Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE 15TH AND 16TH CENTURIES

Vera

P.

MDutaTchieva

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

1988

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO. CCLl

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Copyright 1988 by Vera P. I"loutafchieva ISBN 0-88033-148-8 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-80386 Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

1.

The Timar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2.

Mulk and Vakif. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

3.

Rural Land Ownership and the Feudal Rent . . . . . . . ..

139

Notes .................. .r.

• • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • ••

198

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

242

PREFACE

The feudal means of production in Eastern societies is a matter that has been unjustly neglected by bourgeois historiography, which regarded feudalism as something to be found only in countries that had arisen from the ruins of the Roman Empire; that is, only in Western Europe. A sublect of long and detailed study, the institutions of Western feudalism, in this way, achieved the privilege of being regarded as "classical" feudal institutions. This situation, as far as the study of socioeconomic institutions in the Middle Ages was concerned, was the factor that compelled even the classical Marxist writers to analize their principles of the feudal means of productionnamely through their observations regarding the breakdown of the Gennanic clan-based society and the development of feudalism in Western Europe. In spit~ of this, and in spite of the fact that specialized scientific research had not uncovered the framework of feudal institutions in Southeastern Europe, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and the Far East, Marx indicated the existence of important distinctions between Western and Eastern feudal institutions and the existence of an "Eastern Feudalism." Bourgeois historiography showed an interest in the history of the Asian peoples insofar as it affected the interests of the nations of Western Europe. It was for this reason, quite naturally, that the question of feudalism in Eastern societies has only been investigated scientifically by contemporary Marxist historiographers. The many works on feudalism in Central Asia, east of the Caucasus, Asia Minor, and the Arab countries that have been published in recent decades already make it possible to distinguish certain basic tendencies in the development of Eastern feudalism, and to explain the Eastern feudal institutions. These studies give rise to a number of questions, both theoretical and factual. v

~

vi

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Primarily, the study of Eastern feudalism proves yet again the existence of certain general principles underlying feudal society. Here, as in the West, it is characterized by certain "industrial relationships," which are the result of the incomplete ownership of the means of production by the immediate producer and of the extraction of the surplus product by means of noneconomic pressures. Briefly, the study of feudalism in Eastern societies has shown that all peoples have passed through this socioeconomic formation, and that Western European societies hold no monopoly of it. The study of feudalism in the Eastern nations, however, has revealed a number of purely individual features that do not coincide with the predetermined ideas about feudal institutions, as portrayed by bourgeois historians. These features, in fact, are the result of the most important distinguishing mark of Eastern feudalism, which was mentioned by Marx: namely, the possession by the state of the means of production-the land. In a significant part of contemporary Marxist literature, and more particularly in the literature concerning Ottoman feudalism, it is already customary to speak of the "peculiarities" and "specifics" of this feudalisin. Such a description of the characteristics of Eastern feudalism in practice means its subordination to Western European feudalism. In the final analysis, why should the features of feudalism in France not be considred just as "specific" as far as Eastern feudalism is concerned? And why are the features of Eastern feudalism, which appeared in history earlier than Western feudalism, covered a far wider area, and lasted far longer, always evaluated in comparison with Western feudalism? If this had been justified at a time when Eastern feudal institutions had been studied insufficiently for the general laws governing feudalism to be observed, at the present stage of research it is quite unnecessary to give Western feudal institutions priority over Eastern ones. And if, in accordance with the general laws, each feudal society has created its own feudal institutions, each one should be defined by its features, and not by its "peculiarities. " The main feature of Eastern, and more particularly Ottoman, feudalism is the presence of a strong centralized power. As far as agrarian relations are concerned, this feature is expressed in the power to extract revenue from the land. It can be boldly stated that the salient characteristics of Ottoman feudalism arise from this principle. This fact has its own explanation. The Eastern feudal societies had been exposed to the invasions of nomadic tribes and were forced to engage in a constant struggle for existence. The role of these invasions was a dual one. On the one hand, it showed yet again the importance of

PREFACE

vii

a strong centralized power and, on the other, insofar as these tribes succeeded in penetrating the already formed Eastern feudal states, it had a "rejuvenating" effect on them and imposed upon them certain early feudal institutions. Apart from this, the study of feudalism in Asia Minor and Central Asia brings to the fore yet another of its characteristics: the almost ubiquitous presence of two basic forms of feudal land ownershipofficial (usually military) and unofficial. In other words, there was conditional and unconditional feudal land ownership. Although the periodization of feudalism in many Asian societies has not yet been finally determined, we cannot but observe that conditional feudal landownership is usually strengthened by the arrival of new, seminomadic masses, and that it inevitably accompanies the establishment of the power of new conquerors while, at the same time, the relative share of unconditional landownership is considerably reduced. With the further development of feudalism in the same societies, unofficial land ownership (which expands at the expense of official-usually military-land ownerhsip, and aims to make it subordinate) becomes ever more significant. In the certain sense, a similar phenomenon in Western European feudalism is the transition from benefice to feod. This was an isolated phenomenon, just as the barbarian invasion of Western Europe was an isolated event. One of the main questions that comes up in the study of Ottoman feudal institutions is that of the role of local tradition. Ottoman feudalism, which is fully representative of Eastern feudalism, was established on territories where highly developed feudal relationships already reigned supreme. However inadequately the history of the Kayl tribe-at the time when it played a part in the frontier system of the Seldjuk state and the first century of the by-then Ottoman state formation-may have been studied, it must be noted that the conquerors of Asia Minor and the Balkans were at a much lower level of socioeconomic development. The institutions created by the new state were formed naturally under the influence of local feudal institutions; but the role of that influence should not be overestimated. The forms of Ottoman feudalism were, above all, the result of the development of Ottoman society itself. In the final analysis, all feudal institutions have a good deal in common. This is because they are feudal. For this reason, Ottoman feudalism should not be viewed as a mere mechanical continuation of the development of feudalism in the Seldjuk state, Byzantium, or the Balkan states. In this situation, it is particularly unwise to construct theses regarding transition in feudal institutions proceeding from terminological and formal analogies in

viii

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

general. In this repect, the content of a given institution should be kept in mind. On the other hand, however, Ottoman feudalism cannot be viewed separately from the general development of socioeconomic relations in Asia Minor and Southeastern Europe. The very fact that the Ottomans took possession of the forces of production in these lands does not now permit us to draw a definite boundary between the development of Ottoman society and the societies it conquered. In these circumstances, which should always be borne in mind, Ottoman society was built to the detriment of human resources, which were drawn from the local populations in the process of their consistent and continuing muslimization .. The possession of the forces of production is, in fact, what should be understood by the phrase "conquest of the local population." The feudal institutions of Ottoman society, however, cannot be said to be adopted or imported. If the reverse were true, it would be difficult to explain why, in the conquered territories, where mature feudal relations with some initial signs of breakdown had existed,· feudalism continued to thrive for centuries. Agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire are a matter that has been the subject of considerable study. A few decidedly outdated studies by nineteenth-century European bourgeois historians (Hammer, Belin, Tischendorf) were devoted to the history of the Turkish state, and to its agrarian institutions, but many years passed before any further work was done. The second state in the study of Ottoman agrarian institutions took place in the 1930s and 1940s, during which mainly Turkish bourgeois historiographers (Koprulu, Barkan, Uzun~ar§ili and others) published a number of works dedicated to or touching upon certain aspects of agrarian relations in the empire. The third stage in the study of this matter began after World War II. At this stage, we can point to several research centers at which Ottoman feudalism in general and agrarian relations in the empireto a limited extent-were studied. There is already quite a sizeable group of scholars, mainly in the Soviet Union, (Miller, Novichev, Tveritinova, Dostyan, Djikiya, Ibragimov, and others) who have published many studies on the socioeconomic development of the Ottoman state. There are also many Yugoslav hiStorians who have studied Turkish feudalism (Hadzibegic, DrurdZev, Filipovic, Kresevljakovic, Sokolovski, Sopova-Bozanic, Stoyanovski, Kaleski, Mehmedovski, and others). After World War II Sofia also became a center of active research into Ottoman history.

PREFACE

ix

The many special research projects already carried out, which either discuss or mention the matter of agrarian relations in the empire are undoubtedly on a different level as far as scholarship is concerned. The work carried out by the pioneers in this field in the nineteenth century is indeed far even from the standard required by modem bourgeois methodology. The characteristic feature of their studies is an uncritical attitude toward their sources, a fonnal juridical approach, and the complete absence of historicism. In spite of this, the works of Hammer, Belin, and Tischendorf are still widely read because no new studies of many Ottoman agrarian institutions have been carried out. For example, as far as the timar is concerned, with the exception of J. Deny's article in the Encyclopeadia of Islam (which, methodologically speaking, is not much more contemporary, and which rests almost entirely on the studies already mentioned), there is no subsequent special research available other than that carried out by Tischendorf (1872). . Turkish bourgeois historians who should have carried out the most work as far as research into Ottoman feudal institutions is concerned, fall short of our expectations. As far as methodology is concerned, many of them lag far behind the contemporary bourgeois historians, and have produced works that are, from every viewpoint, rudimentary (Uzun~ar§ili, Karamursal, iI!an), which have completely ignored the actual Ottoman source material (Koprulu), and some have put forward unfounded and controversial theses (akdag). The research carried out by that productive scholar of Turkey's economic history, O. L. Barkan, is worthy of special attention. He is, above all, a contemporary Turkish bourgeois historian who makes use of the most significant original Ottoman material, much of which he includes in their entirety in his studies. In this way, Barkan puts into general circulation materials that were previously not accessible to non-Turkish historians. However, the theoretical interpretation of these sources is not always on a scientific level. Barkan's ideas regarding the very same questions frequently contradict one another, are entirely tendentious, and are of a reactionary, idealistic nature. However, his many works are an undoubted step forward in Turkish historiography, as they are devoted to the actual socioeconomic problems of Ottoman history. There are only two important Turkish historians whose work is completely up to the standards required by contemporary bourgeois historiography- H. ina1cik and M. T. Gokbilgin. In their works, we find a typically bourgeois objectivism (of which, in fact, Turkish scholars can rarely be found guilty), together with a critical and precise interpretation of the sources. The many sources mentioned in Inalcik

x

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

and Gokbilgin' s works are of exceptional importance to the study of agrarian relationtions in the Ottoman empire. Typically, if we exclude contemporary Turkish historiography, it is almost exclusively the historians of the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries who are, at present, engaged in the study of Ottoman feudal institutions. The particular interest shown in the history of Turkey by nineteenth-century Western European historians, which was dictated by the political aspirations of Britain, France, and Germany in Eastern Europe and the Near East, has waned completely. The new inpulse in these studies carne from the Marxist historians. Soviet scholars of socioeconomic relationships in the Ottoman empire concentrate mainly on the resistance by the mass of the people to Turkish feudalism (Tveritinova, Novichev, Dostyan, Thragimov). Valuable hypotheses regarding the position of the dependant population are contained in many of their works, in spite of the limited source material on which they are based, and that in certain cases, lead them to biased conclusions. In the final analysis, the contributions of Soviet scholarship to the study of Ottoman feudal reality determine the course of further studies in this field. Yugoslav historiography, represented mainly by the Sarajevo and Skopje Ottomanists, is known mainly for its valuable publications of new Turkish sources, and for its factual contributions. However, the generalized studies of some Yugoslav historians are still rather empirical (Sokolovski, A vdo) or are full of unsupported and not always methodologically sound theses (Dzurdzev, F ilipovic). In Bulgaria, the study of agrarian relations in the Ottoman Empire has only been put on a true scientific basis fairly recently-during the past fifteen years. In spite of this, a great deal of work has been carried out in this field, notably by such eminent historians as D. Kossev, A. Bourmov, H. Hristov, H. Gandev and J. Natan, who, although they do not make direct use of Ottoman material, offer valuable hypothetheses or have carried out separate investigations on the subject of Ottoman agrarian institutions, mainly during the later period of Ottoman rule. Apart from this, the small group of Ottoman historians from the Institute of History has already produced over thirty special studies in this field, based either on little-known or already well-known Ottoman sources. The undoubted advantage-namely the existence of copious archive material-possessed by Bulgarian Ottomanists has provided favorable conditions for the development of Turkish historical studies in this country.

PREFACE

xi

No matter how recently it has been put on a proper scientific footing, the question of agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire, with particular reference to this country when it was under Turkish rule has been considerably researched in many of its aspects. When it comes to an all around study of the matter, however, there are a number of circumstances that should be taken into account. It would be difficult to explain agrarian relations in any feudal society in isolation, as they are but a part of the complex socioeconomic and political reality of that society. In other words, the matter being examined cannot be isolated from the general historical background of Ottoman life at that time. For this reason, the first obstacle to be encountered is the fact that the history of the Ottoman state as a whole has not yet been studied from the Marxist point of view. Any relevant studies in this sphere are completely out of date. The second difficulty that confronts the scholar of agrarian relations in the empire is the huge volume of original material concerning the latter. Also, when we exclude the actual Turkish historians, the bulk of this material is inaccessible to scholars from other countries. Access is only possible through the publications of Turkish historiographers, which are themselves not particularly copious. In all cases, it should be borne in mind that the publication of this inaccessible but existing source material, when it becomes more generally known, will neccessitate a reexamination of many firm conclusions based on the incompl~te data now available to scholars. The third obstacle encountered in the investigation of agrarian relationships is the circumstance that, in spite of the many studies that have recently been devoted to this subject, at the present stage, a biased view of the matter has been given. The question of the position of the direct producer (land ownership, feudal rent, the categories of dependent population) is considered to be central. As far as the institutions of feudal land ownership are concerned, the most-studied are the later ones, (farms, for example, researched by H. Gandev, H. Hristov, and S. Dimitrov in Bulgaria). Very little attention has so far been paid to the early Ottoman feudal agrarian categories. The timar, in its,initial and early stages of development, has not been studied at all. The question of early unoffical land ownership, etc. has not been examined either. Such a state of affairs has also determined the character of this book. The most obvious point is that in one of its main areas, feudal land ownership, that is (represented on the one hand by the timar, and, on the other, by the mulk and the valdf) , the author has been able to rely to some extent on studies previously carried out. Consequently,

c

xii

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

that part of the book, too, is of an analytical nature. This particularly applies to the study of the mulk and the vakiJ, which have not been examined in Marxist literature. As far as rural land ownership and feudal rents are concerned, the author partially relies on established theories that are the result of research carried out by Soviet and Bulgarian historians and on her own research. Consequently, this section of the book is distinguished from the others by the fact that it does not dwell in detail upon the presentation of certain matters that have been explored in the author's earlier works. It should be noted that no examination has been made of the question of landownership in the sultan's has (Translator's note: has-a fief of an annual value of over 10,000 akqe). This omission is due entirely to the lack of accessible material in this field dealing with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However ample the information may be concerning his land ownership during the later period, it is considered that it would be erroneous to apply it to the earlier period. Furthermore, in the territories owned by the sultan, the forms of land ownership and exploitation were unequivocal, and not subject to general juridical requirements. This can be seen from the regime in the has lands from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. For this reason, the study of landownership in crown territories has had to be postponed until actual source material is found. Another feature of this book, which is dictated by the existing state of affairs, is the study of the history of certain agrarian institutions. Because, in the majority of the existing studies, the peculiarities of these institutions as a whole have been shown, it is necessary to trace their origins, gra~ual establishment, and fmally their imposition in order to demonstrate the changes in their characteristics. Naturally, such a presentation of the matter also requires a brief study of certain socioeconomic and political tendencies in the life of the empire, which have dictated the formation of the institutions in question, or upon which they were based. Finally, it should be stressed that, at the present stage of research, the question of agrarian relationships in the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered to have been studied exhaustively. This book confines itself to the study of separate institutions of these relations, which have been studied on the basis of an ample, but not exhaustive, source material. This material also defmes the geographical borders covered by this study, that is, almost the whole of the Ottoman administrative, military, and territorial units of Rumelia and Anatolia, with priority being given to information regarding the European territories of the

PREFACE

xiii

empire. As it was in those provinces that the agrarian regime was typical of the Ottoman feudal system, it is considered that the fact that land institutions in other parts of the empire have not been studied in no way significantly affects the conclusions arrived at in this study.

Chapter 1

THE TIMAR

The principal fonn of feudal land ownership in the Ottoman Empire in the period under review, the fonn in which we find elements of the tradition of certain Moslem feudal fonnations, and of the conquered non-Turkish states, but which, at the same time, is typically Ottoman in the fonn in which it was dominant in the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is undoubedly the timar. It was the principal fonn of landownership, not so much because of the fact that its relative share in the agrarian system was the largest (this statement, according to some data, is open to dispute), but because, within the framework of the centuries in question, it was an institution imposed by the new state. At that time, the still immature feudal class in the ranks of the conquerors, and the existence of a strong central power did not allow the newcomers to wholly adopt the feudal institutions of those who were already settled in Asia Minor or the Balkan states. In one way or another, these institutions were the fruit of the stable and mature development of the feudal relations that had reached, in the Turkish principalities of Asia Minor, a stage of development far beyond that of the Ottomans. It was for this reason that, during the first decades of their expansion, during which the Ottomans retained some fonn of land ownership already established in the Turkish principalities, and even strengthened them (i.e., the mulk, the vakif, and the malikane-divanl eStates, of which I shall have more to say at a later stage), the first agrarian feudal institutions imposed and codified by the new empire was the timar. The extremely arbitrary, limited character of this land ownership, its close dependence on the state, and the timar-holder's obligations to the sultan are features that betrayed the 'more primitive stage of development of the new society in comparison with those already established on its territories. They bore witness to the lack of a firmly based and c

2

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

economically mature feudal class that would not be satisfied with the many conditions attached to the timar. They also demonstrate the still unchallenged might of the state, which was able to enforce such a conditional form of land ownership. This was a- period in which the timar was the most widely practiced form of land ownership, the period in which the emir, and later the sultan as well, relied on his troops, and they upon him. The barbarians who invaded Asia Minor and Southeastern Europe during the fourteenth century did not, however, settle in lands in which the slaveowning society was breaking down and feudalism becoming established. The relationships represented by the Ottomans were in no way new. They had been experienced, some centuries before, by the peoples whose lands they occupied. For this reason, the Ottoman invasions did not play the progressive role that was played by the barbarian invasions of the early Middle Ages. It was essentially a significant step backward in the historical progress of the nations they had conquered. The invaders inflicted their early feudal institutions upon the developed forces of production, which had reached an advanced stage of feudal relations in those countries. It was this aspect of the Ottoman invasion that was the most reactionary. However ruinous the Turkish conquest of the lands of Asia Minor and the Balkans might have been, it dealt a blow to the forces of production, which did not, however, destroy them. And it was the level of development of these forces of production, once established, and in spite of the cruel exploitation inflicted upon the enslaved producers that did not permit the discrepency between their production relations and the institutions that belonged to early feudal society to continue for any length of time. It was for~this reason that the timar, the foundation of land ownership imposed by the invaders, rapidly underwent changes and soon resembled unconditional feudal land ownership and breached the rules laid down for it by the early Ottoman sultans. The formation of the Ottoman feudal class as a separate group, which had been in progress since the first days of the conquest, went in step with and acted as a catalyst to this process, a process that changed the essence of the timar, or ushered in its decline, as some sources say. So, in the fmal analysis, the development of Ottoman feudal land ownership was the result of interaction between the level of development of the forces of production in the conquered lands and the formation of the Ottoman feudal class as a separate group on the one hand, and, on the other, of the aspirations of central government to keep the feudal agrarian institutions within the framework it had already laid down, and to hinder the expansion of feudal

CHAPTER ONE

3

landowners' powers. This particular aspiration was a short-lived one. Initially, it expressed the interests of the large lower stratum of the feudal land-owning class-the sipahi estate. The state, supported by this stratum, opposed to a certain extent the growing economic power and influence of the big feudal land owners. Soo, however, the latter had succeeded in occupying key positions within the administration and turned it into their weapon against the sipahi landowners. The victory of the feudal ruling class in practice meant a victory over the timar in its classic form, the form in which it was established during the fifteenth century. The features of the timar of that time are, however, of considerable interest to the study of Ottoman society; it was the institution that in spite of tradition, inheritance, and adaptations, remained typical of the feudal landownership imposed by the invaders.

The

Miri Lands

(Crown Lands)

The timar, as a form of feudal land ownership, was to be found only within the min lands. This,' according to Ottoman §eriat (religious) tradition, meant the conquered lands in Europe and Asia, with the exclusion of those comparatively small territories that had received a defmite classification during the time of the early Arab caliphate, the so called a§ar (tenth or tithe), and harac (tax paid by non-Muslims in lieu of military service) lands. If, to the aforementioned categories the mulk is also added, i.e., the real estate in centers of population, we have before us the forms of land ownership according to Islamic tradition. Bourgeois historiography accepts uncritically the scheme drawn up by the Islamic law experts, in spite of the obviously unscientific criterion upon which it rests. 1 In recent years, some Soviet, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav historians have suggested new categories for the lands in the empire, aiming at a clarification of the essence of this still unsolved question, not merely its formal outlines. 2 In their research, however, they do not refer back to the origin of the §eriat scheme, but only to the fetva (decisions on matters of canon law) of Abusuud in the sixteenth century. 3 In this connection, in order to achieve clarity , it is necessary to go even further back, to the epoch of the Arab caliphate, whence the §eriat categorization of the lands originates. Discussion of this division can be found in the works of the Arab legal expert, Abu Yusuf Yakub. 4 According to Abu Yusufs treatise, the territories that were populated by Arabs who had adopted Islam before their actual conquest

4

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

by the Moslems were subject only to a religious tithe (zekaJ) , and were left in the hands of their owners. 5 It was namely these that were the tithe lands. Abu Yusuf regards the harae lands as those whose inhabitants had not adopted Islam before they were conquered by the "righteous." [Translator's Note: zekat-alms prescribed by Islam (one-fortieth of one's income): tax for the relief of the poor.] In return for the right to live within the estates of the caliphate, they paid a poll tax (harae) and, in order not to be deprived of their lands, a harae on the land and what it yielded-land and proportional harae. 6 Typically, in the early caliphate, there were no ikta (fiefs) in these categories. Fiefs were only created on waste lands that were entirely unpopulated which shows that the ikta at that time was not yet of a feudal nature. 7 The tithe and harae lands were maintained in the Ottoman Empire within the exact limits laid down during the early caliphate-namely the first in Hejaz and Basra, and the second in Sevad and Iraq. 8 The literature does not, however, mention the reason for the creation of the miriye (or memleket) lands in the later Islamic formations, particularly in that of the Ottomans. Why, in fact, were the territories conquered by the Ottomans not granted harae status, that is, of lands whose inhabitants had not adopted Islam before being conquered by the believers? They, in fact, fulfilled all the requirements fonnulated for harae lands. Also, as A. S. Tveritinova justly points out, in the miriye lands as well the Ottomans enforced revenue collections (poll tax, land tax, and proportional harae, which were typical of the harae lands).9 In the Ottoman feudal state, the categories of land in question were enforced only because of the conservatism dictated by religious dogma. The interests of the emerging feudal classes in some of the Islamic societies did not permit the vast lands they controlled to be embraced by the statutes mentioned in early Islamic religious and legal tradition. According to the ~eriat, the tithe and harae lands in their initial fonn should have remained the property of the direct producers, as nonns were being created for them in the epoch when the clan structure among the Arabs were already declining. 10 Although these nonns were not observed in the Arab caliphate when it was at the height of its power, and feudal estates (fiefs) were being created in the harae lands, the actual situation did not change the essence of the nonn itself. The determination of the fonnal status of the tithe and harae lands reflected, in fact, the degree of socioeconomic growth in the later Islamic societies, in some of which a third category of land-the miriye or memleket-belonging to the treasury or the state had been created.

CHAPTER ONE

5

This was the fund that the central government had set aside for the maintenance of the ruling class as a whole, and which it kept at its sole disposal. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, the timar system was only widespread on the miriye lands, but the other types of fief were granted. Although the Ottoman state did not destroy the feudal forms of land ownership that had established themselves on a part of the harac lands before their conquest by the Ottomans, it did not impose there its own feudal agrarian institutions, and maintained the already existing forms. Because of the circumstances already mentioned, the tithe and harac lands should be excluded from the categories of land that were typical of Ottoman life, as they were an expression of artificially conserved, already outmoded socioeconomic institutions. The miriye and mulk lands were those,whose status corresponded to the relationships that were characteristic of the empire during the period under examination. The mulk or "true" mulk estates were those within the boundaries of settlements, or in their immediate vicinity. The direct producers ~ had full proprietorial rights over them, and could sell, make a gift or a vakiJ, or leave them to their heirs according to the laws of the ~eriat. II In this context, as I. P. Petrushevski also points out, the mulk could also have represented a prefeudal land category. 12 In the Ottoman Empire and, more precisely, in the Bulgarian lands under Turkish rule the strict distinction between the mulk and the miriye was rather blurred. Although this was supposedly a form of unrestricted ownership, or at least conferred ownership rights and that had been compulsorily required without feudal limitations, in our sources we find information regarding the issue of title deeds for house-building plots (ev yer tapusu) , 13 or even for houses (ev tapusu). 14 In addition, as will be seen below, the mulk lands too-orchards, vegetable gardens, melon fields, etc., which were within the boundaries of the settlement-were frequently subject to the kind of feudal taxation that was typical of the miriye lands. 15 These facts (the possession with deeds of houses and house-building plots, the payment of a tithe on the lands owned within the boundaries of the settlement) show beyond doubt that the predominant feudal relationships had blurred the distinction between the miriye and the mulk categories and that a tendency to equalize the status of the various lands existed at that time. The aim of this equalization was to ensure that as little land as possible remained beyond the control of the feudal land-owning class and that maximum revenue be extracted from the land owned by the producer. The estates that were referred to as "false" mulk, which without \

6

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

exception passed into hereditary or real valdfs (pious foundations), were created on the basis of the sultan's authority over the miriye lands. Their characteristics will be discussed at a later stage. It is merely noted that they should be viewed as a form of feudal land ownership with ownership rights over land that is, in essence, miriye. The miriye lands were, therefore, the principal category in the Ottoman feudal-agrarian system. They were not only predominant as far as quantity was concerned in the land fund of the empire, but most fully corresponded, as far as status was concerned, to the predominant feudal relationships within the empire. According to Ottoman ~eriat tradition, the rakabe-the ultimate authority over the miriye lands l6 -belonged to the treasury, that is, to the central government. 17 Although some authors, in their study of agrarian relationships in other Islamic feudal formations consider such a postulate to be pure fiction, it would be difficult to argue that in the Ottoman empire the supreme ownership of the state over the land was something which did not exist. IS In one way or another, in its capacity as supreme owner, the central government kept at its disposal a significant share of the feudal revenue extracted from the population of these lands; in other words, it required a defmite service from its tenants in return for the land it made available to them. It took away the possessions of feudal lords who did not fulfil their obligations; it exploited, through its own agents, vacant land parcels. It fixed the forms and extent of feudal exploitation. In fact, according to the famous postulate of Marx, state ownership of the land in many Asian countries was a reality}9 The central government, as owner, relinquished some of the legal rights it held over the miriye lands to various representatives of the feudal land-owning class. 20 The nature of the rights relinquished by the state in favor of feudal land owners varied according to the differing status of the latter. The conditions under which these rights were granted also differed. It would, in any case, be difficult to establish in what kind of feudal land ownership during the period in question central government fully relinquished its rights. Even with "true" valdfs, the form in which the state legally had no power of intervention, it fixed the norms for the exploitation of the raiyye, and frequently, only on the strength of one ferman, put an end to the valdfs existence. 21 It should immediately be pointed out, however, that when we speak of the Ottoman Empire, it cannot be regarded as a classless apparatus that administered the lives and property of its subjects with equal force, be they raiyye, sipahi, or pa~a. This theory is advanced, with varying degrees of emphasis, by contemporary Turkish bourgeois

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7

historiographers. The Ottoman state was an apparatus of the feudal land-owning class that acted in the interests of that class, and frequently in the interests of one particular stratum. If, at a given moment, it affected the interests of a particular feudal landowner, that would have been in the interest of the feudal land-owning class as a whole, or of the stratum that was in power at that time. This circumstance should always be borne in mind, as the not infrequent opposition by groups of feudal landowners to the state, and vice versa, could lead to inaccurate conclusions as to the nature and role of the Ottoman central power.

The Origin of the Timar The question of the origin of the Ottoman timar, or rather, of that which was the ~astern feudal agrarian institution whose features are most similar to those of the timar, has still not been resolved. Auth0rities on the timar have, in their researches into its origin, come to widely differing conclusions. From Hammer, who traces the origins of land tenancy by the military back to sixth-century Sassanid Persia22 , to Deny, who is inclined to accept Byzantine influence on this Ottoman institution as the decisive factor, one could also mention many other opinions that have been supported by argument to a greater or lesser extent. 23 For example, M. Belin considers that the first military tenancies in the Islamic formations were granted by Nizam-al Mulk, the vezir of the Seldjuk Sultan Ali Arslan. 24 That eminent scholar of the Seldjuk state, V. A. Gordlevski, points out, however, that the Mongols, who in their tum had been under the influence of Chinese institutions, had had a defmite influence on its military-feudal regime. 25 Tischendorf regards the timar system as an institution established by the first caliphs, or, more precisely, by Osman, 26 although he saw data to support the existance of such a form in the Sassanid state. 27 Contemporary Turkish historiographers 27 give particular significance to the Turkic tradition, represented by the western Mongolic peoples (the state of the ~lhans in thifteenth- and fourteenth-century Iran),28 the Seldjuks in Central Asia and Asia Minor, 29 the state formations of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu beyond the Caucasus and eastern Asia Minor in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-centuries,30 and finally by the many feudal principalities that arose during the decline of the Seldjuk sultanate in Asia Minor (the Anatolian beyliks).31 Without making it one of our aims to clarify the complex question of the origin of the timar, we cannot but emphasize that the formations

8

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

mentioned were not at the same stage of socioeconomic development. For example, while the states of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu were, to a certain extent, seminomadic formations with a tribal armed force,32 in the Anatolian beyliks feudal relationships were mature, and unconditional land ownership was predominant there. 33 Consequently, as far as they are concerned, one cannot speak of military land ownership, which is characterized by its conditional nature. In fact, whatever the elements assumed by the timar in the form in which it was imposed in the Ottoman Empire might have been, it was an Ottoman institution, the result of the actual historical conditions created in Asia Minor and Eastern Europe by the influx of barbarian masses into lands where mature feudal relationships had been dominant. In this sense, the timar, as a basic agrarian institution of the conquerors, could be neither "as found" nor "introduced" because it met the requirements of a definite set of historical circumstances. Analogous features in the characteristics of the timar and official land ownerships in certain formations in Central Asia and Asia Minor on the eve of the Ottoman expansion could not but exist, for it cannot be completely separated from the institutions of the conquered feudal states either. But the Ottoman timar, as an institutional system, remains the perfected form of Eastern military feudal landownership (military fiefs). 34

The Military Organization of the Ottomans in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries However abundant the special literature of theses and hypotheses regarding the origin of the timar, and the influences under which it came to be, that containing data and conclusions about the stages of its establishment and the imposition of the timar system in the Ottoman Empire is, in inverse proportion, scarce. This gap is not a question of mere coincidence: it is a consequence of the scarcity of input about the matter in question. Moreover, it is the development of the timar from its initial stages up to its establishment as the dominant system of land ownership that would outline, to a great extent, the forces active in Ottoman society until the mid-fifteenth century and their changing balance and structure. As the function of the timar in the period under review was the maintenance of the feudal landowner's cavalry, it is closely tied to the military organization of the Ottoman state. This is why a brief review of the development of Ottoman military organization would also cast light on the beginnings of the timar.

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A part of the Oguz Turkmen Kayi tribe, led by Ertogrul, which played a part in the Seldjuk military border system during the thirteenth century, was known as ue. It was through the latter that the Sultanate of Ikoneum organized the Turkmen nomadic tribes that had migrated toward its borders, driven by the Mongols. The sultanate directed this nomadic population to its eastern and western borders, setting it the task of defending the border regions. The leaders of the tribes that were included in the ue system were known as ue beyler, and each of them had several ue emirs. These tribal leaders were given tied estates (officially owned ·land) by the central government, but because of the unsettled way of life of these tribes, which would frequently carry out attacks on neighboring lands on their own initiative and were a constant source of headaches to the sultan, the central government preferred to keep their leaders at court as hostages. At the end of the thirteenth century, in the already considerably declining Sultanate of Konya,a large nomad uprising of a religious-hereticaJ. character took place. 35 Thus, it was that part of the Kayi tribe that later, having already mixed with other ethnic elements, became known as Ottoman. It represented part of the "ue" system, that is, the organization of the tribal border troops of the Turkmen nomads in the Seldjuk state. 36 It should be noted that the ue was still present in the Ottoman state a whole century after its creation. As Babinger points out, at the end of the fourteenth century in the Balkan lands of the Turkish military leaders- ue beyler-Iarge hereditary estates were granted, which passed from generation to generation over the centuries. 37 These were the so-called gazi mulkler. The accuracy of Babinger' s assertion is also proved by the fact that some chroniclers, for example Ne~ri, mention Ottoman military leaders bearing the title ue bey. Such, for example, was the famous Eurenos Bey, Pa~a Yigit, and others. 38 Furthermore, the districts that were considered to be border regions (until the beginning of a new campaign), were obviously considered as ue. 39 Again from Ne~ri, we discover that in 1385, Eurenos Bey was granted Seres as an ue estate. 40 A Jerman issued by Murat I in 1386 corroborates Ne~ri's infonnation. In itythe sultcn allowed Eurenos to create a vakif from any part of that land he considered fit, namely, from Seres Komotini (Gumurcine) to Bitolya, Biglishte and Hroupishte. 41 Although the Jerman does not make clear the status of that estate, it was, in all probability, an ue, granted to Eurenos the previous year. The name ue was also given to the part of Serbia that was conquered by the Ottomans toward the end of the fourteenth century (Laz ueu). 42 Consequently, the ue system, which was brought by the Ottomans

10

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

to our lands from the Konya sultanate, was not abolished until the end of the fourteenth century. In all probability, it disappeared during the period of strife between the sons of Beyazit I, as no reference to it can be found in the fifteenth century. Another form of military organization, this time not originating in the Seldjuk state, but created and formed in the Ottoman state were the yaya or p iya de , and m"Usellem or e§kinci bodies. This was the first step in the transition from the tribal irregular troops that composed the military might of Osman I, which were maintained exclusively by pillage, to a regular army. 43 Alaeddin, brother of Orhan and grand vizier of the new state, has been credited with its creation. In time of war, participants in both bodies received a regular wage of one akqe per day. 44 In time of peace, the yaya and m"Usellem cultivated their tax-free lands (farms), which had been granted by the government in exchange for their service. 45 In fact, the bodies in question were still an organization of troops along tribal lines, composed of free peasants, and not of feudal land owners and their serfs. The fact that it was not' 'inherited," but created at the dawn of the empire is very typical. It bears witness to the fact that, during the first half of the fifteenth century, Ottoman society was still not fully feudalized, and had reached the stage of military democracy. The yaya and musellem retained their position of power in the empire's military forces for almost a century. It was known that Saruca Pa§a, as yaya bQ§i of Rumelia, distributed many m"Usellem farms in the Maritsa valley in 1387. 46 In 1421, Mustafa Bey, governor of Rumelia, carried out a restructuring of both bodies. 47 In all probability, although we know nothing of the essence of these reforms, they would have meant the transformation of the yaya and musellem from a primary military force into auxiliary forces-which they were, according to the legislation in force at the time of Selim 1. 48 A basis for such a supposition is provided by A§ikpa§azade, according to whom, during the period of strife between the sons of Beyazit I, the m"Usellem were on the side of Musa, while Mehmet I was supported by the sipahi. 49 The victory of Mehmet consequently meant the victory of the feudal cavalry of the free peasants, and the above-mentioned reform, dating from the first year of the reign of Murat II, in all probability sanctioned that victory. To the military organization of the Ottomans created before the end of the fourteenth century, we should also add the janissaries. This body was also formed at the initiative of Alaeddin during Orhan' s reign (1328), but was only formed as an order of the fighting dervishes under Murat 1. 50 It would appear that, up to the period following

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

11

the strife between the sons of Beyazit, the janissaries were picked at random because it was not until 1438 that Murat IT commenced a systematic recruitment of Christian children to be trained as janissaries. 51 This army, which in the course of time loomed ever larger, in fact played an important part in the military organization of the empire up to the en,d of the sixteenth century. Even after that time, though, the janissaries played a not insignificant part in the political life of the Ottoman state at home, and had become a serious threat both to the central government and to the civilian population. 52 In all events, from the beginning of its formation until its dissolution, the corps of janissaries could be considered neither a tribal nor a feudal armed force, as it was a paid body of guards attached to the sultan's court, which was typical of the Middle Ages. This, in general outline, suffices to describe the military organization of the empire in the first decades of its existance after the emergence of the Ottomans into the historical arena.

The Creation and Early Development of the Timar The origins of the timar are traditionally linked with the name of the first Ottoman sultan-Osman I (1299-1326). Osman himself, before ridding himself of his dependence on the Sultan of Konya, had been his tenant, and had been granted lands around Kara Hisar as an ikta. 53 Hammer, Belin, and Tischendorf, referring to data given by Ne~ri and Saadeddin, are of the opinion that it was Osman who distributed the first timars. To his son Orhan, he gave his estates around Kara Hisar; to his brother Gunduz, a part of those estates, to his father-in-law Ede Bali, Bilecik; and, to Konu~ Alp and Turgut Alp, his military leaders, Yar Hisar and Aynegol. The lands around Bursa and Tapanili were given to his knights. 54 Regarding the conditions under which timars were granted to knights in the Ottoman army, the aforementioned authors merely indicate that these knights had to carry out military service, that their timars were never taken away from them without a reason, that their sons had to take over both their tenancies and their military service, and, if the tenant died while his son was still' a minor, a substitute for the latter would have to be found until he came of age. 55 These are the data that are quoted in the specialized bourgeois literature of the nineteenth century. Contemporary bourgeois historiography is more cautious, ouUing the features of the military tenancies that were granted in Osman's time. Koprulu merely points out that, according to tradition, it was Osman who first distributed estates,56 and the acknowledged expert

12

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

on the timar, J. Deny, adds that nothing definite can be said about the essence of these estates. 57 This caution in qualifying the estates under discussion was fully justified. Thus, for example, in the newly published seventeenth-century chronicle of Koca Huseyin which, in the opinion of its publisher, is based on earlier Ottoman chronicles, the same people who were granted land by Osman are mentioned. That event, which took place in the second year of Osman's reign, is described in the section headed "Distribution of the Villages and Towns." The estates themselves that were granted at that distribution were given the common name of ikta, and, several lines later, they were referred to as mulk ve mal. 57a It is, however, quite obvious that, in Osman's time, the tenn to be used for these lands distributed among members of the ruling family had still not been arrived at; neither was the content of the estates in question stated exactly. Of course, it is difficult to accept that the lands handed out by Osman, even if they did bear the name timar, were like the Ottoman military tenancies granted during the time of Mehmet II, for example. Ottoman society, which had only just commenced the process of feudalization, had yet to create its own feudal institutions. Moreover, if even in Osman's time the central government had got as far as organizing feudal armies, why would the heirs of that sultan have taken a step backward, fonning a tribal army from free peasants? As has already been stated, the yaya and m"itsellem corps were created under Murat I, and they did not relinquish their dominant position until the end of the reign of Beyazit 1. Up until that time, the uc system, which was typical of the nomadic way of life, had also flourished in the new state. Consequently, the idea that the timar was founded in the first years of the Ottoman state is unacceptable. It is more probable that Osman also shared the administration of the previously conquered land in Asia Minor with his relatives, a practice widespread among the Anatolian beyliks, where each member of the ruling family administered his own district and led his own troops into battle. 58 Data relating to the condition of the timar in the time of Orhan I (1326-1359) are even harder to come by. Only Hammer notes that this sutlan, too, granted timars and zeamets, without indicating the reasons for such a statement. 59 However, the fact that it was not until the reign of Murat I that the tenn zeamet was introduced is sufficient reason for this statement to be rejected. 60 The worries of Orhan I concerning the organization of the Ottoman anny are made sufficiently clear by the fact that he created three entire military corps (of infantry and cavalry from free peasants and janissaries). For this reason, it

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13

is difficult to believe that he would not have devoted tirrie to the organization of the tenants' cavalry, if such had already been in the early stages of creation. Another fact neglected by specialized literature should be emphasized here. Some estates granted to the kadi and other state employees date from the time of Orhan. However, these estates were not timars, but tied valdfs. They were passed from person to person on the basis of service to the state. 61 Estates of this type were granted by the state even in the time of Mehmet II, at which time they were not only connected with service of a religious nature. Persons entrusted with the repair of bridges,62 shipbuilding,63 etc. were granted such valdfs. The fact that such estates were not granted after the reign of Mehmet, that is, after the firm establishment of the timar system, bears sufficient witness to the as yet secondary role of the timar in official (tied) land ownership until the middle of the fifteenth cen~ry. In any case, the use of the valdJfor the remuneration of state employees, (hizmeti mukabilesinde mutasarriJ, "possesses ·it in return for his services' '), at which time three non feudal military corps were created, proves that Orhan I did not engage in the organization of official (tied) land ownership as represented by the timar.64 Information regarding the timar from the reign of Murat I (1359-138~), is far more concrete. It is not only the first major victories in the Balkans that are connected with the reign of this sultan. He is rightly considered to· be the empire's first legislator. Toward 1375, with the aid of the beylerbey of Rumelia, Timurta§ Pa§a, Murat issued a law that, among other things, arranged the division of the military fiefs into timars and zeamets and stated that they should, without exception, be granted by the beylerbeys. 65 In all probability, these initiatives of Murat I followed others connected with the name of Hayrettin Kara Halil <;;andarli, the first vizier of the empire, who, although not a member of the Ottoman dynasty, ruled from 1368 to 1387. 66 Before this period, Hayrettin had been a kadiasker, and in this capacity had established the Ottoman treasury and had declared the conquered lands to be treasury property. 67 Consequently, the system of the miriye lands dates from before 1368, and thus precedes Murat's law for the.. division of the military fiefs. The above mentioned measures undertaken by the Ottoman central government unequivocally prove that it was after the mid-fourteenth century that the beginning of the timar in its "classical" form was created. They also bear witness to the social processes that were tiking place in Ottoman society. The extensive conquests which, in half a century, had turned the "uc emirate" of Osman into a huge state were undoubtedly brought about by the beginnings of Ottoman feudaliza-

14

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

tion. On the other hand, however, they affected the development of socioeconomic relations in their state, and accelerated the feudalization of Ottoman society. In the same way, as with the Franks, where' 'the move to Rome territory broke up the local alliances in the area, which had been founded on blood relationship," the Ottoman invasion of the lands of the feudal Turkish principalities, Byzantium, and the Balkan states contributed to the rapid passing of the remnants of clan relationships.68 An expression of this process was the conversion of the land into state property, i.e., into the property of the feudal landowning class that had recently begun to form, and its removal from the hands of the former owners. The very fact that in the midfourteenth century the conquerors, with one of their first central acts of legislation, laid their hands on the land, which was the main instrument of production in feudal society, unequivocally proves that feudalization was in full swing among the Ottomans at that time. It is only in this way that the fact that in the new state the harac formula, which corresponded to the prefeudal means of production, was not applied in the conquered lands. In certain sources about, and dating from, the era of Murat I, we begin to encounter the sipahis as a military group of a certain importance. For example, in his Jerman to Eurenos, Murat states: "You should open your gates to give rewards and gifts to the sipahis. "69 In his description of the battle of Kosovo in 1389, Ne§ri, in one of his quatrains, refers to "sipahis who eat the sultan's bread . . .' '70 It should be noted, however, that when the composition of the army is listed, the sipahis are not mentioned. Of all the fighting divisions mentioned by Ne§ri-"saf, tulb. ko~un and alay,-only the latter could be taken as meaning "sipahi. ' '71 At that time, both the composition and distribution of troops in battle were different from that encountered when the sipahi corps was at its zenith.72 The comparatively short reign of Beyazit I (1389-1402) left no trace in the organization of military fiefs. At any rate, in the battle of Ankara (1402), there were sipahis from Anatolia and Rumelia among the troops led by the sultan. 73 The period between 1402 and 1421, that is, from the captivity of Beyazit until the end of the reign of Mehmet I (1413-1421), is of exceptional significance'in the study of social forces in Ottoman society in the era when the empire was being formed. The struggles between the sons of Beyazit were not merely struggles for the Ottoman throne. The various strata of society that had an interest in the feudalization of the state were also involved-although one cannot yet speak of a fully formed Ottoman feudal class-as were the masses, who were threatened by this feudalization.' Even bourgeois historiographers, who

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accept the vague term "latinization" for the feudalization of Ottoman society, cannot ignore the social character of these struggles. Musa <;elebi (referred to by Vitek as the "revolutionary prince"), was supported, as already stated, by tribal troops, by the "free peasants," organized in the yaya and mUseliem corps, and by the masses, both Muslim and Christian. The fact that his kadiasker was namely Bedrettin Simavi, the harbinger and inspiration of mass people's movements in the reign of Mehmet I, shows that Musa really tried to put the deep discontent of the peasants-as far as advancing feudalization was concerned-to use in the struggles against his brothers. For his part, Mehmet I, relying on the increasingly strong sipahis, and on his connections with the feudal Anatolian beyliks, waged a merciless campaign against the tribal troops led by Musa and against the mass movement§.74 The historical necessity that had set Ottoman society on the road to feudalization meant that Bedrettin Simavi and Borkluce Mustafa's uprisings were doomed to failure. The rise of the tima;' as an institution of Ottoman feudalism was secured by the victory of Mehmet I. His rule was linked with the gradual imposition of the timar as a system. 75 Although literature does not stress the role of Mehmet in the organization uf the military fiefs, we have at our disposal certain original data from his time, which leads us to conclude that a partial registration of the timars was already taking place. Although they did not form the bulk of the estates in the empire, they were fairly widespread.1 6 Historiographers concede that it was in the reign of the next Ottoman sultan, Murat II, 1421-1452 (with a break from 1444 to 1448), that the timar system reached its fullest stage of development. 77 Toward 1431, it would seem, the first complete registration of military fiefs took place. In it, not only the names of the sipahis and their annual income were recorded, but their strictly defined duties as well. From the notes attached to the registration of 1421, we can discern an established way of transferring timars, and a complete system of accounting carried out by the central government to increase its revenues, etc. from the various fiefs.78 A typical feature is that that particular stage in the establishment of timar estates, which may be considered a victory for the system, is linked with political events in the empire, in which we cannot but notice the action of social forces. In Murat's reign, the Ottoman state was attacked almost continuously by the remains of the Anatolian beyliks and by the old hereditary Turkish aristocracy. These struggles only came to an end in the reign of Mehmet II, with the fmal victory of the Ottomans; but, up to that time, they had seriously threatened

16

AGRARIAN RELATIONs IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

the life of the young state. Until this day, historiographers have been able to discover the reason for Murat's temporary abdication, what forces compelled him to do this, and his reason for resuming his place on the throne. 79 The actions of his son, however, cast some light upon this question.

The Establishment of the Timar as a System Mehmet II (1451-1481) was the Ottoman ruler whose name is inextricably linked with the final imposition of the timar system and with putting it on the statute books. The name of "Conqueror" was given to him not only because he captured Constantinople (1453), but because of his victories over the remains of the Anatolian beyliks and over Karakoyunlu U zun Hasan. 80 It should be stressed, however, that the hereditary feudal aristocracy of the beyliks had its supporters in the Ottoman government. These were in the stratum of senior dignitaries, pashas and viziers, possessors of large, tied estates. It is known that, among the Turkish feudal formations in Asia Minor from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, it was only the Ottomans who exercised the supreme power of the state over the land. Characteristic of the beyliks was the unconditional ownership of estates, which carried no obligations whatsoever toward the central government. 81 In the period of the final establishment of the timar as a system in the actual Ottoman state, this form of land ownership accounted for a considerable share, which was represented by the senior dignitaries and courtiers. 82 The establishment of the miriye land institution armed the aristocracy of the Anatolian beyliks against the Ottoman state. Their opposition grew apace with the rise of the timar, that is, of tied, conditional land ownership. It also represented a danger to the owners of mulks within the empire itself. The campaign of Mehmet II against the Turkish Anatolian aristocracy was merciless. The measures he undertook against the internal representatives of the mulk land ownership were no less harsh. Bourgeois historiographers have been unable to explain the removal and even the murder of senior dignitaries, whose place in the government of the state was hereditary-with Halil <;andarli II in first place. 83 That, however, was the first of a number of measures designed not only to impose the timar as- a system of land ownership, but to impose it at the cost of the mulk system in the struggl~ against its representatives. An expression of this consistent policy of the central government is the circumstance that, during the reign of Mehmet IT, no mulk properties were granted and that no tied vakifs, apart from

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the sultan's, were established. 84 As a peak of the same policy, however, is the fact emphasized in many Ottoman documents of the abolition, under Mehmet II, of tied mulks and vakifs set up before his reign and the formation of timars from their revenues. This fact, which is of immense significance for the study of the development of the Ottoman feudal agrarian system, has remained unnoticed by historiographers. Moreover, the abolition of the forms of unconditionalland ownership which gave birth to the economic power of the group of courtiers that was coming into being that is, of the hereditary landowning aristocracy, is the clearest expression of the establishment of the timar as the principal form of feudal land ownership and as an agrarian system in the empire after the mid-fifteenth century. The political consequences of this act were undoubtedly the defeat of the remains of the feudal aristrocracy of the beyliks, and a serious attempt to ~strike a blow against the growing hereditary land-owning aristocracy in the empire itself. This blow could only be struck by the central government if it relied on the broad stratum of small military fief holders, the sipahis. The fact that Mehmet II made such an attempt, and succeeded in carrying it out within the framework of his administration, means that the sipahis were already sufficiently strong to support the central government against the owners of large mUlks and vakifs and had already established themselves in a firm position in the social structure of the empire. 85 The legislation with which Mehmet II finally determined the status of the timar is of considerable interest as far as the degree of socioeconomic development that Ottoman society had attained after the mid-fifteenth century is concerned. It should be pointed out that, in his great work on the era of the Conqueror, Babinger almost completely ignores this source of information, and devotes a mere three pages of his large volume to the structure of military fiefs and their codification. 86 If the aforementioned bourgeois scholar had shortened his apologia for the statesman-like perfection of Mehmet II and had replaced it with an analysis of the most important document of the era in question, without doubt, the discrepancy between the picture of peaceful and prosperous progress that he paints and the true state of affairs would have become apparent. 87 The law of Mehmet II is divided into four sections (fasil): (a) regarding rape; (b) regarding assault, insult, and murder; (c) regarding the drinking of wine, theft and slander; and (d) simply the "Fourth Section of the Law of Mehmet Khan. "88 As appendices to this law, there is a decree regarding the yoruks (nomads), a "law regarding cebelli" ("mountain dwellers"), and a "law regarding house-holding

18

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

infidels. ' , 89 The briefest glance at the legislation of Mehmet IT gives an impression of its chaotic nature. In the' 'law regarding infidels," which should concern relationships between the subject infidels, or non-Muslims, and the feudal landowners, most of the sections concern trade (including foreign): in the section dealing with wine drinking, theft and slander are included as important decrees relating to landownership in villages, etc. The chaotic nature of, and lack of differentiation in his decrees can, in essence, only be compared with the primitives codes of justice, but not, however, with the level of Byzantine law. 90 In fact, the entire nature of Mehmet' s kanunname only strengthens the impression that it belonged to a barbarian system of legislation. The very fact that its first three sections-in other words, the bulk of it-are devoted to crimes such as rape, assault, slander, etc., for which a fine according to the social position of the culprit is envisaged, confirms its similarity to Burgundian and Salic law. 91 No less typical is the circumstance that, for the section that partially describes the obligations of the already dependant peasant to his timar holder, the legislator could fmd no other title than "Section Four of the Law of Mahmet Khan. " The remaining decrees that determine the feudal obligations of the peasant are to be found in an appendix obviously added at a later date. From a brief glance at the law of Mehmet IT, one underlying fact immediately strikes one-namely the still-primitive, barbarian character of that legislation. Feudal relationships, which were established relatively quickly against the background of Ottoman society, mainly because of the significant degree of development of the forces of production that the Ottomans found in the conquered territories, were, in the time of Mehmet IT, insufficiently reflected in the administrative superstructure. This lack of consistency (which, in fact, did not last long)-as in legislative records that have survived from the time of Stileyman I, there can be no mention of primitiveness and barbarian elements-had a negative influence upon the entire life of the peoples conquered by the Ottomans, a fact that is disregarded by Babinger. The organization of the timar system, which commenced under Murat I, was in fact completed under Mehmet ll. Thus, toward the end of the fifteenth century the timar, as the basis of Ottoman feudal landownership, had attained its classic form, which remained for not more than a century, but the features of which are regarded by literature as characteristic of the timar system.

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The Structure of the Timar and Types of Timar Timars, both large and small, were sums written off from the socalled mal-f mukatele, revenues intended for the maintenance of the army. In the form in which they were granted, timars did not represent indivisible units possessing their own structure. In fact, according to the law, it was only that part of the timar, described as kiliq, which was indivisible. This was the minimal timar of about 3,000 akqe for the European provinces of the empire, and about 2,000 for Anatolia. 92 The name kiliq, meaning "saber," was given to this unit because the person to whom it had been granted was only obliged to provide his own military service. Any amount that exceeded the kiliq was counted as hisse, that is, a part or supplement. 93 In return for the supplements added to the basic size of the timar, the sipahi was additionally obliged to maintain military units and provide military equipment. By analogy with the parts of the timar referred to as kiliq and hisse, was the division of the timars themselves into icmalli and hisseli. Those that were of a minimal, indivisible size belonged to the first category , and those that had supplements over and above the kiliq to the second. This division of zeamets, the minimum size of which was 20,000 akqe, but which had at one time been composed of timars to which over the years a number of hisse had been added, bringing them up to the size of a zeamet (over 20,000 akqe), was particularly important. 94 The first were treated as icmalli-indivisible, and the second as hisseli. The only purpose of this division was to prevent the zeamets that had been granted as zeamets from being split up when they were transferred to new sipahis, while the timars that had subsequently assumed zeamet status could be split up when being transferred. 95 Another division of the timars was that of the tezkeresiz and tezkereli. The latter name was only given to timars that had been granted (up to the time of Siileyman I) by the beylerbeys themselves, without the permission of a central authority being required. 96 For Rumelia, the size of a tezkeresiz timar could not exceed 5,999 akqe, given a kiliq of 3,000. The tezkereli timars in Rumelia, those which were granted by the central government on the basis of a document signed by the beylerbey (tezkere), ranged in size from 6,000 to 19,999 akqe, and their kiliq was from 6,000 akqe. 97 In essence, the timars were divided into e§kinci, each held by only one person who was obliged personally to serve in the army. There

20

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

was also the benovbet, which was granted to several persons who took it in turns to serve, and into mustahjiz, which was granted to nonmilitary persons such as kadi (judge) and defterdar (the head of the financial department of a vilayet), etc., who served the state. In some documents, this kind of timar is referred to as bervech-z qiftlik. 98 The remaining divisions of the timar are not according to a purpose, but bear witness to a certain gradation within the framework of the system itself. Thus, for example, a certain number of timars referred to as gedik were granted only to persons at court, and so on. The gedik timars were not available to ordinary sipahis. 99 The privileged position of these timars was reflected in the fact that their owners were obliged to take part in campaigns only when they were preceded by the grand vizier, i.e., their obligations were very few. loo Finally, the most important division of the timars in the empire was into free (serbest) and not free gayr-z serbest). The division in question is an expression of the specific feudal heirarchy that existed within the timar system. 101 The has of the viziers, beylerbeys, sancak-beys, dizdars ni§ancl-beys, qeriba§i and suba§i, and other ranks of the sipahi's troops also belonged to the "free" timar category .102 The timars of the sipahis with the rank of private, with the exception of the zaim, were considered to be tied. In practice, the differences between these two main categories lay in the distribution of the feudal rent. Thus, the holders of "free" timars did not set aside any part of the revenues registered in their name for the benefit of the higher ranks in the military timar-holding heirarchy, while the holders of "tied" timars set aside half of the so-called free taxes, which were registered in their names as revenue. Consequently, the division in question made some of the timar holders subordinate to other timar holders, and thus established a kind of feudal hierarchy in the timar system. 103

Registration of the Timar As it was the central government that granted, transferred, extended, and withdrew timars, just as it exercised control over growth in revenue from the feudal rent of the miriye lands, which was due to population growth and the cultivation of waste land, it is obvious that its special departments exercised strict control over the condition of the timars. These departments were included in the defterhane, the institution in charge of state income and expenditure. Registers of the timars were kept in three separate offices of the defterhane: icmal kalemi, mufassal kalemi, and ruznamqe kalemi. 104

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According to Uzun9'ir§i1i, the aim of these departments' activities was to protect the raiyye (' 'unbelievers' ') from the whims and arbitrariness of the feudal rulers, and to limit the powers of the latter over their subject populations. 105 It is obvious that this could hardly have been the aim 105 of the central government, for which the complicated registration of the timars and the vast bureaucracy involved in this was the only way of extracting the largest possible land rent from the miriye lands, and, at the same time, securing the maintenance of the much larger feudal army in return for the income from that rent. The iemal office registered each separate estate-has, zeamet, mulk, vakif-in a given administrative-territorial unit, noting the name of the holder, his military obligations, and his annual income. l06 From the surviving iemal registers it is clear that notes of any changes that had taKen place in the timar between two registrations were made in them.l07 The role of the mufassal registers was different. They, above aU, dealt with the taxation of the households included within a given timar, and consequently, exercised control not over the changes that had taken place in the timar, but in agricultural production, the feudal taxation of which was a source of timar revenue. In the surviving mufassal, we find scant reference to any change in timar holder, which is probably due to the fact that these documents were compiled more frequently.l08 The ruznamqe office, which kept daybooks in which permissions granted for receiving, extension, transfer, etc. of the timars were recorded, consequently kept control over their movement. l09 Also, on the basis of the copies issued by that office, the lost entitlement documents of timar holders could be replaced. In essence, the ruznamqe register was a complete collection of all feudal land ownership documents that had been issued. The registration of timars was carried out every thirty years according to the law .110 It would seem that, in practice, this decree was not observed, as the extremely frequent transfers of timars, during which they changed their composition, would have brought complete chaos to the central registry over such a long period. For example, in the ledgers covering Albania, Western Macedonia, and Northern Greece, which have been preserved to this day, the following registrations for the period in question have been established: in 143111432 (this was, in fact, the second registration, but the registers from the first, which were incomplete, have not survived), at the beginning of the reign of Beyazit IT 1506/1507, 1515/1516, 1519/1520. There was a further registration in the time of SUleyman I: 1568/1569, 158111582, 1583/1584. 111

22

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Quite apart from the registration of the timars, the so-called yoklama, that is, inspections of the sipahis who had taken part in a given campaign we~e carried out. Yoklama's were carried out in 1596, 1605,1632,1657,1694,1695,1698,1699,1777,1782,1792, and so on.112 Between two registrations in the villages whose income was given in timar, new households were established. Entire new villages were established, too. As such households and villages were not recorded in the ledger current at that time, they were referred to as haric ez defter (ex-register), or ziyade, or as nev yafte-newly opened}n An official (i/ yazici, or local registrar) appointed for the purpose kept an account of such new developments}14 As a rule, income from the raiyye, and the haric ez defter villages was collected by the treasl!ry, the so-called mejkufcu. They also collected the feudal rent from those timars that had temporarily remained untenanted. liS However, practice shows that, in many cases, the local. sipahis also collected the income from village households that were not registered in their name, which led to frequent arguments between the mefkufcu and the timar holders}16 On the other hand, practice also shows that the unregistered households were frequently included in separate new timars even before the due registration had taken place}17

The Official Status of the Timar As far back as the decree that history considers to have been written by Osman I, it was stated that "he to whom a timar is granted cannot be deprived of it without a reason, while he is able [to carry out his obligations]. On his death, it should pass to his son. If he [the son] is a minor, his servants should assume responsibility for the military service until he comes of age. "liS This decree contains, in general terms, the conditions for the granting, transfer, and removal of the timar, which were later to be developed and expanded. According to the law, a sipahi' s sons were entitled to hold a timar. They had to prove their ancestry with the supporting statements of a certain number of timar holders or zaims. Timars were not granted to sons whose fathers were still living. 119 During the reign of SUleyman I, a table with complex gradings of the timars according to the size to which the sons of sipahis were entitled was compiled. The size of these timars was dependant on the size of their father's timars and were in a one third to one tenth ratio. Apart from this, the sons of sipahis who had died in battle received a larger timar than those whose

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fathers had died of natural causes. 120 In all cases, the rimars of sipahi' s sons were considerably smaller than those of their fathers. In this way, the government aimed at providing for the maintenance of the widest possible circle of a sipahi's descendants. These measures, however, had the reverse effect. The sipahi's sons were insufficiently interested in acquiring rimars because, if their deceased father's annual income amounted to 10,000 ak(e (it will be seen that rimars rarely reached this sum), they would have received a rent of no more than, 2,000-3,000 ak(e. 121 There was another way of acquiring a rimar that during the period in question, was widely used. Any Moslem, whether he was a raiyet who had enrolled in the armies of the beylerbeys and sancakbeys, or whether he had been in a border detachment and had distinguished himself in battle, received from his commanding officer a certificate that gave him the right to apply for a rimar. 122 He could even obtain this from the beylerbey directly, if there were a vacant rimar with an income of less than 6,000 ak(e .123 Any further military distinction led to an increase in the size of the rimar (teraki) by 10 percent. 124 During the reign of Selim II, because of the limitation of income intended for military maintenance purposes, the sum of 500 ak(e was set as the maximum for such a supplement. 125 The sipahi who was found not to have fulfilled his obligations, or not to have adhered to the rules of the sipahi organization, was deprived of hisrimar. If he had not presented himself for service in a given year, he was obliged to pay his feudal income for that year to the treasury. If the offense were repeated, he lost his right to hold a rimar, but could reclaim it if his service record were "clear" for a period of seven years. Sipahis who left the sancak (administrative area) in which their timars were situated (when not carrying out military service) were also deprived of their rimars.127 Timars that became vacant were granted either by, or on the recommendation of, the beylerbey, and the following preferences were taken into account: (a) the son of a deceased rimar holder (b) a rimar candidate who lived in the same sancak. 128 In return for the rimar which was granted, the sipahi was obliged to participate personally in campaigns or in the garrison guard, to keep two or more armed retainers (cebelli) or unarmed servants (gulam), to provide tents, etc. The obligations of the sipahi were a function of the size of his rimar. 129 The legal requirements set out are very general, and describe the timar system in its "classic" form. Bourgeois historiography, to which we owe the many special studies of the timar, has, with the charac-

o

24

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

teristic fonnally legal approach, taken its conclusions to be the essence and features of that Ottoman institution, the fonner being based almost exclusively on the infonnation offered by the legislation, and not on the bulk of the available information at all. 130 The ample material concerning the timar offered by the documentary evidence has been almost entirely ignored by bourgeois scholars. Only in some of his more recent works (such as the detailed introduction to the publication of the Register of Arvanidili of 1431, or in his report on the same ~egister read to the Fourth Congress of Turkish Historians), has H. Inalcik attempted to analyze the actual historical material concerning the timar.l31 Moreover, this analysis is, to a great extent, formal and empirical, and the author has not carried it to any significant conclusions as far as the timar system in the fifteenth century is concerned. It is unneccessary here to emphasize the great significance of the actual source material when it comes to describing the most important socioeconomic feudal institution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One thing is obvious: the legal records of that period are quite unable to convey the many aspects of the timar system when it was at its height and the first symptoms of its decline. This is why, on the basis of the original material used in this study, an attempt will be made to throw light on some features of the timar in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which have been ignored by bourgeois literature.

The Essence of the Timar During the period in question, the timar represented a deduction from the centralized feudal rent, which the state granted to a person who had assumed certain obligations to it, in return for his maintenance. In this sense, the word timar referred not only to rents of 20,000 akqe, but also to official rents in general and, more precisely, to portions of the centralized rent granted in return for service, regardless of the timars' size. 132 The specialized bourgeois literature views the timar exclusively as a rent, as a defmite piece of land, a part of the feudal income that was appropriated by the tenant by delegation from the central government. This is Belin's definition (fief, te rrito ire) , 133 of Tischendorf (lehen) , 134 and finally of Deny, according to whom, the Ottoman legislation defined the character of the timar as "purely agrarian." 135 In this conception of bourgeois science, the attempt to reduce the Eastern feudal institutions, especially the timar, to the forms of land ownership characteristic of the feudal Western European societies can

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be clearly seen. It is not a matter of coincidence that Belin introduces, as the basic argument to support his thesis, the view held by the eminent Restoration historian, August Thierry: "There is nothing exceptional in the question of Turkish society; it is nothing other than the question of the French society which conquered Gaul, the Norman society which conquered Britain .... As the conditions were identical in all three cases, everything else should have been identical, and was, in reality, identical." 136 Further on in his work, Belin uses, with certain reservations, the Frankish institution of the "feud" in order to determine the timar in the same way in which Deny refers to the miriye lands as "dominial." 138 The step forward that Marxist historical study has made in relation to bourgeois historiography consists, among other things, of the fact that its underlying approach is concrete-historical. And, if Thierry is right inasmuch as he compares Ottoman society with the barbarian societies in which territorial gains accelerated feudalization, he unpardonably simplifies the matter as far as the institutions that reflect this feudalization are concerned. Moreover, each attempt to reduce the Eastern feudal institutions to simply variations of the Western European feudal institutions means an underestimation of the historical role of the peoples of the East, who underwent feudal development before those of the West. Unarguably, the timar as a system, which reached its final form in the mid-fifteenth century, was a system of feudal land ownership, or, rather, of the distribution of the feudal rent among the representatives of the ruling class. It could not be said, however, that the timar, as the principal unit of that system, could be compared with the , 'rent, " the "fief," and could even less be considered as a "territory," as an institution of a purely agrarian character. We shall not dwell upon the arguments connected with the grading, formation, supplements, etc. of the timar, which are always expressed in akqebecause they are well known. Only certain data, which make it unequivocally clear that the timar could not be regarded as a territory, but rather as a revenue, will be introduced. A certain proportion of the lands in Asia Minor were organized in the maliklme-divanz system even before their conquest by the Ottomans. That meant that both their possession and a portion of their feudal rent belonged to the vakif (in its capacity of malik), and the remainder was collected by the government. 139 In the Ottoman state, the "malikcme-divanz" system was preserved, with timars being formed from that part of the feudal revenue to which the government was entitled. This situation was sanctioned by the legislature for ~ertain

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Anatolian sancaks: "[The lands] which are not wholly mulk or vakiJ, but are together with has and timar .... "140 "From the villages in the Erzincan vitayet which were vakiJ, from ancient times 3/10-2 divani and 1 malikcme was taken, these being for the vakif. On the basis of practice until then, 2/10 divani and 1110 for the vakiJwas registered. The divan'i [portion] is a timar .... ' '141 Even in our own lands, where the system under discussion never existed legally, cases can be observed in which a part of the revenue of the vakiJ villages was gathered as a timar. For example, the raiyye from certain villages in the vakiJ of ~ehabeddin Pa§a in the Plovdiv district paid only one tax-ispenqe-to the sipahi. 142 Also, in the sixteenth century, another five villages were the vakiJ of Thrahim Pa§a. One of them, the village of Korova, paid a set part of its taxes to the sipahi-' 'his raiyye taxes are a timar to the sipahi," we read in the inventory, "and its title belongs to the vakif" 143 The status of the population of Gaglayik, a vakiJ of Murad IT, was even more complex. It paid a poll tax to the state, raiyye taxes to the vakif, and a tithe to the sipahi. 144 The cases quoted show that here the timar can, on no account, be treated as a tenancy or as a territory. If this were the case, we should have to accept the absurd position that two feudal estates overlapped completely. There are other facts that prove that in the Ottoman Empire, the noncoincidental practice existed of creating more than one timar on the same piece of land. For example, the qeltik bedeli tax, which in principle belonged to state revenues, was paid, among other taxes, by the inhabitants of the Melnik district who were included in the zeamet of Mehmet Pa§a K~raman1.145 In 1481, this tax was turned into a timar, and granted to Ishak Pa§a. 146 Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Seres formed a part of the has of the Beylerbey of Rumelia, who also collected the revenue from the internal excise duties (baq). In 1482, this revenue w Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Seres formed a part of the has of the Beylerbey of Rumelia, who also cas isolated from the others, turned into a state mukataa, and, in 1492, was divided into three parts. The first was so as a timar, to Mehmet Pa§a Hersekzade. 147

In the same way, fishing dues in the Salonika district toward the end of the fifteenth century w~re made into a timar and granted to the subll§i of the city .148 The charges payable on entry into Edirne through two of its gates-the "new" gate and the "Constantinople" gatewere made into timars in 1480, and granted to separate persons, Me§ aleci Ali and Ekmek~i Hidir, and others. 149 The cases mentioned bear witness not only to the fact that other "tenancies" could be created on the territory of a given "tenancy" on

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the orders of the central government; they are also proof of the inc onsequential link between the timar and the exploitation of the feudally dependant population. Thus, for example, timars were formed from taxes on trade, tolls, police fines, and so on. 150 In this sense, the timar could also be connected with urban life, with nonagrarian sources. However, the practice of the has, that is, of the sultan's has, which were unconnected with a given territory, was far more widespread. It is known that many taxes collected from a population with "special obligations," scattered throughout separate administrative units, were declared/to be a has. This is what happened, for example, with the taxes paid by the piyade and mUsellem in the Gelibolu district,151 with the revenue collected from "bad-u hava " in the Nikopol and Silistra areas, etc. 152 And, consequently, in these cases the feudal landowner (in this case the sultan), received as a has revenues that neither were connected with a given territory, nor were paid by the population that cultivated the has land. . On the basis of these facts, it could be pointed out that, during the period in question, the timar was not only a tenancy, a given area of land, but a definite annual income granted by the government to a given person. In the great majority of cases, this income was the result of the feudal exploitation of the dependant populationconsequently, of agrarian origin. But there were timars that were entirely divorced from agriculture and from the exploitation of the raiyye. Consequently, the term timar cannot be adequately interpreted either by the word "tenancy," or by "military fief land ownership," as these only partly describe its essence. This is why it would be most appropriate for this institution of Ottoman feudalism to be described simply as the "timar system," the term being used to designate a given concrete-historical fact. As far as the present study is concerned, however, its object is only those timars that were of agrarian origin, and that were composed of portions of the feudal rent. The treatment of these timars as a form of feudal land ownership is fully justified.

The Size of the Timar As stated, Ottoman legislation had provided that the timar should consist of sums up to 20,000 akqe, and the zeamet, of sums of up to 100,000 akqe. Revenues of over 100,000 akqe were treated as a has. It is sufficient to make only a rough calculation based on the collected works of Aynl Ali in order to establish that the average sipahi tenancy was, in actual fact, much less than that provided for by the law. For example, in Rumelia, the average timar was around 5,240

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ah;e, in Anatolia, 4,271, in Karaman, 5,096, Teme§var, 5,677, Mera§, 3,127, Diyarbekir, 5,170, and so on.153 It should also be taken into account that these data are from the beginning of the seventeenth century, when certain changes in the timar system had already taken place. We can fmd absolutely reliable information about this matter in the timar registers. The oldest known register of timars in Rumelia dates from 1431, from the reign of Murat IT, and contains descriptions of timars that are mainly in today' s Macedonia, western Macedonia, and northern Greece. As there were formerly only partial registers of some districts included in Arvanidili, the ledger in question is in fact the result of the first general registration of the timars in Rumelia, and is, for this reason, of great significance for the study of the timar system in its initial form. 154 According to the calculations of the publishers of this valuable source, H. inalcik, a mere 30 percent of the timars in Arvanidili were of more than 3,000 a/a;e, and 60 percent, from 1,000 to 3,000 akr,;e. 155 The remaining 10 percent were distributed among the zeamets (which in this register were referred to as has), and the true has. 156 Because the percentages set out by inaIcik are very general in character, here is the detailed table of the sizes of timars from the same register. From 500 to 1000 akr,;e 1000 to 2000 akr,;e 2000 to 3000 akr,;e 3000 to 4000 akr,;e 4000 to 5000 akr,;e 5000 to 7000 akr,;e 7000 to 10,000 akr,;e 10,000 to 15,000 akr,;e 15,000 to 20,000 akr,;e More than 20,000 akr,;e

33 112 92 37 19 12 15 2 3 10

From this table, it can be seen far more clearly than from the percentages given that timars of more than 3,000 akr,;e, too, were in fact timars of up to about 5,000 akr,;e. The remainder amounted to an insignificant proportion of the total of 335. The examples given, however, do not reflect the true situation at all, that is, the real income of the sipahis, as some of the timars were miqterek, belonging to two, three, or more persons. Of the 335 timars in Arvanidili, twenty-eight were the property of two persons, nine of three persons, and two of four persons. 156 It is fairly typical that these coowners were, in general, not related to one another. They

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were usually people of entirely different backgrounds who had been brought together in ownership on the sultan's orders. For example, a timar was granted to a certain Yusuf, son ofFiruz the cook; to lefthanded Dogan, to the town crier Sunkur, and to the reis Emir, a "friend" ismail Bey .157 Another timar was held by three sipahis who had come to the area from Saruhan. A fourth person also held deeds for this timar, but the other three managed to get rid of him by showing that the timar was too small each of the three sipahis received about 1,500 akqe from the timar.158 A third timar was granted to three persons; each of whom received about 800 akqe, in return for which, as stated in the register, "Pazarlu will serve in the fortress, Yanko as a gunner, and ~ahin will play the zurana. 159 It can be understood from the notes regarding the holders of the timars in Arvanidili that the practice of the mu~terek timar was even more widespread during the reign of Mehmet 1. Thus, many timars, which in 1431 had been held by one sipahi, had previously been mu~terek, held jointly by two, or in most cases, by three timar holders. 160 In this respect, it should be emphasized that, as far as the jointly held timars are concerned, the Arvanid register was not very typical, as a large number of the timars in that region were held by Christians (18 percent); and it seems that estates of that kind were principally one-person estates.l 61 Again, in many regions, such as Kichovo, for example, toward the middle of the fifteenth century, about 50 percent of the existing timars were m~terek.162 Another factor that had a considerable effect on the timar system in Rumelia was the icmal, the register of the Nikopol administrative area after the middle of the fifteenth century, which is kept in the Oriental Section of the National Library. It embraces 211 timars and about fifteen zeamets, scattered throughout the territory of what is today northern Bulgaria. 163 As the ledger in question is not the result of either the first or the second registration of the timars in Rumelia, we can already see in it the differences between the sizes of the timar established during the temporary registration (probably in 1431) and those established in the intervening period. These differences, which in practice were marked with a zeade, were for the most part, as already stated, not ~c1uded in the local timar, but kept at the disposal of the government, which formed new timars from them. In the meantime, however, in practice "surplus" income was appropriated by the local sipahi before it could be incorporated in another timar. The above mentioned differences between the nominal and the real income of the timar should always be borne in mind when calculating the size of timars, as official documents usually give the nominal amount,

30

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

which was usually less than the real amount. So that the ratio between nominal and real timar incomes can be seen, a comparative table of the two amounts has been set out below. Nominal income Real income From 0 to 1,000 akge 7 13 From 1,000 to 2,000 akr;e 28 23 From 2,000 to 3,000 akr;e 46 30 From 3,000 to 4,000 akr;e 45 48 From 4,000 to 5,000 akr;e 25 29 From 5,000 to 6,000 akr;e 21 25 From 6,000 to 7,000 akr;e 11 14 From 7,000 to 8,000 akr;e 7 11 From 8,000 to 9,000 akr;e 6 8 From 9,000 to 10,000 akr;e 7 3 From 10,000 tOe 11 ,000 akr;e 1 1 From 11 ,000 to 12,000 akr;e 2 4 From 12,000 to 13,000 akr;e 0 1 From 13,000 to 14,000 akr;e 0 0 ·2 From 14,000 to 15,000 akr;e 0 Over 15,000 akr;e 1 3 This table makes obvious the amounts by which timar incomes exceeded the set nominal income, and that some of the timars of 3 ,000 akr;e had in fact been included with those of from 4,000 to 10,000 akr;e. Here, however, the bulk of the timars (three-fourths of the total) are those from 1,000 to 6,000 akr;e-an average size almost double that of the average for Arvanid in 1431. These data are, to a great extent, confirmed by another register, this time mufassal from Turnovo, covering the same period. In it, we find ten timars of 1,000 to 2,000 akr;e, six timars of between 2,000 and 3,000 akr;e, two timars of3,000 to 4,000, three of from 4,000 to 5,000 and eight timars of over 5,000 akr;e. 164 The preponderance of timars is up to 5,000, or even to 3,000 akr;e (21:8 or 16: 13). As a rule, in the register of the Nikopol sancak, the vast majority of the timars had a real income that exceeded the nominal income. Those whose annual income was below the nominal were no exception, however. Here, too, there existed mU:jterek timars (thirty out of211), where we come across tenancies held by five or six persons. Such was the timar of Nusret, Hamza, and Murat, sons of Ok9u Mehmet; Ali, son of isa; and Ahmet, son of Suleyman. 165 The timar of Mehmet, son of Siltik, Nasuh, son of ibrahim, Karagoz, son of

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Abdullah, Galik Yah§a, Kopek and ~adman:166 The timar of Kara Haci and his brother Yusuf, Barik and Yusuihan, sons of Yakub, Orner and Hasan, and so on. 167 The first had an actual income of2,131 akqe, the second, of 1,466, and the third, of3,230 akqe. Also, in the cases mentioned, the co-owners, apart from relatives, also shared their timar with complete strangers. Another unpublished icmal register, which includes the bulk of the timars in the Sofia, and some in the Pirot areas, provides the following infonnation about the size of the timar in Rumelia. 168 /

Up to 1,000 akqe From 1,000 to 2,000 akqe From 2,000 to 3,000 akqe From 3,000 to 4,000 akqe From 4,000 to 5,000 akqe From 5,000 to 6,000 akqe From 6,000 to 7,000 akqe From 7,000 to 8,000 akqe From 8,000 to 9,000 akqe From 9,000 to 10,000 akqe Over 10,000 akqe

1 timar 3 timars 7 timars 16 timars 7 timars 4 timar:s 3 timars 6 timars 1 timar 1 timar 2 timars

Consequently, at that time there were fifty-one timars in the Sofia area, thirty-four of which had an income of up to 5,000 akqe, and seventeen, up to and exceeding 10,000 akqe. As is known, it was not only participants in feudal cavalry who were granted timars, both also participants in other military corps, among which were some of the dogandlar. From the common register of their estates in the eastern part of Rumelia and the Aegean, we discover that their timars in the third quarter of the fifteenth century were of approximately the following sizes: 169 Up to 300 akqe From 300 to 500 akqe From 500 to 1,000 akqe From 1,000 to 2,000 akqe From 2,000 to 3,000 akqe From 3,000 to 5,000 akqe Over 5,000 akqe

22 timars 22 timars 44 timars 6 timars 4 timars 4 timars 5 timars

The exceptionally small timars of the dogandlar were made even smaller by the circumstance that as a rule they were held jointly by two or three dogandlar, who were almost always not related. The extremely small sums shown in the records regarding timars

32

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

in Rumelia are, all the same, larger than those to be found in the sixteenth-century in Anatolia. I70 For example, in Bursa, Rutahya and MihaliC; towards the end of the sixteenth century, there were 101 tezkereli and 739 tezkeresiz timars. 171 At the same time, in Georgia there were forty-five timars of less than 3,000 akqe, seventeen timars of 3,000 to 5,000, and thirty-four timars of over 5,000 and so on.I72 An analysis of timar records from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries almost completely coincides with the results of calculations based on Aynl Ali, i.e., it emphasises 5,000 akqe as an upper limit for the average sipahi timar in Rumelia. Naturally, it should be borne in mind that, for the period between two registrations, the authorities continued· to determine the nominal values of the timars, but not their real amounts. As has been shown, however, when a new registration took place, changes in the feudal income were recorded, and these were included in subsequent registers. Population growth, the recovery of the forces of production after the invasion, and the colonization of the Asiatic elements in Rumelia naturally contributed to an increase in feudal incomes in the Balkan lands. It should not be considered, however, that the initially established nominal incomes of the timars remained unchanged until the end of the period in question. The central government kept a strict watch over the growth of feudal income by means of the il-klztibi, every "ex-register" household was noted, and considered to be a reserve of the fisc for the formation of new timars, and, if necessary, for addition to already existing timars. The very fact that, in 1431, the average timar was one with an income of 1,000 to 3,000 akqe, and it was only toward the end of the reign of Mehmet II that it had reached the 5,000-akqe mark convincingly demonstrates that the authorities recorded any changes that had taken place. In fact, this particular situation continued until not later than the end of the fifteenth century, when the last mufassal registers were compiled. 173 After that time, the government was clearly unable to keep track of the changes that had taken place, both as far as the growth of the feudal income of the separate timars, and even changes in ownership, and the extent to which the timar-holders had fulfilled their obligations were concerned. The chaos in the land registry office, which was the result of the lack of mufassal registers in practice was reflected in the discrepancy between the nominal and the real income of the timars, and this not always to the advantage of the latter. It was in this way that, in the empire in the seventeenth century, "incomeless" or bihasil timars had come into being, that is, timars that existed only on paper, and whose holders were constantly begging to be relieved of them. 174 However, withiil the

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framework of the period in question, we have no reason to suppose that there were any significant differences between the nominal and real incomes of timars. In fact, so that even the remote probability of such differences could be avoided, our study is limited to an analysis of timar registers in the fifteenth century-the period in which these differences should still be minimal. Finally, when speaking of the average size of a sipahi timar, i. e., the average annual sum required for the maintenance of a sipahi, we cann~t but mention the purchasing power of the akqe during the fifteertth century. As there was no common monetary rate of exchange in the empire, and due to the decline in the value of money which began in the reign of Mehmet 11,175 and had reached catastrophic proportions in the time of Suleyman' s heirs, any price mentioned in an Ottoman document should be taken only as a rough guide. 176 However, fua1cik quotes the following prices for 1431: for 1 kile of wheat, 10 akqe; for one sheep, 10 akqe (at the same time, in Bursa, a sheep cost 20 akqe). Toward the end of the reign of MehmetII, wheat already cost 20 akqe per kile .177 The published kadi registers from Sofia are a much more reliable guide to prices in the Bulgarian lands in the second half of the sixteenth century. They provide the following data: 178 Town house .......................... 1,000- 4,000 Mill with two millstones ...................... 5,200 Male slave ........................... 1,000- 4,500 Female slave .......................... 1,000-2,000 Horse ......... '.......................... 800-900 Stallion .................................... 1,500 1 kile of barley ................................ 10

akqe akqe akqe akqe akqe akqe akqe

If such data were more readily available, a very rough idea of the . real income of the average sipahi could be obtained.

Objects and Composition of the Timar The Ottoman legislation that has served as a base for studies of the timar carried out to date is unable to cast light on other aspects essential for its study, namely the object and composition of the timar. On the other hand, documentary evidence provides a certain amount of guidance in this direction. According to the decrees contained in SUleyman's legislation, the objects of the timar can be "villages and mezra [hamlets] in the country under God's protection"-a decree disproved by the simple fact that

34

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE r

a rimar consisted of police levies and rates. 179 Also, there was a large number of rimars consisting of entire towns or parts of towns. In other words, the legislator's defmition is at least incomplete. It is true that it is almost exclusively villages and hamlets that are featured in the registers of rimars. But was it actually villages and hamlets that were the objects of the rimar? The fact that, between the title deeds of the mulks and valdfs and the registration, renunciation, and transfer of rimar documents radical differences exist, gives rise to certain doubts in this connection. For example, in mulkname and vakifname issued on the basis of them, the estates mentioned are described in terms of their boundaries, which are given in the minutest detail. 180 This situation does not exist as far as the rimar is concerned. In the permissions and orders for the granting of rimars, the sum equal to their annual income, and the name of one of the villages from which this income originates, is mentioned exclusively. The remaining villages and hamlets, the feudal rent of which was included in the rimar, are, in principle, marked "ve gayriden. "181 Consequently, in this case, the name of the village is used as a "heading" for the rimar, rather than as a reference to its object, and this heading served, very approximately, to describe the location of the sipahi's source of income. If the village itself were the object of the rimar, what would prevent the government from also making use of the practice established for mulks and vakifs, that is, the precise listing of all its boundaries? Behind these difference in the expression of one and the other type of estate were undoubtedly concealed differences in their essence and form. In the icmal registers, the names of the rimar-holders, and those of the villages of which the rimar consisted at the last registration, were entered. However, the mufassal registers, the documents that described the content of the rimar in the minutest detail, did not indicate their boundaries either, only the names of the members of the dependant households contained in a village, or scattered throughout several villages, and the type and sum of the taxes involved, the composition of the feudal rent, to which the rimar holder became entitled. The actual villages to which the households answerable to the sipahi for the payment of taxes belonged could be neighboring villages, or villages close to one an.other or not, as the case might be. Thus, in Arvanid, according to Inalcik's observations, most of the villages were divided up when they were granted as a rimar, in which case they would not be in the same vicinity as a matter of course. 182 The same observation is made even more categorically by Stoyanovski with regard to the register of Kichevso, where, as a rule, villages included

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in the same timar were some distance from one another .183 In such cases, as has already been stated, the "ex-register" households, which had come into being between two registrations, were not automatically included in the account of the local timar holder. The income from these households was sometimes collected by the authorities, or was at least collected by the sipahis until its inclusion in a new timar. Consequently, the village itself should not be considered to be the object of the timar, but the dependant households that were answerable to the sipahi. The fact is mentioned in a Jetva (permission of a religious nature), that the sipahi was entitled only to revenues collected from those village households included in his own copy of the register, and he was prohibited from making use of any" analogies" whatsoever in the collection of his revenues. 184 As a result, if we try to imagine the timar as an estate, we must inevitably take the boundaries of the raiyye farms owned by village families included in his list as the boundary of the timar. If a timar included all the households in the village, its territory could be quite compact. If, however, the timar consisted of households from various villages, its territory resembled a large number of small islands, scattered among similar groups belonging to other timars. Many examples of such timars could be given. The village of Leshnitsa, situated in southern Albania was split up, forming parts of six separate timars, the latter consisting of parts of other villages, or whole villages. Eighteen households in the village of Leshnitsa formed the entire timar of Sati; the sipahi Karaca, whose timar consisted of the village of Sveta Paraskeva, was later granted seven households from the village of Leshnitsa. Harnza held as a timar eleven households from the village of Tornuk, and seventeen from the same village of Leshnitsa; another Harnza received as a timar part of Leshnitsa (ten households), part of the village of Krasne, in the Edime area, and one hamlet: five houses from Leshnitsa and five from Sradnishte were given to <;;apni, and finally, Aydin received fifteen households from the village of Zeliye and six from Leshnitsa. 185 Thus, if the latter consisted only of the sixty-one households already mentioned, these households were divided among six timars. The other villages, parts of which belonged to these timars, on their part were combined with groups consisting of five to ten households from other villages, and so on. The village of Smokina in the Kanin area was split up in the same way among five sipahis, some of the shares consisting only of one house, etc. 186 In fact, it can be stated with certainty that in Arvanid in 1431, the timars consisting of a whole village, or whole villages, were far fewer than those that were split up.

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

We also find many parts of villages as parts of timars in the Nikopol sancak,187 the Sofia area,188 the Visoka nahiye,189 Avret Hisar and Salonika, etc. 190 The circumstance that, in these registers, entire villages predominated cannot be accepted without doubt. For some of the villages, an abnormally small revenue (under 500, and even less than 100 akqe) is shown, from which the conclusion could be drawn that in the respective descriptions or inventories, a precise distinction has nor been made between villages and parts of timars. In fifteenth-century timar inventories, we also come across towns that had been granted as timars. This had happened in Trun,191 Avret Hisar,192 Turnovo, Nikopol, Rousse, Shoumen, Svishtov, Pleven, Vratsa,193 and so on. It can be positively stated that in,the timar inventories in a given area, the towns in that area are frequently mentioned as the object of a timar. In some registers, as a rule, towns are part of zeqmets (the Nikopol sancak,Visoka), while in other sources we tmd them as parts of timars. Thus, for example, seventeen households in Sofia (with a revenue of 570 akqe) , plus three villages in the Sofia area formed the timar of Mehmet, serasker of Viza. 194 While, as far as villages and towns are concerned, it is quite obvious that it was not the land, but the number of dependent households that formed the timar, the same camiot be said of mezra (hamlets). The mezra was either the land of an abandoned village or land that could be cultivated, quite outside of any village land. It was included in the timar in two cases: either when parts of it were cultivated by villagers who "belonged" to a given timar (in such case, the sipahi with whom the villager was registered was entitled to a tenth of what was produced on the mezra), or, so that he could find a way ofpopulating the land with haymane, that is, villagers not included in a timar, or nomadic elements, and thus to increase the village feudal land fund. 195 By giving mezra as timars, the government enabled the sipahis to take the initiative as far as land ownership was concerned so that the largest possible area of miriye land could be brought under cultivation, and thus into feudal exploitation. In fact, in some registers, part of the mezra, those that in fad had recently lost their population,are described as real villages, with a note to the effect that they are deserted and have been granted as timar in order to be "revitalized." Such was the case with the villages of Metkovets, Roupcha, and so on, described in the Nikopol register, where we also find a number of mezra with the same remark or indication. 196 Consequently, with mezra that were counted as timar, quite different rules were in force. There, the object -of the timar was not the

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dependent households (because there were none), but the land in question, which c.ould be populated by such households.

Practices in the Transfer of Timars All operations connected with the transfer of a timar from one person to another were described with the general term tahvil ("change," a more limited transfer). It has already been stated that the legislation devoted a lot of space to the "inheritance" of the timar, that is, its transfer, with the obligation.s-involved, to the son of a deceased or aged timar holder. For this reason, if we confme ourselves only to an analysis of the Ottoman laws from the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries, we would gain the impression that timars were in most places "inherited." An examination of the timar registers of the same period, or more precisely, those of them in which data regarding changes in timars can be found, would not create the same impression, however. Of the listed 335 timars in the Arvanid sancak, a mere fifty-nine were in the hands of the sons of the previous timar-holder, and only six were third-generation sipahis. These amount to 20 percent of the existing timars. The remainder were held by persons who were not related to the previous timar-holder. It should be noted that, in the Arvanid register, in all transfers recorded in it, only 180 sons of sipahis are mentioned, of whom only the sixty-five in question' 'inherited" their father's timars. The remaining 115 were given other people's timars. Consequently, even in cases where the government recognized the right of a sipahi's son to a timar, it did not consider that it had any obligation to grant him the timar that had belonged to his father and, in the majority of cases, gratified his wish with another, entirely different estate. The letter of the law, which uncondi- . tionally expressed a preference for transfer from father to son, was not adhered to. Other important conclusions can be drawn from the sixty-five cases in which a timar was transfered from a deceased father to a son. It is abundantly clear that, even in cases of that kind, the transfer of a timar from one timar holder to another was almost unconditionally bound up with its new regrouping, that is, with subsequent division into smaller units. The estate was either received by the sipahi's son with the lawful deduction,197 the remainder being kept by the fisc, or was given to someone else, or was divided up among the two, three or more sons of the timar holder, 198 or the portion of the mu~terek timar Gointly held timar) that had been held by the father was reduced when it was divided among his sons, in combination with other

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

persons, and so on. 199 In other words, even when a timar was "inherited," a tendency for it to be divided up into smaller and smaller parts could be detected. Although, in the remaining registers that are available, details regarding transfer are extremely scarce, from the Sofia ledger, however, we are able to establish, for example, that of the total of fiftyone estates described in it, only eight were "inherited. "200 This repre~ sented about one-sixth of all the timars in the Sofia area, a proportion similar to that obtained from the analysis of the Arvanid area. The register for the Turnovo area, which contains only incidental notes regarding transfer, records only one case of "inheritance" of a timar. That is in the village of Malkoch, which was held by one Ali Ibn Tatar. , After his death, it was received by his five sons. The sum of the timar was 4,435 akr;e. 201 From the available material it can be seen that, in the fifteenth century, the timar had not been formed as a unit established once and for all, which would pass untouched through a number of transfers. Each timar, in practice, had a definite composition while it was in the hands of a given person. In fact, even this definition cannot be taken absolutely for granted, as a given sipahi could receive one, two, or more supplements to his timar, which would entirely change the composition of the latter. During transfer, even estates as big as zeamet and has were subject to modification. Thus, for example, the zeamet and has were subject to modification. Thus, for example, the zeamet of the Belgrade suba~i (referred to as a has in the register) was composed of part of the city, eleven villages, and two hamlets. It passed in this form through the hands of three owners, after which it was granted to various timar holders one or two villages at a time. 202 The same happened with the zeamet of the suba~i of Sopot, whose successor received a very small portion of the villages included in the zeamet because they had been divided up among other sipahis. 203 The zeamet of the suba~i of Klissoura, which had remained vacant, was divided up among various timar holders. 204 As far as timar transfers during the period in question are concerned, it can be established that there were extremely frequent changes in "ownership" and that the timar land fund was in a liquid state, which cannot merely be explained by the vacating of timars because of death or dereliction of duty on the part of their holders. This process is reflected with particular clarity in the register for Arvanid, where changes in "ownership" are recorded over a comparatively long period. For example, the village of Koprishte in the Kanin district was held jointly as a mu~terek by three sipahis during the reign of

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Mehmet I. As, during this period, three small villages sprang up on its territory, the village of Koprishte was combined with the new villages, and the whole was divided into two timars. One of them, which comprised the old village with ninty-four houses, was granted to Yusuf Zagarci ("houndsman," name of one of janissary regiments) in about 1431. By 1433, this was the timar of Timurta~, who quickly vacated it. In the same year, it was granted jointly to Solak Ahmet and Hidir Arvanid: in 1437, Koprishte was granted as a timar to the brothers of the suba~i of Provadia. During the same year, it passed to the brother and slave of the same; in 1441, it was transfered to the sipahi's son Yusuf; in 1444, to one Velibey; in 1450, six houses from the village were transfered to the timar of Deli Kasim. Two years afterward, some ten houses from the same village had been transfered to the timar of one hitherto unmentioned Sungur, and, on his death, these houses passed to his son Nasuh. In 1453, the six houses previously referred to as a part of the village of Koprishte had been transfered to the imam Musliheddin, and, at that time, being combined with part of the village of Mikat, were transfered to his son. In the same year, a further eight houses were added to the timar of Hasan in the village of Filok. From the comment in the register dated the same year, we learn that a further seven houses from Koprishte were given to Gazi, who vacated his timar at that time so that it could pass to his son. Finally, in 1453, six houses from the village of Koprishte were given to Halil, a liberated slave of ~ahmelek. 205 Extracts from the same register provide dozens of similar examples. They clearly prove that transfers took place as often as once a year. Moreover, the reasons for these transfers were not always given; that is, why a given sipahi had been deprived of his timar, or a part of it, so that it could be given to someone else. Thus, for example, one of the four holders of the timar in Mouzakiya was, without any explanation, deprived of his share on the orders of one Harnza Bey, who transfered it to Hizir. Some time later, the original timar holder managed to regain it.206 Again, for no reason at all, part of the timar of the sipahi of the village of Streli was taken away from him and given to another sipahi's son. 207 Other circumstances surrounding the transfer of timars were in conflict with legislation-such as the issuing of documents regarding the transfer. From the registers, we can conclude that the regulations regarding the granting of ted<erili and tezkeresiz timars were really not adhered to at all. For example, Stoyanovski notes that, in the entire nahiye of Kichevo, there were only two estates that had been formed on the orders of the central government-one of 1,911, and one of

40

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

2,065 akr;e. These were cases that according to the law, had to be decided by the beylerbey, as the timars in question were tezkeresiz. The remaining timars in Kichevo were wholly distributed by the beylerbey, although a, part of some were almost twice as large as a tezkereli timar. 208 The same inconsistencies can be observed in the register of Arvanid, where timar holders either held tiny estates with the sultan's permission209 on the one hand, or receive timars or parts of such "on the strength of a letter from the sancakbey, "210 "granted by Harnza Bey, "211 "with the permission ofishak bey," and so on. 212 The facts set out, which have been gathered from records of the fifteenth century, an epoch when the timar had hardly established itself as a system of land ownership, demonstrate unequivocally that the system in question did not need centuries to reach a state of total chaos. The clear and definite decisions of the legislature as far as the timar is concerned have left many scholars with the impression that the Ottoman system of military tenancy was subject to strict discipline in land ownership, and that the sipahi as a link in the chain, was a bearer of unchangeable rights and obligations, that the timar was a feod of its kind, a fel;ldal estate, and so on. As can be seen, however, documentary evidence points to an entirely different situation. It is not mere coincidence (and this emerges from afetva issued during the period in question) that when four or five persons who held a joint timar (m"it§terek), asked whether they should each take one village from the timar in question or whether they should divide the income received between them, they were told by the §eyh-ul islam that "God alone knew. "213 In fact, the constant transfer and splitting up of the timars into smaller and smaller pieces had brought the entire system to a state of "God alone knows," even at the beginning of the period in question. This state of affairs, which had been brought about by the fact that a timar was viewed not as a discrete feudal estate, but as a given number of tiny "portions" of a feudal rent, was bound to give rise to attempts to arrange transfer more rationally, even during the early days of the empire. Decrees of this kind date from the reigns of SUleyman I, Selim II, and Ahmet L Above all, to make the timar system subject to the requirements of the court, Suleyman I decreed that feudal land should be granted exclusively by central government. 214 The purpose of the decree was to put a stop to the "on the orders of X," and "with a letter from Y" situation. At the same time, timar holders were forbidden to exchange their estates for other timars to avoid inconsistencies in registration. 215 The splitting up of already formed timars was categorically forbidden. In cases where persons

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who were entitled to a timar were to be given smaller estates, the larger timars that had become vacant had to be granted mu§terek (jointly).216 Orders were issued for the reestablishment of sancakbey has estates that had been split Up.217 The removal of a part of an already established timar was prohibited when a vacated part of another timar was available. 218 Certain duties were attached to given timars, and the person who assumed those duties was compelled to assume the feudal land of his predecessors as well. 219 These decrees of Siileyman, which were administered by Liitfi Pa§a, were partially renewed by Selim n,220 who established a ceiling for supplements to the timar. 221 It is difficult to imagine that the above mentioned "reforms" relating to the transfer of timars could have had any effect. The feudal rent of the miriye lands had already been allotted to a sufficient number of minor representatives of the feudal class to ensure that any correction to established practice would not affect the interests of hundreds and thousands of sipahis. In any case, Siileyman's reforms had a certain timidity, mentioning "already established" timars, and not the "establishment" or "formation" of timars as estates. Furthermore, we can imagine the extent to which already established timars existed in his time, bearing in mind the state of affairs that had been reached one hundred years before his reign. This is the reason why the above mentioned measures probably had little real effect. This assumption is supported by the fact that it was only during the time of Suleyman' s heirs that the timar system was in the chaotic state described so clearly by Ko~i Bey of Gumiircine. 222

The Powers of the Sipahi Ottoman legislation and documentary records state the powers of the timar holder very generally with the term tasarruf("possession") , or with der-dest ("holding"). There, the sipahis are shown as sahib-i arz, sahib-i raiyet ("lord," "possessor," "ruler of the land, of the raiyye"). If the matter under examination is approached formally, the terms mentioned would only confuse the researcher as far as the content of the sipahi's powers is concerned, and would lead to deep inconsistencies. For this reason, it is necessary to give a concrete description of the rights and obligations of timar holders in the light of historical fact, as a number of legal terms such as "property," "estate," and "possession" also have a concrete historical connotation that does not correspond to the relationships that formed the insti-

42

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

tution under discussion. Above all, it should be borne in mind that, even in Ottoman practice, the terms tasarruf, der dest, and sahib were subject to wide and inaccurate interpretation. For example, with tasarrufwere described the powers of the sipahi, and those of the dependent villages, which has led certain Yugoslav scholars to assume that property rights over the means of production were shared by the feudal land owner and the villager. 223 It is abundantly clear, however, that neither one nor the other had "property rights" over the land; apart from which the content of their powers were entirely different, and in no case can they be regarded as equal. Tasarruf, in Ottoman documents, also describes in the most general terms the right of a given person to a given revenue. Thus, for example, the clergy of a mosque in Nikaea were entitled to tasarruf over the produce of the vakif of SUleyman Pa~a in the Malkara district. 224 Certain police fines in the town of V u1chitrun were also the tasarruf of a certain Mehmet. 225 In these cases, the expression in question meant nothing more than a right to receive certain revenue. There can be no question of any matters regarding the land. The meaning of the term sahib is just as vague. It refers not only to the timar holders, but also to the holders of land mUlks-mUlksahibi, and to persons who were entitled to only one feudal collection of revenue. 226 Thus, for example, in the law for Aleppo, the expression sahib-i o{ur is contrasted with the term vakif sahibi, "the possessor of a tenth," the person who was entitled to appropriate a tenth of a given vakif estate. 227 Undoubtedly, the basic right of the timar holder was his right to that "portion" of the centralized feudal rent that the fisc allotted to him.228 Without any exaggeration, it can be emphasised that ninety percent of the decrees of the Ottoman legislature in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries concern matters connected with the size and form of the rent that the state renounced in favor of timar holders. 229 The main characteristic of the rent in the Ottoman Empire is its division between the central government and the timar holder. Moreover, even the part of that rent that, according to the law, was renounced in favor of the fief holders was not wholly theirs. They had to set aside a sum in favor of the upper class of the sipahi hierarchy, which gives Barkan cause to consider the beylerbeys and the sancakbeys as joint in the timars of the sipahis who were their subordinates. 23o For these reasons, and because the state sometimes formed from one single collection of feudal revenue from a given area or inhabited area a new timar, in this way even further increasing the

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the number of persons who collected portions of the feudal rent in that district, one cannot speak of financial immunity within the timar system. Apart from the local sipahi, or rather, local sipahis who, in their capacity of mu§terek, or on the basis of their entitlement to separate portions, realized the tithes and remaining raiyye taxes, the officials who had the task of collecting poll tax (avariz), the mevkufqu (collectors of revenue from ex-register households), the beyt-ul maid (who received the sums from the confiscation of property, the owner of which had died without issue), and the employees of the beylerbeys and sancakbeys who were entitled to their respective share of the "free taxes," all inevitably collected the state's share of the feudal income from the timar. This entire crowd of revenue collectors, who were entitled to one, two, or more payments, were naturally an appalling burden on the dependent population. This situation, however, was not particularly advantageous to the representatives of the exploiting class, who were obliged to enter into extremely complex relation.:. ships, both among themseJves and as far as the state was concerned. It comes as no surprise that the numerous decrees by the legislature, which were dedicated to these interrelationships, additionally complicated by certain regional traditions, bore little fruit. In any case, the underlying aim of the central government in the period in questionnot to allow the economic separation of the sipahi within the timar system-had obviously been achieved. The sipahi had no administrative immunity as far as his timar was concerned either. As has already been stated, significant parts of his timar could be removed, either on the orders of the central government or of the local military administration, for the formation of new timars. The sipahi's lack of administrative immunity as far as his timar was concerned is made particularly clear by the practices applied to the "ex-register" dependent households. Even in cases where a given sipahi succeeded in obtaining a whole village as a timar (and making use of his limited fiscal power) had succeeded in consolidating his position as a local fief holder, he could only maintain this position until the creation of ex-register households in the same village. When such households were already in existance, they were directly dependent of the fisc until they were incorporated into a new timar. 231 Frequently, a very small number of newly formed households were separated from the village, but this resulted above all in the breakup of the timar as an estate, and meant that another sipahi's influence was felt in the village. 232 It should be emphasized at this point that the timar, like any socioeconomic institution, underwent a certain development. It is a

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characteristic feature of bourgeois historiography to consider the rimar of the fifteenth century and that of the early nineteenth century to be equal, for example (to place an "equals" sign between the rimar of the fifteenth century and that of the early nineteenth, for exampIe.) This is clearly evident in the synthetic work of Deny, who mentions in detail the characteristics of the rimar without putting a date to the various periods of which they were characteristic. 233 This creates a general "timar concept, " making it impossible to trace any changes in the essence of the individual features of that institution. Even during the comparatively short period between the reigns of Murat II and SUleyman I, certain changes in the rimar system have been documented. Some of these changes are concerned with the powers of the timar holder. Thus, for example, the Arvanid register makes it unequivocally clear that each ex-register household was unconditionally "subtracted" from the village, the remaining houses of which formed a rimar or rimars.234 Consequently, it is quite clear that the powers of the sipahi at that time did not apply at all to the land, that the rimar in practice was a part of the income of a given number of dependant households. Certain passages in the legislation of SUleyman I, however, lead us to the assumption that during the reign of that sultan, the powers of the sipahi were extended in terms of his capacity of sahib-i arz. Thus, for example, from the kanunname (statute book) for Nikopol, we learned that the haymane (people of no fixed address, who were mainly ex-register), should they move into an area belonging to somebody's timar, would be liable to pay taxes to the timar holder. The sancakbeys and beylerbeys had no right to claim taxes from such villagers, as the land on which they lived was part of the rimar.235 In such cases, it becomes quite obvious that, by that time, it was not the registration of a given household, but that of a certain amount of land that determined the income of the sipahi. Almost the same decree is found again in the "Law Regarding Silistra": "Henceforth, each [sipahi] shall have rights over those of no fixed address then resident in his village. ' '236 Consequently, this decree automatically included the ex-register villagers in the rimars on the lands of which they were living. In the same way, if a population of this type settled in a mezra [hamlet] near a village included in a sipahi's rimar, although that hamlet was not included in the sipahi's lands, he became entitled to claim taxes from the newly settled persons. If, however, the hamlet were far from the village, it was entered as "ex-register," and it was the fisc that taxed its population. 237 The defmition of "near" and

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"distant" hamlets, however, was interesting and extremely flexible. A "near" hamlet was one whose population drank water from a well in the village in question. 238 Finally, again from the Law Regarding Silistra, we learn that the raiyye not attached to the sipahi, who cultivated pieces of land scattered among or adjacent to those cultivated by villagers who were attached to the sipahi were obliged to pay him a tithe as a matter of principle. 239 The above mentioned decrees undoubtedly extended the powers of the sipahi as far as the ex-register households were concerned. Furthennore, they actually cast a different light upon the essence of the timar in Siileyman's time, showing it to be more a matter of estate in the fonn of land included in a given territory. It should be noted, however, that in the very same law, phrases such as "within the boundaries of the village" and "within the defmed boundaries of the village" are to be found, but nowhere do we find "within the boundaries of the timar. "240 Furthermore, the same law also consolidates' the old position: "The raiyye living within the detennined boundaries of the village should pay a tithe and taxes to him in whose register their names are written, and to whom [the taxes] are payable. And, subsequently, if some households come and settle in the village with fixed boundaries, the local registrar should show these houses as being in addition. If he should give them to another timar, let the sipahi in whose register they are entered take a tithe and taxes from them. It should not be emphasized: the size of this village has been determined. It is the register which is decisive. "241 The obvious contradictions in the edicts quoted cannot, in spite of everything, prevent one coming to the conclusion that the significance of the timar as a definite estate was increasing. The above mentioned edicts, which also date from Siileyman's time and were intended to prevent the fragmentation of timars, would also support such a conclusion. The prevention of this fragmentation could only be achieved if the fonnation of new timars from ex-register households were halted, or at least be reduced to the absolute minimum. As we have insufficient or unsuitable register material from the beginning of the sixteenth century at our disposal, just how far these edicts were applied in practice cannot be established. The last aspect of feudal immunity-namely the judiciary-was not left to the timar holder either. Jurisdiction over the villagers dependent on him belonged to the local kadi. Moreoever, it was the latter who arbitrated in disputes between the sipahi and his raiyye. 242 Another fundamental feature of the powers of the sipahi was his right to issue deeds (tapu). 243 In this way, he exercised control over the changes in

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ownership of agricultural land, the movement of dependent households in the rimar, also controlled the use of land, and ensured the cultivation of the maximum area of that land. And, even in this respect, the hands of the sipahi were partly tied, leaving him little scope for initiative. For example, he had the right to issue deeds for parts of the common land and to arbitrarily extend the amount of ploughed land attached to the village. 244 The law even prohibited him from granting parts of his personal estate against a deed, as it was intended only for his use. 245 It was the dependent villager, who was able to plough up part of the "unused" land and, in this way, to enlarge the area of land granted to him by deed, who was able to play a more active part in bringing new land into agricultural use. In order to have the right to apply for a deed for such land, however, the sipahi had to wait until it could be transferred. 246 Consequently, as far as the deed was concerned, the rimar holder did not act on his own initiative; he fulfilled certain functions that were delegated to him by the central government. This provides a complete picture of the powers of the Ottoman sipahi, such as were granted by legislation. There is absolutely no doubt at all that the rimar holders, in their capacity as representatives of the feudal class, extended their authority-if not to the disadvantage of the state (which strictly protected its interests), then definitely to the disadvantage of the dependent peasants. These breaches of the regulations were not, however, a feature confined only to the sipahis. They were characteristic of the entire Ottoman feudal system-of the vast bureaucracy, the army, and the powerful organs of feudal and judicial power. These instances of authority being exceeded are not a matter that needs to be constantly mentioned; it should merely be inserted in parenthesis in making a study of Ottoman feudal society, and for that matter, of any class-based society. In any case, it is the system in operation, the predominant relationships, and not the exceptions that characterize a given society. The Social Essence and Composition of the Sipahi Class The question of the social essence of the sipahi class has not yet been sufficiently clarified in specialized literature. The Ottoman feudal class and its composition and stratification have never been a subject of scientific study. This is why, in historiography, the unspoken conviction has been established that there was some sort of "homogeneity" of the exploiting class in the empire, which some bourgeois scholars attribute to the specifically "democratic" character of

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Ottoman feudalism, in which any common soldier could rise to the rank of grand vizier, and in which raiyye and sipahi were to the same extent the sultan's servants, because every subject owed his life and property to the all-powerful master. 247 The fact that, until now, of all the complex systems of Ottoman feudalism, only that of military tenancy, and of all the feudal strata, only the sipahis, have been studied-superficially-lends support to such false ideas. The small timar income of the sipahi during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, has extremely limited powers as far as land ownership was concerned, and the conditional character of that land ownership are scientifically established facts. In this situation, however cruel the exploitation of the dependent villager might have been, the fact that the sipahi received such a pitiful share of that exploitation serves as an argument of bourgeois science to emphasize the disadvantageous position of the Ottoman feudal landowner in general. It should be noted at this point that some Marxist historiography does not approach the matter under discussion in a concrete-historical manner either. Constantly emphasizing the privileged position of the sipahi in land ownership and identifying the sipahi with the Turkish feudal ruler in general, it simply shifts the emphasis and constructs questionable hypotheses. In fact, could one successfully defend the hypothesis that fundamental exploiters of the dependent peasants in the medieval West were the knights, and in the Principality of Moscow, the oprichniki? And why, if such a thesis is indefensible, must it be assumed that it was in the Ottoman Empire that the feudal ruler par excellence was the sipahi? These is only one answernamely, that Ottoman feudalism has still not been studied through all its institutions so that the structure of the feudal class itself can be convincingly revealed, as well as the stratum of the feudal class that actually composed the state. This is why, on the basis of a study of legislation and documentation, which are confined almost exclusively to the timar system, and relationships between the sipahis and the raiyye, the idea has become accepted that the sipahi was the embodiment of the Ottoman feudal ruler. Also, it can only be emphasized that the fact that the legislation had dedicated its norms to the preservation of exploitation to which the sipahis were entitled is the first argument against such a view. If the state, the apparatus of the ruling stratum, had been in the hands of the sipahis, the latter would not have lavished so much effort on self-imposed limitations, that is, on the limitation of the powers of the sipahis. Here, it is evident that other forces were acting on behalf of the central government, forces whoe interests only partly coincided

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with those of the sipahis and only to the extent that feudal armies defended theirjoint assets against external and class enemies. However, the interests of the ruling stratum, and those of the sipahis differed completely in another aspect-that is, in the sharing of the results of the system of exploitation. And, in this respect, the state, as a tool of the upper stratum of the feudal class, opposed any opportunity the sipahis might have had to widen their powers in land ownership, as any such extension would have been to their disadvantage and to the disadvantage of the big feudal landowners. The discovery of the social composition of the sipahi and non-sipahi feudal strata (as of the differences in degree of privilege in land ownership of both the former and the latter) would disprove tendentious bourgeois theories about the lack of a true feudal class in the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and would place the sipahis in their true place in the social structure of the empire. The Turkish historian 6. L. Barkan, being unable to deny the existence of any class division in Ottoman society, has found a suitable formula for the setting aside of the exploiting class. Emphasizing the limited powers of the sipahis and their minimal privileges in land ownership, he describes this group as being "in service," comparing them with the feudal class in the lands occupied by the Ottomans. 248 In another work, he indicates that there were two main classes in existance in the empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries-the raiyye and the military class (askeri). To support his statement, he introduces many examples of legislation from which it genuinely becomes clear that the government regarded persons who had military obligations toward it differently, and, furthermore, also regarded their households-wives, sons, and slaves-as being "military," and forbade their registation as raiyye. 249 In contradiction to his own arguments, however, Barkan states that the military class was not "closed" and that there were ways in which the raiyye could enter it, while part of the "military" left their class and became members of the raiyye. 250 There is no lack of arguments to support this. It is well known that a member of the raiyye who enrolled in the border units and distinguished himself received the right to a timar, and thus became a member of the "military" class. 251 While each sipahi's son who was not accepted for service by the central government because there was not a vacant timar, and who was issued with a document stating that he was "not needed in the capital or the beylerbey's administrative area, " was then registered as raiyye. The same applied to sipahis who had been deprived of their timars, in whose regard the government categorically ordered "that attention

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should not be paid to statements they may make that they previously possessed deeds, and have been sipahis. "252 The situations described cannot, however, have been in force throughout the whole of the period mentioned, as there was a time when a sipahi could have been deprived of his timar if it were discovered that he belonged to the raiyye, that he was a "foreigner" (ecnebl).253 During the time of Suleyman I, a decree was issued that has prompted bourgeois historiographers to emphasize the "democratic" character of Ottoman feudalism. The fennan in question dates from 1530, and is addressed to the beylerbey of Rumelia. The decree states that the subjects of the sultan, "be they sipahi or raiyye, they are all mine [i.e., of the sultanJ-servants," could not be considered as "foreigners," as they belonged to the population of the different regions of the state. In the samefennan, it was forbidden, under fear of punishment, to use the term "foreigner" for persons attached to the sipahi's estate,and ail order was made for parts of their land of which they had been deprived to be returned to them. 254 In all probability,· this measure was necessitated by the actual needs of the state, as during the same period we can observe an extension of the right to "inherit" timars, the aim of which was to make timars more accessible to a wider circle of persons, which would mean a larger number of sipahis in military service. 255 It was between 1543 and 1544, however, that thisfennan was annulled by another, which ordered that "foreigners" should be deprived of their timars (freed slaves, the sons of clergy, raiyye, and so on); as far as their origins were concerned, they did not belong to the sipahi caste. It was after the end of Suleyman's reign, between 1576 and 1577, during the time of the war with Persia, that the situation described in the fennan of 1530 was reestablished, namely that "foreigners" could also apply for a timar.256 This situation also pertained during the reign of Ahmed I. 257 It is quite obvious that the central government "opened" and , 'closed" access to a timar for the lower strata of the feudal class in a quite arbitrary way, depending on the military needs of the state. Moreover, "accessibility" was very conditional because all that was needed to deprive the "foreigners" of their timars was another fennan. In any case, the fact that the matter of access or lack of access to timars for persons not belonging to the sipahi class was raised at all means that access to the sipahi class was definitely not open to the lower social classes as a matter of principle, as bourgeois historiographers will have it.258 These data regarding the composition of the sipahi class date, how-

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ever, from a comparatively late period, the sixteenth century. The sipahi class would have been able to be an open or closed entity after it had become an entity. With the establishment of the timar as the predominant form of land ownership-from the reign of Mehmet I until that of Mehmet IT-in no case can it be assumed that the rules regarding the recording of timars were observed. Documentary evidence provides the most convincing evidence of this. First and foremost, a significant number of Balkan feudal landowners entered the sipahi class. 259 According to the Arvanid register, 18 I?ercent of the timar holders in that area were Christians in 1431. As Inalcik states, the timars of these Christians, in contrast to the others, which rarely exceeded 3,000 aia;e, were considerably larger. 26o During the time of Mehmet IT, it would seem that the practice of allowing Christians to hold timars ceased because, by the reign of Beyazit IT, in the same districts there were very few such tenancies. 261 In all probability, the abolition of the Christian timars, which were particularly numerous in the Arvanid and Kichevo areas, for example, was due to the uprising led by Skenderbeg (iskender Bey), in which a number of Albanian timar holders took part. 262 From the Arvanid register it is clear that only the Christian timar holders who remained loyal to the sultan during the uprising were allowed to retain their timars.263 A certain numbers of timars were also granted to Orthodox clergy who had rendered services to the conquerors. 264 According to their social composition, the Christian elements of the sipahi caste should be regarded as unconditionally belonging to the feudal class of the conquered states, inasmuch as they represented the interests of the invader, assisting in the consolidation of foreign rule over their own J?eoples. H. Inalcik, who has attempted to establish the social origins of the sipahis on the basis of the oldest known register-that of Arvanidpresents the following information regarding the origins of the sipahis in that area: apart from the 18 percent Christian mentioned in 1431, there were 30 percent Turks who had migrated from Asia Minor, mainly from Sarihan, 20 percent were the freed slaves or retainers of the beylerbeys, sancakbeys, and so on, 20 percent janissaries and other participants in the royal regiments, and 12 percent were of miscellaneous origin. 265 It should be stated, however, that inalcik has not applied the social criterion consistently, having divided a significant percentage into groups according to ethnic origin. Apart from this, his calculations were made according to the timar holders existing at that point in time, not bearing in mind the total numbers of persons involved in the numerous transfers of the 335 timars described.

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Because of this, the picture built from this unique document is not exact. If all the timar holders mentioned as having temporarily held the 335 timars in Arvanid are borne in mind-and that makes about 1,400 persons-the following categories may be distinguished: (a) Muslims who did not possess any particular distinguishing feature, over 50 percent; of these, 13.5 percent were the sons of sipahis, and about 4 percent were not the sons of sipahis, but were related to them. Those belonging to kapi latlu-military detachments belonging to the palace (palace guards) and the sultan's footmen (gulamlar)-over 10 percent; relatives of those belonging to kapi kulu-about 1.5 percent. The gulamlar of big feudal landowners- 3 percent; members of the yaya and musellem corps-less than 0.05 percent; bearers of the title bey or aga-over 3 percent; Christians-about 6 percent; those who had been converted to Islam-about 2.5 percent. A~ can be seen against a bigger time scale, the proportions obtained by Inalcik acquire an entirely different value. The percentages shown above prove, above all, that most of the timar holders in the area in question were undistinguished personsmerely rank-and-file soldiers from various regiments. The fact that most of them had just come from Asia Minor means that, in all probability at that time, persons were included in the sipahi caste who had, until then, never been members of any army. The sons of sipahis were a quite insignificant proportion of the timar holders-about 13.5 percent. They were about the same in number as the gulamlar of the sultan and ~e big landowners-people who were descended from slaves. Both Inalcik, and Barkan267 emphasize that children who had been kidnapped by the Ottoman armies and converted to Islam occupied a significant place both in the palace guards and in the timar system itself in the fifteenth century. Barkan points out that, at that time in Diyarbakir, there were many timar holders who bore the nickname engurillu ("Hungarian"). Names such as Bosnali, Ustrum~ali, Sofyali, and Amaudlu were typical of the sultan's acemicglanlar (a lower military caste than the janissaries). The remaining timar registers at our disposal, to a great extent, support the ideas expressed. Together with the vast majority of Muslims who did not possess any distinguishing feature, we also see a small number of sipahi' s sons, and a considerable number of palace guards and royal regiments (particularly in the Sofia area), and a certain small percentage of Christians (particularly in the Visoka and Avret Hisar areas).268 From the material available, it is obvious that in the fifteenth century a timar held by a non-sipahi was a rare exception. Moreover, timars

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of this kind were usually held by kndilar (Muslim judges), naibler (attorneys), and similar persons in service of the state. Consequently, at that time, the system did what it was designed to do-maintain the feudal armies. The question of differentiation among the sipahis or, rather, among the military tenants, is not discussed in literature. To a certain extent, some light has been thrown on it in the preceding paragraphs, as the correlation between the various groups of timars according to their size has been established. We have already seen, moreover, that the average sipahi's timar during the period in question ranged from 1,000 to 3,000 akr;e during the reign of Murat II, reaching 5,000 akr;e during the mid-fifteenth century, and stayed at about this level until the end of the sixteenth century. Although it should be stated that these amounts did not accurately reflect the true situation, but were chosen at random (as far as the end of the sixteenth century was concerned), it is quite obvious that, in practice, the sipahi's timar rarely exceeded 5,000 akr;e. In contrast to the approximately 10,000 sipahi's timars that were in existence at the time of Mehmet II, all of which had a set annual income, there were a small number of big military fiefs, those of the beylerbeys and the sancakbeys. During the same period, there were two beylerbey estates and forty-eight sancaks. 269 We do not possess information regarding the size of the beylerbey's and sancakbey's has (fief) during the fifteenth century. The sancakbey of Nikopol had an income of 321,108 akr;e from his estates in that sancak alone. 270 Also, part of the fief of the sancakbey of Arvanid brought him an income of more than 250,000 akr;e per annum.271 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the has of the sancakbeys ranged between 1,100,000 and 200,000 akr;e;272 The beylerbeys of Rumelia and Anatolia had an annual income of 1,100,000 and 1,600,000 akr;e respectively.273 These figures, however, cannot be applied to the fifteenth century without adjustment. If we accept, however, that the 10,000 timars in existence during the reign of Mehmet II had a maximum annual fief income for that time of 5 ,000 akr;e, we arrive at the sum of 50,000,000 akr;e. Against this, if we take as a basis for a sancak income the minimum that was mentioned-about 320,000 akr;e, we arrive at 15,360,000 akr;e as a total for a sancakbeys' fiefs. Consequently, about 0.5 percent of the military fief holders appropriated more than one-fifth of the total income intended for the support of the feudal armies. Moreoever, because of the lack of data, the income of the beylerbeys and other large feudal landowners in the system of official landownership remains outside the calculation.

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The facts set out bear witness to the fact that an extremely sharp differentiation existed within the timar system, as the maximum sipahi income was sixty-four times less than the minimum sOJZcakbey income. It is also typical that with this differentiation there are almost no timars in the middle income group that would have formed a bridge between the sipahi's timar and the sancakbey's has. During the period under discussion, there were very few zeamets, just one for each nahiye. Thus, for example, in the whole of the Nikopol sancak, there were only fifteen zeamets, of which only three commanded an income of between 30,000 and 40,000 akqe, one, of 64,593 akqe, and the remainder of about 20,000 akqe each (and that, with a minimum kiliq zeamet of 20,000 akqe), and three exceptions, the income of which was below the legal minimum. 274 Both the limited number of zeamets (even at the beginning of the seventeenth century, with a general tendency toward the expansion of estates, they were unable to reach 10 percent of their total), and their tendency to adhere to the minimu'm set by the law would not particularly change the correlation set above between the sipahi and sancakbey fiefs, which are indicative of differentiation in the ranks of the feudal armies. 275 When it all boils down, when the average annual sipahi income for the period in question is borne in mind, and compared with the relative purchasing power of the akqe, the limited powers of the timar holder and his direct dependency on the central government, the conditional character of timar landownership, the social composition of the sipahi caste, and the sharp differentiation observed within the ranks of the military fief holders, one can only reach the conclusion that, between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the sipahi was not in a particularly privileged position and that he could not be considered as the main exploiter of the dependent villagers.

The Exploitation of the Timar On the basis of the available material, certain conclusions can be drawn concerning the method of exploitation of the timar as a form of feudal land ownership. The feudal mufassal registers depict the timar as an aggregate consisting of a certain number of dependent households that paid to the sipahi feudal taxes of a certain number and sum: all forms of land rent. These taxes were identical for the various provinces ofthe Balkan territories of the empire-only insignificant regional differences existed. This circumstance will lead us to conclude that the regime for the exploitation of the timar had been established and made uniform, that the timar holder was left with no

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choice as far as this was concerned. Moreoever, as the central government completely determined the forms of village land ownership, of the granting and transfer of the raiyye farms, the sipahi was also deprived of any personal initiative in this sphere. In fact, relying on the material available, it would be logical to concur with the opinion of A. D. Novichev that, in Turkey during the period in question, there were no large feudal estates, nor any distinction between the land of the feudal lord and those of the villagers in the estate, and that the lands in each category of feudal land ownership were only a combination of a large number of separate plots cultivated by the dependent peasants. 276 It is obvious that, in a situation of this kind, the sipahi was unable to show much initiative in the organization of agriculture in his timar either. In fact, objective prerequisites for such activity were lacking. Under the conditions of Ottoman feudalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the timar holder was unable to retain his tenancy for very long. The almost constant military campaigns, or at least raids, garrison service, and all kinds of additional obligations prevented the sipahi from settling and taking an interest in the farms in his timar. Apart from this, the mobility that was characteristic of the timar system, the frequent transfer of timars, and the breaking up of the latter did not create conditions that allowed the sipahi to organize the farms for which he was responsible. This is why he was compelled to assume the role of collector of feudal rents, of taxes imposed on the agricultural and livestock production of the peasants dependent on him without being involved in the actual production himself. It should be emphasized at this point that, in specialized literature, there is an entrenched idea that a sipahi was bound to remain within the boundaries of his timar when he was not actually performing military service. 277 It is somewhat difficult to locate the origin of this idea. Aynl Ali does in fact mention that sipahis were obliged to live within their timars so that they could be mobilized at very short notice. 278 Only two lines later, however, when he mentions the sanctions imposed on sipahis who were in breach of this regulation, the same author remarks that timar holders who left the sancak in which their timars were located were punished. 279 It becomes obvious, therefore, that the sipahi was obliged to remain within the boundaries not of his timar, but of the sancak, because this was the way in which he could be mobilized. Much evidence can be offered in support of such a conclusion. Thus, for example, in the Arvanid register we find a register of the timars

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in the Sopot nahiye: the addresses of some of the rimar holders is given as Argirokastron. 28o It is obvious that the sipahis in question were not staying in the town illegally, as they were registered quite officially as not living in their villages. Also, the authors who concur with the opinion described above have ignored a number of decrees contained in the legislation, beginning with that of Mehmet IT, and going as far as that of Suleyman, which makes it obvious that the raiyye was obliged to transport its tithes to the granaries of the rimar holder if he lived in the village, or to the town if he lived there: this amounted to forced labor. 281 Moreover, as is evident from some laws of the sixteenth century, the raiyye was not obliged to transport its tithes to the fortresses where sipahis were carrying out garrison service, but only to the towns in which they were resident. 282 Consequently, it is quite clear that the legislation did not seek to make the timar holder live within his timar, and openly allowed him to live in the town. The town in which he lived, however, should not be outside the boundaries of the sancak to which the rimar belonged. In direct connection with the question of the exploitation of the rimar is that of the personal holding of the sipahi, the so-called hassa r;iftlik. The personal holding of the Ottoman rimar holder was located in the village or several of the villages that were part of his rimar. Consequently, the hassa was part of the fief, was received and lost together with the fief, and was not, in essence, land of a different category, and did not bear specific features of ownership different from those ofthe remaining miriye land. The postulation of some authors, namely that the personal holding of the feudal ruler should be included in the category of estates that were in a sense freehold (mulk, malikcme, vakif, etc.) is without foundation. 283 Such an idea would be convincing if the rimar holder were to keep his hassa even after his rimar had passed into somebody else's hands. The evidence provided by the legislation and documentary records, however, unequivocally treat the hassa as part of the rimar that was passed from one sipahi to another, together with the entire fief. Specialized literature is not unanimous on the subject of the role and evolution of the personal holding of the sipahi and its forms of exploitation. While B. Djurdjev283 and A. S. Tveritinova284 consider that this institution developed and was consolidated within the framework of the period in question. Barkan fmds that it was in decline at the time in question. 285 It is necessary to shed some light on the matter under discussion because the attitude of the rimar holder to the hassa is indicative of the exploitation of the rimar as a whole and of the role of the Ottoman feudal lord in the organization of agriculture.

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The kanunname of Mehmet IT determines the size of the hassa as that of a farm, and allows its extension by the addition of ownerless raiyye land. 286 The general law of Slileyman I already excludes such a possibility. 287 It is obvious that, by this time, the legislation significantly limited the area of the hassa, reducing it to the size of an average farm. The legislation defines the composition of a hassa as fields, vineyards, meadows, gardens, and water mills.288 In contrast to the raiyye farms, where the forms of exploitation were strictly determined by the law, the exploitation of the hassa was left to the discretion of the timar holder. 289 During the period in question, this took many different forms, ranging from the use of slave labor, 290 the collection of half the profit realized for cultivation of the land by dependent peasants, and a levy on one-third, one-quarter, or onefifth of the produce,291 to the usual way of granting with a deed, similar to that of raiyye land. 292 The main method of exploitation of the hassa, as indicated by the legislation, was the forced labor of the peasants whose households were included in the timar.293 A look at the timar registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries will make it clear that the actual situation regarding the hassa differed considerably from that intended by the legislation. It should be noted that in only one of the registers we have at our disposal can some descriptions of the hassa be found that more or less correspond to the conditions set out in the law. This is the register of the V ratsa and Ezudjan nahiyes, where we find as a hassa fields and vineyards, which are consequently elements of the hassa qiftlik (farm).294 In the remaining ledgers, the character of the hassa properties differs considerably. In this respect, the Arvanid register is of considerable importance because of its size. As has been said already, there were 355 timars in the Arvanid area in 1431. Hassa properties of any kind whatsoever can only be found in 124 timars, that is, in slightly more than one-third of the estates in existence. Their number and type is as follows: 134 vineyards, 16.5 watermills, 1,858 olive trees, 168 walnut trees, 137 mulberry trees, 95 pear trees, 15 cherry trees, 8 fig trees, and 95 other miscellaneous fruit trees; 3 irrigation channels, 2 reserved fisheries, 3 landing stages/quays, one ford, and one paddy field. However, these properties were not equally distributed in the individual timars, but were concentrated in a small number of them. It would seem that the hassa in that particular part of the country had to contain a vineyard. Of the 124 estates in which a hassa was included, only 13 did not have a vineyard. In the has of the suba§i of Kanina (this was in fact a zeament, because his income amounted

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to 42,208 akqe), there were six hassa vineyards, three watermills, one paddy field (the only one in the sancak), one irrigation channel and a dozen or so fruit trees. 295 In the has of the suba~i of Belgrade, there were five vineyards, four walnut, thirty-six olive, and three pear trees, one irrigation canal, etc. 296 . In the register of the doganci timars, we also come across many examples of hassa properties recorded. In this, however, they consisted only of fruit trees, reed-beds (osiers), and meadows. 297 The hassa vineyard was not only not a compulsory part of the timar holders personal holding, but was entirely absent. Only meadows and fruit trees are mentioned as hassa in another register of doganci estates from the end of the fifteenth century. 298 In the Tumovo register dating from the mid-fifteenth century, we find only three hassas mentioned-of walnut trees, of an orchard plus walnut trees, and of a meadow, about which it is unequivocally stated that it is "separate from those of the raiyye. "299 In the remaining timar registers to which we have access, there are no hassa properties for the sipahi estates. In contrast to the timars of the sipahis, the large fiefs, such as the has for example, possessed a large and varied hassa property. Here, too it differed considerably from what was intended by the legislation. The hassa was already described in the has estates of the sancakbey of Arvanid. From the register of Montenegro for 1521, it is clear that the sancakbey, Skender Bey Cmojevic, possessed fiftynine hassa estates in his has, namely: only four fields, fifteen vineyards, eight meadows, nine watermills, two gardens, one melon field (elements intended by the legislation.). The remaining components of his hassa were reserved fisheries, fords, oak woods, uncultivated fields, and so on.300 In an excerpt from a fifteenth-century timar register of the Samokov district, we also come across data regarding villages which belonged to the has of the beylerbey of Rumelia. We understand that the beylerbey had a hassa in the village of Studena, on which the villagers were forced to work. Moreover, several villages, among which were Surf Samokov and Velik Samokov, were wholly hassa, a fact that according to the legislation, should have been completely impossible. 301 The conclusions to which we come after an analysis of the timar registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are quite obvious as far as the situation of the hassa is concerned. In the vast majority of fiefs, particularly in the timars, it was hardly evident-if, indeed, it could be considered that it existed at all on any scale. Here, one must take account of the fact that, as the timars were widely scattered,

58

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

the formation of a hassa for the timar holder was, to all intents and purposes, impossible. However, the exceptionally scattered nature of the timars was not the only reason for the lack of personal holdings: this was also due to the fact that from the fifteenth until the middle of the sixteenth century they were still only rarely an estate in the form of land. Here, it should be emphasized that the hassa qiftlik allowed by the law was extremely small, too small, in fact to offer any particular advantage from its exploitation. Also, the amount of unpaid peasant labor allowed-from one to seven days per year-was also insufficient to allow the cultivation of any kind of intensive crops.302 Consequently, even if every sipahi 's timar had contained a hassa, the latter would have been of little interest to the timar holder. It should also be borne in mind that the income of most sipahis would not have allowed them to keep special servants for the organization and supervision of their personal holdings during the months and years that they were away on military service. In any case, most sipahis who had a hassa attached to their timars deliberately tried to combine it with the raiyye farms by issuing a deed, and in this way to ensure that they would also collect the charge payable for the deed, and have a regular annual feudal income from the land in question. Above all, it was expressly stated in many decrees for the laws of the individual sancaks and hassa land could not be transfered to another person by means of a deed. 303 As Siileyman's kanunname explains, this was done by sipahis "because of a craving for money, " because they wished to collect the charge payable for the deed. 304 In order to limit such breaches of the law, the legislation transfered the weight of the sanctions onto the direct producer. Thus, if a sipahi had given part of his hassa to another person, the subsequent timar holder was not obliged to agree to this illegally issued document, and could reclaim his hassa without compensating the peasant in question.305 However, with these sanctions, the central government was unable to achieve anything more than the abandonment of the hassa lands, which in many cases remained uncultivated: hassa watermills just crumbled away as obviously noone was going to take the risk of acquiring land that could be taken away from him at the next transfer of the timar. Finally, the state was forced to permit the transfer of hassa sites under deed in order to ensure their cultivation. 306 In contrast to the small properties, within the big ones-the hasthe personal holdings of the feudal lords were considerable. The huge incomes of the beylerbeys and sancakbeys allowed them to keep special servants for the organization and supervision of the hassa estate, and

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59

the large number of dependent peasants ensured a sufficient number of compulsory work days. In spite of this, one cannot help but remark that, even in the large estates, the hassa did not comply with the legislation and it did not resemble a large farm at all. A certain exception in this respect was the hassa of the sancakbey Skender Bey Crnojevic, in which we fmd cultivated fields as well. In the remaining cases, as can be seen here, there were meadows, oak woods, reed beds/osiers, reserved fisheries, fords, fruit trees, and so on. It was sufficient for a large feudal landowner to post someone at the ford, fishery, or landing stage to ensure that he collected a daily toll from the users of the above. As far as the meadows, reed beds or fruit trees were concerned, he received the produce from the above, harvested by means of forced labor-and could sell it either to the villagers or at the market. Thus, the Ottoman feudal lords who did not renounce their personal holdings, by transfering the hassa with a deed, preferred to tum their has~a lands into another kind of hassa that brought a significant income, usually in cash-and that were unconnected with any kind of agricultural organization. There were also exceptions to the above rule. We shall not dwell at this point, upon the sultan's hassa, which embraced large areas of the most fertile land, and which was frequently cultivated by means of slave labor, the working of the land for half the profit, under lease, etc. 307 It was on the sultan's hassa that the big paddy fields along the banks of the River Maritsa were: these relied on the cruel exploitation of the tenant paddy workers. 308 The working of the land for half the profit (nisfiyet) was also known in the hassa of some of the big estates, such as the has of Skender Bey. 309 An extremely interesting case of the exploitation of the hassa can be found in the has of the Beylerbey of Rumelia in the Samokov area. As has been stated, in certain cases, entire villages has been made part of the hassa, a fact that can compare with the forms of exploitation in the crown lands. In these hassa villages, however, the raiyye did not perform forced labor on the land of the feudal lord (no income from the land is mentioned in the register), but were engaged exclusively in work in the forges. Thus, the villagers of Studena performed forced labor in the forges themselves, as did those of Kletlu, while the raiyye of Samokov Radika worked "in the forest," and were probably engaged in the mining of the lignite coal necessary for the smelting of the iron. The forced labor by the villagers from Surf Samokov and Velik Samokov was of a different type, but still connected with the forges. 310 The actual names of the villages, and the forced labor indicated is sufficient proof that iron mining was highly developed in this part of Bulgaria

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

as early as the fifteenth century311 The important fact, however, is that it was part of the hassa land of the Beylerbey of Rumelia, who worked the iron deposits in the area by means of forced labor, and probably sold the metal obtained to the state. This is one of the very rare cases for the period in question in which the Ottoman feudal lord played a certain part in the organization of production, and, moreover, it should be emphasized that it was not agricultural production. 312 On the basis of the facts set out above, it can be even more reasonably assumed that the Ottoman timar holder played a limited part in the organization of agriculture. This fact was due to a great extent to the actual character of the timar estate, to the limitations the state placed on the exploitation of the timar.313 Given the extensive military obligations of the sipahi, the considerable "turnover" in timar ownership, and the small income of the majority of timar holders, it was unlikely that the small fief holder would take much of an interest in the organization of agriculture. He was, in fact, a small and greedy beast of prey who was only able to avoid bankruptcy through constant participation in military raids because even the severest forms of exploitation to which he could subject the few pitiful dependent households that formed his timar, given the low productivity of labor, could not possibly satisfy the needs of himself and his family or to meet the expenses connected with his obligations. Furthermore, the state itself had far too great an interest in that exploitation to allow the small fief holder to grow fat on the proceeds. 314 F or the reasons mentioned, the Ottoman sipahi of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was an utterly parasitic element who played no part in material production. However, his role in the distribution of the results of feudal exploitation, however small, placed him on the opposite side of the fence to the exploited class. Thus, sipahis were, in fact, representatives of the feudal class, defenders of its interests, and played a role in extending its gains. The sipahi belonged to the extensive lower stratum of the feudal class whose insufficiently privileged position separated it from the small group of big fief holders and owners of mulks and vakifs, and, toward the end of the period in question, placed it in opposition to the state, which was the tool of the big landowners.

,/

Chapter 2

MULK AND VAKIF

Together with the categories of feudal land ownership that represented the Ottoman military fief system and, at the same time, offjcial forms of Hmd ownership in the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, other forms were also to be found. Because of the significant place they occupied within the system of Ottoman feudalism, they should be, and have been placed in a different category. These are the land mulk and the land vakif. 1 It should be pointed out that, in contrast to Ottoman official land ownership, which has been the subject of special research, the above mentioned agrarian category has been little studied. Moreover, it is in an analysis of land mil lk and vakif that certain tendencies in the socioeconomic development of Ottoman society, which are only partic ally revealed in a study of military fiefs, become obvious. The "True" and "False" Miilk

According to Ottoman law, it was above all, freehold properties situated within the boundaries of populated areas that are known as mulk. In practice, this meant all premises and land that had not been built on, and agricultural properties in the immediate vicinity of the populated area (mainly orchards and vegetable gardens, and more rarely~ vineyards).2 This mulk, known according to Ottoman legal tradition as a "true" (sahih) mulk, was inherited according to ~eriat law, that is, divided among the existing heirs, sold, given as a gift, and made into a vakil (pious foundation) without any feudal limitations or duties attached to it. Formally, together with the tithe and harac, the rakabe of the "true" mulks too, also belonged to their owners. 3 Since the relative share of the true mulk in the system of Ottoman feudalism was insignificant, however, and does not relate to the form 61

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of land ownership, it is not covered by this study either. Apart from the true mulk, there existed, in the Ottoman Empire, a further variation-the "false" (gayr-i sahih) mulk, that w~s, in fact, the land mulk, and the vakif resulting from it. In contrast to the institutions of officialland ownership, which were established, developed, and decayed within the framework of the Ottoman state, the land mulk and vakif were adopted from the Islamic state formations that preceded it. Molk and Vakif in Pre-Ottoman Societies

The mulk (Arabic) or milk (persian), as a piece of immovable estate, mainly in the form of land that could be compulsorily purchased, sold, or inherited, was recognized by religious law, and had existed from the first centuries of Islam. It appeared at the same time as the Arab caliphate. In that form, the institution did not possess any feudal features. After the feudalization of the countries included in the caliphate, the word mulk was applied to the small (land) estate of the direct producer, and unconditional possession with rights of full ownership of larger or smaller territories with the productive population that was settled there. In this sense, the mulk had turned into a feudal institution, which, in the opinion of some authors, resembled the Frankish alod. 4 It is known that, even in the early centuries of the Arab caliphate, the government granted land to private persons in the form of ikta (fief), which, although in some of its features was a prototype of the official forms of land ownership widespread in later Islamic societies, in other aspects represented a beginning of real estate. 5 After the decline of the caliphate, in all the Turco-Mongolian feudal formations where Islamic law was adopted, real estate, with various modifications in statutes existed. Thus, in the Seldjuk Sultanate of !conium (Konya), together with the ikta (in the sense of official land ownership), real estate could also be found. The latter was granted by the sultan to prominent military leaders and statesmen. 6 After the decline of the sultanate in the many small states that had been formed on its territory, there existed estates in the form of land whose owners had unlimited powers over that land. Even among the Anatolian Seldjuks, large feudal land ownership based on the mulk came into being.7 In Azerbaijan and Armenia, which, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, were included in the Turkic state of Karakoyunlu, there existed both fiefs and real estate. There, even the central government sold large estates as mulk. 8 As one of the main features of the mulk was

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the right of the owner to tum it into a pious foundation (valdfJ as a direct consequence of the existence of mulks Oand) estates, land valdfs came into being. As a result, the land mulk and valdfwere a common phenomenon in the pre-Ottoman Islamic feudal states, although official land ownership, in the characteristic and widespread form of feudal land ownership, existed in parallel. The Malikane-Divani Institution Of considerable significance for the study of the land mulk and vakif in the Ottoman Empire are the analogical categories in the Turkish Anatolian principalities on the eve of the Ottoman expansion. As a matter of principle, during this period, the mulk represented the predominant share in the land ownership systems of the small states in question. Having arisen as a result of separatist tendencies, and having reached maturity in the Seldjuk sultanate, the Anatolian principalities possessed a fully formed land-owning aristocracy that owned inherited lands unconditionally. Together with the land mulks in the full sense of the word, we also see there another variation in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, adopted-or rather preserved-in Ottoman agrarian institutions: the malikclne-divani system. While with land mulks, the unconditional ownership of the land belonged to the malik or mulk sahibi, that is, to the owner of the mulk, with malikime-divani, this ownership was divided between him and the central government. Malikane-divani is not, in fact, the estate itself, but its income: malikane referred to the part to which the feudal landowner was entitled, and divani to the part payable to the state. The malikane part always and unconditionally belonged to the malik, and he had unlimited powers over it. In contrast to the above, the divani portion could undergo a change of collector. In some cases, this was done by the fisc, and, in others, it was given as a "golden handshake" (dirlik) to some official. In other cases, it was turned into a valdf 9 The malikane-divani system was not further developed in the Ottoman Empire. Individual estates, concentrated almost exclusively in the Rum, Malatya, Karaman, and Yeni iI eyalets (administrative areas) continued to be subject to this system to the extent that their owners had joined the newly formed feudal class in the Ottoman Empire. 10 The malikane-divani system existed in the areas mentioned until 1593, when, according to the information provided by the legislature, it was abolished because of the constant disputes between persons who had parallel entitlement to the income from the lands subordinate to the system. I I The fact that it not only failed to develop under the new

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

conditions in the centralized Ottoman state, but quickly declined is the most eloquent proof that it was an inherited remnant of relationships that were foreign to Ottoman society during the period in question. 12

The Legal Status of the Miilk in the Ottoman Empire In the process of conquest, while official land ownership was in its infancy, or was gradually becoming established, the Ottoman sultans, because a tried and tested new system ofland ownership was still not in existence, adopted some of the agrarian institutions that already existed in the lands they conquered: this was mainly the mulk, which was the foundation of the feudal land-owning regime in the Turkish principalities of Asia Minor. Because that part of the aristocracy of the disbanded Anatolian principalities had joined the Ottoman feudal class and had preserved their landowning rights, and also because it was Asia Minor that was affected by the earliest Ottoman conquests, the institution of land mulk, by then an Ottoman agrarian category, spread mainly in Anatolia, where it continued to occupy its comparatively large share of the land ownership system until the end of the sixteenth century. 13 The spread of the mulk, and consequently of the vald! not in Anatolia itself, where it was (to some extent) an inherited agrarian category, but in the Balkans, and later on, in the Bulgarian lands is of interest to scholars. Here, the land mulk and vakif are part of the Ottoman feudal system, where all remnants of the pre-Ottoman heritage of Asia Minor have disappeared (the malikane-divani system, for example). As has already been mentioned, Islamic legal exports considered a mulk fonned on miriye land to be a false mulk. Theoretically, they based this defmition on the fact that these estates were not acquired by means of §eriat purchase and sale, in which one party had to be the fisc. "On the basis of a temlikname, one cannot acquire a real temlik (fonnal possession of property). 14 For this reason, if a person has not purchased part of the miriye land by way of true purchase and sale from the fisc, based on established practice, and this land is given to him free of charge, and he is given an temlikname, true temlik does not result from this. "15 As in many other cases connected with Ottoman feudal land ownership, in this case too there exists a nonn that is almost fiction. We shall see that the powers of the mulk sahibleri over their estates were unlimited, as far as one may speak of ' 'unlimited powers" under the conditions of a centralized, absolute feudal monarchy. The fact that

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official legal theory in the Ottoman state did not even recognize land mulk as an estate fully independent of the state land fund is no coincidence. It is one of the clear expressions of the consistent efforts of the central government to prevent the economic formation of a feudal stratum in order to avoid its political consequences-separatism. Although Ottoman legal experts regard land mulks as "false," i.e., they insisted that the rakabe on them, too, belonged to the fisc, some scholars consider that by issuing a temlikname, the central government had de facto given up all its powers as far as that land was concerned. 16 In documents of this kind, it is consistently indicated that the mulk sahibi received "full rights" and "absolute ownership" over the property given him by the government. In practice, this meant that he could bequeath the property, sell it, give it, or make it into a vakif according to his own views on the subject.17 In his treatise, Ali Cavu~ from Sofia, stating that land mulks and the "malikane's" that were common in his time were equal, gives the following defmition of their legal status: "A part of the lands are malikane. They are granted freehold by some sultans to deserving persons of high rank, to uc beys and to some statesmen for their duties and abilities. IS They possess mulknames from the previous and current sultans. Malikanes are also like an inherited mulk. They dispose of them as they wish, with full ownership rights. After them, they pass on to their heirs. They may sell them to someone else, give them as a gift or make them into a vakif. They posses them until the family dies out, or until a decree for their abolition is issued. Until that time they are not connected with any official obligations." 19 Consequently, it is clear that, in general terms, the legal status of the Ottoman mulk was absolutely identical with that of the mulk or milk in pre-Ottoman Islamic formations. And here, it was not connected with the fulfillment of official obligations, it was not granted for a definite period of time, nor for the lifetime of the holder ,but quite equivocally, freehold and free.

Temlikname (Miilkname), Mukarername

Sinirname

(Hududname),

An examination of the official acts with which the possession of land mulks was connected is necessary, but not for purely formal reasons. In the documents regarding the formation of these estates issued by the central government, many circumstances that characterize the essence of mulk ownership can be discerned.

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Ottoman land mUlks were the result not of purchase and sale in which one side was the fisc, but of being granted as a gift by the central government. The rights of the mulk sahibi are based on an official act known as a temlikname or mulkname, for the issue of which there was a special procedure: with an order from central government, the kadi in whose area the land about to become a mulk was located, established the exact boundaries of the villages or the hamlets mentioned in the decree according to the evidence of local residents. 20 On the basis of the report that the kadi sent to the capital, the mUlkname itself was issued. This procedure, it seems, was not compulsory in the early years after the conquest, since a number oftemlikname's of that period are very general and quite laconic. 21 In all probability, because of the disputes that arose, as a consequence, between the mulk sahibleri and fief holders in the provinces, the practice described above was adopted, the obvious aim of which was to establish, in the greatest detail, the rights of the mulk owners. After the initial operation, in which only the names of the mulk objects were registered, in addition, their boundaries had to be established. In such cases, the mulk sahibi would send a request to the central government, which ordered the local kadi to establish competently the boundaries that had been mentioned. The document issued by the sultan's office on the basis of the kadi's report was known as sinimame, or hududname. A number of sinimames attached to the descriptions of the vakifs that had originated from land mulks demonstrate the detail in which the boundary of a territory granted as a mulk was described, that is, the rocks, trees, and ditches that distinguished it were mentioned. 22 The procedure with which the granting of a land mulk was linked shows certain circumstances that are important for this study. Above all, it is particularly indicative that, in the early temliknames, the boundaries of the mulk were not shown. This proves that there was still not a large number of feudal estates on the territory of the empire at that time, that the possibility of disputes over the feudal rent of a given town or village did not exist. This very approximate way of showing the area of a mulk disappeared, as from the fifteenth century onward, and particularly from the sixteenth century, we have the most detailed sinimame's at our disposa1. 23 Consequently, military fiefs, which densely covered the lands of the empire during this period, made it necessary to establish the boundaries of the land m'idks exactly. The second conclusion from the information regarding the procedures for granting a mulk clearly characterizes the essence of that

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type of estate: while the documents concerning official (military) fiefs are exclusively devoted to the sun of the feudal income, they do not, in consequence, mention a definite territory; on the other hand, temliknames and sinimames describe the territory, that is, an area of land contained within definite boundaries. In fact, while timar means fief as much as it means income, with the mulk we are speaking in terms of a defmite territory. Documents of a different kind, connected with mulk estates are the so-called mukarernames. As is obvious from the copious information available, this was an act, sometimes simply referred to as hUkUm (order), with which every new sultan confirmed the mulk estate of a given feudal landowner. 24 Also, if a mulk changed hands because of a purchase and sale transaction, the new owner's status only became official when he had received confirmation of his rights in the form of a mukarername. 25 The mukaremame cannot be regarded as a mere formality of mulk ownership. With the necessary periodic confirmation of that possession, the central government retained control over the mulk as well, and did not isolate it from the state land fund. The mukaremame, in fact, is the expression of the real situation-that is, that the land mulk in practice, too, was also "false," that is, a gift that only bound the person who had granted it (the ruling sultan), but did not bind his heirs or the central government at all.

Inheritance of Land Miilks As we have seen, Ottoman legal tradition defines, in the most general terms, the powers of the mulk sahibi as the power to bequeath, to sell, and to make into a vakif without limitation. Although the first right of the mulk sahibi is to bequeath his land mulk to his heirs, one is struck by the fact that, in Ottoman sources, the practice of inheriting this type of estate is little reflected. Cases in which the long-term retention of a mulk in the hands of one family can be established are rare, that is, without the mUlk becoming a vakif, over several decades. Thus, for example, Mehmet Bey, son of the Tatar emir of Samsun, received a temlik for the village of Konush, Stanimah district, during the time of Mehmet I. His heirs continued to possess the same mUlk during the reign of Beyazit ll. Beyazit <;elebi, son of the emir of Kastamonu, isfendiyar, retained the mulk in the Dimotika area given to his father until the reign of Suleyman I. The village of Ravnik in the Plovdiv area was the mulk of the sons of Mihaloglu during the reign of Beyazit ll. They inherited it from their

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

father. Davud Pa~a, vizier of the same sultan, bequeathed to his son two mulk villages in the Dimotika area, and so on. Dozens of similar examples could be quoted,26 but they do not change the situation regarding retention - that is, that a mulk passed as an inheritance through one or two generations at the most, after.which it was almost always converted into a vakif 27 It is obvious, in fact, that of all the rights possessed by the owner of a mulk, the most rarely used was his main right-to bequeath it to his heirs.

The Purchase and Sale of Land Miilks One of the most important consequences resulting from the supreme ownership by the state of the means of production-the land-is the fact that, in the empire during the time in question, .the land estates were outside of free commercial circulation. Consequently, the majority of Ottoman feudal landowners and fief holders were not endowed with the right to buy or sell land on their own initiative at all. Thus, the exclusive privilege as far as the distribution of the income from the land among the members of the feudal class was retained by the central government, while the separate fief holders were unable to increase their incomes by the sale of land with a productive population attached to it. This principle, however, only affected official, or conditional land ownership-fiefs. As far as the owners of mulks were concerned, they were free to conduct all operations connected with the removal of their estates. Although, when a fief was confirmed, such operations were rarer, until that time, and as an exception during the reign of Beyazit II, the practice was widespread. As the literature on the subject does not devote enough space to the significant free circulation of land that was in essence miriye during the period in question, here we shall provide certain information regarding the sale and purchase of mulks. (See Table 2.1) The information set out, which is only a part of the mass of information available regarding the purchase and sale of land mulks, bears witness to the fact that a part of the miriye land, even during the period in question, was in free circulation. Unfortunately, one of the main questions connected with this fact-that is, the correlation between the income and the price of the estate-cannot be established for lack of information. It is true that some of the documents show the income of the estate, and others its price; but we do not have at our disposal sources that contain the two elements in parallel. Thus, we must content ourselves with suppositions based on the average income of a certain type of estate.

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In the table on the next page, the average feudal income from a farm is about 1,500 akr;e, while the only price of a farm we have available is 3,500 akr;e. The average income from a village was about 3,700 akr;e, while prices of a mulk village (including the hamlets attached to the village) range from 43,000 to 175,000 akr;e. 28 Naturally, these average figures are only approximate and express only roughly the correlation between feudal income and the price of the land. They can only lead us to the entirely logical supposition that land mulk cost between 10 and 40 times as much as the annual feudal income from the land in question. The question of whether the sale and purchase of large mulk estates were the only form of free circulation of estates in the form of land is important in terms of providing a description of the land mulk. Were these transactions carried out unconditionally between one mulk sahibi and another? Was there not a way of transforming miriye land into a land mulk by purchasing it from the direct producer, i. e., the farmer? 29 First and foremost, it should be emphasized that the creation of a "true" mulk envisaged in the §eriat by its purchase from the fisc was with very few exceptions, not practiced in the Ottoman Empire. In the cases known to us, the treasury would sell to a new mulk sahibi a mulk that was without an owner (because the family of the owner had died . . . In this way, Ahmet Pa§a acquired a mulk farm during the time of Beyazit ll.30 In fact, it is not clear to what extent, when such a sale was transacted, the buyer received a "true" mulk, or the fisc simply renewed by means of this sale an already granted "false" mulk.

Apart from the case mentioned, there is also information available, fairly limited it is true, regarding sale and purchase transacted between peasants and feudal lords-a fact that is not only in contradiction to the laws in force at the time, but to our ideas about Ottoman feudalism during its early period. As we know, the peasant had the right to sell permanent ownership of the land he cultivated, and that the buyer assumed the feudal dependency and responsibilities connected with the estate. In the cases in question, however, the transaction was carried out between the peasant and the feudal lord, who belonged to the ruling class-and who, in no way, could accept such dependency and obligations. Also, it should be emphasized that the land purchased by the feudal land obviously became a mulk, as he then made it into a vakif Such a state of affairs would not be permissible from the point of view of the §eriat, which, as we have seen, allows the acquisition

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Table 2.1

Seller

Purchaser

Mihail, son of Silahtar Komnen Zaganoz Mehmet Bey Son of Mihaloglu Karagaz Bey Hekimoglu Haci 'Ibri Daug~ter of Haci Ibri Son of Asi Mtiu}k3.r Zaganoz Bey

Wife of Mehmet II

Beyazit, .grandson of Isfendiyar Mehmet Bey, son of Grand Vizier Davud. P¥a The fisc

Hidir, son of Hasan Fakih Kutlu Bey Mahmud, son of 'Isfendiyar Wife of Taci Bey §ehabeddin SubaJii Mahmud Pa}a, vizier Obren Mehmet

Ahmet Pa.p

Heirs of Dogan Bey

Davud Pa}a, Vizier

Gevher Sultan

Ahmet PaJia

Ahmet Paja

.Daughter of Ibrahim Bey Winemaster Hamza

SiIleyman <;elebi Mehmet, son of 'Isfendiyar Mehmet, son of Hidir <;elebi Piri Mehmet P¥a Heirs of Saruca Pa§a

Site Kavaklula alan Seres Ravnik, Plovdiv Hekim K6 y Dimotika Farm in Malkara Farm in Malkara K~i, Sparta Azizlyu, Dimotika Village in Amasya Kazgenci Ergene Hamlet in Azizlyu Dimotika Chaush and Sudjak Punar, Dimotika <;iflik Hasan Fakih, Edirne Timurhan, <;iflik, Edirne Kalami~e,

KeJian HLi srev Bey, Hersek and Rus Kay, Sancakbey Kejan. Mustafa <;ifli~ Ismail Bey, Ipsala His wife BektaJi' Mehmet Pasha Tuidja Balaban and Timurglu Mustafa Pa§a Vrabchitsel Tumchovishte Tetovo Mehmet Paja Mezra

Received from

Sold under

Beyazit I 6615

Mehmet No II Beyazit II Yes

4042

Murat II

I.

Mehmet <;elebi Mustafa Pa§a

Dimotika Kazandji <;iflik Dimofika Dganoglu, Kizilagac Kirk Ali, Malkara

P.

200

Murat I 3500 Murat I

5948 Mehmet II Murat II Mehmet II

Yes

Mehmet Yes II Mehmet No II Beyazit II Beyazit II

1482

Yes

Yes SiIleyman I

Yes

Beyazit II

Yes

2517

-

Beyazit II

No

5108

-

Beyazit II

Yes

4339

Beyazit II

Yes

4100

Beyazit II

Yes

SiIleyman Beyazit II <;elebi Murat II Beyazit II

Y;es

Murat II Murat II Beyazit II

Yes Yes Yes

SiIleyman I

Yes

SiIleyman I

Yes

3000

Selim II

Yes

7128

Beyazit II

Yes

598 8655 8655 7000

ducat

Konu~

Mehmet Pa}a

Whether Made into vakif

-

\

Yes

CHAPTER TWO

71

Table 2.1 cont.

Seller Heirs of Saruca Pa§a Winemaster Zaganoz

Purchaser Mehmet Bey, pejterdar Ipk Pa§a

Granddaughter of Mehmet Bey

Kasim Pa§a

Thrahim Pa§a Hersekzade Ahmet Pa§a Gevher Melik Sultan Isa Bey

Heirs of Abas PaJa

Husrev Bey, Sancakbey Ayni§ah Hatun Kebir Mehmet, son of "Isa Bey Mustafa Pa~a

Koca Hizir Bey Heirs of Davud Pa§a Davud Pa§a

Koca Mustafa Pa§a Mustafa Pa§a

Site Baba Agac Gelibolu Zaganoz Bey, Dimotika Ku~uk bTu and Hacilar, Edime Yenice Kay, Edime Balabanlu, Dimotika Palatinos, Gelibolu Uzgas Scutari (Shkode r) "Izmirli Scutari (Shkode r) ~iflik Koca, Ke§an Musliheddin Edime Kadi, Dimotika

I.

p"

Received from

4655

Sold under Beyazit II

Whether Made into vakif Yes

Beyazit II Yes

Beyazit II

Yes

4005

Beyazit II Yes

4007

Beyazit II

7797

Mehmet II

Yes

Beyazit II Yes Mehmet II

Yes

8500

Beyazit II

Yes

1240

Beyazit

Yes

2500

Beyazit II

Beyazit II Yes

7128 -

Beyazit II

Beyazit II Yes

of a false mulk only if it is given as a gift with a temlikname, that is, with the permission of central government. In the case quoted, there can be no mention of permission from central government, and the mulk was created on the initiative of the feudal lord himself by means of unlawful purchase of miriye land from the direct producer. Because the data in question are extremely important because they indicate unstudied breaches of the law as far as a basic principle is concerned, detailed information about some of these cases will be given. They are contained in some vakifnames for the Macedonian lands dating from the sixteenth century. The data concerning the pu~chase of fields and meadows from the peasants in the skopje area by Isa Bey, son of the first Ottoman governor of Skopje, Pa§a Yigit, belong first and foremost to the sixteenth century.31 This practice was continued by the son of isa Bey, Kebir Mehmet C;elebi, in a much more widespread form: the latter turned many of the properties into foundations of his mosque in Skopje. Apart from urban properties, the vakifinc1uded a large number of separate

72

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

fields, meadows, and gardens, scattered throughout the territory of a number of Macedonian villages. The regular object of the land vakiJ-the mulk village-is here featured as a single unit, namely, the village of Uzga~, Scutari, which the person who bequeathed it, for some -reason, purchased from his father. 32 Information about the remaining mulk of the feudal landowner, together with information about the persons from whom he purchased it, are given on page 73. The objects of purchase referred to were obviously parts of farms (raiyye farms). This is obvious both from their small size and from the fact that they were scattered throughout the common land of a number of villages. These portions of raiyye farms were· purchased by the above mentioned Kebir Mehmet, from which it is obvious that they were purchased with a deed (which is the lawful form of sale and purchase of cultivated miriye land). Moreover, in some cases it is expressly stated that Kebir Mehmet carried out his purchases by means of a deed. In this event, one question remains unansweredthe most important one: Exactly how was this miriye land turned into mulk? First and foremost, it should be reemphasized that the vakifname does not mention any temlikname and mulk property issued by the state. Consequently, it should be assumed that, together with the unlawful purchase of raiyye land, Kebir Mehmet also committed another breach of the law: he either turned miriye land into a vakiJ, or he obtained illegal recognition of his purchases as a false mulk. The most important fact in the cases quoted is that they, to a great extent, remind us of a later practice embodied in the livestock farms established on miriye land. 33 Here, as at a later date, the feudal landowner who succeeded in obtaining miriye land as a mulk was an influential person, a descendent of the most important Turkish feudal family in the Skopje area. To a great extent, the latter circumstance explains the many irregular actions of isa Bey and his son. Apart from this, it could be assumed that Kebir Mehmet also held a fief in the Skopje area because only in his capacity as a timar holder would he have the right to demand feudal taxes from the peasants (their harac). He, however, had no right to confiscate meadows for unpaid taxes, and such an action would only add to the list of offences that served as the basis for his particular kind of mulk. We should also mention the "swapping" of land mulks by mulk sahibleri-which is not mentioned in the §eriat, but is an implied right of such landowners. Information in this respect is sparse, but it obviously does not reflect actions that are illegal. Thus, Sokollu Mehmet Pa~a "swapped" his mulk in Delvin for villages in southern

CHAPTER TWO

73

Bulgaria. 34 Ahmet Pa§a Hersekzade did the same with his mulk village of Akbunar, and so on. 35 The full powers exercized by mulk sahibleri over their lands was reflected in an operation of another kind-the leasing of land mulks. For example the sancakbey of Chirmen leased his mulk farm at Karaagac Pinar for 350 akqe per annum to a liberated slave of Davud Pa§a. The contract was inherited by the son of the lessee, who confirms that it continued. 36 Conversion into a vakiJ, the last element in the full legal powers of mulk sahibleri over their estates, will be examined in detail at a later stage, because it was this act that converted the mulk into an estate of another kind-the vakiJ, or pious foundation.

Table 2.2 Type of property District Vineyard - 11 hoe-lengths Skopje Vineyard - 6 hoe-lengths Krpnja Vineyard - 8 hoe-lengths Poroi Field of 60 plough-widths Leskovaina. Tetovo Meadow of 20 plough-widths Mala Rechitsa Field of 70 plough-widths Tetovo Field of 17 plough-widths Field of 22 plough-widths Plot of 6 plough-widths

Krpnja Treposha Not recorded

Plot of 8 plough-widths

Not recorded

Meadow of 6 plough-widths Garden with walnut trees Plot (no further details) Meadow of 4 plough-widths Plot of 2 plough-widths Plot (no further details)

Large meadow Meadow of 4 plough-widths

Teharets Otoushitsa Otoushitsa Not recorded Not recorded In Otoushitsa and Teharets an entire hill between the rivers Rakovitsa and Vardar Zlokouchan Zhivo Kyutouche

Plot, meadow and forest

Kopanitsa

Plot Field of 4 plough-widths

Kopanitsa Kopanitsa

Plot

Seller Kernan Not recorded Not recorded Hidir Radnich Not recorded The inhabitants of the villages of Zabel, Polatitsa and Saradjinitsa Not recorded Not recorded Exchanged for a meadow belonging to Dimitri Kovach Taken from the son of Roussin for unpaid harae. The sons of Balaban Milutin Milutin Koutsia Raich Dobroslav Not recorded With a deed from Umur <;e1ebi and Suleyman Bey The sons of Petur Ivan and Petko, sons of Radich, and other infidels Milosh Vuichich and the sons of Vitomir Ivan from Radotintsi 37 Ivan from Radotintsi

Miilk Sahibleri (Millk Owners) The qualitatively different privileges that the mulk sahibleri held in land ownership (in comparison with the fief holders)

74

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

detennine their fonnation as a different stratum of the Ottoman feudal class. Did the mulk sahibleri have a social identity of their own? Infonnation that would provide an answer to this question is, it is true, not of the same kind, but because of its volume, it casts ample light on the matter in question. On the basis of the data available, the following main categories of mulk sahibi can be distinguished. 1. Members of the dynasty: the many wives, sons, daughters, grandchildren, and sons-in-law of the sultan composed a considerable group in their own right within the Ottoman ruling class. As can be seen from the records, it is they who are frequently mentioned as the owners of land mUiks, although some of them (mainly the princes) also owned a has. Thus, for example, in the reign of Mehmet IT, Siti Hatun and Gul~ah Hatun, both wives of the sultan, his daughter Ay~e Hatun, and his granddaughters Hani Hatun and Ayni ~ah Hatun were all owners of mulks. Data relating to mulks held by six of his daughters are from the reign of Beyazit IT. Siileyman granted mulks to his son Mehmet, to his sister Devlet ~ah Sultan, to his daughter Mihrimah, and his granddaughter Hiima ~ah. Two of the daughters of Selim IT also possessed mulks: 38 a number of similar cases could be quoted. There is also copious infonnation about mulks granted to the sons-in-law of the sultan. 39 2. Viziers: This group of high-ranking dignitaries held large fiefs. It can also positively be stated, however, that apart from the fiefs, as a rule to which there were very few exceptions, the viziers also possessed land mulks, because of which, in some legal records, estates of this type are referred to as "viziers' mulks. "40 The mulks of Mehmet Pa~a, Saruca Pa~a, Sinan Bey, Rum Mehmet P~a, Thrahim P~a Gandarili, ishak Pa~a, Ayaz Pa~a, Ferhat Pa~a, Kasim Pa~a, Yahya Pa~a, Ali Pa~a, Hadim ibrahim Pa~a, Liitfi Pa~a, Sinan Pa~a, Sokollu Mehmet Pa~a, and so on are all known to US. 41 3. High-ranking military and administrative persons: Although this stratum of feudal lords would compulsorily have held large fiefs, they were frequently owners of mulks as well. For example, Karaca Pa~a, beylerbey of Anatolia and Rumelia under Murat II, possessed mUlk villages, as did another beylerbey of Rumelia, Mehmet Pasha. 42 Sancakbeys also frequently possessed land mulks. 43 4. The remains of the aristocracy of the principalities of Asia Minor: It has already been stated that part of this aristocracy retained

CHAPTER TWO

75

their mulk estates for their own lifetimes, and that the same estates could be inherited and bequeathed. Others, however, received new mulks that were far removed from their old lands: this fact was not a matter of coincidence. Such were the mulks of Mehmet Bey, son of Minet Bey, former emir of the Samsun Tatars, ismail Bey, son of isfendiyar and grandson of the emir of Kastamonu and his descendents in Thrace and the Rhodopes. 44 In the fifteenth century in Macedonia, lived the heirs of the Seldjuk Sultan izzettin Key kavus IT (1246-1250).45 As an exception, the descendants of certain Byzantine aristocratic families also retained their privileges in unconditional land ownership. Thus, Michael Comnenius possessed mulk land in the Komotini area until the reign of Mehmet II.46 5. A considerable number of the mulk sahibleri were the gazis (those who had been military leaders during the conquest), because of which some scholars refer to a land mulk as a gazi mulku: 47 The mulks of Evrenos, Timurta~, Gazi Mihal Bey, Karlizade Lala Ali Bey, and so on. 48 6. Various persons employed at the court, and persons o/various ranks in the palace guards. The sultan, of course, also made his pleasure known to the members of his civil service who were close to him. Because, during the period in question, they only very rarely held fiefs as an exception, the mulk was the only kind of estate that they succeeded in acquiring. Much data is available about the mUlks of defterdars (keepers of the records), mir ahuri, mir §ikan (masters of the hunt), some higher ranks in the corps of janissaries, palace employees whose duties are unknown, and even the sultan's wet nurses, physicians, and the governors/ governesses of the sultan's children. 49 It should be noted that this group of mulk sahibleri, particularly the courtiers whose duties were unknown, accounted for a large share of the total. 7. Clergy: Although some high-ranking Muslim clergy (kadiaskers, the kadi of Edirne and istanbul, and mollas)50 also held mulks, the vast majority of estates of this kind belonging to clergy are the mulks of §eyhs and dervi§ (dervishes).51 This large number of dervi§ mUlks and vaki/s are categorized because of their special function and features, and are an entirely separate group. Apart from this, their owners cannot be included in the previously mentioned groups of mulk sahibleri because of their social characteristics.

76

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

If we exclude the latter category, it is quite obvious that the remainder fully and completely represented the ruling class. Much source material provides evidence that it is within the framework of this stratum, whose land ownership was overwhelmingly of the mulk type, that a certain exclusiveness existed. Its members were linked by blood and by marriage, and bequeathed not only their land-owning privileges, but also a say in the running of the state. The first great families of feudal landowners-the mulk sahibleri, who, at the same time, occupied important posts in the political and military administration of the empire, were formed at the time of the first conquests. The beginnings of the Evrenosogullari, Mihalogullari, Turhanogullari,52 <;andarli,53 and Pa~a Yigit families date from this time. The members of these families retained their privileged positions in affairs of state for more than a century. Without exception, the families in question possessed large mulks, which they increased by means of purchases of new mulk land, and the appropriation of village land in some cases. 54 Thus, they were the mulk landowners not only of the lands granted to them by the central government, but of much larger estates. Apart from landownership, they gradually assumed a dominant role in the life of the town, buying up exceptionally large numbers of urban properties: hundreds of shops, storage facilities, houses, public baths, caravansarays, and so on. Consequently, the mulk sahibleri used the money accumulated from feudal exploitation to consolidate their economic power both in land ownership and in the life of the town. 55 In spite of the efforts of the state to prevent the economic formation of a separate stratum of feudal landowners, the mulk sahibleri succeeded in accumulating significant wealth and in occupying key positions in the economy of the empire. This fact was due to the circumstance that, having once been bearers of qualitative privileges in land ownership, the state was unable to limit the quantitative growth of their economic power. An important prerequisite for the expansion of mulk land ownership at the initiative of the big landowners, and for the consolidation of their positions in the economic life of the town, was their political influence-their participation in the running of the state. This growth of privileges in government, together with privileges in land ownership created from the stratum of the mulk sahibleri a typical medieval feudal aristocracy, which bore all the characteristic features of its social position. Moreoever, the conviction of some bourgeois historians that, during the period in question, there were no feudal landowners, only "servant employees" - persons who had no firm standing in land ownership, but who were mere functionaries of the

CHAPTER TWO

77

central government, dependent purely on the will of the sultan-does not correspond to historical fact. 56 The fact that the representatives of the timar system had a completely conditional relationship with the means of production, that they were unable to take the initiative in land ownership, as timar land ownership was managed, controlled, and limited by the central government is, in all senses, real. This also dictated the disinterestedness by the representatives of this system in feudal landownership. On the other hand, as far as that land ownership was concerned, there were the mulk sahibleri-persons who held long-lasting and secure positions in it. Their attitude to land ownership cannot be described as disinterested. On the contrary, the mulk sahibleri took the initiative, which was in increasing the size of their estates and in their methods of exploitation. Their role in affairs of state allowed them to carry out all kinds of operations with their estates, some of which were illegal. . . In spite of the economic and political strength of the upper stratum of the Ottoman feudal class-the mulk sahibleri-during the period in question, the central government was still in a position to oppose them. In its resistance to their acquired power, the state relied on a very broad base-the sipahi caste, which, until the last quarter of the sixteenth century, had not lost its place in the life of the empire. On the other hand, the feudal aristocracy had not strengthened its position to such an extent that it would be able to oppose the large number of small fief holders, nor was it sufficiently established in the state administration to not allow their representatives to enter the apparatus of the empire. And, for the reason that its position was still insufficiently firm, the feudal aristocracy was compelled to seek ways of preserving the power it had already acquired, to consolidate and bequeath in inheritance its land-owning privileges. Thus, as a form of existence of mulk land ownership, which was protected from intervention by the central government, this was widely used by the burgeoning feudal aristocracy. The Vakif One of the Islamic institutions that has been the object of research is the vakif. This interest has been determined by the character of the institution itself, by the fact that a vakif is a "perpetual" estate. It is namely for this reason that in vakiflands, feudal-or the remains of feudal-relationships were preserved in a number of Islamic countries until very recently, and even to this day. The conservatism of

78

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

the institution in question, which turns vakif estates into archaic islands in a sea of what is, in fact, capitalism has had a negative effect on the economy of many colonial or dependent countries in the Near and Middle East. This role of the vakifin the economy has also determined the interest of colonizers in the problems of the institution in question. 57 It should immediately be added, however, that the study of the vakif has not gone beyond the framework of theoretical and legal approaches. Bourgeois historiography, while studying in the greatest detail the attitudes of the separate Muslim theosophical-legal schools to the vakif, and emphasizing the differences in their views, with the formalism which is typical of it, has left in the shadows the most important, even the only important matters as far as this is concerned-namely, what the aims of creating a vakif were. To which social stratum did the founders of vakifs belong; what production relationships were dominant in the vakif lands; what were the methods of exploitation? What was the attitude of the central government to vakifland ownership, etc? As far as the matters raised are concerned, the study of the vakif lags far behind in comparison with the study of Muslim, and, in greater detail, of Ottoman forms of feudal land ownership. Matters concerning the vakifhave also been neglected by Marxist literature, which devotes a great deal of attention to the timar system for the simple reason that it incorporates, in a general way, the image of Ottoman feudalism. It should be noted at this point that some bourgeois literature on the subject, or, rather, Turkish literature on the subject deliberately sets the study of the subject on a false trail, giving less importance to the role of the vakif institution than it deserves. This is because the extreme conservatism of the vakif is the clearest reflection of the generally reactionary quality of Muslim feudal institutions and the retarding role of the Muslim feudal ruling class. Thus, for example, 6. 1. Barkan states that, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the vakif accounted for an insignificant sector in the land ownership of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, he states, after that period, vakif lands could not be extended because land mulks, which were the only material for the creation of a vakif, were not granted at a later date. 58 As will be seen below, this Turkish historian seriously underestimates the place of the vakif in the Ottoman feudal system. Furthermore, the stance he adopts is not devoid of tendentiousness because he actually states: "It is incorrect to assume that the vakif is one of the reasons for the economic backwardness and poverty of the Islamic

CHAPTER TWO

79

countries. "59 In fact, although the backwardness of the Ottoman economy could not be blamed on the vakif, the latter is definitely one of the convincing examples, and important expressions, of this backwardness. The Place of the Vakif in the Agrarian Structure of the Ottoman Empire.

It should be emphasized that vakif land ownership, which does not determine the image of Ottoman feudal land ownership not only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but later as well, does not occupy an insignificant place in the system of Ottoman feudalism. If it is kept in mind that crown lands, the sultan's has, accounted for one-third of occupied land,60 and vakiflands, for another third,61 it is obvious that not more than a third of the miriye lands remained for fiefs. The author, who has provided data concerning the volume of vakif land ownership, has not stated his source, but his statement can be checked by means of comparison with other information. Thus, for example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century (1603), there were 95,000 Christian raiyye households on vakif lands. 62 In order to get an idea of the correlation between the vakif and the remaining raiyye, let us note that, only at the end of the sixteenth century, the population of the Ottoman state comprised 550,139 households, and the raiyye with special obligations-96,329 households. 63 The total number of vakifhouseholds, however, was at least twice that shown, as 95,000 households belonged only to the Christian raiyye population on vakif lands. Thus, in all probability, the population that cultivated vakif lands comprised about a third of the total dependent population in fact. Apart from this, in some Anatolian sancaks, the correlation in question was reflected as follows: 64

Table 2.3 Sancak

Biga "Inepazari Lapseki

Timar raiyye households

SuI tan's vakif

796 831 976

112 109

117

124

151

households

Vizier's vakif households

16

Murat Han's Vakif households

156

Consequently, in these regions, too, vakif lands accounted for between one-quarter and one-third of the total area of cultivated land.

80

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The correlation set out above will seem even more convincing if it is compared with the actual material concerning the vakifs in Rumelia, where in 1530 there were"2,709 timar villages,64a while also in the sixteenth century, according to incomplete data, on the Pasha sancak alone, there were more than 750 vakif Villages. 64b As vakif status played an important role in the economic development of these settlements, it would be meaningful if they were mentioned by name. Moreover, so that superfluous information will not be included, we shall mention only the vakifvillages within the boundaries of present-day Bulgaria. The data relate mainly to the Pasha sancak, while as far as northern and southwestern Bulgaria are concerned, we have only incomplete and coincidental pieces of information.

Table 2.4

Name of village

District

Balka Bunar Konush

Plovdiv Plovdiv

Kyokline Banishte Penakiya Karaagach/Karaagac MahaJle-i Pasha Vodna-i Balya Vodna-i Zir Lesko va Yavrova Gerova Dobra Luka Mukataa Kizil Hisar Myuderislyu/M'u derris-

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Ttl

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Hidir Sheyh/~eyh Markovo Tabani Yassi Bayram Bey Bayram Bey <;ullu DomaJi Seholova Dokova K rai slave ~arli

Kay

Gurlova Kozadriche Shushinche Kay) Lovadiche Ravnik

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Annual income

According to data reign of/year

542 16,210

Murat IT Mehmet IT

42,448 19,240 7,458 23,047 570 34,610 10,658 10,431 4,655 8.961 70,000

1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4 1693/4

Mehmet IT Mehmet IT 'Ismail 'Isfendiyaroglu Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT

29.372

Mehmet 64C II

27,500

Mehmet 64C II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit IT Beyazit II

Ali Bey b. Karli Ali Bey b. Karli Koca Davud Papa

6,055

Vakif of Murat IT Mehmet Bey b. Minet ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Pap ~ehabettin Pap ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa ~ehabettin Papa

131,468

(~ahin

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Beyazit II Beyazit IT

CHAPTER TWO

81

Table 2.4 cont.

Name of village Gakfe Hamza Chashnigir Kochma Kalivra 'Imirhan Mezra Baba Oglu

District Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Yuvasin (Novasel?)

Plovdiv

Ali Fakih

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Vakif of

Gakfe Hamza .Hu seyin Aga Ibrahim Pa.l'a Yahya Pa.l'a ~eyh Arap Haci Piri Mehmet

Annual income 1,385 5,952 39,000 30,600 1,200 3,000

According to data rei~n of/year Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II

3,897

Selim I

7,758 2,138 2,960 5,616 2,100 1,804 1,100 11,763 834 1.346 3,300

Suleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman Suleyman Suleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman

3.612

Silleyman 1

Pa~a

Yegim Beyli

Plovdiv

Terziler

Plovdiv

Kutluca/KutIudja Kara Bunar .Ham idIu /Hamidlyu Ismail Draz Yeni Kay Mente.l'alulMenteshalu Yenice Kay (Yenidje K.) Saruca (Sarudja) 36 villages in the Plovdiv district, names unknown 12 villages in the Plovdiv district, names unknown Hlomich Virlef or Degermen Dere Seymen Elkes or Manol Chirpan or Yund Kay Sigircilu Umur Bey Klifir Kay

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Piri Mehmet PaF Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Mihrimah Sultan Gevher Han Sultan Gevher Han Sultan Gevher Han Sultan Silleyman 1 Silleyman 1 Silleyman 1 Suleyman I Silleyman 1 Suleyman 1 Suleyman 1 Silleyman 1 Silleyman 1

Plovdiv

~ah

Plovdiv

Ali Bey

Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv Plovdiv

Saruhan Beylu

Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik

Ahmet Pa.l'a Ahmet Pa.l'a Ahmet Pa.l'a Ahmet Pa~a Ahmet Pa.l'a Ahmet Pa.l'a Mueyyedzade, Kadiasker Davud Pap

43,662

Selim 1 Beyazit II

Suleyman 1

34,204

Suleyman 1

Suleyman I

5.600

Suleyman 1

Silleyman 1

16,834

Silleyman 1

Timurta~

Kara Davud hzeddinlil Nasuh Fakih Yuvasin (Novasel) Boguk (Bogova) Aktav Yuvasin (Novasel) Parehan Gabekli

Dogan Kay Dogan Dolab and Derefu Derelyu Duracik (Dorkova)

64

d

Sultan

I I I I I I 1 1 I I I

Suleyman I

44.138

Silleyman Suleyman Suleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman SUleyman Silleyman Silleyman

I 1 I I I 1 1 I

39,698

Suleyman 164e

33.697

Silleyman I

Suleyman Suleyman Silleyman Silleyman Silleyman

I 1 1 1 1

82

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Table 2.4 cont. N arne of village Konstantin (Kostandova) Karneniche Koruk (Korova) Rakinova (Rakitova) Baya (Banya) Lizhani (Luzhene) Oustromcha Chernogor Kazanluk 'Ine Hidir Akfe ibrahimTti/Akche Ibrahimlyu Kortena Beyli Berakli I1ica/Beraklu Uludja Hidir Fakih 64h

Harpishte Naldoken/Naldyoken Dani~nendlu/

Danishmendlu Papas Bozodoganci/ Bozodogandju Toprak Hisar U muroglu/U muroglu 'Islivne Keranbolu Konchoko Kadi Koy Venice Gobel/Gyobel Kovanlu Halil Gok Ta.l'/Gyok Tash Tatar Me.:;edi/Tatar Meshedi Gobelli Yaylasi/Gyobelli Yaylasu Ho~kadem/Hoshkadem

District

VakiJof Suleyman I

Annual income 20,116

According to data reign of/year

Suleyman I

13,706

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

8,000

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

31,283

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

20,084

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

9,737 64f

Suleyman I

Mihrimah Sultan

16. 29 l64g

Suleyman I

Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Tatar Pazardjik Kazanluk Kazanluk Nova Zagora Nova Zagora Nova Zagora Nova Zagora Nova Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Stara Zagora Yarnbol Yarnbol Yarnbol Yambol Yambol Yarnbol Yarnbol Yarnbol Yarnbol

Murat II Murat II Murat II Murat II Murat II Haci Kemalettin :Ismail Bey ,Ismail Bey Ismail Bey

Yambol

'Ismail Bey

Beyazit II

Yarnbol

'Ismail Bey

Beyazit II

Lutfi Pa~a

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

Umur Bey Ali Hadim Pa.l'a Beyazit II

4,251 5,823

Murat II Beyazit II Beyazit II

Beyazit II

21,954

Beyazit II

Beyazit II

506

Beyazit II

Beyazit II

2,256

Beyazit II

Ali Hadim

6,080

Beyazit II

1,044

Suleyman <;elebi

Murat II

15,495

Murat II

Mustafa Bey

2,200

Beyazit II

Mustafa Bey

2,550

Beyazit II

Mustafa Bey

1,190

Beyazit II

Mustafa Bey

1,565

Beyazit II

Mustafa Bey

578

Beyazit II

Suleyman I

2,093

Suleyman I

Aydin

~eyh

58,507

Murat II Murat II Murat II Murat II Murat II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II

CHAPTER TWO

83

Table 2.4 cont. Name of village

District

VakiJof

Budaklu Kovaloz Makula Holi Vitrebolu CODul/Gyobyul Kulkal inehanli/Inehan lu PirIuce/Pirl yudje Mokra .Sule Bey <;:iftlikiChiflik Isa Bey <;:iftlikiChiflik Evlialu 'Idris Aga/aga

Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Yambol Karnobat Aitos Aitos Aitos Aitos Anhialo Anhialo Anhialo Anhialo Anhialo Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kazul Agach (Elhovo) Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo) Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo) Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo) Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyzait II Beyazit II Ali Hadim Pa§a Ali Hadim Pa§a Ali Hadim Pa§a Ali Hadim Pa§a Ali Hadim Pa§a Mehmet II Davud Papa Davurl Papa Davud Papa Davud Papa Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II

Gaziler M oushkef/Mu§kef Serine (?) Avdulu Sozopol <;:enger/Chenger Zonarite Revandinos Yoros 'Iskender Koy/Kyoi

Eski VakifIVakuf

Purfuke/Pyurlyuke

DemircifulDemirdjilyu

Kavaklu

Mehmet II

Annual income 3,175 5,546 4,029 5,678 7,038 7,649 4,025 3,815 2,000 1,386 1,692 7,359 946 3,887 2,000 3,000 40,000 12,000 80,432 2,596 1.500 5,237 10,803 520

3.114

According to data reign of/year Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyzit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Mehmet II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II 64 i

Beyazit II Beyazit II Beyazit II Murat n

Murat II

Muhmet II

Murat

n

n

Murat

n

Mehmet II

Murat

n

Mehmet

84

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Table 2.4 cont.

N arne of village °Ibri

District Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

VakiJof Mehmet II

Annual income

According to data reign of/year Murat II

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Mehmet II

74,771

Murat II

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Mehmet II

74,771

Murat II

OguilOguz Alan

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzu! Agach (E!hovo)

Mehmet II

Murat II

°Iliyasp

Kizi! Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzu! Agach (Elhovo)

Mehmet II

Murat II

Hidir Aga/Aga

Kizi! Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzu! Agach (E!hovo)

Mehmet II

Murat II

Davud Beyfu/Beylyu

Kizi! Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (E!hovo)

Mehmet II

Murat II

Tutulu

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Mehmet II

Murat II

Karli Alan/Karlu Alan

Sari Savcili/Saru Savdjulu

85

CHAPTER TWO

Table 2.4 cont.

Annual income

According to data reign of/year

Name of village

District

Vakifof

IIical uIVludjaI u

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (EJhovo)

Mehmet II

Yenice Kay

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (EJhovo)

Davud Bey

9,160

Beyazit II

~ahinru /Shahinlyu

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

"Ishak Pa.:;a

8,500

Beyazit II

<;akirl u/Chakurl u

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

"Ishak PaF

3,432

Beyazit II

Uyruklu

Kizul Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Murat IT

Sinan Pa.:;a

Beyazit II

Ipik BunarlUshuk

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Sinan PaF

Beyazit II

Eskice Pazar/Eskidje

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Yakub Papa

Beyazit II

Bazigryan

Kizil Agac Satiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Yakub Papa

10,632

Beyazit II

86

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Table 2.4 cont.

Annual income

According to data reign of/year

Name of village

District

Mishlyu

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

DoganoglulDoganogl u

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Piri Mehmet Pa§a

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Suleyman I

Suleyman I

Komarl i/Komarlu

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Hilma ~ah Sultan

Suleyman I

Sasalu

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Hilma ~ah Sultan

DoganlDogan

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

Hilma ~ah Sultan

Davud Bey

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

"Ibrahim Hadim Pa§a

5,201

Suleyman I

Yorukler/Yuryukler

Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach (Elhovo)

"Ibrahim Hadim Pa§a

2,000

Silleyman I

VakiJof Yakub Pap

Beyazit II

3,000

14,483

Selim 1

Suleyman I

Silleyman I

87

CHAPTER TWO Table 2.4 cont. Name of villa~e Timurcifu/Timurdjilyu

District Kizil Agac Safiye Hatun Kuzul Agach CElhovo)

VakiJof 'Ibrahim Hadim Pa§a

Akbiyikl Akbuyuk KutIuca Koy/KutIudja Kyoi Eskice Koy/Eskidje Osum Bey Haci ~eyh/Hadji Sheyh Halil Fakih 3 villages, names unknown Soboshte

Haskovo Haskovo

Umur Bey Murat Bay

Haskovo Haskovo Haskovo Haskovo Nevrokop

Murat Bay Murat Bay Murat Bay Mehmet II Ahmet Bey

Nevrokop

Musonishte

Nevrokop

Kurlak

Nevrokop

Dundopishte

Nevrokop

Beli Deva

Nevrokop

Dranova

Nevrokop

Mevirlihi (?)

Nevrokop

Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Maktul Mustafa Pa§a Ahmet Bey

Kyustendil

Annual income 2,330

According to data rei~n of/year Suleyman I

2,800

Mehmet I Murat II

935 14,626

Murat II Murat II Murat II Mehmet II Beyazit II

775

Beyazit II

4,775

Beyazit II

12,800

Beyazit II

14,085

Beyazit II

9,600

Beyazit II

7,870

Beyazit II

5,800

Beyazit II

14,037

Beyazit

64j

II64

k

Of course, the 180 vakil villages mentioned in the list above are not all of those that were contained within the boundaries of presentday Bulgaria by any means. Only the data relating to one or two districts can be regarded as complete-Plovdiv and Elhovo (Kizil Agac). As far as the remaining districts are concerned, the vakif villages in them are mentioned to a greater or lesser extent by chance. Moreover, no information has been provided here about districts, only part of which are within the territory of present-day Bulgaria: Kara Su (Mesta), Drama, Ctimurcine (in its mountainous part), Stroumitsa, Demir Hisar, etc., as the names of the villages in them are not identified and it is not quite clear to what extent they are within the presentday boundaries of Bulgaria, or outside of them in neighboring countries. In fact, in the attached list are included some of the vakif villages that are in present-day southern northwestern Bulgaria. As far as the remaining part of our lands are concerned, we are forced to extract incomplete information from some unpublished sources.

88

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Thus, for example, from a description of vakiJvillages dated 1866, we learn that the following vakiJ villages existed up to that time in the Sofia, Radomir, and Ihtiman districts (kazalar): Sofia District Radomir District

Gorni Lozen Vidriche Ihtiman Karalar Kayabeyli Karliler Hulu 0)

"Ihtiman Thtiman Ihtiman "Ihtiman

District District District District

Haci Harnza/Hadji Harnza Mezra Vakarel Taciler/Tadjiler Carncez/Djamdjez) Karanlar Beliche Farouna

Thtiman Ihtiman Ihtiman Thtiman "Ihtiman Ihtiman "Ihtiman

District District District District District District District

. Total income collected by the treasury: 133, 141 grosh 641

Among the unpublished sources about vakif villages in northern Bulgaria, a badly damaged fragment of the vakif register for this region dating from 1540, the data in which coincide with already published information concerning big vakif estates in this part of the country should be mentioned. One of the important vakifs in northern Bulgaria was that of Feyruz Bey: this included the village of Pavlikeni, with 183 Bulgarian households and an annual income of 37 ,453 ak~e, that of Murat Bey (present-day Byala Cherkva), which was purely Turkish, with 22 houses, the Turkish village of Umur Bey, where Feyruz had built a zaviye (religious retreat), the Bulgarian village of Mihaliche Kyuchyuk, with 53 households, and a village the name of which has been obliterated, which comprised 100 Bulgarian households. The total income of this vakiJ, the center of which was Turnovo, came to 89,698 akqe. 64m The land vakiJ of ibrahim Pa§a, the center of which was Razgrad, was also considerable. ibrahim, who was grand vizier of Siileyman I, held office from 1523 to 1536, and was afterwards killed on the orders of the sultan; is considered to be one of the greatest Ottoman statesmen. 64n According to Gokbilgin, in 1540 the grand vizier received as a mulk five villages in the Nikopol sancak, after which he made them into a vakif. 640 Here, there is an obvious discrepancy in the dates quoted in literature on the subject and the above

CHAPTER TWO

·89

mentioned author. 1540 is the year of the newly found list of vakifs in northern Bulgaria, and the former is, in all probability, part of the general registration of va kif properties in the empire. This, however, cannot be the date of the temlik (granting in mulk) of the five villages in question, because Thrahim Pa§a was strangled to death four years before that date. In the note attached to the description of the vakif in question, to be found in the register in our possession, it is stated that the four villages (not five, as Gokbilgin says) in the Nikopol sancak were i?itially part of the mulk of Thrahim Pa§a, the center of which was in Istanbul. After the construction of the mosque (perhaps completed after the death of the grand vizier), these villages were transfered to the Razgrad vakif of Thrahim Pa§a. According to the document published by Gokbilgin, the following villages were part of the vakif in question: Gebran (Turnovo district), Kirvite (Krivina?) (Cherven district), Chouchour Kostandog (?) or Mustafa Bey ... ,64p zaviye Seyyit Osman or Dulbend Alagi, in the Shoumen district, and Volona, also in the same district. 64q Two of the above mentioned villages figure in the Sofia list (the remainder of which is damaged and illegible), as well as Razgrad itself (Yenicel Yenidje or Hezargrad), as part of the vakif of Thrahim Pa§a. At that time, there were 84 Moslem and 224 Christian households in Razgrad, which produced a total income of 14,920 ak~e. 64r From the type of feudal taxes that the vakif collected, it is clear that Razgrad was, in fact, a large village with an economy based on agriculture. The vakif of Thrahim Pa§a retained its place in the economic life of the region. About a century later, Evliya C;elebi states that part of the vakif was a large han (commercial building) in Razgrad (Kur§umlu Han) and that he was the owner of a large part of the total 300 shops in the town. 645 The fact that, at the time, it was made into a vakif, Razgrad was entirely agricultural, and over the years became a not insignificant center of crafts and commerce, can only be explained to a certain extent by the vakif status that it had been given. In the above mentioned register, we find another well-known vakif-that of Kasim Pa§a in Dryanovo (Gokbilgin gives the name incorrectly as Turnovo. 651 It did, in fact, include only that village, but its income was considerable [52,332 akqeD. Kasim Pa§a gave the people of Dryanovo a special Kanunname, which set their feudal obligations at a level lower than that determined by the central government. In fact, the subsequent prosperity of that village, which grew into an economically important small town, cannot be viewed in isolation from its inclusion in the vakif of Kasim Pa§a.

90

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As is known, the many land valdfs of the descendents of Gazi Mihal were scattered throughout northern Bulgaria. According to the vakifname of Alaeddin Ali Bey, published by D. Ihchiev, the vakif of that grandson of Mihal included the villages of Yablanitsa, Gorna Desovitsa, Gorna Gyurovitsa, and Dolna Gyurovitsa in the Nikopol district; Gorna and Dolna Mitropoliya, Belkolin, Lozanitsa, Souvadjik Bunar, Desovitsa, Ozhshan in the Pleven district; Oulsloyak and Mezdra in the Lovech district; the village of Banya in the Vidin (?) district; and a large number of hamlets in the regions mentioned. 64u According to a paper published by Barkan, the village of Trustenik, Pleven district, also belonged to the valdfs of Mihal's descendents. 64v Unfortunately, in the list given there is no information about the land vakifs of this important feudal family. From the information regarding his urban vakifs, which is entered in the register, it is clear that the foundess of the valdfs were Mehmet Bey, Hidir Bey, and Ali Bey, sons of Gazi Mihal. 64w The vakif of Hundi Hatun daughter of Maktul Mustafa Pa§a was also located in northern Bulgaria. It included the village of Doiran Obasu, Lovech district. 64x Four large villages in northeastern Bulgaria-Dobrova, with 276 Christian households and an income of 33,358 akqe; Hasanlar, with twenty-nine Turkish households and an income of 3,729 akqe: Bey Bunar, with forty-two Christian households and an income of 4,490 akqe (there is no information available regarding the fourth village) were made into a vakif by a founder whose name is missing from the register in question. The general income of these villages amounted to 94,224 akqe. The village that was made into a valdf of his teke (religious center) by Bali Bey, son of Yahya Pa§a, was also large: the teke was built upon village land. This was the village of Sernova, near Chernovi, which comprised 120 Christian households and had an income of 7,562 akqe 64Y When the register of valdfs in northern Bulgaria, to which reference is being made, was oeing compiled, there was still no other large vakif in that region apart from that of Riistem Pa§a, who was twice grand vizier of Siileyman I (1544-1553, 1555-1561), and who became his son-in-law. His valdf comprised the so-called Arbanassi villages (the Albanian kariye) in the Turnovo district, namely: Gorna and Dolna Oryahovitsa, Arbanassi, and Lyaskovets. 64z Furthermore, in spite of the approximateness that must be assumed in the correlation mentioned by Heffening, it is clear that vakifland ownership was by no means less widespread than the other two main forms of Ottoman feudal landownership-the has and the timar. For

I··

CHAPTER TWO

91

this reason, the underestimation of the vakifs within the system of Ottoman feudalism is completely unjustified and, to a great extent, tendentious. The Theosophical-Legal Definition of the Vakif In Arab legal terminology, where the essence of the Moslem vakif is outlined for the first time, the term means' 'the keeping of something, the preservation of movability or immovability of the same so that a third person may receive property rights over it (temlik).' '65 The chattel or estate comprised in the vakifbecame mevkuf(property), excluded from circulation or transactions of any kind-extra commercium, in other words. 66 In spite of the theosophical argumentation of the legal experts of the caliphate, who attempted to represent the vakif as an institutiqn founded by Mohammed himself, there are data that indicate that a completely analogical institution existed in Byzantine legal practice as far back as the reign of Justinian. 67 Consequently, it cannot be agreed that the vakifis a purely Islamic institution. Formally (according to Islamic and bourgeois theory), the vakif can most briefly be formulated as the pious bequest of a given property for all time, which or whose income should be used for a charitable purpose. 68 Theoretically, the bequeather (vakif) , apart from the inevitable law requirements of religious law that he be of sound mind, of age, and free, he also had to be the full owner of the property that he was making into a vakif (malik). 69 For the purposes of this study, only the last element of that definition is significant, but it is namely on the basis of this element, as far as Ottoman reality is concerned, that only properties included in the mulk category could be made into a vakif. As far as the object of the vakif is concerned (mevkuj), even the Arab legal experts were not unanimous. While some reject any movability as the object of a vakif (for the reason that if it does not meet a main requirement-it is not "eternal, "70 others allow the bequest of animals, slaves, books, etc., but not of money (there is a specific proh ibition regarding usury), 71 while yet others indicate that usury of money and grain is a permissible activity of a vakif 72 In the Ottoman Empire, as is evident from the sources, a vakifcould be created from any mUlk property because the latter was the freehold property of its owner. The true mulks-properties within the boundaries of towns and villages-were made into vakifs without the permission and confirmation of the central government. False mulks,

92

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

which had been received on the basis of a temlikname, or permission from the central government, were also, as a rule, made into vakiJs, with the difference that, in the latter case, the special permission and confirmation of the state was necessary. The following passage from the chronicles of Ali Gavu~ demonstrates that by "land vakif," Ottoman legal practice understood without exception the "false," that is a vakiJ originating from a false mUlk: "A vakif comprises the hamlets and villages which individuals have made into vakifs being in full possession of them on the basis of temliknames' '73 In general, as far as the object of the vakiJis concerned, the Ottoman state shows a complete lack of dogmatism, adhering solely to the following norm-that the object of the vakif should be in the freehold possession of the bequeather. Thus, we encounter vakifs consisting of lands, premises, sums of money, trees, animals, slaves, valuables, chattels (mainly books), etc. By analogy with the terminology connected with the mulk, vakifs can also be categorized as "true" or "false. "74 In fact, even a section of bourgeois historiography shows that this division did not hinder the existence of the land ("false") vakiJ at all. The only condition in the case was its confmnation by the central government. 75 Morever, it is important to note that every new sultan, on ascending the throne, confirmed by means of a mukarername not only the existing land mulks, but the land vakifs as well, which goes to show that, in spite of the formal abdication on the part of the state of its powers over estates of this kind, in practice they had to be sanCtioned many times so that the agreement of the state for their existence could be obtained. 76 The aims of the vakif are strictly determined by Muslim religious law: the bequeathed property and its income should be used by the poor (fukara), and those with no property at all (mesakin) members of the congregation. 77 Some authors emphasize the unconditional truth that the ruling classes in Muslim, and concretely in Ottoman society, used the vakif in order to guarantee "in perpetuity" the rights of their descendents over the lands they owned. 78 This fact, however, does not represent a way of circumventing the fundamental theoretical articles of the §eriat (machinations by the ruling class), but a situation set out in Muslim law and sanctioned by secular law in the Ottoman Empire. It was included as a variation of the vakiJ, at that, one of its main variations. According to the §eriat, the vakifwas divided into two categories according to the purpose for which it had been created-"charitable" (hayn), the income of which was spent exclusively for pious works,

CHAPTER TWO

93

and "of persons" (ahll), where this income was used for the maintenance of a certain person or persons determined by the beque ather .79 The persons who benefited from the bequest of the vakiJ could either be employees of the religious establishment, whose names had been stated by the bequeather, or by his descendents.80 The second variation, which was widespread in the Ottoman Empire, and which was referred to as evlatlik (' 'inherited' ') vakiJ, could trace its origins right back to the caliphate, where its appearance caused heated arguments between the various theosophical-legal schools. 81 Some of them rejected the inherited vakif as invalid, because it did not correspond to its aim (it was not charitable), or to the conditions necessary for creating a vakiJ (it was not eternal). In the end, the arguments ended with the acknowledgement of the inherited vakif as valid, with the added clause that when the family of the bequeather died out, it should be used by poor Muslims. 82 Thus, the evlatlik vakif was regarde':i, in all cases, being part of the ahll vakiJ-a bequest for the benefit of certain persons.

The Objective of the Vakif The objective of the hayn vakif, which was also referred to in Ottoman practice as asil -(current) was a charitable one to provide for the building maintenance and the subsidizing of separate religious or charitable institutions: mosques, religious centers (zaviye) , commercial buildings (han), religious schools, caravansarays, bridges, drinking fountains, water pipes, and so on. In certain cases, where large vakifs were concerned, they subsidized the imarets of the sultans, viziers, and so on. The imaret was a complex institution that could embrace mosque and religious school (medrese) , or medrese and caravan saray , which would include a certain number of cells for those studying at the medrese and other components. The bequeather would describe in detail in his vakifname what portion of the income of the vakiJ should be used for building or repair, for provision of food for the poor, and how much should be invested. In some cases, these bequests are extremely detailed, even going so far as to set out the daily ration of the various foods,83 and how many akr;e should be paid to the employees of these establishments,84 and how the property in question should be administered. In a word, the vakif, hayn or asil, served the institution to which it had been bequeathed in real ternls. 85 The objective of the ahfi vakiJ, one relating to persons, was a more limited one. Its income usually served for the maintenance or one, or perhaps two or three dervishes, as well as other clergy who directly

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owned the vakifland and collected its income during their lifetimes. After their decease, their place would be taken by other persons of the same qualities-frequently their children or grandchildren. 86 At this point, a fact which has not been noted in specialized literature should be emphasised-namely that, until the establishment of the timar as a system, the vakif institution was used by the state for the remuneration of employees, or played the role of a sui generis official form of land ownership. Since, at that time, the army was still of a clan and tribal nature, and not feudal, and was maintained by the institution of the "free farms, "87 it was mainly clergy who were maintained by the vakif This practice was particularly widespread during the reigns of Orhan and Murat I when they were advancing into Asia Minor, and was transfered to lands this side of the Bosphorus by Siileyman Pa§a. 88 Thus, for example, a hamlet in Malkara was granted as a vakifto ~eyh Ahmet, afterwards to the dervish Beyazit, and, as it later became the vakif of the mosque in Malkara, toward the end of the fifteenth century, it was given to the dervish Murat. 89 In this case, the place of the bequeather was taken by the central government, which paid its employees by means of the vakif To the extent that the object had remained without an owner for some time, the government transfered it to an institution determined by itself, after which it removed it from the ownership of the latter in order to satisfy the needs of another employee. The status of a number of valdfs in Asia Minor, which were granted by Orhan, was very similar. Thus, for example, the kadi of Mihalic held the village of Balci Kay in the same nahiye in vakif 90 It passed from him to three members of the clergy who were not related, but were in the service of the state. There are typical cases that demonstrate that the state did not regard the vakifs granted on these occasions as "in perpetuity." Thus, the village of Emirlii/Emirlyu, Dimotika district, was granted in vakifto one, Hisarlii, who proved "not to be deserving of a vakil '91 The state took the vakifback from him, and gave it to Mehmet, who was forced to adopt the title offakih, and the name of Ciineyt. 92 After his death, the village passed into the hands of his sons, who also became fakih. A vakif farm in the Gelibolu area was held by five ~eyhs in return for their services. In the document, it is expressly stated that the vakif is "for their remuneration.' '93 While the dedication of vakifs for the maintenance of clergy can still be regarded as a variation of the personal (ahtl) valdf, other properties of this kind not only resemble the later timar system, but overlap fully. The case of Ali Elyas is typical: he received as a vakifthe village

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of Vlandaki, Malkara district, from Siileyman Pa§a, son of Orhan, "in return for his services in connection with bridges." After his death, both the vakiJ and hisjob were inherited by his son Ahi Ali.94 Murat IT granted a farm in Ipsala as a vakiJ to one Resul, in return for his services as a builder of royal ships on the River Maritsa. Until the middle of the sixteenth century, the farm passed into the hands of two other shipbuilders, with an annual income of 300 akr;e. In the documents, it is conditionally stated that the vakiJ in question was held "in return for services in the management of ships. "95 The practice of this type of ahli vakiJ, established by Orhan, continued in the reign of Murat 1,96 Beyazit I, 97 Murat IT, 98 Siileyman Gelebi,99 and Mehmet IT,100 in whose reign it occurred purely as a matter of chance. This is clear proof that it existed as a "run up" to the timar system, and was abandoned after the adoption of tied land ownership. In fact, the aforementioned variation of the vakif proves that the latter could also be founded by the central government as well when circumstances demanded, or, in other words, when the maintenance of certain officials had to be provided for-the important fact being that these were not always clergy. With the evlatlik variation-or inherited vakiJ, in other words, the aim of the institution was completely different. In cases .of this kind, the bequeather would state the objective of the vakif as being the maintenance of his children, grandchildren, etc. Most frequently, the founder would determine a sum for his own maintenance until the end of his life, and, after that, for the upkeep of his descendents, either taken as a whole or for that of certain individuals. The freed slaves of the bequeather were not taken in isolation from the circle of people that comprised his descendents, either .101 The formal justification of the evlatlik vakif consisted of stating to whom it would pass after the death of a certain person or persons, and, in the event of the family dying out, for the income to be used for the maintenance of the deprived members of the congregation. 102

The Administration of the Vakif The administration of the vakif was carried out by a specially appointed person-the nazit, kayyim, or mUtevelli. The first mutevelli of the newly founded vakif was usually the bequeather himself, or a person appointed by him. If the tevliyet (the post of mutevelli) was not an inherited one-this was a widespread practice- 103 the next administrators of the vakil were appointed by the kadi under whose jurisdiction the lands included in the vakif were. 104 The mutevelli

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received, according to the law, one-tenth of the total income of the vakif in the form of remuneration, but cases when they appropriated a large part of the vakif income were not infrequent, particularly in inherited tevliyets. 105

These are, in general terms, the status and essence of the vakif, that is, its formal characteristics that have been outlined in previous studies. At this point, it should be once again be emphasized that the fundamental feature that distinguishes the vakif from the remaining land estates in the centralized Muslim and, more precisely, in the Ottoman state, is its eternal character, 106 the fact that it was considered outside of the requisitional or compulsary purchase powers of the state in any form whatsoever. 107 The making of an estate into a vakifwas irreve.rsible, and could not be annulled, and, consequently, in contrast to all estates founded on land belonging to the state, over which the central government had greater or lesser power, this agrarian institution was considered to be immune from the clutches of the state. lOS In fact, this fundamental feature of the vakif explains the generalized (with a very small number of exceptions) making of land mulks into vakifs during the period in question.

The "Evhitlik" Vakif and the Inherited Tevliyet Although the "evlo,tlik" vakif, after long arguments about its validity, had been recognized by the ~eriat as fully valid, and consequently excluded from the powers of the central government, it can only be stated that it was not used for the bequest of large land estates, but usually embraced sites roughly the size of a village, a farm, a hamlet, etc. 109 Given the general mistrust in the legal procedures of a despotic feudal monarchy, the land-owning aristocracy, in so far as it had already been formed during the period in question, obviously considered the evla.tlik vakif a form of feudal landownership insufficiently guaranteed by the central government. There is a considerable amount of concrete information to prove that the feudal landowners were justified in this mistrust. For example, the inherited vakif of Haci Elyas in the Malkara district was held first by his son, and then by his daughter. Then, the central government laid hands on it, and turned it into a vakiffor one <;;arullah, a member of the clergy. Later on, it became a vakif of the Eylip Mosque in istanbul; that is, the government made it into an "actual" vakif.110 Some of the evla.tlik vakiflari were abolished with the explicit instruction that this had happened because they belonged to this category: "As the vakif is inherited" it is given as a timar ..... "111

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We can only explain the fact that mulk owners were not satisfied with turning their estates into evlatlik, but sought other ways of guaranteeing them from eventual appropriation by the state by the not particularly protected form of the inherited vakif. Such a form was the inherited tevliyet-that is, the passing of the post of administrator of the vakiffrom one generation to the next. If this was done, the form of the asil, or real vakifwas formally preserved. A part of its income was, in truth, used for charitable purposes. Apart from this, the bequeather named his descendents as the successive administrators of the vakif It is typical that mostly inherited tevliyets resulted from the big land mulks, and not simply inherited vakifs. For instance, the vakifof Ayas Bey, who was sancakbey of Bosnia during .the fifteenth century, 112 had an inherited tevliyet: also the vakil of Ishak Bey in Skopje, in the same century. In the act of bequest for this vakif, it is stated: "While I am alive, I myself will be the owner and mu~evelli of the vakifin question. And after me, I have named [his son] Isa Bey; and then, the most worthy of his sons; and then, the most pious of the sons who follow one after the other, and who descend one from the other, from generation to generation, from family to family .... "113 isa Bey himself, who was the mutevelli of the vakif founded by his father, for his part founded a vakiffrom his own properties and determined an inherited tevliyet, which also included female descendents. 114 Mehmet Bey, from the same family of Macedonian mulk owners, in his tum, founded a vakifwith an inherited tevliyet. 115 Such was the form of the vakif of Maktul Pa§a, which was huge in area, and was scattered throughout Rumelia,116 and so on.ll 7 Sometimes mulk owners, in their efforts to preserve their estates more effectively for their descendents, would resort to very transparent formulations for their vakifs. Thus, for example, Timurta§ Bey stated the objective of his vakifin the following way: "For my descendants, a true rasil] vakif." 118 In spite of the obvious inadequacy of this formulation, the estate passed down from one of the founder's descendents to another, and during the reign of Beyazit I, was in the hands of one of the sons of his liberated slaves. 119 It has been mentioned that the legal maintenance allowance of the mutevelli should not exceed one-tenth of the annual income of the vakif. The bequeather, however, had the power to indicate a larger allowance. 120 Also, the fact that the mutevelli, in spite of the purely formal control of the government, had the right to dispose of the entire income and property of the vakif cannot be ignored. 121 He was the person who granted land to the villagers against a deed, who rented

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vakif buildings to other persons. 122 and ultimately, it was he who disposed of the accumulated funds, which were the result of the exploitation of the vakif peasants or tenants, and lent money for which he charged interest. 123 It was from the mutevelli that the clergy attached to the vakifreceived their salaries. It was he who controlled spending on the construction and repair of vakifbuildings, and ordered various products to be distributed as alms. Consequently, it was difficult for government organs to establish effective control over the mutevelli's accounts, and it is certain that cases of embezzlement on the part of the m'ittevelli did not end with the by no means scant information about such cases in the official records. 124 Moreover, if was the mutevelli who, to a great extent, not only disposed of, but also appropriated the income of the vakif on the one, and at that, extremely flexible condition required of him by the law - to manage the affairs of the vakifthat he controlled. Consequently, it is not by chance that, when the name of the current mutevelli of a vakif is given in an official document, the expression "at present in the possession of... " is always almost used-which, in Ottoman legal practice was used to express the powers of landowners. In the final analysis, it should also be emphasized that the inherited tevliyet in Ottoman feudal reality fulfilled the role of an evlatlik vakif, with this difference-that here the descendants of the bequeather received vakif income after a certain deduction, intended for the maintenance of vakif property, had been made. However, when it is borne in mind that inherited tevliyet's belonged mainly to the big vakifs, this deduction did not have much effect on the financial situation of the mutevellis. In any case, it was the inherited tevliyet that was the form of land ownership protected to the greatest extent against the clutches of the state, as, formally, it remained a hayn vakji, with a charitable objective-and there were no grounds on which this could be disputed by the state. Thus, although there was no trace of many inherited vakifs even a few decades after their foundation, inherited tevliyets like that of Evrenos Bey in the Komotini and Seres districts, and that of Lala Karlizade in the Karlovo district, remained in the hands of one family for centuries. 125 For this reason, when referring to nonofficial (nonmilitary) inherited feudal landownership in the Ottoman Empire during the period in question, it should be kept in mind that this was achieved not by means of land mulks, which managed to exist in that form for not more than three generations, but by means of vakifs, and most precisely, in vakifs with an inherited tevliyet.

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The Objects and Size of Land Miilks and Vakifs As the questions to be examined will affect only the land mulk and the valdfthat emerged from it, they will be dealt with in parallel, or successively, in terms of these two institutions. Among them, the question of the objects and size of land mulks and land vakifs comes to the fore. On the basis of an analysis of the complete data at our disposal, several distinct categories emerge, according to the size of these estates. 1. The biggest estates of a "perpetual" character were undoubtedly the royal valdfs. In contrast to the remainder, they did not emerge officially from mulks. The sultan, at whose supreme disposal the land fund was, would make direct bequests with parts of it, creating valdfs in his own name. The fonnal procedures fqr turning miriye land into mulk were omitted when it came to the royal valdfs. We are unable to say on the basis of the information available, whether the sultans turned part of their has estates into valdfs, whether they fonned valdfs from estates that were vacant at the time, or whether they were appropriated lands that had already been granted in fief. As it was, the sultan's valdfs accounted for an important part of the land fund of the empire. The valdf created by Siileyman Pa§a, son of Orhan, who ruled the European territories of the state and, in this capacity, bequeathed part of the conquered lands to his imaret, should be regarded as belonging to the very earliest royal valdfs. 126 However modest they might have been as far as the later royal valdfs were concerned, it has to be noted that the very first ruler of Rumelia - and at that during a time when a not insignificant part of it was under his rule-fonned large valdf estates in his own name. Murat I also granted a large number of mulks, but he did not leave any land valdfs of his own. The valdf of his son was very modest. It consisted mainly of fourteen Christian neighborhoods in the town of Edirne, with 214 households, and two villages in its nahiye. A further three villages in the Chinnen area were added to it.127 For this reason, Murat IT marked his reign with the creation of a remarkable series of pious works. The valdfs of Murat IT were numerous - he did not content himself with just one imaret. The lands of these valdfs were scattered throughout the whole of eastern Thrace and the Aegean region. They brought him an annual income of 33 ,977 akc;e .128

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Four villages in the Bunarhisar area were made into vakifs of another of Murat's imarets .129 To another imaret, in Edime, the sultan bequeathed the entire income of the Kratovo mines-363,626 akc;e130 Having built the 392-meter bridge at Ergene, Murat II bequeathed to it as a vakifthe newly established town of the same name, two villages in its vicinity and seven villages in, the Malkara district, 131 and to his mosque in Salonika three hamlets in the Salonika area. 132 The next Ottoman ruler, Mehmet II, was also the founder of a huge vakif To his imarets in istanbul he bequeathed the total tax revenue from the Greek population of three neighborhoods of the capital, and from the Armenian population of seventeen large towns in Asia Minor. Also to the vakif of that imaret belonged the ciziye of the Jews in many of the Rumelian towns. 133 The vakif of the next sultan, Beyazit I, was no smaller. 134 After Selim the Terrible, who did not leave a single akc;e to pious works, his son, Siileyman I, made many villages into a vakifs for his imaret in istanbul. 136 From the data given (only agrarian objects are mentioned, i.e., those whose income was the result of feudal exploitation), it is clear that the sultans' vakifs were huge estates. Once again, it should be mentioned that estates of this type (mulks and vakifs) were not territorially compact, they were scattered throughout the whole of Rumelia. This is particularly obvious with the later vakifs, and could be explained by the fact that they had "run out of" villages in Thrace, the district where the mulk and vakif estates were mainly concentrated. 2. Quite a lot smaller than those of the sultans, but all the same considerable were the mulks and vakifs of the so-called emirs, the large feudal landowners. Here are details of some of them. ishak Bey made his mulk of four villages and four hamlets in the Skopje area into a vakif: also included were the River Lepanets and "Mount" Pravond (probably a hill) in the same nahiye. His son, isa Bey bequeathed eight hamlets, many meadows, clover fields, and so on in the Sarajevo area. His son, Mehmet Bey, bequeathed as a vakifthree villages in the Tetovo district, six hamlets, and one farm, as well as separate fields and meadows. The vakif of Yahya Pa~a comprised a farm in the Skopje area, three in the Plovdiv area, three farms (in the Skopje, Plovdiv, and Nikopol areas respectively), and two hamlets in the Plovdiv area.137

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3. The last category of mulks, as far as their size was concerned, were quite insignificant. They usually comprised one village, or even one hamlet, or one farm. 138 The majority of them consisted mainly of the above mentioned estates, which had been granted by the first sultans in return for services rendered usually of an ecclesiastical nature. 139 The small land mulk and vakif category included the largest number of estates. Our idea of the size of mulks and vakifs would be incomplete if we did not bear in mind their annual income. The incomes of some of the royal land vakifs that approached or even exceeded 1,000,000 akqe have been quoted. The following large vakifs of the emirs deserve mention: that of Piri Mehmet Pa~a - 346 ,541 (of which 57,722 came from agrarian objects); that of Kasim Pa~a - 50,619; of Ahi <;elebi - 82,000; ofibrahim Pa~a - 48,955; of Murat Pa~a - 88,618 akqe. 140 The incomes of the third category of land mulks and vakifs were very small-:-frequently as much as, or even less than the income of a small' timar: 386 akqe, 1,448 akqe, 150, 173, and so on.141 Incomes up to 1,000 akqe came from hamlets and farms, while those of 1,000 to 15,000 akqe were typical of mulk and vakif villages. The towns usually participated as part of the royal vakifs (there were six towns in the vakil of Mehmet IT alone). In an analysis of the data regarding mulk and vakif villages, the disproportionately large annual feudal incomes of the majority of them, in comparison with the villages in timars make an immediate impression. This can, to a certain extent, be explained by_ the fact that sometimes the possessor of a mulk or vakil appropriated not only the raiyye taxes (the rent payable to the feudal lord, but also part of the state taxes-to be precise, the poll tax), which, without doubt, greatly increased the income of the village. In many cases, however, it was not this that made for the relatively large income from a vakif or mulk village. It would be reasonable to suppose that the mulk owners, who belonged to the feudal aristocracy, would not have been content with villages of doubtful prosperity. It is no coincidence that the majority of mulks and vakifs were situated in the most fertile regions of the empire-eastern Thrace, the Maritsa Plain, and the Aegean region. It should be emphasized, however, that another reason for the large income of these villages existed: the mulk sahibleri, because of their privileged position, were able to increase the numbers of the dependent population on their estates quite independently of natural population growth (a fact that will be examined when discussing the exploitation of the mulk and vakifJ. It was namely for this reason, in contrast to the timar villages, the income from which often showed no growth

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at all for long periods, or which registered only very slow growth in proportion to the natural growth of the population, that in vakif villages an extremely rapid increase in the feudal revenue is to be observed. 142 As far as hamlets included in land mulks and valdfs are concerned, it is obvious that, in the majority of cases, there was population, that is, the process of formatikn of villages was going on. In some cases, they had been founded by Muslim clergy who held the hamlets as a valdf of persons, and whose express purpose was to ensure the colonization of the lands they possessed (the so-called dervish colonizers).143 In other cases, the hamlets on mulk and valdf lands arose according to the reasons that also dictated the further growth of villages on estates of this type. 144 The mulk farms, one of the commonly encountered elements of the land mulk and vakif, are extremely vague in essence. This lack of clarity is due to their immense variety. It is clear that the initial function of estates of this kind was to provide a living for deserving persons or families that did not place the landowner in a position of feudal dependency (similar to that of a raiyye farm), but which was not· the result of exploitation, either. In fact, by means of the mulk farm, the government gave a guarantee to a given person or village household of exemption from feudal dependency and from the payment of feudal rent to any person whatsoever .145 That the estates in question were cultivated without the exploitation of a dependent population also indicates their annual income, which in rare cases reached 500 akqe .146 This initial form of the mulk farm obviously did not enjoy a very long life. During the period in question, in parallel with mulk farms, which were owned by minor clergy147 and persons who were not granted this land for services rendered, who obviously owed their ownership to a favor granted by the sultan,148 there were also a large number of mulk farms included in the scattered land mulks or valdfs of important mulk sahibleri, who in all probability had acquired them by purchase, or simply by means of pressure exerted on less influential owners of farms. 149 Moreover, it is particularly significant that, once they were in the hands of their new owners, the mulk farms no longer yielded annual incomes of between 100 and 500 akqe, but of much bigger sums, for example, 4,280 akqe (that of Kemal Pa~a in the Edime district), 150 of 4,323 akqe (that of Mesih Pa~a in Anatolia), 151 and so on. This circumstance proves that, under these landowners, the farms in question were undergoing a different form of exploitation and that they were cultivated not individually, but by the

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dependent population, because of which their income increased enormously. The rivers and irrigation canals included in the mulks and vakifs lead one to the underlying conclusion that the estates in question were territorially determined, that they represented not an agrarian income but a piece of land. This is the only way in which rivers and canals, which as a matter of principle were not included in fiefs, for example. According to Islamic law, which was established under the semidesert conditions of the Arabian Peninsula, water and its sources represented an object of ownership, and, stemming from this, of ex.change, sale, conversion to valdf, etc. These norms were also adopted -iii the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Asia Minor, where the dependent population frequently paid "water dues" to the feudal landowner in cases where the crops cultivated by the villagers required irrigation. 152 In fact, rivers that served to drive water mills,153 for example, and which provided irrigation forthe paddy fields alongside the Maritsa river and its tributaries, were included in vakifs in our lands as well. 154 Nomadic groups were usually included in the royal valdfs as the taxes paid by them were in any case appropriated by the state. In the first centuries after the foundation of the Ottoman state, a large part of the newly arrived Turkish population was nomadic. It was namely this nomadic population-the yorUkler-that, according to some recent studies constituted the mass of the Turkish people that was colonized after the (Ottoman) conquest. 155 Those nomads who did not settle in a given place even after their immigration to this side of the Bosphorus were subjected to specific organization and taxation on the part of the state. 156 It was a part of the income from this taxation that the sultans turned into a valdl Thus, the yoruk cemaatleri (nomadic bands) that were scattered over the territory stretching from Gumulcine (present-day Komitini) to Provadiya and the Black Sea coast were included in the vakif of Murat IT, to which they brought an annual income of more than 33,000 akqe. 157 Some mines also belonged to royal valdfs: an example of this is the Kratovo mines, which were also made into a valdfby Murat IT. Indicative of this is their income of 363,626 akqe, which was huge for the time. 15S Moreover, it did not reflect the full capacity of the mines, only the part received by .the central government from their exploitation. Although mines are, in essence, a nonagrarian object, they are included here because their income was gained from an exploitation that was of a feudal nature (that of the dependent miners). One of the sultan's daughters, Fatma Hatun, made the village of Aya

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Tudor in the Vize area, together with the mines and forges that belonged to it into a vakif.159 Finally, it should be pointed out that like the "landless" timars and has in the empire, there were also "landless" vakifs. Their incomes were a sum collected for a certain type of tax, payable in this case by the urban population, which could belong to a given fief (the Jews of Seres, for example, were included in the has of the sancakbey), but which paid the tax in question (in this case, poll tax) to the vakif 160 Thus, in the vakiJ of Mehmet IT was included the ciziye of the Jews scattered throughout Rumelia; 161 Beyazit IT only made certain taxes payable by the inhabitants of Dimotika and other towns into a vakif 162 In objects of this kind, which had been made into a vakiJ, we do not include individual bequests and donations of money as a part of the military plunder to which the sultan was entitled .. (Beyazit made some of his trophies gained in the battle against Sigismund at Nikopol into vakiJs) , 165 only the regular income gained from the feudal rent payable to the state by the population that belonged, or could belong to an official (military) fief. 164 Consequently, even as far as the vakif was concerned, the practice of granting an income not from a given territory, but from a given tax, which was widespread in the empire, soon established itself.

Forms of Exploitation of the Raiyye on Miilk and Vakif Lands As one of the main conditions attached to the creation of a vakif was that the bequeathed property should be used or exploited' 'according to the wishes of the bequeather," 165 and as far as land mulks were concerned, the vakiJ could not determine any other form of exploitation apart from that which existed on its mulk estate, it is obvious that the forms of exploitation in these two agrarian categories overlapped. It is a fact that, in the Ottoman Empire, the feudal rent was divided between the feudal landowner and the state. Moreover, in the kanunname's of the Ottoman sultans, which above all regulated relationships between the feudal landowners and the raiyye, the feudal landowners are mentioned almost exclusively as holders of official (military) fiefs. Only in a very small number of cases do the decrees of secular law speak of the vakiJas the feudal landowner, and in even fewer cases do they mention the mulk sahibi. The central government, which aimed at limiting the power of small fief holders, obviously gave the big hereditary landowners a free hand, and did not fix the methods of exploitation that would be applied to vakif and m'idk populations. For this reason, in orderto judge what forms of exploitation

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were used on valdf and mulk lands, one is compelled to refer not to decrees of the legislature, but to documentary evidence. The main questions concerning the exploitation of the dependent population in mulks and valdfs are as follows: was the raiyye in estates of this type in a different position from that of the raiyye in official (military) fiefs? Was the raiyye the only exploited element on mulk and vakif lands? At this point, it should be pointed out that a section of our bourgeois historiography is inclined to attribute certain wide-ranging "liberties" to the valdf(and, consequently, to the mulk non-Muslim population). The root of such an assumption lies not only in methodological insufficiency, but also in the incorrect interpretation of original texts. It is known that the sultans' and viziers' vakifs were in the "free" estate category, that is, estates whose holders did not have to allocate any part of the income gained from the "free taxes" paid by their raiyye to the local sancakbey, as did the holders of "fiefs with obligation." 166 In the title deeds, the fact that the estate belonged to the "free" category was expressed with the stereotyped phrase "to be administered freely." It was the phrase "serbestiyet uzere idare olunup " that demonstrated the status of the "free" feudal landowner , and not of the dependent population of his estate, that was interpreted by Ihchiev as "to be administered autonomously, as free citizens. "167 This also serves as the basis for the incorrect interpretation of the status of the dependent population in valdfs, which is encountered in the works of this author. When the information provided by the various sources is compared, it is obvious that the rent appropriated by the feudal landowner in most Ottoman valdfs was identical in content and volume with that of the "free" official (military) fief holders. 168 This is an indubitable argument in support of the statement that mulks and vakifs set up on miriye land, and referred to as "false" did not, in practice, change the category of the land on which they were located either. It continued to be miriye land, subject to the same forms of exploitation of its dependent population, although the legislation did not determine the forms of exploitation of the raiyye in mulks and vakifs. From a large number of documents we understand, however, that there were certain peculiarities in the appropriation of rent on estates of this kind-namely, that the mulk sahibi, and consequently the valdf also appropriated a portion of the rent collected on the principle of a fisc: the poll tax, or ciziye, on their own account. This fact is particularly characteristic because, to a great extent, it brings the status of the estates in question to that of financial immunity. It should be

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pointed out, however, that mulk and vakifholders, as a matter ofprinciple, had no right to appropriate ciziye. Its appropriation by feudal landowners was shown as a defmite exception in the title deeds, and therefore must have been a favor granted by the sultan. In general, the right to appropriate poll tax, and the indication of the person or body carrying out that appropriation (the feudal landowner or the state) is mentioned in almost all the sources in which the rent of the vakif is mentioned, while its remaining components are frequently referred to generally as "tithes and taxes" 169 or "the tithe and the raiyye taxes. "170 From this, it is clear that it was the ciziye as a component of the sum payable to the state that was not compulsory, but which was a frequently encountered component of the sum appropriated by the owners of mulk and vakifs. Thus, for example, in the huge vakif of Siileyman Pa§a, the ciziye was appropriated by the vakif only in the town of Bolayir, while in the villages attached to it, this was the right of the state. 171 The poll tax was a part of the revenue of the vakif of Murat Pa§a, of Beyazit IT (only in certain villages), of Keyvan Bey, and others. 172 On the other hand, in many vakifs, even the royal vakifs included, 173 the ciziye was unequivocally indicated as the entitlement of the fisc 174 (amme harac;lari vakif degildir) .175 The appropriation of an important component of the revenue owed to the fisc on the part of the owners of mulks and vakifs brought the latter close to financial immunity. This fact, however, did not reflect upon the position of the raiyye of the mulks and vakifs, because the raiyye, in any case, paid the sum in question. The matter of the other components of the feudal revenue appropriated by the fisc must be viewed in a different light, however; these included the large group of taxes payable in money, obligations in kind and in terms of work done, all included in one category. As the purpose for which they were intended was quite definite, that is, they were imposed in connection with the actual requirements of the central government, the latter could not give them up in favor of mulk and vakif owners. For this reason, the state too realised this revenue collection in many vakifs and mulks. This is proved by the circumstance that, when the revenue collections in question were not demanded of the raiyye in such estates, this always took place on the strength of a specialfennan. 176 In fact, in this case as well, the exemption of the raiyye on mulk and vakif estates from the obligations in question was not a principle, but rather an exception created on the orders of the central government.

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Data regarding the exemption of the raiyye in given vakifs from the population obliged to pay avariz are ample. Thus, one of the villages in the vakiJ of Beyazit IT was exempted from avariz-i divaniye ve teka,lif-i orfiye. The position of one of the three villages in the vakiJ of ~ehabeddin Pa§a was the same. In places, the entire population of a given vakiJ did not pay the taxes in question. 177 The exemption of part of the vakiJ population from the heavy and numerous avarizlar (taxes) cannot but be described as tax relief for the raiyye in question. The motives behind this, however, must also be explained. It can be observed that it was mainly the raiyye in the vakiJs of the sultans and emirs who were granted tax relief of this kindmoreover, as has already been mentioned, on the strength of special decrees served upon the raiyye themselves. I78 Naturally, it was the owner of the mulk or vakiJ who should be given the entire credit for obtaining such a Jerman: he would have been an influential person, if not the sultan himself. His aims were rather obvious: by the exemp-' tion of his raiyye from the ruinous state taxes, he contributed to its prosperity and, in this way, increased the feudal rent owed him by the raiyye; this was paid in the fonn of tithes, tax on livestock, and so on. Tax relief must be mentioned as the underlying factor in the surprisingly rapid growth in the income of feudal landowners of vakiJ villages, which has been previously mentioned. Apart from the fact that, in such cases, the population of a given mulk or vakiJ was exempted from "avariz-i divaniye ve takiLlif-i orfiye, " and that this exemption coincided with the right of the owner to collect a poll tax on the same raiyye, and in this way he ensured for himself financial immunity within the boundaries of his estate .179 This particularly important fact, which was in principle not pennissible within the system of Ottoman feudalism as a whole, was a privilege available to only a select minority of the feudal ruling class. This, however, was undoubtedly a victory gained by the feudal aristocracy, which in this way succeeded in ridding itself of the financial-administrative organs of the central government on the territory of some of its (the feudal landowners') estates. In fact, in some cases, a categorical prohibition was issued to treasury officials to prevent them from' 'interfering in" the estate. I80 In most cases, however, this position was obviously achieved on the initiative of the mulk and vakif owners, who, once they had acquired the right to appropriate the ciziye, subsequently obtained a Jerman for the exemption of their raiyye from avariz-i divaniye ve tekiLlif-i orfiye. The tax relief described was, in a fonnal sense, granted to the raiyye of the vakif, and not to the owner of the latter, and for this reason

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the fact was not recorded in the title deeds, but set out in a special Jerman. For this reason, the central government reserved the right to withdraw this privilege, which was not a part of the "perpetual status" of the mulk or valdf. In many cases, the government simply took away from the raiyye the relief that had once been granted. This is what happened to the villagers of Konush during the reign of Beyazit IT,181 and to Malko Turnovo and other villages at the same time. 182 In other cases, the central government cancelled its own decree without any special order, and, in such cases, the population was compelled to fight for the enforcement of the decree. 183 Another important fact also emerges in connection with the revenue collected from land mulks and valdfs. From the fragmentary evidence available, it is clear that the bequeathers of mulks could grant some tax relief or effect changes within the framework of the rent payable to the feudal landowner, that is, to the taxes to which they had the unconditional right on the strength of their mulknames. Such was the case with Mehmet Bey, son of ishak Bey. In his valdfname, he determined the tithe on his lands as one-tenth exactly, excluding salarlik, a payment in kind, which would have increased the above mentioned proportion, and all other possibilities for the appropriation of a bigger tithe. Mehmet Bey determined a tax of twelve akqe per household, which was not a proportional tax, but a flat rate, in place of the tithe on the tenancy. The bequeather abolished the collection of arusane (a tax for the solemnization of marriage, payable by the father of the bride) for all the women in the valdf. The tax on the pigs owned by the raiyye in the valdJ was also categorically abolished. 184 Another case of changes being made in the sum payable to the feudal lord in vakiJs can be found in that of Beyazit I, which, among other things, included three villages in the Chirmen district. Their Christian raiyye paid all taxes (including ciziye) to the vakiJ, while the Muslim population was exempted from payment of tithe on its agricultural cropS.18S In isolated cases, changes in the exploitation of the raiyye in valdJs were sanctioned by special kanunnames, issued, however, not by the central government, but by the founders of the valdfthemselves. Thus, for example, Kasim Pa~a gave the inhabitants of Dryanovo a kanunname that set a norm for their rent payments as follows: fiftyfive akqe poll tax, payable only by heads of households; cancellation of the regular payment in kind of hay and wood; marriage tax, twentyfive akqe for an unmarried girl and fifteen akqe for a widow; tithe equal to exactly one-tenth of production; one akqe per ten beehives and per ten pigs. The feudal ruler agreed not to demand any payments

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not included in the kanunname, and to impose a tax on sheep only once in every three years. 185a The example quoted is eloquent because a private citizen-a big feudal landowner-and not the state, had issued a legislative decree in his own name, the norms of which, to a great extent, did not coincide with those of the official central legislation. The fact that the government could not change the contents of this private legal act demonstrates that, if it had made such an attempt, the raiyye would have referred to the kanunname of Kasim Pa§a and would have been left in peace. 185b Consequently, it should be accepted that the powers of the founders of vakifs, as far as their dependent populations were concerned, were very wide-ranging, and that the government had no reason for submitting the raiyye in the vakif to the generally valid legislative norms in cases where the owner of the vakifhad set specific norms regarding raiyye taxes. An important observation to be made in terms of the subject under review is the extreme conservatism that is characteristic of feudal taxation on vakiflands. We know that they had to preserve the forms of exploitation in the bequeathed mulk. Also, no changes that had occurred after the bequest had been made had to be made in the taxation (revenue collection) system of the vakif. This is what Ottoman authors meant when they indicated that they (vakifs) "should be managed according to the will of the bequeather until the end of the world. "186 Because of the reasons mentioned, both the components of the total sum paid by the raiyye in vakifs and the amounts payable remained unchanged for centuries. In fact, in some vakifnames, it was specifically stated that the bequeather would not allow any new taxes (bit'at) to be added to the sum payable. 187 In this connection, when the empire was in financial difficulties at the end of the sixteenth century, and supplements to the ciziye were introduced, the raiyye in the vakifs protested that these were bid 'at, newly introduced taxes. 188 This firmly established practice is confirmed by ninteenth-century records regarding vakifrevenue, whose components not only fully coincided with those determined by the legislation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,189 but the sums of which were those determined by that same legislation. 190 When it is considered that, during the intervening four to five centuries, the forms of feudal taxation had undergone serious modifications, and that there had been a heavy fall in the value of the akqe, it is clear that income from taxation on vakiflands reflected circumstances that had long since ceased to exist. Finally, it should be pointed out that important observations can be made regarding data about the feudal rent from vakiflands, which

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come to show the important place occupied by cash revenue in the income of the royal vakifs. Unlike timar land ownership, in vakifland ownership, the feudal landowner played an important organizational role in production. For this reason, the exploitation carried out by him yielded results that provided him with huge surpluses of agricultural products-and these surpluses could inevitably be an object of exchange. Furthermore, in spite of the undoubted interest of the vakif owner in extracting a bigger rent in kind, which is fairly typical, in vakiflands as well, rent was, for the most part, in cash. It is sufficient to examine the voluminous list of villages included in the vakif of Beyazit IT in order for the already established correlation between these two main forms of feudal land rent in the Ottoman Empire to be confirmed. 191

Table 2.5 Edirne district

In products

Pravadi village Kirik Chashnigir KaragulCu Haci Umur Muracili Aslihan Sofular Kir.l'ehirli "Isrnailce SOKUm Oglu Kazan Lefk.e Ahi Mahmad Binarci Haskoy Gobegi Donuz Viran Eynesi Korucu Buiurg Evrenos Saru Durali

3833 2108 1257 2231 1109 4615 824 1410 4241 5884 3748 3162 5583 1991 2091 551 3659 1462 440 3840 4470 1017 1606

In money 2844 1261 597 1387 1501 1590 626 1352 1280 1556 1444 18170 11650 1315 714 1142 1692 1410 1813 3511 29033 1047 9955

In products

In money cash

Kara Ishaklu Olgar Karaca Halil

3670 553 3595

1887 2880 3733

Mustaflu Bayhocalu Helvaci Helvaci Ku~uk Antablu Salih Lolu Akpinar

3689 819 3316 879 1610 1091 1752 2256

2063 1460 1852 1094 1857 2123 5487 6299

Dimotika district

106452 66898 Source: M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 367-368. pp. 363-365.

'1

19950

26946

Furthermore, it a typical that, in this case too, that the agricultural products collected from the peasants in kind were at once turned into cash. The same situation also pertains in the older vakif of Murat IT,

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where it is specifically stated that the vakif collected about 50,000 akc;e per annum from the sale of grain, quite apart from profits realised from the sale of honey, butter, etc. 192 The villages in the Anhialo district alone, which belonged to the valdJofBeyazit IT, realised 16,563 akc;e per annum from the sale of grain, and from direct taxation in cash for the feudal revenue, 190,236 akc;e. 193 Furthermore, in the entire land vakiJ of this sultan, the annual income of which was equal to 1,552, 131 akc;e; rent collected in kind was calculated at 337,136 akc;e (although this too was realized in cash because the agricultural products were at once sold): a sum of 1,214,968 akqe was collected in actual cash. 194 Consequently", on the large estates as well, where the reasons that existed on smaller estates for turning the greater part of the feudal land rent into cash did not apply, and where the feudal landowner realized large profits from the "in kind" part of the revenue (mainly grain), we can observe the predominance of cash over "in kind" components. The correlation in the cases mentioned is defmitely in the region of one-third for payments in kind and two-thirds for cash payments. This is clear proof that the emphasis on the payment of feudal taxation in cash in the Ottoman Empire is based not only upon circumstances in force at a given time, but upon permanent features of the Ottoman economy, that is, the significant development of money as a means of exchange. Other Forms of Exploitation of the Population in Miilks and Vakifs The exploitation of the population on mulk and vakiflands does not stop with that of the raiyye. Unlike military (official) fiefs where the only workforce was the raiyye, on the estates in question the labor of other population categories was used as well. However, their status and the forms of exploitation would not be sufficiently clarified if certain circumstances are not borne in mind. It has already been emphasized that the land mulk and vakiJ represented estates that were determined territorially, and not a given income of a certain sum. Any initiative on the part of the sipahi to increase in various ways the numbers of his raiyye would have led to an increase in the income of the fief, a circumstance that was not always to his advantage. In mUlks and valdft, conditions were radically different. In such cases, the government did not determine the actual income of the landowner, and, in this way, gave him a free hand to extract the maximum income from the exploitation of his estate.

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For this reason, he also sought ways of increasing the population on his lands apart from natural population growth. Second, it should be pointed out that the granting of mulk lands at the time of the conquest was done with two aims in mind. Not only were members of the ruling class rewarded for services rendered, both past and current. By means of unconditional hereditary landownership, the central government attempted to give mulk owners an interest in repopulating the fertile lands of the Balkan peninsula that had been abandoned in time of war. This is unequivocally stated as being the purpose of granting a mulk in some documents. 195 The question of a work force during the first decades after the conquest of our lands was quite acute. It was no coincidence that the conquerors applied surgun (exile) as a system of population, for the transfer of population from more densely populated, but not particularly important, production regions to Thrace and the Aegean, which had been laid waste not only by the Turkish invasion, but also by the internecine struggles in the Byzantium that had pro ceded it. 196 The Ottoman feudal rulers, who had received a great deal of the conquered lands as mulks, now needed to acquire a population for the exploitation of these lands. And, as the raiyye who had been living on their own land when the conquest occurred were left there and forced to remain there, the income from their exploitation was payable to the general central fund of the miriye lands, and this raiyye could not be removed from their villages and transferred to mulk land by the mulk owners, the only way that remained of popUlating the devastated areas was slavery, and forms that derived from it. It is important to note that the forms of exploitation of the population living on mulk and vakif land that were not included in raiyye exploitation were extremely varied. This can be explained by the fact that no norm was laid down and no control exercised by the central government: every mUlk owner was permitted to organize the exploitation of his dependent population (apart from the raiyye) as he considered fit. Mulk owners, usually high-ranking officers who carried away dozens of slaves as plunder or high-ranking dignitaries who could buy just as many, frequently settled some of these slaves on their estates. It is typical that, in most cases, these slaves were freed, that is, turned into the so-called azadli or atik-freed slaves-and only then given land to cultivate in these mulks. A typical example of this can be found in the village of Trustenik in the Pleven area, which was part of the mulk of Gazi Mihal Bey. His son, Mehmet Bey brought fifteen married non-Muslims from Herzegovina to the "empty" village and settled them there. His son

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Hizir brought another ten households after the capture of the Brezova fortress (?) and settled them in the village. 197 The slaves of Mustafa Bey (probably a descendant of Gazi Mihal) were also settled there: there were fourteen of them. 198 This example clearly illustrates the means used to repopulate a deserted mulk village by generations of mulk sahiblen. Liberated slaves were settled in many fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury mulks. In one village alone of the mulk of Evrenos BeyHalvaci, Giimii1cine (Komotini) district, thirty-four slaves belonging to this military leader were settled. 199 Two villages named Timurta§ came into being in eastern Thrace, and these were populated by the pa§a's slaves. One of these villages had been abandoned by its inhabitants at the time of its conquest (its old name was Koroun). 200 Karaca Pa§a, son-in-law of Mehmet <;elebi, formed a small village on his vakiflands in eastern Thrace: its name was Halvaci Fikih, and it was populated by his liberated slaves. Another of his villages, Deli ~ahin,' in the Gelibolu area, was, with the exception of two or three persons, populated by liberated slaves. It is rather remarkable that not all of the slaves had belonged to Mehmet <;elebi-some had had other masters. Koca Hizir Bey settled seven households of his own liberated slaves on his mulk farm in the Keshan area: they accounted for the entire population of the farm. There were also many liberated slaves in the vakif of Ali Bey in the Edirne area. 201 As would be exptected, all the liberated slaves in the mulks and vakifs were converted to Islam, and it was on this basis that they received their freedom. As a surname, they adopted the name of their former master, who had given them their liberty. 202 In many cases, persons of this category were given the title of guleman-i vakif 203 In the reign of Siileyman I, there were many households of them in Anatolia. What, in fact, was the status of such persons? According to the decrees of the legislation, "the liberated slave of a raiyye is the raiyye of his sipahi, " that is, the liberated slave was given the same status as his former master. 205 This is also confirmed by the fact that liberated slaves were to be found in the towns as well, where they had been the property of city dwellers, and had been granted the same status. 206 This situation, however, is not to be observed in mulks and vakifs. Here the liberated slaves, although they belonged to the mulk sahibi, obviously did not receive full personal freedom-they were still to a certain extent dependent on their former master. If one judges by the kind of taxes they paid him, this dependence was purely feudal, as the kind of exploitation to which they were subjected was also feudal. 207 Furthermore, although they had been

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converted to Islam, some of them continued to pay· ciziye. In this respect, a document regarding the vakiJ of Ali Bey in the village of Bulgarohori, Scutari district, is of particular importance. Under the names of the majority of his liberated slaves, mentioned as "guleman-i vakif, " there is the following note that "as gulam of the above mentioned vakiJ, they give their harar; and ciziye to the vakil'; and further on, in the description of the remaining raiyye of the vakiJ, it says that "other infidels, whose ciziye is collected by the sultan, will pay their ispenr;e and other taxes to the vakif ''208 Important facts emerge from these passages: (a) although they had been converted to Islam, the gulam in question were treated as infidels (the remaining Christian raiyye is referred to as "the other infidels"); (b) although they were Muslims, they paid ciziye; and (c) on the strength of the fact that they were liberated slaves, their ciziye was collected not by the state, but by the feudal ruler-their former master. If the vakiJwas one of those where the right to collect ciziye belonged to the feudal ruler at the outset, there was no reason why the remaining Christians should have paid this money to the fisc, as they should have, according to the letter of the law. From the examples given, it is clear that the liberated slaves of mulk owners (unlike those belonging to raiyye or city dwellers) did not receive full freedom from personal dependence, but continued to have obligations to their former masters. Although the exploitation to which they were subjected after their Muslimization and "liberation" was feudal in form and essence, they could not be, and according to Ottoman practice, were not included in the raiyye, as all the taxes that they paid were appropriated by the feudal ruler-the mulk sahibi. An underlying fact that characterized the status of the liberated slaves is reflected in this fact: they were completely dependant on their former masters, unlike the remaining raiyye, which were dependent on the fief holder and on the central government. A much large population, descended from slaves, which belonged to the mulks and vakiJs (and to some of the royal has as well) were the so-called ortakr;ilar (landless persons who cultivated another person's land in return for land-or share-croppers. Unlike the previously mentioned azadli or atik, they had not been liberated before being given land. The special laws that regulated their status referred to them quite definitely as slaves (kullar) and female slaves (cariyeler). 209 Most of them were settled in the royal haslar in eastern Thrace, to which they had been brought from dar-ul harb (lands where military action had taken place).210 Before the commencement of the permanent Ottoman occupation of the peninsula, however, the enslaved

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inhabitants of the Balkans were carried away to Asia Minor and settled as ortakqilar in the vakifs of the first sultans. Thus, there were many ortakqilar,211 some of whom were Bulgarians, in the vakif of Sultan Orhan in the Bursa area. 212 Beyazit IT made a large part of the istanbul has lands into a vakif of his imaret. At that time, there were 163 villages in the kaza (administrative district), of which 110 were populated by ortakqilar,213 and the number of slaves who had been granted land, together with their wives and children, was 10,000. 214 Ortakqilar were also to be found in a large number of the emirs' mulks and vakifs: for example, that of Siileyman Pa~a in Bolayir, of Sinan Pa~a at Scutari, of Hundi Hatun and Hiiseyin Bey at Gelibolu, of Mustafa Bey, etc. 215 This leads one to the obvious conclusion that the ortakqilar represented a large section of the population that cultivated the nonofficial estates of Ottoman feudal landowners. The ortakqilar had a status entirely different from that of the remaining dependent population. They were personally dependent, they were not permitted to leave the villages in which they had been granted land, they could not marry members of the raiyye, nor could they carry on any other trade or occupation apart from agriculture. 216 These limitations originated in the fact that legally they were not considered to have been liberated from slavery (" ortakqilar are the unliberated slaves of the sahib-i vakif'J.217 The differences that can be observed between the status of the ortakqilar and that of the remaining dependent population of the empire, which Barkan considers to be "free peasants," has caused this author to treat them as the equals of Western serfs, and to class them as the one and only feudally dependent population of the empire..218 It is obvious that such a thesis lacks foundation, as (a) It has undoubtedly been proved that the entire raya included in fief or nonfief estates was by no means free of feudal dependency, apart from the fact that dependency in this case did not take the forms characteristic of Western European serfdom; (b) to the extent that the forms of dependency that characterized the ortakqilar were different from those of the raiyye, this difference emanated from the slave origins of that section of the population, an origin that, in principle, does not characterize the feudally dependent population of any feudal formation whatsoever. The above mentioned objections to Barkan's thesis do not mean that manifes-tations of exploitation that is, in principle, characteristic of slavery can be observed in ortakqilik. Given the long-established and completely dominant feudal production relations in the Balkan lands, the slave who had been granted land at once became a part

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of the feudally dependent population, and could be exploited in a way that was feudal in essence. It is true that the ortakqi was distinguished by methods of exploitation that were different in form and volume, but they were different in a quantitative way rather than in any other, and did not change the essence of that exploitation. Thus, 'for example, the ortakqi did not, in principle, pay any state taxes. 219 The circumstance that the law did not consider him to be legally free exempted him from the obligations that every member of the raiyye had toward the fisc. Because of this, his exploitation by the feudal landowner was considerable. When he had been given land, the ortakqi had the right to cultivate it only after he had ensured the cultivation of the has-the land of his feudal lord. The law kept a strict eye on the ortakqi to make sure that he did not neglect the land of his master in order to cultivate his own.220 In the same way, a liberated slave was given two sets of beasts of harness; with one of them he worked the sultan's lands, and with the other, his own. The feudal lord's stewards would hand him a given quantity of seed to sow on the sultan's lands, and kept a close eye on ortakqilar to make sure that they used nothing on their own lands that belonged to the sultan, and that the sultan's beasts were not used in the cultivation of their own lands. 221 Finally, when the harvest was collected, the liberated slave was obliged to give half the yield to the feudal landowner. This was valid for the has land belonging to the sultan that he cultivated, but not for his own personal holding, from the yield of which he would give the one-tenth, or tithe demanded by the law. 222 Consequently, in a general way, the obligations of the ortakqi, which exceeded that of the raiyye, consisted of the fact that he was compelled to cultivate part of the personal land of the feudal landowner and hand half of the produce therefrom to the owner of the land. In the remaining aspects, the slave who had been granted land was exploited in exactly the same way as the raiyye. Moreover, in return for the cultivation of the feudal lord's land the ortakqi was exempted from state taxes, which were by no means less in amount than half of the yield of the has land that he cultivated. Another characteristic feature of the ortakqi population is that it was placed in a situation of one-sided feudal dependency, that is, dependent only on the mulk or vakif owner, but in no way on the state. For this reason, the forms of his exploitation, too, were extremely varied. Information regarding this, gathered from the special law on ortakqilar in the jstanbul haslari district, where, apart from the haslar there were also a number of royal vakifs, does not give a full idea of the variety of this exploitation. Each mulk sahibi or vakif holder

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arranged his dealings with his own ortakc;ilar in his own particular way. Furthermore, it is important to note that, with the passage of time, the forms of exploitation of the ortakc;ilar approached that of the remaining raiyye more closely. Thus, in the vilayet of Karaman in the sixteenth century, the ortakc;ilar paid one-third of their products to the feudal landowner, without paying any other taxes at all. 223 At a later date the situation changed, and they began to pay tithe, plus the remaining raiyye taxes, apart from which they also paid oI1e-fifth of the products and crops produced on their land to the feudal landowner. 224 In the reign of Suleyman, the ortakc;ilar in the vakiJs of Orhan in the Bursa area paid in cash an amount equivalent to a portion of the grain they produced to the vakif. 225 The ortakc;ilar of Siileyman Pa~a in the Bolayir area gave one-fifth of what they had produced to the vakif.226 In the Malkara area, however, the levy was one-fifth of all grain produced, and half of the unfermented grape juice. 227 In the vakiJ of Karabulut, they were exploited according to the ortakc;ilar system-cultivating the land of the feudal lord, and paying him half the crops that had been produced on the land. 228 The ortakc;i1ar who had been settled in the vakiJ of Turhan Bey were subjected to the same forms of exploitation as the remaining raiyye, the only difference being that they also paid their ciziye to the vakif.229 In some vakiJvillages in eastern Thrace, the population continued not to pay poll tax and land tax, and only paid the legal levies on agricultural production, etc. 230 It is obvious from these data that, with the passage of time, the ortakc;ilar were gradually included in forms of exploitation pertaining to the raiyye, but that they, too, like the liberated slaves who had been given land were wholly dependent on their feudal lord (the owner of a mulk, vakiJ, or has, but never a sipahz) , to whom they also paid their entire feudal rent. Although the population that the feudal lords settled in their mulks and vakifs, and to whom they gave land was mainly of slave origin, the former, that is, the Ottoman mulk and vakiJ owners, also had other means at their disposal for the gathering of a dependent workforce. Just how far these actions were permitted by definite decrees of the central government, or to what extent they represented breaches of the law that were possible becuase of the considerable influence wielded by representatives of the feudal ruling class cannot be judged from the available sources. In any case, they reflect certain activities carried on by the mulk owners that cannot be explained away by the norms set out in the legislation. Thus, for example, Rum Mehmet Pa§a had a mulk in the village of Tuyca Oruzlu, in the Dimotika area. Apart from the gulCims of

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the pasha, there were also twenty Christian raiyye households in the mulk. They had been brought there from Macedonia, Albania, and

Serbia. It is quite clear from their registration and taxation that they were not liberated slaves or ortakc,;ilar. On the other hand, their names were recorded in the manner characteristic of the acemogianlar (Christian youths who had been selected for the corps of janissaries and taken away from their homes): Mir Arnaut, Aleksi Manastirlu, Todor Pirlepe, Nikola Arnaut, Zdravko Vardarlu. 231 The possibility cannot be excluded that Rum Mehmet Pa§a, in his position of vizier during the reign of Mehmet II, diverted some of the youths selected for the corps of janissaries to his own estates to add to his work force. The fact that, in the village apart, from Christians there were only gulams-liberated slaves of the pasha-bears sufficient witness to the fact that the mulk sahibi had been granted a depopulated village as a mulk, which had to be populated again. A similar situation can be seen in the village of Masudlu, a vakif of Murat II, where, among the liberated slaves and ortakc,;ilar are recorded the names of, for example, ~irmerd Eflak (Wallachia), Doka Bulgar, etc. 232 The information given leads us to the assumption that dev~irme (forcible removal of Christian youths from their homes, and selection for entry to the corps of janissaries) not only ensured a flow of fresh blood into the Ottoman army, but also a work force for the estates of the feudal ruling class. Another group within the mulk and vakif population were the socalled taallukak (literally, "dependent") persons. Although their presence is recorded in a number of documents, it is not clear how the specific features of their status were expressed. The only thing that is obvious is that like the ortakc,;ilar and liberated slaves, they too were bound by dependency and obligations to their feudal lord alone. Thus, for example, in the vakif of Omur Bey in the Lerin area, there were taallukat of Hasan Bey, son of the late Orner Bey. "The persons in questions were recorded in the old register as the taallUkiiat of Orner Bey, and they have sent an application to the sultan-to pay tithe," we read in our source. 233 In the vakif of ~ehabeddin Pa§a, too, among the many gulamlar and ortakc,;ilar there were "the taallUkat of ~ehabeddin Pa§a, who are not raiyye. "234 There were also five taallukat households in the vakif of ishak Pa§a, and so on. 235 This information does not by any means give us a firm idea of the status of this exploited population group, which obviously consisted of raiyye. The case of the village of Sicak Pinar, Dimotika area, the vakif of Davud Pa§a, is no clearer. It bears witness to the widespread practice of collecting a work force for the mulks and vakifs in that

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the village in question consisted (with the exception of one household), of haymanlar, non-Muslims of no fixed address, mostly dependent villagers who had fled, and were seeking more favorable conditions of exploitation. The interesting fact in this case is that it is unequivocally stated that the haymanlar in question had come "from farm laborers" (irgattan gelip). 236 At a much later stage, the meaning of the term is "hired hand" or "farm laborer. " Such an interpretation of the text, however, would undoubtedly modernize it, and, for this reason, the question of the identity of the irgatlar in question must remain open. The only thing that we are in a position to establish is that they paid all their taxes to the feudal lord, and that the state did not participate in their exploitation. 237 This information, however, only serves to increase the number of cases that speak of the various ways of gathering a work force for the mulks and vakifs. The above mentioned practice of attracting (or perhaps of forcibly settling) roving elements of the population on mulk and vakif lands with the purpose of extracting the maximum feudal income was extremely widespread. It is typical that, apart from on the estates in question, we only find haymanlar in the royal has lands, and not in the inventories of military fiefs as well. 238 This proves that the practice described was the privilege of the feudal ruling class-that it alone had the right to take advantage of the exploitation of the "roving" population. Sometimes, as is obvious from the sources, the haymanlar were not really haymanlar, that is, persons of no fixed address, and consequently, at that point in time, without a feudal ruler. Thus, for example, in the vicinity of the dairy farm of Yahya Pa§a in the Konoush area there were two villages that were abandoned after the demolition of the dairy. In place of the villagers who had fled (and who were obviously left without a way to make a living), the pasha settled eighteen households of "persons the subject of dispute" on his mulk land (nizali e§has) - who remained there because Yahya Pa§a had obtained aferman from the sultan for the population of the abandoned villages. 239 Consequently, in this case, the pasha had commandeered dependent villagers whose feudal rulers were very well known, as it had unequivocally been stated that they were "in dispute" about their villagers, and the pasha, taking advantage of his stronger position, had strengthened his ruined estates with a new work force. Apart from this, it should be stated that mulk sahibleri sometimes also received the so-called haric ez defter (not included in the register) villages which, because they had been destroyed, did not figure in the inventories, as they did not bring any income to the feudal lord.

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Taking advantages of their privileges as far as the repopulation of abandoned areas (and they had previously obtained these areas as mulk), representatives of the feudal ruling class extended their estates and brought an exploited popu~ation into them in every way possible. In this way, for example, Ibrahim Pa~a asked for and received in mulk the village of Gebran in the Tumovo area, which had been abandoned, and obtained permission "to populate it.' '240 The facts set out above prove beyond doubt that, between the exploitation of military fiefs, on the one hand, and that of mulks and vakifs on the other, there existed significant differences. These were not just differences in the forms and volume (sum) of the separate elements of feudal taxation payable by the raiyye in fiefs and on nonfief estates. These differences were initially rooted in the wide-ranging initiative that mulk sahibleri had at their disposal to attract a population to their estates, in their right to subject this subsequently settled population to forms of exploitation not set out in the legislation. Skillfully using their privileges as far as the "population" of noncultivated land was concerned, the feudal lords resorted to many methods of increasing the population they exploited. The most widespread method was slavery-the carrying away of slaves from regions where there had been military actions. Although the exploitation of that population was not slavery either, but feudal in essence, the resettlement of these persons of mulk, vakif, and has lands was carried out mainly on the basis of its enslavement. Other methods of "populating" the estates in question were the commandeering of haymanlar or "persons the subject of dispute, " and extracting a certain number of persons from the contingent of Christian boys selected for service in the corps of janissaries. The methods mentioned above by no means exhaust the possibilities exercised by the feudal ruling class of increasing the size of the population to exploit. It should also be stated that the owners of mulks and vakifs, in spite of the extreme conservatism of the institution, in individual cases introduced forms of exploitation that were applied on miriye lands at a much later date. Thus, for example, even during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in some vakifs the kesim 240a (the farming of a branch of the revenue for an agreed sum), and ortakqilik240b became widespread. From a register for 1639-1640, we learn that, in some Plovdiv district villages belonging to the vakif of ~ehabeddin Pa~a, a tithe in the form of kesim was collected, i.e., that the basic feudal tax collection in kind had been replaced by a fixed sum in cash.240c

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In fact, the wider powers of initiative exercized by vakif owners could only have a positive influence on the development of the forces of production in valdJvillages. This is the only way in which the prosperity of some Bulgarian villages that belonged to vakiJs can be explained. Some of them, which were villages during the period under discussion, even during the age of slavery, became prosperous towns and townships, while others acquired an enviable degree of wealth. In the final analysis, the conclusion to which the facts must lead is that the privileges in land ownership enjoyed by the feudal ruling class (personified by the mulk owners) were not limited to the legal status of the lands they owned (the fact that it was not tied land, such as a fief, and that the owner enjoyed full powers). They were also privileges in the methods of exploitation of the rnUlk and vakif, in the initiative permitted to mulk owners for increasing their feudal income.

Concerning the "In Perpetuity" Status of the Miilk and Vakif The main problem in the study of mulk and nlkif land ownership is that of the interrelationships between rnUlk and vakiJ owners, a matter which has not been studied at all, on the one hand, and the central government on the other, or rather, the role of the central government in this land ownership. To the extent that the matter under discussion has been briefly studied in the research carried out, that is, for it to be established that in mulk and vakif land ownership the state did not intervene at all, that the powers of the owners over these lands was full and unconditional. 241 It is not a matter of chance that in our recent literature on the subject, the term "fiefs in perpetuity" has been coined, with which some authors aim to emphasize the permanent characters of this type of land ownership, its independence from the state. 242 It is not only eminent Ottoman authors, who emphasize that the mulk and particularly the vakifcontinued "in perpetuity"243 who give grounds for such assumptions, but also the many vakif records that indicate the succession of rnutevelis of vakifs and that assume mostly that this type of estate would continue in perpetuity. 244 It should be emphasized that a large part of the land mulks that had been made into vakiJs did indeed have a long life, if not an eternal one, at least equal to the period of Ottoman rule over the Balkan lands. The valdJs of Rustem Pa~a in the villages surrounding Arbanassi,246 some of the Pleven vakifs ofGazi Mihalovtsi,246 the vakiJofKarlizade in Gyopstata,247 and of Mihrimah Sultan at Koprivshtitsa 248 were in existence right up to the time of our liberation. Macedonia and the

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Aegean, which remained under Turkish rule until 1912, also preserved some large vakifs, among which was that of Evrenos Bey in the Gumulcine and Enice-Bardar areas 249 and those of ishak Bey and his descendents in the Skopje district. 25o Consequently, it was not only in words that the land vakif was an agrarian institution in perpetuity . The other aspects of this characteristic of mUlk and vakifland ownership, namely, the fact of its separation from the state land fund, the unlimited powers of the owners of such lands, and the nonintervention of the central government in the operations that could be carried out by mulk sahibleri with their land (making a gift of it, selling it, making it into a vakiJ, etc.) is also confirmed in many sources. First and foremost, it would seem that the mulknames and mukaramames were a sufficient guarantee on the part of the state as to the "full rights" and "absolute ownership" of the mulk owner over the land that had been granted to him.251

If we permit ourselves to doubt the accuracy of these ideas regarding the character of the mulk and vakil, which are confirmed in the literature on the subject and well supported by Ottoman records, this would be because that data that is no less ample would go to prove the contrary, and place in an entirely different light the established concepts of the "in perpetuity" categories of Ottoman feudal land ownership. The data in question bear unequivocal witness to the fact that even the mulk and vakif were not estates completely exempt from the powers of the central government, nor were they' 'in perpetuity" to any great extent. However misguided such observations about the established concept of the mulk and vakiJ may be, they do not contradict our general ideas of Ottoman reality and Ottoman feudalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at all. Given the centralism that existed at that time, which had not been affected by the growing power of the feudal aristocracy, the state was master of the situation. There was, as yet, no force that could compel the state to retreat from its position as sole body in charge of the land fund and the feudal income from the conquered countries. At that time, the feudal ruling class preserved its position within the system of Ottoman feudalism by random actions and finding loopholes in the norms set out in the law rather than by a decisive offensive against the forms of land ownership and exploitation imposed by the state. And it was namely in this environment that the mutual relationships between the central government and mulk and vakiJland ownership had to take on the image shown to us by the many documentary sources in question. Below, some manifestations

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of intervention on the part of the central government in mulk and vakil land ownership will be discussed. The Role of the Central Government in the Formation of the Land

Mulk and Vakif Although actions of this kind on the part of the central government cannot exactly be regarded as intervention, it should be noted that, during the period in question, the emergence of mulk and vakil estates was, if not the exclusive result of initiative by the central government, at least the result of its approval. The state's only right was the issue of documents for rriidk ownership (mulkname), and its organs (the kadis) determined the boundaries of that estate with special documents) hududname, sinimame), and every new sultan would confirm the right of the temlik (granting of formal possession) with. a special act (mukaramame). Of course, after qualitative land-owning privileges had been granted to the feudal lords in this way, it was up to them to increase these privileges quantitively by means of inheritance and sale and purchase transactions. But here as well, in spite of the concentration of mUlk lands in the hands of a given social stratum (a circumstance of which the state did not approve but was in no position to prevent), the state, all the same, possessed the supreme right to transform a certain part of the miriye lands into "false" mulk and, consequently, to allot the common share of the mulk land it required to the system of feudal land ownership. It should be emphasized that, during this period, which was still not characterized by the hegemony of the feudal aristocracy, we can observe a number of compromises with the interests of the feudal ruling class in the actions of the central government in turning miriye land into mulk land-compromises that were to the detriment of the fief holders. Significant concessions in this respect were made to members of the royal family itself. Thus, Murat IT decided to separate the vakil of the newly built bridge at Ergene from the villages in the vicinity. These lands had belonged to timars, and the sultan compensated the evicted sipahis by granting them other villages that, however, had been abandoned. It was only after an extensive (verbal) campaign had been waged by the aggrieved sipahis that their timars were provided with raiyye. 252 One of the princesses, Sofu Hatun, was granted a large mulk in Anatolia (in the Gingyane sancak) during the reign of Beyazit IT. It comprised several musellem farms that had previously been owned by the musellem qeriba§i, and the village of Ada, which had previously been part of the has of the sancakbey. 253

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F our villages in the Dimotika district were the timar of the mirahor (master of the horse), Elias Bey. Beyazit II turned them into a mulk and gave them to his daughter ~ehzad ~ah Hatun. 254 A section of the feudal ruling class managed to acquire mulks from their former fiefs. In this way they transformed a fief, or tied land ownership into unconditional, hereditary land ownership. Elias Bey, for example, who was a son-in-law of Beyazit II, received a temlikname for his own timar in the Korchan (?) area. The same thing happened with one of the court musicians, Dursun Mehter, who was granted a timar of 2,000 akqe in the Edirne district; he managed to acquire a mulkname, for he continued to possess it as a mulk. 255 There were also many cases in which Ottoman feudal lords were granted timars and e§kinci farms as mulk on the orders of the central government. Of course, these people were not just anybody, they were important dignitaries, usually viziers. Thus, were the cases with Davud Pa~a, who received a mulk from a timar in the Edirne district, which he subsequently sold; 256 Davud Bey, a kilyha (bailiff) at the palace, to whose advantage the government "removed" a farm from the timar of a kadiasker and turned it into a mulk farm;257 Kasim Pa~a, who managed to get the e§kinci category lifted from a farm, and acquired it as a mulk, and so on.258 The cases quoted prove that, after the formation of the timar system, mulks were not always formed from nonallocated land, but frequently to the detriment of fief (tied) land ownership. In this case, however, the conclusion that, however influential the representatives of the ruling class might have been, in their drive to acquire mulk land they defmitely needed the sanction of the central government is more significant. In this way, the latter still succeeded in controlling the correlation between miriye land and the "false" mulk, and to a great extent, in hindering the economic growth of the feudal aristocracy.

The Intervention by the Central Government in the Powers of Molk and Vakif Owners Fragmentary but varied information goes to show that, during this period, the central government also introduced a conditional quality to the granting of mulk and vakif lands, which were considered as a matter of principle to be unconditional ownership. It has already been mentioned that, before the establishment of the fief, some of the mulks and vakifs were used for this purpose. Above all, a not insignificant part of the Anatolian Turkish aristocracy, which had kept its mulks under the changed circumstances, had been forced

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by the Ottoman government to accept military service in return for their possession. 259 Even some of the feudal lords from the disbanded beyliks who had received new mulks on the European side of the Bosphorus, held them as bervech-i 9-ftlik,260 that is, sending e§kinciler as substitutes on campaigns. Apart from mulks granted in return for military service, there was also mention of mulks being granted to members of the clergy261 and other dignitaries. 262 This circumstance constituted a breach of one of the main principles of mulk ownership, namely its unconditional, non fief character. The local military and administrative organs were entitled to a certain degree of intervention in mulk and vakifland ownership. Thus, for example, Haci Thri bought a farm in the Malkara district from Kara Terzi and made it into a vakif However, the sancakbey disputed the form of the mulk ownership, and did not sanction the vakif After lengthy proceedings, ibri managed to prove his entitlement and received aferman for mulk land ownership-only then did the sancakbey accept the validity of the vakif 263 Another farm in the Edime district was given in exchange for service as a naval captain (reislik) to various persons. One of them passed it on to his son, together with the obligation for naval servicebut the son owed money to the treasury and the latter declared the farm to have been sold, at which another naval captain purchased it. 266 In spite of mulk and vakifland ownership being formally protected from appropriation by the state, cases in which the latter openly interfered in the affairs of mulk owners were by no means rare. In this way, on the orders of the state some hereditary vakifs were taken away from their current owners and given to new owners, 265 hereditary vakifs were turned into real vakifs, 266 for certian periods of time, the revenue from the mulks were collected by the fisc when the owner died without issue, and so on. 267 It is important to note that the above mentioned examples of state intervention exclusively affected valdfs and mUlks possessed by persons who were not members of the feudal ruling class: §eyhler, reisler, persons of no particular distinction. 268 Moreover, their estates were always small,269 mainly mulk farms. Consequently, in this respect as well, the class-based policy of the Ottoman state can be clearly seen. While the big mulk owners acquired large tracts of land by soliciting influential persons, by purchase and machinations of all kinds, and succeeded to a great extent in protecting their land from the clutches of the state, the small mulks that were owned by unimportant people or by representatives of the former feudal aristocracy of the beyliks remained exposed to the depredations of the state.

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Fical Intervention by the Central Government in MUlks and Vakifs In spite of the examples given above, which are small in number in comparison with the amount of evidence to the contrary, it could be stated that the Ottoman state, to a great extent, guaranteed the powers of the mulk sahibi (inheritance, sale and transformation into a vakiJ). It is typical that, in the mulknames, the central government nowhere excludes as an element of this power the entire income from the territory of these estates. In itself, the lack of financial immunity of the greater part of the mulk owners as far as their estates were concerned is sufficient reason for a certain degree of conditionality in the extremely categorical definition of their powers-' 'full powers" and "absolute ownership.' '270 The existence of state organs and, most of all, of state fiscal organs that carried out certain appropriations on mulk and vakiJ lands does not permit us to define the powers of their owners as "full." Moreover, the lack of financial dependency in these estates was also reflected in the obligations of the mulk owner and the vakiJ to collect taxes from its raiyye in the forms and amounts set out by the central government. 271 When considering the fiscal intervention of the state in the mulk and vakiJ, one should not bear in mind the lack of financial immunity, the fact that, as a matter of principle (but not without significant exceptions), the state kept for itself a portion of the feudal income of estates of this kind as well. As intervention, we should regard the actions of the government that exceeded the legally established norms for the division of the feudal income between the fisc and the mulk owner. These actions were reflected mainly in the giving of a portion of the feudal income to which the feudal landowner was entitled to another feudal landowner, usually a fief holder. This fiscal intervention on the part of the central government was, in practice, an intervention in the powers of the mulk owner as well, because it was not only the central government that was appropriating money from the estate, but also the agencies of the other feudal landowner. Actions of this kind on the part of the central government were fairly frequent, as far as one can judge by the sources. In various provinces of the empire, where land ownership organized according to the malikclne-divani system already existed, the fiscal intervention by the government became normal practice. 272 It became widespread practice for two feudal landowners to lay claim to the results of agricultural production in the same area, both in kind and in cash; the m·ulk owner and the vakiJ, on the one hand, and the fief holder on the other. In the Aleppo sancak, for example, there were villages that were' 'wholly

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vakif and mulk, and others, which were with has and timar together. "273 It is obvious that with mulks and vakifs of this kind there could not be any fonn of territorial separation, nor could there be full powers for the mulk owner. But while, in the regions mentioned, this situation existed as a survival of the malikane-divani system, that is, dating from pre-Ottoman feudal institutions, in the Rumelian territories of the empire, such practice was an expression of the irregular fiscal intervention of the central government in mulk and vakif lands. The existence of two feudal lords with a claim to the revenue from a piece of land that was vakif or mulk in the Balkan peninsula was not subject to the strict frame of reference that was characteristic of these fonns in Asia Minor. It differed in almost every individual case. For example, the inhabitants of Enos paid a part of their taxes to the vakif of Beyazit I and another portion to the vakif of Murat IT.274 Tpe taxes from the village of Davudlar, Plovdiv district, were also split between two feudal lords-the vakif of ~ehabeddin Pa§a collected its tithe, and that of Beyazit I, the remaining taxes. 275 A further ten villages in the Plovdiv district paid raiyye taxes to the vakif of ~ehabeddin Pa§a, ciziyi, and a tax on sheep to the vakif of Mihrimah Sultan. 276 During the reign of Beyazit IT, only the ~ithe of five villages in the Plovdiv district were payable to the vakif of Ibrahim Pa§a, while the remaining raiyye taxes fonned the sipahi's timar.277 The raiyye from the Gaglayik mine paid ciziye to the state, and the remaining components of the taxes they paid were divided between the vakif of Murat IT and some timar holders (their share was only the tithe).278 This situation also pertained in a number of villages in the GiimUlcine (Komotini) district. 279 In this way, the state breached one of the fundamental principles characterizing this category of estate-its territorial discreteness. Practically speaking, in the cases quoted, a vakif and a timar were in existence at the same time over a given territory, or in other cases, two vakifs existed simultaneously. The full powers of the feudal ruler over his lands were also breached in another way, which was related to the feudal obligations of the population of the mulk and vakif. This consisted of special obligations imposed by the state on pa~ of the mulk and vakifraiyye. Thus, for example, the village of Tarbuki, Dimotika district, was hereditary vakifheld by the heirs of one Giil§ehri. However, seventeen Christian households from that village were obliged to carry out derbenci (guarding of a pass) service. It is stated in the document that "the above mentioned infidels do not themselves belong to the vakif, it is only the land they cultivate that belongs to the vakif. "281

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In the vakif of Gok~e Harnza in the Plovdiv district there were kopruculer (guardians of bridges). 281 It could be said that the central government not only laid hands on the taxes paid in money and in kind, which comprised the revenue of land that had already been granted as mulk and vakiJ, but also extracted revenue in the form of special duties imposed in their raiyye, which was undoubtedly to the disadvantage of the mulk owner. The data quoted should not, however, be overestimated. They are no more than fragmentary evidence that, in spite of the efforts of mulk and vakif owners to separate their lands from the general land fund of the empire and to guarantee them against the intervention of the central government, these lands still remained exposed to the depredations of the state and were by no means excluded from the range of its powers.

Could the Vakif by Compulsorily Acquired? Although the argument about the "full powers" and "absolute property" of the mulk and vakil owner cannot, in spite of the facts set out, be disputed in principle, another argument, that regarding the "perpetual" character of these estates can certainly be disputed. However solemn the oaths set out in mulknames and vakifnames addressed to representatives of future generations who might try to breach the integrity of these estates, or to change the method of exploitation or distribution of income from estates of this kind might seem, they obviously failed to impress the generations that followed. 282 In spite of the extreme conservatism of its institutions, the mulk and vakil could not be preserved in their pure, original form primarily because they represented part of an economy that was subject to development and because they existed in the real world. We would fmd it hard to imagine, for example, that during the nineteenth century the itinerants living in the caravansaray attached to the imaret (soup kitchen) of Yahya Pa§a, which was founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century, could be fed on twenty-five akc;e per day, from which sum such items as brawn, honey, butter, and fodder for the horses had to be provided. 283 In fact, the minimum change that would be introduced in the administration of a given vakiJ would be that which was dictated by changing prices and exchange rates. The other changes that were made to the vakiJ were, however, of an entirely different nature and were breaches of its originally determined status. Although the fundamental feature of the vakiJwas the fact that it could not be compulsorily acquired (this is what its

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"perpetual" character comprised), breaches of this principle were by no means rare. This is convincingly proved by the fact that a number of vakifs simply "disappeared," in other words, ceased to be vakift. For example, the vakif of Haci Musliheddin in Edirne, which was founded in 1423, ceased to exist. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, it was simply sold by its mutevelli to Sokol Mehmet Pa§a. 284 Part of another vakif in the Edirne district was sold in the same way (that of Sinan Bey), to another grand vizier, Rustem Pa§a. 285 One of the inner circle of Mehmet II, to whom the sultan had personally granted land in vakif, had sold a vineyard belonging to it to a dependent villager attached to his timar.286 It is clear that the practice of selling vakif property was by no means rare, because when the vakifs were subsequently reregistered, their reduction in size could be seen-a reduction not in income, but in territory. For example, during the short time between the reign of Beyazit IT and that of Siileyman I, several villages were removed from the vakif of Mustafa Pa§a. 287 The vakif of Ahmet Pa§a Hersekzade, which according to the vakifname, included seven villages at the beginning of the sixteenth cen~ry, had been reduced to three villages when it was reregistered. 288 Ibrahim Pasha, a vizier of SUleyman I, left three villages in the Kizilaga9 district as a legacy to his mosque. During the reign of the same sultan, in 1562, the vakifhad already been registered as "disappeared.' '289 Two vakift of the mosque in Belgrade also "disappeared" in the same way, and the state was forced to pay the salaries of their officials from the revenue of the Belgrade customs. 290 The ample information regarding the reduction in size or complete disappearance of some land vakifs prove that the institution was not characterized by that strict immunity to compulsory acquisition that was granted by the §eriat, and by tradition, reflected in the literature on the subject. It was the mutevelliler, who were the de facto owners of the vakif, and not its employees, who took the liberty of selling the property of the vakif either wholly or in part. Moreover, as the sources make clear, it was not ordinary people who were involved on one side or the other in such transactions, but important dignitaries and feudal landowners. This fact, to a great extent, explains the lack of interest with which the government responded to these operations, which were forbidden from the §eriat point of view, regarding the vakifs in question as simply having "disappeared." Furthermore, it should also be emphasized that even the government itself was little restricted in its actions by the "sacred" institutions of the vakif or the "absolute ownership" of the mulk owner.

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In spite of the formal immunity to compulsory acquisition of property that had once been made into a vakiJ, the government made no bones about disbanding some vakifs and turning them into has-land belonging to the royal family. In this respect, the new sultans showed little respect even as far as the wishes of their forefathers were concerned, and even laid hands on royal vakiJs. For example, the 203 shops in Edirne that had been made into a vakiJ of his imaret by Beyazit I, were transformed into has, and the revenue from their rents allocated to a special mukataa (rent paid to the evkaJ for cultivated land turned into building land or gardens), and the latter was sold by resale agents. 291 In the same way, the village of Ayo Tudor, Vize district, was added (ilhak olunup) to the sultan's has, as was the mulk of Hanzada Fatma Sultan, where there was a mine and workshops,292 and the village of Rusul Bey, Lovech district, the vakif of Maktul Mustafa Pa§a, the sultan's son-in-law, was "acquired" by Selim II.293 A fate that was no better befell some of the big royal vakiJs. Thus, Murat II, who built the U~ ~erefli Mosque in Edime with what he had plundered from Serbia and Hungary, and then made the whole of the Kratovo district into its vakiJ (Kratova memleketi) together with its mines, the annual income of which amounted to the vast sum of 363,626 akr;e. The vakif was able to enjoy its income until the reign of Siileyman I, who, in search of new sources of income to help him out of his financial difficulties, turned the mines into a has and attached Murat's mosque to the vakif of Beyazit II.294 Indeed, bearing in mind what has been described above, it could not be said that the vakiJwas a property "not subject to compulsory acquisition, " and "administered according to the will of the founder for all time. "295 In the centralized Ottoman state, given the complete lack of order in terms of the law, or failure to adhere to the laws that existed, even the efforts of the feudal ruling class to protect their estates by turning them into mulk, and even moreso into vakiJ, were not always crowned with success. Naturally, the depredations of the government were directed against the property of those who, at that point in time, were not involved in the administration: persons who had formerly been important, but had fallen into disfavor, or that of deceased feudal lords, or even sultans. In all these cases, the important conclusion is that, in Ottoman society in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was no form of feudal land ownership sufficiently guaranteed against the depredations of the central government. The clearest proof of such a conclusion is the annullrnent of mulk and vakiJ estates during· the reign of Mehmet II.

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The AnnuUment of Miilk and Vakif Estates During the Reign of Mehmet IT The historiography regarding agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire has not recorded the actual point in history that was significant in that it marked the watershed between two agrarian systems, the act that struck a blow against mulk land ownership as the predominant agarian system, and in which is reflected the victory of the new type of land ownership-the fief, or tied land, the timar. In fact, although this fact is one that has been omitted by literature devoted to the topic, it should be emphasized that, in the history of the empire, there was a period when mulk and vakil, i.e., nonfief land ownership was erased from the Ottoman feudal-agrarian system. The annullment of the mulk and vakif took place during the reign of Mehmet IT "the Conqueror, " the sultan whose legislation was the first Ottoman acr that sanctioned the timar as the fundamental unit of feudal land ownership, which for the first time regulated the complex interrelationships between the direct producer, the fief holder, and the state. In an analysis of Mehmet's legislation, which was characterised by an exceptional primitiveness,296 one is struck by the fact that the one and only unit of land ownership that it embraced was the timar. In it there is not even a hint about the existence of other agrarian categories, such as the mulk and the vakil, for example. 297 Moreover, when the fact is borne in mind that until the reign of Mehmet II, these two categories were very much to the fore, even if not actually predominant within the agrarian system, that the vakif was even used as remuneration for services rendered, the question of why the first Ottoman legislation neglects the mulk and vakif is bound to arise. We can fmd an answer to this question in many documents dating from the reign of Mehmet' s son, Beyazit II. From them we learn that, during the reign of the Conqueror, mulks and vakifs were annullled (bozulup) , and that timars were formed from their lands. The fact that this act was not a partial measure, but one that affected the majority of mulks and vakifs is proved above all by the amplitude of the documents concerned, and by unequivocal passages contained in them. In order to understand the radical quality of the measures instigated by Mehmet IT against mulk and vakifland ownership, cases involving vakifs and mulks created during his reign should be kept in mind. Extremely typical of Ottoman feudal life is the fact that the Conqueror, the ruler who wished to erase the institutions in question from the system of Ottoman feudal landownership, was himself the founder

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of a huge personal vakif. The vakiJ of his imaret in istanbul alone included six towns, sixty-seven villages, twenty-eight farms, and 10,303 persons, and its total income was equal to 1,771,060 akc;e. The share of the agrarian feudal income in this total sum represented 1,176,6~5 akc;e. 298 Apart from bequeathing vakifs to his imarets, Mehmet ti also bequeathed vakifs in which many villages in Rumelia were inc1uded299 to the Eyiip Mosque in istanbul, and to Medinaonly three villages, one of which had been a mulk of the kndiasker, but which the sultan had "taken. "300 The Conqueror, who went to enormous lengths in his religious zeal did not, however, allow even members of the royal family to set up their own vakiJs. Furthermore, in some cases, he even deprived them of the mulks that he had personally granted them. Thus, for example, Glilbahar Hatun, his wife and the mother of Beyazit n, received as a mulk a village in the Amasya area. In 1468, she sold it to the wife ofTaci Bey.30l Aferman of Mehmet IT dating from 1478, however, made this transaction void on the pretext that "the village sold had previously been granted as a timar. " Further on, the Jerman decrees that the village in question be "granted as timars" and that the sum unlawfully received by the sultan's wife be returned to the buyer. 302 This case is important only as proof of the extremism with which Mehmet IT carried out his measure, even affecting the interests of his own wife. It is also significant in that it approximately places a terminus ante quem on the royal act that put an end to mUlks and vakifs. Since, when the village was sold, it had already been turned into a timar, the date of the act in question could not be later than 1468. On the other hand, the circumstance that, in spite of the formation of the timar in 1468, it was still without a title holder, so that Glil~ah Sultan could sell this property that was no longers hers, shows that the decree for the abolition of mulks could not date much before the year mentioned. In the fmal analysis, it would be logical to place this act somewhere between 1465 and 1468. No better fate befell some of the "estates in perpetuity" of other sultans' wives. Thus, for example, a vakifwas founded for the mosque of Siti Hatun in Edirne after her death, during the reign of Beyazit IT.303 The mother of Mustafa, who died while he was heir to the throne, Glil~ah Hatun, succeeded in bequeathing to her mausoleum her mulk village in the Dimotika area, but the sultan annulled the vakiJ and granted it in timar. 304 Particularly eloquent is the fact that, in contrast to the reign of his predecessors and heirs, Mehmet IT did not allow a single vizier or grand vizier to found his own vakif.

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The vakifs that survived during the reign of Mehmet IT (which were few and small in size)-we only have information regarding three or four such examples-belonged to persons who were either highranking religious dignitaries or close to the sultan, but who did not belong to the category of the mulk sahibleri. 305 On the other hand, the decision to annul nonfief estates even affected the all-powerful grand vizier Rum Mehmet Pa~a, 306 Turhan Bey, a leading courtier, 307 and other important representatives of the feudal aristocracy. In the final analysis, only data regarding vakifs formed from urban real estate remain from the reign of the Conqueror. 318 Consequently, this measure did not destroy the vakif as an institution, but was directed only against the land vakif, against the "false" mulk formed on miriye land. Mehmet IT would not have been able to abolish landownership that was not tied only by ceasing to grant new mulks and vakifs and forbidding the making of already existing mulks into vakifs. In order for his action to be radical, he resorted to the annulment of mulks and vakifs that had been granted by his predecessors. In this respect, even lands belonging to members of the royal family were included. Thus, many villages of the Dimotika, Shoumen, Kizilaga~, Provadiya and Nikopol districts that belonged to the vakif of Beyazit I were turned into timars (any other significant royal vakifbefore the reign of Mehmet I did not, in fact exist). 309 All kinds of vakifs were annulled-from those of important feudal lords such as Murat Bey, son of Malko~ Bey in the Haskovo area, of Me~met Pa~a, of Karagoz Bey in the Dimotika district, of Mehmet, son of Isfendiyar, of Timurta~ Pa§a in the Scutari area, of his son Oru~ Bey, of Fatma Hatun, wife of Zaganos Pa§a, of ~arabdar Hamza, and so on310 to those owned by sheikhs and dervishes and embracing one hamlet or one farm each. 311 The state even laid hands on vakifs dating from the distant past, when they had been founded with a religious objective. For example, the Arbuz Ata vakif, which had been founded during the time of Genghiz Khan, was abolished with the argument that it was hereditary.312 Even mUlks and vakifs granted by Mehmet himself were annulled. 313 Here are some typical passages that prove that the measuring stick for the formation of timar~ from mulks and vakifs was uniformly applied; about the village of Nurettin Fakih, Ergene, it is stated: "It has been a vakiffor many years. Subsequently, when the vakifs had to be changed, it was granted as a timar. "314 During the reregistration of land estates carried out during the reign of Beyazit IT, the following entry is to be found about the vakif of <;akmak Dede, held in return for religious services rendered: "It was made into a

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vakifby Murat Khan Sultan. During the time of the late Mehmet Khan, when the mulks and vakifs were abolished, this one was not abolished, but confirmed. "315 As for the mulk of Yusuf Gelebi, which was registered in the same inventory, the following passage can be found: "The village of Sapundji, which is in the Odrin [now Edirne] area. Was a mulk. During the reign of Mehmet Sultan, it was granted as a timar. "316 Regarding the vakif of Musa, son of Timur, in the Dimotika area, it is noted: "As it was held as a vakif, it was granted as a timar. "317 The following passage in another document sounds quite generalized just like a summary: this concerns the vakif of Haci Dogan, a dignitary at the court of Beyazit I, and which had been confirmed by all rulers up to the time of Mehmet II: "But it was abolished when the vakifs were annulled, and turned into a timar";318 or that of the vakif of Karagoz Bey in the Dimotika area: "During the time when all mulks and vakifs were abolished, it was granted as a timar. "319 The mass of data quoted, and their categorical unanimity as far as the matter is concerned, all prove that, during the time of Mehmet II, a decisive blow was struck against nontied land ownership to the advantage of tied land ownership. At the same time, the data bear eloquent witness to the fact that the mulk and the vakif can on no account be treated as "eternal," or "estates in perpetuity," that the central government during the period in question could, by issuing a ferman, put an end to their existence. Mehmet's reform, however, only succeeded in temporarily reducing the role of the m"itlk owners in feudal land ownership. During the time of his direct heir, Beyazit II, there was a backlash against it. The new sultan fully confirmed all the documents regarding mulk and vakifland ownership and restored to the feudal aristocracy the privileges that they had lost. "Now the reverse is taking place [we read in some documents], the vakif estate was confirmed." 320 Where the mulk or vakiflandowner had died in the meantime, Beyazit returned the estate to his surviving heirs. 321 We can also judge by the mass of categorical information available that the restoration of the mulk and vakifhad been a general measure, just as their abolition had been. 322 It is obvious, however, from the information available, that the central government took advantage of the vicissitudes undergone by mulk and vakifland ownership. In some cases, when the status of this form of land ownership had been restored, the government appropriated part of the feudal income of the estate (which had already been clearly stated in the title deeds to be the right of the mulk owner) to the advantage of the fisc.

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Thus, for example, two villages in the Edirne area, which were the vakif of Keyvan Bey, were bequeathed together with their dziyeto the entitlement of their owner. When the vakifwas renewed, after it had been turned into a timar, Beyazit "deducted" the dziye for the state. This was worth 2,407 akr;e, as against the 5,610 akr;e of the remaining income. 323 The same also happened with the mulk of isfendiyarogullari in the Plovdiv area,324 and with the vakif of Fatma Hatun in the Gelibolu area (which bore a dziye of 6,405 akr;e against a remaining income of 9,350 akr;e).325 As can be seen, the ciziye formed an important part of the income of the mulk sahibleri in the estates in which it had been granted to them. For this reason, its confiscation represented a significant income for the government after the restoration of nontied land ownership. Apart from this, as that part of the feudal income belonged in principle to the state, the yardstick used for the confiscation of the poll tax was not only not a brea<;:h of the existing norms, but even abolished a situation that was irregular from that point of view. Moreover, between the middle and end of the fifteenth century, changes took place in the land-owning system of the empire that were marked by formal acts. They should, however, be correctly evaluated, as they characterize the fundamental tendencies in the development of mulk and vakif land ownership. Fundamental Tendencies in the Development of Miilk and Vakif Land Ownership

As has already been stated, the timar system was not coeval with the Ottoman Empire. Although its seeds date from the time of Murat I, there were constant wars waged by the Ottomans (by the army rather than by the state), dynastic internecine struggles that almost cost the life of the newly founded empire, frequent rebellions and uprisings that were provoked by the still unstabilized Anatolian Turkish feudal aristocracies: all these factors did not permit the sultans to carry out the necessary organization of land ownership, to form their own system of feudal exploitation. The emergence of the timar as the fundamental system of feudal land ownership took place slowly and unevenly in an environment that contained a constant threat to the existence of the Ottoman state. At that time, the army also made a good living from plunder, which was made possible by constant wars and raids. The still very small number of eminent military leaders or representatives of the already existing feudal renegade aristocracies were satisfied by the sultans

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through already existing and established institutions dating from preOttoman Anatolian states-the mulk and the vakif To a certain extent, they gained a new dimension because some of these estates were granted for services rendered and the powers of their owners were not as soundly guaranteed as they should have been according to the §eriat and established Ottoman traditions. In any case, until the reign of Murat IT, it was the mulk and vakiJ, together with the musellem farm, and not the timar, that represented the prevailing form of Ottoman feudal land ownership. The reign of Mehmet IT, the ruler who expanded the boundaries of the empire, put an end to its most important opponent-Byzantiumand removed from Asia Minor the constant reaction of the Turkish emirs. It was the period in which the Ottoman state became a feudal empire. Now, in an environment in which the hegemony of the Ottomans was established, the timar system, a sketch of which had been created decades before, could be widely applied. In a certain sense, though, it was rather late for the establishment of a strictly tied system of land ownership, for the distribution of the revenues from feudal exploitation among a homogeneous military mass. In parallel with the conquest of Asia Minor and the Balkans and the formation of the new empire, natural processes took place within Ottoman society-it became feudalized, and a small feudal ruling class was inexorably being formed within it, a class that was closely bound to mulk and vakif land ownership, which corresponded much more closely to its interests than the conditional, tied system of land ownership-the timar. The position this class had achieved within the agrarian system of the empire could not easily be undermined, as its influence in affairs of state was considerable. The "reform" of Mehmet II, which acted in the interests of autocracy had its own class basis-the mass of sipahis, who comprised the lower stratum of the Ottoman feudal class, the Ottoman knights. The life and property of this class depended directly on the power of the central government, on a victorious series of conquests. Relying on the sipahis, Mehmet succeeded in striking a blow at the feudal ruling class, which had entrenched its positions in mulk and vakiJland ownership. The fact that this blow was successful and that it did not provoke a definite reaction means that the Ottoman feudal aristocracy had not marshalled its forces sufficiently to raise its hand against the sipahis, against the alliance between the latter and the central government. But the victory of the fief holders over the feudal aristocracy was short-lived, at least in terms of a full victory. It lasted for two or,

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at the most, three decades. In the person of Beyazit II (was it coincidence that he came to the throne after long and bloody internecine struggles 326 and left it with no less bloodshed?),327 the mulk owners had found a supporter. With one stroke, Beyazit completely restored the mulks and vakifs that had existed until the reign of his father, left thousands of sipahis without a source of income who had previously received taxes from the "annulled" non fief estates. Furthermore, during his reign, a large number of new mulks were granted, and permission for new vakifs 328 was obtained, all of which was to the disadvantage of the sipahis. The sultan gave large sums of money to the feudal aristocracy, and tried by every means at his disposal to ensure its maintenance. 329 Beyazit won himself the reputation of being the first Ottoman ruler to become the puppet of his courtiers and big feudal landowners, and who was entirely devoted to the defense of the corps of janissaries. 330 The place of the feudal aristocracy in land ownership was strengthened by the restoration and expansion of the mulk and vakif. It did not even lose this place in the reign of Selim I, who dethroned his father and relied not on the mulk owners, but on the fief holders for support. Selim, who was the implacable enemy of the aristocratic courtiers and the janissaries, followed the traditions of his grandfather Mehmet the Conqueror. 331 He went to such extremes in the defense of tied land ownership that he did not even found a vakif of his own. 331 Four famous vakifs date from his reign: those of the kazasker Cafer c;elebi, the royal surgeon Ahi Celebi, the royal tutor Halimi c;elebi, and of the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmet Pa§a. 332 Only in the last of these vakifs (the data regarding which, moreover, dates from the middle of the sixteenth century, that is, after the death of Selim I) can (rural) land be found; the remaining three are urban. The policy of Siileyman I also followed this line, but more moderately: Siileyman did not resort to the extremes of his father. The personal vakif of Siileyman the Magnificent was modest (with an income of 150,000 akqe, and consisted entirely of ruralland. 334 Apart from the sultan, only six members of the royal family and nine viziers succeeded in setting up vakifs, 335 a very small total indeed, while under SelimII only one vakifwas founded-that of the sultan himself, and the founding of any estate at all except fief estates was not permitted. 336 Thus, the place of the timar as the predominant form of land ownership in the Ottoman Empire was secured. But could the efforts of the central government after the middle of the fifteenth century (if we exclude the reaction during the reign of Beyazit II) keep developments

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running on the rail chosen by the former? The feudal aristocracy, the formation of which took place alongside the process described, did not in actual fact lose its privileged position in land ownership as far as the sipahis were concerned. The mulk and vakif ensured relative economomic stability for the aristocracy. Its influence in the running of the state could not be shrugged off because it was already strongly bound to the royal family and the court. The first sign of weakness on the part of the central government would have been sufficient for the feudal aristocracy, consolidated and powerful, to launch an attack on the sipahis.

Chapter 3

RURAL LAND OWNERSHIP AND THE FEUDAL RENT

On the one hand, there was the feudal class that consisted broadly of timar holders and mulk owners, and, on the other, there were the dependent peasants. It was the timar and mulk versus the individual dependent farms. The position of the dependent peasant in the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, his relationship to the means of production, and his mutual relationship with representatives of the feudal class-in their totality as reflected by the feudal state, or on an individual level with a given local feudal lord-has been the subject of a number of studies. Although unanimity has not been reached on the matter under discussion, even in the latest Marxist studies, many aspects of the question have been the subject of complete agreement. Criticism of certain bourgeois theories about the supposed improve. ment in the life of the Balkan peasantry enslaved by the Ottomans, which has been made by a number of Marxist historians, shows convincingly enough that objective data regarding such an improvement do not exist. I The economic oppression imposed on the population of the developed Balkan states by the conquerors, who were at a much lower level of socioeconomic development, discrimination on grounds of religion and nationality against Christian subjects, arbitrary rule and violence that accompanied not only the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, but also filled the daily lives of our enslaved peasants are facts that have been proved beyond doubt. 2 This is why the question of rural land ownership cannot be discussed in isolation and cannot be isolated from the broad historical background made up of these facts. Such an approach to the matter has led some authors to conclusions that contradict the objective historical truth. We shall not dwell in detail here on the theses of a number of contemporary Turkish historians, whose obvious aim is to endow the 139

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Ottoman Empire and its internal policies with the nonexistent aura of an unbiased judge and dispenser of justice to the enslaved population, the Muslim peasantry, and the feudal ruling class itself (the existence of which, as we have seen, some of these authors deny completely). Many of these concepts have already been subjected to criticism i~ some recent studies. 3 However, the thesis of the Turkish historian O. L. Barkan directly concerns the question of rural land ownership, and the degree and forms of dependency of the direct producer, the more so because that author bases his opinions on ample documentary material and reaches certain positive conclusions. Emphasizing the enormous significance of centralism in the Ottoman feudal actuality, Barkan sees the early empire as a "huge royal farm, " as a community, in which the place and functions of every subject were determined by one will (i.e., the sultan's).4 Furthermore, as would be expected, this Turkish scholar examines the state not as an apparatus of the feudal ruling class, but as the personification of the absolute will of the monarch. He repeatedly emphasizes the positive role of the Ottoman state, which is claimed to have done away with "anarchy" in the Balkans and to have abolished feudalism (derebeylik).5 In this system there were two main classes: the military sinif, which was occupied with conquests, and the structure and administration of the state, and the nonmilitary masses (sumler). 6 In addition to this, the "military" class consisted neither of feudal lords nor representatives of the local rich. 7 Barkan simply cannot find words to express the perfection of the Ottoman state and social structure. Examined in the rosy light that has been created of Ottoman reality in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, both rural land ownership in the empire and its forms of feudal dependency take on a hue that does not correspond to our impression of Ottoman feudalism. Making skillful use of analogies with the position of the dependent peasants in the Balkan countries on the eve of the Turkish invasion and that of the peasants in big feudal empires such as Austria, Russia, and prerevolutionary France, which-this is not denied by Marxist historiography-was bad, to say the least, Barkan demonstrates the enviable position of the Ottoman Empire's peasant in contrast to any other dependent medieval agricultural producer. 8 Moreover, he emphasizes that the "emancipation"9 of every peasant who had become a subject of the empire was why this large population migrated from still unconquered regions and settled on land occupied by the Ottomans. lO Thus, unity was achieved' 'between the people and its rulers, " which was obviously based on the unity of their interests, within the framework of the empire. l l

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We shall dwell on Barkan's concrete formulations in connection with rural land ownership and the feudal dependency of the direct producer at a later stage. His initial thesis, however, has been placed in quotes as proof of the inaccurate historical background against which Turkish bourgeois historiography views this matter. It should also be emphasized here that the picture drawn of Ottoman feudal reality in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is not the result of coincidence. Its aim is to deny the necessity of studying the class struggle in the empire during the period in question, which, as Barkan himself declares, was justified only under the conditions of Western European feudalism, where the feudal lord was the owner of the land and the peasant was personally dependent on him, but not only here. 12 Some of Barkan's postulates have also been subjected to criticism by A. S. Tveritinova. In her study of the position of the peasants and village land use during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, she resist~ the apologetics of the Ottoman feudal system. In the conclusion to her study, Tveritinova states that the facts proved by her (which will be discussed at a later stage) "fully disprove the conception of the particular and 'specific' forms of social and economic development of the Turkish state. "13 In spite of the undoubted value of Tveritinova's study in the clarification of certain aspects of village land ownership, we cannot agree with her final conclusion. The struggle against the idealistic misinterpretation of the medieval history of Turkey would be belittled if Marxist scholars are content to show the lack of "specific" development of the forms and institutions of Ottoman feudalism. Such a method would be at variance with the concretehistorical approach to the study of social phenomena. The very fact that, as regards the forms and degrees of noneconomic compulsionthe fundamental condition for feudal exploitation-Lenin says, "The forms and degrees of this compulsion can be varied, from serfdom to the class inequality of the peasant," is clear proof that endless variety in that direction is possible, and that not only one or two "specific" forms exist. 14 In fact, the emphasis on "specificity" in the development of Ottoman feudal society does not in itself constitute a departure from the study of the fundamental natural laws of feudalism, because' 'unity in the fundamental, the concrete, in essence is not destroyed, but is secured by diversity in local forms. "15 The one important thing in this case is which facts and circumstances are emphasized as "specific." If this is the lack of a basis for class struggle in the heart of Ottoman society, as is the case with the Barkan's thesis, we are not talking about a "specificity," but simply about falsification.

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The Categorization of the Exploited Peasant Population The entire peasant population of the empire, and more specifically, that of the miriye lands was not homogeneous in terms of status and the forms of exploitation. Moreoever, its categorization, in spite of the conservatism of Ottoman feudal institutions, did not remain unchanged. Undoubtedly, it was influenced by the development of the forces of production in Ottoman society. For instance, the large category of ortakc;ilar (Sharecroppers) created during the fourteenth century had lost its place in the system of Ottoman feudalism by the end of the sixteenth century. During the reign of SUleyman I, many categories of "population with special obligations" were abolished, and others only changed their status. During the period under discussion, part of the nomadic Turkish population merged with the dependent peasants in the fiefs. A certain section of the dependent peasants (still insignificant) merged with the urban population. The separate categories of exploited peasant population in the empire were distinguished by their legal status, that is, by the degree and forms of their dependency: by the quality of the lands they owned, by the forms of exploitation to which they were subjected. Consequently, a categorization of the exploited peasant population of the empire, the criteria of which are the elements mentioned is not formal but very much to the point since it takes into account not the bare norms of the legislation, but fundamental elements that characterize the position of the direct producer. On the basis of this criterion, the following four large divisions of the exploited peasant popUlation of the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries can be made out: (a) Population included in the fiefs that had obligations to the feudal lord and to the state on an equal footing. It was feudally dependent on the fief-holder, and the results of his exploitation were divided in an established proportion between the feudal lord and the fisk. (b) Population dependent directly and exclusively on the central government. Some of this category comprised certain nationalities and tribal groups characterized by a nomadic way of life (Gypsies and yorilkler-nomadic Turks). Another part, which was in principle fief population, cultivated the lands of temporarily vacant fiefs. Also included in this category was population owning' 'free" patrimonies and farms, whose exploitation was a right enjoyed by the central government alone; this exploitation had a specific form and usually did not consist of many obligations, but of one only. (c) Population dependent on the feudal lord and exploited exclusively by him. This was population of slave origin (gulamlar and

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ortakqilar), and the central government played no part in its exploitation. (d) Population included in the fiefs but fulfilling special obligations to the state. It also had obligations on an equal footing to the feudal lord, with insignificant relief. The forms of exploitation on the part of the central government were different for this category .16

The Raiyye The raiyye comprised the main mass of the exploited population in the empire. The essence of this term has long ago been clarified in literature on the subject, where it is stated that, during the period in question, it was not only the Christian population to which this term referred (as happened at a later stage), but the peasant population of the ruling and conquered nationalities. 17 A. s. Tveritinov~ determines the existing definition thus: "The entire settled peasant population of the Ottoman Empire, with no distinction on religious grounds [with the exception of insignificant categories, which will be mentioned at a later stage, note A. T.] in official documents and narrative sources is referred to by the general term raiyye.I s The exception to which the author refers were "townspeople and some categories of rural population that were not considered to be dependent." 19 Tveritinova's definition complements those made until now with the differentiation of the raiyye from the nomadic population, whose significance and place in the structure of Ottoman society during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has only recently been accounted for, in connection with the newly published sources regarding its number and organization. 20 This definition, however, does not make a sufficiently clear distinction between the raiyye and the remaining categories of rural population, which were neither' 'insignificant," nor could they "not be considered feudally dependent." As has already been stated, Ottoman legislation differentiated between raiyye and urban population: "If a person from the raiyye category lives in a town for fifteen years, such a person is not a raiyet, he becomes a townsman," we read in the law of Hudavendigar (Bursa) of 1487. 21 The Turkish government treated the raiyye as a separate unit not only in order not to allow those belonging to it to join the lower strata of the feudal class 22 -the following decree speaks of this differentiation: "the son of a raiyet is a raiyet, "23 but in order not to permit the merging of some categories of the exploited population who were in a greater degree of dependency with the raiyye. Thus,

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for example, the category of the ortakqilar that, in spite of the exploitation (which was feudal in essence) to which it was subjected, was considered to be of slave descent, was also "fenced off" by the legislation, which did not permit it to mix with the raiyye. Ortakqilar were forbidden to marry raiyet women, as the children of such a marriage would be considered raiyye. 24 Apart from this, it is also clear from the law regarding ortakqilar that the "female slaves" avoided marriages with "male slaves" and vice versa, in which case their aim was for their children to be raiyye. 25 Consequently, the raiyye was' 'fenced off" not only by those who were higher up the social ladder in the Ottoman state, but by those whose legal status was less privileged. There are also many passages in the legislation that emphasize the difference between the raiyye and the "free" (mu 'aj) or "bearers of a berat (elh-i berat). With this term, the Ottoman government indicated the population that possessed "free patrimonies" or farms, and which had obligations only to the state. The decrees of the law in this respect are categorical: "Possessors of be rats who have been possessors of berats for a long time are not raiyye. "26 We find many passages in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century legislation that order certain "free" persons to be registered as raiyye;27 or, on the basis of certain documents to be registered as "free" or, 28 so that there will be no mistake, that a remark should be written above the names of such persons to the effect that they are "free" ;29 orders are issued which refer to "free" and "not free" persons, etc. It is these passages that prove that within the system of Ottoman feudalism there existed a categorization separating the raiyye from the population that possessed "free" lands. In the final analysis, the existing explanation of the term raiyye should be added to as follows: The raiyye was that section of the dependent population that cultivated lands included in the system of feudal estates (without regard to their type), with the exception of population of slave origin.30 As has already been mentioned, the raiyye represented the mass of the exploited peasant population of the empire. The degree and forms of feudal dependency imposed on the raiyye, the legal status of the peasants on fief land, its land ownership, and forms of exploitation consequently characterize most completely the situation of the broad mass of the people in the Ottoman Empire during the period in question.

Forms of Raiyye Dependency "The forms and degrees of this [noneconomic-author's note]

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compulsion can be varied, beginning with serfdom and reaching as far as the class inequality of the peasant" as Lenin says.31 This renders it impossible to deny the feudal dependency of the direct producer (it is that which is the expression of noneconomic compulsion) under the pretext that it does not fully coincide with some forms that are characteristic of a·given feudal (generally Western European) society. In a word, the denial of the feudal dependency of the peasant in the Ottoman Empire for the reason that, in his status we do not find the features that characterize the Western serf, is in fact an evasion of the question of the forms of feudal dependency in the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, looking for the same features in the status of the dependent peasant in the Ottoman state as proof of his feudal dependency is at variance with the concrete-historical approach. The main feature that distinguishes Ottoman feudal reality from the world to which the serf belonged, namely centralism, was the power the stat~ kept over the land, which naturally created a dependent peasant who was different from the serf. As arguments for his thesis in which he denies the existence of feudal dependency in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries-a thesis unscientific in essenceO. L. Barkan cites certain arguments that cannot be ignored not only because they are supported by concrete documentary data, but also because they logically correspond to the entire picture of the Ottoman feudalism of that epoch. It is acknowledged that, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the Ottoman Empire, there occurred displacements of the rural and urban population that were immense in scale, that these displacements were not a matter of chance but carried out according to a definite plan and were aimed at the' 'Turkization" of the large and mainly Christian lands; they were also aimed at the provision of a work force for the huge feudal estates that had been set up in depopulated areas of the Balkans. 32 This is why, according to Barkan, the central government did not give the fief holder any rights as far as the raiyet's person was concerned. The government needed this raiyet in order to be able to carry out its surgun policy (forcible displacements of population to depopulated areas) to the very end. It cannot be denied that this idea of Barkan's contains, or rather hints at, a certain truth. 33 The centralized Ottoman state deliberately reserved for itself certain powers over the dependent population. It needed these powers, however, not only in order to be able to exile, displace, and forcibly transfer that population at any time it wished to. By this means it could, at any time, summon the dependent population to forced labor on state building projects, in the galleys, and in

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the transportation of military supplies. Preserving its personal "independence" as far as the sipahi was concerned, the government placed this population under general, central jurisdiction and could hold it responsible for nonfulfilment of its obligations toward the state and could remove parts of that population, transferring them to the "population with special obligations" categories. Undoubtedly, many of the above mentioned state enterprises, undertaken in the interests of the feudal class and, most of all, of the big feudal landowners, were contrary to the interests of the individual feudal lords. The removal of the raiyye from their farms for long and exhausting state work projects, frequently with their livestock as well; the state legal procedures, which in many cases made it possible for the peasant to limit (if only on paper) the arbitrary acts of his sipahi; the forced migration of part of the raiyye on the orders of the central government, etc, were undoubtedly measures that were to the detriment of the individual feudal lord. If the latter had had unlimited rights as far as the person of the raiyye under his jurisdiction was concerned, it would not have been possible for the state to carry out these measures. It was for this reason that the central government did not give such rights to the feudal lords. It was for this reason that noneconomic compUlsion, expressed in the feudal dependency of the direct producer, as well as in powers over the land and appropriation of taxes, was divided between the state, the feudal class as a whole, and the individual representative of that class. Viewed in this light, an explanation is provided for one fundamental question: why, under the conditions of Ottoman reality in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the peasant enjoyed relative personal independence, why a number of feudal restrictions that were characteristic of other feudal societies were not in force as far as he was concerned. In a word, if in the legal status ofthe raiyye we can observe certain -elements that are in its favor, if its serfdom was not carried out in extreme fonns, if the raiyye preserved certain rights of movement, that was everything else but an expression of weak feudal dependency, it did not mean that' 'the peasant, fonnally and legally never ceased to be a free man.' '34 They are only proof of the fact that the peasant was also dependent on another master apart from the sipahi, or, as is categorically stated in the legislation even in cases that refer to the population of mulk estates: "The raiyet belongs to the almighty sultan. ' '35 Contrary to the opinion expressed by some historians that "the Turkish feudal lords were absolute masters of the peasants under their jurisdiction, that they could deprive them of their land, sell them,

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or exchange them for animals ... and summarily administered justice to the peasants, "36 the raiyet in the empire enjoyed personal freedom and was dependent only as far as land ownership was concerned. 37 It is no coincidence that the author of the thesis about the complete personal dependency of the raiyet has not introduced a single argument in its support-proof of the sale of raiyye without land and of the purchase and exchange of such raiyye do not exist. The feudal restrictions and obligations of the raiyet were only in force if he owned land included in a fief. It should be emphasized that all legal stipulations determining the dependency of the peasant had only one aim-to ensure the fixed annual income of the feudal lord and, by this means, not to allow the total volume of the centralized land rent to be impaired. The main feudal limitation imposed on the raiyet was the prohibition against leaving his land. This prohibition had still not been formulated in the ~odex of Mehmet II. The categorical decree that bound the peasant to the land dates from the reign of Beyazit II: "According to the old law, if a settled raiyet, whatever he might be, should move, let him be returned to his place.' '38 "But if any person of the raiyye category should live in a town for fifteen years ... according to the law, he is not a raiyet, he is a townsman. "39 Many similar laws from the reign of Siileyman I prove that this measure had become generally applied, although the term for the return of peasants who had left illegally was still not uniform, it varied from ten to twenty years.40 The fact that laws were passed that bound the raiyye to the land in the reign of Siileyman I is proved in a passage from the Asafname of Liitfi Pa~a, which determines it as one of the measures of that sultan: "If the raiyye should flee from one place because of oppression and settle in another place, the administrator of the latter must send them back to their old place.' '41 From many documents dating from the second half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, we can form a picture of how fleeing raiyye were returned from whence they had come in actual practice. From a huccet (title deed) of the Sofia kadi, we learn that the sipahi of Vrazhdebna declared in the presence of the peasant Mitre from Chelopek that the latter was under his jurisdiction as a raiyet and had left V razhdebna seven to eight years previously, for which reason he requested the kadi to send him back to his former place of residence. Mitre produced witnesses to prove that he had been living in Chelopek for ten years, and the kadi did not uphold the plaintiff's case. 42 In the same way, the sipahi of Samokov brought a case against two brothers who had left Samokov and settled

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in Goroublyane. As they could not deny that they had only moved six years previously, the kadi ordered that they return to Samokov. 43 In the third case, the sipahi of Choukourovo requested the judge to order the return of a peasant who had settled in Doganovo fifteen years previously, and who was still in his register. From the kadi's decision it is evident that he had invoked another decree, and not that regarding the return of the peasant, probably because the latter's move had taken place so long ago and the claim was lost by limitation. Thus, the raiyet was obliged to pay the sipahi tithe and other raiyet taxes, but he was allowed to remain in his new place of residence. 44 Perhaps, in this case, he simply paid the components of qift bozan (breach of contract), which was the procedure usually applied to peasants who were found after the period of limitation had passed. 45 From some of the royal decrees of the same period it is evident that the movement of peasants from one fief to another was a frequent phenomenon, and that kadis did not take great pains to keep track of such breaches of the law. A Jerman dated 24 June 1605 orders the kadi of Sofia to search for peasants who had fled from Dolna Kroushitsa, Kyustendil district, and to return them to their former place ofresidence. 46 Only two years later, a new Jerman was issued, in more general terms; this time the kadi was ordered to search for and return peasants who had left villages in the Sofia area that were left with an insufficient work force, and whose sipahis were suffering losses. 47 On the basis of the information quoted, we can form quite a clear picture of the procedure for returning raiyye who had left their lands to their former places of residence. The task of searching for the runaways belonged to the kadis, but, in all probability, this was done by the interested parties, the feudal lords themselves. The sipahi would summon the runaway to the kadi court, and the peasant would be obliged to prove the time that had elapsed since his departure. If this period was less than ten years, the raiyet was returned to his former place of residence by the organs of the government. If, however, his move had taken place sufficiently long ago, he would pay his former sipahi the required sum for qift bozan and thus wipe the slate clean as far as his old debts were concerned. When an analysis of the situation is made, one is struck by the extremely limited amount of information available regarding the arrest and return of runaway peasants. In the Sofia registers published by Gulubov and Duda, there are 1,192 kadi protocols, determinations, and sultans' orders, among which only five to six documents refer to the matter under discussion. This can be mainly explained by the

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fact that the state organs in whose competency lay the location of peasants who had fled did not apply themselves particularly zealously to their task. Given the existing centralization of the land rent, the dependent peasant could not, in any way, improve his own situation, to achieve more advantageous conditions of exploitation. Wherever he went, he was obliged to pay the feudal rent that was fIxed as far as both kind and mount were concerned-which he paid, if not to one, than to another sipahi. Moreover, this sipahi was a person who was maintained by the central government. Consequently, in practical terms, a move on the part of the dependent peasant afforded no relief, nor did it affect the interests of the feudal class as a whole. Second, if the dependent peasant decided to leave agriculture and move to a town, there existed a far less painful way of departure that did not entail any losses. His rights over his land allowed him to sell it (see below), and thus not to be empty-handed when he arrived in town. Apart from this, if he could not fInd a buyer for his fIelds and 'his house, he could wind up any debts with his sipahi by payment of c;ift bozan and leave to the sipahi the job of granting the abandoned land to another peasant with a title deed. The fact that the peasant had the possibility of leaving his sipahi by selling his land and paying c;ift bozan should not be overrated. In practice, this was a formal possibility. In the feudal reality of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for the direct producer the abandonment of his land represented an enormous risk in terms of earning a living for himself and his family. The urban economy was still insufficiently developed to absorb the inflow of a peasant work force. And, if by leaving his own land, the raiyet was thinking of acquiring land from another sipahi, he would have to pay resm-i tapu once again for a raiyet farm, and would be subjected to exploitation that in no way differed from what he had suffered with his former sipahi. This is why the lack of personal dependency of the direct producer in the Ottoman Empire did not in practice contribute to the improvement of his situation. At this point, we must dwell on another expression of the feudal dependency of the raiyye, that is, on c;ift bozan, which was referred to as boz behre in some regions. "From raiyye which fully abandons its land and cultivates land in another place, two tithes are deducted. But for him who left his farm and engaged in another trade and occupation, the usual custom, which was embodied in the law for these regions, was to extract c;ift bozan from him. "48 "If a person is free to cultivate the land which is in his name, but leaves it unsown and abandons it, if the land remains unsown ... the local sipahi takes boz behre from him. But if the land granted to this raiyet

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be given to another with a title deed from the sipahi, or if another person sows the land, and if the sipahi takes from the land resm-i zemin and income, in such case, boz behre should not be asked for from its former owner, but benak and irgadiye. "49 "If a raiyet should come who has a farm elsewhere, and more than ten years have elapsed since his coming and his farm has remained uncultivated by him, [his former] sipahi takes c;ift bozan. And if ten years have not elapsed, the sipahi, with the help of the administrator, sends him back to his former place of residence. "50 And fmally, the decree in the law for Silistra, which fully reveals the content of c;ift bozan: "And c;ift bozan is-if the raiyet leaves his farm and engages in carting or in another trade, if he be a Muslim he pays a sum equal to the tithe of fifty akc;e and twenty-two akc;e as resm-i c;ift-a total of seventy-two akc;e. And if he be an infidel, let him pay a sum equal to a tithe of sixty-two akc;e and a further twenty-five akc;e as ispenc;e, a total of eighty-seven akc;e. "51 The following facts emerge from the legislation that has been quoted: c;ift bozan was the one-time compensation payment made by the dependent peasant to the feudal lord when he left his village with the intention of moving elsewhere. The motive for this compensation was that, during the year in which the dependent peasant moved, his farm might remain without an owner, and might remain uncultivated. The law categorically states that c;ift bozan should only be collected if the abandoned farm was not immediately given, with a deed, to another person, and only if it remained unsown for that year. Consequently, the content of this tax, as we have defmitely learned from the law for Silistra, was a sum equal to the tithe that was uncollected as a result of the peasant's move, and to land tax (resm-i c;ift, or ispen c;e). Since these were the main components of the rent received by the feudal lord, with the round sum of c;ift bozan, the sipahi was compensated for the minimal income that he would have gained from the abandoned farm. The laws did not place any period of limitation for the collection of c;ift bozan. Moreover, it was definitely stated that it was collected in cases where the sipahi had found his runaway peasant after the ten-year period had elapsed, during which time he could return him to his former place of residence. This is confirmed by practice. Thus, the Sofia furrier Shemse Stanislavov was ordered to pay c;ift bozan to his former sipahi from the administrative area of Ergup (?) because he had left his native village of Kossovitsa more than twenty years previously. 52 Finally, there is one further proof of the dependency of the direct

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producer: that is, the categorical prohibition, expressed in the general and regional laws, against the peasant's leaving his land uncultivated for more than three years. During the reign of Mehmet II, this period was limited to one year, but in the kanunnames of the sixteenth century, it was without exception equal to three years, after which the sipahi was empowered to issue a deed for the land to another person. 53 Moreoever, the former owner of the land retained his right to acquire and cultivate the land again, but he lost these rights if he left his village. Finally, it should be noted that those owners who left certain parts of their land uncultivated because of the requirements of the crop itself were not threatened with such sanctions. 54 If information regarding the granting of land left uncultivated for three years to another person against a deed is found only rarely, this can be simply explained. The difficult situation of the direct peasant producer did not allow him to renounce three years' agricultural production, to risk losing his land, if he had not already decided to flee or to move to another place. The above mentioned situations, which are proof of the feudal dependency of the direct producer under the conditions of the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries account for the elements of that dependency that affected the raiyye included in the fief population. In fact, they are also those mentioned by the special literature on the subject,55 and, moreover, some authors reach the conclusion that feudal dependency at that time only affected the raiyye's land ownership but did not imply personal dependency. 56 On the other hand, the authors who insist on the existence of personal peasant dependency on the feudal lord did not quote any arguments to support this standpoint. 57 On the basis of what has been written about the raifye, the postulation of the existence of dependency only in terms of land ownership should be accepted. Such a postulation, based on the information provided by the laws and official Ottoman documents, should bear in mind the possibility of arbitrary practices on the part of the feudal lords. In spite of the legal right of the raiyet to seek protection from the organs of judiciary power against the oppression of his sipahi, in actual practice, he was never able to deal with his feudal lord by resorting to the representative of the feudal state. It is no coincidence that the same Ottoman sources inform us of large numbers of peasants fleeing from certain villages. 58 This is all evidence that the peasant, all the same, preferred one sipahi to another, and that he had been driven away by oppression against which he was defenseless. Moreover, the elements of force and the lack of a legal system, which was

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typical of feudal and especially of Ottoman feudal society, has to be placed in parenthesis, and could not be taken into account in concrete formations.

The Raiyet Farm The foundation of Ottoman feudal agriculture was the raiyet farm, which was owned solely by the dependent peasant included in the feudal estate. In A. S. Tveritinova's latest study, material taken from the Ottoman legislation of the sixteenth century regarding the size of the raiyet farm is featured and evidence shown of complete continuity not only in the appellation of the one-owner farm (the c;ift was equal to the Byzantine zevgar), but also in its size. S9 It is known that the size of the c;ift or c;iftlik was different for the separate regions, according to the quality of the soil and climatic conditions. In the general conditions contained in surviving legal manuscripts, however, we see the following definition of an average raiyet farm: 70 to 80 donums for the best soil, 100 donums for average, and 150 for poor soil. 60 What were the components of a raiyet farm? This is evident both from the laws and from the feudal registers (where, from the type of crops raised, we can form a picture of the components of the farm), and from the documents relating to the sale of raiyet farms. In the decrees of the kanunnames, it is fields, vineyards, (vegetable?) gardens, and melon fields from which the sipahi collected a tithe that are most frequently referred to. 61 These components are also evident from documentary sources. 62 Water mills belonging to raiyye should also be considered as part of the farms of dependent peasants. 63 In a protocol of the kadi of Sofia issued in 1619 regarding the sale of a raiyet farm in the village of Iliyantsi, the following components are noted: house, cowshed, barn, seven fields and one meadow. 64 Consequently, as we observe in the later stock farms, the house and outbuildings also belonged to the farm.6S If it is borne in mind that the raiyet farms consisted of fields, vineyards, melon fields, and vegetable gardens, and given the fact that some of the latter were on mUlk land (a true m·idk, contained within the boundaries of built-up areas-villages and towns), it is obvious that it was not only parcels of land belonging to the eraz-i miriye, but also those belonging to the mulk that were part of the raiyet farm. 66 The circumstance is of particular significance, as it places in a new light a question that has remained unc1arified in literature: was it really only miriye land that was subject to feudal exploitation? From the

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famous Jetva of Abussuud it is clear that the peasant's conditional ownership spread only over miriye land, because of which he was obliged to pay tithe and land tax from the latter. 67 As far as the true mulk is concerned-the properties within the boundaries of built-up areas and their immediate vicinity-in Ottoman legislation, they are stated to be the absolute property of the population and not subject to feudal taxation. 68 This is also confirmed by documentary evidence where the compulsory acquisition of mulk properties is described as presentation (tafriz) of the right of possession (hakk-i tasarrufj,69 while mulk properties were sold (bey). 70 How can we then account for the fact that, in all cases, the feudal lords collected a tithe from vegetable gardens, melon fields, and similar properties that, in principle, were located if not in the village itself, but in its vicinity? There is one answer: the above mentioned most general principle of feudal taxation in the empire was not applied, and all lands cultivated by dependent peasants (as far as exploitation was concerned) were considered to be miriye land, or, by force of an unspoken agreement, the feudal lord had imposed taxation on part of a true mulk (that which was cultivated) as well. As it is unarguable that both miriye and mulk were part of the raiyet farm, it is clear that the raiyet had no definite norm to refer to in order to exclude from the sphere of feudally exploited lands his own mulk land parcels. Stratification in property ownership, which was to be observed in our villages during the period of Turkish rule, was also reflected in the categorization of raiyet land ownership. Moreover, there were regional differences in the determination of categories of dependent farms. The following scheme is to be found in Barkan's compendious article about the qift: it was a farm that consisted of one or more qift of land. The benak was a farm that consisted of less than one-half qiftJI In the law for I~el (?) is set out a much more complicated differentiation of raiyet land ownership: a qift was a farm with at least one or more qifts of land; a farm consisting of one-half qift is referred to as nim qift; a farm consisting of less than half a qift or which did not have any land was referred to as a benak.72 In feudal registers of our lands, we come across, almost without exception, qift (or qiftli) farms; benak was found, in principle, only in villages where Muslims lived. Normally, the Christian population was only obliged to pay a uniform sum (the highest, of course) in land tax, because of which we cannot judge stratification in that sector of the population. 73 Data regarding feudal inventories would be interesting material on which to reconstruct a picture of property stratification among the population of our villages if the categorization of the raiyet farm envis-

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.aged by the law had not been carried out with one single aim in mind-land tax. This is why we have every reason to doubt the information on the correlatiol} between medium-sized and small farms, since the government, from all angles, stood to gain from an increase in the area of land cultivated by a given household. Evidence of this is, above all, the circumstance that in practice there existed a much more simplified division of the raiyet farm, in which it is namely the lower categories of land ownership that were not reflected. In spite of all this, we shall offer some information about property stratification whose correlations can at least be taken as an upper limit.

Table 3.1 Total number of dependent households.

Benak Mucerred

Village

Date

Bolayir (Muslims) Bolayir (Christians) SarimiJ;, Bolayir district: (Christian and Muslim) Babayad, Malkara Re: 13 villages in the vakif of Murat I in Malkara district (Christian and Muslim) Muslims from the vakif of Murat I in Ergene district. Deli ~ahin, Gelibo1u district Osman Fakih Malkara, etc.

Murat I Murat I Murat I

185 61 114

97 35 30

58 23 69

11 3 12

Murat I Murat I

25 1382

14.5 794.5

4 423

6 162

Murat I

353

211

142

48

7 24

7 12

75 4

Beyazit I Murat II

14 40

Qftli

It is typical that we come across information regarding the categorization of raiyet land ownership almost exclusively in inventories of vakifs, and that until the reign of Mehmet II. After his reign, we find only a division of the dependent agricultural producers into qiftli and mucerred, who did not possess a separate household, as they were not yet married.1 4 In fact, it is clear that, on the basis of an unwritten order (since in the legislation of Suleyman's time we still find the benak unit), 75 any peasant who owned land (with a few exceptions)16 was obliged to pay as qiftli. 77 Again, in some documents concerning vakifs, which had been founded before and during the reign of Mehmet II, we find a more complicated categorization of the raiyet farm. Thus, of the thirty-two houses in the villages that were the vakif of Daye Hatun, twenty-four were qiftli, six n'lm qiftli, two benak, and seven persons had no farms of their own. About forty years later, in the same villages, there were thirty-two qiftli, four n'lm qiftli, seven benak, and five unmarried men. 78 On the basis of the information regarding

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the village of Fikeli, Edirne district, which was the vakif of Mehmet II, the following table can be formulated:

Table 3.2 1540 I fiftli household, 5 rum fiftli, 2 benak, I unmarried 1545 2 fiftli household, 6 rum fiftli, 2 benak, 8 unmarried 1572 II fiftli household, 3 rum fiftli, 2 benak, 8 unmarried

Since the available data is much too limited for us to be able to come to conclusions regarding the correlation between the mediumsized (if c;iftli households can be taken as medium-sized) and small households, with respect to landless peasant households during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we can content ourselves with noting that even these limited data are sufficient evidence of another factthe considerable variety (where the government found it necessary to reflect it) in the makeup, as far as property of the peasant population. Consequently, even in the very early stages of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, property stratification in the villages was taking place. 80

The Rights of the Raiyet over His Farm As far as the content of the raiyet's rights over the land he cultivated were concerned, literature on the subject is still not unanimous. Starting from G. D. Gulubov' s postulate that the peasant in the Ottoman empire was, sui generis, absolute owner8) of his farm and ending with A. S. Tveritinova's opinion, namely that the raiyet had use of land rights over the parcel of land which he cultivated, which are diametrically opposed ideas, we also find a number of intermediate theses. 82 Among these we must mention 6. L. -Barkan's postulate, which views the raiyet as a "hereditary tenant in perpetuity" of the miriye land,83 or a "colonist who is bound to the land" ;84 the new theory of G. D. Gulubov, which he arrived at after he had been subjected to criticism and according to which the raiyet farm represented "a life-long, hereditary possession, land in conditional ownership," or "something more than ordinary ownership" or "limited, conditional property"; 85 the opinion of Tsvetkova, who supports Venediktov,86 stating that the peasant enjoyed "only possession and use" of his land; 87 D. P. Georgiev, who considers that there existed divided ownership (tasarruj) between the feudal lord and the peasant; 88 and of A. D. Novichev, who quotes Marx, saying that the peasants

-

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"enjoyed the same feudal right of ownership as the feudal lords themselves"89 before "enclosure" (as in England: author's note), and, it would seem, puts forward the idea of shared ownership between the feudal lord and peasant, etc. 90 It is clear that, as far as the character and essence of the rights of the immediate producer over the land were concerned, there exists a wide range of opinions in the literature on the subject. It should be noted, however, that the difference in this respect is more a matter of difference in the use of language, since many of the authors quoted use the same arguments to support their theses. Moreover, they interpret them in the same way, in spite of which they arrive at different formulations. Furthermore, as Venediktov himself notes, "A different content is invested in the ownership concept. [As we have seen, the majority of authors quoted dwell namely upon the term 'ownership,' with one qualification or another: author's note] in economic, historical, and legal science, as well as in legislation and practice. ' '91 Consequently, it is obvious that to argue about the content of the rights of the dependent peasant over his land without bearing in mind the entire historical reality, which is the background on which these rights are projected, is not possible. Lenin himself, in his classie postulation of the essence of feudal labor relations, indicates only that, under these conditions, the peasant must' 'be endowed with the means of production in general, and more particularly with land," without determining what is contained in the phrase' 'being endowed with land. ' '92 Only the right to use the means of production could not easily be interpreted as "being endowed with land. " On the other hand, the ownership by the direct producer over the land is unthinkable under the conditions of a feudal social system; given the existence of a supreme feudal lord, the state, and of an established feudal class, which also would not be able to avoid being concerned with the means of production. Consequently, it is clear that we must either accept the theory of Marx concerning the division of ownership between the feudal lord and the peasant, which is also put forward by some Marxist historians, or to accept that the raiyet had permanent possession of the land with which he had been "endowed. " The content we consider the term "permanent possession" to have should be concretely explained, keeping account both of the decrees of the legislation reflecting the interests of the feudal class, its striving to endow peasant land ownership with forms advantageous to these interests, and of the information provided by documents, into which data regarding the ways in which the dependent population either

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confonned with or tried to evade the nonns imposed by the feudal government fmds its way. Let us see, first of all, how the Ottoman laws themselves outline the powers of the direct producer over miriye land. Theoretically, they are most clearly explained in a Jetva of Abussuud in respect of Suleyman's legislation, whose variant we also find in the law for Skopje and Salonika from 1568 and 1569. 93 Since it is namely this variant that was connected with the legislation for our lands, it is this Jetva that we shall bear in mind: The fertile lands of this region thus are state lands, and it is customary to call them miriye lands. They are not the property of the raiyye. The [raiyet] holds these lands on loan [a'riyet tarikile] , cultivates and sows them and gives a tithe names harac-i mukassam and resm-i qift [land tax] named harac-i muvassaf. But if he does not cultivate them, [their cultivation] must be restored on the basis of that which is decreed. Those who administer justice should not interfere in his affairs and should not torment him. Let him possess [the lands] as he wishes, until his death. When he dies, let his sons take his place and possess the lands on the basis of the old decree. If he does not leave sons behind, let [the feudal lord] grant these lands with a deed to other persons who are capable of cultivating the lands, taking ·itcret-i muaccele, and let them possess the land on the basis of the old decree. Thus, if land which is not in the possession of one of the above mentioned is not cultivated for three years, it is, according to the §eriat, taken from him and is granted with a deed to another person. And let none of these who are unable to cultivate it, contrary to the above mentioned ways [of possession], purchase it or sell it, give it as a gift or conduct other [operations] with it which are appropriate to the m·itlk, neither shall he tum it into a m·itlk or vakif All [such operations] are invalid. And Jiuccets and vakfiyes issued by the ko.di on the basis of such operations are completely invalid. But if a person wishes to transfer [some] of the lands he possesses via the sipahi, [who] shall take from the [new] person a certain sum for hakk-i ko.rar, and the sipahi should issue a deed to the new person after the completion of the transfer, [this] is according to the §eriat and is allowable. 94

As can be seen from theJetva quoted, the Ottoman government has described the rights of the direct producer very precisely. He did not have a mulk estate, that is, an estate with rights of possession over the land he cultivated. The content of his rights was tasarruf, a tenn whose most general meaning is "possession." It should be

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remembered, however, that "tasarruJ" over the land was held by the feudal lord, as well as by the peasant, and in these circumstances it cannot be thought that the rights of the two were equal. 95 Consequently, if we leave unclarified the content of the term (as D. Popgeorgiev has done), we do not explain the character of the rights of the direct producer at all. 96 Another definition of peasant land ownership in the Jetva of Abussuud is the indication that the land was "lent" to the peasant. This is rather a formal juridical resort to Muslim spiritual law , according to which the life and property of the enslaved are in the hands of the gazis (war heroes), who, once having acquired rights over them by means of conquest, let the conquered have their lives against the payment of poll tax and returned their lands to them for cultivation against payment of land tax. This rule, which was observed on harac; lands, is quoted in the above Jetva by analogy. 97 In this case, the circumstance that the Ottoman legal expert was obviously searching for a term that would express the incomplete ownership status of the peasant as far as miriye land was concerned is important. By using the word tasarruJ, the content of which was extremely general, he contrasted it with the temlik in his efforts to express the conditional quality, the limited nature of the rights of the dependent direct producer. On the basis of the above mentioned analogy with the harac; lands owned by Muslims as far back as the days of the early Arab caliphate and in the miriye lands, the main means of production was considered to have been left in the hands of its owners until the conquest. Consequently, among the elements of continuity among the local population and the reality that was established on our lands after the conquest, this important fact should be noted: the new government did not, in fact, instigate a redistribution of rural land ownership; it was only the feudal rent that was redistributed among the representatives of the Ottoman feudal class. 98 It was exactly the lack of innovation in the distribution of the land cutlivated by the peasants that the law had in mind when it used the term "granting on loan" to its former owners. The change in this regard was expressed only in the acquisition of ' 'supreme ownership" of the means of production on the part of the conquerors' state. The legal decrees that stated that the peasant could own his farm during his lifetime (until he dies), "as he wishes" (nice dilerler ise tasarruJiderler), do not, of course, correspond to historical reality.99 If the dependent peasant had been able to do as he wished with his land, Abussuud could easily have included his land in the mulk

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category, from which he definitely distinguishes it. Moreover, the legislation then goes on to list a number of prohibitions in connection with peasant land ownership. In terms of the life-long character of ownership of the raiyet farm, the statement is made in stronger terms. In fact, if the raiyet was not liable to forcible migration, a possibility which was not all that rare, particularly during the fifteenth century, 100 he remained the owner of his land until his death. 100 It is natural that this fact was not so much of interest to the peasant himself as to the feudal lord. After the legislation, and the government organs and the sipahis doing everything possible to ensure the constant cultivation of as large an area of the miriye lands as possible, it is not clear what the motives could be for severing the raiyet's life-long ownership of his land. As we have already seen, the feudal lord had no interest in the expansion of the private land that had been granted to him, for the law did not allow him to do this. And, since the fief represented a combination of a large number of farms or holdings, it is clear that the aim of the feudal lord was to ensure their maximum cultivation. 101 In this sense, life-long possession of the raiyet farm, with the threat that it would be taken away from its owner if he did not sow that land, ensured in the most reliable way the cultivation of the raiyet land.

The Deed The life-long ownership right of the dependent peasant included in the fief was guaranteed by the deed. In the literature on the subject, contradictory interpretations are given to the act of obtaining a deed. A. S. Tveritinova considers that the right to obtain a deed was a "definite form of the peasant's feudal dependence on the fietholder. "102 This thesis is also supported by B. Tsvetkova, without any amendments whatsoever. 103 In her latest study, Tveritinova expresses her own thesis even more strongly, considering the deed to be "an obligation, on the basis of which the landowner was bound to a given parcel of the feudal lord's land in his capacity of raiyet. "104 The other Marxist historians, among whom are D. Kossev, A. D. Novichev, and H. Hristov, support the idea that the deed was expression of the peasant's rights in terms of the land that he cultivated. 105 A. D. Novichev has reason to criticize Tveritinova's postulate as "one-sided and incorrect, "106 and the data given by D. Kossev and H. Hristov regarding the struggles that ensued when peasants were deprived of their deeds by farmers, 107 are clear proof that in these documents the direct producers saw a guarantee of their rights over the land, and not an obilgation imposed by the feudal lord

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to bind them to the land. There are also other facts to support this thesis. In cases where a given feudal lord went to court in order to prove that the peasant whom he was suing was his serf, his raiyet, he would have (if we adhere to Tveritinova's theory) been obliged to prove his rights over the defendant on the basis of the deed, proving that he himself had granted the deed to the peasant in question. From the kadi's protocols, we see, however, that the sipahis exclusively based their Tights on documents of another kind - the lists of names (mufassal defterleri) of the raiyye included in the fiefs: "According to the old register, the two persons present are my raiyye "; "The above mentioned person moved more than fifteen years ago, but he still features in the register for my village"; and so on. lOB Even the term yazili raiyet (registered raiyet) had been created on the basis of the above mentioned principle, and this term was frequently used in the legislation to mean a peasant who was bound to the landC: "If the fami of a registered raiyet of a sipahi is situated on the land of another sipahi ... "; 109 " . . • he who is the registered raiyet of a given person should pay him the taxes which are necessary"; 110 ". . .the sancakbey and others . . . should not interfere [in the affairs of the sipahll, saying that this man is not your registered raiyet"; III etc. Consequently, the binding of the peasant to the land of a given village was determined by his being entered in the register. As has already been stated, this register was composed by the local katip (il katibi) an official representing the central government who kept track of population movement in the district with which he had been entrusted and who periodically issued lists of newly created agricultural households, from which new timars were formed. 112 There also exist other data, from which it is clear that the person to whose advantage the deed worked was the peasant, that it was he who had an interest in its being correct, because it was by means of this deed that he could prove his ownership of his farm. Thus, for example, a peasant from the village of Zhivkovo, Sofia district, brought a case against one Musali <;elebi through the kadi, stating that the former had taken his land away from him. The Turk, however, presented a deed for the same land and the Bulgarian lost his case. 113 There also exist data from the first years of the seventeenth century that speak of the action taken by peasants in order to acquire a document from the kadi stating their ownership by means of a deed bearing the seal of their sipahi or suba§i. 114 There is one detail concerning documents of this type that immediately springs to mind-and it casts doubt as to whether documents of ownership were issued by

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the feudal lord. From them we learn that persons who had received deeds from a given sipahi appeared together with them before a ~eriat court, which, confirming the validity of the deed, issued a huccet (determination) of ownership. This is not a case of transfer of property , when the two parties appeared before the kadi, but of receiving ownerless land. Without being able to clarify the matter completely because of lack of information, we must assume that the deed represented the written agreement of the sahib-i arz and was a certificate that a single tax for a deed had been received, on the basis of which the kadi could issue the actual act of ownership. Even if the document issued by the court was not an act of ownership, but merely represented its sanction by the government, it is obvious from the sources that this confirmation was necessary in order that the peasant could claim his rights. Consequently, even the granting of land with a deed was not an action the central government completely excluded from its sphere of competency, or which it left completely to the feudal lords. As can be seen from the records, deeds were issued for land included in timars, the royal has, and vakifs.1I5 In the latter case, the document presented by the new owner to the court was known not as a deed (tapu) , but as a certificate (temessuk) , but the procedure with the kadi and its results are in complete analogy with those involved in the possession of timar and has land. In this case, however, the temessuk was issued not by the suba~i or by the sipahi himself, but by the mutevelli of the vakif It was the officer in charge of the village who signed the deed for land in the royal has.

The Inheritance of a Raiyet Farm The above mentioned Jetva of Abussuud, and the entire Ottoman legislation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries envisages the inheritability of the raiyet farm, the right of ownership of the land cultivated by the dependent peasant. 116 The raiyet land, however, did not follow the ~eriat principles of inheritance: these principles were valid only for mulk properties. I I? As far as the miriye lands are concerned, laws that were contrary to the ~eriat were in force; the latter decrees the division of the inherited property between the wife and all relations of first, and to some extent, of second degree. On the contrary, the legislation categorically indicates that the breaking-up of a raiyet farm is not permitted. lIS In this sense, the right to inherit miriye land as well is also indicated. As A. S. Tveritinova has good reason to note, within the framework

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of the period in question, the circle of heirs who had the right to a deed for the land left by the deceased. Thus, while at the end of the fifteenth century it was categorically forbidden for the daughters of a raiyet to receive their father's farm, during the reign of SUleyman, the legislation also permitted female heirs to acquire their father's land with a deed, if he had left no sons.119 In any case, during the whole of the sixteenth century, it was the decree regarding the inheritance of a raiyet farm only by the sons of the deceased raiyet without a deed (which meant that the by no means negligible sum of resm-i tapu did not have to be paid) that was observed. l2O The remaining relatives, by direct or indirect line of descent, could acquire his land with a deed, taking advantage of the priority they were given over the remaining applicants. If the owner had no relations, or if such existed and they did not wish to acquire his farm with a deed, the feudal lord was empowered to issue a deed for the land to whomever he wished. 121 Consequently, the inheritance of raiyet land was not unconditional, if we exclude direct inheritance by sons. Moreover, it is not necessary to indicate that, together with the land, the son also assumed the feudal obligations of his late father. As far as the remaining heirs were concerned, they were excluded from the circle of the deceased's fellow peasants only to the extent that they were granted priority over non relations. In the remaining details, the inheritance of the farm entailed for them the same conditions (the payment of a ben for a deed), which were valid for any other applicant who wished to acquire the ownerless land. In this sense, it would not be inaccurate to assume that the raiyet farm could only be inherited by the direct male heirs of the deceased. For the remaining relations, the acquisition of the right of possession of that farm was equal to the acquisition of possession of any piece of miriye land. In actual fact, it was not inheritance. In connection with the categorical prohibition against the splitting up of the raiyet farm, and with some unequivocal stipulations for Asia Minor that state that the farm must be owned collectively by all the sons of the deceased,122 some authors are inclined to believe that peasant land ownership was not on a one-man basis, that the entire family of the deceased raiyet was obliged to jointly own the land left to it.123 There exists information from the records, however, that contradicts the stipulation described above. This is the large amount of data that exists concerning the ownership of some farms by brothers who were obviously the heirs of the same raiyet. In the feudal registers, the farms of such brothers are usually recorded one after

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the other, which is certain proof of their common origin.124 On the basis of the amplitude of information of this kind, and of the fact that the stipulations quoted are either connected with the prohibition against the splitting up of a farm by frequent transfers, 125 or that they apply to definite areas in Anatolia, 126 we should question the fact that the raiyet was succeeded by his sons, taken as a generalization. Furthermore, the feudal lords themselves would scarcely have gained any advantage from such a practice, since a large part of the money they collected against the feudal rent was imposed primarily on the household. Consequently, although the information available does not permit us to arrive at a fmal conclusion, it is most probable that the government would strive to preserve raiyet farms that had already been formed, and that the fmal result of this would be limitation on the right of unconditional inheritance over miriye land enjoyed only by the sons of the deceased, as in most cases the farm was divid~d between them.

The Transfer of the Right of Possession of the Raiyet Farm The expression in the Jetva of Abussuud, which has been mentioned a number of times as a theoretical account of the rights of the dependent peasant, the expression, in fact, that indicates that the raiyet could do "whatever he wished" 127 with his land should be understood in one sense only: the direct producer had the right to transfer his land against payment, to pledge it, or make a gift of his possession of the land he cultivated. In the most general sense, his rights are expressed by the term tajViz-transfer-which is adopted by the Ottoman legislation for the above mentioned operations. 12s Moreover, the kanunnames forbid transfer of any kind that is not carried out via the sipahi (sahib-i arz mariJetiyle). 129 Interpreting a decree from the law for Bolu of 1528 rather onesidedly, Tveritinova reaches the conclusion that "in the interests of the feudal lords, there existed a strict prohibition as regards purchase and sale of the peasants' lands, purchase and sale of land which was permitted only in certain cases, could only be carried out with the permission of the feudal lord with an obligatory payment of one-tenth of the sum received for the land." 131 The legal decrees support such a statement, which, apart from the decrees mentioned by Tveritinova, is also contained in the law for Aydin. 132 But, as can be seen in the passage quoted, and from its stereotyped repetitions, the prohibition was aimed, above all, against the sale of the land without the involvement of the sipahi and the indiscriminate transfer of the right

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of ownership of miriye land without the control of the feudal lord. Also, the opinion expressed above would be accurate only if we limit ourselves to the information provided by the legislation, and to the laws for certain provinces in Asia Minor. As far as documentary records for our lands are concerned, we find ample information regarding the transfer of raiyet land in all its fOmls-sale, pledge, and gift. As a rule, in all these cases, the fundamental requirement of the law was adhered to: that the transfer be carried out via the sipahi so that the latter would receive the sums to which he was entitled for resm-i tapu or hakk-i karar and exercise control over the use of the land. From what we've seen from the kadi's ledgers for the Sofia district, raiyet farms could be transferred either as a whole or in parts. The procedur.e in both cases was identical. Thus, in 1605, the farm of Mustafa Ion Mehmet in the village of Boyana was sold by the former for 500 akc;e. 133 Another kadi's protocal was issued for the sale of the right of ownership with a detailed description of the components of the raiyet farm. Four coowners, of which only two (who were brothers), sold a field in Kalkandji, Sofia district, to a Turk in 1550. In 1605, a plot for a water mill on the common land of the village of Stolnik was sold for 11,000 akc;e. A Bulgarian woman in the village of Gorni. Lozen transferred her right of ownership over five fields to a fellow villager. A water mill with the field attached to it was sold for 10,400 akc;e in the territory of the village of Moshino. A meadow in the village of Moshino was sold for 1,000 akc;e. Three coowners, who were not related, sold a field for 6,000 akc;e in the village of Boyana in 1550, and so on. 134 Many cases recorded in documents bear witness of the pledging, exchange, and giving as a gift of raiyet farms or parts of these farms. Thus, for example in 1550, one Mustafa TIm SUleyman exchanged three of his meadows for the meadows of three different persons, Turks and Bulgarians, living in the same village. A woman by the name of Selime gave her brother a farm in the village of Kazichene as a gift in the same year. A Turkish peasant from Kalkandji pledged his farm to the vakif of Hatice Hatun in Sofia for 2,080 akc;e. The farm consisted of ten fields, two houses in the village, four oxen, and one cow. A sipahi who had granted credit to a Turkish peasant in the village of Karaman, Sofia district, took his farm in the same village as a pledge in the same year. 135 From the data given, part of the information of this kind, which is contained only in the fragments of the registers of Sofia kadi court from the middle of the fifeteenth century until the middle of the seven-

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teenth, it is unequivocally clear that the transfer of the right of possession of miriye that which the general legislation granted to the raiyet was not fiction. The inevitable condition under which such a transfer could be carried out was the certificate issued by the sahib-i arz, with which the latter declared to the court that he consented to the transfer and that he had received a certain sum in return for resm-i tapu or hakk-i karar. It was, however, the court that sanctioned the assumption of ownership rights, and the former issued a huccet for the right of possession. It was with this huccet, and not with the deed issued by the sipahi, that the peasant could defend his rights should they be disputed. 136 On the basis of what has been said, it would be difficult to accept the idea that the transfer of raiyet land was only carried out as a very rare exception. Moreover, we cannot see why such operations would be to the detriment of the sipahi or why it would have been in tl)e interests of the feudal lords to hinder such transfers. Of course, the ta.fviz of raiyet lands always involved extra income for the fief holder-the sums paid in return for the deed. Not only did transfer not hinder the cultivation of the land included in the fief, it even guaranteed it. Also, in cases where the raiyet did not renounce the whole of his farm, but only a part of it to a person who was not resident in the village of the feudal lord, the latter acquired the rights of sahib-i arz over yet one more person who was not included in the register for his fief. Moreover, the statement that it was in the interests of the sipahi to hinder such actions on the part of his raiyye is not based upon logic. In the final analysis, the rights of the dependent peasant over the land lie cultivated were expressed in its inheritance by direct male line of descent and in its transfer (in the form of sale, giving as a gift, exchange, or pledge) of the right of possession of that land via the feudal lord. The limitations imposed on the inheritance or transfer of miriye lands were typically feudal, and their only aim was to secure the cultivation of the land and the appropriation of the maximum feudal rent.

The General Principles of Feudal Taxation in the Ottoman Empire The main expression of the dependency of the agricultural producer under the conditions of feudal society was his obligation to pay a feudal rent in return for the possession of the land. We shall not discuss the general postulates regarding the substance of feudal ground rent that would be valid for all feudal social formations. We should, however,

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indicate some specific principles of taxation that characterize the Ottoman feudal system during the period under discussion. The fundamental principle that determined the forms and size of the feudal rent was the way in which taxation conformed not with the actual person being taxed, but with the quality of the land he possessed-whether it was raiyet land or "free" land, whether its ownership by a Christian or a Muslim was recorded in the register, whether it was not a part of the hassa that was granted to feudal lords, etc. In this way, the administration was better able to keep track of possible income in terms of feudal rent than if it conformed with the actual person of the peasant owner. In some kanunnames for our lands, a distinction is made between "farm" and "patrimony," that is, between the land ownership of the Muslim and Christian peasant. 137 This distinction is also preserved with the "free" farms. Thus, for example, the soldiers, some doganci, and martoloz (sailors from the Danube in the pay of the Turks) possessed "free" patrimonies, and the m"itsellem possessed "free farms. "138 In the above mentioned sense, there did not exist any difference in the legal status of these two types of farm. As far as taxation was concerned, however, the regime applied to "patrimonies" in some details was dissimilar to that of the "farms." From the vineyards of the Christians, a tithe in kind was collected in the form of must or the cash value of the latter, while from the Muslim vineyards ground rent (resm-i do num) , was appropriate. 139 The actual ground rent paid by the Christians was bigger, as was their ~ift bozan, etc. 140 For this reason, the undertaking of the transfer of a patrimony from a Muslim would also have entailed fiscal losses for the feudal lord if the quality of the new owner of the patrimony had determined its taxation as a farm. In order to prevent such a loss for the feudal lord, the taxation of the patrimony was applied in practice, even if it was owned by a Muslim. Ample information about patrimonies owned by several Muslims consecutively can be found in the kadi registers for Sofia. 141 Consequently, the term "patrimony" was applied not to the farms of Christians but to that which, at the time of registration, had belonged to the Christian peasants, and which by tradition had always been taxed as "patrimony." In the kanunname for Sremsko, it is categorically stated that a Muslim who had purchased a Christian's vineyard would have to pay tithe, and not resm-i donum, in spite of the fact that he was a Muslim.142 A passage in the law for Ohrid from 1613 is also quite unequivocal. It states that an order had been issued that Muslims who owned Christians patrimonies because they had purchased them, and

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even if they were sipahi's, they still had to pay ciziye and resm-i r;ift (ispenr;e), that is, taxes payable by the Christian raiyye, or else their patrimonies would be taken away from them.143 The section of the population that possessed "free" patrimonies was obliged to pay raiyet taxes and poll tax as well (taxes from which they were, in principle, exempt) if, because of the insufficient area of the "free" farms, they also took for cultivation land that was included in a fief. 144 Consequently, even ciziye, which bore no relation to agriculture at all, was related to the cultivation of fief land. From another decree in the law for Silistra it is clear that the remaining part of the rent that was appropriated by the fisc as well, that is, the avariz-i divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye group of taxes, was also considered to be connected with land ownership by the Ottoman administration: "Avariz is connected with the land. ' '145 It has already been indicated that even the lower strata of the ruling class, if they were not satisfied with the direct possession of their hassa lands and acquired raiyet land for cultivation as well, were obliged to pay raiyet taxes. This was also valid for the sons of sipahis who were still not the holders of fiefs but who possessed raiyet farms-they paid the rent appropriated by the fief holder as a matter of principle. 146 On the other hand, if the feudal lord did not wish to set up a farm of his own on the land that the register showed as his hassa, he was forbidden by the government to grant that land to another person with a deed. Because the sipahis persisted in ignoring this prohibition, however, the legislation was forced to sanction this established practice. 147 The stipulations that have been mentioned confirm the fundamental principle in feudal taxation in the Ottoman Empire, namely that it was the land and not its owner that determined the forms and amount of rent paid. This principle is expressed most generally in the actual categorization of the lands included in the Ottoman state. Thus, for example, on our lands, which were determined either as state or fiscal, a ground rent and proportional harac (a tax formerly paid by nonMuslims in lieu of military service). The theoretical argument for the taxation was the circumstance that the population of these lands, in this way, purchased their rights of possession and cultivation of the lands. These theoretical points of Islamic law, however, did not hinder the Muslim population; consequently, the "conquerors" themselves paying, as a matter of principle, both ground rent and proportional harac if they were owners of miriye land. In this case, it is quite clear that fiscal arguments proved stronger than religious and legal ones, and the centralized Ottoman state also imposed the obligations of its tribute-paying subjects on those who theoretically should have gained

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advantage from this tribute. This is one further proof that the central government was not the tool of the governing nationality but of the feudal class, and that the measures it took were based on class and not on nationality.

The Classification of the Feudal Rent According to Marx's well-known analysis, in the Eastern feudal states, where supreme ownership of the land belonged to the central government, fuedal rent frequently assumed the form of taxation, and, in fact, fully coincided with taxes in all respects. 148 This situation was applied with full force under the conditions of Ottoman feudalism. It also represents one of the main peculiarities of the feudal ground rent in the Ottoman Empire during the period under discussion. The circumstances that the Ottoman feudal lord received certain powers over the land by delegation from the central government in itself envisaged that the state should not lose its own powers over the means of production. It is the complex gradation of the relationship to these means of production that was most typical of feudalism as a whole and especially of Ottoman feudalism. The dependent peasant retained considerable powers over the land-he accepted them as possession in perpetuity by inheritance. However limited the powers of this sipahi might have been, and however much they may be interpreted as the exclusive right to a certain portion of the centralized feudal rent, the fact that, for the most part, timars comprised the revenues from feudal exploitation does not permit us to exclude the military fief holders from the circle of persons concerned with the means of production. In this sense, the functions of the sipahis in land ownership could be explained as tenure. It was the mulk owners who exercised possession with powers of ownership over the land. It should be noted that the powers of the state in the gradation of relationships to the means of production that has been set out were not identical in the various categories of feudal estates. And this difference is reflected most clearly in the forms and amounts of feudal rent collected in the different categories of estates. Thus, the central government received for the "rent" of the mulks a given number of taxes, and a different number of taxes for the "rent" of the fief lands. There were forms and volumes of rent received from the dependent population possessing "free patrimonies" or "farms" (not raiyet farms). In a word, the varied gradation of rights over the fundamental means of production, which is the land, in the Ottoman Empire

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was accurately reflected in the forms, number, and amount of the separate feudal taxes. This is why a detailed analysis of the feudal "rent" would clarify the differences in the status of the categories of feudal estate, and in the categories of the dependent population. The feudal rent in the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is also characterized by the variety of its forms. It should, all the same, be noted that, at that time, its forms were still far from the number (which to this day has still not been established), that was attained during the later historical period, that is, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In essence, the forms of "rent" in the empire are divided into two: (a) "rent" appropriated by the feudal lord (rusum-i raiyet), and (b) "rent" appropriated by the fisc (tekalif-i divaniye) .148a Each of these two main groups can be subdivided into three (obligations in terms of payment by working, in kind, and in cash), according to the main division of the feudal ground rent as a whole. It should be noted that the division of the feudal taxes that comprised the rent appropriated by the feudal lord and the rent appropriated by the fisc is, to a certain extent, conditional. Although, in principle, during the time in question, the appropriation of a given tax was clearly determined, in the various categories of estates, some, which were definitely state taxes, were renounced by the central government in favor of the feudal lord, and in other categories of estates, part of the rent to which the feudal lord was entitled was distributed among those at the top of the feudal hierarchy. Consequently, it is not possible to draw an exact demarcation line between revenues to which the feudal lord was entitled and those to which the fisc was entitled. In any case, for each separate category of estate (if we exclude the regime of the royal has), such a demarcation is quite strictly set out. The matter in question is that the number of taxes belonging to the feudal lord and to the fisc do not preserve the same correlation for all categories of fief, but is a function of the category of the estate. This, in fact, not only fails to disprove the suggested classification, but also confirms it, since it demonstrates the defmite presence of two main shares of the rent in all feudal estates, albeit with differing numbers of components. There can be no argument as far as the matter of the subdivision of the two main shares of the rent are concerned, as this is its common classification imposed QY the natural development of feudal exploitation.149

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Feudal Rent Paid for by Working That Was Appropriated by the Feudal Lords There are categories that should be included in the elements of the feudal ground rent that was unarguably appropriated by the feudal lord. One was payment by working (angarya, irgadiye, kulluk, hizmet). This most basic form of feudal exploitation, whereby the peasant is forced to work on the land, which in fact belongs to him, for part of the week, and to spend the rest of the week working on the estate of the landowner was also prominent in the Ottoman Empire during the period under discussion, although the development of the forces of production had already reached a level that should have dictated more advanced forms of exploitation. 150 In a recent study, the Yugoslav historian B. Djurdjev expresses the opinion that, until the beginning of the fifteenth century, it was the payment of rent by working that was predominant in the Ottoman state because of the patriarchal essence of feudal exploitation .151 The author supports this opinion with certain legal stipulations that, as we shall see, completely contradict such a thesis. Djurdjev's other argument, namely that a great deal of this forced labor was dictated by the expansion and consolidation of the hassa, the personal domain of the feudal lord during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is also without foundation. The source data and their analysis show, on the contrary, that, at that time, the majority of feudal lords were deliberately trying to rid themselves of their personal domains. 152 But let us take a look at the sources themselves. The amount and type of rent to be paid by working, which was owed to the feudal lord, were fIxed in the law of Mehmet II (the Conqueror). There, it is stated that angarya amounted to seven kulluk (working days) per annum,153 in which raiyye with special obligations owed only three days.154 It is very typical that, even in that kanunname, the possibility of gaining exemption by payment was envisaged (twenty-two akcse per annum, if the sipahi did not "want some digging done. "155 Consequently, toward the mid-fIfteenth century, angarya was already strictly determined; moreoever, it amounted to very few days if we bear in mind the other contemporary feudal societies. Also, this law provided for exemption from the forced labor on payment of a sum of money, with the defmite indication that some fIef holders "did not want any digging done." In fact, it is quite clear that the prerequisites existed for the substitution of a cash equivalent for forced labor even during the reign of Mehmet II.

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As far as the content of this seven-day forced labor stint is concerned, the law envisaged only one kind of agricultural work-the digging of the sipahi's vineyard. 156 From this it is quite clear that - the drive on the part of sipahis, which was becoming evident during the sixteenth century, to exchange their hassa farms with property that brought them a direct income, without the organization of a separate sipahi farm being necessary, 157 had begun to emerge during the middle of the fifteenth century, if not earlier; that is, it appeared in parallel with the establishment of the military fief system. This conclusion is supported by yet another passage in the same law, which deals with the beylik (the feudal lord) having a vineyard; consequently, even the hassa vineyard was not, by that time, a compulsory part of the timar.158 The other types of angarya (which all comprised seven kulluk) , bore no relation to agriculture. They were used for the building of a house for the feudal lord; but the new sipahi was obliged to live in the house that had been built for his predecessor, and could not ask for a new house to be built.159 The main obligation of the raiyye in the fief, as far as angarya was concerned, was to transport the produce that constituted the tithe to the sipahi's bam, if the latter lived in the village, or to the town if he lived there. 160 The tendencies that have been mentioned in the development of payment of rent by working continued during the reigns of Mehmet's successors. They are borne out by Siileyman' s decrees. In the latter, we fmd above all indications that the volume of angarya had been reduced: instead of seven days, we now see three days or one day.161 Moreover, it is only in very rare cases in Siileyman's reign that the function of angarya is agricultural-work in the hassa vineyard 162 and in the meadows. 163 Another passage from the law for Ohrid is typical of the state of angarya during this period: "If there is a hassa meadow in a village, the old law states that the raiyye should mow all the hay and make a haystack. But it is forbidden to make them transport the hay to another place; that is not the duty of the raiyye. And when the latter has done three days' work, there are no other obligations. ' , 164 In some sixteenth-century statute books, we find information regarding even greater limitations on payment by work done. Thus, in the law for the sipahis of 1519, it is emphasized: "And each person in whose name a farm is registered shall carry out one day's angarya a year for the timar holder." 165 A passage almost identical to this can be found in the law for Erzerum. 166 Consequently, in the sixteenth century, the pay~ent of "rent" with labor could not, according to the law, exceed three days per year.

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S'Uleyman's legislation also devoted a considerable amount of attention to the purpose of angarya. It no longer mentions the building of a house for the feudal lord, 167 but only the building of a bam. 168 Of course, the latter was built only once, but the raiyye were obliged to repair it. 169 The main obligation of the fief peasant at that time was the transportation of the tithe to the sipahi's bam. Many passages about this question contain the same difference from the decree of Mehmet's law; they indicate that the tithe should be transported to the sipahi's bam (it is no longer stated where), or to the nearest market (akreb bazara).170 These passages are convincing proof of the fact that, by the sixteenth century, taxes paid in kind were not always intended for consumption but rather for exchange, a fact that bespeaks the increased vitality of the home market. There are also other decrees that bear witness to the same effect, according to which the transportation of the tithe to the market was considered to be the obligation of the raiyye only when the said market was not more than one day's journey from the village. 171 Consequently, by that time, it was not a question of the ten or so big commercial centers of the empire where the big merchants and exporters bought their grain, but of markets in the local market towns. However, the population of the fiefs, or rather, of the sipahi fiefs that were "not free" was not only obliged to carry out angarya for the feudal lord. There were also similar obligations to the big military fief holders-sancakbeys and beylerbeys-persons who were not their direct feudal lords. From some passages in Suleyman's legislation we learn that "if barley, hay, straw or anything else need to be taken to the san cakbey, raiyye from the zeamet's should not be taken, but from those which are not free. ','172 In some cases, the big feudal lords abused their power and extracted fifteen days' angarya from the raiyye living in the sipahi's fief. 173 Information regarding angarya for the sancakbey can also be found in other legal documents. 174 Both the considerable amount of unpaid labor carried out by the dependent peasants on the has lands of the sancakbeys and beylerbeys and the abuses encountered in this respect lend further support to the statement that, in the big fiefs, the hassa farms not only failed to decline (as had happened in the majority of timars), but, on the contrary, they flourished, and it was there that angarya was applied. And because the three days' angarya per year stated by the law were quite insufficient for the exploitation of such a hassa, the big feudal lords were forced to resort to the labor of the peasants from the "unfree" timars-from the fiefs of the sipahis, who were the subordinates of

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the sancakbey. When this perfectly legal situation also failed to satisfy the needs of the big feudal landowner, he would break the law. Still in connection with the decline of the hassa in the majority of small estates, we also observe the payment of cash to gain exemption from angarya. We have seen that this possibility was envisaged, and this would definitely not be a matter of coincidence, in the kanunname of Mehmet II. The decree in question obviously would not have remained without application. Thus, in the voluminous register for the doganci properties in Rumelia, we come across many entries for revenue, to which a note on the forced labor of the raiyye has been appended. 175 These were the sums received from the fief holders who "did not wish to have any digging done for them." A calculation tells us that the sums paid for exemption were as follows: twentytwo akqe from a qiftli household, sixteen akqe from a benak, ni!le akqe from a m"Ucerred. "176 These data are also confirmed by the inventories of the has of the Sancakbey of Chirmen, 177 and of the vakifs of Mahmud Pa~a in the Edirne district. 178 It is typical that all data regarding the payment of cash for exemption from angarya that are at our disposal all date from the same period-the last decades of the fifteenth century. It should be pointed out as well that there is one other circumstance that becomes evident from these records-it did not always take the place of the seven days laid down by the law. Thus, in the above mentioned doganci register, we see the following passage: "It is customary for the qiftli households of the infidels in question to work three days' angarya a year for the timar holder. In place of this angarya, fourteen akqe are payable." 179 Consequently, in this case, the number of days to be worked had been reduced to three days per year long before SUleyman's legislation had made this the legal number of days. Moreover, even this small number of days was replaceable with its cash equivalent. This change in practice clearly corresponded to the general tendencies toward the decline of payment of rent in days worked. The information set out in the foregoing paragraphs bears definite witness to the fact that this form of payment (angarya) was not predominant during the period under discussion, and that it was definitely in constant decline. The statements of certain authors that "in our villages during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, payment of rent in the form of days worked was widespread," 180 or that it was even predominant until the mid-fifteenth century are obviously without foundation. 181 The tradition of really heavy forced labor for

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the feudal lord during the period of Turkish rule came at a much later date, at the time when the farms were formed. 182

Feudal Rent Expressed in Produce Appropriated by the Feudal Lords Rent appropriated in the form of produce was the form of feudal ground rent that was typical of mature feudalism, and this was dictated by the predominantly "in kind" character of the feudal economy. Starting from this general postulation, a number of historians, without bearing in mind the concrete historical circumstances in the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and without referring to source material, insist that, at that time, in our lands under Turkish rule it was the payment of feudal rent in produce that predominated. 183 This statement, in spite of its logic, does not correspond to the actual state 'of affairs. The main form of feudal taxation expressed in produce was the tithe. In the Ottoman Empire this was known as "iqur, and more rarely as "harac-i mukassam. ' '184 The tithe represented the kernel or nucleus of the .taxes appropriated by the feudal lord. It was applied to all cereals, beans, oil-bearingl85 and fiber-yielding l86 plants, vegetables,187 fruit, and melons l88 -in a word, the entire agricultural production of the dependent peasant. Documentary records completely confirm the differentiated tithe taxation, which is expressed in the laws. In the feudal registers, we come across almost all forms of tithe set out in the laws. 189 Here it is necessary to emphasise a circumstance that is important for extracting indices of the correlation between cash rent, and rent in kind. In the feudal registers that have been mentioned, all appropriations in kind have been turned into money so that the size of the timar can be calculated. 190 That, however, does not mean that these appropriations (the tithe on cereals, for example, the cash equivalent of which is shown everywhere) were realized in cash. Unlike appropriations of produce, where the cash equivalent is always preceded by an indication of the amount of the appropriation in mouds and Idles, in the case of cash appropriations, it is only the sum in akqe that is recorded-a fact that leaves no doubt as to the form of taxation. 191 If we bear in mind the peculiarities of the registration, which have been emphasized, it would be logical to conclude that, during the period under discussion, a significant part of the revenues that were tithe in essence were already being expressed in cash. Payment of tithe in kind was continued with cereals, beans, and oil-bearing plants.

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The remainder was taxed in kind and in cash, or, as a rule, only in cash. Moreover, it is typical that some kinds of tithe had recently become payable in cash, as in the registers we find the words "U§ur (tithe) and resm (tax) used in parallel about them. Such was the case with the taxation of melon fields,192 orchards,193 fiber-yielding plants, 194 and so on. In Siileyman's actual legislation, this dual form of the taxation of vineyards is shown. 195 During the reign of Mehmet II, beehives were taxed in kind. 196 In the laws of Siileyman I, their taxation in cash is allowed. 197 From documentary records, however, the widespread appropriation of a cash equivalent is evident, whether it was u§r-u kovan or resm-i kovan. 198 There was another item that was transformed into cash in Siileyman' s time-the tithe on hay (in principle, a produce appropriation), which can be found in the feudal registers as a tax. 199 The salariye, however, preserved its "in kind" character: this w!ls a kind of supplement to the tithe imposed on some crops. 200 In spite of the insistence by some authors that this was a tax on straw, 201 the circumstance that salariye was also collected from linen and cotton, and from grape must as well disproves such a statement. 202 Whatever the origin of such a tax might have been, the important fact is that it increased the percentage of the tithe to one-seventh or one-eighth of the yield. Salariye was not collected in all fiefs. We only fmd it in one of the feudal registers we have at our disposal, the register of the royal has. 203 This fact, and the actual name of the tax (salar-important person, person in charge-Persian) prove that it was appropriated by the viziers, pashas, and other big feudal landowners from the raiyye in the fiefs of the sipahis who were their subordinates. 204 Certain traditional "presents," which the fief raiyye were obliged to give their feudal lords on special occasions, were also' 'in kind." In this category we can include makiyan ve nan, pogaqa, and aveng engur (bunch of grapes), which, as far as they are found in our sources, were by that time expressed in cash. 205 From the information given it is obvious that the in kind form of rent appropriated by the feudal lord, was very much present during the period in question. Its nucleus was the tithe on cereals-the most important and widespread crop in agriculture. As far as the other kinds of tithe appropriations were concerned (on vineyards, melon fields, vegetable gardens and orchards, beehives, hay, and fiber-yielding crops), at that time, a large part of them had already been turned into a cash payment. This fact, however, should not be overestimated and regarded as evidence of the high level of development of monetary

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relationships in agriculture, since it was, to a great extent, dictated by concrete circumstances. Thus, for example, the sipahi had no particular wish to collect the main appropriation on products (the tithe on cereals) in cash, because the former were of considerable consumer and exchange value. He aimed at collecting the equivalent value in cash of those products that were difficult to store and for which he could not always fmd a market: fruit, grapes melons, hay, etc. If the sipahi was frequently absent from his fief, he would not have been in a position to make use of or to sell products of this kind, and would have suffered considerable losses. This, however, did not mean that it was only the development of monetary relations that necessitated the natural commutation of the produce rent but rather that certain administrative measures or practices imposed by the sipahis themselves had, in a certain sense, overtaken the natural development of the situation.

Cash Rent Appropriated by the Feudal Lord "By cash rent we understand ... ground rent, which arises from the simple transformation of the form of rent into products, just as it [the rent] itself was only transformed rent in labour. "206 This commutation of the produce rent had an objective, progressive significance. Obliged to enter the market in order to transform into cash that part of his produce from which he had to obtain cash to pay tax, the direct agricultural producer gradually forged a link with the market and, by that time, was already striving to put as many products as he could on the market. This stimulated his interest in production and contributed to the growth of the forces of production. However, the cash payment of ground rent, which had been enforced while monetary relationships and the domestic market were still insufficiently developed, contributed objectively to the impoverishment of the direct producer. In fact, since the question of the character of the Ottoman economy in the sixteenth century (the period in which we already see the significant place occupied by taxes payable in cash within the volume of the total feudal rent has not been sufficiently investigated, and as the postulate regarding its closed, in kind character is rather a priori and not based on concrete data and studies, it is difficult to establish to what extent this form of the rent acted as a stimulus or had a restraining effect on the forces of production in our lands. The main tax in cash appropriated by the feudal lord during this period was ground rent. It was split up among specific units of taxation, established in relation to the land owned by one peasant

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household-qijt (or qijtli), benak, nim qijt, kara, mucerred. Depending on this, ground rent also bore different names: resm-i qijt, resm-i benak, resm-i mucerred, etc. These, however, were just different names for one tax-harac-i muvassaf As an expression of discrimination, the Christian population everywhere was taxed at the highest rate (twenty-five akqe), and the land tax of the fonner was known generally as ispenqe. Only for Christian widows was there a reduced rate of this tax-six akqe. 207 Resm-i qijt did not amount to the same sum in all provinces of the empire. In many sancaks in Asia Minor, moreover, this tax was appropriated in its entirety by the feudal lord, who would share it with the zaim (holder of a zeamet)-usually the suba~i and the sancakbey. A detailed table for its distribution was set out in the kanunname of Suleyman I. 208 According to all legal documents and records, land tax was exclusively a cash payment. 209 It is only A. D. Novichev who stat~s in his latest study that' 'even if the land tax is shown in terms of money, we assume that this is but a method of calculation and that it was appropriated in kind." It is difficult to accept that land tax, under the conditions where an in kind economy prevailed, would have been payable in cash. For this reason, we view it as a part of the produce "rent. "210 However, we do not consider that it is possible, just on the grounds of a doubt, to deny the cash nature of resm-i qift and its variations-which have been confirmed by a number of sources, be they laws or documentary records, or the opinion that prevails in scientific litemture on the subject (with the exception of the views expressed in Novichev's thesis). The tax known as qift bozan (or in some areas boz behre was also a significant sum. 211 It could also conditionally be regarded as a form of land tax. While resm-i qijt and its variations were paid to the feudal lord in return for possession and cultivation of the miriye land,qijt bozan was a compensation for the losses entailed by the feudal lord . when that possession was relinquished. Also included in cash rents are the tax on farm animals, or to be precise, on pigs and sheep. In the kanunname of Mehmet IT, the tax on sheep is stated to be payable in cash (one akqe for every three sheep owned),212 or in kind (one sheep in fifty).213 In Suleyman's legislation, we only encounter this tax as a cash payment, which has, moreover, been increased. 214 Appropriation of the tax on sheep is not clear. During the fifteenth century, it was split-half was taken by the feudal lord, and half by the sancakbey.215 Some laws grant the whole of the sheep tax (resm-i agnam) to the fief holder in the "free" estates only,216 others state it to be the royal has, that is,

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appropriated everywhere to the sultan's privy purse,217 or they accept it as the entitlement of the sipahi,218 consequently, of a "tied" feudal lord. To put it briefly, we are bound to agree with the decree contained in the Nikopol kanunname from the reign of Suleyman I, namely that, "at the beginning of April, he who has the right to collect tax on sheep should collect it. "219 This decree indicates that the appropriation of the tax in question was concretely determined in defter-i mufassal-and that unanimity in this respect did not exist. The tax on pigs was also collected in cash-resm-i hinzir or bid'at hinazir. The term itself, bid'at ("innovation, something newly introduced"), indicates that this tax was imposed at a later date, according to Vefik after the conquest of Serbia. 220 From its very inception, this tax was only payable in cash, as Muslimsdo not eat pork. The sum payable during the reign of Mehmet II was one akr;e per two pigs221 and no change was made before the end of the period under discussion. 222 A variation on this tax was one imposed on pigs slaughtered for Christmas. 223 The sum was a bigger one-two akr;e per pig. From written records, it is clear that, unlike the tax on sheep, the tax on pigs was collected by only one person-the feudallord. 224 Also connected with pig-rearing was the tax imposed on the grazing of pigs in oak forests. 225 The kanunname 's contain no information about the taxation of cattle, nor is any reference to be found in records. The only exception is an entry in the register for the towns of Kostour and Seres, where, together with the other taxes appropriated by the feudal lord, we also see resm-i hergele-a tax on herds of horses. 226 What is inexplicable in this case is why it was paid by the urban population, and that the sum was the same (a lump sum of 1,000 akr;e). There is a complete lack of any clues regarding this tax in the laws, and clarification is impossible. Ample information regarding the tax on water mills (resm-i asiyab). During the reign of Mehmet II, this tax was payable in produce-a certain quantity of cereals, which could be reduced if the water mill was not functioning all the year round. 227 Even at this stage, a distinction is made between the different kinds of water mills, which was, in fact, a difference in capacity.228 In Suleyman's reign, although in the general kanunname the in kind taxation of water mills is indicated,229 in some of the individual laws the payment of cash is indicated. 23o In some contemporary documents, a differentiated collection of tax is reflected: sixty akr;e for a do lap (waterwheel) mill, thirty akr;e for a karae (or karaagae) mill, and fifteen akr;e from a sepet mill. 231 In all cases, this tax is expressed in cash.

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In connection with the taxation of watermills, we come across a situation which is typical of feudalism in the legislation: the feudal lord had the right to force the owner of the watermill to repair it and get it working again if it had been damaged and abandoned. 232 Other industries related to agriculture and livestock breeding were also taxed: oil mills (four akqe per mill)233 and dairies. 234 Nothing concrete can be said about this last tax because in written records there is no indication of the individual amounts charged. In any case, from the inventory of the Seres fiefs, we discover that dairies were subject to differentiated taxation, depending on whether they dealt with sheep's milk or water buffalo milk, which indicates a relative growth and specialization in this branch. 235 When a town was also included in a fief, the feudal lord was given the right to tax fulling mills, water-driven forges, smithies,236 premises where boza was produced, chandler's workshops, etc. 237 As can be seen from the legislation and from the records, they were taxed "in cash, with the exception of smithies where pitchforks were made, and here payment was extracted in kind (one pitchfork in ten).238 Finally, to the rent in cash collected by the feudal lord, we can add bad-u hava (literally, "wind and air"). In it were included a tax paid by the bride's parents when she married;239 a lump sum consisting of fines for breaches of the law;240 a tax for the acquisition of miriye land;241 and a tax imposed for wintering on a fief to which the raiyet did not belong. This last tax was collected mainly from the nomadic population (yoriik), and from traveling craftsmen. 242 In some kanunnames, apart from the taxes already mentioned we also see others. There was a fme payable by the owner of livestock that had strayed into somebody elses' meadow. 243 Yava was the name given to the sum the "free" fief holder received in return for the sale of stray livestock caught by the population in his fief. The feudal lord was obliged to keep the animal that had been found for one month before he could sell it by auction, if it had not already been sought by its owner.244 The kaqkun tax was similar in character. Here, however, the object of the sale was a runaway slave who had been caught. The period that had to elapse before sale by auction in this case was three months.245 The essence of the last tax in the bad-u hava category_245 mujdegane-was found most frequently under the heading kul ve cariye mujdegcmesi, but this is not clarified in the legislation. In all cases, however, it is connected with the preceding two items. Depending on this, and on the etymology of the term itself, we can hazard some guesses as to its meaning. Mujdeg(lne means a present given to the bearer of good news by the person to whose advantage the news is

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to the bearer of the news. 246 In all probability, the tax mentioned was that payable by the owner of the slave to the feudal lord in whose fief the former had been caught. The law probably aimed at compensating the feudal lord for the money he had spent on feeding the runaway slaves. The common feature of the components of bad-u hava was their incidental character. The raiyet could either marry his daughter off or not, he might or might not commit breaches of the law, he could buy or not buy miriye land. In all these cases, the taxes payable were dependent on the event. In fact, the main characteristic of bad-u hava was its lack of definition and lack of a definite revenue. This is also quite clear from the name given to it, which obviously underestimates the significance of taxes that amounted to quite a considerable sum. The second feature of bad-u hava is its incomplete appropriation on the part of the feudal lord, its belonging wholly to the so-called "free taxes" category-taxes which were shared between the fief holder and his sancakbey.247 Consequently, it was only in the "free fiefs" that the components of the category were appropriated wholly by the feudal lord, while in the sipahi fiefs, the sipahi had to set aside half of the sum collected for his superior. Some authors regard the unclarified tax known as niyabet as part of the cash rent appropriated by the fief holder. 248 From documents it is clear that this sum was collected by the big feudal lords, although it was paid by all fiefs-both "free" and "unfree", or "tied. "249 However, some passages from the laws bear witness to the fact that it was not the raiyye who paid niyabet, but the fief holders themselves-free fief holders paying three akqe250 and tied fief holders paying six, while others state that it was paid by fief holders to the sancakbey "for the preservation of the region". 251 Apart from this, in a number of inventories of towns that had been granted as fiefs, we come across niyabet as a sum paid by the urban population. 252 On the basis of this information, it is clear that the tax in question was not a part of the rent of the dependent population, but rather a material expression of a certain vassal status within the military fief system. The fact that all fief holders paid niyabet to their sancakbey, apart from which the tied fief holders also added to this sum half of the "free taxes" of their raiyye, means that the sancakbey was at a level in the military fief hierarchy at which both free and tied timar holders were subordinate to him, placing themselves formally under his protection. The minimal sum involved, and the expression "from olden times, it is included in the income of the sancakbey" prove that it was indeed a survival from an earlier stage of feudal relationships,

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that during the period in question it had acquired a purely symbolic character. 253 The fact that niyabet was paid not only by fief holders, but also by the urban population as a lump sum demonstrates the comparative independence of the Ottoman town, which, within the system of the established relationships was under the direct protection of the big feudal landowner , who was the administrative head of the region. In the inventories of large fiefs, we also come across other taxes payable in cash. 254 Their character, however, does not permit us to include them in the feudal ground rent without certain reservations. These represented confiscations of the properties of persons who had died without issue. Such revenues were, in principle, the entitlement of the fisc (which is clear from the name given to the last ofthem).255 The- state, by renouncing the right of appropriation in favor of the big feudal lords, also saved the latter from the intervention of one of its financial organs, beytulmalci, which collected the revenues from the above mentioned confiscations in the remaining fiefs. 256 In this sense, the feudal lord's lack of financial immunity is quantitatively reduced. This concludes the information regarding the components of the rent to which the feudal lord was entitled. Certain taxes collected by the state (such as the tax on trade, for example), which were only granted to fief holders in certain individual cases, but which in essence remained state taxes as an expression of the existing strongly defined centralism, have not been included. As Novichev justifiably points out, between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries, rent in the Ottoman Empire was mainly decentralized, that is, the bulk of it was appropriated by the feudal lords, and the lesser part by the state. 257 This observation can only be justified if concrete examples are given, as it did not apply to the same extent to the whole of that period. 258 Also, the actual phrase' 'predominance of decentralized rent" must be accepted in accordance with the existing historical conditions: the rent was decentralized to the extent that it was mostly appropriated by the feudal lords. But, in actual practice, these feudal lords received deductions from an already centralized feudal rent, a part of the entire rent of the miriye lands, that as granted in areas strictly regulated by the state in return for the strictly regulated obligations of the feudal lords to the state. For this reason, the rent should only be considered as decentralized insofar as its appropriation is concerned, but not as regards its essence, since its auditing, distribution, and redistribution were subject to full centralism and full regimentation on the part of the state.

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Rent Appropriated by the Fisc The division of the components of the rent, the right to which was retained by the central government in tax paid by working, in kind, and in cash is hindered by one circumstance. While the state, by means of legislative acts, firmly ftxed the form and amount of the taxes that it renounced in favor of the feudal lords, in terms of the components it retained, the state allowed itself carte blanche. The data provided by the kanunnames concerning the amounts and forms of state taxes is very scarce indeed. We can form a better picture from incidental information, which is still very limited-at least as far as the period under discussion is concerned. Apart from the above mentioned difftculty encountered in studying state taxes during the ftfteenth and sixteenth centuries, there is another, which concerns their classiftcation into taxes paid by working, in kind, and in cash. It is known that the overwhelming part of the state feudal rent was represented by the large category of obligations, tekiLlif-i orfiye ve avariz-i divaniye. Although it consisted of forced labor of different kinds and obligations in products and money, the form these obligations took was not firmly fixed. Quite frequently, the central government resorted to the substitution of a cash equivalent instead of angarya or payment in kind. This circumstance did not mean, however, that the transformation of the lower forms of rent into a higher form-money-was dictated by the natural development of the Ottoman economy. It was the fruit of concrete conditions, of the concrete need for money and of the inability of the central government to make use in all circumstances of the angarya and products to which it was entitled. In spite of these difficulties, an attempt can also be made at the classiftcation of the forms of rent appropriated by the fisc, but this classiftcation must be accepted conditionally to a greater or lesser extent.

Rent Payable by Working, Appropriated by the Fisc The entire period of Turkish domination in our lands was characterized by the payment of a rent, which was appropriated by the state, by working-and by work which had to be carried out for the state. In spite of the predominance of monetary relations in the Ottoman economy during the period immediately preceding the (Bulgarian) liberation, state angarya did not disappear completely. 259 This is one of the many symptoms of the slow and conservative development of socioeconomic relations in the Ottoman state.

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Infonnation regarding the fonn and volume of forced labor for the state included in the category avariz-i divaniye ve tekalif-i orjiye during the period in question is very scarce. They are mentioned in the legislation in cases where the "exemption" of certain categories of raiyye from special obligations is discussed in terms of the state appropriations in question. Thus, in Mehmet's k£lnunname, we find decrees that exempt yornkler from angarya relating to the building of fortresses and the transportation of fodder. 260 It is obvious that these obligations were a burden on the raiyye in the fiefs. Another k£lnunname from the reign of Selim I confinns the "liberties" of the raiyye on the island of Imros: they did not participate in the building of fortresses and did not provide oarsmen and laborers. 261 The k£lnunname for Erzurum from Suleyman' s reign also speaks of such exceptions for miners. In some documents that determine the status of the raiyye on mUlk and vakiflands, we also come across information about the nature of forced labor carried out for the state from which this raiyye was sometimes exempted. 262 The dependent population of the mulk of Ayni ~ah Hatun, for example, did not provide courriers, night watchmen (?), workers for the kitchens, houndsmen, persons to service staging posts, to build fortresses, to provide transportation, or, in other words, all the avariz-i divaniye ve tekalij-i orjiye, as the document concludes. 263 ._ From the above infonnation, it is not possible to judge to what extent ----- the categories of state angarya mentioned were established duties were carried out regularly and to what extent, in the cases above, various duties are mentioned at random, which come within the government's need for an unpaid work force. It is highly probable that, at this comparatively early stage of Ottoman feudalism, fixed obligations to the central government in terms of payment of rent by working were not yet in existence, and that the government retained the full right to demand angarya from the dependent population when the need arose. In any case, it seems that the types of state angarya, which were demanded of the dependent population, in no way differed from those already mentioned. Certain incidental information indicates that, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the dependent population provided unpaid oarsmen for the galleys,264 building workers for the construction and repair of fortresses. 265 carters, 266 and kitchen staff. 267 On the basis of the information available, it is not possible to establish the amount of state angarya either. In fact, this is quite logical because it did not conform to any norms and was not limited in any way. Every need that arose also dictated the need for the imposition

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of forced labor by the state, and its volume was not determined by anything else but the actual character of that need. It is indeed difficult to accept that the government would exempt a given number of people from angarya if it continued to need their services only because of the circumstance that the term of their obligations had come to an end. The statement made by the German traveler, Hans Dernschwamm, is not accidental; he notes that' 'everywhere in the lands we traveled through, the people spend all their time coping with the sultan and his forced labor." 268 State angarya was not only carried out by the peasant population of the Ottoman state. The town, which was a craft center, also contributed its share of this unpaid labor demanded by the government. The state's need for skilled labor showed a particular increase in times of war. On such occassions, it rounded up the butchers, bakers, cooks, pharmacists, grocers, weavers of quha (a course woollen cloth), saddlers, shoemakers, braid makers, ironmongers, tailors, wool carders, tent makers, cobblers, blacksmithcs, etc. 269 The mass exodus of craftsmen from the towns in time of war had a retarding effect on the urban economy. In a protocol of the Kyustendil kadi from 1683 is reflected the protest of the inhabitants of the town, who emphasize that the enlistment of bakers, blacksmiths, and ironmongers has caused a great deal of inconvenience to the population, and request the release of at least some of them. 270 Unlike the labor the fief holder received from his peasants and that, as we have seen, was limited in amount and was not particularly heavy , the unpaid labor obligations of the population to the central government were perhaps the heaviest of all the burdens they had to bear. These obligations took the direct producer away from his farm for weeks and even months, frequently when the farm work was at its height, a fact that was reflected in all its severity in production on the raiyet farm. The appalling labor conditions in the galleys, building sites, and kitchens and the dangerous condition of the roads frequently cost peasants who had been sent to do angarya their lives. 271 In fact, it would be correct to assume that state angarya should be counted as that part of the feudal ground rent in the empire that had the greatest impact not only on the situation of the raiyye, but on the forces of production as well. Although, in scientific literature, the functions of part of the socalled raiyye with special obligations are not viewed as state angarya, their nature would fully allow them to be included in rent to be paid by working, which was appropriated by the state. 272 The specific feature of the exploitation of that part of the population consisted of

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the substitution of its entire feudal rent with a single form of tax paid by working-that is, service in the voinoush, dogancilar, or martoloz, etc. arms of the service. 273

Product Rent Appropriated by the Fisc It is extremely typical that, for the period in question, there are hardly any data in existence regarding the appropriation of products by the fisc. Moreover, as is known, during the latter period, such appropriations were widely practiced and were expressed both in the many product components of the category avariz-i divaniye ve tekalij-i orfiye,274 and in the compulsory purchase of food supplies and raw materials from the direct producer at prices fixed by that state. 275 In their works on the Ottoman tax system, the authors have carefully evaded the question about the period when these appropriations arose, and have contented themselves with information from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. 276 Without a doubt, some product components of the state rent arose during the period under discussion. Barkan himself, however, who has outlined the general conditions regarding the entire category avariz-i divaniye ve teka1ij-i orfiye gives only one example of a tax collected in products up to the end of the sixteenth century, and, moreover, has not even mentioned the name of the tax. 277 In all probability at that time, taxes collected in products by the state were still not differentiated in order that the respective names could be attached to them. For this reason, the given tax in products was simply referred to as follows: one mud of corn for every three avarizhane. 278 As is known, during the period that followed, appropriations consisting of "mud of the avarizhane already bore different names: nuzul zahiresi, sursat, etc. 279 This was necessary for the government to be able to justify the repeated appropriation of a product during one and the same year, by making it appear like different obligations. How, then, can the comparatively small share of rent paid in products appropriated by the fisc during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries be explained? At all events, not by the state of monetary relationships, nor by the monetary character of the economy, since during the same period, as we have seen, a lower form of feudal rent, which was appropriated by the state, was widespread. In all probability, the fact that has been established was due to concrete historical conditions. The bulk of the state appropriations, namely those included in the above mentioned category, were intended solely for meeting

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military needs, for the maintenance of the army on campaigns. 280 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, the still victorious Ottoman armies were active in places far removed from the Balkan peninsula-Central Europe, Persia, Egypt. With the conventional means of transport, carrying food supplies from Rumelia to these regions was practically unjustifiable. This is why the Ottoman government preferred to realize the greater part of its appropriations in money and to organize the supply of its troops in regions near the site of battle.

Cash Rent Appropriated by the Fisc It was the poll tax known as ciziye or harac appropriated by the fisc, which formed the main revenue during the period in question. Although the poll tax in the Ottoman Empire was §eriat in character, that is, "lawful," and not "extraordinary," its amount was not strictly determined, as were the remaining components of the rent appropriated by the fisk. 281 Consequently, even as far as the main tax imposed by every Muslim authority was concerned, the Ottoman state reserved for itself the right to act arbitrarily. According to M. Akdag, after 1420, the ciziye was twenty-five akqe. During the reign of Beyazit II, it was increased to twenty-six, and during that of Selim I, reduced to twenty akqe, while its systematic increase began as from the time of Siileyman 1. After his reign, the accession of each new sultan was accompanied by an increase of five akqe. Thus, during the reign of Murat ill, it had reached forty akqe. 282 Source information, however, disproves this assumption, mentioning a much larger sum for ciziye during the period in question. Thus, according to calculations made on the basis of materials published by Gokbilgin, it is clear that, during the reign of Beyazit II, the poll tax amounted to about seventy-five akqe-three times more than the sum indicated by Akdag. 283 We learn from the register for Montenegro for 1521 that the population paid a total of fifty-five akqe in ciziye, and the distribution of the sum was as follows: the state took thirty-three akqe, twenty akqe went to the sancakbey, and two to the tax collector. 284 This last sum was sometimes featured as a separate tax, the so-called gulamiye, the amount of which varied from one to ten akqe. 285 1. Fekete takes fiftyakqe as an ex amble of ciziye during the reign of Siileyman, while during the reign of Selim I, the sum had risen to sixty.286 During the 1690s, according to the kanunname for Sremsko, a poll tax of seventy to eighty akqe per person was collected. 287 According to Selimiki in 1598 the poll tax,

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together with its supplements had reached (given a considerably reduced exchange rate for the akqe) 300 akqe. 288 Consequently, the poll tax in the Ottoman Empire obviously represented a considerable sum payable exclusively in cash. Its burden was added to by various supplements added to it by the state, and the imposition of which was supported by rather transparent argumentation. We have already mentioned the gulamiye, which was supposed to serve for the payment of the collector of the poll tax. From the registers published by Gokbilgin it can be seen that, during the fifteenth century, a tax for cloth was collected. In all probability, if we judge by the term, the original meaning of this payment was the price of the bundles or sacks in which the money collected from poll tax was put. During the period in question, however, that function was purely fictitious, as can be seen from the amount involved-an extremely large sum if we bear in mind that, from the ciziye in Se\'"es, which amounted to 326,503 akqe at the end of the fifteenth century, 94,000 akqe was collected; the figure for Zuhna was 26,862 out of

161,877 akqe. 289 The increase of five akqe at the accession of each new sultan toward the end of the sixteenth century, which has been mentioned by Akdag was classed as a separate tax. 290 Again at that time, there was another supplement to the ciziye, known as the "wine ransom. "291 Its connection with the poll tax was probably dictated by the fact that only non-Muslims consumed alcoholic drinks. It was mainly by this large number of supplements that the poll tax reached the significant sum of 300 akqe at the end of the sixteenth century. In the payment of the ciziye, as in that of other state taxes, there existed a collective responsibility according to which the inhabitants of a given village were obliged to pay the tax owed by those who had died or fled. 292 This circumstance (which, it should be noted, is the sole evidence of the possible existence of a village council during the period in question) was a great burden on the raiyye, and the latter frequently refused to pay the share of their missing fellow villagers. Some collectors of poll tax note that the villagers "do not submit to the §eriat and the supreme lennon, do not respond to the summons issued to them by the §eriat court and thus cause losses to the treasury.' '293 Some items from the end of the sixteenth century also indicate that the central government was not always able to cope with such phenomena; we learn that in the Ohrid area between 1571 and 1574, that is, for a whole three years, the state was unable to collect poll tax. 294 The other main component of the cash rent appropriated by the fisc were the other taxes from the category avariz-i divaniye ve tekalij-i

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orjiye, which were payable in cash. The oldest fonn of an "extraordinary" state tax in cash was avariz akqesi-cash avariz. 295 Although data indicating its existence even in the reign of Mehmet II exists, this data is extremely general and does not pennit us to fonn an opinion as to frequency and amount. 296 The information dating from the reign of Beyazit IT is much more concrete: the latter had to impose a onetime tax payable in cash on his subjects in order to be able to pay the janissaries their traditional bakshish on his accession to the throne. 297 Again in his reign, the state collected avariz akqesi in 1497 in connection with its military campaigns. 298 Twice during the reign of Beyazit IT, avariz in the sum of twenty and ten-to thirty akqe was imposed for the repair of fortresses that had been damaged in an earthquake. 299 According to the asafname of Lutfi Pa§a in the reign of Selim I, avariz was collected only once - a sum of twenty akqe. 300 The fact that it was imposed only once can hardly be considered a lightening of the tax burden, and is probably due to the extremely short reign of this sultan (1512-1520). From source materials it is clear that, during the reign of Siileyman I, avariz had become a frequent, but still irregular tax. With the registration of the population that was carried out by the great sultan, strict regulation was brought to taxation. Moreover, the aim of this registration was to increase the number of persons on whom this tax was imposed. A large part of the "raiyye with special obligations" lost its right to "exemption" from avariz when this registration was carried out. This state of affairs is embodied in a number of decrees, according to which, "when the region is burdened with avariz for the needs of the state, no notice should be taken if someone should say, 'I have an order from the sultan [for exemption],' or 'a royal decree has been issued.' All persons, exempt and nonexempt and bearers of a berat should pay avariz-i divaniye ve tekalif-i orjiye. Nobody should deviate.' " In a nutshell, SUleyman rendered null and void the acts issued by his predecessors for "exemption" from state taxes, instructing that only the documents issued during the new registration should be borne in mind. 301 The circumstances set out above show that, during the reign of Suleyman I, avariz was imposed fairly frequently, if not regularly, since, for its imposition and distribution, a registration and a number of legislative measures had been undertaken. The data regarding civil disturbances among the population in Serbia, Morea, and Albania provoked by the measures in question 302 also bear witness in this respect-they would have been senseless if the avariz had not already represented a considerable tax burden. In spite of the opinion of

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Barkan, which is based on the information given by Lutfi Pa§a,303 that by that time the amount of avariz akqesi was equal to twenty akqe,304 but, according to other source information, it already amounted to fifty to sixty akqe. 305 There is ever more frequent information about the transformation into a cash payment of some obligations previously payable by working that dates from this time - these being from the avariz-i divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye category, most of all, the so-called "ransom for oarsmen" (kurekqi bedeli). In 1451, it was imposed at a rate of thirty akqe, in 1537, fiftyakqe, and in 1564, sixty-sixakqe. 306 During the last years of the sixteenth century, this tax was sharply increased because of the fall in the value of money to 160 akqe in 1592, 250 in 1593, and so on. 307 Although, during this period, taxes of the category avariz-i divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye were imposed with ever-increasing frequency, V1ey were not regular taxes. A passage from Suleyman's legislation speaks of this "when state avariz occurs. "308 The tendency that can be observed in the imposition of avariz was clearly manifested by Suleyman's successors-Selim ill and Murat ill-when, during the same year, several kinds of "extraordinary taxes were collected at the same time-in kind and in cash, or else one kind of tax in successive years. 309

Some General Situations Connected with the Feudal Rent in the Ottoman Empire During the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

The entire amount of the feudal rent extracted from the miriye lands was the result of the feudal exploitation of these lands. This is why it would be appropriate to determine the place of the feudal rent in the general income of the empire, that is, the place occupied by feudal exploitation in the finances of the empire. 3lO Positive data about the budget of the Ottoman state during the fifteenth century is lacking. Various authors mention figures such as 2,500,000, 6,000,000, and 900,000,000 ducats as the income of the empire during the reign of Mehmet IT. 311 Moreover, the entire amount of the feudal rent from the miriye lands at that time has not been established. But the level of state revenues can be traced with a certain degree of accuracy from the end of the reign of Beyazit IT to the last years of the sixteenth century. The Venetian ambassadors at the Sublime Porte provide the following information on this subject:

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AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Pietro Bradin Marco Minio Pietro Zen Bernardo Navagero Domenico Trevizano Constantino Garzoni Antonio Tiepolo Giacopo Sopranzo Giovanni Moro Lorenzo Bernardo

1520 1527 1530 1553 1554 1573 1576 1581 1590 1592

7,500,000 7,300,000 7,600,000 8,366,000 8,196,000 8,000,000 8,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000

ducats 312 ducats 313 ducats 314 ducats 315 ducats 316 ducats 317 ducats 318 ducats 319 ducats 320 ducats 321

As components of the state revenues, the authors of the reports show the following: poll tax and tributes from the vassal countries, tax on sheep, customs duties (imposed on foreign trade), the redemption of mines and salterns, confiscations of ownerless properties, and charges for the issue of documents. 322 It is clear that a number of important asset accounts are missing from this list. In the form of "tokens of respect, " some rulers poured uncounted wealth into the imperial treasury, in order to ensure for themselves the friendship of the sultan. According to C. Garzoni, the annual income from such "presents" totaled about 8,000,000 ducats. 323 The revenue derived from "extraordinary" taxes is also missing from the budget calculations: the latter accounted for an important section of the fisc's accounts. There was yet another income that was not calculated, and it was the main one, according to the data of contemporary hums-u ganaim; that is, onefifth of goods plundered during war, which according to ~eriat law was the entitlement of the state. 324 Even when the finances of the Ottoman Empire completely collapsed during the reigns of SUleyman's successors, during the reign of Murat In there was still 50,000,000 ducats that had been accumulated in the victorious wars of Mehmet II and Siileyman I, lying completely untouched. 325 Although it cannot be determined in quantity, the plunder of war represented a large part of the income of the empire, and many authors quite justifiably put it in first place in the fmancial might of the Ottoman state. 326 An irregular, but nonetheless large, income for the empire was derived from confiscations of the properties of dismissed dignitaries. From Rustem Pa~a alone the treasury appropriated (or rather, got back) 15,000,000 ducats, and from Sinan Pa~a, 1,100,000 ducats, etc. 327 Of course, the above revenues, which are not reflected by the Venetian ambassadors in their calculations on the budget of the Ottoman state, cannot be exactly determined. Other fundamental components, namely the revenues from feudal exploitation (excep ciziye)

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are not included in it. According to Soranzo, the fief holders taken as a whole received 18,000,000 from their lands. 328 4,500,000 ducats was the annual income of the sultan's has lands,329 according to other data, 4,700,000. 330 If we add to the 22,500,000 a further 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 ducats in ciziye, the annual income from the feudal exploitation of the raiyye in miriye lands would have amounted to 24-24,500,000 ducats. 331 On the other hand, if we exclude the ciziye, there remains 6-8,000,000 ducats of state revenue that did not originate from feudal exploitation. This last sum represented only between a quarter and a fifth of the total income of the empire. At this point it should again be emphasized that the figure 6-8,000,000 ducats reflects only the regular annual revenue of the treasury, but not its huge total irregular income from gifts, booty, and confiscations. Only the regular income, which was not officially recorded as such from "tokens of respect, " would have doubled the income of the treasury from sums that did not originate in feudal exploitation. In all events, in fact, the question of income from plunder in time of war, without which index the question of the correlation between the income from feudal exploitation and that from other sources, will remain unsolved. Only an approximate answer can be given to another question regarding the correlation between the rent appropriated by the feudal lords and that on which the fisc laid hands. If we exclude the revenues from the exploitation of the raiyye in the royal has (as it would be difficult to distinguish betwen royal income and state income), against 18,000,000 ducats appropriated by the fief holders, only 2,000,000 remain as revenue against ciziye appropriated by the fisc, or a mere ten percent of the feudal exploitation of the miriye lands. In a concrete analysis of the Ottoman material, and when indices for the correlation between the two shares of the feudal rent in a number of different villages are set out, a very different proportion in different areas and for different years is revealed. Until the end of the fifteenth century, according to these calculations, state appropriations accounted for between 30 and 50 percent of the total volume of the rent, and, from the beginning to the last years of the sixteenth century, this correlation remained almost unchanged. It was only in the 1690s that that is changed abruptly to the advantage of the state share of the rent, which reached 75-80 percent of the total volume of feudal exploitation. This fact was due mainly to the frequent imposition of large avariz. 332 The data given should only be taken as a guide, as they have been taken from the inventories of given villages and do not claim to be generally valid. Apart from this, they do not take account of the huge

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devaluation of the Ottoman currency in the last years of the sixteenth century. At all events, although its absolute value is not indicative, the correlation between the sipahi 's and the state rent remained real. Again, in connection with the amount of feudal exploitation, there is yet another question that should be raised: that concerning the correlation between the amount produced in one year by a peasant household and the feudal rent payable by that household. The feudal registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries offer us considerable material for such a calculation. In them, as has already been indicated, information about the amount of the tithe, the prices of the foods that were taxed in kind, and about all forms of the rent appropriated by the fief holder was contained. On the basis of the tithe revenues, the production of an average peasant household, or at least the upper limit of that production, can also be established (by multiplying the tithes by ten). The sum of the feudal rent, also calculated in akqe, should be compared with this one year's production. In this way, we can obtain, for separate villages in widely scattered parts of the Balkans, a rough correlation of 1:2 or 1:3 to the advantage of cereal production for the average agricultural household, for example, in the Turnovo district (in the fifteenth century) and the Kostour district (in the sixteenth century) for the period in question. During the last years of the sixteenth century, however, as a result of the significant increase in avariz, this correlation changed considerably. Thus, for example, in the village of Dobrousha, Kostour district (in 1592), the entire rent represented 82.7 percent of the value of the cereal production of an average household; it was again close to this value in 1593 and considerably exceeded it in 1597. 333 This rapid increase in the rent was wholly due to the increase in avariz and to the fall in the value of the akqe.

The Position of the Bulgarian Peasant Population in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries The legislation and documentary evidence provide ample information about the position of the Bulgarian peasant during this period. The picture that has been built up was based on these sources. Can we, however, consider that it fully reflects the concrete actuality in the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? It is obvious that a scholar of agrarian relations in the Ottoman state in its early period is obliged to use almost exclusively Turkish sources, moreover, Turkish official sources. They reflect the state of things

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as they should have been, the picture that was presented by, or to, the organs of the government. In spite of this, data regarding arbitrariness and force practiced by the sultan's men or the sipahis are no rarity. 334 Even more eloquent and closer to the truth are the travelogues of European observers in which they have to search for words to describe the tragic position of our people. 335 But both sources fail to cast any light on the main culprits in the pillage and force practiced against the population - the big feudal lords. Because, while the kadi heard cases in which the peasant and the sipahi were involved, in which the latter sued for a few bushels of millet or r;ift bozan worth seventyfive akr;e, which cases the sipahis frequently lost, there was the beylerbey, who was the professor of the entire hassa villages where the raiyye performed only angarya. There were the sancakbey, who demanded 100 days of tax paid by work done from each household, the mulk sahibi, whose estates were immune from the sultan's men, the sultan's son-in-law, who had a vakifembracing dozens of villages and half the shops in the town, the viziers and military leaders in whose mulks digging was carried out by thousands of liberated slaves and sharecroppers-all these, representatives of the feudal ruling class, the handful of people who had laid their hands on more than half the wealth of the empire, were left without any control whatsoever. It is no coincidence that a document does not exist that records a lawsuit brought by a dependent peasant against a big feudal lord. It is no coincidence, if we take a close look at the sources available, that we shall fmd scarcely any evidence of the existence of the small group of big beasts of prey, and that it the sipahi, with his ten or so households and three walnut trees for his own personal use who emerges as the villain of the piece. This is because centralism was not only that form of state organization that could regulate in the greatest detail relations between the raiyye and the sipahi and limite the fief holder's striving toward greater wealth. Centralism was also the form behind which the handful of big feudal landowners could take refuge. The state did nothing to counter their arbitrariness and greed. It was they who composed the state. It should also be emphasized that, when the matter of the position of the Bulgarian people under Turkish rule and the most precise determination of the feudal exploitation to which it was subjected is raised, light would only be cast on one side of the matter. Because the oppression that weighed on the Bulgarian, be he dependent peasant, voinouk, or craftsman, was not only limited to feudal exploitation. The main features of this oppression that should be borne in mind are

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discrimination on grounds of religion and nationality, the horror of mass forced migrations, YorUk colonization and the complete lack of any legal order. For this reason, the struggle waged by the Bulgarian peasants against the invaders was both a class and a national one. Because of this, the struggle became more acute during the process of the formation of the Bulgarian nation. 336 . The forms of class struggle in our lands during the period in question began with the simplest ones, the escape of peasants from their villages, the killing of sipahis, and the burning of their houses and barns. It passed through isolated forms of resistance such as organized bands,337 and attained spontaneous mass movements 337 such as those that took place during the rebellion of Konstantin Frouzhin, 338 or the campaigns of Mihail the Brave. 339 The first attempt at an organized mass uprising also dates from the end of the period in question-the Turnovo Uprising-which took place in 1598, in which the nature of the early movements against Ottoman power, antifeudal and nationalist, can be clearly distinguished. 340 'rhe resistance by our people against the yoke of Ottoman domination during the early period of their rule has been little investigated because of the scarcity of source material. It is, however, eloquent proof of the tragic position of our people even before the first symptoms of the decline of the empire. Its participation in the Turkish antifeudal movements, in the opposition of the Turkish masses to the feudalization of Ottoman society at the beginning of the fifteenth century,341 or in the peasant movements during the sixteenth century is even less clearly illuminated. 342 However important it may be, this question must remain open for the time being.

Some General Conclusions At the present stage of historical study of agrarian relations in the Balkans, and more precisely, in the Bulgarian lands under Turkish power, will permit us to form a certain general impression and to come to certain conclusions. It is necessary to emphasize first of all that the Ottoman feudal agrarian system was still not firmly defmed at the beginning of the period in question. The idea we have of the Ottoman agrarian institutions should, in fact, be dated from after the middle of the fifteenth century. During the first century after the creation of the Ottoman state, and even until the reign of Mehmet II, the supremacy of military fief land ownership had still not been established. Together with the timar in its embryo form, there also existed nonfief land ownership

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in the shape of the malikime=divanz, the land mulk, and the different kinds of vakif. The surviving prefeudal institituions and the uc and the musellem were still present in the organization of the anny and its maintenance. Fonns of land ownership that preceded the timar were inherited in the Ottoman state from the preceding Turkish feudal formations that it included in its Asia Minor possessions and in which mature feudal relations were present. The representatives of the feudal class in these fonnations were a fully fonned hereditary feudal aristocracy, whose economic power rested entirely on unconditional hereditary feudal land ownership. Its clash with the new military state of the Ottomans was inevitable and was expressed in long struggles. Fighting against the Anatolian beyliks, however, the young empire adopted their feudal agrarian institutions, which at the outset were mutually exclusive with the Ottoman institution of the timar. Thus, the periQd encompassing the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is characterized, among other things, by the struggle against the hereditary feudal aristocracy of the beyliks and the fief troops, the struggle between unconditional and conditional land ownership, and between the mulk and the timar. The ascendancy of the timar reached its peak under Mehmet IT, who abolished the right to existence of all free land ownership and decreed the exclusive hegemony of the military fief. But, in Ottoman society, which had set out along the road of rapid feudalization, a feudal class was fonned, in its tum, whose interests were not fully satisified by the timar. This is why the actual heir of the Conqueror was forced to sanction the restoration of unconditional ownership, even to significantly extend it. The period between the reigns of Beyazit IT and Siileyman I is, in fact, a period of relative equilibrium between the two tendencies in Ottoman feudal land ownership. Growing ever stronger, the Ottoman ruling class, after the reign of Siileyman, passed into open opposition to the sipahis, brought about a redistribution of the revenues from feudal exploitation, and occupied finn positions within the timar system ofland ownership. In its drive to ensure a place for itself with the timar system, it campaigned against the conditional quality of the timar in every possible way, aiming to transfonn it from a feudal income into a feudal land estate. The sipahis, who were the lower stratum of the Ottoman feudal class, were placed in an incomparably more disadvantageous position not only by the handful of big military fief holders, but also by the representatives of unconditional land ownership. Their unenviable position within the system of Ottoman feudalism was exacerbated by

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the efforts of the feudal ruling class to rob them of their pitiful share of land ownership. The intensification of this process led to mass desertions on the part of the feudal cavalry and to sipahi rebellions at the end of the sixte,enth century. After that time, the sipahis did not represent a support base for the central government, which was conclusively in the hands of the feudal aristocracy, and neither did it represent a particularly effective fighting force. The position of the dependent population in the empire was not identical. The raiyye in the timars had certain advantages; during a considerable part of the period under discussion, the timar was still not a feudal estate in the full sense of the word, and the sipahi was a weakly established element who did not have an interest in the organization of his estate. On the other hand, however, the raiyye in the timars were subjected to all the oppression entailed by being the exploited persons, who, under the conditions of feudal society, were without a finnly established master. The frequent change of timar holders dictated their grasping attitude toward the raiyye included in their fiefs, leading to the complete ruination of that raiyye. The sipahis , superiors on whom the timar holder was completely dependent, also had almost unlimited powers over the raiyye. Finally, there was the state, which to a greater or lesser extent decreased its direct exploitation of the population in the unconditionally owned estates and burdened the raiyye in the timars with the bulk of its needs. The dependent population in the mulks and vakifs (here, we should also add, in the royal has lands as well) had the advantages of persons who were exploited according to a plan. It was not only a given official who would take advantage of the labor of a household exploited by the mulk or vakif until the end of his service, but all the descendents of the mulk sahibi. This lord naturally strove to limit, as far as possible, the plunder of the added product on the part of other lords. This meant that the population of unconditional estates was subjected to a fairly even pressure and was, to some extent, protected from complete ruination. As against this rather doubtful advantage, however, a population of this type was practically dependent to a much greater extent than the raiyye in the timars. First and foremost, a significant part of that raiyye, in spite of the exploitation that was feudal in essence to which it was subjected, had slave or at least liberated slave status-which was much harder to bear than that of the raiyye. Furthermore, exploitation in the mUlks, vakifs, and the royal has lands (this is quite clear even from official sources) was

CHAPTER THREE

197

not placed within the framework of the decrees aimed at the raiyye in the timars. In a nutshell, for that part of the population, all the disadvantages borne by exploited persons in a feudal society who had only one master were in force. A not negligible part of the population of our lands that was burdened with special obligations (and because of this their farms were excluded from the timar system) was, in practice, subjected to more intense exploitation by the state. It is no coincidence that such persons tried to be included in the raiyye in the timars. Finally, it should be emphasized that the agrarian institutions of Ottoman feudalism outlined here are the fruit of concrete historical circumstances-those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Not all the features characteristic of this environment can be expressed in agrarian relations. During the period in question, the empire was experiencing its creation and consolidation-a process vast in scale at:ld immeasurably complex. There was the influx of huge nomadic masses who were at the stage of breakdown of the clan system into lands where mature feudal relations had been predominat. There were the ethnically connected (also Muslim) but developed feudal formations in the same lands; the influx of hostile, nomadic masses in the footsteps of the Ottomans, which almost put an end to the young empire; the long wars carried out later from the lands of the Byzantines, Serbs, and Bulgarians against the remains of their states and, on the other hand, socioeconomic disparity between the regimes on which the Ottoman conquerors sought to impose themselves and the state of the forces of production in the conquered lands. These are all but a part of the contradications that played a part in the formation of Ottoman society and the institutions it created. Some of these contradictions also found expession in agrarian relations in the empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which, until the end qf that period, continued to be characterized by the variety of color of their forms. The image of the Ottoman feudal agrarian institutions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, did not remain unchanged. Changes in the agrarian structure of the empire, which had appeared towards the end of the sixteenth century, were only the beginning of a new and no less complex process-the decline of conditional tied land ownership, the further development of the Ottoman feudal system, and the scarcely perceptible beginnings of its decay. The institutions and relations that characterize this next stage in history already bear their own new features, peculiarities, and tendencies of development.

198

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Notes to Chapter 1 1. J. V. Hammer, Des Osmanlischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung (Vienna, 1815), pp. 342, 346. W. Padel et L. Steeg, De La legislation fonciere Ottomane, (Paris, 1904), p. 9. 2. A. S. Tveritinova, Vostaniye Kara Yazidji-De/i Hasana v Turtsii (Moscow-Leningrad, 1946), p. 27. (Tveritinova accepts the following categories of land in the Ottoman empire: mulk, vakif, and miriye): A. F. Miller, Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar (Moscow-Leningrad 1947), p. 24. (according to Miller, the categories of land were as follows: land owned by the army, crown lands, church lands, and the m"Ulk). B. Tsvetkova, Pozemlenite otnosheniya v bulgarskite zemi pod osmansko vladichestvo do sredata na XVII v: Istoricheski pregled, year VII, book 2, p. 160 (Tsvetkova accepts Tveritinova's categorization, without mentioning the source): G. Gulubov, "Po nyakoi vuprosi na tourskoto feodalno zemevladeniye, " [zvestiya na lkonomicheskiya Institut, year VI, books 1-2, p. 199 (Gulubov mentions five categories ofland: mUlk, rayet, fj,ftlik, village common land, and officially owned land). His categorization has been criticized by B. Tsvetkova. (See "Prinos kum izouchavaneto na tourskiya feodalizm v bulgarskite zemi prez XV-XVI v," Izvestiya na Instituta za bulgarska istoriya, vol. 6, 1956, p. 119. N. Filipovic, "Pogled na osmanski feudalizam," Godisnjak istoriskog drustva Bosne i Herzegovine, year IV, p. 26 onward. (The author is inclined to the opinion that.two basic categories of land-the mulk and min-existed in the empire.) 3. A. S. Tveritinova, ibid. pp. 28-29. B. Tsvetkova, ibid. pp. 159-160. G. Gulubov, ibid. p. 165. 4. Abou Yousouf Ya'koub, Le livre de l'impot foncier (Kitab el-kharadJ) , traduit et annote par E. Fagnan (Paris, 1921). 5. Abou Yousouf Ya'koub, ibid., pp. 84-85. 6. Ibid. pp. 40-41. 7. JEid. pp. 90-91. 8. O. L. Barkan, XV ve XVI-inci asirlarda Osmanli imperatorll!gunda ziral ekonominin hukukl ve maTi esaslari; C. I. Kanunlar (Istanbul, 1943) (hereinafter referred to as "Kanunlar"). 9. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit. p. 29. 10. Compare E. A. Belyaev and A. Yu. Yakubovski, "Arabiya k nachalu VII," Vsemimaya Istoriya, vol. ill (Moscow, 1957), p. 104. 11. Kanunlar, pp. 296, 297. 12. I. P. Petrushevski, Ocherki po istorii feudal 'nych otnosheniy v Azerbaidjanye i Annenii v XVI-nachalye XIX w (Leningrad, 1949), p.224.

NOTES

199

13. H. Hadjibegic, "Kanun-nama Sultana Suleymana Zakonodavtsa" Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevu, Nova Serija, 1949-1950, Sveska IV-V, p. 345; Kanunlar, pp. 46, 49, 332. 14. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit. Kanunlar, p. 332. 15. See Chapter 3. 16. Some authors accept for the rakabe the formal legal term , 'absolute ownership" (B. Tsvetkova, "Prinos. . .," part I, I zvestiya na instituta za bulgarska istoriya, vol. 5, p. 118). 17. Osmanli Kanunnameleri "Milli Tetebbuler Mecmua'si" (hereinafter referred to as MTM), year I, 1331. no. 1, p. 51; Kanunlar p.297. 18. I. P. Petru shev ski , Zemedeliye i agrarniye otnosheniya v Irane XIII-XIV vv (Moscow-Leningrad, 1960), p. 136. 19. K. Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. ill, (Sofia, 1949), pp. 803-804. 20. See Chapter 2, "Ownerships in Perpetuity" and "Central Government. " 21. See, for example, O. L. Bark~, "Ser'i miras hukuku ve evlatlik vakiflar." istanbul Universitesi Iktisat faliUltesi mecmuasi, c. VI, s. I, pp. 157-158. 22. J. von Hammer, op. cit. vol. I, pp. 4445. 23. J. Deny, "Timar, " Enzyklopadie des Islam (Leiden-Leipzig, 1934), Bd. IV, p. 831. 24. M. Belin, "Du regime des fiefs militaires dans l'islamisme et specialement en Turquie," Journal asiatique, serie VI, t. XV, (1870), no. 56, p. 216. Compare: "Siyaset-name," Kniga 0 pravlenii vazira XI stoletiya Nizam-al Mul'ka (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), pp. 34, 140. 25. V. A. Gordlevski, "Gosudarstvo seldjukidov Maloi Azii," Izbranniye sochineniya, vol. I (Moscow, 1960), p. 97, onward. 26. P. A. von Tischendorf, Das Lehnswesen in den Moslemischen Reiche (Leipzig, 1872), p. 27. 27. Ibid. p. 24 28. I. H. Uzun~ar~ili, "XIV ve XV-inci asirlarda Anadolu beyliklerinde toprak ve halk idaresi," Belleten, c. IT, s. 5-6, pp. 105-106; Ditto Osmanli devleti te~kitatina methal (istanbul, 1941), pp. 252-262; M. Belin, op. cit. p. 217 onward, also speaks of the analogies between IIhan (Mongol) and Ottoman landownership. 29. I. H. Uzun~ar~ili, Osmanli devleti ... , pp. 62-63,123-127. 30. Ibid. p. 286 onward. 31. I. H. Uzun~~ili, "XIV ve XV-inci asirlarda Anadolu ... ," p. 99 onward; Ibid. Osmanli devleti ... , pp. 160-163. 32. I. H. Uzun~ar~ili, Anadolu beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu,

/

200

NOTES

Karakoy!!nlu devletleri (Anakara, 1937), p. 58 onward. 33. O. L. Barkan, "$er'i Miras hukuku ... ," pp. 156-157. Also see the documents published in I. H. Uzun
NOTES

201

52. V. D. Smirnov, Kuchibey Gyomyudjinski i drugiye osmanskiye pisateli XVII veka 0 prichinakJz upadka Turtsii (St. Petersburg, 1873), p. 133. 53. M. Belin, op. cit., p. 16. 54. P. A. von Tischendorff, op. cit., pp. 36,37; M. Belin, op. cit., p. 223; J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 337,414-415. 55. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 37. 56. M. F. Kopriilu, op. cit., p. 131. 57. J. Deny, op. cit., p. 832. 57a. Huseyin, "beda'i ul veka 'i, " publication of text, introduction, and general editorship of A. S. Tveritinova (Moscow, 1961), 1 30a-30b. 58. M. F. Kopriilu, op. cit., p. 129. 59. J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 337. 60. J. Deny, op. cit., p. 832. 61. M. T. Gokbilgin, XV ve XVI-inci asirlarda Edirne ve Pa~ alivasi vakiflar-mulker-mukataalar (istanbul, 1952), p. 162, 268, 169-170. 62. Ibid., p. 162. 63. Ibid., p. 296 onward; also see Chapter 2. 64. Ibid., p. 296. 65. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., pp. 41-42; J. von Hammer, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 66. M. Guboglu, "Paleografia ~i diplomatica turco-osmana," Studii ~i album, (Bucharest, 1958), p. 96. 67. I. H. Uzun9ar~ili, <;andarli, islam ansiklopedesi (istanbul), vol. ill, pp. 351-352. 68. F. Engels, "The Frankish Period," K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, vol. XVI, p. 391. 69. G. Elezovic, Turski spomenitsi, p. 12. 70. G. Elezovic, Ogledalo sveta iii istoriya Mehmeda Ne~riye, p.60. 71. Ibid. p. 61 (Elezovic's reading is given). 72. Yakov de Promontorio de Kampis, "Upravlenieto i prihodite na sultana," Izvestiya na istoricheskoto drouzhestvo, Book IX, pp. 5-80. 73. P. Wittek, "De la defaite d'Ankara it la prise de Constantinople (un demi-siecle d'histoire ottomane), " Revue des etudes islamiques (1938), Book I, p. 15. 74. Ibid., pp. 16-34; G. I. Ibragimov, "Krest'yanskiye vosstaniya v Turtsii v XV-XVI vv , " Vizanti iskii vremennik, vol. vn, pp. 133-140; A. D. Novichev, "Krest'yanskoe vosstaniye v Turtsii

202

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

v nachalye XV veka," Problemy vostoko-vedeniya (1960) no. 3. 75. H. inalcik, "1431-tarihli timar defterine gore Faith devrinden once timar sistemi" (hereinafter, .. F aith devrinden once timar. . ."), IV Turk tarih kongresi, p. 135. 76. Ibid., "835-tarihli Suret ... ," See notes regarding the separate timars. 77. Fr. Babinger, op. cit., p. 17. 78. H. inalcik, op. cit., p. 6 onward. 79. Fr. Babinger, op. cit., p. 25 onward, p. 58 onward. 80. Ibid., p. 325 onward. 81. M. E. Koprulu, op. cit., p. 129; O. L. Barkan, "~eri miras hukuku ... ," p. 156 onward. 82. See Chapter 2. 83. P. Wittek, op. cit., p. 26. 84. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 300 onward. 85. The measures undertaken by Mehmet IT are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 86. Fr. Babinger, op. cit., pp. 531-533. 87. For example, see Chapter I of Book VIT of the work quoted: "Mehmet zavoyevatelyat, monarhut i chovekut," (p. 498 onward). 88. Kanunlar, pp. 387-392. (Barkan republished the copy of Mehmet's Kanunname, published by Fr. Kraelitz-GriefJenhorst, Kanunname Sultan Mehmeds des Erobers, Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte (Wien, 1921), vol. I. 89. Kanunlar, p. 393-395. 90. Compare Yeo E. Lipshitz, "Visantiiskoe krest'yanstvo i slavyanskaya kollonizatziya" Vizantiiski sbornik (Moscow-Leningrad, 1945), pp. 132-134, where a detailed comparison is made between Salic and Burgundian law, and agrarian law. 91. Ibid., p. 133. 92. For details of the structure of the timars, see the "Collection of Orders for the Granting of Timars of Ayni Ali Nuezzinzade," published by von Tischendorf, in abovementioned work, pp. 88-94. It should be pointed out that, in the legislation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, no information has been found regarding the minimum kiliC;. In fact, it is not known to what extent Ayni Ali described what was on long-established, formerly existing practice, and to what extent this had been introduced at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 93. P. A. von Tischendorf, abovementioned work, p. 90 onward. 94. Compare, for example, Oriental Section, Fund I, Ed. 181, L. 1, where the timar holder requests that his estate should be de-

NOTES

203

scribed as a zeamet because he received supplements. 95. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 89; 1. Deny, op. cit., p.834. 96. For that order issued by SUleyman, see von Hammer, op. cit., p.90. 97. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 90. 98. V. Moutafchieva, "Kum vuprosa za chiflitsite ... ," p. 45. 99. J. Grzegorzew ski , Z sidzilatow rumelijskih epoki wyprawy wiedenskiej, Acta tureckie, (Lwow, 1912), doc. no. 75, 100. 100. J. Deny, op. cit., pp. 834-835. 101. As is known, historiography denies the existence of a feudal hierarchy in the Ottoman feudal system (Marsigli, L 'etat militaire de l'empire ottoman, (Hague-Amsterdam, 1932), p. 63; J. Deny, op. cit., p. 835; M. E. Koprulu, "Orta zaman Turk-islam feodalizmi," Belleten, C.V.S. 19, p. 339, etc. 102. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 320-321; J. von Hammer, op. cIt., pp. 311-312. 103. For details, see V. Moutafchieva, "0 feodal' noi ierarkhii v osmanskoi voenno-Iennoi sisteme (XV-XVI vv)," Problemy vostokovedeniya (1959), no. 3. 104. According to Ayni Ali (von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 94). 105. I. H. Uzun9ar~ili, Osmanli devletinin merkez ve bahriye tes.kilati (Ankara, 1948), p. 95. 106. I. H. Uzun~~i1i, op. cit., p. 96; Oriental Section, Sign, OAK 45/29. 107. H. Inalcik, op. cit., p. 6 onward. 108. Oriental Section, Sign TH 31/1 O. "Seres-okruzhno ouprav leniye-naseleniye XVI v. " 109. I. H. Uzun9ar~ili, op. cit., p. 96. 110. M. Belin, op. cit., p. 236. 111. H. inalcik, op. cit., p. 1. 112. J. Deny, op. cit., p. 836; V. Moutafchieva, "Za sustoyanieto na spahiluka prez XV -XVI v, " Istoricheski pregled, Year XV, Book 3, p. 59; O.riental Section, Sign D 304, D 369. 113. H. Inalcik, op. cit., p. XXVI. 114. Kanunlar, p. 272. 115. M. Belin, op. cit., p. 235. Compare Fr. Babinger, Sultanische Urkunden zur Geschichte der Osmanischen Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung am Ausgang der Herrschaft Mehmed II des Eroberers, I Teil (Munich, 1?56), pp. 173-180. 116. H. Inalcik, op. cit., p. XXV-XXVI. 117. Ibid.

204

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

118. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 37. 119. Ibid., p. 95 onward; 1. Deny, op. cit., p. 835. 120. J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 352-353. 121. Ibid. 122. P.A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 97. 123. Ibid., p. 89. 124. J. Deny, op. cit., p. 834. 125. J. von Hammer, op. cit., p. 368. 126. Ibid., p. 414, 354. 127. P. A. von Tischendorf, op. cit., p. 95. 128. Ibid. 129. H. Hadjibagic, op. cit., p. 313. 130. Compare, for example, J. Deny, op. cit., p. 831 onward. 131. H. inalcik, aforementioned work, pp. I-XXXVI; "Fatih devrinden once timar . . ." 132. H. Inalcik, "835-tarihli Suret . . .," p. XXITI. 133. M. Belin, pp. 44-47. 134. P. A. von Tischendorf, p. 831. 135. J. Deny, p. 831. 136. A. Thierry, Dix ans detudes historiques (Paris, 1851), vol. VI, p. 209, quotations according to Belin. 137. M. Belin, pp. 188-189. 138. J. Deny, p. 832. 139. See Chapter 2 for details regarding the malikime-divani system. 140. Kanunlar, p. 210. 141. Ibid., p. 182. 142. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 260. 143. Ibid., p. 424. 144. Ibid., p. 209. 145. M. T. Gokb ilg in , p. 139. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid., p. 141. 148. Oriental Section, Sign, CH 16/35. 149. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 115. 150. Oriental Section. Sign. MK/26/6. 151. Ibid., Sign. istanbul (Tsarigrad) defterhane. 20 rabi IT 969, Mukatai. (20 November, 969). 152. V. Moutafchieva, "Edin neizdaden zakon za silistrenskite i nikopolskite voinutsi," Izvestiya na durzhavnata biblioteka "Kiril i Metodi" (1953), p. 267 ownard. The name zeamet was also given

NOTES

205

to the revenue from bad-u hava, paid by nomads in Rumelia. This revenue was payable to the yornk bey of Tekirdag (M. T. Gokbilgin, Rumelide yurnkler, tatarlar ve evlad-i Jatihan (1957), p. 72). 153. According to Ayni Ali (P. A. v Tischendorf, p. 57 onward). 154. H. inalcik, "Fatih devrinden once timar ... " pp. 135. 136. 155. H. inalcik, "Faithdevrindenoncetimar ... " pp. 135, 136. 156. Same author, "835 tarihli Suret ... ," p. XXIII. Compare J. Deny, p .. 834. 157. H. Inalcik, "835 tarihli Suret . . .," timar, no. 19. 158. Ibid., no. 184. 159. Ibid., no. 108. 160. Ibid., nos., 77, 78, 82, 85, 88,94, 102, 103, 117, 118, 130, 131, 154, 162, 180, 182, 185, 191, 194, 195,200,218,220, 223, 254, 289, 306, 310, and so on. 161. H. inalcik, "Fatih devrinden ohce timar ... ," p. 137. 162. A. Stoyanovski, op. cit., p. 125. 163. Roussi Stoikov, who has published an excerpt of the names of villages in the register in question. ("Novi svedeniya za minaloto na bulgarskite selishta prez XV -XVI v," Istorieheski pregled, Year XV, Book 6), places it approximately in the 1430s, this assumption being based on the name Iskender Bey, who is referred to as the saneakbey of Nikopol, whom he identifies with the Albanian national hero. There are the following objections against the date he gives. The register numbered OAK 45/29 is not the result of the first registration of Rumelia (carried out in 1431). This is borne out by the significant differences between the nominal and real incomes of the timars. The fact that two sums are mentioned as the income of each timar shows that there must have been a previous general registration. Consequently, it could have been preceded only by a general inventory of the timars, and not by the partial registrations that existed until 1431. Also, thezeamet ofOmer Bey in the Turnovo area, which was "in fact a vakiJ of Firuz Bey, " is mentioned in the register (page 5a of the register). As we are aware, Firuz..Bey already had a vakiJtoward the middle of the fifteenth century. (0. L. Barkan, XV ve XVI-inei asirlarda Osmanli imperatorlugunda toprak i~qiliinin organizasyonu alinan ~ekiller (henceforth referred to as Toprak i~qiliginin ... ) JUJFM, C II, S. 1940. Phot XXX). Moreover, the vakiJofFiruz Bey had already been turned into a zeamet. It was mentioned that this measure dated from the reign of Mehmet II, and, at that, from the end of his reign (see below, Ch. 2). Apart from this, Hammer states that at the same time, in 1475, Mehmet II ordered a full registration of the timars, which the author in question accepts as being the first

206

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

of their kind to be carried out. (1. von Hammer, p. 414). In all probability, the register in question is the result of the registration of 1475. 164. Oriental Section, Sign. TH 31110. 165. Above mentioned document, L. 29a. 166. Ibid., L. 29b. 167. Ibid., L. 31a. 168. Oriental Section, Inv. no. 1/1959. In "Za sustoyanieto na spahiluka prez XV-XVI v, " the author estimates the date of this document to be during the reign of Mehmet ll. The document, however demonstrates complete compatibility with the register of Arvanid, 1431, published by inalcik, which we had sight of after the publication of the article in question. The registers of which a comparison was made were written by the same person. For this reason, no. 111959 should be considered as dating from the time of Murat ll. 169. Oriental Section, Sign. Defteri (Ledgers), no. 331. 170. For the average size of the timars in Rumelia in the fifteenth century, also compare the unpublished registers from the Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 45/30 (the A vret Hisar aIld Salonika vilayets), OAK 52/59 (Visoka nahiy), Inv. no. 674/1954 (Samokov nahiya), istanbul(Tsarigrad) defterhane (ledger office). Tzmars 1953 (Izvomik sancak) , and others. 171. Ibid., Sign. HPTA XVI v. 1111. ~~~ 172. Ibid., Sign Tsarigrad (istanbul) defterhane. Timars. 4 zilkade 988. 173. 0 . L. Barkan, "C;;ift<;i siniflarinin ... , Ulku, C.X S 58, p.259. 174. V. Moutafchieva, "Za sustoyanieto na spahil uka . . .," p. 56 onward. 175. Fr. Babinger, p. 96. 176. J. von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, (pest, 1827-1835), vol. IV, p. 193. 177. H. inalcik, "835 tarihli suret ... ," pp. XXXV-VI. 178. G. Galabov, H. W. Duda, Die Protokollb"Ucher des Kadiamtes Sofia, (Munchen, 1960). 179. H. Hadjibegic, pp. 320-321. 180. See below, Chapter 2. 181. Oriental Section, Funds Defterhane and Velik Vezir, "Timar" section. 182. H. inalcik, op. cit., p. XXIV. 183. A. Stoyanovski, p. 124. 184. O. L. Barkan, "Osmanli impararorlugunda <;ifti<;i siniflarin hukuki statiisu," fJlk~, C X S 56, p. 157 (Hereafter "Ciftci

NOTES

207

siniflarin . . .". 185. H. Inalcik, Timars, Nos. 16, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33. 186. Ibid., Timars, Nos. 95, 105, 116, 119, 120. 187. Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 45129. 188. Ibid., Inv. No 111959. 189. Ibid., Sign. OAK 52/59. 190. Ibid., Sign. OAK 45/30. 191. Ibid., Sign. OAK 52/59. 192. Ibid., Sign. OAK 45/30. 193. Ibid., Sign. OAK 45/29. 194. Ibid:, Inv. no. 111959. 195. H. Inalcik, pp. XXIX. 196. Ori~nta1 Section, Sign. OAK 45/29, 34a and 37. 197. H. Inalcik, Timar, nos., 22, 24. 198. Ibid., Timar, Nos. 10, 33, 88, 97, etc. 199. Ibid., Timar, Nos. 80, 102, 113, 116, 81, etc. 200. Oriental Section, Inv. no. 111959. 201. Ibi~., Sign. TH 31110, p. 15. 202. H. Inalcik, p. 15. 203. Ibid., Timar, no. 59. 204. Ibid., Timar, no. 67. 205. H. Inalcik, Timar, No. 83. 206. Ibid., Timar, No. 19. 207. Ibid., no. 61. Compare nos., 2, 3, and so on. 208. A. ~toyanovski, p. 124. 209. H. Inalcik, Timar no. 5 (with a revenue of 4,624 akqe); no. 7 (1,250 akqe); no. 9 (1,834 akqe) and so on. 110. Ibid., no. 9. 111. Ibid., no. 83. 212. Ibid., no. 5, etc. . 213. Quotation from H. Inalcik, op. cit., p. XXV. 214. J. von Hammer, Des Osmanischen Reiches Staatsveifassung, vol. I, pp. 358-359. 215. Ibid., p. 359. 216. Ibid., p. 360. 217. J. Deny, p. 834. 218. J. von Hammer, op. cit., p. 355. 219. Ibid., p. 359. 220. Ibid., p. 368. 221. Ibid. 222. V. D. Smirnov, p. 120 onward.

208

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

223. D. Pop-Georgiev, Sopstvenosta vrz chiflitsite i chifligarskite agramo-pravni odnosi vo Makedoniya do balkanskata voina 1912. (Skopje, 1956), pp. 27, 35, 41. 224. M. T. Gokbilgin, "Edime ve pa~a livasi ... ," p. 169. 225. Oriental Section, Sign. MK 2612. 226. See Chapter 2. 227. Kanunlar, p. 210. 228. For types and size of rent, see Chapter 3. 229. V. Moutafchieva, "K voprosy a feodal'noi ierarkhii ... ," p. 92 onward. 230. O. L. Barkan, "<;;ift~i siniflarin ... ," C.X.S. 58, p. 300. 231. O. L. Barkan, "<;;ift~i siniflarin ... ," C. IX, 50, p. 114, C.X 58, pp. 300-302. . 232. Compare, for example, Timar no. 102 mentioned in Inalcik's work, from which two houses were removed. 233. J. Deny, p. 831 onward. 234. H. inalcik, Timars, nos. 102, 184,70, 124, 161,281, 8, 217,20,30, etc. 235. Kanunlar, p. 268. 236. Ibid., p. 272. 237. Ibid., pp. 273-274. 238. Kanunlar, pp. 273-274. 239. Ibid., p. 272. 240. Ibid., pp. 272-273. 241. Ibid., p. 272. 242. G. Galabov, H. W. Duda, Doc. nos. 937, 128, 603, 654. 243. J. Deny, pp. 837-838. 244. Kanunlar, p. 3. 245. H. Hadjibegic, p. 318; J. von Hammer, vol. 1, p. 194. 246. O. L. Barkan, "M·Ulk, topraklar ve sultanlarin temlik hakki," istanbul Universitesi iktisat fakUltesi mecmuasi, C. vn S. 1, p. 170. 247. Fr. Babinger, p. 503 onward. 248. O. L. Barkan, "~eri miras hukuku ... ," p. 257 onward. 249. O. L. Barkan, "<;;ift~i siniflarin ... ," C.IX. S. 49, p. 35 onward. 250. Ibid., C.X.S 59, p. 416. 251. ~. A. von Tischendorf, p. 96. 252. O. L. Barkan, C.X.S. 59, p. 420. 253. Ibid., pp. 416-419. 254. Ibid.; J. von Hammer, vol. 1, p. 349 onward. 255. J. von Hammer, pp. 361, 364.

NOTES

209

256. O. L. Barkan, C.X.S. 59, pp. 418419. 257. P. A. von Tischendorf, p. 96. 258. J. Deny, p. 832. 259. Ibid., p. 834; H. inalcik, "Timariotes chn!tiens en Albanie au XV s., " Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, Bd. N, 1952. Compare same author's Fatih devri uzerinde tedkikler ve vesikalar (Ankara, 1954); also by same author, "Od Stefan a Dusana do Osmanskog carstva," Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju i istoriju jugoslavenskih naroda pod turskom vladininom, vols, III-W; B. Tsvetkova, "Noviye danniye 0 khristiyanakh-spahiyakh na Balkanskom poluostrove v period turetskovo gospodstva," Vizantiiskii vremennik, vol. VID. 260. H. inalcik, "Fatih devrinden once timar ... ," p. 137 onward. 261. Ibid. 262. A. ~tojanovski, p. 127. 263. H. Inalcik, "835-tarihli Suret ... ," Timar, no. 11. 264. Ibid., p. 2, Oriental Section, Fund 1, ed, 15126, L. 3 265. H. inalcik, Fatih devrinden once timar ... pp. 136-137. 266. Ibid., p. 137. 267. O. L. Barkan, C.I0, S.59, p. 419. 268. Oriental section, Sign. OAK 54/29: OAK 52/59: OAK 45/30: inv. 111959: TH 31110, and so on. Unfortunately, the limited extent of these registers and incomplete information as far as the names of the timar holders and their occupations are concerned do not permit us to arrive at defmite percentages in terms of the composition of the sipahi caste. (The Nikopol ledger is very typical in this respect.) 269. Fr. Babinger, p. 531. 270. Ori~ntal Section, Sign. OAK 45/29. 271. H. Inalcik, "835-tarihli Suret ... ," pp. 1-6 (the description is not complete). 272. Ayni Ali according to P.A. von Tischendorf, p. 59 onward. 273. Ibid. 274. Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 45/29, L. 32b, 41b, 37b. 275. V. Moutafchieva, "Za sustoyanieto na spahiluka prez XV-XVL v.," p. 42. 276. A.D. Novichev, "K voprosu 0 feodal'nikh otnosheniyakh i polozhenii krest'yan v Turtsii vo vtoroi polovinye XV veka," Vcheniye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universitets no. 294, Seriya vostokovednickikh nauk, Vyp. 12, p. 135. 277. M. Belin, p. 234; J. Deny, p. 835; A. Stojanovski, p. 120.

210

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

278. P. A. von Tischendorf, p. 95. 279. Ibid. The statement of Ko~i Bey is to the same effect (V.D. Smimov, aforementioned work, p. 90). 280. H. Inalcik, "835-tarihli Suret ... ," p. 28 onward. 281. Fr. Kraelitz., op. cit., p. 25; Kanunlar, pp. 275, 294, 236. 282. Kanunlar, p. 271. 283. A. S. Tveritinova, K voprosu 0 domenial'nom zemevladenii feodalovlennikov v Osmanskoi imperii v XV-XVI vekakh, "Kratkiye soobshcheniye Instituta vostokovedeniya, vol. xxxvm (1960), p. 28. 284. Br. Djurdjev, "0 uticaju osmanske vladivane na razvitak naSih naroda, " Godinjak istoriskog drustva Bosne i Hercegovine, god. II (1950), pp. 29, 36. 285. A. S. Tveritinova, pp. 28-29. 286. O. L. Barkan, C;ift islam ansiklopedisi, C. III, p. 394. 287. Fr. Kraelitz, p. 23. 288. H. Hadjibegic, pp. 301-302. 289. N. Filipovic, "Carska zapoved Besaretu," Glasnik Zemaljsko g Muzeja u Sarajevu, Sv. IV-V, p. 284. 290. O. L. Barkan, op. cit., p. 394. 291. Kanunlar, p. 90 onward. 292. Br. Djurdjev, "Cmogorski defter iz 1521-3 g.," Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladivinom, t. II, (1951), pp. 49 onward. 293. Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 60, etc. 294. H. Hadjibegic, p. 318; Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 283. 295. Fr. Kraelitz, p. 28. 296. Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 197/10. This register is also quoted in my study of farms in the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. (lstoricheski pregled, Year. XIV, Book 1), where, on p. 47, there is an extract in the form of a table of the hassa fields and vineyards as proof that, as an esception during the period under discussion as well, elements of the hassa farm existed in some fiefs. In his study, "L' evolution du regime feodal turc de la fm du XVle jusqu'au milieu du xvm s.," Etudes historiques l'occasion du xle congres international des sciences historiques Stockholm (AOllt, 1960), (Sofia, 1960), p. 175. B. Tsvetkova, arguing against the conception that, in the empire during this period, the hassa in small fiefs was in decline, quotes the same register as her only argument, leaving the reader with the impression that the information contained in the register has been deliberately concealed by me. Moreoever, the only timar register from which I have taken

a a

NOTES

211

a literal extract is the above, because it is this register that is an exception to the others, where the hassa has undergone changes. It should be noted that Tsvetkova has remained silent about the existence of the remaining timar registers to which she had access; these registers w(:>uld disprove her argument. 297. H. Inalcik, op. cit., pp. 1-6. 298. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 299. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 300. Oriental Section, Sign. Defteri, no. 331. 301. Oriental Section, Sign. CL 7/2. 302. TH 31110, p. 13. 303. Ibid., Sign. OAK 45/29: inv. 1/1959; OAK 45/30: .OAK 52/59; Seres-local admi?istration, population, XVI century; Istanbul, Defterhane, TImars. Istanbul-Defterhane. Lands under feudal exploitation, XVI century, istanbul-Defterhane, XVI century, istanbul. Defterhane, Timars, 1480, inv. 647/1954. 304. Br. Djurdjev, op. cit., p. 49 onward. 305. Oriental Section, inv. 647/1954. 306. For forced labor (angarya), see Chapter 3. 307. H. Hadjibegic, p. 318; Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 283; J. von Hammer, p. 194. 308. H. Hadjibegic, ibid. 309. Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 283. 310. Ibid., p. 399. 311. Kanunlar, p. 90 onward. 312. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 128 onward. 313. Br. Djurdjev, p. 49 onward. 314. Oriental Section, inv. 647/1954.

212

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Notes to Chapter 2

1. In the present study, we accept the term "land mulk" (toprak mulku), introduced by O. L. Barkan, Mulk topraklar ve sultanlarin temlik fulkki, " istanbul Universitesi iktisat faliUltesi mecmuasi, C. vn, S.l, p. 164 onward, as the term used in our historiography (gazi mUtk) (B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya v bulgarskite zemi pod osmansko vladichesko do sredata na XVIT vek, Istoricheski pregled, Year VIT, Book 2, p. 165) only partially expresses the meaning of the concept. 2. ~anunlar, pp. 296-297: MTM, I, 1, pp. 49-50. 3. O. L. Barkan, ibid., p. 157. 4. 1. P. Petrushevski, Ocherki po istoriifeodal'nykh otnoshenii v Azerbaidjanye i Armenii v XVI-nacfullye XIX w. (Leningrad, 1949), p. 222 ... 5. O. L. Barkan, op. cit., pp. 165-168. 6. i. H. Uzun~ar§ili, Osmanli devleti te~kilatina methal, pp. 125-126. 7. Ibid., p. 125. 8. 1. P. Petrushevski, op. cit., pp. 224-226. 9. The malikane-divani system has been studied in detail by O. L. Barkan. "Malikane-divani sistemi," Turk hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmua~i, C. IT, 1939. 10. 1. H. Uzun~ar§ili, op. cit., p. 166; compare with Kanunlar, pp. 182, 110. 11. Kanunlar, p. 83. 12. We have dwelt upon malikane-divani to the extent that it can serve as a basis for anaology with the malikimeler that appeared toward the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. See S. Avdo, "Malikana dozivotni zakup drzavniv dobara u osmanskoj drzavi," Prilozi za orijentalno filologiju i istoriju jugoslavenskih naroda pod turetskom vladivinom, vol. XVill-XIX, 1958-1959, which are not an object of the present study. 13. i. H. Uzun~ar§ili, op. cit., pp. 164-166. 14. Temlik-a mulk estate. 15. O. Hilmi, Ahkam-iil evkafistanbul, 1307), 130 fetva, p. 55, quotation according to O. L. Barkan, "Mulk top rakla r, p. 160. 16. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 158. 17. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 160. 18. The author of the translation has adopted the term "absolute property" for the Turkish "miilkiyet." 19. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa iz Sofiya 0 timarskoj organizaciji XVIT stolecu," Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevu, Nova serija, Sv.IT, 1947, p. 153. The official Ottoman documents

NOTES

213

themselves define the powers of the mulk sahibi as follows: M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 414. 20. G. Elezovic, Turski spomenitsi, I., p. 681; H. inalcik, Fatih devri uzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar, I (Ankara, 1954), p. 219. 21. Ibid., p. 108. 22. D. Ihchiev, "Akt ze zaveshtaniye na Karlovskiya tev liyet, napisan na I den ot M. Shaban 801g ot Egira (8 April 1399), " /zvestiya na Istoricheskoto droumestvo, n.m (1911), p. 209 onward; M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 184 onward; G. Elezovic, op. cit., p. 678 onward. Oriental Section F I, ed. 15110, L. 5-4. 23. Ibid. 24. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 188-189, 193,234,282; G. Elezovic, p. 1089. 25. Ibid., p. 449. 26. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 241, 330,408,44, 187, ~75, 33, 403, 437. 27. Information concerning the transformation of mUlks into vakifs is more readily available from the first and, even more so, the second generation of mulk owners (Ibid., pp. 424, 407,392,507,443, 417,381,329,450,128,408,341,412,397: Oriental Section, "istanbul defterhanesi," Vakiflar, 890.). 28. We discover the value of the ducat-(thirty akc;e) from Z. Karamursal, Osmanli mali tarihi hakkinda tetkikler (Ankara, 1940), p.4. 29. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 89,408,282,289, 173,; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-Defterhane, Vakijlar: M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 321, 329,297,230,407,406,392, 118,235,243; G. Elezovic, op. cit., p. 713; M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 507,494,443,438,429,435, 418,417,381; G. Elezovic, pp. 127-144; M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 444, 450,443. 30. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 407. 31. G. Elezovic, Turski spomenitsi, p. 93 onward. 32. Ibid., pp. 127-141. 33. Hr. Hristov, "Nyakoi problemi na prehoda ot feodalizma kum kapitalizma v istoriyata na Bulgariya," Istonsheski pregled, Year XVll, Book 3, p. 86 onward. 34. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 508. 35. Ibid., p. 287. 36. Ibid., p. 411. 37. We fmd anaological information in another vakifname for the Debur area (H. Kaleshki and M. Mehmedovski, Tn vakufnami na Kachanikli Mehmet pasha (Skopje, 1958), pp. 72-73.

214

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

38. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 318, 319, 321, 380-382,498-502. 39. Ibid., pp. 238,417,426,448, 506, 515, 518. 40. H. Hadjibegic, Kanun-nama sultana Sulejmana zakonodavtsa, pp. 320-321. 41. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 242, 248, 253, 334,417,429,403, 432, 435, 456, 502, 504, 506, 508, 391, 409, 417, 435. 42. Ibid., pp. 238, 242. 43. Ibid., pp. 261,417,436,440,448, etc. 44. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 241, 329. 45. V. N. Gordelevskii, p. 218. 46. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 89. 47. B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya v bulgarskite zemi pod osmansko vladichesko," p. 165. 48. G. Elezovic, p. 7 onward; M. T. Gokbilgin, aforementioned work, p. 201; O. L. Barkan, "Toprak i~~iliginin ... " IT, 412; D. Thchiev, "Akt za zaveshtaniye na Karlovskiye tevliyet, napisan na l-ya den na M. shaban 801 ot Egira," IBID, Book Sh. (1911), pp. 208-216. Gokbilgin wrongly assumes this mulk to belong to the reign of Beyazit IT (op. cit., p. 349). 49. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 438, 390, 515,426,435-436,224,437, 414,331,332,415,323,324,488,489. Midks belonging to the "supporters" of a given ruler can also be found. (Ibid., pp. 118, 236.) 50. Ibid., pp. 417, 289, 502. 51. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 198, 199,266-295,325,390,455-456, and so on. 52. i. H. Uzun~ar~ili, "Evrenos," islam ansiklopedisi, C. IV, p.414. 53. Ibid., <;;andarli, islam ansiklopedisi, C. Ill, p. 351. 54. G. Elezovic, p. 13 onward, pp. 27, 29 onward. 55. For details, see V. Moutafchieva, "Miilk sahibite, " Istoricheski pregled, Year XVIT, Book 6. 56. O. L. Barkan, Ser'i miras hukuku ... , p. 157. 57. See the detailed bibliography of the works of Western European bourgeois scholars regarding the vakif in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, etc. in A. Heffening, "Waqf," EnzyklopCulie des Islam (Leiden-Leipzig, 1934), Bd. IV; and in J. Krcsmarik, "Das Wakfrecht yom Standpunkte des Sariatrechtes nach der Hanefitischen Schule, Ein Beitrag zum Studium des islamitischen Rechtes," ZeitschriJt der Deutchen Morgenlandischen GesellschaJt, 45 Bd. (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 511-576. 58. O. L. Barkan, Ser'i miras hukuku ... , pp. 169-170. 59. ibid., p. 169.

NOTES

215

60. Ibid., p. 157. 61. A. Heffening, p. 1191. 62. Oriental Section F. 1, SD. 15115. 63. O. L. Barkan, "Avariz," islam ansiklopedisi c.n, p. 15. 64. Kanunlar, p. 21. 64a. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 86. 64b. Ibid., pp. 161-530. 64c. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 205, 241; Oriental Section, Sign PD 17112. 64d. In places where the publisher of the documents used has printed the names in Arabic script, certain corrections have been made in their transcription. 64e. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 248, 259,315-317,328,370-371,394, 408,414,417,455,457. Compare Elezovic, op. cit., pp. 392,491, 492, 500, 501, 497, 502. 64f. It should be noted that these vakil villages in the Rhodopes were affected by compulsory conversion to Islam during the seventeenth century. See S. Zahariev, Opisaniye na Tatar-pazardjish kata kaza (Vienna, 1870), pp. 67-68. 64g. According to some documents dating from the nineteenth century, the territory of Koprivshtitsa also belonged to the vakif of Mihrimah Sultan (Koprivshtitsa Museum, Arch. Ed. 15). 64h. Not mentioned in Gokbilgin's work. 64i. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 503, 506, 525,407,497,498,500,506, 263, 397, 376, 188, 205, 440. 64j. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 440, 497,205,327,373,396,315,406, 372. 64k. Ibid., pp. 372, 296, 316, 368,405,429-432,453,458,492, 497, 499, 505, 264, 276. 641. Ibid., pp. 276, 390, 445, 446. 64m. Ibid., SF 2217. 64n. The register is kept in the Oriental Section of the Cyril and Methodius National Library under signature OAK 217/8. 640. M. Guboglu, Paleografia §i diplomatica turco-osmana, (Bucure~ti, 1958), p. 97. 64p. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 505. 64q. The kaza to which the village belongs is not stated. 64r. OAK 217/8. 64s. D. G. Gadjanov, "Putouvane na Evliya Chelebi prez bulgarskite zemi prez sredata na xvn v.," Periodichesko spisaniye, LXX, 1909, p. 658. 64t. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 434.

216

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

64u. Ibid.; D. Thchiev, "Tourskite vakufi v bulgarskoto tsarstvo i dokoumenti vurhu tyah," Minalo, Year I, Book 3, p. 243 onward (here we have given Thchiev' s version of the names of the villages, as the publisher the kanunname has not stated where this document is kept). 64v. O. L. Barkan, "XV ve XVI asirlarda Osmanli imparatorlugunda toprak i§<;iliginin organizasyonu alinan §ekiller," JUJFM, C.I, S.4, (1940), Photo No: XXX. 64w. OAK/217/8, p. 34. 64x. Ibid., p. 18. 64y. OAK/217/8, p. 34. 64z. G. Balaschev and D. Thchiev, "Prlvilegiite na rayata v zemite, zaveshtani na chestitite gradove Meka i Medina," Minalo, Year 1, Book 2, p. 144. 65. A. Heffening, op. cit., p. 1187. 66. J. Krcsmarik, op. cit., p. 512. 67. A. Heffening, p. 1189. Compare N. Pigulevskaya, "Zarozhdeniye feodal'nykh otnoshenii na Blizhnem Vostoke, Ucheniye zapiska Instituta vostokovedeniya, vol. XVI, pp. 14-15. 68. J. Krcsmarik, p. 517. 69. A. Heffening, p. 1187; J. Krcsmarik, pp. 512-513. 70. J. Krcsmarik, pp. 529-530. 71. A. Heffening, p. 1187. 72. J. Krcsmarik, 529-53l. 73. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa ... ," p. 153. 74. A. Heffening, p. 1192. 75. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 16l. 76. H. Hadjibagic, p. 161. 77. J. Krcsmarik, pp. 545-549. 78. B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya ... ," p. 168. 79. A. Heffening, p. 1187. 80. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 160-540. 81. Kanunlar, p. 20. 82. J. Krcsmarik, pp. 554-556. 83. G. Elezovic, p. 54 onward. 84. H. Kaleshki and M. Mehmedovski, Tri vakufname na Kachanikli Mehmed Pasa (Skopje, 1958), p. 73 onward. 85. Compare A. D. Davydov, "Imeniya Medrese Subhan-kuli khana v Balkhe (po vakufnoi gramote XVII v.)," Kratkiye soobshteniya Instituta vostokovedeniya, vol. XXXVII, p. 82 onward. 86. J. Krcsmarik, pp. 550, 552. 87. See above, Chapter 1.

NOTES

217

88. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 161-162. 89. Ibid., p. 193. 90. Ibid., p. 162. 91. Ibid., p. 268. 92. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 268. 93. Ibid., pp. 169-170. 94. Ibid., p. 162. 95. Ibid., p. 296. 96. Ibid., pp. 174-175. 97. Ibid., pp. 194, 195. 98. Ibid., pp. 282, 296. 99. Ibid., p. 199. 100. Ibid., p. 331, etc. 101. O. L. Barkan, ~er'i miras hukuku ... , pp. 171-174. 102. ~. Heffening, p. 1187; J. Krcsmarik, p. 513. 103. O. L. Barkan, op. cit., pp. 171-175. 104. A. Heffening, op. cit., p. 1188. 105. J. Krcsmarik, p. 549. 106. ' 'They are administered according to the wishes of the bequeather for all time ... " (H. Hadjibegic, Rasprava Ali Causa ... , p. 153). 107. J. Krcsmarik, pp. 516-517, 562-564. 108. A. Heffening, p. 1187. 109. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 184, 183,289, etc. 110. Ibid., p. 170. 111. Ibid., p. 195. 112. G. Elezovic, pp. 1145-1149. 113. Ibid., p. 19. 114. Ibid., p. 34. 115. Ibid., pps. 14-22. 116. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 441-448. 117. Ibid., p. 203. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid. 120. Sinan Bey, who was beylerbey of Rumelia, set aside one-fifth of the annual income of his big vakil for its mutevelli (ditto, p. 255). 121. L. Fekete, Die Syaquat-Schrift (Budapest, 1955), pp. 164-169; M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 220; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbulGrand Vizier's mukatai, 22 zilhice, 1054. 122. M. T. Gokbilgin, ibid., p. 179 onward. 123. G. Galabov, H. W. Duda, op. cit., doc. nos. 875,991,1136. 124. Ibid., doc. nos. 1094; M. T. Gokbilgin, ibid., pp. 430, 286,

218

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

338-339, 288-289, 295. It is characteristic that all the abuses that have been mentioned are to be found in noninherited tevliyets, when during a change of mutevelli, who was appointed by the kadi, the vakif managers who had been dismissed were obliged to give an account of funds, etc. available. With hereditary tevliyets, the government had no access to their accounts. 125. The vakifs of Evrenos were administered by his descendents unti11912. (G. Elezovic, op. cit., p. 8). From the family tree ofYahya Pa~a, who made his mulk into a vakif during the reign of Beyazit n, it is clear that the estate passed through the hands of fourteen generations of mutevellis from his branch of the family, or in total, through forty-two mutevellis of that family. The last of them, Arif Bey, was mutevelli in 1913 (ibid., p. 210). 126. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 163-169. 127. Ibid., pp. 177-181. 128. Ibid., pp. 203-209. 129. Ibid., pp. 210-213. 130. Ibid., pp. 213-215. 131. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 216-218. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid., pp. 300-315. 134. Ibid., p. 363. 135. The fact that the villages in question were the vakif of Siileyman I is not stated in literature on the subject. It is interesting to note that these were villages in the Rhodopes, which were affected by compulsory conversion to Islam during the mid-seventeenth century. 136. Ibid., pp. 497-498. 137. G. Elezovic, op. cit., pp. 14-18,29-31,43-54,420 onward. 138. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 237-238, 193-194, 162, 195, 184,298, 198, 191,331, 176. 139. Ibid., pp. 267-268,192, 162, 174, 195, 183, 188, 175,412. 140. Ibid., pp. 489-494, 434, 488, 336-337, etc. 141. Ibid., pp. 188, 193-194, 170, 162, 174,282,195,291,295, 273, etc. 142. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 386, 309-311, 307, etc. 143. Ibid., pp. 333,267-268, 189; compare same, "Les Institutions sociales et culturelles de la colonisation et leur action spirituelle dans la Peninsule Ba1canique' , (XV congres internationale de sociologie: Istanbul, 1952), p. 255 onward. 144. M. T. Golkbilgin, p. 517. 145. G. Elezovic, p. 4 onward.

NOTES

219

146. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 193, 195, 191, 188, 282, 275, etc. 147. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 195,188,287,282,275; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul, Defterhane, valdflar, 890. 148. Ibid., pp. 296, 193-194, 198, 191. 149. Thus, Yahya Pa~a included in his mulk a mulk farm in the Skopje area, one in the Sofia area, and one in the Nikopol area (G. Elezovic, pp. 434-444); ~ehabeddin Pa~a-two in the Plovdiv area (M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 260); Rustem Pa~a-several in the Vize and Gelibolu areas (ibid., pp. 518-519); Turhan Bey-two farms in eastern Thrace (ibid., p. 341); Davud Bey-one farm (ibid., p. 404). 150. Ibid., p. 333. 151. Ibid., p. 440 . \ . 152. Kanunlar, p. 70. 153. G. Elezovic, op. cit., pp. 14-18. 154. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 370, 489-494. 155. M. T. Gokbilgin, Rumelide Yorokler, Tatarlar ve EvlluJ-i Jatihan, pp. 9-13. 156. A. D. Novichev, "Turetskiye kochevniki XV -xvn vV," XXV mezhdunarodny kongres vostokovedov, (Report of Soviet delegation) Doklady delegatsii SSSR (Moscow, 1960), Otd. Otpech. p. 6 onward. , 157. M. T. Gokbilgin, Edirne ve PaSa livasi ... , pp. 203-209. 158. Ibid., pp. 213-215. 159. Ibid., pp. 581-582. 160. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 300-315; Oriental Section, Sign. Seres: local administration; population, XVIe. 161. Ibid., pp. 300-315. 162. Ibid., p. 367. 163. Ibid., p. 177. 164. The valdJofthe son of Mehmet <;elebi is typical in this respect: the latter bequeathed the actual revenue from the ford on the River Maritsa to the mosque in his mulk village of Kadi, Chirmen district (which was not itself a vald/); this was worth 1,500 akqe per annum (ibid., p. 318). 165. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa ... , p. 153. 166. H. Hadjibegic, Kanun-nama Sultana Sulejmana ... , pp. 320-321; M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 380, 435-436, etc. 167. G. Balaschev and D. Thchiev, "Privilegiite na rayata v zemite, zaveshtani na chestitite gradove Meka i Medina i dokoumenti vurhu tyah," Minalo, Year I, Book 2, p. 147. 168. For the components of the rent collected by the feudal lord in mulks and valdfs, see Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-Defterhane;

220

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

"Zemi pod feodalna eksploatatsiya, XVI v., Istanbul-defterhane, vakifiar," 890; M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 163-164, 165-166, 171, 178, 263, 273; G. Elezovic, op. cit., pp. 57-58, 1089-1090; G. Balaschev and D. Thchiev, op. cit., pp. 145-151, etc. 169. Ibid., and D. Thchiev, "Tourskite vakufi v bulgarskoto tsarstvo i dokoumenti vurhou tyah," Minalo, Year I, Book 3, pp. 244-245. 170. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 273-274. 171. Ibid., p. 163. 172. Ibid., pp. 336, 378,473,213,220,284,457. 173. Ibid., pp. 515, 499. 174. Ibid., pp. 407, 515, 208, 500. 175. Ibid., p. 177. 176. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 417; Kanunlar, p. 85 (in this case, the raiyye of the vakif was exempted from giving acemi oglanlar or dev§irme-young boys from their families for military service); G. Elezovic, pp. 36-38. 177. Ibid., pp. 259, 276, 284, 233-234, 213, 414, 417, 260, etc. 178. G. Elezovic, pp. 36-38; M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 417; Kanunlar, pp. 82, 21. 179. See M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 284, 276, etc. 180. Ibid., pp. 183, 185; G. Balaschev and D. Thchiev, op. cit., appendix. 181. M. T. Gokbilgin , p. 417. 182. Ibid., p. 434. 183. Kanunlar, p. 85. 184. G. Elezovic, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 185. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 178. 185a. Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 217/8. 185b. Oriental Section, Sign. OAK 217/8. 186. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa ... ," p. 153. 187. G. Elezovic, pp. 57-58. 188. Oriental Section, Fund 1, Unit 15115. 189. G. Balaschev and D. Thchiev, pp. 145-151. 190. Oriental Section, Nikopol, "Vakufsko oupravleniye," rabi II, 1835. 191. Ibid. 192. M. T. Gokb ilg in , p. 220. 193. Ibid., p. 372. 194. Ibid., p. 378. 195. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 517; V. Moutafchieva, "Za prilozheniyeto na robskiya troud v osmanskoto stopanstvo prez

NOTES

221

XV-XVI v. , " Sbornik v chest na Marin Drinov (Sofia, 1960), p. 510 onward. 196. O. L. Barkan, "Toprak i~
222

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

229. Ibid., p. 341. 230. Ibid., p. 169. 231. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 335; compare with list of acemi oglanlar, ibid., p. 119. 232. J?id., p. 249. 233. O. L. Barkan, Doc. XL. 234. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 257-258. 235. Ibid., p. 429. 236. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 408. 237. Ibid. 238. Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-defterhane: Timarlar (incorrect classification. 1480). 239. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 457. 240. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 505-506. 240a. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 261. 240b. Ibid.,pp. 262, 370, 457, etc. 240c. Oriental Section, Sign. PD 17/12. 241. G. Balaschev and D. Ihchiev, p. 144 onward; B. Tsvetkova, Pozemlenite otnosheniya ... , p. 168. 242. B. Tsvetkova, "Prinos ... ," Part I, p. 132 onward; AI. Bourmov, "Tourskiyat feodalizum v bulgarskite zemi," Istoriya na Bulgariya (Sofia, 1954), p. 246. 243. H. Hadjibegic, Rasprava ~.li Causa . .. , p. 153. 244. See documents concerning O. L. Barkan, Ser'i miras hukuku ... , pp. 171-181. 245. G. Balaschev and D. Ihchiev, op. cit. 246. Ibid. 247. D. Ihchiev, "Akt na zeveshtaniye na Karlovskiya tev liyet. . ." 248. Koprivshtitsa Museum, Arch. Ed. 15. 249. G. Elezovic, p. 8. 250. Ibid., p. 78. 251. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," pp. 158-160. 252. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 218. 253. Ibid., p. 384. 254. Ibid., pp. 385-386. 255. Ibid., pp. 426-427. 256. Ibid., pp. 412-413. 257. Ibid., p. 444. 258. Ibid., p. 404. 259. Ibid., p. 433. 260. O. L. Barkan, Ser'i miras hukuku ... , pp. 158-160.

NOTES

223

261. V. Moutafchieva, Kum vuprosa za chiflitsite ... , p. 45. 262. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 329. 263. Ibid., pp. 199,277 331. 264. Ibid., pp. 182, 191. 265. Ibid., p. 289. 266. Ibid., p. 191. 267. Ibid., p. 268. 268. Ibid., pp. 170, 316-317. 269. Ibid., p. 516. 270. Ibid., pp. 170, 191, 268, 289, etc. 271. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 158 onward. 272. "Until now, nobody has interfered in this cultivated land on which crops are grown, the borders of which are marked with these boundaries, and the taxes and tithe of which are in accordance with the law" (M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 185). 273. See above, Chapter 1. 274. Kanunlar, p. 210. Compare same, pp. 74, 111. 275. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 208. 276. Ibid., pp. 370-371. 277. Ibid., p. 500. 278. Ibid., p. 424. 279. Ibid., p. 209. 280. Ibid., p. 208. 281. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 184. 282. Ibid., p. 414. 283. G. Elezovic, pp. 12, 1108. 284. G. Elezovic, p. 409. 285. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 272. 286. Ibid., p. 253. 287. Ibid., pp. 288-289. 288. Ibid., pp. 444-446. 289. Ibid., pp. 391-392. 290. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 504-505. 291. Oriental Section, Fund. 1, Unit 15088, pp. 1-5. 292. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 98. 293. Ibid., p. 582. 294. Ibid., p. 444. 295. Ibid., p. 214. 296. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa ... ," p. 153. 297. See above, Chapter 1. 298. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 21 onward. 299. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 314-315.

224

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300. Ibid., pp. 315-317. 301. Ibid., pp. 317-318. 302. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 320. 303. Ibid., p. 321. 304. Ibid., pp. 318-319. 305. Ibid., p. 320. 306. For example, the vakiJofthe sultan's tutor, Hayreddin, which survived during the reign of Mehmet (ibid., p. 326). 307., Also the mulk of Daye Hatun, the sultan's wet nurse (ibid., p. 323). 308. Ibid., p. 334. 309. Ibid., p. 340. 310. Ibid., pp. 332-356. 311. Ibid., p. 182. 312. Here, the date of the "annulment" of the vakif is shown-1475. (M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 276-277), 243,289,329,201, 247,283,235,249,299,297,334,507, etc; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-defterhane, VakiJs, p. 890. From this inventory, dating from 1485, it is obvious that all the vakiJs in the Isparta area were abolished in the reign of Mehmet II and turned into timars. The only document of the Conqueror to be published concerning the "annulment" of a mulk dates from the end of 1472. (H. ina1cik, Fatih devri uzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar, pp. 224-225). 313. Ibid., pp. 198,174-175,267,295, etc. 314. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 195. 315. Ibid., pp. 241, 331. 316. Ibid., p. 295. 317. Ibid., p. 282. 318. Ibid., p. 299. 319. Ibid., p. 294; compare p. 299. 320. Ibid., p. 189. 321. Ibid., p. 289. 322. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 189. 323. Ibid., pp. 174-175,276,294,298, etc. 324. Ibid., pp. 437, 328, 284, 201, 182, 295, 331, 241 (with a typical passage: "at the renewal of mulks and vakifs"); 195 ("now, when our sultan, Beyazit, confonns the possession of mulks and vakifs"); 334, 267, 507, 198, 175, 341, 247, 235, 283, 320, 329, 243; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-Defterhane, Vakiflar, p. 890 onward. 325. Ibid., p. 437. 326. Ibid., p. 328 onward.

NOTES

225

327. Ibid., p. 284. 328. N. Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. IT, (Gotha, 1909), p. 233 onward. 329. Ibid., pp. 310-316. 330. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 357-470. 331. Ibid., p. 471 onward a list of gifts made to high-ranking dignitaries and members of the royal family. 332. N. Jorga, op. cit., pp. 306-307. 333. Ibid., pp. 316-317. 334. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 486. 335. Ibid., pp. 486-494. 336. Ibid., p. 498. 337. Ibid., pp. 498-519. 338. Ibid., pp. 520-522.

226

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Notes to Chapter 3

1. Y. Mitev, "Imarne Ii vremenno podobreniye v polozheniyeto na Bulgarskiya narod sled porobvaneto mu ot tourtsite?" Narodna prosveta (194911950), nos. 4, 5, 6; I. S. Dostyan, "Borba yuzhnoslavyanskikh narodov protiv turestskoi agressii v lXV-XV., " Vizantiiski vremennik, vol. vn (1953), pp. 32-49. 2. AI. Bourmov, aforementioned work,; N. Todorov ed., Polozheniyeto na bulgarskiya narod pod toursko robstvo (Dokou~enti i materiali: Sofia, 1953); B. Tsvetkova, "0 religiozno-natsional 'noi diskriminatsii v Bolgariya bo vremya turetskovo vladychestva," Sovyetskoe vostoko-vedeniye (1957), no 2, pp. 78-88; iv. Snegarov, Tourskoto vladichestvo, prechka za koultournoto razvitiye na bulgarskiya narod i drougite balkanski narodi (Sofia, 1958). 3. A. S. Tveritinova, "Fal'sifikatsii istorii srednevekovoi turtsii v Kemalistkoi istoriograffii," Vizantiiskii vremennik, vol. vn (1953), pp. 9-31; By same author: "K voprosu 0 k!est'yanstye i krest'yanskom zemepol'zovanii v Osmanskoi imperii XV-XVI v.," Ucheniye zapiski Instituta vostokovedeniya, xvn (1959), pp. 4-14 (among the other opinions that Tveritimova criticizes is that of Barkan, pp. 8-10). 4. b. L. Barkan, "Osmanli imparatorluglunda ~ift~i siniflarin ... ," '(][ku, C. IX, S. 50, p. 102. 5. Ibid., C.IX, S.49, p.37. 6. b. L. Barkan, "Osmanli imparatorlugunda ~ift~i siniflarin . . .," p. 35. 7. Ibid., C.X.S. 56, p. 151. 8. Ibid., C.IX.S. 50, pp. 335-336; ibid, C.X.S. 56, pp. 144-153. 9. Ibid., C.X.S. 56, p. 336. 10. Ibid., C.X.S. 56, p. 154. 11. Place indicated. 12. Op. cit., C.IX.S. 49, p. 36. 13. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 50. 14. V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. III, p. 159. 15. V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. XXVI, p. 374. 16. See V. Moutafchieva for detailed argumentation of the suggested classification: "Kategoriite feodalno zavisimo naseleniye v nashite zemi pod tourska vlast prez XV-XVI v.," Izvestiya na Institouta za istoriya, vol. 9, pp. 57-64 onward. 17. O. L. Barkan, op. cit., C.IX.S., 49, p. 35. 18. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 15. 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. See M. T. Gokbilgin, Rumelide YOrUklet, tatarlar ve eladi fatihan. 21. Kanunlar, pp. 2-3.

NOTES

227

22. See Chapter 1. 23. Kanunlar, pp. 20, 50, 61, 278, 295. 24. 0. L. Barkan, "Toprak, i§~iliginin ... Fot. XIX. 25. Kanunlar, p. 95. 26. Ibid., p. 18 27. Ibid., p. 246: compare G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., Doc. no: 98. 28. Ibid., p. 311. 29. Ibid., p. 401. 30. Kanunlar, pp. 18, 72. 31. V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. XXVI, p. 374. 32. For methods of populating these lands, see 0. L. Barkan, "Osmanli imparatorlugunda bir iskaan ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak siirgiiler," istanbul U niversitesi iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasi, C.XI, XUI, XV; Todorov, "Za demografskoto sustoyaniye na Balkanskiya poluostrov prez XV -XVIv.," Godishnik na Sofiiskiya Universitet, Filosofsko-istoricheski fakultet, vol. LIII, 2. 33. 0. L. Barkan, "<;if~i siniflari ... " C.IX.S. 53, pp. 336-337. 34. 0. L. Barkan, op. cit., C.IX.S. 53, p. 355. 35. Kanunlar, p. 135. 36. G. I. Ibragimov, Krest 'yanskiye vosstaniya v Turtsii v XV-XVI v., p. 124. 37. A. D. Novichev, "K voprosu a feodal 'nikh otnosheniyakh ... " p. 131. 38. Kanunlar, p. 2. We can only find data relating to the binding of peasants to the land in the law for Bursa of 1478. 39. Ibid., p. 3. 40. Ibid., pp. 276-277, 363-364; compare A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 25. 41. R. Tschudi, Das Asafname des Lutji P~a nach den Handschriften zu Wien, Dresden und Konstimtinopel (Berlin, 1910), p. 41. 42. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 227, doc. 940. 43. Ibid., pp. 293, 294, doc. 986. 44. Ibid., p. 352, doc. 1140. 45. Ibid., p. 177, doc. 654. 46. Ibid., p. 105, doc. 440. 47. Ibid., p. 107, doc. 445. 48. Kanunlar, p. 79. 49. Ibid., pp. 132,174. 50. Ibid., pp. 234, 273. 51. Ibid., pp. 288. 52. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 177, doc. 654.

228

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

53. Kanunlar, pp. 389-390. 54. Ibid., pp. 3,7,277: MTM I, 1, p. 90: TOEM no, 18, pp. 50-51. 55. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., pp. 22-27,4243; A. D. Novichev, op. cit., pp. 131-135; O. L. Barkan, "<;ift~i siniflarin ... ," C.IX.S. 50, p. 112, C.X.S. 56, pp. 150-155. 56. A. D. Novichev, same place: O. L. Barkan, same places, same author, "Tiirkiyede 'servaj' var mi idi," Belleten, C.XXX.S 78, p.246. 57. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., pp. 26-27; G. I. Ibragimov, op. cit., p. 124. 58. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 105, doc. 440. 59. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., pp. 34-36. 60. Fetva na Abussuud, MTM, C.1, no. 1, p. 60. 61. Kanunlar, pp. 70,99,253,269,280,286,290,304,313, etc. 62. Oriental Section, Sign. TH 31110, Seres-local administration population. Sixteenth century, Istanbul-defterhane. Lands under feudal exploitation. Sixteenth century, etc. 63. Protocol for the sale of a raiyet watermill built upon the field of the seller. (G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., pp. 328-329, doc. 1081, 1082). 64. Ibid.,p. 289, doc. 976. 65. Hr. Gandev, Zarazhdane na kapitalisticheski otnosheniye v chiflishkoto stopanstvo na severozapadna Bulgariya prez XVII. 66. This is proved by a number of documents for sale, and not for the transfer, of the right of possession of vineyards, gardens, melon fields, etc. (G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 21, doc. 55:90, doc. 362: 103, doc. 430: 160, doc. 604: 169, doc. 629, and many others). 67. MTM, p. 53. 68. Ibid.,p. 52. 69. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 294, doc. 987:303, doc. 1013, etc. 70. Ibid., documents mentioned in Note 66. 71. O. L. Barkan, "<;ift ... , p. 393. 72. Kanunlar, p. 48. We also find data about the existence of categories of raiyet land ownership in other laws (ibid., pp. 235, 326, 132, 33, 278, etc. H. Hadjibegic, Kanun-nama Sultana Sulejmana ... , pp. 331-333, etc.) 73. In very rare cases, it is obvious that the Christians as well were taxed according to the categorization of their farms (M. T. Gokbilgin, Edime ve Pa~alivasi, pp. 163-164.)

NOTES

229

74. An unmarried peasant who still did not possess is own farm was classed as mucerred (Kanunlar, p. 235, etc.) 75. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 163-164,167-169,218,237, 295. 76. Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-defterhane. Has, XVI V., istanbul-Defter no: 313. Istanbul-defterhane. Timars. 77. Oriental Section, Inv. 674/1954; Visoka-Kadi-Timars, XVI cent. Istanbul-defterhane. Timars, 1480; Istanbul-defeterhane. Timars, 935; M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 356 onward. 78. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 206-207. 79. Ibid., pp. 307-308. 80. Regarding the degree of this stratification within the period of Ottoman rule, see Str. Dimitrov. Regarding class stratification among the peasants in northeastern Bulgaria during the 1870s, see Izvestiya za instituta za istoriya, vol. 8, (1960). 81. G. Galabov, "Za osnovnite nachala na pozemleriata sobstvenost v Osmanskata imperiya i spetsialno v Bulgariya pod toursko vladichestvo," Godishnik na Sofiiskiya universitet, Faculty of Philosophy and History, vol. XLill (1946-1947). 82. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 36; in other places, Tveritinova refers to the peasant as the "holder of a portion" (ibid, p. 40). 83. O. L. Barkan, "C;ift~i siniflarin ... ," c. IX. S. 53, p. 339. 84. Ibid., C.X.S. 56, p. 150. 85. See Zhak Natan, Marksistko-Leninskoto oucheniye za obshtestveno-ikonomicheskite formatsii, (Sofia, 1949), p. 235 onward. I. S. Dostyan, op. cit., p. 141; B. Tsvetkova, "Prinos ... ," part IT, p. 119. 86. A. V. Venediktov, Gosudarstvennaya sotsialisticheskaya sobstvennost', (Moscow-Leningrad 1948), p. 212. 87. B. Tsvetkova, op. cit., p. 121. 88. D. Pop-Georgiev, op. cit., p. 24 onward. 89. K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, vol. xxm, p. 730; D. Kossev has also referred to this particular postulate of Marx when he describes agrarian relations at the end of the eighteenth century. (D. Kossev, "Kum izyasnyavento na nyakoi problemi ot istoriyata na Bulgariya prez XVITI i nachaloto na XIX v." Istoricheski pregled, year XIT, book 3, p. 41.) 90. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., pp. 130-135. 91. A. V. Venediktov, op. cit., p. 11. 92. V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. ITI, p. 158. 93. MTM, 1.1, p. 51 onward. 94. Kanunlar, pp. 298-299.

230

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

95. D. Pop-Georgiev, op. cit., p. 27 onward. 96. Ibid., p. 26. 97. Abou Yousouf Ya'koub, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 98. Regarding the elements of local heritage in rural land ownership, see A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., pp. 34-37. 99. Kanunlar, p. 299. 100. Regarding resettlement, see O. L. Barkan, Osmanli imparatorlugunda bit iskan ve kolonizasyon metodu . . . 101. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p. 135. 102. A. S. Tveritinova, Vosstaniye Kara Yazydjy-Deli Hasana ... , pp. 30-31. 103. B. Tsvetkova, Prinos ... , part IT, pp. 119-120. 104. A. S. Tveritinova, "K voprosu 0 krest'yanstve ... ," p. 41. 105. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p. 135. 106. Ibid. 107. D. Kossev, op. cit., p. 42; Hr. Hristov, op. cit., p. 91. 108. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 239, doc. 986; p. 352, doc. 1140. 109. Kanunlar, p. 46. 110. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 111. Ibid., p. 268. Compare G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 899. 112. Kanunlar, p. 233, 277. 113. G. Galabov, H. Duda, p. 254, doc. 876. 114. Ibid., p. 254, doc. 876; p. 294, doc. 987; p. 296, doc. 993; p. 367, doc. 1178; p. 276, doc. 939. 115. Ibid., p. 276, doc. 939; p. 254, doc. 876; p. 294, doc. 987; p. 296, doc 993; p. 319, doc. 1054; p. 367, doc. 1178. 116. Kanunlar, p. 7-8,47, 299, etc. 117. See Chapter 2. 118. Kanunlar, p. 47, 254. 119. S. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 120. From the law of Mehmet IT we know that, toward the end of the fifteenth century, the amount of resm-i tapu ranged between ten and fifty akr;e (Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 22). 121. MTM, 1,1. pp. 58, 78-79. 122. Kanunlar, p. 47. 123. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 39. 124. Oriental Section, Sign, TH 31110: Defter, no. 331; Sereslocal administration. Population. Sixteenth century: istanbuldefterhane. Timars. 1480, and so on. 125. Kanunlar, p. 254. 126. Ibid., p. 47. Compare p. 30.

NOTES

231

127. Kanunlar, p. 299. 128. MTM, 1,1, pp. 78-79. 129. In Tveritinova's book, the phrase is quite correctly translated as pri posredsve sipahiya "through the mediation of the sipahi" (op. cit., p. 44); B. Tsvetkova translates this in all cases as "with the permission of the sipahi" (Prinos ... , part I, p. 117, Pozemlenite otnosheniya ... , p. 183), with which the role of the sipahi in the transfer is intentionally changed. Galabov and Duda adopt various translations of the phrase "sipahi marifetile" -in Einverstandnis (op. cit., p. 289, doc. 1015), mit Genehmigung (p. 303, doc. 1014, mit Hilfe (p. 304, doc. 1015), and so on. It seems that the most acceptable translation is "through the agency of the sipahi. 130. On p. 31, and not p. 71 in Kanunlar, we find the following sentence: "It is against the law for the raiyye to sell and buy raiyet land. In this respect, a royal decree has been issued that they should not buy and sell land among themselves without this being done through the agency of the sipahi. And those buying and those selling should be strictly limited. But to carry out their sales through the agency of the sipahi, who will appropriate a certain sum in hakk-i karar; is permitted". There is a mistake in Tveritinova's translation of the passage in question. The expression "Ama sipahi bir miktar hakk-i karar alip, vermek caizdir" is translated in her text as: "Odnako, yesli pri posredstve sipakhiya polucheno razresheniye na nyekotoroe kolichestvo, [prodazhaJ dozvolena." ("However, if through the agency of the sipahi permission for a certain quantity is received, [the sale] is permitted" op. cit., p. 44). The mistake is a result of the translation; part of the phrase is the term "hakk-i karar, ' , with which in Ottoman legislation is a frequently indicated tax for deed (resm-i tapu). (Compare Kanunlar, p. 11, 30, and the Jetva of Abussuud, where the tax in question is referred to namely as "hakk-i karar," ibid., p. 299). 131. A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 43. 132. Kanunlar, p. 11. 133. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 96, doc. 393. 134. Ibid., op. cit., p. 289, doc. 290; p. 84, doc. 333; p. 91, doc. 369; p. 343, doc. 1117; p. 33, doc. 103; p. 303, doc. 1013; p. 361, doc. 1161. 135. Ibid., p. 33, doc. 104; pp. 70-71, doc. 273; p. 61, doc. 234; p. 72, doc. 282. 136. The case discussed in doc. 817, p. 235 of the published Sofia registers (sidl) is the same; G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit. Compare with doc. 993,6, p. 296; ibid., doc. 1057, p. 320, etc.

232

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

137. See this in detail in A. S. Tveritinova, op. cit., p. 36. 138. V. Moutafchieva, Kategoriite ... , pp. 71-72. 139. Br. Djurdjev, "Sremska kanun-nama iz 1588-1589, " Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Sarajevu, Sv. N-V, (1950), p. 277; compare L. Fekete, Die Syagat-Schrijt, pp. 80-81. 140. V. Moutafchieva, "Feodalnata renta, prisvoyavana ot lenniya durzhatel v Osmanskata imperiya prez XV -XVI v. s ogled na bulgarskite zemi, " Izvestiya na Instituta za istoriya, Year 7, pp. 180-184. 141. G. Galabov, H. Duda, op. cit., p. 108, doc. 450; p. 296, doc. 993; p. 304, doc. 1015; p. 319, doc. 1054. 142. Br. Djurdjev, "Sremska kanun-nama ... ," p. 227. 143. Kanunlar, p. 295, 296. 144. Kanunlar, p. 398, V. Moutafchieva, "Edin neizdaden prepis ... ," p. 267. 145. Ibid., p. 277. 146. Ibid., pp. 20, 235. 147. H.Hadjibegic, "Kanun-nama sultana Sulejmana ... ," p. 318; Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30,283,399; J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 194. 148. K. Marx, Capital (Sofia, 1949), vol. ill, pp. 803-804. 148a. The Islamic legal tradition divides taxes into ~eriat (envisaged by religious law) and ordinary (imposes by the secular legislation) hukuk-i seriye; rusum-i orfiye ve avariz-i divaniye. This classification, which is completely unsound as it does not take into consideration the natural development of feudal society, is accepted by bourgeois literature (A. Heidbom, Les finances otto manes , (Vienna-Leipzig, 1912), vol. IT, p. 15; C. Moravitz, Lesfinances de la Turquie (Paris, 1902), p. 3; Abd. Vefik, Tekalifkavaidi. Der-i saadet 1329 (1911), C.I, pp. 26-28, 91-118), and, with certain reservations, by some Marxist scholars: A. S. Tveritinova, "Vosstaniye KaraYazydjy ... ," pp. 32-33; B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya ... ," pp. 186-188). Tsvetkova has also devoted a monograph to the Ottoman category, differentiated according to a formal criterion (tekalif-i orfiye ve avariz-i divaniye), Izvunrednite dannutsi i durzhavnite povinnosti b vulgarskite zemi pod tourska vlast (Sofia, 1958). Since the criterion of the Ottoman legislation for the classification of taxes cannot be accepted as scientific, we suggest the above mentioned division of the forms of the feudal rent in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, already used in some of our earlier studies (V. Moutafchieva, "Feodalna renta, prisvoyavana ot lenniye durzhatel ... ," same author, "De l'exploitation feodale dans les terres de population bulgare sous la domination

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233

turque au XV et XVI s. , " Etudes historiques aI' occasion du XI Congres international des sciences historiques (Stockholm, aout 1960, Sofia, 1960). 149. K. Marx, Capital, vol. ITI, p. 805 onward. 150. Ibid., p. 805. 151. Br. Djurdjev, 0 uticaju osmanske vladivine na razvitak nasvih naroda, p. 81. 152. For the position of the hassa, see Chapter 1. 153. F. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 24. 154. Ibid., p. 24, 25, 30. 155. Ibid., p. 24. 156. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 28. 157. See Chapter 1. 158. Ibid., p. 28. 159. Ibid., p. 26. 160. Ibid., p. 25. 161. Kanunlar, pp. 59, 67, 110. 162. Ibid., p. 59. 163. Ibid., p. 295. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid., p. 110. 166. Ibid., p. 67. 167. H. Hadjibegic, Kanun-nama Sultana Sulejmana . .. ," p. 362. 168. Ibid.; Kanunlar, pp. 236, 294. 169. Ibid., p. 275. 170. Kanunlar, pp. 131,236,271,275; J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 197. 171. Ibid.; Kanunlar, p. 131. 172. Ibid., p. 61. i 73. Ibid., p. 113. 174. Ibid., pp. 398-399; V. Moutafchieva, "Edin neizdaden zakon ... ," p. 269; compare Hans Dernschwamms Tagebuch einer Reise nach Konstinopel und Kleinasien (15531355), ed., Fr. Babinger (Munchen-Leipzig, 1923), p. 255. 175. Oriental Section, Sign. Defter no: 331. 176. Ibid. 177. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 178. Oriental Section, Sign. Istanbul-defterhane. "Zemi pod feodalna exploatatsia," XVI v. 179. Oriental Section, Sign. Defter, 331, p. 73. 180. B. Tsvetkova, Prinos ... , part IT, p. 148. 181. Br. Djurdjev, op. cit., p. 81.

234

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

182. Ibid., p. 80; Str. Dimitrov, "Chiflishkoto stopanstvo prez 50-70 godini na XIX v.," Istorichesko pregled, year XI, book 2. 183. Thus, according to N. Filipovic, there existed in the empire a tendency to "abolish" taxes payable in cash and replace them with payment in kind, a fact the author supports with only one passage from the law for Aydin, which, the author states, had "corresponded with the essence of the miriye lands" ("Pogled na osmanski feudalizam . . .," pp. 39-41). His words are repeated exactly by another Yugoslav author, Stojanovski (op. cit., p. 132). Moreover, what Stojanovski says is disproved by the data he himself gives. Thus, -the rent in kind in the district he is reviewing, calculated in akqe yields 103,738, while only from one, by no means fundamental tax, resm-i bag, in the same district 56,609 akqe were received (p. 134). Consequently, when we add to the latter the significant appropriations in cash such as resm-i qift, or ispenqe, bad-u hava, resm-i kovan, etc., a correlation is 1: 1 will defmitely be reached, which certainly is not evidence of the "abolition" of taxes payable in cash. Apart from this, what do the authors in question mean when they say "abolition"? Where did the already cash taxes that the Ottomans were supposed to have abolished come from? And where did the axiom that taxation in kind corresponded with the essence of miriye land come from? Was it from the Jetva of Abussuud, who determines the main taxation imposed on the feudal lands by the two kinds of harac? (Compare MTM, I, p. 53). But one of them, the ground rent, had always been payable in cash, and part of the other, as well, was replaced by a cash equivalent as early as the fifteenth century. The authors quoted should support their axiom with arguments. Taking as a starting point the "in kind" image of the Ottoman economy, Zhak Natan also determines payment in kind as the predominant form of feudal rent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Stopanska istoriya na Bulgariya [Sofia, 1957], p. 101), without, however, producing any documentary evidence. 184. Harac-i mukassam, or "iqur should not be confused with the religious tithe, zekQt (alms), which was collected exclusively in historically Muslim lands, which were referred to as tithe lands (u~riye) for this reason: (M. d'Ohsson, Tableau general de l'Empire ottoman [paris 1787-1820], vol. I, p. 269, etc). The components of the religious tax were not collected in our lands. B. Tsvetkova, in a rather arbitrary way, has described the taxes collected on sheep and pigs in our lands as components of zekat ("Pozemlenite otnosheniya ... ," p. 186). It is unthinkable that the religious tithe would be paid by non-Muslims. As far as the tax on pigs, which as

NOTES

235

farm animals were prohibited by Islamic religious law, it is the least likely of all the taxes to be included in §eriat appropriations. 185. Kanunlar, pp. 251, 252-253, 270, etc.: J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 30; H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 336. 186. Kanunlar, p. 270: J. von Hammer, op. cit., p. 285, vol. 1. 187. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 316. 188. Ibid. 189. Oriental Section, Sign. Defter no: 331: TH 31110: "Visokakadi", Timars-XVI; istanbul-defterhane. Timars. 1480, etc. 190. The same registers. 191. These explanations are necessary for the clarification of certain arguments in some recent studies. Thus, for example, A. D. Novichev casts doubt on the approximate indices suggested by ourselves regarding the correlation between in kind and cash rent during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: he considers that we have wrongly included ispenc;e or resm-i c;ift in the cash ground rent. (A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p. 140). In support of his doubts, Novichev gives only one reason, namely the conclusions reached by 1. P. Petrushevski regarding the situation of the cash rent in Iran during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. ("Zemledeliye i agramiye otnosheniya ... ," pp. 341-342). It should be emphasized at this point that there is not one single source from the period in question and relating to the areas under discussion that shows ground rent to be payable in kind. Moreover, the observations on the history of Iran, and, at that, two centuries before the period in question, cannot shake our conviction of the truth of the concrete information, which has been subjected to examination. 192. Oriental Section, Sign. Defter no: 331: TH/I0: istanbuldefterhane. Timars-1480: istanbul-defterhane. Timars. istanbuldefterhane, sixteenth century. The actual legislation of the sixteenth century already shows the collection of the tithe on melon fields in cash-five akc;e according to the Sremsko kanunname (Br. Djurdjev, Sremska kanun-nama ... , p. 279) and two-according to that for the Sofia Kanunlar, p. 252). 193. Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-defterhane, b.d; {istanbuldefterhane-sixteenth century. Defter no. 331: istanbul-defterhane, Has. Sixteenth century. 194. Oriental Section, Visoka-kadi. Timars-sixteenth century. Defter no. 331. In the legislation we can find passages that relate to the collection of taxes on fiber-yielding plants both in cash and in kind (Kanunlar, op. cit., p. 252; Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 39). 195. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 339; Kanunlar, p. 270; Br.

236

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Djurdjev, op. cit., p. 271. 196. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 25, 29. 197. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 342. 198. Oriental Section, Sign. Defter no. 331: istanbul-defterhane, Timars, 1480; "Visoka-kadi, Timars. Sixteenth century. 199. Ibid., TH 31110; Istanbul-defterhane XVI; Defter no. 331. 200. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 336. 201. J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 195; B. Tsvetkova Prinos .. " part IT, p. 136. 202. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 337; Barkan, op. cit., p. 283. 203. Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-defterhane. Timars, 1480. 204. Z. Karamursal, op. cit., p. 168. 205. TH 31110 Kanunlar, p. 275. 206. K. Marx, Capital, vol. ITI, p. 812. 207. For the categorization of ground rent, see V. Moutafchieva. "Feoalnata renta, prisvoyavana ot lenniya durzhatel ... ," p. 179, etc. 208. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., pp. 331-33. 209. J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I pp. 214-215; Kanunlar, p. 326, 132, 33, 278, etc.; M. T. Gokb ilg in , op. cit., pp. 163, 167, 180, 207; Oriental Section. TH 31110: Defter-331: istanbuldefterhane, "Zemi pod feodalna eksploatatsiya." Sixteenth: istanbuldefterhane, Timar, sixteenth century, etc. 210. A. D. Nov ichev , op. cit., p. 139, onward. 211. O. L. Barkan, "Gift<;i siniflarin ... ," C.lX.S. p. 111. 212. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 29. 213. Ibid. 214. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 34. The tax in question should not be confused with another, namely the taxation of big flocks of sheep, which is referred to as resm-i agnam-i celebke~an, which was collected from livestock breeders who owned more than 200 sheep. It was always appropriated by the state, and definitely in kind (compare D. Grouev and At. Razboinikov, Prinos kum vuprosa za djelepkeshanite i djelepite, [Manuscript purchased by the Ethnographic Institute, Sofia], p. X onward). 215. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 24. 216. Kanunlar, pp. 33,34; J. von Hammer, op. cit., vol. I, p. 199. 217. Ibid., p. 198. 218. H. Hadjibegic, op. cit., p. 334 219. Kanunlar, p. 269. 220. Abd. Vefik, op. cit., vol. I, p. 34. 221. Fr. Kraelitz, op. cit., p. 29.