Afghanistan Security

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

LAWRENCE B. PEABODY EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Copyright © 2009 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Peabody, Lawrence B. Afghanistan security / Lawrence B. Peabody. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-60741-404-9 (E-book) 1. National security--Afghanistan. 2. Internal security--Afghanistan. 3. Afghanistan--Armed Forces. I. Title. UA853.A3P34 2009 355'.0330581--dc22 2008055764

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Index

vii Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces GAO Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman

1

49

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

111

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

179

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

215 231

PREFACE Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to peacefully resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai, who is running for reelection in 2009. Major regional strongmen have been marginalized. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 53,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, over 23,000 of the 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.

In: Afghanistan Security Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 1-52

ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION MAY BE NEEDED TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF A DETAILED PLAN TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN CAPABLE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES *

GAO ABBREVIATIONS ANA ANCOP ANP ANSF AWOL CM CSTC-A EU NATO NCO

Afghan National Army Afghan National Civil Order Police Afghan National Police Afghan National Security Forces absent without leave capability milestone Combined Security Transition Command— Afghanistan European Union North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-commissioned officer

June 18, 2008 Congressional Committees Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other coalition nations, has worked to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—to provide security for Afghanistan. The goal of *

Excerpted from GAO Report GAO-08-661, dated June 2008.

2

GAO

these efforts is to transfer responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces. In 2005[1] and 2007,[2] we found that the training and equipping of the army and police had made some progress, but that the Department of Defense (Defense) and the Department of State (State), the agencies responsible for implementing these efforts, lacked detailed plans and cost estimates for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We concluded that, without capable and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces, terrorists could again create a safe haven in Afghanistan and jeopardize efforts by the United States and the international community to develop the country. Since 2005, security in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly. Attacks by armed opposition groups have grown across Afghanistan, with numerous attacks directly targeting the ANA and ANP. Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States.[3] In this review, we (1) analyzed U.S. plans for developing the ANSF and identified the extent to which these plans contained detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies; (2) examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the ANA; and (3) examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the ANP. To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed Defense and State planning, funding, and evaluation documents related to the U.S. efforts to establish, train, and equip Afghan army and police forces. We discussed these efforts with Defense and State officials in Washington, D.C.; Kabul, Afghanistan; and the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida, and with private contractors implementing U.S. programs. In Afghanistan, we viewed Afghan army and police training facilities and equipment warehouses and met with officials from the United States, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, NATO, and the United Nations. We are currently performing separate reviews on the accountability of equipment provided to the ANSF and U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. Consequently, we do not assess these issues in depth in this report. See appendix I for a complete description of our scope and methodology. We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

RESULTS IN BRIEF The Departments of Defense and State have not yet developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We recommended in 2005, and reaffirmed in 2007, that the plans should include clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved. Additionally, in 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

3

of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided GAO a document that, according to Defense officials, met GAO’s 2005 recommendation.[4] However, this 5-page document does not provide sufficient detail for effective planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no sustainability strategy. Further, even though Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not describe the role of State or other key stakeholders. Moreover, State did not participate in the development of the Defense document and has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) completed a field-level plan for ANSF development, which includes force goals, objectives, and performance measures. However, this field-level plan is not a substitute for a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed plan, it is difficult for Congress to assess progress and conduct oversight on the extent and cost of the U.S. commitment needed to develop capable and sustainable ANSF. This is particularly important given the recent calls for further increasing the size of the ANSF and the potential costs, currently estimated at approximately $2 billion per year, of sustaining the ANSF for years into the future. The United States has provided over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002; however, less than 2 percent (2 of 105 units) of ANA units are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. Thirty-six percent (38 of 105) are assessed as capable of conducting their mission, but require routine[5] international assistance, while the remaining ANA units (65 of 105 units) are either planned, in basic training, or assessed as partially able or unable to conduct their primary mission. Building an Afghan army that can lead security operations requires manning,[6] training, and equipping of personnel; however, U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000—nearly three times the 19,600[7] Defense reported in 2005—the ANA has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining its personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors[8] are present in every ANA combat unit, less than half the required number are deployed in the field. Defense officials cited an insufficient number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in the field as the major impediment to providing the ANA with the training to establish capabilities, such as advanced combat skills and logistics, necessary to sustain the ANA force in the long term. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40 percent of critical equipment items, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of U.S. trainers and equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of nearly $6 billion, no Afghan police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Similar to the effort to build the ANA, development of a national Afghan police force that is fully capable requires manning, training, and equipping of police personnel—all areas in which the U.S. continues to face challenges. First, less than one-quarter of the ANP has police mentors[9] present to provide training in the field, evaluate police capability, and verify that police are on duty. According to Defense officials leading the effort in Kabul, the shortage of

4

GAO

mentors is the primary obstacle to building a fully capable police force. Second, the ANP has not received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers critical and continues to face shortages in several types of equipment, including vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Recognizing these challenges, Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan police; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk. To help ensure that action is taken to address our recommendation from 2005 and the recently enacted mandate under the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations for development of the ANSF on the completion of a coordinated, detailed plan, including development of a strategy for sustaining the forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, State expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan and highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as certain operational changes, many of which occurred after the completion of our fieldwork in August 2007. Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan and stated that current guidance provided is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense also disagreed with our conclusion that progress is difficult to assess without a detailed plan. While we acknowledge that changes may have occurred since August 2007, Defense and State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. Furthermore, while Defense produces various documents that report on the current status of the ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate milestones or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set time frame. Therefore, we maintain that without a coordinated, detailed plan for the development of the ANSF, ensuring oversight and assessing progress of the program is difficult.

BACKGROUND Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States, several allies, and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists. After years of conflict and Taliban rule, the new Afghan government inherited a state with limited capacity to govern; an economy dominated by the narcotics trade; constraints on economic development due, in part, to resource limitations and mountainous terrain (see figure 1); a poorly developed infrastructure with few roads and little household access to power and running water; and weak national security forces. In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to help Afghanistan address threats to its security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a security reform strategy for Afghanistan: the United States would lead the training of the Afghan army and Germany would lead the police reconstitution effort. However, due, in part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the German

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

5

training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police training effort. As we reported in 2005, according to cognizant German officials, Germany viewed its role in the police sector as one of advising and consulting with donors and the Afghan government rather than as the major implementer or funding source.

Source: GAO. Figure 1. Mountainous Terrain in Afghanistan.

The Role and Development of the Afghan National Army In 2002, the international community endorsed the decision of the Afghan government to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of no more than 70,000.[10] In 2006, this vision was reaffirmed by the Afghan government and the international community through its integration into the Afghanistan National Development Strategy[11] and Afghanistan Compact,[12] documents that articulated economic, social, and security priorities for Afghanistan. These documents also set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of the ANA. In February 2008, citing increased security challenges, the Afghan government and its international partners endorsed a 10,000-person increase in the force structure of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.[13] The strategic role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the ANA is to defend and deter aggression against Afghanistan, support and defend the Afghan Constitution, defeat the insurgency and terrorism, and support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and reintegration into the regional and international community, among other things. To accomplish this, the army’s current force structure includes (1) Ministry of Defense and general staff personnel, (2)

6

GAO

sustaining institutions, (3) intermediate command staff, (4) combat forces, and (5) Afghan air corps personnel. Combat forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are divided into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. A corps contains 1 or more brigades. A typical brigade consists of approximately 2,800 personnel: three light infantry battalions (with approximately 650 personnel each), one combat support battalion (with approximately 500 personnel), and one combat services support battalion (with approximately 350 personnel). (See app. II for additional details on the force structure and functions of the ANA.) U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, in partnership with the government of Afghanistan. The Defense-staffed CSTC-A oversees the Afghan army’s training, facilities development, assessment, and equipment provision. Under CSTC-A is Task Force Phoenix, a joint coalition task force responsible for training, mentoring, and advising the Afghan army at the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country (see figure 2).

Source: GAO. Figure 2. ANA Commando Training Facility Outside of Kabul.

Reconstitution of the Afghan National Police Force The reconstitution of the ANP began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service committed to the rule of law. In May 2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved an interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed every 6 months. The Afghan government and international community set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of the ANP force. In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, support actions to defeat insurgency, control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among other activities. The force structure for the police includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff, uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

7

This report primarily focuses on U.S. efforts to build the uniformed police, the largest component of the Afghan police force. (See app. II for further details on the force structure and functions of the ANP.) U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense, through CSTC-A, with support from State, which provides policy guidance to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in the police training effort is DynCorp International, which provides police training courses in criminal investigation, physical fitness, and weapons and survival skills, and civilian mentors to assist in developing the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the police forces it administers. Germany leads efforts to train commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan police officers at the Kabul Police Academy (see figure 3).

Source: GAO. Figure 3. Trainees Attending a Class at the Kabul Police Academy.

U.S. Support to Train and Equip Afghan National Security Forces The United States provided $16.5 billion from fiscal years 2002 through 2008 to support the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police (see table 1). Slightly over 45 percent (approximately $7.6 billion) of the funding was provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort to accelerate the training and equipping and enhance the capabilities of the ANSF. These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the personnel costs for U.S.

8

GAO

servicemembers assigned to the training and equipping mission. (See app. I for further details on our methodology.) Table 1. Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008 Dollars in millions Assistance program Afghan

FY 2008

FY 2002 $76.9

FY 2003 $362.7

FY 2004 $723.7

FY 2005 $1,736.6

FY 2006 $767.1

FY 2007 $4,884.2

request $1,721.7

Total $10,273.0

25.5

5.0

223.9

837.9

1,299.8

2,701.2

1,105.6

6,198.8

$102.4

$367.7

$947.6

$2,574.5

$2,066.9

$7,585.4

$2,827.3

$16,471.8

a

b

c

Army Afghan Police Total

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. a

b

c

Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $1,450 million that has been appropriated (approximately $1,108 million for the ANA and approximately $342 million for the ANP) and approximately $1,378 million that has been requested (approximately $614 million for the ANA and approximately $764 million for the ANP). Totals include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. Fiscal years 2007 and 2008 figures include Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding, and International Military Education and Training funds. Funding for the Afghan Army includes detainee operations.

Other Donor Support More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided funds, equipment, or personnel to support U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANSF. As of March 2008, non-U.S. donors have provided about $820 million in support of efforts to develop the ANSF: approximately $426 million was provided to supplement efforts to train and equip the Afghan army and about $394 million in support of the Afghan police. Over 15 nations contribute mentors to the army, providing approximately one-third of the personnel who assist in training ANA units in the field. The EU has provided 80 mentors to assist the police at the ministerial, regional, and provincial levels out of approximately 215 pledged. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme administers the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which provides reimbursement to the Afghan government for police salaries. Approximately 80 percent of international donations for the ANP have supported programs through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (about $311 million of about $394 million).

Prior GAO Recommendations and Congressional Mandate We previously identified the need for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. In June 2005, GAO reported that the Secretaries of Defense and State should develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, future funding

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

9

requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved. Our report recommended that the Secretaries provide this information to Congress when the executive branch requests funding for the Afghan army or police forces. Although Defense and State generally concurred with this recommendation, both suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need to report to Congress their plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State reporting to Congress determined that the departments did not have the detailed plans we recommended to guide the development of the ANSF and to facilitate congressional oversight. As a result, in our 2007 report, we reiterated the need for Defense and State to develop such plans. Following our reports, in 2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after that date, through the end of fiscal year 2010.[14] The first such report was due by the end of April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress. In addition, Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after that date, through the end of fiscal year 2010.[15] The first such report was due by the end of April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress.

THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE HAVE NOT DEVELOPED A COORDINATED, DETAILED PLAN FOR COMPLETING AND SUSTAINING THE ANSF Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite our recommendation in 2005 and a mandate from Congress in 2008 that such a plan be developed. Defense provided GAO a 5page document in January 2007 that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s recommendation. However, it does not include several of the key elements identified in our recommendation and does not provide a sufficient level of detail for effective interagency planning and congressional oversight. Although CSTC-A has developed a fieldlevel plan in Afghanistan that integrates the Afghan government’s interest, this represents military planning and is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed plan containing the elements identified in our 2005 recommendation, as noted earlier, congressional oversight concerning the extent and cost of the U.S. commitment to train and equip the ANSF is difficult, and decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess progress and allocate defense resources among competing priorities.[16]

Defense Document Is Limited in Scope and Detail As of March 2008, neither Defense nor State had developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF that includes clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, and a strategy for

10

GAO

sustaining the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. In January 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not describe the role of State or other key stakeholders. State also did not contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In addition, U.S. military officials responsible for the effort to build the ANSF were not familiar with the document at the time of our visit to Kabul in August 2007—over 6 months after we received the document from Defense officials in Washington. The 5-page document that Defense developed in response to our 2005 recommendation is limited in scope and detail. For example, although the document provides some broad objectives and performance measures for training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few milestones. Further, these milestones are not consistent with long-term milestones identified in field documents generated by U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan and do not include intermediate milestones for judging progress in the medium term. The document provides no mechanism for measuring progress over time against established baselines, other than monthly status reports from the field. These status reports, while useful in identifying month-to-month progress in unit capabilities, use baselines that generally go back no more than 18 months. As such, it is difficult to identify progress since the start of the program and the effect that various factors, such as additional resources, have had on training and equipment availability, as discussed in prior GAO work.[17]

High-Level Plan Lacks Focus on Sustainment Funding Defense’s 5-page document, in response to our 2005 recommendations, does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently estimates that no additional money, beyond the approximately $16.5 billion provided between fiscal years 2002 to 2008, is needed to complete the initial training and equipping of a 70,000-person army force and an 82,000-person police force. If the force structure grows, Defense officials acknowledged that budgetary requirements likely would also increase. In February 2008, the Afghan government and its international partners endorsed an increase in the force structure of the ANA by 10,000. A Defense official stated that increasing the force structure by 10,000 additional army personnel will cost approximately an additional $1 billion. In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $2 billion a year will be needed for the next 5 years to sustain the ANSF—$1 billion for the Afghan army and $1 billion for the police.[18] This is based on a 152,000-person end-strength—70,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP. Defense officials estimate that increasing the ANA force structure by 10,000 will cost about $100 million annually to sustain. By comparison, in 2005, Defense and State estimated the cost to sustain an ANA force of 70,000 and an ANP force of 62,000 would total $600 million per year. This sustainment estimate, however, did not include the cost of sustaining capabilities such as airlift, which is currently being developed for the Afghan army. Defense expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. According to U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and the recently approved CSTC-A Campaign Plan, U.S. involvement in training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade. However, neither Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond 2013.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

11

As noted earlier, the United States has been a major contributor to this mission, providing approximately $16.5 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2008 to train and equip the forces. At present, Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries and equipment replacement, without substantial foreign assistance. An international task force studying the effects of increasing the size of the ANP noted that by 2012, if the Afghan Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for police salaries, the salary costs for an 82,000 police force could total nearly 9 percent of the Afghan government’s budget—a cost that could mean large cuts in other programs, such as education, health, and other social services, according to the task force. U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs, including some salaries. However, despite what U.S. military officials in Afghanistan stated, Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the ANSF. In a briefing on the U.S. approach to sustaining the ANSF, Defense and State officials stated that sustainment costs will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and that the United States and the international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues and capacity to sustain the army and police. For example, Defense and State officials stated that greater revenues could be obtained by improving border management, noting that customs duties generate more than half of Afghanistan’s revenues. These officials, however, did not identify any other ways to improve revenues for the security sector nor did they identify whether this information is being incorporated into a broader plan for developing and sustaining the ANSF when we inquired about such a plan.

CSTC-A Plan Provides Guidance for Field-Level Operations, but Is Not a Substitute for a Coordinated State and Defense Plan Since GAO reported in 2005, field-level planning for the training and equipping of the ANSF has improved. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan for ANSF development, and an operations order with further detail on the development and execution of the fiscal year 2008 ANSF force generation program. The Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan) is a military plan.[19] It provides field-level goals, objectives, and capability milestones for the development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including Afghan army and police forces. With a new emphasis on quality training, the plan extends the time frames for ANSF development beyond those reported in our 2005 report.[20] However, while this military plan provides needed field guidance, it is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. When we last reported in 2005, Defense had not fully implemented or been able to reach agreement on criteria for assessing an Afghan army unit’s readiness to operate without training assistance. Since that time, Defense has developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to assess army and police progress in manning, training, and equipping the forces. Units are assessed against four capability milestones that range from CM1 to CM4. A unit, agency, staff function, or installation rated at CM1 is fully capable of conducting its primary operational mission but may require assistance from the international community in

12

GAO

certain situations. For instance, a combat unit capable of operating at CM1 is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level; however, coalition support may be required for certain capabilities, such as close air support, medical evacuation, or indirect fire support.[21] By contrast, a unit, agency, or staff function rated at CM4 has been established but is not yet capable of conducting its primary operational mission and can only undertake portions of its mission with significant assistance, and reliance on, international support. The table below provides descriptions of the capability milestones, as identified in the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. Table 2. Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces Capability milestone CM1

CM2

CM3

CM4

Description The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.

Source: Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces—Interim, January 29, 2008.

The Campaign Plan identifies three key phases in the development of Afghan army and police forces: fielding/generating forces, developing forces, and transitioning to strategic partnership. Table 3 describes these phases and their corresponding milestones. It is not clear from the Campaign Plan whether the milestones are based on an ANA force structure of 70,000 or 80,000. If based on 70,000, the milestones would likely need to be revisited. Table 3. Description of Key Phases in the Training and Equipping of the ANSF Campaign phase Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security Capability Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership

Description Army and police forces are manned, have completed individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better. Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. Coalition forces will partner with army and police units to assist in the development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. The Afghan government will assume the lead responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement by the international community. CSTC-A will have completed its current mission and should transition into a security assistance organization.

Milestone date Complete by mid-2010 Complete by the end of 2011 Extends beyond 2019

Source: CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces—Interim, January 29, 2008.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

13

Milestone dates for the accomplishment of certain objectives have been extended beyond those reported earlier. For example, our 2005 report states that Defense officials estimated that basic training for 43,000 ground combat troops would be accomplished by the fall of 2007. However, the Campaign Plan extends this date to mid-2010. According to the CSTC-A Commander, given resource constraints and the new emphasis on fielding quality forces, certain deadlines for the fielding, generation, and development of Afghan forces have had to be extended. In addition to capability milestones, personnel and equipment requirements have also been established since our last report. In 2005, we noted that documents identifying personnel and equipment requirements for the Afghan National Security Forces were not complete. However, since that time, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, assisted by CSTCA, have completed personnel and equipment requirements, known as Tashkils.[22] The Tashkils list in detail the authorized staff positions and equipment items for the ANA and ANP. Moreover, ANA Tashkils have been converted into an electronic force management database by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, which provides standardization and consistency given frequent CSTC-A personnel rotations. Agency officials expect that the ANP Tashkils will also be converted to a similar system.

FEW AFGHAN ARMY UNITS ARE CAPABLE OF LEADING OPERATIONS AND EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THEIR CAPABILITY FACE SEVERAL CHALLENGES The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002, but less than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are assessed at CM1—full operational capability. Building an Afghan army that can lead its own operations requires manning, training, and equipping army personnel; however, U.S. efforts to build the Afghan army have faced challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA has increased in size and basic recruiting is strong, the ANA has experienced difficulties manning the army, such as finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, the insufficient number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in the field is a major impediment to providing the ANA with the follow-up training, including in areas such as advanced combat skills and logistics, needed to sustain the force in the long term. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40 percent of items defined as critical by Defense, including machine guns and vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors and equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed.

More Troops Trained, but Very Few ANA Units Rated as Having Capability to Lead Operations Defense planning calls for the development of an 80,000-person ANA force structure that includes Ministry of Defense personnel, sustaining institutions, and infantry forces capable of

14

GAO

accomplishing its mission with limited assistance from the international community. As of April 2008, Defense reports that approximately 58,000 army personnel received training and were assigned to the ANA. The chart below details the number of ANA forces authorized compared with the number currently assigned (see table 4). Table 4. Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of April 2008 Forces Ministry of Defense/ General Staff Sustaining institutionsa Intermediate commandsb Combat troops Afghan Air Corps Total

Authorized 3,185 2,001 16,169 56,127 3,000 80,482c

Trained and assigned 2,596 1,679 13,511 37,866 2,141 57,793

Percent assigned 82 84 84 67 71 72

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Defense data. Note: As discussed later in this report, the number of troops trained and assigned is greater than number on-duty due to attrition, absenteeism, leave, and battlefield casualties. a Sustaining institutions include Military Intelligence Regional Offices, Communications Support Element, Acquisition Agency, Installation Management Department, Military Police Company (Kabul Area), and Detainee Operations. b Intermediate commands include Headquarters Support Brigade and the logistics, training, recruiting, and medical commands. c The 482 positions above 80,000 account for the Afghan National Guard Force.

Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and assigned to the ANA. Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense reports that 37,866 combat troops have been trained and assigned to the ANA as of April 2008, compared with 18,300 troops in March 2005. Although this represents more than a twofold increase in the amount of combat troops, it is approximately 5,000 forces less than Defense had predicted would be trained by fall 2007. Moreover, new positions have been added to the ANA’s structure since our 2005 report, including an expanded Afghan air corps[23] and the ANA force structure has increased to 80,000. While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two ANA units—out of 105 rated—are assessed as CM1—fully capable. Thirty-six percent of ANA units (38 of 105 rated units) are assessed at CM2 and are capable of conducting their primary mission with routine international support. The remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-one percent (32 of 105 rated units) are CM3—capable of partially conducting their primary mission, but reliant on international support; 11 percent (11 of 105 rated units) are CM4—formed but not yet capable; and 21 percent (22 of 105 rated units) are not yet formed or not reporting (see table 5).[24] While few ANA units are rated as fully capable, Defense officials stated that ANA troops had performed well in combat situations.[25] Personnel assigned to mentor the ANA that we interviewed in Afghanistan praised the efforts of Afghan troops, and U.S. and Afghan officials stated they were pleased with the development of the army to date. The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead responsibility for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, monthly reports provided by CSTC-A show the expected date of full ANA capability as March 2011.[26] However, this date does not

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

15

account for shortfalls in the required number of mentors and trainers. Thus, Defense officials cautioned that currently predicted dates for the achievement of a fully capable Afghan army are subject to change and may be delayed. Table 5. Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008 Army units

CM1Fully Capable

CM2Capable with Support

CM4Not Capable

3

CM3 Partially Capable 1

0

Unit Not Formed or Not Reportinga 0

Corps headquarters (5) Brigade headquarters (14) Combat battalions (49) Combat support and combat services support battalions (33) Air Corps headquarters (1) Air Corps squadrons (3) Number of ANA units (105)

1 0

6

5

1

2

1

18

15

6

9

0

11

8

3

11

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

2

1

0

2 (2%)

38 (36%)

32 (31%)

11 (11%)

22 (21%)

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. Note: Percentages in the table may not add to 100 due to rounding. a An ANA unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is either a planned unit or a unit in basic training.

Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in Manning, Training, and Equipping the Force U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the army, such as recruiting for leadership positions and retaining personnel; shortfalls in the number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors deployed with ANA units in the field to assist in developing capable ANA forces; and shortages of critical equipment items.

Afghan Army Faces Difficulties Reducing Absenteeism, Recruiting Qualified Candidates for Leadership and Specialist Positions, and Retaining Personnel Although the ANA has grown in numbers, it faces manning challenges, including absenteeism, recruitment of leaders and specialists, and retention of personnel. First, although approximately 32,700[27] combat personnel received training and were assigned to one of the five ANA corps, the number of combat troops on hand is less than those trained and assigned due to attrition, absenteeism, scheduled leave, and battlefield casualties.[28] As of February 2008, Defense reported that about 20 percent of combat personnel assigned were not present for duty (see figure 4).

16

GAO

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. Note: This figure includes approximately 32,700 ANA combat personnel assigned to the five ANA corps, as well as civilians serving in support roles for the ANA. Figure 4. Comparison of ANA Corps Personnel Assigned to a Unit to the Number On Hand, as of February 2008.

Although some of those absent from the army may have scheduled their absence or been killed in duty, Defense assessment reports from November 2007 to February 2008 show between 8 and 12 percent of combat unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with AWOL rates as high as 17 percent for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to achieve sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL rates should be no higher than 8 percent. Officials attributed these absences to a variety of causes, such as soldiers leaving their units to take their pay home and the lack of significant penalties for such absences. To address these issues, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, assisted by CSTC-A, has initiated programs to allow soldiers to transfer their pay to family members and to facilitate the deposit of ANA salaries directly into soldiers’ bank accounts. CSTC-A officials stated these programs should reduce AWOL rates.[29] Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist positions. Defense reports that recruiting goals for ANA infantry positions have been met, despite adjustments to increase ANA training output by 6,000 soldiers annually. However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in the number of candidates available for non-commissioned officer (NCO) and specialty skill positions, such as logistics and medical support. Between November 2007 and February 2008, ANA manning levels for NCOs ranged between 50 to 70 percent of the authorized number. NCOs provide a vital link between senior officers and soldiers and can provide leadership to ANA units in the field, according to a senior Defense official. Officials attributed the shortage to the low level of literacy among ANA recruits. CSTC-A is attempting to address this shortfall by promoting NCOs from within ANA ranks and implementing new programs to target literate recruits. CSTC-A expects to have greater than 90 percent of the ANA’s authorized

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

17

NCOs staffed by summer 2008. The ANA is also experiencing difficulties manning specialist positions such as logistics, medical support, and engineering. Although the ANA has developed courses to train military specialists, the current Afghan army is comprised primarily of infantry forces. This is, in part, because ANA recruits learn basic infantry skills first. However, this focus is also due to difficulties identifying candidates who are suitable for advanced training. According to Defense officials, without suitably trained support personnel, the ANA will need to rely on coalition forces to provide support services. Third, the ANA is facing challenges retaining personnel. A typical ANA contract lasts for 3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the opportunity to re-enlist with the Afghan army. Between March 2006 and February 2008, just over half of those combat personnel eligible to re-enlist opted to do so, as shown in table 6.[30] Table 6. Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel, March 2006 to February 2008 ANA unit Kabul Military Training Center 201st Corps 203rd Corps 205th Corps 207th Corps 209th Corps Total

Number eligible to re-enlist 474

Number who did not re-enlist 239

Number re-enlisted 235

Percent reenlisted 50

2,554 1,319 963 1,037 730 7,077

731 554 523 864 401 3,312

1,823 765 440 173 329 3,765

71 58 46 17 45 53

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

U.S. and Afghan officials attributed these re-enlistment rates to a variety of factors, such as stationing soldiers away from their families, the rapid pace of ANA military operations, and the higher salaries offered by private companies and insurgent groups looking to recruit trained Afghan soldiers. To address these factors, a senior Defense official stated that the Ministry of Defense and CSTC-A are discussing the implementation of several programs such as allowing re-enlisting soldiers greater choice in determining where they will be stationed and increasing re-enlistment bonuses. Without the ability to retain trained personnel, ANA units will continue to lack experience and thus may be delayed in reaching their ability to lead security operations. For instance, in November 2007, the capability assessment of the ANA’s 209th corps in northern Afghanistan lowered the rating of one of its battalions from CM2 to CM3 when the battalion failed to retain approximately half of its NCOs. Further, the assessment noted that progress developing the capability of this battalion could be delayed nearly a year.

Shortage of U.S. Embedded Trainers and Coalition Mentors Delaying Advanced Skill Training for the ANA Although some U.S. embedded trainers or coalition mentors are present in every ANA corps, the ANA is experiencing shortages in the number of these required[31] personnel to assist in its development. According to CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan, after an ANA unit is

18

GAO

fielded, either an embedded training team (comprised of U.S. personnel) or a mentoring team (comprised of coalition personnel) should be assigned to the unit.[32] These teams are responsible for developing the skills of ANA army units from initial fielding until the unit has developed the capability to assume lead responsibility for its security mission. As the ANA unit builds capability, embedded trainers and mentors guide and assess the units and provide them with access to air support and medical evacuation. Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded. For instance, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46 percent (1,019 of 2,215) of Defense’s required number of embedded trainers. Officials attributed these shortfalls to competing U.S. priorities for Defense personnel, including the war in Iraq. CSTC-A has submitted requests for additional forces to act as embedded trainers to assist the ANA; however, the request has been deferred. As of April 2008, members of the international community assisting in this effort have fielded 32 out of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of international mentors in the field is smaller than the number of U.S embedded trainers. Approximately onethird of personnel in the field assisting ANA unit development are coalition mentors, while two-thirds are U.S. personnel.[33] Without adequate training or mentoring, the ANA’s ability to take the lead in security operations may be delayed. First, Defense officials have cited an insufficient number of embedded trainers and coalition mentors deployed with units in the field as the major impediment to providing the ANA with the training it needs to establish the capabilities necessary to sustain the force in the long term, such as maneuver skills in battalion-level operations, intelligence collection, and logistics. Without these skills, smaller ANA units cannot operate collectively at the battalion level, must rely on the coalition for support tasks, and cannot assume the lead for their own security. Secondly, as ANA units achieve greater levels of capability, embedded trainers and mentors are responsible for assessing and validating their progress. CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan states that the validation process is intended to improve collective training of ANA units; however, without adequate numbers of U.S. embedded trainers and coalition mentors, this validation will be slowed. CSTC-A officials stated that this delay in validation would lengthen the amount of time it will take the ANA to achieve full capability. Moreover, Defense officials noted that, as the number of ANA units fielded increases, the number of U.S. embedded training and coalition mentoring personnel needed also rises. For instance, when we visited Afghanistan in August 2007, Defense officials stated 73 U.S.-embedded training and coalition mentoring teams were needed to assist the development of the ANA; however, Defense officials projected that by December 2008 103 teams would be needed. Without additional training and mentoring personnel to meet this increased need, delays in ANA development will likely be exacerbated.

Critical Equipment Shortfalls Remain Due to Changing Procurement Plans, Competing Global Priorities, and Production Limitations Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005, Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, Defense began providing some ANA forces with U.S. equipment. Further, as security deteriorated, equipment needs changed and Defense planned to provide more protective

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

19

equipment, such as armored Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades. In support of these efforts, approximately $3.7 billion was provided between fiscal years 2005 and 2008 to equip the ANA.[34] As of February 2008, CSTC-A reports that the ANA combat forces are equipped with 60 percent of items defined as critical by Defense, a 7 percentage point increase since August 2007. Despite these advances, shortages exist in a number of equipment items defined as critical by Defense. For instance, of 55 critical equipment items for ANA combat forces, CSTC-A reports having less than half of the required amount on hand for 21 of these items. Types of critical equipment items with significant shortfalls include vehicles, weapons, and communication equipment (see table 7). Although shortfalls exist for certain items defined as critical by Defense, such as NATOstandard machine guns, this does not necessarily mean that the ANA is unequipped. Defense officials stated that while ANA forces wait to receive NATO-standard weapons, Eastern bloc substitutes will be used. However, several ANA combat corps reported shortages in these items as well. For instance, each month between November 2007 and February 2008 at least 2 of 5 ANA corps reported shortages in Eastern bloc anti-tank weapons and 1 of 5 ANA corps reported shortages in Eastern bloc light machine guns. Moreover, shortfalls in items for which no Eastern bloc substitute is being used, such as communication equipment and cargo trucks, were reported in every ANA combat corps in February 2008. Defense officials attribute these shortfalls to a variety of factors, such as competing global priorities for equipment, production delays, and delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding, among other reasons. As equipment orders are filled, ANA units may not be the top priority to receive certain equipment items. CSTC-A officials said that U.S. soldiers currently in combat have first priority to receive some of the equipment that is also requested for the ANA, while security forces in other nations, such as Iraq, may also be higher priority than the Afghan army. When U.S. forces or other nations have higher priority to receive equipment, CSTC-A officials noted that ANA orders are delayed. Officials at the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command also stated that Iraq may be a higher priority than Afghanistan, while a senior official from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated that other nations, such as Georgia and Lebanon, may also receive higher priority. Furthermore, production delays for certain equipment items may contribute to equipment shortfalls. For instance, CSTC-A officials stated that due to production delays, certain equipment items, such as NATO-standard heavy machine guns and mortars, were not currently available and would not likely be delivered until 2009 or 2010. Similarly, Defense officials in Washington, D.C., stated that production limitations were responsible for some equipment shortages, particularly in the case of NATO-standard mortars. Additional factors cited as contributing to equipment shortages included delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding, accelerated fielding of ANA units, and difficulties distributing equipment to the field.

20

GAO

Table 7. Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand, as of February 2008

Item Vehicles and generators 15-Kilowatt Generator Excavating Vehicle M872A4 Semi-trailer 30-Kilowatt Generator Armored Humvee Dump Truck Humvee Ambulance Eastern bloca weapons DsHK 12.7 mm Heavy Machine Gun NATO-standardb weapons M500 Shotgun M224 60mm Mortar M203A2 40mm Grenade Launcher M16A2 Semi-automatic Rifle M249 Machine Gun M240B Machine Gun M24 Sniper Rifle M2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun M252 81mm Mortar Communications technology High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio Omni-Directional Antenna Mast Very High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio Field Switch Board

Number required

Number on hand

Percent of required on hand

40 120 316 75 4,580 60 710

19 56 82 16 469 5 0

48 47 26 21 10 8 0

576

175

30

525 68 2,851 53,287 3,584 2,013 1,544 576 30

116 15 527 6,018 162 81 12 0 0

22 22 19 11 5 4 1 0 0

1,031

501

49

503 200

180 71

36 36

752

202

27

34 Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and equipping of the ANA through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and training. The $3.7 billion figure represents the amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment and transportation for the Afghan army. Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. Note: Equip ment requirements are defined in the ANA’s Military Table of Equipment, known as a Tashkil. a Eastern bloc equipment generally refers to equipment developed by the Soviet Union and produced in Eastern bloc countries. b NATO-standard refers to NATO approved standardization processes applied to equipment, which can include production codes and equipment specifications. According to NATO’s Logistics Handbook, the aim of standardization is to enhance the Alliance’s operational effectiveness and to improve the efficient use of available resources.

One method to help address shortages while western equipment is delayed is through increased equipment donations from the international community. CSTC-A is currently seeking additional contributions, particularly of Eastern bloc equipment, such as the basic soldier assault rifle. Between 2002 and March 2008, over 40 non-U.S. donors provided

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

21

approximately $426 million to assist in the training and equipping of the ANA. Eighty-eight percent of this support has been in the area of equipment; however, the value of equipment donations is determined by the donor, according to CSTC-A officials. The quality of this donated equipment has been mixed (see figure 5), and delivery of some donations has been delayed due to limited funds to pay for shipments into Afghanistan.

Figure 5. Rifles of Variable Quality Donated to the ANSF.

To address quality issues, NATO and CSTC-A have established procedures to verify that international donations comply with current needs for the ANA and, if necessary, verify the condition and completeness of equipment. Furthermore, to defray the cost of shipments into Afghanistan, a NATO-administered trust fund has been established to support the transportation of equipment into Afghanistan. However, Defense officials stated that the amount of money in the trust fund, which they estimated to be approximately $1 million, is limited and may not support the transportation of a large number of donations. Additionally, CSTC-A has also set aside funding to transport donated goods when required. The development of capable ANA forces may be delayed by shortages in equipment, as units cannot be certified as fully capable in equipment unless they have 85 percent or more of their critical equipment items. CSTC-A anticipates that all ANA brigades will be equipped to at least 85 percent of requirements for critical equipment items by December 2008; however, according to Defense’s March 2008 monthly status report, expected dates for achieving CM1 in equipment were pushed back for 12 of 14 combat brigades by between 1 to 7 months due, in part, to delayed delivery and distribution of items such as vehicles and weapons. Moreover, shortages in equipment items may hinder training efforts, since having certain equipment

22

GAO

items on hand, such as trucks, may be necessary to teach ANA personnel logistics and maintenance skills.

SEVERAL CHALLENGES IMPEDE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCES Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Development of an Afghan police force that is fully capable requires manning, training, and equipping of police personnel. However, the United States faces challenges in several areas related to these efforts to build a capable police force. First, less than one-quarter of the ANP has police mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, the Afghan police have not received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers critical, and continue to face shortages in several categories of equipment, including trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective policing, and our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents. Recognizing that these challenges hamper ANP development, Defense began a new long-term initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest component of the Afghan police. However, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may pose a risk to the initiative’s success.

No Police Units Are Rated as Fully Capable of Performing Their Mission Defense defines a fully capable 82,000-person ANP force as one that is able to independently plan, execute, and sustain operations with limited coalition support.[35] However, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission (see table 8).[36] Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about three-fourths of the ANP’s authorized endstrength, were rated at CM4—the lowest capability rating.[37] Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated at CM2, and the other 6 at CM3. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012—a date that conflicts with the Afghan government and international community benchmark of establishing police forces that can effectively meet Afghanistan’s security needs by the end of 2010.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

23

Table 8. Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008 Police units

CM1Fully Capable

CM2Capable with Support

Uniformed Police Districts (365) Border Police Battalions (33) Civil Order Police Battalions (20) Counter Narcotics Police Units (15) Number of ANP units (433)

0

CM4Not Capable

6

CM3 Partially Capable 6

296

Unit Not Formed or Not Reportinga 57

0

0

0

33

0

0

6

2

2

10

0

0

10

3

2

0

12 (3%)

18 (4%)

334 (77%)

69 (16%)

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. a

A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is a planned unit or in training.

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000 (see table 9).[38] This is an increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we previously reported as trained as of January 2005. Table 9. Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008

Ministry of Interior Headquarters Uniformed Police Border Police Auxiliary Police Civil Order Police Criminal Investigative Division Counter Narcotics Police Customs Police Counter Terrorism Police Standby/Highway Police Total

Number authorized 6,015 44,319 17,970 0 5,365 4,148 3,777 0 406 0 82,000

Number assigned 5,237 42,969 12,213 9,318 1,523 2,815 2,265 623 411 2,536 79,910

Percent assigned 87 97 68 N/Aa 28 68 60 N/Aa 101 N/Aa 97

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Interior data. a

The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police, and highway police are no longer authorized.

Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report raises additional concerns about these manning numbers. Specifically, Defense conducted a census to check the reliability of ministry payroll records and reported in September 2007 that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10

24

GAO

percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s census raise questions about the extent to which the ANP has grown since our 2005 report.

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As we reported in 2005, international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that fieldbased training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of similar programs to establish professional police forces. Such training allows mentors to build on classroom instruction and provide a more systematic basis for evaluating police performance. Defense reporting indicates that, as of January 2008, less than one-quarter of the ANP had police mentor teams present. DynCorp, State’s contractor for training and mentoring the police, was able to provide about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian mentors as of April 2008. However, as of the same date, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained—a serious limitation to providing mentor coverage to a police force that is based in more than 900 locations around the country and, unlike the army, generally operates as individuals, not as units.[39] Moreover, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that additional civilian mentors would not help to address the shortfall in military mentors because they could not be deployed to the field without military mentors to provide protection. According to Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq. While the United States and the EU have taken steps to provide additional police mentors, the extent to which these efforts will address current shortfalls is unclear. In January 2008, Defense announced that approximately 1,000 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan in the spring of 2008 on a one-time, 7-month deployment to assist in the training and development of the ANP.[40] However, this temporary deployment will neither fully nor permanently alleviate the underlying shortage of military mentors for the ANP, which stood at over 1,600 as of April 2008. In June 2007, the EU established a police mission in Afghanistan with the objective of providing nearly 200 personnel to mentor, advise, and train the Ministry of Interior and ANP. According to State, the number of EU personnel pledged has subsequently increased to about 215. However, State figures indicate that the EU had staffed about 80 personnel as of February 2008—less than 40 percent of its pledged total. Moreover, State officials said that restrictions in the EU mandate limit the extent to which its personnel are permitted to provide field-based training. Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police. Specifically, the mentor shortage has impeded U.S. efforts in three areas:

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action… •

•

•

25

Field-based training: Senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary obstacle to providing the field-based training necessary to develop a fully capable police force. In addition, State has reported that a significant increase in mentoring coverage is essential to improving the quality of the police through field-based training. DynCorp officials also acknowledged the shortage of mentors to be a challenge to providing necessary training. Evaluation: According to a knowledgeable CSTC-A official, the shortage of police mentors is a serious challenge to evaluating the capability of the police and identifying areas in need of further attention. Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police capability and identify strengths and weaknesses. However, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor coverage of the police as a significant challenge to using this tool to generate reliable assessments. As of February 2008, police mentors were able to assess only about 11 percent of uniformed police districts using this new tool. Verification of police on duty: The shortage of available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Furthermore, although Defense has planned to conduct monthly surveys to determine how many police are reporting for duty in selected districts, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that mentors are not available to conduct surveys. However, a random sample of 15 police districts conducted by the United Nations found fewer than half of authorized police reporting for duty.

Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation and verify police manning, development of fully capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.

Efforts of Civilian Mentors Complicated by Dual Chain of Command Although DynCorp has been able to provide nearly all of the authorized number of civilian mentors, DynCorp stated that the activities of these mentors have been complicated by a dual chain of command between State and Defense.[41] According to a 2005 interagency decision, Defense is responsible for directing the overall U.S. effort to train and equip the Afghan police, while State is responsible for providing policy guidance and management of the DynCorp contract. According to DynCorp, this dual chain of command has affected its efforts in multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities. Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, Congress made available $5.9 billion to support the training and equipping of the ANP. At least $1.3 billion of that amount, or 22 percent, has been directed toward equipment purchases.[42] Although equipping of the police has improved in recent months, shortages remain in several types of equipment that Defense considers critical.[43] Since our August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, the percentage of critical ANP equipment on hand has grown from 53 to 65 percent as of February 2008. This

26

GAO

improvement includes increased totals of items on hand, such as rifles and grenade launchers. Further, Defense anticipates the ANP will be equipped with 85 percent of critical equipment items by December 2008. However, as of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of critical equipment, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. Defense officials cited several factors that have contributed to these shortages. First, according to CSTC-A officials, equipment shortages are due to competing priorities, particularly the need to equip U.S. forces deployed to operational situations and security forces in Iraq. Second, CSTC-A attributed the specific shortage in body armor to the inability of two supplying contractors to deliver the requested items on schedule. Third, Defense officials cited additional causes of equipment shortages such as delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding and instances where CSTC-A did not provide equipment orders in a timely manner. Defense officials and documentation also indicated that distributing equipment to police in the field once it is procured is challenging due to the unstable security situation, difficult terrain, weather conditions, and the remoteness of some police districts. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality. Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related challenges and other logistical difficulties.[44] Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. For example, the reports include several cases where Afghan border police are inadequately equipped to defend their positions on the border or face insurgent forces. Recognizing this shortcoming, CSTC-A has planned to equip the border police with heavy machine guns, which it expects to arrive in the fall of 2008. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to account for the equipment provided to them.[45] In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property accountability procedures.[46] According to CSTC-A, equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the districts’ property officers are first trained. For example, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007 (see figure 6), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures and driver training are established in the target districts. Similarly, as of February 2008, about half of the approximately 17,000 machine guns on hand had not been distributed to the police.

Source: GAO. Figure 6. Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

27

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005 and 2007, we reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce judicial rulings. According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing. Our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks.[47] •

•

•

Pay problems: 94 percent (49 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of police experiencing problems with pay. These include numerous examples of police who have not been paid in several months and multiple cases of police who quit their jobs as a result of pay-related problems, thereby potentially leaving their districts more vulnerable to insurgent forces. Our prior work found that one cause for the corrupt practices exhibited by many Afghan police is their low, inconsistently paid salaries. Furthermore, according to State, the Ministry of Interior’s traditional salary distribution process afforded opportunities for police chiefs and other officials to claim a portion of their subordinates’ salaries for themselves. To minimize skimming of salaries, CSTC-A is instituting a three-phase program to pay all salaries into bank accounts via electronic funds transfer by December 2008. According to Defense, electronic funds transfer had been implemented in 12 of 34 provinces as of August 2007. The government of Afghanistan also has decided to increase police salaries to achieve pay parity with the Afghan army. Corruption: 87 percent (45 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of corruption within the police force or the Ministry of Interior. These include multiple examples of police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban and several cases of high-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct. Moreover, State documentation notes that one branch of the ANP, the highway police, was disbanded in early 2007 because it was notorious for corruption. However, DynCorp weekly reporting indicates that several thousand highway police were still working and being paid by the Ministry of Interior as of September 2007. The ministry, in conjunction with CSTC-A and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, is currently engaged in an effort to reform and streamline the ANP rank structure according to several criteria, including evidence of previous corruption amongst ANP officers.[48] Attacks: 85 percent (44 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of attacks against the police. These include numerous cases where police are targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive devices. According to DynCorp, insurgent attacks against the ANP have increased due to greater involvement of the ANP in counterinsurgency operations and the perception that the police are a more vulnerable target than the Afghan army and coalition forces. DynCorp weekly reports do include several instances where police were able to successfully fend off attack; however, they also contain multiple cases of the dangerous working conditions that police face causing difficulties in retaining or recruiting personnel.

28

GAO

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage a Risk Factor Recognizing several of the challenges faced by the ANP, Defense began a new initiative in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan uniformed police. Defense documentation that outlines this initiative acknowledges that the Afghan police lack capability, have been inadequately trained and equipped, and are beset by corruption. To target these and other challenges, Defense introduced the Focused District Development plan in November 2007 to train and equip the uniformed police—those assigned to police districts throughout the country who comprise over 40 percent of the intended ANP end-strength of 82,000. According to Defense, reforming the uniformed police—the immediate face of the Afghan government to citizens at the local level—is the key to the overall reform of the ANP.[49] Under the Focused District Development model, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training center to train together for 8 weeks and receive all authorized equipment while their district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness (see figure 7).[50] The police force then returns to its district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time for the first year of Focused District Development, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the initiative.

Source: GAO. Figure 7. Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul.

State documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire Focused District Development cycle as of March 2008.[51] Until an entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for successful reform. However, according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

29

In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted. Moreover, according to DynCorp, civilian mentors have an important role in Focused District Development—particularly in providing district-level mentoring—but are not accompanying military mentors into districts that are considered unsafe. Given that one selection criterion for districts is location in unstable areas of the country where better policing might improve the security situation, it is unclear how often civilian mentors will be able to participate in district-level mentoring. Defense documentation also identifies sufficient equipment availability as a requirement for successful reform. According to Defense, adequate equipment is currently on hand to support the Focused District Development initiative. However, given current shortfalls in various ANP equipment items, it is unclear if having sufficient equipment on hand for the initiative may lead to increased equipment shortages for elements of the ANP, such as the border police, that are not currently being targeted through the initiative.

CONCLUSION Establishing capable Afghan national security forces is critical to improving security in Afghanistan and the U.S. efforts to assist foreign allies and partners in combating terrorism. To date the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in this effort and estimates that billions more will be required to build and sustain the ANSF beyond the existing forces—few of which have been assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, measuring progress and estimating long-term costs are particularly important given that U.S. officials estimate that this mission could exceed a decade. The recommendations in our 2005 report called for detailed Defense and State plans that include clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan. In 2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in response to our recommendation. However, this document included few long-term milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no sustainability strategy. In 2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in coordination with State, submit reports on a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a longterm detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Defense has yet to provide these reports. As such it remains difficult to determine if U.S. efforts are on track and how much more they will cost to complete. Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of completing this mission—information that is essential to holding the performing agencies accountable. Consequently, we believe that future U.S. investments should be conditioned on the completion of a coordinated, detailed plan for developing a capable ANSF.

30

GAO

MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION To help ensure that action is taken to facilitate accountability and oversight in the development and sustainment of the ANSF, and consistent with our previous 2005 recommendation and the 2008 congressional mandate, Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations related to training and equipping the ANSF on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan that, among other things, includes clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan; and the timely receipt of the reports mandated by sections 1230 and 1231 of Pub. L. 110-181, the first of which are already late. State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. State’s comments are reproduced in appendix III. Defense’s comments, along with GAO responses to selected issues raised by Defense, are reproduced in appendix IV. The agencies also provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated throughout the draft as appropriate. State appreciated GAO’s views on how to improve efforts to develop the ANSF, which it considers critical to long-term sustainable success in Afghanistan. State expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. In addition, State highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as certain other operational changes, many of which occurred after the completion of our fieldwork in August 2007. For example, while we note that civilian mentors are not accompanying military mentors into districts that are considered unsafe, State notes in its comments that civilian police mentors are now deployed with their military counterparts to all ongoing Focused District Development districts and that all efforts are made to enable the deployment of civilian police in support of the program. We acknowledge State’s concerns and appreciate its efforts to coordinate with Defense. However, we believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the various agencies’ roles would be beneficial, given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff in Afghanistan. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan with intermediate milestones is also important particularly in light of the new Focused District Development initiative for ANP training, which will entail considerable resources and time to complete. Further, intermediate milestones would provide policymakers with more information regarding the transition to a normalized security assistance relationship, as discussed by State in its comments. Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to develop the ANSF, and stated that current guidance provided by State and Defense to the field is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense noted that the 5-page document it provided to GAO in January 2007 articulated goals for the size, capabilities, and requirements for the ANSF, and reflected an approach approved by multiple agencies—including State. Defense also cited a number of other documents it considers to be part of the effort to develop the ANSF. Furthermore, Defense disagreed with our conclusion that, absent a detailed plan, progress in developing the ANSF is difficult to assess, and stated that monthly progress reports and communication with Congress provide legislators with the information needed to assess the program and allocate resources.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

31

We do not believe that the 5-page document provides a strategic-level plan for the development of the ANSF. The document does not represent a coordinated Defense and State plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF with sufficient detail and transparency for Congress and others to make informed decisions concerning future resources. This 5-page document, which Defense now refers to as a “Strategic Vision” and which CSTC-A officials were unaware of at the time of our review, does not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Department of State, Defense’s key partner in training the ANP. This is an element that one would expect in a strategic planning document for ANSF development. Furthermore, the document contains just one date--December 2008, by which time the 152,000 person ANSF would be completed. Defense’s document lacks any other intermediate or long-term milestones by which progress could be measured. While the U.S. role in training and equipping the ANSF could exceed a decade, according to CSTC-A representatives, neither the 5-page document nor the documents identified by Defense in its comments to GAO constitute a sustainability strategy. For example, while Defense states that the international community will need to sustain the ANSF for the “near-term” until government revenues increase in Afghanistan, the document lacks further detail regarding the expected time frames for increasing government revenues, as well as a definition of “near-term.” As such, it remains unclear how long Defense and State expect to support the ANSF. Furthermore, we maintain that, without a coordinated, detailed plan, assessing progress in developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense produces various documents that report in detail on the current status of the ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate milestones or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set timeframe. For additional details, refer to GAO comments that follow appendix IV.

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans contain detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents from Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved versions of the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a planning document provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense briefing on ANSF sustainment. We evaluated these documents to determine the extent to which they contain the four criteria previously recommended by GAO and discussed them with cognizant Defense officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also spoke with officials from the U.S. Central Command and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to discuss their contribution to the Campaign Plan. In addition, while in Kabul, we discussed the Campaign Plan with officials from Embassy Kabul; the commanding general of CSTC-A and other CSTC-A officials; and the Afghan Minister of Defense. Finally, we examined the Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy to gain familiarity with documents developed by Afghanistan and the international community. The information on foreign law in this report

32

GAO

does not reflect our independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary sources. To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed monthly assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other Defense offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the following officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the ANA: •

•

In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with personnel mentoring the army; officials from CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; Embassy Kabul; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MPRI; and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, including the Minister of Defense. We also visited an equipment warehouse and army training facilities. Moreover, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone, including several CSTC-A representatives.

To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the Afghan National Police (ANP), we reviewed monthly assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other Defense offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the following officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced by the United States in building the ANP: •

•

In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, State’s Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, and DynCorp International. In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with U.S. police mentors; officials from CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; Embassy Kabul; the United Nations; DynCorp International; MPRI; and the Afghan Ministry of Interior, including the Minister of Interior. We also visited an equipment warehouse and police training facilities. Further, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone, including representatives of CSTC-A, DynCorp International, and the United Nations Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

Additionally, we asked State to provide weekly progress reports produced by DynCorp International for 2005, 2006, and 2007. To identify challenges faced by the police, we conducted a content analysis to categorize and summarize the observations contained in these

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

33

reports. Specifically, we independently proposed categories, agreed on the relevant categories, reviewed reports, and categorized the observations contained therein. Instances discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the first time they appeared. To ensure the validity and reliability of this analysis, we reconciled any differences. Once all differences were reconciled, we analyzed the data to identify the challenges most often discussed. Because State did not provide us a complete set of reports for 2005 or 2006, we were only able to perform this analysis on 2007 reports. To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, mentors, equipment, and ANSF personnel numbers and capability, we compared and corroborated information from multiple sources and interviewed cognizant officials regarding the processes they used to compile the data. •

•

•

To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and international funding data, we compiled and compared data from Defense, State, and other donor countries with information from cognizant U.S. agency officials in Washington, D.C. We also compared the funding data with appropriations and authorization legislation, congressional budget requests, and reports to Congress to corroborate their accuracy. Additionally, we compared the funding data with our May 2007 Afghanistan report.1 Differences between table 1 in this report and the funding chart presented in our May 2007 report are due to the following factors: Certain funds were removed, such as those provided to support a protective detail for Afghanistan’s President, because agency officials later clarified that these dollars did not support efforts to train and equip the ANSF, while certain funds were added, such as those used to provide support for counter narcotics police, because agency officials later clarified that these dollars supported efforts to train and equip the ANSF. For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, totals printed in May 2007 included budget requests. Subsequently, some of these requested totals changed, such as the allocation of money in Defense’s 2008 Global War on Terror request and Defense’s support of efforts to train and equip Afghan counter narcotics police.

Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. •

To determine the reliability of data on the number of military mentors, we corroborated figures in unclassified progress reports against classified mentor requirements and discussed Defense progress reports with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We checked the reliability of data on the number of civilian mentors by comparing Defense and State figures for consistency and speaking to State officials. Finally, we assessed the reliability of data on European Union police mentors by comparing Defense, State, and European Union data and checking for inconsistencies. Based on these assessments and interviews, we determined that these data on mentors were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.

34

GAO •

•

To assess the reliability of equipment data, we compared different lists of equipment on hand to corroborate their accuracy and interviewed cognizant officials by telephone to discuss shortages of equipment and procedures for keeping track of equipment provided to the ANA and ANP. Based on these comparisons and discussions, we concluded that the equipment data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. To assess the reliability of ANSF capability figures, we spoke with officials from CSTC-A, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State to discuss the processes by which these data are generated. Additionally, while in Kabul, we attended the monthly meeting during which Defense officials discuss and determine ANA capability figures. Moreover, we requested after-action reports to evaluate the capability of ANA troops in the field. However, Defense officials were not able to provide us with this documentation. To evaluate the reliability of ANSF personnel numbers, we spoke with officials from CSTC-A and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Overall, based on our discussions with cognizant officials, we concluded that ANSF capability and ANA personnel data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. However, based on concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and highlighted in our prior work, as well as the results of the census conducted by Defense, we note in this report that the number of ANP reported as assigned may not be reliable. Because Defense relies on the number of ANP reported as assigned as a measure of progress in building the ANP, we include this figure in our report as evidence that the ANP appear to have grown in number over the last 3 years. However, we also note that due to concerns about the reliability of the figure, it is difficult to quantify the exact extent to which the ANP has grown.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

APPENDIX II. STRUCTURE OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES The Afghan National Security Forces are comprised of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The structure of these organizations is described below. (See table 10 for the Afghan army and table 11 for the Afghan police.) Combat forces comprise 70 percent of the ANA’s personnel and are divided into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. Each corps contains a number of brigades, most of which consist of five battalions: three light infantry battalions, one combat support battalion, and one combat services support battalion. The exception is the quick reaction force in 201st corps, which is comprised of one infantry battalion, one mechanized infantry

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

35

battalion, and one armored battalion, in place of the three light infantry battalions. Each corps also includes one battalion of the National Commando Brigade (see figure 8). Table 10. Structure of the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army Component Ministry of Defense and General Staff

Sustaining Institutions and Intermediate Commands

Combat Forces

Afghan Air Corps

Description Department of the Afghan government responsible for developing, fielding, and ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA. The Ministry of Defense develops strategic plans for the defense of Afghanistan. The General Staff implements Ministry of Defense policies and guidance for the ANA. Sustaining institutions and intermediate commands support the Ministry of Defense at an institutional level and include facilities installation and management, acquisitions, logistics, communications support, regional military intelligence offices, detainee operations, medical command, ANA training and recruiting commands, military police, and the Headquarters Support and Security Brigade, an ANA unit that performs specialist tactical and ceremonial missions. Operational arm of the ANA, comprising about 70 percent of the total personnel. Combat forces are divided into five corps, with responsibility for different regions of Afghanistan. The air corps provides support for Afghan army and police forces. Once trained, it will perform missions such as presidential airlift, medical evacuation, training, and light attack.

Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents.

Table 11. Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Component Ministry of Interior

Afghan Uniformed Police

Afghan Border Police Afghan National Civil Order Police Criminal Investigative Division

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan Counter Terrorism Police Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs Police

Description Department of the government of Afghanistan responsible for the protection of the country’s international borders and the enforcement of the rule of law Police assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and general policing Provide broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness Lead investigative agency for investigations of national interest, those with international links, and those concerned with organized and white-collar crime Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism and insurgency No longer authorized

Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents.

The ANP currently consists of six authorized components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see figure 9).

36

GAO

Note: The dashed lines in figure 8 depict the organizational relationship between ANA Corps and battalions of the National Commando Brigade. Each ANA Corps contains a battalion of the National Commando Brigade. These battalions are controlled from the Commando Brigade Headquarters. However, each ANA Corps has the responsibility to provide housing and administration to the Commando battalions located within its Corps. Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents. Figure 8. Structure of the ANA Combat Forces.

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. Figure 9. ANP Chain of Command.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

37

38

GAO

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

39

40

GAO

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action… See comment 1.

41

42

GAO See comments 2,3,4,5,6.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

43

The following are GAO’s comments on Defense’s written response, dated May 27, 2008, to the draft chapter.

GAO COMMENTS 1. Defense states that its document establishes quantitative and qualitative measures to assess ANSF development. While the 5-page document contains some qualitative measures to assess ANSF development, it contains only one milestone date, December 2008, when, according to the document, the ANSF will have achieved initial independent operating capability. However, this one milestone is not consistent with dates contained in monthly reports that track manning, training, equipment, and capability, which have fluctuated. While the monthly updates are useful in providing the status of ANSF capability, each monthly report is a snapshot in time without consistent baselines that would facilitate an assessment of progress over time. For example, even though the United States began funding and training the ANA in 2002, the February 2007 report that was provided to GAO as an attachment to the 5-page document uses three different baselines for assessing the ANSF—July 2005 for the number of trained and equipped Afghan army and police, June 2006 for the status of the ANA battalion Training and Readiness Assessments, and the first quarter of 2007 for the status of ANA and ANP embedded training teams and mentors. However, the report does not refer back to 2002 in measuring progress. Similarly, the Training and Readiness Assessments that are provided on a quarterly basis to congressional oversight committees are also snapshots in time. 2. Defense maintains that the CSTC-A milestones are consistent with those in the 5-page Defense document. We disagree. The three phases and associated time frames of ANSF development are articulated differently in the 5-page document and the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. For example, Phase III in CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan—Transition to Strategic Partnership—is not identified as a phase in the 5-page document. Defense also contends that differences between the two documents are due to developments in the security environment. While this may be true, absent a detailed plan with specific time frames, it is difficult to assess the extent to which deteriorating security delayed ANSF development. 3. Defense notes that until government revenues increase in Afghanistan, the international community will need to sustain the ANSF and that such international support is required for the “near-term.” Moreover, Defense states that, where appropriate, it supports efforts to increase government revenues in Afghanistan. However, in the absence of further detail regarding the expected timeline for increasing government revenues—or the definition of “near-term”—it remains unclear how long the United States will need to support the ANSF. As we note in our report, the United States has been a major contributor to this mission—investing about $16.5 billion to develop the ANSF. Furthermore, current costs to sustain the force are estimated to be at over $2 billion annually. Given that the Afghan government is currently unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces and that U.S. officials estimate this mission could exceed a decade, additional clarity on the estimated length of time and amount of money needed to complete this mission, and the potential for Afghan financial contributions, could assist in conducting oversight of the program.

44

GAO

4. Defense states that the 5-page document received by GAO was a longer articulation of a plan approved by State. However, although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the fact remains State did not participate in the development of the 5-page document Defense provided to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. Defense’s 5-page document does share basic end-strength and capability information with two slides on ANSF development approved by the Principals Committee for ANSF Development. However, these slides do not themselves constitute a coordinated plan and do not contain elements, such as intermediate milestones, identified by GAO in our 2005 recommendation and agreed to by Defense and State as needed. 5. Defense contends that the role of State in ANSF development is articulated in documents other than the 5-page document provided to GAO. However, while State’s role may be discussed elsewhere, the 5-page document provided to us by Defense does not describe the role of State or other key stakeholders. If, as stated, Defense intends this document to provide strategic-level guidance for the development of the ANSF, including in it an articulation of the roles and responsibilities of partners and key stakeholders could assist in implementing and coordinating the program’s efforts. For instance, we note in our report that the dual chain of command between State and Defense has complicated the efforts of civilian mentors assisting with the program. 6. We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense produces various documents that report in detail on the current status of the ANSF, these documents do not contain consistent baseline data, intermediate milestones, or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set time frame. For example, after 6 years and a U.S. investment of about $16.5 billion in the program, Defense status reports show that, as of April 2008, less than 2 percent (2 of 105) ANA units and no ANP units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and the estimated completion date of these forces is March 2011 and December 2012, respectively. Defense asserts this is impressive, particularly for the ANA. However, without interim milestones against which to assess the ANSF, it is difficult to know if this status constitutes progress or will allow Defense to meet its currently projected completion dates. Moreover, the completion dates cited by Defense do not constitute firm goals and have shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, in monthly Defense reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008, completion dates for the ANA fluctuated from December 2008 to September 2010 to March 2011. Likewise, over the same period, completion dates for the ANP fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.” Moreover, as we note in our report, Defense officials stated that completion dates contained in its monthly status reports did not account for shortfalls in the required number of mentors and trainers and, therefore, could be subject to further change. Defense also states that it only began to support independent operations capability for the ANA in 2006. While it is true that planned capability for the ANA was upgraded in 2006, absent a detailed plan, it is unclear the extent to which this planned capability upgrade should be expected to affect the timeline for the development of individual ANA units. Had Defense implemented GAO’s 2005 recommendation to produce such a plan, it might be able to provide more clarity on the relationship between planned capability upgrades and program timelines. Moreover, even though planned ANA capability was upgraded in 2006, prior to that time, the U.S. invested nearly $3 billion to develop the ANA and reported approximately

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

45

20,000 troops trained as of May 2005. Absent a plan with performance measures, such as planned capability, linked to intermediate milestones and end dates, it is difficult to assess the results achieved by this financial investment.

REFERENCES [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9]

[10] [11]

[12] [13]

[14] [15] [16]

GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-801SP (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007). 31 U.S.C. 712(3). GAO-05-575. International assistance may include logistics support, intelligence collection, or operations planning. In this report, the term manning includes recruitment of personnel, assignment to duty, promotion, and retention. As we reported in 2005, the number 19,600 consisted of 18,300 combat troops and 1,300 personnel assigned to sustaining commands (GAO-05-575). In this report, U.S. military personnel who train Afghan army units in the field are referred to as trainers and coalition personnel who train Afghan army units in the field are referred to as mentors. In this report, personnel who train Afghan police in the field are collectively referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who train Afghan police in the field are referred to as military mentors, while contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred to as civilian mentors. The agreement occurred in December 2002 at the Bonn II donor conference near Bonn, Germany. Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, Volume One, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006. The Afghanistan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31February 1, 2006. Along with increasing the force structure to 80,000 in February 2008, the Afghan government and its international partners also approved an additional 6,000 ANA personnel to account for personnel in training or otherwise not assigned to units. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1230. Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231. GAO has previously reported on the need for agencies to take a more strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with measurable, realistic goals and time frames, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. See, for example, GAO, Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain, GAO-08-669T

46

[17] [18]

[19] [20]

[21]

[22] [23]

[24] [25]

[26]

[27] [28] [29]

[30] [31]

GAO (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008). GAO concluded in this report that until the Army provides a comprehensive plan for its modular restructuring and expansion initiatives, which identifies progress and total costs, decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess progress and allocate defense resources among competing priorities. GAO-05-575. Sustainment of the ANSF covers items such as salaries, equipment replacement, operations and maintenance costs, logistics support costs, and training for replacement soldiers and police. The elements of a campaign plan are laid out in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, December 26, 2006. In 2005, we reported that Afghan combat troops would complete basic training by the fall of 2007. The Campaign Plan has identified mid-2010 as the date when basic training for all ANSF forces would be completed. In previous planning documents, CM1 is known as “independent operating capability.” A senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan stated, however, that “full operational capability” is a more accurate description since Afghan army and police forces may require coalition support under certain circumstances. Afghan Tashkils are similar to the Military Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) found in the U.S. military. When we reported in 2005, the air wing planned for the Afghan army was to provide secure transportation for the President of Afghanistan. The currently planned air corps will provide support such as medical evacuation and light attack, in addition to presidential airlift. As shown in table 5, CSTC-A provided us with the capability rating for 105 army units. ANA units have participated with coalition forces in counterinsurgency operations, assisted in the rescue of hostages, and provided security for peace talks and local events, among other activities. While most of the ANA is projected to reach full capability before March 2011, the Afghan air corps, an important element to providing increased independence to Afghan forces, is not expected to achieve full capability before this date. The 32,700 figure represents the number of ANA combat forces trained and assigned to one of the five ANA Corps as reported by CSTC-A on February 20, 2008. Defense officials said that because the ANA lacks a death benefit system, soldiers who have died may remain on the payroll so that their families receive compensation. Since its implementation, the electronic salary payment program has become more widely used among ANA personnel–increasing from 2 transactions in February 2006 to 4,227 transactions in July 2007. CSTC-A documents place ANA re-enlistment rates into three categories: (1) greater than 65 percent; (2) 50-65 percent; and (3) less than 50 percent. The requirement for the number and types of U.S. embedded trainers needed to assist in the development of the ANA and U.S. military mentors to assist in the development of the ANP is defined in detail by Defense in a classified, formal request for forces submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. GAO did not assess the adequacy of these requirements, but rather focused on whether the U.S. has been able to fill these requirements and the effects, if any, of not being able to do so.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action…

47

[32] The number of personnel assigned to assist the development of ANA units varies, depending on the type of ANA unit. As of April 2008, the required number of personnel for an embedded training team assisting an ANA maneuver battalion, combat support battalion, or combat services support battalion was 16. [33] Given the current U.S. embedded trainer shortage, Defense officials have advocated that NATO members field greater numbers of mentor teams to meet the rising demand for more trainers and mentors as the number of ANA forces completing basic training rises. Defense officials have cautioned, however, that increased numbers of mentoring teams may not necessarily correspond to decreased requirements for U.S. personnel, especially when mentoring teams operate with restrictions that will not allow them to accompany ANA units into combat operations. [34] Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and equipping of the ANA through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and training. The $3.7 billion figure represents the amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment and transportation for the Afghan army. [35] The 82,000-person end-strength for the ANP includes over 6,000 authorized positions in the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police force. [36] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, which include uniformed police districts, civil order and border police battalions, and counter narcotics police units. [37] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense assessed as not formed or not reporting. [38] According to Defense, the number of police assigned includes personnel who were already employed as police prior to coalition operations in Afghanistan and have not necessarily been trained by coalition forces. By contrast, since Afghanistan’s army had largely dissolved under the Taliban, nearly all army personnel listed as assigned have been trained by coalition forces. [39] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around Afghanistan to conduct mentoring operations is difficult due to the size of the country and the lack of roads. GAO is currently performing a separate review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. [40] In January 2008, Defense announced the approved deployment of 3,200 additional Marines to Afghanistan—1,000 to assist in training and development of the ANP and 2,200 to conduct security operations in Afghanistan under the command of the NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. [41] Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. [42] The $5.9 billion figure includes approximately $736 million of fiscal year 2008 funding requests. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and equipping of the ANP through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and training. The $1.3 billion figure

48

[43]

[44]

[45] [46] [47]

[48] [49]

[50]

[51]

GAO represents the amount of ASFF funding allocated toward equipment and transportation of the Afghan police. CSTC-A stated that they worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior to develop equipment requirements for the ANP, which are listed in a document referred to as a Tashkil. We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable to provide a complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the first time they appeared. GAO is currently performing a separate review on the accountability of equipment provided to the ANSF. Training in supply and property accountability procedures is being provided to the police by U.S. contractors. The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and retaining and recruiting police were other top issues identified in our analysis. These topics are discussed elsewhere in this report. GAO is currently performing a separate review of U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also eventually be reconstituted through the Focused District Development initiative; however, according to a Defense official, it is uncertain when such efforts will begin. Defense documents indicate that in addition to being trained, a district police force undergoing Focused District Development will also have corrupt leaders replaced by nationally vetted ones, receive new salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates, and have electronic funds transfer accounts established. Defense has also identified development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of Focused District Development. According to State, the first cycle of training at the regional training centers was completed in February.

In: Afghanistan Security Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 53-113

ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

AFGHANISTAN: POST-WAR GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY *

Kenneth Katzman ABSTRACT U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, recent outside studies contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, and growing divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and the relative share of combat primarily in the south. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani government, as failing to prevent Taliban infiltration from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the Administration is adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly eventually assuming U.S. command of the southern sector. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to peacefully resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai, who is running for re-election in 2009. Major regional strongmen have been marginalized. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 53,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now *

Excerpted from CRS Report RL30588, dated June 6, 2008.

50

Kenneth Katzman commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, over 23,000 of the 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. About $2 billion in reconstruction aid is requested for FY2009, including in a FY2009 supplemental appropriations request. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end of the chapter.

BACKGROUND TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortlyafter taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from coveringtheir face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringingmore women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal. Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned antiwar. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name).

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

51

On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert funding.[1] With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publiclyagreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.[2] Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics Population: Ethnic Groups: Religions:

31 million Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4% Sunni Muslim (Hanafi school) 80%; Shiite Muslim (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1%

Size of Religious

Christians - estimated 500 - 8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu - 3,000

Minorities

persons; Bahai’s - 400 (declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews - 1 person; Buddhist - unknown, but small numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church, open only to expatriates.

Literacy Rate:

28% of population over 15 years of age

GDP:

$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity). Double the 2002 figure.

GDP Per Capita:

$300/yr; but $800 purchasing power parity

GDP Real Growth:

12% (2007)

Unemployment Rate: Population: Children in School/Schools Built Afghans With Access to Health Coverage

40% 31 million 5.7 million, of which 35% are girls. Up from 900,000 in school during Taliban era. 300,000 children in south cannot attend school due to violence. 8,000 schools built; 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 82% with basic health services access - compared to 8% during Taliban era, although access is more limited in restive areas. Infant mortality has dropped 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built with U.S. funds since Taliban.

52

Kenneth Katzman Table 1. (Continued). Roads Built Access to Electricity Revenues: Expenditures External Debt: Foreign Exchange Reserves: Foreign Investment Major Exports: Oil Production: Oil Proven Reserves: Major Imports: Import Partners:

About 5,000 miles post-Taliban, including ring road around the country. 20% of the population. $715 million in 2007; $550 million 2006 $1.2 billion in 2007 (est.); 900 million in 2006 $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt to U.S. in 2006 $2.5 billion. $500 billion est. for 2007; about $1 billion for 2006 fruits, raisins, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium Negligible 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to Afghan government on March 15, 2006 food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%; Turkey 4.1%; Turkmenistan 4.1%

Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2008, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC; President Bush speech on February 15, 2007; International Religious Freedom Report, September 14, 2007; press reports about draft Afghan National Development Strategy.

THE MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT AND RISE OF THE TALIBAN The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, was president during April - May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”), formed the Taliban movement. They practiced an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,” akin to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. They viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, antiPashtun, and responsible for civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

53

control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.

Taliban Rule The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the antiSoviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party of Yunis Khalis). Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 64 years old. The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city as representations of idolatry. (Additional damage to the remaining structure was inflicted in May 2008 from an accidental detonation of explosives near the site.) The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women. The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not hit. Some observers assert that the Administration missed several other opportunities to strike him. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with U.S. military force because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.

54

Kenneth Katzman

The “Northern Alliance” Congeals The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan — the Tajik core of the antiTaliban opposition — into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in the table at the end of this chapter (Table 17). •

•

•

Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, who is frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords” who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, although Dostam had earlier contributed to efforts to oust Rabbani. Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups). Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.

Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban resembled Clinton Administration policy — applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from providing military assistance to the Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials wanted to assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces. Other covert options were under consideration as well.[3] In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to end its support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues. Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

55

September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden, judging that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S forces to search for Al Qaeda activists there. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001 said that the Security Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond” (implying force) to the September 11 attacks. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:[4] all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.

Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. The combat consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated bythe cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat operations.”

POST-WAR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION[5] The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a broadbased Afghan government; the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China,

56

Kenneth Katzman

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts, including one from the Karzai clan (including Hamid Karzai) and one centered on Zahir Shah.

Political Transition Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany.

Bonn Agreement On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”[6] It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement, reportedly forged with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance faction: • •

• •

formed the interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai. authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping force. referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter narcotics, crime, and terrorism. applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.[7]

Permanent Constitution A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 376 districts. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission drafted the permanent constitution, and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.- run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance faction failed to set up a prime minister-ship, but they did achieve limits to presidential powers by having major authorities assigned to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president. The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation” - a title that is not heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.[8] The constitution also set out timetables for presidential, provincial, and

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

57

district elections (by June 2004) and stipulated that, if possible, they should be held simultaneously. Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai, about 56, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a credible Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate corruption, resulting in a failure to professionalize government. Others say he seeks to maintain Pashtun predominance in his government. From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Hamid Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election. With heavy protection, he has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or gunfire at or near his appearances.

National Elections Ultimately, it proved impractical to hold all elections simultaneously. The first election was for president and it was held on October 9, 2004, missing the June deadline. The voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the 376 district councils, each of which will have small and likely contentious boundaries, have not been held. For the parliamentary election, voting was conducted for individuals running in each province, not as party slates. (There are now 90 registered political parties in Afghanistan, but parties remain unpopular because of their linkages to outside countries during the anti-Soviet war.) When parliament first convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, selected a senior Northern Alliance figure, who was Karzai’s main competitor in the presidential election, Yunus Qanooni, for speaker of the lower house. In April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani organized this opposition bloc, along with ex-Communists and some royal family members, into a party called the “National Front” that wants increased parliamentary powers and direct elections for the provincial governors. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and

58

Kenneth Katzman

Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). The leader of that body is Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, the pro-Karzai elder statesman.

Next Elections and Candidates The next presidential elections are expected to be held in the fall of 2009. The Wolesi Jirga voted on February 13, 2008 to hold parliamentary and provincial elections in 2010, separate from the 2009 presidential elections, although discussions on combining all the elections are continuing, given the high cost ($100 million per election). The indecision on this question is holding up U.N. and other efforts to help Afghanistan plan the elections and register voters. An election law was submitted for parliamentary approval in November 2007 and is being considered there. Karzai has said, in a Washington Post interview of January 27, 2008, and again in another interview on April 6, 2008, that he would run for re-election. Qanooni might run again but some say that the senior Northern Alliance leader Burhannuddin Rabbani, who is about 75 years old, might run instead. Some Afghans say independent parliamentarian Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, might run, as might former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun. There has been speculation in recent press articles that the Afghan-born U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, who has served as Ambassador to Afghanistan and has been extensively involved in Afghan issues in his U.S. career, might run for President of Afghanistan. Khalilzad has dampened but not outright denied the speculation.

Governance Issues With a permanent national government fully assembled, Karzai and the parliament — relations between which are often contentious — are attempting to improve and expand governance throughout the country. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 28, 2008, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said that the Karzai government controls only 30% of the country, while the Taliban controls 10%, and tribes and local groups control the remainder; U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in March 2008 they disagree with that assessment as too pessimistic. At the same time, there is a broader debate among Afghans over whether to continue to strengthen central government — the approach favored by Karzai and the United States and most of its partners — or to promote local solutions to security and governance, an approach that some international partners, such as Britain, want to explore. The parliament has asserted itself on several occasions, for example in the process of confirming a post-election cabinet and in forcing Karzai to oust several major conservatives from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence. In mid-2007, parliament enacted a law granting amnesty to commanders who fought in the various Afghan wars since the Soviet invasion — some of whom are now members of parliament — in an attempt to put past schisms to rest in building a new Afghanistan. The law was rewritten to give victims the ability to bring accusations of past abuses forward; its status is unclear because Karzai did not veto it but he did not sign it either. In a sign of tension between Karzai and his opposition in parliament, in May 2007, the National Front bloc engineered a vote of no confidence against Foreign Minister Rangeen Spanta and Minister for Refugee Affairs Akbar Akbar for failing to prevent Iran from

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

59

expelling 50,000 Afghan refugees over a one-month period. Karzai accepted in principle the dismissal of Akbar but deferred Spanta’s dismissal because refugee affairs are not his ministry’s prime jurisdiction. The Afghan Supreme Court has sided with Karzai, causing some National Front bloc members to threaten to resign from the parliament, an action they believe would shake confident in Karzai’s leadership. Spanta remains in his position, to date, but the dispute is unresolved. The Front conducted a walkout of parliament on November 26, 2007, to protest what it said was Karzai’s inattention to parliament’s views on whether or not panic by security forces caused additional deaths following the November 6, 2007, suicide bombing in Baghlan Province that killed 6 parliamentarians and about 70 other persons. On the other hand, on some less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature appear to be working well. Since the end of 2007, the Wolesi Jirga has passed and forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga several laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also has recently confirmed Karzai nominees for a new Minster of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank, and the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance.)

U.N. Involvement The international community is extensively involved in Afghan stabilization, not only in the security field but in diplomacy and reconstruction assistance. Some of the debate over the growing role of U.S. partners there was represented in a proposal to create a new position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan. This would subsume the role of the head of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown to this “super envoy” position, but President Karzai rejected the appointment reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy, in particular its potential to dilute the U.S. role in Afghanistan. Karzai might have also sought to show a degree of independence from the international community. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28, 2008. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, extends UNAMA’s mandate for another year and expands it to include some of the “super-envoy” concept. UNAMA is cochair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and Resolution 1806 directs UNAMA, in that capacity, to coordinate the work of international donors and strengthen cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. UNAMA is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a “London Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document also comport with current drafts of Afghanistan’s own “National Strategy for Development,” to be presented later in June 2008 in Paris, as discussed further below under “assistance.” The head of UNAMA as of March 2008, and with the expanded powers, is Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. In speeches in Washington, D.C. in late April 2008, Eide said that additional capacitybuilding resources are needed, and that some efforts by international donors duplicate each other or are tied to purchasing decisions by Western countries.

60

Kenneth Katzman

Expanding Central Government Writ and Curbing “Warlords” U.S. policy believes that stability and countering corruption and narcotics trafficking depends on expanding the capacity, proficiency, and writ of the Afghan central government. A Washington Post report of November 25, 2007, said that the failure to build capacity, as well as government corruption and compromises with local factions, are major contributors to a sense within the Administration of only limited U.S. success in stabilizing Afghanistan. That same report echoed the concerns of U.S. commanders and officials that Taliban militants are able to infiltrate “un-governed space,” contributing to the persistence and in some areas the expansion of the Taliban insurgency. On the other hand, a February 2008 U.N. report on the narcotics situation, discussed below, says that governance is improving and growing in northern and parts of relatively restive eastern Afghanistan, contributing to a reduction of opium cultivation there. U.S. officials continue to try to bolster Karzai through repeated statements of support and top level exchanges, including several visits there by Vice President Cheney and one by President Bush (March 1, 2006). President Karzai has visited the United States repeatedly, including two days of meetings with President Bush at Camp David (August 5 and 6, 2007). They met again on September 26, 2007 in the context of U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York, and again on the sidelines of the April 2008 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania. A key part of the U.S. strategy to strengthen the central government is to help Karzai curb key regional strongmen and local militias – who some refer to as “warlords.” Karzai has cited these actors as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of justice and generation of popular resentment through their demands for bribes and other favors. Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains local militias as well as the Taliban insurgency. Karzai has, to some extent, marginalized most of the largest regional leaders. •

•

•

Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed in September 2004 and was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, Khan was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February2006, clashes that some believe were stoked by Khan to demonstrate his continued influence in Herat. In April 2005, Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. However, in May 2007 his followers in the north were again restive (conducting large demonstrations) in attempting to force out the anti-Dostam governor of Jowzjan Province. In February 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s home in Kabul, but did not arrest him, in connection with the alleged beating of a political opponent by Dostam supporters. According to observers in Kabul, Karzai continues to weigh arresting him. Another key figure, former Defense Minister Fahim (Northern Alliance) was appointed by Karzai to the upper house of parliament, although he remained in that body only a few months. The appointment was intended to give him a stake in the political process and reduce his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim continues to turn heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

•

•

61

(including four Scud missiles), although the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the Panjshir Valley. In July 2004, Karzai moved charismatic Northern Alliance figure Atta Mohammad Noor from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area to governor of Balkh province, although he reportedly remains resistant to central government control. Still, his province is now “cultivation free” of opium, according to the U.N.Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports since August 2007. Two other large militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts in 2005; Hazrat Ali was subsequently elected to parliament.

Provincial Governorships Karzai has tried to use his power to appoint provincial governors to extend government authority, although some question his choices and others say he has a limited talent pool of corruption free officials to choose from. The key Afghan initiative to improve local governance is the formation in October 2007 of the “Independent Directorate of Local Governance” headed by Jelani Popal and reporting to the presidential office. This represents and attempt to to institute a more effective and systematic process for selecting capable governors by taking the screening function away from the Interior Ministry. The directorate is also selecting police chiefs and other local office holders, and in many cases has already begun removing allegedly corrupt local officials. Forming the directorate represents an attempt by Karzai to build on his efforts since 2005 to appointed some relatively younger technocrats in key governorships: these include Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, Khost governor Arsala Jamal, who U.S. commanders say has played a major role in governance progress there, and Paktia governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. (Taniwal was killed in a suicide bombing on September 10, 2006.) Another key appointee has been Kabul province governor Hajji Din Mohammad, son of the slain “Jalalabad Shura” leader Hajji Abd al-Qadir. In March 2008, Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective Helmand governor Asadullah Wafa with Gulab Mangal. Mangal is considered a competent administrator, but he is from Laghman province, not Helmand, somewhat to the consternation of Helmand residents. Other pro-Karzai governors, such as Nangahar’s Ghul Agha Shirzai, are considered corrupt and politically motivated rather than technically competent, although Shirzai is credited with helping weaken the Taliban in Nangahar. In July 2007, Karzai removed the governor of Kapisa province for saying that Karzai’s government was weak and thereby failing to curb the Taliban insurgency. DDR and DIAG Programs A cornerstone of the effort to strengthen the central government was a program, run by UNAMA, to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States. The program had gotten off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22

62

Kenneth Katzman

senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later reduced. Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in the security indicators table later in this chapter. Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say at least 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its partners.[9] Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were collected. UNAMA officials say that vast quantities of weapons are still kept by the Northern Alliance faction in the Panjshir Valley, although the faction is giving up some weapons to UNAMA slowly, in small weekly shipments. Figures for collected weapons are contained in the table. The total cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors, including the United States. Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called “DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors made available $35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were intended to accomplish the disarmament, by December 2007, of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals have not been met in part because armed groups in the south fear the continued Taliban combat activity and refuse to disarm voluntarily, but UNAMA reports that some progress has been achieved, as shown in the security indicators table.

U.S. Embassy Operations/Budgetary Support to Afghan Government A key component of U.S. efforts to strengthen the Afghan government has been maintaining a large diplomatic presence. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin, wasambassador during December 2003-August 2005; he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government decisions.[10] The current ambassador is William Wood, who previously was U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and who has focused on the counter-narcotics issue. As part of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly focused on helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop private industries. The U.S. embassy, housed in a newly constructed building, has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities. The tables at the end of this chapter discuss U.S. funding for Embassy operations, USAID operations, and Karzai protection.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

63

Although the Afghan government has increased its revenue and is covering a growing proportion of its budget, USAID provides funding to help the Afghan government meet gaps in its budget – both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, ARTF account. Those aid figures, for FY2002-FY2007, are in Table 14 at the end of the chapter.

Human Rights and Democracy The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan that adheres to international standards of human rights practices and presumably is able to earn the support of the Afghan people. The State Department report on human rights practices for 2007 (released March 11, 2008)[11] said that Afghanistan’s human rights record remained “poor,” but attributed this primarily to weak governance, corruption, drug trafficking, and the legacy of decades of conflict. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders. In debate over a new press law, both houses of parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the grounds that it gives the government too much control over private media. Even in the absence of the law, media policy remains highly conservative; in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque. That came amid a move by conservative parliamentarians to pass legislation to ban loud music, men and women mingling in public, video games, and other behavior common in the West. Since the Taliban era, more than 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350 independent newspapers have opened. The death penalty has been reinstituted, reversing a 2004 moratorium declared by Karzai. Fifteen convicts were executed at once on October 7, 2007. In January 2008, Afghanistan’s “Islamic council,” composed of senior clerics, backed public executions for convicted murderers and urged Karzai to end the activities of foreign organizations that are converting Afghans to Christianity. The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2007 (released September 14, 2007 says that “there was an increase in the number of reports of problems involving religious freedom compared to previous years.” There continues to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities such as Sikhs and Hindus. In May 2007, a directorate under the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy. Others have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law. Other accounts say that alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores. Some government policies reflect the conservative nature of Afghan society; recent indications of that sentiment were the demonstrations in March 2008 in several Afghan cities against Denmark and the Netherlands for Danish cartoons and a Dutch film apparently criticizing aspects of Islam and its key symbols. On January 25, 2008, in a case that has implications for both religious and journalistic freedom, a young reporter, Sayed Pervez Kambaksh, was sentenced to death for distributing a website report to student peers questioning some precepts of Islam. Karzai has said he will allow the appeal process to play out — and the Supreme Court is likely to overturn that

64

Kenneth Katzman

sentence — before considering a pardon for Kambaksh. A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005. Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department report on human trafficking issued in June 2008. The government is assessed as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but making significant efforts to do so. The Trafficking in Persons Report for 2008 says that women (reportedly from China and Central Asia) are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs. An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has been formed to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. Headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar, it also conducts surveys of how Afghans view governance and reconstruction efforts. The House-passed Afghan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) re-authorization bill (H.R. 2446) would authorize $10 million per year for this Commission until FY2010.

Funding Issues USAID has spent significant funds on democracy and rule of law programs (support for elections, civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, and local governance) for Afghanistan. Funding for FY2002-FY2007 is shown in Table 14. An additional $100 million was requested in further FY2008 supplemental funding, to help prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009, and $248 million for these functions is requested for FY2009. Advancement of Women According to State Department human rights report, the Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s influence is limited and it is now headed by a male, although the deputy minister is female. Among other activities, it promotes the involvement of women in business ventures. Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai nominated only one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the cabinet that followed the

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

65

parliamentary elections, and she was voted down by opposition from Islamist conservatives in parliament, leaving no women in the cabinet. (The deputy minister is a female.) In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-asides. However, some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians. More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities have increased in the most restive areas. U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.

Funding Issues The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L.107-327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The House-passed AFSA reauthorization (H.R. 2446) would authorize $5 million per year for this Ministry. Appropriations for programs for women and girls, when specified, are contained in the tables at the end of this chapter. Combating Narcotics Trafficking[12] Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as one of the most significant problems facing Afghanistan, generating about 40% of the Taliban’s funds. The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in February 2008 that opium cultivation for 2008 will likely be similar to the 2007 record harvest, which was an increased of 34% over the previous year. The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (INCSR) released February 29, 2008, said area under cultivation had increased by 17% in 2007 over 2006 levels. Afghanistan is the source of about 93% of the world’s illicit opium supply, and according to UNODC, “... leaving aside 19th Century China, no country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale.” Narcotics now accounts for about $4 billion in value, about 53% of the value of the legal economy. On the other hand, there are some signs of progress. The February 2008 UNODC report said that the number of “poppy free” provinces is 12, an increase from 6 in 2006, and that cultivation is decreasing in another ten provinces, mostly in the north, where UNODC says governance is increasing. The report said cultivation also decreased sharply in Nangarhar

66

Kenneth Katzman

Province (Jalalabad), a key province near the Pakistan border. The acting Minister of Counter-Narcotics, Gen. Khodaidad, said in late April 2008 that overall cultivation will fall in 2008, and that as many as 20 provinces might soon be declared cultivation free, including Nangarhar and Badakshan. Others attribute the apparent drop in cultivation to the large world increase in prices for legal crops. Much of the cultivation growth in recent years has come from Helmand Province (which now produces about 50% of Afghanistan’s total poppy crop) and other southern provinces where the Taliban insurgency is still consistently active, and the February 2008 UNDOC reports said cultivation is increasing in 7 provinces, mostly in the west and south. In response to congressional calls for an increased U.S. focus on the drug problem, in March 2007 the Administration created a post of coordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan, naming Thomas Schweich of the Bureau For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to that post. On August 9, 2007, he announced a major new counter-narcotics program and strategy that seeks to better integrate counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency, as well as enhance and encourage alternative livelihoods.[13] Part of the widely acknowledged lack of progress has been attributed to disagreements on a counter-narcotics strategy. The Afghan government wants to focus on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing poppy crop, and on building governance in areas where poppy is grown. The Afghan side, backed by some U.S. experts such as Barnett Rubin, believe that narcotics flourish in areas where there is no security, and not the other way around. U.S. officials emphasize eradication. In concert with interdiction and building up alternative livelihoods, the United States has prevailed on Afghanistan to undertake efforts to eradicate poppy fields by cutting down the crop manually on the ground. However, there appears to be a debate between some in the U.S. government, including Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood, and the Afghan government over whether to conduct spraying of fields, particularly by air. The Ambassador and others in the Bush Administration feel that aerial spraying is the only effective means to reduce poppy cultivation. President Karzai, most recently in an interview with the Washington Post on January 27, 2008, strongly opposes aerial spraying of poppy fields. He and others say that allowing such activity would cause a backlash among Afghan farmers that could produce more support for the Taliban. Others believe that Karzai feels that acquiescing to a U.S.-designed counter-narcotics program would make him look like a puppet of the international community. NATO commanders, who have taken over securityresponsibilities throughout Afghanistan, are now focusing on interdicting traffickers and raiding drug labs, and outgoing NATO/ISAF commander Gen. Dan McNeill said in February 2008 that his NATO mandate permits him to conduct counter-narcotics combat when it is clearly linked to insurgent activity. Congress appears to be siding with Karzai; the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-161) prohibits U.S. counternarcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields. The U.S. military, in support of the effort, is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The Department of Defense is also playing the major role in training and equipping specialized Afghan counter-narcotics police, in developing an Afghan intelligence fusion cell, and training Afghan border police, as well as

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

67

assisting an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. The Bush Administration has taken some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers;[14] in April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. The United States is funding a new Counternarcotics Justice Center (estimated cost, $8 million) in Kabul to prosecute and incarcerate suspected traffickers.[15] The Bush Administration has repeatedly named Afghanistan (and again in the February 2008 State Department INCSR report discussed above) as a major illicit drug producer and drug transit country, buthas not included Afghanistan on a smaller list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.[16] The Administration has exercised waiver provisions (the last was published in the Federal Register in May 2006) to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed to provide more than $225 million in recent U.S. economic assistance appropriations for Afghanistan. A similar certification requirement (to provide amounts over $300 million) is contained in the House version of the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161). Other provisions on counter-narcotics, such as recommending a pilot crop substitution program and cutting U.S. aid to any Afghan province whose officials are determined complicit in drug trafficking, are contained in the AFSA reauthorization bill (H.R. 2446). Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban, when it was in power, satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which purportedly dramatically decreased cultivation.[17] The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.

POST-WAR SECURITY OPERATIONS AND FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING The top security priority of theAdministration has been to prevent Al Qaeda and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) continuing combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (2) U.S. and NATO operation of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (3) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force.

The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) U.S. and partner country troop levels (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) have increased since 2006 to combat a Taliban resurgence. NATO/ISAF has led peacekeeping operations nationwide since October 5, 2006, and about 65% of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (numbers are in the security indicators table below) are under NATO command. The NATO/ISAF force is headed by U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, who on June 1, 2008 took over from U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill. McNeill in turn had taken over in February 2007 from U.K.

68

Kenneth Katzman

General David Richards. The remainder are under direct U.S. command as part of the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Most U.S. forces in Afghanistan, who are primarily in eastern Afghanistan, report, as of May 2008, to Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser as st

head of Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), named after the 101 Airborne Division, and headquartered at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. Gen. Schloesser commands OEF but is dual-hatted as commander of ISAF Regional Command-East of the NATO/ISAF mission. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be running about 2 - 3 billion dollars per month. The FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181, Section 1229) requires a quarterly DOD report on the security situation in Afghanistan, along the lines of the similar “Measuring Stability and Security” report required for Iraq. For further information, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. Prior to the transfer to NATO command, 19 coalition countries — primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy — were contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF, but most of these have now been “re-badged” to the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. A few foreign contingents, such as a small unit from the UAE, remain part of OEF. Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base (mainly combat engineers) were part of OEF; they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a July-August 2007, agreement under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South Korean church group visitors in Ghazni province. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government. As of April 2008, South Korea is in the process of re-engaging in Afghanistan by planning to take over the Parwan Province PRT based at Bagram Air Base and possibly train Afghan security forces at facilities in Kabul as well. Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission ended in October 2007 following a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. On June 1, 2008, a senior Japanese official said Japan might expand the mission of its Self Defense Forces to include some reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. As part of OEF, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf. In the four years after the fall of the Taliban, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in the east (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had believed that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had almost ended the insurgency.

The Taliban “Resurgence” An increase in violence beginning in mid-2006 took some U.S. commanders by surprise because the insurgency had been low level for several years, and polls showed that the

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

69

Taliban are politically unpopular, even in the conservative Pashtun areas. Taliban insurgents, increasingly adapting suicide and roadside bombing characteristic of the Iraq insurgency – and enjoying a degree of safehaven in Pakistan – nonetheless have been able to step up attacks, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for on July 31, 2006. The violence triggered debate about whether the resurgence was driven by popular frustration with the widely perceived corruption within the Karzai government and the slow pace of economic reconstruction. Some believe that Afghans in the restive areas were intimidated by the Taliban into providing food and shelter, while others believe that some villages welcome any form of justice, even if administered by the Taliban. Taliban attacks on schools, teachers, and other civilian infrastructure have reportedly caused popular anger against the movement, but others say they appreciate the Taliban’s reputation for avoiding corruption. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen testified on December 11, 2007, that the Taliban support had tripled to about 20% over the past two years. Other developments in 2007 that the United States found worrisome have been the Taliban’s first use of a surface-to-air missile (SAM-7, shoulder held) against a U.S. C-130 transport aircraft, although it did not hit the aircraft. NATO has countered the violence with repeated offensives, including such major operations as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006). The latter was considered a success in ousting Taliban fighters from the Panjwai district near Qandahar. Operation Medusa also demonstrated that NATO would conduct intensive combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of Medusa, British forces — who believe in working more with tribal leaders as part of negotiated local solutions — entered into an agreement with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they would secure the main town of the district without an active NATO presence. That strategy failed when the Taliban captured Musa Qala town in February 2007. A NATO offensive in December 2007, approved by President Karzai, retook Musa Qala, although there continue to be recriminations between the Britain, on the one side, and the United States and Karzai, on the other, over the wisdom of the original British deal on Musa Qala. Some Taliban activity continues on the outskirts of the district. During 2007, U.S. and NATO forces, bolstered by the infusion of 3,200 U.S. troops and 3,800 NATO/partner forces, pre-empted an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive.” In a preemptive move, in March 2007, NATO and Afghan troops conducted “Operation Achilles” to expel militants from the Sangin district of northern Helmand Province. One purpose of the operation was to pacify the area around the key Kajaki dam. The Taliban “offensive” largely did not materialize, and U.S. and NATO commanders say their efforts deprived the Taliban of the ability to control substantial swaths of territory. Taliban militants are often killed 50 or 60 at a time by coalition airstrikes because theymove in remote areas where theyare easily located and struck. The NATO operations, and a related offensive in late April 2007 (Operation Silicon), had a major success on May 12, 2007, when the purportedly ruthless leader of the Taliban insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by U.S. and NATO forces in Helmand Province. His brother, Mansoor, replaced him as leader of that faction but Mansoor was arrested crossing into Pakistan in February 2008 — arrests and deaths such as these are contributing to U.S. command optimism that it will eventually defeat the Taliban outright.[18] A U.S. airstrike in December 2006 killed another prominent commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani. A key commander in Kunar province, Mullah Ismail, was arrested while crossing over into Pakistan in mid-April 2008.

70

Kenneth Katzman

Despite recent losses, several key Taliban leaders are at large and believed to be workingwith Al Qaeda leaders; some Taliban are able to giveinterviews to Pakistani (Geo television) and other media stations. In addition to Mullah Umar, Jalaludin Haqqani and his son, Siraj, remain at large, leading an insurgent faction operating around Khost. Haqqani is believed to have contact with Al Qaeda leaders in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. The Taliban has several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” and publishes videos.

Policy Reviews and Further 2008-2009 U.S. Troop Buildup Despite the offensives, a perception of growing Taliban strength has taken hold among some observers, as evidenced by, among other indicators: (1) 2007 recording the most casualties, including Taliban fighters, of the war so far: (2) numbers of suicide bombings at a post-Taliban high, including such major bombings as one in Kabul on June 17, 2007, which killed about 35 Afghan police recruits on a bus; a suicide bombing in early November 2007 that killed six parliamentarians, as noted above; the suicide bombing near Qandahar on February 17, 2008 that killed 67 civilians and 13 Afghan police - the most lethal attack since 2002; and (3) expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, including Lowgar and Wardak (close to Kabul), as well as formerly stable Herat, where there are few Pashtuns sympathetic to the Taliban; (4) attacks in Kabul against targets that are either well defended or in highly populated centers, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul (see below); the January 26, 2008, kidnaping of an American aid worker in Qandahar; and, (5) the April 27, 2008 assassination attempt on Karzai during amilitary parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union. A parliamentarian was killed. This attack, aspects of which were uncovered beforehand, triggered a move by parliament to vote no confidence in the intelligence director, the Defense Minister, and the Interior Minister, but the three remain in their positions as of mid-May 2008. On the other hand, U.S. commanders say that the United States and its allies have made substantial progress reducing Taliban attacks in eastern Afghanistan where U.S. troops mainly operate and are able to achieve significant coverage; one U.S. briefing in January 2008 said that attacks along the eastern Afghan-Pakistan border are 40% lower than they were in December 2006. U.S. commanders say they have continued on the offensive during the winter of 2008 to deny the Taliban the ability to regroup and that the Taliban “spring offensive” has again been weak or non-existent in spring 2008, as it was in 2007. U.S. commanders — and a U.N. Secretary General report of March 6, 2008 — say that 70% of the violence in Afghanistan is now occurring in 10% of Afghanistan’s 376 districts, an area including about 6% of the Afghan population. U.S. commanders say the increase in violence is caused mainly by a higher tempo of U.S./ISAF anti-Taliban operations rather than any increase in Taliban recruitment or capabilities, and attribute the Taliban resilience primarily to the lax border policing of Pakistan. Some NATO commanders go so far as to say that the Taliban is on the brink of defeat – nearly \ decapitated, having lost 7,000 fighters over the past two years, and low on ammunition. Still, to address the widespread perception of deterioration of the U.S. effort, a reported National Security Council review (reported by the Washington Post on November 25, 2007) found that the Taliban has been able to expand its presence, particularly in “un-governed” remote areas. The review also reportedly concluded that the United States needed to focus more attention and resources on the Afghan situation than it had previously. Joint Chiefs

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

71

Chairman Mullen largely confirmed the perception that the Afghan battlefield was “underresourced” in his December 11, 2007 testimony in which he stated that, in Iraq, “the United States does what it must, while in Afghanistan, the United States does what it can.” Other policy reviews have been conducted by the State Department; it evaluated its use of “soft power” to complement the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Similar findings are emphasized in recent outside assessments of Afghanistan policy, including a report in November 2007 by the Senlis Council;[19] a January 2008 study by the Atlantic Council (“Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action”) and a January 30, 2008 study by the Center for the Study of the Presidency (“Afghanistan Study Group Report”), as well as in recent hearings, such as the January 31, 2008 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

“Americanizing” the Southern Front? As a consequence of the policy reviews and public perceptions, the Administration is taking new steps to keep the pressure on the Taliban in the south, where it remains strongest, as well as to ease strains with key NATO partners. Some policy decisions appear to indicate that the United States might assume greater responsibility for the intense combat in the south. On January 14, 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates approved the deployment of an additional 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan (for seven months), of which about 700 will be for training the Afghan security forces, and the remainder will provide more combat capability in the south. They have arrived and begun to engage in combat in Helmand Province; including an operation that began in late April 2008 that expelled Taliban militants from the Garmsar district of Helmand. Still, U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan have decided that they needed about three more brigades (about 10,000) to be able to stabilize the still restive southern sector, particularly all of southern Helmand Province. With NATO countries unlikely to fill that entire need, on April 4, 2008, at the NATO summit in Romania, President Bush pledged to further increase U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009, regardless of the change in U.S. Administration at that time. The 2009 addition could be as much as 7,000 U.S. forces, in addition to finding replacements for the 3,200 additional Marines sent on a seven month rotation. On May 22, 2008, the Defense Department confirmed that the United States is likely to take over the command of Regional Command-South in November 2010, after rotations by the Netherlands(2008-2009) and Britain (2009-2010). The issue of NATO/ISAF and the positions of contributing countries is discussed further below. U.S. and NATO commanders are also increasingly sensitive to losing “hearts and minds” because of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. and NATO operations, particularly air strikes. In a joint meeting on May 21, 2007, President Bush and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that U.S. and NATO operations were seeking to avoid civilian casualties but that such results were sometimes inevitable in the course of fighting the Taliban. President Bush and President Karzai said they discussed the issue during their Camp David meetings in August 2007. With Karzai saying in October 2007 that he had asked for a halt to the use of air strikes, NATO is reportedly examining using smaller air force munitions to limit collateral damage from air strikes, or increased use of ground operations. Feelers to the Taliban President Karzai believes that an alternative means of combating Taliban militants is to offer talks with Taliban fighters who want to consider ending their fight. Noted above is the

72

Kenneth Katzman

“Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) headed by Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. The program is credited with persuading numerous Taliban figures andcommanders to renounce violence and joint the political process. Several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. The Taliban official who was governor of Bamiyan Province when the Buddha statues there were blown up, Mohammad Islam Mohammedi — and who was later elected to the post-Taliban parliament from Samangan Province — was assassinated in Kabul in January 2007. In September 2007, Karzai offered to meet with Mullah Umar himself, appearing thereby to backtrack on earlier statements that about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty. The Taliban rejected the offer, saying they would not consider reconciling until (1) all foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution is adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed. In December 2007, other press reports appeared that European or other intermediaries had been holding secret talks with Taliban figures. Even though it is Karzai’s position that talks with the Taliban could be helpful, two European diplomats working for the United Nations and European Union were expelled by the Afghan government in December 2007, possibly because they allegedly provided the Taliban intermediaries with small gifts as gestures of goodwill. As referenced above, there have been reports that, before his capture, Mansoor Dadullah was in talks with British forces about ending his battles, and some recent news stories say that Siraj Haqqani has been in talks with Pakistani intermediaries about possibly ending Taliban activity inside Pakistan. In April 2008, representatives of the minoritydominated National Front bloc (see above) said they have had some peace talks with Taliban representatives.

Whereabouts of Al Qaeda Leaders and Fighters Complicating the U.S. mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value targets” of Al Qaeda: leaders believed to be in Pakistan but who are believed able to direct Al Qaeda fighters to assist the Taliban. The two most notable are Osama bin Laden himself and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. They reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.[20] A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.[21] A strike in late January 2008, in an area near Damadola, killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who purportedly masterminded, among other operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. During a visit to the United States in August 2007, Karzai told journalists that U.S. and Afghan officials are no closer than previously to determining bin Laden’s location. Other reports say there are a growing number of Al Qaeda militants now being identified on the Afghan battlefield,[22] although senior U.S. officials say that these militants may now be focused on sewing instability in Pakistan more so than in Afghanistan. Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. His fighters are operating in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, northeast of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

73

Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” On July 19, 2007, Hikmatyar injected some optimism into the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by issuing a statement declaring a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government, although no firm reconciliation talks have been held between HIG and the Karzai government.

U.S. Military Presence/SOFA/Use of Facilities U.S. forces operate in Afghanistan under a “status of forces agreement” (SOFA) between the United States and the interim government of Afghanistan in November 2002; the agreement gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban insurgency ends, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. They supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration”[23] providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in the table. In order to avoid the impression that foreign forces are “occupying”Afghanistan, NATO said on August 15, 2006, that it would negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15 initiatives to secure Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces. Table 2. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan Facility Bagram Air Base

Afghans With Access to Health Coverage

Qandahar Air Field

Shindand Air Base

Use 50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-82. At least 500 U.S. military personnel are based there, assisted by about 175 South Korean troops. Handles many of the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital under construction, one of the first permanent structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $20 million for military construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. 82% with basic health services access - compared to 8% during Taliban era, although access is more limited in restive areas. Infant mortality has dropped 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built with U.S. funds since Taliban. Just outside Qandahar. Turned over from U.S. to NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping responsibilities. In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose militia forces controlled the facility.

74

Kenneth Katzman Table 2. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan Facility Peter Ganci Base: Manas, Kyrgyzstan

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey Al Dhafra, UAE

Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar Naval Support Facility, Bahrain

Karsi-Khanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan

Use Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Bakiyev demanded a large increase in the $2 million per year U.S. contribution for use of the base; dispute eased in July 2006 with U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan $150 million in assistance and base use payments. About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey. Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses CENTCOM forward headquarters. U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there. Not used by U.S. since September 2005 following U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of the base temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. Could also represent Uzbek counter to Russian offer to U.S. coalition to allow use of its territory to transport equipment into Afghanistan.

The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[24] As discussed, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF, consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus 14 partner countries), now commands peacekeeping operations throughout Afghanistan. The several tables at the end of this chapter list contributing countries and forces contributed, areas of operations, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams they control. ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001),[25] initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF in August 2003 paved the way for the expansion, and NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively). The mission was most recently renewed by U.N. Security

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

75

Council Resolution 1776 (September 19, 2007), which also noted U.N. support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar, and the Netherlands is lead in Uruzgan; the three rotate the command of RC-S. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of command, the United States put over half the U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF’s “Regional Command East” (RC-E), although still reporting to a U.S. command in country. The April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania resulted in some new pledges for NATO and other partner forces to add troops to Afghanistan to meet the agreed requirement of 10,000 total extra forces deemed needed to stabilize the restive south. As of now, the partner forces that are bearing the brunt of combat in southern Afghanistan are Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia. The need to line up new pledges became acute in February 2008, when Canada said it would extend its 2,500 troop deployment until 2009, but not beyond that, unless other partners contribute 1,000 forces to assist with combat in the Canadian sector (Qandahar province).

New NATO Force Pledges in 2008 and Since At and in conjunction with the NATO summit in Bucharest in early April 2008, twelve countries did indicate new pledges, although some are of reconstruction aid rather than troops, and others were restatements of previous pledges. The following were the major pledges: •

•

•

•

• • •

France announced a deployment of up to 1,000 forces — a battalion of about 700 plus 200 special forces that formerly were part of OEF. The French forces will be deployed mostly in the U.S.-led eastern sector, freeing up U.S. forces to go to the south. Germany turned down a U.S. request to send forces to the combat-heavy south, but it pledged in early 2008 to add 500 forces to its sector in the north, mostly to take over a Norway-led rapid reaction force there. (Despite opposition in Germany to the Afghanistan mission, Germany’s parliament voted by a 453-79 vote margin on October 12, 2007, to maintain German troop levels in Afghanistan.) Britain plans to deploy about 600 more troops to its already significant 7,800 troop commitment to Afghanistan. These forces will serve in Britain’s sector of the south (very high combat Helmand Province). Poland recommitted to its February 2008 announcement that it would add 400 troops to the 1,200 in Afghanistan, but that they would continue to fight alongside U.S. forces as part of RC-E, operating mainly in Ghazni province. Norway plans to add 200 troops but in the largely passive north, where Norway is deployed. Denmark will add about 600 forces to the mission in the south. Georgia pledged 500 additional forces for Afghanistan.

76

Kenneth Katzman • • • • • •

•

Croatia pledged 200 - 300, which would double its existing force. The Czech Republic pledged 120 new forces. Greece and Romania promised to send an unspecified number of additional trainers for the Afghan security forces. New Zealand pledged to increase its contingent at the PRT it runs in Bamiyan province. Azerbaijan pledged an additional 45, more than its existing force there. In February 2008, Australia ruled out sending more forces to supplement its contingent, which operates in combat intense Uruzgan province, but said it would augment civilian assistance such as training Afghan police and judges and build new roads, hospitals, and schools. In May 2008, Italy announced that it was now willing to deploy some of its forces to the combat-intense south.

Among other unfulfilled pledges (in addition to the 3,200 combat forces the United States has now decided to send) are 3,200 additional trainers that are needed for Afghan security forces. About 700 of the 3,200 Marines that will deploy to Afghanistan by April 2008 will be trainers to address that shortage. Another key point of contention has been NATO’s chronic equipment shortages— particularly helicopters, both for transport and attack — for the Afghanistan mission. Secretary Gates has been pressing for NATO countries to contribute an additional 16 helicopters in southern Afghanistan to relieve a U.S. helicopter battalion that Gates said in testimony would not have its deployment there extended again beyond mid-2008. One idea considered at the NATO meeting in Scotland on December 13, 2007, was for U.S. or other donors to pay for the upgrading of helicopters that partner countries might possess but have inadequate resources to adapt to Afghanistan’s harsh flying conditions. Some NATO countries reportedly are considering jointly modernizing about 20 Russian-made transport helicopters that could be used by all participating nations in Afghanistan. In 2007, to try to compensate for the shortage, NATO chartered about 20 commercial helicopters for extra routine supply flights to the south, freeing up Chinooks and Black Hawks for other missions. Some of the extra Polish troops to be deployed in 2008 will operate and maintain eight helicopters. The shortages persist even though several partner nations brought in additional equipment in 2006 in conjunction with the NATO assumption of command of all peacekeeping. At that time, Apache attack helicopters and F-16 aircraft were brought in by some contributors. Italy sent “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.[26] Germany notes that it provides six Tornado combat aircraft to assist with strikes in combat situations in the south. NATO/ISAF also coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located). In October 2008, Hungary will add 60 troops and take over security at that airport. In an effort to repair divisions withinthe Afghanistan coalition, in his December 11, 2007, testimony, Secretary Gates previewed his presentation, at a NATO meeting in Scotland on December 13, 2007, of a “strategic concept paper” that would help coordinate and guide NATO and other partner contributions and missions over the coming three to five years. This

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

77

is an effort to structure each country’s contribution as appropriate to the politics and resources of that contributor. The concept paper, now titled the “Strategic Vision,” was endorsed by the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania in early April 2008.

National “Caveats” on Combat Operations Some progress has been made in persuading other NATO countries to adopt flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as do U.S. forces. At the NATO summit in April 2008, NATO countries pledged to continue to work remove their so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that U.S. commanders say limit operational flexibility. Some nations refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan National Army or other Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and attendant casualties. There has been some criticism of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan, which focuses heavily on building relationships with tribal leaders and identifying reconstruction priorities, and not on actively combating Taliban formations. Some believe this approach allows Taliban fighters to group and expand their influence, although the Netherlands says this approach is key to a long-term pacification of the south. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, during November 28-29, 2006, some NATO countries, particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove some of these caveats, and some have done so. All agreed that their forces would come to each others’ defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan. (See CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Paul Gallis.)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) — enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government — in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, a December 2002 U.S. initiative, perform activities ranging from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs, and most of the PRTs in southern Afghanistan, focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.[27] Other relief groups do not want to associate with military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Secretary Gates and U.S. commanders have attributed recent successes in stabilizing some areas, such as Ghazni and Khost, to the PRTs’ ability to intensify reconstruction by coordinating many different security and civilian activities. In Ghazni, almost all the schools are now open, whereas one year ago many were closed because of Taliban intimidation. In Khost, according to Secretary Gates on December 11, PRT activities focused on road building and construction of district centers that tie the population to the government have led to a dramatic improvement in security over the past year. Bombings there have fallen from one per week in 2006 to one per month now.

78

Kenneth Katzman

There are 25 PRTs in operation. In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United States turned over several PRTs to partner countries, and virtually all the PRTs are now under ISAF control, but with varying lead nations. The list of PRTs, including lead country, is shown in table 16. Each PRT operated by the United States is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “colocated” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects, as shown in the tables at the report’s end. According to U.S. officials, 54 PRT development projects have been completed and 199 (valued at $20 million) are ongoing. USAID funds used for PRT programs are in the table on USAID spending at the end of this chapter. In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command South, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of Uruzgan Province. Germany (with Turkey and France) took over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain and the Netherlands when those countries deployed to the south. Representing evolution of the PRT concept, Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that region. As of March 2008, the Czech Republic has established a new PRT in Lowgar Province. As noted above, South Korea is expected to soon take over the U.S.-run PRT at Bagram Air Base. There also has been a move to turn over the lead in the U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.

Afghan Security Forces U.S. forces (“Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan,” CSTC-A, headed as of July 2007 by Gen. Robert Cone), along with partner countries, are training the new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).

Afghan National Army U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA, now about 55,000 trained, is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. Senior U.S. commanders say that some ANA battalions in eastern Afghanistan have progressed to the point where they will be able to conduct operations on their own by spring 2008. The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S. Special Operations Forces, are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some counter-insurgency operations in the U.S.-led eastern sector, particularly against HIG elements in Nuristan province. However, General McNeillll said in April 2008 that it would not be until 2011 that ANA (and ANP) forces would be capable enough – and have sufficient air transport and air support – to allow for a drawdown of international forces. Karzai has

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

79

pledged in April 2008 to take over security of the Kabul regional command from Italy as of July 2008. ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” have improved and been stiffened by the presence of U.S. and partner embeds, called “Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams” (OMLTs). Each OMLT has about 12-19 personnel, and U.S. commanders say that the ANA will continue to need embeds for the short term, because embeds give the units confidence they will be resupplied, reinforced, and evacuated in the event of wounding. Coalition officers also are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-eCharki, east of Kabul. Among the partner countries contributing OMLTs (all or in part) are Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and the United States. As noted above, about 700 of the extra 3,200 Marines being sent to Afghanistan in early 2008 will be devoted to training the ANA and ANP. The Indian press reported on April 24, 2007, that a separate team from the Indian Army would help train the ANA.[28] The United States has built four AMA bases (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-eSharif). The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about 10-20 per battalion). The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength operations, according to U.S. officers. In June 2007, the ANA and ANP led “Operation Maiwand” in Ghazni province, intended to open schools and deliver humanitarian aid to people throughout the province. On the other hand, U.S. officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill discipline, and drugabuse, although some concerns have been addressed. Some accounts say that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time. At the time the United States first began establishingthe ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). The chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) requires that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or armor. The tables below discusses major equipment donations, as well as the new U.S. equipment being delivered in mid-2008. The Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat against the Taliban regime. It now has about 400 pilots, as well as 22

80

Kenneth Katzman

helicopters and cargo aircraft. Its goal is to have 61 aircraft by 2011. By May 2008, it is expected to receive an additional 25 surplus helicopters from the Czech Republic and the UAE, bought and refurbished with the help of U.S. funds. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according to U.S. military officials. Table 3. Recent and Pending Foreign Equipment for ANA Country United States

Hungary Egypt Russia Turkey Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Greece Latvia Lithuania Montenegro Poland Switzerland Turkey Croatia UAE

Equipment Major $2 billion value in arms delivered between May 2006-end of 2007. Includes several hundred Humvees, 800 other various armored vehicles. Also includes light weapons. Authorized total drawdown ceiling (un-reimbursed by appropriations) is $550 million; H.R. 2446 - AFSA reauthorization — would increase ceiling to $300 million/year. Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. 20,500 assault rifles 17,000 small arms 4 helicopters and other equipment, part of over $100 million military aid to Afghanistan thus far 24 — 155 mm Howitzers 50 mortars, 500 binoculars 12 helicopters and 20,000 machine guns 4,000 machine guns plus ammunition 300 machine guns 337 rocket-propelled grenades, 8 mortars, 13,000 arms 3.7 million ammunition rounds 1,600 machine guns 110 armored personnel carriers, 4 million ammo rounds 3 fire trucks 2,200 rounds of 155 mm ammo 1,000 machine guns plus ammo 10 Mi-17 helicopters (to be delivered by May 2008)

Afghan National Police/Justice Sector U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. There is a widespread consensus that this effort lags that of the ANA by about 18 months, although U.S. commanders say that it is increasingly successful in repelling Taliban assaults on villages and that the ANP (now numbering about 75,300 assigned) is experiencing fewer casualties from attacks. To continue the progress, the U.S. military is conducting reforms to take ANP out of the bureaucracy and onto the streets and it is trying to bring ANP pay on par with the ANA. It has also launched a program called “focused district development” to concentrate resources on developing individual police forces in districts, which is the basic geographic area of ANP activity. (There are about ten “districts” in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.) In this program, a district force is taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly trained police, and then reinserted after the training is complete. Gen. Cone said on April 18, 2008 that, thus far, ten districts have undergone this process, which he says will take five years to complete for all of Afghanistan’s districts.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

81

The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Much of the training is still conducted through contracts with DynCorp. There are currently seven police training centers around Afghanistan. In addition to the U.S. effort, which includes 600 civilian U.S. police trainers (mostly still Dyncorp contractors) in addition to the U.S. military personnel (see table on security indicators), Germany (technically the lead government in Afghan police training) is providing 41 trainers. The European Union has sent an additional 120 police trainers as part of a 190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. The EU said in March 2008 the size of the EUPOL training team should be doubled to about 400. To address equipment shortages, in 2007 CSTC-A is providing about 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. A report by the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Department, circulated to Congress in December 2006, found that most ANP units have less than 50% of their authorized equipment,[29] among its significant criticisms. Many experts believe that comprehensive police and justice sector reform is vital to Afghan governance. Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses. However, some governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of 86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform committee. The ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; manyof these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform. The United States has trained over 750 judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, according to President Bush on February 15, 2007, and built 40 judicial facilities. USAID also trains court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. On February 15, 2007, President Bush also praised Karzai’s formation of a Criminal Justice Task Force that is trying to crack down on official corruption, and the United States, Britain, and Norway are providing mentors to the Afghan judicial officials involved in that effort.

Tribal Militias Since June 2006, Karzai has authorized arming some local tribal militias (arbokai) in eastern Afghanistan, building on established tribal structures, to help in local policing. Karzai argues that these militias provide security and are loyal to the nation and central government and that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below. Britain favors expanding the arbokai program to the south, but U.S. military commanders say that this program would likely not work in the south because of differing tribal structures there.

82

Kenneth Katzman

U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP” U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this chapter. In addition to the train and equip funds provided by DoD, the U.S. military in Afghanistan has additional funds to spend on reconstruction projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces. These are Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or CERP. The U.S. military spent about $206 million in CERP in FY2007 and expect to spend, subject to FY2008 supplemental appropriations, about $410 million in CERP in FY2008. As noted in the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the State Department. Table 4. Major Security-Related Indicators Force Total Foreign Forces in Afghanistan

Current Level About 64,000, of which: 53,000 are NATO/ISAF. (12,000 ISAF in 2005; and 6,000 in 2003.) U.S. forces: 34,500 total, of which 23,500 in NATO/ISAF and 11,000 in OEF. (U.S. total was: 25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002). U.S. will rise further in 2009, according to President Bush on April 5, 2008, likely by about 7,000. U.S. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air wing (40 aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft). About 1,000 coalition partner forces in OEF, but not ISAF.

U.S. Casualties in Afghanistan

443 killed, of which 308 by hostile action. Additional 65 U.S. deaths in other OEF theaters, including the Phillipines and parts of Africa (OEF-Trans Sahara). About 275 partner forces killed. 100+ U.S. killed in 2007, highest yet. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001 - January 2003.

NATO Sectors (Regional CommandsSouth, east, north, west, and central/Kabul) Afghan National Army (ANA)

RC-S - 23,000 (Canada, UK, Netherlands rotate lead); RC-E -16,400 (U.S. lead); RC-N - 4,300; RC-W - 2,500 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul - 5,900 (Italy lead but Afghanistan planning to take lead by July 2008).

Afghan National Police (ANP)

75,300 assigned. Authorized strength: 82,000. Salaries raised to $100 per month in mid-2007 from $70 to counter corruption in the force. 2,600 are counter-narcotics police. 10,000 are border police. About 4,000 U.S. military trainers as Embedded Training Troops and Police Mentoring Teams. Also, 600 civilian U.S. police trainers. Of these, about 900 U.S. military trainers are for ANP. The remaining 3,100 are for ANA training. ANP training assisted by EUPOL (European Union contingent of 190 trainers, organized as OMLTs; see text), and 41 German trainers of senior ANP.

U.S. and Partner Trainers

Legally Armed Fighters disarmed by DDR Armed Groups disbanded by DIAG

55,000 trained, with about 40,000 on duty. 63,000 including civilian support. Organized into 33 battalions. Will add 13,000 soldiers by end of 2008; 80,000 is goal by 2009, endorsed in Afghanistan Compact. Afghanistan proposes raising ceiling to 120,000. About 2,000 trained per month. 4,000 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces, active in north-east against HIG. ANA private paid about $150 per month; generals receive about $750 per month. ANA now being outfitted with U.S. M16 rifles and 4,000 uparmored Humvees.

63,380; all of the pool identified for the program 161 illegal groups (five or more fighters) disbanded. Goal is to disband 1,800 groups, of which several hundred groups are “significant.” 5,700 weapons confiscated, 1.050 arrested.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Force Weapons Collected by DDR Number of Suicide Bombings

Current Level

Afghan Casualties Number of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s)

About 6,000 in 2007 (including Taliban; all types of violence) 500+ in 2007

83

DDR: 36,000 medium and light; 12,250 heavy. 21 in 2005; 123 in 2006; 160 in 2007.

REGIONAL CONTEXT Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below.

Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border[30] As Pakistan’s government has changed composition over the past year, experts increasingly see Pakistan as unhelpful to U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. During 20012006, the Bush Administration generally refrained from criticism of President Pervez Musharraf, instead praising Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures, some of them senior, since the September 11 attacks. After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Others say Musharraf has acted against Al Qaeda only because of its threat to him; for example, he stepped up Pakistani military activities in the tribal areas of Pakistan only after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him by that organization. On the Taliban, Pakistan has consistently faced Afghan criticism. Afghan leaders resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power and they suspect it wants to have the option to restore a Taliban-like regime. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.) Pakistan viewed the Taliban as providingPakistan strategic depth against rival India, and it remains wary that any Afghan government might fall under the influence of India,which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds to build influence there. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations never

84

Kenneth Katzman

fully recovered from March 2006, when Afghan leaders stepped up accusations that Pakistan was allowing Taliban remnants, including Mullah Umar, to operating there. In a press interview on February 2, 2007, Musharraf tacitly acknowledged that some senior Taliban leaders might be able to operate from Pakistan but strongly denied that any Pakistani intelligence agencies were deliberately assisting the Taliban. Karzai visited Pakistan on December 27, 2007, to discuss the Taliban safehaven issue and other bilateral issues, and reports said his meeting with Musharraf was highly productive, resulting in re-dedication to joint action against militants. While in Pakistan, Karzai met with Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto just hours before she was assassinated on December 27. The latest phase of U.S. attempts to broker cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan began on September 28, 2006, when President Bush hosted a joint dinner for Karzai and Musharraf. It resulted in the two leaders’ agreeing to gather tribal elders on both sides of their border in a series of “peace jirgas” to persuade them not to host Taliban militants. (The first of them, in which 700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders participated, was held in Kabul August 9-10, 2007.[31] Another is planned, but no date has been announced.) In January 2007, Karzai strongly criticized a Pakistani plan to mine and fence their common border in an effort to prevent infiltration of militants to Afghanistan. Karzai said the move would separate tribes and families that straddle the border. Pakistan subsequently dropped the idea of mining the border, but is building some fencing. A U.S. shift toward the Afghan position on Pakistan increased following a New York Times report of February 19, 2007, that Al Qaeda leaders, possibly including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, had re-established some small Al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the Afghan border. The regrouping of militants is said to be an outgrowth of a September 5, 2006, agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this region to exchange an end to Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas for a promise by the tribal elders to expel militants from the border area. In July 2007, U.S. counterterrorism officials publicly deemed the agreement a failure. Despite the widespread assessment that the deals had failed, in April 2008, the new government, dominated by Musharraf’s opponents who prevailed in February 2008 parliamentary elections, began negotiating a similar “understanding” with members of the Mehsud tribe, among which is militant leader Baitullah Mehsud, believed responsible for harboring Afghan Taliban and for growing militant acts inside Pakistan itself, possibly including the Bhutto killing. Outgoing Gen. McNeill blamed the negotiations for an increase in militant infiltration across the border that has undermined some of the progress in pacifying the Regional Command East sector. In addition, Pakistan has stopped attending meetings of the “coordinating commission” under which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani forces meet regularly on both sides of the border. In April 2008, in an extension of the commission’s work, the three set up six “border coordination centers” to share intelligence on cross-border movement of militants, building on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements.

Increased Direct U.S. Action Since September 2007, press reports have said that U.S. military planners are proposing increasing U.S. direct action against militants in Pakistan, partly in partnership with Pakistani border and other forces.[32] Responding to the reports, Musharraf — as well as his newly ascendant political opponents in Pakistan — publicly oppose unilateral U.S. action and any presence of U.S. combat forces in Pakistan. In late January 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

85

said that Pakistan had not yet asked for such U.S. help and that any U.S. troops potentially deployed to Pakistan would most likely be assigned solely to train Pakistani border forces, such as the Frontier Corps. However, press reports also say that visits to Pakistan by top U.S. intelligence officials in January 2008 resulted in agreement for more U.S. Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flights over the border regions; the Abu Laith al-Libi strike discussed earlier is believed a product of that enhanced U.S. activity over Pakistan. In addition, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have acknowledged on a few occasion since early 2007 that they have shelled purported Taliban positions inside the Pakistani side of the border, and have done some “hot pursuit” a few kilometers over the border into Pakistan. U.S. commanders said in June 2008 that NATO and U.S. forces had beefed up their numbers on the border to deal with the spike in attacks caused by Pakistan’s relaxation of efforts to prevent militant infiltration. Suggesting that it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta. On March 1, 2007, Pakistani officials confirmed they had arrested in Quetta Mullah Ubaydallah Akhund, a top aide to Mullah Umar and who had served as defense minister in the Taliban regime. He was later reported released. Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). It is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be re-negotiated. As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back into Afghanistan in the near future.

Iran Iranperceives its keynational interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about $205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him. Iran did not oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan as Herat governor in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.[33] Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. Karzai, who has visited Iran on several occasions says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. During his visit to Washington, DC, in August 2007, some differences between Afghanistan and the United States became apparent; Karzai publicly called Iran part of a “solution” for Afghanistan, while President Bush called Iran a “de-stabilizing force” there. Still, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul in mid-August 2007.

86

Kenneth Katzman

The U.S.-Afghan differences over Iran’s role represent a departure fromthe past five years, when Iran’s influence with political leaders in Afghanistan appeared to wane, and U.S. criticism of Iran’s role in Afghanistan was muted. The State Department report on international terrorism, released April 30, 2008, said Iran continued during 2007 to ship arms to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, including mortars, 107mm rockets, and possibly manportable air defense systems (MANPADS). On April 17, 2007, U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan captured a shipment of Iranian weapons that purportedly was bound for Taliban fighters. On June 6, 2007, NATO officers said they caught Iran “red-handed” shipping heavy arms, C4 explosives, and advanced roadside bombs (“explosively-forcedprojectiles, EFPs, such as those found in Iraq) to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Another such shipment was intercepted in western Afghanistan on September 6, 2007. Gen. McNeill said the convoy was sent with the knowledge of “at least the Iranian military.” Because such shipments would appear to conflict with Iran’s support for Karzai and for non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, U.S. military officers did not attribute the shipments to a deliberate Iranian government decision to arm the Taliban. However, some U.S. officials say the shipments are large enough that the Iranian government would have to have known about them. In attempting to explain the shipments, some experts believe Iran’s policy might beshiftingsomewhatto gain leverage against the United States in Afghanistan (and on other issues) by causing U.S. combat deaths. There is little dispute that Iran’s relations with Afghanistan are much improved from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.[34] In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan.

India The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

87

India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. Pakistan is likely to take particular exception to the reported training by India of the ANA, discussed above.

Russia, Central Asian States, and China Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.

Russia Russia provides some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, although it keeps a low profile in Afghanistan because it still feels humiliated by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and senses Afghan resentment of the Soviet occupation. In an effort to try to cooperate more with NATO at least in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the April 2008 NATO summit, Russia agreed to allow NATO to ship non-lethal supplies to coalition forces in Afghanistan by land over Russian territory. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.[35] Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongsideTaliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. Central Asian States During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.[36] One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s. During Taliban rule, Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that Alliance. It allowed use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October

88

Kenneth Katzman

2001 until a rift emerged in May 2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon, and U.S.-Uzbek relations remained largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in U.S.-Uzbekrelations developed in 2005, suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other issues might be rebuilt. As a follow-up to this, Uzbekistan at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, proposed to revive the “6 + 2” process of neighbors of Afghanistan to help its stability, but Karzai reportedly opposes this idea as unwanted Central Asian interference in its affairs. In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia region. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see above). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.

China A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been allied to Pakistan in part to pressure India, a rival of China. Still, Chinese delegations are visiting Afghanistan to assess the potential for investments in such sectors as mining and energy,[37] and a deal was signed in November 2007 as discussed above (China Metallurgical Group).

Saudi Arabia During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, a majority of whose citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam also practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-Saudi relations

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

89

improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. airstrikes from it

U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction would do more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat. Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). The law also authorized $20 million for that purpose, although funds have not yet been provided in DOD appropriations. On May 30, 2008, Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S. officials, including expansion of roads and education and health facilities constructed. USAID spending to promote economic growth is shown in Table 14, and U.S. and international assistance to Afghanistan are discussed in the last sections of this chapter. Some international investors areimplementingprojects, and there is substantial new construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005 (long considered a priority Taliban target and was attacked by militants on January 14, 2008, killing six) and a $25 million new Coca Cola bottling factory that opened in Kabul on September 11, 2006. Several Afghan companies are growing as well, including Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell phone service), and Tolo Television. A Gold’s Gym has opened in Kabul as well. The 52year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption

90

Kenneth Katzman

that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load, but there are new privately run airlines, such as Pamir Air, Safi Air, and Kam Air. Some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). However, in November 2007, the Afghan government signed a deal with China Metallurgical Group for the company to invest $2.8 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar Province; the agreement will include construction of a coal-fired electric power plant and a freight railway. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not begun to date. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan. Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ’s) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment for import into the United States. For FY2008, $5 million in supplemental funding is requested to support the zones. A Senate bill, S. 2776, would authorize the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZ’s to be designated by the President. Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its neighbors. Afghan officials are said to be optimistic for increased trade with Central Asia now that a new bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The bridge was built with U.S. assistance. The bridge will further assist what press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance. Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.[38] The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. Turkmenistan’s new leadership (President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, succeeding the late Saparmurad Niyazov) favors the project as well. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. Some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan, are complaining that international aid is flowing mostly to the restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

91

needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas. Later in this chapter are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, including some detail on funds earmarked for categories of civilian reconstruction, and Table 14 lists USAID spending on all of these sectors for FY2002-FY2007. •

•

•

•

•

Roads. Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest project category there, taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. An FY2008 supplemental funding requests asks for $50 million more for roads, particularly to rehabilitate a road that would connect northern Afghanistan with Kabul, running through Bamiyan Province. Roads are considered key to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion and former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. Eikenberry said “where the roads end, the Taliban begin.” Among major projects completed: the KabulQandahar roadway project; the Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, completed by 2006; a road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. U.S. funds are also building roads connecting remote areas to regional district centers in several provinces in the eastern sector. Education. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. Health. The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing infant mortality and improving Afghans’ access to health professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif. Agriculture. USAID has spent about 5% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture, and this has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past five years. Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation. (Another 10% of USAID funds is spent on “alternative livelihoods” to poppy growing, mostly in aid to farmers.) Electricity. About 10% of USAID spending in Afghanistan is on power projects. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010. There have been severe power shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to nearly 4 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, but power to the capital is more plentiful as of March 2008. An FY2008 supplemental request asks for $115 million more for this sector, particularly to ensure that a 100 Megawatt diesel generator becomes operational for Kabul. The Afghan government, with help from international donors, plans to import electricity from Central Asian and other neighbors beginning in 2009. Another major pending project is the Kajaki Dam, located in unstable Helmand Province. USAID has allocated about $500 million to refurbish the remaining two electricity-generating turbines (one is operating) of the dam (total project estimate, when completed) which, when functional, will provide electricity for 1.7 million Afghans and about 4,000 jobs in the reconstruction.

92

Kenneth Katzman However, progress depends on securing access to the dam; surrounding roads and areas are controlled by or accessible to Taliban insurgents.

National Solidarity Program The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to promote local decisionmaking on reconstruction. The “National Solidarity Program,” largely funded by U.S. and other international donors seeks to create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local reconstruction projects. The assistance, channeled through donors, provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to the councils to implement agreed projects, most of which are water projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been women.[39] The U.S. aid to the program is part of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account. (Of the supplemental FY2008 ESF funds requested, $40 million is to launch the next phase of the National Solidarity Program, and $25 million is for the budgetary support portion of the ARTF account.)

U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals Since FY2002 and including funds already appropriated for FY2008, the United States has provided over $23 billion in reconstruction assistance, including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP and counter-narcotics-related assistance. These amounts do not include costs for U.S. combat operations, which are discussed in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. The tables below depict the aid.[40] Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S. civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. For the most part, the humanitarian, counternarcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized bythe act were met or exceeded by appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion was funded by the contributing partner forces. The act authorized the following: •

$60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003FY2006);

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy • •

• • •

•

93

$30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005); $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan); $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003FY2006); $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place.

A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction, an amendment to the report required in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives.

Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would reauthorize AFSA through FY2010. Some observers say the Senate might take it up early in 2008. The following are the major provisions of the bill: • •

• •

A total of about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including draw-downs of equipment) per fiscal year would be authorized. a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation is authorized. Afghan officials support this provision as furthering their goal of combatting narcotics by promoting alternative livelihoods. enhanced anti-corruption and legal reform programs would be provided. a mandated cutoff of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking. This provision has drawn some criticism from observers who saythatthe most needy in Afghanistan might be deprived of aid based on allegations that are difficult to judge precisely.

94

Kenneth Katzman • • • • • • •

$45 million per year for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and programs for women and girls is authorized. $75 million per year is authorized specifically for enhanced power generation, a key need in Afghanistan. a coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is mandated. military drawdowns for the ANA and ANP valued at $300 million per year (unreimbursed) are authorized (versus the aggregate $550 million allowed currently). authorizes appointment of a special U.S. envoy to promote greater AfghanistanPakistan cooperation. reauthorizes “Radio Free Afghanistan.” establishes a U.S. policy to encourage Pakistan to permit shipments by India of equipment and material to Afghanistan.

FY2007 and FY2008 The tables below show funds appropriated thus far for FY2008, both regular and supplemental. When the supplemental request is factored in, the requests for both FY2007 and FY2008 appear to be somewhat higher than the amounts pledged in a December 2, 2005, U.S.-Afghan agreement under which the United States said it would provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in civilian economic aid over the next five years ($1.1 billion per year).[41] International Reconstruction Pledges/Aid/Lending Afghan leaders had said in 2002 that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. Including U.S. pledges, about $30 billion has been pledged at donors conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London conference (February 2006), and since then. Of that, about half are non-U.S. contributions. However, not all non-U.S. amounts pledged have been received, although implementation appears to have improved over the past few years (amounts received had been running below half of what was pledged). The Afghanistan Compact also leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor community. Only about $3.8 billion of funds disbursed have been channeled through the Afghan government, according to the Finance Minister in April 2007. The Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and effectively. Later in June 2008, when Afghanistan formally presents its Afghan National Development Strategy in Paris, it reportedly will ask for $50.1 billion during 2009-2014 from international donors. Of that, $14 billion will be requested to improve infrastructure, including airports and to construct a railway. Another $14 billion would be to build the ANSF, and about $4.5 billion would be for agriculture and rural development. Among multilateral lendinginstitutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role in Afghanistan, loaning (or granting) Afghanistan more than $450 million since December 2002. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

95

road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan.

RESIDUAL ISSUES FROM PAST CONFLICTS A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.

Stinger Retrieval Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.[42] The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.[43] In late January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.[44] In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.[45] It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.

96

Kenneth Katzman Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ($ in millions) Fiscal Year

Devel. Assist.

Econ. Supp. (ESF)

P.L. 480 (Title I and II)

Military

Other (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid)

Total

1978

4.989

—

5.742

0.269

0.789

11.789

1979

3.074

—

7.195

—

0.347

10.616

1980

—

(Soviet invasion - December 1979)

—

—

1981

—

—

—

—

—

—

1982

—

—

—

—

—

—

1983

—

—

—

—

—

—

1984

—

—

—

—

—

—

1985

3.369

—

—

—

—

3.369

1986

—

—

8.9

—

—

8.9

1987

17.8

12.1

2.6

—

—

32.5

1988

22.5

22.5

29.9

—

—

74.9

1989

22.5

22.5

32.6

—

—

77.6

1990

35.0

35.0

18.1

—

—

88.1

1991

30.0

30.0

20.1

—

—

80.1

1992

25.0

25.0

31.4

—

—

81.4

1993

10.0

10.0

18.0

—

30.2

68.2

1994

3.4

2.0

9.0

—

27.9

42.3

1995

1.8

—

12.4

—

31.6

45.8

1996

—

—

16.1

—

26.4

42.5

1997

—

—

18.0

—

31.9a

49.9

—

3.6

—

49.14b

52.74

1998

—

Source: Department of State. a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics. b . Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416Bwheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics.

Mine Eradication Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 6), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

97

states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%. Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 ($ in millions)

U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP) State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC

State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program) Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs)

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001

42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program.) 16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation 7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan

68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief) 14.03 for the same purposes

131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b)) 22.03 for similar purposes

136.54 (to U.N. agencies)

6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs 3.0

18.934 for similar programs

113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs)

2.8

7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining

6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes

5.31 for similar purposes

2.615

5.44 (2.789 for health, training -Afghan females in Pakistan)

FY2002 (Final) 198.12 (for food commodities)

Counter-Narcotics

1.50

63.0

USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives

0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan)

24.35 for broadcasting/ media 50.9 ( 2.4 million rations) 57.0 (for Afghan national army) 36.4

Dept. of Defense

Foreign Military Financing Anti-Terrorism Economic Support Funds (E.S.F) Peacekeeping Totals

105.2 24.0 76.6

113.2

182.6

815.9

98

Kenneth Katzman Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 ($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 6) FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) Development/Health P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid) Peacekeeping Disaster Relief ESF Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR) Refugee Relief Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF) Total from this law: FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF) Afghan government support (ESF) ANA train and equip (FMF) Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR, some for Karzai protection) Total from this law: Total for FY2003

90 47 10 94 50 5 55 21 372 100 10 57 170 28 365 737

Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 ($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables) FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF) Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection Elections/democracy and governance (ESF) Roads (ESF) Schools/Education (ESF) Health Services/Clinics (ESF) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation Water Projects Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE) Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations Afghan National Army (FMF) Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR) U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations Total from this law: (of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls) FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199) Development/Health Disaster Relief FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Refugee Relief Afghan women (ESF) Judicial reform commission (ESF) Reforestation (ESF) Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF) Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by USAID for PRTrelated reconstruction = $56.4 million) ANA train and equip (FMF) Total from this law: Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid Total for FY2004

30 70 69 181 95 49 58 95 23 170 73 287 35 92 1,327 171 35 72 5 2 2 2 64 50 403 .085 1,727

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

99

Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 ($ millions) FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447) Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF) Train and Equip ANA (FMF) Assistance to benefit women and girls Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-building Reforestation Child and maternal health Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Total from this law Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13) Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture, alternative livelihoods, government capacity building, training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs (ESF). (Total FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-led reconstruction = $87.89 million.) Aid to displaced persons (ESF) Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF) Women-led NGOs (ESF) DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces. Of the funds, $34 million may go to Afghan security elements for that purpose. Also, $290 million of the funds is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated for this purpose. DOD counter-narcotics support operations Counter-narcotics (INCLE) Training of Afghan police (INCLE) Karzi protection (NADR funds) DEA operations in Afghanistan Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul Total from this law Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid Total

225 400 50 300 2 6 2 985

1,073.5 5 2.5 5 1,285 242 220 400 17.1 7.7 60 3,317 56.95 4,359

Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102) ESF (ESF over $225 million subject to certification 430 (Mostly for reconstruction, governance, and that Afghanistan is cooperating with U.S. counterdemocracy-building; Includes $20 million for PRTs) narcotics) Peacekeeping (ANA salaries) 18 Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 235 (Includes $60 million to train ANP) Karzai protection (NADR funds)

18

Child Survival and Health (CSH) Reforestation Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations

43 3 2 2

Programs to benefit women and girls

50

Development Assistance

130.4

Total from this law:

931.4

FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.

L. 109-234)

Security Forces Fund

1,908

100

Kenneth Katzman Table 10. (Continued).

FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102) ESF 43 (Includes $11 million for debt relief costs, $5 million for agriculture development, and $27 million for Northeast Transmission electricity project) Embassy operations 50.1 DOD Counter-narcotics operations 103 Migration and Refugee aid 3.4 DEA counter-narcotics operations 9.2 Total from this law 2,116.7 Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid 60 Total for FY2006 3,108.1

Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 Regular Appropriation (In accordance with Continuing Appropriation P.L. 110-5) ESF 479 (USAID plans $42 million for PRTs) Counter-narc (INCLE) 209.7 Child Survival and Health (CSH) 100.77 Development Assistance (DA) 166.8 IMET 1.138 NADR 21.65 Total This Law 979 DOD Appropriati on (P.L. 109-289) Security Forces train and equip 1,500 DOD Counter-narcotics support 100 Total Appropriated for FY2007 to 2,539.77 date FY2007 Suppleme ntal (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28) $653 million request/$737 in final law (of which in law: 174 for PRTs; 314 for roads; 40 for power; 155 for rural ESF development; 19 for agriculture (latter two are alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation); 25 for governance; and 10 for the “civilian assistance program” 30 million also provides $16 million in Migration and Refugee P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid aid for displaced persons near Kabul, and $16 million International Disaster and Famine Assistance U.S. Embassy security 47.2 million requested/79 in final version 5.900 billion requested/5.9064 in final version (includes 3.2 billion for equipment and transportation; 624 million for ANP Security Forces train and equip training; 415 for ANA training; 106 for commanders emergency response, CERP; plus other funds ) no request/47 million in agreement; plus 60 million in DOD INCLE aid to counter-narcotics forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, plus 12 million DEA FY2007 supp. 6.870 billion in final version FY2007 Total 10.388 billion (all programs)

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

101

Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request/Action Regular FY2008 Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161) ESF $543 million total. Of this: $126 million for emergency request (see below); $75 million to benefit women and girls; $20 million for agriculture. $300 million limit subject to counternarcotics cooperation certification. Regular ESF request was for $693 million INCLE 274.8 m., forbids use for aerial spraying IMET 1.7 m. Child Survival and Health (CSH) $65.9 m. (incl. $5.9 million for child and maternal clinics) NADR (Karzai protection) 21.65 Radio Free Afghanistan 3.98 Afghan Security Forces Funding 1,350 (For emergency request below) Total appropriated in P.L. 110161 2,261 Revised FY2008 Supplemental R equest (Global War on Terrorism) ESF 834 m. request (additional 495 beyond 339 original supplemental request) (Of the additional $495, $325 is for provincial governance, National Solidarity program, election support; $170 is for economic growth, including $115 for power. Another $50 for roads, and another $5 is for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones) USAID operations 16 Security Forces equip and train 2,700 ($1.71 billion for ANA/$980 million for ANP) U.S. Embassy security 162.4 U.S. Embassy construction, maintenance 160 NADR 5 Total FY2008 appropriated to date 2.26 b. (Of which $126 million in ESF and $1.35 billion in Security Forces appropriated above) Total FY2008 (if remaining requested 4.323 b. FY2008 supp. funds are appropriated)

Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009 Regular Request ESF Child Survival and Health International Counter-Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) International Military Education and Training (IMET) Other non-military accounts Afghan National Security Forces Funding (DOD funds) Total Regular Request Supplemental Request ESF INCLE Total Supplemental Request

707 (includes 120 for alternative livelihoods, 248 for democracy and governance, 226 for econ. growth, 74 for PRT programs) 52 (Plus 57 more of ESF for health and education) 250 1.4 44 (incl. 12 m. in non-emergency food aid) 2,000 $3.054 billion 749.9 175 924.9

102

Kenneth Katzman Table 14. USAID Obligations FY2002-FY2007

Sector

FY 2002

FY 2003

FY 2004

FY 2005

FY 2006

Agriculture Alternative Livelihoods Roads Power Water Econ. Growth Education Health Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund Support to Afghan Gov’t Democracy Rule of Law PRT Programs Program Suppt Internally Displaced Persons Food Aid Civilian Assistance Totals

27 3

56 1

50 5

77 185

51 3 2 21 19 8 38

142

354 77 27 84 104 83 67

1 12 21 56 40

3 22 4 5 108

34 8 11 6 23

FY2002FY2007

27 121

FY2 007 (reg. + supp) 61 246

276 286 21 91 86 111 87

250 66 1 46 51 52 45

418 136 1 68 62 72 41

1491 568 52 321 343 381 317

36

31

15

5

90

132 21 56 17 10

88 15 85 16

17 6 20 4

81 13 210 14

374 67 382 63 141

298 561

159

471

51

462

49

1171

57

1510

60

779

-

376

10

10

1436

5830

(As of June 3, 2008, press reports [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf _placemat.pdf]) (RC=Regional Command).

Table 15. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations NATO Countries Belgium Bulgaria Canada Czech Republic Denmark Estonia France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxemburg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia

375 420 2500 370 690 120 1670 3370 150 205 10 2350 75 200 9 1770 580 1140 165 570 70

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy NATO Countries Slovenia Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States Non-NATO Partner Nations Albania Austria Australia Azerbaijan Croatia Finland Ireland Jordan Macedonia New Zealand Singapore Sweden Ukraine Total ISAF force (approx.) 53,000

70 800 760 8530 23250 140 2 1100 45 210 65 7 265 140 160 2 250 3

Table 16. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Location (City) Gardez Ghazni Bagram A.B. Jalalabad Khost Qalat Asadabad Sharana Mehtarlam Jabal o-Saraj Qala Gush Farah PRT Location Qandahar Lashkar Gah Tarin Kowt Herat Qalah-ye Now Mazar-e-Sharif Konduz Faizabad Meymaneh Chaghcharan Pol-e-Khomri Bamiyan Maidan Shahr Pul-i-Alam

Province/Command U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner) Paktia Province (RC-East, E) Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland. Parwan (RC-C, Central) Nangarhar (RC-E) Khost (RC-E) Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania. Kunar (RC-E) Paktika (RC-E). with Poland. Laghman (RC-E) Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead Nuristan (RC-E) Farah (RC-W) Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner) Province Lead Force/Other forces Qandahar (RC-S) Canada Helmand (RC-S) Britain. with Denmark and Estonia Netherlands. with Australia and 40 Singaporean Uruzgan (RC-S) military medics and others Herat (RC-W) Italy Badghis (RC-W) Spain Balkh (RC-N) Sweden Konduz (RC-N) Germany Badakhshan (RC-N) Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep. Faryab (RC-N) Norway. with Sweden. Ghowr (RC-W) Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland Baghlan (RC-N) Hungary Bamiyan (RC-E) New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). 10 Singaporean engineers Wardak (RC-C) Turkey Lowgar (RC-E) Czech Republic

103

104

Kenneth Katzman Table 17. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan

Party/ Leader Taliban

Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”)

National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Hizb-eWahdat

Pashtun Leaders

Leader Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan)/Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani. Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a socalled “warlord,” heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March 2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated his overthrow. Subsequently fought Rabbani government (1992-1995), but later joined Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces that captured his region by August 1998. During OEF, impressed U.S. commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, now his top “security adviser.” Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city. Various regional governors; central government led by Hamid Karzai.

Hizb-eIslam Gulbuddin (HIG)

Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul, but may be open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.

Islamic Union

Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During antiSoviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Ideology/ Ethnicity ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik

Regional Base Insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east, and in Pakistan Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul

secular, Uzbek

Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan, and environs

Shiite, Hazara tribes

Bamiyan province

Moderate Islamic, Pashtun orthodox Islamic, Pashtun

Dominant in southern, eastern Afghanistan

orthodox Islamic, Pashtun

Paghman (west of Kabul)

Small groups around Jalalabad, Nuristan and in southeast

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

105

APPENDIX A. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS LIFTED Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted. •

•

•

•

•

•

•

On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464]. On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 9672; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan. On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a nonallocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush. On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with

106

Kenneth Katzman

•

•

Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to ArianaAfghanAirlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.) U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representationabroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban. P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a preTaliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S.assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 11/22/05). Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

107

REFERENCES [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6] [7]

[8] [9]

[10]

[11] [12]

[13] [14] [15] [16]

[17] [18]

For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377. After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them. Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002. More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Some of the information in this section is derived from author participation on a congressional delegation to Afghanistan in March 2008. Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm]. The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate. Text of constitution: [http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf]. For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org /~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf]. Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide. For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm]. For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Text of the strategy, see [http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/90561.htm#section1] Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004. Risen, James. “Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War.” New York Times, May 16, 2007. This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking. Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7, 2001. Mansoor Dadullah was one of five Taliban leaders released in March 2007 in exchange for the freedom of kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, but there were reports in January 2008 that Mullah Umar Mullah Umar had dismissed Mansoor because of reported talks with British military officers about his possible defection.

108

Kenneth Katzman

[19] Text of the report is at [http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/ publications/ Afghanistan_ on_the_brink/documents/Afghanistan_on_the_brink] [20] For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman. [21] Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. New York Times, November 10, 2006. [22] Shanker, Thom. “U.S. Senses a Rise in Activity By Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.” New York Times, December 4, 2007. [23] See [http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/ImportantDoc/US-Afghanistan%20 Strategic% 20 Partnership%20Declaration.pdf]. [24] As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF. [25] Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, byResolution 1707 (September 12, 2006). [26] Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19, 2006. [27] Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003. [28] Indian television news channel NDTV. April 24, 2007. [29] Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and of Defense. Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. November 2006. Department of State report No. ISP-IQ0-07-07. [30] For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. [31] Straziuso, Jason. Musharraf Pulls Out of Peace Council. Associated Press, August 8, 2007. [32] Tyson, Ann Scott. “Pakistan Strife Threatens Anti-Insurgent Plan.” Washington Post, November 9, 2007. [33] Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2004. [34] Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15, 1997. [35] Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998. [36] The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000. [37] CRS Conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007. [38] Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3. [39] Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

109

[40] In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11related Emergency Response Fund. [41] Among other forms of post-Taliban assistance, over $350 million in U.S. and allied frozen funds were released to the Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban. The U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities frozen under 1999 U.S. Taliban-related sanctions, and another $17 million in privately owned Afghan assets. The funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold, held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States, that backs up Afghanistan’s currency. Another $20 million in overflight fees)withheld by U.N. Taliban-related sanctions were provided in 2003. The Overseas PrivateInvestment Corporation (OPIC) has made available investment credits as well. [42] Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001. [43] Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002. [44] “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005. [45] “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

In: Afghanistan Security Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 115-182

ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)

ABSTRACT This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of April 10, 2008.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and our international partners toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, ending years of brutal misrule and denying al Qaeda a safe haven from which to launch its attacks. The United States is committed to helping Afghanistan recover from decades of strife, and preventing it from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Our strategic goals remain that Afghanistan is: 1) a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens. Achieving these goals requires the application of a whole-of-

112

Report to Congress

government approach, along multiple lines of operation, including security, governance, and development. This report describes both the progress we are making in achieving our national objectives, and the challenges we continue to face.

Security Although security remains fragile in many parts of Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency approach demonstrates how a combination of military and non-military resources can be integrated to create a stable and secure environment, and to connect the Afghan people with their government. Khowst Province is an example. Khowst was once considered ungovernable and one of the most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan. Today, tangible improvements in security, governance, reconstruction, and development are being made. These improvements are achieved through the closely coordinated efforts of the local government, the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), international organizations, as well as U.S. military, diplomatic, and development experts. Importantly, lessons learned from the successes in Khowst are being shared with our partners and applied elsewhere in the country. The increase in U.S. forces in the spring of 2008 reinforced Afghan and international forces’ momentum and is enabling accelerated growth of the ANSF. On February 5, 2008 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 70,000 to 80,000 personnel. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is scheduled to complete the fielding of 80,000 ANA personnel by the end of 2010. Meanwhile, a U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force is deploying to bolster NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) maneuver forces in Regional Command– South. The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations to date and has demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and professionalism. Operation MAIWAND, executed in the summer of 2007 in the Andar District of Ghazni Province, is just one example of the ANA’s progress. Planned, rehearsed, and executed under the direction of the Afghan 203rd Corps Commander, a combined ANA and ISAF task force cleared the entire district and removed a Taliban shadow governor. This well-integrated security operation was quickly exploited with the synchronized application of governance and development efforts consisting of medical treatment for 2,300 citizens, 10 new schools, the delivery of 260 tons of humanitarian aid, and one million dollars committed toward additional development. This operation resulted in the significant disruption to enemy forces in Ghazni Province and is a manifestation of the growth and maturation of ANSF as well as the spread of governance and development. The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) are improving, although at a slower pace than the ANA. Generally, police development has been hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community. A new CSTC-A-led Focused District Development (FDD) plan, implemented in late 2007, shows promise. This initiative withdraws the locally-based Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

113

months of immersion training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction by carefully selected civilian police mentors, with the goal of increasing their professional capability and their confidence to conduct law enforcement activities. Following their collective training, the AUP return to their districts with enhanced capabilities and better able to serve their communities. Despite many positive developments, Afghanistan continues to face challenges. The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and have coalesced into a resilient insurgency. It now poses a challenge to the Afghan Government’s authority in some rural areas. Insurgent violence increased in 2007, most visibly in the form of asymmetric attacks as Afghan and international forces’ relentless pressure forced the insurgents to shift the majority of its effort to targeting police and civilians. More than 6,500 people died as a result of suicide attacks, roadside bombs, and combat-related violence. The 2007 ISAF and ANSF military campaign caused setbacks to the Afghan insurgency, including leadership losses and the loss of some key safe-havens in Afghanistan. Despite these setbacks, the Taliban is likely to maintain or even increase the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and bombings in 2008. The Taliban will challenge the control of the Afghan government in rural areas, especially in the south and east. The Taliban will also probably attempt to increase its presence in the west and north. Up to the first quarter of 2008, the most significant threat to stability in the north and west of the country has come from warlords, criminals, and drug traffickers. The power of these entities is increasingly challenged by the growing competence of local and national government. Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the international community. While progress has been made in some areas, overall counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan have not been successful. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in his testimony to the House Armed Service Committee on December 11, 2007, “[T]he drug trade continues to threaten the foundations of Afghan society and [the] young government [of Afghanistan].” Opium production in Afghanistan increased substantially in 2007. The narcotics trade dissuades work and investment in legitimate activities, provides the insurgents with a lucrative source of funding, and contributes heavily to heroin addiction in Central Asia, Europe and increasingly East Africa. Although counternarcotics (CN) efforts have resulted in gains over the past six years, the battle against drug traffickers is ongoing, and will be for some time. In conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), CSTC-A is assisting with the development and fielding of a new CN infantry kandak (battalion) for the purpose of providing force protection to poppy eradicators. This unit will shortly be put into action and will provide protection for eradication teams to complete their mandates.

Governance and Human Rights Afghanistan was the prime example of a failed state in 2001. Aside from the Taliban’s enforcement of its version of sharia law, most functions of government were non-existent. There were few social services and little investment in health, education, roads, power, or water. Afghans were denied participation in their government, enjoyed no civil or political liberties, and were afforded no avenue of dissent. Since 2001, Afghanistan has made significant progress rebuilding its national political institutions. Afghans wrote and passed a new Constitution in 2004; 8.1 million people voted in the nation’s first presidential election; and 6.4 million voters helped reestablish their

114

Report to Congress

National Assembly after 32 years without a legislature. Ministries are increasingly capable of executing their responsibilities, particularly the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. Since 2006, the Supreme Court has been headed by an internationally respected and highly capable jurist with a formal legal education. The international community continues to help develop Afghanistan’s justice sector and provincial governments. Progress is slow, in part because of Afghanistan’s human capital shortage. Only three in ten Afghans can read, leaving a very shallow pool of literate citizens to staff the courts, government offices, police, armed forces, or private enterprises. Despite important progress made since 2001, Afghanistan’s human rights record remains poor. Though most human rights violations are perpetrated by the Taliban-led insurgency, weak governmental and traditional institutions, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and the country’s two-and-a-half decades of violent conflict exacerbate the problem. Abuses by security forces continue. However, the government has worked to professionalize its army and police force. Increased oversight of police by internal and external monitors has helped to prevent some abuses, and human rights training has become a regular element for police and army personnel.

Reconstruction and Development Setting the conditions necessary for economic growth is essential to long-term security and stability. Afghanistan has come a long way in seven years. Since 2001, Gross Domestic Product, per capita income, and Foreign Direct Investment are all up. There has been considerable growth in Afghanistan’s domestic revenues as well as international reserves, which have nearly doubled since 2004. However, Afghanistan still faces formidable economic challenges. The Afghan government remains overly dependent on foreign aid, with official revenues covering only 20 percent of recurrent costs. Costs, particularly for food and fuel, are rising, as is inflation. Access to credit is limited, and few Afghans are able to borrow. Four strategic economic priorities support the counterinsurgency effort. These include: 1) embracing free market economic policy at senior levels of government, 2) enhancing government resources, 3) addressing inflation and 4) implementing structural reforms. Commitment to free markets means resisting costly subsidies and price controls that serve to reduce resources for other more constructive expenditures in areas like infrastructure, education, and healthcare. U.S. and international community efforts are assisting the Afghan government in moving towards a sustainable fiscal policy capable of generating revenue, managing resources, and operating without foreign financial support. The international community is also trying to boost economic growth by modernizing the country’s infrastructure, particularly in the areas of electrical power, road construction, water management and agricultural development. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are key elements in these endeavors, ensuring that reconstruction and development efforts are coordinated at all levels and responsive to local needs. Finally, trade is benefiting, albeit slowly, from growing regional integration. Afghanistan is scheduled to join the South Asian Free Trade Area, bringing greater access to and integration with six other countries in the region including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

115

LOOKING AHEAD The U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is unwavering. Success in Afghanistan is both crucial to global security and is a moral responsibility. Achieving that success will take time, effort, resources, and the sustained interest and commitment of the international community. Moreover, success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves. Where we have begun to apply such an approach, real progress is being made. It is critical that we continue to build on the momentum that has been achieved.

SECTION 1: SECURITY 1.1. Counterinsurgency Strategy The U.S. operational approach to the security component of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is to build Afghan security capacity while degrading the capacity of the Taliban. U.S. forces work to root out insurgents while increasing the ability of the Afghans to do so on their own. Throughout Afghanistan, this is achieved through kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to separate the enemy from the local population by partnering with the ANSF and engaging Afghan leaders. Shuras, key leader engagements, medical engagements, humanitarian aid missions, and combined presence patrols provide a venue for ANSF forces to interact with the general population and discuss needs for local improvements. These missions work to create trust between the local populace, Afghan leadership, ANSF, and ISAF forces. As trust increases, support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (GIRoA), the ANP, and the ANA evolves proportionately. Afghan civilians are beginning to report enemy activity including improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements, suspicious activity, and potential future attacks. In an effort to gain the support of the populace and demonstrate the superior governance capabilities of the GIRoA as opposed to the Taliban, ANSF and international forces have increased governance outreach and development activities.

1.2. Nature of the Threat In 2008, there is the potential for two distinct insurgencies in Afghanistan; a Kandaharibased insurgency dominated by the Taliban in the south and a more complex, adaptive insurgency in the east. The eastern insurgency is a loose confederation of affiliates such as the Haqqani Network and like-minded groups that are prepared to cooperate with the Taliban’s Kandahari-based insurgency. These groups include al-Qaeda, Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Pakistani militant groups Jaish-e Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik Nefaz-i-Shariat Muhammad. Their shared goals include the expulsion of all foreign military forces from Afghanistan, the elimination of external government influence in their respective areas, and the imposition of a religiously conservative, Pashtun-led government.

116

Report to Congress

A principal strength of the Taliban-led Kandahari insurgency is its ability to regenerate combat power by leveraging tribal networks, exploiting lack of governance and the Afghan peoples’ inherent resistance to change and outside influence. The Taliban’s strategy hinges on their ability to prevent the Afghan government and ISAF from achieving victory, and the international community eventually losing the will to tactically intervene in the counterinsurgency effort. The insurgency’s critical capabilities are its ability to project strength and a mystique of the inevitability of Taliban rule that is constantly sustained through a focused information effort; in other words, not losing is winning. A principal vulnerability of both the Taliban-led Kandarhari and Eastern Insurgencies is that, beyond forcibly imposing Sharia-modeled law and order, they are unable to deliver to the Afghan people sustainable governance or development of commercial infrastructure. Both insurgencies are anticipatory in nature and maximize every opportunity to separate the Afghan population from the GIRoA. The insurgencies are powerless to provide development and they lack the capacity to meet the basic needs of the citizens of Afghanistan; however, it is worth noting that this limitation did not prevent the original Taliban from controlling, through force of arms, the majority of the country in the late 1990s. The preponderance of both insurgencies’ influence stems from the use of fear and intimidation tactics. As a result of these efforts, in the minds of the Afghan people, insurgent forces are cognitively becoming separated from the respected mujahidin fighters that defeated the Soviets and sustained Afghans for decades.

Figure 1. Distribution of Attacks in Afghanistan by Province.

Violence increased in Afghanistan in 2007. A significant factor in the increase in violence was aggressive Afghan and international force tactics combined with insurgent recognition that, while they cannot defeat Afghan and international forces on the battlefield, they can harm political will by increasing casualties. Violence may also have increased because Afghan and international forces are asserting control over a greater area in increased numbers, thus increasing their exposure to insurgent attacks.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

117

Attack levels alone are not always a good indicator of the security situation. Even in areas where insurgent activity is high, Afghan and international forces often have the full support of the local population. Khowst Province again provides a success story. In this eastern province the level enemy activity and attacks remains relatively high, but most of the population lives without fear, trusting the government to keep them safe. The success of Afghan and international forces in military engagements has led insurgents to increase asymmetric attacks. As such, IED attacks are on the rise. IED incidents reached a high of 2,615 incidents in 2007, up from 1,931 in 2006. Counter-IED training is an important part of U.S. and ISAF efforts to improve security in the country. It includes curriculum that the NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) deliver when training members of the ANA. Although the number of IED attacks increased in 2007 over 2006, so did the number of IEDs that were discovered and pre-detonated, as well as those that were reported by local citizens. The success of the GIRoA in meeting the needs of the population and winning their allegiance has been uneven and sometimes temporary. In many provinces and districts, the government’s failure to connect effectively with the people of the country and provide security and prosperity has provided an opening for the Taliban to successfully install shadow governments that provide basic security against lawlessness. The Taliban is likely to continue efforts to emplace shadow governments in order to enhance local control by insurgent forces, undermine the authority of district and provincial level officials appointed by Kabul, and present a locally acceptable alternative to the Karzai government. Due to the nature of insurgencies, estimates of their numbers are inherently unreliable and there is no agreed-upon figure from the Intelligence Community. Therefore, no estimate is included in this report.1

1.3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has overall command of the battlespace in Afghanistan. Commanded by a 4-star U.S. Army officer, all military guidance for ISAF forces is communicated from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum. The international strategic direction has been approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). U.S. forces assigned to ISAF operate in support of ISAF plans and operations, and are under the operational control of Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF). The bulk of U.S. forces assigned to ISAF operate in Regional Command (RC) East. The United States contributes approximately 19,000 of the 47,000 personnel in ISAF. An assessment of United States Military requirements, including planned force rotation for the three-month period following the date of the report can be found in the monthly “Boots-on-the-Ground” Reports submitted to Congress in accordance with Public Law 110-116. Force rotations beyond the three-month period following April 2008 will be conditions-based and hence cannot be provided with reasonable accuracy.

1

An assessment of the elements of the insurgency are available in a classified format (see National Intelligence Council report #ICB 2008 19).

118

Report to Congress

1.3.1. Efforts to Encourage NATO ISAF Countries to Fulfill Commitments A top U.S. government priority is to ensure that ISAF countries provide all required forces as determined by NATO military authorities in the agreed Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). The ISAF commander must have the forces and flexibility necessary to accomplish the mission of assisting the GIRoA in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment and the extension of its authority in order to facilitate reconstruction and development. Although CJSOR shortfalls remain, especially for maneuver battalions, helicopters, and OMLTs, all 26 Allies and 14 non-NATO partners are contributing in important ways to the ISAF mission. ISAF has increased from approximately 31,000 personnel in November 2006, to approximately 47,000 personnel today. This number is expected to increase in 2008. In order to help Allies shore up domestic political support for increased resources in Afghanistan, the U.S. focused efforts on the development of a Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan for ISAF to explain how Allied security is directly linked to stability in Afghanistan and to lay out a vision to guide ISAF’s role in Afghanistan over the next five years. This Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan was agreed to by the Heads of State and Government from Allied and other troop-contributing nations at Bucharest in March 2008. In the Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan, Allies agreed that Afghanistan is the Alliance’s key priority. The Comprehensive Political Military Strategic Plan incorporates four guiding principles: • • • •

a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan.

Among the pledges of support at the Bucharest Summit, France announced that it will send approximately 700 additional troops to eastern Afghanistan. This will permit the U.S. to assign more troops to the south where Canadian forces have been engaged in combat operations against Taliban forces. Also at Bucharest, Russia agreed to permit ISAF nations to transit through Russia to resupply ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Since the Bucharest Summit, a number of other countries have pledged additional resources to ISAF. For example, Poland has agreed to send 400 additional troops and eight helicopters. Several nations, such as Romania, Italy, and Greece, have agreed to provide additional OMLTs. A key component of ISAF operations is assisting in the training and equipping the ANA. The ANA has approximately 52,000 troops engaged in or leading major operations alongside ISAF forces. ISAF partners have fielded or pledged 36 OMLTs to help build a more effective ANA. However, this still falls short of the total OMLTs required. Thirteen ISAF nations have donated equipment to the ANA through NATO, and a trust fund has been established to cover transportation and installation costs for the donated equipment. An indication of the increasing professionalism and capabilities of the ANA, President Karzai announced at Bucharest that the ANA plans to assume security responsibility for Kabul in August 2008.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

119

1.3.2. National Caveats on NATO/ISAF Forces The U.S. government has consistently emphasized the importance of giving commanders in the field the maximum possible flexibility to ensure that they can accomplish their mission in the fastest possible timeframe, while minimizing risk and loss of life. Just over half of the Allies in ISAF have some form of caveats on the geographical and/or functional deployment of their forces. Some Allies have no written caveats on their forces, but operate with de facto restrictions that can be even more severe than caveats. Therefore, rather than focus exclusively on caveats, the U.S. has pressed all Allies and partners to provide commanders on the ground with the maximum possible flexibility in terms of when, where, and how they utilize forces under their command. The most significant and commonly cited caveats are restrictions that keep some troops currently in the north, west, and in Kabul from moving to Regional Command-South without prior approval from their respective nations’ capitals. The United States takes advantage of every opportunity to urge Allies to lift these restrictions.

1.4. Operations Within the primary operational area for U.S. forces – Regional Command East – operational tempo and the ability to extend the reach of ISAF forces increased two-fold with the addition of a second Brigade Combat Team in early 2007. U.S. forces took part in fullspectrum operations, often with ANSF in the lead. Keeping in line with the overall strategy of clear, hold, and build, the increased security paved the way for improved local government and economic growth. Additionally, CJTF-822 established Border Security Posts, Combat Out-Posts, and Forward Operating Bases along known insurgent routes and support areas. This expanded ISAF and ANSF presence probably contributed to the increase in enemy attacks from 2006 to 2007.

1.4.1. Civilian Casualties The increase in civilian casualties is largely due to a shift in insurgent focus to operations in populated areas, and the use of indiscriminant asymmetric attacks. A series of wellpublicized events during the spring and summer of 2007 highlighted the negative consequences of civilian casualties caused by combat operations in Afghanistan. The willingness of the Afghan populace to support international forces and the GIRoA is directly proportional to their trust and confidence in those forces. The support of the Afghan people is essential to the security, reconstruction, and governance of the country. In response to increasing civilian casualties in the country Admiral Fallon, former Commander of U.S. Central Command; General McNeill, COMISAF; and General Ramms (Commander, Joint Forces Command–Brunssum) published a series of complementary guidance outlining the problems, challenges, and unintended consequences of civilian casualties, and provided explicit direction to all commanders and the Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen under their command on how to limit those casualties. The published guidance directed that, while not limiting the right of self defense, responses to enemy actions

2

On April 10, 2008 the 101st Airborne Division assumed command of Regional Command East from the 82nd Airborne Division. CJTF-101 also serves as the U.S. national command element in Afghanistan.

120

Report to Congress

must clearly demonstrate proportionality, requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in the application of firepower.

1.5. Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) The long-term goal for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is to build and develop a force that is nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and funded from the GIRoA budget. Security is a fundamental prerequisite for achieving economic and social development in Afghanistan. The ANA and the ANP represent two critical elements for establishing that security. The mission of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is to plan, program and implement structural, organizational, institutional, and management reforms of the ANSF in order to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within its borders. CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget request delineates the program objectives aimed at enabling ANSF independent operations. These objectives include improved enablers, logistics operations, infrastructure, training, pay programs, medical facilities, and equipment. The FY 2008 ASFF request totaled $2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000-person 14 brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications, intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the ANSF.

1.5.1. ANSF Desired End-Strength Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain a major impediment to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements for the end-strength of the ANSF. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 70,000-person ANA and 62,000-person ANP. The Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 confirmed those target endstrengths. Security conditions necessitated a reexamination of ANSF end-strength. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

121

increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student account. We are currently examining whether this new end-state is adequate for Afghanistan’s needs. The long-term ANSF posture may also include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. However, additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the sustainability and available financial support for such efforts.

1.5.2. ANSF Recruiting and Retention Actions to improve ANSF’s national recruiting system and the Afghan vetting process continue. The current procedures for processing applications and conducting cursory background checks for the ANSF are explained for the ANA and ANP in their respective sections. However, additional measures and more sophisticated processes are currently being pursued. The ANSF is working to implement identification (ID) cards and biometrics. A national ID program will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion and tracking and accountability from accession to attrition using an accurate record management system for the ANP force structure. Current efforts include integration of the ID card’s barcode system into the pay system of the ANP. The ANA implemented an ID card system and an automated database in April 2006. Similarly, the ANSF are embarking on a long-term, state-of-the-art biometric collection and database program that will provide both the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) a capability to positively identify all Afghan soldiers and police. The integrated database of fingerprints, iris scan, and facial photos will be jointly maintained by ANA and ANP biometric analysts that are currently being identified and trained over the next three years. Another group of ANA and ANP officers are being trained as collectors who will be positioned at ANSF initial entry sites across Afghanistan. The biometric technology is scalable and will allow the GIRoA to expand the program to other segments of the government should Afghan leaders choose to do so. CSTC-A’s leadership is involved in efforts towards developing overall awareness of current retention rates and programs to offer re-contracting options. CSTC-A has enlisted the help of key MoI staff members to promote re-contracting of separating personnel. Measures taken with the MoD include staff assistance visits to the Corps and training by the MoD Recontracting Officer. In January 2008, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education revised the re-contracting regulation to require Company to Corps-level Commanders to project separation dates at least 12 months out and perform regular career counseling with all soldiers and NCOs. The ANSF has pursued monetary bonuses to incentivize enlistment and re-enlistment, specifically directed at the Commandos in the ANA and Afghan Border Police (ABP) in the ANP. Commandos currently receive an additional $30/month incentive pay. Additional proposed initiatives are under financial review for the ABP including a sign-on bonus, retention bonus, and hostile fire or imminent danger pay. More detailed efforts regarding recruiting and retention in the ANA and ANP are described in the relevant sections that follow.

122

Report to Congress

1.5.3. Afghan National Army (ANA) The ANA is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and is divided into five regional corps and an emerging air corps. The 201st Corps operates in RC Central. The 203rd Corps operates in RC-East. The 205th Corps operates in RC-South. The 207th Corps operates in RC-West. The 209th Corps operates in RC-North. Currently, the army serves as an infantry force operating alongside international forces under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, General Bismullah Khan. Each corps is divided into brigades comprising three infantry kandaks (battalions), one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. Additionally, commando kandaks are in the process of being formed. These elite units are currently attached to regional corps, pending establishment of a commando brigade headquarters.

Figure 2. Alignment of ANSF Regional Commands.

1.5.3.1. ANA Desired End-Strength By the end of 2008, the GIRoA plans to field a total of 70,000 ANA personnel. An additional 10,000 personnel are expected to be fielded by the end of 2009. Continued training, mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated above, the long-term ANA posture potentially may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a larger force; however, additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability, and available financial support. The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

123

1.5.3.2. ANA Training and Mentoring Efforts Training the ANA begins with individual training. The soldier training process begins with careful, needs-based recruiting followed by initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT), supervised by international trainers. ANA basics are taught to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the foundation, but the individual soldier’s capabilities are strengthened through branch-specific Advanced Combat Training. Although the priority of fielding a viable force has necessitated training initially focused on infantry and other combat-specific branches, training for support specialties has also developed. Immediately following a new unit’s fielding and arrival at its Corps and brigade area, it undergoes a 60-day period of individual and collective training before being put into the rotation for combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) or a NATO ISAF OMLT. These teams provide comprehensive mentoring across the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and ISAF resources and enablers to enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively and independently. They also serve as role models and key liaisons between ANA and international forces. The OMLTs and ETTs coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in the development of their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, planning, and employment in operations. ETTs and OMLTs also facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement. As of March 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,391 personnel; however, only 1,062 are currently assigned (44 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Full PMT manning requires 2,358 total military personnel. Currently, 921 personnel are assigned (39 percent fill). Sourcing solutions are being worked to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements. Afghanistan deployment requirements are being weighed against other global manning priorities. When additional forces become available to fill these critical personnel requirements, they will be resourced against the ETT/PMT requirements. For now, the Focused District Development (FDD) program, described below, aims to help mitigate the shortages of the mentors for the ANP. In addition, more than 3,400 Marines are deploying to Afghanistan. Of these, approximately 1,200 Marines will conduct ANP training missions in nine Afghanistan districts. These Marines are deploying as a temporary risk mitigation measure due to the global shortage of military trainers. Since the need for continued ANP mentorship in those districts will remain following the Marine redeployment in the fall, the enduring requirement for 1,400 additional ANP mentors remains. In addition to the ETTs and PMTs, NATO OMLTs are also providing critical guidance and mentorship to the ANA. As of March 2008, there are a total of 31 validated OMLTs out of a NATO commitment to provide 71. In many instances, ANA combat units are assigned an ISAF partner unit during combat operations. In general, those ANA units with international partner units have shown a marked increase in their capability to provide security in their areas. However, it should be noted that some Afghan commanders have shown great initiative and improvement without the benefit of an international partner.

124

Report to Congress

1.5.3.3 ANA Recruiting and Retention The ANA continues to make significant progress in recruiting and retention and all indicators point to decreasing rates of absence without leave (AWOL) and an increased ability to curb absenteeism. The past year has surpassed the previous four years in ANA recruitment. The ANA recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 2008. Annual recruitment numbers for the previous four years, beginning with the most recent, are: 21,287; 11,845; 15,790; and 9,671. The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and 56 percent for NCOs. Factors that challenge re-enlistment include the desire for larger salaries, better leadership, and to be stationed closer to family. In February 2008, the ANA had an 8.4 percent absentee rate. This is down from 12 percent at the height of summer. The three corps most consistently in contact with insurgents and anti-government elements had the highest AWOL rates, but on average they experienced less than 10 percent AWOL over the past year. This decrease in AWOL rates has contributed directly to an increase of 20,000 in ANA end-strength since January 2007. This increase in end strength coupled with a deliberate effort to staff combat units fully and overfill entrylevel soldier authorizations should further mitigate problems of absenteeism. During the past year, overall AWOL rates in ANA combat forces have decreased three percent as compared to the previous year. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better facilities and training, better leadership, and more robustly manned units, AWOL trends can be expected to continue to decrease in the coming year. The personnel accession and vetting process is the same for both ANA and ANP and follows the 3-step process described below. All vetting of candidates to serve in the ANSF meets the requirements of the law prohibiting military assistance to units or individuals known to have committed human rights abuses. The ANA commissar at the National Army Volunteer Center (NAVC) is the approval authority for both the ANA and ANP. Step 1: The applicant provides 12 passport photos and secures a national identification card from the district. This is verified by the Governor or another designated individual. Recruits must be between 18 and 35 years-old. Age waivers are considered based on the applicant’s qualification. Step 2: The applicant sees a recruiter at Provincial HQ and completes a contract. An escort guides them through the screening process which examines health and criminal records, as well as other relevant background information. The applicant must get two village elders to sign the form vouching for the recruit’s character. The form must also be signed by an official at the district center. All documents are then taken by the escort to the ANA Commissar HQ for verification and signature. Step 3: Medical screening is conducted at the commissar’s office. All documents go back to the sub-governor for signature. Ultimately, the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defense reviews all the documentation and then notifies the Provincial authorities of acceptance by issuing the directive to commence training.

The ANA has also implemented an additional level of review for potential ANA recruits. An Afghan who requests to join the Army is given a form to complete at the recruiting center. The recruit’s name is then added to a list that is circulated among various MoD offices, including the ANA General Staff G2, for a rudimentary background check.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

125

1.5.3.4. ANA Salary and Pay Recruiting and retention initiatives have been boosted by steps taken to standardize and institute a competitive pay scale. The following chart depicts the current monthly, 25-year base salary plan for members of the ANA. Table 1. 25-Year Base Pay Plan (ANA) RANK

GRADE

>3

>6

>9

>12

>15

>18

>21

>24

O-10

<1 to 3 $880

GEN

$925

$940

$955

$970

$985

$1,000

$1,015

$1,030

LTG

O-9

$780

$825

$840

$855

$870

$885

$900

$915

$930

MG

O-8

$680

$735

$750

$765

$780

$795

$810

$825

$840

BG

O-7

$580

$635

$650

$665

$680

$695

$710

$725

$740

COL

O-6

$430

$465

$480

$495

$510

$525

$540

$555

$570

LTC

O-5

$380

$415

$430

$445

$460

$475

$490

$505

$520

MAJ

O-4

$330

$365

$380

$395

$410

$425

$440

$455

$470

CPT

O-3

$250

$285

$300

$315

$330

$345

$360

1LT

O-2

$210

$245

$260

$275

$290

$305

2LT

O-1

$190

$225

$240

$255

$270

SGM

E-9

$210

$245

$260

$275

$290

$305

$320

$335

$350

MSG

E-8

$170

$205

$220

$235

$250

$265

$280

$295

$310

SFC

E-7

$145

$180

$195

$210

$225

$240

$255

$270

$285

SSG

E-6

$130

$165

$180

$195

$210

$225

$240

SGT

E-5

$115

$150

$165

$180

$195

$210

SDR

E-4

$100

$135

$150

$165

$180

1.5.3.5. ANA Equipment The three infantry companies in each kandak are equipped with former Warsaw Pact rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the Canadian version, the C7). Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars. Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30 howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 132 required are functional. CSTC-A has contracted to have the howitzers assessed for complete refurbishment and conversion to facilitate NATO standard interoperability. One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armor kandak. These units are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T62 main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are currently being studied to upgrade this capability.

126

Report to Congress

The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck. CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) to be fielded beginning this summer. These HMMWVs will displace many of the LTVs, particularly in the combat battalions, to provide a protected mobility capability. The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes (five AN-32s and two AN-26s) and thirteen helicopters (nine MI-17s and four MI-35s). The ANAAC will eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft. By December 2008, the inventory will include an additional fifteen MI-17s, six MI35s, and two AN-32s. Four out of a total of twenty C-27s are being procured for delivery.

1.5.3.6. ANA Assessment ANA unit readiness is gradually improving. The numbers and readiness status provided below are based on an 80,000 ANA structure comprised of 85 battalions/squadrons organized into 14 combat brigades, 5 Corps headquarters (HQ) and 1 Air Corp HQ. As of March 2008, the ANA reported one battalion and 1 Corps HQ as rated at Capability Milestone (CM) 1: capable of operating independently. Twenty-six battalions/squadrons, five brigade HQs, and two Corps HQs were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support. Twenty-six battalions/squadrons, five brigade HQs, two Corps HQs, and one Air Corps HQ were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces. Ten battalions/squadrons and one brigade HQ are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are twenty-two battalions/squadrons and three brigade HQ that are still not formed or reporting. An overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to Corpslevel is positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism. National illiteracy rates remain high, but the members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and writing abilities and plans are being made to improve the education level of the officer corps. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational and strategic concepts. The majority of the officers, and most importantly the very senior officers, believe in the concept of a national military. They are starting to use the military decision-making process and to provide information and decision briefs to their superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to direction from higher ranks. Although there is no credible reporting on estimated numbers or percentages of insurgents infiltrating the ANA, there are multiple reports of insurgent intent to do so, as well as occasional reports of ANA personnel collaborating with and/or assisting insurgents. These reports usually mention ANA personnel providing insurgents with information and supplies or collaborating with insurgent operations. However, we assess that these isolated reports of collaboration are often the result of insurgent threats and intimidation against ANA members in high-threat regions or criminal economic ventures on the part of ANA members as opposed to actual insurgent penetration of the organization. There have been two incidents of ANA soldiers shooting U.S. soldiers; both ANA soldiers involved in these incidents had reportedly been influenced by insurgents while home on leave, but we assess that these cases were probably more opportunistic in nature than contrived attempts at infiltration. We are also

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

127

aware of several ANA members who are reportedly under investigation by Afghan authorities for being hostile agents. However, we have no indications that these authorities have established proof of guilt. Although we are certain that there are cases of successful insurgent infiltration of ANA units, we assess that the current level of ANA infiltration is not operationally significant. The current assigned strength of the ANA as of February 2008 stood at just over 49,000 personnel across 63 kandaks and three commando kandaks, with a planned expansion of one kandak (roughly 600 personnel) every month. This population allows two of the five Corps to field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South. After gaining experience in partnered U.S. operations, the 201st and 203rd Corps have taken the lead and are now capable of independent operations at the company level. Fifty percent of the kandaks in these Corps maintain steady state operations independently and plan future operations. Last fall, the 203rd Corps staff increased capacity sufficiently to plan and execute a brigade level operation with U.S. and other international forces in a supporting role. The 201st and 203rd Corps engineers conducted bridging operations with international engineer units repairing and replacing bridges through the summer and fall allowing greater development in those areas. The ANA have started basic explosive ordnance disposal and counter IED training, expanding their capability to counteract one of the enemy’s most important weapons against the ANSF. The Afghanistan National Military Command Center is able to host weekly video teleconferences (VTCs) with its Corps across the country with newly installed communications equipment. This is improving national headquarters command and control and allowing for better adjacent unit coordination between the Corps. Additionally, both ANA Corps in RC East are leading their own Regional Security Committee Meetings— actively coordinating ANA, ANP and National Directorate for Security (NDS) operations with the international forces. These meetings allow for a common intelligence and operational picture among the ANP, ANA and NDS, which facilitates shared goals and objectives in developing a stable security environment. The 201st Corps Commander has effectively organized provincial governor meetings within his three brigade zones, complementing security efforts with local governance and development efforts. The ANA commando program continues to advance. The first kandaks demonstrate great resolve under fire, a capacity for tactical patience, and the capability for precision operations well above their conventional counterparts. The 201st Corps commando kandak continues to make progress toward autonomous company-level operations. They have conducted six different missions as part of larger ANA and ISAF operations, a no-notice operation with other U.S. and ISAF Special Forces, and an independent company level operation. The 203rd commando kandak conducted its first combat operation in December 2007. ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) capacity and capabilities also grew in 2007. They are now executing re-supply missions, troop movements and humanitarian assistance operations. The ANA Air Corps increased flight time from 100 hours per month to 140 hours per month; a 40 percent capacity increase. The Air Corps earned recognition and is credited with saving more than 1,200 lives by performing flood relief missions. The relief missions built the ANAAC’s confidence in its own abilities as well as the confidence of the populace in the Air Corps. In December 2007, the ANAAC flew missions for the first time as an integrated part of a CJTF-82 Aviation Task Force aerial formation. These missions were the result of a year-long mentorship between Task Force (TF) Pegasus and the ANAAC. In January 2008, the ANAAC conducted a

128

Report to Congress

medical evacuation test of concept that will further build capacity to conduct independent operations. This operation allowed the ANAAC to move patients from Craig Military Hospital at Bagram Airfield to the ANA National Military Hospital in Kabul and proved the ANAAC to be an independent and strong partner for international forces during medical evacuations.

1.5.4. Afghan National Police (ANP) ANP capabilities still lag behind those of the ANA. The current ANP force has not been sufficiently reformed or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security and policing mission. Generally, police development has been hindered by lack of institutional reform, corruption, insufficient trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community. Recently, CSTC-A, in coordination with the GIRoA, the Department of State, and other international partners, implemented the Focused District Development (FDD) initiative enabling a concentrated effort to reform the Afghan Uniform Police. Full implementation of the FDD program under the current force structure is expected to take several years. Section 1.5.4.3 of this report provides a more detailed description of the FDD program. 1.5.4.1. ANP Desired End State The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions: •

•

•

The AUP serve at the regional, provincial, and district levels. The AUP’s activities are focused on patrols, crime prevention, traffic, and general policing. They are intended to spread the rule of law throughout the country and provide a response capability for local security incidents. The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force. It is split into rural and urban units, and trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. ANCOP units provide law enforcement and civil control, conduct operations in areas where government control may be weak, and support counterinsurgency operations. Eight of the 19 ANCOP battalions are currently fielded and are performing exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP are formed as units, receive sixteen weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks of PMTsupervised collective training. All reports on this new national police force have indicated a solid performance in operations to dismantle illegal checkpoints, seize illegal weapons, and retake lost districts. In the locations where ANCOP has deployed, it has successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured the trust and confidence of the people. The ABP provides broad law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry points to deter the illegal entry of people and material as well as other criminal activity. The ABP has been challenged by the fact that they have received the least attention,

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

•

129

funding, and training. This has caused them to lag behind their AUP counterparts. They are currently manned at levels below 50 percent in many areas, are poorly equipped, and under-resourced. However, efforts to build the force and to fill available training slots during FDD will continue to build the ABP, albeit at a slower rate than the AUP. The majority of the ABP facilities along the border is run down and lacks basic necessities. As of December 2007, CSTC-A approved new company and kandak locations for the 2008-2009 build plan and will begin construction of these locations in the summer of 2008 with an expected completion date later in 2009. The CNPA is the lead agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) supplements the AUP at the district level. This bridging force receives two weeks of initial training and will attend follow-on three week sustainment training or may attend the same eight weeks of training that uniform police receive in their basic training. The ANAP will cease to exist by the end of 2008. Those members that have served for at least one year, have undergone five weeks of training, and have received a recommendation from their district chief will transition to the AUP. Once comprehensive assessments can be made on the effects of recently begun reform efforts, ANP strength will be reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required. Currently, a lack of trainers and mentors precludes the acceleration or expansion of reform and mentoring efforts. Through the FDD, current reform and mentoring efforts are principally focused on the AUP. The AUP are closest to the population and are therefore the most immediate face of the Afghan government.

1.5.4.2. ANP Training and Mentoring The AUP at the district level require significantly more coaching and mentoring than the ANA to ensure that all police units are operating according to national standards and procedures as established by the Ministry of the Interior. Unlike the ANA, police forces are not fielded as units. All policemen must be trained as individuals. The objective for ANP training is a minimum of initial entry training (IET) for all new recruits. When training capacity meets demand, it may be possible to tie police pay to training, thereby adding incentive for immediate training attendance. Current training capacity cannot meet demand and many untrained policemen remain in the force. Efforts to expand the training capacity to meet demand should make it feasible to require IET for all police recruits in approximately three years. Currently, individual training is conducted at seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs), a Central Training Center, and the Kabul Police Academy. The State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) uses a private contactor to provide civilian police training and program design at the training centers and to provide field-based mentors. Courses provided at the training centers include the basic 8-week course for all new and entry-level police; the intermediate-level 5-week Transition Integration Program; the 16-week ANCOP program (inclusive of basic and specialized training); and specialized courses in firearms, criminal investigative division, instructor development, field training, tactical training, medic training, and train-the-trainer instruction. From 2003 to 2008, more than 149,000 trainees have gone through basic, intermediate, advanced and specialized training at the training centers.

130

Report to Congress

Building Afghan police training capacity has been a priority. Civilian police mentors build train-the-trainer capacity for Afghan instructors, who in turn provide instruction to Afghan trainees. To further increase training capacity, CSTC-A and INL have established an ANCOP Training Center with a capacity of 800 students per class, and are also planning for a National Police Training Center, which is expected to achieve initial operating capability later in 2008. This center will have an eventual capacity of 2,000 policemen. When operational, the National Police Training Center will make it possible for all new police to attend IET prior to assumption of duties. The CSTC-A training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in “units,” as does the ANA, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. CSTC-A, in conjunction with TF Phoenix and the Department of State, mentors police at all levels, although the program does not currently reach all police locations. The objective is to provide a U.S. military Police Mentor Teams (PMTs) mentor team staffed with civilian police advisors to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. Each PMT is composed primarily of military members that provide training support, maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as liaisons with international forces as required. Each team includes two civilian police mentors. Mentor teams focus on a particular function and their efforts are tailored to develop skills, capacity and professionalism in these areas. The final element of every PMT is a security force. The majority of formal training should be provided under the guidance of qualified civilian police advisors at one of the eight training centers. However, due to the security situation, police training is most often provided by military personnel with civilian or military police experience. There is no area of Afghanistan that permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs. Mentoring of the ANP must occur locally in 364 districts spread throughout Afghanistan. The broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to adequately provide coaching, training and mentoring oversight. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 19 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. More than 500 civilian police trainers and mentors are deployed – in some cases with PMTs – to regional, provincial and district locations in nearly every province. Currently in RC East, a dedicated mentor team is located at every provincial headquarters and at select district level headquarters. Partnership for the police forces is facilitated through multiple avenues. For instance, in RC East, CSTC-A maintains the mentorship role and CJTF-82 conducts partnership activities with the ANP.

1.5.4.3. Focused District Development (FDD) Program The Focused District Development (FDD) program is a pilot initiative that addresses the critical development requirements of the ANP in each district, while also allowing for a strong reform program. The training and mentoring provided through FDD will build the AUP as a reformed service loyal to the Afghan people and Afghan national interests. As the primary government interface with the Afghan people, an effective AUP is critical to the

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

131

extension of the rule of law and to building trust in the institution of the police among the general populace. Accordingly, FDD concentrates resources on the district-level AUP. A reformed, more effective police force that can improve security in an area can facilitate the realization of other desired outcomes. The first part of the FDD process is an assessment of the district by a District Assessment and Reform Team, composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners (especially Canada and the United Kingdom). This assessment leads to selection and vetting of new leaders as required, recruiting to authorized levels, and building of equipment inventories, as well as assessments of facilities, status of the rule of law, the district police’s relationship with the local leaders, and overall professional effectiveness. Once the assessment is complete, an ANCOP unit is deployed to the district to relieve the local AUP forces. The AUP forces then report to the RTCs to begin eight weeks of reconstitution. This reconstitution period includes three different levels of training (i.e., new entrants, advanced, and officer leader and management training), biometric processing and identification card issue, pay records establishment, full equipping, leader reinforcement training, and continual ethics reinforcement. The AUP participating in the RTC training programs receive daily mentorship from PMTs. The PMT remains with the reformed police after the eight week reconstitution phase to continue collective training and mentoring in the district, ensuring the police put into practice the key individual and collective competencies as well as the ethical standards learned during training at the RTC. At the conclusion of this phase, which is proficiencydriven, rather than time-driven, the district is validated as a reformed police force, using the same objective assessment checklist that was used in the preliminary assessment phase. Six cycles of FDD are planned for completion in 2008. The first cycle, which began in seven districts in late 2007, is nearing completion with district ANP reinserted in their districts and undergoing intensive mentoring. The second cycle of FDD is mid-course in five districts, with district ANP undergoing reconstitution at the regional training centers. The third cycle, being implemented in nine districts, is in the initial assessment phase. Current challenges facing the FDD program are a shortage of PMTs, a shortage of trained ANCOP units (currently a growing program), limited capacity at the RTCs, in some cases a lack of provincial governor support (due to the perceived loss of power as the AUP become loyal to the nation and the potential loss of a source of revenue for the governor), and integration of other aspects of rule of law and governance reform. We anticipate that over the course of 2008, these challenges will lessen with the training of additional ANCOP units, the construction of the National Police Training Center, and the ability of FDD-reformed districts to strengthen ties with district governance and populations. The FDD initiative is linked and complementary to ongoing ISAF operations and will center on the Eastern and Southern regions that have experienced increased instability due to anti-government elements. It is aimed at focusing limited resources to maximize the overall development of the AUP, ultimately creating communities able to sustain stability in the long term. Popular perception of the FDD program – particularly in those districts where it is being implemented – is favorable, and the national government views the FDD initiative as a catalyst for similar programs which might benefit other governmental branches. CSTC-A, in conjunction with TF Phoenix, has placed increased emphasis on the training and mentoring of the ABP by increasing the number of U.S. ETTs within the unit organization. ETTs are currently in place from the ABP brigade HQ down to the company

132

Report to Congress

level. They are working to improve the standards of training in combat operations, communications and logistics. All training efforts for the Afghan Border Police will be coordinated with the Border Management Task Force, a group that provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues.

1.5.4.4. ANP Recruiting and Retention The accession process for the ANP mirrors the process described above in the ANA section minus the additional step of name circulation implemented by the ANA. ANP forces have been difficult to man and sustain. Currently, USG is examining options for pay incentives to boost ANP recruitment and retention. From March 24, 2007, through March 2, 2008, the nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs was 17,474 (4,795 ABP; 1,414 ANCOP; and 11,265 AUP and specialty police). Recruiting efforts are the critical lynchpin to the efforts to build and sustain a viable and resourced national police force. The Ministry of Interior has been generally successful in obtaining the required number of personnel to keep the growth in police on an upward trend. However, some critical actions must be taken to preserve the forces on hand and to prepare for replacing expected losses. The first area for improvement is recruiting staff within the MoI. The GIRoA should ensure that appropriate recruiting personnel are authorized and trained. Due to a shortage of recruiters, the efforts to recruit personnel to date have been successful, though not as expedient as desired. Additionally, dispersing recruiters to regional and provincial locations enables the police to fill upcoming losses quicker by reducing recruiter travel time and utilizing their familiarity with the area. Many international force commanders have requested recruiting officers at the provincial level who can travel with them to areas where the village elders have committed to provide men for the police forces. Due to the shortage of recruiters these offers usually go unmet by the MoI Recruiting Department because the vetting and recruiting team cannot focus on multiple areas simultaneously. One successful program utilized in the central zone has been the utilization of assigned police personnel officers at the unit level to assist in the recruitment process. These officers both know the area and the elders and village leaders who bring forward their best personnel to serve their country in the ANP. Similarly, the MoI must capitalize on the efforts that international forces have made towards building relationships with the local elders and tribal leaders. A successful recruiting effort in a nation led by patriarchs will work only if tribal leaders are included in the process. If these leaders submit their own candidates for the police forces they are staking their reputation alongside that of the future officer. In Afghanistan, tribal affiliations still play a more important role than loyalty to the nation. The tribal elder’s certification of a prospective police officer almost guarantees their viability as an asset. While recruiting the right personnel for the national police force is crucial to its success, retention is equally critical. One of the first steps towards retaining the police officers that have been recruited is completion of a functional personnel management system that can track personnel assignments and completion of service commitments. Additionally, police officers are given no incentives to stay on the force when their commitment is complete. Possible solutions could include re-enlistment bonuses and combat incentive pay for those serving in high threat areas. The Ministry of Defense has employed incentives for the ANA and has seen tremendous increases in the retention of their soldiers upon termination of enlistment contracts. Some of the incentives include relocation of family, increased salary, or

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

133

promotion and professional schooling. It is hoped that programs such as these, when implemented, will lead to an overall increase in the professionalism of those who serve in the police forces. Another issue that continues to plague the ANP and challenge recruiting and retention is pay corruption. Cash payment of salaries leaves ample opportunity for corruption. The implementation of Electronic Funds Transfer to the ANP will limit the amount of hand-tohand money transfers that must occur. In order to implement this program, some districts near major population centers are bringing in Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) that are linked into the Afghan Banking systems. Payment of salaries in full and on time significantly reduces pay corruption and improves the morale of ANP officers. As the spread of ATMs and banks continues across the country, the lack of adequate commercial or generator power maintenance will hinder continued progress (highlighting the critical need for additional police to prevent attacks on the power system). Recruiting for the ANCOP is done through institutional-level recruiting by the MOI. In the context of initial MoI reform, senior level MoI officials undergoing rank reform have been vetted by UNAMA and the State Department. The MoI’s recent success in recruiting and vetting well-qualified candidates for ANCOP presents a sound model for the recruitment and vetting of all ANP individuals. Vetting for regular ANP recruits is still done on an adhoc, group basis. In the case of ANCOP, recruits are solicited through self-initiative rather than local nomination en masse. As such, the individuals applying for ANCOP training classes are those with the personal drive and initiative to qualify for entry into the institution. ANCOP recruits are vetted individually through the National Directorate of Security and the MoI’s counter-terrorism division, and their citizenship and health records are verified. Finally, two local community representatives are required to attest to their suitability for the ANP. Several similar checks will be applied to AUP officers in districts undergoing the new FDD program, including candidate approval by a local elder, the district police chief, and a senior representative from the MOI. Upon arrival at an RTC for FDD training, all AUP officers are then vetted once again by a regional police recruiter. During the course of the eight-week FDD training, U.S. civilian police mentors monitor all trainees and identify those that need to be removed from the class. Police officers that fail to graduate from the FDD course are removed from the police force. Although vetting of officer-level recruits is systematic, vetting at the basic recruit level would benefit from a more thorough process. This deficiency is the result of a number of factors, including the need to recruit new trainees in a relatively short time-span. Because Afghanistan National Police officers can leave at any time, unlike their counterparts in the Afghan National Army, there are no numbers for absentee or AWOL rates for the ANP. Furthermore, the lack of PMTs in the field preclude effective monitoring of force levels in the field.

1.5.4.5. ANP Salary and Pay Implementing pay equity between the ANA and ANP will contribute to the growth of the latter organization. Before the pay equity initiative was approved in 2007, an individual in the army would receive a higher monthly base pay than an individual of equivalent rank in the police.

134

Report to Congress

The following table illustrates the reform process for ANP pay rates. The current monthly salaries for rank reformed personnel as of February 2008 can be found in the “Pay Reform” column. Rank Reform is continuing in the grades O-4 to O-6 and when complete in summer of 2008, all ranks will be paid the salaries indicated under the ANP/ANA Pay Parity column. These significant changes should yield additional improvements in recruiting and retention for the ANP. Table 2. ANP Pay Reform RANK LTG MG BG COL LTC MAJ CPT 1LT 2LT 1st SGT 2nd SGT 3rd SGT 1st PTRLMN 2nd PTRLMN

GRADE O-9 O-8 O-7 O-6 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-2 O-1

Pre-Pay Reform $107 $103 $95 $92 $88 $83 $78 $69 $66 $62 $62 $62 $70 $70

Pay Reform $750 $650 $550 $400 $350 $300 $250 $200 $180 $160 $140 $115 $80 $70

ANP/ANA Pay Parity $780 $680 $580 $430 $380 $330 $280 $230 $210 $190 $170 $145 $110 $100

1.5.4.6. ANP Equipment The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2008, in recognition of the higher level of operations they have on the borders. ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchases. Specialty organizations, such as CNPA and counter-terrorism police receive unique equipment consistent with their mission. The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as light tactical vehicles (LTVs) and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles or a similar vehicle in 2008. Police are equipped with a variety of communications equipment. Interoperability issues exist due to the wide variety of communications equipment provided by the previous lead nation for the ANP. The remedy the issue, the U.S. has procured a common set of NATO interoperable communication equipment to completely supply the entire ANP and will complete fielding in 2008. 1.5.4.7. ANP Assessment The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is being re-worked to produce timely and accurate readiness system reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive level brief. The revised RRS should enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness data that will recognize shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

135

actions. Without the full complement of PMTs, however, a comprehensive assessment of the ANP will not be possible.

SECTION 2: GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2.1. Governance Strategy The US seeks to build an Afghan Government that is stable, at peace, capable of governing its territory, democratic, and that protects human rights. The Afghans and the United States have committed to these goals in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the US-Afghan Strategic Partnership of 2005, the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) of 2008. Building an effective Afghan Government is an integral part of counterinsurgency strategy because it will become the international community’s most effective partner in protecting the population, retaining their loyalty by enabling growth and development, and delivering services. The US’s governance assistance strategy focuses on building capacity in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; supporting subnational governance; fighting corruption; and promoting human rights.

2.1.1. Progress Since the Taliban Between 1996 and 2001, Afghanistan did not have a functioning, legitimate government. After the Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Administration in 2001, the nation successfully held an Emergency Loya Jirga to ratify the Agreement; wrote and ratified a new Constitution in 2003 and 2004; and held presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The next presidential election is scheduled for fall 2009; legislative elections will follow in summer 2010. Much still needs to be done. Most Afghan officials are not trained or experienced in what westerners would consider to be traditional managerial functions or leadership. This results in inconsistent leadership quality across regions and levels of government. There is a cause and effect relationship between good governance and security. In areas in which capable GIRoA officials exercise the full scope of the duties and powers of their appointed office, the population turns to the government for answers to their problems. The inverse is true for weak or ineffective leaders, or in areas where lack of security does not allow for effective exercise of GIRoA authority.

2.2. Legislative Branch The rule of law begins with the creation of the law by a competent, honest, and representative legislature. Afghanistan’s National Assembly recently celebrated its second anniversary after a 32 year hiatus. In creating the laws of Afghanistan, the National Assembly has become the primary national forum for the discussion of the major challenges facing the nation, from long-standing inter-ethnic disputes to plotting Afghanistan’s course into a stable future. Groups who at one time were in violent conflict with one another now debate the

136

Report to Congress

issues confronting the country peacefully. Parliamentarians include former warlords, exTaliban, former communists, Tajiks, Pashtun, and Hazaras. Much progress has been made, though there are some hurdles that remain to be overcome. As do other parts of the government, the National Assembly suffers from corruption and a lack of trained human capital. As the contest between President Karzai and the Tajik-dominated United Front has become more acute, the National Assembly’s lower house has become more politicized and distracted from its primary task of legalizing pre-2005 presidential directives. USG assistance to the National Assembly includes direct assistance to five parliamentary commissions, establishing a Parliamentary Institute which will be the focal point for longterm technical training of members of parliament and parliamentary staff, and strengthening parliamentary budget oversight and analysis.

2.3. Executive Branch The rule of law depends on its execution by capable and fair executives. The Afghan population’s perception of the impartiality, probity and effectiveness of the presidency and line ministries contributes significantly to its willingness to support the government and resist insurgent inducements or coercion. Great strides have been made in the executive branch of the GIRoA. The President understands the importance of moving away from the traditional Afghan practice of distributing senior ministerial positions, including governorships, on the basis of political connections. The establishment of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), described in section 2.7 of this report, in August 2007 has led to significant improvement in gubernatorial appointments. USAID is supporting capacity development at the Office of the President and several ministries. Offices at the Presidency that benefit directly from USAID programming include the Office of Administrative Affairs Department of Monitoring and Evaluation, the Office of the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, the IDLG, the Chief of Staff’s Office, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Presidential Spokesman.

2.3.1. Ministerial Capacity Ministerial capacity is improving, but challenges remain. The Ministries of Health and Education continue to demonstrate to remote rural populations the central government’s ability and willingness to improve their lives. Additionally, the establishment of the IDLG is catalyzing improvements in the ministries’ delivery of services in the provinces. The biggest threats to the rule of law in the Ministries include corruption and a lack of human capital. Afghan ministries and institutions are currently challenged with minimal organization and a lack of fundamental management and leadership skills. The majority of national and provincial leaders have some education, but the government faces a shortage of adequately qualified civil servants. District-level leadership largely lacks sufficient education and training. Approximately 60 percent of Afghan civil servants are over the age of 50. The government of Afghanistan continues to suffer from a shortage in experienced staff at all levels due to a low national literacy rate, low wages in government service, and existing salary imbalances. With the high demand for manual labor as a result of reconstruction efforts

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

137

along with demand from international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), laborers can earn more than teachers and civil servants. USAID funds two major public management initiatives, the Capacity Development Program and the Local Governance and Community Development Program to provide advisory support and technical assistance to 14 national ministries at the national and provincial levels to improve basic governance and public service delivery. In addition, the Afghan Civil Service Commission, also supported by USAID, is improving the process of training and testing civil servants for their ability to meet certain qualifications. Concurrently, training programs at the national and provincial level are being strengthened with support from USAID to develop basic skills among government workers and managers to grow the necessary human capital to form the basis for a future civil service system.

2.4. Judicial Branch An effective Judicial Branch is essential to establishing the rule of law and good governance in Afghanistan. This sector is a major focus of Afghan, U.S., and international efforts in the country. Currently, the central justice institutions have competent leaders willing to work with the international community. Several key laws have been passed or are being revised that will lay the foundation for an effective justice sector, and the institutions are generally supportive of organizational restructuring and civil service reform. In addition, the GIRoA is advancing narcotics prosecutions under the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul. Since March 2005, when the CJTF was set up, it has investigated and prosecuted more than 1,200 cases involving 1,600 defendants from 33 provinces for narcotics-related crimes. Of these, 1,450 defendants were convicted.

2.4.1. Civil Legal System Land disputes represent the largest single source of cases before Afghan courts, involving both private individuals and the government. These cases include land seizures by powerful interest groups and persons, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to homes occupied by others, and landlord and tenant disputes. Resolving these land disputes is one of the most pressing civil law issues in Afghanistan, as the efficient and equitable restoration and re-distribution of land is essential to the resettlement of returning refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes and provinces of origin, and the future stability of the country. The current civil legal system faces many challenges: a lack of clarity as to who is responsible for land rights; an overall lack of financial support, administrative personnel, educated government (and private) attorneys, and judges in the area of land dispute resolution; and facilities for the Afghan court system. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) lacks the skills, training, and support staff to evaluate and review land disputes. The ANP are currently increasing their capacity and capability to bring peaceful resolution to disputes and respect the due process of suspects’ and plaintiff’s rights. The ANP possess the same responsibility and authority in both civil and criminal legal systems. Given a civil matter such as a land dispute, the ANP may effectively resolve the dispute between the concerned parties. If the parties cannot agree to the resolution then the case must be presented for adjudication in the given system of law in that area. The Afghan Justice system struggles

138

Report to Congress

to balance three types of law −constitutional, sharia, and tribal− while protecting the rights of all Afghans. Hence, although it is a national police force, the ANP must work within the system of justice that takes precedence in their jurisdiction. Afghanistan’s legal system has inadequate commercial dispute resolution mechanisms. A lack of education and procedures inhibit the enforcement of consistent commercial law on such issues as banking, intellectual property, technology, energy, corporate law, corporate finance, leasing, and bankruptcy. Currently, commercial courts operate in two regions, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. The lack of efficient procedures and resolution for commercial disputes is discouraging to international investors, who fear the risk of doing business in Afghanistan without a court system to enforce commercial rights. The ANDS proposes several solutions to the challenges facing the justice sector. With regard to land disputes, the Supreme Court will develop judicial capacity in property dispute issues, increasing the number of judges trained in this area in all provinces. The courts and the MoJ will also encourage jirgas and shuras to certify and record the decisions they reach in disputes. Finally, the MoJ will improve the government’s ability to defend its interests in land dispute cases and will encourage the adoption of improved laws, regulations and procedures for land ownership and land dispute resolution. More broadly, the ANDS will not only set the roadmap and strategy for establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan, but also provide a sense of security for international donors and international investors. The “Law of Organization of Courts” created by the MoJ, establishes eight commercial courts throughout the country. The timeline for the initiation of these courts will be set in the final ANDS. Once the courts are established, the MoJ plans to increase the capacity of these courts to hear cases and increase the number of qualified commercial court judges with specialized skills in the areas of both national and international market economies. Furthermore, the Independent Bar Association and Afghan Investment Support Agency both plan to develop private commercial law and train attorneys in these areas. A viable commercial bar of attorneys, with regional commercial courts and qualified judges, will enhance the appeal and reduce the risks of doing business in Afghanistan. The international community has not yet done a great deal to assist Afghanistan in the areas of land dispute resolution and commercial law. Although UNAMA, USAID, and private initiatives by NGOs around the world have offered support, available donor funds are waiting for completion of the plan for the way ahead.

2.4.2. Criminal Justice System While the Criminal Justice system is in the early developmental stage and requires substantial assistance from the international community, some progress has been made. Currently, the most visible progress has taken place in areas with large populations. With USAID assistance, judges are being trained, forty judicial facilities in 16 provinces were built, the laws of the country have been published and distributed in a Judicial Reference Set, the Kabul University Law School is updating its curriculum, and a new court administration system is being implemented. Significant progress has been made in strengthening counternarcotics judicial and enforcement capacity at the national level. However, work remains to be done. In many provinces, most Afghans are not aware of their rights under the constitution nor do they have a basic understanding of the justice system. Nationwide, fully functioning courts, police, and prisons are rare. Municipal and provincial authorities as well as judges have minimal training and little or no access to

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

139

published law, often basing their judgments on their personal understanding of sharia law, tribal codes of honor, or local custom. Judges and prosecutors with jurisdiction over the districts often reside in the provincial capital. The lack of trained and qualified judicial personnel hinders the courts and results in very few cases being processed. Renovation of existing judicial infrastructure is needed and utilities, communication equipment, and basic office supplies are lacking. Prison conditions remain poor. Most Afghan prisons are decrepit, severely overcrowded, unsanitary, and fall well short of international standards. Many prisons hold more than twice their planned capacity. At the local and municipal levels, there are still no functional standardized criminal justice procedures in place in Afghanistan because the focus of establishing the rule of law has been primarily on the provincial and national levels. Once a suspected criminal has been arrested the subsequent process is inconsistent and ill-defined. The arrest of a suspect for any offense requires a viable form of detention but jails and prisons are overcrowded and underequipped. A viable and complete investigation is dependent on having trained, capable, and honest investigators as well as forensic specialists. Although the police manning document authorizes specialists in each province, the training and availability of these personnel vary. Pending the outcome of the investigation the individual is either released or the case is referred to the system of justice that takes precedence in that area, usually sharia or tribal law. In the absence of a viable criminal justice system these non-constitutional legal mechanisms fill a gap and are somewhat effective in deterring criminality and dispensing justice, though they often violate the rights of women and minorities. As the rule of law in Afghanistan matures, standardized procedures for the prosecution of all serious crimes must be established throughout the country at the provincial, regional and national levels. At present there is no reliable data to estimate the cost of the long-term reconstruction and development of a comprehensive justice system in Afghanistan. Efforts are currently underway to assess the shortfalls of judicial infrastructure, training, and equipment throughout the country. In February 2008, ISAF directed the Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to conduct a survey of judicial infrastructure, equipment, and other capacity to identify deficiencies and areas in need of improvement. The survey questionnaire was closely coordinated with the interagency, the international rule of law community, and, most importantly, the World Bank. The World Bank will utilize the information gathered from the survey to determine how best to commit resources from the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The surveys will be completed by May 2008 and should provide an adequate assessment of progress made thus far in establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan.

2.4.3. Efforts to Build Judicial Capacity The GIRoA has made strides in drafting and consolidating a National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS). However, disproportionately low salaries, widespread corruption, poor infrastructure, inefficient organizational structures, untrained professionals, and a lack of equipment and supplies plague the system. The NJSS is an element of the ANDS and sets development goals to be met by 2013. To implement these goals, the GIRoA and international community are finalizing the National Justice Program (NJP) which will use a combination of Afghan and donor programs (both bilateral and multilateral) to develop and reform the justice system. The World Bank is establishing a justice program that will support the NJP, using pooled donor funding to reduce the number of small-scale implementers.

140

Report to Congress

With the NJP providing a new strategic framework for the justice sector, the U.S. Government (USG) is developing its own strategy to support the NJP that is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and incorporates U.S. military efforts. Priority areas of the U.S. strategy include: accelerating institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering counternarcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the corrections system; improving linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on public awareness and legal aid to improve public confidence in and access to the justice system. These efforts support the overall USG push to project governance to the provincial and district levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central Government’s ability to provide security and services. To effectively move the justice sector forward, the GIRoA and the international community must coordinate the development of the central, provincial, and district justice systems to ensure standardized training and application of laws. At the central level, our programs and Embassy are working closely with the Afghan Government and international community, and are making progress. At the provincial level, our programs are leading the way, but the needs far exceed available donor resources and programs at present. The GIRoA and its partners must build 34 provincial justice systems. At the district level there is little established judicial capacity, but a plan to train district-level personnel at the provincial level will be launched starting in the summer of 2008. In summary, notable progress has been made and U.S. Government assistance programs have been carefully prioritized, although the overall needs of the justice sector and demands placed on it outpace available international resources. U.S. Government assistance to the justice sector has gradually grown over the years, with an FY07 budget of $67.35 million ($55 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding and $12.35 million in USAID funding). For FY08, the projected INCLE funding level for justice is $68 million, while USAID is projected to provide $4 million. This level of funding makes the USG the largest donor to the Afghan justice sector, not including the substantial contributions made by DoD in establishing the rule of law. There are four U.S. agencies primarily involved in building Afghanistan’s justice system: INL, USAID, the Department of Justice (DoJ), and DoD. These agencies and their programs are coordinated through the U.S. Embassy Special Committee on the Rule of Law, chaired by the U.S. Rule of Law Coordinator. The INL Afghanistan Administration of Justice program is primary concerned with building and reforming the criminal justice and corrections systems. Two major assistance platforms support this program: the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), described in greater detail below. Both programs are implemented by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) Government Services and have been in place since mid-2005 and early 2006, respectively. In addition to these two primary programs, INL also supports several smaller initiatives, including: (1) a grant to the University of Washington – Seattle which brings Afghan law professors to the United States to earn certificates and Master’s of Law (LLM) degrees; (2) a grant with the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) to support women in the legal profession; (3) an agreement with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus on specific policy and reform issues; (4) contributions to two multilateral trust funds to address disproportionately low salaries for judges, prosecutors, and corrections personnel; and

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

141

(5) funding to support three field offices of the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism mentioned above. INL also funds the DoJ Senior Federal Prosecutors Program in Afghanistan. The JSSP supports 30 U.S. justice advisors (prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and criminal justice systems experts) and 30 Afghan legal advisors, and has permanent teams based in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Konduz, and Nangarhar provinces to build Afghanistan’s criminal justice system. JSSP provincial teams as well as DoJ prosecutors are conducting police-prosecutor training and mentoring, and will soon establish a new training program to improve justice capacities at the district level, working closely with the police program’s Focused District Development initiative. To date, DoJ and the JSSP have trained more than 1,000 Afghan lawyers. The Kabul JSSP team is split into three sections. The first section consists of 16 U.S. and Afghan advisors who are reorganizing the Attorney General’s Office, providing training and mentoring, and advising the Afghan Attorney General on key issues. The second section supports the Ministry of Justice and its key directorates with three U.S. and 11 Afghan advisors, including the recently established and entirely Afghan staffed Policy and Strategy Unit. The Policy and Strategy Unit provides policy and organizational reform advice to the Minister. The third JSSP section focuses on improving access to justice, which includes mentoring and capacity building for private legal defense organizations, legal education and training, and organizing provincial justice conferences. The JSSP also has a gender justice advisor who is developing linkages between police Family Response Units and the prosecution services, as well as a military liaison to coordinate joint police-justice efforts. The CSSP supports more than 30 U.S. corrections advisors in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. This support is focused on four areas: training, capacitybuilding, infrastructure support, and operations and maintenance for a new facility in Kabul. The provincial teams have trained more than 1,300 corrections officers to date in a basic 8week course and a “train the trainers” course. The training program is based on international and United Nations human rights standards and was developed specifically for (and with) the Afghan Government. The program launching numerous advanced and specialized courses in 2008. The CSSP also supports a capacity-building program which is advising the Ministry of Justice’s Central Prison Directorate (CPD) on prison policies, prison management, establishing a prisoner tracking system, and organizational reforms. The third CSSP component is the infrastructure team, which has refurbished the national corrections training center, completed numerous small-scale renovations of prisons, provided a new annex for the CPD headquarters for staff, and established an Afghan Engineering Office within the CPD. Together with Afghan architects and engineers, the CSSP has developed a “hybrid” prison design that incorporates international human rights standards with Afghan realities and costeffectiveness to create a sustainable, humane, and secure prison design. In addition to constructing two prisons over the coming year, the CSSP is also advising other donors to ensure that their designs and construction of prisons implement this Afghan-approved sustainable model. Lastly, the CSSP will support the operations and maintenance of the Counternarcotics Justice Center (CNJC) in Kabul, a secure facility built by the Army Corps of Engineers that will house the Counternarcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) as well as a detention center. Finally, INL entered into an agreement with the United States Institute of Peace in mid2007 to work with Afghan and international actors to develop policies and possible linkages with the non-state system of dispute resolution. Although the focus of U.S. assistance must be

142

Report to Congress

on building the central government’s reach through the formal justice institutions, there may be linkages with the informal system for certain civil (but not criminal) disputes that could maximize efficiency and utilize the legitimacy that many customary systems enjoy, so long as human rights and gender rights are respected and enforced. The USAID-funded Afghanistan Rule of Law Project assists in the development of a democratic Afghan government, which has broad citizen participation and a vigorous economic sector, by improving the country’s legal infrastructure. Working with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well as with faculties of law and Sharia in five provincial universities, the project works to improve the formal court system, strengthen institutional capacity for lawmaking, and increase citizens’ awareness of their legal rights and how the judicial system operates. The project is divided into seven components: • • • • • • •

Court administration, which simplifies and standardizes court administration procedures to improve access to court information; Judicial Training and Professional Development, which creates opportunities for improving judicial professionalism, knowledge and skills; Commercial Dispute Resolution, which lays a foundation for the effective resolution of commercial disputes; Legal Education, which strengthens the formal legal education system; Legislative Process Reform, which improves the legislative process and access to legal information; Women’s Rights Under Islam, which increases knowledge of women’s rights under Islam; and Access to Justice and Building Links to the Informal Justice Sector, which ensures that the appropriate sector for resolving disputes is recognized.

Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court began sending its justices on inspection tours of provincial courts to ensure that they are in compliance with judicial regulations. The inspections are followed by 3-day conferences, where the visiting Supreme Court justice will discuss the inspection results and recent or upcoming changes in court policy and operations. Judges participating in these conferences, which are supported by the Afghanistan Rule of Law Project, also receive training in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct and the recently adopted Afghan Court Administration System for streamlining the courts’ case-management processes. Since 2005, DoJ has assigned up to four senior Assistant United States Attorneys as Senior Legal Advisors and three senior experienced criminal investigators to Kabul to assist in law reform and training and mentoring of the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), a special task force of Afghan judges, prosecutors, and police investigators responsible for cases against mid- and high-level drug traffickers. DoJ’s Senior Federal Prosecutor Program also provides criminal law advice to the Embassy and Afghan leadership and U.S. law enforcement, upon request. The prosecutors have succeeded in 1) drafting and enacting a comprehensive counternarcotics law that also provides for the use of modern investigative techniques (e.g., electronic surveillance, and the use of informants and undercover officers); 2) establishing a specialized narcotics court with nationwide exclusive jurisdiction for cases against mid- and high-level traffickers; 3)

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

143

achieving the first-ever extraditions of major drug traffickers from Afghanistan to the United States and 4) working with U.S. and international partners to establish, train, and mentor the CJTF and CNT. Department of Justice prosecutors have: •

•

•

• • •

•

•

• •

Drafted (in consultation with Afghan legal advisors, DoJ's Criminal Division, and the international community) and had signed into law a Comprehensive Counternarcotics Law that builds upon former Afghan law to criminalize all narcotics and narcoticsrelated offenses, sets controls on processing chemicals, authorizes the use of modern investigative techniques, and confirms the use of the 1988 U.N. Convention against Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in extradition; Drafted and had signed into law the Presidential Decree establishing the Central Narcotics Tribunal with exclusive nationwide authority for the trial of all mid- and high-level narcotics trafficking cases; Refined and had signed into law the Military Courts Legislation and Military Courts Penal and Procedural Law that established a separate court and its law and attendant procedures for the Afghan National Army that meet international standards; Drafted counter-terrorism and extradition laws now under review by the Afghan legislative unit at the Ministry of Justice; Prepared a legal analysis of Afghanistan’s former, interim, and proposed criminal procedure codes, highlighting areas for reform; Deployed a DoJ expert team to Kabul to assess current capacities and make recommendations for assisting the Afghan Attorney General and the CJTF with an anti-corruption initiative. As a result, DoJ has now assigned one of the federal prosecutors full-time to the Attorney General’s Office and will be establishing a subunit within the CJTF dedicated to investigating and prosecuting narcotics-related corruption cases upon country clearance approval from the Department of State for additional DoJ attorneys; Provided and continues to provide prosecutorial advice to the Embassy leadership, Afghan officials, and U.S. law enforcement (DEA and FBI) and prosecutors in the development of criminal investigations for prosecution in Afghanistan, the United States, or elsewhere; Prepared an in-depth training regime and conducted training for the CJTF and CNT focused on the new Afghan Counternarcotics Law and proactive investigations. In addition, the DoJ attorneys provide in-depth special topics seminars for the CJTF, CNT, and provincial prosecutors on regular basis to improve understanding of fundamental concepts and the implementation of investigative modern techniques; Advised on the design of Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Justice Center in Kabul that is under construction and will soon house the CJTF and CNT; and Assisted in the development of an adjunct project by the U.S. Marshals Service that has been deployed to train a protective corps drawn from the Afghan National Police to provide court security at the CNT and protection to CNT judges and CJTF prosecutors.

144

Report to Congress

The Department of Defense has increased its activities in providing rule of law assistance over the past year in two main areas: improving linkages between the justice and police sectors, and expanding rule of law programming by the Judge Advocate General Corps in eastern Afghanistan. On police-justice integration, CSTC-A has played an important role in furthering joint initiatives to support the justice sector, building the ANP and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). In this capacity, CSTC-A has advised the MoI Legal Advisor’s Office on key legislation and procedures that govern law enforcement, and is working closely with other U.S. agency efforts and the international community on advancing overall justice sector development and reform. In addition, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 is implementing rule of law initiatives in its area of operations in Eastern Afghanistan. CJTF-101 has worked with the U.S. Embassy and programs listed above on legal training, distribution of legal texts, and infrastructure support to improve provincial and district level justice systems.

2.5. Corruption Corruption is a significant problem in Afghanistan and erodes the legitimacy of the GIRoA. Insufficient analytical work has been completed to give the exact scope and extent of corruption in Afghanistan. Some analysis conducted by the members of the donor community and the Afghan government, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest that Afghanistan’s sources of corruption are composed of both typical sources of corruption as well as corruption that is unique to Afghanistan. The sources and forms of corruption includei: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Low public sector salaries and unqualified public officials; Discretionary power of public administration; Weak legal, legislative and regulatory frameworks; Weak or non-existing mechanisms and systems for public scrutiny; Dysfunctional justice sector and insufficient law enforcement; The narco-economy; Fraudulent NGOs that are actually for-profit businesses; Limited oversight of the central government over the sub-national administration; An unprecedented amount of international assistance; Corruption in the management of natural resources; Political, social, and economic uncertainty; and Tribal and regional leaders outside the central government’s control.

Advancement to higher positions in some government agencies is often tied to bribes and influence. This limits the advancement of those who can not afford to pay for it, and creates a perception of unfairness and inequality by those who see corrupt officials advance while their position remains unchanged for years at a time. Anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan have been the focus of much discussion at recent meetings of the U.S. Embassy’s Special Committee for the Rule of Law (SCROL). Examples abound of corrupt public officials who are immune from prosecution, judges and prosecutors whose discretion is subject to influence, and police who not only refuse to take action to stem

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

145

corruption, but also engage in corrupt activities themselves. It should be noted that what is perceived as corruption in need of correction by Western standards may simply be indicative of the way Afghan society operates. The real issue is not whether corruption exists, but whether the amount of corruption that does exist has reached the point where it undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

2.5.1. Anti-Corruption Efforts The primary focus of anti-corruption efforts has been the removal of corrupt government officials from public service. This process, however, has been significantly hampered by Afghan law. The Afghan Civil Service System does not contain a mechanism for the administrative removal of civil servants. There are only two ways that a civil servant can be removed from office. The first method involves direct removal by the President of Afghanistan. The second method is via a criminal conviction. The employee must be found guilty of misconduct by an Afghan court, the authorized punishment for the offense must include dismissal, and the court must determine that dismissal is, in fact, warranted. CSTC-A is currently working with the MoI on redrafting the personnel regulation that governs MoI employees, specifically, the ANP. These efforts are aimed at empowering lower-level officials to make removal decisions while providing sufficient administrative due process to the employee subject to termination. The creation of an administrative separation mechanism will dramatically speed the process of removing corrupt government officials. Unfortunately, implementing this new process is likely to take at least two years. Once adopted, these laws will serve as a model for reforming the remainder of Afghanistan’s personnel laws. Anticorruption efforts for agencies that do not fall under the MoI are the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission, the Ministry of Justice, and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) at the provincial level. Judicial corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan. Since his appointment to the Supreme Court in August 2006, Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi has made cleaning up the courts his top priority. Working with USAID, he has instituted an aggressive, two-pronged approach to reduce the level of corruption in the courts and to raise the level of public trust and confidence in the judiciary. The strategy includes instituting a new code of conduct for judges and raising judges’ salaries so the judges are less inclined to accept bribery. The two-pronged approach to fighting judicial corruption: •

•

New Regulation of Judicial Conduct: The first part of the Supreme Court strategy focused on developing a modern code of judicial conduct that establishes ethical standards for how all of Afghanistan’s judges are to conduct their affairs. On June 19, 2007, that code, entitled the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was adopted. Each of Afghanistan’s 1,280 judges will receive training on the Regulation’s meaning and importance by the end of September 2008. Improving Judicial Salaries and Working Conditions: The second part of the strategy focuses on securing funds from the international community to increase judges’ wages and improve their working conditions so that they are less inclined to accept bribes. Donor money for judges’ salaries was incorporated as one of the court’s highest funding priorities in July 2007 when the Supreme Court presented its

146

Report to Congress Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to international donors at the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, July 2-3, 2007.

Building GIRoA capacity to manage its own justice system is an integral part of a secure and sustainable Afghan state. However, without high-level political will on the part of the GIRoA to tackle corruption from the top down building justice sector capacities and strong public demand for a functional justice system will have very little effect. To that end, the U.S. strategy emphasizes using diplomatic, political, and law enforcement tools to strengthen Afghan political will to institute true reforms and tackle corruption within their government. We have seen several positive signs, including the recent passage of the Advocates Law (establishing a national bar and legal defense service). The GIRoA recently became a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), an important step in the right direction.

2.6. Human Rights Since the fall of the Taliban some important progress has been made in protecting human rights in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban regime women were removed from all forms of public life. Today while women’s active participation in Afghan society has gained a degree of acceptance, women who are active in public life continue to face disproportionate levels of threats and violence. Currently women work as teachers, health care providers, hold 91 seats in the Afghan Parliament, and a woman serves as chairperson of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). As described in section three of this report, access to education for girls and women has increased dramatically. Police and other security forces receive training in how to respect the rights of individual citizens. In the country as a whole there is increased space and scope for a functioning civil society. Media freedom, despite recent setbacks, is still much more vibrant than it was under the Taliban. Although progress has been made, Afghanistan's human rights record remains poor and serious abuses continue. The GIRoA and its partners are fighting an insurgency that respects no boundaries in perpetrating violence upon civilian populations. Human rights abuses include extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, poor prison conditions, official impunity, prolonged pretrial detention, torture, and abuse of authority. Restrictions on freedoms of movement and association continue as does violence and societal discrimination against women, minorities, and religious converts; trafficking in persons; abuse of worker rights; and child labor. Women and girls face severe discrimination. Violence against women including domestic violence, sexual violence, forced marriages, kidnappings, trafficking, and honor killings remains rampant. Although women's political participation has gained a degree of acceptance, women who are active in public life continue to face disproportionate threats and violence. The media faced increased restrictions in 2007, including heightened detention of journalists and government interference in media coverage. Government repression and armed groups prevent the media from operating freely. A draft media law sent back to Parliament by Karzai in December 2007 could place greater restrictions on media content and create a climate of government intimidation and media self-censorship. The Ambassador and other senior U.S. officials consistently emphasize the importance of human rights to their Afghan counterparts. During Secretary Rice's visit in January 2008 she

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

147

delivered both public and private messages underscoring governance and human rights themes. The U.S. continues to support the AIHRC, as well as the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Ministry of Refugees. The U.S. integrates women’s issues into virtually all of its programs, aiming to increase female political participation, education, economic opportunities, and their role in civil society. U.S.-funded NGOs hold workshops to educate women on their legal rights and the justice system, the new Constitution, and the National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections. U.S. programs promote independent press and electronic media by facilitating the development of a network of independent communitybased radio stations and investing in training and business plan development to ensure the sustainability of independent media organizations.

2.7. Subnational Government One of the central programs intended to improve governance at the provincial, district, and municipal levels is the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). President Karzai issued a decree on August 30, 2007, establishing the IDLG as a focal point for governance policy under his presidency and a new home for the MoI’s dysfunctional Civil Administration Division. The IDLG oversees provincial governors, district governors, provincial councils, and municipalities (except Kabul). The IDLG has established specific assessment criteria for selecting and evaluating district and provincial governors. Those criteria include loyalty to the president and the constitution, freedom from corruption, good management and leadership skills, success in working with the international community and good public outreach. This codification of core values required for the selection and evaluation of provincial governors and sub-governors represents a step towards establishing standards to which current and future governors will have to adhere. Using the established criteria, the IDLG has removed and replaced many provincial governors in the past six months. With few exceptions, these changes have resulted in more effective governors and, by extension, improvements in overall governance. The long-term effect of these changes cannot yet be precisely determined but the outlook is very positive. The impetus behind this approach is in keeping with the IDLG’s mandate of providing good governance by establishing and strengthening government institutions at the subnational levels to achieve open, transparent, participative, accountable and effective governance structures that are based on consensus and rule of law. Recently, the IDLG targeted six governors for replacement or reassignment. The IDLG recently played a pivotal role in the replacement of the governor of Ghazni province due to consistently poor performance. Conversely, the IDLG capitalizes on the strengths of topperforming governors by reassigning them to provinces that are in need of sound leadership and management. A case in point was the recent relocation of the Laghman governor to Helmand province. The IDLG staff frequently travel to each of the 34 provinces to monitor the performance of provincial governors and district governors. The IDLG uses this visibility and awareness to appoint capable and respected members of the community to village and district shuras that serve to link the village community to the government. To this end, the IDLG has effectively spearheaded several district-level shuras, aimed at promoting the capacity of local governance. The IDLG also participates in frequent working group meetings that bring

148

Report to Congress

together various stakeholders—ministries, agencies, international organizations, and embassy officials to discuss governance challenges and solutions. In collaboration with IDLG, USAID, through the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program is strengthening the capacity of provincial and district level officials to govern effectively, more transparently, and to provide better services to constituent communities. Last year, no province in Afghanistan had a viable plan for development. The central government, supported by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), organized an effort to facilitate, mentor, and oversee the completion of Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). After less than three months’ effort, through aggressive interaction with the Provincial Development Committees and elected Provincial Councils, every province now possesses an initial PDP. Much work remains to expand the PDPs into comprehensive, actionable documents, but progress has been remarkable. On the anti-corruption front, the IDLG recently signaled its intent to foster public sector accountability when it filed suit with the Attorney General’s office against six nonperforming firms that were contracted under the Afghan Stabilization Program to construct government facilities. Eight additional companies are expected to face prosecution in the short term. With technical assistance and support from a growing consortium of donors, including USAID, key IDLG leaders are implementing measures aimed at advancing the mandate of the GIRoA as it relates to the promotion of good governance, rule of law and anticorruption initiatives. As part of its mandate, the IDLG has established other short and long-term goals aimed at achieving the following: • • • • • •

Ensuring that Afghan women enjoy greater equity in education, political participation and justice; Elimination of discrimination against women and promotion of their involvement in leadership activities; Ensuring participation of the people at all levels of government; Promotion and advancement of security; Improving the performance of service delivery institutions at the provincial, district and village levels; and Fighting public and private sector corruption to improve the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of government, thus creating the conditions for investment.

2.8. Key Measures of Political Stability Progress in government effectiveness is one of the most difficult areas to measure. Most indicators are subjective in nature primarily because they require a measurement of human capacity, leadership and effectiveness. Although public perception surveys provide quantifiable insight into government effectiveness as it relates to the population, other quantifiable indicators can cause an inaccurate assessment of overall government effectiveness as they fail to consider the inherent qualitative nature of leadership.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

149

Any subjective measurement of governance should include the population acceptance of government authority, government capability to provide for and/or protect the population, effectiveness and use of the judicial system to resolve disputes, and the level and effect of corruption. Though down from a high of 83 percent in 2005, 63 percent of Afghans polled approved of President Karzai’s leadership in 2007. A point of concern is Afghans’ perception of corruption as a major problem for the country. 25 percent of Afghans believed that corruption was the biggest problem facing their country, down slightly from 27 percent in 2006, but a large increase over previous years. Objective measures of the government’s institutional effectiveness vary across ministries and organizations according to the outcome they are charged with accomplishing. For example, the Ministry of Finance’s effectiveness could be measured by the population’s tax compliance rate; the government’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP; or the government’s budget execution and disbursement rates. The Ministry of Refugees’ effectiveness could be measured by the number of refugees successfully resettled. The Ministry of Education’s effectiveness could be measured by the number of schools built, teachers hired, students enrolled, or students graduated. Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a data-poor environment and it is difficult to create a comprehensive or systematic picture of the quality of institutional performance in the Afghan Government. Most ministries do not track their own performance, make data widely available, or keep accurate statistics. The lack of a solid baseline of data continues to hamper reconstruction efforts. Better information, statistical analysis, and intelligence will help create a clearer picture of Afghan governance in the future. We aim to make improvements in data collection a key part of continuing capacity development programs. Difficulties persist in implementing reform at both central and provincial levels. Improving sub-national capabilities remains an essential component of continued progress. Success in the fight against corruption is central to maintaining popular support for both the existing political system and the GIRoA. Success in developing the government’s capacity is essential to sustaining the progress that has been made to date.

SECTION 3: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 3.1. Overview The long-term comprehensive plan for economic and social development in Afghanistan is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. This strategic document is the central framework for Afghanistan’s development, aiming to promote growth, support the development of democratic processes and institutions, and reduce poverty and vulnerability. The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government’s overall development vision and serves as the key document used by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in assessing the country’s poverty reduction strategy. In addition, broad-based and sustainable economic growth is driven by private-sector, market-oriented initiatives. Key economic “enablers” such as roads, power, education, health care, rule of law, sound macroeconomic policy, and security are critical to creating conditions that allow such initiatives to occur.

150

Report to Congress

3.1.1. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) The ANDS seeks to strengthen Afghanistan’s emerging private sector through improved economic governance, but it also heavily emphasizes key economic enablers such as security, governance, rule of law, and human rights. Within its sectoral strategies and cross-cutting issues, the ANDS addresses several key economic sectors, including infrastructure, natural resources, agricultural and rural development, and counter-narcotics. The Afghan government submitted the ANDS to the World Bank on 15 April 2008, as required for setting the conditions for debt relief under the IMF Poverty and Growth Facility. Given the staggering challenges of developing Afghanistan from an extremely low level of economic and social development, effectively implementing the ANDS will require significant long-term donor financing and political support to ensure its benchmarks, indicators, and overall objectives are realized. 3.1.2. Interagency and International Cooperation Development of the ANDS is being coordinated by the ANDS Secretariat and supervised by the ANDS Oversight Committee, comprised of seven cabinet ministers. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) is the high-level international body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS. The final ANDS comprises strategies for 18 sectors, divided into 8 pillars: 1) security, 2) governance, 3) infrastructure and natural resources, 4) education and culture, 5) health and nutrition, 6) agriculture and rural development, 7) social protection, and 8) economic governance and private sector development. It will also include strategies for 6 crosscutting themes: 1) capacity development, 2) gender equity, 3) counter-narcotics, 4) regional cooperation, 5) anti-corruption, and 6) environment. The ANDS articulates both a policy framework and a road map for implementation, translating strategic priorities into effective programs that deliver both immediate and lasting results for the Afghan people. Through identifying a clear set of cost estimates and sequenced priorities, the full ANDS, together with the Afghanistan Compact, is expected to provide a coherent path to achieving Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals.

3.2. Reconstruction and Development 3.2.1. Communications Afghanistan has experienced nearly 30 years of conflict and under-investment that has impeded the development of a national telecommunications network. Only 15,000 people had access to telecommunications services in 2001. Today, Afghanistan has approximately 4.5 million people that have access to telephones, and cell phone coverage is available in 150 towns and cities. Afghan Telecom has installed 86,000 fixed digital lines and 233,000 wireless lines using the most modern technology in all 34 provinces. It has also connected provincial capitals and district centers via a satellite network that provides voice, internet, and video conferencing services - the District Communication Network (DCN). The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MOCIT) has issued 15 internet service provider licenses. These licensees are providing internet services in major cities in Afghanistan. The MOCIT is also in the process of constructing a 3,200-kilometer optical-fiber network connecting major provincial capitals with one another and also with

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

151

neighboring countries. So far, 600 kilometers have been installed and the project is expected to be completed in mid-2009. The MOCIT has also extended basic communications services to government units at the ministry and provincial capital levels, and has improved international connectivity through a microwave link to Pakistan and an optical fiber link to Iran. Almost 220 of the 398 districts across the country are connected via voice, data and fax facilities.

3.2.2. Power Commercial access to electricity is vital for economic development. In 2001, Afghanistan produced 430 Megawatts of electricity; today the country produces 754 megawatts. International statistics maintained by the World Bank indicate the ratio of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth to electrical production is approximately $1,000 to 300 kwh. The GIRoA’s current Power Plan sets a goal to deliver sufficient electricity to meet the needs of an economic growth rate of 9 percent per annum. Additionally, the GIRoA anticipates approximately 90 percent of urban businesses will have access to electrical power by the end of 2010. Finally, the plan’s objective is to provide access to electricity to 65 percent of urban and 25 percent of rural households by the end of 2010. To achieve these goals, initiatives are underway to improve both electrical power production and transmission. These efforts include: •

•

• • • • •

Improvements underway on the North East Power System (NEPS), a GIRoA initiative with multi-donor funding designed to bring power to the northern and eastern regions of the country. NEPS will enable transmission of domestically produced power as well as imported power from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Work to restore natural gas production at Sheberghan so that domestic resources can be used to produce electricity in northern Afghanistan and Kabul, reducing reliance on imported energy. Roll out of a rural renewable-energy project extending access to rural populations not covered by the regional grid. Purchase and installment of diesel-powered generators, intended to provide Kabul with 100MW of reliable power by March 2009. Improvements in the Southern Electrical Power System to increase generation capacity, enhance transmission efficiency, and utilize Kajaki dam hydropower. Installation of transmission lines from Kajaki to Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. Improvements to the Western Transmission System by strengthening transmission lines from Herat to Turkmenistan and Herat to Iran.

The Da Afghanistan Breshna Moassesa (DABM) Corporation is responsible for both the operation and maintenance of national assets for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, as well as the sale of electricity, metering, loss control, and revenue collection. Presently, annual government subsidies estimated at $56 million are required to maintain power production and transmission. The IMF is pressing the GIRoA to restructure the DABM and reduce its level of subsidies. Reforms are proposed that include tariffs, installation of tamper-proof meters, and reduction of technical losses (presently as high as 44 percent) to boost cost recovery to 75 percent by 2010. However, it is anticipated that the proposed

152

Report to Congress

730,000 new connections by 2010 will not be realized as a result of shortages in funding outlined in the National Energy Sector Plan of the ANDS. Electricity distribution, rehabilitation, and infrastructure projects in all major urban centers are underway. Access of rural households to electricity has been increased by seven percent and a Renewable Energy Master Plan has been approved. However, the lack of electrical power significantly affects the pace of development in Afghanistan. There is some potential for private funding of power-generation initiatives and business ventures. An example is the Aynak Copper Mine, where the Chinese developers are expected to build a power plant to provide energy for mining and processing needs. Afghanistan is envisioned as the corridor for the Central Asian-South Asian (CASA) Regional Energy Market, intended to bring electric power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan. Under CASA-1000, the first phase of the project, 1000MW will reach Peshawar in Pakistan and 300MW will reach Kabul. The North East Power System (NEPS) is used to import power to Kabul from three Central Asian neighbors. Other energy projects include: efforts to rehabilitate hydropower plants at Kajaki, Naghlu, and Darunta; the transmission line from Pul-e Khumri to Kabul to be built by India; the transmission lines from Naghlu to Jalalabad/Methar Lam; and the transmission lines from Kabul to Gardez (including a substation for Gardez) to be funded by the Asian Development Bank. The required 33 percent increase per year in electrical connections to meet 2010 goals will likely not be realized due to a $1.2 billion gap in funding the National Energy Sector Plan. The electrical power system in Afghanistan remains rudimentary at best. It severely constrains the economic development of the country, primarily hindering the pace of industrial and manufacturing growth. Power shortages are forecasted to be heavy in 2008 which will likely have a destabilizing effect. Massive, resource-intensive reconstruction programs of the nation’s generation and transmission infrastructure are required. However, such large power projects take time, especially where there is limited physical infrastructure. An absence of a sufficient legal framework and protections for private investment in the sector and a lack of bilateral power purchase or sharing agreements hinder connection of power supplies to existing grids across borders. In the long term, Afghanistan’s dependence on imported power may be reduced if the Afghan government actively pursues increases in generation capacity, mainly through hydropower.

3.2.3. Agriculture Afghanistan’s agricultural sector accounts for about 45 percent of the nation’s GDP and employs more than 70 percent of the work force. Accordingly, growth in this sector is particularly important. Unfortunately, most farmers producing licit crops have failed to advance beyond subsistence farming. Afghanistan urgently needs to improve the productivity of its agricultural sector, currently impeded by inadequate infrastructure, a lack of knowledge of modern practices, water scarcity, and soil degradation. Under semi-arid conditions, community-based watershed management and infrastructure are critical starting points for improving agricultural productivity. Irrigated crop land is in short supply due to an irrigation infrastructure that has been destroyed or degraded. Afghanistan has few dams for harnessing rainwater and spring snowmelt for agricultural use or preventing the damaging seasonal floods which destroy cropland. Additionally, due to the lack of electrical power, transportation, and low-cost/low-technology storage facilities (both

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

153

cold and silo) at the village and district level, there is little capacity to store, process, or market agricultural products. Lack of modern agricultural practices also contributes to severely limited crop yields. A current drive for new, integrated initiatives is underway to increase productivity in this sector. USAID is supporting commercial agriculture though agricultural extension services and U.S. land-grant university programs, partnerships with the private sector, and access to capital for agribusiness using a loan-guarantee program. Promoting commercial agricultural growth at each step in the value chain is key to increasing employment opportunities, raising incomes of rural households and farmers, and contributing to the overall security of Afghanistan. Progress in agriculture requires reforms of land tenure and improved access to finance. Currently, both land tenure and finance are dominated by poppy cultivation. Alternative development programs have expanded, but are not yet effective enough. A current drive for new integrated initiatives is underway to increase productivity in this sector. The first Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) from the Missouri Army National Guard deployed in Nangarhar in February 2008. The ADT provides a complete array of expertise in agriculture, horticulture, pest management, hydrology, soil science, agricultural processing, marketing, and veterinary science. The ADT also has an organic security force and is capable of sustained independent operations. In June 2008, the Texas Army National Guard will provide an ADT to Ghazni Province and the Nebraska Army National Guard will deploy an ADT to Parwan Province in November 2008. USAID’s Alternative Development and Agriculture (ADAG) programs are creating licit alternatives to poppy production by promoting and accelerating rural economic development. ADAG programs are partnering with a variety of entities including GIRoA institutions, civil society organizations, the private sector, other donors, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and the U.S. Military to coordinate actions. The goals are to increase commercial agriculture opportunities, improve agricultural productivity, create rural employment, improve family incomes and well being, and help to ensure the sustainability and management of the natural resource base. Improved job opportunities and incomes provide significant alternatives to opium poppy production. Counternarcotics activities are active where poppy production is most prevalent. Moreover, a robust agriculture economy will play a major role in helping to eliminate poppy production and move the country to both economic and political stability. To accelerate sustainable economic development in regions most affected by poppy production, USAID provides access to materials, technology, and expertise necessary to produce and market high-value licit crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree crops. Various programs dedicate significant resources to providing sources of credit, identifying and supporting value chains, developing new markets, improving productive infrastructure, and removing the administrative constraints that hinder business growth. The goal is to create a vibrant and diversified commercial agriculture sector that provides employment opportunities for rural Afghans. One example is the Mazar Foods Initiative, which will develop a commercial agriculture farm and processing center to create employment, increase sales of agricultural products, and demonstrate agricultural production and retail best practice techniques on a large scale (approximately 6,250 hectares, close to13,000 acres). Other programs facilitate trade opportunities by providing linkages between buyers and farmers.

154

Report to Congress

Activities also seek to improve natural resource management by involving local communities and agricultural universities in problem identification and resolution, and by crafting and employing resource management policies in a manner that contributes to the sustainability of licit livelihoods. USAID also provides Air Services facilitating the ability of USG program managers and key implementing partner staff to move between field locations for program monitoring and management purposes. To increase commercial agriculture opportunities, improve agricultural productivity, create rural employment, and improve family incomes and well being, USAID will build upon the successes of 2007. These successes included: 1) over 1,500 metric tons (MT) of fruit and vegetable exports shipped, valued at over $6 million in sales; 2) over 30,000 farmers under contract with local food processing firms and/or wholesalers to produce and sell licit agricultural products; 3) seven national and regional AgFairs hosted; 4) over 150 rural farm stores or AgDepots established; 5) national and regional market information systems launched; 6) over 3,200,000 forestry cuttings, saplings, and fruit trees planted; 7) 630 Animal Health Care providers attended the first-ever Afghan Veterinary Association Convention held in Kabul; 8) over 9,000,000 vaccines for livestock administered; 9) over 8,500 Afghans trained in business skills and over 75,000 farmers trained in agricultural practices; 10) 58 Kabul University staff members involved in masters degree programs via land-grant universities; and 11) cross-cutting activities that saw women and persons with disabilities incorporated into these programs. There has been significant progress. Cereals production has nearly doubled since 2001, but this progress is dependent on favorable conditions during the growing season. Although Afghans have the ability to produce nearly enough agricultural products to sustain themselves, they lack the ability to store those products for extended periods. Instead, they sell excess produce to Pakistan at the end of the harvest season. Merchants in Pakistan, who have the ability to store these grains and other foods, will sell these products back to Afghans during off-harvest season at an increased cost. To address these problems USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program is providing small-scale community support for agriculture infrastructure improvement and village-level training and commodity support in coordination with the ACDI/VOCA program.

3.2.4. United States Department of Agriculture Efforts The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) continues to provide substantial contribution to the revitalization of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. USDA activities are described in the following sections. 3.2.4.1. USDA Agricultural Advisors on Provincial Reconstruction Teams USDA deploys, supports, and provides guidance to agricultural advisors on PRTs. Since 2003, USDA has deployed 38 advisors from nine different USDA agencies to work in Afghanistan. These advisors work with both U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as with their Afghan counterparts. Agricultural advisors develop and implement projects to rehabilitate provincial-level agricultural systems and provide capacity-building assistance. For fiscal year 2008, USDA expects to deploy a total of 13 PRT advisors.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

155

3.2.4.2. USDA Technical Assistance USDA’s technical assistance programs in Afghanistan include livestock health, agricultural extension and the Afghan Conservation Corps. USDA administers several exchange programs including the Cochran Fellowship Program (Cochran), Norman E. Borlaug International Science and Technology Fellows Program (Borlaug) and the Faculty Exchange Program (FEP), all of which provide participants training to develop their technical skills on various agricultural topics and further the achievement of technical assistance goals. To help build Afghanistan’s national capacity to detect and control animal diseases, USDA, with USAID funding, provides technical guidance and training to the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) and other partners, including veterinary and animal health faculty at Kabul University. USDA also provides technical experts, including a resident animal health advisor, to provide expertise and training to MAIL in animal disease surveillance, data analysis, field response, lab diagnostics, and national planning for disease control. Under an agreement with Fort Valley State University in Georgia, USDA will produce a technical guide of animal diseases in Afghanistan that will assist animal health officials and livestock producers in the detection and control of animal diseases. To enable Afghanistan to achieve its goals in the livestock sector, USDA provides training for Afghan participants under the Cochran and Borlaug Programs. In 2008, USDA will host two participants from Afghanistan under the Cochran Program for training in livestock dairy production. In 2007, two Afghans participated in training on animal disease detection and control methods. Meanwhile, in 2007, four Afghans participated in the Borlaug Program and were trained in animal science and epidemiology. USDA provides technical guidance to the Afghanistan Ministry of Higher Education on the use of USDA monetized food aid proceeds to build university teaching capacity in agricultural and veterinary sciences, including extension services. Similar assistance was given to MAIL in programming monetized food aid proceeds to develop and deliver extension services throughout Afghanistan. Efforts in agricultural extension led to the development of a prototype district-level agricultural extension facility and staffing model. Monetized food aid proceeds have also supported the construction of 17 provincial agricultural centers for extension and cultural activities. With the University of CaliforniaDavis, USDA is working to build MAIL’s capacity to produce agricultural extension materials for use by agricultural producers. Forthcoming activities will focus on agricultural extension services for horticultural products. Training courses are provided to develop the technical skills for the participants to achieve the objectives of the agricultural extension program. In 2008, the Cochran Program will host eight participants from Afghanistan for agricultural extension-related training. Since initiating Cochran Program training activities for Afghanistan in 2004, 12 women have participated in a program on the role of women in small agricultural enterprise development. In 2007, three Afghans participated in the Borlaug Program in agricultural extension, economics, and rangeland management. USDA, with USAID funding, has provided technical guidance to assist MAIL in developing a pistachio forest management plan for rehabilitating degraded pistachio woodlands. In 2006, target villages realized a 65 percent increase in income from pistachio nuts, with 2007 also showing an increase above 2006. This project is being expanded to include other villages. USDA technical specialists have provided training and consultation on

156

Report to Congress

improving the management of tree nurseries and on improving seed collection and storage. In 2008, to support Afghanistan’s goals in forest management, USDA expects to host at least three FEP participants. The FEP brings Afghan participants from institutions of higher learning to the United States for training in a U.S. university. Since 2006, USDA has hosted four FEP participants, all from Kabul University. In 2007, five Afghans participated in the Borlaug Program in horticulture, agronomy and plant pathology.

3.2.4.3. Food Assistance USDA has provided food assistance through Food for Progress (FFP) and the McGovernDole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition (FFE) Programs. In March 2008, USDA approved a government-to-government agreement with the Government of Afghanistan that will provide $10 million in vegetable oil and also will support agricultural development in Afghanistan. In 2007, USDA signed an FFP agreement with the Government of Afghanistan to provide more than 8,000 metric tons of soybean oil valued at $9.5 million. The sale of the soybean oil in Afghanistan generated support for agricultural education, agricultural research and extension, plant and animal disease diagnostics and control, food safety, and natural resource management. Since 2005, USDA implemented a total of six food assistance programs in Afghanistan, including two FFP agreements with the government and four FFP programs with U.S. private voluntary organizations. 3.2.5. Natural Resources Afghanistan possesses hydrocarbon, mineral, and other natural resources estimated at amounts that represent significant commercial value. These resources include an unknown quantity of oil; an estimated 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; as much as two billion tons of copper; significant quantities of precious gemstones; substantial deposits of gold; large reserves of coal; and millions of tons of several other valuable minerals such as chromite, iron and uranium. Although many of these resources are currently unexploited, several (particularly gemstones and timber) are being illegally depleted at an alarming rate, robbing the country and its people of hopes for economic growth. Since 1978, Afghan provinces have experienced 30 to 70 percent deforestation from uncontrolled logging following the disruption of traditional, sustainable, and locally managed logging practices. If current trends continue, Afghanistan could be virtually deforested in 25 years, destroying potential tourism and forestry industries. In addition to the long-term consequences, deforestation causes accelerating soil erosion, flooding, and mudslides which hinder Afghanistan’s immediate development. Illicit gemstone and timber production primarily take raw materials from Afghanistan, effectively outsourcing to Pakistan most of the badly needed employment and income derived from processing and final sales. Funds derived from illicit gemstone and timber sales have become a source of revenue for insurgent operations, including the financing of IED cells and funding for attacks against Afghan and international forces. Therefore, it is crucial to integrate actions to counter the illegal trade in gemstones and timber along with other efforts to counter illicit activities and prosecute the counterinsurgency.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

157

Figure 3. Known Natural Resources in Afghanistan.

Developing Afghanistan’s natural resources will require significant working capital and infrastructure investment. Unfortunately, the security situation and lack of established civil law make the country an unattractive place to do business. Ill-defined and poorly enforced licensing and concession procedures in some sectors, combined with a weak regulatory environment, continue to dissuade potential investors. USAID is providing funding to the Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency to strengthen the country’s ability to enforce the regulatory framework. USAID also provides significant funding for reforestation and biodiversity protection. Yet, there remains great need in this area. Donor institutions and U.S. Government programs provide inadequate assistance in the natural resources sector. Moreover, such programs are long-term in nature, with progress often measured in years. Although significant potential exists for development of Afghanistan’s natural resources, critical building blocks related to the investment climate—commercial laws and the legal and regulatory environment—are only gradually beginning to take hold, thus the full economic potential in these natural resource deposits will remain untapped in the near to medium-term. Military solutions are not sufficient to address these large-scale problems, which will require civilian expertise and a long-term perspective.

158

Report to Congress

3.2.6. Transportation The primary activity of the international community in regards to transportation has been road improvement. Several in-depth studies have been completed, resulting in an overall ‘master’ plan for the road network of the country. Additional modes of transportation, such as rail or air, have received limited attention and should be the subject of further in-depth studies and research. The primary goal of road construction is to increase transport of goods, national and regional trade, and economic growth. The major ancillary benefit of the roads is freedom of movement for Afghan and international forces due to their anti-IED effect. The Afghan saying is, “Where the road ends, the Taliban begins.” The Road Development Master Plan provides the primary strategy to build a network of roads in the country. The basic design calls for roads to connect district centers to provincial centers, and then provincial centers to a central Ring Road connecting the major cities around the country. Thus, the population will be physically linked from the local to the national level, and from their district centers all the way to the capital in Kabul. The Road Development Master Plan will be a permanent legacy of a strong Afghan government providing jobs, linking the nation, and expanding commerce that no alternate organization can provide. Currently, Afghanistan’s road network includes 35,566 kilometers of roads (8,231 kilometers of which have been completed by the United States. and its allies since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom). An additional 2,200 kilometers of roads are planned for completion over the course of 2008. Road construction projects have injected $71 million into the local economy since January 2007. One kilometer of road construction generates and average of 3,500 labor days. The Ring Road will be approximately 2,200 kilometers long upon completion in December 2009. An estimated 73 percent (1,755 kilometers) of the planned length has been constructed to date. Over 60 percent of Afghans live within 50 kilometers of the Ring Road, making it critical to trade and transport. Afghans composed 75 percent of the workforce for

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

159

the largest section of road, the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway USAID, through the Louis Berger Group, will begin the reconstruction of the Khowst to Gardez Road. This road will connect two major provinces and increase economic stability in the region. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works intends to initiate a fiscally sustainable road maintenance system to effectively maintain 7,000 kilometers of roads. Roads, like any other structure or facility, require continuous maintenance. If these gravel or paved roads are maintained by Afghans, this activity will demonstrate the Afghan government’s ability to provide the sustained basic necessities for continued economic growth. It will also sustain the large monetary investment that the United States has made on behalf of the Afghan government. At the current rate of funding, U.S. agencies will increase the current number of improved roads by approximately 20 percent. Between 2002 and the end of 2008, a total of more than 21,000 kilometers of roads will have been completed by the United States and its allies.

3.3. Economic and Social Indicators of Progress A key indicator of progress made in security, governance, and development in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign are the actions and perceptions of the general population. Popular perceptions are measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. Several organizations have sponsored public opinion surveys in Afghanistan since 2005. Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan commissioned a quarterly nationwide survey, the Afghanistan National Development Poll (ANDP), until August 2006. A follow-up ANDP was initiated by the CSTC-A in July 2007. ISAF is currently working to resume nationwide polling on a recurring basis. On a regional level, CJTF-82 has conducted monthly surveys of RC East since April 2007. Additionally, a number of U.S. and international organizations have commissioned nationwide perception surveys, including the Asia Foundation, the British Broadcasting Corporation, the U.S. State Department, and Charney Research. According to polls conducted in 2007, perceptions among Afghans of their country’s economy are improving. In 2004, when asked what they thought was the biggest problem facing Afghanistan, 51 percent of individuals polled chose the economy. When asked the same question in 2007 only 32 percent answered that they believed the economy to be the biggest problem facing the country. Perceptions of the Taliban and security have also shown slight improvements. However, the same polls indicated that public perception of corruption as a major problem is increasing. Organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the Afghanistan Central Statistics Office research and publish annual indicators of economic growth and development. These fairly standardized indicators of social and economic development include GDP, GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality, unemployment, the poverty rate, and rates of access to power, water, health, and education. The difficulty in gathering data in Afghanistan is evident in the diverging results; however, almost all development indicators show that progress is occurring. Many development indicators are dependent on data from a relatively accurate census of the population, including size, geographic disparity, ethnicity, age and sex. Afghanistan has not conducted a full census since 1979; this was a sampling census that results in statistical estimates of the population size and demographics. Extrapolations of those census results

160

Report to Congress

have been conducted by many organizations since 1979, with each publishing their own estimates of the population size. The divergence of these estimates has been significant: the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Fact Book states that Afghanistan has a population of 31,889,923; in 2007, the UN estimated the population at 27,145,000; while the Afghanistan Central Statistics Office—the lead GIRoA agency for population data— published a population estimate of 22,575,900, highlighting the difficulty that assistance and aid providers face in estimating and reporting development indicators in Afghanistan.

3.3.1. Unemployment Although most analysts estimate that unemployment is high in Afghanistan, accurate statistical data is virtually non-existent. The CIA World Fact Book indicates that as of 2005, the official unemployment rate in Afghanistan was 40 percent. The Afghan Central Statistical Office also maintains an official unemployment rate of 40 percent for 2007. However, other estimates of the unemployment rate are as high as 60 percent, and unemployment could be even higher in some rural provinces and districts. Defining unemployment is difficult in Afghanistan as many Afghans are employed on a temporary basis in the informal economy or on seasonal basis during the agricultural harvest. Regardless of the actual unemployment rate, the increase in international support activity since 2001, combined with the exponential growth of Afghan-owned businesses, has created more jobs. This growth has been consistent, even though the number of unemployed is still high. Though an accurate prediction of unemployment numbers may not be possible until the completion of the next Afghan census unemployment indicators remain a cause for concern. 3.3.2. Poverty Levels Poverty remains a significant problem for Afghanistan. According to broad estimates of Afghanistan’s national income and population, per capita income is about $300. This makes Afghanistan one of the poorest nations in the world, despite recent economic growth. Given the overall low level of national income, it is difficult to establish poverty measures in Afghanistan. However, the latest surveys of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) conducted in spring 2007 showed that approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population lives below the poverty line. An additional 20 percent of the population is concentrated close to the poverty line and is at risk of falling into poverty. The impact of rising diesel fuel prices and the doubling of wheat prices may be driving some of these families below the poverty line. Poverty may be even higher among rural and nomadic populations. The latest poverty analyses identify the existence of a large number of working poor in Afghanistan. Low salaries place many who are employed at risk of falling below the poverty line, including government employees. The analysis also showed that poverty was unevenly spread throughout Afghanistan: the poverty rates of provinces vary from around 10 percent in some provinces to more than 70 percent in others. Poverty is more severe in the northeast, central highland, and parts of the southeast. Despite a significant increase in public spending in key sectors to support poverty reduction, scarce domestic resources and limited international assistance resulted in only limited assistance to the poorest of the poor. The Afghan government and its international partners are committed to address the problem of widespread poverty. Poverty research was a vital part of the overall development of the ANDS. To improve poverty data, the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Rural

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

161

Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) launched two National Risk and Vulnerability Assessments in 2003 and 2005. Approximately 45,000 households from across the country were interviewed. This research led to the preparation of a comprehensive poverty analysis in 2007 which has been used as a basis for drafting the ANDS Poverty Profile and formulating the ANDS poverty reduction policies. The ANDS will also serve as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); the PRSP will guide the efforts of the government, international donors, and the major international financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank) in their efforts to reduce poverty in Afghanistan.

3.3.4. Health Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the health sector has seen significant progress in development, with reductions in morbidity (disease), and mortality (death). In 2001, 8 percent of the Afghan population had access to basic health care; today, 79 percent have access to basic health services. In 2001, Afghanistan was ranked the world's worst in infant mortality; in 2007 Afghanistan’s infant mortality rates are falling due to the efforts of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and its international partners. Since 2006, Afghanistan has reduced child mortality (five years and under) by 25 percent, saving 89,000 children in 2007. In 2006, 23,000 Afghans died from tuberculosis. In 2007, due to improved access to basic health care, only 12,000 Afghans died from this disease. Immunization coverage has reached 83 percent of children under one year of age and additional progress has been made in updating routine immunizations for older children, adolescents, and adults. Finally, recent data showed that 70 percent of health facilities have at least one female provider on staff, compared to 45 percent during the Taliban era. The MoPH developed the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), a program which includes maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, public nutrition, communicable diseases, mental health, disability, and supply of essential drugs. The program has recently increased its coverage of the population from 77 to 82 percent. There has been a marked increase in health infrastructure; the number of health facilities providing the BPHS has increased to 897 (from 746), the number of health facilities providing comprehensive emergency obstetric care has also increased to 89 (from 79), and the number of health facilities within the government’s program of Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses reached the stands at 309 facilities located in eight provinces and 39 districts. Thirteen therapeutic feeding units have been established, and two additional midwifery schools were opened. Twelve mobile health facilities were established to provide basic health services to the nomadic Kuchi population. The number of health facilities providing direct observed treatment short courses (in the treatment of tuberculosis) increased to 55 percent (from 45 percent). Approximately 40,000 insecticide bed nets were distributed to control the spread of malaria. Provincial teams in eight provinces were established to track the prevalence of avian flu. In total, 670 health facilities have been renovated or constructed. The GIRoA has clearly articulated its health sector objectives in the ANDS. The ANDS states the following strategic goal for health: "...to reduce the morbidity and mortality of the Afghan population by implementing a package of health and hospital services, special programs and human resource development” (see figure below).

162

Report to Congress

Figure 4. ANDS Health Sector Strategic Area and Programs.

The GIRoA ministry responsible for Afghan health programs is the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) which published a series of progressive health sector strategies beginning in 2005. It also created two documents that lay out operating procedures for health facilities: first, the BPHS is the key document that describes the services provided for primary outpatient health care and outlines staffing, equipment, and medications required to operate a facility; second, the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) is the key document that describes in-patient facilities and identifies a standardized package of hospital services, provides a guide for private and public sector hospitalization, and promotes a referral system that integrates the BPHS with hospitals. Key improvements are focusing less on the number of new health facilities and more on improving the standardization of care, coordination among all levels of care, refining referral services, increasing the available range of services, increasing hours of clinic operations, and fielding appropriate numbers and types of staff. In general, the focus is on increasing intellectual and human capacity as opposed to building facilities and developing infrastructure. Additional improvements include an increased deployment of the Basic Package of Health Services through a nationwide network of linked primary care facilities. This has resulted in increased access to care, raising the numbers of people within a two-hour walk of a medical facility to 66 percent in 2007. Continued improvements are focused towards the long-term goal of achieving standardized, sustainable, and independent health services.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

163

3.3.5. Education Only 28.1 percent of adult Afghans are literate, according to the CIA World Factbook. Many of the literate people are only able to read and write at the second or third grade level. Most of the literate population is only able to read and write at the second or third-grade level. The majority of teachers in Afghanistan have education equivalent to the ninth- to twelfthgrade levels in the United States. They are able to teach basic reading and writing, plus reading (reciting) of Arabic text in the Quran. The Ministry of Education’s (MoE) National Education Strategy Plan in concert with the ANDS is making strides in the educational system. These strides will guarantee access to education to all Afghans. Currently, there are more than five million children that are enrolled in schools today, nearly 38 percent female, compared to five years ago when a little more than one million students were enrolled with almost no females. The number of teachers has grown more than seven-fold, but only 22 percent meet the minimum MoE qualification of Grade 14. Only 28 percent of teachers are female, located primarily in urban areas. The emphasis on improving the curriculum over the last five years has been concentrated on the first six years of schooling. However, a secondary school curriculum is currently being developed. Although more than 3,500 schools have been established, only 40 percent of students have actual buildings in which to meet. Thousands of communities have no easy access to schools, causing parents to send their children to madrassas in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalism is a focus. There are security concerns for Afghan schools: nearly six percent of schools have been burnt or closed down due to terrorism in the last 18 months. Finally, approximately 30,000 to 40,000 students graduate from high school every year, but only one third are admitted to universities due to a lack of university capacity. In accordance with the ANDS, the Afghan government intends to guarantee access to primary education for all children by the year 2020 and provide for most to attend secondary school. Access to higher education will be readily available and the government will ensure that university graduates have a realistic hope of obtaining jobs. To achieve these goals, the United States and the international community must continue to support the ongoing development of the comprehensive national educational system. This effort requires constructing or rehabilitating schools, upgrading primary-school teacher skills through national teacher training programs, increasing the MoE’s capacity to provide in-service and pre-service support for teachers, and coordinating the printing of five to ten million books per year in 2008 through 2010. In the area of higher education, all 16 university faculty training and education programs must be prioritized. The Ministry of Education must coordinate and resource the printing of five to 10 million books per year in 2008 through 2010. The literacy and productive skills of Afghans, especially woment, must be enhanced to meet the needs for skilled workers in a growing economy. The educational system must expand to provide more choices and more competition, such as private schools and Americanstyle education opportunities for university students. This comprehensive plan for a national education system in turn will directly contribute to the long-term sustainable growth of the Afghan economy and hence an improved way of life for the Afghan people.

164

Report to Congress

3.4. Economic Development Outlook The GIRoA continues to make slow but measurable progress in the area of economic development. Afghanistan has met most of the targets on monetary and fiscal policy under its International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic program, but it has fallen short on benchmarks related to structural reforms. The national budget process has improved significantly, as noted by the IMF in its latest assessment, and the government adheres to a strict fiscal policy of no borrowing and no overdrafts with the banking system. Incremental improvements have been made in raising government revenue from customs duties and other sources, and budget deficit targets were met in the current fiscal year (March 21, 2007 though March 20, 2008). The GIRoA’s challenges include increasing revenue, controlling the afghani exchange value, and increasing ministry capacity to plan and implement development programs. Afghanistan continues to have one of the world's lowest domestic revenue to GDP ratios, at about 8 percent. The afghani appreciated in real terms against the U.S. dollar in 2004-06, owing in part to large aid inflows and drug-related financial flows. In the first seven months of this fiscal year, however, the afghani remained steady despite rising inflation. The concern is that an overly strong afghani could inhibit the growth of a domestic industrial base (and the employment it would bring) by encouraging imports and discouraging exports.

Figure 5. Afghanistan Gross Domestic Product (Licit), 2002-2006 (Source: World Bank).

Afghanistan's overall economic performance under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility program has been strong. Since the beginning of the program, fiscal revenue has increased steadily and the monetary policy framework has been enhanced. The droughtinduced decline in agricultural production held the real economic growth to an estimated seven percent in 2006 and 2007. Real GDP growth is expected to exceed 13 percent in the 2007-2008 fiscal year, which ended on March 20, 2008. GDP per capita has increased by around 53 percent in the last five years and grew from around US$200 to around US$306.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

165

Inflation declined to five percent in 2007 but rose to double digits in 2008, owing mainly to sharp increases in the prices of imported fuel and foodstuffs. Some of this inflation is tied to instability in Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s increased dependency on imports in 2007 and early 2008. Pakistan is usually a large exporter of basics (food and fuel) to Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s difficulties in meeting internal demands due to drought significantly affected the Afghan economy. The underlying trends, however, signal that domestic inflationary pressures are being contained. Confidence in the domestic currency, which has remained broadly stable against the U.S. dollar, has been instrumental due largely to a sound monetary policy. According to the IMF, the Afghan economy has grown by an average of 11.4 percent per year in real terms since 2002, albeit from a small base. This strong growth can be attributed largely to reconstruction efforts fuelled by development assistance, as well as to a recovering agriculture sector. In 2006-2007, real economic growth was at an estimated 7.5 percent, weaker than recent averages. The slowdown was the result of a return to drought conditions, which caused agricultural production to drop considerably that year. There has been better weather to date through 2007-2008, and agriculture is expected to rebound. Due to increased agricultural output, the IMF projects that economic growth in Afghanistan will rise to 13 percent in 2007-2008, but it expects GDP to begin to normalize and fall to around 9 percent in 2008-2009 A major challenge for the GIRoA is progress toward fiscal sustainability. While the GIRoA has increased it revenue collection, it cannot keep pace with increased expenditures, largely driven by the security sector. Increasing the number of ANSF and sufficient pay is clearly important for security, but it has fiscal implications for the GIRoA which will eventually have to pick up those substantial costs. It is estimated that the GIRoA will roughly cover less than 20 percent of its total recurrent expenditures, including the core and external budgets, in 2008-2009. Furthermore, the GIRoA has now begun to experience difficulty meeting its annual revenue target due in part to political interference and lack of capacity.

3.5. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 3.5.1. Strategy and Objectives Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) consist of a combination of military and civilian personnel whose mission is to aid in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. PRTs are under military command. Military personnel provide a security envelope in which civilian experts can work on governance and development projects. U.S. PRTs operate under general guidance provided by ISAF. The stated mission of the PRTs is as follows: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts.”

While the specific activities of each PRT are determined by the needs in its respective area of operation, PRTs achieve their objectives by following four key lines of operation: •

increase effectiveness of legitimate authorities;

166

Report to Congress • • •

decrease effectiveness of illegitimate authorities; increase legitimacy of legitimate authorities; and decrease legitimacy of illegitimate authorities.

The U.S.-led PRTs in RC-East play an integral role in the ground commanders’ counterinsurgency approach. They coach, train, and mentor sub-national government officials in order to implement good governance practices that are transparent, guarantee human rights, are free of abuse and corruption, and provide due regard to the rule of law. Additionally, through the DoD-funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and USAID funding, U.S.-led PRTs fund construction projects that assist the local government in meeting the basic needs of the populace and provide the basic infrastructure to support economic growth and development. Although CERP funds are dispersed at the discretion of the U.S. military commanding officer, the program achieves the best results when planned and carried out in coordination other agencies (i.e., USAID) working in the same sectors and in many cases the same districts or villages. This is particularly true for USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development program, which provides technical assistance and training to provincial and district officials combined with community-level small infrastructure activities, as well as USAID’s Alternative Development programs that support the agriculture sector in many of the RC East provinces. Conducting these disparate activities independently of one another would achieve only minor effects; however, by integrating the right combination of governance and development activities with complementing security capabilities, PRTs have the potential to make significant contributions to the reconstruction and development progress in non-permissive environments. The PRTs are in essence synthesizing agents that apply the right combination of governance capacity building and development assistance in concert with the commanders’ security component in order to achieve the greater overall desired outcomes. PRT command teams meet with provincial governors, district officials, and ministry officials in their areas of responsibility several times during each week. The PRTs work closely with Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees and the local representatives of other organizations and aid agencies. In their role as coaches, mentors and trainers, the PRTs work closely with all these provincial-level officials and agencies to assist them in providing for the populace.

3.5.2. Composition and Laydown The table below indicates U.S.-led PRT staffing levels. Current shortages in U.S. civilian agency personnel (primarily USAID advisors and USDA representatives) are currently being addressed by Embassy Kabul and the relevant agencies in Washington. PRT

Military

Asadabad Bagram Farah Gardez Ghazni Jalalabad

Auth 89 63 99 88 88 88

O/H 89 63 99 88 88 88

Civilian DoS Auth 1 0 1 1 1 1

O/H 1 0 1 1 1 1

USAID Auth 1 2 1 1 1 1

O/H 1 1 1 1 1 1

USDA Auth 1 0 1 1 1 1

O/H 0 0 0 1 1 0

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan PRT

Khowst Mehtar Lam Nuristan Panjshir Qalat Sharana Total

Military Auth 88 88

O/H 88 88

Civilian DoS Auth 1 1

88 55 99 88 1021

88 55 99 88 1021

1 1 1 1 11

167

O/H 1 1

USAID Auth 1 1

O/H 1 1

USDA Auth 1 1

O/H 0 1

1 1 1 1 11

1 1 1 1 13

1 1 1 1 12

1 1 1 1 11

0 1 0 0 4

The U.S.-led PRTs are positioned in the following locations: City Bagram Panjshir Kalagush Asadabad Mehtar Lam Jalalabad Khowst Gardez Sharana Ghazni Qalat Farah

Province Parwan and Kapisa Panjshir Nuristan Konar Laghman Nangarhar Khowst Paktia Paktika Ghazni Zabul Farah

ISAF Regional Command East East East East East East East East East East South West

3.5.3. Coordination and Chain of Command Each U.S.-led PRT in RC East is under military command, subordinate to a U.S. brigade task force. The PRTs receive instructions and guidance from their brigade headquarters. They coordinate their actions through the brigade headquarters and laterally with the battalions and civil affairs teams occupying the same area. PRT actions are synchronized by their commands with U.S. and ISAF campaign objectives. The U.S.-led PRTs have an integrated command group structure combining the military and civilian elements (e.g., USAID, DoS, and USDA) to ensure effective execution of security, development and governance programs and policies. Coordination among the PRTs is conducted laterally as well, through USAID and USDA representatives in their respective organizations. CJTF-82 provides liaison officers to ISAF, USAID, UNAMA and CSTC-A to coordinate efforts. USAID and DoS provide advisors at the CJTF-82 HQ, each brigade task force headquarters and each U.S.-led PRT. USAID and DoS also provide advisors to many of the PRTs led by other international partners active in Afghanistan. CJTF-82 hosts quarterly development conferences with USAID and UNAMA which include representatives from the brigades and PRTs. CJTF-82 also sponsors quarterly interagency conferences that include wide representation from CSTC-A, the U.S. Embassy and USAID. These conferences address the salient issues that pertain to all U.S. Government agencies executing governance and development support in Afghanistan and are supported by day-to-day coordination between CJTF-82 development related staff and USAID technical officers on development and governance issues. CJTF-82 also sponsors quarterly stakeholder conferences that include UNAMA, most UN agencies, and multiple non-governmental organizations operating in

168

Report to Congress

Afghanistan. These conferences are conducted for the same reasons as the interagency conferences mentioned above. Recurring meetings and conferences at ISAF serve as the unifying agent across Afghan and international forces as with the CJTF-82 interagency and stakeholder’s conferences. These meetings and conferences help to establish and maintain good working relationships among the respective functional staff sections of the various agencies. It is through these meetings and conferences, as well as the day-to-day coordination and cooperation between the agencies, that U.S. and international organizations drive toward unity of effort

3.5.4. Provincial Reconstruction Team Funding The U.S.-led PRT efforts are funded through CERP under the Department of Defense, complemented by USAID-funded development programs. CERP funds are not used to cover PRT operating costs. The CERP funds available in FY2007 were $206 million. The amount earmarked for FY2008 is $208 million. The following table indicates the amount distributed to each of the PRTs for FY2007. PRT Bagram Farah Gardez Ghazni Khowst Kunar Laghman Nangarhar Nuristan Panjshir Qalat Sharana PRT TOTAL

FY07 OBLIGATED $6,736,139.14 $4,300,167.81 $4,746,008.00 $10,568,059.00 $17,968,464.43 $10,559,073.23 $3,435,263.00 $12,839,907.00 $20,546,045.73 $5,450,159.22 $927,174.02 $23,816,477.07 $121,892,937.65

Although the CERP funding is shared with the maneuver units, the PRTs execute a majority of the CERP-funded projects. Each month, the PRTs receive a monthly CERP allocation which provides them funding for quick-impact projects, calculated on a per capita basis. Additionally, this monthly amount is not a spending limit. PRTs nominate projects identified as being needed within their areas of responsibility that are above and beyond their monthly allocation. A CERP Review Board meets weekly to evaluate the project nominations and funds projects that are deemed technically and legally sufficient and meet the commander’s intent as stated in the current development guidance and operations order. The following table indicates the amount distributed monthly to each of the PRTs. Across the command, CJTF-82, USAID, and DoS work to partner with GIRoA officials at all levels. The primary objective is to help connect the Afghan populace to the government, help build trust and confidence in government institutions and to solidify popular support for the government. The CJTF-82 Commanding General and Deputy Commanding Generals meet regularly with ministers and deputy ministers to ensure that CJTF-82 objectives are in line with GIRoA ministerial strategies. CJTF-82 staff officers meet with and correspond regularly with ministerial officials to work common solutions to issues.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

PRT Bagram Panjshir Nuristan Asadabad Mehtar Lam Jalalabad Khowst Gardez Sharana Ghazni Qalat Farah

169

Monthly Allocation $158,900.00 $22,200.00 $5,400.00 $21,600.00 $32,100.00 $107,300.00 $41,400.00 $26,500.00 $20,900.00 $88,900.00 $43,900.00 $72,900.00

3.6. Reconstruction and Development Oversight Through capacity building programs with Afghan ministries and provincial governments, the United States is working to eliminate inefficiencies and corruption in the delivery of assistance to the Afghan people. U.S. foreign assistance programs work with ministries – focusing on the most important service providers, like the ministries of health, education, finance, and agriculture – to put more responsibility for service delivery at the local levels and ensure funds reach the provinces. This will also allow ministry representatives working at the provincial levels to do planning, decision-making, delivery, and monitoring activities, ensuring assistance reaches the Afghan people. Advisors will mentor and support capacity building for Afghan government employees in areas such as financial management, budgeting, procurement, human resources management, strategic planning, project planning, and project implementation, and information and communications systems. In addition, the U.S. Government has made progress over the past seven years streamlining our disbursement of funds to program implementers. The U.S. Government has disbursed 69 percent of the $26.3 billion in U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan from Fiscal Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2008 (this is not including the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental), which is higher than the Ministry of Finance’s reported international average of 62 percent, and almost 20 percent higher than where the U.S. Government was two years ago. Efforts to put more control of funding decisions into the hands of Provincial Reconstruction Teams have improved the PRTs’ ability to quickly follow security gains with development efforts that address locally-identified priorities. The Office of the Inspector General in Afghanistan has spent $2.7 million on oversight activities. As of December 2007, they had completed 18 performance and 23 financial audits. Not a single one of these audits revealed significant findings of waste, fraud, or abuse.

SECTION 4: COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) The cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan is a major concern. Narcotics-related activities are fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan and, if left unchecked, threaten the long-term stability of the country and the surrounding region. Over

170

Report to Congress

90 percent of the world’s opium originates in Afghanistan, and the emerging nexus between narcotics traffickers and the insurgency is clear. Due to the threat to economic development, security, and governance posed by the trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (OSD CN), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Department of State (DoS) are committed to strengthening the counternarcotics (CN) capabilities of the GIRoA and bordering nations.

4.1. Strategy, Resources, and Priorities The U.S. Government has developed both short and long-term objectives to meet CN goals in Afghanistan and the region. These objectives are framed within the Five Pillar strategic plan for Afghanistan. The five pillars include: 1) Public Information, 2) Interdiction and Law Enforcement, 3) Eradication, 4) Rule of Law and Justice Reform 5) Alternative Development. In the short-term (one to three years), the primary focus will be on the interdiction pillar. To this end, DoD will continue to focus on capacity building programs; sustaining CN police forces; training the ABP to identify, track and interdict outgoing narcotics and incoming precursor chemicals; increasing the capacity of the CNPA to detect, gather evidence, develop cases and incarcerate drug traffickers; integrate CN capacity building in the provinces within the CSTC-A FDD Plan; and better utilize the National Guard State Partnership Program for regional CN support activities. The long-term (three to five years) strategy is to continue providing support to interdiction-capacity building. This support will primarily be targeted towards Afghan law enforcement, but legitimate law enforcement organizations of neighboring countries will also be beneficiaries. U.S. efforts aim to contain narcotics trafficking within Afghanistan, break the tie between insurgents and the drug trade, continue to engage Central Asian countries in order to gain access, ensure regional efforts remain Afghan centric, and eventually transfer CN program support to partner nations. To achieve these goals, the United States will continue to fund programs that enhance the logistical and technical abilities of partner countries to conduct CN interdiction operations. Descriptions of other agencies responsibilities can be found in section 4.2 below. In August 2007, the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan was revised by the interagency community to improve implementation of CN activities in Afghanistan. Strategy elements were based on input from an interagency group of experts representing the DoS, DoD, Department of Justice, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and USAID. The improved strategy evaluated the previous CN strategy for Afghanistan, examined pertinent issues, obstacles and lessons learned, and presented a way forward on the five pillars of the strategy. The way forward involves three main elements: (1) dramatically increasing development assistance to provide incentives for licit development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations; (2) coordinating CN and counterinsurgency planning and operations in a manner not previously accomplished, with a particular emphasis on integrating CN into the counterinsurgency mission; and (3) encouraging consistent, sustained political will for the CN effort among the Afghan government, our allies, and international civilian and military organizations. To ensure the

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

171

goals of this strategy are met, several weekly and bi-weekly interagency counternarcotics coordination meetings are held. All principal policy makers take part in the Afghan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), the Afghan Working Group (AWG), the Afghan Steering Group (ASG), and the Deputies and Principals Committee meetings.

4.2. Roles and Missions At the national level, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are the policing agency responsible for countering illicit narcotics traffickers in Afghanistan. The CNPA mission is to enforce the narcotics laws and regulations, the policy of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and orders from the Ministry of the Interior. In order to foster stability and security, the CNPA targets narcotics trafficking suspects and those who protect them. Provincial governors are responsible for discouraging poppy cultivation and conducting Governor-led eradication (GLE), if necessary. Should governors need assistance in conducting eradication, they can ask for national assistance. In provinces where governors are either unwilling or unable to conduct GLE, the central government’s Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) may be deployed, even if the governor does not request support. Those provinces that demonstrate notable progress in counternarcotics by greatly reducing poppy cultivation or eliminating it altogether, may qualify for high-impact development assistance through the Good Performers Initiative. The international forces present in the country provide operational support to the GIRoA. ISAF does not have a direct mission in CN; however, ISAF assistance to CN activities is a key supporting task. The DoS works within the five pillar plan to coordinate public information campaigns and poppy eradication. DoS and DoJ work in conjunction to enhance the Afghan judicial system, train prosecutors, and build the infrastructure necessary to indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers. The DEA, DoJ, DoS and DoD have been successful in building the interdiction capacity of the CNPA. With the assistance of DoD, the DEA recently opened a new training facility for the CNPA. The DEA is also in the process of developing a three-to-five-year expansion plan for DEA operations in Afghanistan. USAID provides devolvement opportunities for the Afghan people, and is building roads, installing irrigation, constructing cold storage facilities, and introducing improved farming techniques to the Afghan people with the goal of providing viable alternatives to opium cultivation.

4.3. Efforts to Improve Coordination 4.3.1. Interagency As mentioned previously, the U.S. Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan worked with an interagency group of experts to revise the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan with the goal of improving the implementation of CN activities in Afghanistan. Experts from DoD, DoS, Department of Justice, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and USAID worked together to create the revised strategy, which was publicly released in August 2007.

172

Report to Congress

4.3.2. International The opium problem in Afghanistan can not be viewed as Afghanistan’s problem alone. For this reason, the USG will continue to build the interdiction capacity of neighboring countries in the South and Central Asia region. Regionally, DoD will continue to provide non-intrusive detection equipment, training and infrastructure support for better border security to the Government of Pakistan; improve border facilities and provide new communications equipment in Tajikistan; provide scanning equipment and construct border crossings in Turkmenistan; and improve command and control and provide mobile interdiction training in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, DoD will continue to provide the Pakistan Frontier Corps (FC) with funds to improve its ability to identify and interdict narcotics traffickers; in FY08 alone DoD will provide more than $50 million to continue to build the capacity of the FC. Building regional counternarcotics capacity ensures that the Afghan opium problem will not simply migrate to another country in the region and continue to threaten U.S. goals of peace and security in this important corner of the world. 4.3.3. Use of Intelligence The U.S. Government coordinates the development of CN programs and the sharing of CN intelligence and information with partner nations and lead federal law enforcement agencies. Sharing intelligence, while building the capacity of the GIRoA and neighboring countries to collect CN intelligence, will allow the United States to shift the burden of counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan to the Government of Afghanistan more quickly. The Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (UK-led, based in London) enables analysts from different U.S. and U.K. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct strategic analysis to provide CN policy makers with an accurate assessment of the Afghan opium problem. The Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) (U.S.-U.K. joint leadership, based in Kabul) provides law enforcement targeting support and operational coordination for U.S., U.K., GIRoA and other CN law enforcement operations. These operations target the illicit Afghan narcotics industry, and the IOCC works to support, strengthen and expand the rule of law and good governance in Afghanistan. The DoD-funded CNPA Intelligence Fusion Center (CNPA – IFC), located in the CNPA headquarters, liaises closely with the CNPA Intelligence and Analysis Department. On a daily basis, the CNPAIFC handles information requests from the CNPA and IOCC and provides targeting coordination based on information gathered from intelligence sources and seized documents. By coordinating efforts between the CNPA and the international partners, and by facilitating the flow of information, the CNPA-IFC acts as a critical enabler for the intelligence and analysis department while playing a vital role in creating synergy between the GIRoA and partner law enforcement agencies. The Criminal Investigations Management System is a database system for recording data and performing link analysis on criminal activity in support of the CNPA. In addition to a database function, the system provides capabilities for collecting biometric data on criminals. The project involves developing the database system and deploying equipment to Afghanistan in conjunction with system management training. This development enables the CNPA to archive information and share it with international law enforcement agencies. The mission of the Centers for Drug Information is to help disrupt illegal drug trafficking through operational and tactical law enforcement information sharing. Sharing of drug-related information between and among the participating nations and agencies enhances the effectiveness and

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

173

efficiency of CN law enforcement. These systems will ultimately provide the CNPA with the capability to develop a comprehensive information sharing process; and will facilitate sharing of timely and secure investigations information. DoD is also working to improve its human intelligence capability. In FY 2008, DoD will provide more than $57 million towards CN intelligence programs in Afghanistan, and has requested funding to continue these programs.

4.4. Efforts to Improve Afghan Capacity CN operations are severely constrained by the capacity of the Afghan law enforcement and judicial systems. In Afghanistan the judicial system is negatively affected by varying degrees of corruption and a lack of transparency. As a result, DoD, DoS, DoJ, DEA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working to build the infrastructure necessary for the GIRoA to conduct legitimate law enforcement operations against narcotics traffickers. Over the next several years, the U.S. and its international allies will assist the CNPA in building the capacity to arrest high value drug traffickers, intercept narcotics during transit, and destroy clandestine laboratories. Current joint DoD programs with DEA have resulted in the construction of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of equipment for the Sensitive Investigative Unit and the Technical Investigations Unit, and provided advanced training for the CNPA, with DoS funding all the operations and maintenance costs for these facilities. Additional funding for these programs was supplied by DoD and DEA to conduct background checks on applicants and train those who were found to be suitable for duty in these elite units. With DoS, DoD provided funding for the Afghan Joint Aviation Facility and the CN Justice Center, while providing helicopter flight training to MoI personnel for the creation of an organic airlift capability for Afghan CN organizations. DoD is developing an Unmanned Aerial System program to provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to interagency CN forces. This program will provide situational awareness and force protection for CN forces when they are conducting operations, specifically DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FASTs) and the NIU. The FASTs provide guidance, mentoring, and bilateral assistance to the GIRoA and CNPA in identifying and disrupting clandestine drug operations. The DEA FAST teams have consistently requested and received helicopter support from DoS, including mission support, insertion, extraction, medevac, search and rescue, and reconnaissance. Although U.S. military personnel do not directly participate in law enforcement operations, USCENTCOM forces do provide medical evacuation, in-extremis support, pilot training, helicopter lift support for administrative purposes, and intelligence for law enforcement CN missions. In FY 2008, DoD is providing more than $95 million to foster CNPA development. Some major DoD funded initiatives are Afghan helicopter crew member training ($4 million), Mi17 helicopter operations and maintenance ($13.2 million), aviation facilities ($4.3 million), NIU sustainment training ($5.6 million), DEA mentoring and training program ($9 million), expansion of the CNPA headquarters compound ($20 million) and construction of two regional law enforcement centers ($9.7 million). DoD has long-term plans to further support the capacity building of GIRoA CN forces. Some of the potential programs could include acquisition of additional MI-17 helicopters, Afghan helicopter crew member training, additional regional operations and training centers, NIU sustainment training, and mentoring for all levels of the counternarcotics police.

174

Report to Congress

DoD also plays an integral role in building the operational capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan Customs Department (ACD). The ABP and ACD require extensive support if they are to be effective in controlling Afghanistan’s 5,000 plus kilometer border. Border crossings with Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and China present a challenge to these Afghan departments. To meet this challenge, DoD funded a DoS program, the Border Management Initiative (BMI). The purpose of BMI is to improve security and promote stability in the border regions, and to increase interdiction capacity. In FY08, DoD will provide more than $14 million to build the capacity of the ABP and ACD. At the request of DoS, DoD funded the development of the U.S. Embassy Border Management Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime looks to the BMTF as the focal point for border management issues on behalf of the international community. Under the BMTF, U.S. mentors are provided to the ABP and ACD for border crossing points at Islam Qalah and Towrkham. DoD funded construction of several border crossing points in Afghanistan and the region including Sher Khan Bander, Towragundhi, and Islam Qalah. A communications system was also purchased for the ABP to support key command and control functions. Non-intrusive detection capability (x-ray and gamma scanners) has been provided to support inspections at major border crossing points and airports. The Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK), security element for the CN forces, is the Ministry of Defense’s contribution to GIRoA CN efforts. The unit is intended to provide cordon security in direct support of Poppy Eradication Force deployments. The CNIK will enable the CN forces to focus on their core competencies and reduce the security burden on international forces. OSD (CN) is coordinating with CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD to develop the requirements to field a fully air-mobile unit with appropriate combat enablers to deter security threats posed to CN forces by the insurgents and the drug traffickers. The creation of the unit is part of the USG CN strategy for Afghanistan.

4.5. Assessment 4.5.1. Progress to Date Although there has been some limited progress in the fight against narcotics, Afghanistan remains the leading producer of opium in the world. While many provinces have seen success in reducing poppy cultivation (12 of 34 provinces had more than a 50 percent decrease from 2006 to 2007 and the number of provinces that did not cultivate poppy rose from 6 in 2006 to 13 in 2007), four provinces experienced a significant increase in cultivation. Helmand in the south, Farah and Nimroz in the west, and Nangarhar in the east each saw an increase of more than 4,000 hectares from 2006 to 2007. Helmand alone now accounts for 53 percent of the total poppy growth in Afghanistan. One of the foremost problems is the lack of a comprehensive CN strategy among Afghanistan and its regional and international neighbors, especially Pakistan. With growing evidence of a link between the insurgency and the narcotics trade, it is becoming increasingly apparent that security in Afghanistan is directly tied to counternarcotics efforts. Another major issue that requires resolution is the lack of coordination between the MoD and MoI. The current framework leads to a compartmentalization of responsibility between

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

175

these ministries. The CNIK is an example of improvement. The MoD initially opposed the augmentation of the CNPA with ANA forces, mainly due to the potential risks posed by association with counternarcotics operations. In early 2008, the MoD changed its position, and the CNIK went into development. However, the issues that still need to be worked out are officer training for the CNIK, a memorandum of understanding with MoI on equipment loans and shared logistics during operations, and joint coordination and mission planning between the ministries.

4.5.2. Impact of Counternarcotics on the Counterinsurgency Mission U.S. forces provide support to CN law enforcement operations within the scope of current rules of engagement, applicable law and regulation, and within the limits of their means and capabilities. Use of limited forces in Afghanistan is a zero-sum endeavor. A shift in force application from one mission set to another comes with a cost of a reduction of available forces for the former mission set. A shift of limited assets may result in a degradation of the counter-terrorism mission. Intelligence sharing, limited logistical support, and in-extremis rescue and medical evacuation are currently being provided by U.S. and international forces towards the CN mission. Additional resources, targeted to the CN mission would be needed to expand direct DoD support to counternarcotics operations. Similarly changes in rules of engagement and national law would also be required. The CN mission affects the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions in another way. It is likely that counternarcotics operations have in some areas enabled insurgents to make common cause with farmers against the Afghan Government and ISAF. Insurgents can set up a protection racket, exchanging protection against eradication forces for support, supplies, and equipment from locals. 4.5.3. Potential Improvements The impact of building GIRoA CN operational capacity complements the DoD’s primary mission of CT and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. There is a clear nexus between narcotics and the insurgency in Afghanistan that threatens U.S. gains in Afghanistan and the region. The narcotics trade has strong links with the anti-government insurgency, most commonly associated with the Taliban. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to the Taliban, while the Taliban provides protection to growers and traffickers and keeps the government from interfering with their activities. By enabling the GIRoA to confront drug trafficking organizations we positively impact the effort to defeat the insurgency. The U.S. military is committed to continued work with other U.S. agencies, within the legal constraints imposed by Congress on military assistance to law enforcement operations, to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Central and South Asia to defeat the Afghan opium problem.

SECTION 5: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT Regional cooperation is essential for the Afghan government. Following the first Regional Economic Cooperation Conference in December 2005, limited regional cooperation sections have been established within the administrative structures of some Afghan ministries. Additionally, in 2006, a Directorate for Regional Cooperation was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, despite an ongoing successful Asian Development Bank

176

Report to Congress

Technical Assistance program towards mainstreaming regional cooperation, human capacity of this Directorate continues to need serious attention. The establishment of a cross-cutting consultative group and a working group for regional cooperation, within the framework of the ANDS, has helped create platforms of dialogue and interaction between different stakeholders on regional cooperation. However, there is very little discussion or lively debate on regional cooperation in the Afghan media and hence little public awareness of the subject. For the most part, progress has been limited in achieving visible and practical results on the ground in regional economic cooperation.

5.1. Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Areas and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas The greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan is the insurgent sanctuary within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The ANSF must be able to coordinate actions with a Pakistani force that is trained and resourced to eliminate threats emanating from within Pakistan. The Pakistan Military (PAKMIL)’s clashes with Taliban members and terrorist organizations in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas have, in the past, contributed to a decrease in cross-border insurgent activity in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces. The U.S. is concerned about ceasefire negotiations and other agreements between the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and possible militant groups in South Waziristan and other locations in the FATA and North West Frontier Province. After similar agreements were signed in 2005 and 2006, cross-border operations by extremist groups against U.S. and NATO forces increased substantially. The United States recognizes that there is no purely military solution to militancy, but we have made it clear to the GoP that any agreement should be enforceable and backed up by the credible threat of force.3 The potential repatriation of Afghan refugees is a major regional issue. Although there have been no refugees in the FATA itself since 2005, there are many in the greater border region. Of current concern are three camps, Jalozai, Girdi Jungle, and Jungle Pir Alizai, which the GoP has placed on the closure list every year since 2006 but not closed. The estimated combined population of these camps ranges from 130,000 to 145,000. Last year, Pakistan identified four refugee camps −including the three above− for closure. However, only the fourth camp, Kacha Gari, was closed. A worst-case scenario based on the GoP unexpectedly and precipitously closing and clearing multiple camps and expelling Afghans could result in up to 400,000 refugees trying to return to Afghanistan. Pakistan has committed to voluntary, not forced, repatriation and has stated that it will allow refugees from closed camps to relocate to other camps. This option could be attractive for many families who have lived in Pakistan for decades. Some refugees in Pakistan have returned voluntarily to Afghanistan because of sectarian violence, pressure from GoP authorities, and, for some former Kacha Gari residents, the cost of living in Pakistan outside of a camp environment. Mass repatriations, something that neither the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan or the Government of Pakistan believes will materialize, 3

For further detail on the Afghan-Pakistani border see Enhancing Security and Stability in the Region Along the Border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, submitted April 24, 2008 in response to section 1232(a) of the 2008 NDAA.

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

177

would severely tax the existing Afghan infrastructure, particularly in urban areas. Therefore, the Afghan government will attempt to negotiate with Pakistan to delay additional camp closures. Afghans who registered as refugees with the Pakistan authorities received a Proof of Registration card that allows them to stay in Pakistan until the end of 2009. A large number of the refugees have no intention of returning for a variety of social and economic reasons. UNHCR Pakistan is working with the GoP to identify mutually acceptable alternatives for extended temporary solutions for some Afghans. The Tripartite Commission (TPC) is comprised of senior military and diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO-ISAF and was established as a forum in which to discuss issues related to the border. The Commission has not met as regularly as originally intended and the last three meetings have been cancelled. However, recent efforts have aimed to reinvigorate the activities of the TPC. In addition to the Tripartite Commission, there is an ongoing series of meetings of representatives of the ANA, PAKMIL, and ISAF that convene on a quarterly basis. One of these initiatives is the Border Security Subcommittee Meeting (BSSM), a subordinate entity to the TPC, which serves as a forum for border issues to be discussed between U.S., ANSF, and PAKMIL leadership. The location for the BSSMs alternates between the Afghanistan and Pakistan sides of the border in order to foster trust and cooperation between the two countries. At the tactical commander level, Border Flag Meetings between ISAF, ANSF and PAKMIL brigade and battalion commanders ensure that the agreements made at the BSSMs are reinforced with the ground commanders. Pakistan, the United States, and NATO have embarked on a multi-year Security Development Plan for Pakistan’s western border region. One element of the SDP concerns the effort to develop Border Coordination Centers (BCC) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Designed to be manned by liaison officers from ISAF, ANSF, and PAKMIL, these BCCs will be optimized with intelligence feeds – including a network of Forward-Looking Infra-Red Radar (FLIR) nodes with the objective of presenting the liaison officers with a common view of the border area. The BCCs will also be supported with sophisticated communications that will link the liaison officers with their respective force providers – ANSF, the PAKMIL and paramilitary Frontier Corps (PAKMIL/FC) and RC-East – with the objective of speeding the delivery of target intelligence so force providers can execute interdiction missions against Taliban, Al-Qaeda, other extremists, and narco-smugglers. The first BCC was opened on March 29, 2008 at Torkham Gate on the Afghan side of the border. Five additional BCCs are planned for 2008-2010, with the next center expected to be completed before the end of 2008. In terms of communications capabilities, the United States continues to provide highfrequency radios to PAKMIL and FC to increase communication interoperability between U.S. forces and PAKMIL. Additionally, the United States began to field the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) to PAKMIL, providing a secure, rapid, computer-based interface between American and Pakistan forces. Designed as an information system for interactions with all partners active in Afghanistan, CENTRIXS will further increase the international and Afghan forces’ communications capability with Pakistan. The ongoing relations between the U.S., NATO ISAF, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been fostered principally along military channels. If the border areas between the two countries are ever to be fully secured, the strong U.S.-Pakistan partnership should be utilized to ensure that the Afghan-Pakistan military partnership extends to the political arena – specifically including the development programs that are active on both sides of the border.

178

Report to Congress

Afghanistan and Pakistan took initial steps to establish this political extension when they agreed, with U.S. backing, to establish a tribal jirga comprised of tribal elders and government officials from both sides of the border in September 2006. The first meeting of the jirga was held in August 2007. A subset of the jirga has met since then, and we expect the next meeting to be set soon.

5.2. Iran Iran is a significant donor for reconstruction, infrastructure, and development assistance to Afghanistan. Iran is responsible for much of the development in Herat Province, particularly the electric power and transportation infrastructure. Iranian influence is expected to continue to increase at a steady rate over the rest of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Iran will continue to try to achieve multiple objectives by providing overt monetary and reconstruction aid to the GIRoA, while at the same time providing training, weapons and other support to the insurgency to undermine ISAF influence. Iran is also a major trading partner with Afghanistan due to the countries’ extensive mutual border. This prominence gives Iran large amounts of political and economic influence. Numerous Iranian companies continue to expand their presence in Afghanistan, employing large numbers of Afghans. There is evidence that the insurgency in Afghanistan has been provided with lethal aid originating in Iran since at least 2006. It is unclear what role, and at what level, the Iranian government plays in providing this assistance. At present, the lethal support that has been provided to the insurgency in Afghanistan has not proven militarily significant. Analysis of interdicted weaponry, ordnance, and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) in Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban has access to Iranian weaponry produced as recently as 2006 and 2007. We monitor and take seriously any such assistance to the insurgency. Iran will continue to protect its stated national interests and there remains potential for disagreement between Afghanistan and Iran. An example of a potential source of conflict is water-sharing rights, which could be affected by current Afghan dam projects. Forced expulsions of Afghan refugees and undocumented economic migrants within its borders challenge the Afghan government’s ability to ensure the well-being of its citizens. Further deportations of Afghan refugees living in camps in Iran would severely strain the existing Afghan infrastructure and could create a humanitarian crisis similar to that of 2007, when Iran deported hundreds of thousands of Afghans over the course of a few months. The Afghan government will attempt to negotiate with the Iranian government to cease deportations and find a way to facilitate legal employment for the many Afghan workers who contribute to Iran’s economy, particularly in the construction and agricultural sectors.

In: Afghanistan Security Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 183-218

ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181)

ABSTRACT This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan. Consistent with this Act, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), is one of the United States’ top priorities in Afghanistan. The purpose of the ANSF development program is to grow the capacity and capability of the ANSF in line with internationally agreed benchmarks

180

Report to Congress

solidified in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The desired end state is a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic ANSF, with competent ministries and staffs and sustaining institutions, capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF.

Afghan National Army (ANA) The capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are improving steadily. The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations and has demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and professionalism. On February 5, 2008 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end-strength of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000 personnel. The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions. The long-term ANA posture may also include a more robust ANA Air Corps capability and a larger force.

Afghan National Police (ANP) The Afghan National Police (ANP) force is making steady progress, but its capabilities still lag behind those of the ANA. The current ANP force has not been sufficiently reformed or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security and policing mission. However, the Afghan and U.S. governments, and our international partners, recognize the shortcomings and are working to improve ANP capabilities. The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior is instituting rank and salary reforms to ensure that qualified officers remain on the force and achieve the rank and salary that they deserve. The new Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which began being implemented in late 2007, shows promise. The FDD withdraws the locally-based Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two months of immersion training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction. The goal of the FDD program is for the AUP to return to their home districts with increased professional capability and confidence to enforce the laws of their country.

The Way-Ahead An independent, capable Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) are critical to our counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts, and to establishing the security environment that will allow Afghanistan to become an economically prosperous, moderate democracy. It is crucial that the United States and our international partners dedicate the necessary resources and personnel to ensure that the mission to develop the ANSF is a success.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

181

SECTION 1: UNITED STATES PLANS TO ASSIST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN BUILDING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 1.1. Long-Term Strategy for Afghanistan National Security Forces Development Building Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security is a major priority of the U.S. effort in the country. Besides ongoing and concurrent efforts to defeat the Taliban-led insurgency and provide reconstruction and development to Afghanistan’s people, the United States and its international partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are focused on fielding and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF are comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). These forces represent critical pillars for establishing security and stability in Afghanistan. The long-term goal is to build and develop ANSF that are nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and increasingly funded from GIRoA revenue. The plan for ANSF development is consistent with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government’s overall development vision. The plan for developing the ANSF is also consistent with the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement which defined a political partnership between the GIRoA and the international community. According to the compact, the international community commits to providing the budgetary, materiel, and training support necessary to develop national military forces, police services, and associated ministerial structures and the GIRoA commits to providing the human resources and political will. Although the United States (U.S.) is the primary provider of ANSF training and development, other international members are contributing to the effort. Sections 1 through 4 address U.S. efforts to build and sustain the ANSF, and Sections 5 and 6 describe international efforts to do so. Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account. The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and

182

Report to Congress

consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.

1.2. United States Plan for ANSF Development Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the lead U.S. agency responsible for ANSF development. With policy guidance from Washington and the U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A directs all U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan security forces, and seeks to integrate the efforts of lead nations and other members of the international community into a comprehensive police plan. With GIRoA and international partners, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the development of enduring national military forces and police services with associated ministerial and sustaining institutions. This development covers the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities. The CSTC-A Campaign Plan, which has been developed in close coordination with the GIRoA, follows three lines of operation: (1) build and develop ministerial institutional capability; (2) generate the fielded forces; and (3) develop the fielded forces. Specific objectives include: •

• • •

• • • •

• •

Ministries capable of effective inter-ministerial cooperation and formulating, promulgating, and implementing policies, plans and guidance throughout all levels of the ANA and ANP; Reduced corruption in the ministries and throughout the ANA and ANP; Increased credibility of the ministries, ANA, and ANP as effective and professional organizations; ANA and ANP manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the full spectrum of internal security and law enforcement missions as dictated by the local security situation, independent of significant external assistance; Common ideology and procedures across all elements of the ANA and ANP; Well-developed personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP; An enduring training base that can provide basic training, professional training and education, and literacy education at all levels; Efficient and mature acquisition, maintenance, and logistics systems capable of identifying, acquiring, and distributing required resources to the ANA and ANP and thus providing an effective, long-term sustainment capability without external assistance; Fully operational units capable of independent operations with minimal external assistance; and A joint command and control structure coordinated at the national level to integrating the ANA, ANP, and the National Directorate for Security (NDS) at the regional and provincial levels.

Progress along the three lines of operation is tracked using four Capability Milestones (CMs):

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces •

•

•

•

183

CM4 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. It may be capable of undertaking portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support. CM3 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of partially conducting primary operational missions, but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support. CM2 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support. CM1 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions. Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the international partners.

The Campaign Plan’s three phases are conditions-based. They are not sequential and they may overlap. The focus of Phase I (Field/Generate the Afghan National Security Capability) is to generate and field effective national military forces and police services, their ministries, sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands. Substantial assistance will be required from the international community in all areas during this phase. The end state of Phase I will be achieved when the programmed forces have been fielded, received some collective training, and are participating in operations. The Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands will have been established. During Phase II (Development of the Afghan National Security Capability) the ANA, ANP, and international forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. The ANSF, ministries, and institutions will continue to develop the capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. All elements of the fielded ANSF will undergo collective training and evaluation. For the ANA, each unit will go through a validation process conducted by international training teams with final certification being done by the ANA itself. For the ANP, validation and certification processes will be conducted in coordination with the MoI, U.S. Embassy, and various international organizations. The end state of Phase II will be achieved when most ANSF elements achieve CM1, i.e., ANSF organizations are between 85 and 100 percent manned, equipped, and trained and have the capacity to plan, program, conduct, and sustain operations with specified international support. Phase III (Transition to Strategic Partnership and Afghan Security and Police Reorientation) occurs when the GIRoA assumes full responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement with the international community. At this point, CSTC-A will transition to a more traditional security assistance organization. The end state is characterized by an ANSF configured to provide for the security needs of the country: the defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against prospective enemies and internal threats.

1.3. Budget CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately

184

Report to Congress

$2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000person, 14- brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications, and intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the ANSF.

1.4. Tracking U.S. Funding ASFF funds are appropriated by the U.S. Congress to the U.S. Army. The Secretary of the Army distributes these funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA provides funding to Military Departments Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) for purchases in the continental U.S. (CONUS) (e.g., major end items, weapons, ammunition, and communication needs), as well as to CSTC-A for items that can be procured through the local contracting office, or to fund services performed by the Department of State (DoS) or the United Nations CSTC-A’s annual program objectives for the force generation and development of the ANSF bridge the gap between the strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution. Baseline requirements are derived from the approved ANSF force structure. Any modifications to these requirements come from the GIRoA, in consultation with CSTC-A. Changes to requirements result either from a change to the security situation as reflected in updated strategic planning documents of the MoD or MoI, or from lessons learned through operational experience. The ASFF is subdivided by Budget Activity Groups for the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Related Activities that include Detainee Operations. Budget activities are then further subdivided into sub-activity groups. Tracking of funds begins at the Budget Activity Group (BAG – e.g., ANA and ANP) and Sub-Budget Activity Group (SAG) – e.g., Equipment and Training) levels. BAG and SAG funding authorizations for each fiscal year are loaded into the Army’s Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), as well as a database managed locally in Afghanistan. As Memoranda of Request (MORs) are submitted for CSTC-A requirements, funds availability is confirmed by reviewing current funds status. For tracking of funds execution below the BAG- and SAG-levels, in addition to the MILDEP accounting systems, CONUS Life Cycle Management Command obligation reports are provided to the CSTC-A CJ8 and uploaded into a local database. For local procurement funds sent to CSTC-A via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), CSTC-A tracks all purchase requests against available MIPR funding and reconciles amounts daily. As contracts and payments are made against purchase requests, the CSTC-A CJ8 posts the

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

185

transactions in the local database. CSTC-A provides funds status on local procurement cases to USASAC who records the activity in the accounting system (SOMARDS) and the local Disbursing Office provides DFAS documentation of the disbursements made. The various MILDEP accounting systems report funds status monthly to the DSCA reporting systems (DIFS). The DIFS position is official program fund status. A funds control analyst reviews and audits funds status through the local database on a daily basis. Any discrepancies are worked with the appropriate offices and corrected. The status of funds and financial decisions are managed using a Program Budget Activity Council (PBAC) process. The CSTC-A PBAC process reviews budget execution rates, unfinanced requirement prioritization, and recommendations for command decision on program changes on a monthly basis.

1.5. Tracking Equipment 1.5.1. U.S. Procurement The CSTC-A CJ4 tracks equipment from the identification of the requirement, to the refinement of the requirement; from procurement source through shipment delivery; and from issue to end user. A new requirement for a weapon or vehicle system is initiated by a request to the CSTCA directorate or subordinate task force that owns the BAG or SAG. The initiator of the requirement works with the BAG or SAG owner, CSTC-A CJ7, CSTC-A CJ4 Requirements Division, and Security Assistance Office representatives to develop and refine the requirement details to a level that can be correctly sourced. The generation of new requirements is a formal approval process that is documented in an order that details CSTCA’s ANSF development programs. Once approved as a new requirement by the CSTC-A CJ7 (or the Deputy Commanding General for Programs, depending on the dollar value), the CSTC-A CJ4 coordinates with the CSTC-A CJ8 to determine budget availability. The CSTC-A CJ4 allocates the requirement to a specific budget program, the CSTC-A CJ8 commits the funds for the requirement, and the CSTC-A CJ4 conducts a final verification. The CSTC-A CJ4 then determines how to source the requirement—via local purchase or CONUS Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. DSCA guidance requires weapons and vehicles to be purchased via CONUS FMS cases. Determinations for other items are accomplished in accordance with DSCA local procurement guidance and through liaison with DSCA. For an FMS case, a MOR is fully staffed through CSTC-A prior to submission to DSCA. DSCA validates funding exists in the appropriate SAG and determines which service agent would best fulfill the requirement, and the services submit the requirement to their respective LCMCs. LCMCs work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop and award contracts for equipment. Items procured through FMS cases that are designated by DSCA as requiring end use certification due to their sensitivity are certified by the end user through a program managed by the CSTC-A CJ4. 1.5.2. International Donations CSTC-A works closely with the GIRoA at all levels to manage the manning, equipping, training, and provision of facilities for the ANSF. As requested in a December 2007 letter

186

Report to Congress

from Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to CSTC-A Commander General Cone, all equipment donations to the ANA are vetted through the office of the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (DCG-ISC) to ensure that each donation fits an actual requirement for the ANA and will be logistically sustainable. A similar CSTC-A vetting process is in place for equipment donated for the ANP. Once vetted by CSTC-A, the donation offer is sent to the MoD or MoI for final approval. For Donations from NATO countries, the donor nation is notified of the initial acceptance of the offer through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (DATES), Joint Forces CommandBrunssum, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Non-NATO countries can make donations in one of two ways, both considered bilateral donations. The first is similar to the process for NATO countries. A donor nation can approach the DCG-ISC with a potential donation. The vetting process would proceed at CSTC-A as described above, though without the involvement of ISAF DATES. Final approval and acceptance of the offer falls to the MoI or the MoD. The second way that a nonNATO country can make a donation to the ANSF is by a direct offer to the sovereign GIRoA. At this point, if necessary, an inspection in the donor country is conducted to verify the condition of the equipment. These inspections are required for all ammunition, weapons, and highly technical equipment. After the in-country inspection is completed, an arrangement for delivery of all accepted equipment is conducted. Regardless of the shipping method, the CSTC-A CJ4 transportation office is contacted with the arrival times of the donation in order to coordinate its delivery to a logistics depot in Kabul. A receipt (signed by a representative from either the MoD or MoI) is then sent to SHAPE to confirm the delivery and accountability of the donation. Arrival information (e.g., specific quantities and types of equipment) is annotated in a donation database. Since 2002, 46 donor nations (both NATO and non-NATO) have contributed equipment worth $822 million. There are currently 18 pending donation offers from 14 nations with a total value of more than $194 million. Major items include Leopard-1 tanks, MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, M2 machine guns, 81mm mortars, and millions of dollars in construction funding for such projects as the Kabul Military High School. Future solicitations for donations will focus on equipment from both the ANA and ANP requirements lists. However, CSTC-A, on behalf of the GIRoA, is putting more effort into seeking donor funding for equipment already being purchased for the ANSF and for engineering projects. In the search for these resources, CSTC-A is working with the local contingent of 20 defense attachés and with all of the national military representatives at SHAPE. The Polish contingent within the DCG-ISC office focuses on coordinating with Eastern European nations to meet ANSF needs for Eastern-bloc equipment and in-theater training to support this equipment.

1.5.3. Shipment of Equipment CONUS-sourced weapons and ammunition for both the ANA and ANP are shipped by Special Assignment Airlift Mission to Kabul International Airport (KAIA). Equipment is transferred from aircraft to ANA trucks by the U.S. element of the Combined Air Terminal Operations (CATO) activity at KAIA. The CSTC-A CJ4 representative attached to CATO and the ANA transportation element commander both sign a transportation management document that is subsequently signed by an ANA Depot 1 representative (the national depot

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

187

for ANA weapons) or a “22 Bunkers” Ammunition Depot representative (national depots for ammunition and ANP weapons) upon delivery. Large equipment, including vehicles, is shipped via sealift to the port of Karachi, Pakistan, where they are transferred onto commercial trucks by contracted carrier for movement to Afghanistan. Commercial vehicles depart Karachi, cross the PakistanAfghanistan border at Torkham Gate, and proceed to delivery points in Kabul. The CSTC-A CJ4 receives shipping reports through the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. ANA vehicles are delivered to ANA Depot 2 where they are signed for by ANA personnel and prepared for issue. ANP vehicles are delivered to a contracted maintenance organization for preparation and hand-receipt to the MoI Technical Department.

1.5.4. Issue Process and Documentation 1.5.4.1. Afghan National Army Units at initial fielding are "pushed" weapons and vehicles from the national depots in Kabul to the Forward Support Depot (FSD) in the unit area. The directive to issue the initial fielding sets is generated in a "push letter" signed by the CSTC-A CJ4 and transmitted to the U.S. mentors at the national depots. Staff at the depots generate an Afghan MoD Form 9 Issue or Turn-in Order, which is signed by the ANA unit transporting the equipment to the FSD. One copy is kept on file at the depot. The FSD supply officer signs the MoD 9 acknowledging receipt of the equipment and returns a copy to the issuing depot. The FSD issues the equipment to unit supply officers using the MoD Form 9 as well. After the initial issue, units request equipment and supplies on MoD Form 14 Request for Issue or Turn-in. Units submit these requests through their chain of command, through the FSD and Forward Support Group, to the Logistics Support Operations Center at the MoD Logistics Command. Each supporting level in the supply chain will either fulfill the request, forward to higher headquarters if unable to fulfill, or deny the request if it is not within authorization. 1.5.4.2. Afghan National Police The initial fielding process for the ANP is similar to the ANA process described above, except that equipment is “pushed” only in support of the scheduled fielding of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions and through the Focused District Development (FDD) program. Equipment is “pushed” to the Regional Training Centers (RTCs), which currently serve as the regional supply depots until the planned Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) are constructed. RLCs will be the ANP equivalent of FSDs in the ANA. Documentation occurs through the use of the MoI Form 9. After the initial issue, ANP units use the MoI Form 14 to request equipment. Other than support for the scheduled fielding of new units and the FDD program, all equipment is issued to the ANP by request only.

1.6. Efforts to Build and Maintain ANSF-Sustaining Institutions CSTC-A provides military officers to assist in the education and mentoring of Afghan military and civilian leadership on a daily basis. These officers assess and evaluate ANA and

188

Report to Congress

ANP progress and provide valuable advice that is designed to assist the ANSF to meet its development goals. They build confidence and experience in the leadership at the ground level, serving as an example for success. On a daily basis these officers help move the ANSF towards becoming a reliable, capable, and professional organization. CSTC-A mentors currently advise leaders throughout the MoI and the MoD. CSTC-A provides advisors to key leaders including: the Ministers of the Interior and Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, 1st Deputy Minister of Interior, Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics, Deputy Minister of Security, Deputy Minister for Administration and Logistics, Chief of the ANA General Staff (GS), Chief of the Criminal Investigative Division, Chief of Uniform Police, Chief of ANCOP, Chief of Counter-Terrorism, Chiefs of Training and Education, Intelligence, Finance, Internal Affairs, and many others. CSTC-A-contracted trainers also provide staff training via Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in the areas of logistics planning and property accountability, military decisionmaking processes, and other staff processes. A recent initiative has begun to expand this training to include students from district-level operations centers of the ANP. CSTC-A is committed to working in concert with the MoD and MoI to build training management and assessment procedures which train personnel to meet the demands of the entire system, build honest and accurate assessments from the bottom up, and assist the leadership in identifying issues requiring action. In order to develop common objectives and standardization, the oversight of training, including the formation of new training and schools, remains with CSTC-A. To summarize, a few of the processes that assist the ANSF in becoming strong and fully capable are: • • • •

Development of common core and synchronized programs of instruction ensures the same standards are met regardless of the source of the training cadre. Mentor and assessment teams confirm the accomplishment of training standards and the students’ ability to apply the processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Contracts for new training facilities and programs ensure that transition is planned and phased to ensure a successful transition to the ANSF. Training on management and leadership practices, and assisting in their implementation within normal ANSF operations, provides common procedures throughout the command structure to identify and resolve issues.

1.6.1. The Ministry of Defense CSTC-A executes a ministerial development program that synchronizes the development of MoD organizations and institutions with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board, a group of senior mentors and staff that reviews methods to improve the ANA. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability; and contractors with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the ministry to plan, program, and manage the army. The specific core systems being developed within the MoD include:

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

Personnel • Personnel Management • Reserve Affairs • Public Affairs Intelligence • Military Intelligence Operations • Strategic Defense Planning • Operational Planning • Force Management • Training Management • Doctrine Development • Readiness Reporting • Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

189

Logistics • Logistics • Acquisition Special Staff • Resource Management and Budgeting • Inspector General • Installation Management • Military Justice and Legal • Ministerial Administration • Medical and Health Care Ministerial level Capability • Disaster Response and Relief • Parliamentary Affairs

Additionally, senior military and civilian personnel serve as advisors to selected senior Afghan officials and officers within the MoD and General Staff (GS) to assist with seniorlevel issues and serve as liaison officers between the Afghan officials and the CSTC-A Commander and principal staff on matters affecting the development of the security sector.

1.6.2. Ministry of the Interior As the lead U.S. agency for ANSF development, CSTC-A works with the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan, and others in the international community to develop and reform the MoI. Ministerial development is managed through a program that works to synchronize MoI headquarters agencies and the core management systems essential to reforming the ministry and enabling its organizations and personnel to plan, program, and manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) serves as the international coordinating body between the operational-level entities and ANP reform efforts at the political level. The MoI serves as a co-chair for this body. Once issues have been resolved via an international caucus, the IPCB provides direction for action. Senior military and civilian personnel from the U.S. and international community advise selected senior Afghan MoI officials and officers on actions and issues associated with reform initiatives. These senior advisors also serve as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A Commander and principle staff, and the EUPOL Head of Mission. INL provides contractors who also assist with advising senior Afghan officials to facilitate reform efforts. CSTC-A functional staff focus on building organizational capacity and capability. Contractors with the prerequisite skills, working with military functional experts and staff, assist the Afghan senior leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and modern management practices essential to effective reform of the MoI. The core systems being developed within the MoI include:

190

Report to Congress

• Strategic Planning • Operational Planning • Operations and Force Readiness • Internal Affairs • Intelligence • Logistic Management • Faculties and Installation Management • Ministerial Administration

• Personnel Management • Legal Affairs • Finance and Budget • Force Management • Training Management • Programming • Parliamentary/Public Affairs

1.6.3. Logistics, Intelligence, Medical Services, and Recruiting The ability of Afghan security forces to operate independently will rely, in part, on adequate logistical support at all levels that allows the ANA and ANP to sustain their fielded forces. CSTC-A’s current policy is that equipment is not issued unless there is verification of appropriate supply and accountability procedures. A mature and continually improving national logistics infrastructure exists and is already supporting the ANA. A series of national and forward support depots currently provide the bulk of the ANA’s needs. Neither the United States nor the international community is involved in the distribution of supplies or equipment to ANA forces. Brigade-level logistics structures and systems are adequate and continue to develop. However, there is a gap in the linkage from the brigade level to the national level. This gap will require development of a corps-level logistics structure that will be addressed with the increase of 10,000 personnel beginning in 2009. Plans for 2009 lay the groundwork for making currently-contracted logistics an ANA core responsibility. For the ANP, logistics development is currently focused on verification and accountability. CSTC-A is addressing regional, provincial, and district level gaps in ANP logistics that stem in part from still-developing MoI logistics policies and procedures and logistics officer training. The MoI is working to close these gaps through regional, provincial, and district level logistics officer training. The Afghan intelligence community has three main components: the NDS, MoD, and MoI. Historically, information has rarely been shared; collaborative analysis and coordinated collection have been the exception rather than the norm. The establishment of clear roles and functions among the three major agencies has been hampered by distinct developmental paths, legacy Soviet paradigms, and disjointed U.S. Government and international support efforts. Although each agency is playing an increasingly effective role in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, much work remains to build national intelligence structures that encourage intelligence sharing and can provide coherent, timely intelligence to Afghan national decision- and policymakers. Medical services are developing, but are not yet adequate. Existing emergency medical services do not meet the needs of the ANA and ANP. Routine medical care is also rudimentary. However, the integration of ANA and ANP medical personnel into a collaborative health care system with the Ministry of Public Health will improve care, especially for combat casualties. Three new regional hospitals have opened, medical logistics proficiency and patient record keeping processes have improved, and immunizations have increased. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain before the ANA and ANP health care system can provide quality health care to those serving in the ANSF and their dependents.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

191

Effective ANA and ANP recruitment programs are in place. Both the ANA and ANP have consistently met recruiting goals year after year. Although separate and distinct, the ANA and ANP recruitment programs share resources where possible in order to remain as effective and efficient as possible.

1.6.4. Command and Control During the 12 months prior to March 2008, mentors have engaged in a variety of activities to develop ANSF communications capabilities among the national command and coordination centers, the regional coordination centers, and the provincial coordination centers. CSTC-A has focused on strengthening and refining the established command and control centers by improving the efficiency of operations at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Police Command Center (NPCC) by standardizing reporting formats and procedures. Efforts at the NMCC have been concentrated on enhancing operational command and control by developing standard operating procedures for Corps headquarters’ reporting of operational information to the NMCC. In addition, training and mentoring of liaison officers (LNOs) have been an ongoing activity designed to foster an attitude of urgency and accuracy in obtaining information from field units. A weekly video teleconference with Corps commanders was implemented to establish strong personal links at the command level. Current efforts are being made in the NMCC to establish a common operating picture (COP). A COP is established using GPS-established unit locations and graphic control measures that will then allow the NMCC to share its COP with other command centers through e-mail. The NPCC is included in this effort in order to establish a national level COP for all ANSF. This effort also includes an ability to share intelligence at appropriate levels. At the NPCC, efforts have been concentrated on developing standard operating procedures for internal NPCC operations as well as Joint Regional Coordination Center (JRCC) and Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) reporting requirements. The NPCC assumed control of radio communication operations and has been involved in an aggressive program of establishing and maintaining regularly scheduled communication checks with each JRCC. Command emphasis has been placed on the need to consolidate Regional Commands (RCs) and JRCCs in order to institute a single chain of command and control from district to province (i.e., JPCC) to region (i.e., JRCC) to the NPCC. Training and mentoring of LNOs has been an ongoing activity focused on coordinating all operational activities. At the national level, a weekly video teleconference between the NMCC and NPCC has focused on the exchange of intelligence and operations information in an effort to enhance situational awareness of both organizations. In addition, each command center provides LNOs to the other command center to ensure timely and accurate exchange of operational information.

192

Report to Congress

SECTION 2: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY 2.1. Programmed ANA End State By the end of 2008, the GIRoA plans to field a total of 70,000 ANA personnel. An additional 10,000 personnel are expected to be fielded by the end of 2009. Continued training, mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated above, the long-term ANA posture may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a larger army. The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.

2.2. Training Efforts The soldier training process begins with quality, needs-based recruiting. New recruits receive initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT), conducted by Afghan trainers with international supervision. ANA basics are taught to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the basics, but the individual soldier’s foundation is strengthened through branch-specific Advanced Combat Training. Although the necessity of fielding the force resulted in an initial focus on infantry and other combat-specific branches, training for the support specialties has also developed. Immediately following a new unit’s fielding and arrival at its Corps and brigade area, it undergoes a 60-day period of individual and collective training before being put into the rotation for combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) or a NATO-ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT). OMLTs and ETTS perform the same function: providing ANA units with comprehensive mentoring across the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions as well as direct access to U.S. and NATO-ISAF resources and enablers that enhance the operational effectiveness of the Afghan units. They coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in development of their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, and planning and employment in operations. ETTs and OMLTs facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement. They also serve as role models and liaisons between ANA and international forces. As more ANA units improve their capabilities and achieve operational independence it becomes increasingly important to track and record their progress. CSTC-A and the GIRoA have recently deployed Validation Training Teams (VTTs) consisting of U.S. and Afghan personnel to each of the ANA Corps to begin the validation process with the Corps’ most capable units. VTTs assist ETTs and OMLTs in establishing collective training strategies and evaluation standards to assess unit operational capability. These teams have begun to validate the most capable units. March 2008 saw the 203rd Corps Headquarters and the 3rd Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps become the first ANA units validated as CM1.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

193

In many instances, ANA combat units are assigned an ISAF partner unit during combat operations. In general, those ANA units with U.S. or NATO-ISAF partner units have shown a marked increase in their capability to provide security in their areas. However, it should be noted that some Afghan commanders have shown great initiative and improvement without the benefit of an international partner. CSTC-A and the MoD have enacted a cyclical readiness system to manage individual soldier and unit readiness. This cycle is designed around a four-month rotation that allows units to manage missions, training, schools, and leave. The system recognizes past experience, poor banking infrastructure, and issues with overall unit manning levels and readiness. This program has helped to reduce the absent without leave (AWOL) rate to a manageable 10 percent.

2.3. Equipment The three infantry companies in each kandak, or battalion, are equipped with former Warsaw Pact rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the Canadian version, the C7). Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars. Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30 howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 132 required are functional. CSTC-A has contracted to have the howitzers assessed for complete refurbishment and conversion to facilitate NATO standard interoperability. One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armor kandak, but they are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T-62 main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are currently being studied to upgrade this capability. The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck. CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) which will be fielded beginning in the summer of 2008. These HMMWVs will displace many of the LTVs, particularly in the combat battalions, to provide a protected mobility capability. The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes (five AN-32s and two AN-26s) and 17 helicopters (13 MI-17s and 4 MI-35s). The ANAAC will eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft. By December 2008, the inventory will include an additional 11 MI-17s, 6 MI-35s, and two AN32s. Four, of a total of 20, C-27s are will be delivered in 2009. Strategic command and control is accomplished through an ANA-controlled telecommunications network that connects the NMCC and Corps headquarters. The ANA communication network provides voice, video, and data communications capabilities. An offline commercial encryption capability provides secure data messaging. Secure voice capability will be provided by commercial TalkSECURE Digital Wireline terminals and wireless phones. U.S.-made Datron high frequency (HF) base station, vehicle-mounted, and

194

Report to Congress

man pack radios, with commercial encryption capacity, provide tactical and backup strategic command and control and extends HF communications to mobile forces. Thuraya satellite phones have been fielded to key ANA leadership to provide a tertiary means of strategic command and control. Tactical phones and field switches provide battlefield communication capability. Additionally, commercial cell phones provide backup tactical command and control in urban areas with cell phone coverage.

2.4. Readiness and Assessment Tools The MoD readiness reporting system is maturing and provides a metrics-based analytical and decision-support tool to improve readiness. The ANA system, similar to the U.S. Army’s Unit Status Report, is well-established and providing accurate, timely, and useful information that enables the ANA to manage the force more effectively. The system assesses ANA units using CM ratings on a monthly basis. Contractors developed the ANA readiness reporting system regulations and are currently in the process of updating them. Future improvements to the system will enable analysis of ANA mission essential personnel and equipment unique to different types of units (e.g. pacing items). In order to brief unit status on manpower, equipment, munitions, and other operational readiness subjects, the ANA Combat Power Assessment briefing was redesigned to allow ANA leadership a more powerful reporting tool. This briefing is an increasingly Afghanowned and run briefing chaired by the ANA G3 and other key staff. To enable its effective use, training and mentorship was provided to the GS G3 and Corps commanders.

2.5. Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps The ANA officer corps is working to improve its professionalism. Illiteracy rates remain high in Afghanistan, but members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and writing abilities. Plans are being made to improve the educational level of the officer corps. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational and strategic concepts. Nevertheless, the majority of the officers, and most importantly the very senior officers, believe in the concept of a national military and are starting to use the military decision-making process and provide information and decision briefs to their superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to direction from higher ranks. Entry-level officer training occurs in three forms. Officers with previous experience in the former Afghan Army attend an eight-week Officer Training Course which provides professional ethics training. New officers attend the six-month Officer Candidate School or the four-year National Military Academy of Afghanistan. Training provided by or coordinated with CSTC-A is conducted with the intent of building a self-sufficient, strong, and fully capable ANA. The keystone of the ANA end-toend career and training program is the formation and incorporation of branch service schools and combined career progression courses. Advanced training conducted on both branch specific and general military and leadership subjects ensures that the professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers continue their professional development. A

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

195

planned career path that includes professional, advanced schooling also allows for reinforcement of the values and goals of the GIRoA and develops an appreciation for and support of the national agenda. Although initially based on the U.S. Army branch and higher military education system, the ANA career schools must reflect Afghan organization and operation to ensure internalization and independence. In the interim, this training is provided through MTTs and on-the-job training provided by either ETTs or OMLTs.

2.6. Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform There is currently an increasingly effective soldier and NCO promotion process in place. The regulation and process refinement for senior NCO and officer promotion has been held in abeyance pending passage of the Military Service Law. However, in February 2008 a policy referred to as “Pay by Rank” was decreed and implemented. The policy ensured that officers are paid according to their post-reform rank. The implementation of this policy will work toward ensuring salaries are based on merit and appropriate rank is worn.

2.7. Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices The process for capturing ANA lessons learned has been resident at the ANA Training and Education Command. Both international and Afghan members of VTTs have the responsibility to capture lessons learned and appropriately process the information so that it eventually arrives in the ANA Training and Education Command Doctrine Cell. Once it has reached the Doctrine Cell it is incorporated into the relevant ANA guidance. The build-up of additional mentors at the NMCC and NPCC and other staff agencies will result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To date, minimal mentor manning has resulted in missed learning opportunities, as there was insufficient coverage to identify all areas in need of correction and/or mentoring.

2.8. Oversight Mechanisms 2.8.1. Personnel 2.8.1.1. Recruiting and Retention 2007 surpassed the previous four years in ANA recruitment of soldiers. The ANA has recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 20, 2008. Annual recruitment numbers for the past four years, beginning with the most recent, are: 21,287; 11,845; 15,790; and 9,671. The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and 56 percent for NCOs. Factors that preclude higher re-enlistment rates include the desire for larger salaries, better leadership, and to be stationed closer to family. In the February 2008, the ANA had an 8.4 percent absentee rate. This rate is down from the 12 percent rate experience at the height of summer 2007. The three Corps most consistently in contact with insurgents and anti-government elements had the highest AWOL

196

Report to Congress

rates, but on average they experienced an average rate of less than 10 percent in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. This decrease in AWOL rates has contributed directly to an increase of 20,000 in ANA end strength since January 2007. This increase in end strength coupled with a deliberate effort to fully man combat units fully and overfill entry level soldier authorizations should further mitigate this issue. During the past year, AWOL rates in ANA combat forces have decreased three percent. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better facilities and training, better leadership in the ANA, and more robustly manned units, we anticipate AWOL rates will continue to decrease through 2008.

2.8.1.2. Accountability To improve personnel management, the ANA is currently implementing the Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR) system at all levels of command. The objective is for all units to provide accurate information in a standardized format. The supporting policy and regulation have been distributed throughout the ANA, and training on the various processes is taking place by MTTs in the Corps’ respective areas. Once training is complete, a decree will be issued directing all units to use the new PASR system. The military justice system serves as a model for the civilian law enforcement and judicial system. CSTC-A’s ANA mentors have focused upon manning, equipping, and training the military attorneys and judges throughout the ANA. Each Corps has a staff judge advocate office comprised of prosecutors, one or more defense attorneys, and military judges. There is also a Court of Military Appeals staffed with five military judges. There is currently one U.S. or NATO-ISAF force judge advocate at each Corps mentoring the Corps staff judge advocates. The ANA military justice system is operating effectively and hundreds of ANA soldiers have been court-martialed for misconduct. CSTC-A also oversees the creation of justice centers at each of the five ANA Corps. The justice centers will serve as courthouses, office space for ANA attorneys, and short-term detention facilities. Additionally, CSTC-A mentors have been involved in the drafting, reviewing, and staffing of three cornerstone military justice laws: (1) the Military Courts Law, Military Crimes Code and Military Criminal Procedure Code (currently in force by Presidential decree); (2) the Prosecutor and Criminal Investigative Department Law (final draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense); and (3) the Military Disciplinary Punishment Regulation (final draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense). The passing and promulgating of these laws will enhance the ANA’s ability to enforce good order and discipline and ensure fairness in the military justice process. The MoD Inspector General (IG) system is very well established. It is currently rated as capable with international support (CM2) with the expectation that it will be capable of independent operations (CM1) by the end of 2008 or early 2009. IG offices are at the MoD, GS, Corps, and brigade levels and more than 98 percent of assigned IG personnel are schooltrained. In addition, the MoD IG, the ANA GS IG, and the MoI Internal Affairs (IA) all have functional hotlines. Any soldier, policeman, or civilian can call these hotlines to report misconduct or request assistance. 2.8.2. Tracking of Equipment There are two systems used to maintain oversight of ANA equipment, the Core Information Management System (Core-IMS), and the National Asset Visibility (NAV)

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

197

System. Core-IMS is a commercial warehouse management system that has been used at the primary ANA national logistics depots since 2006. Core-IMS complies with ANA supply decree processes and is used to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues resulting from ANA national-level depot operations. The NAV system has been used since 2001 and is a mechanism to track by-unit issue transactions for munitions, vehicles, and communications items. NAV entries are made using Core-IMS issue data from ANA national level depot operations and updated when battle damage documentation is received. Continued training and development of the systems are required to address current challenges with asset visibility and reporting.

SECTION 3: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 3.1. Programmed ANP End State The Department of Defense assumed responsibility for the development of the ANP in April 2005. Efforts prior to this time were not comprehensive and lacked both resources and unity of effort within the international community. CSTC-A’s current efforts focus on key reforms within the MoI, greater unity of effort within the international community, and continued individual training and mentoring with the support of the INL. The target for the ANP is to build and reform 82,000 personnel that are capable of operating countrywide. The ANP consists of Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the CounterNarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions: •

•

The AUP serve at the regional, provincial, and district levels, they focus on patrols, crime prevention, traffic, and general policing. They are meant to spread the rule of law throughout the country and provide a response capability for local security incidents. The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force, split into rural and urban units, trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. ANCOP units provide law enforcement and civil control, conduct operations in areas where government control may be weak, and support counterinsurgency operations. Eight of the planned 20 ANCOP battalions are currently operating. They are performing exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP battalions are formed as units and receive 16 weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks of Police Mentor Team (PMT)-supervised collective training. All reports on this new national police force indicate solid performance through its operations to dismantle illegal checkpoints, seize illegal weapons, and retake lost districts. ANCOP has successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured the trust and confidence of the people.

198

Report to Congress • •

The ABP provides broad law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry points in order to deter illegal entry and other criminal activity. The CNPA is the lead agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan.

Once assessments can be made on the effects of recently begun reform efforts, the ANP strength should be reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required. However, at this point in time, a lack of U.S. military trainers and mentors available for Police Mentor Teams precludes the acceleration or expansion of reform and mentoring efforts beyond the 25 percent of the ANP that is presently covered. Current PMT coverage is focused on the AUP who are closest to the population and are, therefore, the most immediate face of the Afghan government. The auxiliary police are a temporary force of 9,000 officers, hired in 21 provinces, intended to augment the AUP. The auxiliary police will cease to exist by the end of 2008; those members that have served for at least one year, undergone five weeks of training, and receive a recommendation from their district chief will transition to the AUP. Those that do not meet these requirements will be released from service by September 30, 2008.

3.2. Training Efforts 3.2.1. Initial and Field Training Currently, the ANP has fielded 92 percent of its forces, but it lags behind the ANA in capability. Police development has been hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community, among other things. Unlike the ANA, police are not fielded as units. All policemen must be trained as individuals. The objective for ANP individual training is to require initial entry training (IET) for all accessions. However, current training capacity cannot meet demand, and many untrained policemen remain in the force. Efforts to expand the training capacity to meet demand should make it feasible to require IET for all police recruits in approximately three years. Currently, individual training is conducted at seven RTCs, a Central Training Center, and the Kabul Police Academy. Concurrently, CSTC-A and INL are developing a National Police Training Center (NPTC), which will achieve initial operating capability in 2008. This center will have an eventual training capacity of 2,000 policemen per year. Once the NPTC is complete (estimated for late 2010), it will be feasible to require all new policemen to attend IET prior to assumption of any duties. INL contracts to assist in individual police program training design, instructional implementation, and mentoring. More than 500 qualified civilian police advisors serve as training developers and instructors at the RTCs and Central Training Center, and as mentors at regional, provincial, and district locations. These civilian police mentors provide the civilian police expertise to augment the approximately 1,000 military mentors focused on police development. The chart below is an overview of the police courses offered by the U.S. program. All ANP go through the basic course, with the exception of the auxiliary police. In addition to the core courses outlined below, advanced and specialized courses are provided for instructor

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

199

development, field training, tactical training, medic training, and trainer training courses for investigative techniques, weapons proficiency, communications, and ethics. Courses Basic (AUP, ABP) Firearms Transitional Integration Program Criminal Investigative Division ANCOP

Level Entry Basic Intermediate

Length 8 weeks 5 days 5 weeks

Intermediate

6 weeks

Advanced

16 weeks

Description Basic policing skills Training and qualification Democratic policing and human rights Investigative skills; forensics Followed by 60 days of unit field training

The ANP training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in “units” as the ANA does, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. The goal is to provide a mentor team to each police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of Police Mentor Teams affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. Each PMT is composed of mostly military members that provide training support, maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as liaisons with international forces as required. Each team ideally includes two civilian police mentors (provided by INL contract) that provide civilian police training expertise and advice. Due to the security situation, field-based police training is most often provided by military personnel with civilian or military police experience; RTC-based training is provided by civilian police trainers. Every PMT has a security force. There is no area of Afghanistan that permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to cover no more than one fourth of all ANP organizations and units with PMTs. Security is not only an issue for mentoring and training personnel. ANP officers perform hazardous duty. In many instances, the ANP experience significantly higher casualty rates when conducting counterinsurgency operations than do the ANA. The dedication and perseverance of individual police officers to fighting the insurgency and enforcing the laws of their country is commendable.

3.2.2. Focused District Development (FDD) Program CSTC-A, in a coordinated effort with the GIRoA, the U.S. Embassy, NATO-ISAF and the international community, has recently implemented the Focused District Development (FDD) program to train, reconstitute, mentor and develop the AUP on a district by district basis. As the primary government interface with the Afghan people, an effective AUP is critical to the extension of the rule of law and to building trust in the institution of the police among the general populace. Accordingly, FDD concentrates resources on the district-level AUP. A reformed, more effective police force that can improve security in an area can facilitate the realization of other desired outcomes. It will take several years to reform the 45,000-person AUP and 18,000 ABP. The first phase of FDD is an assessment of the district by a District Assessment and Reform Team, composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners (currently Canada and

200

Report to Congress

the United Kingdom). This assessment leads to selection and vetting of new leaders as required, recruiting to full authorization, and equipment inventories, as well as assessments of facilities, rule of law status, relationships with local leaders, and overall professional effectiveness. In the second phase, an ANCOP unit is deployed to the district to relieve the local AUP forces which then report to the RTCs to begin eight weeks of reconstitution (the third phase). The reconstitution period includes three different levels of training (i.e., new entrants, advanced, and officer leader and management training), biometric processing and identification card issue, pay records establishment, full equipping, leader reinforcement training, and continual ethics reinforcement. The AUP participating in the RTC training programs receive daily mentorship from PMTs. Upon completion of the TRC training phase, the PMT returns with the reformed police to continue collective training and mentoring in the district, ensuring the police put into practice the key individual and collective competencies as well as the ethical standards learned during training at the RTC. At the conclusion of this phase, which is proficiency-driven rather than time-driven, the district is validated as a reformed police force, using the same objective assessment checklist that was used in the preliminary assessment phase. The PMT then goes into an overwatch mode to ensure the district police retain the ethic and skills they have learned. The first cycle, which began in seven districts in late 2007, is nearing completion with district ANP reinserted in their districts and undergoing intensive mentoring. As of April 2008, the second cycle of FDD was mid-course in five districts, with district ANP undergoing reconstitution at the RTCs. The third cycle, being implemented in nine districts, was in the initial assessment phase. Three additional cycles of FDD are planned for 2008. Current challenges facing the FDD program include shortages of PMTs, shortages of trained ANCOP units (currently a growing program), limited space availability at the RTCs (which will be alleviated by construction of the NPTC), lack of provincial governor support (due to the perceived loss of power as the AUP become loyal to the nation, as well their loss as a source of revenue for the governor from illegal checkpoints and graft). We anticipate that over the course of 2008, these challenges will lessen with the training of additional ANCOP units, the construction of the NPTC, and the ability of FDD-reformed districts to strengthen ties with district governance and populations. The FDD initiative is focused nation-wide and is linked and complementary to ongoing ISAF operations. It is aimed at focusing limited resources to maximize the overall development of the AUP, ultimately creating communities able to sustain stability in the long term. The initial popular perception of the FDD program is favorable, and the national government views the FDD as a catalyst for similar programs that might benefit other governmental branches.

3.3. Equipment The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2008, in recognition of the higher level of operations they encounter on the borders. ANCOP units also will be provided heavy machine guns. There is no intent to provide the ANP with NATO weapons. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S. funded purchase. Specialty organizations,

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

201

such as the CNPA and counter-terrorism police, receive unique equipment consistent with their mission. The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as LTVs and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with armored HMMWVs or a similar vehicle in 2008. Police are equipped with a variety of communications equipment. They currently face an interoperability challenge because of the wide variety of communications equipment provided by the previous lead nation for the ANP. The U.S. Government has procured a common set of NATO-interoperable communication equipment to field the ANP completely, and will complete fielding during the coming year.

3.4. Readiness and Assessment Tools The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is being re-worked to produce timely and accurate readiness system reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive level brief. The revised RRS should enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness data that will recognize shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective actions. Without the full complement of PMTs, however, a comprehensive assessment of the ANP will not be possible.

3.5. Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps Overall, most MoI senior leaders are currently assessed as capable of performing their functions and duties with limited assistance (CM2), although others are less capable and require more assistance (CM3). The capacity of lower-level leaders and their loyalty to national police organizations are questionable. The lack of full implementation of approved organizational authorization documents and incomplete rank reform hinder progress toward leader professionalism. Assessment and reform are being addressed at the district level through the FDD program. Professional training and development at the national level is a new concept within the various ANP organizations. However, this situation is changing because of MoI involvement in the management of the FDD program, the continuation of the Kabul Police Academy, and a common eight-week leader and management course that all new officers must attend. Each training program provides objective and standardized training to ensure a greater degree of professionalism within the police forces. Additionally, an in-service training program is being implemented in each district and will eventually expand to all of the police forces to sustain training proficiency. Selected officers in each district and unit attend an instructor development course in subjects such as ethics and professional behavior, medical, communications, investigative techniques, and weapons. These officers then become the sustainment trainers in their districts and units. We expect that this program will be fully implemented in 2008. We are also seeing improvements in the establishment of a professional NCO corps in the ANP. This development is critical to the success of the police, as only officers and NCOs have arrest authority, largely due low rates of literacy among patrolmen. Approximately

202

Report to Congress

1,300 police NCOs will graduate from the Kabul Police Academy in 2008. Recently, more than 200 academy graduates were assigned to the districts outside Kabul that are going through FDD. We expect this to continue in 2008. Additionally, an advanced course targeted to NCOs was added to the curriculum for police training. Simultaneously, we are implementing literacy programs in the MoI to increase the literacy level of all policemen.

3.6. Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform The MoI has taken substantial steps toward establishing fair and equitable compensation and recognition across the ANP. It began with rank reform, which sought to evaluate and stratify ANP personnel to ensure that each member was provided the opportunity to be objectively compared to their counterparts. Rank reform looked at the top 18,000 officers within a top-heavy structure and, through an international vetting process, reduced the officer corps by more than 9,000 officers. In addition to rank reform, pay reform provided for a more adequate pay scale, and pay parity provided the police with pay equal to that of the ANA. Other initiatives, including the development of comprehensive promotion and recognition programs, are underway, and written guidance regarding these initiatives is under review by the MoI for implementation.

3.7. Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices The build-up of additional mentors at the NPCC and other staff agencies will result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To date, shortfalls in mentor manning has resulted in missed opportunities to identify all actions needing correction or mentoring. Lessons learned from the FDD process are captured via After Action Reviews (AARs). Training and mentor teams complete AARs and route them back through FDD program implementers, to be used to continually update the training programs as required. This process ensures lessons learned are efficiently applied to future FDD cycles and instruction blocks. This feedback is shared through the mentor chain and with the MoI and ANP leadership to improve the Afghan police beyond those areas that can be touched by FDD.

3.8. Oversight Mechanisms 3.8.1. Personnel 3.8.1.1. Recruiting and Retention From March 24, 2007 through March 2, 2008, the nationwide recruiting number for all police programs was 17,474 (4,795 ABP, 1,414 ANCOP, and 11,265 AUP and specialty police).

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

203

3.8.1.2. Accountability In general, accountability for the ANP has been a significant challenge. The Identification Card Program is a major step towards addressing the problem. This program maintains photographic and biometric records of all registered police. The end state of the program is an identification card that will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion, and tracking from accession to attrition using an accurate record management system. Current efforts include use of the identification card barcode system to pay ANP personnel. Identification cards will allow tracking of all ANP officers as well as their pay, providing accurate strength numbers and ensuring that officers receive their full pay. CSTC-A has proposed a draft ANP strength accountability regulation that incorporates all 11 of the current ANP strength tracking documents as well as adding a Unit Manning Roster (UMR) to track policemen by their position of work, including the data collected during the initial the initial recruitment and vetting process. The database will then be linked to the ANP Identification Card database and a finance database. The UMR should eliminate the possibility of “ghost” employees since every position will either be vacant or have a name attached to it. These reforms will facilitate personnel complaints because it will show exactly where the complainant is located, and it will be easier to find his or her chain of command and records and resolve the issue. In addition, all ANP personnel have the ability to call the hotline mentioned above to request assistance, and the MoI IA is working to add a block of instruction on this subject to the FDD program. CSTC-A mentors are working with the MoI Legal Advisor to provide disciplinary instruction for the ANP. This instruction will be executed and implemented under the Minister of the Interior’s signature and will provide for the administrative discipline of police personnel through the reduction in rank, pay forfeitures, and transfers. However, developing the capacity to implement the program will be challenging. Despite having 11 police prosecutors assigned to MoI headquarters, police corruption and misconduct remain a challenge. Effective administrative internal controls within the ANP are hampered in part due to the law itself and a lack of capacity and will to execute that law. Firing a patrolman requires a criminal conviction or a Presidential decree. CSTC-A is currently working with the MoI on redrafting the personnel regulation that governs MoI employees, specifically, the ANP. These efforts are aimed at empowering lower-level officials to make removal decisions while providing sufficient administrative due process to the employee subject to termination. Regional IA units have been included in the 2008 Tashkil (authorization document) in five of the six police regions (Kabul is not included due to the presence of the national headquarters). The Minister of Interior has commissioned a legislative drafting committee to revise the “Inherent” (or police personnel) Law, by consolidating three outdated laws that apply to the AUP. The drafting committee includes representatives from CSTC-A and the international community. Although the new law may not be passed for some time, the goal is to ensure that it provides for the administrative separation of corrupt or inept police officers. This change likely will require either an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court or a Presidential delegation of authority (the Afghan Constitution grants only the President the authority to fire police). Additionally, CSTC-A ANP legal mentors have focused on using the police court and the police prosecutor to bring criminal cases against police officers for misconduct that amounts to a crime. Again, these efforts have not yet shown results. A policy on drug use is under

204

Report to Congress

development. Though the drug use policy is not yet implemented police officers known to use drugs are removed from the force. In 2007 during the FDD cycle, 29 policemen (out of 650) were identified as drug users, immediately removed from the program, and released from the police force.

3.8.2. Equipment A Stock Record Account (SRA) is used to maintain oversight of ANP equipment. The ANP SRA has been used at the MoI Interim Logistics Facility (ILF) since 2006 to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues. The SRA from the ILF provides the details of all munitions, vehicles, clothing and individual equipment items. The MoI Technical Department maintains a manual property book to track equipment damaged in combat.

SECTION 4: U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 4.1. ANSF Development Efforts The DoS and U.S. Embassy play a major role in mentoring, shaping, and developing the ability of Afghan leadership to direct and prioritize the use of security forces countrywide. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy assist in advising the security sector ministers and provide assistance in coordinating with the international community and participating in security sector development planning forums. The U.S. Government provides International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to send Afghan military officers to U.S. military schools for professional development and leadership training. IMET is also provided for English language training. Further efforts include: •

•

•

•

The U.S. Ambassador provides policy guidance for all U.S. actors in Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on the development of the ANP. INL provides trainers and mentors to assist CSTC-A in executing the police program. INL’s specific mandate is to assist in the development of the police through training in accordance with direction from CSTC-A. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in conjunction with INL and the U.S. Embassy’s Counter-Narcotics Task Force, is the lead U.S. agency for counternarcotics planning and operations. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Afghan Engineering District supports CSTC-A’s efforts in planning and programming infrastructure development for the ANSF, as well as supporting (as needed) USAID’s infrastructure development efforts in Afghanistan. The United States works with the IPCB in order to coordinate its efforts and train Afghan police more efficiently and professionally.

The U.S Government, the GIRoA, and international entities coordinate their security sector development activities through the Policy Action Group, the Security Operations

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

205

Group, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. DoS and CSTC-A also coordinate their efforts through these forums. The Policy Action Group (PAG) is a committee composed of GIRoA ministers, international agencies (e.g., United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), EU, NATO, and ambassadors from key donor nations such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and the Netherlands), and others. The PAG was created to address issues pertaining to four southern provinces (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabol). Over time the PAG has become a forum for discussing overarching national issues (e.g., regulation of private security companies and reconciliation). The PAG is scheduled to meet twice monthly and is chaired by the Afghan National Security Advisor. The U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A Commander, and the ISAF Commander all attend these sessions. The PAG is chartered to develop joint longterm strategic security initiatives with the international forces and the ANSF to ensure that a long-term, consistent approach is adopted towards security, economic development, and social challenges. All of these efforts are designed to accelerate the development, equipping, manning, and modernization of the ANSF. Issues to be addressed by the PAG are discussed in Afghan interagency working groups corresponding to six pillars: security operations, counternarcotics, reconstruction and development, intelligence fusion, sub-governance, and strategic communications. The Security Operations Group (SOG) is composed of representatives at the one- to three-star general officer rank from MoD, MoI, and NDS; international partners; ISAF; and U.S. Embassy representatives. The SOG meets weekly, but a SOG Working Group meets each day to produce an overall security assessment that is passed to Afghan ministries and ISAF. The SOG provides coordinated guidance and direction for security operations, facilitating coordination between security operations and other efforts supporting the pillar groups mentioned above. It is perceived to be the lynchpin of the pillar construct. The SOG ensures the implementation of security-related decisions made by the PAG. The ANSF are fully represented at the SOG and brief their requirements to the forum. The JCMB was established by the GIRoA and the international community for overall strategic coordination of the ANDS. The 28 JCMB members include ministerial-level representatives from the GIRoA and the international community who oversee the delivery of the ANDS. CSTC-A and other U.S. Government participants are critical parts of all JCMB meetings and working groups. They assist in preparing policy discussions and papers that are related to the ANSF. The JCMB meets quarterly. The primary U.S. Government policy-making mechanisms to provide guidance to sustain and build national military forces and police services capacity are the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group, the Afghanistan Steering Group, and the Deputies Committee. CSTC-A participates in the preparation and coordination of topics that are directly or indirectly related to the ANSF via these interagency working groups. The groups meet weekly to discuss all aspects of Afghanistan security policy issues (e.g., ANSF development, counternarcotics planning, reconciliation, border issues, and election security). Additionally, CSTC-A coordinates daily with members of the interagency through the Deputy Commander for Political-Military Affairs (DCG-PMA) and his primary staff who work and live at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The DCG-PMA staff coordinates with the country team at the U.S. Embassy and ensures that ANSF policies and planning are consistent with policies of other U.S. Government agencies. DCG-PMA is also the main conduit to pass

206

Report to Congress

and coordinate information through the chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and other relevant members of the U.S. Government entities. CSTC-A assists in hosting and briefing U.S. Government representatives visiting Afghanistan. CSTC-A officials also make periodic visits to Washington in order to discuss key issues with U.S. Government officials.

4.2. Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector 4.2.1. Rule of Law The U.S. Government is developing its own strategy to support the GIRoA in establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan that is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and incorporates U.S. military efforts. Priority areas of the U.S. strategy include: accelerating institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering counternarcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the corrections system; improving linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on public awareness and legal aid to improve public confidence in and access to the justice system. These efforts support the overall U.S. Government push to project governance to the provincial and district levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central Government’s ability to provide security and services. U.S. Government agencies currently pursuing justice sector and rule of law efforts include: DoD, Department of Justice (DoJ), DoS, and USAID. The Special Committee on the Rule of Law (SCROL), established in 2006 and chaired by the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law (ROL) Coordinator, meets on a weekly basis. The SCROL provides a mechanism to organize, coordinate, and deconflict ROL programs and policy issues among elements of the Embassy; to highlight unresolved issues for decision by the ambassador; and to present a consistent face to the justice sector ministries. 4.2.2. Counternarcotics CN operations are severely constrained by the capacity of the Afghan law enforcement and judicial systems. As a result, DoD, DoS, DoJ, DEA, USAID and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working to build the infrastructure necessary for the GIRoA to conduct legitimate law enforcement operations against narcotics traffickers. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy focuses on helping the GIRoA disrupt Afghanistan’s opium-based economy and strengthen the central government’s control over the country. DoD, INL, USAID, Department of Justice (DoJ), and DEA collectively promote the “Five Pillar” Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The five pillars include: •

•

Public Information: Designed as a year-round, nationwide program focused on helping the GIRoA achieve sustainable reductions in poppy cultivation and production through public information, engagement, and education, the most recent campaign has increased its emphasis on person to person community outreach initiatives through local Shuras that engage trusted local opinion leaders. Alternative Development: Designed to help the GIRoA establish economic alternatives to the cultivation of poppy for the Afghan people, this includes shortterm cash-for-work projects and comprehensive agricultural and business development projects.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces •

•

•

207

Elimination/Eradication: Designed to help the GIRoA deter and reduce the cultivation of opium poppy through incentives while also building a credible forced eradication capability, this program includes support for Governor-Led Eradication and the centrally-led Poppy Eradication Force. Interdiction: Interdiction efforts focus on decreasing narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan by helping the GIRoA to build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations. Groups such as the CNPA, the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force, and the National Interdiction Unit of the CNPA are being equipped to arrest and prosecute the command and control elements of narcotics trafficking organizations. Law Enforcement/Justice Reform: Both police and justice sector efforts help the GIRoA increase overall rule of law, specifically in the area of narcotics-related law enforcement. U.S. advisors mentor the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force’s pursuit of narcotics and public corruption cases through the Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. Building the overall justice system has a direct effect on expanding the rule of law and thus on enhancing counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.

CSTC-A serves in a coordinating role with the U.S. agencies listed above. CSTC-A also coordinates with counternarcotics specialists at ISAF, CJTF-101, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the U.K Embassy. Finally, CSTC-A provides a representative to the CounterNarcotics Sub-PAG meetings hosted by the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Through the various staff agencies, CSTC-A trains, equips, and supports members of the ANP and ANA that are involved either directly or indirectly in the counternarcotics effort. CSTC-A funds training at the Counter-Narcotics Police Academy and is assisting the MoD in its efforts create a new unit, the Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak, intended to provide security for MoI eradication operations. Additionally, CSTC-A provides a mentor to the Deputy Minister of Counternarcotics within the MoI. Current joint DoD-DEA programs have resulted in the construction of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of equipment for the Sensitive Investigative Unit and the Technical Investigations Unit and provided advanced training for the CNPA. Funding for these programs was supplied by DoD. DEA conducted background checks on applicants and trained those suitable for duty in these elite units. With DoS, DoD provided funding for the Afghan Joint Aviation Facility and the CN Justice Center, while providing helicopter flight training to MoI personnel for the creation of an organic lift capability for Afghan CN organizations. DoD is developing an Unmanned Aerial System program to provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to CN forces. This program will provide situational awareness and force protection for DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FASTs) and the NIU when conducting operations. DEA deployed FASTs are supported by DoD and provide guidance, mentoring and bilateral assistance to the GIRoA and CNPA to identify and disrupt clandestine drug operations. While U.S. military personnel do not directly participate in law enforcement operations, U.S. forces do provide medical evacuation and in-extremis support, pilot training, helicopter lift support for administrative purposes, and intelligence for law enforcement CN missions. DoD and DEA are working with the MoI to strengthen the capacity of the CNPA. In FY08, DoD is providing more than $95 million to foster CNPA development. Some major DoD-funded initiatives are: Afghan helicopter crew member training, Mi-17 helicopter

208

Report to Congress

operations and maintenance, aviation facilities, NIU sustainment training, DEA mentoring and training program, expansion of the CNPA headquarters compound, and construction of two regional law enforcement centers. DoD has long-term plans to further support the capacity building of GIRoA law enforcement CN forces. DoD also plays an integral role in building the operational capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan Customs Department (ACD). The ABP and ACD require extensive support if they are to effectively control Afghanistan’s 5,000 plus kilometer border. To help the GIRoA meet this challenge, DoD funded a DoS program, the Border Management Initiative (BMI). The purpose of BMI is to improve security and promote stability in the border regions, and to increase interdiction capacity. In FY08, DoD will provide over $14 million to build the capacity of the ABP and ACD. At the request of DoS, DoD funded the development of the U.S. Embassy Border Management Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) looks to the BMTF as the focal point for border management issues on behalf of the international community. Under the BMTF, U.S. mentors are provided to the ABP and ACD for border crossing points at Islam Qalah and Towrkham. DoD-funded construction of several border crossing points in Afghanistan and the region to include Sher Khan Bander, Towragundhi, and Islam Qalah. A communications system was also purchased for the ABP to support key command and control functions. Non-intrusive detection capability (x-ray and gamma scanners) has been provided to support inspections at major border crossing points and airports. The DoS works within the five pillar plan to coordinate public information campaigns and poppy eradication. DoS and DoJ work together to increase the capacity and competence of the Afghan judicial system, train prosecutors, and build the infrastructure necessary to indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers. DEA is in the process of developing a three-to-five-year expansion plan for DEA operations in Afghanistan. USAID provides devolvement opportunities for the Afghan people, and is building roads, installing irrigation, constructing cold storage facilities, and introducing improved farming techniques to the Afghan people with the goal of providing viable alternatives to opium cultivation.

4.2.3. Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters In May 2005, Takim-e-Solh (PTS) was established as an independent commission by presidential decree. PTS is reconciliation program for the former insurgent fighters. The Office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC) provides oversight for the commission. At the outset, ONSC assigned a full-time PTS program manager and the former Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan assigned a full-time contractor to the program, in addition to providing CJ2 and CJ5 directorate support. Since its inception, PTS has reconciled 5,000 Afghans. Since December 2006, CSTC-A has maintained oversight of PTS. CSTC-A’s role in PTS is under transition, and management options are being explored. The program receives donor funding from USAID, the U.K., and the Netherlands. The United States contributes $1.3 million to the program, and the U.K. and the Netherlands contribute $390,000 collectively. The United States pays for PTS employee salaries and overhead operating expenses, including rent and administrative expenses for the main office in Kabul and 10 of 11 field offices. U.S. funding has been constant since the outset of the PTS reconciliation program. On 1 April 2007, USAID assumed the primary funding role.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

209

SECTION 5: NATO-ISAF EFFORTS 5.1. ANSF Development Efforts 5.1.1. Donation and Funding Coordination The CSTC-A DCG-ISC coordinates closely with the ISAF DATES in order to effectively coordinate both NATO and non-NATO donations to the ANA. CSTC-A also works closely with the MoI and the IPCB Secretariat to coordinate international donations for the ANP. The ISC advertises the training and equipment needs of the ANA and ANP and then manages the details of integrating donated requirements into the force. Donations are coordinated through CSTC-A to validate the necessity, suitability, and sustainability of each donation. 5.1.2. Mentoring and Training NATO ISAF supports ANA training and mentoring in three main areas: generating and deploying OMLT teams; filling CSTC-A training billets; and providing functional area mentoring, mobile niche training, schools, and courses. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation and fielding of OMLTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES. Currently, there are a total of 32 validated OMLTs. This number is insufficient to meet current needs. Furthermore, some OMLTs come into the country with national caveats that prevent them from deploying with ANA units out of their home area of operations, thus hindering operational flexibility. The shortage of OMLTs delays ANA development and has a further adverse effect on police mentoring. At present, the police mentor mission is significantly under-resourced. ISAF does not directly support ANP development with resources. However, the more NATO OMLTs in the field, the more U.S. military assets can be applied to the police mentor mission. Functional area and niche training efforts include officer and commando training provided by France and NCO and officer training provided by the U.K. 5.1.3. Operations ISAF’s operational approach to counterinsurgency is to build Afghan capacity while degrading destabilizing influences. Accordingly, the ISAF Partnership Program continues to enhance the capabilities of the ANSF to plan, gather intelligence, conduct independent operations sustainable at the battalion level, and to integrate enablers in order to enhance security. At the tactical level, ISAF has begun to integrate ANA forces into planning and conducting operations in various degrees depending on the capabilities of the ANA and the respective Regional Commander’s intent and objectives. Additionally, key leader engagements, medical operations, humanitarian aid missions, and combined presence patrols provide a venue for ANSF forces to interact and discuss needs and local improvements with, and create trust among the local populace, Afghan leadership, ANSF, and ISAF. As trust increases, support for the GIRoA, ANA, and ANP evolves proportionately. An example of improved trust and confidence among Afghan civilians is their reporting of enemy activity, including improvised explosive device emplacements, suspicious activity, and potential future attacks. RC-East is the most advanced regional command in regards to coordination of ISAF Operations with the ANA. ISAF forces in RC-East have benefited from having the most capable ANA units currently fielded, the 201st and 203rd Corps, deployed in their area of operation. The integration of the ANA into RC East efforts has contributed to increasing the

210

Report to Congress

ANA ability to successfully plan, coordinate, and execute combined operations. RC-East also complements the PMT effort at the district level. International forces are employed in coordination with CSTC-A to maximize mentorship opportunities for police forces throughout the country, providing some level of mentorship coverage where the PMTs are unable to do so. RC East forces have also created programs that enhance police training at the RTCs.

5.1.4. Sustaining Institutions ISAF efforts to reform and establish ANSF-sustaining institutions are somewhat limited at this time but are beginning to increase, with work focused on the MoD and ANA GS. ISAF does not have a mandate to support police operations or ANP development. ISAF recently began to integrate the GS into its planning and coordination processes. The effort was initiated and continues to be facilitated by CSTC-A and serves two purposes: (1) develop the operational planning and coordination ability of the ANA and (2) integrate the GS into ISAF planning for future operations. RC East works to integrate the ANA GS into planning for the RC East area of operation through regular interfaces. ISAF headquarters staff advises MoD and ANA GS officers on the conduct and planning of security operations in regular meetings. These meetings include: • • • •

A monthly War Council meeting with the ISAF Commander, CSTC-A Commander, ANA Chief, GS, and other key leaders; A weekly Operations Review with the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the ANA GS G3; A weekly Short-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ35, CSTC-A CJ5, and ANA GS G3 key staff members; and A weekly Long-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ5 and ANA GS G3 key staff members.

5.2. Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector 5.2.1. Counternarcotics (CN) ISAF does not have a direct CN mission; however, ISAF assistance to CN activities is a key supporting task. ISAF is providing CN support consistent with its operations plan. The U.K. and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have assisted the GIRoA in producing its National Drug Control Strategy. CSTC-A coordinates with counternarcotics specialists at the U.S. Embassy, ISAF, CJTF-101, the UNODC, and the U.K. Embassy. 5.2.2. Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters ISAF supports the disbandment of illegal armed groups (IAGs), contributing to the GIRoA’s goal of establishing a secure environment through disarmament. In its areas of operations, ISAF units participate in the disbandment of IAGs within their means, capabilities, and mandates; authorized rules of engagement; and applicable national caveats. This support amounts to active participation in policy development at both national and provincial government levels; planning support and coordination; information gathering;

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

211

information operations; situation monitoring; influencing IAG commanders; and, in extremis, logistic and medical support.

SECTION 6: OTHER INTERNATIONAL PARTNER EFFORTS 6.1. Funding and Donation Coordination CSTC-A works closely with DSCA to ensure that funds from donor nations are spent in the most efficient and productive manner possible. DCG-ISC and the IPCB encourage the Coalition partners to donate funding for equipment, training, engineering projects, or to trust funds set up by SHAPE to cover equipment transportation costs from donor countries to Afghanistan. As part of the CSTC-A headquarters, the DCG-ISC concentrates on international donations (both lethal and non-lethal), international training, international military relations, and mentorship of the MoD’s International Military Affairs Department. A detailed description of the funds coordination process can be found in section 1.5.2 of this report.

6.2. ANSF Development Efforts CSTC-A encourages and facilitates international training efforts by educating the international community on requirements and encouraging the provision of key leader and staff mentors, International Police Mentor Teams (IPMTs), and MTTs to assist in the development of both the MoD and MoI and their subordinate organizations. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation and fielding of IPMTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES. Currently, the U.K., Canada, and the Netherlands are providing IPMTs in Afghanistan. There are several bilateral MTTs in Afghanistan, including one from Mongolia and two from Romania. Additionally, several countries are supporting the establishment of institutions such as the Command and General Staff College (France), the Drivers-Mechanics School (Germany), and the Kabul Military High School (Turkey). Many of our international partners participate in the same coordinating forums discussed above (e.g., PAG, SOG, and JCMB). Still, many groups and programs exist to promote reform and ANSF sustainment independent of the U.S. Government process and NATOISAF. The Interagency Coordination Team (IACT) is the coordinating mechanism between the PAG pillar working groups and the PAG itself. The IACT is chaired by a member of the ONSC. IACT members attend the Pillar working group meetings and serve as the liaison for the PAG. Members of CSTC-A, UNAMA, and GIRoA attend the IACT sessions. Aided by a standing secretariat, the IPCB is the principal means for both Afghan and international community coordination with regard to the ANP. The primary international institutions represented at the IPCB include the European Commission, EUPOL, and UNAMA. CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy are IPCB members and assist in ANP reform by developing a common approach to policing that reflects the challenges of the security environment, the need to protect communities, and the requirement to strengthen policing skills. CSTC-A has a full time staff member on the IPCB Secretariat.

212

Report to Congress

The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was established in May 2002 and is managed by the United Nations Development Program. LOTFA finances are disbursed to the MoI through the Ministry of Finance in support of ANP salaries and rations. CSTC-A supports Training Program Development at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) through educational programs. The programs are provided by several institutions, including: • • • •

The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch, Germany; The Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) in Washington, D.C; The Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, California; and The National Defense University (NDU), Washington, D.C.

GCMC courses include the Senior Executive Seminar; Program on Advanced Security Studies; Program on Terrorism/Security Studies; and the Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Course. NESA offers the Senior Executive Seminar and the Seminar on Counter-Terrorism and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Workshop in Washington, D.C. NDU courses include Civilian-Military Response to Terrorism and the Masters Program in Counter-Terrorism. Other educational opportunities include the UK-taught MoD/ANA Leadership Management Training Project in Kabul.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AAR ABP ANSF ANA ANAAC ANCOP ANP ASFF AUP AWOL BAG CATO CJTF-101 CM CONUS COP Core-IMS CNPA CSTC-A DATES DCG-ISC

After Action Review Afghan Border Police Afghanistan National Security Forces Afghan National Army Afghan National Army Air Corps Afghan National Civil Order Police Afghan National Police Afghan Security Forces Fund Afghan Uniform Police absent without leave Budget Activity Group Combined Air Terminal Operations Combined Joint Task Force-101 apability Milestone Continental United States common operating picture Core Information Management System Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (ISAF) Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces DCG-PMA DCMA DEA DOJ DOS DSCA ETT EUPOL FBI FDD FMS FSD GCMC GIRoA GS HF HMMWV IA IACT IAG I-ANDS IET IG INL IPCB IPMT ISAF JCMB JPCC JRCC KAIA LCMC LNO LOFTA LTV MIPR MoD MoI MOR MTT MTV NATO NAV NCO NESA NDS

Deputy Commanding General for Political-Military Affairs Defense Contract Management Agency Drug Enforcement Administration Department of Justice Department of State Defense Security Cooperation Agency Embedded Training Team European Union Police Federal Bureau of Investigation Focused District Development Foreign Military Sales Forward Support Depot George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan General Staff high frequency high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle Internal Affairs Interagency Coordination Team illegal armed group Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy initial entry training Inspector General Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement International Police Coordination Board International Police Mentor Team International Security Assistance Force Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Joint Provincial Coordination Center Joint Regional Coordination Center Kabul International Airport Life Cycle Management Command liaison officer Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Light Tactical Vehicle Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request Ministry of Defense Ministry of Interior Memorandum of Request Mobile Training Team Medium Tactical Vehicle North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Asset Visibility non-commissioned officer Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies National Directorate for Security

213

214

Report to Congress NDU NMCC NPCC OMLT ONSC PAG PASR PBAC PMT RC RLC ROL RRS RTC SAG SCROL SHAPE SOG SPBS-R SSR UK UMR UNAMA UNDOC UNDP U.S. USAID VTT

National Defense University National Military Command Center National Police Command Center Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Office of the National Security Counsel Policy Action Group Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting Program Budget Activity Council Police Mentor Team Regional Command Regional Logistics Center Rule of Law Readiness Reporting System Regional Training Center Sub-Budget Activity Group Special Committee on the Rule of Law Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Security Operations Group Standard Property Book System-Reinstated Security Sector Reform United Kingdom Unit Manning Roster United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Development Program United States United States Agency for International Development Validation Training Team

In: Afghanistan Security Editor: Lawrence B. Peabody, pp. 219-234

ISBN: 978-1-60692-149-4 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

U.S. EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CAPABLE AFGHAN POLICE FORCES FACE CHALLENGES AND NEED A COORDINATED, DETAILED PLAN TO HELP ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY *

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist in the development of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and the establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan. My testimony is based on our concurrently issued report[1] regarding U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP. According to Defense, an improved police force is vital to stabilizing and maintaining security throughout Afghanistan. U.S. support for the ANP began in 2002 and increased significantly in 2005 in response to deteriorating security in Afghanistan and concerns that ANP development was proceeding too slowly. U.S. activities currently include manning, training, and equipping of police forces as well as efforts to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.[2] My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces; (2) challenges that affect the development of capable ANP forces; and (3) our analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF, including the ANP. Over the course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed Defense reporting and planning documents. In addition, we interviewed cognizant Defense, State, and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., as well as in Kabul, Afghanistan, where we also met with Afghan government officials. We also visited an equipment warehouse and police training facilities. We conducted our work for the concurrently issued report from March 2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to *

Excerpted from GAO Report GAO-08-883T, dated June 18, 2008.

216

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

ABSTRACT Since 2002, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion[3] to train and equip the ANP. However, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Over three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not capable—the lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have been formed. As of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000—about 97 percent of the force’s end-strength of 82,000. However, the extent to which the ANP has truly grown is questionable given concerns that have been raised by Defense about the reliability of police manning figures. Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping forces; however, several challenges have impeded U.S. efforts to build a capable ANP.

•

•

•

The shortage of police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to conduct training, evaluation, and verification that police are on duty.[4] As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in Afghanistan.[5] According to Defense, the shortfall in military mentors is due to the higher priority assigned to deployments of U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq. The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns about the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality. In addition, distribution of hundreds of equipment items on hand has been delayed due to limited police ability to account for equipment provided to them. The ANP faces a difficult working environment. For example, although a working judiciary is a prerequisite for effective policing, State noted that much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice sector. In addition, police in the field face consistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks.

In November 2007, Defense began a new initiative called Focused District Development to address some of these concerns. Under this initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn to train as a unit—similar to the way Defense trains the Afghan army—and receive all authorized equipment. We have not fully assessed this new initiative; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk. Despite our 2005 recommendation and a 2008 congressional mandate, Defense and State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed plan with milestones for completing and sustaining the Afghan police and army forces. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to meet our 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State—Defense’s partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not developed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly states the various agencies’ roles and responsibilities, a dual

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of civilian mentors training the police. Defense’s 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would enable assessment of progress made in developing the ANP. While Defense maintains that its monthly status reports allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack the interim milestones and end dates needed to determine if U.S. efforts are on track. Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative involves considerable resources and is projected to last until 2012 at a minimum, Defense has not identified interim milestones or a consistent end date by which to gauge the progress of this new effort. Without interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense’s 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. U.S. officials have stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international community will likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission. To help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts to build a capable ANSF and facilitate assessment of progress, we included a matter for congressional consideration in our report issued concurrently with this testimony encouraging Congress to consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to develop the ANSF. Defense disagreed with our matter for congressional consideration, stating that current guidance provided to the field is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to believe that a coordinated, detailed plan is essential to helping ensure accountability for U.S. investments and facilitating assessment of progress. Afghanistan’s security institutions, including its police and judiciary, were severely damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Reconstitution of the ANP formally began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service committed to the rule of law. Germany volunteered to lead the police reform effort; however, due, in part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the German training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police training effort in 2005—including involvement, for the first time, of the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as increased funding.[6] In May 2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved an interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure for the police includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff, uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See app. I for further details on the force structure and functions of the ANP.) In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among other activities. Also, the deterioration in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 has led to increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in additional training in weapons and survival skills and counterinsurgency tactics. U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense through its Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with support from State, which provides policy guidance to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors

217

218

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in training the ANP is DynCorp International. From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see table 1). Over 40 percent (about $2.7 billion) of funds for training and equipping the ANP were provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort to accelerate ANP development and enhance its capability in response to increased levels of violence and insurgent activity.

BACKGROUND Table 1. Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008 Dollars in millions Assistance program Afghan Police

FY 2002 $25.5

FY 2003 $5.0

FY 2004 $223.9

FY 2005 $837.9

FY 2006 $1,299.8

FY 2007 $2,701.2

FY a

2008request $1,105.6

Total $6,198.8

Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding. a Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $342 million that has been appropriated and approximately $764 million that has been requested.

Defense has developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to assess police and army capability. The table below provides descriptions of the capability milestones. Table 2. Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces Capability milestone CM1

CM2 CM3

CM4

Source: CSTC-A.

Description The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support. The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

219

MOST AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE UNITS ARE RATED AS NOT CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR MISSION After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3).[7] Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the ANP’s authorized end-strength, were rated as not capable.[8] Table 3. Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008

Police units Uniformed Police Districts (365) Border Police Battalions (33) Civil Order Police Battalions (20) Counter Narcotics Police Units (15) Number of ANP units (433)

CM1Fully Capable 0

CM2Capable withCoalition Support 6

CM3 Partially Capable 6

CM4Not Capable 296

or Not Reporting 57

0

0

0

33

0

0

6

2

2

10

0

0

10

3

2

0

12 (3%)

18 (4%)

334 (77%)

69 (16%)

Unit Not Formed a

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. a A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is a planned unit or in training.

Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as capable of leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6 as partially capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and the international community for establishing police forces that can effectively meet Afghanistan’s security needs is the end of 2010.

220

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we reported as trained as of January 2005. Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report to check the reliability of ministry payroll records raises additional concerns about numbers of police reportedly assigned. In September 2007, Defense reported that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned.

SEVERAL CHALLENGES IMPEDE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABLE POLICE FORCES Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. These include (1) shortages in the police mentors needed to provide training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty; (2) shortfalls in several types of equipment that Defense considers critical; (3) a weak judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these challenges to ANP development, Defense began a new initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest component of the Afghan police. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the initiative at risk.

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained.[9] According to Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

221

Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as an impediment to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three areas. First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of CSTCA, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary obstacle to providing the fieldbased training necessary to develop a fully capable police force. Second, while Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police capability and identify areas in need of further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor coverage as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third, the shortage of available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation and verify police manning, the development of fully capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.

Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality (see figure 1).

Source: GAO. Figure 1. Donated Rifles of Variable Quality.

222

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related challenges and other logistical difficulties.[10] Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to account for the equipment provided to them.[11] In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property accountability procedures. According to CSTC-A, equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the districts’ property officers are first trained. For example, according to Defense, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007 (see figure 2), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures are established in the target districts.

Source; GAO. Figure 2. Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP.

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005, we reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce judicial rulings. Our 2005 report also noted that overall justice sector reform was underfunded and understaffed. Subsequently, we reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan judicial sector lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police, combating drugs, and disarmament.[12] According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing.

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

223

Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks (see table 4).[13] Table 4. Examples and Frequency of Problems Faced by ANP Relating to Pay, Corruption, and Attacks

Issue Pay

Corruption

Attacks

Selected examples of problems cited Police not being paid for several months Police receiving incomplete pay Police quitting due to pay-related problems Remote location of payment sites leading police to spend part of pay on transportation Police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban High-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct Police collecting unauthorized “tolls” from drivers Police targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive devices Police stations overrun by insurgent forces Dangerous working conditions causing difficulties in retaining or recruiting police

Frequency of related problems 94 percent (49 of 52 weekly reports)

87 percent (45 of 52 weekly reports)

85 percent (44 of 52 weekly reports)

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided to State by DynCorp. Note: Examples provided are illustrative only and do not constitute the entirety of problems that we found.

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to address them. According to Defense documentation, the objective of this initiative is to focus resources on reforming the uniformed police—the largest component of the ANP—as the key to the overall reform of the ANP. [14] Under this initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training center for 8 weeks to train as a unit—similar to how Defense trains the Afghan army—and receive all authorized equipment while their district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness.[15] The police force then returns to its district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the initiative. Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire Focused District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for successful reform. However,

224

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative. In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted.

DEFENSE AND STATE HAVE NOT DEVELOPED A COORDINATED, DETAILED PLAN FOR COMPLETING AND SUSTAINING THE ANSF In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the concurrence of both agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State have not completed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In the absence of such a plan, coordination difficulties have occurred and progress is difficult to assess. In 2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF.[16] Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF.[17] The first submission of each of these reports was due at the end of April 2008, but neither has yet been provided to Congress.

Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In the absence of such a plan, coordination has been a problem. For example, DynCorp stated that a dual chain of command between Defense and State has affected the efforts of civilian mentors in multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities. Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. While Defense and State have both cited improvements in coordination since our August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the various agencies’ roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be beneficial given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff. For example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically serve tours of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with outgoing officials during which to gain knowledge about their new positions. Given such turnover and loss of institutional knowledge, a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the agencies

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

225

involved in developing the ANP and their respective roles and responsibilities could help incoming personnel become familiarized with their new duties.

Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack the interim milestones needed to determine if the program is on track. For instance, Defense status reports as of April 2008 note that no ANP units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of 433) are capable of leading operations with coalition support. Without interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status represents what the United States intended to achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more than $6 billion in the program. Defense’s monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In particular, completion dates cited in Defense status reports have shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.” Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones and a consistent end date for Focused District Development, it will be difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as intended. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.

Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently estimates that approximately $1 billion a year will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate of U.S. military officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade, neither Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond 2013. U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs. At present, Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries, equipment

226

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

replacement, and facilities maintenance, without substantial foreign assistance. According to Defense and State, sustainment costs will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and the United States and the international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission.

CONCLUSION Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in Afghanistan. The United States has invested more than $6 billion since 2002 to develop the ANP, but no police forces are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency coordination, assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs are particularly important given that Defense has begun a new initiative that is expected to last at least 4 to 5 years and military officials estimate that U.S. involvement in developing the ANP could exceed a decade. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities, lists clear milestones for achieving stated objectives, and includes a sustainment strategy may improve coordination and would enable assessment of progress and estimation of costs. However, despite our prior recommendation and a mandate from Congress that a plan be developed, Defense and State have not done so. Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of completing this mission—information that is essential to holding the performing agencies accountable.

APPENDIX I: STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see figure 2).

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

227

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. Figure 2. ANP Chain of Command.

Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the various components of the ANP that it oversees. Table 5. Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Component Ministry of Interior

Afghan Uniformed Police

Afghan Border Police Afghan National Civil Order Police Criminal Investigative Division Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan Counter Terrorism Police Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs Police

Description Department of the Government of Afghanistan responsible for the protection of the country’s international borders and the enforcement of the rule of law Police assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and general policing Provide broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness Lead investigative agency for investigations of national interest, those with international links, and those concerned with organized and whitecollar crime Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism and insurgency No longer authorized

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

228

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

REFERENCES [1]

[2]

[3] [4]

[5] [6] [7]

[8] [9]

[10]

[11] [12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008). GAO is currently performing a detailed review of U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. This report is currently planned for release in early 2009. This figure includes $342 million appropriated and $764 million requested in fiscal year 2008. In this testimony, personnel who train Afghan police in the field are collectively referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who train Afghan police in the field are referred to as military mentors, while contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred to as civilian mentors. As of the same date, about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian mentors were present in country. Defense also leads U.S. efforts to develop capable ANA forces. CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, which include uniformed police districts, civil order and border police battalions, and counter narcotics police units. This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense assessed as not formed or not reporting. Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around Afghanistan to conduct mentoring operations is difficult due to the size of the country and the lack of roads. GAO is currently completing a review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. This report is due to be released in July 2008. We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable to provide a complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the first time they appeared. GAO is currently performing a detailed review of the accountability of lethal equipment provided to the ANSF. This report is currently planned for release in early 2009. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006); GAO-07-801SP The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and retaining and recruiting police were other top issues identified in our analysis. These topics are discussed in our concurrently issued report. Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also eventually be reconstituted through the Focused District Development initiative; however, according to a Defense official, it is uncertain when such efforts will begin. Defense documents indicate that, in addition to being trained, a district police force undergoing Focused District Development will also have corrupt leaders replaced by nationally vetted ones, receive new salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates, and have electronic funds transfer accounts established. Defense also has identified the development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of the Focused District

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges

229

Development initiative but anticipates limited integration of rule of law reform into the initiative until summer 2008. [16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1230. [17] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231.

INDEX

9 9/11, 68, 92, 93, 106, 107 9/11 Commission, 93, 106

A AAR, 212 access, 4, 18, 52, 73, 83, 88, 91, 92, 114, 123, 138, 140, 141, 142, 146, 150, 151, 153, 159, 161, 162, 163, 170, 178, 192, 206 accidental, 53 accountability, 2, 26, 30, 48, 121, 148, 186, 188, 190, 203, 217, 222, 228 accounting, 184 accuracy, 33, 34, 117, 191 achievement, 15, 155 acquisitions, 35 activism, 87 acute, 75, 136 addiction, 113 adjudication, 137 administration, 36, 56, 60, 138, 142, 144 administrative, 6, 123, 130, 137, 145, 153, 173, 175, 192, 195, 199, 202, 203, 207, 208, 217 administrators, 81 adolescents, 161 ADT, 153 adult, 163 adultery, 53 adults, 161 affiliates, 115 Africa, 82, 113 age, 51, 136, 159, 161 agent, 168, 185 agents, 57, 67, 127, 166

aggression, 5 agricultural, 78, 91, 105, 114, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 160, 164, 165, 178, 206 agricultural sector, 152, 154, 178 agriculture, 91, 94, 99, 100, 101, 150, 153, 154, 165, 166, 169 aid, 50, 51, 52, 56, 63, 64, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 101, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 140, 155, 160, 164, 165, 166, 178, 206, 209 air, 6, 12, 14, 18, 35, 46, 55, 66, 69, 71, 74, 79, 80, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 105, 122, 126, 158, 174, 180, 192, 193 airports, 94, 174, 208 al Qaeda, 53, 55, 67, 70, 72, 73, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 95, 104, 106, 108, 111 Albania, 103 alcohol, 63 allies, 4, 29, 70, 158, 159, 170, 173 alternative, 57, 66, 72, 91, 93, 99, 100, 101, 117 alternatives, 78, 91, 93, 153, 171, 177, 206, 208 ambassadors, 205 AMF, 62 analysts, 121, 160, 172 anger, 69, 126, 193 animal diseases, 155 animal health, 155 anti-terrorism, 74, 105 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 105 ants, 66, 85 appendix, 2, 30, 31, 40 application, 111, 112, 120, 140, 175 appropriations, 4, 30, 33, 50, 67, 80, 82, 89, 91, 93, 107, 217 Arabia, 52, 84, 89, 91, 95, 104, 108 armed forces, 114 Army, vii, 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 19, 32, 34, 35, 45, 50, 67, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 98, 99, 112, 117, 121, 122,

232

Index

124, 133, 141, 143, 153, 179, 180, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192, 194, 195, 204, 212, 215 Army Corps of Engineers, 141, 204 arrest, 61, 83, 85, 139, 146, 171, 173, 201, 207, 208 articulation, 44 ash, 206 Asia, 64, 87, 88, 90, 95, 113, 159, 172, 175, 212, 213 Asian, 83, 87, 88, 92, 95, 114, 152, 159, 170, 175 assassination, 57, 70, 83 assault, 20, 80 assaults, 80, 104 assessment, 6, 16, 17, 25, 32, 43, 58, 84, 111, 117, 120, 123, 126, 131, 135, 139, 147, 148, 164, 172, 179, 181, 188, 192, 199, 200, 201, 205, 217, 221, 226 assessment procedures, 188 assets, 105, 106, 109, 151, 175, 209 assignment, 45 asylum, 64 Atlantic, 71, 117 attachment, 43 attacks, 2, 4, 22, 27, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 65, 69, 70, 80, 83, 84, 85, 91, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 119, 133, 156, 209, 216, 220, 223 Attorney General, 81, 111, 141, 143, 148 auditing, 2, 34, 215 Australia, 75, 76, 103 Austria, 103 authority, 2, 52, 55, 59, 61, 73, 105, 113, 117, 118, 124, 135, 137, 143, 146, 149, 165, 201, 203 autonomy, 60 availability, 10, 29, 139, 184, 185, 200 avian flu, 161 aviation, 82, 173, 208 awareness, 121, 140, 142, 147, 173, 176, 191, 206, 207 Azerbaijan, 76, 103

Belgium, 102 benchmark, 22, 219 benchmarks, 150, 164, 179 Best Practice, 195, 202 Bhutan, 114 bilateral aid, 105 bilateral trade, 90 billets, 209 bin Laden, Osama, 72, 84 biodiversity, 157 biometric, 121, 131, 172, 200, 203 biometrics, 121 births, 52 blasphemy, 63, 64 block grants, 92 blocks, 202 BMI, 174, 208 bonus, 121 border crossing, 172, 174, 208 border security, 172 borrowing, 164 Bosnia, 24 bribery, 27, 145, 223 bribes, 60, 144, 145 Britain, 50, 58, 62, 68, 69, 71, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 103 brothers, 57 Buddha, 53, 72 Buddhist, 51 budget deficit, 164 building blocks, 157 buildings, 163 Bulgaria, 80, 102 bureaucracy, 80 buses, 124, 146 Bush Administration, 54, 55, 62, 66, 67, 83, 105

C B background information, 124 backlash, 66 Bahrain, 68, 74 Bangladesh, 114 bank account, 16, 27 banking, 109, 138, 164, 193 bankruptcy, 138 banks, 133 basic needs, 116, 166 battery, 125, 193 beating, 61 behavior, 63, 201 Beijing, 108

Camp David, 60, 72 campaigns, 171, 208 Canada, 62, 68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 102, 103, 131, 199, 205, 211 candidates, 3, 13, 16, 124, 132, 133 capacity, 4, 11, 51, 59, 60, 62, 67, 81, 91, 99, 115, 116, 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 181, 183, 194, 198, 201, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 226 capacity building, 99, 141, 166, 169, 170, 173, 208 capital goods, 52 career counseling, 121

Index cargo, 19, 74, 80, 126, 193 carpets, 52 carrier, 187 casting, 105 catalyst, 131, 200 caucuses, 57 cease-fire, 56, 73 cell, 67, 90, 150, 194 cell phones, 194 censorship, 146 CENTCOM, 68, 74 Central Asia, 64, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95, 113, 152, 170, 172 Central Bank, 59 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 52, 95, 160, 163 certification, 67, 99, 101, 132, 183, 185 chain of command, 25, 44, 126, 187, 191, 194, 203, 206, 217, 224 channels, 177 Chechnya, 87 chemicals, 143, 170 Chief Justice, 145 Chief of Staff, 136, 210 child labor, 146 child mortality, 161 Child Survival and Health (CSH), 100, 101 children, 52, 89, 91, 161, 163 China, 56, 64, 65, 87, 88, 90, 174 Christianity, 63, 64 Christians, 51 circulation, 132 citizens, vii, 6, 28, 49, 89, 106, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 142, 146, 178, 217 citizenship, 133 civil law, 137, 157 civil servant, 136, 145 civil servants, 136, 145 civil service, 137 civil service reform, 137 civil society, 64, 146, 147, 153 civil war, 52, 53 civilian, 7, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 44, 45, 61, 69, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 113, 118, 119, 129, 130, 133, 146, 154, 157, 165, 166, 167, 170, 187, 189, 196, 198, 199, 217, 220, 222, 224, 228 classes, 133 classroom, 24 cleaning, 145 clinics, 52 Clinton Administration, 53, 54, 90 closure, 176

233

Co, 19, 32, 54, 65, 83, 88, 150, 175, 184, 186, 212, 213 coaches, 166 coal, 90, 156 codes, 20, 139, 143 coercion, 136 collaboration, 126, 148 collateral, 72 collateral damage, 72 Colombia, 62 commerce, 158 commodity, 154 communication, 19, 30, 134, 139, 177, 184, 191, 193, 201 Communist Party, 50 communities, 81, 99, 113, 131, 148, 154, 163, 200, 211 community, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 27, 31, 43, 56, 59, 66, 67, 89, 94, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 128, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 152, 154, 158, 163, 166, 170, 174, 181, 182, 183, 189, 190, 197, 198, 199, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 211, 217, 218, 219, 222, 225 community support, 12, 154, 183, 218 compensation, 46, 202 competence, 112, 113, 180, 208 competition, 163 competitor, 58 complement, 71, 135, 201 compliance, 62, 142, 149 components, 35, 142, 190, 226, 227 composition, 83 concentrates, 131, 199, 211 conditioning, 4, 30, 217 confidence, 59, 70, 79, 113, 119, 127, 128, 140, 145, 168, 180, 188, 197, 206, 209 conflict, 4, 51, 52, 63, 86, 95, 114, 135, 150, 178 Congress, 2, 4, 9, 20, 25, 29, 30, 31, 33, 47, 55, 66, 81, 89, 93, 107, 111, 117, 175, 179, 184, 217, 224, 226 congressional budget, 33 connectivity, 151 consensus, 80, 147 Constitution, 5, 56, 113, 135, 147, 203 constraints, 4, 13, 153, 175 construction, 65, 73, 78, 81, 88, 90, 101, 114, 129, 131, 141, 143, 155, 158, 166, 173, 174, 178, 186, 200, 207, 208 consulting, 5 content analysis, 32 contractors, 2, 7, 26, 45, 48, 81, 188, 189, 217, 228 contracts, 81, 132, 184, 185, 198

234

Index

control, 6, 53, 58, 59, 61, 63, 67, 69, 73, 74, 75, 78, 87, 88, 107, 113, 116, 117, 127, 128, 144, 151, 155, 156, 161, 169, 172, 174, 182, 185, 191, 193, 197, 206, 207, 208, 217 conversion, 125, 193 conviction, 64, 145, 203 coordination, 3, 4, 29, 30, 59, 74, 85, 111, 127, 128, 154, 162, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 174, 179, 182, 183, 191, 205, 209, 210, 211, 224, 226 COP, 191, 212 copper, 90, 156 corporate finance, 138 corruption, 4, 22, 27, 28, 57, 60, 61, 63, 69, 81, 82, 90, 94, 112, 114, 120, 128, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 159, 166, 169, 173, 181, 182, 198, 203, 206, 207, 216, 220, 223 cost of living, 176 cost-effective, 141 costs, 3, 7, 11, 29, 43, 46, 68, 73, 92, 100, 114, 118, 120, 165, 168, 173, 184, 211, 217, 225, 226 counternarcotics, 8, 97, 113, 138, 140, 142, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 218 counter-terror, 84, 128, 133, 134, 143, 175, 197, 201 counterterrorism, 175 courts, 114, 137, 138, 142, 145 coverage, 24, 25, 28, 70, 146, 150, 161, 194, 195, 198, 210, 221, 223 covering, 63, 65, 114 CPD, 141 crack, 81 credibility, 182 credit, 114, 153 crime, 6, 35, 56, 128, 197, 203, 217, 227 crimes, 137, 139 criminal activity, 128, 172, 198 criminal justice, 139, 140, 141 criminal justice system, 139, 141 criminality, 139 criminals, 113, 172 criticism, 77, 83, 85, 86, 94 Croatia, 76, 79, 80, 103 crops, 66, 152, 153 cross-border, 85, 92, 176 crossing over, 70 CRS, 49, 50, 58, 59, 66, 68, 77, 92, 106, 107, 108 cruise missiles, 54 cultivation, 49, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 91, 93, 100, 153, 169, 171, 174, 206, 207, 208 culture, 150 currency, 109, 165 curriculum, 117, 138, 163, 202 cycles, 131, 200, 202

Czech Republic, 76, 78, 79, 80, 102, 103

D dairy, 155 danger, 95, 121 data analysis, 155 data collection, 149 data communication, 193 database, 13, 121, 172, 184, 186, 203 death, 46, 63, 64, 161 death penalty, 63, 64 deaths, 59, 70, 82, 86 debt, 52, 90, 100, 150 decision makers, 9, 46 decision making, 45 decision-making process, 126, 188, 194 decisions, 31, 60, 62, 71, 138, 145, 169, 185, 203, 205 defendants, 137 defense, 9, 35, 46, 77, 85, 86, 89, 93, 105, 119, 141, 146, 183, 186, 196 Defense Authorization Act, 4, 68 deficiency, 133 definition, 31, 43 deforestation, 156 degradation, 152, 175 degrading, 115, 209 delivery, 21, 56, 112, 126, 136, 137, 148, 169, 177, 185, 186, 187, 205 demand, 47, 129, 136, 146, 198 democracy, 64, 98, 99, 101, 180 demographics, 159 denial, 64, 105 Denmark, 64, 75, 76, 102, 103 Department of Agriculture, 97, 154 Department of Defense, 2, 14, 23, 40, 67, 144, 168, 197, 217 Department of Homeland Security, 173, 206 Department of Justice, 140, 143, 170, 171, 206, 213 Department of State, 2, 31, 37, 97, 107, 108, 128, 130, 143, 170, 184, 189, 213 deported, 178 deposits, 156, 157 desertion, 79 desire, 124, 195 detection, 155, 172, 174, 208 detention, 139, 141, 146, 196 detonation, 53 development assistance, 165, 166, 170, 171, 178 Development Assistance (DA), 100 dictatorship, 50 diesel, 91, 151, 160

Index diesel fuel, 160 direct action, 85 directives, 136 Director of National Intelligence, 58, 111 disability, 161 disbursement, 149, 169 discipline, 79, 196, 203 discrimination, 53, 63, 120, 146, 148 diseases, 155 displaced persons, 99, 100, 137 disputes, 77, 81, 135, 137, 138, 142, 149 distribution, 21, 26, 27, 35, 129, 137, 144, 151, 152, 190, 198, 216, 222, 227 divergence, 160 division, 129, 133 domestic resources, 151, 160 domestic violence, 146 donations, 8, 20, 21, 80, 134, 186, 200, 209, 211 donor, 4, 6, 21, 33, 45, 47, 63, 87, 89, 94, 138, 139, 140, 144, 150, 151, 178, 186, 205, 208, 211, 217, 228 donors, 4, 8, 20, 59, 62, 76, 89, 92, 94, 138, 141, 146, 148, 153, 161 draft, 4, 30, 31, 43, 52, 146, 196, 203 drainage, 95 drought, 97, 164, 165 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 111, 170, 171, 204, 213 Drug Enforcement Agency, 67 drug trafficking, 63, 67, 79, 107, 172, 175, 207 drug use, 203 drug-related, 164, 172 drugs, 161, 170, 204, 222 due process, 137, 145, 203 duties, 11, 35, 81, 105, 130, 135, 164, 198, 201, 225, 227 duty free, 90 duty-free treatment, 90

E earthquake, 79, 97 East Timor, 24 Eastern Europe, 186 economic assistance, 67 economic cooperation, 176 economic development, 4, 90, 151, 152, 153, 159, 164, 170, 205 economic growth, 89, 101, 114, 119, 151, 156, 158, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166 economic growth rate, 151 economic migrants, 178 economic performance, 164

235

economic policy, 114 economic stability, 159 Economic Support Fund, 98 economics, 155 education, 8, 91, 98, 101, 102, 121, 136, 142, 155, 156, 163, 186, 188, 195, 204, 212 educational programs, 212 educational system, 163 Egypt, 80, 91 elders, 69, 84, 124, 132, 178 election, 49, 57, 58, 59, 101, 104, 113, 135, 205 election law, 58 electric power, 90, 152, 178 electrical power, 114, 151, 152 electricity, 85, 87, 91, 95, 100, 151, 152 electronic surveillance, 142 emergency medical services, 190 emergency response, 100 employees, 145, 160, 169, 203 employment, 64, 123, 153, 154, 156, 164, 178, 192 empowerment, 65 encryption, 193 end-to-end, 194 energy, 88, 90, 104, 138, 151, 152 engagement, 2, 12, 33, 34, 54, 77, 88, 118, 175, 183, 206, 210 English language program, 120, 184 enterprise, 155 environment, 43, 99, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 149, 150, 157, 165, 176, 180, 181, 182, 210, 211, 216 Environmental Protection Agency, 157 epidemiology, 155 equipment, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 43, 46, 47, 48, 74, 76, 80, 81, 87, 93, 94, 100, 118, 120, 121, 127, 130, 131, 134, 139, 162, 172, 173, 175, 179, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 194, 196, 200, 201, 203, 204, 207, 209, 211, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 228 equity, 133, 148, 150 estimating, 29, 160 Estonia, 80, 102, 103 ethical standards, 131, 145, 200 ethics, 131, 194, 199, 200, 201 ethnicity, 63, 159 EU, 1, 8, 24, 81, 205 Europe, 109, 113, 117, 186, 214 European Commission, 211 European Union, 1, 33, 59, 72, 81, 83, 189, 213 evacuation, 12, 18, 35, 46, 128, 173, 175, 207 evolution, 78 execution, 11, 19, 26, 136, 149, 167, 184, 185 Executive Branch, 136

236

Index

Executive Order, 73, 105 exercise, 135 expenditures, 114, 165 expert, iv, 143 expertise, 153, 155, 157, 198, 199 exploitation, 64 explosives, 53, 86 exporter, 165 Export-Import Bank, 106 exports, 90, 105, 154, 164 exposure, 116 expulsion, 115 extraction, 173 extradition, 143 extremism, 73

F F-16, 76, 80 failure, 57, 60, 84, 117 fairness, 196 faith, 63 family, 16, 58, 124, 132, 153, 154, 195 family income, 153, 154 family members, 16, 58 farmers, 66, 91, 152, 153, 154, 175 farming, 62, 152, 171, 208 farming techniques, 171, 208 fax, 151 fear, 62, 86, 87, 116, 117, 138 fears, 87, 88 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 143, 213 federal law, 172 Federal Register, 67 feedback, 202 feeding, 161 fees, 109 feet, 52, 90, 156 females, 58, 97, 163 fencing, 84 FFP, 97, 156 fiber, 150 fighters, 50, 55, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 116, 208 film, 64 finance, 65, 153, 169, 203 financial institution, 161 financial support, 114, 121, 122, 137, 182 financing, 87, 150, 156 Finland, 103 fire, 12, 57, 80, 90, 121, 125, 127, 193, 203 firearms, 129 fires, 56

firms, 148, 154 fiscal policy, 114, 164 fitness, 7 flexibility, 77, 118, 119, 209 flight, 67, 127, 173, 207 flood, 127 flooding, 156 flow, 172 fluid, 120, 181 FMF, 98, 99 focusing, 14, 66, 96, 131, 140, 162, 169, 200, 206 food, 52, 69, 97, 101, 114, 154, 155, 156, 165 food aid, 101, 155 food commodities, 97 food safety, 156 foodstuffs, 165 foreign aid, 79, 114 foreign assistance, 11, 169, 226 Foreign Direct Investment, 114 Foreign Military Financing, 97 Foreign Military Sales, 185, 213 Foreign Relations Committee, 71 foreign travel, 106 foreigners, 51 forensic, 139 forest management, 155 forestry, 154, 156 France, 68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 102, 118, 209, 211 fraud, 169 free trade, 90 free trade agreement, 90 freedom, 63, 64, 107, 146, 147, 158 Freedom Support Act (FSA), 64, 65, 92, 93 freedoms, vii, 49, 50, 146 freight, 90 fruits, 52, 153 frustration, 56, 69 FTA, 90 fuel, 86, 114, 165 fulfillment, 68 funding, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 43, 47, 51, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 82, 90, 91, 95, 107, 113, 120, 129, 139, 140, 141, 145, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 166, 168, 169, 173, 179, 183, 184, 185, 186, 204, 207, 208, 211, 217, 218, 225, 226 funds, vii, 8, 20, 21, 27, 33, 47, 48, 50, 52, 62, 64, 65, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 99, 100, 101, 105, 109, 120, 137, 138, 140, 145, 166, 168, 169, 172, 184, 185, 207, 211, 218, 228 fusion, 67, 205

Index

G games, 63 GAO, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 215, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228 gas, 52, 88, 90, 91, 151, 156 Gates, Robert, 113 gauge, 45, 217 Gazprom, 108 GDP, 51, 149, 151, 152, 159, 164, 165 GDP per capita, 159, 164 gender, 141, 142, 150 gender equity, 150 Generalized System of Preferences, 105 generation, 11, 13, 60, 94, 151, 152, 184, 185 generators, 20, 151 Geneva, 4, 51, 56 Georgia, 19, 76, 155 Germany, 4, 7, 45, 52, 56, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 88, 102, 103, 211, 212, 217 gestures, 72 gifts, 72 girls, 52, 65, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 146 Global War on Terror, 33, 68, 92, 101 goals, 3, 11, 16, 30, 44, 45, 62, 111, 115, 127, 135, 139, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 163, 170, 171, 172, 179, 188, 191, 195 gold, 109, 156 governance, 49, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 81, 93, 98, 99, 100, 101, 112, 115, 116, 119, 127, 131, 135, 137, 140, 147, 148, 149, 150, 159, 165, 166, 167, 170, 172, 200, 205, 206 government revenues, 31, 43 government-to-government, 156 governors, 58, 61, 147, 166, 171 GPS, 191 grades, 134 grains, 154 grants, 92, 203 Greece, 76, 80, 102, 118 grids, 152 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 114, 151, 164 grouping, 54, 88, 104 groups, 2, 17, 53, 54, 58, 62, 65, 77, 83, 86, 87, 104, 115, 137, 146, 176, 184, 189, 205, 210, 211 growth, 16, 66, 89, 101, 112, 114, 119, 132, 133, 135, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 174 GSP, 105 guidance, 4, 7, 11, 25, 30, 35, 44, 117, 119, 123, 130, 154, 155, 165, 167, 168, 173, 182, 185, 195, 202, 204, 205, 207, 217, 224

237

guiding principles, 118 guilt, 127 guilty, 145 guns, 13, 19, 26, 80, 125, 134, 186, 193, 200

H hands, 169 harm, 116 harvest, 65, 154, 160 healing, 74 health, 11, 52, 53, 65, 78, 89, 91, 97, 99, 101, 113, 120, 124, 133, 146, 149, 150, 155, 159, 161, 162, 169, 184, 190 health care, 53, 78, 91, 146, 149, 161, 162, 190 health care sector, 91 health care system, 190 health clinics, 120, 184 health services, 52, 161, 162 healthcare, 114 hearing, 71 height, 55, 124, 195 helicopters, 73, 76, 77, 80, 95, 118, 126, 173, 186, 193 helmets, 80 heroin, 113 high school, 163 higher education, 163 high-level, 142, 143, 146, 150 Homeland Security, 173, 206 homogenous, 90 horizontal integration, 188, 189 horse, 104 hospital, 85, 91, 161, 162, 181 hospitalization, 162 hospitalized, 121 hospitals, 76, 162, 190 host, 73, 84, 127, 155, 156 household, 4 households, 91, 151, 152, 153, 161 housing, 36 hub, 73 human, 63, 64, 79, 81, 93, 114, 124, 135, 136, 141, 142, 146, 148, 150, 161, 162, 166, 169, 173, 176, 181, 199 human capital, 114, 136 human resource development, 161 human resources, 169, 181 human rights, 63, 64, 79, 81, 93, 114, 124, 135, 141, 142, 146, 150, 166, 199 humane, 141 humanitarian, 79, 86, 87, 92, 93, 112, 115, 127, 178, 209

238

Index

humanitarian aid, 79, 86, 87, 112, 115, 209 Hungary, 77, 80, 102, 103 Hussein, Saddam, 68, 104 hybrid, 141 hydrocarbon, 156 hydrology, 153 hydropower, 151, 152

I id, 92, 116, 135 identification, 121, 124, 131, 154, 185, 200, 203 ideology, 54, 104, 182 illiteracy, 126 imbalances, 136 immersion, 113, 180 immunization, 161 implementation, 17, 28, 46, 63, 94, 128, 133, 143, 150, 169, 170, 171, 188, 195, 198, 201, 202, 205, 224 imports, 90, 164, 165 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 83, 117 IMS, 196, 212 inattention, 59 incentive, 62, 90, 121, 129, 132 incentives, 62, 124, 132, 170, 196, 207 income, 114, 155, 156, 160 incomes, 153, 154 increased access, 162 independence, 46, 50, 59, 87, 183, 195 India, 52, 57, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 114, 152 Indian, 54, 63, 79, 87, 95, 108 indication, 118 indicators, 62, 68, 70, 81, 124, 148, 150, 159, 160 industrial, 152, 164 industry, 172 inequality, 144 infant mortality, 91, 159, 161 infant mortality rate, 161 inflation, 114, 164, 165 inflationary pressures, 165 information sharing, 172 information systems, 154 Information Technology, 150 infrastructure, 4, 20, 47, 69, 94, 114, 116, 120, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162, 166, 171, 172, 173, 177, 178, 190, 193, 204, 206, 208 inherited, 4 initiation, 138 insecticide, 161 insecurity, 49

insertion, 173 insight, 148 inspection, 142, 186 inspections, 142, 174, 186, 208 Inspector General, 169, 189, 196, 213 inspectors, 47, 224 instability, 50, 73, 131, 165 Institute of Peace, 140, 141 institutions, 6, 13, 14, 35, 99, 113, 114, 122, 136, 137, 142, 147, 148, 149, 153, 156, 157, 168, 180, 182, 183, 188, 189, 192, 210, 211, 212, 217 instruction, 24, 81, 113, 129, 180, 188, 202, 203 instructors, 130, 198 insurance, 106 integration, 5, 114, 121, 131, 144, 188, 189, 190, 209, 229 integrity, 183 intellectual property, 138 intelligence, 18, 35, 45, 51, 55, 67, 70, 72, 84, 85, 89, 95, 120, 127, 149, 172, 173, 177, 184, 190, 191, 205, 207, 209 Intelligence Community, 117 intensity, 170 interaction, 148, 176 interactions, 177 interest groups, 137 interface, 130, 177, 199 interference, 83, 88, 146, 165 intermediaries, 72 internal controls, 203 internalization, 195 internally displaced person, 137 International Disaster and Famine Assistance, 100 international financial institutions, 161 international law, 172 International Military Education and Training (IMET), 8, 100, 101, 204 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 149, 150, 151, 161, 164, 165 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), 8, 98, 99, 100, 101, 140, 218 international standards, 63, 139, 143 international terrorism, 86 internet, 150 interoperability, 120, 125, 177, 184, 193, 201 interview, 58, 66, 84 interviews, 32, 33 intimidation, 57, 78, 116, 126, 146 inventories, 131, 200 Investigations, 172, 173, 207 investigative, 35, 129, 142, 143, 199, 201, 227

Index investment, 3, 22, 44, 45, 63, 89, 90, 99, 109, 113, 148, 150, 152, 157, 159, 219, 225 investors, 90, 138, 157 Iran, 53, 56, 59, 74, 85, 86, 89, 91, 95, 97, 104, 108, 151, 174, 178 Iraq, 18, 19, 24, 26, 68, 69, 71, 74, 86, 89, 92, 104, 216, 220 Ireland, 103 iris, 121 iron, 156 irrigation, 152, 171, 208 ISC, 186, 209, 211, 212 Islam, 52, 53, 64, 72, 88, 89, 104, 142, 174, 208 Islamic, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 63, 72, 87, 88, 89, 95, 104, 115, 145, 163, 165, 171, 179, 181, 213 Islamic law, 63, 72 Islamic movements, 50, 87 Israel, 90 Italy, 50, 56, 64, 68, 76, 79, 81, 82, 102, 103, 108, 118

J jails, 139 Japan, 62, 68, 91, 108 Japanese, 68 jewelry, 90 Jews, 51 Jirga, 58, 59, 72, 135 jobs, 27, 62, 65, 92, 158, 160, 163 Joint Chiefs, 31, 32, 33, 34, 46, 69, 71 Jordan, 90, 91, 103 journalists, 55, 73, 146 judge, 94, 196 judges, 76, 81, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 196 judicial branch, 135 judiciary, 27, 98, 145, 216, 217, 222 jurisdiction, 59, 73, 138, 139, 142 justice, 27, 48, 59, 60, 63, 66, 69, 81, 114, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 196, 206, 207, 216, 222, 228

K Kashmir, 87, 95 Kazakhstan, 88 Kenya, 53, 95 killing, 84, 90, 106 Korea, 68 Korean, 68, 73 Kosovo, 24

239

Kuwait, 104 Kyrgyzstan, 74, 88, 152, 172

L labor, 59, 136, 158 land, 50, 87, 96, 137, 138, 152, 153, 154 land tenure, 153 language, 120, 184, 204 large-scale, 157 Latvia, 77, 80, 102 law, 4, 6, 24, 27, 31, 35, 55, 59, 63, 64, 67, 72, 86, 89, 93, 98, 99, 100, 107, 113, 116, 120, 124, 128, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 157, 166, 170, 172, 173, 175, 182, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 206, 207, 208, 215, 217, 220, 222, 227, 229 law enforcement, 24, 35, 86, 113, 128, 142, 143, 144, 146, 170, 172, 173, 175, 182, 196, 197, 198, 206, 207, 208, 220, 227 laws, 59, 135, 137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 157, 171, 180, 196, 199, 203 lawyers, 81, 141 lead, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 29, 57, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 103, 112, 119, 127, 129, 133, 134, 160, 172, 180, 182, 189, 198, 201, 204, 217 leadership, 3, 13, 15, 16, 53, 59, 72, 78, 88, 91, 94, 108, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 147, 148, 149, 172, 177, 182, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202, 204, 209 learning, 65, 156, 195 Lebanon, 19 legal systems, 137 legislation, 33, 63, 109, 144 legislative, 135, 142, 143, 144, 203 legislative elections, 135 licenses, 105, 150 licensing, 157 life expectancy, 159 limitation, 24, 116 limitations, 4, 19 linkage, 190 links, 35, 175, 191, 227 literacy, 16, 120, 136, 163, 182, 184, 201 Lithuania, 80, 102, 103 livestock, 154, 155 Livestock, 155 loans, 105, 175 local community, 133 local government, 112, 119, 166 location, 29, 73, 177, 223 logging, 156

240

Index

logistics, 3, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 35, 45, 46, 120, 123, 130, 132, 175, 182, 186, 188, 190, 192, 197, 199 London, 45, 60, 94, 96, 172 long-term, 3, 9, 10, 11, 22, 29, 30, 31, 62, 73, 77, 93, 114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 136, 139, 147, 148, 149, 150, 156, 157, 162, 163, 169, 170, 173, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 192, 205, 208, 224, 226 Los Angeles, 90, 107, 108 losses, 51, 70, 113, 132, 151 low-tech, 152 loyalty, 132, 135, 147, 201 LTC, 125, 134 Luxemburg, 102

M Macedonia, 103 macroeconomic, 149 macroeconomic policy, 149 maintenance, 22, 46, 80, 101, 118, 130, 133, 141, 151, 159, 173, 182, 187, 199, 208, 226 major cities, 150, 158 malaria, 161 management, 11, 13, 24, 25, 35, 114, 120, 121, 131, 132, 136, 141, 142, 144, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 169, 172, 174, 182, 186, 188, 189, 196, 197, 200, 201, 203, 208, 220 management practices, 189 mandates, 93, 113, 210 manpower, 60, 194 manufacturing, 152 Marines, 24, 47, 55, 71, 76, 79, 119, 123 market, 91, 114, 138, 149, 153, 154 marketing, 153 markets, 114, 153 marriages, 146 Marxist, 106 maternal, 65, 99, 101, 161 maturation, 112 measurement, 148, 149 measures, 2, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 43, 45, 67, 121, 148, 149, 160, 191 media, 63, 64, 70, 97, 146, 147, 176 mediators, 56 medical care, 190 medications, 162 membership, 90 memorandum of understanding, 175 men, 63, 132 mental health, 161 mentor, 14, 18, 24, 25, 28, 33, 47, 104, 130, 143, 148, 166, 169, 188, 189, 195, 199, 202, 207, 209, 220, 221, 223

mentoring, 6, 18, 24, 25, 29, 32, 47, 122, 123, 129, 130, 131, 141, 142, 173, 187, 191, 192, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 204, 207, 208, 209, 224, 228 mentorship, 123, 127, 130, 131, 194, 199, 200, 210, 211 messages, 147 metric, 97, 154, 156 microwave, 151 migrants, 178 militant, 84, 85, 87, 104, 115, 176 military, 9, 10, 11, 17, 24, 29, 30, 33, 35, 45, 46, 50, 51, 54, 60, 67, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 99, 101, 103, 106, 107, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 126, 130, 140, 141, 154, 165, 166, 167, 170, 173, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194, 196, 198, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 216, 220, 225, 226, 228 military aid, 51, 80, 93 militias, 50, 55, 60, 62, 81 Millennium, 150 Millennium Development Goals, 150 minerals, 90, 156 mines, 59, 96 mining, 84, 88, 90, 96, 98, 152 Ministry of Education, 149, 163 minorities, 50, 63, 139, 146 minority, 63, 85 missiles, 54, 61, 95, 104 missions, 35, 67, 74, 76, 77, 115, 123, 126, 127, 173, 175, 177, 182, 183, 193, 207, 209 Missouri, 153 mobility, 126, 134, 193, 213 MOD, 113 models, 123, 192 modernization, 205 modules, 108 momentum, 49, 112, 115 monetary policy, 164, 165 money, 10, 21, 33, 43, 133, 145 Mongolia, 211 Montenegro, 80 morale, 133 moratorium, 63 morbidity, 161 mortality, 52, 91, 159, 161 Moscow, 51, 107, 108 movement, 24, 52, 69, 79, 83, 85, 107, 146, 158, 187, 220 multi-ethnic, 180 multilateral, 52, 56, 95, 105, 139, 140 Musharraf, Pervez, 83

Index music, 53, 63 Muslim, 51 Muslims, 54, 88

N NADR, 98, 99, 100, 101 naming, 66, 79 narcotics, 4, 23, 33, 35, 47, 56, 60, 62, 66, 67, 81, 82, 86, 89, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 113, 114, 129, 137, 142, 143, 150, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 198, 206, 207, 219, 227, 228 nation, 11, 81, 105, 113, 131, 132, 134, 135, 152, 158, 186, 200, 201, 226 national, 3, 4, 6, 29, 35, 50, 58, 68, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 87, 90, 93, 97, 105, 106, 112, 113, 119, 121, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 158, 160, 163, 164, 166, 171, 175, 178, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205, 209, 210, 217, 227 National Defense Authorization Act, 45, 111, 179, 229 national emergency, 105 National Guard, 14, 153, 170 national income, 160 national interests, 130, 178 national security, 4, 29 National Security Council, 71, 136, 208, 212 National Strategy, 60 NATO, vii, 1, 2, 19, 20, 21, 47, 49, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 102, 103, 112, 117, 118, 119, 123, 125, 134, 176, 177, 186, 192, 193, 196, 199, 200, 201, 205, 209, 211, 213 natural, 50, 88, 90, 144, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157 natural gas, 88, 90, 151, 156 natural resource management, 154, 156 natural resources, 144, 150, 156, 157 Near East, 212, 213 Nebraska, 153 negative consequences, 119 negotiating, 84 Nepal, 114 Netherlands, 64, 71, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 102, 103, 205, 208, 211 network, 50, 147, 150, 158, 162, 177, 193 New York, 54, 60, 67, 84, 95, 107, 108 New York Times, 84, 95, 107, 108 New Zealand, 76, 103 newspapers, 63 NGOs, 64, 65, 97, 99, 137, 138, 144, 147 nodes, 177

241

non-emergency, 101 normal, 105, 188 North Atlantic, 1, 32, 117, 186, 213 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1, 32, 117, 186, 213 North Korea, 95 Northeast, 100 Norway, 75, 76, 79, 81, 102, 103 NSC, 208, 212 nutrition, 65, 150, 161 nuts, 52, 155

O obligation, 184 observations, 32 Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 109 Office of National Drug Control Policy, 170, 171 oil, 52, 68, 74, 90, 156 on-the-job training, 195 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 55, 68, 74, 75, 76, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 104, 108, 158 operational independence, 192 opium, 52, 60, 61, 65, 153, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 206, 207, 208 opposition, 2, 54, 58, 59, 65, 75, 84 optical, 150 optical fiber, 151 optimism, 70, 73 organic, 153, 173, 207 organization, 12, 83, 96, 108, 126, 131, 133, 136, 158, 182, 183, 187, 188, 195 organizational capacity, 188, 189 organizations, 8, 34, 55, 63, 87, 92, 105, 112, 130, 134, 137, 141, 147, 148, 149, 153, 156, 159, 160, 166, 167, 168, 170, 173, 175, 176, 182, 183, 188, 189, 191, 199, 200, 201, 207, 211 organized crime, 6, 217 orientation, 183 orthodox, 52, 104 outsourcing, 156 oversight, 3, 4, 7, 9, 30, 43, 89, 93, 94, 114, 130, 132, 136, 144, 169, 174, 188, 196, 204, 208, 217 ownership, 138

P Pacific, 140 pacification, 77 pacing, 194 Pakistan, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64, 66, 69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95,

242

Index

97, 101, 104, 106, 108, 109, 114, 118, 151, 152, 154, 156, 163, 165, 172, 174, 176, 177, 187, 212 Pakistani, 49, 70, 72, 83, 84, 85, 90, 115, 176 paramilitary, 177 parents, 163 Paris, 60, 94 Parliament, 146 partition, 85 partnership, 6, 12, 62, 81, 85, 130, 177, 181 partnerships, 153 Pashtun, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86, 104, 115, 136 passenger, 95 passive, 76 pathology, 156 patients, 128 payroll, 23, 46, 220 PDPs, 148 peacekeeping, vii, 24, 50, 56, 59, 68, 74, 75, 76, 93 peacekeeping forces, 56 Peacekeeping Operations, 82 peers, 64 PEF, 171 penalties, 16 penalty, 63, 64 per capita, 114, 159, 160, 164, 168 per capita income, 114, 160 perception, 27, 70, 71, 131, 136, 144, 148, 149, 159, 200 perceptions, 71, 159 performance, 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 29, 30, 34, 45, 48, 64, 128, 147, 148, 149, 164, 169, 197, 228 periodic, 206 permit, 89, 94, 118 perseverance, 199 Persian Gulf, 68, 74 personal, vii, 49, 133, 139, 191 personnel costs, 7 persons with disabilities, 154 persuasion, 62 pest management, 153 petroleum, 52 Phoenix, 6, 32, 130, 131 phone, 90, 150, 194 phosphates, 105 physical fitness, 7 physicians, 91 pilot training, 173, 207 pilots, 80, 95 pipelines, 90 PKO, 82 plague, 80, 133, 139

planning, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 31, 45, 46, 68, 82, 89, 123, 126, 130, 155, 169, 170, 175, 180, 184, 188, 192, 204, 205, 209, 210, 215 plants, 152 platforms, 68, 140, 176 play, 64, 132, 153, 166, 204 PMA, 205, 213 Poland, 76, 79, 80, 102, 103, 118 police, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 61, 65, 67, 70, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 98, 99, 106, 112, 113, 114, 121, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 170, 173, 181, 182, 183, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228 policy makers, 171, 172 policymakers, 30, 190 political leaders, 86 political participation, 146, 147, 148 political parties, 58 political stability, 153 politics, 77 polling, 159 poor, 62, 63, 91, 114, 139, 146, 147, 149, 160, 193 poor performance, 147 poppy cultivation, 49, 66, 67, 91, 93, 100, 153, 171, 174, 206 population, 51, 52, 70, 78, 91, 115, 116, 117, 127, 129, 133, 135, 136, 148, 149, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 176, 198 population size, 159 ports, 83 Portugal, 102 posture, 87, 121, 122, 180, 181, 192 poverty, 149, 159, 160 poverty line, 160 poverty rate, 159, 160 poverty reduction, 149, 160, 161 power, 4, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 61, 65, 67, 71, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 100, 101, 104, 113, 114, 115, 116, 131, 133, 144, 149, 151, 152, 159, 178, 200 power generation, 94 power plant, 152 powers, 57, 58, 60, 135 prediction, 160 premium, 95 presidency, 136, 147 president, 52, 57, 147 President Bush, 52, 60, 71, 73, 81, 82, 84, 85, 105 President Clinton, 105 presidential elections, vii, 49, 58

Index pressure, vii, 49, 54, 55, 64, 71, 88, 113, 176 pretrial, 146 prevention, 35, 128, 197, 227 PRI, 32 prices, 66, 160, 165 primary care, 162 printing, 163 priorities, 3, 5, 9, 13, 18, 19, 26, 46, 60, 77, 114, 123, 145, 149, 150, 169, 179, 181 prisoners, 68, 73 prisons, 138, 139, 141 private, 2, 17, 63, 82, 99, 111, 114, 129, 137, 138, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 162, 163, 205 private enterprises, 114 private investment, 63, 152 private sector, 99, 111, 148, 150, 153 private sector investment, 99 private-sector, 149 proactive, 143 producers, 155 production, 19, 20, 35, 113, 129, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 164, 165, 169, 198, 206, 227 productivity, 152, 153, 154 professional development, 194, 204 professionalism, 112, 118, 126, 130, 133, 142, 180, 194, 199, 201 profit, 144 program, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 27, 28, 30, 31, 43, 44, 46, 51, 62, 66, 67, 72, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 107, 113, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139, 140, 141, 148, 153, 154, 155, 161, 164, 166, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 217, 218, 223, 225 programming, 136, 144, 155, 204 progress reports, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 222, 223 pro-Iranian, 104 proliferation, 68, 74 promote, 56, 58, 88, 89, 92, 94, 121, 147, 149, 174, 206, 208, 211 property, iv, 26, 48, 96, 105, 138, 188, 204, 222 proportionality, 120 prosecutor, 203 prosperity, 117 protection, 24, 35, 57, 63, 74, 98, 99, 101, 113, 143, 150, 157, 173, 175, 207, 220, 227 prototype, 155 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), vii, 50, 68, 74, 76, 77, 78, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 114, 139, 153, 154, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169

243

public, 6, 53, 63, 71, 83, 137, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 171, 176, 206, 207, 208, 217 public administration, 144 public awareness, 140, 176, 206 public opinion, 159 public opinion surveys, 159 public safety, 6, 217 public sector, 144, 148, 162 public service, 137, 145 public support, 84 punishment, 145 purchasing power, 51 purchasing power parity, 51

Q Qatar, 74 qualifications, 137 questioning, 64 questionnaire, 139

R radical, 50, 52, 87, 88 radio, 63, 70, 147, 191 radio station, 63, 70, 147 rail, 158 rainwater, 152 random, 25 range, 11, 162 rangeland, 155 ratings, 47, 90, 194, 228 raw material, 156 raw materials, 156 reading, 126, 163, 194 Reagan Administration, 95 real terms, 164, 165 recognition, 53, 116, 127, 134, 200, 202 reconciliation, 73, 205, 208 reconstruction, vii, 5, 49, 50, 59, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99, 112, 114, 118, 119, 136, 139, 149, 152, 159, 165, 166, 178, 181, 205 record keeping, 190 recovery, 151 recruiting, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27, 35, 48, 121, 123, 124, 131, 132, 133, 134, 191, 192, 200, 202, 223, 228 reduction, 51, 60, 106, 149, 151, 160, 161, 175, 203 reelection, vii refining, 162, 191 reflection, 87

244

Index

reforms, 80, 120, 141, 146, 153, 180, 197, 203 refuge, 53 refugee camps, 89, 176 refugees, 59, 85, 86, 89, 97, 137, 149, 176, 178 regenerate, 116 regional, vii, 5, 8, 28, 35, 48, 49, 50, 57, 60, 79, 88, 91, 93, 104, 114, 122, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 138, 139, 144, 150, 151, 154, 158, 159, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 182, 187, 190, 191, 197, 198, 199, 208, 209, 223, 226, 227 regional cooperation, 150, 175 regional integration, 114 regular, 94, 114, 121, 133, 143, 210 regulation, 121, 145, 175, 195, 196, 203, 205 regulations, 105, 138, 142, 171, 194 regulatory framework, 144, 157 rehabilitate, 91, 95, 152, 154 rehabilitation, 95, 98, 152 reimbursement, 8 reinforcement, 131, 195, 200 relationship, 30, 36, 44, 50, 131, 135 relationships, 77, 132, 168, 200 relaxation, 85 reliability, 23, 33, 34, 216, 220 rent, 208 repair, 77 repatriation, 89, 97, 176 repression, 54, 146 reputation, 51, 69, 132 research, 156, 158, 159, 160 resentment, 60, 87 reserves, 65, 90, 114, 156 resettlement, 137 residential, 96 resilience, 71 resistance, 57, 89, 116 resolution, 53, 137, 138, 141, 142, 154, 174 resource management, 154 resources, 9, 10, 20, 30, 31, 46, 60, 65, 71, 76, 77, 81, 112, 114, 115, 118, 123, 131, 139, 140, 144, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 169, 175, 180, 181, 182, 186, 191, 192, 197, 199, 200, 209, 217, 223, 225, 226 responsibilities, 2, 29, 30, 31, 44, 74, 75, 78, 114, 170, 216, 224, 226 restaurants, 63 restructuring, 46, 137 retail, 153 retention, 15, 45, 121, 124, 125, 132, 133, 134 returns, 28, 187, 200, 223 revenue, 63, 114, 131, 149, 151, 156, 164, 165, 175, 181, 200 risk, 4, 22, 119, 123, 138, 160, 216, 220

risks, 138, 175 road map, 150 roadmap, 138 roads, 52, 91, 98, 102, 159 roadside bombs, 86, 113 Romania, 60, 71, 75, 76, 77, 102, 103, 118, 211 Rome, 146 rotations, 13, 71, 117 rule of law, 4, 6, 27, 35, 64, 99, 120, 128, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 166, 172, 197, 199, 200, 206, 207, 215, 217, 222, 227, 229 runoff, 57 rural, 52, 91, 94, 100, 113, 128, 136, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 197 rural areas, 91, 113 rural development, 94, 100, 150 rural population, 136, 151 Russia, 56, 80, 87, 88, 108, 118 Russian, 54, 74, 76, 87, 88, 95

S safety, 80, 90 salaries, 8, 11, 16, 17, 27, 46, 48, 82, 99, 124, 133, 134, 139, 140, 144, 145, 160, 195, 208, 212, 225, 228 salary, 11, 27, 46, 48, 125, 132, 136, 180, 228 sales, 105, 153, 154, 156 sample, 25 sampling, 159 sanctions, 53, 73, 105, 106, 109 sanitation, 97 satellite, 150, 194 Saudi Arabia, 52, 84, 89, 91, 95, 104, 108 scalable, 121 scarcity, 152 school, 51, 52, 53, 65, 69, 76, 78, 79, 85, 91, 112, 149, 161, 163, 188, 193, 194, 196, 204, 209 schooling, 133, 163, 195 search, 55, 74, 86, 108, 173, 186 Seattle, 140 secret, 72 secretariat, 211 Secretary General, 59, 70, 71 Secretary of Agriculture, 111 Secretary of Defense, 3, 9, 31, 32, 55, 71, 85, 113, 170, 206, 224 Secretary of State, 3, 111, 179 secular, 50 Security Council, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 71, 74, 108, 136, 208, 212 seed, 156

Index seizure, 50 seizures, 137 selecting, 61, 147 Self Defense Forces, 68 semi-arid, 152 Senate, 53, 55, 58, 71, 90, 93 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 71 sensing, 88 sensitivity, 185 separation, 121, 145, 203 September 11, 4, 54, 55, 56, 57, 83, 84, 88, 90, 109, 111 series, 84, 91, 111, 119, 162, 177, 190 service provider, 150, 169 services, 6, 11, 15, 17, 34, 47, 52, 93, 105, 113, 128, 135, 136, 140, 141, 148, 150, 153, 155, 161, 162, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 190, 197, 205, 206 sex, 159 sexual violence, 146 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 83, 88 shaping, 204 shares, 104 Sharia, 116, 142 sharing, 73, 152, 172, 173, 175, 178, 190 shelter, 69 Shiite, 51, 54, 60, 63, 85, 104 Shiites, 54 shipping, 86, 186, 187 short supply, 152 shortage, 3, 16, 24, 25, 26, 29, 47, 76, 114, 123, 130, 131, 132, 136, 199, 209, 216, 220, 221, 224 short-term, 170, 196, 206 shoulder, 50, 69 SIGIR, 89 sign, 59, 104, 121, 124, 186 signs, 66, 146, 187 Singapore, 103 sites, 121, 223 skills, 3, 7, 13, 17, 18, 22, 130, 136, 137, 138, 142, 147, 154, 155, 163, 188, 189, 199, 200, 211, 217 skimming, 27 Slovakia, 102 Slovenia, 79, 103 smugglers, 177 smuggling, 68, 74 social development, 120, 149, 150 social services, 11, 113 socialist, 50 soil, 152, 153, 156 soil erosion, 156 solutions, 58, 69, 123, 132, 138, 148, 157, 168, 177 South Asia, 83, 114, 152, 175, 212, 213

245

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 83 South Korea, 68, 73, 78, 108 sovereignty, 183 Soviet Union, 20, 50, 51, 70, 105 soybean, 156 Spain, 79, 103 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 89 spectrum, 119, 123, 128, 182, 192, 197 speculation, 58 speech, 52 speed, 145 Sri Lanka, 114 stability, 9, 56, 60, 87, 88, 111, 113, 114, 118, 131, 137, 153, 159, 169, 171, 174, 179, 181, 200, 208, 224 stabilization, 59, 77, 109 stabilize, vii, 49, 71, 75, 83 staffing, 155, 162, 166, 196 stakeholder, 167, 168 stakeholders, 3, 10, 44, 148, 176 standard operating procedures, 191 standardization, 13, 20, 162, 188 standards, 2, 34, 63, 64, 129, 131, 132, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 188, 192, 200, 215 State Department, 51, 53, 54, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 78, 81, 82, 86, 97, 103, 105, 106, 108, 129, 133, 159 statistical analysis, 149 statistics, 91, 149, 151 steady state, 127 stockpiling, 62 storage, 152, 156, 171, 208 strain, 178 strains, 71 strategic, 5, 12, 31, 35, 44, 45, 51, 77, 84, 86, 111, 114, 117, 126, 140, 149, 150, 161, 169, 170, 172, 181, 184, 194, 205 strategic planning, 31, 169, 184 strategies, 2, 31, 150, 162, 168, 184, 192 strength, 10, 22, 23, 28, 44, 47, 50, 70, 79, 82, 112, 116, 120, 124, 127, 129, 180, 181, 196, 198, 203, 216, 219, 220 strikes, 55, 71, 76 structural reforms, 114, 164 students, 52, 130, 149, 163, 188 subjective, 148, 149 subsidies, 114, 151 subsistence, 152 subsistence farming, 152 substitutes, 19 substitution, 67, 93 sugar, 105

246

Index

suicide, 27, 49, 55, 59, 61, 69, 70, 113, 223 suicide bombers, 27, 55, 223 summer, 17, 112, 119, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, 140, 193, 195, 229 Sunni, 51, 52, 60 supervision, 192 supplemental, 50, 64, 73, 82, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101 supplements, 129 supply, 26, 48, 65, 74, 76, 80, 127, 134, 161, 187, 190, 197, 222 supply chain, 187 support services, 17 support staff, 137 Supreme Court, 59, 63, 64, 81, 114, 138, 142, 145, 203 surplus, 80 surprise, 69 surveillance, 120, 142, 155, 173, 184, 207 survival, 7, 217 suspects, 137, 171 suspensions, 105 sustainability, 2, 3, 11, 29, 31, 121, 122, 147, 153, 154, 165, 182, 209, 217, 224, 225 sustainable economic growth, 149 sustainable growth, 163 Sweden, 79, 103 Switzerland, 4, 80 symbols, 64 sympathetic, 70 systems, 50, 86, 123, 133, 137, 140, 142, 144, 154, 169, 173, 182, 184, 188, 189, 190, 192, 196, 206

T tactics, 116, 188, 217 Tajikistan, 56, 87, 88, 90, 151, 152, 172, 174 takeover, 75 talent, 61 Taliban, vii, 4, 27, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 135, 136, 146, 158, 159, 161, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 217, 223 tangible, 112 tanks, 125, 186, 193 Tanzania, 53 targets, 67, 70, 72, 93, 96, 164, 171 tariff, 105 tariffs, 105, 151 task force, 6, 11, 112, 142, 167, 185 teacher training, 163 teachers, 52, 69, 137, 146, 149, 163

teaching, 155 technical assistance, 87, 137, 148, 155, 166 technology, 20, 121, 138, 150, 152, 153 telecommunications, 95, 150, 193 telecommunications services, 150 telephone, 32, 34 television, 53, 63, 70, 108 tension, 59 tenure, 153 term plans, 173, 208 terminals, 193 territorial, 183 territory, 50, 69, 74, 87, 106, 111, 135 terrorism, 5, 29, 35, 56, 74, 79, 84, 86, 87, 98, 105, 120, 128, 133, 134, 143, 163, 175, 197, 201, 227 terrorist, 55, 68, 84, 108, 113, 176 terrorist attack, 55, 113 terrorist organization, 108, 176 terrorists, 2, 4, 95, 111 testimony, 58, 71, 76, 77, 113, 215, 217, 228 Texas, 153 textiles, 52 Third World, 51 threat, 60, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 95, 113, 126, 132, 170, 176 threat of force, 176 threatened, 86 threats, 4, 120, 126, 136, 146, 174, 176, 181, 183, 184 timber, 156 time frame, 4, 11, 31, 43, 44, 45 title, 53, 57 tobacco, 59 Tokyo, 94 tolls, 223 torture, 146 total costs, 46 tourism, 156 tracking, 121, 141, 179, 184, 203 trade, 4, 90, 105, 113, 114, 153, 156, 158, 170, 174, 175 Trade Act, 105 trading, 178 traffic, 35, 128, 197, 227 trafficking in persons, 146 Trafficking in Persons, 64 trainees, 129, 133 training programs, 123, 131, 137, 192, 200, 202 transactions, 46, 185, 197 transfer, 2, 16, 27, 48, 68, 170, 228 transition, vii, 10, 12, 30, 49, 56, 125, 129, 183, 188, 193, 198, 208, 225 Transition Initiatives, 97

Index transmission, 151, 152 transparency, 31, 45, 94, 148, 173 transparent, 89, 147, 166 transport, 21, 69, 74, 76, 79, 158 transportation, 20, 21, 46, 47, 100, 105, 118, 152, 158, 178, 186, 211, 223 travel, 132, 147 travel time, 132 Treasury, 109, 170, 171 Treasury Department, 109 trees, 154 trend, 51, 132 trial, 64, 143 tribal, 50, 55, 69, 77, 81, 83, 84, 116, 132, 138, 139, 176, 178 tribes, 50, 54, 58, 84, 85, 104 trucks, 19, 22, 26, 80, 186, 187, 216, 221, 222 trust, 21, 115, 118, 119, 128, 131, 140, 145, 168, 177, 197, 199, 209, 211 trust fund, 21, 118, 140, 211 tuberculosis, 161 Turkey, 52, 74, 78, 80, 103, 211 Turkmenistan, 52, 56, 88, 90, 108, 151, 172, 174 turnout, 57 turnover, 30, 224

247

United Nations Development Programme, 8, 32 United States, v, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 18, 22, 24, 32, 43, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 117, 119, 135, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 154, 156, 158, 159, 163, 169, 170, 172, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 190, 204, 208, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 225, 226 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 111, 148, 214 United States Attorneys, 142 universities, 142, 154, 163 university students, 163 unmanned aerial vehicles, 76 updating, 138, 161, 194 uranium, 156 urban areas, 91, 163, 177, 194 urban centers, 152 USAID, 63, 64, 78, 81, 89, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 145, 148, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 204, 206, 208, 214 Uzbekistan, 56, 74, 80, 87, 88, 151, 174

V U U.N. Security Council, 53, 54, 56, 59, 74, 108 U.S. Department of Agriculture (UDSA), 97, 154, 155, 156, 166, 167, 170, 171 U.S. military, 10, 11, 24, 45, 46, 54, 67, 71, 73, 74, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 95, 99, 112, 130, 140, 154, 166, 173, 175, 198, 204, 206, 207, 209, 216, 220, 225, 228 U.S. Treasury, 109 UAVs, 108 Ukraine, 103 uncertainty, 144 unclassified, 33 unemployment, 159, 160 unemployment rate, 160 unfolded, 57 UNHCR, 89, 97, 176 uniform, 129 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 68, 74, 80, 84 United Kingdom (UK), 82, 103, 131, 172, 200, 205, 214 United Nations (UN), 2, 8, 25, 27, 32, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 72, 85, 94, 96, 141, 146, 148, 159, 160, 167, 174, 184, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 8, 32, 212, 214

validation, 18, 183, 192, 209, 211 validity, 33 values, 54, 147, 195 variation, 109 vegetable oil, 156 vegetables, 153 vehicles, 3, 4, 13, 18, 19, 21, 26, 76, 80, 81, 125, 126, 134, 185, 187, 193, 197, 204, 222 venue, 115, 209 Vice President, 60, 62, 72, 104 victims, 59, 79, 99, 100 video games, 63 village, 57, 72, 124, 132, 147, 148, 153, 154 violence, 52, 68, 69, 70, 72, 83, 113, 116, 146, 176, 218 violent, 73, 114, 135 visible, 138, 176 vision, 5, 118, 149, 181 voice, 150, 151, 193 voters, 58, 113 voting, 57, 58 vulnerability, 116, 149

248

Index

W wages, 136, 145 Wahhabism, 52 Wall Street Journal, 108 war, 18, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 70, 73, 86, 88, 89, 90, 95, 104 War on Terror, 33, 68, 92, 101, 111 warfare, 89 warlord, 104 warlords, 54, 60, 113, 136 Warsaw, 125, 134, 193, 200 Warsaw Pact, 125, 134, 193, 200 Washington Post, 58, 60, 66, 71, 95, 108 water, 4, 92, 97, 113, 114, 152, 159, 178 watershed, 152 Waziristan, 176 weapons, 3, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 50, 53, 61, 62, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 95, 106, 120, 125, 127, 128, 134, 178, 184, 185, 186, 187, 193, 197, 199, 200, 201, 216, 217, 221, 223 well-being, 178 Western countries, 60 wheat, 97, 160

wholesalers, 154 winning, 116, 117 winter, 70 wireless, 150, 193 wisdom, 69 withdrawal, 51, 53, 87 wives, 70 women, vii, 49, 50, 53, 56, 63, 64, 65, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 139, 140, 142, 146, 147, 148, 154, 155 work projects, 206 worker rights, 146 workers, 77, 137, 163, 178 workforce, 158 working conditions, 27, 145, 223 working groups, 189, 205, 211 World Bank, 95, 139, 149, 150, 151, 159, 161, 164 World Food Program (WFP), 97 World Trade Organization, 90 writing, 126, 163, 194

Y yield, 134