America's Choice 2000: Entering a New Millenium

America's Choice 2000

This page intentionally left blank

America's Choice 2000

EDITED BY

WILLIAM CROTTY

^J$fcst3view ir

T

^ v ^

K

t s s

A Member of the Perseus Book's Group

Dilemmas in American Politics All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Copyright © 2001 by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group. Published in 2001 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Visit us on the World Wide Web at www.westviewpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publieation Data A CD? catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 0-8133-6798-0 (pbk.) T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z3 9.48-1984. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Preface

vii

ONE The Election of 2000: Close, Chaotic, and Unforgettable William Crotty TWO

1

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Elections by Judicial Fiat: The Courts Decide William Crotty

36

T HREF.

Political Participation in American Elections: Who Decides What? M. Margaret Conway

79

FOUR

The Presidential Primaries: Triumph of the Frontrunners William Crotty

95

F IVE

The Curious and Close Presidential Campaign of 2000 James E. Campbell

115

S±X

The Congressional Races: Continuing Battleground for the Parties John S. Jackson, III

138

v

vi

Contents

SEVEN

The State and Local Elections: Politics Beyond the Beltway Malcolm E. Jewell

163

EIGHT

The Election in Perspective: Two Nations, Four Parties John Kenneth White

180

Biographical Sketches of Contributors

207

Index

209

PREFACE

This book attempts to make sense of the longest running, most fiercely contested and, ultimately, closest race in the history of presidential elections. What had been an earnest if predictable general election campaign morphed into a post-election day series of controversies that tested the nation's electoral processes, its courts, and its democratic culture. Eventually, of course, a winner was declared and the nation went about its business, however not before fundamental questions were raised as to the nature of the vote and voter intent and both the standards and processes used to decide elections. These issues will be with us for years to come. By any standard, it was a historic election whose mil consequences are yet to be appreciated. The following sifts through the competing claims and strategies, reviews what occurred and offers some assessments as to the quality of the campaign, the nature of the final decision and the meaning this has to the nation. I would like to thank a number of people who contributed to this effort: Leo A.W. Wiegman, Executive Editor, Westview Press; David Pervin, also of Westview Press; Robert Curtin and James Rossi my research assistants; and Janet-Louise Joseph and Barbara McintoshChin of the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University. A particular debt of gratitude is owed my wife xMary Hauch Crotty. William Crotty Thomas P. O'Neill Chair in Public Life and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy at Northeastern University

vii

This page intentionally left blank

ONE

The Election of 2000: Close, Chaotic, and Unforgettable William Crotty

INTRODUCTION It began as a referendum on the Clinton Administration. It featured Clinton's vice president, Al Gore, running against George W. Bush, the son of the former president Bill Clinton had defeated in 1992. The early favorite was Vice President Al Gore. It was his election to lose. The Clinton years had been a period of prolonged economic expansion, the most sustained in modern American history. The federal debt had been reduced substantially, unemployment was the lowest in decades, consumer spending and confidence was high, and the stock market reached record levels. The economic worries that had paved the way for Clinton's victoiy eight years earlier no longer were of concern. There was peace on the international front. Gore was an able, experienced candidate, well-funded and seemingly well-prepared for the presidency. In political terms, early projections (which proved to be accurate) were that the Democrats would carry the two most populous states, California and New York, usually considered the keys to winning. He faced in George W. Bush a candidate inexperienced in national politics, personally unfamiliar to the American public, and one who had been in public office a total of five years when the race began. It wras to turn out to be one of the closest, hardest fought, and most contentious elections in modern history. The results were not to be 1

2 America's Choice 2000 known until well after the last votes were counted. In the process, a relatively dull contest would end in deadlock, with the winner to be determined through contested recounts and court actions that stretched well past election day. The defining event of election 2000 was to be its aftermath. The following reviews the events of the campaign, the issue positions of the candidates, analyzes the vote and reviews the election's often bitter aftermath. It serves as both an overview of the campaign and an introduction to the chapters that follow.

THE CLINTON FACTOR AJ Gore had served under Bill Clinton for eight years and had come as close as a vice president does to being co-president. Yet Bill Clinton was to prove a problem for the Gore campaign. The architect of the most sustained economic expansion in the post-World War II period (and some would say since the nation's founding) and the most accomplished and talented politician of the contemporary era, it would seem natural that the Democrats would call on his skills for the campaign. There was no question that Clinton was eager to campaign (a point he made repeatedly). He wanted to see his protege elected, his record vindicated, and the prosperity and policies he fought for continued. Clinton was not to fulfill the role in the campaign he had hoped for. He had personal and political baggage that Gore wanted to disassociate himself from (hence the statement in his acceptance speech at the national convention, repeated in the debates and on the campaign trail, "I am my own man"). The Clinton years had been marked by continued investigations, special prosecutors, and congressional hearings looking into alleged misdeeds by the president and his wife, both before taking office and once in the presidency. It had been a strident, highly partisan, tense, and unpleasant time, culminating in the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal and the impeachment of the President by the House of Representatives and his acquittal by the Senate. It was a period Gore did not want recalled. Politically, the Gore campaign calculated that Clinton was least popular among the swing voters and in the swing states Gore hoped to focus on. In choosing Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Comiecticut as

William Crotty 3 his running mate, Gore had selected the first Democrat senator to condemn Clinton's behavior on the Senate floor, speaking and chastising the President for his conduct in the Lewinsky affair and lying about it to a grand jury (it was Clinton's claim that technically and under the law he had not lied; it was this incident that led to the impeachment effort). Lieberman was to later vote against the President's impeachment, but it is this speech that brought him his first sustained national attention in twelve years in the Senate. Gore also had to contend with Hillary Rodham Clinton running for the Senate in New York, although this turned out not to be a problem. The vice president made minimal use of the President in the campaign and avoided being seen with him to the extent a vice president could. Clinton did sum up and defend his administration's record in a well-received speech to the Democratic National Convention, but after that made few campaign speeches. When he did, he presented the case for continuing his administration's successes ("the next best thing to electing me to a third term would be to elect Al Gore president") more effectively and more forcefully than Gore was ever able to do ("if you want to keep the prosperity going elect Al Gore president"). Still, his role was restricted. He ended the campaign by going to New York to campaign briefly for his wrife (who also had made limited use of his skills in her race), and returning to Arkansas to stump for local candidates before flying back to New York, his new home state, to vote. It was a curiously deflated ending to the Clinton years. Arguably, the muzzling of Clinton in the campaign was a strategic mistake that could have cost Gore a decisive edge in the election. In many respects, Gore had not come to terms with the previous years or with his relationship to the president and the Clinton legacy. THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES Al Gore first ran for the Democratic party's presidential nomination in 1988. In 1992, he was chosen to be Bill Clinton's running mate. Both Clinton and Gore were considered to be moderates within the Democratic party, sponsors and members of the Democratic Leadership Council (as was Lieberman, who was destined to join Gore on the presidential ticket). The DLC was created after the 1984 election and Walter Mondale's overwhelming loss to Ronald Reagan. Its purpose was to

4

America's Choice 2000

return the Democratic party to the center, removing it from the control of its liberal and New Deal wings; strategically to focus on the middle class, mainstream voters who turned out in elections; and to position Democrats to compete more effectively with Republicans for the middle ground in elections. Through its candidates and its policy positions specifically designed to appeal to the middle class, the DLC proved to be unusually successful. Gore was the son of a distinguished liberal senator from Tennessee who had received attention (and in the process lost his Senate seat) opposing Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic party's policies in Vietnam. Al Gore Jr. graduated from Harvard University and served in Vietnam. He returned home, spent a period of time in divinity school before becoming a reporter. He was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Tennessee and later to the Senate. He was a working vice president, given significant areas of policy discretion, consulted by the president, and actively involved in all phases of the Clinton administration—the most influential and active vice president of the contemporary era. It was often said during the campaign that his father had bred him for the presidency since his youth. If so, one result was a formal, even distant and pedantic personal style, a fascination with the subtleties of policy issues which he attempted to convey to voters, and, it was argued, an inability to connect convincingly with the average American, the "working people" he said his campaign was directed at. His response to all of this was that the presidency was not a popularity contest and that he would be an active and hard-working president. Few could doubt that. George W. Bush was as close to an opposite in temperament and interests as one was likely to hnd. He was a graduate of Yale University, where his principal accomplishment appeared to be in serving as the president of a fraternity house. He had served in the Air National Guard during the Vietnam War. Later, he turned to different tilings, traveling the country and living the life of a single male. He admitted to being a recovered alcoholic and was accused of using drugs, although this was not proven. He worked in various positions in the oil industry without great success. In 1978, he ran for Congress, but again was unsuccessful. His biggest achievement was heading a group of associates of his father who bought the Texas Rangers baseball team. He served as its executive director and made a substantial profit for himself and the team's investors when it was sold. His personal wealth was based on this transaction.

William Crotty 5 In 1994, he ran against a popular incumbent, Governor Ann Richards, an old foe of his father's, and beat her in an upset. A fewyears later he was running for the presidency. His political assets included name identification (his father had been a largely popular president); a pleasant and relaxed personal style; and strong financial backing. Bush entered the 2000 campaign year with an estimated $100 million war chest, contributed in large part by the oil and pharmaceutical industries and supporters of his father's campaigns (eventually his campaign was to spend $160 million). He appeared likeable, related easily to people, communicated with them seemingly effortlessly and, in many respects, was more of a "natural" campaigner than Gore. On the other hand, he appeared to have little interest in or knowledge of policy, preferred to give vague and general answers to questions (most apparent in the television debates), and was not one of the most hardworking candidates reporters had covered. In fact, his decision to take a day off during the final days of the campaign, as well as his seeming assumption that he had the race won (resulting in trips to California and New York to help congressional candidates) was later criticized by Republican strategists as possibly costing him a clear and decisive victoiy on election day. In many respects, second only to the tense and prolonged controversy that followed the vote, the most surprising element of the 2000 campaign, given his limited time in office and his lack of any national experience, was the emergence of George W. Bush as the overwhelming choice of Republicans from Day One of the campaign. It is indicative of how fast it all developed, and to a degree how unprepared he was initially, that when his staff told him after the 1996 election that he was the first choice of the Republicans for their party's presidential nomination, he reacted with disbelief. He had never even heard of the poll. The chances are that it was his father that most of those surveyed thought they were supporting. Nonetheless, he went on to put together a campaign organization, building on the small nucleus of advisors he had as Texas governor. He attracted the largest amount of funding for a presidential candidate in American history; positioned himself as the front-runner and inevitable choice of his party prior to the primaries; survived some rough early outings in his prenonunation contests with $enatorJohn McCain; won the nomination handily; and went on to run Gore a dead even race. In all, the voters had two distinctly different candidates to choose from in style and personality and two candidates that while both courting the

6

America's Choice 2000

middle class voter offered significantly different policy alternatives to the American people.

THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES The choice of Senator Joseph I, Lieberman, as Gore's running mate, the first person of Jewish descent to run on a national ticket, created a media stir. The choice of Dick Cheney—Texas oil executive, former congressman, secretary of defense under Bush's father, and chief of staff under President Gerald Ford—created puzzlement. Cheney was basically unknown outside of Washington. His wife had been a controversial, conservative force during the Reagan years as head of the National Endowment for the Humanities. He had no public following and appeared to come from the same state as Bush (he lived and worked in Houston but claimed Wyoming as home, where he grew up and which was the state he represented in Congress for 10 years). Although an administrator of proven talents, he was a weak campaigner. And, as it was to turnout, he had a history of health problems. His job in the Bush campaign had been to vet potential candidates such as Colin Powell, former Missouri senator John Danforth, Senator John McCain and others as to their interest in and qualifications to serve as Bush's running mate. The choice of Cheney was not well received. He had failed to vote in recent elections and his severance package from the oil company was unusually lucrative, creating a potential conflict of interest (he later opted out of it). As it turned out, none of this had staying power as issues of consequence in the campaign and after an initial flurry of press attention were forgotten. The two candidates engaged in a mild and friendly vice presidential debate. Sitting side by side it turned out to be more of a conversation than a debate. Throughout the exchange, Lieberman directed attention to his more conservative social and family values and his shared cultural ties to well-known Republicans of similar views such as Wrilliam Bennett. Their major differences appeared to be on bread and butter issues, stressed by Lieberman, and national defense concerns, stressed by the former secretary of defense. All in all, the image presented was of two reasonable, concerned candidates enjoying a friendly and uncontentious discussion of their differences. Overall, the benefits

William Crotty 7 seemed to accrue to Cheney, given his often negative publicity prior to the debate. It was to be Cheney's best showing of the campaign. After this, he was confined to appearances in safe venues stich as schools, military and conservative areas and talk shows (where he did his best) and photo opportunities with the head of the ticket. The Lieberman campaign was also restrained and uneventful. The Democratic vice presidential nominee had a reputation as a strong campaigner and an effective speaker, but received little notice of consequence during the campaign. He did emerge as a proponent of Gore's position in the days following the election, as did Cheney on the Republican side. Overall however neither distinguished himself during the general election and neither appeared to be much of a factor in the race.

THE PRIMARIES Both Gore and Bush began the prenomination season the strongfavorites to represent their parties in the general election; both faced surprising competition from unexpected sources, former Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey for Gore and Senator John McCain of Arizona for Bush; and both emerged, as was predicted, as the overwhelming choices of their parties. Bradley ran to Gore's left, as a liberal courting what is a predominantly liberal constituency in the Democratic primaries and caucuses. Bradley made good use of his days as an Ail-American basketball player at Princeton University and a star with the New York Knicks, achievements that gave him instant recognition among males. Bradley lost in New Hampshire and his campaign quickly faded. A succession of defeats preceded his pulling out of the race and virtually disappearing from the political scene (he did address the national convention and appeared briefly in campaign rallies dtiring the general election). Bradley was not an especially effective speaker, l b many he appeared stiff and aloof, and not particularly comfortable with the give-and-take of the campaign trail. The McCain campaign was another matter. A conservative Republican, he campaigned as a populist. McCain came from a distinguished military family, had suffered severely as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam,

8

America's Choice 2000

and was a legitimate military hero. Campaign finance reform he had cosponsored, the major legislation considered by the Congress and an issue not popular within his own party, was his primary policy emphasis. However, it was more the tone and openness of the campaign (McCain toured in a bus called the "Straight Talk Express") and the accessibility of the candidate to the media (Bush was isolated and aloof in his dealings with the press) that attracted the most attention. AieCain spoke anywhere and everywhere. He connected well with his audiences, and through his personal and direct manner became a television celebrity, assuring his campaign of a considerable amount of free media exposure. McCain won the New Hampshire primary and appeared poised to give Bush a serious run for the nomination. He lost in South Carolina, in a bruising battle. Dispite a victory in Michigan, a disasterous "Super Tuesday" pretty much sealed his fate and ended his candidacy. Nonetheless, McCain was clearly the most dynamic and charismatic candidate to emerge in the election year. Bush was plagued with several minor candidates including economic conservative and flat tax advocate Steve Forbes, who had run unexpectedly well in the 1996 primaries and several others—in particular Gary Bauer and Alan Keyes—espoused conservative family and religious values virtually throughout the nominating season, approaches that clashed with his moderate emphasis ("compassionate conservatism" were the words he used most often). But with McCain out of the race, die remaining candidates were little more than distractions and he moved on to an uncontested nomination at the national convention. CAMPAIGN STRATEGY The contest between Bush and Gore was for the American center. It was for the middle class and aimed at the moderates who voted in the general election. Both candidates had much the same general election strategy. Gore was to emphasize affordable prescription drugs, the environment, keeping the economy strong, a blend of appeals to "working Americans" and "working families" and the middle class, with a mix of occasional (as in the national convention and intermittently throughout the campaign) populist rhetoric attacking HMO's, oil corporations and pharmaceuticals. The appeal was to be moderate, roughly modeled on Clinton's success in 1992 and 1996 (while seldom

William Crotty 9 mentioning Clinton), while lacking the clarity and single-minded focus of the two earlier national campaigns. He chose not to emphasize his role in the Clinton administration (some media had referred to him as close to a "co-president" as a vice president gets, the context Clinton presented him in when given the opportunity), the economic achievements of the Clinton years, and the need to continue these trends through an extension of the Clinton policies. Bush was better at staying "on message." His emphasis was on trusting the people, not government, to make their own decisions, cutting taxes, improving education (his major policy theme) and military preparedness. Gore's message changed almost daily, the substance decided by the events of the day or where he happened to be campaigning, the groups he was most concerned with targeting at that point in the campaign (senior citizens, Cuban-Americans, pro-choice women, African-Americans, those concerned with Supreme Court appointees, the protection of the environment, fiscal responsibility, education, family values, and so on). The list seemed endless, as his preference for reviewing policy options and their consequences brought home repeatedly. The single message of the campaign or any vision of the nation's future was difficult to discern. One consistent thread was the emphasis on his independence from Clinton (a point driven home in his acceptance address to the Democratic national convention and repeated throughout the campaign). For the casual voter, it must have seemed an unusual concern and, taken as a whole, a somewhat bewildering campaign. In contrast, the Bush message was simple, clear and, as he himself was to say, by the end boringly repetitious. But it is the on-message consistency that gets across to voters and wins elections (again Clinton is the model with his "It's the economy, stupid!" approach in 1992). Politically, it would seem Gore had learned little from Clinton, and in fact avoided (to the extent a sitting vice president could) being seen with the President during the campaign or using him for campaign purposes. The latter went to extremes. The President indicated throughout the campaign his willingness to hit the campaign trail and subtly and not so subtly give bis protege advice. He indicated publicly his preferred choice for the vice presidential nomination (George J. Mitchell, former Senate majority leader and peace negotiator in Northern Ireland); emphasized the economic expansion that had take place under

10 America's Choice 2000 his administration and the need for it to be continued; and reviewed the historic budget deficits and economic recessions of the Reagan-Bush years (another theme (^>re did not develop). At a point late in the campaign, Clinton said the next best thing to a third term for himself would be the election of Gore. Throughout all of this Gore was going in a different direction, choosing to emphasize that he was his own man and turning away from Clinton to run his own high-octane if diffused campaign. The relegation of Clinton, the most effective politician in America during the 1990s, to the background was no more evident than in the last days of the election. While Gore stumped maniacally through key states, and ones once considered safe (including his home state of Tennessee), but again failed to call on the president for help. The refusal of the Gore campaign to use Clinton more effectively, again as many then argued, may well have been the most fundamental mistake of his campaign and the one that cost him the election. Meanwhile, in the last days of the campaign, a more confident Bush took what some in the media referred to as an "in your face" tack, choosing not to spend time in key states he felt he had already won, but traveling to Tennessee and Arkansas for appearances interpreted as efforts to embarrass his opponent and the president by taking one or both states in the election (which he did). He then returned home to await the returns. Ironically, given the criticism at the time, the loss of one or both denied Gore his electoral college majority.

THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN There are a number of ways to analyze the general election campaign. One is to compare significant indicators from Labor Day to election day, employing polling data in relation to what they tell us about the candidates and the campaign. In a most basic way, these can be interpreted as measures of the effectiveness of the candidates' efforts. The hallmark of the campaign, confirmed on election day and reemphasized in its aftermath and the recounts and court cases that followed, was its closeness. From beginning to end, neither candidate could maintain an appreciable lead nor could they separate themselves from their opponent. (Table 1.1) This is the election's most distinguishing feature and the one that gives it a drama and historic importance few others have enjoyed.

William Crotty 11 Table 1.1 Closeness of Presidential Race: Polls of Likely Voters During Last Nine Weeks of Campaign Date September 4-10 September 11-17 September 18-24 September 2 5-Oetober 1 October 2-8 October 9-15 October 16-22 October 23-29 October 30-November 6

# of Respondents

Bush

Gore

1,717 1,665 1,502 1,578 1,687 1,680 1,690 3,268 6,043

43% 43 44 46 4<S 4ft 49 49 48

48% 48 4.S 45 45 45 41 42 43

Source: www.gallup .com

The second point is that both major party candidates were favorably perceived (Table 1.2). However, as the campaign progressed, Gore's unfavorable perceptions increased (by nine percentage points) and his favorable assessments decreased (by six percentage points). It is noteworthy that given the Bush campaign's emphasis on personality, diought to benefit the Texas governor, on the average for the campaign as a whole both scored the same (57%). Whether this means that both were well liked or disliked equally, or that voters saw little choice between them in this regard, depends more on the interpretation of the final vote. Bush's highest evaluations came in the last few weeks of October, lending an optimism to the campaign that in retrospect was unwarranted and leading to scheduling decisions diat proved not to be in the best interest of the campaign. Going into the election, Bush and Gore were in a virtual tie as to favorability ratings. In the post-election recount period, the negatives on both increased (Gore by 5% and Bush by 4%). A third trend reflects on the Gore campaign's unwillingness or inability to build upon the economic success of the Clinton years. Americans were satisfied with the way things were (by an overwhelming 69%-28% margin at the beginning of the election year). They remained positive about the direction the country had gone in and was going in. To a large degree, it appeared they took these developments for granted, an attitude reinforced by the Gore's campaign refusal to

12 America's Choice 2000 Table 1.2 Favorability Ratings of Major Party Candidates During General Election Campaign* (in percent) Al Gore

November I 3—1 5 November 4-5 October 24-26 October 23-25 October 5-7 September 28-30 September 15-17

Favorable

Unfavorable

Never Heard of

No Opinion

54 56 53 55 57 61 62

44 39 4: 40 37 31 30

— _ — — 0 —

2 5 5 5 6 8 8

Favorable

Unfavorable

Heard of

No Opinion

54 55 62 60 59 58 55 51

43 39

— — — — — — 0 1

3 6 5 5 4 6 7 7

George W. Bush

Never November 13-15 November 4-5 October 24-26 October 23-25 October 20-22 October 5-7 September 28-30 September 15-17

n

35 37 36 ?s 41

*'Ilie results indicate the views of registered voters Source: www.gallup.com

relentlessly and single-mindedly focus on them (a strategy Clinton had used in 1992 against Bush's father in a time of poor economic performance, and one that could have served as a model for the vice president's campaign). The success of the Clinton administration and the contrast with the economic performance of the Reagan-Bush years had to be among its most impressive legacies. This was arguably the Gore campaign's strongest appeal, but one it failed to use consistently or effectively. Contrast Gore's hesitancy in this regard with Clinton's address to the Democratic National Convention, summing up the achievements of his eight years in office and presumably setting the battleground for the general election campaign. . . . At this moment of unprecedented good fortune, our people face a fundamental choice. Are going to keep this progress and prosperity

William Crotty

13

Table 1.3 Satisfaction with Direction the Country is Moving In (in percent)

January 7-10,2000 February 25-27,2000 April 3-9, 2000 May 18-21, 2000 June 22-25, 2000 July 14-16, 2000 August 18-19,2000 August 29-September 5, 2000 October 6-9, 2000 November 13-15,2000

Satisfied

Dissatisfied

No Opinion

69 65 59 55 56 61 63 59 62 58

28 32 37 42 39 35 33 38 36 41

3 3 4 3 5 4 4

3 2 I

Source: www.gaHup.com

going? . . . we can't take our future for granted. . . . Today after seven and a half years of hard effort, we're in the midst of the longest economic expansion in history: more than 22 million new jobs, the lowest unemployment in 30 years, the lowest female unemployment in 40 years, the lowest Hispanic and African American unemployment rate ever recorded, and the highest home ownership in history. . . Are we better off today than we were eight years ago? You bet we are. . . . lb those who say the progress of the last eight years was just some sort of accident, that we just, kind of, coasted along, let me be clear.. . America's success was not a matter of chance, it was a matter of choice. . . . Today America laces another choice. It is every bit as momentous as the one we faced eight years ago, for what a nation does with its good tortune is just as stern a test of its character, values and judgement as how it deals widi adversity. I just want to tell all of you . . . a few things that I know about AJ Gore. We've worked closely together for eight years now . . . we faced the most difficult issues ol war and peace, of whether to take on some powerful interest,... he always told me exactly what he thought was right... more than anybody else T have known in public life, AJ Gore understands the future, and how sweeping changes and scientific breakthroughs will affect ordinary Americans' lives . . . we need somebody in the White House at the dawn of me 21 sl century who really understands the future." {Boston Globe, August 15,2000, p. A20) In his few campaign appearances, Clinton repeatedly emphasized the same themes: the economic (in particular) and other successes of his administration and his vice president, Al Gore, as the keeper of the

14 America's Choice 2000 flame and the protector of his legacy. The message had a self-interested nature to be sure (how Clinton would be remembered in history despite the scandals, impeachment, special counsels, and the rest). But it was effective: simple, clear and relevant to the daily lives of the voters. Unfortunately for Democrats, it was not the path Gore chose. Instead, Gore focused more on his separation from the Clinton administration and his emphasis on a broad pro-active, future-oriented (if complex and encompassing) agenda. In effect, although the issues were different, Gore chose to run much as Bush was forced to do as the challenger to an incumbent administration, focusing on the policy concerns he would champion once in office. It is an outsider strategy' and one that de-emphasized a straightforward focus on, and reminder of, the formidable achievements of the Clinton years and contrasted these with the economic problems, in particular, of the Reagan-Bush years. It was a miscalculation that fundamentally hurt the Gore campaign. In terms of demographics and party identifiers, the groups most consistently Gore/Democratic or Bush/Republican are found in Table 1.5. Minorities, liberals, women, Democratic party identifiers, easterners, and the less educated, favored Gore consistently. Males, whites, Republican party identifiers, southerners, conservatives and those with some college favored Bush. Those breakdowns reflect the broad out-

Table 1.4

Group Support in General Election Campaign Prior to Vote Adi 'antage %

Swing

Advantage * Gore Easterners .Moderates Liberals No College Non-White

Ages: + 14 +12 +62 +6 +72

Democrats

+74

0/ 10

Bush

Southerners Conservatives Some College White

+20 +57 + 10 + 14

Republicans

+84

votes 18-29 30-49 50-64 65+ Midwest Westerners College Graduates No College Independents

*Likely Voters as Measured from October 30-November 5, 2000 Source: Gallup Poll

Gore

Bmh

— — — +7 —

+2 +9 +6 — +3 +4 +2

+6 +6

William Crotty 15 Table 1.5 Electoral Vote Projection: Beginning of the General Election Campaign Bush

Gore State

Electoral Vote

1996 Vote

State

Electoral Vote

1996 Vote

D 3 Vermont New York 33 D Rhode Island 4 D Connecticut 8 1) Massachusetts 12 D District of Columbia 3 D Maryland 10 1) New Jersey D 15 California 54 D (9 states, 154 electoral votes)

Indiana 12 R Kentucky 8 D Virginia 13 R Mississippi 7 R 9 Alabama R South Carolina 8 R 'Texas 32 R Oklahoma R 8 Kansas 6 R 5 R Nebraska 3 Soudi Dakota R 3 R North Dakota 3 Montana R Idaho 4 R Wyoming 3 R Colorado 8 R Utah 5 R D Nevada 4 D Arizona 8 3 Delaware D 3 Alaska R (21 states, 155 electoral votes)

Key States (undecided) D Pennsylvania 23 21 1) Ohio •Michigan 18 1) Wisconsin 11 1) Illinois 22 D Missouri 11 D Iowa 7 I) Minnesota 10 D (8 states, 123 electoral votes)

States in Flux 1 1 Washington D Oregon 7 1) New Mexico 5 D D Arkansas 6 9 Louisiana D 11 D Tennessee Georgia R 13 Florida 25 D North Carolina 14 R West Virginia 5 D New Hampshire 4 D Maine 4 D (12 states, 114 electoral votes)

Note: 270 electoral votes needed to win

16 America's Choice 2000 lines of each party's coalition. Less predictably, moderates supported Gore and independents broke for Bush.

THE ISSUES The differences between the candidates on issues were marked. These often got lost, or were poorly understood, given Bush's broader emphasis on character, integrity and personal charm and Gore's repeated attempts in the debates and on the stump to explain his complicated proposals on education, health care, the environment, fiscal policy, abortion, foreign relations, campaign finance, and the like. Gore's proposals were specific, factual and, in policy terms, understandable only to a small category of policy types in Washington. Gore appeared to delight in discussions of cutoff points, tax credits, targeted groups, budgetary allocations, funding provisions, qualifying requirements, and the rest. Gore had a program it seemed, thought through in detail, for eveiy group or problem that might arise. His difficulty was explaining these in manageable terms to an electorate not used to such precise accounts. In what could have been crucial to his campaign, he was unable to find a clear, single unifying theme for his candidacy. His most basic response in this regard was to repeatedly assure voters that he would work hard and fully in their interests. Given the intensity of his campaign effort and his previous experience as an active vice president, this claim was not likely to be challenged. Still, it does not have the popular or personal appeal or emotional resonance one might expect from a presidential candidate or from such an issuebased campaign. Nonetheless, and whatever the packaging, the policy differences between the candidates were substantial. Their development was, for the Gore campaign at least, one of the most thorough and exhaustive in the modern history of campaigning. The Bush campaign was more reactive to issues raised by its opponent and preferred more general statements of policy intent. Nonetheless the differences between the candidates and the parties, while often muted, were real enough. Some of these differences between the candidates and the parties can be seen in the following:

William Crotty 17 Al Con

George W. Bush Abortion

Pro

Pro

abortion rights late term abortion restrictions if exceptions are added to protect a woman's life and health an expansion of Medicaid abortions, which are currently provided in instances of rape, incest or to save a woman's life FDA approval of abortion pill Mifeprex

late-term abortion restrictions parental consent and notification a constitutional amendment to outlaw abortion

Against

Against • against parental consent and notification • against a constitutional amendment to outlaw abortion

against abortion except in cases of rape, incest or to save a woman's life against Medicaid funded abortions except to save a woman's life against FDA approval of abortion pill Mifeprex

Campaign Finance Reform Pro

Against

public financing of congressional and presidential campaigns through his $7 billion "Democracy Endowment" fund

publicly financed presidential and congressional campaigns

Civil Rights Pro

Pro

affirmative action * current "Don's Ask, Don't Tell" policy in military on gays allowing openly homosexuals to serve in the military domestic partner protections for homosexuals tougher hate crime legislation, including coverage for sexual orientation Against • quotas and racial preferences ' gay adoptions • domestic partner benefits for homosexuals • Employee Non-Discrimination Act expanding hate crimes laws

18 America's Choice 2000 Military Pro

Pro streamlining DOD bureaucracy under tenets of his "reinventing government" initiative continued investments in technology and defense industries an increase of defense spending and "transforming" die military to meet the needs of the 21 st century in favor of die administration's 3.7% across the board pay budget increase, as well as providing adequate housing and medical care for die nation's military personnel Comprehensive lest Ban Treaty and will urge its ratification in the Senate

deployment of a large system scale national missile defense system akin to Reagan's SD1 and would cancel the ABM Treaty with Russia to do so an increase in defense spending, including a $1 billion increase in military pay spending an additional $20 billion on defense R&D for post Cold War weapons systems

Fiscal Policy

ft • using $432 billion to shore up the Medicare program including prescription drug benefit • providing marriage penalty relief by doubling the standard deduction lor joint filers • in favor of die creation of Universal Savings Accounts to help low and middle income families widiout access to IRA's or 401 Ks save for retirement • in favor of the creation of a 401 (j) Life-Long Learning Account to enable families and employers to contribute up to $2,500 a year tor any education or qualified life-long learning expenses • expanding the low-income housing tax credit to expand and improve the quality of available low-income housing • in favor of a new, refundable AfterSchool Tax Credit for children ages 16 and under • Eliminating the national debt bv 2012

Pro • using the $2.17 non-Social Security surplus in the following manner: $1.3 trillion tax cut; $475 billion in spending on domestic programs; and $265 billion in reserve ' eliminate the estate tax by 2009 1 raising the cap on corporate giving pledge to veto any income tax increase cutting the 15% tax bracket to 10% for die first $6,000 of taxable income for singles, the first $10,000 lor single parents, and the first $12,000 for married couples cutting the maximum tax rate for middle class to 25% from 28% and capping the top tax rate at 33% • a 10-year, $1.3 trillion tax cut that includes an overhaul of the current rate structure 1 eliminating the national debt by 2016

William Crotty 19 Education Pro

Pro

• a 10-year, $115 billion plan paid for by an education trust fund financed with 10% ofthe surplus not dedicated to Social Security or debt reduction • creation of a National Tuition Savings Program to help families invest their money in Special trusts which help pay for their children's tuition at universities outside their state • mandatory teacher testing for all new teachers and rigorous evaluation after granting teacherlicenses • spending $170 billion over 10 years for children in public schools to achieve high standards • raising teacher pay and hiring 100,000 new teachers in order to reduce class sizes in lower grades

• federal government requiring individual states to set education standards and commence a three year testing period tor each school • further development of charter schools by investing $300 million in a charter school homestead fund to provide $3 billion in loan guarantees to 200 new charter schools • allocating $5 billion to establish the "Reading First" initiative so every child can read by the third grade • allocating $! billion to establish a "Math and Science Partnership Fund" strengthen K-12 math and science education • providing $2 billion in new funding for after school programs

Against • school vouchers for private, religious and home schools

The Environment Pro • Kyoto global wanning agreement • ban on off-shore drilling on undeveloped leases oft the Florida and California coasts • using Si billion in federal funds to promote smart growth policies dealing with urban sprawl • spending S2 billion over ten years to create new parklands and open spaces: SI billion in tax cuts to landowners who conserve property; $1 billion for cities and states to create local parks

Pro • increased state control over environmental policies • "conservation partnerships" between the federal and state governments to meet environmental standards for brownfields clean up • continued research into the causes and impact of global warming

Against • against Kyoto global warming agreement

20

America's Choice 2000 Health Care Pro

Pro » expanding the federal CHIP program to include children living with 250% of the federal poverty level • providing a 25 percent refundable tax credit for individuals lacking access to employer based health coverage to purchase private insurance • using part of the federal budget surplus to offer a voluntary prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries • providing low-income seniors with catastrophic prescription drug coverage for chronic illnesses •Patient's Bill of Rights legislation that includes the direct access to specialists; the right to choose the nearest emergency room; choice of providers; and a patient's right to appeal a health plan decision • a Medicare Trust fund "lock box" that would extend die life of the program until at least 2030 by devoting the interest savings from debt reduction to Medicare solvency • strengthening Medicare by encouraging price competition among managed care plans and cost savings for competitive pricing.

returning CHIP to its original design as a flexible bock grant program to provide states with the freedom to innovate and expand coverage of die greatest number of eligible uninsured private-sector based prescription drug benefit tor Medicare

beneficiaries prescription drug subsidies for low income seniors a limited patients' right to sue HMOs over care denials providing taxpayers with 100% above-the-line deduction for long term care insurance premiums providing a £2,000 health credit to families diat do not qualify for Medicaid and other government assistance and are not covered by employer sponsored plan allowing small businesses to purchase "Association Health Plans" from multistate trade Associations and to lower the cost of insurance for small business owners

Social Security Pro • using $2.2 trillion of the Social Security surplus to shore up the program and pay down the debt, thus saving billions of dollars in interest, which can be redirected to ensuring the solvency oi the Social Security trust fund until at least 2050 • the elimination of the Social Security earnings limit, which the president signed into law on April 7, 2000. • an increase in benefits for widows and

Pro partial privatization of Social Security by allowing participants to invest a portion (2%) of their payroll taxes in the stock market the elimination oi the Social Security earnings limit die system's current provision to pay benefits to widows, widowers and the disabled

William Crotty 21 Social Security Pro

Pro

eliminating the "motherhood penalty" —the resulting reduction in benefits for women who take time off from work to raise children • creation of "Retirement; Savings Plus Accounts," maintained by private financial institutions; the accounts would operate similar to traditional IRAs and 401 (k)s, but would allow for tax deductible contributions of up to $2,000/yr • expanding pension portability

Reading over some of Gore's proposals on education, a key issue for both Bush and Gore, it is easier to see why he had such difficulty in attempting to present these clearly in speeches, before mass audiences or in the limited time segments on television, and why also listeners would have a hard time in both understanding the proposals and in relating these to their own situations. For example, there was Gore's commitment to "life-long learning accounts," a proposal he repeated continuously. It would allow "employers and families to contribute up to $2,500 annually; could be used after age 30 to acquire new job skills [and had] an extra tax credit matching 50 percent of the individual contribution." Re-read and thought about, it is reasonably, although possibly not completely, clear. Attempting to explain it (and other equally complicated proposals) to campaign audiences or television viewers was another matter. Again, Bush was less policy specific, choosing to present broad themes as to what he would do once in office, with the emphasis on trustworthiness, character, and integrity rather than the details of policies. It was an easier sell, given the limited knowledge and attention span of viewers; the demands of making one- to two-minute presentations in the debates; and the emphasis on simplicity, drama, and visuals in television ads. Outside of presentation styles, it should be re-emphasized that the differences in policy commitments between the candidates were real, the choices offered clear for those motivated enough to inform themselves,

22

America's Choice 2000

and the direction in which each candidate would take the nation were substantially different. It would be difficult to argue that in this election voters had little to no choice.

THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES The first of the presidential debates was eagerly anticipated. The contest was close, neither candidate had captured the public's imagination, and the expectation was that a face-to-face clash on television would prove decisive in the election. The likelihood is that the debates clarified the images of the candidates and their policy differences but did not provide either with the edge needed to distance himself from his opponent. The voter confusion and indecisiveness that characterized the entire campaign was more than likely reinforced by the debates. The first, the most widely anticipated of the three presidential debates, was seen by a television audience estimated to be 90 million people. It set the tone and mood for the two that followed. Gore was well prepared, aggi-essive in presenting his proposals and in attacking and reacting to his opponent's positions, and depended on the in-depth development of his policy positions to influence viewers. As in the campaign generally, while mentioning them, he chose not to give great weight to the economic achievements of the Clinton administration, his role in contributing to these, and the need to keep a continuity in leadership to best preserve the progress made (the themes Clinton repeatedly stressed in his few campaign appearances). What Gore did emphasize was a broad set of policies he projected his administration would enact, an agenda that could appear difficult to comprehend and possible even a little overwhelming to the casual viewer. Bush's approach was totally different. He attempted to emphasize personality, character, integrity and a commitment to unifying the nation once in office. He appeared laid back and not overly knowledgeable or even interested in specific areas of policy issues, choosing instead to assure viewers that he would represent their interests, broadly conceived, and provide a moral and ethical leadership in Washington that he saw as absent during the Clinton years. He emphasized the role of the states in planning and implementing policy (as contrasted with the federal government); tax cuts and his faith in the peo-

William Crotty 23 pie radier than the government to spend their own money; and military preparedness—not a major public concern. Bush's chief strength appeared to be in focusing on the personality differences between the vice president and himself. Compared to Gore, he appeared warmer, friendlier and more likeable. It was enough, and despite the obvious weakness in his base of knowledge and in his ability to articulate his issue stands, for some observers credited him with generally "winning" the debates. The contention is open to different interpretations: Gore was clearly the more able policy proponent and the more experienced public servant, and arguably better prepared to assume the presidency, qualities that stood out in the television encounters. It may be that most viewers judge more on personal qualities that they feel most comfortable with. If so, Bush did well by these standards. Gore did come across as better prepared and more articulate in presenting his case. If anything, he was considered overly aggressive in these regards. Gore did better in the more formal settings and appeared more comfortable in structured formats (debates one and three). Bush did his best in the more informal and relaxed setting of the second debate, when the candidates sat side by side and addressed the moderator, Jim Lehrer of PBS, rather than a large audience, in a more conversational and familiar style. Gore, as was the case throughout the campaign, came across as a little stiff, overbearing, and at times, pedantic. Most importantly, while a marking point in the campaign, the debates turned out to be less significant and less decisive than originally expected. Neither candidate won convincingly. The voters' inability to decide between the two contenders in choosing the one suited to best represent them appeared to be reinforced by what they saw.

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE STRATEGY There was a consistency in the campaign that was striking. From beginning to end, the states marked as pivotal by each candidate remained important and dictated their strategy. The battleground states proved to be just that: the Midwest combined with the Northwest (Washington, Oregon), the border states of Missouri, Tennessee (Gore's home state) and Arkansas (where Clinton returned to campaign), Pennsylvania in the Northeast, and Florida in the South.

24 America's Choice 2000 There were a number of surprises in all of this. Normally Democratic states could not always be counted on in this election. Florida, usually conservative and Republican and with Bush's brother Jeb as governor, responded to Gore's views on Social Security, the regulation of HMOs and prescription drugs, and put the state into play. The industrial states of Pennsylvania and Michigan, both with Republican governors, saw the labor unions push hard for Gore. The dot.comers in Washington and Oregon provided an unpredictable element to the voting, and normally populist states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin did not totally embrace the populist aspects of Gore's message. West Virginia, a strong Democratic state, was contested and ultimately went to Bush. And as noted, the home states of Tennessee (Gore) and Arkansas (Clinton) stayed in play until Election Day. To the end, the Bush campaign remained true to its original themes, a restoration of honor and dignity to the office of chief executive (a reference to the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal and the various charges and investigations of abuse of office during the Clinton years); a unifier Table 1.6 Electoral Vote Projection: Closing Days of Campaign Critical States Electoral Vote Washington Minnesota Wisconsin Michigan Pennsylvania Illinois Missouri Tennessee Florida

11 10 11 18 23 11 I! M 25

Campaigned* — — i; G — — G G,B G,B

States Still in Play State Oregon New Mexico Iowa Arkansas

Electoral Vote

Campaigned*

7 5 7 6

— — G,B B

* = Campaigned in on the last day of campaign, G = Gore and B = Bush

William Crotty 25 Table 1.7

Electoral Vote: Final Tally Gore

State California Connecticut District of Columbia Delaware Hawaii Iowa Illinois Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota New Jersey New Mexico New York Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island Vermont Washington Wisconsin Total

Electoral Vote 54 8 i 3 4 7 22 4

to 12 18 10 IS 5 33 7 4 3 11 il 267*

* One Gore Elector from District Columbia abstained.

Bush State Alaska Alabama Arkansas Arizona Colorado Florida Georgia Idaho Indiana Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Mississippi Missouri Montana North Carolina North Dakota Nebraska New Hampshire Nevada Ohio Oklahoma South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Virginia West Virginia Wyoming Total

Electoral 3 9 6 8 8 25 13 4 12 6 8 9 7 ii 3 14 3 5 4 4 21 8 S 3 II 32 5 13 5 3 271

as leader (Bush) who would bring the country together, rather than divide it; a President who would return accountability and "an era of responsibility" to Washington. The issues in general were vague and the policy content generalized and unclear. The focus was on character, and by inference, Bush's personality. Gore's message was also consistent, but quite different. It was more comprehensive, policy-driven, and specific. His focus was on the policy programs he intended to implement as president and the commitment he made to "working Americans" to consistently and wholeheartedly

26

America's Choice 2000

advance their interests. The issues emphasized included a laundry list of programs he would champion. As throughout the campaign, when things did not work, Gore did more of the same, hoping it would seem that through sheer energy, stamina, argument, facts and figures, he might reach and persuade each and every voter. He campaigned seemingly without stop, saying the presidency is not "just a popularity contest" and that he was "well aware that I won't always be the most exciting politician." He promised to "work for you everyday and I will never let you down." The approach, the strategizing, the key states, and the messages from day one to election day changed little.

NADER AND THIRD PARTYISM The principal attention (initially quite limited) among the third and minor party candidates was given to Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader. Buchanan had given up his quest for a Republican party nomination, moved into Ross Perot's Reform Party and, after an acrimonious and divisive convention, won its nomination. Buchanan had been around in one capacity or another—Washington newspaper and television commentator, White House staff member in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, quadrennial Far Right contender for the Republican Party's presidential nomination—for decades. He was a controversial figure, and always outspoken. His comments in a book that surfaced during the campaign that Hitler and Germany in the Second World War were not the threat to America that many at the time had thought ("... Hitler made no overt move to threaten U.S. vital interests") (Buchanan, 1999, p. 268). This may well have gone too far, ending the media attention given to his campaign and possibly ending his public career altogether. Buchanan was not a factor in the election. His poor showing-—he received less than 1% of the total vote—meant that the Reform Party would lose its federal subsidy in 2004 and may well have marked the end of a party that, with Perot as its nominee, had attracted considerable attention during the 1992 and 1996 races. Buchanan did emerge briefly in the aftermath of the election. He had received a disproportionately large vote in Palm Beach county in Florida, well out of line with his vote in other Florida counties. The Democrats claimed that these were Gore votes that had been punched

William Crotty 27 on a confusing "butterfly" ballot by voters thinking they were voting for the Democratic presidential nominee, but in actuality voting for Buchanan. If the Democrats could prove this, they would win Florida and the presidency; if they could force a recount their chances of victory would increase. Surprisingly perhaps, Buchanan agreed with the Democrats that the votes were not his and should have gone to Gore. Ralph Nader was another story. Nader, a consumer advocate with a national reputation for four decades, ran as the Green Party's nominee. At first, his campaign attracted little attention. He appealed to a liberal constituency, railed against both major parties as being in the pocket of corporate interests, and claimed that they provided little real choice for Americans. His major constituency appeared to be found on college campuses where his message was well received. His major media event during the fall was an attempt to enter the hall (with a valid ticket) at the University of Massachusetts at Boston where the first of the Gore-Bush debates took place. He was removed by security from the area and later was to sue on the basis that he and his party were arbitrarily barred from appearing in the debates. In the general election campaign's waning days, Nader suddenly began to receive extensive attention from both political parties and from the media. As the race was projected to be a toss-up, the Democrats went after Nader with a vengeance, fearing the vote he received in key states (even at a projected 4-5%) could provide the margin for a Bush victory and a Gore loss. The Democratic Party sponsored television commercials and new conferences, in which former Nader associates and liberal celebrities (such as Robert Redford and Barbara Streisand) attacked Nader as being out of touch with the goals he had fought so long to achieve, and as the unwitting stalking horse for a conservative Republican candidate. The Democrats ran such television ads in key states. Anti-abortion groups and labor unions also funded commercials attacking Nader, and urged their members to support Gore. The major theme was that a vote for Nader was a wasted vote. He had no chance of winning, and his support directly undercut Gore's and advantaged Bush. The Republican party also ran ads in key states, at times under the names of fictional organizations or groups created expressly for the purpose, directed at liberal constituencies and promoting Nader's candidacy as a means of undermining Gore's strength.

28

America's Choice 2000

At first, Nader showed little concern with the attacks from the Democrats and the left and the disguised pro-Nader appeals of Republicans, saying he welcomed the attention after six months of neglect. Later, and especially in the undecided aftermath of the election, his responses were to take on a more combative and edgy quality. Whatever the outcome, he was unapologetic about his role in it. Nader's message was a populistic blend of anti-corporatism and pro-consumer, pro-environment, and pro-women's rights. It was familiar to those who had followed Nader's career and incorporated themes long endorsed by Democrats. Gore touched on similar issues at different points in the primary and general election campaign, but never consistently developed or identified with them. Had he done so (or had the Republican candidate, which would have been less likely), Nader's support would have eroded. It was a point Nader was quick to recognize and even to welcome. He claimed that was the point of his campaign, to challenge both parties' policy commitments and to introduce a reform agenda into the nation's politics. Gore's decision was to present a moderate/centrist message aimed at middle Americans and swing voters. He assumed that the more liberal elements of his party at the end of the day, and presented with the choice of voting for him or "wasting" their votes, would support him. Most, of course, did. Enough did not, leaving Nader the possible margin of victory in several key states and, most noticeably, in Florida. The Nader campaign was clear, outspoken and, for a candidate who lacked charisma and whose personal style and speaking ability might be described as drab, electrifying for those who responded to it. A taste of Nader's rhetoric and uncompromising attacks can be gained from his speech to a rally in New York City: AJ Gore. The Great Imposter. The Great Pretender . . . He bullies the weak and cowers in front of the strong. . . the Democrats sweet talk African Americans and then they betray them What have they done for the cities? What have they done for die ghettos? Every time Ai Gore talks about who he wants to represent, it's always the middle class . . . How about the working poor? I guess they don't count for Al Gore. You know why? Because he thinks he's got them. (Macero, 2000). The Democrats did not take kindly to the attacks aimed directly at their core constituencies, and neither party was used to such sharp take-

William Crotty

29

no-prisoners rhetoric. While Bush was not the principal target, Nader did not let him off lightly either. Yet, at the same time, he cautioned (in his own way) against demonizing the Republican candidate as many liberals and Democrats were inclined to do. "Let's not turn this guy into Genghis Kahn. First of all, he doesn't know much; second of all, he's lazy; and third, he avoids conflicts. Those are his assets." ("Quotes of N o t e . " Boston Globe, November 4, 2000, p. A19). T h e Democrats' worst fears had been realized. Nader received only three percent of the vote nationally. In Florida, the state that was to determine the election, his vote total was lower, just 1.6 percent of the total (at just under 100,000 votes). Had this vote gone to Gore, he would have taken Florida and won the Presidency. T h e Democrats may well have been right. Nader drew support from a number of groups that might have supported Gore nationally. T h e second choice of likely Nader voters favored G o r e 2 to 1. Still, about one-third of the Nader pool favored neither of the major party candidates, would not vote, or were undecided as to whom to support (Table 1.9). At any rate, the immediate reaction in the media and of many Democrats was that Nader had cost Gore Florida and the election. N a d e r was repeatedly asked what it felt like to be a "spoiler" whose campaign overshadowed his decades of work on the issues he most cherished. His reply was to return to the corporate base of politics, government policies and both parties' campaigns and to repeat that either party could have adopted the Green Party's issues. His critics were not satisfied. T h e Boston Globe was not alone in its editorial assessment: Naders vote was the key to George W Bush's lead in Florida . . . Nader got 96,896 votes there, and in his absence, Gore probably would have gained enough of these to defeat Bush Across the nation, Gore would have earned enough of Nader's 2,655,233 votes to win Oregon and New Hampshire and give him a convincing plurality... Nader fails to grasp that the two-party system has proved durable because it forces political leaders to build coalitions across a huge country. Nader and other outsiders... do not dirty themselves with the compromises that are essential to lead a national coalition to power. Before Tuesday, Nader had earned an honorable place in U.S. history as a pioneer in consumer safety. If Bush prevails in Florida, Nader will become a footnote as the willful eccentric who denied Gore the political prize he deserved (Nadir, Boston Globe. November 9,2000, p. A18).

30

America's Choice 2000 Table 1.8 Election I.

Nader Support in the 2000

Nader's Percentage of the Vote in Pre-Election Period

Date

%

September 4-10 September 11-17 September 18-24 September 25—October 1 October 2-8 October 8-15 October 14-22

3 3 2 3 3 2

II.

•1

Second Choice of Nader Voters

Likely Voters

%

AJ Gore George W. Bush Would not vote Other/don't know

43 21 21 IS

III. Profile of Nader Supporters (Total 4% of Likely Voters) Nader Support

0/

Independent: Libera] Some college Moderate West East Nonwhite Midwest Men Women College graduate/ postgraduate study' White 50+ South No college Conservative Democrat Republican

10 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4

/o

4 4 3 2 2 2 1

Source Gallup Poll, October 16-22, 2000

William Crotty 31 Such an accusatory and even bitter tone reflected the media's questions directed at Nader immediately after the initial results were in. As the editorial noted, Nader was hardly contrite: "The Republican and Democratic parties take more money from the same sources; they niorph into one corporate party with two heads . . . there are millions of people who are really ready for a new progressive political movement." Whatever the future might hold for Ralph Nader and the Green Party and its platform, the full intensity of the media and the two campaigns turned quickly to Florida and the battle to be fought there in the counting rooms and the courts to determine who had actually won. Nader's impact on the outcome was now part of historical lore.

FINANCING THE ELECTION Early returns indicated that the 2000 election was by far the most expensive in American history. The perception is correct and by any standard more money was spent by more candidates than ever before. Campaign spending was roughly estimated to be about 50 percent higher than four years earlier. Overall around $3 billion was spent, $2 billion raised by the parties and the candidates, with the remainder of the money invested by interest groups in promoting advertisements in favor of candidates. Some of the records broken, based on information from the Federal Election Commission, included: l.Most money raised and spent by a presidential candidate: George W. Bush $102.7 million (as of 10/00). [Later extended to $160 million] Old record: Bob Dole, $50.7 million in 1996 (as of October 1996). 2. Most money spent by a presidential candidate in the primaries: George W. Bush, $91.1 million, (as of August 2000). Old record: Dole, $42.2 million, 1996. 3. Most federal matching funds for a presidential candidate: Al Gore, $15.5 million (Bush did not accept federal funds and the spending restrictions that accompanied them). Old record: Dole, $13.5 million, 1996. 4. Most unregulated "soft money" raised by a political party:

32

America's Choice 2000 Republican National Committee (RNC): $136.3 million (as of October, 2000). Old record: RNC $113.1 million, 1995-1996 election cycle. 5. Most money raised by congressional candidates: $800.7 million (as of October 18, 2000). Old record: $781.3 million in the 1997-1998 election cycle. 6. Most money raised for a $enate race: Jon Corzine, Democrat, New Jersey, $55.7 million (as of October 18, 2000). Old record: Michael Huffington, Republican, California, $30 million, 1994. 7. Most money spent in a $enate race: the New Jersey contest between Corzine and Representative Bob Franks, $57.8 million. Old record: California Senate race between Huffington and Democrat Dianne Feinstein, $44.4 million in 1994. 8. Most money spent in a House race: California contest between Representative Jim Rogan and State Senator Adam Schiff, $9.1 million (as of October 18, 2000). Old record: Georgia contest between Rep. Newt Gingrich and Michael Coles, $8.9 million in 1996. 9. Most funds raised in one night: Democratic National Committee fundraiser, $26.5 million, May, 2000. Old record: Republican National Committee fundraiser $21.5 million, April, 2000. Older record: Republican National Committee fundraiser, $14 million, April 1996. 10. Largest national convention fundraiser: Republican National Committee, $10.1 million, August 2000. Old record: Republican National Committee, $6.5 million, August 1996 (Salant, November 7, 2000).

A few conclusions are obvious. Politics is expensive and getting progressively more so. The corporations, unions and interest groups with the funds available and a willingness to invest them in politics and the candidates with the access to such funding are the major players in the game. Finally, the reforms instituted by Congress after the 1972 Nixon election and the Watergate scandal have failed to stop the spiraling election costs. While they have accomplished other ends (an impartial accounting of the cost of campaigns; the federal funding of presidential candidacies in the primaries and general elections; the creation of the Federal Election Commission), the parties, the candidates, and

William Crotty 33 their financial backers have found ways to sidestep their regulations and basically undermine any efforts at cost containment. It was an issue raised by John McCain in the primaries and both presidential candidates in the campaign. Gore promised campaign finance reform, including the elimination of soft money contributions, would be the first piece of legislation to be sent by his administration to the Congress. Bush was less specific. Regardless of who was elected, serious reform would be difficult The Congress is not sympathetic and the forces that would mobilize against it are the same ones that fund current presidential and congressional races.

THE CLOSING STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN Going into the last two weeks, the election was close. A tracking poll by John Zogby of 1,206 likely voters for Reuters/MSNBC showed Bush at 45 percent (his largest lead since late September), Gore at 41 percent, Green Party candidate Ralph Nader at 5 percent and Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan at 1 percent, with 7 percent of the voters undecided. A New York Thnes/CBS telephone poll of 1,010 registered voters had a number of positive assessments the candidates must have appreciated—most (between 59% and 70%) saw them as able to get things done, skilled leaders and candidates who stressed issues rather than personal attacks on their opponents. Gore was seen as better prepared for the presidency, better able to negotiate with world leaders, more caring, and better equipped to deal with international crises. Bush's advantages dealt primarily with perceptions of his personal style, the basis of his campaign. He was seen as better in explaining his positions in general terms rather than focusing on details and "trying to show how much he knows," emphasizing the kind of person he was rather than his experience, and saying what he believed rather than what he thought people wanted to hear. The profiles pretty much encapsulated the contrasting messages and appeals of the campaign. More disturbing, over 40 percent of the voters indicated they felt uneasy about the candidates and still—after a long primary season and a hotly contested general election—entertained doubts about both and an indecisiveness that was soon to be reflected in the vote. This probably sums up the entire campaign. Neither candidate had overwhelmed the American public and neither had made his case effectively enough

34

America's Choice 2000

to convince a clear majority to support him for the presidency. Election day was to confirm what many had suspected and what the polls had shown. There was speculation that the final vote might be divided, with Bush taking the popular vote and Gore the electoral vote. The feeling was that this would cause controversy and would detract from the legitimacy of the new administration. This worst case scenario was to prove accurate, although the order was reversed, and the final electoral vote would take a good deal of time to decide. The effect of all of this on the legitimacy or effectiveness of the new administration was open to speculation. After the election, there was speculation about the operations of both campaigns. Gore was criticized (severely by some Democrats) for not using Clinton more effectively and more frequently; for running a poll-driven, cautious campaign (the same was said of Bush); for not running clearly and emphatically on the administration's record, especially in relation to the economy; for his new message-a-week wish list of proposals; for his refusal to align with and campaign for House and Senate Democratic candidates to any great extent (the House Democrats who believed they could have won control of their body with a little more help were particularly upset); for an over-reliance on consultants; for a failure to carry his own home state which would have given him the electoral vote majority he needed; for his stiff and formal campaign and rhetorical style; for his "bread and butter" campaign ("what I can do for you") and his confusing emphasis on the arcane subtleties of policy to the detriment of broader, simpler themes; for his inability to present a vision of what America could be (again a criticism leveled at Bush also); for his overly aggressive style in two of the presidential debates sandwiched around a more contrite and subdued approach in the second; for an inability to communicate who he was as a person and what motivated him; for his refusal to court the liberal vote or to take the Nader candidacy seriously until it was too late in the game; and for anything else that might have resulted in the razor thin margin that lost him the Electoral College. Bush in turn was criticized by Republican strategists, less for his style and approach to the campaign or his inexperience and poor knowledge of policy than for his often relaxed approach to campaigning, the building in of rest days into the final stages of the campaign, and his reliance on a small circle of advisors who had served him well as governor but had limited experience on the national level. Bush's

William Crotty 35 decision to campaign in the immediate period before election day in states such as California and New York (on behalf of congressional candidates) where he had no chance of winning, many believed ultimately hurt his own chances. The time would have been better spent elsewhere, in states in which Gore won by a handful of votes. Republicans criticized the Bush campaigned for its overconfidence in the last weeks of the campaign, which in turn led to an assumption (shared by much of the media) that the election was won and in turn led to a series of strategic miscalculations that may well have robbed Bush of a clear edge in the final vote. Curiously, little of a positive nature was heard from political insiders about either campaign, although the litany of failures leveled against Gore and his inner circle seemed more extensive and less relenting. Republicans were less concerned in the final days with criticizing the Bush effort than in winning the court battles that followed.

CONCLUSION Election day came and when the polls closed, Gore narrowly led in the popular vote and the electoral vote but with neither candidate having enough electoral votes to claim victory. One state was undecided, Florida. Few realized it at the time, but the real drama of this campaign year and the real election were just about to begin.

REFERENCES CITED Berke, Richard L. "Clinton, Opening Convention, Says Gore Will Promote Legacy," New York Times, August 15, 2000, p. Al. Buchanan, Patrick J. A Republic, Not an Empire. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 1999. Macero, Cosmo Jr. "Nader Blasts Bush, Gore, Makes Third Party Pitch," Boston Herald, November 7, 2000, p. 6. Nadir, Boston Globe, November 9, 2000, p. A18. "Quotes Of Note," Boston Globe, November 4, 2000, p. A19. Salant, Jonathan D. "Record $3 Billion in Campaign Funds to be Spent in 2000," Boston Herald, November 7, 2000, p. 14. "Verbatim: Progress, Prosperity, Promise," Boston Globe, August 15,2000, p. A20.

TWO

Elections by Judicial Fiat: The Courts Decide William Crotty

THE LONG COUNT There were two related but distinct aspects to the 2000 election. One, of course, was the lengthy campaign and the choice to be made between competing candidates, political parties, and policy agendas. Clearly, this is of enormous importance to the country in deciding its future direction, whose concerns are best addressed by the White House and the Congress, who is to wield a power that touches all of us, and the conditions under which we live and work. Normally, and in the United States with only very few exceptions, this decision is made on Election Day. Such was not the case in 2000 and, in fact, the aftermath of the election is what gives it a distinction and, beyond others, a historic place in American politics. The decisions made, the court cases argued, and the problems raised directed national attention like no other election in living memory to the way in which we elect presidents; the determining influences of a basically archaic and poorly understood institution, the Electoral College; and the problems and different approaches to counting and recounting votes that goes to the very heart of the operations of American democracy. This chapter attempts to sift through the conflicting claims and the welter of events that marked the post-election effort to declare a winner and, at the same time, do so in a manner that fairly reflected the electorate's wishes and provided the incoming administration the 36

William Crotty 37 legitimacy needed to govern. Through it all, a sense of the political fragility and vulnerability of the most fundamental of institutions in the world's oldest democracy emerged from the conflict. At the same rime the public demonstrated a confidence in the fairness of the eventual outcome and a calmness in the midst of bitter political divisions, and the differing philosophies put forward as to what constituted a credible election count, that was both impressive and ultimatley reassuring. The spectacle was mesmerizing, reemphasizing (if it were needed) the fundamental soundness and strength of America's democratic culture, while at the same time focusing attention on procedures long taken for granted. The long-run consequences of the 2000 election as to a reform of election procedures, with proposals ranging from a standardization of ballots and national criteria as to how votes are tallied (functions of the states in the American system), to a modernization or elimination of the Electoral College, changes that would require constitutional amendments, were left to the future. The inability to achieve agreement as to how the electoral system should operate in relation to the most basic of tasks, counting votes, and as to what constituted a valid expression of voter preference had to be troubling. Such issues are likely to be a focus of debate, and a battleground between differing philosophies and proponents, in the years to come. In one way or another, they will need to be given considered attention. The aftermath of the 2000 election will linger on for years to come. This chapter examines the conflicting claims, political infighting, court interpretations and the continual fight to win public support and approval, the most fundamental battle of them all. It provides a guide to the events that occurred, the processes that eventually elected the nation's next president, and the standards employed to determine what exactly a "vote" was and when it counted towards determining the election's outcome.

THE AFTERMATH Americans in general viewed the proceeding on election night and in the days and weeks to follow with an intensity of interest that was unusual for contemporary politics. They appeared to have faith in the election process and in the courts and to be amused and on occasion

38

America's Choice 2000

angered by the arguments made by the two camps and the actions of the election officials involved in the recount. T h e drama was continuing and offered the public a spectacle no one had ever experienced. Commentators and political operatives were, in turn, amused, less tolerant, more cynical and more partisan. Dire consequences were frequently predicted for the process and the nation. We call on one account: Whatever the election's outcome, the result is likely to be the same anyway. If Mr. Bush wins, especially without taking the popular vote, the Democrats will de-legitimize the election in any way they can, taking particular delight in pursuing the Sunshine State Evita, Katherine Harris—a political gift who will keep on giving. Should Air. Gore win, that old band of Vincent Foster [a Clinton White House official who committed suicide| conspiracy theorists will reunite to target Palm Beach county Commissioner Carol Roberts and the rest of her chad-counters; [Republican Congressman] Dan Burton will lead the investigation into what the Wall Street Journal has already labeled an attempted Democratic coup d'etat. Two years from now, the party that controls the White House is likely to lose untold seats in Congress as well, frustrating the 'winning' president's ability to govern even further. If an economic downturn is thrown into the mix, the president who presides over it may find himself and his party consigned to long-term political oblivion This is one year when it's probably better to be a sore loser than a sore winner. But such is the narrow vision of both contenders that they may be the last people in America to figure that out (Rich, iNovember 18, 2000). T h e questions raised in the election's aftermath ranged from the seemingly petty to the most fundamental. For example, a "chad" was the circle section punched out of a ballot when the voter made a choice. W h e n should it be counted as a true indicator of voter choice? H o w clearly indented need it be to decide voter intent? If two corners remained tied to the main ballot, was it a valid vote? Did it count only if totally punched out? If daylight were to be seen through a partially torn chad was that sufficient to indicate the candidate the voter supported? And so on. An election official even accused one canvassing board member in a deposition of picking up chads from the floor in

William Crotty 39 some type of nefarious but unclear scheme to benefit one side or the other (a charge included in one of Bush's Supreme Court petitions). These were the types of chad (and other) concerns that transfixed the media and the nation—and puzzled the courts—in the weeks that followed the election. Everyone had a point of view and was eager to express it. The analysts, editorial writers, media commentators, lawyers, academicians, campaign strategists, former government officials, think-tank partisans, and other various experts were made available to the media. They paraded endlessly before the television cameras with their own perspective on what was happening. It all, of course, had its amusing side. The cartoonists and the comedians had much to work with. David Letterman may well have been as on target in assessing the returns as anyone: "We held an election and George W Bush didn't win. We held an election and AI Gore didn't win. Can't we just leave it at that?" xMany would have agreed.

THE INITIAL RETURNS When the votes were counted the first time around, the results were as follows: Candidate Bush Gore

Popular Vote

Percentage

48,783,510 48,976,148

49% 49%

Electoral Vote

States Carried

246 260*

29 20

* Prior to recount in New Mexico that put New Mexico in the undecided column. The state was later included again in the Gore column.

The vote difference in the states threatened with challenges was about as close as the election itself:

State New Mexico Iowa New Hampshire Michigan

Winning Percentage

Winning Candidate

.08% .31% 1.20% 1.98%

Gore Gore Bush Gore

40

America's Choice 2000

The votes in these states as well as the contested result in Florida reinforces how indecisive the election was and how much a shift of a few thousand towards one candidate or the other in key states could have changed the outcome. The election was truly a dead heat. Deciding the outcome based on contested ballot counts in the closest of the state contests was sure to further divide the candidates and their parties and open issues as to voter intent, standards of certification, and reasonable limits on election processes that swiftly led to events the American people had not witnessed to such an extent in modern history. Among the states too close to call, Oregon voted by mail ballot and therefore took longer in certifying its final results and New Mexico was challenged (initially Gore lead by 375 votes; after the recount Bush led by 107 out of over 57,000 votes cast) and underwent another recount. ( As a consequence, under New Mexico's law, if the race were tied it could be decided by drawing straws or a hand of poker, evidence that vote counts and the administration of elections have not always kept with social and technological changes). It eventually was decided for Gore. In addition, recounts were threatened in Wisconsin, where Gore led by 6,099 votes out of 2.5 million (all the state totals were subject to change before the final certification of results); Iowra, where Gore led by 4,048 out of 1.3 million votes cast; and New Hampshire, where Bush led by 7,211 out of 578,000 votes cast. In Oregon, Gore led by 4,756 out of 1.4 million votes cast. These were the main states in contention, although much of what followed was to prove to be political posturing. The real key was Florida. The candidate that won its 25 electoral votes would win the presidency. Both sides clearly understood its importance and the significance of a recount in the contested counties (Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade). The Republicans were to argue at one point for a recount in all the state's counties, including those with the largest Bush margins, but later were to withdraw from such a possibility (and, in fact, to oppose any such recount when the courts considered it). At this point it was evident that the election could result in a split decision, one candidate winning the popular vote (Gore) and the other the electoral vote (Bush). There was some speculation along these lines before election day, but the ordering was reversed (Bush the popular vote winner, Gore the electoral vote winner). Such an outcome was

William Crotty 41 clearly unwelcome and it drew attention to the Electoral College and its vagaries. It was to be a subject of contention and national debate, with calls for its abolition as well as some defending its operations. Such a division of the final vote could prove to be a national nightmare, as it had in the close elections of 1876 and 1888, detracting from the legitimacy of the incoming administration and bringing into question the operation of the entire electoral system. The national vote breakdowns for each of the candidates and parties is found in Table 2.1. Overall, as was to be expected, both candidates did well among their core constituencies. Bush did better among whites, males, Protestants, conservatives, college graduates (although not those with post-graduate degrees), higher income groups, those living in rural areas, and former Perot voters. Gore won support among women, blacks and other minorities, Jews and Catholics, city dwellers, union households, liberals and moderates, those with less (and almost no) formal education, and lower income groups. In terms of time of decision, the tightness of the race can be seen in divisions between the candidates, which changed little in the last week. Gore apparently won a plurality vote in the campaign's final days, evidence that the Bush campaign's optimism in the final weeks may have been premature. In relation to issues, pro-gun advocates favored Bush as did those primarily concerned with high taxes (by a 4 to 1 margin) and world affairs. Gore did well on education issues, emphasized by both candidates, and he won support among those concerned with the economy, as befits the Clinton administration's successes in this area. Among those concerned with health care, Medicare, and Social Security, his margin was decisive. Gore's positions on abortion (pro-choice), gay rights and the environment were strongly supported by voters. The call for a renewed Star Wars' program split voters (the emphasis on a missile defense system was part of the Bush campaign's priorities). In broad terms, support for the candidate's policy positions reflected both the differences in emphasis between the parties and the issue stands put forward in the campaign. Like everything else, while presenting different priorities and candidate commitments, they were not pronounced enough to resultin an electoral mandate for either candidate's program. Finally, the low popular vote for Nader (although he greeted the results with enthusiasm: "We've built the third largest party in America" ([Abrahim, November 18, 2000, p. A32]) and for Pat Buchanan and the

42

America's Choice 2000 Table 2.1 A Profile of Bush and Gore Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election (%) Category

Bush

Gore

Gender Male Female

53 43

42 54

54 9 35 35

4: 90 62 55

Race

White Black Hispanic Other

(Note: A voter profile of the US population is as follows: 81% White, 10% Black, 7% Hispanic, 2% Asian, 1% Other) Residence City (over 500,000) Suburbs Rural Union Households Religion Protestant/Christian Catholic Jewish Other None Former Perot Voters Households with Guns Union Households With Guns

26 49 59 37

71 47 37 59

56 47 19 28 SO 64 61

42 50 79 62 61 27 (Nader 7) 36

50

50

Source: "Election 2000: Breaking Down the Electorate," in Time, November 20, 2000, p. 74.

Education Post-Graduate College Graduate Some College High School Graduate No High School

Bush

Gort

43 51 51 49 $8

52 45 45 48 60

Nader

William Crotty Bush

Gore

Nader

Ideology Liberal Moderate Conservative

13 44 81

80 52 17

6 3 1

Income Less than $15,000 $15,000 to 30,000 $30,000 to $50,000 $50,000 to $75,000 $75,000 to $100,000 $100,000 or over

37 41 47 51 52 54

57 54 49 46 45 42

5 3 3 2 2 5

Age 18 to 29 30 to 44 45 to 59 60 and over

46 49 49 47

47 48 48 51

6 2 2 2

By Time of Decision Final 3 Days Last Week Last Month Earlier

45 44 45 50

48 48 48 48

5 5 6 1

By Issue Concerns World Affairs Medicare Health Care Economy Taxes Education Social Security

54 38 33 38 80 44 39

40 60 64 59 17 52 59

4 i 3 2 2 3 1

Source: Poll results published in the Boston Globe, "A Look at the Polls: Presidential Race," and "Demographics," November 8, 2000, pp. A29, A32. Abortion 35 61 Sexual Orientation 32 58 (Protect by Civil Rights Laws; a pro-gay jxisition) Pro-Environment 25 (Stop Global Wanning) Reduce Spending on Missile Defense ("Star Wars") Source: www.issnes2000.org

61

43

44

America's Choice 2000

torn Reform Party (the third largest party during the 1990s) meant that neither the Green Party (Nader's) nor the Reform Party met the 5 percent cutoff level (surpassed in the two previous elections by Ross Perot running as the Reform Party's presidential candidate) and that neither would receive federal subsidies for the 2000 election or in 2004.

ELECTION NIGHT Election night set the tone for what was to follow. It was exciting in itself: the election was close, closer than anyone was to imagine; the candidates were combative and unrepentant; and the media managed to inject itself into the fray in such a way that congressional hearings on its conduct and a reform of its methods for calling electoral victors in the states were in the offing. It was to be a tense night of highs and lows, takes and double takes, media interpretations and reinterpretations, and, at die end of it all, no decision. All close elections have unusual drama. This one however exceeded anything anyone could remember. Three events were to stand out. First, and despite its best efforts, the media were not going to be able to call a final victor)-' for either candidate through the long night. The election, of course, was to extend wrell beyond election night, although no one knew it at the time. Second, and direcdy related to the first point, the networks and the Associated Press were to first call the crucial state of Florida for Gore. After strenuous protests from the Bush campaign, and a recalculation of the data, they moved the state into the undecided column. Relying on the same pooled data and analyses, they later declared Florida for Bush, leading to what was a premature celebration of victory. Bush at this point believed himself to be president-elect and the Bush family the first since John Adams and John Quincy Adams to have a fatherson presidential combination win the office. The euphoria lasted less than one hour. The networks cut the celebrations short by again moving Florida to the undecided column where it was to remain for an unexpectedly long time. Meanwhile, Ai Gore, following the election returns, saw Florida as a lopsided loss, called Bush and conceded. He then proceeded to a plaza in Nashville, where his staff was headquartered, to deliver his conces-

William Crotty 45 sion speech before a national television audience. At this point his campaign manager, William Daley and others managed to convince Gore that Florida, rather than being an overwhelming loss, was actually very close and that he could still win the state and with it the presidency. Gore then headed back to his hotel and called Bush to retract his concession in what was by all accounts a terse and pointed exchange. According to those close to both campaigns, Bush's reply was "Let me make sure I understand. You're calling me back to retract your concession?" Gore's reply: "You don't have to get snippy about this." Bush then claimed victory in Florida and that his brother, Governor Jeb Bush, had assured him he had won the state. To which Gore responded, "Your younger brother is not the ultimate authority on this." And so it went. The tone and tenor of what was yet to come set early, a clear extension of what had been a very close, aggressive, and highly partisan general election campaign,

THE STRATEGIES The basic problem, of course, was that neither candidate had enough electoral votes to claim victory. Both were close to the 270 needed when the fight became folly joined (Gore 267, Bush 246). The election drama, who was to win and who was to lose the presidency, was to be played out in Florida. It was to stay "undecided" until all political and legal remedies were exhausted. The two candidates employed contrasting approaches, ones that made for little common ground and left little room for bargaining. Simplified they were: Gore wanted all votes counted. He wanted the certification of results to be postponed until recounts in the disputed counties were finished and arguments over overseas military and absentee ballots had been resolved. His campaign also wanted an inclusive approach to ballot counting that emphasized identifying voter intentions, resulting for example in a broader interpretation of what constituted evidence of voter intent (the infamous "chad wars," i.e., the registering of partially indented holes or "dimpled" ballots, indicating voter choice). While this represented the basic strategy of the Gore team, and although it was not party to the suits, appeals to the Florida courts to void thousands of absentee ballots the applications for which

46

America's Choice 2000

had been improperly, and illegally it was contended, filled out by Republican Party officials (and not the applicants) were not discouraged by the campaign. These were among the last cases to be decided and, had the courts accepted the argument, the likelihood is that Gore would have won Florida decisively. Political advantage, not legal consistency, were to be the hallmarks of both campaigns in the recount phase. Bush wanted the vote count to end and the results to be certified as soon as possible. During most of the on-again, off-again recount in the disputed counties he led by about 300 votes and by 900 votes (out of over 6 million cast) when the military ballots that had been certifiably postmarked by election day (many had not been counted because of the lack of a postmark, another issue in contention between die campaigns). He wanted the process to end by the deadline imposed by state law as applied by the secretary of state, {Catherine Harris. The Secretary of State was co-chair of Bush's Florida campaign, a member of his brother Governor jeb Bush's cabinet, and a member of Bush's national advisory board. The secretary of state's sympathies were clear. She was to become a major player in the drama and in the process applauded or demonized according to one's political dispositions. She emphasized the finality of formal deadlines and had to be directed by the state's Supreme Court to extend the deadlines to allow some recounts. She refused a canvassing board's request for greater flexibility in cutoff times or dates, and would not accept partial recounts. All of this benefited Bush and hurt Gore. Harris was unapologetic, contending she was following state law and using the "discretion" as mandated by the courts to decide what was reasonable and acceptable. She did all of this with a forcefulness of purpose that attracted national attention, and with it a type of celebrity status. Her role helps make a point. Politics was, predictably, to drive the process. As examples, the political affiliation and ideologies of the various judges involved in the process and indications of who had appointed them, from the state circuit court to the federal courts which heard and ruled on the various appeals, were topics of argument and concern. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, overwhelmingly appointed by Democratic governors, was reviled by conservatives as a liberal court that allegedly overstepped its bounds and infringed on legislative matters. The U.S. Supreme Court was conservative, Repub-

William Crotty 47 lican and primarily appointed by Republican presidents. The political affiliations of lower level judges and the governors who appointed them were debated and criticized. The assumption was that the judges' political allegiances predicted their legal rulings. Given the heated nature of the controversies and the conflicting standards and rulings to come out of the court cases, the interpretation was not necessarily wrong. Watching the courts in action on a sensitive political issue indicated the extent to which they were both legal and political animals. In fact, the legal contests and their outcomes may well have been the most fascinating and potentially revealing aspect of the whole election drama. Gore's approach was to rely on the state courts for relief. The election laws, deadlines, and procedures were mandated by state law and administrative practice. Bush's objective was to take the fight to the federal courts, have them override state election laws, force administrators to recognize statutory deadlines for certification, and disallow continuing or further vote recounts. His objective was to have the vote counts ended and the election over. Gore's argument was that every vote should count and that the federal courts had no role in the process in determining the outcome. It was a simple and effective appeal to the sanctity of the vote and a fundamental belief that all votes should be counted and counted fairly. In this regard, it would appear that Gore had the better of the legal debate and the easier case to make. Also, the venue selected, the Florida legal system, also proved advantageous in that the laws, criteria for deadlines and the other issues in question were all set by state and local bodies. Bush's appeal to the federal courts was more difficult to sustain and the relief sought—in effect, federal intervention in state electoral procedures and a voiding of Florida's electoral codes—was one the courts, and especially the sitting members of die U.S. Supreme Court, would normally find hard to legitimate. The case to be made for an exception, if it were to be considered, would be evidence of extreme examples of systematic vote irregularities and denial of the right to exercise the franchise in a meaningful manner. The advantage in the court fights appeared to be Gore's. Whatever the approach as to the validity of the issues raised and needing resolution, it put the courts in an awkward position, deciding the results of a highly volatile election in a super-charged political environment. It is not a role they like and a situation that they would go to

48

America's Choice 2000

extremes to avoid normally. In the 2000 election, this was not possible. T h e courts were put in a position of deciding the fairness of election standards and their applicability. In the process the decisions made would affect the outcome of the contest and the conduct of future presidential elections. It was to be the courts that would define wrhat wras appropriate and legitimate, what would be tolerated, and, in essence, what the rides of the game would be. In this context also, of course, they were to determine the winner of the election.

THE COURTS ACT T h e most significant of the initial court decisions was handed down by Florida's Supreme Court two weeks after the vote. Both sides had argued before the court and both had been severely questioned by the justices. "Justices cut off attorneys as if they were returning tennis serves. T h e y were argumentative. Time limits were strict. N o one got more than 20 minutes to speak and most of the time wras spent responding to questions, not making speeches" (Kranish, November 20, 2000, p. A19). T h e drama that evolved no one had expected and none had ever seen. T h e issues addressed, the intensity of the justice's questioning, the quality of the lawyers' argumentation, and the heat and emotion that enveloped the whole affair provided for great theatre. It also introduced Americans to the subtleties of the vote, issues it is likely few had thought about. In an extraordinary, nearly two and a one-half hour hearing carried live on television, justices of the state's highest court peppered lawyers for both sides with searching, skeptical questions. The justices honed in . . . on the Republicans' contention that state law allowed no leeway in the deadline for counties to submit their returns one week after Election Day. They repeatedly asked whether there was enough time to conduct laborious hand counts in the populous counties where they are now underway. But the court, the one branch of Florida government dominated by Democratic appointees, also expressed clear unease at the Democrats' suggestions that it, not the Legislature or the state's top election official, should set a new deadline, or oudine their own standards for how ballots should be recounted around the state . . . the justices showed concern that prolonging the post-

William Crotty

49

election wrangling without an official winner could short-circuit the eventual losers right to contest the election by state law (Purdum, November 21, 2000, p. Al). It was hoped (falsely as it turned out) that the court's opinion would resolve the outstanding issues and in turn lead to procedures and a timetable acceptable to both sides. This of course did not happen. T h e court ruled on a number of major points in the dispute, but n o t all, in itself an unreasonable expectation. Its decision did not please either camp, nor did it end the highly political in-fighting. Nonetheless, it is possible that it put into motion a process that will set the standards for future elections, and it does mark a milestone in the efforts to codify and rationalize the way in which Florida and the rest of the nation, approaches elections. As one observer noted: Of all the remarkable elements of this presidential election—the unusually swift triumph of the early front-runners, the pallid nature of the national conventions, the tense general election battle between two candidates barely separated in ideology or in levels of support, the twoweek [make that closer to five weeks] overtime in a contest that seems to defy conclusion—yesterday's nationally televised court hearing may have been the most remarkable (Shribman, November 21,2000, p. Al). T h e court hearing was remarkable in another way. In a lackluster campaign year, the battles that followed the election captured the public's attention. It was an extraordinary event, as many noted, but only the first of a number of extraordinary court hearings. T h e r e were to be layers upon layers of suits and counter-suits and court decisions involving every aspect of the electoral process (see "Chronology" in Table 2.2). Each was to be of long-run significance, if not for the quality of the of the court's reasoning and its interpretation of the law, then for focusing attention on processes long neglected and rights that, while fundamental to a democratic society, often were taken for granted. Each decision also, of course, had an immediate bearing on the contest underway and its eventual outcome. As background in an important trial court test a suit was brought by the Volusia County canvassing board seeking declaratory judgment that it was not bound by the November 14 deadline and it sought an injunction barring the Secretary of State Katherine Harris from ignoring

50

America's Choice 2000

Table 2.2

Chronology of Major Developments After the Election Day

Date November 7 November 8 November 9 November 11 November 13 November 14

November 15 November 17 November 18 November 20 November 21

November 22

Event Election Day—Florida's vote undecided and decisive for Electoral College victory Bush lead of less than 10,000 votes triggers automatic machine recount under state lawGore legal team requests manual recounts in four Florida counties Bush petitions U.S. District Court to block manual recounts Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris says all counties must submit vote tallies by November 14 Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris sets deadline for certification of states votes. Gore appeals her decision and requests time for manual recounts in four counties. Official count gives Bush 300 vote lead. Two counties petition the Florida Supreme Court for guidance Deadline for receiving absentee ballots from overseas Absentee ballot count announced and increases Bush lead to 930 votes Florida Supreme Court hears arguments from Gore and Bush lawyers Florida Supreme Court rules that manual recounts should be included in state's total. The deadline for reporting votes is extended to November 26. Cheney enters hospital with heart attack. Judge allows "dimpled" ballots to be counted in Miami-Dade

County

November 23 November 24

November 2 5

Bush appeals to U.S. Supreme Court to overturn Florida Supreme Court ruling Miami-Dade canvassing board suspends recount; says it cannot meet deadline; Republican demonstrators attempt to enter counting room Gore lawyers go to court to force Miami-Dade to continue recount; court refuses; vote totals submitted to Secretary of State on November 8 stand as county's results Bush files petition to force 13 counties to include overseas ballots with applications filled out by Republican Party workers to be counted (suit later dropped) Bush brings two actions to U.S. Supreme Court U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear Bush challenge Florida state legislators threaten to send their own slate of electors to Electoral College; begin preparations for a legislative session to act on slate Former Senate Majority Leader and 1996 Republican presidential nominee. Bob Dole, leads rally in Pensacola to have all military ballots counted (some not postmarked by deadline or incorrectly filled out) Bush drops suit to force counting of overseas absentee ballots

William Crotty 51 Table 2.2 {continued) Date November 26

November 27 December 4

December 8

December 9 December 11 December 12

December 1 3

Event 5:00 p.m. deadline for final count (extended to 9:00 a.m. it state offices closed) Secretary of State certifies the final count; refuses to allow partial recounts entered into total and refuses to extend deadline by several hours to receive recounts in progress The Gore Camp, represented by its principal lawyer, David Boies, officially contests the election results U.S. Supreme Court vacates Florida Supreme Court decision and remands case to it for reconsideration Leon County Circuit Court Judge N. Sanders Sauls denies Gore the recount. Case immediately appealed to Florida Supreme Court Florida Supreme Court overturns decision (4-3) and calls for a recount in all 67 counties of undervotes. Case appealed to U.S. Supreme Court U.S. Supreme Court stays order of Florida Supreme Court U.S. Supreme Court hears oral arguments U.S. Supreme Court overturns Florida Supreme Court decision, effectively giving the election to Bush. Federal code says that a state's electors, if formally named by the date, can not be challenged by Congress. Gore formally concedes election and urges unity in address to nation. Bush follows in victory statement and pledges to be President. for "one nation"

recounts sent in by the canvassing board after that date. It was the first in a series of sensitive decisions balancing deadlines and state regulations against the attempt to secure accurate vote tallies through recounts. The politics surrounding the decision, both in this case and the others to follow, was intense. The judge in this case, Terry Lewis (later also to rule in one of the two absentee ballot suits), came out with a decision that allowed for flexibility (depending on its implementation), while reaffirming state law and the secretary of state's importance to the process. Judge Lewis ruled that while the November 14 deadline was mandatory, the county could amend its returns after that date and the secretary of state after "considering all attendant facts and circumstances" could use her "discretion" as to whether to include or ignore the amended returns in the final totals. On November 15, the secretary of state announced she would not accept the amended returns for Volusia and the other three counties undergoing recounts and

52

America's Choice 2000

that when she received the results of the absentee ballots from each county in the state she would certify the state's final tally on November 19. T h e decision was contested and an appeals court judge considered the case in a dramatic, televised hearing. H e then ruled against any recounts while impounding the ballots (resulting in a highly publicized live television coverage of the transfer of ballots via a rented van across the state from Miami to Tallahassee, reminding some in the press of the famed O. J. Simpson chase in California). T h i s decision led to a series of actions that brought the case (consolidated with others on the same or related issues) to the state's Supreme Court which "accepted jurisdiction, set an expedited briefing schedule, and enjoined the Secretary [of State] and the Elections Canvassing Board . . . from certifying the results of the presidential election until further order of this Court." T h e legal hardball if not beginning at this point certainly went into high gear, continuing at peak intensity until the United States Supreme Court's ruling on December 12. T h e Florida Supreme Court's willingness to accept this case, its interpretation of the Florida Constitution giving it relevant jurisdiction in the area, the expedited hearing schedule, its enjoining state officials from finalizing the vote count and its eventual ruling, were all controversial. All were to be issues also as the cases resulted from this worked their way up and down the legal chain. T h e Florida Supreme Court's ruling was well developed, given the pressures of time, and well received by those who believed in the controlling importance of a full and accurate vote count in elections. N o t incidentally, it was welcomed by the G o r e camp. In its decision the Court said: Twenty-five years ago, this court commented that the will of the people, not a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions, should be our guiding principle in election cases. . . . We consistently have adhered to the principle that the will of the people is the paramount consideration. Our goal today remains the same as it was a quarter of a century ago, i.e., to reach the result that reflects the will of the voters, whatever that might be . . . Although error cannot be completely eliminated in any tabulation of the ballots, our society has not yet gone so far as to place blind faith in machines. For this reason Florida law provides a human check

William Crotty on both the malfunction of tabulation equipment and error in failing to accurately count the ballots . . . The right to suffrage is the preeminent right contained in . . . [The Florida Constitution's] Declaration of Rights . . . . . . . Because election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citizens' right to vote . . . Courts should not lose sight of the fundamental purpose of election laws: The laws are intended to facilitate and safeguard the right of each voter to express his or her will in the context of our representative democracy. Technical statutory requirements must not be exalted over the substance of this right. . . Ignoring the county's returns is a drastic measure and is appropriate only if the returns are submitted . . . so late diat their inclusion will compromise the integrity of the electoral process in two ways: (1) by precluding a candidate, elector, or taxpayer from contesting the certification of an election pursuant. . . or (2) by precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral process. In either case the Secretary (of State) must explain to the board her reason for ignoring the returns and her action must be adequately supported by the law. To disenfranchise electors . . . as the Secretary in the present case proposes, is unreasonable, unnecessary, and violates longstanding law . . . an accurate vote count is one of the essential foundations of our democracy. . . . We conclude that, consistent with the Florida election scheme, the Secretary [of State] may reject a [Canvassing] Board's amended returns only if the returns are submitted so late that their inclusion will preclude a candidate from contesting the certification or preclude Florida's voters from participating fully in the federal election process. The Secretary in the present case has made no claim that either of the conditions apply at this point in time . . . Because of the unique circumstances and extraordinary importance of the present case . . . and because of our reluctance to rewrite the Florida Fdection code, we conclude that we must invoke the equitable powers of this court to fashion a remedy that will allow a fair and expeditious resolution of the questions presented here. Accordingly . . . the Secretary of State and the Elections Canvassing Commission shall accept any such amended certifications received by 5 p.m. on Sunday, November 26, 2000, provided that the office of the Secretary of State, Division of Flections is open in order to allow receipt thereof. If the office is not open for this special purpose on

53

54 America's Choice 2000 Sunday, N o v e m b e r 26, 2000, then any amended certifications shall be accepted until 9 a.m. Monday, N o v e m b e r 27, 2000.

The Florida Supreme Court then forcefully argued the importance of each individual vote in a democratic system. It overruled the Secretary of State's enforcement of a statutory deadline (seven days after the vote) and her refusal to accept ballots in recounts that went beyond that point in time. It set 5:00 p.m., November 25 for the filing of recounted totals (or 9:00 p.m. the next day if state offices were not open). As of this date, the vote as certified by the Secretary of State favored Bush by 537 votes (See Table 2.3) As much and if not more than any other, its ruling set out the issues to be contested; the reasoning behind these, to be defended, or attacked, in subsequent legal actions; and, more discreet but clear to all concerned, the broad standards and criteria to be used in determining an election outcome. The likelihood is that its commitment to the primacy of the vote will reverberate for a long time to come. It, along with the cases cited in the decision, and particularly the Illinois Court's reasoning in Pullman vs. Milligan (1998), may have set the mark that future Table 2.3 I. Certified Florida Vote* (November 25, 2000) Bush Gore Bush Margin

2,912,790 2,912,253 +537

*'Ibtals do not include 312 Gore votes from incomplete recounts in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties. II. Bush Lead in Florida Election Day (November 8) Recount (November 14) Absentee Ballots (November 18) Certification by Secretary of State (November 26)

1,784 300 930

537

William Crotty

55

efforts to justify or rationalize election outcomes must contend with. Efforts to expedite the process and deadlines set for closure through the procedures enacted by various jurisdictions, from local to federal, must recognize the fundamental importance of the individual vote. T h e efforts to deal intelligently and fairly with these issues may well be the most important outcome from the court proceedings. T h e decision was held by the Gore camp as a ruling in its favor and rejected by the Bush camp as an example of a court overstepping judicial bounds and impinging on the prerogatives of the state legislature. The Texas governor then announced that he would submit briefs to the United States Supreme Court. T h e Court agreed to hear the case on November 24 and set a date of December 1 for oral arguments: It was George W. Bush's turn to score a landmark legal victory in the battle for the White Mouse, as the U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear oral arguments on Bush's challenge of the manual recounts underway in Florida. In doing so, the court indicated that the Bush legal team has raised legitimate questions about whetfier the Florida Supreme Court overreached its authority when it allowed the recounts to continue (Farrell and Corov, November 25, 2000, p. A l ) . . . T h e core of Bush's argument was that federal constitutional issues were involved in the controversy, that the nation's highest court had jurisdiction, and that the state Supreme Court's ruling should be set aside. T h i s argument was stated in no uncertain terms at the beginning of his petition: In plain contravention of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and federal law, the state supreme court has embarked on an ad hoc, standardless, and lawless exercise of judicial power, which appears designed to thwart the will of the electorate as well as the considered judgments of Florida's executive and legislative branches. Because the selection of presidential electors is governed directly by the Constitution and congressional enactments, as well as by state law, the court's decision involves issues of the utmost federal importance. (Bush Writ). T h e issues in question that Bush wanted the Supreme Court to rule on were presented as follows:

56

America's Choice 2000 The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the Secretary of State cannot certify election results in accordance with preexisting Florida law and must instead wait for the statutorily untimely results of manual recounts conducted in three Florida counties before certifying the results of the November 7, 2000 presidential election. This holding raises three substantial federal questions that warrant immediate review by this Court: 1. Whether post-election judicial limitations on the discretion granted by the legislature to state executive officials to certify election results, and/or post-election judicially created standards for the determination of controversies concerning the appointment of electors, violate the Due Process Clause . . . which requires that a State resolve controversies relating to the appointment of electors under "laws enacted prior to" election day. 2. Whether the state court's decision, which cannot be reconciled with state statutes enacted before the election was held, is consistent with Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that electors shall be appointed by each State "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." 3. Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless, and selective manual recounts that threaten to overturn the results of the election for President of the United States violates the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, or the First Amendment. T h e petition went on: . . . the chaos that erupted in the wake of . . . selectively" focused requests for manual recounts has been striking. Unrestrained by statutory guidance, the counties have embarked upon various paths in attempting to divine the "intent of the voters." Counties have adopted conflicting guidelines.... A manual recount in selected limited counties without consistent standards according to guidelines that are constantly changing and where subjective judgments are being exercised by persons who know that their decisions may alter the results of the presidential election will not yield a more accurate tabulation than the original statewide machine count, it will simply undermine the credibility and integrity of any final result. The manual recount process has . . . undermined the physical integrity of the voter's ballots. Ballots have been damaged through-

William Crotty

57

out the manual recount process hy heing twisted, rumpled, creased, and dropped; some have heen stained with ink, poked with pens, and crushed. This aggressive, careless treatment of the ballots has apparently changed the original character in that chads, still attached after voters cast the ballots, have been dislodged in bunches, littering the floor of the recount rooms. It has become impossible to determine the actual condition of the ballots as they appeared when they were cast in the November 7 election in the specified counties. . . . At stake is the lawful resolution of a national election for the office of the President of the United States. As this Court has often recognized, the American public's right to vote is one of the most sacred protected by the Constitution. . . . The Florida Supreme Court's decision poses a clear and present danger to that right, and should be corrected forthwith to ensure that our nation continues to be governed by the rule of law. The choosing of presidential electors is a matter of great national importance and interest . . . Given the national significance of die Florida election results, it is essential that the counting of ballots be conducted in a fair and consistent manner in accordance with established Florida law. Counties in Florida, however, have undergone a blatantly arbitrary, subjective, and standardless process in attempting to count ballots by hand in an effort to divine the intent of the voters.... There is a profound national interest in ensuring fairness and finality of elections, particularly an election for the highest office in the land. This is precisely the type of question that the Nation justifiably expects this Court to decide . . . absent a decision by this Court, the election results from Florida could lack finality and legitimacy. The consequence may be the ascension of a President of questionable legitimacy, or a constitutional crisis. T h e last words were among the most ominous during the often ugly aftermath to the election. Nonetheless, they reflected the concerns of many on both sides of the conflict. On December 4 the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its decision, vacating the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanding the case for clarification and recommendation in light of provisions in the Florida Constitution and in federal codes. Quoting a case cited in its opinion {Mhmesota vs. NationalTea Company, 1940), the Supreme Court found "that there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision."

58 America's Choice 2000 THE BUSH AND GORE TEAMS' APPROACHES TO THE COURT BATTLES Many, including lawyers not partial to either side in the controversy, felt the U.S. Supreme Court was not the place to settle such a dispute and that it should have no role in the process. The minority report in the final Court ruling on December 12 also was to make this argument. The Bush team wanted the procedures in place and the deadlines set by the state legislature and state officials to be observed. Further it felt that any recount that took place would lack clear and strict standards as to wiiat constituted a valid indication of voter intent and that the decisions made along these lines would be done in a heated political environment. This latter point was certainly true. Crowds of demonstrators organized by the Republicans chanted outside the Miami-Dade canvassing and attempted to push their way in, contributing, some believed, to the board's decision to cancel the recount (the board said it could not meet the state Supreme Court's deadline). Other Republicans and Democrats (the Democrats were less effective at mobilizing these than their opponents) appeared in Tallahassee in front of the courts, the state legislature, the governor's mansion, and outside other local canvassing boards. They also appeared in Washington to cheer on, or denounce, one candidate or another. One group appeared daily outside the vice president's official home chanting "Get out of Dick Cheney's house!" It apparently unnerved several members of Gore's family and some of his advisors (Sack, New York Times, December 15, 2000, p. Al) Bush relied on a small group of advisors to collect information, screen advice and strategies, and recommend a course of action. It was a team that had been with Bush throughout the campaign and at the heart of it all were a core of advisors wrho had served him wrell as governor. They made mistakes, as did Gore's advisors, in tactics and approach, but they were able to recover quickly and generally keep their actions focused and on target. Gore was not as successful. Consequently, and unlike Gore, who attempted to coordinate large and unwieldy teams of lawyers, consultants and elected officials, there was a coherence and unity of focus to the Bush effort not always apparent his opponent's approach. The petition to the federal courts wras a clear example. Simply put,

William Crotty 59 the Bush people believed he had won the election. They wanted no recounts and wanted closure brought to the process. They were willing to do in the courts whatever would advance their claims. Basically, it was a more hardnosed approach than the vice president's—the decision to appeal to the federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular expanded the bounds of the conflict exponentially They were also more successful in organizing political support and in having Republican officeholders, from members of Congress to state governors, to argue Bush's case in the public arena. Finally, Bush did better on the public relations front. Gore seemed to disappear from the public's radar except for a few well-scripted public appearances and formal statements outlining his goals. Bush made himself intermittently available to the press in often less formal settings. Given these opportunities, he would gently indicate his disappointment and frustration with the process (and with his opponent's tactics) and a desire to end the controversy and get on with the transition to the presidency. It was an effective strategy and despite a few false starts played out well: a tough, unrelenting stance in the courts; scores of Republican officeholders and conservative commentators attacking Gore and any court decisions in his favor; and a candidate appearing before the public as concerned but also reasonable and, given all that was taking place, fairly relaxed and confident in the outcome. The Gore strategy was more complicated, less well executed, and, ultimately, unsuccessful. Gore was concerned with his image and what people would think if he pushed too hard (not a concern of Bush's) as well as the legitimacy in terms of governing of the eventual winner. Consequently, he restricted the avenues his lawyers could pursue and what his supporters could say in public (again the Bush people felt less constrained in this regard, one official in the campaign labeling a court decision that went against them as "ridiculous"). Gore, much like Bush, saw the post-election campaign as taking place on three fronts: legal, political, and public relations. "There would be inherent tensions, Mr. Gore and his advisers realized, among the legal imperative of capturing every Democratic vote in Florida, the communications mission of presenting Mr. Gore as reasonable and dignified, and the political goal of keeping supporters on board while buying time for lawyers" (Sack, December 15, 2000, p. Al).

60 America's Choice 2000 Gore delegated much of the responsibility for keeping congressional Democratic supporters in line to the minority leaders of Congress, Richard A. Gephardt in the House and Tom Daschle in the Senate. Neither were members of Gore's inner circle, but they were able to keep Democrats in the Congress behind the legal challenge, despite the feeling of many who believed the manner in which Gore ran his campaign deprived the party of the ability to win majorities in both House and Senate. In general, elected Democrats were less noticeable in the media and less ardent in speaking out on behalf of Gore than Republicans were in advancing Bush's case and in attacking the courts, the Democrat's legal tactics, or members of the Gore team. The Bush team appeared to have a consistent response (although on occasion delayed by the swirl of events) and to flood the airwaves with supporters and photo op events. This is not to say that Gore and his advisors ignored the media— quite the opposite was die case. Although the vice president would appear elusive at times and although his communications and political advisors did not always agree, he was conscious of the importance of the public relations battle, giving two brief television addresses and his well-received acknowledgement of defeat. He appeared at a homeless shelter to unload boxes on Thanksgiving eve and where, according to scripting by his media consultant, "he was to wander over to the cameras and give a statement so we have sound from him over the holiday" (Sack, December 15, 2000, p. A26). This is exactly what the vice president did. Gore was critically aware of the media's role in framing public perceptions (as was Bush) and relied on the advice of consultants and his own instincts in deciding strategy, scheduling interviews and addresses (and the settings for these: family pictures and a fireplace in the background; a series of American flags as props in the "flag wars" of the dueling candidates on television), and in calling newspaper editors to present his case and wrarn against over-interpreting the significance of the court cases or official acts or deadlines that went against him. The problem was that he appeared to wage the media fight less effectively than Bush. The governor's two-front strategy—a personally low-key and friendly public demeanor while others organized by his campaign would fiercely attack Gore and his lawyers proved to be more successful. Gore had two other significant problems. He was less effective in balancing the interests of the various groups of advisors (they were

William Crotty 61 often in conflict) and especially in meeting the needs of his lawyers. He was also less successful in controlling what was put forth on his behalf, most notably when vice presidential nominee Lieberman went on NBC's "Meet the Press" to say that in one of the issues confronting the campaign, the counting of military ballots that may not meet the legal requirements as to dated postmarks, election officials should "give the benefit of the doubt" to the military returns. The Gore campaign was murky on this point, and Lieberman effectively and unexpectedly set its policy. The issue may also have had broader ramifications in that Democrats in Florida were challenging absentee ballots in general where the applications had been illegally corrected or filled by in Republican Party members for Republican voters. Gore's legal team did not become involved in either of the contests over the legality of Republican absentee ballot applications changed by party workers, and probably would not have anyway, although the Lieberman statement limited their options. An even more egregious example might have been when an official of the Democratic National Committee, an appointee of the President and responsible to him, publicly called for Gore at the end to quit the race in light of the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision. This was hardly his call to make. There were not corresponding examples of this nature on the Republican side. There the energy went into getting for Bush what Republicans believed he had earned, the presidency. Eventually, the two principal challenges to the improper filling out of absentee ballot applications by Republican Party members were denied by lower level courts, a decision affirmed by the state's Supreme Court (although all of the courts agreed these actions were in violation of a 1999 Florida statute meant to end abuses of absentee ballots, and therefore were illegal). Some observers initially believed these "wild card" suits, as they were called (involving an estimated 45,000 ballots), represented the strongest case Gore might have made and the one whose outcome would have clearly changed the state's final tally. The exclusion of ballots for whatever the reason went against the Gore team's main argument that all votes should be counted, a major concern for the campaign in not associating itself with the challenges. This brings up the final point in an aggressive ("I want to win. I make no bones about it," to use Gore's phrasing in one of his televised appearances) but curiously restricted strategy. His concern with

62

America's Choice 2000

appearing fair, reasonable and less partisan or zealous and more restrained than some of his supporters (especially although not exclusively those on the scene in Florida) or his legal advisors might have preferred did limit the case he could make. One example is in the court actions to discount the Republican absentee ballots. Gore wras quoted by a high campaign official as saying that this ". . . is probably the closest thing to fraud that we have . . . I empathize with these other cases and support them. But I have to look ahead at how I became President and the consequences of that" (Sack, December 15, 2000, p. A26). The appearance of a sense of legitimacy and how he might be perceived when the fight was over was important, even basic, to Gore and how he and his inner circle went about their challenges. The Bush campaign was able to push ahead, follow any of the options available, and depend on the candidate to project the sense of reasonableness and presidential credibility it wanted. The Republicans accomplished this better than did the Democrats.

THE PUBLIC'S RESPONSE The battle for public support may have been the fiercest of all and the most important-—for the incoming administration at least (Berke, November 19, 2000, p. 1). Voters appeared extremely interested in the recount and the court actions (an estimated 4.7 million viewers tuned into the first round of arguments before the Florida Supreme Court). At the same time, the public demonstrated a remarkable calmness, patience, and confidence that the system would work, and that the new President would have the legitimacy and the support needed to govern. Table 2.4 presents the public's views on the candidates and their strategies, what they believed should be included in terms of votes and what should not, how and when the process should end, the use of courts to resolve the crisis, and whether the Electoral College should be changed. The public's positions on many of the major issues were summed up in a Gallup Poll of November 21. The Gallup organization headlined the results as "Most Americans will accept election outcome, but Republicans less conciliatory than Democrats if 'Other Man' wins." This interpretation was on target (Table 2.4). In general, there was (as was to be expected) strong partisan differ-

William Crotty 63 Table 2.4

Public Views of the Vote Count (Percents)

Question: Should recounts by hand be included in the final vote in Florida? Yes No No Opinion National Republicans Democrats

60 28 S4

37 71 12

Question: Are you confident Florida will produce a fair outcome? Very Somewhat Not too Not at All National Republicans Democrats

16 13 19

27 30 26

33 33 33

No Opinion 7

22 22 21

2 1

Question: Gore Campaign's legal action to require that results of the hand counts : three Florida counties be included in the state's final vote count. Approve Disapprove No Opinion National Republicans Democrats

53 16 85

45 83 13

Question: Your willingness to wait for a final resolution? Willing to Gone on wait too long National Republicans Democrats

48 SO 21

51 19 77

Question: How candidates have handled situation. Strongly Approve Approve Disapprove National Republicans Democrats

7 15 2

48 68 32

J] 13 46

Question: How would vou describe the situation? Constitutional Major Minor Problem Crisis Crisis National Republicans Democrats

10 12 9

No Opinion

44 49 42

32 30 33

1 1 2

No

Strongly No Approve

Opinion

9 2 14

5 2 6

Not a Problem

No Opinion

12 8 15

2 1 J

64 America's Choice 2000 Question: Which situation is worse? Candidate Does Not Become President National Republicans Democrats

35 12 54

Situation Continues Indefinitely

No Opinion

58 84 38

7 4 8

Question: Is a completely accurate count possible? Yes No National Republicans Democrats

80 61 94

No Opinion

19 37 6

1 2 *

Question: If Bush wins would you accept him as the legitimate President? Yes No No Opinion National Republicans Democrats

86 96 77

13 4 22

1 1

Question: If candidate you oppose becomes President would it be disastrous tor the country? Yes No No Opinion National Republicans Democrats

21 23 21

75 74 74

4 3 5

Question: Does the vote of the courts bother you? A Great A Fair Deal Amount Not Much National Republicans Democrats

30 46 20

29 34 24

23 13 32

Not at All

No Opinion

17 6 23

1 1 1

Source: www.galhip.com/

ences in evaluation of the on-going events. Among the findings of significance as identified by the Gallup organization were the following: • Eighty-four percent of Democrats, but 28% of Republicans, say that hand counts should be included in the final vote in Florida. • Eighty-four percent of Republicans, and 38% of Democrats, say that machine counts are the more accurate way to count votes.

William Crotty 65 • Eighty-three percent of Republicans disapprove of the Gore campaign's legal tactics in Florida, compared with 85% of Democrats who approve of the strategy. • About half of both partisan groups—46% of Republicans and 52% of Democrats—are confident that the election process will ultimately produce a fair outcome. • Identifiers with both parties are equally likely to label the current situation as a constitutional crisis, a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all. • About three quarters of both parties—75% of Republicans and 72% of Democrats—say it would be worse for the situation to go on indefinitely than for the person they did not support to become president. • Eighty-five percent of Republicans say that it is not possible to get a completely accurate recount in Florida, as do 74% of Democrats (Gallup Poll, November 21, 2000). It should be emphasized, as Table 2.4 shows, how strong the partisan differences were in assessing the canvassing process and the different approaches taken by the two candidates. Yet there is also evident a general willingness to accept the candidate of the other party should he win and a belief among supporters of both parties that the choice of the other parties' nominee would not constitute a disaster for the country. While seeing the inability to resolve the election as a major problem, and not believing a totally accurate vote count possible, the public was generally interested in the proceedings and basically confident that a reasonable decision would be forthcoming. Whatever the outcome, they could live with the results. Other polls indicate much the same (Table 2.5). The public was not unaware of the system's faults, the difficulties involved in getting a fair and accurate vote count, the partisan attempts to press approaches that benefit its side the most, and the political use made of the courts. At the same time, there was a confidence in the broad operation of the electoral system and a belief that while deciding the outcome of the 2000 election was difficult and divisive, the problems encountered did not basically affect the operations of government. The winner would have political and constitutional legitimacy and the support of the public and should be able to govern effectively. The polls did show a belief

66 America's Choice 2000 Table 2.5 Public Perceptions of the Fairness of the System, the Media, and Electoral Reform (.Percent) I. T h e Process and its Results From what you have seen and heard, do you feel that Katherine Harris, the Republican Secretary of State, has handled the recount process fairly, or hasbeen too partisan? All Gore Supporters Bush Supporters Has handled fairly Been too partisan Don't know

50 37 13

22 65 13

80 10 10

From what you have seen and heard about the issue of voters in Palm Beach County misinterpreting their so-called "butterfly ballot" and mistakenly voting lor Pat Buchanan instead of Al Gore, what do you think should happen? Should the entire count}- be asked to vote again, or should the ballot problem there be seen as the kind of honest mistake that occurs in many elections, not serious enough to require a new vote? All Gore Supporters Bush Supporters Vote again Not vote again Don't know

39 55 6

66 29 5

11 83 6

Did the candidates go to court to make sure the vote is fairly counted or to gain die most advantage for their side? Fairly Count Gain Advantage Don't Know Bush campaign Gore campaign

36 41

56 53

8 6

If the courts fail to allow the hand counts, would that be acceptable? Acceptable 61 Unacceptable 36 No Opinion 2 Tf the courts step in and order die hand recounts to be included in the final vote, would that be acceptable? Acceptable 71 Unacceptable 26 No opinion 2

William Crotty 67 Who has the more legitimate claim to the presidency: the electoral vote winner or the popular vote winner? All Gore Voters Bush Voters Electoral vote winner Popular vote winner Neither Don't Know

39 45 10 6

24 63 7 6

67 21 7 5

Can a candidate who wins die Electoral College vote but does not win with the popular vote lead the country effectively? All Gore Voters Bush Voters Can lead effectively Cannot lead effectively Don't know

72 15

62 24

90 5

13

14

5

Given the problems that have been reported how much confidence do you have that your vote was counted properly? A lot 69 Some 21 Not much 6 No confidence at all 3 Don't know 2 Has the outcome of this election increased your belief that every vote counts, or has it raised doubts? Increased belief 74 Raised doubts 23 Don't know 3 Is die uncertainty about die vote in Florida and die delay in knowing who won die presidency a sign of weakness in our political system or are a sign of strength that we are peacefully taking the steps necessary to make sure the right candidate is declared the winner of a very close election? A sign ol weakness 24 A sign of strengtli 69 Don't know 7 Suppose Bush is eventually awarded Florida's electoral votes and wins the presidency despite losing die national popular vote by a narrow margin to Gore. Would it seriously hurt his ability to be an effective national leader? Would seriously hurt 25 Would not 69 Don't know 6

68

America's Choice 2000

Given the closeness of the presidential election and the close partisan division of the House and Senate, do you think the new President and Congress will be able to work together to get things done? They will be able to work together 60 They won't be able to get things done 30 Don't blow 10 II. T h e Media's Role All of the major television networks on election night made mistakes on election night in first calling the state of Florida for Al Gore, and later calling it for George W. Bush. Which statement comes closer to your view? There were serious mistakes and there is no excuse for die networks broadcasting diese calls, or, these were serious mistakes, but it is understandable that these kinds of mistakes happened. Xo excuse 46 Understandable 52 Don't know 2 Thinking about the way the media declared winners in Florida on election night, do you think the media acted responsibly or irresponsibly? Responsibly 17 Irresponsibly 79 Not sure 4 The TV networks had to twice retract their calls for who won Florida on election night. Do you think the networks' problems with die Florida vote reflect such serious flaws in dieir system that they should stop trying to project election outcomes, or was it just an isolated incident? They should stop trying to project outcomes 57 It was just an isolated incident 37 Don't know 6 In announcing election results, do you diink the media are more interested in getting results out first, or more interested in getting the results right? Getting the results out first 87 Getting the results right 10

Not sure

3

Thinking about the way the media declared winners in Florida on election night, do you think the media acted responsibly or irresponsibly? Responsibly 17 Irresponsibly 79 Not sure 4

William Crotty 69 III. Reform of the Electoral System Would you favor uniform poll closing time on election night for all polling places across the country? Favor 71 Oppose 23 Don't know 5 Would you support direct election of the President? Support 63 Oppose 31 No Opinion 6 Should rJhe federal government pass laws that would establish die same ballots and voting procedures in all states for presidential elections or should these decisions be left to state and local officials? Same for all states 67 Leave for states and localities 29 No opinion 4 Source: www.pollingreport.com

that ratings drive the media's election projections and that the networks and media in general may have acted irresponsibly on election night, although any real solution to the problem, while favored by large majorities, are unlikely to be enforced. Finally, all of the polls—and this is not new—show a strong preference for the direct election of the President, although there is a difference in partisan positions on this point in the 2000 election. Any such change, however much support it might have, will be difficult to enact. The implicit confidence in and support for the electoral system and the faith demonstrated in the nation's democratic stability may well be the most impressive results to emerge from the election controversy. The public's concerns however will necessitate some type of action. Here is one perspective and one reform agenda (with commentary): T h e answer may not be for Congress to dictate a uniform national ballot, but it should get to work right away to create standards, preferably through a bipartisan commission . . . the punchcard system that has proved so problematic in Florida should be banned . . . O t h e r steps may also prove useful, such as computer voting, and switching Election Day from Tuesday to a weekend . . . Network officials have already been summoned to tell Congress about their bungled performance on election night . . . all the major networks called Florida

70

America's Choice 2000 wrong not once but twice, demonstrating a lack of judgment and of independence. It is the networks' job to report news, not make it. They should instantly move to a system by which each collects its own data and analyzes it without reference to whatever scoops or blunders its competitors are airing. When races are close, they should de-emphasize exit polls and consider actual votes . . . people have come forward . . . to argue the unarguable—the benefits of the Electoral College. They sayrit forces candidates to pay attention to smaller states and that it avoids the prospect of a messy national recount. But this campaign proved that the Electoral College now sends the candidates only to hattleground states while they ignore voters in states that are safely in either camp. Recent hints of attempts to change the votes of individual Electoral College members adds a new reason to dump the process. This year, Gore's popular vote margin would be enough to avoid a national recount. Even if one were needed, it would be better than swearing in a loser (Boston Globe, November 26, 2000, p. D6)

Gore's slim margin nationally did not lead to winning the presidency and the "loser" in this appraisal did become President. T h e reform agenda put forward, regardless of the results in 2000, deserves independent consideration. O n e approach to reform could be to borrow from the Canadian system (Nickerson November 29, 2000, p. A40). Canada held a national election several weeks after the American election, with no controversy over electoral procedures or vote totals. This was not by accident. Ballots were standardized nationally as to size, materials used, lettering and font; all ballots were counted by hand; all political parties had observers at the polls as did the federal government; the media does not report exit polls, although it can report on final vote counts from the 57,555 polling places; and the maximum number allowed to register at a polling station was 500 (which allows for quick recounts if needed). T h e consequence is that the process is orderly and manageable. T h e final results can be known within hours and there is a legitimacy and confidence in the outcome not evidenced in the Florida free-for-all.

ENDGAME T h e approach of both sides during the re-canvassing of the votes in Florida was unforgiving. O n e observer described it this way:

William Crotty

71

vice president Al Gore and Gov. George W. Bush are equally convinced that they deserve, fair and square, to be declared the next president . . . that mindset... makes it unlikely that either candidate wall hack down easily . . . Mr. Gore is driven hy the view that he is the moral winner. Friends say he truly helieves he had at least a 10,000 to 20,000-vote lead in Florida among people who intended to vote for him, but somehow were thwarted by factors like the perplexing "butterfly" ballots in Palm Beach County that Gore partisans believe led them to vote for the wrong candidate or for two candidates . . . his sense that he is the winner is fueled bv his edge in the popular vote nationwide . . . . advisers to Mr. Bush say... his outlook has been simply that he tallied more legal votes than Air. Gore in Florida. There is no sense among people close to Mr. Bush that he will ever give up. Now that the Florida Supreme Court has decided to include recounts, the Bush camp is weighing other avenues, like turning to the Florida legislature, the United States Congress (both bodies are prone to back a Republican) or even the United States Supreme Court. While officials on both sides described the candidates themselves as intransigent, xMr. Bush enjoys a political advantage because his backers are as determined as he is. They are more unified than and more willing than Democrats to wage total war, at all levels legal and political, to reach the White I louse. Many Democrats, by contrast, were inclined to stick by Mr. Gore only to a point (Berke, November 22, 2000, 1). T h e r e was little sense evident of compromise. T h e battle over votes had become a take-no-prisoners, all-out political war. T h e operative words at this stage were do whatever might work and refuse to give in. T h e Republicans appeared more determined to fight it out and to do whatever was necessary to ensure a victory they believed had been fairly won. T h e Democrats were more divided. T h e media, perhaps the weariest of all, continuously ran apocalyptic stories as to the effect all this would have on the operations of American government and the ability of the in-coming administrations to function effectively. It was to end, sort of. O n Tuesday, November 26, a date mandated by the courts, the Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris was to announce that Bush had won Florida's 25 electoral votes by a margin of 537 votes. Bush then declared himself the President-Elect, put a transition team in place for the second time (the first was immediately after election day; both efforts were dismissed as posturing by the Democrats). H e then called on G o r e to concede. T h e reaction from

72

America's Choice 2000

the Gore camp was quite different. One of Gore's lawyers, David Boies, told a packed news conference: "This election cannot be over... There are votes, thousands of votes, that have never been counted once" (Kranish and Milligan November 27, 2000, Al, A10). The Gore supporters were angered over the secretary of state's decision not to allow the Palm Beach election board several additional hours to complete the hand count of 800 votes and her disallowing the partial recount totals that had been faxed to her. In addition, they pointed to the Miami-Dade board's decision not to continue counting 700,000 votes in contention. It was due, it said, to the time limits (the Gore campaign contended the decision was influenced by one of the Republican - assembled crowds that attempted to force their way into the counting room). In addition, the Gore team argued that 10,000 "underrate" ballots in which the machines had found no vote for President but on which voters had indicated a choice for other offices had not been manually counted. The Miami-Dade recount before being suspended had shown a net gain of 156 Gore votes, but these were not included in the state's total. The Gore team also argued that in another county (Nassau) the unofficial returns were certified, not the machine recount which had given Gore an additional 51 votes. The controversy continued. The Secretary of State refused to allow Broward County a few additional hours to complete its count or to receive the ballot count already completed. Miami-Dade, the state's most populous county where Gore had expected to do well, was the object of a court action by the Gore campaign. Palm Beach County had not used the same standards as Broward County in certifying votes and counting "dimpled" ballots, allegedly costing Gore more votes. The United States Supreme Court was to meet on Friday, December 1 to hear oral arguments on the Bush petition. In effect, the controversy simply moved to a new stage. In another court action by a private citizen not connected to the Gore campaign (a lawyer and Democrat), a challenge to the votes in Seminole County was entered into. The charge was that a local election official (a Republican) had allowed party members into her office for hours on end to alter applications for absentee ballots from party members that had not been formally filled out. Democrats were not aware of what was happening and had not been offered the same opportunities. The challenge would affect 4,700 votes and could include up

William Crotty 73 to 15,000 ballots (later totals of the number of votes affected rose to 45,000). In another county, a Republican Party official had been allowed to take absentee ballot applications home to amend them. In the meantime, the Florida legislature, controlled by a Republican majority, began meeting to make good on its threat to choose its own 25 electors to send to Washington. The public in turn appeared more willing to end it all and for Gore to withdraw. Gore made his position clear in an appearance before the television cameras: . . . all we have asked since election day [is] . . . a single full and accurate count. . . Great efforts have been made to prevent the counting of these votes. Lawsuit after lawsuit has been filed to delay the count and to stop the counting for many days between Election Day and the deadline for having the counts finished. . . . There are some who would have us bring this election to the fastest conclusion possible . . . I believe our Constitution matters more than convenience. So, as provided under Florida law, I have decided to contest this inaccurate and incomplete count Our country will be stronger, not weaker, if our next President assumes office following a process that most Americans believe is fair (Gore Speech November 28, 2000). And so it went. There were charges and counter-charges concerning other counties and other recounts. The contest would now be played out in the courts. Three weeks after Election Day there were no less than 17 cases pending (within a few weeks to rise to an estimated 40) on the Florida vote in the courts ranging from the county level to the Florida Supreme Court to the US Supreme Court. December 12th was the deadline for a final decision, the date by which the state's representatives to the Electoral College needed to be named. Matters at this point began to move quickly. The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments and then returned the case to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification and with an admonition to consider federal law and the U.S. Constitution in its ruling. Two trial courts rejected challenges in two counties to the absentee votes in which Republican Party workers had completed the applications. The cases were forwarded to the state's Supreme Court, which accepted the lower courts' decision. The Florida Supreme Court then met and ordered (by a 4-3 vote) a recount of undervotes in all 67 counties in the state (affecting an

74

America's Choice 2000

estimated 60,000 votes). The decision was appealed by the Bush lawyers to the U.S. Supreme Court which again held an expedited hearingandon December 12 issuedwhatwas to be the final shotin the continuing war. It was to be a controversial decision, issued in an unsigned opinion (an unusual move but not without precedent). And it reflected a serious split with the nation's highest court. The Supreme Court's vote was 5 to 4. The majority opinion stated: "Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional... we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering the recount to proceed." The decision came down on December 12, approximately two hours before the deadline expired. Gore's lawyers had argued that the deadline was not mandatory and that the real point of closure should be December 18, when the electors were scheduled to meet. They also contended the recount, underway until suspended by the nation's highest court, could be completed expeditiously and within the time frame mandated. The Court based its decision to a significant degree on the "equal protection" clause in the Constitution saying the lack of precise standards specified by the Florida Supreme Court as to what constitutes a valid vote ensured a range of criteria, and that individual judgments would be applied that violated constitutional protections as to a fair application of the law. The equal protection argument had been made in the Bush petition, but was considered among the weaker of its points. The Supreme Court's minority took quite a different position as to the Court's role. Two of the dissenting judges disagreed with the finality of the December 12 deadline and believed the Florida Supreme Court should be given the opportunity to clarify standards for the recount. The clearest expression of the depth of the minority's dissatisfaction was evident in the dissenting opinions of Justice Breyer and Stevens. Dissentingjustice Stephen Breyer: . . . By hairing the manual recount, and thus ensuring that the uncounted legal votes will not be counted under any standard, this court crafts a remedy out of proportion to the asserted harm. And that remedy harms the very fairness interests the Court is attempting to protect.

William Crotty

75

The court is not acting to vindicate a fundamental constitutional principle, such as the need to protect a basic human liberty. No other reason to act is present. . . What it does today, the court should have left undone. Dissenting Justice J o h n Paul Stevens: iUthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the nation's confidence in the judge as the impartial guardian of the rule of law.

Simply put the controversy came down to this: whether recounts should be engaged in; the standards to be used; the extent of the recanvassing to take place; and the balance between the need for a full and accurate vote and the demands for closure. The Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount. The U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and halted it. The majority reasoning was that the lack of uniform standards for a recount violated equal protection guarantees in the Constitution. It went on to say that there was no time for a recount to take place, effectively ending the legal and political battle and giving the election to Bush. Bush's spokesperson indicated that they were "very pleased and gratified by the decision." The vice president scheduled an announcement for the evening of December 13 and withdrew gracefully, wishing the new president-elect his best. Some believed it to be Gore's finest hour. Bush then spoke on national television equally gracefully, acknowledging Gore's concession and the closeness of the election. He cited the need "to move beyond the bitterness and partisanship of the recent past" and went on to outline in broad strokes a brief listing of his policy objectives.

CONCLUSION Comedian Mark Russell depends on Washington politics for most of his material. His take on the election: "We have a new President. In this democracy of 200 million citizens, the people have spoken. All five of them." (Shafer, December 15, 2000, p. Al).

76

America's Choice 2000

T h e election clearly raised a number of issues that clearly will outlast the choice of George W. Bush as president. Among the most significant are the importance of the individual vote under given circumstances and the standards and processes that give it relevance. As reported in the Wall Street Journal: The U.S. Supreme Court ended the election with a proclamation that more recounting in Florida would violate the constitutional doctrine of 'equal protection' because standards would vary from county to county. By that logic, the entire nation arguably engaged in an unconstitutional free-for-all on Election Day, as standards varied among many states (Gruley and Cummins, December 15, 2000, p. Al). T h e issues raised are fundamental to the operation of a democratic society. H o w the\ r will be addressed depends on the sense of urgency and importance the voters and their representatives assign to them in the election's aftermath. In his concession speech on the evening of December 13 in a nationally televised address, Gore said: . . . The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt, while I strongly disagree with the court's decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this outcome which will be ratified next Monday in the Electoral College. And tonight for the sake of our unity of the people and the strength of our democracy, I offer my concession. Bush followed with a brief address from the Texas House of Representatives, "a home to bipartisan cooperation." H e went on to say: "After a difficult election, we must put politics behind us and work together to make the promise of America available for everyone of our citizens." The two addresses were the most conciliatory of the campaign and signaled, or at least many hoped it did, a spirit of tolerance and cooperation as the nation ended one phase and entered a new one with a new President. The Final Vote Count

Bush Gore

Popular Vote

Electoral Vote

50,456,141 50,996,039

271 266*

"One Gore elector from die District of Columbia abstained from voting.

William Crotty 77 In the last analysis, the election was won by one vote and that vote was cast, in of all places, the United States Supreme Court. This is far from the best way to elect Presidents and, arguably, the Court should never have been involved in the decision, as contended in a minority? dissent. The Court, of course, was involved; it was assertive of its role; and it acted to overrule state laws, courts, and local canvassing boards in such a manner (particularly evident in the decisive final decision) as to insure that no outcome other than George W. Bush's election was practical or possible. It may be the most contentious and curious act of a contentious, curious and unforgettable election year. In another sense the election is not over. The battle will continue in the Congress and in the nation over policy objectives and in relation to the nation's future direction. The disparity among court rulings should lead over time to a clarification of voter rights and reasonable and inclusive criteria to protect these; commissions and legislation could result from all that has happened to introduce workable national standards into election processes in order to produce fair, accurate, and timely vote counts; the debate over the Electoral College and its many defects could lead to new methods for electing presidents and a stronger reliance on the direct vote; and the bitterness and acrimony of the campaigns and the election's aftermath could lead to a national and political unity fostered by the leadership in Washington, an objective promised in many recent elections but yet to be realized. However questionable the manner of choosing, the American people—8 out of 10 of them in a Gallup Poll conducted after Bush had been declared the winner—indicated they would accept the new President as "legitimate." All is not lost for the political junkie unable to adjust to life without campaigns however. First, the 2004 election has already begun, with both sides maneuvering for advantage and a variety of potential candidates on the Democratic side assessing their chances and their resources for the next time around. This is something for the most diehard of partisans also: under Florida's sunshine laws the presidential ballots are available for a recount to anyone with the resources and motivation needed to engage in such an enormous undertaking. In the end, it was a wild and highly partisan election that tested the nation's institutions and its democratic culture. Both, it would seem, fared well.

78

America's Choice 2000

REFERENCES Berke, Richard L. "Bush and Gore are Loath to Say, You Win," New York Times, November 22, 2000, p. Al. Berke, Richard L. "Spin the Bottle; Fierce Contest to Woo the Public," New York Sunday Times, November 19, 2000, p. 1. Boston Sunday Globe. "The Mandate of 2000," November 26, 2000, p. D6. C-Span Online: www.c-span.org/ Farrell, John Aloysius, and Lynda Gorov. "High Court Joins Election Fray: Will Hear Bush Case Challenging Florida Recount," Boston Globe, November 25, 2000, p. Al. Florida Courts Online: wvvw.flcourts.org/ Gallup Pol] Online: www.gallup.com/ Gore, Albert. National Address, November 28, 2000. Gore, Albert. Concession Speech. December 15, 2000. Kranish, Michael. "Competing Views," Boston Globe, November 21,2000, p. Al 9. Kranish, Michael and Susan Milligan. "Bush Wins Election: Pending Gore Challenges, Possible Supreme Court Ruling," Boston Globe, November 27, 2000, p.Al,A10. Nickerson, Colin. "Efficient Canadians Make It Look So Easy," Boston Globe, November 29, 2000 p. A40. Purdum, Todd S. "No Decision Issued: Lawyers for Both Sides Answer Skeptical and Pointed Questions," New York Times, November 21,2000, p. A1. Rich, Frank. "Mav the Best Man Lose," New York Times, November 18, 2000, p.A31. Sack, Kevin. "In Desperate Florida Fight, Gore's Hard Strategic Calls," New York Times, December 15, 2000, p. Al. Shafer, Ronald G. "Minor Memos," Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2000, p.Al. Shribman, David Al. "Asking the Hard Questions: Llearing Injects Order Into Quest for Resolution," Boston Globe, November 21, 2000, p. Al. Supreme Court of Florida Nos. SC00-2346, SC00-2348, and SCOO-234. Palm Beach Canvassing Board Volusia County Canvassing Board et. al., and Florida Democratic Part)7 vs. [Catherine Harris, etc., et. al. (November 21, 2000)

_i EH t\ EL LJ

Political Participation in American Elections: Who Decides What? M. Margaret Conway

O P E A K I N G TO REPORTERS THE DAY AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL

election in 2000, President Bill Clinton commented, "Well, if ever there was a doubt about the importance of exercising democracy's most fundamental right, yesterday put it to rest. No American will ever be able to say, my vote doesn't count."1 His comments were inspired by the most controversial and close presidential election since 1876, with the outcome of the election still in doubt more than a month after election day. Democratic party candidate Al Gore received 200,000 more popular votes that Republican candidate George W. Bush, out of an estimated 104.5 million votes cast in the United States, but neither candidate had a majority in the Electoral College. More than four weeks after the election, the outcome of the election in Florida remained in doubt, and the outcome in Florida, with its 25 electoral votes, determined who the new president would be. On election day, the television networks first predicted, at 7:45 PM Eastern Standard time, that Gore had won the Florida presidential contest, then at 10:30 PM changed their prediction to "too close to call." At 2:15 AM the next morning they predicted a Bush victory by a few hundred votes. The victory was so narrow that under Florida law a recount of the vote in all counties was required. The networks' initial 79

80 America's Choice 2000 prediction came before the polling places in much of the panhandle (western) section of Florida had closed, as western Florida is in the Central time zone. The early prediction assigning Florida's electoral vote may also have discouraged some citizens from voting in other parts of the country. For example, the television networks' prediction that Gore would win Florida began at 4:45 PM Pacific Standard Time. Because Florida was expected to be a key state in determining the outcome of the presidential election, one newspaper report suggested that some potential voters in Pacific coast states, focusing only on the presidential election, decided not to vote, as they thought the outcome of the presidential contest had already been decided.2 Public opinion polls before the election indicated a very close contest between the two major parties' candidates for the presidency. Both parties, as well as business groups, labor unions, women's groups, civil rights organizations, religious groups, and many other types of groups, attempted to energize their supporters to vote and to support a particular candidate. Many of these groups also attempted to influence the vote choice of non-members. On election day, reports of long lines at the polling places led many to expect high levels of turnout. However, Curtis Gans, director of the Center for the Study ok the American Electorate, estimated that only 50.7 percent of the voting age population voted in the 2000 presidential election, despite predictions that the election would be very close. That represents a small increase over the 49.1 percent who voted in 1996, according to Gans' calculations.3 One frequently made generalization about voting participation is that turnout will be higher in elections that are perceived as close. The election was close not only in Florida, but also in several other states, including Iowa, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin.

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORATE What was the social composition of the "effective electorate" (those who actually voted) in the 2000 presidential election? Using data from surveys administered as voters were leaving a sample of 300 polling places throughout the United States, a portrait can be drawn of those who voted in the 2000 elections. More than half of those voting were 45 years old or older although members of that age group are only 47 percent of the voting age population. Only 17 percent of the voters

M. Margaret Conway 81 were between the ages of 18 and 29, although they are 22 percent of the voting age population. Those who voted were disproportionately drawn from citizens with higher levels of education. Only 5 percent of the voters had less than a high school education (compared to 17 percent of the population having less than a high school education), 21 percent of those voting had high school diplomas (compared to 34 percent in the adult population), 32 percent of the voters had some college education (compared to 2 5 percent of adults), and 42 percent of the voters were college graduates (compared to 24 percent of all adults. Voters were also disproportionately drawn from union households, with 26 percent of the voters having at least one union member in their immediate family. In terms of religious preference, 47 percent of the voters were white Protestants, 26 percent were Catholic, and 4 percent were Jewish. Those who voted also differed from the adult population in their income distribution. While slightly more than one-third of the adult population has an estimated income of $50,000 or more, 53 percent of those voting were in that income group. In terms of ethnicity, the proportion of African Americans voting was slightly less than their proportion in the voting age population; they constitute 12 percent of the adult population but only 10 percent of those who voted. Most under-represented were Hispanics, who constitute 10 percent of the population but were only 4 percent of those who voted. Nine percent of those wrho voted were first-time voters. Prior to the election political analysts emphasized the role of suburban residents as swing voters in presidential contests. Citizens who lived in suburban areas were 43 percent of those voting, compared to 28 percent living in small cities and rural areas and 29 percent who lived in the central cities of metropolitan areas. 4 One of the most frequently discussed voting patterns in the United States is the so-called gender gap, which refers to the difference in men's and women's voting patterns. Was there a gender gap in turnout in the 2000 election? The answer is no. Men are 48 percent of the adult population, and theyr were 48 percent of those voting. However, the gender gap in vote choice persisted in the 2000 presidential election, with 54 percent of the women surveyed reporting that they voted for Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore, while 43 percent reported voting for Republican candidate George W. Bush. Among the men, 42 percent reported voting for Gore and 53 percent voted for Bush.5 A marital status gap also occurred in the 2000 turnout and vote

82

America's Choice 2000

choice patterns. Sixty-five percent of those who voted were married; among the 18 and older population, an estimated 59 percent are married. The vote choice patterns in the 2000 presidential election varied significantly by gender and by marital status, with 58 percent of married men supporting Bush, compared to 49 percent of married women, The contrast in vote choice was even greater between single men and single women, with 46 percent of single men supporting Bush and only 32 percent of single women. Indeed, single women were the strongest supporters of Gore, with 63 percent voting for him.6 Two other characteristics of those who voted in 2000 are of interest: their party identification and their self-perceived ideology. Slightly more Democrats than Republicans voted (39 percent reporting they were Democrats, 35 percent Republican) with 27 percent indicating that they wrere independents. In terms of ideology, 50 percent described themselves as moderates, 29 percent as conservative, and 20 percent as liberal.' After a series of law suits challenging the Florida Secretary of State's certification of George W. Bush as the winner of the Florida presidential election vote had been decided at the local, state, and federal level, the certification process was completed. In the final Florida vote count, only 547 votes separated George W. Bush and AJ Gore, with Bush wining Florida's 25 Electoral College votes and the presidency.8 Even a small change in one group's or one county's voter turnout could have changed outcome of the election in Florida, and consequently the national outcome would have been altered.

TRENDS IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OVER TIME As a percentage of the voting age population, voter participation in American elections declined from the end of the 19th century to 1920, when the 19th Amendment entitled women to vote in all election in the United States. In 1876, turnout reached a post Civil War high of 37.1 percent of the voting age population, but of course only men could vote. As a part of the political negotiations to allocate disputed electoral college votes from Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, the Republicans agreed to end reconstruction in the South. Black males were subsequently disenfranchised by law or by otJher means in the Southern

M. Margaret Conway 83 states, and as a consequence turnout continued to decline. After the 19th Amendment enfranchised women in all the states, turnout increased to 40.5 percent of the voting age population in 1920. It continued to increase, reaching 58.9 percent of the voting age population by 1940, but declined again during World War II. The highest level of turnout as a proportion of the voting age population occurred in 1960, when 62.8 percent voted in the presidential election. Turnout then began to decline again, reaching a low in 1996 of 49 percent. Turnout is estimated to have increased to an estimated 50.7 percent of the voting age population in 2000.9 There are many explanations for why people vote. Based on a model of voter turnout labeled the Civic Volunteer Model, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady argue that people vote who have the resources and the motivation to participate in politics or who have been asked to participate by others. ,0 The focus in the remainder of this chapter is on the efforts to mobilize citizens to vote and on the effects of election registration and administration procedures on patterns of political participation and political outcomes.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION VERSUS POLITICAL ACTIVATION Why was voting turnout so low in the LTnited States? One explanation is that citizens need to be mobilized to vote, as voting is perceived by many as a low benefit activity. Especially in one-party areas or in elections that are not perceived as close, some may perceive their impact on the outcome as insignificant. The process of generating voter turnout in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century could be described as attempts at mass mobilization by the political parries, using repeated personal contacts with citizens to encourage them to vote. Political parties focused on persuading citizens to support the party's candidates and mobilizing large parts of the electorate. Now, the goal is the more narrowly activation of some citizens, seeking to turnout only those who are most likely to support the party, candidate, or policy aims of the mobilizing agent. As Steven Schier has pointed out, activation is a rational response to the decline in the efficiency of local party- organizations, the increase

84 America's Choice 2000 in the number of interest groups engaged in electoral activities, and changes in campaign communications technology which permit highly efficient targeting and contacting of individual registered voters.11 The goal is no longer to maximize turnout, but to increase turnout only of those who have a high probability of supporting a particular candidate, party, or policy stand. How did the party7 organization maximize turnout in earlier periods of American history? The activities of effective local party organizations in the early part of the twentieth century illustrate the mobilization methods used. In communities with effective party organizations, prior to an election each party's election district leaders would compile a list of all adult residents in the precinct (election district) and compare that list against the list of persons registered to vote in the precinct. If eligible citizens in any household were unregistered, they would be asked which party's candidates they would usually support. The precinct leader for that party would then provide assistance in getting the party's unregistered supporters registered to vote. On election day each party's precinct leader would keep a record of who among their party's supporters had voted. About 3 PM on election day, the precinct leader would provide the party's local headquarters with a list of all those registered in the party who had indicated in a pre-election canvass of the precinct that they would support the party's candidates. In-person contacts or phone calls would be made to the home, continuing until a family member had been contacted. The family member would be urged to get those who had not yet voted to the polling place, and assistance with transportation or baby-siring would be offered if it were needed. This type of personal contact based voter registration and get out the vote effort was typical in areas with effective local party organizations. It required time and effort by local party members both prior to the election and on election day. This kind of local party organization, effective in mobilizing party supporters through the party precinct leader's personal knowledge of the precinct's residents and the efforts of local party volunteer workers, exists in the twenty-first century only in a few communities in the United States. What occurs in elections now, instead of personal contact by neighborhood based party activists, is highly targeted, selective voter activation campaigns. These use impersonal distribution of messages through television advertising, contacts by means of telephone calls

M. Margaret Conway 85 from centralized phone banks, and direct mail targeted to specific voters and conveying messages on issues of particular concern to them. These activation campaigns frequently rely on commercial firms which may specialize in political marketing. The goal is to mobilize only those persons who will support the mobilizing agent's preferred candidate or policy stand. These efforts are fueled not by the efforts of large numbers of volunteers but by large sums of money, including "soft money," which can pay for professional campaign services. Soft money is funds donated by individuals, corporations, labor unions, and interest groups to political party organizations for the purpose of operating get out the vote drives and building party organizations at the state, county, or city level. Because they are not spent in support of candidates for federal office, federal limitations on who may donate money and how much they may donate do not apply. Organization building is viewed as fostering professionally skilled state, county, or city organizations, not as building precinct level organizations.

POLITICAL PROFILING The politics of activation is enhanced by the use of political profiling. (Computer programs collate data from a variety of sources to categorize potential voters into types, which can then be used to target selected citizens for voter activation campaigns. Using data based on such things as residential area, occupation, organizational memberships, magazine subscriptions, charitable donations, hunting licenses, and a hostofodier indicators of a citizen's political views, social group ties, and economic interests, profiles are developed of individual citizens. Added to these data is information about whether or not the citizen is registered to vote and if so, whether in a political party or as an independent and the frequency of voter turnout in the past. These profiles are used by candidates, political parties, and interest groups to target those who might be persuaded to support a particular candidate, political party, or interest group cause. Using the same techniques developed in direct marketing by businesses, political profiling makes possible delivery of very specific issue related messages to those most likely to be persuadable and capable of being activated to vote. For example, Map Applications, Inc., a

86

America's Choice 2000

company that sells data base software to Midwestern Republican candidates and organizations, can link more than forty layers of personal information to a registered voter's name and address. On the basis of that information, political organizations can engage in very sophisticated targeting of potential voters.12 Another of the most successful political profiling firms is Aristotle International, Inc., which sells lists of registered voters to candidates for national, state, and local offices. It has a catalog of 150 million names with associated relevant information which makes possible very specific targeting of potential supporters by candidates, party organizations, and interest groups.13 An example of the use of political profiling by a party organization is the activities of the Republican National Committee (RNC), which is well known for the sophistication of its campaign activities. The RNC^ has a list of 165 million names which is combined with information about each listed individual; the information has been obtained from a variety of sources. As a service to candidates and state and local party organizations, the RNC can sort the list by relevant criteria and provide lists of registered voters most likely to respond favorably to specific campaign messages in a city, county, congressional district, or state. The Democratic National Committee lacks this capability, but has supported the development of targeting lists at the state level. 14 While profiles are now most frequently created by matching data from lists, targeting lists can also be created the old fashioned way. That is, either telephone surveys or in person canvassing of election districts can obtain information about citizens' attitudes about issues and candidates which are then used to create targeting lists. Many groups, candidates, and the political parties used political profiling in the 2000 election campaign. For example, the National Rifle Association (NRA) acquired lists of persons who held hunting licenses or permits to carry a concealed weapon, or who subscribed to outdoors magazines. Their names and addresses were compared to the NRA's membership list. Those who were not already NRA members were targeted for persuasive communications through phone calls and mail. Recipients would be urged to become supporters the NRA's cause through becoming members of the NRA as well as through supporting candidates who opposed gun control legislation. In the 2000 election, the NRA is estimated to have spent between $15 and $20 million dollars in its issue and candidate advocacy activities.15

M. Margaret Conway 87 /Another group, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), used profiling techniques based on patterns of mass media use to identify two million Republican and independent women whom NARAL believed would support candidates who were pro-choice on the abortion issue. NARAL believes that profiling techniques are very efficient and effective in identifying and activating supporters of pro-choice candidates.16

POLITICAL ACTIVATION IN THE 2000 ELECTION CAMPAIGN Targeted get out the vote campaigns were conducted by a number of organizations during the 2000 election in addition to those already7 discussed. The Democratic Party, using soft money, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other civil rights organizations ran separate campaigns to mobilize African American voters. An organization legally independent of the NAACP, the NAACP National Voter Fund, allocated $10 million to increase voter turnout among African Americans; using profiling techniques, a list containing three million potential voters was created.17 In addition to targeted voter activation techniques, more general mass mobilization techniques were also used. Advertisements proclaiming "Lift every voice and vote" appeared on Black Entertainment Television and on the movie screens of the Magic Johnson theater chain. Ministers in African American churches urged their parishioners to vote, and entertainment figures campaigned to mobilize the student vote at predominantly black colleges. Recorded telephone messages from Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore and from President Bill Clinton were directed at registered voters in predominantly black neighborhoods. This type of targeted voter activation effort proved to be highly effective in the 1998 congressional and state elections in states such as Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. The goal of these voter activation campaigns in 2000 was to increase African Americans' voter turnout to equal their proportion in the population,18 which is 12 percent. These organizations, however, did not reach their goal nationwide. African American turnout nationally remained at the same level as in 1998, about 10 percent of the total electorate. In

88 America's Choice 2000 battleground states such as Florida, Illinois, and Missouri, African American turnout increased substantially. For example, in Florida African American turnout increased by 50 percent, and they cast 15 percent of the total votes in the presidential election.19 Allegations were made that some black voters were denied access to the ballot. In Miami, Florida, at hearings held by the Washington-based Advancement Project, witnesses stated that they were unable to vote because of intimidation by police officers, lack of assistance if they spoke a foreign language, or refusal of provisional ballots if poll workers could not find their names on registration lists.20 Both major political parties conducted activation campaigns, attempting to activate those persons most likely to vote for the party's candidates. In Florida, the Republican party's activation activities included sending recorded telephone messages to targeted voters from prominent persons such as former first lady Barbara Bush, mother of Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush and a very popular person among older women, Florida's retiring senator Connie Mack, a very popular figure among Florida's more conservative citizens, and retired Army general Norman Schwarzkopf.21 In several states the Republican party funded a massive mailing of absentee ballot applications to those targeted registered voters who were believed most likely to vote Republican. In Florida, the absentee ballot application had the address to which it should be sent printed on the application form. Supposedly, all that was required was for the recipient to sign the application and drop it in the mail. Because of absentee voting fraud in a mayoral election in Miami in 1997, the state law had been changed to require that each absentee ballot application have on it the registered voter's unique voter identification number assigned by the local board of election supervisor. That number was not on a substantial number of the absentee ballot applications sent to potential voters by the firm hired by the Republican party to carry out that task. Some local election officials added the numbers to returned applications, others permitted Republican party volunteers to come into the election board office and add the numbers to returned applications, and still others did neither. In two counties the permitting of Republican volunteers to add those numbers became the grounds for suits challenging the absentee ballots. The number of ballots involved (25,000) could have changed the outcome of the election in Florida if the suits challenging the ballots had been upheld by the courts.22

M. Margaret Conway 89 As surveys taken after Labor Day indicated a very close contest in a number of states, both parties focused on stimulating turnout by their supporters. Republicans traditionally enjoyed higher rates of turnout, but in 1996 and 1998, Democrats, through focused activation drives, increased turnout by their party's adherents. In addition to Democratic party, labor unions, civil rights organizations, women's groups, and other organizations whose leaders preferred Democratic victories at the polls conducted targeted voter activation campaigns in 2000. Labor unions made a major effort to activate union members and their families to vote. After relying on television ad campaigns to mobilize union members and their families in 1996, in 1998 organized labor emphasized personal contacts through in-person and telephone contacts to activate union household members. Those techniques proved to be more successful in mobilizing union members and their families to vote. In 2000, those methods of voter activation were continued and expanded. Although union membership is less than seven percent of the voting age population of 205 million, post election surveys indicate that 26 percent of those who voted in 2000 lived in a household with at least one union member. 23 The increase in voter turnout by union family members was crucial in several states, not only for the outcome of the presidential election but also on other contests such as U.S. Senate and House races. Voter activation efforts similar to that of the Democratic party and its supporters were made by the Republican party. The Republican National Committee allocated $80 million in soft money to its get out the vote campaign. Labeled Victory 2000, the voter activation campaign used recorded one-minute phone calls from candidates, prominent party supporters, and volunteers or paid phone banks, mailings focusing on issues believed to be highly salient to the recipients. The party believed that this effort would increase support for the Republican presidential candidate by 1 to 2 percent. In a close contest, such as the 2000 presidential election, that targeted activation campaigning may have provided the margin of victory.'4 In addition to using the profiling methods previously discussed, new targeting techniques, developed in the 1999 Virginia state legislative election campaigns, were used by the Republican party in 2000. Instead of asking potential voters which candidate they would support in the upcoming election, those interviewed were asked their preferences on several issues. From that, inferences could be drawn about

90 America's Choice 2000 which candidate the potential voter would support. Using both volunteers to staff phone banks and paid professional phone bank firms, the information was then tised to contact those who would support Republican candidates to urge them to vote on election day or to receive recorded messages from prominent party leaders urging candidate Republican candidate support.2'1 Success in staffing phone banks with volunteers varied with the strength of the Republican party organizations. In those states which had strong state organizations, such as Michigan, the volunteer phone bank operations were more successfully managed. Other efforts were made by the Republican party to spur turnout. Two million dollars was allocated to increase turnout by Catholics who were expected to support Governor Bush in the presidential contest. The Republican party also allocated $400,000 to ran ads on C N N International and other media to increase absentee ballot voting by Americans living overseas. That group, composed largely of military personnel and business employees, was expected to vote Republican.26

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES In its decision ending the recount of votes cast in the presidential election in several Florida counties, the United States Supreme Court argued that continuing the recount would violate the constitutional requirement of "equal protection" because uniform standards were not being applied in the counties holding recounts. It could be argued that the application of that standard would call into question election outcomes in most states. No national uniform standard for the conduct of elections exists. Regulation of the administration of elections is left to each state, and the states vary substantially in the extent to which each has a detailed set of uniform standards for the conduct of elections and the extent to which whatever standards that exist are implemented and enforced. Election administration is a low priority in the states and their subdivisions, as other government programs claim a higher priority from state and local governments. Those government units' responsibilities for law enforcement (police, courts, jails), fire protection, roads, education, and health place great demands on state and local resources and

M. Margaret Conway 91 claim priority in access to scarce resources. Therefore, local election boards are usually inadequately staffed, voting machines antiquated, computer resources inadequate, and election day workers poorly trained. The 2000 presidential election vividly demonstrates thatavariety of errors in election administration can significantly affect patterns of recorded voter turnout and vote choice. Election administration can limit citizens' expressions of their electoral preferences. One set of problems exists in the voter registration process. For example, under the national "Motor Voter" law, citizens may register to vote or change their voter registration address when obtaining a driver's license. In a number of jurisdictions in 2000, the motor vehicle bureau did not forward to the election bureau new voter registrations or changes in addresses. Thus people who thought they were registered to vote arrived at their polling place only to learn they were not on the list of persons registered to vote and therefore they could not vote.27 Other problems which were evident in the 2000 election included faulty ballot design. As the problems with the "butterfly" ballot used in several counties in Florida demonstrated, ballot design can be so confusing the voters either vote for a candidate who is not their preference or cast votes for more than one candidate for a particular office. Antiquated voting machines, such as machines using punch cards, may fail to record the vote cast by a citizen. Faulty computer programs may record the vote inaccurately. The result of many of these problems with election administration is to decrease voter turnout, either because people are denied the opportunity to vote, or because they voted but their vote was not properly recorded. What can be done to solve these problems? At least two steps are necessary. One is create more detailed, uniform standards for the administration of voter registration and election administration. The second is to allocate more resources to election boards to replace outof-date equipment and to fund better training for election day poll workers. The resources necessary to cany these two steps are substantial. For example, the estimated cost of replacing antiquated voting machines in Florida is $200 million. In the same budget year (2001), the state faces a $1 billion shortfall in the funds needed for health care funding for the state's citizens. In the debate over resource allocation, funding for health care will probably take priority.

92 America's Choice 2000 EASIER ACCESS TO THE BALLOT One path that many states have taken to increase voter turnout is to make it easier for citizens to vote. Texas, Iowa, and several other states permit early voting, either at specially created polling places in high traffic areas such as banks, supermarkets, or shopping mall, or in public facilities such as government offices and public libraries. Extensive use of absentee ballots occurs in other states in efforts to increase turnout. By law in Michigan, every registered voter aged 60 and older is sent an absentee ballot. The state of Washington allows anyone to apply for an absentee ballot, and it is estimated that 25 percent of those voting used absentee ballots in 2000. Oregon switched to having all voters vote by mail. Seven other states use some form of early voting or voting by mail. Nationally it was estimated that as much as 25 percent of all votes cast in the 2000 election would be by mail. Voting by mail makes it easier for citizens to vote, but it also means that campaigns must consider changing the timing and delivery of method of what has traditionally been the final persuasion and voter activation efforts in the last few days of the campaign. Thus, in Oregon the Republican party's campaign made its "last minute" message delivery 20 days before election day.28

CONCLUSIONS The profile of those who voted in 2000 is very similar to the patterns occurring in recent elections, Those who vote tend to be older, more affluent and better educated. Despite efforts to activate minority voters, their turnout is lower than their proportion in the voting age population. A majority of those who vote perceive themselves to be moderates, and Republicans and Democrats made up almost equal proportions of those who voted in 2000. Efforts to get citizens to vote are no longer mass mobilization efforts. Instead, what occurs is best described as targeted voter activation. Turnout stimulation efforts are carefully targeted through the use of political profiling. The characteristics of those most likely to support a party, candidate, or issue stand are identified, and mobilization efforts are focused only on citizens who have those characteristics.

M. Margaret Conway

93

T h e 2000 election demonstrated that election administration can make a significant difference in election outcomes, and the effect can occur in a number of different ways—in both who votes and in whose votes are counted. T h e absence of clear and uniform standards of administration contributed significantly to the prolonged turmoil over the election of the president. While some states are making it easier for citizens to vote, even use of voting by mail requires clear, uniform election administration procedures would ease the burden on both the voter and on those who are responsible for the administration of the election and the counting of the ballots.

NOTES 1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November. 8, 2000. Remarks of President upon returning from Chappaqua, NY. 2. "Vote Turnout is Low Despite Tight Race," Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2000, p. A-44. 3. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9,2000. Http://www.latimes.com/news/ polities/decision2000/lat na turnbout00//09.html. 4. Marjorie Connelly, "Who Voted: A Portrait of American Politics, 1976-2000," New York Times, November. 12, 2000, Weekly Review, p. 4. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. State of Florida, Secretary of State's Office, Board of Elections web site. 9. Charles E. Johnson, Jr. Non-Voting Americans. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 102; U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Voting Age Population for States November 2000, Table 2. Participation in elections for President and U.S. Representatives: 1930 to 1998. 10. Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. For a discussion of other models of voting turnout, see M. Margaret Conway, Political Participation in the United States. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000. 11. Steven E. Schier, By Invitation Only. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, p 3. 12. John Mintzand Robert O'Harrow, Jr. "High-Tech Political Profiling," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, October 16, 2000, p. 13. 13. Ibid.

94

America's Choice 2000

14. Ibid. 15. Juliet Eilperin. "A Pivotal Election Finds NRA's Wallet Open," Washington Post, November 1, 2000, p. A16. 16. David Van Urehle, "No Stone is Left Unturned for Turnout," Wasington Post, November 7, 2000, p. Al. 17. Michael A. Fletcher. "In Targeted States, A Striking Turnout of Black Voters," Washington Post, November 17, 2000, p. A29. 18. David Firestone, "Drive Under Way to Raise Turnout of Black Voters," New York Times, October 29, 2000, p. Al. 19. Michael A. Fletcher. "In Targeted States, a Striking Turnout of Black Voters," Washington Post, November 17, 2000, p. A29. 20. Ibid. 21. Ed Quioco, "Mrs. Bush, Jeb Stump for Votes," St. Petersburg Times, November 1, 2000. Http://www.sptimes.com/news/...North Pinellas/ Mrs Bush 1 ebStump-f.shtml 22. Nicholas Kulish. "Seminole, Martin Counties' Cases May Tip Scales," Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2000, p. A16. 23. Marjorie Connelly, "Who Voted: A Portrait of American Politics, 1976-2000," New York Times, November 12,2000, Weekly Review, p. 4.; Tom Infield. "Big push to Get Out Union Vote," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 2, 2000. p. A1; Dawson Bell. "UAW tries hard to tool the shop floor for Gore," Detroit Free Press, November 3, 2000, p. Al. 24. David Von Drehle. "No Stone is Left Unturned for Turnout," Washington Post, November 7, 2000, p. Al. 25. Jeanne Cummings, "GOP Puts Its Money and Backers to Work Fighting Low Turnout," Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2000, p. Al. ^ 26. Ibid. 27. Monte Reel, "High Turnout, Mix-Ups Mark Election Day," Washington Post, November 12, 2000, p. M3. 28. Jim Carlton, "Oregon Is First State to Vote Entirely by Mail," Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2000, p. A6; Glenn R. Simpson and John Harwood, "New Ways to Vote Reprise Old Problem: How to Avoid Plague of Election Fraud," Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2000, p. A6.

FOUR

The Presidential Primaries: Triumph of the Frontrunners William Crotty

INTRODUCTION Three developments marked the primaries, often the most contentious and interesting part of the election year. First, the early front-runners, Vice President Al Gore for the Democrats and Texas Governor George W. Bush for the Republicans, entered the election year as the odds-on favorites to win their party's nominations. Each had the money, staffing, organized support at the state level, and name recognition that leads to success. Each also was the choice of their party's most influential elites and of the formal party organization. Second, each faced initially stiff competition from unexpected sources: former U. S. Senator from New Jersey and college and professional basketball star Bill Bradley for the Democrats and Arizona Senator John McCain for the Republicans. And third, the initial frontrunners overcame spirited contests early in the prenomination season, to win overwhelmingly. In the early Democratic primaries, Bradley positioned himself to the left of Gore and argued that the vice president did not represent the values of the liberals in his party, the group that would dominate the primary electorate. Bradley's was a surprise candidacy. He retired from the Senate in 1996 after having served three terms where he was considered something of a loner. He was not a particularly influential senator nor an acknowledged party leader nor liberal spokesperson. He was also not noted for his love of campaigning nor for the rough-and-tumble that 95

96

America's Choice 2000

more often than not marked the primary trail. He had voted with the Reagan administration and against his party on two bitterly contested issues during the 1980s, a Reagan budget which cut social programs and aid for the Contras in the war in Nicaragua. These were defining issues for the era and his votes wrere not appreciated, and not forgotten, by his fellow Democrats in the Congress. In fact, few of them lined up to support him in his run for the party's nomination. Having an eight-year incumbent vice president from a successful Democratic administration as his opponent explains much of the reluctance behind the failure of other Democratic public officials to back the Bradley effort, but not all. There was a curiously non-political atmosphere to the Bradley campaign, more a feeling of an issue-based nonpartisan effort by a highly intelligent independent than a split among competing party factions. Bradley's major success was in running a serious campaign at all and in raising the financing needed to contest the vice president from nontraditional resources. These included financial banking interests, Wall Street, technology and dot.com start-up companies, friends, and independent liberals. Many in the Democratic party thought this could not be done. Gore, with President Clinton's help, tied up most of the party's officeholders, interest groups, and major funders early on. As a consequence, he emerged as one of the best funded candidates ever to seek his party's nomination. Yet Bradley managed to raise $27 million entering the primaries, only $2 million less than the vice president. This was the real story of the Bradley campaign and its major success. It was an impressive achievement. Also, since he announced his candidacy in late 1998, he had run a quiet campaign, spending modestly, unlike Gore who had invested heavily prior to the election year in media, tracking polls, consultants, and organization. In part, the vice president intended to scare off any well known opponents by making his nomination appear inevitable. Bradley, meanwhile, in the year prior to the beginning of the primaries spent hours on the phone each day soliciting from an informal network of supporters and new money sources. Many were old friends from Princeton, his alma mater, the National Basketball Association or the Senate . . . But often (they] were people . . . who had never met him, only read his books, heard him lecture or seen him play basketball. Still others supported him simply because

William Crotty

97

he had never been part of the Clinton administration. Most had no fund-raising experience. But they were affluent people with affluent friends willing to open their rolodexes to help him get elected (Dao,

January 19, 2000, p. 13). One consequence was that by the summer of 1999, Bradley began equaling Gore in fundraising and by the late fall he held a 2 to 1 edge over Gore. Immediately prior to the Iowa caucus and New Hampshire primary, Bradley had substantially more funds available ($19 million) than did the vice president. Had he been a more dynamic and charismatic candidate, or had a contender like John McCain had access to the same level of resources, the unthinkable might have happened and Gore's nomination, conceded by most media experts and party members, might have been derailed. As it was, Gore attacked Bradley ruthlessly on a variety of issues and Bradley proved less effective in making his point or mobilizing his constituency than his opponent. Nonetheless, Bradley represented one more surprise in an election year full of surprises and in the early going looked as if he might offer the vice president a stiff challenge for the Democratic party's presidential nomination. This was not to happen. Bradley was unable to win big in the early contests and his campaign failed to have the appeal or staying power needed to contest Gore on a serious basis up to the national convention. John McCain was another matter altogether. He was easily the most charismatic candidate to emerge in the election year. A conservative, he ran as a populist. He toured the early primary states, and New Hampshire in particular, in a bus called "The Straight Talk Express," and he made himself available to all the media for informal, far-ranging interviews. This contrasted with the Bush campaign's aloofness, lack of accessibility and suspicion of the press, all of which assured McCain of extensive and highly favorable "free media" coverage. McCain was an effective speaker, did his best in the campaign appearances and in interviews with the press to answer all questions put to him, and related well to audiences wherever he went. To add to this, he was a legitimate war hero, having served over five years in a Hanoi jail during the Vietnam War. He had been tortured and suffered severely while in prison. The marks of the physical torture (an inability to lift his arms beyond his shoulders or difficulty in putting on a coat

98

America's Choice 2000

without assistance) were evident during the campaign. Nonetheless, he appeared to be the most optimistic, engaging, and accessible of all the candidates in either party and clearly the most popular. Still the McCain campaign was a hand-to-mouth effort, with little staff or longrun financing. It ran on the candidate's strength and attractiveness, significant virtues but little match for the resources controlled by his opponent. In the end, it was Bush's dominance in funding and party organization, combined with a willingness to do whatever was necessary (in the bitter South Carolina Republican primary in particular), that defeated McCain. Even more than the other primary candidates, he had depended on the momentum from good showings in the early contests to attract the voter interest and funds needed to sustain his challenge beyond the opening rounds. Trying to put these into place while campaigning for the nomination was more than McCain could handle. The 2000 primaries suggest that the candidates who win the pre-primary battle of endorsements, party support, and financial backing have the flexibility and resources to absorb early setbacks and yet go on to win the nomination. This may now be the most significant, and most under-reported, stage of the electoral campaign. Such was certainly the case in the 2000 election in both parties.

THE PRIMARY TRAIL Table 4.1 presents the calendar of primary and caucus dates. As has become the standard in recent decades, the most important contests are those that occur early in the prenomination season and among these the most publicized are the initial ones, the New Hampshire primary and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the Iowa Caucus. For the Democrats, Bradley lost to Gore in late January in Iowa 2 to 1, a not unexpected outcome. (Table 4.1) Iowa was a caucus state with candidates dependent on labor union support and the party's state organization to get the activists to the nominating meetings. These groups were committed to Gore and he won convincingly in the low turnout caucuses (in which only 2,000 participated). In the most publicized of all the contests, the New Hampshire primary, Bradley campaigned hard and gave Gore his strongest challenge, losing a close decision by four percentage points (50% Gore, 46%

William Crotty 99 Table 4.1

Primary/Caucus Results by Date

I. Democrats Date Jan.24 Feb. 1 Feb. 5 Feb. 29 March 7

March 9 March 10

March 1 1 March 12 March 14

March 21 March 26 March 27 April 1 April 4 May 2

May 9

Suite

0/

Vote Totals

Gore 1,269 Iowa* 76,897 New Hampshire 6,349 Delaware Washington 310,405 California 2,090,776 Connecticut 99,536 Georgia 238,396 Maine 33,726 Maryland 334,405 Massachusetts 337,175 Missouri 171,562 New York 598,362 Ohio 671,937 Rhode Island 26,801 Vermont 26,719 1,080 Hawaii* 1,711 North Dakota* America Samoa* 21 South Carolina* 8,864 Colorado 63,280 Utah 12,444 Wyoming* 223 67,582 Arizona Michigan* 15,853 Minnesota* 11,100 912 Nevada* Florida 485,454 Louisiana 114,942 Mississippi 79,408 92,654 Oklahoma lennessee 196,438 Texas 636,542 Illinois 682,916 Puerto Rico Delaware* 6,349 748 Virgin Islands* Pennsylvania 518,635 Wi scon sin 327,436 District ol Columbia 18,621 Indiana 219,604 North Carolina 383,696 73639 Nebraska West Virginia 181,946

to

Bradley 698' 70,502 4,465 162,725 467,706 74,075 46,035 25,900 141,445 210,132 89,092 311,617 238,469 19,000 21,561 235 477 4 172 20,663 3,137 19 67,582 3,117 1,800 2? 109,501 31,305 7,621 34,305 11,216 129,942 115,317 4,465

0 145,869 32,324 796 64,339 99,796 27,884 46,711

Gore Bradley 63 35 50 46 57 40 65 34 18 81 56 41 84 16 54 41 28 67 37 60 65 34 34 65 72 26 58 41 55 44 82 18 22 78 84 16 2 92 71 23 80 20 7 85 19 78 16 83 74 12 98 2 18 82 20 73 90 9 69 25 5 92 80 16 84 14 57 100 74 89 96 75 70 70 72

40 0 21 9 4 22 18 26 18

100

America's Choice 2000

Table 4.1

[continued)

I. D e m o c r a t s Date May May May May

State 16 19 20 23

June 3 June 6

Oregon Nevada* Alaska* Arkansas Idaho Kentucky Virginia* Alabama Montana New Jersey Nevv Mexico South Dakota

Vote Totals Gore 295,027 912 193,750 240 156,952 193,844 67,585 352,668 181,810

p/

Bradley 22

Gore Bradley 89 98 2

126 32,338

"8 63 72

33 15

26,812

92 79 95 77

20

II. Republicans Date Jan. 24 Feb. 1 Feb. 8 Feb. 19 Feb. 22 Feb. 26

Feb. 27 Feb. 29

March 7

State Iowa Caucus* New Hampshire Delaware South Carolina Michigan Arizona Guam* Virgin Islands* American Samoa* Puerto Rico Virginia Washington North Dakota* California Connecticut Georgia Maine Maryland Massachusetts Missouri New York Ohio Rhode Island Vermont Minnesota*

0/

Vote Totals Bush 35,384 72,330 15,250 300,014 547,935 107,545

87,375 350,584 284,053 6,865 1,637,472 82,871 430,480 47,669 206,425 158,208 275,366 355,958 764,726 13,170 28,702 11,531

McCain 4,053 115,606 7,638 234,543 646,345 181,123

4,903 291,487 191,101 1,717 944,997 87,270 179,046 41,379 132,618 320,617 167,831 306,443 495,653 21,745 48,870 3,209

Bush 41 30 51 53 43 60

91 53 58 16 60 46 67 51 56 32 58 51 57 36 36 63

McCain 5 48 25 42 51 36

5 44 39 19 35 49 28 44 36 65 35 44 37 60 61 17

William Crotty 101 Table 4.1

{continued)

II. Republicans Date March 10

March 14

March 21 April 4 May 2

May 9 Mav 16 May 19 May 23

May 25 June 6

State

Vote Totals

Bush Colorado 116,902 Utah 57,490 Wyoming Florida 525,852 Louisiana 86,038 Mississippi 101,042 Oklahoma 98,781 Tennessee 188,094 Texas 1,018,547 Illinois 496,646 Pennsylvania 469,926 Wisconsin 341,365 1,771 District of Columbia 330,095 Indiana North Carolina 253,485 Nebraska 145,176 84,947 West Virginia Oregon 286,629 Alaska* 1,571 Hawaii* 35,759 Arkansas Idaho 116,112 Kentucky 75,758 Nevada* Alabama 162,640 Montana 87,822 New Jersey 198,123 New Mexico 61,518 35,404 South Dakota

McCain 49,303 12,683 145,290 9,165 6,478 12,973 36,097 83,353 158,752 144,877 89,337 593 6,569 35,018 28,065 14,228

% Bush 65 63

McCain 27 14 20 9 6 10 15 7 22 23 18 24 19 11 15 13

412

73 84 88 79 77 87 67 73 70 73 81 79 78 79 S6 36

5,777

80 74 83

7

7,502 6,225

88 7H 83 83 78

10 14

10

*Caucus state Sonne: www.thegreenpapers.com

Bradley). For all practical purposes, this was the end of the Bradley challenge. He lost in the next scheduled contests in Delaware (Gore 50%, Bradley 40%) and even more decisively in Washington State (by a 4 to 1 margin). After doing poorly in the March 7 "Super Tuesday" primaries, he withdrew from the race two days later. He did not directly endorse Gore, waiting until a considerable time later. Bradley quickly faded from the scene. He spoke at the national convention but played little role in the fall general election campaign.

102 America's Choice 2000 John McCain chose not to contest in the Iowa caucus and concentrated his time and resources in New Hampshire. It was a wise choice. In a difficult race and with six candidates in the field, McCain ran strongly. He defeated Bush with 48 percent of the vote to the Texas governor's 30 percent. The victory earned McCain enormous media attention and established him as a credible alternative to Bush. He was hailed as a new superstar on the national scene, and the polls showed him to be the most formidable opponent Gore could face. xMore to the point, his victory brought in much-needed contributions and volunteers. Organization and sufficient financing to run competitive races in the state contests to follow was the McCain campaign's weakness. The Bush campaign exploited it mercilessly. The McCain strategy was to organize successive states as he went along, an approach dictated by his long-shot challenger status and the early and overwhelming financial resources and party support given Bush. It was an approach that had worked effectively for outsider Jimmy Carter in the 1976 Democratic primaries, but times had changed and the far superior resource advantages of die Bush campaign soon manifested their importance. Bush won the Delaware primary on February 2 with 100 percent of the vote in a state that again McCain chose not to contest. The key battle would occur in South Carolina, a southern state with a conservative Republican electorate. It turned out to be a bitter and personal fight. Bush had fundamentalist Christian groups behind him in addition to the state's former Republican governor and his organization, and he had the financial resources to run a well designed and relentless media campaign. McCain banked more on his personal appeal and the support of a large military vote responding to his war record. His campaign was generally not well organized and given the time limitations (the primary took place on February 19) the ad hoc approach used in New Hampshire was not enough to overcome the Bush camp's advantages. In contrast, for example, New Hampshire had taken months of campaigning. The South Carolina primary would prove to be the nastiest contest of the election year. Bush won with 53 percent to 42 percent of the primary vote. It was to prove decisive. McCain went on to contest in other states, for example winning his home state of Arizona (with 60% to Bush's 36%) and winning the more important contest on the same day in Michigan, 51 to 43 percent. A week later McCain lost the West Vir-

William Crotty 103 ginia and Washington State primaries and the North Dakota Republican caucus. When he did poorly on Super Tuesday, March 7 the race was effectively over and George W. Bush was the Republican Party's winner in all but name. While McCain was no longer a contender after the Super Tuesday primaries, he was hardly forgotten. Basically unknown prior to the primaries, he emerged as the most attractive candidate in either party. A year before the New Hampshire primary (February 1999) 2 out of 3 Americans polled did not know enough about McCain to have an opinion on him one way or another (as against only 6% who said the same about Governor Bush). After McCain's big win in New Hampshire, 80 percent of the voters going to the polls in November knew of him and of these, two-thirds had a favorable impression. His ratings and popularity were higher than those of Bush, Gore, or anyone else. He was the best-liked candidate and the strongest Republican challenger to Al Gore in the trial heats, leading the vice president in four such polls by an average margin of 22 percentage points (to Bush's 7 percent). McCain's problem was that he ran better with a national electorate than he did with Republican Party members. His inability to convert his national popularity into a Republican primary vote was his undoing. Even after winning the New Hampshire primary by 19 percentage points, among Republican Party identifiers Bush led McCain 56 percent to 34 percent. As large as that margin was (and it stayed firm at 57-33 entering the Super Tuesday contests), it was as close as McCain would come to Bush in support among Republicans. McCain did emerge as the top choice of a plurality of Republicans for the vice presidential nomination prior to the July national convention (leading Elizabeth Dole 23-22, with all others trailing well behind). The bitter South Carolina primary and his frosty relations with Bush— McCain's limited involvement at the convention was a subject of speculation— precluded him from a further major role in the campaign. There is one other factor of consequence here. The race between McCain and Bush appeared, from their campaign rhetoric, to focus on personal characteristics—leadership ability, experience, and likability. This was true enough, but among Republicans, while both candidates clearly did well, Bush was perceived as closer to the party's base on policy matters than McCain. While many factors contributed to the

104 America's Choice 2000 Table 4.2

Primary, Caucus, and National Convention Results

I. T h e Democrats

Popular Vote Al Gore Bill Bradley Uncommitted L. LaRouche Others Abstentions TOTAL

10,582,501 2,844,931 147,431 320,873 35,134

76% 20% 1% 2% 0%

13,920,870

100%

National Convention Floor Vote 4,328

76%

9 4,337

0% 100%

Totals from Primaries and G incuses 3,027.5 507.5 802

4,337

70% 12% 18%

100%

II. T h e Republi cans

Popular Vote George Bush John McCain Uncommitted Alan Keyes Gary Bauer Steve Forbes Orrin Hatch Others Abstention TOTAL

11,197,406 5,351,176 50,512 945,563 73,781 151,50 16,627 8,747

63% 30% 0% 5% 0% 1% 0% 0%

17,835,952

100%

National Convention Floor Vote 2,058 1

100% 0%

6

0%

1 2,066

0% 100%

Totals from Primaries and Caucuses 1,601 243 205 14 1 2

77% 12% 10% 1% 0% 0%

2,066

100%

"GOP electorate's group preference of Bush over McCain naturally . . . agreement with the candidates on the issues is the single most important item" (Gallup, March 2, 2000, p. 4). The voters who turnout in primaries are highly motivated and well informed compared to the general electorate. They are also unusually ideological, conservative for Republicans, liberal for Democrats. A successful candidate has to tap into their issue concerns and convince them that he or she will best represent them once in office. Bush managed to do this better than McCain. A candidate has to win the primaries before he or she can contest the general election. The two electorates and their concerns are quite different. Bush did go on to contest a handful of candidates with strongly conservative ideological agendas up until the national convention (the last, Alan Keyes, did not formally withdraw from the race until July 25).

William Crotty 105 These were little more than nuisances and Bush went on to a convincing victory in both the popular votes and national delegate support (Table 4.3).

On the Democratic side Al Gore enjoyed an even more impressive win over his one-time principal rival Bill Bradley. Table 4.3 Candidate Financing, Republican and Democratic Nomination Campaigns (as of July 31, 2000) Federal Matching Funds

Contributions

Contributions

from Individuals Minus Refunds

from PACS Minus Refunds

Contribution! • and Loans from the Candidate Minus Repayments

Other Loans MinusRepayments

Republicans SO

$91,331,951

$1,960,060

$0

$0

Democrats Gore $15,317,872 LaRouche $1,184,372

$33,871,206 $3,319,038

$0 $590

$0 $0

$0 So

$3,852,247 $314,135 $100,000 $0 16,502,244 $4,26,382

$6,651,221 $755,319 $1,319,434 $91,331,951 $37,190,244 $9,943,172

$1,000 $0 $0 $1,960,060 $590 $1,000

$43,000 $30,000 $40,000 $0 $0 $144,000

-$14,998 $60,000 $0 $0 $0 $45,002

$20,768,626

$138,465,367

$1,961,650

$144,000

$45,002

Withdrawn Candidates Alexander* $0 Bauer $4,632,803 $0 Dole SO Forbes Hatch So $0 Kasich $3,325,340 Keyes McCain $14,467,788 Quayle $2,087,748 Smith $0 $12,462,045 Bradley

$2,301,747 $7,553,317 $5,001,635 $5,752,150 $2,124,707 $1,702,668 $7,663,253 $28,143,613 $4,083,201 $1,522,128 $29,270,589

$80,383 $6,000 $118,292 $0 $0 $77,224 $10,100 $405,599 $43,200 $17,070 $0

$666,417 $0 $0 $42,330,000 $0 $0 ~$0 $0 $1,000 $0 $18,219

$0 -$63,249 $0 $0 $255,000 $0 S2 $2 $2 $0 SO

$233,584,375

$2,892,534

$43,160,371

$236,759

Bush

Other Buchanan Hagelin Nader Rep. Total Dem. Total Other Total Active Total

Grand

$57,744,350

Total * Activity through die end of 1999 only Source: Federal Election Commission Website- www.fec.gov/

106

America's Choice 2000

FINANCING THE PRENOMINATION RACES A look at the funding of the primary contests through the end of July shows why the 2000 election would emerge as the most expensive to date. George W. Bush had $93 milHon to use in his campaign, the most ever and a sum no other candidate in either party came close to equaling (Table 4.4). Bush turned down federal matching funds which could have limited what he could spend. Al Gore had $34 million plus $15 million from the federal matching funds for a total of just under $50 million. The principal contenders, Bradley and McCain, spent $47 and $42 million in losing causes. The also-rans with no chance of winning—Alan Keyes and Gary Bauer—spent between $11 and $12 million and Steve Forbes of Forbes magazine (and family) fortune fame, who had run a strong series of races on a platform advocating a "flat tax" as a newcomer to the political scene in the 1996 Republican primaries, had a $48 million campaign budget. Eighty-eight percent of his total came from personal funding. Even candidates who never made it to the first of the primaries, dropping out before any votes were cast (Elizabeth Dole, the former Secretary of Commerce; Lamar Alexander, former Secretary of Labor and Tennessee Governor and a candidate in 1996; Representative John Kasich; former vice president Dan Quayle; and Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire) spent between $1 million and $5 million. In all, Democratic spending (Gore and Bradley) surpassed the $90 million mark and Republican spending totaled $227.5 million.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS Even in a year in which both candidates moved to claim the center, the differences between the two parties and their nominees were clear for those who chose to see them. These were evident in, at the most basic level, the parties' electoral coalitions, the characteristics of the delegates who attended each of the national conventions, and the platforms representing what each party professed to stand for. The Democrats and Republicans constitute two different coalitions with different conceptions of government and different policy objectives. These forces were as clear and evident in the national conventions as they ever would

William Crotty

107

Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics and Policy Views of Delegates to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions as Compared to Voters (Percentages) I. Demographic Characteristics of Delegates, Party Supporters, and Voters All Voters

Democrats

Delegates Gender Men Women Race White Black Asian Hispanic

Party Supporters

Family Income Under $50,000 $50,000 to $75,000 Over $75,000 $75,000 to $100,000 $100,000 to $200,000

Delegates

Party Supporters

52 48

42 58

46 54

65 35

48 52

(,<)

74 1" 1 6

80 11 1 6

89 4 2 6

87 2 2 7

6 28

4 19

1

1 10

46 12

43 19

34 27

38 28

4

12

30

21

—

7

7

—

3

6 19

44 23

38 27

4 19

37 30

25 49

15 12

18 10

31 46

23 8

18 21

64 12

59 14

10 16

55 16

57 21

18 —

19 —

57 16

21 —

—

26

—

19 3 12

Ideology Very Liberal 14 Somewhat 20 Liberal Moderate 56 2 Somewhat Conservative Very Conservative 2 Education Non-High School Graduate .High School Graduate Some College College Graduate Post-Graduate

Republicans

25

•

—

108 America's Choice 2000 Table 4.4

(continued)

I. Demographic Characteristics of Delegates, Party Supporters, and Voters All Voters

Democrats D.'legates Over $200,000 N/A Net Worth Under $500,000 $500,000 to $1 million Over $1 million N/A

Party Supporters

Republicans Delegates

Party Supporters

11 6

— 7

— 8

15 17

— 9

61 17

— —

— —

35 -1!

— —

12 9

— —

— —

23 21

— —

47 31 8 5 7 12

48 28 2 3 17 24

53 25 1 4 14 29

63 27 2 4 1 27

63

31

17

14

4

Id

35

48

56

57

66

Religion Protestant CatholicJewish Other None Evangelical or Born-Again Christians Labor Union Members Gun Owner In I lousehold

27 2 4 1 37

II. Policy Views of Delegates, Party Supporters, and Voters Democrats All Voters Republicans Delegates Privately Invest Portion of Soeial Security Pro-Minority Progress Pro-Death Penalty Pro-Environment Government Do More In Solving National Problems

Party Supporters

Delegates

Party Supporters

23

44

53

89

61

83

59

51

29

44

20

46

51

6G

55

60 73

61 44

so 33

8 4

37 21

William Crotty 109 Table 4.4

{continued)

II. Policy Views of Deleg;Jtes, Party Supporters, and Voters Democrats All Voters Republicans Delegates Medicare Cover Prescription Drugs Anti-NRA (National Rifle Association) Pro-Abortion Pro-Safety Locks on Guns Pro-Protect Industry Through 'Hade Restrictions Limit Contributions to Campaigns Protect Environment Over Jobs Ban "Soft Money" In Campaigns Pro-School Vouchers

Party Supporters

Delegates

Party Supporters

58

39

37

34

36

82

44

33

12

20

71 94

48 91

36 84

14 48

IS 76

50

54

57

27

60

81

72

70

$9

71

63

72

64

32

57

47

68

64

24

60

10

41

47

71

53

Source: Adapted from "Convention Delegates: Who They Are . . . And How They Compare on Issues," New York Times, August 14, 2000, p. Al 7. Based on New York Times/CBS News Polls.

be. There were also differences in the public's perceptions of the two contenders and in their support for what they stood for. First, the coalitions of the two parties are different (Table 4.4). Democrats do signihcantly better among females, minorities, the less educated, lower income groups, Easterners, residents of urban areas, union members, and those whose political ideologies are moderate and liberal. Republicans attract as party identifiers more males, whites, the better educated, those with higher incomes, suburbanites, Protestants,

110

America's Choice 2000

married couples, and conservatives. These differences were reflected in the two parties' national conventions. Most delegates to both national conventions are upper status. This the two parties have in common. The delegates in both parties also tended to be well educated and usually economically well-off. While Bush attempted to emphasize the Republican Party's inclusiveness and diversity in its national convention, it is in these dimensions—and in their policy commitments—that the delegates to the two conventions differed the most significantly. "We have young people, people from other ethnic groups and gays and lesbians. White males, laborers, farmers—we run the gamut," this from a Democratic delegate. It is pretty much true: The diversity of the Democratic Convention {over 50% women; 18% African Americans, 8% Hispanic; 28% union members; 52% supporting civil unions and benefits for gay couples) is in contrast to the 88 percent white and die 61 percent males that attended the Republican National Convention. Bush intended his convention to emphasize a moderate appeal to middle America although there was a difference in emphasis between the party's conservative stand in its platform and the message the nominee wanted delivered to the American public. Few outside of Washington read either party's platforms. Consequently, the extent to which contrasting policy goals existed was not a factor of consequence in the campaign. Gore also wanted to appeal to the center, and had considerable success in framing his party's platform to meet his objectives. Like the Republican platform, it called for schools to be held to higher standards of accountability, stronger measures of student performance, better control of the nation's borders, more global trade, a stronger military, and the death penalty. In other respects, it was considerably different from the Republican party's policy pledges and more in line with traditional Democratic issue positions. These included its commitments to expanding Medicaid and extending health protection to children; greater spending on public schools; targeted tax cuts for middle class and lower income families; a restricted and modest missile defense capability; a social security system operating much as it does at present; support for union organizing; and the use of the budget surplus to pay dowrn the national debt. The platform was also pro-choice on abortion and pro-gay rights.

William Crotty 111 In contrast, the Republican platform favored across-the-board tax cuts; a school voucher program; the partial privatization of Social Security for investment purposes; an expensive and ambitious missile defense shield (compared by some to the "Star Wars" program of the Reagan presidency); and tax breaks rather than a direct investment in expanding health care benefits. Its platform opposed abortion and gay rights. "For all those clear disagreements, the platforms are alike in that they closely reflect the styles, broad visions and campaign agendas of the two candidates" (Dao, August 14, 2000, Al). Both Bush and Gore were successful in getting what they wanted and what they felt they needed to contest effectively in the fall campaign. In political terms, both candidates received 100 percent of the convention delegate votes. Their choices for running mates were well received. Gore's choice of Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut was approved by 60 percent of the public in an ABC poll and 83 percent said they would vote for a Jewish candidate for vice president (ABC News Poll, July 7, 2000). At the same time, those surveyed said the choice made no difference in whether they were likely to vote for Gore or not. Sixty-one percent of a national survey approved of Dick Cheney's choice by Bush but again 77 percent said it made no difference in whether they would vote for Bush or not (ABC] News Poll, July 26-29, 2000). On a different front, the American public knew little concerning the vice presidential candidates before their nominations; 53 percent had not heard of or had no opinion on Lieberman at the time he was chosen and 54 percent responded the same way concerning Cheney when he was selected.

COMING OUT OF THE NOMINATING CONVENTIONS Both presidential nominees received a post-convention "bounce." Bush was up from a virtual deadheat (45% to 43 %) pre-convention to a commanding 17 point lead (54%-37%) after the Republican National Convention in July. Gore came out of the Democratic Convention in August with a higher "likability" rating, one of his major objectives, and with an increase in support for his candidacy. A prime goal of the programming at the convention was to show Gore's family and his personal side and to introduce him to the American public in a warmer and more

112 America's Choice 2000 positive light. It worked. His pre-convention ratings increased by 8 points (or more depending on the poll) to at least a virtual standoff with Bush (47% to 46%). The closeness of the race at this point forecast its basic nature until election day (and well after). The thinking of the American electorate on the eve of the general election campaign is reflected in Table 4.5. In issue terms, it favored the positions taken by Bush on national defense, taxes, and family values. It favored Gore on health care, Social Security, and possibly on managing the economy (a slight edge). Educational policy was a wash (Table 4.5). Prospective voters saw real differences between Gore and Bush in terms of both the policies they supported and their personal qualities. In relation to the latter, Bush's greatest strength lay in his personal appeal and in the general belief he would get things done, an argument he repeatedly emphasized in his campaign. Gore appeared remote and something of an enigma to voters during much of the campaign. The personal qualities associated with him were not his strength. Among those polled, his strongest asset was his intelligence. The feeling that he better represented people, a major theme of his campaign, gave him no more than a slight edge (if that) over Bush.

CONCLUSION The primary season had two distinct phases. In the first, spirited challenges to the front-runners came from Bill Bradley on the Democratic side and John McCain on the Republican side. These were generally over after the first tier of primaries had been contested, although McCain emerged as the most popular and appealing candidate to come out of the election year. His visibility on the national scene and his role in the fall campaign were limited and after a strong initial run, he, like Bradley, played little role in what was to follow. The second stage of the primary in effect became part of the general election campaign. The two front-runners, their nominations secured, directed their attacks at each other and focused on developing the policy stands and campaign tactics that would carry them into the fall election. The national conventions in one sense confirmed the choices of the primary voters and legitimized their candidacies. In another and more politically relevant context, they brought together

William Crotty 113 Table 4.5 Support for Policy Positions and Personal Characteristics of Presidential Candidates {%) I. Issue Positions Not Military Defense Taxes Family Values Education Economy Social Security Health Care

Bush %

Gore 0/ fo

Equal (vol.) %

Neither (vol.) %

Sure %

56 45 43 40 38 37 33

24 34 35 41 41 4(1 46

4 4 12 6 6 6 5

3 4 2 2 3 3 3

12 13 8 10 12 14 13

Source: Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll, August 9-10, 2000 II. Perception of Differences Between the Candidates A. Are there real differences on the issues? Yes 68 No 25 No Opinion 7 Are there real differences between the candidates in relation to personal qualitites? Yes 66 No 27 No Opinion 7 Source: ABC News/Washington Part poil, June 8-11, 2000. III. Perceptions of Candidate Closer to People Like You More Honest and Trustworthv More Intelligent More Appealing Personality Strong Leader Gets Things Done More Knowledge and Experience Better Judgement and Character

Gore

Bush

44 38 37 37 37 58 43 38

41 41 34 51 52 06

37 42

Source: ABC News poll, June 8-11,2000; ABCNews/Wtsbmgtm Past pcMJune 8-U, 2000; Bloomberg News Poll conducted by Princeton Research Associates, May 25-Jutie 4, 2000.

the themes and political issues of the preceding months, refined them and set the stage for the general election. The difference in policies, the contrasting approaches of both camps, the groups supporting each party, and the closeness of the election contest were all evident at the time of the national conventions and were predictive of the race to come.

114

America's Choice 2000

REFERENCES ABC News Opinion Poll: www.abcnevvs.com/ Dao, James. "Democrats Ready Stage for Post-Clinton Era: Platform is Centrist like G.O.P.'s, but Differs in Details," New York Times, January 14, 2000, p. Al. ' The Gallup Poll Online: www.gallup.com/

FT VF,

The Curious and Close Presidential Campaign of 2000 James E. Campbell

A J A

1 HE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2 0 0 0 BETWEEN REPUBLICAN

Governor George W Bush of Texas and Democratic Vice President Al Gore was the closest presidential election in American history, and there have been a number of very close presidential contests.1 In the twentieth century, there was the controversial Kennedy-Nixon election of 1960, the surprising come-from-behind victory of Truman over Dewey in 1948, as well as Wilson's razor-thin reelection over Hughes in 1916, the post-Watergate squeeker of 1976 and the turbulent Vietnam-era election of 1968. The later half of the nineteenth century also had several exceedingly close presidential contests, including the disputed Hayes-Tilden race of 1876 and the Cleveland-Blaine "rum, romanism, and rebellion" race of 1884. Table 5.1 lists the closest presidential elections since 1828. They are ranked by the minimum vote change (as a percentage of the total national vote) that could have changed the election's electoral vote winner. In each of these elections, a change in one or more states of less than two-tenths of one percentof the national vote would have changed the election's result. The election of 2000 heads the list. A shift of fewer than a thousand votes in Florida, representing less than one-thousandth of one percent of votes cast nationwide, would have changed Florida's electoral votes and, thereby, the national electoral vote winner. Even beyond Florida, there were a half dozen other states decided by razor-thin margins. 115

Table 5.1

The Most Narrowly Decided Presidential Elections, 1 8 2 8 - 2 0 0 0 Minimum Vott ' Shift in States Necessary to Changethe Electoral Vote Winner

Election

Presidential Candidates

2000 1876 1884 1916 1976 1960 1948 1888 1844 1880 1848 1896 1968

Bush-Gore Hayes-Tilden Cleveland-Blaine Wilson-Hughes Carter-Ford Kennedy-Nixon Truman-Dcwey Harrison-Cleveland Polk-Clay Garfield-Hancock Taylor-Cass McKinley-Bryan Nixon-Humphrey

Electoral Vote Majority 2 1 19 12 29 50 77 33 33 30 18 48 79

Number of Votes 269 445 524 1,711 9,246 16,682 29,294 7,187 2,554 9,409 3,227 18,558 145,559

As a Percentage of the National Popular Vote 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.024 0.060 0.063 0.094 0.102 0.112 0.133 0.199

Percentage of the National Popular Two-Party Vote for the Winning Candidate 49.73 48.47 50.13 51.64 51.05 50.08 52.32 49.59 50.75 50.01 52.67 52.19 50.40

Note: Electioi is are ordered by the minimum percentage of national vote that have to have shifted to changc the election outcome. 1["he first candidate in each pair won the election. The number of electt >ral votes required to change the election winner are the r[umber of Electoral College votes that when added to the losing ma jor party candidate's electoral \ ore totals would have produced an electoral vote majority . T h e minimum vote shift is die number of votes that would have cihanged state winners of electot al votes. For example, a 445 vote shift from Hayes to Tiklen in South Carolina in 18'76 would have swung that state from Hsyes to Tilden and provided Till Jen with more than the one additional electoral vote that h e needed to win the election . Similarly, a shift of 9,409 votes from G arfield to Hancock in 1880 in fijur states would have shifted the electoral votes in those st ates to Hancock and provide •d him with at least the 30 votes that he:needed for an electoral majority r. The minimum popular vote shift as a percentage of the urtal national vote is in percer rtage points. FJach of these percentages a re less than one-fifth of one pe:rcentage point of the total national vote. For further detail s see table 8.2 in Campbell (2000, 172-3).

James E. Campbell 117 FOUR PHASES IN THE CAMPAIGN Voters traveled a winding road to get to this near dead-heat election result. In examining the polls conducted throughout the campaign, there were four rather distinct phases. These are summarized in Table 5.2. As one might expect in such a close election, two of these periods in the campaign favored Bush and two favored Gore. Although summer polls are notoriously volatile (Crespi 1988; Erikson and Wlezien 1998) and though poll leaders in the summer months are about as likely to lose as to win the election (Campbell 2000, 16), the 2000 polls conducted through the time of the Republican convention in August consistently indicated that Bush held a modest lead over Gore. This was somewhat surprising, in that Gore had an easier time than Bush in capturing his party's nomination. Gore's challenge from former senator Bill Bradley was not very damaging to Gore's candidacy. In contrast, Senator John McCain defeated Bush in several states and Table 5.2

Four Phases of Campaign 2000

Phase of Campaign

Candidate Advantaged in Phase

Poll Movement

Poll Leader

Typical Size of Lead

Possible Reason for Phase

Pre-Convention through the Republican Convention

Bush

Stable for Bush

Bush Lead

About 55%

Party unity and enthusiasm

Democratic Convention

Gore

Sharp Shift to Gore

Gore Lead

52-54% range

Convention bump for the trailing candidate

October and The Debate;

Bush

Trend to Bush

Bush Lead

52-54% range

Pressures of competition Debates affected Bush's image Diffused Democratic issues

The Close

Gore

Slight Trend to Gore

Dead-heat

Around 50%

Return to partisanship Split of late deciders

118 America's Choice 2000 forced Bush to appeal to more conservative elements of the party in order to fend off the challenge. Nevertheless, Bush emerged from the nomination contest with a lead over Gore. The second phase of the campaign occurred around the national conventions in mid-August. Despite a well-orchestrated (some might say overly managed) Republican convention, Gore surged in the polls and held a slight lead over Bush through September and into the first week of October.2 The series of three presidential and one vice-presidential debates in October made up the third phase in the campaign. Despite widespread speculation that the debates would favor Gore, Bush regained a slight lead. The final phase of the campaign, the closing week or ten days, saw Bush's lead dwindle. On election day, the polls were divided. Some claimed that Bush held a narrow lead with likely voters while others had Gore with an edge. On election day all of the major polls had the race as too close to call. They were right. Even two weeks after the election, chin-deep in court cases and punch ballot chads in Florida, it remained unclear who the next president would be. With all of the twists and turns in this campaign, how much of a difference did the net effects of the campaign have on the election's results? In a close election like 2000, anything can make the difference between winning and losing, and the campaign was certainly crucial. However, the net impact of the campaign in shifting votes one way or the other need not be great in order to have an impact. That, indeed, was the case in this campaign. If the campaign is defined as the period in July before the conventions until election day, the campaign shifted about three and a half percent of the vote toward Gore. Defining the campaign more narrowly as taking place from after the conventions until election day, it only shifted about one percentage point of the vote in favor of Bush.3 In short, despite the intensity of die campaign and its many ups and downs, the net effect on the vote was marginal. Nevertheless, in an election this close even marginal effects can prove decisive.

THE CONTEXT OF THE CAMPAIGN Why did the 2000 campaign end in a near dead-heat? What explains the four phases in the campaign? Why did Btish take an early lead, only

James E. Campbell 119 to lose it to Gore after the Democratic convention? Why did Bush regain a lead with voters after the debates? Why did Gore close this lead in the final days of the campaign? Presidential campaigns are often discussed as though they were a game. In one respect this trivializes campaigns. Unlike a mere game, presidential elections determine who serves as president, and this makes an important difference to how the nation is governed, and what public policies are adopted and this affects peoples' lives in many important ways. However, from another perspective, viewing the campaign as a game is apt. An election is a contest for votes and, like a card game, the outcome depends on what cards each candidate is dealt and how each candidate plays them: the context of the campaign and the decisions of the candidates' campaigns. Like a card game with good players, the course of the campaign is usually determined more by the context of the campaign (the cards dealt) than by the manueverings and decisions made in the campaign (the play of the cards), but both matter, and this year crucial decisions were made during the campaign that may have made a significant difference to the results. The Four

Contexts

Several aspects of the context of the 2000 campaign indicated that it would be a close election, one strongly favored Gore and the Democrats, and another favored Bush and the Republicans. First, a close campaign might have been expected since there was no incumbent running. As table 5.3 indicates, presidential elections tend to be closer when there is no incumbent in the race. Incumbents galvanize the public's verdict. Two out of every five elections with an incumbent in the race have resulted in landslides, usually in the incumbents favor (e.g., Johnson in 1964, Nixon in 1972, and Reagan in 1984) but sometimes against (e.g., Hoover's loss in 1932). If neither presidential candidate has the many advantages of incumbency, if they stand as equals before the electorate, the election tends to be closer. The odds of a near dead-heat election increase nearly five times if there is no incumbent president running (37% compared to 8%). The second context driving the campaign toward a narrow margin was partisanship. Despite claims to the contrary and an unwillingness often to admit to it openly, die American electorate is highly partisan. Most American voters are partisans (about 90 percent) and most partisans

120

America's Choice 2000

Table 5.3

Incumbency and Election Margins, 1828-2000

Size of Popular Vote for the Winning Candidate No Incumbent (Tk'o-party Vote Percentage) in the Race

Incumbent was in the Race

Near Dead-Heats (under 50% to 51.5%)

7 (37%)

2 (8%)

Competitive (51.6% to 57.5%)

8 (42%)

13 (52%)

Landslides (57.6% to 65.2%)

4 (21%)

10 (40%)

Total

19

25

Note: In "Near Dead-Heat" elections die victorious presidential candidate received a popular vote percentage below 51.5 percent of the popular two-party vote. In "Competitive" elections the winning presidential vote was between 51.6 and 57.5 percent of the two-party vote. In "Landslide" elections the winning candidate received more than 57.6 percent of die national two-party popular vote. The landslide elections without an incumbent in the race were 1836 (Van Buren versus Harrison), 1856 (Buchanan versus Fremont and Fillmore), 1920 (Harding over Cox) and 1928 (Hoover over Smith). The later two cases were both in a dominant Republican era. The two near dead-heats with incumbents were 1888 (the rematch of I larrison over Cleveland) and 1976 (Carter over Ford). Incumbents include presidents who succeeded to the office upon the death or resignation of a president. The non-incumbent races were 1868, 1876, 1880, 1884, 1896, 1908,1920, 1928,1952, 1960,1968, 1988, and 2000.

(again about 90 percent) vote for their parties' presidential candidate. The campaign is an important mechanism for rallying partisans. After sometimes divisive nomination battles, the general election campaign sets intraparty differences in perspective and redirects attention to the larger differences that exist between the parties (Campbell 2001). Partisanship in the 2000 election steered the election toward a close finish because the number of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate are now more evenly balanced than they were for many years. Table 5.4 presents the distribution of party identifiers in groups of four elections from 1952 to 1996. As the table indicates, from 1952 to 1980 there were many more Democratic party identifiers than Republican party identifiers among the voting public. Since 1984, this Democratic party advantage has been cut dramatically. Whereas Democrats had outnumbered Republicans by more than 15 percentage points, their lead has eroded to barely three points in recent years. With nearly as

James E. Campbell 121 Table 5.4 The Partisanship of American Voters, 1952-1996 Mean Pen•entage of Reported Iiters who are: Elections 1952-1964 1968-1980 1984-1996

Democrats

Independents

54.6 53.1 47.8

6.9 9.1 7.4

Republicans 38.5 37.8 44.9

Party Gap +16.1 + 15.3 +2.9

Sonne: Adapted from "Bible A. 5 of Campbell (2000, 216). Note: The percentages are computed from corrected National Election Study data. The data have been corrected for unrepresentativeness as reflected in discrepancies between the aggregate actual and the reported national presidential vote. Based on the findings of Keith et. al. (1992), reported independents who report a leaning toward one of the parties are counted as partisans of that parry. The "Party Gap" is the percentage of voters who are Democrats minus die percentage who are Republicans.

many Republicans as Democrats among voters, all things being equal, neither candidate has an audience of voters either more hostile or more receptive than the other's. While the open seat status of the election and the balance of partisanship were forces for a close election, the public's evaluation of the Clinton administration's record and the state of the economy strongly favored Vice President Gore. To a significant degree, voters are thought to react to the performance of the current administration, to vote retrospectively (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Erikson 1989). The electorate holds the presidential party accountable for the state of the nation and the economy. When things are going well, voters usually reward the in-party's candidates. When things are going poorly, voters normally punish the in-party's candidates. It is not that voters are necessarily voting their personal pocketbooks, but the economy and national conditions more generally affect the public's receptivity to the in-party's message. If conditions are good and the public is happy, they may give the in-party the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if conditions are not so good, voters may be looking for reasons to make a change. By any measure, things were going quite well in 2000. This should have augured well for the Gore candidacy. Table 5.5 displays several indicators of national well-being and general evaluations of the in-party in the late spring of the last three presidential election years. The indicators are both general as well as more specifically economic and objective as well as subjective. According to each of the four indicators in

122

America's Choice 2000

Table 5.5 National Conditions Leading into the Presidential Campaign, 1992-2000 Elections Pre-Campaign Indicators ofNational Conditions and Reactions to the In-Party Average Economic Growth Rate in Previous Two Years (GDP through first quarter of the election year) Rate Economic Conditions as Excellent or Good (April or May) Satisfied with "the way things are going in the United States" (April or May) Approval of Presidential Job Performance (May)

1992 .5%

1996 3.1%

2000 4.6%

12%

30%

66%

20%

37%

59%

39%

55%

57%

Sources: The Gallup Poll, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Congressional Quarterly Weeklv Reports. The public opinion data are from surveys conducted in April or May of die election year. The economic growth rate in the average annual growth rate in the GDP from the first quarter of the second year of the president's term to the first quarter of the fourth year of the term.

table 5.5, conditions in 1996 were better than they were in 1992 and conditions in 2000 were better still. The percent of respondents in a Gallup survey willing to say the economy was good or excellent more than doubled from 1992 to 1996 and more than doubled again in 2000. The increases in those indicating satisfaction with "the way things are going" were of about the same order. Many other indicators suggested the same. There was no question as to how most voters would answer the question: "Are you better off today than you were four or eight years ago?" Even presidential approval throughout 2000 remained at a high level. Despite the various scandals involving the administration and President Clinton's impeachment for misdeeds in the Lewinsky matter, the president's job approval rating in May stood at 57 percent. Normally, approval ratings over 50 percent are a good sign that the public is positively disposed toward the in-party.4 Given that the public's concerns about Clinton's personal character flawrs may have dampened his approval numbers and this level of approval can only be read as a general public endorsement of the administration's tenure. Of course, as a would-be successor to the incumbent rather than the incumbent himself, Gore might not be accorded the full credit that Clinton would have received for the state of the nation. A race with an

James E. Campbell 123 incumbent necessarily takes on a more retrospective focus than one without the incumbent.1 Nevertheless, as the candidate of the in-party and as the sitting vice president who had demonstrated great loyalty to the president, it could be reasonably expected that national conditions favored Gore and that some significant portion of the public's positive views about the state of the nation could be converted by the Gore campaign into votes. While the strong economy and the public's recognition of it established very favorable conditions for the Gore campaign, the Bush campaign benefitted from another condition: internal party unity and enthusiasm. The unity and enthusiasm of a party for its nominee are crucial in the general election campaign. If a candidate has his party behind him at the outset of the general election campaign, he can concentrate on reaching out to independents and opposition's disgruntled partisans. On the other hand, a candidate who enters the campaign worried about energizing his base is in trouble. The Republican advantage in party unity was certainly not readily apparent from the way in which the two candidates won their parties' nominations. On the Democratic side, if Gore had to have a challenge at all, the challenge from former New Jersey senator Bill Bradley was the kind to have. Both the strength and direction of Bradley's challenge were nearly perfect for Gore. Bradley failed to win a single primary or caucus, but mounted a challenge that was credible enough to maintain national media attention on Gore's primary victories. It never hurts to be seen as a winner, particularly for a vice president seeking to come out from the shadows of a popular and controversial president. By the same token, the contest for the Democratic nomination was not so bitterly fought that fences could not be reasonably mended after the nomination was settled. Moreover, the juxtaposition of Bradley's generally more liberal message within the more liberal party and Gore's more tempered or less ambitious positions made Gore seem more moderately positioned to appeal to the more centrist general electorate. The road to the Republican nomination for Texas Governor George W. Bush was not so smooth. Although lacking national political experience, Bush tapped into the political network of his father, former President George Bush, and assembled an unprecedentedly huge campaign war chest and a lengthy list of endorsements from prominent Republicans. After dispensing with an initially crowded field of contenders such

124 America's Choice 2000 as Elizabeth Dole, Steve Forbes, Dan Quayle, Pat Buchanan, AJan Keyes, and several others, Bush confronted a very serious challenge from Arizona Senator John McCain. McCain's reformist appeal to more moderately conservative Republicans, independents, and "Reagan Democrats" took hold with a significant portion of the party and with the media. McCain's challenge to Bush was both too strong and from the wrong direction to help Bush's fall candidacy. McCain defeated the much better-financed Bush in seven early primaries. Originally positioned with a more centrist campaign theme of "compassionate conservatism," Bush publicly moved to the right to beat back the McCain challenge and engaged in some campaign activities that might have hampered his fall campaign. Bush's widely covered appearance at the ultra-conservative Bob Jones University, charges of "under-the-radar" mudslinging phone campaigns, and scurrilous "independent expenditure" negative ads against McCain threatened to make the job of internal party fence-mending far more difficult than it might have been. In short, the Republican nomination contest seemed to leave Bush with the more difficult task of reuniting and energizing a more bitterly divided party.6 Ironically, though Gore had little difficulty in obtaining his nomination and Bush suffered several setbacks on the way to his, Bush emerged from the nomination process with the more unified party. Based on fourteen Gallup polls conducted in May through July, there was a significantly larger percentage of Republicans who said that they would vote for their party's candidate (91 percent) than Democrats who said that they would vote for their party's standard-bearer (85 percent).7 This was the basis for Bush's lead through the summer months and the Republican convention in early August. The difference in party unity was also evident in the vibrancy of the third-parties. After determining that he could not win the Republican Party's nomination, conservative commentator Pat Buchanan bolted the party to seek the Reform Party's nomination. After much wrangling within that party, Buchanan received the nomination. There was also significant third-party activity on the liberal side of the spectrum in the form of the Green Party. Their candidate was long-time consumer advocate Ralph Nader. It was generally' believed that Buchanan's can-

James E. Campbell 125 didacy would take more votes away from Bush than from Gore and that Nader's candidacy would have the opposite effect. While neither candidacy exhibited great vote drawing power, certainly nothing on the order of Perot's 1992 and 1996 showings, the Nader candidacy regularly drew several times the support of the Buchanan candidacy.8 As the campaign began and as it would prove throughout the following months, Nader's candidacy was a bigger problem for Gore than Buchanan's was for Bush. Why did Bush have the more united party entering the fall campaign, despite having the rougher nomination contest? The reason would seem to be that Republicans were more determined than Democrats to win this election. After being out of the White House for eight years and having lost the previous two elections partly because of division within their own ranks, Republicans were eager to set aside differences among themselves and unite behind a Republican candidate who could defeat the Democrats in November. The commitment to a Republican general election victory was a key reason why so many Republicans contributed so much so early to the Bush campaign and why the oftentimes conflicting wings of the party kept any differences they might harbor to themselves. It is often said that "nothing succeeds like success" and though the success embodied in incumbency is normally an asset in seeking the presidency, a party's lengthy tenure office can also be a liability from the standpoint of preserving party unity and enthusiasm. When it comes to holding a party together for the general election campaign, it may be the case that nothing succeeds like failure and nothing fails like success. Having lost the two previous presidential elections Republicans were tired of beating each other up and then suffering through another four years of a Democrat in the White House. For their part, many Democrats became used to a Democratic president and were disillusioned that they were not seeing more liberal policies coming out of the administration and the Gore campaign. Lacking the perspective that comes from the opposition having recently held the office, some Democrats convinced themselves that there was no appreciable difference between Gore and Bush. Unlike Bush, Gore had to work at igniting some enthusiasm in his base. This affected his campaign's message and ultimately made his job of reaching out to centrist voters more difficult.

126

America's Choice 2000

THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN The

Conventions

Although the Democratic and Republican standard-bearers were known for several months before their August conventions, in many respects the national conventions marked the kick-off" of the fall campaigns. As nominations have become settled matters well before conventions in most years, the purpose of conventions have become less one of ending the nomination campaign and more one of helping the party's candidate set forth the campaign's message for why voters should vote for him (or her) in the general election. Despite receiving less attention from the media and the public, both parties took advantage of the conventions as campaign rallies for their candidates and this was reflected in the polls. Like most candidates in previous elections, both George Bush and Al Gore received convention bumps in their poll standings after their conventions. Table 5.6 presents the division of the Gallup preference polls before and after the Democratic and Republican national conventions. As is custom, the out party, the Republicans in 2000, held their convention first They met in Philadelphia during the first week of August to nominate George W. Bush and his vice presidential choice, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney of Wyoming. The Democrats nominated Al Gore and his vice presidential pick Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, the first Jewish candidate on a national ticket, when they met two weeks later in Los Angeles. Both vice presidential candidates were well regarded political veterans. Conventions are often disparaged for no longer being deliberative nor surprising. However, this misses a larger point. Conventions as the beginning of the fall campaign often reveal important information about the nature of the campaigns to come over the following months. Are the candidates emphasizing their record and encouraging voters to make retrospective judgments or are they emphasizing promises for future policies and encouraging voters to make prospective judgements? Are they emphasizing broad, consensus appeals or more narrowly targeted partisan appeals? Both Bush and Gore quite clearly set forth in their acceptance speeches their basic campaign appeals of why voters should vote for them. Both candidates emphasized the future

James E. Campbell Table 5.6

127

The Convention Bumps Poll Standing (Percentage ofTwo-Pa/ty Support)

Time in Campaign Before the Convention After the Convention Change: Convention Bump Averages from 1964 to 2000 for: All Conventions Conventions of Frontrunners Conventions of Trailing Candidates

Bush (Frontnmner)

Gore (Trailing Candidate)

56.2 59.3 +3.2

41.5 50.5 +9.1

+6.7 +4.7 +8.0

Note; The above figures and computations are based on Gallup polls. The frontruimer or trailing candidate designations are based on the candidates' poll standings prior to their parties' national conventions.

(prospective judgments) rather than the past, but Bush's message reached out from his base while Gore's was directed more clearly at his party's base of support. Bush's acceptance speech provided voters with both reasons to vote for him and reasons not to vote for Gore. Citingone issue after another, from education to defense to strengthening social security, Bush ended his critique of the Clinton-Gore administration with the refrain: "They have had their chance. They have not led. We will." In essence, if problems remain, why reelect the crowd that has had eight years to solve them and have not delivered. Near the close of his address he summed up the positive case for his election: "Big government is not the answer, but the alternative to bureaucracy is not indifference. It is to put conservative values and conservative ideas into the thick of the tight for justice and opportunity. This is what I mean by compassionate conservatism." Taking a page from Clinton's cooptation of Republican programs, rather than simply ignoring Democratic proposals on issues from education to prescription drug benefits, Bush offered conservative alternatives, increasing his appeal to centrist voters. In the days before the convention, the Gallup poll indicated that about 56 percent of those indicating a preference for either Gore or Bush favored Bush. After a carefully orchestrated convention to sendoff the Bush campaign, support rose slightly to about 59 percent. Given

128 America's Choice 2000 that Republicans were generally "on board" for the Bush campaign prior to the convention and that Bush was the frontrurmer, this small convention bump was about what might be expected. While seemingly as placid as the earlier Republican convention, the Democratic convention marked a crucial turning point in the campaign of 2000. In his speech accepting the party's nomination, AI Gore made the basis of his fall campaign for the presidency clear. Rather than making the foundation of his message continuing the peace and prosperity of the outgoing Clinton-Gore administration, Gore offered up a populist appeal to working families. The message was a decidedly prospective, change-oriented, class politics appeal to his party's base. Gore told the delegates in the convention hall the message he was to repeat throughout the campaign: This election is not an award for past performance. I'm not asking you to vote for me on the basis of the economy we have. Tonight I ask for your support on the basis of the better, fairer, more prosperous America we can build together. 'Together, let's make sure that our prosperity enriches not just thefew,but all working families. Let's invest in health care, education, a secure retirement, and middle-class tax cuts. . . . To all the families who have to struggle to afford the right education and the skyrocketing costs of prescription drugs, I want you to know this: T've taken on the powerful forces, and as president, I'll stand up to them and I'll stand up for you. One would hardly recognize this address and the subsequent campaign following the same theme as coming from a candidate who had served two terms as the vice president to an administration with high approval ratings in a country in which two-thirds rated the economy as excellent or good. Candidates usually are quick to claim credit for good news on their watch, and while a vice president might not be given full credit, he certainly would be accorded a good measure. Yet, Gore was not claiming credit, or certainly not making much of a claim. To establish his candidacy in his own right, to energize his base and, perhaps above all, to avoid the negatives of the Clinton scandals that wotdd inevitably accompany a focus on the accomplishments of the past administration, the Gore campaign had made the strategically controversial decision to downplay the record and instead to run a prospective campaign. Supporters would long question the wisdom of this decision.

James E. Campbell 129 Although this decision may have cost Gore a significant number of votes in the end, the immediate effect was positive. It rallied Democrats to the Gore campaign. Before the Democratic convention, Gore lagged in the polls, the preferred candidate of only 40 percent of respondents (to 56 for Bush). Post-convention polls indicated that Gore had gained nine points and closed the gap with Bush. As table 5.6 indicates, this bigger convention bump was to be expected for Gore as the candidate trailing in the polls. Trailing candidates are often running behind their opponent because of problems of solidifying support from their party base. Because conventions help to reunite a party, they are a bigger benefit to the trailing candidate who needs this help and, in this respect, Gore made good use of his convention. In the next several weeks, the second phase of the campaign, Gore would take a modest lead over Bush. The average poll in September and early October had Gore leading Bush by 52 to 48 among likely voters for the major party candidates. xMuch of this change seemed due to Gore's message and its energizing impact on Democrats, but glitches in the Bush campaign also reinforced the effect. At one rally in the midwest, an open microphone caught Bush making a derogatory remark to Cheney about a New York Times reporter who he had spotted in the crowd. Other Bush gaffes, such as repeatedly mispronouncing "subliminal," when his campaign was charged with airing ads that associated the Gore campaign with the word "rats" (a graphic that focused on the end of the word "bureaucrats") led critics to question whether Bush was intelligent enough to be president. The

Debates

Each presidential campaign since 1976 has had at least one debate between the presidential candidates. In recent elections, despite haggling over the number and format in each year, the norm has become a series of two or three presidential and one vice presidential debate. In the 2000 election, three presidential and one vice presidential debates were held with varying formats. It was widely believed prior to these debates that they would be to the advantage of Vice President Gore. He had greater experience in national debates (participating in both the 1992 and 1996 vice-presidential debates as well as an informal debate on the Larry King show with Ross Perot over the NAFTA) and had

130

America's Choice 2000

been judged as doing well in them. However, the history of debates also suggested that they did not change many votes, that the most likely viewers of the debates were citizens who had already made up their minds on how they would vote. To the extent that polls had changed after debates in past elections, these changes were largely temporary and had settled back to their original levels even before the next debate was held (Campbell 2000, 56). This year the debates may have had some lasting impact. The first debate in 2000 employed a traditional format with each of the candidates appearing behind podiums and addressing questions from the moderator, Jim Lehrer of PBS. The debate was quite heated, but allowed each candidate to make his case: Gore for a moderately liberal agenda with an emphasis on preserving Social Security, enhancing various domestic programs, and paying down the national debt and Bush for his moderately conservative positions of allowing some private investment of Social Security taxes and cutting taxes across the board. When Gallup asked registered voters after the debate which candidate "did the better job in the debate," 48 percent said Gore and 41 percent said Bush (see table 5.7). However this was not the full story on the political implications of the debate. In the preference polls, Bush gained ground on Gore after the debate. While voters do not necessarily move toward the "winner" of the debate, debates can affect their preferences by serving as a reality check for the images of the candidates that have been built up during the campaign. Although Gore's quite audible sighing while Bush was speaking and several apparent exaggerations by Gore received the most attention at the time, perhaps the biggest impact of the debate was to dispel impressions that Bush was not smart enough to be president. When voters were asked whether their opinion of each candidate was more or less favorable after watching the debate, more said that their opinion of Bush had improved.9 The second debate, using a more informal format with the candidates seated at the same table, also seemed to favor Bush. When Gallup asked registered voters who performed better in this debate, 49 percent named Bush and only 36 percent named Gore. After the debate, Bush gained a couple of more points on Gore in the preference polls. The third debate used yet a third format, a town hall meeting format in which voters posed questions to the candidates. With each can-

James E. Campbell 131 Table 5.7

Effects of the Presidential Debates

Debute First Debate Second Debate Third Debate Overall Shift

Likely Voter Evaluation of Debate Performance (Gore% minus Bush %) +7 -13 +2

Preference Poll Shift from Before to After Debate (two-party division for Gore) -4.8 -2.3 -1.6 -7.3

Note: The debate performance was based on responses to Gallup's question "Regardless of which candidate you happen to support, who do you think did the better job in the debate?" Plus values indicate that more thought Gore did the better job and minus values indicate that more thought Bush did the better job. The preference poll ("If the election were held today, who would you vote for?") shifts were based on averaging Gallup poll and Zogby poll percentages and taking the differences of the three-day tracking polls conducted before and after each debate. As in debates in past years, there was some drift back to previous support levels by the time of the next debate (1.1 percent back to Gore by die time of the second debate and .3 percent back to Gore by the time of the third debate). These drift backs account for the difference between the sum of apparent individual debate effects and the net overall change from before the first debate until after the diird.

didate having his good and bad moments, registered voters judged this debate a draw. In the end, over the course of the three debates (and stellar performances by both Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman in the vice presidential debate), taking place between October 3 and 17, the race changed from Gore having about a 54 to 46 lead over Bush to Bush having about a 53 to 47 percent lead over Gore. In keeping with the campaign message outlined in Gore's convention speech, the discussion of issues during the debates was largely prospective: about the differences in the candidates' plans for future tax cuts, social security, education, prescription drugs, increased defense spending, a patient's bill of rights, and other issues. Vice President Gore did not mention President Clinton even once in any of the three debates.10

The Closing Weeks of the Campaign In the last weeks of the campaign Gore closed the slight lead that Bush had developed from the debates. It remains unclear what the impact on voters was, if any, of the revelation on the Thursday before the election that Bush had been arrested in Maine for drunken driving twenty-four years earlier. He had admitted early in the nomination campaign in very

132 America's Choice 2000 general terms to past indiscretions, but the arrest was not good news for the Bush camp in the final hours of the race. In the last few days before the election some polls had Bush still with a slight lead (Gallup and the Washington Post) and others had Gore with a similarly slim lead (Zogby and CBS News). Even without the drunkdriving revelation, this competitive effect of the campaign was to be expected (Campbell and Wink 1990, Bartels 1992). Late deciding voters as a group usually divide in favor of their party (and more Democrats than Republicans appeared to be in the undecided category of most polls) and more evenly (Campbell 2000, 154-60 and 2001). Table 5.8 presents a late October Newsweek poll demonstrating just how evenly divided voters were about the candidates and the basis for those views. Voters saw both Gore and Bush as having different strengths and weaknesses both as candidates and on the issues. Voters tended to see Gore as more competent and caring, but Bush as more honest and believable. Both were seen as equally likeable and when it came to the issues, voters were just as likely to say that Bush represented their views well as to say that Gore reflected their positions. Gore was seen as better at handling some issues (prescription drugs for seniors, protecting social security, and extending access to health care to more citizens), Bush was seen as better at handling others (national defense and upholding moral values), and they were seen as equally capable on others (education and taxes).

AS CLOSE AS IT GETS How did this election end up so close? Two aspects of the context for this campaign, the lack of an incumbent in the race and the balance of partisanship, were forces for a close election. However, there were other factors, most notably the economy and the public's overall positive assessment of the Clinton administration (approval ratings of nearly 60 percent), that strongly favored the election of Al Gore. In fact, based on these indications, all of the major models for forecasting presidential elections indicated between July and Labor Day that Gore would win the election. Most of these forecasts predicted that Gore would win with between 53 and 55 percent of the two-party vote.11 The election was much closer than expected because of the cam-

James E. Campbell 133 Table 5.8

Voter Reactions to the Candidates Percent agreeing that phrase describe* the candidate

Phrase Cores Strengths "Is intelligent and well informed" "Cares about people like you" Bush's Strengths "Is honest and ethical" "Says what he believes, not just what people want to hear" Equal Strengths "Is personally likeable" "lias strong leadership qualities" "Shares your views on most political issues"

Gore

Bush

82 60

69 53

52 49

63 58

67 65 50

71 65 50

Source: Nnvr^eek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates between October 18 and 20.

paigns that the candidates ran, particularly the Gore campaign. With the public recognizing that the economy wras strong and with high approval ratings for Clinton, one would have expected Al Gore to run a retrospective, consensus-oriented, stay-the-course campaign. From a strategic standpoint, the expected principal message of the Gore campaign should have emphasized the economic progress that was made under the Clinton-Gore administration. In essence: "if it's not broke, don't fix it." Instead, Gore's message was prospective and confrontational (e.g., charges against Bush's "risky tax scheme for the wealthiest one percent"). This mistake was three-fold. First, and most obviously, Gore all but discarded the political benefits he might have derived from the healthy economy. He may have received some residual benefits from some voters linking him to the good economy on their own, but he failed to help other voters focus on this connection. Second, to the extent that he steered clear of emphasizing the economy to avoid association with President Clinton and his scandals, this was a mistake. While many voters clearly disapproved of Clinton personally, the President's high approval numbers suggested that the package of Clinton and his administration's performance was judged positively by more than a majority

134

America's Choice 2000

of voters. Gore had a considerable advantage over Bush if he had made the campaign a referendum on the Clinton administration. The third way in which the Gore message was in error was that he was at a disadvantage to Bush in making the campaign prospectively oriented. A prospective campaign is by its nature a campaign about problems that have not yet been solved. As a member of the administration that had been in office for eight years, voters might well ask whyGore and the Democrats have not solved these problems already and since they have not solved them, maybe the other side should be given a chance to do so. Bush's campaign also deserves credit here. While some commentators dismissed "compassionate conservatism" as an empty slogan, Bush's conservative spin in many policy areas (from Social Security to education) defused the traditional advantage that Democrats had held on these issues. Finally, Bush held an edge over Gore because ideological orientations become more pertinent in prospective campaigns and self-described conservatives more supportive of Bush continue to outnumber self-described liberals who were more supportive of Gore. Recalling the card game analogy, a major reason that we reached essentially a tie game was because one player (Gore) was dealt a better hand but played it poorly, and the other (Bush) was dealt a weaker hand but did a better job playing it. Two wreeks after the cards have been played (as this is being written), it is still unknown whether the game was ultimately decided fairly or whedier one of the players had a few cards (or Florida ballots) hidden up his sleeve.

NOTES 1. Arguably, the 1824 election ofJohn Quincy Adams versus Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and William Crawford was closer in that no candidate received an electoral vote majority, though the practice of popular voting for presidential electors was still taking hold in that election. In 1828 the total number of citizens voting increased by more than five and one half times the 1824 vote count. 2. Although poll leaders sometimes change in the early stages of the campaign year, one candidate typically holds the poll lead from Labor Day to election day. Since 1952, the poll leader after Labor Day has changed only during

James E. Campbell 135 four election years: 1960, 1976, 1980, and 2000. Except for the 1980 election, in which Carter briefly took a lead over Reagan after their late September debate, each of these elections was extremely close. 3. The estimates of campaign effects are based on the difference between the preference polls and the vote. Pre-convention preferences are calculated as the average of the Gallup and Zogby polls (the division of two-party preferences) conducted in July prior to the first national convention. The average of these nine polls indicated that Gore was behind with 46.4 percent of the two-party division, 3.9 points less than the eventual vote. This is a slightly smaller than normal change over this stretch of a campaign. In elections from 1948 to 1996, the average change over this period of a campaign was more than five percentage points. The average of the eleven Gallup and Zogby postconvention polls (from August 20 to September 8) had Gore ahead with 51.2 percent of the two-party division, .9 points more than his eventual vote. From 1948 to 1996, the average change over this period has been about four percentage points (Campbell 2000, 76). 4. Studies finding a strong positive association between presidential approval and the vote include Sigelman (1979), Lewis-Beck and Rice (1982 and 1984), and Brody and Sigelman (1983). Presidential approval ratings are an element of a number of presidential forecasting models (see, the Abramowitz, llolbrook, Lewis-Beck and Tien, and WIezien and Erikson models in Campbell and Garand 2000). 5. A bivariate regression usingjuly presidential approval ratings to explain the in-party vote finds a much stronger fit (adjusted R? = .72 compared to .64) when only races with incumbents are examined. A model with an approval and an interaction of approval and whether an incumbent was running indicated that the interaction was statistically significant (p < .05) and that the effect of approval on the vote increased by about a third wrhen an incumbent was personally running. 6. Because of the nomination campaign and the more conservative appeal to the Christian Right in order to defeat McCain in southern states (most notably, South Carolina), Bush did not appear especially well positioned to reach out to moderates in the fall campaign. However, the front-end loading of the nomination process may have again been fortuitous for Bush. Because of the length of time between securing the nomination and the conventions, he was able to shift back to his mainstream "compassionate conservatism" message well before the conventions. 7. The median party loyalty of Republicans in these polls was 90.5 percent while the median party loyalty of Democrats was 84.5 percent. Although Republicans have traditionally exhibited greater loyalty than Democrats in

136

America's Choice 2000

their presidential voting, this has not been the case in the last few elections. In 1992 and 1996, depending on how third-party votes are treated, the loyalty of Democratic partisans equalled or exceeded that of Republicans (Campbell 2000, 34). 8. In fifteen Gallup and Zogby preference polls conducted in June, July, and August, the average support for Ralph Nader was 4.6 percent of the vote and the average support for Pat Buchanan was 2.0 percent of the vote. 9. Most registered voters said that their opinion of each candidate had "not changed much" as a result of the debate: 55 percent said they did not change their opinion of Gore and 52 percent said theyr remained unchanged about Bush. However, 34 percent said that they had become more positive about Bush and 27 percent said that they had become more positive toward Gore. The remainder said that they had become less favorable about the candidate: 18 percent said this of Gore and 14 percent said this of Bush. 10. Gore put a huge distance between himself and the president he had loyally served with for eight years. The absence of Clinton from the campaign and the absence of even references to Clinton in the Gore campaign was extreme. As evidence of this, the day- before the election the New York Times ran a frontpage story whose third headline read: "Vice President Invokes Clinton Name During 19-1 lour Swing" (Seelye 2000). 11. Seven of these forecasts were presented at the 2000 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The forecasting models by Abramowitz, Campbell, Holbrook, Lewis-Beck and Tien, Lockerbie, Norpoth, and Wlezian and Erikson are presented in Campbell and Garand (2000). The Norpoth model used in 2000 is a variation of the one he presented in a the Campbell and Garand book.

REFERENCES Bartels, Larry M. 1992. "The Impact of Electioneering in the United States." In Electioneering: A Comparative Study ofContinuity and Change, David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 244-277. Brody, Richard and Lee Sigelman. 1983. "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections: An Update and Extension," Public Opinion Quarterly, 47:325-328. Campbell, James E. 2001. "Presidential Election Campaigns and Partisanship." In American Political Parties: Decline or Resurgence?, Jeffrey Cohen, Richard Fleisher, and Paul Kantor (eds.) Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. . 2000. The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote. College Station, TX: Texas A&iM University Press.

James E. Campbell

137

Campbell, James E., Lynna L. Cheny, and Kenneth A. Wink. 1992. "The Convention Bump," American Politics Quarterly 20:287-307. Campbell, James E. and James C. Garand (eds.) 2000. Before the Vote: Forecasting American National Elections. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Campbell, James E. and Kenneth A. Wink. 1990. "Trial-Heat Forecasts of the Presidential Vote," American Politics Quarterly 18:251-269. Crespi, Irving. 1988. Pre-Eleition Polling: Sources of Accuracy and Error. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Erikson, Robert S. 1989. "Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote," American Political Science Review 83:567-573. Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. 1998. "The Timeline of Political Campaigns," Paper delivered at the Annual Aleeting of the American Political Science Association. Fair, Ray C. 1988. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update," Political Behavior 10:168-179. Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Holbrook, Thomas M. 1996. Do Campaigns Matter? Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond F,. Wolfinger. 1992. The Myth ofthe Independent Voter. Berkeley: University of California Press. Key, V.O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom W. Rice. 1984. "Forecasting Presidential Ejections: A Comparison of Naive Models," Political Behavior 6: 9-21. . 1982. "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Vote," Public Opinion Quarterly, 46: 534-537. Seelye, Katherine Q. 2000. "Gore Rallies Base: Vice President Invokes Clinton Name During 19-1 lour Swing," The New York Times (November 6, 2000, p. A1 andA20). Sigelman, Lee. 1979. "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly 43:532-34.

SIX

The Congressional Races: Continuing Battleground for the Parties John S. Jackson III

1* ROM THE BEGINNING, THE 2 0 0 0 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

had the potential to be a part of an historic epoch in American politics. That is, 2000 could prove to be one of those few "critical elections" that shape American politics for generations to come (Key, 1955, 3-18). While no single election can stand alone as the only factor in the electoral transformation of our politics, one election can be the culmination of a trend set by a series of elections where a new majority is formed and where a dominant electoral paradigm is set into place. The last clear example of a critical election was Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential victory in 1932, which was coupled with the Democratic party's capturing of the Congress. The Democratic majority, started in 1932, and confirmed by the results of the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1934 and 1936, became the "New Deal Coalition" which dominated .American electoral politics into the 1970s on the presidential side and which did not break up in the Congress until 1994, when the Republicans took control of both houses of the Congress. Since Kevin Phillips published his highly influential book, the Emerging Republican Majority in 1969, many observers have predicted that a new majority would be born, ushering in a new RepublicanConservative majority coalition (Phillips, 1969). The quest for a new majority and die dynamics of assembling such a new majority has occupied 138

John S. Jackson 111 139 the research efforts of a large contingent of scholars over the past three decades (Burnham, 1970). The academic arguments have flowed back and forth over: (a) the causes of new electoral coalitions, i.e. "party realignment" and (b) the criteria by wrhich such a newr party realignment can be judged. In essence, though, when a party puts together a new governing coalition and is able to control the majority in both houses of Congress and the presidency, one can confidently announce that something fundamental has changed about American electoral politics. In the 1970s and 1980s the Republican party came to dominate Presidential politics with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972, Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 and George Bush in 1988. This era of Republican success was broken only by the single term of President Jimmy Carter in 1977-1980. Indeed many commentators began to question whether the Republicans had an insurmountable "lock on the Electoral College", i.e. a group of states, forming more than the 270 votes necessary for an Electoral College majority, which historically and dependably voted for the Republican candidate no matter who he might be. Others observed that while the Republicans were rather routinely winning the presidency during the era, the Democrats were just as routinely winning the majority in one, or both, houses of Congress. In addition the public opinion polls showed some decline in Democratic identifiers, and an increase in the Independents, but no substantial movement toward a Republican majority among the mass voters. Some thought that the Watergate scandal of 1972-74 artificially interrupted the inevitable march to a dominant Republican majority in that era. Those who believed that the march to a new paradigm with a Republican-Conservative majority were further convinced when the Republicans won the presidency handily in 1980 and 1984 and took control of the majority in the Senate 1980-1986. Of course, in spite of Ronald Reagan's popularity and the significant advantages of incumbency, the Republicans lost their majority in the Senate in the 1986 elections. The Democrats continued business as usual by winning the House in 1986-88-90 and 1992 although their margin declined somewhat when the Democrats lost eight seats in the House and one senator, despite Bill Clinton's victory in 1992. But those who thought a Consei-vative-Republican realignment to be inevitable did not reckon with Bill Clinton who beat the incumbent, George Bush, in 1992. For the first time since 1976 the Democrats found a

140 America's Choice 2000 champion who appeared able to lead the Democratic party to a new era of electoral vitality. For the first time since Jimmy Carter's single term of 1977-1981 the Democrats controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress. Thus, in 1993, "Unified Government", i.e. control of the Congress and the presidency replaced what had seemingly become the norm, i.e. "Divided Government" where one party controls the Congress and the other party controls the presidency (Mayhew, 1991). Of course, Unified Government under Bill Clinton and the Democrats only lasted from the beginning of 1993 through 1994. During that two year-interval, the Clinton Administration accomplished a lot in the legislative arena, including major portions of Clinton's tax increase and budget deficit reduction plan, the "Motor Voter" voter registration plan, and the Family Leave Act. However, their one spectacular failure was on the health care plan of 1994 championed by the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton. That plan and other actions of the Clinton administration became the rallying cry for the Republicans who were running for Congress in 1994 under the leadership of Newt Gingrich. With Gingrich's leadership, most of the Republican candidates signed on to the Republican's master plan termed "the Contract with America." Gingrich and his allies said, in effect, "Elect us and here is what we will pledge to do immediately in the new Congress." The plan included a laundry list of both procedural and substantive changes that Gingrich and the Republicans promised to act on within 100 days of the opening of the new Congress (Gingrich, 1994). In 1994 the Republicans effectively nationalized the congressional elections. The scope of their victory was stunning to the Democrats. The Republicans picked up 53 seats in the House, 8 in the Senate, and controlled 30 governorships wrhen the 1994 elections were over. In early 1995 Bill Clinton and his allies were forced to argue that the President was "still relevant" to the governing of the nation. The congressional Republicans, particularly under Gingrich's leadership in the House, acted quickly and decisively on the items promised in the contract and they were able to pass several of the most popular and high profile proposals. Gingrich and the congressional Republicans were riding high and heady talk was heard again about the potential for a new long term Conservative-Republican majority being formed. Once again the Republicans underestimated Bill Clinton. Begin-

John S. Jackson 111 141 ning with the April 19, 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, Clinton started reasserting himself as a political leader and reestablishing the relevance of the President as a co-equal partner in our separation of powers system. He was able to reinforce the message of a positive role for an activist central government as he orchestrated the budget battles that resulted in two partial shutdowns of the Federal Government in November and December 1995. By the spring of 1996, partisan competition and intense negotiations between the President and the Republican majority in the House and the Senate were the norm. While some important legislation moved, the by-products of Divided Government—partisan bickering, finger pointing, and blame laying—dominated Washington politics in the prelude to the 1996 national elections. Both parties planned and executed their legislative agendas with a wary eye toward achieving partisan advantage in the upcoming elections. The 1996 national elections have been aptly described as a status quo election (McWilliams, 1997). Bill Clinton defeated Bob Dole handily. The Republican party maintained its control of the House and Senate majority. The Democrats did pick up nine seats in the House and lost two seats in the Senate in 1996. This left the House at 226 Republicans and 206 Democrats and the Senate at 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. (Greenwald and Kalb, November 9, 1996; Greenblatt and Wells, November 9, 1996). The Republicans continued their clear dominance of the states by controlling 32 of the 50 governor's offices. The nation's 99 legislative bodies at the state level remained almost equally divided between the Republicans and the Democrats. While there is little evidence to support the notion that the mass voters set out to create the partisan "checks and balances" of Divided Government, when asked directly about this result they tended to approve of it (N.Y. Times/CBS News, October 20, 1996). In the 1998 elections the Democrats gained five seats in the House and the Senate stayed the same. As a result, there was tremendous criticism of Speaker Newt Gingrich, and much of it came from within the Republican party. 1998 was one of the rare off year elections when the party that controlled the White House did not lose seats in the House. One of the most venerable rules or "laws" of American politics had been the recurring pattern of off-year election losses for the presidential party; however, the law was broken in 1998. The Democrats actually

142 America's Choice 2000 Table 6.1 Turnover In House And Senate Seats In Mid-term Elections 1946-1998 Net Seat Losses by the President's Party: Year

House

Senate

1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998

-55 -29 -18 -48 _4 -47 -12 -48 -15 -26 -5 -8 -53 +5

-12 -6 -1 -15 +3 -4 +2 -5 -3 +1 -8 -1 -8 0

So/irce: Jeff Trandahl. 1999. Statistics of the Congressional Election of November ?, 199S. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 53; Also: Harold W. Stanley and Richard Niemi. 2000. Vital Statistics on American Politics 1999-2000. Washington, D.C. CQ Press. 36-37.

picked up five seats in the House and maintained the status quo in the Senate. The Democrats effectively made Gingrich, and his allies, the target of their congressional campaigns in 1998, and the strategy was effective in many races. Most critics even within the Republican party blamed Gingrich who had become something of a lightning rod and a liability to the Republicans. In 1998, the Democrats had also succeeded in nationalizing the election by effectively demonizing Gingrich and his allies. On November 6, 1998, Gingrich announced his resignation from the Speaker's position and from the House in the wake of the Republicans' election failure and in the wake of much other criticism of Gingrich's behavior and leadership. In effect, the Gingrich phase of the Republicans' electoral realignment came to a halt on that date. Other, and probably more lasting facets of the Republican Revolution continued. When the 1998 off-year elections confirmed the partisan status quo in Washington, out of his eight years in office Bill Clinton was consigned to a six-year fate of facing a hostile Congress.

John S. Jackson HI 143 Probably the most damaging to the Clinton presidency was Congress' authorization of the independent counsel, and the subsequent incessant investigations the independent counsel launched. Under Kenneth Starr this investigation of the long ago land deal in Arkansas known as "Whitewater" became the platform for a continuous investigation of the Clinton White House. That investigation also became die instrument for the Republican pursuit of die Monica Lewinsky scandal, which almost became the undoing of Bill Clinton as President. Congresses' power to investigate is a formidable tool in its arsenal of power vis-a-vis the President. It is especially threatening to the president when the Congress is under control of his opposition. In 1998, the partisan fighting only increased with the vote of the House (on December 19, 1998) to impeach the president over the Monica Lewinsky scandal. In January and February of 1999, the hard fought and bitter trial in the Senate left Bill Clinton's presidency and reputation severely damaged; however, he survived on a narrow vote and was left in office to finish out his term. The level of partisan bickering and rancor were perhaps among the highest and most divisive in Bill Clinton's last three years in office (1998-2000). Clinton was able to create a bipartisan coalition on some occasions, e.g. the granting of normal trade relations with China, which required Republican help. On other issues he made modest incremental progress, but on the large agenda items, e.g. Social Security reform, Medicare coverage of drugs for senior citizens, or national health care, Clinton was stymied by the Republican majority. All of this, of course, served as the historic backdrop for the 2000 Congressional and Presidential elections. George W. Bush and his supporters had a simple solution to the problems of partisan rancor and legislative stalemate over a number of important public policy questions. Bush promised, "Elect me, and I will work together with the Congress, just like I did in Texas to create a bipartisan approach to our problems." He further excoriated Gore for his "failed leadership" over the past eight years and for the Clinton-Gore administration's alleged failures to deal with such national agenda items as the needs of public education, the demand to "fix" Social Security and strengthen the military. Of course Bush's appeal conveniently overlooked the fact that the Republicans had controlled the majority in Congress for six of the eight years of the Clinton-Gore Administration. It also failed to note that the Congress is considerably more complicated, diverse, and

144 America's Choice 2000 independent than the Texas legislature. Nevertheless, Bush's appeal seemed to resonate well with the voters and at the least it did not cause him any problems on the campaign trail as he asserted the failed leadership theme repeatedly. One of the overt appeals that Bush did not make often wras to return a Republican majority in both houses of Congress. Nevertheless, this potential was clearly on the minds of the Bush supporters and the Republican Party's leadership. The Republican National Committee (RNC) and its auxiliary groups spent millions of dollars on local congressional races and Senate races. These funds were spent as a part of a well-coordinated national campaign to go into the local congressional district races, and state by state in the U.S. Senate races to try to elect Republicans in all the open seats and in all the marginal districts. If the Republicans could succeed in holding their congressional majority while simultaneously winning the White House, it would be the first time since Eisenhower's first two years (1953-54) that they had a Unified Government under their control. Often overlooked in this calculus is the U.S. Supreme Court, the third and supposedly "non-political" branch of the government. Little noticed in the popular press was the fact that the Republicans alreadyhad control of the Supreme Court, since only Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer were Clinton appointees and Democrats. All the rest were Republican appointees. George W. Bush asserted on the campaign stump repeatedly that he would use Justices Clarence Thomas (appointed by George Bush) and Antonin Scalia (appointed by Ronald Reagan) as his models. Since both were arch conservatives and both were clearly in favor of reversing Roe vs. Wade, this promise marked a major policy difference between Gore and Bush; however, outside the most politically active classes, these differences seemed not to matter a lot in helping people reach decisions. If the Bush campaign won, and if the Republicans controlled the Congress, this would represent the first time since the 1920s that all three branches of the government were under the majority control of the Republican Party. The scorecard as the campaign unfolded rather clearly indicated the general prospects for both parties in their quest to control the majority in Congress. The authoritative pre-election report from Congressional Quarterly rated 344 House seats as "safe" for either the Republicans or the Democrats (CQ Weekly Report, September 23, 2000, 218b and July 29, 2000, 1866-1869). Thus only 91 House seats nation-

John S. Jackson HI 145 wide were rated by CQ as having much potential for change. Of that 91, a total of 50 wrere Republican held seats and 40 Democratic held seats were up for grabs. Of that 50 seat total where the Republicans had seats at risk, there wrere 2 seats rated by CQ as "leaning Democratic", 24 "Republican favored", 12 "leaning Republican" and 12 as "No Clear Favorite." Of the 41 Democratic seats at risk, CQ rated 24 as "Democratic favored", 9 as "leans Democratic", 6 as "No Clear Favorite", 1 as "leans Republican" and 1 as "Republican Favored." If you take these figures as an accurate prognostication, the Democrats could theoretically pick up the net of 6 seats needed to gain the House majority. There were only 34 open seats and 25 of these were Republican and only 9 were Democrats. Based on these figures the Democrats had early hopes of recapturing the House, and more unlikely the Senate, in 2000. In addition, it is notable that the Republicans narrow 13 seat House majority (223-210 with 2 Independents) was the closest margin since the Republicans last controlled the House in 1953-54 by 221:213:1) The prospects for the Democrats to capture the Senate in 2000 going into the fall campaign season seemed more remote. The initial count was 54 to 46 in favor of the Republicans (after the death of Republican Paul Coverdale of Georgia and his replacement by former governor Zell Miller, a Democrat). This meant a shift of 4 seats would produce a tie and 5 seats would produce a Democratic majority of 51:49. The Republicans had 19 seats at risk since this was the first reelection challenge for the 1994 Republican take-over class while the Democrats had only 14 seats at risk. CQ rated 5 Democratic seats as particularly vulnerable and 10-11 Republican seats as vulnerable. There were only 5 open seats total and each of those was rated as competitive (Florida, New York, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Nevada). Of those 5 open seats, four were Democratic seats and the Republicans were mounting a serious challenge on all five open seats. Of the Democratic incumbents running for re-election, only Senator Chuck Robb of Virginia, challenged by former Governor George Allen seemed to be highly vulnerable. The Republicans had several incumbents rated by CQ to be "vulnerable" including Senators Abraham of Michigan, Grams of Minnesota, Santorum of Pennsylvania, Gorton of Washington, and Roth of Delaware. The potential for the Republicans to control the Congress

146

America's Choice 2000

appeared to be very good going into the last week of the campaign. First, the two most important assets are incumbency and fundraising, and the Republicans had the advantage in both. The Republicans already controlled the Congress. All they had to do was to maintain the status quo as they did in 1996 and 1998. The Republican candidates most of the time were able to raise and spend more money than their Democratic counterparts. The RNC was quite adept at directing funds strategically into the targeted races where they could do the most good (Herrnson, 1988 and 1995). The Republicans did not need a national campaign theme such as the ones sounded in the Contract with America. They only needed a national campaign management and logistical plan and the substance could be traditional Republican appeals like lowered taxes. In addition, the polls late in the race began to show that more likely voters said they would choose a Republican candidate over a Democratic candidate for Congress. Thus, the prospects for the Republicans became increasingly bright as election eve approached in 2000. Early in the campaign the Democrats could make a plausible case that they could take over the House and perhaps the Senate in 2000. This, coupled with a Gore victory, would give them control of a Unified Government; however, as the campaign unfolded, almost nobody was talking about such a Democratic sweep in 2000. Indeed it would have taken a very high turnout, what the literature calls a "High Stimulus Election" and a substantial victory by Gore to propel a Democratic sweep of both branches in 2000 (Campbell, 1966, 41). By early October it became evident that the fall election would be close on the Presidential side, so the potential of Gore carrying into office a Democratic congressional majority on his coattails seemed particularly remote. Of course, Gore could win a narrow presidential victor}' and the GOP could prevail in the House and the Senate by a narrow margin. This was a particularly plausible scenario early in the fall campaign. This split-ticket result would produce another era of Divided Government, comparable to Bill Clinton's last six years. There is no evidence that the voters would consciously try to create such a Divided Government result; however, the voters typically endorse Divided Government when confronted with it explicitly in a public opinion poll. On the other hand, if the Republicans could only maintain their majority control of Congress, a President Bush would not be forced into work-

John S. Jackson 111 147 ing with the minority Democrats in Congress on Republican favored legislation, if party unity could be maintained. That fact, too, was not touted openly during die presidential campaign, but it was a clearly possible, even probable outcome enthusiastically sought by the Republicans.

THE ELECTION RESULTS SCENARIOS In summary, there were several scenarios one could offer as possible outcomes for the 2000 election using the "Unified Government" vs. Divided Government" rubric. They are listed here in descending order of probability: 1. The Republicans continue control of the House and Senate and George W. Bush wins the Presidency. Result: Unihed Government under the Republicans. 2. The Republicans continue control of the House and Senate and Al Gore wins a narrow victory for the Presidency. Result: Continued Divided Government. 3. The Democrats take control of the House and Senate and Al Gore wans the Presidency. Result: Unified Government under the Democrats. 4. The Democrats take control of the House and Senate and George W. Bush wins a narrow victory for the Presidency. Result: Continued Divided Government. Tible 6.2 shows the historic context for Unified versus Divided Government for the period between 1946 and 2000. Here one can see that there were more instances (measured in two-year increments) and more total years of Divided Government than Uni fied Government (by 32 years total to 18 years total) Thus, from this table it is clear that Divided Government was more nearly the norm in the United States between the end of World War II and the close of the 20th century. Whether the voters, by their discrete decisions, would continue the Divided Government tradition or unify the government under the control of one party was a key question in the first election of the 21 st Century. Again, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the mass

Table 6.2

Divided vs. Unified Government in the United States since the End of World War II 1946-48 Truman

Divided Unified

D

1949-51 Truman

1952-54Eisenbaiser

1961-68 1955-60JFK/ Eisenhower U1J

1969-76 NixonFord

1977-80 Carter

G

M

D

•

1981-88 Reagan

•

1989-92 Bush

1993-94 Clinton

D —i

1995-00 Clinton

John S. Jackson 111 149 voters think much about these macro-political scenarios and then set out to split their tickets or vote straight party tickets to consciously achieve these outcomes. It could be argued that Unified Government is the overall objective of the strong partisans who vote only for their party's candidates. Unified Government also provides the potential for Party Government, or the Responsible Parties model to develop, which has been long debated and advocated in political science circles. But, the American separation of powers system will always provide a powerful impediment to the full-blown development of this model (APSA Report, 1950; White and Mileur, 1992). Unified Government is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Responsible Party government. By the same token it could be argued that Divided Government is the objective of the Split Ticket voters. But, for most voters the objectives entail voting for their favorite candidate for President, the Senate, or the House based on candidate image grounds, party identification, or on the issues that capture their attention, and they are probably not too concerned about the overall macro-political outcomes. Nevertheless, die results with the attendant policy and governmental implications are the same. When it is all over either the Republicans or the Democrats will control the government or they will share power. The Republicans at the end of the 2000 campaign seemed confident that they would win the Presidency and continue their majority in both Houses. The polls had consistently showed Bush ahead, by a very small margin among those rated, "most likely to vote." Interestingly enough, though, the polls tended to show Gore ahead among registered voters. Thus, the filter questions and weighting schemes used by the various pollsters, as well as a possible late surge by Gore, must account for the difference between the rather constant prediction of a Bush popular vote victory and the subsequent popular vote victory by Gore in 2000. The polls also indicated a small Republican advantage on partisan vote for Congress among most likely voters. The Democrats banked on increasing turnout among their party's faithful and a better than expected performance by Gore. In some respects both were right as the nation saw the closest division in Congress in many years and the most closely divided and disputed Presidential contest since the disputed and divided results produced in 1876 and 1888. Indeed those two ancient elections from well over 100 years ago are the closest analogies to the controversial and delayed presidential outcome in 2000.

150 America's Choice 2000 WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY IN 2000 The congressional campaign results almost got lost in the swirl of confusion that surrounded the results of the Presidential race. This is understandable since the Presidential race results were historic for the closeness of the race and the amount of controversy the disputed vote counts engendered. In addition, the President, while perhaps weakened by post-New Deal twentieth-century standards, is still the mainspring that drives much of the political agenda and discourse. When the presidential race is effectively too close call two weeks after the election ends, that story overshadowed the congressional race outcomes. In any contest that pits the President versus Congress for attention in Washington and in the news media, the President is likely to win. There was much talk of a President elected "without a mandate" and crippled by the close and contested results. Nevertheless, the President sets the political agenda and controls the vast apparatus of the executive branch of the Federal government and staffs the judicial branch. The stakes were enormous and the contestants understood that fact. So while the nation's eyes were focused on Florida and the recounts there, the results from the congressional races rolled in and were provided as almost an afterthought to the story of the 2000 election outcome. What those congressional election results demonstrated rather clearly was a status quo election producing only marginal changes in the composition of the House and Senate. Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent, and the thousands of hours of electronic airtime devoted to the congressional candidates, when it was all over the Republicans were in control of the House and Senate—just as they had been before. In fact, this was the third consecutive election for the Republicans to win since their 1994 takeover of the majority. Indeed this was the first time since the decade of the 1920s that the Republican Party had controlled a majority in both houses for four consecutive election cycles. It is possible that this is the harbinger of a real regime shift. The U.S. House of Representatives, along with the vote for President, are our best indicators of the tides of public opinion. One-third of the Senate is also up for reelection every two years, so over a threeelection cycle, the Senate, too can theoretically be transformed. If a party establishes control over the Congress in one election, then holds it for three more elections, as the Republicans have done between 1994

John S. Jackson HI 151 and 2000, a significant electoral shift can be announced. The Republicans have not garnered anywhere near a majority of party identifiers among the mass public and there they still hover around one-third of the party identifiers. The Democrats are now only slightly above that mark in party identifiers. This lack of success by both parties in building and expanding the loyalties of the party's mass base may be an important indicator of party decline or decomposition. Certainly the thesis that the parties are much weaker is often advanced and it is evident in the psychological attachment data. However, on the matter of behavioral indicators of partisanship, i.e. voting for the party's congressional candidates, the Republicans have done quite well in the 1994 to 2000 era. Given the rather weak hold party identification now has on most Americans, the behavioral indicators may be more significant. Whether a long-term partisan realignment proves to have occurred in the 1994-2000 era, or whether it proves to be more transitory, remains to be seen. What is unmistakable, however, is that the Republicans had the votes to organize the 107th Congress in January of 2001 and Republican Dennis Hastert of Illinois would be the Speaker of the House. Likewise, the Republicans had the votes to organize the Senate and Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi most likely would continue to be the Senate Majority Leader. In those important respects, then, the 2000 Congressional battles, hard-fought though they were, and closely divided at the end as they were in many cases, still produced a largely status quo election in the Congress. The particulars are a bit more complex and interesting. The Republicans entered the November 7, 2000 elections with a 223 to 210 (and two independents) majority in the House. When it was over the Republicans had a 220 to 211 majority for a loss of three seats (with two independents and 2 races undecided). The Republicans lost some ground in the Senate but they held operating control of me Senate when it was all over. The Democrats picked up Republican held Senate seats in Minnesota, Michigan, Delaware, Florida and Wishington. The Republicans took Democrat held seats by beating the incumbent, Robb, in Virginia and taking an open seat in Nevada. The Republicans had a 54 to 46 majority in the Senate before the November 7, 2000 election and they saw that margin reduced by a net of 4 seats for a new 50-50-seat tie. This amounted to a tie; however, given that the vice president votes to break a tie it was a controlling majority. Most importantly it allowed the

152 America's Choice 2000 Republicans to organize the Senate, dominate the committee assignments, to elect the leadership and to control the agenda. All of these prerequisites are the important accouterments of power that count in the long run. In the wake of such a narrow victory in the congressional elections, there was much talk about potential for legislative "gridlock" and the need to build bipartisanship in order to prevail in the legislative process. Tendencies toward both cooperation and conflict will undoubtedly be manifest in the 107th Congress. Also, it is important to note that neither party has anywhere near the 60 votes in the Senate required to limit debate or override a presidential veto. So the majority party leadership will certainly face legislative constraints. Nevertheless, on the issues that really matter to the members of Congress, and their staffs, the interest groups who lobby them, the people who fund the campaigns, and the media who cover them, the Republicans in the House and Senate continued to hold the reins of power and to enjoy significant advantages over their Democratic counterparts. Incumbency and superior campaign financing ultimately prevailed in 2000 and they will almost always prevail in the American congressional elections with the exception of the extremely rare cases of real electoral regime change marked by the election of 1994. In an era of trench warfare, bitterly fought campaigns in the marginal districts, the mobilization of vast amounts of campaign money, and media attention focused on the incumbents, the Republican party was in an excellent position to prevail in both houses of Congress. They mobilized their superior resources well and prevailed overall in spite of 3 vote losses in the House and Senate. The Future The election of 2002 is just around the corner after the post-mortems on the presidential and congressional races of 2000 are complete. People will be choosing sides, seeking candidates for the open and marginal seats and probing the public opinion polls to discern their electoral prospects for another round in 2002. That will be, of course, an off-year election. Traditionally, the party which controls the White House loses some seats in the off-year elections, although that did not happen to the Democrats in 1998. Ordinarily one would expect significant losses for the Republicans in both the House and Senate in 2002.

John S. Jackson HI 153 Because of their superior advantages in organization and tremendous edge in campaign finances, the Republicans should be in relatively good shape to protect their incumbents in 2002. However, the Republicans will also be defending a very narrow majority in both the House and Senate, so there is little margin for slippage for the Republicans. A lot will depend on the legislative record in 2001 and 2002 and the public's perception of the Congress as an institution at that time and how well it has addressed the nation's agenda. The fate of the majority in the Congress will also be especially dependent on the economy and the evaluations of how well it is doing. A lot also depends on the ways both parties are seen as working together with or against the President. In essence there are two patterns of executive-legislative relations that confront a new president and Congress upon taking office. The first is the deep partisan conflict pattern and the second is the bipartisan coalition-building pattern. When the Congress is closely divided and the president faces a hostile majority, and when the president appears to have been elected with no "coat tails" and with little room to claim a "mandate" from the election, it is particularly important to conceptualize these two approaches. Of course any presidential administration will adopt some combination of both depending on the issue and the political conditions, but a general legislative stance and expectation will prevail. The president can rely on his own partisans to push through his legislative agenda, and if he has a clear partisan majority— or a working majority—he can prevail. Alternatively, he can seek to build rather permanent alliances within the other party (e.g. "the conservative coalition") or seek to pick off allies from the other party on an ad hoc basis as the issues and potential coalitions change. There are examples of both patterns in recent history.

The Deep Partisan Conflict Pattern Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Congress of 1932-1936 were probably the best example of a president with an electoral mandate leading the Congress and the country with a vigorous program to tackle the nation's economic ills. Roosevelt had enough Democrats in Congress to prevail even in face of determined opposition from the Republicans and he often did in the New Deal era. This pattern was not repeated again until Lyndon Johnson was elected in a landslide in 1964. Johnson helped

154

America's Choice 2000

carry into an office a sympathetic Democratic Congress that helped him to pass much of his legislative program that came to be called "The Great Society" which emphasized domestic legislation such as Medicare and Medicaid and aid to the urban areas through the "Model Cities" and "War on Poverty" programs. However, in the wake of Vietnam and domestic conflict, Johnson lost his effective control of Congress in the 1966 off-year elections. These are the only two instances in recent American history where a president enjoyed both an electoral "mandate" replete with presidential coat tails, and a wrorking majority of his party controlling both houses of Congress that would allow him to develop and pass a coherent national policy agenda. By contrast Bill Clinton often faced very unified Republican opposition to his legislative proposals and often had to scramble to keep his Democratic congressional colleagues on board. This was partially the result of his plurality electoral victory in 1992 and it also resulted from a very determined Republican opposition. Bill Clinton's 1993 tax and budget plan did not receive a single vote from Republicans in the House or Senate. They warned that the plan would cause the nation to go into a deep economic decline and that millions of jobs would be lost. Of course, just the opposite happened, but the Republican opposition to many Clinton proposals remained very strong during much of his administration. Indeed the deeply partisan nature of the Federal government is seen clearly in the data on "Party Unity" scores, which have increased dramatically recently. "Party Unity" scores are calculated from the number of times a majority of one party votes against a majority of the other party. Figure 6.1 indicates the party unity record for the past several decades. Quoting the prominent congressional scholar Roger Davidson, CQ Almanac, characterized the recent era as follows: "In fact, Davidson argues, Congress is in the midst of the most partisan era since Reconstruction at the end of the Civil War. 'There is a very deep chasm between the parries'." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1998, B-6). During the eight years of die Clinton administration executivelegislative relations have on occasion been marked by the two different patterns but the deep partisan conflict pattern tended to prevail. The deep partisan conflict model was most clearly evident in the late fall of

Figure 6.1 Party Unity Score by Ch 80

•-•-

20

10

0

_,

,-T—,

r—,

-,

P

,

r

-...-..

,#

156

America's Choice 2000

1995 and early winter of 1996-1996. The inability of the president and the Republican majority in the Congress under Speaker Newt Gingrich's leadership to compromise resulted in the stalemate over the budget and the partial shutdown of the federal government in November and December of 1995. The Republicans bore more of the blame for this and were perceived to be obstructionalists and, in effect, lost the public opinion battle. This deep partisan conflict model leading to gridlock threatened to repeat itself in the fall of 2000, as the Republicans in Congress fought with President Clinton over the federal budget. Clinton vetoed several budget bills, and the Republicans accused him of reneging on deals that had been struck. The government was also forced to operate into the new fiscal year on "continuing resolutions," since several budget bills, for FY01 were not settled by election day. Nevertheless, Clinton stuck to his positions and forced the Republicans to accept several programs they did not want. Clinton also went public with the dispute and tried to rally public opinion against the Republicans. The Republicans saw this as a plot to help Vice President Al Gore and to help Democrats who were running for Congress in the fall of 2000. The 106th Congress closed in the fall of 2000 as it had opened in the spring of 1999, on a note of deep partisan division. Congressional Quarterly said the following about the 106th Congress, which was the one President Clinton, faced during his last two years in office: This was a Congress forged by impeachment, embroiled in partisanship from the first day of the session to the hours approaching its last. A narrow and fragile House majority confronted with a Democratic minority united with President Clinton all but guaranteed gridlock in the 106th Congress. (Taylor, October 28, 2000, 2518)

Whatever Clinton's motives he had, at best, limited success in depicting the 106th as a "do nothing Congress" in the style of Harry Truman's successful run against the Republican majority in the Congress in 1946. The stage simply had not been prepared systematically and it appeared to be a last-minute ploy. The mass media paid little attention to it, and apparently public opinion wras unmoved by Clinton's appeals. As we saw above, the Republicans lost some ground marginally in the House and Senate but retained their majority. Implicitly the Republican congressional candidates relied on the people to endorse the idea that they had held Bill Clinton in check and would do the same to Al Gore if he were elected.

John S. Jackson HI 157 There was never any sense in which the congressional campaigns of 2000 were thematically "nationalized", i.e. became an explicit part of one coherent, issue oriented appeal, in the same way as Newt Gingrich transformed the Republican congressional campaigns in 1994. The Democrats under the minority leader, Congressman Richard Gephardt, made a concerted effort to elect Democrats wherever there was an open or vacant seat. Millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of staff hours were poured into those campaigns; however, the themes were traditional Democratic appeals to "fix Social Security," provide prescription drugs to the elderly through Medicare, enhance federal support for education, support affirmative action, and protect American jobs from foreign competition. These issue positions had some appeals to the Democratic party's base and indeed the base in the unions, the minority communities and the cities was energized by election day; however, there was not enough appeal to the Democrats' issues to expand that base substantially. Thus, when it was all over the Democrats had picked off a few marginal seats and lost several close races they had hoped to win. The Democratic party's "Coordinated Campaign" was the central appeal directed by the Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. It was supposed to help Democrats running for the Congress to develop their themes and to provide viable candidates with targeted resources. While those Washington-based committees worked very hard, they apparently did not work very effectively. Indeed at some points their appeal implicitly tended to be couched more in terms of, "please elect Candidate X so the Democrats can take back the House." Such an appeal had little traction at the local level. National issues must be pitched with a human face and in ways that people can relate to in every locale. The challenge for a national campaign is to adopt themes that translate to grassroots support in a wide variety of very diverse states and congressional districts. That which works in New York may backfire in New xMexico. The Republicans under Newt Gingrich had a lot to run against in 1994, and they mined a rich vein of political alienation and mistrust built up against the congressional Democrats. The Democrats in 2000, being the more diverse of the two parties, simply did not succeed in mounting a coherent campaign of issues and ideology and personalities that could overcome the Republicans' majorities. In a time of peace and prosperity it was difficult for congressional Democrats to make the case

158 America's Choice 2000 for change. The Democrats made a coherent appeal well in the cities and in some parts of the Northeast and California. They failed rather abysmally in the South, much of the Midwest, the Plains states and the Mountain states. The Democrats are in real danger of losing any remaining base of support they had in rural America (Giroux, 1999, 2273). On the other side of the equation, the Republicans in 2000 were not required to mount a successful thematic appeal tiiat would oust a well-entrenched majority party, as they had to do in 1994. Instead all they needed to do was to protect their many safe seats, and win a few open seats in Republican leaning districts, which was easy to do. Nationally a significant number of Republicans held seats where they did not have a competitive Democratic challenger. They also could focus their considerable resources on a few key races where they had an incumbent in trouble and on the open seats. This wras what they did with considerable success although they did lose a net of three seats in the Senate and three in the House. It is very hard to mount a successful challenge against the incumbent party in a time when the polls showed that a majority thought the country was "on the right track"; although George W. Bush showed that it could be done at the presidential level. At the Congressional level the Republicans only needed to hold onto gains they had made earlier, especially in 1994. Those gains yielded the advantages of superior funding, better organization and all the benefits of incumbency. When it was over this basically defensive strategy for the congressional Republicans was enough to return them to power. If the Democrats were to win the White House, Republicans in Congress would be there to check and balance the executive. If the Republicans win the Wliite House, the congressional Republicans would happily work in concert with their new President. The "Bi-Partisan

Coalition

Building"

The second pattern of executive-legislative relations is the Bi-Partisan coalition building or compromise model. It is generally this model to which George W. Bush appealed when he mentioned Congress in his campaign. He repeatedly cited his ability to work with and get along with the Democrats as governor of Texas. He repeatedly promised to consult widely and to reduce the level of partisan division and bitterness in Washington. In many ways, both subtle and overt, this was a

John S. Jackson 111 159 form of running against Washington and against the federal government and an adoption of the "outsider" mantle. It is an odd stance for the son of a recent President and one who had himself spent considerable time in and around Washington politics to take; however, it resonated well with many Americans. George W Bush's first words in the first debate were, "I'm from Midland, Texas; I'm not from Washington." That was clearly a calculated theme, which had been extensively tested in focus groups. It is one he returned to repeatedly and effectively in the last six weeks of the campaign when he gained the upper hand in the polls. Never mind that he had been born in New Haven, Connecticut, and had not actually lived in Midland, Texas, in many years and that the Bush family "compound" to which they repaired for vacations was in Kennebunkport, Maine, as the ill-timed DW1 charge reminded people late in the campaign. The fact is that Bush had a Texas accent, attitude, and attire. All of these substantive and symbolic facets of the campaign led credence to Bush's claim to be an "outsider" who was not a part of the "mess in Washington." In fact, he often derided Gore as being born in Washington, not Tennessee, and for being "from Washington, D.C." From Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan to George W Bush (all governors) this has been a time-honored avenue for people to run for power in Washington by running against Washington. It continues to work. George W Bush's claims of bi-partisanship in Texas being applicable to bipartisanship in Washington also appeared to play well with many voters. There is a great geographical and cultural divide in the country evident in the electoral returns (Mileur, 1997). The East Coast (from Washington D.C. north); the West Coast, and the upper Midwest have become Democratic strongholds. Those states mostly voted for Al Gore. The South, Southwest, Plains states and Mountain states have become solidly Republican. They traditionally vote again and again for the Republican presidential candidates. They all voted for George W Bush in 2000. They also returned very large numbers of incumbent Republicans to the Congress. The issue becomes whether George W. Bush could reach out to the Northeastern and Western Democrats to put together a governing bipartisan coalition. Otherwise, he would need to rely exclusively on the narrow margins the Republicans controlled in both houses of Congress. In such a situation a mere handful of threatened party defectors

160

America's Choice 2000

can wield tremendous power since each vote is crucial. While party7 unity scores are currently very high, a President is much better off if he can pick off some votes from the opposition when the Congress is closely divided and Governor Bush recognized that face. Alternatively, Campaign 2000 asked whether Al Gore could reach beyond the Democratic base and appeal to enough Southern, Southwestern, and Mountain states Republicans to pull together a governing coalition? Of course, such a coalition is not permanent and could not be predicted to be the same on each issue the Congress faces. Nevertheless, there is a high level of party cohesion currently7 in the Congress and the issues do often divide the Congress along fairly regular and predictable lines. Thus, a president with a very narrow majority in Congress in the case of Unified Government or a very close minority to work with in his own party7 (in the case of Divided Government) would face the challenge of finding some allies in the other party on most votes. Our separation of powers system demands such compromise oriented behavior on the part of the chief executive. George W. Bush seemed to tell a better story about how he would do this than Al Gore was able to do in the fall campaign. Bill Clinton was sometimes successful in the legislative process by reaching out to his enemies and to fierce Republican partisans to find a coalition to pass his highest priority legislation. On international trade, on welfare reform, banking reform, some budget fights, and on limited health care reform Clinton sometimes found enough allies to prevail even though he faced a deeply hostile Republican majority in the Congress for six of his eight years. If asked, the American public probably favors this compromise oriented, bi-partisan approach to the deeply partisan and ideologically consistent approach that was epitomized by Newt Gingrich's Contract with America. This is one reason Bush's "Compassionate Conservative" theme seemed to resonate so well. He was able to suggest that Americans could have it both ways and that he was not an extremist in his conservative beliefs. This is not too different from the well-known thesis that Americans are "Symbolic Conservatives and Operational Liberals." This is why Bush's campaign motto was such an effective device. It is a form of finding "A Third Way" or a middle ground, which is the path so brilliantly blazed by Bill Clinton. So, the commentators who compared Bush to Clinton were exactly on target in many important respects. Whether Bush can put

John S. Jackson III

161

together a governing coalition and move a positive agenda through the Congress remains to be seen. It is clear that he had a better chance of doing so than Al Gore would have had given the divided and inconclusive results of the Presidential election. W h a t is clear is that some form of bipartisan compromise is going to be required if the nation is to address coherently the very real problems and challenges it faces in the next four years.

REFERENCES x\merican Political Science Association Committee on Political Parries. 1950. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, 44: Supplement. Burnham, Walter Dean, 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Campbell, Angus, 1966. "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," Elections and the Political Order. Angus Campbell, Philip K. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, eds. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 40-62. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Repon,]u\y 29, 2000. "19 GOP Senate Seats in Play," 1866-1867; "CQ's House Ranking Update," 1868-1869. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.. September 23, 2000, 218b. Fruenwald, Juliana and Deborah Kail), November 9, 1996. "Despite Push, Democrats Fail to Topple GOP," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report:. 3225-3232. Gingrich, Newt, et al. 1994, Contract with America, New York: Times Books. Giroux, Gregory L., October 2, 1996. "House Democrats Need to'Go Country' in 2000," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 2273. Greenblatt, Alan and Robert M. Wells, November 9, 1996. "Senate Steps to the Right As GOP Expands Majority," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3233-3238. Herrnson, Paul S., 1988, Party Campaigningin the 1980s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Herrnson, Paul S., 1995, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. Key, V. O., 1955, "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (February): 3-18. Mayhew, David, 1974, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press.

162

America's Choice 2000

Mayhew, David, 1991, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press. McWilliams, Wilson Carey, 1997, "The Meaning of the Election." In Gerald M. Pomper, et al. The Election of 1996: Reports and Interpretations. Chatham, NJ.: Chatham House, 241-272. New York Times/CBS News poll, October 20, 1996. Mileur, Jerome, M. 1997, "The Presidential Campaign and the New Geography of American Politics." William Crotty and Jerome M. Mileur, Editors. Americas Choice: The Election of1996. Dushkin/McGraw Hill. New York Times (CBS News poll), October 20, 1996. Stanley, Harold W. and Richard Niemi, 2000, Vital Statistics on American Politics: 1999-2000. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 46-47. Taylor, Andrew, October 28, 2000, "Symbolism and Stalemate Closing Out 106th Congress," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Vol. 58, #42,2518 Trandahl, Jeff, 1999, Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 3, 1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 53. WTute, John K. and Jerome Mileur, Editors, 1992. Challenges to Party Government. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

JLJ

Hi

M.

LJ

L-Sl

The State and Local Elections: Politics Beyond the Beltway Malcolm E. Jewell

IN

2000

THERE WERE GUBERNATORIAL

ELECTIONS

IN ONLY

eleven states. (Most states elect their governors only in nonpresidential years.) There were state legislative elections in fourty-three states; this includes Michigan, which elected only house members, and excludes Nebraska, which has nonpartisan elections. New Jersey, Virginia, Mississippi , and Louisiana elect legislators only in odd numbered years, and Maryland and Alabama elected all members in 1998 for four year terms. The legislative and gubernatorial elections assumed greater importance than usual because in most states redistricting of congressional and legislative districts, based on the 2000 census, is carried out by the legislature, subject to approval or veto by the governor. In fortytwo of the states voters were also confronted with a total of about 200 issues on the ballot as well. We will describe the gubernatorial elections first, and then analyze the changes in party control of seats in the state legislatures. Then we will summarize some of the more important results of the voters' decisions on ballot issues.

GOVERNORS' RACES Gernerally speaking, gubernatorial elections have become more independent of national trends than used to be the case forty or fifty years 163

164 America's Choice 2000 ago. This is partly because states have shifted their gubernatorial elections into nonresidential elections years. But a more important reason is that gubernatorial candidates are more visible to voters and often they are able to win election or reelection despite a national trend in favor of the other party-. But statewide races such as those for governor and senator are not completely independent of national partisan trends, particularly if they are strong ones. Over the last two decades the number of governorships held by the Democrats has been dropping. Between 1983-1984 and 1999-2000, the number of Democratic governors dropped from thirty-four to eighteen, and the number of Republican governors increased from sixteen to thirty. The largest change occurred after the 1994 election, when Republicans also made major gains in Congress. The partisan balance has remained about the same since then, and going into the 2000 election, the Republicans had a 30-18 lead, with two independents. The net result of the 2000 election was to shift one governorship from Republican to Democratic control, reducing the Republican lead to 29-19. Obviously there was no strong national partisan trend that would be expected to have a dramatic effect on gubernatorial elections. In gubernatorial elections held from 1978 through 1998, there have been incumbents running in almost 60 percent of the races. An important factor that prevents more incumbents from running is that thirtynine of the states limit a governor to two consecutive terms (which is usually a total of eight years). The success rate of incumbents who seek reelection has been growing, from two-thirds in the 1940s and 1950s to about three-fourths in the 1963-78 period, and 81 percent in the 1978 through the 1998 period—when there were 124 winners and only 30 losers (Jewell and Morehouse 2001, 184) Incumbents have many advantages. They are usually much better known than their challengers. The cost of running for governor is growing steadily, and governors are usually able to raise considerably larger amounts of money than can their challengers. They are experienced in money-raising, and because they are usually perceived as likely to win, they are in a good position to raise funds, particularly from interest groups. Incumbency is not always an advantage. Some governors become unpopular because they have to raise taxes or because their record on other issues is criticized. Unlike U.S. senators, who

Malcolm E. Jewell 165 have a slightly higher record of electoral success, governors are usually held personally responsible for what government does and fails to do, and for the level of prosperity in the state. In 2000 eleven governorships were up for election, seven held by Democrats and four by Republicans. The results are summarized in Table 7.1. The Democrats held their seven governorships and picked up one more, in West Virginia. The Republicans kept the other three they had controlled. There were six incumbents running; all four of the Democrats won, and one of the two Republicans won. In the five open seats without incumbents running, three were won by Democrats and two by Republicans. Four of the five governors wrho did not seek reelection (in Delaware, North Carolina, Missouri, and Montana) were prohibited by term limits from running in 2000. Behind the number of wins and losses were some interesting stories. By winning reelection in Indiana, a closely competitive state, Governor O'Bannon extended the Democrats' string of victories to four terms, or sixteen years, the longest stretch of Democratic gubernatorial control since the Civil War. New Hampshire Democratic Governor Jeanne Shaheen faced a difficult reelection campaign for two reasons. Her Republican opponent, Gordon Humphrey, was a former U.S. senator. Moreover, she was caught up in the controversy over the issue of raising taxes to pay for increased funding for public education, as mandated by the state Supreme Court. Shaheen had refused to "take the pledge" regularly Table 7.1

Gubernatorial Elections in 2000

Indiana Washington New Hampshire Vermont Delaware Missouri North Carolina West Virginia L'tah Montana North Dakota

Democratic Governor Frank O'Bannon was reelected. Democratic Governor Gary Locke was reelected Democratic Governor Jeanne Shaheen was reelected. Democratic Governor Howard Dean was reelected. Democratic Lieutenant Governor Ruth Ann Minner won an open seat. Democratic Treasurer Bob Holden won an open seat. Democratic Attorney General Mike Easley won an open seat. Democratic U.S. Representative Bob Wise beat Republican Governor Gecil Underwood Republican Governor Michael Leavitt was reelected. Republican Lieutenant Governor Judy Martz won an open seat Republican banker John Hoeven won an open seat.

166 America's Choice 2000 taken by the state's politicians not to consider an income tax or a sales tax. Nevertheless, she won by a 49-43 percent margin. In Vermont Democratic Governor Howard Dean won a sixth twoyear term in a three-way race, barely winning the absolute majority of the vote required to prevent a runoff. He won despite having signed into law a bill granting "civil unions," with virtually all the rights of marriage, to gay couples, a law that bitterly divided the state and, as we shall see, cost Democrats some legislative seats. Probably his majority would have been greater had not not had to make a decision on that issue. The two Republican governors who ran for reelection faced different outcomes for obvious reasons. Governor Michael Leavitt was easily elected to a third four-year term in Utah, one of the strongest Republican states in the country. Governor Cecil Underwood lost by a margin of only 50-47 percent in West Virginia to a nine-term Democratic member of Congress. When Underwood won his first term as governor in 1956, he was the youngest governor in the country. He came out of retirement in 1996 to win his second gubernatorial term, taking advantage of a split in Democratic ranks. But in 2000 he was the oldest governor in the country at 77, and a number of the state's voters evidently decided it was time for a change. In addition to New Hampshire Governor Shaheen, two women who were lieutenant governors succeeded in moving up to the governorship. Democrat Ruth Ann Minner became the first woman to win the governorship in Delaware, winning by a large margin. She had served eighteen years in the legislature and eight years as lieutenant governor. Republican Judy Martz of Montana also became the first woman to be elected governor in that state, more than eighty years after Montana became the first state to elect a woman to Congress. Martz has been a businesswoman and in 1964 was a speedskater in the Olympics. The 2000 election increased the number of female governors by two, but two nonincumbent female candidates were defeated in the general election, a Republican in Vermont, and a Democrat in North Dakota. The two newly elected women brought the total number of women governors serving in 2001 to five, a new record.

Malcolm E. Jewell 167 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS In most states holding legislative elections in 2000 there were relatively small net shifts in the balance of seats held by Democrats and by Republicans. In order to understand and explain the outcome of these races, we need to review briefly some of the research that has been done on state legislative elections. A high proportion of incumbent legislators who seek reelection are victorious, roughly comparable to the success rate of congressional incumbents, and for similar reasons. In the 1980s and 1990s about 95 percent of legislative incumbents running again won renomination and about 90 percent of those incumbents nominated were reelected (Jewell and Morehouse 2001, 203). In recent years state legislatures have become more professional, with longer sessions and larger staffs. Individual members have also become more professional. They have been serving more terms, which makes them better known to their constituents and gives them the opportunity to become more skillful politicians. Most legislators work harder to provide a wide variety of services to their constituents, which helps to strengthen their political position. They stay in touch with their constituents through newsletters and by attending a wide variety of meetings throughout their district. Most legislators have learned how to represent their constituencies very effectively, finding out what are the needs and interests of the district, and casting votes in the legislature that reflect those needs and interests. In the one-third of the states that have imposed terms limits on their members, however, as the limitations begin to take effect more widely, a declining proportion of members will serve more terms and hence fewer will be very experienced and develop political skills. One important reason for the reelection success of incumbent legislators is that in recent years declining proportions of legislative seats are being contested—and this in turn is partly because many incumbents are so well entrenched that it is hard for the opposing party to find strong challengers. The proportion of legislative elections contested by the two major parties fell from almost four-fifths in the 1970s to about two-thirds in the late 1980s and 1990s (Van Dunk and Weber 1997; Squire 1998). There has also been considerable variation in the proportion of contested races among the states (in the 1984-94 period).

168 America's Choice 2000 There have been more contested races in the larger northeastern states that tend to have better organized political parties. Most of the states with the lowest proportion of contests (between one-fourth and one-half) are southern and border states (Jewell and Morehouse 2001, 205-06). During the 1990s the proportion of legislative seats contested by Republicans has been increasing, but the proportion of seats contested by Democrats has declined, Both parties in the South have been concentrating on seats they already hold or have a good chance of winning. We know, of course, that legislative elections are becoming more expensive, particularly in large states with districts having lots of voters—and this hurts challengers, who usually have much more trouble than incumbents raising adequate funds tor their campaigns. This is an important reason why incumbents usually win, Many legislative districts are safe for one party, and an entrenched incumbent can make other districts safe. If relatively few districts are competitive, the political parties will concentrate their attention and resources on those close races. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find that in some election years party control of relatively few seats is changing, and there may be relatively small changes in number of legislative seats controlled by Democrats and by Republicans. We know that national elections have some impact on various races at state level, including legislative races (Campbell 1986). This impact is likely to be greater when there is a landslide at the national level, either in presidential or midterm elections. Table 7.2 shows the number of legislative chambers (senate and house) controlled by each political party, and the number that were tied, following each of the six elections from 1990 through 2000. (Nebraska is omitted because it has nonpartisan elections.) Beginning with 1992, it shows how many chambers each party gained or lost from one election to the next. (When one party gains more chambers than the other party loses, it is because of a change in the number of chambers that wrere tied between the two parties.) In 1992, when Clinton was elected, Republicans made a modest gain often seats in the U.S. House and won control of nine additional legislative chambers. In 1994 Republicans captured control of the U.S. House and Senate, gaining fifty-three House and seven Senate seats. At the state level, Republicans wron control of twenty additional legislative chambers, a huge increase that gave them their largest share of chambers

Malcolm E. Jewell 169 Table 7.2 Number of Legislative Chambers Controlled by Each Party, Following 1990 to 2000 Elections Year

Chambers Democratic

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

72 65 46 50 53 47

Gains and Losses

Republican 21 30 50 46 45 47

Tie

Democratic

5 3 2 2 0 4

~7 -19 +4 +3 -6

Republican +9 +20 -4 -1 +2

since 1968, when the two parties were tied. Since then there have been only modest changes at the national or state level. Democrats made modest gains in the U.S. House in 1996 and 1998, and gained a total of seven legislative chambers in the two elections. In 2000, when the Democrats made tiny gains in the U.S. House and got a virtual tie in the Senate, the Republicans picked up a net of two legislative chambers, the Democrats lost a net of six; as a result, control of the chambers was divided 47-47 between the two parties (with four ties), and each party controlled both legislative chambers in seventeen states In the forty-three states holding legislative elections in 2000, the Democrats had a net gain of fourty-nine house seats and thirteen senate seats while the Republican net gain was ninty-three house seats and thirty senate seats. Overall the Republicans increased their seats hy fourty-four in the house and seventeen in the senate. Table 7.3 shows the number of seats held by Democrats and by Republican in the house and senate of each state, as well as the net gains of the parties as a result of the 2000 election (compared to what they held at the end of the 1999 session). The eleven southern states are listed at the end of the table to facilitate closer comparison of changes in these states. One measure of the closeness of competition is die number of narrow margins in the houses and senates following the 2000 election. The Democrats held house margins of five seats or less in Oklahoma, Washington, and North Carolina, while Republicans had similar margins in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (Table 7.3). Because senates have fewer members than houses have, we find more margins of five seats or less in the Senate, including ties in Arizona, Maine, Missouri,

170 America's Choice 2000 Table 7-3 Party Composition of Legislatures and Net Party Gains after 2000 Election Senate Seats

House Seats State

Dem.

Rep.

Gains

Dem.

Rep.

Gains

Alaska Arizona California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Hawaii Idaho

13 24 50 27 100 15 32 9

27 36 30 38 51 26 19 61

Rl D4 D4 D2 D4 — R7 R3

6 15 26 18 21 13 22 3

14 15 14 17 15 8 3 32

Dl D1 Dl D3 D2 — R1 Rl

Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Maine Maryland* Massachusetts

62 53 44 46 64 88 106 137

56 47 56 79 36 62 35 23

32 *2 30 30 20 17 14 6

„

— R2 Rl D9 — D6

27 18 20 10 18 17 33 34

R1 — R3 — R3 — D1

Michigan Minnesota Missouri Montana Nevada N. Hampshire New Jersey* New Mexico

51 65 87 42 27 143 35 42

59 69 76 58 15 256 45 27

Rl D2 D3 Dl Rl R 13 — D2

15 39 17 19 9 11 16 24

23 27 17 31 12 13 24 18

R2 R 1 Dl — Rl — Rl

New York N. Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island

99 29 39 53 27 99 84

51 69 60 48 33 104 16

Dl R6 Rl R12 D2 R4 R3

25 18 12 30 14 20 44

36 31 21 18 16 30 6

Rl — — R3 D1 — D2

S. Dakota Utah Vermont Washington W. Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

20 24 62 48 75 43 14

50 51 83 45 25 56 46

Dl D3 R16 1)3 — Rl R3

12 9 16 25 28 18 10

23 20 14 24 6 15 20

R 1 R2 Rl R2 Rl D1 —

Malcolm E. Jewell 171 Table 7-3

{continued} House Seats

Senate Seats

State

Dent.

Rep.

Gains

Dem.

Rep.

Gains

Alabama* Arkansas Florida Georgia Louisiana* Mississippi* N. Carolina S. Carolina Tennessee Texas Virginia*

68 72 43 104 71 86 62 54 57 78 47

37 28 77 75 31 33 58 69 42 72 52

R3 R2 D2 — — R4 R5 R2 R2 —

24 27 15 32 26 34 35 23 18 15 18

11 8 25 24 13 18 15 23 15 16 22

— R2 R2 — — — R 1 — — —

*State held no legislative election in 2000. Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, Table on website: www.ncsl.org "2000 Post-Election Partisan Composition of State Legislatures."

and South Carolina; five or fewer Democratic margins in Colorado, Delaware, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Tennessee; and five or fewer Republican margins in Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. When one party holds a margin of just a few seats, it is very possible that during a two-year term, party control of a chamber may shift because a few legislators leave the chamber or change their party affiliation. Kentucky Republicans won control of the Senate in 1999, when two Democratic senators became Republicans. After an election that produced modest shifts in party seats in most states, it is worth examining a fewr of these state legislatures where greater changes were taking place. The Oklahoma legislature has been under Democratic control, usually by larger margins, for a long time. In recent years the Republican party has become very well organized and aggressive. The cost of legislative and other elections in the state has been skyrocketing, and the Republican party is very well financed and capable of supporting its legislative candidates. The result was a gain of twelve Republican seats in the House and three in the Senate, and the Democratic House lead was cut to 53-48. Republicans hold more seats than at any time in at least seventy years. The legislative term limits take effect in 2004, and the Republicans are counting on benefiting from this because it will help nonincumbents.

172 America's Choice 2000 Party strategy helps to explain the unusual outcome in Maine, where the Democrats gained nine seats in the House but lost three in the Senate. The Republican party was making an all-out effort to capture control of the Senate, which it had held narrowly for one year after the 1994 election. Republicans recmited vigorously in an effort to field good candidates, and the Democrats tried to match their effort. The result was that almost every race in the Senate was contested. In the House, however, the Republicans left a lot of seats uncontested, and probably made less effort to find strong candidates in some of the districts that were contested. The result was that in the House the Democratic margin increased from 79-71 to 88-62. It is also very possible that the term limit requirement that has been in effect in Maine for several years affected the outcome of the election in some districts by forcing the incumbent to retire. Colorado is a state where the Republicans almost always control both legislative chambers. In 2000 the Democrats won control of the Senate for the first time since 1960. But the Democrats won only an 18-17 margin and must work with the Republican majority in the House and a Republican governor. Colorado is another state where term limitations are in effect and reduce the number of experienced incumbents who are able to run. The dominant issue in the Vermont legislative races (as well as the contest for governor) was the law passed by the legislature and signed by Governor Dean granting gay couples the right to "civil unions" that included virtually all the rights of marriage. Passage of the law came after a prolonged public debate, with thousands of persons attending hearings at the Capitol and citizens debating and taking straw votes on the issue at town meetings. Support for the law came largely from Democratic legislators, while many Republican members voted against it. A number of Democratic legislators who voted for the bill expressed the belief that the vote would cost them their seat in the legislature, and some of them were apparently correct. This seems to be the major reason that Republicans gained sixteen seats in the House, winning a majority for the first time since the 1988 election, although the Democrats retained a narrow margin in the Senate. In New York the Senate has been controlled by Republicans (except for one year) since 1938, and the Assembly has been Democratic since

Malcolm E. Jewell 173 1974. After each census, by mutual agreement, each party redistricts the chamber it controls in order to perpetuate its majority7. The 2000 election maintained the status quo, bringing insignificant partisan changes in both chambers. Earlier in the yrear, however, Republican leaders in the Senate were concerned that they might lose their majority because Al Gore was expected to win an big majority in the state, the Senate Republican record was strongly conservative in a liberal state, and some Republican incumbents appeared vulnerable in the face of stronger Democratic challengers. The Republican Senate began moving rapidly to the left, passing bills it had previously rejected on such topics as abortion clinics, gun restrictions, and health care for the working poor. The strategy worked, and the Senate remained safely Republican. The stakes were very high in the 2000 legislative elections because in most states post-census redistricting of both congressional and legislative seats would be done by the legislature and the governor. The election produced few changes in control of legislative chambers, and therefore few changes in control of redistricting. State legislative redistricting is an important issue in all states, both large and small, but the stakes are obviously higher for congressional redistricting in the most populous states with the most congressional seats. In Pennsylvania, Republicans gained firm control of the House and held the Senate and the governorship. In Texas, Democrats held a narrow lead in the House and Republicans kept a one-vote Senate lead along with the governorship. Michigan Republicans held their modest majorities in both legislative chambers, as well as the governorship. In a broader sense, we should realize that the Republicans are in a much stronger position than ten years ago, after the 1990 census, when they controlled both chambers in only six legislatures. After the 2000 election they control both chambers in seventeen legislatures, the same number held by Democrats. There are sixteen states with both a Republican legislature and governor, and onh/ eight with a Democratic legislature and governor. During the 1990s the most important changes in partisan strength in legislatures occurred in southern states (Table 7.3). The Republican party made its first serious, modern effort to win southern electoral votes in a presidential race in 1952, when Dwight Eisenhower won four states, including Florida and Texas. Republicans have won some electoral votes

174

America's Choice 2000

in every election since, and carried every southern state in 1972, 1984, and 1988. Gradually, Republicans began to contest, and often win, races for governor and U.S. senator and an increasing number of races for the U.S. House. But Republicans were slow to run candidates for a significant number of state legislative races, and therefore slow to win many seats, particularly in the Deep South. The Republicans lacked strong organizations, viable candidates, and voters loyal to the party in many of the legislative districts. They faced lots of entrenched Democratic legislators, many of them conservative enough to satisfy most voters. Very gradually the Republican party began to be competitive in a larger number of districts. As recently as 1988, however, the Republican partydid not have a majority in either the house or senate in any of the eleven southern states; Republicans had 20 percent or fewer of the legislative seats in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia; they had at least one-third of the vote in one or both chambers in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas; but only in these last three had they reached 40 percent in at least one chamber. The Republicans began to win significantly more southern legislative races in the 1990 and 1992 elections, and in 1994, the year of the Republican landslide, they made major breakthroughs. They made large gains, particularly in Florida, Georgia, and North and South Carolina; and they won a majority in the Florida Senate, and the North Carolina Flouse and South Carolina House, and in 1996 the Republicans won majorities in three more chambers. On the eve of the 2000 election, Republicans controlled both chambers in Florida and Virginia, the Texas Senate, and the South Carolina House; they were only a few seats short of a majority in the South Carolina Senate, the Texas House, the Tennessee Senate. In the 2000 election only seven of the southern states held elections. The Republicans kept a majority in all of the southern chambers they already held. They gained two seats but fell short of a majority in the Texas House; they gained one seat, producing a tie, in the South Carolina Senate; but they failed to make any gains in the Tennessee Senate. They also narrowed the Democratic lead in the North Carolina House, wrhich they had held after the 1994 and 1996 elections. After the 2000 elections the Republicans are very close to increasing their

Malcolm E. Jewell 175 control from one to both chambers in Texas and South Carolina, and the party is strong in both North Carolina and Tennessee. One reason why the Republican party has been gaining southern legislative seats in recent years is that, once Republicans get elected, they often run for reelection without any Democratic opponent. In recent years more than one-fourth of Republican incumbents who win renomination have had no opponent. In southern states less than onehalf and sometimes less than one-third of all legislative seats on contested by both parties (Jewrell and xVIorehouse 2001, 205-06). Increasingly each of the parties runs strong candidates, often incumbents, in the counties and areas where it is strong and makes less effort in areas of its weakness. If this pattern continues, the rate of Republican gains may slow down, and there may be smaller shifts in party control, in either direction, than in the 1990s. In the 2000 election, a total of 1,647 women were elected to state legislative office, 381 to state senates and 1,266 to state houses (Center for American Women and Politics 2000). This is a drop of 23 from the number serving on the eve of the election. The percentage remains a little over 22 percent of all legislators. The percentage of legislators who are women has increased at a fairly steady rate from 12 percent in 1981 to 18 percent in 1991 to about 22 percent in the years 1998-2001. On a state-by state basis, there were few changes in the number of female legislators in the states. There wras a small net loss in the nine states having the largest proportion of female legislators. New Hampshire and Vermont, states writh a large number of women in large legislatures, each lost seven women. Washington continues to lead the nation with 40 percent female legislators. Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, Kansas, Oregon, New Mexico, and New Hampshire (in descending order) have between 30 and 25 percent. Minnesota, California, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont have 28 or 29 percent women. It is worth noting that seven of these thirteen of these states are in the Northwest, two in the Midwest, and four in New England. That leaves none in the rest of the eastern or southern states. The six state legislatures with the lowest percentage of female legislators are Alabama, (8), Oklahoma and South Carolina (10), Kentucky (11), and Arkansas and Mississippi (13)—all southern or border states and all states near the bottom before the 2000 election (Center for American Women and Politics 2000).

176 America's Choice 2000 REFERENDA AND INITIATIVE ISSUES ON THE BALLOT There were 204 ballot issues that appeared on the statewide ballot for voters to decide in all but eight of the states in November, 2000. (This analysis is based largely on the summaries provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures on its website before and after the election.) There are two broad types of ballot issues. A referendum refers to constitutional amendments, legislation, and bond issues referred by the legislature (or occasionally other government agencies) to the voters for a decision. An initiative is legislation or a constitutional amendment initiated by citizens or groups that collect sufficient signatures to put the measure on the ballot. In 2000 there were there were 131 referenda, as well as seventy measures initiated by citizens—sixty-eight initiatives and two proposals to repeal taws passed by the legislature. Oregon had twenty-six issues on the ballot, almost twice as many as any other state. The state of Oregon sends out a voter information pamphlet to help its citizens understand the issues on the ballot. The pamphlet for the 2000 election was 376 pages long and included 607 arguments for and against the proposals. We can safely assume that relatively few of Oregon's voters read and understood all 376 pages. Voters in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Nebraska had to vote on nine to fourteen measures. The use of citizen initiatives has been growing in recent years. Many of the issues deal with issues that are very controversial and often emotional. There has also been greater participation in the initiative process by legislators and political parties that have failed to get their proposals passed in the legislature and have decided to take their case directly to the voters. One reason why the number of initiative measures has been growing is that groups opposed to a proposed bill or constitutional amendment sometimes initiate another proposal that sounds similar but would have very different results if adopted. The cost of collecting enough signatures to put an initiative on the ballot and purchasing enough time for television commercials throughout the state to attract public attention has been escalating, particularly in the states the larger populations, like California. It is not true that the groups spending the most money are always the winners, but the higher costs mean that

Malcolm E. Jewell 177 groups or individuals must have access to large amounts of money just to compete seriously (Broder 2000). It is impossible to discuss all of the initiatives voted on in 2000, but some of them are important and interesting enough for some analysis. Almost two-thirds of measures on the ballot in 2000 were passed, including almost half of the initiatives. Three states voted on campaign finance measures. Voters in California approved a measure, submitted by the legislature, to impose limits on campaign contributions and to establish voluntary limits on candidate spending. So-called "clean election " public financing campaign reform initiatives, similar to those adopted by several other states, were approved by Oregon voters and disapproved by those in Missouri. The Kentucky legislature for a long time has been one of the very few to hold regular sessions only every other year, and several attempts to hold annual sessions have been defeated by voters in the past. But in 2000 Kentucky voters approved a constitution amendment adopted by the legislature to hold annual sessions. Nebraska voters approved a limitation on the terms of legislators; three previous limitations supported by the voters were rejected by the courts. Arizona voters approved a nonpartisan redistricting, taking that responsibility away from the legislature. In the health field, Colorado and Nevada voters approved the medical use of marijuana, already permitted in six other states. Colorado voters rejected a requirement of a 24-hour waiting period before a woman can get an abortion. Pfrysician-assisted suicide was rejected by Maine voters. The issues of gay rights and gay marriages sharply divided the voters in many states. Voters in Nebraska and Nevada approved of a ban on gay marriages. Maine voters rejected a proposal to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. But Oregon voters rejected a ban on any mention of homosexuality in public schools. Voters in California and Michigan defeated programs for school vouchers. Washington voters defeated a plan for charter schools. Arizona followed California's lead in 1998 by banning bilingual education. Various measures for more school funding, including bond issues, passed in several states, including Arizona, Colorado, Washington, Virginia, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Oregon.

178 America's Choice 2000 Colorado and Oregon voters approved a requirement for background checks at gun shows. Voters in the Northwest disagreed about restrictions on hunting. Washington voters approved a ban on trapping and poisoning animals; a similar ban was rejected in Oregon. The movement to permit state lotteries and other forms of gambling continues to grow, but remains controversial. Arkansas voters rejected a state lottery and permission for casinos; Maine voters rejected a video lottery. A proposal to ban greyhound racing in Massachusetts failed. Voters in a number of states voted on tax issues. Proposals to put limits on property taxes lost in Alaska, but passed in Washington and Arkansas, and passed for senior citizens in Arizona, Colorado, and Georgia. Montana and South Dakota voters abolished the state inheritance tax.

CONCLUSIONS In an election in which the presidential race was too close to call for a long time and congressional elections almost produced ties in the U.S. Senate and House, it is not surprising that the two parties evenly split control of legislatures across the states, with few changes of partisan control of chambers, and there were only a few states with large changes in partisan control of seats. Only one incumbent governor, a veteran RepubHcan in West Virginia, was defeated. The Republicans maintained control of a substantial majority of governorships, and the party faces redistricting in much stronger position than it was a decade ago, after the 1990 census. There were no consistent patterns of liberalism or conservatism in the overall results from about two hundred referenda and initiatives across the country.

REFERENCES Broder, David S. 2000. Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power ofMoney. New York: Harcourt CampbelI,James E. 1986. "Presidential (-cattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections," American Political Science Review 80:45-83.

Malcolm E. Jewell

179

Center for American Women in Politics. 2000. "Women in State Legislatures, 2001," www, rci .nitgers.edu .cawp Jewell, Malcolm E., and Sarah M. Morehouse. 2001. Political Parties and Elections in American States. Washington, D.C. CQ Press, National Conference of State Legislatures. 2000. "2000 Post-Election Partisan Composition Of State Legislatures," www.ncsl.org. Squire, Peverill. 1998. "Uncontested Seats in State Legislative Elections." Unpublished Manuscript. Van Dunk, Emily, and Ronald Weber. 1997. "Constituency-Level Competition in the United States, 1968-1988: A Pooled Analysis," Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:141-60.

EIGHT

The Election in Perspective: Two Nations, Four Parties John Kenneth White

1 HE 2 0 0 0 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE FOREVER REMEM-

bered not for what the candidates said or did during the campaign, but for how it ended. Not since the disputed Hayes-Tilden contest of 1876 has there been so much drama, confusion, and excitement. The trouble began on election night, when the broadcast network projections gave the state of Florida to Al Gore, then to George W. Bush, then to nobody. It only got worse when the same networks called the presidency for Bush only to take back their declaration a few hours later. And it ended when, for the first time in history, the Supreme Court of the United States determined the winner. But that body's certification of George W. Bush as the nation's 43rd President was not a triumph for our democracy or its institutions; rather, it happened only because Al Gore and the Democrats reluctantly surrendered. When it comes to selecting a president, Americans want the process to be both fair, yet provide for majority rule; deliberative as well as quick; representative, but with some having a greater voice than others. Viewed from this perspective, the 2000 election failed on all counts. Many did not see the electoral count as fair; rather, the candidate who won the popular vote did not become president. It was neither deliberative, as the courts rushed to beat the clock set by the Congress and the Florida legislature. Nor was it quick, as the turmoil dragged on for five weeks after the balloting. Finally, the five members of the Supreme Court that foreclosed all recounts were not the "greater voices" either 180

John Kenneth White

181

the voters or the framers had in mind. Al Gore, correctly, did not hail George W. Bush on his election, rather he congratulated Bush "on becoming the 43rd president of the United States."' There is a difference. Because Bush was confirmed by the Supreme Court, his becoming president is likely to be an even more daunting task than it was for Gerald R. Ford, the first man to serve who had neither stood for the presidency nor the vice presidency. Ford's ascension came as a result of a decision by elected officials to remove the corrupt Richard M. Nixon from office—a process that most Americans accepted as legitimate. Bush, on the other hand, enters the White House thanks to the unelected members of the Supreme Court. The result is a serious erosion of public trust. A disturbing 48 percent say their confidence in the election system has been seriously shaken, and an even more alarming 37 percent claim that Bush is not a legitimate president.2 Only John Quincy Adams, Rutherford B. Hayes, and Benjamin Harrison faced similarly dubious circumstances and none of them lasted more than a single term. Like die elections of 1824, 1876, and 1888, the 2000 election will always carry an asterisk next to it in the history books. x'Vccepting the Supreme Court's verdict, George W. Bush told the nation, "Our nation must rise against a house divided."3 But the nation was divided, and its divisions were put on display in the vituperative and argumentative opinions found in Bush v. Gore. By a seven-to-two margin, the Court held that the differing standards in the sixty-seven Florida counties for reviewing ballots that had no immediate or discernible presidential preference violated Bush's claim to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the blizzard of legal papers filed in this case and those that preceded it, the terms "dimpled chad," "hanging chad," and "pregnant chad"attested to this difficulty, and have forever entered our political lexicon. Clearly, it was difficult to ascertain the "intent of the voter" as Florida law instructed. Still, four justices were willing to try. In other cases when the Court was asked to settle difficult political issues, including Brown v. Board of Education, the Pentagon Papers, and U.S. v. Nixon, the Court was able to speak with an authoritative, decisive, and nearly unanimous voice. This time things were different. Justices William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas blamed the voters for not following instructions to clearly and cleanly punch their ballots leaving behind no hanging, dimpled, or pregnant chads. In effect, the three conservatives argued that

182 America's Choice 2000 the state was not required to count ballots where voters had ignored instructions. By blaming the voters and protecting Bush, the Court's conservatives opened a pandora's box for judicial tinkering wn'th state and local election laws—especially when federal offices are the object of contention. In the topsy-turvy world of Election 2000, the judicial conservatism of being a "strict constructionist" was turned on its head. Rather than argue for a literal interpretation of the Constitution and a minimal federal role in a function heretofore performed exclusively bystate and local authorities, Bush v. Gore has created a rationale for those in poorer communities who cannot afford the latest high-tech voting equipment to pursue a remedy through the courts with a claim that their equal protection rights have also been violated. It was left to the Court's liberal wing to speak for a more restrained conservatism. John Paul Stevens wrote that the majority endorsed Bush's "federal assault" on the Florida election procedures. Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed: "I might join the ChiefJustice were it my commission to interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of its own State's law does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated." The minority also worried that the Court's legitimacy had been compromised by its blatant intervention in presidential politics. Stevens was especially acerbic: "Although we may never know with complete certainty the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Stephen Breyer agreed, noting that the public's confidence in the court "is a public treasure [that] has been built slowly over many years some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation."4 The justices were right to worry about the blow the Court suffered in the court of public opinion. Surveys taken immediately following the announcement found 48 percent saying that the Court had become too political; just 43 percent said it had maintained an "objective balance." Likewise, 43 percent thought the Court ruling revealed the personal political interests of the justices; 48 percent said the Court had acted in the best interests of the nation.'' Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, said of the Court's decision, "Their credibility is so diminished and their moral posture is so diminished, it will take years to repair."6 The Court was not the only casualty. For the first time since the

John Kenneth White

183

disputed elections of 1824, when John Quincy Adams became president following the "Corrupt Bargain" between Adams and Henry Clay which made Clay Secretary of State, and 1876, when Rutherford B. Hayes (derided by his contemporaries as "Rutherfraud") was chosen by an electoral commission on a straight party-line vote, the legitimacy of the incoming occupant of the White House was been seriously impaired. Bush and Gore partisans differed sharply when asked about the merits of the Supreme Court decision, their confidence in the Supreme Court, and the legitimacy of a George W. Bush administration (see Table 8.1). Although Bush is the duly-elected president in the eyes of the law and the Constitution, his ability1 to govern is likely to be severely impaired by the refusal of so many Americans to confirm him as president in their hearts.

"POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS" The fact that this chapter begins with the courts and not the voters is significant. As the Supreme Court noted in its per curium, "WTien contending parties invoke the process of the courts, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront."1 Such frequent recourse to the courts in this instance and others has created a new Table 8.1

A House Divided (in percentages)

Text of Question

Bush voters

Do you agree or disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision? (Percentage answering "agree") Do you think the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court who voted to end die recount in Florida did so mosdy based on the legal merits of the case or mosdy based on their own desire to have Bush as the next president. (Percentage answering "legal merits") Does this decision make you lose confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, or does it not have an effect on your view of the Court? (Percentage answering "yes, lose confidence") If George W. Bush is declared the winner and is inaugurated next January, would you accept him as the legitimate president, or not? (Percentage answering "no, not accept") Source: Gallup poll, December 13, 2000.

Gore voters

93

13

87

22

5

54

1

36

184

America's Choice 2000

political dynamic that political scientists Benjamin Ginsberg and iMartin Shefter call a "politics by other means." In this new form of political combat, political parties pursue desired outcomes without using the ballot box as a final, or even primary, arbiter. As Ginsberg and Shefter describe it: For much of America's history, elections have been central arenas of popular choice and political combat. In recent years, however, elections have become less decisive as mechanisms for resolving conflicts and constituting governments in the United States. As a result of the development of new weapons of political warfare, political straggles have come more frequently to be waged elsewhere and crucial choices more often made outside the electoral realm. Rather than engage in an all-out competition for votes, contending political forces have come to rely upon such weapons of institutional combat as congressional investigations, media revelations, and judicial proceedings to defeat their foes [emphasis added]. 8 T h i s new politics by other means has been spurred by the voters' penchant for divided government that has become an enduring feature of the American polity since the Gold War days of the 1950s. 9 T h e unwillingness of the electorate to confer total party responsibility in the presidency and Gongress helped cripple the administrations of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. In each case, independent counsels sought by congressional partisans resorted to the courts to make their point. Democrats argued that Reagan ignored legislative directives that explicitly prohibited him from providing aid to the Nicaraguan contras. Republicans maintained that Clinton lied under oath during the Monica Lewinsky affair. Both cases raised the specter of impeachment, with the Republicans eventually succeeding in making Clinton a modern-day Andrew Johnson. And both presidents found their effectiveness hampered in the face of a ferocious legal onslaught during their second terms. T h i s time, the politics by other means began before a president was inaugurated. Absent a decisive win, George W. Bush and Al Gore vigorously pursued their quests for the presidency using this new politics by other means. Bush prevailed, but his victory was not without a price. For man)? Americans, the idea that "every vote counts" was transformed from a civics theme into a decided "maybe." Yet, the voters themselves

John Kenneth White

185

are to blame for the cynicism that characterized the post-election politics by other means Bush-Gore contest. Indeed, it was their inability to decide that produced the stalemate. In Florida, the vote was so close that Bush's certified 537 vote victory represented a 0.0005%) difference out of nearly six million votes cast. In New Mexico, the difference was also a mere fistful of votes, 368, out of nearly 600,000 votes counted. A few tJiousand votes (less than one percent) separated Bush and Gore in Oregon, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. Nationwide, seventeen states had a margin of difference of five percent or less. Even the Electoral College, which usually exaggerates the winner's margin, was exceptionally close, with Bush securing 271 electors to Gore's 266 (a District of Columbia Democratic elector left her ballot blank). The popular vote showed a small, but significant, 540,435 Gore plurality.10 Although tJiis margin is less than one percent, it is worth noting that Gore won more votes than any Democratic nominee in history (including Clinton). iVloreover, Gore's lead over Bush was nearly five times that ofJohn F. Kennedy's win against Richard M. Nixon in 1960. Undoubtedly, had Green Party candidate Ralph Nader not run, New Hampshire and Florida would have certainly wound up in the Gore column and given him 29 more electoral votes-enough to make him president. Like other minority presidents whose election depended on a third-party-spoiler (James Buchanan comes readily to mind), George W. Bush faces a divided electorate that shows no signs of healing. According to a John Zogby poll, 50 percent believe the country will remain divided, and it will be hard for George W. Bush to accomplish a lot over the next four years.1' Simply put, die 2000 election was a disaster. In the public eye, the contested result has weakened the presidency at a moment when the office needed refurbishing after the Clinton scandals. In government, it has produced an enormous amount of bitterness and partisanship which, despite the best efforts of Mr. Bush to lessen tensions, are unlikely to ease the poisonous atmosphere that has transformed politics into a form of entertainment as seen on programs like The McLaughlin Group, Capital Gang, and Crossfire. The poisonous atmosphere has been accentuated by cries of foul play during the postelection period. Bob Dole called upon Republicans to boycott a Gore inauguration, insinuating that if the Democrat had won Florida he would have stolen the presidency from Bush.12 J.C. Watts, a black Republican congressman from Oklahoma, assailed Gore as "a candidate who will

186

America's Choice 2000

not win or lose honorably, but will try to do so through cutthroat tactics that eight years under President Clinton have taught him."13 Democrats wrere equally vitriolic. Newr York Democratic Congressman Jerrold Nadler told a press conference that the "whiff of fascism is in the air" following a raucous Republican-sponsored demonstration outside the Miami-Dade canvassing board.14 Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd maintained, "There will always be this sense that there was some larceny involved in this election." 1 ' Brookings Institution scholar Thomas Mann contends that the charges by both parties had escalated to a form of "McCarthyism with accusations of traitorous behavior."16 After Bush's victory, both sides promised to heal the wounds created by their partisan rhetoric. Speaking in the Texas House chamber, a body controlled by Democrats, George W. Bush declared: "I know America wants reconciliation and unity. I know Americans want progress. And we must seize this moment and deliver.. .. Now it is time to find common ground and build consensus to make America a beacon of opportunity in the 21st century."17 Vice President Gore echoed similar sentiments, quoting Stephen Douglas who, upon accepting defeat in his race against Abraham Lincoln in 1860, said: "Partisan feeling must yield to patriotism. I'm with you, Mr. President, and God bless you." Gore declared that "partisan rancor must now be put aside," and Americans should unite "in fulfillment of the great vision that our Declaration of Independence defines and that our Constitution defends."18 Americans like this kind of talk. During the campaign, Bush sold himself as a "uniter [sic], not a divider," and promised to change the tone in Washington, D.C.—a pitch heightened by a partisanship all too willing to use the politics by other means. These were sure-fire applause lines in Bush's stump speech (as was his Carteresque pledge to restore honor and dignity to the White House). Muting differences was a key component of Bush's strategy—a tactic Bill Clinton once described as "blur, blur, blur." Al Gore attempted to draw distinctions, especially with his populist mantra of "the people, not the powerful." But Gore hewed to the centrist New Democratic philosophy that Clinton himself had followed. Critics of Bush and Gore likened them to the soft drinks Coke and Pepsi. In a pinch, either was preferable. As Ralph Nader put it, the Bush-Gore "duopoly" was sustained by a corporate America that had bought and paid for their candidacies.19

John Kenneth White

187

THE TWO NATIONS Even as Bush and Gore appealed to the center of American politics, the closeness of the contest occurred largely because diose who occupy the center were a veiy different species than, say, the 1950s. The image conjured up by a description of a centrist American is a married suburban couple with underage children living at home and incomes in the $25,000-$50,000 range. This picture is not too dissimilar from the one painted by Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg in their 1970 book, The Real Majority. In it, they define the real majority as "unyoung, unpoor, and unblack."20 Whoever won Middle America, it was said, won the presidency. But Middle America has become a more divided, less centrist, and less homogeneous country. Changing demographics have meant that the mythical Ozzie and Harriet Nelsons of the 1950s, the Ward and June Cleavers of the 1960s, and the Heathcliff and Clair Huxtables of the 1980s no longer depict the real majority. By 2000, more so-called "traditional families" had neighbors who were single mothers or fathers, unwed couples, blended families, or gay partners. Even the traditional family has changed dramatically, as die stay-athome Mom is now the working Mom. More men than ever before traded in their day jobs to become house-husbands. These new lifestyles and the values that accompany them have altered our politics. In Vermont, civil unions allowed gay couples to obtain virtually all the legal rights of marriage, including inheritance, child custody, and health care issues. (Notably, gay rights advocates engaged in their own local politics by other means by using the state Supreme Court to force the issue to a vote in the Vermont legislature.) Elsewhere, cultural battles persist on such issues as gay rights, school prayer, partial-birth abortion, a flag amendment, and the passage of local "domestic partner" laws that grant healthcare and other benefits to heterosexual and homosexual couples alike. Interestingly, the 1950s era depiction of a mythical suburban family is no longer in vogue. Instead of television programs like The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, Leave It to Beaver, and The Cosby Show, today's television reflects an emphasis on the value of tolerance and an experimentation with the meaning of family. Friends, the popular NBC television program, depicts six characters in and out of various sexual relationships. Will and Grace, another NBC sitcom, is not about a happily

188 America's Choice 2000 married couple; instead, Will is an openly gay character who has a platonic relationship with Grace. Other prime-time shows have also featured actors in leading gay roles. Ellen, the first network series to feature a real-life gay character playing the lead, attracted 36 million viewers to her 1997 "coming-out" episode-almost as many as wratched the last Bush-Gore dehate.21 During the Clinton years, a polarization developed between those who defended "traditional family values," were religious, and believed in certain universal moral truths, and those who believed in a "morality writ small"—i.e., individuals must make their own moral choices, and tolerance for these different choices should be an overriding value.22 That division was accentuated by Clinton's impeachment. Twenty-something Paul Hemesath spoke for many of his contemporaries when asked about the Clinton-Lewinsky affair: "I don't think you'd find too many unattached single women who would pass that up. In a similar position, if there was an attractive woman who was the most powerful woman in the world, who knows how I would have reacted?"2-'Republican House Whip Tom DeLay thought such thinking brought into sharp relief the conflict between "[moral] relativism versus absolute truth." 24 When the Wall Street Journal editorialized in favor of Kenneth Starr, it declared that he was "not just prosecuting Bill Clinton; he was prosecuting the entire culture that gave birth to what Bill Clinton represents."25 Many Americans seemed to agree. When asked which events in the second half of the twentieth century most represented American's declining morality, 34 percent chose Clinton's affair with Lewinsky; 19 percent said Woodstock and the acceptance of free love and drugs; 13 percent, the Watergate scandal; and 5 percent, John F. Kennedy's marital infidelities.20 By purging Clinton, Republicans believed they would also expunge the worst excesses of the 1960sera counterculture. Divided polities are nothing new. In 1845, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli wrrote a book titled Sybil or The Two Nations. The theme of social polarization is made clear in an encounter between Charles Egremont, the hero of the novel, and two strangers: "Well, society may be in its fancy," said Egremont slightly smiling; "but say what you like, our Queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed."

John Kenneth White

189

"Which nation?" asked the younger stranger, "for she reigns over two. . . . Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each others habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws."27

As the 2000 election demonstrates, the United States has come to resemble Disraeli's two nations. If you lived in the South, the Great Plains and the West (save for the Pacific rim), you were on one side of the cultural divide. This was George W. Bush country. Nine of his top ten states were in this L-shaped formation that extended from the Dakotas down through Texas and across to the Florida coast.28 Those states that lay in the heart of the Bible-belt were more religious than the rest of the country, and were more likely to see moral values as the most important problem facing the nation. George W. Bush swept the Southern primaries in 2000, including South Carolina's, where John McCain's last-ditch attempt to stop Bush failed. In each instance, moral values topped the list of voter concerns. The same rule held fast in the general election. When likely voters were asked which candidate would improve the nation's moral values, 43 percent picked Bush; 42 percent, Gore. But when pollsters asked those who believed that the country's moral decline was the most important problem to state their choice, it was Bush by a mile: 68 percent to 16 percent.29 Moreover, it was the Bush voters who were likely to see moral decay. Sixty-two percent of Bush backers said the nation's moral climate was "seriously off on the wrong track," just 33 percent of Gore supporters shared this view.30 However, if one lived in the Northeast or around the Pacific rim of states you were on the otner side of die cultural divide. One could ride Interstate 95 from Maryland to Maine and enter just one Bush state, New Hampshire (won by 7,200 votes out of more than one-half million cast). Likewise, one could travel the Pacific Coast Highway and remain in Gore country (with a bow to Ralph Nader). All of Gore's top ten states were in the Northeast, with the exceptions of California and Hawaii.31 The cultural divide was so powerful that Ck>re lost his native Tennessee and even his old congressional district. Tennessee's placement in the Bush column made Gore eligible to join a small and dubious club that includes James K. Polk, Woodrow Wilson, Alf Landon, Adlai Stevenson, and George

190

America's Choice 2000

McGovern-all major party presidential nominees who lost their home states.32 Overall, those who lived in the Northeast cast 56 percent of their ballots for Gore; Southerners gave Bush 55 percent of their ballots.33 The divisions were more than geographic. In an era when parties are said to have declined, partisanship mattered. Ninety-one percent of all Republicans supported Bush; 86 percent of Democrats backed Gore. The gender gap came back with a vengeance: 54 percent of women supported Gore, and 53 percent of men voted for Bush. But there were many other "gaps," including married versus single; churched versus less churched; the Religious Right and those who are not "born again"; working women versus stay-at-home Moms; union members versus non-union members; working class versus the prosperous middle versus the brie-and-chablis set; liberals versus conservatives; gays versus straights; gun owners versus those that don't have guns in their homes; and, in Vermont, those who are enthusiastic about civil unions versus those who were angry at the idea (See Table 8.2). For a time after the 2000 presidential election, we had two president-elects. While the Supreme Court eventually resolved this situation, the two nations found in the exit polling still endure. Indeed, they are likely to be exacerbated by a heightened partisanship within the federal government that reflect the animosities many Americans have toward one another.

THE RETURN OF FOUR-PARTY POLITICS Four decades ago, political scientist James MacGregor Burns observed the rise of a "four-party politics" that had backing from different quarters of the electorate.34 There was a Democratic presidential party still deeply rooted in the New Deal and Fair Deal programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman. When John F. Kennedy spoke of "getting the country moving again" Americans knew what he meant. In addition to closing the "missile gap" with the Soviet Union, Kennedy wanted vigorous domestic action to counter the passivity of the Eisenhower years. Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society largely completed this task. Thanks to the engorged Democratic congressional majorities, Johnson had a run of legislative successes including Medicare (signed into law in the presence of Truman), a Voting Rights Act that extended

John Kenneth White Table 8.2

191

The Two Nations (in percentages).

Demographic/Issue Democrats Republicans Men Women Whites Blacks Hispanic Married with children Single/Divorced Attend religious services more than weekly Never attend religious services Consider self member of the Religious Right (whites only) Don't consider self member of the Religious Right (whites only) Working woman Stay-at-home mom Union member Non-union member Working class Upper-middle class Upper class (brie and chablis set) Liberal Conservative Gay/lesbian Straight Gun owner Not a gun owner Those who say abortion should be legal in all cases Those who say abortion should be illegal in all cases Those who say the nations moral climate is seriously off on the wrong track Enthusiastic about same-sex civil unions* Angry about same-sex civil unions*

Gon

Bush

86 8 4: 54 42 90 67 41 57 36 61 is

11 91 53 43 54 8 31 56 $8 63 32

54

42

58 44 62 44 51 43 56 80 17 70 47 36 58 70

39 52 34 52 54 39 13 81 25 50 61 39 25

22

74

so

46

33 80 23

'Vermont only. Source: Voter News Service, exit poll, November ', 2000.

the franchise to southern blacks, an Elementary and Secondary Education Act which created Head Start, and a War on Poverty that was Rooseveltian in its outreach to those previously left behind. Until Johnson's presidency, the Democratic congressional party had been decidedly more southern, conservative, and rural than its

192 America's Choice 2000 northern-based presidential counterpart. Virginia's Howard Smith became a potent symbol of the Dixiecrat rule. As chairman of die allimportant House Rules Committee, Smith opposed the elections of Kennedy in 1960 and Johnson in 1964. With Smith and the DixieeratRepublicans blockingJFK's pleas to "get the country moving," Kennedy decried the "substantial power" of the "bloc action" in Congress. 3 ' According to Burns, safe Southern seats meant that the congressional parties had little reason to end democracy's deadlock: "Our man in the safe seat has a wonderful incentive to stay put. He can, with any kind of luck, expect steady promotion to the top councils of the congressional party, regardless of merit. N o other Western democracy rewards its politicians with so much power for so little relevant accomplishment."36 Republicans, too, had their internal divisions. A Republican presidential party emerged after World War II that was dominated by northeastern internationalists who were strongly opposed to the isolationism that dominated Republican presidential politics during the late 1930s. Moreover, these "Modern Republicans" believed that the New Deal could not and should not be repealed.'' As Dwight Eisenhower once stated: "Should any political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history."38 The Republican presidential party found support for its staunch anti-communism and resistance to the expansion of government in the spawning suburbs. Those who lived in the Levittowns of the 1950s and 1960s were well-educated and often employed in white-collar jobs. By becoming homeowners, these suburbanites saw themselves as taxpayers rather than recipients of government services—further diminishing the New Deal in the nation's memory. One could almost watch the spawning of new Republicans as crowded byways carried refugees from the inner cities (still home to the New Deal) who were joining the suburban station-wagon set. By contrast, the Republican congressional party had a very different constituency and outlook. Led by Midwesterners—including Senate leaders Robert Taft (Ohio) and Everett McKinley Dirksen (Illinois) and House Minority Leaders Charles Halleck (Illinois) and Gerald R. Ford (Michigan)—the Republican congressional party was more isolationist, parochial, small-business oriented, rural, and conservative than its presidential counterpart. Congressional Republicans resented easterners whom they associated with the corporate values of size and greed

John Kenneth White

193

on Wall Street, while they supposedly embodied the small town virtues of Main Street. In presidential politics this meant that most of them disliked New Yorker Thomas E. Dewey, and many supported Ohio Senator Robert Taft for their party's 1952 presidential nomination over Dwight Eisenhower. Speaking from the dais at the national convention in 1952, Everett Dirksen, a Taft supporter, caused a near-riot when he shook a finger at Dewey and shouted: "We followed you before, and you took us down the road to defeat. Don't do this to us. 9 Republicans nominated Eisenhower anyway, but the intra-party split between its presidential and congressional wings lasted for another generation. These four-party coalitions Burns so brilliantly identified are no more. The Republican takeover of the South is one reason. When the GOP captured control of the Congress in 1994, the three House leaders (Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, and Tom DeLay) represented districts located in Georgia and Texas, respectively. Most strikingly, for the first time since Reconstruction, a majority of House members from the Old Confederacy are Republicans—a pattern that has remained unbroken. This leave-taking by conservative southerners from the Democratic party has made both congressional parties more ideologically pure. In 1998, 86 percent of Republicans in both chambers cast party-fine votes; Democrats, 83 percent. This is in sharp contrast to the days when Dixiecrats dominated the Congress: in 1970, Republicans and Democrats had paltry unity scores of 59 percent and 57 percent respectively.40 This increased ideological commitment has resulted in both congressional parties being more issue-oriented than ever before, loday, most congressional candidates are self-starters—recruiting themselves, rather than receiving an invitation from their respective political party to seek office. House majority leader Richard K. Armey, for example, ran in 1984 after watching the congressional debates on C-SPAN and thinking he could do a better job. A sense of noblesse oblige which viewed public service as an honor and duty—a notion that animated the career of Connecticut Senator Prescott Bush, George W. Bush's grandfather—has largely disappeared. Even the term "liberal Republican" has become an oxymoron as its civic-minded leaders, including John Chafee, Lowell Weicker, William Scranton, and Nelson Rockefeller have either died or left politics altogether.41 Greater ideological homogeneity also characterizes the new Democratic congressional party. Instead of the Dixiecrats, it is the

194 America's Choice 2000 Democrats from New England and the Northeast, the upper tier of Midwest states, and the Pacific coast who dominate. Most of them are staunch liberals and hail from safe seats that ensure a greater longevity than these districts have heretofore experienced. Barney Frank, for example, was first elected in 1980 from Massachusetts and has won reelection since with no serious competition since 1982, this despite being one of two openly gay members. In fact, the entire ten-person Massachusetts delegation consists solely of Democrats. Likewise, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, first elected in 1962, has accumulated both seniority and stature that rivals that of any Southern baron. Kennedy was re-elected in 2000 with a whopping 73 percent of the vote, beating a token Republican challenger who almost did not make it to the ballot, and finished just one percentage point ahead of his third-party Libertarian opponent. Four decades ago, Donald R. Matthews wrote that the senioritysystem's bias against urban liberals "tends to be self-perpetuating."42 That is no longer true. When Democrats eventually take control of Congress, it is the northern and West Coast liberals like Frank and Kennedy who will wield power. The 2000 elections confirm this point. Democrats won four more congressional seats from California alone. In the Senate, virtually all the Democratic gains came from northern and Pacific states: Minnesota, New Jersey, Michigan, Washington, and Delaware. (The lone exceptions were Missouri where the "Mel Carnahan line" won, and Florida, where Ben Nelson replaced Connie Mack.) This is a significant change from 1994 when the Democrats last controlled Congress—even though more northern and Pacific Coast Democrats had more powerful posts. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show what would have happened if the Democrats had total control of the 107th Congress. Northerners and Californians would have chaired some of the most powerful committees. That tendency is even more pronounced at the subcommittee level. Barney Frank would have become chair of the Domestic and International Monetary Policy subcommittee; Sander Levin of Michigan would have taken over Trade; and Sherrod Brown of Ohio would have headed Health and Environment. The rise of congressional northern and West Coast liberals presents several challenges to a Democratic presidential party transformed by Bill Clinton. Rather than instinctively wanting more and bigger government, Clinton's New Democratic party seeks a "Third Way"

John Kenneth White

195

Table 8.3 Democratic Chairs of Selected Senate Committees, 1994 and 2001 (prospective)

Committee Armed Services Foreign Relations Governmental Affairs Health Education, Labor, and Pensions Judiciary Rules and Administration Small Business

1994 Chair

2001 Prospective Chair

First Election for 2001 Chair

Nunn (Georgia) Pell (Rhode Island) Glenn (Ohio) Non-existent

Levin (Michigan) Biden (Delaware) Lieberman (Connecticut) Kennedy (Massachusetts)

1978 1972 1988 1962

Biden (Delaware) Ford (Kentucky)

Leahy (Vermont) Dodd (Connecticut)

1974 1980

Bumpers (Arkansas)

Kerry (Massachusetts)

1984

between the old New Deal liberalism and its conservative Republican do-nothing, let-the-private-sector-haiidle-it opponents. The Third Way calls for more public-private partnerships between individuals, government, and business that empower citizens to take charge of their problems and solve them without large government-run bureaucracies doing so. As the Democrats stated in their 2000 platform, "Our fundamental mission is to expand prosperity, not government."43 To Al Gore, this translated into a "smaller, smarter government" more attuned to the Information Age.44 Gore led the "reinventing government" initiative of 1993, and boasted that his efforts resulted in the smallest number of federal employees since John E Kennedy. Finally, New Democrats believe that economic prosperity is linked to deficit reduction. During the 2000 campaign, Gore promised to "pay down the debt every year until we can give our children the independence, self-sufficiency, and prosperity that will come when America is debt-free."45 The result has been Clinton's complete domination of the Democratic presidential party, as witnessed in the collective decisions of oldstyle New Deal Democrats—including Dick Gephardt, Paul Wellstone, and Jesse Jackson—not to challenge Gore. Only the iconoclastic Bill Bradley sought the Democratic nod, and while he criticized Gore for supporting welfare reform, he proved to be an inarticulate defender of the old New Deal liberalism—if he ever was. But Clinton's reworking of the Democratic presidential part)' incurred the wrath of congressional

196

America's Choice 2000

Table 8. 4 Democratic Chairs of Selected House Committees 1994 and 2001 (prospective)

Committee Appropriations Banking and Financial Sendees* Commerce* House Administration Judiciaiy Rules Veterans Affairs Ways and Means International Relations* Transportation and Infrastructure* Education and the Workforce* Government Reform

1994 Chair

2001 Prospective Chair

First Election for 2001 Chair

Percentage of2000 Vote

Natcher (Kentucky) Gonzalez (Texas)

Obey (Wisconsin) LaFalce (New York)

1969 1974

63 61

Dingell (Michigan) Rose (North Carolina) Brooks (Texas) Moakley (Massachusetts) Montgomery (Mississippi) Rostenkowski (Illinois) I Iamilton (Indiana)

Dingell (Michigan) IToyer (Maryland)

1955 1981

71 65

Conyers (Michigan) Moakley (Massachusetts) Evans (Illinois)

1964 1972

91 77

1982

55

Rangel (New York)

1970

91

Lantos (California)**

1980

74

Mineta (California)

Oberstar (Minnesota)

1974

68

Ford (Michigan)

Miller (California)

1974

77

Conyers (Michigan)

Waxman (California)

1974

76

Committee was renamed. * Sam Gejdenson, the Democrat slated to chair the committee, was defeated for reelection in 2000.

Democrats on free trade issues. Both Clinton and Gore are staunch free traders. Gore debated Ross Perot on the subject in 1993 on Larry King Live, and die North American Free Trade Agreement won congressional passage thanks to Republican support. In 2000, the Clinton administration favored giving China permanent normal trade relations, even though such support cost Gore among congressional Democrats and union-dominated households, thereby giving Ralph Nader a powerful argument to act as a third-party spoiler. Free trade in general, and commerce Math China in particular, received virtually no mentions in the 2000 Democratic platform—a testament to the rift between the two parties. Welfare reform also proved to be another "wedge issue," as most of the would-be Democratic congressional chairs voted against it.

John Kenneth White

197

Third Way thinking is often at odds with the instinctive liberalism of the Democratic congressional party. House Democratic minority leader Richard Gephardt took aim at Clinton's willingness to listen to advice given by his strategist Dick Morris: "Too often, our leaders seem enamored with small ideas that nibble around the edges of bigproblems." 46 Gephardts championing of the old liberalism represents a turnabout for the Missouri congressman. First elected in 1976, Gephardt ran as a reformer and styled himself as a different kind of Democrat. He supported Ronald Reagan's 1981 tax cut and voted for Reagan's tax reform plan in 1986. He also differed with his fellow Democrats on such issues as abortion, busing, and raising the minimum wage. But as Gephardt climbed the party leadership ladder, his positions changed. He altered his stance on abortion from pro-life to prochoice, and supported increasing the minimum wage. Gephardt backed the big government-oriented Clinton health care plan. In 1998, he voted against a school prayer amendment and for cutting funds for the B-2 bomber. Such votes earned him an 90 percent approval rating from the liberally-oriented Americans for Democratic Action. Just as Clinton moved to occupy the center with his New Democratic initiatives, Gephardt moved into the opposition, denouncing the Clintonsponsored North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), refusing to give Clinton "fast track" authority in seeking new trade agreements with Latin America, and voting no on the welfare reform bill that Clinton signed into law in 1996. In May 1997, Gephardt denounced the balanced budget plan (which passed the House with support from 132 Democrats) as "a budget of many deficits—a deficit of principle, a deficit of fairness, a deficit of tax justice and, worst of all, a deficit of dollars."47 Representative Robert Matsui worries that there is a generation gap between the Old Liberals, like Gephardt, who hold the reigns of power in Congress, and the New Democrats wrho hail from the more competitive suburbs: "There is no question you could see a generation gap. The real problem is wrhether the left wing of our caucus is going to demand that the leadership move left."48 But the duality of views between the two Democratic parties-ingovernment have been muted by Clinton's budget surpluses and high job approval ratings. With more money to spend, Al Gore and the congressional Democrats were able to propose a vast new public entitlement: a Medicare-run prescription drug program for seniors. Likewise,

198 America's Choice 2000 both Democratic parties wanted to spend more money for education. But while congressional Democrats have reluctantly concluded that balanced budgets are politically wise and economically beneficial, the Clinton-Gore presidential party starts with this premise. At heart, congressional Democrats prefer an activist federal government, and don't see public-private partnerships as a means to accomplish their goals. California State Senate President Pro Tempore John Burton candidly captures their views: "I don't get this 'New Democrat' b—s—. There are only so many ways you can feed hungry people, or get jobs for people who don't have them, and get kids a good education."49 In the coming years as trade emerges as the primary foreign policy issue, the split between the two Democratic parties is likely to be more pronounced. Like the Democrats, Republicans have their own intra-party tensions. The Republican presidential party of 2000 belongs to George W. Bush and his party's governors. For more than two years, Bush has spoken of a "compassionate conservatism." Compassionate conservatism is emotive in its rhetoric. Bush often "speaks from the heart," and admonishes opponents by saying things like "don't judge my heart." During the first debate, for example, Bush told of traveling to Del Rio, Texas to visit with a man whose home had been destroyed by a flood. The governor described how he "put my arms around the man and his family and cried with them"—an emotion that got the late Edmund Muskie into trouble when he shed a few tears on the steps of the Manchester Union Leader during the 1972 New Hampshire primary.50 To Bush, this was compassionate conservatism at its best. As the example suggests, compassionate conservatives want an activist, but limited government. Unlike Bob Dole in 1996, George W. Bush does not advocate abolishing the Departments of Education and Commerce, and he has avoided being drawn into the cultural wars that have bashed federal agencies such as the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. While the 2000 Republican platform supported the idea of English as the nation's primary language, it did not want to codify this into law (as Dole did). Instead the platform noted that "mastery of other languages is important for America's competitiveness in the world market."1' Bush's brand of compassionate conservatism includes "single moms struggling to feed the kids and pay the rent; immigrants starting a hard life in a new world; cbildren without fathers in neighborhoods where gangs seem

John Kenneth White

199

like friendship." 12 Nowhere was compassionate conservatism more on display than in the Republican platform crafted by the Bush forces. While restating their pro-life position and opposition to partial-birth abortions, the platform writers laced their positions with large globs of compassion: Our goal is to ensure that women with problem pregnancies have the kind of support, material and otherwise, they need for themselves and their babies, not to be punitive towards those for whose difficult situation we have only compassion. We oppose abortion, but our prolife agenda does not include punitive action against women who have an abortion. We salute those who provide alternatives to abortion and offer adoption services, and we commend congressional Republicans for expanding assistance to adopting families and for removing racial barriers to adoption.''5 To Bush, opportunity and justice means that government must form partnerships with private institutions, especially faith-based organizations. H e has been joined in this quest by the Republican governors, who agree that solving problems like education and health care require innovative approaches and alliances. As Governor, Bush encouraged religious institutions to evangelize in the Texas prisons, and he supported other faith-based, "tough love" programs to help those down on their luck. Bush's remaking of his presidential party had a strategic aim: to win back the presidency after two successive defeats. George H . W. Bush received just 37 percent of the vote in 1992 and Bob Dole didn't do much better, getting just 41 percent in 1996. To George W. Bush and his compassionate Republicans, winning was the most important thing. Therefore, Bush considered pro-choice Republicans—including Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge and N e w Jersey Ciovernor Christine Todd Whitman-as prospective ticket mates. T h o u g h Bush eventually settled on the steadfastly conservative Dick Cheney, his public embrace of these vice presidential possibilities gave him a degree of latitude within his own party that George H . W. Bush and Bob Dole did not have in 1988 and 1996. Congressional Republicans went along with Bush, but there is a fragility to their support. Unlike Bush, they are more motivated by issues rather than tactics. Making government smaller and getting rid

200

America's Choice 2000

of unwelcome Cabinet departments and federal agencies is at the heart of their thinking. House Majority Whip Tom DeLay believes that the outcome of the 2000 election presents an opportunity for Republicans that they cannot miss: "We have the House, we have the Senate, we have the White House, which means we have the agenda."-4 But DeLay and his colleagues may not find a receptive audience at the White House for a conservative agenda that does not need a compassionate modifier. A Bush advisor warns that the new president mayfind a larger challenge from the Republican congressional party than its Democratic counterpart.53 Two of Bush's challengers for the 2000 nomination sided with congressional Republicans in arguing that conservatism did not need any qualifiers. Lamar Alexander described Bush's formulation of the term "compassionate conservatism" as nothing more than "weasel words." Dan Quayle was even more caustic: "I have ordered my staff to never—ever—utter the words 'compassionate conservative.' This silly and insulting term was created by liberal Republicans and is nothing more than code for surrendering our values and principles."56 Nonetheless, remembering how useful an enemy Newt Gingrich was to the Democrats, the Bush forces saw to it that no congressional Republican leader addressed their party's 2000 convention in prime time. Pat Robertson, the founder and president of the Christian Coalition, denounced the gooey televised images of the Republican convention as "Democrat lite."57 Mindful of the tensions between the two GOP wings, President-elect Bush used a line in his victor)' statement that seemed equally directed to members of his own party as it was to television audience: "1 was not elected to serve one party, but to serve one nation." 58 Unlike the Bush-dominated presidential party, the Republican congressional party is much more responsive to the culture wars. Congressional Republicans have overwhelmingly supported amendments to the U.S. Constitution protecting the American flag, the Defense of Marriage Act, and the overturning Clinton's vetoes of partial-birth abortion. Congresswoman Constance Morella (R-MD) decries her party's sharp turn to the cultural right: Many issues have no place in Congress for us to be voting on. They're not in our purview. These are always emotional, publicity-getting issues. . . . The abortion issue is one—especially late-term abortion. We've already voted on it once. Why do we keep voting on it again

John Kenneth White

201

and again? There are a number of other areas that we vote on [that have no place in our politics]. For example, a day of remembrance where everybody should pray to Christ. 59

T H E CENTER CANNOT HOLD Years ago, William Butler Yeats wrote in a poem titled " T h e Second Corning: Turning and turning in the widening gyre The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. In the aftermath of the bitter partisan wrangling surrounding the 2000 election, both parties claim to have popular mandate for incremental change and less partisan wrangling. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott observed that his fellow Republicans "will have to be prepared to work with the Democrats, and we're going to have to say, 'All right, look, here's some areas we're just not going to be able to agree. Are there some areas here . . . where we can agree?'" John iYlcCain agreed, noting that the Senate "cannot do business the way that it has for the last few years." McCain added that the Senate has "been riven by partisanship, and it's not acceptable to the American people." D e m o cratic minority leader Tom Daschle called for "a new power-sharing arrangement" between the two parties where partisanship would be eschewed. House members also echoed the bipartisan appeals for a lessening of party tensions. 60 David Price, a respected Democrat from N o r t h Carolina, maintains that his colleagues have been tempered by a "newr realism" enhanced by the slender congressional majorities: "We have n o t gotten elected as fierce partisans. T h e r e is a critical mass of Democrats who would support a subdued partisanship." 61 But Price's call for a "subdued partisanship" is likely to fail given the inner tensions that still bedevil the two congressional parties and

202

America's Choice 2000

separate them from their presidential counterparts. Powerful congressional Democratic liberals are unlikely to accede to the compassionate conservatism of George W. Bush and, absent a restraining New Democratic presence in the White House, these ranking members will hunger for more government action to solve the country's pressing problems. A Republican tenant in the White House may also prove troublesome to Republican lawmakers. As soon as a Supreme Court vacancy occurs, a controversial administrative decision (such as RU486) is promulgated, or a reigniting of the cultural wars takes place, congressional Republicans will make certain demands on President George W. Bush that he will ignore at his own peril. Even before his inauguration, conservatives were chastising Bush for not appointing more of the ideological faithful to his cabinet and White House staff. The Chinese character for crisis contains the symbols for danger and opportunity. Following the most controversial election in 124 years, this Chinese character seems particularly apt. xAs noted earlier, most pundits predict a one-term George W. Bush presidency, given the historical parallels with 1824, 1876, and 1888. In each of these contests, the popular vote winner did not become president and it took another election to settle things. This time the dangers are different. It is quite likely that the 2004 election will reveal the same cultural divisions that the 2000 Bush-Gore contest did, since the values issues that presendy define our politics are not easily solved and are likely to endure. Cultural issues and a resurgent four-party politics dictate that Bush will have to use all of his legendary charm and persuasive powers to have a chance at a successful administration. Odds are he won't succeed. That does not necessarily mean he will lose the next election, since Bush's half of the "two nations" give him a reasonable chance to win an Electoral College majority7. But it does mean that governing in our system of separated powers and checks and balances is going to be even more difficult than usual. When historians writes the final chapter of the 2000 election they may conclude that, in this case, the winner ultimately lost.

NOTES 1. Al Gore, Concession Speech, Washington, D.C., December 13, 2000. 2. Reuters/NBC/Zogby poll, December 13, 2000. Text of question: "Do

John Kenneth White

203

you have confidence in the U.S. election system, or have the events of the past month seriously shaken vour confidence?" Confidence in system, 48 percent; confidence shaken, 48 percent; not sure, 3 percent. Text of question: "If you define legitimacy as the will of the people, do you consider a George W. Bush presidency legitimate or not legitimate?" Legitimate, 59 percent; not legitimate, 37 percent; not sure, 5 percent. 3. George W. Bush, victory speech, Austin, Texas, December 13, 2000. 4. Bush v. Gore. A copy of the case was obtained on the C-SPAN website (http://www.c-span.org.) 5. Reuters/NBC/Zogby poll, December 13, 2000. Text of question: "Do you feel that the Supreme Court has maintained an objective balance or has it become too political?" Objective balance, 43 percent; too political, 48 percent, not sure, 9 percent. Text of question: "Do you believe the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in the best interests of the nation, or do you believe the ruling reveals the personal political interests of the justices?" Best interests of the nation, 48 percent; personal interests, 43 percent; not sure, 9 percent. 6. R.W. Apple, Jr., "News Analysis: Nation's Fault Line Divides Justices, l o o , " New York Times, December 12, 2000, p. Al. 7. Bush v. Gore. 8. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shelter, Politics by Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), p. 16. 9. See John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). George W. Bush's presiding over a unified Republican government appears to be more an accident of history than a grand realignment instigated by the voters. 10 John Duchneskie and Stephen Seplow, "Gore's Vote Lead Totals 540,435," Philadelphia Inquirer, December 15, 2000, p. Al. Gore won 50,977,109 votes to Bush's 50,436,674. John Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon by 119,450 votes. 11 Reuters/NBC/Zogby poll, December 13, 2000. Text of question: "Given that the results are so close, please tell me which one of these two statements, A or B, comes closer to your point of view. Statement A: The country will be able to unite behind George W. Bush, who will accomplish a lot in the next four years. Statement B: The country will remain divided, and it will be hard for George W. Bush to accomplish a lot over the next four years." Statement A, 46 percent; Statement B, 50 percent; not sure, 4 percent. 12. Bob Dole, "This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts," ABC News broadcast, November 12, 2000. 13. David S. Broder and Matthew Vita, "Escalation of Warfare Is Likely" Washington Post, November 22, 2000, p. Al.

204

America's Choice 2000

14. "Drums Along' the Potomac," Washington Post, December 3,2000, p. B2. 15. Alison Mitchell, "Man in the News: The 43rd President, George Walker Bush," New York Times, December 14, 2000, p. Al. 16. Thomas B. Edsall, "Growing Rage Over the Recount Sharpens Conservative Rhetoric," Washington Post, November 22, 2000, p. A19. 17. Bush, Victory Speech. 18. Gore, Concession Speech. 19. Ralph Nader, Acceptance Speech, Denver, Colorado, June 25, 2000. 20. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970), pp. 45-58. 21. "Gay Issues, Characters, Join Prime Time," CNN, Showbiz TV, October 16, 2000. Internet site: http://www.cnn.com/2000/SMOWBiyy TV/10/16/ga.TV/inde.x.html. 22. See Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After All(New York: Viking, 1998), especially pp. 275-322. 23. Quoted in Megan Rosenfeld and Michael Colton, "Portrait of Monica," Washington Post, September 14, 1998, p. Bl. 24. Quoted in John B. Judis, "Washington Possessed," The New Republic, January 25, 1999, p. 15. 25. Quoted in Ronald Brownstein, "Poshing the Moral Pendulum," Washington Post, December 31, 1998, p. B5. 26. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, poll, March 16-20, 1999. Text of question: "In your opinion, which one of the following events in the second half of the [20th] century, if any, most represents America's declining morality?. . . President Bill Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, Woodstock and the acceptance of free love and drugs, the Watergate scandal, the Olympic bribery scandal, President John F. Kennedy's marital infidelity." President Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, 34 percent; Woodstock and the acceptance of free love and drugs, 19 percent; the Watergate scandal, 13 percent; the Olympic bribery scandal; 6 percent; President John F. Kennedy's marital infidelity, 5 percent; other/none (volunteered), 8 percent; all (volunteered) 10 percent; not sure, 5 percent. 27. Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil or The Two Nations (New York: Penguin Boob, 1984), introduction by R. A. Butler, p. 12. 28. These were Wyoming, 69 percent; Idaho, 68 percent; Utah, 67 percent; Nebraska, 63 percent; North Dakota, 61 percent; South Dakota, 60 percent; Oklahoma, 60 percent; Texas, 59 percent; Alaska, 59 percent; Mississippi, 58 percent. 29. Washington Post and Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, poll, September 7-17, 2000. Text of question: "If the election for president in November 2000 were being held today, and the candidates were Al Gore, the Demo-

John Kenneth White

205

crat; George W. Bush, the Republican; Pat Buchanan, the Reform Party candidate; and Ralph Nader, the Green Party candidate, for whom would you voter" All registered voters: Gore, 43 percent; Bush, 40 percent; Buchanan, 1 percent; Nader, 3 percent; don't know, 10 percent. Moral values voters: Gore, 16 percent; Bush, 68 percent; Buchanan, 2 percent; Nader, 2 percent; don't know, 8 percent. 30. Voter News Services, exit poll, November 7, 2000. Text of question: "Considering just the moral climate of the country, do you think things are generally going in the right direction or are seriously off on the wrong track?" All voters: Right direction, 39 percent; wrong track, 57 percent. Gore supporters: Right direction, 70 percent; wrong track, 33 percent. Bush supporters: Right direction, 27 percent; wrong track, 62 percent. 31. These were Washington, D.C., 85 percent; Rhode Island, 61 percent; Massachusetts, 60 percent; New York, 60 percent; Maryland, 57 percent; Connecticut, 56 percent; Hawaii, 56 percent; Delaware 55 percent; New Jersey, 55 percent; California, 54 percent. 32. Polk lost his home state of Tennessee in 1844; Wilson lost New Jersey in 1916; Landon lost Kansas in 1936; Stevenson lost Illinois in 1952 and again in 1956; and AlcGovern lost South Dakota in 1972. Richard Nixon also technically fits this category having lost New York in 1968 to Hubert H. Humphrey. Nixon moved to New York from his native California just a fewyears earlier. 33. Voter News Service, exit poll, November 7, 2000. 34. James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963). 35. Quoted in Dale Ylnyard, The Presidency (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 107. 36. Burns, 'The Deadlock of Democracy, p. 244. 37. See White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics, pp. 82-85. 38. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 50. 39. Quoted in Herbert Brownell with John P Burke, Advising Ike (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas , 1993), p. 117. 40. "Party Unity Background," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 9, 1999,"p. 92. 41. Only Jim Jeffords ofVermont, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine, and Arlen Spector remain as the Senate's lone liberal Republicans. 42. Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 165.

206

America's Choice 2000

43. The 2000 Democratic National Platform: Prosperity, Progress, and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 2000). 44. Al Gore, transcript of third presidential debate, October 17, 2000. 45. Ibid. 46. Richard A. Gephardt, Speech to the John E Kennedy School of Government, Boston, Massachusetts, December 2, 1997. 47. Quoted in Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: National Journal), p. 835. 48. Janet Hook, "Liberals in Line to Run House if Power Switches," Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2000, p. Al. 49. Mark Shields, "California's Comeback Kid," Washington Post, March 22, 1998, p. CI I. 50. George W. Bush, transcript of the first presidential debate, October 3, 2000. 51. Republican Platform 2000: Renranng Americas Purpose—Together (Washington, D.C.: Republican National Coimnittce, 2000). 52. George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 3, 2000. 53. Republican Platform 2000. 54. Juliet Eilperin, "DeLay Sees Opportunity of a Lifetime for Republicans," Washington Post, December 7, 2000, p. A23. 55. See Mitchell, "Man in the News," p. Al. 56. Quoted in E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Construction Boon: It's No Accident 'That the GOP Is Being Rebuilt by Its Governors," Washington Post, March 14, 1999, p. B4. 57. Pat Robertson, interview, "Face the Nation," CBS telecast, October 1, 2000. 58. Bush, Victor)' Speech. 59. Interview with Constance Morella, Washington, D.C.,June 2, 2000. 60. "Leaders Say Split Senate May Encourage Cooperation," CNN AllPoIitics website, November 12, 2000. 61. Interview with David Price, Washington, D.C., October 25, 2000.

Biographical Sketch of Contributors

James E. Campbell is Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He has authored a number of books and articles on electoral behavior and American politics, including The American Campaign, the most thorough contemporary analysis of presidential campaigns. M. Margaret Conway is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. She has published extensively on political parties, elections, and political socialization. She is the author of Parties and Politics in America, The American Party System, Political Analysis and Political Participation in the United States, the standard in the field. William Grotty is the Thomas P. O'Neill Chair in Public Life and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy at Northeastern University. He has written on American and comparative politics and is the co-author (with John S. Jackson III) of The Politics of Presidential Selection. John S. Jackson III is Interim Chancellor of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. His published research includes studies of congressional politics, political parties and elections, and elite attitudes and behavior. He is the co-author (with William Grotty) of The Politics of Presidential Selection. Malcolm E. Jewell is Professor Emeritus at the University of Kentucky. He is a former President of the Southern Political Science Association. He has directed research and established data repositories on a variety of topics relating to state government and politics, governors 207

208

America's Choice 2000

and state legislatures, state and local elections, and the development of political science. He is co-author (with David Olson) of American State Parties and Elections, the standard in the held. John Kenneth White is Professor of Politics at The Catholic University in Washington D.C. He is the former national chair of die Committee on Party Renewal and the author of a number of influential works on American politics, political parties, elections, democratic values and policy making. These include Seeing Red and (with David Shea) the New Party Politics.

Index

xAdams, John, 44 Adams, John Quincy, 44, 181, 183 Advancement Project, 88 Adventures- ofOzzie and Harriet, The, 187 Alexander, Lamar, 106 Allen, George, 145 Aristotle International, Inc., 86 Armey, Richard K., 193 Barney, Frank, 194 Bauer, Gary, 8, 106 Bennett, William, 6 Black Entertainment Television, 87 Boies, David, 72 Bradley, Bill, 7, 95-97, 98, 101, 105, 106, 112, 117 and fundraising, 96 Brady, Henry, 83 Breyer, Stephen, 74-75, 144, 182 Brown, Sherrod, 194 Buchanan, James, 185 Buchanan, Pat, 26-27, 33, 41, 124-25 Burns, James Macgregor, 190, 193 Burton, Dan, 38 Burton, John, 197 Bush, Barbara, 88 Bush, George W., 1, 4-5, 27, 29, 95, 102-4,111-12,115,117-18,124, 125-28,143-44,158-61, 180, 189-90, 202. See also "four-party politics"; presidential campaign

2000; presidential debates; "Unified Government" vs. "Divided Government" theory; voting approach to Florida court battles, 58-59, 70-75 campaign financing, 31-33, 106 campaign issues, 16-22, 158-59 campaign strategy, 8-10, 110-11 Electoral College strategy, 23-26 and general election, 10-16 petition to United States Supreme Court, 55-57 and presidential debate, 22-23 Bush, George W. Sr., 139, 158, 199 Bush, Jeb, 24, 45, 46 Bush, Prescott, 193 Canada, electoral process in, 70 Capital Gang, 185 Carnahan, Mel, 194 Carter, Jimmy, 139, 140, 159 Chafee.John] 193 Cheney, Dick, 6-7, 111, 126, 129, 199 Civic Volunteer Model, 83 Clay, Henry, 183 Clinton, Bill, 1, 2-3, 8-9, 13-14, 22, 79, 87, 96, 133-34, 139, 140-41, 142-43, 156, 160 address to Democratic national Convention, 12—13 and Lewinsky affair, 3, 24, 122, 184, 188 209

210

Index

Clinton, Bill {continued) relations with Congress, 154, 156 and the "Third Way," 194-98 Clinton, Hilary Rodham, 3, 140 compassionate conservatism, 198-99, 200 congressional elections, 138-49. See also "Unified Government" vs. "Divided Government" theory and bi-partisan coalitions, 158-61 and partisan conflict patterns, 153-58 of2000, 150-52 in upcoming 2002, 152-53 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 154 Congressional Quarterly, 156 Congressional Quarterly report (2000), 144-45 Contract with America (Gingrich), 160 Corzine,Jon, 32 Cosby Show, The, 187 Coverdale, Paul, 145 Crossfire, 185 Daley, William, 45 Danforth,John, 6 Daschle, Tom, 201 Davidson, Roger, 154 Dean, Howard, 166 DeLay, Tom, 188, 193,200 Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), 3-4 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 32,61,86, 157 Dewey, Thomas, 193 Dirksen, Everett McKinley, 192-93 Disraeli, Benjamin, 188-90 Dodd, Christopher, 186 Dole, Bob, 31, 141, 185, 198, 199 Dole, Elizabeth, 103, 106, 124 Douglas, Stephen, 186 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 173, 192 election administration, 90-91

elections. See congressional elections; gubernatorial elections; state legislative elections Electoral College, 34, 36-37, 62, 70, 73,77,79, 139. See also Bush, George, Electoral College strategy; Gore, AI, Electoral College Strategy Ellen, 187 Emerging Republican Majority (Phillips), 138 Family Leave Act, 140 F'ederal F.lection Commission, 31,32 Feinstein, Dianne, 32 Florida, and sunshine laws, 77 Florida Supreme Court, 46, 52-57, 73-74 Forbes, Steve, 8, 106, 124 Ford, Gerald, 6, 181,192 F'oster, Vince, 3 8 "four-party politics," 190-201 Franks, Bob, 32 Friends, 187 Gans, Curtis, 80 Gephardt, Dick, 157, 195, 197 Gingrich, Newt, 32, 140, 141-42, 156, 157,193 Ginsberg, Benjamin, 184 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 144, 182 Gore, AI, 1, 2-3, 4, 27, 28, 70-71, 87,95,96,98, 101, 105, 111-12, 115, 121-29, 146, 156, 180, 189-90, 195, 196. See also "fourparty politics"; presidential campaign 2000; presidential debates; "Unified Government" vs. "Divided Government" approach to Florida court battles, 59-62, 70-75 campaign financing, 31-33, 106 campaign issues, 8-9, 16-22 educational proposals, 21

Index campaign strategy-, 8-10, 110 Electoral College strategy, 23-26 and general election, 10-16 and presidential debate, 22-23 Green Party, 27, 44, 124, 185 gubernatorial elections, 163-66 Halleck, Charles, 192 Harris, Katherine, 38, 46, 49-50, 71 Harrison, Benjamin, 181 Hastert, Dennis, 151 Hayes, Rutherford 13., 181 Hemesath, Tom, 188 Hitler, Adolf, 26 Huffington, Michael, 32 Humphrey, Gordon, 165 Johnson, Lyndon, 4, 153-54, 190-92 Johnson, Magic, 87 Kasich, John, 106 Kennedy, Edward, 194 Kennedy, John E, 185, 188, 190, 192', 195 Keyes, Alan, 8, 106, 124 King, Larry, 129 Landon.AJf, 189 Leahey, Patrick, 182 Leave It to Beaver; 187 Leavitt, Michael, 166 Lehrer, Jim, 23, 130 Letterman, David, 39 Lewinsky, Monica, 3, 24, 122, 184, 188 Levin, Sander, 194 Lewis, Terry, 51 Lieberman, Joseph I., 2-3, 6, 61, 111 Lincoln, Abraham, 186 Lott, Trent, 151, 201 Mack, Connie, 88, 194 Mann, Thomas, 186

211

Map Applications, Inc., 85-86 Martz, Judy, 166 Matsui, Robert, 197 McCain, John, 5, 6, 95, 97-98, 102-4, 106,112,117-18,189,201 and presidential campaign, 7-8, 33 McGovern, George, 189-90 McLaughlin Group, The, 185 Miller, Zell, 145 Minnesota vs. National Tea Company, 57 Minnen, Ruth Ann, 166 Mitchell, George J., 9 Mondale, Walter, 3 Morella, Constance, 200-201 Muskie, Edmund, 198 Nader, Ralph, 26-31, 33, 41, 124-25, 185, 189, 196 on Al Gore, 28 on George Bush, 29 Nadler,Jerrold, 186 National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), 87 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 87 national conventions, 106-12 delegate diversity, 110 National Rifle Association (NRA), 86 Nelson, Ben, 194 News-week poll, 132, 133 Nixon, Richard M., 139, 181, 185 political reforms because of, 32-33 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 129, 197 Perot, Ross, 26, 129, 196 Phillips, Kevin, 138 political participation trends, 82-83 and African Americans, 82-83, 87-88

212

Index

Polk, James K., 189 Powell, Colin, 6 presidential campaign 2000, 1-2, 36-37, 75-77, 92-93. See also Bush, George W.j Florida Supreme Court; Gore, Al; national conventions; United States Supreme Court; voting aftermath, 37-39, 180-83 closeness of, 132-34 closing stages, 33-35, 131-32 context, 118-19 court action resulting from Florida voting, 48-57 four distinct phases, 117-18, 119-29 initial returns, 39-44 media coverage, 79-80 and political activation, 87-90 and "politics by other means," 183-86 possible states holding recounts, 40 post-election day chronology of events, 50-51 primary financing, 106 primary results, 98-105 public response to Florida court actions, 62-70 social composition of the electorate, 80-82 religious background, 81 "two nations" concept, 187-90 voting recount strategies in Florida, 45-48, 72-75 presidential debates, 129-31 Price, David, 201 primaries. See presidential campaign 200, primary results Pullman vs. Milligan, 54

Real Majority, The (Scammon and

Quayle, Dan, 106, 124,200

Taft, Robert, 192-93 term limits, 172 third partyism, 26-31

Reagan, Ronald, 3, 139, 159, 184

Wittenberg), 187 Redford, Robert, 27 referendum issues, 176-78 Reform Party, 26, 44, 124 Rehnquist, William, 181 Republican National Committee (RNC), 32,86, 144, 146 spending on campaign ads, 89, 90 and Victory 2000 campaign, 89 Richards, Ann, 5 Ridge, Tom, 199 Rohh, Chuck, 145, 151 Roberts, Carol, 38 Rockefeller, Nelson, 193 Roe vs. Wade, 144 Rogan, Jim, 32 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 138, 190 and "New Deal Coalition," 138 and New Deal Congress, 153 Russell, Mark, 75 Scalia, Antonin, 144, 181 Scammon, Richard, 187 Schier, Steven, 83-84 Schiff, Adam, 32 Schlozman, Kay, 83 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 88 Scranton, William, 193 Shaheen, Jeanne, 165-66 Shelter, Maitin, 184 Smith, Bob, 106 Smith, Howard, 192 Starr, Kenneth, 143, 188 state legislative elections, 167-75 Stevens, John Paul, 74, 75, 182 Stevenson, Adlai, 189 Streisand, Barbara, 27 Sybil or The Taw Nations (Disraeli), 188

Index Thomas, Clarence, 144, 181 Truman, Marry, 156, 190 Underwood, Cecil, 166 "Unified Government" vs. "Divided Government," 141, 144, 146-49 United States Supreme Court, 46-47, 55-57, 71, 72-75, 76-77, 144, 202 Verba, Sidney, 83 Volusia County canvassing board, 49,51-52' voting. See also election administration; elections and absentee ballots, 88, 92 and African Americans, 87-88 and ballot access, 92

213

and labor unions, 89 and "Motor Voter" law, 91, 140 and political mobilization versus political activation, 83—85 and political profiling, 85-87 Wall Street Journal, 38, 188 Wattenberg, Ben, 187 Watts, J. C , 185-86 Weicker, Lowell, 193 Wellstone, Paul, 195 Whitman, Christine Todd, 199 Will and Grace, 187-88 Wilson, Woodrow, 189 Yeats, W. B., 201 Zogbyjohn, 33, 185