B u h m study (From Berman et ul.. 1970. Fig. I . p . 235.)

improved across both S + and S - problems. However, the younger children in the 33% condition were worse than chance in S + problems in all six blocks of problems. Thus, response shift was stronger in the younger children. Berman e t a / . (1970) offered an explanation similar to that of Maukonen et a l . , but couched in the terms of stimulus-response learning theory. Berman et ul. pointed out that the results can be accommodated by Hull-Spence theory with some assumptions added: ( 1 ) All stimuli have relatively high excitatory values, and therefore the increment in inhibition following nonreward is greater than the increment in excitation following reward. (As already noted, Moss and Harlow, 1947, and Reese, 1964, proposed a similar explanation of response shift in monkeys.) (2) The excitatory values of the stimuli increase with age. Berman et

ul. obtained some support for a predicted consequence of this assumption: The 10-year olds emitted more correct responses than the younger children in both S + and S - problems, that is, following both initial reward and initial nonreward. However, to account for the rapid improvement in the older children, an additional assumption is needed about the speed of change in excitation and inhibition as a function of age. 4 , Fisher, Sperber, und Zecirnuii: Grc~c~nfi’eld Fisher et ul. (1973) challenged Cross and Vaughter’s interpretation of the developmental difference in response shift, on the argument that attributing response shift to stronger tendencies of avoidance than approach does not explain the effect except on “the odd assumption . . . that reinforcement had an interfering effect on choice” (p. 510). The criticism is applicable to the younger children in the S + group in the Cross and Vaughter study, because they performed below the chance level. Fisher r’t al. proposed that both novelty preference and reinforcement effects are involved. (The theory is discusscd in Section V,C,3). In S problems, novelty preference would produce an error and reinforcement would tend to producc a correct response; in S - problems. both novelty preference and nonreinforcement would produce a correct response. Fisher et a / . tested mentally retartled children with low versus high M A . Thcy trained the children to criterion on the first problem and then gave them 200 twotrial problems, 100 S + and 100 S . in alternating blocks of five problems. For the first SO problems of each type the stimuli were pictures, and for the second +

I’AHLI: VII Percentage Correct Trial 2 Re\potise\ in tlic t:i\her er

(I/.

and Greenfield Studich

Picture\ Group

S

+

problem\

ObJects

S

prohlein\

S

+

problenis

S

problem\

Fisher, Sperher. and Zeanian~’ ~

Low M A High M A

58

. 5 .5

77

58

46 75

72 71

37 65

74 65

(;l-eenllcld”

Low M A

~

High M A

-

~~

“From Fisher, Sperher. and Zeamaii ( 1 Y 3 , Tahle I I . p. 513). ”Estimated from Greenfield (1976, 1:ig. ?, p 2<)7).The mean\ arc tor the first ?-day hlocl, ot problems

50, objects. As can be seen in the top part of Table VII, the low MA group exhibited no effect with pictures but exhibited response shift with objects, and the high MA group exhibited the opposite of response shift with pictures and no effect with objects. The occurrence of response shift only in the low MA group is broadly consistent with D’ Amato and Jagoda’s suggestion. Greenfield ( 1976) confirmed the MA difference obtained with objects, as can be seen in the bottom part of Table VII. Fisher el al. computed the values of the three parameters in their theory (illustrated in Figure 1 ) . They found that L was reliable and was not significantly correlated with MA, IQ, or CA (chronological age). In contrast, N (and conversely its complement F ) correlated significantly with M A ( r = -.85 for pictures and objects combined) and IQ ( - . 7 l ) but not with CA (.28). With 1Q partialled out, the correlation with MA ( - .71) remained significant; but with MA partialled out, the correlation with IQ ( - .3 1 ) was nonsignificant. Thus, the relevant subject variable was MA, and the preference for novelty was greater, the lower the MA. An empirical complication was that the values obtained for the parameters were not the same for pictures and objects, or perhaps they were not the same for the first versus second halves of training, which were confounded with pictures and objects, respectively. The regression lines indicated that for pictures the value of N was 0.50 at MA 3 years and about 0.25 at MA 6 years (values and MAS approximate). Thus, if retarded individuals ever prefer novel pictures over familiar pictures (or prefer novel stimuli over familiar stimuli early in training), they do so at MA lower than 3 years. For objects, however, N varied from 0.75 at MA 3 years to 0.50 at MA 4.5 years and 0.25 at MA 6 years. Thus, before MA 4.5 years retarded individuals prefer novel objects and after MA 4.5 years they prefer familiar objects (or late in training they prefer novel stimuli before MA 4.5 years and familiar stimuli after MA 4.5 years). The meaning of these results, however, is not altogether clear because of the problems identified in Section V,C,3. C.

INTERPRETATION

Going into Section VI, the competing-strategies theory (Section V ,C,4) seemed the most plausible, but, as will be seen in the present subsection, the developmental results obtained with one-stimulus problems are not entirely consistent with this theory, even with the addition of either one of two developmental assumptions that have been made in the literature. The assumptions to be considered refer to developmental differences in ( 1 ) the strength of Win-stay-object and (2) the preference for novel stimuli. In the following discussion 1 refer the developmental differences explicitly to age and implicitly-by reference to certain findings-to M A .

183

1.

The Win-Stay-Object Assutiiptioii The development of Win-stay-object is assumed to be faster in older than younger children. Therefore, older children should perform better than younger children in S + problems. This prediction was clearly confirmed by five studies. perhaps confirmed by another (Cantrell & Cross), and clearly disconfirmed by two, as shown in Table VIII. The Berinan et al. study confirmed it if the 10-year olds are included and disconfirmed it if they are excluded. With the assumption about Win-stay-object added, the competing-strategies theory predicts no developmental difference in S problems, because the strength of Win-stay-object should n o t affect performance in these problems. This prediction was clearly confirmed by three studies, and was perhaps confirmed by the Maukonen et d.study and the Bennan et al. study in the early sessions if the 10-year olds are excluded. The prediction was disconfirmed by three studies and by the Berman ct ul. study in the last sessions if the 10-year olds are excluded and in all sessions if the 10-year olds are included. The meaning of these disconfirmations is ambiguous because the clear-cut disconfirmation provided by Berman et a/. is for a much older age group than was tested in the other ~

TABLE: Vlll Summary of Evidence on I>cvelopmenl;il Differences in S Study Berman ( 1973) Cantrell and Cross (1976) Cross and Vaughter ( 1966) Greenfield (1976) Fisher ct ul (1973) Maukonen er ul. ( 1969) Berman (1971) Berman and Myers (197 I ) Berman et al. ( I 970) Excluding 10-year olds Early sessions Late sessions Including 10-year olds Early sessions Late sessions

S

+

problems

Young Young Young Young Young Young Young Young

< old < oldh < old < old < old < old

Young Young

=

= =

=

+

and S

~

Problems’ S - problems ~

old old

Young Young Young Young Young Young Young

old old

Young Young

Young < old Young < old

< old‘ old > old = old = old = old = old

A:

=

old

(?)

old

Young < old Young < old

“The relevant means can be found i n Tahles VI-VII and Fig. 2.except for the Cantrell and Cross (1976), Berman (1973), and Berman and Myers (1971) studies, for which no relevant nieans were reported, and the Berman (1971j study, for hhich the relevant overall means were about 50% correct on S problems and 75% correct on S - problcms. hDifference nonsignificant (JJ = ,052).

studies, and because the other disconfirmations came from studies with problem types varied between subjects (Cantrell & Cross, 1976; Cross & Vaughter, 1966: Greenfield, 1976) and the confirmations came from studies with problem types varied within subjects. The assumption about Win-stay-object also implies that older children should exhibit similar strengths of Win-stay-object and Lose-shift-object: that is, they should perform about the same in S and S problems. The evidence is largely inconsistent with this prediction, in that significant response shift was obtained in the older children in all five of the relevant studies with novelty controlled (Berman, 1971; Cameron, 1979; Cantrell & Cross, 1976; Levinson & Reese. 1967; Reese, 1965) and in four of the relevant studies with novelty uncontrolled (Berman, 1971. 1973; Berman & Myers, 1971: Berman eral., 1970, considering the 6- and 8-year olds as the older children), and the opposite of response shift was obtained in two of the relevant studies with novelty uncontrolled (Cross & Vaughter, 1966; Fisher et ul., 1973, high MA group with pictures). However, the prediction was confirmed in four of the relevant studies with novelty uncontrolled (Berman et ul., 1970, considering the 10-year olds as the older children; Fisher c ~ tof., 1973, high MA group with objects: Greenfield, 1976, high M A group; Maukonen et al., 1969). Four confirmations is not a bad “score” among the studies with novelty uncontrolled, but neither is it a compelling trend. Aside from the mixed evidence regarding the predicted developmental differences, the assumption is problematic because it is inconsistent with evidence obtained by Fisher et a / . (Section VI,B,4) on the value of L (the learning parameter)-,!, was uncorrelated with developmental level. +

2,

The Novel8 Assitniption Younger children are assumed to have a stronger preference for novelty than older children. This assumption is supported by the findings of Fisher et 01. regarding the value of N (preference for novelty)-A’ had a strong negative correlation with developmental level. Preference for novelty is relevant in both S and S problems. Therefore, younger children should have a stronger tendency than older children to be wrong in S problems (unless Win-stay-object were enough stronger in younger than older children to offset the developniental difference in preference for novelty, which would be contrary to all the evidence). This is the same prediction as deduced from the first assumption, and the findings regarding it are predominantly favorable. as already noted. Under the novelty assumption younger children should have a stronger tendency than older children to be right in S problems. This prediction was confirmed by two studies and disconfirmed by the other studies. Thus. the confirmation came from only two of the three studies in which problem type was varied between subjects. +

~

+

~

I85

VII.

Conclusion

Response shift is a robust phenomenon, highly stable across many variations in procedures. However, the underlying mechanisms have not been established. The cross-study comparisons sumniari& in the present paper provide some clues, but these comparisons arc very tcnuous because the studies varied in so many ways (not all of which were documented in the present paper). Preference for novel stimuli seenis clearly to be a blind alley. The tendency to try out both stimuli seems too playful, and anyway it would need explanation rather than be explanatory. Differential increments in excitatory and inhibitory strengths are consistent with much old research on stimulus-response learning. but the required developmental Iption-a greater differential for younger than older children-seems prc atic. If children are using logic, then a disconfirmation (Lose) provides more information than a confirmation (Win), but the developmental evidence on strategic behavior compels the conclusion that younger children are less strategic. less logical, than older children. Most of the studies have been inconiplete in that training was not continued until the children attained learning set, which for definitive results should be defined as nearly perfect one-trial lear-ning. ( A strict one-trial learning criterion would presumably underestimate learning set in young children, because of their well-known distractibility, stimulus preferences, curiosity, etc.) Continuation of training to a learning-set criterion is desirable for two reasons. First, the Berman et a / . (1970) study showed that age differences in problem d across sessions; and second, response shift is a phenomenon encountered in the course of learning-set formation-it is an example of the kind of effect Bugelski (1956) suggested needs to be understood if we are to understand learning set. Furthermore, because i t is a dominant “error factor” in both monkeys (Harlow. 1950, 19.59; Reese, 1964) and children. it may be the key to understanding learning set.

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Hayne W . Reese

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Gelnian, R. (1969). Conservation acquisition. A problem of learning t o attend to relevant attributes. Journal of E,rperimenta/ Child /’.\wholo,!+, 7, 167- 187 Grabbe, W . , & Campione, J . C. (I96Y) A novelty interpretation of the Moss-Harlow effect in preschool children. Child Dewloprnenf, 40, 1077- 1084. Greenfield. D. B. ( 1976). Novelty and faniiliarity as redundant cues in retardate discrimination learning. Journal of E.xperirnrrrtrr/ (’hild P cwhology. 21, 289-302. Gustavson, C. R . , Garcia, J . . Hankitis. W G , Cii Rusiniak, K . W . (1974). Coyote predation control by aversive conditioning. Sciericc. 184, 5X 1-583. Harlow. H. F. ( 1950). Analysis of discriniinatioii learning by monkeys. Journal of E.xperimentrrl Psychology. 40, 26-39. Harlow, H. F. (1959). Learning \et iincl error factor theory. In S . Koch (Ed.), Psycholop: A sfudv o f a scienw (Vol. 2. pp. 492-537). Ncw York: McGraw-Hill. House, B . J . . & Zeaman, D. (19%). Reward and nonreward in the discrimination learning of imbeciles. Journal qf Compunrtiw u r i d Phi~.tiologiculPsychology. 51, 614-61 8. House. B. J . , & Zeaman. D. (19(>3) Miniature experiments in the discrimination learning of retardates. In L. P. Lipsitt & C. C. Spiker (Eda.).Adiurices in child development and b e h u ~ i o r (Vol. I . pp. 313-374). New YorL Academic Press. Jarvik. M. E. (1953). Discrimination of colorcd food and food signs by primates J o u r r d of Compcirutive and Physiological P . \ w ~ / o ~46. Y . 390-392. Kaufrnan, M. E., & Gardner, W. I . ( I Y 6 Y a ) Learning set efficiency i n mentally retarded children. American Jourriul of M e n t d Dcfic.irwv. 73, 708-800. Kaufrnan, M. E., & Gardner, W. I . (lOO9b). Transfer of training of learning sets in mental defcctives. I. Discrimination reversal. Arrrrricori ./ournu/ of Mcvitcrl D@icicwcv. 73, 801-803 King, J . E. (1966). Transfer relationhliips bet\+ecn learning set and concept formation in rhesus monkeys. Journal of Comparuriw cirrtl PIi) siolo,qicul Psycholop, 61, 41 6-420. King, J . E.. & Harlow, H . F. (1902) Effect of ratio of Trial 1 reward to nonrcward on the discrimination learning of macaque monkey\. Joirrna/ qf Comparatiw and Physiologicul P A V chology. 55, 872-875. Krechevsky, I . ( 1932). “Hypothesis” verws “chance” in the pre-solution period in sensory discrimination learning. Ilnrver.c,rv of Ccil!fornui, Berkeley, P uhlicufions it7 Psychology, 6, 2744. Lakatos, I . ( 1978). The mc,thodolo,q\ ~f wrerrrific rcwarch programme's (Philoxphical papers, Vol. I , J . Worrall & G . Cunie, Eds ). London & New York: University of Cambridge Press. Leary, R. W. (1956). The rewarded, the unrewiirded. the chosen, and the unchosen. Psvchologiccrl Reports, 2, 91-97. Levine, M. (1959). A model of hypothe\i\ behavior in discrimination learning set. Psycho/ogicu/ Rcwiew~.66, 353-366. Levinson, B.. & Reese. H. W . (1967). Patterns of discrimination learning set in preschool childrcn, fifth-graders, college freshmen, and the aged. Monographs of /he Societyfor Research in Child Development. 32(7, Serial No. 115) Low. L. A , . Gronberg, F., & Sherling. 13. (1975). Learning sets for simple concept identification and reversal shifts. Bulletin of the, Pswhorromic Society. 5 , 254-256. Maukonen, L. J . , Tal, A , , & Cross, H A (11)69) The Moss-Harlow effect in young children: Replication. P.sychologirul R e p o m . 24, 8X I . X82. Menzel, E. W . , Jr., & Juno, C. (1982) Marnioscts (Sagui,iu.sfirscic,,Ilis): Are learning sets learned’’ Scicvtce, 217, 750-752. Miles, R. C . , & Meyer, D. R . (1956). I.earniiig scts in marmosets. Journal o f Comparurive und Phy.sio/ogical Psychology. 49, 2 19-222. Miller, A . (1971). Learning set formation and tranhfer in concept learning: A comparison between attribute identification and rule learning. P.svc.horiomic S(,ience. 23, 292-294.

Moss, E. M . , & Harlow. H. F. (1947). The role of reward in discrimination learning in monkeys. Journal of Comparative und Phwiological Psychology, 40, 333-342. Neiniark, E. D . , & Horn. M. (1969). Development of a discrimination and oddity learning set i n a two-year-old girl. Psychonomic Science, 17, 108- 109. Palmerino, C . C., Rusiniak, K. W . . & Garcia. J . (1980). Flavor-illncss aversions: The peculiar roles of odor and taste in memory for poison. Science. 208, 753-7S5. Reese, H. W. (1962). Verbal mediation as a function of age level. P.sychologicul Bulletin. 59, 502509. Reese, H. W. (1963). Discrimination learning set in children. In L. P. Lipsitt & C. C. Spiker (Eds.), Advances in child develoipmriit and hehu1,ior ( V o l . I , pp. 1 IS- 145). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (1964). Discrimination learning set i n rhesus monkeys. Psychological Bulletin 61, 321 -340. Reese. H W. (1965). Discrimination learning set and perceptual set in young children. Child Developmen/. 36, 153- 161 Reese. H. W . (1968). The prrcepion ofstimu/u.s relationst Discrimination learning and Iransposrtion. New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W . (1970). Set. In H. W . Reese & L. P. Lipsitt (Eds.). E.xprrimenlal c.hildpsychology (pp, 263-278). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W . (1977). Discriminative learning and transfer: Dialectical perspectives. In N . Datan & H. W . Reese (Eds.), Life-spun developmentul psychology: Dialectical perspectives 011 cxperimental research (pp. 205-252). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (in press). Rules and rule-governance: Cognitive and behavioristic views. In S . C Hayes (Ed.), Cognition. conringmcte.\, and rule-governed he.lru\'ior. New York: Plenum. Reese, H. W . , & Porges, S . W . (1976). Development of learning processes. In V. Hamilton & M . D. Vernon (Eds.). The derdopmenr of (ognitiw p r o w s (pp. 413-447). London: Academic Press. Restle, F. (1958). Toward a quantitative description of learning set data. P.sychologicul Review. 65, 77-9 I . Ricciardi. A. M., & Treichler, F. R . (1970). Prior training influences o n transfer to learning set by squirrel monkeys. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychologv, 73, 3 14-3 19. Riley, A. L . , Lotter. E. C , & Kulkosky. P. J . (1979). The effects of conditioned taste aversions on the acquisition and maintenance of schedule-induced polydipsia. Animal Learning and Behavior, 7, 3-12. Riopelle. A. J . (1953). Transfer suppression and learning sets. Jouriiul of'Com/~urativrund Physiological Psychology, 46, 108-1 14. Routh, D. K., & Wischner, G . J . (1970). Effect of verbal pretraining and single-problem mastery on Weigl learning-set formation in children. Drvelopmental Psychology, 2, 176- 180. Saravo. A , , & Collin, E. S. (1969). Oddity learning and learning sets in children. Joitrnal of Experimental Child Psychology. 7, S41-552. Saravo, A , , & Kolodny, M. (1969). Learning set and shift behavior in children. Journal ofExperimental Child Psychology. 7, 21-30. Schrier, A. M. (1971). Extradimensional transfer of learning-set formation in stumptailed monkeys. Learning and Motivation. 2, 173- I8 I . Schrier, A. M . , & Povar, M. L. (1978). Eye movements of nionkeys during learning-set formation. Science, 199, 1362- 1364. Schusterman, R. J. (1962). Transfer effects of successive discrimination-reversal training in chimpanzees. Science. 137, 422-423. Shapiro. S . I . , & Moely, B . E. (1971). Free recall, subjective organization, and learning to learn at three age levels. Psvchonomic Science, 23, 189- 191

Steinert. P. A . . Infurna. R . N . , Jardulii. M . t . . & Spear, N. E. (1979). Effects of CS concentration o n long-delay taste aversion learning i n pi-e\*canling and adult rats. Behur.ioru/ ciiitl Neurul Biologv. 27, 487-502. Walls, R . T.. B Rude. S H. ( l 9 7 S ) lxploration and learning-to-learn in disadvantaged prcxchoolers. Child Studv Journul. 5. 177- I0 I Warren, J . M. (1966). Reversal Ic'ii-nirig iind the lorination of learning sets by cats and rhewa d i d P / ~ ~ . ~ i o / o g iP,$who/ogv. c~u/ 61, 42 I-42X monkeya. Jouriial of Co~nptinirri~c~ White. 0. R (1971 ) . A ,glos\ur-\ of lw/ioi,ioru/ tri-miiiology. Champaign. IL: Research Press. White, S. H . (1965). Evidericc for ;I Iiicr;irchiciil arrangement of learning processes. In L P. Ltpsitt & C. C. Spiker (Eds.), Advaiicc.\ i i i i h i l d clcwlopment ui7d hehtriior ( V o l . 2, pp. 187-220). New York- Academic Press. Williams. B . A . ( 19x4). Stirnulus ctintrol and aswciative learning. Joitriiul of /he Experimmrol A I I N I ~ S IoJf Behuvror. 42, 460--41(3 Yeh. J . C . - Y W ( 1970). Tran\positi(in id transfer of absolute responding as functions of learntngset training and stiniulus yimilariry ./ortrrrcil of Eiperirnentul Child P.svcholo,yv, 10, 57-66, Yoshirnura. E. K . , Moely, B. E.. & Sliapiro. S 1 (1971). The influence ot age and presentation order upon children's free recall and learning to learn. Psvchonoinic Sciericc. 23, 261-263 Zeaman, D.. & House. B . I. (19631 The role of attention in retardate diacrimination learning In N . R . Ellis (Ed. j, Hundhook 1 q m e i i / i i / t / q f i c . i r r i i . \ P.tyc.hologrc.al rhrorr uiid rrsrarch ( p p . 159223) New York: McGraw-Hill.

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A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF RULE-FOLLOWING

Henry C. Riegler DEPARTMENT Of: PSYCHOLOGY IJNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT ASHEVILLE ASHEVII.LE. NORTH CAROLINA 28804

D o n d d M . Buer DEPARTMENT OF H U M A N DEVELOPMENT THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAWREN(’E. KANSAS 66045

I. INTRODUCTION I1

A REVIEW O F SKINNER’S KEI.EVANT CONCEPTS A. CONTINGENCY-SHAPED BEHAVIOR B. RULE-GOVERNED PROBLEM-SOLVING C EVALUATION O F SKINNER’S PROBLEM-SOLVING ANALYSIS

111. INSTRUCTIONAL-CONTROL. RliSEARCH

IV. DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS A . STEP I B . STEP 2 C. STEP 3 D. STEP 4 E. STEP 5 V . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

The behavior of problem-solving has presented a formidable challenge to every variety of behavior theory. The initial question is of course whether any behavior class deserving such a label exists; the alternative is that problemsolving is only a theorist’s interpretation imposed on the behavior of the orga-

A D V A N C E S IN C-HI1.D DEVEL.OPMFNT A N D R F H A V I O R . V O L 21

nism under study. That question might seem to diminish the importance of the analysis, but if such a class does exist, its analysis obviously is central to an understanding of behavior, and if it does not, then understanding that it does not would at least solve a problem. Skinner has begun one analysis; like the others, it remains controversial: so far, it has generated more abstract questions about its meaning and completeness than applications to enhance human problem-solving. In this paper we review Skinner’s two-part analysis: ( 1 ) the relevant environmental contingencies that control a behavior class of problem-solving (contingency-shaped behavior), and ( 2 ) his description of another behavior class that can be called rules, some members of which can occasion what seems to be problem-solving (rule-governed) behavior. Contingency control of behavior classes in general is relatively well understood at the level of theory, and the extension of that theory to denote problem-solving is straightforward; by contrast. Skinner’s analysis of rule-governed behavior, the extension of which might well define rather than denote a behavior class defensibly called problem-solving, too often generates mutually incompatible restatements. Perhaps his differentiation of contingency-shaped behavior and rule-governed behavior. and his subsequent guess about the development of rule-governed behavior, should be examined for any inadvertent barriers to application. Review from that point of view suggests three theses:

I . Skinner’s argument is sufficient for a structural and functional understanding of rule-governed behavior. 2 . His analysis does not yet provide a sufficiently detailed understanding of how rule-governed behavior develops, but could lead to one. 3. That deficiency has generated most o f the current misinterpretations of rule-governed behavior. These theses arise in part from a review of Skinner’s relevant theory, and in part from a review of research into the control of behavior by rules (often called instructional control). Both will be discushed in detail below. A key issue will be the extent to which research demonstrating control by rules is also addressed to the development of that control. Insufficient analysis of how rule-governed behavior develops may well maintain misinterpretations of Skinner’s original analysis. Yet the potentially crucial developmental analysis may already be implicit in several ongoing behavior-analytic research areas. Thus, the final and most important purpose of this paper is to transform that analysis from implicit to explicit, by stating it in a way that can be experimentally verified-or denied.

11. A Review of Skinner’s Relevant Concepts Skinner has written often about problem-solving behavior and rule-governed behavior. His most recent statement is the 1984 revision of An Opernrzt Analysis

of Problem Solving, which will be taken here as the synthesis of that position. Four earlier references seem to represent its historical context (Skinner, 1953, 1968, 1969, 1974). The central thesis of Skinner’s (1984) analysis is straightforward: Behavior that solves problems may r e d t f r o m direct shaping of contingencies or from rules constructed either by the prohlcn-solver o r by others. (p. 583)

Then the first step is to explain how contingencies shape behaviors that solve problems, and the next step is to explain how rules occasion behaviors that solve problems. A.

CONTINGENCY~SWAPEDBEHAVIOR

When we describe contingency-shaped behavior in everyday language, we often describe the contingency itself as ii “problem“ to be “solved”; but neither of those added terms contributes anything more than results from an analysis of the effects of the contingencies. Skinner used Thorndike’s familiar experiment with cats to illustrate this point. A cat is placed in a box with a latched door; the behavior of turning the latch allows the door to be pushed open, which allows access to food. Eventually, the typical cat does something that turns the latch, and then eventually does something that opens the door, and then leaves the box and eats the food. In ordinary language that chain of behavior is usually described as solving a problem. Skinner’s point is that it also constitutes overinterpretation, much like Thorndike’s clain-that in effect the cat “used” trialand-error learning. Overinterpretation is obviated by describing the class of chains that turn the latch, open the door, pass through the door, and consume the food available there, and by attributing the developing predominance of those chains in that situation to nothing more than their results in that situation, because that seems to be all that is necessary to produce that predominance (see Skinner 1984, p. 583). Now the explanation of the cat’s behavior “leaves no problem and, of course, no opportunity to solve a problem” (p. 584). The cat’s “problem” is really only our problem in describing the cat’s behavior, which is “solved” completely by describing the relevant contingencies of reinforcement. In the same way, Skinner argued, other problem-solutions, such as choice and creativity, are better understood by discovering their relevant contingencies (p. 590). The central point is that when we require an experimeritd analysis of our common but elusive claims about solving problems, we may find that they all will yield an objective analysis of the relevant contingencies and their stimulus controls. Skinner took this same approach in analyzing the rules or instructions that seem to control some of the behavior classes that ordinary language calls problem-solving.

Henry C Riegler und Dontrld M . Boer

I94

B.

RULE-GOVERNED PROBLEM-SOLVING

1. Discriminative Stimuli Discriminative stimuli occasion behavior; because of that, they will seem to solve a problem. For example, the latch in the cat’s box eventually occasions pawing that turns it, which then allows the door to be opened by any behaviors that push against it. In a language system in which escaping from the box is described as a problem, turning the latch will be described as an essential part of the solution to that problem. However, in an analysis in which the cat’s behavior is described not as problem-solving but instead as nothing more than a class of chains made predominant in that situation by the relevant contingencies, the latch will also be described as nothing more than a stimulus capable of occasioning one step in that class of chains, a capability attributable similarly to nothing more than the relevant contingencies. Skinner elaborated this point with another example of a “problem.” You must find a friend’s suitcase at a circular baggage claim in an airport terminal. You have no help and no description of the bag. As the bags move quickly around the carousel, you will check the name tag on each of them, one after another, and very likely will check many of them several times over. But if you could mark each incorrect bag conspicuously after checking it the first time, you would shorten the process. Perhaps you will find a piece of chalk in your pocket, carried away from your last encounter with a blackboard, and use it for that purpose. This marking is a special behavior, in that it constructs a discriminative stimulus to control your subsequent behavior (see Skinner, 1984, p. 584). Skinner offers this example to show simply how we use verbal rules. We use rules as verbal markers to describe stimuli within the environment, responses that can be made in conjunction with these stimuli, and a reinforcing consequence. For example, the statement, “Pick red apples; they’re sweet,” names stimuli in the environment-red apples; responses that can be made in conjunction with these stimuli-picking the apple (by inference, for eating); and finally a reinforcing consequence-the sweet taste of the apple that occurs when the described responses are made to the described stimulus. Thus, a rule occasions the behavior that is named in the rule (see Skinner. 1984, p. 584); that is, people with the requisite history underlying the ability to comply with rules and who prefer sweet to sour now can pick apples selectively. Rules are often stated, and once stated can be stated again by anyone, and can still occasion the relevant behavior: Now anyone can pick sweet apples, given the appropriate rule-even people who have never eaten apples, red or green, before. We do not have to contact the contingencies of reinforcement from which that rule was formulated in order to be controlled by it-the naive apple picker does not have to pick and taste various apples in order to pick the sweet ones; the rule immediately controls efficient sweet-apple picking.

Skinner pointed out that any vcrbal lomi that specifies stimuli and responseconsequence contingencies correlated with those stimuli can itself function as a discriminative stimulus that will occasion behavior. Thus, rules include instructions, laws, maxims, advice, grammar. and most of the propositions of science: These are all verbal forms that name situations and the behavior appropriate to those situations-situation-bchavior correspondences that someone discovered earlier and stated later in order t o occasion the same behavior in others in that situation.

2 . Describing Behavior Skinner asked the important next question: “How do people arrive at the formulas which thus prove helpful to themselves and others? (1984, p. 5 8 5 ) . His answer was that our ability to use description across a variety of situations develops. His description of that development is sketchy: Its components are to observe and describe stimuli and situations and their usual responses in detail. The social community often enough reinforces describing behavior. especially successful behavior. Thus, describing specific occasions, responses, and consequences-tantamount to constructing rules-should become a pervasive behavior, because it is reinforced by o u r experience and our culture. Then, given the ubiquity of rules in our environment, the significant advantage of ruleTfollowirzg is that we can respond successfully in a given situation without ever having experienced the contingencies described in the rule, and without ever experiencing those contingencies in the future (see p. 586). Many of the adults who systematically avoid ingesting anything marked with a skull and crossbones have never been poisoned, never seen any one else poisoned, and very likely never will be by a substance so marked. Hut although they have never encountered or observed the contingencies that led to the construction of that rule by others, the absence of poisoning in their lives may in itself be a contingency contributing to their rule-following-a point to bc discussed below. 3. Responding Controlled by K i i l p s Many behaviors in the class of constructing rules are richly reinforced, in that the rules are discriminative for those behavior chains that are better reinforced than most others-these are the chains that are called problem solutions. However, the behavior class of following rules often encounters not the contingencies that led to the construction of the rule. but to a different set. Consider Skinner’s two illustrative examples of retrieving behavior: baseball outfielders catching fly balls, and naval ship commanders recovering re-entering satellites. These examples are instructive. We know that outfielders’ observing, running, and catching behaviors have been shaped by many past contingencies with balls caught and balls missed, and that they have few if any nonsuperstitious rules to direct their skill; and we know that ship commanders catch satellites because of a history of

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cititl

Donultl M Burr

differential reinforcement for obeying complex orders about how to respond to the outputs of their radars and computers-for rule-following, in short (p. 587). Skinner saw three possible reinforcers to shape rule-following behavior: ( 1 ) a generalized history of reinforcement for following other rules. (2) immediate local contingencies for obedience (or disobedience). and (3) contact with the contingencies described in the rule (p. 588). Thus, even though the behavior evoked by a rule resembles the behavior described in the rule, the reinforcers for performing that behavior will sometimes be different from the reinforcers described in the rule, sometimes the same, and sometimes both. C.

EVALUATION OF SKINNER’S PROBLEM-SOLVING ANALYSIS

Skinner’s analysis appears to be consistent: What is called problem-solving behavior can best be understood through an analysis of the relevant contingencies and their stimulus controls. Some problems are solved by behaviors that are shaped by the relevant contingencies intrinsic to that particular problem: in such situations, local discriminative stimuli internal to the problem will occasion the behavior that is subsequently reinforced. For other problems, we often construct discriminative stimuli external to the problem, usually in a verbal form called rules, to occasion the problem-solving behavior that is subsequently reinforced. That analysis, although consistent, seems incomplete in the half that specifies rule-following as the analysis of some problem-solving. Although that part of the analysis describes several ways that rule-following might be reinforced once it occurs, it does not elaborate on the history that generates this rule-following (especially novel-rule-following) so that it can be reinforced. Skinner’s analysis needs a sketch of a possible history that could account for rule-following behavior; and for theoretical consistency, that sketch should be behavior analytic, if possible. Skinner did provide some direction for a developmental analysis of control by rules. He specified the existence of cultural support for describing behavior, a form of support that is probably essential to a developmental analysis; and he reminded us that we probably will follow rules similar to past rules that we have followed. Both of those premises are useful. But they still do not constitute a complete explanation of rule control: They suggest a contingency-based account of the control of already extant rule-following, but they are not yet a contingency-based analysis of its development. The absence of a developmental analysis apparently fosters misinterpretations of rule-governed behavior. Brownstein and Shull (1985) have observed that the concept of rule-governed behavior too often is misused as an explanation for much complex behavior: To the extent that this phrase (rule-governcd behavior vs contingency-shaped hehavior) reminds us that a topography can he appropriate to current contingencies as a

result of different kinds of pa\t conringcncies. the phrase is useful. The term rulegoverned behavior, however. ofteri seeiiis to be used as i f it were a technical term o n a par with. for instance. discriminated and iiondiscriniinated operants. The term IS being used a5 if i t were appropriate t o a\k, i i i a particular case, whether behavior that IS appropriate to the current contingcncics i \ occurring: ( a ) becausc it has been followed by the relevant consequence. (h) h c c a u e i t has been prompted by a discriminative stimulus whose control was estahlished in other circumstances. or (c) because it has been prompted by instruction\ in the torn1 ot rules ahout the contingencies. Such usage encourages the view that control by i-ulc-like instructions operates according to principles that are unique to huriiaii language. But this i\ precisely the position that Skinner's interpretation calls into question ( p . 266)

In effect, the misinterpretations that Brownstein and Shull describe probably function to fill the vacuum left hy inattention to the drvelupmenr of rule-governed behavior, and by the initial lack of research to document even the nondevelopmental parts of the analysis. It' those lacks could be remedied, even sketchily, misinterpretation might well decrease. The latter problem-the empirical analysis of ongoing rule-governed problem-solving, which is essentially all of rule-governed behavior-initially lacked three classes of sufficiently specific empirical evidence: 1. That rule-following behavior can bc controlled by contingencies 2. That rules can function 3s discriminative stimuli to occasion relevant behavior 3. That the contingencies for rule-following can and often will be different from those for similar behavior that is contingency-shaped.

Fortunately, a relatively recent spate o f research has begun to remedy all three of those lacks. This research is often referred to as instructional-control research. Its contributions to the verification of Skinner's analysis of rule-governed behavior are important; they are the next topic for discussion. But another important point is that some controversy will remain, just as Brownstein and Shull suggested, until more is done. Without an analysis of the development of rulefollowing behavior, some of that behavior will remain elusive. Even if enough examples in all three of thesc classes of functional relationships are demonstrated, the rule-follower's initial compliances to rules and instructions (either self- or other-generated) remain unexplained.

111. Instructional-Control Research Some studies of instructional control concern the lack of schedule control some humans show in fixed-interval (time-bascd) schedules (Long, 1962: Long, Hammack, May. & Campbell, 1958: Weiner, 1962. 1964. 1969): Most human re-

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sponse patterns are either high, steady rates or quite low, quasi-scalloped rates, both unlike the intermediate, scalloped rates (postreinforcement pauses followed by steadily accelerating rates) found in animals. (Although the low-rate, quasiscalloped responding in humans seems somewhat different from the usual animal performance, in that it often appears as only one or two responses as soon as reinforcement is available, it is still a perfectly adaptive response to such schedules, and, arguably, the ultimate form of the scallop so often characteristic of animal responding.) A few studies have shown that instructions emphasizing time as a determinant of reinforcement typically establish low-rate, quasi-scalloped responding in humans (Baron, Kaufman, & Stauber, 1969; Harzem, Lowe, & Bradshaw, 1978; Lippman, & Meyer, 1967), thereby eliminating much of the human-animal difference. Also, clearly, inaccurate instructions about the experimental contingencies can produce and maintain responding in accord with the instruction and in opposition to the programmed contingencies (Buskist, Bennet, & Miller, 1981; Harzem et ul., 1978; Lippman & Meyer, 1967). Several studies have demonstrated that certain instructions can influence responding to several other schedule variations (Hayes, Brownstein, & Zettle, 1986; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966; Scobie & Kaufman, 1969; Shimoff, Catania, & Mathews, 1981). Thus, these studies confirm that 1 . Without instructions about rate or time, not all humans will show the same sensitivity to certain schedules of presumed reinforcement that has been found in lower species under the control of undoubted reinforcement 2 . Accurate instructions about programmed contingencies facilitate responding in conformity with the programmed schedule of presumed reinforcement 3. Inaccurate response instructions can produce responding that does not conform to the programmed schedule of presumed reinforcement 4. Responding to a programmed schedule of presumed reinforcement may be influenced by a self-instruction, which may or may not facilitate conformity to that schedule.

Because instructions can influence responding both in conformity with and in opposition to the schedule, we can see that these instructions in the former case generate behavior that resembles a schedule effect, yet need not be a result of contact with that schedule. Even when an instruction facilitates contact with a schedule, i t need not be the schedule that controls all or uny of that responding. Thus, crucial problems can arise in differentiating control by rules and control by programmed Contingencies. Instructional-control research has also shown that

I . Rule-following behavior can be controlled by contingencies 2 . Rules can function as discriminative stimuli to occasion relevant behavior 3. Rule-following contingencies are different from those that shape similar behavior .

Baron and Galizio (1983) offered a comprehensive review of these studies. It shows clearly the correctness Skinner’s analysis of rule-following as behavior operating under contingencies that often are different from those specified by the rule, and the thoroughly operant character of rule-following. Still, this research does not clarity how rule-following comes under the initial control of its characteristic contingencies. The gap in Skinner’s analysis is paralleled by a similar gap in the instructional-control research, and the controversy noted by Brownstein and Shull (1985) is seen again in conclusions such as, “Instructed or rule-governed responding . . . is less sensitive to contingencies” (Catania, Matthews, 81 Shimoff. 1982, p. 233). As Galizio (1979, p. 53) pointed out, this research has contributed to the erroneous interpretation that rule-following is “a limitation of reinforcement schedule control in humans.” Brewer (1974) and Bandura (1969), among others, have used this argument in support of a cognitive model in humans. However, Galizio (1979) properly reminded us that “although this finding has been interpreted as a limitation of reinforcement schedule control in humans, an alternative approach considers instructional control [rule-following], itself, as a phenonienon determined by the subject’s reinforcement history” (p. 53). Brownstein and Shull (1985) also emphasized the contingencies that probably constitute the relevant history of rule-following. Instructional-control research has contributed to incorrect assumptions about rule control in several ways:

I . Researchers have been concerned with functional analyses of response to a situation-specific instruction only by subjects with a strong natural-environment prior history of instructional control. 2 . In these research situations, the experimental data show within-subject consistency but across-subject variability-some subjects sensitive to instructional control, other subjects sensitive to programmed Contingencies. 3. Even when the data seem to indicate behavioral control by programmed contingencies, control by rules from a variety of sources cannot always be ruled out. 4. The reinforcement used in these studies often seems likely to prove trivial for these subjects’ behavior, and the number of hours for which these subjects are exposed to these contingencies is usually far smaller than the number required to see typical schedule control in powerfully reinforced animal subjects. These shortcomings badly complicate any comparative analysis of the relative strength of the operative rule (and there may be several, not all of them programmed by the experimenter) and the experimentally programmed contingencies. These problems underscore the need for a contingency-based developmental analysis of rule control that is experimentally verifiable. Without that analysis, the many forms of rule-governed behavior that, without experimental analysis, appear to be independent of any contingencies (but that on analysis are found to

involve functional contingencies) will invite unwarranted interpretations of cognitive control. The question of course is whether these cases represent only some forms or all forms of rule-governed behavior. Thus, although this kind of research verifies the immediate functional control of rules as discriminative stimuli, its failure to go further allows and even invites its own paradigmatic misinterpretation.

IV.

Developmental Analysis

In any particular instance of behavior change due to encountering a rule, we may see no current, local contingencies adequate to explain that specific behavior change. The development of the generalized class of rule-governed behavior, however, can be seefi as contingency based, indeed, crucially so. The logic of this argument is fairly straightforward. as will be seen. The conformity of that logic to reality needs a great deal of research. but not much research about behavior labelled rule-governed has been done. However, a fair amount of research has been done on the contingency-based development of a behavior class describable as compliance with irzsfructiorzs, and the thesis here is that this class subsumes the acquisition and maintenance of rule-governed behavior, including those rules that are self-generated. A developmental analysis of the behavior class that can be called compliance with instructions suggests five sometimes progressive, sometimes concurrent, sometimes independent steps: 1 . Initially, certain instructions systematically set the occasion for the reinforcement of certain responses to them. The responses are those that the reinforcing person interprets as compliance with the instruction, because their topography matches the content of the instructions. In fact, that match may not yet be functional for the child. If the match had function for the child, the child might well comply with all comprehensible instructions, whether that compliance was reinforced or not, because every comprehensible instruction, old or new, would represent an opportunity to achieve that match. Instead, this initial situation is like that of a subject memorizing a list of paired associates that are in fact paired meaningfully, but in a language that the subject does not yet know. 2. Eventually, novel instructions and instructions that have not yet set the occasion for reinforcement of their appropriate responses begin to control those behaviors even so. That pattern can more functionally be called compliance (somewhat redundantly, generalized compliance). Now the match between an instruction's content and a resulting behavior's topography is a systematic part of the control of that behavior, thereby creating a class of such behaviorscompliance.

3. At first, generalized compliance may well be specific to those instruction givers who reinforce some compliances (or punish some noncompliances) with some of the instructions that they give. However, a little later, compliance sometimes will be generalized from those instruction givers who reinforce compliance (or punish noncompliance), t o other instruction givers who have not yet reinforced compliance (or punished noncompliance). 4. As language develops, description emerges; descriptions of contingencies have the form of rules (e.g., “When Morn does Y , I get to do Z”). and sometimes of self-instructions (e.g., “When I do X , Mom does Y ” ) . Thus, compliance with self-instructions may well emerge as a generalization from the existing stimulus controls for the coinpliance with the functional instructions that others give. At first, that further-generali-red compliance probably will be specific to those self-instructions that occasion functional consequences f o r their compliance. 5. compliance then may be generalizzd from those self-instructions that have occasioned functional consequences for their compliance, to novel self-instructions that have not yet done s o . A more detailed sketch of the possible development of these sometimes successive, sometimes concurrent steps follows, with the supportive data that research into compliance seems to offer.

Seemingly compliant behavior is specific to only those instructions that have occasioned functional consequences for their specific responses. 1 . Developmental Sketch

Very early in a child’s experience. caretakers use spoken instructions, that is, a set of speech forms ordinarily labelled as requests, invitations, commands, rules, advice, maxims, laws, and so forth. At first, such stimuli seen1 to gain control only over the specific behaviors that the caretakers will reinforce on those occasions, and mainly when those contingencies are possible (exemplified by the children who do not respond to a careless caretaker’s invitation to “Come here and I’ll tie your shoes,” when they are not wearing shoes). Most caretakers do provide consequences for compliance with many 0 1 their early language-based instructions, which often are for simple social responses, for example, to smile, talk, wave, or clap hands. When these behaviors are performed in response to such requests, the caretaker is almost always quite responsive. (The caretaker probably has a somewhat lower probability of being equally responsive to these same behaviors when they occur unbidden.) For example, a mother might say to her child. “Say Mommy,” and when the child

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does, she smiles and laughs, hugs the child, and says, “Oh, that’s great.” And of course, disapproval-avoidance contingencies may also maintain much seemingly compliant behavior. Probably only a few such instances are needed for these specific-seeming compliances to occur: the initial step requires only that the child contact enough specific spoken instructions, and be reinforced (or punished) enough to establish seeming compliance with them. Those instructions have become discriminative stimuli; their specific responses are discriminated operants. Quite possibly, each of these interactions is independent of the others; each is an interaction of its own, and seeing their collectivity as “compliance” may exist only in the eye of the beholder.

2.

Research Support The evidence from the instructional-control research reviewed previously supports the interpretation that instructions or rules can easily function as discriminative stimuli for relevant responding, and that instruction-following behavior is not exclusively controlled by the contingencies described in the instruction. Data showing that instruction-compliant behavior results directly from identifiable contingencies other than those described in the instruction, particularly social contingencies, are reviewed below. That evidence begins to answer questions about how rules control behavior, and supports the initial step in arguing for the development of instruction-following as a behavior class. Early applied researchers often systematically avoided the use of instructions: they represent a source of control in any analysis, and many early studies were designed to afford simple analyses of quite different variables. Besides, many instructions are misunderstood in ways that prove very difficult to analyze, but that might well be obviated by the absence of instructions. And other researchers gave instructions so naturally that they apparently did not consider then1 worth specifying in their subsequent published reports. However, at least some applied researchers sought to establish a case for the use of instructions in altering problem behavior. Ayllon and Azrin (1964) demonstrated their value in that context. They studied 18 mental patients who did not consistently pick up their eating utensils when they took their food trays, even when a probable reinforcer (choice of several special food items) was offered following every instance of picking up the utensils. Yet when these patients were given the relevant instructions about that contingency, 12 of the 18 patients did systematically pick up their utensils thereafter (and 6 of them continued to a year after the experiment and its special-items contingency had stopped, but this cannot necessarily be attributed to the instructions). In a second experiment with similarly noncompliant patients, these researchers demonstrated that instructions alone could increase some patients’ utensil-retrieving behavior. but that the addition of a mild punishment contingency for not responding (delayed access to the serving counter) brought that control to the 90- 100% range.

Ayllon and Azrin ( 1 964) acknowledged Skinner’s analysis that these “verbal statements may be considered as discriminative stimuli . . . [and that] discriminative stimuli are ineffective unless the behavior results in favorable consequences. ” They concluded that “instructions were found to be effective initially for some patients, probably because of the patient’s previous history. . . . [However], reinforcement is needed to motivate and maintain the behavior. It seems for humans instructions anti reinforcement are complementary. ” These authors pointed out that although “previous studies of reinforcement with humans have minimized or eliminated instructions entirely, . . . later studies have found it necessary to utilize instructions to obtain changes of human behavior in a reasonable amount of time” (p. 330). Schutte and Hopkins (1970) similarly suggested that “it is possible to analyze the functional relationship that exists between verbal instructional stimuli and the listener’s response to determine what environmental variables control responding to instructions” (p. 117). In a kindergarten classroom of five girls, a teacher regularly provided a sequence of I0 different instructions; in some conditions, each compliance with these instructions was followed systematically by teacher praise, and in other conditions was ignored. Initially, ignored compliance occurred 60% of the time, even so. However, when the teacher systematically praised compliance, it increased t o 78%. A return to ignoring it reduced it to 69%; a resumption of its praise increased it again to 84%. Thus, Schutte and Hopkins not only demonstrated the functional control of instructions as discriminative stimuli, they also provided clear evidence for its control by social reinforcement. The functional relationship between instructional control and consequences for compliance has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the last two decades. In many classrooms with numerous populations of children, compliance has been accomplished using various consequenccs for compliant (and noncompliant) behavior: tokens exchanged for access to free time, materials, and a snack ( A . M. Baer, Rowbury, & Baer, 1973): tokens exchanged for prizes plus praise for compliance (Zimmerman, Zimnierinan. & Russell, 1969); tokens exchanged for stars and candy plus praise, and inattention to inappropriate behavior (O’Leary , Becker, Evans, & Saudargas, 1969); contingent praise and inattention alone (Madsen, Becker, & Thomas, 1968; O‘Leary et al., 1969); attention or praise alone (Goetz, Holmberg, & Leblanc, 1975; Schutte & Hopkins, 1970); and delayed time-out for noncompliance (Ramp, Ulrich, & Dulany, 1971). Similar results have been found in establishing child compliance with parental instructions (see Forehand, 1977, for a review). Thus, the evidence is conclusive: Numerous studies demonstrate that instructions can readily function as discriminative stimuli, when they occasion functional consequences for Compliance or noncompliance with them-and, more important for this analysis, social consequences can be quite effective.

In many of these studies, the compliance under study was probably not merely the ungeneralized seeming compliance of Step 1 in this analysis, but the widely generalized compliance specified in the later steps. But although that conclusion is probably true, i t is impossible to establish after the fact. The distinctions were not considered important then; no formal specifications were made of systematically reinforced, systematically unreinforced, and novel and thus not-yet-reinforced compliances, or of similar categories of instruction givers. However. the research supporting Step 2 does make those distinctions. 0 . STEP 2

Compliance sometimes is generalized from instructions that have occasioned functional consequences for their compliance, to other instructions that have not.

I.

Developmental Sketch Under what conditions will systematic compliance to novel instructions occur and continue to occur, without contacting any contingency specific to that compliance? In imitation training, after enough training at least some novel demonstrations by a model are imitated on their first presentation, prior to reinforcement, and continue to be imitated, even in the systematic ongoing absence of reinforcement of them (e.g., D. M . Baer & Dcguchi, 1985; D. M . Baer, Peterson, & Sherman, 1967). That empirical precedent suggests that after enough of a child’s compliances contact systematic enough reinforcement (or punishment for noncompliances), novel unreinforced compliances with novel instructions will emerge and will continue even if unreinforced indefinitely. ( A point worth noting is that “indefinitely” has been extended no further than a few hundred trials of consistent nonreinforcement, so far, in both the imitation and the compliance literatures .) Perhaps the nature of “enough” in these empirical summaries is simply a certain variety of models to imitate and spoken instructions with which to comply, with appropriate reinforcement or punishment, such that a set of stimuli common to all of them, and to future instances, gains discriminative function. For example, even though caretakers reinforce compliance to their highly diverse instructions in a great variety of situations, those situations may be composed of a workably small set of common-element classes. Of necessity, the situations common to compliance teaching all include the speech forms that we use as instructions-the requests, invitations, instructions, advices, maxims, and so forth, noted above. However, with development, that set grows increasingly complex and subtle. At first, children may encounter these verbal events more often in the form of simple, straightforward instructions (e.g., “Sit down”) than of rules ( e . g . , “Always sit down when I tell you to!”). However, very quickly in a child’s life, the extraordinarily large class of ways in

which adults convey instructions begins to be represented. Consider. as a small sample, the following: It's tinic t o ido Response XI; [Response XI?; [Response XI!; You need to . . . : I'd like it if you . . . ; Would you like to . . . ; You could . . . ; You can . . . ; Do y o u . . . ; What do you think of , . . ; Maybe we should . . . : and so forth. These events must constitute a conditionu//y controlled stimulus class: Most o f them are linguistic forms that iri other contexts call for not compliance, but instead description or discussion: thus context is a crucial part of the dcfinition o f the stimulus class fairly labelled as instructions. Other events common to thc situationh in which compliance is learned are likely to include the presence of thc caretakcr, and, for some caretakers, certain characteristic facial expressions, tones of voice, inflectional patterns, specific words, gestures, and postures. Any of those, or all ofthose, are as likely to take on discriminative function for compliance as they are likely to be characteristic rives an across the variety o f instructions that arc given. Then. when a caretaker 8' ostznsibly new instruction, but docs 50 i n one of the speech forms characteristic of instructions, and perhaps in onc of the tones of voice also characteristic of those forms, with some of the gcstures characteristic of those forms, and so forth, that may well be enough common discriminative stimuli to evoke conipliance, especially if the words of that instruction are within the child's coniprehension and the response components of that compliance are within the child's capabilities. I f so, that compliancc will be evoked (prior to its reinlorcement, of course), and will continue to be evoked even if reinforcement qf it is consistently absent thereafter. After all, other reinforcement contingencies maintain the function of so many of thosc common stimuli as discriminative for other compliances, some of which have the same response components. If that happens, the child's compliant behavior then is controlled by an indefinitely large class of the speech l'orrns that the child's teachers use as instructions-descriptions of behaviors to be performed. many of which need have no consequences for compliance with their content i l enough stimulus controls are present. When that happens, the definitional criteria have been met to allow calling instructions a stimulus class, and compliance a response class.

2.

Research Support Research has shown that compliance can generalize to novel instructions: A speech form beconies a stimulus class for compliance. Whitman, Zakaras, and Chardos (1971) taught two severely retarded children motor responses t o a set of verbal instructions with the use of positive reinforcement, physical guidancc. and fading procedures. These children then showed generalized responding to a set of untrained instructions, and both trained and untrained instructional responding decreased in a return t o baseline conditions. Bucher (1973) demonstrated the covariation of reinforced and nonreinforced compliance to sets of instructions

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throughout several alternating conditions: reinforced compliance to one set of instructions, extinction, and reinforcement of an alternative task. Compliance to the set of novel unreinforced instructions during generalization probes mirrored the level of compliance with trained reinforced instructions throughout the various experimental conditions. Bucher argued that these results “show that children’s responses to instructions are effected by the contingencies available for compliance” (p. 18). Some researchers (Bucher, 1973; Martin 1971), noticing the procedural similarity between generalized compliance and generalized imitation, have suggested that imitation may be a subset of a response class, compliance with instructions. In a recent comprehensive review of generalized-imitation research, D. M. Baer and Deguchi (1985) discussed this issue. They pointed out that “instructions to imitate typically have been used either initially (D. M. Baer & Sherman, 1964; Brigham & Sherman, 1968; Bufford, 1971; Burgess, Burgess, & Esveldt, 1970; Martin, 1971; Waxler & Yarrow, 1970) or continuously (Peterson & Whitehurst, 1971; Smeets & Striefel, 1973; Steinman, 1970; Steinman & Boyce, 1971)” (p. 191). Although they acknowledged that a few studies (Garcia, Baer, & Firestone, 1971; Metz, 1965) did not involve verbal instructions, these authors suggested that the use of physical prompts and put-through procedures “may be conceptualized as instructions” (p. 191). The point is that imitation may be considered an instructed performance, and thus imitation at the very least is controlled in part by those discriminative stimuli that control compliance. Thus, Baer and Deguchi considered the possibility that “establishing an often nonimitative instruction-following class will create imitative subclasses that we may call modeling stimuli: Do this is functionally considered a subclass of instructional stimuli such as D o as I indicate” (p. 197). The argument is supported by evidence that reinforcing some imitations can maintain unreinforced nonimitative behaviors (Martin. I97 I ; Peterson, 1968), and that unreinforced imitations can be supported by reinforcing nonimitative behaviors (Martin, 1971). The Martin (1971) study displays covariations between reinforced behaviors and unreinforced behaviors throughout several experimental phases, much like the Bucher ( 1973) experiment that demonstrated covariation between reinforced and unreinforced compliance with instructions. Martin interpreted his findings as evidence of generalized instruction-following. Although these data support a response-class label for compliance with instructions, other data show that obtaining generalized compliance is not always easy. Striefel and Wetherby (1973) taught a profoundly retarded boy to comply with certain instructions, using a procedure similar to that of Whitman c’t a / . (197 1)-reinforcement, physical guidance, and fading. After finding no generalized compliance to probes of untrained and currently unreinforced instructions, Striefel and Wetherby suggested that generalized compliance might emerge through systematic teaching with only one concept at first; if that tactic yielded

generalized compliance, teaching could then move on to a new concept. The next year, Frisch and Schumaker (1974) used essentially that procedure to teach three retarded children generalized instruction-following to three categories of prepositional requests: “Put the --- next to the ---.”“Put the - - - under the ---,” and “Put the --- on top of the - - - . ” [Indeed, much of the research on miniature language systems, or matrix training, fits this specification, according to reviews by Wetherby (1978), Wetherby and Striefel (1978), and Goldstein (1985).] An experiment by Neef, Shafer, Egel. Cataldo, and Parrish (1983) showed that with some developmentally disabled children, prompting and reinforcing compliance to specific “do” or “don’t” instructions generalized only to the category o f instructions that was prompted and (if answered) reinforced. These experiments provide evidence that a number o f conjoint verbal and nonverbal elements will determine, in any given case, whether or not a particular speech form will become discriminative for compliance. Generalized compliance is pertinent to Skinner’s analysis of rule-governed behavior. The three explanations that Skinner has offered for rule-following are ( 1 ) the contingencies described in the rule are contacted, ( 2 ) other immediate contingencies for following the rule are contacted, and (3) following similar rules has been reinforced in the past. The prompting and reinforcement used to obtain compliance in the experiments just described seem to fit the second of these cases. However, the third case is the one that refers to the acquisition of generalized responding, such that a child will respond to any request of the form. “[verb] the [object] [prepositional phrase] the [other object],” no matter how the brackets are filled (within reason). ‘The first two cases described by Skinner refer to specific instances of a rule followed by relevant contingencies; the third refers to a generalized response class of rule-following behavior controlled by certain generalized classes of verbal and nonverbal stimuli. In summary, data support the thesis that compliance to a class of speech forms-instructions-can represent a response class controlled by a stimulus class. What is needed is a clearer understanding of how to teach compliance so that the speech form itself becomes the critical variable for compliance. A critical conjoint variable in such a development would have to be the producer of these discriminative stimuli. In everyday language, what are the conditions that determine when an instruction giver will be obeyed? What are the conditions that determine when a rule stater will be believed?

c

STEP 3

Compliance sometimes is specific to those instruction givers who provide functional consequences for compliance, but it soon generalizes to new instruction givers, even when they are stating new instructions, sometimes without reinforcement for compliance with those new instructions.

I.

Dewlopmental Sketch Children first learn to follow their caretakers’ instructions. But soon other people will give the same familiar (caretaker-trained) instructions, and sometimes reinforce compliance or punish noncompliance. With such experience, the children’s compliance probably will generalize to at least the familiar instructions given by another adult, especially an adult like the caretakers. Thus a grandparent might say in a crowd, “Hold my hand” (an instruction the parent has given before in a crowd), and that amount of common stimuli may well be enough to control the child’s compliance; if that compliance leads at least sometimes to grandparental approval, even more widely generalized compliance is well on its way. Thus, the stimulus cl o f speech forms called instructions should begin to contain more conjoint stimulus members-not just certain tones of voice, gestures, and so forth, but also niore people whose instructions will control compliance, and who will introduce to the class their characteristic tones of voice, gestures, and so forth, thereby widening it even more. As that happens, more and more instructions may well be introduced, compliance with which may never be reinforced (and noncompliance with which may never be punished), and the child may well begin to comply with these new instructions from these new instruction givers nevertheless. Thus, the class of effective instructions and instruction givers may grow indefinitely large, and this outcome may prove to be an important step in acquiring self-production of rule-governed behavior.

2.

Resecirch Support Some of the research already reviewed above clearly supports the logic of this assertion. However, to support its details, the two relevant research areas are the promotion of compliance across settings and across novel instruction givers, and researchers have rarely seen such generalization spontaneously. In consequence, explicit reinforcement has been programmed for .some compliance across settings and/or instruction givers. A formidable problem for applied researchers has been to develop compliance in clinically noncompliant children across several settings, particularly clinic-to-home and home-to-school (Forehand, 1977; Gordon & Davidson, 1981). Much of the research on the clinic-to-home problem has led to the development of techniques that enhance parents’ use of contingencies at home: through instructions to d o so (Mindell & Budd, 1977; Peed, Roberts, & Forehand, 1972), with homework assignments (Budd, Pinkston, & Green, 1973), and through daily practice (Forehand & King. 1977; see also Gordon & Davidson, 1981 , p. 545). Wahler ( 1969) showed that parents using differential attention and time out could increase compliance at home; however, their children’s noncompliant school behavior remained high. but then decreased when the teacher was taught to use the same techniques of differential attention and time out. The summary point seems to be that generalized compliance with new instruction givers and in new settings is rarely spontaneous, but when contingen-

cies for compliance with some request\ of some new instruction givers and in some new settings are programmed. compliance then generalizes more widely than that programming. Another approach, however. has promoted generalization across settings and people by systematically programming other kinds of common stimuli (especially antecedent stimulus controls). Kincover and Koegel (1975) were able to identify certain stimuli (e.g.. a teacher’s gesture, a piece of furniture) in a training setting that, when absent from a generalization setting, prevented four autistic children’s responses to verbal instructions from appearing in that setting. When these stimuli were introduced hy a stranger in that setting, correctly generalized responding suddenly appeared there. (One of the four children required a combination of certain instructions with these incidental stimuli before generalized responding emerged. Dugan ( 1980) promoted generalized compliance across instruction givers in nontraining sessions by having the child wear a token ring and adults wear a carpenter’s apron, both of which had been used in the training setting. In another study, Rosenbaum and Breiling ( 1976) taught a severely retarded 12-year-old girl a basic reading-comprehcnsion skill. Using prompts, modeling, physical guidance, praise, and candy, they taught her to comply with written instructions of the form, “Point to - - - . ” Even though she continued to show near 100%correct performance when the training, praise, candy, and attention were discontinued, that performance decreased when the experimenter was absent and was recovered when the experimenter returned ( p . 323). Probes with a new experimenter showed the same pattern. Thus, an experimenter-perhaps any experimenter-was an important conjoint discriminative stimulus for the possibility that any written instruction could control compliance, even when the novel experimenter did not reinforce compliance. These research findings suggest the importance of stimulus controls-simple. conjoint, and conditional stimulus controls-in establishing compliance in numerous situations. However, they also indicate that from the teacher’s point of view, some of these crucial stimuli often were unappreciated, inadvertent, and incidental, at least at first. Thus, just as some researchers (Frisch & Schuniaker, 1974; Striefel & Wetherby, 1973) have proposed or investigated training procedures that develop compliance 3s a response class, other researchers should systematically investigate the conditions under which requests as such will control compliance with and wiihout corijoint stimulus control. The steps already discussed in this analysis mu! provide an outline for escaping conjoint-stimulus control. First, compliance as a response class must be established with one instruction giver. Second, generalixd compliance across settings must be established: novel requests from this one instruction giver in novel settings must produce compliance. Successive training in several settings may be needed to generate compliance to novel instructions in new settings. Then, this procedure

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could be programmed across instruction givers. until probes with novel requests from novel instruction givers in novel settings systematically yield compliance. This procedure would establish two key discriminative stimulus classes for compliance: the speech-form class and the instruction-giver class. Such a reinforcement history within the natural environment might best be understood as a “train loosely” procedure (Stokes & Baer, 1977), in that a generalized instructional form and a generalized instruction giver would be the only common elements in numerous situations. In summary, research reviewed thus far implies that an instruction, as a stimulus cue, could establish compliance across all instruction givers in all situations, although such generalized compliance without inadvertent stimulus controls is not ordinarily characteristic of human behavior, has not been demonstrated, and may not always be desirable. Functional analysis of the verbal and nonverbal elements of numerous instructions that control a child’s compliance may provide the conjoint discriminative stimuli that are critical in prompting selectively generalized compliance to instructions across people and settings. D.

STEP4

Compliance sometimes is specific to those self-produced rules or instructions that have occasioned functional consequences for compliance, and this compliance can generalize to self-produced rules that have not yet done that.

I.

Developmental Sketch Instructions can be produced by other people, but, to the extent that we can describe what happens, instructions can also be produced by ourselves. Children are reinforced for their own instruction-relevant verbal behavior. For example, caretakers often prompt children with “What happened‘?” questions, and sometimes praise the responsive description of events and consequences-in other words, of their relationships. Accurate descriptions are probably praised differentially, when caretakers know the case. Caretakers also prompt children with “What should you do?” questions, and sometimes praise both the statement of what should be done and the relevant compliant behavior. Caretakers also teach and support widely generalized verbal imitation, often delayed, in their children. Enough of those contingencies, with a sufficient range of stimulus controls, some of which can recur in settings without an adult present, should enable the child to emit a familiar instruction, and then its appropriate response, without a prompt or praise from anyone else. Control of child compliance could then include the child’s self-production of familiar instructions in specific situations.

2.

Research Support Correspondence training is the label for a set of procedures that teach children both to describe their own behavior accurately (do-say correspondence), and to

d o what they say they will (say do coi-i-cspondence)-those are the two conditions in which verbal behavior c.,,/.r.c,.s/l””/d,s to its relevant nonverbal behavior. Both may be viewed as teaching compliance to self-instructions. Risley and Hart (1968) did the first study of do-say training in preschoolers. An experimenter asked. “What did you d o that wiij good today’?” following play sessions. In one experimental condition, only ;I specific reply, “ I played with blocks“ (Group A ) or “ I painted” (Group B ) , wa5 reinforced with a snack, whether or not that report was true. Those two replies increased in appropriate children. but their correctly matched actions did riot -the children statements were not describing accurately what the children had ,just done. However, Risley and Hart then produced accurate do-say correspondence by reinforcing those specific replies only when they were in fact truc. I n that condition, the children’s action changed during play. so that later talk about play with blocks o r paint would be accurate. and therefore be reinforced. In a 5ubscqucnt experiment, these authors systcmatically introduced reinforcement 01’ only true reports in a multiple-baseline design across a wider variety of specific play behaviors in each child, and found that the technique was sufficient to niake untrue reports into true reports in each case. After that had been done for SOIIIC hut not all of the play behaviors that were to be studied, do-say correspondence began to occur thereafter even when reinforcement was not contingent on thc truth ot‘ the child’s report about play behavior. Indeed, in successive play sessions, simply announcing the activity that would be asked about after the play session procluccd stronger and stronger control of that activity. Risley and Hart concludctl, “saying controlled doing 22 o r iiiorc hours later” (p. 267). Say-do correspondence training has produced similar results (Israel & Brown, 1977; Israel & O’Leary, 1973). Some evidence indicates that the say-do sequence produces higher levels ot corrchpondence (Israel & O’Leary, 1973; Karoly & Dirks, 1977), but Paniagua and Baer (1982) have argued that this outcome i s a special case, controllable by the timing of reinforcement and the choice of the target behaviors. R . A . Baer, Williams, Osnes, nnd Stoke5 (1984) systematically demonstrated a method for programming gener;ili/ed correspondence using delayed reinforcement. Given an initial condition o f effective reinforcement of say-do correspondence, that correspondence was iiiaintained in the children’s behavior even with delayed reinforcement of the statement, and even when the subsequent action was not necessarily reinforced. These children also showed a g e n e r a l i d say-do correspondence with new statements and delayed reinforcement of the relevant statement, even when the subsequcnt action was not necessarily reinforced. This generalization, when eventually lost. W;IS recovered immediately by reinstating the original contingencies. Rogers-Warren and Baer (1976) taught groups of preschool children t o share and praise, by modeling and reiniorcing the children’s reports of immediately

212

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Rirgler utid Donald M . Huer

prior sharing and praising. As in previous studies of correspondence, reinforcing only true reports increased the behaviors (sharing and praising) and their corresponding reports. In one experiment, the children’s sharing generalized to a second setting, but their praising did not. One likely hypothesis is that situational prompts for sharing (familiar materials and toys in inadequate amounts to go around) are more numerous and more functional in new settings than situational prompts for praising, in that children in general are more often and more carefully taught how and when to share than to praise. Thus, children can be prompted and reinforced ( I ) to state self-instructions and (2) to perform the described behavior with and without consequences for compliance, and then ( 3 ) they can do so in other settings. Other researchers have investigated whether the explicit teaching of selfinstructions will influence performance. In self-instruction training, the experimenter teahes overt self-instructions first, then fades the self-instructions to a whisper, to lip movement, and last (presumably, not certainly) to covert selfinstruction by the child performing the task (Bornstein & Quevillon, 1976; Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971). This procedure can be seen as a variation of say-do correspondence training. After Bornstein and Quevillon ( 1976) taught three overactive preschool children four types of self-statements, significant increases in on-task behavior werc seen in a classroom setting and were maintained for about five months after baseline was reinitiated. However, a recent attempt to replicate these findings failed (Billings & Wasik, 1985). Other researchers have used self-instruction training to enhance counting skills (Murphy, Bates, & Anderson, 1984), creative drawing (Baker & Winston, 1985), and reading comprehension (Smith & VanBiervliet, 1986). Fjellstrom ( 1 986) demonstrated that self-instructions taught and used overtly could be taught to be used covertly (as many of the just-reviewed studies had shown, as well). However, in this study, the children were assigned a match-to-sample task that was nearly impossible for them to solve without a particular problem-solving strategy. After learning how to instruct themselves in that strategy, the children performed the task almost perfectly when overtly using the relevant self-instructions, and, after more training, presumably used the same self-instructions covertly. When these children were asked not to use their self-instructions, overtly or covertly (a novel but quite informative experimental procedure in this literature), their performance usually fell immediately to preinstruction levels (but one child presented an exception to this summary). Thus, some self-instruction research suggests that self-instructions may function as discriminative stimuli for the performance of described behaviors. The prevalence of this possibility remains unexamined. Problems in assessing the generalized use of covert self-instructions are fairly obvious; their solutions are not. Correspondence-training research has clearly shown compliance to specific self-instructions with functional consequences for

that compliance (reinforced do-say or say-do correspondence). That research also shows that once correspondence has been established, reinforcement of a self-instruction alone can produce compliance with it. The use of an overt selfinstruction with subsequent compliance in a novel setting may be anticipated and assessed objectively for its occurrence and its function, as these studies have shown; but a difficult problem will be to design a demonstration that will show that a now covert self-instruction is occasioning appropriate behavior in any setting. Repeated demonstrations across numerous instructions in numerous settings, each systematically transformed from overt to covert, would be only suggestive. Repeated demonstrations that the experimenter’s instructions to “use your selfinstructions” and “don’t use your self-instructions,” without specifying the content of those previously trained self-instructions, would be more suggestive, if they produced the theoretically specified behavior changes, but still not conclusive. They are, after all, a stiniulus from the training setting, and as such they are discriminative in that setting not only for self-instruction, but also, perhaps, for correct performance of the task that the self-instruction is about: In training, they typically have set the occasion for both. So. when present in the generalization setting, they might conceivably evoke correct performance whether or not they evoke self-instruction. overt o r covert. Thus, self-instruction research suffers most from our inability to demonstrate convincingly the actual use of covert instructions; and yet the evidence from these studies is at least concordant with the data from correspondence research. Perhaps successive demonstrations similar to the Fjellstrom ( 1986) experiment will provide implications for future rescarch. And perhaps the significance of covert self-instructions, in contrast to overt ones, is needlessly overrated by developmental theorists: The difference seems more pragmatic than fundamental (in that teachers usually prefer that children talk to themselves as quietly as possible, and that theorists prefer an explanatory mechanism that cannot easily be denied). Finally. a last step in this developmental analysis has yet to be investigated. What has not been shown is whether a novel self-statement can produce compliance without contingencies for compliance. E

STEP 5

Compliance sometimes generalizes from those self-instructions that have occasioned functional consequences for compliance, to novel self-instructions. Developmental Sketch The ability to generate a new instruction in a new situation should emerge next. When a child can answer a question like “What happened?” by describing the event- “1 hit him”-and answer the next question, “What happened

then‘?” with “He won’t play with me any more.” then the verbal components for a new self-instruction are present: “If 1 hit people, they won’t play with me.” The component verbal forms are like the forms in the child’s discriminativestimulus class of instructions, and some of the important conjoint discriminative stimuli (the instruction-giver) are present, in that this is a self-instruction; that could well be enough common stimulus control to generate a new self-instruction. Then the child in a similar situation may say, “Don’t hit them if you want them to play with you.”

V.

Summary and Conclusions

The development of rule-governed behavior begins when a class of verbal forms called instructions, in conjunction with other variables, systematically occasion functional consequences for compliance ( o r noncompliance). These instructional forms then function as specific stimulus controls for compliance, with the other variables potentially taking on conjoint or conditional stimulus control of that compliance. Experience with numerous instructions occasioning functional consequences for compliance can establish generalized compliance t o an indefinitely large stimulus class of instructions, a stimulus class that readily and naturally includes those forms that describe relationships between events and responses to them that we also call rules. The important conjoint variables may well be the instruction giver (rule stater), any of their other systematic characteristics that have occasioned functional consequences for compliance in the past, and the topography of the response requested. Generalization of compliance across people. settings, and topography can occur; this generalization can extend to self-instruction, and can fail to extend to certain topographies (“Thou shalt not kill”). certain rule staters (nonpeers who say “Don’t use drugs” when peers say it is fun), and certain settings (“Don’t play with John in class”). Finally, children’s experiences with describing behavior can lead to new self-instructions that fit the already established discriminative-stimulus class of rules and instructions for compliance, so that the novel self-instruction produces compliance. Compliance-oriented research has demonstrated how instruction givers can establish instructions as a discriminative-stimulus class for compliance, and how generalized compliance to new instructions and new instruction givers can be accomplished. Correspondence-trainin:: research has demonstrated that self-instructions can become discriminative for later performance of the described behaviors. Self-instruction research suggests that these forms of instructions also can control subsequent behavior, and that instructions and rules may be produced covertly as well as overtly. What has yet to be demonstrated is an ability to produce a novel self-instruction that controls subsequent behavior.

The argument has been that the development of a behavior class, cwnpliclnce to instructions, could provide a reasonable explanation for the acquisition of

rule-governed behavior. Experiences within the natural environment, as well as research on compliance, correspondence, and self-instruction, suggest that a behavior class. compliance to / ~ i . s f ~ . ~ ~ ~ could , f / ~ ~ provide ~ z . s , a reasonable model of’ the acquisition and generalization of rule-governed behavior. This analysis puts in context research showing that instructions can override experimental contingencies: Such results simply dcscrihc a set of stronger contingencies to comply with instructions, overriding another set of contingencies. Future researchers might well use the research paradigms suggested here to program that shifting of control, and thus evaluate the rcality of this argument. If this analysis proves to be feasible, then the acquisition and generalization of rule-governed behavior may be said t o depend on contingencies o f reinforcement, and its result only appears to be the “quite difierent” behavior that Skinner cited-as Skinner made clear, if read carefully.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writing of this paper was supported i n p:trt by Grant No. ROI-20410-15 from the National Institute of Mental Health and in pan by Grant N o . POI-HD189.5.5-03 from the National Imtitute of Child Health and Human Developniciit

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PSYCHOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF INITIAL DEVELOPMENT AND A METHOD FOR RESEARCH

DEPARTMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SPECIAL EDLI(’ATI0N AND REHABILITATION THE LINIVEKSITY OF; ARIZONA TUCSON. AK17ONA 85721

I . INTRODUCTION 11. INITIAL DEVELOPMENT

A. INTERACTIONAL EQUIPMENT 0 1 : THE NEONATE B STAGE ONE: PREVERBAL-VOCAI. COMMUNICATION C . STAGE TWO: PRIMITIVE REFERENTIAL VERBAL-VOCAL INTERACTIONS D. STAGE THREE: FIRST-APPROXIMATION REFERENTIAL INTERACTIONS E . STAGE FOUR: SECOND-APPROXIMATION REFERENTIAL INTERACTIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SYMBOLIZING BEHAVIOR F. LATER DEVELOPMENT 111. METHOD FOR STUDYING LANGUAGE INTERACTIONS A. DESCRIPTION O F THE METHOD B . APPLICATION OF THE METHOD C . EXAMPLE O F A STUDY IV. SUMMARY REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

In a popular child development textbook (Liebert, Wicks-Nelson, & Kail, 1986), the chapter on language and communication began with the following introduction to the topic: This chapter begins with a description of language development from the earliest babbling in the crib. We then focus on how words are learned, and the processes through which words are arranged into grammatic and understandable sentences.

22 I ADVANCES IN CI1II.D I E V E L O P M I N T AND BEHAVIOR. VOL 21

Copyright 19XY b! ,Arddcniii Prc\\. Inc A l l riphtr 01 repmduclwn i n m y Iomi rcwrvcd

222

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Finally, we examine language as it is actually used by children and ;idults in social contexts. (p. 145)

This treatment, which is fairly typical of those found in most introductory development textbooks because of the current influence of psycholinguistics, is a marked contrast to the view presented here: psychological linguistics. For one thing, the authors stated that language communication originates in verbalizations, “babbling in the crib,” rather than i n gestural interactions. Second, they implied that the development of language and communication consists of the learning of words rather than specific linguistic adjustments, that is, interactions among a speaker, referent, and listener under the prevailing circumstances which are primarily social. Third, they emphasized, as they must under the postulation that words are the units of language, “the process through which words are arranged in grammatical and understandable sentences” rather than the processes that establish and maintain linguistic adjustments. And fourth, they treated the social context of the actual use of language as an external condition that influences the development of language, rather than as an integral component of each instance of language acquisition. What is psychological linguistics? It is the study of language interactions from a natural science approach, one that is associated with interbehavioral psychology (Kantor & Smith, 1975). According to this view, which is also known as contextualism (Morris, 1987; Sarbin, 1977) and interactional contextualism (Hayes, 1987), the psychological aspect of language behavior is concerned with the acts of persons as they adjust to people, objects, and events either through referential interactions involving verbalizations and/or gestures and writing, or through symbolizing behavior (Kantor, 1977). Besides its psychological aspect. language has, of course, other aspects. Ribes (1986), for example, pointed out that language may be viewed as action (sound effects and acoustics), description (logic and semantics), products (psycholinguistics). formal linguistics (philology and aesthetics), and a set of rules (logic, grammar, and mathematics). A distinction should also be made between language that refers to the linguistic system of a society (e.g., G e m a n , Chinese, English) and language behavior, or speech, that refers to actual linguistic interactions of individuals. Let us elaborate on the meaning of psychological linguistics. Communication as the acts of persons as they adjust through referential interactions is analyzed as a bistimulational relationship consisting of the behavior of a speaker in interaction with both a referent and a listener. Here, the speaker must in some way refer the listener to the referent and the listener must be able to understand, or be oriented to, the referent and respond to it with a narrative or mediative interaction. In narrative interactions, a speaker’s referential behavior (e.g., “That’s an attractive adobe house”) is coordinated with a listener’s referential behavior (e.g., “Yes, but 1 don’t like the entry way”). These interchanges may range from conversations of this sort to a wide range of serious discussions. In medi-

ative interactions, a speaker’s rererential interaction mediates or results in a nonreferential interaction. For a example, a speaker says, “Please close the door” and the listener closes the door. The listener performs an act that is in no way referential but performs the act requested by the speaker. A more subtle type of mediative interaction is one in which the listener’s response is a less obvious movement, such as a seeing reaction in response to, “Look at that sleek sports car.” Skinner (1957) referred to rnediative language as the language of commands and requests, and named it manding behavior. The form, or topography, of a person’s referential behavior in both categories varies according to the dialectical, communal, and cultural linguistic practices of his or her group. Symbolizing interactions, the other component of psychological linguistics, refer to a person’s reactions to a stimulus that has been made to substitute for something else. Such a reaction may be simply an orientational reaction with respect to a substitute stimulus ( e . g . , noticing an exit sign as you enter a theater and take your seat); or an orientational reaction followed by contact with the object or event symbolized (e.g., noticing the exit sign and then leaving the theater through the door under the sign). Symbolizing interactions, in this formulation, do not refer to the influence o f thoughts, ideas, and other mental phenomena on action, but to the linear relation between stimulus and response functions. In addition to its communicative and indicative functions, linguistic behavior has what might be called “secondary” functions, functions that bring about consequences to the speaker and sometimes to the listener as well. Often, people talk for the purpose of teaching something, of selling merchandise, of persuading one to vote for a candidate, and so on. This aspect of language behavior is emphasized by linguistic pragmatists such as Bates ( 1 976). The processes involved in the progrcssions of linguistic interactions are derived from nonhuman and human experimental research in laboratory and semilaboratory situations and include operant and respondent conditioning, habituation and facilitation, stimulus equivalence, and intellectual fatigue. The conditions that influence language development are identified by descriptive studies in natural and seminatural settings. The aim of this paper is twofold: to skctch an hypothesis of language development from random behavior to approximations of conventional speech and to describe a method for studying language, both based on psychological linguistics (Kantor, 1977).

11.

Initial Development

We shall describe the initial development of language behavior in terms o f stages. However, in this system, stages, like categories, are considered analyti-

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cal tools that help to give order to the tremendous variety of interactions occurring simultaneously and successively in the development of an individual. Stages have no properties of their own, neither hypothetical, as in the Piagetian system, nor physiological in the form of analogs to embryological structures and functions, as in the Gesellian approach. Progressions within and between stages are related, in so far as possible, to past events in a person’s interactional history and the current conditions, conceptualized as the behavior of a speaker in reciprocal relationship with both the behavior of a listener and the object or event referred to by the speaker, the medium of contact (air waves for visual interactions, sound waves for auditory contacts, etc.), and setting conditions. Since communication involves interaction with each participant’s whole body. we shall begin by describing briefly the neonate’s store of psychological endowments before discussing the stages. A

INTERACTIONAL EQUIPMENT OF THE NEONATE

The neonate’s interactional equipment has been described in many ways; some include hypothetical nonobservables, others adhere strictly to demonstrated empirical relationships. We shall follow the latter course, dealing with random movements, vocalizations, reflexes, and conditioning capacity. Random movements designate the activities o f an infant when he or she is awake and free from aversive stimulation, deprivation of appetitive substances, or the troughs of the sleep cycle; they are the unorganized, uncoordinated, and diffused movements of the arms, legs, and bodily squirms and shifts. All are difficult to relate to observable conditions or events. Viewed as transitional responses-transitional from biological to psychological activities-their later functioning depends on biological maturation on the one hand, and on physical and social circumstances, on the other. Through interactions, first with the ecological environment, then with a combination of the ecological and social environments, and finally with primarily the social environment, behaviors develop that are categorized variously but mostly as manual and locomotor skills, communication, socialization, self-care, and cognitive behavior. We turn next to the neonate’s vocalizations. An infant displays two types of vocal behavior. One is crying, which is related to specific antecedent stimulation, such as blows, pricks, restraint, or internal pain (e.g., colic), and setting events, such as deprivation of appetitive stimuli (e.g., food and water). Although crying serves an essential survival function, it appears to be of little importance in the initial development of speech. The other type of vocal behavior-the socalled “comfort sounds”-consists of undifferentiated soft sounds that are most likely to occur when the neonate is in a biological state of equilibrium, that is. not deprived of appetitive substances or sleep and not responding to aversive stimulation.

Osgood (1953) has characterized the vocal sounds produced during the first few months of life, stating that the vocal apparatus “is a muscular system, and activity here partakes of the gross, mass activity of the total organism. Just as arms and legs are randomly exercised. and when air happens to be pushed through the oral cavity, varying patterns of sound are produced” (p. 684). If Osgood’s description is correct the transition from primitive utterances and movements to conventional speech and communication might well come about through physiological maturation and a long series of interactions with the people and events comprising his or her interactional history. The large variety of reflexes manifested by the neonate and very young infant may be grouped into physiological and psychological categories. Biological reflexes, such as the patellar tendon. abdominal, and Achilles, are rather precise reactions to specific stimuli and are related to the functioning of the nervous system. Because they do not come under the control of novel stimuli, they play a relatively small role in the adjustment processes in psychological development. Psychological reflexes, in contrast, are diffuse forms of behavior coordinated with antecedent and consequent stimulation. Infants show unconditioned reactions to light, chemicals on the tongue. odors, temperature, pin pricks, electrotactual stimuli, and changes in body orientation and movement. To sounds, which are important stimuli for the development of verbal-vocal language, newborns respond to differences in pitch. loudness, and duration. For example. pitches within normal and below normal speech range tend to produce quieter, more attentive behavior; high pitches generally produce stress reactions (Eisenberg, 1976). The neonate and the very young infant can respond to new stimulus conditions in accordance with both the respondent (Pavlovian) and operant conditioning paradigms. For example, a landmark study of respondent conditioning by Lipsitt and Kaye (1964) showed that non-nutritional sucking can be conditioned to a tone. And an impressive operant conditioning study by Siqueland and Lipsitt (1966) showed that head turning, stimulated by a touch on the cheek, could be conditioned on the basis of consequent stimuli. Later, Siqueland (1968) demonstrated that when head turning was contingently reinforced on an intermittent basis, it was more resistant to extinction than when subjected to continuous reinforcement, a finding well-documented in nonhuman organisms. For a comprehensive account of learning by the neonate and young infant, see Lipsitt and Werner (1981). The young infant also displays what might be called “primitive” imitation (Bower, 1977; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Primitive imitation refers to the interaction between a young infant’s responses and a limited number of facial expressions, such as sticking out the tongue or opening the mouth. The infant’s responses are rough approximations of the stimulus pattern presented. In sum, the baseline behavior of the neonate consists of random bodily move-

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ments, psychological (conditionable) reflexes, vocalizations consisting of crying and “soft sounds,” capacity for both operant and respondent conditioning, and primitive imitation. B . STAGE ONE: PREVERBAL-VOCAL COMMUNICATION

The preverbal-vocal stage of linguistic development begins with gestural communication between the infant and the mother (the term “mother” will be used throughout in the generic sense to refer to any significant caretaker) and ends with the onset of verbal-vocal referential interactions. Its span is the first 9 to 15 months of life, depending on differences in the rate of maturation and circumstances. Included in the latter are the child’s health and hygienic state, nutritional factors, nurturing social interactions, and opportunities to interact with the physical surroundings. We shall examine the outstanding characteristics of this stage, namely, ( 1) development of gestural communication, ( 2 ) changes in vocalizations, and ( 3 ) development of understanding verbal-vocal speech, or receptive language.

1.

Gestural Communicution Gestures are an infant’s first acts of communication. They evolve in three phases over many months from the infant’s interactions with the physical surroundings and play activities with the mother and other members of the household (see Clark, 1978; Gray, 1978). In the first phase, random motor behavior is transformed into simple skills in manual dexterity, body management, and locomotion. The contingencies that strengthen and consolidate such behavior into larger coordinated units are the natural consequences of mastering the body and the physical environment. In the second phase, the motor skills acquired are instrumental in exploring and discovering the properties of the objects, people, and events in the immediate environment; in other words, the infant engages in ecological behavior (Bijou, 1980; Kantor & Smith, 1975). Operant principles are also in effect here. Exploratory activities produce sensory consequences that are naturally reinforcing. The sounds produced when playing with pots and the taste experienced when mouthing the comer of a rug are examples. In the third phase, gestural communication is added to the infant’s motor skills repertoire. Here, the contingencies are mediated not by activities with the physical environment, as they are in the previous phases, but by people. Exactly when gestural communication occurs depends on the infant’s interactional history in the two earlier phases, his or her health, and the play experiences provided by the mother and others. What distinguishes gestural communication from other kinds of infant-mother activities? How does it differ, for example, from an infant’s smiling on seeing the mother enter the room, or from a mother’s removing a potentially dangerous

object from her infant’s grasp’?To engage in gestural communication, an infant must be able to exhibit the behavior of both speaker and listener in a referential act. As a speaker, he or she must react to both the referent (e.g., by holding out cupped hands to receive a ball) and to the mother who is a listener (e.g., by making visual contact, vocalizing. touching, pulling). The mother, in turn, must react relevantly as an indication that she understands the request. Understanding does not mean complying; it nieans being in contact with the referent. Once the mother understands in this sense, hhe can behave according to the circumstances, that is, she may comply, not comply. o r arbitrate. As the listener, an infant must attend to the mother’s gestural overture and respond relevantly (e.g., respond to the mother’s request or refuse to do so). We postulate that the development of gestural communication is an essential, but not a necessary step in the development of verbal-vocal referential interactions. Babies in the next stage can achieve verbal-vocal referential behavior with little or practically no history o f gestural communication skills. However, we would expect that those children who have had opportunities to develop gestural communication are at an advantage in acquiring verbal-vocal referential behavior, since their new modality can supplement their developed skills in nonverbal activities.

2.

Vocalization The verbal-vocal mode of communication originates in the ‘‘soft sounds” described in Section II,A. At about three months of age these sounds become babbling behavior. One indication that an infant will soon begin to babble is his or her control of the articulatory apparatus in which the airstream from the lungs is interrupted by an articulation between the tongue and the roof of the mouth. Ensuing changes, which are fairly orderly, are correlated with certain biological, physical, and social setting factors, and with opportunities both to explore the functioning of the vocal apparatus (ecological behavior) and to interact with people. Another harbinger of babbling is said to be an infant’s discovery that sounds are “fun” (Cruttenden, 1979). a criterion evidently inferred from the observation that normal infants in a state of contentment engage in babbling with or without prompting. Initial babbling and preconventional idiosyncratic utterances (“expressions”), like early motor behaviors, are exploratory activities that result in skills and knowledge with respect to the immediate ecology (Bijou, 1980; Kantor & Smith, 1975). The mechanism responsible for the change may be described as follows: when a .?-month or older normal infant is awake and “feeling good,” or is in a state o f biological equilibrium (an organismic setting condition), he or she will probably engage in babbling, an activity that produces vibrating and auditory stimulus consequences influencing the form and frequency of the vocalizations as well as their relationships with other currently acting

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stimuli. A healthy infant in a responsive social environment appears to babble for “the sake of babbling.” Largely through the auditory and vibratory consequences of vocalization and the social reinforcement of selected responses, random babbling moves away from those sounds that are more universal in the language and toward intonation, inflections, and so forth, of the specific language system to which the infant is exposed.

3.

Understanding Verbal-Vocal Speech While the infant engages in gestural communication, he or she is learning to understand verbal-vocal speech. This learning occurs because at this stage most of the mother’s conversation with her infant is a combination of gestures and verbal-vocal equivalence: The gesture of holding out cupped hands is likely to be accompanied with, “Gimme the ball.” She might also provide supplementary cues to indicate what she wants. In addition to holding out cupped hands, and saying, “Gimme the ball,” the mother might look at the ball, move her hand closer to the ball, smile when her infant makes the first move toward her hands, and so forth. Repeated pairing of motor and verbal-vocal stimuli should enable the infant to mediate simple requests solely on the basis of verbal-vocal stimulation. When he or she does, we say that the infant understands or comprehends what is said. Responding to simple words and short phrases in this manner occurs at about 9 months of age according to the literature (Goldin-Medow, Seligman. & Gelman, 1976; Huttenlocker, 1974). C.

STAGE TWO: PRIMITIVE REFERENTIAL VERBAL-VOCAL INTERACTIONS

The second stage of linguistic development spans roughly the second year of life. Beginning with the most primitive forms of verbal-vocal referential interactions, anywhere from age 9 to 15 months, the infant usually achieves firstapproximation conventional speech by 22 to 24 months.

I.

Transition from Early Vocalization to Primitive Verbal-Vocal Interactions In the foregoing discussion of vocalization, we noted that babbling shifts toward the intonation, inflections, and sounds of the language system to which the infant is exposed. This trend continues and evolves into idiosyncratic expressions and rough approximations of all or parts of strings of sounds voiced by the mother and others. Such undifferentiated utterances become attached to objects, people, and events through the imitative process (Clark, 197&),which works in complex ways. In some situations, a mother’s remarks, which may or may not be directed at the baby, serve as a cue or discriminative stimulus for the

baby’s matching response which i s , of course, only a crude approximation, one dictated by his or her immaturity. The consequence of this matching act might be only the stimuli produced by the baby’s vocalization; or it might be that stimulus together with social stimulation from the mother. The mother sings, “Pop goes the weasel,” and the baby says, “Pah.” to which the mother says, “Yes, pop.” In other situations, the matching behavior might take place in the presence of an object, person, or event, as whcn the mother, talking to the cat, says, “Go away, Kitty,” and the baby says, “ K i t . ” The contingency here may be threefold: the auditory self-stimulation, the mother’s smile and “Yes, Kitty,’’ and the cat’s jumping off the table. In still other situations, the mother’s vocalization may be accompanied by pointing to the referent ob.ject, person, or event. And the baby may or may not point while uttering the speech approximation. When the baby points or makes some other bodily movement (e.g., looks, smiles, gets excited, orients his or her body toward the object) and utters some idiosyncratic expressions or verbal-vocal approximation, he or she is behaving as a speaker, initiating a referential interaction with a combination of gestures and vocalizations. If the mother responds in some relevant way, the child’s initiation results in a dyadic referential unit. The baby has the role of a listener in a referential interaction when the mother initiates a conversation and the baby responds in a relevant mediative or narrative manner. At this stage the baby can respond to a speaker with a simple narrative reaction. The mother says, for example, “Where i s the milk‘?’’ and the baby says, “Allgone.” Heretofore, his o r her responses as a listener were either mediative, that is, carrying out simple requests, or incomplete. We take the position that initial language develops casually and depends greatly on prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, some mothers, particularly middle-socioeconomic-class mothers, provide their babies with graded language sequences. They use simple grammatical structures, fewer pronouns, and limited vocabularies, and talk slowly with frequent repetitions. They tend to respond to the baby’s speech by expanding on utterances, asking questions, cueing and providing answers, and demonstrating meanings by gestures and actions. They also devote time to teaching the names of objects and activities with live examples and/or representations (Cruttendcn. 1979).

2 . Holophrastic Speech One of the characteristics of speech in the early part of Stage Two, in addition to the prevalence of idiosyncratic expressions, is its abbreviated style. Instead of saying, “Pick me up,” “1 want to be picked up.” or “Carry me,” the baby says, “Up.” This form of referential speech, called holophrastic speech, was traditionally most often viewed as a phase that proceeds from isolated words to syntax, on the assumption that language i s exclusively a matter of verbal utterances with words as units. O u r interpretation is different: holophrastic speech,

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like motor skill and coordination, is a matter of general maturation. The baby is in a stage of linguistic awkwardness and incompleteness and makes the best linguistic adjustments he or she can to the prevailing conditions (i.e., referents, listeners, setting factors). In sum, the traditional interpretation of holophrastic speech is based on language behavior as words and cultural style; in contrast, the interpretation presented here is based on language behavior as psychological interactions. D.

STAGE THREE: FIRST-APPROXIMATION REFERENTIAL INTERACTIONS

In Stage Three, which spans from about age 21-25 months to about 28-32 months, a child’s language behavior moves from idiosyncratic and holophrastic to conventionally understandable speech, that is, to first-approximation referential interactions.

I.

Longer and More Accurate Referential Utterances With further physical maturation of the vocal apparatus and more linguistic interactions with the mother and others in the immediate environment, the child makes more utterances more similar to the idiolectic and dialectic expressions heard. These expressions include, of course, the customary word order of sentences, or syntax. Nothing special needs to be attributed to the way a child learns the word order of utterances, such as, for example, an innate capacity to understand and apply grammatical rules (Chomsky, 1968). In situations where objects, persons, and events are involved, the child tends to make linguistic adjustments that adhere to the style of the culture, and the syntax of sentences is clearly an aspect of linguistic style. Kantor ( 1977) succinctly summarized the natural science view on syntax: From a scientific psychological standpoint syntax is not primarily a matter of words being put together but rather behavior of speakers performing communicative adjustments with referee persons [listeners] and referents in linguistic fields. (p. 277)

First-approximation referential behavior refers not only to speech with errors of form but also to speech with errors of reference. At the beginning of this stage, a child’s speech is often overly specific (e.g., referring to a coin as something that is exchangeable only for an ice cream cone), and overly generalized (a classical example is calling men other than the father, “Daddy”).

2.

Narrative Referential Interactions During the first two stages, most of the child’s referential interactions are mediative, either making simple requests or carrying out simple instructions. In

the third stage, he or she becomes capable of engaging in simple narrative referential interchanges. An example with the child as a speaker: at the breakfast table, a child says to the mother, “ I like dis,” pointing to the bottle of maple syrup, and the mother replies, “It’s sweet and sure makes the waffles taste good.” An example with the child as the listener: the mother says, “Blackie is a good dog; he protects us,” and the child replies, “Yeh, nice doggie.” 3. Reference to the Past und Future Another significant change occurring in the latter part of the third stage is the child’s ability to refer to absent situations. For example, walking into the dining room early in the morning a child says to the mother, “Daddy gone,” to which the mother says, “Yes, daddy has gone to work.” The child’s referential behavior is stimulated by things associated with the father’s presence in that situation, not by the father’s driving to work. Customarily, the father is sitting at the table eating breakfast when the child enters the room. The situation without the father serves as a substitute stimulus for the child’s reference to the absent father. References to past occurrences, and to future events as well, do not appear suddenly but require specific histories of interactions with the mother and members of the family (Lewis, 1937). Very likely, learning to refer to past events occurs in two phases and functions on the basis of stimulus equivalence. In the first, the child imitates, with promptings, the mother’s utterances about simple, familiar, past events. For example, she says “Where’s Jimmy?” and urges the child to say something that approximates the word “school.” This kind of interchange is repeated in many ways and reaches a point at which things in a setting associated with past events are sufficient to stimulate a child’s reference to past events, as in the example of the father’s absence from the breakfast table. In the second phase, the child “spontaneously” refers to past events when he or she reports an event that took place during a walk with a sister. In this situation, the child either repeats his or her own utterance or gives an approximation of what the sister said. Two phases are also involved in developing referential behavior to future events. In the first, the mother encourages the child to express his or her needs and wants (e.g., “What would you like f o r lunch‘?”) and to imitate her when she speaks about future events that resemble past events (e.g., “We’ll go to the park again after lunch”). In the second phase, the child refers to future events on the basis of the associated present stimuli, which include the child’s needs and wants.

4 . Expressive Referential Intercictions Linguistic development is believed to consist of progressive interactions with conditions that enable a child to communicate with persons as both a speaker and a listener. But the child’s behavior during this period appears to contradict that

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belief. He or she appears to be talking a good deal of the time whether or not a listener is present. Because the child seems to be “jabbering away” just for the auditory stimulation provided, his or her language behavior is sometimes described as “egocentric speech” (Piaget, 1962). It may sometimes be egocentric, but for the most part the child seems to be engaging in expressive referential interactions in which he or she has the role of both speaker and listener. Talking to oneself, which gradually becomes implicit as Kantor and Smith (1975) and Vygotsky (1962) point out, plays a significant role in planning, choosing, evaluating, and other thinking activities. E. STAGE FOUR: SECOND-APPROXIMATION REFERENTIAL INTERACTIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SYMBOLIZING BEHAVIOR

Stage Four encompasses the nursery school years, generally from about 28-52 months of age. It is characterized by two major changes: linguistic interactions more closely approximate conventional speech and communication through symbolizing interaction evolves.

1.

Second-Approximution Referential Interactions During the fourth stage, the vocal apparatus is sufficiently developed so that a child can fairly accurately make most vowel sounds. Also, more opportunities for social contacts arise within and outside the family circle which bring the child’s linguistic style closer to that of the family and community. Style includes not only idiolectic and dialectic expressions and word order, as previously stated, but also expressions appropriate for different kinds of listeners: parents, relatives, teachers, peers, and younger children. Hence, with better pronunciation and enunciation and more approximate linguistic style, the child at this stage is approaching conventional speech.

2.

Communication through Symbolizing Interactions In symbolizing interactions the child communicates with people, or with him or herself, through responding to things that stand for something else. These things may be three-dimensional objects, drawings, pictures, schemas, or marks of any kind. In simple symbolizing behavior, the child orients him or herself to the symbol or substitute stimulus. In complex symbolizing behavior, the orientation toward the symbol is followed by contact with the thing it stands for. A nursery school teacher on the first day of school says to a child, “I’m going to stick this picture of a red bird on this locker. That means this is your locker.” The next day, the child finds the locker with the red bird (orientation to the symbol), opens the door, and puts his coat and lunch box inside (contact with the object signified). Symbolizing communication evolves from referential interactions. In other words, the child has to be shown, as in the example above or by linguistic and/or

nonlinguistic interactions, that a relationship exists between a symbol and the thing or event it signifies. Easy-to-learn relationships are those with symbols having high correspondence with the thing or event signified, such as houses, cars, boats, and toy animals; difficult relationships are those with arbitrary symbols such as letters of the alphabet, words, insignia, and marks. As a child learns to draw, write, and read, his or her symbolizing repertoire expands rapidly. F.

LATER DEVELOPMENT

Needless to say, linguistic development continues beyond Stage Four. Later social conditions outside the family become powerfully influential in affecting language style and in generating specialized forms of speech. Some of the conditions are related to developmental stage, such as an adolescent who adopts the speech of rock stars; some are related to vocations, for example, the medical jargon of physicians; and some to avocations, hobbies, and recreation, such as the language of golfers.

111. Method for Studying Language Interactions According to psychological linguistics, language development and performance are best studied in the setting in which they occur. Carrying out this kind of research requires having a method that is focused on language behavior as psychological interactions, unlike most currently used methods that are based on counting words, analyzing the length of language units, grammatical classification, and structure of sentences. A.

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD

Over the past several years, a method has been developed by Bijou, Umbreit, Ghezzi, and Chao (1986) which describes language episodes in terms of the behavior of a speaker and the listener, the referent, and the setting conditions. In order to obtain an accurate account of all of the details of the events, linguistic and nonlinguistic, each session is videotaped in its entirety.

I.

The Behavior of the Speaker t i i d the Listener The behavior of a speaker is analyzed in terms of the frequency with which he or she begins a language interchange during a session, the average length of the initiation, the modality (verbal-vocal, gestural, or a combination of both), and the accompanying behavior. The procedure is carried out in two phases. A rater, using a Manual uflnstructions and a data sheet, first determines the number of times the speaker begins an interaction in successive one-minute intervals during

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a session. Specific guidelines and examples in the Manual help the rater to identify each initiation by the speaker and to determine whether the listener’s response is narrative (verbal-vocal or gestural), mediative, or a combination of narrative and mediative. The listener’s irrelevant responses and nonresponses are also recorded. In the second phase of analysis, the rater, using another data sheet, selects up to 10 dyadic interactions (referential units) for detailed study. If the protocol contains 10 or fewer, all are analyzed; if it contains more than 10, 10 are randomly selected for analysis. The rater first records the duration of each initiation of a topic, then classifies each according to modality (verbal-vocal, gestural, or a combination of both), and lastly, notes and describes any concurrent activities that may have taken place.

2.

Reference and Referent The selected referential units are also analyzed for referential contents, including time frame (past, present, future, or no time frame), actuality (real, imaginary, or a combination of both), and mention of persons, animals, objects, activities, holidays, places, or others. Feeling reactions about the referents, such as like, dislike, anger, and fear are also noted.

3. Instrumental Functions of Referential Units The final step in the analysis determines the instrumental or secondary function of referential units, that is, whether they are amusing, instructional, supportive, punishing, cooperative/sharing, and aesthetically appreciative. Categorizations depend not on the rater’s judgment of the speaker’s intentions but on the reaction of the listener. For example, only if the listener smiles, laughs, or otherwise shows some appreciation of the speaker’s remark is the utterance scored as amusing. 4. Setting Conditions The physical and social circumstances and/or the physical and behavioral states of the participants make up the setting conditions. The physical setting is the location-the room in the home or school, the playground, cafeteria, etc.-in which two people are talking to each other; the social circumstances are the activities of other people in that setting. The participants in the study may also contribute to the social setting, as for example, when the members of a dyad agree to communicate according to some set of rules, such as taking turns telling jokes, assuming interrelated dramatic roles, or playing games involving language.

5 . Two-Way Analysis and Data Management System The method we have described is clearly focused on the behavior of the speaker. The listener’s behavior is taken into account only in so far as he or she completes or does not complete the speaker’s linguistic overture with a relevant narrative or a mediative reaction.

If the interest is in obtaining a description of the entire linguistic behavior of both speaker and listener, the linguistic behavior of each participant is analyzed twice, once as a speaker and once as a listener (Bijou, Chao, & Ghezzi, 1988; Chao, Bijou, & Ghezzi, 1987). A data-base management system (e.g., dBase Ill) is used for further analyses after all the selected interactions for all sessions have been analyzed and recorded on the data sheets. This procedure allows a researcher to expedite data analysis, explore different relationships among the data, economize on data storage, and further, create a large data base that can be related to other data bases. Such data management systems are commercially available, and the structure of the data sheets can be arranged to facilitate the transformation of data into the data-base file. B.

APPLICATION OF THE METHOD

The method has been used with nomial and retarded elementary school children and with adults. One of the studies with children was concerned with the influence of the listener’s age o n the behavior of the speaker (Ghezzi, Bijou, Umbreit, & Chao, 1987). The other dealt with the effectiveness of two social skills training packages for mildly retarded children (Ghezzi, Bijou, & Chao, 1987). Of the adult studies, two pertained to the speech of psychotic patients (Lyons & Williamson, 1987; Williamson, Lyons, Abney, Gonzales, & Gallegos, 1986) and one to the language behavior of college students of different academic levels (Chiasson & Parrott, 1987). C

K X A M P I L OF A STUDY

To illustrate the type of data obtained by using this method, we present a study of social skills training (Ghezzi, Hijou, CG Chao, 1987). The specific aim was to evaluate two techniques for training mildly and moderately retarded elementary school children in social skills. A single subject design was used to compare the effects of two types of intervention with three dyads of 6- to 9-year-old boys, one of whom was mildly retarded, the other “normal.” A lounge-like room in the school the children attended was the setting for the research. In one approach, Package A, the objective was to train the retarded child in two separate speaking skills considered “mechanically” important to casual conversation: initiating linguistic interactions and sustaining them. Utilizing videotapes of the retarded child’s conversation with the other member of the dyad. the investigator showed the handicapped child selected segments which depicted commendable and not so commendable instances of him initiating a conversation (Phase I ) , or sustaining the convcrsation (Phase 2). In the daily 5-minute training session, a trained psychologist helped the child to identify correctly the desirable

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Sidney W . Bijou

and undesirable instances, and in the case of the undesirable, to practice acceptable alternatives. The other approach, Package B , provided the retarded child with motivation to communicate by telling him to engage in conversations about, for example, the other child's background, plans for a party of some kind, how to build a backyard clubhouse, and so on. The training session, also 15 minutes long, consisted of helping the child, in a series of role-playing exercises, to talk about a specific topic that later formed the basis of a dual assignment: having a conversation with his nonhandicapped partner and reporting to his trainer the details of the conversation. The effects of training were assessed during daily 15-minute probe sessions in which the child and his nonhandicapped partner were brought together and told to "have a conversation." In Package A training, both children were escorted to their respective classrooms at the end of each session. In Package B training, the handicapped child remained with the trainer for about 5 minutes, reporting the details of his just-completed conversation with his partner. Shown in Figs. 1 and 2 and Table I is a portion of the data obtained in a twoway analysis (the participants are analyzed as a speaker and as a listener) of one of the three dyads. Figure 1 shows the total number of linguistic interactions initiated by the handicapped (H) and nonhandicapped children (NH) throughout Package B training, during both phases of Package A training, and in subsequent baseline and 3-week follow-up sessions. Package A training obviously increased the number of initiations by H. Baseline

Package

B

Package A-1

Baseline

Baseline

3

weeks

I

I

I

1

I

I

0

Package A - 2

LL

0

15.

I

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

SESSIONS

Fig. I . Total number of initiations b y the handicupped ( H i and nonhandic.apped ( N H ) speakers in Dyad 3 during 5-min probe sessions

32

I

A

12

8

20

16

24

28

SESSIONS

Fig. 2. M e m iniriatiori durarion for Dyad 3 during 5-miri probe sessions.

/hi,

horidicupped ( H ) arid nonhundrcupped ( N H ) .speakers in

Figure 2 shows the mean duration of linguistic initiations for H and NH across all conditions. For H, a consistently greater length of time was spent in initiating a conversation under Package B . Table I shows the particulars of H's referents throughout the study. Note, for example, that regardless of the prevailing conditions, H spoke about people

TAHLE I Percentage of Analyzed Initiations with Referents (Indicated) for All Conditions for the Handicapped ( H ) Speaker in Dyad 3 Condition Referent Speaker ( H ) Listener (NH) Other people Objects Places Activities School Nonschool Other

Baseline

B

Baseline

Al

10

5 42 5

IS 2X 22

3 20

4 4

14 34 8 10

I0 4

17

10

10

h

I

II

4

10 2

35

6 12 ~

20

12

A2

Baseline

3 week.,

18

6 29 3 32 15

20

3

9 18

I6

3

29 s 20 5 5 17

1

~

25 S 18

2

32

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Sidney W . B i j m

roughly half the time. Noteworthy also is the fact that from the first baseline condition to the final baseline condition, H’s references to here-and-now school and nonschool activities decreased steadily, while references to objects and places increased. Taken as a whole the data indicate several positive consequences of the training. Package A produced three positive outcomes: ( 1 ) an increase in the number of interactions initiated by the child (i.e., he talked more as a speaker); (2) an increase in the percentage of subsequent initiations that related to or differed from the referent the child originally introduced (i.e., he either talked more about his referent, or changed it altogether); and (3) a decrease in nonrelevant responding as a listener (i.e., he responded relevantly to more of his partner’s linguistic initiations). In contrast to the other two changes, the increase in relevant responses occurred without specific training. Two positive outcomes of Package B training were observed: an increase in the mean duration of the child’s initiations (i.e., he talked longer when starting a conversation); and an increase in the mean duration of responses to his partner’s linguistic initiations (i.e., he talked longer in response to the speaker’s initiations). As in the Package A training, this latter change also took place without specific instruction.

IV.

Summary

Presented here are an hypothesis of language development and a description of a method for studying language, both based on Kantor’s psychological linguistics. According to our hypothesis, language develops in four stages. In the first, which spans the first 9 to 15 months, random movements evolve into body management, manual, and locomotor skills that enable an infant to engage i n play activities, among other things, with the mother and others. Simple gestural communication soon follows. Random babbling progresses beyond the sounds that are more universal in the language to the family’s particular pattern of intonations and inflections, and receptive speech begins, that is, the infant learns to react to simple verbal-vocal requests. During the second stage, which coincides with the child’s second year, vocalizations evolve into “idiosyncratic expressions” and rough approximations of heard sound patterns. Language is now holophrastic-one-word utterances-mostly of the mediative variety. During the third stage, which extends to about 30 months of age, language skills are described as first-approximation referential interactions: they are longer and more detailed, include some narrative interchanges, and refer to past and future events. Typically the child now talks to him or herself, or engages in expressive referential interactions. In the fourth stage, when the child reaches the age of 52 months or so, second-approximation speech begins. By now the vocal apparatus is sufficiently developed to enable a child to make most of the vowel sounds, and

the enhanced language skills set the occasion for more frequent linguistic interchanges. He or she also begins to respond to symbols and other representations of objects and events. In other words, he or she begins to engage in symbolizing behavior. Language obviously continues to develop beyond the fourth stage. Social conditions outside of the family further affect language style and generate specialized forms of speech, notably the jargon of a particular occupation or hobby. The method for studying language interactions involves, through the use of TV tapes, a description of the behavior of a speaker and the listener, the referent, and the setting conditions. The behavior of a speaker is analyzed in terms of the frequency with which he or she begins a language interchange, the average length of the initiation, the modality (verbal-vocal, gestural, or both) and the accompanying behavior. It is also analyzed for content, including time frame, actuality, and persons, animals, objects, activities, and others. Noted, too, are the feeling reactions regarding the referents. A second analysis is made to determine the instrumental function of the speaker’s initiations, that is, whether they are amusing, instructional, supportive, punishing, and so on. The listener’s behavior is categorized as narrativc, niediative, or a combination of both. Also noted and recorded are the listener’s irrelevant responses and nonreactions. In addition. the setting conditions, which include the physical and social circunistances in which the language episode occurred, and the rules for talking mutually established by the participants, arc observed and described. When a particular study requires a description of the entire linguistic behavior of both speaker and listener, the behavior of each is analyzed twice, once as a speaker and once as a listener. For further analysis of all the data, a data-base management system (e.g., dBase 111) is used. The method described has been used with normal and handicapped elementary school children to study the influence of the listener’s age on the behavior of the speaker and to evaluate the effectiveness o f two social skills training packages. The speech of psychotic adult patients and the language behavior of college students of different academic levels have also been studied. As an example of the application of the method, a description of part of a study of social skills training is included. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank P. M. Ghezzi for the preparation ot’the figures and table in the study o n social skills training in children.

REFERENCES Bates, E. (1976). Language and conrc’xr’ Tlre cir,c/ui.\ition ofpragmatics New York: Academic Press. BIJOU,S. W . (1980). Exploratory behavior in infants and animals: A behavior analysis. Psdiological Record. 30, 483-495.

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Bi,jou, S. W . , Chao, C . C . . & Chezzi, P. M. (l9XX). Manual of instructions for analyzing referential language interactions. 11. P.svchological Record, 38, 40 1-4 14. Bijou. S. W . , Umbreit, J.. Ghezzi, P. M . , & Chao, C. C . (1986). Manual of instructions for identifying and analyzing referential interactions Psychological Record, 36, 49 1-5 18. Bower, T . C. R . (1977) A primer of infant development. San Francisco. CA: Freeman. Chao, C . C., Bijou, S. W . , & Chezzi. P. M . (1987, May). Who said Mmhat f u whom:) Part I I . A n interucriw unalysis @speaking and listening. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis. Nashville, TN. Chiasson. C . , & Parrott, L. J . ( 1987. May). Ancrlysis u f l u n g u q e interactions with dyads rfpersons of diferrent academic levels. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville, TN. Chomsky, N . (1968). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Clark, R. A. (1978). The transition from action to gesture. In A . Lock (Ed.). Action, gesture und symhol (pp. 231-257). New York: Academic Press. Cruttenden, A . (1979). Language in igfancy wid childhood. New York: St. Martin's Press. Eisenberg, R . B. (1976). Audifon, competcvm in eurly life. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Ghezzi, P. M . , Bijou, S. W . . & Chao, C . C . (1987. May). A compurison of nu0 intervention .strutegies j o r improving mildly returded children's conversutioti with nonreturded schoolmates. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville. TN. Chezzi, P. M., Bijou, S. W.. Urnbreit. J . , and Chao, C. C. (1987). Influence of age of listener on preadolescents' linguistic behavior. Ps~chologiculRecord. 37, 109- 126. Goldin-Meadow. S.. Seligman. M.. & Celrnan. R . (1976). Language in the two-yearold. Cognition, 4, 189-202.

Gray, H. (1978). Learning t o take an object from the mother. In A . Lock (Ed.), Action. gesture and svmhol (pp. 159-182). New York: Academic Press. Hayes. S. C . (1987). Language and the incompatibility of evolutionary and psychological continuity. Behavior AnulysiJ. 22, 49-54. Huttenlocker, J . (1974). The origins of language. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories of cognitive psvchologv. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kantor. J. R. ( 1977). Psvchologicul linguistics. Chicago. IL: Principia Press. Kantor, J. R . , & Smith, N. W . (1975). The science of psychology: An interhehuvioral survey. Chicago, IL: Principia Press. Lewis, M. M. (1937). The beginning of references to past and future in a child's speech. British Journal of Educational Psycholog?;, 7, 39-56. Liebert. R . M . , Wicks-Nelson. R . , & Kail, R . V . (1986). D~wdopmenrulpsychology (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lipsitt, L. P., & Kaye. H. (1964). Conditioned sucking in thc human newborn. Psychonomic Science, 1, 29-30. Lipsitt, L. P . , & Werner, J . S (1981). The infancy of human learning processes. In E. S. Collin (Ed.), Developmental plusticity (pp. 101-133). New York: Academic Press. Lyons, C. A , . & Williamson. P . N. (1987. May). The lunguuge of ".schizc~phreniu": Toward an analvsis of psychotic speech. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville. TN. Meltzoff, A . N., & Moore, M . K . (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human infants. Science. 198, 75-78. Morris, E. K. (1987, August). N o t SO worlds uparr: Contextrtulisrn. rudical behaviorism. und developmental psychology. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York. Osgood, C . E. (1953). Methods and theory in erprrimenrul psjc'hology. New York: Oxford University Press.

24 I Piaget. J . (1962). The lunguuge und thou,qht oftlrc child. New York: World. Rihes, E. ( 1986). Language as behavior. Functional mediation vs. morphological description. In H. W . Reese & L. J . Parrott (Ed\ 1, Nehurior science: Phi/osophic.ul. rnrtho~~~~logir.ul. utd empirical udvunces (pp. 115-138) Hillsdale. NJ: Erlhaum. Sarhin, T. (1977). Contextualism: A world view fot- modern psychology. In A . W. Langfield ( E d . ) , Nebraska symposium on motivutiori (Vol. 24, pp. 1-44) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Siqueland, E. R. (1968). Reinforcement pattern5 and extinction in human newborns. Jortrnul of E.xperimentu1 Child Psychology. 6, 43 1-442. Siqueland, E. R., & Lipsitt, L. P. (1966). Conditioned head-turning in human newborns. Jortmul cf Experimentul Child P.sychology. 3, 356-316. Skinner, B. F. ( 1957). Verbal hehavror. New York. Appleton-Century-Crofts. VygotSky, L. S . (1962). Thought und lurijiuti,q,. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Williamson, P. N . , Lyons, C . A , , Ahncy, B . R , Gonzales. A , , & Gallegos, M . (1986, May). Analysis of linguistic interuc/fon\ of p\rchotir, iirlu1t.s. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Milwaukee. W1.

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PSYCHIC CONFLICT AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Gordon N . Cantor DIVISION OF PSYCHOLOCiI('AL AND QUANTITATIVE FOUNDATIONS COL.I.EXX OF EDUCATION UNIVERSIIY OF IOWA IowA c m . IOWA 52242

David A . Parton DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY (JNIVERSITY OF IOWA IOWA CITY. I O W A 52242

1. INTRODUCTION

11. THREE EXPERIMENTS ON CONFLICT IN CHILDREN ILLUSTRATING THE USE

OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES A . THE BARKER STUDY B. THE GODBEER STUDY C . THE BERLYNE STUDY D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 'THREE EXPERIMENTS 111. CONFLICT IN PIAGET'S GENERAL. THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

IV. CONFLICT AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY A. PIAGET'S SEMINAL WORK ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT B. MORAL DILEMMAS, KOHLBERGIAN THEORY, AND CONFLICT C . GILLIGAN'S CRITIQUE OF KOHLHERG V. NUNNER-WINKLER ON NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE DUTIES VI. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY A. THE DILEMMAS B . METHOD C . PREDICTIONS D. RESULTS E. DISCUSSION VII. CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES 243 A D V A N C E S IN C H I L D DEVELOPMENT A N D BEHAVIOR. VOI. 21

Copyright 6 ' I Y X Y h y Acadcmic Prcc\. Inc All righlr 01 icproductwn in any form rcicrvcd

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Gordun N . Corirur ond David A . Purruti

I.

Introduction

The assertion that we live today in an era of information overload is a cliche. But for those trying to keep abreast of new developments in an area such as child development, the statement has a compelling ring of truth to it. Added to this demanding task is the even more formidable challenge of relating newly published material to relevant work done in preceding decades. The problem is further compounded when the connections between earlier and later scholarly endeavors are obscured by differences in theoretical orientations, in terminological usages, and in apparent topical concerns. The purpose of this essay is to examine a prototypic example of such a situation. The illustration we have chosen to discuss constitutes, we think, an interesting and important topic in its own right. However, we hope by virtue of the attention we give it to make a second point-namely, that earlier work, when relevant to today’s topical enthusiasms, ought not to be ignored. We begin by asking the reader to consider the following two quotes. Conflict occurs when two o r more incompatible reaction tendencies are inatigated simultaneously. This means that conflict is characteristic of all choice situations, and that it can be understood in terms of thc principles which apply to any case where competing habits are aroused. (Kimble, 1961. p. 451) The choices inherent in a [moral] dilemma are not just two different options; they are incompatible alternatives requiring a recognition of the contradictory nature of their outcomes. (Harding, 19851. p. 52)

The first statement appears in Kinible’s revision of Hilgard and Marquis’ classic text, Corzdifioning and Learning. The second has been drawn from a recent book edited by Harding titled Moral Dilemmas: Philosophical and Psychological Issues in the Development of Moral Reasoning. These statements (and the volumes in which they appear) clearly represent the two structural-theoretical models commonly labeled, respectively, mechanistic and organismicmodels considered by Overton and Reese ( I 973, p. 6 5 ) to be “irreconcilable and irreducible to each other.” The quote from Kimble brings to mind rats in runways, the various types of conflict discussed by Miller ( 1944) (approach-approach, approach-avoidance, avoidance-avoidance, double approach-avoidance), and the kinds of measures one associates with mechanistic research paradigms (e.g., latency and amplitude of responding, incidence of vacillation behaviors, etc.). The quote from Harding, in contrast, suggests articulate human subjects responding in a Piagetian or Kohlbergian clinical interview situation and the use of measurement procedures exemplifying the organismic approach (e.g.. “Standard Issue Scoring”-Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983). Two different worlds? According to Overton and Reese, two very different

world views and two very different associated psychological models are in fact involved here. Though the validity of the irreconcilability argument may be substantial, it does not follow that mechanistic and organismic theorists never have anything i n common in the way of certain concepts they employ or psychological phenomena they study. Thc conclusion seems inescapable that Kimble and Harding were not writing about two entirely disparate sets of phenomena in the quotes reproduced above. Clearly. some conceptualization oriented around the notion of conflict constitutes the focus in both cases. The specific concepts invoked do of course differ. Kinible spoke in traditional mechanistic fashion of competing habits. Harding, in the organismic tradition, had in mind competition between thoughts or ideas. But we arguc that this difference should not blind us to the commonality involved-thc mutual concern with conflict. Our intent is to build a bridge between the two domains represented in the Kimble and Harding quotes. Our thesis is that the concept of conflict has played a substantial role in mechanistic accounts o f learning, motivation, and personality and in organismic accounts o f moral reasoning and development, but that, regrettably, these two significant literatures have coexisted over the years largely in isolation from one another. Wc will argue that, if moral dilemmas are truly dilemmatic, then the presence o f psychic conflict in subjects confronted with such dilemmas should be demonstrable using some of the traditional mechanistic indices mentioned earlier. Similarly, if nioral development is mediated by “cognitive conflict” (as claimed, for example, by Kohlberg, 1976). the presence of that conflict should be detectable, again using some form of objective measure. Our presentation will be organized as indicated below. First, we will describe three studies from the early experimental literaturestudies in which children served iis subjects and psychic conflict was the focus of concern. We will emphasize proceclures. measures, and outcomes (and not theoretical underpinnings). In doing so, we will be calling the reader’s attention to mechanistically flavored methotlologics that we will later argue could profitably be put to use in studying moral judgment and development phenomena. Next, we will shift to a consideration of how Piaget made use of the concept o f conflict in his organismically oriented theory of cognitive development. This transitional section will bring us to a focus on the topic of moral development. At that point, we will examine how contlict has been implicated in moral development theory, starting with Piaget’s own seminal work in the area. This discussion will bring us to an examination of the use of moral dilpmrnas. particularly as popularized by thc work o f Lawrence Kohlberg. From Kohlberg and moral dilemmas we will then progress, by way of Carol Gilligan’s critique of Kohlbergian theory, to the nioral conflict formulation of Gertrud NunnerWinkler. Next, we will briefly describe an attempt on our part to use sonie objective measures to test certain predictions drawn from Nunner-Winkler’s theory.

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Gordon N . Curifor und L)cri,id A . Pnrton

Finally, we will discuss the continued use made by moral development theorists of the concept of conflict in light of our empirical findings and other considerations raised in this paper.

11. Three Experiments on Conflict in Children

Illustrating the Use of Objective Measures A.

THE BARKER STUDY

Some readers may be surprised to learn that Roger G. Barker, well known for his work in psychological ecology, conducted one of the early laboratory studies of conflict in children (Barker, 1942). Nineteen boys, aged 9 to 1 1 years, participated individually in a situation calling for a series of choices to be made between liquids presented in paired fashion. The liquids used included orange juice, pineapple juice, tomato juice, water, lemon juice, vinegar, and a salt water solution. The 21 possible pairs of liquids were presented four times, thus requiring the subject to make a total of 84 choices. Under a “real” condition, the child actually consumed the liquid chosen in each case. Under a “hypothetical” condition, the subject merely indicated the liquid he would drink if he were required to consume his choice. Each liquid pair was presented twice under both conditions, with the spatial arrangement of the two liquids constituting a given pair being counterbalanced from the first to the second presentation of that pair within the condition in question. Nine subjects experienced the “real” condition first and the other 10 subjects had the “hypothetical” condition first. The subjects’ choices provided a basis for rank ordering the seven liquids from most preferred to least preferred for each individual subject (specific rankings of course varied from child to child) and for each condition (i.e., “real” and “hypothetical”; the rankings across conditions could and did vary for an individual child). These preference series enabled Barker to examine conflict behavior involving alternatives of similar desirability (i.e., close to one another in the preference series) and those of discrepant desirability (i.e., widely separated in the preference series). They also allowed him to compare choices made between desirable liquids (approach-approach) with those made between undesirable liquids (avoidance-avoidance). To make certain the subject knew without question which liquids constituted the choices on a given trial, the names of the liquids (rather than the liquids themselves) were presented in an exposure apparatus. Before the various choice trials were administered, the examiner ascertained that the subject could read all seven names correctly. Also, the subject was required to drink 6 cc of each liquid and to identify each correctly. The apparatus included a lever that, in its resting position, was located niidway between the two name cards. When the lever was moved laterally to a 5-in.

maximum, a buzzer sounded, signaling the subject’s choice of either the left- or right-hand stimulus. Movement of lcss than S in. did not commit the subject-he was free to move the lever back and forth as much as he chose, so long as the Sin. limit was not reached. The response measures of concern were two: (a) the time taken t o resolve the conflict and (b) the amount o f vicarious trial and error (VTE) responding. The latter was assessed by arbitrarily designating three sizes of wavers of the leversmall (weighted I ) , medium (weighted 2), and large (weighted 3). The subject’s VTE score was the sum of his wavers, weighted in the manner just indicated. When the two response nicasures wcre plotted against number of steps of separation in the preference series ( I t o 6 steps), Barker found in each case an inverse relationship. That is, thc sub,jccts took the longest times to commit themselves with liquids located only one or two steps apart in the preference series and chose most promptly when a 5- or 6-step separation was involved. Similarly, the highest degree o f VTE behavior occurred with the I - and 2-step separations and the lowest tended to occur with the 5- and 6-step separations. The functions were very close to being monotonic for the time measure; the VTE data were somewhat less orderly. The two response measures were also plotted against location in the preference series (1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, 5 - 6 , and 6-7). The functions in these cases were not at all orderly, but some evidence for longer latencies and more VTE behavior for the undesirable alternatives (locations 5-6 and 6-7) was obtained, suggesting the presence of avoidance-avoidance conflict. Because of the small numbers of subjects involved and the occurrence of order effects, Barker was unable to conclude anything definitive about the role played by the “real” versus “hypothetical” variable. However, when the “real” and “hypothetical” conflicts came first, latencies were longer and VTE scores were higher under the “real” than under the “hypothetical” condition. The orderly character of the response latency data is impressive. Barker indicated that the VTE scores, in contrast, were “ n o t completely adequate.” Some subjects “expressed their vacillation by body, head, or eye movements rather than by movements of the lever.” Barker was led to suggest that “a great amount of ‘running back and forth’ in conflict situations of this sort is entirely ‘mental,’ with no measurable manifestations” (Barker, 1942, p. 18). Barker’s extensive Lewinian characterization of the nature of the conflicts his subjects experienced need not concern us here. However, we consider it fitting to have examined the Barker study first, in recognition of Lewin’s pioneering work on conflict theory (Lewin, 1931). B.

THI- <;OI>REI:K STUDY

In 1940, Elizabeth Godbeer conductcd a master’s thesis project (under Neal Miller’s direction at Yale University) focusing o n double approach-avoidance

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Gordon N Caritor and D a d A Purmi

conflict in first- and second-grade (6- and 7-year-old) boys. Codbeer’s subjects, seen individually, sat before a vertical panel containing two windows. Sliding plates of glass and tin shutters covered these openings. When the experimenter lifted a shutter, candy was exposed in the window. The child was told to move a lever diagonally forward to contact a button under the window as a means of obtaining the candy. When contact with the button occurred, the glass was lifted to make the candy available to the child. Having learned to make this response, the subject was then exposed to three conditions (order of presentation being counterbalanced across subjects): (a) candy was exposed behind both windows, with acquisition of both candies being allowed (response competition involved, but without the necessity of relinquishing one candy by virtue of choosing the other); (b) candy was exposed behind both windows, but the choice of one candy precluded obtaining the other (response competition involved, as well as the need to relinquish one goal by virtue of choice of the other); and (c) only one window containing candy was exposed (a control trial used to assess behavior when no response competition was involved). Response measures included the route taken by the lever (recorded via use of a pantograph), the time taken to make a choice, and the number of eye movements (any movement of the eyes to the right or left during the choice time). Behaviors under the first and third conditions were comparable. That is, having to choose between two goals (when relinquishing one was not required) did not alter the path taken by the lever, did not increase response times, and did not increase amount of eye movement, in comparison with single candy presentations. However, under the second condition, more vacillation in lever movements occurred, the subjects took longer to choose, and more eye movements between the windows were observed. Thus, the first condition apparently entailed pure approach-approach conflict which was easily resolved. In contrast, having to relinquish one goal by virtue of choosing the other (the second condition) produced conflict (double approach-avoidance) that was not so easily resolved. Other subjects had to choose between qualitatively dissimilar goals-candy versus a number of tin soldiers determined to be of equivalent desirability to the candy for the child in question. This condition produced still more conflict when choosing one goal meant relinquishing the other. Subjects choosing between qualitatively different goals of u n q u u l desirability chose more quickly, made fewer eye movements, and responded in a more normal path than those choosing between qualitatively different goals of equal desirability. Finally, Codbeer tested for the effects of uncertainty by exposing closed boxes, both of which the child was told might or might not contain candy. This state of affairs enhanced the occurrence of conflict, as manifested by all three response measures.

Godbeer interpreted her various findings as being consistent with Hullian assumptions regarding the nature of goal and avoidance gradients. C.

T H t BERLYNE STUDY

In 1957, Daniel Berlyne published a paper (titled “Conflict and Choice Time”) in which he described three experiments, two of which involved the use of children as subjects. We will restrict our attention to one of the latter (Experiment 1). Twenty 12-year-old boys served as subjects. They responded to the onset of colored lights (green, red) by moving switches in a forward or backward direction. In a “physiologically compatible” condition, the subject used his right hand to move a right-hand switch forward in response to the green light and his left hand to move a left-hand switch forward in response to the red light. In a “physiologically incompatible” condition, the subject used only the right hand, moving a single switch forward in response to green and backward in response to red. On forced-choice trials, a single color was presented. On free-choice trials, the subject had to respond to the simultaneous presentation of both colors (that is, had to choose between the two responses appropriate to the two colors). A “single” sequence entailed the presentation of a single spot of light for each forced choice and two spots, one of each color, for free choices. In a “double” sequence, two neighboring spots of the same color were presented on forcedchoice trials and four spots (two adjacent spots of each color) were presented on free-choice trials. Each subject attended two sessions, separated by a 24-hour interval. In a given session, both forced- and free-choice trials were administered (for a total of 102 trials). One session involved the “compatible” condition, the other the “incompatible” condition. Similarly, one session entailed single-stimulus presentations, the other double-stimulus presentations. Four groups were constituted, these having the following treatment combinations and orders: (a) compatible-single, incompatible-double; (b) incompatible-double, compatible-single; (c) compatible-double, incompatible-single; and (d) incompatible-single, compatibledouble. The various manipulations were intended to vary degree of conflict. The underlying assumptions were that ( a ) free-choice trials would produce more conflict than would forced-choice trials, (b) the “incompatible” condition would be more conflictive than the “compatible” condition, and (c) more conflict would be generated by double-stimulus than by single-stimulus presentations. The dependent variable was reaction time. Berlyne’s major results, summarized in Table I , were as follows. ’The free-choice reaction time was longer than the forced-choice reaction time for I9 of the 20 subjects. However, single versus

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TABLE I Mean Reaction Times (in msec) The Berlyne (1957) Study Type of Choice Forced

Free

Condition

Green

Red

Overall

Double stimuli Single stimuli Incompatible Compatible

1000 1069 1072 992

989 1015 1055 948

994 1042 1063 973

I323 1216 1270 I269

double stimulus presentation interacted significantly with forced versus free choice. Specifically, the double stimulus presentation (as compared with the single) led to faster forced-choice responses but slower free-choice responses. The “incompatible” condition produced significantly longer forced-choice reaction times than did the “compatible” condition, but the difference was not significant for free-choice reaction times. Because the two conditions called for the same response to green and different responses to red, Berlyne argued that the “fairest” test regarding this variable would be one restricted to just the forced-choice responses to green. Again, significantly longer reaction times occurred under the “incompatible” than under the “compatible” condition. In his usual eclectic fashion, Berlyne subjected his findings to analyses based on Hullian theory, Miller’s conflict theory, an information-theory model, and Hebb’s theory of emotion. D.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE EXPERIMENTS

In our view, the Barker, Godbeer, and Berlyne studies share several virtues, not the least of which is their demonstration under highly controlled conditions of a wide variety of conflict phenomena occurring in the behaviors of 6- to 12-yearold boys. These demonstrations, undertaken within the context of ingeniously devised experiments, involved objective measurement procedures that could be incorporated into the design of moral development studies. As subsequent sections of this paper will document, various theorists in the moral judgment and development area are prone to invoke the concept of conflict in their writings. If this practice is valid, then the use of comparable measures should show that comparable phenomena exist in the moral development domain.

111. Conflict in Yiaget’s General Theory of Cognitive Development We turn now from the mechanistic treatment of conflict in children exemplified in the work of Barker. Godbeer, and Berlyne to Piaget’s organismic theory of cognitive developmcnt and the role played in it by the concept of conflict. The leap, we acknowledge, is a long one. At a minimum, it calls for a terminological shift to the expression cognirive conflict. At times, Piaget’s references to conflict occurred within the simplest of contexts. His analysis of the development of substance conservation in children constitutes a fitting example. The research procedure is a familiar one. Two balls of clay, equal in quantity, are presented t o the subject, who confirms their equality. One ball is then rolled into the shape of a sausage, which the subject is then asked to compare with the unchanged ball. Young children fail to conserve-that is, they say the sausage has either more or less clay, depending on whether they center their attention on the length or the width dimension. Older children conserve-they understand the compensatory roles played by the gain in length and loss in width and hence maintain that the two objects remain the same in amount of substance. But Piaget identified an intermediate stage during which the child “hesitates among the responses ‘more,’ ‘less,’ or ‘equal’ ” (Piaget, 1957, p. 51). Clearly, this stage constitutes a straightforward instance of response competition resulting in delayed responding on the subject’s part. The phenomenon at issue provides a simple and clear example of what Piaget tenned disequilibrium. Resolution of the conflict, in the form of recognizing the compensatory relationship between gain in length and loss in width, constitutes what Piaget called equilibration, the mechanism by means of which he assumed cognitive development occurs. At a more technical level, Piaget (1070) discussed equilibrium in terms of a balance between assimilation and accommodation. When this balance is incomplete, correct problem solutions on the child’s part are not forthcoming. When the child becomes aware of discrepancies existing in a situation-discrepancies stemming from his or her having ignored crucial aspects of that situation-equilibration occurs, taking the form of the generation of new structures that make problem solution possible. Critics have faulted this theory on several grounds-most particularly its vagueness (e.g., Brainerd, 1978; Flavell. 1985). Brainerd (1978, pp. 179- ISO), in addition, argued that new acquisitions on the child’s part should occur in spurts if, in fact, development occurs in the fashion indicated by the equilibration model, but that the evidence indicates otherwise-that development is predomiFlavell (1985, p. 290), on his part, indinantly a smooth and gradual proce cated he found it hard to believe that children master the kinds of concepts Piaget emphasized (e.g., seriation) through such a process. He concluded,

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I believe the equilibration process itself needs expl;cining when and where it does occur. and also that it docs not occur in all instances of cognitive development. 1 think i t likely, i n fact, that thcrc is iio single. overarching procebs or principle sufficicnt to descnbc how all co€nitive-ctevelopr~ientaladvances are made

Nevertheless, the fact remains that Piaget believed that a child’s advancement from a given cognitive level of functioning to a higher one requires the genesis of and subsequent resolution of cogtzifivr conflict, such conflict being variously conceptualized as involving a collision “between schemes,” “between answers,” “between subsystems of thought.” or “between predictions and outcomes.” The expressions just presented all appear in a text titled Leurtzing and [he Development o j Cognition, authored by three close colleagues of Piaget (Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974). That volume, together with one of Piaget’s ownExperiments in Contrdiction (Piaget, 1980)-provide exemplified operationalizations of the equilibriumiequilibration conceptualization of the kind needed by non-Genevans struggling to comprehend the formulation involved. Citations of two examples follow. I n the Inhelder ef al. (1974) text, several studies are described involving situations designed to produce cognitive conflict in children. One consists of a pair of vertically arranged columns of beakers, with three beakers in each column. Liquid poured into the top pair of beakers can be made to flow into the pair immediately below and then from that pair to the bottom pair. The beakers in the top and bottom rows are identical in height and width, but the members of the middle pair differ in size and shape, one being taller and thinner than the other. The child sees identical amounts of liquid poured into the top pair. At this point, the amounts of liquid appear identical to the child (and they are). Next, the liquids are transferred to the middle row. The sanie liquids are involved, but now they appear to differ in amount. Finally, the liquids are transferred to the bottom pair of beakers. Once again, the child sees equality. In the Genevan view, the “contradictions” inherent in such a situation ought to generate cognitive conflict in the child, at least if he or she is “transitional” with respect to conservation at the outset. Further, the child’s resolution of the conflict should transform him or her into a conserver. In this and numerous other cleverly contrived situations, Inhelder et a / . claimed to find evidence for just such a phenomenon. The validity of that claim need not concern us here. For present purposes, an enhanced understanding of what the Genevans mean by cognitive conflict is all that is at stake. One additional example, drawn from Piaget’s Experiments in Contradiction (1980), is worthy of mention. A row of seven disks is attached to a board in such a way that the two end disks can be removed and superimposed one upon the other. However, the remaining disks can be moved only sufficiently to be superimposed on their immediate neighbors. The adjacent disks differ in diameter by

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imperceptible amounts, so that superimposition elicits the judgment “equal in size” from the child with respect to each adjacent pair. Thus, seemingly. A = B, B = C , C = D, D = E, E = F, and F = G. But when A and G are compared, they are clearly different in size. For a child with an understanding of transitive inference, such a contradiction should, again, be a source of cognitive conflict. Critics from opposing theoretical camps (e.g., Zimmerman & Blom, 1983) and even some neo-Piagetians (e.g., Murray, 1983) are questioning the validity of the Piagetian claim that experiencing cognitive conflict is essential to cognitive development. But the compelling fact remains that cognitive conflict, intertwined with the notions of equilibrium and equilibration, has always constituted a cornerstone of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development.

IV. A

Conflict and Moral Development Theory PIAGET’S SCMINAI. WORK O N MORAL DEVELOPMENT

As is well known, Piaget’s The Morul Judgment of the Child (1932) paved the way for an area of theory and research that has been a dominant force in developnlental psychology for many years. In his investigations, Piaget used a variety of techniques, some of which ( e . g . , questioning to get at the child’s understanding of the rules of games) would not now be considered appropriate to the assessment of moral reasoning or development (Turiel, 1983). In contrast, his use of so-called dilernmus as a means of tapping the child’s moral judgment provided a device that gained wide acceptance and that continues to be employed on a grand scale to the present time. For example, Piaget described l’or his subjects a situation in which a boy was told by his father to observe his brother’s behavior during the father’s impending absence and, upon the father’s rcturn. to report “everything.” With the brother having engaged in undesirable hehavior in the interim, the protagonist is, of course, assumed to be torn betweeri a desire not to lie to his father and a desire not to betray his brother. The subject must choose one of those alternatives and give a rationale for preferring that choice. The concept of conflict was not invoked in Piaget’s book on moral judgment. IHowever, one can speculate that Piaget considered dilemmas such as the one cited above to be precipitators for the sihject who confronts them of what Piagetians eventually came to term cognitive conflict. Piaget’s moral development theory itself calls for only brief comment here. In harmony with the rest of his theorizing regarding cognitive development, he took a structurul view of the nature of moral development. Individuals were assumed to have intuitions about what constitutes fairness in human interactions. In the words of James Rest (1979, p. 5 ) , “The psychologist’s job is to capture the logic

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and pattern of these intuitions by postulating underlying cognitive structures that, in effect, account for what is intuitively obvious to the person.” Piaget used the labels “moral realism” and “heteronomous morality’’ to characterize the thinking of young children, who see moral rules and duties as fixed and in the nature of things, rather than as social arrangements arrived at by consensus among equals. Eventually, the latter view emerges-a higher level of functioning labeled by Piaget “autonomous morality.’’ B.

MORAL DILEMMAS, KOHLBERGIAN THEORY, AND CONFLICT

I.

The Nature of Morul Dilemrnus Dilemmas, according to Harding (198Sa, pp. 45-46), have the following characteristics: 1. A dilemma is a valid argument that concludes with a choice between two equal alternatives. 2. A dilemma requires that one of the alternatives must be chosen. 3. Given the present knowledge base, the truth of the premises (i.e., of the logical argument) cannot be known a priori.

Moral dilemmas, according to Harding (1985b, p. xi), “deal with conflict situations, real and hypothetical, that require moral judgments.” This definition, of course, raises the question of what constitutes moral as opposed to other types of dilemmas (e.g., conventional, personal, religious). Turiel’s (1983)’ answer was: The moral domain refers to prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other. Moral prescriptions are not relative to the social context, nor are they defined by it. Correspondingly, children’s moral judgments are not derived directly from social institutional systems but from features inherent to social relationships-including experiences involving harm to persons, violation of rights. and conflicts of competing claims. (p. 3)

Turiel’s focus on the irrelevance of social institutional systems to moral judgments reflects his preoccupation with a differentiation he made between the moral and conventionul domains. He assumed that social context does play a crucial role with respect to the latter domain. Kohlberg’s Theo? of Moral Development Since the early 1960s, Lawrence Kohlberg has without question been the dominant figure in the field of moral development. Kohlberg ( 1976) expanded Piaget’s two-stage formulation into a six-stage model. Piagetian criteria for the definition of such stages include the following (Colby et a l . , 1983): (a) the

2.

lQuotation used by permission of Cambndge University Press

existence of qualitative differenccs across levels of moral reasoning; (b) the occurrence of the stages in an invariant sequence; (c) the existence of a “structured whole” property (an underlying organization of thought permeates all of the reasoning of a child functioning at a given stage level); and (d) the existence of an “hierarchical integration” property (earlier modes of thought are incorporated into later ones, with increasingly differentiated and integrated structures emerging with development). Influenced by the philosophical writings of Rawls (1971). Kohlberg (1976) conceptualized the highest levels o f moral reasoning as entailing a focus on issues of justice, fairness, and individual rights. In this emphasis, continuity with the spirit of Piaget’s earlier theory was maintained. Continuity with Piaget is also reflected in Kohlberg’s methodological approach, about which more will be said later. Few theories in modern psychology have been discussed in the literature as extensively as Kohlberg’s. His own productivity played an important role in this regard. However, the true mark of his influence is reflected in the enormous quantity of theoretical and empirical work done by others both within and outside the Kohlbergian camp. Critics of Kohlberg’s theory and methods have been both numerous and vigorous (see, e . g . , the contents of Modgil and Modgil’s [ 19861 Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus t i t i d Controversy). To his credit, Kohlberg listened to his critics; he and his colleagues responded with modifications in both theory and method (Colby et 01.. 1983, 1986; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). 3.

Kohlberg and Conflict

a. Nondevelopmental Consitlcwtiorzs. In his extension of Piaget’s work o n moral development, Kohlberg ( 1 958) developed a number of his own dilemmatic vignettes, the most famous of which is the dilemma in which Heinz must choose between not stealing a drug (that hc cannot afford to buy but that would save his dying wife’s life) and not letting his wife perish. Turiel (1969) said of this dilemma: As in all of Kohlberg’s stories, this one poscs a conflict between two culturally unacceptable (or acceptable) altcrnatives. It is culturally unacceptable to steal, but it is also culturally unacceptable to allow one’s wife to die if it can be prevented. (p. 96)

The above quote, as well as Harding’s (1985b, p. xi) previously mentioned assertion that moral dilemmas deal with “conflict situations,” raises an important question. Is the “conflict” referred to in these instances merely in the diiemmu or is it in the mind qfthe sirbjccl who is asked to make a judgment about how the dilemma ought to be resolved? I f the former is the case, then the tenn is being used in only a trivial, descriptive sense. If the latter is the case, then the

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Gordon N . Cantor und Duvrd A Parrot1

term takes on considerable psychological significance, although not necessarily in a developmental sense. As we will see below, when Kohlberg invoked the concept of conflict. he had a distinctly developmental implication in mind. But we would like to argue that his formulation, by virtue of its dependence on the use of moral dilemmas for data gathering purposes, is intimately tied to the conflict concept, regardless of any developmental implications that may be involved. In other words, we take the position that a moral dilemma does (or at least can) generate conflict in the mind of the subject asked to make a judgment about the dilemma, even if no developmental changes eventuate from the experience. An example from outside the cognitive and moral development realms may help to clarify this argument. Imagine a boy told by his mother that he can go to a ball game or to a movie during the upcoming weekend, but not both-a prototypic example of what mechanistic researchers have called double approachavoidance conflict (assuming the child wants badly to attend both events). The child may well experience considerable conflict, as indicated by vacillation, delayed decision making, and a good deal of attendant emotionality. Eventually, the conflict is resolved and he makes his choice. Under ordinary circumstances, one would hardly expect this experience to produce any sort of significant developmental change in the child. Similarly, conflict induction and subsequent resolution in the cognitive realm may not necessarily entail developmental change in the child. In the case of the substance conservation situation discussed earlier, the child may reach a point at which he or she notices the sausage shape is both longer and thinner than the ball and therefore is torn between a ‘‘more” and “less” response. However, the child may resolve the conflict by simply opting for the “more” choice because of the greater salience of the length dimension for him or her. No developmental change in the child is implicated here whatsoever. Movement from one developmental level to a higher one occurs only when the child recognizes the compensatory relationship between gain in length and loss in width and concludes that the amount of substance must be unchanged. We take the position that the same argument applies to situations requiring judgments about moral dilemmas. Confronting such a dilemma may result in conflict generation in the individual. The conflict in question and its eventual resolution may or may not be associated with developmental consequences. Piaget, of course, was not concerned with conflict in the nondevelopmental sense. b. Developmental Considerations. On some occasions when they invoke the concept of conflict. moral development theorists clearly have in mind developmental changes that occur in subjects as a result of their having had to make

judgments about moral dilemma rcxolutions. Kohlberg ( 1976) himself wrote in this vein as follows: Structural theory stresseb that niovcincnt t c i the next stage [of nioral rcaaoningl occur5 through retlective reorganization ari\ing froiti senaed contradictions i n one’\ current \tage structure. Experiences of cognitive conflict can occur either through exposure to decision situations that arouse inteimil contradictions in one’s moral reasoning \trueture, or through exposure to the tilord reaoning of significant others which i h discrepant in content or structure from one’\ (iun reawning. (pp. S I - 5 2 )

This conceptualization, clearly consonant with Piagetian equilibration theory, has served as a springboard for a number of theoretical, critical, and empirical efforts focused on moral development (e.g., Berkowitz & Gibhs, 1985: Kupfersmid & Wonderly, 1982; Turiel, 1969, 1974, 1977; Walker, 1983). In the empirical work, investigators explicitly look for evidence of developmental change in level of moral reasoning in their subjects resulting from conflict resolution. c. The NonclevelopmentullI~~~~~clopnirrittrl Distirzctiorz. Our view is that conflict and conflict resolution associated with exposure to a moral dilemma can occur with or without the “reflective reorganization” referred to by Kohlberg. If such reorganization is in the picture. then developmental implications are clearly involved; if not, then no such implications are suggested. A noteworthy consideration is that moral development theorists appear to invoke the concept of conflict in both senses without attending to the distinction drawn here. In any event, when conflict is generated by exposure to a moral dilemma, then its presence ought to be demonstrahle using otjective measures, even if no “reflective reorganization” occurs in conjunction with it. When such reorganization does occur, objective measures should similarly reveal the presence of conflict, which is assumed to mediate the occurrence of the reorganization in question.

cl. Measurement in the Kohlbcr-gitrri Frurncwork. The Kohl bcrgian approach, of course, does not involve the use of measures such as response latency or extent of vicarious trial and error (VTE) behavior. Verbal interactions between the examiner and the subject, typically i n the form of Piaget’s mcthod of “critical exploration” and oriented around various moral dilemmas, provide the modus operandi for Kohlbergian data gathering activities. Colby el ul. ( 1983) reviewed the history of the various changes the Kohlbergian measurement approach has undergone over the years. culminating in the “Standard Issue Scaring” method, which certainly entails more structure than do orthodox Piagetian procedures and for which strong reliability and validity claims are made. However, all the various methods involved were designed with a view toward pinpointing the stage of moral development at which the subject is functioning.

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Conflict, given a central role by the theory, is nonetheless not directly-or certainly not objectively-measured under any of the methods the Kohlberg group has employed. C.

GILLIGAN’S CRITIQUE OF KOHLBERG

Carol Gilligan’s (1982) critique of Kohlberg’s moral development theory calls for special mention here, because it served as a basis for Nunner-Winkler’s (1984) analysis, the latter in turn having provided the springboard for the empirical work we will discuss later in this paper. As indicated in Section 1V,B,2, Kohlberg’s higher stages of moral development are characterized by a focus on considerations having to do with questions of justice and fairness. Gilligan took the position that such an emphasis casts the moral reasoning of women in an unfavorable light, under the assumption that women have a stronger tendency to focus on the responsibilities they bear for the welfare of others. In Gilligan’s words, “the very traits that traditionally have defined the ‘goodness’ of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them [i.e., in light of Kohlberg’s theory] as deficient in moral development” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 18). Whether or not a sex difference in moral development is in fact demonstrable when Kohlbergian measurement techniques are employed remains a hotly contested issue (e.g., Baumrind, 1986; Walker, 1984, 1986). For our purposes, the important point is that Gilligan’s viewpoint has been taken seriously by others, including Gertrud Nunner-Winkler (1984), who, as we shall see below, has recast the “justice versus caring” distinction in Kantian terms. One of the features that attracted us to the Nunner-Winkler formulation was her frequent use of conflict terminology. This use suggested to us that the formulation might contain some implications that could appropriately be tested using traditional conflict methodology.

V.

Nunner-Winkler on Negative and Positive Duties

Nunner-Winkler ( 1984) has argued that Gilligan’s characterization of two moralities-one of justice, the other of care and responsibility-can be usefully reinterpreted in terms of a distinction to be found in the writings of Kant (17971 1977) and Gert (1973). These philosophers delineated two types of moral duties-negutive (also termed “perfect”) and positive (also labeled “imperfect”). Negative duties are duties of ornissioiz-they proscribe certain activities (e.g., “do not kill,” “do not steal”). They are duties that can be followed strictly by everybody, at least when conflicting demands on the individual are

absent (hence the label “perfect”). Positive duties are duties of commissionthey prescribe certain activities (e.g., “be charitable,” “be kind”). These duties have an open-ended character to them (hence the label “imperfect”). Be charitable or kind to whom? To what extent‘?These types of duties can never be observed completely. In Nunner-Winklcr’s words, “Positive maxims do not define limits of their application. do not specify which and how many good deeds have to be performed and whom they are to benefit so that the maxim can be said to have been followed” (Nunner-Winkler. 1984, p. 349). An exercise of judgment is called for in the case of this type of duty-something not needed when one is confronted with a negative duty. Nunner-Winkler contended that the morality of justice (said by Gilligan to be a focus on the part of males) can be construed as involving an attribution by the individual of great significance to negative duties. Similarly, she argued that the morality of care and responsibility (considered by Gilligan to constitute a female orientation) can be reinterpreted as involving a strong commitment on the individual’s part to the importance of positivc duties. Gilligan’s assertions about sex differences suggest some predictions applicable to situations in which different types of duties are pitted against one another. Thus, in Nunner-Winkler’s words, “Gilligan’s claim . . . can be interpreted to mean that females ( I ) feel more obliged to fulfill imperfect duties than males. and (2) in cases of conflict will more likely opt for the fulfillment of imperfect duties, whereas males will insist more rigidly on having the perfect duties respected” (Nunner-Winkler. 1984. p. 350). (Notably, the term “conflict,” in one or another of its various forms, appears 18 times in Nunner-Winkler’s 13-page paper.) One can derive from mechanistic contlict theory some additional possibilities not considered by Nunner-Winkler. If two negative duties are pitted against one another and no other options are available. males should experience more conflict than females. Although in such a situation the choices made by members of the two sexes could not in any pertinent way be used to differentiate their reactions, the latencies of their responding should differ-males should take longer to respond than females. The same logic is applicable to conflicts involving two positive duties, except that in these cases females should experiencc more conflict and hence manifest longer latencies of responding. These are the considerations that led t o the design of the research we describe in the next section of this paper.

VI.

An Empirical Study

In order to test the various implications of the Nunner-Winkler formulation, we first devised nine dilemmas that would pit the different types of duties against

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Gordon N . Canror utid Duvrd A . Parton

one another and that would, we hoped, be meaningful for fifth-, seventh-, and ninth-grade ( l o - , 12-, and 14-year-old) students. A.

THE DILEMMAS

Three dilemmas ( # 1 , 2, 3) involved positive L’ersus positive duty oppositions. Their themes were: (a) the protagonist had to choose between warning a small group of close friends and a much larger group of acquaintances about an impending tornado; (b) the protagonist had to choose between two candidates for a “best citizen” award-one who engaged in a brief act of bravery and one who did many hours of volunteer humanitarian work; and (c) the protagonist had to choose between helping two classmates prepare for a mathematics test-one a close friend in only moderate need of help, the other an acquaintance in dire need of help. Another three dilemmas (#4, 5 , 6) involved positive versus negutive duty oppositions. Their themes were: (a) the protagonist had to choose between helping an animal in need (positive duty) and not disobeying a parental order (negative duty); (b) the protagonist had to choose between helping a best friend on a test (positive duty) and not cheating (negative duty); and (c) the protagonist had to choose between helping an elderly woman in need (positive duty) and not disobeying a parental order (negative duty). The third set of dilemmas (#7, 8, 9) involved negurive versus negutive duty pairings. Their themes were: (a) the protagonist had to choose between not betraying a friend and not lying; (b) the protagonist had to choose between not breaking a promise and not stealing; and (c) the protagonist had to choose between not disobeying two different parental orders.2 Female names were used for the characters in the dilemmas for female subjects, male names for male subjects. B.

METHOD

A total of I 15 subjects-58 males, 57 females-participated. Forty-two were fifth graders (10-year olds), 49 were seventh graders (12-year olds), and 24 were ninth graders (14-year olds). The children were seen individually. Each of the nine dilemmas was presented to the subject on the screen of a personal computer. ’One could argue that some of the duties we categorized as negative (e.g., not disobeying a parental order. not lying) have positive counterparts (obeying. telling the truth) and so are not clearly of the negative type. We classified them as negative because their positive counterparts d o not clearly fit the “caring” mold. However. the duty of not betraying a friend (also designated negative) has a positive counterpart (being loyal) that does fit the mold. so the legitimacy of this particular categorization n u s t be considered open to question. We do not underestimate the magnitude of the difficulties involved in adequately exemplifying the negative- and positive-duty categories.

At the end of the dilemma, a question was posed on the screen calling for a yesino answer. Each dilemma had two question forms (for example, with respect to the “tornado” dilemma, one question was whether the protagonist should warn hisiher best friends, the other whether the protagonist should warn the larger group of acquaintances). Assignment of particular questions as well as of three different dilemma orders to subjects was counterbalanced. The subject chose an answer by moving the cursor from the top center to either the lower left or lower right side of the scteen, via a series of arrow-key presses. Seven consecutive presses of the left arrow key resulted in a “yes” decision, seven consecutive presses of the right arrow key in a “no” decision. If the subject switched arrow keys along the way (VTE behavior), some number of responses in excess of seven was required to commit to a decision. Initial instructions encouraged VTE behavior. The interval from the onset of the question until the first response ( R l ) was timed, as well iis the rcniaining interresponse intervals (R2 to R3, R 3 to R4, etc.). The computer was programmed with the PCiPlLOT Authoring Program (Washington Computer Services, Bellingham, WA). These procedures allowed the analysis of several measures, including (a) latency of the initial response ( R I ). (b) time taken to make any remaining responses, (c) the number of direction changes (VTE behavior), and (d) the ultimate choice made. C

PREDICTIONS

Based on Nunner-Winkler’s formulation, we predicted several outcomes. In the case of competition between two positive duties, we expected that females would manifest longer response times and more response vacillation (VTE behavior) than would males. When a positive and a negative duty were pitted against one another, we expectcd females to opt more frequently for positive duties and males to opt more frequently for negative duties. Finally, in the case of competition between two negative duties, we expected males to take longer to respond and to engage in more response vacillation than females.

1 . Choices Made between Positi\.r tirid Negative Duties Table 11 presents the numbers of females and males opting for the competing duties constituting the choices appearing in Dilemmas #4, 5 , and 6-the dilem-

mas in which in each case a positive and a negative duty were placed in opposition to one another. Note that the females were less inclined than the males to opt for the positive duty in Dilemma #4. With respect to Dilemma # 5 , both sexes favored the negative over the positive duty; thc excess of males over females doing so was

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TABLE 11 Frequency of Choices by Females and Males of the Positive and Negative Duties Providing the Choices in Dilemmas #4. 5 , and 6 N o of choices made by

Dilemma #

Competing duties

Females

Males

4

Help animal ( + ) Don’t disobey parents ( - 1 Help fnend ( + ) Don’t cheat ( - ) Help elderly woman i+ ) Don’t disobey parent ( - )

19 38 10 47 36 21

2X

5 6

29 6 51 35 22

small. In the case of Dilemma #6, both sexes tended to prefer the positive duty and to an almost identical extent. Chi-square tests indicated that none of the differences involved in the frequency patterns associated with the three dilemmas in question was statistically significant.

Response Times for the + I + rind -1- Dilemmus Analyses of variance applied to various time measures (e.g., latency of initial response, total time taken to make a judgment) revealed no significant sex X dilemma type interactions-the specific effect focused upon by our predictions regarding the + / + and - / - dilemmas (Dilemmas # I , 2, 3 and #7, 8, 9 , respectively). Neither were there any significant main effects for sex or grade. On the average, our subjects did take significantly longer to respond to the + I + than to the - / - dilemmas, but the questions posed at the ends of the + / + dilemmas were on average slightly longer than were those posed at the ends of the -1- dilemmas. Thus, the obtained time difference could be attributable solely to the difference in average question lengths across the two dilemma categories.

2.

3. Response Vacillation Our method of requiring the subjects to perform a series of key presses to make an eventual commitment to a choice between the two alternatives presented in a dilemma was singularly unsuccessful in eliciting response vacillation behaviors. The total of 114 subjects, each responding to the three + / + and the three - / - dilemmas, yielded 684 opportunities for vacillation behaviors to occur. Such in fact occurred only 3% of the time (19 instances), these involving only I 7 different subjects. In 16 of the 19 instances, only one reversal in direction took place. Thus, in the preponderant majority of cases, the subjects chose one direc-

tional arrow and remained with i t , making the minimum of seven responses needed to commit themselves to a choice in responding to a given dilemma. Given the miniscule amount of VTE behavior occurring in our subjects, statistical tests on these data were deemed superfluous.

4. Significance Ratings We asked all 42 fifth graders (10-year olds) and 25 of the seventh graders (12-year olds) to rate the nine dilemmas on a 4-point scale il = “not important at all,” 4 = “very, very important”) to determine what degrees of significance they attached to the various dilemmas. These subjects exhibited considerable consistency in the rank orders 0 1 thcir ratings. The two dilemmas rated most significant included the one about the tornado warning ( # 1. a + / + dilemma)mean rating = 3.79-and the onc pitting the duty of not lying against the duty of not betraying a friend (#7, a - / - dilemma)-mean rating = 3.68. The two rated least significant were given mean ratings of 2.38 (#4,a + / - dilemma) and 2.36 (#9, a - / - dilemma). An analysis of variance suggested a trend ( p = .06) for initial response times to be longer for the most as compared with the least significant dilemmas. Again, however, a slight difference in question lengths associated with the two pairs of ciileininas may have been responsible for this time effect. E

DISCUSSION

Clearly, the results provide n o support for Gilligan’s contentions (as reconceptualized by Nunner-Winkler) regarding sex differences in moral judgment behavior. The two sexes performed i n a highly similar fashion in o u r situation. Perhaps the dilemmas we used were not sufficiently compelling for our subjects. The significance ratings they provided suggested that some of the dilemmas were taken a good deal more seriously by the subjects than were others. All were chosen because they tapped what we regarded to be meaningful problem situations, likely to be encountered in everyday life, but our judgments may well have been faulty in this regard. Our requirement of a sequence of key pressing responses as a means of provoking the occurrence of vacillation behaviors was singularly unsuccessful. It is apparent that, once our subjects began the chain of responses triggered by the appearance of the question at the end of‘a dilemma, they had usually decided on their answers and were committed to them. Again, perhaps the particular dilemmas we used were not compelling enough to trigger vacillation behaviors. In any event, Barker’s statement regarding the “mental” nature of presumed VTE behavior in articulate human s h j c c t s certainly seems germane in the present context. We were surprised and disappointed by the failure of our time measures to

264

Gordon N . Cumor und Du\,ctl A . Partori

provide any genuinely interesting effects. Given the precision of those measures and the assumption that the dilemmas we used had at least some degree of meaningfulness for our subjects, the negative results we obtained involving those measures raises questions, at a minimum, about the validity of the theory that was under test. Though clearly one modest study with negative results cannot provide a justifiable basis for seriously questioning a widespread scientific practice, we are nonetheless led to ponder the ubiquitous invocation of the concept of conflict in the domains of moral reasoning and moral development. We turn in the final section of this essay to the latter consideration.

VII.

Conclusions

Although the Nunner-Winkler (1984) paper (discussed in some detail earlier in Section V) may not be typical, it supports the view that moral development theorists are inclined to invoke the concept of conflict in their writings. We do not think this practice should continue in the absence of attempts made to link such efforts to the large body of work that constitutes the classical psychic conflict literature. At the outset of this essay, we described three experiments (Barker, 1942; Berlyne, 1957; Godbeer, 1940) chosen because each, using objective measures, demonstrated the occurrence of certain psychic conflict phenomena in the behavior ofchildren. These studies, of course, constitute a very small portion of a large body of knowledge that includes extensive theoretical analyses (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Brown & Farber, 195 I ; Lewin, 1931; Miller, 1944, 1959), empirical work on animals (e.g., Brown, 1942~1,1942b; Finger. 1941), additional empirical work on children (e.g., Cantor, 1972a, 1972b; Castaneda, 1965; Eddy, 1959; Innes, 1969; Steigman, 1964), and empirical work on adults (e.g., Hovland & Sears, 1938; Sears & Hovland, 1941; Worell, 1962). When moral development theorists invoke the concept of conflict, does the referent involved have anything in common with the concept dealt with by such investigators as Barker, Godbeer, and Berlyne? If so. then use of some of the latters’ objective measures in the context of moral development studies ought to provide a demonstration of the reality of the commonality. Moral development theorists have clearly committed themselves to some form of “clinical interview” methodology. But what is wrong with an admixture of methodologieswith studies that combine clinical interview and objective measurement techniques‘? If the commonality between organismic and mechanistic conceptions of conflict cannot be demonstrated, then we see three possibilities that should be confronted. One is that moral development theorists’ use of the concept of conflict differs from the classical use of it; if so, then such theorists should

indicate what they mean by thoir concept of conflict. The second possibility pertains to the developmental versus nsndevelopmental distinction made earlier in this paper (see Section I V , B , 3 ) . Perhaps conflict, in the classical sense of that term, plays a role when moral dc~~eloprnerit occurs, but not when an individual simply deals with a moral dileninia (without developmental changes in that individual resulting from the experience in question). If such is the case, then the presumption that an individual is i n conflict because of his or her sheer exposure to a moral dilemma clearly becomes inappropriate. The third possibility is that conflict, however one may conceptualize it, plays no role whatsoever in moral judgment and development phenomena; if so, then modifications in terminological usages are called for on the part of theorists in the area. We have tried to document in this essay the historical role played by Piaget's use of the concept of conflict in his general theory of cognitive development, a use that we believe has had compelling ramifications for the specific domain of moral judgment and development. As indicated previously, significant questions are being raised about the validity of the pivotal role in cognitive development Piaget assigned to conflict (Zimnierman & Blom, 1983). Perhaps similar questions should be raised regarding the role assumed to be played by conflict in moral judgment and development phenomena. Our major point, as indicated at the outset of this paper, is this: Theoretical and empirical efforts expended in one era should not be divorced from those of earlier eras, if commonalities across eras appear to exist or are assumed to exist.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The empirical work reported in this papcr was \upported by a Laura Spelnian Rockefeller Children and Parenting Seed Grant and by an award from 'The Iowa Measurement Research Foundation Both granting units arc affiliated with the LJniwwty Iowa. We are grateful to Reid R. Rigglc for his data collection efforts and t o Fr. MBrio 1);i Co\t;r Arevedo for his background research on Kantian typologies of duties. Appreciation is also e\prcsscd t~ the Iowa City and Norway (Iowa) Community School Districts for their kind cooperation Finally, we are indebted to Hayne W Reese for editorial and substantive reactions

REFERENCES Barker. R. G (1942). An experimental study of the resolution of conflict by children: Time elapsing and amount of vicarious trial-and-crror behavior occurring. In Q. McNemar & M. A. Merrill (Eds.). Studies in per.wma/itv (pp. 13-34), NeLc York: McGraw-Hill. Baumrind. D. (1986). Sex differences in iiioral reasoning. Response to Walker'!, ( 1984) conclusion that there are none. Child D e v r l o p m w t . 57, 51 1-521. Berkowitz. M. W . , & Gibbs. J . C . ( I ' M ) , The process of nioral conflict resolution and moral

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development. In M. W. Berkowitz (Ed.), Peer conflict andps~ychologiculgrowth (pp. 71-84). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Berlyne, D. E. (1957). Conflict and choice time. British Journal of Psychology. 48, 106-118. Berlyne, D. E. (1960). Conflicf,arousal. and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill. Brainerd, C. J. (1978). The stage question in cognitive-developmental theory. Behuviorul trnd Bruin Sciences, 2, 173-182. Brown, J . S. ( I 942a). Factors determining conflict reactions in difficult discriminations. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 31, 272-292. Brown, J. S. (1942b). The generalization of approach responses as a function of stimulus intensity and strength of motivation. Journal of Comparative Psychology. 33, 209-226. Brown, J . S . , & Farber, 1. E. (1951). Emotions conceptualized as intervening variables-with suggestions toward a theory of frustration. Psychological Bulletin, 48, 465-495. Cantor, G . N. (1972a). Children's size-difference judgments: Latency and amplitude effects associated with degree of stimulus similarity. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 35, 939-944. Cantor, G . N. (1972b). Use of a conflict paradigm to study race awareness in childrcn. Child Development. 43, 1437-1442. Castaneda, A. (1965). The paired-associates method in the study of conflict. In L. P. Lipsitt ti C. C. Spiker (Eds.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 2. pp. 1-18). New York: Academic Press. Colhy, A,, Kohlberg, L., Candee, D., Gibbs, J . C . , Hewer, A., Kaufman, K., Power, C . , ti Speicher-Dubin, B. (1986). The measurement of moral judgment: Vol. 1 . Theoretical fouridtirions and research; Vol. 2. Standard Issue Scoring Manual. New York: Cambridge University Press. Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J . , & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 48(1-2. Serial No. 200). Eddy, J . R. (1959). Motor conflict as a function of amount of training (Doctoral dissertation. University of Iowa, 1959). Dissertation Abstracts, 20, 2396-2397. Finger, F. W. (1941). Quantitative studies of "conflict." I . Variations in latency and strength ofthc rat's response in a discrimination-jumping situation. Journal of Comparative Psvchology, 31, 97-127. Flavell, J . H. (1985). Cognitive development (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gert, B. (1973). The moral rules. New York: Harper & Row. Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theov and women's deidopment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Godbeer, E. (1940). Factors influencing conflict in the choice behavior of children. Unpublished Master's thesis, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Harding, C. (1985a). Intention, contradiction, and the recognition of dilemmas. In C. Harding (Ed.). Philosophical and psychological issues in the development of moral reasoning (pp. 43-55) Chicago, IL: Precedent. Harding, C. (1985b). Introduction. In C. Harding (Ed.), Moral di1emmu.s: Phifosophictrl undpsychological issues in the development of moral reasoning (pp. xi-xv). Chicago, IL: Precedent. Hovland, C. I., & Sears, R. R. (1938). Experiments on motor conflict. I . Types of conflict and their modes of resolution. Journal of E.xperimenta1 Psychology. 23, 477-493. Inhelder, B., Sinclair, H., & Bovet, M. (1974). Learning and the development o# cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Innes, R. J . (1969). Escape and avoidance as responses learned to a specific conflict-produced drive. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 80, 78-84. Kant, I. (1977). DieMetaphysic der Sitten. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (Original work published in 1797)

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Kimble, G A. (1961). Hilgurd and Mar-qrti.\-' wndirioning and learning. New York: AppletonCentury. Kohlberg, L. (1958). The deweloprnerrr o f modes of moral rhinking and choice in the yeur.5 ten lo sixteen. Unpublished doctoral disscrtaiion, Ilniversity of Chicago. Chicago, IL. Kohlberg. L. (1976). Moral stages and mvrali~alion.The cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Morul developmr~nt( i d lirhu~~ior: T h e o n . research, and sociul issues (pp. 31-53). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Kohlberg, L.. Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (10x3) Moi-ul .stuge.s: A currenrformulurion u n d a response IO critics. New York: Karger. Kupfersmid, J . H . , & Wonderly. D . M. ( 1 9 x 2 ) . Disequilibrium as a hypothetical construct in Kohlbergian nioral development. Child Strctf\, Journal. 12, 17 I - 185. Lewin, K . (1931). Environmental forces in child behavior and development. In C. Murchison (Ed ), A handhook qf child psychology (pp. 04- 127) Worcester. MA: Clark University Press. Miller, N . E. (1944). Experimental studie\ of conflict In J . McV Hunt (Ed.). Personulrry und the behavior disorders (Vol. I , pp. 431-465). New York: Ronald Press. Miller. N . E. (1959). Liberalization ot h a i c S-R concepts: Extensions to conflict behavior. inotivation and social learning. In S. Koch ( 1 3 . ) . I'sv(.hologycA studvofuscrencr (Vol. 2. pp 196292). New York: McGraw-Hill. Modgill, S., & Modgill. C. (Eds.). ( I O X h ) Ltiwrc~we Kohlberg: Conscwsrr untf cwntrowrsy. Philadelphia. PA: Falmer. Murray, F. B . (1983). EqUilibrdtiOn as cognitive conflict. Developmental Re.vieiv. 3, S4-6 I Nunner-Winkler, G . (1984). Two moralities" A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and ju\tice. In W M Kurtines & J . L. Gewirtz (Eds.),Morulitv, moral hehurior. and nrorul developmcvir (pp. 348 -361 ). New York: Wiley. Ovcrton. W . F., & Reese. H. W . (1973). Model5 of development: Methodological implicationh. In J . R. Nesselroade & H. W . Reese (Eda 1, I,ifc,-.\puri developmmtml p.wholog\ Merhodologicul issues (pp. 65-86). New York: Ac;idciiiic Press. Piaget, J . (1932). The moral judgment of I / I P child New York: Harcourt Brace Piaget, J . (1957). Logique et Cquilibre daiv les comportements du sujet. In L . Apostel, B . Mandelbrot, & J . Piaget (Eds.), Etude., il' ~ : / i i c / f . r n o l o ~ i cgPnPtiquet , L o g ~ y u e('1 Pyuilihre (Vol. 2. pp. 27-1 17). Paris: Presses Univer\iiairr\ de France. Piaget. J . (1970). Piaget's theory. In P. H . M u s c n ( E d . ) ,Carmichuel's manuul of child psycholog\ (2nd e d . , Vol. I , pp. 703-732). New York: Wiley. Piaget. J . ( 1980). E.rperiments rn confrudicrron Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press. Rawls. J . (1971). A theory ofjusric.c. C'anihi-idgc, MA: Harvard University Press. Rest, J . R . (1979). Davelopment in jru/,qrii,y rmirul i,\srws. Minneapolis: Univcrsity of Minnesota Press. Sears. R . R . . & Hovland. C . I. (1941). Expel-iincnts on niotorconflict. 11. Detemiination of mode of resolution by comparative strengths ot conllicting rcaponses. Journul qft~perimerirulPsvcholo g y , 28, 280-286. Steigman, M . J . (1964). Effect of discrimination conflict upon drive level as manifested in children's performance. Child Development, 35. 13x5- 1300. Turiel, E. (1969). Developmental processe\ i n the child's moral thinking. In P. H. Mussen. J . Lanper, & M . Covington (Eda. J, Trends trritl i.\.\rt~~.s I J I duvelopmenral p . q d i o l o g y (pp. 92- 133). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Turiel. E. ( 1974). Conflict and transition in adolehccnt moral development. Child Dervlupment. 45, 14-29. Turiel, E. (1977). Conflict and transition i i i adolescent moral development. 11. The resolution of disequilibrium through structural reorgani/ation. ('hild Develupmenr. 48, 634-637 '

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Tunel, E. ( 1983). The development of social knowlrdge: Morality und convmtion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Walker, L. J. (1983). Sources of cognitive conflict for stage transition in moral development. Developmenral Psychology, 19, 103-1 10. Walker, L. J . (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. Child I)evelopment, 55, 677-691. Walker, L. J. (1986). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A rejoinder to Baumrind. Child Developmenr. 51, 522-526. Worell, L. (1962). Response to conflict as determined by prior exposure to conflict. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psvchology, 64, 438-445. Zimmerman, B. J.. & Blom, D. E. (1983). Toward an empirical test of the role of cognitive conflict in learning. Developmenral Review, 3, 18-38.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE CHILD'S DEVELOPING THEORY OF THE WORLD

Dtri'icl S. Palermo DEPARTMENT 0 1 ' PSYCHOLOGY PENNSYLVANIA S T A I E UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY I W R K . PENNSYLVANIA 16x02

I. INTRODUCTION I1

CHILDREN'S COMPREHENSION OF METAPHOR A THE 1MPORTANCE OF THE ASCH AN11 NERLOVE STUDY B CONSTRUCTING THE MEANING 01. METAPHOR C RECENT CHALLENGES OF ASCH AND NERLOVE

111. METAPHOR AND THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE

A. B. C. D. IV

V

THE CHILD'S THEORY OF THE WORLD SHIFTING THE FOCUS FROM STRlJCTlJRE TO CONTENT COMPREHENDlNG METAPHOR: A DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRESSION KNOWLEDGE AND COMPRfHENSION

ON THE NATURE OF KNOW1 F I X I E A KNOWLtDGE HOW B KNOWLEDGE THAT C KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH D NONJUSTIFICATIONAL THI OKY OF KNOWLEDGL KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITIVI: 1X:VEI.OPMENT KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHOR

V1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

I.

Introduction

In 1963 when I prepared a paper for the first volume in this series (Palerrno, 1963), 1 discussed the early work I had begun in collaboration with Jenkins in

exploring our “interest in the higher mental processes” (p. 32) through the use of word association data. At that time, we felt that our entree into those higher mental processes would be facilitated by the normative data we had just finished collecting from children in grade one through college (Palermo & Jenkins, 1964). I reported on the history of interest in word associations, the rationale for our work, the characteristics of the normative data we had collected, and the beginnings of the experimental research in which the norms were being used at that point. Jenkins and 1 were excited about the research opportunities that seemed to lie ahead as we carried on in the British Associationistic tradition establishing the nature of trains of thought, memorial processes, and related mental phenomena accounted for through verbal mediational processes. We had gone so far as to write a theoretical paper accounting for the process of acquiring language based upon our mediation theory (Jenkins & Palermo, 1964). Needless to say at the present point in time, a great deal has changed since the appearance of those papers (see Kessel & Shaw, 1988). The cognitive revolution (see Volume 18 of the present series, in which a symposium on this topic was reported, Reese, 1984) has shifted the paradigmatic view of large numbers of psychologists from the associationistic tradition of the British to the mentalistic. rationalistic orientation of DeCartes and Kant as represented in the writings of Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1971) and Chomsky (1966). As I am one of the scientists who has been convinced of the fruitfulness of shifting from one paradigm to the other during the 25 years intervening between the first and the present volume of this series, the reader will find little relation between what is put forth here and the contents of the previous paper except a continuing interest in the higher mental processes, their manifestation in language, and the manner in which the processes develop. Without tracing the route by which I moved from an examination of the influence of word associations on mediational processes to niy present interests in metaphor, a travelogue presented elsewhere (Palernlo, 1986b), I will begin with a discussion of the developmental literature pertaining to how the child comes to understand metaphor.

11. Children’s Comprehension of Metaphor Since the early study of Asch and Nerlove (1960), which aroused interest in the study of metaphor, we have learned a good deal about children’s ability to comprehend and produce metaphor. Only in the 1980s, however, did interesting questions begin to be asked about the role of metaphor in the cognitive development of the child. As we shall see, the reasons for the slow reorientation to the use of metaphor as a vehicle for the understanding of children’s mental processes have historical roots and reveal theoretical constraints to progress in this area.

27 1

A.

THE IMPORTANCE OE T I I EASCH AND NERLOVE s-rtim

The Asch and Nerlove study was conceived as an exploration of double function words suggested by Asch (1958) as “a point of departure for thinking about the general problem of metaphor” (p. 94). The developmental findings reported by Asch and Nerlove suggested that children do not understand double function terms such as warm. harrl, crooked, and bright in their psychological senses until approximately 9 years of age. Not until two years later do they recognize the relations between the physical meanings, which are learned first, and the subsequently learned psychological meanings of those terms. Developmentally, children first apply the terms only to physical objects and deny that the terms can be applied to persons; followed by an effort to apply the terms literally to persons as if they were physical objects; then a gradual awakening to the fact that the terms can also be used to describe characteristics of persons but without any recognition that the two meanings are related; and finally at about 1 1 or 12 years of age, an understanding of the relation of the two meanings, at least when probed for the relation. Three themes may be found in Asch and Nerlove’s presentation of their results and discussion, and these themes have had a marked influence on the research questions asked about how children’s understanding of metaphor develops. The first theme is that children are likely, as a first strategy, to interpret metaphors literally. Only after learning and consolidating the literal meaning of a word is the child able to comprehend its use in a figurative sense. In short, this theme is the postulation of two meaning systems, literal and figurative, acquired sequentially. The second theme is related to the assumption that the child’s ability to understand metaphors pertaining to psychological phenomena is a late accomplishment, not apparent until children are about 9-years old. Third, Asch and Nerlove suggested that children must be at least 1 I - to 12-years old before they can relate the literal to the figurative meaning. Although Asch and Nerlove clearly showed that the study o f figurative language is an important way to “throw light on the development of cognition of persons” (p. 60), these themes have come under careful scrutiny since they were proposed. As will become clear in the following discussion, their hypotheses about metaphor have not fared well in light of subsequent research. Their research, however, was followed by a great deal of interest in metaphor per se as well as the development of the ability to comprehend and produce metaphor. Those interests seem to have been generated by several characteristics of metaphor that make it a particularly interesting cognitive task. First, thc prototypical metaphor takes the form “ X is a Y ” as in “Man is a wolf.” “My love is a fever,” or “Betty is a bouncing bubble.” In these cases, as is the case with most metaphors, the statements are literal falsehoods and yet nobody has shown that anyone responds to any of them, in their appropriate contexts, by saying,

“No, that is not true,” nor by suggesting that the speaker is mentally unstable. Instead, if the listener understands, he or she agrees or disagrees and elaborates or, understanding Gricean principles (Grice, 1975), puzzles over the meaning, including asking questions, until an understanding of the meaning intended to be conveyed is reached. In effect, the listener knows that the producer of the utterance has some meaning in mind and that the task of the listener is to figure out what that meaning is. When the words used are not combinations that are ordinarily deemed literal, we often describe the utterance as figurative. B.

CONSTRUCTING T H E MEANING OF METAPHOR

The simple fact that persons do not appear to be disturbed by the insertion of metaphoric utterances in the course of conversation or prose is theoretically important in and of itself. More important, however, is the process of constructing the meaning of such an utterance. Although a number of theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain how the meaning of a metaphor is derived, the one that has received the most attention is the “interaction theory” put forth by Black (1962. 1979). By interaction, Black meant that the topic or tenor (X) of the metaphor invites the listener to select some of the properties of the object or vehicle (Y) and construct a parallel implication-complex that fits the tenor and that, in turn, leads to reciprocal parallel changes in the vehicle. In short, the process is one of interaction of tenor and vehicle such that the meaning of both are, in the mind of the listener, modified and, often, creatively changed in the sense of providing new knowledge through the new relationships established. Such a process seems, by definition, to involve abstract relationships. Some researchers have argued that the basic underlying form of the relationships is one of analogy (e.g., Sternberg, Tourangeau, & Nigro, 1979). The argument takes the form that metaphor comprehension involves inductive processes from an underlying analogical form. Thus, “Man is a wolf” is cast in the analogical fomi “Man is aggressive as wolf is predaceous” and the meaning emerges by induction from the analogy. Such a process is itself abstract at two levels. First, the form of the analogy is not made explicit in the metaphor and must, therefore, be inferred by the listener. Second, having recognized that an analogy is involved, the dimensions of the two parts of the metaphoric construction on which the metaphoric interpretation rests must be selected from the many dimensions relevant to the tenor and vehicle. Although not everyone agrees that metaphor is at base an analogy, everyone appears to agree that the interpretation of a metaphor involves dealing with abstract relations. This agreement emerges despite the fact that very frequently the vehicle of a metaphor is a term that would be rated as relatively concrete even when the metaphor is created by poets of the caliber of Shelly (e.g., “My soul is an enchanted boat”), Shakespeare (e.g., “Juliet is the sun”), or Keats (e.g., “Love is a dressed up doll”). The ground, the unstated

relation between tenor and vehicle. remains to be recovered and involves abstract relations in these and most metaphors. The literal falsity, the possible analogical base, and the abstractness of the relations invoked suggest that metaphor is not something for children. In fact, the findings of Asch and Nerlove fit most conveniently into the developmental stages of Piagetian theory. Preoperational children can deal only with the meanings of the double-function words in terms of concrete physical objects. Application of the terms to humans appears in the concrete operations period. However, only as the child enters the logical operations stage can he or she comprehend the relations between the two meanings o f the terms, one physical and the other psychological. Such abstract relations, especially if they are analogical in form, are beyond the cognitive capacities of anyone not yet at the highest level of cognitive functioning. C.

RECENT CHAl.I,ENGES OF ASCH AND NERLOVE

Subsequent developmental research, stimulated at least in part by Asch and Nerlove’s study, has been interpreted as challenging the interpretation of those early findings and has created a whole new conceptualization of the nature of metaphor and of the developmental processes involved in a child’s increasing ability to comprehend and produce metaphor. The later research has revealed that preschool children produce large numbers of spontaneous metaphors (e.g., Billow, 1981; Carlson & Anisfeld, 1969; Chukovsky, 1968) and more recent research has indicated that preschool children also comprehend metaphors presented to them (e.g., Broderick, 1983; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1986; Vosniadou, Ortony, Reynolds, & Wilson, 1084; Waggoner & Palermo, 1987). In addition, Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, and Gardner (1981) have reported data they interpreted as demonstrating metaphorical responding in infants before language is available. The infants matched, tor example, a rising auditory stimulus with a visually presented arrow pointing upward and a descending auditory stimulus with a downward pointing arrow. Thus, the roots of metaphor may well lie in cross-modal perceptual transfer evidenced in infancy (Marks, Hammeal, & Bomstein, 1987; Palermo, 1987). These developmental data, only a part of what is now available (cf. Vosniadou, 1987), are not easily reconciled with the rather abstract conception of metaphor presented thus far. Either metaphor does not involve the abstract relations assumed by those who have analyzed it or the child is capable of levels of abstraction not previously envisioned. The rest of this paper will be an argument in favor of the latter option. Such a position, however, involves rejecting portions of Piagetian theory in favor of a theory more in the tradition of Lewin (1946). I will begin with theoretical considerations that will take us in the direction of considering changes in knowledge acquisition as basic to metaphor

Duvid S. Polerrno

214

comprehension, in contrast to changes in intellectual structure to which Piaget devoted most of this theory.

111.

Metaphor and the Acquisition of Knowledge A.

THE CHILD’S THEORY OF THE WORLD

In a number of previous papers (Palernlo, 1983, 1986a, 1986b), I have argued that the child has a theory of the world and that this theory provides a framework within which the child is able to interpret or give meaning to the events in the child’s life. Such a theory is subject to change as the child comes to understand more about the world through interactions with the world. The theory has a biological base in the sense that the newborn is capable of making discriminations or classifications based upon the biological characteristics of the species. Lewin (1946) discussed these early infant differentiations in terms of vague distinctions between states of comfort and discomfort, but we now know a great deal more about the infant’s biologically based perceptual and classificatory capabilities than was known to Lewin more than 40 years ago (see Acredolo & Hake, 1982). As a function of interactions with the environment, the child’s individual experiences, social interactions, and cultural influences modify the child’s theory. Such experiences lead the child to make differentiations with respect to time, space, reality, and fantasy as well as a whole host of other cognitive dimensions that expand the theory by virtue of making it applicable to more and more differentiated situations. The child’s conception of the world and how it operates is based upon a theory, as opposed to being based upon knowledge. I t is a theory in the sense that children cannot have experiences with all situations that they may encounter and, therefore, they must have a theory in order to construct an account of the environment from moment to moment as well as to decide what response is appropriate to each new environmental situation. In fact, because one can never step in the same river twice, one is always making decisions based upon the theory of the world held at the moment. However, the more knowledge one has about the world, that is, the more varied the experiences one has on which to base a theory, the more likely the theory will provide appropriate meanings and allow adaptive responses to situations with which the individual is required to interact. To put this point in Lewin’s (1946) terms, “From the greater differentiation, the greater wealth of inner levels, there must result for the given person a greater richness of ways of conceiving and observing” (p. 233). Within this framework, everyone, from the youngest baby to the oldest adult, has a theory of the world. Theories held by members of the same species have

commonalities because of the inherent biological, social, and cultural commonalities that exist among members of the species. Theories of the world also reflect individual differences attributable to variations in the biological structure, and to variations in the social, cultural, and individual experiences of the persons involved. The theory in each individual case, however, provides the conceptual framework within which the paiticulars o f the world are interpreted or understood by that individual. The theory is a system for making judgments about what is and what ought to be and, thus, for giving meaning to the empirical experience and, thereby, avoiding the inherent ambiguity of that experience. B.

SHIFTING THE W W S F R O M STRUCTURE TO CONTENT

This theoretical orientation toward the child's cognitive development shifts the focus of concern from the development of cognitive structure to a concern with the development of cognitive content. t o use Piaget's terms. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that Piaget may have been in error in his conception that cognitive development involves a shift from sensory-motor t o concrete operational to formal operational structures. The evidence appears. instead, to support the theoretical argument that changes in content rather than structural changes drive the system to higher levels. The ability to think at structurally higher levels, in Piaget's ternis, is made possible by increasing knowledge of a particular domain rather than by general changes in structure applicable across domains. In fact, a large body of data drawn from a broad variety of cognitive tasks now suggests that structure. in Piaget's sense, does not change at all. In previous discussions of this topic ( e . g . , Palernio, 1987), I have selectively reviewed this research literature, which is drawn from the domains of infant precursors of logical and mathematical operations (Langer, 1980), infant conceptual development (Cohen & Younger, 1983), young children's constraints on the learnability of natural classes and relations among classes (Keil, 1979, 1981), the child's developing concept of number (Gelrnan, 1977), language acquisition (Hardy & Brdine, 1982; Macnaniara, 1982), memory (Chi, 1978; Kail & Nippold, 1984), and hypothesis testing (Cantor & Spiker, 1982). In each of these areas, the authors have been led 10question the theoretical idea that changes in performance are attributable to changes in structure. More radically, they have been led to reject the idea that structure differs at different ages or stages. Macnamara (1982) stated it the most boldly when he wrote that he knew of "no evidence that the minds of children and adults differ in structure. . . . We have seen considerable evidence that even to learn names of things, a modest part of what the very young child learns even in language, they [children and adults] must be structurally equivalent" (P. 236). If we accept the position that structure i s a biological given and that the child's developing conception of the wodd changes as a function of the changing content

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or knowledge acquired by the child, we will have to revise our whole theoretical orientation about cognitive development, the variables that may influence it, and how one might wish to investigate it. This revision is exactly what has happened among those who have been investigating metaphor as one aspect of cognitive development. Until about 1980, for example, most research was devoted to establishing when the child comes to understand metaphor, that is, how old the child must be before becoming capable of comprehending metaphor. Billow ( 1975), for example, presented data he interpreted as indicating that simple metaphors can be comprehended in the concrete operations stage but proportional metaphors involving analogical processes are opaque until children enter the fomial operational stage. Gardner (1974), however, presented data he interpreted to mean that preschool children are able to comprehend some kinds of metaphors, though not others. Gentner (1977) presented evidence she interpreted to indicate that preschool children can reason analogically. These kinds of data led a number of researchers to look at the demands placed upon the child in the experimental tasks to see if the child was unable to interpret metaphors because the task involved metacognitive demands that were interfering with performance. Winner, Engel, and Gardner (1980) reported that, indeed, some metacognitive skills were required. They suggested that unfamiliarity with the metaphoric form, nonexplicitness of the analogical comparison, and the analytic task of explicating a metaphor were demands that interfered with the child’s ability to reveal comprehension of metaphor. Vosniadou and Ortony (1986), using a task that very much reduced the metacognitive demands upon the child, provided data to indicate that preschool children recognize differences among pairs of words that are related metaphorically because of the perceptual similarity of the referents of the words (e.g., rain and tears), words related literally (e.g., rain and snow), and words with anomalous relations (e.g., rain and dog). In a subsequent study, Vosniadou et ul. (1984) demonstrated metaphor comprehension by preschool children in a task that allowed the children to act out the meaning of the metaphoric endings of stories. The children were successful, however, only when the metaphoric ending referred to a highly probable outcome for the story. C.

COMPREHENDING METAPHOR. A DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRESSION

Efforts to make sense of these data were offered by Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer, and Wolf (1978), Winner, McCarthy, and Gardner (1980), and Pollio and Pickens (1980). Each suggested a developmental progression from preschool to adulthood in which the child proceeds from an initial literal period characterized by a lack of understanding of metaphor, through the preschool periods in which the child freely creates metaphor-like constructions and comprehends metaphors

constructed by others if they are based upon perceptual similarities. Metaphors pertaining to psychological phenomena, because they are too abstract or may not be represented in terms of perceptual similarities, are beyond the cognitive capabilities of preschool and early grade school children and are not understood until the child is about 9-years old (Cicone, Gardner, & Winner, 1981). The early school years are marked by ;I return to the literal period in the sense that the child now resists metaphor in favor of the literal as the child’s knowledge of the language becomes consolidated. In the later grade school years, at about 9 to 1 1 years of age, figurative language gradually reappears, but not until adolescence and the establishment of formal operations can the child understand and appreciate the exact sense of metaphors created at multidimensional levels. Such an account of the developmental process with respect to metaphor, of course. requires an explanation of the acquisition of two different kinds of meaning, an account of how the literal meaning is acquired and an account of how the metaphoric meaning is acquired. Although two kinds of meaning may perhaps be learned at different developmental periods, the postulation of one meaning-generating process is more parsimonious until evidence indicates otherwise. Within the framework proposed here, only one set of processes underlies all meaning, literal and figurative. The child, as the adult, interprets or gives meaning to the events in his o r her world in terms of the theory held by the individual at the moment the interpretation is made. Thus, in all developmental periods a meaning will be assigned to all events to which the individual attends. The interpretation of any particular event may differ between individuals at different points in the developmental continuum, as it may differ between any two individuals at the same developmental point, if the two individuals hold different theories with respect to those events at that point in time. Within this framework, children of all ages use the same processes to interpret all metaphors. The child’s interpretation of the metaphor may, however, differ from that of someone older i t the theories held by the younger and older individuals differ with respect to the content involved. One variable likely to influence the theory a child has about a particular content area is the child’s knowledge about that content. D.

KNOWI,tI)GE A N D COMPREHENSION

Some research attention has been directed toward determining the relation between knowledge and metaphoric interpretation. Keil ( 1986), for example, has approached the problem by exploring the child’s ability to comprehend metaphors in knowledge domains that the child is in the process of acquiring. He argued that children can comprehend metaphors by making use of terms drawn from those domains once the domains are known to the child. Furthermore, partial knowledge of a domain is all that is required to enable figurative use of

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terms from the whole domain. In the latter case, Keil argued that once a single member of a conceptual domain is extended metaphorically. all members of that conceptual domain may be meaningfully extended metaphorically. Keil provided an indirect test of his hypotheses by asking kindergarten, second-grade, and fourth-grade children ( 5 , 8 and 9 years of age, respectively) to indicate the meaning of metaphors created out of eight conceptual domains. Examples are “The car was tired” (domain of animate terms), “The idea flowered“ (plant term), and “The girl tasted the book (eating term). The results indicated that animate terms used with the inanimate car as tenor were least difficult, plant terms with idea as tenor were intermediate in difficulty, and eating terms with book as tenor were the most difficult. The order of difficulty corresponded to the order Keil had demonstrated that the child acquires knowledge about the domains involved. In addition to the order of difficulty of the overall domain, the results suggested that there was a higher degree of within-domain agreement in metaphoric ability than between-domain agreement. Thus, Keil interpreted the results to indicate that conceptual distinctions that emerge early provide domains for which metaphoric relations may be established shortly thereafter. In addition, he interpreted the results as support for the contention that once a child has made a conceptual distinction between, for example, animate and inanimate objects, the child can relate any member of the animate conceptual category to any member of the inanimate conceptual category in a figurative manner. A second indirect approach to the issue of the influence of knowledge on metaphor comprehension has been taken by Waggoner and Palermo (1989). They were interested in the young child’s ability to interpret metaphors pertaining to psychological phenomena. Prior research in which children could not comprehend metaphors in this conceptual area (e.g., Cicone et al.. 1981) involved psychological traits or types such as nice, friendly, or bossy. Little is known about children’s knowledge of general terms such as these. Waggoner and Palermo examined emotion-descriptive metaphors because considerable evidence indicates that children as young as 3 or 4 years o f age have well-developed and differentiated knowledge of the causes, consequences, and facial expressions associated with a number of emotions. The metaphors included “she is a bouncing bubble” (happy), “silver minute” (happy), “sinking boat” (sad), and “used joke” (sad). They were presented as the final sentence in descriptions of a situation with two alternative outcomes. one of which would result in one emotion and the other in a contrasting emotion. The final metaphoric sentence indicated which of the two outcomes had taken place. This procedure required that the children understand the metaphor in order to be able to select the correct meaning of the metaphor. The use of this procedure avoids the problem associated with the Vosniadou et al. (1984) experiment in which the story itself provided clues as to the interpretation of the metaphoric endings, as indicated by the fact that the metaphors used to describe high probability endings were more

likely to be correctly interpreted than the metaphors used to describe low probability endings. The results of the Waggoner and Palernio study indicated that children as young as 4 years of age can correctly interpret emotion-descriptive metaphors. Because most of the stories were constructed to contrast emotions at opposite ends of the emotional continuum, a second experiment was conducted in which the stories were created to contrast o n l y emotional outcomes at the same end of the positive-negative continuum (e.g., sadness vs. fear; love vs. happiness). The results confirmed the findings of the first study in showing that 4-year olds as well as older children can correctly interpret emotion descriptive metaphors. In addition to providing evidence that children of preschool age can comprehend psychological metaphors, the latter results indicate that contrary to a suggestion by Winner, Gardner, and their colleagues (e.g., Cicone e t a / . , 1981), children do not acquire the polarity of a metaphor before they comprehend the meaning of the particular emotion involved. Finally. these data support the findings of Keil in demonstrating that given knowledge of the conceptual domain to which the metaphor is applied, children can and do comprehend metaphors. Following up on the previous experiments, we have been collecting data that provide a more direct test of the effects of knowledge on metaphor comprehension. Assuming that children acquire the so-called literal meanings of new words and their associated concepts in the classroom, we have created metaphors that include the new terms to be acquired by children in the units to be presented by the teachers. Our preliminary work has involved lessons on science, social studies, and health for third and fifth graders who are 8 and 10 years of age. We have created metaphors with these new ternis as the vehicles. Each metaphor is embedded in a story in which thc metaphor indicates which of two possible outcomes could occur, a procedure similar to that used in the Waggoner and Palermo (1989) studies. Children arc being tested both immediately prior to and. a month or so later, immediately following the lessons given by the teacher. The initial results suggest that having learned the literal meaning of these ternis in the classroom, the children are quite capable of extending those meanings figuratively in metaphor. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge in the classroom allows the children immediate figurative use of that knowledge. In summary, the evidence that we have briefly reviewed here suggests that the early findings and interpretations provided by Asch and Nerlove (1960), although an important stimulant to further research. have not held up to subsequent efforts to understand the relations between metaphor comprehension and cognitive development. First, the later research appears to provide no support for the hypothesis that children learn the literal meanings of words before they learn the metaphoric meanings. In fact, Leondar (1975) has provided convincing arguments that the acquisition of early word meanings involves the processes required for metaphor comprehension. Although not all the required evidence is in yet, when children are

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acquiring the meaning of a word or conceptually related domains of words, they are ready to extend that word or domain of words to metaphoric uses. Second, children as young as preschool are able to comprehend metaphor-even metaphor pertaining to a psychological phenomenon-if they have prior knowledge of the substantive area to which the components of the metaphor pertain. Finally, although young children may not be able to explicate the relation between the literal and the figurative meanings of words in a metaphor, this failure appears to be attributable to their inability to express what they know verbally rather than to a lack of knowledge. The failure is one of being unable to give verbal expression to knowledge, not one of lack of knowledge per se. Although knowledge may not be the sole determinant of the child’s ability to comprehend a particular metaphor, it appears to play a particularly important part in the process. Certainly, without knowledge of the words used as tenor and vehicle in a metaphor, as well as the concepts underlying the latter terms, no one can recover the ground that relates the tenor and the vehicle and thereby comprehend the metaphor. Knowledge. therefore, is a significant variable in the cognitive task of comprehending a metaphor, as it also is in other cognitive tasks. Although knowledge has been widely advanced as of primary importance to an understanding of cognition of all kinds, little effort has been devoted to identifying what is meant by knowledge. The literature is filled with statements indicating that research participants have had success in or have failed this or that experimentally presented cognitive task because they did or did not have the knowledge base required for the task. Efforts to explicate what is meant by “the knowledge base” have gone little further than speculations about networks of associations that may or may not have been stimulated by experimental tasks resulting in the activation or lack of activation of appropriate responses; discussions of how expert performance on a task differs from novice performance; or descriptions of a variety of specific bits of information that were or were not available to the individual but were assumed to be required to achieve success in the task. The extensive philosophical literature dealing with epistemology has been almost totally disregarded. Although psychologists probably do not need to become epistemologists in order to study cognitive development or cognitive processes, they should examine some of the prior philosophical analyses of knowledge and attempt to bring them to bear on psychological considerations of knowledge before leaping into experimental research presumed to have something to say about knowledge. In the next section, I will indicate some of the issues that arise when philosophers turn their attention to knowledge. In the last section, I will briefly consider how the philosophical issues may be relevant to psychology in general, but more importantly, to an understanding of how a person develops an ability to comprehend metaphor.

Knowledge m d 1)cvelopiiig Theory of the World

IV.

28 1

On the Nature of Knowledge

Everyone, of course, knows more or less what is meant by the term knowledge. However, if one asks seriously about the meaning of knowledge, as philosophers are wont to do, the nature of knowledge turns out to be rather complex. The early portion of the discussion that follows is drawn from a number of sources but is based upon the presentations of Russell ( 1959) and Pears ( 1971 ) to the greatest extent. We can begin, as Pears did with the recognition that knowledge is a state of mind in which, under most circumstances, the knower knows that he or she knows. If, however, we are aware of our knowledge then we are knowledgeable about our knowledge of that knowledge and, clearly, we find ourselves in a reflexive state of an infinite kind. We shall sidestep this issue for purposes of the present discussion, but the question does make clear that any consideration of knowledge must be so general as to include itself in its scope, that is, knowledge about knowledge is knowledge and must be covered by the theory. Those who have tried to define knowledge have identified several different forms of knowledge. Although they do not by any means agree about the categories, they repeatedly discuss at least three types of knowledge in various forms. Each of the types is subdivided in various ways. The three divisions 1 will discuss are: “knowledge that,” “knowledge how,” and “knowledge of truths.” A.

KNOWLEDGE HOW

Knowledge how seems least problematic, although that suggestion may reflect the fact it appears to have received the least amount of attention. In any case, knowledge how relates to knowledge o f method, for example, knowledge of how one rides a bicycle, recognizes an Irish setter, solves a physics problem, ties a shoe, or obtains milk from a nipple. As will be seen later, if one can describe this knowledge to someone else, knowledge how is very much like factual knowledge or knowledge that. But as clearly shown by the last example, in particular, as well as many others, one can know how without being able to tell someone else, that is, without being able to put the knowledge into symbols representing what is known. Parents, for example, become acutely aware of their lack of the ability to explicate their knowledge how when they try to teach their children motor skills such as how to pump a swing, ride a bike, or catch a ball. The fact that symbolization is not required for knowledge indicates that at least some animals and preverbal children may possess knowledge. This fact is not particularly surprising because one must be able to discriminate prior to being able to codify that which is discriminated. Thus, one must know how to recognize things, as one among many similar kinds of unexpoundable knowledge,

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before one can match symbols to the recognized things. In this sense, knowledge how may be considered the most primitive form of knowledge. The evidence of discrimination prior to symbolization also makes clear that symbolization is not required for memory. Knowing how requires only the ability to respond appropriately in particular circumstances. Memory of the nature of a particular circumstance and the response appropriate to that circumstance, has, of course, been demonstrated numerous times with animals and with infants, both presumably presymbolic. B.

KNOWLEDGE THAT

Knowledge that or knowledge of things is much more complicated and has received considerably more attention. I will begin with a consideration of what is the opposite of knowledge. The obvious answer to the question of what is the opposite of knowledge is a total lack of knowledge or a state of ignorance about whatever is under consideration. An example may, however, show that the distinction is not as simple and clear-cut as it appears. If two persons are looking across the room, one may say that she knows that the person standing on the other side of the room is her friend, John Smith. The other person may say that he has no idea who the person is. We may conclude that she has knowledge and he does not. Some alternative scenarios make this seemingly clear-cut distinction appear more problematic. For example, he may request an introduction to her friend and, as they approach the person, she recognizes that she has made an error and the person is not really John Smith. At the same time, he realizes that it is a person he knows but did not recognize from the other side of the room. She had a reason to believe that the person was someone she knew because he looked like that person from a distance. Thus, she was confident that she knew who the person was, based upon what seemed to be good reason but her confidence turned out to be misplaced. He, in contrast, was not aware that he knew, based upon the same data, and he too was wrong. This example demonstrates that knowledge, which we might have thought to equate with certainty of belief, is not easily captured in what seems a simple example. As Russell points out. it seems natural to begin a search for certainty with our present experiences; what is made known by our immediate experiences, however, is often wrong. On many occasions we have great confidence that we know something and subsequently discover that we are wrong, although we had what seemed to be good reasons for our false belief. That the sun rotates around the earth, that the earth is flat, that the infant lacks color vision, and many other everyday phenomena have in the past been considered knowledge. Our knowledge of past history and our everyday experiences, however, make us aware, on reflection, that ideas which are considered knowledge today may be demonstrated to be in error tomorrow. Consideration of these facts makes the tenuous nature of knowl-

edge most clear. In fact, as will be argued in a later portion of this presentation, some persons (e.g., Weimer, 1979) argue that in contrast to the traditional view of knowledge being presented here, no knowledge can be considered infallible. But that gets ahead of the story. The opposite of knowledge can be illustrated with the case in which the woman in the previous situation says that she believes that the person seen is the person named but cannot givc any reasons for her belief. There are two possibilities here. She may be correct about her belief or she may be incorrect. Our conception of knowledge, however. usually includes more than the ability to make the correct response. Here, we face the issue of justifying one’s knowledge in that we would not wish to give credit to a person for knowing if they were just guessing and happened to be correct. Our conception of knowledge usually includes more than the ability to make the correct response. We ordinarily demand that a person be able to give good reasons for an assertion of knowledge. Unsubstantiated belief is not considered enough and the provision of reasons to justify a response gives us a basis for judging the validity of the knowledge as well as the probable reliability o f the person’s response based upon that knowledge. Thus, if a person can provide logical arguments or authoritative support for the knowledge they claim to have, we are willing to agree that the person is in possession of knowledge and may be expected to respond consistently in light of that knowledge. We run into a similar situation when someone appears to know something but lacks confidence in that knowledge despite the fact that he or she may be able to give reasons that appear to be appropriate for what is offered with a lack of surety. In this case, one may know but not be sure one knows or not be sure that one’s justification is appropriate. The question. in this case, focuses upon whether one must have full confidence before one can pass the test of knowledge. The problem, of course, is that on some occasions individuals are correct that they do not know, on other occasions they are able to respond as if they knew but they are correct for the wrong reasons, and at other times they should have full confidence because thcy have what would be considered by others as knowledge with appropriate reason. Often, teachers are faced with making decisions about attributing knowledge to students who lack self-confidence but provide a correct answer. Researchers often use multiple methods on the assumption that converging operations will allow them to establish knowledge in such cases. The issues concerning the critcria for knowledge and the justification of knowledge serve as background for understanding a number of issues about knowledge, in general, and makc clearcr the reasons for some of the considerations to be discussed in connection with knowledge that. 1 will begin my discussion by noting that knowledge that may be divided into a number of subcategories. In the first subcategory, 1 niay know, for example, that a patch of color is red, that I have a pain, that the quality of redness exists, that one event occurred

before another in one place or another, that similarities exist such that, for example, one red is more similar to another than either is to a green, and that one red is greater than another in brightness. I also know that I have memories of sensory data obtained at other times, as well as other mental things such as my awareness of being aware and my consciousness of myself. All these examples are, on Russell’s account, instances of knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge directly given by the senses, with minimal amounts of abstraction and, therefore, needs no justification. In the case of these directly given sense data, we are dealing with particulars. We cannot know the quality of red, for example, until we have experienced at least one particular red. All of our individual experiences are of particulars whether we are referring to those sense data impinging upon our receptors from external sources or those that derive from internal sources. All knowledge is assumed to begin from such particulars. (I will ignore here the skeptic’s various arguments pertaining to the relation between what may be assumed to be external to us and what we refer to as our sense data.) Not until we begin to group particulars can we go beyond the sense data and be taken to another distinction in kinds of knowledge. The next question to be considered, therefore, pertains to the nature of the step from particulars to groups of particulars, that is, to generalizations and concepts. Russell suggested that at the lowest levels, generalizations are a result of universals known by acquaintance, that is, universals that involve minimal amounts of abstraction and seem to occur automatically. Universals known by acquaintance provide knowledge of things that is not derivative and therefore fallible. Such universals include the grouping of sensible qualities such as the grcupings of particular experienced reds into a category of red achieved through abstraction of the quality of redness common to all the particulars. Similarly, other universals are relevant to the relations of time (e.g., before and after) and space (e.g., between and behind), similarity (e.g., the similarity of two reds), and abstract logical universals such as “greater than” and other arithmetic and logical propositions. These universals and their relations are given a priori but come to be known through acquaintance with sense data. They are natural functions of the organism, but sensory input is required to activate them. All other knowledge is knowledge by description or derivative knowledge. Such knowledge always involves a combination of knowledge by acquaintance with something else. That something else is some form of deduction or induction, the latter of which, by its very nature, is fallible. Knowledge by description includes knowledge of objects (as opposed to sense data), other persons’ minds, and particular singularly defined individual persons, objects, or events. In the case of knowledge by description, we are putting particular components of our knowledge by acquaintance into categories such as collie, dog, animal, and living thing, which distinguishes them from other categories and allows the

development of knowledge about the relations among those categories or concepts. Thus, we have a distinction betwcen knowledge by acquaintance which, according to Russell, is infallible bccause the sense data themselves cannot be deceptive, and knowledge by description. which combines knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. Knowledge of truths, however, can be true or false. We may believe conccpts that are false as well as concepts that are true and our beliefs may be as strong in one case as in the other. Our beliefs are based upon the reasons we bring to bear as support, or justification, for the knowledge by description that we have. C.

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

We are led to a consideration of what counts as a truth or an adequate reason. If we are able to present analytic statcments that are true by definition to support our position, we are able t o give reasons with unquestionable credibility because a priori statements are supported by logically valid formulas that yield truths. For example, if we have the information that all four-sided geometric figures with equally long sides are squares and this four-sided geometric figure has equal sides, we may conclude a priori that this figure is a square because we have no reason t o question the logical truth involved. In contrast, a posteriori synthetic statements based upon perfectly valid logic are contingent. For example, "all metaphors about psychological phenomena are not understood by 5-year-olds and this is a metaphor about a psychological phenomenon. therefore this metaphor is not understood by 5-year-olds." Nothing is wrong with the logic, but the generalization is not established by definition as is the case in the a priori analytic statements. The conclusion in the second case is contingently true and must be established by inductive generalizations based upon experience. One must, in the latter case, make observations 0 1 S-year-old children attempting to understand metaphors about psychological phenomena. If any 5-year old should understand a metaphor about any psychological phenomenon. then the conclusion-the piece of knowledge induced-is demonstrated to be false. Of course, we can never test all the cases leaving us in the position of being open to error. The acquisition of knowledge through the method of science follows exactly this procedure and suffers the same fate. This discussion clearly shows that knowledge of truths is based in the one instance on acquaintance and in the other on description. Knowledge of truths by acquaintance combines knowledge of particulars consisting of intuitive or selfevident sense data combined with a priori universals. Knowledge of truths by description, in contrast, is derivative and includes everything we can deduce from self-evident truths using self-evident principles of deduction and induction based upon sense data combined with logical and mathematical principles. Such knowledge, however, is based upon degrees of self-evidence and is trustworthy

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in proportion to the degree of self-evidence. Because the self-evidence itself is based upon judgments or inductions made about the sense data, it is, therefore, subject to error. We are led to a point now where knowledge and belief are clearly seen to shade into each other in imperceptible degrees. What we firmly believe to be true is knowledge if it is true, assuming that it is based upon intuitive knowledge or is inferred logically from intuitive knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is based upon empirical knowledge with which we are acquainted or it is based on pure a priori knowledge which provides the connections between universals and enables inferences from particular facts given in empirical knowledge. What we firmly believe, if not true, is error. Everything else we claim to know is belief often justified by the coherence of a set of inductions related to or used to support our belief, as is the primary theory building method used in science. Therefore, the individual, as the scientist, seems to operate within the framework of a theory based upon varying degrees of knowledge and belief, the latter of which is recognized as less justifiable than the fomier although no part of the theory may be considered absolute. D.

NONJUSTIFICATIONAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

This latter point about the lack of absolute knowledge has led a number of philosophers of science and cognitive scientists to argue that the justificationist philosophies of knowledge are subject to serious criticism and the whole idea of knowledge should be reconceived. Although the nonjustificational, or critical rationalist, conception of knowledge has evolved from a number of philosophers, the present discussion draws heavily from Weimer’s presentation (Weimer. 1979). The nonjustificationalist begins by rejecting the idea that knowledge is identified with proof and authority in the form of logical deductibility and empirical verification, for example. The position taken is that absolute proof or ultimate authority do not exist and therefore cannot serve as justifications of some particular piece of knowledge. Consequently, absolute or unquestionable knowledge does not exist. Any knowledge, instead, is conceived as a defensible opinion, conjecture, or belief that can neither be proven true nor justified by appeal to any ultimate authority. In short, knowledge claims are always fallible, always subject to criticism, and, therefore, always subject to revision and rejection. This has always been the case and always will be the case. Although no knowledge is proveable on this view. knowledge can be “warranted.” Warranted knowledge consists of beliefs for which n o criticism can be brought to bear at the moment to produce questioning of that knowledge. One must defend conjectures and beliefs but they cannot be proved. Good reasons may be given for them, that is, other conjectures and beliefs that seem relevant to

assessing the belief or conjecture under consideration at the moment. Of course, the conjectures brought to bear in building a case of warrantability are fallible, as is the case for the particular piece of knowledge under consideration. Given that all knowledge is fallible, we arc i n a position of recognizing that we can do no better than to develop contingent theories. Everything has equal potentiality as a source of knowledge or support tor our theories but, at the same time, nothing may be taken as the authoritativc o r definitive support. Consequently, according to this view, truth is or may be taken to be an ideal to which we may aspire but which we will never attain, nor would we have a way of recognizing it if we happened to stumble over it. Because rationality is located in criticism. from this perspective, all knowledge is open to criticism at all times. There will, of course, be times when one is convinced of some particular position, but that conviction does not require a commitment to its truth, only to the inability to find any criticism of the position at the moment. No one can predict when an anomaly may arise that will lead to criticism of a theoretical position and subsequent revision or rejection of that position. The point is that rationality. from this perspective, is located in criticism and not in justification. Such a position does not eschew beliefs in matters about which one is convinced. it merely withholds commitment to those beliefs as being above criticism. Almost any set of beliefs, even those held to be true at any point in time, is based upon a variety of unexaniined presuppositions and assumptions. A critical rationalist is willing to examine critically those presuppositions and assumptions when they are revealed. Such critical examination will involve the taking for granted of other beliefs. The latter are used because they are considered unproblematical at the time of criticism, but they are not considered above criticism forever. They are unproblematical because no criticisms of them seem to exist now. Weimer (1979) quoted Bartley (1962) who made the point nicely, “The fact that most of a man’s beliefs are beyond criticism at any one time does not mean that any of them has to be beyond criticism all the time: this is not so logically, and probably not even practically. Nor does it mean that the belief in criticism itself may not come up for critical review from time to time” (p. 49). The detection and elimination of error is the primary effort of the nonjustificationalist. The means to that end may take many forms including the commitment to a position in order to explore its consequences. That commitment should not, however, be irrational in the senst‘ of defying or ignoring criticism that may destroy the position. The critical rationalist, thus, allows for both commitment in this sense and criticism of any and all positions in an effort after excision of error, a never-ending task. With this very compact discussion of the nature of knowledge as a background, we may now turn to a consideration of the issue that led us down this path: How does knowledge develop and what influence does it have on meta-

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phor, in particular, and cognitive psychology, in general? Regardless of whether we accept the traditional justificationalist position or the critical rationalist position, our efforts as cognitive psychologists attempting to understand the effects of knowledge on various cognitive tasks, and developing theories of cognitive processes, will be influenced by our assumptions about the nature of knowledge, whether we are aware of them or not.

V.

Knowledge and Cognitive Development

The conception of the acquisition of knowledge presented here is based on the assumption that the newborn baby begins the acquisition process, if it has not begun prior to birth. with the sense data gained from particulars with which the baby happens to interact plus the a priori universals the baby has available to it as a function of the structure provided by its species membership. Thus, the baby begins the process of building a body of knowledge within the framework of a theory constrained by species defined universals and encompassing knowledge by acquaintance from the beginning. The baby. on this view, experiences sense data of particulars such as colors, shapes, tones, tastes; internal feelings and desires; and memories of prior acquaintances. On the basis of these continually expanding sources of knowledge by acquaintance, the infant develops universal conceptions of sense categories, time and space categories, and other categories based upon universal a priori similarities among these acquaintances. The latter universals are the ideas, forms, or essences that are shared by many particulars as apprehended by the mind of the child. In addition, the child is acquiring knowledge how: how to suckle, hold on t o a rattle, coordinate eye and hand, vocalize, and many other kinds of activities. The child, of course, has no verbal symbols at this early stage and, therefore, is severely limited in his or her ability to express that available knowledge. Although knowledge niay be a state of mind at this age and the knowing infant niay even know that he or she knows, we do not attribute a symbol system to the infant, which forces us to use other techniques to infer the infant’s knowledge. However, parents, researchers, and others can draw inferences about the infant’s knowledge via other responses available to the child, responses many researchers have used as a basis for making theoretically important inferences about infant knowledge. As the child begins to acquire language, significant changes in this picture take place. First, the child acquires a socially shared symbol system for representing his or her knowledge, beliefs, or theory of the world. In addition, the child learns what count as socially acceptable reasons for their knowledge, beliefs, and theory. We can begin at this point t o ask children what they know, but we cannot know directly how well they can exprcss what they take to be the nature of the world. Although the latter is a problem for all of cognitive psychology, it is

particularly problematic in the study of’ cognitive development because adults may not be well attuned to children and techniques for gaining access to their conception of the world. KNOWLEDGE A N D METAPHOR

The history of the study of metaphor described earlier is an example of how developmental cognitive psychologists have misconstrued the child’s theory of the world and, as a result, misrepresented the child’s knowledge for a number of years despite a good deal of contradictory experimental work. The acceptance of Piagetian theory, of course, made thc experimental results used to support that theoretical conception of the child more warrantable, thus increasing our confidence in that conception of our knowledge of the child. Subsequent research results indicating that preschool children are able to construct an appropriate meaning of a metaphor, as well as create their own metaphors, have not usually been taken as contrary to Piagetian theory. Rather, Piagetian theory has been ignored in this area because it seems irrelevant to current conceptions of how the child comes to know the meaning of a metaphor. The fact that Piagetian theory constrained our view of the child’s developing ability to comprehend metaphor, that is, our knowledge of the child’s cognitive development, is not to say anything against Piagetian theory. Scientific theories have played this role throughout the history of science. As their heuristic value lessens, scientific theoretical conceptions of the world are rejected in favor of new conceptions which, in turn, are replaced at a later time. Such is the history of science. As an aside, the stages postulated by Piaget for the cognitive development of the chiid might be conceived as analogous to the changes in scientific conceptions that take place with scientific paradigmatic shifts. However, that postulate would take a good deal of unpacking for which space is not available here. Returning to the conception o f the child’s cognitive development presented earlier in this paper, we can re-examine what is involved in the child’s ability to comprehend metaphor. For any metaphor in the form “X is a Y,” some minimum requirements for comprehension can be identified. The comprehender must have a meaning for, or knowledge of X , 1 will call it B , and a meaning for, or knowledge of Y, I will call it C. The comprehender will then have to construct a relationship between the meanings or knowledge of B and C such that a meaningful interpretation may be constructed which is appropriate to the context as the comprehender conceptualizes that context. Thus, understanding what meaning the child is likely to give to any particular metaphor, requires knowing what knowledge the child has of X and of Y ; what knowledge the child has of the relations between the knowledge hc or she has of X and Y; and what knowledge the child has of the context. The complexity of the task begins to become

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apparent even before we consider the developmental issues to which we now turn. If we consider what we are coming to know about infant cognitive development, it is possible to build a case for how, or at least when, this cognitive process may begin. The work on cross-modal transfer, for example, may reflect early universal relations recognized as of importance to early cognitive development (see Wagner & Sakovits, 1986). As Rose (1986) has pointed out, “a deeper understanding of the nature of abstraction may be forthcoming by determining what processes underlie this transduction of information from one sensory channel to another and what sort of similarity is being detected in such dissimilar sense impressions” (p. 221). In addition to Wagner et al. (1981). who originally linked some evidence for cross-modal transfer to metaphor, Marks et a / . ( 1987) have explicitly examined the relationships empirically. The latter authors concluded that cross-sensory metaphors “may provide the key to understanding more generally the establishment in childhood of metaphoric competences” (p. 84). These findings allow us to build a case for metaphoric processing at the very earliest ages of infancy and base that ability upon universal similarities, or knowledge by acquaintance. I should note before discussing presumably more abstract metaphors that no inherent perceptual reason is available to explain why an infant should respond to the perceptual dimension of pitch as if it were related in a systematic way to the perceptual dimension of brightness; or that the dimension of a rising or falling pitch should be related to an arrow pointing up or down. Even these so-called simple perceptual relations involve abstract relations because the relations are not manifest in the sensory data. The infant or child must perceive the dimension involved and relate that dimension to another dimension in a different modality, and the relation must be of a particular kind, that is, increases in one related to increases in the other. Some such relations appear to be more natural than others in the sense that some may be observed in infancy and others are not apparent until later ages. In the Marks et u/. study (1987), for example, 4-year olds perceived and conceived similarities between pitch and brightness but not between pitch and size, although the latter relationship was perceived and conceived by 1 I-year olds. A clear need is evident to begin to explore the universal dimensions to which infants and young children attend, how they make their appearance at different age levels, as well as the relations among them that are naturally or universally known to the child. The work on cross-modal transfer and the extension of that work to metaphor by Marks et a / . ( 1987) is an important step in that direction. The more abstract relations involved in poetic metaphors extend well beyond these perceptual relations and must involve additional cognitive processes that extend beyond the perceptual system known by acquaintance. In short, they depend upon knowledge by description, although knowledge by description may

depend, as Russell (1959) suggested. upon knowledge by acquaintance of at least some relevant particulars. But all knowledge by description is relative in the sense that we never have a complete concept, for example. We may have knowledge of a concept that will allow us to pass a particular test of that concept and, thereby, achieve one criterion o r set of criteria indicating knowledge of that concept but we may fail other tests relevant to the same concept. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge may be seen to involve an understanding of what tests are used as criteria of knowledge; which tests need to be passed to use a particular piece of knowledge to acquire another piece of knowledge; and how the pieces of knowledge are related. I will illustrate what I mean by giving an example of what is meant by knowing what a horse is. A very young child may be said to know that a particular object is a horse if on command he or she points to a horse in a pasture. Such a child has passed that test of knowledge, but the same child may not recognize a horse in a different context. for example, in a zoo; or the child may not be able to differentiate a horse from a mule. Does the child know what a horse is, having failed the latter tests? What about the many other tests of knowing what a horse is? A horse i s a inember of a superordinate category of animal; it has subordinate category members, such as palomino: individual horses have names, such as “the old grey mare”; the whole horse has parts, such as hooves; a horse can be a part of a larger whole, such as a herd; a horse may be related to a temporal context, as the one I saw last week; horses have categorical relatives, such as cows, as well as being members of categories, such as pet; horses have functions, such as beast of burden; a horse has relatives, such as colt, mare, sire; other animals are similar to horses, such as ponies and zebras; and the word horse has homophonic relations, such as hoarse, polysemic relations, such as gymnastics horse, synonymic relations, such as stallion, and rhyming relations, such as gorse. Obviously, much more could be included in the complex of knowledge that might be expected o f someone who claims to know what a horse is. To know a horse means much more than to be able to identify one particular referent of the category horse, although knowledge by acquaintance of one particular may be a prerequisite for the rest of the knowledge by description. If a child is presented a metaphor in which horse is used, for example, “The man is a horse,” the child’s interpretation of the metaphor will clearly depend, at least in part, upon what knowledge of horse the child possesses. A 3-year old whose knowledge consists of no more than being able to identify a horse in a pasture will be forced to interpret the metaphor in terms of the perceptual characteristics of the horse. At this knowledge level, the child may assume that the metaphor means that the man is big, the same color as the horse, four legged, grass eating, or any of a number of other possibilities depending, in part, upon the characteristics of the horse that are salient to the child and may, in the child’s judgment, be appropriate to extend to the particular man in question in the

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context of the utterance. As the child gains more knowledge of what a horse is, the possible meanings of the metaphor may change. Without some understanding of the child’s knowledge, however, one cannot anticipate what interpretation will be constructed by the child. Literary analyses of poetic metaphors, for example, often involve an analysis of the author, the culture, the time at which the poem was written, as well as the meanings of the particular words and context of the poem itself. In short, the effort in literary analysis, as the effort to understand the meaning the child constructs for a metaphor, requires an effort after the theory of the world held by the individual at the time the metaphor was constructed or comprehended. Research explorations such as those initiated by D. Kuhn (1986) which are directed at changing the child’s theory of the nature of some particular conceptual domain, would be another area of considerable theoretical interest. As others have suggested is the case with scientists (e.g., T. S. Kuhn, 1962), some existent evidence suggests that factual evidence may not be the major determinant of conceptual change. A worthwhile effort, in this connection, may be to pursue a two-pronged approach to metaphor in this Context. First, how do children come to change their interpretations of metaphors and, second, can metaphors be used to bring about change in children’s theoretical conceptualizations’? Developmental psychologists interested in the child’s developing cognitive abilities, as exemplified in the ability to understand metaphor, will have to come to some understanding of what is meant by “to know.” When we recognize that we cannot know very much by acquaintance, because we have very limited experiences relative to the infinite number of possible experiences, we must operate for the most part upon the basis of beliefs. Those beliefs appear to be organized more or less well in a theoretical framework that is used to construct meaning for, or knowledge of, the world with which we must cope on an everyday basis. Our task is to come to know that theory, the constraints upon it, the universals guiding it, the manner of expanding it, and the factors that lead to reorganizations of it. Perhaps, the study of the child’s expanding understanding of metaphor will help.

VI.

Summary and Conclusions

In this article, I have presented a brief history of research directed toward examining the developing ability of children to comprehend and produce metaphor that occurs with increasing age. l argued that the child’s ability in this area does not rest upon developing an ability specific to metaphor, but, instead, metaphor comprehension and production, not unlike other forms of cognition, rests upon a developing theory of the world founded upon an expanding knowledge base. Given that knowledge is central to the child’s cognitive development,

I turned to an examination of the nature of‘ knowledge. The discussion of knowledge drawn from philosophers who have attempted to propose theories of knowledge in answer to the question, ”What is knowledge?” Traditional justificationalist theories of knowledge and subsequently developed nonjustificationalist theories were considered. The discussion was focused upon a number of issues which have divided philosophers with respect to their treatment of knowledge in order to highlight the problematic nature of knowledge. Cognitive and developmental psychologists may wish t o consider some of these issues and the implications they hold for their theories as they study knowledge and/or invoke knowledge as a part of their theory construction. Some of the implications of the issues were illustrated in a discussion of the relation of knowledge to the developing child’s comprehension and production of metaphor.

REFERENCES Acredolo, L., & Hake. J . L . (1982). Infant perception In B . B. Wolman & G . Strickcr (Eda.), Hundhook of drwlopwntal / ~ . s ~ ~ ~ / 7 0(pp / o g244-2831, ~ Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall A s h , S. (1958). The metaphor: A psycholo~icalinquiry. In R . Tagiuri & L. Petmllo (Eds.). Person pc’rceprion and iiitrrpersonul hehmior- (pp. 86-94). Stanford, CA: Stanford University P r e s Asch, S . . & Nerlove, H . (1960). The devclopment of double function terms in children: An cxploratory study. In B . Kaplan & S. Wapnci- (Eds.), Per-sperfives in p.sycholoyic,ul theory (pp. 47-60). New York: International Universities Pre\s Bartley, W . W . . 111. (1962) The refrrm 10 ( ‘ o i n m i t m ~ ’ i i fNew York: Knopf. Billow, R. M . (1975). A cognitive developincntal study of metaphor comprehension. Developmenrul Psvchology. 11, 415-423. Billow. R . M. (1981). Observing spont~iieousmetaphor in children. Joirrnal ofE.yerimc~ritulChild Psychology, 31, 430-445 Black. M . (1962). Metaphor. In M . H l x h (Ed 1, Models und meruphors. Ithaca, NY. Comell University Press. Black, M . (1979). More about metaphor. 111 A . Ortony (Ed.), Metuphor urid thoirghf (pp. 19-43). New York: Cambridge University l’rc\\ Broderick, V. K. ( 1983). The delelo/viieiir of iii<>fupli(ir com~)i-c/ieiisioiiarid fhr .skills of rwrucrioii and fusion. Unpublished master’s thesis, Pennsylvania State Univcrsity, Univcrsity Park. Cantor, J . H.. & Spiker, C. C. (1982) Thc elfect ofthe temporal locus of the introtract prohe on the hypothesis-testing strategies of k~iiclergartenchildren. Journal of E.rpc~rimem>lChild P\\chology. 34,510-525. Carlson, P., & Anisfeld. M. (1969). Sonic ohscrvations on the linguistic competence of a two-yearold child. Child Dewlopmenr, 40. 56.5 575. Chi, M T . H. (1978). Knowledge structuw ;ind ineinory development. In R . Sieglcr (Ed.). Children’s rhinking: Whar devek~ps?( p p 73-96] Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbauin. Chomsky. N. (1966). Corresian lingui\rit,\ Ncw York: Harper & Row. Chukovsky, K . (1968). From fwo fo fiw Ikrkclcy- University of California Press. Cicone, M . , Gardner, H . , & Winner. 1: ( 1981). Llndcrstanding the psychology i n psychological ~ ~2~I, 3 2 I6 metaphors. Journal ($Child L u i i ~ q i r t r 8, Cohen, L. B., & Younger, B. A . (1983). Perceptual categorization in the infant. In E. K. Scholnick ~

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(Ed.), New trends in conceptual represenrution: C h m q e s in Piaget’s theorj (pp. 197-220). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaurn. Gardner, H. (1974). Metaphors and modalities: How children project polar adjectives onto diverse domains. Child Development. 45, 84-91 Gardner, H . , Winner, E., Bechhofer, R., & Wolf. D. (1978). The development of figurative language. In K. Nelson (Ed.), Children’s langucrge (Vol. I . pp. 1-38), New York: Gardner. Gentner, D. (1977). Children’s performance o n a spatial analogies task. Child Dervlupment, 48, 1034-1039. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semanrics: Vol. 3 . Speech mfs (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press. Hardy, J . A . , & Braine, M . D. S . (1982).Categories that bridge between meaning and syntax in fivcyear-olds. In W. Deutsch (Ed.), The child’s consrruction of’ lungitage (pp. 201-222). New York: Academic Press Jenkins, J . J . , & Palernio, D. S. (1964). Mediation processes and the acquisition of linguistic structure. Monographs oj‘the Socirtvfor Reseurch in Child Development, 29( 1 Serial No. 92). Kail, R., & Nippold, M . A. (1984). Unconstrained retrieval from semantic memory. C‘hildDeve/opment, 55, 944-951 Keil, F. C. ( 1979). Semantic and conceptual decelopmeiit: An oritologictrl perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keil. F. C . (1981). Constraints on knowledge and copnitive dcvelopment. Psvcholo,qic.al Rei,iew. 88, 197-227. Keil, F. C. ( 1986). Conceptual domains and the acquisition of metaphor. Cognitive Deve/opmmt, 1 , 73-96. Kessell, F., & Shaw. R. (1988). The cojiniti\v reidiirion recorzsidered: From empiricism to rationulisrn. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kuhn, D. (1986. June). Coordinating theory and evidence in reasoning. Paper presented at the meeting of the Jean Piaget Society, Philadelphia, PA. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure qf scieiitfic revolutions. Chicago. IL. University of Chicago Press. Langer, J . (1980). The origins of logic: From 6 10 I2 muiirhs. New York: Academic Prcss. Leondar, B . (1975). Metaphor and infant cognition. Poetics. 4, 273-287. Lewin, K. (1946). Behavior and development as a function of the total situation. In L. Carmichael (Ed.), Manical qf child psvchologj (pp. 819-832). New York: Wiley. Macnamara, J . (1982). NamesJhr rhinjis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Marks, L. E . , Hammeal, R. J . , & Bornstein, M. H. (1987). Perceiving similarity and coniprehending metaphor. Monographs of the Societyvfor Rr.seurc.h rn Child Development, 52( I . Serial No. 215). Palernio, D. S. (1963). Word associations and children’s verbal behavior. In L. P. Lipsitt & C . C. Spiker (Eds.). Advances in child development mid hehuvior (Vol. I , pp. 31-68). New York: Academic Press. Palermo, D. S. (1983). Cognition, concepts, and an employee’s theory of the world. In F. J . Landy, S. Zedeck, & J . Cleveland (Eds.), Performuiicc, meu.suremen/ und theory (pp. 97-1 15). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Palenno. D. S . (1986a). From thc marble mass of language, a view of the developing mind. Metaphor and S-ymholic Activity, 1, 5-23. Palermo, D. S . (1986b). Metaphor: A portal for viewing the child’s mind. In L. P. Lipsitt & J . H. Cantor (Eds.). Essavs and e.xperimerir.s in honor of Charles C. Spiker (pp. I I I - 136). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbauni. Palenno. D. S . (1989). The rrunsfer dilemmu. From cross-modal perceprion t o metaphor. In D. M . Topping (Ed.), Third International Conference on Thinking. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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Palermo, D. S , & Jenkins. J . J ( 1004) M'(JR/ u\\oc'rrifrim / ~ o t - r i i . )Gr-ridc, : . \ ~ I ( J o / f / w o i c K h CYJ//C,~<,. Minneapolis: University o f Mintie\ot;i Pres\. Pears, 11 (1971). What is k n o w l d g e " New York. Harper & R o w . Piaget. J ( 1971). B i o l o , q ~and k n o d c d g c Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press. Pollio, M . R . , & Pickens, J I). (19x0) 'The developmental structure o f figurative competence. 111 R . P. Honeck & R. R . Hoifman (Id\ J, ('ci,qtiifio/i (ifid /igirrrrfivc /cm,qrtrrgr (pp 31 1-340) Hillsdale. N J : Erlbauni. Reese. H . W . (Ed.). (19x4). Advurrcr\ c h i l d clrwlopmr~if cuid hrhctvior ( V o l . I X J . N e w Yorh Academic Press Ro\e, S. A . ( 19x6). Abstraction in inl;incy. Evidence from cross-niodal and crosa-dimen\ional transfer. I n L P Lipsitt & C . Kovec-Collici ( M s . ) . A d v ~ ~ c cin, . irtfancv ~ rc.srur-d2 ( p p . 21X229). N o r w o o d . NJ: Erlbaum. Russell. B . (1959). The prohlrms o f / i h i / i J , \ o / d i \ N e w York Oxford University Pre\s Sternberg, R. J . . Tourangeau. K . . & Nigiti, C i . (1979). Metaphor. induction. and sociiil policy: 'The convergence of ni;rcroscopic and Inicro\copic views. I n A . Ortony (Ed. ). Mc,rtiplror. m c l f / i o i i , q l i f (pp. 325-3531, N e w York: Caiiihritlgc Ilnivcrsity Press. Vosniadou, S ( I 987). Children and nielaphors ('lrild L)rvc/opiienf, 58, X70-XXS. Vosniadou, S., & Ortony. A . ( 19x3) The enicrgcnce of the Iiteral-nictaphoricel-;inomolou\ distinction in young children. Child f ) c , i , c , / , i / i f n c , t t f . 54, 154- 161 Vosniadou. S . . & Ortony. A (19x6) Testing the metaphoric competence of the young child. Paraphrase v s . enactment. Hitmrrti I ) c , ~ ~ ~ / r ~ p n r 29, ~ , r i 223-224. f, Vosniadou. S . . Ortony, A . . Reynold\. K IJ , Kr Wilson, P. T. ( I 9 X 4 ) . Source\ of difticulty in children's understanding of metaphoriciil 1;ingtiage. C'liild I)ei,c,lol,rirerir. 55, I S X X - I60h. Waggoner, J . E & Palermo. D. S ( IOXUJ Betty i s il houncing bubble. Children's comprehension 01 emotion-descriptive metaphors. f ) ( , i , c , / r J / " f i u r i r a / P . s w ~ o / o ~ 25. Y. Wagner. S. H . , & Sakovits. L. J . l l 9 X O ) . A process analysis of inlant v i s u ~ land cro\\-modal recognition memory: Implication\ lor ;in :mitidal code. In L. 1'. Lipsitt B C. Kovec-Collier (Eds ), Advanc.r.s i n it$&nc.v reserirc Ir ( p p 105- 2 17). Hillsdale. NJ: Frlbauiii. Wagner, S. H Winner. E.. Cicchctri, I).,& (;;irdner, H . (19x1) "Metaphorical" iiiapping i n hunian infants. Child I ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , / < I / ~ 52, ~ n r ,7t 2 i f-, 7 3 I Wcimer. W . B . ( 1979). Nora.\ o t i f h c s mv/todo/o,qv o/ .sc~icw/i/icrcse(ir,-c./i.Hill\dalc, NJ: Erlbauni Winner. E.. Engel. M . , & Gartlner. H ( 10x0) Mi\undcrstanding mctiiphor- What'\ the prohlcni

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Winner. ti , McCarthy. M . . 6i (hrdnei. II ( IOXOJ 'l'he ontogenesis ofnietaph
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CHILDHOOD EVENTS RECALLED BY CHILDREN AND ADULTS

D m i d B. Pillemer DEPAKI'MENT OF PSYCHOLOGY W F.L.L.ESLEY COLLEGE WELLESLEY. MASSACHUSETTS 02181

Sheldon H . White DEPAK'I MENT OF PSYCHOLOGY H A R V A R D lJNlVERSlTY

CAMBKI1X;E. MASSACHUSETTS 0213X

I. INTRODUCTION 11. DEFINING PERSONAL MEMORIES 111 ADULT RECOLLECTIONS OF LARLY CHILDHOOD A THEORIES O F CHILDHOOD AMNESIA B RESEARCH EVIDENCE

IV

PERSONAL MEMORIES R E C A I J E D BY YOUNG CHILDREN A TAXONOMY OF RESEARC'H STUDIES B RESEARCH EVIDENC€.

V. THE EMERGENCE O F SOCIA1,LY ACCESSIBLE MEMORIES: AN INTEGRATION O F RESEARCH O N CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS' EVENT RECALL A. PERSONAL MEMORIES BEFORE ACE 3 B. PERSONAL MEMORIES BLSTWEEN AGES 3 AND 5 C. EVIDENCE FOR A DUAL MEMORY SYSTEM D. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION O F PERSONAL MEMORY E. COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIALLY ACCESSIBLE MEMORIES F. A CONCLUDING IMAGE: SECHENOV'S LIBRARY AND BEYOND REFERENCES

297 .4UVANCt.S IN CHILD DEVtLOPMENr A N D BEHAVIOR. VOI. 21

Copyright 'c' IL)W hy Academic Pre% Inc All righi, o f ieproduilion In m y fiirni ie\ervcd

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I.

Introduction

In this paper we examine two parallel yet distinctive phenomena of human memory. First, most adults can recall few if any specific events from the early years of life. Second, attempts by preschool children to recall past events on demand-even events of the previous day-frequently are unsuccessful by adult standards. A tantalizing parallelism is evident here. What is the connection, if any, between the paucity of early childhood memories for adults and the limitations of an immature human memory system‘? Our ultimate purpose is to delineate possible connections between early memory development and the difficulties that most adults experience when trying to remember events of their childhood. Two prior questions also must be addressed. First, evidence for the presumed lack of early memories in adults-commonly termed childhood amnesia-has with a few notable exceptions consisted of clinical case studies. Critical new data have been presented in the past few years. What is the current scientific status of this concept’? Second, systematic studies of preschoolers’ memory for naturally occurring events, practically nonexistent 10 or 20 years ago, also have increased sharply in the 1980s. Is a deficiency of memory in early childhood convincingly demonstrated‘? A review and integration of research on memories of childhood events is timely for two reasons. First, the most compelling evidence has appeared in the last few years, and has not yet been synthesized. Second, both adults’ and childrens’ recall failures have practical consequences. For adults, reconstruction of early childhood events remains an important component of psychotherapy (e.g.. Spence, 1982; Wetzler, 1985). For preschool children, the question of whether they can recall specific episodes has become a critical and controversial aspect of legal testimony (e.g., Ceci, Toglia. & Ross, 1987).

11. Defining Personal Memories Clearly, children and adults have ready access to a voluminous amount of information first encountered early in life. Preschoolers have no trouble remembering words, common objects, and familiar people, and this learning carries over to adulthood. The parallel limitations of memory found in young children and adults are apparent under a particular set of performance conditions: ( I ) the memories are delivered in narrative discourse, spoken or written; (2) the to-beremembered events are part of the individual’s personal life history; (3) the events are pinpointed, episodic, one-moment-in-time occurrences; and (4) recall is intentional, and usually is prompted by a direct request from a researcher. clinician, or attorney. Memories fitting this description are episodic. according to Tulving ( l983),

p. I ) : “The kind of memory that is involved in remembering past events is called episodic memory. ” However, most experimental studies of episodic memory were not designed to examine memories of everyday events. Memory for a specific word list encountered by a college student in the prototypical laboratory experiment also fits Tulving’s definition. Brewer’s (1986) description of pc>r.rordrnernory provides a much tighter fit to the phenomena of interest. A personal memory is a “recollection of a particular episode from an individual’s past” (p. 34). It often approximates a “reliving” of the original experience, and as such usually is accompanied by visual or other forms of imagery. The memory is “accompanied by a belief that the remembered episode was personally experienced by the self” (p. 34), and the informational content is related to the self. Finally, the memory is felt to be an accurate record of the original event. Although personal memories are perceived to be accurate representations of what rcally happened, veridicality is not one of Brewer’s defining characteristics. Indeed, if research is restricted to the universe of personal events that are verifiable by objective standards, then phenomena such as childhood amnesia would for the most part remain outside of scientific psychology. Our discussion will focus on memories that fit Brewer’s characterization.

111.

Adult Recollections of Early Childhood

In conducting an earlier analysis of childhood amnesia (White & Pillemer, 1979), we discovered that theoretical explanations were plentiful but relevant data were scarce. Important new studies have been published in the 1980s. We first briefly review several theoretical accounts of childhood amnesia, and then reevaluate the theories in light o f the recently expanded data base. A.

THEORIES OF CHILDHOOD AMNESIA

Most discussions of childhood amnesia attribute adult recall failures to one of three general explanatory factors: repression, the cognitive limitations of young children, or the shifting social circumstances of childhood. Wetzler and Sweeney ( 1986a) and White and Pillemer ( 1‘979) provided detailed descriptions and comparisons of these theoretical perspectives.

I.

Repression Freud identified the phenomenon of childhood amnesia in his early psychoanalytic work: “What I have in mind is the peculiar amnesia which, in the case of most people, though by no means all, hides the earliest beginnings of their childhood up to their sixth or eighth year” (190511953, p. 174). The point is not

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that early memories are missing, nor that the memory traces have decayed as a simple consequence of the passage of time. The memories are actively blockaded from adult consciousness because they connect with the unacceptable sexual and aggressive impulses of early childhood. The task of psychoanalysis is to break through the repression and to bring “this forgotten period back into memory” (Freud, 1916-191711963, p. 326). This image of childhood amnesia as fully formed memories existing behind a wall of repression-Freud’s “blockade model” (White & Pillerner, 1979)-is not the only view that Freud put forth. He also suggested an alternative “selective reconstruction model” (White & Pillemer, 1979) in which memories laid down in early childhood are qualitatively different from memories formed later in life: “I mean the fact that the earliest years of life, up to the age of five, six, or eight, have not left behind them traces in our memory like later experiences” (Freud, 1916-191711963, p. 200). Young children do not create fully formed narrative memories. They retain fragments, images, and feelings. Therapy does not help the patient to “discover” early memories but helps to reconstruct an adult-like narrative symbolization of the early traces. Childhood amnesia exists because most early memories are not actively reconstructed, or are reconstructed in misleading ways. Freud apparently considered the possibility of selective reconstruction early on. In a letter t o FIiess on December 6, 1896, Freud outlined a hierarchical memory system in which repression is identified as a “failure of translation” from a lower-order to a higher-order level of processing. In the blockade model, childhood amnesia is viewed from an adult’s perspective. Freud, talking to adults in therapy, saw early memories as troubling to adult sensibilities, and needing to be restrained by powerful psychic forces. The selective reconstruction model builds out instead from a developmental orientation. Early memories are not readily accessible because of the limitations of an immature memory system, and the difficulties in translating early memory fragments into adult-like forms. Studies of children’s as well as of adults’ memories are relevant within this latter conceptualization.

2. Socially Induced Changes in Memory The premise that childhood amnesia is a failure to reconstruct early memory traces-usually only an implicit part of Freud’s formulation-forms the basis of explanations put forth by Schachtel (1947) and Neisser (1962, 1967). These authors posited that the “forgetting” of early childhood events is an inability to reconstruct past circumstances using currently available mental structures. Remembering does not involve the direct retrieval of static traces. Rather, it is an active process, in which the individual constructs and interprets past events using current concepts and modes of thinking. Childhood amnesia is directly attributable to the dramatic changes imposed upon the child by the regimens of adult society. When children are 6 or 7 years

old, they face socialization pressures that require a reorganization of mental structures. The child becomes reality oriented, responsible, and increasingly reliant on spoken and written language for successful communication. As a result of these socially induced discontinuities, ”The categories (or schemata) of adult memory are not suitable receptacles foi- early childhood experiences and therefore not fit to preserve these experiences and enable their recall” (Schachtel, 1947, p. 4). This assumption has important consequences for long-term reconstructive memory: This means that the universal m m c m for childhood i s not pnmarily the result ot anxiety or guilt, and is not based on an active process of suppression. I t is, instead, a necessary consequence of the iliscontiiiuitiw in cognitive functioning which accompany growth into adulthood. From prc-vcrhal to verbal. from naive t o sophisticated. from carefree to responsible, frorii ucah l o powcrful-the cognitive acconmodations which must accompany these transiiions \ceni to make the pa\t inaccessible. (Neisser, 1962, p. 6 3 )

4 related view is that childhood amnesia is attributable to the paucity of effective memory cues for childhood events in the adult world. The ecology of the child broadens dramatically with development (Barker & Wright, 1955). As children move away from the people and familiar behavior settings of early childhood, they have fewer opportunities for early memories to be reinstated by repeated exposure to the original learning conditions (Campbell & Spear, 1972; Rovee-Collier & Hayne, 1987), and early memories become less likely to be cued by the physical environment. 3.

Cognitive Developmental Clicirigc’.s in Memo q The cognitive developmental account of childhood amnesia emphasizes changes in mental capacities rather than socially induced memory reorganization. According to this view, the child’s social adaptations are made possible by underlying cognitive advances. Shifts in a number of mental capabilities occur at about age 5 (White, 1965; White bi Pillemer, 1979). Cognitive developmental explanations presume an encoding deficit in early childhood (Wetzler & Sweeney, I?X6a). The child’s immature cognitive apparatus will not support the construction of the fully formed narrative memories that characterize adult remembering. Childhood amnesia exists because children cannot process information in a way that facilitates long-term recall. Neurophysiological immaturity may underlie early memory deficits. Spear (1979) and White and Pillemer (1?7?) have outlined several potential connections between brain changes and childhood amnesia. More recently, Bower (198 1) has speculated about links between brain growth and long-term retrieval failures: “In this view, as infants mature, their brains gradually change state, so that early memories become inaccessible in the more mature state” (p. 146). Research using animals indicates that deficient hormonal responses may contrib-

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ute to infantile amnesia. According to P. E. Gold (1987, p. 153), “Arousal appears to be the major contributor of additional information telling the brain to make new memories.” Adrenaline injections reduce the memory deficits of juveniles, indicating that the immature memory system is capable of holding information, but that regulatory hormonal responses are not yet engaged. Work with humans links changes in brain functioning, marked by shifts in electrical activity, to periods of rapid intellectual development at 4 years of age and again at 6 to 7 years (Fischer, 1987). At a functional level of analysis, developmental changes in basic cognitive abilities may contribute to long-temi memory deficits. Piaget ( 1962) proposed that childhood amnesia is a by-product of the general limitations of preoperational thought: There are no memories of early childhood for the excellenr reason that at that stage there was n o evocative mechanism capable of organising them. . . . The memory of the two or three year old IS still a medley of made-up stories and exact but chaotic reconstructions, organised memory developing only with the progress of intelligence as a whole (p. 187)

Others have singled out specific memory deficiencies that could impede longterm recall of information stored in early childhood. For example, children’s immediate memory span increases regularly with age (Case, 1985; PascualLeone, 1970). Deficient short-term memory could have a negative impact o n long-term episodic memory. Increases in processing capacity occurring in early childhood would allow deeper and more elaborate encoding of information. A broader attentional capacity could lead to the formation of a richer network of retrieval cues (White & Pillemer, 1979). The growth of processing capacity may be a by-product of the increasing automaticity of mental operations (Bjorklund, 1985; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Dempster, 1985). According to Turtle and Wells (1987), the increased automaticity “reduces demands on operating space and frees up storage space, which, in turn, might aid long-term memory” (p. 242). Attributing childhood amnesia to specific cognitive or neurophysiological deficits is speculative and many rival hypotheses remain plausible. For example, the lack of effective retrieval cues for early events can be explained without reference to deficiencies in immediate memory span. Very young children may attend to routine rather than to novel aspects of events, so that they generate a paucity of distinctive retrieval cues. In contrast, older children and adults know where to look (Fivush & Hamond, 1987). Although the specific deficiencies underlying adult memory failures remain to be identified, all cognitive developmental explanations locate one source of childhood amnesia in the unsophisticated or inadequate mental activities of the young child.

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Generating speculative theories of childhood amnesia has been easier than designing critical empirical tests. According to Bower (1981), one problem is that the theories often do not lead to testable hypotheses that clearly distinguish between the competing accounts. Furthermore, childhood amnesia seems unlikely to be attributable to a single causal mechanism; social, cognitive, and emotional influences may prove to bc interlocking pieces of a complete explanation (White & Pillemer. 1979). Nevertheless, one can identify several general patterns of memory performance, each of which would demonstrate the influence of one of the hypothesized explanatory factors. I.

Theoretical Predictions What pattern of evidence would support the psychoanalytic blockade model. in which the early memories of adults are held at bay by a wall of repression'? Early memories should exhibit a sharp discontinuity, with memories largely absent before age 6 or 8 and plentiful afterwards. Any early recollections that survive should be screen memories, with a muting or redirection of hostile. aggressive, or erotic content. Successful psychoanalytic treatment should lead to a rediscovery of the early, fully formed memories (Neisser, 1962). Finally, the use of repression as a defensc mechanism should be negatively related to the accessibility of affect-laden memories (Davis, 1987). The cognitive developmental inode1 leads to a different set of expectations. Childhood memories would not suddenly become available at one point in time. Rather, the incidence of early memories should directly mirror the age-related growth of memory abilities in childhood. The form of childhood recollections should show a corresponding changc, with memory accounts from toddlerhood appearing fragmentary and only gradually approximating the fully formed narrative structure of adult memories. The social1.y induced chunges rnodel predicts a direct correspondence between accessibility of early recollections and shifts in social circumstances. This predicted correspondence leads t o an intriguing and testable hypothesis: Whenever important difference\ hetween thc customary assimilations of adults and of children are the rule, we can expcct relatively less recall of childhood expenence. Wherever the culture makes the transition relatively continuous, and particularly where the cognitive accommodation\ of adulthood arc consistently hased 011 those o l the child. childhood memories \hould he more available. . . . Not only the thoroughness o f the amnesia, but also the period that it covers should vary with the developmental pattern in the society (Ncis\er, 1962, p. 68)

One would predict, for example, that adults who moved to the United States from another culture after age 7 would demonstrate a greater amnesia for early

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childhood than would adults who did not experience an abrupt cultural discontinuity (Otoya, 1987). Variations in childrearing practices within one culture also might offer opportunities for testing Neisser’s hypothesis. For example, the childhood memories of adults who accommodated to the social context of group childcare at an early age could be compared to the memories of adults who spent their preschool years in the home environment (Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986a).

2.

Empirical Studies Theorists have posited that social, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms govern the incidence and substance of early recollections. In the following sections we examine research on the age of the earliest memory; patterns of agerelated changes in the frequency, narrative form, and emotional content of early memories; and effects of cultural transitions on early memories. In most studies, memories of early childhood are given in response to the spoken or written questions of a memory researcher. The research designs are only partly naturalistic. People talk about personal experiences, but the memories are elicited outside of the everyday contexts in which such recollection normally occurs. The experimental conditions may resemble some real-life situations, such as an initial interview by a psychotherapist, but in these instances the rationale for the questions probably is clearer to the respondent. The empirical evidence should be evaluated in light of the somewhat unusual context for remembering.

a. Age of the Eurliest Memor?. Does one particular age mark the beginnings of personal memory for most people? Freud (190511953) claimed that childhood amnesia extended to the “sixth or eighth year.” If Freud’s age cutoff is inaccurate, is there another, earlier starting point of a person’s episodic life history? Early investigators examined this issue cither by asking for the earliest niemory (Dudycha & Dudycha. 1933a, 1933b, 1941) or by asking for all memories of events occurring before age 8 (Waldfogel. 1948). Both approaches identified the average age of the earliest reported memory at about 3; years, with a small but consistent gender difference indicating that females reported earlier memories, A modern study of the earliest memories recounted by high school and college students (Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982) supported the earlier age estimates, The average age of the earliest recollection for both the high school (mean 3.9) and college (mean 3.2) samples fell in the fourth year of life. Although studies of the earliest memory consistently locate the beginnings of episodic memory for most people between the ages of 3 and 3 , the task presented to subjects is somewhat curious. Adults are asked to identify, out of context, the earliest experience that now conies to mind. How is this event located in memory‘? Events are unlikely to have been encoded initially with specific information

about their relative proximity to the beginnings of personal memory. One possible retrieval strategy would be to locate a memory of any datable early event, and then to compare it to any other readily available and datable events. A person using this strategy would fail to identify very early but undatable memories. A second issue involves the use o f sihjects' own age estimates. Some investigators asked subjects to validate the dates o f occurrence by consulting with family members (Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933a, 1933b), but the accuracy of dating the earliest memory has not been I'ormally tested against an objective standard. A different research strategy involves asking about events that have a known date of occurrence. By requesting a specific memory, the vagaries of early memory sampling are avoided. Sheingold and Tenney ( 1982) elicited memories of the birth of a sibling. Female collegc students first listed all of their siblings. and then answered 20 specific questions pertaining to each sibling's birth (e.g.. Who told you that your mother was leaving to go to the hospital'?). Figure I presents the students' median recall scores (number of questions answered correctly) as a function of their age when the sibling was born. The earliest age at which a birth was remembered was 3 years. but almost all college students who were 4 years of age or older at the time of the birth recounted at least some information. Winograd and Killinger ( 1983) examined "flashbulb memories" (Brown & Kulik. 1977) of the 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy. The authors restricted their sample to high school and college students who were between I and 7 years old in 1963. Respondents answered five questions pertaining to their ouw pc.rsona1 circumstmnces upon learning o f the assassination (e.g., their location, the ongoing activity). Figure 2 presents the proportion of subjects who recalled at least one category of information as a function of their age in 1963. Consistent

AGE AT TIME

OF EVEN1

Fig. 1. Medrun recull score.\ us ( I ,furi(.tiori of ticyefor sibling hirths reported by femule college students. From Memory Observed hv lllric Neiscrr. Copwight 0 1982 W . H . F'reemun und Compunv. Reprinted with permission.

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(3

1.0r

:

7L

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AGE IN 1963

Fig. 2 . Proportion of wbjei-ts of’ each age in 1963 who gave evideiice of recall i f circ.umstances uccompanying the news of the assassination of President Kenne&. From Winograd arid K i l l i n g c ~ . 1983. 0 19x3 by the Americcin P.r~chologiculA.ssociation. Arluptrd by permi.s.sio17.

with Sheingold and Tenney (1982), few subjects who were younger than 3 recalled any information about the event. Approximately one-third of subjects who were 3 years old recalled some information, and a majority of subjects who were at least 5 years old reported memories. Taken as a whole, studies using both free and directed recall consistently indicate that age 3 to 4 is the earliest period of life that most adults can remember. Whether the request is open-ended or targeted to a specific childhood event, relatively few adults can recount, on demand, events occurring before their third birthday. b. Age Distributions of Early Memories. The common existence of memories before Freud’s age cutoff-6 or 8 years-invalidates childhood amnesia only in the most simplistic and stereotyped sense of the concept. An amnesia before age 6 could appear as a reduced accessibility of early memories rather than as a total absence. However, a scarcity of early memories does not in itself provide convincing evidence for childhood amnesia. After all, the events of childhood happened a long time ago. Their reduced accessibility in memory could be due to normal forgetting rather than to an age-specific deficiency. When amnesia truly exists. “the memory impairment is greater than what one would expect to find according to simple decay theory (recall decreases as a function of the time since the event)” (Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986b, p. 192). Waldfogel (1948) conducted the classic study of age-related changes in the freauencv of earlv memories. College students were given 85 minutes to record

all of their memories for events occurring before age 8. Students reported about 50 memories on average. Memories were not commonly reported until age 3, and the rate of increase in reported memories accelerated sharply up to age 5. Although the existence of many early memories undermines the blockade model of childhood amnesia, the accelerated increase in reported memories strongly suggests that forgetting before age 5 is governed by factors other than simple decay. Wetzler and Sweeney (1986b) conducted a statistical analysis of the apparent accelerated rate of forgetting for early childhood events. They reanalyzed data from a study conducted by Rubin (1982, Study 1) in which college students recorded the first memory to conic t o mind in response to 125 separate word cues, and then dated each of the 125 memories. Wetzler and Sweeney first derived a mathematical function based on the memories dated from age 8 to adulthood. Then. they statistically compared the actual number of reported memories for the early childhood years (before age 7) to the value expected according to an extrapolation of the function describing the older memories. A significant decrement was found for early nicmories, suggesting that the rate of forgetting for preschool events is steeper than for events of later childhood and early adulthood. Rubin’s (1982, Study I ) data pinpointed the greatest deficit as occurring before age 3, but other studies have indicated accelerated forgetting for events occurring before age 5 (Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986b. p. 198).

c. Age-Related Changes in the Eiriorional Contents of Memories. Childhood amnesia also could appear as a qualitative discontinuity in the emotions associated with early memories. According to this view, screen memories should be less affectively charged than nicmories of later life periods: “ I f , for example, episodic memories typically display a range of affective experiences. then an absence of equivalent affective cxperiences from childhood would suggest a unique form of censorship” (Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986b, p. 193). Analyses of the affective content o f early recollections do in fact demonstrate a “range of affective experiences.” In an early review of the literature, Dudycha and Dudycha (1941) pointed o u t the “considerable agreement . . . that emotions usually accompany early, remembered experiences” (p. 678). In their own work on the earliest reported memory, Dudycha and Dudycha (1933b) found that the most common emotions were tear (30% of memories). joy (28%), and anger (10%).Kihlstrom and Harackicwicz (1982) also found a mix of emotions accompanying college students’ earliest memories: 43% of memories were rated by respondents as pleasant, 27% were rated unpleasant, and 30% were rated neutral. Waldfogel’s ( 1948) broader sampling of all reported memories before age 8 identified joy as the most common specific emotion (30%), followed by fear (approximately 15%). Subjects’ memory ratings produced the following approximate distribution of general affective responses: pleasant (46%), unpleasant

(28%), and neutral (17%), with the remaining 9% not fitting one of these categories. The affective content of many early recollections contradicts the notion of a complete blockading or screening of early emotional responses, but the possibility remains that emotions accompany childhood recollections less often than they accompany memories of later life periods, or that the early expressions of emotionality are qualitatively different from later expressions. A study of niemories from adulthood (Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter, & White, 1988) provides a point of comparison. College alumnae gave written descriptions of the first four memories that came to mind of their first year in college, and then rated each memory for affective quality and intensity. Memories were obtained from women who had graduated 2, 12, or 22 years earlier; the longer retention intervals are similar to the retention intervals when adolescents and young adults are asked for their memories of early childhood. Alumnae memories were rich in affective content. Participants identified their emotional reactions as either positive (34%1), negative (27%). mixed positive and negativc (35%), or neutral (4%). Average ratings of emotional intensity (on a five-point scale) were between moderate and strong for all alumnae groups, and emotion ratings did not vary significantly as a function of time since graduation. These emotional responses are similar to those associated with early childhood memories in several respects. First, both data sets demonstrate a range of positive and negative emotions. Second, strikingly similar percentages of purely negative memories were reported by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (27%), Waldfogel (28%), and Pillemer et al. (27%). Memories of troubling experiences from early childhood appear to be no less common than negative memories from adulthood. Both Kihlstroni and Harackiewicz’ and Waldfogel’s subjects rated substantial numbers of memories as neutral, but few of the college memories had neutral ratings. Although this finding could indicate a screening of early emotional responses, it also could be due to the failure to include a “mixed positive and negative” category in studies of childhood recollections. For example, Waldfogel’s subjects may have viewed the “neutral” category as the proper repository for memories that encompassed both poles of the five-point rating scale (very pleasant, pleasant, neutral, unpleasant, very unpleasant). The virtual absence of neutral memories of college could reflect the inclusion of a mixed emotions category. Although a discontinuity in the emotional content of early memories has not been demonstrated empirically, questionnaire or interview studies may not tap the kinds of emotional experiences that concerned Freud. Perhaps the original emotions reappear, but in disguised form. For example, fearful feelings associated with the birth of a sibling could be reconstrued as a fear for the sibling’s safety. Some evidence suggests that personality characteristics or defensive styles are related to the screen quality or affective nature of childhood memories

(Davis, 1987; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz. 1982), suggesting the potential for motivated distortion of emotions i n early memories. However. these effects do not appear to be limited to remembrances of early childhood (Davis, 1987). d. Age-Related Changes in tho Nwrutirle Form of Earlv Memories. If childhood amnesia is attributable to impoverished encoding abilities in early childhood, the narrative structure of early and later memories should differ. Early memories should not only be scarce, they should be fragmentary and childlike, and descriptions of later events should more closely resemble the fully formed and informationally rich narratives characteristic of adult memory. If, however, early encoding is not deficient. then any childhood memories that the adult is capable of retrieving should be similar in form to memories from later life periods. Two studies discussed previously provide evidence relevant to this issue. Winograd and Killinger (1983) asked respondents to provide five Categories of information about their own personal circumstances when they learned about the Kennedy assassination: location, ongoing activity, source of information, aftermath, and any “other” details. The number of informational categories recalled provides a measure of the conipleteness and coherence of the memory. The categories correspond roughly to the conventions of narrative reporting, in which information about who, what, and where need to be specified in order to tell a good story (Neisser, 1982b). The mean number of informational categories recalled as a function of age in

1

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AGE IN 1963

Fig. 3. Degree of elahorurion qfrc~i~ull. ( i s intlurcd I)! the meuti iturnher of cutrgorrrs riyresented in recall. From Wino,qrad and Killin,yer. IYX.?. C 1983 by the American P.s~chologica1Associution. Adapted by permission.

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1963 is shown in Figure 3. Only those subjects who were able to provide a memory were included in this analysis. A clear increase is evident in the informational complexity of memories reported by subjects who were older than 4 years old at the time of the event. Although some sub.jects who were between 1 and 4 years old in 1963 also had memories of the assassination, their narrative descriptions were inadequate by adult standards. Subjects who were under 5 years old at the time of the shooting were able to provide information about only two or three of the informational categories on average, but subjects who were 6 years of age provided information about four of the five categories. The incomplete accounts of respondents who were very young at the time of the assassination appear to derive from an absence or inaccessibility of critical information in memory. Sheingold and Tenney ( 1982) examined the relationship between age at the time of a sibling birth and the amount of information that could be recalled about the birth (see Figure 1). Although memory incidence increased dramatically at about age 3, memories from age 3 onward did not demonstrate a clear pattern of change in informational complexity. Several aspects of this study make it d cult to pinpoint age-related changes in personal memory complexity. First, the investigators grouped subjects into 2-year age categories, so that 3-year olds and children who were almost 5 were grouped together; I-year intervals may be necessary to identify the shift that was apparent in Winograd and Killinger’s analysis. Second, subjects who had no memories of the birth are included in Fig. 1 , so that the distribution does not directly reflect changes in the complexity of reported memories. Third, several of Sheingold and Tenney’s questions tap information that was not necessarily a part of the respondents’ personal memory of the birth (e.g., Who picked your mother and the baby up’?What presents did the baby get‘?) Remembering these types of information may depend more on later retellings by parents than on the original encoding circumstances. If memory depends on the degree o f cognitive sophistication at encoding, one would expect a shift in what is remembered as well as how much is remembered. One aspect of early experience that may change with age is the sophistication and differentiation of emotional responses. Dudycha and Dudycha ( 1933a) asked college students to describe the emotions accompanying their earliest remembered experience. Basic emotions, such as fear, joy, and anger, were most common, and more refined emotions, such as disappointment, embarrassment. and resentment, were rare. The investigators concluded that “we cannot expect a large number of memories involving these other emotions, which in all probability are just beginning to develop” (p. 480). e . Cultural Influences or1 Early Memories. 1s the accelerated forgetting of early childhood events caused by dramatic changes in social circumstances, as proposed by Neisser (1962, 1967) and Schachtel (1947)‘?According to the social

change explanation for childhood amnesia, the accessibility of early memories is directly related to the quality of the transition from childhood to adulthood. Abrupt change should interfere with recall of early memories, and cultural continuity should facilitate recall (Neisser, 1962). Otoya (1987; Otoya & Pillemer, 1988) examined this hypothesis by comparing the early memories of two distinct cultural groups. All 40 participants in the study were EnglishiSpanish proficient bilinguals. Half of the subjects were monocultural bilinguals who had grown up in one cultural setting (the United States). The other half were hic~4/114rtl/bilinguals who were born in Central or South America and came to the United States after age 6. All subjects were asked to report the first three memories to come to mind of events occurring before their eighth birthday, and then to (late each event. Monocultural subjects recounted significantly earlier events. The average age for the first reported memory o f monocultural subjects was 3.8 years, a value that is remarkably consistent with prior estimates of the age of the earliest memory (e.g., Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz. 1982). The average age for the first memory of bicultural subjects was more than one year older (5.1 years), a value that is well outside the range of published estimates for the age of the earliest memory. This finding supports the proposition that the abruptness of cultural transitions influences the accessibility of early childhood memories. The bicultural subjects, who were confronted with a dramatic cultural shift, demonstrated a greater “amnesia” for very early childhood than did the monocultural subjects. The social change hypothesis can be extended to other life periods. Whenever new modes of thought emerge in response to a major life transition, such as entry into college or parenthood. retrieval of memories of events occurring before the transition should become more difficult. J: Summary. The preceding empirical synthesis has provided partial answers to several basic questions. (1) Does an amnesia for the ewrits of early childhood exist:) When adults are asked by a researcher to provide narrative accounts of childhood memories, the responses demonstrate an early memory discontinuity. Most adults do not rccount events occurring before age 3 , and experiences from ages 3 and 4 appear to be forgotten at a faster rate than later experiences. Questionnaire and interview studies provide little support for a marked qualitative discontinuity in the emotions accompanying early n i e n i o r i e ~ ~ r e c o u n t eevents d from both childhood and adulthood often are associated with emotional reactions. Certain individuals, such as those with strong repressive tendencies, may display a “limited accessibility to personal, real-life affective memories” (Davis, 1987, p . SSS), suggesting that Freud’s identification of a pervasive early amnesia before age 6 or 8 may be restricted to certain client populations. ( 2 ) Do shifrs in the social ( , i t - ( , i ( n i . s t ~ i i of i ~ ,childhood ~s contribute to the inac-

D u d B Pilkmer und Sheldori H . White

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cessibility of early memories? In the only empirical test of the social change explanation for childhood amnesia, Otoya (1987) found that adults who experienced an abrupt cultural transition after age 6 appeared to have a more pervasive amnesia for the events of early childhood than did adults for whom the passage into later childhood and adulthood was relatively continuous. The question of whether individual differences in the accessibility of memories within one cultural group are related to differences in early social circumstances has yet to be examined. (3) Do developmentctl changes in m e m o p during childhood contribute to adults’ long-term memor~ftrilure.s?Studies o f age-related changes in early memories reported by adults support the cognitive developmental explanation of childhood amnesia. Although the persistence of memories of emotionally salient events has been attributed to frequent reconsideration and retellings (Neisser, 1982b), rehearsal alone cannot explain the pattern of results for adult recollections of early childhood. Why, for example, are memories of the birth of a sibling (Sheingold & Tenney, 1982) or the Kennedy assassination (Winograd & Killinger, 1983) so clearly dependent on the person’s age at the time of the original event, unless adult recall is constrained by the nuclear information encoded in childhood? Some adults who were under 3 years old at the time of a sibling’s birth certainly heard the “story” of the birth recounted in later years. Yet virtually none of these respondents provided memories, although most of the respondents who were older than 3 were able to do so. The age dependency issue can be addressed directly by examining research on young children’s personal memories. In the following section we review studies of children’s memory for personal events, and explore how developmental changes in autobiographical memory could constrain long-term memory performance in adults.

IV.

Personal Memories Recalled by Young Children

Until the 198Os, systematic research on the development of autobiographical memory was almost nonexistent. Inspired in part by calls for naturalistic approaches to memory research (e.g., DeLoache & Brown, 1979; Neisser. 1982a; Perlmutter, 1980), the number of studies of children’s personal memories has increased markedly in the last decade. We have limited our empirical synthesis to studies that fulfill several criteria. First, we focus primarily on studies that included children under age 5-the age range most clearly associated with accelerated forgetting in adult memory studies. Second, we continue to use the definition of personal memories adopted at the beginning of this paper: the memories are part of the individual’s personal life history; they are pinpointed, one-

moment-in-time occurrences; recall is intentional; and memory is assessed by verbal performance. When asked to describe personal memories, adults show an accelerated forgetting for events occurring before age 5 . Do children ages 2, 3. and 4 exhibit parallel difficulties when asked to produce memories on demand’? Do developmental shifts in chiltiren’s personal memories correspond to agerelated changes in the incidence and structure of adults’ memories of childhood’? In a previous theoretical analysis, wc posited that the memory of a preschool child is not yet “socially accessible”; that is, the child has difficulty verbally sharing recollections on demand: “the development of spoken and written communication by children implicitly demands that they express their thoughts in a well-organized way and, if they are to respond to communications from others, that they be able to find memories in response to questions annotated according to the ‘world view’ of the common culture. Some organization of access to memory must be created to permit this” (White & Pillemer, 1979, p. 63). If young children do in fact have difficulty locating personal memories, or if the memories are not easily addressablc through verbal or narrative modes of thought and communication, then one would hardly expect adults’ recall efforts, occurring many years later, to be more successful. A.

TAXONOMY OF REXSEARCH STUDIES

Four general types of memory performance have been examined in studies of young children’s personal memories: ( 1 ) narrative memories of singular, highly salient events given in response to direct questions from an adult; (2) event memories offered in the context of ongoing conversations or activities; (3) memories that are expressed through behavioral as well as verbal channels; and (4) memories of specific instances of routine or scripted events. Memories of salient events produced on demand are directly relevant to the issue of childhood amnesia. The task is similar to that confronting adults when they are asked to describe early childhood happenings. The literature includes studies of children’s eyewitness accounts of staged events (Goodman, Aman, & Hershman, 1987; Goodman & Reed, 1986; Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac, 1979) and of natural occurrences (Pillemer. 1988; Sheingold & Tenney, 1982). Other investigators have used more naturalistic methods, in which memories are obtained from presleep monologues (Nelson, 1988), extended mother-child (Ratner, 1980) or experimenter-child (Fivush, Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Todd & Perlmutter, 1980) conversations, and observations of everyday activities (Eisenberg, 1985; Nelson & Ross, 1980). These data are at arm’s length from the phenomenon of childhood amnesia as it is demonstrated in studies of adults’ long-term memory. No reported studies have focused on adults’ childhood recollections as expressed in ongoing conversations or everyday activities. The naturalistic approach reduces the performance demands of a formal question-and-

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answer format, and therefore may provide a better picture of young children’s actual memory abilities. As such, it may help to reconcile the discrepancy between observations made by parents and teachers of children’s impressive feats of memory on the one hand, and experimental studies showing impoverished early memory abilities on the other (Daehler & Greco, 1985; DeLoache & Brown, 1979; Nelson & Hudson, in press). In a third subgroup of studies, children’s memory performance was evaluated with behavioral as well as verbal measures (Gray & Fivush, 1987; Myers, Clifton, & Clarkson, 1987; Smith, Ratner, & Hobart. 1987). Although no studies of adults’ memories of childhood have included nonverbal indices, comparisons of children’s verbal and nonverbal expressions of past events may help to distinguish between early memory deficiencies and early verbal deficiencies. The fourth group of studies dealt with children’s ability to recount specific instances of routine or scripted events. such as what happened at dinnertime or school yesterday (Fivush, 1984; Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1986; Pillemer, Picariello, Ucci, & Blum, 1988). Because the remembered events usually are typical, everyday occurrences, the memories would not be expected to persist for very long time periods and, as such, do not resemble adults’ memories of childhood. Despite the surface dissimilarities, Nelson, Fivush, and Hudson have argued that the ability to identify specific instances in memory is critical for voluntary address to long-term memory, and that very young children may be deficient in this regard. B

RESEAKC11 EVIDENCE

I. Narrative Memories of Salient Events Several investigators have questioned preschool children about pinpointed events. Sheingold and Tenney (1982) asked 44-year-old children 20 questions about a sibling’s birth occurring within the past year. To get credit for an answer, children had to provide specific information; for example, responses to the question “What presents did the baby get?” had to be more specific than “ toys. ” Preschoolers were quite proficient at answering the questions. They produced specific responses to 13 of the 20 questions on average, and 9 of the responses were confirmed by mothers’ independent answers to the same questions. Comparisons with older children showed little memory loss over time: Preschoolers’ memory performance was very similar to that of 8- and 12-year olds who recounted the birth of a sibling that had occurred when they were 4 years old. As noted earlier, Sheingold and Tenney found that most adults who were older than 3 years of age when a sibling was born could recount some information about the birth. The strong memory performance of the 4-year olds suggests that adults were in fact remembering nuclear material from childhood. Goodman and colleagues conducted a series of studies probing young chil-

dren’s ability to recall eyewitnesh information. Goodman and Reed (1986) asked 32-year olds, 6i-year olds, and adults to play a “game” with an unfamiliar adult. The game involved following a series of arm movements. Five days later, subjects responded to questions about the encounter. Free recall scores were determined by the number of verified characteristics of the situation present in the accounts. Very large age differences were found in free recall: 3i-year olds correctly recounted less than one unit of information about the event, but 6$-year olds provided 5.5 units and adults provided 17.7 units. Most of the youngest subjects “either recalled nothing or said only I or 2 things” (p. 326), and a few of these responses bore no relation to the actual experience. Significant age differences also were found in correct responses to objective questions, with both older groups outperforming the 3h-ycar olds. However, the magnitude of the youngest group’s deficiency was much smaller than for free recall, with 3j-year olds correctly answering 10 out of 17 questions compared to approximately 12 correct answers for both older groups. The performance of the older groups in Goodman and Reed’s study concurs with the findings of Marin et a / . ( I979), who elicited memories of an altercation between an experimenter and a confederate. Kindergarten and first-grade children remembered less than older children and adults in free recall but not in directed recall: “although young children were unable to freely narrate what they had observed as thoroughly as adults, they were as accurate as adults in answering objective questions” (p. 295). Goodman, Hepps, and Reed (1986, described in Goodman rt a / . . 1987) assessed the recall of 3- to 7-year olds of a potentially stressful blood drawing that had occurred several days earlier. Their performance was similar to that of control children who had had a nonstressful interaction with a laboratory technician, suggesting that stress did not interfere with memory. Goodman et a / . ( 1987) also reported preliminary results of an innoculation study. Forty-eight children between 3 and 6 years of age received a regular innoculation at a clinic, and memory was assessed several days later. In contrast to Goodman and Reed (1986), comparisons between children 3-4 and 5-6 years old showed no age difference in free recall but a significant difference in answers to objective questions. Goodman et al. (1987) suggested that the experiences in the medical studies may have been more familiar to the children and that this familiarity may have reduced age differences i n free recall. Pillemer (1988) interviewed 14 34-year-old and 16 4i-year-old children about their experiences during an unexpected preschool evacuation that had occurred two weeks earlier. Burning popcorn set off a fire alarm, and the children were rushed from the building. The teachers were unaware of the source of smoke, the alarm never had gone off previously, and the children had not experienced an evacuation in the preschool context. In agreement with Goodman and Reed (1986), free recall performance was unimpressive and children recounted more

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information when given direct questions to guide recall. Although the older children recalled more information in both free and cued recall, age differences were not statistically significant. Pillemer examined what was remembered as well as how much was remembered. In response to a direct question about the location in which they heard the alarm, 94% of 4i-year olds gave the expected response: they placed themselves inside the school. Surprisingly, a majority (54%) of 31-year olds stated that they were outside. These responses were not incorrect in a technical sense, in that the alarm still could be heard after the children had retreated to the safety of the playground. Yet the flow of events, the “story” of the evacuation, is very different when the major action occurs outside the school. A typical 41-year old might describe playing with blocks in the classroom and then rushing outside when the alarm sounded. A typical 31-year old might describe sitting on the edge of the sandbox in the playground, singing songs. One possible explanation for the age difference in narrative content is a discontinuity in children’s understanding of what transpired. The 34-year olds may not have fully grasped the causal sequence of events that led to the evacuation: 44% of the older children but only 8% of the younger children spontaneously mentioned “popcorn” or “smoke” as the cause. Many of the accounts of 31year olds lacked any sense of urgency or necessity accompanying the evacuation. What has been learned from studies of young children’s memories of singular events‘? When asked direct, objective questions. preschool children are capable of providing a good deal of accurate information, although probably not as much as older children or adults. Preschoolers’ free recall generally is inferior to cued recall. These general conclusions are consistent with reviews of experimental studies (e.g., Marin et a l . , 1979; Saywitz, 1987; Zaragoza, 1987), which have shown a superiority of cued over free recall: “children’s recall performance can be comparable to that of adults when they are given direct cues, such as specific direct questions, to stimulate recall. . . . Nevertheless, young children generally do have greater difficulty than adults in retrieving information from long-term memory in free-recall situations” (Zaragoza, 1987, p. 65). Pillemer’s (1988) fire alarm study identified additional early qualitative discontinuities in what is remembered about a personal event, and suggested that memory content is influenced by the child’s understanding of the to-be-remembered episode. The number of studies in which preschool children have been questioned about specified events is small. Several factors probably contribute to the paucity of relevant data. First. very few momentous events are experienced by large numbers of preschool children under known and observable circumstances. Second. staging such events is ethically and logistically d cult. Third, young children are not very proficient at verbally answering an experimenter’s questions about a specified event. This lack of proficiency probably explains why researchers have not used this procedure with children under 3 years of age.

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2.

Memories Elicited by Con~~c~rstrtioti or Everylay Activities Memory researchers, recognizing that structured interviews do not elicit optimal performance from preschoolers, have examined memories recounted in more casual encounters. Todd and Pcrlniutter (1980) recorded two 1 -hour unstructured play sessions involving an experimenter and a child. In the context of ongoing play, the experimenter casually asked about past events (e.g., What did you do in school today?). Six 3-year olds and six 4-year olds participated in the exercise. Parents reviewed transcripts of the sessions and provided information about the accuracy of the memories. Even the 3-year olds recounted pinpointed events; both age groups recalled an average of over 20 specific episodes in the two hours of play activity. The specific memories of 3- and 4-year olds were similar in informational complexity, although the younger children required more memory probing. Memories of routine and novel events were reported equally often. About one-half of the memories were elicited by direct questions, and most of the remaining episodes were cued by a physical object or some aspect of the conversation (including the child’s own utterances). Only 8% or recounted events had no identifiable external cue, and specific cues were most effective: “although questions such as ‘What did you do at school today?’ typically produced answers such as ‘Nothing’ or ‘Played,’ questions such iis ‘What did you put on your Christmas tree’?’o r ‘Can you tell me one funny thing that happened at your school‘?’usually elicited information from memory. I t thorefore appears that very young children may require fairly specific direction in order to understand what is required or locate the appropriate information i n memory” (pp. 79-80). Parents judged the memories to be quite accurate, and the age groups did not differ in accuracy. Many of the remembered events had happened recently, with one-half occurring in the past month. The average age of the child at the time of the earliest reported event was 2.4 years for 3-year olds and 2.9 years for 4-year olds. Fivush et al. (1987) also examined preschoolers’ responses to memory questions posed by an experimenter “in the course of playing and talking” ( p . 396). Although the investigators described the children as “2-year-olds,” the average age of the 10 participants was 33 months, just 3 months shy of the average age of the “3-year-old” children interviewed by Todd and Perlmutter ( 1980). Interviews with parents were used t o identify a list of distinctive events that each child had experienced only once or twice. such as the second birthday or a trip to the zoo. Children were asked general questions about these events, followed by more specific probes. Virtually all of the memories were judged by parents to be accurate, and only confirmed infomation was credited as recall, Preschoolers gave responses to slightly over half of the approximately 10 questions posed by the experimenter. The children had memories dating from early in the third year of life: the oldest event had occurred 10 months earlier, and all 10 children recalled at least one event that had occurred 6 months earlier.

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Memories often included specific details. Children had no more difficulty recounting remote than recent events. Over 40% of the information was given in response to initial open-ended questions, indicating that some information was accessible with very little adult guidance. Certain events-Christmas, movieswere commonly remembered, but others-the birth of a sibling, a trip to the zoo or the library-were not. Most (70%) memories were elicited piecemeal by a series of questions posed by the experimenter: “The only apparent organization is the organization provided by the sequence of interviewer questions” (Fivush et d.,1987, p. 403). The large average number of conversational turns per memory (22) also suggests that adults frequently provided the scaffolding for children’s recall. The remaining 30% of memories were recounted in “narrative” form, in which the child organized a response that contained at least “three units” of information on the same topic. The memory did not need to follow a “correct temporal or realworld sequence” (p. 404) to be considered a narrative. Fivush et al. provide the following example of a five-unit memory of a library visit recounted by a 35month-old child: “ I looked at books. 1 picked one out . . . I looked at it and open it . . . my momma did come in” (p. 403). Most (84%) narratives contained fewer than five informational units. Although the investigators asserted that the memories demonstrated “an impressive amount of coherently organized recall” (p. 405), the evidence also points to a preponderance of narratives that either were very brief or were supported by adult guidance. Ratner ( I 980) recorded conversations between mothers and children as they went about their daily routines at home. Ten 24-year-old and 10 34-year-old children participated for four two-hour sessions. Children recalled an average of 7.2 events in conversations with their mothers, far fewer than in the Todd and Perlmutter ( 1980) study, in which an experimenter deliberately elicited memories. Although the ability to answer mothers’ memory questions improved somewhat with age, “only about one-third to one-half” of the questions were answered correctly at either age. Ratner concluded that “Conversations between mother and child concentrated heavily on here-and-now aspects of the world with mothers questioning relatively infrequently about past events and children recalling the past sporadically at best” (p. 64). Nelson and Ross (1980) instructed mothers to keep a diary record of every memory produced by their toddler that referred to happenings occurring at least one week earlier. Nineteen children between 21 and 27 months old and their mothers participated for a 3-month period. An average of six memories per child were recorded, although “these numbers reflect mothers’ recognition of children’s memories and willingness to record them” (p. 94). The results corroborate Ratner’s (1980) finding that identifiable instances of long-term memory in toddlers do not occur in the home with high frequency. Forty percent of memories referred to some aspect of a past event, and the proportion of event memories

increased with age; younger children more often recalled the location of an important person or object. There were no recorded instances of spontaneous or uncued recall. The most comnion cues were locations, objects, and people. Most memories were identified through the child’s verbalizations, although this finding may have reflected mothers’ definitions of what constituted a clear instance of memory. About one-half of the memories were of novel situations and onehalf were of recurring events. The earliest age at which a remembered object or event had been experienced initially was 15 months. Although the 2-year olds appeared to remember scattered events for months, the study “could not, because of the verbal limitations of the children, verify whether their memories were specific autobiographical memories . . . or whether they were indistinguishable from general knowledge” (pp. 96-97). Eisenberg (1985) conducted an unusually rich case study of memories appearing in naturally occurring conversations involving two girls and their families. A wide range of everyday contexts and conversational partners were sampled. Taping began when the girls could produce two-word utterances and continued from ages 21 to 32 months for one child and from 24 to 38 months for the other. Tapes of two two-hour sessions were made every three weeks. Over the course of the study, one child engaged in 57 and the other child 186 distinct discussions of past events. Most recollections were judged by parents and the researchers to be true. The percentage of conversations in which children discussed unique rather than routine aspects of past events increased sharply between 2 and 3 years of age, and the percentage of memories that were elicited by an adult’s question or command decreased over the time period. Most early recollections had an identifiable external cue, but spontaneous recountings became common between 24 and 3 years. Eisenberg identified three general phases in the ability to discuss the past. In the first phase, toddlers’ conversations were guided by adults’ questions: “The girls rarely introduced a past event as the topic and only produced two or more utterances about a topic either when requested to do so or when the additional utterances were simply a repetition of previous ones” (p. 193). Between ages 2 and 3 (at 2 years for one child and 3 years for the other) the girls “became much less dependent on the scaffold provided by the adults’ questions” (p. 193), although the children rarely discussed unique events. Conversations in Phase 2 focused on scripted or general aspects o f events. and the retellings were not bound by the temporal sequence of’the original happenings: “The descriptions of the past were not motivated by a sense o f ‘And then what‘?’,but by a sense of ‘And what else?’ ” (p. 195). By about 28 months one of the two girls moved into a third phase (the other girl remained at Phase 2 until the end of the study). The child recounted past experiences without probing and independently of the recall context. Conversations often contained unique occurrences. Despite these advances, the memories of this 24-year old did not resemble the coherent narratives

characteristic of adult recall. She often failed to state the time and place and to identify the actors; her narratives were disorganized and did not follow a logical sequence; and the child and family members appeared as actors in events i n which they were not participants. Memories took the form of free association, with questionable links between idea units: “ I t was as if one utterance or the mention of one event (or event element) ‘triggered’ another and that element triggered a third. The sense was of a speaker wandering through a conversation, rather than of a speaker with a point and a plan for speaking” (p. 199). However, when the listener was aware of the original circumstances, the stories were comprehensible. Nelson (1988) examined one child’s presleep monologues. The monologues were recorded by the child’s parents when she was between the ages of 2 1 and 36 months. The child had exceptional language skills and was “comparable in many ways to children a year or more older.” Between 21 and 22 months, routines were discussed more frequently than specific memories, but specific memories were more frequent thereafter. The monologues often dealt with variations o n daily routines rather than truly novel events. Novel events that were recounted usually had occurred within the past few months. In contrast to the child’s monologues, pre-bed dialogues with parents contained fewer examples of specific memories. Although the narratives became more coherent as the child approached age 3, they still remained “somewhat loose, with often what seem to be random associations between topics. ” Studies of casual conversations and monologues have identified several general characteristics of preschool children’s personal memories. First, children as young as 21 months converse about the past, although clear references to past events occur infrequently unless an adult makes a systematic effort to elicit memories. Consistent with studies of memories of pinpointed events reviewed earlier, specific verbal cues are more effective elicitors of narrative memorics than are general probes. Second, several changes in memory occur during the third year of life. Young toddlers frequently recall routine occurrences or locations of important people and things, with specific event memories and memories of novel occurrences becoming more frequent by age 3. Conversations of twoyear olds about past events are maintained by direct adult questioning and memories usually are prompted by external cues, but by age 3 some independent, internally cued recall occurs. However, spontaneous, out-of-context remembering is an uncommon conversational activity even at age 4. Third. although young children’s memories frequently appear to be accurate and they make sense to familiar adults, the form of the narratives is very different from adults’ recollections. The memory reports are loose and disorganized, with apparently random associations connecting ideas. The events often are difficult to identify without prior knowledge of person, place, and so forth.

32 I

Behaviorul versus Verbal E.xpressiotis of Eurly Memories As defined in this paper, childhood amnesia refers to the paucity of narrative accounts of early autobiographical events. This definition excludes all memories that are not accompanied by conscious and verbally communicable knowledge of having experienced the event heforc, in one time and one place. An alternative definition of a “remembered” event is an event that has an impact on later behavior (Rovee-Collier & Haync, 1987). Whether or not early experiences influence adult behavior outside of consciousness is not part of Freud’s or modem formulations of childhood arnncsia. Nevertheless. comparisons of verbal and behavioral expressions of early niemorics may help to determine whether the memory failures of young children are attributable to deficient language production. Perhaps fully formed memories are present, but the 2-year-old cannot provide a convincing verbal description. Gray and Fivush (1987) showed 16 2;-year-old children an unusual series of five activities in a laboratory setting ( c . g . , making a “duck pond” with crayons, shells, and glue). One month latcr the children returned to the laboratory and were asked to “do exactly the sanic thing that we did the last time.” Children could either verbally describe thc activities or show by doing. The majority of children’s responses were behavioral. Children’s recall was very accurate and, in contrast to memory studies requiring vcrbal descriptions, coherently organized. Smith, Ratner, and Hobart ( 1987, Experiment 1) had 42 kindergarteners (age unspecified) participate in a clay-making exercise with an experimenter. Children recalled the event immediately and after a two-week delay through action (remaking the clay), object-cuing (providing a verbal description with the ingredients and utensils available), or verbal recall without cues. Children’s memory was much better in the action condition than in the other two conditions: “Thus, children clearly encode many actions fi-om even complex events. but they have difficulty describing these actions cven when very salient event cues are present. Reconstruction of the actions thcmselves was necessary for children t o demonstrate their event knowledge” (p. 21 ) . Although these studies demonstrate that young children can recreate more of an experience with actions than with words, the behavioral reenactment does not clearly demonstrate a personal memory. Children may have learned to perform the activity, yet not have access to a memory of the specific learning episode itself. Nelson and Ross (1980) make the important point that in the absence of language, one cannot tell whether ;I behavior represents a specific past event or more general knowledge about how t o perform in a particular situation. If toddlers have autobiographical memories resembling adults’ memories, memories should not only be expressible through behavior. they also should become verbally expressible when the child has the ability to reconstrue preverbal events in narrative form. I n an ingenious study by Myers er al. (1987), five

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children who were almost 3 years old returned to a laboratory they had visited 15-19 times when they were between 6-40 weeks old. The focus of the original study was infants’ perceptions of auditory space. In the follow-up study, the toddlers were asked direct memory questions ( e . g . , “Do you remember this room?”) and their behavior was videotaped. Behavioral indices indicated that the children remembered activities from two years earlier. For example, they played more with and looked longer at old objects than did control subjects. However, with one exception the children were unable to provide verbal memories. Even the exception (one child correctly predicted that a hidden picture was a whale) did not demonstrate an ability to reconstruct a pinpointed event in narrative form, in that the early activities had been experienced repeatedly. In a few anecdotal reports, toddlers are said to have verbally recounted or labeled events that had occurred prior to the onset of spoken language. The anecdotes do not clearly indicate that the children were remembering onemoment-in-time events rather than general routines. For example, a 3-year old apparently made a reference to the chocolate- or honey-flavored milk in her baby bottle (Todd & Perlmutter, 1980, p. X2), and a toddler who had moved from his old neighborhood before being able to say the name of a friend yelled the name when he passed the house some months later (Nelson & Ross, 1980, p. 96). In both instances, it seems likely that the child was accessing general knowledge rather than one specific occurrence. In any case, such examples are extremely rare (Todd & Perlmutter, 1980). Memories of Specific. Instunces of‘ Recurrent Events Nelson, Fivush, and Hudson (Fivush, 1984; Fivush et al., 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1986) have examined children’s memories of specific instances of routine events-for example, what happened in school yesterday. These studies bear upon childhood amnesia only indirectly. The remembered events are fairly typical, not the type of occurrences that would be expected to persist in memory for years. In addition, only one of these studies (Hudson & Nelson, 1986) included children under 5 years of age. Nevertheless, this research could prove to be relevant to a theory of childhood amnesia (Nelson, 1988). If preschool children are deficient in differentiating specific memories from general event representations or scripts, then one might expect early recollections to be largely devoid of particular episodes. Truly unique (nonrecurrent) events would be memorable but very rare exceptions. Hudson and Nelson (1986, Study 1 ) interviewed 19 3-year olds and 19 5-year olds about snack at camp and also dinner at home. The children were asked a general question (e.g., “What happens when you have snack at camp?”) and a specific question (e.g., “What happened when you had snack at camp yesterday?”). These questions were followed by general probes (e.g., “Anything else’?’’)and temporal probes (e.g., “Then what happened?”).

4.

Children at both ages had more difficulty answering the specific than the general questions: children gave more informaticln in response to “What happens‘?” as opposed to “What happened‘?’’ Atypical information not included in the routine was uncommon even for the specific event descriptions. The authors concluded that “children appeared to draw from general event knowledge in reporting both what happens in general and what happened yesterday for routine events” (p. 263). Fivush (1984) found the same pattern of results in a study of kindergarteners’ memories of school. Children had difficulty recalling specific events from the day before. but they were able to outline the school-day routine. One possible explanation is that specific instances are absorbed by or fused with the general script (Hudson & Nelson, 1986). If this is the case, then memories of novel events should not suffer a similar fate. Hudson and Nelson (1986, Study 1) found that 3- and S-year olds provided more detailed memories of special episodes (“What happened one time R hen you did something really special‘?”) than routine events. In a follow-up study (Hudson & Nelson, 1986, Study 2), 3-, 5-, and 7-year olds recounted three events that according to parents had been experienced many times, a few times, or only once. Details in memory increased as experience with the event decreased. and children in all three age groups provided specific information about infrequent events. Fivush et al. (1984) interviewed 54-year olds about a visit to a tnuseum of archaeology. None of the children had visited the museum before, and they engaged in “hands-on” activities that were unusual in a inuseuni setting. Children’s memories remained specific and accurate even one year after the event. In addition to event novelty, another factor influencing children’s memories appears to be the form of questioning. General temporal terms such as “yesterday” may be ineffective cues. Fivush (1984) reported that specific cues, such as the title of a book read in school yesterday, wer’e more successful. Similarly, Fivush et al. (1984) found that after one year only lone child recalled the museum visit in response to an open-entlcd question, but that specific cues such as “Remember you learned about archaeology?” led to better recall. In a follow-up interview, specific cues elicited accurate memories even after a 4-year time interval (Hudson & Fivush, 1987). E. Gold and Neisser (1980) examined children’s and teenager’s recollections of kindergarten; again, specific cues often were more effective than general probes in eliciting memories. Pillemer et al. (1988) investigated whether specific questions also might be effective in cuing children’s recollections of routine events. Sixteen 5-year-old children were interviewed about dinnertime. In addition to the question “What happened at dinnertime last night?”, children were asked about specific aspects of the event (e.g., “What did you do just before dinner last night’?” “What did you eat for dinner‘?”). When asked direct questions, the children usually provided information not present in their open-ended accounts, and the details often were consistent with independent reports given by parents.

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V. The Emergence of Socially Accessible Memories: An Integration of Research on Children’s and Adults’ Event Recall In this paper we have reviewed much of the evidence bearing upon childhood amnesia. Our initial belief that useful parallels would be found between studies of adults’ and young children’s personal memories has been confirmed. The evidence suggests two phases of accelerated forgetting in childhood-from birth to 3 years and also from 3 to 5 years. In this concluding section, we first summarize the findings for these two age periods, and then present an integrative account of the relationship between early memory development and adult longterm recall. A.

PERSONAL MEMORIES BEFORE ACE 3

Studies of adults’ early memories consistently pinpoint the beginnings of personal event memory between the ages of 3 and 3 years, whether the request is for the first or earliest memory to come to mind, for memories of specific salient events such as the birth of a sibling, for all memories reportable within a limited time period, or for memories elicited by word cues. Of course, individual values are distributed around the average, with some personal life histories starting early in the third year and others commencing after age 4. All studies of adults’ earliest memories are based on verbal reports elicited by requests from an experimenter. Thus, the memory gap before age 3 involves voluntary, out-of-context access to narrative accounts of past episodes. Studies of personal memory in preschool children also have shown memory limitations in the first 24 t o 3 years of life. N o investigators have attempted to elicit personal memories from children under 24 years of age with formal questioning. Memories of specific events are relatively rare in toddlers’ ongoing conversations and everyday activities. Most identifiable event memories are elicited directly by some concrete aspect of the conversation or environment, and toddlers’ talk about the past usually is organized and maintained by adult directives. Toddlers may demonstrate some spontaneous recall in their presleep talk. but these monologues are not part of directed social discourse. These early memory limitations involve verbal expressions. Toddlers are better able to express their memories behaviorally, by re-enacting an activity rather than describing i t , However, behavioral reenactments may indicate general learning rather than memory of the specific episode in which the behaviors were learned. The ability of children to describe in words pinpointed events that occurred before the onset of language has not been demonstrated convincingly. The average age of the earliest memory for adults-about 34 years-is somewhat older than the age at which toddlers begin to communicate their memories

to others. Two factors may contribute to this age ciiscrepancy. First, adults often are asked to recall early events out o f context and in the absence of specific cues. but preschoolers’ memories usually are elicited by concrete cues, conversation. or ongoing activities. Adults’ earliest rriernories night become inore accessible with appropriate cuing. A second factor is especially problematic. In most studies o f the earliest memory, the adult both selects which events to report and also provides age estimates. Adults’ idiosyncratic nicniory sampling is unlikely to identify consistently the earliest extremes. The issue o f adults’ age estimates also is a serious one. A memorable event that occurred when the adult was, say, 28 months old almost certainly was not encoded with a precise temporal marker. Indeed, the concept of a person’s age is only beginning to develop during the early preschool years. How are age estimates assigned by an adult many years later’?Adults may use their general knowledge about cady circumstarices to arrive at an estimate, or they may continue the memory search until a clearly datable event is identified. Episodes occurring later in life --the fourth birthday, the first day of kindergarten, and so on-probably are casicr to date than earlier events because thc remembered information is linked to age. For these reasons, one would not expect exact agreement between thc age of the earliest narrative memories of adults and the emergence of personal memory abilities in young children. B

PERSONAL Mt.MOR16S R t T W E E N AGES 7 AND 5

Most adults are able to describe childhood events dating from the fourth year of life. For example, all of the college students in Sheingold and Tenney’s ( 1982) study who were at least 4 years o f age when a sibling was born could recount some information about the event. but students who were under 3 years old at the time of the birth could not. l‘hc rate of increase in the number of memories accelerates rapidly up to age 5 and thcn levels off. Not only do adults’ memories of childhood become more frequent, but also niernories from later periods contain more information. Winograd and Killinger ( 1983) demonstrated a sharp increase in memory content between ages 4 and 5. Children’s personal memories also change in the 3- to 5-year age range. By age 3 memories of specific events. purticularly unique occurrences, appear with some frequency. For example. 4-year olds are able to recount a sibling’s birth occurring during the past year (Sheingold Kr Tenney, 1982). Children in this age range become progressively less reliant on external cues or memory probes. However, unprompted recall of past events still is a relatively infrequent occurrence, and specific cues are much more effective elicitors of narrative memories than are general questions. Memory narratives of 3-year olds tend to be loose and somewhat disorganized, and they may be connected by associations that are understandable only to familiar adults. As children approach school age. their

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event descriptions more closely adhere to the organization and logic of adults’ memories. In summary, both preschool children and adults are able to recount some specific events occurring in the middle preschool years. Age-related increases occur in the incidence and elaboration of both children’s and adults’ self-generated event narratives. C.

EVIDENCE FOR A DUAL. MEMORY SYSTEM

In our earlier account of childhood amncsia (White & Pillemer, 1979), we argued that the phenomenon could be best understood by positing the existence of two functionally separate memory systems. The first system, present from birth and operational throughout life, is addressable by situational and affective cues. Past experiences are evoked by feelings, locations, or people. The memories are expressed through images. behaviors, or emotions. For example, a 10-month old will respond to the sight of a familiar grandparent with a smile and outstretched arms. The relative is “remembered,” but the memory is not clearly linked to a specific past interaction and is not “transportable” or capable of being communicated to others out of context. Perhaps the infant also would respond to an internal image of grandpa with a smile and reach, but such a memory would be uninterpretable to others and would remain part of the private memory system. The second, socially accessible system, emerges during the preschool years. Memories are addressable through intentional retrieval efforts, apart from the original learning conditions. Furthermore, they are identified by the child as representing personally experienced events and, as such, compose the individual’s personal life history. Event representations entering the higher-order system are actively thought about or mentally processed and thus are encoded in narrative form. Or, they are processed into verbal symbolizations at later times and are brought into socialized memory. Memories in the higher-order system can be accessed and recounted in response to social demands. Although the higher-order memory system comes to predominate in social contexts, it does not replace the primitive system. The two forms of memory probably coexist throughout later childhood and adulthood. The social memory system is engaged when the situation calls for an intentional, purposeful memory search-for example, in responding to a researcher’s queries. When the higherorder system is inactive, as during free association, sleep, or undirected rumination, stored images, feelings, and behaviors may be reinstated automatically by affective or contextual cues. Because many of the studies reviewed in this paper have examined purposeful recall of verbal memories, the age-related changes summarized earlier refer for the most part to changes in the social memory system.

Recent research has provided a clearer picture of how the primitive memory system operates in very early childhood. Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) described an ingenious program of research with young infants. infants show evidence of long-term retention through behavior, especially following reinstatement of original learning cues: “Forgotten memories can be reactivated when the infant reencounters portions of the original context within which an earlier experience occurred” (p. 230). Similarly, when placed in the original learning context 3-year olds in the study by Myers rt ml. (1987) showed behavioral evidence of very long-term remembering. However, they did not appear to “know” that the events had been experienced before, and they were not able to verbalize their memories. Smith et a / . (1987) also have shown that preschoolers can re-enact past experiences that are “forgotten” in the verbal domain. How might adults gain access to early, nonverbal memories? Reinstatement of situational and affective cues should be far more effective than verbal requests: But in every study of infantile anine\iii with which we are familiar, subjects have been asked to retrieve long-term memories with vaguely expressed instructions or with highly limited, supporting contextual cues . . some type of retrieval task having a format more similar to recognilion memory may be more appropnatc. (Daehler & Greco. 1985, p. 74)

One way to reinstate early memories would be to return to the childhood environment (Hall, 1899), but because the scene is viewed from an adult’s perspective, very early memories may not be cued. Far more dramatic and even fanciful recreations may be necessary to return the adult to the physical and emotional perspectives of infancy (Tompkins, 1970). Certain therapeutic environments or states of consciousness may elicit primitive affective cues that trigger early memories (e.g., Easson, 1973). Adults’ long-term memory also could be assessed with behavioral as well as verbal indices. Do adults show differential attention to objects (or enlarged models of objects) that were more or less familiar in infancy’? Behavioral reenactments would not invalidate the phenomenon of childhood amnesia as put forth by Freud and demonstrated in contemporary studies. If Rovee-Collier and Hayne’s ( 1987) definition of remembering is adopted- “If early experiences have an impact o n later behavior, then they must be remembered” (p. 18.5-then remenibcring early childhood is a prominent aspect of psychoanalytic theory. Freud believed that early experiences profoundly influence adult behavior, but that memories of specific events ordinarily are not accessible to adult consciousness. Building on Freud’s writings, researchers investigating infantile amnesia have focused on the conscious awareness of early events. In addition, behavioral reinstatements simply may tap learned routines rather than singular episodes. A critical difference between the two memory systems is language. Is it the primary or perhaps the only difference? The development of autobiographical

memory could be a relatively continuous process, with the emergence of language simply enabling the child to communicate memories to others. If this were the case, the older child or adult should be able to use his or her verbal skills to reconstrue in words the familiar but nonverbal memories of earlier years. Such verbal translations are exceedingly rare. Adults usually do not recount events occurring before age 3, and preschoolers normally do not describe events occurring before the onset of language. Why do early memories remain socially inaccessible after the language performance system is intact‘? Language apparently is not superimposed on an existing memory system. Rather, a new memory system is constructed in the preschool years, with language as the primary medium of expression. D. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCIION OF PERSONAL MEMORY

As preschool children acquire language, they begin to use this symbolic medium to communicate about past events as well as present circumstances. Even toddlers under 3 years of age are asked questions about their remote pasts, and 3-year olds whose mothers ask many questions show better long-term memory (Ratner, 1980). In what ways do conversations about the past foster the development of an autonomous autobiographical memory system‘? Theorists working within the tradition of Vygotsky (Rogoff & Garner, 1984; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984) view memory development as a collective enterprise: . . . mental functioning occurs first between peoplc in social interaction and then within the child on the psychological plane. This implies that mental functions. buch as thinking, reasoning, problem solving, or logical memory. can be carried out in collaboration by several people (on the intcrpsycholoyical plane) as well as by an individual (on the intrapsychological plane). That is, dyads or groups as well as individuals can be agents that think and remember. (Wertsch bt Rogoff, 1984, pp. 1-2)

Studies of children’s narrative memories have demonstrated the predicted progression from collective to individual remembering. For example, Eisenberg (1985) identified a shift in preschooler’s verbal memories from an almost complete reliance on adult guidance or scaffolding to relatively autonomous memory functioning.

I.

Internalizing the Process qf Memory Probing When adults attempt to elicit memories from young children, direct probes are more effective than open-ended questions. This finding is strikingly consistent across studies. For example, 3&year olds who previously interacted with an unfamiliar adult could recall little or no information about the encounter in free recall, but could correctly answer over 50% of objective questions about the event (Goodman & Reed, 1986). Specific questions also are more effective than general probes in eliciting children’s memories of a museum visit (Fivush et ul.,

1984), in talking about idiosyncratic past events with an experimenter (Todd & Perlmutter, 1980), and so forth. Of course, this effect is not limited t o very young children. When adults are asked to remember salient past events, such as the attempted assassination of President Reagan (Pillemer, 1984). information missing from open-ended accounts often can be cued by specific probes. The difference is that adults’ openended narratives are coherent and inforniationally rich. For example, adults in Goodman and Reed’s (1986) study produced 20 times more information in free recall than did 3J-year olds, with the performance of 64-year olds falling in between. The developmental shift in rclinnce o n questions posed by others is an important indicator of the transition to an autonomous, voluntary memory system. Adults may benefit less than young children from direct probes because they can produce relevant memory cues iritcrrici//y. One way to locate a specific episode in memory involves internally generating possible event characteristics and then recognizing the correct alternatives. Aspects of the target episode identified in this fashion may then cue additional details (Glass & Holyoak, 1986; Reynolds & Takooshian, 1988). For example, in trying to remember what happened at lunch yesterday, an adult may wontler “Where was I at noontime‘?” and produce “in my office” or “in a restaurant” as likely alternatives. Recognizing “office” as the correct location niay serve to cue other associations, such as what was eaten or what work was underway. For self-directed recall to succeed, the rememberer must both know what questions to ask and be able to generate possible alternatives. Mental scripts may providc the structure for an internally guided memory search. Nelson and colleagues have done much of the groundbreaking work on script development. By 3 years o f age, children’s thinking is guided by scripts; they “organize their knowledge o f familiar events according to generalized temporal and causal sequences o f acts” (Nelson, Fivush. Hudson, & Lucariello, 1983, p. 57). For example, in response to the question “What happens when y o u make cookies‘?”, a 3-year old replied “Well, you bake them and you eat them” (p. 57). The scripts of 3-year o l d s are more skeletal than those produced by 5-year olds, but “the basics are there“ (Nelson et a / . , 1983, p. 59). Age differences in script production are most apparent when scripts are recited verbally (Adams & Worden, 1986). A script may provide the internal blueprint for what self-directed questions to ask when searching for a past event. Suppose that an adult’s dinnertime script includes expectations for before-dinner activities, where dinner is eaten. who is there, and so on. When attempting to recall dinner last night. these expectations would be translated into memory probes (“Let’s see, where did 1 eat dinner yesterday‘?”). The script also would generate the most likely alternatives (“Was I at home‘? At a restaurant?”). I f an alternative is not recognized, then less

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typical possibilities are considered (“Did 1 have dinner at home‘? No, 1 didn’t get home until well after nine, after I went shopping. I ate a sandwich in the car on the way to the store.”). Script development during the preschool years could contribute to the rapid growth of an autonomous personal memory system. Even preschoolers retain some truly unique episodes in memory, but novel variations on routines may be more salient to older children and adults, whose scripts are more fully elaborated (Hudson & Nelson, 1986). In addition, toddlers’ skeletal scripts could not generate as many self-directed questions as could the more fully formed scripts of older children. In the “baking cookies” example given earlier, the 3-year-old script- “You bake them and you eat them”-could produce questions about these basic activities (e.g., “Did we eat the cookies‘?”). The answers to such rudimentary questions are unlikely to contain distinctive information. An adult script also would include expectations about preparation (made from scratch or from a prepared mix), purpose (snack or dessert), and so forth, that also would generate self-directed probes. This information would not be generated spontaneously by the preschooler’s skeletal script and ordinarily would not be part of the event narrative. If this formulation is correct, the degree of children’s script elaboration should be directly related to memory for specific instances as well as for general routines. Developing an Awareness of Mcmor.y Shuring Developmental differences in script-generated categories of experience alone cannot account for the accelerated forgetting of early memories. After all, Nelson and colleagues have shown that toddlers have rudimentary scripts, yet these expectations infrequently lead to successful self-cuing of specific memories. In addition to having a mental representation of the event categories on which self-directed probes are based, the child must have an awareness that probes can be self-generated, that probing facilitates recall, and that presenting narrative memories to others is a desirable activity. In short, the child must develop a metascript for the process of memory sharing, in which autobiographical memory is viewed as a vehicle for social interaction. Adults know that telling a good story, or successfully recounting a past experience, requires specifying who, what, when, where, and why (Neisser, 1982b). When asked about a past event, the adult automatically generates internal cues relating to these categories, and includes this information in the memory narrative. If distinctive answers to self-directed questions are not readily available, the adult may fill in the expected or “default” value. How does the preschooler develop an awareness of the social functions of memory‘? The most likely source is through interactions with others: “establishing a past that can be travelled through probably depends on socially shared remembering experiences” (Nelson, 1988). Parents talk to children about the

2.

past, providing specific retrieval cues and direct questions. In so doing they provide an external model of memory cuing that, through guided practice, becomes internalized. According to Eisenberg: . . . actual participation in converutions ahout past experiences may have the general effects both of providing the linguistic forms for describing such experiences and of illustrating to children how 10 think about such events and how to internalize the information in such a way that they can report it without further support. (1985. p. 201)

Children must learn that shared recollection is not only appropriate, it is considered important and desirable (Eisenberg, 1985). At what age does an awareness of social functions of memory emerge? In order to converse about the past, language is a necessity. Not until the third year of life do children actively engage in conversations about their pasts, after which children’s understanding of social memory evolves rapidly, facilitated by direct teaching and modelling (Eisenberg, 1985; Nelson, 1988). For example, a parent may provide the initial motivation for remembering (“Remember our visit to grandma’s house? We are going there again today.”) and a specific model of memory probing (“What did you do at Grandma’s house? Do you remember playing on the swing? Eating Grandma’s cookies‘?”). Systematic studies of joint recollection should illuminate these processes. The age at which children begin to discuss their pasts with others-sometime during the third year-immediately precedes the beginnings of autobiographical memory for most adults. Nelson (1988) has proposed that the appearance of conversation about memory in the middle preschool years sets a lower limit on the beginnings of autobiographical memory: In brief, the claim here is not that early autobiographical memory is lost in infantile amnesia, but rather that it never exi\tcd as such . . . what changes in the system is that instead of being lost, nnvel nicrrioriec may be shared and thus retained in a newly esteblished autobiographical system. perhaps throughout life. Of course. once established, the autobiographical system need no longer be dependent upon sharing: that is, after early childhood an experience rieed not be socially shared to be retained in the system, although it frequently will he, and may be held longer if it is.

This proposal leads to the hypothesis that individual or cultural differences in the availability of childhood memories are a product of variation in early patterns of discourse about the past. The continued inaccessibility of very early memories after the child has mastered the conventions of socialized remembering suggests that an event must be processed as part of a higher order, functionally independent, social memory system in order to be retrievable by purposeful, internally guided efforts (White & Pillemer, 1979). Only those events occurring after the child is aware of the social aspects of memory are recognized as part of the autobiographical record. By actively construing an event in relation to the social categories of memory,

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the child recognizes the internal representation as distinct from the original context and can evoke it outside of that context: “One can address this higher order memory as humans ordinarily address one another’s memory” (White & Pillemer, 1979, p. 60). E.

COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIALLY ACCESSIBLE MEMORIES

The preceding discussion identified social interaction as the primary agent through which autobiographical memory is acquired. As parents guide toddlers through discussions about the past, they portray shared recollection as a desirable activity and elicit memories by providing directed probes. With practice, the memory probing process is internalized, and the child is able to cue personal memories internally. Parents and other socializing agents alone probably do not determine the timetable of such instruction. The child must be developmentally ready to acquire the memory processes modeled by adults. Spoken language is a prerequisite. The child must talk about events, comprehend an adult’s questions, and internalize linguistic representations of the adult’s contribution. At the early stages of this process, the child may even ask a self-directed question in its complete linguistic form, in much the same way that a toddler who recently has internalized adults’ prohibitions may vocalize these prohibitions (e.g., the child says “Don’t touch!” when approaching a hot stove). In addition to language, autobiographical memory appears to depend upon other basic cognitive capabilities that develop in the 3- to 5-year age range. Although a 3-year old may recognize the social aspects of remembering, the quality of the narrative product depends on the child’s understanding and reconstrual of the original event. For example, in the study of preschoolers’ memories of a school evacuation following a fire alarm described earlier (Pillemer, 1988), 39- and 42-year olds could recount some information. However, the age groups differed in memory content. The older children’s memories included descriptions of events occurring inside the school when the alarm sounded, but a majority of the 39-year olds located themselves in the playground outside of the school, the spot where they regrouped after the evacuation. Four-year olds but not 3-year olds frequently mentioned burning popcorn as the cause. One possible explanation of these age differences is that the younger preschoolers did not fully understand or integrate the causal sequence of events. The experience was unfamiliar and complex: an alarm sounded and the teachers rushed the children outside, yet the adults had been “fooled” because no real danger existed, but everyone still had to wait for the fire truck before re-entering the school, and so on. Recent studies have shown the causal reasoning of 3-year olds to be different

from older preschoolers’ reasoning. Sophian and Huber (1984) compared the performance of 3- and 5-year olds on causal reasoning tasks and found a shift from judgments based on concrete evidence to judgments based on abstract principles. They concluded that “ a major component of the development of causal reasoning may lie in children’s ability to make sense of novel events, since that is where the difference between empirically and logically based reasoning should be most apparent” (p. 526). Coppens (1985) found that the level of 3- to 6-year olds causal reasoning was related to the ability to differentiate between safe and unsafe situations. Fivush and Mandler ( I 985) discovered developmental differences in preschoolers’ ability to sequence events. The children had more difficulty sequencing uniamiliar than familiar events: “To accomplish this task, children must understand and infer the logical relations linking actions together. Either the understanding of these relations, or the ability to make inferences about them, presents some difficulty for young children” (p. 1444). The 3&year-old children in Pillemer’s (1988) study probably had only a limited understanding of the causal sequence of events. Logical and temporal reconstruction was made even more difficult by the event’s unfamiliarity. The children had no existing script to organize recall, and so located themselves at the end of the “story,” omitting information about prior events. One consequence is that the described experiences, by themselves, may not be recognized as responses to a potentially dangerous situation. Similarly, in later years the memory may cease to be recognizable to the self as a “school evacuation in response to a fire alarm.” The narratives of some 34-year olds resemble Freud’s screen memories, in that they are largely devoid o f the emotional impetus for the activities. Limitations of young preschoolers’ thought in social as well as cognitive domains should have similar influences on the quality of memory reports. Although most theories of socialization deal with the effects of society on the child, children are active participants in the construction of their social reality, and their constructions are constrained by their level of understanding (Fischer, Hand, Watson, Van Parys, & Tucker, 1984). According to Fischer el al. (1984), children progress from an understanding of single social categories at 3 years of age to an understanding of simple relations between categories at age 4. Because 3-year olds do not form relations between categories, they “consistently combine categories that do not belong together and thus construct categories that greatly distort social reality” (p. 59). Memory representations of social events of 3-year olds may not be compatible with adults’ conceptions, and may be difficult to reconstrue using the more sophisticated social categories of the older child or adult. Earlier, we proposed that free recall of personal memories may require generating a series of self-directed questions, probes, or cues. As the social categories of thought change with development (Fischer et al., 1984; Neisser, 1962; Schachtel, 1947), the individual’s self-generated memory cues also are likely to

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change. Accordingly, adults’ efforts to retrieve memories of a preschool evacuation, the birth of a sibling (Sheingold & Tenney, 1982), or the Kennedy assassination (Winograd & Killinger, 1983) would be limited by mismatches between adults’ expectations for these events and the ways that they, as young children, understood and encoded them. How might the mismatch between the experiences of an infant and adult contribute to childhood amnesia‘? Consider the following question posed to adults: “Did you ever intentionally eat an insect?” Most people who grew up in a Western culture are likely to respond with a quick, almost automatic “No.” We have found few exceptions to this rule in an informal sample of friends and colleagues. How do people “know” that they have never intentionally eaten an insect? They may assume that such an atypical event would be remembered. Intentionally eating an insect does not match our usual social conventions. One might generate probes to help stimulate recall of uncommon events (e.g., Have 1 ever visited a culture where insects are part of the diet? Did I ever swallow a bug in school to impress or offend my peers?). The questions are used to probe instances where intentionally eating an insect would be understandable in light of cultural variations on social conventions. Because such instances are uncommon, self-directed probes often will fail to identify a memory. Now consider the same question, amended only slightly: “Did you ever intentionally eat an insect before your third birthday.?” What a difference the age qualifier makes! We suspect that this question rarely would be answered as quickly and assuredly as the first. What probes might one generate to stimulate recall? Certainly not questions about unusual circumstances where conventions could be violated. Intentionally eating an insect hardly violates the social conventions of infancy. This activity probably would have evoked feelings of interest and delight rather than disgust. It would not be categorized as “intentionally eating an insect” in the adult’s sense of what this act entails. Adult expectations and categories are not, to use Schachtel’s terminology, “suitable receptacles for early childhood experiences and therefore not fit to preserve these experiences and enable their recall” (1947, p. 4).

F.

A CONCLUDING IMAGE: SECHENOV‘S LIBRARY AND BEYOND

Research reviewed in this paper points to two general phases of childhood amnesia in adults: birth to 3 years, in which few if any memories are readily accessible; and 3 to 5 years, in which memories are underrepresented relative to later life periods but also show a rapid increase in frequency and elaborateness. Studies of young children’s memories also identify a developmental shift begin-

ning in the third year of life. At this age preschool children become aware of memory as an instrument for social interchange. They become progressively more skilled in the social uses of personal memory, in large part due to the guidance provided by adults. A model of childhood amnesia must account for the shift beginning at about age 3 in both adults’ recollections of childhood and in young children’s personal memory. Ivan Sechenov anticipated contemporary work on memory in his Elements of Thought (1935). I n it he offered a compelling analogy for the differences between the memory of a child and that of an adult: Let us imagine for a moment that the niental stock of an adult is distributed in his memory like books in a well-arranged library, and it becomes at once clear that it must be as difficult to get the necessary ideas from the memory of a child, as it is to find hooks in a badly-organised library. This analogy is extremely tempting. (p. 427)

Sechenov’s “library” provides a useful metaphor for the second phase of early memory development-between ages 3 and 5-and the transition at about age 5 or 6 to a socially accessible memory system (White & Pillemer, 1979). One image-a library-depicts both the memory of a child and that of an adult. The key distinction has to do with differing levels of accomplishment in using a sophisticated internal system of information storage and retrieval. In order to incorporate the first phase of memory development-before the third year of life-into Sechenov’s model, the irnagc needs to be expanded to include a second memory system that predates the “library.” A primitive memory system is present from early infancy onward. The memories are not located together in a well-defined library that can be searched for whatever is needed. The arrangement is orderly, but it is an order of places, emotions, and images. The memories are coded in terms of concrete feelings and situations and reside in all of the locations of one’s life. Memories are discovered as one strolls through the landscape and happens upon them. When the child begins to engage actively in reciprocal conversations about the past, a new memory system emerges. The adult acts as a librarian, helping the child to organize new acquisitions according to conventional social categories of thought, and guiding the child’s early efforts to retrieve information. The adult’s cues direct the child to the proper locations within the emerging system. The child learns the value of a functionally independent system where items are logically organized and readily accessible. With practice, the rules are internalized and the child can find an entry by following self-generated instructions. The existence of a logical filing system does not immediately guarantee adultlike memory performance. The library of the 3-year-old still is somewhat “badly organized” from an adult’s perspective. The initial organizing principles are rudimentary, and the child’s understanding of complex or novel to-be-filed information is limited. The “correct” item may be located, but the child may not

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express its contents in a way that is understandable to an adult. The child even may appear to have found the wrong “book.” Similarly, the adult’s efforts to locate memories that were originally filed in the preschool years are hampered by early limitations in organization and understanding. By about age 5 or 6, the organizing principles presumably are refined enough so that the adult’s retrieval efforts meet with greater success. One characteristic of the socially accessible system is that it is ineffective in locating entries within the primitive system. The rules work only in the library. where memories are filed and retrieved in accordance with established conventions. If one forgoes the socialized filing system-leaves the library-then early irnages may be elicited by contextual or affective reinstatement. Events recorded in the primitive system can be entered into the library at a later time, but this entails recoding and categorizing of the content according to convention. Items from early childhood may be difficult to recognize as part of the self-system, and after reworking they may lose some of their child-like characteristics. As defined in this paper, childhood amnesia is a problem of conscious, purposeful retrieval of early autobiographical memories. Because directed memory searches take place in the library, early unprocessed images usually are not identified. Although salient events must have occurred in one’s early life history, only the library books are referenced in the autobiography. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the Spencer Foundation and by a Brachman Hoffman award from Wellesley College.

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Index A Actualization, normality and, 57 Adaptation, normality and, 67 Affect recollection of childhood events and, 303, 307, 308, 327 social development in infancy and, 13, 14, 25 Affection, social development in infancy and, 9, 23 Aggression normality and, 60, 61 social development in infancy and, 7 Amnesia, childhood, 298, 299 adults, 299-304, 306, 307, 309, 311, 312 socially accessible memories, 324, 327, 335, 336 young children, 321, 322 Analogy, knowledge and, 272, 273, 276 Anger, social development in infancy and, 9 Anxiety, social development in infancy and, 8 Asch and Nerlove study, knowledge and, 271-274 Assertiveness, normality and, 60 Association cognitive psychology and, 74, 87 discrimination learning set and, 155 knowledge and, 270, 280 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 123, 148 psychological linguistics and, 231 recollection of childhood events and, 320 selective attention and, 100, 101, 111, 114 Attachment normality and, 54 social development in infancy and developmental dimensions, 22, 23 methodological dimensions, 27, 28, 33 research, 6, 7 theoretical dimensions, 11, 13, 16 Attention cognitive psychology and, 82, 83 discrimination learning set and, 157-159

psychic conflict and, 251 rule following and, 203, 208 selective, see Selective attention Attitudes, normality and, 57, 60, 61 Automaticity recollection of childhood events and, 302 selective attention and, 100 Aversive stimuli, psychological linguistics and, 224

B Babbling, psychological linguistics and, 227, 228 Bait-shyness, discrimination learning set and, 155 Barker, psychic conflict and, 246, 247 Behavior modification normality and, 58 social development in infancy and, 13 Behaviorism, cognitive psychology and, 73, 74, 77-79, 83, 84 Berlyne, psychic conflict and, 249, 250 Biology knowledge and, 274, 275 normality and environment, 53 range of significance, 63-65 science, value-free, 60 social development in infancy and, 6, 10, 11 Blockade model, recollection of childhood events and, 300, 303, 307, 308 Blocking, selective attention and, 100 Bowlby’s attachment theory, social development in infancy and, 13 Brain, recollection of childhood events and, 301, 302

C Categories knowledge and cognitive development, 288, 291 34 1

342

Index

metaphor, 278 nature, 281, 284 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 147 psychological linguistics and, 225, 234 recollection of childhood events and adults, 301, 305, 308-310 socially accessible memories, 330, 333, 334, 336 Central nervous system, normality and, 57 Childhood amnesia, see Amnesia, childhood Cognitive development discrimination learning set and, 157, 161 knowledge and, 288-292 metaphor, 270, 271, 273-276, 279, 280 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 121-124, 147, 148 normality and, 52, 54, 55, 59 psychic conflict and, 245, 265 Piaget’s theory, 251-253 psychological linguistics and, 224 recollection of childhood events and adults, 299, 301-304, 310, 312 socially accessible memories, 332-334 rule following and, 199, 200 selective attention and, 97, 114 social development in infancy and, 34 developmental dimensions, 23, 26 methodological dimensions, 29, 30 research, 5, 6, 8 theoretical dimensions, 12-14, 16, 17, 19 Cognitive psychology, 73, 74, 88, 89 behaviorism, 77-79 learning theories, 87, 88 methodology, 80-83 models, 83-86 scope, 79, 80 structural psychology, 74-77 Coherence, normality and, 53, 63, 65 Commitment, knowledge and, 287 Competing-strategies theory, discrimination learning set and, 174, 175, 182 Compliance, rule following and, 200-215 Components discrimination learning set and, 169, 170 knowledge and, 284 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 125, 131, 132, 137 rule following and, 205 selective attention and, 105-107, 110

Compounds modified Spence discrimination theory and original theory, 125, 128 stimulus, 131, 132, 136, 140 selective attention and discrimination, 105-107 stimulus, 108-114 Conditional reaction, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 137, 140 Conditioning cognitive psychology and, 80, 85, 87, 88 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 122, 123 original theory, 125, 126 stimulus interaction, 130, 133 psychological linguistics and, 223-226 rule following and, 205, 206, 214 selective attention and, 99, 100, 110, 112 social development in infancy and, 12 Confidence, knowledge and, 283 Conflict, see Psychic conflict Consistency, rule following and, 199 Constraints cognitive psychology and, 88 normality and, 63, 65-67 recollection of childhood events and, 332- 334 Content knowledge and, 275-277 recollection of childhood events and, 336 Context cognitive psychology and, 73, 75 knowledge and, 289, 292 normality and environment, 50 outcomes, 57 range of significance, 62, 67, 68 science, value-free, 61 psychic conflict and, 251 recollection of childhood events and adults, 304 socially accessible memories, 326, 327, 332 young children, 313, 317 selective attention and, 98, 104, 107 social development in infancy and, 33 developmental dimensions, 21, 26 methodological dimensions, 29 research, 10 theoretical dimensions, 14, 16

Index Contingency knowledge and, 287 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 127, 137, 144 psychological linguistics and, 225, 226, 229 rule following and, 192, 215 developmental analysis, 200-208, 210, 211, 213 instructional-control research, 198-200 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 193-197 social development in infancy and, 12, 13 Continuity modified Spence discrimination theory and, 127 selective attention and, 100 Contradiction, psychic conflict and, 252, 253 Coping, social development in infancy and, 19 Correspondence training, rule following and, 210-213, 215 Cues cognitive psychology and, 88 discrimination learning set and, 158, 159 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 146, 147 differential cue-producing responses, 140-146 original theory, 127, 128 stimulus interaction, 129, 134-137. 139 normality and, 55 psychological linguistics and, 228, 229 recollection of childhood events and adults, 301, 302, 307 socially accessible memories, 324-327, 329-333, 335 young children, 316, 317, 319-322 rule following and, 210 selective attention and, 115 discrimination, 99-103, 105, 106 history, 92, 93, 96, 97 social development in infancy and, 9 Culture knowledge and, 275, 292 normality and, 52, 54, 60, 66 environment, 52, 54, 55 range of significance, 66 science, value-free, 60 recollection of childhood events and, 303, 304, 310, 311 social development in infancy and, 6, 15

343

D Day care, social development in infancy and, 16, 19, 29 Decay, recollection of childhood events and, 306, 307 Deprivation psychological linguistics and, 224 social development in infancy and, 5, 22 Deviance, normality and, 65 Differential cue-producing responses, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 124, 140-146 Differentiation, selective attention and, 104, 105, 108 Dilemmas, moral, see Moral dilemmas Dimension discrimination learning set and, 158, 159 knowledge and, 290 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 146 differential cue-producing responses, 140-145 stimulus interaction, 130, 131, 134, 135, 139 selective attention and discrimination, 99, 100, 102, 104-107 history, 97 stimulus compounds, 108, 109, 112-114 Discrimination cognitive psychology and, 87 knowledge and, 281, 282 rule following and developmental analysis, 202-205, 207, 209, 210, 213, 214 instructional-control research, 200 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 194-196 selective attention and, 98, 107, 108 compounds versus components, 105-107 functioning, 98-102 history, 92, 93, 95-97 learning rate, 102, 103 perceptual differentiation, 104, 105 pseudoreversal, 107 stimulus compounds, 110 social development in infancy and, 12 Spence discrimination theory and, see Modified Spence discrimination theory Discrimination learning set, 153, 154, 185 animals, 161, 162 interpretation, 164, 165

344

Index

studies, 162-164 children, 165, 166 components, 169, 170 novelty, 166-1 69 two-mechanism theories, 170-175 definition, 154-156 developmental differences, 175, 176 interpretation, 182-184 novelty, 176-182 theories, 156, 157 attention, 158, 159 rules, 159-161 stimulus-response, 157 suppression of transfer, 157, 158 Disinhibition, cognitive psychology and, 80 Distinctiveness, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 128, 146 original theory, 143, 146 stimulus interaction, 129-131, 134-137, 139 Distraction, selective attention and, 113 Duties, psychic conflict and, 258, 259

E Ego, normality and, 50, 52 Emotion knowledge and, 278, 279 psychic conflict and, 256 recollection of childhood events and adults, 303, 307-312 socially accessible memories, 326, 327, 333, 335 social development in infancy and, 34 developmental dimensions, 22, 26 methodological dimensions, 33 research, 6-11 theoretical dimensions, 13 Encoding recollection of childhood events and adults, 301, 302, 304, 309, 310 young children, 321, 325 selective attention and, 99, 104 Environment knowledge and, 274 normality and, 49, 68 organisms, 51-53 range of significance, 67 psychological linguistics and, 224, 230 recollection of childhood events and, 327

rule following and, 192, 199, 203, 210 selective attention and, 101 Eponymic designation, discrimination learning set and, 165, 166 Equilibration, psychic conflict and, 251-253, 257 Equilibrium, psychic conflict and, 251-253 Error factors, discrimination learning set and, 160, 185 Errors of reference, psychological linguistics and, 230 Excitation discrimination learning set and, 185 animals, 165 children, 171, 174 developmental differences, 178-181 theories, 157 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 125, 127 stimulus interaction, 129, 131-133, 138 Expectations, normality and, 54 Extinction modified Spence discrimination theory and, 148 psychological linguistics and, 225 rule following and, 206 selective attention and discrimination, 100, 102, 103, 106 history, 94-96

F Facial expression knowledge and, 278 psychological linguistics and, 225 social development in infancy and, 8, 9, 31 Facilitation discrimination learning set and, 161 modified Spence discrimination theory and differential cue-producing responses, 141, 143, 144 stimulus interaction, 130, 135 psychological linguistics and, 223, 235 rule following and, 198 selective attention and, 97, 102 Fading, rule following and, 205, 206 Familiarization, discrimination learning set and, 168, 169, 176

Index Fear, social development in infancy and, 8, 9 Feature-integration theory, selective attention and, 113, 114 Feedback, social development in infancy and, 6, 13, 27 Free-choice trials, psychic conflict and, 249, 250 Free recall, recollection of childhood events and, 315, 316

G Generalization discrimination learning set and, 157, 163, 171, 174 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 122, 123, 146 differential cue-producing responses, 144 original theory, 125, 127 stimulus interaction, 129-132 psychological linguistics and, 230 rule following and, 201, 204-215 selective attention and discrimination, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107 history, 95 stimulus compounds, 110 Gestures, psychological linguistics and, 226-229, 238 Global precedence, selective attention and, 112, 113 Goals normality and, 50 psychic conflict and, 248, 249 Godbeer, psychic conflict and, 247-249 Grandparents, social development in infancy and, 7, 21

H Habits discrimination learning set and, 172 modified Spence discrimination theory and original theory, 125-128 stimulus interaction, 129-133, 137, 138 psychic conflict and, 245 Habituation, psychological linguistics and, 223

345

Hierarchical integration, psychic conflict and, 255 Holophrastic speech, psychological linguistics and, 229, 230 Hormones, recollection of childhood events and, 301, 302 Hostility, social development in infancy and, 7 Hyperactivity, normality and, 57, 58 Hypothesis testing, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 147, 148 Hypothesis theory, discrimination learning set and, 160, 164

I Imagery, cognitive psychology and, 82 Imitation psychological linguistics and, 225, 226, 228, 231 rule following and, 206, 210 Infancy knowledge and cognitive development, 288, 290 metaphor, 213-275 recollection of childhood events and, 327, 334, 335 Infancy, social development in, 1, 2, 33, 34 developmental dimensions, 20 critical periods, 21-23 direction of influence, 23, 24 focal period, 21 orientation, 20, 21 unit of analysis, 24-26 methodological dimensions, 27 analysis level, 33 approaches, 28 data collection, 29-33 designs, 27, 28 settings, 28, 29 research biological basis, 10, 11 emotional development, 8-10 maturation of, 2-4 shifts, 4-6 social interactions, 6-8 theoretical dimensions aims, 13, 14 applied orientation, 18-20 culture, 15

346

Index

explanatory models, 11, 12 explanatory processes, 12, 13 other disciplines, 17, 18 scope, 14 secular influences, 15-17 Information processing cognitive psychology and, 74 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 123, 124 recollection of childhood events and, 301 selective attention and, 112-114 Inhibition cognitive psychology and, 80, 87 discrimination learning set and, 185 animals, 165 children, 171, 174 developmental differences, 178-181 theories, 157, 158 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 125-127 stimulus interaction, 129-133, 138 selective attention and, 106 Institutionalization, social development in infancy and developmental dimensions, 22, 23 methodological dimensions, 28 research, 5 theoretical dimensions, 19 Instructional-control research, rule following and, 197-200, 215 Integrality, selective attention and, 108, 109, 112, 114 Intelligence discrimination learning set and, 155 selective attention and, 94, 95 Interaction theory, knowledge and, 272 Interactional equipment, psychological linguistics and, 224-226 Interdisciplinary ties, social development in infancy and, 4, 17, 18, 34 Interference discrimination learning set and children, 170, 171, 174 developmental differences, 181 theories, 165 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 135, 140 selective attention and, 102, 108 Internalization, recollection of childhood events and, 328-332, 335 Introspection, cognitive psychology and, 74-77, 80, 83, 84, 86 Intuitive knowledge, 286

K Knowledge, 269, 270, 292, 293 cognitive development, 288-292 metaphor child’s theory of world, 274, 275 comprehension, 270-274 developmental progression, 276, 277 focus, 215, 276 knowledge, 277-280 nature of, 281 how, 281, 282 nonjustificational theory, 286-288 that, 282-285 truth, 285, 286 Kohlberg, psychic conflict and, 244, 245, 254-258

L Labeling, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 145 Latency of response, psychic conflict and, 259 Learning set, discrimination and, see Discrimination learning set Linguistics psychological, see Psychological linguistics social development in infancy and, 17 Lose-shift, discrimination learning set and animals, 162-165 children, 166, 169-171, 175 definition, 155 developmental differences, 184

M Matching, psychological linguistics and, 229 Maternal care, social development in infancy and, 5 Mediation, knowledge and, 270 Memory childhood events and, see Recollection of childhood events cognitive psychology and, 82, 83, 86 discrimination learning set and, 164, 165 knowledge and, 270, 282, 284, 288

Index

modified Spence discrimination theory and, 121-124, 127 normality and, 54, 55 rule following and, 200 selective attention and, 100 Mental retardation discrimination learning set and children, 168 developmental differences, 181, 182 theories, 159, 161 psychological linguistics and, 235, 236 rule following and, 207, 209 selective attention and, 91, 92, 94, 95 Metaphor, knowledge and, see Knowledge Modeling, rule following and, 209 Modified Spence discrimination theory, 121-125, 146-148 differential cue-producing responses, 140-142, 145, 146 assumptions, 142, 143 implications, 143-145 original theory, 125-129 stimulus interaction, 129-132, 140 hidden implications, 138-140 implications, 133-137 performance equations, 132, 133 transfer of training, 137, 138 Moral development, see Psychic conflict Moral dilemmas, psychic conflict and, 265 empirical study, 261-264 theory, 253-257 Motivation cognitive psychology and, 87 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 125, 132 psychic conflict and, 245 psychological linguistics and, 236 recollection of childhood events and, 309, 331 rule following and, 203

N Neurophysiology, recollection of childhood events and, 301, 302 Niche, normality and, 62, 63, 65, 67 Nonjustificational theory of knowledge, 286-288 Normality, 51, 68 environment, 51-56 outcomes, 57, 58

347

range of significance, 62-68 science, value-free, 58-62 Norms, normality and, 50 range of significance, 63, 67 science, value-free, 59, 61 Novelty discrimination learning set and, 154 animals, 165 children, 166-169, 172, 174, 175 developmental differences, 175-182, 184 psychological linguistics and, 225 recollection of childhood events and, 302, 323 rule following and, 204-206, 209, 210, 213, 214 selective attention and, 92, 99 Nunner-Winkler’s theory, psychic conflict and, 245, 258, 259, 261, 264

0 Oscillating inhibitory potential, cognitive psychology and, 85 Overshadowing, selective attention and, 111

P Paired associates, rule following and, 200 Patterning modified Spence discrimination theory and, 129, 130 selective attention and, 110 Pediatrics, social development in infancy and, 17, 26 Perception knowledge and cognitive development, 290 metaphor, 273, 274, 216, 277 selective attention and, 115 discrimination, 101, 104, 105 history, 96, 97 stimulus compounds, 108, 109, 112-114 social development in infancy and research, 5 , 6 theoretical dimensions, 12-14, 17 Phenomenology, cognitive psychology and, 80, 82 Piaget knowledge and, 273, 275, 289 psychic conflict and, 244, 245, 251-255, 257, 265

348

Index

Positive duties, psychic conflict and, 258-261 Potentiation, selective attention and, 112 Predation, cognitive psychology and, 83 Predictability, social development in infancy and, 13 Prejudice, normality and, 60 Prematurity, social development in infancy and, 17 Problem solving, rule following and, 191, 192 developmental analysis, 212 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 194-197 Pseudoreversal, selective attention and, 107 Psychic conflict, 244-246, 264, 265 empirical study, 259-264 experiments Baker study, 246, 247 Berlyne study, 249, 250 Godbeer study, 247-249 implications, 250 Piaget’s theory, 251-253 positive duties, 258, 259 theory Kohlberg’s theory, 254-258 moral dilemmas, 254 Piaget’s seminal work, 253, 254 Psychoanalysis, recollection of childhood events and, 299, 300, 303, 327 Psychoanalytic theory, social development in infancy and, 5, 14, 20 Psycholinguistics, social development in infancy and, 13 Psychological linguistics, 221-223, 238, 239 development, 223, 224 first-approximation interactions, 230-232 interactional equipment, 224-226 later development, 233 preverbal communication, 226-228 primitive interactions, 228-230 second-approximation interactions, 232, 233 method for study application, 235 description, 233-23 5 example, 235-238 Psychopathology, social development in infancy and, 17 Psychotherapy, recollection of childhood events and, 298, 304

R Range of significance, normality and, 50, 59, 62-68 Reaction time, psychic conflict and, 249, 250 Recognition, social development in infancy and, 8 Recollection of childhood events, 298, 299 adults, 299 childhood amnesia, 299-302 research evidence, 303-310 socially accessible memories, 324 before age 3, 324, 325 between ages 3 and 5, 325, 326 cognitive constraints, 332-334 dual memory system, 326-328 Sechenov’s library, 334-336 social construction, 328-332 young children, 312-314 everyday activities, 317-320 expression, 321, 322 narrative memories, 314-316 recurrent events, 322, 323 Reconstruction, recollection of childhood events and, 300 Reference psychological linguistics and, 222, 226-234, 237-239 social development in infancy and, 9, 10 Reflective reorganization, psychic conflict and, 257 Regularities, discrimination learning set and, 159 Rehearsal normality and, 55 selective attention and, 100 Reinforcement discrimination learning set and, 171, 172, 174, 181 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 125, 127, 128 stimulus interaction, 129, 132, 134, 136, 137 psychological linguistics and, 225, 226 rule following and, 215 developmental analysis, 200, 201, 203-213 instructional-control research, 198, 199 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 193-196 selective attention and, 92, 93, 100

Index

social development in infancy and, 5, 12, 27, 28 Repression, recollection of childhood events and, 299, 300, 303 Response bias, cognitive psychology and, 81 Response shift, discrimination learning set and, 154, 184 animals, 161-165 children, 165-175 developmental differences, 175-184 theories, 160 Responsiveness, social development in infancy and, 6, 7 Retrieval cognitive psychology and, 80, 88 recollection of childhood events and adults, 300-302, 305, 309, 311 socially accessible memories, 331, 334 Reversal discrimination learning set and, 161 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 127, 136, 141, 145 selective attention and, 98, 99, 101-104, 106 Rotation, cognitive psychology and, 81, 82 Rule following, 191, 192, 214, 215 developmental analysis, 200-214 instructional-control research, 197-200 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 192, 193 contingency, 193 problem solving, 194-197 Rules, discrimination learning set and, 159-161

S Scanning, discrimination learning set and, 159 Schizophrenia, normality and, 53 Scripts, recollection of childhood events and, 319, 329, 330, 333 Sechenov’s library, recollection of childhood events and, 334-336 Secular influences, social development in infancy and, 15-17 Selective attention, 114, 115 discrimination, 98, 107, 108 compounds versus components, 105-107 learning rate, 102, 103

349

levels of functioning, 98-102 perceptual differentiation, 104, 105 pseudoreversal, 107 history, 91-94, 97, 98 animal learning, 95, 96 definitions, 96, 97 intelligence, 94, 95 stimulus compounds animal learning, 110-112 information processing, 112-114 trends, 108, 109 Selective reconstruction, recollection of childhood events and, 300 Self-evidence, knowledge and, 285, 286 Self-report, social development in infancy and, 30, 31 Semantics, cognitive psychology and, 78 Separability, selective attention and, 108, 109 Shadowing, cognitive psychology and, 82 Siblings, social development in infancy and, 7, 16, 25 Significance ratings, psychic conflict and, 263 Skinner’s relevant concepts, rule following and, 191-197, 215 developmental analysis, 203, 206, 207 Smiling psychological linguistics and, 226 social development in infancy and developmental dimensions, 27 research, 8, 10 theoretical dimensions, 12, 13 Social interaction, social development in infancy and, 6-8, 11 Spence discrimination theory, see Modified Spence discrimination theory Standard Issue Scoring method, psychic conflict and, 257 Stimulation cognitive psychology and, 84, 85 social development in infancy and, 5, 9, 22 Stimulus cognitive psychology and, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88 discrimination learning set and, 185 animals, 161-165 children, 166-175 definition, 155, 156 developmental differences, 176-180, 182-1 84 theories, 158-160

350

Index

knowledge and, 273 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 122, 146, 147 differential cue-producing responses, 142, 144 interaction, 129-140 original theory, 125, 127, 128 psychic conflict and, 247, 249, 250 psychological linguistics and, 223-225, 228, 229, 231, 232 rule following and, 214 developmental analysis, 201-203, 205, 208-210, 214 instructional-control research, 200 Skinner’s relevant concepts, 194-197 selective attention and, 115 discrimination, 98-103, 106, 107 history, 92, 93, 96, 97 Stimulus preference, discrimination learning set and, 172-174 Stimulus-response cognitive psychology and, 74 discrimination learning set and, 157, 180, 185 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 123 social development in infancy and, 12, 28 Stimulus-reversal, selective attention and, 101, 114 Stranger anxiety, social development in infancy and, 8, 10 Strategy, discrimination learning set and animals, 164 children, 174, 175 theories, 160, 161 Stress recollection of childhood events and, 315 social development in infancy and, 19, 23, 26 Structural psychology, 74-77 Subproblem analysis, selective attention and, 104, 106, 107 Suppression of transfer, discrimination learning set and, 157, 158 Sym bolization knowledge and, 281, 282, 288 psychological linguistics and, 223, 232, 233, 239 recollection of childhood events and, 300, 326, 328 Symptoms, normality and, 53

T Temperament, social development in infancy and, 10, 13 Trade-off, normality and, 63, 65-68 Traits, social development in infancy and, 30, 33 Transfer discrimination learning set and, 156-158, 161 knowledge and, 273, 290 modified Spence discrimination theory and, 127 differential cue-producing responses, 140-145 stimulus interaction, 136 selective attention and discrimination, 101, 102, 106, 107 history, 94 stimulus compounds, 111 Transfer of training, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 122, 137, 138 Transposition, modified Spence discrimination theory and, 128, 140 Two-mechanism theories, discrimination learning set and, 170-175 U

Urnwelt, normality and, 5 5 , 59 V

Vacillation, psychic conflict and, 261-263 Validation, cognitive psychology and, 82 Vicarious trial and error, psychic conflict and, 247, 257, 261, 263 Vocalization, psychological linguistics and, 226-229, 238 W

Win-stay, discrimination learning set and animals, 162-165 children, 166, 169, 170, 174, 175 definition, 155 developmental differences, 176, 178, 183, 184 Word association, knowledge and, 270

Contents of Previous Volumes Evidence for a Hierarchical Arrangement of Learning Processes

Volume 1 Responses of Infants and Children to Complex and Novel Stimulation

Gordon N. Cantor Word Associations and Children’s Verbal Behavior David S. Blermo Change in the Stature and Body Weight of North American Boys during the Last 80 Years

Sheldon H. White Selected Anatomic Variables Analyzed for Interage Relationships of the Size-Size, Size-Gain, and GainGain Varieties

Howard V Meredith AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Howard Y Meredith Discrimination Learning Set in Children

Hayne W Reese Learning in the First Year of Life

Volume 3

Lewis I? Lipsitt Some Methodological Contributions from a Functional Analysis of Child Development

Infant Sucking Behavior and Its Modification

Herbert Kaye

Sidney W Buou and Donald M . Boer The Hypothesis of Stimulus Interaction and a n Explanation of Stimulus Compounding

The Study of Brain Electrical Activity in Infants

Robert J. Ellingson Selective Auditory Attention in Children

Charles C Spiker The Development of “Overconstancy” in Space Perception

Eleanor E. Maccoby Stimulus Definition and Choice

Michael D Zeiler

Joachim E Wohlwill Miniature Experiments in the Discrimination Learning of Retardates

Betty J. House and David Zeaman AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

Experimental Analysis of Inferential Behavior in Children Tmcy S. Kendler and Howard H. Kendler Perceptual Integration in Children

Herbert L. Pick, JL Anne D Pick, and Robert E. Klein

INDEX

Component Process Latencies in Reaction Times of Children and Adults

Raymond H. Hohle Volume 2 AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

The Paired-Associates Method in the Study of Conflict

Aljed Castnneda Transfer of Stimulus Pretraining to Motor PairedAssociate and Discrimination Learning Tasks

Volume 4

Joan H. Cantor The Role of the Distance Receptors in the Development of Social Responsiveness

Richard H. Walters and Ross D Fbrke Social Reinforcement of Children’s Behavior Harold W Stevenson Delayed Reinforcement Effects

Developmental Studies of Figurative Perception

David Elkind The Relations of Short-Term Memory t o Development and Intelligence

John M. Belmont and Earl C Butterjeld Learning, Developmental Research, and Individual Differences

Glenn Errell

Frances Degen Homwitz

A Developmental Approach to Learning and Cognition Eugene S Gollin

Psychophysiological Studies in Newborn Infants S. J. Hutt, H. G. Lenard, and H. F R. Prechtl

35 1

Contents of Previous Volumes

352

Development of the Sensory Analyzers during Infancy

Yvonne Bmckbill and Hiram E. Fitzgerald

Jean L. Bresnahan and Martin M. Shapiro

The Problem of Imitation

Justin Aronfreed AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

Learning Strategies in Children from Different Socioeconomic Levels Time and Change in the Development of the Individual and Society

INDEX

Klaus F Riegel The Nature and Development of Early Number Concepts

Rochel Gelman Volume 5

Learning and Adaptation in Infancy: A Comparison of Models

The Development of Human Fetal Activity and Its Relation to Postnatal Behavior

7iyphena Humphrey

Arnold J. Sameroff AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Arousal Systems and Infant Heart Rate Responses

Frances K. Graham and Jan C. Jackson Specific and Diversive Exploration Volume 8

Corinne Hutt Developmental Studies of Mediated Memory

John H. Flavell Development and Choice Behavior in Probabilistic and Problem-Solving Tasks

L. R. Goulet and Kathryn S. Goodwin

Elaboration and Learning in Childhood and Adolescence

William D Rohwer, Jr Exploratory Behavior and Human Development

Jum C Nunnally and L. Charles Lemond AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Operant Conditioning of Infant Behavior: A Review

Robert C Hulsebus Birth Order and Parental Experience in Monkeys and Man Volume 6

G. Mitchell and L. Schroers

Incentives and Learning in Children

Sam L. Witryol Habituation in the Human Infant Cohen I Wendell E. Jeflrey and Leslie € Application of Hull-Spence Theory to the Discrimination Learning of Children

Fear o f the Stranger: A Critical Examination Harriet L. Rheingold and Carol 0. Eckerman Applications of Hull-Spence Theory to the Transfer of Discrimination Learning in Children

Charles C Spiker and Joan H. Cantor AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Charles C Spiker Growth in Body Size: A Compendium of Findings on Contemporary Children Living in Different Parts of the World Howard I/ Meredith Imitation and Language Development James A. Sherman Conditional Responding as a Paradigm for Observational, Imitative Learning and VicariousReinforcement

INDEX

Volume 7 Superstitious Behavior in Children: An Experimental Analysis

Michael D. Zeiler

Children’s Discrimination Learning Based on Identity or Difference Betty J. House, Ann L. Brown, and Marcia S. Scott Two Aspects of Experience in Ontogeny: Development and Learning

Hans G. Furrh

Jacob L. Gewirtz AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

Volume 9

The Effects o f Contextual Changes and Degree of Component Mastery on Transfer of Training Joseph C Campione and Ann L. Brown Psychophysiological Functioning, Arousal, Attention, and Learning during the First Year of Life Richard Hirschman and Edward S. Katkin Self-Reinforcement Processes in Children

John C Masters and Janice R. Mokros AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Content, oj Preiious

Volume 10

Volumes

353

Life-Span Development of the Theory of Oneself Implications for Child Development

Current Trends in Developmental Psychology

Boyd R. McCandless and Mary Fulcher Geis The Development of Spatial Representations of Large-Scale Environments

Alexander U! Siege1 and Sheldon H. White Cognitive Perspectives on the Development of

Orville G.Brim, JI: Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Childhood Education

Leo Montada and Sigrun-Heide Filipp AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Memory

John W Hagen, Robert H. Jongeward, J r , and Robert I.:Kail, Jr The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know

Ann L. Brown Developmental Trends in Visual Scanning

Mary Carol Day The Development of Selective Attention: From Perceptual Exploration to Logical Search

John C Wright and Alice G. Vlietstra AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 12 Research between 1960 and 1970 on the Standing Height of Young Children in Different Parts of the World

Howard I.I Meredith The Representation of Children’s Knowledge

David Klahr and Robert S. Siegler Chromatic Vision in Infancy

Marc H. Bornstein Developmental Memory Theories: Baldwin and Piaget

Volume 11 The Hyperactive Child: Characteristics, Treatment, and Evaluation of Research Design

Gladys B. Baxley and Judlth M. LeBlanc Peripheral and Neurochemical Parallels of Psychopathology: A Psychophysiological Model Relating Autonomic Imbalance to Hyperactivity, Psychopathy, and Autism

Bruce M. Ross and Stephen M. Kent Child Discipline and the Pursuit of Self: An Historical Interpretation

Howard Gadlin Development of Time Concepts in Children

William J. Friedman AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

lNDEX

Stephen W hrges Constructing Cognitive Operations Linguistically

Harry Beilin Operant Acquisition of Social Behaviors in Infancy: Basic Problems and Constraints

W Stuart Millar Mother-Infant Interaction and Its Study

Jacob L. Gewirtz and Elizabeth F Boyd Symposium o n Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Child Development: Introductory Remarks

Rlul I3 Baltes Theory and Method in Life-Span Developniental Psychology: Implications for Child Development

AIetha Huston-Stein and Rlul B. Baltes The Development of Memory: Life-Span Perspectives

Hayne W Reese Cognitive Changes during the Adult Years: Implications for Developmental Theory and Research

Nancy W Denney and John C. Wrighr Social Cognition and Life-Span Approaches to the Study of Child Development

Michael J. Chandler

Volume 13 Coding of Spatial and Temporal lnformation in Episodic Memory

Daniel B. Berch A Developmental Model of Human Learning

Barry Gholson and Harry Beilin The Development o f Discrimination Learning: A Levels-of-Functioning Explanation

Tracy S. Kendler The Kendler Levels-of-Functioning Theory: Comments and an Alternative Schema

Charles C. Spiker and Joan H. Cantor Commentary on Kendler’s Paper: An Alternative Perspective

Barry Gholson and Therese Schuepfer Reply to Commentaries Tracy S Kendler On the Development of Speech Perception: Mechanisms and Analogies

Itter D. Eimas and Vivien C Tartter

Contents of Previous Volumes

354

The Economics of Infancy: A Review of Conjugate Reinforcement

Carolyn Kent Rovee-Collierand Marcy J Gekoski Human Facial Expressions in Response to Taste and Smell Stimulation

Jacob E. Steiner AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Social Bases of Language Development: A Reassessment

Elizabeth Bates, Inge Bretherton. Marjorie Beeghly-Smith. and Sandra McNew Perceptual Anisotrophies in Infancy: Ontogenetic Origins and Implications of Inequalities in Spatial Vision

Marc H. Bornstein Concept Development

Martha J Farah and Stephen M. Kosslyn Production and Perception of Facial Expressions in Infancy and Early Childhood

Volume 14 Development of Visual Memory in Infants

John S. Werner and Marion firlmutter Sibship-Constellation Effects on Psychosocial Development, Creativity, and Health

Marie Eurle Wagner, Herman J. f? Schubert. and Doniel S. I? Schubert The Development of Understanding of the Spatial Terms Front and Back

Tijfany M. Field and Edra A. Walden Individual Differences in Infant Sociability: Their Origins and Implications for Cognitive Development

Michael E. Lamb The Development of Numerical Understandings Robert S. Siegler and Mitchell Robinson AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Lauren Julius Harris and Ellen A. Strommen The Organization and Control of Infant Sucking C K. Crook Neurological Plasticity, Recovery from Brain Insult, and Child Development

Ian St. James-Roberts

Volume 17 The Development of Problem-Solving Strategies

Lkanna Kuhn and Erin Phelps

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Information Processing and Cognitive Development

Robert Kail and J e f f y Bisanz Research between 1950 and 1980 on Urban-Rural Differences in Body Size and Growth Rate of Children and Youths

Volume 15

Howard Y Meredith Visual Development Reevaluations

in Ontogenesis: Some

Juri Allik and Jaan Valsiner

Word Meaning Acquisition in Young Children: A Review of Theory and Research

Ibmela Blewitt

Binocular Vision in Infants: A Review and a Theoretical Framework

Richard N. Aslin and Susan 7: Dumais Validating Theories of Intelligence

Earl C Butterfield, Dennis Siladi, and John M. Belmont Cognitive Differentiation and Developmental Learning

Language Play and Language Acquisition Stan A. Kuczaj I1 The Child Study Movement: Early Growth and Development of the Symbolized Child

Alexander W Siegel and Sheldon H. White AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

William Fowler Children’s Clinical Syndromes and Generalized Expectations of Control

Fred Rothbaum AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 16 The History of the Boyd R. McCandless Young Scientist Awards: The First Recipients

David Iblermo

Volume 18 The Development of Verbal Communicative Skills in Children Constance R. Schmidt and Scott G. Ftrris Auditory Feedback and Speech Development

Gerald M. Siegel, Herbert L. Pick, J L , and Sharon R . Garber Body Size of Infants and Children around the World in Relation to Socioeconomic Status

Howard I/: Meredith

Contents of Preisious Volumes Human Sexual Dimorphism: Its Cost and Benefit James L. Mosley and Eileen A . Smn Symposium on Research Programs: Rational Alternatives to Kuhn’s Analysis of Scientific ProgressIntroductory Remarks

Hayne CC: Reese, Chairman World Views and Their Influence o n Psychological Theory and Research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan

Willis E: Overton The History of the Psychology of Learning as a Rational Process: Lakatos versus Kuhn

355

Effects of the Knowledge Base on Children’s Memory Strategies

k t e r A. Ornsrein and Mary J Naus Effects of Sibling Spacing on Intelligence, Interfamilial Relations, Psychosocial Characteristics, and Mental and Physical Health

Mazie Enrle Wagner. Herman J I? Schubert, and Daniel S. I? Schubert Infant Visual Preferences: A Review and New Theoretical Treatment Martin S. Banks and Arthur P Ginsburg

k t e r Barker and Barry Gholson Functionalist and Structuralist Research Programs in Developmental Psychology: Incommensurability or Synthesis?

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Harry Beilin In Defense of Kuhn: A Discussion of His Detractors David S. &lermo Comments on Beilin’s Epistemology and Palermo’s Defense of Kuhn

Willis E: Overton From Kuhn to Lakatos to Laudan

k t e r Barker and Barry Gholson Overton’s and Palermo’s Relativism: One Step Forward, Tivo Steps Back

Harry Beilin

Volume 20 Variation in Body Stockiness among and within Ethnic Groups at Ages from Birth to Adulthood

Howard V Meredith The Development of Conditional Reasoning: An Iffy Proposition

David P OBrien Content Knowledge: Its Role, Representation, and Restructuring in Memory Development

Michelene 1: H. Chi and Stephen J Ceci AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX CONTENTS O F PREVIOUS VOLUMES

Descriptions: A Model of Nonstrategic Memory Development

Brian I? Ackerman Reactivation of Infant Memory: Implications for Cognitive Development

Volume 19

Carolyn Rovee-Collier and Harlene Hayne Gender Segregation in Childhood

Response to Novelty: Continuity versus Discontinuity in the Developmental Course of Intelligence

Cynthia A. Berg and Robert J Sternberg Metaphoric Competence in Cognitive and Language Development

Marc Marschark and Lynn Nall The Concept of Dimensions in Developmental Research Stuart 1. Offenbach and Francine C Blunihrrg

Eleanor E. Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin Piaget, .4ttentional Capacity, and the Functional Implications of Formal Structure

Michael Chapman INDEX

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