APPALACHIA AND
AMERICA AUTONOMY AND REGIONAL DEPENDENCE
ALLEN BATIEAU, EDITOR
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY
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APPALACHIA AND
AMERICA AUTONOMY AND REGIONAL DEPENDENCE
ALLEN BATIEAU, EDITOR
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY
Copyright© 1983 by The University Press of Kentucky Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth serving Bellarmine College, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Oub, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University.
Editorial and Sales Offices: Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0024 Ubrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title:
Appalachia and America. 1. Appalachian Region-Social conditions-Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Batteau, Allen, 1946-82-40462 HN79.A13A75 1983 306' .0974 ISBN 0-8131-1480-2
CoNTENTS
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Allen Batteau
INTRODUCTION: lHE lRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY with Phillip Obennille r DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
1
Charles E. Martin
14
FAMILY GROUP ORGANIZATION IN A CUMBERLAND MOUNTAIN NEIGHBORHOOD F. Carlene Bryant
28
STUDYING RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEMS IN lHEIR SOCIAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT Melanie L. Sovine
48
RELIGION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN lHE KANAWHA COUNTY SCHOOL TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY Dwight B. Billings & Robert Goldman
68
THE IMAGE OF APPALACHIAN POVER'IY
86
Walter Precourt
lHE PLACE OF CULTURE AND lHE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY Henry D. Shapiro RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE IN APPALACHIAN KENTUCKY APPALACHIAN INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE HEALlH CARE: lHE CITY VERSUS lHE MIGRANT
111
Allen Batteau
Richard A. Couto John Friedl
142 168
189
LOWER PRICE HILL'S CHILDREN: FAMILY, SCHOOL, AND NEIGHBORHOOD 210 Kathryn M. Borman with Elaine Mueninghoff EXPERIENCES OF IN-MIGRANfS IN APPALACHIA
Mary Anglin
227
FRONTIER CULTURE, GOVERNMENT AGENTS, AND CITY FOLKS James Willia m Jordan
239
PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH ON LAND OWNERSHIP IN RURAL APPALACHIA Patricia D. Beaver
252
CONFLICT, CONFRONTATION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN lHE REGIONAL SETTING Thomas Plaut
267
CONTRIBUTORS
285
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TI-lls book originated in a symposium on Appalachian Studies that was
held at the annual meeting of the Southern Anthropological Associa tion in February 1979 in Memphis, Tennessee . At the conclusion of the symposium the participants decided to seek publication of the papers . Over the next two years several of the papers were substantially revised, and several new papers were added to complete the volume . I would like to express my appreciation to my fellow contributors for their patience in seeing the project through to completion. ALLEN BATTEAU
INTRODUCTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY ALLEN BA TTEAU WITH PHILLIP OBERMILLER
IN the hundred years since Appalachia was discovered by the Amer ican public as a distinctive entity, the question that has recurrently presented itself is that of the identity of Appalachia and the explana tion of a regional culture that was "in but not of" America . In every discovery and rediscovery of Appalachia, the currently fashionable social theories are invoked for the purpose of explaining this identity: Theories of degeneration, "retarded frontiers, " racial devolution, en vironmental determinism, exploitation, cultures of poverty, and inter nal colonialism have all been used as the "basic" cause of Appalachian "otherness . " In some publications one finds an insistence on identify ing authors as " 1 00 percent Appalachian, " even as other articles ac knowledge the difficulty of deciding just what the boundaries of Appa lachia are . Seminars and workshops discuss what it "means" to be Appalachian, and controversies in scholarly circles continue over which factions more authentically "speak for Appalachia. " Behind these questions o f the identity o f Appalachia one hears questions of the identity of America . The paradox of Appalachia is that it has always combined opposed images of America's self-definition: The Appalachia of William G. Frost combined Anglo-Saxon pioneer ancestry with devolution and degradation; the Appalachia of the poverty warriors in the 1960s combined the romantic appeal of bucolic self-sufficiency with the indignity of welfare dependence . Every suc ceeding statement of the identity of Appalachia has posed a challenge for the identity of America: A land of progress containing an entire region of backwardness and poverty, a metropolitan society of rapid mobility and footloose individualism, accommodating a subculture that insists on maintaining strong family ties and a sense of com munity. The fourteen articles gathered together in this volume examine the latest transformation of this paradox, in the creation of an Appalachia
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ALLEN BATIEAU & PHILLIP OBERMILLER
that is increasingly defined in terms of its "need" for educational, health, and social services . They examine the interplay between com munity values and structure, the focus of attention on the region by outside groups, and the conflicts and antagonistic relationships that derive from the professionalized efforts to "help Appalachians." Sovine, Bryant, and Martin examine certain core aspects of the local culture of Appalachia, with some interesting notes on how that local culture itself is informed by its relationship to dominant cultural forms in America. Shapiro and Precourt examine two important aspects of the profes sional definition of Appalachia: The region as a thing-in-itself, and the region as a poverty area . The bulk of the articles examine the conflicts between local and outside groups and values in several domains, and at several levels of experience ranging from a child's search for identity to policy decisions in national councils . The concluding articles, by Pat Beaver and Tom Plaut, while taking note of the conflicts between local and outside, offer an appreciation that the "outside society" is itself differentiated and that Appalachian people can build alliances with outside groups for the purpose of securing local goals. This focus on local values, professional definition, and above all on the conflictual relationships thus resulting, enables us to locate Appa lachia within certain prevailing forms of differentiation in America . It enables us to see that the paradox of Appalachia and America is no paradox at all, for in every succeeding epoch Appalachia has presented itself as an exemplar and a critique of the salient forms of political differentiation within American society, a presentation that is para doxical only to those who insist on seeing America in undifferentiated terms. To understand the historical and political context of this defini tion, it would do well to examine first the succeeding forms of dif ferentiation that in years past have defined Appalachia, and then to consider briefly the ideology and values of the culture of professional ism which now defines it. In the nineteenth century, when the division between commercial metropoles and agrarian hinterlands was an important issue, the southern interior, particularly the upcountry districts, were hinter lands par excellence . As such, they were the object of considerable land speculation. Lawyers, politicians, and large landholders constituted the dominant class of the region. In the industrial society of the turn of the century, Appalachia was first and foremost an industrial outback, supplying raw material for the fortunes of Morgan and Rockefeller. The images of the region then combined the lack of progress and the ravages of progress. As exemplar, Appalachia contained vivid cases of the dis privileged classes: the most isolated ruralites, the most exploited
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
3
proletariat; as critique, Appalachia furnished images for an indictment of the powerful and the urbane, images that range from Sut Lovingood to Mother Jones. These forms of domination have received ample recognition in the scholarly literature of Appalachia . Beginning with the first settlement in the eighteenth century and going through the devastation of the Civil War and the development of timber and mining industries, the political and economic domination by metropolitan elites and the ex ternal control of the region's resources have been well documented . This metropolitan domination continues today, in the form of external ownership of land . 1 Previous studies have examined the use of this ownership to support environmental destruction, 2 and the predatory labor relationships existing within the coal industry. 3 Drawing on analogies from areas colonized by European powers in the nineteenth century, many scholars have concluded that these relationships of ownership and industrial control justify characterizing Appalachia as an internal colony or the internal periphery of a capitalist world system. 4 In the years since World War II America has emerged out of the classical model of industrial society and into what various authors characterise as a post-industrial society or a late capitalistic society . For our purposes here it is less important how this society is labeled than to recognize some of its dominant characteristics, characteristics agreed upon by conservative and liberal commentators alike . In the industrial society of the nineteenth century one of the major divisions of society was between the owners of industrial enterprises and those who worked in them. In the post-industrial society of today, it is the posses sion of managerial and professional expertise, rather than ownership of property per se, that entitles one to a commanding position . In the industrial society of the nineteenth century, the middle class was poorly developed and for the most part outside the industrial system; contemporarily, the middle stratum of society is broad, differentiated, and at the heart of the economy . In the late nineteenth century, political power was concentrated in a smaller number of captains of industry, who purchased senators and governors as carefully as they purchased railroads . Today, such captains of industry have faded into the background, and at national and international levels there is a plurality of centers of power. For scholars and activists working within the region, it is essential to recognize that as these forms of stratification in American society change, so too does the identity of Appalachia . In previous years the subordination of Appalachia was related to its abundant land and later
4
ALLEN BATIEAU & PHILLIP OBERMILLER
to its abundant industrial resources; the prevailing images embraced these facts, even as the prevailing modes of domination exploited them. However, in the late twentieth century, land speculation and industrial predation assume an increasingly archaic quality: The gruff mannered coal barons of the 1920s have been replaced by smooth talking human resource managers and well-tailored community relations experts, working for national and multinational energy corporations, whose polished approach signals the firm and uncon tested grip they have on the region' s mineral wealth . As the older forms of industrial stratification become firmly entrenched, newer forms quietly emerge, appropriating a new set of human activities and human needs into the national economy. Those who are intent on fighting the battles of fifty years ago often fail to notice this invasion of the latest ascendant class . I n the last twenty years a significant ascendant class in Appalachia has been the professionals who control education, health, and social service bureaucracies, replacing the informal structures of family and community control over socialization and mutual support. As with the invasion of Appalachia by coal barons ninety years ago, this has pro duced its own set of conflicts and controversies, in the clashes between newer and older elites, and the creation of new forms of alienation . Although professions such a s the law and medicine are centuries old, the efforts to professionalize a wide variety of occupations, and to secure state protection for professionalization, date back no more than a hundred years . Professionalization is the assertion of a sacred status for an occupational role: It is an effort to remove the rights and obliga tions of the role, the rewards and costs of performance, from the polluting competition of the marketplace, and to have them controlled by a body of collegial peers bearing many resemblances to a priest hood. This is accomplished through the systems of licensing and certification sanctioned by the state and through elaborate periods of 'training in universities set apart from the mundane world . The auton omy so created is legitimized through an ideal of service: The profes sional supposedly performs his or her role to serve society and not for personal aggrandizement . However much this ideal of service may be contradicted by the actual behavior of specific professionals, its political sanction and pub lic subscription nevertheless permit professionals to maintain their monopoly on competence : to assert that only they are able to heal the sick, interpret the law, or unravel the mysteries of the universe . This monopoly, however, creates an alienating and dependent relationship between the professional and the client: it divests the client of his or her own competence and ability and substitutes that of the professional.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
5
Three constituent elements of professionalism make up this alienating and dependent relationship: the ideology, the technology, and the system of interpersonal relationships involved in what Bledstein has called the "culture of professionalism . " 5 As an ideology, professionalism includes both a set of skills and a set of attitudes toward those skills . Professionalism denotes extensive education and certification, which in turn convey a certain status and distinct prerogatives. However, these prerogatives are contingent upon popular acceptance and acclaim, routine in the middle class, but not always forthcoming from blue collar communities such as those in Appalachia or those of urban Appalachians. Contemporarily, higher education is not a major goal for many rural and urban Appalachians . The ambivalence that many Appalachians feel toward the values and expectations of well-educated professionals is well documented in the articles in this collection; the antagonism and potential conflicts it implies will become increasingly important with the continuing de velopment of professional services in the region . In its technological aspect, professionalism involves the application of various techniques to the solution of personal and social problems . For the professional, technique often becomes an end in itself and is applied in a counterproductive manner. Technique frequently entails adopting a dispassionate stance, as when a nurse gives a child a painful injection . While such objectivity is necessary and has short-term advantages, it builds the image of the unfeeling clinician in the minds of both the professional and the client. Eventually both begin to act out of the expectations built on a stereotype. Stereotyping is a two-way street. Most professionals do not count it important to have among their technical skills the cultural competency to work effectively among different social groups. But those who realize that their work is not carried out in a cultural vacuum are hard put to avoid stereotyping. Even the positive labels found in the litera ture on Appalachia which is most accessible to professionals are at best epiphenomenal. 6 Cultural competency in working with Appalachians or similar groups means learning the social, political, and historical contexts in which such groups operate . It is based on solid research rather than the glib assumptions and inaccuracies which unfortunately compose many professionals' working knowledge of the social groups they serve . The third dimension of professionalism is its appreciation and use of bureaucracy . Most professions are closely linked to bureaucratic institutions: scholars to their universities, doctors to their hospitals, lawyers to their courts . These institutions are run by hierarchies and guided by regulation, rather than by collectivities guided by consen-
6
ALLEN BATIEAU &: PHILLIP OBERMILLER
sus. To be professional, therefore, is to be sensitized to a hierarchical mode and to act accordingly by obeying and enforcing regulations . Form takes precedent over result, a n d the written word is more impor tant than the spoken. This is alien to working-class groups like Appa lachians whose quality of life, if not survival itself, depends on getting results whatever the form, through groups whose cohesion is main tained by face-to-face interaction . The result is a conflict between the values and attitudes of profes sionals and those of the communities that they serve, a conflict that is built into the very nature of professionalism . Professional groups, whether they be schools, hospitals , or government agencies, have adopted a world view that accepts instrumental rationality as a fun damental assumption: they approach human groups as objects for technical manipulation rather than as subjects for social participation. They view the world analytically, in contrast to the holistic world view of rural communities . The professional looks for utility while popular culture seeks meaning. The professional has a highly refined apprecia tion for process while the popular culture intuitively values the actual product of the process . In short, the professional attitude, informed by instrumental rationality, often conflicts with the popular ideal; rational technology conflicts with the accumulated wisdom of tradition; formal organizations replace informal networks; and the demands of profes sionalized bureaucracies conflict with the functional economy of every day life . Within the middle class, this conflict is either suppressed or dis placed, because middle-class Americans subscribe to and attempt to participate in the professional values of instrumental rationality. One can see this in the efforts to professionalize the most diverse occupa tions (garbage men become sanitary engineers, groundskeepers be come turf-management technicians) . One can see this in efforts to professionalize consumption, whether in the connoisseurship of im ported wines or in an appreciation of the finer points of CB radios. In all of these efforts there is an attempt to acquire social esteem through an aura of expertise and to assert autonomy through the appropriation of skills, in the face of the dependency relations created by the normal operation of a market society. 7 As a form of social relationship, the two faces of professionalism are autonomy and control, both based on expertise: the protection of one's status against the vicissitudes of the market, and the securing of honor through the creati on of a dependent clientele. In every epoch, the conficts over the prevailing forms of domination have taken on an especially acute form in Appalachia . Because of a local ethos of auton omy and independence, and the uneven penetration of the diverse
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
7
forms of control, efforts to assert control over Appalachian communi ties, even when under the banner of "helping" them, entail greater conflicts than similar efforts elsewhere . This was observable in the mine wars of fifty, sixty, and seventy years ago; it was observable in the violence over the Charleston, West Virginia schools in 1974. The local culture was, and continues to be, well entrenched within Appalachia . It is not, however, unique to Appalachia, as the many recent local protests against outside control attest. These articles thus provide several approaches to the study of two critical issues in contemporary American life: the ongoing experience of a region as part of a national polity and international economy, and the interaction of professionals and bureaucratic organizations with a rural people. By elaborating on the rural culture, the professional world view, the interaction and conflict between the two, and finally on possible resolutions to the conflict, these articles present a message that is important both to professionals and to the local communities within which they work. An excellent example of the local culture, and the functional economy of everyday life that it contains, is presented in Chip Martin's article, "Decorating the Appalachian House . " Martin makes the case for a local culture in an activity usually associated with images of poverty and degradation: papering the walls of one's home with newspaper. From extensive interviewing, he draws out a detailed set of protocols for this process, showing the rules, preferences, styles, and proce dures involved. These people, he concludes, were able to take a product of "mainstream" America-the catalog, newspa per, or magazine-and, following their own traditional framework of always putting an object to new and good use instead of discarding it, utilize it to insulate themselves from the cold, to teach and entertain themselves, to define personal space, to welcome the advent of spring, to beautify their surround ings, and to articulate their dreams.
This offers a dramatic contrast with the poverty image that Precourt analyzes: From Depression-era photographs, many Americans associ ate newspapered walls with deprivation and poverty; for those moun taineers, they represent just the opposite. Yet, in a final ironic turn, presenting "the promises of the consumer-oriented and industrial society," these images, arranged for traditional ends, drew Appa lachians into admiration of the mass-produced good life. In similar vein, F . Carlene Bryant, in her article on family group organization, gives a cJassic illustration of how one must understand the indigenous conceptions of ancestry, identity, blood relatedness, and love before one can make sense out of the organization of a
8
ALLEN BATIEAU & PHILLIP OBERMILLER
Tennessee h illtop community . Based on extensive field research, her article is convincin g proof of the importance of these indigenous con ceptions, a nd hence of a local culture, for understanding the local community . She further illustrates how these meanings are related to relationships involved in religion and neighboring, suggesting the difficulty of separating out kinship, religion, and relationships of pro pinquity . For many scholars, religion offers one of the most distinctive areas of Appalachian local culture, although the sectarian groupings of the region often are seen through denominational eyes. Melanie Sovine, in her article on Primitive Baptists, demonstrates that religion is not so much an "institution" as it is a matrix for the totality of social life . For church members, religion is simultaneously a way of being in-the world and a way of being apart-from-the-world, an experience un familiar to those who see religion as reserved for Sundays . Understanding religion as a patterning element in the local culture enables one to make sense of some of the more distinctive political episodes of the region . When coalminers in the Kanawha Valley struck over the issue of school textbooks in 1974, large numbers of journalists descended on Charleston to observe the newest episode of urban progress versus rural backwardness. Billings' and Goldman's article demonstrates that the key element in this controversy was a working class consciousness filtered through Protestant fundamentalism. For Billings and Goldman, this class consciousness is a form of resistance to the efforts at control entailed in corporate liberalism. These forms of control are the various forms of professional domination to which, in the eyes of the coalminers, the school textbooks lent ideological sup port (although the miners would not state it in that manner) . The view of culture as a filter, through which perceptions are interpreted, similarly informs Walter Precourt' s examination of the definition of Appalachia as a poverty region . In a critical examination of the idea of "poverty" as a stigma essential to the commodity structure of American society, Precourt demonstrates how a capitalist society needs a poverty population, and how Appalachian "poverty" derives not from the standards of living within the region, but from certain values of the metropolitan society. To get ahead of our argument for a moment, one can generalize from this analysis of the source of "pov erty" to the origin of other sorts of "need" for professional help, particularly the lack of health care and educational services . From the perspective o f intellectual history, Henry Shapiro ex amines how the idea of Appalachia as a region has shaped perceptions of and attitudes toward it. In a basic departure from his previous work, Appalachia on Our Mind, where he examined the idea of Appalachian
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
9
"otherness," Shapiro here examines the idea of a region as a bounded combination of people, place, and culture . Such an idea is based upon a pluralist image of America which is comprised of similarly bounded regions, an image that "is consistent with certain American ideals of egalitarianism and localism . This impulse (if one may, with psycholog ical jargon, suggest its pre-rationality) to isolate and classify is at the heart of instrumental rationality, as many (of which Foucault is but the latest) have demonstrated; it is fundamental to the professional world view . Yet in its construction of cultural regions it often obscures the relationships of domination which are national in scope. These relationships supply the point of departure for Allen Bat teau' s examination of dependency relationships in eastern Kentucky . In an effort to link theories of economic dependency with theories of psychological dependency, Batteau sees the lower class of Appalachia as being at the bottom rung of these hierarchies; such relationships, Batteau argues, are implied in the nature of a competitive, centralized economy . As experienced in the lives of those on the bottom, they cultivate feelings of inadequacy and helplessness and impulses of dependency, which some have labeled a "culture of poverty . " Richard Couto's examination of Appalachian innovations i n health care is the first of several case studies in this volume on specific issues in the professional definition of Appalachia . He sees the mal distribution of health services as "related to the political economy of the American health care system" and demonstrates with striking clarity the steps that professionals within the system took to maintain their monopoly on competence . It would require a considerable feat of the imagination to see doctors and medical bureaucrats as exploiters in the same mold as the coal barons; nonetheless, Couto suggests, these maintain their position only at the expense of community control of health care . The analyses of Couto, Batteau, Shapiro, and Precourt all rest on an analysis of American society, seeing it as an integrated and dynamic whole (even when the integration is obscured by constructions of regionalism) . For them, America is made up of diverse groups; no one of these groups can be considered "mainstream" except for the fact that it has captured the imagination and control of resources of the society and hence exerts a dominant influence over other groups. For Couto and Batteau, the control of resources in a competitive economy is a prime consideration, although one might conclude from their articles that in a post-industrial society, intangibles such as health and personal identity have become resources, placed on the market, and made into resources for surplus appropriation . For Shapiro and Pre court, the ability of journalists, novelists, and scholars to capture the
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ALLEN BATIEAU & PHILLIP OBERMILLER
imagination and control the collective representations of the larger society is crucial . These essays see Appalachian "otherness" less as a matter of peculiarity and more related to the control (or lack thereof) of America's collective representations. This is a crucial distinction for students of Appalachia to make . Taking a more ethnographic viewpoint, John Friedl, in "Health Care: The City versus the Migrant, " and Kathy Borman, in "Lower Price Hill' s Children," demonstrate that the problems of community values clashing with professional imperatives are also played out in urban settings . Friedl examines the problems of providing adequate health care to Appalachian migrants in Columbus, Ohio . He distin guishes between the problems that are structural, due to the economic and demographic realities of urban life, and those that are cultural, stemming from the clash between popular and professional cultures. This professional culture stresses an ongoing relationship between the patient and the health care provider, as in programs of prevention and non-crisis intervention; yet the popular culture, resisting such rela tionships (as, we would suggest, implying dependence), is largely crisis-oriented in its attitude toward medical services : turning toward physicians when other remedies have failed and overutilizing emergency room facilities . Friedl argues that for professionals to be effective in their professional goals, they must have an appreciation for the popular culture and how it can contribute to or impede the provi sion of health care . Borman's examination of children's experience in Cincinna ti, Ohio, shows how the clash between the cultures of family, neighborhood, and professional socialization agencies (such as schools) can be per plexing for the child who is trying to integrate these into a coherent identity . These children, and their families, are forced to choose be tween the values of family and community which they brought with them from Appalachia on the one hand, and the values of instrumental rationality taught in schools and necessary for success, on the other. Again, consistent with Friedl' s thrust, while some of this dash is structural, much of it stems from differences in popular and profes sional orientations. Educators who wish to realize their professional goals of providing knowledge and enlightenment to their urban Appa lachian pupils should (as one might conclude from Borman's paper) enlist rather than oppose the popular culture. Mary Anglin, in "Experiences of In-Migrants in Appalachia, " ex pands the viewpoint thus far presented to the context of the entire local community. Based on her experiences of living in western North Carolina for five years, she examines the confrontations resulting from the arrival of several streams of migration into western North Carolina:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
11
young health care professionals, romantic back-to-the-land home steaders, and a somewhat older category of families looking for land to farm . In every case, the problems and difficulties of acceptance into the rural community, whether in its institutions of church, neighboring, politics, or subsistence patterns, create awkward confrontations for local residents and the outsiders alike . Much of the conflict, she sug gests, is focused around land as an "emblem of rural life . " While the outsiders diligently work the land, in order to prove themselves as ruralites, for the local residents it is more the attitude toward land that makes for authenticity . In Appalachia, land is a symbol, a matrix for rural life, a resource for re-creation, and a commodity . These conflicting definitions of land provide the bases for the concluding articles by James W. Jordan, Patricia Beaver, and Thomas Plaut. Jordan, in "Frontier Culture, Gov ernment Agents, and City Folks, " demonstrates how deeply the loss of control of the land they live on affects the lives and behavior of people in eastern Tennessee . He contrasts the world views of Forest Service personnel (professionals), Coker Creek (a traditional community), and Reliance (a more progressive community), describing the sometimes destructive misunderstandings that result. For Jordan, it is the differ ing cultural orientations of these groups that create and exacerbate their conflict. Other scholars, most notably those on the Appalachian Land Own ership Task Force, have documented the dramatic degree of outside ownership and control, as well as the economic and political problems that develop at the local level as ownership shifts out of the region . The study produced by this task force has received widespread coverage elsewhere and requires only minimal citation in this volume. 8 How ever, an examination of the study as one episode in an emerging social movement embracing a diversity of political actors may suggest that both cultural orientation and legal ownership are important elements in the continuing controversies over land . Patricia Beaver, a member of the task force, in "Participatory Research on Land Ownership, " ex amines the events that led up to the commissioning of the study by the Appalachian Regional Commission and the working of a team consist ing of local activists and university-based scholars (with Washington bureaucrats hovering nervously in the background) . For those who may be unfamiliar with them, she gives a brief statement of some of the findings of the study; the primary focus of her article, though, is on how different people, with markedly differing interests and orienta tions, were able to work together on a common problem. Thomas Plaut's concluding essay is both summarizing and path finding. In "Conflict, Confrontation, and Social Change in the Re-
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ALLEN BATIEAU & PHILLIP OBERMILLER
gional Setting, " Plaut contrasts the differing orientations and interests of "formal organizations" and "communities . " These "formal orga nizations" are the institutional setting of the instrumental rationality and professional services that today define Appalachia; the latter are the setting of the "popular" and "folk" cultures that most of the authors in this volume examine . Plaut draws from his experience in a rural clinic, where he was able to mediate between the cultural orienta tions of local residents and the recently arrived health care profession als . From this, he suggests that an appreciation of organizations and communities as cultural systems, made up of personnel, values and goals, and processes provides a tool "for people seeking a measure of control and self-determination in the processes of planning and change . " "By focusing on value orientations, " he concludes, cultural systems analysis enables one to see significant differences not only between agency and agency or agency and community, but among subgroups within an organization . Who wins how much in the struggles between factions is ultimately a matter of power, but often power can only be amassed and strategies developed in the light of usefully organized and focused data that conceptual frameworks such as cultural systems analysis can provide.
We thus have not only a new form of dependency and control, but also a new critique and a new way out of it; for the same society that creates the culture of professionalism has also created new forms of pluralism and the tools with which communal groups can build a more equitable relationship with their professional caretakers. As many have noted, the most rapidly growing part of the American economy is the human resource sector of health care, education, and social services . 9 This growth, and the professional class it establishes, threaten new forms of dependency not only for Appalachians, but for working class communities generally . The articles in this volume docu ment the inherent disservice, misservice, and alienating approach of professionalism when confronting working-class and rural communi ties not as the actions of poorly trained practitioners, but as fun damental to the very nature of the professions. Contemporarily we are witnessing a reemergence, in varyingly conservative and progressive colorings, of ethnicity and cultural regionalism in America . The Moral Maj ority, La Raza, Black Power, and the American Indian Movement are all groups and slogans of this reemergence. Such phenomena, as the papers in this volume suggest, represent not a recrudescence of tribal sentiments within the working-class and ethnic populations, but rather a use of the tools at hand for resisting newer forms of domina tion .
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEPENDENCY
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Such newer forms of class relationship, and the newer forms of resistance, are part of the dynamism of American society . As long as the American economy continues to grow, it will continue to create new dominant groups and new Appalachias--n ew ethnic and regional minorities that will pursue, with whatever means they have, their economic and communal interests . Should any group, whether a pro fessional elite or a moralistic minority, succeed in imposing its vision upon America, it will mean not the perfection of the society but the end of its history . NOTES 1. Steve Fisher, ed . , A Landless People in a Rural Region: A Reader on Land Ownership and Property Taxation in Appalachia (New Market, Tenn .: Highlander Center, 1979). John Egerton , Appalachia s Absentee Lan d lo rd s," The Progressive, 45(6) (1981), 42-45. 2. Harry M. Caudill, My Land is Dying (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1973). 3. Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands (New York : Little Brown, 1963). "
'
4. David Walls, "Internal Colony or Internal Periphery," in Helen M. Lewis, Linda Johnson, and Donald Askin s, Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian Case ( Boone, N . C . : Appalachian Consortium Press, 1978) . 5. Burton Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism (New York : Norton, 1978). 6. As an example of this, one might note that Jack Weller's Yesterday's People con tinues to be required reading for those who are preparing to become caretakers to Appalachian communities. 7. . . . a possessive market s ocie ty necessarily puts in a d ependent position not only the wage-earners but also all those without a substantial (and, by the natural operation of the market, an increasing) amount of capital." C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p . 267. 8. See note 1. 9 . Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1976) . "
DEcORATING THE APPALACHIAN HousE CHARLES E. MARTIN
THE desire for decoration in folk architecture is frequently expressed by the inclusion of such decorative devices as Gothic trim, Greek revival returns, decorated cornices, beaded siding, and wainscot. None alter the structural strength of the building but they do help add a sense of visual pleasure to the necessity of providing shelter. In parts of Appa lachia, particularly eastern Kentucky, these visual reliefs were rarely present in folk housing, perhaps because the aesthetics of a well shaped hewn log, often two feet high, twenty feet long, and carefully thinned with an axe and adz to a uniform six-inch width, may have supplanted the desire to decorate woodwork. Still, the impulse to individualize, to personalize, to decorate was sometimes woven into the unembellished Appalachian structure. One former log builder living today explained that when he built the chimney in his house he rounded the top of the stack (Figure 1 ) from its rectangular base because to him, "It was prettier that way, nicer to look at." 1 Logs, by the 1930s, were sometimes covered with vertical boards and battens (Figure 2) because they could make a log house resemble the more fashionable milled board variety.2 New or freshly painted roof tins were regarded as extremely nice looking by builders who used them.3 Almost all houses had either day lilies, apple rose (usually planted by the well), tulips, or roses growing somewhere close by. But the most far-reaching decorative method, in terms of wide appeal and individualization, was the papering of interior walls from either newspaper, catalogs, magazines, or any combination of the three.4 Papering walls was a practice stretching back in the area for at least eighty years5 and was the norm for at least two reasons-there was little cash for paint (commercial wallpaper only became available in parts of eastern Kentucky in the 1940s and helped replace the older decorative methods) and properly applied paper served as insulation against the weather, which invaded the house through small cracks and openings that formed between the logs and mud chinking or
DECORATING THE APPA LACHlAN HOUSE
Figure I. An aesthetically planned chimney built, as was the attached log house, in the late 1 930s.
15
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CHARLES E . MARTIN
Figure 2. A board and batten house. The spaces between the eleven-inch boards are covered from the elements by the four-inch battens.
between the boards and battens. Although these papered walls are often considered, by the outsider, to symbolize the neglect and dis order of Appalachian life, the application and placement of media pages was highly structured, following collectively established pat terns but still allowing the possibility for individualized expression. Most important, this practice was base d on the Appalachian custom of transforming nonfunctioning machine-made objects into objects fit for everyday use. Worn-out shoes, for example, became hinges, and empty lard buckets were turned into stools, or cut into strips and used for chimney flashing. 6 A log wall first had to be prepared for papering by applying a heavy paper or cardboard to smooth out uneven surfaces and by filling any large holes with wads of rolled paper or burlap, since the wallpaper would split over any open spaces as the paste dried. Proper application of the paper meant no tears or breaks could appear. Children also had a tendency to want to stick their finger s through such places. A board and batten house had straighter walls and needed only a cardboard undercoating, which served as insulatio n and as a backing for the paper. Paper saved for wallcovering was held on with a paste made from boiled water and flour, which , when mixed to the right consistency, was thin enough to spread evenly but too thick to run down the walls.
17
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
It was important to remove the lumps either by hand or with a short broom. One former paperer recalled: You take your hand and get all the lumps out of it. Then you stir it and it will be very smooth, the paste is. If it lumps, it's not very good. It's not good to leave it over either. You usually try to use up what paste you make that day or it' s not very good . 7
A paste mixed so that it was smooth and clear would not show through the paper. Red pepper and rat poison were sometimes added to keep the mice from eating it. Sweet anise and arrowroot, which grew along the high ridges and had a licorice taste, were dug up, the roots dried, ground to a fine powder, and added to the paste to give it a sweet aroma. The act of papering itself was thought to give a room a fresh look and smell. The sheets of paper were laid flat on a table and a small brush was used to dab a small amount of paste in the corners, around the edges, and once or twice in the center. It was then applied with the pasted side to the wall, beginning in any corner, either 1 , 5, 1 6, or 20. (Figure 3 represents a papered wall showing the relative positions of the pages. Each page is given a number to show the possible sequences in which it could be pasted.) The next sheet was then applied, with particular attention being paid to keeping the borders straight and overlapping the previous page by about an inch. Straight edges were thought to look correct. If its lines were not uniform, a papered wall could not be
2
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Figure 3. Layout of a papered wall . Overlapping of adjacent sheets is indicated by broken lines.
18
CHARLES E. MARTIN
considered attractive. Two basic patterns of application, either hori zontal or vertical, were followed. If number 1 was the first sheet applied, the rest followed the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or the 1, 6, 1 1 , 16, 2, 7 sequence. Any paper that overlapped the edge of the wall was care fully trimmed with scissors or pocketknife. Of the three types of paper used, magazine paper was the favorite because of its heavy weight. It lasted longer and coal dust discolored it more slowly. Newspaper and catalog paper were of the same light weight and needed to be papered over as often as every two weeks because of fading and discoloration. One informant told of her father saying he needed to rush home before the dress styles in the paper pasted to the walls changed again. 8 Newspaper did have its advan tages: if sheets were chosen without photographs, it approximated a wall painted white. The white background's domination of the black print was the reason newspaper was used on ceilings. Before electric ity, newspaper reflected outside light better and made the room seem brighter. Also, stray pages with photographs were thought to upset the visual uniformity of a wall or ceiling covered only with print. Pages with photos, on the other hand, were sometimes consistently chosen so that the wall was awash with what were considered interesting images. 9 This policy of photo versus non-photo was flexible enough to change, though, by the next papering. With newspaper it was important that the print face right side up. (Occasionally, however, the print was purposely applied upside down, since it was regarded by some as a sin to read anything but the Bible.) The older and more illiterate residents could often only tell which way was up by the inclusion of pages with photos; they spaced the photo pages evenly with the non-photo so that an acceptable mixture of both ran along the wall. If no photo pages were available, it was still necessary to have the edges absolutely straight even though the writing was often upside down. A different practice was to cut the pages square and alternate them so that the newsprint columns in square 1 (see Figure 3) were vertical, those in square 6 were horiz ontal, 11 vertical, 16 horizontal, 2 horizontal, and so forth, so that a checker board pattern was formed. Another pattern had the newsprint col umns in line 1, 6, 1 1 , and 16 run vertically, and the columns in line 2, 7, 12, and 17 run horizontally so that each column alternated print direc tion. These were called "crazy quilt" walls. Usually, if not enough of one type of paper was available to go around a room, then two or more types were used, but none could be mixed on the same wall. Newspaper might be used on three walls but even if there was enough to do half of the fourth, catalog paper was
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
19
substituted instead. It was thought to be too visually disordered to co mbine the two on one wall. Another use of newsprint was to serve as a bland background for favorite color pictures from magazines which were pasted in the center of a wall or over the fireplace. In this scheme it was important not to use newspaper with photos which could detrac t from the central focal point. The outline of the wall was like a large frame, the newsprint was the mat, and the magazine picture the painting. Sometimes, to ac centuate the central picture even more, one of two devices was used: the newspaper to be used along the wall' s edges (boxes 1, 6, 1 1 , 16 , 17, 18, 19, 20, 15, 10 , 5, 4, 3, and 2) was folded in a back-and-forth pattern and notched on one end with scissor s. When unfolded, the ends opened into a symmetrical cut-out design, which was then pasted on with the scalloped e dges nearer the outside perimeter of the wall. The darker colored cardboar d underneath accentuated the scalloped edges. This method was even used without benefit of a central picture (Figure 4). The other fashion was to paper the same outside perimeter with magazine page s held in no particular regard except as a contrast ing, colorful border to the white , central background and as an accent to the central picture area. Each wall paperer exercise d personal prefer ence in her choice of the middle picture. Preferred pictured subjects
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20
CHARLES E. MARTIN
were Christmas, houses, automobiles, and ornately prepared food dishes, for example . One woman recalled : I remember in a farm magazine one time when you opened it, it had a picture in the middle . It was a farm, and that was so pretty I remember putting that over the mantel and then put white around it; that big farm. I remember that, you know, it was all different things, farm horses and cattle in this big barn, and . . . it was pretty . 1 0
Another informant used pictures of flowers because she thought they approximated t he still lifes that hung on the walls in homes out side the area. 1 1 Another used Norman Rockwell covers from the Saturday Even ing Post because "It kind of told a little story," which h er small children, who had not yet learned how to read, could appreciate . 12 Some people placed cartoons and Sunday funnies along th e l ower walls at about eye level for the smaller children who were then able to move around the room looking at one after the other. Since the walls were repapered as often as every two weeks, there was always a fresh round of new cartoons. Interesting newspaper articles were pasted up which mothers wanted their ch ildren to read. Two informant s told how they learned to spell "Cincinnati" from the wall, and another said all her children learned the alphabet by playing a game in which one of them would sight a letter on the wall and t he others would try to locate that particular lett er by following his instructions on whether they were getting closer or farther from it. Variant s of this game were played with colors or subject s on the magazine and catalog page s . One informant made a special point t o paste newspaper poems in positions where she could read t hem while she worked. She learned to do this over sixty years ago as she sat at the table eating with her father. As she tells it: I learned a many of a poem right off the wall when I was a little girl . Me and my dad learned poems off the wall when I was nine years old . It was right up over the table where we ate, and he told me, "Let's me and you see which one can remember this the longest"; and he's been dead about ten years . He remembered it the last time I talked to him and I remembered it, too . It tickled me and him. It said, Foxes could talk if you know how to listen, Pa said so. Owls have big eyes that sparkle and glisten, Pa said so . And bears can turn flipflops and climb big elm
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
21
trees and steal all the honey away from your bees and they don't mind the winter because they never freeze, Pa said so . Girls is scared of a snake, boys ain't, Pa said so. Girls run and holler and sometimes they think, Pa said so. A boy'd be ashamed to be frightened that way when all a snake wants to do is play, You've got to believe every word that I say, Pa said so. They're as fond of a game as they are of a fight, Pa said so. Most all the animals found in the woods ain' t all time fierce, most time they're good . The trouble is mostly they' re misunderstood because, Pa said so. (laugh) Ain't it funny? One thing that made me remember it so good was me and him was saying let' s see which one can remember it the longest. The last time I talked to him not long before he died he asked me if I remembered it and I said yes and he said he did too and he said it to me. 13
Magazine paper was heavier, more durable , and did not need to be changed as often, as this informant remembered: When I could get a Life or a [Saturday Evening] Post or something, why they were the most precious ever was and we'd save them, you know. I'd use them and they'd last maybe a year and they'd stay white, but newspaper you'd have to paper every two weeks because they'd turn yellow . 14
Color page s were also popular . After the wire staples were removed, the pages were dabbed with paste and advantageously arranged on the wall so that the eye would fall o n the image s to which the paperer was most attracted. In a wall awash with color, the favorite picture, the one neighbors would sto p and comment on, was placed in the middle of the wall, the most coveted spot in the house fo r a favored two dimensional, repre se ntational subject. Since these walls were repa pered at least once a year, it gave the paperer the opportunity to find new image s, reinforcing the same theme , or to change theme s entirely, thus showing new personality facets, though sometimes at risk. One woman put a picture of a car in the middle of her wall and recalled that "my sisters laughed at me , made a joke about it because I kept th is car in my bedroom on the wall. I don't know why I did it unless it was just
22
CHARLES E. MARTIN
bright and colorful. " 15 At a later date she mentioned she used cars because they represented the means to get to all the places, particularly the cities, she wanted to see . 16 With magazines, as well as catalogs, there was some segregation by subject matter. Pictures of food were pasted on the walls where the family ate and recipes were near the stove, visually reinforcing spatial function . Some people arranged the magazine pages across from where they slept, not necessarily by subj ect matter but by color, so that at night the light of the coal fire would reflect off the glossy colored walls causing those special chosen hues to dance as they fell asleep. The third type of paper used on a large scale were the pages from the old Sears and Montgomery Ward catalogs, called "wish books . " 1 7 The staples were removed and the pages were sometimes pasted up in the order they came from the book. Some people, though, saw that method as breaking esoteric rules. For example, some informants never mixed tools with clothes, or tools with shoes . It was important to keep subjects closely related to each other within the same area (like women' s shoes and dresses) or to pick certain motifs corresponding with room use: for example, toys for boys went where the boys slept, girls' dresses and furniture defined the girls' area, and dresses and shoes usually went in the adults' bedroom . As the paper went up, family members were allowed to pick the subjects that, until the next
Figures 5. A Knott County woman on her papered porch, around 1925 . Courtesy Alice Lloyd Photographic Archives.
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
23
papering, would define the limits of their individual living space. One informant remembered that she liked: the pictures with furniture. That is what I would always pick when my mother would be papering mine and my sister's room; that was the bedroom. I'd pick the pages that had the living room couch and chairs to match and an old rocking chair sitting in the background. And then also the bedroom suites, like the bed and the chest and the dresser, and usually you'd see a dog sitting in the background in the corner. I picked things like that. That's what I liked my 18 bedroom to be papered with .
The subjects used in the communal living areas were generally chosen at the discretion of the paperer. One informant expressed an additional rule that papered walls did not go well with linoleum floors, but only with wood floors or hooked rugs. 19 Certain types of paper, not so widely utilized as magazines, news paper, and catalogs, were used on th e walls for a different effect. In one instance, the lilac-patterned wrappers of Waldorf toilet tissue were used. Also, before World War II paper flour sacks sold in Appalachia were white on the outside and covered with print, but the inside color was a robin's egg blue . Women were careful then to open the sack by the folds without tearing it. When the flour had been used, the bottom was unfolded, the sack laid flat, and saved until enough sacks had accumulated to cover a wall. All the frayed ends were later trimmed with scissors and the paper applied like other types, with continued care concerning straight edges. Some took red paper from other kinds of sacks and outlined the blue walls with it. This red border could also, at the paperer's option, be scalloped. Newspaper had other decorative uses: instead of pasting scalloped pieces on the walls, paperers often hung them from the mantel, from the cupboards, along the window sills, and from the ceiling joists, if these were visible. One informant, though, when talking about deco rations, expressed how taste and values had changed in Appalachia: You could cut that [newspaper] out in all kind of little designs, you know. Fold it together and cut it out. Oh, you just learn a lot of things, when you have to make your own. But now, you know, it wouldn' t go good now, but it was really pretty then. And everybody lived alike, you know, that was the thing about it. Nobody, even if somebody had a little more money, they didn't show it. And now everybody wants to live j ust a little bit more than somebody else . 20
These cutouts, called "lacing, " were considered a pretty decoration unto themselves, but if the doors were left open on a warm, windy day they trembled in the breeze-a visual treat usually reserved for spring time.
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CHARLES E. MARTIN
There were other decorations heralding spring. After the weather warmed enough so that coal was no longer burne d in the firebox, the latter was cleaned of its soot and ashes and the grate taken out and scrubbed down to the metal. Orange clay was th en rubbed over the front of the grate before setting it back in the firebox. The fireplace arch and jamb rocks were coated with white or blue clay, and willows or garden roses were cut, placed in the grate and allowed to extend out a short distance into the room. Spring cleaning was also considered to be a form of decoration. Children were sent down to the creek bed to pound white sandstone into granule s as an ali-day project. The sand was spread over the poplar floor and rubbed in with a hickory scrub broom until the floor looked white . One individual recalled its joys: That good fresh smell of clay. There were clay banks, really, and you'd go and get that and it was already gooey, you know, and it was just white as it could be, and when it would dry, it was as white as snow . A lot of people that didn't want to paper but they had the ceiling, the rough ceiling, and they would put that over the ceiling . It was just like paint, it was beautiful . And when we scrubbed our floorr--w e didn't have rugs of any kind-and when we scrubbed our floors, we beat up the whitest sand rocks . That was a day's work for the children to take a hammer and beat up all that sand, if you were going to scrub the next day. After we had rinsed it all off-scrub it and rinse it all off-then we would sprinkle that sand over it and let it lay on there until it dried, then sweep it off and it was just as white and smelled so good and fresh. 21
A well-scrubbed floor was said to look as if it had a coat of wax (and it also kept the spring fleas down). 22 This scrubbing was extended by some people to include the door and window facings, and even the chairs . What is left of all this work and decoration done years ago in Appalachia is the image of a room freshly papered, with edges perfectly straight, the fl oors and doors white, the green of spring extending out from the once black heat source, and the lacing moving sporadically in the breeze that made its way through the opened doors and windows. One obvious value of these decorations was, of course, thrift. The Appalachian could visually improve his surroundings with a mini mum of capital. Another was cleanliness. An informant mentioned that if one walked into a house , h owever humble, and clean paper was on the walls, the housekeeper was automatically assumed to be a good one. A third value was more inclusive--even if only one medium was spread throughout the interior walls of a house, each family member
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
25
could relate to its varied images on an individual basis . One member might, at any one time, see an image as artistic, another see it as encompassing dreams, another as educational, and another as a form of entertainment. Many of these decorations allowed a certain degree of individual expression in a culture that had, for generations, placed its weight behind tradition and its predictability . The individual could add small esoteric embellishments to a quilt or chair or the preparation of a certain food which would not threaten older cultural and artistic norms . But when someone cut a picture to which he was strongly attracted from a magazine and placed it in the middle of the wall or over the mantel where all could see, he took a calculated step away from predictability based on tradition and toward symbols conceived of by national advertisers . By the 1 930s, with the consumerism based on the coal-related industrial paycheck, these symbols of houses, cars, clothes, Christmas, and carefully arranged foods influenced Appa lachians increasingly to change their conceptions of what life was supposed to be like . The wallpaper continually and visually presented the promises of the consumer-oriented and industrial society-a soci ety not of traditional farmers, but of suburban men who carried un dented lunch boxes to clean factories in polished workboots and pressed workclothes . Their wives had well-equipped white kitchens and their children every kind of toy . The images of factory-made furniture, lawn chairs, automobile seatcovers, and electric refrigera tors constantly beckoned to people in eastern Kentucky as examples of the industrial wonders and conveniences . When family members divided catalogs by subj ects t o define indi vidual space, it was a prelude to the Appalachians' decision to alter the course of their lives, to pursue not a community-oriented system of survival, but a more economically complex system of industrialism, mobility that promised to spiral steadily upward, and decisions based on personal, not group choices. Media-papered walls were not a sym bol of privation but of the conscious acceptance of change, born of the Appalachian' s optimism to use industry rather than to let it use him . Residents could state their dreams by using these pages and giving their particular choices of symbolic images prominence in the center of the orderly arranged wall or over the mantel . One informant recalled pasting pictures of cities in the center of her wall and poetically reasoned : "I've never been to a large city in my life, and I'm a little bit like Tom Sawyer. I guess I like to explore . I explore with my mind even if I've never been there . " 23 How does the contemporary Appalachian look back upon these no-longer-functional decorative techniques? That depends on age and
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CHARLES E. MARTIN
experience . Younger people, more industrially oriented, are emo tionally and experientially removed from media-papered walls. They would not, under any foreseeable circumstances, decorate that way. "Are you crazy?" was one informant's response. Older people, who used it and understood its aesthetic, functional, and symbolic value, are still drawn toward it . Several informants expressed the desire someday to paper a wall with newspaper . But which wall? Well, it would have to be a wall tucked away out of sight because, as one informant put it, "People would make fun of me . " She and many other women are afraid of embarrassing their children and grandchildren, who view Appalachia's past much differently than their elders. Many women feel they would paper the old, emotionally comforting way if it were not for the pressure put upon them by young people not to. Regardless of the present attitude of the young who equate news papered walls with the bad old days of technical deprivation, the older Appalachians were able to take a product of "mainstream" America the catalog, newspaper, or magazine-and, following their own tradi tional framework of always putting an object to new and good use instead of discarding it, utilize it to insulate themselves from the cold, to teach and entertain themselves, to define personal space, to wel come the advent of spring, to beautify their surroundings, and to articulate their dreams. NOTES This article, in an earlier form, appears in Appalachian ]ourna/ 10(1) (Autumn 1982):42-52. I wish to thank Katherine R. Martin for her helpful advice and editorial assistance. 1. Interview with Boss Slone, Hindman, Kentucky, 23 July 1979. The chimney and house were built in the late 1930s in Knott County, Kentucky. 2. Interviews with Irene Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 24 October 1 979; Oliver Caudill, Lexington, Kentucky, 13 October 1979. 3. Interviews with Austin Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 23 May 1979; Boss Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 23 July 1979; Ellis Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 20 June 1979; Elbert Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 1 April 1979. 4. Occasionally houses were papered on the exterior walls underneath porch roofs, as Figure 5 demonstrates. 5 . Meredith Slone of Pippa Passes, Kentucky, in an interview conducted 22 October 1979, recalled her mother saying that she began papering walls in about 1900. The practice, however, may be much older. The oldest wallpaper located in the area, in terms of publication date, has been from an 1833 edition of James Fenimore Cooper's The Pioneers. It could have been applied much later than that, of course. Papering may possibly have antecedents in the British Isles. In Scotland, whitewashed newspaper was used to smooth over a roughly finished wooden wall . Occasionally, the newspaper was left unpainted, covering the wall or the headboard of
DECORATING THE APPALACHIAN HOUSE
27
an enclosed box bed in even rows (R. W. Smith, Curator, Auchindrain Museum of Country Life, Argyll, Scotland, to Charles E. Martin, 6 January 1982) . 6. Interview with Marcus Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 4 February 1980. 7. Interview with Rilda Watson, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 22 October 1979. 8. Interview with Aorida Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 4 November 1979 . 9. Interview with Meredith Slone, 2 2 October 1979. 10. Interview with Alberta Madden, Hindman, Kentucky, 23 October 1979. 1 1 . Interview with Lou Hattie Hall, Hollybush, Kentucky, 4 October 1979. 12. Interview with Vema Mae Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 23 October 1979. 1 3 . Interview with Meredith Slone, 22 October 1979. 14. Interview with Alberta Madden, 23 October 1 979. 15. Interview with Irene Slone, 21 May 1979. 16. Interview with Irene Slone, December 1979. 17. Sears has adopted the term for their own advertizing campaigns. 1 8 . Interview with Irene Slone, 1 6 November 1 979. 19. Interview with Betty Huff, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 6 October 1979. 20. Interview with Mary Sparkman, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 23 November 1979. 21. Interview with Mary Sparkman, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 5 November 1979. 22. Interview with Paul Slone, Hollybush, Kentucky, 17 February 1980. 23. Interview with Irene Slone, Pippa Passes, Kentucky, 16 November 1979.
FAMILY GROUP ORGANIZATION IN A CUMBERLAND MOUNTAIN NEIGHBORHOOD F . CARLENE B RYANT
THE "top of the mountain, " 1 a small rural neighborhood in which I conducted research in 1974-75 and the summer of 1976, comprises fifty-one households situated on and about three ledges or "flats" near the summit of one of the Cumberland Mountains in East Tennessee. With the exception of a family of four who recently moved to the mountain from Virginia, all of the neighborhood's 198 residents are related, and people make much of this fact in remarking upon their social world . They are fond of explaining, for example, that "We're all at least a little bit kin," that "We're all one big family here"; and they stress this feature when_ comparing their neighborhood with other American communities-outside-the-mountains . Ties of kinship are evoked in numerous contexts as commentary on diverse facets of the neighborhood' s social organization. Thus, a man explaining his landholdings may cite his kin relationships with the owners of adjoining tracts or tell of how his great-grandfather settled the property in the nineteenth century. And he may explain a neigh bor' s church affiliation with "Well, her daddy was one of the first preachers in that church," or remark of another that "Ever since he married that Cooley girl, he' s been going over there to Mountain Baptist . " His manner of speaking suggests that relations of kinship, persons' positions in the neighborhood's kin network, are maj or deter minants of social roles and group memberships. All this is reminiscent of the classic kinship societies that have long preoccupied anthropologists, societies that are organized on the basis of one or another of the many ordering possibilities inherent in a genealogy . Yet from another perspective the top of the mountain is anything but a kinship society. In fact, it could even be argued that kinship may play a smaller role in the day-to-day lives of these moun tain residents than it commonly does for people in most other parts of
FAMILY GROUP ORGANIZATION
29
the United States. This conclusion is suggested by the logic of the situation . For where everyone (or almost everyone) is kin and where, as in most of American society, the indigenous conception of kinship seemingly neither includes principles for the categorization of kin into discrete and bounded groups nor even clarifies egocentric classifica tions beyond the range of first cousins, kinship would appear to be relatively meaningless as a basis for social organization. Indeed, although residents frequently use the terminology of kinship in speaking of their social world, the actual memberships of the mountain' s maj or social groupings--ev en of its four extended fami lies-often seem to be based on principles of organization and recruit ment that are radically different from those of kinship . What, then, is the significance of kinship on the top of the mountain? Students of Appalachia have long stressed the importance of kinship and family in the region, writing, for example, that Appalachia "was, and to a considerable extent still is, a familistic society, " 2 and that kinship "is the central organizing principle of social life . " 3 But while these kinds of statements are not untrue of the top of the mountain, they shed little light on the role of kinship there . In what sense is the top of the mountain, or Appalachia generally, a familistic society, and how does kinship organize social life-by what principles and mechanisms and into what patterns? This paper is concerned with an aspect of this problem that appears to be particularly crucial for understanding the social organization of the top of the mountain. Specifically, it explores the indigenous mean ing and role of kinship in shaping the four extended family groups of the neighborhood . As will be apparent to readers acquainted with the work of David M. Schneider, my analysis owes much to his seminal study of American kinship, in which he treats kinship as a cultural rather than an exclusively biological and social phenomenon. 4 Not surprisingly, since the top of the mountain is an American neighbor hood, many of my findings and conclusions closely parallel those of Schneider for American kinship in general. Yet I also depart from Schneider' s analysis and approach in many ways and am throughout considerably less faithful to his account than to the statements of the people of the top of the mountain . This is as it should be, of course, for what kinship is "all about, " according to Schneider, is whatever the "natives" say it is all about. 5 FAMILY GROUPS
Although almost all residents of the top of the mountain are related, some are considered to be more closely related than others; and, with
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the exception of a newcomer family, residents speak of themselves as belonging to one or the other (or, in a few cases, two) of four extended family groups . Each of these families is designated by a surname, each is thought to be composed of closely related kin who are the descen dants and affines (spouses and their relatives) of the descendants of a founding ancestor bearing the family name, and each is associated with the area of the neighborhood said to have been settled by this ancestor in the nineteenth century . The eighteen members (five households) of the Campbell family trace their family descent from Isaiah Foley Campbell, who moved to the mountain from Foley Bottom, a small community near the south eastern foot of the mountain . Isaiah and his family probably arrived shortly before the Civil War when, it is believed, Isaiah purchased about seventy-five acres of mountain land from the non-resident owner of a large land grant. Most members of the Campbell family people who count themselves as the descendants and affines of the descendants of Isaiah Foley Campbell-still reside in the general area in which Isaiah's land is believed to have been located . This is a small community now known as Campbell Flats or Laurel Woods, located at the southern end of a flat south of the county highway which passes through the neighborhood. The second family group, known as the Johnsons of Rocky Gap, is said to have been founded with the arrival of Robert Johnson and his family from Sourwood Grove, another small community at the south eastern foot of the mountain . Probably shortly after the Civil War, Robert Johnson traded his property in Sourwood Grove for about 100 acres of mountain land owned by a resident named Isaiah Wiley. This tract is thought to have been located in an elevated pass now known as Rocky Gap, and most of the mountain's sixty-eight current residents (seventeen households) who are known as "one of them Johnsons, " as the descendants and affines of the descendants of Robert Johnson, reside in this area . The ninety-six members (twenty-four households) of the third family group, the Bradleys, date their family' s residence on the moun tain from 1871 . In this year, according to an old deed retained by a member of the family, Abraham Bradley of Sourwood Grove became "the first Bradley on the mountain" when he purchased 200 acres of land from a local settler named Zachary Wiley. This tract is believed to have been located on a second flat north of the county highway and is now known as Bradley Flats or Cherokee Bluff. 6 Most current residents who are considered to be "Bradleys or leastwise married to Bradleys" live there . The twenty members (seven households) of the fourth family, the
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31
Johnsons of Mine Flats, reside on a third flat known as Mine Flats or Lower Bluff, which is situated beneath Bradley Flats . Mine Flats was settled by Hiram Johnson, the founder of the Johnson family of Mine Flats, who is said by some to have been "some kin" to Robert Johnson, although the precise nature of the genealogical link is not generally known . Most residents also do not know where Hiram lived before his arrival on the mountain, but they think he probably settled there shortly after Abraham Bradley . FAMILIES AND GENEALOGIES
Most mountain residents' closest social relationships-exhibited in frequent visiting, finding work for one another, assisting with house and garden chores, selling, buying, renting, and giving land, and so forth-are within the family group, among people they consider to be their close kin. These close relationships are believed to derive from the close kinship links among family members, and intrafamily kinship relationships come up frequently in daily conversation as commentary on various family members and the social relations prevailing among them. The following excerpt from a tape-recorded conversation illus trates the context in which family relationships are often discussed: You know, Eli and Alice went and got theirselves a lot of new [things] . Yeah, I seen it . . . They're always spending money, uh, buying new things, and don't have a cent put away . They've always been that way. Yeah, but it's funny, ain't it, how the others is so different. Now you take Cal-he's so careful and don't hardly spend nothing. Must have a lot saved up by now . Funny how two brothers can be so different. Well, Cal takes after his mother that way. She was old Sam's girl, and that bunch was always tight-fisted . And, 'course, you got to remember that Alice was a Smith [a non-resident family] and that comes into it.
A great deal of genealogical information is exchanged through such conversations, and most adult residents of the mountain can trace the relationships linking the members of their own family group to one another and to their family founder three to five generations ascen dant. However, compared with their familiarity with the details of con sanguineal and affinal relations among their close kin, or members of their own family group, most people are not highly conversant with the number and precise nature of all the ties through which family groups are related to one another, that is, through which the Camp bells are related to the Bradleys, the Bradleys to the Johnsons of Rocky Gap, and so forth, mainly as a result of past interfamily marriages .
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These relationships between families are generally described as being "distant" ones . "We're all at least a little bit kin, " as residents say, but some kin-namely, members of one's own family-are "close" kin, while others are "just a little bit kin" to oneself. Most residents are familiar with at least some of these interfamily links, but usually only with those that are recent or genealogically close to themselves. For example, any marriage between resident members of two of the mountain' s family groups that had occurred, say, within the last twenty to thirty years would be a matter of common knowl edge, and the members of the household concerned would either be spoken of as members of both family groups (as in fact is the case for two households) or would be affiliated with one family with the in marrying spouse noted to be also, as an individual, a member of the other family group (as occurs in the case of one household) . With regard to a long past interfamily marriage, the grandchildren of the alliance will almost certainly be aware of their links to both family groups involved, noting for example that "My grandmother was a Johnson, " but many other people may be unaware or only dimly aware of the link. That most residents are not particularly knowledgeable about the details of all interfamily relationships is not to say, however, that these links are not knowable . Consultations with several elderly residents who are reputed to know all about the "old timey" days and who have old family Bibles on hand elicited many connections between family groups. And an elderly former resident of the mountain, now residing in a nearby town, has been engaged for some years in tracing the ancestry of one of the mountain' s families . She generously shared her data with me, revealing many more interfamily ties. These inquiries revealed that genealogical relationships among all mountain residents (not just among members of the same family group) are far more complex and closely knit than residents generally suggest to be the case. For example, most people say that Robert Johnson and Hiram Johnson and the two families founded by them are probably distantly related, but through unknown ties. In fact, it was found that both Johnson families are descended from Robert Johnson for, as was recalled by two elderly residents, Hiram Johnson was Robert Johnson's son. Also noteworthy are two second-generation marriages among the children of Robert Johnson, Isaiah Foley Camp bell, and Abraham Bradley, through which many mountain residents . are descended from two or more of these men . A number of older people are aware of these links, and they point to them as evidence of the distant interrelatedness of the mountain's families . They do not,
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however, interpret them as suggesting that these family groups are each descended from several family founders or that most people are members of more than one family . Clearly, when residents speak of each family as being composed of "close" kin who are all "Bradleys or leastwise married to Bradleys" (or Campbells or Johnsons, as the case may be), and when they trace its origin to the arrival on the mountain of one and only one putative founder, they are lending each family clearer contours and a more distinct identity than it possesses genealogically. More than this, they are thereby creating these families. For the complex and intricately interwoven kinship diagrams resulting from my research revealed less the genealogical relationships among four families than an "endoga mous soup" from which four conceptually distinct family groups had been delineated through a process of selective recall and interpretation of genealogical detail. But what principles and concepts have informed this selection and creation? How, to phrase the problem somewhat differently, does the indigenous image of the neighborhood as composed of four distantly related and distinct "families" come to be? To be sure, the family groups of the top of the mountain are each said to be and are in fact composed of the descendants of a founding ancestor . They are thus apparently similar (except for the promiscuous inclusion of affines) to the ancestor-focused cognatic or nonunilineal descent groups that anthropologists have described for many societies throughout the world . In fact, Ward H. Goodenough illustrates one form of this kind of kinship system with the example of some Appa lachian communities : I n a n endogamous community, the course o f time will produce a n increasing overlap of membership in such [nonunilineal descent] groups, until eventually everyone is descended from all the founding ancestors and the several descent groups have become coterminous with the community itself . . . . Approximat ing this arrangement . . . are some of the valley communities of the Kentucky mountains . . . in which all persons accounted as members, as distinct from outsiders, must have one parent who was accounted a member, and so on back to the original settlers from whom all members are by now equally descended . 7
Like these Kentucky mountain communities, the neighborhood of the top of the mountain has a history of numerous locally endogamous marriages . As a result, most residents are the descendants or affines of the descendants of more than one of the neighborhood' s early settlers . Unlike the overlapping descent groups described by Goodenough, however, the memberships of the mountain's four families are by and
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large discrete . To be sure, almost every resident can, if he wishes, trace some kind of consanguineal or affinal relationship to almost every other person and to all four founding ancestors. Each therefore could theoretically claim memberships in all four family groups, which would create a situation similar to that which Goodenough describes . The point, however, is that residents either do not bother t o trace these links or when they do come up-as so often happens in conversations with a visiting anthropologist-do not interpret them as indicating that they are members of more than one family group. A member of the Bradley family, for example, whose mother' s father was a son of Abraham Bradley and whose mother' s mother was a daughter of Isaiah Foley Campbell, is unlikely to say, "I'm a Bradley through my grand father and a Campbell through my grandmother. " He describes him self, rather, as simply a Bradley and acknowledges his relationship to the Campbells by noting that "My grandmother was a Campbell . " Despite, therefore, the existence o f a large number o f known o r know able genealogical relationships between family groups, most people view themselves and are viewed by others as being members of only one family . But how is it decided that a particular individual or household belongs to one family rather than another? For, as by and large dis cretely bounded groups, the families of the top of the mountain must incorporate some rule or principle of closure by which it is determined who, among all the descendants of an apical ancestor, are to be counted as family members and which therefore informs the delinea tion of these four families from the endogamous soup . SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
It is tempting to posit the operation of a submerged patrilineal princi ple . Although here as elsewhere in Western culture kinship is traced through both males and females, it is nonetheless possible that family group membership, like surnames, is inherited patrilineally. Indeed, although all family members do not necessarily bear the same sur name, the fact that these families are known by surnames would seem to suggest that this might well be the case. Some of my genealogical data can be construed as providing sup port for this hypothesis . For example, most of the descendants of the second-generation marriages among the children of Isaiah Foley Campbell, Robert Johnson, and Abraham Bradley are assigned to the family group of the sons of these men, the husbands . Despite these prominent cases, however, the genealogies reveal numerous instances in which family group membership is apparently based on rela-
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35
tionships th rough females in preference to equally close links through males . A more arresting potential explanation o f the principles underlying the determination of family group membership resides in the possibil ity that membership may be determined primarily or entirely on the ba sis of principles other than those of kinship . In other words, these "families" may not be kinship groups at all, or they may be only partly so, combining kinship and some other kind of principle of recruitment or exclusion . Anthropologists have traditionally thought of kinship relationships as being distinct kinds of social relationships, analytically different from those, say, of politics and economics, and they have structured their studies accordingly . Hildred and Clifford Geertz, however, sug gest that it may often be misleading to isolate the kinship component of multi-faceted relationships: "What we would like to suggest . . . is that to start with the notion that there is an isolable, internally integrated system of 'sentiments, ' 'norms,' 'categories, ' to which the adjective 'kinship' can be unambiguously appended is not the most profitable way to go about the matter. " 8 Starting from a kindred premise-that all natives do not necessarily share the dominant anthropological notions pertaining to the natures and proper categorization of social rela tionships---D - avid M. Schneider arrives at a conclusion that is similar to that of the Geertz' s but stated more radically . He suggests that under these circumstances "kinship" may not exist at all, that it is "an artifact of the anthropologists' analytical apparatus" and that "like totemism, the matrilineal complex, and matriarchy, [it] is a non-subject . " 9 It is possible, then, that many of the relationships between kinfolk which anthropologists have discussed in terms of kinship categories and principles are shaped by concepts and rules that do not involve kinship at all. But if this conclusion is true for the top of the mountain, if the four families residing there are not "really" kinship groups, then what are they? One possibility is that they are local or territorial groups. James S. Brown and Allen Batteau have each found that territoriality is an important component in the organization of Kentucky mountain "family groups" or "sets," which appear to be very similar to the family groups of the top of the mountain . According to Brown, "Family groups were typically not only groups of close kin but also territorial groups. Often the families constituting a family group lived in a clus ter, each family being closer to the other families in the family group than to any other family-usually because they had inherited parts of the same estate . " 10 In Batteau's words, "The elementary unit of the kinship system of the Mountain People of eastern Kentucky is the
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F. CARLENE BRYANT
localized, non-unilineal descent group [or set] . This unit . . . is consti tuted by those descendants of an apical ancestor who reside at or near the original homeplace of the ancestor . " 1 1 Brown's and Batteau's findings are in accordance with mine, for most of the mountain' s households belonging to the same family are found to reside together in the same neighborhood section, or "com munity, " on "family land" said to have been passed on from the family' s founding ancestor. It is clear therefore, that community resi dence, land ownership, and family group affiliation on the mountain are closely related, a subject I have discussed at length in a previous publication . 1 2 For the purposes of this more limited discussion, however, it is sufficient to note that residents of the mountain clearly distinguish between residence groups and family groups . The "com munity" of Mine Flats, for example, is described as being inhabited "mostly" by members of the Johnson "family" of Mine Flats . Thus, although the memberships of communities and families are known often to coincide, they are conceptually distinct groups. Another possibility for characterizing and understanding the fam ily groups of the top of the mountain is brought to mind by a comment made by Schneider with reference to prescriptive alliance systems: "In principle a table of random numbers might be used to allocate new members to groups--and indeed, systems have been reported from New Guinea which work that way . " 13 This suggestion, whether seriously intended or not, merits consideration, for the principle of random numbers accords very well with the actualities and "regular ities" of family memberships on the mountain . An appropriate "rule" explaining the assignment of individuals and households to family groups, constructed on the basis of observed regularities, might be as follows: All descendants and affines of the descendants of the family founder are members of that family except those who are members of other families . Each of these briefly discussed possibilities--patrilineages, local groups, random clusters--has some merit, for each can account for at least some aspects of the family organization of the top of the moun tain . They all, however, share a serious problem . This problem is not that they cannot be used to explain all cases of family membership assignment-although most of them in fact cannot. It is, rather, that they would seek to anchor the family groups of the top of the mountain in the empirical realities of statistical regularities while ignoring the cultural dimension of what they may mean to the people who, after all, have created and live within them. For while it is possible to compose rules such as that suggested above which adequately explain these family groups insofar as they restate their composition and character in
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terms of general principles, these principles cannot be said truly to underlie and inform their creation unless they somehow accord with the in digenous understanding that both derives from and shapes these families . THE CULTURAL DELINEATION O F FAMILIES
Residents of the top of the mountain do not call their family groups patrilineages, communities, or random clusters, nor do they describe them as being composed of people who are related to one another through males, or who live close to one another, or who perhaps "just happen" to belong to the same family. Rather they call them "families" and they explain that each family originated with the local settlement of a family founder. Family members are close kin who are "all John sons [or Bradleys or Campbells] or leastwise married to Johnsons, " descendants and affines of the descendants of the family founder. It is clear from much of what residents say of families, however, that family members are thought to be related to one another and to the family founder in more than a strict genealogical sense. Family mem bers are not only described as the grandchildren or great-grand children of the family's founding ancestor; they are also said to "take after" him, to have inherited many of his personal characteristics. For example, the stories told of "old Hiram Johnson, " founder of the Johnson family of Mine Flats, depict him as a colorful, rather pica resque character who often ran afoul of the law but who was nonethe less a likeable and good-hearted person . His descendants take after him in these respects, for the Johnsons of Mine Flats are considered by themselves and by others to be a fun-loving people whose high spirits often get them into trouble but who are friendly, loyal, and not at all malicious . In contrast, the Bradleys are characterized as a very indust rious family whose members, except for a proneness to occasional sexual misadventure, are upright and respectable, and the stories told of Abraham Bradley and his sons highlight these traits . Having inherited many characteristics from the founder, family members are therefore very similar to one another, and each family group is often spoken of as though its members all shared a common personality or set of family traits. The kinds of traits that may be attributed to different family groups are diverse: generous, quick to take offense, God-fearing, law-abiding, upright, respectable, loyal, friendly, clannish, prone to violence, stuck-up, loud, selfish, untrust worthy, no-account. As might be expected, traits that are positively valued are most often emphasized in describing one' s own family group while negatively valued traits are frequently stressed in talking
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about other families . Despite these differences in emphasis, however, there is considerable consensus in the attribution of traits to each family, and each is accordingly depicted as possessing a unique con figuration of characteristics which is shared to some extent by all its members . The similarities among family members are said to be "naturally" or genetically determined, based on the shared "flesh and blood" inher ited from the family founder. Family traits are said, for example, to "run in the family," and people frequently support such statements by pointing to evidence of the same or similar traits in the family founder . Residents appear to believe, moreover, that the sharing of flesh and blood has important implications for the nature of social relationships among kinfolk. People who share the same blood and are hence very similar to one another are also considered to be naturally close to one another, united by bonds of mutual love, trust, and support. "Blood is thicker than water, " and relationships between parents and children, brothers and sisters, uncles, aunts, and cousins are thought to be compelled by blood, by the immutable biological nature of human beings . A mother loves her child, for example, not simply because she chooses or is morally expected to do so, but also because it is in her nature to do so . Likewise, family members in general do not love and support one another simply because it is in their interest to do so or because of some cultural or moral imperative, but also because of a natural and biological imperative, one that derives from the fact that they are all very like one another, that they are all one flesh and blood . Not all family members, of course, are of one flesh and blood for, as residents note, many family members are related to the others through ties of marriage rather than consanguinity. But while affinally related family members are distinguished as in-laws in some contexts, they are also said to share many of the family traits . This is because "like marries like," because people are thought to have a natural tendency to marry those who are most like themselves . (Indeed, many people of the mountain have married relatives, sometimes members of their own family group, which validates for residents the truth of their concep tions. ) Thus, affines--spouses of family members and their relatives- tend to be viewed as sharing many of the family characteristics even if they are not known to be related to the family founder. Their likenesses, although not based on biological inheritance from the founding ancestor, are nonetheless natural in the sense that they derive from inborn traits and predilections. In the indigenous view, then, a family is a group of close kinfolk who are very like one another and united by bonds of mutual love and support . These similarities and social bonds are thought to be naturally
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determined and are explained in terms of genealogical relationships, for the closer people are genealogically the more similar and socially and emotionally close they are said in general to be. In the case of consanguines, these relationships are explained through the notion of shared flesh and blood inherited from a common ancestor, the family founder. In the case of affihes who are not also known to be consan guines, they are also thought to be largely natural, residing in the individual's inherent and immutable make-up and resulting from the fact that like marries like . But in the real world genealogical proximity and social and psycho logical closeness do not always coincide . Kinfolk, however closely related they may be, do not always have similar or even compatible personalities and do not always love or even like one another . How are these facts reconciled with the notion of a family as a group of closely related people who are very like one another and who accordingly love and support one another? Individual differences, far from threatening the concept of family unity, are often cited as proof of the family' s essential oneness . Although residents stress the fundamental similarity of all family members, they also pride themselves on their individuality and on the ability of all family members to get along together or at least "put up with" one another's idiosyncrasies . It is said that among kinfolk each person is treated as an individual . While people must conform to social conventions in relationships with non-kin, they can "be themselves" with their close kin, who will love them despite and sometimes even because of their faults. This is implied in the saying that kinfolk "stick together through thick and thin . " Thus, while love among family members is founded on an identity, it often endures despite-and even encourages-diversity. Sometimes, however, this individuality threatens the solidarity and amity that is supposed to pervade family relationships . It may then be said of a person that he or she is "not really a Bradley. " As this suggests, this kind of difficulty is often resolved by the "distancing" of individual kin through terminological variation or simple denial of kinship. However, the top of the mountain also exhibits a more thor oughgoing resolution of this problem in the organization of the neigh borhood into four family groups. For individuals who are not "really" members of one family are, as it often happens, members of other families . The family groups of the top of the mountain, while based on genealogies, are also more than genealogical groups . When people on the mountain talk about someone as being a member of a particular family and not of another and when they trace the origin of each family to a founding ancestor, they are not seeking to provide themselves and
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others with a neighborhood genealogy . They are rather talking about social relationships. But they are not simply employing an idiom of kinship and descent to characterize relationships that are really of some other nature . For it is thought that these relationships are kinshi�they are natural similarities and bonds, believed to result from a common biological heritage or to be expressed through mar riage . A family is thus composed of those kinfolk who are both genealogi cally and socially close and who invest their relationships to one another with cultural significance, tracing their descent and the social bonds that are believed to result from this to a common family founder. Clearly all the descendants of a family founder are not necessarily members of the family group said to be founded by him, for all kinfolk do not behave as family to one another. But, as discussed, genealogical relationships on the mountain are so complex and interwoven that they permit considerable latitude in the interpretation of family group memberships and contours. Indeed, it is this very complexity that, far from constituting a barrier to the demarcation of relatively discrete family groups, actually facilitates the creation of families that confirm and conform to ideas of what a family is . CULTURAL PROCESS
It should not be inferred from this discussion that individuals simply select those kinship ties they would like to emphasize and in this way affiliate with the family group of their choice . While this undoubtedly captures much of the process through which family contours are shaped, it neglects the indigenous view of families as natural groups rather than voluntary associations . A far more satisfactory and illumi nating interpretation is suggested by the circumstance of two cases of dual family membership. As noted earlier, members of two households are considered to belong to two families: the first, that of Fred and Grace Bradley, to the Campbell and Bradley families and the second, that of Jed and Sally Jones, to the Johnson family of Rocky Gap and the Bradley family . Fred Bradley' s mother, now residing elsewhere, is a great-granddaughter of Isaiah Foley Campbell; his father, now deceased, was a great-grandson of Abraham Bradley. Fred and his wife Grace are on close terms with both the Campbells and the Bradleys and are considered by themselves and others to belong to both family groups . Similarly, Jed and Sally Jones maintain close ties with many of the Johnsons of Rocky Gap, to whom they are related through Sally, who is the great-great granddaughter of Robert Johnson, and with the Bradleys, to whom
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they are related through Jed's paternal grandmother and through several recent affinal links. This household is accordingly spoken of as b elon ging to both the Bradley family and the Johnson family of Rocky Ga p . I t i s possible that these ambiguities o f family contours will eventu ally be resolved by the children of these two families somehow opting for exclusive membership in one or the other of the family groups to which they are currently considered to belong. But the process through which family groups are created may perhaps be better understood in terms of shifting images rather than shifting people . That is, current images of the family groups of the top of the mountain may undergo gradual alterations that would continually account for and resolve recurring discrepancies and ambiguities . To illustrate, fifty or a hundred years hence residents of the top of the mountain may not conceive of their neighborhood as composed of four families known as the Campbells, the Johnsons of Rocky Gap, the Bradleys, and the Johnsons of Mine Flats . For example, the neighbor hood may by then be viewed as consisting of three families--the Bradleys, the Johnsons, and, let us say, the Joneses. Under these hypothetical circumstances, the Bradley family group would be com posed of some of the descendants of the people currently considered to be Bradleys and encompass the descendants of the group now known as the Campbells. The children and descendants of Fred and Grace Bradley might belong to this group. The Johnson family would consist of the descendants of the present Johnsons of Mine Flats and the descendants of some but not all of the Johnsons of Rocky Gap . And the Joneses, to which groups the descendants of Jed and Sally Jones might belong, would include the descendants of some of the present mem bers of the Bradley family plus the descendants of some of the people who are now included among the Johnsons of Rocky Gap . This example, while not offered as a prognostication, is neither far fetched nor randomly chosen . Both the Campbell family and the John sons of Mine Flats are very small groups that have lost many members through out-migration and are therefore likely to become conceptually united with other families . And families may not only shrink and then disappear through mergers with other groups; they may also grow and, with their memberships inevitably becoming increasingly heter ogeneous, eventually be thought of as two or more families. Both the Johnsons of Rocky Gap and the Bradleys have become very large families, each containing two or more identifiable but as yet unnamed subgroups of people who have closer social relations with one another than with other family members, and their future conceptual division is therefore not altogether unlikely.
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From the perspective employed in this illustrative discussion, the processes through which family groups are delineated are best under stood not only as boundary shifts resulting in part from the vagaries of individual social alignments, but also as shifting family group identi ties, cores, or foci through which these vagaries are continually reinter preted. They are both social processes involving changing affiliations of individuals with family groups and cultural processes involving the changing conceptual definition of these groups. Indeed, from this perspective, family groups as social units become inseparable from the ideas that both inform and are informed by them . FAMILY HISTORY
The notion that indigenous conceptions of the identities of family groups may evolve and change in the manner suggested here is sup ported by historical data concerning two earlier mountain families, the Wileys and the Wilsons . The Wileys were the contemporaries of the first Campbells, John sons, and Bradleys and were their predecessors on the mountain . Yet most people claim to know little of this family beyond the fact that some persons bearing this surname sold land to the Johnsons and the Bradleys . Most who have thought at all about the matter suppose that the Wileys simply moved away shortly after Isaiah Wiley and Zachary Wiley "sold out" to Robert Johnson and Abraham Bradley . There is much evidence, however, that this may not be what actu ally occurred . The Wiley name appears in many of the records and documents-deeds, cemetery markers, family Bibles-pertaining to all four of the family groups of the top of the mountain, often in contexts that strongly suggest that all of the Wileys may not have left the mountain in the nineteenth century and that many of their descen dants may still be living there in the guise of Campbells, Johnsons, and Bradleys . For example, genealogical records contained in family Bibles be longing to some of the descendants of Abraham Bradley identify his wife as Sally Wiley Bradley. Since it is known that Abraham Bradley purchased his land from Zachary Wiley, it seems highly probable that Abraham Bradley's wife was related to Zachary Wiley, possibly as a sister or daughter, and that many of the Bradleys may therefore be descendants or collaterals of Zachary Wiley. Descendants of Abraham and Sally Bradley who were asked about the matter were strikingly ignorant and uninterested, however, noting only that while it was possible that Sally Bradley had been "some kin" to Zachary or Isaiah
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Wiley, th ey did not know anything of her family background "for a fact." An oth er example concerns the wife of Hiram Johnson, Bessie Wiley Johnson . Like Sally Wiley Bradley, she was also a Wiley . Many moun ta in resi dents are aware of this fact, but most say they know little else ab out he r. A few elderly descendants of Hiram and Bessie Johnson claim to be more knowledgeable, however, and they state with assur ance that not only was Bessie Wiley Johnson the daughter of Zachary Wiley but also that the couple acquired their land in Mine Flats through inheritance from Bessie' s father . A s these examples suggest, it i s quite probable that the Wileys who lived on the mountain in the nineteenth century did not all move aw!ly from the mountain as residents commonly suppose . Rather, some of them may have intermarried with other residents, and "the Wileys" may have only disappeared as a separate family group-through their eventual conceptual merger with several of the mountain' s present family groups. Other evidence of past alterations of family group contours is pro vided by the history of what was once known as the "Wilson family . " The Wilsons, consisting a t one time o f five or six households, used to live high above the forebears of the Campbells, Johnsons, and Brad leys, almost on the literal top of the mountain, but according to resi dents they "moved off" several decades ago . As it happens, however, all the Wilsons did not move far, for a few married with the Johnsons of Rocky Gap and the Johnsons of Mine Flats and only moved off as far as these communities. Yet "the Wilsons" no longer exist as a family group, those Wilsons who still reside on the mountain having become parts of what are now viewed as the Johnson families of Rocky Gap and Mine Flats. The view of the mountain' s families as fluid, shifting groups which is suggested by these histories and by the earlier discussion of hypothetical future family changes sheds light on at least one prob lematic aspect of the history of the Campbells, Johnsons, and Bradleys . As noted earlier, it appears that the descendants of the early marriages among the children of Isaiah Foley Campbell, Robert Johnson, and Abraham Bradley were in each case assigned to the family groups of the sons of these men, an observation that hints of the operation of a patrilineal principle, which is seemingly ignored, however, in many other cases. But this is a retrospective assessment that assumes resi dents of the mountain have always conceived of their family groups as "the Campbells, " "the Johnsons of Rocky Gap, " "the Bradleys, " and "the Johnsons of Mine Flats . " From the perspective suggested here, it
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is more likely that at the time of these marriages and for some time thereafter these groups had not yet emerged as separate families . Under this assumption, any apparently patrilineal bias becomes only an artifact of contemporary family group contours and of a tendency to trace the ancestry of each up through males and male surnames. The continual redefinition of family group identities does not of course occur at random . People do not simply choose their families and ancestors, and processes of family group delineation are always shaped and conditioned by the givens of genealogical history . It is suggested, however, that these processes are also creative of this history. It is in an important way inaccurate to describe the mountain's families as groups composed of the descendants of a family founder, for this firmly embeds these groups in an inalterable genealogical process that began in the nineteenth century . The following would be more satisfactory: each current family group is defined by tracing its origin up to an apical ancestor. For Isaiah Foley Campbell, Robert Johnson, Abraham Bradley, and Hiram Johnson obviously did not begin their careers as family founders . Rather, they became so in retrospect, through the conceptual organization of the past in a man ner that lends meaning to the present. CONCLUSION
When I began fieldwork on the top of the mountain in 1974, I was struck by the omnipresence of kinship. Not only was it said that everyone (or at least almost everyone) was related to everyone else, but people seemed to make a great deal of this circumstance in daily conversation . Where one lived, who one's friends were, where one went to church, where one was finally buried-all were a function of one's position in the local kinship network, or so it seemed. Later, when genealogies had been duly collected, the role of kinship-which had initially seemed so clear and straightforward became increasingly problematic . For these genealogies revealed that everyone was indeed related to everyone else (or almost) , but in so many complex and overlapping ways as to make kinship in itself appear to be quite useless for the patterning and understanding of interpersonal behavior and the demarcation of social groups . Not only did the genealogies reveal no "natural" basis for the grouping or categorization of kin, residents themselves did not seem to use any cultural categories or distinctions (except the distinction between "close" and "distant" kin, neither of which anyone was able to define or indeed seemed interested in defining with any precision) by which all of these kinfolk might be sorted out into the four families of which
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re sid ents spoke. It appeared that however much people liked to talk about kinsh ip, it had no real significance for the patterning and there fore fo r the understandin g of their daily lives. This initial interpretation was wrong, of course. The difficulty lay in ically applying my own idea of kinship (or rather a widely held crit un ological conception of kinshi�my own ideas upon reflection rop an th be closer to those of the people of the top of the probably uld wo definition and analysis of the problem. This concep the to n) untai mo olds that kinship pertains exclusively to the facts of consanguin n h tio cites Marion Levy's definition of kinship as Schneider affinity. and ty i providing a particularly lucid illustration of this: "[Kinship structure is] that portion of the total institutionalized structure of a society that, in addition to other orientations, sometimes equally if not even more important, determines the membership of its units and the nature of the solidarity among its members by orientation to the facts of biologi cal relatedness and/or sexual intercourse . " 14 This definition suggests that kinship is something that exists out there in the real world in its own right and that is therefore an immut able given that the anthropologist records and analyzes and that the natives, however strangely they may categorize their kinfolk, simply adhere to in their understanding of their relationships with one another. And if they sometimes do not adhere to it very faithfully, then it may be "classificatory" kinship, suggesting that it is necessarily different from real kinship, which pertains to the facts of blood and marriage. But as Schneider has been at some pains to explain, although biological relatedness, copulation, parturition, and so forth certainly exist out there in the real world, kinship as a cultural construct in terms of which people create, understand, and explicate social groupings and relationships is whatever the natives say it is. 15 Now it so happens that the particular natives with which I am here concerned seem to be in agreement with the dominant anthropological view. They say that kinship is primarily a matter of biology, of the shared blood inherited from a common ancestor and of the natural similarities among kinfolk which are attributed to the fact of shared blood . But while biology and blood are sometimes spoken of as though they were the sine qua non of kinship, setting kinship relationships apart from all other kinds of relationships, kinship is also rather more than a simple matter of biology, as the inclusion of many affines as family members clearly suggests . For, when speaking of kinship, resi dents of the top of the mountain use "blood" to connote-more than a particular red substance-a kind of social relationship between those who share it, a relationship that Schneider has described as one of "love" or "enduring diffuse solidarity" 16 and that residents of the
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mountain often speak of as "sticking together through thick and thin . " Blood i s thus both a substance and a symbol for the kind o f social relationship that its sharing is believed to entail . This relationship based on shared blood entails a natural rela tionship of identity, similarity, or equality. Kinfolk, because most of them share the blood inherited from a common ancestor, are believed to be very like one another, and the more blood they have in com mon-that is, the closer their genealogical relationship-then the greater their similarities are believed to be. It is because of these similarities, because they are of the "same flesh and blood, " that kinfolk "naturally" love and support one another. I have argued here that it is only in the light of these indigenous conceptions that the organization of the top of the mountain into four extended family groups becomes intelligible . Residents speak of their neighborhood in terms of four "families"-the Campbells, the John sons of Rocky Gap, the Bradleys, and the Johnsons of Mine Flats which are described as groups of dose kin, people related to one another primarily by the bonds of shared blood inherited from a common ancestor. But one often cannot tell who belongs or does not belong to a particular family (and of course residents have never claimed that one could) by consulting a genealogy. For dose kinship entails not only a dose biological or genealogical relationship but also a dose social relationship . Thus, kinfolk who do not get along together, have little to do with one another, or do not stick together through thick and thin, are often spoken of as distant kin, members of separate families, although they may be genealogically dose. On the top of the mountain, blood and genealogies express rather than create family and kinship relationships. The neighborhood's four families are therefore best understood not as groups somewhat akin to species or genera; rather, they are social groupings-that is, human creations-whose members are bound to one another not by the physical facts of genealogical propinquity but by the imports or meanings that people may attach or fail to attach to these facts . NOTES This paper is a revision of portions of my ea rlier book, We're All Kin: A Cultural Study of a Mountain Neighborhood, used by permission of The University of Tennessee Press, copyright 1981 . 1 . "The top of the mountain" is the actual phrase residents use to refer to their neighborhood. All other proper names of local people, families, and places are fictitious, however. 2. Harry K. Schwarzweller, "Social Change and the Individual in Rural Appalachia," in Change in Rural Appalachia: Implications for Action Programs, ed. John D. Photiadis and Harry K. Schwarzweller (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 53.
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3 . George L . Hicks, Appalachian Valley (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), p. 35. 4. A merican Kinship: A Cultural Account (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . : Prentice-Hall. 1968). 5. " What Is Kinship All About?", in Kinship Studies in the Morgan Centennial Year, ed. Priscilla Reining (Washington: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1972) . 6. The exact location of Abraham Bradley's property cannot be verified because the deed describes this tract as bounded on the northeast by "too poplars and a hickry," on the northwest by "a shugartree," on the west by "a chesnut, " on the south by "a hickry," "a pine," and "a stake and hickry , " and on the southeast by "a chesnut. " 7. Description a n d Comparison in Cultural Anthropology (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p p . 51-52. For his description of the organization o f these Kentucky communities, Goode nough cites an unpublished 1 960 paper by Kutsche. 8. Kinship in Bali (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 975), p. 155. 9. "What Is Kinship All About?", p . 59. 10. "The Conjugal Family and the Extended Family Group," American Sociological Review 17 (1952): 300. 1 1 . "Modernization: Inflections on the Appalachian Kinship System" (unpublished paper) p. 1 . 12. We're All Kin, esp. Chapter 3, "Communities. " 13. "What I s Kinship All About?", p . 57. 14. Cited in David M. Schneider, "Kinship and Biology," in Aspects of the Analysis of Family Structure, ed. Ainsley J . Coale et a/. (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 83. 15. For the fullest exposition of this argument, see "What Is Kinship All About?", pp . 32-63. 16. American Kinship, pp. 50ff.
STUDYING RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEMS IN THEIR SociAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT MELANIE L. S OVINE
STUDENTS of Appalachia primarily have been concerned with the func
tion of religion as a social institution within the greater Appalachian society. These functional interpretations of religion have many dimen sions, ranging from descriptions of a socially and/or psychologically functional religion to a socially and/or psychologically dysfunctional one . 1 Considering the numerous contributions to this body of litera ture, one might assume that substantial insight has been gained into the nature of religion in Appalachia . However, these numerous con tributions are narrowly concerned with the role of religion in society, and less is known about religious belief and behavior than one might assume. Following Durkheim, the functional perspective rests on the assumption that the essence of religion consists in its collective ex pression of community ethics and values . Religious entities are merely collective ideas that are projected outwards. As such, gods and other spiritual beings are symbolic expressions of community morality . Through religion, the solidarity of the community is maintained since, in the Durkheimian thesis, community values are the object of worship . In this view, religion enhances solidarity in society . 2 The unit of analysis considered most appropriate to the functional perspective is the social group or, in this case, the religious-social institution . But focusing on the role of the religious-social institution more often than not deflects one' s attention from what I believe to be one of the primary areas of concern in any study of religion: that of religious belief and behavior. And as Spiro 3 has suggested, the study of religion solely within the functional perspective tells us more about society itself rather than the intended insight into the realm of religion . In addition, functional interpretations tend to dilute the richness of the
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everyday life experience in which religious beliefs and behaviors find their ex pression and consequent reality. With the possible exception of Abell , who presents a somewhat disintegrated description of the Pen tecostal "system of knowledge," there has been no attempt to system atically delineate the religious belief systems in Appalachia per se. Rather, the studies of religious belief consider only isolated beliefs (i. e . , beliefs out o f the context o f a belief system), correlating them with such sociolo gical variables as education, sex, age, socioeconomic status, 4 so cial class, and occupational leve1. Consequently, these studies con tribute primarily to the understanding of the role of religious beliefs within the Appalachian society, drawing theoretically from the func tional perspective of religion . A more complete analysis of religion could be achieved if religious beliefs and religious behaviors were systematically and meaningfully dealt with in terms of the everyday life contexts in which they occur, and in terms of the �ocial-historical canvas against which the everyday context of religion may be inter preted. By a systematic approach to the study of religion I am suggest ing that particular religious beliefs should be examined within the context of a total belief system. 5 The procedure of the belief systems approach involves eliciting native or indigenous religious beliefs from the believers and identifying and systematizing these beliefs into cate gories of explanation according to the categorical rules and principles of the believer. The resulting structure of this categorization process is a model of the believer's belief system . The delineation o f belief systems i s directed toward a n understand ing of native systems of meaning. Through eliciting and systematizing native beliefs, the explanatory categories and principles employed by the believers begin to take shape, providing an interpretive framework within which the meaning of beliefs and behaviors may be understood . I n this view, religion i s primarily a system o f knowledge rather than a means of promoting social solidarity, as the functional view would have it. Seen in this light, religious interpretations of everyday life and all its complexities represent attempts to explain and thereby under stand the world around us. As such, the primary unit of analysis is religious belief itself rather than the social group in which it occurs . It is within the interpretive context of a belief system that religious behaviors should be understood . This is simply to say that religious beliefs and religious behaviors bear an intimate relationship to each other. An analysis of religion solely on the basis of behavior represents a sort of violation of the total religious system. However, a behavioral approach to the study of religion in Appalachia has been a common one . This is especially evident in interpretations of snake-handling
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groups, where the focus is on the snake-handling behavior itself with a barely minimal focus on the system of religious beliefs that make more intelligible the religious behaviors. When the goal is to understand religious meaning from the believer' s point of view, the seemingly bizarre or exotic elements of any religion often become intelligible. For example, perhaps most outsiders view the practice of foot-washing in Old Baptist churches as exotic, even revolting. However, when viewed in terms of the Old Baptist belief system, the practice is both rational and reasonable . The Old Baptist can see it to be no other way, and it is the Old Baptist view that the systematic approach to the study of religious meaning attempts to attain . Religious behaviors are not ex plained in terms of our own perspectives, but rather in terms of the religious beliefs from which they derive . Failure to appropriately grasp an understanding of religious belief and behavior in Appalachia has inevitably produced a lack of apprecia tion for religious diversity in the region . Functional perspectives have tended to support broad generalizations of an "Appalachian religion" characterized as traditional, fatalistic, or fundamentalist. These reduc tionistic generalizations fail to acknowledge the shades of religious meaning which are important features of different belief systems. The explication of a broadly defined regional religion in Appalachia can only be achieved by obscuring the empirical reality of religious diver sity . Focusing on religious belief systems, on the other hand, makes it possible to show that "grace" for a Primitive Baptist is not at all similar to "grace" for a Holiness-Pentecostal . These seemingly small differ ences in the shades of religious meaning are, after all, the kinds of differences that the people themselves regard as important and thereby help to account for the varieties of religious groups . Before progressing to a final aspect in outlining an approach to the study of religion in Appalachia, the social-historical context, it will perhaps be helpful to offer an ethnographic example of the belief systems approach. As an illustration, a preliminary analysis of a few aspects of a Primitive Baptist religious belief system will be offered . The analysis is preliminary in that we will actually focus on one maj or categorical principle in the belief system, the categorizing of the Elect and the non-Elect, and on the implications of being among the categor ical Elect. It is preliminary, further, in that these implications will be illuminated largely in terms of one area of religious ritual, the practice of foot-washing in the Primitive Baptist Church . The descriptions and analysis presented below hold for a particular association of Primitive Baptist churches in northern Georgia . This association is of the absolute predestinarian persuasion, believing in the predestination of all things as well as in the predestination of the
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etemal status of the soul, and many of the detailed aspects of belief discussed in this essay would not apply to other types of Primitive Baptists . While the general description of religious ritual behavior presented here would generally hold to Primitive Baptist churches across the country6 there are always particulars of religious behavior which have developed according to local traditions. As suggested, the following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather illus trative of the belief systems approach . Keeping these qualifications in mind, we may now turn the discussion to Primitive Baptist religious belief and behavior . THE RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM
The Primitive Baptist belief system divides all people into two maj or categories, the Elect and the non-Elect. The non-Elect are those people whom the Primitive Baptists believe are to be eternally lost. They are people who have no inclination toward God or religious affairs; the Primitive Baptists describe them as being "of the World," belonging to that segment of humanity which is organized apart from any consid eration for the existence and the will of God . The Elect are those people whom God has predestined to be eternally saved. They are inclined toward God and religion; the Primitive Baptists describe them as being "in the World, but not of the World . " Elected individuals can be further categorized into the "chosen" Elect and the "unchosen" Elect. The Primitive Baptists distinguish between the chosen and unchosen Elect, but they do not attach labels to this distinction . The terms "chosen" and "unchosen" are my own terms and are used here for explanatory purposes. Elected individuals, at some point in life, are made aware of their elected condition . Those who are among the Elect but have not been made aware of that condition are the "unchosen" Elect, while those who have been given a knowledge of their elected condition are the "chosen" Elect. The chosen Elect are also those people whom God has predestined to be members of the Primitive Baptist Church, thereby gaining knowledge of church order and discipline . In this context, a church member quoted the scripture (Matthew 22: 14), "Many are called, few are chosen . " As she explained it, the "many called" or the unchosen Elect are those who never have an opportunity to join the Primitive Baptist Church; for example, elected individuals who live in countries where the P rimitive Baptist Church, as a religious institution, does not exist or who are made aware of their elected condition just before death . When a person passes from the unchosen Elect to the chosen Elect,
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he undergoes a rite of passage which is called an "experience of grace. " The experience o f grace i s one o f the most important rituals in the life of a Primitive Baptist. Defining "grace" as the unmerited favor of God, one can infer that an experience of grace is an encounter with the grace of God . Consistent with Calvinist theology, the encounter with God's grace is considered by the Primitive Baptists to be an "operation" and not an "offer" of grace . To be a child of grace, then, suggests a change in the individual's state or condition that is effected by the workings of the Spirit of God. Primitive Baptists describe it as a passage from the condition of spiritual death to spiritual life . At some predestined point in life, the Primitive Baptists believe that one is made aware of his vile and helpless self. A common phrase used in connection with this awareness is, "I have been made to hate my own life . " It is a period during which one can think only of one's worthless, sinful condition. Thus, this period of self-awareness is usually characterized by inward struggle. Elder William R. Welborn offered a typical example when he wrote: "But all my expectations were cut short by the hand of Omnipotence; for I became greatly burdened, my troubles were very great, for I felt myself to be the greatest sinner on Earth . 0, how wretched I felt! I was ashamed of myself. " At the point of deepest humiliation and condemnation, one encounters the mercy or the grace of God, extended in this condition by a visitation of the Holy Spirit. During this spirit visitation, one is made aware that one is among the Elect and will be eternally saved. Welborn wrote : One evening I watched the sun go down and as he sank below the horizon I bade him farewell, and never expected to see the sun rise again . 0, how dreadful I felt! For I thought I would soon be dead, and no sooner dead than damned . When night came on and all my father's family were asleep, and I was lying on my pallet in the silent cabin; I arose softly and went out and going a considerable distance from the house, I fell upon my face to pray. I thought I must now sink into eternal woe and misery . . . but just at the moment when I thought I was gone, I saw Jesus as it was a bright star descended from heaven, and the next I saw to that superior bright star was a little infant lying in a very shabby-looking stable, and I thought, or it was revealed to me, that this shining light left heaven to become a way for my redemption from death and hell, and became an infant to that end . 7
Having received this call of the Holy Spirit, one not only becomes aware of his elected condition, but at the same time in fact passses from the unchosen to the chosen Elect, from spiritual death to spiritual life . As a result of the experience of grace, a person gains full access to
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the Primitive Baptist religious belief system. Having passed into a condition of spiritual life, this access to the religious belief system is d escribed as being able to "hear with spiritual ears" or "see with spiri tual eyes . " Again through the workings of Spirit visitation and inspiration, the chosen Elect gain an understanding of what might be called "deep knowledge . " 8 Deep knowledge is knowledge that the World cannot understand; it is knowledge that accumulates over a lifetime. Examining the contents of deep knowledge, we find, for example, knowledge about God, the major "causal agency" of the belief system. The theistic model of the Primitive Baptists is a common one in Protestantism. God is the supreme, sovereign, authority; He is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. However, further examin ing the theistic model in the belief system we find that God is one god, yet manifests Himself in three entities: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. Again, the "Three in One" concept is com mon to Protestantism, and this concept becomes unique to the Primi tive Baptists only when the three manifestations are considered in terms of their respective roles within the belief system. God the Father is the predestinator of all things. All things that occur are said to be "the will of God . " And, in the case of future happenings, they occur according to the will of God . Everything is, as the Primitive Baptists say, "on time and in time . " The Primitive Bap tists believe that one is living out one's life exactly as God pre-planned it to be. Understanding the deep knowledge that concerns the Primi tive Baptists' theistic model is helpful in understanding that the belief system must explain only one major class of events-that is, predes tined events . The Primitive Baptists regard all events as meaningful because, as the events unfold, they represent a fulfillment of the will of God . The Son, Jesus Christ, came to Earth and died the sacrificial death that paid for the sins of the Elect. Had it not been for the death of Christ, grace would be extended to no one . Further, it is through the righteousness of Jesus Christ that the Elect are received into the Heaven of God . While on Earth, Jesus Christ set Himself up as the only true Head of the Church, instituting the Church of God (in a universal sense). The Primitive Baptists refer to this Church as the "Apostolic Church" and consider themselves to be descendants of the Apostolic Church. In terms of church government, the Primitive Baptists claim no other authority but Jesus Christ. This is especially evident in their belief in the complete autonomy of the local church . Each church group is a self-governing body. While local churches are organized into associations, the association is largely an organization for fellowship .
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Although the association can make suggestions and recommendations to local churches, it holds no j urisdiction over the churches that consti tute its membership . The Holy Spirit manifests Itself in three roles : the call, regeneration, and sanctification of the Elect. The call is what has previously been discussed in connection with the "experience of grace," whereby the unchosen Elect become the chosen Elect. Regeneration is concerned with the inner character; it is God's provision for correcting man's depravity or the strong tendency to do wrong. For the Primitive Bap tists, the Holy Spirit regenerates or completely overhauls a person' s nature, so that his values, motivations, and endeavors correspond to what he believes is the will of God . As it is said, "You don't want to do the things you used to do . " As a result of the call and the regeneration by the Holy Spirit, one is sanctified, or set apart from the world . As previously stated, the Primitive Baptists refer to themselves as being "in the World, but not of the World . " I n addition to the call, regeneration, and sanctification o f the Elect, the belief system holds that the Holy Spirit has other roles . Spirit visitations continue throughout the lifetime of a chosen Elect . As stated, the call of the Holy Spirit results in one's first realization of an elected condition. However, when the Spirit leaves, one is left with only a "hope" of salvation. As one member explained it: "There have been times when I could say that I was one of the Elect, but this is only for a short time . The Spirit does not linger and then you have only a hope left . " A Primitive Baptist remains in this hopeful condition most of the time, for the assurance of election is realized only during Spirit visitations. Spirit visitations are never continuous . They are usually brief. Therefore, subsequent visitations after the call help to encourage or maintain the Primitive Baptist' s hope of salvation . Further, Spirit visitations often result in revealed knowledge, specifically the pre viously mentioned "deep knowledge" of the belief system. For exam ple, one can read and understand the Bible only when "God gives you a mind" to understand . Spirit visitations are of importance to the Elders of the Church, for without Spirit visitation and inspiration, the Elders cannot preach, and preaching is another method by which deep knowledge is revealed for those who "have a mind to hear it. " Initiation into the Primitive Baptist Church i s by the workings o f the Holy Spirit upon the chosen Elect only . Primitive Baptists make no attempt at proselytizing members for the Church. Only those who come the "old school" Baptist way are desired . The membership con sists of those who have had an experience of grace . One who desires to join comes to the front of the congregation and tells of his experience of
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is carefully evaluated and voted upon by the present grace, which members . In turn, the experience of grace and subsequent church membe rship are requisite for participating in church rituals, such as baptism , co mmunion, and foot-washing: and du ring this same winter I borrowed some clothing and went to Rock Springs meetinghouse and heard Elder B. E. Caudle preach, which was the first sermon I ever heard preached in my life . So time passed on with me in many ups and downs, doubts and fears, until the 18th day of May, 1878, when I went to the church and told some of the great things the Lord had done for me. And in June following, I borrowed clothing of Brother C. W. York to be baptized in, and walked to Mitchell's River meetinghouse, about eighteen miles, and was baptized by Elder B. E. Caudle . 9
The significance of the categories of election and the experience of grace can be further illustrated by the anomalous situation of G . Mat thew Amston. Mr. Amston was frequently inspired by Spirit visita tions, during which he wrote prolifically on religious subjects of the Primitive Baptist Church. Although Mr. Amston died some years ago, his articles are still being published in Zion 's Landmark, a principal publication of the Absolute Predestinarian Primitive Baptists . One would certainly think that Mr. Amston could testify to an experience of grace. As Mrs . Amston related it to me, "Matthew kept waiting and waiting on a big experience so he could join the church, but it never came . " Thus, Mr. Amston anomalously bore the characteristics of a chosen Elect, yet because he could not relate an experience of grace, he also bore the essential characteristic of an unchosen Elect who had yet to receive revelations of his elected condition . Had his writings not been so supportive of Primitive Baptist religion, perhaps their propri ety could have been successfully questioned and Mr . Amston catego rized as a non-Elect who could never receive Spirit visitations, let alone spiritual revelations of deep knowledge . From the beginning, how ever, his letters and articles received wide circulation through the Zion's Landmark. More troublesome than Mr . Amston's personal fate was the fact that his situation posed a serious challenge to the belief system itself. Essentially, here was a case that the belief system could not explain, thereby placing its explanatory capacity in question. Elder Howard Leffonts solved the problem of this anomaly with the interpretation that Mr. Amston "leapt in his mother' s womb," like John the Baptist, who was said to have been "filled with the Spirit" before birth (Luke 1 : 15) . That is to say, Mr. Amston received his first visitation of the Spirit and the experience of grace before birth and thus could not testify to any experience during his lifetime . It was an
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interpretation that served to maintain the integrity of the belief syste m, while allowing Mr. Amston membership, and later a Deaconship, in the Primitive Baptist Church. The Primitive Baptist experience of grace should not be thought of in terms of a "single, dramatic, conversion performance" that is often considered to characterize the southern religious experience . Nor is it the result of an evangelistic or revivalistic appeal . Rather, it is a period during which one achieves a view of life and the universe; an experi ence of grace is the period during which the individual personality experiences and subsequently internalizes the notions of the belief system. This system of meaning makes sense out of all that has con fronted one in the past and is a means of explanation for the confronta tions that are yet to come . For the Primitive Baptists, the very heart of the experience of grace is man's confrontation with himself and with the Supreme Being: So finally I concluded that I was going to die and sink down into a lake of fire unquenchable and everlasting, and that because of my sinfulness. I viewed myself as nothing but a grea t mass of corrupted wickedness, and that the Good Man, as I knew, was going to sink me into irretrievable woe and misery on account of my sin. Then I began to examine myself to see why it was that I must sink down into hell, and why it was that I was the worst being on earth and could not solve the mystery; for I had never been as wicked as I had heard of some being. I had never acted the thief, neither had I been a liar, nor had I been guilty of any big crime. Then what is the matter? I could not tell why I was so guilty. But when I had view [sic) sin in all its deformity, then I could solve the mystery; for then I saw that it was that original guilt and my total aepravity in nature that condemned me. But all my reasoning about not having been guilty of any great crime did me no good, and finally sleep fled from me . Then I heard a voice say, "Fear no longer, for this [the blood ofJ esus Christ) will overshield and overspread you from all harm, from the thunder storms, " etc. This voice was the sweetest melody to me; my whole being was filled with sweet and holy melody, and I felt as innocent as a little new-born infant; for all my load of sin and guilt was gone. Now it was right here I saw, or it was revealed to me, just how Jesus came into the world; for I viewed that He lived for me a perfect life of obedience in the flesh, and that He died for me, or died in my stead, and arose for me a victorious conqueror over death, hell and the grave; and then ascended to heaven for me . I also had the same view in regard to the whole church in her triumphant state . Now this heavenly view and divine revelation was so great to me that in after years, when I had gotten in possession of the New Testament and began to read it, it seemed I had always been acquainted with its readings . 10
Thus, entering into right relationship with God involves an admission of one' s sinfulness, helplessness, and worthlessness, and an acknowl-
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edgement of the supreme, sovereign authority of God, who extends grace to the Elect only because of His mercy . When referring to this experience, the Primitive Baptists say, "He carried me down . " Through the experience o f grace, one achieves a ritual condition of humility. However, this condition of humility is not a temporary condition, for it continues far beyond the ritual context of an experi ence of grace . Humility is an attitude, a value that is central to the Primitive Baptist religion. The notion that one should be humble is so important to them that it is given ritual significance in the church . Above all, it is expressed in the foot-washing ritual, their most impor tant means of intensifying the attitude of humility. The Primitive Baptists are "fundamentalists" : they believe that the Bible was directly inspired (word for word) by God and, therefore, that interpretation of the Scriptures should be a literal interpretation . This fundamentalism bears directly on the practice of foot-washing, for the Primitive Baptists derive foot-washing from the Bible (John 13: 1-16) . Paraphrasing, the Biblical account o f foot-washing goes something like this: At one of the last meals the Disciples and Jesus were to have together, the Disciples began to quarrel among themselves as to whom should be seated in the places of honor. Jesus rose from the table, took off his outer cloak, tied a towel around his waist, poured water into a basin, and began to wash the Disciples' feet. In order to understand why Jesus did this, we must examine the customs of His day . In the Middle East, the climate is hot, and in Jesus' lifetime the roads were quite dusty. Any venture outside resulted in dusty feet, as only sandals were worn . Should a guest come to one's home, it was commonplace to provide water for the washing of his feet, this being a mark of hospital ity and respect toward strangers. The act was sometimes performed by servants, whose duties included many humble tasks . Therefore, in addition to being a token of regard, it was also a sign of humility . Jesus was well aware of this practice and its implications for, as we have said, it was the custom of His day . When Jesus had finished washing their feet, he said, "Know ye what I have done to you? Ye call me Master and Lord : and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you . Verily, verily, I say unto you, the servant is not greater than his Lord, neither he that is sent greater than he that sent him . If ye know these things, happy are ye if you do them Gohn 13: :l-- 1 7) .
S o Jesus was teaching a spiritual truth, the important lesson o f humil ity. We are not to seek to be served, but to serve our fellow Christians. And the Primitive Baptists agree with this interpretation, for they say,
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"it shows our humility. " Looking to the verse, "For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you," foot-washing is literally observed by the Primitive Baptists, for they believe it was literally instituted . However, this exegetical interpretation of "showing humility" toward fellow Christians does not cover the full symbolic value of the ritual in the Primitive Baptist Church . Foot-washing can be said to be a symbol of humility, a symbol of religious thought for the Primitive Baptists . The Primitive Baptists strive for and react out of the attitude of humility in all areas of church life . The foot-washing ritual is an isolated event that occurs only twice a year in the church's calendar. As such, the ritual is an intensification or a perfection of the concept of humility which is so important in the Primitive Baptist religion . Many months pass without the occurrence of foot-washing, but its implications are in the minds of the believers at all seasons . Twice a year these implica tions are condensed and symbolized by the foot-washing ritual . The communion and foot-washing Sunday begins with a regular meeting to "sing, pray, and preach . " At the close of the worship service, all are invited to share a meal together which the women of the host church prepare . The communion and foot-washing service is said, simply, to "follow lunch . " There is no set time to begin, no formal call to worship . A few will gather in the church house and begin to sing a hymn . Hearing the singing invites others to come and begin the after noon service . Those who are to take communion and wash feet assume designated positions in the church (see Figure 1 ) . The Elder (1) is seated just in front of the stand (2) and behind the conference table (3), which is being used for the "communion table" during this service . The Deacons (4) of the Church sit at the conference table, facing the Elder. The men have taken positions in the pews (5) to the right of the stand . The women are seated facing each other to the left of the stand (6) . A pew (7) has been pulled over to separate the women from the men. Those who are not participants in the communion and foot-washing services are seated in the pews (8 and 9) that run horizontally from midway to the back of the church house . When all people have gathered in the church house and taken seats, a hymn is selected which speaks to the occasion. At the close of the hymn, the Elder stands and offers a brief explanation about com munion in general and about "the bread" in particular. The bread is specially prepared; that is, it is "unleavened bread" and is symbolic of the body of Jesus Christ. After a prayer, the Elder breaks the bread into edible pieces, placing the pieces on two dishes. The bread is not cut, but purposely broken with the hands, just as the body of Jesus Christ was broken by man . The Elder calls for the Deacons to come forward;
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Figure 1 Positions for the Communion and Foot-washing Ritual
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Position of Elder The stand Communion table Position of Deacons Male participants Female participants Separating pew 8. Seated positions for non-participants 9. Seated positions for non-participants 10. Chair
one Deacon serves the men, the other the women. The men and women are served simultaneously, yet each one individually, eating the piece of bread as they are served. One Deacon then serves the Elder, who is seated, and the Deacons serve each other. The server always stands, while the one being served is always seated . Following the partaking of bread, the Elder stands and offers a brief explanation about "the cup . " As one Elder stated, "It is an emblem of
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His blood to remind us of His sacrifice . " The Primitive Baptists use wine for their communion service . One Elder stated, "The reasons why our forefathers used 'ferminated wine' was because the blood of Jesus had power . It [the blood] stimulates us; it brings us to life . " (Recall that through the death o f Jesus Christ, a "limited atonement" was provided for the Elect . ) Wine is poured into two common cups. A prayer is said and, again, one Deacon serves the men, the other the women. A Deacon serves the Elder and then the Deacons serve each other. The remaining wine (the believers only sip from the cup) is poured back into the wine flask, and all communion elements are taken from the table and placed behind the stand . The cloth is folded and put aside . After communion, the service progresses to the foot-washing ritual . The Deacons put aside the communion articles and bring for ward the foot-washing articles: wash basins, buckets, and towels . Those articles used by the men are placed on the conference table . The women have theirs placed under the pews where they are sitting. Also, at this point, a chair is moved in front and between the two aisles where the women are sitting (see Figure 1 , no . 1 0) . The men and women wash feet in the same room; therefore caution is taken to see that all things are done "in order . " The Elder offers a brief explanation of the ritual, which is, in essence, the exegetical interpretation of humility . At this point, the Elder removes his suit coat, as do the other men, and then their shoes and socks . The women have prepared (removing hosiery) before the service . The Elder ties a towel around his waist, dips water into the basin with a dipper, and begins to wash another man' s feet; the others, men and women, follow suit, women washing women' s feet and men washing men' s feet. The participants are seated adjacent to each other, so that one side washes the feet of those seated on the other side . And then, the action is repeated in the reverse. The pattern is always the same: a participant ties a towel about his waist, stoops down and places the basin of water at the adjacent, seated participant's feet. Then the washer places both feet, one at a time, in the basin, splashing water on the foot and then drying it. After both feet have been washed and dried, the two participants embrace and have a personal conversation . As one member said, "you thank the person for letting you wash their feet. " Both men and women continue at their own pace until all are finished. When finished, all stand and sing a hymn of dismissal . An integral question to the complete understanding of the symbolic value of the foot-washing ritual is, "Who are the participants?" In the first place, the participants are those people who have had a witness by the Holy Spirit that they are among the Elect and have thus had an
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experien ce of grace . In addition, the participants are those who have co me into the Church by "water baptism . " "Water baptism," to the Primitive Bap tists, refers to a mode of baptism-that is, immersion . Im mersion , to them, is the only proper mode of baptism . Baptism, to the Primitive Baptists, is symbolic of the death of an old life of sin and rebirth or resurrection to a new life in Jesus Christ. Thus, immersion is pre ferred because it symbolizes going down into a watery grave of death after a life of sin and then rising again to a new life. Immersion is preferred on other accounts as well, however. For one thing, Jesus Christ was baptized in the River Jordan by John the Baptist. His mode of baptizing was thought to have been by immersion and, true to their fundamentalist nature, the Primitive Baptists thus follow that mode. In addition, the Primitive Baptists prefer to be baptized in flowing water because Jesus was baptized in the river. Only those people who have testified to an experience of grace are to be baptized . This testimonial to the Church is the time at which one joins a particular church and he must then follow (usually on the same day) in water baptism . Therefore, referring again to the question "Who are the participants?", we see that the participants are members of a church through testimony of an experience of grace and through water baptism . However, there are other diacritics that mark the participant. Churches are organized into associations . If a church in the associa tion is having a foot-washing, all other members of churches in the same association may participate . In addition, the member's church must be at peace and in fellowship with the other churches in the association. Likewise, associations can be in or out of fellowship with one another. Members from visiting associations may also participate . A believer who desires to be in fellowship, whose church or association is out of fellowship, must be rebaptized into a church that is in fel lowship. Only a baptized believer in fellowship may partake of com munion, and only the believer who partakes of communion can partici pate in foot-washing . The communion and foot-washing are described as "closed" by the Primitive Baptists, and this closure is reflected in who is allowed to participate . The closed order of communion and foot-washing is the result of a genuine concern for the spiritual order and discipline of the church, and in the minds and hearts of the Primitive Baptists is not merely a mechanism for exclusion . Closure is symbolically represented in another way . Recall that men and women are not radically separated during the ritual; they are separated only so that all things can be said to have been done "in order . " The symbolic separation is seen in the fact that all participants, male and female, are situated in the immediate front of the church house, and the nonparticipants are all sitting midway and to the rear of
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the church house. A nonparticipant simply would not be sitting among the participants . Summarizing, then, when considered as a part of the Baptism/ Communion/Foot-washing trilogy, foot-washing becomes a ritual of closure . Participants in any one of the three--baptism, communion, or foot-washing-are clearly defined . Closure is even symbolically repre sented in the physical separation of participants and nonparticipants in the rituals, for only a believer who is a "fellowshipped" believer may sit among the participants in communion and foot-washing . Closure is symbolically enacted in the Primitive Baptist Church because the Primitive Baptists consider themselves to be a closed society. While some have characterized this behavior as strictly exclu sive, the Primitive Baptists would say that it actually reflects inclusive ness. Those participating are those chosen Elect who have been included within the spiritual kingdom of God. These are God's "little ones," as the Primitive Baptists would say, and they participate in the rituals with feelings of unworthiness to do so. Closure, then, is sym bolically directed toward and exclusive of "the World" and is a sym bolic behavioral statement of their perception of being "in the World, but not of the World. " The relationship between believing and behaving in the Primitive Baptist religion has been illustrated above through the example of believing in and the ritualization of the attitude of humility . However, the behavioral implications derived from a belief system certainly reach beyond the ritual enactment of any particular belief. Drawing again from the Primitive Baptist religion, we may note that the foot-washing ritual is held in conj unction with the communion service; both are preceded by a regular worship service . For example, at Heines Creek Primitive Baptist Church, all services are held on the "third Sunday and Saturday before . " On the weekend designated as "Communion and Footwashing, " the "Saturday before" service has an interesting relationship to the following day' s events, for it suggests that foot washing is a ritual means of resolving conflict in the church. People who attend church together regularly are participating in a type of social action . Conflict seems to appear inevitably during social action, and we may well anticipate conflict appearing in the Primitive Baptist Church . On the "Saturday before," however, all members of the church must be "declared at peace, " or else the communion and foot-washing service cannot be held on the following Sunday. Con sider this story related by a church member: There were two men in the community that had been quarreling over a property boundary for nearly a year. Everyone knew that these two men
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he Primitive Baptist Church, and that for the oncoming footbelonged to t place, that everyone in the church must be declared at peace . take to ashi ng what these two men were going to say, or, how they were red nde wo ey ecause one had to give in, or both had to give in . . . something going to re act, b had to be do ne. So , when the time came and the minister asked, "Is this church now at so that we can have communion and foot-washing?" . . . Well, the ace pe members said, "No" . . . the pastor got up and said, "I believe we have a little trouble in our congregation . And we would like for these two brethern to see if they are at peace now or if we can or cannot have communion and foot washin g tomorrow. " All these neighbors and people who had come in to see what was going to n . . . people all over the community knew about the quarrel and they ppe ha knew the custom of the Primitive Baptist Church. They knew these two men had to be peaceful else there couldn't be any foot-washing. So, up gets this Bro . Johnson and up gets this Bro . Jones and they just come "Zip!" right to the middle of the Church . And he says, "Bro . Jones, "I'll cut down the tree . " And Bro . Johnson says, "No, I'll move the fence on the other side of the tree . " And, they embraced each other. And, they had been fussing almost a solid year over the boundary line . And, they had fussed . . . and they had threatened to go to court to make them move . They embraced and were in tears . Everybody in the church was in tears . And everybody rejoiced to see how strict the Primitive Baptist Church was. 1 1
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A t another level of interpretation, then, the foot-washing ritual serves as a way of resolving personal conflict in the church community. Through the ritualization and subsequent intensification of the atti tude of humility, the persistence of conflict between individuals and the consequences of this persistence for all church members becomes a matter of immediate concern . And, as in the case described above, the problem of personal conflict often becomes a matter of public concern . Ideological commitments that are reflected in ritual enactments have wider implications for appropriate church behavior in general. And, inasmuch as the conflicts are within the awareness of a larger commu nity, the implications of religious beliefs extend well beyond the boundary of church-related behavior. The relationship of religious beliefs and behaviors to the broader concerns of everyday life brings us to another consideration in the proposed approach to the study of religion, that is, the social-historical context of religion . THE SOCIAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
The understanding of any religion depends not only on a grasp of religious meaning, but also on the insight one is able to gain into the
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place of any religious group within its everyday and social historical context. By the place of religion within the context of everyday life, I am simply suggesting that we must contend with the fact that religious groups do not exist in a vacuum but are interrelated with other facets of everyday life . Religion, as a system of knowledge, does not exist to explain religious behavior and religious events alone, but rather is part and parcel of the total explanatory system that gives meaning to all of life. The view of religion as permeating the whole of life is a different view from that common to the Appalachian community studies which, again, draw on the functional, social-institutional model of society. The focus on religion as a social institution creates a false image of boundaries within everyday life . It is as if one stepped in or out of the religious realm like stepping in and out of the church-house door. Thus, many community monographs have a photograph album "now here we all are at church"-flavor; i . e . , religion is described as though it were a divisible sector of community life operating in isolated fashion . The predominance of the geographical and cultural isolation theme as an explanatory concept for the greater Appalachian experience has predisposed students of the region toward using the community as the geographical unit of analysis, and the kinship group as the sociological unit of analysis. In fact, all of Appalachia has been described as an area of scattered, isolated communities socially organized by kinship princi ples. These organizational schemes were largely imposed on the study of Appalachia with little regard for indigenous principles of geo graphical or cultural organization . It may be that the use of geo graphical communities and sociological kin groups as units of analysis represent quite arbitrary and inappropriate impositions on the study of religion in Appalachia as well. This would certainly be true of the Primitive Baptists, whose associations, for example, cut across the community and kin group. Many associations include churches from several communities across county and state lines, this being a historic al as well as contemporary pattern . Bars of fellowship against other associations have been known to create divisions within a particular community of kin groups . Some Primitive Baptists have often re marked to me that the "brethern" are closer to them than their own family members. These examples from the Primitive Baptists are simp ly to suggest that in order to understand everyday life as believers' view it, we must be prepared to work with principles of organization which divide up the real world in ways that are different from our own . This is particularly true in the case of religious groups, whose princi ples of organization may be ostensibly different from those of "the
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patterns of organization can have meaningful im World. " As such, obtain from the religious belief system itself which that plicatio ns of every day life . context the interacts with nce of life today, with its constituent religious element, The exp erie by numerous social-historical processes. The kin shaped is, in turn, studies are largely synchronic and fail to address munity group -com nce of historical dynamics . The proposed approach differs the significa from community studies by insisting that the study of additionally religion is necessarily diachronic . It is the diachronic perspective that allows one to understand the ever-emerging present of any religious group. Considering religion in Appalachia, it is clear that attending to the influence of social-historical processes requires that the social historical development of any religious group be interpreted against a wider context than the immediate geographical locale . This is to say that while we are concerned with the religious belief system in the everyday context, we are also concerned with the relatively short and the much broader social-historical trends against which the religious group resonates . Insofar as these trends are American in breadth, so is the development of a religious group in Appalachia. No religious group may be understood simply in terms of its "Appalachianess . " And the notion that a religious group may be understood only i n terms of itself-in isolation from other influences-is not empirically sound . These comments call for an explication of what is empirically observed when one is studying religion during a period of primary fieldwork, for example, or when one visits a church in any geo graphical region . We are observing the empirical manifestations of the "interpretive face" of a religious group . The "interpretive face" of religion is the sum total of what is observable, both behaviorally and symbolically, for any religious group. 12 This face is most apparent, of course, in specifically church-related settings, although, as stated, any portrayal of the face must include its non-church-related settings as well . In addition, the interpretive face of a religious group can be thought of as something like a point of culmination for the living interface of the religious belief system, the everyday life context in which the belief system occurs and to which the belief system gives meaning, and the social-historical processes that give the interpretive face of any religious group its own peculiar shape. To the extent that variation occurs in religious belief systems (for example, intradenominational variations in theology, doctrines, etc . ), in the contexts of everyday life (for example, varieties of agricultural communities or industrial communities), or in the social-historical processes (for example, differential effects of the coal industrialization
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process within central Appalachia), one would anticipate degrees of variation among the interpretive faces of any religion within one region or certainly across geographical regions . To the extent that there are similarities within the three areas above, one would anticipate similar ity among the interpretive faces of any religion. This is simply to say that one may always recognize oneself to be in a Primitive Baptist worship service, for example, but it is also to say that the Primitive Baptists along Brownies Creek, Kentucky, appear somewhat different from the Primitive Baptists in the Wiregrass section of southern Ala bama . The continuities may not be accounted for simply in terms of rurality or "southernness"; nor may the differences be accounted for simply in terms of a "regional religion" in Appalachia (or a "regional culture" that determines the difference) or merely in terms of adapting to a social and economic situation. Rather, the interpretive face of any religious group may only be understood in terms of the complex and dynamic interfacing of belief, everyday life, and social history . NOTES 1. John D. Photiadis, ed. , Religion in Appalachia: Theological, Social, and Psychological Dimensions and Correlates (Morgantown: Center for Extension and Continuing Education, West Virginia University, 1978); Robert Coles, "God and the Rural Poor, " Psychology Today 5 (3) ( 1972): 33-40; Joseph C. Finney, "Introduction," in Joseph C. Finney, ed . , Culture Change, Mental Health, and Poverty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), pp. xi-xxiii; Jack E. Weller, "How Religion Mirrors and Meets Appalachian Culture," in Max Glenn, ed . , Appalachia in Transition, (St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1970), pp. 132-37; Weston LaBarre, They Shall Take Up Serpents, (New York: Schocken Books, 1976). 2. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: Collier Paperback Edition, 196 1 ) . 3. Melford E . Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition a n d Explanation, " i n Michael Banton, ed. , Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 85-126. 4. Earl D. Brewer, "Religion and the Churches," in Thomas R. Ford, ed. , The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey (Lexington : University Press of Kentucky, 1962), pp. 201-18; Berton Kaplan, "The Structure of Adaptive Sentiments in a Lower Class Religious Group in Appalachia, " Journal of Social lssues 21 (1965): 126-41; James S. Brown, "Social Class, Intermarriage, and Church Membership in a Kentucky Community , " American Journal of Sociology 57 (195 1) : 232-92; Thomas R. Ford, "Status, Residence, and Fundamentalist Religious Beliefs in the Southern Appalachian Region," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 5 (3) (1960): 52-65; Allen Keith Jackson, "Religious Beliefs and Social Status: A Study of the Relationship between Religious Beliefs and Social Status Levels in Sixty-One Churches of the Southern Appalachian Mountains" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1960); John D. Photiadis and J. Schnobel, "Reli gion, a Persistent Institution in a Changing Appalachia, " Review of Religious Research 19 (1) ( 1977) : 32-42; Lorin A. Baumhover, "Value Orientations of Clergy in Appalachia" (unpublished Ph . D . dissertation, Colorado State University, 1976); Byong-Suh Kim,
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"Religiosity as Related to Social Factors and Modes of Social Institutional Behavior in the Southern Appalachian Region" (unpublished Ph . D . dissertation, Emory University, 1968); Loyde H. Hartley, "Sectarianism and Social Participation: A Study of the Rela tio nsh ip between Religious Attitudes and Involvement in Voluntary Organizations in Se venty -Two Churches in the Southern Appalachian Mountains" (unpublished Ph. D . dissertation, Emory University, 1 968) . 5. For an example of this cf. Charles Hudson, "The Structure of a Fundamentalist Christian Belief-System, " in Samuel S . Hill, ed . , Religion and the Solid South (Nashville, Tenn . : Abingdon Press, 1 972), pp. 122-42; Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, Tenn. : University of Tennessee Press, 1 976) . 6. Arthur Carl Piepkorn, "The Primitive Baptists of North America, " Concordia Theological Monthly 42 (1971 ) : 297-314. 7. William R. Welborn, "Experience , " The Christian Baptist 11 (9) (1977) : 1 25 (original ly published in The Gospel Messenger, 1880) . 8. Hudson, "The Structure of a Fundamentalist Christian Belief System," op. cit . , p. 135 . 9. Welborn, "Experience, " op. cit . , p. 1 1 . 1 0 . Ibid. , p . 1 1 . 1 1 . Carolyn P . Alston, interview, Decatur Georgia, June 22, 1 977. 12. Clifford Geertz, "Ethos, World-View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols" Antioch Reviw 17 (1958): 421-27; Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Michael Banton, ed. , Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (New York: Praeger 1966), pp. 1-46. -
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RELIGION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE KANAWHA CouNTY ScHooL TEXTBOOK CoNTROVERSY DWIGHT B . BILLINGS & ROBERT GOLDMAN
A SERIES of bitter, divisive, and persistent local conflicts concerning textbooks and school curricula have erupted throughout the Appa lachian region over the last decade. Because these confrontations have sometimes escalated beyond the angry rhetoric of school board meet ings into the frenzied behavior of book burnings and physical violence, they have attracted substantial media attention. Indeed, because the focus of these disputes has involved fundamental questions of what is moral, a supercharged emotional atmosphere has accompanied the textbook controversies . Consequently, the textbook controversies have been characterized as battles between the forces of enlightenment and modernity on the one hand, and the obstructing forces of back ward, reactionary, or folk traditions on the other. On the surface it appears as if this is simply another instance of the kind of behavior that can be anticipated from that strange people known as Appalachians poor, uneducated "hillbillies" who resist all forms of progress in an irrational and authoritarian fashion . However, we contend in this essay that such accounts of the textbook controversies are partial (one-sided) and ahistorical . We seek instead to recast an understand ing of these within the framework of broader American class structures and ideologies . In this essay we shall address ourselves primarily to the textbook controversy which took place in Kanawha County, West Virginia, in 1974 . Though the events surrounding the Kanawha County textbook controversy became muddied and complicated by the intervention of various extra-local right-wing organizations that sought to exploit the protest, we contend that the movement against the liberalization of textbooks was first and foremost a fundamentalist working-class movement .
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Kanawha County is a large urban-industrial complex in southern West Virginia . Charleston, its principal city, is the state capital . In Kanawha County, opposition to the textbooks centered in portions of the county which have long traditions of working-class resistance. The hotbed of opposition was the Paint Creek and Cabin Creek sections of the county-sites of some of America' s most violent labor conflicts when the United Mine Workers struggled to organize these mining communities early in this century and still the most militant miners' district in America . Industrialization, over-expansion of the coal indus try, cut-throat competition among coal operators, and opposition to unionization produced not a backwater of rural traditionalism but working-class communities with a heightened sense of occupational consciousness and a tradition of activism not shared by the chemical workers in the urban sections of Kanawha County . This tradition of dissent and working-class resistance was expressed as a defense of fundamentalist religion and of seemingly conservative values . We seek to understand why this was so. We will approach this question first by critically examining inter pretations of the textbook conflict advanced in the scholarly press and popular media . We believe their superficial plausibility depends upon a widespread misunderstanding of Appalachian culture and an in adequate understanding of mountain historical experience, including especially the regional pattern of social class relations. Our reinter pretation follows a two-fold approach: on the one hand we offer a rereading of Kanawha County events in light of new Appalachian historiography; on the other hand, we probe the contradictions be tween affirmative and oppositional elements in American Protestant ism. First, however, we will recount the course of the Kanawha County protest. "EVEN HILLBILLIES HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS"
Although certainly it was much more than this, the Kanawha County textbook controversy has been characterized as "a struggle over words. "1 During one of the demonstrations, a protest sign proclaimed: "Even Hillbillies Have Constitutional Rights . " 2 Such words suggest the contradictory loyalties and group identities that characterized opp osition to textbook choices in Kanawha County. For the sign bea rer, ethnic defensiveness seems mingled with subcultural pride, de mocratic faith with the fatalism of the powerless . Such contradictions have perplexed interpreters. Numerous com mentators have hypothesized diverse explanations for the protest . So me attribute the protest to the antics of "cultural Luddites" deter-
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mined to "cling to yesterday . " 3 From this point of view the textbook crusade was an instance of symbolic politics in defense of threatened traditionalist lifestyles . The Charleston NAACP interpreted the whole affair as a racist ploy to "get Negroes out of the schools," yet others compared the conflict with the struggles of black community control advocates in the late 1960s . 4 Curiously, a liberal New Yorker reporter interpreted the conflict as "class war, '1 5 though a Marxist sociologist teaching in the county perceived only the machinations of right-wing infiltrators (as did the liberal National Educational Association) . The Methodist bishop of West Virginia discerned "a trumpet for powerless people" amidst the clamour of dissent while others feared religious warfare or the resurgence of McCarthyism. From a technocratic point of view, professional educators pointed to the failure of school officials "to find ways to contain and manage conflict, to negotiate and win compromise . " Most observers agree that mounting rural dissatisfaction with deci sions made by the Charleston-dominated school board was in the background of the textbook battle . Closed meetings of the school board, consolidation of rural neighborhood schools, and experimental programs in sex education have been identified as sources of discon tent in the early 1970s . The precipitating cause of the controversy, however, was a unanimous decision by the school board in April 1974 to adopt 325 language arts textbooks and supplementary readings selected by a teachers' committee to comply with a "multicultural" and "multiethnic" mandate in state law . School board member Alice Moore, the wife of a fundamentalist minister who had been elected to the school board in opposition to sex education, approved the books but managed to delay the purchase orders. In June she began speaking to church groups, charging that the proposed texts were "dirty, anti Christian, and anti-American . " At the end of June a committee of twenty-seven ministers publically demanded that the school board reject the books and on June 27 an overflow crowd of 1 , 000 protestors attended a school board meeting. Many of the protesters watched the meeting from hallways with closed-circuit television and loudspeak ers . Opposition to the books intensified over the summer months as copies and passages were displayed in rural churches . By the end of August protesters had organized a massive school boycott. When the school term opened on September 3, 20 percent of the expected enroll ment was missing; protesters held a rally on the same day which was attended by 2, 000 dissidents . Sociologists Ann Page and Donald Clelland have analyzed the published statements and pamphlets of protest leaders and letters to
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the editor written throughout the summer and early fall of 1974 in opposition to textbook adoption . They identify four basic thematic complaints voiced in this literature: "(1) disrespect for traditional orthodox conceptions of God and the Bible; (2) use of profanity and vulgar language; (3) disrespect for authority; and (4) advocacy of moral relativism . " Interpreting these statements as expressions of concern about the destruction of a "style of life," the researchers suggest other subsidiary themes including: "concerns about lack of patriotism, leftist political values, neutral treatment of immoral sex, drinking and violence, violations of privacy, and evolutionism . " 6
Protesters obj ected to the moral implications of many readings which explicitly advocated "situation ethics . " One exercise requiring students to compare the fable of "Androcles and the Lion" with the biblical story of Daniel in the lion's den drew particular wrath . School board official Alice Moore objected to it saying: "That's putting the Bible right on the level of fables. Several things imply that God is make-believe and that prayer is a pretend thing . " One teenage pro tester wrote: "We're not asking that they teach Christianity in the schools . We're just asking that they don't insult our faith . " 7 Since a central obj ective of the textbook series was to convey multicultural and multiethnic perspectives, many of the readings contained language that was viewed by local community standards as inappropriate for youth . "Profane" or "crude" language using "the name of God in vain" was particularly objectionable. Examples included expressions such as "by God," "good Lord," "for Chris sake" as well as usages such as "ass-whipping" and "poor bastards . " A reference to pubic hair as "electric fuzz" in an e . e . cummings poem was not appreciated either. 8
Since much of the objectionable language came from black writers such as Dick Gregory, Eldridge Cleaver, and Malcolm X, protesters were condemned as racist. Perhaps closer to the protesters' true concern, however, was one protester's succinct remark that the textbook adop tion was felt to be "an insidious attempt to replace our periods with their question marks . " 9 One day after the school boycott began, the protest was given fu rther impetus by a wildcat support strike by Kanawha County coal miners. Roughly 3,500 miners stayed off the job for several weeks after a few antitext women carrying protest signs picketed local mine sites on September 4. On September 10, 1 1 , 000 Charleston commuters were stranded when protesters halted the city' s bus service. On the follow ing day, with pickets spreading rapidly to other area businesses, the Charleston Daily Mail urged protesters and school officials to "Make Texts Concessions . . . . The ordinary trade and commerce upon
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which all of us depend must not be impeded . " The texts were "not worth the fight that is being made over them . " That same day the school board proposed such a compromise offering to remove the texts for a 30-day citizen review. The concession was acceptable to protest leader Alice Moore but not to more militant protest leaders . The Rev erend Martin Horan urged continued resistance . Horan is reported having said the following to the school superintendent at this time : I drive a truck for a living and I preach the gospel because the Lord called me . The common man don't know what to do except what he's done and that' s to go home and sit down. It's his strong back that keeps the system going, and when he don't like something he goes on home and sits down.
The Kanawha County schools were closed September 13 through 16 to protect children from violence . On September 18, eleven protest ers including several ministers were arrested for violating a court injunction against picketing. From this point on, conflict intensified as various compromise solutions were rejected . Violence occurred throughout October including vandalism at school buildings, shoot ings at empty school buses, and the dynamiting of a board of education office . At this point, middle-class conservatives, at first sympathetic, confessed that things had gotten out of hand . According to one jour nalist living in the county during the conflict, "the tacit support given the protest by middle- and upper-class elements melted away as the picket lines got rougher and the coal companies yelled louder. " Once "the growing militancy and anti-business character of the miners' involvement weakened the fragile coalition of antithetical constituen cies," the conservatives-"always somewhat disdainful of coal min ers"-are said to have begun "muttering about the 'nuts' and 'crazies,' terms which the enlightened liberals in town had used from the first. " 10 In early November the school board voted to return the texts to the classrooms. Protesters established several small private schools in opposition and at the end of the month several rural mayors unveiled a plan for secession from Kanawha County. The conflict gradually di minished, though not before a school board meeting in December was disrupted by fist-fighting, when a proposal by Alice Moore was adopted barring certain of the texts from classroom use . According to Francis Parker, a plan was devised to exclude texts that "pry into a child's home life, teach racial hatred, undermine religious, ethnic or racial groups, encourage sedition, insult patriotism, teach that an alien form of government is superior, use the name of God in vain, [or] use offensive language . " 1 1
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APPALACHIAN STEREOTYPES VERSUS APPALACHIAN HISTORY
The Kanawha County textbook conflict was fraught with many ironies . Observers were puzzled b y the paradox that protesters challenged school authorities with illegal and violent tactics because of their opposition to textbooks that they perceived as encouraging children to que stion authority . 1 2 For many observers this led to the conclusion that the protest movement was simply an authoritarian, anti-modern de fense of traditionalist lifestyles. This interpretation is supported by commonplace misunderstandings of Appalachian culture and history . From the pages of "Lil' Abner" to television images of the "Beverly Hillbillies" or the "Dukes of Hazzard, " Appalachian people have been subject to extensive and pejorative stereotyping. Many accounts of the textbook confrontation re-evoked these stereotypes . Franklin P arker, for instance, reported that "most" rural Kanawha County residents "are set in their ways, wary of change, " to account for the course of events in Kanawha County. Because of emigration "many who remain are underpaid, underemployed, undereducated, undermotivated to change . " He added that "what the mountaineer who remained gained in independence, he paid for in isolation, clannishness, superstition, backwardness . " 1 3 New Yorker reporter Calvin Trillin referred to the protest leadership as "brawl-and-stomp" ministers and reported "an assumption that any dispute involving mountain people-particularly mountain people who are coal miners-will end in violence . " 14 Washing ton Post reporters Baker and Barnes began their feature article on the textbook battle with the following description of Kanawha County "hillbillies" : It is easy to sneer at them, those women in hair rollers and men in bib overalls, who go to school board meetings to denounce atheism and immorality in the classrooms of Kanawha County. They have old wringer washers on the front porch and drive battered pickup trucks . They have never heard of John Dewey or Jean Piaget. They are troubled and confused by the 'new morality, ' the 'new secularism, ' the impact on their lives of all that is 'relevant' and 'innovative, ' and they hurl back words like 'blasphemous, ' and 'obscene, ' and 'un patriotic . ' 15
In a critical commentary on Appalachia's image in the media, Curtis Seltzer, a journalist who lived in Kanawha County during the protest, responded to the Baker and Barnes story saying, "I covered this story since its beginning and I never saw a woman in hair rollers or a man in bib overalls . " He complained that "because there is no organized mountaineer constituency in Manhattan and because so few newspeo-
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pie have ever lived there, they get away with typing the protesting parents as raggedy, half-literate, bomb-slinging religious nuts. " 1 6 Media stereotypes of Appalachia are lent plausibility by academic literature, which blames economic and social troubles in Appalachia on perceived cultural traits and personality deficiencies of mountain peo ple . This literature portrays a mythical image of Appalachia as a tradi tional folk culture, frozen in time . 1 7 Rupert Vance, for example, argues that in Appalachia "mountain isolation . . . became mental and cul tural isolation, holding people in disadvantaged areas, resisting those changes that would bring them into contact with the outside world . " According t o Vance, "the effect o f conditions thus become a new cause of conditions, but the cause is now an attitude, not a mountain . " 1 8 A related approach interprets the folk culture as a "culture of poverty . " 1 9 In either case, "the crux of the problem is clear . To change the moun tains is to change the mountain personality . " 20
Although a recent cover story in Mountain Life and Work reflects the frequency with which "Appalachians Demand Quality Rural Educa tion" throughout the region, 2 1 academicians in the subculture deficiency traditions contend that "education has not been as valued in Appalachia as in the rest of the United State s . " Along with "a negative attitude toward ambition, leadership, higher formal education, and other status-making differences, " rural Appalachians, according to this view, "have not internalized the value of education . " 22 Such an assumption prevents one from understanding the intensity of feelings with which a Kanawha County coalminer would complain to a reporter during the textbook controversy: "We built these schools with our sweat and taxes and, son, no bureaucrat is going to tell me that my kid has to learn garbage . " 23 Reified, monolithic images of Appalachia are plausible only be cause of this long-standing tradition of mythologizing and stereotyp ing Appalachia, as Henry Shapiro's important intellectual history of the idea of Appalachian "otherness" makes clear . 24 A critique of Appa lachian mythmaking such as Shapiro's, however, is not a denial of Appalachian history . New historical studies by scholars such as Alan Banks, David Corbin, Ron Eller, and John Gaventa document the gradual replacement by capitalist industrialization of two pre-capitalist modes of production in rural Appalachia. 25 These modes of production are household subsistence and independent commodity production organized as family farms . 2 6 These studies describe the separation of rural Appalachians, first from their land and later from control of their work and the value of their products . These forms of alienation accom pany the transformation of mountain people's work potential into commodities. 27 This process fundamentally restructures Appalachian
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social relations and prepares the region for the far-reaching commo 2 ditization of more and more spheres of daily life . 8 Community studies also document the strains of transition to the ca pitalist mode of production . Unfortunately most of this sociology, like most American social science, substitutes reified images of "mod ernism" or "industrialism" for a theoretical comprehension of the logic of capitalist relations and its alternatives. This, along with a synchronic a pproach, tends to obscure how the "data" are best contextualized historically . Occasionally, instances of resistance to capitalist domina tion are misread as evidence for a Snuffy Smith subculture of poverty mentality. The best community studies, however, may be reinter preted as documenting the persistance of elements of precapitalist Appalachian experience . Thus in Shiloh John Stephenson provides a graphic picture of class conflict at the workplace which is terribly significant because of its very mundaneness . Stephenson writes: One local story that has been handed down with embellishments over the years tells of a man who helped build the "scenic, " a parkway through the mountains nearby. Although his was not a factory j ob, the sto ry illustrates well one local attitude toward close work supervision. The man' s j ob involved hauling loose dirt and rock away from a construction site and dumping it over a nearby cliff. After dumping each load, he would Jean on his wheelbarrow and watch the dirt cascade to the bottom of the cliff. The supervisor, after watching the worker enjoy several episodes of this time wasting spectator sport, walked over to him and said gruffly, "Why don't you get another and watch it chase the first one down?" To which the worker is said to have replied, "Why don' t let's watch the wheelbarrow chase it?" At this he pushed the wheelbarrow over the cliff and "went to the house" (walked off the j ob) . 29
This daily life incident illustrates resistance to the capitalist separa tion of work and control. It complements historical accounts of collec tive expressions of resistance as in Cabin Creek or Harlan County. As an anecdote in folk culture, the story preserves a remembrance of the precapitalist meanings of work and personhood while it presents a local tradition of opposition to capitalist control over the workplace . Working-class-consciousness and traditions of resistance have been nurtured in Appalachia by the presence of strong occupational communities and, following the loss of their land and independence to absentee corporations, the strength of familial and religious ties among mountain people. Many sociologists have documented the tendency for the changing organization of industrial production in the early twentieth century to undermine the social basis for occupational communities. 30 The reverse has been true, however, in extractive industries such as coalmining where industrial villages were created in
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rural areas near mineral deposits . In Appalachia the residential prox imity of these workers, along with their underground work experience and overt oppression and exploitation by employers, contributed to strong community bonds at the same time that elsewhere they were being weakened . 3 1 Also, family and church functioned "to protect [Appalachians] from the sudden influence which came with the de velopment of industrialization . " 32 Today, community, family, and religion remain sources of strength in times of social class confronta tion as well as institutions to defend against interventions by the agents of other class formations. DIALECfiCS O F WORKING-CLASS ACTIVISM
It is ironic that belief systems and ideologies that were largely imposed from above in an earlier epoch of capitalist development as a means of disciplining and controlling a rural labor force have become today an obstacle to the continued integration of that labor force under a later stage of capitalist development. We contend that this paradox cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of the dialectics of working class activism and the uneven development of capitalist hegemony. Class conflict rarely confines itself to narrowly economic issues. The lives of people and communities are not so easily carved up that we can dissociate their use of symbols or their meaning-producing activity from the analysis of class as a historical process . As E . P. Thompson puts it, "class happens when some men, as a result of common experi ences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs . " 33 At any given moment, working people's understanding of their interests is a product of many layers of meaning. Some of the terms of a commu nity's self-understanding are imposed from outside or above, others are embedded in group traditions, and still others emerge as common sense from the shared experience of daily life. The ability to define, evoke, or limit these terms is an important source of cultural power. Configurations of working-class consciousness result from decades of cultural imposition and resistance. Thus it is our contention that the Kanawha County textbook controversy reveals an episode of working class opposition obscured by a language-that of Protestant fun damentalism-more often used by other classes for social control to evoke commitment and stability rather than dissent. Why did protesters choose textbooks as their symbolic focus? In our advanced industrial society the school system has become central both in the shaping of values as well as in the creation and reinforcement of
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pa tterns of social class. Not only has the school emerged as a pivotal ins titution in the reproduction of class relations, it has also become a central institution in the quest for mobility. One interviewer found that most of the protesters in Kanawha County "confessed to their lack of formal education, " which "made desperate their concern that their children receive a 'good education' and more of a chance in life than they had . " 34 He rightly observes that what is at stake here is commu nity control, a challenging of the professional domination over the institutions that affect the life chances of working people and their children. In addition, resentment was directed against middle-class educators for, in the words of one protester, "talking down to the laboring class of people . " 35 Thus we contend that the initial symbolism of the textbooks in the protest was neither a consequence of a shallow, backward-looking fundamentalism, nor an abstract defense of life style, but rather part of a quest for class respect, community autonomy, and control over a crucial allocating mechanism of social class and social status. Working-class people in the Upper Kanawha Valley experience, and live with, a series of internal tensions generated by a class-based society. Although many of the protesters acknowledge the inade quacies of schooling in the Upper Kanawha Valley, they nonetheless continue to pin their hopes for their children on the schools . They are thus caught in a dilemma . They know that the dominant culture claims to allocate dignity, freedom, and material resources on the basis of educational accomplishments, but they are unwilling to sacrifice their dignity and freedom that results from the middle-class denigration of their cultural heritage . As a result, the working-class parents from these coalfield communities rebel . They are not wholly willing to accept the "injuries to dignity" which are the price of becoming legiti mate in class society . 36 Sociologists in the "status politics" tradition such as Riesman, Vidich and Bensman, and Gusfield correctly perceive a turning point in American life early in this century. But their spatial metaphors of localism (small town values versus mass society), like their psycholog ical analyses (inner versus other-direction), obscure the changes in American class structure and ideology which occurred with the shift from competitive to corporate capitalism. 37 Educational practice came to reflect this shift as meritocratic and technocratic ideologies of school ing replaced earlier practices that were grounded in the metaphors of the marketplace and possessive individualism. 38 Kanawha County parents, we argue, rebelled against texts embodying moral relativism and situational ethics--v alues more resonant with the "corporate liber alism" of downtown Charleston than with the experience of be-
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leaguered industrial villages in the mining district. In doing so, these parents resisted the imposition of new forms of class domination-in this case, by professional experts who speak the language of the liberal technocratic ethos. AFFIRMATIVE AND OPPOSITIONAL ELEMENTS IN AMERICAN NEO-EV ANGELICALISM
It is now commonplace talk that American social institutions are in crisis . Ours is a crisis of political and economic viability as well as a crisis of culture . Liberals such as Jimmy Carter, prompted by pollsters' readings of the public "mood, " admit to a "loss of confidence" by Americans in their way of life; radical social theorists such as Jiirgen Habermas refer to a "crisis of legitimacy" as a systemic tendency of late capitalism operating at levels of institutional authority and personal motivation . 39 "In a period like our own," writes sociologist Robert Bellah in The Broken Covenant, "when we have lost our sense of direc tion, when we do not know where our goal is, when our myths have lost their meaning and comprehensive reason has been eclipsed by calculating technical reason, there is need for a rebirth of imaginative vision . " 40 The clarification of progressive social goals and values and the revitalization of democratic public culture will involve a complex, collective process of discovery, rememberence, and renewal . A num ber of students of American culture such as Robert Bellah, William McLoughlin, and Jeremy Rifkin contend that American religious tradi tions are potentially central, significant aspects of revitalization . 41 At the same time, a conservative religiosity threatens to mask and support populist suppression as an instrument of ideological domination . Although the accommodation of mainstream American religion to corporate capitalist society may suggest skepticism for its contribution to "comprehensive reason" and "imaginative vision," observers watch closely for developments that might reinvigorate a liberating, prophetic tradition . In the 1960s the anticapitalist, communal impulse of Woodstock and youth culture as well as the holistic, antitechnicist spirit of eastern religions were viewed as promising influences. Their potential impact, however, has been blunted by their easy cooptation and their commodification as designer jeans and TM courses. 42 A new candidate for playing a catalytic role is Third World "liberation theol ogy . " Translations of works by Latin American theologians and biblical scholars by the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America seem to be encouraging new sociological reflection and theological interpretation, especially among American Catholics . 43
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With its stress on personal pietism and its rural "Bible-belt" roots, Protestant Evangelicalism, however, has typically been discounted as either defensive and marginal or irrevocably conservative . 44 A recent book, however, by Donald Dayton entitled Discovering an Evangelical Heritage attempts to return the American Evangelical movement to its "radical" nineteenth-century roots which, according to Dayton, in clude both personal repentance and struggles for social reform . Dayton contends that myopic attention to personal holiness is unfaithful to an American Evangelical heritage that includes antebellum abolitionist and feminist agitation . 45 Observers are divided on whether they find a potential here for a socially progressive ideological reorientation . William McLoughlin, perhaps the best historian of Evangelicalism and revivalism in the United States, concludes that "the world view of neo-Evangelicalism, by concentrating on the individual, is essentially an escape from seemingly insoluble, tension-ridden social and political problems . " He finds "too much of the old political and economic conservatism of the Fundamentalist ideology" in the movement today for it to play a visionary, progressive role . 46 In another recent publica tion entitled The Emerging Order: God in the Age of Scarcity, Jeremy Rifkin concludes otherwise . In the theological argumentation and political practice of young neo-Evangelicals such as Jim Wallis, Rifkin discerns a potentially potent critique of the establishment values of liberal Protes tantism and corporate capitalism . Viewing American Protestantism in relation to the current crises and contradictions of world capitalism, Rifkin sketches two possible scenarios. On the one hand he finds promise in new developments within neo-Evangelical theology . If these are combined with what he interprets as the liberating impulse of the "new charismatics, " Rifkin suggests the possibility of a new covenant vision for a more just and ecologically sound future . On the other hand he warns that American religious spokesmen may instead ally with conservative, upper-class interests to j ustify a nationalistic, antidemocratic response to declining economic opportunity and energy/natural resource scarcity. The range of ideological variation within neo-Evangelicalism can be seen in the contrast between Jim Wallis and Jerry Falwell, whose Moral Majority movement appeared on the American scene after Rifkin's book was published and lends strong support to Rifkin' s second sce nario. In his Agenda for Biblical People, Jim Wallis contrasts "establish ment Christianity" with "Biblical faith, " which he says requires a renunciation of the values of American capitalism and an identification with the poor and powerless. 47 This viewpoint is· represented in a fairly widely read evangelical periodical publication, Sojourners, which Wal lis edits . In Listen, America, and through the Moral Maj ority organiza-
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tion, Jerry Falwell, on the other hand, espouses a politically reactionary "Biblical plan of action" for "revival in America . " 48 Falwell's program represents a right-wing defense of laissez-faire, free enterprise capital ism; American military and nuclear superiority; an authoritarian stress on personal immorality as the principal source of social decline; and a defense of male-dominant politics of the family. The Moral Maj ority's defense of the capitalist status quo functions implicitly as well as explicitly. In their packaging of Protestant religion as a televised commodity available for millions of viewers of the "elec tronic church" as well as in the instrumental rationality of their mass media hardware, their computerized approach to fundraising, and their mass mobilization techniques, television Evangelism and the Moral Majority both implicitly uphold dominant logics of capitalist industrialism . This represents a new technocratic version of the affinity Max Weber pointed to between Protestantism and the spirit of early entrepreneurial capitalism. It is erroneous, however, to posit simply a "one-dimensional" interpretation of the Moral Majority. One must distinguish the political aims of the movement's conservative lead ership from the diverse levels of meaning that participation implies for its supporters . Despite the intent of its well-financed leadership, one can uncover potentially progressive elements in Moral Majority positions . For ex ample, despite its defense of laissez-faire capitalism, the Moral Major ity's campaign against television violence and sexuality contains an implicit critique of narcissism and capitalist consumer culture . Like its demand for the teaching of creationism in public schools, the Moral Maj ority position on abortion, though certainly antifeminist and anti female, contains an implicit critique of the spread of technicism and scientism in everyday life. Its defense of the family, though male dominant, defends an increasingly threatened aspect of private space which radical critics such as Christopher Lasch also see as increasingly threatened by the extention of the "therapeutic state . " 49 Like the Moral Maj ority movement, the Kanawha County textbook crusade, as we have argued, manifested a paradoxical blend of ideolog ical positions . Kanawha County families rebelled against school authority in defense of Appalachian working-class culture, which in cludes Evangelical Protestantism. Historically, as Liston Pope showed in his description of company churches in the southern textile indus try, employers in the South have manipulated religious conservatism to blunt class-consciousness. 50 Once such values become part of work ing-class traditions, however, they may provide a rhetoric for dissent. E . P . Thompson has shown that although Methodism was used to discipline early industrial workers, it also contributed to the making of
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an English working class by providing an organizational and moral basis for the subsequent emergence of socialist leaders . 51 Similarly in the American South, Protestantism has functioned not only as a cul tural opiate; it has contributed as well, for example, to the social solidarity and cultural symbolism of the farmer' s revolt when Populist meetings approached the style of revivalist camp meetings. 52 The same Protestant farmers gave socialist presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs his widest electoral margins in the United States in 1912. 53 Presently, and in the past, Evangelical Protestantism has figured prominently in American class struggles, providing both affirmative support and ideological opposition to industrial capitalism. In a study of the social class status of Evangelical converts during the Second Great Awakening in the 1830s, Paul Johnson found that, initially, New England revivals disproportionately attracted master workmen, manufacturers, and j ourneyman craftsmen-not merchants, clerks, or laborers . This was true, according to Johnson, because the religion preached was "order-inducing, repressive, and quintessentially bourgeois . " 54 Evangelical Protestantism offered new standards of per sonal comportment and work discipline just when the emerging fac tory system-contradicting the old paternalistic and authoritarian grammar of Puritan social control-drastically increased the social distance between employers and laborers . According to Johnson, in contrast with Calvinist doctrines of man' s moral depravity and the need for collective social control, the Evangelical stress on personal piety and voluntary self-restraint emerged as a middle-class religious solution to the moral dilemma posed by free (and increasingly uncon trollable) labor. Evangelical revivals, Prohibitionism, and Sunday Schools thus functioned as assaults on autonomous working-class institutions that threatened early industrialism. 55 At the same time, however, in movements such as the fight for the ten-hour workday in the late 1830s and 1840s, working-class Protestants found in Evangeli calism a language for resistance as well . 56 This was especially true in the early 1900s in the coalfields of Kanawha County and southern West Virginia . One tenet of the pejorative tradition in Appalachian studies is that Appalachian people, to quote Jack Weller, "have never appreciated anything but a simple literalistic belief in the Scriptures . " 57 This stereotype of fatalistic, conservative Appalachian religiosity has been challenged in historian David Corbin's account of union struggles in the Paint Creek and Cabin Creek sections of Kanawha County. Here, in the period from 1912 to 1922, "the miners found the Bible to be a gospel of unionism and a handbook of social justice . " Sin, in the words of one miner was "to be lukewarm for the [union] cause . " 58 In the
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course of coalfield struggles, lay "miner-preachers" -reminiscent of the working-class Protestant lay preachers of the English Revolution who would have "turned the world upside down" and made of En gland a true commonwealth59-responded to God's call to contest the hegemony of company-owned churches and company-controlled ministers . Leading miners in daily prayers at mine faces and picket lines, these union miners articulated a religious doctrine that was enabling rather than fatalistic, comforting rather than narcotic. In commentary on one of the many West Virginia hymns that pictured a unionized heaven, Corban notes that miners' salvation imagery "also gave the miners ideas and ideals to fight for on this side of the workers' paradise": When you hear of a thing that's called union, You know that they're happy and free, For Christ has a union in heaven, How beautiful union must be . There's nothing like union to me, It's a home of the happy and free, It's a heaven of rest for the miners How beautiful union must be! 60
Such hymns did not secularize religion; rather, they endowed eco nomic struggle with communal religious purposefulness . According to Corban, the Appalachian coalfield religion that thrived outside the company churches "promoted collective thought and action, gave cohesion and strength to a social class, and permitted the miners to resist the servility and feelings of inferiority that class oppression often breeds in the oppressed . " 6 1 In the early 1970s Appalachian working-class parents in Kanawha County drew on this religious tradition that earlier had been used both to legitimate human dignity and working-class interests as well to bolster an oppressive system of managerial control. While the content of the antitextbook movement appears as reactionary and authoritar ian, we contend that the movement itself can better be understood as the mobilization of class-consciousness within one fraction of the working class in Kanawha County. This class-consciousness is ex pressed in a series of cultural formations that in an earlier stage of capitalist development usually evoked a commitment to control and stability and occasionally dissent. Ironically, as the parents in Cabin Creek and Paint Creek struggle for community control, they appear reactionary because their opposition to the new social control forms elaborated by technocratic-meritocratic educational practices is phrased in a language of social control which is now in decline . 62
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NOTES The authors wish to thank Dr. Julie Porter for many valuable suggestions in the prepara tio n of this paper. 1 . Ann L. Page and Donald A . Clelland, "The Kanawha County Textbook Con tro ve rsy: A Study of the Politics of Life Style Concern," Social Forces 57, no. 1 (1978): 273 . 2. Franklin Parker, The Battle of the Books: Kanawha Cou n ty (Bloomington, Ind . : Phi D elta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1975), p. 30. 3. R . K . Baker and B . Barnes, "A Cling to Yesterday," Charleston Gazette, November 17, 1974, pp. 1, 7, section A . 4 . Unless otherwise cited, quotations are taken from Parker, Battle. 5 . Calvin Trillin, "U.S. Journal : Kanawha County, West Virginia, " The New Yorker 50 (1974) : 32. 6. Page and Clelland; "Textbook Controversy, " pp. 274, 275 . 7. Quoted in Page and Clelland, "Textbook Controversy, " p. 274. 8. Parker, Battle, pp. 1 6 and 1 7; Page and Clelland, "Textbook Controversy, " p. 274 . 9. Quoted in Page and Clelland, "Textbook Controversy, " p. 276. 10. Curtis Seltzer, "A Confusion of Goals: West Virginia Book War, " Na tion , Novem ber 2, 1974, pp . 434, 433 . In "Textbook Controversy," Page and Clelland assert that since textbook opposition initially cut across class lines the movement was not working-class. For a critique of this argument, see Dwight Billings and Robert Goldman, "Comment on 'The Kanawha County Textbook Controversy, ' " Social Problems 57, no. 4 Oune 1979) : 1393-98. 1 1 . Parker, Battle, p. 15. 1 2 . Page and Clelland, "Textbook Controversy," p . 275 . 1 3 . Parker, Battle, pp. 5, 6. 14. Trillin, "Kanawha County," p . 1 19 . 15. Quoted i n Curtis Seltzer, "The Media v s . Appalachia : A Case Study, " Mou n tain Review 2 (May 1976) : 10. 1 6 . Seltzer, "Media vs. Appalachia, " pp. 1 0, 1 1 . 1 7 . See, for example, Jack E . Weller, Yesterday's People: Life i n Contemporary Appalachia (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1966) . For empirical evidence against the idea of a distinctive Appalachian subculture, see Dwight Billings, "Culture and Poverty in Appalachia , " Social Problems 53, no. 3 (December 1974): 3 1 5-23. 18. Rupert Vance, "An I ntroductory Note, " in Weller, Yesterday's People, p. viii . 19. See for example, David H. Looff, Appalachia's Children: The Challenge of Mental Health (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1971) and Richard Ball, "The Analgesic Subculture of the Southern Appalachians," American Sociological Review 33 (December 1968) . For a critique of this approach, see Steve Fisher, "Victim-Blaming in Appalachia," in Bruce Ergood and Bruce Kuhre, eds . , Appalachia: Social Context Past and Present (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1976 ) . 20 . Rupert Vance, "Introductory Note,'' p. ix. 21 . Mountain Life and Work, "Appalachians Demand Quality Rural Education" (February 1980) , pp. 3-1 1 . 22. Hart M. Nelson, "The Internalization o f Education a s a Value i n Rural Appa lachian Culture : Myth or Reality?," in William Muse (ed . ), Business Economic Problems in Appalachia (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1968), pp. 9, 1 1 , 7 . 23 . Seltzer, "Confusion of Goals," p . 432. 24 . Henry D. Shapiro, Appalachia On Our Mind (Chapel Hill, N . C . : University of North Carolina Press, 1978) . 25. Alan J . Banks, "The Emergence of a Capitalistic Labor Market in Eastern Ken tucky, " Appalachian Journal 7, no. 3 (Spring 1980); David Corbin, Life, Work and Rebellion in
84
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the Coal Fields (Urbana, Ill . : University of Illinois Press, 1981); Ronald Eller, Miners, Mil/hands and Mountaineers (Knoxville, Tenn . : University of Tennessee Press, forthcom ing); John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Qu iescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana, Ill . : University of Illinois Press, 1980) . 26. On precapitalist modes of production in rural America, see Christopher Clark, "The Household Economy, Market Exchange and the Rise of Capitalism in the Connecti cut Valley, 1 800-1860, " Journal of Social History 13, no. 2 (Winter 1979) : 169-90; also, James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America, " William and Mary Quarterly 35, no. 1 Ganuary 1978) : 3-32. 27. For a discussion of methodological and theoretical issues involved in the analytic shift from cultural modernization theory to Marxian political-economic theories of social change, see John G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production (Atlantic High lands, N.J. : Humanities Press, 1979) . 28. The most important theoretical analysis of commoditization is Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass . : MIT Press, 1968) . Although the term is not used, the commodity trend is a principal theme in Appalachian fiction. James Still's River of Earth (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1977), for instance, de scribes the Baldridge family's shattered dreams of preserving an autonomous existence in some high lonesome place, as the Baldridges lose their land, move in and out of eastern Kentucky mining camps depending on the vicissitudes of far-away coal markets, and struggle to fulfill the moral obligations to extended family and community that are increasingly compromised by industrialization. 29. John B. Stephenson, Shiloh: A Mou ntain Commun ity (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1968), pp. 26-27. 30. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1929) . 31. Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion, pp. 61 -87. 32. Helen Lewis, S. Kobak, and L . Johnson, "Family, Religion, and Colonialism in Central Appalachia or: Bury my Rifle at Big Stone Gap, " in Jim Axelrod, ed . , Growin' Up Country (Clintwood, Va . : Council of Southern Mountains, 1973), p . 148. 33. E . P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Vintage, 1966), p. 9. 34 . Seltzer, "Confusion of Goals, " p. 432. 35. Ibid. 36. On the contradictions of freedom and dignity in class society, see Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage, 1973) . 37. See Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana, Ill . : University of Illinois Press, 1963). 38. See Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon, 1972); also Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976) . 39 . Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon, 1975 . ) 40. Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p . 153. 41. William G . McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings and Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Jeremy Rifkin with Ted Howard, The Emerging Order: God in the Age of Scarcity (New York: Putnam, 1979). 42. McLoughlin, Revivals, pp. 1 79-216. 43. See, for example, Jose Miranda, Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression (Maryknoll, N . Y . : Orbis Books, 1974) . 44. See George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Ox ford University Press, 1 980) .
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45. 1976) . 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 1942) . 51. 1%6). 52.
85
Donald Dayton, Discovering an Evangelical Heritage (New York: Harper and Row, McLoughlin, Revivals, p. 2 1 3 . Jim Wallis, Agenda for a Biblical People (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980) . Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: Basic Books, 1977) . Liston Pope, Millhands and Preachers (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage,
Robert McMath, Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers' Alliance (New York: Norton, 1975). 53. Leo Ribuffo, "Fundamentalism Revisited: Liberals and That Old-Time Religion, " Nation, November 20, 1980. 54. Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper's Millenn ium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1 8 1 5-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 138. 55. Johnson, Shopkeeper's Millennium, pp. 136-41 . 56. See Paul Faler, "Cultural Aspects of the Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Mas sachusetts Shoemakers and Industrial Morality, 1826-1860, " Labor History 15 (Summer 1974): 367-94; also Herbert Gutman, "Protestantism and the American Labor Move ment," in his Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America (New York: Vintage, 1977), pp. 79-119. 57. Weller, Yesterday's People, p . 130. 58. Corbin, Life, Work and Rebellion, p . 160. 59. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1975). 60. Corbin, Life, Work and Rebellion, p . 164. 61 . Ibid. p. 169. 62. We are indebted t o A I Gedicks for pointing o u t the similarity between t h e "New Right's" cooptation of this heritage in Kanawha County and Ernst Bloch's analysis of the cultural efficacy of "German Fascism . " In Heritage in our Times, Bloch argued that the Fascist movement accurately comprehended and propagandistically exploited the raw material of "nonsynchronous contradictions." According to Gedicks, Bloch's concept of "nonsynchronous contradictions" refers to superstructure from unfulfilled preindus trial and precapitalist pasts that "survive in the present and result in fractures in the relationship between social being and consciousness . " This concept also helps to make sense of the contradictory affinity between the structural exigencies of late capitalism in the United States and the otherwise anachronistic policies advocated by the Moral Majority and ideological positions articulated in current "New Right" legislation such as the Family Protection Bill, which harken back to the paternalism of a bygone era . See AI Gedicks, "Occultism and Marxism: The Dialectics of the Irrational" (unpublished pa per), p. 9; also Anson Rabinbach, "Ernst Bloch's Heritage in Our Times and Fascism, " New Left Critique, no. 11 (Spring 1 977).
THE IMAGE oF APPALACHIAN PoVERTY WALTER PRECOURT
THERE is little doubt that the term "Appalachia" is associated with poverty. In the 1960s the Johnson administration categorized Appa lachia as a region of "grinding poverty . " Appalachia was in turn designated a frontier in the "war on poverty . " Literature on Appa lachia abounds with statements about the region's poverty . In the Washington Star an eleven-part series entitled "Poverty in Appalachia" was published in 1 964 . 1 The following statement appears in the fore word of Appalachian Kentucky: An Exploited Region, "Appalachian Ken tucky brings together the factors within the physical environment and the forces within the human geography which have created the condi tions of backwardness and poverty associated with 'Appalachia . ' 2 Poverty: A New Perspective, published in 1975, focuses almost exclu sively on Appalachian Poverty. The book grew out of research on "Poverty in Appalachia" initiated by the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare . According to the author, "some areas, such as Appalachia, appear as massive concentrations of poverty. "3 What has emerged is an Appalachian poverty image . That is, the _term "Appalachian" connotes the idea "poverty. " Where did the Appalachian poverty image come from? How did it develop? Does poverty really exist in Appalachia? The latter question may appear ludicrous in light of the barrage of studies and statements on the region's poverty. But if we scrutinize the meaning of "poverty" it is apparent that it rests upon a complex set of cultural assumptions and processes associated with Western economic history. Although most discussions on Appalachian poverty proceed from the assumption that the existence of poverty in the region is a given-that it definitely and concretely exists--there is by no means a consensus among social scientists and policymakers of what poverty actually is . But one thing seems clear:_"Poverty" as frequently used in America today definitely is not a simple synonym for "low income" or "unemployment"; it has
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co m plex and far-reaching ideological connotations rooted in the fabric of We stern economic and political history . This paper will critically examine the notion of poverty in Appa lachia . It will seek to identify the historical, economic and social proces ses that underly the image of Appalachian poverty . An attempt will be made to show why the Appalachian poverty image developed, not why Appalachian poverty developed . The difference between these two terms is very significant, as will become evident in this paper. CONCEPTUALIZING POVERTY
Poverty, at its extreme, has been defined in �erlll s of absolutes such as starvation, death from exposure, or loss of life due to some total lack of resources . Few definitions, however, define poverty in terms of such -extremes . Most definitions use criteria that vary depending upon the social and economic conditions present in a particular geographical region at a particular time jn history. According to Louis Ferman, "Definitions of poverty are classification systems, designed to suit the particular policy or program purposes . " 4 In the United States this type of definition is utilized by the Council of Economic Advisors, which defines poverty in terms of minimum family income. In fact, income is by far the most frequently used indicator of poverty. Wilber states: "Poverty itself is typically regarded as a lack of income, which in tum is related to poor housing, inadequate education, insufficient medical care, excessive fertility, unemployment, and many other depressing problems.'1 5 Mad den cites a study that lists six broad dimensions of poverty: income, assets or wealth, access to basic services (e. g. health, transportation, legal ser vices), social mobility and education, political power, and status and satis faction. Income level is the cornerstone of this poverty classification. 6 Davis reiterates the importance of income as a basic poverty-defining criterion in the United States: "Poverty is defined by the U. S. Department of Labor in terms of the adequacy of current family income in meeting a constant absolute standard of food consumption. The poverty income line is based primarily on family size, with adjustment for farm and nonfarm residency. In the Census Bureau's definition, additional adjustment is made for sex and age differences of the head of household ." He cites Department of Labor statistics for 1973 poverty income limits for the continental United States. For a nonfarm family with three persons the poverty income level was $3,450; the level for a farm family was $2,950. For a family with six persons the poverty income levels were $5,550 and $4,725, respectively. 7 While there is a great deal o f consensus that income is the most
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widely used criterion for defining poverty, there is little consensus that income level and the associated criteria adequately represent the phe nomena of poverty. Wilber attempts to go beyond poverty definitions based primarily on income, which he considers "too simplistic and unrealistic. " He views poverty as a complex system: "The system of poverty is defined as the relative lack of resources and/or the inability to utilize resources . At a general level, poverty is treated as a function of resources and mobilization . . . . Thus, instead of treating poverty as a singular entity which is related to a number of additional characteris tics of individuals or regions, factors 'related to poverty' are brought into the system. " 8 Wilber divides poverty properties into two categories. Category A includes those properties that relate to the life cycle of the individual . They include health, capability, motivation, personality, and socioeco nomic status . Category B includes properties that relate to areas, re gions, or collectivities of people . These include natural resources, state policy, economic systems, social norms, stratification, community ser vices and facilities, and mass media. Except for nutritional and biochemical standards, which appear as absolute poverty standards, most authors feel that poverty standards are highly relative. Lampman states: "It [poverty] is relative rather than absolute, it is essentially qualitative rather than quantitative, it is to a certain extent subjective rather than objective . . "9 Madden cogently discusses the relativity of most poverty standards . .
.
Prevailing concepts of income adequacy and relative deprivation change over time . Some societies, particularly Western societies, have been characterized as being on a "hedonistic treadmill. " That is, as individuals find themselves better off in period two than they were in period one, their aspira tion for further improvement in period three tends to make them dissatisfied with the improvement already experienced . This syndrome has serious im plications with regard to interpretation of income distribution data . . . Propo nents of the relative standards of poverty recognize that frustration is a func tion of the gap between aspirations and expectations. Aspirations of the less well-to-do tend to rise as they observe the ever-increasing affluence of their reference groups. 10
The criticism of some poverty definitions is based on the recogni tion that most poverty standards are relative. For example, Michael Harrington states that "Poverty should be defined in terms of those who are denied the minimal levels of health, housing, food, and education that our present stage of scientific knowledge specifies as necessary for life as it is now lived in the United States." 1 1 Rose Friedman, in Poverty: Definition and Perspective, questions Harrington' s
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use of the idea "minimum levels" in his definition. "Since, except for food, there are no minimum levels specified by scientific knowledge, th e only way this quotation can be understood is to take 'necessary' to mean 'customary' or usual-perhaps average in the sense of modal or typ ical . " 1 2 In light of the variou s definitions and concepts of poverty discussed above, it is clear that ideas about poverty deal as much with ideology as they do with material wealth. That is, while physical needs are often considered, cultural values and beliefs are equally significant. Since it is the ideological aspects of Appalachian poverty that are crucial to understanding how Appalachian poverty images have developed, I shall explore in more detail how ideology relates to poverty. Ideology has been defined as "a general interpretation of reality in terms of a combination of values or preferences and obj ective descrip tions of events. " 13 In Karl Mannheim's perspective on ideology, "the whole fabric of institutions of a society must be intimately related to the dominant system of existential belief, which, in turn, not merely rationalizes, but springs from the exigencies of functional organization . " 1 4 The use of ideology in this paper is in line with Mannheim's perspective, but the emphasis here is that ideologies resultin a positive or negative interpretation of life experiences. Thus, ideology consists of a basic set of ideas and attitudes shared by mem bers of a society or inhabitants of a geographical area that skews perception at a highly abstract level, placing perceived phenomena into polarities such as good/evil, right/wrong, and desirable/undesir able. Ideological systems are mediated and communicated through complex cultural codes and symbols, e . g . , "God" and the "Devil. " A fundamental semantic ingredient in the notion of poverty is the idea of good or bad, positive or negative. Thus, to understand the phe nomenon of "poverty" we must take into consideration the profound importance of ideology . When we compare ideologies cross-culturally and at different historical periods, the ideological standards by which poverty can feasibly be determined seem potentially as variable as the 862 societies described in the Ethnographic Atlas. 1 5 Any "objective" criteria seem to exist only in terms of the ideological systems that give them meaning . Even when we consider such basic biological necessities as food and shelter, we cannot overlook the importance of ideology . William Leiss comments on the difficulty of sorting out biological needs from the cultural context. The symbolizing or cultural activity of human beings is so intense and so com plex that the biological-cultural dichotomy is never present in the everyday
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activities of social groups, whether they are primitive societies or industrial ized empires. The available anthropological record reveals the great diversity in all the human practices devised in response to physiological requirements, including the instances in which certain individuals will commit suicide by depriving themselves of survival necessities so as to maintain the integrity of the social group. What the individual organism objectively requires is a mini mum nutrient intake, proper conditions for retaining or dissipating bodily heat, and socialization experiences to maintain group cohesion in social ani mals such as man . These are everyone's "existence need s . " But such needs can be satisfied under a great variety of circumstances, many of which would be considered abhorrent by most persons today . Indeed these needs can be satisfied most efficiently in a setting where the environment has been ruthless ly simplified and organized for just that purpose . Such a setting is described in Zamyatin's famous dystopian novel We, where everyone is assured the neces sary nutrients and shelter to sustain life . The sole nutrient is a bland petroleum derivative, however, and the shelter is a small glass-walled cubicle furnished identically for all . . . . All the most interesting and important issues arise when we study how the objective necessities of human existence are filtered through the symbolic processes of culture and of individual perceptions. In short, all the most important issues arise j ust in that nebulous zone where the so-called objective and subjective dimensions meet. 1 6
If aboriginal Eskimo societies didn't regard themselves as poverty stricken, even though they lived in a harsh physical environment, possessed virtually no material wealth, and often were on the brink of starvation, then how can individuals be considered poverty stricken when lack is defined as an inappropriate house-type or style of cloth ing? This line of thinking may appear like relativism at its extreme, but it does point out the absolute necessity of understanding poverty in a particular context. We must ask why poverty standards exist at all. We must determine how the phenomenon of poverty is manifested and given meaning in different societies. We must identify how a specific version of poverty links to specific social, economic, and ideolog ical processes. These considerations form the basis of the analysis of Appalachian poverty images which follows below. IDEOLOGY AND CONTRASTING ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
To understand the origin of Appalachian poverty images it is first necessary to contrast the ideological characteristics of the Appalachian preindustrial economy to those of market capitalism . Between 1800 and 1900 two basic noncapitalistic economic patterns emerged in the Appalachian region. The first can be termed family-based subsistence farming . Eller desribes this economic pattern:
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Each mountain homestead functions as a nearly self-contained economic u nit, depending upon the land and the energy of a single family to provide fo od, clothing, shelter, and the other necessities of life . . . . the family not only functioned as a se l f-contained economic unit, but it dominated the economic system itself. The mountain farm was a family enterprise, the family being proprietor, laborer, and manager; and the satisfaction of the needs of the 17 fa mily was the sole objective of running the farm
Eller also points out that by 1880 Appalachia contained a greater concentration of noncommercial family farms than any other area in the nation . Few commercial items were purchased by those primarily depen dent upon the self-sufficient type of economy . Some trading and bartering was done, but these were not interrelated with other aspects of the economy, and were not based on a commercial market system of supply and demand . The autonomy from the national market economy can in part be explained by the presence of the second economic pattern, independent commodity production . 18 The main feature of independent commodity production is that the producer controls the means of production and personally carries out distribution of goods without an intermediary labor market or monetary system. Thus, production and consumption are localized . Banks characterizes independent commodity production in eastern Kentucky during the late 1 800s : "Regular household needs, from clothing and food to soap, lamp oil, spirits, sorghum, hand tools, and stoneware, were satisfied through a local trading network based upon the exchange of products from household manufacture, limited farming, and artisanship . The producers and consumers in this setting were virtually one and the same people . " 19 Thus, the system of eco nomic exchange was for the most part outside the sphere of the nation al economy . It is important to maintain an historical perspective when character izing the preindustrial, noncapitalistic economic patterns that de veloped in the Appalachian region . �elf-sufficient farming and inde pendent commodity production have been replaced almost entirely by involvement with and dependence on the national market economy . The development of the lumber and coal industry starting at the end of �he 1800s is associated with this economic transformation . It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that the first decades of the twentieth century saw the end of subsistence farming in Appalachia. Even though the size of most farms had decreased, by 1930 self-sufficient far ms in Appalachia numbered 150, 659 . 20 A study initiated by the Department of Agriculture in the 1930s found that 76 percent of the
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farms in Knott County, Kentucky were self-sufficient. 2 1 In 1945 Robert Galloway contrasted the social organization of "a typical county in the Northwestern Wheat-fallow sub-region of the Wheat Belt with one in the Southern Appalachian Mountain sub-region . " The economy of the wheat farming county, based on mechanized farming, is a large-scale operation with the average gross income in 1945 being $33, 000 from wheat alone . In the Appalachian county the farming is essentially domestic. "A typical farmer in this county plants about half of his cropland to corn which is the basic for food for his stock and his family . . . . purchases are confined to necessities-principally clothes and a few staple foods that they cannot produce on their farm. " 22 It would also be inaccurate to imply that subsistence farming was the only economic pattern present in the Appalachian region during the nineteenth century . Capitalistic enterprise existed throughout the _region in the 1 800s in the more urbanized areas, and even in the larger rural settlements. In fact, one must often know the precise date and geographical locale to estimate the relative importance of subsistence farming versus capitalistic enterprise. Early in the 1800s, when the transportation conditions of the Appalachian region were comparable to lowland regions of the United States, commercial enterprise pre vailed even in the most remote mountain sections via trade to outside commercial centers. But with the explosion of transportation facilities outside the mountains during the middle of the 1 800s, many commer cial producers simply could not compete in outside markets because of transportation difficulties. As Arnow. observes, "numerous as were the manufacturing establishments of 1 803, the Cumberland Country was not destined to become a great industrial center. The small farmer manufacturer grew less and less able to compete with the mass produced goods of New England and elsewhere. ' ' 23 Banks similarly notes, "Even if the mountain producer could accumulate sufficient surplus goods for export, the mountains themselves presented a for midable barrier, even to the most daring and enterprising indi viduals . " 24 Although subsistence farming was not universal, Appalachi<.! had J:'Y far the greatest percentage of self-sufficient farms in the United States during the late 1 800s and early 1900s. But statistics tell only part of the story. The self-sufficient farm economy formed the basis of folklore about the mountains . It was intriguing to outside observers to witness the ability of certain mountain inhabitants to subsist on pro duce from the farm and forest, and literature on the mountains focused on this type of economy. The self-sufficient economy came to symbol ize Appalachia, and the self-sufficing way of life was depicted in novels and eventually in "documentary" works such as the Foxfire series . 25
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Thus, whether we consider actual statistics on subsistence economy or works of folklore, the self-sufficient economy became closely associ ated with Appalachia, and the legacy of the self-sufficient mountaineer exists today. To understand the relationship between subsistence farming and the emergence of Appalachian poverty images, it is necessary to realize that subsistence farming is much more than a type of economic activ ity. That is, subsistence farming involves a total system of social rela tionships and values . Production and consumption are embedded in social institutions, not the commercial market. That is, economic activi ties are closely tied to the kinship structure and community-wide networks of mutual aid and exchange . James Brown observes this pattern in his Beech Creek study . The family was the primary economic unit: Unlike most urban families, and even many rural families in the U . S . today, the Beech Creek family tended to be a unit of economic production and consumption. Consequently the economic roles of the family on the farm could not be separated, except analytically, from the family roles . 26
Moreover, "most cooperative farming activities were carried on within the family group . " In this system the economy does not function as a separate institution as it does in a commercial market system. As a result, many of the values and beliefs associated with a market ideol ogy, i. e . , wealth as a basis of prestige, do not exist or, if they do exist, are mitigated by the demands of kinship and community organiza tions. This is not to say that "status" does not exist; status, however, is defined in terms other than those related to market ideology. Eller discusses the status system in the self-sufficient farming econ omy: These status distinctions were functions not of economics (wealth, land ownership, or access to natural resources) but of the value system of the community itself. In remote mountain neighborhoods where economic differ ences were minimal, measures of social prestige and privilege were based on personality characteristics or ascribed traits such as sex, age, and family groups. The rural social order was divided not into upper, middle, and lower classes, but into respectable and non-respectable groups, and each local com munity determined its own criteria for respectability. This status system, of course, tended to break down in the villages and county seat towns where class distinctions (and thus class consciousness) were more noticeable . 27
Eller also indicates that the lack of overt class-consciousness "was refle cted in the emergence of strong egalitarian attitudes and b eliefs . " 28
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Many authors have alluded to this value orientation in studie s conducted at different times and in different parts of the Appalachian region . Semple states, "Every man recognizes man's equality; there are no different classes" (eastern Kentucky, 1 890s) . 29 According to Ed wards and Jones, there is no discrimination on the basis of dress, language or wealth . "The mountaineer is the same person in overalls, or rags, that he is in a dress suit" (northern Georgia, 1930s). 3 0 Pearsall similarly observes that the men "feel no special pressure to acquire money and material possessions as status symbols" (eastern Tennes see, 1950s) . 3 1 These attitudes do not mean that the mountaineer did not put a premium on work. If one refused to contribute his share to family and community, there were definite sanctions against his behavior. But the sanctions were based on standards of the community and not on standards of the marketplace . Here again, however, it is necessary to point out the "egalitarian ethic" was not universal but limited mainly to those areas where the self-sufficient economy was predominant. But as with self-sufficiency per se, the egalitarian value system has become part of folklore on Appalachia, and generalized depictions of Appalachian society have been colored by this ethos . Market capitalism is essentially different with regard to modes of economic participation and values and beliefs associated with eco nomic behavior. In a market economy, commercial enterprise is a distinct institution. Social institutions such as kinship and community wide systems of mutual aid no longer control economic behavior.' Therefore, the social mechanisms by which the economy functions are no longer effective . The economy must create another mechanism-one by which members of a society are compelled to function in the market system. Basic physical subsistence is not automatically translated into an incen tive to produce . Physical subsistence is linked with production through the need of earning an income. That is, the capitalist mode of production is characterized by the "separation of producers from real control over and possession of the means or products of labor, and the contractual exchange of labor power for wages . . . labor itself becomes a commodity. "32 Thus, going from point A, physical need, to point B, commodity, is not direct; the path is mediated by an intermediate agency-wages controlled by a market-based labor system. Physical needs, however, are never the sole incentive to work in the market system. "An economic system actually relying for its main spring on hunger would be almost as perverse as a family system based on the bare urge of sex . "33 It is necessary that "higher motives" become
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roote d in the market ideology and therefore pride, honor, and power become tied to gaining market goods and services . In the nineteenth century the Protestant ethic was the predominant gical motivation for market-oriented behavior in Europe and the olo de i Uni te d States . As the commodities market expanded by the beginning of the twentieth century, conspicuous consumption gradually sup planted the Protestant ethic as an ideological force in the market system. The nature of the commodities market as it developed in the twentieth century must be considered before one can understand the value system associated with the acquisition of consumer goods and services. Commodities by definition are goods and services designed to fulfill wants, needs, and desires-the demand . The essential point is that market commodities are not geared to fulfilling a stable set of "obj ective needs"; the market defines existing needs and constantly generates new needs oriented toward the survival and perpetuation of the market system per se. Furthermore, "the market is the principal reference framework that defines the prevailing model of rational behavior for the members of society . "34 In The Limits to Satisfaction, William Leiss discusses the commodities market process: In this setting wants become less and less coherent, and their objectives less clear and readily identifiable, as individuals continually reinterpret their needs in relation to the expanding market economy . . . . New commodities, which today appear steadily and in great numbers, simultaneously promise the satisfaction of wants and promote a feeling of dissatisfaction with regard to the previously existing array. The dizzy pirouette of wants and commodities presents to the individual an ever-changing ensemble of satisfactions and dissatisfactions in terms of which their is no resolution, but only a continuous movement from a less extensive to a more extensive participation in market activity. 35
Leiss also argues that commodities themselves become very com plex objects . "They are not simply material things but 'material-sym bolic' entities-that is, things which embody complex sets of messages and characteristics. " 36 One of the results of the need-commodity treadmill is that each asp ect of a person's needs tends to be broken down into progressively smal ler component parts . For instance, individuals treat their own bo dies as objects made up of component units, each having its own de mands . According to Leiss: Hair, face, mouth, eyes, hands, axillae, neck, crotch, legs, and feet all require the application of specific and distinct chemical mixtures, which
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together will make one's body pleasing to others and therefore a means of winning favour. Each of these specific needs in turn can run through poten tially infinite permutations in relation to the technological sleight-of-hand embodied in commodities: a deodorant undergoes metamorphosis from paste to powder to spray, is scented with synthetic resemblances to all the fruits of the earth, is packaged in a dazzling variety of shapes and sizes-and so on ad infinitum . 37 The point of all this is quite simple: the fragmentation of needs requires on the individual's part a steadily more intensive effort to hold together his identity and personal integrity . In concrete terms this amounts to spending more and more time in consumption activities. 38
In sum, the market/commodity system exerts profound control on virtually every aspect of a person's physical, psychological and emo tional being. Individuals socialized in a market-oriented culture are highly sensitive and finely tuned to market-induced demands. Con sumption behavior is delicately coordinated and regulated according to the pitch pipe of the market. If we extend the simile further, we can consider physical needs the two lowest notes on a piano keyboard; in addition to these notes, the tune of market control over individual behavior can be played on any of the remaining eighty-six note�ach representing a "needed" commodity . Of course, the number of notes on the piano keyboard continually increases. An important point to be emphasized here is that the goals con cerned with the fulfillment of the market-induced needs are not only those that result in "prosperity, " or "luxury . " The market also estab lishes the subsistence level. This is a culturally defined level below which a person is not gaining a culturally defined "subsistence . " This in no way implies that a person will lack food, shelter, or clothing if he is below this level . The subsistence level I am considering is defined entirely in terms of cultural values oriented around the acquisition of commodities . The subsistence level is therefore the balance point where a person is contributing just enough to meet the market' s needs and in return is just "getting by" in terms of the "necessities" as defined by the market culture. The person demonstrates a lifestyle defined as appropriate by market conditions since the lifestyle is func tionally linked to the market via consumption patterns that will ensure the market' s existence . The market maintains this subsistence level by adapting the culturally defined goals to its needs. The circumstance of a person's functioning inadequately in terms of the market manifests itself in negative values such as inferiority, shame, and guilt, i . e . , the person is below the culturally defined "subsistence level . " Poverty is therefore the stigma associated with this negative cultural and economic position . It makes members of a culture
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aware when they dip below a functionally adequate level in the market economy. The flaw in this system, however, is that a person may be defined as functioning inadequately in the economy but may still manage to survive in the society. This may occur among those who disregard the cultural values set accordingly by the market culture . It may also happen when people are incapable of meeting the market demands or unaware of the negative values associated with their economic position. POVERTY AS A STIGMA
This brings us to the basic concept of poverty. To understand exactly why the label "poverty" is attached to levels of economic functioning deemed inappropriate by market standards we must understand the idea of poverty in an historical context. Since the fourteenth century in Europe the label "poverty" has been attached to certain groups of people as a stigma for ostracism and the enforcement of oppressive governmental policies designed to con trol potentially disruptive behavior. Prior to this tme the care of the so-called poor was in the province of the Church, which in fact re garded the poor to be of the highest moral status . lt was also during the fourteenth century that the collective label "poor" came into wide usage among governmental officials . Waxman notes, "the persistent call for repressive policies to deal with the poor was legitimized by their inherent moral defectiveness and by the belief that they will only cease to be morally defective when they are 'purified' through the process of forced rigid resocialization. . . . " 39 The earliest among these repres sive policies were the Statutes of Laborers of 1349, which forbade the giving of alms to those who "refuse to labor, giving themselves to theft and other abominations . " A number of Poor Laws were enacted in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the period 1 722-1 782 a system of workhouses was implemented where men, women, and children who received relief were forced to eat, sleep, and work . The rules in the workhouses were very rigid, and failure to observe them resulted in punishments which "included the stocks, the dungeon, denial of meals, refusal of permission to leave the hou se. " 40 It was the social Darwinist thinking of Joseph Townsend and Thomas Malthus in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that influenced attitudes toward poverty at the time of the emergence of capitalism . The "survival of the fittest" mentality fit well into the idea of "laissez-faire" capitalism and influenced the enactment of the Poor Law reforms of 1834 .
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Central to the Poor Law reforms was the doctrine of less eligibility, which meant that persons on relief should be kept in a condition "necessarily worse than that of the lowest paid worker not on relief, the objective being to make relief undesirable and to provide the recipient with a clear and strong incentive to get off the relief rolls . " 4 1 Chaim I . Waxman discusses the diffusion of attitudes about pov erty to the United States: In 1 9th century America, these attitudes and approaches to poverty were transplanted. These were adapted to the prevailing ideologies which, on the one hand, from a religious perspective saw poverty as "a fortunate necessity which led the poor into paths of industry and the rich into acts of charity," and on the other hand, saw poverty as a misfortune, unnecessary in the land of golden opportunity . No one who was willing to work need remain poor. Where it existed, poverty was seen as "punishment meted out to the poor for their indolence, inefficiency or improvidence; or else it was interpreted in terms of heredity, intoxicating drink, "degeneration, " partisan politics, or, as in one case, the unrestricted liberty allowed to vagrant and degraded women . 42
In the twentieth century the fundamental povety stigma was main tained except the consumption "ante" was steadily "upped" : The poverty stigma was applied not just to those who eked out sustenance, but as a sanction for anyone whose behavior did not demonstrate a consumption pattern at the prevailing market level . EMERGENCE OF AN APPALACHIAN POVERTY IMAGE
Let us now consider how the above perspective on poverty relates to Appalachia . Hicks in Appalachian Valley notes, "Since at least 1 844, when one of Edgar Allan Poe's short stories mentioned the 'fierce and uncouth races of men' living in western Virginia, there has developed an image of people in Southern Appalachia as slovenly, impover ished, ignorant and sternly individualistic. " 43 Thus, by the mid-1 800s the process of labeling Appalachians as different on the basis of alleged antisocial traits or deprivation of some form set the stage for the development of the clearly established poverty image that emerged in the twentieth century. The labeling of a group as "different" is_ a significant aspect of the poverty stigma dynamic that had been present in Europe since th�. 1300s. Also, there were scattered accounts of poverty per se in the region . In 1 856, a British traveler spoke of the "proverbial poverty" of the people in the "whole region"-due to the excessive time spent on hunting. 44 Missionary groups directly or in directly fostered a view of impoverishment and deprivation in the
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region during the late 1800s and early 1900s . As Hicks notes, "mission ary efforts of church groups had . . . advertised the mountain people as ignorant and impoverished . "45 Ideas about Appalachian poverty were, however, relatively spor adic until the economic transformation that occurred between the 1890s and 1 930s . During this period the precapitalistic subsistence oriented economy came under extensive influence and scrutiny by industrial and political agencies of the capitalist system. Let us con sider how this proces s of economic change strengthened and eventual ly crystallized the image of Appalachian poverty. Subsistence farming is largely outside the sphere of the commercial market system . In fact, self-sufficient farming is virtually the antithesis of a market-based productive system; it is not based on wage labor and cannot possibly provide the monetary means to acquire what the market defines as necessity . In fact, the subsistence economy is inte grated according to an entirely different set of principles . Motivation to work is rooted in institutions other than the market, i . e . , the family and community-based networks of mutual aid . Thus, prestige is not based on acquiring market goods and services; appropriate productive be havior is defined in terms of an adequate contribution to family and community . While on the periphery of the capitalist system, Appalachians maintained the integrity of their localized economic system. 46 As Appalachians became more involved with the commercial economy of the United States, the material aspects of their way of life were evalu ated by a new set of standards, which was based on the ideology of a self-regulating market system . Economic production and consump tion, which by traditional standards was appropriate, represented "poverty" by market standards. It is true that some authors have viewed the self-sufficient economy in positive terms. For instance, in Eller's historical study of Appa lachian preindustrial economy, the perspective is generally positive: "familism, rather than the accumulation of material wealth, was the predominant cultural value in the region, and it sustained a life style that was simple, methodic, and tranquil . "47 But the message com municated by most studies is that subsistence farming is economically unproductive if not disastrous . One reason for this view is simply that most recent studies are based on the standards of contemporary agri cultural economics, which measure agricultural productivity in terms of profit and monetary equivalence. Obviously, if the farming system is not geared toward the agricultural market, monetary returns from farming will be negligible, if not entirely absent. For instance, the following statement appears in The Southern Appalachian Region: "Data
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from the 1930 census of agriculture revealed that the Appalachians held the highest concentration of low income farms in the country . Many returned less than $600 value of gross products: subsistence farms sold little on the open market . . . . Every measure used served to indicate the uneconomic returns from Appalachian agriculture . " 48 In the same survey, the conjunction of federal monetary standards and subsistence farming during the depression of the 1930s is dis cussed. "Without any lowering of the customary live-at-home and do without economy, the application of federal standards made at least half the population in certain Appalachian areas eligible for relief. " 49 Two important points can be made about this statement. One is that a negative connotation was attached to the existing self-sufficient econ omy; the second is that by the decree of federal monetary relief standards, the subsistence economy became defined as "poverty. " Where subsistence farming h a s persisted, i t h a s generally been associ ated with poverty. In Bowman' s characterization of eastern Kentucky made in the 1 960s, an aspect of the economy is defined as "an ex tremely poor and largely subsistence agriculture . " 50 I suggest that at least one hillbilly stereotype grew out of a basic misinterpretation of the self-sufficient lifestyle . The stereotype is that of people sprawled out in front of a cabin beside a somnolent bloodhound. The stereotype is now portrayed in the television pro gram "Hee Haw," and has been widespread in numerous depictions of the mountaineer. An observer from outside the mountains might gain an impression from certain activities associated with a self-sufficient way of life that could lead to the fabrication of such a stereotype, especially if the observer were accustomed to a market-based work schedule . Subsistence farming is characterized by periods of produc tive labor with alternate periods of inactivity. Marion Pearsall discusses time usage among subsistence producers in Little Smokey Ridge: There are periods of great activity when a man plows, plants, harvests, or perhaps does some building. He may then leave home to wander if he pleases. . . . At home again work is done in spurts, and there are long hours to sit on the porch, relax at the store, or talk and drink with other men. In the course of a year, however, a man does spend a good deal of time and energy in work. 51
Whether or not it is plausible to link this hillbilly stereotype to a false representation of a subsistence-oriented economy, the stereotype clearly connotes laziness and idleness. These are the characteristics that historically have formed the basis of a poverty stigma . Thus far I have considered the emergence of Appalachian poverty
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images in light of general ideological differences between precapitalis tic and capitalistic market economies. We must also consider how developments in the coal industry in parts of Appalachia reinforced the emerging poverty image . Appalachia's rich mineral resources made the region a resource in the 1800s from the perspective of American political and economic interests. Valuable raw materials were waiting to be exploited. A major problem, however, faced the outside political and economic interests: Local Appalachians owned the land containing the valuable resources; thus, the local people represented an obstacle to exploiting the re sources-they were "in the way . " I t i s useful to consider this situation i n historical and cross-cultural perspective . Whenever a powerful economic and political force de mands access to the resources on or under the land of indigenous peoples, a similar pattern seems to emerge in response to the same problem. The problem boils down to this: Something must be done with the people in order to get the resources . One solution to this problem in some cases has been actual genocide. More often, however, indigenous peoples are "corralled" into reservations or otherwise forced off their land. Such exploitation usually never occurs without a rationale. Most often, the rationale is that, because the exploited peoples are culturally or biologically inferior, they must be "saved" or "modernized . " In fact, the term "white man' s burden" has been applied to non-Western groups undergoing colonialization. The same pattern developed with regard to the exploitation of Appalachian resources . In "Property, Coal, and Theft, " John Gaventa discusses the ideology and rationale of economic exploitation in the coal industry. "Anyone who had or who wanted any part of the economic benefit of the new society was dependent on the will of those few who controlled it. . . . With the dependency on the economic controllers, though, also came a supporting ideology of progress, civilization, and response to social need . . . Like other traditional col onialists, the virtues of this 'civilization' were unquestionably better than the past, somehow less-than-human, ways of the 'natives . ' "52 The author notes that articles appeared in the New York Times and Harpers Magazine in the 1 890s that supported this ideology. The process of denigrating local populations for purposes of ex ploitation contributed to the poverty stereotype . The process relates dire ctly to the ideological factors associated with the contrasting eco nomic systems discussed above . The Appalachian way of life did not fit the market model; it was therefore lacking; it was therefore in need of salvation by outside industrial interests. Indeed, the poverty label
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places people, socially, in the need-of-help role. The paternalistic atti tudes of early mine operators is indicative of this role relationship . In mining towns practically all economic, political, and legal responsibili ties were assumed by the mine operators . Harry Caudill states: "In return for his labor his employers clothed his back, filled his belly, sheltered and lighted his household, and provided his family with medical treatment, fuel and water. " 53 When a mountaineer became dependent on mining, he was placed in a situa tion virtually the opposite of the self-sufficient way of life . He no longer made his own decisions; rather, the company made them for him . He was now completely dependent upon wages. The company controlled his money by issuing scrip that was made by the company and could be used only in company stores. The company made all decisions con cerning political and legal matters, hiring its own law officers and dealing with any legal infraction. The miner was at the mercy of the mine operators, to the extent that he could be evicted from his com pany house at the company's will. 54 Paul Cressey describes the transition of the mountaineer from self-sufficiency to dependence upon the industrial market economy in Harlan County, Kentucky, where by 1940, 70 percent of the men were engaged in mining. Instead of the security provided by the older self-sufficient agriculture there was substituted the instability of industrial employment. A man' s livelihood now depended on fluctuations in the national economy which were entirely outside his control. . . . With this change in occupation money a ssumed a dominant place in the miner's life . The friendly barter system disappeared and human relations came to be measured in terms of wages and profits . . . . The most serious aspect of economic disorganization developed in the relations between the mine operators and the workers . Instead of the older social equality a rigid class system was introduced . . . . More far-reaching than the disruption of the economic organization was the breakdown of the older community structure . . . . Competition and exploitation replaced friendly mutual aid as social relations became casual and impersonal . 55
The miner had thus become dependent upon the industrial market economy of the United States . However, the coal industry, being so completely specialized, left the miner virtually isolated from other industries and subsequently from access to other forms of wage labor. Morris states: "The mining camp is a one-industry community, usually isolated-cut off from the main currents of industrial life . " 56 This left the miner no alternative to mining. During the times of unemploy ment, therefore, the miner was economically defenseless; he was de pendent on, but not well integrated into a market industrial way of life .
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PRESENT APPALACHIAN POVERTY IMAGES
The emergence of present poverty images is directly related to the two factors discussed above, which include the denigration of subsistence oriented economic behavior by market standards, and the exploitation of Appalachian resources . In the context of recent economic trends, these forces help mold the poverty stereotype that prevails today . Throughout the twentieth century Appalachia faced periods of sporadic unemployment. Where coal mining developed as a maj or source of employment, fluctuations in the coal market often led to the closing of mines. Furthermore, many mining activities became auto mated. In these circumstances, large numbers of miners lost their jobs. Because of unemployment, many persons migrated out of the moun tains to various cities seeking employment. Many became successfully employed; often, however, there were no jobs available and some of the migrants had to collect welfare. While some of those remaining in the mountains could find employment, many had no alternative but to collect welfare . It is important to emphasize that not all Appalachians faced these �conomic_ problems . Some successfully continued in subsistence and cash-crop farming patterns. Others were employed in occupations that were not affected by unemployment associated with mining. The conditions of economic depression affected only certain parts of Appalachia; however, that cast a shadow on the entire region: Economic depression was interpreted in terms of the negative ideas already ingrained in the minds of the general populace regarding the nature of Appalachian culture and society. Furthermore, the mass media emphasized the very worst economic conditions and, at the same time, it portrayed a picture of the Appalachian as culturally backward, if not actually depraved. The significance of the mass media cannot be overemphasized. The mass media are highly sensitive to the fluctuations and demands of the national and international market system. Through advertisements, news broadcasts, financial reports, and political messages the key ideological codes of market-appropriate behavior are neatly packed in a highly palatable form . As Leiss notes, "In the high-intensity market setting the number of messages circulating in the social environment is truly staggering. Before reaching the age of twenty a person in the United States will have been exposed on average to 350, 000 television commercials . " 57 The rise and fall of the stock market is translated into the emotional well-being of the populace . The interest rate is communicated by news announcers in words and facial expressions as a cause for joy or
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sorrow. There is virtually no escape from the compulsion to conform to highly variable market standards. Those who do not conform are portrayed in the mass media as exhibiting some form of pathos or deprivation. Another characteristic of the mass media is to communicate about eth nic groups and regional populations using caricatures, cliches, and highly edited behavioral portraits. The various Appalachian stereo types portrayed on television are discussed by Horace Newcomb. The programs considered range from the Beverly Hillbillies to the Dukes of Hazzard. 58 ��v.erty images fit well into the mass media scheme of communica ate a phenomenon of the mass media. Documentary films such as Appa lachia: Rich Land, Poor People and Christmas in Appalachia clearly com municate the message that Appalachia is a poverty-stricken region . But the poverty messages are also part of most dramatized depictions of the "mountaineer. " Take for instance, the Beverly Hillbillies: the song introducing the program includes the phrase, "poor mountaineer barely kept his family fed . " And, of course, the material heritage of the Clampett family is beyond the pale by market standards . Fantasy ls{and had an episode on a "hillbilly" family that was aired on January 10, 1981 . The story was about a man who wanted his hillbilly family to experience being millionaires . The following is from the program narrative: "Ten millionaires and their ladies are going to attend a party hosted by four of the brokest hillbillies ever to set foot on Fantasy Island . . . This is embarrassing Mr. Roarke . A family of poor dirt farmers rubbing shoulders with all that gold and glitter. What have I done?" These and numerous other portrayals of the mountaineer convey a message entrenched in the media perspective of the hillbilly: the mountaineer is poor. Among social �entists_ctnd policymakers another trend of thought has emerged that has reinforced and strengthened the Appalachian poverty image . Conceptions such as "lower-class culture," "low income lifestyles," "culture of violence," "slum culture, " and even "dregs culture" are used to categorize and study groups occupying low income sectors of various regions. 59 Oscar Lewis, in La Vida, intro duces the concept "culture of poverty" and sa�s essentially that there are certain lifestyles characteristic of the poor . 6 It is generally assumed that poverty-culture traits prevent or inhibit upward mobility in urban economic and social systems. According to Lewis, wherever the cul ture of poverty occurs, "its practitioners exhibit remarkable similarity in the structure of their families, in interpersonal relations, in spending
Jj�m. In fact, in certain respects, Appalachian poverty images
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habits, in their value systems and in their orientation in time . " Lewis identifies seventy traits that characterize the culture of poverty. For instance one trait is the "disengagement, the nonintegration, of the poor with respect to the major institutions of society . . . . The people do not belong to labor unions or political parties and make little use of banks, hospitals, department stores or museums. " 61 The concept has been influential in perspectives on poverty in Appalachia. Appa lachians, facing economic difficulties on the one hand and having their way of life stereotyped and denigrated on the other, fit well into the "culture of poverty" mold-Appalachia was now regarded as having a culture of poverty! Rolland Wright presents a penetrating critique of the culture of poverty concept. His perspective is that of a native of a rural population subj ect to poverty stereotypes. His analysis has important implications for the present discussion, since it questions the meaning of poverty using criteria that relate to ideological differences between popula tions. Wright's arguments center around differences between social and economic patterns of individuals living in certain rural areas and those of urban market-oriented groups . According to Wright, the differences are so fundamental that they involve different concepts of the "self. " The urban ground rule is that acts are definitive of the self. "Urban people are quite sensitive to any behavioral cues which allow them to locate an individual categorically, whether that cue is overt behavior or some expressive symbol, such as clothes, property, bumper stickers or whatever . . . . This tendency to infer meaning about a man from his acts is so pervasive in urban life I call it the 'urban ground rule . ' "62 In contrast to this concept of self, Wright argues that among the rural population within which he was socialized, identity tends to be given . "They have very little grasp that a man can 'become' anything fundamentally different by the way he acts. . . . " An individual from this group is more likely to think the kind of man he is determines what he will accomplish or achieve, not the other way around . The discussion of different concepts of self is part of Wright' s general argument pointing out the inconsistencies in the notion "cul ture of poverty. " The inconsistencies result from the fact the culture of poverty idea stems from one population categorizing another popula tion on the basis of values and judgments meaningful only to the po pulation making the judgments . According to Wright, poverty culture traits are a series of urban definitions turned inside out. "Being negative constructs, they tend to be empty, something like saying the sea is not the land . It is true, but it doesn't say much about the nature of the ocean. In a similar way, the
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'culture of poverty' tells us the [so-called] poor are not urban men, but it says nothing about who they are in their own terms . " 63 Wright' s perspective offers support for the basic argument ad vanced here: that the image of Appalachian poverty is rooted in the interpretations of precapitalistic Appalachian economic and social pat terns on the basis of commercial market standards. Whether or not it is done intentionally, a group labeled poverty stricken is stigmatized . Authors have voiced the opinion that poverty is just a word-what difference does the word make as long as prob lems such as low income and unemployment are identified? Use of poverty labels may be j ustified as a muckraking device that will concen trate attention on corruption and injustice . If the poverty label does have utility, it is definitely a double-edged sword . A word such as poverty, especially when incorporated into official policy, is similar to terms such as psychotic, criminal, convict, and traitor. When a person becomes identified with the label the label becomes a stigma having far-reaching emotional, psychological, and social consequences . When the poverty label is attached indiscriminately to an entire region the influence on inhabitants of the region is similar. Coffman discusses the nature of a stigma : While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind-in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one . Such an attribute is a stigma . 64
Coffman distinguishes three kinds of stigmas: "tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, " "physical stigma-deformities," and "blemishes of individual character. " According to Waxman, a poverty stereotype, when attached to a geographical region or ethnic group, is similar to Coffman's tribal stigma of race . He states that "the stigma of poverty is a special type of stigma which attributes to the poor a status of being 'less than human,' and that the stigma has taken various shapes at different historical stages. " 65 In Appalachia, the poverty image clearly falls into the "tribal stigma of race" category, since the idea of poverty is indiscriminately attached to the group-level category "Appalachian . " Poverty stereotypes can create difficulties for people identified as Appalachian. Such images result in a communication barrier between local Appalachians and those from other regions : This is especially
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harmful to Appalachians when they migrate to cities . In this situation the problems caused by the negative stereotype far outweigh those associated with such economic factors as unemployment; Appa lachians are often socially segregated in residential, educational, and occupational settings . Furthermore, because of the poverty stereotype, it is often assumed that the Appalachian must give up his way of life in order to adapt successfully to "middle-class" urban life . I am aware of inhabitants of the Appalachian region who refuse to be included in literature on the region because they do not want to be considered "poverty-stricken . " For the social scientist and policymaker, poverty images take on another dimension . _It is often assumed that if one studies Appalachia, one studies poverty . Thus, it is difficult to formulate research problems that are not biased: The poverty image conveys a perspective for observing Appalachia that compares this population's behavioral, so cial, and cultural patterns to an arbitrary standard . The poverty image establishes a mind set with which to perceive, select, and categorize information about Appalachia . It is important also to consider the influence of poverty images on public policy . It is often assumed that policy should reflect poverty conditions . Hicks describes the "skirmishes in the war on poverty" that developed in a North Carolina mountain community in the 1960s . "The poverty program in the Little Laurel [Valley] was undertaken by a regional organization, composed of paid and volunteer workers over an area of four counties . Under a well-paid director, this association assigned VISTA workers to various sections of the area, wrote progress reports, and applied for financial grants from the Office of Economic Opportunity in Washington . " 66 Hicks notes first of all that the local people resented the flood of poverty propaganda associated with the war on poverty. They simply didn't see themselves as "universally destitute and helpless . " Also, the rhetoric and communication styles of poverty workers were insulting to local people who respected their way of life . But overt conflict erupted when application was made to the Office of Economic Opportunity for a large grant to set up a "poor people's newspaper . . . . Obj ections from Appalachian newspaper editors and political leaders were overpowering . " 67 Hicks concludes his discussion of the impact of the poverty program with the following statement: "Change in the Little Laurel Valley, meanwhile, proceeds at a quickening pace and the outlines of urban America become clearer, but the agencies of change in large part are industrial employment, improved highways, and television, not the poverty program . " 68 I would like to conclude this paper with a quote from Shiloh: A Mountain Community, by John Stephenson . John, a native of the Appa-
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lachians, is a sociologist and director of the Appalachian Center at the University of Kentucky . I feel his statement captures the essential theme of this paper: My interest in the mountains has not always been so problem-centered. In fact, I, like many people raised near the Appalachians, was not so aware that we had such problems until someone informed me . . . . Only gradually did I come to realize that the people referred to by Michael Harrington and Harry Caudill and John F. Kennedy and Vance and the Saturday Evening Post-were the same ones I had as neighbors and school friends when I was a child. In truth, I still think of the mountains as a corner of heaven first and a national disgrace second . 69
NOTES
1. Haynes Johnson, "Poverty in Appalachia, " Washington Star, eleven-part series, February 9-14, 16-20, 1964. 2. R.C. Langman, Appalachian Kentucky: An Exploited Region, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1971), p . v . 3 . George L. Wilber, ed. Poverty: A New Perspective (Lexington, Ky . : University Press of Kentucky, 1975), p. 5. 4. Louis Ferman, Joyce L. Kom bluh, and Alan Haber, eds . , Poverty in America: A Book of Readings (Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 6. 5. Wilber, Poverty, p . 5. 6. J . Patrick Madden, "Poverty Measures as Indicators of Social Welfare, " in Poverty: A New Perspective, ed. G. Wilber (Lexington , Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1975), p . 26. 7. Carlton G. Davis, "Poverty and Rural Development in the United States: Where Do We Stand?" in Rural Poverty and the Policy Crisis, ed. R . O . Coppedge and C. G. Davis, (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1977), p. 12. 8. Wilber, Poverty, p . 3. 9. Robert J . Lampman, E nds a n d Means of Reducing Income Poverty, (Chicago: Mark ham Publishing Co. , 1971), p. 26. 10. Wilber, Poverty, pp. 36-38 1 1 . Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macm ill a n, 1 962), p. 179. 12. Rose Friedman, Poverty: Definition and Perspective, (Washington : American Enter prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1965), p. 26. 13. Communications Research Machines, Inc . , Anthropology Today (Del Mar, Cal . : CRM Books, 1971), p. 546. 14. Anthony F . C . Wallace, Culture and Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 143 . 15. George P. Murdock, Ethnographic Atlas, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967) . 16. William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problems of Needs and Commodities. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp . 54, 61-62. 17. Ronald D. Eller, "Land and Family: An Historical View of Preindustrial Appa lachia," Appalachian Journa/ 6, no. 2 (Winte r, 1979): 92, 100.
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18. Alan J. Banks, "The Emergence of a Capitalistic Labor Market in Eastern Ken tucky," Appalachian Journal 7, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 189. 19. Banks, "Emergence," p . 190. 20. United States Department of Agriculture, Economic and Social Problems and Condi tions of the Southern Appalachians, Miscellaneous Publication no. 205 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 46. 21 . Faith M. Williams, Hazel K. Stiebeling, ldella G. Swisher, and Gertrude S. Weiss, Fa mily Living in Knott County Kentucky, Technical Bulletin no. 576 (Washington: United States Department of Agriculture, 1937), p. 13. 22. Frank D. Alexander and Robert E . Galloway, "Salient Features of Social Organ ization in a Typical County of the General and Self-Sufficient Farm Region, " Rural Sociology 12 (December 1947): 396. 23. Harriett S. Arnow, Seedtime On the Cumberland (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p . 283. 24 . Banks, "Emergence, " p. 1 90. 25 . Eliot Wigginton, The Foxfire Book (Garden City, N . Y . : Anchor-Doubleday, 1972) . 26. James Brown, "The Conjugal Family and the Extended Family Group," American Sociological Review 17 Oune 1952): 297. 27. Eller, "Land and Family," p. 87. 28. Ibid. 29. Ellen C. Semple, "The Anglo-Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains," Bulletin of the American Geographic Society 42 (1910): 589. 30. A . S . Edwards and Leslie Jones, "An Experimental and Field Study of North Georgia Mountaineers, " Jou rnal of Social Psychology 9 (August . 1938): 333. 31 . Marion Pearsall, Little Smokey Ridge: The Natural History of A Southern Appalachian Neighborhood (Birmingham, Ala . : University of Alabama Press), p. 56. 32. Banks, "Emergence, " p. 32. 33. Karl Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Economy," Commentary 3 (February 1947): 111. 34. Leiss, Limits t o Satisfaction, p . 92. 35. Ibid., p. 27. 36. Ibid . , p. 74. 37. Ibid . , p. 18. 38. Ibid . , p . 19. 39. Chaim, I . Waxman, The Stigma of Poverty: A Critique of Poverty Theories and Policies (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 75. 40. Ibid . , p. 78. 41 . Ibid . , p . 4 1 . 42 . Ibid . , p . 86. 43. George L. Hicks, Appalachian Valley (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19 76), p. 6 . 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid . , p. 1 03. 46. See David Walls, "Internal Colony or Internal Periphery? A Critique of Current Mo dels and an Alternative Formulation , " in Colonialism in Modern America: The Appa lach ian Case, ed. H. Lewis, L. Johnson and D. Askins (Boone, N . C . , Appalachian Con sortium Press, 1978) . 47. Eller, "Land and Family, " p. 106. 48. Thomas R . Ford, ed . , The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey, (Lexington, Ky. : Univ ersity Press o f Kentucky, 1962), p . 5.
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49. Ibid. 50. Mary jean Bowman and W. Warren Haynes, Resou rces and People in East Kentucky: Problems and Potentials of a Lagging Economy (Baltimore: johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 24. 51 . Pearsall, Little Smokey Ridge, pp. 89-90 . 52. John Gaventa, "Property, Coal, and Theft," in Lewis et a / . , Colonialism in Modern America, pp. 144, 145. 53. Harry Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography of A Depressed Area (Boston: Little, Brown and Co . , 1963), p. 1 1 5. 54. Homer Lawrence Morris, The Plight of the Bituminous Coal M iner (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934) . 55. Paul Cressey, "Social Disorganization and Reorganization in Harlan County, Kentucky," American Sociological Rev iew 14 ( 1 949) : 389-94 . 56. Morris, Plight, p. 85. 57. Leiss, Limits to Satisfaction , p. 82. 58. Horace Newcomb, "Appalachia on Television: Region as Symbol in American Popular Culture," Appalachian ]ournal 7, no. 1 -2 (Autumn-Winter 1979): 1 55-64 . 59 . Charles Valentine, Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter Proposals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 968) . 60. Oscar Lewis, La Vida: A Puerto R ican Family in the Culture of Pot•erty, (New York: Random House, 1 966) . 6 1 . Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," Scientific American 215 (1966): 19-25 . ; see Dwight Billings, "Culture and Poverty in Appalachia: A Theoretical Discussion and Empirical Analysis," Social Forces 53 ( 1 9 74): 315-23 . 62. Rolland H. Wright, "The Stranger Mentality and the Culture of Poverty," in The Culture of Poverty: A Critique, ed. Eleanor B. Leacock (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 320-21 . 63. Ibid . , p. 325. 64 . Erving Coffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . : Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 2-3. 65. Waxman, Stigma of Poverty, p . 69. 66. Hicks, Appalachian Valley, p. 1 03. 67. Ibid . , p. 1 04. 68. Ibid. , p. 1 05 . 69. john Stephenson, Shiloh: A Mou ntain Com m u nity (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 1968), p. viii.
THE PLACE OF CULTURE AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY HENRY D . SHAPIRO
THE apothegm "know thyself, " despite its apparent clarity and long popularity, sounds better than it means . Whether we hear it from the ancients or the moderns, it lacks the operational specificity of such other and ancient prescriptive statements as "honor thy father and mother" or "thou shalt not kill. " And while it may be true nonetheless, as an assertion of the first obligation of the human consciousness, it does not help us to know who we are or tell us what we should do once we find out. Nor does it tell us about the nature either of self knowledge or of the self that is to be known . Indeed, the search for self-definition, for identity, cannot occur without some elaboration of the question, by which the asker is provided with a sense of the range of acceptable answers to "who am I?" Only God is permitted to say: "I Am That Am. " "Know thyself, " which as an obligation may b e recognized a s a motif in that abstraction we call "Western civilization," must thus be ,\ seen to be embedded also in the culture of time and place, which alone can provide the necessary elaboration permitting the question to be dealt with, if not finally answered. But because real men and women do not live in "Western civilization, " it is only in the context of the local or historical culture in which the asker lives that the question is asked . And it is only by the local or historical culture in which the asker lives that the question is made answerable . While we may separate for analytical purposes the asking of the question from the kinds of an swer given by real men and women in real times and places, we must also recognize that real life asking and real life answering are insep arable events . The question makes no sense without the elaboration provided by the culture that gives it specificity and focus, and any answers given lack the status of identity statements, unless the ques tion is implied .
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What is true of real people in real time and place, seeking to know themselves, is true also of those who attempt to know others--to view "objectively" someone else' s self, someone else's culture, someone else' s identity. For we as onlookers also live in real time and place, in a local and historical culture that gives specificity and focus to the ques� tion "who are they. " Any attempt at understanding the culture of others must thus begin with some assessment of the manner in which our questions and our answers are themselves the products of a local and historical culture-the culture of "social theory"-and with a recognition that, just as the cultural patterns we seek to understand can change, so the culture of social theory can change . Indeed the culture of social theory has in fact changed, so that while the questions we ask have remained the same ("who are they?") the kinds of answers we give are quite different now than they were a hundred years ago, or two hundred . Today we are principally concerned with the culture of _groups rather than the culture of individuals, and we are prepared to identify particular patterns of culture not only with particular groups or populations, but with particular groups or populations in particular places, and ultimately with particular places. Culture is now tied to "place . " It wasn't always . .. Social theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries consid� ered the relationship of the individual and society largely without reference to the location in space of either the individuals or the so cieties which were its focus and concern . When place was mentioned at all, it served in a naming way, as a partial identifier of some particu lar social phenomenon used anecdotally as an example that proved or disproved the rule being advanced or attacked . Thus one might talk of "Roman" society and institutions or "English" society and institutions as familiar examples of human experience illustrative of one or another aspect of the general laws of social theory . But in the same way, one might find equally useful examples of human experience through the imagination, in the idealized states of "nature" or of "civil society" examined by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and Thomas Paine, in the "histoires hypothetiques" of Rousseau, or in the utopias or dys topias of More, Bacon, Defoe, Voltaire, or Montesquieu. Whether one drew one's examples from the actions of men and women in real time and space or in imaginary time and space, however, it was the rules rather than these examples which were the concern of social theory. The examples epitomized the rules or provided evidence on the basis of which such rules might be constructed . But social theory moved as quickly as possible from examples to generalizations that might be true at all times and in all places. The concern of social theory indeed was
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with the true nature of mankind and the true nature of society, and it presumed to attempt universal statement precisely because it assumed that time and space were accidents, mere reference points in the histor ical record rather than elements essential to the human condition. This was the character of social theory whether it concerned itself with the nature of mankind or with mankind's behavior (including the creation and use of institutions); whether it viewed real human popula tions as aggregates of atomic individuals, each of whom epitomized the characteristics of the species, or as a collection of classes or types, each of which displayed some characteristic of human beings; and whether it viewed real human societies as epitomes of human society in general or as examples of a class or type. This was the character of social theory even after the invention of the new idea of history in the nineteenth century, · which separated past and present into epochs distinguishable by differential patterns of behavior or by different sets of characteristics common among the men and women of different times, moreover. While Hegel and Comte, Spencer and Marx rejected ,--\ the assumption of timelessness which had informed the generaliza tions of seventeenth and eighteenth-century social theory, that is, they retained the older assumption of placelessness . Their contribution was to erect new rules that would describe the processes of change, de velopment, evolution, irrespective of the location in space of those phenomena that were the focus of their interest and provided the data for their generalizations. "Place" thus retained its function as an identi fier of exemplary phenomena rather than assuming new status as an essential element in the construction of social theory itself. By the beginning of the twentieth century, of course, all this _h�ci begun to change. Place as environment had entered social theory as the > critical context facilitating or prohibiting the development of particular patterns of relationships between the individuals of a place and the society of that place . But place had also come to seem the critical element for the identification of a variety of apparently unique social phenomena that seemed to resist classification by any of the conven tional schemes of social theory. As the distinguishing element in the description of such phenomena, moreover, place became a potentially important factor in explanation as well as identification . The origins of this change may be traced to the taxonomic crisis of the mid-nineteenth century. Precipitated by the rej ection as useless of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century schemes for defining the units of reality and for arranging them as a set or system, this crisis in classifica tion yielded a series of attempts to erect new taxonomies that could "more adequately" describe the processes of natural history and civil _
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history. Some of these sought to use place (range, habitat, provenance, "culture area") as a principle for the grouping and arrangement of the units of reality (including "events" and "artifacts"), while others fo cused new attention on the role of place as environment in the develop ment and distribution of biological species and subspecies, including the races and peoples of mankind, and of languages, belief patterns, and cultures. But all of them tended to replace the more traditional vertical or hierarchical schemes of classification based on one or another ranking criterion with new schemes that arranged popula tions, events, artifacts, or cultures horizontally in space-as-place . The conventional assumption of seventeenth- and eighteenth century thought concerning the universal character of mankind made possible the search for a universal social theory descriptive of man in society, at any time and in any place; but it left little room for acknowl edgment of differences between individuals (or societies) except in sofar as these were themselves the product of man's situation as social being. Thus seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social theory had no difficulty in recognizing real differences between men and women, adults and children, or free persons and bound persons; such a classi fication of the population according to sex, age, or civil condition derived from assumptions about the legal status implicit in such a taxonomy and hence derived from principles pertaining to men (and women) in society . Further, the civil condition of any individual might easily be seen to be accidental, that is, a characteristic external to the essence of the person as human being. Such characteristics resulted from that individual' s participation in a particular historical society that classified its population in particular ways, or was the result of that other kind of "accident, " the product of fate or fortune, as "an accident of birth . " The perception o f differences among individuals continued to chal lenge assumptions of a universal humanity, however, and thus threatened the possibility of social theory itself. Whenever possible, social theory directed its efforts at discovering patterns of similarity in the structure and function of individuals and societies, leaving the description of difference to the realm of literature. As new interest developed in the comparative study of individuals and societies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, social theory found mechanisms to resolve the dissonance between the grand assumption of a universal mankind and the observation of human variation . One mode of resolving this dissonance was through the use of the same anthropomorphic metaphor that had served to connect indi-
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vidual and society in the work of Hobbes and his successors, by means of the analogy of function . In a logical extension of this analogy, differences between individuals (or between societies) might be viewed as merely the results of the accidents of fate or fortune, of some mi schance that precipitated a misfunction or malfunction in the normal processes of the universal human physiology or the universal human psychology (or the universal human "sociology") . In addition, mis fu nction or malfunction appeared during the late eighteenth century as a most productive explanation for the occurrence of disease and yielded patterns of treatment which were designed to put the human body back in working order, especially by reestablishing a proper balance among its parts . It was also, of course, the most powerful explanation for the necessity of revolution in America, where in much the same way, it generated attempts to erect new institutions that would put the body politic back in working order and reestablish a proper balance among its parts . But differences explained as the result of malfunction could account only for exceptions to the rule, while ordinary observation suggested patterns of difference between indi viduals and between societies which had to be integrated into the rule itself. Here again, however, the analogy of function proved to be of use in its capacity to resolve the dissonance between assumption and observation . Because the anecdotal data of natural history and of civil history, of individual history and of national history, seemed all to suggest that universal processes were universally in operation, the different stages in the life cycle of an individual might be viewed as analogues of equally different stages in the life cycle of a society, and the differences between individuals and between societies might be explained as a result of differential rates of their individual growth or development. As individuals were young, mature, or old (and enfeebled), and as one stage of life differed from another in the normal experience of all living creatures, so also societies might be said to be young, mature, or old (and enfeebled) . And as the young might be said to be naive, "natu ral," primitive, savage, uncivilized, uncultivated, and the mature to be sophisticated, "civilized," complete, cultivated, societies also might be cla ssified as having the characteristics of one or another age category by analogy. The problem was to determine what was naive and what so phisticated, what patterns of behavior actually pertained to the young and what to the old, which institutional forms were primitive, which were complete and mature . But in this context, the meaning of "culture" was clear. Culture was what one did to the young and it was also what the mature possessed as a result of learning and experience,
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but in either case it was the opposite of "nature" and "natural, " involving the bending of the twig, the giving of shape to raw material, the "development" of otherwise unrealizable potential, the training in one direction or another rather than no training at all. Using anthropomorphic classifiers of this sort, social theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was able to account for observed differences between individuals or between societies by locating such differences on a scale of youth to maturity, nature to culture. And when the idea of history (both natural and civil) as a linear rather than a cyclical process was introduced into discussions of social theory during the early nineteenth century, the stage-of-development analogy con tinued to be useful. Indeed, the new idea of history reinforced the notion of a normal correlation between the calendric epoch and the life cycle epoch, between time and the stage of development . Persons or societies not meeting the norm expected of their historical age might be said to be "young for their age" as we still say of the naughty child; and in the case of individuals or societies, one was then free either to accept the disparity between expectation and behavior or culture, or else to make some efforts at reconciling the two by helping an individual or a society to achieve the expected degree of maturity. Education was of particular usefulness in this context, for accelerating development toward the expected level of maturity or cultivation. By the middle of the nineteenth century this entire structure of assumptions concerning the universal character of mankind and the possibility of a universal social theory, and of explanations to account for differences between individuals and between societies, had begun to crumble . Social theory was left with a mass of data but no principles by which to organize them, with persisting questions concerning the nature of man and of society but no clear definition of either, and with only the root observation with which modern social theory had its beginnings in the seventeenth century to do duty as the foundation for subsequent thought: that there was a difference between the state of nature and of civilization, between natural man and civilized man . It was at this point that social theory, itself emergent as empirical science, engaged in that characteristic gesture of mid-century science and sought to spread out as if on a table all the data available to it concern ing the nature of man and of society, in the past and present, with the hope that a fresh look at the whole might yield hints of such a natural system of classification as would permit the grouping of discrete bits and the formulation of generalizations concerning the relationship among them. 1 Out of this experience---<:a rried out literally by the curators and
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librarians of the first ethnographic museums, symbolically by the pre parers of "tables" of statistical data, and metaphorically by systematiz er s without number-emerged the notion that "place" was the critical characteristic by which one group of data might be definitively distin guished from another, and that an identity of location, in time or in s pace, was what linked apparently discrete facts, events, or indi viduals to each other in such a way as to form the natural units that were the proper concern of an empirical social science . Sometimes "place" was real place-location in definable geographic space or in that historical space revealed by archaeology either as long ago or in some more precise time provided by the evidence of stratiation. Some times place was merely that locus on the table where particular data were observed . In all cases, however, the grouping of data in place was never dependent upon assumptions about the rank of these data relative to each other or about the rank of their places relative to each other (except perhaps as "now" or "then") . Instead, the concept of place provided the matrix or grid on which social data were arranged, and at which social data were observed . It was in this context, more over, that "culture, " formerly the possession of the mature as a result of experience, education, cultivation obtained new meaning and new usefulness in the pursuit of social theory. Some of the social data arranged by place consisted of characteris tics that pertained to man as species, "natural man," and these, grouped as units according to their location in space or time became the special concern of the new sciences of anthropology-which sought to identify those attributes that distinguished man from other animals and ethnology-which sought to distinguish among the "types" of man . Some of these data consisted of characteristics that pertained to man as a member of society, "civilized man," the product of experi ence, education, cultivation. These too became the special concern of anthropology and ethnology, as the critical capability that separated man from the other animals and as the particular behavioral patterns which separated men into "types" of another sort-peoples, families, na tions, tribes . For both anthropology and ethnology, as a result, "culture" could no longer be the possession only of the mature but became also the possession of the immature, so that one could talk about the "culture" of children and the "culture" of savages which was their possession as a result of their experience, and distinguish be tween that which was learned and that which was innate . " C ulture" thus became that which made each individual and each society unique but which also pertained to individuals as individuals and to societies a s societies so that each individual and each society became an exemp-
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Jar of the universal character of man as species . And "culture" became that which individuals shared as members of particular societies, which made societies out of an aggregation of individuals . The first to use "culture" in this fashion appears to have been Edward Burnett Tylor, in an effort to distinguish between the natural and the artificial in man's behavior and to give a name to that which was the possession of a people as a people and which made them a people, in the past and in the present. "Culture," Tylor said, or "civilization, " "is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities or habits acquired by man as a member of society . " 2 Out of context, this defini tion offered no change from current usage in English. In the context of Tylor' s own work, however, it effectively combined the conventional meaning of culture as the possession of the mature with mid nineteenth-century meanings of Kultur and civilisation as the posses sion of a people as a people in such a way as to permit discussion of the culture of those ancient ("primitive") peoples whose monuments had first engaged his interest in anthropology and ethnology. By exten sion, this new use of culture also permitted discussion of the culture of peoples or societies located apparently randomly in time as contempor ary peoples or societies appeared to be located randomly in space, even while it forced anthropology and ethnology to confront the dilemma of talking systematically about phenomena the occurrence of which did not appear to be systematic . Although Tylor was thus the first to use "culture" in this new way and with these new implications, within a relatively few years the word, or at least the concept, became a commonplace among anthro pologists and ethnologists and a principal focus for their work . 3 Cul ture was the baggage a people carried with them, in their wanderings through time and through space, and by which they might be recog nized as contemporary tourists are identified by their little blue shoul der-bags . Sometimes the travelers were available to be interviewed, so that anthropologists and ethnologists might ask, "Is this your bag?" but sometimes the travelers had long gone and the anthropologists and ethnologists found only traces of their presence in the left-luggage rooms of prehistory . In either case it was the baggage that most en gaged their attention, strange in shape and color, and of uncertain and sometimes unimaginable usefulness, and they sought to describe it fully and to classify it according to the place in which they'd found it. Through the end of the nineteenth century, "culture" was defined as the possession of peoples, although now of all peoples irrespective of their stage of development. In Europe generally, this identification of culture and people facilitated contemporary efforts toward the
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achievement of nationalism by providing a range of characteristics, and a name for those characteristics, which were the common posses sion of peoples in places, and which transcended in importance the characteristics dividing a population-individual differences in height or physiognomy or behavior, and especially class differences in wealth, status, or the ability to exercise power. Thus a people, united by their common possession of a particular pattern of culture, were "the nation, " and the space they controlled was the nation's territory. Or conversely, the space in which common cultural characteristics prevailed was the space of that people who were defined by those characteristics, hence again the nation's territory . Throughout Europe and even in England, this formula created a variety of intellectual dilemmas concerning the matter of peopleness as a function of cultural characteristics and of national territory as a function of nationhood or peopleness, thus exacerbating preexisting patterns of political confu sion . But its applicability both to "settled" and historical populations and to "migrant" and prehistoric populations was a condition of its vitality. 4 In the United States by contrast, the usefulness of a definition of culture as the possession of a people seemed limited in its application to North America's native population only . For North American ethnology, the concept of culture proved to be of enormous useful ness, and indeed it was out of attempts to understand the processes of native American history and prehistory that the idea of culture had its origins . In Europe the new concept of culture was available as an element in the construction of a new social theory applicable to the present as well as the past, and to the "sophisticated" as well as to the "primitive . " In the United States, by contrast, both the concept of culture and the anthropologists and ethnologists who used it as an intellectual tool seemed excluded from full participation in contempor ary efforts at the construction of a new social theory, contemporary discussion of the nature and future of American civilization, and con temporary efforts at the achievement of an American nationalism . For in the United States, no single people possessed a common culture and no common culture seemed to prevail among a population united politically and hence defined administratively as a people. In the United States, moreover, possession of the national territory seemed to antedate either the appearance of the people as a nation or the exis tence of any cultural characteristics commonly possessed by each and all . Thus it fell to Americans to attempt some essential connection between culture and place and people and place, as Europeans had e arlier connected people and culture using place as grid or matrix only . Among the first to make this attempt was Daniel G . Brinton,
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perhaps the premier American ethnologist of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Born in 1837 and hence an almost exact contem porary of the Englishman E. B. Tylor, Brinton attended Yale College and the Jefferson Medical College of Philadelphia, took the obligatory study tour of Europe, and then began the practice of medicine at West Chester, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia . During the Civil War he served as a surgeon in the Union Army, from 1862 to 1865, returning to West Chester upon the cessation of hostilities . In the early 1870s, he moved to Philadelphia, as assistant editor and then editor of the Medical and Surgical Reporter. He retained this title and some of his functions on the j ournal until 1887, although from the mid-1 880s it became possible for him to pursue full-time the work in ethnology and anthropology which he had begun during his student days and in which he had engaged as an "amateur" up to that time. In 1884, he was named to the chair of ethnology and archaeology at the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia, and in 1886 to the professorship of American linguistics and archaeology in the University of Pennsylva nia, holding both positions concurrently for the rest of his life . 5 Already by this time his bibliography in anthropology and ethnolo gy was substantial, comprising thirty-two articles and five books, in addition to the series of North American myths he began publishing in 1882 as the Library ofNorth American Aborig inal Literature and the anthro pological materials he prepared for the Medical and Surgical Reporter, but in the fifteen years before his death on July 31, 1899, he would publish an additional 166 articles and nine books, including Essays of an Amer icanist (1890), Races and Peoples (1890) , The American Race ( 1891), and Religions of Primitive People (1897) . A member of numerous learned societies in the United States and in Europe, including the Anthropolo gical Societies of Berlin and Vienna, the Ethnological Societies of Paris and Florence, the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Copenhagen, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Antiquarian Socie ty, he served during the later years of his life as president of the American Folklore Society, the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science . Almost inevitably, therefore, he was chosen to organize and pre side at the International Congress of Anthropology held in conjunction with the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago during the summer of 1893, one of a series of meetings intended to demonstrate the progress of science in the nineteenth century and establish publicly America's full participation in the learned dialogues of the day. Almost inevitably also, Brinton chose to address the Congress at its opening session not with a learned and descriptive paper on North American
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mythology, linguistics, or ethnology, but by attempting to come to grips with the peculiar status of anthropology and ethnology as mar ginal sciences in the contemporary world . And almost inevitably also, he did so in a peculiarly American way, from the special perspective of the contemporary dilemma concerning the nature and future of Amer 6 ican civilization. In his address, Brinton proposed to extend the activities of anthro pology from its traditional focus on "primitive" man, to which some would restrict its concern, arguing that the discipline was in fact as its name claimed, the science of man in general . Thus he urged that anthropology take as its motto that phrase conventionally identified with the Enlightenment beginnings of modern social theory, a me nullam humanum alienu m puto. He then proposed to demonstrate the breadth of anthropology' s potential field through an examination of the manner in which the insights of anthropology might be brought to bear on that peculiarly modern phenomenon, the nation. 7 By "The Nation as an Element in Anthropology," Brinton meant the influence of territorial community on the lives, customs, and char acteristics of men and women, as an analogue to the more familiar study of the influence of "blood" community-family, tribe, gens on the lives, customs, and characteristics of men and women. "Whenever we find men united together under some form of �ocial compact, " Brinton noted, "we shall find also that this compact will fall under one of three categories . It is based upon community . . . of blood, of ter ritorial area, or of purpose . " These three were mutually incompatible, both logically and historically, Brinton added, suggesting that they marked off the three stages of development from savagery to civiliza tion . And despite our own claims to the achievement of civilization and the triumph over savagery, in fact at best we found ourselves in the middle stage of territorial community. Recent events, it was true, gave promise of the achievement of a community of purpose manifested in contemporary movements toward internationalism-including the in ternational scientific congresses organized by the exposition mana gers-but as yet this promise and this hope remained unfulfilled . Most men and women lived in communities defined territorially . And that being the case, it was incumbent upon anthropologists to examine the imp act of nation and nationality upon those who lived in territorial communities. But because he was "breaking new ground, " Brinton prop osed to be suggestive rather than definitive in his own attempt to ex plore this theme. 8 In general, Brinton found that life in a territorially defined com munity possessed advantages over life in a community founded upon kins hip ties, and that the emergence of nationality did in fact mark an
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advance in civilization. At the same time, he admitted that life in a nation also possessed disadvantages over the state of savagery or un-civilization, especially in the ability of the state or the ruler of the state to enforce conformity and to suppress dissent, although the function of the state rightly understood was not to suppress but to enhance individual differences. "The individual is indeed the true purpose of the state. Its aim distinctly is that he, or she, as an indi vidual, shall be provided with, and protected in, the greatest possible amount of personal liberty, in this being in the utmost contrast to consanguine governments; where the individual is nothing, the tribe is everything. " 9 Through a series of contrasts, between exclusive tribal ethics and modern national concepts of jurisprudence, between exclu sive tribal religions (including the narrow monotheism of the ancient Hebrews, contra Comte's assertion that monotheism marked the achievement of civilization) and the ecumenism and inclusiveness of modern Protestantism, and between the status of woman as labor in tribal and as person in national communities, Brinton suggested the manner in which "the nation" functioned to alter culture and laid the basis for the eventual inclusiveness, ecumenism, and individualism of the international age ahead . But the importance of this essay lies not in its status as a symptomatic statement of the late nineteenth century' s hopes concerning the direction progress would take and the eventual characteristics of the "modern" age, so much as in Brinton' s tentative gesture toward a connection of culture and place, and consequently his abandonment of an older vision of culture as "simply" the possession of people. As early as 1890, in Races and Peoples, Brinton had acknowledged the role of "physico-geographical conditions" upon the development of the "physical and psychical" traits of populations inhabiting particular "geographical provinces" over long periods of time, but his treatment of the role of place there extended no farther than to acknowledge the substantial interest in place as environment which derived from the contemporary Darwinian debates over the causes of change during long epochs of time . 10 Occurring in a section on the beginnings and the subdivisions of the "races, " his argument was founded upon two conventional assumptions current in the last years of the century: the assumption of a single origin of the human species (against the claims of "polygenesis" advanced by the so-called "American" school of ethnology, especially before publication of The Origin of Species but still a proposition to be considered); and the assumption of the usefulness of place as locus in quem, that is as the critical classifier by which human populations might be divided into distinct groups . 1 1 In Races and Peo ples, his acknowledgement of place as environment permits Brinton to
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h edge on the great issue dividing ethnology and anthropology during the 1870s and 1 880s, of diffusion or simultaneous emergence of dis ti nct racial types and distinct cultures, and then to move on to the "easier" matter of describing the "races" of mankind . "The Nation as an Element in Anthropology" thus appears to have been Brinton's first attempt to connect place and culture irrespective of the racial character isti cs of the population inhabiting a place or of the older issue of the genesis of racial/cultural differences . Had Brinton titled his address "Territorial Community as a Stage in the Emergence of Civilization, " we might have had a more certain sense of his intention than the text of this address in fact provides . With such a title and such a concern, then the address would have been as a whole what it was in part: an attempt to modify earlier vertical modes "analytic" of the stages of development from savagery to civilization, as outlined by Comte, by Lewis Henry Morgan, or by those more recent proponents of evolutionary schemes based on patterns of eco nomic development, 12 and his ultimate goal would have been to pre serve (or restore) notions of a universal humanity traversing the same historical/developmental road, albeit at varying rates and with varying degrees of success. As it is, this appears clearly not to have been his intention; for while the age of territorial community is indeed offered us as one of the stages in social (and moral) evolution, the experience of nation is an experience with a particular set of cultural forms in a particular place . By 1895, moreover, in his presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Brinton made explicit his abandonment of any and all models projecting a single humanity experiencing a universal process of evolution or develop ment, by attacking theories of "cultural diffusion" which suggested that similarities among cultural forms were the product of their com mon derivation from a single prototype or resulted from culture con tact among distinct peoples . Instead, Brinton argued that cultural differences and cultural similarities were the result of distinct pro ce sse s of invention or innovation in distinct places; that however much patterns of similarity might be explained as a result of the similarity of the places in which the processes of invention occurred, ultimately each place was distinct and each experience of place was distinct; and that the task of anthropology remained, to address the "reasons" for similarities or differences without preconceptions concerning the ne ces sity or inevitability of the emergence of particular cultural forms . 13 In the memory of later anthropologists, Brinton was ranked with those same evolutionary determinists whose assumptions he found both attractive and probably incorrect, and against the implications of whose assumptions he directed much of his writing during the 1 890s .
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As early as 1 896, for example, in his own paper at the annual meeting of the AAAS, Franz Boas sought to counter Brinton' s alleged determin ism of the previous year with the evidence of his field researches, which suggested that the "cause" of the cultural patterns discernible in any particular place was so complex a matter as to defy simple explana tion. In subsequent years, however, Boas himself became identified with analyses of the culture of places rather than the culture of people independent of the places they inhabited. 1 4 What is important is that by the late 1890s a new focus on place had emerged in cultural anthropology, in the work of Brinton and Boas but also in the work of others, which proved to be a direct analogue of the contemporary focus on place in physical anthropology under the influ ence of the environmental determinists . As a result, when during the later 1910s and 1920s the anthropological community divided between physical anthropology and cultural anthropology, and especially over the validity of the concept of race and the policy implications of the concept of race, both sides in the dispute assumed the centrality of place as an organizing principle for the conduct of research to demon strate the accuracy of their respective positions. Both sides assumed that the anthropological characteristics of places constituted the proper focus of inquiry for the new science in the new age of the twentieth century. 15 By the time the anthropologists arrived in Chicago for their meet ings, the historians had come and gone, as participants in the World's Congress of Historians and Historical Students . Organization of the congress, j ointly by a local arrangements committee chaired by William F. Poole of the Newberry Library, perhaps the greatest American bibliographer of his day, and a committee of the American Historical Association led by Herbert Baxter Adams of the Johns Hopkins Uni versity and Charles Kendall Adams, President of the University of Wisconsin, was fraught with conflict, and neither the program nor its participants gave much advance promise of contributing to historical scholarship in the United States or of demonstrating the achievements made under the influence of "scientific" methods of research. Some of the more distinguished practitioners of the historian's craft threatened to stay away . 16 One who did attend, and who must have been among the first to arrive, was Professor Frederick Jackson Turner of the Uni versity of Wisconsin, accompanied by Mrs . Turner and several of his colleagues . Mae Turner and the colleagues proposed to spend a few days before the opening session of the congress visiting the fair. Turner proposed to spend those days finishing the paper he was scheduled to present, on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," a
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rew orking of an essay he had written for the Wisconsin student news 17 paper on "Problems in American History . " Like Brinton's address, Turner's "Significance of the Frontier" was a general attempt at identifying a new theme for study by disciplinary p ro fessionals . Like Brinton, Turner suggested that the traditional sub jects of scholarship had missed the mark in their conventional focus on limited and narrow issues, and especially on the explication of particu lar events, with the result that the discipline as discipline lacked those intellectual constructs that would permit connection to be made be tween past and present. As a consequence, both suggested, their disciplines found themselves outside the mainstream of contemporary discourse in social theory, useless for the explication of the present or planning for the future . And like Brinton also, Turner suggested a relationship between culture and place that transcended the use of place as matrix or context. But here the similarity ends. For while Brinton was at the height of his career and reputation-perhaps indeed past the height of his career and reputation-Turner was relatively young and certainly unknown to the profession at large, just another protege of the great Herbert Baxter Adams, who sought to push him as he had pushed others toward scholarship and professional visibility by urging a place for him at the Chicago meeting. And while Brinton's address followed from a retrospective look at anthropology as it had developed-largely at his own hands-during the previous half century, and made an intentional effort to expand the role of anthro pology into social theory, Turner's paper was almost accidental in its arguments and effects . For both, it was not until the 1920s that their ideas became identifiable as a school of research or interpretation, but Brinton's ideas were never identified with Brinton, while Turner' s ideas were so fully identified with Turner that he himself began to think-and, worse, to say-that he knew what he was up to when he drafted his address on those July days of 1 893 . 18 Born in 1 861 at Portage, Wisconsin, Turner attended the state university at Madison from which he received an AB in 1884 and, upon completion of a thesis on "The Character and Influence of the Fur Tra de in Wisconsin," an AM in 1888 . From 1 885 to 1888 he taught rhetoric and oratory, and then rhetoric and history, at the university . In 1888-89 he attended Johns Hopkins as a member of the famous "historical seminary" of Herbert Baxter Adams; he returned to Madi so n for the next academic year as assistant professor of history . Upon the death of Turner's friend and mentor, William F. Allen, and follow ing completion of a doctoral dissertation for Adams on "The Character and I nfluence of the Indian Trade in Wisconsin, " Turner was a pp ointed to Allen's chair as professor of history beginning in 1891 . In
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1892, he was appointed to a new position as professor of American history . 1 9 Turner' s doctoral dissertation, an elaboration of his master' s thesis, which was itself an elaboration of a college paper on "The History of the Grignon Tract on the Portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers," 20 was, like those two earlier works, a piece of local history and home town boosting . 2 1 By 1 891, however, Turner had managed to turn the now familiar facts in the history of the Portage inside out, so that the completed dissertation sought no longer to describe what had hap pened in his old hometown or even to justify close study of "western" history . Instead, he used events out of Wisconsin's past to construct a more general model of the processes of western settlement in the United States as an epitome of the history of civilization generally, and as a key to understanding American history more particularly . "The Influence of the Indian Trade" asserted the centrality of the Portage area and Wisconsin generally in the northern fur trade and argued that this trade paved the way for the eventual settlement of the upper Midwest . But it also argued that the history of the Indian trade as an example of the confrontation between differing levels of culture per mitted one to view, as under a glass and in an hour, the processes of cultural change which yielded that pattern of evolution which all agreed was so striking a characteristic of modern and especially Amer ican history . It thus denied implicitly the assumption of America as a blank stage which had governed all previous descriptions of western settlement in the United States and much of the history of the United States as a whole . Such an assumption had made possible the conventional identifica tion of the hunter as pioneer par excellence, and hence as the principal agent of civilization in the American context. If America were indeed a blank stage, then of course the evolution of civilization in North Amer ica would replicate the evolution of civilization in general, passing from the primitive age of the hunter-gatherer, through the pastoral, the agricultural, to the mercantile-industrial stage . This was, for exam ple, the theme of Theodore Roosevelt' s widely read The Winning of the West (which Turner had reviewed for the Dial in 1889 but chose not to mention at all in the dissertation) as it was of an 1850 speech by Thomas Hart Benton which Turner quotes and attacks, perhaps as bein g a safer object of correction than the popular work by Roosevelt. The mere presence of a Native American population, Turner noted, made America no blank stage at all, while Native American and Euro American use of trade routes determined by topography-the famous buffalo trails which became public roads, of which Benton had spoken--served as a reminder that North America was not only fur-
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nish ed with an established human population to whose habits and cu sto ms the Euro-Americans a dapted, but also with an established la nd scape to which all also adapted . 22 This was of course the note he struck in his 1893 address to the assembled historians in Chicago, that the history of the West was central to an understanding of American history because it was in the West-whether the "frontier" of European civilization on the Atlantic Coast during the colonial period, or the "frontier" of American civiliza tion across the Alleghenies during the nineteenth century-that Euro Americans confronted the human and the unbuilt but nonetheless "developed" environment of landscape. As a result it was in the West that one might see both the transit of civilization and the transforma tion of civilization, the removal to the new world of old world culture and the alteration of old world culture into new world forms. "The frontier . . . masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe . It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin . . . . Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs . . . [but] a new product that is American. " That product in particular, Turner noted, was American nationality, by which he meant both a sense of loyalty to the nation as a whole and a wholly new population, ethnical ly mixed, which abandoned its "memory" of European or American homelands and prior European or American cultural usages as no longer appropriate in the new environment of the frontier, and which emerged as a new people as a result of the common experience of (as Oscar Handlin would later put it) being "uprooted . " But it was also American democracy, a sense of individualism bred of the isolation of the westward migrants from their support communities, and a sense of individual worth based on accomplishment in the new world of the frontier rather than on previous status . And it was also American "pragmatism" as a characteristic of the American intellect, that "coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisi tiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expen die nts; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless nervous energy; that domi na nt individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that bouy ancy and exuberance which comes with freedom . These are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier . " 23 For Turner in 1 893, culture was the possession of people, and p lace-in this case the moving line of the frontier of Euro-American •
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settlement-was the matrix against which patterns of culture and processes of cultural change might be located. Within a few short years, however, as he came to revise his 1893 essay for publication and republication, and to use segments of it in other and more "popular" essays, Turner began to see the implications of his own rhetoric and to identify the frontier as a specific place where one found a culture that was peculiarly American. In this he was helped by his discovery of Ratzel and anthropogeography, which served him as legitimation of his "frontier thesis" by connecting it with the "latest" in European social theory, and by the more general American discovery of "re gionalism" precipitated by the simultaneous discovery of Appalachia and of the West of Bryan and the populists. 24 If we may believe Turner' s ambitious remarks in his essays of 1892 and 1893, his interest in the history of western settlement derived from its potential use as an organizing theme for all of American history up until that present in which the commissioner of the census announced that there could no longer be said to be a frontier line . "And with its going has closed the first period of American history . " Yet his own growing reputation as teacher and scholar during the later 1890s and early twentieth century-and his eventual influence both on American historical writing and on American culture generally-turned less and less on his articulation of the theme of national unity, well established by Benton in the 1850s, Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1860s, and Theodore Roosevelt in the 1 880s, and more and more on his expertise as the chronicler of the history of the Midwest, and then of the several sections of the nation . The first of these appeared in 1896, as "The Problem of the West, " in the Atlantic Monthly. Although begun as an attempt to characterize the West and Westerners for eastern readers, at the suggestion of the Atlantic's brilliant editor, Walter Hines Page, its last pages attempted to explain Bryanism and the farmers' revolt of the 1 890s as the inevi table consequence of the closing of the frontier and the end of the era of free land, and it was this section of the essay which brought Turner to national attention. By casting the populist movement as a natural and hence legitimate product of the American experience, Turner made the "otherness" of the West seem comprehensible if not entirely accept able, a protest within rather than against the more familiar patterns of American culture . 25 So enthusiastically was Turner's essay received, and so frequently was it quoted in newspapers and other magazines, that Page projected a series of articles describing the characteristics of all of America's sections, to be written by Turner, W . P . Trent of the University of the South, and A. F. Sanborn . Although only one essay by Turner was ever
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co mpleted for this series, the series as a whole was founded upon the re gionalist assumption with which Turner had begun his essay of 1896, that "the west, at bottom, is a form of society rather than an area," and s ought to elucidate the historical processes by which a single (albeit heterogeneous) people had developed diverse patterns of culture in the several sections of the nation of such distinctiveness as to make the residents of one section-irrespective of their place of birth or ethnic 26 heritag�istinguishable from the residents of any other section . Although by 1920, at the height of his professional prestige and influence, Turner would identify his principal contribution to Amer ican historiography and the understanding of American civilization as the recognition of that single "factor" that made the United States unique among the nations of the world, this reminiscence-like most of those he was to make in the last decade of his life-involved some considerable manipulation of truth . 27 The origins of such manipulation are easy to understand . In the historical context of the end of World War I and the beginning of an age of intense American nationalism and introspection, and on the occasion of republishing essays that had greater historical interest than historical usefulness, Turner could legitimate the presentation of old work to new readers by implying that his essays had been written from the first as attempts to solve the problem of American uniqueness. In his preface Turner was careful to note that his concern as histo rian was the relationship of past and present, and to insist that the age of which he wrote was long gone, separated from the present by that watershed of the closing of the frontier. Such caveats and admissions could easily be ignored by the unwary reader, however, who found more memorable remarks: "The larger part of what has been distinc tive and valuable in America's contribution to the history of the human spirit has been due to this nation's peculiar experience in extending its type of frontier into new regions; and in creating peaceful societies with new ideals in the successive vast and differing geographic prov inces which make up the United States, " Turner wrote . "Directly or indirectly these experiences shaped the life of the Eastern as well as the Western States, and even reacted upon the Old World and influenced the direction of its thought and its progress. This experience has been fundamental in the economic, political and social characteristics of the American people and in their conception of their destiny. " And, "We must study the transforming influence of the American wilderness, remote from Europe, and by its resources and its free opportunities affording the conditions under which a new people, with new social and political types and ideals, could arise to play its own part in the world, and to influence Europe . " 28
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These remarks, and the reputation he received as a result of this, his first "book, " denied that other focus of Turner' s work from 1893 to 1918, on the similarities between the United States and Europe, conti nent and continent, as a result of the sectional divisions that divided the United States in the same way that national boundaries, equally reflective of distinctions among peoples and cultures in particular places, divided Europe into a crazy quilt of competing geopolitical units . His 1 896 essay was, of course, the first of those that emphasized sectional division and competition as a characteristic of American history and as the key to American civilization, and was followed by a series of more strictly historical pieces arguing that isolation from Europe or the east coast settlements and the presence of "free land" to the west had "caused" the development of sectional distinctiveness and yielded the reality of sectional or regional diversity and sectional or regional competition characteristic of the United States in "our" own time . Most of these focused on the West. By 1 907, however, Turner had begun to explore the subdivision of the West into a series of Wests, regions identifiable by the cultural characteristics of their populations and which were the product of the historical experience of those populations in those places, and to address the issue of regionalism as a countervailing force to that nationalism so much talked of in the Progressive Era as the triumph of American historical development . 29 In a paper for the American Sociological Association's meeting at Madison in 1907, for example, Turner noted that growth in the power of the central government did not in itself prove that America was becoming increasingly unified, however much such centralization of power might mean a loss of initiative to the states. For the opposite of nationalism was not states' rights but sectionalism or regionalism, Turner argued . A look at the American present indicated a persisting capacity of the distinct geographic regions of the United States to resist homogenization into the national whole, as manifested by their capac ity to operate as political blocs but, also and more important, by that "economic and social separateness involved in the existence of a set of fundamental assumptions, a mental and emotional attitude which segregates the section from other sections or from the nation as a whole . " Himself a good Progressive, Turner saw no obj ection to such a Balkanized view of America, since he anticipated the achievement of balance or equilibrium among the parts of a sectionally divided nation through the Congress and through regional and interregional association. 30 After 1907, moreover, Turner turned increasingly to an effort to define the boundaries of the American sections or regions, to identify their several characteristics, and to elucidate the processes by which a
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particular people in a particular place developed a particular culture. In so doing, he came increasingly to abandon that theme of national unity implicit in the flow of population westward which he had borrowed and altered for his essay of 1893, and to abandon also that simplistic division of the United States between East and West as between mother country and colony, between age and sophistication, youth and naivete, which had been his theme in the 1890s . After 1907, as a consequence, the great problem that remained was to understand the implications of sectionalism in the past as in the present . Sectionalism itself was a given. Thus when Turner's work came under attack by a younger generation of historians, in the late 1920s, what was at issue was his explanation for the cause of sectional characteristics, not the reality of sections themselves. 31 It is well beyond the scope of this essay to attempt any explanation of the "causes" for those new intellectual emphases on place as the critical element in classifying human populations, which seem so strik ing a characteristic of social theory in the United States since the early twentieth century. But the legacy of those emphases, and especially of the imbedding of culture in place as a fundamental assumption of social science and social theory in our own time, must be recognized. Its manifestations are almost without number. They appear in the use of place-based units in social policy formulation and social planning for neighborhoods, metropolitan areas, regions, sections, nations, and such transnational "regions" as "the Mediterranean" or "Europe" or "the Western Hemisphere . " They appear in the focus of social theory and social science on "communities"-entities that are defined by place and characterized by the presumption of a single culture and a single population even when the particular culture and/or the particu lar population is/are acknowledged to be "pluralist" in its/their charac ter. They appear in the emergence of a place-based rather than space ba sed focus for studies of land-use in surface geography, in the new science of topography, in the vogue for anthropogeography and his torical geography, as well as in the practice of the new profession of city and regional planning. They appear in the new emphases among architects on the function of places rather than on the relationship of spaces in the built environment. And they appear in the construction of the new concept of ethnicity as a combination of the concepts of culture and place, and the use of ethnicity as a key to the development of personality and/or the formation of group or individual identity, hence to the behavior of groups or individuals--at home, in the work pl ace, and in the voting booth . Regionalism and its associated concepts, of culture, place, and
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ethnicity were not merely "new ideas" at the start of the twentieth century, however. Their emergence as key words in the American vocabulary available to describe the American reality was linked to a shift from the traditional vertical and hierarchical system of ordering social reality to a horizontal and then a horizontal and non-hierarchical "pluralist" scheme, and at the same time to a series of changes in the criteria by which the units in the social system were defined as units, hence a series of changes in the definition of the elements of American society itself. At its simplest level, this transformation moved from a " system comprising individuals ranked hierarchically on the basis of their degree of possession of some valued characteristic external to themselves, to a system comprising groups arranged horizontally on the basis of their possession of some characteristic intrinsic to their status as a group, all such characteristics being equally valued, and then further to a system in which horizontal arrangement was arbi trary, that is not indicative of centrality or peripherality or any other evaluative or analytical schema . The ladder of the eighteenth -century social hierarchy, one might say, was turned and laid on edge, appear ing thus as a measuring stick indicating distance from one end to another or from the ends to the center. As individuals could move up or down the eighteenth century ladder, so they could move along the ladder on edge, and the rungs represented arbitrary divisions of the whole, marking off for convenience equal distances up or along. But at the turn of the century, that ladder on edge was sawn along the rungs into a set of equal and equivalent segments, necessarily arranged in a two-dimensional series but not for this reason indicative of a rank order. 0 h ig h
1
2
3
4
5
I I I I I I I
3 0 2 1 c a . 1870 - 1920
1
2
•11111 ca. 1 92 0 - l ow
6
3
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This was the world of regionalism and pluralism . But now the seg ments of the ladder appeared as cells, self-defined units, and the question of what the cells contained, what the pieces of the ladder surrounded, became critical. The discovery of Appalachia, as I have argued elsewhere, 32 oc curred in the context of the first phase of this transformation, during the 1880s and 1890s, and the literature on Appalachia speaks predict ably of the "distance" that separated the mountaineers from their American brethren in the North and lowland South, as measured along the ladder on edge, and concerned itself with patterns of popula tion movement along the ladder (the emigration of mountaineers to the urban centers of civilization, the immigration of engineers, entrep reneurs, home-missionaries, and social workers as leaven to the loaf), the movement of goods and services in and out of the mountain region, and the availability of transportation facilities to make such movement possible . During the early years of the twentieth century, as the ladder was sawn into equivalent cells, the matter of content, of the special culture of Appalachia and the special characteristics of the moun taineers as a group-which legitimized Appalachia' s place in the social system at all, and from which its status as a place followed-became critical. It was in this context that the literature on Appalachia became concerned with the internal characteristics of the region, the intrinsic patterns of culture by which the people were defined as a group, the real history of the region or the people which was their own. By 1920, such characteristics, such a culture, such a history were "found" and Appalachia was established as one of the legitimately distinct patterns of culture in a culturally plural nation. Yet the search for mountain culture, for Appalachian distinctive ness, for Appalachian identity followed from the requirements of the model more than from the necessities of mountain life itself, and the tripartite division of the people, the place, and the culture-like the assumption of an essential link among all three, such that one may serve as a metaphor of the other-was equally the product of the necessity for theoretical coherence and of the conventions of theoreti cal convenience . And while it may be true that for the purposes of analysis one model may be as good as another, we must be wary lest we presume that any model represents reality, that the coherence of our analytical scheme reflects a real coherence out there in the world we seek to understand . This is the dilemma of Appalachian studies a s it is indeed of "American" studies . From the presumed connection between people, place, and culture, and from the assumption of an essential link between place and culture, has come that series of oper-
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ational questions which has dominated Appalachian studies at least since 1920---t hat is long before the current movement with its formal organizations and journals, its bibliographies as monuments to the field's legitimacy as well as guides to past and future research, its archives, its courses and certificate programs, and its institutions spon soring research. These questions have been of three sorts . They have asked about the uniqueness of Appalachian culture in America . They have asked about the relationship of Appalachian culture to Appalachian space, that is about the "origins" of the culture in Appalachia as a place, including the "origins" of the culture in the historical experience of Appalachia or the people in Appalachia . And they have asked about the relationship of Appalachian culture to the Appalachian people, that is about the "origins" of the culture in the people as a people, including the historical experience of the people in the place . But they have not asked if culture, which manifests itself in the behavior of people, is necessarily tied to place, if culture is the possession of place . They have not asked if the culture of "Appalachia" as conventionally described is really the culture of the Appalachian people, in the moun tains or out. And they have not asked if "who you are is where you're from" is really the same as "what you do is where you're from," or if these cannot exist as independent statements to be evaluated on their own merit without reference to a more general model of the social reality. Nor have they asked if the new "place-ism" of social theory in our time is not just another version of nineteenth-century "race-ism" derived, as was that one, from attempts to understand the reality of human diversity and to classify individuals according to "useful" criteria, but yielding a separation of individuals from each other and a denial of all of our selves in the name of analytic convenience .
NOTES 1 . The rise of empiricism during the mid-nineteenth century is discussed, although with another end in view, by George Daniels, A merican Science in the Age of Jackson {New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), from which my own thinking about "Baconian ism" as a response to taxonomic crisis largely derives. The rise of empiricism in the "science of man" appears clearly, e . g . , in [Appleton's) New American Cyclopaedia: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge ( 1 857) 1 : 647-53 and 7:306- 1 1 , s. v. "Anthropology" and "Ethnology , " and especially in [Appleton's] American Cyclapaedia: A Popular Diction ary of General Knowledge, 2nd ed. (1883) 4:753-60, s . v . "Ethnology," by G. A. F. Van Rhyn; Encyclopaedia Brita n n ica , 9th ed . (1884) 2 : 1 07-23, 8:613-26, s . v . "Anthropology," by Ed ward Burnett Tylor, and "Ethnography and Ethnology," by Elie Reclus. John C. Greene, The Death of Ada m : Evolu tion and Its Impact on Western Thought (Ames, Iowa : Iowa State
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University Press, 1959), remains the best examination of the taxonomic crisis of the mid-nineteenth century as it affected the "science of man . " 2 . The famous remark begins Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion , Language, Art and Custom, 2 vols (London, 1871 and subsequent editions); in full it reads: "Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethno graphic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, insofar as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely pervades civiliza tion may be ascribed, in great measure, to the uniform action of uniform causes; while on the other hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of development or evolu tion, each the product of previous history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the history of the future . " Tylor's status as the "father" of anthropology is acknowledged in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1 1 th ed. (1910) 27:498, s . v . "Tylor, Edward Burnett, " and celebrated in Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology 47, no. 1 ( 1 952), esp. part l . For the development of his thought, cf. his essays, "Anthropology, " in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed. ( 1884) 2 : 1 07-23, and "Anthropol ogy, " ibid . , l ith ed. (1910) 2 : 108-19. 3 . Kroeber and Kluckhohn insist on the distinction between "culture" and "cul tures" as central to modem anthropological thinking and note that the latter appears only in the twentieth century. "Culture" as the possession of all persons irrespective of their "stage of civilization" and as distinguished from "nature" or "instinct, " however, was the critical insight which made possible an independent "science of man," regularly designated in the 1 9th century as "ethnology" rather than "anthropology," e . g . , the distinction drawn in [Appleton's] American Cyclopaedia ( 1 883) 4:753, ethnology being "the science which treats of man as a member of a tribe or nation, and of his culture, morals and language" and anthropology the science "which treats of man zoologically, and of his physical condition and inherent faculties. " 4 . Daniel G . Brinton used "nation" i n this way through the 1 880s to designate a settled population, historic or prehistoric, associated with a place or "site," e . g . , Amer ican Hero Myths: A Study of the Native Religions of the Western Continent ( Philadelphia: H . C . Watt & Co. , 1 882), p . 3 5 et passim, a n d "Were the Toltecs an Historic Nation?" American Philosophical Society Proceedings 24 (1887) :229-41; but see below. Rudolph Rocker, Nationalism and Culture (Los Angeles, Rocker Publications Commit tee, 1937) and George L. Masse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) explore the European connection between concepts of people, culture, and nation with special reference to the "event" of Nazi Germany, and hence view them as unnecessary and unfortunate. In contrast, Hans Kohn, in The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: The Macmillan Co. , 1944), sees the European connection of people, culture, and nation as both inevitable and desirable, as a necessary precursor to globalism or internationalism, and hence asserts their origin in the classical age, when "western civilization" had its beginnings. His work remains the best introduction to nineteenth century developments and completes the analysis begun by Carleton } . H. Hayes, e . g . , The Historical Evolu tion of Modern Nationalism (New York: Richard R . Smith, 193 1 ) . 5. Biographical a n d bibliographical information is summarized from Encyclopaedia Britannica, l i th ed. (1910) 4:572, s . v . "Brinton, Daniel Garrison;" Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia 1 899, pp . 581-2, s . v . "Obituaries, American. Brinton, Daniel Garrison;" and [American Philosophical Society,] Brinton Memorial Meeting . Report of the Memorial Meet-
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ing held Jan uary 1 6, 1 900, under the Auspices of the American Philosophical Society, l1y Twenty-Six Learned Societies, in Honor of the Late Daniel Garrison Brinton, M . D . (Phil adelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1900 ) , especially Albert H. Smyth, "Memorial Address, " pp. 16-29, and Stewart Culin, comp. , "Bibliography [of DGB]," pp. 42-67. His contributions to American ethnology, and his dose relations with coworkers in the development of American anthropology, are attested in the letters of tribute sent by John Wesley Powell, Alice C. Fletcher, Frank Hamilton Cushing, and the remarks of Frederick Ward Putnam and especially W. J. McGee, "On the Ethnological Work of Daniel Garrison Brinton, " ibid., pp. 7-9, 33-4, 37-4 1 . The list of his memberships appears in the Encyclopaedia Britannica sketch, supplemented by Daniel G. Brinton, Races and Peoples: Lectures on the Science of Ethnography (New York: N . D . C . Hodges, 1890), p. 1 . 6 . On the World's Congress Auxiliary, its purpose and organization, see Appleton 's Annual Cyclopaedia 1 893 , pp . 768-72. The proceedings of the anthropology meeting were published as Memoirs of the International Congress of Anthropology, ed. C. Staniland Wake (Chicago: Schulte Publishing Co., 1 894) and in Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report 1 893 .
Frederick Ward Putnam of the Peabody Museum was on the Exposition Committee itself, as chief of the Department of Ethnology, Archaeology, Progress of Labor and Invention, in charge of "isolated and collective exhibits," Ann. Cyc. 1 893 , p. 760. The ethnologic exhibits at the World's Columbian Exposition, organized by Otis T. Mason from the collections of the Bureau of American Ethnology and Smithsonian Institution, have been regularly hailed as marking the origins of the "culture area concept" in museum display, rather than "aesthetic type" display, and hence as preparing the way for the rise of cultural anthropology, e.g. , Joan Mark, Four Anthropologists: An American Science in Its Early Years (New York: Science History Publications, 1 980), pp. 154-55 et passim, and Lee Clark Mitchell, Witnesses to A Vanishing America: The Nineteenth Century Response (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1980), p . 248, where Boas is unaccountably given credit for these exhibits . (Boas is otherwise given credit for the invention of the "culture area concept" by Alexander Golden weiser, "Leading Contribu tions of Anthropology to Social Theory," pp. 433-90, in Harry Elmer Barnes et al. , eds . , Contemporary Social Theory [New York: D. Appleton-Century C o . , 1940], p p . 461-62; but Brinton himself traced the origin of the concept to Agassiz's organization of the Museum of Comparative Zoology during the 1 850s, Races and Peoples: Lectures on the Science of Ethnography [New York: N . D . C. Hodges, 1890], p . 95. ) A n examination of Otis T . Mason, "Ethnological Exhibit o f the Smithsonian Institu tion at the World's Columbian Exposition, " Memoirs of the International Congress, pp. 208-16, suggests that Mason used the "culture area concept" sometimes and sometimes did not; and d. Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Book of the Fair: An Historical and Descriptive
Presentation of the World's Science, A rt, and Industry As Viewed Through the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1 893 , 2 vols. (Chicago: Bancroft Co. , 1893) 2:629-46, 650-53, 663.
More indicative of the power of the "culture area concept" and its relation to the idea of place during the early 1 890s is the fact that the main exposition area and the adjacent "Midway Plaisance" included numerous "cultural area exhibits," frequently living dioramas inhabited by the peculiar people from the strange lands whose culture was on display . These included life-sized models of an American Indian school, a logger's camp, an angler's camp, a military hospital, and a "modern" public school where instruction was conducted (all from the United States); a Japanese tea house, which served refresh ments; an East Indian Village, an American Indian village, a Dahomey village, an Austrian village, a Chinese village (also with a tea house), a Turkish village, a Dutch "settlement, " and a Moorish palace: Bancroft, Book of the Fair 1 :55 and photos passim, 2:835-83.
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7 . Daniel G . Brinton, "The 'Nation' as an Element in Anthropology," Memoirs of the International Congress of Anthropology, p. 19; also printed as a separate (Chicago: Schulte Publishing Co . , 1893) and in Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report 1 893, pp. 589-600. In
addition, Brinton presented two specialized papers at the Congress, "On Various Supposed Relations between the American and Asian Races," pp. 145-51, and "The Present Status of American Linguistics, " pp. 335-38. The breadth of Brinton's interests, and his ambitions for anthropology as the science of mankind, were regularly noted in the testimonials printed in Brinton Memorial Meeting, as those by Frank Hamilton Cushing, ibid., pp. 8-9, and Albert H. Smyth, ibid . , p. 18: "The great questions of religion, politics, society and science were of vital importance to him. 'Humani nihil a me alienum puto,' he might have said . " So much for good friends who claim to have read your work! 8 . Brinton "The 'Nation' as an Element in Anthropology," pp. 21, 33-34. The emer gence of the state (or "politics") as an event in the evolutionary history of mankind was a conventional subject for discussion during the 1860s and 1870s. These discussions were genuinely "evolutionary" in their presumptions but often retained the two-stage model of earlier social theory, recast as a developmental process. Thus the emergence of the state was viewed as revolutionary; but the history of the state was then evolutionary and was characterized by the rise of human freedom, choice, and appearance of universal ethical standards, and so forth. Brinton's departure from this tradition will be apparent and, to the best of my knowledge, he is the first to talk of the nation as distinguished from the state from an evolutionary and anthropological point of view. See also above, n. 4. Brinton's third stage of development, the achievement of community of purpose, appears in Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Association (1887 and 1912) as a character istic of earlier societies as well as a desideratum of future society, although Tonnies' mid-twentieth century readers have ignored his own internationalistic socialism and used him as justification for a romantic revaluation of "little communities" persisting into the modern age of "artificial" and "contractual" relationships, which thus become a rebuke to the present and a model for the future. One such "little community" is said to be found in the southern Appalachians. 9 . "The 'Nation' as an Element in Anthropology," p. 3 1 . 10. Daniel G . Brinton, Races and Peoples: Lectures on the Science of Ethnography (New York: N. D. C. Hodges, 1 890), p. 95. 1 1 . On the "American School" and the origin of polygenesis, see William I . Stanton, The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes toward Race in America, 1 81 5-59 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); on its persistence, George W. Stocking, Jr. , "The Persistence of Polygenist Thought in Post-Darwinian Anthropology," in Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 44-68. 12. Below, n. 22. 13. Daniel G. Brinton, "The Aims of Anthropology," American Association for the Advancement of Science Proceedings 44 (1895) : 1-17. Brinton asserted the universal same ne ss of the human capacity to reason and solve problems, hence the potential of men and women in different times and places to respond in identical ways to identical situations, but also their capacity to respond in different ways to identical situations. Brinton and Boas did not disagree on the principle of evolutionary determinism as the origin of cultu ral forms (both denied it) or the principle of diffusion and the use of the comparative method to identify common derivation from a single source (both denied the principle and the usefulness of the method). They did disagree on the reality of differential cap acities of the "races" to achieve "civilization . " Boas made his stand in his address as re tiring AAAS vice-president for Section H (Anthropology) in 1894, "Human Faculty as Determined by Race," AAAS Proceedings 43 (1894) :327: "Historical events appear to have
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been much more potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it follows that achievements of races do not warrant us to assume that one race is more highly gifted than another. " Brinton took exception to this position en passant, in "The Aims of Anthropology," p. 12. The problem for anthropologists at the end of the nineteenth century was to explain the polygenesis of culture without assuming �he polygenesis of mankind, and to explain cultural change without assuming evolutionary inevitability or geographic determinism; that is, to reconcile the horizontal distribution of differences in space characteristic of the concerns of ethnology with the vertical distribution of differences in time characteristic of the concerns of anthropology, into a single "science of man . " In this context, "diffusion ism," long denied by ethnologists (including Tylor as well as Brinton and the unnamed author of the article "Anthropology" in (Appleton's] New A merican Cyclopaedia ( 1 857] 1 : 463-70), gained new credibility, especially among the "folklorists . " Cf. in this connec tion Grafton Elliot Smith, "Anthropology," in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 12th ed. (1922), 30: 1 43-54. 14. Franz Boas, "Limitations of the Comparative Method in Anthropology," Science, n . s . 4 (1896) :901 -909; reprinted in Race, Language and Culture (New York, Macmillan Co. , 1940), p p . 271 -304. Boas' "attack" o n Brinton (but not Brinton's earlier attack o n Boas) has become a minor Event in the history and folklore of anthropology : Leslie A. White, The Ethnology and Ethnography of Franz Boas, University of Texas, Texas Memorial Museum Bulletin no. 6 (1963): 43-5; Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Co. , 1968), pp. 255-57; Stocking, Race, Culture and Evolu tion, pp. 209-10. On the rise of Boas and "the Boasians," see Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture; Leslie A. White, "The Social Organization of Ethnological Theory, " Rice University Studies, 52, no . 4 (1966); Harris, The Rise of A n thropological Theory; Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1 900- 1 94 1 (Phil adelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) . The "old fashioned" quality of Brinton's work was regularly explained as a result of his failure to engage in "field work" after the 1860s, e . g . , Truman Michelson, "Brinton, Daniel Garrison, " in Dictionary of A merican Biography (1929) 3:50-51 , and Clark Wissler, "Brinton, Daniel Garrison, " in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1930) 3:4, both of whom follow McGee, "The Ethnological Work of Daniel Garrison Brinton, " almost verbatim. McGee also noted the absence of fieldwork but chose to identify Brinton as one of the "pioneers" of American ethnology, along with Albert Gallatin and Lewis Henry Mor gan, while Charles C. Harrison of the American Philosophical Society (Brinton Memorial Meeting, p. 41) reminded his colleagues that Brinton was not a "mere collector or observer" but sought to use anthropological knowledge for the improvement of man kind. Harris, Rise of Anth ropological Theory, pp. 255-56, prefers to identify Brinton as one of Boas's contemporaries, for the sake of the drama in which the latter as young hero emerges as primus in ter pares. 15. Stocking tells the story in "The Scientific Reaction Against Cultural Anthropol ogy, 1917-1920," in Race, Culture and Evolution , pp. 273-307, to be supplemented by Cravens, The Triumph of Evolu tion, for the 1920s and 1930s. The acceptance of "culture" in a nthropology in fact meant the acceptance of culture as the possession of people in places, that is of what Harris, in The Rise of A n thropological Theory, calls "particularism . " Whether or not this requires taking a moral stance on the issue of "cultural relativism" is quite another issue. On the acceptance of "culture" in anthropology, see Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture; Harris, The Rise of A n thropological Theory; and Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution . On the acceptance of "culture" in the social sciences, through the new focus on the study of peoples in places ("groups" ), see
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY
1 39
William Fielding Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser, eds . , The Social Sciences and their Interrelations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1927); Harry Elmer Barnes et a/. , eds . , Co ntemporary Social Theory (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co . , 1940); Leonard D . Wh ite , ed . , The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1956), es p. P hillip M. Hauser, "Ecological Aspects of Urban Research, " pp. 229-54, and Everett c . H ugh es, "The Cultural Aspect of Urban Research, " pp. 255-68; and such examples of th e monographic literature as Ernest W. Burgess, ed. , The Urban Commun ity: Selected Papers from the Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 1 925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926); T. V . Smith and Leonard D. White, eds. , Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); Robert S . and Helen Merri ll Lynd, Middletown : A Study in A merican Cultu re (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1929) . There i s no satisfactory study of the rise o f "community studies" in the United States (or Europe), although the phenomenon is recognized in R. Jackson Wilson, In Quest of Com munity: Social Philosophy in the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1 968), and Jean B. Quandt, From the Small Town to the Great Com m u n ity: The Social Thought of Progressive Intellectuals (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1970) . 16. On the organization of the Congress and controversy surrounding it, see Ray Allen Billington, The Genesis of the Frontier Thesis: A Study in Historical Creativity (San Marino, Calif . : Huntington Library, 1971), pp. 161-66; W. Stull Holt, Historical Scholarship in the United States, 1 876-1 901 : As Revealed in the Correspondence of Herbert Baxter Adams (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), pp. 196-99. 17. On the preparation of "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" in the hotel room in Chicago, and its derivation from "Problems in American History," see Billington, Genesis, pp . 156-6 1 , 1 65, and Wilbur R. Jacobs, The Historical World of Frederick fackson Turner: With Selections from h is Correspondence (New Haven, Conn . : Yale Univ. Press, 1968), p. 198. "Problems in American History," originally published in the University of Wisconsin Aegis, 7 (November 4, 1892): 48-52, is reprinted in Frederick Jackson Turner, Early Writings, ed. Fulmer Mood (Madison, Wise . : University of Wiscon sin Press, 1938), pp . 71-83. 18. Turner's reminiscences are published, with necessary editorial corrections, in Billington, Genesis, pp. 179ff . , and without correction in Jacobs, The Historical World of Frederick Jackson Turner. 19. Biographical details are from Jacobs, The Historical World of Frederick Jackson Turner; Billington, Genesis, and Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) . 20. William F. Allen routinely set his junior and senior students to work doing "original research" from published or unpublished documents. In 1 882 Allen was asked by Herbert Baxter Adams to provide information on early landholdings in Wisconsin which might illuminate Adams' study of the origin of towns in the New World . Turner was enrolled in Allen's American history course that spring and was naturally assigned to examine the land records of his home town of Portage. Billington, Genesis, pp. 21-22 and notes, pp. (on Allen) 1 5ff. and notes. The text was published in Turner's father's newspaper, the Wisconsin State Register (Portage) and subsequently reprinted with an introduction by Fulmer Mood and Everett E . Edwards as "Frederick Jackson Turner's History of the Grignon Tract on the Portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, " Agricul t u ral History 17 (April 1 943): 1 1 3-20. 2 1 . Herbert Baxter Adams urged his graduate students to write the histories of their hometowns as ways of examining the growth of "Teutonic germs" in American soil . Billington, Genesis, p. 28. On the "Teutonic School" of American historiography: Billing ton's summary, ibid. , pp. 87-93, is superb.
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22. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Character and Influence of the Indian Trade in Wiscon sin. A Study of the Trading Post as an Institution, Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, 9th ser. , nos. 1 1-12 (1891); reprinted in Turner, Early Writings, pp. 172-74. Turner's review of Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, appeared in the Dial 10 (August 1889): 71 -72. The stages of civilization as progressing from food-gathering to the pastoral, agri cultural, and thence to the mercantile was popularized in the United States in the writings of Richard T. Ely, although Ely derived them from the work of Friedrich List, according to Billington, Genesis, p. 33 and notes. 23. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American His tory," in The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt & Co. , 1920), pp. 4, 22-30, 30-36, 37; reprinted from American Historical Association, Annual Report 1 893 , pp. 199-227. It was on the frontier that "the bond of custom"-sometimes Turner said "the cake of custom" -was broken. The "cake" is from Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics, or
Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance" to Political Soc iety (London , 1867; New York, D. Appleton Co . , 1895), pp. 27, 53, 158. See also above, n. 8. As Billington notes, Genesis, 166, the "authorized" text was too long for oral delivery at a session that included papers by four other historians. As a result the version actually presented in Chicago can only be reconstructed imaginatively, which Billington appempts in The Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History? (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), pp. 9-20. 24. Turner's discovery of Ratzel is discussed in Billington, Genesis, pp. 57 n. 56, 100-101, 267-68, 272. On the influence of Ratzel and anthropogeography among histo rians, see ibid . , pp. 96-100; among social scientists, see Franklin Thomas, "The Role of Anthropogeography in Contemporary Social Theory, " pp. 143-2 1 1 , and James A. Quinn, "The Development of Human Ecology in Sociology,'' pp . 212-46, in Harry Elmer Barnes et al. , eds . , Contemporary Social Theory (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co . , 1940) . 25. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Problem of the West, " Atlantic Monthly 78 (September 1 896) : 289-97, reprinted in The Frontier in American History, pp. 205-21. See also Billington, Turner, pp. 192-94; and John Milton Cooper, Jr. , Walter Hines Page, the Southerner as American (Chapel Hill, N . C . : University of North Carolina Press, 1977), p.
124. 26. Turner's essay was "Dominant Forces in Western Life," Atlantic Monthly 79 (April 1897) : 433-43, reprinted in The Frontier in American History, pp. 222-42. The series included W. P. Trent, "Dominant Forces in Southern Life," Atlantic Monthly 79 (January 1897): 42-53; Phillip Morgan, "The Problems of Rural New England: A Remote Village," Atlantic Monthly 79 (May 1 897) : 577-87, and Alvin F . Sanborn, "The Problems of Rural New England: A Farming Community," Atlantic Monthly 79 (May 1897): 588-98; W. P. Trent, "Tendencies of Higher Life in the South," Atlantic Monthly 79 (June 1897) : 766-78; Alvin F. Sanborn, "The Future of Rural New England," Atlantic Monthly 80 (July 1897): 74-83 . It was continued as a series of community studies: Alvin F. Sanborn, "A Mas sachusetts Shoe Town," Atlantic Monthly 80 (August 1897) : 177-85; William Allen White, "A Typical Kansas Community," Atlantic Monthly 80 (August 1897) : 171-76; Henry B. Fuller, "The Upward Movement in Chicago," Atlantic Monthly 80 (October 1897): 534-47. 27. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. vi. So powerful was this assertion that it not only determined Turner's own reputation among historians in the years immediately following his death (e. g . , Frederic Logan Paxson, "Turner, Frederick Jackson" and bibliography, in Dictionary of American Biography [1936) 19:62-4), but it also (1) gave shape (a) to the revolt against Turnerism during the late 1920s and
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1 930s as a denial of the uniqueness of America (e. g . , Dixon Ryan Fox, ed. , Sources of Cu lture in the Middle West: Backgrounds versus Frontier [New York: D. Appleton-Century
Co . , 1934), esp. pp. 6-8) and (b) to the revolt against the idea of American uniqueness in th e 1950s and 1960s as an erroneous notion spawned by Turner (e. g . , Thomas L. Ha rtshorne, The Distorted Image: Changing Conceptions of the A merican Character Since Turner [Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1968)) and (2) persisted into the 1970s to trouble Ray Allen Billington, who found the chronology of Turner's essays on sectionalism difficult to explain; Turner, pp. 209-32. On Turner's periodic reinterpretation of the history of his career and accomplish ments, see Billington, Genesis, esp. pp. 27-29 and part III. 28. Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. vi. 29. E . g . , Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Old West, " State Historical Society of Wisconsin Proceedings 56 ( 1 908): 1 84-233, reprinted in The Frontier in American History, pp. 67-125. Turner's essays on sectionalism were reprinted only posthumously, in Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Section in American History, ed . Max Farrand and Avery Craven (New York: Henry Holt & Co. , 1932) . 30. Frederick Jackson Turner, "Is Sectionalism in America Dying Away?" American Journal of Sociology 13 (March 1 908): 661-75, reprinted in Turner, The Significance of the Section, pp 288, 313-14. Cf. also Turner's essays, "Sections and Nation," Yale Review 12 (October 1922) : 1-21, reprinted in The Significance of the Section, pp. 315-39, and "The Significance of the Section in American History," Wisconsin Magazine of History 8 (March 1925): 255-80, reprinted in The Significance of the Section, pp. 22-51 . 31 . For the revolt against Turnerism, see the annotated bibliographies in Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier (New York: Macmillan Co . , 1949), pp. 760-61, and The Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation ?, pp. 120-22. 32. Henry D. Shapiro, Appalachia on Our Mind: The Southern Mountains and Moun taineers in the American Consciousness, 1870-1920 (Chapel Hill, N . C . : University of North Carolina Press, 1978) . .
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE IN APPALACHIAN KENTUCKY ALLEN BATTEAU
DEPENDENCE AND POVERTY
In the past twenty years, two contrasting orientations have dominated discussions of the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in Appalachia . One orientation, viewing the region' s poverty as a matter of underdevelopment or dependent development, finds the structural causes most basic. In this view, it is the lack of capital, lack of infrastruc ture, or economic dependence on outside industry and capital that keep Appalachia underdeveloped. The alternative orientation, usually associated with theories of "provincialism" or a "culture of poverty," finds the personal causes more basic; in this view, either the poor need to be taught new attitudes so that they can overcome their poverty or the "traditional" culture needs to be "modernized . " While there is a general agreement between these two orientations on the overall dimensions of the problem-lack of jobs, lack of capital, lack of mobi lization of local resources, and the politicizing of the half-hearted development efforts that do exist-there is no agreement on whether the structural or the personal a spect of the problem is "more basic . " T o posit these a s mutually exclusive alternatives i s illusory . Just as any social order has both personal and structural manifestations, so too do the economic problems of Appalachia; the problem for any person who wishes to understand or to change these is not to engage in Thomistic exercises of deciding which is "more basic, " but rather to understand how social structures elicit individual attitudes and be haviors, and how individual actions maintain the larger structures even when the latter are experienced as oppressive. The larger structure in question is the set of relationships of objec tive dependency between the regional economies of Appalachia and lowland metropoles . 1 These relationships establish a subservient posi tion for the region in financial, commercial, and regulatory transac tions. Whether this is a matter of "dependent development," the
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creation of "internal periphery , " or "internal colonialism" is of less
interest to u s than its aggregate result: It has precluded industrial
d iversification and regional autonomy in Appalachia, because all cap ital formation has flowed into channels of greatest profit to lowland
commercial and financial centers. The dependency of the Appalachian
coal industry on railroads, steel mills, and urban utilities is a well documented fact; the most recent development, the purchasing of coal
properties and mines by multinational energy corporations, will furth
er guarantee that the coal industry will never become an instrument of regional transformatio n . In the Alleghenies, the touris t industry, cater
ing primarily to lowland tourists, offers a similar case of dependent
development. As such, the paradox of "rich land, poor people" that many have noted for Appalachia is no paradox at all, for it is precisely
those regions richest in natural resources that are the most inviting targets for outside capital and consequent underdevelopment . 2 The other maj or export of Appalachia, population, is the basis of what I
have elsewhere labeled the "human resources economy . " 3 This is the
set of educational, health, and social services, provided by the state,
that ensure a population motivated and capable of participating in the national economy. In some counties o f central Appalachia this human
resources economy accounts for more than
30 percent of the em
ployment; it includes the schools, which prepare students for jobs
outside the region . Dependent o n state funding and controlled by state
boards, the schools, hospitals, and human service agencies have not been agencies for pursuing local or regional development.
Dependency theory and world system theory have been criticized
for their economic reductionism and determinism. Overcompensating for these defects are the theories of a culture of poverty and "character
ological deterrents" to economic progress in Appalachia. In these
conceptions, such values and attitudes as conservatism, fatalism, con
ceptions of honor, the "image of limited good" all stand in the way of "modernization . " The best-known approach of this sort is Thomas
Ford's essay, "The Passing of Provincialism. "4 In similar vein, the
behavior of the lower class is often explained by invoking ideas of a "culture of poverty . "5 In this conception, the lower class is charac
terized as present-oriented , self-centered, and hedonistic; the "amoral
familism" of its members prevents them from cooperating for the common good . In both of these theories, the population so described
lacks the attitudes and motivations, usually those a ssociated with the Protestant ethic, thought to be necessary for economic growth and
success. The key to development in such societies, it follows, lies
in
teaching the people some new attitudes . These theories, as has fre quently been observed, often generalize from a few pathological cases
144
ALLEN BATIEAU
to an entire group or region; they rarely offer observations shown to bear a factual correlation with differences in level of development. 6 Each of these two orientations, the structural and the attitudinal, focuses on some important empirical realities: In the former case, the relationships of economic domination; in the latter, the manifest occurrences of self-defeating behavior among the poor. Each achieves its respective focus, however, through some strategic omissions. In the case of dependent development, what remains hidden is the person alistic aspect of dependency relationships; in the case of the culture of poverty, what one does not see are the relationships through which these attitudes and behaviors are elicited and cultivated . I n this paper I will attempt t o find a common ground between the two, by examining the ramifications of dependency in the daily lives of people in an eastern Kentucky community . I suggest that dependence is not simply the structure of commercial relationships between Appa lachia and lowland metropoles, but is a pattern of relationships and values exerting a pervasive influence on all areas of life in the depen dent region-a climate, if one wishes, requiring heroic measures to overcome . I suggest that within the institutions of economic and poli tical dependency, there exist interpersonal relationships having as part of their content certain ritualized behaviors that manipulate the shame and dependent impulses of the subordinate. Through such organiza tion and orchestration of emotions-the key to any effective ritual-the subordinates are bonded to the very system that they as renters, welfare recipients, and political clients find oppressive . This reinforce ment of dependent impulses through ritual is the key to understanding why clientele classes have such difficulty in either banding together against those who have power over them or abandoning the oppres sive relationships altogether: At the internal periphery of a mature capitalist economy, power is exercised less by force or cooptation, and more by the manipulation of regressive and self-defeating impulses within the dependent class . A qualification is necessary here . Obviously, within a complex society, dependent relationships are a fact of life . Children are depen dent on parents, non-unionized employees are dependent on their bosses, voters on their representatives, small businessmen on large. With very few exceptions everyone in a late capitalist society lives within a web of dependency relationships . For most, however, the economic, political, and psychological debits of dependency are par tially offset by the fact of having others dependent on them. Only at the very mudsills of the society-among the unorganized, the unedu cated, the unemployable poor-does one find a condition of absolute (as distinguished from relative) dependency . This "underclass, "
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
145
which is the despair of policymakers of every ideological persuasion, is the necessary concomitant of a society built up on these inequalities . Such dependency is found, i n eastern Kentucky, i n the various hierarchies of state and local politics . Articulated by kinship, friendship, and patronage, these form a lattice-work extending down ward from state politicians to courthouse officials to family patriarchs, and finally down to the individual voters . Through the control of patronage jobs and development resources, this sytem absorbs the very opportunities for survival and economic improvement in eastern Kentucky. In the absence of "public works," political loyalty is the price of a j ob; in the absence of other means of access, every develop ment scheme becomes enmeshed in patronage politics . 7 This political dependence is the interpersonal infrastructure of economic depen dence: together they create an environment in which there are various political, economic, and psychological rewards for playing a subser vient role in the national economy. These rewards include the oppor tunity to have a big name in the local community, to form a clientele of one's own, to accumulate capital . There are many beguiling opportuni ties for dependence in Appalachia, whereas the opportunities for independence are few and far between . DEPENDENCE AND RITUAL
Some do choose to be independent. A man who "has some land he can be independent on" escapes dependence, providing he is willing to forgo most opportunities for substantial income . Old Regular Baptists, abjuring the things of this world with their minds intent on salvation in the next, are similarly independent. But these are a minority. The more active efforts to counteract a history of subservience in Appalachia, efforts that have included the development of a mining industry, the organizing of a miners' union, the creation of local planning districts, or the establishment of a regional commission, have despite their short-run successes simply rearranged the terms of dependence . The paradox of all these efforts is that the dependency relationships within them-between a mineowner and outside financiers, between a coaldigger and the boss, between a local official and a Washington bureaucrat-are entered into voluntarily, if not eagerly. Once entered into, however, they are difficult to break out of, despite a lack of coercion, even when their limitations are recognized . The reason for this, I would suggest, is that all of these relationships-jobs, access to development resources, political patronage, involvement in the game of conspicuous consumption-involve far more than simply an imper sonal economic content. Whether considering dependency rela-
146
ALLEN BATIEAU
tionships in coalmining, politics, welfare, or a number of other institu
tions, there is a ritualistic dimension giving personal content to and thus reinforcing and maintaining the economic content. This person alizing of an economic relationship is found, perhaps most poignantly,
in the indignities visited upon welfare clients; it is found in all the othe r relationships as well . The economic content is personalized through
such patterns of behavior as the invasion of private domains, the public
exhibition of various tokens of inferiority, the rewarding of compliance
and subservience, and the creation of a series of no-win situations for
the person in the subordinate position. By examining these patterns in
a variety of contexts, we can begin to see such personalizing of depen dence as a significant issue in Appalachia . The one ritual that is omitted
here, regretably, is that of obtaining a political job. It is perhaps one of the most typical of the rituals of dependence in the region, and it
creates some of the most durable and far-reaching ties of dependence; yet because it is so private, I was unable to observe it.
The personalizing of dependence is less extreme, yet more perva
sive than the infantilizing "ceremonies of degradation" which authors
such as Stanley Elkins and Erving Goffman discuss. Regarding such
interactions in the context of nineteenth-century Indian removals, Michael Ragin notes that they destroy
the victim' s connection to his previously validated social self. Individuals lose social support for their own personal experience of reality. The infantilizing process, calling into question one's basic security in and tru st of the environ ment, undermines the independent ego . . . . The victim's blank and bare environment offers him only one remaining source of gratification, the authority who manipulates rewards and punish ments . Thus the very oppressor becomes the source of values and sustenance . The infantilized victim, in the extreme case, identifies with his oppressor and seeks total dependence upon him . 8 The rituals of dependence and structures of domination that I am
discussing here are, to be sure, less extreme than those discussed by Goffman and Elkins . Yet for their effectiveness, they draw on the same archaic impulses that bond victims everywhere to their oppressors .
Despite the institutional dissimilarity of the behaviors I examine
here, I suggest tha t they share a common social-psychological struc ture, made up of the personalizing contents just mentioned . Their
common outcome is the orchestration and manipulation of feelings of shame and inferiority . This results in the maintenance of social rela
tionships based on various defenses against shame and the threat of shame . These defenses include dependent identification, rej ection ,
and overconformity . 9 They are associated with a sense of fragmenta-
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
1 47
ti on of identity, a lack of personal wholeness, and a lack of internalized at tachment to the symbols that unify the disparate aspects of an indi vidual's life and integrate them into the social world . In children this is the normal state of affairs, and emotional dependence on and identi
fication with the parents is the d efense against it. The psychological task facing adolescents is to overcome this emotional dependence .
Such dependence is repressed but never eliminated, and dependent impulses remain a regressive threat well into adulthood. In an adult,
emotional dependence can be recognized by such behaviors as clinging submissiveness to a superior, lack of initiative, feelings of inadequacy
in the absence of a powerful figure to attach oneself to, repeated
requests for gifts and favors, and an apparent lack of gratitude for those
given . 1 0 In some societies, such dependence is acceptable, if not re warded; there is no incongruity or childishness implied . In a modern
society, however, for an adult to behave in such a manner implies an
inadequacy that can itself become a further source of shame, particu larly insofar as the behavior is made a matter of public display .
There are several defenses against this shameful experience of
inadequacy which are normative in modern societies. By maintaining
certain boundaries of privacy one can always retreat if the competition becomes too intense . The threat to such privacy, as we shall see, is an
essential part of the status of the welfare recipient and the renter; it compromises this defense, and becomes itself a source of shame . By
depersonalizing relationships, one maintains a similar sphere of pri
vacy, guarding against the exposure of emotions and weaknesses . By roleplaying and overconformity one arrives at an identity closure that,
however artificial and detached from one ' s true self, can ward off
shame . These defenses , it might be noted, are typical of the "bureau cratic personality" that Robert Merton first described in 1940 . 1 1
I n describing these rituals o f inferiority, exposure, and shame, it
may seem frivolous that so much attention should be devoted to
behavior that is dismissed, especially by subordinates, as "mickey mou se" or "playing games . " Yet the very dismissal of such behavior as gameplaying reveals part of its structure: It creates an inequality where
none previously existe d . 12 More properly speaking, it orchestrates
certain sentiments of inequality for both superior and inferior. Part
ritual in its j oining of two individuals, and part game in that certain
rules must be followed , but certainly never playful, these rituals of
shame and dependence are the bonds by which the victims' coopera tion is secured in the process of their subjection .
"Just Renters. " I first became aware of the symbolic content of ren ting a house in two of my efforts to obtain a place to stay in a small an d ve ry rural county in eastern Kentucky . In the course of fieldwork
ALLEN BATIEAU
148
I rented houses in four different locations, from fo ur different people: a settlement worker, a retired farmer, the wife of an
in this county
automobile dealer, and a bootlegger. I also came dose to renting a house from the wife of an engineer in a large (population
10, 000) town
in the next county . In the transactions that led up to the renting, it was understood that I was a university student there doing research . These
status consideration s contributed to the relationships that evolved
between me and my potential landlords . Two of these were modestly educated country people, and two were the wives of (relatively)
urbane men with prestigious occupations.
All of the houses were small s tructures close by, usually in back of
the landlord' s house-an architectural arrangement that itself indi
cated inclusion and subordination . The landladies could always see my comings and goings; some commented on them more than others.
Occasionally, upon returning to the house, I would find that the
landlady had been in it for some purpose. In the community at large
I was identified with the landlord, as "the boy that' s renting from ---
. " Altogether, the relationship was one of subordination and
inclusion within the landlord ' s household, in a rather personal but asymmetric manner . Since the community .
I was "j ust a renter," I lacked full status in
As in all of the rural South, renters in this community do indeed
occupy a depressed status; in discussions with others,
I learned that
my experiences were not atypica l . Renters are thought of as transient,
unreliable; they were often manipulated by their landlords, being told
how to vote and which stores to trade at. Since no leases were ever signed, the renter could be turned out at the landlord' s pleasure .
Renters were generally deferential to their landlords, at least in my
presence; many were shy, awkward, and ill-at-ease in the community
at large .
With certain of these landlords
I found that their behavior toward
me was that d escribed in the local idiom as "lording it over" one . For example, in my dealings with the engineer' s wife, I was told that a
substandard house would be acceptable to me: she had three houses
available, one of which had indoor plumbing, one of which had out door plumbing and a twelve-foot dug well, and one of which was
uninhabitable (lacking doors and having been taken over by a flock of chickens ) . She did not want to rent the first to me, saying that she regarded the second as adequate . For another example, the wife of the
car dealer insisted on storing certain of her furniture in the house that I
rented, including a double bed in the small living room . She did not
have any place for the furniture in her house, she said, and I did not
need that much space for myself anyway.
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
1 49
My relationships with these landlords contained elements of per
so nalized dependence and inferiority; I felt uneasy in such a position, although my status as an outsider may explain this . I was dependent
on these landlords and had to show the proper deference in asking them for a place to rent . They, in turn, made the assumption that they
co uld tell me what I needed and supervise and comment on my life . I had few defenses other than avoidance against the sense of powerless ness that resulted .
"Getting a Check. " In the mountain towns of Kentucky,
the first day
of the month is colloquially known as "check day" or "stamp day . "
This i s the day that government checks-social security, supplemental social insurance, public assistance, disability, workmen' s compensa tion, aid to families with dependent children, unemployment com
pensation, veterans' benefits-arrive in their distinctive brown en
velope s . Welfare recipients crowd into town, j amming the narrow
streets, picking up their checks, cashing them at the bank, and then going over to the post office to get their food stamps. In the town in
which my fieldwork was conducted, the food stamps were sold not in
the front lobby of the post office, but in a small vestibule at the back of the building near where the mail truck parked. Anyone coming to that
window is obviously coming not to mail a letter or pick up a parcel but to buy food stamps . The purchas e of food stamps, like their use at the
supermarket, is a public announcement that one is on welfare .
On check day, there are nearly a hundred people in the food stamp
line, which stretches a long distance outside the window, as the clerks check the recipients' authorization cards and identification cards and
sell them the stamps . The recipients must wait patiently in the slow
moving line, even in rain and snow, if they wish to have anything to feed to their families that night . Meanwhile, the people who live and
work in town pass by on their various errands, at times feeling sorry for the recipients, but also at times angry because their tax money sup
ports these "bums . " Food stamps and the various checks considered
"welfare" are the only forms of government largesse distributed in so
demeaning a manner. Manifestly a protection against fraud, the latent
function of such disbursement is to put the recipient in his place :
him that he is inferior.
It tells
The public assistance office is run in a similar manner, although the
waiting area is indoors . The main office is a large room with a number of caseworkers' desks; off a corridor in the back are the supervisors'
offices . In the front, separated by a free-standing partition, are a few fol ding chairs for the welfare clients waiting to see their caseworkers . If one is not a client but simply a friend or a visiting professional, one
need not wait but can go back behind the partition . The client must
ALLEN BA ITEAU
150
wait until the worker is ready to see him, which is another remin der of inferiority . In nearly every case, the caseloads of the workers are far too large to obviate such waiting or even to permit the treatment of th e
clients with a consistent level of courtesy .
T h e task of the public assistance caseworker is to ascertain and
certify "eligibility, " to examine the particularities of a potential client's
life and determine whether that client is eligible for the small amount the welfare system might pay . To ascertain this, the caseworker,
whether in Appalachia or Chicago, is mandated to make a greater invasion of the client' s privacy than is found anywhere else in America
outside of prisons . One must tell the caseworker the composition of one's household, assets, medical condition, education, work history,
and prior residence . The caseworker is entitled to instruct the client to
alter the composition of his household, divest himself of particular
assets, or seek particular employment, in order to qualify for assis
tance . In some states, the caseworker is permitted to make un
announced "visits" to a client's home, visits which may result in a
"missing" husband slipping out the back door as the caseworker
knocks on the front .
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which the public assistance
caseworker is a presence in the private lives of welfare recipients . If one
is certified as permanently and totally disabled, there is little further intervention from the caseworker. However, if one is on Aid to Fami
lies with Dependent Children, or if one occasionally works at seasonal
employment, the interaction with the caseworker is a recurrent phe
nomeno n . In such a situation, one has little privacy . The state-that is,
the public assistance office-has the right to inquire about nearly every
aspect of one ' s life, and one constantly has to evaluate different actions
in terms of how they might affect eligibility . Should a son visit relatives
in Cleveland for the summer? That would cut the check . Dare one take a temporary j ob? It might be too difficult to get recertified . What if one
votes for the wrong candidate? Welfare is supposedly divorced from politics, but many fearful recipients believe otherwise .
The reality of the system is that the caseworkers find these petty
interventions just as burdensome as ·do the recipients . But for the fact
that too many cases of fraud might be discovered on a worker' s case
load, the caseworker would j ust as soon certify the potential client as
eligible and get rid of him . The caseworker is as much compelled to go through the forms as is the client, with the only difference being that it is the client' s and not the caseworker' s privacy that is being invaded .
As a result, there evolve a number of games played between social
workers and clients . The master game here might be named "Eligibil
ity . " In this game the client approaches the worker with an attitude of
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
151
suffi cie nt humility yet optimism that, with a little help, he or she might be able to get off of relief. The w orker cooperates with the client, and with a few winks and hints suggests some strategic lying so that the
in tervi ew can be quickly concluded and the potential client certified . The experienced client needs no such winks and hints; the caseworker often prefers such an experienced client to the greenhorn who naively presents all the honest, messy details of his life . The outcome of this
process is the clarification of an inherently ambiguous situation, the
classification of the client's life into one or another of the categories of
eligiblity . Clarifying this is the worker's responsibility, although the
client can help reduce the worker' s anxiety by providing the correct answers . Similar games are played by caseworkers and clients, many
of which are described in Polansky' s
Roots of Futility,
aggerated shows of conformity and playing stupid . 13
including ex
These are games only in the sense that they are arational : They are
played in defiance of a welfare system that forces the client into a
personalized inferiority and attempts to rationalize the minutiae of the
client's life . They accomplish this subversion by providing the appear
ance of conformity to the rules while maintaining a sphere of privacy in
players' emotions contrary to the spirit of the system that attempts to manipulate not only living arrangements and lifestyles, but also atti
tudes and emotions. As a total institution, welfare permits no privacy;
by playing the game, caseworker and client simultaneously protest and protect the system.
These "games" mobilize certain impulses and sentiments in order
to restate and reinforce a social relationship . The sentiments of the
worker are those of superiority, confidence that she knows what is best for the client. The client confronting the w orker finds that compliance
is rewarded, and independence is not. Dependence in following the
worker's instructions elicits smiles of approval and a continuation of the check; independence, whether through self-assertion or taking a
job, provokes hostility or a reduction of the check. Such reinforcement of infantile impulses, in Polansky' s j udgment, leads to "some de
terioration in adequacy . " 14 Forced into such a situation, the client can
direct his anger and shame at either the worker or himself. The latter is
clearly self-defeating, whereas the former invests further emotional
energy in the relationship bonding worker and client together through their mutual rejection . 15
"Getting a Road. "
The subordination of renters is a common phe
nomenon in the South; the cultivation of psychological dependence in
welfare recipients is found throughout America . However, when one
begins to examine political clientelism, one arrives at a definitive char
acteristic of the texture of life in eastern Kentucky . Relationships be-
152
ALLEN BATIEAU
tween politicians and their clients pervade all areas of life, and consid erations of patronage and loyalty influence some of the most far reaching decisions involved in the development of the region. The scene is familiar enough to any politician: A group of clients has come into his office-a table in the corner of the dairy bar-seeking his support for a petition . The politician is casually dressed, with an open-collar shirt and knit trousers . The petitioners are wearing work clothes and housedresses; some have mud on their boots . The most articulate member of the group speaks for the rest, explaining why they "need" a road up their holler. Currently all they have is an ungraded "county road, " which half the time courses through a stream bed and most of the winter is unpassable . The petitioners feel that they have a "right" to a road, since several nearby communities have obtained roads in the past few years . Yet they do not insist on their "right, " for to do so would be an imputation of the politician's bad faith . Instead, they make their case on the basis of "need . " The politi cian may well agree in the back of his mind that the group is entitled to a road . To acknowledge this would make it more difficult for him should he fail to deliver. He knows that these people, and many similar groups, have rights and needs which he cannot satisfy; yet refusing them outright would cost him their votes. He weighs just how many votes are to be gained and lost by granting which of the patronage requests that have been made to him-whether for roads, bridges, jobs, schoolbus service, loads of gravel, or help with various public agencies. In the end, he sees the group off with a warm but noncom mittal promise of "I'll see what I can do . " The group itself is divided between those who think he meant it and those who have had their mistrust of politicians reinforced . For county officials in eastern Kentucky, political survival hinges on the astute distribution of such patronage . Each of the magistrates has some discretion as to how his share of the county's patronage is distributed, and the fiscal court as a whole can also decide to build a road or a bridge in a certain district. As a consequence, a common spectacle at the monthly fiscal court meetings is for diverse groups of local petitioners to address the court, seeking some favor. In the county in which my fieldwork was done, the monthly fiscal court meetings are quite informal, with the four magistrates and the county judge, along with other county officials, sitting crowded around a table so small that some of the magistrates have their backs to the audience . On one day in October the judge and the county attorney were wearing jackets and ties, but the magistrates were variously clad in hunting jackets, work uniforms or jackets from leisure suits . During the meeting there was much passing back and forth of papers for
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
153
sign atures between the sheriff, the county treasurer, the judge, and some of the squires, to the extent that the conduct of business seemed at times a distraction from the more important tasks of paper-shuffling . Peo ple came and went in and out of the small courtroom, and loud conversations could frequently be heard through the open door to the anteroom . Above all this confusion the county judge tried to run the meeting, which consisted primarily of hearing the petitions of various dele gations from communities in the county. The petitioners, when called on by the judge, would explain why they needed a road, a bridge, or a load of gravel on a driveway. Nearly all of the petitioners were from rural areas; people in town were sufficiently well-connected that they did not need to present requests at public meetings. The petitioners were dearly ill at ease when presenting their requests. Their clothes marked them as poor, and their speech-they say "re questies" rather than "requests"-indicated their rural origins . Occa sionally a petitioner's anger showed through his thin and cracking voice . Yet confrontations are rare here, and the appearance is main tained that building a road is a favor done by the politicians for their constituents . The favor, of course, is rewarded with votes at election time; if the petitioners appeared to be demanding their rights, they might not be trusted to reciprocate . Conversely, if the petitioners have been consistently loyal to the politician, supporting him in each elec tion, they have little difficulty in getting their road. After each group presents its request, it usually leaves, not waiting for the end of the meeting. After all of them have left, the county treasurer comes in to present his report. A nattily dressed man, in a polyester suit with matching trousers and jacket, he has the sleek look of a television preacher. "What can we do for you?" the judge asks, "What do you want?" , just as he had asked all of the rural petitioners . With a wink and a broad grin, the treasurer parodies the rural petition ers: "I need some gravel on my bridge . " I n its daily practice, the game of local politics in eastern Kentucky involves just this sort of exchange of patronage for loyalty. This artic ulation extends upward through neighborhood politicians, big men in the county, factions in the state Democratic party, and ultimately into the statehouse and the federal capital . At every level, the same interpersonal situation obtains: a group approaches an official seeking patronage, with the implicit understanding that loyalty will be re turned . To approach the politician singly with no imputation that one is representing a larger group, implies a relationship of equality, or that one has a completely unrealistic notion of how politicians grant favors . Only in the distribution of jobs does the one-to-one approach work, and there the expectation of loyalty from the j obholder is stronger than
ALLEN BA TTEAU
154
ever. The holder of a political j ob, along with his family, is expected to vote, if not actually get out and campaign, for the politician that got
him the j ob . This expectation of loyalty is sometimes extende d to private employment as well: Employees should not actively opp ose a candidate their boss is "interested" in .
Certain styles of behavior, containing strong elements of verbal stroking, are crucial to these processes of securing patronage or mobi
lizing a constituency: flattery, reassurances of trust and good faith, a suppression of negative or hostile impulses, and a heightened sensitiv
ity to the nuances of speech and gesture that might indicate one' s
hidden feelings . Such behavior pervades many settings in which per
sonalized relationships must be mobilized for instrumental e nd s . The
interminable discussions that go on in families and local groups are
efforts to find a satisfactory consensus on past events or courses for future action. The avoidance of dissen sion in Appalachia, which many
have noted, necessary in a milieu where cooperation is relatively
unstructured, is reinforced by the sensitivity of others' feelings . The counterpoint to this avoidance is a heightened vulnerability to others'
blame and censure . These personalized relationships are found in such
diverse settings as families, villages, political groups, dubs, and street
corner encounters; in such personalized settings, there is considerable
reinforcement to suppress one's individuality and accept the drift of events . Whether these reinforcements are experienced as the warmth
and intimacy of a "folk community" or the smothering pressure of
village gossips, they are an expression of a caring that is quite real and which, like all reinforcements, carries over beyond the immediate
setting to create an atmosphere pervading all interaction .
The personalized political dependence described here extends far
beyond the matter of obtaining gravel for a road. The development of central Appalachia (outside the coal industry) is for the most part
financed by state and federal dollars, funds that are with varying degrees of subtlety subject to the rules of patronage distribution . As a
result, one finds at all levels of Appalachian society a reinforcement for
political dependence and a subversion by political considerations of
the economic rationalization that is the intended consequence of these
development efforts . Some of the deformations of the local polity
which result from this dependence will be considered in the final
section .
The Aigner Purse.
The examples given this far are pertinent primarily
to the poorer families in Appalachia, families whose dependence is
obvious even if the reasons for it are not. These families dangle from multiple dependencies on country stores, politicians, welfare offices
and landlord s . Appalachia has a higher proportion of welfare depen-
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
155
de n ts than most other southern regions; hence, like the frequency of po litical dependence j ust noted, the incidence of welfare dependence
is su fficiently great that the quality of relationships in the welfare sy stem affects the texture of life throughout the community, in ways no t found elsewhere in the South .
For these families living in a state of multiple dependency, the only
source of independence they might have is land of their own; yet even
the value of land ownership has been rendered questionable . Land
without a road is of little value, since it cannot be used commercially or residentially; even if a farmer' s land has a road, it can provide him with
little more than "a cornbread living" unless he has a j ob and a regular income. Today a homesteader needs the electricity, deep well, tele phone, automobile, and store-bought food and clothes that his grand
father never dreamed of having . This rise in living standards creates one of the most subtle and pervasive forms of dependence in Appa
lachia today .
To understand why living standards rise, often more rapidly than
the incomes with which they are purchased or the satisfactions that they bring, we have to understand the uses people make of the objects
involved in different standards of living. Aside from cases of sheer necessity, the ownership of such goods is part of participation in the
larger community . This "participation" is a set of stylized rituals; the
"large community" can be a high school, a club, the street life of a small
town, or a circle of friends . In nearly every case in Appalachia, these
groups do not set their own standard s, but follow the lead of other groups. Understanding how these rituals bind individuals into the
"larger community," and how that group in turn is bound to other
groups, will enable us to understand how conspicuous consumption
and emulation form one of the strongest bonds in the society, even as
they cultivate and threaten feelings of inadequacy .
When I conducted a survey of the students in the consolidated high
school in McPherson, Kentucky,
I found that one item on the survey
elicited more comment than all of the others combine d . On the girls'
questionnaire,
I asked, "Do you own an Aigner purse?" For the next
few days, any time I would meet a mother in town who had a daughter in the high school, she would mention this item on the questionnaire .
The simultaneous novelty and importance of Aigner purses for these
families made them a focal point for all their ambivalences involved in conspicuous emulatio n . 1 6
The women' s self-consciousness about their Aigner purses was
mostly due to the novelty of the purse s . A boom had started in the coal industry j ust a few months previously, and for the first time in the region there was a class that was simultaneously sizable, well edu-
156
ALLEN BATIEAU
cated, and sufficiently affluent to create a public impression by con spicuous consumption. The middle class of earlier years had been smaller, less sophisticated, and less affluent. There was a change in atmosphere so that for the first time in this small town it was becoming acceptable to compete through stylish consumption . The ritualized character of conspicuous consumption-whether in the car one drives or the jogging suit one wears-is a commonplace sociological observation: The specificity of time, place, social context, and script involved is sufficient to characterize it as ritual, even if the details of symbolic adornment periodically change . The outcome of this ritual, like the others, is to define positions of superiority and inferiority, and to reinforce impulses of confidence and diffidence in the respective parties . In urban America, for reasons Michael Harrington notes in his discussion of the invisibility of poverty, 17 rituals such as these are often more of a game, playfully undertaken and seldom striking to the core of one's being . In eastern Kentucky, where large-scale inequalities of income exist within small-scale communities, the ritual display of superiority and inferiority is at times quite blatant. A common story heard from adolescents of rural origin in Appalachia is of their shame and embarrassment at wearing the wrong clothes or having the wrong purse when they attended the consolidated high school in town . The public shame that accompanies a display of low status is itself at times difficult and embarrassing to observe . Whether it be a customer in the post office who cannot fill out a money order for herself, or a high school girl whose clothes are out of date, the awkwardness and embar rassment are obvious and contagious . One should guard against overstating the sense o f shame induced by such rituals . Two middle-class adults meeting on a streetcorner will have sufficient means of rationalization and avoidance to obviate any more than the slightest feeling of awkwardness . Conversely, many people raised in rural Appalachia feel little compulsion to make fre quent trips into town, into a setting where they will feel awkward and out of place . In some situations though, particularly among adoles cents in high school, where identities are not crystallized and where avoidance is impossible, the shame produced by having the wrong purse, wearing an out-of-date dress, lacking current knowledge on cars, television trivia, or sports, can be quite intense . Other shaming rituals, such as the professional's flaunting of his vocabulary in front of clients, or the teacher's exhibition of a student's poverty before the entire class, 18 can similarly produce intense feelings of shame and inferiority . The common armature of these rituals is that one partner in the interaction, by contrast with the other, becomes seen as an unsoph-
RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
157
is ticated "hillbilly . " The entire range of conspicuous consumption of cars , houses, knowledge, clothes, and so forth continuously sorts out the po pulation into gradations of sophistication and backwardness. such invidious comparisons, accumulating over the last hundred years, have made many within the region quite sensitive to the judg ments of others from outside the region . The shame of wearing the wrong skirt is qualitatively the same as the shame of having the wrong speech . Both are badges of inferiority within a community that is nominally egalitarian. They are sometimes dealt with by avoidance: Some of the poorest rural families prefer to trade at the country stores, where prices are higher, rather than go into town where they feel embarrassed by their dress . When avoidance is impossible, as when one needs to do business with some professional agency in town or see the doctor or attend school, there are several possible defenses against the shame of personalized inferiority. De nial, in the form of defensive statements such as "I'm just as good a man as he is!", is one . Regression to dependence, and identification through emulation, reap greater rewards, for the obvious reason that they are socially integrative, obviating the isolation of feelings of shame . When a person in Lexington imitates the fashions in New York, he is identifying with certain stylish groups there; it is the same when a person in Hazard imitates the styles in Lexington, or a person in Beaver Creek imitates the styles in Hazard . In every case there is an attempt to be like the other, to avoid threats of awkwardness in comparison or interaction with the other . Yet this imitation, when continued or compulsive, places the individual in a dependent position vis-a-vis New York, Lexington, or Hazard, just as a child takes its cues from its parents for its sense of identity. Compulsive stylishness is a defense against feelings of incongruity, in a society where people are j udged on the basis of elective consumption . The Currency of Shame in Public Order. Four typical situations have been given here-the renter, the welfare mother, the political petition er, and the style-conscious consumer. With the exception of the last, these pertain primarily to those at the bottom of the social pyramid, people who live in dependence without the offsetting advantage of having others dependent on them. The distinctiveness of Appalachia in this regard is less in the fact of these relationships and more in their pervasive character. Despite their diversity, the situations given share the common structure of one person being placed in a position of inferiority or incongruity with respect to another. To the extent that this is personalized and publicly displayed, there is the accompany ing threat of shame, unpleasant for both those who experience and
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ALLEN BA TIEAU
those who witness or evoke it. "It just tears me up, " a postal wo rker told me, "When these people come into the post office, you know, that
cannot read or write , and say, 'Can you back [i . e . address] this lette r for me . I'm so nervous today I j u st can' t write , ' or home . ' It just tears me to pieces . "
'I left my glasse s a t
These activities, in addition to their rational content, have a ritual
script that allocates positions of superiority or inferiority and reinforces
certain subj ective defenses against the shame of inferiority . Thes e
defenses alternatively include a rej ection of the superior, or a need for dependence on the part of the inferior . These maneuvers satisfy both
parties: A mulish or hostile rejection is a subj ective denial of another's
superiority; the other individual will see such behavior as proof of
childish stubbornne s s . Clinging and dependent behavior similarly
justify subordination while obviating its shame through identification.
In all of these situations, diverse sentiments and emotions are
enlisted in the maintenance of relationships of superiority and inferior ity . Such superordination is a normal state of affairs in all human
societies, although some acknowledge it more readily than others. 19
Yet in most of the typical situations described above, the subordination
is made a matter of public display, even while the public ideology asserts a nominal equality, maintaining that personal inadequacies are
private matters. This public exposure itself becomes a further source of shaming. There are two available defenses against such shaming and
manipulation of inferiority . The first, w hich is the emhasis of this
article, is identification and dependence . This defense is further rein forced by the manner in which landlords and welfare workers invade
the privacy of their dependents, denying them the conventional de
fenses of social distance and physical privacy . Identification, necessi tating as it does innovative behavior, is a more progressive defense against the same feelings; to the extent that it is compulsive and stylized, it becomes
a
mortgaging of one' s identity to the innovators of
fashion . One can see in the overconformity of the arriviste, whether in
Pineville or Louisville, a reaction to fears that perhaps one does not fit in, is not accepted by the emulated group .
The final defense agains t shame is the rej ection of the superior,
either in the form of passive avoidance or in active hostility . The former is more available when the needs are of the subjective sort satisfied by politics or status consumption, or when one has social skills that
facilitate a carefully controlled dista nce within interaction . However, if
the need is a matter of survival, as is the case of the welfare recipient,
then the dependent must rej ect the superior who satisfies it, even
while the relationship is maintained . This rejection, like the need for dependence, is an investment of emotional energy upward, toward
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RITUALS OF DEPENDENCE
the su perior, rather than horizontally toward one ' s peers . In any sy stem of dependent relationships, there are three routes to obj ective am el io ration of one's position: The accumulation of equity and other re so urces, upward mobility through the creation of one's own clien
tel e, or organizing the clas s that is dependent by virtue of being frag mented . The first of these is precluded by the rules of the welfare syst em ,20 the second simply perpetuates and elaborates the system,
whereas the third, the only strategy promising fundamental change, is made more difficult by the bonds to the superior .
21
The superiors in this system, whether those who design the rituals
or those who participate in them, are similarly caught up in the depen
dent relationships that seem to be a characteristic feature of a late
capitalist economy. This is clear from the discussion of conspicuous
emulation; it similarly obtains with welfare caseworkers and politi
cians . Yet all of these have in their obj ective circumstances a number of resources and opportunities that the renter or the welfare client do not.
The middle-class person enters into a dependent relationship with a
greater degree of choice than does the lower-class person . The former
has available a larger sphere of autonomy, whether in the control of private living space or in the control of a skill, both of which offer
refuge . It he must seek public largesse and reveal his private finances,
as in the case of a parent applying for a scholarship for a college student, it is th