LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Jeffrey W. Bowlby
Applied Research Branch Human Resources Development Canada
John F Dovidio
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Jeffrey W. Bowlby
Applied Research Branch Human Resources Development Canada
John F Dovidio
Department of Psychology Colgate University
Patrick J. Flinn
Alston and Bird LLP Atlanta, Georgia
Margaret Foddy
School of Psychological Science La Trobe University
Samuel L . Gaertner
Department of Psychology University of Delaware
Karen A . Hegtvedt
Department of Sociology Emory University
Gladys Kafati
Department of Psychology Colgate University
Neil]. MacKinnon
Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of Guelph
Phoebe Riches
School of Psychological Science La Trobe University
Cecilia L . Ridgeway
Department of Sociology Stanford University
Judith G. Smetana
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology University of Rochester
Vii
vu i
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Frans N . Stokman
ICS University of Groningen
John F. Stolte
Department of Sociology Northern Illinois University
Jonathan H. Turner
Department of Sociology University of California, Riverside
Marcel A .L .M . van Assen
ICS University of Groningen
Jelle van der Knoop
DECIDE University of Groningen
Reinier C.H. van Oosten
DECIDE University of Groningen
Henry A . Walker
Department of Sociology University of Arizona
Elaine Wethington
Departments of Human Development and of Sociology Cornell University
Morris Zelditch
Department of Sociology Stanford University
PREFACE
EDITORIAL POLICY Advances in Group Processes publishes theoretical analyses, reviews, and theorybased empirical chapters on group phenomena . The series adopts a broad conception of "group processes ." This includes work on groups ranging from the very small to the very large, and on classic and contemporary topics such as status, power, exchange, justice, influence, decision making, intergroup relations, and social networks . Contributors have included scholars from diverse fields including sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy, mathematics, and organizational behavior . The series provides an outlet for papers that may be longer, more theoretical, and/or more integrative than those published by standard journals . We place a premium on the development of testable theories and theory-driven research . Chapters in the following categories are especially apropos :
•
•
Conventional and unconventional theoretical work, from broad metatheoretical and conceptual analyses to refinements of existing theories and hypotheses . One goal of the series is to advance the field of group processes by promoting theoretical work . Papers that review and integrate programs of research . The current structure of the field often leads to the piecemeal publication of different parts of ix
x
PREFACE
•
a program of research . This series offers those engaged in programmatic research on a given topic an opportunity to integrate their published and unpublished work into a single paper, Review articles that transcend the author's own work are also of considerable interest . Papers that develop and apply social psychological theories and research to macro-sociological processes . One premise underlying this series is that links between macro- and micro-sociological processes warrant more systematic and testable theorizing . The series encourages development of the macro-sociological implications embedded in social psychological work on groups .
In addition the editors are open to submissions that depart from these guidelines .
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 17 This volume of Advances in Group Processes covers a broad section of theory and research . The first two chapters address stereotyping and discrimination . Both contributions emphasize the importance of intergroup relations in the production of seemingly intrapersonal phenomena. In their chapter "Group Identity and Intergroup Relations : The Common In-group Identity Model," Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kafati illustrate how the same social categorization processes that ordinarily lead to prejudice and discrimination, can also be used to reduce them . Their theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that cooperative intergroup contact can significantly alter the cognitive interpretations responsible for prejudice, stereotyping, and behavioral discrimination . The next chapter utilizes a distinct, yet somewhat complementary, theoretical perspective . In "The Affective Dynamics of Stereotyping and Intergroup Relations," MacKinnon and Bowlby show how affect control theory can be used to analyze the connections among stereotypes, intergroup attitudes, and discrimination . Three studies are shown to be consistent with hypotheses derived from the affect control model . Taken together, these two chapters do an especially nice job of extending and integrating research on prejudice and stereotyping . The next two papers deal with important theoretical issues concerning status in task groups . In "The Formation of Status Beliefs : Improving Status Construction Theory," Ridgeway explicates the basic logic of status construction theory . Upon reviewing the theory and evidence for status construction processes, Ridgeway offers a "belief formation" assumption to more formally explain how social interaction fosters consensual status beliefs . Next, Foddy and Riches extend a theory of status cues by specifying how task and categorical markers of status combine to alter social interaction . They argue that task-related cues (such as verbal fluency) can overwhelm the effect categorical membership cues (such as ethnic accent) when the two are opposed. The reason is that the former are more directly
Preface
xi
related to the task outcome . Two studies involving Anglo-Australian and Greek-Australian speakers were found to support the main hypotheses . Three papers tackle various aspects of power in bargaining and exchange . In "Strategic Decision Making," Stokman and collaborators describe a simulation-based methodology for analyzing decisions wherein stakeholders have differing priorities, values, and power capabilities . This technique uses empirical data gathered by subject area specialists to predict the decision process and outcome . Not only do these models generate highly accurate predictions, they also provide a strategic tool for analyzing the decision-making process and potential points of compromise . The next chapter represents an important follow-up to a theoretical paper that appeared in the first volume of Advances in Group Processes more than a decade ago. In "The Normative Regulation of Power," Zelditch and Walker analyze and examine theoretical propositions based on their elaboration of the Dornbush-Scott theory of authority . They report data from nine experiments which scrutinize various implications of the theory . An important finding is that internal self-restraint is a tenuous basis for the normative regulation of power-external constraints play a major role . This trio of papers is rounded out by Stolte's chapter titled `Beyond the Concept of Value in Power-Dependence Theory : Expanding a Model of the `Whole Actor ."' Here, Stolte takes on the important task of clarifying and extending Emerson's unfinished theory of value . His theoretical analysis yields important insights into the kinds of decisions that are based on rational deliberation, versus those guided by feelings and emotions . This analysis also raises important questions about the relationship between value and environmental uncertainty . Readers interested in rational choice theory and/or emotional processes should find Stolte's chapter especially provocative . The next chapter deals with conflict in familial relations . In "Cultural Contexts and Developmental Processes in Adolescent-Parent Relationships" Smetana describes a program of research directed at understanding adolescent-parent conflict within a broader normative context . It is argued that adolescents and parents experience conflict due to divergent perceptions and interpretations of important issues . In turn, these conflicts play an important role in modifying the overall family structure and furthering adolescent development . Data from European American, African American, and Chinese families are compared and contrasted to illustrate the similarities and differences in conflict across cultures . Two chapters deal with the spread or transmission of social phenomena . Wethington's chapter "Contagion of Stress" addresses how social stressors are spread from one area of life to another . Wethington catalogues the major types of stress contagion and reviews the primary theoretical perspectives that are used to understand them . She then discusses in unusually fine detail how these approaches may be improved, arguing for refined measurement procedures, a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, and longitudinal studies of the contagion process . Next, Hegtvedt and Flinn break fresh ground by pushing justice theory in new directions in their chapter titled "Intergenerational Justice and the Environment :
xii
PREFACE
Determining the Fair Use of Mono Basin Water ." They first theoretically assess how fair distributions come to be viewed as unfair, and detail how actors attempt to resolve competing justice claims . These ideas are then applied to the trans-generational distribution of natural resources . An insightful case study involving California water-rights litigation is offered to illustrate the principles involved . Finally, Jonathan H . Turner offers a broad-ranging conceptual framework for analyzing the relations between micro-, meso-, and macro-level forces . Turner claims that "embedded encounters" are shaped by the larger categorical and corporate units in which they occur. He then develops a number of testable propositions and shows how these might be useful for an array of sociological theorizing . The prospects and strategies for building multilevel theory are discussed . Shane R . Thye Edward J . Lawler Michael W . Macy Henry A . Walker Volume Co-Editors
GROUP IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS THE COMMON IN-GROUP IDENTITY MODEL
John F . Dovidio, Samuel L . Gaertner, and Gladys Kafati
ABSTRACT Discrimination is an intergroup as well as an interpersonal phenomenon and is related to fundamental processes associated with social categorization and the development of in-group favoritism . We propose in the Common In-Group Identity Model that by understanding the factors that underlie the development of these intergroup biases, these forces can be redirected to improve intergroup relations . In particular, if members of different groups are induced to recategorize themselves as a superordinate group rather than as two separate groups, intergroup prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination will be reduced through the extension of pro-in-group bias to former out-group members . Moreover, recategorization in the form of a dual identity, in which superordinate and subgroup identities are both salient, can achieve the benefits of a strong superordinate identity without requiring groups to forsake valued ethnic and racial identities . Data reported from laboratory studies, field experiments, and surveys involving a range of different types of groups offer converging evidence in support of the model .
Advances in Group Processes, Volume 17, pages 1-35 . Copyright m 2000 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0651-3 1
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
Overt expressions of prejudice have declined significantly over the past 35 years (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986, 1998 ; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997) . To the extent that prejudice causes intergroup biases (Dovidio . Brigham, Johnson, and Gaertner 1996), corresponding reductions in discrimination would be expected to occur . However, discrimination is shaped by more than personal prejudice (e .g ., LaPiere 1934) . Discrimination is an intergroup as well as an interpersonal phenomenon . Thus, more comprehensive perspectives and strategies for combating discrimination need to consider the nature of the relations between groups as well as between persons . The present chapter therefore examines the role of intergroup processes in both generating and also potentially in improving intergroup relations . In particular, we propose that intergroup contact can reduce social biases by changing the way people view the relations between groups .
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE RELATIONS Psychological and sociological approaches to race relations have traditionally reflected different perspectives . Psychological theories have commonly emphasized the role of the individual, in terms of personality and attitude, in social biases and discrimination (see Duckitt 1992 ; Jones 1997) . Traditional psychological theories, such as the work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 1950), have considered the role of dysfunctional processes on the overt expression of social biases . In addition, contemporary approaches, such as aversive racism and symbolic racism perspectives, have considered the contributions of normal processes (e .g., socialization and social cognition) in the expression of subtle, and often unconscious, biases (Dovidio and Gaertner 1996, 1998 ; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986a ; Kovel 1970 ; Sears 1988) . Sociological theories, in contrast, have frequently emphasized the role of large-scale social and structural dynamics in intergroup relations in general, and in race relations in particular (Blauner 1972 ; Bonacich 1972 ; Wilson 1978) . These theories have considered the dynamics of race relations largely in economic and class-based terms-and often to the exclusion of individual influences (see Bobo 1999) . Despite the existence of such divergent views, both sociological and psychological approaches have converged to recognize the importance of understanding group functions and collective identies on race relations (see Bobo 1999) . Blumer (1958a, 1958b, 1965a, 1965b), for instance, offered a sociologically based approach in which group competition and threat are fundamental processes in the development and maintenance of social biases . Blumer (1958a) wrote : "Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of group position . . . . As such, race prejudice is a protective device . It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group" (p . 5) . From a psychological orientation, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961)
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
3
similarly proposed in their classic Robbers Cave study that the functional relations between groups is the critical factor determining intergroup attitudes . According to this position, which is related to realistic conflict theory (Bobo 1988 ; Bobo and Hutchings 1996), competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination, whereas intergroup interdependence and cooperative interaction that result in successful outcomes reduce intergroup bias . Discrimination can serve less tangible collective functions as well as concrete instrumental objectives . Blumer (1958a) acknowledged that the processes for establishing group position may involve goals such as gaining economic advantage, but they may also be associated with the acquisition of intangible resources such as prestige . Theoretical developments in social psychology, stimulated by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), further highlight the role of group categorization, independent of actual realistic group conflict, on motivations to achieve favorable group identities ("positive distinctiveness") and consequently on the arousal of intergroup bias and discrimination . Personal prejudice and stereotypes, realistic group threat, and symbolic threats reflect different hypothesized causes of discrimination, but they can operate jointly to motivate discriminatory behavior . Bobo and his colleagues (see Bobo 1999) have demonstrated that group threat and personal prejudice can contribute independently to discrimination against other groups . W . Stephan and his colleagues (Stephan and Stephan 2000 ; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwartzwald, and Tur-Kaspa 1998) have also found that personal negative stereotypes, realistic group threat, and symbolic group threat all predict discrimination against other groups (e .g ., immigrants), and each accounts for a unique portion of the effect . The independence of these effects points to different underlying mechanisms . In this chapter we examine how group representations and identities influence the nature of race relations .
INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP PROCESSES The operation of group-level processes is hypothesized to be dynamically distinct from the influence of individual-level processes . Different modes of functioning are involved, and these modes critically influence how people perceive others and experience their own sense of identity . In terms of perceptions of others, for example, Brewer (1988 ; see also Fiske and Neuberg's 1990 Continuum Model) has proposed a "dual process model of impression formation ." The primary distinction in this model is between two types of processing : person based and category based . Person-based processing is bottom-up . It is data-driven, involving the piecemeal acquisition of information that begins "at the most concrete level and stops at the lowest level of abstraction required by the prevailing processing objectives" Brewer 1988, p . 6) . Category-based processing, in contrast, proceeds from global to specific ; it is top-down . In top-down processing, how the external
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
reality is perceived and experienced is influenced by category-based, subjective impressions . According to Brewer, category-based processing is more likely to occur than person-based processing, because social information is typically organized around social categories . With respect to one's sense of identity, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner 1985) view the distinction between personal identity and social identity as a critical one . When personal identity is salient, a person's individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when social identity is salient, "people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others" (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell 1987, p . 50) . Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary . Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction, Verkuyten and Hagendoom (1998) found that when individual identity was primed, individual differences in authoritarianism were the major predictor of the prejudice of Dutch students toward Turkish migrants . In contrast, when social identity (i .e ., national identity) was made salient, in-group stereotypes and standards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes . Thus, whether personal or collective identity is more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others (Kawakami and Dion 1993, 1995) . In general, the social categorization of others and oneself plays a significant role in prejudice and discrimination . We propose, in the Common Ingroup Identity Model, that appropriately engineered social categorization during group contact can play an important role in the reduction of social biases.
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND BIAS Models of category-based processing (Brewer 1988 ; see also Fiske and Neuberg 1990) assume that "the mere presentation of a stimulus person activates certain classification processes that occur automatically and without conscious intent . . . . The process is one of 'placing' the individual social object along well-established stimulus dimensions such as age, gender, and skin color" (Brewer 1988, pp . 5-6) . We have further hypothesized that "a primitive type of categorization may also have a high probability of spontaneously occurring, perhaps in parallel process . This is the categorization of individuals as members of one's ingroup or not" (Dovidio and Gaertner 1993, p . 170) . Because of the centrality of the self in social perception (Higgins and Bargh 1987 ; Kihlstrom et al . 1988), we propose that social categorization involves most fundamentally a distinction between the group containing the self, the in-group, and other groups, the out-groupsbetween the "we's" and the "they' s" (see also Tajfel and Turner 1979 ; Turner et al . 1987) . This distinction has a profound influence on evaluations, cognitions, and behavior .
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
5
Upon social categorization of individuals into in-groups and out-groups, people favor in-group members directly in terms of evaluations and resource allocations (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971), as well as indirectly in valuing the products of their work (Ferguson and Kelley 1964) . Also, in-group membership increases the psychological bond and feelings of "oneness" that facilitates the arousal of promotive tension or empathy in response to their needs or problems (Hornstein 1976) . In part as a consequence, prosocial behavior is offered more readily to in-group than to out-group members (Dovidio et al . 1997 ; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark 1981) . In addition people are more likely to be cooperative and exercise more personal restraint when using endangered common resources when these are shared with in-group members than with others (Kramer and Brewer 1984) . In terms of information processing, people retain information in a more detailed fashion for in-group members than for out-group members (Park and Rothbart 1980), have better memory for information about ways in-group members are similar and out-group members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder 1981), and remember more positive information about in-group than out-group members (Howard and Rothbart 1982) . Moreover, people are more generous and forgiving in their explanations for the behaviors of in-group relative to out-group members . Positive behaviors and successful outcomes are more likely to be attributed to internal, stable characteristics (the personality) of in-group than out-group, whereas members negative outcomes are more likely to be ascribed to the personalities of out-group members than of in-group members (Hewstone 1990) . Relatedly, observed behaviors of in-group and out-group members are encoded in memory at different levels of abstraction (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri and Semin 1989) . Undesirable actions of outgroup members are encoded at more abstract levels that presume intentionality and dispositional origin (e .g ., she is hostile) than identical behaviors of in-group members (e .g ., she slapped the girl) . Desirable actions of out-group members, however, are encoded at more concrete levels (e .g ., she walked across the street holding the old man's hand) relative to the same behaviors of in-group members (e .g ., she is helpful) . Because abstract schemas are resistant to modification, these biases lead to a persistence of more positive cognitions and evaluations about ingroup than out-group members . Thus, in-group/out-group categorization not only initiates bias, but it also helps to maintain biases . Given the centrality and spontaneity of the social categorization of people into in-group and out-group members, how can bias be reduced? One of the most influential strategies involves creating and structuring intergroup contact .
INTERGROUP CONTACT AND THE REDUCTION OF BIAS Over the past half-century, Allport's (1954) revised Contact Hypothesis has been a guiding framework for strategies designed to reduce intergroup bias and conflict
6
JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
(Pettigrew 1998) . This hypothesis proposes that simple contact between groups is not automatically sufficient to improve intergroup relations . Rather, for contact between groups to reduce bias successfully certain prerequisite features must be present. These characteristics of contact include equal status between the groups, cooperative (rather than competitive) intergroup interaction, opportunities for personal acquaintance between the members, especially with those whose personal characteristics do not support stereotypic expectations, and supportive norms by authorities within and outside of the contact situation . Although it is difficult to establish all of these conditions in intergroup contact situations, this formula is effective when these conditions are met (Cook 1984 ; Johnson, Johnson, and Maruyama 1983 ; Pettigrew 1998) . Recent approaches have extended research on the Contact Hypothesis by attempting to understand the potential common processes and mechanisms that these diverse factors engage to reduce bias (Brewer and Miller 1984) . For example, when intergroup contact is favorable and has successful consequences, psychological processes that restore cognitive balance or reduce dissonance produce more favorable attitudes toward members of the other group and toward the group as a whole to be consistent with the positive nature of the interaction . Also, the rewarding properties of achieving success may become associated with members of other groups, thereby increasing attraction (Gaertner et al . 1999) . Intergroup contact can also influence how interactants conceive of the groups and how the members are socially categorized . Cooperative learning and jigsaw classroom interventions (Aronson and Patnoe 1997), which are designed to increase interdependence between members of different groups and to enhance appreciation for the resources they bring to the task, may reduce bias in part by altering how interactants conceive of the group boundaries and memberships .
CONTACT, CATEGORIZATION, AND IDENTITY As we have argued earlier (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, and Rust 1993), the factors specified by the Contact Hypothesis may reduce bias through the process of reducing the salience of the intergroup boundaries or redefining group boundaries . The former process refers to decategorization, whereas the latter process involves recategorization . Decategorization and Personalization
From the perspective of decategorization strategies, intergroup interaction under the conditions specified by the Contact Hypothesis can individuate members and reduce the salience of intergroup boundaries . Interventions that reveal variability in the opinions of out-group members or have out-group members
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
7
respond as individuals rather than as a group renders each member more distinctive and thus weakens the prior categorization scheme (Wilder 1986) . Increasing the perception that both in-group and out-group members are "separate individuals" rather than part of a "we-they" categorization scheme further reduces bias by undermining the effects of pro-in-group biases in evaluations, cognitions, and behavior. Another decategorization strategy of repeatedly criss-crossing category memberships by forming new subgroups each composed of members from former subgroups changes the pattern of who is "in" and who is "out" can also weaken the effects of prior categorization (Urban and Miller 1998) . Brewer and Miller (1984) offered a potentially unifying theoretical framework that posits that the features specified by the Contact Hypothesis (e .g ., equal status, cooperative interaction, self-revealing interaction, and supportive norms) share the capacity to decategorize group boundaries and to promote more differentiated and personalized conceptions, particularly of out-group members . Brewer and Miller propose that personalization, involving the exchange of personal information, can complement and enhance the impact of decategorization . With a more differentiated representation of outgroup members, there is the recognition that there are different types of out-group members, thereby weakening the effects of categorization and its subsequent effects on intergroup bias . During this personalization process, interactants focus on information about an out-group member that is relevant to the self (as an individual rather than self as a group member) . Repeated personalized interactions with a variety of out-group members can, over time, undermine the value of the category stereotype as a source of information about members of that group . The effects of personalization may therefore generalize to new situations as well as to other out-group members who are not present during the intergroup contact situation (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, and Miller 1992 ; Marcus-Newhall, Holtz, and Brewer 1993 ; Miller, Brewer, and Edwards 1985) . Thus, intergroup contact can reduce bias in both an immediate and generalizable fashion (see also, Pettigrew 1997) . In addition to decategorization, we propose that the features specified by the Contact Hypothesis also reduce bias through recategorization that increases rather than decreases the level of category inclusiveness (Gaertner et al . 1993, 1994, 1996) . That is, these contact conditions facilitate a reduction in bias, in part, because they share the capacity to transform members' representations of the memberships from separate groups to more inclusive social entity . However, we do not necessarily consider the decategorization and recategorization frameworks to be completely mutually exclusive theoretically ; we believe them to be capable of working in parallel and complementary ways . Given the complexity of intergroup attitudes, it is plausible that these features of contact operate through several related as well as different pathways .
8
JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI Recategorization
Recategorization, as represented by our own work on the Common In-group Identity Model, involves interventions to change people's conceptions of the memberships from different groups to one, more inclusive group (Gaertner et al . 1993) . The model is rooted in the social categorization perspective of intergroup behavior and recognizes the central role of social categorization in reducing as well as in creating intergroup bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979) . Specifically, if members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves more as a single, superordinate group rather than as two separate groups, attitudes toward former
Conditions of Contact
Representational Mediators
Consequences
Intergroup Interdependence (e.g., joint outcomes)
One Group Recategorization ("We")
Evaluative Consequences (e.g., prejudice)
Group Differentiation (e.g., similarity) Environmental Context (e.g, egalitarian norms) Pre-Contact Experience (e.g., affective priming)
Two Subgroups
in One Group Recategorization ("Us+Them =We") Two Groups Categorization ("We/They") Separate Individuals Decategorization ("Me/You") /
Cognitive Effects (e.g., stereotyping)
Behavioral Effects (e.g., helping)
Figure 1 . Within the Common In-group Identity Model, elements of an intergroup contact situation (e .g, intergroup interdependence) influence cognitive representations of the groups as one superordinate group (recategorization), as two subgroups in one group (recategorization involving a dual identity), as two groups (categorization), or as separate individuals (decategorization) . Recategorization and decategorization, in turn, can both reduce cognitive (e .g., beliefs), affective (e .g ., feelings of empathy), and behavioral (e .g ., helping) biases, but in different ways .
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
9
out-group members will become more positive through processes involving pro-in-group bias . As noted earlier, categorization of a person as an in-group member rather than as an out-group member has been demonstrated to produce more positive evaluations and to influence systematically how people process information in ways that reinforce these favorable attitudes . For instance, changing the basis of categorization from race to an alternative dimension can alter who is a "we" and who is a "they," thus undermining racial biases . Thus, cooperative relationships between group, such as those established in Sherif and colleague's (1961) Robbers Cave study, can reduce bias not only by ameliorating realistic group threat but also by establishing a more inclusive, superordinate group identity (Gaertner et al . 2000) . The Common In-group Identity Model is presented schematically in Figure 1 . On the left, situational factors and interventions, such as intergroup interdependence (which produces cooperative behavior) and group similarities or differences, are hypothesized to influence cognitive representations of the memberships (center) as one group (recategorization), two subgroups in one group or on the same team (recategorization with a dual identity), as two groups (categorization), or as separate individuals (decategorization) . Within the model, intergroup cognition involved in social categorization is the critical mediator of subsequent intergroup attitudes and behavior . The model recognizes that recategorization and decategorization strategies can both reduce prejudice, but in different ways . Recategorization, either in terms of a one group or dual identity representation, reduces bias by extending the benefits of in-group favoritism to former out-group members . Attitudes and behavior toward these former outgroup members thus become more favorable, approaching those toward in-group members . Decategorization, in contrast, reduces favoritism toward original ingroup members as they become perceived as separate individuals rather than as members of one's own group .
INTERGROUP CONTACT AND THE COMMON IN-GROUP IDENTITY MODEL As illustrated in Figure 1, we hypothesize that interventions in intergroup contact situations designed to produce a recategorization of people from members of different groups to members of a common group can have a significant impact on intergroup attitudes (prejudice), stereotypes, and behavior . We summarize empirical evidence consistent with the basic propositions of the model . Intergroup Attitudes Cooperative interaction, which results from intergroup interdependence and superordinate goals, is one of the most powerful and robust aspects of intergroup
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
contact for reducing bias (Sherif and Sherif 1969) . From our perspective, cooperative interaction may enhance positive evaluations of out-group members, at least in part, by transforming interactants' representations of the memberships from two groups to one group . To test this hypothesis directly, we conducted a laboratory experiment that brought two three-person laboratory groups together under conditions designed to vary independently the members' representations of the aggregate as one group or two groups and the presence or absence of intergroup cooperative interaction (Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, and Pomare 1990) . To develop separate group identities and allegiances, participants first worked on a problem-solving task in three-person groups, unaware of the existence of the other group . We then arranged contact between the groups on another problemsolving task (involving survival in the wilderness) in which structural aspects of the situation were designed to emphasize separate or common group identity (e .g ., segregated or integrated seating ; original group names or a new group name for all six participants) . In addition, we manipulated whether the outcome (and potential reward) for their solution to would be evaluated independently for the two three-person groups or jointly for the six-person group . After the interaction, participants evaluated original in-group and out-group members . The "groupness" and the independent/joint outcome manipulations both reduced intergroup bias . Moreover, even when the groups had independent outcomes, participants induced to feel like one group relative to those whose separate group identities were reinforced reported that the aggregate did feel more like one group . They also had lower degrees of intergroup bias in their evaluations of ingroup and out-group members . Consistent with our hypothesis about how interdependent outcomes reduces bias among participants induced to feel like two groups, the information that the joint solution developed by the six-person group would be evaluated increased the extent to which the participants felt like they belonged to one group. Feelings of belonging to one group, in turn, mediated reduced levels of bias in evaluative ratings . Also supportive of the Common Ingroup Identity Model (see also Brewer 1979), reduced bias associated with introducing interdependent outcomes was due to enhanced favorable evaluations of out-group members . More direct support for the hypothesized mediating role of cognitive representations was revealed by the multiple regression mediation approach, a form of path analysis . The results are presented in Figure 2 . The coefficients associated with the paths are standardized beta weights . This analysis indicated that the influence of interdependent relative to independent outcomes on more positive evaluations of out-group members was substantially reduced (i .e ., from a beta of .62 to one of .09 ; see Figure 2) when the mediating effects of group representations and perceptions of cooperation and competition were considered . Furthermore, consistent with our model, among these potential mediators, only the one-group representation related independently to evaluations of out-group members . That is, intergroup interdependence improved attitudes toward the out-
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
11
Individuals
.03
-.59 -.74 i \
Interdependent/ Independent Outcomes
Different Groups
One Group
26
/
~~
. •~-r''r,
Attitudes Toward Outgroup
.80
Cooperation t
I .62 Note :
.09
Thick arrows indicate statistically significant paths (p < .05)
Figure 2.
The mediating role of cognitive representations in the effects of cooperation on the reduction of intergroup bias .
group, and thereby reduced intergroup bias, primarily indirectly by producing more inclusive, one-group representations . The advantage of this experimental design is that interdependence preceded changes in participants' representations of the aggregate from two groups to one group and also changes in intergroup bias . In addition, because we manipulated the representations of the aggregate in the absence of interdependence, the development of a one-group representation preceded changes in intergroup bias . Thus, we can be confident about the directions of causality in this study . In other experiments we have manipulated structural aspects of intergroup contact situations, such as segregated or integrated seating, and found that these manipulations directly influenced group representations and, ultimately, intergroup bias (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986b ; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio 1989) . Taken together, these studies provide convergent evidence for a clear sequence of events and identification of causal relations . In a second series of studies we utilized survey techniques under more naturalistic circumstances . The advantage of these studies is that they may provide more externally valid evidence related to enduring and meaningful groups, often with histories of conflict . One of these studies involved a survey of black, Chinese, Hispanic, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Caucasian students attending a multi-ethnic high school in the northeastern United States (see Gaertner et al . 1994, 1996) . The primary theoretical question we pursued in this study was
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
whether students' perceptions of the student body as one group, different groups "playing on the same team," or separate groups would mediate the proposed relation between their perceptions of the favorableness of the conditions of contact (e .g ., cooperative interaction, equal status ; see Green, Adams, and Turner 1988) and their degrees of intergroup bias . Contact Hypothesis items measuring participants' perceptions of equal status between the groups included items such as, "Teachers at this school are fair to all groups of students ." Group representations were assessed with items such as, "Despite the different groups at school, there is frequently a sense that we are just one group ." One index of intergroup bias included items designed to assess feelings (good, uneasy, bad, respectful) toward one's own ethnic group relative to each of the other ethnic groups . Another index involved rating each ethnic/racial group on a modified "feelings thermometer" (see Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and Fiske 1982 ; Esses, Haddock, and Zanna 1993) . The findings were consistent with the processes we hypothesized in the Common In-group Identity Model . More favorable perceptions of the conditions of intergroup contact predicted stronger representations of the student body as one group and as different groups on the same team, but weaker representations as separate groups . Cognitive representations, in turn, predicted bias . The more the student body was perceived to be one group or different groups on the same team, the lower the bias in affective reactions . The more the student body was perceived as different groups, the greater the bias in favorability . We conducted two additional survey studies of intergroup relations in different contexts-banking mergers (Bachman 1993) and blended families from remarriage (Banker and Gaertner 1998) . In these studies Contact Hypothesis items were adapted, for example, to measure participants' perceptions of equal status between the groups in each context (e .g., "Employees from [the participants' company] and [the other organization] are seen as equal members of the merged organization" for banking mergers ; "My stepparent treats me, my siblings and step-siblings equally" for blended families) . The findings of these studies offered converging support for the hypothesis that the features specified by the Contact Hypothesis improve evaluations of out-group members and decrease intergroup bias by changing members' representations of the groups . In particular, perceptions of more favorable conditions of intergroup contact predicted more inclusive, one-group representations . These representations, in turn, mediated more positive interorganizational and interfamily attitudes . Stereotypes In addition to our evidence that a common superordinate identity increases positive evaluations of people who would otherwise be regarded as out-group members, other researchers (Maass, Ceccarelli, and Rudin 1996 ; Study 2) have demonstrated its capacity to reduce subtle linguistic biases the serve to perpetuate stereotypes (Maass, Ceccarelli, and Rudin 1996 ; Study 2) . Maass and colleagues
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gave northern and southern Italians living in Switzerland messages that emphasized the differentiation between northern and southern Italians (in a two-groups condition), or between Italians and the Swiss (in a superordinate "Italian" condition) . These participants were then shown cartoons depicting northern and southern Italians performing positive and negative behaviors . Participants were then asked to choose one of four response alternatives corresponding to the four levels of abstraction (see Semin and Fiedler 1988) . When the distinction between northern and southern Italians was emphasized, the results replicated the linguistic bias effect . Higher levels of abstraction were used to describe positive behaviors of in-group members (e .g ., she is helpful) than for out-group members (e .g ., she walked with the old lady) . Also, higher levels of abstraction were used to describe undesirable behavior of out-group members than for in-group members . This linguistic bias was not evident in the superordinate identity condition . Thus, a superordinate identity fundamentally changed the way behavioral information about in-group and out-group members was processed and importantly, in a way that reduced this subtle bias in information processing . In addition, research by Karpinski and Von Hippel (1996) revealed that this linguistic bias mediates the extent to which people maintain stereotypic expectancies in the face of disconfirming information . Thus, the development of a common in-group identity can not only reduce general intergroup prejudice but also, by reducing intergroup linguistic bias, can help to change intergroup stereotypes . Intergroup Behaviors
In addition to producing more positive intergroup attitudes and reducing prejudice, the development of a common in-group identity can facilitate more positive intergroup behaviors and thus reduce discrimination . Although the connection between positive intergroup attitudes and behaviors seems intuitive, the extension from evaluative bias to intergroup behavior is not a trivial one . As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, discrimination is shaped by more than prejudice . Indeed, the empirical relationship between evaluative bias and is not particularly strong . In a review of the literature regarding the relationship between racial prejudice and racial discrimination by whites, Dovidio and colleagues (1996) found that the correlation was significant but relatively modest in magnitude (r = .32) . In addition, Struch and Schwartz (1989) demonstrated that intergroup bias and intergroup aggression were virtually unrelated (r = .07) and had different antecedents . The variables that predicted intergroup aggression strongly, such as perceived conflict and trait inhumanity, predicted intergroup bias only weakly, if at all. Struch and Schwartz (1989) concluded, "These results make clear the danger of generalizing from research on in-group favoritism to intergroup aggression" (p . 371) . Thus, in another set of studies we focused the consequences of promoting a common in-group identity for positive behavioral interactions between groups .
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
Although, as Struch and Schwartz's (1989) work demonstrates, intergroup bias and intergroup behavior may have different antecedents, the development of a common in-group identity is likely to influence both evaluations and positive forms of intergroup interaction . With respect to helping, theoretically several factors could contribute to the effects of recategorization on intergroup helping . Recategorization could operate indirectly through several interpersonal processes . Recategorization of a person as an in-group member increases perceptions of shared beliefs (e .g ., Brown 1984; Wilder 1984) . The perception of greater interpersonal similarity, in turn, typically facilitates helping (see Dovidio 1984) . In addition, recategorization may facilitate empathic arousal, whereby a person's motivational system becomes coordinated to the needs of another (Hornstein 1976 ; Piliavin et al . 1981), which may motivate helpful and sometimes altruistic actions (see Batson 1991) . Intergroup processes, as well as interpersonal processes, can promote helping . Hornstein and his colleagues (Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal, and Weitzman 1996 ; Hornstein 1976 ; Hornstein, Masor, Sole, and Heilman 1971) have demonstrated that recognition of common group membership increases helping beyond the mere effects of interpersonal similarity or attraction . Hornstein and his colleagues (Hornstein 1976 ; Sole, Marton, and Hornstein 1975) proposed that factors such as similarity or common fate may give rise to a sense of "we-ness"-a sense of belonging to a common group . This sense of we-ness, in turn, leads to more positive behaviors such as helping, particularly under conditions of threat (Dovidio and Morris 1975 ; Flippen et al . 1996) . Sole and colleagues (1975) suggested that developing this sense of we-ness facilitated helping toward others independent of interpersonal attraction . It is possible that the development of a common in-group identity (the sense of "we-ness") could also facilitate other forms of positive social interaction, such as the exchange of more self-disclosing information among members of the recategorized superordinate group . Recategorization fundamentally involves a more inclusive redefinition of the in-group boundary, and self-disclosure is intimately involved in the regulation of interpersonal boundaries . According to Derlega, Metts, Petronio, and Margulis (1993), "It is useful to consider adjustments in self-disclosure outputs and inputs as similar to the opening and closing of 'boundaries"' (p . 67) . Self-disclosure and interpersonal closeness are reciprocally related. Self-disclosure communicates a desire for intimacy and promotes closeness (Altman and Taylor 1973) ; in turn, as the closeness of the relationship between interactants increases, self-disclosure increases (Dindia and Allen 1992) and can produce even greater involvement with the other person (Davis 1976 ; Derlega and Chaikin 1976 ; Shaffer, Pegalis, and Bazzini 1996). Thus, creating a common in-group identity may produce a bond of closeness that facilitates greater self-disclosure (Derlega et al . 1993), as well as greater trust, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness (Kramer and Brewer 1984) . We therefore hypothesized that recategorization from two groups to one superordinate group would increase both
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helping and self-disclosure between members of former out-groups (see Dovidio et al . 1997) . Following the basic paradigm of Gaertner and colleagues (1990) for manipulating group representations (described earlier), members of two three-person laboratory groups were brought together under conditions (e .g ., integrated or segregated seating, same or different t-shirts) designed to induce them to conceive of themselves as one group or to reinforce their separate group identities . Then, some participants were given an opportunity to help or to engage in a self-disclosing interaction with an in-group or an out-group member . For helping, participants listened individually to an audio-recording of another student (described as either an over or under-estimator, from a previous session) describe how illness had prevented her from completing an important survey of student life for a committee on which she served . Subsequently, participants received a note ostensibly from this person that contained an appeal to help her by placing posters recruiting volunteers to participate in the survey in various locations across campus . The other participants were engaged in a self-disclosure task in which they were asked to discuss the topic, "What do I fear most?" During this task, subjects interacted with either an in-group or out-group member who participated earlier in their session . The results for the helping and self-disclosure measures converged to support predictions from our model . In each case, the bias favoring in-group members, which was present in the two-groups condition, was eliminated for those induced to regard the aggregate as one group . We found further evidence of the benefits of emphasizing a common in-group identity on interracial helping in a field experiment (Ward, Rust, Nier, Gaertner, and Carpenter 1995) . In this study, which was conducted at the University of Delaware football stadium prior to a game between the University of Delaware and Westchester State University, black and white male and female students approached white fans from both universities just before the fans entered the stadium . These fans were asked if they would be willing to be interviewed about their food preferences . Our student interviewers wore either a University of Delaware or Westchester State University hat . By selecting fans who similarly wore clothing that identified their university affiliation, we systematically varied whether fans and our interviewers had common or different university identities in a context in which we expected university identities to be particularly salient . Consistent with the results of our laboratory experiment, white fans' helping behavior toward a black confederate was significantly influenced by making the common university identity salient . The black confederates were helped with the interviewer more when they visibly shared the common group identity than when they did not (60% versus 38%) . The white confederates were helped equivalently across the two conditions (43% versus 40%) . These fans were obviously not color-blind : Only black interviewers who shared common university affiliation with the fans-and who presumably voluntarily assimilated to the fans' salient group identity-were given especially high levels of assistance .
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
These effects of recategorization on both helping and self-disclosure have practical, as well as theoretical, implications . They suggest that recategorization manipulations can help to create interactions among group members in the contact situation that can activate other processes, which can subsequently promote more positive intergroup behaviors and attitudes . In particular, both self-disclosure and helping typically produce reciprocity . More intimate self-disclosure by one person normally encourages more intimate disclosure by the other (Archer and Berg 1978 ; Derlega et al . 1993) . As we discussed earlier, the work of Miller, Brewer, and their colleagues (e .g ., Brewer and Miller 1984 ; Miller et al . 1985) has demonstrated that personalized and self-disclosing interaction can be a significant factor in itself in reducing intergroup bias . Considerable cross-cultural evidence also indicates the powerful influence of the norm of reciprocity on helping (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, and Piliavin 1995) . According to this norm, people should help those who have helped them, and they should not help those who have denied them help for no legitimate reason (Gouldner 1960) . Thus, the development of a common in-group identity can motivate interpersonal behaviors between members of initially different groups that can initiate reciprocal actions and concessions (see Deutsch 1993 ; Osgood 1962) that will not only reduce immediate tensions but can produce more harmonious intergroup relations beyond the contact situation . Although finely differentiated impressions of out-group members may not be an automatic consequence of forming a common in-group identity, these more elaborated, differentiated, and personalized impressions can quickly develop because the newly formed positivity bias is likely to encourage more open communication (Gaertner et al . 1993) . The development of a common in-group identity creates a motivational foundation for constructive intergroup relations which can act as a catalyst for positive reciprocal interpersonal actions . Thus, the recategorization strategy proposed in our model and decategorization strategies, such as individuating (Wilder 1984) and personalizing (Brewer and Miller 1984) interactions, can potentially operate complementarily and sequentially to improve intergroup relations in lasting and meaningful ways . More positive interpersonal and intergroup relations, which predict more inclusive group representations, may not only relate to more positive attitudes toward others but also more favorable feelings about and commitment to one's organization or institution. Both individually and socially, this commitment can have important consequences . For instance, attrition rate is a serious issue for students of color on college campuses (Steele 1997) with between 50 and 60 percent of black and Hispanic college students dropping out of college before receiving their degree (Carter and Wilson 1997 ; Stangor and Sechrist 1998) . Institutional commitment is an important predictor, over and above academic performance, of retention (Bennett and Okinaka 1990) . To explore the applicability of the Common In-group Identity Model to this issue, we reanalyzed data from a racial climate survey of black and white college students attending a midwestern state
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L. GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
university (Snider and Dovidio 1996) . This survey included items assessing satisfaction with the social environment (with other students, faculty, administrators, and the local community), with experience of discrimination (inside and outside the classroom), and with academic factors (high school preparation and current college grade-point average) . Because the survey was designed for other purposes, the group representations identified by the Common In-group Identity Model were not directly included . One item did relate to feeling to a common ingroup identity-"feeling part of the university community ." This item, however, does not distinguish between a one-group representation or a same-team representation (see Figure 1) ; that is, people could feel part of the university community as one, single common group or they could maintain their group's own identity while feeling collectively part of the "same team" (i .e ., the community overall) . Nevertheless, because both of these perspectives represent recategorization within our model, we used this item to reflect the development of a common group identity . The measure of institutional commitment for our analyses was a composite index of intention to complete the degree at the university and willingness to recommend the university to others . Overall, black students were significantly less satisfied with each of the four aspects of the social environment than were white students . Blacks also reported substantially higher rates of discrimination experienced both inside and outside the classroom . In addition, black students felt significantly less a part of the university community and were substantially less committed to the university than were whites . Of relevance to our model, however, was the pattern of mediation . As illustrated in Figure 3, feeling part of the university community was the primary mediator of commitment . When it was considered in the regression equation it significantly predicted commitment while the effects of race and all of the other variables except satisfaction with the administration and with teaching were nonsignificant . The strength of the path from race to institutional commitment, which was initially significant (beta = - .20) was substantially weakened and nonsignificant (beta = - .01) when the measure of feeling part of the university was considered in the equation . When the responses were analyzed separately by race, feeling part of the community was the most influential predictor for both blacks (beta = .52, p < .001) and whites (beta = .42, p < .001) . The only other significant predictor of institutional commitment was satisfaction with the administration for both black (beta = .25, p < .05) and white (beta = .25, p < .01) students . Thus, the development of a common in-group identity may predict not only the nature of the relationship among individuals but also between individuals and the group, which can have important consequences for both . We found a similar pattern of results in a re-analysis of data of white, Latino, and black psychologists employed in academic departments (see Niemann and Dovidio 1998) . A measure of feeling part of the department was created from two related items in the survey : (1) "I have to prove myself to be fully accepted as a
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19
member of my department" (reverse scored), and (2) "I feel free to be myself at work ." The outcome of interest, related to commitment, was job satisfaction (see Niemann and Dovidio 1998) . The responses of whites were compared to those of blacks and Latinos (which did not significantly differ from each other) . Analogous to the findings for students, black and Latino psychologists felt less part of their department and were less satisfied in their position than were white psychologists . Again, consistent with our model, the effect of race/ethnicity on job satisfaction was significantly mediated by feeling part of the department . In general, consistent with the Common In-group Identity Model, we have found evidence that a range of aspects involved in intergroup contact, which have been identified by the Contact Hypothesis as key elements, decrease intergroup bias in part through changing cognitive representations of the groups . Moreover, we have shown that developing a common in-group identity can produce more favorable attitudes, reduce stereotyping, and facilitate greater pro-social and personal interactions with people originally identified as out-group members, and enhance group commitment . Nevertheless, for both practical and theoretical reasons there may be limits to the benefits of interventions designed to emphasize solely a one-group representation .
RECATEGORIZATION AND A DUAL IDENTITY Hewstone (1996) has argued, pragmatically, that interventions designed to create a common in-group identity (such as equal status contact) may not be sufficiently potent to "overcome powerful ethnic and racial categorizations on more than a temporary basis" (p . 351) . Moreover, theoretically, based on the assumptions of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979 ; Turner 1981), introducing equal status interventions in intergroup contact situations may produce threat to the integrity of members' separate group identities and needs for group distinctiveness . Consequently, to re-establish positive and distinctive group identities, members of such equal status, interacting groups may maintain relatively high levels of intergroup bias (Brown and Wade 1987) or even show increased levels of bias (Deschamps and Brown 1983) . Hornsey and Hogg (2000), for instance, found that a condition that emphasized students' common university membership produced even higher levels of bias between humanities and math-science students than did a condition that emphasized their separate group identities . Thus, under some conditions, equal status intergroup interactions may not produce more inclusive group representations nor successfully reduce bias-and may, in fact, exacerbate bias . Under other conditions, however, equal status contact can reduce bias . Hewstone and Brown's (1986 ; see also Hewstone 1996) Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model suggests that equal status interaction reduces intergroup bias when original group identities are salient and are not threatened by contact, such as
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
when the groups have differentiated areas of expertise . Hewstone and Brown (1986) proposed that for contact between members of different groups to reduce bias successfully, "first, that contact should be 'intergroup' not 'interpersonal' ; and second, that an appropriate model of intergroup contact should be based on 'mutual intergroup differentiation"' (Hewstone 1996, p . 333) in which the groups are distinguished by the experience and expertise that they bring to the situation . When the groups are not differentiated in their roles or experience, positive social identity may be threatened (Tajfel and Turner 1979), and bias may be exacerbated rather than reduced (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead 1997) . Furthermore, according to the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model, bias will most effectively be reduced when the groups are encouraged "to recognize mutual superiorities and inferiorities, and to accord equal values to dimensions favoring each group" (Hewstone 1996, p . 334 ; see also Tajfel 1969 ; Turner 1981, 1985 ; van Knippenberg 1984) . Differentiation and a Common In-group Identity
The predictions derived from the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model are not necessarily incompatible with those based on the Common In-group Identity Model . Recategorization into a single, undifferentiated group (a one-group representation) is only one form considered in our model (see Figure 1) . We further propose that the development of a common in-group identity does not necessarily require each group to forsake its less inclusive group identity completely . As Ferdman (1995) notes, every individual belongs to multiple groups . For example, Rodriguez-Scheel (1980) found that Chicanos in Detroit chose nonethnic categories, such as religion, occupation, and family, as often as ethnic labels to describe themselves . Thus, recategorization can also take the form of a dual identity, in which superordinate and subgroup identities are both salient . This type of recategorization is represented by a "different groups working together on the same team" representation . Establishing a common superordinate identity while simultaneously maintaining the salience of subgroup identities (i .e., developing a dual identity as two subgroups within one group) may be particularly effective because it permits the benefits of a common in-group identity to operate without arousing countervailing motivations to achieve positive distinctiveness . We report two studies investigating this hypothesis . In one study (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic 1998) groups of three students were given feedback indicating that, based on their performance on an earlier task, their group was higher, lower, or equal in status than another group with which they were about to cooperate . This status manipulation was crossed factorially with whether the groups were assigned identical or different task perspectives in preparation for their cooperative interaction . The discussions involved the Winter Survival Problem (Johnson and Johnson 1975) and when the groups had different task perspectives, the members of one group were told to assume that
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21
they would hike to safety whereas the members of the other group were asked to assume that they would stay put to await search parties . As predicted, the analyses revealed that when the groups were of equal status and task perspectives were different, intergroup bias was lower and the representation of the aggregate feeling like one group was higher than in each of the other three conditions (i .e., equal status-same task, unequal status-different task, and equal status-same task) . In addition, the one-group representation mediated the relation between the experimental manipulations of status and task perspective on intergroup bias . These findings are consistent with the proposed value of equal status, primarily, as Hewstone and Brown (1986) propose, when the distinctiveness between groups is maintained . In another study (Mottola 1996) relative group status among actual employees of many different companies was varied by asking participants to imagine that their current organization was about to merge with another . In one condition, their present company was described as higher in status than the other in terms of generating greater sales and greater profits . In another condition, their company was lower in status on both dimensions . In a third condition, both companies were described as having equal status in terms of both sales and profit . In a fourth condition, their company was described as higher in status on one dimension (e .g ., profit), but the other company was higher on the other dimension . Consistent with Hewstone and Brown's (1986) ideas about the benefits of maintaining the mutual distinctiveness of groups working together, participants in the fourth condition in which one company had higher profit and the other higher sales anticipated that they would more strongly identify with the merged organization than did participants in each of the other three conditions (which did not differ from one another) . Thus, when each group can maintain positive distinctiveness, we can anticipate greater acceptance of a superordinate identity from the members of both groups . This would be particularly important in organizational settings when subgroups must be formed and only the convergent pattern is realistically possible . Furthermore, when the basis of group differentiation facilitates the merged group's effectiveness, the development of a common group identity could be enhanced . For example, as in this study, when each subgroup contributes a different but necessary component to the merged organization's effectiveness, group differentiation could enhance the acceptance of organizational identification . Beyond generating more positive intergroup attitudes, the degree of organizational unity experienced can have implications for the effectiveness and productivity of a merged organization . For example, we have found that the extent to which members of two groups perceived of themselves as one superordinate group correlated with the actual effectiveness of their task solution (r = .28, p < .02) . This relationship is also consistent with the meta-analytic conclusions of Mullen and Copper (1994) who found that group cohesiveness significantly predicts group productivity (r = .25) . Moreover, Mullen and Copper suggest that the relationship between cohesiveness and productivity may be bidirectional and thus iterative : cohesiveness may enhance productivity, and successful accomplish-
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
ment, in turn, further increases cohesiveness . Indeed, the relationship between successful performance and subsequent productivity is even stronger (r = .51) than the relationship between initial cohesiveness and productivity . Thus, the development of a common ingroup identity can help form a basis for more harmonious intergroup relations to develop through mutual success and achievement, which reinforces the common bond and identity between the groups . As depicted by the "subgroups within one group" (i .e ., a dual identity) representation in our model (see Figure 1), we believe that it is possible for members to conceive of two groups (for example, parents and children) as distinct units within the context of a superordinate (i .e ., family) identity . The development of dual identities, in which groups are allowed or encouraged to maintain their previous group identities while at the same time having salient superordinate identities, is an alternative form of recategorization to the one-group representation . A representation of "different groups on the same team" permits mutual intergroup differentiation while recognizing a common, superordinate group membership . Moreover, this type of recategorization may be particularly effective when people have strong allegiances to their original groups . When group identities and the associated cultural values are central to members' functioning or when they are associated with high status or highly visible cues to group membership, it would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish these group identities or, as perceivers, to be "color-blind ." Indeed, demands to forsake these group identities or to adopt a color-blind ideology would likely arouse strong reactance and result in especially poor intergroup relations (see Schofield 1986) . If, however, people continued to regard themselves as members of different groups but all playing on the same team or as part of the same superordinate entity, intergroup relations between these "subgroups" would be more positive than if members only considered themselves as "separate groups" (see Brewer and Schneider 1990) . In this respect, the benefits of a dual identity may be particularly relevant to interracial and interethnic group contexts . Majority and Minority Group Perespectives
Racial and ethnic identities are fundamental aspects of individuals' self-concepts and esteem and thus are unlikely to be readily abandoned . Thus, attempts to produce a single superordinate identity at the expense of one's racial or ethnic group identity may ultimately be detrimental to intergroup relations . In contrast, the development of a dual identity, in terms of a bicultural or multicultural identity, may not only improve intergroup relations but may also contribute to the social adjustment, psychological adaptation, and overall well-being of minority group members (LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton 1993) . There is evidence intergroup benefits of a strong superordinate identity can be achieved for both majority and minority group members when the strength of the subordinate identity is equivalently high. For example, in a survey study of white
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adults, Smith and Tyler (1996, Study 1) measured the strength of respondents' superordinate identity as "American" and also the strength of their identification as "white ." Regardless of whether they strongly identified with being white, those respondents with a strong American identity were more likely to base their support for affirmative action policies that would benefit blacks and other minorities on relational concerns regarding the fairness of Congressional representatives than on whether these policies would increase or decrease their own well-being . However, for the group who identified themselves more strongly with being white than being American, their position on affirmative action was determined more strongly by concerns regarding the instrumental value of these policies for themselves . This pattern of findings suggests that a strong superordinate identity (such as being American) allows individuals to support policies that would benefit members of other racial subgroups without giving primary consideration to their own instrumental needs . Among people of color, even when racial or ethnic identity is strong, perceptions of a superordinate connection enhance interracial trust and acceptance of authority within an organization . Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996) surveyed white, black, Latino, and Asian employees of a public-sector organization . Identification with the organization (superordinate identity) and racial/ethnic identity (subgroup identity) were independently assessed . Regardless of the strength of racial/ethnic identity, respondents who had a strong organizational identity perceived that they were treated fairly within the organization, and consequently they had favorable attitudes toward authority . Huo and colleagues (1996) conclude that having a strong identification with a superordinate group can redirect people from focusing on their personal outcomes to concerns about "achieving the greater good and maintaining social stability" (pp . 44-45), while also maintaining important racial and ethnic identities . We found converging evidence in our multi-ethnic high school survey study (Gaertner et al . 1996), which we introduced earlier . In particular, we compared students who identified themselves on the survey using a dual identity (e .g ., indicating they were Korean and American) with those who used only a single, subgroup identity (e .g ., Korean) . Supportive of the role of a dual identity, students who described themselves as both American and as a member of their racial or ethnic group had less bias toward other groups in the school than did those who described themselves only in terms of their subgroup identity . Also, the minority students who actually identified themselves using a dual identity reported lower levels of intergroup bias relative to those who only used their ethnic or racial group identity . Not only do whites and people of color bring different values, identities, and experiences to intergroup contact situations, these different perspectives can shape perceptions of and reactions to the nature of the contact . Blumer (1958a) proposed that group status is a fundamental factor in the type of threat that different groups experience . Recent surveys, for example, reveal that blacks show a
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
higher level of distrust and greater pessimism about intergroup relations than do whites (Dovidio and Gaertner 1998 ; Hochschild 1995) . Majority group members tend to perceive intergroup interactions as more harmonious and productive than do minority group members (Gaertner et al . 1996 ; Islam and Hewstone 1993 ; see also the college student survey discussed earlier), but they also tend to perceive subordinate and minority groups as encroaching on their rights and prerogatives (Bobo 1999) . In addition, majority and minority group members have different preferences for the ultimate outcomes of intergroup contact. Whereas minority group members often tend to want to retain their cultural identity, majority group members favor the assimilation of minority groups into one single culture (a traditional "melting pot" orientation)-the dominant culture (Horenczyk 1996) . Berry (1984; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, and Dasen 1992) presents four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies that represent the intersection of "yes-no" responses to two relevant questions : (1) Are cultural identity and customs of value to be retained? (2) Are positive relations with the larger society of value, and to be sought? These combinations reflect four adaptation strategies for intergroup relations : (1) integration, when cultural identities are retained and positive relations with the larger society are sought ; (2) separatism, when cultural identities are retained but positive relations with the larger society are not sought ; (3) assimilation, when cultural identities are abandoned and positive relations with the larger society are desired ; and (4) marginalization, when cultural identities are abandoned and are not replaced by positive identification with the larger society . Although this framework has been applied primarily to the ways in which immigrants acclimate to a new society (van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk 1998), we propose that it can be adapted to apply to intergroup relations between majority and minority groups more generally . Substituting the separate strengths of the subgroup and subordinate group identities for the answers to Berry's (1984) two questions, the combinations map onto the four main representations considered in the Common In-group Identity Model : (1) same team (subgroup and superordinate group identities are high, like integration) ; (2) different groups (subgroup identity is high and superordinate identity is low, like separatism) ; (3) one group (subgroup identity is low and superordinate group identity is high, like assimilation ; and (4) separate individuals (subgroup and superordinate group identities are low, like marginalization) . Research in the area of immigration suggests that immigrant groups and majority groups have different preferences for these different types of group relations . Van Oudenhoven and colleagues (1998) found in the Netherlands that Dutch majority group members preferred an assimilation of minority groups (in which minority group identity was abandoned and replaced by identification with the dominant Dutch culture), whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants most strongly endorsed integration (in which they would retain their own cultural identity while also valuing the dominant Dutch culture) . These preferences also apply to the preferences of whites and of people of color about racial and ethnic group
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relations in the United States . We have found that whites most prefer assimilation, whereas racial and ethnic minorities favor pluralistic integration (Kafati 1999) . Moreover, these preferred types of intergroup relations for majority and minority groups, a one-group representation for whites and same-team representation for people of color, may differentially mediate the consequences of intergroup contact for the different groups . To explore this possibility, we examined how different types of cognitive representations might mediate the relationship between more positive perceptions of intergroup contact and higher levels of institutional commitment among white students and students of color (Kafati 1999) . As in the Snider and Dovidio (1996) survey study of college students considered earlier in this chapter, commitment was chosen as the main outcome variable because attrition rates by race/ethnicity are a widespread concern on college campuses . Perceptions of favorable intergroup contact were measured in the same way as in our multi-ethnic high school study (Gaertner et al . 1996) and included ratings on the dimensions of equal status, supportive norms, personal interaction, and cooperative interaction . Commitment included items about students' intentions to complete their education at the institution and their willingness to recommend the institution to others, as well as questions about the academic and social climate . Whereas in the Snider and Dovidio (1995) survey, only a single item, feeling part of the university community, assessed recategorized representations, this study examined all four cognitive representations identified by the Common In-group Identity Model and hypothesized to represent different models of intergroup relations : perceptions of being (1) one group (assimilation), (2) separate groups (separatism), (3) separate individuals (decategorization/marginalization), and (4) different groups on the same team (integration/multiculturalism) . In addition, participants' identification with their racial or ethnic group was assessed . We hypothesized that the positive relation between perceptions of more favorable intergroup contact and institutional commitment would be mediated by different representations of the groups . Whereas we expected that the relation for whites would be mediated by one-group representations, reflecting an assimilation perspective, we anticipated that the relation for people of color would be mediated by same-team representations, a multicultural perspective that recognizes both one's racial or ethnic group identity and a superordinate identity-a dual identity . The results confirmed the hypothesis . For whites, more positive perceptions of intergroup contact related to stronger perceptions of students consisting of one group, different groups on the same team, and separate individuals, as well as weaker perceptions of different groups . However, when considered simultaneously, only the one-group representation was significantly related to commitment (see Figure 4, top panel) . Supportive of the hypothesized mediation, the relationship between perceptions of more favorable conditions of intergroup contact and greater institutional commitment, which was initially significant (beta = .36), was greatly reduced by the inclusion of one-group representations in the
26
JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
White Students Individuals
Different Groups
Conditions of Contact
One Group
.04
.36
Students ofColor Individuals
Different Groups
Conditions of Contact
Same Team
34
.37 One Group
.24
Figure 4 .
.04
Intergroup Relations and Satisfaction at College for White Students and for Students of Color
Group Identity and Intergroup Relations
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equation (beta = .04) . This pattern of results is also consistent with the finding in our field experiment, described earlier in this chapter, that white football fans responded particularly favorably to blacks who apparently adopted their university affiliation as a superordinate identity . Conditions of contact also significantly predicted each of the representations for students of color . In contrast to the pattern for whites, though, the same-team representation-but not the one-group representation-predicted commitment (see Figure 4, bottom panel) . In general, these effects were stronger for people higher in racial ethnic identification, both for whites and people of color . These findings have practical as well as theoretical implications . Although correlational data should be interpreted cautiously, it appears that, for both whites and people of color, favorable intergroup contact may contribute to their commitment to their institution . However, strategies and interventions designed to enhance satisfaction need to recognize that whites and people of color may have different ideals and motivations . Because white values and culture have been the traditionally dominant ones in the United States, American whites may see an assimilation model, in which members of other cultural groups are absorbed into the "mainstream," as the most comfortable and effective strategy . For people of color, this model, which denies the value of their culture and traditions, may not only be perceived as less desirable but also as threatening to their personal and social identity-particularly for people who strongly identify with their group . Thus, efforts to create a single superordinate identity, although well-intentioned, may threaten one's social identity, which in turn can intensify intergroup bias and conflict .
CONCLUSION Discrimination and bias are group-level as well as individual-level phenomena . Categorizing people as members of one's own group (the in-group) and other groups (out-groups) automatically initiates biases that produce and maintain more positive attitudes, stereotypes, and actions toward in-group than out-group members . We propose that by understanding the processes that underlie the development of these intergroup biases, these forces can be redirected to reduce prejudice and discrimination. In particular, the Common In-group Identity Model involves interventions to change people's conceptions of the memberships from different groups to one, more inclusive group . If members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves more as a single, superordinate group rather than as two separate groups, attitudes toward former out-group members will become more positive through processes involving pro-in-group bias . In general, data from laboratory studies, field experiments, and surveys involving a range of different types of groups offer converging evidence in support of the model .
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JOHN F . DOVIDIO, SAMUEL L . GAERTNER, and GLADYS KAFATI
The development of a common in-group identity does not necessarily require each group to forsake its less inclusive group identity completely . Recategorization can also take the form of a dual identity (such as by a "different groups working together on the same team" representation), in which superordinate and subgroup identities are both salient, and the benefits of a strong superordinate identity can be achieved for both majority and minority group members when the strength of the subordinate identity is high . Moreover, because of the salience and importance of racial and ethnic identities among minority group members relative to majority group members, there tend to be differences in these groups' preferences for recategorization strategies and intergroup relations . We have found, for example, that whites most prefer assimilation (reflecting a one-group identity), whereas racial and ethnic minorities favor pluralistic integration (involving a dual-identity or same-team representation) . Furthermore, these preferred types of intergroup relations for majority and minority groups differentially mediate the consequences of intergroup contact . Whereas a one-group representation is of primary importance for whites, a same-team representation is the critical factor for people of color . Taken together, these findings indicate that, although racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination have long traditions, these biases can potentially be addressed by harnessing the fundamental psychological processes that would typically promote bias and redirecting them to improve intergroup relations . We acknowledge that interventions based on these principles need to be considered carefully . It is important to be cognizant of how interventions might affect social categorization and to be sensitive to the differential effects for majority and minority groups . Nevertheless, understanding the multilevel nature of prejudice and discrimination is an essential step for finding solutions-which may need to be similarly multifaceted .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research described and the preparation of this chapter were supported by NIMH Grant MH 48721 . We are also grateful to the editors and the reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter .
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Snider, K ., and J . F. Dovidio . 1996 . A Survey of the Racial Climate at Indiana State University . Institutional Research and Testing, Indiana State University, Terra Haute, IN . Sole, K., J . Marton, and H . A . Hornstein. 1975 . "Opinion Similarity and Helping : Three Field Experiments Investigating the Bases of Promotive Tension ." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 11 : 1-13 . Stangor, C ., and G . B . Sechrist . 1998 . "Conceptualizing the Determinants of Academic Choice and Task Performance Across Social Groups ." Pp . 105-124 in Prejudice: the Target's Perspective, edited by J . K. Swim and C . Stangor . San Diego, CA : Academic Press . Steele, C . M . 1997 . "A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance." American Psychologist 52: 613-629. Stephan, W . G ., and C . W . Stephan . 2000. "An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice ." in Reducing Prejudice: Claremont Symposium on Applied Psychology, edited by S . Oskamp . Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum . Stephan, W . G ., O . Ybarra, C . Martinez, J. Shwarzwald, and Tur-Kaspa. 1998 . "Prejudice Toward Immigrants in Spain and Israel : an Integrated Threat Analysis Theory ." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29 : 559-576 . Struch, N ., and S . H. Schwartz . 1989 . "Intergroup Aggression : Its Predictors and Distinctness from Ingroup Bias ." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56: 364-373 . Tajfel, H. 1969. "Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice ." Journal of Social Issues 25(4) : 79-97 . Tajfel, H ., M . G . Billig, R . F . Bundy, and C . Flament . 1971 . "Social Categorisation and Intergroup Behavior ." European Journal of Social Psychology 1 : 149-177. Tajfel, H ., and J . C . Turner . 1979 . "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict ." Pp . 33-48 in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by W. G. Austin and S . Worchel. Monterey, CA : Brooks/Cole . Turner, J . C . 1981 . "The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior ." Pp . 66-101 in Intergroup Behavior, edited by J . C . Turner and H . Giles . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press. Turner, J. C . 1985 . "Social Categorization and the Self-concept : a Social Cognitive Theory of Group Behavior ." Pp . 77-122 in Advances in Group Processes, Vol . 2, edited by E . J . Lawler. Greenwich, CT : JAI Press . Turner, J. C ., M. A . Hogg, P . J . Oakes, S . D . Reicher, and M. S . Wetherell . 1987 . Rediscovering the Social Group : A Self-categorization Theory . Oxford, UK : Basil Blackwell . Urban, L. M., and N . Miller . 1998 . "A Theoretical Analysis of Crossed Categorization Effects : A Meta-analysis ." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 : 894-908 . van Knippenberg, A. 1984. "Intergroup Differences in Group Perceptions." Pp . 560-578 in The Social Dimension : European Developments in Social Psychology, Vol . 2, edited by H . Tajfel . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press. van Oudenhoven, J . P., K. S . Prins, and B . Buunk. 1998 . "Attitudes of Minority and Majority Members Towards Adaptation of Immigrants ." European Journal of Social Psychology 28 : 995-1013 . Verkuyten, M ., and L. Hagendoorn. 1998 . "Prejudice and Self-categorization : The Variable Role of Authoritarianism and In-group Stereotypes ." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 99-110. Ward, C. M ., J . Nier, M . C . Rust, S . L . Gaertner, and T . Carpenter. 1995 . "A Game They Came to Watch : A Study of Compliance and Team Membership ." Poster presented at the Annual Eastern Psychological Association Convention, Boston, MA . Wilder, D. A . 1981 . "Perceiving Persons as a Group : Categorization and Intergroup Relations ." Pp . 213-257 in Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior, edited by D . L . Hamilton. Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum . Wilder, D . A. 1984. "Predictions of Belief Homogeneity and Similarity Following Social Categorization ." British Journal of Social Psychology 23 : 323-333 .
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Wilder, D . A. 1986. "Social Categorization : Implications for Creation and Reduction of Intergroup Bias ." Pp . 291-355 in Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol . 19, edited by L . Berkowitz . Orlando, FL : Academic Press . Wilson, W . J . 1978. The Declining Significance of Race . Chicago : University of Chicago Press .
THE AFFECTIVE DYNAMICS OF STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS
Neil J . MacKinnon and Jeffrey W . Bowlby
ABSTRACT Most of the research on stereotyping and intergroup relations in social psychology has been conducted within the social cognition paradigm of psychological social psychology . In this paper we identify three deficits of the social cognition approach to stereotyping and intergroup relations that have hindered its developing a satisfactory explanatory model : first, an overemphasis on cognition and a concomitant neglect of affect ; second, the confounding of affect and cognition by recent attempts to redress this imbalance ; and, third, the tendency to treat the relations among cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of intergroup relations as a one-way causal process, rather than as a system of reciprocal effects and cybernetic control . We show how affect control theory, with its twofold emphasis on affect and control, and its clear distinction between cognition and affect, provides a comprehensive, explanatory model for analyzing stereotyping and intergroup relations . To illustrate this claim, we report three studies based on intergroup attitudes for Canadian regional identities . The first applies the in-group bias/ethnocentrism and out-group
Advances in Group Processes, Volume 17, pages 37-76 . Copyright © 2000 by JAI Press Inc . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0651-3 37
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NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY homogeneity hypotheses from social cognition research on intergroup perceptions to affect control theory data on intergroup attitudes . The second employs the attribution equations of affect control theory to demonstrate how stereotypic traits can be generated from intergroup attitudes for social identities . The third applies the impression formation equations of the theory to analyze the affective outcomes of intergroup relations between Canadians with different regional identities . Our findings reveal qualified support for the application of the in-group bias and out-group homogeneity hypotheses to affect control theory data on intergroup attitudes . In addition, the generation of stereotypic traits from intergroup attitudes for regional identities, and the analysis of affective outcomes of intergroup relations, yield plausible results . Following a discussion of the limitations of our research, we show how social cognition theory and affect control theory are complementary approaches to the study of stereotyping and intergroup relations .
Originally coined by the journalist, Walter Lippman (1922), to refer to the simple, fixed, and often erroneous conceptions people have about members of social groups, stereotype remains a vibrant concept in social psychology 65 years after Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) applied it to the perception of racial groups . While sociologists and sociological social psychologists have often invoked the concept as an assumed antecedent of prejudice and discrimination, they have generally left theoretical and empirical work on stereotyping itself to psychological social psychologists (for a recent exception, see Ford and Tonander 1998) . Most of this work has been conducted within the social cognition paradigm, inspired by Tafjel's (1969, 1970) discovery that prejudice and discrimination can result from the mere categorization of individuals in laboratory settings . In the three decades following Tafjel's pioneering work, social cognition research on stereotyping has produced a massive literature (for concise summaries, see Hamilton and Mackie 1993a; Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford 1991 ; for reviews, see Hamilton, Sherman, and Ruvolo 1990 ; Messick and Mackie 1989 ; for an overview of social cognition theory from a sociological perspective, see Howard 1995). Impressive as this research has been in delineating the content and ascription of stereotypes and identifying some of the underlying cognitive mechanisms and conditions of stereotyping, it has failed to produce an adequate explanatory model of intergroup processes relating stereotypes to intergroup attitudes and behavior . For instance, one textbook laments a decade after Tafjel's (1969, 1970) pioneering work that "theories explaining the psychological process of stereotyping have not been developed or tested as have theories pertaining to the content of stereotypes . . . [and] the selection of target groups" (Albrecht, Thomas, and Chadwick 1980, p . 255) . And 10 years after this sobering assessment, Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford (1991, p. 360) conclude that "despite the voluminous research concerning patterns of social stereotype ascription, there has surprisingly been very little empirical research concerning the relationship between stereotyping and prejudice or between stereotyping and discrimination ."
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Perhaps the past three decades can best be described as a period of normal science (Kuhn 1962), focusing on the implications of Tafjel's (1969, 1970) exemplary research on social categorization . Late into the 1990s research continues to address such conventional issues as differences in perceptions between groups engaged in mutual stereotyping (e .g ., Allen 1996 ; Judd and Park 1995), the perceived variability of in-groups versus out-groups (the out-group homogeneity effect) (e .g ., Judd and Park 1995 ; Lee and Ottati 1995), the favorability of in-groups versus out-groups (the in-group bias or ethnocentrism effect) (e .g., Allen 1996 ; Judd and Park 1995), and the accuracy of intergroup perceptions (e .g ., Ryan 1996) . The failure of social cognition theory to develop a satisfactory, explanatory model of intergroup processes stems in large part from its one-sided emphasis on cognition and its concomitant neglect of affect, along with the confounding of cognition and affect by recent attempts to redress this imbalance . As elaborated below, we attribute this confounding of cognition and affect to two related factors : first, a conceptualization of intergroup attitudes as summary cognitive judgments of group favorability, consisting of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components ; and, second, the use of predictive models to determine the relative contributions of these components to intergroup attitudes . For example, Esses, Haddock, and Zanna (1993) and Stangor and colleagues (1991) regressed intergroup attitudes (a single-item measure of group favorability) on personal and/or consensual stereotypes (the traits ascribed to members of social groups) and group-elicited emotions (the feelings evoked by members of social groups) . Both studies found that, net of group-elicited emotions, stereotypes play a negligible role in predicting intergroup attitudes . What are we to conclude from these implausible findings? To begin with, they are hardly surprising . The fact that both the attitude criterion and the emotions predictors are affective phenomena disadvantages stereotypic traits as predictors of intergroup attitudes . Contrary to the view that intergroup attitudes can be reduced to cognitive judgments of group favorability, we maintain that affect is involved in all such judgments . As argued below, affect is essential to attitude and cannot be excluded by definition without destroying the construct as conventionally understood. Moreover, if interpreted literally, these findings suggest that stereotypes are unimportant in explaining intergroup attitudes . Strictly speaking, however, predictive models do not explain anything, certainly not the causal relationships of stereotype-based cognitions and group-elicited emotions to intergroup attitudes, nor their causal connections to intergroup behavior itself . Besides its traditional neglect of affect, and the confounding of cognition and affect by recent attempts to rectify this deficiency, the failure of social cognition theory to develop an adequate explanatory model of intergroup processes can be attributed to a third factor : the tendency to view the relations among the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of intergroup processes as a one-way causal process, rather than an integrative system of cybernetic feedback and control . This
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is exemplified by the either-or selection of cognition-affect-behavior or affect-cognition-behavior models in the intergroup processes literature . More recent theoretical formulations, however, promise to correct this deficit . In the words of two prominent social cognition researchers, "viewing the intergroup encounter as involving constantly interacting cognitive and affective processes reveals the arbitrariness of any distinction between emotion-to cognition and cognition-to-emotion models of behavior . Instead, it becomes evident that intergroup behavior reflects the joint influence of both kinds of processes" (Hamilton and Mackie 1993b, p . 373) . This paper illustrates the application of affect control theory (Heise 1979; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988 ; MacKinnon and Heise 1993 ; MacKinnon 1994) to intergroup processes . We begin by expanding the discussion of stereotypes, intergroup attitudes, and intergroup behavior with which we introduced this paper . Then, following a concise statement of affect control theory, we show how its conceptualization of attitude and its twofold emphasis on affect and control address the issues raised in the preceding discussion, and how the theory provides an explanatory model of intergroup processes based on reciprocal relations among stereotypes, intergroup attitudes, and intergroup behavior . Against the background of these conceptual and theoretical discussions, we illustrate the application of affect control theory to intergroup relations with attitudinal data on Canadian regional identities . These data were collected in 1995 from comparable samples of Alberta and Ontario university students, representing two regions of the country characterized by a history of interregional disparity and resentment. The research reported here comprises three distinct studies . Study 1 compares the intergroup attitudes of Alberta and Ontario samples for Canadian regional identities, exploring the classic in-group bias/ethnocentrism hypothesis and the out-group homogeneity hypothesis derived from social cognition research on stereotyping . Study 2 employs the attribution equations of affect control theory to generate stereotypic traits from intergroup attitudes for regional identities . Study 3 applies the theory's impression formation equations to explore the affective outcomes of intergroup relations between Albertans and Ontarions . In the general discussion of these three studies we address the limitations of our research and the additional issues it raises, including the use of mathematical models to study intergroup relations . We conclude this paper by showing how social cognition theory and affect control theory are complementary approaches to analyzing intergroup processes . This discussion includes a brief comparison of affect control theory with social identity theory (Tafjel 1974, 1978, 1982 ; Tajfel and Turner 1979 ; Turner 1982 ; Hogg 1992,1993 ; Hogg and Abrams 1988 ; Hogg, Terry, and White 1995), a later development in social cognition theory that advances a more adequate, explanatory model of intergroup relations than can be found in conventional social cognition research on stereotyping .
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STEREOTYPES, INTERGROUP ATTITUDES, AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR As commonly understood, stereotypes are rigid, oversimplified, and inaccurate generalizations of the traits and behavior of members of social groups . These "category-based expectations" (Jones and Gillis 1976) engender "snap judgments" (Schneider et al . 1979)-simple, unreflective, and immediate cognitive appraisals about members of a particular group . People tend to engage in more reflective and complex cognitive processing only when the appearance or behavior of group members violates category-based expectations . Thus, stereotypes are more than group concepts in the Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) tradition ; they are cognitive structures that organize and direct the processing of social information ; and, like all cognitive structures, they enable people to deal with the complexity of their social environment efficiently . In this sense, stereotypes function as prototypes (Cantor and Mischel 1979), mental representations or images of typical members of a group that serve as fuzzy categories in cognitive processing. Or, at a more general and complex level, stereotypes can be viewed as generic schemas, abstract cognitive structures that organize experience at both the perceptual and cognitive-interpretative levels of psychological processing (Mandler 1984, pp . 55-60) . More specifically, because stereotypes conespond to social identities based upon membership in or ascription to social groups, they can be treated as identity schemas (MacKinnon 1994 ; Stryker and Serpe 1994) . Although the term, role schemas, is more commonly employed in the social cognition literature, we prefer the term, identity schemas to emphasize that role behavior is predicated upon the identification with social positions, a basic assumption of both identity theory (Stryker 1968, 1980 ; McCall and Simmons 1978) and social identity theory (see references above) . Terminological preferences aside, identity or role schemas refer to "organized knowledge about the expected behaviors of occupants of particular social positions" (Howard 1995, p . 93), those pertaining, not only to instrumental activities (e .g ., familial, occupational), but also to social groups (e .g ., ethnic, racial) . From this perspective, "role [identity] schemas can be considered the [cognitive] basis of stereotyping and intergroup prejudice and discrimination" (p . 93) . In contrast to the general consensus in the intergroup relations literature on the meaning and function of stereotypes, there is considerable disagreement on the definition and role of intergroup attitudes . This reflects the dissension in attitude theory and research in general (Hill 1981) . According to conventional definition, an attitude consists of "positive or negative affect toward or evaluation of some object" (Schuman 1995, p. 68, following Thurstone 1928, 1967 ; cf. Edwards 1957 and Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) . Proponents of this definition distinguish clearly between attitude-"essentially a subjective judgment . . . of like or dislike . . . good or bad . . .favorable or unfavorable" and belief-"a probability judgment that links
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some object or concept to some attribute" (Fishbein 1978, p . 378) . While the strength of an attitude is measured by the extremity, intensity, or felt importance of an affectively based evaluative judgment (Schuman 1995), the strength of a belief "is defined by the person's subjective probability that the object-attribute relationship exists (or is true)" (Fishbein 1978, p . 378) ." In short, affectively based evaluations are the essence of attitudes ; cognitive judgments, the essence of beliefs . The causal connection between the two constructs is captured by Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) model of attitudes, which proposes that beliefs evoke attitudes, which, in turn, engender behavioral intention and response . We return to the distinction between attitudes and beliefs, or affect and cognition, in our discussion of affect control theory . Although some authors consider the identification of attitude with affect or evaluation as the conventional meaning of the construct among social psychologists (e .g ., Schuman 1995), others assert that the most popular definition of attitude today is a multicomponent one (e .g ., Delamater 1992 ; Hamilton and Mackie 1993b ; Zanna and Rempel 1988) based on Rosenberg and Hovland's (1960) definition of attitude as a relatively stable organization of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components . According to this definition, an attitude encompasses, not only what we feel about an object, but also what we think about it, and how we are inclined to behave toward it . Applying this definition to intergroup attitudes, stereotypes constitute the cognitive component ; ethnocentrism and prejudice, the affective component ; and discrimination in social relations, the behavioral component . Zanna and Rempel (1988) propose a substantial revision of Hovland and Rosenberg's definition, redefining attitude "as the categorization of a stimulus object along an evaluative dimension based upon, or generated from, three general classes of information : (1) cognitive information, (2) affective/emotional information, and/or (3) information concerning past behaviors or behavioral intentions" (p . 319) . There are three important characteristics of this definition of attitude that distinguish it from the multicomponent definition popularized by Hovland and Rosenberg (1960) . First, it considers attitudes as simple summary evaluations of an object or event along a single dimension such as good-bad or favorable-unfavorable. Second, because such summary evaluations are viewed strictly as "items of knowledge" (Zanna and Rempel 1988, p . 330), attitudes are reduced to cognitive judgments . In Zanna and Rempel's view, "evaluation and affect or emotion are not the same concept . . .emotions may be a component, or even the sole basis, of an evaluation, but the two need not occur together" (p . 320) . Third, as independently variable "sources" or "antecedents" of attitudes, cognition, affect, and behavior are not simply separate components of attitudes or different modes of response to attitude-objects or events, "they constitute very different ways in which the attitude is formed and subsequently experienced" (p . 320) .
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The studies of Esses and colleagues (1993) and Stangor and colleagues (1991), discussed in the introduction to this paper, take Zanna and Rempel's (1988) definition of attitude as their starting point . Regressing single-item measures of group favorability on group-elicited emotions and stereotypic traits, both studies found that the latter are of negligible import in predicting intergroup attitudes . In our earlier discussion we attributed this counterintuitive finding to the fact that traits are disadvantaged as predictors of intergroup attitudes because both the attitude criterion and the emotions predictors are affective in nature . To their credit, Stangor and colleagues acknowledge that the use of a criterion measure that may be "particularly sensitive to the affective component of prejudice . . . might have provided an unfair advantage for the emotion variables" (1991, p . 371) . Moreover, both groups of researchers interpret their findings cautiously, disclaiming any intention "to minimize the role of stereotypes in intergroup relations" (Stangor et al . 1991, pp . 376-377) or "to suggest that it is not important to understand the cognitive component of prejudice" (Esses et al . 1993, p . 158 n15) . Despite these disclaimers, the fact that both studies found that stereotyped-based cognitions play little if any role in predicting intergroup attitudes begs the question, "how then do stereotypes feed into this process?" (Hamilton and Mackie 1993b, p . 375) . This question cannot be resolved by predictive models, such as those estimated by the Esses and Stangor studies, because such single-equation models consider only the direct effects of predictors . Identification of indirect effects requires the estimation of a multiple equation causal model (a path analysis model) in conjunction with an analysis of effects (Pedhazur 1997) . To their credit, Esses and colleagues acknowledge that their research "has not examined the causal connections between intergroup attitudes and their affective, cognitive, and behavioral components" (1993, p . 160) . Contemplating the possibility that "stereotypes play a more indirect role in determining intergroup attitudes," they speculate that "the characteristics. . . we attribute to members of a group may influence how we feel about these people and thus our evaluation of the group" (p . 152) . This suggests that a model containing the following specifications should have been estimated : (1) Stereotypic Traits --- P 21 ---4(2) Group-Elicited Emotions --- P 32 ---I(3) Intergroup Attitudes (1) Stereotypic Traits p31 *(3) Intergroup Attitudes The total effect of stereotypic traits on intergroup attitudes consists of its direct effect (p31 ) plus its indirect effect via group-elicited emotions (p21P32) . The total effect of group-elicited emotions on intergroup attitudes, on the other hand, is coextensive with its direct effect (p32) . To assess the relative effects of stereotypic traits and group-elicited emotions on intergroup attitudes, one must compare the total effects (direct plus indirect) of each independent variable . In contrast, an
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assessment of relative effects employing a predictive rather than a causal model is restricted to a comparison of direct effects, leading to the seemingly anomalous findings of Esses and colleagues (1993) and Stangor and colleagues (1991) . In summary, studies of intergroup processes employing Zanna and Rempel's (1988) definition of attitude as a purely cognitive evaluation based on cognitive, affective, and behavioral components, in conjunction with the use of predictive models to determine the relative contributions of these components to intergroup attitudes, create a number of problems . First, the Zanna-Rempel definition is predicated upon the assumption that attitudes can be reduced to cognitive judgments pasteurized of affect . However, as Schuman (1995, p . 85n1) has observed, "it is difficult to imagine an evaluation of interest to sociologists [and, presumably, many psychologists as well] that is totally devoid of affect ." Moreover, Stangor and colleagues (1991) implicitly question this assumption by acknowledging the possible sensitivity of their attitude measure to the emotions predictor ; and Zanna and Rempel (1988) themselves acknowledge the difficulty of creating affectively free evaluations in experimental settings . Second, because predictive models do not address the causal relations among predictors, they mask any indirect effects these predictors may have on the criterion . This appears to be the case for the stereotypes predictor in the Esses and Stangor studies . Third, predictive models do not do justice to Zanna and Rempel's (1988) definition of attitude, which emphasizes that cognition, affect, and behavior are not simply constituent components, but rather "sources" or "antecedents," of attitudes . While Zanna and Rempel (1988) suggest the use of predictive models to determine the extent to which the relative effects of these three sources of attitudes change over time, they advocate causal experimental research to study their relative effects on attitude formation and change . Finally, neither the Zanna-Rempel (1988) model of attitude nor its application to intergroup attitudes by the Stangor and Esses studies incorporates the distinction between generalized or global affect and the specific emotions . As we shall see in the following section, this distinction is a critical one in affect control theory.
AFFECT CONTROL THEORY Affect control theory formalizes Mead's (1934) model of mind as an internal process of cybernetic feedback and control, and his conceptualization of social interaction as an ongoing process of mutually adjusted response among interactants (MacKinnon 1994) . Moreover, the theory accepts Mead's premise that language creates shared objects of consciousness through social categorization, and that these social cognitions are the basis of intersubjectivity and coordination in social interaction . Contrary to Mead's view that the affective associations of social cognitions are individual or idiosyncratic rather than social, affect control theory views these sentiments as more or less shared by members of the same culture or
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subculture . These cultural sentiments, rather than the social cognitions that evoke them, are the raw materials for affect control theory ; and, in contrast to Mead's cognitive social psychology, affective rather than cognitive processing is its focus . Because "affective associations to social categorization generally are recognized as `attitudes"' (Heise 1979, p . 179n1), affect control theory draws heavily upon attitude theory and research for insights into affective processing . Operationally, the theory measures cultural sentiments by capitalizing on the established EPA (evaluation, potency, activity) structure of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957 ; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975), which Osgood has interpreted as capturing the connotative aspect of meaning, "the `feeling tones' of concepts as part of their total meaning" (1969, p . 195) . Evaluation and potency, respectively, have been identified with the sociological dimensions of status and power (Kemper and Collins 1990) ; and, depending upon context, activity has been associated with the emotional energies of social interactants (Collins 1990), the expressiveness of identity-based roles (Heise 1988, p . 6), or the agency of participants in social interaction . We describe the specific scales employed by affect control theory to measure evaluation, potency, and activity in the method section of this paper . The EPA structure of connotative, affective meaning enables one to get a quantitative handle on the indeterminable content and dimensional complexity of denotative, cognitive meaning (Heise 1979, 1988 ; MacKinnon and Langford 1994) . Because they serve as generalized attitude scales (Osgood et al . 1957, pp . 195-198), EPA ratings also allow one to measure all kinds of social phenomenasocial identities, interpersonal behaviors, social settings, social characteristics, personality traits, and emotions-on a single, common metric . Moreover, EPA rating scales provide a mathematically coherent metric (Heise 1979, p . 50), enabling one to transform one type of phenomenon into another within the same semantic space . This is accomplished in affect control theory by applying the various mathematical models of the theory . For example, given the EPA profiles for the situated identities of social interactants, one set of equations generates their culturally expected behaviors . Another set of equations simulates the reidentification processes (labeling and trait attributions) that take place when the actions of participants belie culturally expected behavior . A third set of equations generates the emotions produced by interactional events, and so on . At the heart of these various models lie the principles of affective reaction and affect control. The first principle proposes that people react affectively to interactional events, experiencing transient feelings for the actor, behavior, and object person in each event . The second principle proposes that people construct and interpret events to confirm cultural sentiments for these event components . The discrepancy between established cultural sentiments and the transient feelings produced by events is called affective deflection in affect control theory . Restating the affect control principle in these terms, people construct and interpret interactional events to minimize affective deflection . Thus, besides advancing a model of
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mind based on language, affect control theory incorporates Mead's conceptualization of mind as a cybernetic control system . In contrast to Mead, however, the theory applies the principle of control to affective (attitudinal) rather than cognitive (information) processing . The overall operation of the affect control model can be summarized in six steps (adapted with revisions from Heise 1979, p . 3) . (For a formal propositional statement and verbal exposition of the theory, see MacKinnon 1994 ; for a more technical, mathematical account, see Heise 1988 .) 1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 6.
Each person present in a situation (as actor, object person, or observer) engages in cognitive work to define the situation at hand, employing social categories (identities) to identify people present. Because social identities are associated with characteristic acts (e .g ., counsel and medicate for doctor ; listen and obey for patient), additional cognitive work enables one to narrow down the potential actions of each person . At the same time, the social categories identified by all this cognitive activity evoke cultural sentiments for the imputed identities and likely behaviors of people present . Events that are judged to be comprehensible within the cognitive framework established by the definition of the situation and additional cognitive work are tentatively selected for recognition . Events that come closest to confirming cultural sentiments for their constituent identities and behaviors are more likely to be selected for final recognition than those that do not . The recognition of events generates transient impressions or feelings about participants that may confirm or disconfirm cultural sentiments for their imputed identities and perceived behaviors . Discrepancies between transient feelings and established cultural sentiments (i .e ., affective deflection) engender the conceptualization of new events that would bring transient feelings back into line with cultural sentiments . If self is the actor in such conceptualized events, a behavioral intention or disposition is the outcome of this process ; if another participant is the actor, an expectation for that person's behavior . The realization of a behavioral intention or expectation through action creates a new event, looping the process back to (2) . If cultural sentiments for the identities of participants cannot be confirmed through restorative action (5), the process loops back to (1) instead, and a person engages in a redefinition of the situation on the basis of the most recent event . This higher-order feedback helps to stabilize the system . In view of the greater observability and/or finality of behavior, a redefinition of the situation generally focuses on reidentifying participants (MacKinnon 1994, p . 24) . This is accomplished by imputing new identities (labeling) or modifying the original identities through the attribution of explanatory traits .
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This summary outline makes explicit three essential features of affect control theory . First, the theory specifies the relations among cognition, attitudes, and behavior, not as a simple causal chain, but rather as a control system in which people actively engage in maintaining their experience of social reality through corrective action or through reconceptualization of what has taken place . Second, the theory views the relation between cognitive and affective processes as complementary and interdependent phases of human consciousness . That is, the theory supposes that present cognitions evoke affective reaction and control which, in turn, stimulate new cognitions-the conceptualization of restorative events (see Step 4), for instance, or the reconceptualization of those that have been previously recognized (see Step 6) . Third, the theory acknowledges that attitude-behavior dynamics are "subordinate to a definition of the situation-that is, to a person's categorizations of people and objects in a scene" (Heise 1979, p . 2) . The theory does not predict the initial definition of the situation (Step 1), only its modification (see Step 6) . The original definition of the situation is provided by the researcher conducting affect control simulations of social interaction . In short, affect control theory begins with the affective associations or attitudes evoked by social categories, and models the attitude-behavior dynamics that follow . Because social categorization is the focus of social cognition theory, while attitude-behavior dynamics is the focus of affect control theory, this suggests a division of labor and a point of complementarity between the two theories . We return to this point in our general discussion . Absent from the summary outline of affect control theory just provided is the theory's model of emotions . In this regard, affect control theory distinguishes between the global affects of cultural sentiments, transient feelings, and deflection and the specific emotions experienced by participants in social interaction . Derivations from the empirically based attribution equations of the theory reveal that the latter are a consequence of two factors : first, the amount of affective deflection produced by events ; and, second, the extent to which events confirm or disconfirm the situated identities of participants (MacKinnon and Heise 1993 ; MacKinnon 1994 ; Smith-Lovin 1990) . The three studies with which we illustrate the application of affect control theory to stereotyping and intergroup relations can be located in the above outline of the theory . Study 1 employs only the cultural sentiments data (EPA measures of Canadian regional identities) (see Step 1) to test hypotheses about in-group versus out-group attitudes . Study 2 applies the attribution equations (see Step 6) to generate the characteristic traits of regional stereotypes . Study 3 employs the impression formation equations of the theory to generate the transient feelings (Step 3) and affective deflection (Step 4) produced by a set of a priori events, in order to study the affective outcomes of interaction between Canadians with different regional identities . It is important to stress, however, that simulations of intergroup relations can be conducted employing the full affect control model, including the affect control or impression management equations generating
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NEIL] . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY
interpersonal behaviors (Steps 4 and 5), and the equations predicting the specific emotions experienced by participants . While we have conducted many such analyses, considerations of space preclude reporting them here . With this brief statement of affect control theory in hand, we return to our previous discussion of stereotypes and intergroup attitudes to show how the theory addresses the issues raised there. While affect control theory accepts that stereotypes are identity schemas, it does not deal with the content of these cognitive structures directly, in the sense of measuring the traits attributed to members of social groups . In contrast to social cognition research, affect control theory takes the affective associations evoked by social identities (their EPA profiles) as its starting point . At the same time, the plausibility of affect control predictions suggests that EPA measures of social identities code much of the cognitive information embodied in identity schemas, including stereotypic beliefs about the characteristic traits and behavior of group members . For example, Study 2 shows how the stereotypic traits of Canadian regional identities can be recovered from their EPA profiles by applying the attribution equations of the theory . While the divergence between affect control and social cognition theories with respect to the concept of stereotype is more complementary than irreconcilable, it is a different matter when we turn to intergroup attitudes . In contrast to Hovland and Rosenberg's (1960) definition of attitude that includes cognition, affect, and behavior, affect control theory restricts the construct to affective meaning or response . Therefore, in contrast to Zanna and Rempel's (1988) definition of attitude, employed as a conceptual linchpin in the studies of intergroup attitudes by Esses and colleagues (1993) and Stangor and colleagues (1991), the theory does not accept that evaluations can be reduced to cognitive judgments devoid of affect. For affect control theory, affect is an essential property of attitude and cannot be eliminated by definitional fiat without destroying the construct as conventionally understood. Affect control theory recognizes that, ontologically, cognition and affect are inextricable modes of psychological experience, a matter of relative preponderance than mutual exclusiveness . Epistemologically, however, the theory recognizes the distinction between cognition and affect is an analytically useful one"particularly at the extremes of `cold' cognitions (where affective arousal is of low intensity) and `hot' cognitions (where affective arousal is more pronounced) ; or, alternatively, at the extremes of affective experience largely unmediated by cognition and that conjoined with a high level of cognitive awareness and appraisal" (MacKinnon 1994, p . 45) . From this perspective, beliefs are more cognitive than affective ; and attitudes, more affective than cognitive . Moreover, some attitudes are hotter than others-that is, of greater intensity in either direction on the bipolar scales employed to measure them . For example, while a bigot evokes intense negative feelings (-2 .34) on the evaluation scale for Canadian male respondents, and a charity worker, intense positive feelings (2 .48), other identities evoke affective associations that are closer to neutral on the evaluation scale (e .g .,
Stereotyping and Intergroup Relations
49
.39 for a customer) . (For an extensive discussion of the relation between cognition and affect as debated in the psychological literature, and the implications of this issue for affect control theory, see MacKinnon 1994, pp . 41-50 .) Thus far, we have discussed attitude as the affective response to objects in terms of positive or negative evaluation (good-bad, favorable-unfavorable, and so on) . However, following the EPA structure of affective meaning established by Osgood and associates (Osgood 1969 ; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975), affect control theory extends the domain of attitude to feelings of potency and activity as well . Whether viewed in terms of E or EPA, restricting the construct of attitude to affective response analytically separates intergroup attitudes (ethnocentrism and prejudice) from their presumed antecedents (stereotype-based cognitions) and behavioral consequences (social discrimination) . As acknowledged by Zanna and Rempel, this one-component definition of attitude has the advantage of making the consistency between attitudes and behavior "a theoretical or even empirical question rather than a definitional necessity" (1988, p . 316) . Besides rejecting Zanna and Rempel's reduction of attitudes to cognitive judgments devoid of affect, affect control theory does not share the view of these authors that emotions are a direct source of attitudes . Instead, as discussed above, the theory treats emotions as a product of the more global affective dynamics of identity processes in social interaction . On the other hand, the theory's emphasis on the role of action in attitude-formation and change (Heise 1979, p . 38) is consistent with Zanna and Rempel's identification of past behavior and behavioral intentions as important sources of attitudes . As discussed above, affect control theory views the relation between attitudes and behavior as a reciprocal process of cybernetic feedback and control, rather than as one-way causal process . While this model of attitude resonates with the model proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), there is an important difference in emphasis . In the Fishbein and Ajzen model, the feedback from behavior to attitude is more incidental than designed . In the affect control model, the discrepancy between fundamental attitudes and the transient attitudes produced by events "generate behaviors designed to create new feelings that confirm fundamental attitudes" (Heise 1979, p . 39) . This model of attitudes sheds some light on the empirically tenuous link between attitudes and behavior that continues to plague attitude theory in general (Hill 1981 ; Schuman 1995) and theories of intergroup processes in particular (Mackie and Hamilton 1993b ; Seeman 1981 ; Zanna and Rempel 1988) . According to the affect control model of attitudes, "behavior is not generated directly from either fundamental or transient attitudes but rather from the discrepancy between the two ." Hence, "an attitude as such does not ordinarily generate any typical behavior" (Heise 1979, pp. 38-39) . In summary, affect control theory provides a powerful model for exploring the relationships among stereotypes, intergroup attitudes, and intergroup relations, an explanatory model of intergroup processes based on attitude-behavior dynamics and affective processing . From the perspective of affect control theory, ste-
50
NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY
reotypes are identity schemas deriving from membership in or ascription to social groups ; intergroup attitudes are the cultural sentiments evoked by group identities ; and stereotyping itself exemplifies the identification processes that underlie all social interaction . Thus, the theory models stereotyping and intergroup relations in the same way that it models identification processes and social interaction in general . When people act in accord with their group identities, affective deflection is minimal and interaction between members of social groups proceeds in stereotypic fashion . When the actions of group members deviate from stereotype-based expectations, the motivation to minimize affective deflection mobilizes restorative actions to repair the violation of the "expressive order" (Goffman 1967) defined by intergroup attitudes . In the event that the deflection produced by disruptive events cannot be resolved through restorative action, stereotypes themselves may become modified through the attribution of explanatory traits, or discarded altogether through the imputation of entirely new identities .
METHOD The general methodology of affect control research is available from a number of published sources (e .g ., Heise 1978 ; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988), enabling us to restrict our discussion to details specific to the research reported here . In this section we describe the sample, instrument, and measurement procedures employed in this research . We discuss other aspects of research design, including data analysis procedures, in the specific sections dealing with each of our three studies . Sample Data on cultural sentiments for regional identities were collected as part of a larger study conducted in 1995, employing convenience samples of undergraduate students enrolled in introductory sociology methods courses at an Ontario and an Alberta university . Each of the two samples consisted of approximately 30 males and 30 females born and/or raised in Canada . Instrument Our survey instrument was introduced by a covering page, providing instructions to respondents and asking them to provide information on their gender and the country in which they were born and/or raised . The body of the survey consisted of 11 pages of word stimuli pertaining to social identities and interpersonal behaviors . Each word stimulus was followed by the evaluation, potency, and activity semantic differential scales described in the next section .
Stereotyping and Intergroup Relations
51
Measurement We measured the affective meaning of regional identities and interpersonal acts with the evaluation, potency, and activity scales developed in past affect control research . The evaluation scale is anchored by "bad, awful" to "good, nice" ; the potency scale, by "small, weak, powerless" to "big, strong, powerful" ; and the activity scale, by "slow, old, quiet" to "fast, young, noisy ." Calibrated from -4 to +4, each scale captures a wide range of negative to positive valence, from infinitely "bad, awful" to infinitely "good, nice," for example . Actual values generally fall between ±3, with a ±2 considered a large (positive or negative) value . Following established procedures in affect control research, estimates of cultural sentiments were obtained by aggregating individual scores on EPA scales . As discussed above, affective deflection (the dependent variable in Study 3) is conceptualized as the discrepancy between the fundamental cultural sentiments for social identities and interpersonal behaviors outside the context of any event and the transient impressions or feelings for these components created by their combination in ABO (Actor-Behavior-Object) events . Thus, deflection can be viewed as a kind of global affective response to interpersonal events, employing fundamental cultural sentiments as a point of reference . Operationally, deflection is measured as the sum of the squared discrepancies between fundamental sentiments and transient impressions for the ABO (Actor-Behavior-Object) components of events on the EPA (evaluation, potency, and activity) dimensions of affective meaning : Deflection = E [(A e - Ae' )2+ (Ap - Ap')2 + (A a - Aa ) 2 + (B e - B e' )2 + (BP - Bp' )2 + (B a - Bay )2+ We - Oe ')2 + (op -O p ')2 +(Oa -Oa ) 2 ]
Unprimed terms in this expression denote fundamental cultural sentiments ; primed terms, transient impressions created by events . Subscripts (e, p, a) denote evaluation, potency, and activity . Squaring discrepancies avoids the cumbersome algebra of absolute differences and provides greater weight to larger discrepancies than to trivial ones . The fundamental sentiments in the deflection measure are simply the mean EPA values of identities and behaviors measured on the semantic differential scales described above . The transient impressions or feelings created by events analyzed in Study 3 were generated from the empirically based impression formation equations of affect control theory, employing estimates of parameters from earlier Canadian research (MacKinnon 1985) . Because these equations are far too complex to discuss here, we refer the interested reader to Heise (1988) and Smith-Lovin (1988) for technical detail .
52
NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY
STUDY 1
The first study explores two classic hypotheses from social cognition research on stereotyping, employing Alberta and Ontario data on cultural sentiments for Canadian regional identities . According to the in-group bias or ethnocentrism hypothesis, people tend to evaluate their own group more favorably than out-groups . According to the out-group homogeneity hypothesis, people tend to perceive members of an out-group as more stereotypic and less diverse than members of that group see themselves (Judd and Park 1995) . This study differs from past research on these hypotheses in two important ways . First, we apply the ethnocentrism and out-group homogeneity hypotheses to intergroup attitudes (cultural sentiments) rather than to intergroup perceptions (attributed traits), the usual focus of social cognition research on these hypotheses (e.g ., Judd and Park 1995) . Second, we explore whether the ethnocentrism effect generalizes from evaluation (the dimension of attitude emphasized by social cognition research) to the potency and activity dimensions of affective response . On the other hand, by studying the attitudes of both Albertans and Ontarions, we maintain the intergroup perspective of more recent work on stereotyping by social cognition researchers (e .g ., Allen 1996 ; Judd and Park 1995) . Findings In-group Bias/Ethnocentrism Hypothesis
Evidence for this hypothesis within each sample is provided by comparing mean attitudes for regional identities down columns in Table 1 . For example, the mean evaluation of male Alberta respondents for an Albertan (2 .01) is higher than its evaluation of all other regional identities-Maritimer (1 .74), Ontarion ( .42), and Quebecer (- .30) . This pattern prevails for female Alberta respondents and for Ontario respondents of both genders, with one minor exception-Ontario respondents evaluate a Maritimer as a bit nicer than an Ontarion . We do not report tests of significance for within-sample comparisons of means because such comparisons probably violate the assumption of statistically independent evaluations (Blalock 1979, p . 141) . The ethnocentrism hypothesis is tested across samples by comparing the mean evaluations of Alberta and Ontario respondents for their respective regional identities, Albertan and Ontarion . Although the two samples are not random, we employ tests of significance here as a heuristic device to discriminate between the trivial and the possibly important . As revealed by across-row comparisons in Table 1, Alberta respondents evaluate an Albertan more highly than Ontario respondents do (2 .01 versus .76 for male respondents ; 1 .84 versus .98 for female respondents) ; and Ontario respondents evaluate an Ontarion more highly than Alberta respondents (1 . 16 versus .42 for male respondents ; 1 .12 versus .66 for
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NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W. BOWLBY
female respondents) . While the latter comparison falls short of statistical significance, the overall pattern of differences supports the in-group bias/ethnocentrism hypothesis for the evaluation dimension of affective meaning . Extending the ethnocentrism hypothesis to the potency dimension of affective meaning, both male and female Ontario respondents view an Ontarion as more powerful than all other regional identities . However, contrary to the hypothesis, male Alberta respondents view an Albertan as less powerful than an Ontarion, and female Alberta respondents view an Albertan as less powerful than either an Ontarion or a Quebecer. Applying the hypothesis to across-sample comparisons, Alberta respondents view an Albertan as more powerful than Ontario respondents do (1 .12 versus .49 for male respondents ; .62 versus .29 for females), albeit the latter difference does not achieve statistical significance . While these across-sample differences support the ethnocentrism hypothesis for Albertan as the in-group target identity, across-sample comparisons for Ontarion as the in-group target identity does not . In fact, Alberta respondents rate an Ontarion as more powerful than Ontario respondents rate themselves (1 .67 versus 1 .16 for males ; 1 .82 versus 1 .15 for females) . Taken together, these findings provide only limited support for extending the ethnocentrism hypothesis to the potency dimension of affective response . Within-sample (down-column) comparisons for the activity dimension of affective response also reveal only limited support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis . Consistent with the hypothesis, Ontario respondents of either gender see themselves as more lively than Albertans, Maritimers, or Quebecers, and male Alberta respondents also view themselves as more lively than Canadians from other regions . However, contrary to the hypothesis, female Alberta respondents see themselves as less lively than either an Ontarion or a Quebecer . Moving to across-sample comparisons, Albertans view themselves as significantly more lively than Ontario respondents do (1 .20 versus .11 for males ; .72 versus - .23 for females) . Although these comparisons support the hypothesis for Albertan as the in-group target identity, those for Ontarion as the in-group target identity are small, statistically insignificant, and inconsistent in direction across gender . The Out-Group Homogeneity Hypothesis
Following the statement of this hypothesis by Judd and Park (1995)-in terms of intergroup perceptions or mutual stereotyping, we explore the hypothesis with across-sample comparisons of intergroup attitudes for Albertan and Ontarion as out-group target identities . We use standard deviations to measure the homogeneity of group attitudes, smaller values indicating greater homogeneity . We do not employ tests of significance for differences of standard deviations across samples, even as a heuristic device, because such (two-sample F) tests are notoriously unrobust in the presence of even slight departures from normality (Moore and McCabe 1993 ; Pearson and Please 1975) . Therefore, differences in standard devi-
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NEIL) . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY
ations between samples must be interpreted strictly as sample-bound, descriptive data which we employ to explore rather than test the homogeneity hypothesis . As reported in Table 2, Ontario respondents view an Albertan as more homogenous on evaluation than Alberta respondents themselves (1 .14 versus 1 .48 for males ; .87 versus 1 .21 for females . Ontario respondents also view an Albertan as more homogenous on potency than Alberta respondents ( .98 versus 1 .49 for males ; .70 versus 1 .36 for females), and more homogenous on activity as well (1 .00 versus 1 .41 for males; .97 versus 1 .31 for females) . Thus, for the Ontario sample as the in-group and Albertan as the out-group target identity, these findings support the out-group homogeneity hypothesis across all three dimensions of intergroup attitudes . In contrast, our findings reveal a reversal of the out-group homogeneity effect for the Alberta sample as the in-group and Ontarion as the out-group target identity . That is, Alberta respondents view an Ontarion as less homogenous than Ontario respondents themselves on all three dimensions of affective meaning . For evaluation, the relevant comparisons yield 1 .36 for Alberta male respondents versus 1 .04 for Ontario male respondents (1 .26 versus 1 .07 for females) ; for potency, 1 .43 versus 1 .17 (males) and 1 .25 versus 1 .17 (females) ; and for activity, 1 .64 versus 1 .06 (males) and 1 .09 versus .99 (females) . Discussion This study applied the ethnocentrism and out-group homogeneity hypotheses from social cognition research on stereotyping to Alberta and Ontario attitudes for Canadian regional identities . While both within- and across-sample comparisons support the ethnocentrism hypothesis for evaluation, the results are mixed when the hypothesis is extended to the potency and activity dimensions of intergroup attitudes . Within-sample comparisons on potency support the hypothesis for only the Ontario sample . In across-sample comparisons on potency, the ethnocentrism effect was found for Albertan as the in-group target identity, but a reversal of the effect was found for Ontarion as the in-group target identity . With the exception of Alberta females, within-sample comparisons support the ethnocentrism hypothesis for the activity dimension of intergroup attitudes . On the other hand, across-sample comparisons on activity reveal the ethnocentrism effect only for Albertan as the in-group target identity . Our findings support the out-group homogeneity hypothesis for the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of intergroup attitudes, but for only the Ontario sample as in-group and Albertan as the out-group identity . In fact, for all three dimensions of intergroup attitudes, we found a reversal of the out-group homogeneity effect for the Alberta sample as in-group and Ontarion as the out-group identity . The group-specific nature of the ethnocentrism and out-group homogeneity effects revealed by this study resonates with the findings of Judd and Park (1995) .
Stereotyping and Intergroup Relations
57
Eliminating rival hypotheses through a sequence of carefully designed studies and sophisticated analyses, these researchers accumulated support for a differential socialization explanation of their finding that African-American university students manifested ethnocentrism and in-group homogeneity effects while white American students did not . Specifically, Judd and Park (1995) argue that young black Americans have been socialized to believe that ethnic group membership is a meaningful social category and social identity, to be emphasized in the ongoing struggle for social equality, while young white Americans have been socialized to avoid making distinctions on the basis of ethnic group membership . While the intensity of interregional relations in Canada pales by comparison to the intensity of racial conflict in the United States, the differential socialization hypothesis proposed by Judd and Park (1995) may help to explain some of our findings-specifically, the greater ethnocentrism effect for the Alberta sample on evaluation and the manifestation of this effect on potency and activity for the Alberta sample only . Historically, Western Canada has been an economically disadvantaged region relative to Central Canada ; and although this disparity has narrowed in recent decades, intergroup attitudes may lag behind economic change . If true, we would expect the intergroup attitudes of young Albertans to manifest greater in-group favorability than those of young Ontarions, the kind of defensive ethnocentrism described by Judd and Park (1995) . While this line of reasoning helps to explain why the ethnocentrism effect is stronger for the Alberta sample, it does not shed light on why a reversal of the out-group homogeneity effect was found for Albertans (historically, the economically disadvantaged in-group) with Ontarion as the out-group target identity ; nor, by the same token, does it explain why the out-group homogeneity effect was manifested only for Ontarions (historically, the economically advantaged group) with Albertan as the out-group target identity . However, while many studies have revealed that in-group members perceive out-group members as more homogeneous and less variable than themselves, other studies reveal that this is far from a universal tendency (see Lee and Ottati 1995 for references) . Moreover, the form in which we have stated and tested the out-group homogeneity hypothesis in this study employs the in-group homogeneity of the target group itself as a basis for comparison. Therefore, the in-group homogeneity of target groups becomes relevant to explaining our findings with respect to the out-group homogeneity hypothesis . In this regard, Lee and Ottati demonstrate experimentally how cognitive and motivational factors affect in-group homogeneity, suggesting that "instead of being static, perceptions of in-group variation appear to fluctuate across time and circumstances" (p . 610) . The issues here are complex and we can only speculate as to why Ontarions exhibit greater in-group homogeneity for their group identity than Albertans do for theirs (see Table 2) . However, since the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the application of affect control theory to stereotyping and intergroup relations, rather than to debate the relative merits of any
58
NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W. BOWLBY
particular explanation, we move on to the next study without additional commentary .
STUDY 2 As discussed in our description of affect control theory, the measurement of all kinds of social phenomena on EPA scales enables one to transform the affective meaning of one type of phenomenon into another within the same semantic space . This study illustrates how stereotypic traits can be generated from social identities by employing the attribution equations of the theory . In affect control theory, traits are treated as descriptive attributions of a person with a particular social identity . The procedure of recovering characteristic or stereotypic traits from social identities involves simulating a social event that perfectly confirms a particular social identity, then applying the attribution equations to generate a numerical EPA profile for the kinds of traits that might be attributed to a person with this confirmed identity . With this numerical EPA profile in hand, the cultural data base for identity modifiers is searched for traits that optimally fit this test profile . This procedure is based on the notion that when events perfectly confirm a person's social identity, the traits attributed to that person become a function of the cultural sentiments for that identity (see MacKinnon 1994, p . 128 for a discussion of this rationale applied to characteristic or stereotypic emotions) . For example, when an event (say the delivery of a flawless, enthusiastically received lecture) confirms a professor's identity, observers of this event might consider that professor to be studious, experienced, dignified, tactful, practical, responsible, reasonable, and mature (predictions from Canadian equations and cultural sentiments) . Table 3 reports the characteristic or stereotypic traits generated by the attribution equations of affect control theory for the four regional identities employed in Study 1 . Each list of traits is preceded by the numerical EPA profile generated by the model and trait retrievals are ordered according to their fit to this test profile . For example, the numerical EPA profile (2.8 1 .9 .7) suggests that the characteristic traits attributed to an Albertan by male Alberta respondents would be extremely positive, quite powerful, and slightly lively in nature friendly, loved, employed, confident, competent, talented, and reliable. Those attributed to an Albertan by male Ontario respondents (1 .2 1 .1 .1) are much lower on evaluation and notably less on potency and activity as well-conscientious, modest, tactful, sophisticated, poised, accommodating, and practical . The difference in stereotypic traits attributed to an Albertan by male Alberta and Ontario respondents stem from differences in their cultural sentiments for this social identity . Because male Alberta respondents view themselves as much nicer and more powerful and lively than male Ontarion respondents do (see Table 1), they make self-attributions that are more positive, powerful, and lively .
Stereotyping and Intergroup Relations Table 3 .
59
Stereotypic Traits of Regional Identities for Alberta and Ontario Samples Males
Regional Identity
Albertan
Ontarion
Maritimer
Quebecer
Alberta
Females Ontario
Alberta
Ontario
(2 .8 1 .9 .7)
(1 .2 1 .1 .1)
(2 .31 .4 .4)
(1 .2 1 .0 - .1)
friendly loved employed confident competent talented reliable
conscientious modest tactful sophisticated poised accomodating practical
easygoing helpful worthy trusting appreciative cooperative intellectual
poised virtuous cautious contented modest sophisticated warm
(1 .5 1 .8 .6)
(2 .01 .7 .7)
(1 .82 .0 .7)
(1 .9 1 .6 .5)
witty wealthy intellectual rich persuasive perceptive successful
original bright efficient self-discipl talented confident wealthy
confident clever self-discipl perceptive rich wealthy independent
intellectual worthy self-discipl clever respectful charming creative
(1 .3 .5 - .6)
(1 .4 .7- .2)
(1 .4 .8- .7)
(1 .3 .7- .4)
wholesome noble humble religious discrete cautious
accomodating earnest modest noble agreeable
wholesome accomodating modest earthy humble reverent sentimental
modest earthy accomodating agreeable humble cautious poised
( .71 .1 .8)
( .7 .9 .7)
(1 .41 .5 .7)
(.7 .9 .6)
modern well-bred provocative demanding talkative suave idealistic
suave lucky modern clean-cut demanding white normal
well-bred charming married witty creative rich earnest
sensuous idealistic masculine sophisticated suave normal candid
The numerical EPA profile for the characteristic traits of an Ontarion is more similar for male respondents from each province, differing only in the higher evaluation of traits (2 .0 versus 1 .5) attributed by Ontario males to themselves . Interestingly, considering the historical status of Ontario as the most prosperous Canadian province, Alberta respondents view an Ontarion as wealthy, rich, and successful . In contrast, the self-attributions of Ontario respondents emphasize talent, intelligence, and efficiency-original, bright, intellectual, clever, efficient, self-disciplined, and talented, depending on the gender of respondent . The EPA profile generated by the attributions equations for a Maritimer is quite similar across both province and gender, denoting traits that are positive, weak,
60
NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W. BOWLBY
and unlively in nature-wholesome, noble, modest, humble, accommodating, agreeable, earnest, discrete, cautious, religious, reverent, and sentimental. Again, these traits are consistent with the positive, weak, and unlively cultural sentiments for a Maritimer reported in Study I (see Table 1) . With the exception of Alberta females, the EPA profile for the stereotypic traits of a Quebecer is also quite similar across samples, resulting in trait retrievals that are slightly good, powerful, and lively-modern, suave, well-bred, and the like . In the case of Alberta females, whose EPA profile is much higher on evaluation and a bit higher on potency, retrievals also include such traits as charming, witty, and creative. In view of the resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the last two decades, and the publicly expressed frustration by other Canadians to understand the aspirations of Quebecers, the most interesting trait retrievals are those that describe a Quebecer as provocative, demanding, and idealistic. Again, these trait retrievals reflect the cultural sentiments for the regional identity at hand . As reported in Study 1 (see Table 1), a Quebecer is viewed as slightly negative to slightly positive on evaluation, and as low to slightly positive on potency and activity, depending on the gender and province of the respondent . Discussion
This study demonstrates how the stereotypic traits attributed to Canadians from different regions of the country can be generated from the cultural sentiments for regional identities by applying the attribution equations of affect control theory . Since cultural sentiments for regional identities differ by region, the stereotypic traits attributed to these identities differ across region as well . The differences in trait attributions between Alberta and Ontario samples revealed by our findings are plausible enough, judging by our knowledge of Canadian culture . However, because stereotypic traits were not measured directly in this study, our findings should be considered hypotheses for more conventional research in the social cognition tradition . We return to this point in our general discussion of findings .
STUDY 3 This study explores the affective outcomes of intergroup relations between Albertans and Ontarions from the cultural perspective of each group . Design and Analysis
The units of analysis in this study are interpersonal events . The dependent variable is affective deflection, described in the method section of this paper. We regress the affective deflection produced by events on the nature of the act (its evaluation, potency, and activity), the type of event (Ontarion > Albertan and
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62
NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W . BOWLBY
Albertan > Ontarion), and interactions between these two sets of predictors . The analysis is replicated across Alberta and Ontario samples to determine the effect of cultural perspective on the affective outcomes of intergroup events . In one analysis we employ the cultural sentiments of the Alberta sample for an Albertan and an Ontarion ; in the other those of the Ontario sample for the two regional identities . In the dummy variable analysis for the Alberta sample, we employ Albertan > Albertan events as the reference category ; in the analysis for the Ontario sample, Ontarion > Ontarion events . This enables one to compare the effect of out-group to in-group interaction within each analysis, To ensure maximum variation in behavior for the events analyzed in this study, we searched our Canadian database for behaviors having EPA profiles closest to the eight possible configurations of low (-) and high (+) EPA values listed in Figure 1 . The empirical EPA profiles for behaviors available in our database that come closest to these ideal EPA profiles are reported in Figure 1, along with representative behaviors . In some cases empirical EPA profiles only approximate ideal EPA configurations because of the unavailability of matching behaviors . For instance, there are no behaviors that are simultaneously high on evaluation and low on potency . As a consequence, empirical EPA profiles are close to neutral on potency for (+ - +) and (+ --) configurations ; and, because behavior is inherently lively, a number of other empirical EPA profiles are close to neutral on activity . Behaviors were selected from those listed in Figure 1 to construct the events analyzed in this study . A cross-classification of these eight types of behaviors by the three types of events described above yields 24 ABO (actor-behavior-object person) events to analyze for each gender, or 48 events in all when pooled across gender . These 48 events were analyzed separately for the Ontario and Alberta samples, yielding parallel equations describing the affective outcomes of intergroup relations from the cultural perspective of each group . Employing ordinary least squares regression, we performed a dummy variable analysis for each sample to estimate the effects of event-type (D1 : Ontarion > Albertan events ; D2 : Albertan > Ontarion events), the evaluation, potency, and activity of the behavior in each event (BE, BP, and BA), and the interactions between event-type and the nature of the act (D1BE, D1BP, D1BA and D2BE, D2BP, D2BA) . As explained above, in-group interaction (Ontarion > Ontarion events in the Ontario equation ; Albertan > Albertan events in the Alberta equation) was defined as the reference category, thus omitted from the equation for each sample . In preliminary analysis, we included a dummy variable for the gender of respondent and tested its main and interaction effects with event-type and behavior evaluation, potency, and activity . Because neither main nor interaction effects were found, gender was deleted from the regression analysis . Thus, the general equation for the dummy variable analysis reported in this study is as follows :
O OO OO OO ON OO OC ~0 O M N O CL O 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 C~M OO N;-o0N OC
E
U > wQ) LoM m > U
'O t M N t0 0~ r t N ~O a1 Ct CO of WN MN ~0t t~OW Oo0 ON'D N NN t '°N -N`° I I ~ OM ro CW7ro`v co IO u)t c in t cc rn N M u1 u1W Co u)t 10 N NM~7n C4 . N r-N Q N N N
C C U > le Q) WC CL NO L
tIn NLnN~o l0 l0 N O1 M 10 M h N r, 10 u1 inC0O tItN ~oM 0.-C~M NN CN ~n I I N
0 O 0 II d Ma
fl II C 0 7 0Q r. II C OO O
c3 .Nco0 0^ M OO CL 0O 0O 0O 0O 0O Mn co 0 r-
C O Q U • N •
GO
N . N 1 Ln M un N 0 ~ON~O O O t M t O IM C-4 IDLn O O N M C~ M M t N ~-- O
W O • Oc ~c M u7 u1 l0 u) n l0 V) Q-'D•O O O O O M t O M t 7
t NCcotr.000 NO t ..O u1 t ~O t MLnM r.M mO NO MO mn nM NN u1 t I r-i I I M • •
c a• -Q v •vv .~~ a _ S
c w o Q m C C N N C c cc) co co 0 C) Q
63
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NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W. BOWLBY
Deflection' = a + b1D1 + b 2 D2 + b 3 BE + b4BP + b 5 BA + b6D1BE + b 7 D1BP + b 8 DIBA + b 9 D2BE + b 10D2BP + b1 1 D2BA For predicting the affective deflection produced by a particular type of event (D 1 : Ontarion > Albertan or D2 : Albertan > Ontario), this equation reduces to the constant (a), the main effect of event-type (either D1 or D2) ; the evaluation, potency, and activity of the behavior (BE, BP, and BA) ; and three terms (either D1BE, D1 BP, D1BA or D2BE, D2BP, D2BA) representing the interaction of event-type with the nature of the act. Findings Overall Equation
As reported in Table 4, the overall equation explains 97 percent of the variance in deflection for the Alberta sample (F = 96 .983 ; p = .000) and an equivalent amount of variance for the Ontario sample (F = 98 .741 ; p = .000) . Behavioral Dynamics
In this section we deal with the main effects of behavior evaluation (BE), potency (BP), and activity (BA), net of event-type (Dl or D2) and interactions between event-type and the nature of the act (D1BE, D1BP . . . D2BA) . For both samples, behavior evaluation, potency, and activity manifest sizable and significant effects on deflection (-2 .567, p = .000 ; .656, p = .000 ; - .406, p = .020, respectively, for the Alberta equation ; -1 .348, p < .001 ; .354, p < .001 ; - .377, p < .001 for the Ontario equation) . The direction of these effects in both equations indicates that nice and lively behaviors between Albertans and Ontarions reduce affective deflection while powerful actions increase it . While the pattern of effects is similar across equations, the effects of behavior evaluation and potency are notably larger in the Alberta equation . The main effects of behavior evaluation, potency, and activity are modified by a number of interactions with event-type-D1BE and D1BP for the Alberta equation, D2BE for both equations, and so on . While one can interpret these interactions in terms of event-type moderating the main effects of behavior, the principal concern of this study is with the effect of event-type (Ontarion > Albertan versus Albertan > Ontarion) on the affective deflection produced by intergroup relations . Therefore, we delay our discussion of interaction effects until the following section, where we interpret them in terms of the nature of the act (BE, BP, and BA) moderating the amount of deflection produced by event-type (D1 and D2) .
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Effects of Event-Type on Deflection The main effects of BE, BP, and BA have been discussed in the preceding section . Because the pattern of these effects is similar in the general equations for Alberta and Ontarion samples, we ignore them here in order to simplify our presentation of findings regarding the effects of event-type on affective deflection . Dl : Ontarion > Albertan Events Alberta equation : Deflection' = 5 .571 - 1 .264D1 + 1 .246DIBE - .367DIBP Ontario equation : Deflection' = 3 .454 - .454D1 Recalling that the reference categories for the Alberta and Ontario equations are, respectively, Albertan > Albertan and Ontarion > Ontarion events, the negative coefficient for D1 in both equations indicates that out-group interaction involving Ontarion >Albertan events produces less deflection than in-group interaction . While the main effect of D1 events is about three times larger in the Alberta equation (-1 .264 ; p = .000) than in the Ontario equation (- .454 ; p = .000), it is moderated by behavior evaluation (BE) and potency (BP) in the Alberta equation . The sign of the D1BE effect in the Alberta equation suggests that the nicer the actions of an Albertan toward an Ontarion, the larger the deflection produced by D1 (Ontarion > Albertan) events . Considering the size of this effect (1 .246 ; p = .000), positively evaluated actions by an Ontarion could easily wash out the reduction in deflection (-1 .264) produced by the main effect of D1 events in the Alberta equation . Recalling our discussion of Table 1, both Albertan and Ontarion are positively evaluated identities for Alberta respondents, albeit they evaluate an Albertan as much nicer than an Ontarion . The impression formation equations of affect control theory reveal that unexpectedly good actions produce transient impressions that enhance the fundamental status of both actor and recipient . Therefore, unexpectedly nice actions in Ontarion > Albertan events produce sizeable deflections because such events create transient impressions that exceed the fundamental positive status of both participants . The large positive effect of D1BE in the Alberta equation simply captures this property of the evaluation dynamics of affect control theory . The potency of the act also moderates the main effect of D1 (Ontarion > Albertan) events in the Alberta equation . In this case, the negative coefficient for the D1BP term (- .367 ; p = .10) reveals that powerful actions by an Ontarion enhance the reduction in deflection produced by D1 (Ontarion > Albertan) events . As reported in Table 1, Alberta respondents view Ontarions as more powerful than themselves ; and according to the impression formation equations of affect control theory, powerful actions maintain the fundamental potency of powerful actors and the relative impotency of weaker recipients . Thus, deflection should be reduced
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NEIL J . MacKINNON and JEFFREY W. BOWLBY
when an Ontarion implements powerful actions in Ontarion > Albertan events . The negative coefficient for D1 BP in the Alberta equation simply reflects this aspect of the potency dynamics of affect control theory . In sum, the amount of affective deflection produced by Ontarion > Albertan events for Alberta respondents depends, not only on their cultural sentiments for the two regional identities, but also on what an Ontarion actually does to an Albertan . By the same token, the absence of interactions between event-type and behavior in the Ontario equation reveals that the amount of deflection produced by Ontarion > Albertan events for Ontario respondents is influenced solely by their cultural sentiments for an Ontarion and an Albertan . D2 : Albertan > Ontarion Events Alberta equation: Deflection' = 5 .571 -1 .752D2 + .933D2BE Ontario equation : Deflection' = 3 .454 - .620D2 + .397D2BE + .339D2BP Recalling, again, that the reference category in each equation represents in-group interaction, the negative coefficient for D2 in both equations reveals that deflection decreases as one moves from in-group to out-group interaction involving Albertan > Ontarion events . The size of this effect in the Alberta equation (-1 .752 ; p = .000) is about three times larger than in the Ontario equation (- .620 ; p < .001) . However, the main effect of D2 events in both equations is moderated by the nature of the act-behavior evaluation (BE) in both equations and, additionally, behavior potency (BP) in the Ontario equation . The large positive effect of D2BE in the Alberta ( .933 ; p = .000) and Ontario ( .397 ; p < .001) equations counteracts the reduction in deflection attributed to the main effect of D2 events in each equation (-1 .752 and - .620, respectively) . This suggests that the nicer the actions of an Albertan, the greater the deflection produced by Alberta > Ontario events for both Alberta and Ontario samples . The main effect of D2 (Albertan > Ontarion) events in the Ontario equation is also moderated by its interaction with the potency of an Albertan's actions (BP) . The positive coefficient for D2BP ( .339 ; p = .017) indicates that increasingly powerful actions by an Albertan toward an Ontarion washes out the deflection-reducing main effect of D2 events (- .620 ; p = 000) . Discussion As reported above in Table 4, the general equation for predicting the global affective outcomes of intergroup relations between Albertans and Ontarions explains a substantial and significant amount of variance in the dependent variable . The large and significant main effects for behavioral terms in this equation reveal that the amount of deflection produced by intergroup events depends on the nature of the act-what interactants actually do to one another, regardless of the
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type of event . However, the interactions between behavior and event-type in the general equation indicate that the effect of behavior on deflection is influenced by who implements the behavior and who is the recipient . The main effects of event-type in the general equation represent the impact of intergroup relations (relative to within-group relations) on the deflection produced by events . In the remainder of this section, we discuss the mechanisms through which event-type influences the affective outcomes of intergroup relations . We conclude our discussion by addressing several seemingly anomalous findings from this study . As defined above, affective deflection is based on the discrepancy between the cultural sentiments for identities and the transient impressions or feelings created by events . The impression formation equations generating transient impressions in affect control theory are asymmetrical . As a consequence, the transient impressions for the actor in ABO events are different from those for the recipient . Because the transient impressions of an Ontarion created by D 1 (Ontarion > Albertan) events are quite different from those produced by D2 (Albertan > Ontarion) events, for instance, the amount of affective deflection produced by those two kinds of events will also be different . This explains the differences between equations for predicting D1 (Ontarion > Albertan) and D2 (Albertan > Ontarion) events within each sample . Differences in equations across samples for predicting the same type of event-D 1 (Ontarion > Albertan) events, for instance-can be attributed to differences between samples in cultural sentiments for the regional identities, Albertan and Ontarion . Recalling our discussion of Table 1, Ontario respondents evaluate an Ontarion higher than an Albertan ; and, depending on their gender, Alberta respondents evaluate an Albertan as three to five times nicer than an Ontarion . The cultural sentiments of Ontario and Alberta samples for regional identities also differ on the potency and activity dimensions of affective meaning . For example, Alberta respondents rate an Ontarion as more powerful than an Albertan . These differences in cultural sentiments across samples result in sample-specific equations for predicting the affective response to the same kind of event . Our analysis of the affective outcomes of intergroup relations has revealed several apparently anomalous findings-for instance, that out-group interaction between Albertans and Ontarions creates less deflection than in-group interaction . This is reflected in the negative effects of D1 (Ontarion > Albertan) and D2 (Albertan > Ontarion) events in both the Alberta and Ontario equations compared to the reference categories in these equations (Albertan > Albertan and Ontarion > Ontarion events, respectively) . This counterintuitive finding results from the fact that we have "forced" a full range of intergroup behaviors in the events analyzed in this study, including extremely bad and powerful actions (see Figure 1) . Because such actions are even more uncharacteristic of social relations within than between groups, deflection declines as we move from in-group to out-group interaction .
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Another finding that seems anomalous at first blush concerns the increase in deflection resulting from the interaction between event-type and behavior evaluation-the 131 BE term in the Alberta equation for D1 events and the D2BE term in both Alberta and Ontario equations for D2 events . The DIBE term suggests that deflection increases in Ontario > Alberta events with the goodness of an Ontarion's actions ; and the D2BE term, that deflection increases in Albertan > Ontarion events with the goodness of an Albertan's actions . This remains a strange finding only if one fails to consider that deflection is a squared quantity, hence not resulting exclusively from negatively evaluated actions . While an examination of our data matrix reveals that bad actions create much greater deflection than good ones, positively evaluated actions that exceed those expected by virtue of the fundamental evaluation of an Albertan or Ontarion also produce considerable deflection . This kind of deflection, however, enhances the status of interactants . That is, while extremely nice interpersonal actions between an Albertan and an Ontarion create deflection because they are culturally unexpected, their consequence is to increase rather than diminish the status of each participant . The positive effects of DIBE and D2BE in our equations simply reflect the status-enhancing deflection produced by such events .
GENERAL DISCUSSION This paper has reported three studies to illustrate the application of affect control theory to stereotyping and intergroup relations . The first explored the in-group bias/ethnocentrism hypothesis and the out-group homogeneity hypothesis from social cognition research on stereotyping, employing data on intergroup attitudes (cultural sentiments) rather than intergroup perceptions (ascribed traits) . The second study applied the attribution equations of affect control theory to generate stereotypic traits from the cultural sentiments for regional identities . The third applied the theory's impression formation equations to explore the affective outcomes of intergroup relations . Findings from these three studies have been discussed extensively above . Here we address the more general issues raised by this kind of research . The first issue concerns the external validity or generalizability of our findings . For instance, we did not directly measure the affective reactions of Ontario and Alberta respondents to the events analyzed in Study 3 . Instead, we constructed a measure (affective deflection) based on the discrepancy between the transient feelings produced by events and the culturally established sentiments for the regional identities and actions involved in them . While the cultural sentiments of Alberta and Ontario respondents were directly measured in our research, transient feelings were generated from the impression formation equations of affect control theory estimated from previous Canadian research . This calls into question the external validity of our findings-whether we can generalize from estimates of
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affective deflection based on equations established in previous research to the affective reactions that might actually be experienced by Alberta and Ontario respondents . However, the impression formation equations of affect control theory have been estimated empirically from large-scale, carefully designed research on the affective reaction of people to hundreds of interpersonal events . Moreover, predictions from affect control models based on these empirical equations have been supported by experimental research (Wiggins and Heise 1988 ; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992 ; Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Tsoudis 1994), survey research (Heise and MacKinnon 1988 ; Heise and Calhan 1995), and qualitative research (Smith-Lovin and Douglas 1992 ; Francis 1997) . Therefore, despite the fact that we did not measure the affective reactions of Alberta and Ontario respondents directly, we feel confident in what the findings from Study 3 reveal about the affective outcomes of intergroup relations between Albertans and Ontarions . The same kind of question concerning external validity also applies to our findings from Study 2, which employed the attribution equations of affect control theory to generate the stereotypic traits of regional identities . However, these equations are simple derivations from the empirically based amalgamation equations of the theory, which describe how traits and other modifiers combine with social identities to create impressions of composite identities (Averett and Heise 1988) . Therefore, we also feel confident in what the findings from Study 2 suggest about the stereotypic traits of Canadian regional identities . There remains, however, a second and more mundane kind of external validity to consider, one that applies to all three studies reported in this paper-the extent to which we can generalize findings based upon non-probability, convenience samples of university students to the larger populations of Ontario and Alberta residents . In this case, the question of external validity pertains to the representativeness of our samples, rather than the validity and integrity of our research procedures . Here, we rest our case on the assumption that the kind of cultural data employed in our research-EPA measures of social identities-is uniform enough within cultures to be accessible from convenience samples of university students . From this perspective, sample respondents serve as "informants," providing information on the intergroup attitudes of Alberta and Ontario cultures . This raises the related question as to whether samples of about 30 males and 30 females from each culture are sufficiently large to provide reliable information . Here, we rely on the mathematical model developed and tested by Romney, Weller, and Batchhelder (1986), which estimates that stable results for the aggregation of high concordance cultural data (which we presume ours to be) can be expected from samples of as few as a half dozen informants .
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CONCLUSION In the introduction to this paper we identified three deficits of social cognition research on stereotyping that have hindered its developing an explanatory model of intergroup relations, articulating the causal connections among stereotypes, intergroup attitudes, and intergroup behavior . These deficits include a traditional neglect of affect, a components approach to intergroup attitudes that inspires predictive rather than explanatory models, and the lack of a control perspective incorporating cognitive and affective processes as aspects of a larger system . We also described how affect control theory provides a powerful explanatory model of intergroup relations by not sharing these limitations of social cognition research on stereotyping . At the same time, however, one must acknowledge the strengths of social cognition theory and research that complement the limitations of affect control theory . For instance, affect control theory does not measure stereotypic traits of social groups directly ; instead, the theory generates them from attitudinal data on group identities (Study 2) . Therefore, it is important to validate predictions from affect control theory with direct research on the stereotypic traits actually attributed to social groups . This remains the forte of social cognition research, which has developed sophisticated measures and procedures to study the content, ascription, and accuracy of intergroup perceptions (e .g ., Esses et al . 1993 ; Judd and Park 1995 ; Ryan 1996 ; Stangor et al . 1991) . Moreover, social cognition researchers have expanded the cognitive content of stereotypes to include, not only ascribed traits, but also symbolic beliefs (those pertaining to whether groups uphold or violate cherished values and norms), and have demonstrated the importance of such beliefs in predicting intergroup attitudes (Esses et al . 1993) . In contrast, there is no direct equivalent to the construct of symbolic beliefs in affect control theory . Finally, while the attitudinal data of affect control theory enables one to explore such intergroup phenomena as ethnocentrism and homogeneity effects (Study 1), social cognition research on intergroup perceptions enriches our understanding of these phenomena . In short, social cognition theory's focus on cognition and cognitive processes and affect control theory's focus on affect and affective processes complement one another in the study of intergroup relations . We have located this paper in the context of social cognition theory because the bulk of research on stereotyping and intergroup relations in social psychology has been conducted within this general paradigm . In order to balance our comparison of affect control and social cognition approaches to this area of research, we conclude this paper with a brief discussion of social identity theory (see above references), a more or less separate development within social cognition theory itself . Like affect control theory, social identity theory advances an explanatory model that is lacking in general social cognition research on stereotyping and intergroup relations .
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Social identity theory proposes that broad social categories or attributes (gender, ethnic origin, and so on) describing groups to which one belongs, or to which one feels one belongs, are represented in one's mind as social identities . Thus conceived, social identities become important components of self-concept, motivating group comparisons and behavior that favor the in-group and hence the self . As a consequence, in-group and out-group perception become stereotypic and intergroup behavior acquires competitive and discriminatory properties . Social identity theory emphasizes the generative nature of the "sociocognitive mechanisms" (self-categorization and the self-enhancement motive) underlying identity processes, and views the salience and content of social identities as dynamically responsive to situational context (Hogg et al . 1995) . A later extension of social identity theory, self-categorization theory (Turner 1985 ; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987) draws heavily from cognitive psychology to elaborate self-categorization and identity processes . Like social identity theory, affect control theory deals with identities based upon broad social categories or attributes . Affect control research has accumulated EPA data for many such identities, and the existence of comparable data for various cultures (American, Canadian, German, Japanese) enables one to analyze intergroup relations from a cross-cultural perspective . As discussed earlier in this paper, the theory also advances a social psychological model of identity processes . Like the model advanced by social identity theory, the affect control model is an inherently dynamic and generative one, according to which the affective meaning of identities shifts with the identities of others in an event, the actions implemented by each interactant, and the setting in which the event takes place . Finally, like social identity theory, affect control theory supposes the operation of a self-enhancement motive in identity processes, locating it in a social psychological theory of motivation based upon the principle of affect control and the incentive of identity-confirmation (MacKinnon 1994, pp . 50-59) . For both theories, the motivation to enhance self-esteem through the confirmation of valued social identities is the well-spring of stereotyping, ethnocentrism, and discrimination in intergroup relations . Despite these similarities, there are important conceptual differences between the two theories that stem from their origins in different traditions . While social identity theory developed from the cognitive tradition of individual psychology, affect control theory traces its roots to the social psychological tradition of Mead and symbolic interactionism . This difference in origin has important repercussions for how each theory views the micro-foundations of group processes and intergroup relations . For social identity/self-categorization theory, the depersonalization of self-the shift in identity from unique individual to group member resulting from the categorization of self in terms of group prototypes-is the fundamental process underlying group and intergroup aspects of behavior such as stereotyping and ethnocentrism . As a consequence, "social identity theory and self-categorization models . . . do not construct group processes from interpersonal
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processes . The process of self-categorization depersonalizes perception, feelings, and actions in terms of the contextually relevant self-defining in-group prototypes" (Hogg et al . 1995, p . 262) . Establishing group processes on cognitive structures (group or otherwise), rather than interpersonal processes, brings social identity theory perilously close to "the jagged rocks of psychological reductionism" (p . 264) . In contrast, affect control theory constructs group processes and intergroup relations from interpersonal events, the units of analysis in symbolic interactionism thought and the ultimate empirical referents of social phenomena (Wallace 1983, p . 167) . Moreover, the theory does not associate group identification with the depersonalization of group members, but rather with the internalization of cultural sentiments for the groups with which individuals identify . Thus, by establishing group processes on interpersonal events and the internalization of culture, affect control theory avoids the psychological reductionism implicit in social identity theory, maintaining its integrity as a genuine social psychological theory . In conclusion, social identity theory, like social cognition theory in general, has focused almost exclusively on cognition and cognitive processes . Despite its emphasis on self-enhancement motivation, social identity theory has generally ignored the role of affect, affective processing, and emotions in identity processes (for one attempt to integrate social identity theory with appraisal and constructionist theories of emotion, see Smith 1993) . This deficit of social identity theory (and social cognition theory in general) creates an opening for affect control theory to make an important contribution to our understanding of group processes and intergroup relations .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research reported in this paper has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant #410-94-0087) . We wish to express our gratitude to John Goyder, David Heise, Herman Smith, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this paper .
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THE FORMATION OF STATUS BELIEFS IMPROVING STATUS CONSTRUCTION THEORY
Cecilia L. Ridgeway
ABSTRACT Widely shared status beliefs that characterize people in one social category as more esteemed and competent than people in another category play an important role in the organization of inequality . Status construction theory argues that the terms on which people interact across a social difference boundary can cause shared status beliefs to form and spread widely throughout a population . This chapter reviews the evidence for status construction theory and develops it further by offering an explicit theoretical account of the mechanism by which interactional contexts induce participants to form status beliefs even when those beliefs disadvantage the participant. I derive testable hypotheses from this account . I show as well how this account can be represented in the graph-theoretic terms of expectation states theory, allowing further testable predictions to be derived.
Social status is a fundamental dimension of social inequality in human societies along with social power and material wealth (Weber 1968) . Status involves relations based on social evaluations of prestige, honor, or esteem . Given its recog-
Advances in Group Processes, Volume 17, pages 77-102 . Copyright © 2000 by JAI Press Inc . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0651-3 77
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nized importance in the organization of inequality, it is odd that contemporary sociologists approach social status in a disjointed manner . Macro sociologists conceptualize status as a relationship between social groups and often study it in terms of the relative prestige of occupational groups . Micro sociologists, on the other hand, approach status as a social hierarchy of influence and esteem within a group, often called a power and prestige order . These disparate approaches to status can be brought into dialogue with one another by a focus on the linking concept of status beliefs. Status beliefs are widely shared cultural beliefs that people in one social category are more esteemed and competent than people in another social category . Status beliefs can be perceptions of what "most others" believe or what actors themselves believe . As their definition suggests, status beliefs are beliefs about the evaluative relationship between social categories or groups . Yet, as decades of research with expectations states theory has shown, they are also the primary determinant of the social influence hierarchies actors form when they interact in regard to a shared goal (Berger et al . 1977 ; Webster and Foschi 1988 ; Berger and Zelditch 1998) . A broader investigation of status beliefs-how they form and change as well as what their effects are-is the key to integrating sociological approaches to status and developing a deeper understanding of the role of status dynamics in systems of social stratification and inequality . Status construction theory is a recent approach that describes one set of processes by which status beliefs about social differences might develop and become widely shared among a population (Ridgeway 1991, 1997 ; Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997 ; Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, and Robinson 1998 ; Webster and Hysom 1998) . The theory claims that interactional contexts are not only an arena in which status beliefs are at play ; they are also important contexts for the development and spread of status beliefs . This chapter attempts to increase our understanding of the nature and development of status beliefs in society by elaborating and improving status construction theory's account of the formation of status beliefs in interaction .
FRAMING THE PROBLEM Status construction theory argues that when people on opposite sides of a recognized social difference boundary regularly interact in regard to shared goals, the terms on which they interact and the influence hierarchies that emerge can induce the participants to form shared status beliefs about their difference . People carry these beliefs to other encounters with different others and, by acting on them there, induce some of these others to take on the beliefs as well . This creates a diffusion process that, under some circumstances, will create roughly consensual (i .e ., widely shared) beliefs that people from one of the difference categories are more esteemed and competent than are those from the other difference category .
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When a status belief is roughly consensual in a society, it has become part of the society's shared culture and is part of the taken-for-granted social framework of beliefs that actors bring to interaction and use to organize their behavior together . Investigations of status construction theory suggest that interactional contexts where people from different social categories come together may indeed be a potent source of status beliefs . Experiments confirm that when influence hierarchies repeatedly develop between actors with a salient social difference, the actors form corresponding status beliefs about their difference, as status construction theory predicts (Ridgeway et al . 1998 ; Ridgeway and Glasgow 1996) . Other experiments show that actors can indeed spread status beliefs to others by treating those others according to the belief (Ridgeway and Glasgow 1996 ; Ridgeway and Erickson 1998) . Finally, computer simulations support the logical sturdiness of theory's argument that, if interactional processes create and spread status beliefs, the diffusion process will cause these beliefs to become roughly consensual in society under many circumstances (Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997 ; Mark, Smith-Lovin, and Ridgeway 1999) . How can we explain the power of interaction to create status beliefs? It is well known that the creation of any salient difference between people is enough to cause people to favor their own group over the other (Brewer and Kramer 1985 ; Dovidio and Gaertner 1993 ; Messick and Mackie 1989) . With status beliefs, however, all groups agree, or at least concede, that one group is socially recognized as better and more competent than the others are . Thus it is the beliefs of those who are disadvantaged by status beliefs that distinguish status beliefs from the in-group bias created by difference alone . What is it about an interactional context that could induce an actor to form a status belief that disadvantages that actor? Status construction theory offers an account of belief formation in interaction that can be summarized as follows (Ridgeway 1991) . When people who differ in standing in the power and prestige order of an encounter also differ in an easily recognized, distinguishing attribute, there is a likelihood that they will associate their perceived differences in competence and status in the setting with the distinguishing attribute and form a status belief about that attribute . This assumes that the actors do not already have shared status beliefs about the attribute . Note that this account of belief formation is essentially descriptive . It does not explain the processes through which an association between a nominal difference and standing in a power and prestige order induces people to generalize to status beliefs about whole categories of actors, even when these beliefs are against their personal interests . As an initial account of belief formation through interaction, this descriptive formulation has worked well . It has stimulated empirical investigations of the formation of status beliefs in interaction and led to the further development of status construction theory . Given what has been learned, however, it is now clear that this initial descriptive account of belief formation has limitations that need to be addressed . First, it does not explain exactly how an association between standing
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in a power and prestige order and a distinguishing attribute leads to status beliefs among participants . The informal, general terms in which the process is described in the theory are open to diverse interpretations . Second, the formulation fails particularly to make clear why the associational process it describes would be sufficient to induce actors to take on status beliefs that disadvantage them . Finally, status construction theory uses expectation states theory to formulate key parts of its argument about the development of power and prestige orders in interactional contexts . Yet the core of status construction theory, its description of the formation of status beliefs, is not expressed in terms that are easily related to expectation states theory . Expectation states theory is the best-developed and empirically documented theory of status dynamics at the interactional level . The ability of status construction theory to improve our understanding of status beliefs and their role in linking micro and macro status processes will be greater if the theory is formulated in terms that can be articulated with the dominant micro-level account. The overall goal of this chapter is to improve our understanding of the emergence of status beliefs in society by developing status construction theory's account of belief formation . I will examine in detail the relationship between the local realities created by power and prestige orders in interactional contexts and the nature of status beliefs . Based on this examination, I will suggest a formal belief formation assumption for status construction theory that offers an explicit theoretical account of the mechanism by which interaction induces actors to form status beliefs. The goal is to theorize this mechanism in a manner that accounts for the acceptance of status beliefs by those they disadvantage as well as advantage . A specification of the mechanism by which interaction creates status belief must also take into account recent theoretical and empirical developments in status construction theory . I will then show how the belief formation assumption can be explicitly articulated with expectation states theory . I begin by reviewing recent developments in status construction theory and the issues they raise for understanding how interaction creates status beliefs . Then I turn to the task of formulating an improved and formally explicit theoretical account for this process .
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATUS CONSTRUCTION THEORY Creating Status Beliefs From Resource Differences In its initial formulation, status construction theory focused on the way a correlation between the distribution in exchangeable resources and a nominal (i .e ., unordered) distinction (say, As and Bs) among people in a society could be transformed by interactional processes into widely held beliefs that members of the resource-advantaged category are more esteemed and competent than members of the resource-disadvantaged category (Ridgeway 1991) . Given this focus, the the-
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ory highlighted encounters between people who differed in both resources and the AB distinction (called "doubly dissimilar" encounters) as the central contexts that drive the formation of status beliefs about the distinction . Resource advantages tend to create expectations for competence in the situation, as expectation states research has shown (Cook 1975 ; Harrod 1980 : Stewart and Moore 1992) . These expectations shape behavior in ways that result in a power and prestige order favoring the better paid . In doubly dissimilar encounters, actors may associate their standing in the power and prestige order, created by their resource differences, with their corresponding AB differences and form status beliefs about that distinction . Due to the correlation in society between resources and the A/B distinction, more doubly dissimilar encounters will foster status beliefs favoring the resource-advantaged category (say, As) than the resource-disadvantaged category (Bs) . As actors spread their beliefs formed in doubly dissimilar encounters to other encounters with people who differ on the AB distinction, the numerical predominance of status beliefs favoring As should gradually overwhelm those favoring Bs, resulting in widely held status beliefs favoring As . An experimental test of this formulation has shown that doubly dissimilar encounters do indeed induce their participants to form status beliefs favoring the resource-advantaged nominal category . After two encounters with partners who differed from them in a nominal distinction, were paid differently, and attained influence in the encounters corresponding to their pay level, subjects developed beliefs that "most people" consider the typical person in the resource-advantaged category to be more respected, competent, and leaderlike, but not as cooperative and considerate as the typical member of the disadvantaged category (Ridgeway et al . 1998) . ! Significantly, even subjects in the disadvantaged category formed beliefs that those in the other group are considered higher status and more competent than people in their own group . Two subsequent experiments, which I will describe shortly, further demonstrated that actors could transmit status beliefs to others by acting on those beliefs in interaction (Ridgeway and Glasgow 1996 ; Ridgeway and Erickson 1998) . Thus, status beliefs created in doubly dissimilar encounters can be spread more broadly through interaction . In addition to this experimental evidence, simulations of the proposed diffusion process provide logical support for the theory's prediction that status beliefs favoring the resource-advantaged category will become roughly consensual among the population (Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997) . Therefore, the evidence thus far supports (although does not fully prove) the initial predictions derived from status construction theory's assumptions about status belief formation and transmission in interaction . These predictions can be summarized as follows . Given a correlation between the distribution of resources and a nominal distinction in a society, interactional processes will be sufficient to create widely shared status beliefs about that distinction . Those beliefs will favor the resource-advantaged nominal category .
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A More General Condition for the Development of Status Beliefs
Despite status construction theory's initial focus on resource differences, however, its model of belief formation actually implies a more general set of circumstances by which status beliefs could develop . If status beliefs are fostered by a systematic association between standing in power and prestige orders and a nominal distinction, then any factor that systematically biases the development of influence hierarchies in encounters between nominally different actors will create status beliefs favoring the nominal category advantaged by that factor . This second derivation is status construction theory's most general implication (Ridgeway and Glasgow 1996 ; Webster and Hysom 1998) . Webster and Hysom employ this derivation to expand status construction theory to show how distinguishing characteristics, like sexual orientation, that are not immediately visible but that carry a moral evaluation in society can become status-valued characteristics . Webster and Hysom (1998) propose as well that not only resources with exchange value, but also those with status value (e.g ., a larger office) could act as the biasing factors that create status beliefs . Differential access to valued information between As and Bs, or control over technology are other examples of biasing factors that could potentially create status beliefs about an A/B distinction . For this second, more general derivation to hold, people must form status beliefs from the simple association in encounters of standing in the power and prestige order and a nominal distinction without obvious accompanying differences in resources or other factors . In other words, the experience of interactional hierarchy itself associated with a nominal distinction must be sufficient to create status beliefs if interactional processes are to act as a general translator of biasing factors into status beliefs . In an experiment that tests this hypothesis, Ridgeway and Glasgow (1996) had confederates treat a nominally distinct subject in a deferential or assertive, nondeferential manner during a cooperative decision-making task . As expectations states theory predicts, this created patterns of behavioral exchange between the subject and confederate that resulted in the deferential confederate becoming less influential than the subject and the assertive confederate becoming more influential than the subject . After two experiences with an influence hierarchy associated with a nominal distinction, subjects formed beliefs that "most people" consider the typical member of the influence-advantaged nominal category to be higher status and more competent, but less cooperative and considerate, than the average person in the influence-disadvantaged nominal category . Again, subjects who were influence disadvantaged themselves formed status beliefs that disadvantaged their own nominal category . Thus interactional hierarchies alone, without supporting resource differences, were sufficient to create status beliefs . This suggests that status construction theory's second and most general derivation is plausible .
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Implications for the Spread of Status Beliefs
Ridgeway and Glasgow's (1996) experiment also indicates that if actors who have formed a status belief in one encounter then treat others according to it in subsequent encounters, those others are likely to acquire the belief themselves as status construction theory assumes . The confederates in that experiment acted as though they thought the nominal distinction between them and the subjects carried status value . By so acting, they created a power and prestige order between them and the subjects in self-fulfilling manner and from that, the subjects inferred the status beliefs themselves . Thus this experiment shows that status beliefs can be spread through behavior in interaction, as status construction theory argues . A subsequent experiment suggests that interaction may spread status beliefs quite broadly . Ridgeway and Erickson (1998) had a third member of a group observe the status valued (i .e ., deferential or nondeferential) treatment of someone who was nominally the same as they were by someone else who was nominally different. These bystander participants also formed status-corresponding status beliefs about the nominal distinction . Thus, status beliefs can be spread through observation in interaction as well as personal treatment. As a result, interaction may be a powerful teacher of status beliefs, greatly speeding the diffusion process, as simulations suggest (Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997) . Creating Status Beliefs Through Chance Processes
If any factor that systematically biases the development of influence hierarchies between nominally distinct actors can foster status beliefs, could chance processes alone result in the development of status beliefs about the nominal distinction? In the initial statement of the theory, Ridgeway (1991) reasoned that, in encounters between nominally different actors where no biasing factor was present, the association between nominal category and power and prestige would be governed by chance . As a result, these encounters would produce equal numbers of status beliefs favoring one nominal category as favoring the other category . In the diffusion process, these contradicting beliefs would eventually wash each other out . This analysis, however, neglects the way chance processes can produce path dependent effects that act as biasing factors in favor of a given status belief. By chance alone, a series of coin flips can occasionally produce a string of "heads" or "tails ." Similarly, a series of initial encounters between As and Bs could by chance produce a substantial preponderance of status beliefs favoring one category (e .g ., As) rather than another . As actors spread these beliefs through future encounters, there is a chance that this initial preponderance will be magnified and gradually result in consensual status beliefs favoring the initially preponderant category . In effect, the chance string of early encounters creating beliefs favoring one category, not the other, acts as a type of biasing factor that leads to widely held status beliefs . In a formal analysis with supporting simulations, Mark
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and colleagues show that an initial predominance of status beliefs favoring a particular nominal category, created by chance, would logically result in consensual status beliefs favoring that category under many circumstances (Mark 1999 ; Mark, Smith-Lovin, and Ridgeway 1999) . Mark and colleagues' analyses suggest that the belief formation processes described by status construction theory have an additional set of implications not initially anticipated by the theory . When actors regularly interact across a nominal difference boundary, there is a likelihood that they will form shared status beliefs about the nominal distinction through chance processes alone . When status beliefs are created by chance factors, however, the group that will be favored by the beliefs cannot be predicted in advance . This is in contrast to the situation where beliefs are created by a nonrandom biasing factor such as resources or technology. Thus, when status beliefs are created by chance processes, all categories of the nominal distinction are equally likely to become high status . Conclusions and Implications
For the purposes of this paper, what conclusions can we draw from these theoretical and empirical developments in status construction theory? First, the theory's initial focus on doubly dissimilar encounters as the crucial sites for the creation of status beliefs is too limited . All encounters between people who differ on a given nominal distinction are potentially sites for the creation of status beliefs . In cases where a systematic biasing factor is present, a subset of nominally different encounters will also be doubly dissimilar encounters and the latter will be important for determining the evaluative direction (i .e ., favoring As or Bs) of the status beliefs that develop. Second, a wide variety of factors other than resources can function as the biasing factor that creates status beliefs favoring a given category of a nominal distinction . These two points suggest that any specification of the mechanism by which interactional associations induce status beliefs must accommodate encounters where no biasing factors are salient in the situation as well as encounters where such factors are present . The specification must also allow the incorporation of a variety of biasing factors .
THE NATURE OF STATUS BELIEFS
To specify a mechanism by which interaction creates status beliefs we must first keep in mind the nature of status beliefs . In the terms of expectations states theory, status beliefs are the widely shared beliefs that render a recognized social distinction into a status characteristic . Status beliefs associate higher social evaluation and expectations for greater general and/or specific competence with one state of a characteristic (men, the better educated) than another (women, the lesser educated) (Berger et al . 1977) . At a minimum, then, interaction must associate both
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evaluative and competence differences with actor's nominal categories in order for actors to impute status beliefs about the nominal distinction . In this section I consider the means by which interactional contexts create an apparent correspondence between a nominal distinction and differences in both social evaluation and competence . In the next section I take up the further question of how a mere situational correspondence between competence and evaluation differences and a nominal distinction could induce people to form status beliefs that disadvantage them. It is clear how goal-oriented interaction juxtaposes presumed competence differences with the actors' nominal distinction . As expectations states research shows, actors in goal-oriented interaction form differentiated expectations for the usefulness or competence of the contributions from each actor compared to the others (Berger, Conner, and Fisek 1974 ; Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1991) . These differentiated performance expectations are the foundation of the power and prestige order (i .e ., influence hierarchy) that organizes interaction in the setting . In goal-oriented settings, then, interactional hierarchies embody presumptions about differences in competence in that setting . This expectation states theory argument is the basis for status construction theory's assumption that interaction can induce status beliefs (Ridgeway 1991) . In addition to embodying presumptions of competence, the behaviors by which actors actually enact relations of influence and esteem also act as signs or markers of each actor's evaluative standing, or status, in the setting . These observable power and prestige behaviors, as expectation states theory calls them, include opportunities to participate, participation rate, positive evaluations received, influence, and choice for leadership positions (see Webster and Hysom 1998, p . 354) . These behaviors cast the influential actor in the position of the primary performer, the center of evaluative attention in the setting, while less influential actors are cast in the position of reactors to the primary performer (Wagner and Berger 1997) . It is apparent, then, that the observable power and prestige behaviors by which interactional hierarchies are enacted have a dual aspect . They are driven by and represent actors' presumptions about their differences in competence in the situation . By the same token, they are also status markers that signify differences in the social evaluation of actors in the situation (Ridgeway and Berger 1986) . Not surprising, research indicates a reciprocal relationship between the display of observable power and prestige behaviors and presumptions of competence (Berger et al . 1974 ; Ridgeway, Berger, and Smith 1985 ; Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1991) . Because these interactional power and prestige behaviors are culturally associated with the enactment of competence differences, actors can display them to create the appearance of competence and gain influence in the first place (especially among social peers) . On the other hand, any other factors that affect the actors' appearance of competence, such as external status characteristics (e .g ., occupation, education, race, or gender), resource differences, or actual performance in
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the setting will also determine the power and prestige behaviors that the actor can effectively display in the situation . The enactment of an interactional influence hierarchy, then, provides a display of both apparent competent differences and status markers indicating evaluative differences . Thus the association of position in an interaction hierarchy with a nominal distinction creates a juxtaposition between that distinction and competence and evaluative differences that could encourage the formation status beliefs . Observable power and prestige behaviors, however, are not the only means by which evaluative differences among actors might be displayed in an interactional (or other) setting . The social evaluation of actors can be indicated through a variety of other social signs and attributes as well . As Webster and Hysom (1998) note, evaluative standing can be indicated by the possession of valued goal objects (a nice house) or by differences in exchangeable resources such as pay differences in addition to behavioral gestures of deference and esteem . The diverse indicators of evaluative differences between actors, however, can all be understood as status markers (Ridgeway and Berger 1986) . A status marker is any possession, attribute, or behavior that is culturally associated with a position of high rather than low status in power and prestige orders . While there are a wide variety of status markers in any culture, the observable power and prestige behaviors by which actors actually enact relations of influence and esteem may function as core status markers . I base this suggestion on evidence that the enactment of a behavioral power and prestige order creates impressions of the actors that correspond closely to what research indicates is the core content of all status beliefs . Geis and colleagues (1984) and Gerber (1996) report that actors in the high status position of an observable power and prestige order are perceived as more instrumental and directive while those in the low status position are seen as more expressive and emotional . In strikingly parallel findings, Conway and colleagues (1996) show that the status distinctions associated with gender, occupation, and general evaluative standing in a society all involve similar impressions of those in high rather than low status groups . In each case, people in higher status groups are seen as more agentic and instrumentally competent while those in the lower status groups are perceived as more interpersonally responsive and communal . Recall that experiments testing status construction theory's arguments about belief formation in interaction also found that subjects developed beliefs that one nominal group was more leaderlike and competent but not as cooperative and considerate as the other nominal group (Ridgeway et al . 1998 ; Ridgeway and Glasgow 1996 ; Ridgeway and Erickson 1998) . Perhaps it is not surprising that the content of status beliefs so closely reflects the impressions actors create when they enact an interactional status order . Status beliefs are widely shared cultural schemas for organizing cooperative interaction across a social difference boundary, but on unequal terms (Ridgeway et al . 1998) . As shared schemas for organizing interaction, status beliefs typify interactional structures . The correspondence between status beliefs and the impression actors
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give in observable power and prestige structures underlines the importance of interactional processes for status beliefs . It adds credence to status construction theory's claim that interaction is not only an arena that is shaped by status beliefs, but one in which such beliefs can be created and changed . The above considerations suggest a more detailed and useful conceptualization of the process by which status beliefs are created in status construction theory . To begin with, it is useful to conceptualize the process as the establishment of a link between a nominal distinction and both differences in status markers and expected competence . The concept of status markers is broad enough to encompass the diverse interactional contexts that status construction theory argues can lead to status beliefs, including those involving resource differences and those with behavioral influence hierarchies alone . This conceptualization is also phrased in the terms of expectation states theory, facilitating its integration with that approach . This is the first step in specifying the mechanism by which interaction induces status beliefs . It is still not clear, however, why a correspondence between a nominal distinction and differential status markers and competence expectations should induce people to infer status beliefs that disadvantage them . Addressing this important problem is the crucial next step in the argument .
CONSENSUS, VALIDITY, AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS BELIEFS Ridgeway and colleagues (1998) argue that interactional power and prestige orders can create local realities where a nominal difference appears to the participants to be consensually evaluated before it actually is so on a broader scale . The local appearance of an evaluative consensus about a nominal distinction, I suggest, is the key to inducing those who would be disadvantaged by a status belief to take it on . The appearance of consensus also spurs actors to generalize beyond the current situation to a belief, like a status belief, that they expect to use to make sense of future interactions . When actors with one state of a nominal distinction have consistently higher status markers and expected competence in the situation than those with another state of the distinction, then there is a correspondence in the situation among states of the nominal distinction, status markers, and expected competence . When a power and prestige order enacts such a correspondence and this correspondence is not explicitly commented upon or resisted, the enacted correspondence appears to be socially accepted and consensual . The appearance of consensus makes the correspondence seem like an objective social reality in the situation that is accepted by others as a social fact. In effect, the appearance of consensus gives the correspondence among the nominal distinction, status markers, and competence expectations social validity in the eyes of participants (Ridgeway and Berger 1986 ; Weber 1968 ; Zelditch and
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Floyd 1998 ; Zelditch and Walker 1984) . 2 Following Weber (1968, pp . 31-33), Zelditch and Floyd argue that something is valid in a situation if actors expect other actors to accept that thing in the situation. Thus the correspondence is socially valid in the situation when an actor, P, expects others to accept the correspondence in the situation . In a situation where such a correspondence is enacted without contest, then, participants enter into a local reality where it seems accepted as objectively valid that people in one nominal category are more competent and leaderlike than are people in another category . Given the apparently valid social truth that the situation presents to its participants, is it surprising that they take the next step and form a more general belief that As are typically more competent and status worthy than Bs? The social validity that the situation lends to the correspondence among the nominal distinction, status markers, and competence has two important effects that facilitate this belief formation process . First, since the correspondence appears to be a valid social fact, actors presume it would be accepted as a social fact by others beyond the situation as well . The sense that it would be accepted by others is an inducement to the actors to generalize the local correspondence into a belief about As and Bs that could be transferred to other actors and situations . In effect, the social validity of the correspondence in the local situation suggests that a status belief about As and Bs is an effective social schema for making sense of and acting toward others in future encounters because those others will also accept its social truth . Second, the sense that the correspondence would be accepted as a social fact by others as well confronts the actors who are disadvantaged by the correspondence with a hard reality . Whether the disadvantaged actors like it or not, others are likely to treat them as though the correspondence indicates a valid social truth about the actors' status worthiness and competence compared to those of the other nominal category . Confronted with this prospect, the disadvantaged actors have little choice but to accept the status belief themselves as an aspect of social reality with which they must contend . They may accept the disadvantaging status belief simply as an estimate of what "most others" believe . Or they may feel the pressure of social validity more deeply and accept the status belief as a matter of personal belief as well . Either way, however, the status belief will affect how they react to others in subsequent encounters . The creation of a sense of social validity about a link between a nominal distinction and status markers and competence, by this account, is the central mechanism by which interaction induces its participants to form status beliefs . The following belief formation assumption summarizes this argument . It provides a formal belief formation assumption for status construction theory that achieves two goals . It can account for the development of beliefs in situations where resource or other differences are present and where they are not . Furthermore, it specifies a mechanism by which interaction induces belief formation even among those the
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beliefs disadvantage . This formal assumption replaces the informal principle of association between standing in a power and prestige order and belief formation stated earlier . Belief Formation Assumption :
Given a situation in which there is a socially valid correspondence between individuals' differing states of a nominal distinction and their differentiated status markers and expected competence, then there is a likelihood that actors in the situation will form corresponding status beliefs about the nominal distinction. Status beliefs are corresponding when the nominal state that is associated with more valued status markers and greater expected competence in the situation is also associated in the status belief with more positive social evaluation and greater competence compared to the other nominal state . To this formal assumption about belief formation, status construction theory adds an assumption from expectation states theory that actors transfer expectations about categories of actors formed in one setting to future encounters with actors that also differ in those categories (Markovsky, Smith, and Berger 1984 ; Pugh and Wahrman 1983) . Finally, status construction theory also assumes that subsequent encounters with others who differ on the attribute that confirm an actor's newly formed status belief strengthen that belief while inconsistent, disconfirming experiences undermine it . Together, these three assumptions constitute status construction theory's account of the formation and spread of status beliefs through interaction .
CHALLENGES TO CONSENSUS AND THE FORMATION OF STATUS BELIEFS In the above analysis the appearance of consensus creates social validity and social validity fosters the formation of status beliefs . Naturally, then, a question arises about the effect that a challenge to consensus in the situation would have on the likelihood that participants would form status beliefs . An examination of this question will clarify some implications of the belief formation assumption for status construction theory and suggest a means for testing hypotheses derived from the assumption . The reasoning below draws heavily on Zelditch and Floyd's (1998) insightful analysis of the relationships among consensus, dissensus, and the construction of social validity in a situation . If a participant speaks up to challenge an apparent correspondence in the situation between actors' nominal categories and their status markers and expected competence, what is the effect? The challenge might question the validity of the competence differences enacted between nominally different actors . Or the challenge might accept the competence and status marker differences but question
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their link to the actors' nominal categories . Such a challenge might explicitly attribute the status and competence differences to some other difference between the actors or might suggest that the actors are exceptions to their nominal categories . However phrased, the challenge suggests that a link between the nominal distinction and evaluation and competence would not necessarily be accepted by everyone, creating uncertainty about its validity as a social schema. Zelditch and Floyd (1998) argue that the validity of something that has been challenged can be reaffirmed in the situation if the majority of the actors present appear to reject the challenge and support the thing that was challenged . An explicit action on the part of some participant to reject a challenge to the correspondence among actors' nominal categories and their status markers and expected competence would be necessary to reassert its validity . Most others present must appear to support this rejection by standing by the validity of the correspondence. If, on the other hand, no one speaks up to actively resist a challenge or if the majority in the situation do not support that resistance, then the social validity of the correspondence between the nominal distinction, status markers, and competence will crumble . Furthermore, even when the validity of the correspondence is reasserted in the situation, the fact that it was challenged places some limits on the range of actors that can be presumed to accept the correspondence, narrowing and weakening its social validity . Classic research on conformity suggests that a break from the appearance of unanimity in a group greatly reduces the pressure on those who privately disagree with the majority to go along with them (Asch 1955 ; Shaw, Rothschild, and Strickland 1957) . Thus any challenge to consensus about the correspondence between actors' nominal categories and their status markers and competence undermines the validity of that correspondence to some degree, especially in the eyes of actors who are not personally persuaded by the correspondence . Actors disadvantaged by the correspondence may be more likely to fall in the latter category . These considerations suggest hypotheses that may be derived from the formal belief formation assumption in order to test its assertion that social validity is a powerful ingredient in the formation of status beliefs . The assumption implies that actors will be less likely to form status beliefs about a nominal distinction in a situation where a correspondence among actors' nominal categories and their status markers and expected competence is challenged than in a situation where the correspondence appears consensual . In addition, in a situation in which a challenge to such a correspondence occurs, the greater the proportion of participants who act to support the challenge rather than the correspondence, the less the likelihood that the participants will form status beliefs about the nominal distinction . 3 Empirical verification of these hypotheses would support the assumption that the ability of interactional contexts to lend social validity to an association between nominal differences and status and competence is central to the process by which interaction creates status beliefs .
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Beliefs
A GRAPH-THEORETIC REPRESENTATION OF BELIEF FORMATION With a formal specification of the mechanism by which interaction induces status beliefs in hand, the next step is to represent this mechanism in the terms of expectation states theory . Expectation states theory represents its formal arguments about the development of power and prestige orders in terms of theoretical graphs (Berger et al . 1977 ; see Webster and Whitmeyer 1999 for a recent explication) . My goal here is to adapt these theoretical graphs to represent status construction theory's assumptions about the formation of status beliefs in interaction .
Graphing Belief Formation Expectation states theory's graphs represent the way established status characteristics, reward levels, and behavioral patterns that are salient in a situation shape the expectations for task performance that a focal actor, P, holds for self compared to each other actor (0 1 . .0,) in the situation . When P and 0 differ on an existing status characteristic, such as educational attainment, that carries broad, diffuse status value in society and P has a more valued state of that characteristic (is better educated) than 0, expectation states theory graphs the situation as shown in the
P
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Actors who differ on an existing diffuse status characteristic b). The formation of a status belief about a nominal distinction, N
Figure 1 . a) .
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top of Figure 1 . This graph for an existing diffuse status characteristic provides a template for graphing the formation of a new status belief that creates a status characteristic . For clarity, let me explain Figure la. In it "possession" lines link P to a more valued state of the diffuse status characteristic (D+) and link 0 to a less valued state of that characteristic (D-) . Negative signed "dimensionality" lines link the two states of D indicating that they are contrasting states of the same characteristic . Widely shared status beliefs about D (say, education) link it to general expectations for competence (F), indicated by "relevance" lines connecting states of D to states of F . General expectations for greater competence from the better educated (F+) than the less educated (I'-) lead through relevance lines to expectations that P has more ability at the task at hand in this situation (C*+) while 0 has less of that ability (C*-) . Expectations about task ability lead to corresponding expectations for better task outcomes (T+) from P than from 0 (T-) . When actors form status beliefs in interaction, they impute differences between nominally distinct actors in some degree of general competence beyond that necessary for the specific situational task. In addition, these imputed general competence differences between actors are linked to the state of the nominal distinction that the actor possesses . As a first step in graphing this situation, the nominal distinction can be represented as "N" which divides actors into Nas and Nbs . When, in the formation of a status belief about N, actors link general competence to the nominal distinction, it transforms N into an evaluated distinction with a more and less valued state (i .e ., N+ and N- instead of just Na and Nb) . Therefore, the formation of a status belief about a nominal distinction, N, can be represented as an imputed line of relevance that links P and O's states of N and their presumed competence in the situation (C*-T) by means of an intervening assumption about their differences in some type of valued general competence . 4 In Figure lb this logic is used to graph the formation of a status belief about N . In this graph P is an Na and 0 is an Nb . P's presumed competence in the situation is higher (C*,-T,) than O's is (C*A-TA) . From their apparent differences in competence in the situation and their differences in N, P imputes (dashed relevance lines) corresponding differences in some valued general competence (I'/y) that P infers is linked to their states of N . When actors link general competence differences with a nominal distinction, they may assume, unless they encounter evidence to the contrary, that these competence differences apply broadly across most situational tasks and goals . In this case, expectation states theory would represent the imputed competence differences as a gamma (T'), for general competence . On the other hand, actors may impute competence differences that they assume apply to a specific range of tasks, represented as an upsilon (y) . The circumstances in which actors infer one type a competence difference rather than another is a question that is beyond the scope of the present chapter .
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/T t + C*+ T2+
TZ
C*Ti -
0Z Figure 2 .
Formation of Status Beliefs After Two "Doubly Dissimilar" Encounters
From this foundation, we can develop graphs that represent the formation of status beliefs in two situations that have been investigated in research on status construction theory . In the first "doubly dissimilar" situation, actors differ in resources as well as the nominal distinction . After two encounters like this in which power and prestige orders developed that corresponded to resource (pay) differences, Ridgeway and colleagues (1998) found that actors formed status beliefs favoring the pay advantaged nominal category . Figure 2 represents an actor, P's, formation of a status belief about a nominal distinction, N, after two doubly dissimilar encounters . P is an Nb . 0 1 , who is an Na, is the actor P dealt with in the first encounter . All P's assumptions about 0 1 from the first encounter remain as a referent for P in the second encounter where P interacts with 02 who is also an Na . Thus lines representing P's and 0 1 's links to differential task success in the first encounter (i .e ., links to T 1 ) are present in the graph as well as lines linking P and 02 to expected task success in the second encounter (links to T2) . Since, in the situation studied by Ridgeway and colleagues (1998), the task was the same for both encounters, T 1 and T2 are linked to the same ability characteristic (C*) . Both 0 1 and 02 possessed higher levels of a valued goal object (GO+), pay, than did P (GO-) . Differences in pay imply different levels of social rewards (R+ and R-) between P and each 0 which turn imply differences in expected competence in each encounter (C*-T 1 and C*-T 2 ) . After two encounters where those who are better rewarded and appear more competent are Nas rather than Nbs, P infers a link (dashed lines) between states of N and general competence (17y), forming a status belief .5 In the second situation investigated by status construction theory, nominally different actors develop a power and prestige order on the basis of the behavioral inter-
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/0 1
Na(+) --
Figure 3.
The Formation of Status Beliefs After Two Behaviorally Differentiated Encounters Between Nominally Different Actors
change patterns that emerge between them without supporting differences in resources . After two such encounters, Ridgeway and Glasgow (1996) found that subjects formed status beliefs favoring the nominal category that consistently had higher standing in the power and prestige orders of the encounters . A graph of belief formation in this situation is shown in Figure 3 . P, an Nb, has had two partners, 01 and 02, both of whom were Nas . Both partners acted confidently and assertively (b 1 + and b2+) in task discussions with P, casting P into reactive, less assertive behavior patterns (b l - and b2-) . As these assertive-reactive behavioral interchange patterns came to characterize the interaction between P and each 0, they evoked cultural images of status typified, leader-follower behavior (B+ and B-) . Status typified behaviors are culturally associated with differences in general problem solving ability (Y+ and Y-) which in turn suggests differences between the actors in competence at the task at hand . After two nominally different partners who seem more competent and act more leaderlike than P, P infers an evaluative link between the nominal characteristic and general competence, forming a status belief . Graphing Social Validity and Challenges
The belief formation assumption that I have proposed for status construction theory asserts that the social validity that an interaction lends to an association between actors' nominal differences and their status markers and expected competence is an important determinant of the likelihood that actors will form status beliefs from the experience . How can social validity and challenges to social validity be represented in graph theoretic terms?
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Graphs represent an interactional situation from the perspective of a given actor, P . In that sense, they do not directly represent collective attributes of the actors' situation, such as consensus or social validity . On the other hand, validity develops from the appearance of consensus that the situation presents to each of the actors . In the face of a challenge, it develops from the appearance of explicit majority support for something . Graphs can represent the appearance of consensus that a situation presents to an actor . They can do so through the relationship the graph portrays between an actor, P's, own first-order expectations for each person's relative performance in the situation and the second-order expectations communicated by another actor for those people's relative performances (Moore 1985 ; Troyer and Younts 1997 ; Webster and Whitmeyer 1999) . P's own expectation that "0 knows more about this task than I do" is a first-order expectation . Second order expectations are someone else's expectations about P and 0 that are communicated to P . Thus, P's assumption that "someone else thinks 0 knows more about this task than I do" is a second-order expectation . There is substantial evidence that actors presume consensus in an interactional situation unless they receive explicit information to the contrary (see Zelditch and Floyd 1998) . When actors form expectations for self and others based on events in interaction and people's salient attributes, they presume that these expectations are shared . Consequently, a graph of the situation from P's perspective that contains no explicit second order expectations from another represents a definition of the situation that is socially valid for P because P takes it to be consensusal . A similar graph that contains another's second order expectations that support P's own expectations for people in the situation actively confirms P's sense that this definition of the situation is consensual, strongly validating it for P (Berger et al . 1998) . Therefore, a graph that contains no second-order expectations that are inconsistent with P's first-order expectation represents a definition of the situation that P presumes to be consensual and socially valid . If the graph also represents a situation where nominally different actors are consistently linked to differentiated performance expectations and valued goal objects, there is a likelihood that P will form status beliefs in the situation . An actor who speaks up to challenge an apparent correspondence between actors' nominal categories and their status markers and expected competence can be represented as communicating second-order expectations about the nominally different actors that conflict with P's first order expectations . Figure 4 graphs one such situation . In it P, an Nb, observes 0 1 , an Na, and 0 2 , an Nb, establish a pattern of behavior between them in which 0 1 is influential and leaderlike while 02 defers and accepts 0 1 's influence. P forms differentiated competence expectations for 0 1 and 0 2 , creating a correspondence between actors' states of N and performance expectations that P presumes to be consensual and, therefore, socially valid . Another actor in the situation, 0 3 , speaks up to challenge the presumed consensus, questioning 0 1 's reasoning and asking to hear more from 0 203'S second order expectations for 0 1 and 0 2 are represented by wavy lines con-
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Figure 4 . Second-Order Expectations Challenge The Validity of an Association Between a Nominal Distinction, N, and Expected Competence
fleeting 02 to task success and 01 to task failure . 6 Since the second-order expectations are inconsistent with the P's first-order expectations for nominally different actors, this graph represents a situation in which the likelihood that P will form status beliefs is reduced . Graph Theoretic Implications
As these analyses suggest, the degree of consensus or dissensus in a group can be portrayed by the degree of inconsistency between P's first-order expectations for actors in the situation and second-order expectations for those same actors that others make explicit in the situation . Given the belief formation assumption, a straightforward implication of the graph theoretic representations is the following. The greater the number and strength of second-order expectations for nominally different actors in a situation that conflict with P's first-order expectations for those actors, the less the likelihood that P will form status beliefs about the nominal distinction . It is also apparent that the overall consistency of a graph structure linking nominally different actors to differentiated task outcomes also has implications for the formation of status beliefs in that situation . By overall consistency, I mean the extent to which all lines linking nominally different actors to task outcomes link those actors to similarly evaluated outcomes . Lines representing first-order as well as second-order expectations are both included . Holding constant the strength of these lines (generally inversely proportional to their length), the greater the degree of consistency in a graph structure linking nominally different actors to evaluated outcomes, the greater the likelihood that P will form status beliefs about the nominal distinction . This more general implication of the graph theoretic representation of belief formation covers situations in which a consistent correspondence between actors' nominal differences and their status marker and expected competence differences never clearly develops as well as situations where such a correspondence is explicitly challenged .
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There is a third prediction about belief formation that can be derived from graph theoretic representations as well . Consider a graph that represents a completely consistent correspondence between actors' nominal differences and their links to evaluated task outcomes . The more elements linking nominally different actors to differentially evaluated task outcomes in such a graph, the more comprehensive it is (Berger et al . 1998) . These elements can be attributes of the actors, such as supporting resources or status characteristics, they can be referent others from previous encounters, or they can be additional others in the present situation . The point is that each of these elements provides another consistent link between actors' nominal differences and their expected competence . Therefore, the more comprehensive a graph structure is that links nominally different actors to evaluated outcomes in a consistent manner, the greater the likelihood that P will form status beliefs about the nominal distinction . Comprehensiveness affects belief formation partly by strengthening the expected competence differences between nominally different actors . However, since the impact on competence expectations of each new consistent element is progressively less, this strengthening effect attenuates as comprehensiveness increases . Comprehensiveness also affects belief formation by broadening the appearance of consensus about an evaluative difference between nominally distinct actors by portraying a wide array of social evidence that supports it. The reinforcement of validity through wider evidence may be comprehensiveness' most powerful effect on belief formation . These predictions derived from graph theoretical representations of the belief formation process suggest the value of transcribing status construction theory into terms that are compatible with expectation states theory .
BECOMING PART OF THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK When status beliefs are widely held in a society, they become part of its taken-for-granted, roughly consensual culture . Expectation states theory argues that status beliefs which are established in the culture form part of the social framework of beliefs that actors bring to a situation of action and use to frame their behavior there (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1982 ; Zelditch and Floyd 1998) . The social framework of beliefs is a cultural tool kit of taken-for-granted beliefs that actors use to make sense of interactional situations and the actors within them in order to orient their own behavior in the situation . Among other things, the social framework includes beliefs defining the socially significant categories of actors in the culture and their social meaning and status value in society (e .g ., beliefs about men and women, people of different ethnic groups, or different occupations) . Actors presume that beliefs in their social framework are consensual and act on them accordingly .
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If certain interactional experiences are sufficient to induce status beliefs in their participants, how and when do these beliefs become stable elements in those actors' taken-for-granted social framework of beliefs? Due to their specific interactional experiences, individuals who acquire a status belief about a nominal distinction may come to presume that the belief is widely consensual before it actually is in the society . These individuals learn to take the belief for granted as part of their social framework of beliefs . In this way, individuals, due to the sequences of interactional experiences they have had, may "bootstrap" the process which the status beliefs become broadly consensual in society by presuming that it already is so . Status construction theory deals with this process by arguing that beliefs that actors form in one encounter are strengthened by future encounters that enact power and prestige orders between nominally different others that confirm the status beliefs (Ridgeway 1991 ; Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997) . Of course, by acting on the newly acquired status belief in future encounters with nominally different others, the individual substantially increases the likelihood that the status belief will, in fact, be supported in those encounters . Encounters with nominally different others that disconfirm the status belief undermine it, according to status construction theory, and reduce the likelihood that the individual will act on the belief in the next encounter . The extent to which the belief is undermined by a disconfirming encounter, however, depends on strength with which the belief is held . A belief which has been strongly established in prior experience will only be slightly weakened by a single disconfirming event . The belief formation assumption offered here suggests that the "strength" of status beliefs might better be conceived as the extent to which an actor presumes that belief to be consensually valid in a society . The broader the presumed consensuality of a status belief, the more the actor can rely on the belief to effectively frame any given interaction where it is relevant and salient (i .e ., encounters with those who differ on the status valued distinction) . Subsequent encounters with different tasks and actors that support a person's newly formed status belief confirm that the belief is not merely a locally valid construction of reality, but rather, a broadly valid interpretation of the nominal distinction that, it appears, would be accepted by almost anyone . It is an empirical question how many confirming experiences are necessary before a status belief appears sufficiently consensual and valid to an actor that it becomes a stable element in the actor's taken-for-granted social framework . I suspect, however, that the number is small, say three or four . The local reality of encounters and the social validity they convey are powerfully persuasive agents for individuals . I suspect that people generalize quickly from a few such persuasive experiences of local consensus to the presumption of a more general consensus . Indeed, without such a tendency to generalize quickly from local consensus, the presumption of general consensus about a status belief would be difficult to for actors to achieve . The presumption of general consensus about a social frame-
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work of beliefs, in turn, is fundamental to the emergence of social structure from routine interaction . It seems that people take on status beliefs from interaction because of the appearance of consensus in a local situation that makes an enacted correspondence between people's nominal differences and their status markers and competence appear to be a valid social fact. Subsequent encounters that confirm this status belief, even if they do so because of the self-fulfilling effects of an actor's own behavior, broaden the appearance of consensus about the status belief . As the appearance of consensus is validated across contexts and actors, the belief becomes part of the actor's accepted social framework . As more actors in the society take on the belief and make it part of their social framework, the chance of disconfirming experiences drops . At some point the status belief really does become roughly consensual in society in that almost everybody assumes that "most people" hold the belief and act on it. Thus, the persuasive power of the appearance of consensus in some local situations eventually creates a genuinely broad consensus in a society.
CONCLUSIONS Given the importance of status relations in society and the central role that widely held status beliefs play in organizing status relations, it is remarkable that sociologists have so little systematic evidence about the formation and change of status beliefs . Status construction theory posits a set of processes that are sufficient (although not necessary) to create status beliefs that become part of the taken-for-granted social framework of most actors in a population . As initially formulated, status construction theory offers some deceptively simple ideas about the formation, transfer, and strengthening and weakening of status beliefs in interaction and seeks to specify the social conditions under which they would lead to widely shared status beliefs about a nominal distinction . Empirical and theoretical developments now suggest that widely held status belief are indeed likely to develop when a nominal distinction becomes correlated in a population with an inequality in resources, as status construction theory originally posited . More generally, however, current research suggests that status beliefs are likely to develop when one nominal group is relatively advantaged compared to another in any factor, not just resources, that systematically biases the development of power and prestige when members from the two groups interact . Furthermore, chance processes alone may sometimes create status beliefs about a nominal distinction through path dependent processes . Such conclusions about the development and spread of status beliefs under different social conditions depend, however, on the nature of the processes by which interaction induces actors to form status beliefs in the first place and "teach" them to others through interaction . Thus, status construction theory turns on its assump-
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tions about the processes by which interaction causes people to form status beliefs about nominal differences . To develop status construction theory into a useful account of the development and change of status beliefs, it is important to provide a clear theoretical specification of the process by which interaction creates status beliefs and suggest means for testing this specification . This has been my goal here . Analyzing the mechanism by which an interactional context induces status beliefs in its participants even when the belief disadvantages them highlights the importance of the appearance of consensus and social validity that the context provides for those who participate in it . I argue that it is the apparent social validity of a correspondence between participants' states of a nominal distinction and their differentiated status markers and expected competence that persuades them to infer a status belief about the distinction . On the basis of this argument I have proposed a formal belief formation assumption for status construction theory and derive testable hypotheses from it . I have shown as well how this assumption can be represented in the graph theoretic terms of expectation states theory, allowing further predictions to be derived . The next step is to conduct empirical tests of these hypotheses . To understand the role of status relations in social stratification and inequality, we must understand how structural conditions, social distinctions, and status beliefs co-evolve in society . Gaining a fuller theoretical and empirical understanding of the power of interaction to create status beliefs under different structural conditions is a first step in this project . From it, we may begin to assemble the tools as well to understand the conditions under which status beliefs change in a society .
NOTES 1 . In this experiment as well as those reported in Ridgeway and Glasgow (1996) and Ridgeway and Erickson (1998), a nominal distinction was created by giving subjects a test purportedly measuring "personal response style." Subjects were told that personal response style is a stable characteristic of individuals that divides the population into two roughly equal sized categories . "Results" of the test showed that subjects and partners differed in their personal response style category . 2. Zelditch and Walker (1984) refer to this form of validity as endorsement because it is based on apparent support by an actor's peers in the situation . 3 . As a simplification, this assumption holds constant any status differences among the participants. It is likely that the support of high status participants will have a greater impact than the support of lower status participants . Incorporating the impact of status differences among the participants is a project for another paper . 4. Expectation states graphs represent actors' competence expectations for one another rather than their power and prestige behaviors because power and prestige behaviors reflect competence expectations. As a consequence, an expectations states graph of the formation of status beliefs represents more explicitly the development of a link to competence expectations than to status markers and evaluation (although the latter is implied) . However, the graph does explicitly represent the formation of an evaluative dimension to the (formally) nominal distinction by indicating that Na and Nb become N+ and N- .
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5 . Webster and Hysom (1998) suggest that people in doubly dissimilar situations may also form status beliefs by forming referential beliefs about N . That is, they may form beliefs that Nas generally possess more valued social rewards than do Nbs in society . In a graph this would be represented by the imputation of a link between states of the nominal distinction and levels of goal objects (GO+ and GO-). This is a plausible suggestion that awaits empirical investigation . 6 . The lines are wavy because the strength of the impact of second-order expectations on P's own expectations varies with strength of P's expectations for the person who communicates the secondorder expectations (Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1995 ; Webster and Whitmeyer 1999). I will not deal with this aspect of second-order expectations here, however . 7 . Expectation states theory refers to this as the size of the performance expectation advantage in the situation that actors of one nominal category have over those of another category .
REFERENCES Asch, S . 1955 . "Opinions and Social Pressure ." Scientific American 193 : 31-35 . Berger, J ., T . L . Conner and M . H. Fisek. 1974 . Expectation States Theory: A Theoretical Research Program. Cambridge, MA : Winthrop. Berger, J ., M. H . Fisek, R. Z . Norman, and M . Zelditch, Jr . 1977 . Status Characteristics and Social Interaction. New York: Elsevier . Berger, J ., C . L. Ridgeway, M . H. Fisek, and R. Z . Norman . 1998 . "The Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders ." American Sociological Review 63 : 379-405 . Berger, J ., D . Wagner, and M . Zeldtich, Jr. 1982 . "A Working Strategy for Constructing Theories : State Organizing Processes ." Pp . 107-123 in Metatheorizing, edited by G. Ritzer . Newbury, CA : Sage . Berger, J ., and M . Zelditch, Jr . 1998 . Status, Power, and Legitimacy: Strategies and Theories. New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Press . Brewer, M ., and R . Kramer. 1985 . "The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes ." Annual Review of Psychology 36 : 219-243 . Conway, M . M ., T. Pizzamiglio, and L . Mount. 1996 . "Status, Communality, and Agency : Implications for Stereotypes of Gender and Other Groups ." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 : 25-38 . Cook, K . S . 1975 . "Expectations, Evaluations, and Equity ." American Sociological Review 40 : 372-88 . Dovidio, J . F., and S . L . Gaertner. 1993 . "Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias ." Pp . 167-194 in Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping, edited by D. M . Mackie and D . L . Hamilton . New York : Academic Press . Harrod, W . J . 1980. "Expectations from Unequal Rewards ." Social Psychology Quarterly 43 : 126-30. Fisek, M . H ., J . Berger, and R . Norman . 1991 . "Participation in Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Groups : A Theoretical Integration ." American Journal of Sociology 97 : 114-42. Fisek, M . H ., J . Berger, and R . Norman . 1995 . "Evaluation and Formation of Expectations ." American Journal of Sociology 101 : 721-746. Gerber, G . 1996 . "Status in Same-gender and Mixed-Gender Police Dyads : Effects on Personality Attributions ." Social Psychology Quarterly 59 : 350-63 . Geis, F . L ., J. Jennings, and D . Corrado-Taylor . 1984 . "Sex vs . Status in Sex-Associated Stereotypes ." Sex Roles 11 : 771-85 . Mark, N. 1999 . "The Emergence of Status Inequality ." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, August . Mark, N., L. Smith-Lovin, and C . L . Ridgeway. 1999. "The Emergence of Status Inequality ." Unpublished paper. Stanford University .
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Markovsky, B., L . F. Smith, and J . Berger. 1984 . "Do Status Interventions Persist?" American Sociological Review 49: 373-82. Messick, D . M ., and D . M . Mackie . 1989 . "Intergroup Relations." Pp . 45-81 in Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 40, edited by M. R . Rosenzweig and L . W. Porter. Palo Alto, CA : Annual Reviews Press. Moore, J . C . 1985 . "Role Enactment and Self Identity : An Expectations States Approach ." Pp . 262-316 in Status, Rewards, and Influence : How Expectations Organize Behavior, edited by J . Berger and M. Zelditch . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Pugh, M . D ., and R. Wahrman. 1983 . "Neutralizing Sexism in Mixed-Sex Groups : Do Women Have to Be Better than Men?" American Journal of Sociology 88 : 746-62. Ridgeway, C . L. 1991 . "The Social Construction of Status Value : Gender and other Nominal Characteristics ." Social Forces 70 : 367-86. Ridgeway, C . L . 1997 . "Where Do Status Value Beliefs Come From? New Developments ." Pp. 137-158 in Status, Network, and Structure, edited by J . Szmatka, J . Skvoretz, and J . Berger . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press . Ridgeway, C . L., and J. W . Balkwell . 1997. "Group Processes and the Diffusion of Status-Value Beliefs ." Social Psychology Quarterly 60 : 14-31 . Ridgeway, C . L ., and J . Berger . 1986 . "Expectations, Legitimation, and Dominance Behavior in Task Groups ." American Sociological Review 51 : 603-17 . Ridgeway, C. L ., J . Berger, and L. Smith . 1985 . "Nonverbal Cues and Status : An Expectation States Approach ." American Journal of Sociology 90 : 955-78 . Ridgeway, C . L ., E. H . Boyle, K. Kuipers, and D . T . Robinson . 1998. "How Do Status Beliefs Develop? The Role of Resources and Interactional Experience ." American Sociological Review 63 : 331-50 . Ridgeway, C . L ., and K . Glasgow . 1996 . "Acquiring Status Beliefs from Behavior in Interaction ." Paper presented at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, August . Ridgeway, C. L ., and K. G. Erickson . 1998. "Third Party Observers and the Spread of Status Beliefs in Interaction ." Paper presented at the International Sociological Association 14 World Congress of Sociology, Montreal, July . Shaw, M . E ., G . H . Rothschild, and J . F. Strickland . 1957 . "Decision Processes in Communication Nets ." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54: 323-330. Stewart, P . A ., and J . C . Moore, Jr . 1992. "Wage Disparities and performance Expectations ." Social Psychology Quarterly 55 : 70-85 . Troyer, L ., and C . W . Younts. 1997 . "Whose Expectations Matter? The Relative Power of First-Order and Second-Order Expectations in Determining Social Influence ." American Journal of Sociology 103 : 692-732 . Wagner, D ., and J. Berger . 1997. "Gender and Interpersonal task behaviors : Status Expectation Accounts ." Sociological Perspectives 40 : 1-32 . Weber, M . 1968. Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C . Wittich and translated by E . Fischoff et al . New York : Bedminster Press . Webster, M., and M . Foschi. 1988. Status Generalization : New Theory and Research . Stanford, CA : Stanford University . Webster, M ., and S . J. Hysom . 1998 . "Creating Status Characteristics." American Sociological Review 63 : 351-79. Webster, M ., and J. M . Whitmeyer. 1999 . "A Theory of Second-Order Expectations and Behavior." Social Psychology Quarterly 62 : 17-31 . Zelditch, M., Jr. and A . S . Floyd . 1998 . "Consensus, Dissensus, and Justification ." Pp. 339-68 in Status, Power, and Legitimacy : Strategies and Theories, edited by J . Berger and M. Zelditch . New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press. Zelditch, M ., Jr. and H. A . Walker. 1984 . "Legitimacy and the Stability of Authority ." Pp . 1-25 in Advances in Group Processes, vol . 1, edited by E . J . Lawler . Greenwich, CT: JAI Press .
THE IMPACT OF TASK AND CATEGORICAL CUES ON SOCIAL INFLUENCE FLUENCY AND ETHNIC ACCENT AS CUES TO COMPETENCE IN TASK GROUPS
Margaret Foddy and Phoebe Riches
ABSTRACT A theoretical extension of Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, and Rosenholtz's (1986) theory of status cues is proposed, which argues that task cues which contradict expectations based on categorical cues may reduce or overcome the effects of the latter on status processes . Possible mechanisms for these differential effects were suggested . Two studies examined the relative impact of verbal fluency and ethnic accent on perceptions of competence, and on acceptance of influence in a group task . In Study 1 tape-recorded passages read by Greek- and Anglo-Australian speakers were judged by independent groups on rating scales which tapped three dimensions : intelligence, competence/education, (referred to as status dimensions), and solidarity . Fluency of speaker affected raters' judgments of confidence and intelligence, but
Advances in Group Processes, Volume 17, pages 103-130 . Copyright © 2000 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0651-3 103
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not solidarity ; ethnic identity of speaker affected only ratings of intelligence . Tape recordings of fluent and stilted versions of a conversation were used in Study 2, which employed a computer controlled joint decision task . Subjects were required to resolve prearranged disagreements with a partner whose ethnicity (Anglo-Australian or Greek-Australian) and fluency (fluent or stilted) were cued by means of an overheard conversation . It was predicted and found that fluency would have a stronger impact on deference toward the partner than ethnic accent, and fluency affected post-task ratings of confidence . Partner's ethnicity did not affect rates of deference, but did affect post-task ratings of the partner : Anglo-Australians were rated as significantly more educated, quick, intelligent, and confident by both Anglo- and Greek-Australians .
INTRODUCTION When we first encounter people in a work setting or at a more informal occasion, we quickly process a great deal of information from their speech and appearance . Even before they speak, we will have noted such things as gender, race, age, and attractiveness from their physical characteristics, and perhaps socioeconomic status and sexual orientation from their dress . While the content of their initial conversation is very important, so too are the paralinguistic and nonverbal cues which accompany the words. Ethnic and class accent will add important information to our emerging impression of the person . Posture, gaze, and general demeanour will tell us whether the person is comfortable and at ease, or nervous and unconfident . Speech characteristics, such as fluency, loudness, and pitch will either confirm or contradict these initial impressions . As the televised debates of various U .S . presidential candidates showed, these latter cues can be decisive in the judgments made about the abilities and trustworthiness of well-known figures ; they are likely to be even more important in first impressions of strangers . People are also able to form strong and reasonably accurate impressions of others from hearing them speak. In an early analysis, Allport and Cantrill (1934) cited a report in the New York Times Magazine of June 18, 1933 : "The human voice, when the man [sic] is not making conscious use of it by way of impersonation, does in spite of himself, reflect his mood, temper and personality ." Although the study referred to radio speakers, another early study by Allport and Cantrill showed that listeners were quite prepared to judge both physical traits and personality of ordinary speakers from tape recordings . Further, they were more accurate than chance in judging personality dimensions such as extraversion/introversion and ascendance/submission . These authors noted the importance of stereotypes in the judgment process, with listeners including several related features once they had placed a person into a particular category ; this often reduced accuracy, but increased consensus among listeners as to the meaning of different vocal characteristics (see also Pear 1931) .
Fluency and Ethnic Accent as Cues to Competence in Task Groups
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Subsequent studies of paralinguistic and nonverbal cues have demonstrated clearly that nonverbal cues, including paralanguage, ) have a strong influence on the perception and evaluation of others (Ball, Byrne, Giles, Berechree, Griffiths, Macdonald, and McKendrick 1982 ; Callan, Gallois, and Forbes 1983 ; Giles and Sassoon 1983 ; Ridgeway, Berger, and Smith 1985 ; Sebastian and Ryan 1985 ; Driskell, Olmstead, and Salas 1993 ; Rashotte and Smith-Lovin 1997) . Researchers studying the social impact of speech characteristics have focused on how cues such as fluency, loudness, ethnic accent, and "correctness" of speech affect different dimensions of person perception . For example, Lambert (1967 ; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner, and Fillenbaum 1960), in his studies of ethnic accent, argued that perceptions of ethnic speech reflect two dimensions : status (competence, dominance, power, status, and achievement) and solidarity or affiliation (friendliness, solidarity, affiliation, and helpfulness) . 2 The accents of higher status groups evoke more favorable reactions from both low and high status raters on the status dimension . Other studies have shown that unfavorable evaluations are given to the speech patterns of regional speakers, ethnic group members, and lower-class populations in terms of status and prestige, from judges who may or may not be standard speakers themselves (Callan et al . 1983 ; Sebastian and Ryan 1985 ; Giles and Coupland 1991 ; Cargile, Giles, Ryan, and Bradac 1994) . Ratings on the solidarity dimension reflect a tendency for people to favor members of one's own group, although evidence for this latter relationship is mixed (Ryan and Carranza 1975 ; Callan et al . 1983 ; Nesdale and Rooney 1996) . The two dimensions, status and solidarity, also appear in ratings of speech qualities such as fluency, speed, and loudness, with higher status and competence being assigned to speakers who are fluent, loud, and fast . Several studies (Sereno and Hawkins 1967 ; Smith, Brown, Strong, and Rencher 1975 ; Brown, Giles, and Thakerer 1985) have shown that rate of speech influences listeners' perceptions, with judgments of competence a linear function of increasing rate . Similarly, fluency has been shown to affect perceptions of competence . For example, Pryor and Buchanan (1984) assessed the impact of nonverbal behavior on jurors' evaluations of the defendant's credibility and guilt and found the defendant received the highest competency ratings in the setting where he was highly fluent, maintained good eye contact, and did not fidget. Norton-Ford and Hogan (1980) demonstrated that fluent speech produced significantly higher ratings than nonfluent speech on adjectives such as assertiveness, competence, and aggressiveness (see also Rashotte and Smith-Lovin 1997) . Solidarity (or affiliation) ratings seem to be a more complex function of speech qualities . Existing evidence suggests that the relationship between rate of speech and solidarity ratings, for example, is sensitive to contextual variables such as the