After Rorty: The Possibilities for Ethics and Religious Belief

After Rorty: The Possibilities for Ethics and Religious Belief

G. ELIJAH DANN

Continuum

AFTER RORTY

Continuum Studies in American Philosophy: Dorothy G. Rogers, America's First Women Philosophers Thorn Brooks and Fabian Freyenhagen (eds), The Legacy of JohnRawls James Marcum, Thomas Kuhn'sRevolution Joshua Rust, John Searle and the Construction of Social Reality Eve Gaudet, Quine on Meaning Douglas McDermid, The Varieties of Pragmatism Timothy Mosteller, Relativism in Contemporary American Philosophy

AFTER RORTY

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ETHICS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

G. ELIJAH DANN

continuum LONDON

NEW

YORK

Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038 © G. Elijah Dann 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. G. Elijah Dann has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 0-8264-8902-8 (hardback)

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

vii

Introduction

1

1 Contextualizing the Study—Philosophy, Ethics, and the Possibilities for Religious Belief

7

2

Rorty's Analysis of Traditional Philosophy Truth, Objectivity, and Rationality Rorty's View of Science Some Preliminary Conclusions Systematic Philosophy and Edifying Philosophy

3

Rorty, Religious Belief, and Ethics Rorty, Religious Belief, and the Philosophy of Religion Ethics after Philosophy Alvin Plantinga: Rorty, "Defeaters," and Christian Belief Kai Nielsen: Embracing Rorty, and the Possibility for God-talk

42 46 74 109 126

4

Rorty and the Transformation of Theology Appropriating Rorty: Systematic Theology and Edifying Theol Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo: The Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered

158 160 178

14 15 22 26 30

Bibliography

200

Index

206

"And we should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once. And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh." Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank James Fieser, series editor for Thoemmes/Continuum Publishing, for having asked me to consider publishing this book with Continuum Press. In addition, I am grateful to the editorial staff at Continuum: Philip de Barry, Anthony Haynes, Sarah Douglas, and Joanna Taylor. I would also like to thank Professors James Home (University of Waterloo), Gabriel Vahanian (Universite de Strasbourg) and Gary Gutting (University of Notre Dame) for their support, even though they may not see where they provided it. Of course I remain responsible for all mistakes in judgement, interpretation, and facts. "Inculcating Values: Moral Realism or Pragmatism?" was first published as, "Democratic Values Education Revisited—Moral Realism or Pragmatism?" in Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 33, issue 2, July 1999, pp. 187—99. With kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media. "Kai Nielsen: Embracing Rorty, and the Possibility for God-Talk," was first published as, "And now, how about taking god-talk seriously?" in International journal for Philosophy of Religion, 51: 101-19, 2002. I would like to thank Kluwer Academic Publishers for kindly allowing its reprinting.

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Introduction

Richard Rorty is best known for his relentless critique of philosophy as the Grand Tradition. Briefly put, the major tasks and questions that philosophers have tried to address and resolve, largely since Socrates, are no longer worth pursuing. As Rorty sees it, the big philosophical questions pondered throughout the centuries are loaded: they assume what first needs to be shown. That we must have solid, definite, uncontroversial or foundational definitions for words like justice, truth, and knowledge before we can use them meaningfully. Truth, reified, is an object to be encountered, and the world can somehow be described as Nature, herself, sees things. Plato's Republic was one of the first to get the philosophical ball rolling, with Socrates asking Thrasymachus how he could do what was just before knowing what justice was. St Augustine later showed similar frustration with defining time, thinking he knew what it was until he tried to define it. Then Immanuel Kant, wishing to distinguish the phenomena—"as they appear"—from the noumena—"as they are." Whether the attempt to find epistemological foundations for our beliefs, looking for metaphysical reality behind our ordinary experiences or trying to somehow encounter The Truth, Rorty thinks all need to be abandoned in favor of addressing useful, concrete social issues. As Dewey, Rorty's philosophical hero put it, "the problems of men." Rorty denies neither the worth of studying philosophy, nor philosophy departments teaching it as a historical discipline. There is intellectual value showing students how philosophy got started, how the discipline evolved over the centuries, and the quite serious questions it contemplated and tried to answer. "To say that philosophy might end is not to say that holding large views might become unfashionable, or that philosophy departments might be plowed under, but rather to say that a certain cultural tradition might die out." This is the difference between "hoping for the end of 'Philosophy 101' and hoping for the end of philosophy ... I hope that we never stop reading, e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Dewey, and Heidegger, but also that we may, sooner or later, stop trying to sucker the freshmen into

2

After Rorty

taking an interest in 'the problem of the external world' and 'the problem of other minds'." While the history of philosophy will continue to be taught in the university, the limits of philosophy need admitting. The result is philosophers conceding their inquiries haven't resulted in the hoped-for solutions. In turn, as a discipline philosophy has to give more consideration to the political and social issues facing humanity—issues which have real impact on our society, locally and globally. Sounding like a social activist chiding the old guard of society, Rorty believes philosophers should concentrate their mental energies on addressing issues of the here and now, such as justice, education, and globalization. Quite fittingly, his change of university departments over the years reflects his shifting academic and intellectual interests. He left the Department of Philosophy at Princeton to become a humanities professor at the University of Virginia in 1982. In the late 1990s, Rorty left Virginia moving to Stanford as Professor of Comparative Literature. Philosophers have neither been amused by Rorty's claims, nor convinced by his multifaceted critique of philosophy and its tradition. He has become a sort of pariah in philosophical circles, the sort of thing you would expect, say, from theologians who had one of their most promising Cardinals wake up one day convinced religious belief was a ruse. Carrying the comparison a bit further, the rancor Rorty has faced because of his secular apostasy is largely due to how, in his early training, he showed himself to be a promising, tough-minded philosopher. Trained in the most prestigious of universities— University of Chicago and Yale—under the tutelage of the most rigorous of philosophical minds, he would most certainly step up when the old vanguard was slowing down into retirement. But by turning sceptic, the denouncement of his work by the philosophical community has been all the more forceful, even shrill. Consider Bertrand Russell's criticisms of religious belief. Though robust and mostly pertinent, they had little impact on the Church as an institution. Think, however, if the same criticisms of the Church would have come from, say a Ratzinger, who just before the death of Jean Paul II decided religious belief was bunk. Traitors are the most despised critics because they were once insiders, those most intimately acquainted with the inside story—sometimes even better than the remaining faithful. This book is not vitally concerned with whether Rorty is right or wrong about the subjects central to his metaphilosophical position. There has been much written by epistemologists and metaphysicians on those, sometimes deeply complicated, matters. While it is an extremely interesting and worthwhile debate, I'll leave that for others. What hasn't been earnestly explored is a topic on the periphery of Rorty's work: the philosophy of religion. Or, more narrowly, the consequences his position holds for religious belief.

Introduction

3

Associating Rorty with the philosophy of religion, once suggested, will have various reactions. If we put the matter positively, "what might be the case for the philosophy of religion if Rorty were right?" it's unlikely our study will appeal to Rorty's detractors or his admirers. For detractors of Rorty, the mere possibility that he may be metaphilosophically right (not even to mention religiously), will be enough to make this book uninteresting. It will be seen as an uncritical, unsophisticated ability to see the shortcomings of his position. As we will see in Chapter 3, Alvin Plantinga's assessment of Rorty's position on concepts such as truth, is that it is incoherent at best. There would then be little value pursuing his views into the philosophy of religion. At least at first blush for admirers of Rorty (those who think he is right about metaphysics, ontology and truth), in the aftermath of his critique, there would be little seen here as useful for invigorating religious belief or God-talk. Christian theology, with its own dependency on metaphysics, ontology and truth has as much to lose in the way of conceptual undergirding as first philosophy. This would be the view of philosophers like Kai Nielsen, albeit in a roundabout way. Nielsen, thinking he has long since put to rest all efforts to speak coherently about God-talk, now moving on to new philosophical interests he finds himself in agreement with Rorty's metaphilosophical views. Suggesting that Rorty's position actually reopens discussion about the viability of Godtalk would probably illicit a "Not that again," disapproving shake of the head. Despite these reactions it is exactly here where the impetus for this study resides, as boring or surprising as it might seem to philosophers like Plantinga and Nielsen. Agreeing with Rorty's views need not result in the end of the philosophy of religion (and by extension, theology). Just as the possibility for philosophy exists after the demise of .Philosophy, so a possibility for the philosophy of religion exists after the demise of Philosophy. Rorty provides the conceptual tool for this reinvigoration in his contrast between "systematic philosophy" and "edifying philosophy," and what I describe in the contrast between "systematic theology" and "edifying theology." Just as philosophy can be pared down to an intellectual, social, and moral engagement, so theology can be pared down to an intellectual, social, and moral engagement, albeit within the framework of religious belief. This study aims to explore how Richard Rorty's metaphilosophical critique might be useful for the philosophy of religion, theological work, and religious belief. It attempts to bridge (or better, blur the boundaries between) contemporary philosophy, the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and theology. The subject of ethics and metaethics is a natural extension of these topics, so this book includes discussion about the implications Rorty's position has for doing ethics, not only in the pursuits of the public square, but as well for how religious believers can engage in those pursuits.

4

After Rorty

Chapter 2 is a brief survey of Rorty's analysis of traditional philosophy, traced from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature to the third volume of his philosophical papers Truth and Progress. We want to quickly look at the questions and issues of central importance for first philosophy, with some detail given to talk about objectivity, rationality, the "scientific method," and truth. This is contrasted with Rorty's sense of philosophical progress, described as "the increase in social solidarity." Lastly, we will develop Rorty's division between systematic and edifying philosophies elaborated in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. This distinction will come to serve as a parallel in theology. Once we have outlined Rorty's metaphilosophical position (now well known and under meticulous scrutiny in philosophical literature, whether in academic journal articles or books), we will move to our main interest in this book: an exploration of what can be described as the beginnings of Rorty's philosophy of religion. Chapter 3 has four major divisions. The first division, "Rorty, Religious Belief, and the Philosophy of Religion," surveys the various articles Rorty has written over the years about religious belief. We want to track how his views have changed and nuanced, from "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," to his better known article, "Religion as Conversation-stopper." We take special interest with the latter article. We want to show that the main features of dividing our pursuits as private and public is a needed observance between religious practice and belief, and the public square. It is one we try to argue further, though not entirely in agreement with Rorty. In the second division of Chapter 3, "Ethics after Philosophy," we turn to metaethics and ethics, first seeing what is left for talk about ethics after the grand tools of the philosophical tradition have been removed. Contrary to what some critics might think—that without talk about moral reality, truth and objectivity, we should expect only moral decay and anarchy—we will provide an applied case that shows the contrary. Here we enter into debate about whether moral realism or a pragmatist's account of ethics is better suited for teaching values to children. This is an extremely relevant discussion in a day when we hear much about "values education." We will then turn to an examination of ethics and religious belief, in particular an article where, re-examining his highly controversial study "Religion as Conversation-stopper," Rorty squarely faces the criticisms of Nicholas Wolterstorff. Rorty wants to show why, contra Wolterstorff, he is justified taking exception to the moral beliefs and public policies of ecclesiastical institutions, especially those that emphasize idiosyncratic moral beliefs which contrast with our more general feelings of liberty, the sort described by John Stuart Mill. Rorty takes homosexuality as a case in point. We will continue with his example, showing how it raises a number of hermeneutical points that, in turn,

Introduction

5

demonstrate how dialogue in a pluralistic society, between religious and more secular-minded citizens, can be carried out. The third and fourth major divisions of Chapter 3 examine two important commentators on Rorty: Alvin Plantinga and Kai Nielsen. Plantinga wants to see if Rorty's metaphilosophical position offers defeaters for Christian belief. In contrast, Nielsen thinks Rorty should be taken seriously by mainstay philosophers. What makes Nielsen's embracing of Rorty interesting for this study isn't so much that it buttresses our own affections. Rather, returning to the philosophy of religion, we want to show that Nielsen's agreement with Rorty, on metaphilosophical matters, undermines Nielsen's own protracted critique of religious belief. Nielsen's value is that: (1) he is an example of a stalwart philosopher who thinks Rorty is on to something important, metaphilosophically speaking; and (2) albeit inadvertently, Nielsen helps our own efforts to show that accepting Rorty's position actually opens up new possibilities for religious belief. Chapter 4 describes how Rorty's distinction between "systematic and edifying philosophies" can be applied in the theological context as "systematic and edifying theologies." Just as the aspirations of systematic philosophy distorted philosophy—at least as the discipline etymologically goes, as "the love of wisdom"—so theological inquiry—"as love for God and one's neighbor"— was distorted by systematic philosophy to the extent it obscured and redefined theoretical and practical fields of investigations. Edifying theology, similar to edifying philosophy, turns the theologian's attention from robust metaphysical inquiry to a more basic theological engagement, which, in part, shares the Deweyan concern for the problems of society. This comes as no surprise to theologians who have always seen social justice at the heart of scripture. After showing historically how theological study assumed the language of first philosophy, in the last part of Chapter 4 we return to Richard Rorty. While Rorty's earlier writings showed disinterest, even antagonism for religious belief, over the past few years he has, for whatever reasons, come to discuss how religious belief may exist in his pragmatist society. Most recently, Rorty has found common ground with the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. Vattimo, for his own reasons, has come to re-evaluate his religious beliefs. Perhaps because of their age, with nothing needed to prove to each other in light of their well-established academic careers, they now find themselves with enough repose to rethink their respective religious beliefs out loud to each other. This dialogue has been collected in a recent book by Santiago Zabala, which we will critically examine. It is a wonderful example of how the philosophy of religion and theological musings, after Philosophy, can contribute to the task of reducing misery, and the increasing of human flourishing.

6

After Rorty Notes

1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Richard Rorty is presently finishing his academic career at Stanford. He had previously been Kenan Professor of Humanities at University of Virginia. He taught at Wellesley and, from 1961 to 1982, at Princeton University where he was Stuart Professor of Philosophy. Kuipers has noted, "Richard Rorty is arguably one of the most important and influential thinkers of the late twentieth century. Despite this importance and influence, however, his work has tended to evoke a strong negative reaction from many philosophers. In fact, a common response from the philosophical community to his bold and often bluntly stated ideas has been a curious form of intellectual disdain." Ronald A. Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger: Themes in the social philosophy of Richard Rorty (Boston: University Press of America, 1997), p. 1. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 32. Richard Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," Journal of Philosophy, 90, 9, September 1993, pp. 446-7. For example, see Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), or his book with Derek Nystrom and Kent Puckett, Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies (Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002). Some valuable recent treatments are: Charles Guignon and David R. Hiley (eds.), RichardRorty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Alan Malachowski, Richard Rorty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Gideon Calder, Rorty and Redescription (UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); and Richard Rumana, On Rorty (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000). Malachowski's book is a well-deserved, largely supportive study that critics of Rorty need to carefully consider. While overall Guignon and Hiley's edition is not as sympathetic, it is an excellent contribution to critically understanding Rorty's work. This is a term lifted from Aristotle, who classified epistemology, logic and metaphysics as a single philosophical discipline. As Guignon and Hiley put it, "For this standard conception of philosophy, theory of knowledge is 'first philosophy,' and all other areas of philosophy should accede to its judgments about the limits of knowledge." RichardRorty, p. 7. Rorty distinguishes between "Philosophy," as first philosophy, and "philosophy," as pursuing solutions to the problems of humanity, in\iis Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). See Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 365—72.

1

Contextualizing the Study—Philosophy, Ethics, and the Possibilities for Religious Belief

"Theology is useless without the cultural tools to communicate it. So long as we do not meet the present crisis from this angle, our civilization will be able to build neither temple nor a tomb." Gabriel Vahanian, Wait Without Idols There were detractors of philosophy portrayed as early as Plato's dialogues— those who argued with Socrates over definitions of justice and goodness. Now informed by a conversation spanning two-and-a-half thousand years, modern nay-sayers may very well have intellectual history on their side. Given all the laborious arguments by philosophers over the centuries, with little to show, it may be time to change the topics of conversation. This is the substance of Richard Rorty's position. Rorty has had some success convincing philosophers and other intellectuals that the issues and problems should change to a more pragmatic, concrete nature. Instead of the obsession "with the primal world of some final vocabulary, with truth or objectivity", attention should turn to pressing issues of contemporary society: gender, race, and class discrimination, to name a few. This is a focus, as Dewey put it, on the "problems of society," envisioned as "clarifying the ideas men and women have on those issues that divide them." Irrespective of Rorty's highly critical analysis of the philosophical tradition (or, as he terms it: "Philosophy" or "first philosophy"), Rorty still sees a role for philosophy as the pared-down version which grapples with the problems of society. He holds this view without denying that the history of philosophy is worth studying as a catalogue and chronology of the many important ideas and issues that have intrigued scholars over the centuries. This appreciation for intellectual history prevents the young philosopher from repeating the same mistakes. Regardless of whether Rorty's diagnosis and prognosis of philosophy is on the mark, there is little doubt his position has broad consequences. Consider Rorty's contention that truth, as correspondence, fails in the attempt to discriminate between large-scale beliefs. Ben H. Letson comments on what follows from Rorty's view:

8

After Rorty [T]he correspondence theory of truth is taken to imply more than that there are facts in the world that we are trying to correspond to when we use language. The objectivity that is desired in holding this view is usually understood to be a consequence of the realism about truth that undergirds the correspondence relation. Thus the correspondence theory posits a world of objects that might forever remain aloof from all attempts to represent, or correspond to, them. But if OUT sentences correspond to these facts, then we have knowledge that is as objective as can be—there would be no residue of subjectivity, no problems of perspective, no mention of locutions such as 3 "true-for-us".

This has obvious implications for ordinary beliefs. Gould it also be, in the context of religious belief, that if beliefs cannot be expected to link with objects in a one-to-one correspondence, global claims by Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism about how the world "really is" will no longer be able to be taken seriously"? In some respects Rorty is extending a Nietzschean point. It is beyond the scope of this book, but worth noting here the very interesting question that even if such correspondence were possible—even if the fire-breathing conservative Catholic, Protestant or other religious fundamentalist were correct (viz., that their views actually represented the Truth)—we might still have to ask the Nietzschean question, "What would it mean to assent to such Truth; who would we become by granting assent?" As Nietzsche put it: "A question seems to lie heavily on our tongue and yet refuses to be uttered: whether one could consciously reside in untruth? or, if one were obliged to, whether death would not be preferable?" 4 Nietzschean concerns aside, the problem of correspondence applies as well to non-religious views (or what some might term "quasi-religious views") like naturalism and materialism. In short, any view that thinks it can describe the world as nature herself might. A more specific example involving the correspondence theory of truth is the debate between theologians and philosophers over the existence of God. The habit of the philosopher, especially in the past century, was to quickly challenge the theist with the newest philosophical tool of analysis. For instance, demanding the theist must somehow point out the object of their religious belief—i.e. God. If Rorty is right about his anti-epistemological claim that truth as correspondence hasn't panned out, then theists are also off the hook with the demand they must show the correspondence between talk about God and God himself. Although Kai Nielsen hasn't seen the connection, this is the main problem he faces in his own embracement of Rorty. On the one hand, when it comes to religious believers, Nielsen demands that theists somehow point God out. On the other hand, when pondering Rorty's

Contextualizing the Study

9

metaphilosophy, Nielsen now thinks Rorty is right to blow the whistle on truth as correspondence. The relationship between philosophy and theology in the Western tradition goes back to the fourth century A.D. Once Gonstantine transformed Christianity from a religion of martyrdom to the official state religion, with their newfound leisure church fathers began the debate over doctrine. While those like Tertullian questioned the relationship Jerusalem was to have with Athens, others either explicitly or implicitly assumed that the truth of philosophy was compatible, indeed complementary with theological truth. "All truth is God's truth." Philosophical inquiry, in its quest for Truth, objectivity, certainty, and the uncovering of reality, was quickly made the handmaiden of theology. As a result, theological language, doctrine, and aspirations became tainted because of their proximity to the perceived tasks and language of philosophy. Instead of theology being concerned with interpreting its own subject-matter it became diluted with the goals and assumptions of philosophy. With these cursory remarks in mind, Rorty's provocative views should not escape the notice of philosophers of religion and theologians. In fact, and perhaps not surprisingly, some of the most interesting challenges for theology do not come from a theologian but from Rorty himself. If theological thinking has been as dependent on philosophical thinking as we presume, then any criticism of the philosophical tradition that is on the mark, the same consequences will follow for theological thinking. Gilson's observation is prescient here, that "when religion tries to establish itself on the ruins of philosophy, there usually arises a philosopher to found philosophy on the ruins of religion."6 Once the challenges to the philosophical and theological traditions have been recognized, their respective redescriptions become possible. Rorty's critique likewise assists in the task of recovering theological language and the creation of new conversations in the philosophy of religion. The "demise of the philosophical tradition," to borrow this phrase from Kai Nielsen, does not mean that philosophy, in all its forms, must end. Moreover, the call for the end of robust metaphysics does not mean that theology or the philosophy of religion must end. By understanding post-Philosophical analysis in theological and ethical terms, the philosophy of religion might continue as applied philosophy of religion, or as edifying theology. 9 The demise of the philosophical tradition should be seen as creating, among other things, an overture for theology. The demise of Philosophy puts an end to robust philosophical and theological metanarratives. Once discarded, reinterpretation becomes possible. Due to the close, tumultuous relationship between philosophy and theology, a number of interesting repercussions will be found exactly at this juncture. My overall intent in this study is neither

10

After Rorty

to baptize Rorty, nor to argue he is a disguised theologian. My aim is to rather show that his metaphilosophical position allows for at least two implications of interest to the philosopher of religion (and, depending on one's predilection, the theologian). The first follows from Rorty's assessment of traditional philosophy. The two main features of traditional philosophy that Rorty takes to task are realism and foundationalism. "Realist philosophers say the only true source of evidence is the world as it is in itself." As for foundationalism: [It is] an epistemological view which can be adopted by those who suspend judgement on the realist's claim that reality has an intrinsic nature. A foundationalist need only claim that every belief occupies a place in a natural, transcultural, transhistorical order of reasons—an order which eventually leads the inquirer back to one or another "ultimate source of evidence". 11 There are different possibilities for a foundational source, ranging from "scripture, tradition, clear and distinct ideas, sense-experience, [to] common sense." In contrast, for the pragmatist: They think that the question of whether my inquiries trace a natural order of reasons or merely respond to the demands for justification prevalent in my culture is, like the question whether the physical world is found or made, one to which the answer can make no practical difference. 13 Once first philosophy, with its desire for epistemological foundations and traditional definitions of truth and objectivity is seen as inutile,the very tools used by the philosopher to vex the theologian crumble in the philosopher's hand. However, if Rorty is on the mark, traditional theological investigation suffers a similar loss, at least insofar as theologian or philosopher of religion worked from the same philosophical tool-box. As long as the theologian shared interest in epistemological foundations, truth as correspondence, objectivity, and reason (all of which allowed for the possibility of metaphysics), the theologian had common ground with the philosopher. The philosopher may have disagreed with the theologian over the truthfulness and objectivity of religious belief, but at least they agreed on the conceptual importance of the language to be employed in the exploration of these disciplines. This changes with Rorty's, end-of-philosophy, critique. Secondly, more positively, since Rorty believes philosophy, as edifying philosophy, is possible after the demise of traditional philosophy, a comparable case can be made for theology. Instead of Rorty's metaphilosophical position eliminating religious belief, certain forms of theological inquiry, as a viable form of discourse, gain new prospect in the post-Philosophical scene. It is here where we need to look at Rorty in order to determine exactly what he

Contextualizing the Study

11

thinks follows for religious belief in the post-Philosophical context. There are places in his writings where, for instance, he has disparaged religion, interpreting the demise of the philosophical tradition as a further step to rendering religious language irrelevant. Recently, however, Rorty has come to see that this dim view doesn't necessarily follow. This is where the recommencement of theology dovetails with Rorty's proposal for a post-Philosophical definition of philosophy. Just as the end of systematic philosophy can save philosophy, albeit transformed, so its end also allows for the renewal of theology.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

Gabriel Vahanian, "The Denatured Nature of Ethics: In Praise of the Secular," Philosophic de la religion entre ethique et ontologie (Biblioteca dell' Archivio di Filosofia, Cedam, textes reunis par Marco M. Olivetta, 1996), p. 508. Vahanian, "The Denatured Nature of Ethics," p. 508. Ben H. Letson, Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implications for Rorty's Pragmatism (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 9; emphasis his. For further discussion see my review of Letson's book in The Review of Metaphysics,December 2000. Speaking of correspondence theories Susan Haack states that "None of these attempts to generalize the Aristotelian Insight is unproblematically successful. The Logical Atomists' version of the correspondence theory is metaphysically demanding, requiring an ontology of logically ultimate objects. Austin's version of the correspondence theory is straightforwardly applicable only where there are indexicals for the demonstrative conventions to latch onto. Tarski's method relativizes 'true' to a language, and applies only to languages which are formally specifiable which may, as Tarski thought, preclude its applicability where natural languages are concerned. Ramsey's approach—where the liberation felt with the resort to sentence letters achieves full generality only by means of sentential quantifiers— requires a new account of how such quantifiers work . .. And Peirce's definition faces the problem of Buried Secrets: that statements about the past which would not be settled however long inquiry were to continue must be deemed neither true nor false." Irrespective of these difficulties Haack maintains that our hopes should not be daunted: "Does this mean that my defense of the value of concern for truth [as correspondence] places impossible demands on the concept?—of course not! That we have not yet devised a completely satisfactory and fully general statement of the Aristotelian Insight is no reason to conclude that it isn't an insight at all; to suppose otherwise is to succumb to the Arrogance of Theory, to that 'factitious despair' of which Bacon wrote—and 'all for the miserable vainglory of having it believed that whatever has not yet been invented or discovered will not be invented or discovered hereafter.' " Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 22~3; quote from Francis Bacon, The Mew Organon (1620), Book I, Aphorism LXXXVIII.

After Rorty

12 4.

5.

6. 7.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All To Human: A book for free spirits, translated by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 29; emphasis his. Paul Horgan's The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), is a good example. Although many of the scientists Horgan interviews are atheists, they all tend to at least implicitly believe they will one day find "the Truth," and once they do all the questions of humanity will be answered. This is as questionable as the Church's claim that religion holds the key to all of life's mysteries, even those of a scientific nature, like whether the world is flat, or if we are the result of special creation or the processes of evolution. Whether spoken by a scientist or priest, it isn't obvious how the Unified Theory or the Bible will give easy answers to the questions people face in their existential, day-to-day lives. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 35. Kai Nielsen, After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991).

8.

Rorty's citation of Sidney Hook is useful here: "Traditional metaphysics has always been a violent and logically impossible attempt to impose some parochial scheme of values upon the cosmos in order to justify or undermine a set of existing social institutions by a pretended deduction from the nature of Reality . . . But once crack the shell of any metaphysical doctrine, what appears is not verifiable knowledge but a directing bias . . . the preeminent subject matter of philosophy has been the relation between things and values." Sidney Hook, John Dewey (New York: John Day, 1939), pp. 34—5; as quoted by Rorty in Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 74. We can nuance this view. Traditionally, metaphysics is the "science of being as such." But there are secondary and derivative meanings appropriate in this context as well: "(a) Anything concerned with the supraphysical . .. (b) Any scheme of explanation which transcends the inadequacies or inaccuracies of ordinary thought." William S. Weedon, "Metaphysics," Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert Runes (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1966), p. 196. The sense of (b) would not be controversial for a pared-down version of philosophy or theology. 9. Dewey, moreover, "thinks that the moral of the story is that metaphysics, having exhausted its potentialities, leaves us with nothing except an increased appreciation for our concrete problems—for beings." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 49. 10. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New York: Penguin Press, 1999), p. 150. 11. 12.

Ibid.,p. 151. Ibid.

13. Ibid. Rorty believes that Rawls is in agreement on this view of justification: "What justifies a conception ofjustice is not its being true to an order antecedent and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions

Contextualizing the Study

13

embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us." John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1980, p. 519; as quoted by Rorty, Contingency,irony, and solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 58. 14. One of the first assumptions to go was anticipated by what Wittgenstein described as a "presentiment that there must be a realm in which answers to questions are symmetrically combined—a priori—to form a self-contained system." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Loguo-Philosophuus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 5.4541. 15. "The Deweyan notion of language as tool rather than picture is right as far as it goes." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xviii—xix.

2 Rorty's Analysis of Traditional Philosophy

"Many responsibilities begin in dreams, and many transfigurations of the tradition begin in private fantasies." Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others Central to Rorty's critique of traditional philosophy is that it has no public utility. For sympathetic, philosophy insiders—those who spend their careers in departments of philosophy—this is evident in the way colleagues can be nonchalant, even disdainful about how their discipline might relate to current social issues. This might be reasonable behavior for philosophers who are deep into esoteric questions of logic or the philosophy of mind. But it's especially distressing that some philosophers in these disciplines have an interest in their own specializations inversely proportional to their attitude towards other philosophical investigations into ethics, applied ethics (whether biomedical, business, or the environment), aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Despite how philosophers wish to battle this out in their departments, as Rorty sees it, academics need to shift their neural energies to the very real and pressing issues that confront us globally. It is, in the Deweyan sense, the need to address the problems of society. This shift of attention isn't Dewey's own. Rorty believes Dewey only echoes Hegel's definition of philosophy. Quoting from Dewey, Rorty writes: When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day. Before refocusing takes place, Rorty must first provide a clearing by setting forth his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and secondly, to reinterpret philosophical activity. Because of our own interests, this clearing must at some point consider the relationship philosophy has had with theological thought, a relationship which was as raucous as it was amiable, the beginnings of which started when Christianity became institutionalized at the hand of the Roman

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Emperor Gonstantine. Theologians, fresh out of the catacombs, thought deliberations over doctrine could be aided by certain conceptual terms employed by the philosopher. It was a cohabitation resulting in a turbulent, often violent, two-thousand-year relationship. Consider, for example, how theologian and philosopher agreeably denned rationality, objectivity, and truth only to subsequently find themselves pitting reason against faith, truth against belief, and science against religion. Dualisms like these dissolve in Rorty's critique. The effects ripple through philosophy, into the subset of research interests like ethics and the philosophy of religion, into theological investigations. Before we can further describe, as it were, these rippling effects, we need to look at Rorty's metaphilosophical critique in order to see exactly how he argues for the setting aside of the Philosophical tradition. The first task on the list is to tackle some of the most pivotal terminology of the systematic philosopher: Truth, Objectivity, and Rationality.

Truth, Objectivity, and Rationality Richard Rorty describes how philosophy has traditionally defined its subjectmatter: Philosophers usually think of their discipline as one which discusses perennial, eternal problems—problems which arise as soon as one reflects. Some of these concern the difference between human beings and other beings, and are crystallized in questions concerning the relation between the mind and the body. Other problems concern the legitimization of claims to know, and are crystallized in questions concerning the "foundations" ofknowledge. Although we've briefly mentioned how Christian theology was affected by philosophical thought early in church history, we should quickly add that the relationship was, more often than not, symbiotic. Theologians and philosophers are both well aware of the attempts to somehow show that their musings are really embedded (or should be embedded), in some kind of objective certainty. Rorty explains: To discover the foundations is to discover something about the mind, and conversely. Philosophy as a discipline thus sees itself as the attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art, or religion. It purports to do this on the basis of its special understanding of the nature of knowledge and of mind. Philosophy can be foundational in

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respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims. It can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge, and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Rorty thinks philosophy has come to be characterized in this manner chiefly because of the interdependent work of three philosophers: Locke, with his theory of knowledge based on mental processes;6 Descartes, with "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur; and Kant using philosophy as the tribunal of pure reason adjudicating the truthfulness of various claims brought forward by the culture. While other philosophers, like Friedrich Nietzsche and William James, attempted to show culture need not ground its beliefs in this manner, the majority opinion in philosophy outweighed their objections. Rorty believes this trinitarian view of philosophy, a la Locke, Descartes, and Kant, came to be, at least for the intellectual community, a substitute for religion. Just like religion, "It was the area of culture where one touched bottom, where one found the vocabulary and the convictions which permitted one to explain and justify one's activity as an intellectual, and thus to discover the significance of one's life." As a substitute for what is commonly desired in religion, it comes as no surprise Rorty thinks this quest for philosophical foundations is, at heart, a religious aspiration: "The idea that it [culture] ought to have foundations was a result of Enlightenment scientism, which was in turn a survival of the religious need to have human projects underwritten by a nonhuman authority." We should bear in mind these initial observations when we explore in greater detail how traditional philosophical and theological study became entangled. Because of the increasing succession of the secular over the religious, and, as a result, the diminishing need for the philosopher to be viewed as the guardian against superstition, late in the nineteenth century, and early into the twentieth century philosophy's self-image began to weaken: According to this story, Nietzsche marks the point at which it became impossible for Western intellectuals to believe what Plato had taught: that there is something stable for human beings to rely on, a fixed point in the changing world around which to rally. Simultaneously, it became impossible to believe that there is some privileged vocabulary ... in which to state the final truth about the human situation. For, as Hegel had already

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realized, we are historical creatures, continually remaking ourselves by redescribing ourselves. The hope for finality is futile. Philosophers should stop looking for necessary and universal "conceptual" truths and should realize that concepts are as malleable as any other social institutions. Moreover, because of philosophy's growing interest in becoming scientific, it was becoming increasingly removed from being an active participant in the public square. Philosophy's decreasing relevancy was matched with the rising popularity of another type of intellectual, "the culture of the man of letters, the intellectual who wrote poems and novels and political treatises, and criticisms of other people's poems and novels and treatise ." Whether novelist or poet, the intellectual was slowly coming to displace both philosopher and priest. Aggravating the philosophical scene in the twentieth century was a new breed of philosopher, seen in the likes of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. While early in their philosophical careers they occupied themselves with trying to deliver the foundations longed for by philosophy, in their later years they came to see philosophy as "therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply him with a new philosophical program." By abandoning epistemology and metaphysics—knowledge conceived as accurate representation, establishing foundations of knowledge, and resolving problems that follow from the philosophy of mind—these three philosophers brought about a period of "revolutionary" philosophy. Despite the attempt on the part of these latter philosophers to break free from systematic philosophy—to bring an end to its ongoing problems and concerns—Rorty notes that over the past two decades there has been a gradual return to its traditional image and perennial questions. Rorty sees more than a hint of nostalgia in these endeavors, and in contrast thinks it is sufficient to accept the Deweyan conception of knowledge as "what we are justified in believing." Under this view: [W]e will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on what can count as knowledge, since we will see "justification" as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between "the knowing subject" and "reality." If we have a Wittgensteinian notion of language as tool rather than mirror, we will not look for necessary conditions of the possibility of linguistic representations. If we have a Heideggerian conception of philosophy, we will see the attempt to make the nature of the knowing subject a source of necessary truths as one more self-deceptive attempt to substitute a "technical" and determinate question for that openness to strangeness which initially tempted us to begin thinking.

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Rorty's criticisms hold on both the analytic and Continental sides of the philosophical continuum. Whether it is Frege's philosophy of language or classical Husserlian phenomenology, both attempt to place philosophy in a Kantian privileged position: "that of judging other areas of culture on the basis of its special knowledge of the 'foundations' of these areas." Accepting the Deweyan, Wittgensteinian, and Heideggerian view of philosophy, Rorty characterizes himself as anantirepresentationalist. Instead of viewing knowledge as a matter of showing correspondence between belief and reality, he views knowledge in terms of "acquiring habits of action for coping with reality." But what does Rorty mean by this high-minded word, "reality"? Is it a world outside our minds, one to which we must compare our beliefs in order to decide if they are true? 20 Rorty certainly is not a skeptic.21 Neither is he an idealist (although he shares the Idealist's doubt that "truth is correspondence to reality" ). He believes there is a real world. What he wants is to make a careful distinction "between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there . . . Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there." As a consequence, attempts which try to show how our minds or language corresponds to or represents our environment are misguided: Representationalist theories in epistemology think of Reality as a Something beyond all our epistemic practices. Notoriously, this Something cannot fall under any description. Any description offered itself becomes predicated of a Something of which it may or may not be true. In the analysis of "This physical object is a brown table," this is thex which is a physical object, brown, and a table. We have ways of determining whether an object in a room is a table; whether there are physical objects in a room; whether a table is brown. But when we ask whether these ways refer to Something called Reality, we are looking for a relation, independent of any context, which has no application and, hence, no meaning. Another commentator puts Rorty's position a slightly different way: Rorty is suspicious of philosophy-as-epistemology because ultimately its message is that we cannot be certain we are in touch with reality unless we can show that our minds are mirroring an extramental reality. Yet for him, the sheer impossibility of our successfully performing this intellectual feat makes skepticism inevitable. Such a detached construal of human knowing makes us think of ourselves as separated from an unfamiliar and hostile world, and creates for us the problem of figuring out how we can bring ourselves back into familiar contact with it. This problem would not have

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occurred to us, Rorty argues, had the philosophical tradition not posited two disparate ontological realms: one containing our descriptions of the world and the other consisting of the world itself apart from any such description. Without these posits, he says, "[we] will feel in touch with reality all the time," precisely because the epistemological issues of representation and correspondence do not arise in the first place. Instead of philosophy-as-epistemological theory, Rorty holds to the holistic theory of meaning, a position which has clear relevance to theories of how language is learned. The holistic view of meaning is the view that a theory of meaning for a language must do no more than show how the meaning of sentences depend upon the meaning of words. At its heart is the Davidsonian point that we need not think that "individual words must have meanings at all, in any sense that transcends the fact that they have a systematic effect on the meanings of the sentences in which they occur." In another place Rorty states that this "Davidsonian way of looking at language .. . the activity of uttering sentences is one of the things people do in order to cope with their environment. The Deweyan notion of language as tool rather than picture is right as far as it goes." This is in contrast to the traditional view: The traditional view is that we anchor language to the world by giving meaning by ostension (or some other nonintentional mechanism—one which presupposes no "stage-setting in the language") to certain words, and then going on holistically from there. Davidson's neo-Wittgensteinian point is that even "red" and "mama" have uses—can help make possible the statements of truths—only in the context of sentences and thus of a whole language. The correspondence view, at least as far as the antirepresentationalist and pragmatist are concerned, is deplace: Pragmatists say that the traditional notion that "truth is correspondence to reality" is an uncashable and outworn metaphor. Some true statements— like "the cat is on the mat"—can be paired off with other chunks of reality so as to associate parts of the statement with parts of the chosen chunk. Most true statements—like "the cat is not on the mat" and "there are transfinite numbers" and "pleasure is better than pain"—cannot. Furthermore, we will be no better off even if we construct a metaphysical scheme which pairs off something in the world with each part of every true statement, and some first-order relation with every relevant metalinguistic relation. For we should still be faced with the question of whether the first-order language

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After Rorty

we use itself "corresponds to reality." That is, we should still wonder whether talk of cats or numbers or goodness is the right way to break up the universe into chunks, whether our language cuts reality at the joints. The pragmatists conclude that the intuition that truth is correspondence should be extirpated rather than explicated. On this view, the notion of reality as having a "nature" to which it is our duty to correspond is simply one more variant of the notion that the gods can be placated by chanting the right words. The notion that some one among the languages mankind has used to deal with the universe is the one the universe prefers—the one which cuts things at the joints—was a pretty conceit. But by now it has become too i . shopworn to serve any purpose.30 Rorty is adamant on this point of representation. There is no sense to the demand one must link language to something outside that language in order for sense to be made of what is being stated—the image of the mind as being a Great Mirror. Instead of seeing our philosophical beliefs arising through pictures and metaphor, traditional philosophy accounts for our convictions by means of propositions and statements. This has critical import for the philosophy of religion because of the repeated demand by assorted agnostics and atheists to show where the correspondence fits between God-talk and God himself. If Rorty is right that meaning is not derived by corresponding language with reality, but rather by showing how various sentences work within the context of the language spoken, the religious believer is not, a priori, banned from speaking her language. But whether in the context of religious language or ordinary language, there are immediate questions—albeit some of which ride on the assumptions Rorty rejects—which arise once the theory of truth as representation is discarded. For instance, how does one then distinguish true statements from false statements? Sense from nonsense? Can we even speak of objectivity? Rorty replies to these questions as an antirepresentationalist, so he reduces issues of representation and objectivity to the question of how to enhance social solidarity. If talk of objectivity comes up, it should not be objectivity construed as the attempt to move outside our society, to jump from our contingent placement in the world to something robustly metaphysical or ontological. Objectivity should be rather understood as the attempt to extend intersubjective agreement as far as possible. It is the desire "to extend the reference of 'us' as far as we can." Those who do this are pragmatists. "Within the philosophical community, they are best known as holists." Pragmatists view truth in William James' sense of "what is good for us to believe." In contrast to the view of truth understood as the "accurate representation of reality," the pragmatist's goal is to work towards Dewey's view of a society—one that is democratic, progressive, and pluralist. We work

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towards it insofar as we successfully establish greater and greater intersubjective agreement and novelty: If one reinterprets objectivity as intersubjectivity, or as solidarity, in the ways I suggest below, then one will drop the question of how to get in touch with "mind-independent and language-independent reality." One will replace it with questions like "What are the limits of our community? Are the encounters sufficiently free and open? Has what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders who are suffering? To outsiders who have new ideas?" These are political questions rather than metaphysical or epistemological questions. Dewey seems to me to have given us the right lead when he viewed pragmatism not as grounding, but as clearing the ground for, democratic politics. Lacking what appears to be robust philosophical and conceptual reinforcement to his position, can Rorty be so confident he will be successful in establishing solidarity? Without robust conceptual tools, how optimistic can Rorty be in his desire to increase social solidarity? When examined in the moral context, some have argued his criticisms of first philosophy leads to relativism. If so, the chances for establishing social solidarity would apparently bejeopardized. Rorty rejects the charge that the pragmatist's view is equivalent to relativism. Distinguishing pragmatism from relativism, Rorty says rationality and truth can be understood as compliments we pay to our beliefs once we oblige ourselves to justifying them. Gary Gutting, a critical but fairly agreeable commentator on Rorty, puts the matter of justification this way: "Rorty's view— which he calls 'epistemological behaviorism'—is that we need nothing beyond this commonsense model as an account of epistemic justification. That is, justification, even in far more significant and complex cases, is just a matter of being able to give good reasons (put forward adequate supporting propositions) for the belief." Rorty's pragmatism is not a state of relativistic fuzzies where you have your truth and I have mine. For the pragmatist, what is true is an expression of commendation, whereby " 'knowledge' is, like 'truth,' simply a compliment paid to the beliefs which we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed." This is very different from the relativist's view (assuming there are people who actually think this way), that we cannot, in any wise, evaluate our respective beliefs—that we have no basis for saying an existence without suffering is better than one mired in violence, or that we have no support for saying indiscriminate kindness is better than indiscriminate murder. The pragmatist is "making the purely negative point that we should drop the traditional distinction between knowledge and opinion, construed as the distinction between truth

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After Rorty

as correspondence to reality and truth as a commendatory term for well-justified beliefs." Linked to the desire for human solidarity, thepragmatist's view of truth isn't overly complex. The pragmatist, in fact, does not have a theory of truth. She sees no need to go beyond the description of truth as being those beliefs we find good to believe. Rorty's redescription of the main vocabulary of traditional philosophy has dramatic consequences for philosophy. But traditional philosophy does not stand alone in this respect as this vocabulary also forms the backbone of traditional science and the so-called, "scientific method." It is therefore important to review how Rorty understands the impact his metaphilosophical position has on these topics.

Rorty's View of Science Rorty has found support for many of his criticisms of the philosophical tradition, although there has been hesitation on the part of many philosophers to subscribe to Rorty's account of science. "Science as solidarity," at first blush, reads as if it had been authored by a theologian troubled because of the priority now given to science over religion. This is not meant as a criticism of Rorty's tone or disposition. It is refreshing to read a critical appraisal of science from someone with no religious beliefs or theological affiliations. Religious or not, he does us all a service by analyzing the favorite claims of science and setting forth the limits of an inquiry which can sometimes exaggerate its abilities. For those with a close eye on Western culture, it is evident that, now come of age, we have placed science on a pedestal. It is an estimation often put in contrast to other human endeavors and inquiries. "In our culture, the notions of 'science,' 'rationality,' 'objectivity,' and 'truth,' are bound up with one another. Science is thought of as offering 'hard,' 'objective' truth: truth as correspondence to reality, the only sort of truth worthy of the name." In the traditional view of scientific inquiry, if an explanation is to be considered solid and objective it must be measured against the true picture of reality as described by science. As a result, academics who labor outside the domain of the natural sciences often feel compelled to show how their work embodies the scientific method. Only by proceeding through the inquiry this way, so the story goes, can one be assured the results are true and objective. Rorty pegs logical empiricists as some of the main culprits of this view: For just as Plato was content to leave the world of appearances to the philodoxers, so many of the logical empiricists were, implicitly or explicitly, content to leave the rest of the culture to itself. On their view, once the job of demarcation had been accomplished, once the distinctive nature of science

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had been accurately described, there was no need to say much about the other activities of human beings. Although logical empiricism was humbled through the critiques of Hempel and Neurath, the same high opinion of science's ability nevertheless remains largely intact. Rorty wishes to put forth a different view of science. He suggests that the science versus nonscience distinction was a search for metaphysical comfort. Just as the scientist has replaced the priest, the comfort once provided by religion is now replaced by this view of science. The analogy is strong. Religion has it high priests, bishops and cardinals, holy books, holy language, doctrines and heresies, places of worship, imprimatur and liturgies. And so science has its prestigious institutions, Nobel Prize winners, leading researchers, academies, journals, and conferences. This isn't to say that there can be no means of securing excellence for the tasks science (or, for that matter, any other discipline) endeavors to achieve. It is only to warn of the exaggerations its success may bring. Rorty contends this venerated image of science is also problematic because it unduly prioritizes the sciences over other intellectual inquiries. "We need to stop thinking of science as the place where the human mind confronts the world, and of the scientist as exhibiting proper humility in the face of superhuman forces." To show what is at stake in this debate, we can distinguish two different meanings of the word "rational": rationality as "methodology" and rationality as "reasonability." Rationality as methodology is the view that the "criteria for success is laid down in advance." Understanding rationality this way divides and qualifies intellectual activity, clearly demarcating and separating the work of poets and artists from the judges and lawyers. The former, as opposed to the latter, have no a priori means (or desire) for gauging their success before they accomplish their ends. There are no agreed upon standards that necessarily guide their work. Standards can even arise as they engage in their creative activity. "By contrast, we think of judges as knowing in advance what criteria a brief will have to satisfy in order to invoke a favorable decision, and of business people as setting well-defined goals and being judged by their success in achieving them." The classic example in this latter grouping is the scientist: [The scientist] knowing in advance what would count as disconfirming his hypothesis and prepared to abandon that hypothesis as a result of the unfavorable outcome of a single experiment, seems a truly heroic example. Further, we seem to have a clear criterion for the success of a scientific theory—namely, its ability to predict, and thereby to enable us to control some portion of the world. If to be rational means to be able to lay down

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criteria in advance, then it is plausible to take natural science as the paradigm of rationality. Once this definition of rationality gains wide acceptance the humanities can quickly be relegated to a level of rational engagement sub-par to that of the sciences. Rorty wants to offer an alternative which does not unjustly discriminate between the humanities and the natural sciences. Rorty's alternative to the scientific view of rationality carries a sense of saneness or reasonableness. Rorty believes this understanding of rationality actually names a set of moral virtues: [Such as] tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force. These are the virtues which members of a civilized society must possess if the society is to endure. In this sense of "rational," the word means something more like "civilized" than like "methodological." When so construed, the distinction between the rational and the irrational has nothing in particular to do with the difference between the arts and the sciences. On this construction, to be rational is simply to discuss any topic—religious, literary, or scientific—in a way which eschews dogmatism, defensiveness, and righteous indignation.49 Understood this way the research carried out in the humanities can also be legitimately viewed as rational, irrespective of the fact that academics do not always exemplify these virtues. Yet human failure should no more disqualify the humanities as being "rational" than it should the sciences. Despite what Rorty believes to be a more adequate definition of rationality, he freely admits it is one that does not readily satisfy all members of the academic community. For some, the stronger sense of rationality is to be preferred because of how it emphasizes objective truth, method, criteria, and the requirement of corresponding beliefs to reality. Despite this opposition, Rorty's pragmatic disposition finds the stronger view of rationality misguided, especially with its bifurcation between the objective and the subjective, and the distinction between fact and value. Rationality, instead, should be the desire for "unforced agreement"—even if this agreement is derived within our admittedly, ethnocentric society. As Rorty puts it, we must work by our own lights. This does not mean our society is impermeable to ideas and criticisms from outside. On the contrary, we must openly encourage new ways of thinking. The ideas introduced will be compared, and possibly intertwined, with views already held. Viewpoints outside of our own culture can also be welcome— "we can always enlarge the scope of 'us' by regarding other people, or

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cultures, as members of the same community of inquiry as ourselves—by treating them as part of the group among whom unforced agreement is to be sought." What can't be provided is some sort of epistemological or metaphysical skyhook that will extract us from our distinctly finite situation. What is most striking about Rorty's position is that it seems capable of moving society towards greater tolerance and solidarity without the robust conceptual machinery of the philosophical tradition. In light of the discussion so far, it's now worth asking if scientific investigation is able to carry through with its optimistic self-description. Rorty doesn't doubt that science has had success describing the world. What Rorty finds contentious are the reasons typically given for why this success has been achieved. Success, he thinks, is not due to the scientist being able to show, for example, the correspondence between an atom and the world: The antirepresentationalist is quite willing to grant that our language, like our bodies, has been shaped by the environment we live in. Indeed, he or she insists on this point—the point that our minds or our language could not (as the representationalist skeptic fears) be "out of touch with the reality" any more than our bodies could. What he or she denies is that it is explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that item "corresponds to" or "represents" the environment in a way that some other item does not. The reason for this denial is the antirepresentationalist's contention that there is no "independent test of accuracy of representation—of reference or correspondence to an 'antecedently determinate' reality—no test distinct from the success which is supposedly explained by this accuracy." Quoting Kuhn, Rorty writes "there is no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'."56 Seen this way: [GJreat scientists invent descriptions of the world which are useful for purposes of predicting and controlling what happens, just as poets and political thinkers invent other descriptions of it for other purposes. But there is no sense in which any of these descriptions is an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself. These philosophers regard the very idea of such a representation as pointless. Rorty can't be read as demeaning the importance scientific inquiry plays in society. But the importance is not because science somehow represents the nature of reality in a way other disciplines fall short of doing. Rather, the humanities have different measurements for success. Because of their different subject-matter we should expect difference. Prediction and control, as Rorty

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puts it, should not be the primary (or even secondary) concern of the humanities. In fact, seen from Rorty's softer version of rationality, as reasonability, the sciences and the humanities operate in compatible, albeit different, measure. What Rorty does find particularly praiseworthy in the sciences are the institutions it has created and the virtues exemplified in its pursuits. The solidarity that largely characterizes work in the sciences should be a virtue envied by society at large, not outside their own grasp of implementation. These would be the attributes of "relying on persuasion rather than force, of respect for the opinions of colleagues, [and] of curiosity and eagerness for new data and ideas." Out of this milieu arises a "free and open encounter," one that Rorty even characterizes as "an encounter in which truth cannot fail to win."

Some Preliminary Conclusions Rorty's metaphilosophical position is striking for a number of reasons. In contrast to the view of truth as a correspondence, Rorty wants to talk about the capacity to understand others: "the best way to find out what to believe is to listen to as many suggestions and arguments as you can." If we speak of inquiry, its stipulated goal will be "an appropriate mixture of unforced agreement with tolerant disagreement (where what counts as appropriate is determined, within that sphere, by trial and error)." There is no method for deriving more rational, objective, or truthful considered judgments. Mere coherence and mere agreement are all that should be expected. When we turn to moral theory, and in light of the conceptual machinery that must be in place for it to work, Rorty's view is also relatively unencumbered. We should again return to the problem of relativism for a few moments. The big question for many of Rorty's detractors is whether his account of objectivity, truth, rationality and science pave the way for relativism. Put otherwise, by removing truth and objectivity from our language, is the potential for moral and political anarchy around the corner? To take a common, favorite example, without a robust definition of truth how do we ultimately refute the neo-Nazi? Or, to update an old example, how will the religious zealot be deterred? Rorty senses that this way of putting matters only begs the theoretical questions. Having abandoned the language of the realists, pragmatists cannot be expected to answer questions presupposed from within the realists' own framework of thinking. Rorty puts a twist on matters by saying that pragmatists do not try to argue against the realists' answers but against their questions. "Unless one were worried about the really real, unless one had already

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bought in on Plato's claim that degrees of certainty, or of centrality to our belief systems, were correlated with different relations to reality" one would be hard pressed to make sense of these questions. While pragmatists do not think zealots, ruffians and other undesirables will be refuted by uttering platitudes, it is naive to think people of this sort need only be convinced of the Truth to change their ways. Moreover, to slip in a Nietzschean point, it is worth noting that those who speak most glowingly of the Truth have historically been the ones most guilty of violating its precepts, whether as presidents trying to justify wars of aggression, or as religious leaders trying to impose their parochial values on the rest of society. Put otherwise: It is the analytic moral philosophers who are concerned to preserve the Platonic and Kantian notion of unconditional obligation who are giving aid and comfort to authoritarianism . . . It is an attempt to attribute ultimate authority to a quasi-divinity called Reason, and it is no better than the attempt to attribute such authority to God. It is one more attempt to say, "What I am saying is not just one more interpretation; it is true." Rorty contends that notions like "unforced agreement" and "free and open encounter" should not only replace disputes as the above, but in addition the more convoluted and controversial notions such as "the will of God," "the moral law," "moral absolutes," "what our beliefs are trying to represent accurately," and "what makes our beliefs true." Once these replacements are made, the difference between a society that praises tolerance, open dialogue, and the free exchange of ideas, and those which don't obtains its own justification. Admittedly, neither religious nor political fundamentalists may be easily convinced of the errors of their ways. But this will be the case whether one is a pragmatist or a realist. Rorty's weak sense of rationality does not pit the sciences against the humanities. Charitably put, "The people now called 'scientists' would no longer think of themselves as a member of a quasi-priestly order, nor would the public think of themselves as in the care of such an order." The outcome of this reorganization of definitions and conceptions would have dramatic consequences for society: For one's ultimate loyalty would be to the larger community which permitted and encouraged this kind of freedom and insouciance. This community would serve no higher end than its own preservation and selfimprovement, the preservation and enhancement of civilization. It would identify rationality with that effort, rather than with the desire for objectivity. So it would feel no need for a foundation more solid than reciprocal loyalty. 67

28

After Rorty

Eschewing the belief that social solidarity needs strong philosophical or scientific backing, Rorty attempts to accomplish the goal without undue conceptual and theoretical sweat and labor. "On a pragmatist view, rationality is not the exercise of a faculty called 'reason'—a faculty which stands in some determinate relation to reality. Nor is the use of a method. It is simply a matter of being open and curious, and of relying on persuasion rather than force." Reasonability and objectivity, construed as tolerance and willingness for dialogue, should be sufficient for increasing social solidarity. There is a particular attractiveness to Rorty's position. Lacking the conceptual machinery normally attached to other theories that attempt to render society more hospitable, Rorty's view may have more practical chances for implementation. For example, the straightforward emphasis of Rorty's position on tolerance may prove more successful for granting social emancipation than a view which demands robust principles or rules. There is, in addition, an intuitive appeal to a view of knowledge that does not, a priori, set one domain of research and study over another. Whether literature, poetry, religious, political studies (and, yes), philosophy, all have contributed to our overall personal and social well-being. For example, the privileging of science and the coupling of its handmaiden, technology, has resulted in social conscience acquiescing to the "Technological Imperative." This Imperative cum Mantra seduces us into thinking that, "If the technology exists, we should do it." More often than not the values implicit in this claim follow from strong corporate interests, which, in turn, are foisted on society without dialogue, discussion, or consideration of the implications that might result from this implementation. The values pushed aside in the scientist's wake are also important to the well-being of the individual and society, such as environmental and health concerns, and for those who chose so, spiritual well-being. Although Rorty does not speak of progress in philosophy, he does think there is progress in society, though it is not the image of humanity moving towards an apex point of perfection. "For now the question is not about how to define words like 'truth' or 'rationality' or 'knowledge' or 'philosophy,' but about what self-image our society should have of itself." Rorty sets up the difference between the realist and the pragmatist quite nicely by stating that the former is interested vafinding and the latter's interest is in making. For the latter, there are no deep definitions to be found, uncovered, or grounded. Efforts are rather directed to increasing (or "making") social solidarity, its values of tolerance, openness, willingness for dialogue, and hesitancy to use force. While Rorty sees no way of showing foundational justification for this view or that it "mirrors the natural world," it would be a mistake to fault pragmatists on this point. The problem of justification is a general problem for all who make theoretical claims. Assertions by philosophers or others to

Rorty's Analysis of Traditional Philosophy

29

the contrary, that justification has been finally grounded, satisfied, or made uncontroversial, are misleading. The only justification needed (or available) is that of comparison. Compare a society with these characteristics named by the pragmatist against a society which does not have them. The characteristics find their justification by showing that "nobody who has experienced both would prefer the latter." We can even do more—and note how Ro r t y thinks the society should discuss religious beliefs: One will talk about the problem of evil, the stultifying effect of a religious culture upon intellectual life, the danger of theocracy, the potentiality for anarchy in a secularist culture, the Brave New World consequences of a utilitarian, secular morality. One will contrast the lives of one's secularist and of one's religious friends and acquaintances. One will do, in short, just what the "new fuzzies" in philosophy of science say scientists do when some relatively large-scale proposal to change the way nature (or part of nature) is pictured is up for discussion. One will muddle through, hoping that some reweaving will happen on both sides, and that some consensus may thus emerge. Lacking in this dialogical process are stout methodological concepts. The dialogue, in a very basic sense, requires a single responsibility, one which will serve us again in our discussion over private v. public pursuits: "a duty to talk to each other, to converse about our views of the world, to use persuasion rather than force, to be tolerant of diversity, to be contritely fallibilist." Envisioned is an "intellectual life" described by Rorty in rather blase terms: [The intellectual life] would be pursued without much reference to the traditional distinctions between the cognitive and the noncognitive, between "truth" and "comfort," or between the prepositional and the nonpropositional. In particular, it would not make much of the line between "philosophy" and something else, nor try to allot distinctive cultural roles to art, religion, science, and philosophy. It would get rid of the idea that there was a special sort of expert—the philosopher—who dealt with a certain range of topics (e.g., Being, reasoning, language, knowledge, mind). It would no longer think that "philosophy" was the name of a sacred precinct that must be kept out of the hands of the enemy. People in other disciplines would no longer come around to philosophy professors to get their concepts "clarified." On this note, Rorty's analysis of truth as representation, what constitutes rationality and objectivity, including his examination of science, has significant implications for the philosophy of religion and theological investigation.

30

After Rorty

Before we look into these implications we need to first explore Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophies. This distinction will provide a conceptual framework for implementing Rorty's redescription of key philosophical terms into the theological context.

Systematic Philosophy and Edifying Philosophy In Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature one of the most useful distinctions in Rorty's writings is found, that between systematic philosophy and edifying philo75 sophy. Beginning with systematic philosophy, what characterizes this approach to philosophy is its interest in epistemology. The popularity and strength of systematic philosophy has largely come about by applying the success achieved in the sciences to philosophical problems: Successive philosophical revolutions within this mainstream have been produced by philosophers excited by new cognitive feats—e.g., the rediscovery of Aristotle, Galilean mechanics, the development of self-conscious historiography in the nineteenth century, Darwinian biology, mathematical logic. Thomas's use of Aristotle to conciliate the Fathers, Descartes's and Hobbes's criticisms of scholasticism, the Enlightenment's notion that reading Newton leads naturally to the downfall of tyrants, Spencer's evolutionism, Garnap's attempt to overcome metaphysics through logic, are so many attempts to refashion the rest of culture on the model of the last cognitive achievements. 6 The systematic philosopher typically takes success gained in one area of inquiry and attempts to apply this success as a sort of methodological template across all other areas of culture. With proper epistemological understanding, so the story goes, where there was once superstition and convention, there will be objectivity, rationality and deep insight into human nature, knowledge and assurance of progress: A "mainstream" Western philosopher typically says: Now that such-andsuch a line of inquiry has had such a stunning success, let us reshape all inquiry, and all of culture, on its model, thereby permitting objectivity and rationality to prevail in areas previously obscured by convention, superstition, and the lack of a proper epistemological understanding of man's ability accurately to represent nature.77 Systematic philosophers who establish reputations, a greatness, do so because of their astonishing, scientific-like ability to erect conceptual edifices. "Great systematic philosophers, like great scientists, build for eternity." 78 Once

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31

built, defense by vigorous argument and proof is necessary to show that the edifice represents nature, how things really are if they could describe themselves. Offered are accurate representations, between the world and our sentences, our thoughts, a final vocabulary that successfully achieves universal ,• 79 commensuration. In contrast to this mainstream, systematic view of philosophy, there is a peripheral view of philosophy described by Rorty as "edifying" philosophy. The exemplary figures within this peripheral view are philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Santayana, William James, John Dewey, the later Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Despite the diversity of this assemblage, their resemblances can be noted on a number of points. First is their shared suspicion of the idea that the task of human investigation is to know "essences." There is, secondly, a general distrust for taking a successful methodology from one discipline and applying it as an algorithm for all other disciplines to use in the hope it will grant similar success. Thirdly, and related to the second, against the constructive impulse of the systematic philosopher, the edifying philosopher is suspicious of overly optimistic visions of vocabulary. Once one becomes enamored with a particular vocabulary, what usually follows is the desire to show how this way of speaking, in Rorty's metaphor, mirrors nature. Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, in contrast, are emblematic of the edifying philosopher of the twentieth century. Unlike systematic philosophers, they "hammer away at the holistic point that words take their meanings from other words rather than by virtue of their representative character, and the corollary that vocabularies acquire their privileges from the men who use them rather than from their transparency to the real." Rorty explains: They have kept alive the historicist sense that this century's "superstition" was the last century's triumph of reason as well as the relativist sense that the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, but be just another of 81 the potential infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described. Instead of attempting to show the representative nature of words, edifying philosophers wish to show how the meaning of words is derived from other words. The "great" edifying philosophers are therefore "reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms."Unlike systematic philosophers who wish to build eternal conceptual systems or schemes, edifying philosophers wish to pull apart, to sound out the idols, to "destroy for the sake of their own generation." Rorty particularly likes the similarity between edifying philosophers and poets. Edifying philosophers, like poets, are intent on opening a "sense of wonder," "something which is not an accurate representation of

32

After Rorty

what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be described." Characterizing philosophy in this manner, they indeed go against a deeply entrenched view of what it is to do philosophy. But this is exactly the point. The comparison between systematic and edifying philosophers (and especially the comparison between philosophers and poets), brings up the question of what constitutes a philosopher. Quite naturally this takes the discussion back to Plato as he was most notable to contrast reason and emotion, realty and mere appearance, knowledge and opinion. Those who take these dualisms to heart will, in turn, take seriously the "who really is the philosopher" debate, the most typical being between continental and analytic philosophers. This in-house battle has been nicely summarized by Stanley Rosen, who, "with his tongue firmly in his cheek, deftly summarizes the stereotypical representation of the distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy as follows: 'precision, conceptual clarity and systematic rigour are the property of analytical philosophy, whilst the continentals indulge in speculative metaphysics or cultural hermeneutics, or, alternatively, depending on one's sympathies, in wool-gathering and bathos'."86 Rorty takes this protracted argument to be little more than "a rhetorical gambit" between incommensurable discourses. Edifying philosophers go against both analytic and Continental streams of philosophy because of a suspicion of language, argument and attempts to represent the Real in a final vocabulary. Edifying philosophers see their task to "simply offer another set of terms, without saying that these terms are the new-found accurate representations of essences."88 For edifying philosophers, to philosophize is to be engaged in a task that differs significantly from how philosophy has traditionally been carried out. Compared to the goals of the systematic philosophers, edifying philosophers see themselves as "participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry." Edifying philosophers, as we have seen, drop the idea of representation. And so while edifying philosophers have something to say in a conversation, it is predicated on the belief that uttered sentences are connected to other sentences, not to the world. With this view of philosophy and language, edifying philosophers, like Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 90 do not wish to be thought of as philosophers having views about how things are. In fact, Rorty contends that "edifying philosophers have to decry the very notion of having a view, while avoiding having a view about having views." 91 Their philosophical task is not seen as having to represent the world accurately or as it is if it could speak for itself. "They do not accept the Cartesian-Kantian picture presupposed by the idea of 'our minds' or 'our language' as an 'inside' which can be contrasted to something (perhaps 92 something very different) 'outside.' "

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33

This brings the conversation back to Plato. But instead of the classic concerns that originally got the philosophical ball rolling, Rorty reminds us of a more overall embracing concern. The philosopher's love of wisdom: One way of thinking of wisdom as something of which the love is not the same as that of argument, and of which the achievement does not consist in finding the correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to think of it as the practical wisdom necessary to participate in a conversation. One way to see edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into a research program. Edifying philosophers can never end philosophy, but they can prevent it 93 from attaining the secure path of a science. If the philosophical enterprise, now as edifying philosophy, is stipulated by Rorty as participating in a conversation, rather than contributing to an inquiry, it's clear this understanding will dramatically change the way philosophy is to be done. And there is no better place to explore this change than in the context of religious belief.

Notes 1.

Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 58; quoting from John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: New American Library, 1948), p. 26. 2. We can agree with Gilson here. "When theologians, whatever their particular creed may be, attempt to remodel philosophy to suit their own beliefs, they are prompted to do so by a sincere conviction that philosophy is in itself an excellent thing, so good indeed that it would be a shame to allow it to perish." Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 36. 3. These debates are well represented in the tensions between theologians and philosophers. It certainly did not go unnoticed by Hume. Philo, in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, illustrates this view. "Actually, Philo was repeating what had been asserted by Christian skeptics from Montaigne and Pascal to Bayle and Hume. This view, which is close to that of Demea in the first dialogue, contends that because human intellectual responses are incapable of any certain truths, one therefore should abandon reason and accept truths on faith. This view, called 'fideism,' employs skepticism to undermine human knowledge claims in order to prepare the way for the acceptance of revealed truth. Various religious writers have stated this view in a moving and convincing fashion." Richard H. Popkin, "Introduction," Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by David Hume (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1985), p. xv. 4.

Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 3.

5. Ibid. He goes on to say "philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which

34

6.

7.

8.

9.

After Rorty represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so)." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 3. "The classical modern view develops this understanding in terms of representation. A belief is taken to be a mental representation. Its truth is a matter of its accurately corresponding to an external (nonrepresentational) object. Since, on the representationalist view, we are directly aware of only our representations, the great problem becomes justification: showing that our beliefs do in fact correspond to external objects. This project requires showing that some representations (a subset of our beliefs or perhaps some other, more basic representations—e.g., sensations) have a privileged status that makes the connection to the world." Gary Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 32. In a helpful article Jaegwon Kim isolates three components of Rorty's critique of traditional philosophy: (1) The Platonic doctrine is a doctrine concerning truth and knowledge, according to which truth is correspondence with nature, and knowledge is a matter of possessing accurate representations. (2) The Cartesian doctrine is the doctrine of the mind as the private inner stage, "the Inner Mirror," in which cognitive action takes place. The Platonic doctrine of knowledge as representation was transformed into the idea of knowledge as inner representation of outer reality. The Cartesian contribution was to mentalize the Platonic doctrine. (3) The Kantian doctrine is a conception of philosophy according to which it is the business of philosophy to investigate the "foundations" of the sciences, the arts, culture and morality, and adjudicate the cognitive claims of these areas. Philosophy, as epistemology, must set universal standards of rationality and objectivity for all actual and possible claims to knowledge. See, Jaegwon Kim, "Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy, 11, 10, October 1980, pp. 589-90. In another place Rorty cites Brandon's division: "For the first, or representationalist, school (typified by Frege, Russell, Tarski, and Carnap), Brandon says, 'the essential feature of language is its capacity to represent the way things are.' Representationalists, he continues, 'take truth to be the basic concept in terms of which a theory of meaning, and hence a theory of language, is to be developed.' The second school (typified by Dewey and Wittgenstein) starts off from a conception of language as a set of social practises. Members of this school start off from assertibility, and then squeeze the notion of truth in as best they can." Richard Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 151. Quotation from Robert Brandon, "Truth and Assertibility," Journal of Philosophy LXXIII (1976),p. 137. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, p. 4; emphasis his. This comparison with religion is voiced elsewhere: "For our notion of the world—it will be said—is not a lot of unquestioned beliefs, but rather of a hard, unyielding, rigid etre-en-soi which stands aloof, sublimely indifferent to the attentions we lavish upon it. The true realistic believer will view idealisms and pragmatisms with the same suspicion with which the true believer in the God of our Fathers will view, for

Rorty's Analysis of Traditional Philosophy

10. 11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

35

example, Tillich's talk of an 'object of ultimate concern'." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 13. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 52. Richard Rorty, "Foreword," in Nihilism & Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, & Law, by Gianni Vattimo, edited by Santiago Zabala and translated by William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. x. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 4. As Milbank notes, "Kierkegaard denies that those who existentially live the Christian life, or preachers who expound it from pulpits, present the truest vision of this life. This is done better by poets, who are aesthetically suspended from the continuum (i.e. subject to melancholia), and reinvent Christianity as though it were their own fiction." John Milbank, "The Sublime in Kierkegaard," PostSecular Philosophy: between philosophy and theology, edited by Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge Press, 1998), p. 147; emphasis his. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 5. In the case of Wittgenstein, Kerr remarks: "In retrospect, that is to say, he regarded his own early work as deeply metaphysical—in the sense that certain words are allowed to call things 'of a higher order' into existence, like an enchanter's spell. 'The idea,' he says . .. 'is that one can beckon a lifeless object to come, just as one would beckon a person.' The principle at work, in metaphysics as in magic, is that of'personification' .. . animism, as we might say." Fergus Kerr, "Metaphysics and Magic: Wittgenstein's Kink," Post-Secular Philosophy: between philosophy and theology, edited by Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 248; quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer1 s Golden Bough (Retford, Brymill, 1979), p. 4. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 5. Ibid., p. 9. Rorty states elsewhere that for the pragmatist "'knowledge' is, like 'truth,' simply a compliment paid to the beliefs which we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 24. As for "thinking," Heidegger believes that it only begins when "we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought." Martin Heidegger, The Question of Technology, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), p. 112. For an excellent introduction to this division see Simon Critchley's, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Malachowski also has interesting comments here; see RichardRorty, pp. 12—13. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 8. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 1. On the question of the "mind-body" problem, see forty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. At least as far as some definitions go. Rorty presumably would not be adverse to what Hume described as "reasonable skepticism." As Cleanthes defines it in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: "The declared profession of every reasonable skeptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, without the greatest

36

22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

After Rorty violence, preventit." David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1985), p. 25. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 64. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, pp. 4—5. This goes for, so-called, laws of logic and other principles of this sort. Rorty states, "There are, of course, lots of criteria which cut across all divisions between parts of culture—e.g., the laws of logic, the principle that a notorious liar's reports do not count as evidence, and the like. But these do not possess some special authority by virtue of their universality, any more than the set consisting of the fulcrum, the screw, and the level is privileged by virtue of contributing to every other machine." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. xlvii, footnote 51. D. Z. Phillips, "Reclaiming the Conversations of Mankind," Philosophy, 69, 1994, p. 37. Speaking of Wittgenstein and Davidson's view of the relation of language to the world, Rorty states they "both want us to see the relation as merely causal, rather than also representational. Both philosophers would like us to stop thinking that there is something called 'language' which is a 'scheme' which can organize, or fit, or stand in some other noncausal relation to, a 'content' called 'the world'." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 60. Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 23; from Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 145. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 303; from Donald Davidson's "Truth and Meaning,"Synthese 1(1967), p. 304. The full reference is: Volume 7, No. 3, September 1967, pp. 304-23. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 303; from Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 305. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xiii—xix. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 303; see Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 308; emphasis mine. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, pp. 79—80; emphasis his. As he states elsewhere, "Pragmatists agree with Wittgenstein that there is no way to come between language and its object. Philosophy cannot answer the question: can we perspicuously relate the various vocabularies we use to one another, and thereby dissolve the philosophical problems that seem to arise at the places where we switch over from one vocabulary to another?" Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers Volume 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 127. As we will see later, this has been most vigorously argued by Kai Nielsen, although in his recent metaphilosophical writings he discusses how the attempt to pair off bits of language with their corresponding objects is no longer philosophically tenable. Compare, for example, his Philosophy & Atheism: In Defense oj Atheism (New York: Prometheus Books, 1985) with his metaphilosophical views in After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991). Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 23. For his part, Nielsen understands objectivity in the following terms: "we say that a morality or a set of moral views

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37

is justified ('objectivelyjustified' if that isn't pleonastic) when, at a given time in a cool hour, among reasonable people properly informed, these people achieve a reflective consensus on what is to be done and on what moral views to hold." The advantage of defining objectivity in this manner is that it is an "utterly nonmetaphysical conception of objectivity compatible with reflective common sense ('critical commonsensism,' to use Peirce's phrase) and with an appeal to our considered judgments." Nielsen, After the Demise of the Tradition, pp. 242—3. 33. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 64. Elsewhere he states that "Once conversation replaces confrontation, the notion of the mind as Mirror of Nature can be discarded. The notion of philosophy as the discipline which looks for privileged representations among those constituting the Mirror becomes unintelligible. A thoroughgoing holism has no place for the notion of philosophy as 'conceptual,' as 'apodictic,' as picking out the 'foundations' of the rest of knowledge, as explaining which representations are 'purely given' or 'purely conceptual,' as presenting a 'canonical notation' rather than an empirical discovery, or as isolating 'transframework heuristic categories.' If we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all possible forms of social practice. So holism produces, as Quine has argued in detail and Sellars has said in passing, a conception of philosophy which has nothing to do with the quest for certainty." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 170—2. 34. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 22; emphasis his. In another place, Rorty has a slight variant on this statement by James as stating, "what is better for us to believe." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 10; emphasis mine. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Ibid. Rorty, Objectivity,relativism,andtruth,p. 13. Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 15 Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 24.

39. 40. 41. 42.

Ibid., pp. 23—4; emphasis his. Ibid., pp. 35-45. Ibid., p. 35. Roger Penrose is a good example here: "Penrose is an admitted Platonist. Scientists do not invent the truth; they discover it. Genuine truths exude a beauty, a Tightness, a self-evident quality that gives them the power of revelation." Or, Horgan himself: "Science, more than any other mode of knowledge—literary criticism, philosophy, art, religion—yields durable insights into the nature of things." Horgan, The End of Science, pp. 2, 3; emphasis mine.

43.

Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 46.

44. Ibid., p. 36. 45. This has a certain resemblance to Nielsen's view: " 'reasonable people' here can be plausibly taken to be people who are not parti pns, who are open to argument and the appeal to evidence, who attend to the causes of their coming to have the considered judgments they have and to the consequences of acting on them, who are willing to reconsider and are concerned with consistency and coherence." This coincides with his own sense of Wide Reflective Equilibrium', "rationalization

38

46. 47. 48.

49. 50.

51.

52. 53.

54.

55. 56.

After Rorty involves a shuttling back and forth between theories, principles, and concrete moral judgments with a mutual correction between them until we have, considering them together, the best fit." Nielsen, After the Demise of the Tradition, pp. 242, 225. This is a helpful way of understanding reasonability, and although we are getting ahead of ourselves, this view would be good to keep in mind when we come to the discussion about how religious people should try to discuss their private beliefs all the while recognizing the private/public distinction. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 36. Ibid. Ibid. James Home has pointed out to me that Rorty's concept of rationality differs from Dewey's, in that Dewey posits reason on a scientific model, whereas Rorty seems to have gone beyond that view. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 37. "[We] should avoid the idea that there is some special virtue in knowing in advance what criteria you are going to satisfy, in having standards by which to measure progress." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 37. To be ethnocentric "is merely to say that beliefs suggested by another culture must be tested by trying to weave them together with beliefs we already have." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 26. Rorty is not interested in establishing a cross-cultural means of deriving agreement. With Davidson, Rorty believes we already hold to mostly true beliefs. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 38. An interesting discussion of such attempts can be found in Fergus Kerr's Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 5. As Phillips further explains, we "can ask whether Tom is in pain, but what does it mean to ask whether the language in which we talk of pain itself accurately represents what is Real or what is True? We can ask whether it is true or false that there are chairs in the next room, but what would it mean to ask whether the language in which we speak of physical objects is itself true or false? We can ask whether the curtains are blue, but what would it mean to ask whether the language of colours refers to anything real? Our various uses of language show us what 'contact with reality' comes in these contexts: what it means to speak of real pain, real chairs and real colours. What does it mean to ask whether these uses of language adequately represent what is Real or True? It may be said that we need only distinguish between sentences and vocabularies to appreciate the point being made." Phillips, "Reclaiming the Conversations of Mankind," p. 36. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 6; emphasis his. Ibid., p. 38. From Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 206. As Letson comments, "Correspondence is thus made trivial from the standpoint of epistemology, for given a language-game or vocabulary, it is a simple matter to state the conditions of correspondence. For these theories, questions that would arise in an epistemological inquiry are already settled. A theory will come with an ontology assumed

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39

or postulated by the theory, and that ontology may be superseded by some other theory's ontology; but if the theory is not being questioned at the time, the ontology will be in place for the correspondence theorist to employ. The issue of correspondence under these circumstances is easily settled, for that part of the world that our sentences correspond to will simply be the objects that are used in the putatively true sentences of the theory." Letson, Davidson's Theory of Truth audits Implications for Rorty's Pragmatism, p. 16. 57. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 4; emphasis his. 58. As he asks elsewhere, "what is so special about prediction and control? Why should we think that explanations offered for this purpose are the 'best' explanations? Why should we think that the tools which make possible the attainment of these particular human purposes are less 'merely' human that those which make possible the attainment of beauty or justice?" Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 59. 59. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 39. 60. Ibid.; emphasis mine. This description is somewhat optimistic given how scientists have shown themselves to be highly competitive. The diminutive treatment of Rosalind Franklin by Watson stands as a low point in collaborative work in the sciences. We can nevertheless take what Rorty describes as an ideal, where we aim toward "domination free communication." He has said that "Such a narrative would clarify the conditions in which the idea of truth as correspondence to reality might gradually be replaced by the idea of truth as what comes to be believed in the course of free and open encounters." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 68. 61. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 39. 62. Ibid., p. 41. 63. Ibid., p. 52. 64. Rorty, "Foreword," Nihilism & Emancipation, p. xvi; emphasis his. 65. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 42. It is again easy to see Hume's influence on Rorty here. As Philo argues, "when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies; when we carry our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing without beginning and without end, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and incomprehensible . .. We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to skepticism not to be apprehensive that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions and remove (at least in part) the suspicion, which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning, that is very subtle and refined." David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1985), p. 7. 66. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 44. I'm not quite as charitable as Rorty here. Although scientists and the public don't always openly show these

40

67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81.

After Rorty characteristics, I think the tendencies are at least implicit. I have the good fortune ofliving close to the Perimeter Institute, a new, world-class institute where quantum physicists are congregating to pursue their work, work which to the neophyte appears highly esoteric and delightfully mysterious. To the Institute's credit they have had public lectures which can draw a few hundred people from the community. But the lectures remind me of how it must have felt in times past for the laity to listen to the Mass in Latin, or for peasants who would have had occasion to listen to the university's metaphysicians. While the physicists try to aim discussion at a lay-level, I'm quite certain most of the audience (myself included) is lost after the first ten minutes. Yet all sit in meditative silence with the expectancy that somehow a glimpse into the Truth will be seen. Even the Prime Minister of Canada at the Institute's inauguration said something like, "when we come home at the end of the day, wondering what it's all about, this Institute will be in the middle of trying to answer that question." Unfortunately none of the physicists or dignitaries sharing the stage even smiled at the suggestion, though Steven Weinberg, himself a particle physicist, would've shared this speaker's enthusiasm, thinking that Final Theory, "will bring to a close the great quest for fundamental knowledge." Horgan, The End of Science, p. 75. Rorty, Objectivity,relativism,andtruth, p. 45. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 62; emphasis his. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 28. Kuipers cites House's definition of metaphysical realism, an obsession similar to that of the realist mentioned by Rorty above: "Genuine human knowledge has traditionally been understood in terms of the acquisition of an accurate mental reduplication of extramental reality. In contemporary idiom, knowledge consists in rationally justified, true beliefs or propositions; rational justification means primarily the provision of incorrigible foundations; and truth is largely understood as the correspondence of our concepts, beliefs, or statements to extramental reality." Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 35, footnote 5; from Vaden House, Without God or His Doubles: Realism, Relativism and Rorty (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), p. 12. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 29. Ibid., p. 67. Ibid. Ibid., p. 76. See pp. 365—72. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, pp. 366—7. Ibid.,p.367. Ibid.,p.369. "By 'commensurable' I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point of where statements seem to conflict." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror oj Mature, p. 316. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of .Nature, p. 368. Ibid., p. 367.

Rorty's Analysis of Traditional Philosophy 82. 83. 84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91.

92. 93.

41

Ibid., p. 369. Ibid., p. 370. Having the poet on hand gives the systematic philosopher a handy foil: "Normal philosophers need to think, for example, that in forging the powerful tools of modern analytic philosophy, they are developing weapons to ensure victory in the coming final struggle with the decadent dialecticians. Everybody needs everybody else." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 108. Rorty, Philosophy andthe Mirror of Mature, p. 370; emphasis his. Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, p. 34. Rorty, Philosophy andthe Mirror of Nature, p. 370. See also Truth and Progress, p. 9. Ibid.', emphasis his. Ibid., p. 371. Rorty notes that "Heidegger is not the first to have invented a vocabulary whose purpose is to dissolve the problems considered by his predecessors, rather than to propose new solutions to them. Consider Hobbes and Locke on the problems of the scholastics, and Carnap and Ayer on 'pseudo-problems.' He is not the first to have said that the whole mode of argument used in philosophy up until his day was misguided." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 40. On this point he notes that Heidegger's Die ^eitdes Weltbildes (translated as "The Age of the World-View" by Marjorie Grene in Boundary II197 f>) is the best discussion of this difficulty that he has seen. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.371. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 12. Rorty, Philosophy andthe Mirror of Nature, p. 372; emphasis his.

3

Rorty, Religious Belief, and Ethics

"The god that can be pointed out is an idol, and the religiosity that makes an outward show is an imperfect form of religiosity." Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript While many would dispute the success of the discussion so far, we've attempted to show how, after the demise of traditional philosophy, we cannot hope to establish epistemological foundations or metaphysical vantage-points. These are the vistas which offer, a so-called, God's-eye view of the world, with all objects and truths transparently made known to the rational, objective examiner. Systematic philosophy's failure to provide robust definitions of truth and objectivity, along with the definitions of what it even means to be rational and scientific, requires a redefinition of philosophy and its task. An alternative to this is the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. There are a number of different consequences to Rorty's metaphilosophical view, not the least of which is with ethics. Just as the epistemological project of matching sentences to objects in the world is seen as malpose, so the duty of matching sentences to moral objects, finding moral absolutes or uncovering moral reality fares no better. Better to see "morality," if indeed we call it that, as a relational dynamic with others. Moral progress becomes a matter of our ability to enlarge that dynamic to include more people (but not necessarily one that excludes animals and the environment at large), irrespective of how we may differ in matters of private pursuits. With the aspirations of systematic philosophy placed aside, theology (as well as other disciplines in the humanities, such as literature and poetry), no longer sit underneath the critical, scrutinizing eye of the philosopher. The release from the interests of first philosophy, however, comes with certain conditions. At least in the case of theological investigation, it too has historically operated on the assumption that truth, rationality and objectivity were necessary components of serious inquiry. With these heady notions securely in place, theologians were as guilty as systematic philosophers thinking their discipline provided the optimal vantage-point for saying how things ought to be (albeit in a religious sense), epistemologically and morally. The pragmatist critique of philosophy has as much application to theology as it does with philosophy. Just like systematic philosophy, theology comes

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down from its lofty heights to the realm of human concerns and activities. In other words, the critique that applies to systematic philosophy applies to what we can analogously describe as "systematic theology." Just like systematic philosophy, theology faces similar problems with its strong claims about how the world really is, or what moral absolutes we are bound to. Before we get into more specifics about how theology can be done in Rorty's postPhilosophical, pragmatist world (a discussion reserved for Chapter 4), we need to first move on to what can be described as a pragmatist's philosophy of religion. Throughout his prolific writings Rorty has spoken much of religion, religious belief, theism and Christianity. References to these items appear regularly throughout his work. If they were indexed in the glossaries of his books and articles they would appear almost as frequently as the vocabulary of his metaphilosophical analysis, such as representation, truth as correspondence, rationality and objectivity. Similarly insightful, his comments about religious belief detail what a thoughtful philosopher of religion might also take note of. We begin our examination of Rorty by looking at his account of how language comes in and out of use, and how this quite broad description applies to religious language. Next we will look at his view of religious belief as laid out in an article entitled, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," then moving to more current thoughts as collected in his book Philosophy and Social Hope. Two other chapters that interest us are "Religion as Conversationstopper," and "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance." 4 We will then give a general account of Rorty's view of ethics, and how it might be applied in the secular context. Because religious belief (especially if slipped into the public square), also involves moral matters, we will look at what follows from Rorty's pragmatist view of ethics in the religious context. We will do this with the help of an article by Rorty where he has updated his initial thoughts described in "Religion as Conversation-stopper." We will then present a negative view of Rorty's overall position as seen by Alvin Plantinga, and lastly a positive view offered by Kai Nielsen. What makes these discussions important for this chapter is how they all contribute to an understanding of what follows for religious belief if Rorty's metaphilosophy is on the mark. For the sake of topical organization, other recent thoughts by Rorty on religious belief, contained in a book edited by Santiago Zabala, could be included in this chapter. But due to how the subject-matter of that book better integrates into our last chapter on edifying theology, it has instead been placed there for our review. Alvin Plantinga's negative assessment of Rorty is important for this present study because of how his view contrasts with my assumption that Rorty actually provides a refreshing start, not only for the philosophy of religion but also for religious belief and theology. As we will see, Plantinga offers a

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After Rorty

two-pronged difficulty for my assumption. In a chapter in his book on warrant and Christian belief, Plantinga asks if Rorty's position jeopardizes the integrity of the Christian faith. In particular is the question of whether Rorty's view of truth offers a "defeater" to the faith. In the final analysis Plantinga thinks there is no need for the Christian to worry because Rorty's position actually borders on incoherence. As such, there is no threat to Christianity. If Plantinga is correct that Rorty's position smacks of incoherency, then our attempt to appropriate his description of edifying philosophy into the philosophy of religion (in general), and theological inquiry (in particular), fails from the outset. There is little to gain using an incoherent position as the beginning point to a further project. On the other hand, a quite different but equally debilitating problem is possible. If Plantinga turns out to be wrong about the coherency of Rorty's metaphilosophical position, Rorty's account of philosophy, at least as far as Plantinga sees it, might then seriously jeopardize the stability of Christian belief by offering defeaters. This is because of how Plantinga thinks Rorty's view is contrary to a proper understanding of Christian teachings. Among these choices I think there is yet another alternative to Plantinga's assessment. Briefly, Plantinga is right, but for the wrong reason. He is right that Rorty doesn't provide defeaters for Christian belief. He is wrong, however, to think this is because Rorty's views (of truth, in particular) are incoherent. Rather, Rorty's metaphilosophical view is quite compatible with Christian belief. And, by extension, it is quite compatible with attempts to reconstruct the philosophy of religion, religious belief and theological musings. Kai Nielsen offers a different challenge, one which stands in interesting contrast to Plantinga's assessment. Nielsen is well known for being part of the old school grouping of late-twentieth-century atheists—lining up with the impressive likes ofBertrand Russell, J.L. Mackie, J.J.C. Smart, Antony Flew and Paul Edwards. Nielsen has been as prolific as the best in this group. In his critique against religious belief, and Christianity in particular, he has used every "Challenge" and conceptual tool likely to prove effective in bringing down the theistic house of cards. Recently, perhaps because of boredom after all these years writing about the philosophy of religion, or because, as he has said, getting rid of positive arguments for religious belief is really just a "mopping up job," Nielsen has turned his philosophical interests to Richard Rorty. In one article in particular, Nielsen comes out swinging in defense of Rorty, arguing that Rorty makes a great deal of philosophical sense, and should be taken seriously particularly by Nielsen's Marxist colleagues—Marxism still being dear to his heart. 8 Nielsen is correct in his assessment, at least as far as the need to take Rorty seriously is concerned. (As for the Marxist part, I'll leave that for his colleagues to debate.) What makes Nielsen's article especially interesting for us is

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how it stands in contrast, even contradiction, to many of the arguments he has made over the years about religious belief. By embracing Rorty's critique of strong philosophy and, with it, the rejection of epistemology and what constitutes determining truth and knowledge, gone are the most robust conceptual favorites used in Nielsen's critique of religious belief. The implication is that if Nielsen is to retain his affection for Rorty's metaphilosophy, he must back off attempts to decimate religious belief with the robust tools provided by that same philosophical school of thought he is otherwise now dissatisfied with. This isn't to say Nielsen, with hammer and tongs, can no longer go after any forms of religious belief. He is free to do so, but only according to the metaphilosophical assumptions he now accepts, and only with those religious beliefs (of which there are still a number to choose from), that piggy-back on epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, moral reality, and objective truth. As for religious belief that is ready to forgo this language, Nielsen's (and of course Rorty's) contrite, but socially and politically ambitious version of philosophy should have no obvious incompatibility with edifying theology. It's curious how Rorty, Plantinga, and Nielsen compare and contrast with each other. Plantinga, a well-known evangelical philosopher, Christian apologist, and some-time theologian, considers Rorty's position antithetical to Christian belief. Perhaps this isn't too surprising given Plantinga's conservative take on matters, philosophically and theologically speaking. Consider now Plantinga in contrast to Nielsen. In the days when debating important intellectual issues was still considered a worthy occasion for the university, a debate over the existence of God would most fittingly have had them standing on opposite sides of the stage. And yet it isn't clear Nielsen has recognized how his acceptance of Rorty (something Plantinga cannot do) disarms him of the very philosophical tools that have traditionally been used to discredit religious belief. Then there's Rorty. While I think it is safe to say Rorty didn't have much use for religious belief in the past, now he at least acknowledges some forms of it can't be, ipso facto, ruled out of court in post-Philosophical culture. By at least acknowledging the possibility for religious belief, Rorty stands quite conspicuously (and quite curiously) in disagreement with both Plantinga and Nielsen: Plantinga, who, on the one hand, thinks Rorty's position might somehow threaten Christian belief, and Nielsen, who apparently hasn't considered how accepting Rorty's position allows for the possibility of religious belief. In any case, before we get much further into the differences between them we need to get a clear sense of how Rorty considers religious belief. The hope is that by doing so we'll be able to chart out some of the main issues for the philosophy of religion, and then theology.

46

After Rorty Rorty, Religious Belief, and the Philosophy of Religion

Throughout his examination of traditional philosophy, vis-a-vis the pragmatist's alternative, Rorty has had much to say about religion, religious belief, and Christianity. In his more pessimistic moments he has said that after "five hundred years of experience with the language of a secular culture we may find ourselves no longer bothering to use religious terminology." Despite this dim view, Rorty has little interest in providing a tough-minded rigorous argument against religious belief, or what is usually described under the general idiom as God-talk. Concerning the traditional debate over the existence of God, Rorty says "I doubt that we'll get anywhere arguing theism vs. atheism." So while he has called himself an "atheist" in the past, he thinks it best to today describe himself as "anticlerical": These are the ones who use "atheism" as a rough synonym for "anticlericalism." I now wish that I had used the latter term on the occasions when I have used the former to characterize my own view. For anticlericalism is a political view, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. It is the view that ecclesiastical institutions, despite all the good they do—despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in despair—are dangerous to the health of democratic societies. Whereas the philosophers who claim that atheism, unlike theism, is backed up by evidence would say that religious belief is irrational, contemporary secularists like myself are content to say that it is politically dangerous. 11 This short paragraph summarizes Rorty's view on religious belief: in line with his metaphilosophical views, he can't be philosophically heavy-handed against theism. In fact, more optimistically, in other places, he has made room in his language for talk of "spirituality," even saying "the question at hand is ultimately spiritual." 13 Despite fluctuating tendencies, he thinks he can be critical with ecclesiastical institutions because of the political dangers they represent. These institutions are fair game because, as we will explain, they have breached the private/public distinction. Given his anticlericalism, what should we make of his claim that a day is coming when religious terminology will no longer be of interest? While the prediction might come true, it isn't straightforward how we can strictly demarcate the language of secular culture from religious terminology. Nor is it clear this way of speaking can even be expunged from culture. The Death of God theologian, Gabriel Vahanian, has noted we "may indeed have abandoned a certain religious conception of the world but surely not for a nonreligious one. Insofar as the present crisis is cultural, we are only exchanging one religious mentality for another.'' With Eliot as a case in point, Vahanian goes on to say:

Rorty, Religious Belief and Ethics

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In Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, published in 1949, Eliot observes that culture is the incarnation of a people's religion. Does this mean that only one type of culture can incarnate a given religion? Or does it mean simply that culture is a more or less accurate expression of certain fundamental religious assumptions, regardless of whether these are organized into dogmas and institutions or diffusely scattered across some collective unconscious:0 15 There are many examples of how a culture can exemplify certain fundamental religious assumptions outside of an ecclesiastical institution, the more obvious being Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany in the twentieth century, or North Korea of today. Vahanian's claim takes particular relevance in societies that have been openly hostile to traditional religious practice. We should keep this in mind as we proceed in our study, especially where we discuss Rorty's view that religious beliefs must be kept out of the public square. Despite some disparaging comments about religious belief, Rorty is nevertheless consistent with his overall view of how our language changes and how we acquire new beliefs: Think of human minds as webs of beliefs and desires, of sentential attitudes—webs which continually reweave themselves so as to accommodate new sentential attitudes. Do not ask where the new beliefs and desires come from. Forget, for the moment, about the external world, as well as about that dubious interface between self and world called "perceptual experience." Just assume that new ones keep popping up, and that some of them put strains on old beliefs and desires. We call some of these strains "contradictions" and others "tensions." We alleviate both by various techniques. For example, we may simply drop an old belief or desire. Or we may create a whole host of new beliefs and desires in order to encapsulate the disturbing intruder, reducing the strain which the old beliefs and desires put on it and which it puts on them. Or we may just unstitch, and thus erase, a whole range of beliefs and desires—we may stop having attitudes toward sentences which use a certain word (the word "God," or "phlogis16 ton," for example). This explanation of how our language changes extends into his view of the ideal culture. The disappearance of religious belief and the success of the secular are thought to be a process of liberation. Rorty's view of how we acquire and forfeit beliefs is important, but he offers little in the way of argument for believing that religious language need fade away in order to have a truly cultured and liberal society. In one place he merely muses that:

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After Rorty

It isn't that we believe in God, or don't believe in God, or have suspended judgment about God, or consider that the God of theism is an inadequate symbol of our ultimate concern; it is just that we wish we didn't have to have a view about God. It isn't that we know that "God" is a cognitively meaningless expression, or that it has its role in a language-game other than the fact-stating, or whatever. We just regret the fact that the word is 17 used so much. It should be added that Rorty's desire for a dedivinized society, in which all trace of religion is removed, is arguably out of keeping with what he has said elsewhere about the edifying philosopher having an "openness to strangeness which initially tempted us to begin thinking," a disposition quite compatible with some expressions of religious belief. As tiring as it might be to hear some people talk about God, especially, as Tillich put it, when it's like a rock thrown at the religiously ambivalent (or, as Rorty puts it, the "religiously unmusical" ), compare Buber's view: "Some would deny any legitimate use of the word God because it has been misused so much. Certainly it is the most burdened of all human words. Precisely for that reason it is the most imperishable and unavoidable." 20 Rorty's own interest with religious belief, especially of late, has shown Buber to be more right than wrong. Rorty is nevertheless correct thinking there are many who are no longer interested in religious belief. For others, however, it remains an integral part of who they are. What bears pointing out is that, in places, Rorty's description about religious belief and language are at odds with his repeated encouragement for philosophers to take into account the importance of Wittgenstein's language-games. An appreciation for the complexity of language-games is perhaps nowhere as critical as in the context of religious language. "Holiness," for example, is normally a vital part of the religious believer's languagegame, and cannot, matter-of-factly, be excised from its pivotal position in the matrix of meaning. Rorty recognizes this when speaking about language in the more ordinary sense: One can reply that of course language can usefully, for many purposes, be viewed as a system of representations ... All that one has to do to make any of these approaches useful and productive is to take the vocabulary of the present historical period (or class or society or academy) for granted and to work within it. Once one is safely ensconced within this language-game, questions about what correctly represents what, how we know that it does, and how it manages to do so will make admirable sense and will get useful answers." 21 This is compatible with his view of pragmatism: "As we pragmatists see it, there can and should be thousands of ways of describing things and people—as

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many as there are things we want to do with things and people—but this plurality is unproblematic." Problems only begin when there are attempts, like those in the Kantian tradition, to cosmologize and eternalize "its current view 23 of physics, or right and wrong, or philosophy, or language." Rorty is correct about when problems arise, whether speaking about philosophy or religious belief. But theology, the language of religious belief, can also eschew the "Kantian tradition" as described by Rorty. As a result, just as a post-traditional view of philosophy can survive the demise of systematic philosophy, so theology can survive the demise of systematic theology. Theology as much as philosophy can delight "in throwing out as much of the philosophical tradition as possible," urging "that philosophers perform their principal social function only when they change intuitions as opposed to reconciling them." 24 Although we are somewhat getting ahead of ourselves, these preliminary thoughts help to contextualize the following study. So now is a good time to take a closer look at Rorty's articles on religious beliefs and the philosophy of religion. The most recent could be described as a "pragmatist's philosophy of religion." Taken in their various contexts, some of the things he has said are not only provocative. I venture to argue his comments and views are rather insightful, observations a theologian sensitive to issues in contemporary 25 culture would as well share. Sentential Attitudes The process by which beliefs (religious or otherwise), change within a given society is a highly complicated affair. So we need to consider Rorty's general description of how we adjudicate between new and old beliefs and desires, or, 26 as he puts it, our "sentential attitudes." Using the Gopernican Revolution as an example, Rorty notes cultural change "of this magnitude does not result from applying criteria .. . any more than individuals become theists or atheists, or shift from one spouse or circle of friends to another, as a result either of applying criteria or ofactesgratuits." Consistent with his metaphilosophical position, and with his admiration for Kuhn's description of paradigms and how they shift, Rorty doesn't think change of beliefs occur because of a failure in relations of representation. Instead: [T]he pragmatist recognizes relations of justification holding between beliefs and desires, and relations of causation holding between these beliefs and desires and other items in the universe, but no relations of representation. Beliefs do not represent nonbeliefs. There are, to be sure, relations to aboutness... there is no problem about how a belief can be about the unreal or the impossible. For aboutness is not a matter of pointing outside the web.

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After Rorty

Rather, we use the term "about" as a way of directing attention to the beliefs which are relevant to the justification of other beliefs, not as a way 29 of directing attention to nonbeliefs. Rorty goes on to comment that: [Beliefs] all come with contexts attached, just as Riemannian space comes with axioms attached. So there is no question of taking an object out of its old context and examining it, all by itself, to see what new context might suit it. There is only a question about which other regions of the web we might look to find ways of eliminating the residual tensions in the region currently under strain. Nor is there an answer to the question of what it is that is being put in context except, boringly and trivially, "beliefs." All talk about doing things to objects must, in a pragmatic account of inquiry "into" objects, be paraphrasable as talk about reweaving beliefs. 30 But how is the "reweaving" of beliefs (religious or otherwise) carried out? Does Rorty's description imply there is no way of evaluating or legitimately changing our beliefs? Coherence, in Rorty's view, plays an important role in the process of acquiring and disposing of beliefs. But what exactly he means by coherence should be kept in mind: I think the test of philosophical truth consists neither in "correct analyses" of individual concepts (for example, "meaning," "intentionally") nor in the internal coherence among hundreds of such analyses linked together in a philosophical system, but only in the coherence of such a system with the rest of culture, a culture which one hopes will continue to be as ondoyant et divers as is that of the Western democracies at the present time. 31 On this account, the coherence of belief will be judged by how well it fits with the rest of culture, situated at least for us within the description of the Western democratic world. It is important to keep these distinctions in mind as we look specifically at Rorty's narrower discussion of the functioning of religious language in contemporary society. Rorty has argued, in the context of how our beliefs come and go, that webs of beliefs and desires are continually rewoven in order to account for new sentential attitudes. Questions of how and from where these new attitudes arise are not of central interest for Rorty. The important point is that some of the new beliefs "popping up" will put older beliefs under strain. "Strains" will be of two sorts: "contradictions" and "tensions." There are various ways we can alleviate these strains, but as described by Rorty there are three options

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which are especially noteworthy. We'll take a closer look at those options in the context of religious belief. The first option of how to alleviate the strain a new belief may bring is to simply abandon the currently held belief causing contradiction or tension. With religious convictions, this could mean abandoning a global belief such as the existence of God. This option, however, would most likely apply to a less consequential, secondary belief cum theological doctrine like shifting from the view of baptism, as sprinkling, to full immersion. Secondly, and perhaps more dramatically, we may attempt to account for the new belief by constructing an entire set of new beliefs to account for "the disturbing intruder,'' "reducing the strain which the old beliefs and desires put on it and which it puts on them."33 Here, I take it, is a reconfiguration of our old beliefs together with new beliefs in order to account for the, so-called, intruder. An example of this sort could be the Christian fundamentalist taking an undergraduate course in evolutionary biology, and in the course of her studies retaining her theistic beliefs but dispensing with a Creationist (or the updated "Intelligent Design") reading of Genesis. The extent to which this change causes a rippling effect on her other religious beliefs will depend on a number of factors. Suffice here to add, at least from this example, that while the student might retain belief in God, a significant shift in her religious thinking has occurred, possibly taking her from a very conservative view of Christianity to a more moderate evangelical or liberal view. She might even develop an interest in comparative religion, thinking about how Buddhism compares and contrasts with her Christian views. This is in line with Rorty's observation that "in special situations, the acquisition of that belief will provoke the sort of large-scale, conscious, deliberate reweaving which does deserve the name of inquiry . . . a revelation which leads one to rethink one's long-term plans and, ultimately, the meaning of one's life."34 The third option is to "just unstitch, and thus erase, a whole range of beliefs and desires—we may stop having attitudes toward sentences which use a certain word (the word "God," or "phlogiston," for example)." This option is more radical than the first. Using the example of option two, once certain principles of evolutionary biology are accepted, one could imagine the student developing a fascination for the writings of Richard Dawkins and completely abandoning theism (hopefully first considering Michael Ruse's view that the religious believer can also be an evolutionist). 36 It is important to note options one and three are different because of how important the new belief is seen in light of the entire belief system. Option one seems to apply best with trivial beliefs. It would hardly be expected that having the belief I packed my sandwich to work, when in fact I left it in the refrigerator, would necessitate erasing my beliefs about democracy or the existence of other sentient creatures. Changes in belief of this category are

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distinguished by Rorty as habits rather than inquiry. Options two and three apply to those cases in which the beliefs are of consequential importance, and hence fall under the distinction of inquiry: As one moves along the spectrum from habit to inquiry—from instinctive revision of intentions through routine calculations toward revolutionary science or politics—the number of beliefs added to or subtracted from the web increases. At a certain point in this process it becomes useful to speak of "recontextualization." The more widespread the changes, the more use we have for the notion of "a new context." 38 In this case, either we "create" and "encapsulate," or "unstitch" and "erase." With God-talk, Rorty, at least in earlier writings generally favored erasure, while I wish to make room for creation or encapsulation. Put otherwise, while Rorty sees "contradiction," I see "tension." Rorty's account of how our language changes, and possibly drops out of use, appears not only consistent with his post-Philosophical view of society but, as well, appears theologically neutral. From a book published in 1989, describing culture in its ideal form, Rorty nevertheless stated: The difference between a search for foundations and an attempt at redescription is emblematic of the difference between the culture of liberalism and older forms of cultural life. For in its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would be one which was enlightened, secular, through and through. It would be one in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world or a divinized self. Such a culture would have no room for the notion that there are nonhuman forces to which human beings should be responsible. It would drop, or drastically reinterpret, not only the idea of holiness but those of "devotion to truth" and of "fulfillment of 39 the deepest needs of the spirit." Irrespective of Rorty's exhortations, it is nevertheless debatable if this "secular" culture is an "ideal form." To suppose so, is perhaps a precipitant assumption, one that Rorty himself might today consider as too strong. Indeed, Rorty elsewhere does not presume to say what sort of language will drop out of usage. "X-talk just fades away, not because someone has made a philosophical or scientific discovery that there are no X's, but because nobody any longer has a use for this sort of talk." In another place Rorty "freely admits that his post-Philosophical liberal culture will retain many of the ethical elements of the Judeo-Christian tradition from which it has emerged." Most would agree these are reasonable claims. Here he makes no pre-judgment as to which sort of talk (moral, religious, political, scientific, etc.) will pass into obscurity.

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For some people, certain forms of religious discourse, and hence religious belief, will most probably fade away. It is just as likely, however, some forms will continue as integral parts of self-expression. Rorty's view of how we acquire and forfeit beliefs is important, but on the pessimistic side of things, it is not clear all forms of religious language need dissipate in order to obtain a truly cultured and liberal society. Religious language, like philosophical language, can take different forms. Some may become tiresome and no longer interesting, other forms may be reconfigured or reinvigorated because of new insights and the impact of changing social concerns. Understanding Rorty's view about how language and beliefs change is important for our present discussion because we wish to find out if his accoun in some way disqualifies religious language in post-Philosophical culture. If room is allowed we need to be clear about the stipulated conditions. I wish to argue religious belief is consistent with post-Philosophical culture. Putting aside interest in metaphysics, epistemological foundations and essentialist views of Truth, at most, disqualifies some, though not all forms of religious belief. Just as a post-Philosophical view of philosophy can survive the demise of systematic philosophy, theology can survive the demise of systematic theology. We haven't, as yet, entirely fleshed out the particularities of religious belief and language in post-Philosophical culture. We can nevertheless find further clues about how it might be done by focusing on another article by Rorty where, among other things, he sketches a pragmatist philosophy of religion. After listing his five staccato theses, we will discuss how these might give edifying theology its initial form. Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism: A Review True to his pragmatist views, Rorty notes that "an advantage of the antirepresentationalist view of belief which James took over from Bain and Peirce—the view that beliefs are habits of action—[is] that it frees us from the responsibility to unify our beliefs into a single worldview." Instead of attempting to unify our beliefs as tightly as possible—representing a single world—we look to habits of action. With habits of action, purposes vary according to what is desired, as do the habits inculcated and nurtured. Secondly, from what Rorty describes as the viewpoint of "a pragmatists' romantic utilitarianism," dropped is the idea that "some parts of culture fulfill our need to know the truth and others fulfill lesser aims." In particular, gone are privileged vantage-points over culture, whether provided by science, first philosophy, or religious metaphysics. Leaning on Nietzsche, this "is an attempt to make more room for individuality than can be provided either by orthodox monotheism, or by the Enlightenment's attempt to put science in

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the place of religion as a source of Truth." As for the place of religion in the pragmatist's romantic utilitarianism, Rorty quips: we "treat religion as poetic and poetry as religious." As his third thesis, Rorty wishes to make a further distinction between "projects of social cooperation and projects of individual self-development." With respect to the former, intersubjective agreement is required, and he thinks that natural science "is a paradigmatic project of social cooperation.'' Romantic art, on the other hand, is an example of a paradigmatic project of individual self-development. Rorty includes religion here too, but only if it is disconnected from both "science and morals." This disconnection, Rorty believes, circumvents the attempt "to predict the consequences of our actions and the attempt to rank human needs."50 This is a thread of thought that has remained consistent in Rorty's writings: If religious belief is going to be pursued, it will be a private, not public pursuit. Fourthly is Rorty's well-known critique of the essentialist view of Truth. Galling on Truth as the enforcer for one's beliefs has appropriately been described by Rorty as a "conversation-stopper." It is a sort of trump used in disagreements in order to avoid the obligation to further discuss differences. While religious believers are as apt to use conversation-stoppers as much as philosophers, Rorty notes that in the latter part of the twentieth century it has enjoyed considerable use by the philosopher against the religious believer. "The Idea that we should love Truth is largely responsible for the idea that religious belief is 'intellectually irresponsible.' " In a passage that could be penned by a post-Philosophical theologian, he then states: But there is no such thing as the love of Truth. What has been called by that name is a mixture of the love of reaching intersubjective agreement, the love of gaining mastery over a recalcitrant set of data, the love of winning arguments, and the love of synthesizing little theories into big theories. Instead, intellectual pursuits should be carried out by "persuasion rather than force, of respect for the opinions of colleagues, [and] of curiosity and eagerness for new data and ideas." Rorty's fifth and last thesis follows from his critique of the essentialist view of Truth—"The attempt to love Truth, and to think of it as One." For Rorty, this is a sort of philosophical hubris which tries to rank human needs, and is comparable with the religious desire to align oneself with "something big, powerful, and non-human."Whether in the philosophical or religious sense, it is the hope that a "powerful being" will side with the believer in the struggle with other people. As much as this appeals to those deep in conflict and struggle, pragmatists are as much opposed to the attempt to "circumvent the process of achieving democratic consensus about how to

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maximize happiness" as they are for hopes of an epistemological vantagepoint to scrutinize society. How is the philosopher of religion to respond? Especially in light of Rorty's metaphilosophical position, are these views compatible with a postPhilosophical view of religious belief? If so, how? We've seen that Rorty, in agreement with James, speaks of beliefs as "habits of action." By accepting this antirepresentationalist view of belief, the philosopher of religion (and theologian) is released from a barrage of weighty historical debates. Notable examples are those raged over the existence of God and the relationship between faith versus reason, belief versus knowledge, and science versus religion. In an antiessentialist recontextualization, dropped for philosopher and theologian alike is the requirement to represent "a single world," the facts of which must "all hang together fairly tightly." Theologians have already seen the importance this view has for their discipline: But where it is the world-self we are trying to conceive, the whole within which everything else falls—including not only all facts but also all our symbols—there is nothing outside our conception against which we can place it to see whether it "corresponds": just as every thing is within the world, so also everything must be conceived as included within the conception of the world. With this conception, then, criteria of correspondence cannot be applied: only criteria of coherence and pragmatic usefulness to human life are relevant and applicable. If these considerations hold for the concept of world, how much more must they apply to the concept of God, built up as it is through even more elaborate imaginative constructive moves. Dewey, on the philosophical side of things, discussed "habits of action" in his own general account of language: If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty, and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false. Confirmation, corroboration, verification lie in works, consequences. Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruit shall ye know them. The web of belief is not dormant, inert, withoutfruit; rather, it "produces movements in the organism's muscles—movements which kick the organism into action." Allusion here to Christian and Jewish scripture is not accidental.

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Throughout the centuries care for the poor, the orphaned and the widow, concern for justice and equality, and other deeds of compassion were performed by Christians because of their conviction that the religious life is one of solidarity and empathy with one's neighbor, locally and afar. Edifying theologians are in agreement with edifying philosophers on thesis two: Edifying philosophers want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause—wonder that there is something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation of what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be described. Given the tension between modern scientific investigation and religious thought (its disagreement on matters of fact and matters of faith), this recalibration by Rorty helps to show what we should expect from each in postPhilosophical culture. For one thing, we won't see the opposition between science and religion as one where "some parts of culture fulfill our need to know the truth and others fulfill lesser aims." It is only to say questions of science are different from questions of religion. It is not a comparison of "the serious with the non-serious." Each has their respective legitimate pursuits, so each will produce different habits of action. How different habits of action may be pursued, either as private or public pursuits, is a major concern of thesis three, and it merits some consideration. Rorty, in fact, has discussed this further in his article "Religion as Conversation-stopper", so we'll leave our analysis for the section to follow. On thesis four, as we noted above, dropping the essentialist view of Truth is as important for the edifying theologian as it is for the edifying philosopher. The attractiveness of Rorty's view of truth is just as striking in the theological context. For one thing, the old dualisms are seen as unnecessary oppositions: we "need to argue that the distinctions between absolutism and relativism, between rationality and irrationality, and between morality and expediency are obsolete and clumsy tools—remnants of a vocabulary we should try to replace." Truth as "privileged representations," once put aside, also removes demands to somehow correspond beliefs to how the world "really is": If there are no privileged representations in this mirror, then it will no longer answer to the need for a touchstone for choice between justified and unjustified claims upon our belief. Unless some other such framework can be found, the abandonment of the image of the Mirror leads us to abandon the notion of philosophy as a discipline which adjudicates the claims of science and religion, mathematics and poetry, reason and sentiment, allocating an appropriate place to each.

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This is something Rorty has repeatedly maintained throughout his writings. It also has very important implications for the way that the philosophy of religion has been debated. In the case of our own study it strikes at the heart of Kai Nielsen's own appraisal of religious belief, especially in his repeated demands that theists somehow designate or point out what they mean by "God." Rorty, as we will soon see, understands very clearly how his metaphilosophical position is a clearing for heavy-handed claims about reality, whether made by a theist or a naturalist. Perhaps we are letting the cat out of the bag a little early in our study, but none other than Rorty has seen that: People who find themselves quite unable to take an interest in the question of whether God exists have no right to be contemptuous of people who believe passionately in his existence or of people who deny it with equal passion. Nor do either of the latter have a right to be contemptuous of those to whom the dispute seems pointless. Consistent with thesis three, this allows the edifying theologian and the edifying philosopher to affirm "one's responsibility to cooperate with other human beings, not of one's responsibility to Truth or to Reason." Similar to the other theses, thesis five follows from Rorty's post-Philosophical view and his general sense of religious skepticism. It is, as well, one of the most challenging as it goes contrary to beliefs held deeply in the human psyche. In short, Rorty wants humans to take responsibility for their actions, both negative and positive. The behavior of war-mongers, despots and ordinary wrongdoers will not face ultimate judgment by the Truth of Morality, Justice or Rationality. Religiously speaking, neither will the transgressions be reckoned on the Day of Judgment, by Karma, reincarnation, or through the accumulation of bad vibes. The only way injustices and wrongs will be corrected will be by good people working to protect the vulnerable and innocent. The reckoning will be through human courts and tribunals, by people demanding accountability, not from the gods, but from governments, officials and institutions put in place to ensure justice and transparency. This way of thinking about the various offences that occur in our world, not only with gross human rights abuses but the injustices that go with daily living, would be difficult for most people to accept. Believing there is some higher power, some divine strength that will aid us when we feel oppressed or wronged, has been of insurmountable assurance for people under cruel and sadistic circumstances. From believing there will be a divine judgment one day for the brutal oppressor, to thinking, on the small scale of things, that at least bad karma will come to those who are malicious and mean-spirited gets most of us through the day. But there is another side to this way of thinking. Believing that all wrongs will ultimately be judged may indeed contribute to

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the long-standing criticism by atheists that religious belief mollifies our outrage to earthly injustices. One day all injustices will come to divine judgment, so if we are not able to correct them in the here and now, all is not lost. While there is some weight to Rorty's claims here, I don't find this particularly compelling. Religious people have also been on the forefront of fighting for human dignity and rights, either as Hugo Grotius, William Wilberforce, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., or Mother Teresa. One can, however, find historical examples to reinforce almost any belief. So there are also examples of ecclesiastical leaders who encouraged their people to accept oppression for the sake of some future reward or placement in the Kingdom. The denouncement of liberation theologians by Pope John Paul II comes precariously close to this way of thinking. Whether Rorty is right about this is not particularly the issue. Its value lies in thinking about it as a thought-experiment. It's worth considering for a moment how our thinking would be changed if we knew there would be no final judgment, a time where all the wrongs done would come to light, that there would be no punishment for secretly or openly displayed cruelty. Instead of making us despondent and more willing to accept injustice, it might make us more intent on rectifying wrongs. After all, if we don't do it now, there will be no second chance in a life to come. There might be another result to this way of thinking: that some actions will never be held up for accountability. We need to therefore learn when to let go of certain wrongs and to know when to pursue the correction of others. This is the therapeutic side to Rorty's point, one close to the Buddhist sense of "nonattachment," letting go of matters not of particular importance or consequence, even though they may be troubling at the time when we are unduly treated. Rorty's "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism" makes an important, albeit provisional, contribution for understanding how religious belief will figure into culture. Rorty has written other articles which also merit our attention. There are three that specifically interest us, and we'll look at them in the order in which they were published, perhaps tracing a certain development in Rorty's thoughts on religious belief. We'll start with "Religion as Conversationstopper" (1994); then "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance" (1997); and finally the most recent, "Anticlericalism and Atheism" (2002). 71 Features of the Private/Public Distinction We saw that the third thesis of Rorty's romantic polytheism was a distinction between public and private pursuits. It merits further discussion as it raises a number of important issues pertinent to our study. So we will consider a more

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recent discussion of Rorty's thoughts on the subject from an article entitled, "Religion as Conversation-stopper." We need to pick up on other features of the private/public distinction made in his article describing polytheist pragmatism. This distinction was one made by William James in his utilitarian, pragmatist philosophy of religion. James' primary intent in making this distinction was to remove tension between science and religion. The most controversial part of this distinction is that private pursuits, including the religious sort, need not be concerned with supporting its various beliefs and pursuits with talk about truth, or even evidence. It is "never an objection to a religious belief that there is no evidence for it." This is why they are considered "private." They are pursued for one's own personal interest, for reasons of one's own preference, and are not the business of anyone else. Among other concerns raised in this division between the private and the public, there are two which immediately surface. Some worry that religious belief (as private pursuits), once unhinged from truth and the need for evidence, will be gutted of meaning. Or, quite the opposite problem: that any belief can be held, no matter how nutty. Starting with the latter concern, for many religious believers, some of whom might very well hold curious ideas, being alleviated of the obligation to show good reasons why they believe would come as a welcome relief. But there is an important caveat in Rorty's position when it comes to the boundaries of this distinction. Because these beliefs are private, and therefore have no requirement for evidence, "The only possible objection to it [viz., the private belief, whether judged nutty or not by the rest of us] can be that it intrudes an individual project into a social and cooperative project, and thereby offends against the teaching of On Liberty."An intrusion of a private belief into the public square would be "a betrayal of one's responsibilities to cooperate with other human beings, not of one's responsibility to Truth or to Reason." Namely, religious believers cannot trump the need to argue for their private beliefs if they decide those beliefs should be brought into the public sphere of deliberations. The former concern has quite a different worry attached to it. While some religious believers would be happy to have their beliefs unconnected to an epistemic obligation for evidence, there are just as many who are on the opposite side, who not only like to think their religious beliefs are true and not false, but who are more than ready to argue for them as a matter of public policy. Saying truth shouldn't be a concern would be quite strange for them. They cannot help but think (for example), that their religious experiences really happened, and were not merely a chemical burp in their brains. Or, that their moral values, while based on the belief that God exists, are necessary for the well-being of society.

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Rorty's conditions for private and public pursuits have a certain merit. People, as long as they don't hurt or interfere with the liberty of others, should be free to pursue whatever private pursuits they wish, from poetry readings to sadomasochism. I may not fully understand why some find such pleasure in these activities, but as long as those participating are adults (at least in the case of S & M), have given informed consent to the proposed exercises, and do so in their homes or private establishments, it should be no concern of mine or anyone else. After all, I would be occupied with my own private pursuits. Rorty is quite right saying we are under no obligation either to provide some justification for why we engage in these sorts of interests, or for giving an account of the truthfulness underlying the pursuit. It isn't necessary to explain the pleasure associated with reading Walt Whitman or being dressed in leather. Rorty has taken this matter even further. Not only is no evidence required for private beliefs, but he thinks no argument or evidence is even possible: President Bush made a good point when he said, in a speech designed to please Christian fundamentalists, that "atheism is a faith" because it is "subject to neither confirmation nor refutation by means of argument or evidence." But the same goes, of course, for theism. Neither those who affirm nor those who deny the existence of God can plausibly claim that they have evidence for their views. Being religious, in the modern West, does not have much to do with the explanation of specific observable phenomenon. When Rorty is talking about evidence, he is probably thinking of W. K. Clifford's sort, the view that "evidential relations have a kind of existence independent of human projects .. . of which the most prominent are realism and foundationalism." Despite Rorty's clear demarcation here, there are specific private pursuits that involve beliefs that will require at least some minimal sense of justification, albeit not the full-blown sort which come out of realism and foundationalism. Religious people, after all, sometime like to discuss their private beliefs with others who are curious about why the beliefs are held. While there may be no theoretical or moral necessity connected to explaining why one holds private beliefs, it is reasonable for a curious interlocutor to ask why certain religious beliefs are held, if those holding them wish to enter into dialogue. Though what constitutes a sufficient explanation may be argued, it might suffice to hear that someone believes in God just because he has always gone to church, and now finds enjoyment in liturgy, the Eucharist, and coffee and cookies after the service. Rorty comes close to saying the same thing where, in his account of a utilitarian philosophy of religion, he cites Habermas'

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"communicative rationality." This is when "our obligation to be rational is exhausted by our obligation to take account of other people's doubts and objections to our beliefs." Religious experience is another example of an epistemologically-light reason. During my Ph.D. dissertation defense, one co-director of my thesis told me he was never able to make sense of why I had religious belief. I told him that for those who have had a religious experience, it is something quite difficult to dismiss; but without any such experience it would be just as unlikely that someone would be able to make sense of a religious experience. It isn't that the person with the religious experience must somehow show how the experience accounts for belief in the existence of God. A requirement like that is quite outside the boundaries of post-Philosophical duties. But the religious experience does provide a reason, however minimally, for why that person has a religious belief, either in a theistic sense such as believing in God, or a non-Western sense like following the practices of Buddhism. The religious believer, like others in post-Philosophical society, doesn't know if her beliefs are true; she might have no idea what that could mean. She can nevertheless give reasons for why she believes the way she does. Of course the person listening to these reasons might object. He may remark that these reasons hardly count as sufficient reason for believing, because one might say the same thing having been raised in a Muslim family—that he has always practiced his faith, and has his own religious experience. Given the incommensurability of Christianity with Islam, how could both explanations therefore count as justification? This way of responding is to be still caught up in philosophical notions of representation. Rorty cites thinking such as John McDowell, who has claimed "that without 'direct confrontation by a worldly state of affairs itself, thought's 'bearing on the world' will remain inexplicable." At least with private pursuits, the reasons given by the religious person are adequate. They are adequate because, unlike Philosophical reasons, these reasons are not meant to convert the listener to the truth, to the way things are known to be. Instead, they give some indication why a particular pursuit has been chosen; they give a minimal account for addressing our interlocutor's doubts and objections. There is no implication the private pursuit must be pursued by everyone else. It is rather the ability to appreciate the private interests of others. Paraphrasing the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, people with different private interests "can work together side by side on the basis of different ontological interpretations of something ... A nonmetaphysical religiousness is also a non missionary one. I may have a philosophical hangover thinking there should be some willingness to give reasons or evidence for some private beliefs—that I like Rorty's private/public distinction to get religious belief off the epistemic hook, but

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also can't quite shake my philosophical training by thinking we should still have a way of saying some private beliefs are wrong-headed. Yet it isn't a strong epistemic obligation or a matter of fulfilling a requirement of Truth that is needed here. It is rather that even private beliefs sometime require reasons for why the belief is held. There is another important consideration that should be raised with Rorty's distinction between private pursuits and public interests. In modern democracy, religious values (to take the best example), cannot, by mere fiat, be shoved into the public square as policies. Rorty reminds us: On our view, religion is unobjectionable as long as it is privatized—as long as ecclesiastical institutions do not attempt to rally the faithful behind political proposals and as long as believers and unbelievers agree to follow a policy of live and let live. Public policies need to be based on unequivocal devotion to notions of justice, equality, fairness, rule of law, and constitutionality. Secondly, and jus a s importantly, all of these notions in turn ride on the principles of open delib eration and reason-giving. Whatever public policies we might be considering, debate must be based on strong reasons. The strong reasons used in this debate are quite in contrast with the epistemologically-light reasons of those private beliefs religious believers wish to speak about. Prayer in the public school system is a good example here. Its implementation has been, in short, the attempt to circumvent divisions between the private and public domains. Refusing implementation isn't a matter of limiting the rights of religious believers. Religious believers are entitled to pray where they wish, with the caveat they don't interfere with the liberty of others. So, the religious person can pray in public over his latte at the local cafe, as long as he isn't praying so loudly others around him can't work or talk. Prayer in the classroom as a matter of public policy, however, involves more thanjust the right of a student to pray before class. Without the policy he or she can still pray. No one in particular need care or take notice. I have had Muslim students in the middle of a final examination request a moment for daily prayer. They simply went over to a quiet spot and returned a few moments later. No need to stop the exam for everyone; no need to insist everyone else stop and pray (although I'm sure there were other students praying about their exam at the same time). Yet once put into place as a matter of public policy, the liberty of other students is infringed by the expectation they participate in a planned, organized activity, the purpose of which they do not share. There are other serious doubts about the coherency of this proposed public policy, all of which brings into focus the very difficulty certain private beliefs have when it comes to their relationship with public policy. Unlike questions

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of public policy, like, "Should the factory down the street have strict emission controls? Are casinos good for our community? What constitutes a 'just war'?" questions of a private, religious nature are of a different sort. "Should prayer be in the classroom?" is first predicated on belief in the existence of God. The existence of God is then predicated on the belief that the Christian Bible is his Word, and that the prayer to be recited in the classroom should be the Lord's Prayer recited by Christ in the New Testament. Then, prayer in the classroom is predicated on the quite idiosyncratic interpretation that the Lord's Prayer is one that should be instituted as a matter of public policy. All of these claims involve incredibly complex issues, some of which have been argued for centuries. And there would be need for more debates, like what the New Testament says about a country being considered Christian, and the associated belief that prayer, instituted as a matter of public policy in the classroom, carries some soteriological value. In other words, it isn't evident prayer in the classroom has theological merit. Should we pursue matters further? Will members of Congress or Parliamentarians call a host of philosophers and theologians to debate the issue? There is one last consideration worth making on the relationship between projects of individual self-development and projects of social cooperation. On the one hand, it is clear private religious pursuits are projects of individual self-development which ordinarily have no epistemic requirement for justification. As a consequence, intersubjective agreement with the rest of one's community is not of primary concern. Yet it is not the case this pursuit will never have concern for intersubjective agreement. For example, although Rorty wishes to separate private religious pursuits from the deliberation over morality, the religious dynamic requires, at times, social engagement. Of course, what moral topics should come up for intersubjective discussio is a big question. One way of deciding which moral convictions based on religious beliefs should be fair game in the wider, public discussion over values can be made by asking whether the conviction under discussion need have, or requires, overt religious belief as a justificatory assertion. For instance, the argument that prayer in the public classroom and the placement of the Ten Commandments in public places are necessary for the moral health of society is bound to primary religious presuppositions. One hardly would have these beliefs unless it was first believed God existed, the Bible was his Word, and the need for public prayer was supported by the New Testament. But as we saw above, these private beliefs can have no part in the public, democratic process. We want democratically elected representatives in our government, not philosophers and theologians debating belief in God and the nuances of religious texts. Irrespective of Rorty's strong division between the realms of the private and public, and that overt religious beliefs cannot be thrust into the public square,

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it is quite unlikely that religious, private beliefs can be entirely separated, or sealed off from social, public concerns. I think we cannot expect such hermetic demarcation, but there are ways of ensuring that engagement, if done, is legitimate. Pro-Life groups who oppose abortion make the quite critical mistake, at least in their public demonstrations, by arguing abortion is morally wrong because all life is sacred, that the Ten Commandments condemns murder, that God creates all life, and by citing various verses in scripture that supposedly reprove it. The mistake doesn't lie in their opposition to abortion, or even in their desire to talk about their opposition in the public square. Rather, if religious believers wish to discuss, in the public square, their opposition to abortion, they must first translate their claim into language suitable for discussion in the public square—the common language of democracy. Some may be dubious about the possibility of translating religious concepts into secular terms, especially on the topic of abortion. This is largely the fault of the Pro-Life advocates who repeatedly have made their very public opposition to abortion on the basis of religious platitudes. It is nevertheless possible to make the translation by speaking of "human dignity" instead of the "sacredness of life." Whereas speaking about the sacredness of life carries a religious assumption, human dignity does not. Granted, philosophers may argue human dignity must be bound up in strong metaphysical considerations for it to be coherent. On a Rortyan account, however, human dignity may just mean we grant a high value and respect to humans (whether they are described as "potential" or not). Pro-Life advocates could then argue from history, citing instances where people were stripped of their basic rights in spite of their humanness. They may also cite, along with social and technology critics, the dangers of treating humans as means to an end.These considerations, by themselves, do not establish the fetus as a person with full rights. Conflicts with the welfare of the woman may legitimately put constraints on the rights of the fetus. This just means more deliberation and argument are needed by the various participants to work through their disagreements. Pro-Life advocates may not be particularly impressed with this requirement for translation, wanting more in their arsenal of reasons for why abortion is morally wrong—some "knock-down, drag out" ballistic missile of persuasion which will leave our interlocutors with no choice but to nod in passionate agreement. The arguments available to us in this world won't be of this sort. Instead, we will have to do a great deal of intellectual trench-work, thinking through our assertions about public policy to see which stand up to scrutiny— those which have the best reasons for implementation. Short-cuts have to be avoided, so no one should fall back into making overt religious claims. Religion becomes a conversation-stopper, after all, largely because of intellectual laziness. Instead of arguing for beliefs, one tries to trump the beliefs

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of others with the God-said-so card. Whatever success is gained with the God-said-so card, it will only be a hollow victory as it does not provide a real reason for why the belief should be accepted as a matter of public policy. How Religion Becomes a Conversation-stopper Rorty's "Religion as Conversation-stopper," written after his article on romantic polytheism, helps to nuance some of the points made on the public/ private distinction. His target in "Religion as Conversation-stopper" is a book written by Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion. Carter wants to resist the attempt, on the part of, so-called, secular America, to push religious believers out of debates over matters of public morality and policy-setting. Carter thinks "the legal culture that guards the public square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a hobby, something done in privacy, something that mature, public-spirited adults do not use as the basis for politics." As the title of his book suggests, Carter thinks moving religious belief into a privatized, nonpolitical sphere trivializes religious belief. Rorty points out that the private/public distinction shouldn't trivialize private pursuits. There are many types of private pursuits, and while they are nonpolitical, they need not all be reduced to a "mere hobby." They may be considered, in fact, quite important and serious "private pursuits of perfection." The actual division between the public and private, Rorty believes, can rather be seen with Jefferson and the Enlightenment compromise reached with religious believers: that they accept privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty. This is a political reason given in support of this division. But there are other reasons, a central one of which Rorty quotes from Carter himself: One good way to end a conversation—or to start an argument—is to tell a group of well-educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one, such as being against abortion or pornography)

because it is required by our understanding of G. "Sayingthis," Rorty observes, "is far more likely to end a conversation than to start an argument." Rorty is right on this point though it can also be said: "it is far more likely to end a conversation because nothing in the way of an argument has been offered." Thinking a political view has to be accepted because one believes it to be the will of God would be of no interest to people in the public square. The public square is a place for democratic, not theocratic, political debate. As we saw with the example of prayer in the classroom and abortion, if religious believers wish to take a private belief into the

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public sphere, they will first have to translate that belief into language that can be argued and reasoned. Being told that religious belief must be left out of the political sphere will, for the religious believer, smack of inconsistency, even hypocrisy. In the place of talk about the will of God, Garter asks how it is more relevant to moral decisions to speak of "the will of any of the brilliant philosophers of the liberal tradition, or, for that matter, the will of the Supreme Court of the United States." Rorty responds that liberal theory doesn't have to show it is somehow better or beyond the will of God. It only has to show moral decisions or matters of public policy in a pluralist and democratic state are satisfied by a particular test. This test is a political proposal, one which examines a claim's ability to be placed under a certain kind of scrutiny. It is an "ability to gain assent from people who retain radically diverse ideas about the point and meaning of human life, about the path to private perfection." It's unlikely arguments about what God wants (putting aside for the moment whether he even exists) would satisfy this criterion. The values that follow from appeals to the will of God, the Bible, and various scripture will fail unless they can be translated into language that those with different backgrounds and private pursuits can also accept. Garter isn't happy with what he thinks is a disregard for the religious person's right to participate in decisions of public morality and policymaking. This exclusion is a destruction of "a vital aspect of the self." In a passage that, I think, cuts directly to the heart of the matter, Rorty says quite rightly that: Garter seems to think that religious believers' moral convictions are somehow more deeply interwoven with their self-identity than those of atheists with theirs. He seems unwilling to admit that the role of Enlightenment ideology in giving meaning to the lives of atheists is just as great as Christianity's role in giving meaning to his own life. This observation by Rorty cannot be taken too lightly, especially in light of the common rhetoric of the so-called "culture wars." Whether on matters of abortion, euthanasia, prayer in the classroom, placement of the Ten Commandments in public places, and same-sex marriage, conservative Christians never tire of reminding others that their values shouldn't be excluded from matters of public policy. Implied, sometimes quite explicitly, is that they have more at stake in these matters as do other members of society who have their own concerns about self-identity and private perfection. Yet this isn't so. All citizens have a very clear stake in the flourishing and well-being of society, whether in private or public spheres. The flourishing and well-being of both spheres only have a chance of success if we understand the constraints and liberties associated with each.

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"Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance"—Rorty's Philosophy of Religion In an article, entitled "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance," borrowing from John Stuart Mill, Charles Saunders Peirce and William James, Rorty weaves the main threads of his metaphilosophy into a pragmatic description of religious faith: 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

Placing aside talk about Truth and Reason, our only responsibility, philosophically and morally, is to our fellow human beings, not some "sublime dimension of being," or "the starry heavens." This responsibility is "to make our beliefs cohere with one another, and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with one another." We examine our beliefs on the basis of how they are "habits of action," not on whether they represent the world. What emerges is a utilitarian ethics of belief, which is treatment of a belief as a habit of action. Placed into the context of the philosophy of religion, a utilitarian philosophy of religion must "also treat being religious as a habit of action."

Rorty spends some time in this article explaining these points, along with many more in greater detail. For our purposes, I wish to concentrate on those that help to flesh out this view of religious faith along the lines of the discussion already covered. The second component to the title of this article, as "intellectual responsibility," asks the question of "whether the religious believer has a right to her faith—whether this faith conflicts with her intellectual responsibilities." As we saw with the nature of private pursuits, including the religious kind, there is no obligation to give justification for why the beliefs are held. With beliefs having to do with the public square, of public concern, the matter is quite different. Beliefs in the public sphere do carry an obligation. They need to be somehow justified. Rorty cites James' utilitarian view of obligation: "the obligation to justify one's beliefs arises only when one's habits of action interfere with the fulfilment of others' needs." Or, said otherwise, to "th extent to which the actions of religious believers frustrate the needs of other human beings." As we have already seen, allowing privately-held beliefs to be free of this obligation wasn't in order for the skeptic to trivialize those beliefs, as much as to alleviate tension, in particular, between matters of science and matters of religion; the former as "cooperative endeavors," the latter as "private projects." The difference between these two projects is because: [SJcientific inquiry is best viewed as the attempt to find a single, unified, coherent description of the world—the description which makes it easiest

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Religion, on the other hand, isn't particularly interested in prediction and control. Religion "offers us a larger hope, and thereby something to live for." As long as the religious believer doesn't start talking about our moral obligations in relation to things like the will of God, there need not be any conflict between religion and "utilitarian ethics." Any antagonism arising will likely be due to overlooking how science and religion differ in their interests about the world. Rorty puts the issue nicely when he describes how different pursuits will examine phenomena differently: To ask, "Which of their two accounts of the universe is true?" may be as pointless as asking, "Is the carpenter's or the particle physicist's account of tables the true one?" For neither question needs to be answered if we can figure out a strategy for keeping the two accounts out of each other's way. This doesn't mean the carpenter's way of seeing matters isn't as sophisticated as the physicist's. Nor does it mean the physicist sees matters more objectively. They rather have their own respective tasks to accomplish, tasks which have little to do with each other. Where does the "romantic" component of the title to Rorty's article fit into the pragmatist's philosophy of religion? This is a matter he takes up with James' own discussion with Clifford. "James accepts exactly what he should reject [from Clifford]: the idea that the mind is divided neatly down the middle into intellect and passion, and the idea that possible topics of discussion are divided neatly into the cognitive and noncognitive ones." These two divisions house beliefs and desires that reflect two different quests, "one for truth and the other for happiness." Rorty then makes a remarkable statement, perhaps the most important in his pragmatist's philosophy of religion. Despite what some philosophers and theologians may make of his pared-down version of religious belief, especially the charge that Rorty, deep in his heart, thinks God is a silly twenty-first century notion, pragmatist theists "believe that God is as real as sense impressions, tables, quarks and human rights. But, they add, stories about our relations to God do not necessarily run athwart the stories of our relations to these other things." This might seem too good to be true to hear from Rorty. Yet many religious believers find little conflict, for example, with the scientists' description of the world. Many other scientists have religious belief, finding no incompatibility with their scientific endeavors. But there is more to Rorty's view, and for those who still think this account is too good to be true may feel justified in their suspicions. Immediately after the above statement, he adds a caveat:

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Pragmatist theists, however, do have to get along without personal immortality, providential intervention, the efficacy of sacraments, the Virgin Birth, the Risen Christ, the Covenant with Abraham, the authority of the Koran, and a lot of other things which many theists are loath to do

without. Many believers would be hesitant to give up these beliefs, but Rorty believes it isn't as bad as it seems. The believer still has the option of speaking about

beliefs in a way which is, intentionally, "blessedly vague": Or, if they want them, they will have to interpret them "symbolically" in a way which Maclntyre will regard as disingenuous, for they must prevent them from providing premises for practical reasoning. But demythologizing is, pragmatist theists think, a small price to pay for insulating these doctrines from "scientific" criticism. Demythologizing amounts to saying that, whatever theism is good for, it is not a device for predicting or control-

ling our environment. In Rorty's view, the religious person must be either willing to give up the beliefs embodied in particular doctrines such as those listed above, or to interpret them symbolically. If these options are refused, and the religious believer insists on speaking of her beliefs, then "the very private way of giving meaning to one's own life—a way which romanticizes one's relation to something starkly and magnificently nonhuman, something Ultimately True and Real—[becomes] obligatory for the generalpublic."This isn't only a religious tendency, but a quite human habit obvious in many other areas of thought. It certainly has been a tendency in philosophy and science. "From a utilitarian point of view, both Maclntyre and 'scientific realists' (philosophers who insist that, in Sellars's words, 'science is the measure of the things that are, that they are') are unfairly privileging some human interests, and therefore

some areas of culture, over others."In a passage worth quoting at length, Rorty draws the connection between two equally hard-nosed positions: Scientific realism and religious fundamentalism are products of the same urge. The attempt to convince people that they have a duty to develop what Bernard Williams calls an "absolute conception of reality" is, from a Tillichian or Jamesian point of view, of a piece with the attempt to live "for God only", and to insist that others do so also. Both scientific realism and religious fundamentalism are private projects which have got out of hand. They are attempts to make one's own private way of giving meaning to one's own life—a way which romanticizes one's relation to something starkly and magnificently nonhuman, something Ultimately True and Real—obliga-

tory for the general public.

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Rorty is adamantly against bringing these beliefs into the public realm, believing they are rather "private projects," and as such, should be confined to that domain of beliefs. With certain qualifications, this is fine, as we've argued this puts reasonable constraints on both religious and secular interests. Religious believers are welcome to hold their beliefs without a strong requirement for justification, but if they feel compelled to bring those beliefs into the public arena they are then obligated to translate the private beliefs into a public claim that doesn't act as a trump against reasonable discourse. Rorty wants to qualify religious language further by saying religion is a matter of faith, not a matter of assorting beliefslike whether true baptism is a matter of sprinkling or complete immersion. "A pragmatist philosophy of religion must follow Tillich and others in distinguishing quite sharply between faith and belief." Those who do so will be "quite willing to talk about their faith in God, but demur at spelling out just what beliefs that faith includes." To the point about "habits of action," it is not religion's task to "produce any specific habit of action, but rather to make the sort of difference to a human life which is made by the presence or absence of love."We need not quibble here whether this stipulated difference is, in fact, a specific habit of action. What Rorty is thinking about, in this stipulation, he puts into a comparison between how religious people speak of their love for God, and how ordinary people speak of their love for each other. In the latter case, as outsiders, we might be unable to understand how this love can be given or is deserved. Love "often seems inexplicable to people acquainted with those spouses and children—just as inexplicable as faith in God seems to those who contemplate the extent to seemingly unnecessary human misery." Recalling our discussion about the role of evidence in religious belief, "James urges us not to mock those who accept what James calls 'the religious hypothesis'—that hypothesis that says 'the best things are the more eternal things'—merely because we see no evidence for this hypothesis, and a lot of evidence against it." To the further question, "Why do they do that, either as a lover or as a religious believer," "so we can often answer it simply by saying, 'She loves him' or, 'She hopes against hope that he . ..' or, 'She has faith in him'. The 'him' here may be either her son, her lover, or her god." Irrespective of this description of the pragmatist's philosophy of religion, Rorty thinks it needs further work, described as a "fuzzy overlap of faith, hope and love 'romance'."For its part, romance can be a part of many different types of communities, religious or not. What seems to matter most for Rorty in this description of romance "is the insistence itself—the romance, the ability to experience overpowering hope, or faith, or love (or sometimes rage)."This is the powerful feeling which has accompanied all expressions of faith, whether in politics, poetry, religion, or philosophy. "What is distinctive about this state is that it carries us beyond argument, beyond

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presently used language. It thereby carries us beyond the imagination of the present age of the world." So much for our present hopes. Yet this romance also had an obvious role in our thinking in the past, especially with religious beliefs. In the midst of terrors, uncertainties, and sufferings, both man-made and natural, believing in something beyond us, whether as a supernatural being or the afterlife, brought about religious forms of romance. Pivotal to Rorty's point about religion is that modern life has brought successes which no longer necessitate this past way of thinking: Nonreligious forms of romance have nourished—if only in those lucky parts of the world where wealth, leisure, literacy and democracy have worked together to prolong our lives and fill our libraries. Now the things of this world are, for some lucky people, so welcome that they do not have to look beyond nature to the supernatural, and beyond life to an afterlife, but only beyond the human past to the human future. These changes do not, in themselves, rule out religious belief. Rather, "we latest heirs of time are lucky enough to have considerable discretion about which option will be live for us and which will not."Put in the context of romantic poetry, it is not a matter of choosing between "an atheistic creed and a theistic one." Depending on the proclivities of the philosopher of religion, Rorty's pragmatist philosophy of religion will be received differently. So criticisms and praise will follow variously. Given the distinctions we made in other sections covered in this chapter, my point of departure with Rorty is not so much with his privatizing of religious belief, but rather his further rendering of those beliefs into strict matters of faith. I'm not certain why Rorty wants this further stipulation with religious language, though it is not one that must necessarily follow from his general postPhilosophical outlook. It is rather, as he admits, of a more personal nature— that those "like me, [who] were raised atheist.. . now find it merely confusing to talk about God ..."With a background outside the religious context, beliefs about baptism, the Resurrection, life in the hereafter, along with certain other Christian notions may all indeed seem quite odd (not to mention hopelessly metaphysical). Oddness, however, shouldn't be anyone's concern if the beliefs remain private pursuits. Rorty has been clear about this. There is no need, ceterisparibus, to give evidence for why private beliefs are held, even if they smack of metaphysics. Rorty's talk about faith instead of belief may be just a matter of further consistency with his overall view. His metaphilosophical position, applied to the context of religious belief, unloads obligation to the Truth (as the obligation to

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represent things as they really are), epistemological and moral foundations, and metaphysics. Among other things, this will neutralize religion's tendency to act coercively and violently. Moreover, religion will no longer require defending God's nature or his will in order for the rest of humanity to have blessed comfort in an absolute and nonnegotiable moral code. By placing religious belief into the private compartment of the private/public distinction, Rorty accomplishes two tasks: he sets the parameters for how public matters—issues that affect our freedoms and liberties—will be argued. Whatever decisions we come to will be achieved through the process of careful argument and deliberation, not by attempting to trump this process by appeal to the divine will or moral code. At the same time, religious believers, just like others, will be able to pursue beliefs in the private realm of interests. To reiterate: there is no strong obligation to provide robust justification for why private beliefs, religious or otherwise, are held. This liberty is bound to the insistence that private beliefs can't be used as clubs in the public square to pummel other members of society. So far, so good. But here we part company with Rorty. When it comes to private beliefs, by offering epistemologically-light reasons why we believe something, we discussed how, under certain conditions, this provides justification, however nimble, for why those beliefs are held. That sometimes we will talk to others who are curious about why we have certain private beliefs. Even bearing in mind our post-Philosophical limitations, we need not stop talking with others about why we like poetry, NASCAR, kid's soccer, or thinking about religion. Moreover, there could be times when we find that a particular private belief might bring us to speak about a certain public policy. If we are able to translate that private belief into language of the public realm, so that it is dialogically manageable, then there is no violation of the private/public distinction. In the end, private beliefs, imported into the public realm, have to be argued for: The pragmatist objection to religious fundamentalists is not that fundamentalists are intellectually irresponsible in disregarding the results of natural science. Rather it is that they are morally irresponsible in attempting to circumvent the process of achieving democratic consensus about how to maximize happiness. The point of departure is rather with Rorty's insistence, at least going back to his article, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," that religious believers can talk about their faith in God, but should "demur at spelling out just what beliefs that faith includes."The first problem is whether this even makes sense—that one can have faith about something without beliefs about what that faith is. In the case of those classic doctrines of Christianity, Rorty's

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fear, of course, is that once, say, the doctrine of immortality is held too closely by religious believers, this might negatively affect their participation in the public realm. Thinking everything is going to be made right in some distant future by an all-knowing, all-just Being will only create apathy for dealing with the injustices of today. Perhaps. But there have been examples to the contrary—men and women of faith who were also committed to correcting the injustices of their day. It isn't clear that believing in the efficacy of the sacraments or the Virgin birth of Christ hampered their commitment to social justice. To the contrary, their fight for social justice was invigorated exactly because of their conviction that there is more to life than gaining prestige and wealth at the cost of a neighbor's well-being. Rorty's further reduction of beliefs to the category of faith is unnecessary. Rorty may not think so, but his skepticism might very well exist because he has seen so few examples to the contrary: people who have held deep religious beliefs, but who were quite active in public life and issues without wearing those convictions on their sleeves, so to speak. Nonetheless, there have been those who have fought vigorously for all the things Rorty holds dear in terms of increasing social solidarity, while at the same time eschewing the imposition of religious beliefs on others. In a couple of cases of religious leaders that I have in mind, while their devotion to social issues was evident during their lives, there was no indication the devotion was because of religious beliefs. But at their funerals, much was said about their deeply held faith in God, that they read scripture regularly and participated in various religious celebrations. The point isn't that only those who have religious beliefs will be concerned with the well-being of society. In modern times, with the advent of freedom of disbelief, we have come to see that concern for one's neighbor doesn't depend on a commitment to religion. To the contrary, those who have no such commitment have shown they are just as capable of personal sacrifice and selflessness. Having looked at Rorty's metaphilosophical position, his assessment of religious belief and what a pragmatist philosophy of religion might look like, the next subject of consideration is ethics. With Rorty's more humble version of philosophy, and with strong religious moral claims disqualified from the public square, what is left in the way of conceptual tools for the moral philosopher? After all, the philosopher (and non-philosopher alike) typically thinks of the ethical project as one that also involves robust notions of truth, objectivity, and rationality. Those with more religious inclinations will add notions such as God's will and divine law. Taken together, this is the strong tendency to want our ethical theories and beliefs not subject to whim or caprice, so we think of them as in some sense being true. We want them to be objective—that normative claims can be understood by any careful, unbiased investigation.

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The virtue of rationality is held in high esteem by traditional moral philosophers and theologians; shunned are unbridled emotions and sentimentality, all the characteristics normally associated with irrationality. Moral theories require calm, careful building of cognitive edifices. Logical analysis and scrutiny are required. Theories have to stand up to counter-arguments and thought-experiments that try to show how they, in some way, can't resolve an important moral question, conundrum or dilemma. The last thing the philosopher is determined to avoid is the quagmire of relativism. Here is the frightful place where there is no certain truth, where anything goes morally speaking. With Rorty's analysis of traditional philosophy, and his criticisms of systematic philosophy, is it even possible to say anything about ethics? That is, if we give up Philosophy, what is left when it comes to speaking about morality?

Ethics after Philosophy Richard Rorty's antiessentialist position opens him to charges of relativism and/or bringing society to the brink of anarchy and nihilism. These accusations are repeatedly made by his various detractors. Speaking of Rorty's favorite philosophers, one Catholic philosopher has stated: "let me state baldly that both Nietzsche and Heidegger fail—and cannot help but fail—as moral thinkers because, whatever their other accomplishments, they have no place for absolute moral truths or universal principles of justice." Whatever "absolute moral truths or universal principles ofjustice" might look like, or how we will be able to determine when they are had, being rational and objective will be a necessary part of the project. To be rational, one eye must be kept on reality and the other on one's given beliefs. Beliefs about right and wrong are to be compared with "moral reality." Few need convincing that the debate over the source of values, morality, and ethics has enormous implications. Yet how do we decide the right course of action when facing decisions of a moral nature? What is the basis or source of our distinctions between right and wrong? In the context of our present study, to what extent are robust philosophical concepts required for securing our moral beliefs? These questions also illustrate the strong relationship between epistemology and ethics. Once the rug of strong epistemology is pulled out from underneath robust claims of knowledge, what can be a substitute for the source and basis of moral beliefs? Not surprisingly, the same confidence Rorty shows in his abjuring of epistemology remains in his discussion about ethics. Just as we can confidently believe the world around us exists in the way we normally experience it, so we can confidently discuss our moral beliefs without anyone

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having to think we must get philosophically heavy-handed. Of final importance, at least for our study, is how Rorty's account of ethics affects religiousbased values. No one is surprised that religious people, acting either as individuals or in ecclesiastical institutions, believe the very fabric of society depends on their values having an important place in the public square. Ethics without Principles: A Review In a chapter entitled "Ethics without Principles," from his book Philosophy and Social Hope,Rort y describes how the pragmatist sees the task of doing ethics. In short work, Rorty discusses essentialism, ethics as reason versus ethics as relational empathy, moral obligation, moral progress, and human rights. These topics are not quickly set out to dazzle the reader as much as to show what considerations are built into moral theories, how they play out in traditional moral theories, and to set forth the pragmatist account of why people participate in the moral life. How each topic weaves into the respective whole should be apparent as we move along. One might very easily expect that Rorty's views of traditional normative moral theory and metaethics will be along the same lines as his views on epistemology and metaphysics. This expectation makes good sense in light of how the "generalized form of antiessentaialism" is part of his overall pragmatist outlook. Nuanced further, Rorty's antiessentialism piggy-backs on the Darwinian claim that humans do not significantly differ in kind from other animals. There is nothing particularly divine—that is, created in the image of God— that should encourage us to dig about looking for the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of humans. In contrast, the essentialist assumption has been the starting point for philosophers and theologians for centuries. The starting point gives way to the subtle and not so subtle normative questions such as: "What is man?" "What is the nature of man?" "Is his nature divine or a hybrid of divinity and sinfulness?" And, of course, "How do his features as man place him in relation to woman and the rest of nature?" By dropping essentialist notions, like the intrinsic and extrinsic features of objects, Rorty thinks human activity should be understood as "relational through and through." The relational view has interesting application to ethics. The traditional questions, such as those about the nature ofhumans, are substituted by "practical" questions: "Are our ways of describing things, of relating them to other things so as to make them fulfil our needs more adequately, as good as possible Or can we do better? Can our future be made better than the present?" The relational view of ethics differs not only with essentialist approaches to ethics, but also with moral positions which insist on unconditional obligations. Rorty doubts there is anything unconditional bound up in the moral life

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because of how the pragmatist doubts "that anything is, or could be, nonrelational."The moral choices we make are always within the context of our relations with other humans, even with other animals. There is no divine command to obey or adjudicate. Rorty is fond of saying our relations and moral obligations are horizontally located (e.g. with other people), not vertically (e.g. God, Reason, Truth, or Nature). Rorty describes relational morality as comprised of two parts. The first part of the relational feature takes up Dewey's prudence/morality distinction. Traditionally this distinction has been understood as opposing conditional and hypothetical obligations with unconditional and categorical obligations.As already noted, pragmatists doubt there could be anything nonrelational, so thinkers such as Dewey redescribed the traditional distinction as between "routine and non-routine social relationships." As we negotiate through our human and non-human environments, words like "prudence," "habit," and "custom" contribute to the routine need for normal and quite regular "uncontroversial" adjustments to our human and nonhuman environments.Prudence governs routine social relationships. The second part, which invokes the language of morality, and sometimes issues of law, will be more controversial. It steps into non-routine moments where prudence or routine are not enough, not sufficient to resolve the conflicts that arise whether in our activities as individuals, community, or country. The distinction between prudence and morality compares with that of custom and law. It is not so much that these are specific, distinct kinds, as much as they are concepts set as a matter of degree. "We invent both when we can no longer just do what comes naturally, when routine is no longer good enough, or when habit and custom no longer suffice." Rorty thinks he is riding on both Aristotle and Dewey's identification of moral obligation "with the need to adjust one's behavior to the needs of other human beings."Morality and law become necessary only where ordinary routine, custom, and habit—what comes naturally—is not sufficiently robust, in degree, to resolve our issues or adjudicate deep differences. The relational view of morality stands notably in contrast to Kant's essentialist identification of the quintessential feature of human nature, the faculty of "reason." Dewey, not surprisingly, has serious doubts about this view of reason. Doubts are not only because of his overall skepticism with essentialism and the ability to detect the ground of human nature, but also because he saw the language of morality as a natural growth of language. That is, when we began speaking—however it first came about or what it sounded like—it was a continuous series of reactions to stimuli provided by the environment and behavior of other humans. It began as "an instrument for expressing beliefs."In this process, Dewey wants to make clear, the language that started as language continued as such. Over the course of time our ability to

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express ourselves in language certainly became more complex, but at no point did it turn into something "specifically moral." Our ability to speak in the language of ethics was not a matter of a human capacity to suddenly use reason, or an uncovering of a rule or rules for governing all human behavior. Instead, when we began using language to speak about our relations with each other, including how we should behave, without any discernible break cultural evolution took over from biological evolution.Hence, the connection to the Darwinian paradigm of human development. There are more points of contrast between the relational view and Kant's deontology. For Dewey, there is nothing particularly ingenious or complex about the categorical imperative. The demand can simply be boiled down to commending the "habit of asking how we should be willing to be treated in a similar case."As a straightforward, non-metaphysical encouragement, this way of putting it is uncontroversial. The problem was rather Kant's particular expression of the categorical imperative, which Dewey thought sounded more like "the doctrine that the essence of reason is complete universality (and hence necessity and immutability)," a take on a quite simple injunction, puffed up "with the seriousness becoming a professor of logic." Dewey thought this belayed certain traits about the psychology and personality of those who take the categorical imperative sternly: 1.

2.

Kant's view of morality is not indicative of moral maturity. Quite the opposite. Wanting to have "ready-made rules available at a moment's notice for settling any kind of moral difficulty [is] born of timidity and nourished by love of authoritative prestige." In turn, the sort of personality that finds the need for "immutably fixed and universally applicable ready-made principles" to stave off "moral chaos"suggests a certain tendency towards "sado-masochism."

To the extent those in Dewey's camp will nod in agreement, Kantian moral philosophers and moral realists will seethe. At least what these reactions show are the deep divisions which separate these groups. Kuhn's notion of incommensurable paradigms easily comes to mind. We now turn to another highly important and controversial notion part and parcel of the history of moral philosophy: moral obligation. That is, "What motivates us to act according to moral precepts?" Put otherwise, "Why should we treat each other the way we do; why should we help a stranger, or not hurt a friend?" Other questions ask how we can derive moral obligation from moral theory. Does moral obligation flow from moral theory because we have some innate moral sense? That reason governs our human nature and our character? Does moral obligation come about because of fear of punishment from the state or God? The questions we prefer depends a great deal

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on our presuppositions about human nature—hence, the original essentialist concern. If there truly is a division within human nature between reason and the passions, the true-self "which hears the call of conscience" and the falseself "which is merely 'self-interested,' "then obligation becomes a necessary spring-board, launching us to do what morality dictates. Another way of thinking about moral obligation is found within the diverse thinking of Dewey, Hume, and Nietzsche. Whatever differences these philosophers may have on other matters, "All three share the same distrust of the notion of'moral obligation'." Freedom from "timidity" and the maturity to make hard choices is required in the moral life, without "adding immutable, unconditional obligations."Hume's empathy and sentimentality, to take a strong example, are sufficient for explaining our relatedness, its progression and why it is pursued. There is no need to determine human nature or even to assume such a task makes sense. In sum, the relational component found in the surroundings of our families and communities is sufficient for an account of morality. Just like the moral realist, Dewey also saw there was much at stake, morally speaking, for setting out how we should act with each other. We might put it as "the morality of the moral life." The traditional way of formulating obligation (along with the conception of the self, or human nature), was, for Dewey, extremely disheartening. It saw the self as a "cold, self-interested, calculating, psychopath,"making the question "Why should I be moral?" quite impossible to answer. Seen in the "dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness of the soul,"theology was as much to blame for this view of human nature as philosophy. The pragmatist instead thinks it is much better to think of selfhood as an ongoing, life-process in the making. In terms of a moral disposition, instead of the need for continual surveillance and upbraiding, it is empathetic to the suffering and plight of others. When it comes to inconsistencies in our own behavior (or as Dewey puts it, those "unharmonized dispositions" ), we will sort out and deal with these inconsistencies and dispositions not through some internal process of soul-searching, or attempts to harmonize our various desires. Instead, the needed harmonization will be an external affair. Inconsistencies in our habits and routines will be resolved when we become better at recognizing and strengthening the relational dynamic with our family, friends and community. Little progress will be gained in the moral life by trying to reconcile tensions in the unconscious. In bringing home the importance of social support, Rorty cites Annette Baier who sees psychopathic behavior as indicative of someone who has lacked this relational connectedness, notably derived from maternal love exhibited in the family. The responding we do, in the context of our relatedness, is what we do naturally, "for most people responding to the needs of family members is the most

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natural thing in the world." Rorty thinks morality comes on the scene when our "natural" relatedness needs expanding. This is one sense of moral progress, whether for the individual or for the entire human species. It "is a matter of re-marking human selves so as to engage the variety of the relationships which constitute those selves." The "enlargement of the self" should come, at least ideally, in empathy to the needs and suffering "of any human being (and even, perhaps, that of any other animal)." If we were able to proceed in the expansion of our relational affirmation and response, Rorty says quite rightly, our discussion of morality would no longer be part of our language. Our actions, which some would then consider highly moral, like going out of our way to aid those in need, for us would only be a natural and quite common manner of behaving. The pragmatist's sense of moral progress, understood as expanding our relations as wide as we can—is viewed, to say the least, with great suspicion. Those holding to the pragmatist position are lumped "with reductionists, behaviourists, sensualists, nihilists and other dubious characters." Whatever worth these tags have, the pragmatist simply doesn't see how the "ideal of human brotherhood and sisterhood" need anything more than "the culmination of a process of adjustment which is also a process of recreating human beings."Moral development can't be a matter of rationality or intelligence. As most people who hang around in universities or with highly trained professionals know, intelligence doesn't translate into having wide sympathies. In fact, acting in a rational manner can often interfere with the moral life. "It is neither irrational nor unintelligent to draw the limits of one's moral community at a national, or racial, or gender border. But it is undesirable—morally undesirable." If morality is a matter of relatedness, and moral progress measured in our ability to take greater numbers into our community, then where do we find the normative component to this scheme? That is, how do we go about deciding if we should make this embracement? Can moral progress only be had if there is some way of knowing the difference between moral success and sliding down the proverbial slippery slope? Rorty sees the connection between his account of morality (and its progression), with his antiessentialist pragmatist outlook. Whether it comes to investigations over knowledge, morality or science, pragmatists do not aim their investigation in the direction of a high-minded pursuit of truth. The aim is rather towards justification. The difference can be put this way: it isn't evident how we can know when the truth of a moral matter has been reached. For exam ple, what does it mean to say, "It is true that x is a matter of moral deviance"? Just as certain religious beliefs can be a conversation-stopper, describing our moral view as merely true can be just as stultifying. On the other hand, it does make good sense to speak of how our moral views can be justified, and, as a

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corollary, to talk about whatever doubts we may have about its justification. "Analogously, you cannot aim at 'doing what is right', because you will never know whether you have hit the mark .. . But you can aim at ever more justifica tion, the assuagement of ever more doubt . .. Justificatory ability is its own reward."Rorty uses Rawls here to support his view of justification: "What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for aus." Moral progress is similar to scientific progress, at least science as understood in a post-Kuhnian framework. If it's understood that science cannot, any more than philosophy, get behind appearances to uncover the basic, intrinsic structures of reality, then justification becomes as vital to the pursuits of science as it is to determining moral progress. Justification moves us forward in terms of progress, because for moral philosophy (and for that matter, science) it "is a matter of integrating more and more data into a coherent web of belief."Particularly in the case of science, it is "data from microscopes and telescopes with data obtained by the naked eye, data forced into the open by experiments with data which have always been lying about. It is not a matter of penetrating appearance until one comes upon reality." In the last section of Rorty's chapter he discusses how the notion of rights figures into the discussion of morality. Contrary to what many rights specialists would argue, Rorty thinks that throwing rights into a discussion, or argu ment, will have the same difficulty as any language that speaks of the intrinsic reality of things, representationalism, and truth. Talk of rights, like truth, is only another slogan that says we've reached bottom in our argument. It also becomes a conversation-stopper used as a substitute for justification, a refusal to continue the discussion and to make our reasons transparent, open to inspection and examination. For instance, if a philosopher sees morality as a metaphysical pursuit, then the question about who has what rights will be turned into questions about what essential nature a human must possess, what skin color or gender they must have to be considered a person. Rorty wants to instead see human rights in a more Nietzschean manner, as "merely a convenient way of summarizing certain aspects of our real or proposed practices."Instead of arguing about the source of human rights, and whether humans have rights as intrinsic or inalienable, the debate will rather be "whether inclusive societies are better than exclusivist ones." The extension of human rights, at least traditionally, turns on commonality. Rorty thinks commonality, even the noblest sort, leads to a dead-end inquiry. Instead, and in light of the similarities that hold our community together, we should work on minimizing our differences. This will become a matter of "redescription" and "imagination," not a rational engagement

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based on increasing the capacity to see the "True or the Good or the Right."It was not the Truth which brought the most significant contributions to our notion of moral progress, but rather imagination and the ability for redescription. "It was what Newton and Christ, Freud and Marx, had in common: the ability to redescribe the familiar in unfamiliar terms." To his credit, Rorty notes early Christians did exactly that when Paul exhorted believers not to think of the differences between Jew and Gentile as significant. Indeed, the breakdown of distinctions, which leads to broadening of sympathies and communities, have provided moments of greatest moral progress in Western society. Redescribing may, at first, seem very strange and probably insufficient for studies into ethics and metaethics. But, extending the example further, this should have no more importance to us than St Paul's indifference to the traditional Judaic distinctions demanded by the scribes and Pharisees. In sum, Rorty wants to change the topic of conversation, whether the big topics of philosophy or how moral philosophy needs to refocus its attention. How we go about talking about these topics can go variously, as long as we aim to talk "in a reasonably coherent way." How does Rorty's understanding of ethics, after the demise of traditional philosophy, shape what we've discussed so far about religious belief? Rorty's beginning point in his treatment of ethics, questioning the usefulness of extrinsic and intrinsic definitions of human nature, is a good place to start in the critique of traditional ethical theory. This is a practice filled with attempts by philosophers to somehow peel off the skin of human appearances to get at the metaphysical guts of reality, to figure out the fundamental core of human nature, all done to provide answers, even a template, for how humanity ought to be treated. Tucked into the pocket of the essentialist understanding of human nature is the claim that once we understand human nature, the key to how we ought to act will also be secured. The assumptions behind traditional moral theory are not merely an academic concern. They give life to views which have real effects on humans, the environment and all the sentient and non-sentient organisms that inhabit it. An important, current example of how the discussion of what constitutes human nature is played out in questions of morality and public policy is that of same-sex marriage, and, more specifically, homosexuality. Rorty raises this exact issue in an article we will look at in a section to follow. But we mention it here in light of what we have discussed concerning the traditional view of human nature. According to most Western traditional views of human nature, male and female are not on a continuum of gendered humans. They are specific, stable designates of humanity—two clearly demarcated groups with an extrinsic form that gives evidence of intrinsic difference. From the essentialist

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understanding of human nature follows the moral of the story, one of the most central to the tradition articulated by Aristotle, jigged by St Thomas Aquinas: that there is a certain functioning to our human nature, the goal—or better telos—is the uniting of male and female in marriage to then fruitfully multiply. With this concrete definition of human nature at hand, contrary activity, qua homosexual, contravened proper use and was therefore morally, even legally, deplorable. As is the case with most philosophical dictates, there is a theological correspondence in the insistence. In this case it is the Genesis account of the creation of Adam and Eve as the proof text for the only possible human combinations of sexual partnership: "male and female He created them." The seriousness to which the traditional view extends can be seen by how, so-called, "improper use" becomes a matter of morality. It's a rather odd thought. If I decide to use a coffee mug for apple juice it may not be using it for the purpose for which the mug was designed, but irrespective of the chagrin the artisan may feel, it would hardly be an immoral act. Even if I were to use a glass cup for hot coffee, it might be stupid, but hardly morally deplorable (as long as when it breaks I don't place on someone else the responsibility of spilt scalding coffee). Teleology, however, holds that improper use will have obvious moral indicators. In the case of homosexuality, the best (or worst) example being AIDS explained in secular terms as a gay and lesbian disease, and in religious terms, as divine punishment. Whatever worth the essentialist view has, its character is most suspicious in that it has undeniably been a trial-by-error, historical process. Today, for example, the essentialist anchoring is used to guarantee the equal treatment of women and minorities, and without it, so the story goes, this protection would not hold as relativism would be the only alternative. And, as in the case of other moral issues, the removal of a certain moral anchor would only precipitate going down the slippery slope of relativism. Yet the same essentialist assumptions used to guarantee today's obvious truths were the same assumptions used to maintain yesterday's prejudices—whether the rightness of slavery, or the denial of personhood and equal rights to women. In a book review about the life of Mary Wollstonecraft, Toni Bentley explains the established moral truths of her day: Here's how things stood for women in the world Mary was born into, the England of 1759: your property and your children were the property of your husband, divorce was impossible, and if you dared to leave your horrid—or abusive—husband you had to desert your children in the process and become an outlaw. Marital rape was perfectly legal, and probably frequent. (In all fairness, a new law in 1782 stated that a husband should not beat his wife with a stick wider than his thumb.)

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It seems likely (if not just a hope) that all the fear about moral decay, all the prejudices and righteous indignation vented by many of today's societies against same-sex marriage and homosexuality will, sometime in the future, be seen in the same light as these other examples. It would be a reminder of both our capacity for ignorance and ability to bring about moral progress. Whatever headway is being gained grappling over this and other issues, the relational view of ethics would grant a more effective clearing of prejudices. Those who insist that any empathy must measure up to the essential nature of humanity and the dictates of moral reality will be more of a drag on moral progress rather than an aid to it. Despite the rather straightforward approach the relational view has in dealing with current moral matters, most moral philosophers insist something more robust is required. Do they actually deliver the goods? Or are we still prone to how language can mystify our presuppositions, giving the appearance that something real is going on when in fact it is only a befuddlement of words and pronouncements of platitudes? Kant's moral theory shows how a theory based on "reason" can be less than an obvious basis for deriving normative beliefs. Admittedly, Kant's description of the categorical imperative, in its formulation as universalizability, isn't different from what most religious traditions have argued for, from Christ's admonition to "do unto others," to the same stated by Confucius, albeit in the negative form: "do not do to others what you wouldn't want them to do to you." But unlike Kant, few who used this as moral admonition thought it could be done with no regard for (or irrespective of) consequences, no consideration given to special relationships between family and friends, or the admission of moral dilemmas. Whatever success Kant's moral theory achieves is at the price of what it ignores. As far as how the self is pictured in Christianity, and its relation to morality, Rorty is correct that Christianity often pictures the self as divided and conflicted, as in Paul's statements that "the things that I want to do I don't do, and the things I don't want to do, I do," or that his flesh is warring against his spiritual self. Philosophical influences over the centuries often had theologians construing this to mean that Paul was restating the Platonic distinctions between the true self (as soul) and the false self (as corporeal body), and the reason/passion dualism. Here is Dewey's point that if the self is seen as conflicted, instead of relational, then that very self runs the danger of being a self-interested, calculating, social and moral misfit. What is curious in Rorty's article is that immediately after describing this conflicted self, he then states that this view, whereby the self is envisioned as fixed and simple, the "dogma" of the "ready-made completeness of the soul" 170 is the theologian's fault. He thinks, quite rightly, that it would be better to side with Dewey who saw that selfhood was in process, one that is

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capable of acting inconsistently. Rorty even cites Davidson in this context as wanting to emphasize the notion of "multiple inconsistent selves." 171 While it is true some theologians have spoken of the soul in this ready-made way, this isn't the case with St Paul, as we've noted in some of the verses we've cited. This ready-made sense also stands in contrast with the conflicted self. I'm not quite sure what to make of this apparent contradiction here in Rorty's thought, except to try to clarify matters by again looking at how obligation plays out in Christian theology. The self is certainly seen as conflicted in Christian theology, but it is also described in places as being in process. Moral perfection isn't something a Christian should expect in this life. So where does this leave obligation? There is much in the Old Testament that speaks about morality. The Ten Commandments and the, quite detailed, "Holiness Code" of Leviticus are good examples. Yet, for those who read carefully, the strict notion of morality and that of obligation (as an enforcement), drops out of view when it comes to the New Testament. The message of how we treat each other (in the moral sense, to still use that language), is that we just do what is very generally described in the Golden Rule and other statements by Christ, and that the greatest commandment is to "love God and love your neighbor as yourself." Irrespective of how Paul and other writers of the New Testament speak in the language of morality, it is arguable this language was aimed at those members of the Christian community who, like Kohlberg's subjects, were still working through the basic stages of the moral life; those who were not ready for a life without moral obligation. When moral obligation drops out, this is a life where we act, not because of moral commandments, fear of Hell or divine punishment, but because of who we are. When we help others, give money or listen to someone in need, we do not first enter into deep moral reflection about whether we should do so. There is much evidence in the New Testament that supports this way of being—despite how Christians have contrarily acted. Those familiar with Aristotle's notion of habit in the development of virtuous behavior will see a connection here with the Christian ideal. As we practice virtue there will be occasions where we will act according to that practice which follows from our character. It won't be a case of rational, moral deliberation. It may well be that this is an instance where classical Greek philosophy influenced Christ and the New Testament authors. Perhaps just as likely Christ, Aristotle, and before them, Buddha and Confucius merely reiterate the wisdom that has flowed down throughout the centuries. It's clear that in Rorty's chapter on ethics he wants to get at a description of how we ought to act without having to use the word "ethics." Ethics, as he sees it, is a more formal account of how people should act, people who either

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haven't been raised properly by their parents or community, or have been in the wrong social conditions, such as in poverty, strife or a war-torn country.172 Ethics merely takes our intuitions, like empathy, stuffs it with the language of official, traditional philosophical language and nuance, and calls it Kant's categorical imperative or Mill's utilitarian calculus. Rorty thinks this is a matter of getting carried away with philosophy. A little too exuberant, a little too much of taking ourselves seriously. Kant's view can be boiled down to the rather common belief we should treat others in a way we would like to be treated. As for Mill, we should usually think about the consequences of our actions. We need to admit to moral dilemmas. There will be instances (such as biomedical cases), where the choice has to be made between competing lives. Ethics are for those who don't know how to act decently. Morality, like the law, is an invention for "when we can no longer do what comes naturally."173 Rorty wants to explain "ethics" by our relational bond to each other. That if we are raised under the right conditions, such as being generally without want, by loving mothers and/or fathers, we'll turn out quite fine, treating people with regard. Empathy and sentimentality will be the sufficient machinery to motivate our relating to each other. When we do something of the sort that Aristotle would call' 'virtuous,'' like helping an elderly neighbor, we do so not because of duty, obligation, moral dictates, or moral law. We just do it, and when asked why, we can't really say. Rorty thinks such a person has no need of what ethical theory tries to provide. Having outlined Rorty's view of ethics and some broad implications for religious belief, we want to take a more applied turn at this point, first seeing how Rorty's pragmatist account of ethics might be played out in a secular context, in the very practical, no-nonsense way children are taught values. It is one thing to argue robust philosophical truths must be available for a stable morality; it is quite another thing to show how such a position can be practically applied and engaged. I have the suspicion that while the language of the moral realist stirs philosophical enthusiasm for doing something breathtaking and exciting, it may be more a matter of philosophers, just like ordinary people, being susceptible to platitudes. The section below addresses this debate, pitting moral realism against a pragmatist's account of values education. We hope to show that the realist is quite mistaken in the belief that the things called "objective moral standards" are necessary for the inculcation of moral values. The nonrealist, pragmatist account, on the other hand, not only better explains how children learn values, but also provides all that is necessary to ensure children have sufficient guidance in the basic framework of their moral decision-making understanding. In the last section of this chapter we will look once again at religious ethics, and, once again, how religion can be a conversation-stopper. This time we

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will look at an article by Rorty that updates the position he originally took in "Religion as Conversation-stopper," and how his modified view of ethics can be applied in debates that involve religious values, moral behavior and public policy.

Inculcating Values: Moral Realism or Pragmatism? In an article discussing the means by which democratic values education is to be inculcated, Tapio Puolimatka argued "it is possible to educate in democratic values in ways that foster the development of the rational and moral autonomy of children only within the moral realist context." 174 Describing in detail Puolimatka's defense of moral realism, we will offer a Rortyan response to moral realism, as well as a pragmatist account of democratic 175 values education. Addressing the problem of democratic values education, Tapio Puolimatka argued that "democracy presupposes citizens who are capable of forming authentic convictions about the life they regard as most worth living and of bringing their contribution to the guidance of society on the basis of their deliberation." 176 What counts as "authentic convictions" are those "the person can identify while being conscious of the processes which led her to identify with them." 177 Education will certainly play a role in this process even though Puolimatka readily admits that the inculcation of values will be a tenuous affair. The real danger, he warns, comes from those who wish to replace democratic values with values contrary to those of liberty, equality, justice, solidarity, and truth. How can we maintain these values and at the same time allow for dissent? Puolimatka contends that "[i]t is crucial for democratic society to agree on a set of procedural values for adjudicating conflicts over substantive value-orientation." 178 For Puolimatka, deriving agreement is fraught with obstacles owing to the inherent definition of democracy—allowing for the possibility of dissent over the very values it upholds. This leads to the paradox of trying to sustain democratic freedom while allowing for radical remonstration. The problem is exacerbated, he believes, by those who contend that moral decisions are a matter of personal responsibility. As such, individual moral decisions may conflict with public values currently in place. "This indicates a basic discrepancy between the individualistic nature of morality and the socialising nature of education." 179 When it comes to teaching values to students this issue becomes more delicate. How is it possible "to teach a commitment to moral values in a way that respects individuality"? The problem of democratic education, as it turns out, can only be seriously resolved in the moral realist context. Moral realism is:

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[T]he view that the realm of moral values and norms is wider than our knowledge of it and that their validity is not dependent on individual attitudes or social contracts. The conditions for moral experience cannot be reduced to the views, desires and valuations of moral agents. The real (as opposed to the imaginary or routinely projected) structure of human interaction has an irreducible moral aspect which sets requirements for 180 human behaviour. The result, Puolimatka concludes, is that human actions "are always subject to evaluation by moral standards whether one acknowledges the reality of the moral 181 order or not." And just for good measure Puolimatka notes that the moral 182 realist's paradigm, due to its "explanatory power", gives added preference over anti-realism. Provisionally we might remark that this way of setting up the problem begs 183 the question from the very beginning. Why believe, in the first place, that moral standards are somehow beyond the decision-making process of the moral agent? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, what does it really mean to assert that there is a moral reality that somehow is distinct from human agency? That the ethically true could exist without anyone knowing it?184 And if such a realm (this way of speaking naturally conjures up Platonism) is something we are to somehow come in contact with to be moral, why does moral realism give way to different versions and different norms? 185 My hunch at this point is that in the end the moral realist will ultimately fall back on ad hominem—accusations that one's opponent in the discussion over ethics cannot agree because he or she has some sort of cognitive, psychological, or spiritual (or a little of each) malfunction which impedes seeing moral 186 truth.186 In any case, Puolimatka offers the following premises to his argument which he then elaborates in closer detail: 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

The essence of democracy is in moral values expressed in societal procedures and human relationships, and in critical citizens who are committed to these values. The continuity of democratic society presupposes that citizens are both critical and committed to democratic values. Without moral truth there is no adequate reason for critical persons to come to definite conclusions about values. Since each person has the right to make her own value choices, education should provide her with the capacity to make them in a rational framework on the basis of the best available information. Genuine moral convictions can develop only in a rational framework where ideas are accepted on the basis of their validity and justifiability. Convictions formed in a context closed to reason are prejudices.

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Critical individuals adopt democratic convictions only if democratic values prove to be more valid than competing value-systems. If these values have no rational appeal, it is not sensible to teach them since there are better moral choices. 7. An indoctrinatory teaching approach cannot foster the development of democratic convictions. Educational authority should not be used for ideological purposes. Rational convictions presuppose a learning process which discloses the human potential for being critical, and the formation of convictions which stand critical scrutiny. Democratic convictions should be taught without indoctrination. If they cannot, it is hard to justify their teaching at all. 187

How would the pragmatist evaluate the premises of this argument enumerated by Puolimatka? To be admitted at the outset, the goal for the pragmatist or Rortyan theorizer is not to do what the moral realist does—except better. It is to rather show that the former can teach values to students in a rational framework, but without the cumbersome assumptions presupposed by the moral realist. From a pragmatist standpoint premises (1) and (2) are uncontroversial. In terms of enhancing solidarity and human nourishing the pragmatist would argue similarly. For the time being we will leave them as they stand. Premise (3) would be the most troubling for the pragmatist, although most of Puolimatka's criticisms here are directed against the antirealist. And while the pragmatist sees this as "the flabby old controversy between realism and antirealism", 188 some comments should be offered about this premise. 189 Puolimatka argues that developing moral authenticity in students can best be achieved through moral realism—the contention that "moral truth is not reducible to prevalent social conventions." 190 It is reducible neither to mere individual preferences, nor to practical effectiveness. Instead, "[t]he teacher is expected to foster students' capacity to relate to moral reality and focus on its relevant features, rather than to use persuasive methods to communicate her convictions." 191 Puolimatka then goes on to offer three different examples of moral realism—Kant, Scheler, and the classical intuitionist. Admitting that there is difference among them as to what constitutes the nature of moral cognition (which should immediately put up a red flag to the cautious), Puolimatka believes that the crucial point is "that moral knowledge is not essentially relative to culturally transmitted vocabularies, conceptual systems and justificatory conventions." 192 The principal difficulty is that Puolimatka does not explain what exactly it is that the moral educator is supposed to come into touch with before being adequately equipped to teach values to students. How exactly does one "relate to moral reality" and "focus on its relevant features"—to transcend

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the human point of view, reaching out to objects that are wholly external to 193 our descriptions? Perhaps this goes unexplained for good reason. As it turns out, much preparatory conceptual busy work is necessitated: A life spent representing objects accurately would be spent recording the results of calculations, reasoning through sorites, calling off the observable properties of things, construing cases according to unambiguous criteria, getting things right . .. He wants to be constrained not merely by the disciplines of the day, but by the ahistorical and nonhuman nature of 194 reality itself. Rorty notes that this impulse takes two forms: [T]he original Platonic strategy of postulating novel objects for treasured propositions to correspond to, and the Kantian strategy of finding principles which are definatory of the essence of knowledge, or representation, or morality, or rationality. But this difference is unimportant compared to the common urge to escape the vocabulary and practices of one's own time and find something ahistorical and necessary to cling to. 195 It would take some time for Puolimatka both to explain what the moral realist means by all of this, and to then show the educator how she will carry out the task of teaching this information to students in a meaningful way. In short, to find "the a priori structure of any possible inquiry, or language, or form of social life." 196 This will be a challenging undertaking. Yet this is what being moral means on the moral realist's account—to give substantive content to 197 how "the student's capacity to relate to moral reality" can be fostered. Reality is distinct from social reality. If not explained, these ideals are platitudes which merely give the impression some high-level activity is being carried out. Pragmatists, on the other hand, urge us to think differently about rationality and, as a consequence, about what one must do to be considered moral. They contend "that rationality is what history and society make it—that there is no overarching ahistorical structure (the Nature of Man, the laws of human behavior, the Moral Law, the Nature of Society) to be discovered." 198 But far from plunging humanity and society into an abyss of relativism, anarchy, and meaninglessness (a fear that the moral realist enjoys poking a stick at), the dismissal of realism pushes the individual towards responsibility. "Dewey emphasizes that this move 'beyond method' gives mankind an opportunity to grow up, to be free to make itself, rather than seeking direction from some imagined outside source (one of the ahistorical structures mentioned above)." 199 In response to the query "How real is that?" the pragmatist can only say that nobody would ask this question "unless he had some invidious

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contrast in mind between things that are really real and things that are (as Royce put it) 'not so damned real.' " 200 Premise (4) seems, at first glance, unproblematic and conducive to the pragmatist's position. But it becomes increasingly clear that what constitutes being rational in this premise carries with it the Kantian idea of rationality—that "it is rational to be moral," 201 and the Kantian model of philosophy—a model where epistemological questions are foremost areas of concern. Understood thusly, philosophy, as epistemology, "must set universal standards of rationality and objectivityfor all actual and possible claims to knowledge." 202Once these universal standards are established, the knowledge derived gives the philosopher a privileged perspective whereby she may adjudicate cultural quarrels over values and truth claims.203 Puolimatka does not exactly mention Kant in his discussion of the "rational framework." But it is interesting to note that in his elucidation on this point he quotes Kant's view of moral education. And given the context of Puolimatka's article there is good reason to believe Kant's notion of rationality is what is meant. If so, this view, compared to the pragmatist's view of rationality, is epistemologically loaded, creating more problems than it attempts to solve. In contrast to the moral realist's position, the pragmatist contends that rationality names a set of moral virtues: [TJolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force. These are the virtues which members of a civilized society must possess if the society is to endure. In this sense of "rational," the word means something more like "civilized" than like "methodological." When so construed, the distinction between the rational and the irrational has nothing in particular to do with the difference between the arts and the sciences. On this construction, to be rational is simply to discuss any topic—religious, literary, or scientific—in a way which eschews dogmatism, defensiveness, and righteous indignation. 204 The pragmatist insists this metaphysically unencumbered view of rationality makes good sense. Instead of trying to isolate the shared human attribute which grounds morality in rationality, rationality is understood by the Rortyan as the attempt to "make one's web of belief" 205 as coherent as possible. 206 Dropped is Kant's attempt to square a dying rationalist tradition with "a vision of a new, democratic world": Kant's balancing act has become outmoded and irrelevant. We are now in a good position to put aside the last vestiges of the idea that human beings are distinguished by the capacity to know rather than by the capacities for friendship and intermarriage, distinguished by rigorous rationality

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rather than by flexible sentimentality. If we do so, we shall have dropped the idea that assured knowledge of a truth about what we have in common is a prerequisite for moral education, as well as the idea of a specifically j.j.-207 moral1 motivation. Avoiding otherworldly denotation, the pragmatist's account exhibits a human point of view coupled with the explanatory power sought by values education. It is clear that educators know how to inculcate these values into the moral life-world of students. It is something that skillful, sensitive and judicious teachers have always done. Similar to the other premises, the force of premise (5) turns on the use of the word "rational." The pragmatist, while not rejecting this premise out of hand, once again is suspicious of the moral realist's use of this word. She is, moreover, skeptical about the necessity and efficacy of the rational framework that provides "genuine moral convictions." The pragmatist's first suspicion, provoked by Dewey and Foucault, is that what counts for rationality is often motivated by politics and power exhibited through nurture and culture, not nature and reality. 208 What is rational in one era (or generation) may be considered irrational a few years down the road. 209 When we look back in our own century to certain beliefs that were once counted as truths according to nature, the moral realm, in short as rational—we now think as unjust, bigoted, racist, sexist, or xenophobic. And this is to our credit. The second suspicion is that the interests of those with political, ecclesiastical, and monetary power, cloaked in the guise of being "rational," more often than not lead to breaches in human rights, environmental disasters, intolerance,and unjustified discrimination. Instead of being the foundation of democracy—instead of strengthening democratic values—these constructed views of rationality give way to conduct that threatens democracy. As Ricoeur has warned, once the unquestionable is established violence is not far off: Rien ne prete plus a 1'imposture que 1'idee de totalite. On a trop vite dit: elle est ici, elle est la; elle est Esprit, elle est Nature, elle est Histoire; la violence n'est pas loin; d'abord la violence sur les faits et bientot la violence sur les hommes, si par surcroit le philosophe de la totalite a pouvoir sur les hommes.210 The moral realist fears that without objectivity and rationality, morality slips into anarchy. 211 Pragmatists, on the other hand, see universalism and realism "as committed to the idea of a reality-tracking faculty called 'reason' and an unchanging moral reality to be tracked, and thus unable to make sense of the 212 claim that a new voice is needed." Moral progress, for the latter, must make

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way for new voices and new ways of seeing things. The questions asked are "What are the limits of our community? Are the encounters sufficiently free and open? Has what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability 213 to listen to outsiders who are suffering? To outsiders who have new ideas?" As Rorty rightly notes, these are political questions rather than metaphysical or epistemological questions. Moral progress "consists in an increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the differences."214 What must the teacher do, under the realist's account, in order to show that the moral beliefs accepted have "validity" and "justifiability?"215 Again, if by rationality we mean the non-metaphysical, pragmatist sense given above, the pragmatist would agree that one should certainly be able to give students reasons for certain behavior. Validity and justifiability are the descriptions we apply when reasons for actions are successfully explained and accepted by a 216 particular audience: If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty, and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false.217 The pragmatist would fully agree with Puolimatka's contention that when teaching "morality" to children "the child should be provided with reasons as early as he is able to understand them."218 Children easily understand (usually better than adults) norms such as, "treat everyone with kindness, because this is what we like best for ourselves." If the child (or adult) asks for more—e.g. "why should I care about Sally or Johnny"—no unarguable, irrefutable response can be given. Yet because no final and ultimate response or justification is available it does not follow that no response is possible: A better sort of answer is the sort of long, sad, sentimental story that begins, "Because this is what it is like to be in her situation—to be far from home, among strangers" ... or "Because her mother would grieve for her." Such stories, repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the rich, safe, powerful people, to tolerate and even to cherish powerless people—people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own moral identity, our sense of the limits of permissible i • • 219 219 human variation.

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But in Puolimatka's working paradigm, providing reasons is more than providing justification—this is the point of moral realism. Reason-giving is one thing, establishing objective moral truth is something else. The moral realist needs to do more than merely give children reasons for doing certain things and refraining from other things. Required is a crash course in Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, along with standard readings in the history of metaphysics and epistemology. It will be no mean task for the average school teacher to provide this foundation of morality for the student—getting in touch with objective reality and moral truth takes time, plenty of energy and most certainly much homework. In contrast to the attempt to come into contact with moral reality, Rorty emphasizes the importance of conversation. As Rorty describes it, this is close to Habermas' philosophy of intersubjectivity, which "centers around a practice characteristic of liberal societies—treating as true whatever can be agreed upon in the course of free discussion and waving aside the question of whether there is some metaphysical object to which the result of such discussion might 220 or might not correspond." Language is treated in this account as a game 221 rather than a picture. Language and the world are not seen as two separate realms "separated by an abyss that has to be crossed."222 It is the rather banal assertion that we will never escape our language. Which is another way of saying that we will never "see God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality face to face." 223 But this does not mean that humanity is left in a quagmire of meaninglessness. The intersubjectivity we pursue ("unforced agreement among 224 larger and larger groups of interlocutors" ), is a sense of social solidarity that rivals the realist's "pursuit of objective truth."225 In premise (6), the first sentence appears to be straightforward, at least if we interpret the notion "more valid" as "based on good reasons." The values that are part of democratic convictions remain fallible. But, contrary to the realist, the pragmatist believes that the vocabulary of democracy is to be preferred over the alternatives because it encourages the capacity for human flourishing, not because it represents reality more adequately:226 I take the point of Rawls and Habermas, as of Dewey and Peirce, to be that the epistemology suitable for such a democracy is one in which the only test of a political proposal is its ability to gain assent from people who retain radically diverse ideas about the point and meaning of human, about the path to private perfection.227 If an appeal is made to a standard outside of our community, pragmatists contend it can only be to "the practice of a real or imagined alternative com228 munity." Rather than appeals to standards, rules, and laws in other worldly reality, appeal is made to human reality. Rorty calls Dewey into the picture here:

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[Dewey] insisted that the only point of society is to construct subjects capable of evermore novel, ever richer, forms of human happiness. The vocabulary in which Dewey suggested we discuss our social problems and our political initiatives was part of his attempt to develop a discursive practice 229 suitable for that project of social construction. This will be a creative process, "the creation of a greater diversity of indivi230 duals—larger, fuller, more imaginative and daring individuals." Puolimatka, as a moral realist, must mean more than this account offered by Dewey and Rorty. But it is not exactly stated in this premise how his position is different. In fact, as Puolimatka describes it, his view of rationality is arguably more pragmatic than Kantian. For instance, in his elucidation of premise (6) Puolimatka states that the "democratic way of life," as "rationally preferable," means that it "is more valuable than the totalitarian way of life, just as freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, and truth are preferred to their opposites."231 The pragmatist would be in hearty agreement. Here the question of values turns on accessing ways of life based on inquiry and preference. "For the pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry—scientific as well as moral—is deliberation concerning the relative attraction or various concrete alternatives." 232 This agrees with William James' definition of truth as being "what is good for us to believe." 233 The better approach to those ways of life mentioned by Puolimatka above, Dewey tells us, "is not 'Do they get it right?', but more like 'What would it be like to believe that? What would happen if I did? What would I be committing myself to?' "234 If this constitutes "critical scrutiny" then children, reflecting on these questions, are certainly capable of "sharpening their critical capacities." 235 The second sentence of premise (6) captures an important point of contention between the moral realist and a Rortyan account of democratic moral education. For the latter, appeal is not so much a matter of being rational. It is a matter of sentiments. This distinction is clearly demarcated within a historical, intellectual context. Again, it is to be kept in mind that when Puolimatka speaks of rational appeal for moral beliefs the appeal is made from the context of moral realism. 236 Presupposed is a set of moral truths of "which we are immediately aware." Puolimatka quotes approvingly from Stout on this point: "That is the moral truth of the matter, whether we recognize it or not—a truth I deem more certain than any explanation I could give of it or any argument I could make on 237 its behalf."237 Instead of appeals to a rational justification of democratic values, Rorty situates the issue of moral progress within the human rights project.238 Changing the conversation thusly, Hume replaces Kant. Of especial interest is Hume's contention that "corrected (sometimes rule-corrected) sympathy,

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not law-discerning reason, is the fundamental moral capacity." Agreeing withBaier, Rorty believes "trust" rather than "obligation" should be our fundamental moral notion. Advancement in concerns over human rights or extending the principles of democracy is not a matter of more people becoming rational or coming in touch with moral reality. It is rather "a progress of sentiments." "These two centuries are most easily understood not as a period of deepening understanding of the nature of rationality or of morality, but rather as one in which there occurred an astonishingly rapid progress of sentiments, in which it has become much easier for us to be moved to action by sad 240 and sentimental stories." Of course someone might ask, "Why should I be motivated by these stories if I am under no objective, rational moral obligation?" For people like Hume, 241 Rorty remarks, this response is a sure mark of intellectual immaturity. It is a clear separation from the contention of the moral realist that democratic values must have "rational appeal" in order to be considered "better moral choices."242 This "progress in sentiments" view maintains that moral failure is not due to irrationality. It denies, for example, that those who are intolerant are somehow "irrational"—"that with only a little more effort, the good and rational part of these other people's souls could have triumphed over the bad and irra243 tional part." This Platonic-Kantian view implies that we (the good people) know something that they (the bad people) do not know. With a little more intellectual effort, a little more inculcation of what it means to be rational, they could be like us. Instead of explaining bad people's beliefs as the consequence of a deficiency of rationality, or failure to be objective and cognizant of the categorical imperative, it would be better (that is, of more explanatory power because it 244 is "more concrete, more specific, more suggestive of possible remedies" ) to teach students that their moral failure is due to some other condition. "The bad people's problem is, rather, that they were not as lucky in the circum245 stances of their upbringing as we were." Most probably they were deprived not of truth or moral knowledge, but security and sympathy: By "security" I mean conditions of life sufficiently risk-free as to make one's difference from others inessential to one's self-respect, one's sense of worth . .. By "sympathy" I mean the sort of reactions Athenians had more of after seeing Aeschylus's The Persians than before, the sort that whites in the United States had more of after reading Uncle Tom's Cabin than before, the sort we have more of after watching television programs about the gen246 ocide in Bosnia. Security and sympathy must both be part of an individual or community's environment, just as peace and economic prosperity go together. "The

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tougher things are, the more you have to be afraid of, the more dangerous your situation, the less you can afford the time or effort to think about what things might be like for people with whom you do not immediately identify. Sentimental education works only on people who can relax long enough 247 to listen." This account of moral education is captured in Puolimatka's elucidation of his final premise. After all the debate and appeals to rationality and truth are finished, he concludes: "the distinction between a critical and an uncritical citizen has more to do with personal depth than with intellectual skills."248 The pragmatist could not be more in agreement. Pragmatists are suspicious of the moral realist's account of values education. For the pragmatist, the realist's attempt to represent the nature of moral reality is "the search for a way in which one can avoid the need for conversation and deliberation and simply tick off the way things are.'' 249 Pragmatists, on the other hand, believe that Kuhn, Derrida, Putnam, and Davidson, would all agree that: [I]t is futile either to reject or to accept the idea that the real and the true are "independent of our beliefs." The only evident positive sense we can make of this phrase, the only use that derives from the intentions of those who prize it, derives from the idea of correspondence, and this is an idea without content.250 This follows from the recognition that distinguishing between language and reality is ultimately an impossible endeavor. Quoting Putnam, Rorty writes: [EJlements of what we call "language" or "mind" penetrate so deeply into what we call "reality" that the very project of representing ourselves as being "mappers" of something "language-independent" is fatally compromised from the start. Like Relativism, Realism is an impossible attempt to view the world from Nowhere.251 The pragmatist, because she can give all sorts of reasons for her preference for democracy, is quite justified in thinking as she does. But in contrast to the moral realist, "we cannot check our view of the matter against the intrinsic nature of moral reality .. . Nor will we get anywhere by telling those who think differently that they are out of touch with reality or that they are behaving irrationally."252 While the realist believes that values education can only be completed by holding to a robust view of truth and objectivity, the pragmatist maintains that inculcating values will be most effective through appeal to "sentiments." Rorty's description of edifying philosophy shows here how it can be practically

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applied. Stripped of highly metaphysical language, edifying philosophy can be successfully used to guide our beliefs and norms. It is one example of how this sense of philosophy addresses the concrete problems of society. Religion as Conversation-stopper Reconsidered: A Case Study in Ethical Debate I think Rorty is right in his general criticisms about traditional ethical theory. Ethical theory may provide a basic framework for how we should behave (whether taught in its more simple forms by mothers and fathers or in more heady forms by university professors). It may even develop moral character, but there is nothing deep going on in moral theory that will help those incapable of acting decently. If someone has been raised or lives in unfavorable conditions, the most we will be able to do is introduce that person to the greater community in the hopes we will address the basic needs she or he requires. This is why social programs and assistance, along with humanitarian efforts, contribute more greatly to human nourishing than courses on moral theory. Rorty also wants to insist that an important part of how we talk about our values, whether we use moral theory or not, is to maintain the private/public distinction. What concerns him most is the importing of religious beliefs and values, holm bolus, into the public square. We have discussed this view in his "Religion as Conversation-stopper." Rorty, however, has come to think the views he previously espoused against Garter need "a chastened, and more cautious, restatement" of his anti-clerical views. This was largely because of arguments and criticisms given by Nicholas Wolterstorff 253 and Jeffrey Stout. 254 As a result, Rorty updated his initial response to Garter in a 2003 article entitled, "Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration." 255 This is an important article as it nuances the private/ public distinction and, at the same time, provides a case study for how questions of morality should be addressed in the public square. This is why we chose to place discussion of this article in this section on ethics rather than in the preceding section on Rorty's philosophy of religion. "In the U.S.", Rorty begins by reminding us, "the government offers toleration, and various special privileges, for almost anything that chooses to call itself a religion. In exchange, the churches are supposed not to use the pulpit, or church funds, to support political candidates and proposals—or at least not to do so in so blatant a way as to lose their tax exemptions." 256 So far, there is no change of heart on Rorty's part. If anything, the temper of Rorty's argument is more passionate than what is normally seen in his writings. The target of Rorty's chagrin is the ecclesiastical institutions which go out of their way to create grief for the homosexual community. Where he finds himself in need of more careful division, or, as he puts it, a "back-peddling," is in his division "between congregations of religious

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believers ministered to by pastors and what I shall be calling 'ecclesiastical organizations'—organizations that accredit pastors and claim to offer authoritative guidance to believers."257 Rorty is ready to name names. "Our anti-clericalism is aimed at the Catholic bishops, the Mormon General Authorities, the tele-evangelists, and all the other religious professionals who devote themselves not to pastoral care but to promulgating orthodoxy and acquiring economic and political clout."258 The "Justice Sunday," meetings organized by conservative Christians to fight what they think is "judicial activism," would certainly find inclusion here, along with James Dobson and his para-church organization, Focus on the Family, which has tried to scare people into thinking that same-sex marriage will spell the end of the family—that cartoon characters (like SpongeBob Squarepants) teach depravity to our children. Or, Pat Robertson, of the 700 Club, openly stating that presidents of foreign countries can be assassinated because they are friendly to Castro, or because they may withhold their oil resources. The reason Rorty has come to narrow his scope of criticism to these ecclesiastical organizations is because, "We think that it is mostly religion above the parish level that does the damage."259 If by some spectacular turn of events religious believers suddenly were all convinced by Rorty to disband ecclesiastical organizations, "pruning them back to the parish level," what might be the negative effect? It is worth noting Rorty's thoughts here, as he addresses a couple of popular warnings made by Christian apologists. The first argues that this pruning would leave an enormous gap in the lives of religious people. "[TJhey will no longer have a sense of being part of a great and powerful worldly institution."260 It might turn out this way for many religious believers, although it might also come to be these same people find the gap filled by working with the wider community in the effort to increase social justice by working with the homeless, shut-ins and the elderly. What Rorty thinks, with numerous examples from history on his side, is that instead of addressing the problems of their fellow human beings (Dewey's "problems of society"), religious believers often have their attention diverted to the proverbial "pie in the sky." By shifting attention to more earthly concerns (which, we should add, is hardly an unbiblical notion), "the only role left for religious belief will be to help individuals find meaning in their lives, and to serve as a help to individuals in their times of trouble."261 The second response from apologists, to the charge over how much harm has been perpetrated by ecclesiastical institutions, involves at least two points. The first is that these religious institutions have served a vital role, acting as a kind of magnifying glass over scripture focusing on values which, in turn, were reflected in the establishment of Western society. These values need to be retained for the moral health of the society. Rorty agrees religious belief

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has been useful for Western society, but, using a Wittgensteinian metaphor, we should now hold on to the obtained vantage-point, kicking away the ladder that brought us here. Not surprisingly, Christian apologists would consider this a mistake. This leads to their second point. They would argue that Rorty is myopic in his judgment concerning the degree to which Christians have contributed to the legislative, political, and social well-being of society. In our discussion of moral theory we've seen something of the complexity of how this view of morality contrasts with Rorty's. We won't repeat it, only to say that the apologists' position is double-sided. In its proudest moments, ecclesiastical institutions have indeed fought for virtuous causes. But this isn't a buffet where we can choose our best moments and leave behind the more shameful ones. "We grant that ecclesiastical organizations have sometimes been on the right side, but we think that the occasional Gustavo Guttierez or Martin Luther King does not compensate for the ubiquitous Joseph Ratzinger and Jerry Falwells."262 If the scales of justice are pulled out, "History suggests to us that 263 such organizations will always, on balance, do more harm than good." I'm not exactly sure how this claim can be quantified, but taking the most recent scandal, that of the Catholic Church's shameful cases of child abuse by priests, and even worse, the hierarchy ignoring the issue and complicit attempt to cover it up, the scales seem to be tipped in Rorty's favor. 264 With these preliminary points made, Rorty turns to the main unease raised by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Wolterstorff's point, which Rorty agrees with, is that a religious person has the "right to insist that both law and custom should leave him free to say, in the public square, that the endorsement of redistributionist social legislation is a result of his belief that God, in such passages as Psalm 72, has commanded that the cause of the poor should be 265 defended." Rorty makes this initial agreement because he also wants no law and custom hindering him from his own preferences, like citing passages in John Stuart Mill to justify the same legislation. But this is not really the point. While Rorty takes some time to explain it, we can summarize it quite quickly: How does Wolterstorff and others like him so easily discriminate between the verses in scripture that jibe with the sentiments of most citizens—like aiding the poor, the sort of things Psalm 72 speaks about—and the more curious verses like Leviticus 18:22 used by ecclesiastical groups who want to prohibit homosexuals from having the same rights as heterosexuals— everything from having sex, to getting married and adopting children? If it was as simple as a plain reading of scripture, why shouldn't we put into action other verses found in Leviticus, like putting to death children who curse their parents? Or, in the New Testament, Christ's hermeneutically straightforward injunction that if your eye causes you to sin, then it is better to pluck it out than let it carry you into Hell. Plain and simple it may be, but

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one would be hard-pressed to find a single parishioner in these organizations in need of an eye-patch because of a self-inflicted moral reprimand. It isn't so much that Rorty thinks Wolterstorff, or an ecclesiastical organization, should be hindered from using religious-based views in discussions in the public square. As we have suggested elsewhere, it is rather that this won't get us very far in the dialogue that ensues—specifically with those who don't share the same religious or theological interpretations. What Wolterstorff wants to say in response, is that the same problem exists when Rorty cites Mill's On Liberty and his utilitarianism in support of his views vented in the public square. If all Rorty could do is cite Mill, Wolterstorff would be right. And here is another important qualification to his original article, "Religion as Conversation-stopper." This time it is Jeffrey Stout who gives Rorty pause. Stout admits there are some expressions of religious belief which can be a conversation-stopper, "as when someone says, 'Don't ask me for reasons. I don't have any. It is a matter of faith.' " Trouble being for Rorty, "this kind of reply is not confined to the religious. It is the one I should have to make if I were asked why I believe that the aim of political life should be the greatest happiness of the greatest number." 266 What is the outcome then? Rorty says at the end of his article that: [IJnstead of saying that religion was a conversation-stopper, I should have simply said that citizens of a democracy should try to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible. We should do our best to keep the conversation going without citing unarguable first principles, either philosophical or religious. If we are sometimes driven to such citation, we should see ourselves as having failed, not as having triumphed.267 I don't think Rorty should have ended on this note. It is easy for some detractors to think this is the best Rorty can do—that at worst we'll just have Rorty's secularists lining up against the ecclesiastical institutions. To think so is to misplace ordering in his article as an ordering of dialogical importance. We shouldn't be too quick to skip over some important qualifications Rorty makes a couple of pages before the concluding paragraph. Here he considers how we can adjudicate the various claims made in standoffs between 268 competing parties, and what "rules of engagement for theKulturkampf" we can draw up. From the outset Rorty is somewhat skeptical about being successful: Philosophers such as John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Robert Audi have attempted to draw up rules of engagement for the Kulturkampf. I agree with Jeffrey Stout that attempts to find rules that are neutral between two sides

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are pretty hopeless. So is the attempt to say that one or another contribution 269 to political discourse is illegitimate. He also admits, "On the subject of the vacuity of epistemological foundationalism, Wolterstorff and I are as one . .. Like Wolterstorff, I have doubts about the utility of the notions of'epistemological adequacy' and 'motivational sufficiency.' I am not sure that we have criteria for measuring either." 270 Rorty is troubled by leaving the matter like that. When all is said and done he thinks he has picked out a difference in these approaches. "It is one thing to explain how a given political stance is bound up with one's religious belief, and another to think that it is enough, when defending a political view, simply to cite authority, scriptural or otherwise." 271 What we all need to do, irrespective of the personal or institutional views we may feel compelled to defend, is to go beyond simplyquoting our favorite Bible passage or political philosopher, 2723 which, in both cases would be the mere appeal to authority. Those well acquainted with Rorty's writings know he isn't going to flesh out in detail what this "going beyond" entails, though in one place he admits a certain liking to the "Gadamerian attitude." 273 He also points out that his deepest disagreement with Wolterstorff "is on empirical matters." 274 What he leaves us with isn't meager. It adequately describes the way we sort through many of our differences. What bears attention is that between Wolterstorff's claim that "both law and custom" should allow him to say what he wants, and Stout's skepticism to find rules of engagement that are neutral, there is a great deal left in the way of being able to discuss our views and differences. At least if we can agree to talk to each other and to try to answer the objections and questions posed by our interlocutors: It is OK for Christian believers to have Christian reasons for supporting redistribution of wealth or opposing same-sex marriage, but I am not sure it counts as having such reasons if the person who finds such marriage inconceivable is unwilling or unable even to discuss, for example, the seeming tension between Leviticus 22:18 and I Corinthians 13. The believer's fellow citizens should not take her as offering a reason unless she can say a lot more than that a certain ecclesiastical institution holds a certain view, or that such an institution insists that a given Scriptural passage be taken seriously, and at face value.275 The rest of Rorty's article does exactly this, with the morality of homosexuality as a case example. He takes some time, in line with his reason-giving approach, to indicate why he finds this is the best, most current example of how ecclesiastical organizations create unnecessary human misery. Here are Rorty's reasons, listed in point form:

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Though the law should not forbid someone from citing such texts [like Leviticus 18:22] in support of a political position, custom should forbid it. 2. Citing such passages should be deemed not just in bad taste, but as heartlessly cruel, as reckless persecution, as incitement to violence. 3. Religious people who claim a right to express their homophobia in public because it is a result of their religious convictions should, I think, be ashamed of themselves, and should be made to feel ashamed. Such citation should count as hate speech, and be treated as such. 4. Our attitude to them should be the same as that toward people who remark that, though of course Hitler was a bad thing, it cannot be denied that the Jews didki\\ Christ—or, to vary the example, people who urge that, although the lynch mobs went too far, it is a truly terrible thing for a white woman to have sex with a black man. [p. 143; emphasis his] 5. I do not think that it is helpful to say that the homophobes are being "irrational." The efforts of moral philosophers to show that sexual orientation is "morally irrelevant" seem to me to beg all the questions against their opponents. 6. So I view the struggle between utilitarians and homophobic Christian fundamentalists as no more a struggle between reason and unreason than is the Catholic-Protestant struggle in Northern Ireland. There is nothing called "reason" that stands above such struggles. [p. 144] 7. The Protestant and Catholic churches of Western Europe did not exactly make war on the Jews during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. But they did keep up a steady barrage of contempt, combined with support for politicians running on anti-Semitic platforms, and with silence concerning the sadistic pogroms-cum-gang-rapes which provided weekend amusement for the devoutly religious peasants of Central and Eastern Europe. 8. The situation is the same, nowadays, for homosexuals in the United States, who find themselves confronting two main enemies: ministers of the Christian religion who cite Leviticus 18:22 and gay-bashers. 9. These ministers sometimes try to distinguish themselves from the gay-bashers by saying that even though sodomy is an abomination, Christians must be kind and merciful even to the most disgusting and shameless sinners. The gays and lesbians, however, persist in thinking that if the churches would stop quoting Leviticus and Paul on the subject of sodomy, would stop saying that tolerance for homosexuals is a mark of moral decline, and would stop using tax-exempt funds to

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campaign for repeal of pro-gay ordinances and statutes, there would be fewer gay-bashers around, [p. 145—6] [Homosexuals] find it strange that such a large proportion of the time, money and energy of the Christian churches in the U.S. is devoted to [fighting against equality laws for homosexuals]. [Homosexuals] are struck by the fact that religious reasons are now pretty much the only reasons brought forward in favor of treating them with contempt. Except for the mindless gay-bashing thugs, their fellow-churchgoers are the only people who still think that sodomy is a big deal. So gays and lesbians might reasonably conclude that the reason Christian pulpits have become the principal source of European anti-Semitism—namely, than encouraging exclusivist bigotry brings money and power to ecclesiastical organizations. There is nothing like a sense of banding together against a group that one has heard described as an object of divine disapproval and of justified disgust to encourage and excuse sadistic violence, [p. 146; emphasis his]

Rorty has raised a number of important points which merit further reflection. That many of these statements won't strike everybody as overwhelming reasons for abandoning their position on homosexuality shouldn't delimit their dialogical worthiness. Members who represent ecclesiastical institutions may very well have good responses to these points. But I wish to show how the process can be carried even further. The reason I think it is important to go more into this matter is to take up Rorty's challenge that, even without foundational rules for engagement, we can nonetheless gain a great deal of clarity about the appropriateness of proposed public policies. So I want to return to Rorty's query, against Wolterstorff, over how one can discriminate between the various normative claims in the Bible. Using Rorty's example, what is the hermeneutical principle at work when it comes to knowing whether to invoke Psalm 72 or Leviticus 18? Or, our own example of Matthew 5:29—"And if your right eye makes you stumble, tear it out, and throw it from you"? Although Rorty doesn't go into the matter, it's worth pursuing. If Christians believe that it is simply a matter of accepting what is written in the Bible as transparent instruction, whether in Leviticus or another book of scripture, then we should be out sacrificing lambs, not wearing clothing that has a fabric of both linen and cotton, and stoning children who swear at their parents. Yet even modern conservative Christians don't think like this. While they believe God is still the Supreme law-giver, and the Bible is where those values are expressed, they nonetheless use hermeneutical caution when

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interpreting these and similar passages. While many would be reluctant to admit it, this hermeneutical caution is partly due to how our values have been historically conditioned by social sentiment. Some historical examples illustrate how this occurs. As Rorty has showed with his own examples, at times the very people fighting against social justice were ecclesiastical institutions. Slavery is not strictly condemned in the New Testament, and many members of the clergy used the Bible to support arguments against emancipation. The same goes for women's rights. Historically at least, just like the current debate over same-sex marriage, Christian conservatives used the Bible to warn against what appeared to them as clear, biblical transgressions. Here's the point: once the laws were changed (sometimes after much bloodshed) and social policies reversed—with blacks receiving the same rights as whites, and women the same rights as men, the Christian hold-outs eventually found themselves also coming on board. With the passing of years, Christians read the same scripture, and what seemed so clearly indicated in the Bible years before, now clearly merits a different interpretation. In light of these examples, when it comes to interpreting scripture, what are the essentials of "biblical," Christian morality, unconditioned by the social environment? Which are conditioned by historical circumstances? To some extent the Bible itself gives the answer. A good, but not obvious, example are the Ten Commandments. We are used to hearing that this list is one of moral absolutes, unconditioned by social circumstances, "True for all time." Yet one of the Commandments was dropped by Christians 2,000 years ago: to keep the Sabbath holy. Early Christians took St Paul's view that they were no longer under Jewish religious law but were free in the Gospel. As a result they substituted Saturday, the Sabbath, for Sunday, "the Lord's Day" as a time to celebrate their faith. What about the commandment not to kill? Most scholars maintain this is more accurately a commandment against murder. Yet even here there have been debates over what constitutes "murder." Is the killing (including, socalled, "collateral damage") in a war murder? Would the killing of a tyrant, in order to save the lives of innocents, be an act of murder? Even Christ threw a wrench into the hermeneutical machinery by raising the story of David and his men fleeing King Saul. David and his men were starving, so David took the consecrated bread from the Holy Place in the tabernacle—an act strictly condemned by Jewish law, enforced by the penalty of death. And yet Christ pointed out that the taking of the bread, which fed David and his men, was fully justified. "Humanity was not created for the Law, but the Law for humanity." In other words, the law is to enable and aid humanity, not to hold it hostage through strict and narrow application. It is likely the current conservative Christian opposition to same-sex marriage will, in a few years, be relegated to the same dustbin of outmoded worries

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such as those in past, like how the moral fabric of society would be torn once women were granted full human rights. It is just as likely that Wolterstorff's enthusiasm for Psalm 72 will be as inspiring for the rest of us in a 100 years as it is now. This enthusiasm won't exist because we will have become more of a Christian society. Rather, at the heart of the enthusiasm there will be the realization, as there is now, that society has the ability to evolve in its moral sentiments without religious endorsement, sometimes hand-in-hand with it, and sometimes in spite of it. Rorty is right tackling Wolterstorff on how he is able to decide which verses in the Bible should be brought into the public square. There has to be more than just a normative claim contained within a verse. There are normative claims in all sorts of passages in the Bible, and most are not considered applicable as modern public policies, even by the more conservative of Christians. So some other criteria of selection must be at work in the minds of Christians when it comes to selecting those values they think are integral to the moral health of society, and therefore worthy of public policies. One consideration already noted is the difference between laws and rules as dictated in the Jewish scripture, called by Christians the Old Testament, and those prescriptions contained in the New Testament. Christians don't, for example, follow all the other rules in Leviticus because they recognize St Paul's admonition that Christians are no longer under "the Law, but Grace." This follows for other laws given to the Jews in the Old Testament. Yet even here things are not altogether uncontroversial. Christians are also divided over the weight of claims made by St Paul in the New Testament. The best example is some of the things he says about the role of women in the church, or other things said about human sexuality. Some Christians take what is said by him in the Epistles on par with Christ's words in the Gospels. Others, like the theologian Vattimo, think that Christ's injunction that we love our neighbors as ourselves should be the key focus of our theology, a view also in keeping with St Paul's I Corinthians 13. Rorty's example of Leviticus 18:22 is nevertheless an interesting one. Rorty is not a theologian so it's forgivable he takes it as a clear injunction against homosexuality. It isn't as forgivable, however, for Christians to take it as a prooftext for homophobic beliefs. With further exegesis, this verse should be seen as have nothing to do with the morality of homosexuality. In making this argument there are some basic, uncontroversial hermeneutical principles at work. The most important being the context of the verse in question. As with other documents, whether legal, legislative, literary, or scientific, one cannot read sentences, paragraphs or passages out of their immediate framework. With Leviticus 18, the context is given at the beginning of the chapter: "The LORD said to Moses, Speak to the Israelites and say to them: T am the LORD your God. You must not do as they do in Egypt,

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where you used to live, and you must not do as they do in the land of Canaan, where I am bringing you. Do not follow their practices.' " Throughout the following three chapters God continues to tell the Israelites they are to understand themselves as a nation separate from the other tribes surrounding them. This "separateness" was to be reflected in their daily activities, a sort of living iconography which would remind them of their geographical and religious independence. Chapters 19 and 20 continue with further prescriptive elaborations, from not mixing different seeds together when planting crops, to avoiding mixing different fabrics in clothing, to not having sex with a menstruating woman. With this general context in mind, we can now better consider the verse most interesting for conservative Christians, found in 18:22: "Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; that is detestable." If understood as a general condemnation of homosexuality, this verse comes up short as there is no mention of female-to-female sex. The absence certainly can't be because the writers knew nothing about acts of this sort. Rather, coming back to the overall context of these chapters in Leviticus, the injunction has to do with the ritualistic reminder to avoid "mixing together." Male-to-male sex has an obvious, 27+ physical mixing together that female-to-female sex doesn't. Besides this contextual fact, a fundamental question to be resolved is whether the verses in these chapters should be understood in a moral or ritualistic sense, or as a combination of both? For instance, at the end of chapter 18, verse 30, it says "Keep my requirements and do not follow any of the detestable customs that were practised before you came and do not defile yourselves with them. I am the LORD your God." If the "requirements" are moral in nature then how do we understand the verse just before verse 22 which states: "19: 'Do not approach a woman to have sexual relations during the uncleanness of her monthly period.' " Is it immoral to have sex with a menstruating woman? The same goes for the mixing of different seeds in the same field, or Leviticus 19:28 which forbids tattoos. Yet there are verses in these chapters that apparently do have moral connotations, such as those in chapter 19: "13 Do not defraud your neighbour or rob him. Do not hold back the wages of a hired man overnight. 14 Do not curse the deaf or put a stumbling-block in front of the blind, but fear your God. I am the LORD. 15 Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favouritism to the great, but judge your neighbour fairly. 16 Do not go about spreading slander among your people. Do not do anything that endangers your neighbour's life. I am the LORD. 17 Do not hate your brother in your heart. Rebuke your neighbour frankly so that you will not share in his guilt.

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18 Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbour as yourself. I am the LORD." We will not pursue why prohibitions like not perverting justice, clearly a matter of morality, do not garner nearly the same attention among ecclesiastical groups as the verse which mentions male-to-male sex. Yet it should at least be clear not all the verses in these chapters are strictly moral in nature. Many appear concerned with ritual, pertaining more to the Israelites, and not prescriptive for all humanity. How do we then categorize the verse which mentions male-to-male sex? Is this an act that carries a moral sense, or is it a ritualistic admonition of a localized sort? There is good evidence to believe it pertains to the realm of the ritual and not the moral. The Hebrew word describing male-to-male sex as an "abomination" is toevah, and could also be satisfactorily translated as "unclean." This word differs from zimah which carries a moral connotation, not just a cultural or ritualistic sense of uncleanness. The sense of this verse was later reflected in other translations, one of the most important being the Septuagint. Due to the Hellenizing of the Jews, there was concern they would not be able to read the scripture in the original Hebrew language. As a result, between 300—200 B.C., Jewish scholars set about to translate their scripture into Greek, as the Septuagint. When it came to Leviticus 18:22, while the translators had the choice of using Greek words which would describe this as an immoral act, such as poneria, asebia, or anomia, instead the Greek word was chosen indicating ritua277 listic impurity, bdelygma. Those at the time of the translation were probably not keen about male-to-male sex, but however we might think about this today, the translators were not willing to make this activity a moral matter. Homosexuality is a subject that only recently has come under open scholarly investigation—despite how same-sex issues have been discussed for centuries.278 The same applies to modern investigations into heterosexuality—and sexuality in general. We cannot assume the Bible speaks about homosexuality any more than it speaks to the subject of psychiatry. While the Bible speaks about male-to-male sex and female-to-female sex, albeit in a handful of passages, the Bible also speaks about Jesus healing those who, by contemporary understanding, were mentally ill. We would be just as wrong to take these passages about Christ healing the infirm as a template for modern healthcare practices as we would if we took Bible passages about sexual practices as a template for our understanding of human sexuality, and homosexuality in particular. That Leviticus 18 does not speak about the morality of male-to-male sex (or homosexuality), is really beside the point. Even if it did condemn all homosexual behavior, as many religious scriptures do, Rorty is still right to maintain that those who support such beliefs need more in their arsenal of

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arguments than their respective scripture. It is one thing to say one's scripture says such-in-such. It is quite another thing to say that such-in-such should therefore become public policy. Much more is needed—things like independent reasons for why this reasoning follows. We live in a democracy, not a theocracy. Laws are put in place by democratically elected officials, not by pastors, priests, and ministers in consultation with theologians to make sure the interpretation of scripture is correct. With this said, Wolterstorff is correct that he still has the right to voice his scriptural views in the public square. But members of the public square also have the requirement to avoid simple appeals to authority. They must give reasons for why the particular proposal under consideration should be accepted—reasons other members of society can also agree with. Jordan offers one way theologians might participate in the public square, to the benefit of the wider society: Theology risks crude ignorance if it refuses to learn new legal and medical theories about sexed human bodies. It risks silliness if it simply adopts those theories without examining their origins, purposes, and consequences. If theology is no longer Queen of the Sciences, it shouldn't become just their gullible sidekick. This is especially important in sexual matters, which are so vulnerable to abuse by scientific, medical, and legal structures of power. But it is no easy thing to negotiate the conflicting claims of theology and modern medicine or science. Indeed, much argument would be required just to claim that religious and medical or scientific discourse overlap enough to produce negotiable conflicts. On some views, theology and science or medicine must talk past each other because they never talk about the same things, even when they use the same words. On other views, they do talk to each other, but with one or the other in an assumed position of superiority.279 All in all, while Rorty does indeed tread more cautiously in this latest evaluation of religious belief as a conversation-stopper, it leaves unaffected the general thrust of his earlier study. While Rorty's writings on philosophy, post-Philosophical culture, the role of religious belief and ethics have found many supporters, there are at least as many detractors. Besides the dissenting metaphysicians and epistemologists, there are numerous philosophers of religion who are highly critical about the overall coherency of Rorty's views, resisting any appropriation into theological terms. The problem, then, appears to be two-fold. Some take Rorty's position as too extreme. As they see it, Rorty misrepresents the philosophers he discusses. Describing what he calls the Rorty Factor, Dennett has quipped: "Take whatever Rorty says about anyone's views and multiply it by .742' to derive what they actually said."280 Yet if Rorty is taken

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seriously, his position, it is feared, opens up a Pandora's Box. As we have seen, one of the most important problems falls directly on the philosopher's ability to effectively do ethics. Without keeping robust notions of truth, rationality, and objectivity, it is argued that there will be no basis for normative claims. In short, if realism is rejected, we will be thrown into a morass of relativism and nihilism. I hope our discussion of how a pragmatist ethics in the context of values education has eased that fear. Alvin Plantinga, however, remains one example of a philosopher who is troubled by Rorty. He wonders whether Rorty's discussion of truth can be taken seriously. Secondly, as a philosopher of religion, he wonders whether anything that Rorty argues for may be taken as a "defeater" for Christian belief. In short, Plantinga believes that if Rorty is right, Christian belief will suffer. It is important, then, to review Plantinga's understanding of Rorty to see if he is correct about philosophical analysis and religious belief.

Alvin Plantinga: Rorty, "Defeaters," and Christian Belief In a chapter entitled "Postmodernism and Pluralism," from his third volume on warrant and Christian belief, 281 Alvin Plantinga begins by taking aim at the postmodernists' view of truth. As Plantinga sees it, postmodernism teeters on the brink of incoherence due to its conceptual ambiguities and exaggerated claims. Plantinga is not only on the offensive. He takes a defensive position as well, assuring the reader that contrary to what some might maintain, postmodernism does not offer "defeaters" for Christian belief. Plantinga explains: [T] o provide me with a defeater for my belief B, you have to do or say something such that (given that I am aware of it and have heard and understood it) I can no longer rationally continue to believe B, or continue to believe it as firmly as before. In the typical case, you will do this either by putting me into a position where I can see that my belief is to be rejected (e.g., by arranging for me to have the right sorts of experience) or by giving me an argument of some kind.282 Plantinga raises a number of concerns worthy of further discussion, the two most notable being his definition of what kind of believer belongs to the Christian community and, secondly, this community's compatibility with postmodernism. In the context of defeaters however, of special interest is Plantinga's more specific analysis of Rorty's view of truth. As Plantinga sees it, Rorty's position, taken seriously, does not offer defeaters for Christian belief. I want to show that, at least here, Plantinga is correct, albeit for the wrong reasons. Plantinga is quite right to maintain

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Rorty's view of truth does not offer serious defeaters for Christianity. But this is not because Rorty's metaphilosophical position is incoherent and muddled. Rather, on a particular reading, Rorty's view is compatible with Christianity. Read carefully and charitably, Rorty's critical concerns may even illumine the kerygma of this great faith. Rorty, Truth, and Defeaters for Christian Belief Professor Plantinga considers the most common of perceived foes to the faith: the postmodernist. Not unlike other conservative Christians, Plantinga is rather confident postmodernism offers little in the way of providing defeaters for Christian belief, whether from Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Lacan, Derrida, or Rorty. The critique is not altogether negative. Plantinga thinks that while there are deep differences between these thinkers and traditional Christian doctrine, there are some points of commonality, in particular, on their agreed rejection of classical foundationalism. Perhaps more obviously, is their shared views of social justice: [O]ne thinks of sympathy and compassion for the poor and oppressed, the strong sense of outrage at some of the injustices our world displays, celebration of diversity, and the "unmasking" of prejudice, oppression and power seeking masquerading as nothing but self-evident moral principles and the dictates of sweet reason.283 This commonality, no matter how heart-warming it appears, is in stark contrast to the deep differences between postmodernism and Christian belief. Three of the most notable are: 1) God is dead; 2) there are no "objective" moral standards; and, 3) "there isn't any such thing as truth, at least as commonsensically thought of."284 Plantinga takes particular aim at the third claim, with the observation there are at least a couple of different ways it can be understood. The first is to think "what is true depends upon what we human beings say or think."285 Taken at face value, this would be an odd way of understanding our relationship to the rest of the world—that somehow a certain object's existence depends on our cognitive relation to that object. With the claim "God exists" as an example, the truthfulness of this proposition would apparently depend upon whether or not we think God exists. "But of course," Plantinga concludes, "from a Christian perspective that is wholly absurd."286 The second way of understanding this third assertion is to argue there is "no such thing as the way the world is." 287 On a strong reading, Plantinga thinks this would lead to the abandonment of the very important place we and other objects have in the world. Common sense would instead indicate the world is a certain way. Horses exist while unicorns do not. Plantinga concludes that "the

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existence of truth is intimately connected with there being a way things really 288 are, a way the world is." Plantinga's third offered interpretation suggests a less controversial way of understanding the postmodernist's rejection of truth. She may merely be rejecting truth understood as correspondence. If so, the postmodernist's skepticism is well placed. But the stronger claim that "there really is no such thing as the way the world is, and hence no such thing as truth" is much more problematic for Plantinga. "For it is certainly crucial to Christian belief to suppose that there is a way things are, and that it includes the great things of the gospel; it is crucial to Christian belief to suppose that such propositions as God created the world and Christ's suffering and death are an atonementfor human sin are true." 289 After this initial introduction Plantinga considers two arguments a little more closely, albeit he remarks their relevance for Christian belief is not 290 entirely obvious. We will pay particular attention to this second argument, 291 entitled, "Do Human Beings Construct the Truth?" It is here where Plantinga takes to task Rorty's view of truth. In short, Plantinga wants to show that Rorty's position cannot be taken seriously. And as such, it cannot be considered a defeater for Christian belief. Referring to what Rorty "is widely credited (some might say 'debited')" as saying, Plantinga describes Rorty's view of truth as "what our peers will let us 292 get away with saying." This definition, Plantinga adds "is a bit vague."293 Yet if taken seriously, he points out, its incompatibility with Christian belief will be apparent: That is, if a proposition is true (true "for me", I suppose) if and only if my peers will let me get away with saying it, then .. . God is dependent ("for me", if that makes sense) for his very existence on my peers. For if they were to let me get away with saying that there is no such person as God, then it would be true that there is no such person, in which case there would be no such person. So whether there is such a person as God depends upon the behavior of my peers. Not easy to believe.294 Not surprisingly, how one understands "truth" will affect how one confronts and interacts with the world. The ethical implications are as well obvious. Plantinga explains: For example, it promises an auspicious way of dealing with war, poverty, disease, and other ills our flesh is heir to. Take AIDS; if we all let each other get away with saying that there just isn't any such thing as AIDS, then on this Rortyesque view it would be true that there isn't any such thing as AIDS; and if it were true that there is no such thing as AIDS, then 295 there would be no such thing.

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Plantinga, albeit with tongue in cheek, thinks he reaches the logical conclusion of Rorty's definition, that "all we have to do to get rid of AIDS, or cancer, or poverty is let each other get away with saying there is no such thing. That seems much easier than the more conventional methods, which involve all 296 that time, energy and money." The same argument apparently would apply to other events, like the Holocaust, Tiananmen Square, tsunamis or destruction wrought by hurricanes. If so, what would then happen if everybody became convinced these events, or others, did not occur? Would this mean, in truth, they did not occur? Plantinga at least concedes his account of Rorty's view of truth might be a straw man. A more robust reading would understand Rorty's position in light of his well-known, broader analysis of analytic philosophy. On this reading, philosophy amounts to a "panoply of definitions, principles, necessary and sufficient conditions, attempts at rigor, and all the rest." 297 And yet, Plantinga is after something a bit different here. He poses the problem: My aim is to ask whether Rortian thought offers a defeater for Christian belief; one of the most prominent strands in Rorty's thought is what he has to say about truth; but then I need to know whether what he means to say about truth is or isn't incompatible with Christian belief. For that, it would be nice to have a relatively serious way of stating what this strand of thought might be. What could he mean? 298 Determining whether Rorty's view of truth is compatible with Christian belief is no trivial matter for Plantinga. So for possible clarification, Plantinga turns to Gary Cutting's exposition of Rorty's view of truth. On Cutting's reading, Rorty should not be understood as saying that truth is dependent upon certain properties of society. The key point, says Gutting, "is that our 'discourse on truth' should be limited to an assertion, without philosophical commentary or elaboration, of the baseline commonplaces about truth; and a review of the arbitrariness and/or incoherence of efforts to criticize (i.e. analyze, modify, or justify) the baseline truths." 299 Plantinga thinks Gutting rightly notes that Rorty's primary point of contention is with realism, and the view of truth most often associated with it: truth as representation. "This is the idea that we (or our minds) possess and think by way of representations, which are true just if they 'correspond to reality'."300 From this criticism, however, it does not follow, as Gutting points out, that Rorty rejects "all the commonsense, baseline platitudes about truth and our relation to it."301 Plantinga isn't convinced. He thinks Cutting's explanation disguises what it has otherwise attempted to expose—that even this basic version of representationalism is platitudinous. Plantinga stresses even a loose grip on "baseline,"

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mundane versions of representationalism carries a certain robustness that cannot easily be differentiated from the more "platitudinous" versions of representationalism. If so, Rorty would be in a delicate situation: "[He] really can't both reject representationalism and accept all those baseline pla-

titudes."pective of Cutting's attempt to clarify Rorty's sense of truth,

Plantinga believes if Gutting is accurate in his description, Rorty's view 303 becomes somewhat "pedestrian." As a consequence, Plantinga succeeds in his attempt to show that Rorty's view of truth does not constitute a serious threat to Christian belief. Despite what seems to be a victory, Plantinga wants to prod Rorty further. So he suggests another variation of the original construal of Rorty's view: "that truth is a human construction and that a belief or other candidate for truth is true ('for us') just if it stands in a certain relationship to (our) 304 society." This time Plantinga takes a direct quote from Rorty: About two hundred years ago, the idea that truth was made rather than found began to take hold of the imagination of Europe .. . To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. 305 Putting aside the consideration it would have been better to start out a study on Rorty's view of truth with a direct quotation from him, Plantinga raises two 306 objections raised in this excerpt. One is "serious," the other "fatal." Starting with the serious objection, after a little reflection Plantinga thinks Rorty's understanding of truth leads to rather odd conclusions. To begin with, Rorty apparently includes beliefs, assertions, claims, and suggestions in the range of other sentences that are either true or false. The difficulty arises when the proposition 2 + 1 = 3 (a proposition that is necessarily true ) is compared with the sentence "2 + 1 = 3." As a sentence, at least insofar as Plantinga understands Rorty, it could have failed to be true. "This is because it is a sen308 tence, and is true, on Rorty's view, because of something we do with it." Plantinga continues: "The proposition 2 + 1 = 3 , therefore, has a property that the sentence '2 + 1 = 3', does not have: being necessarily true, i.e., being such that it could not have failed to be true. The proposition (truth) that 309 2 + 1 = 3 , therefore, is not the sentence '2 + 1 = 3'." There is something peculiar, to say the least, about a view of truth that would somehow see this sentence as failing to be true. But this is what follows, at least on Plantinga's interpretation of Rorty. As for the, so-called, "fatal" objection, Plantinga remarks that if we assume sentences, in the primary sense, were the only things that are true or false, then

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one could say humans make truths. "[F]or we make it the case that a given sequence of sounds or marks is indeed a sentence and thus capable of being true or false . . . [this] string of shapes or sounds owes its being a sentence to what we, the users of language do with it. And perhaps we could express this by 310 saying that truths are made." Plantinga is quick to add it does not follow from this sense of sentencemaking "that we make a given sentence true, or that it is by virtue of something we do that a given sentence is in fact true." 310 If we write, for example, "Dinosaurs existed," it does not then follow that dinosaurs existed because of our sentence. "For the sentence to be true, there must once have been dinosaurs; and that, presumably, is not something we have made to be the case, by our language making activities or in any other way."312 Expressed thusly, this claim is quite unlike the other above. For Plantinga, it is an integral component to Christian belief: Taken the other way, as the nonplatitudinous claim that we human beings are responsible, notjust (for example) for the sentencehood of "God created the world", but for God's having created the world, the conclusion of the argument is indeed incompatible with Christian belief; but taken that way there is not the slightest reason (beyond a certain confusion) for thinking that conclusion true. It certainly doesn't follow from the premises. Either 313 way, therefore, there is no defeater here. So while it seems Rorty's view of truth makes for provocative debate, cooler heads will prevail. There is little reason to suppose he provides serious defeaters for Christian belief. Perhaps, surprisingly, we need not suppose otherwise. As I noted at the beginning of this study, Plantinga is indeed correct Rorty offers little in the way of defeaters for Christian beliefs. But he is right for the wrong reasons. In assessing Plantinga's position and his critique of Rorty's view of truth, there are a number of points worth noting. The first is that Plantinga's disagreement with Rorty follows largely because of Plantinga's, arguably narrow, understanding of who constitutes the Christian community and, secondly, what should constitute their beliefs. Leaving these concerns for later, we need to first examine in closer detail Plantinga's criticisms of Rorty's view oftruth. Rorty and Truth With all of Rorty's writings, not only on the issue of truth but also on the related issues of realism, objectivity and rationality, it is surprising Professor Plantinga bases a five-page discussion on a view oftruth "credited" to Rorty,

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leaving the original quotation in a footnote. And given Rorty's thoughts on postmodernism, bringing it into the discussion only makes things more confusing. Some years back Kuipers already noted Rorty had become increasingly unhappy with the label "postmodern," not only as a description of his thought but as well as a description of a general intellectual trend: I have sometimes used "postmodern" myself, in the rather narrow sense denned by Lyotard as "distrust of metanarratives." But I now wish that I had not. The term has been so over-used that it is causing more trouble than it is worth. I have given up on the attempt to find something common to Michael Graves' buildings, Pynchon's and Rushdie's novels, Ashberry's poems, various sorts of popular music, and the writings of Heidegger and Derrida. I have become more hesitant about attempts to periodize culture—to describe every part of a culture as suddenly swerving off in the 314 same new direction at approximately the same time. Even avoiding the term "postmodern," Rorty notes arguments about truth can be phrased as a straw-man: The quarrel is often described as between people who no longer believe in Truth and those who still do believe in it. But this is misleading. Nobody, not even the most far-out post-modernist, believes that there is no difference between the statements we call true and those we call false. Like everybody else, post-modernists recognize that some beliefs are more reliable tools than others, and that agreement on which tools to use is essential 315 for social cooperation. In any case, as far as Plantinga's treatment is concerned, only near the end of his analysis does he quote directly from Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. The quotation Plantinga leaves for a footnote states: What he [Rorty] actually says is "For philosophers like Ghisholm and Bergmann, such explanations must be attempted if the realism of common sense is to be preserved. The aim of all such explanations is to make truth something more than what Dewey called 'Warranted assertability': more than what our peers will, ceterisparibus, let us get away with saying."316 Ceterisparibus, "all things being equal," is the operative phrase in this paragraph. On a charitable reading of Rorty, one of the things bearing consideration on the equality (or balance) of the definition would involve taking into 317 account other statements he has made concerning truth. To be sure, at various times over the years, some of Rorty's more pithy quips have been unduly strong. Nevertheless, his overall position remains clear,

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concise, coherent, and extensive. Ample discussion and nuance can be found in various chapters of his books: Philosophy and the Mirror of'Nature: "Truth Without Mirrors," "Truth, Goodness, and Relativism," "Objectivity as Correspondence and as Agreement," and "Edification, Relativism, and Objective Truth"; Consequences of Pragmatism: "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey," "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," and "Philosophy in America Today"; Objectivity, relativism, andtruth: "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, ethnocentrism, and liberalism," "Solidarity or objectivity?" "Pragmatism without method," "Pragmatism, Davidson and truth," and "Representation, social practise, and truth"; Contingency, irony, and solidarity. "The contingency of language"; and most certainly the volume Truth and Progress. Two of the three major divisions of this last book are directly relevant to his view of truth and the implications for morality: "Truth and Some Philosophers" and "Moral 318 Progress: Toward More Inclusive Communities." Given Rorty's various writings on truth, what is his view? Throughout Rorty's books and articles he has made it quite clear he rejects any essentialist view of truth, where truth is some sort of reified object that exists over and above that of the natural world. In what could be taken as a direct reply to Plantinga, Rorty states: "There is no truth." What could that mean? Why should anybody say it? Actually, almost nobody (except Wallace Stevens) does say it. But philosophers like me are often said to say it. One can see why. For we have learned (from Nietzsche and James, among others) to be suspicious of the appear319 ance-reality distinction. There is a deeper difficulty here, although it isn't Rorty's problem. To try to answer this question about truth posed by philosophers like Plantinga, the pragmatist immediately encounters a conceptual barrier; namely, to define a concept for which, Rorty believes, no definition is possible. Siding with Davidson, Rorty believes the attempt to delineate the nature of truth should be avoided: The greatest of my many intellectual debts to Donald Davidson is my realization that nobody should even try to specify the nature of truth . .. Davidson has helped us realize that the very absoluteness of truth is a good reason for thinking "true" indefinable and for thinking that no theory of the nature of truth is pos320 sible. It is only the relative about which there is anything to say. With this view of truth, what about Plantinga's warning that if we abandon the attempt to define truth, a relativistic quagmire will be created where

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everyone does what is right in his own eyes? Another Plantinganian suspicion should also be addressed: whether Rorty's description of the "absoluteness of truth" is some sort of metaphysic snuck through the philosophical back door. By saying that no theory of truth is possible, Rorty distinguishes justification from truth. Harkening back to his observation concerning quarrels about truth and postmodernism: Truth is, to be sure, an absolute notion, in the following sense: "true for me but not for you" and "true in my culture but not in yours" are weird, pointless locutions. So is "true then, but not now." Whereas we often say "good for this purpose, but not for that" and "right in this situation, but not in that," it seems pointlessly paradoxical to relativize truth to purposes or situations. On the other hand, "justified for me but not for you" (or "justi321 fied in my culture but not in yours") makes perfect sense. While we cannot compare our beliefs with the true nature of reality, we are still able, indeed required, to justify beliefs (at least those we raise in public) to our audience. Herein is the cleavage between talk about truth over a given belief, and talk of justification. We might not know exactly what it means to have the truth about a given moral belief, but we will have a good sense if a given moral belief has been justified: Pragmatists think that if something makes no difference to practice, it should make no difference to philosophy. This conviction makes them suspicious of the distinction between justification and truth, for that difference makes no difference to my decisions about what to do. If I have concrete, specific doubts about whether one of my beliefs is true, I can resolve those doubts only by asking whether it is adequately justified— by finding and assessing additional reasons pro and con. I cannot bypass justification and confine my attention to truth: assessment of truth and assessment of justification are, when the question is about what I should 321 believe now, the same activity. This scaled-down version ofjustification will not bring agreement, in all cases, to all audiences. Acceptance by an audience is dependent on their respective beliefs and how various justifications will be adjudicated. We may nevertheless say on this account that intellectual and moral progress has already been achieved, and will continue: Certainly we have been making progress, by our own lights. That is to say, we are much better able to serve the purposes we wish to serve, and to cope with the situations we believe we face, than our ancestors would have been.

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But when we hypostatize the adjective "true" into "Truth" and ask about 323 our relation to it, we have absolutely nothing to say. Specific examples of progress offered by Rorty are "increased health, security, 324 equality of opportunity, longevity, [and] freedom from humiliation." If Rorty doesn't want to try to define truth—that it doesn't help to think of truth as a noun, a reified object with some sort of independent existence (suggested in Plantinga's description of truth's "existence" as a "thing" )—then truth as correspondence is also left behind. I think it is clear why Rorty rejects this way of describing truth. Unless one shares the essentialist's view of truth (and perhaps, as well, the Good and the Beautiful), this manner of speaking about truth will be markedly odd. The distinction Rorty makes is "between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there .. . Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind— because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there." 326 In short, Rorty maintains, philosophy will get along better "without the notions of'intrinsic nature of reality' and 'correspondence to reality' than with them." 327 How might Rorty respond to Plantinga's claim "the existence of truth is intimately connected with there being a way things really are, a way the world is"? 328 Or, that one must have this understanding of truth in order to adjudicate between beliefs—that there are elephants but no unicorns, and that dinosaurs would have existed even if there had been no humans to think about them? Rorty is very clear on this point. It is the difference between corresponding, or representing, small-scale beliefs with "the world," and doing likewise with large-scale beliefs. With the former, we are quite successful corresponding our ideas with a visual image, like a designer with her clothes, an architect with his buildings, or an artist with her paintings. But the "mapping," 329 or representation, that goes on with the latter sort of beliefs is quite different. How do we begin to make sense of the claim that one's religion or politics corresponds, or represents the way the world is? Are things any easier with Plantinga's suggested propositions that "God created the world" or that "Christ's suffering and death are atonement for human sin"? By what manner do we show how these propositions correspond to the world? Can the proposition "God created the world" be corresponded to the world (or universe) the same way we correspond the coastline of Newfoundland to a map? Sometimes, of course, they are pictures or representations, as when we use an illustrated dictionary or field guides to identify birds or wanted posters to identify criminals. Then we have representations in the proper sense-items some of whose parts can be correlated one-to-one with parts of the thing being represented (a condition that obviously does not hold for most sen330 tences or beliefs).

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As Letson has noted, this brings us back to justification: [AJccording to Rorty, the trouble with correspondence is that such mundane [small-scale] demonstrations of correspondence yield nothing very interesting in the way of helping us to be better knowers ... Rorty rejects any sense of large-scale correspondence for theories and with it any hope for a piece-by-piece justification of the sentences of theories. What this leaves us with is an account of justification that is coherentist and holistic in nature. 331 Next, what about Plantinga's charge that Rorty's position implies the world is somehow dependent upon our beliefs, that there were no objects before language? That dinosaurs existed only when our language found room to include talk about them? Or that God suddenly pops into existence because we successfully convince colleagues he exists? 332 Rorty (in agreement with Taylor, Goodman, and Putnam ) indeed maintains there is no description-independent way the world is. With this admission there is the temptation to say "no objects before language shaped the 333 raw material (a lot of ding-an-sichy, all content-no-scheme stuff)." This sort of talk, Rorty acknowledges, quickly evokes charges like Plantinga's— that the existence (or nonexistence) of objects in the world are dependent on our language and beliefs. "[A]s soon as we say anything like this we find ourselves accused (plausibly) of making the false causal claim that the invention of 'dinosaur' caused dinosaurs to come into existence—of being what our 334 opponents call 'linguistic idealists.' " Rorty addresses this charge at length: But none of us antirepresentationalists have ever doubted that most things in the universe are causally independent of us. What we question is whether they are representationally independent of us. For X to be representationally independent of us is for Xto have an intrinsic feature (a feature that it has under any and every description) such that it is better described by some of our terms rather than others. Because we can see no way to decide which descriptions of an object get at what is "intrinsic" to it, as opposed to its merely "relational," extrinsic features (e.g., its description-relative features), we are prepared to discard the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction, the claim that beliefs represent, and the whole question of representational independence or dependence. This means discarding the idea of (as Bernard Williams has put it) "how things are anyway" apart from whether or how 335 they are described. In place of trying to answer questions of reference, Rorty suggests the burden of the argument is on detractors. The two questions he asks of them are:

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(1) Can you find some way of getting between language and its objects (as Wittgenstein sardonically put it) in order to suggest some way of telling which joints are nature's (part of the content) and which merely "ours" (just part of the scheme?) (2) If not, can you see any point in the claim that 336 some descriptions correspond to reality better than others? As for the first question, Plantinga has not shown how we might exactly go about this procedure. In fact, as we will see below, he admits we can only go so far with the certainty of our beliefs. Who has the Failure of Nerve? Living without Foundations In the last section on his treatment of Rorty, "Postmodernism a Failure of Nerve," Plantinga shows himself not completely in disagreement with the postmodernist. For example, he agrees with the postmodernist about the failure of classical foundationalism. He believes, however, this should not lead the postmodernist to conclude "that there is no such thing as truth at all, no way 337 things really are."' By agreeing classical foundationalism is no longer an option, what is Plantinga's alternative for a life "without sure and secure foundations"?338 To start, Plantinga believes our present epistemic condition is not a recent one. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Kuyper all recognized the lack of certainty due to the absence of a Cartesian foundation: [The nonfoundational stance] is a stance that requires a certain epistemic hardihood: there is indeed such a thing as truth; the stakes are indeed high (it matters greatly whether you believe the truth); but there is no way in which you can be guaranteed that you have the truth; there is no sure and certain method of attaining truth by starting from beliefs about which you can't be mistaken and moving infallibly to the rest of one's beliefs; and many others reject what seems to you to be most important. This is life under uncertainty, life under epistemic risk and fallibility. I believe a thousand things and many of them are things others—others of great acuity and seriousness—do not believe. Indeed, many of the beliefs that mean the most to me are of that sort. I realize I can be seriously, dreadfully, fatally wrong, and wrong about what it is enormously important to be right. But that is the human condition: my response must be finally, "Here I stand; this 339 is the way the world looks to me." There is something decidedly peculiar about Plantinga's description of our 340 epistemic condition, including the modified quote from Luther. Namely, how exactly does the existence of truth help one's beliefs if, at the end of the day,

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one cannot have epistemic certainty? What exactly constitutes this life under "epistemic risk and fallibility"? Living Under Epistemic Risk In light of this passage from Plantinga above, he and Rorty (and indeed the rest of us) are in the same epistemic boat. Irrespective of all the courageous talk, there is a gap between mapping our beliefs and the way the world truly is (if that makes sense). Given the gap, does talk about truth being somehow "out there," a reined object to be sought after, truth as a noun, only evoke and give life to charges of skepticism and relativism? The stakes are high, but is there no way we can make a safe bet on the outcome of our wager? Quoting Bennington, Rorty notes "any philosophy which gives itself world and language two separate realms separated by an abyss that has to be crossed remains caught, at the very point of the supposed crossing, in the circle of dogmatism and relativism that it is unable to break.'' 341 So the claim that we must submit our beliefs, because of this lack of certainty, to review and debate with our peers, is merely to say that "we hope to justify our belief to as many and as large audiences as possible"—a romanticizing of the "pursuit of intersubjec342 tive, unforced agreement among larger and larger groups of interlocutors." We may wish for something stronger and more convincing. But it is not clear that such things are even desirable. The differences between Rorty and Plantinga come down to the practical consequences of how we understand our world, and as a consequence, our place in the world. Rorty's response to these questions leans on Dewey, with no attempt to somehow correspond beliefs to the "real" world. Rather, one must ask about the consequences of holding a particular belief. The pragmatist asks: "What would it be like to believe that? What would happen if I did? 343 What would I be committing myself to?" Plantinga would probably consider it epistemologically irresponsible to address these questions before finding out how the world actually is. People, on his reading, apparently have some kind of aversion to living in a world 344 they have not "constituted or structured." Plantinga's response is quite unsympathetic: "Now some of this may be a bit hard to take seriously (it may 345 seem less Promethean defiance than foolish posturing)." But if truth as correspondence is placed aside, at least with large-scale beliefs, then the task of understanding our beliefs vis-a-vis the world will decidedly be hermeneutical. This is the rather blase notion that " 'interpretive' or 'hermeneuticaP is not having a special method but simply casting about for a 346 vocabulary which might help." And contrary to what Plantinga believes, the hermeneutical view does not deny "reality"—that the world is actually out there. "Reality," for the antiessentialist, remains. Or, as Rorty puts it,

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"Reality is one, but descriptions of it are many." The plurality of descriptions that arise because of this condition is unproblematic. In fact, it is to be encouraged, because "human beings have, and ought to have, many different purposes. ,,348 To have a plurality of descriptions about the world, and therefore different purposes, is contrary to Plantinga's view that the world is one way and therefore no other way. As a consequence, the real question to be asked, Plantinga argues, is whether these various descriptions constitute defeaters for Christian belief. Plantinga offers the following scenario to illustrate his point: We saw . .. that you can give me a non argumentative defeater for certain kinds of beliefs; but could she give me a defeateryor an element of Christian belief without giving me an argument? Here is a possibility: perhaps she can give me a defeater by citing the trajectory of her own intellectual and spiritual life. Perhaps she is raised as a traditional believer; in her sophomore year in college she is introduced to Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche; the next year she advances to Heidegger, Derrida and Rorty. She is captivated by Nietzsche's brilliant, sparkling style, by Heidegger's air ofTeutonic profundity, by Derrida's mischievous and playful spirit, and by the brave "making-the-bestof-a-really-lousy-situation" attitude of Rorty.349 As important these factors are for the student, a change in disposition like this does not automatically give a defeater for Christian belief. Plantinga goes on to explain: "Nor do I automatically get a defeater by retracing her steps and reading these authors myself: where she finds profound insight, I may find posturing obscurantism . . . one can sensibly read these authors and—despite verbal pyrotechnics and airs of profundity—remain unmoved, rationally con349 tinuing to accept Christian belief." What is interesting about this student's experience is how Plantinga remains unmoved by her account of change of belief. The intimation is that because he remains unmoved, the account of why her beliefs have changed is somehow less than compelling. For Plantinga, beliefs should change, at least philosophically rightly, on a basis of a defeater, a "rationally" active process. This, however, doesn't exactly make the settling of deeply complex issues more obvious. For example, one could imagine a debate over the existence of God between Plantinga and, say, someone else with a healthy respect for what is meant by rationality, perhaps Bertrand Russell. At the end of debate, one could also imagine each saying the same thing about being unmoved, and how each is rationally able to continue in the originally accepted beliefs. In short, whether we speak of dispositions or beliefs, we can always say we remain unconvinced about our interlocutor's view. For as many different ways of seeing the world, most people think their beliefs are rationally responsible.

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With this noted, Rorty's view merits bolstering. There is much to be said for thinking a given view can (justifiably) alter on the basis of a change in disposition, as it can on the basis of change of beliefs. That is, we often come to a certain disposition over a given issue not because of argument or defeaters, but rather because of experiences, both striking and subtle; instead of rationality, sentimentality. This account jibes with how most social change occurs. Our past two centuries "are most easily understood not as a period of deepening understanding of the nature of rationality or of morality, but rather as one in which there occurred an astonishing rapid progress of sentiments, in which it has become much easier for us to be moved to action by sad and sentimental 351 stories." Someone, for example, quite unfeeling about race relations in the US might be struck by the plight of blacks caught in the aftermath of the New Orleans hurricane. No drawn-out argument with defeaters and claims about which view is more rational are given. All that is needed are the news cameras and tenacious journalists who show and discuss the suffering for the people at home watching their televisions. Plantinga is right that the student's account of her new disposition need not be considered a defeater for Christian belief. Depending on her particular understanding of Christianity, her disposition towards certain Christian associations may nevertheless change. One could imagine she now finds herself very uncomfortable attending her present church, either finding a different church that expresses her newly assumed disposition more adequately, or perhaps discontinues attending church altogether. "[If] you want to work out who you are—put together a moral identity—which describes the importance of your relationships to one set of people and increases the importance of your relationships to another set, the physical absence of the first set of people may 352 be just what you need." And it wouldn't be epistemically irresponsible to shift these preferences. "[I]n special situations, the acquisition of that belief will provoke the sort of large-scale, conscious, deliberate reweaving which does deserve the name of inquiry . . . a revelation which leads one to rethink 343 one's long-term plans and, ultimately, the meaning of one's life." If she were asked by concerned, philosophically informed Christian friends which defeaters offered by her professors resulted in this state of affairs, quite possibly she would not know how to respond. It may turn out that it was not so much she heard an argument against " Christian belief " as she acquired a particular disposition. And this change somehow made distasteful or undesirable the holding of certain beliefs, or the attending of a particular church. In light of talk about the "rationality" of beliefs, despite what may be suspected, from the student's point of view there is nothing about her choice that is irrational. This undoubtedly may come down to how we define rational and irrational, but the point here is that the student has undergone an experience—even what may be described as a legitimate educational

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experience—leaving her with a new orientation. A Christian need not feel threatened, taking this student's change as an offered defeater for his own disposition. This may simply be the case because the student doesn't accept, at least implicitly, Plantinga's account of how beliefs are legitimately supposed to change. Let's assume she attended the University of Notre Dame, and took a philosophy course or two. Imagine, for example, if she had taken along the way a senior seminar course on Rorty, and adopted for herself the term "ironist." On this definition, she would need to fulfill three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve those doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see the choice between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight one's way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old. 354 Adopting these criteria, the student would not necessarily have any bone to pick with a Christian. She is more than willing to let Christians continue to hold their beliefs. She just thinks, on the basis of what she has read and thought about, there is a need for her to think differently about things. This is perhaps why someone like Toulmin says we should speak about beliefs being "reasonable" instead of "rational." The reasons for why and how we change our beliefs about major issues is a complex affair. Plantinga does not give due consideration to how beliefs actually do change—how people come to believe, adopt, or inculcate a new set of beliefs or disposition. A change or shift in views has more to do with a particular confrontation with the world, rather than confrontation with the truth (a s sseldo change or remain because of defeaters. Beliefs change because of new experiences and the sentiments and empathy which arise out them. In fact, beliefs often change without our notice—at least until we are reminded by something, sometimes a flash of thought, about what we once believed. To take a rather mundane example: this is why international travel can be so life-changing. We become introduced to different ways of life, different ways of understanding the world, all the while accomplished without philosophy seminars discussing whether or not the new ways of seeing the world are defeaters for our original beliefs.

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This brings us back to the question of whether this student (or anyone else for that matter) can only change beliefs, at least in an epistemically responsible manner, through the way Plantinga suggests, by offering defeaters. But this begs the entire question of how and why beliefs do change. On the pragmatist account, her beliefs can change without having to show where Plantinga goes wrong in his view of language and the world. As Rorty notes on the "philosophy of life": It is just not the case that one need adopt one's opponents' vocabulary or method or style in order to defeat him. Hobbes did not have theological arguments against Dante's world-picture; Kant had only a very bad scientific argument for the phenomenal character of science; Nietzsche and James did not have epistemological arguments for pragmatism. Each of these thinkers presented us with a new form of intellectual life, and asked us to compare its advantages with the old. In another place he states: "Getting out from under one's parents or one's predecessors—setting aside the assumptions of the preceding century or the preceding few millennia—is never a matter of simple repudiation, any 356 more than it is a clean cutoff." Plantinga might possibly respond by saying that describing the way views change doesn't resolve the question of whether they should change. That it is the pragmatist who is begging the question. It is difficult to know how we would be able to dislodge the resulting disagreement. One way of possibly resolving matters is by looking at some other presuppositions evident in Plantinga's thinking. The first is more philosophical. The definition of what a defeater is, and how it works, is bound up in Plantinga's very robust notion of truth. How defeaters work alongside truth needs more explanation. Is it that defeaters, if done properly, somehow reflect the truth? Or, are defeaters somehow extensions of the truth that tweak cognitive functions when properly activated? Is it more a matter of metaphysics or metaphors? If these matters need to be explained (which will be no small task) before we discuss whether a belief should change, we might just want to invoke Ockham's Razor, going for the simpler explanation of how large-scale beliefs change. Considering reasons for change, and not the more esoteric question of whether the change of belief is "rational," we will want to listen to the explanation of how someone's beliefs changed. We will probably hear about the respective justifications for the change. While the justification may not reach the requirements needed to be a defeater, we may nonetheless consider the reasons for the change of belief satisfactory. The second consideration is more theological, namely Plantinga's notion of who constitutes being a Christian. Unfortunately, it leaves out more people than it includes. The second assumption, following from the first, is that

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Christians should be ill disposed to figures such as Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Lacan, and Rorty—that their various claims should be considered contrary to the faith.357 For some Christians, these authors will be a scandal to the faith. Some of their remarks will be considered blasphemous and insulting. For other Christians these authors might very well bring to the faith a deeper critique, a more insightful thoughtfulness than its own theologians and ministers have been able to produce. Nietzsche's scathing rebuke of Christian hypocrisy, Marx's castigation of the rich, Freud's analysis of repressed desires, all find an important place in personal and theological reflection. The third assumption follows from the above considerations: that Christianity must be defended against unbelievers. Of course, who the unbelievers are is determined in light of beliefs about who constitutes the Christian community. The more narrow the definition of who constitutes the Christian community, the wider the scope of opponents, and finally, the more difficult to bridge the differences. Despite the differences between Plantinga and Rorty, Plantinga is closer to Rorty than he realizes. When all is said and done Plantinga does note that the human condition is such that there is no final or ultimate way of seeing if our beliefs fit with reality; that we can somehow escape our language and stand outside of it, our history and finitude. As clear-headed as this admission sounds, it isn't clear how it fits with his further notions about truth and the interrelatedness of defeaters. Professor Plantinga is correct in his analysis about Rorty, but for the wrong reasons. He is right that Rorty's view of truth offers little in the way of defeaters for Christian belief. But this isn't because Rorty's views, especially about truth, are incoherent. Rorty, much like Plantinga, only recognizes our epistemic limitations. Within this limitation, Christian or not, we should be attempting to change the conversation—to divert the subject away from whether our beliefs represent the Truth, to whether our beliefs are helping to "construct subjects capable of evermore novel, ever richer, forms of human 359 happiness." This is, after all, what Christianity has most in common with Rorty's brand of philosophical thinking.

Kai Nielsen: Embracing Rorty, and the Possibility for God-talk

Alvin Plantinga thinks Rorty's view is, at worst, incoherent. At best, it doesn't offer anything in the way of defeaters for Christian belief. Kai Nielsen is quite on the other side of things. Instead of disagreeing with Rorty over definitions of philosophical concern, Nielsen thinks Rorty's metaphilosophical thinking is not only on the mark, but should be taken seriously.

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What makes Nielsen's analysis notably interesting, especially in light of Plantinga's view, is that his affection for Rorty's position has important implications for his own critique of religious belief delivered over the course of nearly a half-century of writing. That is, if Nielsen is right about Rorty, the philosophically robust conceptual tools Nielsen has used over the years to badger, challenge and vex theists also dissipate. One can't, for instance, challenge theists to somehow correspond their belief to the object "God" in order to fulfill the criterion for knowledge. By embracing all of what Rorty has to offer Nielsen inadvertently allows Christianity (and other forms of theism) to merrily go along its way. Nielsen's affection for Rorty's metaphilosophical view has been made clear in a number of books by Nielsen.360 In a recent article entitled "Taking Rorty 361 Seriously," Nielsen continues his examination of Rorty's metaphilosophical position. Nielsen's sympathetic reading has been welcomed by many who feel Rorty is still brushed off too easily by mainstream philosophers. Before we look at Nielsen's take on Rorty more closely, we should back up somewhat and summarize what Nielsen's academic career has been most preoccupied with: God-talk. Those acquainted with the prolific writings of Nielsen are well aware of his extensive critique of religious belief.362 Over the years he has examined the most prevalent arguments for religious belief, concluding that all fail to show 363 that such belief is meaningful. His main argument against religious belief is not "whether God's existence could in some way be proven but rather the stress is on the question of whether God-talk of the appropriate sort is or is 364 not coherent." God-talk has been examined so extensively and effectively that Nielsen has in fact written that his is merely a "mopping up job": There is little interest now in so-called proofs for the existence of God. The salvoes fired against these classical arguments by Hume and Kant have been, though sometimes in rather reconstructed forms, convincing to philosophers. There are those who would claim that some of these attempted proofs are useful in giving us a sense of deity but, a few scholastic philosophers apart, few would claim they give us a proof of, or even good evidence 365 for, the existence of God. Of course Nielsen has not only concentrated his critique on the "proofs" for the existence of God. He has looked at a wide range of attempts by theists who argue for the coherency of their beliefs, maintaining that none fair better; whether using Wittgenstein's language-games, 366 Tillich's Uncondi367 tioned Transcendent, or Otto's Numinous,368 to name a few. And so, after close inspection, Nielsen says, "Christianity is myth-eaten. The very intelligibility of the key concepts of the religion is seriously in question; there is no

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evidence whatsoever for the existence of God." Yet Nielsen's seemingly devastating critique of God-talk stands in contrast to his appraisal of Rorty, particularly because of two reasons. First, as far as the philosophy of religion is concerned, once Nielsen accepts Rorty's metaphilosophical position, and the hardy tools of traditional philosophy are dropped, what are the consequences for Nielsen's robust critique of God-talk? That is, Nielsen agrees with Rorty that philosophers should discard grand narratives of reality, as well as sturdy definitions of truth, reason, and objectivity. Metaphysicians should drop their attempts to describe the nature of reality. For their part, epistemologists should abandon all efforts to establish a foundation for knowledge. Nielsen believes, again with Rorty, that by doing so we will be giving up Philosophy, but not philosophy.370 If so, could some forms of religious belief be compatible with this pared-down version of philosophy? Or, put slightly different, when all the shiny tools of Philosophy are discarded, does God-talk once again become a legitimate form of discourse? I wish to argue that as long as the philosopher of religion and theologian are mindful of the limitations of philosophy, and therefore the limitations of God-talk, then this way of speaking remains a possibility in the post-Philosophical context. Secondly, this possibility shows an interesting difference between Rorty and Nielsen. Rorty recognizes more clearly, after the demise of Philosophy, the limitations his position holds for deciding which beliefs are legitimate in liberal society. Nielsen, while agreeing to the same philosophical limitations, but believing that religious belief has long since been shown to be incredulous, does not reconsider the religious question further. Yet there is a real issue to be broached here. Does not Nielsen's (even qualified) acceptance of Rorty's metaphilosophical views necessitate a reevaluation of religious belief? In short, if we are to take Rorty seriously, should we not do the same with God-talk? Embracing Rorty In a recent article on Rorty, "Taking Rorty Seriously," Nielsen continues his evaluation of Rorty's metaphilosophical views, especially in light of their compatibility with analytical Marxism. Early into his article Nielsen reiterates his assessment of Rorty. It is one that has remained constant: [Rorty] does argue, clearly and probingly, and he does, his occasional disavowals notwithstanding, in fact have a clearly articulated and carefully interlocked form of pragmatism that includes a well-thought-out metaphilosophy, a metaphilosophy that deeply challenges how philosophy, particularly in our ambience, is both standardly practised and conceptualized (usually rather uncritically).371

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And while these "challenges" are in some cases as applicable for the Continental side as for the analytic side of philosophy, Rorty's primary target is often the latter: Rorty's account, in fine, is a nuanced, not unsystematic, account that comes to grips with central issues both in and about analytic philosophy in a way that deserves careful—though, of course, not uncritical—attention. He is not to be shrugged off, as he so often is, as an irresponsible figure of fun fro372 licking with Derrida in Paris. This sympathy and support of Rorty's metaphilosophy is the "text" of Nielsen's article. But Nielsen has two additional "subtexts". The first subtext is that the Left has unfairly received Rorty. That is, Rorty is neither a dupe of the American capitalist order, nor an "irresponsible shootfrom-the-hip" 372 social commentator. Rather, Rorty is "firmly committed to 374 intelligently commenting on the social and political problems of our time." Nielsen's second subtext is that Rorty and the neo-pragmatists "should not be so spooked by the ghost of 'grand theory' that they continue to ignore the 375 careful and politically relevant work of analytical Marxians." The purpose of my study is not to evaluate the relevance of Rorty's views for the Left or for Nielsen's Marxians. Yet these "texts" have interesting implications for the philosophy of religion, whether it is Nielsen's main text (i.e., his agreement with Rorty's position) or the two subtexts. Suffice here to note, given the first subtext, just as the Left need not be fearful of Rorty, so philosophers of religion need not fear Rorty either. Indeed, Rorty's views about antirepresentation, truth and justification need not be seen as necessarily hostile to religious belief—even Christian belief. As for the second subtext, while Nielsen believes analytical Marxism is deserving of Rorty's attention, no such prodding is required on behalf of the philosopher of religion. Rorty has acknowledged that some forms of religious belief are compatible with his account of philosophy. And so Nielsen might think that, after all, if Rorty considers religious belief after the demise of the tradition, should he not also consider the compatibility with analytical Marxians? Of course whether Rorty decides to do so is up to him. What is more important, at least in this present study, is to show how Nielsen's acceptance of Rorty's metaphilosophy stands in contrast to his original critique of God-talk. If Nielsen agrees with Rorty that the philosophical conversation needs changing, what are the results for God-talk? In contrast to the often antagonistic relationship between traditional philosophy and religious belief, once antireprestationalism replaces representation and the traditional sense of objectivity, is it possible for God-talk to find a place within this intersubjectivity? Granted, it will be a more humble version of God-talk, in line with changing

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the conversation from metaphysical and epistemological questions to public conversations of solidarity and private hopes. But is not God-talk at least an option in Rorty's post-Philosophical culture? To explore this further we need to review some of Nielsen's main arguments against religious belief. "God's" Need for a Referent Nielsen wholeheartedly agrees with Rorty's, now well-known, metaphilosophical views. This includes Rorty's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. Yet, when it comes to discussions over the existence of God, Nielsen has made quite drawn-out criticisms which assume the theory, stating, in sum, that'' [God] is a referring expression whose referent obviously cannot be iden376 tified by ostension." Nielsen goes on to explain that because the word "God" lacks this ostensive identification (nullifying any attempt of an extra-linguistic definition), it follows that no secondary meaning can be attached to this noun (viz. definite descriptions or intra-linguistic definitions). Explaining this criticism against God-talk, Nielsen offers the somewhat quaint example of two comparable sentences: "God made the heavens and the earth" and 377 "Fred made bread and soup" Putting aside the issue of how the word "made" in the former sentence 378 can be said to have any sense Nielsen states, "What I want to ask is what is 'God' supposed to stand for in such a sentence and how is the referent of 379 that term to be identified?" In contrast to the first sentence, the second claim has a referent (viz., "Fred") that can, at least under normal circumstances, be taught extra-linguistically (ostensibly) and/or intra-linguistically (by definite descriptions). Extra-linguistically, even if we are not acquainted with the "Fred" of this proposition we know that Fred refers to a human being, of which we have similar models. We know what kind of "reality" 380 Fred refers to. If the name "Fred" is used in an ordinary sense, we know that this person could (under normal circumstances) be identified by pointing him out. Considering the activities of Fred, even if one did not know what making soup entailed, it could be ostensively taught by pointing to the activity of making soup. Since this is not possible with propositions concerning God or his activity, Nielsen concludes that God-talk, of this sort, is incoherent. With the failure of extra-linguistic definitions of God, and his assumed activity, is it possible to teach what God refers to intra-linguistically—by definite descriptions? Nielsen suggests three possible candidates. God is:

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"the maker of the heavens and earth" "the being transcendent to the world, upon whom all other beings depend and who depends on no one or no thing" "the being of infinite love to whom all things are owed." 371 By not establishing how the referent God can be "filled" (extra-linguistically), the sentences of this secondary type (intra-linguistically) will likewise be rendered problematic. While it is difficult enough to imagine what can be made of the word God, the alleged definite description of him "being transcendent to the world" certainly exacerbates the perplexity. Nielsen goes on to state: [I]f you had trouble about knowing what was referred to by the word "God," you are going to be equally puzzled about "A being transcendent to the world." How would you identify that? Or "the being of infinite love to whom all things are owed?" How do you know what it would be like to meet such a being? What is it that you're talking about in talking about a being of infinite love? Or "The maker of the heavens and the earth," rather than "The maker of the pasta and the cake?" How would you know what that 382 refers to? So, whether speaking about God extra-linguistically or intra-linguistically, because of the missing referent, this way of speaking about God lacks 373 coherence. Evaluating God-talk After the Demise of the Tradition In developing his view of the post-Philosophical project, and in agreement with Rorty, Nielsen speaks of putting aside metaphysical and epistemological concerns, truth as correspondence, and philosophical vantage-points whereby the totality of society can be examined. Again, in language very similar to Rorty's, Nielsen says his "Deweyian account does not presuppose a position in metaethics, the epistemology of morals or epistemology more generally, in 384 metaphysics, or the acceptance of a distinctive normative ethical theory." But this metaphilosophical account undermines his original evaluation of God-talk. Once abandoning the "problems and conceptions of perennial philosophy or foundationalism, even modest foundationalist epistemology and 375 metaphysics or metaethics," how can philosophy still stand in judgment over religious belief, setting forth heavy-handed philosophical requirements for what can and cannot be considered true beliefs? An example that serves to illustrate this tension can be seen in Nielsen's repeated claim that theologians must provide the referent to the word God.

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In the post-Philosophical context, exactly what is the sense of this demand? What does Nielsen mean by this? Isn't this a demand that found its impetus in the Tradition's desire to find a one-to-one correspondence between language and the world outside our language? Given the demise of philosophy and the need to see it transformed, is it consistent to admit that traditional philosophy's definitions of truth and objectivity are problematic, but the theist must nevertheless show how God-talk refers to the object, God? Is this a challenge the theist should be obliged to solve? Here is an example of Nielsen's contrasting, even conflicting admission when talking about his agreement with Rorty: It is also the case that we can never compare a thought or a statement or a network of thoughts or statements with an unconceptualized reality so as to tell whether the world answers to that thought or statement or network of

thoughts or statements. 386

Describing this view, Nielsen then makes a straightforward assessment: What makes a proposition or statement true is the way the world is. There are these fact-like entities—these truth makers—there in the world for true propositions or, if your will, sentences to correspond to. However, and unfortunately for the modest-foundationalist, the world is not prestructured into fact-like entities. The world doesn't consist in some totality of fact-like entities there to be discovered and counted and to which, one by one, or in any other way, our sentences correspond . . . To think of truth as correspondence is to assume, perhaps naturally but still utterly mistakenly, that thought or language 387 mirrors the world. But that notion makes no sense ... If this demand to link our language to the world makes no sense when talking about ordinary matters, then it belies a certain prejudice on Nielsen's part to expect such a linking when it comes to religious language. For example, criticizing modest foundationalists (or perhaps better, metaphysical realists), Nielsen notes their view is characterized by the belief that there is one uniquely true description of the world. This description of the world "tells us just what 388 that world is, quite independently of how we happen to conceptualize it." The task of philosophy is to provide this description. Truthfulness is determined by matching a sentence, belief, statement, or proposition with fact-like entities that are present in the world. "There are these fact-like entities—these truth-makers—there in the world for true propositions or, if you will, sen1299 tences to correspond to." Even though the modest-foundationalist's view is curiously similar to Nielsen's own demand that the theist show the referent to the word God, Nielsen goes on to criticize this view at length:

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However, and unfortunately for the modest-foundationalist, the world is not prestructured into fact-like entities. The world doesn't consist in some totality of fact-like entities there to be discovered and counted and to which, one by one, or in any other way, our sentences correspond. Nor is our world prefabricated in terms of kinds of categories. Objects and kinds do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. There is no coherent answer to the question "How many objects are there on my desk?" It makes no sense to say that there must be a determinate number of objects in the universe and thus there is no logical possibility, some convention aside, of saying how many objects there are on my desk, in my hand, or in the universe. There are, moreover, no self-identifying objects. The world does not come precategorized, presorted, or presliced. It is the noetic activity of the mind or the establishment of linguistic convention or linguistic practices that produce the categories and categorical systems that we have. To think of truth as correspondence is to assume, perhaps naturally but still utterly mistakenly, that thought or language mirrors the world. But that notion makes no sense, for it assumes, incoherently, that the world comes precategorized in factlike, self-identifying entities. It is also the case that we can never compare a thought or a statement or a network of thoughts or statements with an unconceptualized reality so as to tell whether the world answers to that thought or statement or network of thought or statements . . . This conception of the simple truth and of a match of the true-description of the world rests on a myth. Language, or, for that matter, thought, does not work in this simple fashion. 3901 Given this clear and lucid assessment, how then are we to decide what propositions or truths to believe? Are we doomed to solipsism if we have no way of matching our language to the world? In a passage surprisingly familiar to Rorty's language (and once again in contrast to Nielsen's language when dealing with God-talk) Nielsen states how we come to have our various beliefs: There is no language which just tells it like it is—just records or depicts or pictures what nature is like. We rather are always, and inescapably, dependent on the societal norms or determinate uses of terms in certain linguistic and social practices (they go together) of a given society or family of societies during a given historical period. It very much appears to be the case that, at least that in that way, society determines what we can say, think 3901 and believe and what has the most foundationalist epistemic authority. These limitations notwithstanding, is it not the case, Nielsen asks reflectively, that one can at least make trivial claims? For example, that there is "a yellow breasted finch in the bush"? Nielsen contends that although this might hold

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under certain cases it need not hold in all cases. "What we can correctly say is that, given a certain interpretation of the sentence expressing that proposition, of the world (so specified), that (if all these conditions obtain), it is true 3902 that there is a yellow breasted finch in the bush." There are other interpretations, however, that would make this claim false or indeterminate. In a statement that bears relevance to God-talk, Nielsen notes that there is "no just looking and seeing what is the case. There is, of course, indeed there must be, a way the world is—we do not create the world—but we are never in a 3903 position to say, independently of human devising, the way that it is." Many more statements could be cited where Nielsen makes the clear distinction between our language, how we conceptualize the world, and the impossibility of somehow matching our language to the world. 394 Nielsen is clear that we often come about our beliefs in a complex manner. The result is a highly developed web of linguistic and social practices, both on an individual and communal level. Conceptualized thusly, it is not evident God-talk should be excluded from all linguistic and social practices because of questions of reference. And if religious belief seems at least provisionally acceptable given Nielsen's metaphilosophical position, this possibility is even more certain given Rorty's interpretation of the demise of philosophy. Summary and Conclusion Nielsen is quite in agreement with Rorty's assessment of traditional philosophy. In short, it has failed in its goals: the attempt to define truth as correspondence, the attempt to establish an epistemological foundation, and the attempt to find a metaphysical backdrop against which we may compare societies. When Nielsen turns to the phenomenon of God-talk (or religious belief), however, his tone is noticeably different. For example, although Nielsen holds to a view of truth as coherence, when discussing religious belief coherence becomes predicated upon the requirement that the theist shows the correspondence between her language of God (or God-talk) and God himself. Besides post-Philosophy's disinterest in this issue, this demand overlooks an understanding of God, at least from the Judeo-Christian perspective: The scripture not only affirms that no one can see God, it adds that contrary to idols, God is nameless (Dt4,15; Ex 33,20-23; Jg 13,22; Jn 1,18): God is named by what is naming him. He names as one who is un-named. As the radical Other, because he is unnaming himself, in naming he calls to the being all beings and makes to be. By naming man and woman, he calls all humanity by their name, and so he becomes the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and Jacob, the God of Jesus Christ. God is not a name but a verb.

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This verb is one with humanity; and therefore God has no need to "make himself a name" (Gn. 11:4).395 Perhaps Nielsen cannot be reproached for overlooking this theological, nuanced understanding of God. In any case, whether on this theological reading of God or the post-Philosophical understanding of reference, Nielsen's objection on this count misses the mark. Similar to Rorty, Nielsen argued that without the metaphysical vantagepoints that grant a privileged view of reality, philosophers should turn their attention to addressing the problems of humankind: Philosophers should concern themselves with the problems of our time—the deepest and most intractable problems that human beings face—but we would also like, were we are [sic] doing philosophy, if we can, to view them somehow comprehensively: to give ourselves an integrated and critical conception of who we are, were, and of whom we might become with what social institutions, social practices, and with a reflective sense of our lives together.396 Having acknowledged its limits, philosophy reorientates its interests. The issues of systematic philosophy are to be abandoned partly because they are questions malpose—without a final answer—and partly because the philosopher has no access to specialized tools necessary for solving these issues. The difficulty for Nielsen is that his drawn-out critique of God-talk is at odds with his metaphilosophical position. One cannot consistently side with Rorty and at the same time tell those who engage in God-talk that their talk is incoherent because of a lack of an extra or intra-linguistic reference. If the God-talkers are willing to drop robust claims to truth, metaphysical musings, and concentrate on increasing intersubjectivity and solidarity, then there is as much room in post-Philosophical society for them as there is for Nielsen's analytic Marxians. In short, if we take the demise of the philosophical tradition seriously, there is no reason why theists cannot take God-talk seriously. This conclusion is quite in keeping with the ground already covered in our study. Having set out Rorty's metaphilosophical position, we have described in further terms how religious language can flourish within his private/public distinction. While theists like Plantinga might find Rorty's position contrary to the main tenets of Christianity, it is a rather pessimistic, if not wrongheaded, interpretation of Rorty. As Nielsen himself shows, the traditional topics of discussion in philosophy, once discarded, actually free-up religious belief. We have described in this chapter, at least in part, how this sort of language might look in post-Philosophical society. We now need to go on and explain this in further detail.

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After Rorty Notes

1

2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13.

"God's-eye standpoint" is a phrase Rorty borrows from Putnam. It indicates a vantage point, "one which has somehow broken out of our language and our beliefs and tested them against something known without their aid. But we have no idea what it would be like to be at that standpoint." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 6. Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," The Revival of Pragmatism: Mew Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, edited by Morris Dickstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 21-36. Originally published in Common Knowledge (Spring 1994), vol. Ill, no. 1, pp. 1—16. Republished in Rorty's Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 168—74. Originally published in The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ruth Anna Putnam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Republished in Rorty's Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 148—67. Santiago Zabala (ed.), The Future of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Alvin Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," Warrant and Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 422-57. Nielsen particularly likes what he has called "Flew's Challenge." See Antony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," Mew Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by A. Flew and A. Maclntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 96-9. Kai Nielsen, "Taking Rorty Seriously," Dialogue, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, Summer/Etc 1999, pp. 503-18. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 115. Rorty, "Religion as Conversation-stopper," p. 4. Richard Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," in The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)^ p. 33. Rorty has stated elsewhere that "I use 'secularism' inthesenseof'anticlericalism' rather than 'atheism.' " Speaking of Dewey, Rorty notes further that "Dewey's dislike of ' aggressive atheism' is made clear in A Common Faith. I have argued elsewhere that Dewey, like James, wanted pragmatism to be compatible with religious belief— not only with a privatized religious belief, not with the sort of religious belief that produces churches, especially churches which take on political positions." Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 142, footnote 8. Note the difference here between how Rorty and Nielsen approach religious belief. Rorty, consistent with his metaphilosophical position, isn't going to attack the "rationality" of religious belief. Rather, he is going after forms of religious belief that he correctly sees as being politically treacherous for the health of society. We need to quote this statement more fully in context: "the question at hand is ultimately spiritual, and . .. the adoption of my view would be a real change in people's self-image. For when people step outside of their expert cultures—when they stop acting as carpenters or physicists and start getting reflective in religious or philosophical ways—they do, alas, start wondering about whether we are

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14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

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shadowing, displaying, mirroring, and representing something. I wish they did not. I think that if we could get rid of both Farrell's sense that we are meaningless unless we are getting something not ourselves right, and the Nietzschean sense that we are meaningless unless we create a world in our image (the Romanticism that Farrell attributes to me), then our spiritual state would be better than it is now." Richard Rorty, "Response to Farrell," Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, edited by Herman Saatkamph (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), p. 195; emphasis his. As quoted by Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 35, footnote 6. Gabriel Vahanian, God and Utopia (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), p. 2. Gabriel Vahanian, Wait Without Idols, (New York: George Braziller, 1964), pp. 136—7; from T.S. Eliot's Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (New York, 1949), p. 32. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 93; emphasis his. An example of this process is given by Rorty where he notes that, "Intellectual historians commonly treat 'the nature of the human subj ect' as the topic that gradually replaced' God' as European culture secularized itself." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism,andtruth, p. 183. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 98. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, p. 9. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 33. Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 123. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 104; emphasis his. Richard Rorty, "Against Unity," Wilson Quarterly (Winter) 1998, p. 30. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 104; emphasis his. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 130. There is another nice comparison between Rorty and Nietzsche on this point. Many have understood Nietzsche's highly acerbic criticisms of Christianity to be indicative of rabid atheism, yet others have better seen these criticisms leveled against a form of Christianity rightly deserving of chagrin, whether one is a Christian or not. See Rorty's "Inquiry as recontextualization: An anti-dualist account of interpretation," in Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, pp. 93—110. Some of the discussion here overlaps with "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 6. Gary Gutting further explains how Kuhn's position is helpful for Rorty: "First, it rejects the idea that there is any necessarily shared epistemic ground (e.g., a neutral observation language or a priori methodological rules) that we can use to resolve scientific disagreements. This is Kuhn's doctrine of incommensurability, which corresponds to Rorty's rejection of privileged representations. Second, Kuhn locates the ultimate source of science's cognitive authority in the consensus of the scientific community, a view that corresponds to Rorty's insistence on the primacy of conversation (reason-giving as a social practice). Rorty's idea is to extend what Kuhn says about natural science to the entire domain of human knowledge." Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 19.

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29. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 97; emphasis his. Moreover, "we should

30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

view inquiry as a way of using reality. So the relation between our truth-claims and the rest of the world is causal rather than representational. It causes us to hold beliefs, and we continue to hold the beliefs which prove to be reliable guides to getting what we want." Richard Rorty, "Truth Without Correspondence to Reality," Philosophy and Social Hope (New York: Penguin, 1999), p. 33. Here there is another comparison with Nietzsche: "Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present—and it was we who gave and bestowed it." Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 301; emphasis his. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 98. This description of objects should not be interpreted as meaning the "antiessentialist" is an idealist. Rorty goes on to state that the "antiessentialist specializes in creating this hall-of-mirrors effect in getting us to stop asking which is the real thing and which the image, and to settle for an ever-expanding choice of images, of Goodmanian 'worlds'." [100] The antiessentialist believes, like the realist, that "there are objects which are causally independent of human beliefs and desires." [101] The inquiry is not based on a confrontation between beliefs and objects, but rather in the search for a coherent set of beliefs. "We do in fact describe most objects as causally independent of us, and that is all that is required to satisfy our realistic intuitions. We are not also required to say that our descriptions represent objects." [101; emphasis his] Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 90. The similarity to Kuhn's description of a paradigm shift in not accidental in this description. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 93. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 93; emphasis his. See Michael Ruse, Can a Darwinian be a Christian? The Relationship between Science and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). "This is, like all of Dewey's distinctions, one of degree. At one end of a spectrum are situations where minimal reweaving is required . . . The reweaving involved in assimilating the novel belief'The fork is on the wrong side' is usually too minimal to deserve the name of'inquiry.' " Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 94. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 94. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 45. Some have seen in Rorty's view of religious belief a particularly vehement anti-religious tone. Gabriel Vahanian notes that when Rorty speaks of the secular "he means secular, even with a vengeance . . . in Rorty's use, it acquires an even more radical meaning than, especially in the wake of the Reformation, is normally associated with it. Originally serving to distinguish the so-called secular from the regular clergy, it attenuates or even extenuates all rigid opposition between the world—secular—and faith. Though it has no meaning except through the religious, it enjoys its own franchise." Vahanian, "The Denatured Nature of Ethics: In Praise of the Secular," p. 507 ; emphasis his.

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40. 41.

Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 115. Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 9. On this point Kuipers refers the reader to Rorty's Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 202.

42.

"Essentialist claims—that human beings (or whatever) have an inherent (biological, genetic, psychological, or whatever) nature, and so on—are not things that Rorty wants to 'counter': he simply wants us to be rid of them, to conduct our lives without giving them much thought." Malachowski, Richard Rorty, p. 19. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," pp. 27—8. This follows from Ror-

43.

ty's holistic, coherentist position. Letson notes we "need at this point to combine the coherentist's claim that truth is a matter of consistency with the comprehensive set of beliefs of a knower with the claim that this view of the matter does not commit the coherentist to the view that there is no way to pick out any particular consistent set from all of the possible sets available for belief. The coherentist does not face this alarming possible proliferation of sets of beliefs for a very simple reason: we already have a comprehensive set of beliefs, and any candidates for belief must pass the test of these beliefs. It is never the case that any actual knower can be in the position of having to choose between competing sets.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

Rather, there will be small adjustments to the set that he already has—coherence then entails that new beliefs conform to the vast body of unquestioned and unquestionable beliefs now held." Letson, Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implicationsfor Rorty's Pragmatism, pp. 26—7. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 28. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 39. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 29. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 28. Gordon Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995), p. 87; emphasis mine. He states elsewhere that "the concepts of God and world must be assessed and reconstructed in consideration of the kinds of activity and forms of experience they make possible, rather than with reference to some objects to which they are supposed to 'correspond.' " Kaufman, p. 39. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 156; emphasis his. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 93. I do not intend to use this as some sort of apologetic for the Christian faith. It was often the case that these concerns were willfully ignored by the Church and those

140

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

After Rorty professing to be Christian. It is only to point out that scripture speaks clearly about putting belief into action. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 370; emphasis his. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 28. Ibid. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 44. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, p. 212. In a lucid explanation Rorty states elsewhere "if Sellars is right that we cannot check our language against our nonlinguistic awareness, then philosophy can never be anything more than a discussion of the utility and compatibility of beliefs—and, more particularly, of the various vocabularies in which those beliefs are formulated. There is no authority outside of convenience for human purposes that can be appealed to in order to legitimize the use of a vocabulary. We have no duties to anything nonhuman." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 127. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," pp. 30—1. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 29. Originally published in Religion After Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 37-46. Republished in The Future of Religion, pp. 29-41. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 149. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 28. Ibid., p. 29. Rorty notes that Mill chose an epigraph from Wilhelm von Humboldt for On Liberty. "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity." As quoted by Rorty, p. 22. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 29. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 33. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 150. Ibid., p. 149. See John McDowell's Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 142-3, as quoted by Rorty in Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 165, footnote 8. Rorty goes on to describe the realist philosopher who says the "the only true source of evidence is the world as it is in itself." Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 150. Gianni Vattimo, "What is Religion's Future After Metaphysics?" in The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 66. Karl Barth, though not an edifying theologian, nevertheless saw why religious believers should attempt to make their views understandable. This opens up the possibility of seeing things in a new way. As one commentator has noted, "No one did more than he to overthrow the dominant theologies of the nineteenth century, yet in this very connection he tells us that the theologian of today must keep his ear open to the voices of that period for 'there is always the possibility that in some sense or other we may be in particular need of wholly unexpected voices, and that among them there may be voices which are at first wholly unwelcome.' " John Macquarrie, The Scope ofDemythologizing:

Rorty, Religious Belief and Ethics

81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114.

141

Bultmann andhis Critics (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 52; cited from Karl Earth's, Die protestantische Theologie im neunzehnten Fahrhundert (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947), p. 3. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 33. Two of the best current examples of this come from Bill McKibben's Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age (New York: Times Books, 2003), and Francis Fukuyama's, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). StephenL. Carter, TheCultureoJDisbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (New York: Basic Books, 1993). Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 169-70. Ibid., p. 170. Ibid.,pp.nO-l. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief', from forty's Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 171. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 171. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief; from Rorty's, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 172. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 173. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief; from Rorty's, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 173. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 173-4. Originally published in The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ruth Anna Putnam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Republished in forty's Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 148—67. Here Rorty quotes from William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 148; from Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 148. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 149. Ibid., p. 148. Ibid., p. 149. Ibid. Ibid., p. 148. Ibid.,p. 149. Ibid. Ibid.,p. 153. Ibid.,p. 150. Ibid.,p. 153. Ibid.,p. 155. Ibid.,p. 154. Ibid.,p. 156. Ibid.,p. 156. Ibid.,pA5B. Ibid.,p. 156. Ibid.,p. 157. Ibid., pp. 156-7. Ibid., p. 157; emphasis mine. Ibid.

142

After Rorty

115. Ibid., p. 158; emphasis his. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. Quoted from James' The Will to Believe, p. 29. 118.Ibid., p. 160. 119. Ibid.

118. Ibid., p. 160. 121. Ibid. 122. Ibid., p. 162. 123. Ibid., p. 164. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid., p. 163. 126. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," p. 29; emphasis his. 127. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 157. 128. Robert Royal, "The Forgetfulness ofBeings," Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy. Edited by Roman T. Ciapalo (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 209. See my review of this book in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 2000. At a conference sponsored by the University of Notre Dame Law School, Joseph Boyle, President of St Michael's in Toronto, began his lecture on religion and society with the language of philosophical orthodoxy, using phrases such as: "principles of reality"; "fundamentally good and the true"; "objectively good"; "objectively, rational, religious demand"; and "the Transcendent perspective." During the question period my query (written beforehand) was this: "I can offer motivation for action and reasons for behavior without reference to 'principles of reality' and the 'objectively good'. I am dubious that we must categorize issues of alienation, sin, and failure [his stated issues] under these principles because of the realization that the 'objective, rational, religious demand' is often used as a substitute for conversation and more often than not rhetoric to sustain religious conservativism. The rational appeal has been used historically for the justification of slavery, subjugation of women and capital punishment. So my question is: How much consideration have you given to the difficulties associated with the terms that support your sense of moral obligation?" In his reply Boyle could only say that the alternatives are relativism or some sort of "postmodernism." 129. pp. 72-90. 130. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 72. 131. Ibid. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid., p. 73. 134. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 140. Ibid.

140. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 139. Ibid., p. 74. 140. Ibid.

Rorty, Religious Belief and Ethics 141. 142. 143.

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

143

Ibid. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., from John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, The Middle Works of John Dewey (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), vol. XIV, p. 169. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 75. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid.,p.77. Ibid., from Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, The Middle Works of John Dewey, p. 96.

152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

172.

173.

Ibid. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 78. See Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). Ibid. Ibid., p. 79; emphasis his. Ibid., pp. 80-1. Ibid.,p.81. Ibid. Ibid., p. 82; emphasis his. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1980, p. 519; as quoted by Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 58. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 82. Ibid. Ibid., p. 84; emphasis his. WzW.,p.86. Ibid.,p.87. Ibid. Ibid.,p.88. Ibid.,p.85. ToniBentley (reviewer), " 'Vindication': Mary Wollstonecraft's Sense and Sensibility," by Lyndall Gordon, New York Times Book Review, May 29, 2005. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 77, from Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, The Middle Works of John Dewey, p. 96. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 78, from Donald Davidson's, "Paradoxes of Irrationality," in Philosophical Essays in Freud, Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). "Foundationalists think of these people as deprived of truth, or moral knowledge. But it would be better—more concrete, more specific, more suggestive of possible remedies—to think of them as deprived of two more concrete things: security and sympathy." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 180. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 73.

144 174. 175.

176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183.

184.

185.

After Rorty Tapio Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," Journal of Philosophy of Education, 31, 3, November 1997, pp. 461-76. Tapio has since responded to my critique in an article entitled, "Democratic Values Education Reconsidered: A Moral Realist Case," Journal of Philosophy of Education, 31, 2, 2001, pp. 299-308. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 461 Ibid. Ibid., p. 462. Ibid. Ibid., p. 463. Ibid., p. 464; emphasis mine. Ibid. Mackintosh, speaking about Troeltsch's rigid principles of historical investigation, put the problem in a way comparable to the moral realist view of ethical theory: "The possibilities have been fixed in advance; the facts are compelled to fit the method by which they are to be treated; just as, though an automatic machine when opened may disgorge nothing but unbent pennies, this is not because the outer world is made up of unbent pennies and nothing else, but because the selective mechanism at work will accept no other sort." H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet, 1937), p. 203. For example, Puolimatka cites Stout who says " I deny that the wrongness of torturing innocents is simply a belief we have that is justified by some expedient social convention. Knowingly and willingly torturing innocents is wrong, impermissible, unjust. It always has been. It would still be unjust if, after the general collapse of civilization, everybody was justified in believing it permissible, given the expedient conventions of the day . .. That is the moral truth of the matter, whether we recognize it or not—a truth I deem more certain than any explanation I could give of it or any argument I could make on its behalf." Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 463; from Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel. The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1988), p. 245. Stout is right here. The wrongness of torturing children is not simply a belief we have that is justified by social convention. It is more than that, even on Rorty's position. Rorty can say, like Stout, that this is "wrong, impermissible, unjust"—but it is something more to say that it would be unjust even if everybody believed otherwise. Rorty would undoubtedly say that this claim makes no sense because truthfulness can only be assigned to beliefs possessed by an agent. On Stout's account, moral truths have a life of their own. As Owens has further noted, "But no overall agreement is to be found among philosophers, whether ancient or modern or contemporary, in their own explanations of the detailed ways in which philosophy influences human conduct. The views differ radically with each individual thinker. Also, the fact remains that people can be good citizens and good soldiers and good rulers without having had formal philosophical training. The track record of philosophy's conscious influence on the major events of human history does not glow with any notable brilliance." Joseph Owens, Some Philosophical Issues in Moral Matters: The Collected

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Ethical Writings of Joseph Owens, edited by Dennis J. Billy and Terence Kennedy (Roma: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1996), p. 15. 186. An example of this is Schall who argues that "the denial of God is not primarily an intellectual problem about proving God's existence but a spiritual problem, a murder in fact. There are basic questions that we refuse to ask so that our problem is not really intellectual but spiritual, a problem of will and not of intellect." James V. Schall, S.J., "Our Postmodernism and the 'Silence' of St. Thomas," Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy. Edited by Roman T. Ciapalo (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 219. Rorty's response is appurtenant: "We are quite justified in thinking as we do, but we cannot check our view of the matter against the intrinsic nature of moral reality . . . Nor will we get anywhere by telling those who think differently that they are out of touch with reality or that they are behaving irrationally." Rorty, Truth & Progress, p. 7. 187. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," pp. 463—4. 188. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 61, footnote 49. 189. We will not examine this debate between the realist and antirealist although Rorty does spend some time discussing it in his writings. See "Solidarity or Subjectivity," in Rorty's Objectivity, relativism, and truth, pp. 21—34. As he states elsewhere "[t]he difference between the moral realist and the moral antirealist seems to pragmatists a difference that makes no practical difference. Further, such metaethical questions presuppose the Platonic distinction between inquiry that aims at efficient problem solving and inquiry that aims at a goal called 'truth for its own sake.' That distinction collapses if one follows Dewey in thinking of all inquiry—in physics as well as ethics—as practical problem solving or if one follows Peirce in seeing every belief as action-guiding." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 173; emphasis his. 190. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 464. 191. Ibid. 192. Ibid. 193. Referring to Murdoch's account of transcending our human condition, Kerr states, "we live in a world that makes claims on us, morally, ethically—claims we can ignore, claims to which we may be blind, but we are not the ones who invent them or project them—we find them, discover them." Kerr, Immortal Longings, p. 87; emphasis mine. 194.

Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 164—5.

195. Ibid., p. 165; emphasis his. 196. Ibid.,p. 166. 197. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 464. 198. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 204. Moreover for the pragmatist, "there is no overarching, ahistorical, context-free criterion to which one can appeal when asked to shift from one paradigm of explanation to another." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 104. 199. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 204. As Kwiek puts the issue, "Man, freed from an ethical smoke-screen, from a meta-narrative haze that covers ethical

146

200. 201. 202. 203.

204. 205. 206.

207. 208. 209.

210. 211.

212. 213. 214. 215. 216.

After Rorty choices, receives the burden of his own moral dilemmas." Marek Kwiek, Rorty's Elective Affinities: The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought (PoznanUniversity, 1996), p. 35. Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 116—17; emphasis his. Ibid., p. 181. Kim, "Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy," p. 590; emphasis his. "Kant's example encouraged the idea that the philosopher, as an expert on the nature and limits of knowledge, can serve as a supreme cultural arbiter." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 174. As he says elsewhere, "To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing which nobody else knows so well would be to drop the notion that [the voice of the philosopher] always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 392. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 37. Ibid., p. 171. And as we shall see below, it is one that admits the utter contingency of our beliefs. Instead of accepting the realist's model that beliefs must represent moral reality, "To accept the contingency of starting points is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 166. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 166. "[RJationality is what history and society make it." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 204. Speaking of Goethe, Kierkegaard, Santayana, James, and Dewey, Rorty states that "They have kept alive the historicist sense that this century's 'superstition' was the last century's triumph of reason as well as the relativist sense that the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, but be just another of the potential infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described." Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 367. Paul Ricoeur, L'homme fallible, Fimtude et Culpabilite I (Paris: Aubier, editions montaigne, 1960), p. 66. Here is what Richard Bernstein describes as "Cartesian anxiety"—"the dread of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch bottom nor support ourselves on the surface." Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,Hermeneutics,and Praxis (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 18. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 208. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 13. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 181. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 464. "On James's view, 'true' resembles 'good' or 'rational' in being a normative notion, a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit in with other sentences which are doing so." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xxv.

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217. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, New American Library, 1950), p. 156. 218. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 466. 219. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 185. The ability to respond to those who suffer, the pragmatist believes, means that "people merely need to turn their eyes toward people who are getting hurt, notice the details of the pain being suffered, rather than needing to have their cognitive apparatus restructured." Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 80; emphasis his. 220. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 309. In a section worth quoting at length Rorty describes his differences with Habermas: "Our differences concern only the self-image which a democratic society should have, the rhetoric which it should use to express its hopes . . . A liberal society is one which is content to call 'true' (or 'right' or 'just') whatever the outcome of undistorted communication happens to be, whatever view wins in a free and open encounter . . . I want to replace [Habermasian universalism] with a story of increasing willingness to live with plurality and to stop asking for universal validity. I want to see freely arrived at agreement as agreement on how to accomplish common purposes (e.g., prediction and control of the behavior of atoms or people, equalizing life—chances, decreasing cruelty), but I want to see these common purposes against the background of an increasing sense of the radical diversity of private purposes, of the radically poetic character of individual lives, and of the merely poetic foundations of the 'we-consciousness' which lies behind our social institutions." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, pp. 67—8; emphasis his. 221. See Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 110. And, "There is a difference between vocabulary that just happens to work, and vocabulary working because that is the way things really are." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 192; emphasis his. 222. Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida, by G. Bennington and Jacques Derrida (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 103; as quoted by Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 331. 223. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 80. 224. Ibid., p. 41. 225. "I argue . . . that it is imagination rather than a clearer grasp of our moral obligations, that does most for the creation and stability of such communities." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 12. 226. This is the distinction between "finding out whether a proposition is true and finding out whether a vocabulary is good." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 142. 227. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 5. 228. WzW.,p.214. 229. Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 31. 230. Ibid.,p.30. 231. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 466. Puolimatka's objection to Rorty's account is most interesting within the context of

148

After Rorty this point: "Without a sense of objective value, human motivation is impoverished, since an objective moral vacuum does not motivate." Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 475. Only professional philosophers think that we have to be in touch with moral reality or objective truth to give reasons for why living in a peaceful, tolerant, and open society is preferable to living in one that is totalitarian and war-torn. While questioning what it means to have objective moral values in the realist's sense, we are not left with a moral vacuum or lack of motivation for our choice.

232. 233.

Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 164. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 22; emphasis his.

234.

Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 163. This, Rorty believes, coincides with Sellars' thesis "that morality is a matter of what he calls 'we-intentions,' that the core meaning of'immoral actions' is 'the sort of thing we don't do.' " Such a description seems quite close to the ethics of virtue. As Rorty goes on to say, "On Sellars' account, as on Hegel's, moral philosophy takes the form of an answer to the question 'Who are "we", how did we come to be what we are, and what might we become?' rather than an answer to the question 'What rules should dictate my actions?' In other words, moral philosophy takes the form of historical narration and Utopian speculations rather than of a search for general principles." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, pp. 59—60; emphasis his. On Wilfrid Sellars see Science and Metaphysics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), chapters 6 and 7. Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 467. Ibid., p. 463.

235. 236. 237.

Ibid.', from Stout, Ethics After Babel. The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents, p. 245; emphasis mine.

238.

See "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," Rorty's Truth and Progress, pp. 167—85. Annette Baier, "Hume, the Women's Moral Theorist," WomenandMoral Theory, edited by Eva Kitay and Diana Meyers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), p. 40; as quoted by Rorty, Truth and Progress,pp. 180-81. Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 181, 185. Stories, "repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the rich, safe, powerful people, to tolerate and even to cherish powerless people—people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own moral identity, our sense of the limits of permissible human variation." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 185. He adds that for those "who want a demonstration that less suffering and greater diversity should be the overriding aims of political endeavor, Dewey and Whitman have nothing to say. They know of no more certain premises from which such a belief must be deduced." Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 30. Puolimatka is somewhat ambiguous here with the wording of this statement. The exact wording he uses is "If these values have no rational appeal, it is not sensible to teach them since there are better moral choices." Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," p. 464; emphasis mine. It would be obvious, even on a pragmatist's account, that there must be some sort

239.

240.

241.

242.

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149

of "rational appeal" for a moral choice. Even a little justification (a couple of half-baked reasons) would be more than "no rational appeal." It seems unlikely, then, that he is speaking about a problem likely to be encountered. 243.Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 179. 244.Ibid. 245.Ibid. 246.Ibid. 247.Ibid. 248.Puolimatka, "The Problem of Democratic Values Education," pp. 467—8. 249 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 164. 250.Donald Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy, 87, no. 6, 1990, p. 305; as quoted by Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 67. 251. Hilary Putnam, Reality with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 28; as quoted by Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 67-8. 252.Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 7. 253.In particular, Rorty cites two publications from Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking and Acting for Religious Reasons," Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. by Paul J. Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997a), pp. 162-81; and "Audi on Religion, Politics and Liberal Democracy," Religion in the Public Square, by Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997b). 254.Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Language of Moral and Their Discontents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 255.Richard Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,"Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 31, no. 1, 2003, pp. 141-9. 256.Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," p. 141. 257.Ibid. 258.Ibid. 259.Ibid. 260.Ibid.,p. 142. 261. Ibid. The Jewish scriptures encourage us to care for the poor, the orphans, and widows. As Jim Wallis of the Christian organization Sojourners reminds us, while the Bible speaks sparingly about sexual matters, there are thousands of verses which draw our attention to poverty. 262.Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," p. 142. Bear in mind this article was written before the meeting of the Cardinals to select their new pope. As for Falwell, Rorty maybe thinking of when, on Pat Robertson's television program, Falwell commented on the September 11th terrorists attacks: "The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million innocent babies we make God mad. I really believe that the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make an alternate lifestyle . . . all of them who have helped secularize America." 263.Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," p. 142.

150 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273.

274. 275. 276.

277.

278.

279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288.

After Rorty See Laurie Goodstein's article, "Citing Survey, CNN Says 4,450 Priests Were Accused of Abuse," New York Times, February 17, 2004. Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," p. 143. Ibid., p. 148. Ibid., pp. 148-9. Ibid., p. 146. Ibid., p. 147. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 147. Ibid.', emphasis his. Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, and Santiago Zabala, "Dialogue: What is Religion's Future After Metaphysics?" The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 74. Rorty says here, "I think the hermeneutical or Gadamerian attitude is in the intellectual world what democracy is in the political world. The two can be viewed as alternative appropriations of the Christian message that love is the only law." Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," p. 144. Ibid., p. 147. See Mark D.Jordan, The Ethics of Sex (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 42. Jordan's book is an excellent treatment of how sexuality has been viewed and generally distorted throughout the centuries by theologians and ecclesiastical leaders. His treatment of the Levitical Code is also an important contribution to this understanding. For a fuller study of this passage see Daniel A. Helminiak's What the Bible Really Says About Homosexuality (Tajique, NM: Alamo Square Press, 2000), pp. 51—67. I am indebted to Helminiak's fine discussion in this book. Further discussion can be found in Robin Scroggs, The Mew Testament and Homosexuality: Contextual Backgroundfor Contemporary Debate (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1983). As Jordon notes, "No debate among contemporary writers on same-sex desire has been more long-lived or more rancorous than the debate about the very application of the term 'homosexuality' before the nineteenth century—or in cultures that do not participate in the medico-legal project of European 'sexuality.'" The Ethics of Sex, p. 13. Jordan, The Ethics of Sex, p. 13. As cited by Michael David Rohr, "Rorty, Richard McKay (1931-)," Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). Alvin Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 422-57. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 426. Ibid., p. 424. Ibid.; emphasis his. Ibid. Ibid., p. 425. Ibid. Ibid.

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289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294 295. 296 297. 298. 299.

Ibid.', emphasis his. Ibid.,p.427. Ibid.,p.429. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 429-30; emphasis his. Ibid., p. 430; emphasis his. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 4:31. Ibid., p. 431; from Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity.

300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307.

Ibid.,p.4-32. Ibid. Ibid.,pp.4-32-3. Ibid.,p.4-33. WzW. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, pp. 3, 5. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 434. As Plantinga notes, "that means among other things that it couldn't have failed to be true; there are no possible circumstances in which it is not true." "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 434. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 434.

308.

309.Ibid.,p.4-35. 310.Ibid.; emphasis his. 311. Ibid.; emphasis his. 312. Ibid. 313. Ibid., pp. 435-6. 314. Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, pp. 16—17, footnote 2. Quoted from Rorty's Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 1. 315. Richard Rorty, Truth, politics and "post-modernism" (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1997), p. 23. 316. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 429. Cited by Plantinga from Rorty's Philosophy andthe Mirror of Nature, pp. 175—6; emphasis Rorty's. 317. As one philosopher has noted, "It is a fundamental methodological principle of the art of interpretation that one attribute to the writer one is reading the best intentions and as few errors as the text will allow . .." Denis McManus, "Sympathy for the Devil: Edwards and Heidegger," Philosophy, 70 (1995), p. 265. 318. One commentator on this paper said this list wasn't particularly important, as most readers would know about these texts and passages. This might be so, but given Plantinga's misunderstanding, the passages seem worth listing. 319. Rorty, TruthandProgress,p. 1. Rorty believes this holds even for postmodernists. 320. Ibid., p. 3; emphasis his. Rorty adds, in parenthesis, a sort of comment not uncommon in his earlier writings: "This is why God of orthodox monotheists, for example, remains so tiresomely ineffable." 321. Ibid., p. 2.

152 322.

After Rorty Ibid., p. 19.

323. Ibid., p. 4. 324.

325.

326. 327. 328. 329. 330.

331. 332.

/AzW. Put another way Rorty has said, "To say that we think we're heading in the right direction is just to say, with Kuhn, that we can, by hindsight, tell the story of the past as a story of progress." Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 27. Or where he criticizes claims to the contrary—that "there isn't any such thing as truth, at least as commonsensically thought of." Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 424. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, pp. 3, 5. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 2. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 425; emphasis mine. Or, "the 'tie' between words and the world . . . '[to be] held captive by a picture.' " Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 114. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 96. "Given a language and a view of what the world is like, one can, to be sure, pair off bits of the language with bits of what one takes the world to be in such a way that the sentences one believes true have internal structures isomorphic to relations between things in the world. When we rap out routine undeliberated reports like 'This is water,' 'That's red,' 'That's ugly,' 'That's immoral,' our short categorical sentences can easily be thought of as pictures, or as symbols which fit together to make a map. Such reports do indeed pair little bits of language with little bits of the world . .. The great fallacy of the tradition, the pragmatists tell us, is to think that the metaphors of vision, correspondence, mapping, picturing, and representation which apply to small, routine assertions, will apply to large and debatable ones. This basic error begets the notion that where there are no objects to correspond to we have no hope of rationality, but only taste, passion, and will." Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 162,164. Elsewhere Rorty states that "we cannot go back and forth between our statements about electrons and electrons, or our ascriptions of belief and beliefs, and pair them off as we pair off bits of the chart and bits of Maine. This would be, as Wittgenstein said, like checking what is said in the newspaper against another copy of the same paper." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 115. Gutting remarks: "I think Rorty should have no difficulty accepting Michael Devitt's point that Rorty's critique of correspondence as an epistemological theory does not, in principle, exclude it as an element in a causal explanation of knowledge." Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 16, footnote 9. Letson, Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implications for Rorty's Pragmatism, pp. 13, 17. See, as well, page 31 of this same text. Rorty notes that "When we go, so do our norms and standards of rational assertability. Does truth go too? Truth neither comes nor goes. This is not because it enjoys an atemporal existence, but because 'truth,' in this context, is just the reification of an approbative adjective, an adjective whose use is mastered once we grasp, as Putnam puts it, that 'a statement is true of a situation just in case it would be correct to use the words of which the statement consists in

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333. 334. 335.

336.

337. 338. 339. 340.

341.

342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349.

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that way in describing the situation.' " Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 53—4; from Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 115. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 90. Ibid. Ibid., p. 86. As Gutting notes, "The issue is not, Did the Big Bang occur before there were any human beings to experience it? It obviously did. The issue is rather whether the Big Bang, as we know it, has any features that are representahonally independent of us. That is, do the categories we use to characterize it somehow mirror features it has entirely apart from our characterizations?" Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 27; emphasis his. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 91. Elsewhere Rorty says: "This is the sixty-four [sic] dollar question: whether we can (as Dewey and Davidson insist we cannot) separate out 'the world's' contribution to the judgment-forming process from our own." Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 35. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 436. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 436—7; emphasis mine. We won't pursue the matter further, but this has Plantinga sounding, according to his own philosophical definitions, at best like a relativist, at worst like a conversation-stopper. As for the first interpretation, "this is the way things look to me," comes close to saying "therefore this is the way it is." In other words, the way I see it is the way it is. As for the second interpretation, this is to Rorty's point about truth versus justification. It is indeed the case that things look a certain way to us. But instead of saying "this is where I stand," (read: because I have the truth), we should instead say, "If you don't agree with me on this way of seeing things, I'll try to provide you with more justification and not just make the platitudinous claim 'I have the truth.' " Bennington, Jacques Dernda, p. 103. Cited by Rorty in Truth and Progress, p. 331. Rorty states: "I follow Davidson in thinking that 'it is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking that there are representations which engenders thoughts about relativism.'" Richard Rorty, 'Religion as Conversation-stopper,' Commonwealth, 3 (1994), p. 4; citation from Donald Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," in Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. by Michael Krause (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 165-6. Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 39, 41. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 163. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 436. Ibid. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 199. Rorty, "Against Unity," p. 32. Ibid., p. 31. Plantinga, "Postmodernism and Pluralism," p. 426; emphasis his.

154 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357.

358.

359. 360.

361. 362.

After Rorty Ibid. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 185. Ibid., p. 223. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth,p. 94 Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 73. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 156. Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 338. Qualifying matters somewhat, in a footnote in another chapter of his book Plantinga at least recognizes Christians can learn some things from Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx. He just believes the lessons to be had "can be learned at a much more subtle level from, for example, the Bible." Plantinga, Warrant and Christian Belief, p. 136; footnote 4. Cavell warns us of the attempt to avoid our finitude, "that we are mortals, who think and talk as we do because we have read, talked with the people we have talked with. They [foundationalism and the "Cartesian quest"] encourage us to think that philosophy will do for us what we once thought religion might do—take us right outside language, history, and finitude and put us in the presence of the atemporal. They lead the philosopher to think himself so little dependent upon his community that what he says will 'work on people at random, like a ray.'" Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 186; from Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 326. Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 31. See After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), On Transforming Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), Naturalism without Foundations: The Prometheus Lectures (New York: Prometheus Books, 1996), and his most recent book Naturalism and Religion (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001). Kai Nielsen, "Taking Rorty Seriously," Dialogue, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, Summer/Etc 1999, pp. 503-18. Nielsen's most trenchant treatment of traditional Christian thought is found in: Philosophy & Atheism: In Defense of Atheism (New York: Prometheus Books, 1985); Ethics Without God (New York: Prometheus Books, 1990); andGod, Scepticism and Modernity (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989). Many articles could be added to this list of books. As one commentator on Nielsen has rightly pointed out, "Kai Nielsen's writings constitute a major philosophical achievement. They are so numerous and have appeared in such diverse places that some years ago he confessed that even he might not be able to produce a complete list of them. In these wide-ranging books and articles there is hardly a topic in moral philosophy or a major figure in its history that he has not treated perceptively." James Rachels, "Reflections on the Idea of Equality," On the Track of Reason: Essays in Honor of Kai Nielsen, Rodger Beehler, David Copp, and Bela Szabados, eds. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), p. 1. For a good bibliographical listing see this same work.

Rorty, Religious Belief and Ethics 363.

364.

365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370.In

371.

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"I argue that it is not merely the case that there are no sound arguments for the existence of God and that the claims of religious experience give us no good evidential grounds for belief in God but that no such arguments or evidencings could do anything of the sort, for the very concept of God, where 'God' is construed non-anthropomorphically, is incoherent. The problematicity of the concept of God in developed forms of Judaism, Christianity and Islam is so deep that it is irrational for someone to believe in God who is fully aware of the problematicity. There are, of course, anthropomorphic conceptions of God— Zeus-like conceptions of God—that are coherent, but, while being coherent, it is little more than a superstition to believe that such a God exists." Nielsen, God, Scepticism and Modernity, p. 2. Nielsen, God, Scepticism and Modernity, p. 25. This has interesting comparison to Pannenberg's view that theology "has to learn that after Feuerbach it can no longer mouth the word 'God' without offering any explanation; that it cannot pursue theology 'from above,' as Barth says." Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1983), p. 190. Nielsen, God, Scepticism and Modernity, p. 210. Ibid., p. 111. Nielsen, Philosophy & Atheism, p. 89. Ibid.,p.84. Nielsen, Ethics withoutGod, p. 100. language strikingly similar to Rorty's, Nielsen says: "We do not (or so at least it appears) have anything that counts as a distinctively philosophical knowledge. Neither in its epistemological phrasing nor in its successor logicosemantical phrasing has philosophy been able to cash in on its foundationalist claims." Nielsen, After the Demise of the Tradition, pp. 125—6. Nielsen, "Taking Rorty Seriously," p. 504.

372.Ibid. 373.Ibid. 374.Ibid. 375.Ibid. 376.Nielsen, Philosophy & Atheism, p. 81. 377.Nielsen,God, Scepticism, and Modernity,p. 18. 378.Concerning the concept of "made," in the theistic sense, Nielsen notes that "there is the ancient point that 'to make something' presupposes that there already is something out of which it is made. If it is replied t h a t . . . God is taken to be the final cause and not the efficient cause of the universe and that 'make' here means 'sustain' or 'order,' then it should be noted that this still presupposes something to be sustained or ordered; there is no use for 'ordering or sustaining out of nothing.' " Philosophy & Atheism, p. 86; emphasis his. 379.Nielsen, God, Scepticism and Modernity, p. 18; emphasis his. 380. Ibid. 381. Ibid.

156 382. 383.

384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392.

393.

After Rorty Kai Nielsen and J. P. Moreland, Does God Exist? The Great Debate (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990), p. 51. Antony Flew, as well, has raised this problem of reference. See his God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1966); and The Presumption of Atheism (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976). We may note, at least provisionally, that the question of the reference to the word God has an ancient history. The Old Testament resisted any attempt to provide this referent to God because any attempted referent would have been taken as an instance of idolatry. As Pannenberg notes " 'Holiness' is the Old Testament's word for God's otherness. Yahweh holiness prohibits not only his representation in a cult-image, but absolutely every attempt to compare him with something else." This was even extended to the prohibition of mentioning his personal name. "In every act of naming there is an element of seizing possession (Gen. 2:19), which was supposed to be guarded against in relation to God by the prohibition against misusing his name just as much as by the prohibition against images." Pannenberg cites Isaiah 40:25: "To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One." He notes further that Koch has shown that Deutero-Isaiah "provides a comprehensive basis for the prohibition against images in this repudiation of all comparisons." Pannenberg, Basic Questions of Theology, p. 154. Nielsen, On Transforming Philosophy, p. 176. See especially Part One of this book, "Philosophy as Metaphysics," pp. 19—84. Nielsen, On Transforming Philosophy, p. 148. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid.', emphasis mine. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 138-9; emphasis his. Ibid., pp. 139-40. Ibid., p. 140; emphasis his. If this is a challenge, it seems quite unjustified the theist somehow does the same with the phrase, "The Lord is in the heavens." Whether speaking of a yellow-breasted finch or the Lord, showing how our language corresponds to the obj ect spoken of is a highly questionable demand on the part of the traditional philosopher. Nielsen, On Transforming Philosophy, p. 140. Compare this with Kuipers' description of Rorty's position: "Rorty's critique of metaphysical realism has at least two dimensions: epistemological and ontological. Realism, for Rorty, is the position that accepts the existence of a mind-independent 'world in itself (the ontological dimension), and on that basis considers knowledge as justified and true only when we can show that our statements have immediate, privileged access to this mind-independent reality (the epistemological dimension) . Rorty does not only question whether or not such a description of human knowledge is accurate, but whether it is useful any longer. Because such a detached construal of human knowledge cannot effectively be used in the service of our particular cultural problems, he suggests that we are better

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off to leave such outmoded philosophical concerns behind." Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 26. This holds, as well, for ethics. See, On Transforming Philosophy, pp. 201, 202. Gabriel Vahanian, Dieu anonyme (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1989), p. 20. Translation mine. Nielsen, On Transforming Philosophy, p. 148.

4 Rorty and the Transformation of Theology

"The theologian who is not a realist (and who could never become a realist) .. . uses realism and becomes a positivist to the positivists, a pragmatist to the pragmatists, and a tragic interpreter of life to the tragic interpreters of life." Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations It is hoped this chapter fits into a logical progression. This book is primarily concerned with the relevancy Rorty's view has for religious belief. To get to that point, we needed to first get some sense of Rorty's metaphilosophical position, and how, in addition, that view impacts moral theory and action. We then looked at how Rorty, while in his early writings saw little worth in religious belief, has more recently started to think about what place it may have in post-Philosophical society. We tried to argue this change of heart is at least consistent with the deep questions he has voiced about the philosophical tradition. Religious belief is not necessary in post-Philosophical culture, but it cannot, on the other hand, be discounted out of hand. And it is here where we thought it worthwhile to explore this further with two dissimilar thinkers, Alvin Plantinga and Kai Nielsen. We noted what makes their respective analysis of Rorty interesting is how his view compares and contrasts with their own religious views. Plantinga, a well-known Christian philosopher, instead of welcoming Rorty's view as an opportunity to open the gates of the Kingdom wider, thinks it is a direct (though unsuccessful) attempt to knock down some of the main pillars of Christian belief and doctrine. And then there's Kai Nielsen. Nielsen, an oldschool atheist, has spent most of his academic career writing about what he sees, philosophically, as the incoherency of religious belief. Recently turning his attention to Rorty's work, Nielsen thinks Rorty should be taken more seriously by contemporary philosophers, all the while not taking notice of how this acceptance is incompatible with the critique he has vigorously launched against religion. This leads us into the present chapter. To some extent, it is a natural extension of the chapter on the philosophy of religion, though it is a more narrow study, focusing on theological matters. We want to see what possibilities are open for theological investigation. Even here Rorty's analysis has an important role, setting out a helpful conceptual framework in the distinction made

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between systematic philosophy and edifying philosophy. Appropriated into the theological context, the distinction is between systematic theology and edifying theology. Using this distinction in theological matters is useful for a couple of reasons. First, philosophy and theology have historically shared common interests for how their pursuits should be engaged, whether in their confidence that Truth can be discovered, or the cover over Reality can somehow be peeled back. Although systematic philosophers and systematic theologians may find themselves in conflict with each other over what constitutes the truth of the matter when it comes to describing the fabric of reality, both are nevertheless interested in such descriptions. Similarly, there is a close comparison between what edifying philosophy wants to do, as a pared-down version of philosophy, and what edifying theology wants to do as a pared-down version of theology. Both wish to travel metaphysically light. Both want to have, as their main goal, the increasing of solidarity—in general, addressing the problems of society. Edifying theology is not a new theoretical invention. Critics of this pareddown version of theology have it backwards. Edifying theology is not trying to impose on theological thought some sort of glib, postmodern, fashionable way of understanding religious belief. To the contrary, edifying theology was the main concern for New Testament thinkers. The more robust, theological musings that speak of metaphysics and heavy ontological concepts are concerns that have drifted over the centuries into theology from systematic philosophy. In other words, edifying theology is closer to the heart of the New Testament than systematic theology. In this chapter we want to show how edifying theology was quickly overtaken by systematic theology. We do this in the hope that edifying theology can regain its importance as an earnest attempt to enact main biblical themes of social and political justice. Before we do this, however, we need to first show, in the first few sections of this chapter, how Christian theology was quickly saturated with the questions of systematic philosophy, and how theology continued in this saturation, largely uncontested for almost 2,000 years. While there had always been theologians trying to voice their opposition to being assimilated by first philosophy's obsessions, their objections were largely ignored. Jumping into the contemporary scene, one advocate for making this break from first philosophy, in a theological context, is the Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo. Among other important subjects he has written about over the years, Vattimo has now taken up Rorty's metaphilosophical language, restarting the investigation of how theological language may be plotted without heavy use of metaphysics and epistemology. A recent book has accomplished even more, bringing together Rorty and Vattimo in conversation to see how this may be preliminarily charted. We will first consider Vattimo's article, then, finishing our study, we will see how Rorty has come

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to see that religious belief has a legitimate part in post-Philosophical society. Not unlike its brightest moments in history, conceived rightly, religious belief can serve in the process of reducing human misery and, at the same time, increase human nourishing.

Appropriating Rorty: Systematic Theology and Edifying Theology

In an early book of essays Rorty described a fairly pessimistic view of religious belief. "I should like", he said, "to replace both religious and philosophical accounts of a suprahistorical ground or an end-of-history convergence with a historical narrative about the rise of liberal institutions and customs—the institutions and customs which were designed to diminish cruelty, make possible government by the consent of the governed, and permit as much domination-free communication as possible to take place." While at this time Rorty had in mind more philosophically robust accounts of religious belief, it has been, overall, a fairly consistent, gloomy view of religion. Yet, as we have seen, Rorty has more recently been willing to allow for religious belief, albeit within certain parameters, notably within his private/ public distinction. Set out this way the demise of philosophy does not necessarily exclude religious belief. Rorty's vision of society turns out to be quite atheological. Perhaps Kai Nielsen says it best where he notes the "perspicuity (perhaps the genius) and sanity of Rorty is to show something of what it should be like for us unalienated pragmatists, if you will, to live without shallowness, evasion, or inauthenticity in a world that no longer concerns itself with metaphysical questions and the other traditional questions of philosophy." This view, argued in this chapter, is perfectly compatible with edifying theology. Philosophy has been transformed. Because of the close relationship theology has shared with philosophy over the centuries this transformation will affect theological thinking to the point where theology must likewise be altered. It has no less an obligation than philosophy to speak to contemporary culture in language that can be understood. It needs to provide a meaningful description of our condition, and by doing so, offer a means to increase personal liberties and to achieve greater social tolerance. Rorty's distinction of systematic and edifying philosophies was described in Chapter 2. As we saw, systematic philosophy is the traditional way philosophy has been largely carried out throughout the centuries, with its major interests in metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology on the forefront of inquiry. Edifying philosophy, in contrast, travels philosophically light as it addresses the "concrete problems of society." One of the most important recognitions

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Rorty has made is that the demise of traditional philosophy does not spell the end of intellectual inquiry. This pared-down version of philosophy remains sufficiently equipped for addressing, even resolving social and political problems. Similarly, it's useful to draw the same comparison in theology between systematic theology and edifying theology. In the appropriation of the adjectives systematic and edifying into the theological context, certain parallels between philosophy and theology become apparent. We begin with the parallel between systematic philosophy and systematic theology. Truth, Reason, Science, and the Eternal Questions Throughout the centuries theologians have continually debated with philosophers about the importance and role of philosophy in theological matters. While many theologians demurred, most were convinced theology and philosophy shared at least some important goals, such as investigating to what extent knowledge could be established, and if that knowledge could be placed on an epistemic foundation. Two other issues can be added: the eternity of the world and the immortality of the soul. Etienne Gilson gives us a good sense of how these disputes played out: Averroes had proved that the world is eternal and that there is no personal immortality. All the Christian theologians protested against his conclusions and attacked his demonstrations, but not all in the same way. St. Bonaventura attempted to prove by philosophical arguments that the world is not eternal and that the soul of each man is immortal. St. Thomas Aquinas was of the opinion that Averroes had failed to prove the eternity of the world, but that St. Bonaventura had also failed to prove that the world is not eternal; in short, philosophy cannot prove anything on that point, but it can prove the immortality of the soul. Duns Scotus' position was that neither the creation of the world in time, nor the immortality of the soul could be proved by theologians. As to Ockham himself, he was willing to hold such conclusions as philosophical probabilities, but not as conclusively proved truths; to which he added that what cannot be proved by philosophy can still less be proved by theology, where certitude is not grounded on reason, but on faith .. . The result of that state of things was a widespread feeling that theology could not afford to ignore philosophy, but should not trust it.4 Similar to systematic philosophers, systematic theologians are also truthseekers. For the theologians, however, it is not only the correspondence between beliefs and the objective reality which is hoped for. Truth is ratcheted to the next level where this reality, if truly gained, is an obtaining of God's

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Truth. "Truth, therefore, was also conceived as having a kind of objectivity, or overagainstness; it was a quality or attribute or possession of (the objectively existing) God. The human mind had to conform itself to this objective reality of God's truth if it was to avoid falling into error." Despite the extraqualifier of "God's truth" at stake for systematic theologians, there is a shared goal with systematic philosophers—the attempt to reproduce the true picture of reality. The traditional understanding of reason plays an important part in this quest for representation by systematic theologians. Reason, at least as guided by the light of scripture, will yield insight into the earthly and heavenly realms. Kaufman explains: This whole scheme was consistent in itself; and it was the basis for a coherent conception of the theological task, one that has in fact been operative through most of Western history. The theologian's task consisted, on the one hand, of setting out clearly and fully this schema itself, so it would be possible to see just how God, humankind and the world are interrelated and interconnected. On the other hand, the theologian was concerned to show how and why this schema is true, i.e., is an accurate reflection of God's Truth, either as God has himself revealed that truth to men and women (e.g., in the Bible) or as we have come to know that truth in some other way (through intuition or experience). There were, of course, great disagreements about details of all these matters, and splits between Augustinians and Pelagians, Catholics and Protestants, high churchmen, low churchmen, mystics and biblicists, and others, proliferated. But nearly all accepted the basic schema which elaborated a conception of God, and of God's Truth, as having independence and objectivity over against humanity. While a highly speculative and metaphysical activity, systematic theologians, just like systematic philosophers, buttress their claims by being highly attentive to scientific investigation and the scientific method. As John Peacocke describes it, "The linking of the projects of metaphysics, theology and philosophy is meant to show that they are appropriated to the rational. In the rationality of their rational pronouncements they are firmly wedded to the sciences." There is a peculiar disposition that lends itself to this sort of inquiry: "each of these sciences [psychology or biology] has its own object, a reality existing over against and independently of the investigator, a reality to be perceived, studied, analyzed, theorized about, understood." Kaufman elaborates how this compares to theological thought: The student of life has many examples—trees, dogs, birds, human beings— which can be examined; the student of the psyche has not only his or her own

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experience as object for reflection but also observations of the other persons round about. Likewise the theologian: though the object of inquiry here is not so directly evident and available, it too may be thought of as in some sense there, over against the theologian as an object of knowledge; as real as—actually, much more real than—any of the objects open to direct ,• 9 perception. As a result, just like systematic philosophy, systematic theology tried to ride the success granted in the sciences into the theological domain. For systematic theology, science and theology served intersecting interests. What is known in science, theology confirms. What is known in theology, science confirms. There was no real contradiction between the two, as properly interpreted. 10 Systematic Philosophy—Dewey's Description In a thread passing through Hegel, Spinoza, Aquinas, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, and Aristotle—reaching at least as far back to Plato—it's possible to show the influences on theology.Deweyhimself saw it. All taught that, "Ultimate Reality is either perfectly Ideal and Rational in nature, or else has absolute ideality and rationality as its necessary attribute." From this came the great "systematic philosophies."In an important article on Heidegger, Peacocke discusses this transition in a passage worth quoting at length: When philosophy donned its garb of respectability—the argument, this gave rise to the spectacle of the contest; "thinking" became "philosophy" and philosophy was about battle and war, winners and losers. The "lovers of wisdom" were those who joyfully did battle with irrationalism and ignorance to proclaim the "truth" of reason. "Thinking" which did not cover the nakedness of its insight with the proffered cloak of respectability was consigned to the depths of irrationalism and exiled from the respectable precincts of philosophy. The "thinking" which was exiled from philosophy was to be encountered only in poetry, literature, art and, we might venture, mysticism and the religious. The whispered insights gained in such diverse fields, were never to be deemed worthy of the name "philosophy"; and never were the figures from these realms to be hallowed with the name "philosopher." Contrary to poets and moralists who accepted the transitory nature of human existence, systematic philosophers "defined perfect Ideality in conceptions that express the opposite of those things which make life unsatisfactory and troublesome."Dewey went on to give some important examples of this thinking:

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Wherever there is change, there is instability, and instability is proof of something the matter, of absence, deficiency, incompleteness. These are the ideas common to the connection between change, becoming and perishing, and Non-Being, finitude and imperfection. Hence complete and true Reality must be changeless, unalterable, so full of Being that it always and forever maintains itself in fixed rest and repose. As Bradley, the most dialectically ingenious Absolutist of our own day, expresses the doctrine "Nothing that is perfectly real moves." And while Plato took, comparatively speaking, a pessimistic view of change as mere lapse and Aristotle a complacent view of it as tendency to realization, yet Aristotle doubted no more than Plato that the fully realized reality, the divine and ultimate, is changeless. Though it is called Activity or Energy, the Activity knew no change, the Energy did nothing. As a result, "to know the world" takes on a particular sense. "To know it means to neglect its flux and alteration and discover some permanent form which limits processes that alter in time." Dewey saw Aristotle as an important exponent of this view in philosophy: The highest degree is attained in knowing ultimate Ideal Being, pure Mind. This is Ideal, the Form of Forms, because it has no lacks, no needs, and experiences no change or variety. It has no desires because in it all desires are consummated. Since it is perfect Being, it is perfect Mind and perfect Bliss;—the acme of rationality and ideality. One point more and the argument is completed. The kind of knowing that concerns itself with this ultimate reality (which is also ultimate ideality) is philosophy. The similarity between Rorty's and Dewey's descriptions of systematic philosophy is evident here. Dewey states: Philosophy is therefore the last and highest term in pure contemplation. Whatever may be said for any other kind of knowledge, philosophy is self-enclosed. It has nothing to do beyond itself; it has no aim or purpose or function—except to be philosophy—that is, pure, self-sufficing beholding of ultimate reality. Philosophy, as the desire to behold ultimate reality, had a particular view of learning, and it resonates with our discussion of values education: But the function of study and learning of philosophy is, as Plato put it, to convert the eye of the soul from dwelling contentedly upon the images of things, upon the inferior realities that are born and that decay, and to lead

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it to the intuition of supernatural and eternal Being. Thus the mind of the knower is transformed. It becomes assimilated to what it knows. There is a moral to this story, one that Rorty has been very clear about. Trying to achieve solidarity with one's community in the here and now, in this humble existence of dirt, air, and contingency—all of it was placed aside by systematic philosophers who were drawn to the realm of "the really real." As Bradley put it: All of us, I presume, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not felt this, however differently he might describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And, wherever it has been strongly felt, it has been its own justification. This sets the stage for appreciating systematic philosophy's influence on theology, and, as a matter of course, its evolution as "systematic theology." The Influence of Systematic Philosophy on Theology Systematic philosophy was quickly assimilated into Christian thought by theologians. As Heidegger believed, "Western metaphysics... since its beginning with the Greeks has eminently been both ontology and theology."This is the crux of our argument, long set out by Dewey: Through a variety of channels, especially Neo-Platonism and St. Augustine, these ideas found their way into Christian theology; and great scholastic thinkers taught that the end of man is to know True Being, that knowledge is completive, that True Being is pure Immaterial Mind, and to know it is Bliss and Salvation. While this knowledge cannot be achieved in this stage of life nor without supernatural aid, yet so far it is accomplished it assimilates the human mind to the divine essence and so constitutes salvation. Through this taking over of the conception of knowledge as Contemplative into the dominant religion of Europe, multitudes were affected who were totally innocent of theoretical philosophy. Understandably, this view might be dismissed because Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Dewey, are suspect commentators. It is therefore important to

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note these views are far from idiosyncratic. Etienne Gilson, having never been accused of dramatic exaggeration, wrote that: [T]he perfect type of rational knowledge was the philosophy of Plato, as revised and brought up to date by Plotinus. Consequently, given his own idea of what rational knowledge is, the whole philosophical activity of Saint Augustine had to be a rational interpretation of the Christian Revelation, in terms of platonic philosophy .. . when all is said, it still must be maintained that the net result of Augustine's philosophical speculation was to achieve a platonic understanding of Christian revelation. Bringing nuance to Gilson, another staid commentator has argued: Paul was a missionary who taught a religious mystery, while Augustine had a philosophical bent, with a real metaphysical interest. In any such mind the primary interest is always the nature of the real. Thus Augustine belongs, in this respect at least, to the same tradition as Plato and Aristotle and Democritus, but with the important difference that, while their interest in the nature of reality was mainly secular, his was primarily religious .. . What he found, therefore, was naturally a different kind of reality from theirs. This philosophical bent continued to have its sway on Christian thinkers: Bacon's conviction of the quarrelsome, self-displaying character of the scholarship which had come down from antiquity was of course not so much due to Greek science itself as to the degenerate heritage of scholasticism in the fourteenth century, when philosophy had fallen into the hands of disputatious theologians, full of hair-splitting argumentativeness and quirks and tricks by which to win victory over somebody else. By the Middle Ages, as Gilson notes further, "practically all the philosophers were monks, priests, or at least simple clerics." After centuries of reinforced interpretation, solidified into intellectual history, there were dramatic consequences for Christian theology, not the least of which was with the understanding of God. Altizer explains: Once having absorbed a Greek metaphysical idea of God as an eternal and unmoving Being, and having refused Paul's proclamation of faith as freedom from a moral law and a priestly cultus, Christian theology found its ground in the God who alone is God, the awesome Creator and the distant Lord. No way lay from this transcendent and wholly other God to the Incarnation, the act of the Word's becoming flesh, apart from a transformation of the Incarnate Word into an eternal Logos and a mysterious Lord.

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The influence of systematic philosophy on theology was not one way. Once systematic theology took on a life of its own, a symbiotic relationship between philosophy and theology was put in place. Thus Gilson's note above how philosophers were, at the same time, well-entrenched members of the religious community. Gilson again explains: Christian philosophy arose at the juncture of Greek philosophy and of the Jewish-Christian religious revelation, Greek philosophy providing the technique for a rational explanation of the world, and the Jewish-Christian revelation providing religious beliefs of incalculable philosophical import. What is perhaps the key to the whole history of Christian philosophy and, in so far as modern philosophy bears the mark of Christian thought, to the history of modern philosophy itself, is precisely thefact that,from the second century A.D. on, men have had to use a Greek philosophical technique in order to express ideas that had never entered the head of any Greek philosopher. Five examples which exhibit this relationship between theology and philosophy are Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Pascal. Known best for the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, Anselm thought he had been able to show, by logic alone, that a rational understanding of the Christian faith could be established. Gilson argues such methodology had dire consequences for Christian theology: Once a Christian thinker gets to this point, nothing could prevent him from applying the same method to each of the Christian dogmas. And indeed Anselm of Canterbury, as well as his immediate disciples, remain famous in the history of theology for their recklessness in giving rational demonstrations to all revealed truths. To limit ourselves to Anselm himself, we find him proving, by conclusive dialectical arguments, not only the Trinity of the Divine Persons, as he did in both his Monologium and his Proslogium, but even the very Incarnation of Christ, including all its essential modalities, as he did in his Cur Deushomo. Aquinas, though "not a pupil of Moses, but of Aristotle,"ne verthelesssaw this as a dangerous tension between philosophy and theology. Again, as Gilson notes: Himself a theologian, St. Thomas had asked the professors of theology never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the word of God, and if you try to prove it, you destroy it. He had likewise asked the professors of philosophy never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the word of God, and if you try to prove it, you destroy it. In other words,

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theology is the science of those things which are received by faith from divine revelation, and philosophy is the knowledge of those things which flow from the principles of natural reason. Since their common source is God, the creator of both reason and revelation, these two sciences are bound ultimately to agree; but if you really want them to agree, you must first be careful not to forget their essential difference. Perhaps the most dramatic reaction to philosophy dictating theology's work was that of Martin Luther. Accusing Scholastics of trying to peek into God's bedroom, Luther criticized the philosopher's perceived powers of reason as "the Devil's Whore"—an attempt on the part of raw reason to grant more knowledge than God himself would permit. 33 Soren Kierkegaard, while more of a philosopher than a theologian, may nevertheless be placed on the other side of Luther, moving even further away from theologians like Aquinas (who, comparable to Kierkegaard, also had much to say about theology and philosophy). Suspicious of system builders (primarily Hegel ) and any coziness between faith and reason, Kierkegaard was a formidable opponent of the systematic theologian. His dictum, "it is absurd, therefore I believe," was, and continues to be, vexing for the theological and philosophical communities who still take dualisms of this sort seriously. An intellectual who tried to soothe the tensions between theology, philosophy, faith, and reason was Blaise Pascal. For him, there was no hostility between faith and reason. If doubt lingered, the infamous leap of faith could resolve the doubt that reason provoked. If, before the leap, the skeptic insists on asking "if he can have a peep and see how the game will turn out,"the needed answer, says Pascal, is not a final proof for the existence of God. What the skeptic rather requires is a change in those passions that prevent belief: You would fain reach faith, but you know not the way? You would cure yourself of unbelief, and you ask for a remedy? Take a lesson from those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all they possess. These are they who know the road you would follow, who are cured of a disease of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began, that is by making believe that they believed, by taking holy water, by hearing mass, etc. This will quite naturally bring you to believe, and will calm you .. . will stupefy you. "But this is what I fear." Pray why? What have you to lose? Despite attempts by Pascal to placate matters, as if the relationship between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, did not bring enough conflict, the increasing autonomy of modern science exacerbated their respective concerns.

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The Beginnings of Edifying Theology Just as there are peripheral philosophers who stand outside the traditional view of the philosophical task, so there are theologians who are on the periphery of the theological discipline. These theologians think systematic theology fails because it is rooted in a history no longer relevant: We can sense the estrangement of the contemporary Christian from his own theological heritage by simply noting the inability of all traditional forms of theology to speak in the presence of our history. As the historical world of Christendom sinks ever more deeply into the darkness of an irrecoverable past, theology is faced with the choice either of relapsing into a dead and archaic language or of evolving a whole new form of speech. These theologians have recognized that the failure of systematic philosophy need not bring an end to all theological work. Altizer believed this "evolving" was to be carried out by theology conceived as radical theology. For my purposes, this theological twist is better described as edifying theology. Similar to edifying philosophers, edifying theologians do not assert that the truthfulness of their beliefs is established through showing how those beliefs correspond to reality. They are interested neither in establishing epistemological foundations for theological beliefs, nor in efforts to discover metaphysical truths. Edifying theologians share Wittgenstein's skepticism over these matters: The medium in which the traditional metaphysician works seems to be propositions about the world, theses about reality, the truth of which he seeks to establish by analysis or insight. But in fact, according to Wittgenstein, he manipulates language, or is manipulated by language, to generate myths which answer to deep and ancient needs, at least in our culture. In a theological context, establishing the truthfulness of a proposition is not a matter of showing how scripture represents (or mirrors) nature. Comparable to the edifying philosopher, the emphasis is on language. A Wittgensteinian appropriation into the philosophy of religion is useful here: "Wittgenstein clears away persistent encrustations and allows us to see familiar things as if for the first time. It becomes possible to see how 'wild conjectures and explanations' might be replaced by 'quiet weighing of linguistic facts.' " The edifying theologian sees language in holistic terms. Recognizing the significance of Wittgenstein's discussion of language-games, edifying theologians see beliefs as part of a complex form of discourse. Here is the theological application of Davidson's neo-Wittgensteinian point. Our concepts and words will only have meaning in the context of sentences and thus of a whole language:

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If Wittgenstein is correct in stating that the meaning of a word is its use in language, it also needs to be stated that useis not fixed. Certainly there are ordinary uses of a word, but there can also be extraordinary uses that are important in thinking about thinking. This is especially important when singularities mark the recording surface of thinking. It is the singularity that needs to be thought. Singularities include the knots and intensities in our lives. They remain "other" unless they can be thought. Language, as a tool and not a mirror, bears significant importance for theology's interest in God-talk. Kaufman notes: Theology (theos-logos) is "words" or "speech" about God—"God-talk." All the other terms of the theological vocabulary in one way or another qualify, explain or interpret what is meant by "God," or indicate ways in which God is related to or involved in human experience and the human world. In this sense they are all derivative from or secondary to "God." It should not be supposed, however, that this means they can be logically deduced from the concept of God and that the only real theological problem, therefore, is to get that concept straight. That would be an overly simple and too undialectical way of understanding the matter. For words and concepts are not selfenclosed things which simply are what they are: they interpenetrate each other in many complex ways, qualifying and conditioning each other reciprocally .. . The theological vocabulary is an organic whole and must be studied as such . . . [God, far] from being an independent given from which all other concepts can be deduced, is the most complex and difficult of all concepts, in some ways dependent and conditioned by all others. God is the predominate locution in God-talk. But this is exactly the reason why this word cannot be merely extracted and examined as an object of science. It is interlaced and bound to integral points of human experience. "However central and fundamental to the theological enterprise is the concept (or image) of God, therefore, it cannot be dealt with independently or in isolation from the rest of the theological vocabulary. It gains its meaning precisely through its connections with other terms and ultimately thus with the whole of human experience."Kerr goes on to describe how Wittgenstein himself recontextualized various words and concepts in the theological language game: It is not difficult to find other instances of how Wittgenstein, without ever revealing his own religious commitment, offered illuminating descriptions of how key words in theological discourse are actually used ... He invited us to regard "the face as the soul of the body" (1980:23). Christianity, he

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reminded us, is not "a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life" (1980:28). He invited us to consider predestination as "less a theory than a sigh, or a cry'' (1980: 30). He drew attention, in a very remarkable passage composed in 1937, to the conceptual connections between belief in the resurrection of Christ and love (1980: 33), a passage headed by a pretty clear declaration of his personal lack of faith. This is not to say, however, faith is synonymous with language. Although faith uses language as an instrument, faith cannot ultimately be reduced to language: . .. il n'y a pas de langage propre a la foi. La foi ne fait pas 1'object d'un Iangage qui, parce qu'il en serait 1'instrument, lui serait a la limite superflu. Dans ce cas, le langage ne servirait qu'a de-signer la. foi tout en I'as-assignant a tel ou tel domaine de la vie, a telle ou telle dimension de 1'exercice personnel ou social de la realite humaine. II serait 1'instrument de la foi, une foi qu'on pourrait alors prendre comme ceci ou comme cela et qu'en derniere analyse on pourrait se dispenser de comprendre. Au contraire, c'est la foi qui est 1'instrument du langage, un langage qui, par consequent, prend et, du meme coup, se comprend. Theology, as performed by edifying theologians, will undergo a certain transformation. Particular issues, while important for systematic theology, will lose their significance. Abandoning metaphysical and epistemological problems, there will be no desire to show whether atheism or theism better represents the world. Edifying theologians and philosophers of religion, like Rorty's edifying philosophers, see the task as how one can better cope with the world, to address the problems of society. Edifying theologians aspire to speak in a way contemporary culture can understand. "Christianity, while it has contributed much to Western culture, is now unable to speak to it, nor can it profit from the crises of conscience through which modern man gropes for his soul." Certainly, in the United States in particular, Christianity permeates all sectors of society. This permeation, in the eyes of many Christian conservatives, is a sign of its spiritual success. But it is more a mimicking of popular culture, an assimilation that assumes its "human, all too human" assumptions: from the adoption of all forms of media entertainment, the creation of its own amusement parks, to the regular appearances of its popular characters on Larry King Live. Its attempt to "become all things to all people" has resulted in the dissolution of its integrity. Instead of being a means to evaluate, critically understand and engage in culture, much of contemporary Christianity only mirrors culture's

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rapidly changing and impetuous fascinations. Certainly Christians also consider their role in society as a preserving effect—as "salt"—but sadly this has been reduced by the Christian Right to idiosyncratic "values" shoved in the face of "secular" America—the worst of which has gone to support a President who's insistence and declaration of war has shown decreasing legitimacy. In contrast to simply mirroring cultural fascinations, theology, laboring to sustain its status of relevance and comprehension in modern society, has to be in continual process of transformation. The transformation is symbiotic. Theology must be capable of speaking in a language of critical relevancy. And while not merely mirroring society's tendencies, theology must also be capable of listening to its interests and problems. This is the task of the "new theologian": From the perspective of the theology of our century, the strangest thing about this new theologian is his conviction that faith should be meaningful and meaningful in the context of our world. Indeed, the very conviction that faith is eternally given or wholly autonomous is forcefully being challenged. Having come to the realization that Christian theology cannot survive apart from a dialogue with the world, it is increasingly being recognized that dialogue is a mutual encounter: faith cannot speak to the world unless it is prepared to be affected by that world with which it speaks. This reflects the sort of lightweight engagement we described above in the context of religious believers discussing their views with an interested party— insofar as long as those beliefs are not lobbed into the public square as social policies to be accepted prima facie. This is what edifying philosophers and theologians look for: " 'Edification' stands for the general project of finding better ways of describing ourselves or, to be more dramatic, 'remaking ourselves', 'as we read more, talk more and write more.' " This can be described as epistemologically-light dialogical explanation, weak justification, or Tillich's "understandability." Baudrillard describes this process as similar to a move in a kind of game, but one of playfulness, not the kind of high-stakes Socratic gamesmanship of the tough-minded, philosophical sort: [It is] a game of appearances (as between potential lovers) in which each player seeks to lure the other into the mirror of their own desire, and, in so doing, challenges the other to defer that expression through a counterchallenge of their own. The practice of seduction, so conceived, is neither unilateral nor, despite its libidinous alibi, motivated by desire at all. It is not even, in religious context, motivated by such a desire as underlies Pascal's existentially drivenyoz.

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This is a game that is taken seriously, as most games are. There are challenges and counter-challenges, but, keeping the metaphor of seduction, a healthy and mature seducer knows the limits of the engagement. Converting the other to be loved is not the end purpose in the interaction. There is, just as there should be in religious conversation with the wider society, the ability to take "no" for an answer. Tillich's emphasis to avoid obscure and cryptic descriptions, and our own notion of lightweight justification, is necessary because of how religious language can become a powerful tool of manipulation and destruction. Here is a Wittgensteinian application into the philosophy of religion: Thus, rather than a systematic exposition of metaphysical principles, work in philosophy becomes "a battle", as Wittgenstein will say .. . "against the bewitchment of our intelligence (Ver stand] by the devices of our language (durch die Mittel unserer Sprache]".

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Being mindful of this danger, the need to speak of our private beliefs, especially as edifying theologians, is because of how religious beliefs cannot but help permeate world views. As Tillich states elsewhere: If religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, this state cannot be restricted to a special realm. The unconditional character of this concern implies that it refers to every moment of our life to every space and every realm. The universe is God's sanctuary. Every workday is a day of the Lord, every supper a Lord's supper, every work the fulfillment of a divine task, every joy a joy in God. In all preliminary concerns, ultimate concern is present, consecrating them. Essentially the religious and the secular are 51 not separated items. Rather they are within each other. Although Rorty would find this description by Tillich a little too heady, Winquist puts the matter slightly different, if not more poetically: Since theologians do not have a proper place in the dominant culture they, like other marginalized consumers, must rent their space. They must insinuate their differences into the dominant text. Theological strategies are efficacious to the extent that they can be tactically insinuated into existing textual practices. Tactics exploit the discursive and nondiscursive spacing in the dominant discourse ... It is because theology does not have a proper place of its own in the dominant secular culture that it must value and affirm its identity as a marginal and interstitial reality. That is, theology inhabits the edges and cracks of the dominant culture. It is a nomad discipline wandering, wondering, and erring.52

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During this wandering, edifying theology or the philosophy of religion will have to raise issues pertinent for social concern. Investigation and inquiry should be done in conversation with other disciplines, a process that extols eclecticism. "Among other things," Vahanian has observed, "theology will have to enter the fields of, e.g., literature, politics, and economics, if it wants to tackle the chief problem of our age, namely, the problem of God. Otherwise, it will merely engage in the business of updating the Church. And that is not the position to take, especially if being the Church means also being the avantgarde of society; the axis of culture."53 Edifying Theology As " Theology Light" My understanding of edifying theology (finding help in the writings of theologians such as Barth, Bultmann, Kaufman, Tillich, Vahanian, and Winquist) seeks to communicate to contemporary society in a meaningful manner. Edifying theologians, similar to edifying philosophers, see their work as therapy. But this therapy is not passive. It is both dynamic and iconoclastic. This is the only means by which therapy gives way to actual change. Their task is not to provide security within a system of beliefs. It is rather to question the very use and justification of the terms embedded in its discourse. Theological therapy, then, does not seek to offer simple answers. As Wittgenstein recognized with nontheological therapy (but as well applicable for theological therapy), its danger lies in the fact that it often raises more problems than it solves.54 In any case, it isn't a fashionable, new way of putting the matter. As one commentator put the issue over 40 years ago: "The purpose of religious knowledge is ... therapeutic. All construction of religious theories ought to be controlled 55 by the desire to heal." Edifying theology has aims radically different from systematic theology. Edifying theology loses interest in correspondence theories of representation, robust theories of truth and descriptions of reality. It admits it has no privileged epistemological vantage-point over culture, moral strategies and beliefs. Transforming theology, similar to other periods of theological upheaval, will be regarded by some as unforgivable heresy. The ecclesiastical institutions that Rorty spoke of, deprived of "a little religiosity," will surely find this loss too much. Just as first philosophy, once transformed, remains a viable discipline of research and inquiry, post-Philosophical theology, likewise transformed, becomes a discourse and investigation that tries to nudge out for itself cultural space. After the failure of systematic philosophy, just as philosophy took on a new set of objectives, so theology is free (if not obligated) to do the same. The task is to deal anew with how theology is to be envisioned and the issues with which it must grapple. Rorty, in his distinction between systematic philosophy

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and edifying philosophy, has perhaps offered theology the conceptual groundwork necessary for its reinvention. Just as philosophy must give up its pretense for believing it must represent the world in some deeply true sense, so must theology. Just as philosophy must give up all pretense thinking it has a privileged point over culture, a corner on the Truth so to speak, so must theology. The consequence for theology is that it becomes one voice among others. This need not be regarded as undesirable. No longer will people be lured or coerced into religion because of enticing claims to truth. No longer will people be tempted by claims which offer privileged vantage-points over one's culture, one's society or one's neighbor. Once philosophy turns its attention to what Dewey described as the problems of humanity, a certain degree of liberty for society follows. It is a sense of liberty that will, in part, be ethical. Rorty's subjects for social ethics and justice are appropriate for edifying theologians: One will talk about the problem of evil, the stultifying effect of a religious culture upon intellectual life, the danger of theocracy, the potentiality for anarchy in a secularist culture, the Brave Mew World consequences of a utilitarian, secular morality. One will contrast the lives of one's secularist and of one's religious friends and acquaintances. 57 This is as fitting in the theological context as it is for the philosophical context. Edifying theology provokes believers to question their motives for holding to their particular religious beliefs, and to enter into a dialogue with the rest of society concerning pertinent and vexing questions. So edifying theologians ask the questions posed by Rorty: "What are the limits of our community? Are the encounters sufficiently free and open? Has what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders who are suffering? To outsiders who have new ideas?" As Rorty rightly notes, these are political rather than metaphysical or epistemological questions. They are, as well, ethical issues. As a consequence, they are of concern for all members of society, theologians not excluded. Edifying theologians should see themselves entrenched in the attempt to respond to the problems of society for their generation. It is an effort that demands eclecticism—a selection from whatever conceptual tools will aid in the resolution. Kaufman, for example, describes the theologian as an "artist": "In painting his or her picture of the whole, the theological artist must draw on wide ranges and types of experience, showing how each is grasped in the integrating vision and what each means, for the 'whole' is nothing, an empty abstraction, apart from the parts that make it up." Anticipating edifying theology's ethical interests, Kaufman notes, in language similar to Rorty, the human concerns of its activity:

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[This picture] which results dare not be highly idiosyncratic or "subjective"; it must be recognizably of our world, our life, our experience. It will have to find place for the terrors and joys, the triumphs and failures, the striving and the repose, the loves and hatreds of actual human life. It will have to do justice to the complexity of political and economic institutional structures in an industrial society, as well as to the intimacy of personal communion; it will have to deal with and be relevant to problems of conservation of the environment on this planet as well as personal crises of despair and meaninglessness.60 In fine, "No important dimension of experience can be omitted from the theologian's concern and interest and interpretation, and he or she must exert every effort to root out one-sidedness, prejudice and bias." Faith actively engages in the problems that confront society either on an individual or global level. It must, or it fails to remain faith: [T]he Christian can only participate in the suffering and broken body of the humanity of our time by freely sharing the depths of its anguish and despair, not with the self-conscious realization that his participation is vicarious, but rather the certainty that there is no true suffering which is foreign to faith.62 The problems of society become an important area of concern for edifying philosophers and edifying theologians alike. The process of social change is a dialogue in process. It begins with one's community and then extends intersubjective agreement as far as possible—"to extend the reference of'us' as far as we can." Those who do this in the philosophical discipline are pragmatists. Or, with "the philosophical community, they are best known as holists," a sense perfectly applicable to theology. Edifying theologians, rejecting both grand metaphysical narratives and attempts to provide epistemological foundations, agree with William James' definition of truth as being "what is good for us to believe." The questions that come up will be scrutinized by asking: "What forms of human life do these conceptions facilitate? Which forms inhibit? What possibilities do they open up for men and women? Which do they close off?" The similarity between edifying theology and edifying philosophy is important to see here. Yet edifying theology is not limited to the same subject-matter as edifying philosophy. Certainly the edifying theologian is very interested in promoting dialogue, solidarity, and tolerance within the society. But if this were the extent to which the edifying theologian was engaged, this activity would be merely edifying philosophy. Pace Rorty, the theologian Winquist believes theology still has something in addition to say to secular society:

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It would appear that in the shallowness of secular culture there are singularities that this culture has not been able to think—that is why we have raised the question of whether we need to think theologically even in a secular culture. Is there anything special on the surfaces or in the mechanics of theological text production that are differential possibilities for thickening the meaning of secular lives? Has the silencing of theology diminished the capacity for living? This is not a meaningless question for those who are restless with their sense of boredom or emptiness. 67 Maintaining that theology still speaks to secular society, edifying theologians (unlike edifying philosophers) are interested in the nuances of language that are religious. This language, even in post-Philosophical culture, need not be expunged by the enthusiastic Rortyan. Edifying theologians, working within their private pursuits, nevertheless have a task "of constructing a meaningful and humane world . . . [It] is in part the task of articulating and explicating a world already in certain respects denned in and by the culture in its religious traditions, its (conscious and unconscious) myths, its rituals and taboos, its linguistic classifications; that is, it is always based on the prior human constructive activity which produced and shaped the culture." 68 Edifying theologians analyze these terms and concepts in order to provide greater understanding through reflection, criticism, and interpretation. This will, it is believed, give way to "refinement or reconstruction of their meaning and use." It is not a covert attempt to convert the "religiously unmusical." Kaufman further explains what edifying theologians could also take as integral to their investigations: Theology is the disciplined effort to see what we are trying to do and say with these complexes of meaning so as to enable us to say and do them better—more accurately, more precisely, more effectively. In this sense, as Ludwig Wittgenstein has put it, "Theology [is] grammar" . .. Theology also, as grammar, not only attempts to describe how men and women in fact talk about God; it searches out the rules governing the use of such talk so that it will be possible to see more clearly just what that talk is intending to express. Thus, theological analysis aims to distinguish better from worse forms of expression and seeks to define adequate or proper speech about God.70 The multifaceted task for edifying theologians, just like Rorty'spragmatists, is one that will endeavor to better understand and bring greater coherence to their language, with its particular words, terms and concepts. But it also must address critical social issues. Again in line with Rorty's pragmatists: "Theology must now be conceived not simply as the imaginative constructive work of individual minds addressing the theological problems they confront: it

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becomes, rather, a wide-ranging conversation among many voices, all involved in imaginative construction but representing significantly diverse standpoints in our thoroughly pluralistic world." 71

Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo:

The Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered When Richard Rorty spoke about religious belief in his earlier philosophical writings it was usually in a diminutive tone. As he more closely considered religious belief in later articles, such as those reviewed in this book, Rorty showed a clear development in thought. Still in transition it forms a strong basis for what could be a philosophy of religion. Yet even at that point in development, it still was not clear Rorty had fully realized how his metaphilosophical view—as a pragmatist, anti-essentialist, anti-representationalist, and antifoundationalist—could play-out for religious belief. In his typically prodding, yet breezy style of analysis, Rorty has begun to think quite carefully about this matter of religious belief. Some of this has been done in collaboration with a philosopher who has come to reconsider theological matters himself: the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. This interaction, one that hopefully is just the beginning of further collaborative dialogues, has been put together in a book edited by Santiago Zabala.72 Published in 2005, this is an important book that, in light of our own study, merits attention. Zabala's edited work brings together three articles, one by Rorty and the other by Vattimo, with a last in dialogue form between all three, "What Is Religion's Future After Metaphysics?" 73 After an introductory chapter by Zabala, "A Religion Without Theists or Atheists," 74 Rorty's "Anticlericalism and Atheism" follows. Seeing how our own study has sought to explore the implications Rorty's thought has for the philosophy of religion and ethics, we need to closely see how Rorty's thoughts on religious belief have most recently developed, and how they relate to what he has said as appraised in our own study. But we begin with Gianni Vattimo's article, as it serves as an excellent example of how theological discussion can be done in full view of Rorty's pragmatist philosophy. Vattimo, Rorty, and Religious Belief What makes Gianni Vattimo's writings of interest to this study is how his work is a theological application of many of Rorty's own main philosophical ideas. Although we have seen that Rorty wasn't always open to this, he has come to appreciate how it might even contribute to his central hope of having social

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progress and solidarity. Some of Vattimo's most insightful remarks have been 76 77 made in three books, After Christianity, Belief, and Nihilism & emancipation: ethics, politics, & law. The article Zabala chose for his edition, "The Age of 79 Interpretation," has many of the ideas from these books summarized. What we need to do is outline some of the main thoughts which show application to Rorty's views. "The Age of Interpretation" is an example of Vattimo's hermeneutical task at understanding Christianity and interpreting biblical texts, the heart of which is taken from Nietzsche's own recognition that "there are no facts, but 80 only interpretation." As Vattimo as well understands, like Nietzsche before him, this is also an interpretation, one that "can only be argued as an interested response to a particular historical situation—not as the objective registration of a fact that remains external to it but as itself a fact that enters into the 81 makeup of the very historical situation to which it co-responds." As arguable as the coherency of this statement may seem to detractors, this is the beginnings of Vattimo's account. It provides the conceptual mechanism for describing the shortcomings of the Christian theological tradition and for reconfiguring its message. At the end of his article, Vattimo wants to even use it as help for Rorty, showing how it can aid Rorty's own position, and at the same time indicate where he and Rorty might find common ground. We begin our own study of Vattimo in the second part of his article, on a topic favorite to Rorty: Truth. Truth, not as a benign identification "to say of what is, that it is" as Aristotle positively put the matter, but rather the Philosopher's Stone. As a pursuit it seduced theologians into thinking their own quest should parallel the philosopher's: All truth is God's truth, no matter who uncovers it, whether in the humanities or the sciences. "The Church too adopted this conception of truth more or less explicitly, with the consequence that it had to attribute objective truth to the statements of the Bible, even ones that expressed the astronomy and cosmology of the ancient world." As great as these problems were for the Church, in some respects they are matched if not surpassed by current controversies raging between religions and secular society over "moral values." However this might be, as students of intellectual history know, theological thinking has long shared a coziness with the, largely Platonic, doctrines of philosophical truth: such as the immortality of the soul, disparaging of the flesh, the disjunction between the appearances of this temporal realm and the world to come, philosophical contemplation to escape this world or prayerfulness for eternal life. Whatever benefits of clarity were brought to theology, it was penalized ten-fold once philosophical thinking, coming of age, found itself in disagreement with the theologians. The "main challenge faced by the Church 83 has been science's claim to be regarded as the only source of truth." This was a critical blow to the heart of theology, only to be matched by modern

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philosophy's critical inquiries into the possibilities of miracles and the existence of God—all topics the Church could only see as rebellion, then insouciance on the part of secular thinkers. For their part, modern theologians holding to the objectivity of the revealed word of scripture couldn't differently understand Christ's claim that the "truth would make them free." The interpretation of this verse had long since been covered by first philosophy's understanding of objectivity and the definition of truth as correspondence. In light of all this conflict, the Church's simultaneous thinking it had the Truth, was to pursue the Truth, and was to bare witness to the Truth, should have placed it in a near schizophrenic state. There was no place for Truth modified. Vattimo mentions this was exactly what had to be done in the case of Galileo—scientific truth contrary to theological truth. For theologians incapable of modifying "truth," nothing was so clear that scripture, the source of transparent revelation, taught the world was the center of God's creative world and mindfulness. Man (yes, "Man"), created in God's image, did not inhabit a planet among many circling the sun. Everything in scripture, whether descriptions about the world or strictly theological musings, all had to presuppose man as center to God's creative action. "Naturally, the Church's 'literalism' changed over time, owing in part to a hermeneutic that grew increasingly attentive to the 'spiritual' meanings of scripture." 84 Even with this change, there remains today what Vattimo rightly describes as, "Galileo cases." These are "other confrontations between ecclesiastical authority and the contemporary world, owing purely to the stubborn faith of the Church in the contents of a culture that is certainly more ancient and habitual but that has no claim to be considered the eternal truth.'' Vattimo cites examples as the tiresome denial of women to the priesthood, but also the hyper-current biomedical cases where "teleology" and what is "natural" (versus the "unnatural") continue to be used as necessary moral terminology in the decision-making process. The problems are the usual, abortion and euthanasia, but also the new debates raised by technology, economic forces, and the media—in vitro fertilization, sex-selection, stem-cell research, genetic and body modification, and nanotechnology. By continuing in the insistence that the Truth which will make us free is the Truth of objectivity, the Church remains in mortal combat with science and secular ethics. "[TJrapped in the web of its 'natural metaphysics' and its literalism," the entanglement will also be felt ecumenically, "not only among Christian confessions but also among the religions generally." 86 It is a way of understanding that can only be overturned by acknowledging the "age of interpretation" has arrived, one that carries an "evangelical message." This is not that the Church has an exclusivist corner on the Truth. Quite the opposite, it is "the principle that dissolves all claims to objectivity." 87 This acknowledgement is necessary if the Church wants to engage in authentic

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dialogue—one that is pluralist and global. Vattimo explains how it can do so by acknowledging two elements: Christianity only makes sense if reality is not first and foremost the world of things at hand (vorhanden), objectively present; and the meaning of Christianity as a message of salvation consists above all in dissolving the peremp88 tory claims of "reality." 89

Applied, Vattimo cites Paul's claim, "Oh death where is thy victory?" This declaration and many others like it from scripture illustrate what Vattimo 90 describes as "an extreme denial of the 'reality principle.'" The denial of the reality principle is a denial of the assertion that only by positing Reality, and Truth as its guiding light will we escape oppression and the deliverance from evil, from idols, whether religious, political, or economic. In contrast, self-described experts who give life to these idols through their institutions, those who wish to decide what values should dominate our lives, or how they should best be imposed on our behalf, find their power exactly in the precepts of Reality and Truth. Vattimo explains further: "In general, a democratic regime needs a non-objective-metaphysical conception of truth; otherwise, it immediately becomes an authoritarian regime." 91 Placed into the religious context, should we "recognize that the redemptive meaning of the Christian message makes its impact precisely by dissolving the claims of objectivity, the church might also finally heal the tension between truth and charity that has, 92 so to speak, tormented it throughout its history." The full brunt of Vattimo's analysis is found just slightly later in this explanation: The only truth revealed to us by Scripture, the one that can never be demythologized in the course of time—since it is not an experimental, logical, or metaphysical statement but a call to practice—is the truth of love, 93 of charity. It is here where Vattimo finds agreement with "contemporary postmetaphysical philosophy," not only the "neo-pragmatism of Rorty," but also the "philosophy of communicative action of Habermas" where "the proximity of truth 94 to charity is anything but an extravagant idea." It is an appreciation for their combined importance that Vattimo wants, yet not without an acknowledgement of how other contemporary intellectuals contribute to the dialogical necessity of an "experience of truth." How wide should the scope of acceptance be? Here is the importance of our own discussion about the need to express even private hopes (at least sometimes), to our community in the public square: That "no experience of truth can exist without some kind of participation in a community, and not necessarily the closed community (parish, 95 province, or family) of the communitarians." Vattimo brings Gadamer's hermeneutics into fruitful application, where "truth comes about as the ongoing

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construction of communities that coincide in a 'fusion of horizons' (Horizontverschmelzung), which has no insuperable 'objective' limit (like that of race, language, or 'natural' belonging)." As Vattimo summarizes it, "postmodern 97 nihilism (the end of metanarratives) is the truth of Christianity." Having introduced himself to Rorty, now Vattimo finds the moment to embrace him, even though it was, after all, an affinity first initiated by Rorty and the "sympathy" he had for Vattimo's interpretation of kenosis. That Rorty should find Vattimo interesting on this point is fascinating, as the theological tradition uses this word for denoting Christ's "emptying" of himself to become the Son of Man, "the incarnation as God's renunciation of his own sovereign transcendence." It is a word Vattimo now thinks is key to bringing theology back to its senses, but also key for helping Rorty's own thinking. Vattimo, fully uninterested (bless his heart) in "converting" Rorty, believes kenosis grants Rorty's nonfoundationalism because of how Rorty's proclamation piggy-backs on a culture "shaped by the biblical, and specifically Christian message." 99 While Rorty has faced detractors of all stripes and sorts, Vattimo gently thinks he has found a place where Rorty's view is not defeated, but will benefit. Vattimo believes that without the Christian message "Rorty would, paradoxically, be obliged to supply demonstrative proof for his nonfoundationalism as an 'objective' thesis, that is, to argue that in reality there are no foundations—forgetting the additional clause in Nietzsche's sentence: 100 there are no facts, only interpretations; and this is an interpretation." Vattimo thinks he has found a critical tension in Rorty's thinking. This, all the while granting that with his pragmatist views Rorty isn't under an obligation to offer what Vattimo calls "objective-metaphysical proofs," those which would assume first philosophy and its language. On the other hand, Vattimo thinks Rorty's position will somehow come up short providing for community solidarity when other members of our community decide their "spontaneous preference for a more humane and democratic society is lacking." 101 What do we do if those members turn ugly and cruel? Vattimo posits the alternative (3):

(1) The Metaphysical Demonstration of Christianity's Truth

^

(2) Scientific Reason

(3) Christianity as a historical 102 message of salvation Vattimo thinks that the tension between (1) and (2) can be resolved by (3), in the realization that (1) was not the basis for the conversion of Christ's

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follower's—it wasn't even the "proof" of any miracle; "They believed, as we say in Italian, 'sullaparola,' that is, 'they took him at his word'; they had 'fidesex auditu,' faith from hearing. The commitment to Christ's teaching derives from the cogency of the message itself; he who believes has understood, felt, intuited 103 that his word is a 'word of eternal life.' " From a critical perspective Vattimo's dilemma here doesn't carry a great deal of persuasive weight. I don't see Rorty being trapped between the alternatives, (1) and (2), having to choose (3). It actually has been a criticism he has faced elsewhere: that empathy, solidarity, and social progress won't be sufficient to dissuade those who want to be violent and act contrary to the democratic values of liberty, tolerance, and freedom. Despite the dissatisfaction detractors have with Rorty's account of what's available as glue to our social fabric, this is the best we can hope for in our contingent condition. There is no epistemological or moral scaffolding behind earthly appearances providing a final defense for when human decency isn't enough to hold back those who find pleasure in corruption and domination. Besides the metaphilosophical reasons for why Rorty can't believe in structures of this sort, it isn't clear or obvious how this scaffolding would even help: that all we have to do for criminals and the morally and socially challenged is to show them the scaffolding. To take a few philosophy graduate courses in metaethics and realism would settle the matter, bringing the deviants into line. Of course Vattimo doesn't think Rorty needs to provide a philosophically robust edifice to avoid anarchy. It is just that Vattimo thinks Rorty needs something more. Read in the full context of Vattimo's writings (the charitable component to hermeneutics), Vattimo's position can be seen as only minimally stating this: 1. 2. 3.

Western history is a tradition laden with Christian belief. Contemporary culture cannot easily place aside the Christian element to this history. Avoiding all deceptive claims for Truth, Christianity asks us to acknowledge the Christian dictum to love one another.

As we will see in Rorty's response to Vattimo, the third point is where he finds agreement. With this said, any shortcoming we might see with Vattimo's challenge to Rorty will only be because we are still unable to see how far Rorty's critique carries into religious thinking, especially for Christianity. An argument for this thinking "seems insufficient only because we have not yet fully developed the antimetaphysical consequences of Christianity itself; 104 because we are not yet nihilistic enough, in other words Christian enough." Vattimo sees that belief in Jesus Christ isn't one that insists on the petty moralisms collected by the Christian Church over the centuries, or even what have

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been argued as the main doctrinal pillars of its faith, such as the creation story or the resurrection of Jesus: "It is far more reasonable to believe that our existence depends on God because here, today, we are unable to speak our language and to live out our historicity without responding to the message 105 transmitted to us by the Bible." This is based on Vattimo's belief that how we understand ourselves, our "existential condition," must be "always histor106 ical and concrete." In sum: "we discover that we cannot place ourselves." Vattimo is reasonable enough to acknowledge his interpretation will not be highly persuasive to "nonbelievers." Yet what Vattimo wants to pull from this Christian, historical placement isn't a new apologetic for Christian belief. It is rather a minimalist interpretation which only wants to acknowledge that our Western society has been formed by the "proclamation of Christ." That after the metaphilosophical dust has settled, "where the metanarratives have been dissolved and all authority has fortunately been demythologized, including that of'objective' knowledge—our only chance of human survival rests in the Christian commandment of charity." 107 I still haven't been able to decide if it is surprising that Rorty agrees. Rorty, Vattimo, and Religious Belief Previously published in 2002, Rorty's "Anticlericalism and Atheism" finds itself republished in Zabala's collection. It is an article which marks an important change in Rorty's thinking about religious belief. Yet it is, I think, a change which Rorty sees as following quite consistently from his corpus of writings. For example, immediately after a couple of paragraphs at the beginning of his article, briefly reiterating his anti-essentialism and his historicism (which denies we can answer the big questions of philosophy ahistorically), Rorty writes how this should inform our thoughts about religion. Written by a different scholar, one whose religious predilections were known to be optimistic, this wouldn't be very startling. For Rorty, however, this indicates an important, new shift of understanding. The first remark Rorty makes indicating this shift concerns the tension historically found between science and religion. The Habermasian view of "communicative reason" has "weakened the grip of the idea that scientific 108 beliefs are formed rationally, whereas religious beliefs are not." In earlier writings Rorty tried to show that science, just like philosophy, wasn't getting at something deeper in the fabric of reality. Rather, it was very successful at its tasks. Now Rorty is able to see that Habermasian reason removes any latent, competitive tension between science and religious belief. Returning to another intellectual hero of Rorty's, William James, we are now able to take seriously the claim that "natural science and religion need not compete with 109 one another."

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Secondly, as a result of these changes, the conceptual barrier between religious belief and atheism is dissolved. The result being that these are no longer polarized positions that can be conceptually belligerent, admitting of no nuance. Instead, those unable to take interest in religious belief won't be apt to call themselves "atheists." More fitting, they will use Max Weber's expres110 sion of being "religiously unmusical." Rorty explains this metaphor more fully in a passage worth repeating: One can be tone-deaf when it comes to religion just as one can be oblivious to the charms of music. People who find themselves quite unable to take an interest in the question of whether God exists have no right to be contemptuous of people who believe passionately in his existence or of people who deny it with equal passion. Nor do either of the latter have a right to be contemptuous of those to whom the dispute seems pointless.111 Put this way, Rorty's metaphilosophy is starting to find compatibility with religious belief. Or, perhaps better, those who find themselves in agreement with Rorty's metaphilosophical position need not find this incompatible with their religious views. This breaking down of the conceptual barrier between science and theology, because of a softening of the idea of "rationality," is just as likely to upset various theologians as it will scientists. Traditional theologians, after all, are as convinced they have the truth about reality (including, in their case God), as scientists and philosophers. They are not likely to call a truce, as they believe any breakdown on these conceptual matters would reduce belief in God to "merely a matter of taste."112 Philosophically speaking, it opens the flood-gates of relativism. In contrast, anti-essentialists like the pragmatists, described in Rorty's other writings, do not accept the "Kantian idea that being rational is a matter of following rules." 113 Instead they ask "what context certain beliefs 114 or practices or books can best be put in, for what particular purposes." Here Rorty divides philosophers into two groups. The one sort comes close to that of Kai Nielsen, at least pre-Philosophically speaking. Here is Rorty's description of these philosophers: The first sort are those who still think that belief in the divine is an empirical hypothesis and that modern science has given better explanations of the phenomenon God was once used to explain. Philosophers of this sort are delighted whenever an ingenuous natural scientist claims that some new scientific discovery provides evidence for the truth of theism, for they find it easy to debunk this claim. They can do so simply by trotting out the same sorts of arguments about the irrelevance of any particular empirical

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state of affairs to the existence of an atemporal and nonspatial being as were used by Hume and Kant against the natural theologians of the eight115 .1 . 115 eenth century. But Rorty goes on to say: Neither those who affirm nor those who deny the existence of God can plausibly claim that they have evidence for their views. Being religious, in the modern West, does not have much to do with the explanation of specific observable phenomenon. 116 This is not Rorty as a philosophical theologian. It is Rorty who speaks about religious belief, post-Philosophically. Rorty now thinks "anticlericalism," rather than "atheism," is a better word to describe his own view. The reason, again consistent with his metaphilosophy, is that we are not in the epistemological or metaphilosophical position to say whether God exists or not. If this isn't acknowledged, the old tiresome debates will be unearthed from the philosophy of religion. It is an acknowledgement at the nub of Rorty's entire view: that we simply do not have the conceptual tools to do these kinds of investigations. So the old dualisms, like those between atheism and theism, are also outworn and should be placed aside. Rorty's preference for "anticlericalism" is consistent with his overall view, especially seen in the political sense. In making his point, he reiterates what he laid out in "Religion in the Public Square": "For anticlericalism is a political view, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. It is the view that ecclesiastical institutions, despite all the good they do—despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in despair—are dangerous to the health of democratic societies."117 Rorty's dim view of ecclesiastical institutions rests in the observation that religion can throw the individual into "otherworldliness," a worry Dewey shared: "Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing." 118 Unlike traditional philosophers who describe themselves as atheists, and who talk about the irrationality of religious belief, "contemporary secularists" like Rorty talk about the potentiality for religious belief to be dangerous. This danger will not be realized, and religion will not be objectionable "as long as it is privatized—as long as ecclesiastical institutions do not attempt to rally the faithful behind political proposals and as long as believers and unbelievers agree to follow a policy of live and let live." 119 As we have noted, Rorty has been quite consistent on this view over the years. And quite rightly so. The policy of "live and let live" need not be a glib phrase. It is an expression that can be interpreted in the ways we charted—that religious believers need

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not have their religious values hermetically sealed off from their social interests, including the formulation of public policies. They must, however, find some way of translating those religious-based values (viz., like an interpretation from scripture), into language (in the form of reasons) one can, in the context of the public domain, understand and deliberate. After outlining his view about how the end of philosophy allows for the possibility of religious belief, in the second part of Rorty's article attention is turned to Gianni Vattimo. In this section Rorty offers a commentary on Vattimo's thought. This is an important development in Rorty's views on religion. While Rorty fully admits, in the end, he is "religiously unmusical," I think it is clear Rorty has much to offer the philosophy of religion and theology. And using Vattimo as a point of reference is a good choice on Rorty's part. Vattimo is part of a group of philosophers who want to explore how past and current philosophical learning opens new possibilities for religion. A leader in this regard, Vattimo wants to "argue for the reasonableness of a return to the religiosity of their youth."120 Appropriately, Rorty takes up his discussion with Vattimo on an epistemological point raised in his Credere di credere, translated as Belief~. Rorty quotes Vattimo's confession, one that has come about in the later years of his life. " 'Do you now once again believe in God?' amounts to saying: I find myself becoming more and more religious, so I suppose I must believe in God."121 Rorty thinks Vattimo's confession would have fared better if he would have instead said: "I am becoming more and more religious, and so coming to have what many people would call a belief in God, but I am not sure that the term 'belief is the right description of what I have."122 Why the suggested reformulation by Rorty? He thinks it should be changed because it reflects the post-Philosophical implication that if we speak about belief being true, "everybody ought to share it." 123 Herein lay a contradiction because "Vattimo does not think that all human beings ought to be theists, much less that they should all be Catholics. He follows William James in disassociating the question 'Have I a right to be religious?' from the question 'Should everybody believe in the existence of God?' " 124 James' distinction is a very important one, but I don't see how it applies here to Vattimo. Vattimo is only saying that as time passes by he finds himself becoming more religious, to the point where he feels himself having "belief in God." If Vattimo accepts the main lines of thought in post-Philosophical thought, which he does, his use of the word "belief" does not carry the sense suggested by Rorty. In the private/public compartmentalization, beliefs held as private pursuits have no necessary interest for others, much less an obligation to be accepted as true. Vattimo's belief in God need not be interpreted as a shared obligation for others to do the same.125 Rorty does move on to a more important matter, namely, "Vattimo's attempt to move religion out of the epistemic arena, an arena in which it

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seems subject to challenge by natural science." 126 This can go in various directions, and two, in particular, have grave problems. The first, from Kant, views "God as a postulate of pure practical reason rather than an explanation of 127 empirical phenomena." On the opposite extreme are "thinkers like Kierkegaard, Barth, and Levinas," those who "make God wholly other—beyond the 128 reach not only of evidence and argument but of discursive thought." Both tendencies are unfortunate as they bring God-talk into a continuum somewhere between mushiness and incoherence. Vattimo's strength and innovation are found in his rejection of such "unhappy post-Kantian initiatives."129 In contrast to those initiatives Vattimo "puts aside the attempt to connect religion with truth and so has no use for notions like 'symbolic' or 'emotional' or 'metaphorical' or 'moral' truth." 130 His alternative, in the tradition of past theologians who had their own preferred scriptural theme, "reduces the Christian message to the passage in Paul that most other people like best: 1 Corinthians 13." On this point, Rorty's commentary on Vattimo's theology is worth noting: His strategy is to treat the Incarnation as God's sacrifice of all his power and authority, as well as all his otherness. The Incarnation was an act of kenosis, the act in which God turned everything over to human beings. This enables Vattimo to make his most startling and most important claim: that "secularization ... is the constitutive trait of authentic religious experience." 131 This allows Vattimo a conceptual stepping-stone, one which brings him to the place where "there is no internal dynamic, no inherent teleology to human history; there is no great drama to be unfolded, but only the hope that love may prevail." 132 And now the coup de grace for fully appreciating how Rorty's critique of the philosophical tradition, once digested, plays out for religious belief. Rorty, along with a quote from Vattimo, says: Vattimo thinks that if we take human history as seriously as Hegel did, while refusing to place it within either an epistemological or a metaphysical context, we can stop the pendulum from swinging back and forth between militantly positivistic atheism and symbolist or existentialist defenses of theism. As he says, "It is (only) because metaphysical meta-narratives have been dissolved that philosophy has rediscovered the plausibility of religion and can consequently approach the religious need of common consciousness independently of the framework of Enlightenment critique."133 As a result, "Vattimo wants to dissolve the problem of the coexistence of natural science with the legacy of Christianity by identifying Christ neither with

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truth nor with power but with love alone." Translated into secular terms Rorty thinks this is a coming together of some of Rorty's favorite thinkers: Nietzsche and Heidegger, and James and Dewey. "For these two intellectual traditions have in common the thought that the quest for truth and knowledge 135 is no more and no less than the quest of intersubjective agreement." This thread of thought, now found in Vattimo, makes him an ally. Not so much in the effort to wrest religious belief from a clash with reason and science, but more of a buttress for Rorty's division between private and public domains. This division is once again worth reviewing. When religious belief is placed in the private domain, as Rorty sees matters, the analysis of religion remains outside the grasp of so-called "first philosophy" where epistemology and metaphysics lurk waiting for the next wandering, hapless naif. Rorty thinks if religion keeps within the private domain, then it will as well keep itself "from getting caught up in what the contemporary American philosopher Robert Brandom calls 'the game of giving and asking for reasons.' "136 But this shouldn't happen in Rorty's scheme because "to say that religion should be privatized is to say that religious people are entitled, for certain purposes, to opt out of this game." And by opting out of the game— keeping their private pursuits, as it were, to themselves—"They are entitled to disconnect their assertions from the network of socially acceptable inferences that provide justification for making these assertions and draw practical consequences from having made them."137 We have gone over this already, arguing that under certain conditions, even in the religious, private sphere, there will be moments when these people wish to be part of "the game," as Brandom puts it, "of giving and asking for reasons." This won't be the heavy-handed reason-giving of first philosophy—a strict, almost moral obligation to satisfy the highly critical, skeptical minds of philosophers qua judges of cognitive content. Rather, it will be a conversation, a dialogue with others who share an interest in getting a sense of why something is believed. Those holding to religious belief are not under obligation to join the game. But, as an option, it remains open for them to do so. I find little basis for why this further nuance of beliefs held in the private domain should not fit within the parameters of Rorty's private/ public distinction. With much of this ground already covered, it's important to see it is one that has important relevance to Vattimo's theological vision. In fact, our nuance of how we might wish to give reasons for a given private belief is not only compatible with Vattimo's theology, but as well (at least implicitly) with Rorty's discussion of Vattimo's views. In fine, what Vattimo is describing in his theology are reasons for why he now finds himself speaking of religious belief. Rorty, for his part, happily engages in the conversation, noting where he finds connection in his own understanding of intellectual history, and describing where he

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finds difference with Vattimo. It is an excellent example of just how the game of giving and asking for reasons, even with private beliefs, can take place. How this article serves our greater study can especially be seen on the last couple of pages of Rorty's article where he notes agreement with Vattimo. The first point of agreement is worth quoting at length: The battle between religion and science conducted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a contest between institutions, both of which claimed cultural supremacy. It was a good thing for both religion and science that science won that battle. For truth and knowledge are a matter of social cooperation, and science gives us the means to carry out better cooperative social projects than before. If social cooperation is what you want, the conjunction of the science and the common sense of your day is all you need.138 But as Rorty clearly understands, people may look for more in their lives, and in some cases that extra something is found in religion. Again, agreeing with Vattimo, Rorty notes "if you want something else, then a religion that has been taken out of the epistemic arena, a religion that finds the question of theism versus atheism uninteresting, may be just what suits your solitude." 139 So where does this leave Rorty and Vattimo when it comes to understanding each other's views on religion? As we said above, outside the parameters of traditional philosophy, there is still much to discuss, all with a healthy respect for each other's views. Unfortunately, some critics within the philosophical community have gleefully reduced this agreement to a, so-called, "postmodern" notion where "you have your truth and I have mine." This is an unfair interpretation. Instead, "People like Vattimo will cease to think that my lack of religious feeling is a sign of vulgarity, and people like me will cease to think that his possession of such feelings is a sign of cowardice. Both of us can cite 1 Corinthians 13 in support of our refusal to engage in any such invidious explanations." 140 Where does this leave the conversation about private beliefs like religion? We can list Rorty's suggestions this way: 1. Differences with Vattimo come down to his ability to regard a past event as holy and my sense that holiness resides only in an ideal future. 2. Vattimo thinks of God's decision to switch from being our master to being our friend as the decisive event upon which our present efforts are dependent. 3. His sense of the holy is bound up with the recollection of that event and of the person who embodied it. My sense of the holy, insofar as I have one, is bound up with the hope that someday, any millennium now, my

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remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law. In such a society, communication would be domination-free, class and caste would be unknown, hierarchy would be entirely at the disposal of 141 the free agreement of a literate and well-educated class.

Rorty is able to agree with Vattimo on more fundamental concerns, not whether one can prove God exists, or whether such belief or disbelief makes someone irrational or immoral, but on the fundamental needs necessary to any life—sufficient affection, safety, food, housing, and education. Once provided, the work becomes how to provide these items in abundance so that we are not merely existing, but experiencing human nourishing. These descriptions sound almost impossible, perhaps even platitudinous. But no matter how Rorty's outlook in other ways has changed, nuanced, and modified over the years, this optimism remains. It has even seen success. Our history is one that has brought progress, not in resolving the great questions of traditional philosophy, but rather how social progress, albeit always tentative, always fragile, has occurred over the centuries. We cited this quote earlier in our study, and it remains just as important for Rorty who is now in collaborative dialogue with Vattimo: If one reinterprets objectivity as intersubjectivity, or as solidarity, in the ways I suggest below, then one will drop the question of how to get in touch with "mind-independent and language-independent reality." One will replace it with questions like "What are the limits of our community? Are the encounters sufficiently free and open? Has what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders who are suffering? To outsiders who have new ideas?" These are political questions rather than metaphysical or epistemological questions. Dewey seems to me to have given us the right lead when he viewed pragmatism not as grounding, but as 142 clearing the ground for, democratic politics. The interesting thing now about Rorty's position is how he views certain religious beliefs as aiding, not detracting in resolving the questions posed in the paragraph above. That matter-of-factly, it most certainly can't be the discovery and implementation of philosophically robust tools, but rather the very soft, "coming into existence of a love that is kind, patient, and endures all things."143 The best known citation of these "virtues" (as they were later described by theologians), is found in the Christian scriptures. Once again, Rorty sounds like a careful theologian in the final passage of his article:

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1 Corinthians 13 is an equally useful text for both religious people like Vattimo, whose sense of what transcends our present condition is bound up with a feeling of dependence, and for nonreligious people like myself, for whom this sense consists simply in hope for a better human future. The difference between these two sorts of people is that between unjustifiable gratitude and unjustifiable hope. This is not a matter of conflicting beliefs about what 144 really exists and what does not. What makes 1 Corinthians 13 such a powerful passage is that it resonates with the human spirit, inside and outside of religious circles as a devoted concern and care for the welfare of fellow humans and the environment we live in. Rorty is of course right to be very cautious about other scripture and how they should be interpreted. Whether one is religious or not, this shouldn't detract from passages like 1 Corinthians 13 that speak of our shared sentiments. The theologian David Tracy gives another example of how scripture can do this: Job and Lamentations will always speak their meditative, penetrating truth to anyone capable effacing the tragedy that is human existence. The Gospel of John—that meditative rendering of the common Christian narrative— will always describe the beauty and glory of the whole of reality (even the cross as the lifting up and disclosure of glory) to all those capable of genuine meditation on the limit experiences of peace, joy, beauty, and love. Meditative humans, then as now, will turn to intelligence and love, to nature and to cosmos, to mind and to body, to aid their reflections on the vision of life, the wisdom, disclosed by the biblical narratives for our common human limit-experiences. 145 Despite how scripture can speak of human flourishing and the need for extending human solidarity, edifying theologians also acknowledge the limits of their discipline. They do not want to replace one highly metaphysical theological model with another; one God's-eye view with another: Once we have given up our epistemic concern to found culture on an incorrigible and immutable foundation .. . there will no longer be a need for a distinct "priesthood" of intellectuals to tell us when, in our various activities, we are in touch with such a permanent, ahistorical foundation (reality), and when we are not. 146 Whether described as post-Philosophical or postmodern, contemporary culture has no religious, political, or philosophical metanarratives. From the perspective of edifying theology, faith has become vulnerable. This does not

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mean, however, that no descriptions of the world can be made. As Rorty has noted, toeholds that attempt to capture and describe part of our experience are acceptable. To this end, edifying theologians hope toeholds also remain for them.

Notes 1.

Another important author who would make an interesting contribution to this discussion is Robert C. Solomon. In his Spirituality for the Skeptic: The Thoughtful Love of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), he says, "my search in this book is for a nonreligious, noninstitutional, nontheological, nonscriptural, nonexclusive sense of spirituality, one which is not antiscience, which is not otherworldly, which is not uncritical or cultist or kinky." [xii]. In short, what he describes as "naturalized spirituality." [xiii]. See my review in TheReview of Metaphysics, September 2003.

2. 3.

Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 68. Nielsen, After the Demise of the Tradition, p. 122.

4. 5.

Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience,p.96. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 27.

6. 7.

Ibid., p. 28; emphasis his. This thinking is evident in many departments of philosophy, throughout the United States and Canada, where there is an active attempt to move the department curriculum into more scientific matters, like courses in the philosophies of science, biology and physics. Unfortunately, this push is usually at the expense of courses of the more Continental sort, like existentialism and the philosophy of literature, which are either taken completely out of the curriculum or rarely offered. John Peacocke, "Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-Theology," edited by Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 190. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 25; emphasis his. Of course this clause, "as properly interpreted," can be employed to deflect or delay apparent contradictions between theology and science indefinitely. Put slightly differently Gilbert Murray states that: "The religious side of Plato's thought was not revealed in its full power till the time of Plotinos in the third century A.D.: that of Aristotle, one might say without undue paradox, not till its exposition by Aquinas in the thirteenth." Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), p. 17; as quoted by Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (Amherst, MA: Yale University Press, 1941),p.62.

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1948), p. 96. Ibid.

14. Peacocke, "Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-Theology," p. 180. 15.

Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 96.

194

After Rorty

16. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 96—7. Another question that vexed minds such as Ockham's was "how is it possible for things which are material to cause impressions in a soul, which is immaterial?" Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 75. 17. Ibid., p. 97. 18. Ibid.,p.99. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford, 1902), pp. 5-6; as quoted by W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), p. 353. 22. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference,translated by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 54. 23. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 99—100. 24. Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 22-3. 25. W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), p. 353; emphasis mine. 26. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy p. 4:7. 27. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 74. 28. Thomas JJ. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 42. Altizer goes on to state that "[TJhroughout its history Christian theology has been thwarted from reaching its intrinsic goal by its bondage to a transcendent, a sovereign, and an impassive God." Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 42. 29. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 43; emphasis mine. 30. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 26. 31. The full quote by Gilson is, "As a philosopher, Thomas Aquinas was not a pupil of Moses, but of Aristotle, to whom he owed his method, his principles, up to even his all-important notion of the fundamental actuality of being." Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 67. 32. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 62. It is interesting to see, as well, Gilson's comparison between Aquinas and Augustine on the notion of truth: "Shall we say, as St. Thomas Aquinas was to answer, that since God has made man a rational animal, the natural light of reason must be able naturally to perform its proper function, which is to know things as they are, and thereby to know truth? Or shall we say with St. Augustine, that truth being necessary, unchangeable, mutable and impermanent human mind interpreting unnecessary, changeful and fleeting things? Even in our minds truth is a sharing of some of the highest attributes of God; consequently, even in our minds, truth is an immediate effect of the light of God." Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 54. 33. Altizer notes that when "Christian Scholasticism followed Aristotle in defining God as pure actuality or actus purus, it wholly isolated God from the world, knowing him as inactive and impassive, the God who is aseitic, or self-derived, the causa sui who is the sole cause of himself." Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 62; emphasis mine.

Rorty and the Transformation of Theology 34.

35. 36.

37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

195

On the relationship between Hegel and Kierkegaard there is Altizer's observation that "few theologians have taken account of the fact that Kierkegaard adapted almost the whole movement and method of his thought from Hegel." Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 24. Terence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 213. Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensees, edited by H.F. Stewart (New York: The Modern Library, College Edition, n. d.), p.121; as quoted by Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, pp. 212—13. My thanks to Professor James Home for pointing out this passage by Pascal. Altizer, TheGospelof Christian Atheism, p. 76. Kerr, "Metaphysics and Magic: Wittgenstein's Kink," p. 253. For example, "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by the means of language." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated byG.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), §109. Kerr, "Metaphysics and Magic: Wittgenstein's Kink," p. 253; from Ludwig Wittgenstein's ^ettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §447. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, p. 303; see Davidson, "Truth and Meaning", p. 308; emphasis mine. As Rorty notes, justification is a matter of historical comparison. "To think such a justification sufficient would be to draw the consequences from Wittgenstein's insistence that vocabularies—all vocabularies . . . are human creations, tools for the creation of such other human artifacts as poems, Utopian societies, scientific theories, and future generations." Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 53. Charles E. Winquist, Desiring Theology (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1995), p. 53; emphasis his. Winquist cites Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968). Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. As J.J.C. Smart remarked, "The question 'Does God exist?' has no clear meaning for the unconverted. But for the converted the question no longer arises. The word 'God' gets its meaning from the part it plays in religious speech and literature, and in religious speech and literature the question of existence does not arise." J.J.C. Smart, "The Existence of God," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair Maclntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 41. Or, as Heidegger puts it, "God is in no way the object of investigation in theology, as, for example, animals are the theme of zoology." Martin Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking, translated by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 15. Kerr, "Metaphysics and Magic: Wittgenstein's Kink," p. 252; quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein's Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 28, 30, 33. Gabriel Vahanian, Dieuanonyme (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1989), p. 45. Gabriel Vahanian, The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 73. Altizer, The Gospel oj Christian Atheism, p. 17.

196 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63.

64. 65.

After Rorty Malachowski, Richard Rorty, p. 60; quote from Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature, p. 360. Andrew Wernick, "Jean Baudrillard: Seducing God," Post-Secular Philosophy: between philosophy and theology, edited by Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 354. Kerr, "Metaphysics and Magic: Wittgenstein's Kink," p. 241; quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein's, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §109. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein says "[pjhilosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us." Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 27; emphasis his. I would argue religious language exerts this fascination in the strongest form. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 27. Winquist, Desiring Theology, pp. 133—4. Gabriel Vahanian, No Other God (New York: George Braziller, 1966), pp. 99-100. A striking example of this interdisciplinary dialogue is Rudolf Bultmann's appropriation of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The resulting profundity of Bultmann's theological approach, which at some but not all points is compatible with edifying theology, is demonstrative of the importance of viewing the theological task in a holistic manner. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, p. 34. "In a way having oneself psychoanalysed is like eating from the tree of knowledge. The knowledge acquired sets us (new) ethical problems; but contributes nothing to their solution." Translation from German by Peter Winch. Peter Munz, Problems of Religious Knowledge (London: SCM Press, 1959), p. 140. Paul Ramsey, "Preface," The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. xxviii. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 67. Ibid.,p. 13. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 40. Ibid. Ibid. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 28. "Today's world, by contrast with that of the apostles, is the beneficiary of the impact of the Christian faith on its human as well as cultural and social structures . . . It also includes the vast number of functions and responsibilities which once were ecclesiastical and have become public or governmental, or even private." Vahanian, Mo Other God, p. 92. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 23. Davidson, putting the matter somewhat differently states that "we improve the clarity and bite of declarations of difference .. . by enlarging the basis of shared (translatable) language." Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Post-analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 142. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 64. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 22; emphasis his.

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197

66. 67. 68.

Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 39. Winquist, Desiring Theology, p. 53. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 40. See as well Jeanrond for eleven criteria for new biblical theologies, all of which are applicable to edifying theology. Werner Jeanrond, "Criteria for New Biblical Theologies," Journal of Religion, 76, April 1996, pp. 246-7. 69. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 11. 70. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. xiv; emphasis his. 72. Zabala (ed.), The Future of Religion. 73. Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, and Santiago Zabala, "Dialogue: What is Religion's Future After Metaphysics?" The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 55-81. 74. Santiago Zabala, "Introduction: A Religion Without Theists or Atheists," The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 1-27. 75. Richard Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 55-81. 76. Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 77. Gianni Vattimo, Belief (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999). 78. Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism & emancipation: ethics,politics, & law (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 79. Gianni Vattimo, "The Age of Interpretation," The Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 43—54. 80. Vattimo, "The Age of Interpretation," p. 45.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 49. Ibid., pp. 47-8. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid. Ibid., p. 49. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 50-1. Ibid., p. 51.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

Ibid.; emphasis mine. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 52. Compare this to Vahanian: "The emergence of a post-Christian era makes it all the more imperative not only to rethink theology on the basis of a new

198

After Rorty model but also to recast the structures of the Church in terms of man's personal and social self-understanding today. A mobile and dynamic society has replaced the traditional stable structures in the light of which the nature of the Church was constructed. In a post-Christian age the Church cannot remain at the center of the village if it wants to be present in the midst of life. Nor can it resort to become an enclave, a modernistic ghetto. Much less can Christianity forfeit itself by becoming merely a private matter . . . it would seem that unless Christianity wants to be wiped off the face of the earth, the Church must begin to think of itself not as a place of retreat from the world, not as a society within a society, but as a community that has no reality other than through the society of men, as the avant-garde of society, as the axis of culture." Vahanian, No Other God, p. 99; emphasis his.

100. Vattimo, "The Age of Interpretation," p. 52; emphasis his. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 53. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 53. Ibid. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 30. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 30-1. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 31-2. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Ibid., p. 41, footnote 2. From John Dewey's, "A Common Faith," in Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 9 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), p. 31. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 33. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Even in the philosophical tradition, "belief," as opposed to "knowledge," doesn't carry the necessary obligation for everybody else to share it. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 34. Ibid. Taking his cue from Kant, Schleiermacher turned this into the "theology of symbolic forms." Rorty notes this is Nancy Frankenberry's phrase. Ibid.

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199

129. Ibid.,p.35. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid., p. 34. Quote from Vattimo's Belief, p. 21. We need to note, at least in passing, that secularization and the public/private division might be seen as quite distinct from each other. As Vahanian noted in the ground-breaking work The DeathofGod: "Protestantism calls for secularity. But it does not call for secularism — in which it has often resulted. By secularity is meant the sphere of man's action. This means temporality in contrast to the divine eternity; and it means finitude in contrast to God's infinitude. Secularity refers to the ensemble of man's activities as well as his creativity, all of which reflect the Biblical fact that man is created in the image of God, but is not divine per se . . . Once these characteristics have been understood, it is easy to distinguish secularity from secularism. While the former is that realm in which religion can show its relevance, the latter is an inverted or concealed religious attitude. Secularism is a form of religiosity, for which the present and the immanent are invested with the attributes of the eternal and the transcendent. It is an expropriation of religion, not for the sake of shaking off the tyranny of its supernaturalism as it is claimed, but really for the sake of another mystique and another fundamentalism or fanaticism. Few attitudes are more 'religious' than those of certain secularists, who have deified democracy or sex or the classless society." Vahanian, The Death of God, pp. 66—7; emphasis his. 132. Ibid.,p.35. 133. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 34. Vattimo quote from his article, "The Trace of the Trace," in Religion: Cultural Memory in the Present, ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, translated by David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 84. 134. Ibid.; emphasis mine. 135. Ibid.,p.36. 136. Ibid. 137. Ibid., pp. 37-8. 138. Ibid.,p.39. 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 142. Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, andtruth, p. 13. 143. Rorty, "Anticlericalism and Atheism," p. 40. 144. Ibid. 145. David Tracy, "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity," Theology Today, 51, April 1994, p. 113. 146. Kuipers, Solidarity and the Stranger, p. 13. Compare this with Nagel, who "thinks that to deprive ourselves of such notions as 'representation' and 'correspondence' would be to stop 'trying to climb outside of our own minds, an effort some would regard as insane and that / regard as philosophically fundamental.'" Rorty, Objectivity, relativism, and truth, p. 7; emphasis mine. From Thomas Nagel's, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 9.

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Index

Altizer, Thomas J.J. 166,169 analytical philosophy 32 anticlericalism 46,97-8,186 see also ecclesiastical organizations antirepresentationalism 18, 19—20, 25, 53, 55 Aquinas, Thomas 167—8 Aristotle 164, 166, 179 Baudrillard, Jean 172 belief(s) acquisition and disposal 47—8, 49-53 Christianity and postmodernism 109-26 in existence of God 57, 61 and faith 70-3 and philosophy of religion 46—74 private/public distinction 72 and science 67-9,187-90 Bennington, Geoffrey 121 Bradley, F.H. 165 Buber, Martin 48 Carter, Stephen L. 65, 66, 97 categorical imperative 77,85 Christian belief see belief(s) Christianity 72-3,83,84,99-100 and contemporary/secular culture 171-2, 176-7 and postmodernism 109—26 Clifford, W.K. 60 continental philosophy 32 conversation-stopper, religion as 58—9, 65-6, 97-109 Corinthians 192 culture, secular/contemporary 29, 171-2, 176-7 Davidson, Donald 19, 84, 116 democratic values, education in

86—97

Descartes, Rene 16 Dewey, John 7, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20-1, 31, 76-7, 78, 83-4, 93-4, 163-6, 186 ecclesiastical organizations 97—109 passim anticlericalism 46, 97-8, 186 edifying and systematic philosophy 30-3 edifying theologians 56 edifying theology beginnings of 169—74 and ethics 175—6 and language 169—70 and systematic theology 160—78 as "theology light" 174—8 education in democratic values 86—97 Enlightenment 65, 66 epistemology and ethics 74—5 ethics after philosophy 74-109 and edifying theology 175—6 and epistemology 74—5 relational view of 75—7,78—9 without principles 75—86 see also entries beginning moral faith

and belief 70-3 and language 70—2, 171 leap of 168 foundationalism 10 postmodernism as failure of 120—1 foundations of knowledge 15—16 gender issues 81—3 see also homosexuality Gilson, Etienne 9, 161, 166, 167-8 God 48, 166, 167-8, 186 belief in existence of 57,61 and correspondence theory 8—9

207

Index need for a referent 130—1 will of 66 God-talk 20, 46, 127-35passim, 170 God's truth 161-2 God's-eye view of the world 42 Gutting, Gary 21,112-13 Habermas, Jurgen 60—1, 93 "habits of action" 53, 55, 56 Heidegger, Martin 17, 18, 31, 163, 165 hermeneutical view 121—2, 179 homosexuality 97-8, 101-3, 105-6, 107-8 same-sex marriages 99—100,104—5 human rights 80, 94-5 humanities and natural sciences 24, 25-6 Hume, David 78, 94-5 injustices, retribution for 57—8 "intellectual life" 29 "intellectual responsibility" 67—8 intersubjectivity 63, 93 objectivity as 20-1,191 James, William 16,20,55,59,67,68, 70,94, 176, 184, 187 Jordan, Mark D. 108 justification 79-80,117-19 Kant, Emmanuel 16,77,83,85,90-1, 93 Kaufmann, Gordon 162-3, 170, 175-6, 177 kenosis 182 Kerr, Fergus 170—1 Kierkegaard, Soren 42, 168 knowledge, foundations of 15—16 Kuhn, Thomas S. 25 language and cultural beliefs 47-8, 49-53 edifying theology 169—70 faith and belief 70-2,171 God-talk 20, 46, 127-35 passim, 170 ofmorality 76—7 postmodernist perspective 119—20 pragmatist perspective 48—53 theological 9 theory of meaning 19—20

language-games 48,93,170—1 leap of faith 168 Letson, BenH. 7-8 Leviticus 84, 99, 101-2, 105-6, 107-£ Locke, John 16 logical empiricism 22—3 love of wisdom 33 Luther, Martin 168 McDowell, John 61 Marxism 128, 129 methodology, rationality as Mill, John Stuart 85,100 moral irresponsibility 72 moral language 76—7 moral progress 78, 79, 80-1, moral realism vs. pragmatism education 86—97 moral relativism 74 moral virtues and rationality 90

23—4

91-2 in

24, 74,

natural sciences and humanities 24, 25-6 Nielsen, Kai 8-9, 44-5, 53-4, 57, 126-35, 158 Nietzsche, Friedrich 8, 16, 78 objectivity 15-22 as intersubjectivity 20-1,191 obligation 67, 76-8, 95 Pascal, Blaise 168 Peacocke, John 163 philosophers, definition of 31—3, 185-6 philosophy demise of 9-10,16-17 as historical discipline 1—2, 7 limits of 2 relationship with theology 9,10, 14-15 traditional, analysis of 14—41 see also systematic philosophy philosophy-as-epistemology theory 18-19 Plantinga, Alvin 43-4,45,109-26 passim 158 Plato 32, 33, 164, 166 plurality of descriptions 122

208 post-Philosophical analysis of theology 9-11, 131-2 postmodernism 109,110-12 and Christianity 109-26 and foundationalism 120—1 and language 119—20 pragmatism 19-22, 26-7 and language 48—53 and realism 28—9 as Romantic Polytheism 53—8 and theology 42—3 and truth 54-5, 56-7 and unitarianism 59, 60—1 vs. moral realism in education 86-97 prayer, in public school system 62, 63 private/public distinction 58—66 beliefs and 72 obligation and 67 Pro-Life groups 64—5 prudence/morality distinction 76 Psalm 72 99,103,105 Puolimatka, Tapio 86-9, 92-3, 94 Putnam, Hilary 96 rationality/reason 15-22,27-8 Kantian idea of 90 as methodology 23—4 moral virtues and 24, 74, 90 and systematic theology 162—3 Rawlsjohn 80 realism 10, 28-9 moral realism vs. pragmatism in education 86—97 relational view of ethics 75—7,78—9 relativism 21,26 moral 74 "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance" 67-74 religious fundamentalism 69, 72 representationalist theories 18 retribution for wrongs and injustices 57-8 "revolutionary" philosophy 17 Rico eur, Paul 91 rights human 80, 94-5 women's 82, 104

Index Romantic Polytheism

53—8

StPaul 83,84,102-3,105,166 same-sex marriages 99-100,104-5 science 22—6 and humanities 24, 25—6 and religious belief 67-9, 187-90 and religious truth 162-3, 179-84 secular culture 29,171-2,176-7 secularism, influence of 16—17 security 95—6 selfhood 79,83-4 sentential attitudes 47, 49—53 sentimentality 123 social solidarity 20-1, 26, 27-8, 175 vs. individual self-development see private/public distinction Stout, Jeffrey 94, 97, 100, 101 sympathy 95—6 systematic and edifying theology 160-78 systematic philosophy Dewey's description 163—5 and edifying philosophy 30—3 influence on theology 165—8 and "systematic theology" 43 Ten Commandments 104 theology post-Philosophical analysis of 9—11, 131-2 relationship with philosophy 9,10, 14-15 systematic and edifying 160—78 Tillich, Paul 48,158,173 tolerance 24, 26, 27, 28, 90 Tracy, David 192 traditional philosophy, analysis of 14-41 trinitarian view of philosophy 16 truth 15-22 correspondence theory of 7—9,118, 119 and postmodernism 109—26 pragmatist perspective 54—5, 56—7 religious and scientific 162—3, 179-84 systematic theology perspective 161-3

Index unitarianism and pragmatism 59, 60—1 view of obligation 67 Vahanian, Gabriel 7,46—7,174 values, inculcating 86—97 Vattimo, Gabriel 159-60,178-84, 187-91

209

Winquist, Charles E. 173, 176-7 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 17, 18, 31, 48, 169-71, 173 Wolterstorff, Nicholas 99-100,101, 105, 108 women's rights 82,104 wrongs and injustices, retribution for 57-8