Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade (African Political, Economic, and Security Issues)

AFRICAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES

AFRICA'S CONNECTION TO THE DRUG TRADE

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AFRICAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES

AFRICA'S CONNECTION TO THE DRUG TRADE

PEYTON E. DANIELS EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Africa's connection to the drug trade / editor, Peyton E. Daniels. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-61668-779-3 (eBook) 1. Drug traffic--Africa. 2. Drug control--Africa. I. Daniels, Peyton E. HV5840.A47A37 2010 363.45096--dc22 2010012175

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

vii Statement of Michael A. Braun, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs - "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa" Michael A. Braun Testimony of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Bureau of African Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa" Johnnie Carson Testimony of Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs - "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa" Farah Douglas Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan, Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, DEA, U.S. Dept. of Justice, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, - "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa" Thomas M. Harrigan

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vi Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Contents Testimony of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa" William Wechsler Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook

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Chapter Sources

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Index

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PREFACE Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a focus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Africa's emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns. This book examines how best to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies in Africa, how various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require. Chapter 1 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by Michael A. Braun before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs on June 23, 2009. Chapter 2 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by Johnnie Carson before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs on June 23, 2009. Chapter 3 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by Douglas Farah before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs on June 23, 2009. Chapter 4 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by Thomas M. Harrigan before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs on June 23, 2009. Chapter 5 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by William Wechsler before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs on June 23, 2009. Chapter 6 - Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a

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locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent estimates suggest that each year between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine may transit West Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply higher than those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year. Africa‘s emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries. The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. Novel strategies and adaptations of existing efforts may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. While most of the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and little of it enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the region, notably heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs, do enter the United States. The growing drug trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including elements of at least one U.S.-designated terrorist organization, that are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military operations. Other challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance programs in Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance, political stability, rule of law, and human rights, and programs to build African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities. U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying short-term remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in Africa, and long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to combat drugs in the region. In recent years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa. The State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY20 10, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate $19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY20 10 to counternarcotics programs in Africa.

Preface

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The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417, for instance, required that DOD submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa. In responding to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may choose to review existing authorities and funding levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BRAUN, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS - "CONFRONTING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA" Michael A. Braun Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by drug trafficking and related security issues in West Africa. The security challenges facing West Africa today, above and beyond drug trafficking and abuse are enormous. However, I believe it will be abundantly clear by the end of this hearing that most of the security threats facing this region are in large part driven by, or certainly related to, powerful drug trafficking cartels from Latin America and Mexico that have taken root on the African Continent. What is even more ominous are the broader strategic threats, the by-product if you will, this activity has, and will continue to produce. Mr. Chairman let me say up front; that each of you on this subcommittee, and your colleagues throughout Congress, should be praised for all that you have done to support the multi-faceted counternarcotics efforts of our Nation, and many other countries around the globe. I appreciate the fact that it is in

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that spirit you called us here today, to determine what we can do to help Africa with this dangerous and highly volatile situation. Before entering the private sector on November 1 of last year, I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency‘s Acting Chief of Intelligence. I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as approximately three years in various countries in Latin America and Iraq. It is through my 34 years in law enforcement that I sit before you today, deeply concerned about drug trafficking and related security threats playing out in West Africa. You will receive a career, federal narcotics agent‘s perspective on what is happening in West Africa, and how that region has become an important link in the global cocaine trade.

WEST AFRICA ASSUMES AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE GLOBAL COCAINE TRADE The reasons for the increased drug flows into West Africa, involving principally cocaine from Latin America and Mexico, are many and varied. Demand for cocaine has increased dramatically in many parts of Europe, and the best estimates are that approximately 400 to 500 metric tons of cocaine is destined for Europe this year from Latin American and Mexican drug cartels. Consequently, West Africa now plays a critical role in connecting cocaine transiting the Atlantic Ocean from Latin America and Mexico to destinations throughout Europe and elsewhere. Think of it this way: West Africa has become to Europe what Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico are to the United States with respect to cocaine trafficking. It has always been about the money for global drug trafficking cartels; greed being their single most important motivator. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, which operate with Fortune 100 corporate efficiencies, also recognize the current value of the Euro over the dollar, and are successfully capitalizing on this lucrative upshot in the present global economic state of affairs. I believe there are other important reasons for this shift in global cocaine trafficking trends. U.S. law enforcement and our military, working shoulderto-shoulder with our Mexican, Caribbean and Latin American partners, have hit the Latin American and Mexican drug cartels hard over the past few years

Statement of Michael A. Braun, before the Subcommittee…

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with record breaking seizures of drugs, cash and precursor chemicals. For over two years now, we have witnessed ever-increasing prices for cocaine throughout the United States, and ever decreasing levels of the drug‘s purity. This phenomenon is unprecedented and I do not believe we have experienced anything quite like it for a very long time—if ever. The Latin American and Mexican drug cartels are also experiencing enormous pressures in their own neck of the woods—in their own respective countries, and throughout the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, they are looking to develop and expand new markets, and Europe has naturally emerged as the perfect, latest playground for these ruthless cartels. I have been told many times by my European law enforcement colleagues, that they do not possess the tough drug laws and sentencing guidelines that you, our Congress, have bestowed upon the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other federal law enforcement agencies in our Country. That, coupled with very liberal attitudes toward drug trafficking and consumption found in many European countries, is the underpinning for disaster in Europe in the years to come. I see Europe today teetering on the brink of a drug trafficking and abuse catastrophe similar to the one our Nation faced about 30 years ago. If you need a visual on what I predict Europe is facing in the years to come, just picture Miami, Florida in the late 1970s, followed by the ‗crack‘ cocaine epidemic that exploded all across our Nation in the 1980s. The bottom line—Latin American and Mexican drug lords currently face far less of a threat distributing their poison in Europe then they do in the United States, and there is far more to gain in the way of profits. Africa is the center of gravity for the drug cartel‘s movement of cocaine out of Latin America and Mexico to European and other markets. West Africa‘s geographical location, positioned between Latin America and Europe, and its weak security status, make it the ideal setting for exploitation by powerful drug cartels and terrorist organizations. These powerful cartels, just like terrorist organizations, thrive in ‗permissive environments;‘ something our military refers to as ‗ungoverned space.‘ In fact, the cartels invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year to destabilize regions around the world to advance their operational efficiencies. They rely heavily on the hallmarks of organized crime—corruption, intimidation and brutal violence—to destabilize governments in places like West Africa. Many countries in West Africa qualify as quintessential examples of ungoverned space, and allow powerful criminals and terrorists to work unimpeded.

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Most countries in West Africa simply do not possess the judicial, border, military and intelligence institutions and infrastructure necessary to deal with the threat posed by the Latin American and Mexican drug cartels, not to mention terrorist organizations and indigenous criminal groups that operate freely throughout this region. What is the security situation really like in some West African countries? Cops without ink pens and paper, much less radios, automobiles, guns and ammunition; border guards without uniforms, not to mention basic checkpoint facilities and contraband detection equipment; militaries often led by the toughest thugs money can buy; and intelligence service operatives who blend seamlessly in with the bad guys, because they are working directly for, or in conjunction with the bad guys. The security ‗fabric‘ of most West African countries has the same tensile strength as the worn out, filthy and flimsy Western T-shirts that cover far too many of their neglected citizens. The retail value of a few, multi-hundred kilogram loads of cocaine passing through many of these countries is equal to or exceeds their GNP. The narco-dollars being spent in support of the cartel‘s efforts in West Africa threaten to destabilize their already anemic economies even more. Porous borders, and the significant challenges they present, exacerbate the overall security threat even further.

STRATEGIC SECURITY THREATS THAT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED Many have written about the strategic security threats caused by drug trafficking and consumption in Africa, but I would like to address some that you most likely have not heard of or considered. Local indigenous organized crime groups in Africa are as brutal, if not more so, than any in the world, but they have historically lacked the sophistication of global drug trafficking cartels and other transnational organized crime groups. However, they are now learning from the most advanced organized crime organizations in the world—the Latin American and Mexican drug trafficking cartels, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which by the way has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by our Country, the European Union and other countries. Why? Because, the cartels rely heavily on these indigenous organized crime groups for their smuggling and trafficking expertise on the African Continent; just as the Colombian cartels did with the Mexican

Statement of Michael A. Braun, before the Subcommittee…

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syndicates when we successfully closed off the old Caribbean drug transportation corridor, and forced the Colombian kingpins to start moving their drug loads across our Southwest border. Another dimension to this dangerous scenario is that indigenous organized crime groups have most likely learned from Mexican traffickers to demand payment in ‗kind‘ (cocaine) for their services, rather than in cash. They can make far greater profits with cocaine in their hands than they can with currency in their coffers. This type of arrangement allows the indigenous organized crime groups to create demand—markets—in their own back yard. There is an important lesson to be learned here: no ‗transit country‘ remains purely a transit country forever. Just ask our colleagues in Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. This growing, mutually supporting and beneficial relationship is advancing the sophistication and complexity of African indigenous organized crime groups at light speed. The state of affairs I described in the two previous paragraphs is troubling. However, seven months after I hung up my DEA badge, gun and credentials for the last time, I am still losing sleep over something that haunts me like nothing else. Terrorist organizations and global drug trafficking organizations naturally migrate to, and ultimately comingle in, the same ungoverned space. A recent CNN exclusive reported that al Qaeda was believed to be moving some of its command and control network back to Somalia where they had a significant presence through the mid-1990s. The fact of the matter is, al Qaeda never left the African Continent and they have routinely had their operatives working throughout North, East and West Africa. Hezbollah and Hamas are even more active in West Africa and other places on the Continent. Mark my word, as we speak here today, operatives from al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas— perhaps others—are rubbing shoulders with the Latin American and Mexican drug cartels, including the FARC, in West African countries and other places on the Continent. They are frequenting the same seedy bars and sleazy brothels, and they are lodging in the same seamy hotels. And they are ‗talking business.‘ They are sharing lessons learned, sharing critically important contacts and operational means and methods. What is most troubling about this situation is that terrorist and cartel leaders send their toughest, most cunning young sergeants and lieutenants to places like West Africa; the kind of guys who they can count on to advance their (the leader‘s) agendas no matter what it takes. These are the guys who will fight and claw their way into executive leadership positions within their respective organizations within the next decade—in both terrorist groups and global drug cartels. And these are the guys who are forming personal

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relationships today that will most assuredly evolve into strategic, organizational relationships tomorrow, as they work their way up the ladder within their respective organizations. This scenario is the witches brew. We as a Nation should be doing everything in our power to drive a wedge between these powerful threats, but I fear that we are not. And I am afraid we could pay dearly for our mistake in the years to come. Finally, permissive environments like those found in some countries of West Africa are unintentionally promoting the continued evolution of what I call the ‗hybrid terrorist organization,‘ which is a designated foreign terrorist organization that has involved itself in one or more aspects of the global drug trade to help fund operations and keep their respective movements alive. The Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, Sendero Luminoso, Abu Sayef and at least 15 others of the 45 current designated foreign terrorist organizations have made this transition. It is the face of 21st Century organized crime, and places like West Africa are its preferred breeding ground and base for operations.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS TO HELP TURN THIS AROUND It is difficult for global drug trafficking cartels to establish wholesale bases of operations in areas of the world where the rule of law is strong and security institutions are respected. In many West African countries, as well as other challenged environments around the globe, it is important that we work closely with host-nation officials to develop and implement fully vetted judicial paradigms. Our government has been obsessed with building corruption free police institutions in some extremely challenged environments over the past few years, yet we continue to miss a critical link that is essential to the success of these projects. If trusting police officers have to deal with corrupt prosecutors, and/or corrupt judges, and/or corrupt prison officials, then the entire judicial process falls apart like a house of cards. Focus on creating a corruption free judicial process—and not just corruption free cops. Anything short of that is doomed to failure. Equipping militaries, law enforcement and intelligence services with aircraft, swift-boats, and other costly interdiction and enforcement hardware is important, but we had better have a longterm training and mentoring piece attached to these projects. If not, we could find our counterparts in West Africa using those assets against us in support of the cartels—or terrorist organizations. I no longer speak for the DEA, but I believe the Agency would

Statement of Michael A. Braun, before the Subcommittee…

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be willing to assume greater responsibility for enhancing our Nation‘s counternarcotics strategy in Africa if it received the additional personnel and resources that it desperately needs to address the threats I have discussed today. Included should be funding for the DEA to stand-up additional offices in Africa, as well as fully vetted host-nation Sensitive Investigative Units in several African countries, much like the Agency has in Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The DEA could then share the most sensitive intelligence with their African counterparts for effective action. Many Department of Defense detection and monitoring (D&M) resources, as well as maritime interdiction resources, were moved out of Southern Command‘s area of responsibility after the 9/11 attacks on our Nation, and these resources have never been fully recouped. These assets are responsible for identifying and interdicting drug loads moving by sea and air. Although Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) interdiction seizures have been nothing short of spectacular over the past few years, it is in large part due to our military working closer with federal law enforcement in the post 9/11 era. Needless to say, if Southern Command recovered those missing D&M and interdiction resources, the seizure numbers would be even greater, including the interdiction of drug loads destined for Europe via Africa. Finally, it would be easy to say that Africa is Europe‘s problem, but the truth of the matter is that the money which flows back into the coffers of the Latin American and Mexican drug cartels, the same ones that are directly impacting our country, makes the cartels even stronger. We as a Nation should be doing a great deal more to support Africa, but I also strongly believe we should press many European countries to do more in support of counternarcotics efforts designed to dismantle or significantly disrupt the Latin American and Mexican drug cartels. The United States has funded the global, counter-narcotics ticket for far too long, and it is time other responsible nations assumed more responsibility of this burden.

‘OUT OF AFRICA’ If I had one over-arching theme to sum up my comments today it would be, ‗Out of Africa.‘ We cannot modify that wildly famous Las Vegas slogan, ‗What goes on in Vegas stays in Vegas‘ and apply it to Africa. Because what goes on in Africa does not stay in Africa; whether it is drugs, terrorism, the

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black diamond trade, human trafficking or some other transnational organized criminal activity, the end result impacts distant shores. I mentioned that I lose sleep at night thinking about the escalating involvement of Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups in the global drug trade. They are operating freely in many parts of Latin America and that is troubling indeed. However, in my mind the threat is far more dangerous than most choose to admit, because these same terrorist groups and others are now clearly positioned on our Eastern ‗flank‘—West Africa—and the drug trade emanating in Latin America is clearly funding, and now facilitating much of their operational capacity. What goes on in Africa does not stay in Africa.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS - "CONFRONTING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA" Johnnie Carson Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on drug-trafficking in West Africa. Thank you also for asking my colleagues from the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to join me at the witness table. We are united in our understanding of the serious threat that drugs and drug trading are to Africa and to U. S. interests. Our partnership and coordination are essential to any success in deterring this threat.

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A RAPIDLY GROWING PROBLEM Drug-trafficking, especially of cocaine, has increased dramatically through West Africa in recent years. Before 2005, seizures from all of Africa rarely totaled more than one ton a year. Between 2005 and 2008, at least 46 tons of cocaine were seized in West Africa alone. By 2007, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) described West Africa as ―under attack.‖ Access to shifting global cocaine markets drove traffickers to look for new routes. Global cocaine markets have shifted because of demand, supply, and the value of the dollar. Cocaine use in the United States has declined, while use in Europe has increased. Law enforcement efforts in the United States and Latin America have made it harder for traffickers to move cocaine to US markets. The declining value of the US dollar, relative to the Euro, may also have influenced the shift towards European markets. As European law enforcement made it more difficult to move cocaine along direct routes from South America to Europe, traffickers began to look for alternate ways to access the European markets. West Africa is appealing to traffickers for several reasons. It has endured a staggering level of poverty, which promotes a susceptibility to corruption: on average, 50% of the population lives on less than $2 a day. West Africa lies in close proximity to Latin America. Dakar, Senegal, is 700 miles closer to Recife, Brazil, than it is to Paris, France. West Africa‘s borders also are mostly unguarded and porous. The region boasts more than 2,600 miles of coastline. In perspective, our Pacific coast (minus Alaska) and Atlantic coast each are less than 2,100 miles long. West Africa‘s area and population are slightly less than that of our contiguous 48 states. Many governments do not have the legal systems, judicial structures, plans, funding, resources, and political will to combat drugs. Half the region‘s population is under the age of 18 and the unemployment rate of the work- age population average is 30-50%. Thus, the trafficking of illegal narcotics is a lucrative alternative in a culture disposed to view narcotics like any other commodity to buy and sell. Moreover, foreign traffickers usually prefer unstable but not chaotic operating environments. They choose to operate in countries with weak law enforcement and judicial systems and thrive in areas where they can operate with impunity – either by corrupting officials or by inept systems. West African nations like Guinea-Bissau and Guinea fall into these categories.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Bureau…

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In some countries, we can rely on local cooperation to prosecute and expel foreign traffickers, especially if such action displaces outsiders from the trade. However, such cooperation is compromised when the foreign traffickers are able to cultivate complex, symbiotic networks with the local elite.

DRUG-TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA HARMS U.S. INTERESTS Though the majority of the drugs transiting West Africa do not come to the United States, the proceeds flow to the same South American drugtrafficking organizations that traffic drugs to the United States. This illicit activity reinforces and bolsters their financial strength. Guinea-Bissau‘s GDP is $340 million; that is the wholesale value of six tons of cocaine, which can easily be trans-shipped over one to two months. This creates a threat to good governance, local and regional stability, and development in West Africa. UNODC has noted that, “The relationship between diamond smuggling and the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia has been well documented, but, at their peak, profits accruing from this activity amounted to some tens of millions of dollars per year. The potential destabilizing influence of the cocaine traffic, where the value of a single consignment can exceed that sum, is very real.”

Drug-trafficking poses at least two threats to good governance, a principal focus of U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance in West Africa. First, trafficking normally is facilitated by corrupting public officials from law enforcement and judicial actors to the highest levels of government. Second, politicians could look to drug money to finance their elections. Being a transit state is detrimental to a country‘s development. The government has less to invest in health or education, because those resources have been diverted to address the insecurity resulting from possible trafficking-related violence. Investors are less inclined to do business in transit countries: unstable environments are risky and operating in high-crime areas entails higher business costs. Being a transit state is also harmful to public health. Though initially most transit states in Africa do not have markets for illegal drug consumption, eventually they develop. In West Africa, local facilitators of trafficking networks are believed to be paid in cocaine. Much of this is smuggled to

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Europe but anecdotal evidence suggests small domestic markets for cocaine are already developing.

USG EFFORTS TO STOP THE DRUG FLOW AND OBSTACLES The Department of State recognizes the serious threats posed by drugtrafficking in West Africa. With our interagency colleagues, we have engaged in a careful planning process. The Department of State‘s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has been leading interagency counternarcotics assessments throughout West Africa. These assessments have provided valuable information about the nature of the drug threat and the willingness and capacity of West African governments to respond to the threat. A comprehensive counternarcotics strategy requires both the interdiction of the drugs and the dismantling of the drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). Our European partners are focused largely on interdiction, which is logical as the majority of the cocaine flows to Europe. We are primarily working to build the law enforcement and judicial capacity of West African governments to effectively counter the DTOs. This complements the European focus and fits well with U.S. security, governance, and development objectives in West Africa. Rule of law and judicial capacity strengthen the ability of emerging democracies of the region to prevent or respond to transnational issues such as rising drug-trafficking. One of the areas our Interagency Task Force has looked at through the assessments is countries‘ counternarcotics legal frameworks. While most West African states have many of the elements in place to support more robust national counternarcotics efforts, there are some ways in which the laws could be improved. In some countries, there is significant judicial discretion allowed in sentencing for even the most serious drug offenses. In Togo and The Gambia, judges can decide to sentence traffickers to prison or simply to fine them. This invites corruption. Many countries lack the legal concepts of conspiracy and plea bargaining. Both are powerful legal tools in combating organized crime. Asset forfeiture is another helpful legal and financial tool. West African countries that have some sort of asset forfeiture laws often require a conviction before they can seize assets. By contrast, many other countries around the world have alternative legal mechanism that provide a broader basis and more efficient means for seizing and forfeiting assets related to criminal activity.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Bureau…

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The national agencies charged with counternarcotics missions across West Africa vary from actively facilitating trafficking to risking their lives to stop it. Even in agencies that have the will to counter drug-trafficking, there are common challenges to their ability to do so effectively. Many do not know how to gather and analyze counter drug intelligence. Most of the big seizures in West Africa have occurred by chance or through a foreign tip off. Further, the agencies do not know how to conduct investigations. Basic policing is a challenge and most agencies will require significant assistance before being able to conduct complex investigations. Counternarcotics programs and strategies are inherently interagency. Border officials and traffic cops need to coordinate with lead counternarcotics police agencies that, in turn, must work closely with prosecutors or investigative judges to develop a case. This is a significant challenge. Like law enforcement, the judicial sectors across West Africa vary widely. Senegal, for example, is a society with a capable judiciary and a respect of the courts and the rule of law. Sierra Leone recently convicted traffickers in a historic case connected to a July 2008 cocaine bust. Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, has not tried a drug case since 2005. Even with such mixed results, there are common challenges. The courts have sizeable backlogs. In many countries, prisons hold accused persons who have been awaiting trial longer than the maximum sentence they would receive if found guilty. In the rare cases where West African countries have arrested and tried foreign traffickers, the traffickers often hire talented private defense attorneys. Further, due to capacity problems, defendants are often held too long before being charged, which has resulted in some dismissals. Even when this does not happen, police and prosecutors often prepare cases and witnesses poorly, with the alleged drug seized neither proven to be cocaine nor tied to the defendant. Finally, countering judicial corruption is a challenge around the world, and West Africa is no exception. This is an area of serious concern and will require careful attention. As with the rest of the criminal justice system, prisons vary greatly from country to country. Guinea-Bissau has no civilian prison whatsoever, though one is nearing completion. Togo, on the other hand, has a prison system that is functioning remarkably well given the extreme lack of resources. The main challenge corrections systems face is maintaining custody over accused and convicted traffickers. Security at many prisons is not good and traffickers have access to significant financial resources with which to bribe prison officials. Despite the significant challenges facing West Africa, there is reason for hope. Oil-wealthy Nigeria is entirely unique: numerous and very experienced

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Nigerian traffickers have been deployed worldwide over decades. But despite its many problems the Government of Nigeria has demonstrated increased political will in fighting narcotics. U.S.-donated body scanners at Nigeria‘s four international airports are having a deterrent effect, causing traffickers to shift their operations to seaports and land borders, where adequate protection is lacking, or to airports in neighboring countries. Nigeria‘s National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) flexed its muscles in arresting a drug kingpin, processing an extradition, and convicting 1,231 of 1,239 traffickers in 2008. The Attorney- General recently approved the embedding of a USG sponsored drug investigations specialist within the NDLEA. The Government of Cape Verde has vast potential as a trans-Atlantic partner for regional interdiction activities, as an intelligence platform, and as a facilitator of dialogue with Guinea-Bissau. It benefits from: a strong and stable democracy; its strategic location; its three U.S. Federal Aviation Administration-certified airports; its excellent track record on cooperation with DOD‘s United States Africa Command (A FRICOM), NATO, the European Union and U.S. and European law enforcement agencies; and, its success at curbing drugs from Latin America. Furthermore, we hope that our projected re-establishment of a formal diplomatic presence in Bissau will help improve what we know about the problem there and encourage the host government to raise its profile on this important matter. Department of State assistance is targeted and carefully monitored. For instance, in Ghana we will support a judicial advisor this year to develop further capacity to prosecute complex drug cases. In countries where there is not yet a strong understanding of the domestic implications of being a transit state, we will use public diplomacy to build this awareness. Our embassies have been instrumental in facilitating the expulsion of traffickers into U.S. custody, which has a powerful deterrent effect. The Department of State‘s counternarcotics assistance programs are shaped according to the following principles. Above all, we do not want our assistance inadvertently harming innocents. We don‘t want equipment we provide misused. Since donated boats or radios could be used to facilitate trafficking, for example, such assistance must be provided responsibly. Second, counternarcotics operations are dangerous and should not expose our West African partners to unnecessary risks that they have not been prepared to address. Counternarcotics assistance should include both operational support and institutional reform. Providing training and equipment are important

Testimony of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Bureau…

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components of assistance strategies, but we must also address institutional incentives and structures. For example, prosecutors might not know how to oversee a complex investigation or turn it into a winning case. Training in these areas should be part of the assistance provided. Institutionally, the prosecutorial service may not be structured to encourage complex investigations. Promotions of these prosecutors might factor the number of convictions without regard for the complexity of cases. These structures must be reformed if prosecutors are to learn and implement complex prosecutions. The U.S. Interagency Task Force has collaborated closely to confront these challenges. At the working level, State, DEA, and DoD jointly have conducted all assessments and now include the FBI, Treasury, and USAID on a case-by-case basis. The Department of State also hosts an African counternarcotics working group with even broader interagency participation. Senior level coordination is also taking place, particularly between the three agencies represented on this panel. Similarly, international coordination is also taking place at both the working and policy levels. One of my INL colleagues will be leading the US delegation to meetings with the EU Drug troika in the coming weeks. We look forward to working more closely with AFRICOM to help build capacity, provide data analysis and management, facilitate interoperability, and promote limited interdiction, where feasible. Finally, there is much that the United States can learn and do in concert with the Europeans, Latin Americans, and international organizations in order to fight increasing narcotrafficking in the region. Increasing our own knowledge of, and ability to track, trans-Atlantic contraband and developing regional African capacity through a reliable, willing partner (such as Cape Verde) and its government could be one of our more productive and costeffective efforts as part of an integrated approach. For Fiscal Year 2010, the Department has requested $7.96 million in narcotics and law enforcement assistance for West Africa. Our primary targets are to develop capacity in the law enforcement and judicial sectors in GuineaBissau ($3 million), Cape Verde ($2 million), Nigeria ($2 million), Ghana ($500,000), Sierra Leone ($250,000), Guinea ($110,000) and Burkina Faso ($100,000). To complement these efforts, we propose applying $42.4 million in other Department resources to bolster democracy, governance, and rule of law programs in these countries. As Secretary Clinton has indicated, the Department requires sufficient personnel and financial resources to carry out its missions, and we welcome your support in helping us do so.

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I look forward to hearing from my colleagues, listening to your insights, and consulting you further as we address this serious issue. Thank you for your invitation, and for your consideration and support.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS "CONFRONTING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA" Farah Douglas Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on an issue that I believe is one of the most pressing we face in terms of the security and stability of the African subcontinent, Latin America and, ultimately, the United States. The movement of drugs, particularly cocaine, through West Africa is the product of several developments in the overall drug trade, and the consequences are already devastating, as shown by the new wave of political instability and the creation of the continent's first true "narco-states." As the trafficking grows, so will the havoc wreaked on weak states in West Africa-many of which are only now emerging from decades of chaos and unspeakable violence and are ill prepared to face the new challenges. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conservatively estimates that 40 to 50 tons of cocaine, with an estimated value of $1.8 billion,

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passed through West Africa in 2007, and the amount is growing.1 The Pentagon's Africa Command and other intelligence services estimate the amount of cocaine transiting West Africa is at least five times the UNOCO estimate.2 But even using the most conservative estimate, the magnitude of the problem for the region is easy to see. Using UNODC figures, the only legal export from the region that would surpass the value of cocaine is cocoa exports from Cote d'Ivoire. If the higher numbers are used, cocaine would dwarf the legal exports of the region combined, and be worth more than the GDP of several of the region's nations.3 As Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime wrote recently in an recent op-ed in the Washington Post, this epidemic of drugs and drug money flooding Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone and elsewhere has become a security issue. ―Drug money is perverting the weak economies of the region...The influence that this buys is rotting fragile states; traffickers are buying favors and protection from candidates in elections.‖4 This staggering influx of illicit new revenue into the region is taking place in a broader and unhealthy context. The changes across the globe have been swift and dramatic in recent years, as demonstrated in a snap shot drawn from three World Bank studies5 and a recent survey by Foreign Policy Magazine and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.6 Both sets of studies use metrics of economic development, state legitimacy, human rights, demographic pressures, public services and citizen security to determine where countries rank on a global scale. Those nations at the bottom have become know as ―failed states‖ or ―fragile states,‖ terms that have come into vogue to describe the growing areas of the world that lie beyond the control of central governments. In 1996 only 11 states were judged to be failing across the world. By 2003, a scant seven years later, the number had grown to 17 and by 2006 the number was 26. More than half of those, 18, are in Sub- Saharan Africa. This trend is important because these growing areas that are either stateless or governed by states that are in practice are functioning criminal enterprises give rise to new hybrid organizations which make the traditional distinction between terrorism and organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, meaningless. I believe we will see the emergence of these hybrid organizations in West Africa in the very near future and indeed they may already exist.

Testimony of Farah Douglas, Senior Fellow, International…

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What draws terrorist and criminal organizations together, as overt state sponsorship for terrorism has been curtailed, are the shadow facilitators who understand how to exploit the seams in the international legal and economic structure, and who work with both terrorist and criminal organizations. Both groups use the same pipelines, the same illicit structures, and exploit the same state weaknesses, and are increasingly overlapping. Of the 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration says 19 have clearly established ties to drug trafficking and many more are suspected of having such ties.7 One of the reasons for this is the dismal state of governance in West Africa is that since the early 1990s the region has suffered a series of conflicts centered on natural resources, particularly diamonds, timber, oil, and gold. Profits from these "honey pot" wars fueled the rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone with its child soldiers and unspeakable atrocities; fed the wars sustained by Liberia's Charles Taylor; and contributed to the rampant corruption and weak or failed institutions in almost every country. These natural resources, while valuable, pale in comparison to the money the cocaine trade generates. For example, at the height of the "blood diamond" trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the total value of the diamonds being smuggled out was less than $200 million. The potential to fuel conflicts over the cocaine pipeline, the most lucrative commodity so far and one whose profits are several orders of magnitude larger than diamonds, is truly frightening. Terrorist and criminal organizations are masters at exploiting weak or criminal states,8 and the existence of these regions in West Africa, as well as other macro trends in cocaine trafficking, explain the emergence of West Africa as an important transit area in recent years. One of the primary developments is the growth of cocaine consumption in Europe, the former Soviet Union and other new and emerging markets.9 Drug traffickers, like all good entrepreneurs, are constantly looking to diversify their markets and move to markets that provide greater profitability. While U.S. demand for cocaine has remained steady or declined in recent years, consumption in other parts of the world is growing rapidly. According to the State Department, Brazil is now the second largest consuming market for cocaine, after the United States.10 Moving drugs through Africa to Europe, while a circuitous route, is lucrative enough to draw many illicit organizations' involvement. A second development is the growing ability to move cocaine from the Colombian production sites, largely controlled by the self-declared Marxist

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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) or other non-state armed groups, through Venezuela with impunity. The government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela has allowed the FARC, with whom Chávez has a deep and personal relationship,11 to establish routes through his country that greatly lessen the threat and the cost of moving cocaine. The closeness of the Venezuelan government to the FARC was demonstrated in September 2008, when the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned three of Chávez's closest associates, including two intelligence chiefs, for aiding the FARC in the purchase of weapons and drug trafficking.12 It should be noted that the FARC has a wellestablished network, including financial handlers, already established in Europe, particularly in Spain, where a good portion of the cocaine enters the European Union.13 It is interesting to note that several of the largest cocaine busts in West Africa have come aboard aircraft that departed from Venezuela.14 Since Chávez expelled the Drug Enforcement Administration from Venezuela in 2006 and has halted all counter-narcotics cooperation, U.S. officials describe Venezuela as a "black hole." Not only does the Venezuelan government's attitude encourage drug trafficking, but Venezuela's geographic proximity to West Africa make it an ideal launching pad. This is true for both maritime operations and the use of aircraft. A third factor is the success of the Colombian government in dismantling the large cartels, leaving the field open to smaller groups that seek alternative routes and markets. This is particularly true of resurgent drug trafficking organizations in Bolivia and Peru. While the Colombian organizations were for years able to keep the Bolivian and Peruvian structures from participating in any significant manner in the production of cocaine hydrochloride (HCL), or refined cocaine, those restrictions have eased as the Colombian organizations have weakened. Gen. Oscar Naranjo, commander of the Colombian national police, recently stated that Colombia, due to the weakness of the traditional groups, no longer produces 90 percent of the world's cocaine, as has been the case for most of the past two decades. Rather, he said, Colombia produces about 54 percent of the HCL on the world market "with the rest coming from Peru and Bolivia."15 He noted that for the first time in two decades or more, there was no single drug trafficking organization that dominates, as the Medellín, Cali, Northern Valley, FARC and the right wing United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia-AUC) structures were able to.

Testimony of Farah Douglas, Senior Fellow, International…

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Rather, the landscape is now divided among many smaller groups, called "Grupos Emergentes" or Emerging Groups, such as the Aguilas Negras. These groups, in turn, are often made up of remnants of the former cartels, even ones that were mortal enemies at one time, such as the FARC and the AUC. At the same time Mexican cartels are under increasing pressure inside Mexico, and U.S. interdiction efforts have raised the cost of doing business in the United States. This pressure has made a diversification to the European market, via West Africa, increasingly attractive. This has direct consequences for West Africa. There is a consensus among U.S., UN and European monitors that the volume of cocaine flowing through West Africa is accelerating, and that the dramatic rise will not end any time soon, for a variety of reasons. Among those reasons are the rapid shifts and increasing fluidity within the overall world drug trade. A significant portion of the Bolivian (and to a lesser degree Peruvian) cocaine shipments move by air to Venezuela, in part because of the alliance and friendship between Bolivian president Evo Morales and Chávez that makes the transportation relatively easy and safe. The cocaine is then often shipped onward to Europe, via Africa. But the majority of the Bolivian and Peruvian product is moved through Brazil, a nation with growing consumption, and then onward to Africa. There are linguistic as well as geographic reasons for this. Angola and Guinea Bissau, two of the most active transshipment hubs, are former Portuguese colonies, and the official languages there is Portuguese, making communication easier for Brazilian traffickers. This trend is creating the conditions for the convergence of these groups in new and dangerous ways, affording them not only the opportunity to reap enormous profits, but the chance to share "lessons learned," best practices and the latest technology in areas that are largely beyond state control. What I have observed repeatedly in two decades of following drug trafficking, transnational criminal organizations and non-state armed groups is that when they are able to meet in neutral territory they often form alliances that would not be possible under other circumstances. This is holding true in West Africa. Already in Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and elsewhere we are seeing members of Mexican, Colombian, Venezuelan, Surinamese and European organizations operating in the same territory and plugging into the same pipeline. Identified members of the FARC, as well as other Colombian organizations are on the ground in West Africa, protecting shipments and making deals.

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Not only do these actors bring a huge influx of cash, which can be used to buy or corrupt virtually any state institution. The Latin American cartel operatives also bring a whole new level of violence and sophistication to the illicit pipeline structures. Just as the "blood diamond" trade and illicit timber deals allowed groups like the RUF to purchase advanced weapons on the international market and become a much more lethal force, the influx of cocaine cash will allow the criminal and militia groups in the region to acquire ever more sophisticated armaments, training and communications. At the same time, the weak host states have severely limited police, judicial or military capacity to confront these groups in any commensurate manner. There is a broader potential danger that must be kept in mind as we see assess emerging trends in West Africa. I spoke earlier about the "hybrid" criminal-terrorist organization, of which the FARC is a leading example. In West Africa, it is Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shiite Islamist organization that has long maintained an operational presence and has had a significant role in the blood diamond trade and many other illicit activities. In addition, many in the Lebanese Diaspora community in West Africa, numbering several hundred thousand, pay a portion of their earnings to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the host government.16 The importance of this revenue stream was revealed when a charter flight bound for Beirut from Cotonou, Benin, crashed on takeoff on Dec. 25, 2003. On board was a Hezbollah "foreign relations" official carrying $2 million in contributions raised in the region. The money was said to represent "the regular contributions the party [Hezbollah] receives from wealthy Lebanese nationals in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin and other African states."17 Given the prominence of the Lebanese Diaspora community and its members' control of most of the existing pipeline to import and export illegal commodities, it is inevitable that those organizations and the drug trafficking groups will encounter each other and mutually benefit from each other because they each has something the other wants and needs. The Lebanese networks control the decades-old contraband networks and routes to Europe, while the drug traffickers offer a new and lucrative product for the existing pipeline. Violent clashes may take place, but the history of both groups indicates they will cooperate where useful. Given Hezbollah's long-established presence on the ground in the region and the closeness of its operatives to that community, it is also reasonable to assume that Hezbollah and the drug traffickers, operating in the same permissive environment, will cross paths. It is precisely this type of environment that allows for the otherwise unthinkable alliances to emerge.

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Most are short-lived, centering on specific opportunities and operations that can benefit both groups, but others are longer lasting and more dangerous. There is a long history of outside terrorist actors, particularly Hezbollah, being active in Latin America. The most egregious documented cases of Hezbollah and Iran's direct involvement in terrorist activities are the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish center the same city.

Figure 1. Hezbollah Office in Freetown, Sierra Leone

But there are other instances that merit mentioning. The FARC has a long history of reaching out to other terrorist groups, notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the ETA Basque separatists, for training and exchanges. There are documented visits in the late 1990s to the Tri-Border Area by Hezbollah's chief of logistics Immad Mugnyiah (now deceased) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, currently held in Guantanamo.18 There is the possible presence of Osama bin Laden in the region in 1995, as reported by the Brazilian, French and U.S. media.19 Given the security with which these senior operatives would have to move it is unlikely they would visit the region unless there were adequate security arrangements and infrastructure to allow them to operate. It is also unlikely they would travel there if there were no compelling reason to do so.

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More worrisome is the recent evidence of Chávez's direct support for Hezbollah, including the June 18, 2008 OFAC designations of two Venezuelan citizens, including a senior diplomat, as terrorist supporters for working with the armed group. Several businesses also were sanctioned. Among the things the two are alleged to have been conducting on behalf of Hezbollah were coordinating possible terrorist attacks and building Hezbollah-sponsored community centers in Venezuela.20 Given Iran's ties to Hezbollah and Venezuela, Venezuela's ties Iran and the FARC, the FARC's history of building alliances with other armed groups, and the presence of Hezbollah and other armed Islamist groups in Latin America and on the ground in West Africa, it would be dangerous and imprudent to dismiss the possibility of an alliance of these actors. The history of these groups indicates that they will take advantage of the ungoverned spaces and corrupt and weak states of West Africa to get to know each other, work together, learn from each other and exploit areas of mutual interest. Unfortunately, the primary area of mutual interest is a hatred of the United States. Given that most of the cocaine passing through West Africa is destined for Europe, and given the limited resources of the United States for protecting its strategic interests around the world, one can ask why any of this of pressing concern for us on a strategic level. There are multiple reasons. The first is that the West Africa cocaine trail directly strengthens drug cartels that exercise great power and pose a direct threat the United States and its allies in the Western Hemisphere. The money generated by the cocaine trade largely flows back to the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, greatly increasing the power of non-sate criminal organizations to challenge the state. We see daily the threats posed by the transnational Mexican drug organization on and across our borders. We have spent significant resources to aid Colombia in its costly wars against the drug cartels and the FARC in recognition that these groups posed a direct challenge to our national security and the stability of areas of vital strategic interest in our hemisphere. The movement of drugs through West Africa to Europe produces enormous revenues for these groups, allowing them to survive, morph, reconfigure and continue to wreak havoc. Just as importantly, the drug trafficking in West Africa also directly strengthens those who seek not only to harm the United States but also to strangle the struggling liberal democracies in Latin America. These include Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, his allies in Iran, the FARC and Hezbollah. As

Testimony of Farah Douglas, Senior Fellow, International…

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noted above, the circumstances in West Africa are ideal for allowing many of these non-state criminal and terrorist organizations to greatly expand their cooperation. The money raised from the cocaine on the West Africa route brings all these threats closer to the United States. A second reason to engage in this threat is that the infusion of drugs and drug revenue into West Africa--one of the poorest and most corrupt regions of world with a history of violent conflict centered on commodities and resources--will inevitably bring a new wave of violence and instability to the region. Apart from the very legitimate humanitarian concerns, about 18 percent of the oil21 and 14 percent of the natural gas (LNG) imported by the United States each year comes from the region,22 and these amounts are estimated to rise significantly in coming years. By 2015 Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to supply about 25 percent of U.S. oil and LNG imports, the vast majority of that from West Africa.23 Africa remains one of the most promising regions of the world for future oil production. Proven reserves increased by 56 percent between 1996 and 2006, compared to 12 percent for the rest of the world. A third reason is that we have already witnessed-and I have spent considerable time in the war zones of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea documenting-the horrendous human tragedy of resource wars in West Africa. These range from the campaigns of mass amputation and systematic rape by the RUF and the brutality of the Taylor regime to the millions of displaced refugees and the destruction of civil society across the region. The revenue stream derived from cocaine will make past wars pale in comparison to what will come. In addition, if history is any guide, the traffickers will work to create internal consumption markets in the countries where they operate. Having seen first hand the damage done by child soldiers in drug- induced hazes already, it is clear that easier access to cocaine will give rise to a whole new level of violence. The United States has already taken important steps to engage in this theater. Africom, the DEA and State Department each are devoting considerably more resources to drug issues in West Africa than they were a year or two ago. But by any measure it is not enough, and certainly has not slowed the flow of cocaine through the region. Compartmentalization, stovepiping of information and the continued focus on delimited geographic territories continue to hamper the effectiveness of counter drug programs. It is no longer a useful model to look at the old, static model of Latin American drug trafficking organizations because the new organizations operate on multiple continents rather than a single country or region. Hence, information

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sharing across regions and across U.S. government agencies is vital to beginning to significantly improve the situation. As the DEA knows well, the key to identifying, mapping and dismantling drug trafficking organizations is human intelligence. The DEA is working to identify and target "shadow facilitator," or those individuals who service a variety of organizations, both criminal and terrorist. A prime example of this type of individual was Viktor Bout, the Russian weapons merchant who Sen. Feingold worked hard to bring to justice and who is currently in prison in Thailand, awaiting a ruling on whether he can be extradited to the United States to stand trial.24 However, U.S. agencies cannot work effectively in the region without local allies. One of the keys to success in Colombia and elsewhere has been the establishment of effective vetted units within a local police or military force, where information can be exchanged with less fear of leaks or compromise. Given the linguistic and cultural complications across West Africa, and the fact that they vary from country to country, the ability to work in some fashion with at least a segment of the national law enforcement community is vital. Finally, our European allies, particularly the French, British and Belgians, must be brought into the process in a much more robust way. This is true not only because most of the cocaine ends up in Europe. These countries have deep colonial histories in different countries in the region, and have a much deeper historic knowledge of the traditional criminal and smuggling networks that operate. For example, the Belgians have followed the blood diamond trade for decades and understand and have mapped the Lebanese family and clan networks involved in the trade. This type of information and understanding would take years for U.S. agencies to develop, but can be put to good use in combating drug trafficking in the region. These nations also have many more levers of "soft power," through trade and aid, than the United States does, and hence have more tools with which to engage the region on this issue. I am not optimistic about the possibility of avoiding a wholesale disaster in West Africa that will have direct spillover effects in Latin America and the United States. The cancer of cocaine trafficking is far advanced in a host body that is weak and unable to fight back without a great deal of help and significant structural changes. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations have an operational presence across Sub-Saharan Africa. They are increasingly using the same pipelines and facilitators as transnational criminal groups. These pipelines will grow and spread with the infusion of cocaine and drug money, accelerating the corrosion of already weak states.

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But the consequences of allowing the cancer to spread unabated, and the direct threat that will pose to the United States, means we have no choice but to work to stem the tide.

End Notes 1

Presentation of Antonio L. Mazzitelli, regional representative, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for West and Central Africa, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 28, 2009. 2 Presentation of Peter D. Burgess, Counter Narcotics Project Officer, U.S. Africom, , at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 28, 2009. 3 Extrapolated by the author from UNODC and Africom data. 4 Antonio Maria Costa, ―Cocaine Finds Africa,‖ The Washington Post, July 29, 2008, p. A17, viewed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/28/AR200 8072802466.html 5 ―Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress,‖ The World Bank, September 2006, Washington, D.C., accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/ieg. 6 ―The Failed State Index 2007,‖ Foreign Policy Magazine, Jul7-August 2007, pp. 54-63. 7 DEA Chief of Operations Michael Braun at a July 18, 2008 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, accessible at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07 .php?CID=411 8 For a more detailed look at the criminal/terrorist pipelines and the different functions of failed and criminal states in their exploitation, see: Douglas Farah, "The Criminal-Terrorist Nexus and Its Pipelines," The NEFA Foundation, Jan. 14, 2008. 9 According to recent data provided by U.S. agencies, the wholesale value of a kilo of cocaine in the United States is about $30,000, while the value in Europe is $47,000. 10 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Country Report: Brazil, United States Department of State, Feb. 27, 2009 11 The relationship is meticulously documented by the FARC leadership. The documents were captured from the computer of Raul Reyes, the FARC's second in command, on March 1, 2008, when Colombian troops raided Reyes' headquarters established on Ecuadoran soil. For more details, see: Douglas Farah, ―What the FARC Papers Show Us About Latin American Terrorism,‖ The NEFA Foundation, April 1, 2008, accessible at: http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarc0408.pdf. 12 The three are Hugo Armando Cavajál, director of military intelligence, described as providing weapons to the FARC; Henry de Jesus Rangél, director of the civilian Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services, described as protecting FARC drug shipments; and Ramón Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, who, until a few days before the designation was Venezuela's minster of interior and justice. He is described as the "Venezuelan government's main weapons contact for the FARC." The role of the three in closely collaborating with the FARC is described in some detail in the documents captured in the Reyes documents. See: "Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC," Press Room, Department of Treasury, September 12, 2008, viewed at: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1132.htm. 13 For details of the FARC European network, see: Douglas Farah, "The FARC's International Relations: A Network of Deception," The NEFA Foundation, Sept. 22, 2008, accessed at: http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarcirnetworkdeception09 08.pdf

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Among the largest was the May 1, 2007 seizure of 630 kilograms of cocaine aboard a Cessna aircraft in Nouhabidou, Mauritania. The airplane's GPS showed it had taken off from Venezuelan territory. See: "Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa: Situation Report," UNODC, October 2007, pg. 9. In July 2008 another aircraft with 600 kilograms of cocaine and using a false Red Cross emblem on its tail, was seized in Sierra Leone. 15 "Colombia: Amid Signs of Progress, Warning of a Cartel War," Latin American Security & Strategic Review, January 2009. 16 See: Edward Harris, ―Hezbollah Extorting Funds From West Africa‘s Diamond Merchants,‖ Associated Press, 29 June 2004. 17 Hamid Ghiryah, "Hezbullah Officials Carrying Donations Reportedly Killed in Lebanese Plane Crash," al-Siyasah (Kuwait), Dec. 29, 2003. For a broader look at the role of the Lebanese diaspora in West African illicit trade activities, see: Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamond and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper 6, January 2003. 18 For a comprehensive look at possible radical Islamist activities in the region, see: Rex Hudson, "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border (TBA) of South America," Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, July 2003. For more recent Hezbollah ties, as related by Colombia authorities, see: "Colombia Ties Drug Ring to Hezbollah," Reuters News Agency, as appeared in the New York Times, Oct. 22, 2008. 19 ―El Esteve no Brazil,‖ Veja on-line, no. 1,794, March 19, 2003; ―Bin Laden Reportedly Spent Time in Brazil in ‘95,‖ Washington Post, March 18, 2003, p. A24. 20 One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, who served as the charge d'affaires of Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and then served in the Venezuelan embassy in London. The OFAC statement said that in late January 2006, al Din facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese parliament to solicit donation and announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. The second individual, Fawzi Kan'an is described as a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a "significant provider of financial support to Hizbollah." He met with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnapping and terrorist attacks. The OFAC statement can be accessed at: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1036.htm 21 Statement of John R. Brodman, deputy assistant secretary for international energy policy, office of policy and international affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2004 22 Statistics from the U.S. Department of Energy: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/petmove impcusa2nusep00im0mbbla.htm. Nigeria is the fifth-largest source of oil for the United States, produces some 2.5 million barrels a day, and supplied the United States with a total of 413 million barrels of oil in 2007. Angola was next, with a total of 185 million barrels of oil sold to the United States, followed by Chad (28.4 million barrels), and Cameroon (10.8 million barrels). 23 National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts," December 2000, accessed at: http://www.dni.gov/nic /NICglobaltrend2015.html#link13e 24 For a more complete look at Bout and his transnational operations see: Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2007.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. HARRIGAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR AND CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DEA, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, - "CONFRONTING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA" Thomas M. Harrigan Good morning, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration‘s (DEA) Acting Administrator, Michele M. Leonhart, I want to thank you for your continued support of the men and women of DEA and the opportunity to testify about the scope and dynamics of drug trafficking in West Africa as well as related threats.

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OVERVIEW Over the past decade, international drug law enforcement efforts have focused principally on the major source countries, and limited resources have been dedicated to other areas impacted by the global drug trade, such as the African continent. DEA investigative efforts and those of other western law enforcement agencies have chronicled the significant increase in Africa‘s utilization as a transshipment point, storage, cultivation, and manufacturing point for narcotics destined for Europe, and, to a lesser extent, other consumer markets, including the US. The versatility of transnational criminal organizations is well-known, as is their penchant for finding and exploiting vulnerable regions of the world to further their illicit activities. Unfortunately, Africa is such a place, with its strategic geographic location, and, in many instances, weak governments, endemic corruption, and ill-equipped law enforcement agencies. As a single mission agency, DEA‘s focus in Africa is to disrupt or dismantle the most significant drug, chemical, money laundering, and narcoterrorism organizations on the continent. A secondary – but no less important part of this mission will be the longterm effort to address law enforcement capacity building endeavors and mentoring programs with our African counterparts. The cocaine, heroin, chemical, money laundering, and narcoterrorism threats in Africa have an impact on the U.S., particularly since some of the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that smuggle illicit drugs in the U.S. are the same as those using Africa as a base of operations for smuggling operations into Europe and the Middle East. By expanding DEA‘s operational capabilities into Africa, DTOs will increasingly find it difficult to operate in Africa with continued relative impunity. While DEA is increasing its presence in Africa, a critical part of DEA‘s overall Africa strategy calls for broad interagency support from U.S. government partners for assistance in capacity building and mentoring programs with African law enforcement counterparts. DEA‘s presence in Africa consists of four offices established on the continent of Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt & South Africa), and is anticipating opening an office in Kenya. DEA is striving to enhance its intelligence collection and operational capacity to address the African drug threat. At the same time, DEA is working closely with its U.S. law enforcement, military, intelligence, and diplomatic counterparts to counteract the wave of drug-related crime impacting many African nations. DEA also is engaging foreign law enforcement agencies and governments in an effort to

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coordinate counter-narcotics strategies in Africa. While DEA remains a singlemission agency with a law enforcement focus, decades of experience in drug source and transit countries has evidenced the need for close coordination with U.S. government agencies focused on intelligence and capacity building programs. DEA alone does not have the resources or authorities to implement parts of our Strategic Concept for Africa; and therefore will continue to work cooperatively to leverage the resources and expertise of our interagency partners.

DRUG THREATS IN AFRICA For DEA, the principal drug threats in Africa are: cocaine, Southwest Asian heroin, methamphetamine precursor chemicals, drug money laundering, narco-terrorism, and other drugs such as marijuana, hashish, and khat.

Cocaine West Africa is a transshipment location for metric-ton quantities of cocaine being transported to Europe by South American DTOs. A 2007 U.S. government assessment estimated that between 180 and 240 metric tons of cocaine transited established transshipment points in West Africa most ultimately destined for Europe. Colombian and Venezuelan traffickers are entrenched in West Africa and have cultivated long-standing relationships with African criminal networks to facilitate their activities in the region. Criminal groups take advantage of Africa‘s porous borders, poorly-equipped and under- trained law enforcement agencies, and corrupt government officials to facilitate their trafficking operations. The significant rise in cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe, via established routes in Africa, presents a threat not only to Europe, but also to the U.S. The same South American DTOs responsible for transporting major cocaine shipments to the U.S. are using the African continent as a transit base/storage location for cocaine destined for European markets. The drug proceeds from cocaine trafficking return to these South American DTOs to further their illegal activities in the U.S., Africa and Europe.

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Southwest Asian Heroin DEA investigations, intelligence and seizure information identify Africa as a staging ground and transit location for Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin entering global markets. The heroin is principally smuggled by West African criminal groups from Pakistan through Middle Eastern countries and East Africa to West Africa. Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana are the principal transit zones in East and West Africa. The heroin is concealed in air cargo, luggage and body-carried by couriers for eventual transshipment to the U.S. and Europe.

Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals Current drug and laboratory seizure statistics suggest that the vast majority of the methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. is produced by Mexico-based DTOs. Since methamphetamine is a synthetic, clandestinely produced drug, its production and distribution relies exclusively on the ability of Mexican organizations to obtain key precursor chemicals, particularly pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Since 2006, DEA investigations and intelligence collection initiatives indicate sub-Saharan Africa has become a major transshipment location for precursor chemicals destined for the Americas.

Drug Money Laundering The laundering of drug proceeds in Africa is a major concern. DEA investigations and intelligence collection initiatives have revealed evidence of money laundering on the continent is rapidly expanding. Africa does not constitute a global money laundering hub, but its permissive and corrupt environments offer opportunities for traffickers and their money brokers to operate with relative impunity. DEA has observed the following money laundering methods in Africa: bulk currency smuggling and storage, illicit wire transfers, Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) or ―hawalas‖, corrupt foreign exchange houses, casinos, laundering through precious gems (particularly diamonds), real estate investment and trade-based money laundering (including the used car market). Often several laundering methods are used in the same operation to repatriate proceeds to the criminal

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beneficiaries. As evident from the scope of methods available to traffickers, deficiencies in some African economies (such as sparse banking outlets, cashdependent markets and inadequate regulation) do not discourage money laundering.

Narco-terrorism Activity The threat of narco-terrorism in Africa is a real concern, including the presence of international terrorist organizations operating or based in Africa, such as the regional threat presented by Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM). In addition, DEA investigations have identified elements of Colombia‘s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) as being involved in cocaine trafficking in West Africa. In a large number of African states, there are also insurgent/anti-government groups undermining stability, the rule of law, and the weak central governments, all of which are conditions exploited by international drug and precursor chemical organizations. The weak economies throughout Africa make drug trafficking one of the more profitable ways for criminal organizations to generate money, certainly a point not overlooked by terrorist and insurgent organizations. The transportation, money laundering and logistical infrastructures utilized by DTOs in Africa are vulnerable, wittingly or unwittingly, for use by terrorist organizations.

Marijuana, Hashish, and Khat Marijuana, hashish, and khat are additional drug threats currently posed by DTOs operating in Africa and are serious issues of concern to our African counterparts due to their growing rates of abuse on the African continent. Marijuana is the primary drug of abuse in Africa. Marijuana production takes place in almost every African country for internal sale, and also is smuggled to Europe. The primary drug trafficked in northern Africa is hashish. Each year Spanish drug law enforcement authorities seize massive amounts of hashish, smuggled into the Iberian Peninsula from Morocco. Hashish traffickers and cocaine traffickers now utilize the same routes to transport those drugs into Spain. Finally, khat is smuggled into the United States from East Africa via European countries, where the plant is legal. As a result, millions of dollars a year are being sent to Somalia and other countries in the Horn of Africa that may end up in the coffers of terrorist networks.

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DEA’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR AFRICA DEA‘s principal mission in Africa is to identify, target, and dismantle significant international DTOs. In the last 24 months, DEA‘s near term strategy for Africa has focused investigative efforts to uncover those DTOs which represent a threat to the U.S. or our law enforcement counterparts in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Once identified, DEA has initiated bilateral and multi-lateral criminal investigations into these groups to great effect. DEA has developed a long-term strategic concept for our efforts in Africa. The strategic concept includes a series of programs that will enable DEA and U.S. government partners to address operational and capacity building requirements in Africa.

African Investigative Units Enforcement activities in Africa have demonstrated the need for African counterparts to develop specialized investigative teams to conduct investigations into significant local, regional, and international DTOs. DEA is currently working to cooperatively train, equip, and support specialized units within host nation law enforcement authorities. DEA will continue to work with the Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs - INL) in this effort.

DEA Training in Africa The DEA International Training Section (TRI) will dedicate the necessary training and mentoring to Africa‘s law enforcement community, which is necessary to combat drug trafficking in Africa and support DEA‘s strategic concept for Africa. TRI will seek to provide the African law enforcement officers with knowledge of investigative and tactical techniques. The goal is to improve the ability of law enforcement agencies in Africa to investigate narcotics related crimes ranging from simple seizure cases to large-scale conspiracy cases. During 2006 – 2007, DEA conducted 9 training seminars in Africa with students from 26 African nations. The seminars ranged from instruction in Basic Drug Enforcement Operations to the Drug Unit Commanders Course. In

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Fiscal Year 2009, DEA is participating in 7 training courses for African counterparts in Botswana, South Africa, and Morocco. The courses will include Asset Forfeiture, Drug Unit Commanders, Basic & Advanced Agent Course, Airport Interdiction, and Clandestine Laboratory Operations.

International Law Enforcement Academies/ Training Centers DEA will continue to participate in the Department of State‘s International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana and continue to sponsor African law enforcement counterparts to attend its courses. The mission of the ILEA is to support emerging democracies, help protect U.S. interests through international cooperation, and to promote social, political and economic stability by combating crime. The ILEA concept and philosophy creates a united effort by all of the participants to include government agencies and ministries, trainers, managers and students to achieve the common foreign policy goal of international law enforcement. In July 2000, the governments of the U.S. and Botswana entered into an agreement for establishing an ILEA that would provide training for member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East Africa and other eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

ONGOING DEA EFFORT TO COUNTER THE AFRICAN DRUG THREAT DEA recognizes that in order to effectively attack the international drug trade it has to forward deploy its personnel into the foreign arena. DEA has the largest federal law enforcement presence overseas. DEA has 83 offices in 62 countries and works with host governments in assessing drug threats, gathering intelligence, targeting major DTOs, and assisting host governments in developing comprehensive counter narcotics strategies. DEA agents understand the importance of working to establish relationships of trust with host nation governments in order to accomplish DEA‘s mission. DEA‘s global presence has already proved to be essential in assessing the drug threat developing in Africa. Much of the intelligence obtained to date on the activities of DTOs operating in Africa has come from ongoing DEA investigations on the continent and in other DEA domestic and foreign offices.

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DEA will continue to develop these investigations and enhance our understanding of how DTOs in Africa function, so we are best positioned to attack their command and control. As noted, DEA currently has four offices established on the continent of Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt, & South Africa), and plans to open a new office in Kenya. These offices are strategically located across the continent to utilize limited manpower and financial resources. DEA‘s offices serve as regional hubs in which DEA coordinates investigative activities and implements its regional strategy.

Organizational Attack In order to prioritize and maximize the use of DEA‘s manpower and financial resources, DEA works with DOJ partners to identify those organizations having the most significant impact on international drug availability. The result of this collaboration has been the identification and targeting of the full scope of an organization‘s criminal activities. Since 2007, DEA has identified at least nine top-tier South American and Mexican DTOs that have established operations in Africa. By attacking these groups in the source and transit zones, as well as their operations in other areas of the world, a unified targeting strategy is being implemented. As the same South American DTOs transporting cocaine into West Africa are also responsible for multi-ton cocaine shipments into Mexico and the U.S., DEA‘s organizational attack strategy calls for investigative efforts against these organizations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

International Drug Flow Attack Strategy A key element in combating international drug trafficking is the concerted and coordinated efforts of the inter-agency community to jointly identify chokepoints vulnerable to enforcement efforts and simultaneously direct assets to vigorously target the identified chokepoints on a coordinated and sustained basis. To this end, DEA developed an International Drug Flow Attack Strategy, which has the primary objective to cause major disruption to the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between the source zones and the United States. The strategy includes an integrated intelligence- enforcement process

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that rests on four pillars: intelligence-driven enforcement, sequential operations, predictive intelligence, and law enforcement deception campaigns. To stem the flow of drugs into the U.S., DEA will continue to implement this successful Drug Flow Attack Strategy by expanding enforcement initiatives with our global law enforcement partners and the military. Where applicable, DEA will begin to engage African counterparts in these initiatives and develop Africa specific enforcement initiatives.

Financial Attack The UN World Drug Report 2007 affirms that the global illicit drug trade is as lucrative as it is poisonous. This global illicit drug trade generates an estimated $322 billion a year in revenue, far more than the estimated profits from international human trafficking, arms trafficking, and diamond smuggling combined. To make a significant impact on the drug trade in the U.S. and internationally, DEA is tracking and targeting illicit drug money back to the sources of supply before it can be used to finance the next production cycle of illegal drugs. DEA‘s financial investigations are driven by strategies designed to inflict permanent damage against DTOs. By denying DTOs the revenue from the distribution of illegal drugs, the drug traffickers‘ capability to acquire or produce additional drugs and support their organizations is hampered. DEA‘s perspective on the money laundering threat is two-fold: first, DEA is focused on proceeds generated by the illegal drug industry; second, DEA is addressing the threat that drug proceeds represent as a means of financing international terrorist organizations.

Extra-territorial Authority DEA has the legal authority to investigate and charge drug traffickers with extraterritorial offenses under U.S. Code Title 21 § 959. Section 959 gives DEA extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute drug offenses with a nexus to the U.S. even though the drugs in question have not actually entered the United States. The 959 statute has proven to be an invaluable investigative tool in pursuing drug trafficking organizations overseas where we can satisfy the requirement for a nexus to the U.S.

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Additionally, Title 21 U.S.C § 960a gives DEA an enforcement tool for narcoterrorism. Like Section 959, Section 960a gives DEA jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute extra-territorial offenses if a link between the drug offense and a specified act of terrorism or a terrorist organization can be established. Under this statute, the prescribed punishment is twice the punishment provided for the underlying drug offense. Significantly, there is no requirement for a nexus to the U.S. for the underlying drug offense, a concept that is particularly important in cases involving heroin from Afghanistan, and could also be applied to international terrorists involved in the African drug trade. Sections 959 and 960a and traditional conspiracy charges under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 848, provide the legal authority to prosecute transnational DTOs, and the robust sentencing provisions in these statutes provide incentive for defendants to cooperate with investigators, promoting success in investigations.

DEA INVESTIGATIVE SUCCESSES A number of recent successes detailed below demonstrate how the cooperative efforts of the U.S. and foreign law enforcement counterparts are addressing the African drug threat. In September 2008, a Colombian national was arrested by Togolese officials based on a narcotics investigation targeting a South American DTO operating in West Africa, which resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 kilograms of cocaine. DEA was able to identify the Colombian as the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the Southern District of Florida (SDFL) pursuant to a 1992 federal investigation in Miami, Florida. The arrest warrant was based on an indictment for cocaine trafficking related to the seizure of 12,500 kilograms of cocaine secreted in cement fence posts – the largest single seizure of cocaine in U.S. history at the time. The Colombian was identified as the head of a cell operating in Miami working directly for former Cali Cartel leader Miguel RODRIGUEZOrejuela. In January 2009, DEA coordinated the expulsion of this individual from Togo based on the SDFL arrest warrant, and he is awaiting trial in Miami. This operation demonstrated that South

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American DTO personnel based in West Africa are in fact, experienced, high-level operatives. In July 2008, Sierra Leone authorities seized approximately 600 kilograms of cocaine from a twin-engine airplane that landed at Lungi International Airport in Freetown. The aircraft was marked with a Red Cross emblem and had originated in Venezuela. The flight crew fled the area upon landing; however, Sierra Leone officials quickly apprehended the flight crew and subsequently arrested other South American nationals in Sierra Leone involved in the smuggling operation. The investigation revealed the defendants and cocaine were linked to a major South American DTO. DEA worked with international partners and Sierra Leone officials to develop a criminal prosecution against those involved. In April 2009, 15 individuals involved with this DTO in Sierra Leone were convicted on narcotics charges, several of which were subsequently expelled to the U.S. to face charges under Title 21, U.S.C. § 846. In 2007, DEA, French, and Congolese law enforcement counterparts conducted a successful operation which resulted in the seizure of approximately 9 tons of pseudoephedrine in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The investigation revealed a Mexicanbased organization was responsible for the pseudoephedrine shipment, as well as several prior precursor chemical shipments that transited the DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa enroute to Mexico. Since the March 2007 operation, DEA has assisted with the seizure of several other multi-ton pseudoephedrine and ephedrine shipments in Africa that have been linked to Mexican DTOs. In 2006, DEA initiated an investigation targeting the head of a Kabulbased DTO operating a major heroin processing laboratory in Afghanistan and as the source of supply for heroin groups in West Africa and Europe. During UC operations in Ghana and Afghanistan, DEA agents negotiated a 100 kilogram heroin deal, which was intended for distribution in the U.S. In late 2007, the principal target and an associate were arrested by Ghanaian authorities and an expulsion order (to the U.S.) was issued by the Ghanaian courts. Both individuals were quickly transferred to U.S. custody and transported to Virginia to face charges issued under a Title 21, Section 959 indictment from the Eastern District of Virginia. Based on their conviction, in June 2008, the subjects of the investigation received prison sentences of 24 and 17 years, respectively. This investigation

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Thomas M. Harrigan disrupted the West African trafficking operations of a major Afghan heroin DTO, included successful DEA UC operations in Ghana and Afghanistan, and was the first time Title 21 Sub-Section 959 authority was used by DEA in Africa.

DEA is continuing to target the most significant DTOs operating in Africa, and I fully expect continued success. The achievements described also must be attributed to the brave and determined African police counterparts and their willing governments. Without their cooperation, coordination, and support, the successes realized in Africa would not be possible.

CAPACITY OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCCESSFUL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES Africa is experiencing an unprecedented rise in drug trafficking, and the growth of organized crime in Africa is an increasing national security threat, as evidenced by the integration of South American drug trafficking networks with African and European buyers and distributors. Organized criminal groups are exploiting governmental weakness and corruption prevalent in many African nations. There are obvious signs that Africa‘s vulnerability is being exploited by some of the world‘s most dangerous drug trafficking organizations. The global expansion of West African drug trafficking syndicates, such as Nigerian DTOs, has been documented from Bangkok to Kabul; from Nairobi to Cape Town; and from Lima to Detroit. This expansion would not be possible without safe bases of operation on the African continent. South American cocaine DTOs have impacted much of West Africa due to the rising demand for cocaine and the higher profits that can be made in the European drug market. The wholesale price for a kilogram of cocaine in Europe can exceed the cost of the same kilogram in the U.S. by two or three times. The current political and economic environment in Africa presents an unprecedented opportunity for drug traffickers and terrorists to flourish and expand their operations on the continent. There is a risk that the rule of law in some West African states might collapse under the sustained pressure from foreign and local DTOs. In addition, many African governments do not have

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the economic capacity or political will to address the drug threat in the face of other issues such as famine, disease and poverty.

CONCLUSION As the lead U.S. federal drug law enforcement agency, DEA is integral to the realization of a successful counter-narcotics plan in Africa. With decades of overseas experience and an unparalleled global law enforcement presence, DEA is well-positioned to forge the partnerships necessary to achieve lasting success in Africa. Implementing an effective counter-narcotics strategy in Africa represents a significant challenge to DEA and its partners throughout the U.S. government. DEA is enhancing its bilateral intelligence collection and operational capacity to address the African drug threat. DEA is also working closely with its U.S. government and foreign law enforcement counterparts to counteract the wave of drug-related crime impacting many African nations. With the implementation of the proposed programs – such as increased training opportunities – DEA and its partner agencies can achieve meaningful and sustainable counter-narcotics success in Africa. Mr. Chairman, the DEA is committed to working both harder and smarter in dealing with the threat of transnational drug trafficking that affects the entire global community. We recognize that interagency and multinational cooperation are essential elements of the President‘s National Drug Control Strategy, and these cooperative efforts are the best way for us to dismantle and disrupt international DTOs. DEA will continue to work tirelessly to enhance the effectiveness of our enforcement operations in order to curtail the flow of drugs to the United States and around the world. Again, thank you for your recognition of this important issue and the opportunity to testify here today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, "CONFRONTING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA" William Wechsler Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the threat of drug trafficking in West Africa. Narcotics trafficking in West Africa is not a new phenomenon, but the unprecedented growth in trafficking since 2005 demonstrates that West Africa is now firmly tied into international trafficking patterns and is being systematically targeted by international drug trafficking organizations, principally from South America. While the direct threat to the U.S. is limited, this trafficking problem endangers peace, development, stability and

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democracy in West Africa and poses an increasing threat to both our African and European partners. In accordance with NSPD 50, the national security goals for Africa include building capacity, consolidating democratic transition, bolstering fragile states, strengthening regional security and providing humanitarian and developmental assistance. The Department of Defense strategy for achieving these goals include reducing threats that flow from ungoverned areas of weak and fragile states, countering humanitarian tragedies that often arise from conflict, ethnic tensions and extreme poverty, working with our partners to build capacity and reduce threats by promoting reform and professionalism in African militaries, and by fostering stability and assisting in reconstruction. Together with regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and partner countries such as Senegal and Ghana we have worked to raise regional peacekeeping capabilities. The recent explosive growth in narcotics trafficking in West Africa seriously impacts our strategy and goals. We have seen how drug traffickers on other continents work to corrupt politicians, militaries and the judicial process. They are using the same tactics in Africa. West Africa has made great progress since the horrendous civil wars at the turn of this century. The corruption and violence associated with the drug trade can rapidly undermine the progress made in the region. What we see as vulnerabilities in Africa the traffickers see as opportunities. Drug related corruption and violence will undermine overall U.S. regional strategy and weaken African militaries unless the traffickers can be convinced now, while they are still establishing their networks, that West Africa, and the rest of the continent is not open for their business. Four years ago, only 10 percent of the cocaine destined for the European market first transited West Africa, but by 2007 we saw this estimate climb to nearly 60 percent, representing 180 to 240 metric tons and 18 percent of the total world cocaine production. In 2008, this fell to approximately 40 percent of the cocaine destined for Europe, likely due to the instability in Guinea and Guinea Bissau, two of the regions primary entry points. In 2009 this figure is expected to climb again, as the drug trafficking organizations adjust their operations around the political realities of the region. Drug traffickers have intensified their use of Africa as a transshipment point as a reaction to increased interdiction efforts against direct shipment to Europe and to take advantage of Africa‘s porous borders, instability, corruption, and lack of law enforcement. Once on the continent, the drugs are broken down into smaller quantities for further shipment using various means

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and routes. Often, traffickers will put as many as 30 couriers on a single commercial flight from places like Accra, Ghana to the European Union, and will then give the name of one courier to the authorities on the receiving end to focus law enforcement on that individual, allowing the remainder to proceed unchecked. West African organized crime groups receive large amount of cash or up to one third of the drug shipment as payment for services. This in turn leads to the serious corruption issues with certain West African Governments and is contributing to a growing drug use problem. The amount of money officials are paid in bribes far exceed what these impoverished governments can pay in salaries, and can lead to what is called a narco state, defined as an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent. Recent events in Guinea Bissau leave their current status unknown. For example, a UN Report states that in 2006, 674 kilograms of cocaine was taken off a plane that landed at a military airstrip. Military officers took control of the drugs, which subsequently disappeared. The two Colombian suspects that were arrested were later released by a judge, with no legal reason given. As government capabilities decline due to rampant corruption, licit activity becomes more difficult and discourages foreign investment. Also, there is a large population of young people in this region. Without any real avenues for licit employment or opportunity, they can become a humanitarian burden through illegal immigration to Europe or America or become vulnerable to extremist ideology and become part of a terrorist organization. Finally, left unchecked regional instability can deteriorate into armed conflict necessitating expensive Non Combat Evacuations of American Citizens or the deployment of peacekeepers to the region to stave off wide spread humanitarian crisis. Regional government capacity to address the problem is varied, but in general is weak to nonexistent. Certain countries like Cape Verde, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Ghana have either a limited basic capability to conduct independent counter narcotics operations or have demonstrated their political will through participation in maritime law enforcement operations with the United States. DOD‘s Counternarcotics Strategy, which guides counternarcotics operations and assistance at all Combatant Commands, calls for building host nation capacity to conduct counternarcotics operations through ―enhancement of interdiction forces.‖ To build a regional capability, aid in terms of training and equipment for the navies and coast guards must be tailored to the individual countries while keeping in mind the broader regional capacities we

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seek to build or enhance. For successful maritime operations to occur, our international partners need assets to patrol against and interdict drug trafficking organizations, including land vehicles, patrol boats, and aircraft, along with the requisite training and funding stream for maintenance and operations. However, it must be noted that basic government, law enforcement and military institutions must be in place before substantial investment in hardware will be beneficial, and that the funds available to these governments both internally and in terms of foreign assistance are very limited. AFRICOM CN efforts recognize this reality and focus on the basic capabilities these governments need. The interagency is currently working to develop a strategy that balances interdiction and other counternarcotics efforts. DOD is collaborating closely with our interagency colleagues to ensure the resulting strategy appropriately addresses narco-trafficking in the African context, including taking into consideration the assistance our European partners are providing. AFRICOM CNT analysts are actively collaborating with their counterparts at Joint Interagency Task force South (JIATF-S), our European partners‘ Maritime Analysis and Operations Center (MAOC) based in Lisbon, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Defense Intelligence agency, and others to monitor the drug flow, support the broader efforts, build capacity, and help guide which projects will have the greatest impact against drug trafficking organizations. AFRICOM CNT provides assistance to both military and law enforcement units with counternarcotics missions. The maritime projects already underway in West Africa include: AFRICOM CNT sponsorship of students from multiple West African nations on Africa Partnership Station to attend courses taught by US Coast Guard Trainers. Construction of a pier and refueling facility to extend the range of the Senegalese Navy. Supported the establishment of Cape Verde Maritime Security Interagency Operations Center, which is an interagency fusion center that will help to develop the regional intelligence picture and communications with US organizations like JIATF-S and the MAOC in Lisbon. Construction of a climate controlled facility at the international airport at Accra, Ghana to screen passengers suspected of swallowing drugs. Collaborating with 6th Fleet to construct a boat facility in Ghana to support Defender Class boats that were provided by the US.

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Supporting the training or the future Liberia Coast Guard Commander and Deputy Commander at the International Maritime Officer‘s Course at the USCG training facility in Yorktown, VA Some of the aforementioned programs are the result of direct AFRICOM interaction with country teams, but others are the result of an interagency development process that will serve as the model for future joint efforts. To achieve this, a joint assessment led by INL and including individuals from DoD, DoJ, and others is conducted in the individual countries to identify current capabilities and weaknesses. The resulting assessment generates a list of programs and proposals which are designed to integrate with and support each other. The members of the interagency team are then able to identify which proposals fall with the scope of their expertise and authorities and allow them to collaborate with the interagency for execution. In addition to the assessment process, AFRICOM routinely consults with the interagency community via the interagency personnel embedded with AFRICOM in Stuttgart, daily phone calls to State INL, and participation in various working groups. Through active consultation with the interagency community we seek to only engage in meaningful projects that directly support foreign policy. In conclusion, we are still discovering the scope of the problem in West Africa, and are in the process of building a complete picture and comprehensive plan to assist West African countries in becoming capable partners against drug trafficking organizations. We look forward to continued successful collaboration with the interagency and thank the committee for the opportunity to be here today.

In: Africa's Connection to the Drug Trade ISBN: 978-1-61668-668-0 Editor: Peyton E. Daniels © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE IN AFRICA: TRENDS AND U.S. POLICY Liana Sun Wyler1 and Nicolas Cook2 1

International Crime and Narcotics 2 African Affairs

SUMMARY Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent estimates suggest that each year between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine may transit West Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply higher than those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year. Africa‘s emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries. The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. Novel strategies and adaptations of existing efforts may

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be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. While most of the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and little of it enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the region, notably heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs, do enter the United States. The growing drug trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including elements of at least one U.S.-designated terrorist organization, that are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military operations. Other challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance programs in Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance, political stability, rule of law, and human rights, and programs to build African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities. U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying short-term remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in Africa, and long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to combat drugs in the region. In recent years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa. The State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY20 10, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate $19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY20 10 to counternarcotics programs in Africa. The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417, for instance, required that DOD submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa. In responding to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may choose to review existing authorities and funding levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require.

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INTRODUCTION: THE RISING DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT A rise in illicit drug trafficking in Africa in recent years has drawn the attention of U.S. policy makers. The 110th Congress, for instance, passed P.L. 110-417, which required that the Department of Defense submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region, among other related goals. The issue has also arisen in the 111th Congress. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, and other recent hearings have also referenced this issue. President Barack Obama has also highlighted the challenge posed by drug trafficking in Africa, which he has stated ―threatens stability‖ throughout West Africa.1 Africans have been involved in the global illicit drug trade for several decades, both in Africa and elsewhere, but as a region, sub-Saharan Africa played a generally peripheral role in large-scale global drug trafficking prior to the mid-2000s. This was due, in part, to its geographic distance from traditional key centers of non-cannabis illicit drug production and consumption and from primary transit routes between them. While commercially significant amounts of some drugs, particularly heroin, reportedly transited the region in the 1980s and 1990s, the amounts trafficked were generally much smaller than those in most other global regions. With the exception of cannabis, local drug demand and supply incentives also remained low by global standards for several reasons. These included a relative lack of purchasing power as a result of low average household incomes across much of sub-Saharan Africa (―Africa‖ hereafter, except where otherwise noted), along with widespread cultural unfamiliarity with and exposure to the main non-cannabis, illicit narcotics common in other parts of the world. Africa‘s relative peripheral status vis-à-vis the global trade in noncannabis illicit narcotic drugs appears, however, to be ending. Hotspots of illegal drug activity have emerged in West Africa and East Africa, as well as in Southern Africa. Diverse signs of drug trafficking activity in West Africa during the past five years indicate that this sub-region is emerging as a key warehousing and transshipment hub for large-scale consignments of South American cocaine being smuggled en route to Europe.2 In recent years, the region has witnessed a sharp rise in record-sized multi-ton cocaine seizures and a rise in reported cocaine criminal cases involving diverse foreign and

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African individuals, including African state officials and Latin American drug syndicate members. Recent reports showing a decline in cocaine seizures in Africa in early 2009 have emerged in contrast to the rapid rise in reported trafficking volumes passing through the region in recent prior years. Analysts are currently debating whether the decline in 2009 seizures is indicative of a short-term or long-term trend. Questions at issue include whether the decline is the result of increasing counterdrug efforts in the region, recent positive changes in political and governance factors in the region, or an indication that drug traffickers have adopted improved smuggling methods and are successfully evading detection.3 According to analyses by government and multilateral agencies, Kenya and Ethiopia are notable transshipment hubs for heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan. East Africa is the primary smuggling conduit for moving heroin from Southwest Asia to Africa for further transshipment around the globe, according to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).4 South Africa has become a source and transshipment point for synthetic drugs, like methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type drugs, for both domestic consumption and foreign destinations in Europe and South Asia. There are also reports that multiple countries in Africa are being used as hubs for the illicit diversion of chemical precursors used to manufacture illegal drugs. According to the INCB, Africa ―has emerged as a major area‖ for the diversion to the Americas and elsewhere of the key methamphetamine precursor chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.5 Local drug consumption trends are generally not well documented because of a paucity of data on illicit drug usage rates.6 Cannabis use rates in Africa, however, are reportedly among the highest worldwide, while available data indicate that use of other drugs, including cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines, is generally below the use rates of other world regions but is growing in some African countries.7

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS Historically, U.S. and international policy makers directed relatively little attention to counternarcotics issues in Africa, largely because the potential consequences for the United States and other non-African countries arising from drug trafficking in the region were typically viewed as limited. The

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perception that such activity may indeed threaten U.S. and other international interests has grown, however, as Africa‘s role in global trafficking has expanded. Some U.S. observers now argue that the rise in drug trafficking in Africa has been so rapid and large—an indication that international drug trafficking patterns are in flux—that it must now be given heightened consideration within the context of global U.S. counternarcotics goals and strategies.8 The extent of this rise also suggests that such activities have the potential to threaten diverse U.S. security, foreign policy, and economic interests within Africa.

Confluence of Transnational Drug Syndicates and Other Security Threats The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. These trends suggest that novel strategies or adaptations of existing ones may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. Many observers have raised concerns about potentially growing operational linkages between Latin American, West African, and Southwest Asian drug syndicates and European criminal elements. The increased trade suggests that such organizations are growing in capacity, strength, and global reach.9 There are signs that Latin American trafficking syndicates have expanded into the region. Several Latin American individuals from countries such as Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico, some with known or suspected ties to cocaine syndicates, have been arrested in cocaine cases in West Africa in recent years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also reports that since 2007, ―DEA has identified at least nine top-tier South American and Mexican DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] that have established operations in Africa.‖10 Numerous Latin American persons, some suspected of having drug links, have reportedly established residences and businesses in Africa, particularly in West Africa.11 Many of the same transnational Latin American drug trafficking organizations that supply U.S. drug markets and engage in other, often violent, crimes targeting U.S. citizens, interests, or jurisdictions are believed to be

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playing a key role in the rapid growth of drug trafficking in Africa.12 In this respect, the threat to U.S. interests posed by this trend is direct, because these actors‘ expansion into Africa increases their global reach and provides them additional profits and organizational linkages, making them more financially and operationally diversified, robust, and versatile—and thus more difficult and to track and halt. For West African criminal groups, growing involvement with Latin American cocaine traffickers signifies their expansion beyond heroin trafficking, their traditional niche in the drug trade.

Potential Links between Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Groups Drug trafficking in Africa may also facilitate collaboration or other synergies between drug trafficking organizations and the activities or interests of other entities that are adversarial to U.S. interests. These may include nondrug-related transnational organized crime networks and, potentially, U.S.designated foreign terrorist organizations, including the leftist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Hezbollah. Both of these groups are reportedly involved in drug trafficking and money laundering in regions other than Africa, and Hezbollah supporters are reportedly common among West Africa‘s Lebanese commercial diaspora. These or similar entities, potentially including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), could earn money directly from participation in the African drug trade.13 Such entities could also derive indirect benefits from the African drug trade (e.g., sources of financing for non- drug operations, increased international ties with other illicit actors, or access to barter deals involving drugs and other illicit goods, such as black market arms).14

The strongest known link between drug trafficking and international terrorist groups in West Africa involves the FARC, which has been linked to cocaine trafficking into Venezuela, from where much of the cocaine now transiting West Africa is believed to be exported.15 Hezbollah, which reportedly has financial and business ties and a network of supporters in West Africa and in Europe, among other world regions, has been linked to cocaine traffic originating in or transiting Venezuela, as well as in other countries, including the United States. Although there are no substantiated public reports of Hezbollah involvement in trans-African cocaine traffic originating in Venezuela, given the group‘s reported involvement in cocaine trafficking in other countries and its links in Africa, some analysts believe that Hezbollah may be involved in Africa-related trafficking trade, particularly with regard to

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the laundering of trafficking earnings between Europe and Africa.16 Some analysts believe that a portion of earnings from the trade are laundered through a process in which cash earnings are illicitly exported to African countries, where the funds are then legally wired to banks in the Middle East in which Hezbollah may play a role. Little known evidence, however, indicates that either Hezbollah or AQIM are playing a significant role in drug flows through the region—with the possible exception of hashish in the case of AQIM.17

Potential for Narco-Violence? Some analysts warn that the rise in drug trafficking in Africa could prompt a rise in criminal violence in the region. African authorities have seized small arms from Latin American cocaine trafficking suspects in several West African cocaine cases, and several drug trade-related shoot- outs and murders in the region are known to have occurred in recent years. To date, however, there has been no marked or widespread rise in drug-linked criminal violence in Africa.18 While analysts may debate whether there is a potential for the growth of drug-related violence in Africa, other countries‘ experiences, most notably Mexico today, highlight the potential danger of drug- related violence. One of the most recent violent, possibly drug-related incidents involved the assassination of Guinea-Bissau‘s armed forces chief, Batista Tagme Na Wai, on March 1, 2009, which was followed within hours by a reportedly retaliatory murder of the country‘s president, Joao Bernardo ―Nino‖ Vieira. No publicly available evidence suggests that drug trafficking organizations were behind the assassinations, and there are strong indications that political factors may have played a role in the deaths. Both men were party to Guinea-Bissau‘s 1998 civil war, and the two men were reportedly bitter political rivals. Some reports suggest, however, that the remote-controlled bomb that was used to assassinate Na Wai could imply a drug link in his death. Such devices are reportedly rarely used in the region but are frequently used by Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations. Both men had taken public stances against drug trafficking, but both were also reportedly believed by diplomatic sources, international organization representatives, and some analysts to have had links to the drug trade.19

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Other Threats to U.S. Foreign Policy Goals Growing transnational drug trafficking in Africa may directly jeopardize other U.S. foreign and economic policy goals in Africa, such as the promotion of legitimate economic growth, state institution-building, and diverse other foreign aid program goals.20 It could also put at risk large amounts of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction assistance that the United States and other donors have invested in the region, notably in West Africa, in recent decades.

Corruption and Other Funding-Based Threats to Law Enforcement An increase in drug trafficking could have a negative impact on levels of corruption among law enforcement, judicial, and military officials. Drug corruption poses a particular danger to African states since, due to their institutional and economic weaknesses, relatively small financial resources may be required to elicit high levels of corrupt behavior by officials and to vastly expand the challenges faced by already-challenged criminal justice systems (see text box on ―Regional Vulnerabilities,‖ below).21 Moreover, the high volumes and value of the drugs being moved through the region mean that large-scale traffickers have at their disposal financial resources that are significant in relation to low average incomes common in the region. There are indications that this threat is being realized—particularly at regional air and sea ports of entry, where high levels of corruption and low official pay facilitates the trafficking of illegal drugs.22 State officials have been implicated in a number of drug-related cases in multiple African countries. Similarly, the organizational and logistical assets that Latin American drug syndicates can potentially bring to bear in operations in Africa are extensive and sophisticated in comparison to those available to many law enforcement agencies in the region. Should trafficking through the region grow substantially, these assets could pose a substantial added challenge to governments‘ capacities to combat such activities. Possible Economic Effects There are some indications that the scale of the illicit narcotics trade may be growing so large as to rival the volume of legal trade in some sectors. The United Nations (U.N.) Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has reported that the wholesale value of the cocaine transiting West Africa, for example, may be starting to rival that of a number of primary legal export commodities

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produced in the region. UNODC findings have also highlighted several economic trends that may be indicative of drug-related effects on economies in the region, including the unexplained doubling or tripling in annual remittances from Europe to several West African countries, and relatively sudden, substantial increases in foreign direct investments in several others.23 If drug-related criminality in the region were to increase markedly, some analysts fear that legal foreign investment in the region—which is already low in many countries, due to a variety of factors—could be further deterred, potentially negatively affecting U.S. interests in the region.24 For example, State Department analysts suggest that such inhibitions on investment could potentially negatively affect U.S. energy security interests in the region by affecting U.S. oil sector investments.25 On the other hand, it remains unclear how much of a marginal increase drug-related inhibitions on investment, including investment in the energy sector, might add to a substantial existing level of foreign business reticence to invest in Africa. Large energy firms have long routinely operated in very challenging business climates, remote and harsh environmental contexts, and in countries that are affected by high levels of corruption or political instability.

Possible Governance Impacts Corruption and the economic value of inflows of drug-related hard currency funds into Africa‘s relatively small economies hold the potential to undermine the political will to strongly back substantive and effective counternarcotics efforts, and could pose a range of broader governance threats. These include the potential undermining of civil and constitutional liberties, notably freedom of the press, and limitations on citizens‘ franchise powers to suit the interests of corrupt officials. In the extreme, in cases in which the operational influence of drug trafficking networks significantly penetrates key institutions, such as the military, the sovereignty or viability of states as independent rule of law-based entities may be jeopardized. Such concerns have been repeatedly raised by many analysts with regard to Guinea-Bissau, as well as Guinea, albeit to a lesser extent, during the final years in power of the late President Conte.

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DRUG TRAFFICKING AND USE TRENDS IN AFRICA Trafficking: Overview Although long considered a relatively minor global source, destination, and transit point for illegal drugs, Africa‘s role in global illicit drug trade has grown in recent years (see Table 1 for drug seizure levels in 2006, the most recent year for which Africa-wide data were available). Most prominent among recent drug trafficking trends in Africa is the record number of multi-ton seizures of cocaine in West Africa. Between 2005 and 2008, West African, European, and U.S. officials have seized at least 46 metric tons of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa. This represents a significant rise over impoundment levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when total drug seizures rarely exceeded more than 1 metric ton per year for the entire continent. Although the region has long been a transit point for small consignments of cocaine destined for Europe, the volume and frequency of cocaine seizures in recent years appears to indicate emerging changes in methods used for trafficking of cocaine, the mix of criminal actors involved, and in patterns of global cocaine movement and consumption. How durable such changes may prove, however, is unclear. While a wide variety of factors may explain the relatively sudden rise of cocaine trafficking through West Africa, a number of structural and institutional characteristics common to many African countries may make the region as a whole susceptible to trafficking of various illicit substances. These are discussed in the following text box.

Cocaine Sources and Destinations As with practically all illegal cocaine, that which transits West Africa originates in South America, where it is processed in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia using coca leaves grown in the same countries.26 In 2007, Colombian authorities estimated that approximately 35% of cocaine produced and shipped from the coasts of Colombia, Venezuela, the Guyanas, and Brazil is trafficked via West Africa to Europe.27 During the same time period, U.S. and international authorities estimated that approximately 80% of cocaine traveling from Latin America to Africa moved by sea and the remaining 20% by air. In

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recent years, the proportion of Latin American cocaine moving through West Africa en route to Europe has increased. UNODC reports that seizures in Africa increased from under 1 metric ton per year in the 1998- 2002 period to 15 metric tons in 2006, and that during the three years from 2005 through 2007, officials seized at least 33 metric tons of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa.28

REGIONAL VULNERABILITIES Africa—in particular West Africa with respect to cocaine trafficking— is viewed as attractive to traffickers because they are likely to face relatively lower risks of monitoring and apprehension by law enforcement there than in many other world regions. While the capabilities of African governments vary, sometimes substantially, many countries on the subcontinent share a number of socio-economic and state characteristics that appear to make the region a favorable operating environment for traffickers. These include the following: Poor internal transport and communications systems, which impede tracking and monitoring of drug trafficking. Large, sparsely populated, remote zones; porous land borders, frequent, often long-established patterns of unrecorded or illicit crossborder trade. Lack of maritime, air, and land surveillance and interdiction technical capacities, and often limited seaport, airport, and border post security and goods shipment controls, and lack of operational and logistical resources for these purposes. Institutionally weak law enforcement and judicial systems that, in some cases, are subject to corruption or political influence. Limited state regulatory controls and administrative capacities, and a frequent general lack of public fiscal resources, resulting in low levels of public sector compensation and/or salary arrears and often widespread public sector corruption. High rates of poverty and unemployment, and a sizable differential between average income levels in the region and the amount of operational capital and profits available to large-scale trafficking organizations.

Table 1. 2006 Drug Seizures in Africa (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West and Central Africa Africa Total World Total African Share of Global Total (%)

Heroin and Morphine 137.9 78.6 29.7

17.0 91.2 363.4

225,340.6 146,490.5 637,227.9

32,236.1 427.7 145,751.6

2.3 118,523.6 54.8

N/A 2.1 315.4

0.0 1.0 22.9

107.6

14,578.9

207,820.0

928.4

10,426.0

517.7

3.5

353.8 103,991.6 0.3%

15,050.6 705,789.4 2.1%

1,216,879.1 5,239,695.3 23.2%

179,343.7 1,340,507.5 13.4%

129,006.8 1,024,828.6 12.5%

835.1 43,171.5 1.9%

27.5 4,510.7 0.6%

Cocaine

Cannabis Herb

Cannabis Plant

Cannabis Resin

Amphetamines

Ecstasy

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, a possible seizure estimate error related to a cocaine case in Nigeria in 2006 may exaggerate total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as 11 tons for that year. In addition, a lack of data for some countries may result in under-reporting for all years. No other source for comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.

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The latter three factors may give rise to financial incentives that may prompt significant numbers of African citizens or public officials to accept payment in exchange for facilitating or participating in trafficking. Several countries also share other unique features seen as making them particularly susceptible to trafficking. Gambia, Benin, and Togo, for instance, host busy ports that function as large-scale import and re-export hubs for regional trade in licit, gray, and black market goods. This loosely regulated, highvolume trade may offer a useful conduit for concealing illicit drugs. Similarly, several countries, notably Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana, host regional commercial air traffic hubs that connect the region to Europe and are used by drug mules. Lastly, several countries, notably including Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. There has been a corresponding increase in other drug trafficking indicators: in 2006, 34% and 30% of cocaine seized at European airports came from the Caribbean and Latin America, respectively, and 24% came from Africa. In 2007, European cocaine seizures that transited through Africa had jumped to 46% of the total, while those trafficked directly from Latin America provenance increased only slightly, to 33%, and those from the Caribbean dropped to 12%.29 In global terms, African cocaine seizures increased from 0.1% of total global seizures in 2000 to 0.3% in 2005 to 2.1% in 2006 Table 2.30 While this rise may suggest that cocaine trafficking through Africa remains peripheral in global terms, the proportional rate of growth of this increase has been abrupt, as has its potential impact on European and African drug supply and use trends.

Volume The actual amount of cocaine transiting Africa en route to Europe is not known; estimates of both the total amount of annual European cocaine consumption and the amount being trafficked through Africa vary significantly. Based on reported drug usage levels in Europe and extrapolations based on drug seizure data, various U.S., European, and international agency estimates suggest that between 46 tons and as much as 300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in Europe may transit West Africa annually.31 Estimates of the value of this trade, and the possible amount of profit that it may generate for traffickers, also vary widely. One UNODC study estimated that in 2006, about 40 tons of cocaine worth $1.8 billion—just over 27% of total European cocaine consumption of 146 tons in that year—passed through Africa. Wholesale profits on this 40 ton amount are estimated at $450 million, or 25% of the value; these profits may have been significantly higher

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if some of this amount was retailed.32 Potential earnings may also be far higher given that some estimates of the total amount of cocaine entering Europe are significantly higher than the 146 tons used by UNODC to compile this estimate.33 In contrast to the reported upward trends in cocaine trafficking through West Africa that have been reported in recent years, data on cocaine seizures in early 2009 show a drop in the volume of cocaine transiting through Africa. A UNODC analysis of drug interdiction data from the first quarter of 2009 suggests that airport seizure incidents have halved since 2008 and that no multi- ton seizures have occurred to date in 2009 (compared to 11 in 2007 and 4 in 2008).34 Table 2. Cocaine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

2000 8.0 35.8 272.6 137.1

2001 7.5 6.4 180.7 273.0

2002 25.0 21.6 455.1 98.3

2003 5.7 17.2 818.7 269.3

2004 1,178.4 9.2 611.0 1,797.9

2005 12.2 843.4 343.9 1,365.0

2006 17.0 91.2 363.4 14,578.9

453.5 2.6%

467.7 3.1%

599.9 28.3%

1,110.9 85.2%

3,596.6 223.8%

2,564.4 -28.7%

15,050.6 486.9%

1,750

539

148

69

2,533

3,681

4,081

23

21

21

24

25

30

27

344,454.1

365,922.2

372,418.2

579,526.7

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

499,025. 2 0.2%

749,895. 7 0.3%

705,789. 4 2.1%

0.6%

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs, data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, an error in data for West Africa in 2006 may likely exaggerate total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as 11 tons. No other source for comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.

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Geography of Trafficking Traditionally, cocaine destined for Europe followed a northerly route from South America, through the eastern Caribbean and the Azores, to landing points on the Iberian peninsula and the Netherlands. Interdiction pressures and other factors appear to have prompted a southward shift in routing, generating the rise in cocaine trafficking to Europe through West Africa. Large consignments of cocaine are now transported from Colombia and onward to Brazil, Venezuela, and some smaller destinations, from where they are dispatched to Africa, primarily West Africa. The largest known loads of cocaine en route to Europe via West Africa have been transported by boat (including fishing boats, sailing yachts, and speedboats) and on container ships and other so- called mother ships that hand off shipments to smaller, faster boats outside territorial waters.35 Small private airplanes are also commonly used. The bulk of cocaine shipments are believed to arrive in Cape Verde and in countries along the West African coast, ranging from Mauritania southward along the West African Atlantic coast as far as west as Nigeria. Key regional entry points include Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ghana, among others. Some shipments are also offloaded in South Africa, which is a destination for small quantities of cocaine as well as a transit point. Major European entry points for cocaine transiting through West Africa include Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. While more circuitous than direct routes between South America and Europe, the southern trans- Atlantic oceanic distance between South America and Africa is geographically shorter and thus more secure for trafficking purposes than that between South America and Europe. These southern routes are also located south of the Atlantic zone where U.S. and European maritime shipping monitoring and drug interdiction efforts have historically been most intense. In recent years, the southern routes through Africa have been reportedly characterized by denser traffic and larger average cocaine cargo sizes than the northern ones, as indicated by a growing number of large seizures, including a number of multi-ton consignments.36 Smuggling roughly along Latitude 10 North between northern South America and the West African coast (specifically between Venezuela and Guinea and adjacent Guinea-Bissau), has become so common that law enforcement agencies have dubbed it ―Highway 10.‖ Another major southern route appears to link northern Latin American source countries with Gulf of Guinea countries from Ghana to Nigeria. Some landlocked Sahelian countries that lie along routes

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connecting coastal West Africa to northern Africa via the Sahel, such as Mali, have also seen an increase in trafficking. 37

Trafficking Patterns and Actors Limited data on cocaine trafficking into and within Africa are available, but many indications suggest that the bulk of cocaine is trafficked into West Africa, as opposed to other sub-regions on the continent. This pattern may be explained by geographic factors and changes in trafficking patterns spurred by developments outside of Africa, but it may also be rooted in the preexisting role of West Africans in the international narcotics trade. As early as the 1970s, reports indicate West Africans of multiple nationalities were significantly involved in international heroin and cocaine trafficking.38 In 2000, the U.S. government International Crime Threat Assessment report stated that Nigerian criminal syndicates dominated ―transatlantic cocaine shipments between Brazil and Africa‖ and were ―increasingly trafficking South American cocaine to various regions in Africa and throughout Europe.‖39 The report stated that Nigerian traffickers primarily transshipped cocaine using drug couriers traveling via commercial air flights. As the size of the cocaine shipments has grown in recent years, the actors involved in its trans- Atlantic transport appear to have changed. Much of the recent large-scale trafficking from South America to West Africa appears to have been dominated by Latin Americans, in particular Colombians, and some Europeans.40 The rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa in recent years had led some analysts to conclude that the increase might indicate a long-term shift in strategies by Latin American cocaine traffickers. However, the sharp drop in cocaine seizures in early 2009 suggests to others that such a conclusion might be premature or inaccurate. Despite such uncertainties, there are some indications that suspected Latin American traffickers have been establishing a long-term permanent presence in West Africa in recent years. A relatively recent small flow of apparently wealthy Latin Americans into West Africa has drawn attention in a number of countries in the sub-region. A number of these persons, who often claim to be investors in the local economy, have purchased or constructed elaborate villas and compounds, and often drive expensive vehicles.41 Another possible indicator that traffickers may be moving portions of the wholesale cocaine supply chain across the Atlantic is the discovery of cocaine processing labs that convert cocaine base into a finished product, cocaine hydrochloride (HCL). Several such labs have been recently found in Spain and Portugal.42

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Latin American traffickers are believed both to directly organize cocaine transport onward from West Africa to Europe and to collaborate with West African traffickers in other cocaine redistribution and export activities. According to UNODC, ―[t]here appear to be two parallel flows. One, mainly involving large maritime and private air shipments, is owned and managed by South Americans,‖ while West African crime groups, either in collaboration with nationals from other world regions or individually, ―also traffic these drugs to Europe, usually via commercial air flights.‖43 West African traffickers are reportedly paid in kind with cocaine for their logistics services and buy wholesale consignments of cocaine from their South American counterparts. Some of these actors may, in turn, sell or consign cocaine to low-level, freelancing traffickers who are also involved in moving cocaine from West Africa to Europe.44 West Africans have also been associated with relatively smaller amounts of cocaine smuggled from South America to Africa. Tracking the movement of cocaine from West Africa to Europe is challenging for law enforcement and intelligence agencies because of a lack of manpower, technological, and other resources. Some patterns have been identified, however. In general, drug syndicates, mainly from West Africa and, to a lesser extent, South America, move cocaine from West Africa to Europe using human couriers flying commercial air passenger routes. Parcel post, private air flights, trans-Sahel land and air routes, and boats are also employed.45 The trafficking of cocaine via commercial airlines is, in particular, believed to be well-established among West African drug syndicates. Recent UNODC drug seizure data suggest that two sub-regional repackaging and redistribution trafficking patterns have emerged. One involves cocaine entering Guinea Bissau that is then routed to Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, and Mali for onward transport to Europe, primarily by passenger air flights, but also by land. Cocaine entering the Gulf of Guinea, by contrast, reportedly often flows through Ghana into Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, and then onward to Europe, primarily by passenger air flight.46 Surveillance efforts in Europe targeting commercial air flights regularly interdict numerous human couriers, known as mules, who either swallow their shipments (a procedure known as ―body packing‖) or transport them on their persons or in their luggage. This mode of trafficking appears to use a so-called ―shotgun‖ approach, in which numerous individual mules each carry amounts typically ranging from a few ounces to several kilograms. Jointly, they transport large quantities of cocaine, but traffickers face relatively low losses if some of the mules are apprehended.47 According to the UNODC, between 2004 and a portion of 2008, at least 1,357 couriers were detected on Europe-

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bound flights originating in West Africa, with each courier attempting to smuggle up to 4 kilograms of cocaine.48

Heroin Africa is not a production source of illegal heroin and other opioids, and the level of opioid abuse in Africa is low in global comparative terms, although there are some signs that use rates may be increasing moderately in some countries, notably in countries along key heroin trafficking routes in East and Southern Africa (see Table 3).49 Heroin trafficking through Africa and by African drug networks, however, is a relatively longstanding phenomenon, with one of the first reported instances of heroin trafficking occurring in Nigeria in the early 1980s.50 West African crime networks, in particular, have long played a key role in international heroin trafficking, both with respect to the procurement of wholesale heroin from producer countries and with regard to the wholesale and retail sale of heroin in consumer countries, including the United States. West African crime networks have long played a substantial role in the U.S. and European heroin markets.51 In 1994, Nigerian-controlled couriers accounted for 30% of all heroin seized by the U.S. Customs Service.52 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that West Africans are continuing to play a primary role in transporting and distributing heroin in the United States.53 Historically, West African networks have sourced heroin in Southeast Asia and trafficked it to consuming countries through networks mainly controlled from Nigeria and transnational operations based in various countries, particularly Southeast Asian ones, such as Thailand. In recent years, as Southwest Asian heroin has come to dominate the global market, West African heroin networks have become active in the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin, particularly from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to UNODC data, for example, at least 600 Nigerians have been arrested in Pakistan since 2000 in possession of more than 100 grams of heroin.54 According to the State Department, Nigerian and Ghanaian trafficking organizations are involved in smuggling heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan to several parts of the United States, including Ohio and the New York area.55 Today, heroin is smuggled from Southwest Asia through East and West Africa into Europe and North America, usually by commercial air courier.56 East Africa—which has longstanding trading links with South Asia, a global heroin source region, and the Middle East, a heroin transit zone that is today linked with these regions via multiple commercial airline routes and growing trade ties—is a particularly notable entry point for heroin shipments to the

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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

continent.57 Annual reported seizure volumes and incident totals in Africa, however, are generally very limited compared with those in other world regions, and some observers hypothesize that heroin trafficking through West Africa may be in decline, as heroin markets in both Europe and North America appear to be stabilizing.58 Table 3. Heroin and Morphine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

2000 59.5 48.6 17.5 100.0

2001 66.7 57.3 30.9 77.4

2002 95.7 66.0 15.5 114.7

2003 68.3 36.0 35.6 105.7

2004 87.8 56.7 19.9 237.5

2005 79.8 57.0 49.5 140.5

2006 137.9 78.6 29.7 107.6

225.5 -2.5%

232.4 3.0%

291.7 25.6%

245.6 -15.8%

401.9 63.7%

353.8 8.3%

785

2,594

900

1,121

1,530

326.7 18.7 % 2,712

22

26

26

22

26

30

23

80,92 4.4 0.3%

65,613. 4 0.4%

73,447. 9 0.4%

90,42 7.6 0.4%

103,99 1.6 0.3%

97,565.7 100,089. 8 0.3% 0.4%

4,883

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.

Cannabis and Cannabis Resin Cannabis has long been produced, trafficked, or used in practically every country in Africa—and analysts predict strong long-term increases in cannabis production in the region (see Table 4 and Table 5).59 The illegal cannabis drug

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market is by far the largest drug market in Africa; according to the UNODC, somewhere between 28.9 million and 56.4 million Africans used cannabis at least once in 2007.60 Like other world regions, cannabis production in Africa supplies a largely domestic or intra-regional population of users. In addition— and unlike most other world regions—the continent is the source of a significant cross-regional cannabis export market, mainly to West and Central Europe and to a lesser extent to East Asia and North America.61 According to UNODC figures, Africa contributes between an estimated 22% and 26% of global cannabis production. Major producers include Benin, Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia, along with Egypt and Morocco in North Africa.62 Compared to other regions, Africa is one of the largest annual sources of cannabis production and ranks among the top regions with respect to the number and volume of annual local cannabis seizures. While cannabis is known to be widely produced in Africa, and some cannabis-related production, distribution, retail value, and use trends can be discerned, detailed country-level data on these phenomena are often lacking.63 While cannabis availability is widespread across the continent, views regarding the acceptability of its use vary considerably by country and among social groups. In some African countries, cannabis has long been widely used for diverse work-related, recreational, medicinal, cultural, and other purposes. In others, acceptance of its use differs among social or economic groups; for example, in many African countries, cannabis is primarily consumed by poor populations, notably in urban areas, and shunned by elites.64 In many African countries, law enforcement efforts to counter the cannabis trade are sporadic, in part because often under-resourced police agencies face a range of more serious, violent crimes. In addition, according to the UNODC, while the drug is considered a problem from a public health perspective, it is often seen as less of a threat to national security than other types of drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. In general, illicit profits and incidents of drug-related violence associated with African cannabis trafficking are fewer than those associated with other drugs or criminal activities.65

Table 4. Cannabis Herb Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents) 2000 36,268.1 116,004.5

2001 683,111.6 118,544.6

2002 175,663.7 147,812.0

2003 769,986.1 153,878.6

2004 983,384.4 398,866.0

2005 162,876.0 193,084.0

2006 225,340.6 146,490.5

Southern Africa West & Central Africa

1,062,221.8 284,082.7

161,966.0 335,268.2

141,894.4 526,007.0

151,059.0 562,363.0

878,503.8 697,871.2

347,094.4 162,919.8

637,227.9 207,820.0

AFRICA TOTAL

1,498,577.1

1,298,890.4

991,377.0

2,958,625.4

865,974.2

1,216,879.1

Change from Prior Year (%)

201.4%

-13.3%

-23.7%

1,637,286. 7 65.2%

80.7%

-70.7%

40.5%

Number of Reported Drug Seizures

18,469

8,156

19,288

8,193

11,402

10,050

35,245

Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL

28

27

31

30

30

34

25

4,679,750.8

4,758,433.4

4,667,495. 8 18.6%

5,229,695.3

27.3%

5,940,558. 1 27.6%

7,152,169.8

32.0%

4,798,430. 3 20.7%

East Africa North Africa

AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

41.4%

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.

23.3%

Table 5. Cannabis Plant Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures

2000 10,981.0 N/A 929,438.4 50.6 940,470.1 246.1%

2001 81,098.8 73,857.7 660,035.7 273607.5 1,088,599.8 15.8%

2002 1,057,021.1 93,613.0 760,604.2 5120.5 1,916,358.8 76.0%

2003 674,8621.4 21,091.1 98,803.4 313.9 6,868,829.8 258.4%

2004 15,454.2 421.2 97,414.8 2790.0 116,080.2 -98.3%

2005 436,113.4 37,590.0 3,397.4 N/A 477,100.8 311.0%

2006 32,236.1 427.7 145,751.6 928.4 179,343.7 -62.4%

509

1606

727

1,359

1,888

529

754

9

14

14

14

11

10

13

GLOBAL TOTAL 6,120,773.1 6,098,692.7 11,351,607.3 12,253,027.8 3,597,710.2 3,790,275.2 AFRICA‘S SHARE OF 15.4% 17.9% 16.9% 56.1% 3.2% 12.6% GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.

1,340,507.5 13.4%

Table 6. Cannabis Resin Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

2000 6,404.1 150,119.8 27,056.6 350.0

2001 51.5 71,892.2 539.5 13.0

2002 1,885.8 70,604.1 1,744.2 2.0

2003 898.4 117,970.5 219.6 13.2

2004 0.2 107,705.0 0.0 975.7

2005 12,333.7 109,145.4 95.0 1.4

2006 2.3 118,523.6 54.8 10,426.0

183,930.4 192.2%

72,496.2 -60.6%

74,236.1 2.4%

119,101.7 60.4%

108,681.0 -8.8%

121,575.6 11.9%

129,006.8 6.1%

128

28

421

567

1215

7960

7512

13

15

16

15

10

16

12

1,050,590.5 17.5%

941,518.6 7.7%

1,088,429.8 1,391,926.6 1,470,752.4 1,269,506.1 1,024,828.6 6.8% 8.6% 7.4% 9.6% 12.6%

Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.

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Cannabis resin, which is used in the production of hashish, is the second most widely trafficked drug in Africa, but is predominantly produced in North Africa (see Table 6). In addition to possessing the world‘s largest documented cannabis cultivation area, Morocco is the world‘s largest producer of cannabis resin.66 Unlike cannabis herb production, cannabis resin production is reportedly set for a gradual but global decline, due in large part to declining demand in Europe and various other factors.67 One well-known smuggling route for both cannabis and cannabis resin to Europe is through Morocco. From Morocco, traffickers reportedly smuggle illegal cannabis into Spain, where it can be easily transshipped to other EU countries because of limited border security within the EU.68 Some of the same routes used for trafficking cannabis from Morocco to Europe are reportedly being used for transiting cocaine. EUROPOL has found that Colombian and Moroccan criminal groups are cooperating together to smuggle both cocaine and cannabis into Europe.69 Such trends may not last, however. Some analysts hypothesize that the co-mingling of cocaine and cannabis shipments and their transport along North African routes traditionally used for cannabis smuggling may decline because of concern by smugglers that the merger of cocaine and cannabis trafficking might draw increased law enforcement attention and increase the risk of interdiction. At the same time, however, reported drug seizures by the government of Niger indicate that North African smugglers are willing to go to considerable lengths to protect their routes. In one incident, for example, the Nigerien military encountered ―considerable resistance‖ from a ―professional‖ hashish smuggling operation that was trafficking the drug in convoys of three to five four-wheel drive vehicles secured with military-grade weaponry and satellite phones.70

Synthetic Drugs and Precursor Chemicals The illegal synthetic drug market in Africa is reportedly relatively small (see Table 7 and Table 8). One exception to this is South Africa, which is a destination and sometimes also a production source for methaqualone, methamphetamine, and MDMA (ecstasy); foreign production sources for these drugs include China, India, and Europe. Maxiton Forte, an amphetamine-type drug, is also reportedly produced in Egypt for domestic abuse. Despite limited data availability, reports indicate that the non-medical abuse of pharmaceutical preparations containing psychotropic substances occurs in West and Central

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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Africa.71 Amphetamine users in Africa are estimated at 2.3 million, or approximately 9% of the world total, and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) predicts that the number of users in Africa will continue to increase gradually, in large part due to increasing South African demand for methamphetamine and crystal methamphetamine.72 The INCB reports that Africa is also emerging as an increasingly significant transshipment point for the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals, particularly ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, used to manufacture illicit drugs.73 Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are two key precursor chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Recent reports indicate that much of more than 120 metric tons precursor chemicals for methamphetamine had been diverted to or through Africa in 2006. The countries in Africa to which these shipments were destined included Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. If the precursor chemicals had not been seized, they could have been converted into a total of approximately 80 metric tons of methamphetamine—a total that represents approximately one-third of current global methamphetamine production estimates.74 Table 7. Amphetamine-Type Drug Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

2000 6.0 13.6 0.0 6.2 25.8 -93.9%

2001 N/A 17.0 1.8 6.0 24.8 -4.2%

2002 N/A 11.8 1.3 3.2 16.3 -34.3%

2003 0.3 0.3 0.5 2,326.8 2,327.9 14,211.4%

2004 N/A 3.4 N/A 344.2 348.2 -85.0%

2005 N/A 1.4 1078.5 2,064.5 2,064.5 492.9%

2006 N/A 2.1 315.4 835.1 835.1 -59.6%

59

321

17

204

N/A

4026

4881

8

7

6

8

3

6

4

43,622.2 26,343.0 22,773.0 0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

36,840.4 6.3%

30,485.3 41,302.2 43,171. 5 1.1% 5.0% 1.9%

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.

74

Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook Table 8. Ecstasy Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 (simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)

East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West & Central Africa AFRICA TOTAL Change from Prior Year (%) Number of Reported Drug Seizures Number of African Countries Reporting Seizures GLOBAL TOTAL AFRICA‘S SHARE OF GLOBAL TOTAL (%)

2000 N/A 0.3 30.9

2001 N/A 0.7 9.6

2002 N/A 0.1 58.9

2003 N/A 0.4 40.2

2004 N/A 0.6 195.0

2005 0.0 1.3 0.0

2006 0.0 1.0 22.9

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.5

31.2

10.3

58.9

40.6

195.6

1.4

27.5

933.8%

-66.9%

469.9%

-31.1%

381.9%

-99.3%

1,933.4%

779

327

3

5

3129

6

33

3

4

4

5

4

6

6

4,993.5

4,537.5

6,865.5

4,810.9

8,209.2

5,131.8

4,510.7

0.6%

0.2%

0.9%

0.8%

2.4%

0.0%

0.6%

Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008. Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. Ecstasy data includes the psychotropic compounds MDA, MDEA, MDMA.

The low level of commercial and pharmacological regulation and a frequent lack of trade monitoring and weak customs capacities in much of Africa compared to those in many other world regions have made the continent attractive as a transshipment hub for precursor chemicals used in illicit drug manufacture. Once in Africa, traffickers may be able to relatively easily divert such chemicals from the legal commerce into illicit trade. As a result, new precursor routes and re-shipment operations are expected to continue to emerge in Africa, given that many governments in the region lack the enforcement and forensic infrastructure to detect such trafficking.75 In July 2009, Guinean authorities seized large quantities of solvents used to process cocaine and heroin, precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of

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75

MDMA (ecstasy), and equipment used in such production processes. A subsequent assessment by the UNODC and INTERPOL found that the ―quantities and nature‖ of the chemicals found were ―far in excess of the legitimate demands in Guinea.‖ Their findings suggested that ―the clandestine production of controlled drugs might be widespread in Guinea‖ and that the discoveries provide ―the best evidence yet for clandestine [illicit drug] laboratory activity.‖76

ILLICIT DRUG USE TRENDS IN AFRICA U.N. data also suggest that regional consumption of heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamine- type drugs is increasing, likely as a side-effect of the continent‘s growing prominence in the global drug trade (see Table 9). South Africa has long been the largest consumer of illegal drugs in Africa. There is a well-established trade in all major illicit drugs in South Africa, where cannabis, methaqualone (known locally as mandrax), methamphetamine (known locally as tik), and MDMA (ecstasy) are produced for domestic consumption and international export. East Africa is reportedly a growing transit point for heroin from Southwest Asia mainly to Europe, and heroin abuse is a relatively small but growing problem in Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, and Zambia, as well as in Egypt, in North Africa.77 In addition to emerging as a major transit hub for cocaine being trafficked from South America to Europe, West Africa has become an important transit point for heroin being smuggled from Southwest Asia to the United States and Europe. There is also concern that several countries in Africa are increasingly being used as major transshipment points for precursor chemicals, primarily pseudoephedrine, as well as ephedrine, which are both used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type drugs.

Focus on West Africa: Explaining the Emergence of the Subregion as a Global Cocaine Transit Hub In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian-dominated criminal organizations active in many countries became key players in the international smuggling of heroin, particularly into the United States, drawing the concern of U.S. policy makers. Apart from heroin, however, West Africa long remained a minor

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destination and transshipment point for other illegal drugs from regions outside of Africa. During the past half decade, West Africa has become a prominent locus of international drug trafficking, especially with regard to cocaine being trafficked onward to Europe, as previously discussed.

Driving Factors West Africa‘s increasing use as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from changes in the mix of disincentives and incentives, or ―push‖ and ―pull‖ factors, that have traditionally structured international drug trafficking patterns. Push Factors Push factors, notably with regard to cocaine, include heightened U.S. antidrug and counter-terrorism law enforcement and border control efforts, and U.S. and European interdiction efforts targeting northern trans-Atlantic cocaine routes directly connecting South America cocaine production sources with European destination markets. Such activities have reportedly gradually forced smuggling southward toward Africa‘s western coast, to the waters off Cape Verde en route to the Canary Islands and the Iberian peninsula, and further south, to destinations from Mauritania to as far south as Nigeria. Other push factors include continued counterdrug pressure in source countries, stepped-up U.S. drug interdiction efforts in U.S. drug transit zones in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and an expansion of cocaine exports via Venezuela and Brazil from Colombia, in part due to increased involvement in the cocaine trade by the Colombian FARC rebel group, as previously discussed.78 Growing Mexican government pressure on violent and politically powerful Mexican trafficking organizations, which have enjoyed a high degree of control of over traffic passing through Mexico into the United States—as well as competition between these groups—may also be driving South American criminal organizations to seek alternative non-U.S. markets and transit routes.79 Other factors include the declining value of the U.S. dollar prior to August 2008, declines in U.S. seizures attributed to increased interdiction efforts, and relatively stable cocaine demand in the United States, which remains the largest single cocaine consumption market globally. 80 Pull Factors Important pull factors, or incentives attracting increased cocaine transit through West Africa, include the high value of the Euro in recent years,

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77

steadily rising European cocaine use rates and strong demand, and stable or rising cocaine prices in Europe, where cocaine prices are as much as double the level of U.S. prices, according to the UNODC.81 West Africa is also attractive to traffickers because it is the nearest land mass located en route from South America to Europe.82 Traffickers may have also been attracted to the lack of effective drug interdiction in countries such as Venezuela and Brazil—countries that are well-positioned as transit countries for cocaine movement across the Atlantic toward Africa and Europe. Regional institutional and other state and economic weaknesses in the subregion are other major pull factors. West Africa is seen as attractive to traffickers because many countries there lack law enforcement and border control capabilities and resources, and are characterized by high levels of corruption, poverty, and unemployment, as discussed below.83 Traffickers operating in many West African countries are likely to face relatively lower risks of apprehension by law enforcement than in many other world regions where police and the justice system are more effective or less susceptible to corruption. Large-scale traffickers with access to large amounts of capital are also well-positioned, given high rates of poverty and unemployment in the region, to tap a diverse pool of potential African accomplices who may be willing to accept payment in exchange for facilitating or directly engaging in trafficking activities. Latin American traffickers may also be able to tap into an extensive pool of experienced West African drug traffickers to facilitate drug transit through the region, as well as to connect with other criminals in West Africa with expertise in related illicit activities, including money laundering, human smuggling, and document fraud.

Driving Factors: Two Applied Examples Some of the push and pull factors discussed above—as well as state characteristics discussed in the earlier ―Regional Vulnerabilities‖ the text box—are illustrated by a rise in trafficking in recent years in Guinea-Bissau, a tiny impoverished country that suffered a civil war in 1998 and has been wracked by numerous coups d‘état, putsches, political assassinations, periodic civil unrest, and chronic military interference in governance. It has seen a sharp rise in trafficking, in part due to geographic factors: its territory contains a remote, lightly populated island archipelago and many colonial-era airstrips. Numerous reports also suggest that trafficking is often undertaken or facilitated by state security personnel, notably elements within the military, which is among the most influential institutions in the country.84

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Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook Table 9. Number of Drug Users in Africa, 2005-2006 (number of drug users and percent share)

Africa Use

Global Use

Africa Use as a Share of Global Use 2005 2006 6.3% 8.2% 7.6% 7.2% 24.1% 25.1%

2005 2006 2005 2006 980,000 1,360,000 15,550,000 16,540,000 1,084,000 1,147,000 14,257,000 15,987,000 38,200,00 41,600,00 158,800,00 165,600,00 0 0 0 0 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 Ampheta 2,100,000 2,260,000 24,890,000 24,650,000 8.4% 9,2% -mines Ecstasy 193,000 199,000 8,561,000 9,047,000 2.3% 2.2% Source: UNODC, 2007 and 2008 Word Drug Reports; World Bank World Development Indicators, and CRS calculations. Notes: Estimates of domestic drug use in Africa are inherently limited by a lack of consistent or reliable data collection and reporting. Africans constituted 11.8% and 12% of the total world population in 2005 and 2006, respectively. As a result, drug use rates are proportionally lower for Africa than the global average for all drugs, except cannabis. However, estimates of drug use in Africa may vary substantially from rates estimated by the UNODC, since there is little available data on drug use trends in many African countries. Opiates Cocaine Cannabi s

Such reports indicate that the country fundamentally lacks a capacity to counter trafficking. The national police system is highly underfunded and operates without some of the most basic equipment, notably including vehicles and fuel for them; the 60-person drug control agency has one vehicle and police reportedly use public taxis for official business, such as transporting arrested persons.85 Police also receive ―low salaries that are seldom paid, lack phones, computers, and often even electricity. They have almost no ships to patrol a rugged coastline, and little fuel for their few police cars. Moreover, many police officers can neither shoot a gun nor swim; the latter, a real problem in a country with a long coastline and many islands.‖86 The judiciary is significantly under-resourced and the country is without a prison, reportedly prompting judges to refrain from passing jail sentences on convicted offenders.87 Many of these problems are recognized by the government of Guinea-Bissau. The relatively new president of the country, Malam Bacai

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79

Sanha, who was elected in July 2009, has pledged to end Guinea-Bissau‘s use as a hub for drug trafficking.88 Guinea-Bissau‘s southern neighbor, Guinea, has also reportedly emerged as a key cocaine transshipment point. Investigations by the junta that took power after President Lansana Conte‘s death in late 2008 indicate that Conte‘s son and numerous top security sector officials were involved in cocaine trafficking and used state resources, including diplomatic pouch traffic, in their activities. Its anti-drug police unit, while slightly better equipped than that of Guinea-Bissau, is also reportedly highly under-resourced and lacks operational capabilities. According to the State Department, the police agency that was until recently in charge of counternarcotics activities lacks ―almost everything—training, equipment, investigating skills, and organizational motivation—to accomplish its mission.‖89

Role of West African Criminal Syndicates West African crime groups operate in more than 80 countries and are organized into more than 500 cells internationally.90 They have long been involved in heroin trafficking and marketing, but increasingly also smuggle cocaine and other contraband, including persons, and are involved in diverse other crime, such as financial fraud. Financial crimes, including 419 fraud schemes, reportedly cost the United States alone between $1 billion and $2 billion per year.91 The transnational reach of such groups has given them a reputation as being among the most aggressively expansionist perpetrators of crime internationally. West African crime groups are primarily engaged in financial frauds and drug trafficking. The United States and the United Kingdom are reportedly key targets of West African crime groups, but these groups operate small cells in strategically useful locations worldwide (e.g., in illicit drug source and producing countries, financial centers in which crime proceeds can be laundered with relative ease, and key ports of entry and other international transportation hubs). With respect to drug trafficking, West African crime groups in the 1980s were one of the primary groups to popularize the relatively low-risk but sophisticated use of low-level traffickers, called couriers or mules, to traffic drugs across international borders via commercial passenger flights.92 When using this method of drug smuggling, West African crime groups sometimes plant ―decoy‖ couriers who intentionally draw the attention of law

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enforcement personnel and therefore increase the chances of one or more couriers on the same flight—often couriers trafficking greater amounts of the contraband substance—to avoid detection. West African crime groups also recruit ―low profile‖ couriers, such as Caucasians, women with children, the elderly, or the disabled, who may be less likely to draw the attention of authorities.93 Few publicly available documents describe the organizational structure and composition of West African crime groups—and those that do broadly describe them as highly fluid and adaptable, loosely organized across a networked web of West African diaspora communities worldwide. Individual West African crime groups vary, but in general, they draw members from families or communities with which they have close national, ethnic, regional, or kinship ties; are composed of small, compartmentalized cells that often range in size between 2 and 10 members, and limit members‘ access to information or details about a criminal network to specific operations or tasks for which they are responsible; communicate mostly in African indigenous languages, which often insulates the crime group from outside infiltration; often function on a project-by-project basis, with impermanent operating structures that last only as long as a given project; may include members who are simultaneously active in more than one crime network; rarely fall under the permanent control of a static leader and loyalty to a single crime boss is not required; and are mainly motivated to participate in criminal activity in the pursuit of profit.94 These characteristics contrast sharply with those of traditional organized crime, modeled on the Italian mafia and Chinese triads. While membership in both traditional, non-African organized crime and West African groups typically relies on kin-based, ethnic ties, the former groups tend to be organized hierarchically, with senior leaders making decisions and low-level actors carrying out the orders. By contrast, membership in West African crime groups tends to be task-based and revolve around distinct criminal specialties (e.g., procuring drugs, falsifying passports and travel documentation, recruiting couriers, laundering illicit proceeds, and similar activities). West African crime groups also tend to be more willing than others to cooperate

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with other West African crime groups, rather than to compete for turf or dominance in a given crime sector. Instead, some have been known to pool their joint resources in order to improve their mutual profit potential. Their networked organizations also make West African crime groups more immune to tactics typically used by law enforcement to dismantle traditional organized crime groups, which can involve either targeting the senior leader or pitting several groups against one another. 95

U.S. POLICY In general, U.S. policy responses to the rise in drug trafficking through Africa remain in the formative stages.96 Many African countries lack effective law enforcement agencies and judicial systems, which fundamentally limit counternarcotics efforts in the region. In many cases, substantial U.S. and European operational cooperation or capacity-building assistance has accompanied African government efforts to increase drug trafficking monitoring, detection, and seizure rates. A fundamental challenge confronting policy makers is how to develop a strategy and find the resources to both stem the rising flow of drug trafficking through Africa— particularly West Africa— in the short term, through such means as effective interdiction operations, and simultaneously address the underlying, long-term law enforcement capacity weaknesses that make the region vulnerable to drug trafficking. Several U.S. government agencies are currently developing policy strategies to achieve such ends, and the amounts of personnel, financial, and other resources being devoted to anti-drug efforts in the region are increasing. These efforts include the establishment of at least one new U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Ghana, and potentially more in other countries in the region in the future, including in Nairobi, Kenya. Total Africa-related State Department counternarcotics assistance is gradually expanding; it rose from approximately $0.5 million in FY2006 to $1.6 million in FY2009. The Obama Administration requested $7.5 million for such purposes in Africa in FY2010.97 Such levels of funding remain small compared to some other regions, but there are indications that greater policy attention—in terms of strategy development, programming, resources, and international cooperation—is being devoted to combating the illegal drug trade in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent.

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Interagency Approach No public interagency counternarcotics strategy focusing specifically on Africa was available as of mid-August 2009. However, several internal U.S. government agency strategy documents have been formulated or are being developed. One such agency strategy involves the State Department‘s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL). As of mid- August 2009 INL‘s strategy was focused specifically on providing assistance to African countries for the targeting, investigation, and prosecution of narcotics traffickers. In addition, INL has, since 2008, conducted several country assessments in West Africa (see Table 10). INL conducts these assessments jointly with other U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), DEA, and the Department of the Treasury. The country assessments are intended to inform the development of multiagency counternarcotics aid programs for the individual countries and for the region as a whole. Another indication of a growing U.S. government focus on counternarcotics in Africa is the inclusion of seven African countries in the 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), released by the State Department but consisting of interagency agreement on the years‘ top foreign counternarcotics priorities. The INCSR is an annual report mandated by Congress that provides a country-by-country analysis of selected drug producing or transit countries, including a description of the current drug situation and government efforts to improve conditions. The 2008 INCSR identified West Africa as an emerging ―hub for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe.‖98 New African country narratives for the 2009 INCSR include Cote D‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. DOD is also developing a counternarcotics strategy for the region. The FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-417, requires that DOD, in consultation with the State Department, submit to Congress no later than June 30, 2009, ―a comprehensive strategy ... with regard to counternarcotics efforts in Africa, with an emphasis on West Africa and the Maghreb.‖99 Required components in the requested report include a description of the overall U.S. counternarcotics policy for Africa and DOD‘s roles and missions, including the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa, AFRICOM, in support of overall U.S. counternarcotics policy in Africa. As of early June 2009, the State Department‘s INL bureau had hosted one working-level interagency meeting on counternarcotics and related issues in

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Africa. It was attended by representatives from the State Department, DEA, DOD, Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Security Council (NSC). Each agency provided an overview of its assistance in Africa. Participants also discussed next steps in developing and coordinating a comprehensive approach to the Administration‘s counternarcotics assistance in Africa.100 Table 10. Status of Interagency Country Assessments

Country

Visit/Assessment Completion Date

Ghana

September 2008

Senegal

September 2008

GuineaBissau

March 2009

Togo

March 2009

U.S. Agencies Involved in the Assessmenta AFRICOM, DEA, DOJ, DOS AFRICOM, DEA, DOJ, DOS AFRICOM, DEA, DOS, FBI, Treasury, USAID AFRICOM, DEA, DOS, Treasury TBD

Status of Country Assessment/ Strategy Completion Complete Complete Complete

Complete

November/December — 2009 Cape Verde November/December TBD — 2009 Liberia October 2009 TBD — Sierra Leone September 2009 TBD — Gambia September 2009 TBD — Burkina Faso 2010 TBD — Guinea TBD, post ―free and TBD — fair elections‖ Source: State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009. Notes: Country assessments are not available for public distribution. a. AFRICOM: Africa Command; DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration; DOJ: Department of Justice; DOS: Department of State. Benin

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Implementation The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for overseeing the implementation of overall U.S. drug control policy, including international counternarcotics efforts.101 Primary agencies involved in formulating and implementing counternarcotics efforts in Africa include the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The State Department coordinates all U.S. foreign assistance to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production and trafficking.102 DOD is responsible for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, and is also authorized to provide counternarcotics training and equipping assistance to foreign countries in certain circumstances.103 DEA leads U.S. coordination of law enforcement investigations involving international production, trafficking and sale of illegal drugs and other controlled substances. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for drug-related maritime security and border control and related policy issues, while the Treasury Department occasionally undertakes activities to combat drug-related financial crimes. The United States has begun to increase multilateral cooperation on countering drug trafficking in Africa with European and other partners, both informally and formally. Formal coordination takes place through mechanisms such as the U.S.-European Union (EU) Drug Troika talks.104 In addition, since 2007, the United States has shared counternarcotics intelligence and other information with the European Maritime Analysis and Operation Center– Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in Lisbon, Portugal. In the 2008 U.S.-E.U. Summit Declaration, the United States and the European Union also symbolically committed to continue their counternarcotics cooperation, particularly as it related to drug trafficking through West Africa.

Counternarcotics Foreign Assistance State Department The two major sources of counternarcotics foreign assistance to the region are administered by the State Department and DOD. The State Department provides counterdrug assistance to a number of countries in Africa, primarily through programs funded under its International Narcotics Control and Law

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Enforcement (INCLE) account. A key INCLE program funded by the State Department since 2001 is the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gabarone, Botswana. There, the United States trains approximately 500 African law enforcement officials each year, providing courses on drug enforcement, anti-corruption, financial crimes, border security, and other matters.105 INL also provides bilateral anti-crime assistance, which includes efforts to bolster counternarcotics capacities, to a number of African countries. The Obama Administration‘s FY20 10 budget request included $7.5 million in counterdrug foreign aid to seven countries—up since the Bush Administration‘s FY2009 budget request, which included $1.45 million in counterdrug foreign aid to six countries in Africa (see Table 11). Table 11. State Department Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa, FY2006 Actual-FY20 1 0 Request (in current $USD millions) Country Burkina Faso Cape Verde Ghana Guinea GuineaBissau Morocco Nigeria Africa Total GLOBAL TOTAL

FY2006 Actual

FY2007 Actual

FY2008 Actual

FY2009 Estimate

FY2010 Request

— — — — —

— — — — —

— $0.496 $0.246 — $0.600

$0.100 $0.500 $0.500 $0.500 $0.100

$0.100 $2.000 $0.500 $0.110 $3.000

— $0.495 $0.495

— $0.200 $0.200

— — $1.342 $1,133.664

— $0.360 $1.610 $1,322,277

$0.750 $1.000 $7.500 $1,538.0 63

Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2008-FY2010 (which include data from FY2006 actual to FY20 10 request).

DOD/AFRICOM DOD provides foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve counternarcotics capacity and capabilities in foreign countries under two authorities, commonly known as Section 1004 and Section 1033. Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510), authorizes DOD to provide counternarcotics-related training and transport of foreign law enforcement personnel. Under its Section 1004

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authority, DOD has provided counternarcotics training assistance for several years. Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1 998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended, enables DOD to assist 22 foreign countries‘ counternarcotics efforts by providing non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including equipment for navigation, secure and non-secure communications, and radar surveillance, as well as night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft, and boats. In FY2009, Congress authorized DOD to provide Guinea-Bissau and Senegal with Section 1033 counternarcotics assistance; this was the first instance of a congressional grant of authority to DOD under Section 1033 to provide counternarcotics aid to African countries. In FY2009, DOD estimates that it will provide approximately $19.3 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa, mainly through AFRICOM (see Table 12).106 The bulk of the assistance is committed to regional counternarcotics programming, which cannot be attributed to a single country alone. Leading individual country recipients in FY2009 include Nigeria ($1 million), Mauritania ($0.9 million), Liberia ($0.8 million), Cameroon ($0.6 million), and Ghana ($0.6 million). DOD also provides counternarcotics-related Excess Defense Articles to some African countries.

Maritime and Airport Security Assistance While maritime security in Africa is a general issue of interest for U.S. policy, counterdrugrelated maritime security efforts in the region have focused mainly on West Africa in recent years. According to General William E. Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, the ―absence of credible maritime security capacity‖ along the coast of West Africa has allowed drug trafficking and other criminal activity in the region to thrive.107 To address such challenges, various DOD elements, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard and several U.S. civilian agencies, have become involved in an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation activities in West African coastal countries. One such training initiative is the Africa Partnership Station (APS), implemented by U.S. Navy Forces Africa and AFRICOM, in partnership with U.S. civilian and non-governmental agencies, to increase the capacity of West and Central African coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea to patrol and monitor their waters. APS vessels sponsor a variety of joint exercises, on-board trainings, and port visits aimed at enhancing diverse maritime security capacities.108

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Table 12. DOD/AFRICOM Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa, FY2009-FY20 1 0 (in current $USD millions) Country FY2009 (estimate) FY2010 (request) Algeria $0.012 — Benin $0.018 0.012 Burkina Faso $0.007 0.007 Cameroon $0.635 0.817 Cape Verde $0.185 0.300 Cote D‘Ivoire $0.025 0.025 Djibouti $0.100 0.012 Gabon $0.136 — Gambia — 0.500 Ghana $0.591 3.872 Guinea $0.238 0.332 Guinea-Bissau $0.042 0.854 Kenya $0.422 0.055 Liberia $0.806 1.341 Libya $0.010 — Madagascar $0.012 — Mali $0.012 — Mauritania $0.900 0.885 Mauritius $0.012 0.020 Morocco $0.012 0.350 Mozambique $0.101 — Niger $0.006 — Nigeria $1.042 2.617 Rwanda — 0.005 Sao Tome $0.370 0.070 Senegal $0.200 0.975 Seychelles $0.012 0.015 Sierra Leone $0.368 0.795 South Africa $0.112 — Tanzania $0.100 — Togo $0.015 0.066 Tunisia $0.773 0.761 Zambia $0.012 — Africa/Europe $12.022 14.538 Regional TOTAL # of 31 countries 23 countries COUNTRIES TOTAL $19.308 $27.964 ASSISTANCE Source: DOD response to CRS inquiry, June 17, 2009. Notes: This chart includes DOD counternarcotics funding under all existing DOD counternarcotics authorities, including Sections 1004 and 1033. This data estimates of DOD counternarcotics support provided or efforts in these nations or regions. DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs by regions or countries, but by program.

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In addition, since early 2008, at least one U.S. Navy surface combatant is on patrol off West Africa at any time, a threefold increase in such a patrol presence since 2002.109 Other projects underway include maritime port and airport security assistance and infrastructure construction and related training. DOD is involved in constructing boat and refueling facilities for West and Central African navies and coast guards and seeks to enhance the capacity of African port and customs security agencies by providing training and equipment for law enforcement personnel, including scanners and other facility improvements.110

Detection, Monitoring, and Interdiction Operations Several other DOD elements are involved in the detection and monitoring of illicit drugs that flow through Africa. The combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM, which began initial operations in October 2007 and became fully operational in October 2008, includes counternarcotics efforts as one of its strategic areas of activity.111 DOD‘s Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), which traditionally has coordinated drug interdiction monitoring and detection operations in the transit zone between South America and the United States, also coordinates with AFRICOM and European counterpart agencies regarding similar operations relating to the trafficking of drugs from South America to Africa. JIATF-South-European cooperation has, in particular, focused on the goals and activities of the European Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in Portugal. DOD is also involved in the establishment of an ―Information Fusion Center‖ in Cape Verde, which would help to collect and share drug-related intelligence.

Drug Enforcement Administration Role DEA, with DOD/AFRICOM funding, is seeking to establish U.S.-vetted African police units, which would help expand DEA‘s counternarcotics operations cooperation with African governments. Although plans are not final, DEA hopes to establish the first of such units on the continent in Ghana, which would be the first of its kind in Africa. The pending proposal calls for Ghanaian personnel to be hand-picked by DEA to undergo extra training, as

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well as to undergo background checks, including polygraphs.112 To date, the United States established no vetted African law enforcement units, largely because personnel and funding have not been provided for such purposes. Vetted units are designed to improve U.S. capacity to coordinate with host nations regarding counternarcotics matters and to minimize the risk of joint law enforcement operations from being compromised through official corruption. DEA also participates in drug interdiction and other drug-related law enforcement operations in Africa. The State Department‘s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that DEA, in coordination with European and African law enforcement agencies, ―has developed and implemented a program to gain increased understanding of narcotics trafficking in West Africa, fill intelligence gaps, and promote intelligence sharing.‖113 Public details about such activities are limited, however, to avoid compromising ongoing DEA operations. Recent DEA-related activities in Africa include the extradition of two Colombians from Sierra Leone in April 2009, the first such defendant transfer in the history of U.S.-Sierra Leone relations. A third suspect who is a material witness in the case was also transferred to U.S. custody.114 The Colombians were allegedly involved in an attempt to smuggle about 600 kilograms of cocaine to Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 2008, on a small plane. Another U.S. case in 2009 involved an alleged Colombian drug cell head, who was expelled from Togo and transferred to U.S. custody to face U.S. drug charges.115 In 2006 and 2007, a DEA investigation also disrupted an Afghanistan-based drug trafficking organization‘s heroin smuggling route through West Africa en route to the United States; two of the targets of the investigation were expelled from Ghana and convicted of the drug trafficking charges in the United States.116 Key legal tools in such efforts include two provisions of U.S. law—21 U.S.C. 959 and 21 U.S.C. 960a—that provide the DEA with the ―extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute drug offenses with a nexus to the U.S. even though the drugs in question have not actually entered the United States.‖ Similar authority is provided in cases in which a drug trafficking crime can be tied to terrorist activities anywhere in the world.117

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Drug-Related Anti-money Laundering Efforts To combat money laundering originating from drug proceeds, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act in 1999. It authorizes the President to target and block financial criminal proceeds of ―Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,‖ or SDNTKs.118 The Treasury Department‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implements the SDNTK asset blocking program. In 2000, the first year that the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was implemented, the President identified 12 SDNTKs, 2 of whom were Nigerians.119 The President has since named a total of 70 SDNTKs, but apart from the two Nigerians designated in 2000, a husband and wife team, no others have been nationals of an African country.

MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFRICA In addition to the United States, multiple African and donor governments and multilateral organizations are involved in combating drug trafficking in Africa. In general, while most actors involved at the multilateral and regional level agree that drug trafficking through Africa is a growing phenomenon and poses a variety of law enforcement challenges, a shared consensus on how to address these challenges has not emerged. Limited resources and, in some cases, limited political will, often hamper the effectiveness of African and multinational efforts to combat the illegal drug trade. For these and other reasons, some African policy makers reportedly do not view drug trafficking as a priority problem. 120 As one report explains: ―for such poor countries ... unless funded from abroad, the advantages of directing policing resources to countering narcotics trafficking are not as apparent as in the rich consumer states that they supply.‖121 Nevertheless, there is growing support among African governments for efforts to address the drug situation, both at the national level and in multilateral fora. Some West African countries, notably Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, have recently won praise from U.S. officials for their efforts to mount effective law enforcement responses to the problem, and for their willingness to cooperate with U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts.122 Forty-five of 53 African countries have signed all three international U.N. drug control conventions.123 Key multilateral, European, and African

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country groupings that are developing efforts to combat drug trafficking in Africa include the following: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Established in 1997, UNODC is mandated to assist Member States in their efforts to combat illegal drugs, transnational crime, and terrorism. UNODC publishes an annual report on drug trafficking, called the World Drug Report, and collects data on drug cultivation, production, seizures, and other drug-related statistics. In Africa, UNODC maintains five field offices: one in Egypt, covering Northern Africa and the Middle East; one in Kenya, covering Eastern Africa; one in Nigeria; one in Senegal, covering West and Central Africa; and one in South Africa, covering Southern Africa. These offices report on drug trafficking and other criminal activity trends at the regional level. They also help to build anti-crime policy and institutional capacities at the regional and country level, including with respect to counternarcotics efforts, through programs that foster drug law enforcement mentoring and training, justice and penal sector reform, and drug demand reduction. UNODC also supports Data for Africa, a project launched in 2005 that is designed to increase the amount and reliability of data and information on African crime and drug trends. U.N. Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Established in 2001 by the U.N. Security Council, UNOWA is mandated to further the United Nations‘ peace and security objectives in West Africa. UNOWA focuses on cross-border illicit activity in the sub-region, among other issues, and helps to raise West African government‘s awareness of the challenges posed by drug trafficking. It also facilitates related multilateral security and political cooperation in the subregion.124 African Union (AU). Established in 2002, the African Union is a regional multilateral grouping of all states in Sub-Saharan and North Africa except Morocco. The African Union has addressed drug trafficking through its Revised AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). In March 2009, the A.U. Commission and the UNODC launched a joint project to support the implementation of the A.U. Plan of Action, building on earlier joint efforts focused on drug demand reduction and drug trafficking, among other crime prevention and criminal justice issues.125

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Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Established in 1975, ECOWAS is a 15-member multilateral grouping of West Africa states that promotes regional economic integration and security cooperation. Recently, ECOWAS has begun to play a greater role in combating drug trafficking in the region. In October 2008, an ECOWAS ministerial conference, organized in collaboration with the UNODC and UNOWA and held in Praia, Cape Verde, adopted a draft Political Declaration on Prevention of Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa. One of the organization‘s stated goals for 2009 is to complete an ECOWAS convention against drug trafficking and abuse. 126 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in Africa. Established in 1989, FATF is a multilateral organization that establishes international standards for legislative and regulatory reform to combat money laundering, including drug-related money laundering and terrorist financing. South Africa is the only African member of FATF. However, two African FSRBs―the Eastern and South African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA, its French acronym)―support and promote the standards established by FATF. International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The INCB is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ that monitors the implementation of U.N. drug control treaties. In 2007, the INCB conducted a program to monitor and prevent illicit trade in precursor chemicals through Africa, called Operation Crystal Flow. The findings from that operation proved that Africa is a transshipment point for international trade in illegally diverted precursor chemicals. In its recent annual reports, the INCB has urged African countries and donor nations to continue to take steps to curtail cocaine trafficking and the emergent precursor trade in Africa. INTERPOL. Established in 1923, the International Criminal Police Organization, or INTERPOL, is a 187-member state organization that facilitates international police co-operation and efforts to prevent and combat international crime. With respect to counternarcotics issues, INTERPOL assists its member states to identify new drug trafficking

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trends and criminal organizations, and supports law enforcement efforts to combat drug trafficking. In Africa, INTERPOL launched Project COCAF (Cocaine Trafficking from Western Africa to Europe) in 2006, which facilitates information sharing between European and African law enforcement agencies to identify and target emerging drug trafficking routes, particularly cocaine shipment on commercial air flights from West Africa.127 INTERPOL has also facilitated two other related efforts, Project PROTEUS, which was designed to combat cocaine trafficking originating in South America and transiting Western Africa en route to Europe, and Project DRUM, an effort to target the diversion of precursor chemicals in Africa.128 INTERPOL is also involved in policy capacity building in Africa, through a project called OASIS Africa (Providing Operational Assistance, Services, and Infrastructure Support to African Police Forces).129 The organization also deploys Response Teams that provide specialized expertise and investigative aid to countries facing major or serious police issues or cases.130 European Union (EU). In December 2007, the EU committed to greater counternarcotics cooperation with and assistance for Africa in the Joint EUAfrica Strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit.131 The European Commission (EC) and several European countries also provide counternarcotics assistance to some African countries at the bilateral and regional or sub-regional levels, and through international multilateral institutions, like the UNODC and the Dublin Group.132 Two additional initiatives that are partially funded by the EC include the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center—Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in Portugal and established in 2007, and the Mediterranean Anti-Drug Coordination Center (CeCLAD-M), located in France and established in 2008.133 These efforts support maritime surveillance and intelligence coordination pertaining to drug trafficking interdiction operations along maritime routes between Africa and Europe. ECOWAS and the EU Ministerial Troika also meet regularly to promote mutual security cooperation, including with respect to counternarcotics efforts.

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CONGRESSIONAL ROLE AND POSSIBLE OVERSIGHT ISSUES Congress is involved in many aspects of U.S. international drug control policy. Members regularly appropriate funds for counterdrug initiatives, conduct oversight activities on federal counterdrug programs, and legislate changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug policies. Recent activities, as discussed above, include the 110th Congress‘s passage of P.L. 110-417, which required a DOD counternarcotics strategy for Africa and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee‘s conduct of a June 23, 2009, hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.134 During the hearing, the Chair and Ranking Member each expressed their concern regarding the issue, and stated that further policy efforts to halt rising drug trafficking in Africa are necessary. Congress may also respond to increasing executive branch prioritization of counternarcotics assistance efforts in Africa, as previously discussed.135 Key Africa-related counternarcotics issues that Congress may consider, among others, include the following:

Data Reliability: Implications for Analysis and Policymaking The analysis of drug trafficking and use trends in Africa—and, in turn, the formulation of policy solutions to combat drugs in Africa—is inherently limited by the frequent lack of basic crime and law enforcement statistics, drug-related health and social indicators, and security and justice sector evaluations in Africa. Data on domestic drug use are often unavailable or cover limited time periods. Statistics on drug-related arrests, prosecutions, incarcerations, seizures, and other related trends are often unreliable or nonexistent. There is also a paucity of actionable intelligence data in the region; as the UNODC has reported, many of the largest drug seizures in recent years in Africa were detected through foreign tips, as a result of non-African law enforcement actions. Similarly, several of the largest cocaine seizures undertaken by African law enforcement appear to have arisen from accidental detection and other coincidental circumstances, rather than as a result of systematic intelligence gathering or other law enforcement operations.136 As a result of the lack of data on drug trafficking trends and patterns, estimates of the amount of cocaine currently transiting Africa vary widely, with estimates ranging from 40 metric tons to 300 metric tons per year, as previously

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discussed. In the absence of better data on seizures and traffic volumes, accurate projections of emergent and prospective trafficking-related trends and developments—which may provide the basis for allocating resources and formulating policy responses to the problem—are likely to be difficult to generate. While cocaine trafficking through Africa has risen sharply in recent years, it remains unclear whether a reported drop in seizures in 2009, for instance, is indicative of a short-term or a longterm trend.137 Several observers have argued that more and better intelligence and data collection on the nature of the drug threat in Africa is needed. 138 This could take the form of increased human intelligence collection and the increased deployment of technology-based methods for detecting and monitoring drug flows transiting the region. Efforts to increase such Africa-related law enforcement resources, however, are nevertheless likely to be countered by contending pressures to devote greater resources to similar objectives in other parts of the world where the drug threat is viewed as being greater. In the absence of better information on the drug threat in Africa, some observers may argue that significant shifts in U.S. attention to the region may not be warranted. Others may argue that without good information on the problem, policy makers may be prone to formulate policies that ineffectively respond to current challenges, or do not address key aspects of the problem, such as the reported involvement in African drug trafficking of criminal organizations targeted by the United States in other regions.

Short-Term, Targeted Counternarcotics Assistance versus LongTerm Law Enforcement Capacity Building Given that many African countries lack effective law enforcement agencies and judicial systems and resources to fund them, many observers have argued that donor countries, including the United States, should consider scaling up and expanding existing counternarcotics capacity- building assistance programs in Africa. Such recommendations raise questions over how to achieve that end. Some policy makers may contend that, given the urgency and extent of the drug trafficking threat faced by African countries, an immediate rise in U.S. and European interdiction operations, quick impact training and equipping programs, and other short-term operational activity are necessary. Others, however, may argue that in the absence of a comprehensive law enforcement and judicial system capacity-building, the results of such short-term assistance are likely to be fragmentary and ineffective in the

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immediate terms, and negligible with regard to long-term trends. Without a capacity to ensure fair trials; effectively prosecute potentially wealthy, highprofile defendants; properly control seized drugs for evidentiary purposes and subsequently destroy them; enforce prison sentences; or to deter police corruption, for instance, overall efforts to curtail drug trafficking may founder. Such capacity-building assistance would likely include a broad but integrated combination of law enforcement, rule of law, and government infrastructure and process training and assistance, as well as facility construction or upgrades and providing operational equipment.

Resource Level and Allocation Considerations Ultimately, questions over the relative mix of immediate impact and longterm development that may be necessary boil down to decisions on policy prioritization and resource allocation. Some policy makers are likely to argue that both short-term interventions and long-term capacity- building efforts may be necessary. In a budgetary context in which federal fiscal resources are increasingly limited, however, decision makers will need to carefully consider what mix of resources is likely to have the greatest effects with respect to both time frames. While some may be inclined to provide such aid, others may question whether a substantial level of U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Africa is warranted at all, since much of the recent growth in cocaine traffic through West Africa is believed to be destined to Europe, not the United States. As a result, some may suggest that European countries should provide the bulk of counternarcotics assistance in Africa. A related line of debate may center on whether the extent and effectiveness of current European counterdrug efforts in Africa are adequate, and whether individual European countries or the EU plan to increase their counterdrug presence in the region. Such views, however, may be countered by those who contend that drug trafficking in Africa poses a variety of direct threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests in Africa. Currently, the U.S. counterdrug footprint in Africa is expanding in terms of resources and personnel. The mix of resources being devoted to such efforts reflects short term and long-term policy objectives and emphasizes the importance of cooperation with multilateral and U.N. agencies and with European governments and the EU. The State Department‘s FY2009 estimated level of funding for such purposes is 13 times as large as that for FY2006, and

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during the same period, the number of African recipient countries targeted to receive such assistance has grown from just one country (Nigeria) to six. Additional resources to combat drug trafficking through the region have also begun to flow through DOD entities and initiatives, including AFRICOM, APS, and JIATF-South. DEA is also scaling up its presence, having recently augmented its three existing regional offices by opening a new office in Accra, Ghana. DEA also has provisional plans to expand its presence in other parts of Africa farther by opening up five additional country offices and developing new law enforcement operations in five additional locations.139 In addition, various other U.S. plans for other counterdrug training programs and other projects are also under development. Despite recent and prospective increases, counternarcotics efforts in Africa remain relatively small when compared to U.S. counternarcotics programs in other parts of the world. In FY2008, for example, the State Department obligated 0.12% of its total counternarcotics aid budget to Africa, while the State Department‘s FY2010 request for counternarcotics assistance to Africa— which is significantly larger than that of any previous year— comprises just 0.49% of total global State Department counternarcotics assistance. Personnel resources and attention devoted to drug trafficking in Africa are also limited. The State Department has one Transnational Crime Affairs Officer stationed in the region (in Abuja, Nigeria) and has a limited diplomatic presence in some African countries affected by drug trafficking, such as Guinea-Bissau, where the State Department maintains an office staffed only with Guinea-Bissau nationals.

Defining Agency Roles and Responsibilities U.S. government agency roles and responsibilities in combating drugs in Africa are not yet clearly defined in a public strategy document for the region. In practice, the State Department‘s INL Bureau has taken the lead on counterdrug matters in the region, focusing primarily on country assessments to inform future programming efforts. INL, however, is only one of several U.S. government agencies or agency units that could play a role in counterdrug efforts in Africa. As U.S. assistance for such ends grows, the 111th Congress may see a need to weigh in on what agencies play which policy implementation and coordination roles, including with respect to the relative balance of civilian and military agency participation in such efforts, as did the 110th Congress with regard to the military‘s role.140

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In the absence of a clear integrated, inter-agency strategy for the region, several questions about agency participation in counterdrug efforts in Africa and interagency coordination may arise. One such question is whether an interagency coordination body should formally be established to ensure policy consistency and avoid program overlap and duplication across U.S. government agencies and offices. Presently, no such body formally exists, although informal inter-agency working group sessions have taken place on an ad hoc basis. If policy makers decide that such a coordinating body is necessary, secondary questions include which agencies should participate in the group, which agency or agencies might chair or co-chair the group, and whether the members of the group should meet at the principal, deputies, or working group levels. Similar questions regarding program coordination on the ground in countries in Africa may also arise. A related question pertains to the emerging role of the U.S. military, particularly with respect to the role of the regional combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM—and the proportion of African counternarcotics assistance currently provided by DOD (approximately $19.3 million in FY2009 compared to the State Department‘s approximately $1.6 million in FY2009). Some observers have questioned whether DOD‘s growing role in counternarcotics activities and AFRICOM‘s prospective participation in these activities, and others that are widely seen as primarily civilian in nature, is appropriate. Proponents of an expanded DOD counternarcotics role generally argue that the U.S. military is well-equipped with the resources and monitoring and detecting skills to help foreign governments counter powerful drug trafficking organizations and that the absence of DOD‘s participation in counternarcotics assistance would lessen the effectiveness of U.S. programs. Some may also contend that protecting the integrity of national borders and territory from external threats, including drug trafficking, is an inherently military activity. Opponents, by contrast, may contend that counternarcotics foreign assistance is primarily a law enforcement and intelligence activity and not a core military mission. In the view of some, the training of foreign militaries and police in counternarcotics operations could result in legal dilemmas and human rights controversies arising from a merging of civilian police and military roles, potentially resulting in serious political and diplomatic repercussions for the United States abroad.

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APPENDIX. COCAINE SEIZURES AND AFRICAN MEMBERSHIP IN ILLICIT DRUG CONVENTIONS Table A-1. Reported Cocaine Seizures of 10 Kilos or More in West Africa since 2000 Reported Report Amounts in Date Kilograms Liberia/int 2,400 January ernational 2008 waters Togo 500 October 2008 Country

Sierra Leone

691

July 2008

Mauritani a

53

April 2008

Summary Details French navy vessel seizes drugs in international waters off Liberia. Crew of nine Ghanaians arrested and later convicted. Seizure near port of Lome; eight Colombians arrested, one of whom Togo agrees to extradite to the United States. Drugs seized from aircraft originating in Venezuela with fake Red Cross markings lands without permission at Freetown International Airport. Suspects flee. Automatic weapons linked to them are seized. One U.S. citizen, four Colombians, two Mexicans, a Venezuelan, a national of Guinea-Bissau, and several Sierra Leoneans convicted in the case in April 2009. Two suspects later extradited to United States to stand trial in a separate cocaine trafficking case. Persons arrested: two Mauritanians and a Senegalese. Cocaine seized together with two tons of cannabis. Drugs seized at Nouadhibou. French navy vessel seizes drugs in international waters off Guinea.

Guinea 3,000 /internatio nal waters Mali 750

February 2008

Mali

15

Mali

116

January 2008 December Drugs seized at near Guinean border; two Togolese arrested. 2007

Mali

35

Senegal/in 3,700 ternational waters Mauritani a

830-864

January 2008

November 2007 October 2007

August 2007

Drugs seized near Algerian border after shootout between Malian security officials and smugglers driving Algerianregistered vehicles. French woman arrested at Bamako airport.

Drugs seized at near Guinean border; a Togolese and a Nigerian arrested. In international waters off Senegal, Spanish police seize ship suspected of ferrying shipment from off-shore mother ship to Senegal. Persons arrested: Dutch ship officers and four Ghanaian crew members. Persons arrested: two Mauritanians, two Moroccans, a Senegalese, a Spaniard, and a Mexican.

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Country Benin

Reported Report Amounts in Date Kilograms 350 August 2007

Senegal

1,254

July 2007

Senegal

1,200

June 2007

Senegal

44

June 2007

Mauritani a

625

May 2007

Guinea Bissau

635

April 2007

Burkina Faso Senegal

49

April 2007 November 2006

Guinea Bissau

674

12

September 2006

Summary Details Drugs confiscated from coastal village near capital, Cotonou. During a counter-narcotics operation mounted in response to a reported smuggling incident, police officers allegedly divert between 20 and 25 kilos of cocaine, in addition to that seized; two alleged traffickers are killed; and a reported Guatemalan trafficker flees, allegedly with official connivance. These incidents lead to the arrest of 14 police officers. Drugs seized near Nianing at private residence close to location of 1,200 kilo seizure days earlier; links found among suspects in both cases. Two French nationals and three Senegalese, and three additional Colombians arrested at various times in connection to the 1,254 kilo case. Cash and arms also seized. Suspected trafficking pattern: Cocaine from Colombia, Venezuela and/or Ecuador transported to Aruba; shipped to West African coastal waters; and off-loaded frommother ship to sailing boats. Drugs seized aboard a mechanically disabled, deserted sailing ship near the coastal resort of Nianing. Travel and financial documents suggesting links to Guinea-Bissau, Brazil, Colombia, and Portugal confiscated. A Colombian, a Venezuelan and an Ecuadoran arrested days later in connection to the seizure. Total cocaine seized at Dakar International Airport by midyear. Origin of cocaine: Venezuela. Persons arrested: one French national and 13 Mauritanians, including a Mauritanian Interpol officer and a relative of former Mauritanian military junta leader Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla. Drugs seized from aboard a small aircraft flown from Venezuela near port of Nouadhibou, a key illegal migration debarkation point. Drugs seized by police, who lacked the capacity to confiscate an estimated additional 2.5 tons of cocaine linked to the seized drugs. Two military officers arrested in case ordered freed by military authorities. Drugs seized near Mali border; five Nigerian females arrested. Drugs seized over 10 days at Dakar International Airport. Persons arrested: Two Bulgarians en route from Guinea to Spain, and two Nigerians. Drugs seized in raid on private residence by police; later seized by military officials and moved to a national treasury building; later removed by unknown parties. Two suspected Venezuelan smugglers arrested after shootout with police later released by judge.

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Table A-1. (Continued)

Benin

Reported Report Amounts in Date Kilograms 100 July 2006

Nigeria

14,200

June 2006 Drugs reported packaged in 284 50 kilo bags of hidden among cement bags of similar appearance. Total seized is the subject of dispute.

Ghana

30

Nigeria

80

Ghana

588

May 2006 Three Ghanaians and two Chinese nationals arrested; seized amount suspected of being part of a 2 metric-ton shipment, which was not recovered, sparking a later inquiry into possible official links. March Nigerian arrested. 2006 November Two Venezuelans charged after drugs seized at their 2005 residence. July 2004 Togo-registered tugboat from Venezuela to Spain interdicted by French military vessel in coordination with Togolese officials and turned over to Togolese officials. Six Venezuelans, a Ukrainian, and the Cuban ship‘s captain arrested. January Drugs seized at port of Tema. One U.S./U.K. dual citizen, 2004 one German, three U.K. nationals, and three Ghanaians arrested September Drugs concealed in rice sacks imported from Guyana. 2003

Country

Togo/Inter 374 national waters

Ghana

674

Ghana

42

Summary Details Drugs confiscated at home of former Beninois finance minister.

Source: Compilation based on multiple press accounts from Agence France Presse, Global Insight Daily Analysis, BBC Monitoring Middle East, VOA, Reuters, Cotonou Fraternite, and the U.N. Integrated Regional Information Network.

Table A-2. Status of Sub-Saharan and North African Countries’ Membership in Multilateral Anti-Crime Agreements or Bodies

Countries

Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Cent. African Rep. Chad Congo, Rep. Cote d‘Ivoire Dem. Rep. of Congo

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Member State of States Party a to the 2000 States Financial U.N. Party to the Action Convention 2003 U.N. Task against Convention ForceTransnational against Style Organized Corruption? Regional Crime? Body (FSRB)? Yes Yes Yesb Yes Yes Yesb Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yesb Yes Yes No

No Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes

No Noa Noa Yes

States Party to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended?

States Party to the1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances?

States Party to the 1988 U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances?

No Yes Noa No

No No Yesb No

Table A-2. (Continued)

Countries

Equatorial Guinea Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Sao Tome and Principe Senegal

States Party to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended?

States Party to the1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances?

States Party to the 1988 U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances?

States Party to the 2000 U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime?

Member State of a Financial Action Task ForceStyle Regional Body (FSRB)?

States Party to the 2003 U.N. Convention against Corruption?

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes No No Noa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No Yesb Yesb Yesb Yesb Yesb Yesb Yesc Yesb Yesb No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yesb

Sierra Leone Togo Burundi Comoros Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Mauritius Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Tanzania Uganda Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Sudan Tunisia Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Noa Yes Noa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Noa Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes

Yesb Yesb No No No No No Yesd No Yesd No Yesd No Yesd Yesd Yesc Yesc Yesc Yesc Yesc Yesc No Yesd Yesd Yesd Yesd

Table A-2. (Continued)

Countries

Namibia South Africa Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe

States Party to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

States Party to the1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

States Party to the 1988 U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

States Party to the 2000 U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime? Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes

States Party to the 2003 U.N. Convention against Corruption?

Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes

Member State of a Financial Action Task ForceStyle Regional Body (FSRB)? Yesd Yesd Yesd Yesd Yesd

a. The government of this country is a signatory to the Convention, but it did not ratify, accede, or succeed to the Convention as a States Party. b. The government of this country is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) FSRB. c. The government of this country is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) FSRB. d. The government of this country is a member of the Eastern and South African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) FSRB.

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Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. Figure A-1. Map of Africa

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End Notes 1

White House, Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, (Accra, Ghana), July 11, 2009; and White House, Readout of the President’s Call with President Mills of Ghana, Office of the Press Secretary, April 10, 2009. 2 See, for example, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, November 2008; UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), December 2007; UNODC, Crime and Development in Africa, June 2005; and UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005, as well as numerous press reports. UNODC, which monitors drug trafficking trends in globally and assists countries to design and carry out counternarcotics efforts, is a key source of data on illicit drug trafficking and other criminal trends in Africa. 3 UNODC, ―Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,‖ 2009; and Oxford Analytica, ―West Africa: Reports Underestimate Trafficking Impact,‖ August 10, 2009. 4 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008, E/INCB/2008/1, February 2009. 5 See INCB (2009). See also INCB, Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, March 2008. 6 Such a lack of data is in part due to a lack of treatment facilities, which often help collect such information. UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, June 2009. 7 Illicit drug markets sometimes arise as an indirect effect of trafficking in countries that lie along trafficking routes but are not primary target market destinations for drug shipments. The availability of local supplies that generate drug use and demand may be created when, for instance, in-kind drug payments are made by large-scale smugglers to local accomplices; when drugs are found on beaches or elsewhere after being lost by smugglers due to shipwrecks or jettisoning to escape law enforcement; or when corrupt police officials sell seized drug stocks. In the context of cocaine trafficking West Africa en route to Europe, this appears to have occurred most prominently in Guinea-Bissau. See, for instance, Kevin Sullivan, ―Route of Evil,‖ Washington Post, May 25, 2008; and U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN hereafter) ―Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine to Europe Produces Addicts Locally,‖ March 3, 2008. 8 For such a discussion, see hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 9 See, for example, Amado Philip de Andrés, ―West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security,‖ UNISCI Discussion Papers, January 2008; Antonio L. Mazzitelli, ―Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: The Additional Challenge,‖ International Affairs, 83:6, 2007; UNODC, Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe, July 2006; and UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005. 10 Testimony of Thomas Harrigan, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 11 For examples, see Appendix A, Table A 1, Reported Cocaine Seizures of 10 Kilos or More in West Africa Since 2000. 12 See testimony of Michael Braun, Managing Partner of the Spectre Group International, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Merida Initiative, March 18, 2009. 13 AQIM is a regional affiliate of the international Al Qaeda terrorist group that operates in multiple countries within the Sahara and is believed to be involved in contraband trade along traditional trans-Saharan smuggling routes. Daniel Williams, ―Al-Qaeda Sahara

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Network Spurs U.S. to Train Chad, Mali Forces,‖ Bloomberg News, April 23, 2008; and Nicholas Schmidle, ―The Saharan Conundrum,‖ New York Times Magazine, February 15, 2009. 14 See Williams (2008); Schmidle (2009); David M. Luna/State Department, ―Narco-Trafficking: What Is the Nexus With the War on Terror?‖ panel presentation, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association/Southern Command Conference SOUTH 2008: Drugs and the Americas: What Are the Challenges and the Global Impact?, October 8, 2008; Alain Rodier, ―L‘Infiltration d‘Al-Qaeda en Afrique‘‖ [Al-Qaeda‘s Infiltration of Africa], Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R), Note d'Actualité, No. 2, 2004; and J. Peter Pham, ―Islamist Extremism‘s Rising Challenge to Morocco,‖ World Defense Review, August 7, 2008. 15 See CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, by Mark P. Sullivan; UNODC, The Threat of Narco-Trafficking in the Americas (October 2008); International Crisis Group [ICG], Drugs I: Losing the Fight and Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm, both dated March 14, 2008; Andy Webb- Vidal, ―Cocaine Coasts: Venezuela‘s and West Africa‘s Drug Axis,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2009; Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability, RAND Corporation, 2001; Samuel Logan, ―FARC Moves to Consolidate Trafficking Network,‖ [commentary], Security Watch, International Relations and Security Network, July 18, 2006; and Juliette Kerr Luis Carlos Niño, ―Brazil to Strengthen Ties with Colombia and Bolivia, Global Insight Daily Analysis, July 18, 2008. 16 On Hezbollah, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa,‖ press release TG-149, May 27, 2009; Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, ―Drug Probe finds Hezbollah Link,‖ Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008; Sara A. Carter, ―Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.,‖ Washington Times, March 27, 2009; Prepared Statement of James Phillips, for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List, June 20, 2007; Douglas Farah, Hezbollah ’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America, International Assessment and Strategy Center, August 4, 2006; Michael P. Arena, ―Hizballah‘s Global Criminal Operations,” Global Crime, August 1, 2006; Luna/State Department (2008); and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists, May 25, 2005. 17 Testimony of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 18 Isolated reported incidents include a shootout between smugglers and security forces prior to the seizure of 750 kilograms of cocaine in Mali near Algeria, and the death of two suspected Ghanaian smugglers in Benin prior to an August 2007 seizure of 350 kilograms of cocaine. 19 See Brent Latham, ―Bissau Assassinations Highlight Obstacles to Drug Trafficking Fight,‖ VOA News, March 3, 2009; Todd Pitman, ―Guinea-Bissau Collapse Deepens after Leader Killed,‖ Associated Press, March 5, 2009; Assimo Balde and Rukmini Callimachi, ―Twin Assassinations Leave Guinea-Bissau in Turmoil,‖ Associated Press, March 2, 2009; Tristan McConnell, ―President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau Assassinated by Army,‖ The Times, March 3, 2009; Agence France Presse, ―Murdered GBissau General Found 200 kilos of Cocaine: Officer,‖ March 5, 2009. 20 See, for example, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, which outlines the U.S. government‘s primary foreign aid goals, including, good governance, rule of law and human rights, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. State Department, Supplemental Reference: Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, December 12, 2008.

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Such corruption has been reported in the region in several countries, most notably GuineaBissau, Guinea, and Ghana, among others. In Guinea-Bissau and Ghana, there have been several cases in which suspected large-scale cocaine shipments that were seized or targeted in drug operations disappeared prior to or after being confiscated, in most cases with alleged with official connivance. The National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) junta that took power in Guinea in after the death of long-time president Lansana Conte in December 2008, however, has pledged to end cocaine trafficking, even though there are reports that some of its membership has been tied to cocaine trafficking. See UNODC (December 2007); Léonard Vincent, Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and Coups Haunt Gagged Nation, Reporters Without Borders, November 2007; Alistair Thomson, ―Drugs Trade Threatens to Corrode Ghana‘s Image,‖ Reuters, December 23, 2008; Africa Confidential, ―Ghana: Snow White,‖ July 21, 2006, and ―Ghana: Show Time for the Spooks,‖ January 16, 2008; Bismark Bebli, ―The Drug Menace, Country Sits on Time Bomb,‖ Ghanaian Chronicle, May 7, 2008; Dan McDougall, ―Ghana to UK: The New Trail of Misery,‖ The Observer (UK), November 11, 2007; BBC News, ―Guinea Drug Agents are ‗Corrupt,‘‖ October 22, 2008; BBC News, ―Guinea Drugs Bust Nets Officials,‖ September 5, 2008; Pascal Fletcher, ―Bauxite-Exporter Guinea Faces Drugs Trade Threat-UN,‖ July 12, 2008; Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN)/U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ―Guinea: Drug Trade ‗Potentially More Dangerous Than GuineaBissau,‘‖ October 10, 2008; Saliou Samb, ―Guinea Holds Conte Son in Drugs Probe Police,‖ Reuters, February 24, 2009; and Agence France Presse, ―Guinea: Son of Late President Conte Confesses to Drugs Trafficking,‖ February 26, 2009. 22 Stephanie Hanson, ―In West Africa, Threat of Narco-States,‖ Council on Foreign Relations— Daily Analysis, July 10, 2007. 23 See for example UNODC (November 2008) and UNODC (December 2007). 24 Such factors include investor concerns over high business risk, perceived high levels of corruption, lack of infrastructure and diversified supply chains, and the relative difficulty of doing business in the region, among others. Several studies and annual indices show that, whether merited or not, such factors are widely viewed by many investors as major impediments to investment in Africa. See, for instance, World Bank Ease of Doing Business, 2009; and Africa Business Initiative, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Inside the Boardroom: How Corporate America Really Views Africa, May 2009; and Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008. 25 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009. 26 In this report, unless otherwise noted, all references to cocaine are to illicit cocaine, and not to cocaine that may be legally produced and consumed for medical purposes. 27 See UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report; Webb-Vidal (2009); Joanna Wright, ―Cocaine Traffickers Develop New Routes From Brazil,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2006; José De Cordoba and David Luhnow, ―U.S. Accuses Venezuelan Officials in Drug Case,‖ Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2008; and José De Cordoba, ―Chávez Lets Colombia Rebels Wield Power Inside Venezuela,‖ Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2008. 28 UNODC (December 2007); Simon Baynham, ―Drugs Set to Become Africa‘s New Invaders,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1996; and Stephen Ellis, ―West Africa‘s International Drug Trade,‖ African Affairs, 108:431, April 2009. 29 UNODC (December 2007). 30 UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report. 31 INTERPOL estimates that as much as 300 metric tons transit through Africa en route to Europe. The U.S. Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement estimates that approximately 70% of European demand of about 350 metric tons per year, or 245 metric tons, was being trafficked through Africa or African waters. EUROPOL, the European Union Police Office, has estimated that recent annual supply levels of 250 tons, while the INCB reports that approximately 200 to 300 metric tons are smuggled into Europe each

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year. According to the UNODC, data on seizures of cocaine in Europe for which a place of provenance had been established indicated that 22% of seized cocaine in Europe in 2007 passed through Africa, up from 5% in 2004. This increase was steady; European cocaine seizures with an African provenance stood at 9% in 2005 and 12% in 2006, although there are questions about the methodology used to measure a large seizure in Nigeria in 2006, which contributed to this dramatic rise. See UNODC (November 2008); UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report; EUROPOL, ―Project COLA: European Union Cocaine Situation Report 2007,‖ September 5, 2007; and 2007 INCB Report. 32 UNODC (December 2007). 33 EUROPOL (2007); and 2007 INCB Report. 34 UNODC (2009). 35 Wright (2007). 36 For examples of large seizures, see the Appendix and Wright (2007). 37 Gemma Ware and Marshall Van Vale, ―Drugs: Powder Trails,‖ The Africa Report, June-July 2008; and UNODC (October 2007). 38 See Ellis (2009), p. 181. 39 Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury, ―Chapter 3: Worldwide Areas of International Criminal Activity,‖ in International Crime Threat Assessment, [report by U.S. Government interagency working group in support the President‘s International Crime Control Strategy], December 2000. 40 United Kingdom (UK) Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), 2008/9 UK Threat Assessment of Serious Organised Crime, 2008; and UNODC (November 2008). 41 UNODC (December 2007); and multiple press accounts. 42 UNODC (November 2008), p. 12. 43 See UNODC (November 2008); and press reports. 44 Mazzitelli (2007), p. 1076; UNODC (November 2008); and Ellis (2009), p. 188. 45 State Department, 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), ―Morocco,‖ 2008; UNODC (October 2007); and Wright (2007). 46 UNODC (November 2008). 47 In this strategy, the criminal groups assume that authorities will catch some of the mules, but are unlikely to catch all of them. As a result, their profit margin remains viable. In addition, those who are apprehended are often of little value to law enforcement or intelligence collection efforts because mules are typically low-level actors who lack substantial knowledge about the structure of the crime organization and higher-level actors who employ them. UNODC (November 2008); Alex Klein, ―Mules or Couriers: The Role of Nigerian Drug Couriers in the International Drug Trade,‖ mimeo; Mazzitelli (2007), pp. 107 1-1090; U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime to U.S. National Interests, September 2006; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Organized Crime: African Criminal Enterprises,‖ n.d.; UNODC (October 2007); and Wright (2007). 48 The greatest volumes of cocaine came from Senegal, Nigeria, and Guinea, but Senegalese made up only 2% of couriers by nationality. Nigerians made up the largest share of couriers (57%), and operated across the West African sub-region; they were the single most detected nationality on flights from every country in the sub-region, with some exceptions. In a few countries, the majority of couriers were from Guinea-Bissau. The greatest number of couriers flew out of Guinea and Mali. The leading two destinations by volume for cocaine trafficked from West Africa to Europe were Spain and the United Kingdom, which ―host the two largest populations of cocaine users in Europe,‖ according to UNODC, which also reports that ―Spain serves as both a prime destination and as a redistribution centre‖ in Europe. Other key destinations included the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and likely Italy, although seizure data regarding trafficking into Italy were reportedly incomplete. UNODC

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also reports that West Africans are often involved in distribution activities within Europe. UNODC (November 2008); and UK SOCA (2008). 49 The poppy flower, the source of opiates like heroin, is generally not grown in Africa. At least one news report, however, indicates that very small amounts of illegal opium poppy are being cultivated in Algeria. Hasna Yacoub, ―New Plantations discovered in Adrar: Algeria In the Process of Becoming the New Opium ‗Kingdom,‘‖ La Tribune (Algiers), March 12, 2008 via BBC Monitoring Middle East; and UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, June 2009. 50 UNODC (2005); see also Ellis (2008). 51 See, for instance, Eniwoke Ibagere, ―Drugs: The Nigerian connection,‖ BBC News, June 6, 2000; and Joseph B. Treaster, ―Nigerian Connection Floods U.S. Airports With Asian Heroin,‖ New York Times, February 15, 1992. 52 Testimony by Donnie Marshall, DEA, before the House International Relations Committee: Heroin, June 24, 1998. 53 Testimony by Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 54 UNODC (November 2008). 55 In November 2004, two alleged drug traffickers from Ghana were indicted in Columbus, Ohio, for shipping heroin for distribution across central Ohio. A Ghanaian parliamentarian arrested in November 2005 revealed a similar trafficking network operating in New York. In 2006 several Ghanaians were arrested in the United States for trafficking heroin. In 2007, two Afghan nationals were arrested by Ghanaian police and extradited to the United States for conspiring to distribute heroin in the United States. See 2008 INCSR, ―Ghana‖ and ―Nigeria.‖ 56 In East Africa, heroin is smuggled mainly through Kenya and Ethiopia, but also Tanzania, Egypt, and Mozambique. In West Africa, heroin is smuggled mainly through Cote D‘Ivoire and its neighbors. See INCB 2007 Report. 57 See UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report and previous annual editions of the report, as well as annual reports by the now defunct Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD, or Geopolitical Drug Watch). 58 Mazzitelli (2007), p. 1076. 59 UNODC, Cannabis in Africa: An Overview, November 2007. 60 UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report. 61 See for example INCB 2008 Report, and UNODC (November 2007). 62 INCB 2008 Report. 63 Factors accounting for this data deficit include varying levels of counternarcotics law enforcement capacity; a frequent lack of political will among African countries to devote significant resources to combating the cannabis trade; and the often highly decentralized nature of cannabis markets in Africa. Typically, many small players cultivate and distribute the drug, making monitoring of such activities difficult. UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, November 2008, p. 31. 64 UNODCCP, The Drug Nexus in Africa, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime Monographs, March 1999. 65 UNODC (November 2008), p. 31. 66 UNODC (November 2007); INCB 2007 Report. 67 UNODC (November 2008). 68 2008 INCSR, ―Morocco.‖ 69 2008 INCSR, ―Morocco;‖ and Wright (2007). 70 UNODC (November 2008). 71 2008 INCB Report. 72 Ibid. 73 INCB, 2007 Report and 2008 Report. 74 INCB 2008 Report.

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See INCB 2008 Report; and INCB, Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, March 5, 2008. 76 UNODC, ―Evidence of Clandestine Laboratory Activity in West Africa,‖ Press Release, July 31, 2009. Antonio Mazzitelli, the UNODC representative for West Africa, later emphasized, however, that his agency ―cannot conclude that narcotic labs are operating in Guinea‖ but that the findings are a firm indication ―that traffickers in Guinea had developed the capacity to produce drugs like ecstasy and refine cocaine and heroin.‖ See IRIN, ―Residents of Conakry are Worried for Their Health after the Discovery of Chemical Products Only Metres from Where They Live,‖ August 11, 2009. 77 2008 INCB Report. 78 See UNODC (October 2008); ICG (2008); U.S. Government Accountability Office, ―Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined,‖ Report to the Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 2009; and Webb-Vidal (2009). 79 Juan Carlos Llorca and Frank Bajak, ―Mexican Drug Cartels Expand Abroad,‖ Associated Press, July 21, 2009. 80 UNODC (November 2008); see also Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada, Cocaine Production and Trafficking: What Do We Know? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4618, May 1, 2008. 81 The Euro is the common currency for most countries in the EU. One indication of rising European demand is a rise in European cocaine seizures. UNODC (November 2008); Mejia and Posada (2008). 82 For a discussion of other geographic pull factors, see discussion under the cocaine trafficking trend section of this report, above. 83 See World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 1996–2008; Transparency International, 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, among other indices that suggest that many African countries face problems of corruption and poverty. Among other works that discuss weak law enforcement practices in Africa, see Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, James Currey, Oxford, 1999. 84 Alberto Dabo, ―Guinea-Bissau Probes State Complicity in Drug Trade,‖ Reuters, June 1, 2007; 2008 INCSR; and Vincent (November 2007). 85 UNODC (December 2007); and Vincent (November 2007). 86 Raggie Johansen, ―Guinea-Bissau: A new hub for cocaine trafficking,‖ Perspectives [UNODC magazine], May 2008. 87 Ibid. 88 Sanha assumed office on September 8, succeeding Joao Bernardo Vieira who was assassinated following the death of army chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie, as previously discussed. BBC, ―Guinea-Bissau ‗to Tackle Drugs,‘‖ September 25, 2009; and Agence France Presse, ―Guinea-Bissau Leader Vows End to Drug Transits,‖ September 24, 2009. 89 In recent months that agency‘s counternarcotics role has been supplanted by that of an ad hoc unit controlled by the junta that seized power in Guinea in late 2008. The new organization‘s role is to fight drugs, corruption and organized crime. 2008 INCSR, ―Guinea‖; and CRS Report R40703, Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States, by Alexis Arieff and Nicolas Cook. 90 This paragraph draws from U.S. Government, International Crime Threat Assessment, ―Nigerian Criminal Enterprises,‖ December 2000. 91 419 schemes, a term derived from a provision in the Nigerian Criminal Code, involve advancefee fraud. While these schemes vary, 419 swindlers typically approach individuals overseas by postal letter or by email. They promise to share with their intended targets putative ―unclaimed‖ assets in financial or other overseas institutions in exchange for various ―fees‖ and ―administrative costs‖ paid upfront by the target of the scheme. In such schemes, the assets, often described by the swindler as unclaimed inheritances or funds resulting from administrative oversight, are fictitious, and any fees paid by the fraud target are taken by the

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swindler. U.S. Department of Justice, ―Organized Crime: African Criminal Enterprises,‖ n.d.; see also Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 92 For a discussion of mules, see the cocaine trafficking trends section of this report, above. 93 McDougall (2007); UK HM Revenue & Customs, ―Ghana Drugs Case Shows the Misery of Narcotics Trafficking,‖ January 23, 2008; Damien Francis, ―The Young Women Targeted as Mules by Cocaine Smugglers,‖ The Guardian, August 27, 2008; and UNODC (November 2008). 94 See Mazzitelli (2007), pp. 107 1-1090; U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime to U.S. National Interests, September 2006. 95 U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime to U.S. National Interests, September 2006. 96 For more information on U.S. foreign counternarcotics policy generally, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy, International Drug Control Policy, by Liana Wyler. 97 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification - Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010. 98 INCSR, ―Policy and Program Developments: Overview for 2008.‖ 99 Sec. 1025(a). 100 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009. 101 Sec. 703 of P.L. 105-277 (112 Stat 268 1-672; 21 USC 1702), October 21, 1998. As early as 1993, under congressional authorization that was subsequently repealed and superseded, the President designated the Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) as the lead executive branch agency with the responsibility to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for U.S. drug control policy. See President Bill Clinton, ―National Drug Control Program,‖ Executive Order 12880, November 16, 1993, as originally authorized by Sec. 1005(d)(1) of P.L. 100-690 (102 Stat 4187), November 18, 1988. 102 Sec. 4601 of P.L. 100-690 (102 Stat 4286; 22 USC 2291(b)(1)), November 18, 1988. 103 The authority to serve as the lead agency for detection and monitoring stems from Sec. 1202(a)(1) of P.L. 101-189 (103 Stat 1563; 10 USC 124), November 29, 1989. 104 The EU Troika includes the Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU Member State holding the current Presidency of the Council of the European Union; the EU Secretary-General for common EU foreign and security policy; and the European Commissioner in charge of external relations. 105 INCSR, ―U.S. Government Assistance,‖ 2009. 106 DOD response to CRS request, received June 16, 2009. For more information on AFRICOM, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. 107 Statement by General William E. Ward, before the House Armed Services Committee: Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization, March 13, 2008. 108 The first APS deployed in 2007 and was completed in spring, 2008. It involved a variety of joint exercises, on-board trainings, and port visits in West African coastal countries from Senegal to Gabon. In 2008, a follow-on APS initiative engaged 15 West and Central African countries, hosted 79 ship riders from 10 foreign countries, conducted more than 1,700 training sessions involving more than 1,500 participants. A second APS cruise occurred in spring 2009. AFRICOM, Fact Sheet: Africa Partnership Station, January 28, 2009. 109 Richard Reeve, ―Commanding Presence: AFRICOM‘s Uncertain Mission Statement,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2008. 110 DOD response to CRS inquiry, June 17, 2009; Testimony of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, DOD, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.

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Statement by General William E. Ward, before the House Armed Services Committee: Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization, March 13, 2008. 112 See testimony by Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 113 2009 INCSR. 114 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Southern District of New York, ―United States Announces Historic Transfer of Defendants from Sierra Leone to Face Cocaine Importation Charges,‖ April 22, 2009; ―Un Colombiano Es El Primero Narco Extraditado Desde Sierra Leona a E.U.,‖ El Tiempo, April 29, 2009; and information provided to CRS by the DEA, July 21, 2009. 115 Testimony of Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 116 Ibid. 117 Testimony of Thomas M. Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 118 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182). The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury's sanctions program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October 1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.). 119 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Sanctions under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, p. 1063, William J. Clinton, Book 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2000-2001. 120 UNODC (2005). 121 Reeve (2008). 122 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. 123 The three U.N. drug treaties include the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 124 The current mandate for UNOWA lasts until December 2010. See U.N. Security Council, ―Letter Dated 28 November 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ S/2007/753, December 21, 2007. The most recent mid-year report on the activities of UNOWA, covering the period from July 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, discusses drug trafficking a priority cross-border subject. See U.N. Security Council, ―Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office for West Africa,‖ S/2009/3 9, January 15, 2009. 125 UNODC, ―African Union Commission and UNODC Launch Joint Project to Combat Drugs and Crime in Africa,‖ March 12, 2009; UNODC, ―UNODC and AU Extend Cooperation,‖ December 10, 2007; and CRS Report RS21332, The African Union, The African Union, by Nicolas Cook. 126 At the conference ― which was also attended by multiple U.N. agencies, EUROPOL, MAOC, INTERPOL, and multiple non-African governments, including that of the United States ― the UNODC released its November 2008 report, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa. See Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC Executive Director, ―West Africa Under Attack/drug Trafficking Is A Security Threat‖ [speech], ECOWAS High-level Conference on Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, October 28, 2008; Final Report, ECOWAS Ministerial Conference on Illicit Drug Trafficking as a Security

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Threat to West Africa, October 28-29, 2008; and Melissa CheaAnnan, ―West Africa: ECOWAS Adopts Strategies against Illicit Drugs,‖ AllAfrica.com, November 4, 2008. 127 INTERPOL Fact Sheet, ―Drug Trafficking,‖ COM/FS/2008-06/DCO-01, June 2008; INTERPOL, ―Guinea Bissau Requests INTERPOL Assistance Following Major Drug Seizure,‖ July 21, 2008; INTERPOL, ―Liberia Requests INTERPOL Assistance After Major Cocaine Haul,‖ February 4, 2008; INTERPOL, INTERPOL Response Teams, n.d. 128 Ronald K. Noble, INTERPOL Secretary General, Keynote speech, 9th Meeting of the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), 3 October 3, 2007; INCB 2006 Report; and INTERPOL, Facilitating International Police Co- Operation For A Safer World [presentation], n.d. 129 INTERPOL website, ―OASIS Africa,‖ last modified April 3, 2009. 130 INTERPOL, INTERPOL Response Teams, n.d.; and; INTERPOL, ―Guinea Bissau Requests INTERPOL Assistance ... ,‖ and ―Liberia requests INTERPOL assistance,‖ op cit. 131 See also the ―EU Drugs Action Plan for 2009-2012,‖ Official Journal of the European Union, C326/7, December 20, 2008. 132 The Dublin Group is a group of donor countries that coordinates their international counternarcotics assistance; see Council of the European Union, Regional Report on Western Africa [report to the Dublin Group], CORDROGUE 112 16344/06, December 12, 2006. 133 MAOC-N is staffed by law enforcement and military personnel from the UK, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Italy, EUROPOL, as well as personnel from the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which is the American drug interdiction corollary to MAOC-N in the Caribbean. The French have invited members of the 5+5 Interministerial Conference of the Western Mediterranean—France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Malta, plus Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania—to participate in CeCLAD-M. See European Commission, Directorate for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, ―Non-Paper on Maritime Surveillance,‖ November 13, 2008; Daniel Ducarme (Rapporteur), ―A Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe—Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,‖ 55th Session of the European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, A/2028, December 2008. 134 P.L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 23, 2009. 135 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2010; White House, Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, (Accra, Ghana), July 11, 2009; White House, Readout of the President's Call with President Mills of Ghana, Office of the Press Secretary, April 10, 2009; and CRS Report RS22809, Ghana: Background and U.S. Relations, Ghana: Background and U.S. Relations, by Nicolas Cook. Also see testimony of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, ―Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,‖ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, February 12, 2009. 136 For instance, in June 2007, a passerby informed Senegalese officials about an unattended boat that had washed ashore, only to find 1.2 tons of cocaine. Similarly, in May 2006, Ghanaian authorities happened upon 1.9 tons of cocaine after searching a van during a routine traffic stop. In other situations, African law enforcement reportedly could have seized more cocaine, if it had more manpower, vehicles, and gasoline to give chase. For example, in April 2007 authorities in Guinea-Bissau intercepted a consignment of 635 kg of cocaine, but traffickers were able to escape with the rest of the consignment, believed to be about 2.5 tons, because the police did not have the manpower and vehicles to give chase. UNODC (November 2008). 137 According to the UNODC, seizures in West Africa peaked in 2007, with the share of seized cocaine in Europe traced to Africa dropping from 27% in 2007 to 7% in 2008.

116 138

139

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See, for example, testimony of Doug Farah and Johnnie Carson, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009. These include Nairobi, Kenya; Rabat, Morocco; Dakar, Senegal; Cape Town, South Africa; and Conakry, Guinea. DEA response to CRS request, July 2, 2008. See P.L. 110-417, which requires that DOD submit a report to Congress on its counternarcotics strategy in and objectives for the region and DOD roles and missions in support of overall U.S. counter-narcotics policy for Africa, including the role of AFRICOM in such efforts.

CHAPTER SOURCES The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Michael A. Braun, Managing Partner, Spectre Group International, LLC., before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, dated June 23, 2009. Chapter 2 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Johnnie Carson, Assisstant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, dated June 23, 2009. Chapter 3 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, dated June 23, 2009. Chapter 4 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan, Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, dated June 23, 2009. Chapter 5 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, dated June 23, 2009. Chapter 6 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code R40838, dated September 30, 2009.

INDEX A accounting, 100 adaptations, viii, 46, 49 ADC, 34 age, 10 airports, 13, 55 amphetamines, 49 amputation, 24 armed conflict, 43 armed forces, 51 arms trafficking,, 36 arrest, 37, 91 assassination, 51 assessment, 31, 44, 68 assets, 6, 12, 35, 43, 52, 101 atrocities, 19 attacks, 6, 23, 27 attitudes, 3 authority, 36, 37, 38, 78, 82, 102 automobiles, 3 availability, 35, 63, 97 awareness, 13, 83

B background, 81 banking, 32 banks, 51

barter, 50 behavior, 52 black hole, 20 black market, 51, 56 blood, 19, 21, 25 border control, 69, 70, 76 border security, 65, 77 breakdown, 54, 57, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67 breeding, 5 bribes, 43 brutality, 24 business costs, 11

C campaigns, 24, 36 cancer, 25 candidates, 18 cannabis, 48, 62, 63, 65, 68, 71, 90, 100 capacity building, 30, 33, 85 cartel, 3, 4, 5, 21 cell, 37, 81 chaos, 17 chemical precursors, viii, 47, 49 children, 72 civil society, 24 civil war, 11, 42, 51, 70 cocoa, 18 collaboration, 35, 45, 50, 59, 84 commerce, 67

120

Index

commodity, 10, 19 communication, 21 community, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 34, 35, 39, 44 compensation, 56 competition, 69 complement, 14 complexity, 4, 14 complications, 25 components, 14, 75 composition, 72 compounds, 59, 67 conflict, 24, 42, 52 consensus, 20, 82 conspiracy, 12, 34, 37 construction, 80, 87 consulting, 15 consumer markets, 30 consumption, 3, 4, 19, 21, 24, 48, 49, 54, 57, 68, 69 control, 5, 18, 22, 35, 43, 69, 71, 73, 76, 82, 84, 85, 87, 102 convergence, 21 conviction, 12, 38 corrosion, 26 corruption, viii, 3, 6, 10, 12, 13, 19, 30, 39, 42, 46, 52, 53, 56, 70, 77, 81, 87, 98, 101 costs, 101 covering, 83, 103 crack, 3 credentials, 4 crime, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 18, 30, 34, 38, 39, 42, 50, 59, 60, 72, 73, 77, 82, 83, 84, 86, 98, 99, 101 criminal activity, 7, 12, 73, 80, 83 criminal groups, viii, 3, 26, 31, 39, 47, 50, 65, 99 criminal justice system, 13, 52 criminal violence, 51 criminality, 53 criminals, 3, 70 cultivation, 29, 65, 83 culture, 10 currency, 4, 32, 101 customs service, 61

D danger, 21, 51, 52 data analysis, 14 data availability, 66 data collection, viii, 47, 71, 86 death, 52, 71, 98, 101 deaths, 51 decision makers, 87 decisions, 73, 87 defendants, 12, 37, 87 defense, 12 deficit, 100 democracy, 13, 14, 41 Democratic Republic of Congo, 66 Department of Defense, viii, 6, 9, 42, 47, 74, 76, 98 Department of Energy, 27 Department of Homeland Security, 75, 76 Department of Justice, 76, 99, 101, 102, 105 destruction, 24 detection, 3, 6, 48, 72, 73, 76, 80, 86, 102 diamonds, 18, 32 disaster, 3, 25 distribution, 32, 36, 38, 62, 76, 100 diversification, 20 domestic markets, 11 dominance, 73 donors, 52 draft, 84 drawing, 68 drug consumption, 11, 49 drug flow, viii, 2, 44, 46, 49, 51, 86 drug offense, 12, 36, 81 drug smuggling, 72 drug trade, iv, vii, viii, 5, 7, 17, 20, 29, 34, 36, 37, 42, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 68, 74, 82 drug trafficking, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 96, 103 drug use, 42, 70, 71, 86, 97

121

Index drug-related arrests, 86 duplication, 89

E earnings, 21, 51, 57 economic development, 18 economic growth, 52 economic integration, 84 economic policy, 52 ecstasy, 66, 67, 68, 101 elderly, 72 electricity, 71 eligible countries, 34 emerging markets, 19 employment, 43 energy, 27, 53 entrepreneurs, 19 environment, 22, 39, 56 epidemic, 3, 18 ETA, 23 evolution, 5 execution, 44 exercise, 23 expertise, 4, 30, 44, 70, 85 exploitation, 3, 26 exports, 18, 69 exposure, 48 expulsion, 13, 37, 38 external relations, 102 extradition, 81 extreme poverty, 42

F fabric, 3 facilitators, 11, 18, 26 failed states, 18 failure, 6 family, 25 famine, 39 fear, 5, 25, 53 federal law, 3, 6, 34 females, 91

finance, 11, 36, 92 financial resources, 13, 14, 35, 52 financial support, 27 financing, 36, 50, 84 firms, 53 fishing, 58 flank, 7 flight, 21, 37, 42, 60, 72 flooding, 18 fluid, 72 focusing, 74, 88 foreign aid, 52, 77, 98 foreign assistance, 11, 43, 76, 77, 89 foreign direct investment, 53 foreign exchange, 32 foreign investment, 43, 53 foreign policy, 34, 45, 49, 88 franchise, 53 fraud, 70, 72, 101 freedom, 53 friendship, 20 fuel, 19, 71 funding, viii, 6, 7, 10, 43, 47, 74, 80, 81, 88 funds, 43, 51, 53, 85, 101 fusion, 44

G gasoline, 104 GDP, 10, 18 global markets, 31 global trade, 48 GNP, 4 goals, vii, ix, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 52, 80, 84, 98 gold, 18 governance, viii, 11, 12, 14, 18, 47, 48, 53, 70, 98 GPS, 26 gravity, 3 greed, 2 grouping, 83 groups, viii, 3, 4, 5, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 42, 47, 50, 51, 59, 63, 65, 69, 72, 73, 99

Index

122 growth, viii, 19, 38, 41, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 87 guidelines, 3 guilty, 12

H hands, 4 hard currency, 53 harm, 24 health, 11, 86 height, 19 hemisphere, 24 heroin, viii, 30, 31, 37, 38, 46, 48, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 68, 72, 81, 100, 101 hopes, 81 host, 6, 13, 21, 25, 33, 35, 43, 56, 81, 99 hotels, 5 house, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104 household income, 48 hub, 32, 48, 67, 68, 71, 74, 101 human rights, viii, 18, 47, 89, 98 husband, 82 hybrid, 5, 18, 21

I ideal, 3, 20, 24 identification, 35 ideology, 43 illicit substances, viii, 46, 55 immigration, 43 implementation, 39, 76, 83, 84, 89 imports, 24 incentives, 14, 48, 56, 69 inclusion, 74 income, 56 indication, 48, 49, 74, 101 indicators, 55 indices, 98, 101 indigenous, 3, 4, 72 indirect effect, 97 industry, 36 information sharing, 25, 84

infrastructure, 3, 23, 67, 80, 87, 98 insecurity, 11 instability, 24, 42, 43 institutions, 3, 6, 19, 43, 53, 70, 85, 101 instruction, 34 insurgency, 97 integration, 39 integrity, 89 intelligence, viii, 3, 6, 12, 13, 17, 19, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 44, 47, 60, 76, 81, 85, 86, 89, 99 intelligence gathering, 86 interaction, 44 interference, 70 international law, 34 international standards, 84 international trade, 84 interoperability, 14 intimidation, 3 investment, 32, 43, 53, 98 investors, 59, 98

J judges, 6, 12, 71 judiciary, 12, 71 jurisdiction, 36, 81 justice, 25, 26, 70, 83, 86

K kidnapping, 27 kuwait, 27

L land, 13, 43, 56, 60, 69 landscape, 20 laws, 3, 12 leadership, 5, 26 leaks, 25 learning, 4 line, 3, 27, 87

123

Index links, 50, 51, 52, 61, 91, 92 listening, 15 locus, vii, 46, 68 logistics, 23, 60 loyalty, 73 luggage, 31, 60

M maintenance, 43 management, 14 manpower, 35, 60, 104 manufacturing, 29 mapping, 25 marijuana, 31 market, 19, 20, 21, 32, 39, 42, 61, 62, 66, 69, 97 marketing, 72 markets, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 19, 20, 24, 31, 32, 50, 61, 69, 97, 100 media, 23 membership, 73, 98 men, 29, 51 mentoring, 6, 30, 34, 83 mentoring program, 30 migration, 91 military, vii, viii, ix, 2, 3, 6, 21, 25, 26, 30, 36, 43, 44, 47, 52, 53, 65, 70, 89, 91, 92, 103 missions, 12, 14, 44, 75, 104 model, 25, 44 money, 2, 3, 6, 11, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 36, 43, 50, 70, 82, 84 money laundering, 30, 31, 32, 36, 50, 70, 82, 84 morning, 29 motivation, 71 movement, 3, 17, 24, 54, 60, 69 murder, 51 muscles, 13

N narcotic, 48, 101

narcotics, 2, 6, 10, 13, 14, 20, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 53, 59, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 91, 104 narratives, 74 nation, 6, 21, 33, 35, 43 national borders, 89 national security, 24, 38, 41, 63, 88 National Security Council, 75 nationality, 99 natural gas, 24 natural resources, 18

O objectives, 12, 83, 86, 88, 102, 104 offenders, 71 oil, 18, 24, 27, 53 oil production, 24 opiates, 100 opioids, 60 order, 14, 34, 35, 38, 40, 73 organ, 84 oversight, 85, 101

P partnership, 9, 80 peacekeeping, 42, 52 personal relations, 5, 19 personal relationship, 5, 19 planning, 11 plea bargaining, 12 poison, 3 police, 6, 12, 20, 21, 25, 38, 63, 70, 71, 81, 84, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 100, 104 policy levels, 14 policy makers, 47, 49, 68, 73, 82, 86, 87, 89 policy responses, viii, 47, 73, 86 political instability, 17, 53 poor, 63, 82 population, 10, 43, 62, 71 porous borders, 31, 42 ports, 52, 56, 72 poverty, 10, 39, 56, 70, 101

Index

124 power, 5, 23, 25, 53, 71, 98, 101 president, 20, 51, 71, 98 pressure, viii, 20, 39, 46, 69 prevention, 83 prices, 2, 69 prisons, 12, 13 private sector, 1 producers, 62 production, 19, 20, 32, 33, 36, 42, 48, 60, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 76, 83 professionalism, 42 profit, 57, 73, 99 profit margin, 99 profitability, 19 profits, 3, 4, 11, 19, 21, 36, 39, 50, 56, 57, 64 program, 52, 77, 80, 81, 82, 84, 89, 102 programming, 74, 78, 88 public health, 11, 63 public sector, 56 public service, 18 punishment, 37 purchasing power, 48 purity, 2

R radar, 78 range, 24, 44, 53, 63, 72 rape, 24 real estate, 32 reality, 43 reason, 13, 23, 24, 43 recognition, 24, 40 reconstruction, 42, 52 recruiting, 73 redistribution, 59, 60, 100 refugees, 24 regulation, 32, 67 regulatory controls, 56 relationship, 4, 11, 26 reliability, 83 remittances, 53 repackaging, 60 reputation, 72

reserves, 24 resistance, 65 resource allocation, 87 resources, vii, viii, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 47, 52, 56, 60, 70, 71, 73, 74, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 100 retail, 4, 61, 62 revenue, 18, 21, 24, 36 rice, 92 risk, 39, 52, 65, 72, 81, 98 routing, 58 rule of law, viii, 5, 12, 14, 32, 39, 47, 53, 87, 98

S sanctions, 102 satellite, 65 scaling, 87, 88 searching, 104 secure communication, 78 security, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 17, 18, 23, 41, 49, 53, 56, 70, 71, 76, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 98, 102 seizure, vii, 6, 26, 31, 34, 37, 38, 46, 54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 73, 91, 98, 99, 100 sentencing, 3, 12, 37 sharing, 5, 81 shoot, 51, 71 shores, 7 shoulders, 5 signs, 39, 48, 50, 60 skills, 71, 89 smuggling, 4, 11, 25, 30, 32, 36, 37, 48, 49, 61, 65, 68, 69, 70, 81, 91, 97 smuggling, 58 social group, 63 social indicator, 86 soil, 26 solvents, 67 sovereignty, 53 space, 3, 5 speech, 26, 103 speed, 4 spillover effects, 25

125

Index stability, viii, 11, 17, 24, 32, 34, 41, 42, 47, 48 standards, 48, 84 state control, 21 State Department, viii, 18, 19, 24, 47, 53, 61, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104 statistics, 31, 83, 86 statutes, 37 storage, 29, 31, 32 strategies, vii, viii, ix, 12, 14, 30, 35, 36, 46, 47, 49, 59, 73 strength, 10, 50 structural changes, 25 students, 34, 44 sub-Saharan Africa, 32, 34, 48 supply, 10, 24, 36, 38, 48, 50, 55, 59, 82, 98, 99 supply chain, 59, 98 surveillance, 56, 78, 85 susceptibility, 10 suspects, 43, 51, 90, 91

T tactics, 42, 73 targets, viii, 14, 47, 72, 81, 101 taxis, 71 tensile strength, 3 territory, 21, 26, 70, 89 terrorism, 7, 18, 30, 31, 32, 37, 69, 83 terrorist organization, viii, 3, 5, 6, 21, 24, 26, 32, 36, 37, 43, 47, 50 thinking, 7 threat, viii, 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 19, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 47, 50, 52, 63, 86, 87 threats, viii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33, 35, 42, 46, 49, 53, 88, 89 timber, 18, 21 time frame, 87 time periods, 86 Title I, 103 Title V, 102 tracking, 36, 56

trade, vii, viii, 2, 5, 7, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 74, 82, 84, 97, 100 trading, 9, 61 traffic, 10, 11, 12, 51, 56, 58, 59, 69, 71, 72, 86, 87, 104 training, 6, 14, 21, 23, 34, 39, 43, 44, 71, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 87, 88, 89, 102 training programs, 88 transition, 5, 41 transport, 33, 56, 59, 60, 65, 78 transportation, 4, 20, 32, 72 transshipment, 21, 29, 31, 32, 42, 48, 66, 67, 68, 71, 84 treaties, 84, 103 trial, 12, 25, 37, 90 trust, 35

U U.N. Security Council, 83, 103 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 97 U.S. history, 37 unemployment, 10, 56, 70 unemployment rate, 10 unique features, 56 urban areas, 63

V vehicles, 43, 59, 65, 71, 78, 90, 104 versatility, 30 vessels, 80 village, 91 violence, 3, 11, 17, 21, 24, 42, 51, 64 violent crime, 63 vision, 78 vulnerability, 39

W wants and needs, 22

126 war, 24 weakness, 20, 39 weapons, 19, 21, 25, 26, 90 wholesale, 5, 10, 25, 26, 39, 53, 59, 60 winning, 14 witnesses, 13 women, 29, 72

Index working groups, 44 World Bank, 18, 26, 71, 98, 101

Z zimbabwe, 95