Aristotle, Rhetoric I. A Commentary

ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I A COMMENTARY William M. A. Grimaldi, S.]. +t ~ ++ ++ § NEW YORK FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 1980...

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ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I A COMMENTARY

William M. A. Grimaldi, S.].

+t ~ ++ ++

§

NEW YORK

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 1980

by FORDHAM UNIVI!RSITY PRESS All rights remlltd.

@ Copyright 1980

LC 79-SJ37Z ISBN 0-82.32-1048-0

PrjJl~J

de

CULTURA PRESS

Wetteren. Belgium

CONTENTS SIGLA •

vi

vii

PREFACE

Chapter 54a Chapter 55b Chapter 58a Chapter 59a Chapter 60b Chapter 62a Chapter 63b Chapter

I I - 55b 24 2. . 25 - 58a 35 3 36 - 59a 29 4 • 30 - 60b 3 5 . 4 - 62a 14 6 • IS - 63b 4 7 . 5 - 6Sb

8

35 79

89 103 121 143

:LI

•

181

6sb 22 - 660 2.2

Chapter 66a Cbapter 68b Chapter 6gb Chapter 723 Chapter 73b Chapter 74b

9 . 2.3 - 68a 37 10 • 1 - 69b 32 33 - 72.a 3 12 • 4 - 73a 38 13 . 1 - 74b 2.3 14 . 24 - 7Sa 2.1 22. -

2.25

2.43

II .

C~pter IS •

7sa

191

77b

2.69 285 307 317

12.

ApPENDIX: The Role of the ",taT"" in Aristotle's Methodology

349

BIBLIOGRAPHY

357

SIGLA

A. Anaximenes Bonitz, bulex Cope Cope, IlIlrod.

edd.

LS OCD

S. Spenge!

SlfJilies

540 1

54B

2

TexIS

Aristode. M. Fuhrmann's Teubner edition (leipzig 1966). H. Bonitz, Index Amloklicus (Betlin 1870). E. M. Cope, The RHETORIC ofAristoll" rev. and ed. J. E. Sandys, 3 vok (Cambridge 1877); except where odIerwise designated, dIe citation is to Vollllll<: r. E. M. Cope, An IntroJuaio/l 10 Aristolle's RHETORIC (Cambridge 1867). The editors of die live r~ent critical texts of die Rheloric: A. Roernet, Teubner, 2nd ed. (Leip2ig 1898/1923); M. Dufour, Les Belles Lettres, 2nd ed. (Paris 1960); A. Tovar, Instituto de Estudios Politicos (Madrid 1953);W.D. Ross, Scriptorum C1assicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford 1959) = OCT; R. Kassel, De Gruyter (Berlin 1976). A Greek-English LexiCDn, edd. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. McKenzie, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1948). The Oxford Classical Diaionary, edd. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, and ed. (Oxford 1970). H. W. Smyth, Greek Gramm., (Cambridge, Mass. 1956). 1. Spengel, Anslolelis Ars rhelorica, 2 vok. (leipzig 1867); except where otherwise designated, die citation is to Volume I. W. M. A. Grimaldi, S.1., Studies in Ihe PiIilosophy of Artistotle's RHETORIC (Wiesbaden 1972).

All text references to die Rhelom are dim abbreviated; e.g., 540 I = 13540 r, etc; B, r = Books 2, 3 usually wid, chapter and text reference, e.g., B I, 77b 20, r I, 03b 10. The Greek of die text is essentially iliat of Roemer's Teubner edition. Citations in bold face designate cro.....references. All references to c1assical.uthors are to the Teubner editions, save dIe following: references to dIe Topics and Sophistid Elenchi are to Ross's OCT edition; to dIe Organon as found in T. W:ritz, Arislolelis Organon. where die Teubner edition is not used, dlC editor and edition are identified.

Complete references to all die source material, cited iliroughout iliis book in brief fashion, will be found in die Bibliography.

PREFACE

IT IS MY HOPE that this commentary on Rhetoric I and the effort to explain Aristotle's text will encourage others to carry the work further by way of correction or devdopment of the ideas presented. This has been the object of any work which I have done on the text. The last commentary in English was published by Cope in 1877; it was preceded by the work of Spengd in Latin in 181\7. Since then, apart from particular studies on strucNre or major concepts in the three books, and some periodical literature on passages in the text, any interpretation of the entire text of Book One has appeared either in the establishment of the text in the critical editions or in the translations of the three books. The one exception of any significance known to me is the brief notes to the chapters of Book One in the text and translation of Granero published in 1951. Though Aristotle has not always been served wd1 by the translations which have appeared over the past seventy-4i.ve years, still they are the major access to the work for many who are engaged extensively in the fidd of rhetorical studies. I would hope that the present commentary will offer these scholars positive assistance commensurate with their efforts, and that, where it may difIer with traditional interpretations, the diJferences will be carefully weighed and studied, and the results lead us to a more exact and comprehensive knowledge of this important work. I have not tried to establish any new readings although, at times, I have been so tempted. My usual procedure has been to comment on that reading of the codices which is accepted by the editors of the text (Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross, and Kassel) and by the commentators (Spongel and Cope), unless there is a serious reason not to do so. Consequently, this commentary can be used with any of the five recent critical editions, the readings of which in questionable passages have been consulted and given attention. Although the Oxford critical edition may be more readily available to most readers, I have not used it as my basic text for a number of reasons, one of which was Ross's frequent change of the standard lineation. Instead, despite the strong criticism which it has received - e.g., Roberts ("Notes," 356) and Kassd (Der Text, pp. IIOif.) - I have followed the text and lineation of Roemer's Teubner edition because it diverges less frequently from the standard lineation and because it clearly has had an influence on all subsequent critical editions. The most recent of these editions, Kassel', Aristatelis Ars rhetarica, appeared after my work was finished, but I was able to consult it before my manuscript went to press. r should also mention that in referring to the Codex Parisinu,

viii

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' I

1741 (A) I have followed the more ordinary designation of it as A rather than the notation used by Roemer and Bekker, Ae. One of the objectives of this commentary, as I said, is to make Aristotle's statements about rhetoric accessible and uuderstandable to scholars working in the field of rhetorical studies but not actively engaged with the Greek language or classical scholarship. Consequently, wherever the understanding of a passage Called for, or would be helped by, a grammar reference or the completion of Aristotle's elliptical Greek, these have been supplied in the notes. For this reason, too, the more readily available book, periodical, and reference literature in English has been selected wherever possible. In conclusion I should like to e.'Cpress my gratitude to the following: Pr<>fessor Hermann Gundert, the former editor of Hermes, whose careful and detailed reading .of my earlier book on the Rhetoric was most helpful, and whose untimely death was a deep loss to classical scholars and classical scholarship; Professor George Glanzmann, S.J., also deceased, who gave generously of his time in discussing text problems with me and voluntarily read through the entire unrevised manuscript, and whose enthusiasm with what was emerging was always encouraging; Professors]oseph Dolan, S.J., and Gerald McCool, S.J., who on sundry occasions lent a helpful ear to my tentative solutions of, or queries on, philosophical problems which arose from time to time in the text; the editor of Philosophy and Rhetoric for permission to reprint a note which first appeared in his journal; the American Philological Association at whose request I undertook this commentary - a task, which, I am happy to say, I enjoyed; and my University, which awarded me 3 faculty fellowship during which I completed the major part of the work.

,Fordh.m University

WILLIAM

M. A.

GRIMALDI, S.J.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 5
1-

54"

II -

2.

I -

I

55a 3

II

rhetoric is like dialectic since it is concerned with subject matter within the competence of men and submits to systematic analysis

55" 3

deficiencies in previous studies of rhet-

54"

oric:

(.) 542 II -542 31

nothing on nlant', the heart of any rhetorical TBVl1; sole concern is with matters extrinsic co rhetoric: e.g., with ways to influence dicasts

(b) 542 jl - 55-

this procedure encouraged by our legal system, with the result that rhetorical

study confines irself to judicial rhetoric

II . Development: 55a 3 - 55b I.

2.

55" 3 - 553 55a

19-

18

55b 7

21

what " rhetorical TiXP'1 should be:

its primary concern is with the nLaTttt;

and with truth it is usefUl to men

3. 55b 8 - 55b 21

III . Conclusion and transition: 55b

the function of rhetoric 22 -

55b 24

548 I ci,,-r!G"po'Po~ The meaning here is explained immediately at 5
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETOB;1C' [

part" is the usual tr..ulation of the word; it aptly expresses the general movement of both discipID", with respect to one another, for it catches the stropheantistrophe idea of dora! song and dance in which the antistrophe mirrors the movement of the strophe. Since rhetoric and dialectic do not correspond exacdy in details, and since A. wishes to stress, as we will see, only the larger correspondence between the two, "analogue" might be a better translation, or "correlative." In tb opening chapters A. constantly emphasizes the general correlation of each in what they do, e.g., in this first ch.pter alone: 55a 8-10, 28, 34-35; 55b 8-10, 16. In fact the first chapter ends with a return to the idea stated here and thus forms a cyclic structure. The important fact in this opening stalmlent is that by correlating rhetoric with dialectic, A. makes the art of rhetoric a rational endeavor, .n activity of the intellect, and, consequendy, a pursuit which is both reasonable and accept.ble to the responsible citizen (••liT11~). From 54' I-II it is clear that for A. rhetoric, as • .i%Yf/' is a guide for .ction, a guide which submits to reason, and can thus be explained. This appears to be an opening reply to the criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias of Puro where it is argued that rhetoric doe. not submit to reason (465a). Indeed the reply is made more direct by the echoing of certain Platonic phrases in the first two chapters: e.g., rhetoric i. the counterpart not of cookery (d..lrtTeo'Po~ atpo"o,la~, 465d) but of dialectic, a. we are told here; nor is it a part of Battery (/loe'o, 1TtC1TeO'Po~, A. tells us something of what he has il, mind at 56a 30-33 (see 56a 25, 56a 30 : 2, 56a 3I : 1); a clear idea of the relation will be in our hands by the end of chap. 3. There are many reference. to the dnirtTeo'Po~ idea in subsequent theorists occasioned quite likely by A:s challenge to Plato; for the citations see Spenge! on 54' I. We must not forget here that since "dialectic" was a cherished Platonic word we have a whole new dignity conferred on rhetoric by the opening words of this chapter. On A:. use of 6'aAB"n1<7j in our text, see 55" 9. "2 : 1 "cpl ....OL...m..V ••• ci'P"'P"'ILEv'l; i.e., any and all subject matter which belongs to the body of common and general knowledge (d

54. 8

COMMBNTAllY

>
necessarily a body of professional or technical knowledge specific to some discipline. At SE 172a 23 - 172b 1, A. uses f.irly much the same language to explain the subject matter of dialectic. Spenge~ p. 5, believes that A. is arguing here the position of Gorgias and the Sophists on the universality of rhetoric against Plato, who himself came to this position in the Phaedms. An ~"'''lnip'1 Wp"e'''piVYJ is an established discipline such as politics, geometry, ethics; see 59h 12-16. See S. 1304. • Ii..........." a 3 ... ,a-njV-'1~

genitive of possession; see S. 1303.

a 4 liV-cpoiv

is explained by the parallelism in 54a 5-{j where the words d~BTdCs .. Hal unixo .. Myo~ refer to the effort of dialectic to investigate and offer a reasonable explanation of. problem. and MoAoysia8a, "al "aT'f/yoeo,y refer to rhetoric in its general effort to speak in defense of, or against, a proposed position. At the same time it is true that in this first chapter A. speaks with judicial rhetoric uppermost in his mind, a fact which commentators fail to note (see S43 15 : z). Thus it might be urged that he is thinking of these last two words in the more technical and usual sense in which he uses them of judicial rhetoric (see 58b Io-II, 16-17). However, the tenor of this and of the following two chapters, which analyze the general character of rhetoric, suggests that a reference to such • restricted sense is unlikely. At the very least the phrase is used metonymously to serve for "rhetoric" in general; I note that Spengel, p. 6, would agree that the reference is to rhetoric in general. which is repeated in Md TO" a~TOpaT01) (543 9-10) is explained by the contrast set up with av1>i8B,a~ (543 7, 9): namely, "to do it spontaneously, without any reasoned process or method," as opposed to "doing it from the known experience produced by an acquired and established habit." To investigate a problem, or to speak on it to another, is an ability which all men possess, to a certain extent, either instinctively (BI"iil or as the result of constant and repe.ted practice (av1>i8"aY). See Cic., De orat. 2.8.32-33.

a 6 .ben

On the idea in "1)1~8B,a1, see 69h a 7: 1 cruv-qOE'tl" 1i..1> ~1;E"'~ I6 : .; see also 7Ia 24-25. On lEo.", see 62.b I3 : 2. The point which A. wishes to make here is the natural familiarity acquired through the repetition of an action over a long period of time. 2 liV-cpO'<£p"'~ "in both ways"; for both are possible.

is the reading of the codd. (save uncorrected A), three of a 8 O&O:n:OI.'" the edd., Spengel, and Cope. Ross and Kassel read &dq; ",Ote'., a conjecture of Bywater's ("Aristotelia IV," 248) suggested by cod. A, and there is some-

4-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

thing to be said for it ill the present context (on which see Kassd, DeT Text, pp. Il7£). The meaning of odq; would then be "via ac ratione," as we find it ill Bonitz, Index 4-96.56, and atiTa "ul odq; "O,,;;, would be interpreted as "it would be possible to lrea.t these matters indeed by a reasoned methodology." Once again we are made conscious of a position which is contrary to Plato', in the Gorgias, where we are told that rhetoric is not an art, but a skill (~fJ"''I!la, i.e., without any knowledge of principles), and that it is not an art precisdy because it cannot give an account of, or explain the cause, why it does what it does (Gorg. 465a). Compare Gorg. 465a 5 (cllun nI. alTia. ',,&aTOV p~ HXe .. e"'ei.) with our 54a IO, and Gorg. 46sa 2-3 (dX'1f' dll atlT~' 06 'P1fP') with 54a II. In our passage A. implies that this formulation of an art of rhetoric has not yet been achieved and that his present study will do. it. Granted the meaning of odq; in this usage; I still would not wish to lose the metaphor in the word, which is brought out clearly in the reading of the codd., odo"o,,;;.. The word means to make a road, to trace out a path. A road is a guide, and, so, in a way, is directive. We find the same metaphor in pi80do~, 54b 23 (i.e., peTti. and &M~): following along the path or way set out; or, in our sense in the text: attending to the system. A. implies that what follows in the treatise will be just such a road. Cicero, De div. 2.1, speaks of "optimarum artium vias," and Quintilian, Inst. orat. 2.17.41, of "viam atque ordinern in bene dicendo." Cope, pp. 4-5, illustrates 000:.:0<6;;. with numerous "-'GlIl1ples. a 9 : 1 s,' a The antecedent of 8 is alTia. (54a IO); see Cope, p. 5, for parallel passages. The use of the neuter relative pronoun referring to a masfuline or feminine antecedent to "-'<press the idea in the antecedent corresponds to a similar use of the neuter pronoun; see Gildersleeve, Syntax, II 501. 2 i1CL"NyxcivOUIJLV "to hit the mark, attain 'or reach one's goal. In other words, those who successfully use rhetoric and dialectic in this way know only "that they do so" with success, not why they do so. But the one who knows the art knows the "why and the cause" (Met. 98ra 28-30). A:s purpose in this treatise will be to provide such an answer for rhetoric. II

a II : 1 Tixv"IJ~ An art i. always grounded in a rational principle, or as it is described in EN II40a 10: art is "an established capacity for making, conjoined with true reasoning." Consequendy art is always able to explain what it is doing. As a T6XV1f, rhetoric certainly consists of a body of ruies and general principles which can be known by reason (54a 6-11). As such, it is a form of 'muniP1f, as opposed to mere ep".«!ia, Plato's word for it in Gorg. 465a, SOL It is interesting to see that A. refers favorably to Polus' comment on ip".'eia (Gorg. 448c) when he describes TBX'1f and ~p".'ela and their difference at Met. 981a 2 - 982a 2.

COM.MENTARY

In a very real sense every dxv1/, although it is an rn'''n/I'1/ "ea"n"~, must also be to some e.'
6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

54" II

says at EN II53a 24-25: "Art produces, not activity, but the capacity for activity," o~6' rde cill'1; 'VEers/a; o(Jdsp.ta; TexV1] lcrrtv, dAld T'i; dvvdp.6W;. (The question of d6vap.'; and 'veer ..a is discussed at Met. I048a 25 - I05Ia 33, on which see Bonitz, Metaphysica, or Ross, Metaphysics.) There is yet a further distinction which belongs to M.ap.,; when it is used of rhetoric and dialectic. In this further meaning, rhetoric and dialectic as d.vap." are different from all other dv.dp. ..;. Every TiXV1], as A. says (55b 27-31), is c'insnucti.ve or persuasive with respect to its own subject matter," and its M.ap.';, obviously, is coucemed only with that subject matter. But rhetoric (and dialectic, 55b 8-9, 56a 32-33) is a TexV11 which contains a body of principles and rules which are applicable to any subject matter. Thus the one who has mastered the T6XVTJ of rhetoric acquires a M.ap.'; which enables him not only to actualize the elements which constitute the ..t of rhetoric but also to apply thos~ elements to any subject so as to discern the possiWy suasive in that subject (55 b 25). To do the latter, ofcourse, the person must have, as we will see, an adequate knowledge of such subjects. But the major point here is that in this sense of do.ap.,; rhetoric like dialectic (or, indeed, the art of logic) has no delimited and unique subject matter upon which it must be exercised: olin l.a; ·",.a; ri.ov; drpwe,ap.i.av (ssb 8). Instead, rhetoric as an art transcends all specific disciplines and may be brought into play in them (e.g., 55b 31-34, 59b 8•. r6). In this sense the methodology ofrhetoric, like that of dialectic, is unlimited in its application. This is a point which A. stresses. Rhetoric is, in reality, the artistic (TSX"><>j) use of language on any subject in the effort to communicate effectively with others. As A. says at 560 33, rhetoriC is a do.ap." Toii noetaa, lOrov;, and its coucern is the sdeuce of discourse, l""anlp.TJ lOyw •• See 59h r6 : 1. In every way rhetoric is the art of the lOro; in discourse. This position of A.'s was apparendy missed by later theorists of rhetoric; see, e.g., Rhetores Graeel, II 102, V 213, VI 16, 50. Alexander himself in his commentary on the Topics (CG II.2.4, lines IIff.) hedges on this universality. :2 "pyay The lero. of anything, in its use here, is that which it is specifically intended to do. We see it so used at ssb 10, ssb 27, and 57" I; and at SE I83a 39 - I83b r. The argument by which, from an analogy of separate bodily parts or different trades, A. proves that man has a proper function (leyo,) or demonstrates the relation between a thing's excel1ence (de6Tlj) and its proper fuuction (lero.) - e.g., EN II06a 15-21 and II39a 16-17 ("The excellence of each thing is relative to its proper function") is found quite e.'q>licidy in Plato, Rep. 352d - 354", Gorg. 503e, 5170, Crat. 390d. Thus we say that when something fulfills its lero. it manifests its own particular cieBnj. The lero. of the eye is to see. The more perfectly it does this the more fully it possesses and shows forth its cieB..lj.

54a 13

COMMENTAl!.Y

7

a 12 : 1 ....6XV.. ~ auV....,OME~ We know of such rhetorical handbooks from Plato, Phaedr. 27IC, 266c - 269c, and {socrates, Against the S.phists 19. Radermacher presents the remains of the corpus of these writings prior to A. In the SE I83b 26-34, 1840 8 - 184b t, A. himself comments on the work done in rhetorical studies. 2 6;>.(yov ",.",onj"""rLv cro-rij~ IJ.OPlOV There are a nwnber of variant readings for this phrase. Spengel and Roemer read &).[y •• ''''''0.01"a.... (cod. A); Cope, dllyo. "."oet"a....; Dufour, Tovar, and Ross, o~div rb, ./n••• "."oel",... .. (cod. A corrected). Ka!sd conjectures "."0.>1""...., i.e., dllyo. """0.>1""..... Roemer collated A and considered the correction o,)"w cD, dns'i'J1 1rsnoe["aa,,, as an interpretation, not a variant reading. Ka!sd identifies it as a variant reading. As far as the substance of the statement is concerned there is no essential difference in any of the readings: e.g., "To produce a small part of the art" (Spengel, Roemer); "to provide no part, so to speak, of the art" (Dufour, Tovar, and Ross); "to labor at a small part of the art" (Ka!sel). In fact what A. has in mind he expresses positively at 54a 15-16. Our statement at 54a 12-13 is importantifl the light of what follows in this chapter, and of the usual interpretation given to the chapter. A. announces here that contemporary technographers (with ,..~. oil. emphasizing the .ii.) have preseJi.ted but a small part of the TiXVTI (,..oe'.' refers to something which is part of, a constituent of, a thing; we see it so used at 66b 23 for the parts of virtue; see also plato, Gorg. 462e 3 - 463" 3). Thus in criticizing these technographers for their concentration on arousing an emotional response A. is saying not that they have not written on the art at all, but that they have written on only a small part of it. Consequently he is not denying that the ,,&8'1 are part of the rhetorical TiX''1. Nor is there any contradiction between what he. says here and in 56a IIf. Here he is questioning a misuse of the eniotions by these technographers and the encouragement which they are giving to a kind of demagogy.

,..oe'o.

a 13: 1 ".plOV· Id yap ... npoo-Oij"'" Ross prints the text: (al yae ... :n;eoa8;j"a.). To punctuate a te.'Ct is to interpret. Whenever the edd. do so in a way which can be questioned or which might merit a remark, artention will be called to it. Her., for example, all the other edd. read a colon after and no parenthesis, as should be done. z lV....EXVOV is the reading of the codd. and accepted by four edd., Spengel, and Cope. I see no reason to change to with Ross. As Gildersleeve, Syntax, 1 124, remarks, "the copulative verb often agrees with the predicate." Cf. Plato, Laws 7320 4-5, Men. 9IC 3-4; Spongel, p. 10, gives examples from A. The principle on readings followed in this commentary will usually be to follow, where possible, the reading of the codd. accepted by the edd. as the best attested.

,..oe'o.

.0-.....

.1,,,

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

5~

15

a 13-14 ",lcr"El~ ... ",pO ...8ijXIlL This is the first of the many times ni,m, appears in the text (41 in all: 22 in A, 8 in B, 12 in 1') and its meaning should be determilled from the outset. At the moment we can say only that the "terre." whatever they are, are the part of the art which submit to technique (l.~sX"'&. lerr.); everydring else is supplementary. See 54b 21, 55a 4. c£ Appendix. a 14 : 1 ..Ii 5' ,u>.,. This is unspecified. If we interpret from the immediate conte.'Ct, we can e..'Cplain it by 5~ 15-21: these technographers write about an indiscriminate toying with the emotions of dre auditors, emotions which have nothing to' do with the point under discussi9n (e.g., 54a 26-28, 54b 13-15). It is a ploy unfurtunately too common at all periods of history, particularly in political, legal, and editorial speaking and writing. It is not that the line between legitimare and illegitimate appeal to the emotions is too fine for distinction, but drat the substitution of emotion for reason has the pragmatic value of enabling dre speaker or writer to gain his point with either a weak fabric of reasoning, or, indeed, no reasoning at all. Plato, Rep. 493, makes the point in a strongly negative way. The word neaaOij"a. (e..'CternaI, subsidiary additions; cf. Demosthenes, Olynthiacs 2.14, 3.32) exacdy carches the idea of what A. is criticiZing. We shall see (e.g., 55a 4) drat emotion is a legitimate object of good rhetorical theory and is, in fact, one of the "taTS', which he caIls ••• s7:.a. at 54a 13. 2 01 li. "But they say nothing ..." Most translators interpret this passage and convey the very distinct impression drat somehow the "{a~s,, of 543 13 are enthymemes. In the light of what follows in the chapter, this naturally leads people to conclude that A. is saying effectively in this first thapter drat the only true art of rhetoric is concerned purely and simply wid! the rational demonstration of the problenl under discussion. Yet the structure of the sentence contrasts the I'e. oJ. at of 54" II ("Contemporary technographers, to be sure, have produced a small part of the art, for dre ",ian., alone submit to art") with the at M of 5~ 14 ("On the other hand, they say nothing about the enthymeme, which is the body fur "ia~,,''). There are simply two statements: the technographers present a relatively small part of the art; they say nothing about enthymemes. 3 lveul''lJI'ci....." See 55a 4-7, 550 8, 560 36 - 56b 4·

.v.

a 15 : 1 ...."'" ..ij~ "'{"..."'~ The usual interpretation of this, such as we find in Cope and the English translations, is: the body, or the substance, of proof; e.g., "'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substOlltial proof of the case" (Cope, p. 5). This, of course, means that the proof proper to rhetorical discourse is, for A., only logical and drat it is identified with endlymeme. All other proof, Sllch as the appeal to emotion (",,100,) or character ("100'), becomes indirect and really only accessory ("eoaOii"al),

5""' 15

COMMBNTAllY

9

an accommodatio;' to the limitations of the auditor (see, for example, Cope's remarks throughout his commentary on chap. I, esp. pp. 28-29n3). There is no reason, however, for such a metaphorical use of the word; A. uses it too frequendy in a literal and physical sense as "hody" (see Bonitz, Index, s. v.): that which enfolds, iucorporates. To argue as Cope suggests here, and agaiu later (p. 29), would mean that the critically substantive ",t(m~ of rhetoric is the enthymeme which is the logical, demonstrative proof of the subject matter. This abrupt dismissal of the other two ",l(f"'~ soon to be named (56a 1-4) is not warranted by the text here, or even later, as is done by Spcngd (p. 17); see 5"b 18: z. Furthermore, it simply disregards the explicit statement made shordy later at 54b 21-22 where there can be lime question that A. is speaking of the three entechnic proofS (7}60~, ",d60~, reasoll; on last, see end of 500 I : 3) and that the enthymeme pertains to each (see ~b 21). If anythiug, (f{ijf'Q means: the structure, the frame, which incorporates ",l(fn~, the "corpus probationum"; and if ",l(f"~ is ethical, and emotional, as well as logical, then the enthymeme is the structure which embodies them. A. at the moment does not explaiu how dris is done but the implication is clear: the enthymcme is a rhetorical argument which is organic in character and contains reason, "d60~, and 7}60~. z 'fii'>v l~", TOU "'P~YI''''''o~ This phrase is repeated a number of times in this chapter (5,,", 22; 54b '7-20, which is an explanation of the phrase; 54b 27; 55a 2, 19). [t is correcdy interpreted to mean: those matters extrinsic to the subject of discourse or to the point at issue in the discourse. Most, if not all, interpretations assume that the reference is to the use of if6o~ and ",d60~ (e.g., Spengd, pp. 17£), which are often called "indirect proo£" The reason for this assumption is, presumably, the .:"planatory clause which follows, together with the rest of chap. I. In this interpretation, then, A. would be saying that there is really only one way to prove or demonstrate in rhetorical discourse: namdy, by the use of logical proo£ For example, Cope's comment on this passage reads in part: "Aristode here assurnes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistendy adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject" (p. 6). Pearson in a critical comment on some speeches of Demosthenes justifies his own observation by a similarly restricted interpretation of A. (Demosthenes, p. 63). Such an interpretation create. immediate difficulties: first of all, in this chapter there is the statement at 55a 24-26 (sec 55a 25); secondly, at the beginning of chap. 2, A. acknowledges that if60~ and "d60~ are coequal with reason as the ways of demonstrating in rhetoric; thirdly, he then proceeds through the first two books to devdop his treatise around all three proofs: logical, ethical, emotional. He is quite aware, in other words, that one is always speaking to a person, who is a complexus of rcason, feelings, emotion., and set attitudes; and he says at B I, 77b 21-24: "But since rhetoric is directed to judgment •..

10

ARISTOTLE, cRHETORIC' I

5
it is necessary for the speaker not only to look to the discourse that it be probative and convincing, but also to develop a certain character in himself and in the one deciding." I would say that in his study of Demosthenes Jaeger speaks in a way completely acceptable to A. when he writes: "The new rhetoric gives rise to a psychag6gic consciousness such as the ancient poets themselves had nevet known. . . . This logic of proof is but the servant of a new conscious art of psychologically influencing the listener, and controls all the stops of human emotion with masterly virtuosity" (Demoslhenes, p. 29). In this first chapter there are a number of points which have been overlooked by those who stress the primacy of rational proo£ (a) In the chapter we have an obvious attack upon the misuse of the emotions in rhetorical discourse: namely, the playing upon the emotions in a way which is totally unrelated to the subject under discussion, with the sole intent of conditioning the auditor (e.g., at 540 18, 24). This is bad rhetoric and unacceptable, and we can see what A. has in mind not only from his comments in this chapter but also from Socrates' remarks in Apol. 34b-e, or from the Wasps (975-978) of Aristophanes. (b) A. in this chapter is speaking primarily of judicial rhetoric, a point which is rarely, if ever, noticed (see, for example, his references to dicasts, to the Areopagus, to legal cases in dl'rp'(fP'1TO;;VTO~ at 540 27, and his explicit statements at 54b 26-29, 55a 19-20). In connection with this perspective of A.'s in this chapter, it is interesting to note that Gorgias (Corg. 454b) gives as his fifth and fmal ansWer on the nature of rhetoric that it is the art of persuasion which is found "in law-courts and in other crowds." In legal rhetoric it is not at all difficult to manipulate emotional response with little or no reference- to the subject under discussion, as A. says at 54b ll-33 (see ~o Lycurgus, Againsl Leoerates II-I3, and Isocr., Antidosis 321). On the use of such extraneous emotional appeal, see Radermacher, p. 216. Spengel, pp. II-Il, gives some examples from the Greek orators of lEw TO;; neaYl'aTO,. Cope's reason, such as it is, for speaking of "direct and indirect proofS" is given in his notes (pp. 5-6, 28-29)- together with references m. his [ntrod., p. ISO. a 16: 1 "'p..y".....uOVT..' As Bonitz, Me/4physica, says at 987a 30, "in Aristotle ntet T"O~ "eaYl'aTtVOvTa. is used of one who proceeds in an orderly way and by reason in examining and coming to know something." Thus from the ordinary meaning of "to busy oneself, to engage in business" the word passes into a more technical sense, "to e..umine in a systematic way." In this sense there is a nicely ironic comment on the work of these textbook writers. 2 8'''~OA>i We think, of course, of Socrates' comment in Apol. 28a. ~'aPa.'J.£L" is "to set at variance, set against, discredit"; it reflects the use of reason to stir up the emotions. In itself d.apo).~ is not an emotion;

COMMENTARY

II

it produces an emotion. Demosthenes, On the Crown 3-4. reveals the .ttractiveness of such material to Greek audiences, material which he characterizes at 9 as irrelevancies: .. i~ Uwe •• lOyo,~. Radermacher, p. 216, speaking of the propensity of early Greek rhetoric for emotional material extraneous to the point at issue, remarks: "As a consequence anything prought forward which was foreign to the case in hand is especially called ~,apoA'Ij." Siiss, pp. 245ff., discusses the idea.

...

6L1, ..a-njv These are emotional appeals which are a 17 n.o~ totally extraneous to the issue (0. nsel TOJ "'eal'l'aro~), similar to what Socrates describes in the Apol. 38d-e or to Aeschines' comment in his work Against Ctesiphotl 205-206. As we saw in 5.... 15 : 2 and will see in what foliows in the Rhetoric, there are appeals to >}80~ and "a80~ which are quite de£nite1y ",sel TO;; "eal'l'aTO~. It is quite incorrect to say without any qualification that "Appeals to the feelings .re lEw TO;; "edl'l'aTO~ ... intended to bias and pervert ... judgment" (Cope, p. 7).

The dl here introduces a very slight antitha 21-22 ot!LEv ..• ot 6. esis and carries the idea of TS ••• "ai: i.e., "theoretically men believe that the l.ws should so declare, and further in practice they exclude discussion of such material." On the Areopagus see: MacDowell, the OCD, a 23 Ev 'Apdcp ",ciycp and Hignett. We know from Lysias, Against Simon 46, that A. is apparently describing accepted procedure in this court. Yet a glance at the speeches of Lysias before the Areopagus does not lead one to think that the roleo of "aeo~ and >}80~ were neglected, in spite ofQuintilian'o remark "quia Athenis aifectus movere etiarn per pr.econem prohibebatur orator" (rnst. orat. 6.1.7), which Spengel suggests may refer to the Areopagus. A. is speaking of the ordinary juror who would be a 24 : 1 6LXlla·"'jv found in an Athenian court. Socrates makes the point vividly and concisely in Apol. 35a--
ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

12

passages are wually cited as confirmation that all emotional appeal is occasioned by the sorry nature of the audience. Quintilian (Insl. o,al. 5-I) puts the matter well in his comment that some distinguished men think that the we of emotion prevents access to the truth. a 2S 3f100'OV yc.p xiiv ei ,,11.. = cr;"is for leal 11.', in which a. goes with a verb understood, such as ,.o.?j"... : i.e., "for one would indeed act similarly [81'0'0', as an adverb ofmanner] should one make .••" (see Eucken, De Amlolelis dicenJi raliolle, p. 61). Cope, p. 9, explains at length and somewhat

differently. a 27: 1 C.fIoCP.a(a'l,
r

UTa"",

in a non-technical sense." See Bonitz, Illdex, s.v.; see also the use of dnodBi'~a, at S4b 30. a 2S-30 0'< •.•. 5,wp'x€V The specification here is explained more fully in ssb s - S9a 26. Once again, however, these lines (particularly the words dl"",U). "fl1.d."o.; see ssb 26) and the following section, s4b, indicate the burden of A.'s concern in this chapter: namciy, judicial rhetoric, where the intent of the law Can be easily subverted by a clever speaker wing material not pertinent to the issue as defined by the law; c£ 54a IS : 2.

a 32 Ke'fIoEvou~ vOfloouS On " ..,<78",. ("to be fixed, established") as convertible with the passive of nO';.a" see Cope, p. 10; for both words together, see 76b IS. As we can see from Pol. I272b S-7, I2S6a 17-20, A. considers good law safer than rule by man.

a 33

m!

a 34: 1

2

of place: "resting upon," and, so, "within the power o£" Xa.L p~OV

'lor"; used to

link

alternatives, see Denniston, p. 292.

sc. J"n.

54b 1 l0flo08£,
COMMENTAlIY

13

between the two ideas is maintained in the second part of this sentence by .01'086<1la, (54b 2) and "el<1"~ (54b 3). It is developed in 54b 3-1 I to stress the fact that the judgment of the juryman, as opposed to that of the lawmaker, is a judgment conditioned (a) by the need to give animmediate (eE ~"o""io,,) decision on a specific incident, a procedure which can jeopardize justice and the better course of action, and (b) by personal feelings and personal interests. At 54b 16-20 A. declares in a more explicit way that because of the manner in which they compose their treatises the technographers encourage this bad kind of decision-making. At 60a 30-37 A. speaks briefly on legislation. more correctly: ~oy,$ov; "on the spur of the b 3 : 1 ':'",.yu{ou moment, offhand." Cope, p. II, in his study of the use of the word and of the explanations of scholiasts suggests that its root "",•• (limb) would mean in composition (e.g. ~"."",••): '''under the hand', as an unfinished or just finished work ... and lE ~"o""I.v, 'from under the hand', corresponds to our 'off-hand ' .... Similarly ex x"eo~ ... 'off-hand '." Z ..",.I;'86"u, "to assign, or give, what is due"; c£ 56a IS. As Trendelenberg, Elementa, p. 99, says: "it means properly reddere." Cope, pp. II - I2, has an extensive note on the word. J "'0 &b.u,OII ... ClUIlq> Since the lawmaker's concern is with the future and with a general situation, he can look to the common good objectively. Some codd. make this point stronger by adding the words .liTS "oel TW. "aeon.,. (apparently by way of explanation) after o~ "aTa I'ie';, This addition then sets the whole .phrase in contrast to 54b 7-8, nBel. ... "e lv01Ja,,,. b 7 lIli"/) Cope, pp. 13-14, presents a copious 'note with examples on this particle, together with the related particles of time, 0;;"." 0~'''T&. Briefly we can say that 116'1/ as indicating time is used to emphasize the present moment, to mark the present moment as particularly important: "actually, forthwith,

14

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

immediately." In our passage, for example: "are actually making a judgment on specific problems of the moment." See the word again at 54b 8. b 8 ",po~ oG~ i.e., the ecdesiast and dicast: "with respect to whom, in whose case." Something of what. A. has in mind here can be seen in his comments at 72a 17-21. This reading of the major codd. is accepted by the b 9 ""~"ilp1]"'Cl' edd. (save Ross and Kassd), Spengd, and Cope, and by Van Straaten & De Vries (p. 141). With this reading, by means of a dubious interpretation of av.a'e_r., we tranSlate: "In their regard both personal likes •.. are taken into account." Ross and Kassd (for the latter's reason, see Der Text, pp. II9f.) read av.~eT7JTal. Cope, p. "4, considers this more probably correct. The context does demand a verb with a meaning which is better represented here by av.aeTa",. With this reading we translate: "in their regard both personal likes •.. are often ~volved." b Io-II e. ........ AU"I1:1]pciv There are two results stated: (a) that they (ecdesiast and die.st) are not able to discern the truth (see SS. 22 : t) adequately, and (b) that personal pleasure or grief darkens their act ofjudging. See Pol. 1287a 4Iff. Used metaphorically: "to throw darkness over." b II l""cnconiv See hocr. To Demon;clIs 7, On the Peace 10; Oem., 01. 2.20. A. has not formally identified these. Prom what he has b 12 cD.Aw~ said from 54a 16 to 54b II, they would indude anything, particularlyemotional appeals, not direcdy concerned with the actual fact past, present, or po~tially future, and its agreement or disagreement with the prescriptions set down by the law; see also TcLU.a at 54b 17 where the meaning is made more definite (54b 17-20) but in no way different from the general advice of 54" r6 - 54b II. The speaker must direct his attention to the factual evidence and not to conditioning the juror emotionally. Obviously so since, as he has told us, the nomothetes b 16 : 1 'ltpO'5Eiv looks not to the particular instance but to a general problem. Thus we have the question of equity; see 74a 26 - 74b 23 and 748 26 : 1. 2 El 51j We have here a general condusion which assumes that the preceding analysis is really and truly such as it has been presented. The 6·~ is resumptive; Spenge!, p. 17, cites a number of examples of this usage in A. Ross, alone among the edd., reads d M. ~Il., ..oii "'PcZYI'oCl..o~ See S48 IS : Z. Z 5,opll;ou..,v to mark off, separate a thing from others by setting down its essential cbara=istic, and so "to define." Prom what we mow (see following note), the word here probably includes more than simple

b 17:

1

COMMBNTARY

15

definition and extends to a discussion of each part of a speech and of what belongs to it. In r '3, 14' ]Iff., A. discusses the parts of a b 18 : 1 npoo{jLLOV speech, which he identifies as basically two in number: statement and demonstration. He speaks disparagingly of "the divisions now in use." While insisting on his two parts A. admits the possibility offour (r '3, 14b 8-9): (a) exordium (neooll"o,); (b) statement of case (neo9.a,~) or narrative (d,~y'l"'~) - Cope, Introd., p. 333, reviews the difference between the two, such as it is; (c) proof (nl(rn~); (d) peroration (l"lloyo~). A. continues the analysis of these in chaps. 13 through 19 of Book Three. This fourfold division has been identified as Isocrates'. Plato in Phaedr. 266d-e speaks of such parts as neoo',.uov, a,.qY1}a", J.'aeT:Ve,a" el"&T4, nlaT:wut" inmtuTwuu;. Endless divisions and subdivisions of a speech are to be found among rhetorical theorists; Cope, Introd., p. 333, presents some of them. See also Radermacher, pp. 34-35, '33, 209, 213-15. 2 -rWy cD.Awv "'ClIJTOY jLOpu..y Spengel, p. '7, on this passage indic2tes clearly that he (like Cope) considers the use of ~90~ and na90~ as lEw ~o. nedYf'a~o~ and that the only real n{aT<~ for A. can be "ex re ipsa." However, see following note and SSa 4b 21 lvTixy'"'Y "(""''''''Y These are usually identified (e.g., Cope, p. 16) as the two kinds of proof which A. develops in the Rhetoric: enthymeme (syllogism or argument by deduction) and example (argument by induction). There are a number of difficulties with this interpretation, however. (a) The use of "ia~..~ 1.~.X"o, makes one, as we are told, b8vl''1l'a·...,6~, skilled in the enthymeme. This is a very strange statement for A. to make if he intends to include example, as he certainly should, if the interpretation is correct. The interpretation beconles even stranger when we leam that he has a word, and a word peculiar to him, for a speaker's use of examples, "aead.'YI'~,;,a'l~ (56b 21-27). and that he employs it precisely by way of contrast to i.9Vf''1I'an"ci~. (b) From this line to 55a 20 (which is practically the end of the first chapter)', A. is talking only of the enthymeme and of argument by enthymeme; nor from 55a 20 to the end of the chapter does he say anything of significance about example. (c) Finally, A. explains at 55a 10-14 how he understands 1.9vl''1l'aT<''o~ and the "-,
16

ARISTOTLE, 'RBETOllIC' [

that whatever the nIClT"~ tvu%"o. are they are closdy rdated to the enthymeme since by using them one becomes "skilled in the enthymeme"; see ssa 4. C£ Appendix.

b 22 'Tij~ ..6Tij~ ....... Otl&au At sSb 6-S A. divides all rhetorical discourse into three classes, judicial, deliberative, and epideictic, a division which is not mentioned here. In saying without qualificati<m that the technique (methodology) for rhetorical discourse is the same in two of these classes A. declares that the art of rhetorical discourse ("eayl'aT.ia~, s4b 25) consists of certain principles and implies that it can be used in all three kinds ofrhetoric. In confirmation of this explanation it is to be noted that at the end of this chapter (at ssb 8-21) he returns to the comparison between rhetoric and dialectic made in the opening lines. This cyclical structuring indicates that A.'s intent in the Rhetonc is a study of the fundamental principles of the art, a study of the genetalmethodology which constitutes the technique of good discourse. As he remarks at the end ofchap. I (ssb22£), "Let us now attempt an account of the method." Ifhe is successful, by the end of the treatise we should have an analysis of all the dements necessary for rhetorical discourse. As a matter of fact, by the end of the introductory chaps. 1-3 all these essentials will have been announced in some detail, save for the study of arrangement and style found in Book Three. more becoming the obligations, responsib 24: 1 1ta>"""""'TEP"~ bilities, sense of duty, of the citizen, the one whose concern is directed to d,e larger interests of the city-state and the common good of all the citizens. Thucydides catches this concept, which underlies "o).
COMMBNTARY

I7

b 25 CNVaO.Aci:y"'...... Cf. 76b 12; the word refers to conrraCts, transactions, business dealings between individuals which can result in a law suit even when mutually agreed to, and obviously do should they involve deception of some sort. Cope, pp. I6-17, discusses av.&.uaypa, avv8>i"'l, avfJ'pOAaloo. On contract see Jones, chap. 12; for general information on the law of property, see Harrison, Vol. [, Part IT. See also EN II3Ia I-9. b 26 &,xcr.~ccrO .., [f this is true, the effort of all the writers of technical treatises on rhetoric was directed to the fidd of judicial rhetoric, a view also expressed by boer., Ag. Sophists I9-20. We do know that A. made a collection of rhetorical treatises in his Synagog. Technon and so should know whereof he speaks; furthermore, his citations in the Rhetoric from the rhetorical writers are fairly wide-ranging. Phaedr. 266d - 267e speaks of such books as our text mentions at 54b I7Jf. Aside from the work called the Rhetoric to Alexander we do not possess any of these handbooks in complete form. The work of Theodectes (co. 375-334 B.C.), one of the mOre notable writers on the snbject, is quite inaccessible to us save through a reconstruction from A. We have the work of Alcidamas (11. 4th century B.C.), On the Sophists, but it cannot be considered his Finally, the Rhetoric to Alexantler, accepted by many as that of the technographer Anaximenes (ca. 380-320 B.C.) - but see Grube, pp. I56Jf. - appears on internal evidence to follow, not precede, A:s Rhetoric (see Stlldie5, pp. 75ff.). Radermacher contains the available remains of the preAristotelian treatises. Kennedy, pp. 52Jf., discusses early rhetorical theory. Chroust discusses A:s early work on rhetoric in Vol. [, chap. 8 and Vol. n, chaps. I-3. On Alcidamas, Theodectes, and Anaximenes, see Studies, pp. 72.-82.

d".".

b 27 ..po ifpyou ordinarily written: "eoveyo,,; "serving for, toward, a work; serviceable; useful, helpful to the matter in hand"; c£ 59a 36, 59b I6. b 28 ij.....6" ... xllKo\ipyoy "a less harmful instrument." For the neuter predicate adjective as equivalent to a substantive, see S. 1048. The verb xaxoveyi., catches the flavor of the word here: "to falsify, corrupt"; see r 2, 04b 38; Plato, Gorg. 483a. b 29 XD'''O''CP'''' i.e., pertaining more to the public, general interest, to the concerns of the State (-rd "0 •••0). [have since noted that Bonitz, Index 399a 56-58, would agree with this interpretation. There is a problem in the codd. with Bn "o ..oneop read by the edd. and Cope. Kasse!, the most recent editor, prefers dA).d "o .. ,lTseo., as did Spenge!, but then brackets the whole clause .t 54b 28-29 (;cal 'lj"nop .•. "o ..oneop) mosrlyon the grounds that it does not make sense in the context (Der Text, pp. 120£). Whether his arguments, which are reasonable, should lead to seclusion is questionable. In fact, [ am not sure that there is any need to change the more commouly .ccepted lin xo •••neo" which makes sense in the context.

18

ARISTOTLE, 'RHEIORIC' I

b 29-30 "P'T7)~ ... "plv., Spengel cites as a parallel reference B I, 77b 26-78a I (see 541> 3I for the same passage). But 77b 26ff.isnotsaying the same thing as A. is saying here. In 77b 26ff. A. is stating the necessity of "dBo, and if8o~ in rhetorical discourse. This reads as though A. were b 30-3 I 4"08.,1;"" ... CJU!L~ou)..uo>v concerned simply with the strict logical proof of the issue, as many interpret him (see 548 IS : 2). But to take the statemellt here as another instance of A.'s conviction that the only proof is logical proof and not as yet another instance of an expanded statement against an unwarranted play on the audience's emotions leaves one confronting not only difficulties such as those already noted (e.g., 548 IS : 2) but a statement such as "that at 55a 24-26: "Precise knowledge will not readily produce conviction." b 31 li,x",v,"o,~ On the Athenian legal system, see Bonner & Smith. The contrast which A. draws here (54b 2!}-34) between deliberative and forensic rhetoric is theoretically sound. Obviously it is again part of the attack on the misuse of the emotions which A. so readily sees in legal oratory. But as a criticism it labors under the burden of being an overstatement. Where we can make a comparison - e.g., in the civil suits ofLysias (forensic rhetoric) and the speeches of Demosthenes before the Athenian Assembly (deliberative rhetoric) - we can see that both use argument.tion legitimately involving the personal feelings of the hearers. And A. would not be surprised at all with such argumentation, as we can see in his statement at B " 77b 2178a 5. Furthermore, from the statement at 54b 28-29 it is difficult to understand how anyone can be as certain, as Cope, p. ,8, is, that there is a real difference between a modern juryman and an Athenian dieast, and that the Athenian was more susceptible to emotionally distorted argument. b 32 «VatA"'~.i" "To win over" is a legitimate translation (see LS, IV) of the word here. But it is also clear evidence that A. is pushing the polemic which we find in this first chapter. The attempt of anyone who uses rhetoric is surely "to win over" in the correct sense. The speeches of Demasthenes and the writings of Isocrates clearly show that there is no difference in general in the nature of one's audience, be they dieasts, ecclesiasts, simple auditors, or readers. reflexive pronoun (lavTCii.) used in the genib 33 n:po~ ..o 116";;;,. tive with the article to form a noun-phrase (see S. II53d): "with a view to their 01VIJ interests." b 34 &,&c\",a, sc. 'av"o.~; c£ Aeschines in Ti",arc!Jus, r75-8r. In '75 he makes, Demosthenes claim to do this very thing; 177--78 throw light on the statement of our text at 54' 32 - 54b 8.

COMMENTARY

19

ssa 2 dnO(.LEV This reading is accepted by Roemer, Kassd, Spengd, and Cope. The reading of the better codd. and the one accepted by Dufour, It is more usual for A. to use the plural when he Tovar, and Ross is refers to something already said (as here he refers to 54a I8-21); see, for example, 56a 31. See Bonitz, Index 589.2I-38. Roberts ("Notes," 354) prefers and considers it one of the two exceptions to the general Aristotdian rule.

.In...

.In..

a 4 lV'<EJ(vo~... "'CJ't"E'~ A restatement of 54a 13, this should also be taken with 54b 21. These passages contain the first three instances of the word ",laTS'~ in the Rlre/oric, and in each it is connected with enthymeme and with some form of the word €.... x•• ~. These three passages, together with s5b 35-37, 56b 32, O4a 16, and SE 172a 34-36, constitute the few places in which we find "T'XVO~ employed by A. In each of the first three instances in the Rhetoric, lVT'XV.~ appears in a context in which the word suggests a technique (method) for statement by means of the art of rhetoric. Thus at 54a 13, the ",laT"~ alone bdong to the art, i.e., are subject to systematic treatment. At 54b 2I, technographers do not explain the "laTE'~, which are the things which submit to the Tix.'1 of rhetoric. At 55a 4. the methodology which bdongs to the art is concerned with the ",taTE'~. Since we have already seen (at S4b 2I) part of the problem connected with the meaning of ",laT._ it is appropriate to state here that A. uses ",taT£~, ",laT"~ in three different meanings in the Rhetoric, a fact which writers on the Rhetoric regularly fail to notice: see, for example, note 3 on the opening page of the Oxford translation of the Rhetoric (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [Il). W. Rhys Roberts, the translator, is much more precise in his comments in "Notes:' 352-53. We meet the three different meanings in the first three chapters. ",laT'~ can mean: (a) the state of mind called conviction or bdief which is produced by a reasoned statement (this is usually a verb form - e.g., at 55a 5 - but it also appears as a noun - e.g., at 67b 29); (b) a technical method used by a person to organize the material of an argument into a form of logical statement which will more readily create in a listener the state of mind called conviction - i.e., meaning (a). In this sense ",taT._ means enthymeme (the process of deduction) and example (the process of induction). This meaning can be seen clearly at 55a 5-6 where ",laT._ is a demonstrative process of some kind, and at 56b 6-8, and 58a I; ,ee also B 20, 93a 23-25 where we are told that there are generally two kinds of ",laT6I;: enthymeme and example. In All. Pro 68b 9-14 there is a very interesting use of "laT" where, from the paralldism with O'1IUol',af'&" it must mean an inferential process of some kind;

2.0

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [

(c) evidentiary material of a specifically probative character wirb respect to rbe subject matter. If this material is used correctly, it brings about in the futener the state of mind called belief or conviction. This third meaning is usually the meaning when A. speaks of "{(1<"~ as entechnic and .technic (e.g., at 55b 35). A. finds this material fur conviction in rbree specific areas which he identifies at 56a rff.; they are called oJ8o~, ,,&8o~, and reason (on the last, see 56& 3 : 3). "taT'~ in the expression ,,{a,.. ~ "
55a8

21

COMMENTARY

demonstrating something by the deductive method. As we see here. the enthymeme is a "kind of syllogism." O"V.uoy.a!,.~ '" (55a 8). The enthymeme is the fonn of rhetorical argumentation which. as we know from the opening section of this chapter (54a II-16). previous technographers have failed to discuss. A more detailed explanation of the enthymeme will be given at 56a 35f£ Wemustnotethatthephraseat55a5-6. TOTS yae ., . .moUP"'!' ••• cannot be properly understood without attending to 56a 34 - 56b II where we learn that for A. there are only two ways by which anything is demonstrated: deduction (this. in rhetoric. is the E.O,s!''1!,a. "the syllogism" of rhetoric) and induction (this is ''''e/M.,y!'a or example). A. speaks primarily of the deductive method here, and indeed the larger part of the treatise centers upon the study of the enthymeme. B 20 is the one section formally given over to example.

n,

This is para1leled by "".uoy,a!,o, (55a 8). and a S d'l1:oIiELIi(~ "L~ what is said about the latter is valid here. an.a •••" usually means the scientific syllogism in A. (e.g.• Top. lOOa '-7-"1.9. An. Post. 73a 24). but he also uses the word for false syllogism (An. Pr. 55a 4) - namely. that which leads to the is his more usual word (see Waitt. p. 295. of his absurd - for which commentary on An. Post.). A. also uses the word to mean demonstration by sign (Top. r67b 9). Common to the word. but not exclusive to it, is the idea of demonstration by syIIogism. e.g., An. Pro 2sb 30£: "Demonstration [lin&a...,,] is a kind of syllogism. but not all syllogism is demonstration," Here in our passage, consequendy. he is qualifying ",an, (lj di n'aT', lin.d ..Et, n,) as a kind of demonstrative process which is syllogistic in character.

d.,<"

a 5--<5 (..O..E

•••

l'""o>.ci~"'f.Lev)

parentheses read by edd.

"general1y speaking"; on linlw, see 56a 7. a 7 : 1 cl>~ ElnEiv d.u.... ~ On the absolute in£nitive. the use of which is common in A.• see S. 20U. Kassel brackets 55a ']-8. "a. [an . .. "'aTS"'., read by the other odd,. Spengel. and Cope; he gives no reason. a xupu:..." ..ov Cpo 56a 13. together with the note. A syllogism is a form of inference COD.SlStmg a 8 cru),),oYLaf.LO~ .",~ of two propositions called premisses and a conclusion. There are many types of this inferential process and A. studies them in detail in his Prior Analytics. A sinIple form of the structure would be: all men are mortal; John is a man; John is mortal. Although A.'s authorship of the syllogism (inference by deduction) is disputed. there can be no question that he alone (as far as the evidence is in hand) developed it as an instrument of logic, together with induction, as the methodology whereby we move toward a more detailed knowledge of the world of reality. Here in the Rhetoric A. introduces this method of demonstration into the field of rhetoric, In fact, he will build all

22

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

the basic elements which for him constitute the art of rhetoric into this technique of deductive and inductive inferential reasoning. In itself this is another indication that for A. rhetoric is basically a reasoned and rational endeavor. Thus his distress, as we have seen, at all efforts which dismiss or neglect the role of reason. Throughout the Rhetoric A. identifies enthymeme as a sylle>gismo He stresses the identification when, in explaining enthymcrne at s6b 16/f., he employs the formula for his definition of syllogism as found in An. Pr. 24b 18-26 and Top. 1000 2Sff., r6sa r£ Certainly we are not to think of "syllogism" here as meaning strict scientific demonstration (the demonstration of the absolutely true) any more than we are to think of dn.d"EI~ at ssa 5-6 in such a way. A. clearly indicates that for him "syllogism" has a much wider extension and is a form for a variety of deductive reasonings (c£ API. Pro 2sb 26-3 I). Top. 162a IS/f. illustrates this well in its enumeration of types of syllogism: 'P,loaorpTffJa (the scie11tific syllogism), hr.''l.8IeTffJa (dialectical sylIe>gism), aorp'''fJa (eristic syllogism). To this enumeration we can now add ill86fJTffJa (rhetorical syllogism; c£ also s6b 4-5). See 56b 5 : 1. In a recentsrudy of rhetoric, The Prospect of Rhetoric, there is an intriguing comment on this matter: "In centuries past when dialectic and rhetoric were closely allied, speakers felt their reasoning ought to meet the tests of strict deductive and inductive inference. The feeling persists in modem text books on rhetoric. It now appears to be mistaken and outmoded" (.Bitzer & .Black, p. IS). While the author does not verify the st.tement, wh.t he does go on to say (name!y, that the logic of discourse involves more than mere reason) is precisely what A. himself is saying in the Rhetoric. "9 ' the difficulty with that interpret.tion, for surely the Analyties, not the Topics, analyzes the syllogism. Others acknowledge that the word also refers to the AIl.lyties, particularly to the Prior Analyties. In the light of our passage, this last explanation is preferable not only for the reason just given but for two others: (a) if with the commentators we take Aorl"otl~ <11I.uor'''fJo6~ (ssa 13-r4) as scientific demonstration (as is reasonable from the context of ssa 14-18), then ,l.aA8"T'''~ must be taken in the more inclusive sense; (b) s6a 3S - S6b 21 is cited by Dionysius of Halicamassus almost verbatim (Bpistula ad AJnmaeum I 73off.), and he reads d'aAvn"oi~ .t s6a 36 instead of the dlaA8"n"oi~ found in the codd. and accepted by the edd., Spenge!, and Cope. At s6a 30 where A. speaks of rhetoric as fI.el •• TI T~~ dlaAB,....I"~~. the word "dialectic" is being used in its stricter sense; for the meaning there, see 568 30 : z.

55a 18

COMMBNTAI\Y

23

a 10 S;y.ov S' 3.. , This is the reading of the best caddo and ofOufour and Kassel. The other edd., Spengel, and Cope either omit or seclude ai. Our phrase here begins the consequence of a long series of statements (55" 3-10) which connect "tan,-a"od..~"-i.8,s~''1pa-r1VAAo'Y,apo>-a,,,)...... T'''~. For this reason I would read ai, and interpret it as apodotic: "Consequently it is clear ..." On the possibility of apodotic di, see 64a 8-9; Cope, p. 20, accepts the possibility, and gives a large number of instances of it. an: I be .. Iv,"", i.e., the subject matter of the statements used in the syllogism. Z "iiiS the variow ways in which a syllogism can be formed. J x ..1lv8uI''lJI'....'xos The "at is adverbial; on ••8,sP'1pa, c£ 54A 15 : I, 54b 21.

a 12.-18 "poaA.. j3wv ... 4....'v This passage should be read with care. The clawe immediately preceding (55a I()-U) indicates that in form enthymemes are syllogisms. Here we read that enthymemes have subject matter peculiar to thern ("Bel "o.a) and have some differences (unspecified) from what are called "logical syllogisms." In the light of 55a 14-18 the "logical syllogisms" are understood to be "scientific syllogisms," or syllogisms the object of which is exact truth, knowledge, scientific certainty. But in accepting such a difference between rhetorical and logical syllogisms we should not set up a sharp cleavage between the true and the probable as though probability had little or no relation to truth, and then conclude that rhetorical reasoning is not concerned with truth. In a matter of a few lines (55a 21£) A. will defend the wefulness of rhetoric on the ground that it helps truth and justice to prevail. It is more likely, therefore, that the clawe 55' 14-18 affirms the close relation between enthymeme and logical syllogism because the intellect constructs both in its effort to arrive at what is the truth in a given case, or the truth asJa' as it ,an be discerned. As A. says at 55a 17-18: "The ability to aim skillfully at probabilities belongs to the man who is equally able to aim skillfully at the truth." There is no reason to believe that A. in his Rhetori' has shifted from the view that "All men by nature desire to know" (Met. 9800 I) and that "Every man has some contribution to make to the truth" (BE m6b 31). a 16 : I ".'Pux..cnv See 6rb II : 1. z d. "Ad... the adverbial use of TO "Ato. with the plural form for the more common singular; it is translated: "for the most part." a 17 O'''C'0xuCJ-r1.xw,; lxE1V "to be skillful in aiming at"; we see the verb form at 60b 5 and 62a '5.

a 18 "ou 61'01... S l)(ov,,
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

ssa 21

both ..doEa and &l>l0 ••ay, i.e., "alike, equally able": "And therefore the ability to aim skillfully at probabilities belongs to the man who is equally able to aim skillfully at the truth." Plato, at Pha,Jr. 273d 2-{i, says practically the same thing. In other words, the same faculty (doS_a/"" 5sa IS) is engaged in both operations: "Logicae peritus ad Rhetoricam aptior est." The force of "at in "al "Ild; n)y &l>l0.,a_ must be righdy grasped. We have here a condensed comparison which must be filled out: e.g., "al (I1Toxaanxw; Ix ...) "Ild, n). &1>10.. a_; see S. 1501. This is a transitional pi• • J. used ror summing up a 19 : I I'£V ow befOre beginning the new idea at ssa 21; see Denniston, p. 4-72. z 'rei ~Ii'" 'raU "pci.YI''''ro~ See 54-a IS : z. Perhaps the best explanation of this phrase is "irrelevancies"; as should be clear by now, such irrelevancies included for A. emotional appeals unrelated to the point at issue (e.g., imprecations, charges against a person's life: ,1ryxo; TO;; (il.v) and a concern with the technique and technicalities of speech structure, which Isocrates also challenges in Hele" 7ff., Ag. Sophists 9-10. a 20 : I SuS.., Cope, p. 21, takes this as: an = "thae." and gives extensive literary evidence of this use. In A., in fa!'t, the use of d,an for Ifn is not rare, and at times d,aT' is used for Bn when "al precedes, as here (see Bonitz, Inrlex, s.v.). But here it seems more correct to take d,on in its usual sense of "why." A. says that it is clear that others engage in presenting irrelevantmateriaI. and it is clear "'hy they favor judicial oratory (see 54-a IS : .); indeed he actually gave some reasons at 54-b 22-34- for the favor shown toward judicial oratory and he may possibly have that in mind here. z cl"o~.",uX""t The verb means: "turn away from (other obj~cts) toward one"; and so we have: "incline to, turn toward." 3 S"COAOY"~ Clearly here: judicial rhetoric; c£ 54b I, 54b 26. a 211£. XP>\"'I'O~ S. lG'rt~ A. begins the conclusion of this first chapter by giving reasons why the art of rhetoric is important to man. Along the way he insists on the close relation between rhetoric and dialectic and therefore repeats the opening statement of the treatise. This repetition indicates that for A. rhetoric is an exercise of the intellect, and gives the reason for his strong criticism of those who reduce the art to emotional chicanery. This eminendy practical justification for the art is the one formal effort of A.' s in this regard which we possess. It is repeated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his Ep. ad Amm. 1729-730 and referred to by later rhetoricians (for evidence, see Spengel, pp. 2.3f£). A's apology for rhetoric is a fourfold answer to the criticism of Plato. We should compare the defense with that of Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of the same name (456-457), and that of !socrates in Antid. 249-2.50, 297-305. Both contain statements similar to A.'s

55a 23

COMMBNTARY

25

at 55b :df. on the misuse of the art (see also Isoer., Nicoc/es 1-9). Plato's art of rhetoric should also be consulted since A. would in no way take issue with the position staced there. See also Cic., De oral. I.46.202, D. inv. I.3-4.

PhtreJr. 272b - 278a on the true

a 2 I : 1 xpoJja,p.o~ an adjective of two or three endings, each of which appears in A.' s writings. 2 Su' 'l"e •.. lv..v...u.w To this first reason are added others at 55a 29 and 55a 38, as well as a general defense of rhetoric at 55b 2.

a 22: 1 ..aA'I)8ij x ..l 'l"& Six.. ,.. The first reason for the usefulness of rhetoric clearly connects the art of discourse with truth (see also 54b IO, 55a I7-18, 3I-38). If truth and justice, which in themselves are superior realities, fail to realize themselves in the decisions of men, the failure is that of rhetoric. This is particularly so since, as we shall see in chap. 3, rhetoric has as its goal just such decisions on the part of the auditor. Although Roberts leans strongly toward this relation between rhetoric and truth in our work, he is obviously not fully certain, as his strange, unsubstantiated statement shows: "In the body of the work fallacious arguments are, without comment, supplied to the reader as freely as legitimate ones" (UNotes," 351). The purpose of rhetoric for A. is to guard against the very thing which Euripides speaks about: "Time and again a man, even though he speaks what is just, caught by a lade of eloquence gains less than the glib-tongued man" (Alexalldros, frg. 56, ed. Nauck). In our passage A. makes a dose connection between truth and its correct articulation in language qnite similar to the statement of the Tix.~ TOO' i.&YOJ' in Phtredr. 260d 3-9. Indeed, Diiring's position (pp. 132-34) that the background against which our work was written is Plato's Phtredrus would further underline this stress on truth in the Rhetoric. Isocrates' comment in Antid. 255 is another way of expressing this relation: "The most substantial index of sound thinking is the proper use oflanguage." 2 x"'l"& TO 7I:p0crijxov .0 "eoa1j"o, is that whiclr is proper, fitting, seemly; and it is such primarily because it is that which belongs to, or concerns, something or someone. See Gorg. 507a. is the reading ofchecodd. and is accepted by three of the a 23 S,' ldJ"';;v edd. of the critical texts, by Spengel, and by Cope in his text and commentary. There are two exceptions to be found in the two most recent critical editions: i.e., Ross following Bywater reads d.' aVTOO.; Kassel follows Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ep. ad Amm. 1729), who excerpted this passage of the Rhetoric. But, instead of the 6.'aVTO. of the codd. ofDionysius, Kassel reads &' aVTo., as does Roberts (Dionysius, p. 63). Both Ross (6,' aVT';;.) and Kassel (6,' ailT&') rellect in their readings a common interchange in the codices of A. between the rellexive and the definite pronouns. However, we must remem-

26

ARISTOTLE, tRHBTORIC' I

55a 23

ber that breathings and accents, like punctuation, are operative dements of interpret2tion, and reflect what someone thought A. meant. In this particular instance it would seem that the reading of d,e codd., d,' represents more corr«dy wh.t A. meant to say, and we should attempt to undentand it. Furthermme. Kassd's explanation (Der Text. p. 12I) for his reading is not coovincing and is answered in what follows. Our problem, then, is to determine whether aUr.,. or aVr.,. better represents whst A. possibly said. To avoid confusion in what follows, no breathing will be placed over avr.,•. There are two major difliculties in 55a 21-24: (a) What is the subject of 'ljrraaOa,? and (b) To what does avr.,. refer? Inanelfort to resolve the prol>lems, which are quite important for what A. is saying about rhetoric, let us put this initial question:Wh.t does the sentence at 55a 21-24 assert? In reply we find dut: (a) first, it makes a single statement: rhetoric is useful because truth and justice are naturally stronger than their opposites, i.e., untruth and injustice; and (b) secondly, it states the necessary consequence of this: if judgments are not made as they should be, something is necessarily defeated; (e) it passes a value judgment on the consequence. Looking at 55a 21-24, and without prejudicing a final decision, one must insist that from A.' s statement the usefulness of rhetoric is somehow tied to the superiority of truth and justice. Whatever may follow from this rel.tion, the fact is iliat the relation associates the usefulness of rhetoric with the natural superiority of truth and justice. This brings us to the first question about the subject of nrrau/la.. There is a threefold possibility. (a) Some say that the subject is "the speaken"; Bywater (arId so -presumably Ross), for e.'tample, introduces the reflexive av.,..,. to refer "back to the implied subject of nTIaa8a" i.e., the speakers or pfeaden." But we should reasonably expect a word like all.,..,. to refer to something within the sentence or, at least, within its logical vicinity. However, the only referent in A.'s ee.'
a.iT.,.,

55a 23

COMMENTARY

27

practitioners. (b) The structure of the Greek might suggest "etu.., as the subject of 7jniiu8a.. But, in addition to offering little sense, it leaves a problem as to what avTC;;. could possibly refer to. (e) Some say (and others - e.g., Victorius and Spengd - imply) that the subject of 7jmiu8a. is truth and justice. This view seems quite correct. When we turn to the second problem - i.e., to what does aVTeO. refer? - we are faced with three possibilities. But the second and third really coalesce into a single logicial enunciation, and after stating them separatdy I shall present them jointly. (a) Some maintain that the referent is the "speakers." (b) The second possibility is "Utu", I-'7J "aTa Td nuouij"." Le., bad judgments. (e) The third, and correct, possibility is TeO. l.a.Tlw. (55a 22), i.e., untruth and injustice. Victorius originally suggested that TeO. iva•• l",. was the referent, and once again, as in other instances, he was to the point - Cope, p. 23, notwithstanding. Truth and justice can be necessarily defeated only by their opposites: namdy, untruth and injustice. In our passage this is done through the instrumentality of bad judgments. A. assumes that judgments should properly ("aTa Td nuou;;"••) express truth. If they do not do so in a given instance, then the untruth which they express necessarily destroys trutlt itsel£ Truth and justice are de facto destroyed by bad judgments. But what necessarily destroys truth and justice is the untruth and ;,yustice which take their place in the judgment. Bad judgments are the instrument by which the naturally superior (truth and justice) are necessarily defeated by their inferiors (untruth and injustice). The agent responsible for permitting the bad judgments is • rhetoric which does not achieve its perfection as rhetoric, and thus fails to realize its usefulness. And so 55a 21-24 should be translated: "Rhetoric is useful because truth and justice are naturally stronger than their opposites; and so, if judgments are not made as they should be, it follows necessarily that truth and justiCe are defeated by their opposites [untruth and injustice]. And this merits censure." Implicit in this statement, and worthy of note, is that rhetoric prevents us from making wrong judgments, and in doing so it protects truth and justice. To defend the usefulness of rhetoric on this ground, as A. does, is to attribute to rhetoric an important and significant position. Forwhat A. is quite pointedly saying is th.t rh,toric is mimesis and that it is supposed to re-present the real (i.e., truth and justice) in any situation for an .uditor. Rhetoric does this in the only way it can: through language. Truth and justice are naturally stronger and should prevail for two reasons: in se, as he says here, and for the reason which he gives at 55a 15-17. If truth and justice are defeated, it is because rhetoric has failed in its function as mimesis. The defeat of truth and justice is caused by their inadequate articulation in language. It is the task of rhetoric, and in this task resides its usefulness, to ensure an adequate and competent articul.tion of truth and justice. When rhetoric fails to present

28

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

55a 28

this articulation, bad judgments are made by men, and truth and justice are destroyed by their opposites. As A. remarks: this truly merits censure. Thus it is that in explaining the usefulness of rhetoric here A. is making a remarkably strong pronouncement about the importance of rhetoric, a pronouncement which is usually not even considered "' possible for the Rhetoric, and yet one which is not out of keeping with his other comments in this treatise. To the point of this interpretation is EN IIpa 35-36: "Whenever language is out of tune with the perceived facts it is despised, and it destroys truth besides." a 24 ~.., &t

introduces the second reason.

• 25 ciKPL~'CJ"ci..l)V 017<, ....>11'-"11" an expression ordinarily used for the absolute, unconditioned knowledge acquired through the fIrst principles of a subject; it is what is meant by "discourse grounded in knowledge" at 55a 26. This second reason for the importance of rhetoric does not mean that rhetorical discourse is not grounded in knowledge. A. would certainly agree with Socrates in the Gorgias that the rhetorician must have knowledge (see also Phaedr. 25ge - 261'). That this is so would seem to be conf1IIIled by the reference to the Topics (at 55a 28), a study in eight books which has as its purpose training in the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject in an effort to disclose truth and error (see Top. lora 35-36). The key idea of this section is at 55a 25. A. argues that scientifIc knowledge by itself cannot win conviction in ordinary discussions with people because of the inability of untrained minds to follow such an argument (55a 27-29). He repeats this idea at 57a I-4, B 22, 95b 25. There is one further point to keep in mind: A. does not appear to believe that reason will by itself and necessarily persuade anyone. See De an. 433a Iff., and EN II39a 35-36: "Intellect by itsdfmoves nothing"; see also EN II79b 23-29. i.e., "Discourse grounded in specialized a 26 &'& ..CJKclAl..; . . . >'oyo; knowledge is proper to formal instruction." What A. has in mind here is expressed well at 59b 8-16; 58a 2, 58a 17 : I, and 59b 25-32 should also be read so that the statement here is not interpreted to mean that the art of rhetoric engages in vapid geI'..eralities . • 27 KO'''''''' This would be that body of factual information generally possessed by an educated person with respect to a subject. Such information is described well in chap. 4 with respect to the subjects discussed there, or, indeed, in any of the subsequent chapters of this book. Some idea of what A. has in mind can be gathered from his distinction between "0"& and i61a at 96b 9-19, and his comments at Top. IDoa 18-20, IOob 21-23. a 28 : 1 Tac; ni.a't'ELt; KClt "roUt; l.oYOUt; "Proofs and argwnents" is a common interpretation. If we accept it, then "t"T<~ here is to be understood in its second meaning (see 55' 4; also the text at 56b 6 where the sarne phrase,

55a 32

29

COMMENTARY

in part, appears). It is, however, equally possible to interpret our passage: "to develop the ,,!rn:.., and the discourse by means of evidence known to all." Iu this interpretation ,,!rn:.., can be understood in meaning (b) or (c) of 55a 4. 2 ,
a 29-38 '
(...:. ... "d9ELV)

The edd., s.ve Tovar, read parentheses.

a 32-33 tv .. I'>\'<E .•. ~... I'EV There is some confusion in the codd. here. "al IJ"w, aHov The best codex, A, re.ds: iva I'r,TS AavOc1vn nwt; xewl'i.ov J",a!wt; Myo., aVToit; A.... This is read by Spengel, Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar but they bracket Myo.,. The readings of Ross :md of Cope are rather haphazard. Kassel reads with A, except for a1lToit;, which he explains as a corruption introduced into A for aVTO! (Der Text, pp. 121£). Before coming upon Kassel I preferred to read the TO'. Myo., with aVTo'" but his explanation for aVTO! makes sense and I

1'' '

TO',

e"..

''''''1''''

TO',

30

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' [

55b 2

accept it. Therefore I interpret the passage: "but in order that the actual facts may not escape unnoticed, and in order that when another makes an unf:rir use of arguments we ourselves may be able to refute." a 32 I'-Ij liLK'..... ~ i.e., misrepresents by argument or language what is the truth. And so we are back to the idea of ssa 23: truth wrongly presented is defeated. See A.'s further comment at 55a 36-38. a 36: 1 ....... lv .." ...t...v an objective genitive: "both in like manner have to do with opposites"; cf. S. 1333. 2 . . . . . . . (",axElI'''''' "'poiy!'''..... i.e., the subject material; for the various meanings of Td ~",o".{,..••o. in A., see Waitz, on Cat. Ia 2of. The phrase appears again at 59b IS. The repetition of this word from 55a 35 nicely emphasizes a 37 6I'al...~ the contrast between what rhetoric and dialectic can do, on the one hand, and, on the other, what the material upon which they exercise themselves permits them to do. a 38 : 1 a.cruUoyu,"'O.... p.. K"l "',8..".:....p" Clearly, since all men desire to know (Met. 9803 I) and all men desire the good (623 23). 2 w~ "n>.W~ See ssa 7 : 1. 3 "'PD~ Ii~ ",oU...a,~ i.e., the three reasons already given.

01",.,,,

a 39 :

Ii...o",ov

sc. laT'; or possibly d. ei1J. I'lv Obviously, from the position of physical is contrasted with mental power. 1

2

...:.1'.....,

,..i. and di,

55b 1 :!ooy'!' This is both speech and reason as we see it used at r 2, 04b 2-3. Ml'o~ is proper to man alone; Pol. una 9-18 and I3Pb 5 state it more emphatically than is done here. Of course, in offering this deferue of rhetoric, A. is presenting rhetoric once again as a reasoned activity, and indeed something more proper to man since it uses that which is more properly a characteristic property (Ed,o.) of man. Rhetoric calls for knowledge, as Plato insists in Phaear. 25ge - 26Ia. It is the apparent fuilure of Gorgias and Polus to appreciate this relation between rhetoric and knowledge which Socrates presses in the first half of the· dialogue. See Corg. 447-480, especially 459c 6 - 460a 4; and !soer., Antid. 250.

a.

b 2 d Ii' 6..., There is an ellipsis, i.e., ,E ('1"ju., n~) liT' • " !socrates offers this same defense, in A"tid. 2.52 (see also his Nicocles, or The Cyprians 1-9), as does Gorgias in the dialogue named after him, 456c - 457C. There appear to be echoes of the Corgias in this concluding section; 55b 10, for example, is in itselfa retort to Corgias' fourth answer on the nature of rhetoric, an answer which Socrates ttanslates into the well-known ",.,8o.~ d1J,.,,-

55b 8

31

COMMI!NTAl\Y

overo, (453a 2). just as

the example of medicine (55b 12ff:) recalls Gorgias' comments at 456b Iff. and his own comparison of rhetoric and medicine in Helen 14. See also 54a 1.

b 4 " ..",.5< "'..v.....v

is used here in a way comnlon in A. to indicate the things of which something is predicated or stated: "aT& Ur6a6a,. The idea behind the phrase in our passage is expressed at EN 1094b 16-19: "Even good things admit of error because harm comes to many from them."

b 5 olov t"ltuo~ ... "",p"""lyl~ Plato. lI-Ieno 87e - 88d.

".0,

On these draM see 60b 21ff: and

b 8 : 1 oil",. iv6~ "'LVO~ is the reading of the codd. and accepted by all the edd. save Ross. who writes 01l8",0, 'mo,. which Kassel (Det Text. p. 122) rejects as a misunderstanding of A.'s Greek. a y6vOU~ &"""pLap.ivou The genitive is one ofpossession: "Rhetoric belongs ~ no one d~te class of subjects." This first chapter concludes on its opening statement: the relation between rhetoric and dialectic. The relationship is made more specific now by emphasizing that both disciplines extend to an unlimited subject matter. This is another way of saying that just as dialectic is the art oflogical investigation and inquiry on any subject. so rhetoric is the art of suasive discourse on any subject (see also 543 3. 55b 25). As an art. rhetoric certainly possesses a body of rules and principles proper to it. which we call its subject matter. The reader's attention is directed to 5.... II : 1 where the topic was treated at length; Cope. Introd•• pp. 14-19. also speaks of rhetoric as art and as faculty. What A. is concerned with here is the universal characier which rhetoric and dialectic possess. His argument is that any subject submits to presentation in language in order to be communicated to another. and as such is the legitimate concern of rhetoric, which is the art of discourse. Le.. language used to speak effectively to the other. The scope of rhetoric is not limited to any particular subject or subjects. Even A.'s three types of rhetoric are not mutually exclusive (see S8b 8-29. S8b 13. and Cope, InlTod•• pp. II9-20). and in spite of their specifying d~ticms can and do contain most other types of discourse. Riccobonus. cited by Spengel. pp. 34£. with approval. expresses the point concisely: "licet praecepta tradantur imprimis de tribus generibus causarum. tamquam de materia praecipua. non !amen cae!era reiiciuntur." On this matter we must keep in mind what A. calls the proper work of rhetoric: "Its proper function is with subjects about which we deliberare but for which we have no body of systematic principles [
32

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

ssb IS

rhetoric is concerned with the unlimited range of man's discourse with an other, but also never really challenges the Gorgianic st.tement that rhetoric is an '""anil'''' "sel M)'ov~ (449d). Indeed, in our text at S9b [S-I6 we find a similar phrase offered .s the explanation of what rhetoric is .bout: l",anil'''' .lO)'a,.; see S9b 16 : 1.

b 9 xp>\a'!'oot;

i.e., SS.

".'a...

21 -

SSb 7.

b [0: 1 06 «I> The function of rhetoric is, not persuasion in itself, but the ability to perceive in any given subject, problem, or situation ("se11"arrrov, ssb II) those elements which are suasive (Ta ",.dexovTa m8aod) and which make decision possible and reasonable. The proper activity of rhetoric is to present these elements and there it rests. A. says exactly this in his example of medicine (ssb 12--13): 1'8xe' ov ... I'£xe' TOVTOV "eoa),a),",v, Rhetoric does not make persuasion (i.e., a persuaded mind) the wayan artist makes his object; this would make rhetoric what Plato calls it, " ..90;;~ ~'1I"O;;e)'o~, or as we find it presented in the Hele.. of Gorgias. For A. rhetoric creates an attitude in the mind of another by selecting the dements on hand whereby the listener can arrive at his own decision; see Top. lOIb S-10. 3 Ifpyov See S48 II : 3.

b 12-14 (06&0 ... xClAG>t;)

The edd., save Tovar, read parentheses.

b I2. : 1 t....p.xijt; i.e., o1Me yae (lerov) laTe'''* (T8X"'i~) Td ")'v.1i no'ijaQ& ... neoayaystv, z uyu.ii Neuter plural = "health"; on omission of the article, se; S. I 126.3.

b r3 :

1 3

!'otxP' OU iv&tx• ."...

"up to which" = "where." used absolutdy; >l ,,)'i•• a is to be understood as the

subject.

b '4 1I!""t; 8.p..",Eila". xcU."'t; As we read in the Topics passage (rolb 9-ro): "If the physician omits none of the available means, we will acknowledge that he possesses competent knowledge of his subject." To practice an art correctly and to be in full possession of it mean to execute the method in all its detail, not necessarily to obtain the result of the art. For, as A. says in De all. 433a 4-6: "One wllO possesses medical knowledge does not always heal since something dse is required to produce action according to knowledge; knowledge alone is not the cause." b [S : 1 I;"'. sc. (<pav.e6. "an) 8n. 3 «ijt;
«"

ssb 17

COMMENTARY

33

used in two ways: (a) the very common meaning is: that which is not true, that which appears 10 be but is not (see SE 16sa 21-22; Bonitz, Index, s. v.); (b) that which seems to be and actually is that which is manifest to the senses (see 63a 4, 8, and 63> 8). From the context here (ssa IS-17) it is clear that the cpa •.,i",••o. ",Oa.d., the apparendy suasive, is that which seems to be suasive toward the actual situation but is not at all relevant to the matter in hand. An obvious instanCe of such would be all T4 lEw Toii "edy",aTo,. It is further dear from the context that A. has in mind the same problem as that of Ssa 2l}--38 (see note). Although A. does not speak in the Rhetoric of the "apparently suasive," he does speak at some length (B 24) of the "apparent enthymeme" by way of contrast with enthymeme. There, in keeping with the first meaning above of cpa...",..o., we see that the "apparent enthymeme" is not a true enthymeme either because of incorrect form or because of improper content (see Studies, pp. 94-103). In our passage A.'. reference to dialectic and the cpal.d",8.o. O'Vlloy.O'",d. is dearly to the Sophistid Elellchi. This work is an ..,<arnination of the ways of false dialectical reasoning (see 164a 20-26, 164b 2S-27). And so our passage asserts: the art of rhetoric enables one to see that which persuades to the truth as well as that which persuades to what is not true, although its object is the truth as far as that is possible. And his very next comment, ssb 17-21, bears this out. b 17-21 'Ii yoltp •.• su... ..p.,v Roemer and Tovar enclose this passage within parentheses. As we saw at ssb '4, one is a skilled practitioner of an art if one fully follows out the method. But in an art such as rhetoric or dialectic which legitimately considers either side of a question (ssa 29-38), this can create a problem. A. faces that problem here, stating that the distinction between true and false dialectic is grounded lIot in the art bUI in the way in which the art is used. In dialectic there is a name for the dialectician who misuses the art: he is called a sophist. The"dialectician" can but does not wish to deceive (ssb 20-2I); the "sophist" using the sarne art also can deceive and wishes to deceive (ssb 20). Unfortunately there is no special name for the person who deliberately misuses rhetoric (ssb 19-20); like the true rhetorician he is also called e.qTWe (ssb 20). False rhetoric like false dialectic involves itself in a misrepresentation of reality as it is and as it can be known. And A.' s analysis of the apparent enthymerne (B 24) demonstrates that this false rhetoric misrepresents by fallacious argumentation. In the Rhetoric A. is not interested in argumentation which leads to falsehood. He has already indicated (ssa 2l}--33) why the student of rhetoric must be made aware of such argumentation. In Book Two he takes up the analysis of false argumentation, not, as some have said, because the art of rhetoric occupies itsdf with false argumentation, but in order to point out the ways of fallacious reasoning. From A.' s statements about rhetoric it is clear that it, like dialectic, starts from proposi-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

34-

ssb 24

tions truly hdd by men in its effort to arrive at the truth. Neither methodology is a game. In A.' s mind rhetoric is quite definitdy an art. In spite of his reservation, Cope's general comment (Introd., p. IS) about A. and the arts applies as will to rhetoric and dialectic: "To Politics and Ethics or the military art or medicine it certainly is "at a matter of indifference which side of a question they take; they aim at truth and reality, d.l7jO..a, and in so far partake of the nature of science." Cpo Roberts, "Notes," 3S6-S7. b 18 ~..... 'l:"n &w ...... , . .. "'po,up.!".' This is a distinction which A. uses in a number of places: e.g., Met. I004b 22-26, EN II27b 14, SE I6sa 30--3 I; the point of the distinction is the way in which (i.e., by deliberate choice, preference, purpose) the faculty (d •• a!",) is used - as he indicates in Top. I26a 30 - I26b I.

b 22 !'-.eo&ou b

23

See 54& 8.

TiiN "'po ... , ......"",

b 24 olov

the adverb.

i.e., the objectives proposed.

CHAPTER

2.

I . Introduction: 55b 25 - ssb 34 rhetoric defined: the faculty of perceiving the possibly suasive in any subject II . Development: 55b 35 - 58a 32 I.

Ssb

3S -

s6b

2.7

(a) s5b 35 - 56a 33

the means to achieve this objective: the ""tedm;'; and ateclmic ";1,.<£1, in themselves and bow they relate rhetoric to dialectics, ethics, and politics

(6) 56. 34 - 56b '7

2. s6b 28 - s7b 2S (a) 5.6b .8 - 57a

the infereotial method, which uses the "I<ns,,: deduction by cothymeme, induction by example the meaning of suasive and its implications (this develops I):

I

the mean'ng of suasive

57a 33

implicatioDS for the character ofehetori-

(e) 571 34 - 57b 25

implicatioDS for the kind of propositions used in rhetorical inference: the elxol'(I

(6) 571

I -

cal inference

and

3. s7b 26 - 58. 32

C1l11"sia

analysis of rhetorical inference velops II.I):

(a) 57b a6 - 57b 36

the nature of example

(6) 58. [ - 58a 3'

d>e nature of eothymeme

(this de-

III . Conclusion and transition: 58a 32 - 58; 3S

ssh 25 : 1 p'l'rop'>c>\ Richards conjectures < l!> e7rrOe,,,>j. The edd., Spenge!, and Cope do not read it. However, a general check of A:s use of e7JTOe'' >j in the treatise finds the article with it. Richaros' conjecture may well be correct: the article may have disappeared in copying.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

55b 29

z &Uva!1U;

See 54ll I I : 1: the faculty resides in the person who has mastered the rules and principles of the TiXVl]. Thw aile with the d~7a"..~ is able to scan the subject and perceive the &d.xo". •• in it, i.e., that which will move the auditor toward a reasoned acceptance. Sec Spengel, pp. 32-40, for his ample citations from ""cient sources on the definition of rhetoric; sec, too, his "Die Definition und Eintheilung," on A.'s definition of rhetoric.

o. ""Oavo.

b 25-26 IXaa7:011.

'<0;; O""pij"'" ... ",0""0'"

See

ssb Ie-II: TO ide, • ...

b 27: 1 "PYo... See 54ll II : •. z ""'1, see Carg. 45Sa; on the force of adjectival endings in -'''a~, see 5gb 32 : 1. The important word here is With it A. acknowledges that the use oflanguage in all the disciplines is always something more than notional and rational. The word greatly extends the area of "persuasive speech" and recognizes that almost all discourse with another inevitably seeks to win acceptance for itself from tbe other. As Socrates says in Carg. 453d, "Is it rhetoric alone which appears to effect persuasion, or do the other arts also do tI,is? For example, doesn't everyone who is teaching any subject whatsoever persuade?" A.' s. e..,
'''''''''''>1.

r

"inseparable properties"; see Cope, p. 27. b 29 '<" ""!1IiElillHo,<" ....Oll Ordinarily Ta UtJfJP,P1J",iTa are what in philosophy are called ""ccidents" of an entity: anything which mayor may not happen to an entity (e.g., for a man to be educated, mwical) or which can be truly predicated of an entity although it does not belong to its essential constitution (e.g., intellect, free will, imagination, in a man).

COMMENTARY

37

..., ....."1)1'-..... We ore to complete the clause with the words at ssb 27: neel TO au-rai, oOno;edpsvo" StU' lhaaaxal,,,al xal 1(8UI1;,,,at. • "'xvWv " ..l .""'' "1)1'-' ' 11 i.e., the arts and the ,ciences.

b 3I

: 1

" ..l

b 32: 1 ",.pl "OU &08 .....0. i.e., "Bel T"O~ d08"'TO~; "with respect to any subject presented to it." A, was ,aid at SSb 28, under rhetoric A. includes discourse on an unlimited subject matter. Cicero himself (although he ,peaks differently in De illv. 1.5.7) saw this in De orat. 1.15.64 when he wrote: "is orator erit mea sententia ••. qui quaecumque res inciderit quae sit dictione explicanda, prudenter et composite et ornate et memoriter dicet. ••• " And Quintiliau writes (Inst. orat. 2.r5.16): "Omnia subiecis,e oratori videtur Aristote1es cum dixit vim esse dicendi quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile.... " This broad definition of rhetoric by A., which, of course, under,core, its similarity to dialectic (see notes, chap. I), worried later Greek: theorists, as is evident from the citations in Spenge!, pp. 32-40. At the same time we must understand A.'s 'tatement here correctly. For if we do not, it leads to the interpretation of rhetoric a, trickery, and places him in the same position as Gorgia' (see Gorg. 454C - 460a): namdy, that rhetoric is the art whereby without a need for knowledge an uninformed mind can 'peak to other uninformed minds and appear to know more than those who possess knowledge of the subject matter (459b 6 - 459c 2). A. insists that rhetoric demands knowledge of the subject (as we have already ,een in a general way and shall ,ee quite definitdy, e.g., 59b 25-32). Therefore we must add that although Spengd (following Riccobonus). clearly recognizes thi, universality, still the tenor ofhis comments is wrong. He insists, for example, that rhetoric argues only &om large, general sources: namdy, the common topics. However, for A. rhetoric argues from the particnlar topics proper to a ,ubject as well as from common topics. The Ari,totelian theory of rhetoric demands an intelligent understanding of the subject so that one can present a valid argument and therefore an argument acceptable to the auditor as the ground for a reasoned judgment. For it is just such a judgment which is the ..Uo~ of rhetoric, e.g., 57a I-5, 5Sb I-S. • ell. d ... See 5sa 7 : 1.

,v

b 34 ..0 ""Xv,,,,,'11 i.e., all that constitutes rhetoric as an art and creates the proficiency proper to it as an art; on the article, see S. II53a. See ssa 4; this is ,,{a..,~ used in meaning (c) as b 35 : 1 .. ,........... "source material." The division into entechnic and atechnic i, A.'s. We find something somewhat similar in Anaximenes 142S1I I6-26, in the work spoken of as the Rhetoric to Alexanaer in S4b 26. The division into entechnic and atechnic to which Cicero at first only vaguely alluded (De inv. 2.I4.47) he accepted in the work of his maturity (De orat. 2.27.U4-20). Cf. Appendix.

56a

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I Z

&'<EXVO'

"lflT"~ (although he

I

See chap. 15. This is the first time A. mentions these

has indirectly spoken of the "'Texvo" at 54a 13 and

55a 4) and he explains them at once. The meaning of d-rsxvo, is seen at 62a 3: "things which are in no way the result of the exercise of a TiVTJ." Thus at 54a 13 when he says that "the ",lflT"~ alone constitute the art" he is speaking of the mevo" which he will explain at 560 Iff. Rhetoric can use atechnic proofs, but the object of its technical competence is the entechnic proofs the derivation and use of which it teaches. 3 lv'<EXVO' It should be noted that A. makes no mention of "direct" or "indirect" proofs among these entechnic proofs (see 54& 15 : 1). Nor is there any indication which would confirm Cope's statement (p. 29): "For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs [i.e., ij80~ and ",d80~I, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, ... are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, •.• serviceable but not essential." A. always calls the three entechnic proofs simply ""lflTe" and studies each almost equally in the first two books. Both Ci=o (De orat. 2.27.II4-17) and Quintilian (Inst. orat. s.u) refer to atechnic as A. does, and not ouly make no distinction among the and entechnic entecbnic between "direct" and "indirect," but do not speak of the third entechnic proof as "enthymeme." C£ Appendix.

""{fITs."

h 36 npoilm;pxEV

i.e., these proofS are on hand for the speaker (or writer) independently of the art. As described by A. (ssb 37), they are extrinsic, not intrinsic, to the subject and fall within the scope of the art only insofar as the sp~aker (or writer) uses them (ssb 39).

h.,37

p4p.... p.~ ...

'<0'116....

See chap. IS.

h 38 XII'
Ai".,

56a 3

COMMENTARY

39

collocata" (De orat. 2.27.II5-I6). Maximus Planudes (Rhetores Graea, V 506507) uses Myo, in his definition of each of the three ,,{m•• ,. Clearly, then, these ,,{rrr.., are to be developed by means of discourse itself, although some have thought differendy (e.g., on >}80, the Velus Trans/atio worked from Greek which probably read at 56a 9 pi! d.d Toii M)'o" dUd 6.,; TO "eoa.ao'a.rOa.). With this in mind we can see that A.'s comments on how >}Oo, (56a 5-13) and "dOo, (56a 14-16) must be developed as "{tim, are self-explanatory: they must be incorporated into the language of the discourse. Once again the basic importance of language as the vehicle to establish conviction is made clear. J Tplex d6'1 See r I, 03b 9-13. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Lysias 19) states that the entechnic "I"",••, are three in number, a division unquestionably Aristotelian, as we see in the text here. Further, he identifies them as TO >}80" TO ""fOo" TO "ea),pa. The ,,{""'., which Dionysius calls TO "ea),pa modem commentators on A. call "the argument," "the rational proo£" If they mean by this simply the material in the subject matter which submits to reason and off'crs a logical explanation of the subject, then they reflect what A. is saying in 56. 1-2.0, and what Dionysius is trying to specify by his elassification TO "eaypa. If, on the other hand, these commentators mean that this third ,,{m., is the enthymcme (e.g., see Cope, pp. 5-6, and cf. 54& IS : 1; Spengel, p. 46, and c£ 560 13), then there is difficulty. For there is no clear textual statement in the Rhetoric in which A. identifies this third "{tiT., as enthymeme. From what he says here (56. 1-2.0) about these .,,{UTe., two things are cle.r: each "{tlTI, assists one in demonstrating one's point, and each "{UT., must be expressed in language. It seems safe to s.y that neither Cicero nor Quintilian fully comprehended A.'s division of the three entechnic ,,{""'.., (see Cope, pp. 28-29, for the relevant citations). Cf. Appendix. See B 12-17. As Socrate, says in Gorg. 5I3C: "Everyone rea 2. liBel joices when words are spoken in accord with his own character and dislikes those which are foreign to him." a3:

1

2

iv TcjI . . . . ."'; See B I-II. iv cdn:cj1 .•• 6."aNv,.. This is the third

"'UT.,. The meaning of lO)'o, here and at 56a 19 wh::re the third again appears must be determined. From the structure of the whole section, one might be justified in arguing that M)'o, here means the same as it does at 56a I: discourse, language. It can, in fact, be taken this way and would mean, because of the specifying a.d TO. a••".,!.a., discourse or language which expresses the logical coherence of the subject. Spengel, who considers this third to be enthymeme, still interprets mJTrjl Trjl AO),'I' as "the speech": "h.e. sola oratione, nulla alia re externa assumpta" (p. 46). Cope, p. 32, while favoring

,,1m.,

"'UTI,

ARISTOTLE, 'RHliTOIlIC' I

56a 3

"reasonings or arguments" (which is a bow in the direction of enthymeme as the third "t<1T'~), first acknowledges as equally possible "the actual words" of the discourse. There is reason, then, for taking M)'o~ (in w aVToji Toji M),,!,) as the words of the discourse which express the logical coherence of the subject. lO)'o~ then carries its meaning of" explanation, definition" of a thing. An idea of what I have in mind is a statement of Antisthenes' cited by Guthrie: "A logos is that which sets forth what a thing was or is" (Sophists, p. 210; see also pp. 2.1Q-II, 2.10114); or, even more to the point, Plato's use of M)'o~ as rational explanation in The.et. 2.oSb-e. M),o, as the third "t<1T'~ would in tbis sense be the explanation of the subject matter, an explanation which, like ~Bo~ and "dBa" must be given in language. The reason for accepting the word thusly is that from the text at 56a 1-20 A. gives us three entecbnic ,,[<1T.., which are in every way coequal. Each is constructed through discourse, and each is separately identified. There is ethical "tUTI~, emotional "tCIT",iogicai "t<1T'~. In ethical ntun" language is used in a way which will strike up in the auditor an ethical resonance; in emotional "tUTI;, an emotional resonance. In logical "[CIT'" language is used which sets forth for the mind of the auditor the logical structure of the subject matter so that his mind can grasp its inner coherence and meaning. And so we have the explanatory phrase at 56a 4 ~,d TO;; d.,~••• a" in which a.,~ a, (Bonitz, I"dex s. v.) means: to e."Plain, set forth, lay open the meaning of, demonstrate. This meaning is seen at 74a 9. At B 22., 96b 3 d,d TO;; 10)'0" ... d.'~".a, means precisely the same thing, since, as we are told at 960 32 - 96b 19, we must have the specific facts about a subject in order to speak intelligently on it. At B I, 77b 21 - 7Sa 5 there is a -restatement of these three entechnic ",;[uro". There A. sums up his analysis oLi 4-14 as he prepares to study ijBo, and "elBo" saying (77b 2.3): "It is necessary not only to look to the language to ensure that it will explain the subject and be credible [clnod.'~T",d, ... "a; ",uTlkl, but also to establish oneself as a certain kind of person and to put the audience in the right frame of mind." The last two can only be done through language. 10),0', then, as the third "tUTI, is the evidentiary material on the subject matter which conveys meaning to the mind of the auditor, and which is set forth in language. As has been noted, Dionysius ofHalicarnassus (Lysias 19) specifies A.'s three "t<1T.'~ as ~Bo~, "d80" "eli),pa. Minucianus (Rhetares Graed, IX 601) calls them .qB."a[, ",aB"ITI"a[, 40)""a; a[ aolTal xal "ea)'pan~at. To avoid the confusion which can result from calling the third "[UT', "101'0"" or the possible misunderstanding from using Dionysius' word TO "eli)' pa, we shall

•••

denote this nlaTt.f; as ulogical explanation, II or "reason, n or "rational analogue,

It

and we mean by anyone of them "the statement of the subject as the mind grasps it."

COMMBNTARY

a 4
4I

On the meaning of tpat7.a8a., see S6a 36 - 56b

a 5 : 1 ij8ou~ Understood here, and at 56a I4 after a..eOclTC07, would be some form of the verb foWld at 560 19 (,naTBuovaw) - probably manuo,..... from the context. a ci~"i"',....ov This word can illustrate how A. understands nla-,;,r; as a source of credibility or conviction. In a passive sense it is something which in itself is such as to confer credibility, to make one d•••maTo,. When possessed by a person (b" •• 56a 6) and used (6,; . .. AOyov, 56a 8-9), it operates actively to cause beliefin another, as A. says here at 56a 6-IO. Philip, for example, carries such conviction (d<.&maTo~) to the Athenians in 349 B.C. (Dem., 01. 1.3). The art of rhetoric consists partly in the intelligent selection and development of these sources (7J80~, "&80,, "eiiy,..a) for the presentation of any subject. This is precisely what A. attempts to exemplify between chap. 4 of Book I and chap. 17 of Book ll. In the discussion of any open question, there is material which can lead another to belief: (a) in the manner in which the subject is presented by the speaker (his 7J80~), a speaker who at the same time attends to the character of his audience (7J80' of auditor); (b) in the emotional ambience of the subject (,,&80'); (c) in the factual evidence which the subject offers of its veracity (logical explanation). Carefully and intelligently selected, this material effectively contributes to belief or conviction about the subject, as A. indicates at 560 20-1.7.

".a.,

a 6 1"".,xtCl' "reasonable; fair"; see Sophocles, Oedipus Colo,Je,IS !I25II27 for the idea, and Cope, p. 30, for a fuller description of the word; see also ~b 18 : 2, and Vablen, Beitrage, pp. 266-68. Demosthenes, On the Embassy 339-340, indicates to his fellow-Athenians the importance of the "character" of those who advise them. has a number of meanings; we see it used at 62a 2I in a a 7 &.1tA...~ way similar to the use here. The word can mean (a) "singly, by itself, without the admixture of anything else," and, so, "simply," in either a physical or moral sense. Connected with this use is one in which dnl';;, is employed in a derogatory sense, "negligently, without suffu:ient care"; e.g., Met. 987a 2I: "to treat a subject too simply." (b) A second meaning is a development out of the first; here dnl.;;; is the same as "a8' aVTov, "in itself. absolutely, without reference to anything else," and thus is it opposed to "e6~ n, "the relative"; e.g., Top. !I5b 33-35. (c) There is a third meaning, "generally, universally," which is used in opposition to "a8' ."aaTOV or "aTGt ,..ieo~, "individually, particularly, specifically." This third meaning is the meaning in our passage and is a common usage of the word.

42

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

56. I3

i.e., Wlcertainty; and so there is room for argument on a 8 cl:".q,,60~Eiv either side. Since the problematical is properly the field of rhetoric (e.g., 573 1-7), the importance of each of these three "tl1T"~ is revealed by the comment here on ~9o~. In A.'s words ~9o~ (and so by implication ",d90~ and reason) motivates acceptance in all areas (""el "d.Tw. ,.,. dnlw~), whether the subject be ,onlething verifiable in and by it,elf (TO dxe<{U~) or SOntething Wlcertain. a 9 >.cSyou For the meaning, c£ 56& I : 2.

a II : 1 ",8clla,v is the reading of the codd. and i, accepted by all the edd. save Ross, who writes: <00> Tt9.,.... Ross's conjecrnrewithout changing the sense of the passage lends it some clarification. But the passage is texruaIly sound and ,hould not be changed. z £V -.ij dXVfI Though it is usually taken together with TeJCVO10yov'Tw. - "some of the writers in their treatises on rhetoric" - I suggest that it is better taken ·with "al T~. i",.t,...a• ... av,.pallo,.&rJ., as I have done in the following note. 3 XIII -ri]v 47<,e!XE.IIV This is the reading of cod. A; cod. F, comparable to A in Kassel's view, omits "al. Four edd., Spengel, and Cope read "at. Kassel omits it clainring in his apparatus "si recte, lacunae indicium." If we interpret as the translators do, following a common usage of oO;!: rllan.e in A., we have: U It is not true, as SODre writers assume" (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [7); emphasis added). But these translations drop the "at. There is a proper interpretation if we read n9iaa<. and "at with the codd.: "at can be av, and its position would argue adverbial, lending emphasis to ~v for this interpretation. I would accept it and translate: "For it is not the fact, .s some of the handbook authors assume, that in the art of rhetoric the goodness of the speaker indeed contributes, as it were, nothing toward persuasiveness; on the contrary, the fact is that ~90~, practically speaking, carries the most authoritative nta-r&r;:'

."".t"..

a 13 xup"""cl:'n)v ".e
56 •

21

a '4 Myou

COMMENTAlIY

On the meaning, c£ 56a

43

I : •.

1 ou yap ... ""O'OiiV"'E~ See B I, 77b ]I - 78a 5. • KptaE'~ When we discuss the role of deliber.tion (see 5'" 2 :. 1), the obvious importance to A. of >J80~ and ",180" as we see them in this section, will become clear.

a 15 :

'1' ..,...,. i.e., .t 54b 19-20 and 54' 15-18. The verb in this sense expresses the ide. • "pcty,.."....UE.. O'lL also found in naaY/AaTf;la: OCto engage in a systematic treatment"; cf. 54a 16 : 1. It is to be taken with "ed~ 6 "ai ,.&'0>: "For which objective ./one contemporary treatise writers, we maintain, attempt to develop a systematic treatment."

a 17:

1

i.e., B I-II. This is one of a number ofindic.tors a 19: 1 "'cdv""Oidv that A. is setting before us an organized and wrified treatise; 56a 18-19, e.g., is taken up at B I-II, 56b 26 .tB 2C>-26, r '7. 2 5,a 5. ",aii >.ayou The genitive is a conjecture of Spengel's more fully justified by Vahlen ("Kritik d. Rhetorik," 560). It is read by all the edd. except Kassel (see below). Uyo, here is obviously the Myo~ of 56. 4, on which see 56a 3:'. It isnotthe.:t&yo~wemeetat56aIand56a9(sees6a I : .). VahIen's e.....:planation of the conjecture bears out the interpretation offered at S6a 3 :.. As he notes quite well, this section on the "IOTe., begins with an identification of the three and continues with a description of each, e.g., 6r.a /-,£11 06" TOJ lI(Jo1J~ •. • 6-ra'J/; 6r.& de Tei;" a:lteOdTa.W~ o-rQ'J}; ",0. 68 TO;; .:t&yov ... 8Ta.. And so we interpret Myo, here: ''by means of the logical statement of the subject." Whether one should read TO. Myo. with cod. A or TO;; Myov is not certain since dIll with either case can indicate means and A. d~es not hesitate to change cases with prepositions (witness "eel at ssb 28-30). Kassel reads dod d. TW. My ... and interprets in his apparatus: '" argumentis', 'ratiocinatione'." I om not sure of what he means by this, but the rest of his note clearly indicates that he sees a difference between the Myo~ here and that at 56a I, a.difference already indicated at 56. I : 2. a ~o 'I''''V6,..EVOV sc. d.:t7J01,; here the "apparently true" is that which to all intents and purposes is the highly probable truth in a given situation. It does not mean "the f.illacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments" (Cope, p. 32). For Cope's meaning of 'Pa••&,. ••o., see 5sb 15 and SSh 15 : 3. See also s6a 36 - S6b 4. Le., the three "[CIT.., '.TeX'o,. Spongel, p. 46, wrongly a 21 "'ctU"'''~ calls these l.OIl,.7JI'''' >JOo" ,,&00,; see 56a I : 3 and S6a 3 : 2.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

44 a 22 :

TOU liuv .. ",o!vGU On the genitive, see S. Il
TO;; is read by all the edd. save Ross, who a 23 TplTOV TOU .... p[ brackets it. The TO;; is meant to repeat the idea of 560 22, TO;; Bewe-iiaa" and should be read.

...oiav T. i.e., the quality of the emotion, its particular character. be: T["lIlV ••• xed nwr;: I.e., its sources and the manner in which it arises. A. will discuss the emotions in Book II; at B r, 78a 20-27 he explains his meaning here in more detail.

a 24:

1

2

..... p..
a 25

22: 2

Onrefercnces to Plato, see 54a I; see, too, Roberts, "References," 342-46. A.'s

theory from what we have seen thus far precludes any conflct between rhetoric and philosophy. See 54b 24 : 2; C£ also 59b 8-12. See EN I094a 27 - I094b 3. Politic, as the study of a 27 ...ol..T.X"ljV man in society (the ",6A<~) is the branch of ethics with which rhetoric is pri-

56. 33

COMMENTAlIY

45

marily concerned. On the Rhetoric's perspective with regard to politics, see Barker, pp. 359-60; see also Cope, pp. 32f. a

28

a 29:

iv'C'L11'010Uf.L€VOl

... clt!'tv ......clt &C "partly ... partly"; see LS, 6, A.VIII.4. z
a 30 : 1 ... clt S. "czl S,' is the reading of the codd. and is accepted by four of the edd. and by Spengel and Cope. Kassel rejects it, claiming that cod. A reads ~d d. d,' dlaCo•• ta. ~al ,Ula~ alTta~ d.8e."""&~ (c£. DOT Text, pp. 81£). Personally, I prefer to read uncorrected A with Kassel. It satisfies the Greek more (i.e., ~d /•••... ~d di at s6a 29 stands by itself and is used in its ordinary way), and more properly fits what appears to be a passing observation. However, if one reads with the other edd., then our ~d di introduces another particular reason, and the "at is adverbial emphasizing the propositional phrase d,' cUla~ al~ta~ d.8e."""a~ (see S. 2883). On the meaning of the word, see 54a 12 : z. Dy z !,op,ov ... , using of rhetoric the expression ",aea'P"i~ TI Tij~ d,al."TI"1i~ (at 56a 25) A. has extended the relationship of rhetoric to dialectic in a way which makes the expression here, "oe'c!' n, intelligible. Rhetoric, though an independent discipline, is very closely related in nature to dialectic. Consequently I cannot accept Spengel's objection (p. 48) that A. cannot call rhetoric both "o~I6v TI and ii.>Tt(1reo",O~ (54a I). Insofar as rhetoric is an independent development (",aea",vi~), it can be ;cal1ed d.~tuTeo",o~ ~ii d,al."TI"ii; and insofar as the "a.ea",vi~ has its origin in the mother plant it can be called

"oelc!• ..

Tti~ d,al'''TI''1i~.

a 31 : 1 b!,ol« The reading of the best codd. and of four of the edd., it is confirmed by S9b II. It means "resembling, being similar to." Ross reads o"otw"a, which is an apt expression for rhetoric as a counterpart or analogue of dialectic, but is not, in the light of the evidence, an acceptable reading. z d",O!,EV i.e., at 54a I, ssb 8-21. On the plural form, see 55a 2. a 33 : 1 "'WS Ox"' Spengelfinds the expression unintelligible. The subis to be found in o~d•• d~ ... rue1u"i.ov, i.e., some specific disciject of pline, or body of knowledge. The meaning is made quite clear at 59b 2-18. 2 &uvd!,",~ See 54a II : 1. d6.a",~ here and in the other instances cited in 54a II : I means primarily "power to do" something. There is a discussion of d6.a",~ and its meanings in Mel. 1019a 15 - 10200 6, and I045b 27 - 1048a 24 in which A. says that "All the arts ... are dv.a".,~ since they are principles of change in anotlrer thing or in the artist himself as

'x.,

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

S6. 36 - s6b 4

other" (1046b 3-4). In this sense rhetoric as a d6.al"~ is the power, devdoped within a person through training in the art, to discern in all subjects those dements which may be suasive to others (ssb 2S-26), a11d to be able to express them in language in a reasonable way (s6a 33).

s.

Spengd, pp. 48£, quite cortectly says: "Here begins the a 3S ........ examination of proofs and, now especially of major importance, the investigation of the enthymeme." In A.'s words, the ways of proving or ap_ parently proving are two in number: ••S.JI'1/I'a and ",aedd"l'I'a; these two are the only methods of proving in rhetoric, just as syllogism and induction are the only two methods in dialectic. From the paralldism with 56a I (i.e., TOO" ••• "mew,,) and the statement at S6b 6 (i.e.,

'rae- ntcnBt~ nOlovvTa,), we

are to understand with .00. M the word ",{err.w.. But "'{rr"~ here must be understood in a different way from ",trrr:.~ at s6a dE, for here it quite clearly means (e.g., S6a 36 - S6b II) an instrument for proving or demonstrating. At s8a 1 ivS61'1/I'a and "'aerld"l'I'a .re called ",tan., rmod""'...,,al; later they will be called the "o ••al "tf1T61~ of all rhetoric (B 20, 93a 23-"'1). A shift in meaning like this is not so unusual, as a glance at the startling change in S8; 36 (see SBa 36 : 1) will show. Furth=ore, we see that such a meaning for "'{f1T'~ is found in A. (An. Pr. 68b 12-14) and was accepted as Aristotdian; witness Alexander's commentary on An. Pro 2sb 32 (ee II.I.43) in which he specifically calls syllog;sm a ",tf1"~ .. ~ and indeed says the same of ",aedd6l1'I'a : " oIiTe", l"'0l'iVf/ ,,{err.~ "aedd"l'I'a "aJ..iTa •. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus (Ep. ad Amm. I 732) cites our passage (56a 3S - s6b 21) as proof that the Rhetoric is a,work of A.'s maturity: "Thus did A. write and give with respect to himsdf unequivocal evidence that he composed the Rhetoric when he was already an older man and had published his most important treatises." In fact there seems to be no question that in giving l.861'1/I'a (in particnlar) and "'aedd.'l'I'a such prominence in his treatise A. is introducing into rhetoric the inferential methodology (deduction-induction) ofhis philosophical system. Moreover, it is interesting to find in this section, which provides that introduction, a ,eries of references to his works on general logic: Dialeelic (S6a 36), AntJytia (s6b 10), Topia (S6b 13), and Methodies (S6b 20). On the text, Kassd alone brackets s6a 3S - S6b 6, TOO. 6•... ~1/TOe'''~'' and writes "secrevi, sed ut Aristotdea." C£ Appendix. The logical instruments for a 36 - SCib 4 "",e,b'Ep ... cruA).oyta,,6~ organizing and presenting an argument are paralld in rhetoric and dialectic. The distinction in nomenclature is no't, however, arbitrary. "'aedd..l'I'a is not exacdy the same as lxal'"'l'~' as A. will indicate at S7b 26ff. Nor, as we ntay righdy presume from ssa I2-14, is enthymeme exacdy the same as syllogism, i.e., scientific syllog;sm; see SCib S : 1. Yet, by calling attention to the paralldism, A. wishes to stress the similarity between rhetoric and

COMMENTARY

47

dialectic and to introduce his new idea that rhetoric wes what was for him a general method for all inferential reasoning: induction and deduction. He makes this point at 56b 8-1 I and then goes on to illustrate it at 56b 12-20. In what follows in this chapter A. will enlarge on the enthymeme and the example. He does not discuss the apparent enthymeme until B 24. On the other hand, it is important to understand from the outset that A.'s concern with the apparent enthymeme is not. concern with the technique of deception as • positive factor contributing to the exercise of the art of rhetoric. In 55' 2!r33 he located his concern: namely, that the art of rhetoric mwt be able to handle false reasoning on the part of others. As he says in SE 165a 24-27, "It is the task of one who has knowledge about a thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the individual who makes false statements." His discwsion of the apparent enthymeme in the Rhetoric leaves no doubt that it is an inference false either in form or in content; in either case, as he says at 56a 36, <pal.BrI9a, d..".v.a,. Apparent enthymeme will conclude only to false statements; see Studies, pp. 94-99. Therefore we rightly conclude that there is no place for sophistry in Aristotelian rhetoric, and it becomes possible to comprehend his evident dissatisfaction with the fact that there is no name for the false rhetor and rhetoric as there is for ti,e false di.lectician (55b 17-2I; B 240 02a 24-28). The above explanation proceeds from the text as the modern editors (Dufour, Roemer, Ross, Tovar, Kassel) present it to us. It is interesting to note, however, that 56b 1-2, .d d. <pa..o,. ••o~ O"vl"ol'",,.d~, does not appear in . any of the codd., or in Dionysius, but' comes from a correction of cod. A. Furthermore, 56b 3-4, which all the edd., save Ross, read as a conjecture, Td at! <pawo,.••••••9vl-'7JI-'a <pa,.o,. ••• ~ O"vll.'Y'(fl-'O~' is not in ally of the codd. It comes from Dionysius, who does not include the word •• 9vl-'7JI-'a (nor does Kassel in his edition), writing simply Td
6LC'>'£XT'XO'~

Dionysius in his transcription of these lines reads

this as d.a.lvT£".'~, a word whiclI he used a few lines earlier. a,al'''T'''.'~ is possibly a reference to the Topics, as looa 18-24, I05' Io-I9mightsuggest. But 55a 8-ro implies that "dialectic" studies all aspects of syllogism, and this is more properly the subject of the Analytics. See ssa 9. S6b

I : 1

z

ol""''Y'''y"lj au>'>'oY"'f'oo~

See 57b 26f£, and S6b 5 : z. See s6b 5 : 1 and ssa 8.

b 2 'P""Yof'oCVO~ au>'>'oY'''f'oO~

b 3 ""'pci6£.yf'o'" .""'Y"'Y>l

See S6a 36 - S6b 4See 57b 26-36 and S6b 5 :

b 3-4 36 - S6b4-

2.

See comment at the end of S6a

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

56b 5

The enthymeme for A. is the sylb 5 : I p'Il'
S6b 14

COMMENTARY

49

critically examine generally accepted opinions on any problem whatsoever}. one further reason is that enthymeme and example place the exercise of rhetoric in the area of reasoned activity. Here from what is said at s6b 6-II. ",IClT", clearly refers b 6 "'I.....,' to enthymeme and "aead••y",a; see 55- 4. 55a 4-7. 56a 3S. b 7 "".pelL TeNTCI eNliiv EN II39b 26-29.

e.g.• An. Pro 6sb 9-14. AI•• Post. 7Ia I-II. and

b 9 [ij av..,v..uv] Bracketed by all the edd•• it is presumably omitted in only one codex and in Dionysius. An accusative masculine singular (i.e•• &......(a)o;;'. with the elision of a. as in Oem.. A/. 3.2.) nlakes no sense in the sentence. b 10 •AvtU.u.. "c&>v This is also read by Dionysius. From the context. here. a likdy reference is An. Pr. 6sb 9-14 and the whole of chaps. 23 and 24. as wdlasAn. Post. SIa 39 - 8Ib 42; see also 71a I-II. b II : I ckVClYXCl,av ..• Ellio~ Roemer's comment on Imes II-19: "a most difficult passage and one much badgered by scholars." z aNT"''' i,.Cldp'I' TeNT"'V aolTw, '''aTie'l'. which does not appear in Dionysius. e.'Cempli£es in part Roemer's comment. I would interpret the referents in aVTw•• TO';TW. thusly: a"TW. (s6b II). i.e.• deduction (<11IAAoy.C6",",,0,. S6b 8) and induction (maYO.Ta. s6b 9); TOUTW. (S6b II). i.e.• enthymeme and example. See 57" 33. b 13 To..,x"'" This is read by Dionysius. While one can find passages in the Topics (see chaps. I and I2 of Book I; see also 56a 36) which reflect in a very general way A:s assertion here. there is no specific passage which discusses the difference mentioned. As in the citation at s8a 29 (see Bonitz. Index. s. 'Ae'ClTOTiA1J" IOIb #ff.). this is more likdy a reference to the general contents of the treatise. In fact. the only place in which enthymeme occurs in the Topics is a passing reference at the very end of the work containing the only mention of rhetoric as a discipline. Our lines (s6b I2-I3) exemplify the kind of problem we find on occasion which causes some scholars to question the coherence and unity of the te.'Ct. However. with Dionysius' transcription of our passage in hand its authenticity is more than likdy. b [3-[4 (iXEi ..• n:p6T.pOV)

Parentheses read by edd.

As we saw in 56b 5 : I and 56b 5 : z. b I4-I8 3T'... XtU.E'''''' these are A.'s ordinary definitions of deduction (syllogism) and induction. In our passage. (a) induction is the method of "showing that something is (true) on the grounds of a number of like illStances"; (b) deduction is the process whereby "when certain things are (true). something else distinct from

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

50

s6b 19

them [na¢ TauTal results from them [d«, Taiiral by the fact that they are (true) [Tq; TaiiTa .l7all, either universaIIy or as a general rule." b 14 ... 0 fIo'V • • • &.bcw"OIl' An articular infmitive, the subject of .aTW (S6b IS), to which TO 6t ... ClVf'pat.e•• (s6b 16), the subject of "ale;" Ta. (s6b Ii), corresponds. b IS

IbCEi

Presumably the Topics, but see S6b 13.

b 16-18 'to 8i: "C'LVWV . . . Xi2A£l"tUl The structure is: nvwv 8"TCJJV, a genitive absolute expressing an attendant cirCllIDStance; TO dt tned. TO pal..w, an articular infinitive, the subject of "aleiTa. (s6b IS); d.d; TaiiTa,

CIV,..

naea

-ravIa. modifying phrases in which ?:avTa refers to T£VQ;V 8nClJ1'; TCP TaiiTa elval, another modifying phrase as an articular In1initive in the dative expressing cause and TaUTa again referring to n.eil. 6.T.,.; ~ "aOdlov ~ ..~ TO noM, adverbs modifying avf'pal..... From this explanation, w~ have

.,.!

every reason to think that the enthymeme is in fonn an ordinary syllogism and that it expresses the scope of an argument in a precise, reasoned inference of two premisses and a conclusion; see S6b 5 : 1 and Studies, pp. S3-94. Kassel's bracketing of d,d TaiiTa in s6b 16 does not affect the meaning. "UniversaIIy"; the word refers usuaIIy to the demonstrab 17 " .. 06AOU tion of a necessary truth, that which must be. A. calls such demonstration the scientific syllogism. inl TO "o)'6 is used for the demonstration of what is most likdy but not absolutely true: i.e., the probable. Suchis the demonstration of the dialectical syllogism and, generally, the enthymeme. b 19 <paM!POV So K/lllI... , X/I' is the reading of the best codd. and is followed by the edd., save Ross and Kassd, who accept the reading ofDionysius. The second "at, omitted by Ross and Kassd, is adverbial. The first dt ;eat (see Denniston, p. 305) is a not infrequent connective in our text; ~ di is ~~ective and the "at supplements it: "and in fact it is evident that

Indeed • •• b 19-20 uci"'.pov... ~1J...opd/l~ This phrase has been interpreted in two ways: (a) "each of these two types of rhetoric," i.e., .,,"neo. TO .ldo,; and (b) "rhetoric enjoys each of these two advantages," i.e., ... dneO. al'aOo7. The problem with (a) is that A. does not specify the kinds of rhetoric in this way. He speaks of three kinds of rhetoric (sSa 361£), and he does say that among them some are better served by "aea6eI1'f'a'l:a, some by bOvf'ljf'a'l:a (6Sa 29-33; r 17. ISa 1-2). In the context of the passage in whichA. compares rhetoric with dialectic (s6a 3Sff.), the second interpretation appears more correct and is certainly preferable: rhetoric once again is like dialectic for it, too, participates in both methods of inference. However, such a use of ,,,oneo. without the article is unusual, and made more so by the fact that

COMMBNTAAY

51

draO •• is used substantivally. There is a possible parallel instance of the onmsion of the artide at 94a 2-3, 'xov" .. draO';. TO;;TO, but I am 110t happy with it. Therefore I would interpret the passage in this way: 8.. "al draOo. TO Bldot; Tijt; e"lTOe.tat; Ix" .""neo" I would translate the whole clause: "And, in fact, it is evident that indeed the kind of rhetoric which is the correct kind [see S. rr691 possesses each of the two inferential methods." As a comparison for this use of .""neOt; by A., see 56b 26 (t"aTieq», a passage which also refers to the two types of inference, and s6b 11 (t"4TBeO', .• •"aTeeq».

b 20 : 1 p'l",opd",~ i.e., rhetoric, or rhetorical practice; it is used in this sense at s6b 21. This meaning is quite consonant with the second meaning in the preceding note. Jndeed Cope's comments (p. 38) on the meaning of the word fit very well the interpretation suggested: namely, "the kind of rhetoric which is the correct kind." 2 I'-.eo& ...oi~ a work mentioned by Dionysius (Ep. ad. Amm. I 729, 730 [7321, 733) and others; we know nothing ofit save that, as Cope, p. J7, suggests, it is probably connected with A.'s writings on logic. b 21 : 1 0l'-0u..~ Ix., "is"; a common use of lx... with an adverb of manner; see S. 1438. 2 " ..p..&.'yl'-""'';'&.'~ ".T..1. See S6b 19-20. Sponge!, p. 56 suggests that Demosthenes would be enb 22 p>\",op.~ thymernatic, Cicero more paradeigmatic; Pearson speaks ofDemosthenes as "a notably paradeigmatic orator" (Demosthenes, p. 73). b 23-25 ",e.."ot ..• £V8uI'-'1I'-",,,,,xo( See Top. Iosa 16-19. At s6b 6-8 A. said that the structure of all inference is either deductive or inductive (see An. Post. 8u40, and, for other references, S6b7). AtAn. Pro 68b 13-14A. further remarks that "onr convictions on everything ore brought about through syllogism or induction." He now states that although both structures are persuasive (mOa.ot) enthymernes "are cheered more" (OOeOPOUvTa,; on this meaning of Ooeopo;;...a, see Isocr., Panatheuaicm 233; see also B 23, oob 30-31). He does not say why this is so, but we do know that A. favored inference by syllogism. read by the edd., except Ross and Kassel, who with Mnret b 25 eli>"';;" bracket it. I see no reason to do so and A. does give a detailed aida of them; see next note.

b 26 ipoiil'-"" G...... pov unity in the text.

i.e., B 20-24; another example of a general

"dearly, plainly."

AlllSTOTLE, 'RHETORIC) I

s6b

30

b 28-S'7lL 7 '<"0 ",,8..~o~ For the development here, see the outline analysis of chap. 2. A. now resumes the discussion of the nature of the suasive, begun at ssb 25£, saying that by its nature that which is suasive implicates an individual: the one to whom the suasive is suasive. Speaking thusly, A. comes into direct conflict with one of his own basic principles: namely, that art as art (and, therefore, rhetoric) looks, not to the individual, but to the universal (e.g., 56b 30, 32-33), as he explains with examples from both medicine and rhetoric itself (56b 30-35). Thus he concludes that, even in the matter of the suasive, rhetoric looks to the universal (as does dialectic, 56b 35). Furthermore, it seeks its arguments, not from what may seem suasive to some

one individual, but from what is acceptable to men in general as most likely representative of the true situation (TO To.0,,,6., 56b 34). A.'s analysis, in other word" remains consistent with his presentation of rhetoric as an art. But at the same time, because of the nature of TO ",8ao.0, he is forced to face the fact that rhetoric as the art of discourse is directly concerned with statements addressed to an individual (or individuals) and, therefore, that both the material and the argumentation must be selected from the general sources with this fact in mind; consult S6b 30-35. b 28 : J €'lCoi yelp ",ince, in fact, .. ." - to which the adversative M, in 0,)6,/,ta 61 T~XO'1, replies: ",till, no art •.. " 2 " ..1 ,<"0 fLEv ... '<"0 &£ "and since one thing is,uasiveand credible in and by itself, another by the fact that it seems to be proved by statements which are such." i.e., ",9aowv l1 here is A.'s theory of what we know and how we know it. The mind cannot know the individual completely because of the element ofmatter, which to A. is unknowable. The very thing which accounts for individuality - i.e., matter - is the very thing which introduces "unlimit" ("""eoo, 56b 33) and makes the individual unknowable (0,)" btL"TT/T.o). Art considers universals, classes, organizing principles (56b 31-32) which the mind can know. As an art, rhetoric with respect to the suasive will seek out in any ,ubject those concepts and ideas which are probable to a class or group; for this is its field as an art: TO.TO lVTBZOOO (56b 32). Rhetoric can train one to discern such material, but it cannot determine specifically that which is suasive or probable

rae

COMMENTARY

53

to this individual because it is the this-ness which ties the individual into matter and therefore into the unknowable. b 30 :

1

,,0

"..e' /l"CI....O"

• oro..

~ tCl"p'X-lj

See 511b

sc. TtZ"'1

2.

o~

a".",i.

b 3I ..tj> "O'&. "Some such person"; i.e., a general type represented by a person, such as Callias or Socrates. b 32-33

(-.ou..o ...•71:,....7)..6,,)

.x. . . ."

Parentheses read by edd.

"'&01;." "the individually probable," which from b 33 ..0 "Cl9' what follows means: probable to some one individual.

b 34 "0'0'''&. Ross alone of the edd. reads TOLoiad,; it is a strengthened furm of To,6"a8; "to people such as they are." This passage hasregularlybeenin~ b 35-57'l I XCII y4p •••• lw9CS....." terpreted in the way we meet it in the Oxford Aristode: "Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate" (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [9]). Vater (p. 27) considers the passage not to be A.'s, arguing that the sentence has to do with the subject matter used by syllogisms and belongs, if anywhere, not here, but after S7a Iff. His view can righdy be questioned and a case easily made for the logic of the statement precisely where it appears in the codd. still there is a difficulty with the usual interpretation given to i" TW. 7Id'l {Jov;',6,,,Oal ,1",06T"", but it is not the problem which Spengel, p. 58, cites: namely, that A. should more precisely and correcdy say "eel TW' 7Id'l {Jov;'etle"Oa, elw8dTW' (and "eel TW. Myov deop ••",.). Spen~ gel's reason for this suggestion is open to question simply because there is no point in pressing A. to this kind of precision; the statement can quite readily be understood and accepted as it stands. The difficulty is whether or not {Jov;'B,JBaOa, can be translated as a passive, as everyone does. In fact, though the usage is certainly not common, it is not absolutely impossible. Apparendy because of this problem Kassel in his eclition has adopted a con~ jecture of Maier's and reads dBOp.,O'~ and e/wOd"w, commenting upon them in Der Text, pp. 123£ He considers these dative participles as masculine and as referring to persons, citing in support deop••w. at Top. lOsa 3-4, and mentioning BE I2I4b 28 - I2Isa 3. Presumably he would translate the passage (he forgoes doing so himself) in the following way (1 use the Oxford l Roberts 1translation once again): "Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of the ideas occurring to those who need a reasoned discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the ideas occurring to those accustomed to engage in d~

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

54

liberation." Granting the difficulty with pov)..,Jea8a" I am not at all sure that the inteq>retation of M.ier-Kassd is correct. Surdy it is clear that a few lines on, .t 5?a 9, we have d80l'i.ro. used again; yet it is used to refer, not to persons, as Kassd seems to argue it must, but to statements. I am inclined to think that such is its use in the present passage and that the common interpretation of the reading of the codd. is correct. i.e., be TOVTO,. Ii twX'" Dialectic does not b 36 : 1 .~.rw l.."XEV use as the subject matter of its argurnentatioll any and every chance idea or notion. Dialectic is an art devoted to a reasoned (avJ.J.oytCBTa., 56b 35) discussion of rational, not irrational, statements, of ideas which require ""planation (56b 37; see also Top. I04a 4-8, 105' 3-'7). 2 a'r'l:'CI i.e., Twa ; it is not an enclitic. 57"- 1-2 ~ouA.u.a8clL ... ~ouAEU6I'E8.. In the next seven lines A. mentions a few important ideas about rhetoric: (a) its general subject matter (namely, questions open to deliberatiou) and its specific function. Since men deliberate only about all things which· are problematical or open (or .pparently open) to other possibilities andinterprelOtions (5?a 5-'7), A. extends rhetoric to the whole area ofhuman inquiry. The excellence of rhetoric (its aeBnj) is achieved when it assists such deliberation; this is what rhetoric is meant to do (its leyo.) just as the ear is meant to hear; see 55b Io-II and 5.... II : 2. (b) the object of the art: rhetoric is directed to others, who constitute an integral part of the art; see 58. 36ff.

a

I

TO

epyov

See 5....

II : Z.

;, 2 : 1 ~auAEUOI'E8C1 We are told .bout deliberation somewhat more fully at EN II40a 3I - II40b 4. It is important to understand the way in which A. views deliber.tion since his understanding of it is closdy related to the concept of the three entechnic ntaTB'~ which he analY2ed at 56. 1-33. From the discussion of it in EN IIIIb 4 - IIl3a 14 we learn that deliberation is directed to what is contingent (changeable), as well as to the things which man can do (practical action; see our text at 5?a 24-26), and th.t it involves both the intellectual and appetitive faculties of man. Deliberation is not complete without intellect and appetition. For as the mind is deciding, the appetitive dement in man is desiring the thing decided upon, which is called the neoa/l1BTO.. Deliberation aims at "eoaIeBa.~, the act of choosing. neoa{e.q.~, in tum, is not possible without the exercise of reason and appetition. The act of deliberation is complex, and this complexity is caught by the explanation of neoate.a.~ as POVJ.BVTI~ 6eB~'~ (deliberative desire, EN III3a II), or even more explicitly by A.'s phrases "desireful reason," "reasonable desire" (EN II39b 4-5). Deliberation implicates both reason and appeti-

COMMENTARY

55

tion in man. If, then. the e~y .. of rhetoric finds its fulfillment, as A. says in our text here, in matters which call for deliberation, it is clear that rhetoric in its argumentation must look at any problem from both its rational and its appetitive aspects. This is another way of saying that it must seek its sources of conviction in 1100" ""00,, rational analogue, or in what he has already called the entechnic "to'T6t~; see ssa 4, S6a 3 : 2. As an activity rhetoric belongs primarily to what A. calls the practical intellect. Rhetoric is an activity of what he calls the '0;;' loy'O'T'''&,: the intellect working together with the appetitive element in nWl. See Studies, pp. 18-28. C£ Appendix. 2 x .. l ."exv ..~ i.e., rhetoric itself is the Tix,,! for this kind of endeavor. If another art, or arts, fulf,]led this l~'Yo" there would be no place for rhetoric. The negative "'~ is probably that of cautious assertion (S. 2869); a possible reason for the caution i. given at 58a 6-7; see SBa 6-7. a 3-4 S,Il ..OA>.&'>v . . . Aoyl1;£lJaa, ..opp...8w The whole phrase effectively comes to the same thing: people who are unable to engage in a long and subdy reasoned argument; see B 22, 95b 23-27. In 57" 3-2.1 we are given a more complete view of the typical auditor than that provided at 55a 24-26. a 4: 0'1JV-,

1 CNVopav We meet the word again at 59b 3 I; on the force of see 57'L 8 : 1. 2 ..opp",aw See 7Ia I2 : 1.

a 4-'7 ~OUA£\IOP.£aa ... yllp ....tov This is explained in more specific terms at 59" 30 - 59b I; see also EN II4O" 31-33. a 5 tvstX...a .., . . . l](uv "Able to be in both ways," i.e., "capable of admitting alternatives"; see S6b 21 : 1, and 54a 8. a7:1

oG_~ l'I"oA"p.~ciy.,v

"ifhe so conceives the issue." ou&w yllp ....tov "for there is nothing further in it"; i.e., such deliberation is useless. See LS ,,"sIOJ>, II, 'for examples. Our reading is accel'ted by the odd. The variant readings are explained well by Cope, p. 41. Z

a 7-17 tvS.X£....., . . . "ulloY'''!'~ The argument here is relatively simple but not immediarely obvious. A. first speaks about inference in general (57" 7-13), and then draws conclwiol" from this general statement with respect to the inferential processes of rhet.oric: namely, enthymeme and example (57" 13-17: cllO'T' .• """Ao'Y'O''''o~), He says of inference in general that one can first of all infer from material which itself is the result of prior inference, but that this kind of close reasoning is not suitable to the ordinary auditor. Secondly, he continues, one can infer from material which is not self-evident and so needs proof in order to be at least probable, but such material labors under the difficulty of not being commonly understood and therefore of

ARISTOTLB. 'RHETORIC' I

not being suasive. And so he concludes that inference in rhetoric - namely, enthymeme and example - must use subject matter which is probable (and so potentially suasive), and solidly probable to the .uditors: i~ 6,..OAOYO",..••.", (and therefore in no need of prior proof). uuU0Y{~E,,8(ll, auvciye,v U1IV- in composition with verbs is used (a) objectively: to put things together to make a whole; or (b) subjectively: to do something together with someone else (see Guthrie, Sophist!, p. 136n3). With verbs expressing mental action, as here, the use is objective, and the verbs denote bringing things together in the mind for comparison in order to make a judgment, draw a conclusion, enlarge one's understanding; see also Cope, p. 41. Z be GUAAu..OY'''JUvwv ..pO't"Epav It is dear from 57'i 10-12 that A. is talking about setting forth a chain of interdependent demonstrations, i.e., syllogisms from whose ultimate conclusions (b' ""AAe).oy,U,..•••,.) one establishes the premisses for the final demonstration. The problem with this procedure is the auditor (57a 12); he is assumed to be unsophistiCated, unable to follow such cIo;e reasoning (see also 57a 3-4). This remark re-emphasizes the important role which A. gives to the auditor in his theory: rhetoric is concerned primarily with discourse (spoken or written) which is directed to another.

a 8: 1

a 8-9 ...clt fIoEv ......clt 5'

C£ 56. 29: 1

a 9 olau>.Aoy,,,......v i.e., "from statements not reasoned out." From the to."t we can see the problem with this kind of material: as it stands it is un-

proved, and so"is not probable to the auditor (57a .uasive (57a 12). a 10: 1 ...ou......v T';;.

10);

it cannot therefure be

i.e., the ""lAsAoy,u",.,,,, of 57" 8 and the duvAAoy,u-

of 57a 9.

flo'"

2 "'0 i.e., the process of an interrelated series of inferences whereby one reaches the premisses to be used in the final argument. I I xp ....~S This word surely is the same as dxeoaf>i~ as the use of which a few lines back (57' 3--4) and a £ew lines on (57" 19) would prove. I mention this because the word is, I believe, pushed too far by those who comment on the text; see, for example, s8b 2. A., as has just been said (57" 8 : z), assigus to the auditor a prominent role in the rhetorical endeavor, which is spelled out in chap. 3. His basic character always remains that of an d"eo .... ni~ (see 5Sa 37 : 1), although he may be denominated diJferendy in specific instances.

a

a 12 : 1 ....AOU~ (a) at S6a 7.

i.e., unsophisticated, simple; it is similar to meauing

57a 16 2

COMMENTARY ..elt

66

57

responds to Td !''''' (57a 10) and picks up d"ulloY,"Tw>

(57a 9). a 13 c...... civ..y,...ioll ".T.l. On the relation of this to what precedes, see 5,.. 7-17. The purpose of the lines which follow is to introduce the type of subject matter which the two kinds of rhetorical inference use, matter which A. will discuss between 57a 22 and 57b 25. In general, this subject matter is contingent, concerns things which can be other than they are, is generally agreed upon, and is quite probable: e.g., an angry man usually, but not always and absolutely, acts in his anger.

'1.....

a 15-16 "'..pciS ••y ........ i118u ... Since A. is speaking about the two kinds of inference used in rhetoric, we should note the following. In our present passage down to s7b 25, even though he mentions example at the outset (57" I4fE), A. speaks with the rhetorical syllogism uppermost in his mind. This is rather typical ofhis whole treatise. "ae&6.,y!'a is clearly coordinate with enthymcme as the method of rhetorical inference, but enthymeme enjoys a dominant role. At the same time there is no indication in the text here, which is ptimarily a quest for the source material for argument by enthymeme, that this same material is not also to be used for argument by "a~dd ..".. !,a. Spengel, p. 59, asks: "Why not cb, ",I Td "ol6 a 15 .:.~ ..elt ",oUci which A. uses later?" Presumably (but it is not clear) Spengel is referring to 57a 27f£ Granted: both phrases can mean the same thing - i.e., "for the ·most part." still the point of the phrase here is not to signify the contingency of the material which is expressed by au"" lixew here and in 57" 27 by cb, inl Td "OAV. Here A. is stating that the material with which rhetorical inference operates uis,jo, the most part, contingent" (on this use of :1(0;(11" see Bouit>:, Index 6I8a 46 - 618b 13). Thus we should translate "so that it is necessary for both the enthymeme and the example to be concerned with' matters, for the most part, contingent." Therefore the possibility of using scientific material (6 "aTa T~> ""anl!'1J> Adyo" 55a 26) is not excluded; see 57" 22ff. and 57" 22 : 1. a 16 Et; o},(yc.>v This is the loclls classicus for the common interpretation of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism, i.e., with one of the premisses ("~OT&I1.") or the conclusion (aul''''~al1;''a) missing. This interpretation goes back to the distinguished Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias of the third century A.D. A. himselflends strength to this interpretation by his use of 6 "~WTO, aulloy,a!'", (57" 17) - which means: the syllogism in its elementary, typical, unchanged form (see Cope, p. 42) - and by his explanation and example at 57a 17-21. However," careful reading of the text here and at B 22, 95b 24-26, the only other passage in which he discusses form, does not

ARISTOTLE, cRHETORIC' I

58

57a 20

permit one to say that the enthymeme by definition is an abbreviated syllogism (see Studi", pp. 87-91; see also the comment at the end of 57b 10-21). On the other hand everything which A. says about the character of rhetorical argumentation encourages the acceptance of his statement at r 18, 19a 18-19: "Enthymemes should be condensed as much as possible." A. wants to enable the auditor to acquire a quick, solid, and comprehensive grasp of the argument. See preceding note. a 17: 1 0 "@"'TO~ INUoy.",,"o~ 2 ielV yap It should be remarked that lines 57a 17 to 57b 6 (O'1JUo"."p&~) have disappeared from cod. A, and appear only in corrected A in the margin. i.e., one of the "eOTaa.ol; or the avpnieaapa. read by Spenge!, Cope, and all the edd. except Kassel, who, here and at 57a 21, reads o';6i., giving his reason in Der Text, p. 124, together with sorne paralle! exomples. I ftnd his reason not suasive at least for 57a 18, possible for 57' 21; his parallel examples are more suasive.

a 18 : 1 TOUT"'" 2

ou8E

a 19 : 1 orOV ST. oro. is the adverb. The edd. punctuate 57a 19-21 variously, reflecting their interpretations. Most place a comma after axeoanil;, but I think that the period, used by Cope and Kasse!, is better since 57a 19-21 illustrate 57a 17-19 (ldv •.. dxeoanM. Thus iJn ... d",;;va ••vtmay be taken as an indirect statement depending upon an understood taken from 57a 20 - "for example, to state that Dorieus was victorious in a contest in which the prize was a crown" - or as a QTO clause loosely attached to the ~ statement (S. 2586) - "with regard to the fact that

'''I'''' ,In,''

Dorieus ... "; we have a similar8n clause at Dem.., Crown,

2II.

a",p.eU~

son of Diagoras of Rhodes (on whom see Pindar, 01. VII). Diagoras himself, his father, and his two sons won Olympic victories. Thucydides (3.8) mentions a second victory for Dorieus at Olympia (c. 428 B.C.), and Harpocration in his Lexicon of the Ten Attic Orators (ed. Dindorf) tells us that Dorieus was a pancratiast. 3 aTe
oeD.

a 20 : 1 txClVOv d".LV is the reading of the codd., four of the edd., Spenge!, Cope; Ross alone transposes the "de, following a conjecture of Spenge!'s, and reads £Xav•• "de If one studies Ross's punctuation, the reason for the transposition is apparent. Obviously, the codd. are to be read. 2 3... 'O)'U""".,, yap The OTI' in the phrase OTI is pleonastic, and, since it is the equivalent of a colon, is not to be translated: "it is sufficient to say: for he won at the Olympic games." On '01-6,.,.0", a form of cognate accusative, see S. 1570d.

.In,'''

sin...

COMMENTARY

59

3 .... 6' the demonstrative article object of the infinitive ("'eo.-O.loal); the following substantival clause BT' •.• 'OAv,uma is in apposition to it.

Ross's inclusion of 57a 23-30 a 22-33 i ..... 6·l....l~ ........6'<0 E{~'" in parentheses is not acceptable. for it confuses A.'s statement. The opening l".l 6' AUTio altya 1'.0 is picked up after a parenthesis at 57a 23-27 (Td yde ..• TOUT/"O) - which we can read and is read by the edd. - by Td 6' cb~ at 57a 27. and the conclusion to the statement is drawn at 57a 3033. <pao.edo ..••l.a,. The logic of the paragraph is developed then in this form: "Since few of the class of necessary facts. . .• and since contingent facts ...• it is clear that of the sources from which enthymemes are formed some will be ... " Ross's parenthesis from 57a 23 to 57" 30 does not admit this development of the ideas. The question of the doay"ala should be a 22 : 1 .."'" Iiv"YlC"["'~ resolved at once since. among other things. they are closely related to one of the sources of the enthymeme, the Te",uo1e'OO (57b 4). as we see at B 25. 02b 19-20: "Those enthymemes are taken from T6",uo1e'oo when they are based upon what is necessary and (invariably) is what it is." doay"alo. is a word used of things which are what they are of necessity; they cannot be other than they are (Met. I026b 27-30). If rhetorical discourse can use doay"ala. as obviously it can from the statements here (57" 22-24) and at 02b 19-20. then it is not confined in its argumentation exclusively to probable matter. The d.ay"aloo. in other words. extends the dimension of the subject matter to material which is certain and unconditioned. This is a reasonable position insofar as rhetoric. as rational discourse on open problems. should have access. when necessary and pertinent. to the special principles (commonly accepted to be dvay"ala) of the subject, whether the subject be the nature of government. justice. economics. or anything else. A. again recognizes the legitimate use of doay"ala by rhetorical enthymerne at B 22. 96a 2-3. See

also ?Oa

IO.

2 l~.r,~ is the reading of the codd. and is correct. Roemer alone of the edd. reads ".el dio. a 23 lCptcrEL~ i.e.. judgment. which is an act which results from deliberation. Judgment. the act to which the art of rhetoric attempts to lead the auditor. plays an important part in A.'s analysis of rhetoric. as we shall see in chap. 3. This is natural since the art of rhetoric comes into existence precisely when there is deliberation seeking assent on problems which are not incontrovertible. are subject to change. and admit neither absolute knowledge nor absolute assertion bnt only probable knowledge and conditioned assertion; see Studies. pp. 24-28. a 24 lC,.1

ruw~

The "at is intensive.

60

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

a 26 : I TO'Ou-rOU yevou~ see S. I320. 2

c:.~ lno~ el:n:dv

I.e., contingent (cf. 57a 24); on the genitive,

See 55a 7 :

I.

a 27: I TOUT"", modifies .~di. and refers to Ta nean0l"'o., 57a "5. 2 c:.~ ... cr"I'{3CdVOVTIl That which generally, or for the most

part, happens is in the last analysis something which can also be other than it is (57a 24: ••diX.To.. d,uru~ IX"'). It is also something which is possible, TO •• 6,xol"'.' (see next note), in the san,e sense: namely, that it can be, or not be, or be different from what it is. Since A. specifies what he means by cb~ tlnl TO ",.l~ <JvI'Pal••• To. by using the example of slxo, at 57a 34, consult 57a 34 : J. J ev6q0 I'EVCI For A. the ..6.x0I'.'0, is that which can he or not be. It is something which is possible, but which is not necessary: it does not have to be. A. uses the word by itself (see An. Pr. 32a I7ff. where he explains it in chaps. I3 and I4) or with an explanatory phrase such as we saw at 57a 5. Waitz in his commentary on At•. Pro 25a 37 distinguishes between TO 6v.o.To. as physical possibility and TO 1.68Xol'.'.' as logical possibility (logical possibility = we can safely assert something without fear of contradicting oursdves: e.g., "this mother loves her son"; for, as a general rule, mothers love their children). In its use in the Rlretoric, ••66X01'6••• would certainly include both physical and logical possibility; on the general problem of possibility, see Hintikka. a 28 lx TO'OU....,V ••• lTEPO>V A. is speaking here about the kind of statement whiclr is possible in enthymemes. In what it infers, any syllogism differs according to the character ofits premisses. For example, if the modality of the premisses is necessary, the syllogism asserts necessary rdations; if the modality is contillgent, it asserts contingent or possible relationships. We frod such a distinction in An. Pro 29b 32-35, which is possibly the passage to which A. is referring at 57a 29. A. acknowledges here that rhetoric, concerned as it is with deliberatioll about human action, deals for the most part with the contingent, and therefore with syllogisms which infer the probable. The fact that such "probabilities" are (see 573 34 - 57b 25) secure and unchanging enough to offer material for inference by syllogism proves that even in the problematical situation (which is the typical situation of rhetorical discourse) one can arrive by reason at an intelligent and logical position or course of action. On the other hand, in allowing the enthymeme to employ necessary premisses (see 573 22: I) A. extends the horizon of rhetorical discourse. He is in fact locating rhetoric in the larger domain ill which we frod it in the P/llrednrs of Plato. Rhetoric apparendy can be the vehicle for all discourse in which one speaks in an effort to win understanding from another.

57a 34

COMMENTARY

a 29-30 (&ij).ov ... civm).u"",,,';;v) parentheses.

6x

All the odd. except Ross read the

See 57a 28. a 30 : 1 'P
a 3I

ciV
See 57&

22 : 1.

See 57& 22 : I, 57& IS. a 33 :

J ToU'nI)V Exci'C'EPOV i.e., e,,,6-ra and f11Jpera (S7a 32). a EKU"C'EP'IJ i.e., Ta dvayxala and Ta xAslaTa cLt; lnl TO nOAV (57a 3X). We had the same words and a similar distribution at 54b II.

a 34 : 1 iCM'LV':'~ is the reading accepted by three of the edd., Spenge!, . 2 d,,6~ On the ,1"OTa and "'1pe,a (probabilities and signs), see Cope, Introd., pp. 160-63; Studies, pp. 104-15. In what follows in the text A. gives three sources for premisses of the enthymeme - (a) .!"o~, (b) non-necessary ""IPS'o. (hereafter "'11"'00 d.",ovpo.), (c) necessary "'1ps'o. (hereafter TO"p7j!!,O.) - and explains each. (At B 25, 02b 13-25 he repeats these three and confuses things by adding :>rae4ds,ypa, as a fourth source. What he probably means by adding ",aedde,ypa, although no explanation is given, is that induction [naed6.'ypa] can be the ground for educing a general, probable proposition which em be used as an sl"o~ or "'11"'0' d.",oupo.; see Studies, pp. x04.) If these three are the sources for rhetorical premisses, one might ask with some justification what happens to the "topics" (see 58a 10-35) which are usually thought to be the sources for rhetorical premisses. From what A. says about el"rlTa, "'1pe,a, and ronoo, we must conclude that the rhetorician derives the .l"ora and the "'1peia from the
' 'T<

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

on the subject under discussion. It is from this material that the rhetorician develops ./x&Ta and '"IIl.'a for argumentation by enthymeme and example (see StlII/ies, p. nonn). It is clear from the Rhetoric (see also All. Pro "]Oa 2-3) that A. argues for a difference between B/".Ta and a'1p"a or, to be precise, the '"Ip.'a a.eIi,vIla. The ...."Il'l~ ••• sign reveals its difference even to the casual reader. On the difference between .l,,&~ and '"11"'.' d.eIi,vIl." see 57b I : 2. As far as can be seen, subsequent rhetoricians and philosophers followed, or attempted to follow, A.'s analysis of .1,,&, and '"Ill.'.', C£ Appendi.'(. 3 w~ ml TO noAU y'v6p. ...ov A. clefines .I,,&~ here as "that which generally happens, but not in any unlimited sense as some define it; rather an 6'''&, is that which, with respect to things which can be other than they are, is related to that to which it is an sl,,&~ [i.e., the things which can be other than they are] in the same way as a universal is related to a particular." An example of such an .I".~ would be: children love their parents. As we experience and know the world of reality, this proposition represents what is generally the case, but not always so. From this ./,,&~ one can conclude with some security that child X loves his parents•• /,..~ is not that which simply happens, for that equates it with sheer chance. ./x&~ possesses a note of stability and regularity which is intrinsic to the nature of the thing which is the ground for the .l".~ proposition derived from that nature. A stabilized, but contingent (i.e., not necessary), fact can be known (Met. I027" 2o-2I), and it can even be used in a demonstrative syllogism (An. Pro pb 20£f.). Obviously is something relatively stabilized and knowable (An. Pr. 70a 4f£) and, as s1ich; olfers ground for reasonable inference to further knowledge. An .1,,6~ belongs to those realities which, as we are told in An. Post. 8sb P.-33, are "true, yet capable of being .other than they are." Expressing such a fact or truth, an ./,..~ can be the basis of probable argumentation, for "every syllogism works through propositions which are either necessary or for the most part true •.. ; if they are for the most part true, so, too, is the conclusion" (An. Post. 87b 22-25). By the meaning he has given to A. has established a rational foundation for all probable argumentation. From the correct ./x.~ we can argue to what is quite probably, but not necessarily, the fact in any given situation. As a matter of fact Plato uses in this Aristotelian sense many times to develop an argument; Rep. sI9b is a typical example. I find even more relevant to this discussion of A.'s understanding of sl".~ the study by W esdake of the use of ./x&, in Thucydides and contemporary as ~ as later :,:,!.iters. ~!':: meanings he ~~~ in the use of the word - e.g., reasonable, natural, to be expected, fitting," "right" - can be readily seen as the ground for the Aristotelian concept outlined above.

.1".,

.1"rI,

.1".,

COMMENrAllY

In .I~., (and also "'11"'.v dv"""I'.v) the art of rhetoric is built upon sound, though probable, reasouing which is rooted in reality. An inference from does not conclude to unconditioned truth. But it does present an eminently reasonable warrant that the conclusion represents the objective is difkrent from that of Plato as fact. In this respect the Aristotelian we see it in Phaedr. 2p.c, 25ge, 260. A.'s .~., (of which there is an example at 67b 31-32) is not subjective but objective. It is grounded in the order of reality and consequently men accept it as a most likely statement of the truth. See Demosthenes' use ofit at 01. 1.7-8.

,I".,

s/".,

a 3S : 1 &1
.1"."

s/".,

3S -

T.

a 36 : 1 iD.Ac.>~ Ix£'y Kassel, De, Te.'
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

(a) (S7b 4) Te"I'>1e1e1e'o, does not fall into the class of things which are gell"rally so. It points to what it signifies always and necessarily. But what call be the difference, which A. clearly sees between sz,.6~ and C11J1',io. d.,;,.vl'0'. which makes him draw a distinction between the two? For e'tample, it is clear that if we use the C11Jl's'o. 0.";'''''1'0' in an argument we can conclude ouly to what is probably true, which is all that we can do with sz,..~. Ifwe take A.'s explanation of what he understands in general by <1711"'0', we may come to some understanding of the difference between <17J1"'0, d.,;,.vl'0' and sz,.&~. In A,.. Pro 70a 7-9 A. describes <1711"'0' in this way: "Whenever by the fact that one thing exists something else exists, or by the fact of its comingto-be something else has come to be prior to it or consequent upon it, the first is a sign of the other's becoming or existing." In other words, there appears to be • definite and firm relationship in the order of existence between the two realities. From the knowledge of one the mind can move to a knowledge of the other, from the knOWll to the unknown. Present in the sign is the knowability of the signate. It is quite likely that because of this relationship <1711"'0' appears to possess a strollger demonstrative force for A. than el,,&~. This fact is revealed by his illustration of C11Jl's'o. by means of the syllogistic figures (e.g., S7b I0-2I; An. Pr. 70a II - 70b 6). <171I'S'O. argues immediately and direcdy to the signate: necessarily so, if it is the 're>'I'~e'o,; with strong probability, if it is the C11Jl's'o. d,,';'.vl'0" The nature of C11JI'"'o, is to lead, of and by itself, to the probability, or necessity, of the thing signified. This is not so for ,l,,&~. sl,,6~ is a general probability grounded in reality, but without any formal relation to an other, which is the relationship present in <171l's,o" Because of this relation (necessary or probable) between sign and signate, it is possible to understand why A. differentiates between ,l".~ and <171I'S'o" Furthermore, even though ,l,,&~ and C11J1"'0, d.w.vl'0' yield only a probable conclUsion. the fact rentains that because of the relation in the order of existence between sign and signate, given the sign, there is a stronger probability pointing toward the specific signate than an sl".~ can muster for its specific instance. For e;7e
COMMENTARY

example, we find that Isocrates wes both ig,o-. in one sentence but without noticeable distinction between them (Paneg. roIl. However, there is no question that they recognize the idea of relationship between sign and signate, as we can see in the citation of Isocrates, or in Sophocles' Alltigolle 998f[, Electra 23f[ In his example of signs A. s.implifies matters by wing natural signs (57b n-2I), i.e., .,wting realities which by the way they are physically constituted implicate the being of something dse. This explains Td !'w, and n governs ..w...aO' [..a<11:o•. b 2 ':'~... or, Our clause is parallded at 57b 3 by the explanation of .. d M in &;~ TW • ..aOdAov TL

b 3 ToUT••". i.e., the two signs mentioned .t 57b I-3, which will be specified further at 57b 4-5. b 4 orEX!''';p,av is the name given to ..d !'A. d.a)' ..aio. (lg,O. is the <17/,....0. which would offer the "demonstrative premiss which is necessary." The a"l!,.'o, d.w • .,!'o. is the "demonstrative premiss which is probable." The TB"!'>ie'o, is a sign which guarantees the certainty of the signate, .s A.' s explanation of d.a)'.. aio. at 57b 5-6 indic.tes: "by necessary signs I mean those from which the strictly demonstrative syllogism comes." I add the words "strictly demonstrative" becawe that is the meaning of" avJ..to)',a!,d~" here: e.g., An. Post. 73a 24: "strict demonstration is the syllogism from necessary premisses." T6HJJ7Je'O" makes the syllogism built upon it a strictly demonstrative syllogism with respect to the signate. In fact, when Socrates uses ""!,ojew, at Euthyphro 9" 2, it would appear from the context which leads up to it that he wants such a demonstrative proof from Euthyphro. The TB,,!'oje'O., then, introduces into rhetoric the character of reasoning found in the Annlrlies, just as the ei.. a and lg.o. indicates a constant and unchanging relationship between sign and signate. Evidence for the sign assures the fact of the signate, and A. underlines this by identifying the ..,,!'>le'o, with the middle term of the first figure syllogism, the usual figure for the strictly scientific syllogism. It is necessary to add, however. that in calling attention to the rdationship between " ..'!'>le'o, and d.a)'"aio. by which ..s,,!'>le'o, becomes the "eo .. aal~ anod .." ..."oi d.a),,,aia we do not thereby identify ".,,!'>ie'o, with the strict apodeictic protasis which leads to complete knowledge. TB;,!'>ie'o" as A. explains it in the Rhetoric, will give certain knowledge of the existenre of the signate. He does not say that it

o..

66

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [

57b 10

gives, or will give, the reason for the fact of the existence, which is necessary for full ~",un'lI'''I. TS"I'r,lll0V win tell you that the signate exists, but not why it exists. i.e., this U"II'Biov has no further specifying b 5 XCI..-" ,",V &""'P0pclV diiference. To distinguish it from the u"ll',iov which is a TB"I'r,Il'0V A. calls it simply U"Il'e,ov d.wvvl'0v, probably because of his observation at r 13, 14b 15-18.

b6: 1 2

aullOyL"P.O~

oro

TOLOU'S'OV

For its meaning see S7b 4. i.e., an elv""""iov; see S7b 4.

b 8 : 1 'PEP£LV "Adduced, brought forward." :z .:.~ &£&£Lyp.4vov ••. ,,£n:£pexap.4vov These words presumably explain 7:e"I'r,lll0V: "a something, as it were, demonstrated and drawn to a full conclusion. " Yet the only thing which they explain about it is its character as elv"""",ov: namely, that it necessarily and absolutely points to its signate. b 9 ..-lKP.exp XCIi n:4pex~ A.' s explanation suggests that the n"I'r,lll0V could also be called "'.Il"~ (from """,seaul'l..ov). What he has in mind here at 57b 7-9 is explained by what is said about U"II'8ioV-TS"1'7}Ill0V in S7b 4 and in S7b 10-21 under (a). As for his further explanation that both words mean the same thing "in the ancient tongue," Gaisford has a somewhat startling comment. He says that the language of the fourth century did not diffi:r from Homer's but that the Homeric poems were not too well known in the fourth century. In confn-mation of this he points to Oem., Against Aristocrates 630, in whi.ch the orator explains a word (""olva) fairly common in Homer's fliaJ; see Spengel or Cope for the full citation. b ;0-21 I!O..-LV SO ... n:vEUGTLiiv A. uses his three syllogistic figures to illustrate the two kinds of U"II"'ov. Apparendy he finds in an U"Il's,a the quality possessed by the middle term of a syllogism. A middle term is something which points to another thing which it either includes within itself, or within which it is included. "Man" as a middle term points to all the individuals of the species which it includes within itself, and to a larger class within which it is included: namely, animal. The middle term in each of the three figures is a sign pointing to the signate in the conclusion. Thus A. can say, at An. Pr. 1Qa 10-13, that "an enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs; and a sign may be understood in three ways corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures"; or again, at 70a 24-25, that "thus if a single premiss is stated, there is only a sign; but if the second is added, there is a syllogism." The middle term of the syllogism serves as a foundation to exemplify the nature of U"II'Biov. A. uses as his examples U"II'"a commonly employed by men. Furthermore, and this is important, he uses them in an argument in the way in which men

57b 10-21

COMMENTARY

presumably use them to establish a proposition. Thw he is able to show clearly the difference between Te"p>je'.' and '"11'0'.' d.,;,."p... For he is able to demonstrate that only the -""p>je'" is wed correcdy and infers a valid conclwion. The '"11'0'0' d.,;,.vpo. is wed by men in argument in such a way that if it is put into the syllogistic structure it employs the form incorrectly and can reach only an invalid conclusion. As he says at 57b 14, B 24, oIb 9-II, 25, and 03a 2-5, these '"Ipoia are dU1l,uoy,a-ru. Thw it is that in A.'s examples the (f~psi•• as used in the second figure syllogism violates a basic law of the syllogism by appearing as an undistributed middle term, while the '"Ips'o. used in the third figure concludes to a statement not warranted by the premisses. At most, therefore, in the second and third figures the sign will infer only a probable (and refutable) signote. But in the fmt figure the sign is wed correcdy and infers a certain and irrefutable knowledge of the existence of the signote. In exemplifying the text examples I will change A.'s order to that of the three figures.

(a) First figure: T8"p>je'.v: 57b 14-17: A. accepts the middle term "fever" (as does Plato, AidbiaJu II I40a-b) as necessarily included within "sick" - "all with fever are sick"; the term., in tum, includes "this man." It is a valid middle term for this inferential form. and the conclusion is certain and absolute. If A.'s text between S7b 10 and 57b 17 says anything in the Greek, then the rdation of this '"11'0'0' to its signote is that of a particular to a universal such as we have in (c) bdow. But in analyzing the logic of this '"Ips'o. I can find nothing in it which makes it, as a (f~pB'O', different from the '"IPS'o. in (b) which is related to its signate as a universal to a particular. (b) Second figure: '"11"'0' dv';'."po., which is rdated to its signote as a universal to a particular: 57b 17-21: The middle term "rapid breathing" is assumed to be included within "fever." But it may, or may not, be included, for, to paraphrase A.'s words at An. Pro 70a 35-37: "a syllogism cannot be formed when the terms are so cdated; for althottgh those with fever breathe rapidly and this man breathes rapidly, it is not necessary that he have a rever." Thus the conclusion can be refuted (57b 19). (c) Third figure: '"IPS'o, d.,;,."poo, which is rdated to its signote as a particular to a universal: 57b rr-I4: The middle term "Socrates" includes both "wise" and 'Jwt" (and truly so, S7b 14), but one can conclude from this kind of

68

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' 1

rdation not that "the wise are just," but only that "some wise person i. ju.t." The structure of the third figure will conclude only to a particular statement. The conclusion can be refuted (57b 13), as can that in the .econd figure. In conclusion, we should note that A.'. discussion of sign enthymemes, as well as his analy.i. of refutation, B 25, 02a 29 - 02b 13, clearly indicate that he assumes that the enthymeme, a. far as form is concerned, is in no way notably different from the syllogism, i.e., composed of two premisses and a conclusion; see S7ll 16. b II TI> " ..e' Ii"......ov •.. " ..e6Aou 1-3; see S7b Io-aI under (e).

b 13 AUTO"

A. begins the explanation of 57b

For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under

(e).

o"

b 14: 1 &.uuAA.;y,..... For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under (e). Ross alone of the edd. reads: .!e1Jl'wov (dO'lJAM".C1TOV ,,&e), with a comma after the parenthesis. It is more reasonable to punctuate it as follows: .le1Jl'evo• • aO'lJAM",C1TO' ,,&e. -i.e., a colon (or period), no parentheses, and a period after ,,&e. Z T;' 6£ introduces the second illustration of 57b 1-3. introduces a statement dependent upon "'11'810. b 15 : 1 3T' "o..aL (elva.). The statement is explained in 57b 10-21 under (a). 2 liT' yoiA .. EX£' The {fn is causal. It was a commonly accepted view that the relation between the two (having milk - recent childbearing) was a necessary one (d.a""aio., 57b 16); see, e.g., Plato, Menexenus 237e, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates RomanaB II.34.6.

b 17: 1 &A"Tov 2

TO 6£

b IS 3T' ""p£.....£,

b 19 :

1

"",..".;"

2 AUTO"

For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under (0). introduces the third illustration of 57b 1-3. See S7b 10-31 under (b). neuter; sing. and pI., frequendy used adverbially. For the reason, see 57b 10-31 under (b).

'ii"

b 21 7tIIEu ..... Cope, pp. 45£, has an extended note on this word a. an example of a class of verbs in -aw, ·
COMMBNTARY

of suasive and its implications for the audience and for the nature of rhetorical argumentation; (4) and, finally, in the present section (57b 26 - 58a 35), the analysis of the methodology of this argumentation. partially at 56b 2-0 and 12-27. C£ An. Pr. 69a 13-19; rhetorical induction by example is not the strict counterpart of ordinary induction (B 20, 93a 26-27) since it infers only from part to part, or from like to like. It does not, as induction does, infer from the part to the whole, i.e., from a set ofindividual instances to a universal statement. Furthermore, example does not infer from the whole to the part, i.e., from a universal statement to a particular instance (e.g., criminals are jwtly punished; therefore X, a criminal, is justly punished), or from whole to whole (all animals have senses; therefure all men have ,ense,). A. give, the reason at 57b 29-30; "example" is what i, meant when one infers from a more known particular thing to a less known particular thing in the same general class (vno TO a,ho y'vo., 57b 29). "General dass" is also meant by TO a~To ~aOoAov (57b 35), which in A. is the opposite of TO ~aO' 8"arn:o., the individual. "General dass " as used here is any genus or species endosing a set of individuals possessing all the characteristics of the class, and so can be predicated of each; see An. Po,t. 73b 26-27. Induction by naea6"YI-'a is inference by resemblance: from one particular fact one infers another particular fact because of the likeness between the two. A. illustrates it here, and again at B 20. A moment', reflection will show that one cannot use example without implicitly or explicitly making a real induction in order to apprehend ·the general class under which the particulars fall and therefore resemble one other. Spengel, p. 271, makes the same observation; and if one attends to A.', example on tyranny (57b 30-36), one will discover that A. himself has implicitly made a real induction. Example is an imperfect induction and usually will give only probability, since the general dass assumed does not necessarily apply to each and every like instance. This is precisely the point of A.'s illustration: not everyone who asks for a bodyguard is certainly aiming at tyranny. Isocrates in his exhortation To Demonic", 34 gives the working rule for example as it was generally used by the Greeks: "Make past events be examples of future events." A. does that in his examples, giving his reason for his doing so at 68a 30-3 I. Andocides in On the Pe.ce argues throughout the speech from past examples. A. shows a preference for naeWslYI-'aTa which factual evidence presents, e.g., B 20, 94" 6-7 (and see Poetics 1451b 16-19). But since factual instances are not always easy to come upon, one may use comparison or fable, i.e., invented example; c£ 93a 28 - 94" 8. b 27 :

1

dP'I"«lL

z oIl...

n

.:.~ IL£PO~

b 29 ciIL'fK" A neuter dual with a singular verb, on the analogy of the usual neuter construction; see S. 957.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

70

58a

I

b 30 : 1 010113.., See 57& 19 : 1. 2 E'''~OUA£U6' The present tense, as given in cod. E, is better for the logic of the sentence at 57b 34-35; I note that it is read by all the edd. except Ross. The general class here is "the one who aims at tyranny asks for a bodyguard" (57b 35-36). From like instances ofpcisistratus and Theagenes one argues that such is the aim ofDionysius. Plato, Rep. 566b, speaks of "the notorius request of all tyranny ... to ask the demos for a bodyguard." Dionysius (ca. 43<>-367 B.c.) by the stratagem of acquiring for himself his own guard became <1Tea'"'1yd~ a')-r."e,iTwe in 406/5 and tyrant of Syracuse; see Diodorns Siculus, 13.9I-95. Pcisistratus (d. 528/7) made his attempt in 561; we have the story in Plutarch's Life of Solon, 28-31, and in Herodotus, r.59-"41. On Peisistratus and Dionysius I, see Andrewes, CAH IV 61-7r, and Hammond, pp. 1']9-85. Theagenes ofMegara took control ofhis country some time between 640 and 620 B.C.; see the OeD, and Hammond, pp. 14~ 50. His son-in-law, Cylon, attempted, but failed, to establish a tyranny at Athens ca. 632; see Thucyd., 1.126; Herod., 5.71. Speaking of the overthrow of government in the Pol. 1305a 23-28; A. again mentions these three tyrants together. b 32 E'
71....

b 34 &v cKoX taClalv "'.. As was explained at 57b 3<>-JI the auditors know that Dionysius is asking for a bodyguard; but they do not know if his goal (61a -roO-ro, 57b 35) is tyranny.

It 35 :

1 ,,1iv..Cl i.e., the "'aeM8iypara just presented. 2 "",1>..0 Cl~"O XCl86AOU See 57b 27 : 2. 3 3·.. i.e., "to the effect that"; c£ S. 2586, 57& 19 : 1.

58a I ,,1a't"E'~ 6;",olE'X...XCli They are called dox.Oaai ("generally considered to be demonstrative"; c£ Gorg. 472a 2.) because they are not strictly demonstrative, and do not give certain knowledge, not because they are not proofs. We have already seen that BIHora and I17Jpeia (i.e., J~ c1i. of 58. r) in general present us with probabilities, not =tainties. The ",1<1TBI~ d",.,.. a''''TI"al, from the context of this whole chapter, are ••O.Jp7Ipa and "aed6B1ypa. As A. said at 56a 35/£, the ways of demonstrating are induction and syllogism in dialectic, naead.''Ypa and ••O.sp7lpa in rhetoric. At B 2.0, 93' 2.4-25, A. tells us that the "oIVal ",iar..~ of all rhetoric are two in number, "ae&6"'Ypa and 'vO.sp7lpa (see also 94" 9-10), and that he will now discuss them. This he proceeds to do in B 20-26 by setting before us dilferent aspects of "aedd"Yfia and i.O.sp7lpa. C£ Appendix.

COMMBNTARY

71

a 2 fLEYI ....'l SlarpOpa This difference is also found in the syllogism of dialectic (58a 4); so once again rhetoric is joined to dialectic. Spengel ina very extensive note at SSb 26 (pp. 33-40) offers an interpret.tion of this "distinction of major importance" in which he says that it means that rhetoric makes use of the common topics. An interpretation of this "diffi:rence" will be oflered in the notes which follow. We must first remark, however, that since A. appears to have been the first to introduce the idea of enthymeme e.g., 54a 14-15 (and see Studies, pp. 69-82) - it is not clear how a difference which belongs to enthYDleme could be "almost universally overlooked" (s8a 3). Despite this mystery, the distinction which he establishes here is important for the structure of the first two books of his treatise. If we comprehend what he is s.ying, we come upon the schema which clearly demonstrates that the development in Books I and 2 is logical and coherent and that the text enjoys a unified structure. In essence the "great diflerence" of s8a 2 is that rhetorical enthymemes like dialectical syllogisms derive their material for inference from common topics as well as from particular topics. A. tells us here (s8a 2-35) that ••8ViJ7jiJaTa (and, by implication, naeadsiYiJaTa), obtain the material for their inference from two sources: (a) particular topics (s8a 17-26), and (b) general topics (58. 10-17). It is upon this division that he will develop the first two books. For example, after the final introductory chapter (chap. 3), A. will analyze the particular topics between A 4 and B 17 and the general topics between B 18 and B 26. I-lis analysis of the particular topics (A 4 to B 17) centers on the three entechnic ",111T.'~ (reason, o}8o~, na8o~, c£ s6a 1-33, and the notes thereto). For example, inA 4-14 he studies the particular topics which assist one in finding the evidentiary material (i.e., the :n:il1T'~ which I call reason, the rational ana/ogll') for each of the three kinds of rhetoric. (Chap. IS on ateChnic proofS is introduced where it is because it is rdevant to judicial rhetoric which he discussed in chaps. 10-14). In B I-II he studies the particular topics which assist one in developing the entechnic ",1(1TI~: na8o" and in B 12--17 the ",irrn~: o}8o~. Before beginning the specillc analysis of the general topics atB 23-26 A. makes a resume (B 18-19) of what has thus far been accomplished in the treatise, followed by a transition (B 20-22) in which ho gives his attention primarily to the two methods of rhetorical argument: e.O~!,~.,a and naerl.d"YiJll. On the unity of the te.'
a 3 : 1 1.d.'lIlui« modifies a'cupoed: "a diffi:rence which has particularly passed unnoticed." 2 len,,, ij",.p ""l ",.pl "is a differt1,ce which indeed is connected with the dialectical method of syllogisms."

a4:

1

fLi8oSov

2 .... fLW yap

See

ssa 4, ssb 8. answered by Ta d8 (s8a 5): "for some enthymemes."

72

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

58a 6

a 5-6: c.,"".p... au).).oy."I'Wv The reading commonly accepted by the edd. for these lines is: cll=se x"l ""Tn Toj. d.alB"T•..?j. fJi80do. TW. O'1>,u01""fJw" Cope brackets fJB80doo . . . "vAlo1""fJw, without explanation, and olfers no commentary on the passage. Spengel conjectures TWO avAAo1""fJw" which changes the meaning of the sentence entirely. Kassel without explanation brackets the whole passage. None of the English versions accurately translates the Greek text; if anything, they all produce something similar to Spengel's conjecture. In the Oxford translation, for example, we find: "One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic" (Roberts, Rheto,ic., p. [12». Clearly this is not what the Greek says. Since the time ofVictorius the passage has been considered a problem. Yet it appears that the text we have from good codd. is correct. lfind the evidence for that ot 58a 2-4 and especially in the words EaT.. fj"'e . .. "vAAo)""fJw" There we are told that this great difference concerning enthyrnemes which has been missed by all is one having reference to the dialectical method of syllogisms. 1 would translate 58a 2-6: "The greatest dilference concerning enthymemes, a dilference which has particularly passed unnoticed practicaUy by all, is one which indeed is connected with (has reference to) the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some enthymemes are in accord with the rhetorical method of syllogisms in precisely the same way as they are in accord with the dialectical method of syllogisms, while other enthymemes .•." A. has repeatedly told us that rhetoric is like dialectic. Here he gives us a specific instance of that likeness: namely, that enthymemes are formed in the same way as dialectical syllogisms. In other words, rhetoric, like dialectic (or, indeed, the art of logic), is an art which transcends all specific disciplines, and its method of argumentation by enthymeme is formed in ;uch a way that it can be used, as dialectical syllogisms are, in various disciplines. A. explains this quite clearly at 58. 10-17. a 6-"7 x ..... • /D.ACl~ .•. oil"", x ..'<Eu.'lJl'l'tv..~ "While other enthymemes are in .ccord with other branches of knowledge and special faculties, some of which are already on hand, othe.rs are not yet established." TeX"'7 (Bonitz: Index 759.37-42) is frequently a synonym for ';"'aT~fJ'1 and it is used in that sense here. This means that some enthymemes are structured in accord with the specific information contained within the different branches of knowledge. Rhetoric, in other words, uses in its argumentation the materials of already established disciplines, or any others which may come to be formulated. A. was quite aw.re that new areas of knowledge, and therefore new disciplines, were possible: e.g., "Perhaps the areas of knowledge are unlimited" (SE 170a 22-23). He realized, as Ci=os.ys (Deo,at. 1.42.187), "omnia quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus •.. dissipata quondam fuerunt." Again it is clear that A. does not limit the range of rhetorical discourse.

58a 10

COMMENTARY

73

"established, fixed"; for references on the word, a 7 ....'tELA'I...... iv..~ see Cope, p. 48. Dufour and Tovar read with a 8 ..E r..oU~ ..KpO ....a;~] x.., ...iillov the codd. TO~~ d"eoaTIi~. Cope, Spengd, and Roemer bracket TO~~ d><e0aTIi~. Ross brackets ,..allo•. Kassel reads a lacuna after d"eoaTIi~. In resolving this problem the first thing which must be kept in mind is that 58a 2-9 is • single logical statement the objective of which is to set forth the ,..."laT7j ~Ia'Poe" "al ,..liAlaTa AoA'18via with respect to the understanding of the enthymeme. With that in mind it is obvious that the subject of Aa.8el.ova .. (58. 8) and I'sTapal.ova .. (58a 9) is contained in the "aa .. (58a 3): i.e., those who have overlooked the dilference. In the logic of the sentence there is no place for To.k d><eoaTa~, though the words are grammatically acceptable as a personal object of Aa.M.ova... They are even more out of place when one compares 59b 8-16 with 59a 8-9. At 59b 8-r6 A. states in more detail what he is saying here. It is this same passage (59b 8-16) which makes it quite clear that there can be no reason for secluding pallo•. This leaves us with the question of whether or not A...8d.ova.. has an object, or whether there is a lacuna in the text. As the object of Aa.8d.ovaw, I take riJ. ~la'Poed. understood from s8a 2. Such an accusative with Aa.8d"s .. may appear unique, but it has a paralld at 660 2-3 and in Poet. r4ssa 25: Aa.8d.o. Ta V"s ....Tla. Thus I would read 58a 8 d.d "al Aa.81i.oval. TO [TO~~ d"eoaTd,], " ..I ,..aAAo. anT0l's.Ol! and translate s8a 8-9: "Therefore these individuals fail to notice this diH'erence, and the more they fasten upon the subject matter in its proper sense ["aTa TeO"'O.), the more they shift from the arts of rhetoric and dialectic." As Bonitz, Index, 77zb 45, says, it often means a 9 : 1 ......Ilt "pcl",ov apte, III decet. Our phrase is followed in some codd. by what is obviously a gloss: d•••Toot;. But it catches the meaning of our phrase: "in the proper, appropriate way," i.e., "using the method proper to the specific discipline." See Plato, Rep. 58Ib 7 ("aTa TeO"OV), comparing with it s8ra 6 and the use of de8cii~ in a parallel statement. 2 ..",..clII-""o, x ....1lt "pu",ov is e.' before "aTa TeOnO.; I do not see the point of this. 3 IL£Ta.(aa;(vOUGLV

Uto pass from one

place to another"; thus the

kind of action being criticized is that by which those who profess to be rhetoricians or dialecticians abandon the very arts which they profess, i.e., rhetoric and dialectic: a~Tcii. at s8a 9. a 10 : 1

TO AEYUII-""OV

Sux at s8a 10-35. 2

nAElOVtdV

"this statement." i.e., in more detail, which he proceeds to give

s8a 18

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

74

a II ",.pt wv ToU~ TO"'OU~ AtYOILEV Dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms for A. are "those syllogisms we have in mind when we speak: of the topics." These are the topics he calls ".w.t (s8a 12); they may be used as a source for inference in any discipline (s8a 12-17), but they will not provide knowledge about the disciplines (s8a ZI-22). They are obviously general sources from anyone of which one can construct a form of syllogistic inference which will be a valid form for specifically different disciplines (s8a 13-14: a.a'l'eeO.TW••rae,). For a fuller discussion of the I<.W.! Ton •• , see Studies, pp. 129-35; to the evidence there, add Thurot. C£ Appendix. a 12

oi. )COlVOt

See

58a

II.

a.,

a 13 SLC..p.pOV't1o)V .. i.e., subjects which are specifically separate and is used here we distinct; see s8a 16-17: "atTo • ... d.a'l'see •. Although must remember that, when we classify, any can become a yi.o, as we descend. A.'s meaning is more fully expressed at s8a 17 where he mentions both: eldo, "a! yi•• ,.

.1a.,

a 14: 1

olov b ... TO"'O~

.1d.,

See B 23, 97b 12-27.

Z DUSEY y.zp ILiiAADV This is the predicate to <"Ta. and is to be X.T••t: "to infer or to express an enthymeme on followed by 1j nee!

'l'V"."Qi.

justice from this topic will be no different frOIf! inferring or expressing an enthymeme on physics or on any other subject whatsoever." 011 .Udi. plill ••, see LS, "cla, II.S. a 16

o"';'ououv

a 17: 1 la",· These are the particular topics; not only are they called L:I.a but, in contradistinction to i, they are more frequently desigat tin1es nated erd7f (s8a 27, 30, 33). Although A. will use the word without distinction for both particular and general topics, the ra.a come from the particular discipline, and can be used only in the discipline to which they belong (s8a 17-21). Further, the more specific they are to the discipline, the more they move one into that discipline and away from rhetoric (s8a 23-26). The use of the neuter form rd.a for fa.o. Ton., is not remarkable insofar as A. uses ,.ax.'.a (s8a 21) to refer to x•••• l Ton.,. We have a similar use of the neuter at ssb 35 (a"X.a) and at S5b 37 (l'TBVa). For further information on the particular topics, see Studies, pp. 121-29. C£ Appendix. z dljo~ xCitl YEvD~ "species or genus." "at here links alternatives; see Denniston, p. 292.

Ton•• ".I••

Ton.,

a 18 n:pDd......v Usually means the prei:nisses of a syllogism (see Cope, p. 51); the more likely meaning here, from the context of S8. 18-25, is sinlply: statements, propositions about the subject matter. These would be statements such as A. makes in handling the particular topics in chaps . .jJf. We

58a 26

COMMENTARY

75

can take the word, however, to mean "premisses" and still keep the meaning suggested; and perhaps in the light of 58a 3I and 35 it should be so interpreted. Nonetheless, the word is not monosemantic, as Cope, p. 72, recognizes: "Understand ..d~ neoTcl<1.'~, which generally stands in Aristotle for the 'materials' of Rhetoric which the speaker must have at his command."

a 18-19 olov ... -I)B.x"'''

The example clearly describes the character

of these particular topics: statements from the subject matter of physics are worthless for inference in ethics.

a 20 &>.A...... "",Inx"''' i.e., aAl,," ("eoTd<1"~) l~ eli. 1) ""lloY'<1,..d~) neel T';;. '1'"<11"';;'.

e.,...",.."

a21

xUK£tVcr:

i.e., "awol

T&"Ol.,

s8a

0';"

i<1T"" (h-

12ff.

a 22 Il'-'Ppov" To be knowledgeable or wise about a thing, to have it in mind; here, to know the subject matter ("no"et,.. ..07) of a particular discipline; on vnox6lJJB'PO-r, see 55a 36 : 2.

a 23

..u....

i.e., the r~." of 58a r7fL (3d..u.. read with the codd. by the edd., except Ross and Kassel, who, with Cope, read (JilTIO•. 3 [..
1

..

2

a 24: 1 ).'ljaE. ",o.'lja~ a common idiomatic usage with la..ocl.w; C£ 58a 8. 2 &>.A'll" In this use with the genitive it is like dllo'o~ -a -0': "of another sort, different from." 3 "I" On rhetoric as a form of '".<1Ttj,...", see 54'1 II : 1, 59b 13 : 3.

.".a..>j ...

a 25 d:pX..i~ These would be the r~I'" or the 01" ••". dex"t, the principles which constitute the nature of the particular ''''<1Ttj,...,,; as such they are the proper object of the study of that discipline. A. described this kind of study at 55a 26: ~'~"C1"aAla~ , . ,Myo~, A. seems anxioos to emphasize that rhetorical discourse on, let us say, law is not a jurisconsult's discourse on law, that rhetoric has its own dlo~ and 'eyo" even though it takes up varied disciplines. I am inclined to think that M has a 26-35 laT. 5. . . . ",pu..daE'~ a somewhat strong force here: "and yet." This is a summary statement on the

58. 33

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 1

role of particular (elM.., 58a 2.7) and general ("olVliiv, 58a 2.8) topics. In an intelligent discussiOll of. subject it is obvious that the bulk of one's argument will be developed from the particular topics. Consequendy, granted: enthymemes built all general topics arc proper to rhetoric ("aTa nI" e7JT02,1
.Iii.

Clearly the particular and general topics are the sources from a 30 ol~ cr." which arc derived the propositional statements for inference by enthymcme, and by inlplication for "aeddBl),",a, the other common form of inference. a 31 hEY'" 5' d&"I

See S8a 27-28.

a 32 : 1 HOLVOU~ DI10lc.»~ i.e., "alike, equally": "those equally conunon for all subjects (,.,IVTOO. yllv",.)." z npo,<.pov refers to A.' s intention of speaking first about the ,rd,!, which he does from A 4 to B 17, followed with a presentation of the "owol in B 20-26. a 33 np"''
s8a 3S

COMMBNTARY

77

a 35 GTOLXEill A. uses this word again at B 22, 96b 20-22, and by it he says that he means T&"O~. In fact it is his "owd~ T&"O~ as B 26, 03a 16-18 indicates; see Studies, pp. 131-)2.. The word is used at 62a 20-21 and 01a 2930 in the more common sellse of "ultinrate dements" of a thing; on this meaning, see Cope, Ill/rod., pp. 127ff. The important point here is that in aTo'X"a "al "eOTa".I~ A. actually gives the division of the first two books of his treatise. First comes a study of the particular topics for reason, ~60~, "a60~, which provide the material for statements, i.e., "eoTCl ....'; then a study of the general topics (i.e., our ..ToIZ"a here) which allow one to put the statements in the form of simple inferences. It is generally assumed that for some idea of what A. means by TO"O, one must go to the Rhetoric; for a discussion of the topics, see Studies, pp. IlS-3S. We may say this of the topics in a general way. The topics are the method which A. devised (a) to supply one with the content for an intelligent examination of the subject of discourse, and, (b) to present one with ways in which to express this content by forms of deductive reasoning. Since rhetorical discourse is the process of speaking to people on open issues in order to communicate with them in a reasonable manner, it should be clear not only that subject matter is at issue but also that persons are involved (the persons spoken to and the person speaking). Therefore particular topics will be concerned with all three (subject matter, person speaking, person spoken to), and will olfer various aspects under which the subject both in itself and with respect to these auditors may be presented. These aspects are, specifically, the three entechnic .,.t"T8'~: reason, ~60" "dOo,. The general topics will give various forms of inference in whicll to present this material. Thus the topics olfer the speaker (or writer) the material dement for discourse; these are the particular topics and they constitute a logic of invention. The topics also olfer the speaker the formal element for discourse, the ways in which to express the material in forms of inference: these are the general topics and they constitute a logic of inference. If a person is to hold discourse with another person upon a subject in an informed way, he must know what he is speaking about and to whom be is speaking. This is the work of the particular topics. One must then be able to present this matter in a convincing m:umer. This is the work of the general topics, which give inferential forms for structuring the material. As an art of discourse rhetoric needs each kind of topic. One cannot say from the RlU!toric that the particular topics are less proper to rhetoric. On the other hand, one can say that the general topics are more proper to it as an art which, like dialectic, transcends all the specific disciplines and may be used in all of them. C£ Appendix.

CHAPTER 3

I . Introduction: s8a 36 - S8b 8 rhetoric is divided into three classes: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic; the division is determined by the persons addressed

II . Development: S8b 8 - S9a 26 I.

s8b 8 - S9'l S (0) jab a - jab "" (b) jab 20 - jab 29 (c) jab 29 - j9a j

a more specific analysis of each class: what each docs and the time proper to it the specific dAo< of each class why each dAo< is ptOpct and exclusive to its class

2.

S9'l6-S9a 10

the geoeral sources for argumentation in each cla..

3· S9'l 11 - S9'l 26

theee elemcots absolutely esseotial for any and all rhetorical discourse

III . Conclusion and transition (to chaps. 4 through 14): S9a 26 - S9a 29

sSa 36 : I d61J is as good an example as any of the problems we metat ssa 4 on the meaning of "lUTe,~. After speaking of .rd7J in quite specific terms (s8a 25-21), A. now uses the word in an cotitely different meaning, one more usually expressed by 'Y.'7J, which he has just employed at s8a 33. Bekker and Cope, in fact, read 'YB.7J here. But at B 22, 96b 29 we find Bfa.,. where it is clear that 'Y"." in its usual sense and as it is used at B 18, 91b 24 is meant. Spengd in his note on our line (po 75) remarks of 'Y"o~ and .rdo~ that "these two words are rather frequendy interchanged by Aristod.." Further he says that 'Yt>7J should be read since, as he maintains, the ancient theorists (e.g., Anaximenes, the Audor aJ Herennium, Cicero, Quintilian) always speak of the kinds of rhetoric as 'Y"7J, or genera. z .... p I.. It is probable that this division is A.'s. The evidence which we possess points in that direction. Certainly A. formalized and established the division which most subsequent theorists of rhetoric accept. As Radermacher says of epideictic rhetoric: "proprium genus ante Aristotelem fUisse non videtur" (p. 26). Quint., Inst. orat. 3.4., is a good commentary; as he notes, there were other divisions, such as those of Anaximenes (ca. 380-

80

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

58b

1.

320 B.C.), Protagoras (ca. 485 - post 444 B.C.), Plato (ca. 429-347 B.C.), and !socrates (436-338 B.C.). There is an e.'
r.

58b I ",po~ ...G...ov With the accusative, criterion; see LS, C.Ul.5.

"'eo,

indicates the norm or

b 2 e....p/w ... KpL'n\V See 57a II. The point of the distincrion would seem to be to allow A. to differentiate the three kinds of rhetoric. The distinction does not seem terribly effective, for in each case the-auditor is a "emj" whether of the future, the past, or a speaker's command of the art. For this reason I can sec no reason to press the distinction between 8,wed, and "e"'*, Thus I do not agree with Spengd, pp. 76£, who says that the 8,wed, is not a "e'T* (and yet at p. 14 he speaks of "eta.., with respect to epideictic oratory); nor do I bdieve it necessary to accede to Cope's view (p. 5:') that 8.wed, is like 8.anj" a spectator, one more passively occupied than the "emj,. I say this even though the distinction here is echoed at B IS, 91b IS-19 (B 1, 77b 16-:.:. does not allow one to argue with any certainty). For, if we press the distinction, we make nonsense of A.'s comments on the nature of rhetoric, and on the act of deliberation and judgment to be exercised by the auditor. At B 1, 77b 21-22 A. says that rhetoric exists for the sake of making judgment possible, a statement in no way at odds with his comments on "eta" in this chapter. Furthermore it is obvious that iu our passage the verb "etp(J)v (58b 4) is to be understood with 6."aani, (5Sb 5) and 8,wed,

5Sb S

COMMENTARY

S1

(5Sb 6). At B IS, 91b 16-17 A. ca1ls the O,weoq a "etT7i~, and even though he qualifies the remark (as noted above) in the next two lines, I believe that it is clear that for A. as far as judgment is concerned the auditor in each class of rhetoric can righdy be called "emjq. C£ Appendix.

b4:

1 0 xpl\MII A decision or judgment is always the result of deliberation, which is completed by an act of choice, "'eoatq.a,~. But "eoatqea., is pardy the result of the appetitive part of man (see S'7ll 2 : I). Therefore in all.cts of deciding (><el....) the rational and appetitive parts ofman come into action. If this is so, then once again we see that discourse must of necessity be concerned with >100~ and "dOo" as well as with reaso". 2 oiOIl lXx>.llcrUlcr-n\~ is the reading of the codd. and accepted by four of the edd.; Ross alone reads 6 e"x.l'1a.acmj~ without oCo.; the reason for his change is not clear. The ekklesiast was a citizen called to serve in the Assembly (Ek1clesia) and to give his attention to all political matters of the city-state, legislative, administrative, financial. The dikast was any citi2en called to be a juror in one of the various courts of law. See "EWesia," ''Dikasterion'' in the OeD; see also Ehrenberg, Greek State, and Hignett.

6'XClcr-n\~ is the reading of the codd. and four of the edd. There is no reason to bracket oCOP as Ross does. One might ask why, if one secludes it here, one should not do the same at 5Sb 4 (S8b 4 : 2) instead of omitting the word entirely.

b 5 oiOll b

'
b 5-6 b 6E .,,£pl

b 8-29 aul'~ouAij~ ..• i."ClII"'PEpOUcr,"

A. now divides the three genera into sbc subdivisions, which flow naturally, as he says, from each genus: (a) deliberative rhetoric: the rhetoric of counsel or advice may (i) exhort or (ii) dissuade; (b) judicial rhetoric: the rhetoric of the courts may (i) accose or (ii) defend; (c) epideictic rhetoric: the rhetoric of the public or occasional event may (i) praise or (ii) blame.

Each of the subdivisions is a primary TOAO, for its kind of rhetoric. The ultimate TeAo, of all three kinds is still the auditor. Cooper quite correcdy speaks of the natural commingling of the three genera in any discourse (pp. xxix-xxx). In fact it seems correct to say that, although A.'s analysis of rhetoric is conditioned (as we see here) by the contemporary historical and cultural context and its somewhat circumscribed understanding of rhetoric,

5sb 17

ARISTOTLB, cRHBTORIC' 1

it would be wrong to restrict his analysis to such a limited compass. For, as we have already seen in part, the nature of his analysis makes his treatise a critical study of all discourse as men employ it to communicate with their fellow-men. Essentially A:s study of rhetoric has much in common with Plato's study in the phaedrlls (2611£), A:s division is this:

Formality

Kind

(a)

ddiberativ~

(5Sb 7)

(b) judicial (5Sb 7)

(e) epiddctic (5Sb S)

exhortation dissuasion (58b 8--9) accusation defense (5Sb II) ~raise

lame (58b 12-13)

Time future (58b 14)

Proximat,

TiAo~

Ultimate

TiAo~

the advantageow audience the harmful (58b 22)

(5Sb [-2)

past justice (58b 15-[6) injustice (58b 26) ~resent

58b [S)

the honorable the dishonorable (5Sb 28)

With the auditor in mind as the ultimate TiAo~, the discourse under one of the fonnalities proper to its genus attempts to realize its proximate TiAo~ (later rhetoricians call these proximate TiA" the TBA,,,« "'9'dAa,a). We can thus see how rhetoric as a ~~.al"~ to perceive the possibly 'suasive (55b 25-26) must look at its subject matter and seek in it those elements, the ,maexO.Ta mOa.d (55b 10) - and they will be. the entecluric "l(rm~: reason, ;jOo~, "dOo~- which will speak to thi$ auditor in his effort to make a judgment in term5 of thil proximate TiJ.o~.

b 9 UiL",

A. makes

b, II b1to,<"povoiiv

the same statement at B 18, 91b Io-II. the indeJinite use: "either of the two."

b x3 Xpovo,

Just as the three kinds of rhetoric commingle, so do the times. Nor are the times as firmly set as stated here; see e.g., 62a 15-16, 660 17-1S. As A. does in these last two passages, so Demosthenes also speaks of the present and future as the times of deliberative speech; see Cro ..n 192; Proemia ra. A. admits the interchange of times in his comments on epideictic at 58b 17-20.

b 14-15 1t"pl ... oi"OTpt!"..... Ross, Tovar, and Kassel place these words in parentheses; it is acceptable. b IS S,x ..l;op.t!v't' In the middle voice the verb means "to plead one's cause, to go to law with a person"; by extension it means: "forensic speaking" (54b 26), "forensic speaker." b 16-17 1t"pl ... ""O),0Y"'TII'

b 17 X\lpu:.'
See S8b 14-15.

i.e., "most valid in, belongs most effectively to";

ssb 30

COMMENTARY

b IS-19 KII"'ok ••• "civ'<E~ in parentheses; it is acceptable.

Ross, alone of the edd., places these words

b 20 ",.Ao~

See S8b S-29. This T'lo~ is the proximate .iAo~, as can be seen in the development at ssb 2Iif., 2S/£, and 27/£

b 22 GUI''P.pov As we saw above, the kinds of rhetoric and their times can interchange. One could also say with Tacitus, Dial. d. Drat. 31: "Speaking broadly, in judicial oratory our argument turns upon justice, in deliberative upon advantage, in epideictic upon the honorable, though these topics quite frequently overlap." A. also accepts this kind of interchange (e.g., ssb 24-2S), but he insists that each genus has its own proper and peculiar TiJ.o~ (sSb 29S9a s). Thus his use of rrol-"'a.tlda,..pd..... = "to take in, along, as assistants" (sSb 24, 27). sc. n: "something, as more advantageous."

b 24: 1 .:,~ XeIpov is the reading of the codd. and of the edd., save Ross, and should be retained. Cope's explanation (p. S4) is reasonable, with the exception of his conunent on A.'s disregard for Greek usage (on which, see 66b 7: I}. Ross's w~ ".leo,o~ offers a more common Greek usage. With a reading such as Ross's we are to understand n.d T"O~ (dnd nM~, as seen at sSb 35) w~ x.leo,o~: "dissuade someone from something as more disad.vantageous." 2 ~pot; 'C'OU'TO i.e., 'Cwith reference to this Te.(o,""; so, too, neo~ Ta;iTa at ssb 27, 29: "with reference to this TiAO~ [lit.: "theseobjectives"j, he employs other considerations as auxiliary [takes in as assistantsj." Demosthenes exemplifies the point in Cro1/ln S7-94 when in arguing the TO Jl"a,o. he strengthens his argument by urging that the action was advantageous (av,..rpieov) and honorable ("do.). b 26 ",ok S' ,nAil as at ssb 24 and again at sSb 2S. The meaning (as can be seen in s8b 22 and S8b 24 : z) is that, although each kind of rhetoric attempts to demonstrate its specific dlo~, it can employ the other Til.,! (Tli J' ,ula) toward that objective. b 29 '"II'Eiov

S7b I : z explains the meaning of the word here.

b 30 "EP' I'~ ycip A. begins his confirmation that each Tilo~ is proper and exclusive to each genus. His argument is that no speaker in any genus intends, in the last analysis, any TUO~ other than the one which A. has assigned, e.g., ssb 32-33: the one and only thing which the judicial speaker seeks is M"a,o. ~ ad,,,o•.

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORlC' I

b 31':'~ The use of w, here and at 5sb 34 to introduce a finite clause in indirect statement (dependent upon d. UI"'P,u{J1}T'iaatt.) is rare in A.; see Bonitz, Index 87I.55f( There is practically a parallel "-"ample of what b 32 : 1 CI·n 5' &'6,,,oi A. is saying here in Plato, Ellihyphro Sc-e; see also 73 b 3slf. 2 0I'-O>'Oy~crE'EV a fairly common form in prose, see S. 66sd; in the plural the form at 5sb 35 is more usual. b 33

51,,'1~

b 34':'~

i.e., lawsuit, or trial; see 74b 32 : 2. See 58b 31; at 5Sb 32 0 .. is used with OI"OAO'Y"'.

b 36 .:,~ 5' ...:." On the use of w" see 58b 3 I. This is the reading of the codd. and the edd., except Ross. With this reading we must understand before w, something like TO;; 6.",.,;..w (Cope, p. 55, suggests TO;; "''1'" or TO;; w,), which is governed by 0~6';. 'PeoniCovuw: "they give no thought to showing that it is not unjust to ..." Thus A. dedares that these speakers in their concern for the expedient neglect the very serious issues of the justice of their proposal. We find the Athenians doing this in the Melian discourse (Thucyd. 5.84-rr6). Ross with Wolf brackets 0';". There is no reason for it textually, but it is attractive for the directness which it gives to A:s statement. It makes w, 6' «UT'! i1.6,,,0. the object of 0,,6 •• 'PeoniCovuw, and A. thus introduces a striking exanlple of injustice to illustrate his statement at 58b 34, Ta 1"" ... "eot..Tal: "They give no thought to the fact that it is unjust to enslave neighboring States alld those who have dOlle no wrong at all." In Paneg. 53-56, Isocrates praises S9a 2: I cI>',ywp>i"«~ •.• x«>.';y Athens for forgetting her own advantage in order to help others. 2 "<"aU «(,'t"Cj\ is the reading of four of the edd., as well as of Cope :md Spengel. Ross reads aVTq;; on the interchange, see 60a r : 1. a 3 'AXv.A.« Iliad IS.94-126; cf. Plato, Apol. 28c, Symp. I7ge; Xenophon, Symposium 8.3 I. One would expect "a,utw.; but this construction apa 5 "ci).l.,av pears elsewhere in A., e.g., Pol. I326b 3. For the general rule, see S. 1048. a 6

"l'oU'tWV

a7

npO"fciaELC;

the three genera. See 58a 18.

a 8 "pO'tci"E'~ dcr\y P'I't"op,x .. ' See 57& 34 : 3 where this matter was discussed. Cope, p. 55, in his note to this section agrees with the interpretation given in 57& 34 : 2, but his remarks on what he calls "the four xowol TO':tol' are not correct. On these, see 598 II-I3, S9B 23.

59a

COMMENTARY

II

85

a 9-10 ..I> S' ...... po...." ...." The prowes "mentioned" are clearly the ""I'~ela, "".Ta, r1~l'eia. They represent typical ways in which the material for the propositions of enthymemes are stated (cf. 57a 22 - 57b 35). This material should center in the three entechnic ,,{u...~ (ration.l analogue, ~80~, "d80~), and would be derived from these three subject areas through the instrumentality of the particular topics. On tlus, see S6b 5 : 1. C£ Appendix. a 9 :1

"UAAOyL"!1I>~'"

See ssa 8 and S6b 5 : 1 and A:s description

of syllogism at 56b [6-[8. 2 ..I> Ii' E,,80!1'1!1" "UllOYL"!10~

See S6b 5 : I.

a II-I3 .".llit ......p"X8~"."e..L A. in this apparently obvious statement (for he has said [5f.l 5--7J that we do not deliberate about the impossible) is actually introducing his brief analysis of the clements which he considers absolutely necessary to all three kinds of rhetorical discourse. Such discourse by the very fact that it is Usnally discour$e about the probable implicates these elements. The elements are: possible-impossible (59' II-I5), past fact-future fact (59a [6), great-small (59a [9-26). To understand more fully what he is attempting to say here we should read B [9, 92a 8 - 93a 21, a companion passage (see Studie." pp. 36-38). A. gives these elements a name, after a fashion, at B 18, 9Ib 29-92a I (see als:> 92a 4-7) by calling them the "oIVd (see 7sa 8 : 3). Tills has occasioned confusion among interpreters who constantly identify thcse "oIVd with the "01.01 '0"01 (see, for example, the Cope passage cited in S9a 8). But nowhere in the Rhetoric docs A. use the word '."01 of these "o...t From what he docs say about them here and in B I9 we discover the following: (a) they are mentioned in connection with the .~).~ of the three kinds of rhetoric and are said to be common to thcse T~).~; (b) they are necessary to achieve the ..,,~; (c) in both places where these "o,.d appear in the text they occur in passages where A. is talking abont the large structural blocks of his theory: namely, enthymeme, naeddSly.aa. particular topics, general topics. One can assume that these "ol.d also belong among those key concepts. This assumption becomes more assured when we reflect on what A. has said thus far in the text. Rhetoric, as he tells us, involves open questions about which men deliberate. But men enter upon the discussion ofsuch an open question only when they consider it to be something possible, past, present, future, which is of some importance to them. In other words the "OIV& are necessary preconditions to the whole process of deliberation leading to one of the three TiA.~. This necessity arises from the manner in which A. has analyzed the art of rhetoric. The "oIVd represent categories into which the subject must fall before a speaker (or writer) can responsibly engage in any of the three kinds of rhetorical discourse (see 59a 14-16). The "OW" are like the 0el'a.a in the Topics (1.13-18); without them there

S6

.ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

presumably can be no rhetorical discourse just as there can be no topical investigation without the l1eyava. C£ Appendix.

oro"

010" T£ C£ LS, III.2. "'pcxxO>jCJ£CJOex. The future passive catches the contrast of past and future which A. has in mind, as we see from what follows. It is read by the edd., with the exception of Ross, who reads ",meaxBa •.

a

II : 1 2

a 13 oUX This is read by the edd. save Ross, who brackets it. Spengel reads it but is not happy with it. Even though the negative idea is already on hand in o~M (59'1 u) it should be read unless there is a solidly strong reason for secluding it.

".u,,••

a 15 bn& ••x....xij> as at 5Sb 17; Spongel, p. So, suggests b"6•• a verb which A. does use in the companion passage, B IS, 9Ib 27.

'P,

a 17: 1 l",ex.voiiv,,£S A. probably uses the six formalities (see 58b S-29) instead of the three genera to emphasize the fact that in every kind of rhetoric these three "o ••d come into play: namely. possibk-impossible, past-future (the ~a .le7Jpi.a of 59a 19), and great-small (p.iya IJ ,,"'eo', 59a 19). It appears that it is for the same reason that he uses the six proximate Til7J of the three genera, 59a 20-21. The order here of the z l", ...vo;;v,,£S •.. cl",ol\oyou!'-""o. three genera is: epideictic, deliberative, judicial. At 59a 20-21 when he presents the proximate Til7J of each genre the order is: deliberative, epideictic, judicial. It is this second order which he follows in the first book, i.e. deliberative (chaps. : i.e. dlld "al 6..".';va. ""'l1w.Ta. 8... TO araBo. " .... l. (SrIT.) pira f/ "'''eo,. a 21 xexO' ..u"cl i.e., "absolutdy," as opposed to "comparativdy"; "with reference to (in virtue of) themsdves alone," i.e., "with reference simply to greatness or smallness themselves." The phrase "aB' av~o is a common expression in A., and he explains its various meanings in Met. 1022a 14-36 (on which see Bonitz, Metaphysica, pp. 265£; Eucken, Sprachgebrauch, p. 44). In our passage the phrase means to speak of the greatness of something exclusively and entirdy in terms of what "greatness" is in and by itsel£ On the other hand :n;eo, aA47J4a (59a 22) "with reference to each other" means to speak of a thing's greatness by setting it off against smallness. a 23 "0;; !,-Ell;ovos These words are also used in connection with piy.Bo, and p'''eOT7J' in the companion passage at B 19, 93a 9-19. The question .rises: Are there three "o ..d (see 59a 11-13) or four (see Cope, p. 55)?

COMMENTARY

In both passages "more" and "less" are tied very closely to "great" and "small" and are actually an explanation of "great" and "small." There is no reason to a=pt I'BiI;oo-llanoo as constituting a separate :<0".', or to argue for more than three :<0 .."; see 63b 7: 1. In B 26 A. speaks of I'Bil;o.-llano. and he explains it as ~d aii~". "at 1'''0';'. He continues with the statement (03a 18-I9) that the purpose of TO aJ~... .. • 1'",0';' is "to show that a thing is great or small"; see Studies, p. 49. a 24 xCl86AOU See S4b 5. "aOdAov is opposed to "aO' g"aaTo" "a~a I'.eo~, or here to "eel '''''aTOV, and refers to "l1niversal" proposition. on greatness and smallness which can apply to any particular subject. ",eel '''''aTOU refers to propositions on greatness and smallness which apply only to a particular subject. In chap. 7 A. offers both kinds of analysis as he gives principles for determining greamess and smallness in themselves and with reference to specific draBa. In Book Two (B 19, 93a II-16) he makes a reference to his eJfurt in chap: 7, and his remark at 93a r6-I9 is instructive: " ... to seek further into the nature of greatness and superiority in itself is to engage in idle discussion. For, as far as what is of help, specific aspects of the particular subjects carry more weight than do the universal statements." a 25

5.XCliwI'Cl

i.e., "ajwt act"; see also 73b I where it means the same

thing and is opposed to "an unjust act" (dM"'1l'a). Cope, p. 56, has a note on the use of this word in which he concludes from a number of sources (but particularly from EN II3Sa 8-15, and from Plato, Laws 864e) that it means not simply "an act ofjwtice," "a just act" (as in our text), but more properly "a rectification of an act of injwtice." Le., "a"d. ; "ald. - alaXed.. For he has mentioned the a 26: I clIAAco>v other three TiJ.'1: draOd.; .l1.6."•• - 61"a.... Spengel believes that the word refers to the three genera. z _pI cT>v i.e., the three genera; c£ S9a 6. a 28 [51,!, i.e., separate! y, one by one. The order which he gives is the one he follows, e.g., deliberative, chaps. 4-8; epideictic, chap. 9; judicial, chaps. 10-14. With chap. 4 A. begins and continues through chap. '4 an anal}'>is of the source material for the three kinds of rhetoric (on the relation of chap. IS to this development, soe tsa 22 : z, tsa 23). It is a study of the particular topics which will give material for the "e.T"a..~ to be wed in each genw. At the end of the analysis he describes the whole process as an "account of the 66Ea. [i.e., el"oTa and a7Jl"iaj "al "eoT"a..~ for" each kind of rhetoric (B I, 77b 16-20).

CHAPTER 4

I . Introduction: 59a 30 - 59b 18 general introduction to deliberative rhetoric by way of resume on: I.

59a 30 - 59b

2.

59b

2 -

I

59b 18

nature of ddiberation (chaps. 2 and 3, especially 56b 37 - 570 7) rhetoric as dVval''' (chaps. I and 2, especially 55h 8 - 580 34, 58a I - 58. 30)

II . Devdopment: 59b 19 - 600 37 subject matter of deliberative rhetoric: 59b 59b 3· 59b 4. 600 I.

2.

19 - 59b 23 23 - 59b J2 ll-60a 5 6 - 60a II

5. 60a u - 60a 17 6. 600 18 - 60.. 37

introduction ways and means

war and peace national defense imports and exports legislation

III . Conclusion and transition: 600 38 - 60b 3

S!)a 30 : J ,.pWTOV fLEv The statement which begins here and ends at 59b 18 is introductory; c£ outline of chapter. z ciy ..Oclt l\ XIIX4 interchanged with TO I11JI''PleO'/l Kal TO pJ.aP~ eDv. as we saw at 59a 20.

a 31 06 ,..pl

8.

£,.""""

sc. I11JI'Povl..l... See 57' 4--'7 and S7& 1-2.

a 32 Sa .. The 6i is .dversative and introduces the subjects .bout which men do not deliberate (59' 33-34). As A. says elsewhere: "No one deliberates about mose things which cannot be other than they .rc" (EN II39' 13-14). Isocr.tes remarks: "Intelligent men ought not to deliberate about wh.t they know, for it is a waste of time" (Peace 8). See Cic., De orat. 2.82.336: "All deliberation ends when we realize that the subject is impossible or inevitable, and the man who taught this truth [i.e., A.j not seen by others showed the deepest insight."

8.

a.

a 33 ".pl The here is rcsumptive, i.e., "with respect to these matters, theil, (I say) ..•"; see also 59' 38: TOlaVTa 6'.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

90

59b 3

Not everything which is contingent is a 34-36 06&~ &" ... K.d "'>\ the subject of deliberative discourse. One. for e.'Cample. does not give advice (Td rftJ,..pov)..ti.... 59a 37) on matters such as these: potential natural endowments (,,,,;,,... 59a 35) - whether Jane is. or will be. plain or beautiful - or chance events (dnd TVX'I" 59a 35) - whether John will. or will not. fmel the treasure. We do not because this is not material for deliberation (povJ..';scr8a •• 59a 38) as A. will e."Plain at S9a 38 - 59b I; see also EE uIsa 12-15. The meaning of <pol".. and dnd T';X'l' i. explained in greater detail at 68b 33/£

a 36 :

1

ol>6c!v

2

."po lpyou

a 37 ciAA& 6;p..o~ 8uwp .. .

the adverb; ""TI is understood. See 54b 27; it occurs again at 59b 16.

Le•• dUd dijJ.O. (."TI) {In (TO "v,..povJ.." ... ,j"TI) n'el

a 38 - 5·9b I ..OLIN. . . . . . . ."pii~.. L A. presents the character of the subject matter about which there is deliberation; see 57a 24-26. 573 2 : 1 speaks of Aristotelian deliberation. As A .•ays in the passages cited there. we deliberate about the things man can do. or as .tated here at 59a 38. about things within our natural competence ("all those things so constituted by their nature is more fully exthat they fall within our competence"). d.dy."Oa••1, plained by eli. ij d~m The .ymbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes (e.g.• the O/1mhiacs) illustrate the point which A. is making. In this area we must have recourse to Demosthenes since his deliberative oratory constitutes the only specimens we possess from the Attic orators. with the exception of a speech of Andocides' (ca. 440 - ca. 390 B.C.) and one possibly from Hegesipp'" (II. 340 B.C.).

...•"TW.

",..ii,

a 39 ",EXPL ycip gives the reason for 59a 38-39: ill our deliberation the final test i. whether or not we can bring the matter 0/£ 59b 2 K..O' lK"IJ'<~ In A. TO "aO' ."a"TO' is the particular (see 593 24) in contradistinction to TO "aO&lov. Here the phrase. without the article. is adverbial: "singly. individually"; similarly "aO&J.ov: "universally." b 3 : 1 6Lcx)...~.r" A. is using the word here as it is frequently found in plato (see Ast) in an effort to arrive at a c1e;uer understanding of a concept by the method of division (see also a.a;e.'" alate.""), After accurately listing (d"e'Pw, alae,Op>i"acr8a.) all the topic. of deliberative di... course (nBel ... xe'lpaTtC...). one classifies them (a&aJ.dp", 81, 81d'l). i.e.• gives a scientific division of them. 2 XP'lI'-ll..(~.L~ Frequently used of public assemblies. and meaning "to deliberate" (see LS, I.z). it may also be used of law courts; see Dem .• AgaitlSt Timocrates 55 (717).

· COMMENTARY

91

b 4 &,.placlL " ....... ..-iJv \O.,,,,, I.e., define these topics according to their real nature: namely, scientifically; see Top. 105b 3D-3I.

&,," . .

0 fl>\ .... ".~.A. A. gives two reasons, both of which are contained b 5 in articular infinitives: (a) "'1fTB T;j;; e"lTOe"';j;; •.. (59b 6), and (b) no).,lq; TB nABi., ... (59b 7). The text accepted by our odd. reads 1'1f~B ..• TB; this use of the particles indicates that the reasons are coequal and corresponsive. Some codd. and editors (Spengel and Cope, for example) read ",1fTO . .• where the idea of contrast and difference is in the second member. Here ",oAlq; TB is a better reading than nollq; on the basis of the codd. and the sense itsel£ Cope, pp. 59£, has a full note on TO •.. Te, TB ••• M (see also Denniston, pp. 503, 513), and he reads no).,lq; M, saying that it "represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind ... that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigoed as reasons.•.."

a.

a.

I.e., such knowledge belongs to a b 6 ~flrppov.a..-£p..~ ... ciA"lJO'\lij~ discipline which is more informed about (."''Peo''~'eat;) and can more faithfully represent (d1"l8";j;;) the subject: namely, nolm'fi bna~,..n (58b 17). b 7 7tl..Iw &.&OaO .., We are not in a position to determine here what was going on in rhetorical theory. If we possessed A.'sSynagoge Technon, we might be enlightened. But we can form some idea of what plato thought was happening from a passage such as Gorg. 447-466. Indeed, !socrates with his view of education grounded in rhetoric (~ Ttli> My.,. na,6sla) could well have encouraged lesser minds to place within the study of rhetoric these many disciplines which do not belong to it, T.v. oIHE/.,. OE"e"l",aTtJJ. (59b 8); see Isocrates in Jaeger, Paideia III, or Beck. b 8 "p.s".pov i.e., 56. 25-3 I. At 56a 26 A. used a,al'''''''';j;;; here he speaks of d.alv ...~;; (59b 10). It is more likely that 560 26 refers to the Topics (see 55- 9 and 56822 : .), but at 56a 36 the word clearly refers to the Analyties (see 568 36); at 56b 10 we find d.alVT'''.v •. A. apparently uses the words interchangeably at times; see 55- 9. Rhetoric does share in the Analytics to the extent that the Analyties gives us our knowledge of syllogism and is concerned with the d.ay"aia found at 57a 22. b 10 -rij~ •.. ".A,.. ,,,ij~ see EN I094b II, I099b 25-32, II02a 5-10, II80b 28-31; ethics and politics constitute ~ "'Bel Ta ri.8edi" ..a 'P'Ao(J0'P1a, II8Ib IS. b

II

...

a. fl'" ........ &0

adverbial: "pardy ... pardy"; see 568 29 : l '

b 12 aorp,a..-,".i~ AOYO'~ Certainly rhetoric is not like sophistic because it engages in deception. Rhetoric, like dialectic, studies apparent argumentation and apparent probabilities in order to discover where they are false, not in order to use them. This, presumably, is also the intent of Spengel's

92

ARISTOTLB, IRHETORIC' I

explanation of the words (p. 83): "Quod non modo Td ,.,8avoy sed emm Td <pa ..o!'B'Po, ,,"8a.o. considerat." See ssb 15 : J, s6a 20, 56& 36 - s6b 4. At 55b 18-20 (see 5Sb 17-:n) A. explicitly distinguishes true and false rhetoric by comparing them to dialectic and sophistic respectivdy. b 13 : 1 xa8cb".p clv sc. "aTao".vdCOI; c£ S. 2464. The lI.y indicates a potential optative; at 5gb 12 the ci. is to be taken with ""eaTal, a subjWlctive representing future time. See 54& II : " 55b 25 : 2, s6a 33 : z. Cope's note z WVdP..LS here (p. 61) is strange. As ~v.a!,,,~ rhetoric and dialectic are common to all disciplines and arts, a point on which A. continually insists. It is easy to see why he does so if we take, for example, deliberative rhetoric, which he discusses in this section. One of its subjects is legislation. In order to present an analysis of this subject for use by others, a writer on rhetorical theory could easily enter into the kind of detail on law which is the domain of legal philosophy, and only of legal philosophy, certainly not of rhetoric, or dialectic, or logic. J b:u""lj p...s A. explains the meaning of tim word in what follows at 5gb 15-16. Earlier (58a 23-26) we have the same statement. Both statements point to still earlier ones: ssb 8-5), 25-34. The idea behind these statements is excellently summarized here by the words at 59b 16 which describe rhetoric as an '''"rn7J1''1 Mycu., not "eay!'aTcu.; see 59b 16 and note. b 14 xa...... crxEUd~.LV is "to furnish a thing fully with, to construct," and so here: "to establish rhetoric and dialectic." For the word see ssb 38, and 76b 3 with Cope's note, pp. 281£, where we are told that in dialectic the word is a technical term denoting the process of constructing positive argumentation. At 5gb 15 b ...."evclC,•• is "to make afresh, reconstruct." The point A. wishes to make ill using these verbs is that by establishing rhetoric and dialectic as the carriers of specific .,,'......fi!'a. (see 59b 2-8) one is thereby recolIStnJding them into these new ."...Tij!'a., and thus destroying what they essentially are: narndy, ''''''''fi",a• .ldycu., 59b 16. A. wants to say here that b 14-15 ..q. p......a~..tv.LV ... i71;u..njp... s in tire very ad of recoIlS/meting rhetoric and dialectic into other disciplines and not simply into the disciplines of language one is changing from rhetoric and dialectic to those other disciplines. For this reason I believe that ",6'afJa!•••• '"" ..".vdCcu. el~ must be taken closely together as a compendious expression, for it is the only structure which will give sense. First of all ",.Tapa!• .,•• l~, or ent. is a common usage in A. But bUC1~evdCw" slt; is acceptable to Bonitzr Index (b.......vclC...) and to LS for our passage, although Cope, p. 61, has reservations about the usage. If we accept ",'Tapa!.... el~, but not '", ..".vaCow .k, then we are faced with the fact that at the end of the sentence ,Uld

COMMENTARY

93

,..~

My,,)?, i.e., ,...Tapal,... • I~ l1"trr",..a~ My",. makes no sense in the context. For if the person constructs dialectic and rhetoric correctly, he is not chang;lIg over to them at all, and Cope, p. 62, accepts this. Therefore I would interpret: "he will unwittingly destroy their real nature by changing over to A"""Tfi,..al of particular subjects in the effort to reconstruct (rhetoric and dialectic) into 1"'''Tii,..ul of particular subjects and not simply into rnl"'ii,..a. of language."

b IS ~"OK""'.""'V

See S5a 36 :

2.

'",,,,,,,..a,

b I6 : 1 AOY"'" i.e. (from s9b IS), .l~ My",.; see 59b I3 : J. As has becu said a number of times (see 54& II : 1 s. fine, and SSb 8 : 2; see also 74b I2), it seems more than clear that rhetoric for A. is the art oflanguage as used in discourse with another. One can only add by way of further confirmation the observation of Sextus Empiricus (fl. A.D. I7S-200), who held no brief for rhetoric, as he held none for many other things. In his work Aga;'''t the Rhetors he remarks at 6: "Xenocrates, a disciple of Plato's, said that 'rhetoric is the science, that is, the art, of good speech' [rn,,,,,,,..'1' Tali .J Aiy.... .. T~O rnltrr",..'1v la,..Pd,oVTo~ ... dOTl Tii~ Tixv'l~l." He continues in 8: "Aristotle in the first of his books on the art of rhetoric describes rhetoric more simply as 'the art of speech' [c!:n:lo.lu"eov ... TtXV'1' Myw,]." 2 a"",~ liE oall A. intends to speak of those subjects usefully determined (ned leyov ... dIBl•••) as far as the study of deliberative rhetoric is concerned, but the larger examination (.lnol.&.., ""..,..) of them belongs to political science. {J"a serves as the object of aIBA.iv and the subject of ~"oA.&. ... b I9 ciyopeUoUO'LV Used here possibly in its first meaning of "to speak in the assembly"; but at S4&22 and at 74a 20 it means "to proclaim.'" i.e., the most common and important b 20 ....ok "'olyu,.... 11 ••• "tv..... subjects are five, and they are discussed between S9b 23 and 60a 37 (see analysis of chapter) "briefly but with a sagacity which is astonishing" (Roberts, Greek Rhetor;c, p. 27). In Xen. Menwrnbilia 3.6.4-I3 there is a list of subjects about which the prospective statesman, in Socrates' mind, must be informed. They correspond with A.'s list, save that Socrates omits legislation, i.e., A.'s ,0,..08."la (60a I8-37). For example, we find in Xenophon: neo"odOl,S (our s9b 23-32); "dAe,..o\", 8 (our s9b 33 - 60a S); " 'I'1'Aa"oj 'ii~ x';'ea~, 10 (our 60a 6-n); TdQ1'Ve6,a-a;:TO~J 12-13 (somewhat similar to our60a12I7). In the work of Anaximenes (on whom, see Studies, pp. 7S-77) I423a 20-29, we are given a list of seven subjects, of which only four correspond more directly with A.' s list. This is typical of what takes place in later rhetoricians on this matter: they do not follow A.'s list too closely; see Spenge1, p. 84, for some examples.

94

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

h 23 ..op,",v There is a work traditionally ascribed to Xenopbon (ca. 430 - ca. 354 B.C.) on Athenian finances ("oel "tie"") which carries into detail some of the ideas mentioned here. The problem of revenue is a recurring theme in Demosthenes: e.g .• 01. I.29-20; Philippics I.]2-33; On the Symlllories 24-30. See also Anaximenes 1425b 2I-]5.

h 24 GUI-'fjOUAEUE'V

On the present instead of the future. see S. 1959'; some codd. read avl'{Jov). ••".... as does Cope.

h 25-32 'L'{"E~ XIII ",6..",•... Wl-'/3OUA>\V Tbese are the particular topics, the o!l6o~ and ",i6o~ (analyzed in Book B). forms the material substance of rhetorical argumentation (see ssa 40 s6a 1 through S6a 3). They are the ii"dexo.Ta ",6a.d (55b Io-II), the elements present in the subject which will carry conviction to this auditor and "which rhetoric is to discover in each and every subject." As he says at B 22, 96b 1-2. speaking of the three kinds of rbetoric, our argument comes 1" TW. ".el E"U"TO. ,j"«exd'TW'. Obviously we cannot give advice or counsel ("vI'{Jov).~. 59a 34) without specific details of the subject. and details which speak to this auditor. Thus it is that A. concludes the discussion of deliberative and epideictic oratory by saying that this is tbe "material from which" we argue (66a IS, 6Sa 33), and introduces his discussion of judicial rbetoric with a sjpillar expression (6sb I). SO, too, at the end of the presentation of "ci8o~. we meet the same phrase (B II, 88b 29). A. makes • summary statement on the methodology with respect to the entecbnic ,,1<1T'~ logical explanation (see 56a 3 : 2) atB 2.2. 96a4--9: "Well. then, fIrSt of all we must understand that it is necessary to have control of either all or some of the facts of the subject .bout which one must speak or reason - whetber it be by political reasoning or any other kind; for without control of any of the facts one could draw no conclusions. My meaning is this: how. for example. could we advise the Atbenians as to whether they should engage in war if we have no idea of the nature of their power.... " The position of Crassus in the three books of the De Oratore with his iusistence that the ideal orator must bavea wide-ranging knowledge in all areas, and especially in philosopby. is simply an extension of the Aristotelian view. As we find them in the Rhetoric. the particular topics offer specific determinations of a subject which will speak to the intellect. the emotions, the character, of the auditor. Our present chapter is as good an example of these topics as any, e.g .• the State's financial resources; its power and what that dictates about war, peace, international relations; its defenses,

COMMENTARY

95

imports, exports, etc. In the light of the interpretation of these particular topics offered here and in this commentary, I £nd the comment attributed to eli. Victorius on Be eli. (6ob 1) at the end of this chapter quite interesting: vocat locos, ex quibus e1iciuntur argumenta.••6'1 autem appellare haec ipsum planum est, i.e. proprias .licuius generis propositiones." C£ Appendix.

"so

sc. olat; it is not unusual in Greek to omit forms b 25 ..lve. K ..t 1<0...., of the copula in short statements, questions, as can be seen in the following lines, e.g., .r Tl, (Ian) .UTT"", etc. b 27 1<eplepyo,

See 60a IO : 1.

b 28 1
""."'1

This indefmite relative pronoun (OaT") appears differendy b 36 i! "'. in different editions. Some regularly print the indefmite and relative as separate (Roemer, Tovar); some join them (Ross, Kassel); Dufour vacillates.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

60a 5

b 38 :

1 d&£v.",. [ill'''''' This is the reading accepted by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel; Cope does not seclude 11; Kassel omits it, as does Ross. The period after elM.a. is preferable to Ross's comma. 2 "po~ 06~ ... ,,<>A£P.ELV !socrates, in Anlid. II7, describes as anlong the qualities of a good general "the ability to know against whom he must wage war, and what aII.ies he must acquire. For this is the source, the first principle, of generalship."

."I&o~ov ". strong probability." Cope, p. 66, suggests, with number of examples, that Ani in composition means "subject to, liable to," and that the word in composition is the base upon which something rests; here, for example "subject to .•• expectation." 2 "Ol..P..LV subject of an understood lOTi, as the articular infinitive (6oa 1) is the subject of It is quite probable that the force of the articular Td "olel"" is to emphasize the idea in the verb: "the decision to make war." J dp'I)Y.u......"'. used intransitively = "keep peace, live peaceably," as in Plato, Theael. 180b.

b 39 : 1 3

n.

60a 1 : 1 icp' "'{,"'OL~ The reading l,,' aVTo,~ is accepted by Ro=, Dufour, Tovar, Spenge!, and Cope. Ross and Kassel read with cod. A l
a3:

a 5 : 1 Ii,,;, yckp •.. necpux£v This is a principle which A. frequently uses, e.g., 71b 16K; EN II55a 32f[, n65b 7; BE 1235' 5f[ plato uses it in Lysis 2I4/E in his analysis of the nature offriendship and cites the same Homeric

60a '4

COMMENrAIlY

97

line as A. does at 71b 16. The epilogue to TheophIastus' "oel rp,lo"oV7Jela~ (Characters 29) expresses the principle apdy: "like moves toward like." 2 ylYVEO"OelL ".'PUXEY "llatmally follows from."

a 6: 1 "Epl '..xjj~

z ...iJ >..."0«".,,,

Xen., Mem. 3.6.10.

sc. d.uy"aio. Ean.

a 9 l ...
".,pov

a 9-11 t,,' ......i>'>'a" this more orIess repeats the statemeut at 59b 2528 and as there, so here we must understand EaTt in the protases of the condition; see S9b 25.

a 10 : 1 7CEp{EPYO~ here in its meaning ofICsuperS.uous"; it is a contrasting phIase to "eo leyov of 59b 16, "serviceable"; see Plato, Polit. 286c: d.taa'TB~ PfJ ",oeloeya •.• Uyo,,., •. 2 m''"I&dO"U~ i.e., positions suitable for defeose, for guarding (T7Jewen), and therefore "favorable"; see, e.g., Thucyd. 2.20.4, Herod. 9.2.1. a 12 : 1 &....6."'1 This word appears in a good text tradition and is read by all dIe edd. except Ross and Kassel, who seclude it. I prefer to read it, and would punctuate with a comma after "'010" not after "oia (on which see next note). I would translate: "how large a financial investment is adequate for the State, and what kind oHood supply is on hand ..." 2 x ..l ..01.. There should be no comma after "oia aldIough Roemer, Dufour, and Ross so punctuate. Spengel, Cope, Tovar, and Kassel omit the comma. This word should be taken with what follows, i.e., Hal nola (EaTt) 1i (TeOrplj) aVTO;; TO YW.opSV7J ;eal ,laaywY'fJo~. I prefer this dIough it is obvious dIat if we bracket 6ana.~ we can parallel the use of ,,&~ and "oia at 59b 34-35, 60a 2G-21. a 13 : 1 -I) ..6 ...oG ....... xed The TO .•• xa/, "not only ... but also" (see Denniston, p. 515), is repeated in the next phIase. 2 ..6ToG referring to the State's own land (T06 zweov). J dO"..yc;,y,fI.O~ "which em or may be imported." On imports and exports see Dem., Cro,vII 145-14.6; Against Leptines 34-35. Ross conjectures < ~>, unnecessarily, before slaaywY'fJo~. 4 ...(""'" i.e., the products which must be exported, and, at 60a 14, imported. The subject understood is "dIe people of the State." These are the people from whom the State imports and to whom it exports, as was seen by Richards and by Roberts ("Notes," a '4 :

1

&Eov...... ,

2

.... a6Tau~

ARIS'l'OTL~ 'RHETORIC J I

60a 23

359). There is no reason in the text to confine the reference to the first class, as Cope does. Nor is there any need to write as Bywater and Ross do d.w. <"al d.w.> .laaywy'ij. in order to provide .o~.ov~ with an antecedent, the absence of which also worried Roemer ("Kdtik," 497). '

"aea

",xi

a 15 : 1 """Oij"'" crufL~O).'" We meet avv8'I"'1 again at 73b 8, 760 33, 76b 30. It is used in general for contract, compact, or agreement, public

or private in nature. avvrlO'1I" (for the compound with ~v-, see 57a 8 : 1) can mean in the middle voice "to put together for oneself" and also "to agree with others." And so in law a av.O'lj,,'1 is something which is put together and mutually agreed upon. There is a solid text tradition for av,..poAal and not the more usual atl,..poAa which I would prefer to read with Madvig. If av,..pd'lj is read, it is to be understood in the sense of ~,..poAo.: namely, "a treaty between two States providing for the security of one another's citizens and sometimes for the settlement of commercial disputes." A. in Pol. u800 38ff. speaks about av.O'Ij"'1. ~,..poAa; for further commellt on our passage. see Cope. p. 68. z ... po~ SUo The two are identified in 600 16-17. a 16 5"upu).ci",,,0,,, d.d in composition here denotes continuance: "to maintain constandy, continually."

a.....""'.. ",..il"..

a 18 i.e., everything mentioned since 59b 23. 60a 18~37 see Barker, p. 361.

On

a 19 "OfLOOO"("~ See Ana:ximenes I4240 9 - 1424b 27; !soer., AntUl. 79-83 (on which see EN II8Ia 12-23 and Immisch, 54-61). As has been noticed (Brandis. Spengel, Cope), there are parallels to 6O'a I9-30 in the Politics. The parallels reveal a relationship (borne out elsewhere in the Rhetoric) between the two works. Compare, for example, 60a 19-20 and Pol. I2860 7 - I287b 8 on the supremacy of law. See also Dem., Against Aristogeitan A I5ff. in praise of .&,..o~. See also 54b I-II.

a 2I

...o).,,,olc.>,, Ei5'1 The varieties of "oA ...la are discussed in several places in the Politics. In A.'s political theory "oA...la gives a particular ,,&A.~ its distinctive character. It is what constitutes the formative principles which shape a political community. Like the relation of the .oul to the body in living things "oAmia is "the .oul of the body politic because it is the animating principle that gives form and purpose to a political community," The "oA ...la of a city-state is antecedent to the constitution which is meant to express and give shape to the noA...la; see. Adler & Gorman, 42-43. a 22 ",8dpo .. 8.. , ...."'u,,""

Thi. is studied at length in Book Five of the

Politics. a 23 )."Y'" 56 ,,6

i.e., "I mean by the phrase."

60a 30

COMMBNTARY

99

a 24 cXvIIlfloEVex, "exl ."""'E'vofloovex, This metaphor from tightening and loosening the strings of the lyre to make a different tone is exemplified for democracy at 600 25ff.: if what constitutes democracy as a form of government (Tti .lxsla) - namely, the principle of equality - is interpreted too loosely (loosened) or too strictly (tightened), then the principle itself is altered and the form of democracy changes into another form. A. specifies either change as oligarchy, 60. 26; see Pol. 1304b 19 - 1305a 7. Although it probably is best to leave his explanation alone, still in an attempt to explain the metaphor, the following illustration is offered (with the caution th.t some commentators will interpret in exactly the opposite way): oligarchy seems a natural result of buTst...., which implies a restrictive interpretation of who enjoys equality; an unrestricted interpretation of equality, d"'.al, seems to move toward anarchy leading to tyranny which A. actually discusses as a consequence in Pol. 1305a 7-36. The metaphor is common to plato and to A.; see Cope, p. 70, for citations. used adverbially; see LS, lb.•. a 26 ....!AoS a 27-30 a.er",.p "exl ••• elvex. a further explanation of the metaphor by the simile of the aquiline and the snub nose; see Pol. I309b 21-35, where the same example is used. Whether to us the details of the illustration are clear and valid (see Spengers comments), they apparently were to A., and the example makes the point he wants: to carry anything far enough to either side of its mean position (what it is in itself) is to change its character; see his comments at Pol. 1295a 34 - I295b 5. a 30-33 XpJjer.fIoov ••• cXpfloo'L"'L"cruer.v The same Greek is read and the same punctuation used by four of the edd., Spengel, Cope; Ross alone reads Osweoii.Ta and places a comma after (J'f)I"'P'eBL. The structure of the Greek in the pass.ge is: subject: Td .I"~ 1"•• 0 • ••• "aeBJ.'7J.1!O,lTw. and tUJ.ti "al ... ael".TT.1IaW; predicate: xe~a.I".' (eaT'); itulirect object: 06weoii.n. This structure produces the meaning which is confirmed by the result clause at 60a 33-37 (WaTB ..• laToeta.). Unfortunately, the sentence has been needlessly confused in the interpretations. In fact, if one takes the translations as illustrative one wonders what Greek text the authors had before them. This is the Oxford translation: "It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to leam for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited" (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [18]). More correctly the translation should run: "With respect to enacting laws it is useful for the one considering this not only to understand from past history wh.t kind of constitution is beneficial, but also to know the constitutions of other States, [i.e.,] what kinds of constitution .re suitable to what kinds of people."

100 a 30 vo"oS",,[.. ~

ARISTOTLE, caHETORlC' 1

60a 34

"legislative action, the enactment of laws."

See 603 30-33 for the grammar. The correlative a 3 I : 1 ...0 .....t ..v of this articular infinitive as subject is elM.a" the infinitive without the as articular; cf. 60b 32 : 1. See 60a article. But it is possible to take 19 where ~"at... is used in conjunction with OSaJes". z 't[~ ...0).'.... (.. "what fonn of government." The one who is to give advice in a given situation must know the no':IITelw. sfd'7 (60' 21) as they have existed. Thus the phrase ." TOO' "'aeel'7AVOoTaJ', which is explained further at 603 35-37 (ned~ di ... CUToeta,). 3 "'''pu:'l).uSd't",,, "Past events, history" is to be read with Td jJ.q 1'0.0. '",ats .. : "not only to acquire his knowledge from past history." The correlative of this statement is the need for the speaker on legislation (see following note) to know the constitutions of other States.

.Id'.a,

a 32 : 1 S,,,,pouv... , "the one observing and considering." This word is the indirect object to both statements made in the sentence and refers to the one who wishes to discuss legislation, the subject of this paragraph, 60a 18-37. This interpretation satisfies both the Greek and the conte."
60b

I

COMMENTARY

roI

p. 71; Pearson, Historians; and van Paassen. The following writers of these surveys are mentioned in the OCD: Scylal<, Hecataeus. Anaximander, Hanno (I). and Eudoxus (I); see also the OCD article on "Logographers." a 36 ,xl •.. I""op['" A. had an adequate number of such studies at his command for US to assume that the word was acquiring among the Greeks the meaning wbich we usually give to it when we speak of "history." On Greek bistorical writing, see Chatelet, Starr, and Bury.

a 37: 1 ICJ'1:'Op{'" 600 33-37 demand. z 4....,."..

50. xa~u,po,

from 60a 34 as the parallel structures in

See 59b 16-18.

suggested by Vahien, read by the edd. save a 38 <"Ii, ",pOTCi.cr~l'> Kassel; Spengel. Cope do not read it. However, Cope's comment (p. 72) on the word is quite interesting in the light of 59b 25-32: ''Understand Tel, "eoTC1us<" which generally stand, in Aristotle for the 'material.' of Rhetoric which the speaker must have at bis command." Se. 59b 24. 60b I : 1 cru"'~OUA.u.,V 2 "Ii ",oIy,cr".. i.e., 59b 20-21. 3 ol~.r.v Se. S8a 30, S9b 25-32.

CHAPTER 5

[ . Introduction: 60b 4 - 60b 18 1.

60b 4 - 60b 13

intrinsic to all choice is dJda'fJo.la with its component parts; therefore it is essential to exhortation .nd dissuasion, i.e., ddiberative rhetoric definition of dJ~a'l'o.{a

•. 60b I4-60b 18

II . Development: (job 19 - 6>a

12

wh.t necessarily Hows from the definition as componel! t parts:

I. '60b [9 - 60b 29

general introduction

2. 60b 30 - 60b 37 3· 60b 38 - 6Ia I I

cbildren

4· 6ra

12 -

6xa 24

good birth wealth

5· 6ra 25 - 6,. 27 6. 61. 28 - 61 b 2

good reputation

7. 6Ib 3 - 6Ib 6

health

honor

8. 6Ib 7 - 6Ib 14

beauty

9. 6rb 15 - 6Ib 18

physical strength

10. 6Ib 18 - 6Ib 26 II.

6Ib 27 - 6Ib 34

stature good old age

12. 6Ib 35 - 6Ib 38

friends

13. 6Ib 39 - 62. 12

good fortune

III . Conclusion: 6>. 13 - 62a 1~

deB'" will

be discussed more properly in chap. 9

i.e., both as individuals and in society; see 60b 4: 1 151, ... xo,v'ii aIso 610 8. We have the same idea at EN ID94b 7-8: TauTo. iaTi' bl "al "0';". z CJXo",;~ practically the same as Ttl.., in this metaphorical use: "the end, the object," that on which one fixes one's gaze; see Plato, Gorg. 507d.

104

AllISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

b 5 at; ClTox"'l;o"'.... a' vov,; C£ 55a 17, 62a 15. b 6: 1 b xc
60b 12

Cpo Plato, Rep. 5I9C: 06 [""""061 a~oxaCo,..i.e., to give the sum and substance of this a"o-

no, brie.fly and pointedly. z d ...c'" See ssa 7 : I.

3

,,,,..,.I..

c6& .. For on indication that this is commonly considered to be the a"o:;r;o" see Plato, 8ymp. 205a: "There is no further need to ask why man, when such is his wish, wishes to be happy; the answer seems to be final." We are told immediately that this wish is "common to all men." See also Gorg. 49ge; EN I094a 1-3, II76a 30-32; Pol. 1252a 2-3: "For all men do everything they do to obtain what they think is good." See also 62b 10. 4 ..& ",op,.. On the idea in the word, see S4'l 12 : z. b 7 .....p..&ely"'....a~ X"P'" The argument proceeds in four steps: (.) aU men's choices have a common objective (60b 4-5); (b) this is eM",,.ovl,, (60b 5-6); (c) therefore let us define B~da,,.ovla ond its constituent parts (60b 7-9); (tI) since all deliberation involves men's choices, and therefore, ultimately, sMa,,.ov!a (60b 9-13). When they are specified in the development of the chapter, b 8 lx ..:I"",,, they are the particular topics to be used in building the argumentation of deliberative discourse. C£ Appendix.

b

IO ...pa.. pa .....l... ci...a .. pa.....1 clearly shows.

i.e., deliberative rhetoric, as 58 b 8--9

b II .....p..crx£U .. l;ov.... See 5gb 14. K".-aaK.vciCB" = fit out, prepare what one has; "aeaa"evciC.,. = provide, prepare what one has not. This idea is at work here: we must do what procures for us the .~6a,,.0.la, or some part of it, which we do not as yet have, and avoid whatever keeps us from it. This is ordinarily interpreted to refer to e~da,,.oola. Alb 12 ",.,1;0" though there is a problem with ,.B'COO (and not with ,.elCova of corrected cod. A), it can be resolved through the use of the neuter to refer to a generic idea (S. 1048). Thus we find the common interpretation which the punctuation in .11 the critical editions would justify: "whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do" (Roberts, Rhetoric., p. [20]). Furthermore to the legitimate objection which can be raised - namely, that Buda.,.ov!a as a form is either present or not present in a thing, ond as such cannot be increased or decreased - we con reply that the form's actuation of the potency can be complete and full, partial, or minimal; c£ 6,.. 36-37. In this real sense we can speak of a form such as ~6a.,.oo!a being made greater. And yet I do not see why a change in the

60b 14

COMMBNTARY

105

punctuation with a consequent change in intetpretation does not serve the Greek and A.'smeaningjust as well. By removing the coIl1Iita after ,..oelw. TO we find that the iJ ... 'I disjunction explain, "aea .."svaCo.Ta Ta~r'l" and that ,...iI;o. thereby modifies the preceding TO: "for it is necessary, on the one hand, to do that which procures happiness [and do,," so] either by creating some one of its parts, or by mug one of those parts greater instead of less, and, on the other, not to do that which destroys, or hinders, happiness, or effects those things which are the opposite of happiness." We are offered four possible definitions, b I4-17 l......, ... ...ou....." anyone, or all, of which would be considered by most men to be sMa.,..o.la. From 60b I9 through the end of this chapter, A. will draw the consequences from the defmitions. Since we are concerned in this chapter with particular topics (.ra'l), it is important to recognize and understand what is going on, particularly since A. repeats this methodology in subsequent chapters. A. may cite a definition (as he does here at 60b I4-I7), or he may cite a general principle ora general To"Oq (see 62b 30ff., 63b Sff., 66a 33-34, 660 36 - 66b I). With the assistance of the definition, the general principle, or the general TO"Oq, A. is then able to establish an entire series of specifics, or what we call particular topics, concerning the subject. A., in fact, states the methodology at 60b 7-9 (lapw,. •• ... Ta.h'lq) and then proceeds to put it to use in this chapter. He states the definition of .~da.,..o.la. The definition itself is not a particular topic, but a source for particular topics. Here A. will use the definition to derive particular topics for developing the general idea of .~da.,..o vla. b I4 : 1 l"",,,, &i) d>&Il'p.o,,11l In EN 1095a I2-30 A. indicates that ordinary people and philosophers differ in their understanding of what constitutes .~da.,..o.[a. In what follows there to 1102a 4, he examines the concept philosophically, returning to the problem at II 53 b 9-21 and again at 11760 30 II79b 23; see Gauthier & Jolif; L' Ethique Nicoln"que II. What we are given in the Rhetoric is the explanation of .~da.,..o.[a as it is commonly understood by the people together with an incorporation of some of the philosophical ideas which appear in EN. • ""..... &i) Spenge! suggested (followed by Brandis and Cope) that the form lrn;w d>i, used a number of times in this and the following book in giving a defmition, indicates the popular (see 69b 31-32) rather than the scientific character of the definition and that when the definition is precise and Inore scientific, Ian ,,~ is more common (SpecimetJ commentariOTum, p. 16). The evidence for such usage, however, is really not adequate. The definition of rhetoric at 55b 25 is quite precise, and indeed one can agree with Roberts that it possesses "scientific exactitude" ("Notes," 358). It is interesting that Spengel does not repeat this interpretation in his commentary. For Cope's

a

106

60b 20

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 1

view on definitions in the Rheto,ic, see his Introtl., pp. 12-14. Cope's critique is generolly unfavorable to A. and can be misleading insofar as none of the definitions which Cope mentions is substantially incompetent. 00. this matter of definition in the Rheto,ic, see 69b 31 and 69b 33 : 1. :1 Ei>71:pal;la See Pol. 7.1, especially I323b 21-32 where the argument is that "the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues, and action in accordance with them." Compare 1325b 12-16 with this passage. At I325a 321[ we come upon the genuine Aristotelian doctrine that happiness is an activity. We also frnd this traditional identification of B~"'ea~la with ~6a,po7{a in Plato, Charm. 172a; see Tuckey, pp. 73-'76. 4 a?...tipxE'.. See EN 1097b 7-21, II770 27 - II77b 4. In both these passages (chap. 5 of Book I; chap. 7 of Book IO) A. attempts to refine the concept of eMa'po.la. In the course of his discussion in book 10 (chaps. 7-1O) we meet the first two definitions of eMa'po.!a mentioned in our Rhetoric passage: namely, e~",a~la and a~Tae"Bla. Our fourth definition (.,)8'1/.la) does not appear at all, and our third (Plo~ i16,aTo~) only indirecdy, and Dot reolly in our meaning here (c£ chap. 8 of Book IO). In the analysis of e~da.po.la which follows in the Rhetoric, 60b 19 - 62a I2., A. explicidy mentions only two of the rour definitions - aurae" ••a (60b 23) and Plo~ pera. aa'l'alel~ (60b 28) - and then only in passing. Instead, he uses the ideas implicit in the four definitions in his analysis. 1 ..... (Ioti......" Superficially this wonld seem to mean "slaves," and some so interpret it: "an abundance of possessions and slaves." But the word is not ordinarily used absolutely in this sense until the third century B. c. A more likdy expression for such an interpretation is found at 61a r4. aOOpa is Dot used in this way in the Rhetoric and the one passage which is quite close to this one, 83b 1-2, does not submit to this interpretation. It seems better to take both plurals as plurals used to refer to asingleidea (S. IOOO); "a thriving state of property and body." 2 6uvti(loEfd; M.ap,~ here has the meaning whicll we find at 6ra 2 and 62b 25, i.e., power, ability; on the general notion of 66.ap,~, see 5.fa II : 1.

b r6:

b 17 '
-"'0"

b 19 To.oiiTOV

for the gender (the. is movable), see S. I048.

Ei>yc"E.av... t"...,v Omitting the bracketed lines 60b 23-24, 11 "al ... a"''I'eOau.''I., as the edd. do, we have twenty-two ple'1/: of e~da'po.la:

b 20-29

60b 30

COMMBNTAlIY

I07

,a.

(0) the first I6, from .tlri•• to dQBTIj. (60b 23), are what A. calls ,,4 ,,' i. atlTq; draB& at 60b 24 and they include the draB& of (i) the soul, and (ii) the body (60b 26); (b) to these I6 he adds 6 more at 60b 26-29 from stlyi•• ,a to

"'X7J"

These comprise T4 I"Td~ draO& (60b 25).

This tripartite division of draBd into (i) Ta ".el !p1IX~., (ii) Ta "Bel uwpa, and (iii) "a bm$~ is also used in EN I098b I2-I5 and in Pol. I323a 24-27. It is aIso found in Plato, Laws 697b, 717C, Philebus 48d-e, Aldb. I 130a; and in Anaximenes 1422a 7-II. Cicero reports that this division was common to the Peripatetics and Academics (Tusc. 5.30.85, De fin. 3.13.43, Partit. orat. 22.74). It should be noticed that of the "externaldya8d" two (stlri •••a, ".poj) are also mentioned under the "internal dyaO&." Three "external dra8d" are quite siruilar to the "internal draOd": 'Pilo, to nolv'P.lia, xe"UT0'P.lIa; xe.}paTa to "lo;;To~; to .tlruXia; only one stands alone: dv.dp.,~. In what follows in the chapter A. speaks on .11 the pie" but he combines five of the extemal dra8d with their similars from among the internal. The order of presentation does not follow the order of 60b 2()-29, yet A. does keep the "excellences of the body" together and in the same oroer, e.g., 61b 3-26. Since all the pie" are mentioned in the chapter, they will be ",,:plained, when necessary, as they occur.

"'X7J

b 21

O[OV...

ciyto>v,..... 'x.qv

Ross, alone of the edd., encloses this in

parentheses. b 23-24 III x"l ........ rppoaOv'lv] Roemer, Spenge!, and Cope do not print these lines in the text; the other edd. bracket them, and rightly so, it would seem, in the light of A.'s comment at 62a I 3-14. b 23

",:,.."pxt....." ..

o,

Ross alone of the edd. conjectures a ".~ after

this word; possible, not necessary.

&Wei"."

These are not specified. From the context, it is clear b 27 that as an external dra06., they would have to be the powers which an individual possesses within the civil or social structure of the State. & such they are not powers or capacities radicated in a man's nature. They are dv.dps., by analogy, capacities or powers conferred on a person which are in no way dependent on his 'Pou", e.g., the powers enjoyed by an appointed or elected civil oflicial. b 28-29 011,"" y/tp av . . . (alo, d'l This is the reading of four edd., Spengd, and Cope; Ross, without giving any reason, reads differently. This is divided into good birth as it pertains to the b 30 : 1 e6yevE'" State (60 ... - ,,61.., 60b 3()-33) and to the individual (ldlq;, 60b 33-37). We

108

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

60b 38

find a number of the qualities of e{}yi.stu mentioned here in Plato, Menex. 2>37 and in Isoer., Paneg. 2>3-2>5. " ...0 c:t6dX9ovClS See Herod. 1.171-17'- on the Carians, Caunians; on Athens, see Thucyd. 1.2>.5-6; Dem., Embassy 261; Isoer., Panathen. U4; and Eur., 1011 29£, 589£, 735--738. This is the first constituent of a State's e{}yi...a. The other two are renown,d rulers and distinguished descendants of these rulers. Athens certainly (and the other Creek no}, .., as well) would make such claims. b 31

ijy."OVIIS ••. ",p':' ..OUS

C£ S. II59.

b 32 : 1 Y.YOVEVIIL is the verb for both >1YE!'o.a, and "o},},o~,. The infmitive is probably articular with the TO of 60b 30 understood; see Dem. 01. 1.10, or Goodwin, Syntax, p. 806. Or Olle may take it as a simple infinitive, as was done with ei6s1·at at 60a 3 I : 1. "",,[ i.e., "resting on," "distinguished for things which are held in esteem"; see also 60b 35 and 6:zb 2>2 : 2. b 33 : 1 Uil~ In Pol. U94" 20-2>'-, 130lb 3-4 A. defmes the ''''yi...a of individuals as flowing from established wealth and excellence (our 60b 35). The definition of the Rhetoric is far more detailed. In Helen 44, Isocrates cal1s l-vyiveta an "eternal patrinlony.u " Ii",' Iiv5pcdv In Evagoras 13-19, 71--72>, Isocrates e:'(emplifies for Evagoras (ca. 435-374/3 B.C.), prince of Salamis in Cyprus, most of the points which A. makes in 60b 34-37. b 34 YV'lClLo..'1S Ii,,' 1i"'P0Lv i.e., citizenship from both parents (Ii, a!''Poi. acnoi.).-· The rules for citizenship were determined by the constitution of the city-state and could vary. For a discussion of the Creek idea of citizenship, see Ehrenberg, Greek State, pp. 28-102>. b 35-36 .. oUS .... ·• "LfI.!""EVWV This is the reading accepted by four of the edd., Spenge!, and Cope.· Ross alone reads after n!'wpi.OJ. from the Fragmentum Monace.se and accepts Bywater's conjecture of '" before TOV, Te. In this way he sets up an articular infinitive to paralle! 60b 30-3 J.

,l.a,

The text, however, is secure.

i.e., t't.P£: "any other." b 38 : 1 ":;..."V[CI 50 ,,"l 7
COMMENTARY

109

far as the Greeks were concerned the male citizen at the age of thirty constituted in effect the polis while the primary role of the woman was familial, the subdivisions are quite natural. A. concludes (61a 7-II) with the injunction that, publicly and privately, these bodily and moral excellences mwt be sought for both lnen and women. Z EU"t€xvlm is "the blessing of children." Eur., Andromache 418IE: "For all men, surely, children are their very life and soul; those without children disparage them and though they are spared much pain yet their happiness is but wretchedness"; see He<. 581, 620, and Herod. 1.136. J -rei» KOlvcil 1"0 XD£.",$-, is a very common e..~pression for the State; see, e.g., Herod. r.67.s. 6Ia I : 1 [€U"tExvlm] This is carrecdy bracketed following Spenge! since we already have the double subject in 60b 38 (repeated in the same way at 6Ia 4) and there is no reason to think that A. is speaking only of ..dTB".ia here. I note that the edd. bracket it. z iiv i.e., la.'II. 3 ciymO>\ is specified for the young men in what follows as (a) bodily excellence, (b) moral excellence.

a 2 : 1 ..m"t' ciPE-rI\V dpBn7 in this sense, as we see it so frequendy in the Socratic dialogues, is the excellence proper to something by reason of what it is in itself. This human e.-"cellence is dre constant quest of Socrates; for example, he attempts in part an analysis of our d.~e.ia (Laches) and aro'l'eotW.'1 at 613 3 (Charm.) and of 'P'lIa (Lysis) which we meet at 6Ib 3SIE z otoy I'-~YEeO~ ... ciytdV",·",x>\v Compare with 60b 21-22; we fmd only vyi"a. missing. here. These particular excellences are seIf-explanatory, and, to one acquainted with the importance which Greek culture placed upon physical excellence joined with mental and moral excellence, not at all starding. Pericles' funeral oration (Thucyd. 2.35-46) is permeated with the ideas. See also Plato, Akib. I 123d - 1240, where bodily excellence without mental excellence is presented as a limited thing. a 3 : 1 "'uxij~ 5£ ... ciPETCd We are given here in aru'PeOtW.'1 >tal d.de.ia two new dyaOci of the 1JI1>x>i; another, 'P,A.eyia, is added at 613 7. The first two are mentioned in the bracketed lines at 60b 23-24. Z civ5pdm Variously writteu in our text byth. edd.: e.g., Roemer and Tovar read dvdeia without explanation; Dufour, Ross, and Kassel read d.~eBta. On the orthography, see LS, ci.deBia, init. a 4 Ked 'R'OAU'TEXVla. 25·

sc. faTi; on this and subsequent instances, see 59b

1I0

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

6xa IO

a 5 ..o""il.... TO'O;;TO~ generally points backward as it does here and at 6xa 9. However, it is also regularly used as the demonstrative antecedent of a following relative clause. The demonstrative To.ouds points forward. As an dyaOoy of women, this was praised by Eurymachus a 6 fL.YEeO~ in Pendope (Odyssey I8.248fE): "Since you surpass all women in beauty and stature, and, within, in wisdom of mind." Penelope, in reply, accepts this as part of i!,~y deST~' (251). Plutarch tells us that the Spartans fined their king Archidamus, "for venturing to marry a small woman, for they charged him with intending to furnish them with kinglets not kings" (On the Education '!!Children Id). In EN II23b ~ we read: "Greatness of soul resides in greatness [!"y.Oo~I, just as beauty resides in a large body; small people are degant and suitable but not beautiful." a 7 cpu-cpyi.. 4ivw clvEAEUeEp(,,~ "industry without servility." d••;'.vOeela signifies an absence of those qualities of mind and personality which become the free citizen. Here it would seem to indicate one who subjects onesdf inordinately to work without regard for anything else - or, possibly, with a view simply to material gain. The first part of this interpretation would be in general accord with what A. says about d• .;...Ose1a; see Bonitz, Index, s. v. and s. d.';'sv8BeO~. The latter part of the interpretation is also borne out by A.'s comment on the kind of wealth which can be qualified as 11.vOBeia at 6xa I7; see especially 6]. 27. Writing on iAsv8Be'O""'~ in the Nicomm:hean Ethics Ostwald comments (p. 306) that "by the fourth century B.C. the term was so restricted to money matters that it seems advisable to use the more idiomatic GBNBBOSrrY in preference to • • • 'liberality'."

~ 9 "'& KtI.'r.z YUVClLXUt; cpcdil.« H(lTa ywatxac; = uwith respect to women" (cf. 6Ia 8). Ta HCI"Ca ytlvatxa, = "Ca yvvClHsia, and cpaiiAa is predicate adjective: "the condition, the estate, of women is poor"; Cope and Freese interpret the phrase to mean "the character and conduct of women," which does not seem correct. We have an almost identical statement in Pol. I269b 12-23 (another instance of the dose rdation of these two treatises), and it concerns the general condition ofwomen. See the Politics passage jwt cited. There is· a 10: 1 A""'&"'fLOV(O'~ rdativdy little in contemporary studies on Sparta to throw further light on A.'s remark, which is at odds, for example, with Plutarch's comments in his life of Lycurgus. But see Oliva, pp. 29-32; den Boer, pp. 213-32; Chrimcs; and Lacey, pp. 203-208. Arethus., 6, No. I (I973), is entirdy devoted to women in antiquity; though it incorporates the more recent scholarship on the role of women in Greece, it offers no hdp on Spartan women. allier's book is an interesting study of the idealization of Sparta by the Gredrs.

6ra

.s

CO MMBNTA1\Y

III

z ,......" ...1. ijl'LlJU "They are, to all intents and purposes, but half blessed with eMa,,.0.[4." The implications of this statement for the importance, in A.' s mind, of women in Greek society and culture are obvious. See also Plato, Laws 78ra-b on this question. The principle at work throughout a .2-24 ,.).oU...ou 50: . . . ,.).ou...o~ this section is stated at 6ra 23-24: "wealth" consists in the use of what is possessed, not simply in the possession ofit. We are meant to read the section with this in mind. We have the same idea in Pol. I2s7b 1 - 12s8a .8. AtENII2Da 5-8 we read: "wealth is one of the useful things, and the man who possesses the virtue proper to each (useful thing) ~es the best use of each. Thus the man who possesses the virtue proper to wealth will use wealth best. This is the liberal man." A position similar to this is found in Isoer., Demo"icus 27-28. However, cf. 62b 18 : z. a 12 : 1 ,.).oU"ou Roemer and Dufour place a lacuna before this word, primarily because the definition of wealth is believed to be missing. However, the codd. are secure and should be left unchanged. Z vop.lcrp.a.-r0t; coin, money; see "Coinage, Greek." in the OCD. This is the reading of four of the edd.; Ross 1 ,.).ij80~, yij~ alone conjectures ",MiOo, <"a/> yij" which, with his punctuation, makes yij, a genitive with "lijOo, not ""iju" (an abundance of money and land) and changes the meaning somewhat. The text without the conjecture is preferable (possession of land and estates). The text seems secure here, although at 6ra '3-'5 it appears to be less so. 4 yij~ may represent, as Cope, p. 80, suggests, "public property, territory," which is the interpretation reflected in some of the translations. If it doe. mean this, then A. intends us to distinguish it from x"'e["'" which i. private property, "landed property, estate." Yet both may represent private land possession, which seems more likely in view of 6Gb 38 : 1. a 14 l,.[,.).c.)v movable, as oppo.ed to fi.'Ced, properties. It would indude household furniture, dress, etc., armor (see Xen., Qeconomicus 9.6-9; Thucyd. 3.68.3), and, in general, both from the context here ~d from Pol. 1267b 10-12, all inanimate movables as distinguished from such animate movables as slaves and cattle. See Lysias, Against Eratosthenes 19.

"/XU,,..

a IS : 1 5c •.. XP>\'''l'cx A. states here that for wealth to be wealth "all these parts are to be , secure, worthy of a free man, useful." He goes on to explain what he means by each. a is the suggestion of Moret and i. accepted by the edd.; Spengel and Cope do not read it. I would note, however, that A. in 6Ia 15-22 indicates dearly that he knows that he has written dU9'alij, AlwOie,a, and Xe~ul,.a at 6ra 15-16. The evidence for o/".ia is at 6Ia 21-22

II2

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

61a 24

where it is explained by way of contrast with cia",dl..a. Since his order of explanation reverses the order of presentation, it appeaxs reasonable to suggest that ol""a was present as the first specification. a 17-19 "lip""",Cl ... a~,ov parentheses.

Ross alone of the edd. places this within

a'I7 : 1 ..1& ""P."',,,Cl Productive wealth belongs more to the category of the useful. Thus A. goes on to explain (61a 17-18) productive wealth as that which is the source of income ("udaodo.). On the idea in dleu8eu.a, see 6la 7. 2 D.augep'Cl •.• oi.,,6>'Clua,v Here A. specifies it further to mean: "wealth used with a view to the pleasure of a person." On tbis idea in cinolaua." see loa 5-7. As Socrates says, "Wealth is only that by which man may be benefited" (Xen.,Otcon. 1.13). He continues in a way which shows that by "benefit" he does not mean any and every thing which wealth can bring but rather that which is becoming to and enhances man's living. See 66b 7 : 1, 66b 18 : 2. a 19 "Cll

emphatic: " ... indeed worthy of consideration."

Many interpret this as "in such places." But what that a 20 tv..Clil9Cl could mean is puzzling. Perhaps the root idea of the word as an adverb of place "here" is the meaning, and we should interpret simply: "to have them in one's possession here, in a given situation." See, for example, s4h 29, or, especially, 55b 18; Plato, Lysis 209b 8. See also 71a 6, 19, 6n 32 : z; 77b 5 and note. See 61a 15 : z; the genitive of the articular a 21 ..oil &~ 01>.£;.. dvCl' infinitive is dependent on /luo~ (6Ia 19). i.e., power to alienate; this A. defines ima 22: 1 oi."cx>.>'o..p,ii'>aCl' mediately as the right to give or to sell (what one possesses); on the use of the infinitive with I",' aVT<ji ii, see S. 1984-1985. Kassel claims that WlCOrrected cod. A reads an articular infinitive and so he read, T& cinallaTu,wO'a •• z ij ",>i In the codd. these words appear after aEx"a .r.a. (so Ross, Kassel, and Cope). The other edd. transpose them to follow cinallaTu.waa,. There is no reason why we carmot read with the codd. a 23-24 3>.c.>S &E ••• ...>.oil..oS

See 6la 12-24-

a 24 >i tv"py£'Cl • . . XCll >i xpija,s This statement explains what immediately precedes, /lJ.w, ... "8"f~a8a. (61a 23): namely, that wealth actually resides in use, not in possession. In saying that wealth is ~ l.iuy..a TW. To.avTCu. A. means that wealth is the actualization (l.iuyeta) of the potentialities (fW' fo.aVf«>. used as at 6[a 5), i.e., the elements of wealth (money, land, etc.) which he set forth at 6xa uf( These elements (PiU'1'

61a 32

COMMENTARY

II3

61a 12) represent wealth as 66.a,..~: they are elements necessary for wealth to come into existence. Potentially they are wealth, but they are not wealth in actuality. When they are actualized by being used, then, and only then, are they wealth. Thus lj ••lel'•• a "allj lCeiia.~ should be interpreted: "the actualization, or use ["at corrective, S. 2870), of such elements." 1 dJ&o~11l This is the Mea of 60b 22. • <mou&lliov i.e., respected: "of being held in universal respect." A number of the senses of the word are at work here, e.g., (0) "good or excellent in its kind," as opposed to <pavAo. (bad, inellicient); (b) "morally good," as opposed to "o'~e&~, e.g., "a good man [anovdaiod is good from possessing virtue" (Cat. rob 7). Like that of S""B",7j~ (reasonable, equitable, good), the specific meaning of cmov6aio, must frequendy come from the context. See 67b 21 and 67b 2I : ••

a 25 :

a 26 ....0'0;;-.:611 .... ' The meaning here is partially determined by anD".. daiD', to which it rel.i:rs. Thus, it will be something which elicits respect. We can gather an idea of what such a thing might be from what follows at 61. 28 - 61b 2. There he speaks of ....,.7j which is a sign that one possesses a favorable reputation as one who does the good; C£, for example, 6ra 3¢: a 27 t\YIl801 ... 'PpOII'fI.O'

a 28 :

See 63a 17 and note.

,fI.>1

See 60b 22. • '"Ifl.tiioll See 57b I : 2. 3 £(,£py..... ,,,ij; .u&o~I..; "of a good reputation for doing good"; c£ 66a 38. Socrates in Apol. 36c explains his effort at eVeel'Baia. 1

....

,.e.

a 29 : 1 1;'"..Iw; fl.EII here is answered by the adversative oV ,..;,. dAAIi, where ,.7j> stresses that the fact stated in its clause coexists with the preceding statement which is opposed to it. See Denniston, pp. 334-35, 29; see also Plato, Gorg. 449b. Note the tense of e~Be1'8~"&"'B>, and therefore the contrast with the answering clause. 2 KClt p.ciAIO''Ta. "and above all"; take with d£xalQ)'. 3 ou fl."" oi1.l.ci "not but that"; see Denniston, pp. 28-30, with which compare LS, dAAa, II.5. a 30 " ..loa.. sc. I
a 32 :

1

•

Il4

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

6Ib 3

code!. is usually interpreted to mean "at a particular place and time," an interpretation which might seem to receive support from 6ra 33-34: T."OI - "aleot. But once again it appears more correct to interpret i.TaiiOa as in the other instances (6Ia 20) as "either in this givetJ situation or at any time." a 33 : 1

6"k fL'XP" 60XoU"T..

"because of benefactions which seem

sm.Jl." Tbe clause in which this phrase occurs (noAAol yael is meant to explain the statement made just before ir, t.TaiiOa ij "OT': namely, the fact that although the benefactions were not particularly significant in themselves they became substantial because of the circumstances of place and time. Oem., Lepti".. 41-46 illustrates precisely what A. is saying. Z T6",o, has a very common variant in a number of codd.:

"'edno,. a 34

fLip,! As with ,.,tOiiTO, (6Ia 12), A. decides to give us "parts" of np.rj. It is interesting to see that a number of the tbings which he mentions are specifically noted as marks ofhonor in the Iliad 12.310-321. There is ample

evidence in Dittenberger for the varied honors listed at 6ra 34-37; see also Cicero's comment in Pro Milone 80. From literary sources, we can illustrate them with the following authors: (a) o,,<1ta., TB,..i'71, Ta'P0" Thucyd. S.Il.I, and see Eur., Hipp. I424-I430; (b) ""fjp.a, a.... ,..'TeW. (t. ,..'TeO', are more likely grave inscriptions but avev ,..'TeW. are also possibly such): Thucyd. 2.36-46, Plato, Apol., Isocr., Evagoras, Xen., AgesiitlUs; (c) ysea: any number of places in Homer, e.g., Iliad 1.120; or the aTi'Pavo, which was the subject of Demosthenes' speech 0" the Crown; (d) "eo.dela" Herod. 1.54.2; (e) TtftpO.: Thucyd .. 2.34-I; (f) .t"•••" Oem., Leptin.. 70; (g) Teo'Pal d71,..oata" Aristoph., Frogs 764, Plato, Apol. 36d; (h) Ta PaePae,,,a ("oriental homage"): a /.tieo, which is specified by A. as "eoanv.ria..,: Aeschylus, Persians 584-599, Herod. 1.134.1-2, and '''aTaa.,,: Herod. 2.80, Xen., Spartan Constitution 15.6. "the gifts held in honor among a 37 6C.plI "' .. "'''P' ~x.......o,~ TtfL'" each and every people," with the article in the attributive position. The use of ["aaTo, in the plural in this sense is ordinary; see, for example, Oem., 01. 2.7.29. Cope, p. 87, suggests that it may also refer to the two groups at 6ra 39: lovers ofmoney, oEhonor.

6Ib I cil'q>o..-£po.~ ..• qu dp.'P0Tieo" is masculine not neuter and refers to 'P,lOXeriP.aTO', 'P"l,IT.,..o,; Td aweov is the understood subject of

Ix ..· b 3-26 cn:.fLIITo~ 5£ ... ",""","e),o~ As already noted (60b 20-29), the excellences of the body (mentioned at 60b 21-22) are kept together in their presentation. The idea which controls all the statements in this section

6rb

II

COMMENTARY

II5

on bodily excellences is the physical well-being of the body (e.g., 6Ib 3-4). It serves as the validating nonn and in its own way reflects how deeply rooted in Greek thought was the idea of the double excellence of soul and body. b 5 : 1 ·Hp6&.xo~ a native of Megara, later a citizen of Sdymbria. We might get some idea of his floruit from the fact that he was supposed to be a teacher of Hippocrates (469-399 B.C.). Plato, in Rep. 406a-c. gives a more detailed report of what A. mentions in passing here; see also Protag. 316e. Phaedr. 227d. We are told that Herodicus was among the first to make a scientific study of the therapeutics of exercise and diet. It was possibly his insistence in translating theory into practice in his own life which was marred by weak health that made his life, in Plato's ironic words, "along dying." A comment ofT.citus· illustrates A.'s point: "It is not enough not to be ill..•• The man whose soundness alone [sa"itas1 is praised is but a step removed from an invalid" (Dial. de Drat. 23.4-) a 66&,,,,,"ovl..... read by the edd.• Spengd, and Cope primarily from the Latin translation; it means "to call one happy." The major codd. read .,jdal,..o.~O"...: "to be happy." 3 "
excellence. b TO ",,,,,"O"ex&>'o, five events: running. jumping, discus. javdin throwing. wrestling. It was one of the contests at Olympia and at the other festivals. Simonides mentions the five events in an epigram; see Hiller & Crusius. no. 133. On Greek athletics, see Harris. b II: 1 ",po~ ... ",...,uKexcr." We saw this usage at 55a 16; the perfect is intransitive and passive in meaning: "to be formed or disposed by nature," and therefore "to have a natural capacity for." Since the natural capacity is for the two qualities which constitute ,,"llo, (6Ib 9). the pentathletes are called "dll.aTo. (6rb 10). a 4x,,"ci~ov"O"o~ sc. from 6rb 7-8: "dllo, [~I1T!] Td xe~a.,..o. 6x.,. TO aoo,..«- A. frequently engages in this kind of brachylogy (as we have seen)

n6

6Ib 24

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

in which words or phrases must be supplied dnd yoo.,o;; from a previous statement. "to have the reputation [LS, 11.51 of being pleasant b 12 .r...,,, &o".i... as well as fear-inspiIing." b 13

YEP""""O~

See 6xb II :

2.

b 14 eli... i.e., 1",1,,,,, ii Td rijea~ A",plirat: "which disfigure old age." 25-27: "Freedom from pain in old age is preferable to freedom See Top. from pain in youth for it is more important in old age."

II.,..

generic: either person or thing. Although A.' s thought in b r 5 g.....pov this section (6rb 3-26) is dominated by the idea of athletics (see in particular 6Ib 23-26), still to give as the general norm of strength one's ability to lift, push, pull another person is not particularly reasonable. We have no reason to make A. say it, especially since he describes the ,,1'1JC1'~ of another person or thing in partially similar terms in the Physics 243a II-IS (OCT edition). b 17 ",aaLv .......Lalv

The datives are instrumental; see S. 1516.

b IS ....0 ':''''.pq.LV is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd. Ross, however, reads ro ""tieze .. with Bywater, and pe,Co,' (presumably pelCo.a) for peleo•• at 6rb 20. With the reading of the codd. the interpretation is: "Excellence in size is the pre-emmence which belongs to one superior to the many with respect to height, compactness, and breadth, to such an extent that bodily movements are not retarded because of the superiority." b"2I

ciYWVLGTtXiJ

i.e., "competitive excellence in a body."

b 22 " ..I ......Xou~ read with the codd. by Dufour, Tovar, Ross, and Cope. Spenge! bracketed it and is followed by Roemer and Kassel. Sponge! believes that the next clause stating that swifmess belongs to strength and the fact that A. did not include swiftness among the deeral of the body indicate that the words were not written by A. Possibly so; but I would read the words, and not accept Cope's strictures on careless writing in the Hal rtie clause. The "al rtie can introduce an explanation justifiably added by A. in the effort to clarify the mention of rax~~. b 23

p""....iv

Cope's note here on a difference between

tim..", and

el"Tru is not correct; see, for example, Jebb on Aja" 239.

b 24: 1 'Ked 'ROpPW Cope, p. 92, translates ~''''B''JI noeew as Uta take long strides." More likely the whole phrase should be interpreted: "move quickly and over a distallce." Most Greek running was at 200 yards and above; see Harris, pp. 64ff.

6rb 29

Il7

COMMENTARY

6po",'x6~, ..
and similar adjectives in 6rb 24-26 have the force of "is good at, fit for, has a capacity for"; see 5!1b 3:> : 1. 2

b 2j oi"'3) must be understood with 6 in 6rb 24, :>j, it is also to be understood with 6 d' a,ucpOT'eO'~, 6 dt on the datives of respect, see S. rjr6. See H>rris, pp. rOjff., on the pankration.

a.

"Ii",;

b 26 :r"VTCl9>'o~ See 6Ib ro, 6Ib II : 1. Since boxing was not one of the events, Cope (p. 89) finds it very difficult to understand how A. can include it. Since A. does not mention javelin throwing or the discus, it would is simply a generalizing use and indicates the overall exappear th.t cellence found in the pent.thlete. "a happy old age; happiness in old age"; see Isoer., b 27 : 1 eUY'IP(CI Evag. 7r on the idea. 2 ~pIl6,,-rIj~ i.e., "growing old gradually" (the idea is aptly expressed by the expression: "to grow old gracefully''). A. discusses the causes of a long and short life in animals and plants in a separate treatise called "On the Longness and Shortness of Life " (464b r9 - 467b 9) which forms part of his work Parva naturalia.

"Ii",

.ijY'lP"'~ the adjective; all the cdd. save Tovar read .iI"'1ew~. ",6y,~ a rare word in Attic prose (save for Plato). The more common form, "o).,~, is used by Demosthenes and generally by A. In our

b 28 :

1

2

"0",,

is interpreted: "if olle grows old scarcely at all." This of course passage .picks IIp Peadvn), ,,~eW,.; therefore: "if one grows old slowly indeed, yet with

pain." 3 ~"""V

The subject is .oY'1~{a.

b 29 xlll -rox'l~ is the reading of the codd. and four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross co.yecrures nlX'1\" b 29-31 "'lJ civOIfO~ ... &""",£LVE'ev civ As far as the reading at 6rb 3r is concerned: (a) all the edd., Spenge!, and Cope read Muret's palmary emendation a~BV nlX'1, for UV BOTVX*; (b) Cope, Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar bracket O"T'; Spenge! (p. 98), Ross, and Kassel read in its place Roth's conjecture oO~. If one writes out th, Greek for 6rb 29-3 I without accent, punctuation, and word division, one can see how dv BOTVX~' came about and why a negative idea (OilT') was then demanded. As far as the punctuation of the passage at 61 b 30 is concerned: Cope, Dufour and Tovar place a comma after a..... a8*; Spenge!, Ross, and Kasse! place it after aAV"o,. But a change ill punctuation here alters the mC'.I1ling of the passage. A. here is explaining the statement which immediately precedes: name!y, that happiness in old age comes from the excellences of the body and from good fortune. Ifwe (a) read iJ..sv ruX'1, and bracket OilT' -there being no need for a negative

liS

ARISTOTLE,

r RHETORIC'

[

61b 37

idea (itis already contained in the conjunction ",Jd' at61b 30) - and (b) place a comma after dna81j" our lines explain the previous statement in this way: (I) a..0<10, • •• dna8* explains excellences of the body: physical soundness and strength free one's old age from physical distress; (2) o.la' cUvno, . .. a.~ explains good fortune: freedom from the hardships of old age (e£: aAvnop at 6Ib 14) and a long life are the gift of good fortune. Thus we have the interpretation: "For if he is not free from sickness and is not strong he will not be free from physical distress, and without good fortune he would not survive free from the hardships of old age and for a long life."

I"n

b 33

.....nol

such as Herodicus in Plato's account; see 6Ib 5 :

1.

b 34 001i." 'IJ 4xp,~oAoyl.. Once again we have a somewhat gratuitous remark by Cope (p. 93) to the effect that "nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise." This is not A.'s point. His remarks throughout the chapter are clearly general, and meant to indicate large reservoirs for development. We surely have seen thus far, and shall see, that A. can be "exact ••• scientific" in the Rheteric when the occasion calls for it; see, e.g., 6Ib 37 : 1; see also 69b 31. b 35

TO;; 'I'(Aou

clJp,a",Evou

i.e., "when 'friend' has been defIned."

As the antecedent to the relative 8(f~", this refers b 36: 1 TO'O;;TO~ to what is said in the relative clause, S. 1249 (and see 618 5): "The 'friend' is one who," or,:-"the kind of person who." z 3....,~ See S!lb 36. b 36-37 II ....,~ Ii ... Ii,' be.,VOll We can translate 6tb 36-37: "A friend is one who for the sake of the other brings about that good which he considers to be good for the other." b 37: 1 beEl"", i.e., "for that other person." A. discusses friendship at some length in B 4 (compare 80b 36 - 8ra I with our 6Ib 36-37), and throughout Book 8 of the Nkomachean Ethics, especially chaps. 1-8. In neither discussion is there anything substantially diJferent from his brief definition here, which is direct and to the point. In EN 9, chaps. 4 and 8, A. puts forward the idea of "true" self-love as the basis offriendsbip, but this development does not obscure the idea that "The good man has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself, for his friend is really another self" (n66a 29-32.). 3 "'P""T'''O~ Le., is both "able to, and inclines to effect" these dra8&; e£: 60b 17, and see S9b 32 : 1.

62a 3

COMMENTARY

II9

€,,,,.,,••

b 38 i~ See 6Ia 25 : z, 720b I8 : z. Here it probably means "good men": i.e., "and the one who has such who are also ["at] truly good men is the possessor of good friends [xe'laT09'Mod." b 39: 1 a.-ruxla "good fortune." A. disewses this concept in EE 1246b 37 - I248b 7. '~Tvxla is one of the elements in ed6a'povta (60b 23) and differs from it insofar as sMa'povta, as A. speaks of it, is essentially under human control and attainable by the individual, while Il1lTVXla is totally free from such control Z cd'da See Cope, Introd., pp. 2I8-24, on TtlX'/ as cause. 3 ..-aii..-a yIYVEcr8,.. Kill 6""pxE.V an infinitive clause, with a subject accwative, as predicate with AaTt. in a de£inition. ..aii..a (sc. clya8c£) as the subject of the infinitive resumes the stated subject, which is in the relative clause eli. • • • clya8w. alTta. On the "al ("acquisition or possession"), see s.... 34: 1. 6za Z Kill adverbial: "which also have the arts as e.'CCIIlplifies this at 62a 4-

their cause." He

a 3 : 1 tldxv,",v e1fects which have no relation to any known TiX.a,. We saw this word at 55b 3S set in contrast with lv"vo,. The meaning is basically the same: something which is not controlled by rules and principles and a reasoned procedure. Z olov ...
120

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

62a 14

trary to nature." There was an instance of this at 61 b 22 (see 6Ib 22). Ross and Kassd enclose the ciause in parenthe.e.. a 4 ':'YLd..~ • . . dxv1J ..1.·1.. A. would not deny that health can also be the effect of 'I'.Ja.~ (and of ",uX"I); but he does deny (62a 5) that ....1.""1 could cause beauty or stature, a denial preswnably still valid, in spite of the advances of technology and science.

a 5-6 3),w~ •.• oI~ whici, ••. "

"in general, fortune's goods are the kind for

a 7 : 1 .... pa: 1.oyov "unexpected, unlooked for." It is quite like n:ae&).oyo~; see, e.g., 74b 6: d..."xljpa...a ptv {Jaa "ae&).oya. But "aed lOyo. in A. can also be opposed to "a...d AO),O', and means "contrary to reason." Z ot IiAAOL From a parallel with the clause which follows, we can take this phrase as subject, and aEaXeol ddtA'I'oi as predicate to an understood Blat, and translate: "if the rest are ugly brothers," i.e., "if all the other brothers are ugly, but one is handsome." Ross alone of the edd. transposes the reading of the codd. to da';''I'ol alaxeoi. a 9 "ou ..1.1Jalov On the use of the article with an adverb to form a substantive, see S. 1I53e (the appropriate form of
a

a 12

dvc:u Roemer alone of the edd. believes that there is a lacuna here after elva,; see 6Ia 12 : 1.

a 13 b ..o..o~ a good example ofthe use of ... 6,,0~ to refer to the particular topics, Bra"l; see sSa 17 : 1. a I4 o"'C'uv TtEpl en:cdvou

i.e., A 9.

CHAPTER 6

I . Introduction: 62a 15 - 62a 21 deliberative rhetoric centers on aspects of w6alfJovla, and its proximate T.AO~ is the C1'IJfJ'P6eOV; since the a"fJ'Pieov is an dyaB.v, a general determination of the a1JfJ'Peeov and me dyaB&. is necessary

II . Developmalt: 62a 21 - 63 b 3 I. 6,. 21 - 62a 34

definitions of dya8.v

2. 6,. 34 - 63b (a) 620 J4 (6) 62b 10 (c) 62b 29 -

what are good thillgs: in general specific dyafJd which are Dot disputable

3 62b 9 6.b '9 6J' 19

dya8d which are debatable and are

[0

be determined by using the 'lated norms as guides in general. neoalgBTo can be: considered dy.8d

III . Conclusion: 63 b 3 - 63 b 4

6:za IS .J)v ••• &Ei ""OX..~.aeClL "to aim at, shoot at" (see 55a 17). The image is wonderfully I112intained in 62a 17-18 (ind ... a"fJ'P6eO') with the word ""&"O~, as we can see from Plato's we ofit in Rep. 519C. This opening sentence is quite similar to the introductory sentence of chap. 5 (6ob 4-5). In chap. 4 A. spoke of the subjects proper to deliberative rhetoric in general, i.e., the larger issues of concern to the State. In chap. 5 he attempted to reach what lies behind the discussion of such issues. This, he decided, was man's desire for e;,6alfJovla, the good life. Consequently he subjected 8ddalfJovia to a detailed practical, not theoretical, analysis. In chap. 6, as we shall see from the intrOdUCtory sentences, he reverts to the dJ.o~ of deliberative rhetoric: the C1'IJfJ'PF.eov. As TiAO~ the C1'IJfJ'PBeOV is what determines me character of all discussion in deliberative rhetoric, such as, for example, that found in chaps. 4 and 5. Therefore it is necessary to know what is meant by aVfJ'Pieov, not in itself, but specifically as it applies to ')Or actions which strive

122

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' I

6za 20

for the means leading to the end, which, practically, is s~aa'fJovta. Since the U1Jp."Se07 is dyaB&", we must have some elementary notions on "good." Therefore A. proceeds in this and the following chapter to provide an analysis of the good as it relates to Ta avfJ",ieO'Ta "aTa Tde; "eM •• e; (62a 19-20). Anaximenes' definition of (fVfJ/PBeo> at I422a 4-S is quite interesting in comparison with what A. says at 62a 27-3 S. a 16 ~1<"PXov"<wv

See S8b 13.

"oU"<WV

refers to 0;•••• (fToxdC.(f8a. "eOTeinOVTtL 2 "'POXE'''''' The metaphor in this word ("to set before one as a prize") is not absent as the word is used here. a 17 :

1

Only Ross and Kassel of the edd. and a 17-21 .",d &~ .•. ,b"AG>. Spengel and Cope use parentheses in this sentence. But if parentheses are used they must be used with discrimination. The structure of the sentence is clear: there is (a) a causal clause, composed of l".1 all ... avfJ/Pseov (62) 17IS) and TO 6. (fVfJ/pBeOV dya86v (62a 20); and (b) its conclusion, A'InTi,. •.. d,,}.we; (62a 2C>-2I); with (c) the intervening clause, PoVJ.stlovTa, •.• ned~s.e; (62. IS-2.0), providing a reason for the causal clause. As Ross punctuates wing parentheses - (POvJ.etlovTa • ... aya86.) - this logical sequence is destroyed. I have since noted that Van Straaten &: De Vries (p. 147) find difficulty with what Ross includes in parentheses. Kassel concludes the parenthesis correctly at "ed~..,: (PovAstlwra • ... "ed~.. c;). a 17

"ii>

CIU!'(j.OU).WOV", • • . CIU!''P
See 58b 2C>-25, S8b S-29.

... IS : 1 ax01
""o'X""

The optative is potential. the ultimate elements; see sSa lS.

6za 24

COMMENTARY

123

a 21 : 1 &ru.c;;~ "generally"; see S6a 7, meaning (c). Cope's comments (p. 97) on the "popular" character of rhetorical theory are again mis-

leading. 2 ~CJ'<W &~ Cope derives the "popular character" of the definition from laTro d>l, which is not strong evidence; see 60b 14 : 2. A. expresses a view on definitions at 69b 3I-32, on which see 69b 31.

a ZI -.6:zb 9 ila'<W &iJ ..• ,dp£'«i ......'v A. sets down in 62a 21-34 a series of basic defInitions of the good as he intends to discuss it. He follows this (still by way of general introduction) with 6za 34 - 6zb 9 wherein he draws from the definitions a series of conclusions upon which he builds the analysis which follows in chaps.6-'7. The conclusions. are: (a) the acquisition of good, or deliverance from evil, is good both absolntely and relatively; (b) virtues are good; (c) pleasure is good. Commentators stress the practical character of the definitions and the examples derived from them. In doing so they imply (or state) that the defInitions really are expedient methods to achieve an end proposed - namely, success in deliberative rhetoric - and not analyses of ...o dya8o.. This is incorrect. In their substance the definitions and the instances drawn from them are correct. The fact that the specific particular topics developed from the definitions may not, as stated, be absolutely and universally valid simply points to the practica1 character of the analyses. A. would admit this, as he does at 62b 291£ His objective, however, is not a philosophical analysis of the good bnt the presentation of basically valid focal points from which to examine whether one's subject can be considered uu,..",4eo, - dya80.. In this respect Finley's observation (p. 35n52) on the working principles in the Rhetoric is quite to the point.

n III.".,.

a 22 : 1 Ii iiv ... ,dp£..-6v See BE 1248b 18-19; Plato, philebus zod,22b. 2 "",l aU See Plato, Gorg. 49ge, which is somewhat echoed by Philebus 54c-
ou .'P[£"-"" "liv..-", See EN 1094' 1-22, I172b 36£; Pol. 1252a 1-7; Top. n6a 19-20. The argument is that the object of such a universal natural

a 23

desire is a good. The three definitions of the good which we have here are not at all saying precisely the same thing (as Cope, p. 97, argues), but presenting varied aspects under which good in se can be viewed. a 24 vow Since the ide. of good is at issue, .o;;~ here must refer in a general way to the practical intellect, the .o;;~ ;t.y'aT'''o~. For, as De an. 433a 15-16 tells us, "The object of desire is the starting point for the practical intellect." Cope, p. 98, wants our word to stand "in a general sense for the special faculty or part of it ",eo,'1u,~, the practical reason, the calculating

AR.ISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

62a 29

discursive and moral part of the intellect." He points to 64b II-I9. However, see 64b 12 where we find that rpe.1I1J'''~ is not the practical intellect, but a virtue of it; see also 63 b 12-1 j whete A. repeats what he says here and distinguishes between .o;;~ and rpe&1I1J'''~' a 24-25 a.... ~ voG~ ... tCTTW from Moerbeke's ttanslation. The use of rde clearly refers this clause to what precedes. With the correct punctuation after draB.v - namely, a colon - the reference is equally clear without rae. 2 " ..l oil 11:cipOVTO~ We have here another definition of araB.v: "and furthet that (is good) because of whose presence one is all that one should be, and enjoys independence." w 6,a".,.,.Ba, = "to be well disposed." See S. 1709b. It should be noted that Td a 27: 1 cNTcip_~ ~.. avme"'~' which follows, is a new good, not a simple repetition of what has just been said. In the Rhetoric A. uses a~Tde".. a in a definition of siJda',uovia at 60b '4 and of draB •• here, but in neithet place docs he specify the meaning of the concept. He does specify it at EN 1097b '4-'5 as that "which when taken by itself makes human life desirable and without any want." 2 11:0'''lT'XGV "and that which tends to produce or preserve such qualities as the above (is good)"; on the form, see 59b 32 : 1. a 28 xal c!> .•• To ...GTa "and that which such properties attend upon (is good)"; or, as Cooper translates, "whatever entails such things." At 63b 15-16 A. repeats this statement. a 29 : 1 "",AuT'xci,
62a 36

COMMBNTARY

goods: namel y, all those things which are pursued and loved for their own sake; see EN I096b 10-13 where both are so described. z 4"oAouO.i liE Ii,X';;~ i.e., d,,010v8s, U (U,,'Ta,) a,Xw~: "The word lattend upon' is used in two senses" (at 62a 32 Te'XW!; = coin three senses"). Here and at Top. II7a II-I3 we have a twofold division (a,Zw~). At63b 28-J2 we are given a threefold division. Cope, p. 99, has a good note with citations on the meaning of ",,010v8s" and brs,,8a, (the latter word is used at 63b 16, 28-32). Cope shows that the words do not simply signify "to follow upon," but denote an invariable, or necessary, attendance upon or following upon. He further indicates that the primary sense of ""010v8s" is U to wait upon"; the secondary, "to accompmy, to follow upon." a 30-3 I ;j yckp ••. iiI''' Ross is the only ed. to enclose this statement in parentheses. a 31 : 1 "C'o inlG"t't&G8C1.L i.e., TO 6'/r.tf1TaaOa, (ti,eoAov660 VUTSeO'JI. z '<" ~jjy i.e., TO Cij. (",,010v8s1) d"a.

a 32 : 1 ,Y liE ... 4TCo~oAcl~ We come now to the first conclusion which follows upon these defmitions (TO~T"" "",,,8''''') of good: acquisitions of anything good are a good, as are deliverances from evil. See 69b 23-28 and EN IIJ I b a 35-36 ,"~ •.. 47to~oAci~ I6-2J; on arguments from Mi'l"~ and anopol>!, see Top. II7b J--9. a 36 4"oAoue.i The principle used here is similar to his general or common topic of Consequents, on which see B 23, 99a 10-17. On the various meanings of the phrase a J6-37 '<'i> I'Ev ... '<'i> liE (e.g., the one-the other, the former-the latter, the latter-the former) see Gildersleeve, Syntax, II SIS. The usual interpretation of the phrase is "the latter-the former": e.g., "freedom from evil follows immediately on the latter, possession of the good follows subsequently on the former." This appears

126

AIUSTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

to be correct since evil for A. is a privation and the ridding oneself of this privation. which requires a positive actuation. brings at once the good of being free from the evil. Good is something positive. an actuation of a potency which grows. or can grow. toward more completeness. Thus the acquisition of a good (or goods) leads to the eventual fuller fruition of the good. e.g .• to acquire the good of an answer to a critical problem does not stop there but contributes to the enrichment .of the more substantial good: intellectual understanding. sc. iun ay,,8 ••• 6zh 1-2 ymp ••• Cb'O~OA>i At 62a 37-38 we read that "The acquisition of a greater good in place of a lesser. and of a lesser evil in place of a greater. is a good." Our present sentence explains why: "for that by which 'the greater' exceeds 'the lesser' constitutes the measure of [..ounp ,,(,sT,,"1 the acquisition of the one [the greater good) and the loss of the other [the greater evil)." In short. the measure whereby good is increased. or evil diminished. is itself a good. I am reading at 62b I TOU..ep with cod. A. Spengd. Dufour. Tovar. and Ross. Roemer and Kassd read TOUT01l with Vahlen following Muret. I see no critical diiference between ..oU...ep "loBT"". "in this measuTe consists the acquisition of the one. the loss of the other." and ..OU...1I "loBTal. "the acquisition of the one and the loss of the other belotlgs to this measure of difference." Vablen discusses the passage in "Kritik arise. Schriften" (p. I04). giving Murot's translation: "nam quo minus a maiore superatur. eius fit. boni quidem sumptio. mali autem depulsio." Roberts offers translations for the three possible readings ...OtlTep. TOtlT01l. ..O;;TO in R/letorica. p. [2S). b 2-3 "a, ...m~ 2I - 62b 9.

...

.rva,

b 3-S "a........ 1>'I....ov within p=theses.

the second conclusion as oudined in 62& Ross alone of the edd. places these words

b 3 .u .... &"i".,v...a, See 62& 26 : 2; the possession of the virtues llI2kes one all that one should be. Although the moral (>18"",,") virtues seem more prominent. it is clear from what follows shordy in the chapter that A. is not excluding the physical excellences. b 4 "0''1'"'''''''' "p.." ...." ..! "and further [..a-""l) the virtues ..•• There is a diiference between "ol"lulc; and "eMlc;. for. as A. says (Pol. I2S4a S). al"cpl.esl Bra... "0"" is "to llI2ke something"; its end is the production of something (e.g., poems are !1I:O"7fJQTa). neane", is "to act," and its end is the action itsel£ Both these ideas are at work here: e.g.• in "ol"lTl""i. the virtues as productive of other goods; in ore"".... the virtues as specifying

""i.

COMMENTARY

127

one's action, making one the doer of good things. This distinction appears to be present in the use of the words at 60b II-I3, 6Ib 37, 62a 27. b 5 X... pl~ p1Jdov

e.g., chap. 9.

b 6 -1jSo~-Ij~ the third conclusion as outlined in ~ 21 - 62b 9. On pleasure, see 69b 33 : " and Books 7 and 10 of EN where we are told that pleasure is a good, but not the supreme good. b 6-7 ,.ci~.... y"p ...
"the former," i.e., ...d >j6ia. "IIIA....~ Cope suggests with some justification that in 62b 8-9 we have a division of HaA .. into physical beauty (that which is >jdBa, 62b 9) and moral beauty (that which is "a6' la" ...d ale ....d). Perhaps excellence, or goodness, might be a more appropriate term than beauty. Certainly the moral aspect of HaA.~ is apparent in the definition which we are given ofit at 66a 33-34. especially when read in the light of A.'s discussion of "aA.v in EN II69a 6-35. Physical goodness or excellence is more obviously the source to the senses of what is pleasant and delightful. But that which is honorable and noble (TO "aA&v as virtue, the touchstone of what becomes a man in the Socratic dialogues of Plato) is more clearly that which is desirable in and for itself as the goal of one's actions: e.g., "It is fur the honorable that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs" (EN IIISb 23-24; see also III3b 6-r3). b 8 : 1 .... I'tv 2

..Ow S~

b 9 "..0' l .." ..ci b 10 : 1 "..0' ill 7:

See S!}a 21. "individually"; on the absolute infinitive, see

ssa

1.

2 £1lS..,I'OV(.. See 60b 6 : 3 and 60b 14 : 1. We are told here at 62b II-I2 that s(,da'/Jovla has three qualities. These are the same qualities assigned to it at EN I097b 20-21 where, after a long discussion on what is the highest good, A. concludes that it apparendy is .~6a'/Jo.la for it seems to be: (a) T.fA"ov, our xa6' aUTO a!~'T.v (on which see r097a 3I - I097b 6); (b) a6Taext~, our aVTae"S'i (c) TWV neax:TW1' 1'£10" our IVBxa a,lroti (on which see I097b 16-20).

b II : 1

..ij....p".~

See 62a 27 : 1.

z ..u..oG This is the reading of the codd., four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross reads a~Tii' (Spengel thought it should be read). However, a~To;; is quite acceptable since the neuter pronoun can refer to masculine or feminine substantives, as e.g., in Plato, Meno 73C; see Gildersleeve, Synta,,:, II 501.

u8

AD.ISTOTLB, ':aBBTORIC' I

b 12-28 6,x..'o~ ... xo'vii la·..." At 60b 19-29 (see 60b 20-29) A. gave us twenty-two parts of wda.",o.ia divided into three categories. Keeping in mind what was said of that division in 60b 20-29 we can see now that he follows the division in a limited way, e.g., draBa (a) of the soul: 62b 12-14; (b) of the body: 62b 14-18 ; (c) external: 62b 18-22. But after tbis, at 62b 22-28, A. reverts to what could be more properly considered internal goods (of the soul and body), concluding with TO di"a.o. (62b 28) which picks up the initial dyaO&., 6."a.ocnho1J (62b 12). None of the draBd of the soul mentioned in 62b 12-14 is mentioned at°60b 2(>-29. The two draM of the body noted here (1Iyi..a. "dUo,) are mentioned at 60b 20-29. of the external draBa only our rpilo, (62b I9) and T'",.j (62b 20) could be included among the clearly stated external draM of 60b 20-29. Plato's MenD 87e-88e carries an interesting parallel with many of the draBd mentioned in our 62b 12-28. b 12: 1 ttOllci is read by the codd. and edd., save Kassel; I am not sure that Kayser's conjecture (TilUa) is correct, though it is attractive. 2 6,x..,ooNv'l .•. l'.ycO..o1tpm.,.. A. repeats these moral virlUes and adds to them at 66b 1-3. All are given more detailed attention there, and in Books 3, 4. and 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics; for the references, see 66b 2. 3 dv8pd.. See 6Ia 3 : 2. 4 ""''PPOoNv'l See 66b 13, 660 2: 2. S I'EycO.."""'X I.. See 66b 17. b 13 : 1 l'eycO..o1tpol1t.,,, See 66b 18 : 2. 2 .. t ... gli:E~ In that part of the soul whichA.calls TO de,,.T"'''. -;- i.e., the appetitive part - there are three elements: ",d8'1, dvo';'",•• ,. lOBI,. The lEel, are stable dispositions which direcdy affect the dvvd",e., and indirecdy the dO'l, which are transitory motions proceeding from the dvvd",•• ,. These stable dispositions, or habits, are acquired by the person usually as the result of repeated acts. They are imposed upon those 6vv';'",.., which are able to be disposed one way or another since they are not already determined by nature. Thus a habit, shapes a faculty, d~va",.,. in a certain, stable way; when it disposes this power in a way proper to man it is called a virtue, UeBT07. The moral virtues (which are the ones mentioned at 62b 12-13) perfect the appetitive powers of the soul and under the guidance of rpeO'71au; (an intellectual virtue) effect an actual tending toward genuine human good. The moral virtues, as virtues, are "elective habits." 1,£1.(; neOa'eSTr.Kat. They assimilate the person to the standard of human goodness, a standard which is detemrined by nothing else save the objective good proper to man as man. Although it is not the ground for this analysis, the fact is that a careful reading of EN n03a 14 - II03 b 25 will find echoes of many of these comments.

iE."

129

COMMENTARY

b 14 : 1 "yiE'" 3

"ci7.Ao~

3

...& ...

C£ 61 b 3-6. C£ 61b 7-14. e.g., 60b 2C>-22

0',.;:;.....

(.vye••• a•

... dy",••"",,~.).

,,,.1l

b 15 : 1 'l'l:0''1... is the reading of the codd. and the edd., save Ross. We should read with the codd.; compare Ross's reading here with 62b I I : 2. z '1'1:0''1...,,,..1 'l'l:oAA&Iv i.e., dya8". as indicated for Ilyleta at 62b 15-18 and for "aAA.~ at 61b 7-14. b 16 &,0 ",d cip"I'''ov See B 21, 94b 13: d.6el 6' -dy.al.... c'1e'''T&' BaT". This same idea appears in EN 1099a 27 where A. identifies it as a Deli." epigram; see also BE 12140 1-5. We also find it in Theognis' (fl. 544-541 B.C.) degies (II. 255£, ed. Young). A. gives us two reasons why health is considered to be the best of all good things: 62b 17-18. n>.oG...o~

See 6ra 12-24 and notes. This defInition of wealth is at variance with the idea expressed earlier (see 6Ia 12-24, 6xa 24) that wealth, though it requires possession, resides in the use of what one possesses, not simply in the possession of it. Cope's note, p. 104, explains how A. can call ",A.GT.~ the demj "T~"'Q)~ but not how he can give this defInition in the light of 61a 24 where it is really the deBT>! X~".Q)' (which would be a tempting reading here with ".''1T'''.' ".AA ...).

b 18 :

1

z dPE..-li ••• " ...1\cr.... ~

b 19 :

1 cpi>.o~ " ..I cpLAt.. See 61b 35-38 and 6Ib 37 : 1. Z " ..0' lI,hllv .. lpE...6~ The friend as defined in 61b 36-37 is

obviously someone "desirable for his own sake"; since this is so, he is an dya8&., in the light of the dcfmition given at 62a 22. b 20:

See 6u 28 - 61b 2. See 61a 25-27. As we see in 61a 28lf., TlI'~ refers to external honors of every kind bestowed upon a person, whereas 6&E.. (6ra 25-27) is the esteem and repute in which one is hdd by others. 1

""1-'1\

z &61;11

b 21 : 1 ""...oi~ is the reading of the codd., four edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross alone reads atiTa'~, following a suggested conjecture of Spengd's; however, see 62b II : z. z c:.~ t'l'l:l ..... 'l'l:oM For the meaning, see 5'79- 34 : 3. b 22 :

1

"'0 "'I'I:"PJ(E'V

The subject of d".A• .,8 ••; it means "the actual

possession, the actual presence. n Z Up' oI~ The antecedent of or, is an understood a.ha, the subject of the articular infInitive tlndex..... '"l with the dative in this usage gives the reas.n for the honor paid; see Eucken, Sprachgebrallch, p. 52.

T.

13 0

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

3 or~ For Tll't} these would be such things as those mentioned at 6ra 34fL For M~a they would be personal qualities which win the esteem ofmeo. 4 ... The subject is most probably "men"; less preferable would be Tll't}, ~6Ea. In the latter case the verb should be translated: "are

,"""'v.....,

prized." 5 &UvClflo'~ ,<eN l.ty£'v aptly expressed in Phoenix' words to Acbilles, niad 9.443. Homer's words, in Jaeger's mind (Paid,ia, I 8; and see all of chap. I), bear witness to a "new ideal of human perfection." Cic., De orat. 3-16.59, speaks of such men as Themistocles and Pericles "qui ••. propter ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique sapientiam. florerent." b 22-28 &UvClflo'~... i ....'v Up to this point there has been an order in the presentation of these goods, e.g., (a) goods of the soul (62b 12-14), (b) goods of the body (62b 14-18), (e) external goods (62b 18-22). Here we shift back to what are more properly internal goods (some of which are d".dI'B'" 62b 25). The rdation between this group of internal goods and the goods of the soul and body at 62b 12-18 is revealed by the mention of TO (62b 26), which echoes 62b 16, and the inclusion of TO M"a,o. (62b 28), which repeats ~.,.a,o"O", at 62b 12 to which it is closely related (as we can see from 67a 20). See 62b 12-28. The root idea of the word "well-grown" gives a clue b 24 : 1 eU'f>\ItCl to its use as denoting natural goodness in general (see EN 1II4b 8-I2) or good qualities, whether of the body, mind, or person (in the last case it would be the moral qualities of the person). From the context here and the use of the ward at 63a 35, and B 15, 90b 28, as well as at Top. 163b 13-15, and u8a 22-23, it seems to refer more direcrly to the mind and to mean quiclcness, cleverness, of intellect. See Cope, p. !O5, for further references. 2 fIoV>\fIolJ This correction of Victorius' for the codd. I"nl'a, is read by the edd., but not by Spongel or Cope. Since the enumeration in which it occurs lists individual faculties in the singular, and since A. is obviously talking about the faculty of memory, the correction is quite reasona?Ie.. CoP." reads the pl~ with the codd. and gives a competent explanation, I.e., acts ofmemory. 3 eUfIoci8£,.. See Plato, el,arm. 159d-e. z cl:YX'VO'CI "shrewdness, sagacity, quick wit," the ability to apprehend a problem at once; see Plato, Charm. lOOa where it is called

en.

",OTT}'

T', Tn' "",Vi,·

b 25

&\lVciflo£'~

See 60b 16 :

2.

b 26 i1t'aorijflo"' .•• ..ExVCl' "all the sciences and the arts"; on the difference between them, see Met. 98Ia 2 - 982b Io,ENU39b 14 - II4Ib 23.

6ab 30

COMMENTAllY

131

b 27 x,dl' Cl.h·D CllpEd" I.e., even if no other good attends upon "living," and even if it is not productive of other goods (see the general division at 6aa 27-28), still it is a good because it is desirable in itself (see 6aa 22).

If justice is ""1''Pieo, in any way, then it is a b 28 : 1 GUI''PEPOV yap good, for A. has told us that the ""1''Pieo, is good (6aa ao). 2 This is generally interpreted as "for it is of advantage to, promotes, the common interest"; "o,wii would then stand for the more common T.p "ow
82b 17-18, 1278b 21-22. Finley, passim, observes the role of Td aV"''PieO.-Td M"a.o. in the speeches of Thucydides and Euripides.

xo'''n

Now that we ha;'e before' us, b 30 - 63b 3 'L'o" 41''P'CJ/3'1'L''1''{l'o" more or less (ax.a&., 62b 29), the goods which men accept as such, A. takes up the draB& about whose validity as draM one might argue. He gives us a set of norms for determining that they are draB&. which Spengd,pp. I03-ro, finds are ten in number: namdy, (a) 62b 30, Td iva.Tio• ... ; (b) 62b 31, oJ TO iva'Tlo• ... ; (c) 62b 33, "al 8),"" ... ; (d) 63a 2, "ai oJ ,..~ ... ; (e) 63a 3, "al oii EVB"a ... ; (1) 63a 7, "al oii ..01.401 •.• ; (g) 63a 10, TO bratV6To.; (h) 63a II, "al 8 0/ AxBeol ... ; (i) 63a 17, "al 8 TW•••• ; (j) 63a 19, "ai 8),"" Tci neOa'eBT& (on this last, see 63a 19). Spengd calls these criteria "topics," as indeed they are, and they are like all the topia which we have seen thus far: particular topia. Some (such as the first, for example) arc simply stated to be draM; others arc shown by an example or by an argument to be dra8&. Each of these criteria falls into the class of particular topics described in 59b 25-32. Spengd calls attention to the fact (and gives ample evidence in proof) that "later rhetoricians, who for the most part ignored Aristotle, followed him in this area." i.e., "from what follows"; see S. 1245. b 30: 1 lx 'L'",,,&o 2 auUoy,,,f'O{ The meaning here is probably "reasonings," "inference." If one insists (as Cope, p. 107, does) that the meaning is "syllogisms," then it would have to be rhetorical syllogisms, i.e., "enthymemes." b 30-3 I <1> ••• 4yClOcl" In B 23, 97a 8£F., this is cited as the first of the general topics. It is presented there as an inferential form on which to structure arguments; here it is simply a form of classification: anything which has evil as its contrary is a good thing. Thus the comment on criteria at 62b 30- 63b 3. In Top. 1ub 27 - II40 25 A. discusses the various kinds of contraries; in Cat. I3b 36 - I4a 25 he analyaes the idea of "contrary" and shows that the term must be used with care. For example, he is willing to agree that the contrary of good must be evil. But as he goes on to show, the con-

132

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

trary of an evil can be either: (a) a good, or (b) an evil: e.g., the contrary of defil:iency which is an evil is both (a) right measure, which is a good. and (b) excess. which is an evil. Yet A. does admit that generally speaking the contrary of evil is good. which is what he asserts here. sc. rour' dra8&.. A. uses a genitive with the b 3I 0~ ...1> lv"'v... [..... substantive adjective here instead of the dative which he has just used. The dra86. which he is discussing is clearly rdative and particular to the indiv,idual. or individuals. concerned. It is not as general or as universal.s the preceding dra86.. By his example A. appears to generalize it. However a moment's reflection on it will show that as .n .11'..8&. it is rdative. Demosthenes at the opening of the First Olynthiac 4--0 uses this topic but in a more complex way. He argues that Philip's greatest good as ruler is his absolute power but that in the given situation (the effort to win over the OIynthians) the desire of the Olynthians is fOr independence and full freedom such as Athens has to offer; thus the opposite ofPhilip's good is Athens' good. b 33 civlipd", See Mob 12: J. b 34-35 a 01 qOpot ... "''''[V....'''L For examples of this particular topic in the orators, we have Andocides (ca. 440 - ca. 390 B.C.). Against Alcibiatks 5--0 (a speech which is considered to be not from the hand of Andocides but from a Iatet period); Oem.. Embassy 299, 01. 1.24, Crown 176. 198. On the Chersonese 17-21; Cic.• Pro MUTeIl. 39.83. See Spengd for other instances . • ,,8eot in Ross's text is wrongly accented. b 36 ~

XEY ••

~ np!",,,o~

i.e.. fliaJ 1.255.

b,37 lllTL Ii' eN,. dd Tltis is one of the reasons why these dra8& are disputable. It also indicates why argwnents from contraries must be used with care (see Mob 3D-31). 63a I ...ci ,.",xci auvdy.. The point of this illustration of 62b 34-35 is that what may be hdpful and therefOre good (""fJ'P.e .... 62b 37) to our enemy may itself - and not its opposite - be good for us. as we find when caught up in a threat common (ra~rd (Jla{J'e6.) to our enemy and oursdves. See Pol. 1304b 23 - 1305a 7 where A. gives a nwnber of e.'CaIIlples of enemies being brought together by a common fear. On the force of awd".... see S'JIl 8 : 1. a 2: 1 x,d 06 is the reading of the codd. and should be retained. The edd.• except Ross and Kassci, follow Spengel and write "aI6. This simplifies the statement. but Spengd's reasoning is not convincing; Roemer. however. accepts it together with the additional evidence of a scholion. 2 06 ,,>1 EIITLV 6"'.p(30A>1 Here we have the doctrine of the mean. It is this mean which constitutes for A. that excdlence which in the

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133

Nicolflll£he.II Ethics he calls desT?!. The idea of P'UOT7}<; lies behind a whole body of Greek thinking represented by such words as uOJ
"Much labor has been spent and many

Two reasons are given: (a) such a thing a 4-5 rpll'VO!'£vov ... liy,,06v is, and for some time (7}d'1Yhas been, established as a good in the mind of the person, and (b) the person considers such an object a TiAo" and the dAo, for a number of actions ("o}.Aw.); but a dAo, is good (as A. defined goo.r. at 62a 22: ~al 0,) ' ••~a aAAo a1eou,...Oa}.

a 5 T
i.e., of the many .ctions stated in the two verbs of 63a 3.

a 6 : 1 ",,6 ... Up'''!,,!, niaa 2.176. The point of the citation, ho.wcpo 176-178, 160-162. ever, is found in 177£: el••"a ... ; 2 "l"Xpov... !'tv.,v Iliad 2.298. a 7 : 1 "Ill i) :n:mpo'!,l" 6£ ~al ... dl is used here to introduce the last item in the series; see Denniston, pp. 200if., esp. p. 202, and Cope, pp. T0910. Neither the origin of the proverb, nor the complete form of it, is known. Like the two illustrations from the niad, it presumably illustrates in its own tum the statement at 63a 3, 0,) ; ••"a . .. d.dana''1TaL: namdy, a goal on which much effort has been expended (in the proverb: to bring water from the will to the house?). The examples from Homer, and presumably the proverb, are meant to show that men consider the object of strenuous efforts a good because they think it foolish to lose the goal of such efforts. Thus this proverb is usually assumed to have said: "[to break] the pitcher at the door." A verb appears necessary in the proverb. But there is no way of knowing whether it is necessary, and if it is, what it is, or how it has dropped out. rf one could assume some verb such as ''''Teitpa" one could see the possibility of haplography: .d "me'",a, ,,,I Ouea" T-q. vdelav. On Greek proverbs, see "Paroemiographers" in the oeD. 2 <01> This is Spengd's conjecture followed by the edd., save Kassd, and probably called for by the presence of the phrase at 63a 9: 01 d~ nOAAol wl11ree XaV'E'6!:'. a 8 '<0 71"P'!,"X'I'
134

ARISTOTLE) 'RHETO:RIC' I

and at II69a 21 he speaks of highly prized goods as ~d ""e.p.aX'ITa draM. Isocrates uses the word of Hden in a quite similar sense (Helen 17, 40). a 9 : 1 ciy..elN ii" "is good (as we have seen)," e.g., at 620 23. The use of the imperfect for the present is called the philosophical imperfect; see S. 1903. Z a t So Tl:OAAO I gives the reason why he feds confident in saying that "what many long for" is indeed an draO&•• a 10 ...0 lTl:IILV ....OV See 67b 27: "Praise is language making mauifest the greatness of virtue." This comment, together with the rest of the sentence here (otl~BI, ... rna ....), leads one to assume that the l",a •••T •• is sam.... thing which actually is, or is very closdy rdzted to, de.T~. Thus it is draO.v. In EN IIOIb 17-18, we are told that we praise things because of their relation to something good, and that praise is of virtue (IIOIb JI-32). Some, doubting these words are A.'s, omit them, a II: 1 " ..loi'P .."ioi primarily because the explanation which follows does not refer to them specifically. Thus the edd. (save Ross), Spongel, and Cope bracket them. Aside from the fact that the evidence in the codd. for the words is good, they themselves make sense as a parenthetical addition by A. (see, for example, 62a 3-4) to make his point more forcefully: "that which the enemy, espedally ["al intensive] the most disreputable of them . •. ." If such people, who are practically devoid of any sense of value, are compelled to express their approbation, then clearly what is praised is something good. z &cm:EP.... 1'tE'lCDV8o'TEI) "For all. so to speak, do, in fact. a;J<nowledge the goodness, particularly when those who are ill-disposed concede it." In Plato, Mellex. 243a we read (in the funeral oration of Aspasia) about the Athenians whose enemies gave them higher praise than others give to their friends. At 63a 12, Kassel, following the VelUs Translalio, reads "a/ 8 o! for./ "al ot, and argues in his apparatus that a new topic begins here. There is disagreement (see 1S3a II : 1) a 12-16 auk yap ... "D..o" on some of the readings in this passage occasioned by the codd. themselves. However, the edd. read exacdy the same text with two exceptions which occur at 63a 14: (a) all read "al [clraOol] oilr;, save Roemer who reads "a/ 0(Jr;; and (b) ill begin a new sentence at de., ending it at "Illov, save Ross, who considers the thought a continuation of the previous sentence and encloses it in parentheses. clyaOol is righdy bracketed. A new sentence without parentheses is preferable. A. is giving the reason why all concede that what an enemy praises is something good: "For all men would acknowledge it because it is obviously good, just as those men are indeed worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. Thus it was that the Corin-

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thians considered Simonides' remuk 'Ilium has no fault to find with Corinth' insulting." a IS E'fLCoIVUiou On Simonides (ca. SS6-468 B.C.), see the OCD. Two other sources mention this line (a .cholion on Pindar, 01. 13.78 [see Drachmann] and Plutarch, Life oj Dion I) and read ",a.i." "'''I.1••• respectivdy for A.'s "'""''PeTal, a change which does not affect the point of the example as A. uses it. The background for the citation is this: (a) the Corinthian. obviously fought with the Achaeans (see Iliad 2.S70); (b) the Corinthians might also be said to have fought with the Trojans insofar as Glaucus, bead of the Lycians (2.876-877), had a great-grandfather who was Glaucus of Corinth (c£ 6.ISo2II). Both Plutarch and the scholion state that (b) is what Simonides was speaking about when he wrote the line (.ee Page, p. 29S). Since we have not the slightest idea of the general context of the line we are unable to judge whether or not A. has given us an "ill-chosen" example (as Cope, p. Il3, suggests). But if we accept (b) as the explanation, there is certalnly no difficulty in understanding that the Corinthians fdt slandered since they would wish to be identified with the other Greeks as the enemy of Troy. In this sense the example illustrates the topic perfectly. The Corinthians quite naturally bdieved that Simonides was saying that they were disreputable by calling attention to the fact that Troy (an enemy) did not censure them. i.e., those who are sagacious, prudent, intdligent. Thi. a 17 cppovlfLColV adjective indicates the role of reason in choice, just as aya8cii. points to moral excdlence (both word. also appear at 6Ia 27). such" person is the a"otl6a,o~ who "makes a correct judgment on everything, and in each case the truth manifests itsdf to him" (EN III3a 29-3 I). At B 23, 98b 20 - 99" 6 we have the general topic of judgment, which not only explains in greater detail the process at work here, but also indicates the difference between a particular topic such as we have here and a general topic; see 58& 3S on the rdation between the two. a r8-I9 olav ... 8eld On Athena and Odysseus, see the Odyssey passim, e.g., 144£, I3.299i£, 20.4Si£ On Theseus and Helen, see hoer., Helen 18-22. There was probably an account of Alexander (i.e., the judgment of Paris) in the lost Cypria, but apart from that we have only such passing references as Isocrates' in Helen 39-42. 19 " ..l 67w>~ Tel rc;POIILPHci; so. iiaTI dyaM. As we saw (62b 30 - 63b 3), this is the last of the ten topics (according to Spengd) which are useful aids in determining dya8d which are arguable. It is essential to understand that the effort to make some determination about dyaM which are open to question is the controlling idea in the rest of the chapter. The whole passage is part of the attempt to resolve arguable dya8d. In doing so it proposes ac&

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

tions which men deliberately choose as such since the choice is obviously made because men see such actions as good for themselves. A. is saying not that his proposa1s are, or are not, intrinsically ciyaOd - they may, or they may not be - but that such actions, as general objects of deliberate choice on the patt of men, are seen by men as good for themselves. Since those things which men as a general rule desire are dyaOd (62.a 21-25), such actions may reasonably be argued to be ciyaOd. a 20 - 63h 4 "pol"pcrii".... ' ... "t....6'~ These word. (c£ 63a 30-3 I, 35) make explicit the theme just stated: namely, "eoa'eBTd ~aT' dyaOa. Objects of choice, as we know, are ciraed (62a 21-25), and the argument now is that men view the actions which they deliberately choose to perform as dya8d for themselves ("eOa'l1eTa as .uch are the things which men deliberately choose to do - at Met. I025b 24 "eoa'eeTd and "ea"Td are the same; see EN III3a 2-12, esp. 5-<5). In fact it is difficult to understand how most of the instance., if not all, cited in our passage (63a 20 - 63b 4) are in truth ciraOd unless they are qualified as objects deliberarely chosen to be done. To take but one: How are the "things which are easy to do" (63 a 3 I) in themselves dyaOa? Still the explanation given at 63a 3'-33 as to why-they are draOdmakes sense because such things are potentially "eoa'estd in terms of EN II12b 13III3a 4: i.e., things which the person cae do (Tel 6vvaTa of 63a 21-23), and which he therefore .ees as a good for himsel( and capable of being chosen. On the matter, see 63a 38 : 2. I have since noticed that Vater, pp. 43-44, remark. of our passage beginning at 63a 20: "in iis, quae usque ad 6nem capitis sequuntur, facilius suppletur, "eoa'eO;;vTa ••" If the interpretation just offered is accepted (and Vater's suggestion strengthens it), then 63a 20 - 63b 4 is con~istent and logical. Furthermore, the interpretation enjoys this advantage: it gives the chapter a cyclic structure, bringing A. back to the opening statement on the general nature of the good as the object of men's choices. Once again I note that Vater makes this same observation: "Ari.totde. cum a bonorum tractatione parumper deverterit, a proposito suo non debt. Bona enim eo de caussa enumerare coeperat, quod haec sunt, quae eligi saleant" (po 44).

5,..

20 : 1 "po .. ,pou....... , On "eoa{eBa." see 2 : 1. Voluntary action for A. (EN II09b 30 - IIIsa 3) rests on deliberation (po.lsva,,) and choice ("eoaleea.,). Men deliberate about the things which they cae do;

a

after deliberation they decide on the action; then in accord with their deliberation they desire the action decided upon. The action which they so desire is the "eoa'l1BT<'V, and thus deliberation completes itself by neoaleBa". This act of choosing is the result of both reason and appetition, or, as A. calls it (ENU39b 4-5), "desirable reason," "reasonable desire," or "deliberative desire of the things within our power" (III3a II); see also On the Movemento! Animals 700b 23.

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2 dp'lJfL£VIl most probably all that he has mentioned from 62b 29 on, for A. is attempting to set forth how one is to reason (62b 29-30) in those instances where the dra6d are arguably such. 3 Klll..-Ill •.. ciyll8ci To do evil to your enemy was a legitimate aleeTO' for the Greeks in general, and also for A., as we have already seen in this chapter (see also 67" 19-22 and Top. II3a 2-4). It was a somewhat conventional Greek idea; see for example, Plato, Rep. 33 Ie - 332b; Archilochus 66; Solon, 1.5 (see Diehl & Beuder); Pindar, Pythian 2.83-85. It was a mark of a man's excellence to be able to reward his friends, punish his enemies. We find the idea well expressed in the Ion of Euripides: "Whenever one wants to do evil to his enemies no law stands in his way" (10461047), or in Medea 809-810 where such action belongs to the Plo, 'oI""eit1TaTO,. Socrates of the Socratic dialogues of Plato is the outstanding opponent of this view, arguing, as he often does (e.g., Corg. 469ff., Rep. r), that to do wrong is a greater evil than to be wronged. This last viewpoint A. himself expresses at 64b 21-23. To oversimplify the general attitude, however, can be misleading. Any code of honor grounded solely in man tends to move in the same direction as the Greek ~60,; a fealty oath in the II th century A.D., for example, promises in part "to be a friend to all your friends and an enemy to all your enemies." In a nunlber of respects the period of classical feudalism in the West echoes many of the qualities of friendship, honor, good repute, and so on, which A. discusses in this chapter. I am indebted to the late Professor G. S. Glanzman, S.J., who called my attention to Matt. 5:43: "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy'." Although the command to love is quoted from Leviticus 19:r8, the command to hate, which Jesus rejects, appears nowhere in the Old Testament. It is not in any known Jewish source; nor is it a fair statement of contemporary Jewish morals. Professor Glanzman suggested that the notion might be traced to the Hellenistic attitudes current in Palestine even in Romall times.

a 21 ..-Ill &uvll"-ci This is picked up immediately in TatiTa and we are told (63a 22) that there are twO kinds of "possibles" which men choose: (a) those which might be done, and (b) those which are easily done. We find the same distinction in Cic., De in •• 2.s6.r69. ii.. with the participle represents a potential a 22: I YEVOfLEVIX /J.v optative with
ARISTOTLE, 'RHEI'ORIC' I

2 ..dt P'!'&("'~ y'yvOP.EVIl "Easily" is actually explained by the definition of what is dif1icult at 63a 24. We should not forget that we are discussing particular topics of deliberative oratory whose dAo~ is Td """'P<eov, which we have been told (620 20) is a good. These 6".aTd, then, are actions which could be proposed as contributing to the advantage and therefore the good of the audience. In this way they help the auditors to make a determination about something else which may in their minds be a disputable good (0£ 62b 30). Thus Spengel's citation of Isocrates' address, To Philip, is quite to the point. In this speech bocrates tties to convince Philip to unite all the Greeks under his leadership. Part of the argument is built on the fact that this is quite possible (39-56), part on the fact that it is easily possible for Philip (57-87).

is presumably the reading of cod. A a 25 : 1 " ..l £.xv w~ (30~>'OV""' and is accepted by the edd., Spengel, and Cope. The last suggests this interpretation: ""Ilav b,i",!Ta, n] di~ (JOolAOVT'" [draB&. SO'T"'], which Freese's translation catches: "And anything that happens as men wish is good." However, as has been said (63a 20 - 63b 4), it is difficult to see how such a thiog in se is necessarily an draBo.; furthermore such an interpretation does not suit the context of this section, which discusses men's deliberate choices. It seems better to interpret [neoa'eo;;"", (S. 1879) "edTTBW a~Td] lav [riV~T"'] di, (JovAov ...a" "And men will choose to do things if these will take place as they wish" (cf. 64a 30). In other words, they choose actions which they see as good for themselves. For this can be the only reasonable understandiog of the explmation offered by A. of what he means by di~ (JOVAOVT". in what follows. Clearly men do' not wish anything evil, i.e., harmful to themselves v<~dtv "">to.), or if they wish something evil, they wish it as less harmful. to themselves than the good for themselves which they foresee in the action. Men certaioly do choose actions to which a penalty ("",,6.) is attached but which they see as good for themselves either because they con escape the penalty entirely or becanse the penalty will be less than the good which they see for themselves in the deed. And this is what A. will say at 63a 26-27. 2 P.'1&Ev With these words A. specifies (JovAo ....a.: i.e., "men wish either no evil at all (for themselves) or an evil less than the (accompanying) good." Surely it does not make sense to say that "men wish no evil." Many things which men wish may be evil but they are seen not as evil by those who wish them, but rather as good for themselves.

"""0,, ... n

a 26-27 "0;;"0... p.'''pdt parentheses. a 26: 1 "0;;"0 &~ l ......, companying) good.

n

Ross alone encloses the statement in

i.e., the latter - an evil less than the (ac-

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2 olav lj ).",,8oivn 'II "'"",,,pI.. is the reading of the codd., Spengd, Cope, and the edd., with the exception of Ross and Kassel. As it stands - and there is no need to emend the text - it is an explanation of 63a 25-26 (I} p1J6'" ... draBaii): "if the penalty either passes tmnoticed [la.8&'l1 (aolaa)], or is insignificant." By this I understand A. to mean that in actual fact no penalty is given (and so p1Jd'. "a"••), or that it is less than the good obtained (ElaTT.. TaJ draBaii), e.g., 72a 7-<}, 72b 8-9. See 65b 2. Ross and Kassd read with Wolf l.i> I} lav8a"11 ., "T,pOJe1a. Kassd justifies the reading with a reference to Vahlen. But Vahlen's explanation of the meaning of the passage (with Wolf's reading) is not, in the last analysis, dissimilar to the interpretation given above ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 105-106). Further, if the emendation of Wolf is accepted, then problems would be simplified by undentanding 6 dew. as subject with lavBa.'II, and translating: "if eithet the agent escapes notice, or the penalty is insignificant" (c£ Rauehenstein, 469). a 27 : I x ..t ..a Iii,..... n:ep,....ci In accord with 63a 20 - 63b 4 these are the object of an understood neoa'eaii'Ta'; or, possibly, in view of 63a 30-3 I, of neaa'eaii.Ta. neaTT.... The reason for such a choice is given at 63a 27-28: T'P~ ... !'.Ula•. 2 ..a Iii,.. i.e., proper or peculiar to them, for which they, by their nature, possess a special ability or talent; see 55b 1. 3 Ii IL'Ilid. sc. nedne,. "which no one at all does." Perhaps there is the added idea of "no one to their way of thinking" in p1J6elc; (S. 2736). Howevet, Cope, p. u8, maintains: "au6el<;, no definite. particular person; f.'7Jdet~, no indefmite person, no man ,vhatever." 4 ...a n:ep'......ci i.e.• "exceptional"; that which is pre-erninent. striking, standing out from the ordinary. The word is based on "eel, "over and above" (as peTaaaa.· is on peT a). Cope, p. II6. has examples of its various meanings; see also Waitz on Top. u8a 6 for its use in A. 5 ""IL'; as we saw it at 6:l.b 20 : 2. in contradistinction to MEa.

a 28 ....... PILO""OV..... Again we understand neoa'eOiivTa.. The choice, of course, implies action in these ~tances. Ta aepona.Ta would seem to be the same as Td Id,a above. A., however, explains its meaning in the next clause: they are things which bdong to, befit (neocni"avTa). the person's lineage (riva<;) or position (66vapcv), or which, even though triffing, he considen himsdf to be without. a 29 : 1 IiUv"IL'V The meaning is unclear. It can have the meaning we met at 60b 27 which is that. given to it in the preceding note - indeed the Greek at 60b 27-28 is quite similar to what we read here - and which seems to fit the context better. Yet it could mean "in accord with one's nab"a'

.bilities, ,apabilities."

140

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETOlIlC' 1

z.r.v governed by the verb lUBl.7rBW, the subject of which is the same as that of OrO.Ta" "and men choose those things whicb they think are wanting to them." Tbe idea is that these are goods which rigbtfully belong to

them.

01lIiEv... ~....ov see LS, ijaaow, III. a 30

an adverb:

u

none

the less,"

I

Just as much as";

a 31 : 1 d>".....-£py......,.. "easy to do"; he explains the word in wbat follows: they are ~".aTa clJ~ et#D,a; and so see 63a 21-24. A. defines the word at 63a 31-33: they are actions which men in general accomplisb successfully. is read by four edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross alone z: .:.~ p~&,.. reads ;eal e4d.a; it is possible as far as the interpretation is concerned. a 33 : 1 .......:.p8c.oal1V Tbe aorist simply indicates a fact of experience (see S. 1930). 2 Ii Tbe antecedent to this clause is an understood TaiiTa "eoa.eoiina. "eanew, as we might assume from 63a 30 and 63a 35. However, a here and in 63a 34 is an accusative of respect. This statement is similar to that made at 63a 20-21. It should, perhaps, be noted that Spengel finds Isocrates' To Philip a fruitful source of illustration for many of the points which A. makes in tbis section. For example widl respect to 63a 25 (ea. clJ~ fJ06),00Ta.): Philip 95-104; 63' 27-28 (>eal Ta ... l'iiUoo): ph. 140-143; 63a 28 (Ta aeI'OTTooTa): ph. 68--']1; 63a 29 ("aTa ri.o~): Ph. 105-127; 63a 29 ("aTa . .. ~6.al'w): Ph. '37; 63a 33-34 ("al Ii ... AxOeor~): ph. 130; 63a 34 (>caI8aa ...): Ph. II3; 63a 3S ("al "eo~ ... ll'''..eo.): Ph. 97-98; 63' 363,. ("a I Ii ... 1'iiJ.).0.): ph. 130-136.

"at 8aQ (e"et)'o&

a 34

.... lISa ..

SC.

a 35

E6'PuEi~

See 6zb 24:

a 36:

nQc:i-r:ToVUI) 06r; 8a1J~dCovat ...

1.

1 pqov "more easily" than in matters in which they are not so clever or practiced. Z ........,pOwa£'v This reading of good codd. is accepted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, and Kassel. Roenler, Dufour, and Tovar read "aToeOwaa. with cod. A. J "l)&d~ See 63a 27 : J. I understand <paulo, here to rr.ean "tbe common and ordinary person." Consequently, if the actions are beyond the interest and competence of such • person, they are somewbat beyond tl,e ordinary and therefore are praiseworthy. If we interpret <paii).0dsee 63aI I : 1) as "worthless" (i.e., of no moral value), as the translators do, it is difficult to understand the rae clause, even with Victorius' explanation presented by the commentators. Victorius cites a fragment of Euripides which says:

141

COMMENTARY

"Do not mention wealth; I stand in no awe of a god whom even the basest of men can easily make his own" (Aeo1m, fig. 20, ed. Nauck & Snell). As A. tells US at EN II IIh 17, buOvpia is a 37 <1">v b",O\l"OUVT.~ concerned with "the pleasant and the painful," and so his use of ~d~ at 63' 38 (on whicb sec the following).

This velb goes with both >i6~ and {JiAno•• A. gives a 38 'PCz[VETlIl the reason why men choose to do "such things as they happen to desire": namely, because such "seem to be not only pleasant (c£ also 69b 15-16) but also bettel." This is a reasonable attitude on the part of men inasmuch as the object of buOvpia, ordinarily speaking, is certainly the pleasant (70a 17-18), and usually taken to be the good (e.g., 62a 23-24). But neithCI is necessarily so because not all pleastlIes are truly things to be desired (EN II48a 22-28), and if they are not desirable in thCInselVes they will certainly not be good in thCInselVes.

"ciA"..... ...

a 38 - 63h 3 XIII wa..u_~ This sentence makes quite clear the ellipsis referre.d to ~ 63a,,20 - 6~~ 4." The sentenc~ (see foll~wing note) makes sense only if we mSelt choose or choose to do ("eoaoeov'Ta,; neOal(!oij"TQl

63h 1 : 1

neaTTU)I).

IX_Tol

"each group, each class"; undelstood with it is

E'XQrnot (neoa'l:?Oii),Tal [or neoa&l:?ov'VTa& neaTTBI.'V) Tavra) ned,

u: . ..

is the reading of the codd., three of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. Vahlen suggested 'P'AOTO'OUTO', and he is followed by Ross (with a wrong accent on the word) and Kassel. [would prefel to read with the codd., i.e., "each group chooses [or, chooses to dol that to which it is disposed by its nature (TO'OUTO,j." The Vah!en reading means "to be fond of so and so," as A. explains it. at EN 1099a 8-1I: "To each man that which he is said to be fond of ('P'AOTO,oiiTo~j is pleasant, for example a horse to the one fond of horses, a spectacle to one fond of spectacles..•. " In our passage the word, if read, would be translated: "Each group chooses (or, chooses to do) that of which it is fond •..." Spenge! calls attention to the use of the ar3 TO;; a\I"'PtpOVTO~ ticle hele, which is not found at 62a 21, the beginning of this chapter, but is found again at 69b 29. 2

TOlOUTOl

CHAPTER 7

I . Introduction: 63b 5 - 63b 7

II· De.6nition: 63b 7-63b 27

what we mean by "greater," "more," "good" (and so, also, "expedient"):

I. 63b 7 - 63b 12 2.

men generally agree on two things which are expedient, but argue about which is the more so; thus, we must speak on the greater good and the more expedient

greater, more

63b 12 - 63b IS

greater good (and, so, expedient)

3. 63b IS - 63b 21

(2) exemplified in general

4. 63b aI - 63b 27

(I) exemplified in general

III . Development: 63b 27 - 65b I. 63b 27 - 63b 35

19

ways by which to determine the greater good and greater: greater

2.

63h 35 - 64a 12

greater good

3·

64a 64a

greater

4·

5· 64a 6. 64b 7· 65a

I2':'

64a 23

23 - 64a 30 ]I -

64b

II -

6sa 8

II

S-65a 33

S. 65a 33 - 65h 19

greater good greater (but see 64& 31) greater good greater greater good

IV . Conclusion: 65b 19 - 65b 21 The care with which this rather involved chapter is structured should be noted: e.g., the chiastic arrangement in II and the alternation of theme in the development in III.

63h 6 "'pi",oij ",ii).)."" In chap. 3, 59a II-26, A. discussed the socalled "0..<1, elements common to all discourse. Among them were the "greatsmall," "more-less" (see S98 II-I3, and S98 23). These, as we saw, were not

144

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

to be called TO"OL (and so Cope's introductory cODlD1Cllt to chap. 7 is wrong). Further they were to be used in particular with respect to the Til,,! of the various kinds of rhetoric ill precisdy the way in which we have "greater (smaI1er) - more (less)" being used in the present chapter with respect to TO ""f''Pseo" the n!"o, of deliberative rhetoric. As A. remarks, men can and do argue about what is the "more advantageous" and the "greater good." Because of the possibility of such disputes, A. attempts to analyze and illustrate that which constitutes "greater (smaller) - more ~ess)" prinurily with respect to dya9r1•• As he remarks (63b 9), the concept "greater-more" denotes in itself a rdation simply to "less" whether the less be quantity or quality. With that in mind A. proceeds to an analysis (for the most part) of.the ways by which we can determine whether or not the dya9&. is "greater (smaller) more (less)" than one assumes it to be. From the analysis comes a series of focal points, particular topics, into which we can place our particular dya9&v and thereby specify it as a greater good and one more advantageous for our auditor, or argue to the contrary that a proposed aya9r1. is less good and less advantageous. The "vf''I'i~o. is also dya9r1. (c£ 62a 20), and so in what follows in the chapter dya9r1. often denotes the composite concept <1Vf''I'eeo, -dya9&•• In its content this chapter is diHicult at times to understand; no doubt, the abstruseness of the material. has occasioned some of the problems in the text tradition, not all of which have been resolved by the conjectures offered. A.'s Top. 3.I-S discusses many of the ideas which we meet in this chapter, but, oddly enough, A. does not refer in the chapter to that work. Cicero discusses many of these same topics in Topic. 18.68-71. His presentation is Il}Ore orgacizcd, and Spengel suggests that we owe this to later Peripatetics who systematized the material in this chapter; see Studies, pp. II S-18. b 7 : I I'EU;OVO,-I'iU.Aov As was said in the previous note, A. specifies the difference which he sees in these two terms at 63 b 9. There we find that both are relative to the term "less." Therefore to say that something is IIgreater" or u more" is effectively to say the same thing; so, see S9a 23. 2 E......, is the verb for the series of definitions which follow between 63b 8 and 63b 12. On its use in definitions, see 60b 14: 2, 62a 21 : 2. b 7-12 EO,"" &-1) ••• o),lyov wo..u,",,~ A correct interpretation of the text would be: "Let 'exceeding another' be that which is as large as and something more than the other, and let 'being exceeded by another' be that which is contained in the other; let 'greater' and 'more' always be that which is relative to 'less,' whereas 'great,' 'small,' 'much,' 'little' is that which is relative to the average size of things; let' great' be something which exceeds (the average) and let something which falls short (of it) be 'small,' and the same for 'much' and 'little'."

145

COMMBNTARY

b 8 : I uTCepq,av "exceeding"; in a logical sense it would mean "the concept with the wider extension." In a physical or moral sense it carries the same basic idea: that which in quantity or q!Jality surpasses another. Both ",BU;07 and ",W07 indicate something as ,j".e.xo,. See 63b 20 : z on the way A. uses the word. a ,,"0 'C'OD'OU'C'OV xul E'Tl "a so large thing and something more" or "of such and such quantity and something more." We can fill out the phrase in this way: T(J TOO'OVT01 (8ao? TO lTBtlOJl ian) xal ITt, CCas large a thing as another and something marc." The edd., save Kassel, read ~o ~oaoij... ~o.. Kassel, Spengel, and Cope read simply ~ouo;;~o. with codd. A and F. 3 u"'.P.X0floEVOV "being exceeded." In a logical sense: "the concept with the smaller extension"; in a physical or moral sense: that which in quantity or quality is surpassed by another. llano. marks something as ,j"ee'xO",'70 •• b 9 : I " .. lw",cipxoy "the thing cantained in (the other)"; again it can be used in a physical, moral, or logical sense. z flo'" cid The adverb modifies an understood lu~., The contrast clause is between the comparative and positive degrees in in the ",£7 ••• an effort to demonstrate how the six terms are specified by their relation either to the nann B"ano. or the norm nu. noAAw. ",ir.60~.

a.

b 10 "I>.".;,y ",ollWv fIo.y.8o~ the average magnitude.

"the magnitude of the many," i.e.,

is the reading of the codd., fOur edd., b II "0 lit t).:I..':n:OY, fIo ...pay Spengel, and Cope. Ross accepts Bywater's conjecture: This reading makes parallel with ~o ",iya and gives us a chiastic structure. But this is really not an adequate reason (though it is, in fact, Bywater's reason) for changing the reading of the cadd., which means: "and that which falls short is the small."

,,""eo,

",'''eo, ,,,,,,i,,o•.

i.e., "in the same way as 'great' and 'small'."

b 12-16 .",01 oW ...•"'."11' "ok TOUNTII See 620. 21-34. The clause which begins with i".l oJ. continues to 63b 18, where the conclusion is drawn at d.ay,,'1 ~a ~. "l,l",. . .. It is important to comprehend the swing of this sentence, for if we do not, we will reject the logic of the sentence with Cope, Introd., pp. '77-79, or seclude certain parts of it, as Ross and Kassel do (see notes on 63b 16£). As was pointed out in the analysis of the chapter, between 63b I2 and 63b 21 A. is defining and illustrating the greater good. His statement set down briefly is: Since the following are what we call good, it necessarily fOllows that more of them, granted certain conditions, constitute a greater good than fewer of them. See 63b 16 : z.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

"that which is desirable." b 15 : 1 ""130..-. Referring to "a.~a (63b 14). this circumstantial participle e.""press< a condition: "which all things. should they acquire intelligence and 'P{!"'I0·". would cboose"; see 62a 23-24. 2 TCOI"l'1:"l.av, qJuACl.X'1:'U(O'V See 62a 29 : 1.

i7l:E·'" See 6:za 29 : 2. 6' ci ... ru.. The codd .• the edd. (except Ross and Kassel). Spengd, Ild Cope read these words. Ross brackets ~O d' oJ ... l(1~I.; Kassel seel ues the whole to aAAa. I can see their problem. i.e.. the logical coherence (the statement with what precedes and follows it. Indeed. I am not sure Vater. p. 44. wishd to seclude from ~O d' oJ to that the followingis the solution, but I should prefer to accept a strong text tradition and to sok a solution than to engage in seclusions. For clearness I should place witin parentheses TO ~iJ.o, .(1~(•• TiAo, di l(1~'. 0,) 8••"a Ta eLlAa (or in the Lan phrase: "finis est propter quod alia"). I see the development of the passag from 64b 12. In.l oJ. (see 63b 12-16). as follows: "Since. then. we eall gooc:that which is desir.ble for itself .•• that which all desire ••. that which te:nIs to make and to preserve such goods. or that upon which such goods attend,md that which is oJ [c£ 63a 3-5] (it is a TiAo,. and dAo, is that for Wich all else is done) [c£ Met. 994b 9-10]. and that which with respect to anindividual has these attributes which we call a good for him. it follows ncessarily that a greater number of these goods ..." b 16 : 1 3

....1>

"""'0.8.,.

"."a

b 17: 1 oro....cj> •• "~""Ov These words. found in the best codd. (A and F). are read·b1the edd. and Spengel. They are masculine and therefore point to a person ani to a relative. not an absolute. good. I accept this reading. but I would call atention to the het that the evidence for the neuter in both places is good and was recognized as possible by Stephanus. Cope. p. 120. reads the neuter (Ie reads av~q; . . . aUTO) and offers an explanation; he also gives a translaion in Introd•• p. 178. If one reads the neuter. one must realize that one clmges the interpretation of the passage. 2 . . 1> ..poC;.n...ov ......ii .... "."'OVeD<; that which with respect to the individual has beenmodified. qualified by these things. i.e.• "that which with respect to the indhidual bas these attributes." ~aii~a are the things of which he has been speakUg in 63b 12-17. We can illustrate in this way: a Greek dictionary in itself i an indifferent object to many persons; to a student of the Greek language it acquires the modification ("",,,0.6&,) with respect to him ("'110, a"~o.) of beilg productive ("0''1 ....''••• 63 b 15) of the good which he seeks; and so it is Illw a"~q; dyaM•• 63b 17. This is the conclusion to the In.l oJ. b 18 : 1 civciyK"IJ ~ci '<E ~d", clause of 63b 12-lt The caddo and four .dd. read T •• which would be T.

COMMENTARY

147

consequential; see S. 2968. Ross changes to Y'; no explanation is given, but for a possible reason, see S. 2968a. 2 7tAd... sc. dyaM, as we see at Top. II?" 16-18. There is something of an illustration of what A. says here in EN 1097b 14-I8, II72b 23-32. In this chapter Spengel lists 67 particular topics of which this is the first. The second is at 63b 21, third at 63b 27-28, fourth at 63b 33-34. etc. J ...oil lvo~ ... 0.11.....6"..." sc. d1'aOo;; •.• d1'aO';;., which are genitives of comparison with 1"'Co. d1'aB••, 63 b 20. Genitive absolute expressing condition: "on b 19 """Ilpdlp.oup.~"ou the condition that the one good or the fewer goods be included in the numeration." The reason for this observation of A.'s is that several goods (health, wealth, beauty) are not a greater good than justice. But the possession of them with justice is. In the same way, a larger number of secondary goods is not a greater good than one or two primary goods unless the primary good. are included; e.g., to possess beauty, magnitude of body, good children, good reputation but without possessing health, or justice, i. not a greater good. See 63b 7-12; the ••vnaexo. is the one b 20 : I ..... liE l'Iu7tcipxov good, or the .maller number of goods, which, when counted in (Cf'V'Pae.0/JOV/J6.ov) with the other good., constitutes the larger number. 2 (,,,epExE. SC. T
"A,•.,;

b 21-30 Kill ow ... '
,l.a,

I ... p.iy .....ov "the greatest member of one class." 2 K"l ,,6..& 1l(,-tWv sc. {,n'eUvlaB..-O&: "then that class will surpas. the other class." a~.a .tands for the whole set of individual members who constitute the class. A. exemplifie. his statement at 63 b 23-24. Both Spengel and Cope offer Top. II7b 33-39 as an example of what A. says here

b 21 :

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

at 63b 21-22. But A.. is not saying the same thing in the TopiC5passage, though what he does say em help us to make more specific, precise, md legitimate his statement in the Rhetoric. rn both 63b 21 md 63b 22, Ross and Kassel read the definite pronouns (a~Ta a~Tw.). The codd., the other edd., Spenge~ and Cope read a~T
b 22 ,.Ill aUIl 116.. 0. 116.."", i.e., I
b 23-24 oIOY... the statement there.

I"(~OUS

As noted at 63b :n :

2,

this exempliflCs

b 23 ,.Ill oAwS

"then, in general." The argument in the passage 63b 21-27 is sound, and to suggest that the topic is a source of fallacy is to misunderstand the principle which underlies it. A. admitted degrees of being; some realities are superior to others: the soul to d,e body, for example. This being the case, then certainly any .individual within a superior species, if that iD.dividual shares in the full actuality of that species - namely, what A. in our passage calls TO "iyoaTo, - will eo ipso be superior to the greatest of the inferior species. Furthermore, if we can demonstrate by reason that an individual who is the greatest exemplification of one species is clearly superior to an individual who is the greatest exemplification of mother species, then we can safdy conclude that the first species is in se superior to the second. A.'s point is made in Pol. I323b 13-18 where we read in Barker', translation: "rn general terms, we are clearly entided to lay down this proposition: 'The best state of thing A is to the best state of thing B, as thing A itself is to thing B.' [This last sentence is a paraphrase of the Greek.] If, therefore, the soul is a thing more precious - intrinsically as wdl as in relation to us - than either Olu· property or our body, the best state of the ,oul must necessarily bear the same relation to the best state of either our property or our body."

b 24-26 l
22.

This exemplifies the statement

COMMENTARY

149

b 26-1.7 &vcV.oyov... m...oi~ Here we have the reason for the statement just made: namely, that a relation of proportion e.'Cists in the examples which he has used.

is used adverbially: "in proportion," e.g., ! b 26 &vcV.oyov "For the superiority of the classes (i.e., of class over class) and the. superiority of the greatest in the classes (i.e., greatest in one class over greatest in other class) is in proportion." This means that as the class surpasses, so does the greatest in the class.

"0""'1'

b 1.']-1.8 xed o....v ... !'>l To complete this we must understand something like ~".'v6 ~cJn ""'Coo; e.g., "whenever X follows on Y, but Y does not follow on X, tlum Y is the greater." The reason for this statement is given at 63 b 29-30: lvvn&el" . .. 9aTEeov. b 28 : 1 l" ..... , 6£ i! is the commonly accepted reading. Ross alone of the edd. follows the reading of the tleteriores without any explanation. 2 .n:.....,... 6uvci:p... "and one thing follows on another either simultaneously, or subsequently, or potentially." A. explains this at 63 b lo-33. On the idea in "'eTa" see 62a 29 : 2 aod Top. II70 5-15. J ..cj>
a,.. ...

b 30 : 1 lv..-ij sc. le./em; the question of the use, the exercise, of the antecedent-consequent enters into the explanation of the way in which the antecedent is greater; see, for example, the next note. 2 In:£.... l •.. &n:o:n£P>lG£lEV This passage illustrates three kinds (as opposed to the more common division at 62a 2!}-31) of consequents in which the consequent in each instance is contained within the antecedent, but does not contain the antecedent. Consequently, the antecedent is greater than the consequent, and so ti,e t~pic of consequent can be used to demonstrate something as greater. Yet there is a point in the examples which must be kept in mind. In each instance we are given, not two totally distinct and disparate entities, but two closely allied aspects of one larger reality, e.g., health-life are aspects of human existence learning-knowledge are aspeCts of intellectuollife sacrilege-robbery are aspects of thieving. Thus any seeming contradiction is not really present. A. is saying, for example, not that, absolutely speaking, health is something greater t11an life, but that,

150

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

given the foct oj human existence, to live life as it should be lived, health constitutes something greater than mere life itself This point holds true for learning and sacrilege. :3 iiI''' When a simultaneous consequent marks reciprocity between the two, it means the parity of the two things; e.g., to say "man" is to say the simultaneous consequent "rational animal." But such reciprocity is not always the case with a simultaneous consequent, as A.'s example "healthlife" shows. "but the former (health) does not follow upon b 3I ""06"",,, BE: ixE'''O the latter Qife)"; and so health in terms of A.'s argument is to be considered greater since 1j X~;jr1I~ Toii pta" is contained in (l"""<4/xo,) 1j x~'iu,~ T;j~

Vr,sla,.

b 32 iwcifloEL ••• &:n:o......EpE'" "Robbing, defrauding, follows potentially upon an act of sacrilege" since, as A. says at once, d rd~ ... "d7 d"0r1T.~>ir1'''7 (63b 33): "The one who indulges in stealing from the gods could also [..a7 = "al &7, potential optativeI engage in stealing from his fellow-men."

This particular topic, b 33-35 x ..l""u ~'"PEx01l""CI ..• p.e!t;01Io~ which does not appear in the Topics, is somewhat difficult. We have here the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross and Kassel), Spengd, and Cope. Ross reads at 63b 35: Toii ,..ICo.. ; Kassd reads Toii <"iTTO» ,..tC070~. I do not see that either change is necessary, or clarifies the meaning. (a) Reading ,..IC070~ at 63b 35 with the codd. and attempting an explanation of the passage, we must first explain 63b 34: Toii aolToii ,..IC071 ,.flew. We could take a.lToii with Cope, p. 123, and the trans1ators (e.g., in English, Jebb & Sandys, Cooper, Freese, and Roberts) as meaning "the same thing" or "a third thing," and translate as Cooper does: "Again, of two things which exceed a third thing, that which e.'
IjI

COMMENTAllY

ty it also exceeds the greater." This is to say that any A which surpasses a B. IIIhich B itself is greater than C. is greater.

b 35 "111 ....1i !,dl;ovo~ ... "'o.'1 ....."ci good are themselves greater goods.

i.e.. eflicient causes of greater

b 36 ....0 !,d~ovo~ "'o.'1....ll
This is a restatement of 63b 3j but b 36-37 1<111 00 ••. .:.crIlU....... ~ now from the effi:ct. not the cause: "and that good whose producer is greater .is likewise greater." i.e.• rbaa6rw, a~ro ",.iCov. We are to presume that this is explained at 63 b 37-38: "For if that which is health-giving is more desirable than that which gives pleasure. and is a greater good. then health is greater than pleasure." ro ~", ..... and ro >i66 must be interpreted in a way which indicates that they are the ""''In".v. and this is not made dear in the transla&. means tions. A parallel passage in Top. II6b 26-36 (where ro "health-giving") will demonstrate thi, meaning of fl" ....... as will the dear statement on V", ..... at Met. Io03a 34-36.

v".e..

b 38 - 6.4a I "Ill ....o 1I1p• .....:. ..... pov ,,118' ""....6 is the reading of the codd.• Spongel. and Cope. The edd. change the text as follows: Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. and Kassel. "at TO alenov; Ross. Hal aEe.Tcbreeo. ro "aO' avr., a reading which he attributes to Bywater, but which Spengel suggested becawe of the presence of a/e.rcbreeo, in place of the expected a/eer ••. The reading of the codd. for this topic is acceptable and is to be prefen:ed, for it gives quite good sense to 64a 1-3 and. in particular. to the words at 64a 2-3 6"'e ~v TO draO.v; it also allows for the retention of the predicate ",tiC ov d"aO •• (which A. introduced at 63b 35) and does not have him introducing a new predicate. The reading of the codd. down to 64" 3 would be inter-

152

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

preted: "And that which is more desirable in itself is a greater good than that which is not, as, for example, strength is more desirable than the healthgiving; for the latter is not more desirable for its own sake, while the former is, and this was our definition of the good." This is quite similar to what he says in Top. u6a 29-39; see also u6b 8-10. If we read "al TO ale.TO. with the edd. (save Ross), then the Topics passage is the same. There are two things to note no matter what reading one follows: (a) all the English translation, must be used with care; (b) "aB' aVT. means: in and by itself (per se), and see An. Post. 73a 28 - 7<Ja 23, together with Waitz on the passage and on Cat. sb 16; see also Bonitz, Metaphysica, on 1022.. 14ff., pp. 2.64-<16.

6<Ja I Uy,.,VoU as in 63b 36-37: "health-giving." "for the latter," i.e., health-giving. We desire such • a 2 : 1 '1:10 P.Ev thing for the sake of health. z ,,0 601 i.e., strength. e.g., 62a 21-24. 3 o".p ijv a 3 "av 1i ... p.o/J'l:o.o, We see the same mode of expression at 64" Io-II. On the idea, see Top. II6b 22-23. This is, of course, that which is the TO ,..if Tilo,: a 4: 1 ciAAou Eve"" exercise, diet, and rest are not as desirable as health, which is the end we have in view. Nor are temperance, justice, and virtue itself as desirable as the dida,,..o.!a for the sake of which we desire them. 2 ~oG £is ExElV sc. 6'J16HQ. a 5-<1 ",d '1:10 • • '. 1\ l ...,pwv is the reading of the codd., three of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. R05S followed by Kassel secludes ii. Since they offer no reason and since the text is secure we shall read it with the codd.: "That which has less need of the added assistance of a second thing or of other things (is a greater good)." At 6<Ja 6-7 A. e."
a6

As we saw at 62a 27, this was a definition of the

a 6-7 o.V The point is that as .. general rule the thing which can realize itself with either little or no assistance, or with assistance, which is relatively simple and uncomplex, is a greater good.

153

COMMENTARY

a 7-8 xClt 3.."" ... "ou"ou A. is clearly spe.king of two things here (e.g., Odne")' one of which may exist or come into existence without the other. However, he reverses the usual formula and names the /LeU;•• ara9 •• in second not first place. There is also a change in the way in which the .podosis is stated, and this causes a problem, as we see in the following note. The usual apodesis formula has thus far been rae; see, e.g., 63b 36, 63b 38, 6.ja 2, 64' 4. 64a 6. a 8--9 Cl6'rClPXE<J'<EPOV 5E ... oiYCl86v The dO of the text is secure and is read by the edd. (except Ross and Kassel), Spengel, and Cope. But Spengel was bothered by a dO introducing the apodosis. Presumably influenced by this, Ross secludes it and punctu.tes with a comma before a~.ae"iune'" not with the accepted colon; Kassel reads a rae in its place. I do not see how M can be omitted or changed. As for explaining it, I do not see that apodotic ~i is impossible, although A.'s use of it has been debated: for example, Waitt, on Cat. !7b I, argues for its use; Bonitz, Index 167' 34-39, doubts its use. Another possibility is the use of 6i for rae (see Denniston, pp. 169-70), a usage found in Xenophon and also in plato. Finally A:s use of ~i for ~" (see Bonitz, Index I67a 24-34) does not, in the context, seem impossible.

n

a 10 : 1 ICily The absence of /Liv in both members is not an uncommon Greek usage; see Gildersleeve, Syntax, II 517-18. At 62a 6-12, for example, no effort is made to correlate. 2 06.. cd.. ,av For 00" instead of see S. 2698b. A. discusses aeri in M£t. 1.3 and 4.1, at.o•• 3 oipx1\ - CllT,ov at 1.3 (983a 26-32) and 4.2. This last is almost the same as Phys. I94b 23 19Sb 21. He takes np the matter also at An. P.st. 2..II. From what he says in Met. 1.3 in discussing deri as the principle of a tiring, it would seem that all dela! are ai..a, just as "he says in Met. 4.1 (lOI3a 17) that all ai'na are deXai. Yet his discussion of deX>7 and ar.... in Met. 4.1-2 speaks of them as separate and distinct, a separation understood, it would seem, here in our Rhetoric passage. For a grasp of cieri and ai.o••, the commentaries of Bonit., Ross. and Wait. on the passages cited and Cope's long note (pp. 126-28) will be of help. With regard to the meaning of the words in our passage, however, it appears adequ.te to accept deri as the starting point, the beginning, the originating principle, of. thing: that from which something follows (cf. Plato, Rep. 377a 12 - 377b 3). As such it exercises sOnle causal influence as A. is using it (see 64a II-12, IS-23), despite ti,e fact that he constandy distinguishes it from ai.... ill the whole passage down to 6"" 23, and speaks of it as though it were simply a starting point. In view of this. there is no difficulty in understanding that such an aeX"1 is. greater good than that whim proceeds from it, since that which proceeds from such an originating principle depends

/L"

154

ARISTOTLE, 4RHBTORIC' I

64a 17

on it. Cope, pp. 126-27 discusses the meanings of aem by way of a nomber of citations. An alT,07, on the other hand, is direcdy and effectively the reason for the being or becoming of something else. It gives that which is in some way necessary to the existence or becoming of the other. As snch it is a greater good than the non-aln07. Demosthenes, in his argoment that Aeschines, as the arno~ of the disasters which befell Greece, was the greater evil (Crown 158-59), illustrates the idea. a II : 1 ed'nOll After alnov understand rpatvovTa, PBtCro dya9d, continning the parallelism with 64" 9. 3 &.c!t ...1> ,,6...6 The same reason - namely, that given at 64a II-12, cf7BV . •. YBvia9a, - explains why dex" and arnov arc greater goods. a 12-14 Kell Suoiv ... I'Ei~ov The first thing to note here is that apparendy the stated or understood predicate is no long~r PB";OO clya9&v, but, again, ps'Cov by itsel£ This certainly seems a legitimate inference from the statements and the examples between 64" 12 and 64" 23. In this matter Cope, p. u8, appears more correct than Spengel, p. u8, in his note to 64a 16. Yet the situation is not so self-evident. If one were to accept the tenor of Cope's interpretation of dex>i (pp. 126-27), one might well build a case for ",B'CO. dya9&v in 64" 12-23. But the evidence of the text does point more firmly to a shift to "greater" from "greater good" and A. is certainly arguing at 64" 12-14 that what comes from the greater of two dexai or a~ na is the greater. This is a principle which we find illustrated at Top. II6b 1-4, U8:l29-33, li9a 17-19. ;14-15 K"l civci".o..v ... I'Ei~ov This is the converse of the principle just stated. Here we argue not to the greater effect bnt to the greater cause: e.g., from the gre:lter effect initiated by either of two auxa; or tw.o arToa we conclade to the cause as the greater dexlj or alT'ov.

a 16:

dp'll''''''''' e.g., 64a 10-15; Ross's oil" is a misprint for oJv. I"i~OII l ......v I prefer this accentnation for what is apparendy found in the codd. and read by three cdd., Spengel, and Cope. It is Ross's change, and I note that Kassel also accents in this way. I would translate: "It is possible for something to be shown to be greater in both ways." A. explains this in 6.,"" 17-23. Although rpai.. a9ao is not read by Spengel or Cope (or Freese), it is read by the edd. 1

2

,tv,,,,

This is the first of the two (dprpOTie"~) a 17 d cipX>\ •.. ,,'iI;OII ways: if one is an clexlj and the other is not, then clearly from 64a U-I2 the dexlj will appear to be greater.

COMMBNTARY

155

a 18 : I d I'iJ &px>l ... o6x cipx>l This is the second of the two ways. To understand the statement, it is necessary to know (a) that the I'-iJ dex'l is the greater, and (b) that it is so because it is understood as dlo~. Thus A. says: "If one is not an dgri and the other is, the non-dgX1/ will appear to be greater, for the Tilo, is greater and is not an dgx1j." A. obviously intends I'-iJ dex~ to be interpreted as Tilo,. [t is equally clear that if we set TiAO', the end of an action, against dem, the beginning of an action, dAo, will appear to be greater since ordinarily dAo, is that for which all else is done (63b 16-17). 2 o6x &px>l sc. MEB. B'va.. Ross alone reads a conjecture of Bywater's: o~X deX1/· a I!}-23 c, ....£p ... "p«~"''''\1 These lines illustrate the twofold way of 6<Ja 17-18. CalIistratus (in the argument of Leodamas), as the plotter, was the adviser and therefore the beginning (dex1j) of the action. Thus his was the greater guilt. On the other hand, in the case of Chabrias, who cooperated with Callisttatos, the argument of Leodamas was that Chabrias, as the one who by his action effected the deed, brought it to completion, and therefore participated directly in the end result. Thus his was the greater guilt. The point of the illustration is to demonstrate that in accord with the way one analyzes an action one can show it to be greater either on the part of the one who initiates it (dex.il or the one who brings it to completion (dAO'). a 19 :, A£C"MI'''~ of Achamae; he is mentioned again at B 23, ooa 31. (but see Cope, Commentary, II 291). Leadamas is a fourth-century statesman and orator, a pupil of Isocrates, and one whom Demosthenes placed among the distinguished speakers of the day (Lop"nes 146). Aeschines described him a, in no way infetior to Demo'thenes in ability, and indeed as more delightful to hear (Ctesiphon I38-I39). Leodamas opposed Chabrias as early as 376 after Chabrias' victory at Naxos, and again in 366/5 when he accused both Calli,tratus and Chabrias (as weare told here) of treacbery in the matter of the town of Oropus. In 366 a Theban garrison aided by Oropian exiles seized the town. Athens sent ber general Charcs against Oropus, but Callistratus and Chabrias intervened and worked out a compromise whereby the town would remain Theban W1W the matter could be settled. However, the Thebans later refused to yield (see CAR; VI 95-104 on Oropus). 2 KIlll,CJTp«'tou governed by "aT'1ll'0ewv and so placed to show its relation to the accusative and infinitive in indirect discourse; the construction is repeated at 6<Ja 21-22. The influence of ii'P'I continues down to 64a 23. Calli,trattls (fl. 377-36I B.C.) is mentioned by Demosthenes (Crown 219); and Plutarch (Demosthenes 5a) tells us that his eloquence inspired the young Demosthenes with a passion for oratory. On Callim..tus and Cbabrias (ca. 420-357/6 B.C.), see the OCD and CAH, VI 74-78, 146-51.

ARISTOTLE, 'R.HETORIC' [

156

20 i1v "'PClXOijVIlL the apodo.is of an unreal condition in indirect discourse, with the protasis expressed as a genitive absolute: 1'1} {Jov).svaa",nov; see S. 2344.

a

a 2I : 1 (3ouAEUaClfl-EvOU is the reading of the codd. and the edd., save Ross, who reads {JovAs6aa'To~ without giving any reason for the change. The re.ding of the codd. makes eminent sense. 2 ",cU,v 6£ i.e., "ciA .. ~s "al ("aT1]l'oeOi' IrprJ [e.g., at 64a 19]) Xa{Jet01J, Td. "edEa..a

a

22 : 1

...

ToG ~ou).,waCN"C'o~

at 64a 20])

i.e.,

ro., neCUavTCI

(.uaAAO? d8",dv [e.g.,

TO;; {Jov)'.6aa>T0~.

2 I1v YEV£aOCl' the apod;).is of an unreal condition in indirect discourse; see S. 2621. 3 ~v On the indicative, see S. 2621, 2623. 4 0 ",p~~..." ,,?e article is ~"?eric (s. 1122) and should not be translated; e.g., a doer, anyone to do 1t.

a 23 ",OU",Ou •.. np4~"'I"V In these words attributed to Leodamas A. effective!y says that the ..'<ecution of the deed is ToAo~ and the plotting is .lex>/: "men lay plots to this end that they may execute them." a 24 ",I. aTCClv,wnpov SC. 1"'Co. al'a66v. At 64a '4 (see 648 12-'4) we appear to bave left I"'C o. al'a66., the dominant idea in this chapter, for an analysis of 1"'Co •. From the content of 64a 24-30 I's'l;o. as a predicate makes little sense, and so it would appear clear that we are retuming to I's'l;ov al'u66.. For another change, see 648 3I. On the idea contained in' the topic here see Isoer., Amid. 80-83. a 25 :

1

iJJv

2

fI-.i~ov

concessive. SC. al'a66•. 3 X.v.E...... dpClV is the re.ding of the better codd., four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross .lolle reads xalrncoTOea. On the idea in this

topic, see Top. II7b 28-30. a 26-28

&AAov ... \l6wp Ross encloses this within parentheses for which there is no need. In fact, if we pl.ce them here, why not .t 64" 29-30: (aAAo • ... (JovA6 ...s6a)?

a 26:

1 ",I. ci
(than non-use)." Considering the sentence as a whole, we would have to say that lurking in the idea of ;cefja,~ is the meaning "useful" and therefore "usable" (see Top. 117' 34-36). This is what makes it something greater, tl"'e'x", as the word is used at 63b 8.

64a 32

COMMENTAlty

IS7

a 28 ,zp ......Oy I'~ GS",p Pindar, 01., LI; see 01. 3.42. Cope's suggestion (p. I3I11) - i.e., 01. rr(Io).r-3 - is quite good. Plato cited the passage in Buthyd. 304b in support of a statement made there, which A. seems to have in mind in the present passage. Pindar's line was "much cited in antiquity and variously interpreted" (on which, see Boeelch, II.2.I02ff.), but, as Gildersleeve (Pilldar, p. I29) continues, "no profound philosophical tenet is involved." As A. interprets him here, Pindar is asserting simply that water is the source and sustenance of life.

a 29 "'0 XaAEml>...EpOV Spongel cites (p. n 8) as an example of this topic Andocides,' 0" his Return I7-I 8 (the conclusion of a development which begins at IO). This is the criterion used at 633 2S. a 3I xcll cI> "'0 .,."" ... tov I'.il;ov Spongel, pp. n8£, thinks that at this point A. shifts his critique from his proposed goal, the ""'Co. dl'a8d., and moves on to the idea of Td "dAl,o. "al Td ala-x,o., as he appears to be doing at 64a 33. This is not correct and Bonitz, for example, can understand ,..eiCo. dl'a8d. here without any difficulty at all (Stlldien, p. 87). I would agree with Spengel that there is a shift (c£ 64a 34 : ,), but it is one which we have already seen (e.g., 64a 24), and which is in accord with the general purpose of this chapter. The change here is a return to the idea of ""'Co. (as we saw at 64a 12-I4), and it will continue to 64b II. Thus we should read here: "al .;; Td tva'Tio. ""'Co. (pB'Cd. ia-n) "a! oJ " a-de7Ja-" ,...tC.,. (ps'Cd. ia-n): "and that whose contrary is greater is itself grearer; and that whose loss is greater is itself greater." We can illustrate both ideas with a single example. Both health and wealth are personal goods, their contraries being sickness and poverty; since sickness is a greater hann to a person than poverty, health is something greater than wealth; and the loss of health is a greater loss than the loss of wealth. a 32 " ..l cip • ...-IJ I'i) ciPE-rij~ x ..t x ..,,[.. I'i) " ..xt..~ I'dl;",y is the reading of the codd., the edd. (save Ross), Spongel' and Cope. Ross, following a conjecture ofBonit2', reads ;eal de....?} ,..oi "a"ta, "al "a"ia,..~ desrii, ,..etC.,.. This passage illustrates two things rather well: (a) that a consensus of the codd. should be respected; (b) that a misunderstanding of the text will ascribe to A. a view of rhetoric which cannot be justified from the treatise. Cope, p. I32, follows the codd. and translates: "and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and vice to non-vice; because the one is an end, and the other not." He interprets this to mean that'" positive virtue and positive vice, which caiJ. be ends or objects to aim at, arc in so far superior to mere negatives which can not.' Moral considerations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not recommended) to take the irnnloral side of the question:

158

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' [

vice may be regarded as an 'end' of human desire and exertion." In itself Cope's conclusion is quite startling since we have met nothing thus far in the text (indeed we find the contrary) which would suggest it as a possibility. Bonitz (StuJiell, p. 87) did not see how one could speak of"greater" with respect to virtue and that which is not-virtue, or to vice and that which is not-vice. Thus he suggested the reading which Ross adopts and which we can translate: "Virtue is greater than the mere absence of evil, and evil is greater tban the mere absence of virtue." Presumably for Bonitz the idea "greater" now resides in the fact ·that in the case of "virtue" and "evil" each exists, which is to say that each possesses in A.'s statement the positive attribute of being. On the other hand, the absence of "virtue" and of "evil" represents nothing, that is, Ilon-being. I do not know that this resolves the problem of "greater," for it does seem rather fatuous to assert that being is greater than non-being. More importantly, however, both Bonitz and Cope must still confront the difficulty that their interpretation has A. say that evil can be an object to aim at, a T.lo~. For this "Aristotelian" view one would wish some confirmation. There is a solution offered by the Greek commentator Anonymus (CG XX!.33) for the reading of the codd.: nattlely, that the distinction of "greater" is between virtue and vice as l~,~ and as d,dO.a". A habit (lc',) is a firmly established, lasting, permanent quality. A disposition (dui/J8a.,) is changeable, easily movable, impermanent, in that it can come and go (see Cat. 8b 25 9a 13). The very first thing which this explanation does is to give us two positive, existing realities, and so make talk about "greater" much more sellsible than using the term with respect to something and nothing. In this explanation we have A. stating that the habit ofvirtue is greater than a dispositign toward virtue, the habit of vice greater than the disposition toward becoming a person of vice. With respect to virtue, this is another way of saying that to possess the virtue .courage is greater than to be insecurely disposed toward it. A habit (whether of virtue or vice) is something established, complete, a Tilo, (for a similar use of Tilo" see Met. 1042a 4). A disposition as something in a state of becoming is incomplete, dTSllj~, or, in A.'s words, o~ dlo~ (for a similar use, see EN IIS2b 23). And so there is no question of evil's being proposed here as an "end of human desire and exertion." We translate: "The habit of virtue is greater than a disposition toward virtue, as the habit of vice is greater than a disposition toward vice; for the former are in a state of completion, the latter are incomplete." a 33: I K ..t cr." We begin here a passage of very condensed and elliptical expressions in which verbs as well as modifying phrases must be supplied from the t';;' = "those things with functions more noble or more base. 2 lpy.. See 54a II : z.

COMMENTARY

64a 37

159

6....

refers to cliv: "Those things are greater whose functions are a 34 : 1 .. more noble or more base." From the use of "ai.llw-aluzlw, and from what follows, A. appears now to be analyzing "greater," not simply in terms of greater good (whether physical or moral), but dominandy ill terms of moral qualities: the honorable, the shameful, the better, the worse. In this respect Spengd's position (64a 31) is reasonably taken. There is clear indication, however, of what is going on in the codice sreading at 64b 13 (on whiclr, see 64b 13 : 1). Spengd, Cope, and Kassd place a period after aUTd. I prefer either no punctuation or a comma since the statement from 64a 33 to 64a 37 forms a whole; see 64a 36. 2 XCIX" ..
a 35-37 1!,.."lEp .•.
This gives the reason for 643 33-34.

a 35 : I,d..... -
t.....

a 36 x ..l ..ei .. the same use of "at as at 64a 34 : 3. In 64a 33-37 the basic principle at work is cause and effect: namdy, that the eJfcct mirrors the cause, and that cause flows into effect and is responsible for the kind of reality whiclr the eJfect reveals. Therefore, if one effect is greater than another, its cause is greater than the cause of the other. a 37 - 64b 2 XIlI iIw ... 'PtAOXP1]I'-....[..~ This passage should be read with the codd., and punctuated as follows: "al eli. " ~"eeox71 ateeTomlea 11 "aAAtw.· 010. Td a><eopw~ 6eiiv aieSTtbneO' TO;; darpeat.sa8ao, 1f'P0~ darpetjasw,· Td rp.AolTaoeov .l.ao TO;; rp.AOxe>i!-,aTOv !-,IiA.\ov "moo., clIaTe ,,"l rp.AsTaoela rpo'.oXe1J!-'aTla,. Spengd, Cope, and four edd. accept the reading of the codd.; Ross introduces clranges. As for the differences in punCtuatioll, whiclr are several in number, I call attention only to Ross's parenthesis at 64a 38 - 64b I, ,,"l oarpe>iaew" whiclr is harmless, and Kassel's double-bracketed 64a 37 - 64b 2, 010• .•• rpoJ.oXe1J!-,aTl"" whiclr he identifies as "philosophi additamentum," and whiclr I do not accept. Granting the problems whiclr can be found here, I would say drat the passage is basically sound, and would interpret it in the following way: "And those things whose superiority is more desirable or more honorable are greater, as, for example, sharp sight is more desirable than a keen smdl since in fact sight is more desirable than smdl; and to be fond of comrades is far more honorable than to be fond of money so drat, indeed, the love

,,"l yae

,,"l

rae ...

r60

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

of comrades is more honorable than the love of money. And conversely, the better things are, the better their superiority; the more honorable things are, the more honorable their superiority." a 37 : 1 cr.V"IJ ••• xcz).:l.iwv SC. (p.te., a.n&)· oloo TO dxe.{Jw, ... : "those things whose superiority ..• are themselves greater, as, for example ... " This topic is found at Top. usb 4-'7. z CdpE......dp.. exemplified at 64a 37 - 64b r. 1 xu>.Alwv exemplified at 64b 1-2.

a 3S :

1

6cr
z x ..l ycllp Il"',~

sc. rl"e.{J.". 6cnpP";crE"'~

sc. (aCe .....,...tea) dcr'l'e>icr6",. In aCe6Ttb ....eO. is contained the ide. that sight possesses 1j ,j",eeOX11 over smell for it is this which makes it more desirable, and greater. Vah!en's comments ("Kritik orist. Schriften," I07-ro) appear to be the source of the problems experienced by Spenge!, Ross, and Kassel. Contrary to Vohlen, I cannot see that the ..., cpU.""iPUTO. (.l.a.); Ross's change to 'I'.l.Taoetb ....eO•... rp,loxe"lpa...';'TBeo" and his seclusion of pal).o•• are a variation of this. nle problem with this interpretation is that it introduces a change in the topic which is not in the topic itsel£ All that A. is trying to say is that the superiority of X makes it more desirable, or more honorable, than Y, and so X is greater than Y. He does this very thing with ",Mia - ze>ipaTa at Top. nSb 4-'7. If sight and smell.re in the positive degree, why should love of comrades and love of money be placed in the comparative degree? Therefore it is necessary for pa).).o. to go with "c£.U.o •. Suclt a use of peiUo. with a conlparative is not impossible, as Waitz shows (on Top. u6b 24). In this interpretation we have: "to be fond of comrades is far more honorable than to be fond of money, so that, indeed, the love of comrades is more hOllorable than the love of money." b 2 cpU.E"
COMMENTARY

b 3:

161

xcxl ... &i

Sec 63a 7 : 1. The topic here is a double one: "the better things are, the better their superiority," and "the more honorable things are, the more honorable their superiority." This is clearly not the same as the previous topic. We are reasoning here conversely: from the higher perfections of the instances to the higher degree oj superiority in itself of that which they instance. 1

z cl"'T'X"I'EvwS

b 4-II xcxl cr....... &,cl T""ha. In these lines A. makes two further statements, to each of which he gives the converse, which he introduces by "al- dB just as he has done at 64a 37 - 64b 4. We have the first statement at 64b 4-5, with its converse at 64b 5-'7; the second statement at 64b 7-10, with its converse at 64b Io-II. b 4 x ..l cr....... 1\ ~EATlouS sc. "BiCw a.lTd: "The objects of better and more honorable desires are themselves greater." This is explained by 64b 5 (aE rcle ...). •E""Ov"la is a natural desire, and insofar as desire is specified by that which is desired it follows that the better desires (,,£11;ov~ &eU",) are for the better objects (""Cdv",». b 5-'7 x ..l ........... TO cW..6 Now the converse: "and for the same reason (namely, the rdation between desire and things desired) the more ho~ora~le or better the objects desired, the more honorable and better the desu:es. We should pause for a moment to see the intent of these various topics in deliberative rhetoric. For e."'
162 b 8 ........S....;.,·cp..

D9 :

b 10:

64b 13

ARISTOTLE, tRHBTOD.IC' I

1

2.

"is/'

IX£L

1.

a,,", ,,;,

On the word, see 618 25 :

&~"'10.s

"I> ..,hijs

a b,cia",!

"So, too, is the reality known."

See 54b 33. sc. br.'''T~P7J.

b II : 1 &vciAoyov See 63b 26. The "proportion" here is: as the subject matter, so the l"'~P7J; if the subject matter is more honorable, then the l",,,~p'1 is more honorable. a SlI' " ..6"ci The codd. read TaUTa and so do Spengel, Cope, and Kassel. I prefer Ta~...d, a suggestion of Finckh's which is read by the other edd., and preferred by Spenge!, as is ...a~.,.a, which Ross reads. is the codd. readiog accepted by Spenge!, Cope, and 3 "pIV.L"V four edd. I note, however, that Kasse! reads "el.a ... and assigns it to cod. A, among others. See S8b 3:> : 2. b IZ 01 CPpoVLfIooL those who possess practical wisdom., 'PeOV7J"'" Plato, in a passage not unrelated to the basic notion (Rep. SI8c-e), described it as "the eye of the soul." A. defines it at 66b 20-:>2 as "an iotellectual virtue by which men are able to deliberate with respect to their own happiness about the goods and evils mentioned above." See 638 17; see also EN II4Da :>4 II40b 30 (and the commentary on it of Grant, II 158-62), where 'P1!6v7J"" is primarily that virtue which regulates the life of the iodividual with respect to his good. In these passages, as in our own, the 'Pea.,po, - either the generality of such men ("d.TS') or, if we ascend the ladder of ability, the best (~£ "eli...."TO') of them - is the one who looks to the good. On the intent of this topic, see Top. II6a 14-:>2. b 13 : 1 &y.. OI>v ij p.ci~av is the reading of the codd., the edd. (exeept Ross and Kassel), and Cope. Ross reads clyaBd. P"'C0. with the scholiast; Spenge! and Kasse! seclude 11. Although the passage has been variously argued, the codd. seem quite correct. A., as we saw, strayed from his ioitial proposition of seekiog the "greater good" to an analysis of simply "the greater." He is retumiog to the idea of the good (which remaios the domioant idea in the rest of the chapter), as his introduction of the judgment of the 'Pea.,po, makes clear. Good is certainly present to his mind, as is also shown by the phrase "aTB nil. ,!lAw. (64b IS), which are "thiogs other than the good," and by his comments at 64b I6f[ Therefore it seems quite reasonable to read with the codd.: dyaBd. IIp"'Co. (draBa.): "the good (simply) or the greater good." a 41W1">S See S6a 7, meaning (b).

COMMENTARY

n

b 14 : 1 All the codd. read 8/. However, the use of ii at 64b 20-21 and at Top. u6a 16 suggests ii as more likely, and it is accepted here by the edd. ii is the dative singular feminine of the relative pronoun, used as an adverb of maimer, "insofar as": i.e., "either absolutely or insofar as they make their judgment in accord with practical wisdom." 2 "cd "cz"ck ""'" /iAAwv "also in respect of other matters (besides goods)." A. frequently uses MTa with tl,e genitive to indicate to whata predicate is attributed. in! wirll the genitive or dative (see A:n;' aya8wv, 64b 17) or ".et with the genitive or accusative serves rlle same purpose; see Eucken, Sprachgebrauch, p.40. b 15-16 "cz1 yckp ••. d"o, This sentence presumably. explains the statement just made, and does so by saying that "for in fact somerlling is wh:!t it is, is of such a size, ofsuch a quality, in the way in which reason and practical wisdom would assert it to be." Accordingly, tlle judgment of the most infonned minds is a very valid criterion. As an e:cal "o.d. refers to the first rllree of A.'s ten categories of being: namely, substance, quantity, and quality (see Cat., chap. 4). These categories represent the most general predicates which can be assigned essentially to anyone subject and tell us what the subject is in itse!£ But in iliis interpretation of the phrase there is a problem with the use of rlle word Tt to express >j o~uia. A.'s ordinary way of expressing substance is, not by ri, but by Td T{ IUT •• Therefore Sponge! has reservations about the text here.

b 17:

1 l,,' ckycz9"", dp-q"czp.cv In rlle light of rlle el':n;o. (64b 16) inlmediately preceding, and the explanatory cl\elUTal yde >c. d. inlmediate!y following, iliis apparently casual comment must be interpreted as "I bave made just such an assertion in the case of good rllings"; i.e., in my statements on the good I have fullowed the norm of the mind best informed about the nature of the good. 2 &p,,,,,cz, yckp ciycz96v e.g., at 63 b 12..

is rlle reading of the codd., the edd. (e.."'Ccept Ross and Tovar), Sponge!, and Cope. Brandis (p. 41) would be willing to strike TCi "eaYl'aTa; but the Greek commentator reads a plural&naVTa for :n;eaYl'aTa - and at 64b we read :n;a.Ta There is no need to change the codd.; out expression recalls iliat at 63b 14-15.

b 17-18 )'c.!36v"cz "ck "pciy",cz....

Z4

d,.,,,...

b 18 : 1 2"""",,ov in partitive apposition wirll the pluta! subject: "which all beings, if rlley acquired practical wisdom, would choose, each and every one of them." 2 5jjAov 0;)" • • . ).Eyc, the conclusion to 64b I I- 18.

64b 23

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC· I

b 19 :

1 fLEil;ov sc. draB ••. 2 fLiV.Aov .•• AEyE' ,..cillo> is probably to be translated, as uq>6dea, i.e•• "very firmly asserts to be so." The point which A. is making is that if the judgment of one endowed with 'I'e6.~u,~ is normative for" good,"

it is also nonnative for "greater good." b 19-:"22 XClt 'to 'toi~ .•. ci&'XEiv The fundamental point which A. is trying to make here - namely. the better man as the criterion of the greater good·- is exemplified well by Top. II6b 12--16. which reads in part: "what belongs to that which is better is more desirable; for example. that which belongs to god (is better) than that which belongs to man and that which belongs to the soul (is better) than that which belongs to the body." b 20 :

1 2

II II

ck"'Ab>~

"either as a general rule"; on cinMii~, see S6a 7. sc. ""'Co. draB6•• "or insofar as they are better

n I3EA't{ou~

(are a greater good)." 3 otov ".T.l. The example illustrates p.;....lov~. just as the exaIlJ.ple at 64b 21-22 exemplifies p.l"';.,>. In each instance A. takes the general rule (a:nAcii~) for granted on the principle which he has already set forth at 63 b 7-9. and exemplifies what he means by "man insofar as he is better." In the present example d.de.La is an excellence of the soul; as such it belongs to the better part of man. and therefore to "man insofar as he is better." Strength is an excellence of the body which A. would place at a lower level of reality. For a good discussion of a.de.la, see Plato. Laches I99d - 20IC; see also EN III5a 6 - III7b 20. 4 civ&pdCl See 6zb 12 : 3.

n

n

1 x,d a no,'t' ..... I3EA'tiwv sc. "'''Co> d"aB&•. With this topic we move from the nature of better men as the criterion (64b 19-:"20) to their activities. specifically their choices. as the criterion. and their choices viewed once again as coming either from their general nature (ci:n:Acii~) as better men or from some specific aspect W PeA,t.,.) of that better nature. 2 olov TO ci.&ucEia8cxL SC. oiov (ei 1", 610&1:0) 1'd ac""si'a6a& . .. The reason for the statement is given in the following dause, where A. assumes that all will acknowledge that the d,,,a,,jTBeO' exemplifies 0 peAT!.,. ii peATL.,.. The whole question of whether it was a mark of a man's <-'
If 21 :

b 23 :

1

•

XClt 'to lj&,ov SC. IIB'Co.d"aB&.; this is another topic. i)&ovljv See 62b 5-9 and notes.

COMMENTARY

""",ou The reading of the codd. is a,ho;;; Cope, Dufour; and Kassel read it. Spengel suggested a""'o;;, which is read by Roemer, Tovar, and Ross. In the light of dle,a
b 24 : 1

b 25

:

1 2

't'OU't'OLC; i.e., n-al'Ta dt.W"6/" cWToii 1'l16H.a. TO "rE cll.unO'1'EpOV xcii. ';'0 7COAUXPOVWTEPOV 'ij&u

This is

what A. means by 11°'0': as a greater good than the pleasant, the more pleasant must be both more free from pain and more lasting in character.

b 26 XCll"
sc. 1'.1Co. ara8 ••.

b 27-28 "<0 ycl

Compare 62b 8-9, and see 62b

2.

"All things are greater goods which men desire to b 28 : 1 xcII O.,..,V bring about far more forthemselves or ... "; compare Top. !I8b 7-9, lI8a I-S. 2 'l'll.o,~ See 6Ib 3S-38 and 6Ib 37: 1. We know that all men desire the good (62a23, 6sa I), and as wesco at6Ib 36-37 a friend does the good to him to whom he is a friend. Therefore, in each case, to wish to be a greater (I'allo.) cause of this good is to wish a greater good, in the light of 64a 13. b 29 Saw" from 64b 28.

i.e., {JaCUl} (ath'ol a';Toi~ IJ cpl..to,~ {JouJ.ovTal, ainot. el'l1at.)

b 30 llx,a"
is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross), Spengel, and Cope. It means here "least of all."

b 30-3 I xCll"
b 32 : 1 ""EpiXE' ycip '1 xpija,~

And so on the basis of 63 b 8 such longer lasting and securer goods are greater goods, at least to the extent that the use of them enters in as a criterion. 2 "t'ta)v f'Ev i.e., the former: Td nOAt.lXeOVu[n'sea. 3 "'''''' 80! i.e., the latter:
-.n

I66

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

that what is willed is under our control (see 69a 2-3). This idea seems to be in the verb here also, i.e., P06A., ••a,. Perhaps we can translate: "The usefulness of the latter is something superior by reason of voluntary control, for the use of the securer good is more readily available whenever men will it." An example would be the secure control of a second langw.ge, of a welldeveloped memory; or, at the material level, a trust fund at the disposal of the legatee. _t.:,~ ... a"''Ppov£iv Two things must be resolved for an understanding of this topic: (a) the reading of the text; and (h) the meaning of ava-ro,xa, iJpOl.O, nT:tha8'~. (a) The reading of the Greek in the codd. at 64b 34, a reading accepted by most of the edd., Spengel, and Cope, is: "al cb, Ii. 1" .... uvrnotx.,p· " .•• A, Ross reads Richards' conjecture: "al di, <2. I. T
b 34-37

.:,~ iiv ... Wv sc. cb, Ii. (d,,010v60t'l) l" ,
b 34

XCIi TUll.' 4xo~oueEi "so, too, there are other consequents," a statement which A. immediately spells out in an example. From the example we can see the point of the comparison with the ordinary use of coordinates and inflections and the relevance of the comparison to the subject under dis-

b 3S

6S' 3

COMMBNTARY

cussion, the greater good. There is an extended usc (ual Tdll' d"oAov8".) of coordinates and inflections which is helpful in identifying a greater good. Thus if we can use one set of coordinates to denominate something as greater, then we can make the statement of the thing through the coordinates and inflections. Coordinates and inJlections in thenaselves enta.il other members in their group: e.g., "courageowly" entails "courage," "courageous action." Now A. extends that rdation further and says that if one can say that "courageously" is more honorable and more desirable than ·"temperatdy," then one can draw other statements as consequents: for example, "courage" is more honorable and more desirable than "temperance." From the passage it is clear that A. is using his argument from consequents (6aa 29-31) and applying it to coordinates and like inflections in the effort to present us with further instances of greater good.

b 38 : 1 CdPoUVTClL

sc. ".,,1;0. a"a8&.; this is also to be wtderstood in the clause immediatdy following, "aI8 ... Udn'OV,. 2 'L'oU fIoiJ 6 This is a rather unUsual but not unique displacement for TOJ 8 ".~. See Bonitz, Index S39a 14-17; on the usc of ".of, see S. 270Sg. J l\ 01 is the reading of all the codd., of Dufour, Tovar, Kassel, Cope, and Spengd (hut he is not happy with it). Ross reads ij 8 01 as part of the text, taking it from Moerbeke; Roemer reads <6>. The 8 could easily have been lost in transcription; see the codd., e.g., at 6sb 14- However, we can read without it, and I would prefer to read with the codd.

65' 1 : 1 ciYClBbv ycip This was the definition of the good at 62 a 23-24. 2 C. .....E KClI fIoEil;ov 06 fIoii>.>.ov i.e., cliaT" xal (81.a.) ".",1;0. (d"a80.) oJ ".cL1.Ao. ('~I.'Ta.): as long as it is a "mort desired thing" it is • greater good .

• 2 : 1 KClI 3 01 ciflo'PLa~7J'L'OUV'L'E~ sc. ale.J.TCI., ".eil;o. d"a8&•... . 2 ~fIo'PL:~7J;oUV'L'E~ t~ose who disagree on, dispute, the point WIth one, I.e., one s opponents. On the word, see 54" 27 : 1. J l\ 01 lJt8po! A.'s point is explained by 63a II and 63' II : 1. 4 ot Kp(VOVTE~ "the experts," since they "decide the issue."

a3:

1 otlt; OU"C'OI xplvoualv "whom the experts select"; these, too, are qualified to give a judgment. We are presumably concerned here with a situation similar to that expressed at 64b II-IS - namely, that of a specially qualified person whom A. describes at EN I094b 28£: "each man judges well what he knows and in these matters he is a good judge." There is no question here of a more restricted meaning in the word 'Judge," that of 6",aaTof" for e.'WIlple. 2 ...0 floW yap "for in the former as.," i.e. what one's opponents or enemies choose as a greater good.

r68

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

6sa 8

3 .:., ltv el w~ here is the relative used as an adverb (S. 2990) in a comparative clause which is conditional; it is correlative to a suppressed OIJT"~ which goes with E
0'

a 4 : 1 .... &£ 01 >CUP'O' XIIL' 01 .U;OT.' sc. Td 6. (w~ a. B~ at ,..;.. e'o' "al 01 olMT8~ (<pail.. ian). 3 >CUP'O' We saw the word at S4b 12. It means one having power, authority; here: "those eminendy qualified."

"at one tim.e ... at another." " S : 1 I'.i~ov sc. dya8&•. z ciT'I'I.. to be without, deprived of, what confers T,,.>7, which (as we saw at 61a 28 - 6rb 2) consists primarily of external honors of every kind. And so dTl,.ia would be, in this instance, a mark of aTlie1)a.~ (see 64" 3r) in the individual, a lack of some honor which men possess and which is acknowledged by others.

"S-6 b'L"' Ii•... 6>'lyo,' a colon after allyo •.

sc. ,.eTIi'ICova" ,.8'CO' dra8&.; punctuate with

"6 : 1 ""'IILV";'UPOV ycip At 64a 2S (,.BiCo. yme) we fmd the reason which validates this explanatory statement. At 6sa 19 A. takes it as selfevident that the ona.uf>Toeo, is ,.BiCo•. .. z E:7tClLVE~""'EPCl As we saw at 6]a IO the ~naW6Tdll is virtue, or is in some way related to it. Consequently it is dra8&•• Thus the lnalV6Twnea are certainly ,.eIC", draM of the moral order, and therefore are called here "aAU.,; see 64" 34: 1.

"7:

1

kudos.

T'I'.lI

u......

See 6ra 28 - 6r b 2: honors, awards, all forms of external

2 .:.".. sc. aUTd ,.BICOJ draM. was at 63b 37; see, too, 63h 36-37.

waatlT"~ is used here as it

1 c.iJG'1CEP ci:~(CI "'C'LCi "is, as it were, a kind of estimate of value"; i.e., the award given reilects the judgment of the giver on the deeds, acluevements, etc., of the person honored. all dla:n:ee as "quasi," see Borutz, rudex 872b 48££ 2 x ..l cJ)v ..I ~YJI'('" I'd1;ouo; sc. aUTd ,.8ICw. Here we shift back to the idea of "greater." C1),.la. are "penalties" or "fines," as is evident from the contrast with ",.al. !;rll,ta, do not mean "losses." Anything ro-

a8:

6sa

II

COMMENTARY

ceiving a heavier penalty is ordinarily something more serious and substantial

in

nature.

a 8-9 x"l ..& ••• I"U;", "those things greater than •.." In this translation, which is used to make more explicit what A. is saying, the article has its original demonstr:ltive force. a 9 : 1 -rWv ofLOAoyoUP.tvwv i.e., TmJ! Op.O).O),OOI'£l1{JJl1 (el'JIar.) J'Bi'dlQw: "acknowledged to be great." The infinitive with this and the following verb may be understood, as indicated in the notes, but it may also be omitted. A.'s elliptical way of writing includes omissions tolerated in correct Greek as well as others which are more in the character of a shorthand. When either is supplied in the commentary, it is for the sake of clarity. z ij
modifies Til aVTa: "those things which," or, perhaps a 10 S".. pOUP.EVII better, "the same things when .• ." Td aVTa is the subject of ",ai•• Ta. which here (and in 6sa II) has its meaning of "appear to be." A. isspeaking here of the figure of division. Cope's note (p. 141) on the character of this figure is misleading. The figure does not "exaggerat[el the importance of anything •.• making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess." Since it simply breaks something down into its component parIS, as the example (6sa 13-1S) ,hows, it cannot make the thing into that which it is not. Further it should not be called a "purely rhetorical topic" since the process of d.ate.a.~ plays a critical role in philosophical analysis, as Plato's dialogues demonstr:lte. The technique, as its use in Greek writers frequently reveals, has the value of giving new perspective on and new insight into what might seem quite innocuous in itself, and it is in this quality that the dimension of "greater" whicll it fosters resides. Division is a figure at the heart of distinguished poetical and prose literature. Quint., [list. orat. 8.3.61-'71, discusses this topic, and his example (67-69) i, so similar to the one used here that he appears to have A.'s example in mind. is the reading of the codd. and the edd., except a II nAE,6~",~ yap Ross, who reads "leio. yae. Here we are given the reason why a fact or idea divided into its constituent parIS appears greater: "for it appears to exceed a greater number of things." "Appears": ie., in the sense that by resolving the whole into its part' the mind apprehends the greater significance of what at first glance seems simple and insignificant. Cope (p. 141) translates: "to exceed in a greater number of points" and identifies tl,e genitive as one of

65a 18

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 1

170

quantity. But it is difficult to construe in this way. Bywater's "l,io. (read by Ross) can be taken as an adverb: "to exceed more"; and this, in fact, seems to be the point behiod Bywater's explanation for the conjecture. a 12
a 13-15 Saa ..... ciiyoua," Homer, Iliad 9.592-594. where Cleopatra speaks to Meleager in words which differ slightly from A.'s citation.

""tc",

,...l '<0 tat, which we have seen (e.g., at 64b 10), is connective and intensive: "and also." Accumulation and climax are two aspects of the same thing, i.e., composition. The varied parts of an idea, action, or subject are brought together to give greater weight to the idea or action. If the parts are arranged one upon the other (""o,>todo,..i.) in an ascending order (see the comments of Anaximenes on this, I.p6b 3-12), we have what came to be known as the figure of "lI,.a~ (the ladder). For example, Demetrius (Co. 270 B.C.), in his work On Style 270, cites as an example of the figure Demoschenes' words in Crown 179: "I did not speak thus and then fail to propose a motion; nor propose a motion and then fail to go on the embassy; nor go on the embassy and then fail to persuade the Thebans"; see also Herod. 3.82.3. The Romans called this figure gradatio; see, e.g., Quint., Inst. Drat. 9.3.54-57. Cicero mentions the word in De Drat. 3.54.207. z 'E"(X"p,,o~ On this writer of comedy from Sicily, active about S00-475 B.C., see the OCD. A., in De gen. an. 7242 a8-30, mentions £picharmus again in connection with this figure. An example from Athenaeus reinforces A.'s implication that he was somewhat fond of the figure, e.g.: "afrer the sacrifice, a feast; after the feast, a round of drinks; after the drinks, derision; afrer derision, swinish insults; after the insults, a law suit; [after the lawsuit, a verdict;) after the verdict, leg chains, the stocks, a fine" (Deipnosophistae, 36c-d).

a 16:

"Ta..

1

The reason why composition, like division, appears to a 17 ,
The parentheses are read by the odd.

If the subject appears to be such, then on the a 18 oipxil... ..r·"
65a 23

COMMENTAllY

171

a 19 mol 6•... ""L?;ov A. stays with the idea of "greater" without any qualification. To be sure, this shifting of the predicate - "greater good," "greater,JI IIbetter," "more desirable" - is disconcerting. But it does not giye one the right to introduce the specifying predicate with complete freedom, as, I find, the English translators do in this chapter. The point of the topic at 65a 19 is that the more di.fficuIt or less likely an action is with respect to an opportune moment (e.g., one's age, the place, the time, one's ability) can determine the greatness of what is done. For example, to risk one's life as a young man makes the action more signiJicant than to risk one's life at an advanced age. This illustration exemplifies a! ~.""ta. at 65a 20; A. himself explains 65a 1~21 at 65a 21-29. We saw this earlier with 01 T&nol at 61a 34. "a<eot; a 20: 1 ot "",pol is the opportune, the propitious moment, the right, fitting, or critical time, as opposed to time in general. At EN r096a 26 A. says that Td dyaOov is predicated, in the category of time (iv xeov'!'), of the opportune moment (0 "ale0t;). The idea recurs in Top. 107a 5-12. This fact does not change the observation at 6sa 19 on ,,",Co. as the predicate in this passage. In Top. II7a 25 - 117b 2 A. presents us with examples of what he means by 01 """eot: e.g., to be free from pain in old age is to be free I. "ate (at a fitting time). Isocrates, in Antid. II4, uses 01 """eot to press home the great importance of the actions which he is praising. See also Barrett, p. 23I, for the word as it appears in the fifth century B. C., and in poetry. z cd 'iJl.ixlClL i.e., "age. generation," a 21 : 1 ,,{ liu~ciI'E'~ i.e., the abilities, powers, faculties of the person; see 6zb 25, 60b 16 : 2, 60b 27. For the general meaning of the word, see 548 II : 1. 2 el ycip With this and the following eI clause (i.e., 653 22.: xal 6~, we must und~tand something like Tct1'Ta ne'aTTBTat, , 3 .."ptlt}u~"I"~ ".T..t. "beyond one's ability, one's age, or what one s peers do.

a 22 ""t et rrllT"'~ not usual)."

"and if these things are done in such a way (as is

a·23 : J i] ~'1'«u8C1 ij ""O"'C'E "or in the circumstances, or at that time"; see 6Ia 20, 6Ia 32 : 2. 2 il;e, The subject of the verb comes from the understood antecedent: Ta;;Ta = these actions. 3 I'EYEeO~ goes back to ,,",COV at 65a 19, on which see the note there. As "ald, dya9a, dt"ala they would be greater (or great) goods; but as iva.na (r-aVTtro., 65a 24) they would be greater (or great) evils.

172 a 25

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

....iii 6).u",,,,o,,bc'/l

65' 31

For the dative. see S. 1502.

a 26-27 "pOrteE ... ~EpO" A. at 67b 17-19 mentions both sayings again. The epigram on the Olympic victor has been attributed to Simonides by Aristophanes of Byzantium (see Eustathius. p. 1761.23-26 [ed. Sta!lbaumJ); Hiller & Crusius. p. Ix, deny that it is by Simonides. and it is not attributed to him in Page. Ross's text is without an accent on »A~yav~. a 28 : 1 ·I'P'xp«....'1~ It is questionable whether this is the distinguished general of the fourth century (ca. 415-353 B.C.). a lli iIw The phrase in more complete foml is found at 67b 18. The idea is: from such a background I have come to what I am. Roemer would prefer to leave out the whole phrase: Uy",. IE eli. vmj~E'. TaiiTa ("Kritik." 500).

"",Ca.

a 29 xed ....;, ..u.....'f'U.~ self-grown. natural. from one's nature. is understood after b",mjTav. If we take TO aln:arpvi~ as "natural" and refer to Top. u6b 10-12. 1I9a 7-12 as paralld loci. there will be a problem in explaining why "the natural" is "more difficult." and therefore. in the light of 64" 29. a greater good. Yet A.'s use of TO a(,Tarpv.~ (and not the phrase TO
"'"yu. . .

ov ","POS sc. ",s'C o. without any qualification. Both a 3I : 1 . the example and a comparison widl 63b :1.1-26 demonstrate this. However. at 6sa 33 and on to the end of the chapter A. returns inlplicidy. if not explicidy. to the leadiog idea with which he began: namely. the ",.iC", ciyaB&. Z TO" «'P'o" This is the funeral oration given at Athens toward the end of 43 I B. c. in honor of those who had died io the campaigns of the first year of the Pdoponnesian War. Thucydides. who reports the speech (:1..35-46). does not iodude this poignant simile. We have no way of knowing whether Thucydides (who made no clam to verbatim accounts in his speeches) omitted it or A. has made a mistake. If A. has made a mistake. he has made it twice. for io rIo. Ita 1-4 he repeats the example and the

l"'. .

6sa 35

COMMENTARY

173

attribution. In Herod. 7.162. th..-re is a statement quite similar to A.'s, and Euripides, in The Suppliant. 447-449, catches the same idea. We also have a very interesting parallel (cited by Spenge!, p. 127) in a funeral oration attributed to Demosthenes (Epitaphio. 24). a 33 : I l~".p£eel'l a comparative conditional clause (see S. 2.478) in indirect discoUIse with the original mood retained. See Top. II]a 25-33. In Thucyd. z 'felt ~ Xpd'l' IUU;,,,,. 3.S6.3-'7 the Plataeans in their superb, but fruidess, speech before the five judges from Sparta (427 B.C.) argue their position on this ground. a 34 : 1 xplj'''''''' sc. petCw aym8d. This predicate is valid for the rest of this chapter; c£ 6sa 3I : I. z 8UOLV can be taken by itself, "of two things," or, more probably (and Bonitz, SIIIJien, p. 88, would agree), with an understood dl'aOoiv, "of two goods." The genitive is partitive with ~d ry1'6~.eo" which also governs the genitive of comparison TOU T6Aov~: "of two goods the one nearer the end is the greater good." We have this topic at Top. 1I6b 22-2.3. "Nearer the TtlO~" means more directly and effectively related to the T'AO~ which in this case is the criterion for the greater goodness: e.g., if the T6AO~ is b"rrrfJp7J, intellectual training is a good greater than physical training. Whenever one decides upon a dAO~ one automatically establishes a hierarchy of values. sc. p.ICov al'aOd.. Our reading a 3S : 1 x"l .... WTcj> x,,1 &"'>.W~ is the reading of good codd. and is accepted by Roemer, Tovar, Spenge!, and Cope. ,,"l Td a';Tq; II MAW, is also found in cod. A •. 1. and is read by DufoUI. Ross and Kassel read ,,"l ~d ati~q; ~OU MAW~. From a glance at the structure of the preceding and subsequent sentences, one can see why the reading Ii MAW~ or TO;; MAW~ is preferred, fur one finds there a comparison of what is the greater good in any given two instances. Bonitz (Studion, p. 88) also prefers 11 (or TOO) MAW~. (a) If we read with Ross and Kassel, we have: "the good relative to a person is greater than absolute good." This is acceptable, even though it is a source of trouble to Spenge! (pp. 128-29) and Cope (pp. 146-47), for the very solid reason that the general good is greater than a relative good. Both cite to their point Top. u6b8-Io. But Cope does note that there is a difference between what is theoretically good and what is practically good. This is important. For, theoretically, the greater good is perfect health; but if a person labors under debilitating disease which precludes such, then partial recovery (health) is the greater good. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that these topics are meant to help one to present a subject as advantageous (O'IJp'l'ieov--al'a06v, S9a 30ff., 62.3 ISff.) to an auditor trying to come to a decision on a practical problem. Such a person is no diJIerent from all men of whom A. says (A IS, 7Sb 19): "no one chooses the absolute good

174

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOlUC' I

but the good relative to himself"; see also 65b 35. Moreover, in this particular situation, which is concerned with TO (11Jp, A. himself says that TO (fVP in itself is a relative good, not an absolute good (B 13, 89b 37 - 90a I). (b) If we follow the more accepted reading of the codd., we translate: . "the good relative to a person simply and solely is a greater good (than what is not so relative to him)." This is most acceptable. The fact that the structural balancing of the surrounding sentences is changed might raise a question in our mind. But such a change is certainly not unique, from what we have seen in this chapter alone. In either reading, the point of this topic is illustrated by the topic which immediately follows. The text here presents a not uncommon problem in this first book, and we might use it as an example of the kind of puzzle which one faces in any attempt to interpret. The text contains a number of difficulties which could be occasioned by either mistaken punctuation or poor copying. Here are a few of the possibilities which are quite legitimate:

(I) Start the sentence at leal dvo" and punctuate differently: e.g., "al dvoi" TO

l"YVTBfl071 1'06

TslotJ,' xal TO cW1'q; xal dn.tru,. ~vo'> TO Ey"V-

(2) Do the same but write the words as follows: "al

Teeo, TO;; Tilov, . "al TO aVTW "al dnAw,. xal ~voi. TO

{"",s-

a"1'O Hal tin..tru,. (i) aVTIji and aVTIji are easily, interchangeable, as we know. (ti) a~T'; could have been misunderstood and written aVTIji. (iii) both sentellces as written in (2) have the same meaning. (iv) the sentellces as written in (2) can stand by themselves, in which case the statement is tile same as Top. II6b 8-ro: namely, that which is good absolutely and simply is a greater good. 2 ,,"l '\'0 &uv1l'\'Ov sc. pB'CO> a"aB';.; cf. Top. u6b 26. As we have seen (57" 5-7), men do not deliberate about the impossible. If something is seen as beyond their attainment, it is not seen as a good for them. Alexander in his commentary on Top. n6b 26 cites the extreme example as an illustration: e.g., long life vs. immortality (CG II.2). TeeO" 1'06 T£..lOV," . ual TO

1'"

a 36 : 1 '\'0 I'Ev yap cruoriil sc. TO "d~ ({(ff') aVTIji (d"aB&.): TO piv = "the former," namely, the possible. The me:ming of Tiji aVTIji (or aVTIji as some read) will certainly be determined by what precedes at 65a 3S (TO aVTIji) and from such comparable usage as 63b 17-18 (see 63h 17: ,) and

90a I, where we see that it is equivalent to T..l. For a discussion of the word in. this meaning see Cope, p. 147, and Bonitz, Studkn, pp. 88£

6sa 37

COMMENTARy

17S

2 Ttl..,. TEAEL Toii ~'ou Here again we have a statement variously interpreted. Since the entire sentence (to Tq; TU•• , 6sa 37) is involved, let us look at each part. (I) 6sa 36: Ta l. Til •• TO' Piou would seem to mean the same as the phrase in a companion passage from the Topics (n6b 23-26), Ta "eo~ TO TOU Plou Telo~: nam.ely, anything directly related to the accepted TUO~ of life. As directly related to the T'lo~, such things more· properly constitute a part ·of the Tilo~ (see Bucken, Sprachgebrauch, pp. 22-28). The preposition .. does not appear to be temporal as many interpret it-Jebb&Sandys, for example: "Also, goods at the end oflife are greater goods; for those things are more ends which are close to the ends." (2) 6sa 37: Ta "eo~ Tq> Til." these would be anything itulirectly related to the Tilo~, near it, by its side, but not immediately flowing into it. neo~ with the dative here is different from "eo~ with the accusative, which A. uses in the sentenCes which follow. (3) 6sa 36-37: and so we translate: "those things which are direcdy related to the end of life are greater goods; for ends are more important (greater) th2n things indirectly related to the end." Finally, an ex:ample of the topic: ethical knowledge is direcdy related to .d~a.p•• la, the T'lo~ of life; typewriting only indirecdy. The fonner is more clearly Te.l.."O~, or, as A. says, Til'l pall••, or, in the Latin phrase, "sapit natuIam

rae

finis."

a 37 - lish 8 xed Ttl. •.. ~y""{VELV 06 This is one of those passages which make sense upon reading and become confusing upon analysis. Yer it will yield .ense upon analysis if we assume that A. is talking here, as at 6sa 3S-37, about relative, not absolute, greater good. A. an expression of the practical choices of the greater good which men actually make in relation to themselves and of their reasons for doing so, the statements are valid. But they are not valid as statements of absolute greater goods. For, surely, conferring benefits is equal, if not superior, to receiving benefits (e.g., 7Ia 3S 71 b 4), and being just is a greater good than seeming to be just, in the same way as, clearly, actual health is a greater good than apparent health. Asecond point to keep in mind is that A.'s argument at first glance appears to be this: the greater relative good lies in that which is grounded in reality, and not in the. appearances of reality. And in fact this has to be the base for any intelligent understanding of these two topics, as the second topic (6sb S-8) - where the greater good (actual health) is the one grounded in reality makes quite clear. This is the base for the second topic, and is expressed in

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

the phrase .l.a, ,,,,illo. ~ do".i.. It is present in the first topic, 65' 376sh 5, hut it is somewhat obscured (a) hy the phrase "eo, MEa. (which seems hest translated "related to appearance"), (b) hy what seems to be an unnecessary enlargement of the example at 6sh 2-5 (which could he set down more directly, e.g.: 6,0 ~al ,0 tJ ",da-X.w ME., .. a. a!et..>\IIE,clO.,a was used to denote the real (TO II.); see Bonitz, Index 3Ia 391£, and c£ Met. 993 b 30-3 r: "as each thing is in respect of its being, so it is in respect of its truth." 2 &6IiCtV The distinction here is hetween reality, that which is, and appearance, that which seems to he. This is clear from the passage down to 6sh S, and from the definition of "'eo, Mfa. given here and in a parallel passage at Top. ush 20-22. So we translate: "those things related to reality are greater goods tbao those related to appearance." another example of the article used to make 3 .....u n:po~ &61i ..v the prepositional phrase a substantive (see S. US3): '" Related to appearance' is defined ..." if one is likely to pass unnoticed, which in the b 2 >..aVO10.,a. hy showing that those chosen with Mfa as the norm (i.e., "eo, 66fa.) are the lesser goods. It is a kind of proof from contraries.

COMMENTARY

I77

b 3 : J 8GIi..",,"" a potential optative to indicate that the statement is conditioned not absolute (Goodwin, Syntax, 235). I believe that Cope's comment (p. 148) gives a twist to the passage which is not in it: "the words ddE .... l/v suggest that we need not take this for granted; it caD. be 'made to appear' that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question •.• " A. is speaking merely of men and of their choices as we usually find them. For most men, as he says, to receive benefits would have the appearance of being more desirable (and so would be a greater good) than to confer them. 2 "'0 fLlY y
,..0.

b 6: I "po~ Ii>.lj8E'"'' ycltp fLillov i.e., the wishes are directed to what is, and therefore to what is the greater good, on the principle of 65 b I. 2 'P""I Those who would say that "appearing to be just is more desirable than actUally being just" are not merely men in general but also men who were considered to be reputable thinIcen, like the Sophists, Callides in the Corgias (481-522), for example, or Thrasymachus in the Republic (336354). Thrasymachus' position is quite clear: justice is sinrply what it would seem to any practical and realistic individual: namely, the interests of the stronger. Socrates countered with the argument that the answer to the problem entails the nature ofman and must be determined by what that nature is in itsel£ We find the Thrasymachean view frequendy in Thucydides' account of the last quarter of the fifth century; see, for example, 3.82.-83. b 7:

5.

J fL'XPG" On the neuter, see S. I048. Z .,,0 ':'y,..I"E'" This clearly manifests the confusion typical of this relativism. Unable to escape the facts of physical reality, it admits the validity of the principle for the physical world: "it is better to be than to

AIUSTOTLB, IRHETORIC' [

6sb 14

seem" (6sb I). But in the arca of ethical reality, where the facts can be interpreted, it shifts readily from objective to subjective criteria. Socrates w:ith his e.'Campie of the dagger (Gorg. 469O-e) pinpoints the weakness in such subjective criteria.

b S : 1 TO ••. XPlIcr,I'...... pov

SC.

,...";0.

a1'a6&,·.

See Top. nSb

2 TO ,.p0t; ...6 "e.~ goes w:ith each of the following specifications of "olid, but A. feds no need to repeat it - a fact which should be kept in mind when we find that a preposition is not repeated in other instances; c£ S. 1667. b 10 !'-iT'....... so. d1'a6d. On "AO;;T.~. see 6Ia 12-24 and notes. On ~1'{.,a see 6Ib 3-0 and notes. The text in each place demonstrates that these two goods possess lbra.Ta Ta.Ta, 6sb II. II : 1 xlli ... o !,-EO' i)6ovijt; is the reading of most of the codd. and four of the edd.; Ross, Spengd, and Cope omit the article. The article can be read but it should be intetpreted as a repetition of the article referring to the same entity qualified by two separate thing. (c£ Gildersleeve, SYlltax, II 603). From the explanation at 6sb U-I3 it i. clear that one single thing i. meant which writes in itsdf both "freedom from pain" and "pleasure": "that which has more freedom from pain together w:ith pleasure." Reading w:ithout the article make. thi. more obviou.. In Top. n']a 23-34 thi. topic appears as two distinct topic•. 2 I'EO'i)6ovijt; $C. d1'a6&••

b

,...,C••

c!Av:Ir."'e.' "al Td ,...0' "6
b 12: 1 .u.e""

b 13 : 1 Z

XIII 6uOLV Cl6Tcj1;

TcjI

This refers to Td

Everyone interprets this: Kal dv." (d1'a6 •••) 8 ..• i.e., a third thing; literally: to the .ame thing.

b 14: 1 ...1> &:l.ov "o'EL 22-2S·

.0. ,... .C..

d1'a6... See Top. nSb Ie-n, nga

6sb 16

COMMENTARY

179

2 ,,«pOV..... i) Ii Sc. "deo.Ta (,..s.Co.. d,.aO&.), 11 il (deO'Ta) 10.8&.... The (from cod. A corrected) is read by four edd., Spengel, and

a

Cope; Kassel does not read it. See 64b 38 : ,. b IS "poe; niJSEla.V .. . -rdVE.L 1:8["8'" ned, = cccomenear, dose to." The difficulty with 6sb 14-16 really starts, I would say, right here, if we stay with the Greek. For the Greek says that those goods which are present and noticed by others are greater goods than those present but not noticed. But if the goods are actually possessed (",deona), how can we speak of them as "coming close to reality" or even "tending toward the real"? Further, how does the example TO "loun'" which would be an existing good, exemplify "eo, dl7jO.,a. Ttl••,? I do not know. What the passage supposedly means is this: the presence of these goods is such as to make an impression on others, and so they acquire a gre.ter sense of reality. Thus, on the principle of 6sb I, they are a greater good. The translations more or less rellect this interpretation: e.g., "those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the fonner have the air of reality" (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [361).

b 16 : 1 -ui> &OXELV I would have to accept this conjecture of Munro's (Cope, p. ISO) over the reading of the codd.• TO;; do"•••, accepted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, and Kassel. The passage has been variously interpreted. The latest interpretation is that of Kassel. who resolves the difficulty by reading TO;; do"••• with the codd.• which he finds consonant with the immediately preceding "eo, cU7jOs,a. • •• Ta;;Ta. However. he then must dismiss 6sb 14-15 ("al II .•• ;'a.Od•••), which is the real cause of the problenl; he does so with the words: "quae manca esse suspicati surnus." To my mind it does not seem reasonable to attempt to resolve the problem of the text here independendy of 6sa 37 - 6sb 8 - I have since noticed that Vater (p. 51) thinks the passage belongs with the earlier lines - where A. introduced the reality-appearance opposition as the criterion of a greater good. In our passage he repeats words (and so, presumably, ideas) which he used seven lines earlier, e.g., la.Od..... "eo, 10 ..a•• 60""'. If we work from that base, then we approach the passage with the ·understanding that the criterion of reality-appearance will somehow be operative. Accepting the TO;; 60"." of the codd. Spengel eiplains it thus (p. 130): "The wealth which one enjoys is easily recognized; it is not apparent in one who seems to be wealthy but is not. Therefore TO "loun•• is a greater good than TO;; 60"...... But if the individual is not wealthy, what does A. mean when he says iI il ;.".8&••• at 6sb "4, where ",deo'T" must clearly be understood with la.8&••• if the clause is to make any sense? Cope. p. ISO, suggests: d.o TO;; "louTS.. !pa.st." d. ,..••Co. d,.a80. TO 60".... Although Cope explains this Greek in a way which avoids Spengel's difficulty, the fact remains that his

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

180

65b 20

Greek without the explanation would appear to lead to the very problem which I find in Spengel. Munro's conjecture (read by Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar) Tq; do".,. makes eminent sense and gives the examples some illustrative force. It is also the way in which the Greek commentator (who, unfortunately, does not cite the te-"t he read) e-"Plains. the sentence. His e-"planation is: xal TO "'AOtrrsZ'" "at tpal",eafJa, psi.CO'JI TO;; nlo'VTslv Hal /JTJ tpat'VBa8a", This would suggest that he may have read a te-' IlY"7t1J'
"a••

ru...

b 17: 1 xed '
CHAPT.ER 8

I . Introduction: 6sb "2 - 6sb 29 deliborative rhetoric demands knowledge of (0) the kinds of govemment, and (b) the institutions peculiar to each since men in a political structure consider the f1VI''PSeOv to be that which preserves the structure

II . Development: 6sb "9 - 660 16 t.

(a) 6sb 29 - 66a (6) 66. 2.

there are four kinds of government, each with its specific 'f'AO,: the kinds the TtlO~ of each

6sh 29 - 66. 6

1 -

2

66. 6

the imporb.nce in knowing the characteristics and institutions peculiar to each

66. 6 - 66. 16

III . Conclusions: 66. 17 - 66.

22

general conclusion to chaps. 4-8 on deliberative rhetoric

6sb 22 : I I'..y".... ov S.. This chapter, which draws to a conclusion the section on deliberative rhetoric, 6lIs in the general and necessary details of the statement made in the introductory chapter (4) at 60a 19--37. In reading chap. 8, it is advisable to keep in mind A.'s admonitory comment in chap. 4 (60a 37) that full and complete knowledge of this material is "the lero, of political science, not of rhetoric" (see also 660 21-"2). A casual reading of our chapter makes it clear that we must tum to the Politics for a more detailed explanation, just as we discover that to understand the next chapter we must have recourse to the Nicomachean Ethics. As was stated earlier (see S5a 28 : 2) and as we have just seen in tho relation between chap. 7 and the Topics, the Rhetoric can be read intelligendy only in the light of the Aristotelian corpus, it was clearly written with the other works in mind. Whether, in view of what A. himself says, we are to go so far as to say that the chapter "affords an excellent illustration of the difference between the methods appropriate to a scientific and a popular treatise such as Rhetoric" (Cope, Introd., p. 18r) is highly questionable. The Rhetoric itself is as much a scientific analysis of the art as the Ethics or Politics are scientific analyses. Any other view is somewhat

182

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

silly. It should be obvious that the Rhetoric cannot enter into the details of the specific disciplines which it employs. At the same time we have not, as yet, come upon any statement concerned with ethics, dialectic, politics, or topics which is invalid, or dangerously loose and inexact, or misrepresentative of the discipline to which it refers. The major sections of the Politics where the material of this chapter is discussed are: Book 3 (I279a 22 - 1288b 4), Book 4 (I289a 26 - 130Ia IS), Book S (I204b I9 - I3 I6b 27). See also EN rr60a 3 I - II60b 21. as it is used at ssa 7, S6a 13, and S8b 17: "most • XUp"i>T"TOV decisive of all hdps." J npo~ ..11 8,;"".. 8", nd8ELV If SSb IO is correct, we must translate: "with respect to the power of speoking persuasivdy," Le., giving expression to the ,j"dexovTa ",8avd (ssb Io-n). b 23 : J GUl'f3ou).eUE'V ..ci~ is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross and Kassd), Spenge1, and Cope. With this reading, the infinitives (lap.,. and a,.l.,v) are predicate to an understood I<1TI (see S. 1986). Ross and Kassd read Bywater's conjecture av",povl.6... Td~, which makes the two infinitives articular and subject of the understood I<1TI. z 7rO~L-rrdCl.t; i.e., "forms of government." As A. says at Pol. I278b II, "the "ol,nla (comtitution) is the form of government [TO "r>Alnv",a]"; see also 1279a 2S-26. b 24 l81) is the common reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross alone reads 1I8~, a correction in a good cod. (A). The correction may be occasioned by what appears at 66a 12-16. The seb.oliast is of no hdp since he reads 1I8~ and interprets by using 681/. There TiI~ "oA'T6la~ is a similar exchange of the two words inDem., 01. 3: e.g., (21), T* "oA'TBla~ 118.. (26). Since l81/ appears at 66a 7 in all codd. in a repetition of what is said here, since we are given a definition of 18o~. at 69b 6-7 which fits the present text, and since the use here is similar to that at Pol. I29.b 13-17, l8~ is to be preferred. (For a contrary view, see Bywater, "Aristotelia IV," 249-S0.) At 6sb 23-24 there is a kind of ascending order in the words: i.e., to determine (a) the customary ways and attitudes (181/) identified which each kind of government, (b) the usages established by their law (v&",.",a), and (c) that which is specifically beneficial to each kind of State (<1V,..",8eOVTa). On l8o~, see 69b 6 : J, 7006 : J; on 681/ in the present passage, Cic., De oral. 2.82.337, is cited as a paralld, but "mores civitatis" clearly means "the customary way of the citizens of the State."

.8.,

b 2S

nd8OVT"' ... GUl"I'iPOVT'

b 26 ..0 "';;1;0"

on the principle set forth at 7Sb 19.

"that which preserves."

COMMENTARY

b 26-28 ... , 5. ""p(" ... "oA,..dCl~ "further, still, the edict of the governing body is prescriptive and the governing bodies are determined by the forms of government." Thus we must know the kinds of government and their legitimate powers of legislation. i.e., sovereign power; see Pol. 1281a II, and b 27: I ..ou xup(ou Plato, Rep. 565a. Therefore Tel .roe.a (which follows in the line) = the supreme authorities; see, e.g., Dem., Embassy 259. 2 cin6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

6sb 33

in their history. In Rep. S43a - S76b we have Plato'sdiscussionoftimocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. For a brief acc01mt of A. on ",oAmia, see Sinclair, pp. 21S-31. b 3<>-31 Xel' TO xpt~ov "al here coordinates, not two separate ideas, but alternatives, i.e., two ways of expressing the same idea: "the governing power or the power with final decision." In a democracy (6sb 29) this power resides in all the members of the State (8AO.). In the other three forms of government it constitute. only a part (,,
66a

I

18S

COMMENTARY

does not belong exclusively to oligarchy. For in listing the types of democracy (Pol. I29Ib 30 - 12.92.b :>1) A. names one type which is ano np1Jpa~.,•.

b 34-36 ",,,lid..,. 6l . .. ilpxouG'v

"By education I mean that e... tablished by law. For those who ahide by the legal directives of the State hold the governing power in an aristocracy." Ordinarily the principle upon which A. structures aristocracy is deB~7j-excellence; see e.g:, Pol. I2.73a 2627, 1273a 41 - I273b I, and 1294a !)-II. It is rule by the hest men (1279" 35-37), men who are good (I286b 3-5), men best by any standard (I293h 1--'7). At the same time, he notes that people tend to identify education with aristocracy (I293b 34-38). He says further that aristocracy is specified by the facr that governing power goes to the educated (U99b 24-25). It is this last point which is important to an understanding of our passage. A. is defining "oAI~Blal here by the manner in which governing power is assigned, and he is saying that only in aristocracy does governing power go to those who are educated in the law consonant with the "oAI~sla. Aristocracy, alone among the "oAI~.lal. uses, as the criterion for governing, education in the law of the State. Furthermore, he asserts, the people who can meet this criterion are the iielO'~OI, and for that reason (6Sh 36-37) this ,,;oAI~.la has received its name; see Pol. 1279a 35-37. In making this qualification A. is apparendy stating one of the actual defining characteristics of aristocratic governance as aristocracy was understood. For, strictly speaking, all education withln any particular kind of government had to be consonant with the intent and spirit of the "ollTBta since it was important to the necessary unity of the ,,;olITBia; see Pol. 1263b 36-37, 13Ioa 14-22.

b J4. 6"" .,;au v.sl'au XE'I'tv'lV

i.e., education consonant with the character of the ,,;ol....la as it is established by law.

In Pol. 1294a 1-7 A. associates aristocracy with government by law, an idea with which our passage (6sb 34-36) would agree.

b 3S 01 ycltp ... ilpXauG'v

66& I : 1 .,;au.,;..." This refers back to pO'aeXla. In Pol. 1]IDa 39 1313a 17 there is a comparison made between paO'I)•• la and weaVIl • iJ f'lv xcnclt '
I,.

186

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

a 2 ClOpL<JTO~

See, e.g., Pol. I310a 39 - 1313 a 17; see aIso Barker, p. 24I1J,

on "Aristotle's interest in tyrannies."

5.,

a 3 : 1 0'; A"",ecX~"~ The reason is given in the following clause. As was said at 63b 16-17, the TiAO~ is that for which all else is done. The purpose for whiclr the noA".ta is instituted ob~ously directs and guides everything connected with it, and it therefore plays an important role in the knowledge which the deliberative speaker or writer must possess. Whether one agrees or not with the ~ews of Demosthenes or Isoerates, it is quite clear, for example, that they had a firm grasp of the historical meaning of Athenian democracy. a basic principle of all choice in A.; z Cllpoii~...Cl' Y"'P ...o!. .. po~ see, e.g., 66a 8, 15-16, and 66a IS : Z. a 4~ ..-t!AO~ EAoue.plCl ... ! (c£ 6sb 34-36), wealth, and freedom respectively. In our passage A. expresses the finality of oligarchy and demoeracy in the same terms but uses a different term for the finality of aristocracy: namely, "education and the established institutions." as

"1;'«

'KEpi 7CC1L8dll\l

i.e., education.

a 6 : 1 ..-.. ~61-"I-'Cl "the established institutions," ie., all that is sanctioned by tradition, custom, and law. Z ...... ~0l-'.!'.., "L"Up ..wl&o~ Two edd. - Roemer and Dufourindicate that a statement on paa'ABta is missing here; Spengel, Cope, and Brandis agree. There is no textual ~dence that kingship (66a 2) was given a TiAO~, yet there ·,s no way in which the question can be settled with any certainty. Both Roemer (whose note in his apparatus is clear and good) a1ui Dufour mark a lacuna: ie., TIl Tovar, Ross, and Kassel read without the lacuna, which is preferable. 3 1 (see 57b 30-36) and a king's guard is that the former is used against the citizens and is often composed of non-citizens; see, e.g., Pol. 1285a 24-2.9, 13IOb 40 - '3Ila 8.

.&,..,.a ...;

a 7: 1 "rei RPOC;: TO TEla.; EJcciCJ"t'lC;: se. nOA'Teia,,; "national characteristics ... related to, belonging to, the end of each kind of government." Some translators give this as "conduce to," upromote," the end. But A. is not saying this. There could be any number of EO.", (ostracism, for example, in fifth-century Athens), and C11J,.rpieovm (pericles' restriction of citizenship ca. 45 I B. c.) which might "promote the end" of democracy, and yet not be proper to this fonn of government. In these three words (which pick up 65b 22-25) A. is talking about "national characteristics, established institutions, advantageous factors" whiclr belong to the ..O",'Tela insofar as

.&,.,,.a

66a 12

COMMBNTARY

they reflect it and designate the way in which it expresses itsel£ These are the things which the deliberative speaker mwt know and distinguish. It has been said that the architecture of the city-state"grew out of the needs, ways of life, traditions and ideas of its citizens, and followed these at every point, without pursuing the artificial and extravagant" (Wycherley, p. vii); the same sentiment may be applied to its "oA,ula and emphasizes the importance of a speaker's knowing these "national characteristics, established institutions, advantageous factors." z 118'1 is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross), Spengel, and Cope. Ross reads "I~, a conjecture of Bywater's. I interpret .0'1 as "national characteristics." As to its differences, if any, from 118'1 at 66a 12, see 66a I2.; on the general meaning of lOo~, see '7Qa 6 : 1; for the meaning of o1Oo~, see 69> 18 : J. J See CiSh 24; Le., "the established institutions" of the State as they reflect the common effort to achieve the common good.

vo"."..

a8:

1 eL1CEP "if, as is the fact, U and therefore ICsince." 2 l ...." ..'P.pOV'l"£. "with reference to the TiAO~, men (within the

State) make their choices."

!.......

> 9: 1 .. "tunt; here is most probably wed in meaning (el as source material; see ss> 4- If we take ",1,rrB<~ here in meaning (b) - namely, as the inferential process of enthymeme or example - wbich is also a' possibility, then A. is expressly Slating in what immediately follows that enthymemes and examples are not only logical, but ethical, in character, and we would have to assume also 6,d "a0'1m,oii Myo". z cI<.. 06 ••,..",xoU See S6a 3 : 2, and B T, 77b 22-24.

> TO ijB.xoil sc. Myo,,; see S6a 3 : z. See Isoer., AntiJ. 276-280, on the importance of o180t; as ;.tun~. a 10-12 ("oj> ... cli"'PbJ) The material enclosed by the parentheses (read by all the edd.) explains what A. means by 6,' >j8."oii and is only indirecdy relevant to the main statement at 66a 8-12: .".1 ... y'.ovTa • . " M.o. Ii•.... The point of the whole statement at 660 8-12 is that jwt as o18o~ is important in speaking to individual persons, so, too, is it important in addressing oneself to the interests of a collective person - a "oA.T.la, for example. The speaker mwt know the o1Oo~ r;j~ "ol'Tela~ so that the content, tone, and quality of his discourse reflect an intimate acquaintance with the habitual interests and objectives of the particular type of "oJ.,ula; for such discourse, responding as it does to the dAO~ of the "oA'Tela, carnes with it a strong persuasive power. a 12 "ok lIB'I "."V .. 0>'."••0;" As we saw at 6Sh 24 Demosthenes wes lOo~, o180~, T;j~ "oJ.'TBla~ interchangeably. In the light of the context at 660 8-16 and its apparent reference to 56a 5-7 and 11-13 and anticipation of

188

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' J

66. 17

660 25-26, it would seem clear that >}8o~ is the word which A. intends to use here. If this is so, then he is employing the word in an extended sense and applying it to a moral person, the State, in contradistinction to its normal use of a person. For, as A. says, >}80~ properly belongs to a person and is the result of moral choice. It represents the person fIrmly disposed one way or another and indicates the dominant direction which he gives himself as a result, in part, of deliberate choice. As will be said .t 760 25 : z (see also 698 18 : 3), >}80~ is the sum of • person's physical and psychic nature together with his dominant habits. Insofar as the State is a community of persons joined together to achieve a common good, we can speak of it as possessing >}80~, by an extended use of the term. >}80~ then becomes an expression for the dominant tendencies of the State determined by the choices it makes as a moral person. Because of the point which he is attempting to a 13 n:,e"V':'''''''''DV make in the Corgias, Socrates would clearly dismiss this approach, arguing that it proves his contention that rhetoric is Hattery bent on giving the people pleasure, trying to amuse them, saying what they like to hear and not saying what is best for them to hear whether it is welcome or nnwekome (see Corg. S02C - S03 b). Fortunately for the truth of the situation plato reallied in the Pha,ams what A. in fact is saying here. a 14: 1 'rf&Uom

z """"

i.e., 'E'a ~81J t'wv noA'TelQ)'V.

Clu..wV

This is explained by the following sentence. As the >}8o~ of the individual is determined by his deliberate choices made with respect to a determined ·,ilo~, so the nation's >}8o~ is determined by the collective choices which the people make in order to obtain the goal of their "'oA'TEla. As we see at EN 1I60a 9-15, A. recognizes that any community forms itself in the pursuit of a good common to all the members. >}8o~ is revealed in choice for A. since "by choosing a IS: 1 ","VEl'" what is good or bad we are men of a certain character," EN III2a 1-2; see also B 21, 9sb '3-14, and Poetics I4sob 8-10. On "eoaieea,~, see EN II lIb 4 - IIIsa 3, and 57B 2 : 1. z ciV"'P.pE"'''' i.e., neoaieeat, is relative to the TiAo, since choice is not of the end but of the me:ms to the end; see, e.g., EN lIIIb 27, lII3h 3-4.

These lines form a conclusion to chaps. • '7-22 iIw!,Ev... "'''''''''''v 4-8, the section on deliberative rhetoric. Chaps. 4-S gave the general subject areas of this branch (66a 17-18: WY ••• lao",i• .,. ~ O.TOJ.); chaps. 6-7 spoke of """,,,,eeo, (660 18: "eel ,0;; """,,,,ieO'TO,); chap. 8 spoke of the kinds of nojhn:ia (66a 19: 1&Bf2l Td~ noln:elaG-). a I7-(S oao!'EVwv ~ av.....v

See ssb I4-I5, 62. 15-16.

66a 22

COMMENTARY

a 18 : 1

EX .. (vwv These were formally and specifically given in chaps. 6-7. But all the material of chaps. 4. 5. and 8 must also be included since it concerns the subject matter of deliberative rhetoric. the TiAO, of which is the I1vp'Pieoo (58b 20-22). 2 "I.....,. As at 66a 9. this is probably "tl1n, in meaning (c). i.e .• the source material from which we develop our propositions; see 59a 6-7. and 26-27. as well as 600 38 - 60b 3. It is the evidentiary material of a probative character which we must seek out and which lends itself most readily to the demonstration of what is crvp'Pieoo.

I .. , 6£ "'pt ..c;,v is the reading of cod. A and is accepted by the edd. (except Ross). Spengel. and Cope. There is no reason not to read it. Ross reads with cod. F ST' TWO. in which case the genitive is govemed by the verb (i.e.• "further still. the means [dod Tlv ...J and the method by which ["w,J we shall be amply supplied with the characters and the established institutions with respect to forms of government .•. ").

a 19

a.

a 20 E
Toi~

n:aAlT1Xoit;

Se~ end of 6Sb 22 : 1.

CHAPTER 9

I . Introduction: 66_ 23 - 66_ 32 II . Development: 66_ 33 - 68a 33 I.

66a l3 - 67a 3"

(a) 66a II - 66a 34 (6) 66a 34 - 66a 36 (e) 66a 36 - 66b ..

TO :leala", the proximate of epideictic:

statement on TiAo~

d.efmition of 'I'd "deW

de-'" is ~aA.w dc:vclopmcnt of (6): definition of virtue together with its component part1, each ofwhich, save is briclly aoalyaed development of (a): that which COl>stitutes Td "ales. is dctcrmincd. by its relation to de_'"

"""Ia,

(d) 66b 23 - 6;.0 32

2.

67a

32 -

67b .6

the way to praise (blame), i.e., the way to attain Td "aM. (Td alaXed.): look to

qualities present in the person, the audience, the penoll and his moral choices

3· 67b 27 - 68a 33 (a) 67b 27 - 67b 3S (6) 67b 36 - 68a 9 (e) 680 10 - 68. 3l

~ comments on praise, i.e., on

epideictic: the nleaning of praise the relation between praise and advice the relation between praise and amplification

III . Conclusion: 68_ 33 - 68a 37

66a 23 .....Ii &i ....G.... . . . A. now analyzes the particular topics, or sources, of epideictic rhetoric (see 58b 6, 12-I3, '7-2O, 27-29; 58b 38 590 5). As he said at 59" 6-<7, we must have propositions oneach of the three kinds of rhetoric, propositions which assert something _bout the specific subject matle, of each branch of rhetoric, _bout 7}80~, and "a8o~ (see SlIb 25-32). This chapter examines the kind of subject matter which offers ground for the intelligent expression of praise or blame. It presents an analysis of those elements by which the subject matter can be found to be honorable (or dishonorable) and thus worthy of praise (or blame). C£ Appendix. In

192

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' [

66.28

De orat. 2.84.341-349 Cicero speaks of praise, making some necessary distinctions which are not clear in A. He notes, for example, that external or natural gifts are not in themselves grounds for praise since praise has its cause only in virtue. Yet e."'Cternal or natural gifts can present reasons for praise because of the use the person makes of these gifts, for in such use he can manifest his virtue. a 23-24 x ..x{..~. ..lOXpoil A. discusses "a"La or alaxe •• not directly, but only indirectly and in passing; see, e.g., 66h 10, 13, IS, 16, 19-20, and 67a 7-15. This is the same as Tilo~ at S8b 20ff.; see 6Gb 4 : z. a 24 : 1 CJX07to[ z b:..tvaUv.. t x ..l oj>.yov.. t the formality under which epideictic rhetoric works; see S8b 8-29.

rae

a 25 : 1 ycip This is not the causal which we see in 66a 24 and possibly in 600 27. The fact that the way to establish >700~ results from the proposed discussion is incidental. It is not the reason for the discussion; that reason is given at 600 24. If anything. this rde is explanatory: "at the same time, for example, it will happen ..."; see S. 2808-2809, and 69b 23 : 1. 2 .. ou'""'" The antecedent is contained in the phrase ",eel ae'rii~ ... alaxeo;; 66a 23-24. These are not specified, but they are explained at 66a 3 xciXeLv" 26-28 (iE w. ".T.l.): in developing propositional statements about the honorable and the virtuous (and their opposites) the speaker inescapably presents a view of his own character as well as that of another to the listener; see 66a 27 : z. a"'7: 1 S......p.. 7t1CJ"
66a 33

COMMJiNTAllY

2 "po~ &pE"~"

I93

This qualifying phrase is added for two reasons:

(a) the word >J0o, can include more than moral excellence (0£ 76& 1.5 : .), as A. explains .t B I2., 88b 30 - 89' z; and (b) since the source material for the honorable (or dishonorable) must of necessity be derived from the choices a person makes in the domain of action, it directly reflects a man' s de.~~ and >J0o, - see, e.g., EN n62a 22-23: "the essential element of <4!'~ and >JOo, lies in deliberate choice." In other words, in epideictic rheroric the source material o/fered by the particular topics (the subject of this chapter) to establish the grounds for praise (or blame) and therefore for the honorable (or dishonorable) also establishes in p.rt a person's de'~ and >JOo,.

a 29 x"'pl~ ,",ou&ij~ i.e., 'Jokingly." Spenge!, Cope, and others believe that 660 28-)2 refer to • division of epideictic into the serious and the burlesque. In the latter would be included such exercises as encomia on salt or bumble bees (see Isocr., Helen I2; or, later, Lucian [ca. A.D. no - post r80] with his panegyric of the fly). This may be so. But in the whole of chap. 9 A. is concerned with legitimate praise, and praise only of men. As a matter of fact, praise in this chapter, as in the Ethics, is possible only with respect to the man of virtue. There is no further reference, even by way of illustration (see 66& 32: z), to burlesque encomia. 1 ~O TUX6" i.e., any chance thing, result: "this one or that from among the lower .nimals."
a 3r :

a 32:

blCJ'l'e "and so"; see LS, B.II.2. lIao" ••• Xcip'" On {lao. see LS, IV.2: "and so let us speak also of these matters o"ly so Jar as we must by way of illustration." But see the comment .t 66& 29. 3 ~oU""'" See 66& 31 : 3. 1

2

a 33 : 1 xcU.6" In Plato's Gorgias (474C 1£) there is a discussion of ~O "aM. which, as every reader of the early Socratic dialogues knows, is a touchstone against which Socrates tests many of the ideas of virtue which he attempts to clarify. The present chapter on ~O "aM. is the most extended

194

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

66a 36

statement on the idea in A. which we possess. We have the definition here at 66a 33-34. which is paralleled by 62b 7-9 and 64b 27-2.8, as well as one other comment atB 13, 89b 37 - 900 1. In BE I248b 16-25 we are told that ...& "aM. is a ...i.lo~ of 011 good things and that it is (as we are also told here at 600 33) something which exists for its own sake and is praiseworthy. In EN lII5b 13 and II20a 33-34"'& "aAd. is the T'.lO~ of desnj and of virtuous actions. In his comments on A:s Ethics, Stobaeus (II 72) writes that A. set down three goals to man's natural striving, T& "aAd., ... &C1V1''P'~O'' and ...0 7jd~, among which T& "aM. ranks first. T& "al6. is something desired for itself (not for the sake of something else, which is T& C1V1''Pi~o.), and it is connected with d~.T~ since it is praiseworthy and since the object of praise is d~BT>1 (67b 37). z &:II,vE..6v See 6]a 10; see also 62a 13-14. The structure of the sentence here is important and is not precisely reflected in the interpretations. d. and 7jd~ are predicates, the participle o. in each instance qualifying the subject.

"'.a......

On the relation of 7jd~ to "aM., see 62b 8 : 2. a 34: 1 -IJliu Z 3","l ciYCl8cSv i.e., "seeing that it is good," or, "because it is good," which is the equivalent of our phrase "qua good." Just as a dose connection exists between "al6. and dya86., so too between al"x~d. and "a,,6., as the words ofTyrtaeus nright indicate: 8",,', I). al"x~d "a8'1/" yiy.&TaL d.d~l "a:
66b

195

COMMENTARY

I

"the popular Rhetoric and the comparatively scientific Ethics." Least of all is it true, as Cope continues (p. 160), that neoa{eou,,; "is omitted." It may not actually be mentioned in these lines, but it is dearly present in A.'s thought, as 67b 22-24, 25-26 expressly state. In other words, we may have here a statement which is not as mistaken as has been thought. In the first place A. is quite aware that virtue and the virtues are Us." as 62b 12-14 reveal, and in fact in that passage he mentions and calls U .., a number of the virtues included here at 66b 1-3. He is even more aware of their character as habits to establish a certain disposition within a person, as we can see at 62b 3-4: oJ ..-a, ollzov..-" (see 6zb 13 : 2). As a matter of fact, in 62b 2-5 he speaks of virtue in much the same way as he does in the present passage, where he calls it .~oeym"~ (66a 38). For he makes it clear both tliat virtue is a habit, that by which one is righdy disposed, and that i~ is a source of activity, nO"I"-"'?} "ai "ea"T&>'~ (62b 4). In the definition here he is stressing this active aspect (see 66b 4), but he is fully aware of the "habit" aspect, as his mention of the same virtues which he has already identified as l~.., (62b 13) indicates. des~ can be called a aol.ap.', insofar as it is a capacity in the soul resulting from the repeated acts which made it a I~", or habitual disposition. Grant, I 241, who would agree in general with Cope and Spengel, makes my point well when he says: "the l/:" is a fIxed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these." In other words the meaning of atlva,." here is not as obviously contradictory as it has been assumed to be. Those who insist that it is must be ready to explain how TiM, which in A. is so demonstrably a can be called l~., at EN II40' 2-23 and In.a''-~''T/ at II39b 31: 7} p.~ /Iea Ant-

.. a,dx, ..

ao.,.,.."

dol.a,.."

a~fJT/

AUT/.

U.,

dnoaB."n~.

a 37 : 1 nop ...... 'xJj "able to supply, obtain." There is nothing in the word which denotes "for onesel£" It may be for the self or for another. Ifanything, the emphasis is "for others" as 66b 3 and the anal}'llis of the fieSTal (66b 3-22) make manifest. Compare 62a 27-28: "o'T/T",d. - cpvla"T&"&'. Z cpul.......1l<Jj See 60b 16, 60b 17.

a 38:

1 "':'opye<1l<Jj "for doing good"; on the word, see 61a 28-32. z x ..t ...ciV'<Wv ....pt "civ..... Take "Ill as emphatic, not copulative:

"a £acuity, .ctually, of confCrring all benefits with respect to everything"; i.e., virtue enables one to do well all the things which, as man, one should do. A. will illustrate this in what follows in the chapter.

«v......

66b 1 : 1 .. jUP'l Read withOLtt a lacuna. Roemer following Spengel marks a lacuna in the text after "d....a. Spengel thought that "1I"la at Tool.a• ..-{o. should be there. There is no prevailing reason which would substantiate this. See 66b 22 : z.

66b 6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

z ",olp1J &~ IiPE-nj~

See 60b 23-24 which is righdy bracketed;

cf. comment in 6Gb 20-29. C£ also 62b 12-14. 64b 34-37, 6sb 6-7. 3 &l)CClLOcrUV1J " .••1. In what follows (down to 66b 22) these virtues are briefly analyzed. a0'Pia is not considered most probably because it is formally an intellectual. not a moral, virtue. 'PeO"'1a£f;. on the other hand. is considered because it is an active guide for the devdop'ment and use of the moral virtues. On the spdling (cf. also 66b II. 29. 30). see 62b 4 Iiv8pd.. 12: 3. b 2 D..£U8EP"''''1J~, "p"o"'1J~ is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengd. and Cope. Ross omits "'eaoT1l' without explanation, but the fact that it is given no formal analysis in what follows may be his reason. However. the idea reappears at 67a 3S and at B 3. 80a S - 80b 1. where A. defines and discusses it at length. More detailed attention is given 10 these same virtues in EN in the following order: d.deeia, aW'Peocnl.". ,1..,... 8ee";'"'' l'8)lalonei....a. l'8)la10'l"'1.1a. and "'ea••", in IIo7a 28 - IIo8a 6 and IIIsa 4 - IIz6b 9; a."a.oav"'1 in 1129a 1 - II38b 13; 'Peo."a., and aO'Pia in II39b '4 - II4sa II.

,""''''ci.....

b 4 ",oi~ cD.Ao,~ Xp1J .. ~ Since virtue is ordinarily viewed as something which perfects the individual. this emphasis may be puzzling. Yet we cannot forget that A.'s analysis of epideictic rhetoric is practical in intent. not theoretical. He is trying 10 present us with particular topics by means of which we can praise (or blame) someone. Therefore he will be looking for those qualities which are social. altruistic. less sel£.directed. Such qualities more directly serve the goal of epideictic discourse. as A. himsdf notes at 66b s: l'''l,a.a "I'wa... Cope quite correctly notes (p. 16z) .this difference of approach to the virtues in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics. but does not explain why A. adopts this perspective in the Rhetoric. b S : 1 a.EpYE""Xlj A period marking a full break is preferable here. and I note that four edd. so punctuate. Ross alone reads a comma, followed by a conjectured "a~ Z 'j "all. "'01£1''1' ;cal .. Blen-n. which also appears in a scholion and in the Vetlls Trans/alio. and is read by Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. and Ross. Though the addition makes sense, I cannot decide fIrmly on one against the other.

b 6:

a.

66b

II

COMMENTARY

197

b 7: 1 ~ ~EU9EpLC;"''1i is preswnably the reading of the codd. as far as the edd. are concerned. Ross alone omits the article. On "libera1ity," or, more probably, "generosity," see 6ra 17 : z, 6Ia 7. For aJulIer description of the concept, see ENIII9b 19- IIZ2a 16. Very little has been said in this commentary about A:s style in this work or about the way in which he uses Greek. With respect to the latter, his writing, which most probably reflects the devdopment and legitimate changes through which Greek was passing in the last half of the fourth century, has been notably neglected by grammarians in general. As an example of what I have in mind, consult 66b 24 : 3 and 6?a 22 : 2; see also Cope, p. 202. A:s style in the Rhetoric as we find it in this first book is often subtle and precise. Here, for example, in the chiastic sentence structure of 66b 5-9 (.o,)~ 6,,,aiov~ . •. "I"~' ya2 . .• ~).ev9.2,,$f7/~ ... "2ot...a.), he uses the structure to emphasize ("men," the key idea) and to enclose (the idea of virtue). The sentence presents us with: the individuals and then their specific virtue, the specific virtue and then the individuals. At 7Ib 2. : 2 I take the opportunity to illustrate the careful articulation of a sentence which superficially could seem banal. Judgments on style can be subjective, and it would be correct to say that a more typical view of A:s style is that of Spengd in his comment at 68a 2 to the elfect that A. was not concerned with "sermonis degantia." 2 . "pot£V'l"Il' "give away, give &edy, spend generously, be openhanded." b 8 XP'I""'''''''v One of the external goods, as we saw at 60b 27; with the . idea, one should compare :do6TO~, 60b 20, 6Ia r2-I4, and 618 12-24b 9 ...elI ,.{,..-wv

See 54b J3.

b 10 Kill Wi .; v0I'o0S sc. ".l.';e, (0. 66b 12). Cope's comment (p. r6I) that the presence of this phrase invests justice and courage "with a political and objective character" distinguishing them from the. other virtues mentioned here which "are rather subjective and individual" is questionable. It might apply to courage- though, even with respect to courage, the fact is that in the Nicomachean Ethier the first of the five subdivisions of courage at Iu6a 16 - rrI6b 3 is political courage "because of its close resemblance to true courage." On the other hand, 6."a.oatl.'1 does look primarily to rdarions within the State, to the conduct which i. proper to those living in society, as we al.o see in Plato's Republic. Furthermore <1.,rp20<16.'1 is defined at 66b 13-15 in a way which is more public than private and individual. In fact A: s approach here to these moral virtues centers on their public, rather than their private, character. The reason for this would be that suggested at 66b 4b II civ&pdu Cope's review (pp. 161-62) of this passage in rdation to the passages of the EN cited in 66b 2 reveals no startling discrepancies in the defmition here. In Plato', Laches we have a Socratic discussion of this virtue.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

66b IS

b 12: 1 x'v&6vo,~ Becauseofthephraseat66b6(b noUp'P) and thefollowing comment on obedience to the law ~aw cannot legislate courage, but did legislate military service), this word would seem to mean "the dangers of war." Thus rl.de.ta is associated primarily with the courage expected of the citizen-soldier such as we find it in the discourse of Socrates and Laches in the Laehes. Later in that dialogue Nicias tries to give rl,oe.ta a less restrictive ~d more proper definition. In the Ephebic oath (cited by Glotz, p. 133), we read: "I will not abandon my comrade in battle.. " If anyone sha11attempt to overthrow these laws [ofthe polisJ •.• I will fight for them, whether singlehanded or with my fellows." z b v6f£o~ Law is reason unalfected by desire: "'."'e d• .., &e.~."" .0;;, d ••po~ ernt., Pol. 12S72 32. b 13 """PpouUv'l) See 63> 2 : 2. "Self-mastery, self-control" is specified in EN at II07b 4-6, III7b 23ff. in terms of bodily pleasures as we have it here. a"''PeouV'''I as a virtue is more properly personal (as Cope, p. 161, argued) than societal. "As the law commands," however, is introduced to emphasize the responsibility of the citizen to the public morality of the State; furthermore its introduction is in accord with the principle of analysis for these virtues which A. proposed at 66b 3-4 (on which see 66b 4). On the idea of ""''I'eocnW'I/, see Plato's Ch.,,,,icI.s, and the brief discussion of the idea in Tuckey, pp. 5-9.

b IS

: 1 cixoM"lex See EN IrISb IS - III9b IS. Cpo Thucyd. 3.37.3. 2 D.EUe£pLCI'n)~ See 66b 7 : I, 66b IS : 2.

b 16 : 1 ":'no,'I)'t'x't\ sc. de'T~. On the force of the ending, see S9b 32 : 1: "disposed to doing good." , 2 rlVEAEU8£plll See 61> 7; EN III9b 27-30, II2,. ~4-IS, II21b 17 - II22a 16 disagree in no substantial way with what is said here. b 17 f£ey.u..o<j.ux1ex See EN II07b 21 - 1I0Sa I, II23a 34 - II2sa 16. As a virtue which tends toward the making of great benefactions (.tlBeyn"l-' p,iT",.), "high-mindedness" is immediately related to np~, as is clear from the statement at 61a 2S-30. Furthermore it is precisely in terms of np~ ("the prize of virtue," EN II23b 35) that PBYaAo,!,VXta is explained in both EN passages above. Again one is forced to conclude that although the explanation· in EN is more embracing and detailed, that of the Rhetoric does not dif&r in the essential details, and that Cope, p. 163, once more overstates the dilference between the two works. In doing so, he appears to be following (and to have been followed in his tum) the comment in Gaisford (p. us) on 66a 33ff.: "Definitiones, quae sequuntur, non esse accuratas facile Iiquebit, cum Us, quas in acroamatico ad Nicom. opere perscripsit has conferenti..••" This should probably be b IS : 1 [f£'XPO""'Xlex &£ 'to6vllv'tlov] bracketed as a gloss, although it appears in all the codd., save C. Leaving

66b 23

COMMENTARY

199

it in the text (as Dufour and Tovar do) creates some confusion at the end of the sentence by giving the impression that f-""I}Oljl"Xla is also an opposite of ",oraAOne"",a. If we allow the phrase to stand, the confusion is certainly not insurmountable, yet the whole sentence (66b 17-20) does not read clearly. 2 I'Ey.o.07l:pi7l:EUI See EN IIo7b 16-21 and lIna I7 - 1I23a 18 where we are told that "magnificence" is related to "generosity" (ils"O'I},OT'I') since it, too, concerns money, but that it differs from generosity in that it is concemed with spending, and spending on a large scale - which is, of course, our b armaV7)",a'1& """iOov. "o''1n''oj. Pericles in his building program for Athens was ",s"alonl}e.-n/•• Obviously, ",oralo"l}t".,a for A. is not quite the sarne as it is for Plato; for him it means "high-mindedness" (Rep. 402C, 4860, 487a, S03c) and is frequently joined to the cardinal virtues, uorpia, u"rpl}0tffl.'1, d.dl}ela, a,,,a,otffl.'1 (on which see Rep. 427d fE, PhaeJo69c, and Laws 63IC). Similarly llsvOse'oT'/' in plato signifies the virtue befitting a free man (the idea at 6Ia 7), and is not, as in A., confined to liberality in spending. b 19 :

1

z

1""PO",,"XLu See EN II07b 21 - lIo8a I, lI2sa 17-341""P07l:P£7I:E'" See EN I107b 16-21, 1I23a 19-33.

b 20-22: 'l'POv'lcr'S . . . e6li .. ,....."L..v See EN II39b '4 - II4Sa II, where 'I'eo"lul> "appears much in the same character" (Cope, p. 163) as here. rpl}o,'1u,. is a virtue of the intellect (e.g., d,a.ola" 66b 20) whose importance fur moral action (II39a IS - lI39b 13) and role in deliberation (U42a 32 II42b 33) we find discussed in the EthiC!. 'I'l}o.'1U", in A.'s word" is the -virtue by which men "deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for the self; ... about what contributes to the good life in general" (EN lI40a 25-28). This passage from the Niconlachean EthiC! is, in eJfect, a translation of our lines. 'I'e~u,> is the guide for the virtues and directs them toward genuine human good; see also 64b 12. 1 dp'll'oIvwv e.g., 66b 10-20, and the whole of chap. 6. z .6liu'l'0vl..v Take with .,J {Jo1)l..!suOao: "with respect to their own happiness." After Bilda.,.o.la. both Roemer and Dufour assume a lacuna. The reason given by Ro= is that (a) rpI}Q"Iu,. should have an opposite, and (b) there is no definition of uo",la at 66b 3. At 66b I : 3 a reason is offered for the omission of uorpla which is adequate and better than postulating a defective text without more evidence. As for an opposite to 'I'I}O"lu" one could ask what Roemer might have in mind as far as A. is concemed.

b 22 :

He speaks of it ouly by indirection; we may safely b 23 : 1 " .."Iau; assume that it is all that virtue is not. z l'0pLwv i.e., 66b 1-3.

200

66b 1.7

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

b 24: 1 elP'l...., i.e.. 66a 36 - 66b 22. z Ev£OTW'TCI XCl.lpOv "for the present occasion"; on 'H:a'llo'JI, sec 65a 20 : 1. 3 "Ept With reference to A.'s use of Greek. Cope. pp. [64-65. in his extensive note on A.'s use of ..oet with the genitive for the more common direct object. points up quite well the observation made at 66b 7 : 1; see also 75a22: 1. b 25 : 1 ';C,IV Ii}.Awv A. begins bere a determination of specific topics of Td "a.ld. (c£ 600 23). He uses c!eBnj. which he has just discussed. as the basic principle for deriving these topics since deoT1j is "aM. (66a 35). Therefore Tiii.
W",.

b 2.6 "po~ ckPE'djv for all such things are related to, tenJ to, c!aBnj, and deoT1j is "ald.. All the edd. read the parentheses: ("ed; .•. yde). b 2.7 : 1 ..ell y,v6fU'v" on the principle set forth at 62a 2.9-3 I and 63h 28-32. 2 .. a' ..';.... lit The word is resumptive and picks up hoth Ta nO'fJ ..."d and ,Ii y
66b 29

201

COMMENTARY

other possibilities, certainly actions which flow from
-.n,

-.n,

A. simply states this as a fact. The grounds b 28-29 beel 6•... KCIA" for his doing so would be: (a) '"I,.. ••a of virtue which are intrinsically related to virtue, as they are here, are ,,
CTIJ,,"E'ex i.e., signs of virtue, from 66b 27. dtyexOoii usually interpreted to mean "of the good man"which seems rather reasonable until we fmd that we must also interpret "dB1J at 66b 29 as "the sulferings of the good man." We must then ask ourselves why the sufferings of a good man are noble, or why, iodeed, his actions unqualified and io themselves are noble. Further, in the text between 66b 25 and 66b 34 A. is talking of virtue and virtues in a genetic way: e.g., 'E'a nO''1nKd T'ij, aesTij" 'rei an' deet"', 'Y1JJl0f'£'JIa, Ttl aTtpeia Tij, aee-rij, il:Ql Ta leya, a.deeta, leya, '"I,..••a d.deeta,. Therefore, even though I must admit that virtue belongs specifically to the person and is revealed by the acts of the person. I do belleve, as will be explained io the followiog note in more detail. that draBoii here must be taken genetically and ioterpreted to mean "of goodness" or "of what is the good." In this interpretation ayaB•• is practically a synonym for cleml. Thus I would construe the phrase: "and such things as are the activities of goodness or are modifications by goodness are noble." C£ Pl.to·s use of dra8 •• for Td ayaB •• in Phileb. 547d, IIb 4 (? 13e 6), and Rep. 505c; see Hackforth, pp. 106114, 108. 1

2

b 29 " ..0'1 The usual translation of this as "the sufferings of the good man" may possibly stem from Cope's comment (p. 166) that at 66b 3I the

202

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

66b 29

word denotes "suffering." But this interpretation of "dO" does not eliminate the problems at 66b 29 or at 66b 3 I and does not explain what A. is talking about. A. is certainly speaking about virtue ill gentral and about the ways in which it may manifest itself in a person and thus poi1lt to what is "aM~ in tbe person. Virtue manifests its presence in a person either actively or passively (leya ~ "dO", 66b 28-29), and does so either by actions (leya) which flow from the virtue or by changes elfected in the person (m10,,) by the virtue. In view of the general character of the passage, the more reasonable way to translate "dO" would appear to be: "modifications by, properties o£" A. is saying that either the exercise ofvirtue or the undergoing of some change effected by virtue expresses the presence of virtue in the person and so reveals what is "a,ld (66b 29). He argues further that in the matter of the virtue called justice it is not always true that the modifications by justice denote the presence of justice in the person. In view of this it would be preferable to translate 66b 28-34: "Since the signs of virtue and such things as are the activities of, or modifications by, virtue are noble, it is necessary that all acts of courage, or things done courageously, be noble. So, too, acts of justice and acting justly are noble (but not so for the modifications by justice. For, in this virtue, alone of the virtues, 'justly' is not alway. noble; in fact, in the case of being punished, 'being punished justly' is more shameful than 'being punished unjustly'). With respect to the other virtues the same principles prevail." This interpretation of ndO'1 gives greater coherence to the entire passage. But A. is not clear, and his example "being punished jusdy" is not valid as an example, for· a relatively simple reason: a step is left out. When one is punished justly, it is correct to say that one experiences the effect (undergoes a ",dOo,) of the virtue justice. But this justice e.'Cists in, and is exercised by, the person who punishes justly. The fact that the punished person experience, this action of justice does not mean that he is internally modified by justice, and is thetefore just. Yet it is precisely this internal modification which is meant when the passage talks of leya II ,,0.811 (66b 28-29). The person punished jusdy who i. not internally modified by the virtue justice may even become more unjust in reaction against the punishment. all the other halld, he may undergo a further "aOo, - this is the omitted step - whereby he accepts the action of the virtue justice upon himself alld thereby undergoes within himself the modification elfected by justice. In such an imtance, the person punished justly is affected by the virtue justice and thereby shares in it. Such a ndOo, [ii, ~,,,a ..a';v,,, would indeed be a "aM. in him. Although A. was aware (see, e.g., SE r80b 21-29) that in ordinary language use one can misrepresent the virtue ofjustice, his ...,
66b 37

203

COMMENTARY

b 30 cltv6pd... ~ ".",p..,."'''' This exemplifies what is meant by draOo. "aO'1 at 66b 28-29: here the person acting is presumably modified by a.deela, and thus the action is virtuous and therefore "aM•. b 3I

",cit 6,,... l... ~ opyll

For the same position of the adverb, see Plato,

PhaeJo I0ge 7, Xeo., Helienic. 7.3.7. b 3I - 33

("li9'1... a61,.",S)

b 32 "';, 6'>ClIl... ~ >cm>.Ov

All the edd. read the p>rentheses. '''Justly' is Ilot olways noble."

b 34 .'P' S"o,~ i.e., in reference to, with respect to: "all those things with respect to which." b 3S ,...AIi i.e., "all such things are honorable." In EN I123b 35' we are told that honor is paid to virtue. Consequently, anything which is the object of honor is virtuous; but what belongs to virtue is "aM. (66a 35). The predicate "ald ("al&.) is to be supplied, if it is not expressed, with all the particular topics which follow. b 36

""

eN",";;

evEIC..

,wTO;; refers to d~, the subject of the verb; since

"aM. is that which is 6<' ,wTO a1eeT&' (660 33), actions which are not sdfdirected and have as their object, not the self, but some one of the aleeTa, would be honorable. b 37 : 1 ",cit cltrcA"'~ cltyll91i those things the goodness of which resides totally in themselves and is not dependent on anything else. On dnlw~, see S6a 7 (meaniog b); see 6sa 3S : 1 on absolute and relative good. 2 3".. urc.p "<£ is the reading of the codd. Kassel accepts it seemingly undisturbed by the reservations of the other edd., all of whom are unhappy with the unattached Te. Spenge!, Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar read for TS the Tfi' found in an early printed edition and accepted by Bywater as a "plausible correction." Vahlen ("K.ritik arist. Schriften," nO-II) conjectures ll"ie Te "aTei6o~ <"al "OA.TW.> with which Eucken (De Aristotelis ratione dicetuli, p. IS) would agree. Cope, p. 167, would shift the clause to 673- I: -ra TOlatl'ta. Baa -unst! 1'6 . . . nae,6ciw .0 ati-rov. "allJaa TBOYeana. . .. Finally Bywater, followed by Ross, conjectures {faa Te The base for this is the parallel at 66b 29-31. But 66b 29 is not textually secure. Since I believe that 66b 36 - 67a I is best read as a single sentence which sets forth, with explanations, a single topic - namely, that the wtselfish choice of good is a Iloble action - I would be more inclined to read with Bywater-Ross, or Spengel-Roemer, or Vahlen-Eucken ill that order. In any of these readings we find that 66b 38, "alII fJ~ aVTo/ araOa, repeats in negative form the statements "al Ta dnAw~ draOa and "al Ta cptla.. draM, and underlines the emphasis in the passage on the quest for absolute ramer than relative good.

vn'e.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

b 38 :

1 TO eNTOil See 54b 33. z ~ci 't"n cpUGEL ciyex9ci e.g.• one's own country, parents, family, intelligence, etc.

6'78- t : 1 exUToU ... ~OLexUTCI Tot.atjTa refers to goods which are Ta aVTcp dra6d, relative to the person. a xed 3"" In these 6aa clauses (e.g., 66b 29, 34, 35, etc.) we must Wlderstand ToaaiiTci Ian with the correct predicate; see 6Sb 5 : 1. J T€6v£WTL "when one is dead. n a 2 "0 ycltp CI~Toil €vex"

object of ex..; tran.slate: "a selfish character."

"those things which belong to • man while alive." This a 3 "clt ~WvT' reading is the accepted (by the edd., Spenge!, and Cope) correction by Victorius for the admittedly diflicult Ta Ccii.Ta of the cadd. a4:

lj"t"Tov ... CI~"oil "for there is less of the self (in them)." 2 EU"p"yl", See 60b r4 : J on 8Vneaota.

1

a 5 "iJ "Epl eNTOV. x"l "Epl Four edd. read cWTO.; Spenge!, Cope, and Roemer read atho'l1; Ross adds an unnecessary conjecture: "al:Trset. Punctuation here is important. It would be better, and certainly more helpful toward an understanding of the text, to punctuate by placing a period afrer aUTOV: neel aUTO'P. "al nBell'ov~ tV :TrO'r1a'a'PTa~' ~lxat.ov "«2. What is just (U"a.",,) is to do good to one's benefactors. It may also be "alo., which is the conunonly understood predicate throughout, but A. is making a distinction here: doing good to others (""nearta. noel eUlov~, 67' 4) in genera! is honorable but it does not involve justice. a 6: ,. EUEpyE"nj"....... See 6ra 28-32 where we find that the idea of benefaction resides in the word itself: "a giving of something." It is not merely doing good (""nearta., 67a 4). 2 "clt .... ""..1.. This is explained by the ii clause: "and actions opposite to those for which men are asharned (are honorable)." The verb is used absolutely; its a 7 "clt ycltp Cl1crxpclt .. lcrxuvovT", subject is in the three participles which have as their object ..a alaxea. a 8 :&"'"1'"" 'AAx.. lou Sappho of Lesbos (b. ca. 6r2 D.C.); Alc.eus of Mytilene in Lesbos (b. ca. 620 B.C.). For both see the oeD. For the to>.1; see Lobe! & Page, Sappho '37. Alcaens wrote: "Som,thing I would say but shame holds me back." Sappho answered: "If you had a longing for the noble and the good, and if your tongue were not churning some evil for utterance, shame would not shroud your eyes, but you would speak of what is right."

20S

COMMENTARY

J eXYWVUA»al "to be distressed or an..-,Qous about"; sec Plato, Protag. 333e. Anything wbich is the objeCt of such anxiety is bonorable since,

a IS :

as A. goes on to say, this is a normal human experience with respect to all things leading to renown. We see this concern in Phaedra in Euripides' Hippolylll' (c£ in particular II. 403-404). The reading accepted by the edd., save Kassel, a ",.pl YO:P "'''''' who reads with cod. A: "eel TOl. rde.

a 16 qJuacl a 17:

instrumental dative; "naturally.

G1'C'ou&cllo·d:Plll'V see 6xa 2S : •• J

It

Here the word means "morally superior";

a 1\ This is the comparative particle. The two genitives are subjective: e.g., oloo al de_Tal Hal Td ilera a.oed, "alAtov, " rvoa",.,. a r 8 li",oAIN ..... ,xlI! the virtues which "are capable of giving enjoyment to others"; on dn.lav,,,,, see 6Ib 9. After " atlTo" one must understand _lui "alAlov,. From the following clause (67a 19) did ... , it is manifest that the enjoyment is primarily of all order higher than the merely physical. a 19-20 XIII "'0 ... fl-iJ xll",oV,).,i.""...e,,, sc. "aAO. fUTI. We saw this idea at 63a 20£; see also 63a 20 : 3. However, A. now gives us his reason (67a 20-22) for this kind of statement. As a principle with its ground in narural ethics, it is quite reasonable. If we go a step further and interpret justice in a stricdy legal sense, it is even more M>
&vSpdou

a 22 : ,

partitive genitive with tuTl understood.

""fI->\

See 61a 28 - 61b 2. • """" X .......v This usc of the partitive genitive with an understood or expressed Tl or e.; TI for a predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject is a fairly common construction in A. (see 70& 16 : ,). Cope, p. 202, cites a number of instances togetber with examples from Aeschines, Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Plato, remarking that he does not find the usage in any writer earlier tban plato.

a 23 : , il"llp"ll In whatever sense we take .1"71 (e.g., victory, mastery, success), this adjective makes a perceptively ironic comment. • o".POX>\v See B 12, 89a 13-14: victory is 3 kind of preeruinence. In what follows between 67a 23 and 673 32 I will accept the punctuation of the edd., wbo for the most part agree. Tbe exceptions are Kassel, who at 67a 2S reads and brackets "al 1/ TIl''' d"olov6 ••, alld Tovar and Kassel at 67a 28 who read a period after rdla "alii, not. comma. a 24 : , fl-V'Ifl-ov£uTa is tbe reading of one cod. for 1"71l'ooWl'aTa, i.e., "memorials," such as we saw.t 6r. 34-36. Our reading "tlUD.gs wbich

206

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

are remembered are honorable" is probably correct in the light of eiJl"~"'O"v TdT6/!a (67a 26) and the preceding statements which it qualifies. ",~",o'BvTa is the reading of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. • ,
p"..

d"aena modifie, tIle noun; the undet'a 27 : 1 " ..I " ...>1" ....... ax.. stood predicate is "a,la. Possessions do not in themselves fall into the class of the honorable, and productive possessions ("TfJ",aTa "ae"'l'a) are, ifanything, not honorable, but useful; See 61a 12-19 with notes. Possessions which yield no profit are "honorable" because they are lA8v08e"bnea. In the light of 6Ia I1-I9 (see 6xa I7 : .) such possessions are proper to the "free man"; on this see 6"73 29 : •• z ...ok " ..p' lxdlJ"
a 28 " ..lll".. "'I f.L£iCl This can be taken, as it usually is, as another topic. It is partIy that, but it is equally a development of the clause immediately

67a 32

COMMENTARY

207

preceding. For the ~a fd.a "aU are also to be included with rai. ",ae' I"da'ro" inatvovps'PC01J. 829 : 1 "tWv '" ."'''VOU"Ev",V fu we have seen (638 ro) praise is given to what is endowed with virtue, and we know that anything so endowed is also "aM•. 2 Ev ACUC£SIl("avl Xenophon (Spartan Constitutioll II.3) attributes this custom to Lycurgus (so, too, Plutarch, Lycurgus 22.1 153D since "it appeared to make men taller, more like free men (~AovO,p'QJdpov~), and more frightening to the enemy"; but see Herod. '.82. The infinitive is subject to on understood eaTl.. :J D.£u8~pou ya.p '"l,,£lOV The impliecl statement is: that which belongs to the free man is honorable. The statement is accepted as not open to challenge. The free man possessed the a~Tdp".. a (a qualified independence of others, 67a 32; Met. 982b 26) necessary to pursue the excellence proper to the good citi2en in the polis. A. explains this independence in what follows. 31 : 1 8'1~",6v... ~"VIlUCJOV Performing work for the community as something necessary and essential in order to live one's life (such is the work denoted by OnTO"'" and fld.avao.) removes one from the class of the free man as he is described here. A 8* was a hired laborer who of necessity worked for others ·(Pol. 1278a nf£), and a {Jd.avao~ was a craftsman who did the same (I278a 24-25). It is assumed that this kind of work limits a person', freedom and independence. All such pursuits which "make the body, soul, or mind of free men useless for the practice and exercise of virtue" are banawic (Pol. '337b 9-II; and see '337a 33 - 1337b 21; Xen., Oecon.402-3). In fact, A. extends the principle even to the study of the liberal arts if they are pursued not for oneself or one', friends but for other people (Pol. 1337b 20(21). The 8ijT6~ were made one of the four classes in the Solonian Constitution (see chap. 7 of A.'s Constitution of Athens), and it was this move of Solon', which gave the laboring class a share in political power and thus established him in the minds ofthe Athenians a, the founder of democracy. 2 "to "'IS,,,(..,, •.. "tEXV'I" Though this topic may apply to the Spartans - see, e.g., Aelian (ca. A.D. 170-235), Varia historia 6.6. - A. presents it as a separate topic on the honorable. a

,,"l

8 32 : 1 ...pO~ elIA).o" in relation to, with reference to, another; ie., "in any way dependent "POll another." Z A'I'/C"tEOV As has been indicated in the chapter outline, a new section discussing the ways by which one is to praise or blame - i.e., give expression to what is "aM. or a/aXe'" - begins here. Apart from the Content, this development is also indicated by the change of approach: e.g., An",do. (67- 32), (67b 7), 60' (67b 9), "'''eaTeO. a.."•••a, (67b 22),

a..on."

208

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

67a 34

and A'l'm!o. (67b 2S). Spengel would apparendy (p. '44. note to 67b 21) divide the chapter into two sections - (a) what is "oM., and (b) other matters ofimportance in e.'qlressing praise - and include in the first section everything down to 67b 20•

• 32 - 671> 7 ).YJ"do~ . .. ro ".Ld~ The principle at work in this section can be misunderstood, and misused. Misunderstanding is easy because, for the first time, A. appears to be playing loose with the truth. His comment at 67b 3-4 would strengthen this view (see 671> I : 3). One could argue that A. encourages deliberate fa1sehood, and is creating the kind of self-destroying climate which Thucydides vividly describes as a consequence of the collapse ofvalues brought on by the Peloponnesian War (3.82). Yet there is a way in which to understand A.'s statements which is not only reasonable, but proper - until strong evidence to the contrary can be brought forward and which removes the kind of blatant sophistry just described. Virtue, for A., is a mean between two extremes. A declination from the mean may be neither virtue nor vice, but legitimately viewed as either the virtue or the vice. To use A.'s e.'Cample at 67a 34: it can readily be possible that one who appears to be discreet and prudent (a virtue) is actually calculating and indifferent (a vice). But it is also possible that he is discreet and prudent. Isocrates makes the point rather clear. Telling Nicocles to be a man of dignity he says: "This is the most diffu:ult of admonitions; for you will find that by and large those who affect dignity [To.k u.""""o","'ov~1 are cold ['I'v:ceoo~l" (N""c/es 34; see also 46, and 67' 3S). These aflinities of meaning which reflect ambignities in the order of reality are simply something which must be recognized as possible aids in praising or blaming. Quintilian, in a passage (Inst. orat. 3.7.2S) referring to this section, considers A.'s position a valid one because of the close relationship which can exist between a virtue and its vice (see also Cic., Partit. orat. 23.81). Qnintilian calls the procedure "derivatio verborum": substituting one word for another to soften the expression. This is one use. But the technique can also be misused, as QuUltilian illustrates in the sanle passage with Cornelius Celsus; see also Livy's example of such misuse, 22.12. II-l2. Alexander (CG II.2.IS6-s8), in commenting on the topic of "substituting a more &miliar and clearer term for one which is less so" (Top. I IIa 8), not only shows by his examples how powerful such a change, legitimately made, can be. but also demonstrates the misuse of it by Callicles in the Corgias, who substitutes To.k ~A,8Iov~ for ToV~ aW'Peo,,,,, For further justification of the explanation oJfered here, see my observation at 671> 12 : 1• • 33 ..... aU~'YYU; "qualities closely allied to the actual qualities"; see 6,. 36: "aea"oAov8o';vTro•.

• 34 ...o~ .u).Cl~'ij .. £"I~ou)'~ This exemplifies the method when used "po~ 'l'oy.,; the method "'eo~ l"aIVo. receives two examples at 6,. 3S.

COMMENTARY

209

See 66b 2. See also EN II08a 4-{i, Iusb 26 - II26b 9. A a 35 "piiav careful reading of the second passage demonstrates how close d.d.lY~TO' is to neiiov. A. says: Clit is not easy to determine .in what manner, with what person, on what occasion and for how long a time one ought to be angry, and at what point right .ction ends and wrong action begins. We do not blame a man for straying a little either toward the more or toward the less. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in anger and call them gentle, and sometimes we praise the angry as manly .•." (I126a 32 - II26b 2). a 35-36 "Ill all""'ov ... (3EA... ' .....OV The verb for this coordinate clause is .l~'m!o. of 66. 32: "and one must choose each quality from among those qualities intimately related to it - and always in the most favorable sense,'- On the force of naeaxoAovOovvraw. see 623 29 : 2. a 36 KIl..... '1&,,":l:0' should have been written. As far as the text is concerned, our word is secure. 2 ".p.v6v "majestic, lordly"; one worthy of respect. Insofar as Uel"OT7I' is a mean between a,)Odd"., and de~u"•• a (EE I233b 34-38, 122" 8), we can see the possibility in situations which are unclear (see 67'l36 and 67b I : 3) either of • legitimate, or of. partially legitimate substitution. Cope, p. I75, has an extensive note on this type of euphemism, which is called hypocorism. 3 ...OU~ tv .....,~ "".p(30A",S Here we are on dangerous ground (67'l 32 - 67b 7), and the misrepresentation of the truth is apparently accepted. Both Oe".ro~, (67b 2) and aU(J)Tia (67b 3) are vices - i.e., e. Tai, ';"'ePo.lai, (EN II07b 2-3, II07b 8-10). Their presentation as virtues is accepted here for two reasons (67b 3-4): (a) they will seem such to most men - which is not a valid reason at all; and (b) one can proceed to develop an argument for the honorable which is superficially correct, and therefore

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

210

convincing, but is, in fact,}imdanrentally folse - which is the force of naeaAo"""""•• (67b 4). On the other hand, there is an explanation which makes A.' s statement here acceptable, and less sophistic in actual fact than superficially it appears to be. A. acknowledges, as his use of "aeaAoy.a-r."•• indicates, that theoretically and absohudy speaking what is proposed here is not correct. At the same time he must admit in terms of his own analysis of the virtues (such as we saw at 67& 36: namely, EN noSb 35 - II09a 19), that in the practical order it is not always easy and simple to establish an extreme of virtue as a vice although it is in fact a vice. rn other words, what is to be qualified, theoretically speaking, as a vice, is not in the harsh light of practical experience and action so readily identifiable. As he says: "for e.'CalIlple, since boldness seems to be more like and closer to courage, and cowardice more unlike courage, we more readily establish cowardice as the opposite of courage" (EN 1I09a 9-10). This is to say that theoretically boldness is as much a vice as cowardice; but faced with it in the order of action it is not as easy to draw the same finn conclusion. Thus it is that, following A.'s general line of argument in 67a 32 - 67b 7, • person in praising someone might quite reasonably and honesdy assess as a.deeia in. given action that which is quite possibly and more correcdy 8eautlT'1'. b 4 "'llpllAoY"'"r'xOv be ..ij~ Ilt..tll~ is the reading of the codd. and the edd., except Ross, who secludes .". It should be read: "a form of fallacious reasorring proceeding from cause." An example of this kind of reasoning would be to take two different causes, or motives, for two different actions and interchange them, thereby attributing the cause (or motive) of one action to the other. It can be exemplified from 67b 4-5: facing unnecess~danger(el "<76u.81J...."d, [ell1] oJ I'~ d'''r''l1 [laT/]) is an act motivated by boldness, a vice, and not by courage, which alone is the virtue and would constitute the honorable. However, the argument is made that a person motivated by what, in fact, is a vice (e.g., 8eaavT1)" which is an excess of a virtue) would act by reason of the virtue itself (a.6eeia) when the honorable is at stake. The same kind of argument is made for aaCJJTia, a vice, and iAev8eel.T1)" a virtue. c£ 67b 6.

b 5 : 1 iiv

SO~ElEV

sc. ",,,6VVBveiv, £1 'ltpOE""lKD~ sc. (ef71) 't'oi~ TVXOUat. "al ...."d,) Toi, "lAo". 2

Kelt

(a"

dO~6'6

neo£-

b 6 {,"'.pfJOA~ yap ape-rij~ This rde explanatory clause should be taken with both virtues implied in the argument: namely, courage and generosity. rn each instance it would be the virtue itself and not its excess which "benefits all men." The false reasoning ("aeaAOY'aT,,,d. b, Tfi' UlTiu,) consists in wrongly attributing to one motivated by an e."cess of virtue a motive which can come only from the virtue itsel£

COMMENTARY

2II

b 7 axo"Elv 5£ C£ Quint., Insl. Drat. 3.7.23. To COlltinue the preceptive character of the instruction indicated by l~"T.o, (672 32), de. (67b 9), we should understand de. with ""0".".

b 8 c,"".p yap See r 14, Isb 30-33 where this comment is repeated. Socrates (Menex. 23Sd) further remarks that "whenever one makes the effort to praise in the presence of those whom one is praising, it is not at all difficult to appear a fine speaker." If this is not dittography, and none of the edd. suggests that b 10: 1 av it is, then the force of the participle is to stress that which is in fact hdd in esteem by each separate group of people. "aed with the dative is generally used of persons. • w~ ~",apX'L "that it is actually presellt in the subject {of one's praise)." b II : 1 xed 0Aw~

"and as a general rule." sc. 6.,; i.e., one is to bring Td d,.,o> (see 6xa 34 and 6:zb 20 : .) into the class of that which is Td "aM., on which see 66a 33 : 1. On the phrase dy ... .z~, cpo r 19, 19b 24-2S. Spenge!, p. 143, pointedly observes that this and the following particular topic (67b 12-13) are characteristic of Demosthenes' deliberative oratory. •

ClY.LV'~

If the dlo, of virtue is the "aU. (EN 1IISb b 12: 1 50x.;: Y.L'NLiiv 13) and honor is the prize given to vU-tue (T;j~ de.~;j~ "de d810. 7j n,.t!, EN II23b 35), one can see how Td would be considered close to . Td "aM•. It seenu to me that what we are being told to do here (67b II-12) is, in fact, the valid and legitimate e.'Cercise of the principle set down between 67a 32 and 67b 7; see 672 32 - 67b 7. • x ..........1> "POcrijXDV See 55a 22 :'. Understood with this relative clause would be ~"n "ald.

Ti,.,o.

b 13 : 1 "'poil""lPY"£v<,,V See ssb 36; "of one's antecedents," or, more likdy because of the explanation given (67b 13-14), "of one's past acbiev... ments," the achievements which are already present and on hand to the individual, as we see the word at ssb 36. 2 m5 ..,,,ovLXOv See 60b 14ff., 6:zb 10 : •.

b I4: 1 xed '""0 n:POG£'RLx"C'iia8al. 'J
b IS :

1

"'..p....1> "pocrijxov

,,,I

212

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC'

r

to read pi. with "eoaij"o•. The force of ."'{ with the accusative is that of direction toward which: "but incline to what is better and more honorable." z ~"
",!,U,o.,

b 17

XIZ'fczll."K"t'lxW't'EPO~

"more conciliatory"; see 67a

20

for the

idea. b 18-19 Ell 01"", ... -rpuXEiu" On both sayings see 6sa 26-27, 6sa 28 : I, and 6sa 28 : z. Ross and Tovar alone use quotation marks with l~ ... ola. b 19-20 E......,..,(Sou A. is our source for attributing this epigram to Sirnonides (ca. 566-468 B.C., and see the OCD). There is no reason to think that the attribution is incorrect, though we know that sepulchral inscriptions at this time did not contain a reference to the writer. There is a fuller citation without mention of the author in Thucyd. 6.59; see Peek, p. 539. From the full citation we can see its point as an example: "This earth covers Archedike, daughter of Hippias, a man best in Greece of those in his day; though her father, husband, brothers, and sons were absolute rulers she gave not her mind to vanity." On Hippias, the Pisistratids, see the OCD. b 21 : 1 OK ....." "poill..." See EN IIorb 12-18: "we praise ... any good man ... on the basis of his actions." z IS,o" ..au a"ouSu(ou Since anovdaio~ is almost an established c9aracteristic of de6ni (see, e.g., EN nosb 30, 1I09a 24, n45b 8), A. is effectively saying here that action in accord with deliberate moral choice (TO "aTa neoa1e"'" ["e,iTnwU is a property of the man of virtue. Thus we should attempt to make clear that the person we are praising so acts (neanoVTa. 67b 22; ""'eaX&Ta, 67b 23). On "'eoa4!.a,~, see 6]a 20 : 1. b 23 .." ... 'l'u(".aOu, "and it is of help that he be frequently seen to have acted (in accord with deliberate moral choice)"; on cpai.ea6a .. see 63a 8. b 24 &,,\ Because the person praised has been shown in so many instances ("o.ud",~, 67b 23) to act with moral purpose, one can take "coincidences," or n chance incidents," from among his actions as actions reflecting his deliberate moral choice. The possibility and the acceptability of such a procedure is explained in another connection. at 67b 32-33. It is more than likely that avpnTwpaTa and dna WZ"I' are synonyms set in contrast to "aTa. :;reoaieBaw (Dem., Crown 212 is cited as illustrative of A.'s comment here). However, if there is a distinction between the two, aVp"'Twpa is something loosdy related to what the person chooses to do, dna TUX'1' has

COMMENTARY

213

no relation to it at all. Thus, if there is a difference between the two, we might illustrate it in this way: Demosthones deliberately chose war against Philip to save Athens; in the course of the war Demosthenes inspired the whole country with his bravery, and Philip's fleet was wrecked in a storm. Neither of these last two actions is the object of Demosthenes' moral choice. But the first is a avpon-rw,..a; the second, a sheer accident. used collectively: all the incidents, both those delibb 26 "'1I'Elav erately chosen and the coincidental and chance ones, will appear to be signs of his virtue and his moral choice. As all the edd. point out, this b 27 - 68a 9 ~a"'Lv... 1'• ..,....,.9jj passage (with minor variant readings reported in their apparatuses) is found again in all the codd. at r 16, 16b 29f[ where no one is happy with it, and all indicate a lacuna. Victorius was the first to spot the lacuna at 16b 29, which the present passage was used to fill. The question before us is whether or not the passage belongs here. Spengel, pp. I#., did not think so, and all the edd. indicate his reservation in their apparatuses. With the exception of Kassel, they accept the passage (Roemer somewhat reluctandy) as an integral part of chap. 9. Cope (pp. 180f[), accepts it (see also Cope, I"trod., p. 18s), and explains its place within the chapter (Cope, Introd., pp. 212-18). As far as I understand Spengel's difficulty, he is not happy with the way the chapter develops and thinks that somewhere in here A. should take up Td ,..eiCo. "cL\6. just as he gave us Td ,..eiCo. dya06. in chap. 7 and will present Td ,..e.Co. dl"alo, in chap. 14. Spengel's assurance on this is in no way undermined by A.'s comment (which he acknowledges) at B 19, 93a 9-18, where we read in part: "In deliberative oratory there was a discussion both about the greatness of dyaM and about the greater and lesser in general. And so, since the proposed ..,,(10, in each kind of oratory is an riya06. - for example, it is the uv"''Peeo" the "aM., the M..B'o. - it is clear that everyone must obtain the matter for amplification from the proposals of that discussion [taking do' ~..e[,... .... to refer to 93a II-I3]." I certainly cannot be as sure as Spengel would appear to be on the way in which A. should have written our chap. 9. Nor has he convinced me that the passage is not"apte positus" here. It is a matter of interpretation, but I do not think that convincing arguments have as yet been adduced against the presence of the lines here. In the outline given at the beginning of the chapter, the chapter development appears logically coherent and reasonable. Therefore concluding the chapter on epideictic rhetoric with a general discussion of lna&>o, and its difference from ~y"w""o" its similarity to the giving of advice and so to deliberative rhetoric, whichhas just preceded, and, finally, the role of amplification in praise seems quite natural to me. For this reason I would accept the passage with the four edd., and reject Kassel's seclusion of the entire passage as Aristotelian but misplaced.

214

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

b 27-33: .....,... 5' l ..'lL.... ~ . . . ..o'oil.......

The line of the argument is: to bestow o~ is to make the virtue of a person manifest; since virtUe is revealed in action, it is necessary to show that the actions are virtuous; ly"';',,,o. is directed to individual acts (and so is related to lna,.o~); (in both lna ..o~ and loy"';',,,o. actions are critical) all else,like education, merely serves as confinnatory evidence; loy,,';',..,o. is directed to men who have acted; but the fact is that actions signify habit (therefore good actions would signify the presence of virtUe) and so we would give "'a ..o~ to one who did not act, provided we consider him to be one who, ifhe acted, would do good things, i.e., had the habit of good action. A., then, is saying that is directed to good actions, "'a ..o~ to good char:tcter. On virtue and virtuous actions, see EN nosa I7 - nosb 18.

'"a ..

"'''';',..'0.

b 27 i ....,.... ~ Myo~

From here to 67b 35 praise in itsd£ and its dif,. ferenee from ,..a"ae,,,,..6~, and .~6a,,..0 ,,,..6~ is considered. Praise and blame are the moral approval and disapproval by which 'we distinguish virtue from vice; c£ EN n06a 1-2, and Cope, [nlTod., pp. 212-18.

.y",;,,.. ....

..

1 w~ ..o'..il.... , l",d..,,.,!.a, has as its object "'ed<.,~ and the dependent subordinate clause which is introduced by di~ and in which .1,,[ is understood. The force of di~ ("how, in what way"; see S. 2S78c) expresses A:s idea precisely. 2 In their fundamental meanings Td By",;,,..,O. denotes that which belongs to a ,,{j),..o~, the group which escorted a victor in the games, and "a''1"ul!'''O~ denotes that which is of or for a public festival or general assembly; a Adyo~ "aV1]Y1!I!'''O~ was a festival oration such as those pJOllounced at the Olympic Garnes, !socrates' Panegyriko., for example. If we take what A. says in the present passage and in EN nOlb 31-34. we must admit a distinction between praise which is directed to virtue, and 6,,"';',..'0' which is directed to deeds done. Such a distinction, moreover. is followed up and developed in BE I219b 8-16 where we read (14-16): "Therefore .{,da,,..o.,,,,..6~. '"alVo~, .y,,';',..,.. diJfer. For By",;,,..,O. is discourse directed to the individual act, while '"alVo~ expresses the general character of the man [and see 8-91, and .vda,,..o.,,,,..6~ is directed to the end." Praise, then, has as its object the virtuous character of the man (blame, the opposite). By"';',..,O. (or panegyric) is directed to his achievements, the things he has done. Alexander, in Rheto,.. Gra.d, IX 333-36, discusses the diJference between praise and loy",;,,.., .. in substantially the same way. Kassel secludes Td d' By",;,,..,O• • • • BI1TI•• On the relation between loy",;,,..,o. and biography, see Momigliano, Pp·49-41.

b 28 :

EyxW"",.,,,

b 29-31 (..Ii 5• . . . £Iv .. ,) The statement here is correcdy put in parentheses, and the edd. except Kassel so punctuate. But a period, or at least

COMMENTARY

2IS

a colon, should be read at the end of the parenthesis. 6.& ,,"l at 67b 3I begins an independent statement of conclusion. Kassel secludes 61& ... neMaHa, at 67b 3I. b 29 : 1 ...,z U xU~ We see this phrase again at r 14, Isb 24, and at EN III7b 1-2: "the attendant, surrounding circumstances." z Et~ n:{aTlV Some interpret the word as "persuasion" (Dufour, Freese); others translate it as "credibility" (Cooper, Jebb & Sandys). Cope interprets the word as "confirmation." This interpretation moves the word more toward the third meaning given to the word at ssa 4. i.e., evidentiary material whicb can be used in argument. "Conviction" or "belief" seems more likely: i.e., "attendant circumstances help toward lei,] belief" 3 ~yEv'U' See 60b 30-37. Anaximenes I440b 14-24 lists .~,.A.Bla among those things whicb are ~.. 1<., ~fi' ciuerfi" as our passage does. b 30 : 1 d"cI~ S.ee S~ 34 : 2. The statement here is a good example for what is said there. z ll; cly..Oiilv cly..Oou~ See Pol. I2S5b 1-2. Our phrase demonstrates the validity of .~i...a (67b 29) a5 n{'TTI" just as ~&••/I~., ~e"'l''''' Ta demonstrates the validity of nala.la (67b 29) as ",{,m,. b J2 : 1 a'll'd.. See S7b I : 2 for whicb the example here is a good illustration. See also 66b 27 : 3. 2 ~I; .... ~ C£ 6~b 13 : z. If the actions are "signs of a habit," we must assume that they are repeated actions and of a certain kind. b 33 : 1 ,,,a"'~OLI'EV As far as meaning is concerned, this verb usually denotes the state of mind brought about by evidence, i.e., conviction, belief; see 55a 4, first meaning. 2 I'",,"pLal'ci~ . This apparently unique example of the noun form in A. is probably best translated "calling blessed." H-..re it is identified (aoT.i, ps.. n';Td) with edda,p.Vlapo" "calling happy," and both are set apart from Ina ..., and i,."wl"": a".p ... '<"IIu",,, difference: .Ma.p•• ,ap6. and paxae.al,6, constitute a larger class including within itself enaw., and ir"';'P'" (n.e"!,; .. TavTa). A competent explanation of these lines is to be found at EN llOIb 10 - n02a 4 where A. considers whether ed6alp •• {a belongs among the things we praise. Kassel secludes 67b 33-35: pa"ae.apd, ... Ta;;Ta. b 36 : 1 d&o~ We begin here a brief study of the lines of agreement between praise and advice, or epideictic and deliber:ltiv(: rhetoric, .ld.~

216

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

68a 5

is probably used here as it is at 58a 36 (on which see sSa 36 : 1); the sentence

that epideictic and deliberative rhetoric share in a common class, or genus, to the extent that subject mattet validly used in one can be used in the other. On sldo" see also 68. 26. 2 cd ""!'-(aouA..i the material of chap•• 4-8.

means

b 37: 1 ~..o80,o seCODd person singular, second aorist optative middle. This furm represents an extenSion of the thematic inflection to an athematic verb. Some of these thematic forms are found in the classical period. See S. 746c. 2 .,...;;.,...... Aclli.' "these matters when their expression is altered." liSa

1

lxo!,-EY

"understand, know"; LS A.I.9.

x ..l "oioY ... S., "and the kind of person one ought to be." z .,...;;.,... This refers to both the actions and the specific character. Ta;;Ta cfJ, .m06>7"a, is the object of liyo'Ta" which in tum is subject of peTan6wa, and UTee"'.... Ta;;"" is also the object of the two in£nitives, e.g., "when we present these matters (the actions, the character of the person) as advice, we must alter them in expression and tum them about." a

2 : 1

a 3 otov D'TL

.c. 010. (Aiy.,.) 8n.

a4

sc. y,y.opi.o,,; or /indexovu" as at 68a 6.

i"l

.,.o,~

a 5 : 1 ~"o8""x1Jy The statement at 68a 3-4 (ot! dsi ... d,' aUTO.) actually appea" as a u,,06>7''~' a piece of advice, in Isoer., Panathen. 32 in his comments on the truly educated man; c£ liSa 5-6. z su" ...,..., Used here with the accusative as cognate, it is best taken as "equivalent to, equal to" (sec LS II). This meaning satisfies many of the instances cited by Cope (p. 182) in his note. As he remarks, the idea of power, furce, which is in the primary meaning of the word, is developed into the secondary meanings. These secondary meanings would be such as we find them in LS (of which "equal to" is an instance). At times, however. we can find in the verb the idea "to bring about, bave the force of"; see, e.g., Eur., Medea 128 (a difficult passage), Herod., 3.89.2, and Thucyd., 6.40.2. In the present passage both meanings seem possible: "when thus expressed it is equivalent to (or, it has the power of) advice." a strengthened form of the demonstrative adverb (bdi, it J cbS! points to what immediately fullows.

..6.,.."

a 5-6 !,-o1y..... Cope, Ross. and Kassel prillt this ill quotatioll marks, possibly because it is an almost "'
as praise.

68a 10

COMMENTARY

217

a 6 ~"cipXO\l'''v On the suggestion of Spenge!, Roemer and Tovar bracket this, but there is no reason to do so. Similarly, Ross conjectures an ent without an adequate reason, i.e., tpeavrov 00" Tot,.

£...

a 7 : 1 c...... general principle. 2 6,,0100'0

A. swns up his preceding comments by way of a The optative is potential; on the form, see 6,b 37 : I.

a 8 UV'rlXE:I.P.EvYJ.~ civClyxij.; i.e., "opposed," "contrary"; not necessarily its technical sellSe of "contradictory." There is no evidence in the resulting statements that anything more is intended than some kind of opposition, such as we have in the example given: 00 6" ",ira 'Peo",,-",ira 'Peo,,,,, Yet why there must be opposition at all, to say nothing about its being necessary, is unclear. Why is it not possible in giving advice to say "be prond not of chance events but of your own achievements," and in giving praise, "he was a man who took pride not in chance events but in his own achievements"? The next problem is with ",6TaT.Ofj, which means "change, alter," and is so used at 67b 37 and 68a 3 and, as far as I can see, must be so interpreted here. On the other hand Cope, then Jebb & Sandys, Cooper, Preese, Roberts' OxfOrd translation, Dufour, and Tovar interpret it to mean "interchange," "change into," and this interpretation gives another meaning to the sentence. For example, we have Jebb & Sandys: "The modes of expression will necessarily be opposite when the prohibitive and non-prohibitive clawes are interchanged." But I believe that the more correct translation is: "the manner of expression will, of necessity, be opposite when a prohibitive and a non-prohibitive statement is altered." But in no instance offi:red am I sure of what A. means. Is he saying that (a) since the advice can be positive or negative, the praise must be altered accordingly to a positive or negative statement; or (b) where the advice is negative, the praise must be positive i.e., advice and praise must be set forth in opposing statements; or (e) is he simply explaining the example given - i.e., the advice is expressed as a prohibitive statement while the praise is put forward in a non-prohibitive statement? But if any of these are meant, I can see no reason why, when advice is altered to praise, it must (" d.ar"'i~) be done in " HE'~ ii.'T,,, ..,,,iVI'J. a 10: 1 ..&Iv ..ut;1)...x ....v 1
:u8

68a 16

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [

a II : 1 Xell [aJ 8 is read by the codd. The edd. and Sponge! seclude it with Wol£ Grammatically it is a problem. Cope does not read it, but notes (p. 183) that if it is read (and Kassel reads it) we must supply, e.g., ;eal (el XS1fot7J"BV) 8. 2 Xelt fUU'O"tel "most especially"; this can mean a number of things, e.g., he has done it more than anyone else; he has done it who was least expected to; he has done it in an excellent way, etc. is the reading of some codd. and is accepted by four a 12 : 1 Xelt..... edd., Spenge!, and Cope. The major codd. read "al ...&; Ross following Bywater reads "al Tq; (Bywater probahly has ;Ce7JaTio. of 68a IO in mind). As a result ofhis change, Ross changes ... au...a at 68a 13 to TO~T(I'. The word to be understood with "al TO would be either .ra., (s8a 26-35, 5gb 25-32) or fa,a (S8a 17 : 1), both of which are used for "particular topics." 2 XpOVWY •.• lCCXLP';;Y See 65a 20, and 'sa 20 : 1. a 13 : 1 ...elii ...el S. is the reading of the codd. and three edd., Spenge!, and Cope. But Ross (...o....ep a' el) and Kassel (TauTa aA<sl» insert el from a scholion. The reason for considering sl is clear from the structure of the sentences between 68b 10 and 68b 21. 2 "elpm ...;, npocr;jxoy See 67b 14 and ssa 22 : 2. The idea in these words is exempli£ed by Socrates' refusal to try the eight generals as a group after the battle of Arginusae in 406 B. c. and his rejection of the orders of The Thirty, who were in power for a few months after the fall of Athens in 404 (Apol. pa-d). The Apology itself is, in an unobtrusive way, an illustration of many of the ideas in this ninth chapter. II- 14

lCel"":'p8",,.EY The verb gives the idea: i.e., "to accomplish successfully." A successful performance of the same action time and again in all likelihood clearly marks a unique or very special ability of the individual, and not a run ofluck. As should be clear from the context at 67b 21-23, our topic is not the same as the statement at 67b 23-24, but the underlying principle of consistent action is.

a IS : 1 S,' elhoy is the reading of the codd. and of four edd. Ross reads with Bywater ("Aristotelia III," 72) a,' a""'ou. 2 "fir: npOTpE1tOY"E'IX xal TLl'ciJ'V"C'CI. . . . And if incentives to achievement and awards of honor have been invented and established on his U

account."

a 16 Xel.... crlCEU .. cr8'1 On the meaning, see S9b 14. This topic reappears at 75a 4-6. Cope (p. 184) has a long note on the juxtaposition of this aorist with the perfect, eiJe7JTa" "apparently with no distinction of time." Spengel too is disturbed by the "mutatio temporum." It may well be that we are not meant to sense a difference of time. Gildersleeve (Syntax, I 227; see also

68a 18

COMMENTARY

219

24-8-5 I) speaks of the aorist as the shorthand of the perfect. On the other hand, it is possibly not the aorist which must be explained, but the perfect. Most probably what we have in efie'lTa, is what became known in later Greek as an aoristic perfect, or the perfect used for the narrative aorist (see Blass, Debrunner, & Funk, p. 343; Atkinson, p. 145: "In Hellenistic times the perfect came to be used as a past definite identical in meaning with the aorist ..• "). a 16-17 "Cll et~ 3v .•. 'I",,,,ci>'axov .k 6v is the reading of the codd. accepted by the edd. save Ross, who conjectures TOOTOV. Kassel secludes the whole phrase as an Aristotelian addition.

a 17:

1

mania1J

is a good word here for iy,,,b/llov as a made thing,

and is reminiscent of Isocrates' phrase for rhetoric as a "O''ITOH.V "'eii.ypa (Sophists 12) as something made by the art oflanguage. 2 "Cll 'App.cl5,ov Spengel and Cope read Hal d,' 'Aep&d,ov; Roemer, Hal ; Kassel, di~ <do'>; Ross, "al . Dufour and Tovar read as I would read. A repeated ok is likely, but since all the names are used as examples, an omitted el~ is not impossible; see 6Sb 8 : 2. Following the codd. without the insertion of<6,'> or<el~>, the translation would be: "as, for example, in the case of Hippolochus, the man for whom [.l~ 8v) the first ly""p'ov was composed, and ill the case of Harmodius and Aristogeiton for whom the erection of statues in the market place was first done." Both these instances are .pparendy meant to illustrate the preceding topics to which they are attached. Certainly they would make no sense taken as topics in themselves, as some interpret them. We know nothing of Hippolochus, but, in a plot which miscarried, Harmodius and Aristogeiton made an attempt on the ryrants Hippias and Hipparchus in SI4 B.C.; see "Aristogeiton" in the OGD. a 18 : I "'0... a ..ClSijyCI, i.e., were erected, set up. The articular infinitive is the subject of t,,;o,~e'l' If A. is correctly interpreted here, he is saying that these were the first statues set up in the Agora at Athens. We do know that Antenol (ca. S40-5OO B.C.) made bronze statues of the two which were carried off in 480 by Xerxes. These were then replaced by a group sculpted by Critius (see "Critius," "Antenor" in the OeD). There is an interesting, but apocryphal, story in Pseudo-Plutarch, Lives of the Orators (Life of Antiphon). There we are told in one account of Antiphon's death that as a very old man he went to Syracuse. When asked by Dionysius of Syracuse (430-367 B.C.) "What is the best bronze?" he replied that the best was that of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton were made. He lost his life as a consequence since Dionysius thought that the reply was an implied threat against himsel£ 2 bp.a(",~ 5~ "Cli i.e., use this same topic for blame. In fact A.'s example at 7sa 4-<5 to demonstrate the greater wrong is an apposite instance of

68a

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

320

22

how the topic could be used to disparage. "at is adverbial: """d similarly, also, in opposite cases." a 19 "i1v fLl) ... E6"opii~ concerning the man himsel£"

"if you do not have an abundance ofmaterial

a 20: 1 4~TL"'ClpCl(3cillEL~ infinitive used as a command (S. 2013); or has a., disappeared? a.i does appear, for example, in the margin of cod. C, and is used in the nen sentence. On !socrates (436-338 B.C.), see the oeD. z 'Iao"pcl:T1J~ J €"otEL the imperfect of customary action (S. 1893): "as was the custom of !socrates." This is the reading of a good cod., and is accepted a Z I : 1 4"",,1j8EL"~ by the edd. (e..'CCept Kassel), Spengel, and Cope. The other codd. ""d Kassel read '''',,'oi0 ..av ("as !socrates used to do from the habit of pleading lawsuits"). III Roberts' Oxford translation and in that of Jebb & Sandys, avvoJO..a. is accepted. fu the latter note, we do have six forensic .peeches of Isocrates', and both Cicero (Brutus 1:1..48) and Dionysius of Halicamassus (Isocrate, 18 15761) refer to his forensic work. Without challenging the statements of Cicero and Dionysius, I find it of interest to note that both these men were writing in Rome around the same time. However, not only are most of !socrates' extant works given over to epideictic and deliberative rhetoric, but Isocrates C..'Cplicidy remarks in the opening paragraphs of the Antidosi' (2-3) and passim that he had decided early in his career to devote his life to works of larger significance than petty legal cases. He repeats this cgnunent and eularge. upon it in the Panathell. 9-14, citing the physical and personal dispositions which turned him away from a legal career. The Antido,i, itself, ostensibly a legal defense, is not .uch, but an "apologia pro vita sua" (see Antid. 8-12). Victorius thought that this statement of A.'s was "" attack upon !socrates. Certainly there is no reason to think so from what is said here. As a matter of fact since !socrates is always mentioned with respect it, the Rhetoric, it is difficult to understand what occasioned Victorius' conviction to the contrary. Iudeed, recalling A.'s somewhat jaundiced view of contemporary legal rhetoric expressed in the first chapter, we would have to accept the comment here as a tribute to Isocrates . .3 auYXplVE.LV O'VY"Q'7Ie,v Tl. neo~ Tt = to compare; and a1lrov is to be understood. !socrates uses this topic to compare Evagoras with Cyrus (Evag. 33-39) and Athens with Sparta (Panathe/I. 39-58). a

22 : 1

t&6;lJ'1'U(Ov

anou&,,""~

i.e., "promotes amplification"; see

S,b

32 : 1.

as used at 67b 21. J "("T.L... e\~ i.e., falls into the category of epideictic speech. 2

68a 26

COMMBNTAlty

221

a 23 tv u""poxii ylip The reasoning, which is compendious, would be: amplification is basically rooted in a kind of excelling; exceIling belongs to that which is "aM. (68a 24); but the "aM. is 'na..STO. (66a 33 and note); therefore amp1i6cation falls, with good reason (,vA6r"~, 68a 23), into the category of epideictic. The ground for the reasoning is to be found in the comments on 1inseixov - vnSeSX0J.levov at 63h 7-12 where "the more" is considered as something positive, that is, sonlething which excels in • good sense, something which reveals superiority. Confer the observation at 68a 25-26, ,;"e£nee ... deenj •. We see this idea of ""'eox>i at Pol. I282b 30u83a 8, and in the statement that "better resides in superiority": TO rae {W.T.O. e. ""eeoxii (Degen. an. 787a I); see also EN I124a 21-23.

"a" ... ".. 0'"

p..~
222

68a 32

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

amplijicatio, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric ... "? But A. do.. not speak of "universal kinds of persuasion." Furth=ore, although the statement does not openly contradict Cope, we read at B 18, 9Ib 33-35: "all speakers use a~E,,!a,~ in deliberative speeches, ill speeches of praise or blame, of accusation or defense." More directly to the issue, however, is the statement which follows at 92a 4-"7: "of the elements common to all speech avE,,!a,~ is most suited to the purpose of epideictic, as has been said, the past to forensic (for the decision is concerned with that), the possible and the future to deliberative." This is also what A. is saying in our passage: namdy, that the great-small (,..,,,000<;, 68a 28) is hest suited to epideictic, the future (,..Ulo ••a, 68a 30) to deliberative, the past ("eyo.6~, 68a 32) to furensic. Further, he gives the technique (a;;<,,!a,~, "a~ad ..",..a, l.Otl,.."!,..a) which can best express each common element. He presents the technique first because it is a natural devdopment from what precedes-namdy, his discussion of avE'1/"" a'~ - but it is incidental to the larger statement. C£ Appendix. To translate this as "topics common to all kinds of a 26 xo,"';;v dSOiv speech" is wrong. "a~ad .. and J.Otl,.."!,..a are clearly not topics for A., and he never calls aV<,,!O"'~ a topic. "OIVai. ,ldai. here denotes sometlting like "classes oftltings common to all rheto!ic" (see ,Mo~ at 67h 36: 1). This is quite in accord with the way A. speaks of all three. For example, he speaks of "a~a a.. and •• Otl,.."!,..a as the "oIVal "["'8<<; (B 20, 93a 23-25), and he caiis a;;E"!O"'~ one of the "o,.ai. (B 18, 9Ih 29). He also speaks of "owol '&"0', as we have seen (58a 12). Of course, il80~, "aOo~, "~ii.,,,..a, d,,6~, 0"'1/,..0'0., and are common to all three kinds of rhetoric and could fall under "o •• d .rd"! as fu words are used at 68a 26. Anaximenes expresses the idea at'1427b 3"]f[ when he discusses the "elements common to all rhetoric."

",..a

",..a

"",...,e'o,

"most suitable, adaptable to the purpose of"

a 29 ""p"SdYf&""''' See 57h 27 : 2; see also 56b :HI, I2-I6. Isocrates, in Demonicus 34, says the very same thing as we have at 68a '!}-O3!. a 30 ...oi~ OUf&(3ouA...... 'xoi~

discussed in chaps. 4-7.

i.e., surmise. 2 lvSuf&>if&""''' See 55a 4-"7, 55a 8, 56& 36 - 56h 4. This is one of the three times this word is used between A 4 and B 17; the other two instances are at 76a 32 and 77b 19. 3 ...oi~ S'xllV'xoi~ discussed in chaps. ro-I4. a

31 : 1

KCI"'E'ClI'-ClV'I:'EU0f.LEVOL

a 32 : J ClLT(CI:V as it is wed at 69a of "that which explaios the event." 2
5,

B 21, 94a

31:

c'cause," in the sense

68a 33

COMMENTARY

223

a 33-37 ix ... Iv"", ... l"... lv The general conclusion to the chapter, which A., from his words here, divides into three parts: (a) praise and blame (this would correspond more or less to ILl of the chapter outline); (b) what one must keep inrnind in praising and blaming (this is IL2); and (c) (this is 11.3).

.""",,..'0.

a 33 lx ... Iv",v as we saw the phrase used at 66a 18 and 6sb 19, or the variant at 63 b 4: i.e., we now have in our possession the particil/ar topics for the epideictic genre. C£ Appendix.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 6sb

I -

6sb 5

II . De£nition: 6Sb 6 - 6sb 26

10

with a division into three subjects for discussion: the motives of wrongdoers (discussed in chaps. IOo-II); their state of mind (the· subject of chap. 12), the character and disposition of those wronged (discussed in chap. 12, ~b 23 - 73a 27) of wrongdoing, together with its general cause, which is vice and moral weaknesses ("a,,[a, dxeaala, 6sb 14)

III . Development: 6sb 26 - 69b IS I. 68b 26 - 69a 31

(n.b.: see 68b 26-27): the discussion of

motives for wrongdoing leads to 3D. analysis of human action as voluntary and involuntary, and to the conclwion that there arc oruy seven motives for wrong2.

6ga 32 - 69b

18

doing analysis of the seven motives given at 69>

(0) 6ga

3S: "';"8'

(6) 6gb

4:

(c) 69b (d) 6gb

. s:

(t) 6gb

)

'.VI

6-7: in light of 68b 6-7: 10Urce of involuntary

P(~

6: 19..

)

7: AoY'''1'6.

in light of 6g. I ; : 10urce of volunt:lry

(f) 6gb II-18: 9v1'6. - ot>Y>!.

IV . Conclusion and Summary: 69b IS - 69b 32 with emphasis on the nature of voluntary action the goal of which is the real or apparent good or pleasant, in view of this, since the good has already been analyzed (chap. 6), there will now be an analysis of the pleasant (i.e., chap. II)

226

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

68b 1 : 1 XIl't"l)yoP'Il~ XIII .mOAOY'Il~ See 500 36 - 59a 10 passim. In this third and final section of the fitst book A. introduces us to an analysis of judicial rhetoric in chaps. 10-14. In chaps. 10-12. he considers the motives and character of wrongdoers and, briefly, of those WIonged. In chap. 13 he gives us a classification ofjust and unjust .cts. In chap. 14 he takes up the question of the greater wrong. . z .,. 1V xIII 1<01"", See Sgb 25-32. b 2: I ...oU~ CNAAoy.al'oU~ Cope, p. 188, quotes Schrader to the effect that this word is used to mark "the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two." This is not correct. For A. - as has been indic.ted in the notes, especially those of chaps. 1-2 - logic operates in all three kinds of rhetoric. For those who insist on missing this fact, A.'s remarks at 59a 6-10, which are a summary staleroent of the burden of his study in A 4 - B 26, are inesc.pable. If there is a particular reason for using "".uO"'c7I'0~~ here, it is probably that he has just remarked (68b 31-32; on this, see 68a 26-33) that judicial rhetoric enjoys a special relation to enthymemes, which are the syllogisms of rhetoric. So he continues by using ""llo".c7I'0~~' rather than his more usual words "'eoTclc7"~ (59a 7; 600 31) or ",tc7T"~ (63b 4; 600 18). Furthermore, we should note that even if there were some such spedal relationship between judicial rhetoric and 1./M1''11'4, the conclusion we would have to draw is one which has been constantly argued in this commentary. For the demand for such a special relationship would clearly demonstrate that the subject matter for 1.861''11'4 is not simply and exclusivdy the logical aspect of the subject, since th....861''11'4 looks to 7}8o~ and "d8o~ as well. The opening lines of this chapter clearly point in the direction of the latter (see ssa 40 SSb 35 : 3). Furthermore in chaps. 10 through '4 A. is seeking, as he says (68b 1-2), the material for rhetorical syllogisms in judicial rhetoric. He fmds this material not only in the logical analysis of the subject matter (namely, the nature of justice, the pleasant, just actions), but also in the attitudes and dispositions (7}8o~, ",d8o~) of wrongdoers and the wronged. 2 lx.I'EVOV iiv dJ) "would appropriatdy follow next"; "appropriatdy" is to be found in the optative with It.. On this form of periphrasis, see 7Sa 22 : 3; S. 1961, 1857; LS,lxw, C.l.3. "the kind and number of motives for which." b 4: 1 &.llxEIf£EVo. "how they are disposed," i.e., their state of mind, their attitudes, character, feelings, etc.; see 62a 26 : z, 62b 3. Z .... ou~ 1
68b 10

COMMENTARY

i.e., their dispositions, conditions, outlook, situation. 2 AtY"'I'EV .J;ij~

e.g., chaps. 10-12, where these three matters

are considered. 1 l.,...., ~1\ See 60b 14 : 2. 2 '<0 ~Aci"...." EItOnC1 See 7lb 27-29; EN IIlsa 16--28, 1136a 31-)2.

b6:

Private or special law has two characteristics: (a) it is b 8 : 1 [Ii."" written (68b 8) and therefore presumably enacted and published; and (b) it is the law under which the citizens live in the polis (,.aAITEt!avTa., 68b 8). Such positive law attempts to cover the whole area of responsible public life for the members of an organized social group. See 600 18-37. There is a further refinement of this private law in 73b 4-6, 74a 18ff. (see notes to the passages). 2 )(o.vo" Universal law (a) is unwritten (68b 9) and (b) appears to be acknowledged among all peoples (68b 9). Such :universal law (see 73b 6 and note) includes all considerations of justice, right, and the universally expedient which are in ·accord with the nature of man and are declared to us by the voice of reason. Cope, Introd., pp. 239-42, presents the commonly accepted view of these unwritten laws. However, Ehrenberg (Saphacles and Pericles, pp. 167-72) makes a distinction between the three unwritten commandments of popular Greek ethics (honor the gods, parents, guest-friends) and the i'J.yelllpo. v6,..a.. He would not call the first (as Cope does) unwritten laws. The question of positive law and natural law will be seen in greater detail in chap. 13. for the moment Guthrie's discussion (Saphists, pp. II7-34) of the idea in the fifth-fourth centuries is competent (his strange comments on the Rhetoric Ipp. I24-zslnotwithstanding); more specific.lly to the point of A's text in chaps. 10-15 is Ostwald, "Was There a Concept of l1yea'l'a~ v6,..o~ in Classical Greecr?" b 10 d&o'<E~. Voluntary human action (l,,6vTB~ ... ,.a.a;;eTw) requires knowledge (SeTa 6~ ... /bravTa, 68b II-12) and freedom (I"i dvayxaCd,..6va., 68b 10); see also EN IIIla 20-25.

1'""

b 10-II II".. ou" E>tov....~ is the reading of all the codd., four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross reads 6lc1&TB~, following Richards, who gives no significant· reason for his conjecture. In the light of what A. says at A 13, 73b 33-36 and at EN IIIIb 6--10 and 1112. 14-15, l,,&v<.~ clearly is correct. For, as A. indicates, l>
ARISTOTLE, 'RBliIOllIC' I

228

6sb IS

ignorant of what he delibetately chooses." We also know from EN III2.a IS-16 that "'eoale.a.~ implicates reason. At MM nSg. I - IIgoa 7 there is a good discussion of "poaleea., and i"o~a.o.. Reading eMOTe, makes 6sb 9-I I contradictory. A.'s word for vice; see 64' 32 and 660 2.3-24. The burden of the discussion of moral weakness in EN n4sa IS - IIS2. 36 is that the rnorallyweak man (the d"eaT7j,), though he knows something to be wrong, still does it since he is one who yields to the strong urge of his feelings and emotions.

b 14 : 1 XIIX!II •

ciXPIIG!1I

is the reading of the codd. and is accepted by four b IS _pI SE ..oil..o of the edd. and Spengel; Cope and Ross read ",epl ToiiTO from • marginal notation in A (A itselfreads "'Bel dB TOiiTO). Omitting at simplifies matters of interpretation. Roemer, for example, believes that the order of the lines here is disturbed. At the same time, the evidence for dt is strong and we should not exclude it without reason. Though there are doubts about apodotic dt (see 64a S-9), it could be read here, and doing so would enable US to retain the text: "for, if people have bad qualities [,uox6~ela'l, one or several, tho. with respect to that in which they happen to be bad, they are also doers of wrong; for example ..."

In each of the following instances down to 6sb 2.4 we b 16 : 1 otov,; are to understand that the subject named "happens to be bad and is also a wrongdoer" (pox6fled, T'VYXd.7B' W" xal a.a~o, san) with respect to the matter which is specified; e.g., ",eel xp7j,uaTa (6Sb 16), etc. • ci,.u.w8.po~ See 6Ia 17 : " 6ra 7, 66b 7 : 1. cix6AII....O~ See EN Il17b 23 - lIIgb 18 where self-indulgence is considered together with a(J)'Peo~~, a correlation which we shall find latet in our text (at 6ga 21-24). The fundamental characteristic of the w
Ii"17

In EN 1150a 9 - II sob 28 A. gives some attention to b 18 : J P.IlAIIX';~ the "soft man" in an effort to classify more precisely moral strength and weakness. We learn that the ,uaAIl>lO~ is one easily overcome by bodily pain. The diffi:rence between the self-indulgent and the soft man with respect to pain is that the d"olaaTo, avoids bodily pain by choice while the ,ua1a,,0, is overcome by it. Moreover, the ,uaAa,,6~ does not withstand that bodily pain which most men readily tolerate; see 83 b s - 843 2. Thus, the specification here: "B/!l Ta gd6",ua, "with respect to what makes for his ease." On the idea in ed6"pa, see 63 a 23-24, 70a 14-16.

68b 23

COMMIlNTARY

229

Z 5Eo.AO~ The cowardly man is usually set in contust to the brave man in EN; see, for example, lI03 b '7, HO"," 21£, I104b 7£, IIosb 19£, Hosb 23/[, u09'l 2/[, uoga 71[, lIISb 33/[ Thus the specification given in our text ("eel T.,)~ " ..M..,v~) is to the point. At ruga 21-23 cowardice is contrasted with self-indulgence; we are told that self-indulgence is more voluntary than cowardice, but cowardice itself is more voluntary than cowardly acts. ("
b 19

b 20 : I cp.>'6"<.fIoO~ We see this word at 6Ia 39, 63b 2. In the context of both passages, it appears to be relatively neutral. At EN H2Sb 1-25 we are given tbe reaSOll for this. However, A. points out in the EN passage that an excessive desire of honor is considered characteristic of the one who is '1'.1&..:.He is one who is not sinIply fond ofhonor, but fonder than he ought to be. z o;uflufloo~ See B 4, 82b 20; B 12, S9a 9: the quick to anger, the trigger-tempered; Eur., Medea 319.

p.,.

I cp.Mv.xo~ We find the word at 63b 1. In the light of 68b we should assume that this is a love for victory greater than it should be. • Ii ".xpo~ is the reading of the better codex; it is a=pted by the edd. except Ross, who, along with Spengel and Cope, reads 0 di " ... "I!&~' thus preserving the parallelism found from 6sb 17 on. In the one place .in the EN in which A. mentions the vindictive man (I126a 19-26), the meaning here is explained quite well. This man is embittered, and only revenge satisfies him.

b" : 20 :

I

5.

b 22. cicpp"'" The thoughdess, foolish man would be the opposite of the 'l'e6••p.~, the man possessing practical wisdom, 'l'eo".""" the virtue whereby we deliberate well about the good and the bad; see 66b 2!>-22 and note. This kind of not-knowing A. calls self-deception (dnaTau8a.), not ignorance, since the absence of knowledge here is a privation for which one is preswnably to be held accountable. There is an interesting comment at Top. 148a 6-7: "that which docs not possess l"'UT~p71 does not seem to be that which is ignorant [dyvoel_], but rather that which is deceived [d'71"OT'1P&v.v]; thus we speak of neither inanimate things nor cbildren as being ignorant." Sharnelessness is mentioned at B 3, 80a ,8-21, and b 23 civ",laxuV"
23 0

A1USTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

68b 31

b 23-24 o!,o""~ ..• 6"OX.L~ i.e., in the same way as each of the oth.r types of man (TOO' liAAw. '"a<1To~) is bad and a wrongdoer {.uox8'1eol T"l'Xa.ov....... 1I.6",0[ d ..e., 68b 15-r6} with respect to each of the instanCeS of vice ("'ell"a<1To. TOO. V"o""l'ivw.). Sec the following note. h 24 On;OXEI.f.LEvwv Ttl vno'JestpB'Va. or as we see it at ssa 36, Ta: Wroxet1'6.a "eaYl'aTa (sec ssa 36 : 2), are all the instances which make up a par-

ticular class, genus, or species as such; those things of which the class can be predicated. In the present pass.ge the word denotes all the things which constitute the subject matter of "a"ia about which he is talking. W. can translate: "with respect to each of the instances of vice."

b 25 : 1 TW"\"WV what he has just been discussing in 68b 12-24: namely, his eJfort to illustrate how men do wrong through vice and moral weakness. 2 5ijAOV, TI
b 26 :

1 elp,!!,"""'" i.e., chap. 9. 2 "I< 5' Ex ... i>'lllYJao!'''''''''' i.•.• B I-It. A knowledge of the emotions and feelings (such as ang.r or vindictiveness mentioned abov.) also enables us to recognize bad emotions, or good emotions gone wrong; see A.'s conunent at 69' 9-JI.

b 26-27 ""L"1Iv .•• ..Iv..~

This is substantially a repetition of 68b 3":..5. His effort in what follows in this chapter will be to .xplain Tivo, (see the chapter outline), but in doing so he is at the same time indirectly explaining "oo~ 'XO'TS~. But only indirectly; h. do.s not formally take up 3Z'cO, 8XOllU, or Hal dva~ until chap. 12. .

l.,,,a

b 28 ,,(""'" - "0'" picked up at 68b 30 and 68b 32 in ,,&..a "ai "ota: not only the particnlar things which motivate men, but also ",hat kind of things theyar•. The reason is given at 68b 29/£: MiAo. yae .•.

b 29 : 1 lYX.LpoiiaLV a&L".LV "put their hand to doing wrong." .,:,~ governs .."."Tio. ('''Ti). 68b 30. 1 Wv The antecedent is n6aa Hal nola 1:001:(.(1)', 2 oni> 8€ ""OAOYOU!'Evct> Sc. .".=io.. From A.'s use of "aT'1yoesr. and dno.loyer.8ae (sec 58b 8-12) it is clear that we are looking for material proper to judicial rhetoric. A practical and detailed example of the procedure is Cicero's analysis of Clodius and his activity in comparison with Milo and his actions in the Pro Milone.

b 31 :

68b 3S

231

COMMBNTARY

b 32 - 6ga 2 "civ~ 5iJ . .. 5.' cU.oyov Obviously. if we are to d.,. tennine causes for human action (Tlv., 'v.xa, 68b 27), we must know the nature of human action. This A. analyzes here in what is the most detailed effOrt in his work to classify the facets of human action. We find the idea in Plato, and elsewhere in A. but not in such detail; see, for example, Plato's La.vs 888e-889c and A:s All. Post. 94b 34 - 95a 9, Phys. I98a 5--6, Met. I032a 12-13 and I070a 6-8, EN I099b 20-23, III2a 32-33, and II40a 14-16.

I I I I chance

(aj involuntary All human action is

compulsion

necessity

nature

habit

(b) voluntary

rational

appetite (6e.<',)

l

irrational

A further analysis at 69a 2-4 will give A. the seven causes for human action, which he lists at 69a 6-7. The causes listed under (a) above (save nature) are extemal to the person; those under (b), internal. In knowing the cause, we know the reason fur someone', action and his disposition (Tlv., ".xa xal ",;;, exo.Te" 68b 27). It may hdp toward understanding hwnan action if we give a schema of the soul as the principle of human action, EN Il02a 26 - n03a 10:

,1101'" " 'i"'XIi My.vlx· ..

r '1''':''''.' 1 l ""Ovl'1J

Il

T ",d.

Ady.v I'eT~X'"

}

TO oe.xT,xdv

).oyt~&v

That part of the "irrational" soul called b",OV!'lIT'''.' somehow slrares in reason to the extent that it call comply with reason; see 6ga I : 2. illustrative of a dilference which A. obviously finds within this irrational- rati9nal appetency are 69a 1-4 and 70a 18-27. See 69a 32-35· b 34 -Nx'IV This will be explained in his comments on flt~ and b 35 : 1 oivciyX"IJ~ 2 lUI!' See 69b 5-6. See 69" 3S - 69b 43

'Puu.,.

23 2

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' I

69& I : 1 leo~ See 69b 6--7, - On 100s, see 'IDa 6: 1; c£ comment at 6Sb 24. 2 IIp_!;,y This word denotes appetency in the soul: it is one of the three dements in the soul controlling action and truth, the other two being aiaIJ"a" and v06s (EN II39a 1']-18). /JeB"s itself consists of three elements: potl)."a.s, o",..&s, and 'mO",..(a (De .n. 4I4b 2). When found in the "rational" soul (the soul acting with reason, d.d ).o)'.a~.....Jv /Jee'''' 69a 2), it is called potl)."a.,; when found in the "itrational" soul (the soul acting not under the ditection of reason, a.' tUo)'ov, 6ga 2), it is called O",..&s and ",,01J-o ,..ia (De an. 432b 3-'7). In the soul, furthermore, /Jet"s (appetency) is the single cause of motion (and therefore of action, which is our concern here). For it is /JeB", which offers the grOlUld for the practical intellect to corne into play, wo&. as the practical intellect cannot function without (fee<'s (De an. 433a 9-30, EN II3ga 18-36); see also Trendelenberg, D. anitna, pp. '5'-53. a 2 : 1 ).ay,...,x-ljv IIp_!;,y See 6gb ']-II; this is dId J.o),.a,..&. of 6ga 6. 2 6,' nay.... See 6gb II-IS; this is O",...v, .,,,O,,,..la. of 690 7. This statement on potl)."a., as the a 2-3 -lj pkv flrN).1)'''~ ... lIp.!;.~ rational wish or desite for the good is in complete accord with the explanation of the word in D. an. 3, chaps. 9'--II, and, in fact, is a summary statement of it. Once more Cope, p. Ig2, is prompted to characterize our lines as "the too unlimited statement of the WlScientific Rhetoric." Cope should begin the citation which he gives from the Nicotnachean Ethics as .. qualification not at lIlIb 26 hut at IIJIb Igff. He should also note that (fee"s at 6ga 3 must be .read as /fet"s ).Ol"C1T"'>7, as is more than clear from De an. 433a 23-26: "One is moved by rational desit. for the good when one is moved in accordance with reason; but /JeB", [appetency) can move one in opposition to reason, for I",O"",la [~dent, strong desire; some translate it as "concupiscence") is a form of lieB"s." Spengel himself suspected that .lOl"C1T"''i Hee"s should be read in our text at 69a 3 to define potlJ."a.s. Indeed in support of such a definition of potl)."aLf:, Spengel cites Top. 146a 36 - 146b 6. Cicero's statement on potl}.7Ja., as understood by the Stoics (Tusc. 4-6.rz) is directly to A.'. point. a3:

a4:

I

oU&d~ ycl:p ••• aytl80v

2

i\

See EN III3a 14 - III3b 3. See LS, dJ.J.d, 1.3, or dll' 11: "except."

&'6pE!;"~

See 69& I : 2. In the list of seven causes this appears as and is a synonym for it; see 6g0 II, 6gb II. a 6-'7 ..uX'l"... imOuflolClv On these various terms, see the references in the notes between 68b 34 and 6ga 2. Cope, [lltrod., pp. 218-33 discusses these seven causes. 1

naya,

z 6py";

0",..."

COMMENTARY

233

a 7-31 "'0 &~ ••• np......ov When A. calls the matter of these lines "8/ii8/iYo. (69) S) to the matter in hand he is perfectly correct. In the final

analysis, the causes for human action are those which he has listed. Other considerations such as age, wealth, and moral attitudes may qualify or condition the causes, and fur this reason are important, as he says at 69a 24-31. But they are not in themselves causes; nor are they oj necessity a part of any cause. Since his concern is with the seven causes fur human action, he excludes, rightly, anything which does not directly and necessarily belong to them. He admits, as noted above, that certain things do qualify and affect these causes, btlt they do not belong here and will be treated in their proper place (e.g., at B I2-17). . a 7 ...0 &£ npocr&ullp.icrO'IL "To divide further" would be useless since the cause in any instance (as he will show) will always be one of those which he has already given.

as:

..e. -1J)....11lV

as he did at 61b 7-14. See 62b I3 : 2. The word here would refer to the dominant habit which characterizes the person, e.g., the liar, the just man, the avaricious man, etc. The point which A. is making is that UB'~ are not to be included among the seven direct and immediate causes of action (e.g., 69a 15-1S), just as >}Oo, is not to be included (e.g., 69a IS-24), even though, as he goes on to say (69a 24-31), they may be influential and thus merit further study. It would be foolish to say that a man's established habits (or his character) do not enter into his actions, and A. is not so arguing. However, he does not want to admit them among the seven causes enumerated. The problem taken tip in 69a 7-31 may have arisen because of the inclusion of 690, among the seven causes. For eOo~ as that which we do because we do it repeatedly (69b 6) is the base for IE,,;, that stable disposition in the soul acquired as the result of repeated acts (62b 13 : 2), and for i/Oo" that sum of a man's physical and psychic nzture as it has been formed by his dominant habits (69a IS : 3). See S6b 36 : 2; i1TTa Tci 1<eano,..s.a = "any other fac3 .......... tors," such as poverty, wealth (69a II). 1

..

2

i!1l"~

a 9 au!,~.(3'1XOV The perfect here represents the result of the action as being maintained and continuing (S. 1946): quick tempers and strong passions are an attribute, a characteristic, a concomitant, of the· young. a II :

6pyi)v x..l b"Ou!,l..v The irrational appetencies of 69a 4. a68i: SlU tUoU't'ov xell lCEVlcxv sc. neanova& oE neV1JTe, "at 01 nAo-va,ol. 1

2

a 12 "'"Ou!,Eiv Both poor and rich act, as A. says at 69a 14-15, because of the presence of '"dlvpia. Although their poverty or wealth may con-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC 1 I

234

tribute to the cause (and this is the reason for the study of "d8o~ and -il8o~ in B), neither is the real cause of the action. Obviously the whole psychology of human .ction is at issue here. However, A.'s remarks within the limits he has set are correct. a I 3 ~'i.ual"" This is better taken as "excess wealth" which easily effects the ennui which resorts to seeking out new pleasures; see Thucyd. 3.45.4. On the interpretation here, see ']2b 20 : z. Some interpret the word as ICpower," rcconunand over~n -IJ&ov"'~ In EN TI52. 361£ A. treats of pleasure; .t II54' 8 - 1I54b 20 he treats of bodily pleasures, among which are those he calls necessary (II543 17).

a I4 l'iJ clv"'yx",ICdV

a I5 0l'.u,,~ i.e., the sarne explanation as that just presented is also true for those who act in accord with their dominant moral attitude (see 69& 8 : z). The point which A. wishes to establish in 69a 15-24 is that good or bad habits - though they may more or less dispose a person to good or bad action - are not causes of action in the srrict sense of the seven causes. a 17 &,,1. ..",ij..", Namely, the seven causes listed, as is clear from the followiug clause of explanation. See 69& 2 : 1. Since affections, feelings, and emotions are spontaneous and transient movements in the person, they are not, as such, under the control of reason: e.g., "a80~ in general does not appear to snbmit to reason (EN II79b 28-29) •. Thus "d80~ here would appear to carry on the contrast and 10 refer to the second member at 69a 2, 6,' ~Aoyov. 3 ijlh) This word, which we saw for the first time at 56a 2, is the name given to that firm disposition within man (especially with respect to the appetitive part of the soul represented by the "d8"1) which reflects the quality of his dominant habits. -il80~ is the name for the stable attitude and response partially formed under the direction of reason which a man assumes in the area of moral activity. For A. it expresses a certain direction of the person toward either the good or the bad. Consistently correct moral action means a good -il80~ just as consistently bad action means a bad -il80~; see 76a 25 : 2. Understood with o! "tv is "edEov ..~

a I8: 1 Aoy,al'Ov 2

"ci8o~

a I!)-20 aul'(!"'I~£,... 4XoAou8£;:~ At this point A. modifies his statement somewhat and thus is able to conclude as he does at 693 24-31. As he says here: "Still, such things [namely, actions based on good or bad -il80~, "a8o~1 do happen to follow regularly upon one set of dispositions, and other such consequents upon another set." On the force of a"oAou8 ••v, see 62a 29 :2.

69a 28

COMMENTARY

235

a 21 : 1 EOIlU~ ycip "for at once, immedi.tdy"; Cope, p. 194, has a note with references on etl8.~. It is to be taken with the verb and means that .lmost by tile very fact tl<.t one is a self-restrained or sdr-indulgent man, ones judgments on (d6~a,) and desires for pleasures will be good or bad; see EN n03 b 13-25. 2 Yala)~ here nleans "equally, in like manner," i.e., the temperate man acts temperatdy in the same !Vay as the intemperate man acts intemperatdy. From his understanding of l<'~ A. would not say that "perhaps," "probably" these would be the results; see remark at 6!)a 25. "For in a like manner good judgments on and desires for pleasures attend directly upon the temperate man by reason ofhis being temperate as the opposite .ttend upon the intemperate man with respect to the very same pleasures." 3 "' I"Ev "':''PPOVl See 66b 13; 68b 17·

a 23

...cj> .."o).ci.....'I'

See 68b 17.

a 24-25 Su\.. ETt'E0'9tu This is an important sentence; the contrast should not be missed: "Consequently while such classifications must be put aside, still the fact remains that we must consider ..." Although there is no indication in our sources, A. gives the impression that he is rejecting here the same kind of excessive classification as he rejects at 54b 17-18.

&.

a 24 .."."....0'1 As we saw at 6ga 7-3 I, A. does recognize that other concomitants may exert an influence on the causes for one's actions. He is ready to consider them in their proper place: e.g., B for "d80~ and >180,. .What he wishes to do here is to offer a working principle: namdy, that if a

concomitant can exert an in.B.uence on a cause, then it merits attention. The force of In6a()al. (see 628. a 25 norcz n:OLOl~ eiCa)8EV E1t'EOOClL 29 : .) is strengthened by. e!W8BV, and both express a fairly constant relationship between nota and nato". a 26 : 1 06&Ev to be taken with TroV TO'OUT",.: "none of the things such as I have been talking about" - namely, certain kinds of a&,a" l",,(J'Vp.ta" and also actions. 2 'rETClXTUL •.• ci.xoAouBEiv "is an ordained consequent"; i.e~ • consequent which is prescribed, destined to fOllow by reasoll of what whiteness, etc., is in itsel£ a 27 lj&rj &U1'PEpE' On '1a~, see 54b 7. "Whether one is young or old ... actually makes a difference." It is often dif1icult to translate iI~7J in instances like this; but the idea can be caught by the tone of e-"pression, e.g., this makes a difference." U

a 28-30 " ..l31."'~", """X.tV Here we have a specific application by way of a general rule (6,\",,) of the fact mentioned in 6!)a 24. Because one's

236

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

'J60~

does have an inauence upon one's actions, any such concomitant (TW' av",pa"o'TOJ') which eJIects a change in one's character ("0'" d.a!pie'" Ta '16",) will affect the inauencc of >J60~, and merits our attention. For example, as A. says, the thought that one is wealthy, or naturally wtIucky, can affect a person's general attitude. For the understanding of these lines something like Toua;;Ta u"."do. should be supplied after aT1lX'" (69) 30). a 28

~OlEi

takes the aCCl.1Sative and infinitive:

U

to cause, bring about,"

LS, A.Il.b. a 30 i1cn.pov

e.g., B 12.-17; but see also 693 24.

a)2. ..uX'l)~ A. begins here> brief analysis of each of the seven Illotives, beginning with the involuntary and concluding with the voluntary. Cope, Introd., pp. 218-33, studies each motive in detaiL In the Physics (195b 31198> I3), A. explains the meaning of TUm at greater length but in substance just as he defines it here; he tdIs us that with TVX'1 we cannot assign a cause to the event (<iT' del ... TeT«YI''''W,), We have already s X'1 at 6Ih 39 - 62a 12 and at 67b 24-. a 33 :

1

«iT!« "6p"rTo~

This is a cause which cannot be determined,

specified, by m:m; see Phys. 196b 28, 197" 9-10. 2 xell lLiJ EvEKCX SC. "al (Baa) I'~ Evt1'a. 3 ~EXci. TOU the object, or end, of one's action; the dAo~ which one h .. in mind; see 63b 16-17: "all that happens without a purpose."

For the idea, see 57a 34- and S'7ll 34: 3. a 34-: 1 .;,~ btl TO 7toAU 2 ....T«yp.Ev"'~ in the meaning found at 69a 26. Here the participle is used as an adverb. If one accepts the translators' "regularly," one must remember that the Greek word denotes "in accord with a rule, a norm, in a prescribed way." a 35 : 1 ~p"rp.oii -rij~ TUX'l)~ A. may possibly have in mind the explanation of chance given in the Physics passage cited in 69a 32. The kind of thing which he is discussing is any reality ("sel TOOTW.) the existence of which is explained by the defmition. 2
COMMENTARY

237

b 2 n:a.prz. rpaUL" is generally taken. to mean "contrary to nature"- see, e.g., LS s. "'aea, III.4 - a common enough meaning in A. (see, e.g., 700 9). The phrase ean also mean "side by side with" or "beyond" (0£ 68a 13, 74a 27) and with tbis interpretation the phrase would denominate "things which do not necessarily belong to nature yet are not contrary to it." Sucb a meaning would remove tbe puzzle which might arise with "onea "aTa <pouw in 69b 3: namely, if the things are contrary 10 nature, what is the point of .ttempting to determine if they are according 10 1wl"re? However, we can accept the first interpretation and assume that by "contrary to nature" A. means that there are things which are not the usual effect of the regular and uniform c.usality typical of nature. To attempt to determine precisely their causality as belonging either to some nature of which one knows nothing or to some other causality is not necessary in the use of such topic material in deliberative rhetoric, insofar as everyone would accept such a reality as the result of chance. b 3 ......."
6." Aoy.al'0v 6.

sc. "earreTa" the subject of which is Ta do-

238

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [

2 ..... 6oxoilv..... .... ...'P.pELV i.e., those things are done which from among the goods mentioned are judged to be useful, bene:6.cial, helpful. The "beneficial" is one of the three elements which for A. determine choice (the others are the noble and the pleasurable); see EN II04b 30-3'.

b 8 :

1 ....;;" EiP"'l"""""v i.e., chap. 6. 2 i\"~ ...u.o~ Ii .. ~ 1tpo~. • . The good is seen as beneficial either as an end in itself or as a means to an end.

b 9 o.....v ... 1tp«TTIJ....., The reason for this qualification is twofold. The first reason is the explanation of loy'''p.' given at 69b 7-9; the second, that given in the following sentence, 69b 9-u: the self-indulgent (01 Wc.lu,,TO.) can do something which is objecti,"iy bene:6.cial, but they do it, not because it is beneficial, but because it is pleasurable. This does not mean that there is anything wrong with pleasure. It can be a reasonable end, but it is not such for the self-indulgent (on whom, see 68b 17). b II eu ...ov s£ x ..i 6py1jv Since, as we saw at 69& 4 : 2, &eY'l is a synonym for O"p.~, we should take "at here with the connective at as link:mg alternatives: "or." At the same time, Cope's elfort, pp. 196-97, to differentiate meaJ1ings - e.g., passion and anger - is certainly not to be dismissed. "acts of revenge." Not only do they How b 12 : 1 ........ ,f£C'>P'l...'x« from anger, but, as is clearly noted at 69b '3-'4, they are intended for the satisfaction of the agent. "Chastisement" ("&la".~), on the other hand, is intended for the recipient as a form ofcorrection; nothing is said about whether it comes from anger or not. Clement of Alexandria (ca. A.D. ISO - ca. 21S) in his Strom.teis 7.895 (ed. Dindorf) marks the distinction well: "God does not act vengefully [npWe.ZTa,J. For vengeance is to do evil in turn. However, he chastises ["oAdC ..J for the bene:6.t of those chastised." z xQ),..",~ See 74b 33 - 7sa 2, Protagora. in Plato's dialogue of the same name (324a-c) with his theory of preventive punishment uses "OAdCBW and npwe.ZuOa. with no apparent differentiation. Aulus Gellius in Nottes A/lien, 7 (6}.14 has a relevant discussion on punishment in which he notes in passing that in the Corgias of Plato there is also no distinction between vengeance and chastisement. b 14 Iv .. oi1t01tA'IP... 8ij "that he might be satisfied." Bekker's correction for the reading "l"lecoOfj of some codd. is most reasonable and makes far more sense than the a".").1JeWOl1 of the best cod. It is read by four of the edd., Spengel, and Cope; Ross reads "A'1ewOfi. b IS tv...aU; .•. -e.;;"

i.e., B 2 for anger specifically.

b 16 : 1 -/jSm On the role of pleasure in all action ("pleasure and pain attend upon every action," EN II04b 14-1S), see EN II04b 4 - lIosa '7.

COMMENTARY

239

Furthennore. as A. tells US at 70a 17-18. "lm91Jpia is an appetency for the pleasant." • aUv'l9.~ - ~e"r'l:"" TO ,,,5• .,,9., is the customary. the usual; TO 19,crre•• that which is acquired by habit. A. seems to intend here a distinction between u~..,,8e, and l8,UTO•• We meet forms of ~..,,8e, at 71a 5. II. 25. and at 54"- 7; see too 68a 21. Prom its use the word implies something which comes from repeated action (as 54" 7 indicates). but for which one is more readily fitted by one's nature or to which one more easily adjusts because of one's nature. By contrast TO i!9,crre. would indicate something which is acquired by habit but which could be not fully consonant with. or even opposed to. one's natural inclinations. If this distinction is valid. TO l8,uTe. (the acquired hahit) is the result of deliberate. reasoned effort. and TO ~• .,,9., (the natural habit). though the result of repeated action. something to which one responds almost naturally. The reason is given in the following clause.: b 17 : 1 Ev 'l:OL~ IjU."v actions to which we habituate oursdves are done with pleasure. since habit is like nature (70a 6). and what we do in accord with nature is pleasurable (700 3-4). • qrua'L r would take this as the adverb: see LS. III. or Bonitz, Index 3a. b 18 : 1 c,a'<E This is the beginning of the general summary of the chapter; see chapter outline. Therefore one should place a period after "elevu... as Roemer and Kassel do. rather than use the serni-colon. which Ross prefers. Dufour and Tovar not only punctuate with a period. they also begin a new paragraph here; in keeping with the comment of the scholiast on this line. which implies such a break. The summary concentrates upon voluntary and deliberate action (the involuntary is passed over); for it is by deliberate action that one's virtue is revealed. On this. see comment at 69b 21. • auU"~""'I:' .[n.Lv The absolute infinitive is used idi01natically (but here without cb,). as we have seen a number of times (e.g.• at ssa 7 : 1). u1JAAap6.... "by way of summary"; see S. 2012. 1497. J c,a'<E ••• 4"llv'I:' ta'l:[v This is a result clause. with dlUTB and a fmite verb. A good illustration of this construction (see S. 2255). the dlcrre clause contains the main thought and states what is in fact the result of the matter discussed. b I9 il «Ylle.....
240

ARISTOTLB J cRBBTOllIC' I

provided in 68b 32 - 6ga 2. When the soul acts according to appeteney Wlderstood as practical reoson (lOrou ,.eTi".w), it attains, or should attain, to what is the truly good or the truly pleasant (draM, "aia). When it acts according to appetency understood as Td h"O.,.1Jn""7, it can sometimes be mistaken, for it sometimes seeks out the apparent good or pleasant (<paw",. ••a draOa •.. "dia); on this, see De all. 433a 26-30.

b 20-23 mEl... i)&tcz

The puepose of this statement is to identify:

(n) actions of which men are the cause as voluntary, and (b) the object of voluntary action as either the good or the pleasant, or the apparently good or the apparently pleasant. Actions of which men are not the cause are to be called involuntary. In this distinction all actions caused by chance, natuee, or compulsion are involuntary; see 68b 36 - 6~ 4.

b 21 oUX t!..Ov....~ The distinction between d"",. (involuntary) and 0,)" herb. (not-intentional) which we see at EN IIIOb 18/£ is not present here as Victorius thought; Due phrase means "not voluntary." 1 yap I would prefer to take this not as causal, but as more likdy what Denniston (p. 67) calls appositional rae: "And I consider, for example, among goods both ..."; see 66a 2S : 1. • ..czl njv This is picked up by "al nj1' at 6gb 26, and in each case the construction is balanced by distributing the article hetween the two nouns dnallar~v and ,.BTdl1J'P'"

b 23 :

f'o.[l;ovo~ ••. f'o ....a).'1',..v We saw this principle at 620 34 - 62b " (especially 62a 37-38). From what A. says there we can see with what right he says TiB1J,., l'a~ ..... TO'~ draBo'~' Oue phrase is generally interpreted: dVTI "6iCovo~ "a"oii, eldTTol'o~ "o>
b 24-2S 4v...l

""'~) Obviously, if they are such, then they are to be placed I.. Toi~ draBoi~; see 62a 21-22 and 63 b 12-14. All the edd. punctuate with the parentheses.

b 2S (•.ip... ", ...

b 26 il 'Pa,vof'o£VWV il is the reading of the codd. accepted by foue of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross introduces <.tv"1J~cii.> after <pawo,.i.",., clearly on the basis of a parallelism with "a"cii. at 6gb 24; there is no need for it. b 27 4v..l f'oE,l;6vb>Y

See 69b 24-2S.

lipcz is a logical connective with the force of oJ., ~* "and so." • .." CJUf'o'PEpov"", The av,.rpieov is an araO"., as is stated at 62a 20 and B 13, 903 I.

b 28 :

1

Ci9b 32

b 30 "ponpov

COMMENTARY

241

i.e., chap. 6.

b 3I ...,u~ &pou~ See 62a 21 : 2. Since the opening line of the treatise A. bas time and again given definitions for clarification and precision. In all of them A. states with competence and clarity necessary and helpful distinctions. In this respect we cannot quote against him his own words: "It is easier to do anything, no matter what, than to do it well" (Top. 139b 8). These definitions do not labor Wlder either of the two defects of a definition which he mentions in the same passage of the Topics (X39b 12-18): obscurity and prolixity. A.'s definitions in the Rhetoric are competent working definitions - which is to say that they are correct, adequate to the subject defined, enlightening, and helpful. See 6Gb 14: 2 and 69b 33 : 1.

i.e., overly precise, or technical.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 69b 33 - 70a 3

II

the meaning of pleasure

II . Devdopmeot: 70a 3 - 72:1 2 the consequents of tlris meaning I. ,.,.

3 -,.,. 16

2. 70a 16 - 70a 27

(a) 70" 16--,00 IS (6) -,00 IS - -,00 '7

3. 70a 27-721 2

direct cons.quents closely following upon the meaning pleasuse and desire: relation between desire and pleasure kind, of desire

pleasure studied in detail:

(a) -,00 '7--,00 JS (b) 70b I - 70b 3'

further analysis of tbcnature of pleasure pleasures connected with memory, antic... ipation

(,) 70b 3' -'/>. •

other pleasures

III . Conclusion: 72a 2 - 72a 3 b 33 : 1 {,noxel.. e... In the light of what has just been said about definitions in the Rhetoric (69b 3 I) this statement on pleasure would appear to be a striking <-""eption. Let us note at once that it is not a definition. A. says: "Let us assume as an hypothesis," which means "tentativdy, as a working proposition." But at the same time we must ask whether as a working definition it substantially represents what can validly be said of pleasure, or whether, as Cope, following others, would argue, it "is a mere hypothesis, which will answer the purpose of the rhetorician wdl enough, and satisfy a popular audience, though when we come to examine it more closdy we find that it is untenable. It is in fact in other passages of his writings both virtually and actually contradicted: but from the rhetorical point of view it is sufficient, because accepted" (Introd., p. 235). Spengd, pp. 157-58, would agree that the statemeot here is contradicted by those in the Meomachean Ethics. The contradiction, if there is such, will be found in the Ethics. For the passage from Book 7 of the Physics (247a 7f[), cited by Cope, but incorrectly, does not contradict the Rhetoric staremeots; and the passage from the De .,lima (431a 9££), in suggesting a rdation between pleasure and eveel'e
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

chaps. I-S. It is generally agreed that the later and more definitive treatment appears in Book 10 and that Book 7 (in fact, Books S-'7) was part of an earlier Eudemian Ethics which was brought into the Njcomacheall Ethics (,ee Festugiere, Lieberg). Our task is not to resolve A.', various statements on pleasure. The fact that he made a number of them which seem to differ is indicative of the difficulty which he experienced with the concept. Our task is to inquire whether A. would consider his general statement here at 69b 33 -700 16 substantially correct or simply a popular view of pleasure from which he can devdop his special topics for rhetorical discourse. Since the most definitive statement is thought to be Book ro, chaps. 1-S of EN, let us briefly compare it with our Rhetoric passage. But before doing so, we might note that if the statement in the Rhetoric, particularly 69b 33 - 70a S, would "satisfy a popular audience," as Cope says, then the audience was rather astute and intellectually sophisticated. Since the passage from EN most obviously contradicts our Rhetoric pass.ge in its denial that pleasure is • "lV~""~, and in its assertion that pleasure is closdy related to ~.t!w..a, a few points about A.'s use of "iv~,,,, in the Rhetoric passage are in order. First of all, he does not use the word absolutdy to explain pleasure, but speaks of pleasure as "lv1}"l. nva Tii' 'P"X~'. In its own way this indicates that pleasure is some kind of activity, an idea which is in accord with his view of pleasure as seen in Books 7 and 10 of EN, e.g., IIS3' 14: pleasure is an ..t!e'YSlu Tii~ "aTa ~a .. l~ew~. Secondly, in the Rhetoric passage A. does not use "{V1}""' "al yi..a." which is the usual phrase he challenges in EN (e.g., IlSlb 28ff., 1I74" I9ff.) and which identifies pleasure with the process·ofbecoming and therefore with something incomplete and lIlI>ving toward a TiAo,. Further, it is quite possible that the word "iV1}a., is used here as a synonym for ~.iw..a (e.g., Met. 10470 32: 'Yae ii ••l.e'Y..a p
ao".'

COMMBNTARY

identify with pleasure in se. In our passage the words which seem to point to such somatic pleasure are: "aTaO'TOO'W d,0eoav ... B~ T~" vndexovaav .",sa.. (69b 34-35), and TO T8 .1, ... liva, (70a 3-4). On the other hand, the words ~al pdl,a'TO {h:av ... "~y,,oflB'JIa (7oa 4-5) seem to point to the explanation of pleasure set forth in EN as something closely connected with iVEeyota T~' "aTa tp.sa .. '~e<", (lIS3a I4). As mentioned earlier in this note, this is, not an e1fort to present A.'s analysis of pleasure, but an attempt to show why any casual dismissal of our Rhetoric statement as wrong and without value or as an exercise in expediency should be received with care. A.' s hypothesis as a working definition does agree in general with EN 7 and 10. However, for contrasting views on the passage see Festugiere, pp. lxii-lxiv, and Lieberg, pp. 23-42. If, then, we make a comparison of the two passages to see what is said of pleasure, we find this: EN 10.1-5: Pleasure is a whole, something indivisible (like seclog) which is whole and complete at any given moment. This is the basic reason why A. is reluctant to call it "{"'7""as he ordinarily understands the word. Pleasure is to be found in the activity (the 'VEeyota) of the senses, of thought, of e''''eia. It is found together with the activity; it is in a way specified by, 'but it also intensifies, the activity which it accompanies. It "completes" the activity [as the principle of health "causes" the patient's health]. Without the activity there is no pleasure, and every activity "is completed" by its pleasure. Pleasure does not appear to be the activity (for example, sense perception) but it is diflicult to distinguish pleasure from the activity. Indeed each activity has its own proper pleasure, and therefore since activities di1fer with respect to goodness and badness, so do pleasures. One theme which emerges from this collation of statements is a conjunction of two separate things: activity aIld pleasure. They go together; pleasure is joined to the activity. Since the activities which A. is speaking about here flow from nature, pleasure is joined to the activities of our natural state. Rhetoric 69b 33 - 70a s: When we turn to the Rhetoric passage, we find that what is the heart of the statement (for all else develops from it) is the same kind of conjunction of natural state (nature) and pleasure (69b 33-35), what produces the natural st:lte will be productive of pleasure (70a 1-2), and activity leading to, or in accord with, the natural state will be pleasaot (70a 3-6). Translating the whole passage in the critical sections we have: "Pleasure is a kind of movement of the soul and a collective and perceptible settling down into one's natural state...• anything productive of the state just mentioned is pleasurable.... consequently it follows of necessity that both to pass into the natural state is, as a general rule, pleasant, and most especially is there pleasure when things done according to

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

70 a 3

nature recover their own special nature" (on this last, see EN II74b

14-2 3). Surely there is no radical disjunction of thought between the two passages. In EN human pleasure is joined to the activities of man's nature. In the Rhetoric pleasure is joined to man's nature" 2 ':'lIOxdaa", &'1\ The codd. read dB. Most edd. read d>i with Spenge!, who gives ample evidence in his notes on 55b 26 that d~ represents Aristotelian usage in this kind of statement. b 34-35 xal x....cia-r..a.v ••• cpUa.v See 6j1b 33 : I. It is argued by some (among whom are Spenge!, and Cope, Introd., pp. 234-35) that we have here the platonic theory of pleasure as the natural harmony of the human system such as can be found in Phileb. 3Iff.; a detailed rejection of the Platonist position is found at EN 7.II-I4 and IO.2-3. is the reading accepted by Roemer, Tovar, and Kasse!; b 35 et Ii"; Ross, Dufour, Sponge!, and Cope read .1 d' with codd. A and C.

'lOa I '<0 ""''I,<.xov See 62a 2']-28 for the general rule and 62a 29 : 1 for the underlying idea. This would be 69a 33-35: "[V7Ja" a 2: 1 elp~",Evq~ &lI.at"...,~ ~ ..a . .• tlnOexovaav ",va... In Cat. 8b 27 - 9a 13 we are told that a a"f8e ...~, as opposed to a IE.~, is more transient and less stable. As a term for pleasure, it is in accord with EN II75a 3-10, where we read in part "pleasure is not continuous.",. See 64a J2 for a comment on d"f8.a.~. , Z K ......""'cia..... ~ taken by Bonitz, Index 375a II-I6, as a synonym here of d.d880.,; I would agree. a 3 : 1 ,bUM oiN This is what follows of necessity if we assume pleasure to be as described. First we are given the immediate consequents (TO ~e .l~ .. ,,7Da 3-16), and they are alljoined to ",v...~ (one's natural state) and to activity, which is in some way related to that state. z ..6 'fE ••• ttv... "to pass, go, lUove into"; although these·words indiCate activity on the part of the person, they appear to denote some kind of y.v...., as the nature of pleasure. Such a definition of pleasure is rejected in EN (e.g., 1I53a 12-15, II73b 4lE), except for bodily pleasures when they are restorative and bring the body back to the perfection of its nature. But such "pleasures" are accidentally "pleasure" (EN II52b 34). i.e., "the natural state"; the use of the 3 dt; 'to HUT&; qNG'lV article to make a substantive of the prepositional phrase is ordinary in Greek and conunon in A. The use of "a~a ",va.., rather than a simple accusative object niv tptla .., is probably intended to stress the idea of an acting, not a

'lOa 6

COMMENTARY

passive, '1'6t1<~. We can see the difference at 70" 5 in the use of q>U'"' and "aT' atlT~' l'
a 4: 1 clJ~ ••• ",oAU For the idea, see S'73 34 : 3. TIris phrase will occur a number of times in this chapter. 2 ci'K£Ll.1)'96~a: i.e., to receive what is one s due; c£ comment on d,,06.M.a. at s4h 3 : 2 and see Cope, pp. II-U (particularly p. u). For th~ translation, see 69b 33 : 1.

n

t

a 5 : 1 ..-Ijv ~"'u"""" qrucr.v See EN II74b 14-'3 for an explantion of what A. bas in mind here: ''Pleasure is attached to all sense perception and also to thought and speculation, and each pleasure is most·pleasurable when it is most complete. But most complete is the pleasure of a well-<:onditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects" (II74b 20-'3). 2 ........ y.yv0l'.... '" Again activity is indicated, and it is activity in accord with one's nature ("aT' atlnl.). a 6:

1

.....

1!&rJ

At 69b 6-7 we are given the most explicit defutition of

100~ in A. Previous references to the word can be found at 6sb 24, 663 7 : 2, 693 I : 1, 69b 6 : 3. The definition at 69b 6-7 states that 100~ is the name

given to the acts which men do as the result ofhaving done them repeatedly. If this is so, then Tei 10~ would represent that set of an individual's specifically different actions, all of which constitute his habitual ways of acting. such habitual ways of acting are usually expressed in English as "the characteristic," or, "the typical," or, "the customary" ways of acting peculiar to the person (or to a moral person, such as the State; see, for example, the use at 6sh 24. and the comment on the State at 663 u). In this meaning it is easy to see how 180~ is the base for both iiOo~ and ll;.~. For its relation to iiOo~, see the explanation ofiiOo~ at 693 18: 3, and A.'s comment at EN n03a 17-18: "moral virtue [lj 7jO'''li] is formcid by 100~, whence also it bas its name [i.e., >i0<>Ut1.. Ho", ••• A. does look upon lOo, as opposed to q>U'''~ but that is because "what is implanted in us by nature cannot be changed by habit" (EN 1I03a 19-20). See 693 27. 3 i\6YJ

Tn

ARISTOTLB. 'RHETORIC' I

70a 14

In On Memory 4S2a 27-28 A. tells us that habit is practically like nature, primarily because (as we read at 4S2a 30) frequency of repetition (TO ",•.Ua...~: which is what produces habit) is the characteristic of nature. a 7

51'o,ov yap 'l"'

a 9 : 1

XCli..o I'ij j31.lLov There should be either a colon or a period before this phrase. The odd. print a period. Dufour and Tovar also begin a new paragraph here. We are to understand with this phrase clvdy,,'7 >la~ ,Iva, (70a 3). z "upelt rpUa", Here: "contrary to nature"; see 6gb 2. Ross alone of the odd. prints ",aea ... 'tpv in parentheses.

a 10 ..0 ""uyxci'ov At ~t. IOIsa 20 - IOIsb IS we are given four meanings of "necessary" as it is popularly understood; T. pta••v is one of them (see Ross, Metaphysics; Bonit'>:, Metaph}'sica; or Wait'>:, on An. PO!t. 83b 38, for a discussion of the meaning of necessity in A.). A. reduces these four meanings to the one which we saw at S7" 22 - s7b 2 r, 3lld to a degree seen here: namely, that which cannot be other than it is. The other three meanings, as he says at Met. 10lsa 3S-36, come from this meaning. I accept the comma after pta as read by Spengd, Roemer, Dufour, and Ross (Cope, Tovar, and dva""ai.v the at ,ba""a, of Kassel use a period). Kassd alone reads for cod. F.

T.

""'v yeltp . • • This line, attributed to Evenus of Paros, is quoted again by A. in BE I223a 30-]3, and at Met. 10Isa 29-30, together with a similar line from Sophocles. Evenus was apparently an degiac poet and a sophist living iD. the time of Socrates, as we would gather from Apol. 20a-c and ph..J. 6od. His death is thought to have followed shortly upon that of Socrates in 399. He is mentioned in the Phaedrus (267") as one of the rhetorical technographers involved apparently with study of the parts of speech (see S4b 18 : 1). The line quoted in our text appears among his elegies (Hiller & Crusius, no. 8) and among the degies of Theognis (ibid., line 472, where zefj,..' is read in place of our nea.",..'). a II

a 12 AU"'lP~

sc. clvdl''''1 .lval from 7fJa 3.

a 13 i8,o8",a,v The subject of this verb is not TaiiTa as one might believe from some interpretations (although it is possible grammatically; see S. 9S9), but "men." Strictly speaking, men are the only ones who can form habits: "unless men have become accustomed to them."

a 14 :

1

"OLEi

ij&Q

See 69b r6-r8.

Telt 5' ivu"'l"lu It is interesting to see that A. has given each of the nouns in 7fJa I I a pair of opposites in 70a 14-16: e.g., b<,,..eAe'a~ (care, concern): clpile.a - na,ala, (indifference-amusement); a"ovM~ (trouble, 2

70' 19

249

COMMBNTARY

effort): eaOv,.la.-ano.ta. (idling-liziness); (11JC1To.ta~ (intense application): c!.a"cWl1"~ - ;J".o~ (rest from, reIax.tion....Jeep) . TWv ir6tc..v sc. T', and see 6'7& 22 : 2; C£ also 7Ia 8, 17. xcd eN We begin here an analysis of desire as pleasant; see chapter outline. I note that Dufour begins a new paragraph here.

• 16: I

2

ir .".!lufL'el C£ 69a 4, 7; 69b 15-16; 69" I : 2. Obviously such desire, since it is present in one's nature, is I
1

2

£vn

a 17-18 ""oU irliio~ ... 3pe~.~ This is a more precise statement explaining the one at 69b 15-16. Thi. definition is found again at De 414b 5. A. a definition it is examined at Top. 140b 27 - 14Ia 4 (and again briefly at SE 173a 38-40) and aIlowed to stand as valid. Quite reasonably so; for, as we see in De an. 414b 2, 8e'~'~ is a generic term for what appears as flo';l~I1'~ in the rational soul, and as Ov,.d" .,nOv,.la in the irrational soul (see also 432b 5-'7). This natural relationship between desire and pleasure so well expressed at 62b 5-7 is also mentioned by Plato (Phf1Lt/r. 2nd), who calls it an 1",Ov,.la which is l"
.n.

a 18: I IIp6~'~ See preceding note and 69a 1 : 2. 2 "";;V lit E7t.!lufLlc.>v On the division given here at 70. 18-27 between rational and irrational desires see the schema at 68b 32 - 69a 2. EN II47b 21 - Il48a 17 will explain rather well what A. has in mind when he speaks of rational md irrational desires here and in what follows down to 70a 27. Our text between 7Da 18 and 7oa27is read by the edd., except Kassel, and by Spongel and Cope. I read with the edd. Agreeing with Spengel on the conB.ict with 69a 4, Kassel secludes 7Da 18-27 (TW' ... " ••<70ene,) as an Aristotelian addition. The schema at 68b 32 - 690 2. replies in part to Spengel's reservations, as do the notes which follow here. J ell fL£v liAoyo. This is in accord with 69a 4 and in the schema would correspond to ....Ov,.~T<",;.. However, that there are I",Ov,.ta. which are ,.BTa ldyov i. at variance with the statement at 69a 4 but not with the schema at 68b 32 - 690 2; there Myov l'eTixe,. i. a part of the appetitive soul ca1Ied by the general name TO oe.,m"••. a 19 : 1 cU6you~ Cope, p. 203, compares these with what he caIIs "the Platonic "',Ovl'~T&I<6. (Republic)," and cites R£p. 554a, 558d, 559" 1£, and 572C. Kassel reads C!Myov, I'i. with some codd. and gives good evidence for doing so. 2 IIcrel~ must be taken as a cognate accusative (Sua, bnOv,.ia,) with l"'Ov,.••• which ordinarily takes a genitive.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

70a 25

a :z.o: 1 ToG \In:o>.u",(3mvolv "from a formed opinion, from some kind of understanding." fmolafJ{Ja.... frequendy means: to take up, entertain, accept a proposal, an idea, an opinion, and tberefore to understantl, i"terpret, form an opinion. Weseeitso used at ru, I:z.a 30-31. It indicates activity of the mind, and A. wishes to underline in these 'm6vfJia. cUo)'o. the absence of such activity. Some of the codd. make the point more obvious by reading Ix TO. v"olafJ{J&.... n, which is read by Cope and Kassel. z et.,.lv lit To my mind there are two important places for proper punctuation in 70. :z.o-25: narnely, before "0'1. at and after in 70. 25. I would punctuate thusly: .m6vfJo.aw· .10'1. a•... 0."". I note that the edd., save Ross, so punctuate. Ross introduces parentheses at 70. 20-:>5 (elal. a•... if.",,) apparendy in an effort to tie the entire statement between 70a 19 and 7Oa:>7 closely together. Ross's punctuation and parentheses can be accepted.

0.,,"

1 """,op ,xl . •• IIn:mpxou.,..., This phrase explains cp~a••• Natural desires are "like those present in us through the medium of the body."

a 21 :

2 olov " ... XCll "OLV" A. here exemplifies what he means by at ... ,jnciqxovaao: "as, for example, thirst for nourishment or hunger for nourishment." Spengel is not happy with the text at 7fJa 21-25 (010' .•. 0.,,"); nor is Kassel (see 7Qa 18 : z), who also brackets M."a "al ",'va. However, the text is well attested and makes sense as we have it. Spengel's major problem was with di."a "al "".a, which he said are not InillvfJia., but are caused by them. But A. uses the same expression when speaking of desires at B 12, 89a 3-9 ; in De an. 4I4b II-I3 he calls them 1".6vfJia., as does Plato in Rep. 437b-e.·

a. . 22 xal XIX'- ExIXG-rOV ... E:7u8ufJ.LUt; i.e., "corresponding to each kind of nourishment there is a form of desire"; as there are specific nutritive needs, so there are corresponding desires. a 23 xed til sc. b,,01J~la,. A. mentions desires with respect to taste, sex, touch in general, smell (fragrance), hearing, and sight. a 24 [€u",liu.~l Vablen following Muret deletes this word found in all the codd. because he cannot explain it as a genitive. It could be an accusative (see Plato, Tim ....s 560) and explanatory of oerfJ>1" which in fact is frequendy used for foul rather than pleasant smells. Our word, however, looks like a gloss. Though one would like more certainty before secluding it, the fact is that all the edd., Sponge!, and Cope bracket it.

/l.,...

a 25 : 1 is the reading of the codd. accepted by the edd., except Ross, who reads 8era, (c£ 70a 19). Spengel and earlier editors would agree with him. Reading with the codd. we can take the relative pronoun as a cognate accusative: "all the desirings which they have."

70a 28

COMMENTARY

251

2 .K .. aU "€LC,8ijvClL explained by the following sentence. The verb clearly, in the conte.'Ct, indicates the exercise of reason and thus the translators' phrase: "from being convinced," "from conviction." See Studies, pp. 3-5. The role of reason ill persuasion is stated well at De all. 428a 22-23: uFurtb.ermore, every opinion implies conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and persuasion implies reason." Hicks's comment (p. 464) is also to the point: "There cannot be belief Ii.e., nilT<'~] without persuasion and, apart from the direct evidence of the senses, there cannot be persuasion without reasoning."

a 26 ".).).ci ycip ...•",Bul'aU,rtV These rational desires can be either natural or acquired, and Cope, p. 204, is wrong in distinguishing between irrati~" desires as "natural and necessary" and rational as "artificial and acqmred.

.".l

.""'v ...

a 27-32 5' Cd"8YJ"L~ The /irst thing to note here is that Cope, following Victorius and Vater, is surely right in finding the apodosis to the sentence which begins lnsl a'sud. (70" 27) at 70" 30-32: MiA •• lin ... aruO'1u,~. Those who wish the apodosis to be at 70" 29-30, cisl s• • cji ••• Unle.., must explain the logic of such a sentence. For example, how does it follow from the fact that pleasure is the experience of a certain feeling, and that <pa••aula is a kind of experiencing, that <pa..auia attends upon remembering and anticipating? On the other hand, if we take 70a "'7-30 as consisting of three prefatory statements summed up by the prowis, eE dt '0;;'., at 70a 30 and the .podosis at 70a 30-32, the whole passage down to 70a 35 makes an articulated statement and serves as the foundation for everything which follows down to 70b 32. In this interpretation I am reading at 70a 29 HClel 8V of Susemihl with Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar (Kassel reads >
a.

a"

a 28 'P""....,,(.. In De an. 427b 27 - 429a 9, A. speaks of ",a••auia in this way: it is the faculty by which we say that an image presents itself to us;

ARISTOTLB, cnSETOB.IC' I

it is that by which we judge ttu!y or &lsely; it is not sensation (araO'l'''~) as such, or knowledge (.,,,ani,.'l, .ojj~), or opinion (Mea); it is a kind of motion which does not arise apart from sensation, and it has the objects of sense for its objects; it is a motion generated by actual perception. fmagination may be true or &lse. At 433b 29 we are given a more extended meaning: "imagination may be rational or it may be imagination ofsense." In qualifying imagination as araO'lat~ ,,~in our text at 70a 28, A. is certainly not deviating in any large way from his statement in the De allima. a 29 oiXoAOU8oi:

For the idea, see 6". 29 : 2.

We find the idea at 620 29-31, 63b 28-29; and so here: fJ.,.a (d"OA01!Ooiia.) ~ ".T.l.: "simultaneously attend upon ... "

a 31 4",,,

,..,.V7j,.....

a]2 "ciVT" Til -IjS." EN rr68a 13-14: "Activity [••ieyetaJ fuI£lling itself in the present, the hope which looks to the future, the memory of the past are pleasurable. The most pleasant and the most cherished is activity fulfilling itself in the present." '7Ob I Til "'"" jMa. As can be seen in both cases the present ("ae&.Ta) has a role (see 70b 9-10) which bears out the comment from EN cited in 700 J2. Together with our lines here on the place of memory and anticipation in ."periencing pleasure, one should read Plato, Phileb. 34-36.

,.V7j-

"to 1'E'l'ci. ~oU~O i.e., "the sequel." As we have seen, a common use of the article with a prepositional phrase forming a substantive. S. 1153C.

b3

b 4 ,i),).' .•• "Ovc.Jv Eur., Andromeda, frg. IJl, ed. Nauck; see Cicero's "suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria" (De jill. 2:]2.105).

Od. 15.400-401 (see the entire passage, n. 398b 5-6 ",.Til ...•6pyn 402). Line 401 is not exact and may be a "lapsus memoriae" on A.'s part; it is further confused by the fact that we should (as Spengel notes) have the indicative with "''laa,. ••or; on. If we read with Kassel """"B'O~ aaTL~, we have, in his words, a "forma inaudita" in o~. Both passages cited by A. are commonplaces, as the citation from Cicero above Sllggests, and illustrate Vergil's "Forsan ct haec olim rneminisse iuvabit" (Aen. 1.203). See also Sen.,

,..r,,.••

COMMBNtARy

Hercules [Furms] 656-57, and the fragment of Soph., Tympanista., no. 574, ed. Campbell

b7:

J 3

'roUTOV &' ut"rlOV se. ean. sc. EI1',",; the subject of this clause is the followIDg

a... ~&U

phrase. See 62a 36; "at is intensive. 3 Ked ..o "" ExE." K""6v 4 ..ci &' tv 0..,,[&. i.e., things hoped for. This passage carries on the devdoprnent of 70a 32-34 (OlI1'r' ... l'iUo.Ta) which was begun with TcZl''''1I'0VS1ITd at70b I. We are to understand with it ~6ia lan. from 70b I. b 8 : 1 3.." "'''po".." Take circumstantial participle as temporal (see S. 2069) and translate: "all things which whenever they are present." a cognate accusative (for the use of the adjective, see a "Eyen.. S. 1573): "to confer great delight or advantage." The phrase should probably be taken closdy b 9 : 1 K"l &vEl> "U""l~ with what precedes as a qualification of (~'PelB" at 70b 8. On 11•." l*,,!, cpo 63a 23-24. and 64b 23-26, 65b II-I3 on its assumed rdationsbip with the pleasant. a "' ..p6v.... See 70b 8 : I.

1 KCll o..",U;o"..,,~ B~'Peat'B' with this clause:

b 10 :

"al responsive: "also"; we are to understand

"also delight ..."

a w~ ... na>.u See 7Ila 4 : I. 3 &.0 This sentence down to 70b 15, >1TTO. (after which there should be a period; I note that the edd. so punctuate, e.'
II

~&U

See A.'s comments on anger at B

2,

78a 30 - 78b 10.

b 12 8~ ... KCl". ••~Of'olvo,o lli.d t8.I09 (see also ll. 107-10). This line is quoted again, together with I. no, at B 2, 78b~. b 13-15 o{,9el~ ycip ... in parentheses.

i\ ij.....ov

Ross alone of the odd. places this

"at one manifestly beyond the reach of b 13 : 1 TijI •••
ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 1

254

70b 21

has no authority. With the codd. we interpret: "nor even at those far above them in power, with whom they either are not angry or are less angry." b 15 "ott lv ..cd~ Tills begins a new illustrative topic on desires and appetites. Therefore there should be a period after i!TTOV (see 70b 10 : 3); Dufour and Tovar in &ct begin a new paragraph. On d"OAOVO ••, see Ci2a 29 : •• b 16 : t l\ I'.fLVlJp.£vo, . . • !l D... (tOV1:~ For the idea, See EN rr66a 24-26, where we are told that "such memories (Le., of the past) and hopes (i.e., for the future) are 1jd"a•." The accent in Ross's text on the second 1j is incorrctt. 2':'~ The first cL~ is the relative adverb of manner; the second, the relative co.yunction introducing an object clause. But both can be interpreted as the relative conjunction introducing an object clause. There is no problem with ll'Il.7ju""v and the cL~ object clause, but Un'C... ordinarily takes a OTt object clause. still the shading between OT. and cL~ in such constrUCtion is slight. b 17 :

1

.., ... ~6ov-ljv

•

EX0"""O'

cognate accusative: "enjoy a certain pleasure." It is probably best taken with l. TO'~ nve'TTO'~ (c£ Plato, Phileb.4Sb): "those with fever," though it could be taken with Ta,~ M'Pa,~: "held fast by thirst." The first interpretation makes Ta,~ at'Pa,~ the object of xa'eova,., and the statement now illustrates more precisely the introductory observation at 70b IS: namely, that some pleasure attends upon most desires. The Ta,~ with di'Pa,~ represents the unemphatic relative pronoun (S. 1121): "their thirst." b)8 : t _" ...... "cd "both .•. and." ..:,~ the relative adverb of manner, but see '7Ob 16 : •• This contract form of the future (for "".aBa,) is 3 ....1,,8.. , another example of a later development in the language structure. Its presence here raises a question: namely, when, precisely, did this form arise? LS, s. v., consider instaoces from the classical period as "falsae lectiones," and the instanCes which they cite from the Septuagint and the New Testament are not contract futures. b 19-20 " ..t ypcl;cpov-..~ " ..t "o'oUvd~ .. , This probably should be interpreted: "and writing and busying themselves in some way about the beloved." But it is possible to interpret as Cope, p. 208, does: drawing likenesses and composing bits of poetry; for l'ecvp'"q (drawing) is one of the four branches of education (Pol. 1337b 23-"7); and reatpoo7 clearly refers to painting, as nO''lToo7 does to poetry, at 7Ib 6-7.

b 21 : t

"Q,.u..Q'~

thernsdves about.

i.e., such activities as convening, writing, busying

COMMENTAllY 2

olav

2SS

In the light of the use of the genitive with p'p'~C1"opa,

at 70b 23, 0.0' quite possibly is to be taken hote as the adverb with alaBd••..Ba<: "for in all such acts, because of their remembering, they believe that they sensibly perceive, as it tvere, their beloved." But I would prefer to take it as the relative pronoun (such as we see it at 70b 2S), the object of 1'_1'''''1'''0' (for A.'s usc of the accusative, see 89a 24-25) - i.e., /Jsp,'IJ"Ip.i1lo, l'OtOUTOV olo~.q, becoming p_p'~p"OI olo. (S. 2S32): "remembering the kind of person he was they believe that they sensibly perceive their beloved." b 22.-23 x,d &pxiJ .•. &",6v" I'iJ "'''pdV'", x,d tv nivS.a, ......~ iJSav>j. This is the way these line. are read and punctuated by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Ross. We must first note that there is a major breakdown in the text tradition at 70b 24 which is not easily resolved from a .tudy ofthe edd., including Kassel. The codd. read 1'0'1'0''11'0''0' (PP'~p"o,~ is a conjecture ofSpengel's) and lewa .., which was first bracketed by W 01£ Kassel attempts to stay with the reading of the codd., but hi. reading is in part a reconstruction. Since I would prefer to read with the codd., I do not readily dismiss his reading, which retains both p£p.~pI.o. and lew ..... However, faced with manuscript readings which are beyond my conttol I am accepting the passage as printed above. There is one change which I believe mu.t be made in the punctuation of the edd.: JWne!y, a colon after "ae",a., not a comma. I would then interpret 70b 23-26: "whenever they not only find pleasure in the presence of the loved one, but also whenever they, as they recall the absent one, are overcome with grief by reason of his absence; in the same way there is a certain pleasure which attaches to mourning and lamentation (for a departed one)." This i. a responsive "ai: "so too." Four of the edd. punCtuate b "s x ..1 with a comma before "at. Kassel, Der Text, pp. 12-7-28, wants a strong break before "at to introduce a new idea, which continues down to 70b 29 (on a parallel with 70b 1S-16: "al ... >iaoVrJI' This is a matter of interpretation, but his suggestion has merit. b 26 AU"'! This picks up "I.B .... "al Be>i'o", 70" 2S. b 2.7 bpciv _~ i.e., "and in a way (as it were) seeing bim." b 29 .:.~ ... yoo.o b 30 :

Iliad "3.108; OJ. 4.183 (II3).

See 69b I2-14.. eN There are two ways in which this can be understood. prefer the first: namely, oJ as the rdative pronoun object of T1I)'Xd•••• r .... 1

2

" ... f'Wp.iaU ..'

256

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

7Ia

1

ferring to Td ,,!'OJe.rcr8a.: "for not to obtain revenge is painful"; see the use of oJ at JOb 34. The second way is to take oJ as the adverb, LS, Bri-J, A.b.I; then Td!,i, T"l'X".... = failure. b 31 ~.p~).-Ir.....~ gandy." b 13 :

I

... tAOV(XOl~

2

",<1.....110("

"in a way not to be surpassed," i.e., "extrava-

See 63b I. ycl:p Sec 7Da 28. We sec in this and the following lines (down to 710 ra) how imagination, the presentative faculty, works to make an image real to us, and dIus affects our appetitive system. 3 .m:EPOXij~ For the idea, see 63b 5-12 and the notes. At 6]a 22-23 we are told in what dIis "pre-eminence" consists as far as .1x7J is concerned. At 68a 23-26 (and see 68a 23) this rdation between a specific preenIinence and virtue is made into a general rdation: pre-eminence = virtue. b 34 il lLiillov is dIe reading of the codd. and dIe edd., except Ross, who reads a tentative conjecture of Spengd's: "!',,.1a. Certainly the reading of dIe caddo does not call for any change. Cope's translation (p. 210) of !,cU.1o. is quite to the point: "of which all fed dIe desire eiilier in a slight degree or more strongly," i.e., "all fed dIe desire more or less." b3S: I Iivcl:yx"II If the statement (70b 32-34) on victory is true, dIenthe sense of pre-eminence experienced in winning at competitive activities makes them pleasures, as A. also says at 7,a 1-2 (,,0.1l""'~ ... ""Ii'), and 7Ia 6

(8"ov ... lam). 2 7t,"8Lc1:~ See 70a IS and 7Da '4 : z. The character of "a,d,,, as amusement is "clearly stated at Pol. I337b 29 - 1338a I where its role in dIe vtry inIportant concept of leisure is stressed.

7Ia I : I ...~ !LOX'l""KcI:~ Because of dIe contrast here widI T,k Ae'CfTI""~ and the context down to 7Ia 8 in which A. exemplifies each genus (i.e., Ta~ !,a~n",~~-T~; Ae'~'"d~) we shoul~ interp~ this ~~d as "physically competltlve, not warlike, fit for fighttng, etc. ; e.g., games must be pleasurable, bodI those which are physically competitive and dIose mentally competitive, ... as wdl as games of knucklebones ("al
COMMBNTARY

257

a 2 1i....p..yClA(....~ On this and the following two g"lIlCS, see."Astragalus," "Ballgames," and "Dicing" in the OCD. "'Breel.. is a game similar to backgammon, and this could explain why A. distinguishes it from ""p./... But it is often quite ditlicult to distinguish the two when they are met in the literature. The scholiast on Eur., Medea 68, for example, explains " .....o.~ (possibly a proper name for the place where " ...<101 were played) as TOU~ T&"O"~ TOW ""P'''Tiiw; sec also Plato, Phaedr. 274d, Rep. 374C. There is a rather moving comment in Cicero's De sellectule (16.58): "Let the young [have their games] but let them leave to us old men from their many games our dice and backgammon."

a3 EO'1'Cau&a.ap.6va.~ i.e" "seriol1sly treated" which can be tumed: t'of a more serious kind"; in other words, games calling for careful attention and study. ..I

a 4-5

fL£v . . .

a 5 cruv-ljhJ~

cd &'

The serious games fall into two classes.

See 69b 16 : z.

a 6 c!1p.Ill..

Cic., De fin. 5.22.61, paints a delightful picture of the competitiveness of children at games.

-I) &.XCIV.X-I) x .., [-I)] tp"......x-Ij is the reading of three of the odd. and Spongel; Kassel OIuits [7j] altogether; Ross and Cope read unbracketed 7j. It does not appear in cod. A but in a number of other codd. dX"'I is prohably understood with both words, in which case 6."a"">1 would refer to judicial rhetoric, some of the bad aspects of which A. attacked in chap. I. In our present chapter (together with chaps. 10, 12-14) by this detailed analysis of the subject matter ofjudicial rhetoric A. places before us many of the comple:x intellectual challenges of legitimate judicial rhetoric. On ee.tIT.,,>1, see 718 1 : z. 2 -1)&.,.. is the way this word is read by the codd. and the edd. e:xcept Ross, who reads old/a. On the question of orthography, see the comment at 61a 3 : z. 3 .le'''P.£VOL~ "..1 &uv"fL£vO'~ These are closely related, i.e., the repeated activity develops the ability. It is both which make the action second nature and therefore pleasurable; sec 70a 3-9. a 7: 1

a8:

... p.>\

See 61a 28 - 61b 2. Sec 6ra 25-27. 3 ...;;,. -I)&i!J'nI>V See 6zb ZcrZ2; on the constrUCtion, sec 678 22 : 2. I

z .6&01;1..

S... "oLoii ..o~ oto~ sc. 8n To,oiiTd~ ('tln) old~ «tIT.)
a 9:

I

z .;

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' I

7Ia 16

a 10 : 1 a",..v'l'''''''v For the idea. see EN IIS9a 16-24; and for a more derailed explanation of what A. has in mind. see B 6. 84a 23 - 84b 26. 2 ",ou,;;",o, i.e.• those whom one bdieves to be telling the truth. and especially those. as this topic indicates. who bdong to the first member of the comparisons down to 7Ia 14. although favorable commendation from either member of the comparison contributes to one's pleasure. a II 01 ""v>ie.,~ See 710 5 and 69b 16 : something like "one's familiars, intimates."

2.

Here the word means

a 12 : 1 ......v 0I_8ev Cope. p. 213. has a detailed note on the use of the suffix -0." as indicative of the fact that the Greeks marked spatial distance not from the person measuring. but from the object measured to the person measuring. Z ot'l'Pav,f.LO' See 64b 12. 66b 20-22. a 13 : 1 "'PpoVV. The artide is omitted here and with dAly.,v (7Ia 13); see S. IIz6.3. II29. On the idea in the word. see 68b 22. Z ElK6~ See S7a 34 : 2. a 14 "'oU~ dp'lp.Evou~ The subject of the infinitive, it refers to the general dasses in the nominative case in 71a 11-13. which. in turn. are the specifications of TO.O.TO. in 7Ia 10.

.,..1 ... ""

This sentence concludes by way of confirmation a 14-17 the statement at 7Ia 10 ("alpcioUov •.• d.l'10'';BW). The antecedent of eli. (7Ia 14) is TO~T"V (7Ia IS). and at 7Ia 17 with ''''Be and d.' cUA. TO one can understand mlrcji pU." "for one pays no attention to the honor or esteem o£ those whom one gready disdains. such as children or the uncultured at least not for the sake of the esteem itsdf; but if one does attend to it. he does so for some other reason." 81)pwv The translators interpret this as "animals. beasts." Certainly this interpretation makes no sense in the context for reasons which should be obvious. The word can be used in a condemnatory sense of men as we find it in Plato. Pha.dr. 24ob. and in A., EN I1I8a 23-25. II48b 19 - II49a 20. Therefore interpret the word as "uncivilized people." B 6, 84b 24 should be interpreted in the same way. Confinnation of this meaning can be found at eo•• and MM I200b 9-II: "for whenever we see someone 7Sa 6: 6'1e • utterly bad we declare that he is not even a man but a beast [IDei 8'1e'ovj." See also Theopompus' use of the word to describe Philip of Macedon's followers as wild beasts. in Jacoby. II.B.s84.

a IS

.,M"....

For the completion of this phrase. see 71a a 16 ciAA-' £t,..p, 6,' UAAO or, 14-17. This kind of condensed expression is not unconimon in A.; see. e.g .• EN IIssb 30. II68a 12.

7Ia 22 a 17:

1.59

COMMBNTAllY

1

Ii
z -rWv 1IIIiwv

See 6Ib 35-38. On the construction, see 67a

22 : 2.·

a 18 (06I1El~ •.. 01"'1') A:s point in this parenthetical remark is: to like, or to love, means· to find pleasure in (xale"")' as words compounded with 'P"'" clearly denote. The parentheses are used by the edd. and Cope. a 18-19 ","'''LV ..• ","'''LaO",

11M

On friendslrip, see B 4.

These lines give the reason why 'P<.Mu9a. is "d6. The reason fundamentally is that they indicate the presence of a]la9 •• in the person loved. Cope, p. 1.14, appears to take the first clause ('Panau;a • •• ald9av.,.••o., 7Ia 19-20) as exemplifying TO 'P ...... >ld6 and saying that one sees good in what one loves. But this does not seem possible, unless one reads as Ross does at 7Ia 20: aVTIji TO dJla9o• •1.a.. The second clause (TO d. 'P ....<79a • .•. d.' aUTO', 7Ia 21) is then taken as exemplifying TO 'P""u8a, "d6 (7Ia 19), and declaring that being a loved one is good because that which is loved for itse!fis good. However, the more correct explanation would seem to be that 7Ia 19-21 explains the second clause TO 'P ••••<79a. >166 and does so by asserting that the person loved sees goodness in himself because he is an object oflove. a 19-21

",Il"""alll y«p . . • II,' ..u,
a 19 : 1 ",..",
stance. 3

This is

'
the articular infinitive modifying 'Pav-

Taula; see following note. a{,'
desire." • 0& T
On the good as the object of universal desire, see

a 21 II,' ..u-relv If the good is that which is chosen for itself (see, e.g., 6Ia 21-22, 62b la-II, and 62b 19 : .), the implication is that when one is cherished for oneself one is seen as good. a 22:

1 2

,<10 Oaufl-cil;EaO/l, See B 6, 842 23-]2. II,' 116'<0 '<0 ,<,,,,,,a8a, is the reading of

the codd. accepted by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Sponge! (though not happily), and Cope. It

260

AlllSTOTLB, 'RHETOR.IC' I

would be interpreted "because of the honor itself," which, of course, is implicit in the admiration given. Ross follows an equally good text and reads dod ",lTo TCP "I'iiu6.o, which is also Kassel's reading. On the grounds of 6sa 17, both insert . Both readings make good sense and there is nothing definite in the context which would argue for one over the other. J ...1> "oAClXeU.,,8cll flattery in EN II08a 28-29, II207a 7-IO is called the act of pleasing others with the ulterior motive of some material gain. In the Rhetoric, B 6, 83b ]2-35, A. gives some qualities of flattery which are consonant with the statement here, and they do not include the idea of seeking material gain. a 24 '1''''''16"""., '1'0.0, At EN IIS9a 13-16, II73b 31 - II74a 1 the distinction made between friend and flatterer clearly shows why the flatterer is an "apparent friend."

cNv'I)8., See 6l1b 16 : z. the philosophical imperfect; see 63a 9 : 1. The reason for the truth of this statement was given at 69b 16-18. J "",l..... " ......~cill.'v This does not appear to be a statement about change in se but is to be read within the context to indicate that change from an established and set way of acting is pleasant. As such, it declares what is obvious: namely, that any shift from a highly organized pattern of acting tends to allow the normal and natural condition to reassert itsel£ In most people this experience is usually pleasant. a 2S :

1

z

~v

Here and in the following clause (TO rde ... U6",q) a 26 : 1 ei, qru",v A. gives the reason for his statement: such change is, in general, a retum to one's natural state in the activity (wier ...) of which pleasure, as A. understands it, is found. rtr.STa. tl~ denotes the coming into a neW state of being and seems to be used deliberately here to mark the return to one's natural state ('I',jc,,~). Z " ......~cill.'v Ross alone of the edd. conjectures a T6 with this verb. It is helpfizl but not necessary. However, see 7Ia 34 : 1. a 27 : 1 {,"Ef'~oA-I)v The meaning here is that seen at 63a 2: "excess"; see 63a 2 : 2. The possibility of excess, particularly in bodily pleasures, is discussed at EN "S4" 8-21. Clearly any such excess introduces disorder into one's nature (cp,ju.~) and characteristic state ("a66UTcOua lEo.) and is therefore an impediment to pleasure. In the context of the statement at 7Ia 27 that absence of change is an impediment to pleasure, there is a further reason why change is pleasurable to man. As we learn at EN IIS4b 21-31 (see also II7sa 3-ro), no human i.Bey". can keep fully active because of man's mixed nature. There can be no continuous activity of man's nature which will result in constant pleasure. And so change itself can be pleasurable for man. This is

71a 32

COMMBNTARY

clear when we set the intellectual against the physical, as A. does at 1154b 22-2,4. For example, continued thinking imposes demands upon man's physical nature, which soon finds itself struggling under it to the extent that the intellectual activity ceases to be a pleosure for man. Yet the same holds true if we consider bodily pleasures. When the ••ier..a of the physical nature is an act in accord with nun's nature there is pleasure. When the act is no longer in accord with nature there is no pleasure. For example, continued eating of food to a nature adequately sared is no longer a pleasure, and it is not a pleasure because the act of eating is no longer an act satisfying to a rightly constituted nature but hannfuI to it. In such instances change itselfis a pleasure. z Tiis XdEcrWa'l]S ll; ..... s i.e., the characteristic state, settled condition, nonnal condition, of the individual. The comments in ']Oa 6 : I on the relationship of IOo~, >JOo~ and give the ground for this meaning.

U.,

Eur., Orestes 234. As the schoIiast on Euripides notes, the truth of the statement has been challenged. As A. is using the idea of change, such criticism is not relevant. When he cites the line dsewhere (EN 1154b 28-29), the passage in which it occurs, EN lI54b 21-J1, gives the reason why the statement is valid as A. uses it here: human nature is not simple, but a combination of mind and body. The demands of such a nature would not pennit one single, simple, unchanged pleasure, e.g., the pleasure of contemplation which is the highest pleasure. a 28

p.....Il(3o}.-/J ••• ylouxU

a 29: 1 S ..i "'OU"'o x.1i is the reading of the codd. accepted by four edd. Ross alone introduces rde after TOVTO. I can discern no reason for doing so. "after an interval"; -rei lJl.a xeovov: "the occasional z s... Xpclvou things are pleasant." a 30-J 1 P.ETIl(3o}.-/J ••. Xpclvou Two reasons are given as to why the occasional is pleasant: (a) it is a change: fJ6TafJoAiJ ••. s,,-rt. (and so see 71a 25-26); and (b) it is rare: llfJa _•• xeo.ou (and so sec 643 24-26). WS .,tt",/J 7
a 32:

1

3 [p...eEiv1

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

71b 1

contrary, we are told that admiring is pleasant simply because it is a desiring, and desire ufor the pleasant (see 7Ia 33). A. is not concerned with tying "admire" to "desire to learn." What might give one that impression from our text is ocasioned by a lack of attention to the structure of the sentence at 71a 31-34,' structure which is immediately repeated at 710 34 - 71b 2 in the very next topic. The structure is: statement (7Ia JI-32) - explanation (71a 32-34); see 7xb 2 : 2. But in the explanation A. reverses the order of the statement, and so he explains TO 6avp&C... first, and then TO pa.80...... Furtherm.olt, we should note that neither the Metaphysics passage, nor Plato's statement which it echoes (Theaet. Issd), maintains that "admiring" is only "desiring to learn." On admiring, see ilio B 6, 84> 2S-31, and A.'sconunent 63a 34-3S.

at

See A.'s remark at 700 10--18 ("al oJ ••• as true, we have the reason why he as he does here at 71a 32 - 71b 6 and ilio at

a 33

TO kul"'GTOV .",Oup:'lTOv

oeoE.~); since A. accepts both statements

can .ay that TO 6avpacn6. is >!a., r 2, 04b II-I2, and in Poet. 1460a 17.

a 34 : 1 <..6> read by all the edd. following Bonitz, who thinks that with a TO before and after ol~ one could be missed in copying. He also points to 70a 3, 89b 21. Spengel thinks that TO can be readily understood from what precedes. 2 d~ '1"" .......81a..llcr8IlL "in learning there is the achievement of one's natural state"; see 69b 33 - 7Da 4, which tells us that such a movement into one's natural state is pleasurable. No reason is given here to prove that the activity of the mind is the expression, par excellence, of man's '1'.... ,. It;' certainly assumed in the well-known passage of Met. 980a 21 (all men by their nature desire to know) and at EN 1178a 22 - 1178b 32 where the fullest expression ofthe happiness which belongs to man is eo"e1a. 1 TCi m 7tOlEiv .. . 7tciUXElV i.e., to confer or receive benefits"; sec 6sb 2-S and notes. Spengel, p. 16S, is not happy with the intervention of 7Ia 34 - 71b 4 ("al T •••• h"nABi')' breaking what he considers a natural sequence between 71a 31-34 and 71b .jJf. Kassel would agree; he brackets the passage, but considers it Aristotelian. However, see 7Ib 2 : z. U

Sec 6'7& 22 : 2 for construction. Clearly an l ....t has to be understood here, if not read, as it is not by four edd. and Sponge!. Cope and Kassel do read it with some the codd.: nyx&v... Jerri. di •• a 3S :

1 ....... -Ij&"",v 2 'L"UYXcivOLv

of

7Ib 1 : 1 il>v ..."Oup.ouen And since "d~ire" is for the pleasant, they obviously have received the pleasant. 3 lx.,v "Ill ':''''PEx£'V !C. derTl; "to confer benefits indicates ability to do so [understanding sV "oloi. with Ix ...; some interpret Ix...

7Ib 6

COMMBNTARY

to mean: "possession"] and superiority"; on this use of v"ee~xo,., see 64a "7, 37; 64b 3"; 65a II. b ,,: 1 cr." ... .1'1'1........., the reason is the same as that at 7Ib I : J: if men desire these goals and desire is for the pleasant, such things are pleasant. 2 &ui &~ TO . . • Since the following is not at all Wlique in the structure of the Rhetoric, we should call attention at least to one instance of such detailed structure, although a commentary does not ordinarily permit such a lnxury. It seems necessary to do so, particula:rly since Spenge! thinks that 7Ia 34 - 71b 4 is a break: in the logical devdopment. The argument of 71a 3I -7Ib 12 follows a carefully articulated structure of A B B' A'. For example, if we break: the structure down we find this:

A (a b)

I -,,;

B (a b)

I ' -,,';

B' (a'); A' (a' b'):

A (. b): 71a 31-]2: a double statement: statement a (TO pa.Bd.... lido); statement b (TO Bavp6'sw li~o): I : 7" 3'-33 proof of .tatement b (e. ""' ... b ..6.,,~T6.) 3 : 711 33-34 proof of statement II (Iv de .• . H(lStC1Taa9a,) B (a b): 7Ia 34 - 71h 2: a double statement: statement a (TO .J ,",o..i• ...J; statement b (TO .J ,,6ax...): I' : 7Ia 3S -7Ih 1: proof of statement b (1'0 pb " . AndJvpoiitn) .' : 7.b I-a: proof of .tatement • (TO U ... ~I.,..a,) B' (a'): 71b 2-4: the consequents of B (a) statement (d,a d•...

"',nAe")

A' (a'-h'): 71b 4-12: the consequents of A (a h) statement (...01 d•

•.• TaiiTa). , b 3 x,d TO l_vopCloil" "at has a consequential force: "so too"; the verb is neutral: "to restore." This denotation and the context leave the object of the verb', action with respect to the neighbor fairly Wldefined. Cope, p. "17, therefore, may be correct in interpreting the word to mean that with respect to one's neighbors one sets right "their property, when their affairs have gone wrong; .•• their judgment, when they have made a mistake; ..• their conduct, when they have deviated .•. from the right path."

b 4 Tcl& nA'7I:ii

i.e., "their deficiencies." "'mAsi.: "to complete" in the sense of "to £ill out, make p",fect," what is lacking to one's neighbors. In the light of the preceding, this completing could be in any area, monetary, intdlectual, moral. The article can be taken as a possessive pronoun; see S. IIU. There is a different explanation of this particular topic of pleasure (TO Ta eU"';j .nlTOAerO) at 7tb "5-26. The "at has a consequential force: "so too." To.6a. = "the following," as we saw at 6xa S.

b 5 x ..1 TcZ TOtci&E b 6

1'"'~fl.EVOII

"the imitative," i.e.,

the imitative art. The codd. read

"'P'P1Jpwo,. Our reading, accepted by Ross, Spengd, and Cope,

COlUel

AIUSTOTLB, c:aHETOl\JC r 1

71b

I2

from Twining, p. 280n22. Twining righdy points out that an active foem of the verb is required here, as is indeed dear from the phr2se which A. uses to iIlustt2te what he means (';'<1m~ Y~CUP"'l! •.•) and the addition of "that which is imitated" (Hal "Ii• ... ",B",'",'1pi'.') as something separate and distinct from what bas just been said. Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar read which is derived from Moerbeke's translation and carries the same basic meaning as ",'",••",8'.'. Cope, p.217 (lI23, fIrst paragraph), and Freese, p. 124nI, are confusing.

"""'''IT'''.',

TiM is understood with this and the preceding two b 7 : J ",o''1 ...xlJ adjectives. • xcd ",iiv ... This is the art product, the imitation. To give pleasure (e.g., "Ma, 71b 6), it must be a skillful imitation (eJ ",B",'",'1""'.'). There is no need that its model be something pleasurable (e.g., ,,8. if•.., 71b 8); C£ P.et. I448b IC>-II.

n

b 9 4>.1... crulloy ..r..cI~ i.e., "rather, there is an inference." This is the key to the whole argument, as a comparison of 71 b 4-10 (enel dt . •• CIV",{Jal.e,) with chap. 4 of the P.etics (1448b 4-19), or with Rhet.ric r 10 (lob 6 - II b 21) will reveal. A. is t:illcing about the flash of insight which infers new knowledge from something given, and the pleasure which comes from the illumination. His use of ClVAA.y,,,,,,o~ here, and of ClVU.yICe"Ba, at Poet. I448b 16, and his explanation at rIO, lob IC>-36 confirms this. Some kind ofnew knowledge is the de facto result, as 71 b 9-10 ( ';'''T6 with the indicative) shows. Certainly A. is not, as some think, speaking about simply identifying in an art object' Something which we already know in reality. This makes for sheer nonsense. Yet some might possibly try to justify such an "-'n7, and one would have difliculty in demonstrating that what a writer makes in any way permits" comparable relationship of sameness with its source. On the idea of ",6.B'1"'~ Tax.1a, see Studies, pp. 88-89. b 10: J cd "'.p."',........ For defInition and "-'!:planation, see Poet. 14S2a 22-29, and F. L. Lucas, pp. IIC>-I3. Z "'''pm ...xpclv i.e., "being saved by the skin of one's teeth"; see "a~6., LS, lIT.s.b. Cope's note (p. 219) on this use of the preposition together with examples is good. We also have an explanation of the phrase from A. himself at Phys. 197" '7-30.

b

I2 : J

..;,

see 70a 3-4-

x ...... cpu.nv

iJ&U

i.e., uthat which is natural is pleasant";

7Ib 19

Z '
Ii.

,,"'0,: either kind (1IWl

Ii).A>\AD'~

understand qvy,,8lrij as predicate: "and since the kindred akin to each other by nature."

b 13 are

26S

COMMENTARY

again this qualification; see ']Oa 4 : 1. The phrase b 14 .:o~... ,.o).~ is appropriate here since Hesiod takes an opposite stance with his own proverbial refiection (Works and Days 2S-26): "potter grumbles at potter. craftsIIWl at craftsman; the beggar i. jealous of beggar and minstrel of minstrel" This Hesiodic view is cited iu part iu BE I23sa lB. is the reading of the codd.• four edd.• Spenge!. and Cope. b IS : l.:oS Ross read. [&i.I. following Bywater. who suspects that "it is an iutruder ..• through the &i, before al.;," z ijA,!; ... '
b 17 XOAO'OS

.""-ni>

bIB : 1 -I)6u i~ the reading of the codd.• four edd.• Spenge!. and Cope. Ross follows Richards. who reads savTcp 1jd6 because he wants to take eavTq; with 8,...1••... truY'Y"'" Although the passage has been given both iuterpretations. it should be clear from what has been said that what makes kiudred and like gravitate to kindred and like is th.t each finds the other pleasant: 1\6,) savTq;. Furthermore, as the argument goes on to say. because men find this likeness present iu themselves a pleasant thing. they are selflovers. 2 /i,.IIV goes with TO 8,...1••• TO avYl""" 3 I'ciA"""1I 6o! "and since iu the highest degree."

b 19 :

i.e.. likeness and kinship. "Each and every man is affected iu this way with respect to himsel£" The basic meaning iu this verb will be found iu the at 66b 29. explanation of 1

'
Z

"."ov9."

,.dO.,

z66

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBI'ORIC' I

b 20 : 1 ~ b<1 . • . See ']Oa 4 : 1. b· 24 : 1 ...d cal Td. Since >cal Td Td is textually well grounded and is paralleled at 7Ib 4, I prefer to read with Ross and Kassel. See 7Ib 4 and note. Here we receive a reason different from that at 71 b 2-4 for the pleasure in this action. The explanation of Cope, p. 22Z, of the difference is not correct: there is no "selfishness" as such in the motive here. On the contrary, the pleasure is derived from the sense of personal achievement and personal satisfaction in completing what has been left unfinished.

71b 30

COMMENTARY

b 26 : 1 ij&rJ On the tr.InSlation. see 6\18 27. 2 l"El ...o ciPXE'V ij8,a...ov Spengel is not happy with the appearance of this topic at this point without previous mention of YO aex... as pleasant. He finds more sense in placing 71b 215-28 ("al "".1 ... b"anll'7J) after the !feX'" at 7tb 30. e.g .• "al YO' aex... . "al .",.1 ••• '",.anjl'7J' leal YO ltv ". y.l. This is a matter of interpretation. Although the editors of the critical editions do indicate some uncertainty on the text between 71b 26 and 7xb 32. the fact is that all the codd. read the lines 7xb 215-28 where we find them in the text. We should also note with respect to Spengel's solution that the presence of "al YO aex... at 7xb 30 is questionable. (Of the good codd•• A alone reads it. Roemer questions the reading and brackets the phrase. as does Tovar; Cope omits it; Ross. Dufour. Kassel. and Spengel read the phrase but punctuate. and therefore interpret. differently.) In the latest critical edition Kassel secludes 7I b 26-28 as an Aristotelian addition. AJ far as I can see. 71b 215-28 is quite coherent within the context and rightly located. A topic on power over others (YO aex.... ..."errue of authority) readily derives from the development of the idea in 71b x9-26 that men are rpiAavyo •• There is no need. as Cope. p. 222. suggests. to go back to 70b 32-34 and 7Ib 1-4 to justify its presence. As far as Spengel's difficulty is concernednamely. that A. assumes the topic as proven and draws conclusions from it we find the same thing done at 66b 28-29. 3 " ..1 ...6 "at as at 7Ib S.

el",..

b 27 : 1 ... 0 aocpav 80,.E'" aorpd. should be translated as "wise" or "possessed of knowledge." with the understanding that its meaning is general and can thus denote both "skill." "cleverness in practical matte,," and "wisdom." "understanding." Then the words of .xplauation make somewhat more sense in that rpeo"" (71b 27) could refer to skill in practical matters and aorpta (7Ib 28) to' speculative knowledge. 011 rpeOV7Ja.,. see 661> 20-22. 64b 12; aorpia is mentioned at 66b 3 (see 661> I : J) but is not developed in the Rioetoric. 2 4pXlXOv sc. "confers power over others." On the use of the word in this sense, see EN rr6xa 18-20. b 28 cp'AO.. ,fl.0'

sc.

,1.-.; on the meaning of the word, see 62b 20 : 2.

b 29 " ..1 ..0 l"'''''l''iiiv "at as at 71b s. The pleasure in censuring others. from what A. says here. is caused by the fact that in our love for our own honor we appropriate to ounelves a sense of superiority which finds satisfaction in criticism. b 30.: 1 [" ..1 ..0 ciPx""J secluded by Roemer and Tovar; read by Dufour; Ross. and Kassel. If Roemer is correct. the passage should very probably be bracketed since it was marked for deletion in cod. A. It does not appear in

268

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

72a 2

F or a number of other codd.• although the scholiast and Moerbeke read it. Since it could be read as a further consequence of ""Atin",o. without contradicting what immediately precedes it. and since its presence or absence is subject to question. I cannot decide firmly against it. But if it is read. there should be a period. not a comma. after it. 2 x ..l ... The article goes with 81aTetp.... b 31 : 1 ...:....oG TIns reflexive pronoun is governed by pilTlaTo~. and is used in this construction to express the highest degree to which a person. or thing, attains (S. 1093. 1078). See. e.g .• Plato. Laws 7ISe; Xen.• Mem. 1.24'; and Herod. I.I93.3: "to be at one's very best." 2 lv...IIG8.. &, .....p((!.'v sc. ojdd laT~ punctuating. of course. with a period after xal Td !lex.... as indicated at ']Ih 30 : I. 3 0 "O''1.....j~ i.e.. Euripides in the Antiope (frg. 183. ed. Nauck). Nauck: follows the citation as found in plato (see following note). From plato we know that these lines were spoken by Zethus; see Gorg. 48se S. Nauck reads as do our codd.• save for the second line, which he reads as: "",.,. Td nl.iaTo • .q""ea~ TodTq> ",ieo~. b 32-33 xli"t ...oG .. • i"dy ..... , ... illv There are two points in Ross's text calling for attention here. (a) Ross. or his printer. has mangled the citation. >«Inl . .. bntrBTal is always cited as part of the lines of Euripides; see. e.g., Problemata (attributed to A.) 917a 13-I4; Plato. Gorg.484e. We also find the third line (iu part) in Akib. II I46a; Plutarch. Mo,alia SI4a. 630b. (b) mstr .. is read by Ross without any explanation for changing the .... traTa, of the codd.• which is rcad by all the other edd .• Spengel. and Cope. See 7Gb 3S : z. See 6"7ll 22 : z for construction. 3 civ.a,~ On the idea. see 60a 240 Kassel alone of the edd. follows Spongel in sccludiug ~al " riAW~ TW. >iMw •.

h-34:

1

"Ii " .. ,Sui

z ..;;", "IiS""'v

b 3S livayxl) x ..1

"at as at 7xh S.

72a z : 1 lv ...ol~ ... "O''1 .. 'xij~ as also at r 18. I9b 6-7. We do not have this passage from the Poetics. It is thought to have been a part of his treatment of comedy promised at I449b 21-22. We have a definition of the laughable at 1449" 32-37. 2 elpJja8", & Cope, p. 224, remarla. this is the first instance in the Rhetoric of this form. which is rather common to A. and which denotes that the action or process "has been completely gone through aud finished. and that that is sullicient. and no more need be said or done about it"; see. e.g .• Plato. Phileb. S7C; Xcn.• Mem. ,(,2.I9. Cope cites instances of other verbs usiug this third person imperative passive with this sense of a fully completed action.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 72a 4 - 72a 5

12

the kind of people who do wrong and the kind of people who are wronged

II . Development: 72a 5 -73a 37 I·72a

5-72b 22

(0) 'Po 9-721 II

(h) 'Pa

II -

721

(,) 721

>I -

7" II

21

(d) 7>0 3J -7.b ..

(0) 7.b '3 - 730 27 (h) 73a 27 -73" 37

the wrongdoers are those who, considering the act possible, believe they may (i) go undiscovered, (ii) pay no penalty, (iii) pay little penalty, or receive other compensation: possibility will be seen later (ii) pay no penalty (i) go uncllicovercd (iii) pay little penalty, or receive other compensation

the wronged, and the kinds of wrong action: the wronged tbe kinds of wrong aesion

III . Conclusion: 73a 37 - 73a 38

wv...

'P8 4: 1 iv.XCI This goes back to the statement at the end of chap. 10, 69b 20-32, which in tum picked up the opening statement and the first subject to be discussed in chaps. 10-14: namely, 68b 3-4• " ... ~ 8£ I!xov,<.~ This is the second subject proposed for discussion at the opening of chap. 10, 68b 4 (a.,jr.~ ••). a 5:

1

,
50.

Z CI,hal I'£V

cla",.ii".; this is the third subject, 68b 4-5 sc. da",.ii"•.

(relro.).

o~v

a 6 8uvCI'
72a

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

IO

appears that the second is simply a determination of the first; i.e., the action "mst be possible to begin with, and then it must be seen as a possible action for the ag""t. This;' the intent of all that is said between 72a I I and 72b 22. .'...E c1v is the reading of the codd. accepted by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Cope. Spengel suggests .IT' BaV, which Kassel accepts, as does Ross who reads it as siT' Ifv. Spengel's vivid "Haec graece non CO"coquo" notwithstanding, the codd. represent acceptable Greek in .rn ... ~ (see S. 2854); the introduction of the second alternative (I} aoiiva.) is unusual but not impossible. I would read with the codd.: .rn (OrOVTa.) dv ).aOe" "eli
a7

''Well, then, men do wrong [,..;.... 1 ps. oJ,] whenever they think that an act am be done and done by them, whether they believe that in doing it they would escape notice, or that, if they are detected, they would not pay the penalty; or believe that they would pay the penalty on the one hand, but that the punishment is less than their personal gain or the gain of those for whom they care." In this interpretation there are three things (see chapter outline) which specify the attitude of those who do wrong, and possibility is not one of them (see 72a I6-I7). Thil is as it should be, for ability to do the action has nothing to do specifically with .wrongdoing. It applies to all action (good or bad), since no one tries to do the impossible. As A. says of a""a"'a at 63a 21-24 (and see Cisa 35: z): they are what can be done by anyone, or can be easily done. On the other hand, if we read .l...a with Spengel and Ross (as most of the translators do), we have: .1... ' d. (o'eo ....a.) ).aO••• "eMa.Tet; .I. Here
".T.

11-'"

a8 till' There is a coordinated antithesis here: 7j (oro ....a. i/.) 60ii.a. pB.:",- ill' (.r••ra.) • .!dna> ~v C.,plav .l,a•• But the second member is introduced by the stronger adversative particle, &.l.l' (S. 2781.); see 7.... 2.

a 9 ij

cr....

i.e.,

i/ (T•.sT.'~) eli••

lv ~o;~ .G ......pov i.e., B 19, 920 8 - 92b t4z xo.vu See S!)a II-I3, and Studies, pp. 32-39. Ross, Kassd, and Cope encl~ 72. to-II, ".wei ... AOy",v, in parentheses.

a

10: 1

72a 19

COMMBNTAlIY

a II "':'..Dl A. begins here a catalogue of those wrongdoers who think that they will pay no penalty; it ends at 72a 21.

.",dv

a 12 : 1 6UVUI'-EVD' namely, the kind of facility so apdy described in the opening pages of Plato's Apology (170 - ISa). As !socrates says in Against EuthYllus s: "I think that you all realize the fact that those who are clever speaker>, since they have no money, are especially the ones who instigate. these malicious prosecutions, whereas the prosecuted are Wlable to speak but are able to pay money." z at 'JCpClK~1)CO' limen of action." As we see at 73a 5--6, it is the poor speaker and the i"eso/ute person who are wronged. . a 13 : 1 l!1'-1<E'PD' 11 On the usage, ,ec S. 2346d and N. 2; or LS, £I, B.VII.a. i.e., friends, etc., who are in the categories jnst 3 "O"';:;"CJ,,, ... xo,,,..,vDl ,upply an apodosis 72a IS: oiona. d~.aa6a. (O:CIiI"o, dd ......).

nom &". y&p ••. SlX"IJv

. This statement clearly bean out the conthe wrongdoer for A. is not that the act is possible, but that one will be undetected and pay no penalty for doing the

a 16-17

t~tion of 'J2a 7 that what specifies

act.

a IS : 1 ..oi~ xp'....i~ We should recall here A.'s comments on precisdy this sort ofthing in chap. I, S4a 24 - S4b 16 in his attack: on theidenti£ication of "rhetoric" not merdy with judicial oratory, but with poor judicial oratory in particular. 2 Dl p.Ev y&p
ARISTOTLB. 'RHETORIC' I

have no reason whatsoever to ascribe to him from what we have seen in the text thus fat. Cope writes: "This sounds very atrocious. and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us •.. that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the theory of the art. which argues each side ••• without regard to moral considerations." We have not been told any such thing. But more importandy we should remember that A. is simply presenting here the kiud of men (and thdc attitudes) who do wrong. They constitute particular topics fur which the one who writes or speaks on judicial rhetoric should be on the alert. for he may well be able to use this material jusdy and truthfully. z ...c - x,d ties together the two stated advantages for the one who wrongs his friends. J "pa""lncV.AIi........,....a' On "ed~ (in addition. besides) in composition. see LS. "ed~, E.II. The preposition gives an added meaning which is not fuund in ~aTaAlciTTBC78a•• in spite of Cope's contention, p. 227, which argues that it is. Kassd alone reads "eo"aTaAldTTo.Tae. The ~8 picks up the "". (72a I8). and we are now given the explanation for TOr~ ><e'Tar~ (72a I8).

a 20 at 5. xpITa'

a 21 b&rj ...,xo\ is the reading of the codd•• accepted by four of the edd.; Ross alone conjectUres la8ljTl"d. This section down to 720 33 considers the class mentioned in 72a 7: d. ld8.ev "ed
as explained by olo••.• ",oe'l.Bla~: the indmduals. as persons. are physically or mentally. etc.• unsuited to the charges laid agzinst them. 2 c!c"e£voi~... alx'a~ d".8....~ is the reading of a good cod. and is accepted by Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. and Ross. Another good cod. reads d0"8.v1j~. which is read by Spengd, Cope, and Kassd, and which within the context I too would be inclined to read. The statement here is repeated at B 24. 02a 17-20 where it is used as an example of false argument grounded in the misuse of terms. specifically sl,,&~. A. also notes there that this kind of argument is typical of the rhetorical art of Coru<. There is an interesting paralld in Phaedr. 273a--
a23 :

J 6 IlI"ltpoS Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. Kassd. and Sponge! bracket d which appears in all the codd.; Ross and Cope read it. Clearly most

COMMENTARY

273

odd. wish to join ne"q~ and al"iCeO~ as descriptive of one person. This is possible. I do not see it as absolutely necessary; nor do I find any difficulty in a reference to two separate individuals (a poor man, an ugly man) on the ebarge n.el 1'0''1.Bia~. 3 I'.LXd ..~ Punctuate with a colon after this word. Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar use a period; Ross, a comma. Kassel uses a CODUna but with his reading it makes sense. J x ..l ..1lL Al..v The ebange here to the neuter between 72a 23 and 72a 26, and so presumably to a discussion of actions, when he has been talking in this passage and will continue (&om 72a 26 to 72a 33) to talk about men is s1ighdy strange. The shift occasions comments by Spengel, Cope, Roemer (pp. !xxv and fullowing), and Kassel (Der Te"t, p. I29) abour the logical development of the passage. I would agree that sneb a shift to actions would more properly belong at 73a 27ff. Furthermore, befOre and after 72a 23-28 A. is talking about wrongdoers who expect to go undiscovered, and apart &om its relevance to the question raised by the commentators I think that this should be kept in mind when offering a solution. In order to preserve a discussion here of persons and not to shift to actions, one must inter alia remove the periods after 1'0''1..{a~ (72a 23) and ot.u8a, (72a25). vahlen (whom Kassel follows) does this not only because he wishes to continue the discussion of persons but also because he insists that 01 T' e"avTio, demands an answering phrase. Thus his suggestion, which follows the Greek text of 72a 2,...26 as found in the critical editions, except where noted: 011'6 banta, TO;;, iyxA,nllaa,,, (olav aa8B"fJ, . .. /Jo'Xsia,), xal
-ra Ala.,. .• • ocpfJaJ.l'oir; (dtpvAaxTCI yae •. . oisafJat.) Hal TO. l'1]A.lrXatiTQ ;eol TO. TO,at;-ra [sc. cld",oii.Tt~I, ola l''Tfd' <2• • 1,. This makes sense. At the same time I do not see why we cannot punctuate with colons after 1'0''I.ela~ (72a 23) and ot."Oa, (72a 25) and understand the laO'TfT,,,oi .1", of 72a 2I at both 72a 23 and 720 25; i.e., "al (laO'1n"oi Bl",) Ta lia• ... , and "al (laB77n"ot .1",) Ta T'1l,,,aiiTa. In this case, the neuters would be taken as accusatives of specification.· Spengel, p. I7I, suggests an accusative to whieb Roemer (p. lxxv) objects. This would give us the following interpretation for 72a 23-26: "And men are likely to escape detection with respect to acts whieb are done quite openly and in folI view, for these acts are not guarded against because in general no one would consider them possible, and with respect to acts whieb are so great and of a kind such as no man would consider possible." See 72a 25, 72a 26. a 24 "cpUAClX..CI This adjective has two meanings, both ofwhieb develop from'l'vlaTTs"Oa<: (a) "off one's guard," as we saw at 720 I9; (b) "not guarded against, against whieb no precautions are taken," as we see here.

274 a 2S

ARISTOTLB; 'RHETORIC' I

olEG8aL

Understand with this verb,

72 a 35

sl'JIal. CJV'JIQTa; i.e.. "no one

would consider .them possible." Or, possibly, as Cope, p. 228, suggests: '1'",' 4'1' :n:otijaQI. atiTa.

a 26 ol~ Understand olo'TO elva, d.vaTa. If one follows Cope (see preceding note), then one is to Wlderstand

,ro.",,,••.

a 27 : word.

1

"pp.....'n\"ao;"

"diseases"; Cope, p. 229, has a note on the

a xal -;
These are the ones who have no Cnemies

5."

a 30' 0;0 ,,~Soxo,v These are the persons with a multitude of enemies (0., ,..o.lloi, 72. 29), and so they escape detection "because of the unlik:elihood that they would attack those. on their guard." a 3 I 5.u '<0 cb,o)..ylczv lx..v They also esc.pe detection "because they offer in defense that they would not make an attack." This is an example of Corax' probability argument, which A. cballenged; see 72" 22 : z. a 32

;j ,
hiwhich to conceal.

Namely, "devices (artifices) or hiding places"

Le., "easily obtained ways of disposal";. a 33 : 1 II 5".ei....~ oil",.p.' this·is the alternative to "~'I'., ... TO"O.,. Z x"t CI....~ "" We begin here a discussion - which conthrougb 72b 22 - of those detected wrongdoers who expect an insignificant penalty, or if penalized, accept as adequate compensation other benefits which accrue to them.

tinue.

a 34 ""a~o).~ Xp6vou "postponement." There is a metaphor at work: that of building up a breastwork of time as a bulwark against prosecution.. a 3S : 1 .,.'«a.... ~ ~ I?'T....., is "payment .in full" (see 73a 9). The point is dear: they expect not to escape all payment, but to escape any kind of substantial payment; or they have hopes for a lengthy delay (a.alloA» xed"o,) before paying the penalty. In 72a 34-36 we are given the next step: either found guilty in the trial (at,,'1" 72a 33), or expecting to be found guilty, these people are confident of escaping the penalty.

COMMBNTARY

z ij 50' ""op!""

?-7S

1'-'15~

E;'O 3·". cl"o).tcrn is the reading. of cod. A, and it is accepted by Roemer, Dufour,.and Tovar. Ross and Kassel.acc~pt lInoUa.., which appears in other codd. and as a correction in cod. A; they also (along with Cope) accept Spengel's conjecture: f} <.1> d,'. Spengel. suggests <.1> because he finds it difficult after "al olc; (72a 34) to understand either 6c; nc; or .r nc;. Although this <.'> also explains "'7JMv, it is not absolutely necessary. Thus one can read with cod. 'A above, p~tuating with a comma before -iI: dvapo;'., zed.,oc;, fj d.' ... i.e., "or a lengthy delay (in paying the fine), or because of poverty one will have nothing to lose.~' With respect to the reading lInoUa.. I find the form difficult to explain. ·It could be (a) a future indicative, which is found in Homer, the Septuagint, and Matt. 2X :4x (on the last, see Blass, Debrunner, & Funk, p. 53); or (b) an aorist subjunctive (see Buck, no. 39).

EyyU~ i.e., i'immediate," as also "aeazefl",a at 72b II, and as opposed to "deeaJ, "remote" (72b x). On the role of gain as a motive for' wrongdoing, see !soer., Ellthynus 6. a 37

72b x x,d cT>. the reading of cod. F accepted by Roemer and Ross;. take as referring to a person: "and the man for whom." See comment a.~ beginning of 72a 23 : 3. The reading of cod. A is leal eli. and is accepted by. Dufour, Tovar, Kasse!, Sponge!, and Cope, although Kassel bracketS "al. eli. . . .
b 3 ToUvlS'VTLov

i.e., Cion the other handJJ ; see LS, £vavT:ior;. I1.I.C.

b 4 f"",ovov See 67b 27. Since praise connOtes virtuous ··and right actinn, these people consider their w\v",vo Of the individual. with this name who might have been known to A. - and are known to us - we have no evidence which would enable us to make any identification here. As Cope indicates. (pp. 231£), some events from the life of Zeno of Citiwn are, in the light of ,our. text, intriguing; but Zeno was born in 335 B.C. (d. 263). Z "'{ picks up the.a ",i. oC72b 3.

5.

b 6 50' cl[L'l>oT.p'" The two reasons are: (a) personal advantage outWeighs any personal shame (72b 2--3); and (b) the sense of doing what is good outweighs the physical punishment (72b 3~).

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIc' I

b ']-8 4p.cpo"£F"'~ lxov,,€~ . . . lIeEa,~ i.e., "men have either attitude of mind Idl''I'oTBe'''~ lxo.T.,], yet the men are, not Inl». o"X] the same, but opposite, in character." As was pointed out at pb 6, one group acts with a sense of doing the good, the other without any regard for it. Indeed, such individuals as A. deb 9 ttollcix,~ elttO"E""X'IXa«~ scrib.. them (010' d.al'ax.uO ..£, 72b 10) sound like born losers in their dforts to do wrong. b 9-II dal yelp ... el~ap.ciXEa8a, Ross alone includ.. this in parentheses. iv ..a;:~ "o".u..a,~ i.e., in comnnttmg wrongs. O[OL This conjecture of Victorius' for the 010. of the codd. receives support from Moerbek:e's translatioo, "qui victi penitus volunt vincere," and is patently correct. For the only thing wbich would explain this kind of wrongdoer is that he belongs to that kind of person (010') who is convinced that ifat first you do not succeed ..• 3 el~CI..ciXEa8cll the infinitive with 010.; see, e.g., Dem., Aristogeiton A, 2: 010' TO~~ "o"'leo~, 'I'u", " ..I ar{>C.w. Vergil expresses the idea in our verb when, in speaking of the Trojans, he says: "quos nulla fatigant I proelia nee victi possont absistere ferro" (Aen. II.306-307).

b 10:

1

2

b 12:

1 2

,,1> x£p&O~ a.xpCI"E;:~

sc. n ..goxe7il'a. See 68b 14 : 2.

b 13 : 1 elxpClalCl C£ 68b 14 : 2. This is moral weakness; A. discusses it, and moral strength (AY"ea ..,..), at EN II4Sa IS - IIS2a 36. 2 ",.pl tt~"CI oa...~ 6p"yov"a, i.e., moral weakness is something "concerned with all the objects of man's appetitive drives." What is said here (72b II-16) about moral weakness and moral strength is in accord with the statements of the Nko,.eu:he•• Ethics. b 14 : 1 "o6vCl~"iov See pb 3. 2 i\~ Because of the contrast with lianea ,,01 xeo.,WTeea, this carries the meaning "inunediately and for the moment"; see Soph., o. c. 6I4-6IS. b IS : 1 x ..l .:.cpo.,I'OV Ross alone conjectures " ..I ciJcpil.l'o•. It really is no more necessary than oE would be with 'I'eo"l'w-rseo, in the next line. 2 xpovLciJ«p.. C£ 64b 23-26, 30. 3 lyxpCl".;:~ These are the morally strong men who are analyzed in conjunction with morally weak men at EN II4sa IS - IIS2a 36: the morally strong men abide by the results of their deliberations and decisions. On the idea in the word, see 63a '7, 66b

20-22.

COMMENTARY

b 17 :

1 .

Suk ""XJ)V

2

Soil'" "piill'"

277

See 6911 32. i.e., those for whom there exists the possibility "of being thought to act ..." 3 S,' ci~ciY"'l~ Since A. mentions tp1la .. explicitly, a.a),,,,), here means ~,a pia., as found at 69b 5-6, and not what is said at 68b 35. See the use of pta.a at 70a 13. 4 SuI< cpuc..~ See 69a 35 - 69b 5 and notes. The three causes we have jusr seen (i.e., rum', d.dy,,'7" and 'I'tla..) were included among the involuntary causes of chap. 10; see 68b 32 - 6911 2. 5 S,' i!8D~ See 69b fY7 and 69b 6: 3. This was considered a voluntary cause in chap. IO. However, if 'I'tla,~ can be considered an involuntary cause, it is clear from the way in which A. wishes to be understood in chap. II, 70a 6-8 (and see 70" 6: 1) that wrongdoers can easily take lOo~ as an excuse since it could fall (in the light of 70a 6-8) into the same

.00,

elass of cause as qWc,,~.

"I'-..

b 18 : I p"'.i~ ... ciS'XEi~ At 68b fY7 there was a definition of wrongdoing (see also 66b 9-n). At 73b 25 -74a 17 and at 74b 2-IO A. repeats it and approaches the idea of a distinction between deliberate, intentional wrongdoing (d~".. '.) and unintentional wrongdoing which arises from misunderstanding (al'aeniv). The latter is also the idea in al'aeTia as we see it in Poet. I453a 7ff. For a brief discussion of al'aeni. in A., see D. W. Lucas, Appendix IV. a ",oii ~,,'..xoii~ See 56& 6, 6Ib 38. We will meet the word in a more detailed explanation at 74a 26ff. Translate as "fair and humane consideration." ENU37b II-I3: ",,0 t",.,,,i~ involves justice, not in the legal sense of justice, but rather as a rectification of what is legally just." ,,0 .",..",i~ is "what the law~ver himself would say about the case if he were present" (II37b 22-23); see II37a 31 - II38a 3. b 20: I .:,~ ~"yxCdDU Understand l.d •• i~ after cL~ here, and also after the next cL~ (see following note). Thucyd. 3.45-4 illustrates the idea. 2 .:,~ ';".p~oAij~ This statement confirms the interpretation given at 6911 13. b 21 ""SoX'l'-oii~",.~ i.e., "those very well thought of"; see 6zb 20 : 2. b 22 : 1 0'; ScSliw".~ i.e., "as those who will not be suspect." Their position is similar to that of those who harm their friends; see 72a I7-20. 2 oi>SEv l'-iiAA~ See 58a I4: 2: "as none the more held in contempt," i.e., "as those held iu the same contempt QS before."'

b 23 : 1 oll...... ~ lXO~E~ This statement (ad".1 ...
ARISTOTLB, 'RHl!.TORIC' [

a <1i6.x.'~> is added by modem editors (except Kassd) following Spengd. It is Cettainly called for by 72a 4 and 68b 3-5. b 24: 1 oi/ioxoii.... We begin bete the final section of the devdopment as given in the outline to this chaptet. • x,d ..1i ....czG.... "and they commit the following kinds of wrong." This is certainly correct, and is called for by 73a 27-37 and by the use of nola in the sentence sWIlIIlarizing the contents of the chaptet at 73 a 3738. A. hU added a new item to his division at 68b 3-5 and 72a 4-5. Therefore we should not change the punctuation: i.e., either a comma or a colo';' aftet TOlaiiTa; nor sh!,uld we take Ta· TOlaiiTa as the object of To.k '"o'Ta~ as Jebb & Sandys clearly do. Cope, p. 234. is unclear on this point. 1. buyx..'" as he has just used the word at 7.b '0. a {"'.POX>Tis the same as v".e(Jo).ii~ at 72b 20. On doing wrong to people either for necessities or to satisfy one's desires, see Pol. 1267a 2-9; see also Isoer., Trapez. 8-9. . 3 1i"Q).CIU"'~ See 6Ib 9.

b 25 :

b 26 : 1 x ..l "oU~ . . . ""oVTa~, 7.b 24-

• ..wv "tv

EyyU~

This phrase completes the idea in

"the latter": namdy, those who

To!l~

are nearby; see 73>

4: z.

b 28

:

1

Ka.pX1J60yIou~

the Carthaginians. Piracy in the ancient world fifth century. See "Piracy" in the· oeD;

was not UI1COmIJlon down into the

andOrmmod. See 67a 34. b 30 : 1 m."doU~ a construction with an understood laTi, which we have seen a number of times - S4a 2 : 2, for example. The ca1eful man is the opposite of the easy-going, indolent man. 2 ul"JtU'l'<1Jl.oU~ ie., bashful, retiring, .modest people. Iu we see the word at B6, 85a9 andB 12, 89a 29, and in EN I128b 19-30, itsigni£ies people who are shy and overly sensitive to a feeling of shame. b·31

1""X1J1.x.1

See its use at 7I> 1:

1.

b 32 : 1 mEl;deOv"u~ . We have seen this word a number of timese.g., ·at 73' .0 and at 72b 30 - and in each instance it denotes legal prosecution. As such it is an interesting comment to the efli:ct that the Greeks apparendy didnot take the law into their own hands despite remarks like those at·63a 20-21 and 67. 19-.1; see 63> 20 : 3 and 67" 19-'0. 3

~C; liv't'ClS ... 't'oU't'ouC;

i.e., "as people who are , • ,"

'Pb 37

COMMENTARY

b 33 : 1 Mu...;w A£I..... "Mysian spoil," i.e., easy prey; see Oem., Crown 72. There are many accoWlts of this phrase, and Cope, pp. 23S£, in a long note has most of the references. One story has it that they were defenseless while their king Telephus (of sesquipedalian fame in Horace, Ars Po,L, 96, 104) sought to be cured by Achilles, who had wOWlded him and who alone could heal him. 3 x"l "oU~ . . . "o).Acix,~ sc. a,j""l6i'Ta~. Both instances of T06~ appear only in the Basel edition of Michael Isingrin.

b 34:

1 ci
b 35 'l:oU~ 6'''~'~A'Iv-tvOU~ l\ .u6l1l~OAOU~ On the idea, see 5.fa 16 : z. Socrates' words in the opening pages of the Apology (170 /f.) make it cleat that he had been subjected to such extensive calumny. He claimed too (19b /f.) that caricatutes such as that in AIistophanes' Clouds made him an easy subject for slander. b 36 "po"'poUV'I:'" The edd. (except Ross and Kassel) read "eoal· e06.Ta, , a conjectuIe of Vahlen's. Spengel and Cope read as Ross does, but both in their notes Wlderstand the infinitive. Vahlen's conjecture is reasonable since it makes explicit what seems to be the intended contrast: -(a) out of fear of the jury they do not choose to ioitiate proceedings; (b) as people detested and despised, they are not able (if they go to law) to win over the jury. Presumably Ross, and more cert.linly Kassel with his PWlctuation, take the verb -with "eoa'e06'Ta. to be ",16.... (72b 37). b 37: 1

cl)"

01 1Io"'eNfI£'IO' x"l cp8OVeNIIoOVoi

.t,,,,,

is presumably the

reading of two good codd. (A, F). The reading foWId in the edd. (except Kassel) is from a corrected copy of A (14th c.): cb~ I'"UODI'S'O' "al '1'60'06,."0' ("as men who are detested and resented"). Cope and Kassel read with the uncorrected codd.; Spongel does the same but changes cli. to cb,. Whichever reading is chosen, this clause must be taken closely with 72b 3S-37 (oE •.• 6...). The cb, •.. '1'60.06,.6.0' reading does this with facility. The cli••.• eluw reading presents us witli a genitive which is somewhat cumbersome but which would be interpreted as "among whom are those who are detested and resented." Z _1 "po~ oG~ For the sake of-clarity we must understand here the main verb of 72b 24: "al (.18.".6u, T.6T.V~) "ed, o1J~ ••• ; see also at 73a 4·

".1-

:>80

ARISTOTLE. 'RmrrORIC' I

73a 7

Take· these genitives as objective 73a I : 1 l\ ..poy6vc.>v . . . cp!Ar.>v with neo<patl..: "concemiJJg their ancestors, or thcmsdves, or their friends." 2 l\ ..O''1Gci........v ... P.U.A'IGciv.."'" These two participles qualify the preceding nouns and have as their ohject the following words: "as men who hamu:d or intended to harm them or their ancestors ..•" a 2

mv

x~8ov't't&&

a 3 ..pocpciG....~

se. (TOtS,:ovr;) cO)' .•.

The pretext of past harm or potential harm is too

frequendyan excuse, as A. says, not for good or just action, but for villainy; see, e.g., a past harm: Pol. 13Ub 8-17. About the closest we can come to a citation of the proverb is from a later period, i.e., Menander (342/341293/:>89 B.C.), Frg. 193: I""I!rJ '1'. ne4<patl/~ TO;; ne!Ua. """Qj~.

"tiT'

a 4: 1 ".d "oU~ . . . C£ 7Zb 37 : 2. 2 ..oU~ p.~ .....OU~ 6£ "the latter - the former," as at 7Zb 26 : 2; see also 6:za 36-37. J tI,S.ov For one reason, see 72a 18-20; for the sentiment, see Theognis (I\. 544-541 B.C.), 1219-20 (ed. Young). Lysias,'Andocides 7, claims that Andocides has the particular gift of doing wrong always to his friends, never to his enemies.

i.e., one's enemies. Isocr., Euthynus 8, uses the a 5 : 1 ..OU~ 56 -IJIU topic as an argument; see 63a 20-21 where it is considered a good. 2 AcplAou~ Apparendy this was followed by a period in the codd., and it is so read by Dufour, Kassel, Spenge~ and Cope. Roemer, Tovar, and Ross join this topic to the next by leaving out any pllllC1:uation. In the light of the threefold explanation (73a 6-7), there may possibly be some justification for doing this. J p.iJ 6£,voU~ EI..£lV See 72a I2 : 1; d...O~ is the usual adjective to describe skill and cleverness in speaking. A facility in speaking on the part of the person wronged could be a positive hindrance to a wrongdoer, as we can gather quite clearly from the fears which Socrates attributes to his accusers (Apol. 17a ff.). To what such facility might descend is delightfully portrayed in Aristophanes' Clouds 8891£ in the exmange between the just and the unjust M'Yo~. a 6 npii~cz. Narndy, with the ability mentioned at 72a 13: ",••tAw. dyed• .,•• From Xenophon's account of Crito (Mem. 2.9) we gather sorne idea of how hazardous life at Athens could be in this regard ifone were a prominent or wealthy person. a 7 oiISlv ,,£pcztVOUG.v out any success.

i.e., they undertake the prosecution but with-

73 a 14

COMMENTAlIY

281

a 8: 1 b"'n!p..ucnv "to keep an r:ye on," agreeing with ol~. These would be people whose major interests presumably lie outside Athens (
trial. a ~..oupyo( The word, as Cope, p. 239, notes, commonly refers to the independent farmers (this would seem to be its meaning at Thucyd. I.I4I.3, s). This could be its denotation here, but its reappearance at B 4, 8I. 24 in a more general sense of "one who works for himself" encourages one to accept the more extended meaning here as well: i.e., "self-<mployed." a 9 ...1... " ..........uov...., Th~ entire statement can be taken as an explanation of both parts of the topic just stated. However, it does seem that 1",1 ••• 61aAvo...al is an explanation of ."TI"", which would bear out the meaning giv:n to ""TI"".~ (full paym"';'t) at 72a 3~ : 1: i.e., ':they;, settle f~r a smaller sum. Then "al . . . "aTanIWOVTa. explams dl,..,v: I.e., they Wlthdraw more readily from trial proceedings." a IO oI.. eU;,,,oWor.. , i.e., those harmed have committed "the kind of wrong such as thr:y are now being subjected to." a II : 1 ~yyu~ y«p '" 50"0' •.. .rve.. "for it appears to be something bordering on ... "; on iyl'v~ see LS, IV. "whenever someone has any such harm done a a..czv... ci5,,,o,v to him as he himself indeed is wont to inflict (on others}." a IJ : 1 u(3plr;o,v A. defines {j{J~.~ at B 2, 78b 2J-26 as doing or saying anything which gratuitously insults another. Intentional insult with sdfsatisfaction in view constitutes iJ{Je'~' and a l'~aqn! fJ{J~ • .,~ (which was a public prosecution) could be a far-ranging indictment, bringing even death as the penalty. See Harrison, I 168, 172112. 2 cdXla"'TG alHlfJ is a personal assault; a (J,""I alxla, (a private law suit) was an action for assault and battery. See 72.22. a 13-16 " ..1 "oU~ ... 'P..1v....., Cope, p. 240, citing Victorius, makes a distinction between this topic and the topic at 7.b 37 - 73a 3: I
282

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

73a 21

a 16 xed or~ X..p.ouv...... is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Kassd olone reads "al oiJ~ from uncorrected cod. A. It is the only reading which makes grmunatical sense and should be read. The usual way in which "al ol~ is taken is: "al (eld",o;;a. ro.sro,,~) or~: "and they harm those through whom they will gratify ..." This is an Wlusuol dative, for it says in effect "by means of whom," which is impossible (S. 15(4) .. The ordinary construction with xaeIC... can be seen at 63a 33. It is questionable whether or not of~ could be considered a generic comitative dative (S. 1521). Reading "al oiJ~, we have "al (d~",o;;". To6ro,,~) oO~ (d~."o;;"".~) xae,06vra, ... a 17 : 1 ij xup'o,~ Archedamus in the passage cited from the Memorabilia (2.9.5-8) at 73" 6 exemplifies this delightfully in regard to Crito. "in dependence upon whom they live," .. z TCpO~ olI~ l;",O"lV the phrase at 6,. 32 clearly suggests. a 18 :

£n:'E.xd..~ See 7Zb 18 : z. z EyxEXA'I"';"~ biO".v See S. 691.

1

KciAA'TCTCO~

We have the story in part in Plutarch's Life of B.C.; see the OeD) went to Sicily in 357 to liberate his country from the harshness of Dionysius II. Callippus, an Athenian friend, and an associate from his days at Plato's Academy, accompanied Dion and was finally the instrument of his death in 354 through deceit. We know from Plutarch that Dian was aware of Collippus' activity but did nothing, and that Callippus' life was endangered by. relatives ofDion's who learned of the plot. Plutarch does not td! us how Collippus defended his action, but from what A. says, it appears that Callippus offered in defense the fact that Dion', relatives were threatening him and that his act therefore was one of sdf-protcction: ifhe had not done the harmful act, he would have been harmed. Z Tolr. TCEpl The article makes the prepositional phrase substantival: "in the Dion afIiir"; see S. n5]e. a 19 :

1

Dion 54-57 (98Ie - 983 b). Dion (ca. 408-354

.11."""..

a

P.il.l.OVT.II.t; sc. ddut:eia6al. z iiv p.-I) ..6TO{ sc. Of course a-drol refers to those who do the wrong. The active verbs in this section (72b 23 - 73a 27) refer to the wrongdoers, although the object of the whole section is to present the kinds of people who are wronged. 1 .:.~ ••. lv6EX0P.evOV cb~ with the participle (here the accusative absolnte) sets forth the real or presumed reason for the action of the agent (see S. 2086 ond 2086d): "on the groWld that it is no longer possible to take counsel" 21 : J

00.,,0)....

COMMENTARY

a:l.2.: 1 'A'VEa(&It"",~ We know ofan Amesidemw-see, e.g .• Herod. 7.154. 165; Pindar. 01. 2.46. 3.9. and [sth ... 2.28 - who was a member of the bodyguard of Hippocrates. tyrant of Gela (ca. 498 B.C.; see the OeD). and the father of Theron. tyrant of Acragas (488-472, B.C.; see the OCD). We know nothing further which would clarify this example of A.'s which inrplies a position of power for Ainesidemw and apparent equality with Gdon. See the OeD; Gelon (ca. 540-478 B.C.) was tyrant of z rol1.01VL Gda but later established himself at Syracwe (485 B.C.). which then became one of the most powerful of the Greek city....tates. a 23.: 1

"o.....ci~'..

for the more usual "orrap"a. The word stands for

the prize won at the game ofkottabos. which was wually played at drinking parties (for a description. see Whibley. 694. and Sparkes. The major source of infonnation on the matter is Athenaew 479c-e. 487d-e. 665C - 668f; see also Aristophanes. Peace 343. Ia44). The prize for winning the g.me was eggs. cakes. and sweetmeats. Something such was apparently sent by Ainesidemos to Gelon for his smartness in getting ahead (6-r. ErpBact••) of Amesidemus in the coD.quest and enslavement (d.6eano6",a,.i.rp) of some State. z Iiv6p .."o&,a"lL~ The edd .• save Tovar and Kassel. indicate a lacuna after this word. presumably on the grounds that the name of the enslaved people has been lost. I am not convinced that something has disappeared.

...

a 25 c:.~ laaolLEVo, Understood as object is something like -rei dd,,,a aVTcV.; on dk with a participle, see 7]a 21 : 3.

a 26 ·Ici.....v b e"....c:rA6~ as he is also called by Plutarch. who. in his essay on "Political Precepts." in Moralia 817f - 818a. tells us how Jason "when he outraged or molested anyone always used to say that those who will act justly in great matters must be unjust in small ones." On Jason. who was tyrant ofPherae. ca. 385-370 B.C•• see the OeD. a 27 "at Ii . sc. Hal (d6,,,oiia. -raiiTa) II ... We begin here the section on the kinds of d6.,.,j,.a-rB which were mentioned for the first time at 72b 24: -rei -ro,aii-ra (on which see 72h 24 : z). Whether we can call it. transition to the next chapter. as Cope. p. 243. does. is questionable in the light of 73a 3738. Yet it does point in that direction. Men have become habituated to this kind of wronga 28 : 1 .tc:.O .. a,v doing so that they readily do it. and readily aaept it. as the following clause indicates. In order to keep A.'s idea in 72a 28-37 clear z ".d or.. p~6,a and to follow his logical development of the wrongs which men do. first stated at 72b 24, dd,,,ooa, TO: TomiTa, we must lUlderstand "al (d6",o;;a,) Tel t!q.6.a ... Furthermore from tl,e context of 73a 28-33 we must interpret

AIUSTOTLli, 'RBETORIC' I

the understood hannful actions as "thefts"; at 73a 34-37 we must consider

them in the more general sense of "wrongdoing." a 30: 1 ...Ii ili':'lio!'-" Ross and Kassel place" comma after Adri>d'l'a. The other edd., Spengd, and Cope use • period. I would find a period more acceptable to the division of ideas in 73" 2!r]2. 2 l\ xp':'!'-"a,v l\ "pliaEO"V Re-dyeing or repainting (xeml'llO"W) stolen goods makes sense, just as it might also be possible for the ingenuity of a thief to devise ways of altering the goods "by combination" ("eaaBaw). "Combination" seems to be used purposefully to suggest the blending of nonliquid materials. But it is strange that A. uses " word here which he employs mostly in its normal sense signifying the mixing of liquids (e.g., Top. 122b 25-32); one wonders whether "eaaBO"w here could refer to the melting down of precious ores.

a 31 ticp"v(all'

i.e., to make disappear, and therefore "to hide."

a 33 : 1 oI~ &6uicpoPII "indistinguishable from which," i.e., "exactly like," whereas the 81'0,a would be "generally like, similar to"; see its use at 70a 7. i.e., ready at hand; see ssb 36. a 34:

,,"I

30'11 See 73a 28 : 2. IIlaxWov...II, •.. AEY£'v See Lysias, Deftnse Against Simon 3. 3 YUVII'''Wv an objective genitive.

1

2

Il~PE'~ [£l~l ul£~

See 73a 13 : 1. tI~, not found in the best cod., is secluded by Roemer, Tovar, and Spengd; not read by Kassel; accepted by Ross, Dufour, and Cope. sc. ;cal (Ta,lr:a cid,xova,,) Baa . .. : "and they commit 3 xt:ll Gau those wrongs in prosecuting which the victim would be considered a lover of litigation." On tpMod",.i., see B 23, 000 1!r20; Thucyd. 1.77.2; Dem.,

a 3S :

1

z

Against DionysoJonlS '4. i.e., "for which iudulg= is shown." the conclusion to this chapter.

CHAPTER 13

I ' Introduction: 73 b I - 73 b 24 I.

73b 1 -7lb l

justice and injustice arc defined with respect to two no~. laws and persons, :and in each instance in two ways:

(a) particular

{ written unwritten

2.

laws

7lb 4 - 7lb 18

(b) general, i.e., law of nature, this is discussed at 7lb 6-18, 74a 2.1-2 S (a) the individual

persons

f (b) d,e community

II ' Devdopment: 73b 25 - 74b 22 I.

73b 'S - 742 17

justice and injustice with respect to persons (this devdops I.l.a-b), definition of being wronged (ie., injustice): act must be voluntary. knowing'

(b) 73b 38 - 74" 17

since the actions are often admitted bUI their wrongness is clliputed. we must ddine wrong action by showing that it resides in the moral purpose which motivates the act

justice and injustice with respect to laws, specifically unwritten laws (this develops !.z.a-b),

's 's - 74b ..

(0) 743 18 - 743

unwritten general (na,ural) law

(b) 743

unwritten particular law which involves the matter of equity

III . Conclusion: 74b 22 - 74b 23

see 74b 23

286

ARISTOTLE, 'RBBTOlUC' 1

73b I liUC"":'"IITII "acts ofjustice"; see S98 25. Cope, p. 245, wrongly identifies those as "~ust acts."

b 2 C.PLCH.' This does not necessarily mean that A. has so de£ned justice and injustice. ":!,he petteet simply indicates an accepted and still operative norm for specifying them. At 66b 9-11 A. gave a brief definition of justice and injustice, and at 68b 6-24 he de£ned injustice, using as his norms written and unwritten law, the voluntary, and knowledge. All these are norms which he also uses in this chapter. b 3 v6"ou~ &.10 xlIl ",po~ oilS The fundamental criteria (and "eo~ with the accusative indicates that A. has criteria in mind) for determining justice and injustice are: laws and persons. Each of these is further specified (M., a,%.;;~) into particular and general:

(I) Law as a general criterion is what A. calls natural law (73b 6), and, as we see here (see also 68b 11-9), it is unwritten. Law as a parncular criterion can be either written or unwritten (73b 5-<>; see also 74" 25-26). (2) ''PClSons'' as a general criterion means any collective group of people. "PClSons" as a parlicular criterion is the individual person; it is the human person, as an individual, who is accepted as the nonn for establisbing man's rights and duties within society. At 73b 2.2-24 A. gives an example of what he meallS by both.

In reality A. gives us here two norms by which to determine just and unjust acts: law and person. It is important to remember this because later A. speaks of "kinds" ofjust and unjust acts (e.g., at 74a 181£), and he means acts whiCh violate these two norms oflawand person. Law itself will be divided into three categories: (a) natural (unwritten); (b) positive (written); and (c) positive (but unwritten). Persons are divided into two categories: (a) the State; (b) the individual (on this, see 73b 26). In a true sense there is really only one norm: the person, singular or collective; for law itselfin this area, whether it be nataral or positive, is ultimately derived with reference to the human person. b 4: 1 TOY ply i5,ov ..ov 5. xo,,,o.., See 68b 8 : 1 and 68b 8 : 2. At EN Il34b 18 - Il35a 15 A. speaks of nalural justice (which is our .opa. .0.) as opposed to legal justice (our ,01'.' rala.). Cope, Intrad., pp. 239-42, gives evidence from Greek V',,:iters for the idea of natural law; on this, see 68b 8: 2. z tlilOV jdv This is set off against ,,~ ..d. di (73b 6). We are told here that this particular law is established by each community, and is pardy written, partly unwritten. The unwritten form of particular law is taken up between 74" 26 and 74b 23.

".l-

COMMENTARY

b 5 : J bc.......o,~ ':'P'''"",,ov Le., established for the good ordering of their lives by each and every community. Such a community would be a " ....,.ia like that mentioned at 73b 8. '"daT.', is a dative of agency; for its force, see S. 1488-1489. 2 ~o6"",ov i.e., the 7&~OV ld,o'J'. 3 ciyptupov At 68b 8-9 unwritten law was identified with universal or natural law. Here we find that there is unwritten law which belongs to the class of particular or positive law. An adequate and precise meaning for this unwritten, particular law is given neither by A. nor by those who interpret the Rhetoric. In fact A. complicates the problem at 74a 18-20 by introducing a further distinction on two kinds of unwritten law without giving any clear indication whether he is speaking about unwritten particular law, unwritten universal law, or both. In an elfort to make clear the kind of law which A. is describing, we will look briefly at the three critical passages together: namely, 68b 7-9, 73b 4-6, and 74' 18-20. From these sources we discover that A. divides law in this way: (1) particular, written law (i.e., positive law); (2) universal, unwritten law (i.e., natural law); (i) customary law (3) particular, unwritten law which is either { or (ii) equity (or ."n.t...

" ..a). A. speaks about each of these in the following passages in chap. 13:

(I') 73b 18 -74' 17; (2') 73b 6-18; 74' 21-25; (3') {(j') 73b 5 (ii') 74a 25 - 74b_ 23.

Returning, then, to areatpo. at 73b 5, we can say that A. has in mind customary law, or the institutions, customs, and accepted ways of a particular society for which there is no positive legislation, but which the entire community accepts. It is necessary to note that "particular society" is the connotation demanded by the Greek '"dl1To" tbe,a,,'.o, neo, atlTo';, (73b 5). Thus A. is speaking here of the customs accepted as normative (though unwritten) in a particular society. COluequently I am forced to conclude that many of the references cited from ancient sources for such particular, unwritten law do not appear to be correct. For e,ample, those given by Cope, [nuod., p. 244, and Speugd, p. 178, apply better to unwritten natural law - our (2) above - than to customary law - our (3.i) above - to which IJ.reatpo. at 73 b 5 refers. Thus the following do not appear applicable as references: Dem., Crown 275, Aristocrates 61, 70 (85 is possibly applicable); Xeo., Mem. 4-4.19; Lysias, And.cides 10 (possibly applicable); Cic., Pro Mil.,",

288

AIUSTOTLB, cRHETORIC' I

4.10. On the other hand, Plato, Law! 793a-d does seem to be speaking of customary law. Phillipson, r S3ff., speaks of universal and particular law. b 6 : 1 x ........
I

""""06o"......'

in the meaning we found at 68a 3I

: 1.

2 'Pu"., The dative here is the equivalent of >laTa
"'I5."t.. . ..

b 8-9 xCiv auv81jX1) This superior and all-pervasive power of natural law asserts itself even in the absence of any mutual agreement or pact, as A. explains well at 740 21-2S. Natural law will determine the justice or injustice of an act but it cannot ensure that the act will be rewarded or punished according to its merits. Only the positive law does

this.

,,!..

b 8 : 1 xo"".. This possesses more the character of a voluntary assoClanon; see, e.g., Pol. 1252a 1-7, I2S2b 27-31, lz62b 3S - 1263a 19, 13240 13-23, 1326b 2-9. On the idea in >loww.ta see Newman, 1 41-44. On the word as it appears in the PolitiC!, see Susemilil & Hicks, who say (po 138) that it "denotes chiefly •.. I) the voluntary combination, association, or cooperation of free men with each other in objects in which they have common interest ... 2) the associated body, the members who compose the

union ..." 3

auv81jX1)

See 60a IS : " and Pol. 1280a 38 - 1280b 12, 12840

41; at I276b 7 we meet the phrase 1eowOJlIial' "al avv6saw.

b 9 : 1 'A"",yOvrj of the play of the same name presented by Sophocles (ca. 496-406 B.C.), possibly in the year 441; see "Sophocles" in the OCD. 2 'P..l" ....... , AEyOU.... "manifestly means when she says that .••" This is the use of <pat.eTa., which we saw at 63a 8. Our expression here is compendious for <pat.eTa. li"... lirovaa; cpo Eur., Hec. 736.

COMMBNTAlI.Y

b 10: 1 Iln.,P'lp.£voY is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. Ross alone read. ';"e'l!'1pivov; there is no reason not to read with the codd.: "in .aying that to bury Polyneices is right, though forbidden." z .:.~ CPUCJE' IJv cb, with the absolute participle: "on the ground that"; see S. 2086d. Antigone assumes that it is right by natural law, and implies that natural law should be the ground of positive law. On ,6'181, see 73b 7: z. b 12-13 0(, ycip .. , ..• cpciV"IJ Soph., Antigone 456-457. For the full import of A:s citation, read 450-460. At 73b 13 A. reads TOVTO for Sophocles' TaVTa. This is an instance of A:. adjusting a citation for his own use as an example of the natural law. In confirmation of this, I note that when he again cites 1. 456, together with I. 458, at 75b 1-2, he makes a similar change at the beginning of 458 which makes it quite clear that he wants an accusative form and not the genitive (TOUTWV) of Sophocles. In each instance A:s changed form fits his own context. b 14 'EfIon£lioxAij~ ca. 493-433 B.C.; see the OCD. Empedodes' cosmology bas been traditionally interpreted as explaining the world process as cyclic and circular, passing through a four-stage process from writy to writy under the direction of two major forces, Love and Strife. Recently it has been argued that a more correct understanding of his cosmology would be ". single linear development in which the impulse toward cosmogony is given by Strife, whereas Love acts as the creative power" (A. A. Long, p. 398). This citation as we read it is no. 135 b 16-17 1iAA....o p.£v .....(,yij~ of the fragments of the pre-Socratics edited by Diels & Kranz. b 17 ..(,yij~ read by Ross, Tovar, and Kassel. aJ codd. is read by Roemer, Dufour, Spengel, and Cope.

l'ii' of the .inferior

a rhetorician of the fuurth century; see the OCD, b 18 : 1 •AA,,,&ciflo"~ and Sblt/ies, pp. 72-75. This "speech," the Messeni.cus, is cited again at B 23, 97" U-12. Cope, p. 247, and Commentary: II 239-40, discuss this "speech," which the scholiast suggests was made on behalf of the Messeniansin their break with Sparta. Such·a break would probably refer to the years 370/369 B.C. when Epaminondas established an independent Messeuia. Radermacher, p. 147, on the other hand, cites our evidence as pointing to a "libellum qualis fillt lsOCIatiS Archidamus," rather than a speech. The Architlamus of Isocrates was possibly published in the year 366. In it Archidamus III, son of Agesilaus, the ruling king of Sparta, urges the position that the Spartans should never cede Messenia. After this name Spengel, Cope, and three of the z 'AAx'&ciflo"~ edd. (Ross and Kassel are the "-,,ceptions) assume a lacuna. If we are to con-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

73b 23

jecture a lacuna, both Dufour and Tovar indicate it more precisdy, i.e., < ...>. That we are to assume a lacuna is not at all certain, however, in spite of the fact that one was assumed quite early by the ,choliast. Editors read a lacuna on the grounds that since A. cites Sophocles and Empedocles, he should cite Alcidamas as well. At 73b IS-ISa, Ross gives the citation ".Asv6ieo,,~ . .. "",otTJ"'.' wbich from the scholiast and which, from Ross's inclusion of it in his text, we are safe in concluding he accepts as the citation from Alcidamas. Though the incorporation of the words in the text is a questionable procedure, and although they are better omitted, it should be obvious that the quotation ("God has sent all men forth free; nature has made no man slave") is quite apposite to the point at issue. I make this observation because Spengd, p. 179, and Cope, p .. 247, comment rather strangdy. Spengd writes: "egregia sunt quae scholia graeca exhibent ad locum nostrum et supplendum et interpretandum"; and Cope observes: "It SeenIS to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and ..• is at all events quite out of place here." 3 ,.pl>~ oG~ "and with respect to persons"; this picks up the second criterion for justice and injustice at 73b 3.

=

,.pl>~ oG~ ..• i1>p'cr",CI' yap This reading, restored from cod. A by Vablen and Roemer, is accepted by the other edd., who use the same punctuation.

b 18--19

b 19 : 1 &Lp'cr",CI' &LXCl i.e., "there is a twofold division"; cf. 73b 3 where we can also obtain the subject for this verb: namely, Ta d{"a.a "al ..a c!d",a. However, it seems better to take as the subject of this verb the su,bjecr of the followiug we.l1Tat: namdy, the clause at 73b 20, d dB• ... !,.q

ne aTTS '''.

2 , XD'VOv

b 21

See 60b 38 : 3.

"unjust acts," a cognate accusative with d6&xE;i", just as ..a a",a.rh!,aTa is with d."a.on;ea'Y.... The infinitives are subject infinitives of d.xCii, lUT•• ("is possible in two ways"). On ddool!,aTa, see 74b 4-10 and notes. 'rtl8lXlifLCI'fCl

b 22 "pl>~ IvCl XCII c:.pur"ivov This is the individual as the norm of just and unjust action. If the individual's rights are violated, he may resort to the courts. The private legal action of one person against another (or against a group of individuals, a socia~ political club, etc., for example; see 73 b 26: cUAov~) is called in Attic law a 6{"TJ (or M"'T} l8ta); see, for example 73a 13 : z which would be an action brought against 6 nl"",w. of 73b 23.

"eo,

b 23 : 1 "po~...o xo,vOv This is the community, or the collective person, as the norm. The public legal action brought by any qualified citizen

COM.MENT ARY

on behalf of the whole body politic is c:illed a Yeu'I'>i (dymv d~l'dcr...). Refu.ring military service ~rued one to a rea'l'>i acrTeaTBta.; see, e.g., Arist., Knights 440-444. Other public charges were: high treason, accepting bribes from the enemy, disenfranchisement, kidnapping, etc. 2 ,; fIoo'XEllwv This is presented here as a 6~, but the Athenian State was willing to .ccept it as a rea'l"1' since it considered such action an offense also against the common good of the State. This' identification, in certain areas, of the private with the public good is reflected in 'Cicero's comment (In Veff. 3.69.16r): "Quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam rei publicae fecisti iniuriam. Susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi,

sed etiam. patriae ..." b 2S : 1 &nciv"'""' ... 8'tlP'lflotvwv "with this division, then, of all wrong actions." This phrase gives the tenor of A.'s remarks in this chapter: while ostensibly concerned with the classification of just and unjust acts, he places emphasis primarily upon unJust actions. 2 ICcd '~ allou~ is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd. Ross re.ds cLUov 11 ciAlo~., but gives no reason for his change. Cope, without comment, reads as does Rrus. Spengd in his text also reads as Ross does, but in his note prints as the codci. do, saying that there is no call for,,! The codd. should be read; it is quite possible to consider "at as "at linking alternatives (Denniston, p. 292, no. 7). Furthermore, &llo~> does not introduce "a new distinction" (Cope), but offers &lAov: i.e., "with respect to an individual, a legitimate alternative to or some few individuals."

b 26

"eo.

"eo>

"eo.

"eo.

clw>.
b 27

Bl"a,.

b 28 :

1

",I> 6"" .IC"""'O~ ",ck 48'ICII

""OX"'V

If "to do wrong"

(dd,,,.iv) requires by definition a voluntary act by another (e.g., 73 b 28-29), then "to be wronged" (dd",.icr6a,) can only be the effect of a voluntary act. These are simply two aspects of one and the same action, as A. talces for granted in his clause of explanation at 73 b 28-29: TO rae ... •lva•. 2 6"o .lCcSv",O~ On the voluntary as a requisite for wrongdoing, see EN Il3sa r6-28, Il36a 31-32, II13b 3 - III~ 31.

b 29 "ponpov

i.e., 68b 6-12.

A1USTOTLBJ 'RHETORIC' I

b 2!r31 hrEl S' a.Va.Y>Cn .•• der.v A number of the English translations misinterpret this sentence, and I am not speaking of their accepting i"ooat(JJ~ (on which, see next note). The Oxford (Roberts) translation is typical. Our sentence, as printed by the edd. (except Ross), should be translated: "Inasmuch as the person wronged must be harmed, and harmed against his will, such harmful actions are clear from our earlier comments." In this interpretation, the clause ."sl ... dxo"at.,~ plw..rsaOa, is correctly taken as subordinate to the statement at 73b 30-31, at pB' ... slaw.

b 30 a.xouer(.. ~

is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. Ross reads i,,01lClt(JJ~, a conjecture by Richards, who reads it because of the context: e.g., i"&'TO~ at 73 b 28, and I.xouata at 73 b 32. The conjecture seemingly makes A.'s statement a more clearly consistent one. Nevertheless, d"ovat.,~ is to be preferred because Td. d6,,,oups.o. pJ.O:n.TsaBa, in the context of 73b 2']-31 (see, for example, 73b 28 : J) can only mean "one who is willfully wronged is harmed." Thus it is superfluous to repeat this by saying i"ouat.,~ pJ.w..r8aOa,. What A. wishes to state is that "being wronged" means, not only to be harmed (plw..rsaOa,), but to be harmed against one's will (dxouatw~ pU.".eaOa,). Wrongdoing constitutes a ;:wofold injury: deliberate action against another, as well as action contrary to what the other person wills. As Socrates gets Meletus to admit (Apol. 2sd), no one wants to be harmed by another. ix ....", "po""pov As A. states in what follows, he has already considered good and bad actions, and the nature of deliberate action. The last is obviously a reference to A 10. As for A.'s discussion of good and bad, €ope, p. 249, and Roemer (in the text itself) point only to A 6, and in this they are followed by others. I am not sure that this is correct, for A. certainly discusses various aspects of good and bad in chaps. 6, 7, and 9.

b 3I

b 32:

J x..e' .......a. Cope, p. 249, says "in themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7)." This refinement is not necessary. It seenu more correct to interpret: "good and bad in themselves have been discussed earlier." 2 "po... pov See 73b 31. J x ..l ..olI boO"... sc. .l'e'1.a~ This is a reference to A 10. 4 3Tt ~G"C'L" sc. (.d'e1rra,) 8" £(17:'" (beooata Toaai1Ta) 8aa 81d&T8~ ("o,o;;a ••); see 68b !rIO. The force of OT' taken by itself, as it can be, is best e."<pressed by "namely that"; see 7Sa 9 : 2.

b 33 £yx).'I\/L""" a court oflaw.

i.e., formal charge of wrongdoing, accusations before

b 34 : J ..;, (S.ov frequently interpreted as "the individual" in contradistinction to "the community" (Td "owo.). It is more precisely and correctly interpreted as "private interests" as opposed to upublic interests."

COMMENTARY

293

",d

z ij O:Y"0oU~"'o~ "",( This is the reading accepted by the edd.• following the scholiast and Bekker. Spengel and Cope also read it. though Cope does so reluctantly (it should he pointed out thzt his note on the passage is not an explanation of the text which he actually reads). In this reading of th. text A. sets a balance by coordinating ignorance with the involuntary (ar'OO;;'TO~ "al d"OVTO~). just as knowledge for him (68b 9-IO. 73b 32-33) is coordinate with the voluntary (he&'TO~ "al sld&TO~). 3 cl.Y"0oU~",o~ This and the following genitives are personal ("one who do.s not know"). and they are to be taken as objective genitives with Tel Er,,}"fll.aTa understood from 73 b 33.

b 35 : 1 .t60...o~ Oem.• Aristocrates 45-50. distinguishes betw.en involuntary manslaughter and deliberate murder. i.... "the latter" - namely. those who act willz ",d ...oU......~ ingly and knowingly. which is the phrase it modifies as it separates these people into two classes: (a) the one who acts with deliberate moral choice. and (b) the one who acts in passion. 3 ...ck ,,"E~ "'POu.o,,"~ou Ta ,..s• ... Tel M. are used adverbially. as they are at 74a 2.8. The full expression would he Ta "eos).o,..ivov ("edT"IV) Tel d. d.el "dBoe; ("edTTOVTO~). in which the genitives are in explanatory apposition with TOVTWV: "and with respect to the latter the charges are directed in part against the one who acts with deliberate moral choice. and in part against the one who acts in passion." As w. saw .arlier at 68b 10-12 and 68b Io-II. acts done with deliberate choice are done with knowledg•.

"'s.

s.

b 36 : 1 ...ck Th. Tel ,..B'I'-Tel di phrase is the same as if A. had said Tel ,..B. o.el neoale,a .. Tel OB d.el "dBo~. It appears that the English translations blur the text her. at 73h 36-38: Ta dB oca "dBoe; ... sle'1Tao "e&"eo" For surely 73 b 36-38. "Bel ,..E. oil•... ,re'1TOC :n:e&..eo. is a comment on 73b 35-36. "al TovTru••.. cI.el "dBoe;. For 73b 36-38 remarks thzt the idea behind "eoe}..o,..i.ov has b.en discuss.d. and thzt A. will take up "dBoe; lat.r. The problem is to clarify the nexus between ,,&Boe; and Bv,..&e;. For at 73b 36 A. explains clOel "dBoe; by Bv,..&e;. But we already know from 68b )2.-69a 2. (and see 68b 32 - 69> 2) thzt Bv,..&e; is a caus. of voluntary action (see also EN UUa 22 - IIIIb 3). which A. is discussing here. The difference betw.en voluntary action done with deliberate choice ("eo,}..o,..",ov) and thzt done under the influence of passion (dui "dBoe;) was discuss.d in chap. 10. It is also very explicitly set forth at EN Il35a 16 - II36a9; see. e.g.• II35b 8-u: "R.garding voluntary acts: some we do consequent upon moral choice. oth.rs ,"i/hout moral choice. Our moral choices f.ill upon all chings about which we have previously deliberated; those things not subject to previous delib.ration are not the objects of moral choice"; and II3sb 19-20: "Whenever one acts with knowledge but without previous deliberation there is an unjust act

74a

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

I

[dM"~l'al, as, forexample. all acts done because ofanger or other emotions necessary or natural to man." See also 68b Ie-II on A.'s differentiation between "voluntary" and "moral choice." Cope in analyzing the kinds of wrong acts mentioned at 74b 4-10 speaks of the difference between the lists in EN and in the Rhetoric, noting (pp. 257-5S) that there is a fourth category in EN: i.e., '~a wrong act ..• done in a fit of passion ... and not after deliberation." But this is exactly the category which A. speaks ofhere in his comment on actions done dla "cl9o~, 73b 36. " 2 P'I8>jcr€..... in B 2, where anger is analyzed.

b 38 :

1

dP'l"'''' ",po".pov i.e., in chaps. &' ... cNX 6P.oA0YoGcr.V

m.l

II-I2.

This causal clause is introductory to the main statement at 74a 6, d,a TaiiTa aBO! Il~ .•. : "but since men, while &equendy acknowledging the action, either do not admit ..." 2

See 5sb 2\r-32 and 58b 32 :

1.

"1-2 ..I> .",Iyp .. p.p... : .• jj ",.pl 3 The tide or name given to an offense to classify it and to place it in a certain category as a violation of a specific law, and as subject to a certain court of law and certain penalty, is called Td l"'Yeal'l'a. This classification of an action later became known as the l1Tao"l~ oel"~: the definition of the action. The "sellJ (74' 2) would be the action itsdf which must be defined. Obviously all dispute will center on this, as we can see &om 74a 2-<5. For once the action is clearly and .dequatdy described it either will or will not qualify for the iniYe"l'l'a. In the examples given in 74" 2-<5 the first dement - e.g., lafl.i~, "aTMa~ etc. - represents the "'el ;; as the defendant understands it. The second dement - e.g., .tii'Pal, vPeiO"CJ! - represents Td intYeal'l'a, as it is usually accepted by the common consent of all in the community (see 74" 7 : 2). The exchange between Socr.tes and Euthyphro (Buthyp. Sc-e) illustrates the distinction quite will. As time went on, these legal issues in an action were devdoped in • more detailed and formal manner and became known as the o"Tao".I~; see Cope, IntroJ., pp. 397--400. In A. O"TaO". .~ in its technical meaning does not appear; for him the issues are more generic, and are called dl''P'o"P'fJ~'''u;. See IS, 17, and EE 1221b 18-26 (we saw the verb form at 54" 27, 5sb ]I, and 6sa 2). Quintilian in speaking of O"TaO"SI, (Inst. orat. 3.6.49) mentions A. in a passage which Spengel, p. lSI, says can refer only to r IS or 17, and which Cope, p. 251, says can refer only to r 16.6 and 17.1. Both appear to be correct. "But the real point is Spengd's observation on Quintilian's comment: Spengd says that Quintilian has misunderstood A. Of this there can be little question, for the evidence is inescapable that both the Greek: and the Roman tecbnographers missed at times the import of A.'s theoretical argument. On O"TaO"6L~ in A., see Thompson; and since Thompson works out of

r

295

COMMENTARY

74" 9

Nadeau, one should also consult Nadeau, "Hennogenes on Stock Issues," "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases," and "Hetmogenes on Stases." a 2 I'~ Iill' 06 See also 74'1 4, 5-j). dAU answering I'i> gives the second clause a strong adversative force; see Denniston, p. 5, and see ']2a 8. a3:

1

"".....~'"

"p6...pov

See B 24,

020

1-3.

• cruyyevt"e", ... I'0'XEii"'" Spengel refers to Oem., Against Neaera 64-71; see especially 67. See also BE 1221b 23-25. an example used frequendy by teachers of a 4 1\ xA""'" ... e.aU .., rhetoric: e.g., Hermogenes, on definition in his lIBel ITtia•• , 35 (ed. &abe, p. 62); Sopater, Rhetores Grned, VIII 102-105. a 4-5

(06 ycltp . . ....,)

All the edd. use the parentheses.

a 5 : 1 tn.pyoi"""e", The word means to encroach or trespass upon (and frequendy upon sacred ground); we see it so used by Lysias, On the Oli.e Stump 24; Thucyd. 1.139 (hreel'aaiav); Aeschines, Ctesiphon II3. See Cope's note (pp. 251£) with examples on the use of hri in composition; he argues rut it implies reciprocity, mutual association. • &.jl"'al"y ,,"'ea> is understood. Cope reads ~'1l'da.a; this form not only commands good testimony but also is not impossible: i.e., d'll'oa.a d'll'0ala> is read by the edd. and by Spengel; it is the more probable reading since it is clear rut land is intended.

""'e'a.

a 7: 1 ""I intensive. i.e., the actions of 74'1 H, but, as is seen from what • ..06""'" immediately follows, A. mentions only the first three of these six actions. 3 a''''pl"e", "definitions be established"; i.e., that the actions be given a clear status before the law. It was on the question of such definitions that technographers later developed the a<\ An lad is understood with these phrases, i.e., "what is thefr," etc. Retuming to 74& 1-2, we can say rut ~Aomj, l1{Je", etc., represent.d .",ll'eal'l'a. Whatever constitutes the d in each instance would be the ",eel 8 .d hrll'eal'l'a (74a 2). It is helpful to understand as the subject of the infinitive a 8 6"oiPX"y a generic Td MI"'1l'a (the offense), which would include any of the antecedent words, i.e., "Aom!, iJ{Je'~, I'o."ela.

a.,xv6v",

a 9: 1 As we have seen (S6a 3 : .), the word means simply "to show, point out." • lx"'I'ov "to be able"; see ssa 18, and LS,I"." A.III. "toshowforth,make plain, rut which is 3 tl"l'"yll;.,y..-II &bCCllCIV right and just." In its own way this is a confirmation of what we saw in the

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

progranunatic statement of chaps. 1-3: namely, the concern of Aristotelian rhetoric with getting at the truth as far as possible in any given situation. 4 mi"..........0'..;;-... This is usually interpreted in a way which suggests that it is an accusative of respect; see, e.g., Cope, p. 252, or Jebb & Sandys: "Now in all such instances dle question is whether ... " (in passing we should note that the Oxford [Roberts] translation is not a tr.mslation of the Greek). Cope's interpretation is diflicult to understand. It is better to take our words as a nominative. For the reason and the translation, see the following note.

a I I : I ij 41'
a

a 13 :

J lI(3p,~ See 73a 13 : J. zeN. •. miv..... ~ il(3p'crev

"he, assuredly, has not committed

an act of v{le"." a 14 ToU a 14-IS

i.e., TU10~.

olav ... 7lcr9;jv.. ,

This is explained at 73a 13 : J.

For the case, see S. I973a.

COMMBNTARY

297

a 16 : 1 bel (3l.ci(3n Ocl.E.jI€ xcII CKf'€T£PLC'P.ii> is the reading of all the codd. The Id,V', is generally considered to be a gloss and secluded. As far as I can see, this is the better reading and it is .ccepted by Spongel and Kassel; Cope and Freese also accept it but omit Ixl6'l" entirely. The other edd. (Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Ross) accept the reading from Moerbeke vi. Dittermcyer (see Roemer, pp. xxxi £): ...1 pU.PTI < rovr"" acp' oJ llap_> Jeal af{'BTSe&api[J. • btl (3l.ci(3lJ "for the purpose of," "with a view to"; LS, i"t, B.III.2. J CKf'tt.pLC.p.ij> l ..u ..oG a unique and unusual noun form with which an objective genitive is used: "for the use and advantage of onesel£"

.".1 ... d&.J "Although there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (the written and the unwritten), while the kind for which law speaks [i.e., the written; see A's comment at 542 21-22] has been discussed, there remain two kinds of unwritten just and unjust actions to be discussed." There should be no punctuation after ,r6~ at 74' 18. a 18-2O

a 18 'ljv philosophical imperfect; 63a 9 : I. The most obvious reference is to 73b 4-<5. But since we also have 68b 8-9, one cannot be as certain, as Cope, p. 254, is, that the reference is exclusively to 73b 4-<5. A., in fact, uses the words ra.ov - HOW.V in both places, and in such a way that one readily assumes that the difference between them is the difference between particular (positive) and universal (natural) law. At 73 b 4-<5 he adds that there is particular law which is also unwritten. In the light of 74a 18 -74b 23 it seems most important to keep this in mind because A. is talking here of unwritten natural law (e.g., 742 21-25) and of unwritten positive law (e.g., 74a 25 - 74b 23). 1 (de p.~ ••. ciYP"'P") All the edd. use the parentheses. • yeycip.p.ov.. -. llyp"'P" i.e., Er6~. That A. means by "the written and unwritten kinds ofjust and unjust actions" actions in accord with or contrary to written tmd "IIIvritten I.,v is clear from 68b 6-'7: lrn:m ... "aeet rdv v&po •. 3 rcept cInI

a 19 :

a 20 : 1 .rpll...., This is left unidenti£ed by the commentators, but it refers to 73b 18 - 742 17. • &.10... d&.J The two are explained: (a) at 742 21-25, ret pe. "a9' ... ; and (b) at 742 25 - 74b 23, rei 6A ••. a 21 ..Ii p.~ x..e' 'nt.p(3ol.'ljv The modern translations are unanimous in their inteIpretation of this phrase, and the interpretation can be seen in the Oxford translation: "First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness" (Roberts, p. [61]). Cope, p. 254 (and Schrader as well

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

7~

21

[as cited by Gaisford, p. 166]), interprets this kind of Wlwritten law as universal, i.e., natural, law: "the universal law, the precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is meant by the •excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice' above the legal standard, expressed in "aO' "nSe{JOA~' desTij, I
74' :>6

COMMENTARY

:>99

a:>:>: 1 ,;"d&q K ..l £""'''0' Praise (and blame), as we know from chap. 9, is the tribute given to virtue; see 63a 10, 67b :>7. Z K ..l ,....,p.lIIt, See 65a 5 : z. Ross alone of the edd. prints a comma after d-rlptal. It is strange and should not be there. Less troublesome are his parentheses at 74" 23-25. They can stand, although the other edd. read the text without them. J .. ,p... 1 See 6ra 28 - 6rb 2, 65a 7: I,

a 23 8"'p.:.. l

See 6ra 37 - 61b

2.

a 23-25 oT"" ..o .....o,eN.... A.'s examples here are accepted precepts of the natural law, and represent actions which obtain the spontaneous moral approval of men. See also Anaximenes 142rb 36 - 1422a 2; Ear., Antiope, frg. 219, ed. Nauck. a 25 .... 8. This is the second member of the 74a 21 phrase, -rav-ra 6' lad. Tel pi•. We can translate: "and in part those which represent a defi-

ciency in the particular and written law." As A. will go on at once to explain, and explain quite well, this Wlwritten law represents an interpretation of written law; it is an interpretation which is, in general, in accord with the spirit and the mind of the legislator, even though it may be directly opposed to the written prescriptions of the actual law. As his explanation reveals, this Wlwritten law is an effort to preserve true justice as far as it is humanly possible. . See Cope, IntroJ., pp. 19C1-92, 242-44, and EN a 26 : 1 ..0 y ..p b""'XE~ "37a 31 - I138. 3, which is a passage rightly called "an important stage in the history of law" (Gauthier & Jolif, II 433). In the light of what follows at 74" 26-74b :>3, it is interesting to reread A.'s comments at 54" 26-54b 16. The usual translation ofbr.I.I"i~ is "equity," and I will use it in the commentary. L.w as enacted does not always embody the right and just when it is applied to specific cases in certain circumstances. In a legal sense that which is "according to the law" is the just and the right. But in a given instance the legally just may be Wljust and wrong. In such a given instance, "equity" denotes a judgment of what constitutes the just and the right, a judgment determined not by the law in question, but by a higher law, or principle, which frequently is what the generality of men would consider to be by nature the right and the just in tllis instance. Equity, then, is concerned with legal justice, and it is an attempt to s.feguard the truly right and just from the imperfections of positive law. Equity, as opposed to legality, looks to the sense of the law rarlIer than ·to the letter of the law. Equity seeks the same rlIing as r1Ie legislator desired by the law but could not fully achieve insofar as it is impossible to legislate for all circumstances and situations. Equity, in other words, does what the legislator would do were he on hand: it remakes

300

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

7-!a 34

the law. It is a correction of the law, a law which, if applied in a given case, would result in injustice - or even totally irrational action. Equity is a correction of the law made by attempting to follow the mind and the will of the legislator when he wrote the law. Equity says that in a given case the given law does not apply, and that the legislator clearly did not intend it to apply. Equity is a restriction set upon a law because to apply the law in a given situation makes nonsense of the general intent of the law as enacted. 2 60K£L "seems, appears" to people, and does so for some higher reason, as explained in the preceding note. The verb here does not mean "appears to be but is not"; for A. says immediately (74a 27): "Equity ;5 the jwt," a justice which goes beyond jwtice as found in written law. a 27

TCupci

i.e., "beyond"; see 6gb 2.

a 28 "" """" - "" st

adverbial; see 73b 35 : 3. 7tO'~ "'C'Lvl

i.e., "whenever they are unable to give a precise definition, and yet it is necessary, on the one hand, to speak in a definitive way and possible, on the other, to speak only in a general way. Furthermore, whenever the problems are all those which are not easy to define with precision because of a lack of experience - for example, the statement about wounding with iron of a certain size or kind." a 30-33:

O'MV

tJ.iJ ...

a 30 K"SO>'Ol> d".iv, 1'0-1) Ti St C£ EN 1137b 14-16; see also LS, el",l, A. VI. Despite varied interpretations offered of 74a 3<>-31 (particularly in the translations), the tran5lation given in the preceding note represents what the Greek says. a j I: I K"l 3a" The ~al coordinates what follows with DTav "'~ 6uvanl'ra, ",oelaal.; therefore we must understand: (8Ta." 't'oaaUTa if) oaa ... 2 3.. " ... p~S,ov sc. laT.. Apart from the clearly defined .ction upon which he legislates the lawmaker obviously cannot (and should not attempt to) foresee and provide for the unlimited possibilities which can readily qualify any action. A. vividly describes the impossibility of such a procedure at 74a 33: ".lifetime would not suffice" for it. All such contingencies must be left to intelligent interpretation by those competent to ...-"ecute the intent of the lawmaker. But this procedure also has its drawbacks, as 54a 28 - 54b 16 reveals. For A. rightly constituted law was sovereign in the State. Vet there were instances where it could not be such because of its inability to be precise; see Pol. I282b r-6. 1 ciopla-ro'Y i.e., "if the action, then, is something which cannot be precisely defined." The English tran5lators interpret with Cope in this manner: "If, then, it is impossible to be defInite." But A. from what follows at 74" 35-J6 is speaking with an action in mind such as he has mentioned at

a 34 :

COMMBNTARY

301

74a 32, Td TeWua, u,dljelfl, and this should be made quite clear in translating: e.g., "if the action is beyond precise de6nition." In other words, in such instances the defect lies not in the law, or in the lawmaker, but in the nature of the action; see, e.g., EN Il37b '7-19. 2 &n').W~ E.b~Eiv i.e., "to speak: generally"; on MAw(;-, see s6a 7, meaning (c). The phrase carries the Same meaning as ~a6&'ov elnti., 74a 3O-3I: "to speak universally," "to make a universal statement." In speaking of equity at MM Ilg8b 24-33, A. restates much the same idea. a 35-36

WaTE ...

a 36: 1 .Voxo~

EG'''fCIl.

xlSl clSLXEi

the indicative to stress actual fact.

As a legal term, it means "subject, liable to" the law.

a mo., Four of the edd. read 'UTa' with cod. A; Ross, Spengel, and Cope read iO"Ti with the other codd. Either reading is possible, but 'UTa, expresses the sense more precisely. This is set in contrast to 74" 36 (~aTd 74h I : 1 XII'tel< BE 'tD aA'I8t~ /AB• ... './Ao,). It is precisely this fact which gives validity to, as well as demands, the exercise of equity. Without equity in such instances the execution of justice becomes an act of injustice. See Lysias, Against Theo",nestes 6-20, especially 7; compare also the criticism of Sextus Empiricus (II. A.D. '75-200) in his essay Against the Professors 36-38. 2 'tOu-ro This word refers to what A. has just said at 74a 28 74b I (uv/A(Jai... .•. dd,~.l): namely, in a given instance, to make the judgment between the demands of the written law and the actual truth of the case. b 2-3 .t &~ . • • Iiv8pw"o, With this transitional sentence A. moves on, from 74b 4 to the end of the chapter, to draw the conclusions which follow from his analysis of equity. Each of them opens up further the character, quality, and humaneness of this most necessary qualification of all positive law. See Barker, Appendix II, 362-72, for a consideration ofjustice, law, and equity as they appear in the Ethics and Rhetoric. For d. (74b 2) Spengel, with a reference to 54b 16, 83b '7, reasonably suggests dlj, and it is read by

Kassel. b 1 xlll "OLO' ... 1iv8p..."o, Spenge~ pp. 184-85, mentions two problems with respect to this clause: (a) the absence of a positive to balance the negative, as we find in the preceding clause; and (b) the omission in what follows of any discussion of "inequitable persons," such as that given in the EN passage, e.g., II3ib 34 - Ill8a 3. The first problem is simply a matter of personal judgment on the part of the commentator and carries no real weight. The second is surely incorrect. For by pointing out in detail what kind of person can make judgments of equity (see 74b 10 : 1) A. illustrates the inequitable man by way of the equitable person. See, for example, 74b 4 : 2.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

302

b 4: J bp' oI~ This is "'/ in the local (figurative) sease: "in cases such as these"; see LS, 1.,,1, B.I.I.i. and S. 1689.2.C. 2 ""YY"rl>I'"IIV lx.LV i.e., "to judge kindly." """y.o,I''1 expresses feeling with another, an effort to make a compassionate judgment of the other. I do not think that """y.o,I''1' here, or in the exPression at 74h la-II ("al Tel ••• "'.. ,,,.,), means anything more than this: compassionate tmderstanding prompted by a sense of a higher law or principle causes precisdy that recourse to the mind of the lawmaker which is the mark of equity .s we find it in the Nicoma,hean Ethics. In fact A. attaches inunediatdy to his statement at 74b la-II the requirement which he demands for equity in EN: look to the intent of the lawmaker. I make these observations because our phrase has been interpreted to mean: "to pardon, to excuse," a meaning which is found for in Thucyd. 3.40.2-3. But such an interpretation changes the nature of equity. For it grounds equity, not in the law, but outside the law. This gives an interpretation of equity different from that in the Nicomachean Ethics, which is the •.""planation which A. is following, as far as one can see, in the Rhetoric. For the evidence on this matter in EN, see Gauthier 11£ Jolif; II 431-33; see also 74b II. 3 beL.'Xij ...IIG..... perhaps best translated: "such cases bdong to equity."

.,,,,.I><.,a

b 4-6

x..l ...o ...

Ii~u.uv

se. i.,~'B'H4~ ean, i.e.. flis an act of equity."

b 5 ml'''p-n\I'''''''' a failure, fault; c£ EN II35b 16-20, where we find (see 74b ~), as we do here (74b6-IO), that Ql'aeT'1l'a as a failing stands midway between ddl"'1l'a and dniX'1I'I1· The distinction made here among the thr;e is recognized by Oem., Crown "'74.

b ~ Ii~u.uv, I'"II&~ ...ok ci..-ux>ll''''''''· l!.....v Ii..-ux>ll''''''''' I'~ II.... n ..pciAoYCI The text here is read in different ways, and arguments can be adduced for the varied readings. The reading given above is that of Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar, and of Kassd as well except that he reads lUTI a' for lUT... Since the reading of the edd. has the advantage of reproducing a good text, it is preferable. The major variant is introduced by Ross and it repeats in part changes made by Spengd and Cope. However, the substantial sease of the passage is not seriously affected by the reading of the edd. or that of Ross. In the reading which the edd. accept, the interpretation of 74b 5--'7 would be: "(and equity consists in) not judging errors and wrong actions, or indeed misfortunes as worthy of the same penalty; misfortunes are all such as are beyond calculation and not the result of moral badness." In the reading of Ross and Cope - neither of whom presents a reason for it - we have a critical addition: dE,.;;p, l''1di Ta QI'I1enil'aTII Hal Ta ·,Ir~%~l'aTI1. Although the reading is acceptable, my problem with it is twofold. (a) It implies some special relationship between al'aenipIITa and ciWml'l1TI1 which is not justified

COMMENTARY

303

in what follows in the text. For in what follows, it seems clear that A. wishes simply to distinguish among three things: dd'~1i,uaTa, a,uaeT11,uaTa, dTtlvl,uaTa (and see also the passage from EN cited in 74b s). (b) I find Spengel's objection to the reading a reasonable one, and rather than take the space t() explain it I will cite it: "Haec [i.e., Ta a,uaeT~,uaTa "al] vulgo pmt ,u'fJdA posita om. A, recte; nam non modo haec sed etiam dd'''~,uaTa intelligenda

sunt, quod illis verbis omissis fit." b 6 : 1 cil;.ouv with the accusative and the genitive means: "to think something worthy of either reward or punishment" (see, e.g., LS, I). In our context the negative idea of punishment is the dominant meaning. • ci""X",,"''''''' As A. says in EN II3Sa 16 - II3!Sa 9 (mentioned in 73b 36 : I), there are three kinds of harm (pM.pa., II3sb IIf£) done in transactions between men. They are called dnlX'fJ,ua, a,utleT'fJ,ua, and rlM"'f},ua. "Mistakes," "misfortunes" (dTtlx>7,uara) axe the results of a person's action, results which axe in no way to be expected (i.e., they axe "aedAora, 74b 7; see 62a 7 : 1) and which do not have their source in any moral evil in the pers<>n (,u~ "'". ,uoX6'fJela~, 74b 7). In such an instance, the agent is in no way responsible, even though he may be guilty before the law. He has committed, not an ddl"'f},ua, but an dnlX'fJ,ua, and so there is a place for equity. In the EN passage (at II3Sb 12), A. does use rl.,uaeT11,uaTa (best ttanslated as "errors") to introduce both dT1lx~,uaTa and 6.,uaeT11,uaTa (see Spengel, p. 18S), but he distinguishes between the two just as he does in our Rhetor;c passage. As far as we know, the attempt to distinguish degrees of responsibility in PUP'fJ by a study of the subjective dispmiti<>ns of the agent is first found in Plato, Laws 86Ie - 8640, although Gorgi.s in his Helen is surely awareof some distincti<>ns among ddlx'fJ,ua, dnlX'fJ,ua, and pmsibly ti,uaeT'fJ,ua; see GDrg., Helen 6, 7, IS, .and 19 in Radermacher, pp. S4. s6~ and S7. See also Anaximenes 1427' 34 - I427b II. b 7 ci","pTij",,,..,, These axe what we would call "faults," implying, as the word does, some personal and moral responsibility. They are not simply intellectual errors. Unlike aTVx>7,uaTa, they have their source in the person as an agent, in some flaw in character which, though it is not morally wrong in any substantial way, can be the cause of harm to others. Despite the extensive discussion on 6./AaeTla in tragedy, whenever one makes the attempt to specify it in a chaxacter, one finds ultimately that it is some such character flaw - or action resulting from such a flaw. As such, it is something understandable (,uiJ naedAora, 74b 8), acceptable, and, in most circumstances of living, harmless to others. But it is potentially dangerous in the wrong situation, and in such a situation can actually be the cause of serious harm to others. Yet as a a,uaeT'fJ,ua it is in no way attributable to moral badness in the agent (,u~ "'". nOV'fJela;, 74b 8).

ARISTOTLE, 'RB:BTORIC' I

b 8 &S.X>1"'....... From what has been said in the previous two notes, it should be possible to recognize "wrong" or "criminal" deeds: they arc the usual consequents ip1/TE "ae&.l0l'a, 74b 9) of the kind of action from which they derive: namely, action whose source resides in moral badness in the agent (lind "O"'leta~, 74b 9). As we saw in 73b 36 : I, there are two kinds of dM"'Ipa. There is a possibility for equity in the second kind (TO dt d.o "aOo~; but see 74b r r), not in the ftrst. from the context it appears that A. has in mind the ftrst kind (Ta 116. "eOeA0lli.ov) here, the truly wrong act for which there is no possible role for equity. b 9-10 ..... yap ... 1CO"'IpICl~ This is the reason why an act is an ddiH'l/pa. It is an act inspired by an rn.Ovpta whose source is ''""'leta (which is synonymous with pox07leia at 74b 7 and which was deftned at 74" II-U). If the analysis at 68b 32. - 69a2 and 69a 1 : 2 correcdy represents A.'s thoughts on the causes of human action, we must conclude that In.Bvllia can also be guided by reason. When so guided, it must therefore rellect knowledge, a necessary ingredient for voluntary action (68b 9-10). Certainly, then, the .,,,OVlIla here at 74b 9-10 must be under some control of reoson. For there can be lW voluntary act otherwise, and the statement on M'''''lIaTa becomes nonsensical Since this '""Ovllia has its source in evil (lind ""'l/ei~), and since people whose acts arise in this source are both IIOxO'leoi and 11.6"'0' (68b 14-16), we can readily understand that their acts are dd'''''lIaTa. Kassel, Der Text, pp. 129£, considers our phrase to be a contradiction of A.'s logic and ethics and omits the clause in his edition of the text. b 10: 1 XClI ...o ....i~ . . . A. begins here a brief listing of the kinds of ju<;Jgutent which characterize dle man of equity. In doing so, he enlarges upon the meaning of equiry, and indicates the elements in human action which are entided to be qualified by the term equity: namely, "oia lcn:. Ta l"".urij (74b 2-3). 2 "oi~ &v8p... ,,(Yo.~ C£ reference at S6a 29 : z. b II wYY'YVWaKE'Y Le., "to have a fellow-feeling with another," and so, "to make allowances for"; see LS, IV. See 74b 4 : z, to which we may add thatif one presses the word C1VJ'y.o,P'l/ toward the meaning of "indulgence, pardon." and argues that the concept of equity in the Rhetoric is one of indulgencc - namely, something whicll is ""terior to the law - difficulties arise. For A. says clearly that voluntary acts committed in passion (which, as we saw at 73b 36: I, fall under d6"'>1l1aTa) are lWt pardonable: o~ C1VJ'1'..... 11""'&' EN II36a 7-9. But they should certainly be subject to equity, if what A. says about equity makes any sense. Indeed, we might well ask: Why bother to make a distinction in 74b 4-10 among pUpa. if this were not so?

COMMENTARY

305

b II-I3 xed'tG ..• axO"E'" See 74& 26 : 1. The point, of course, is. that one must look not so much to the words as to the intention of the lawm2ker in enacting the law; see EN II37b I9-24. b I2 ...;". >.eIyov This is an interesting use of Ml'o~ to mean "words"; see also 74b I9. For the idea which A. has in mind, see Auclor ad Hemin. I.II.I9, and 2.9.I3-I4, and Hermogcnes, nBell:Tcla..~ 54-55 ("eel t1'1TOU "al d,....

• oia~). b I4 "polllpE"L" See 74& II : 2. All these specific topics on equity in 74b II-I6 stress the importance oflooking fully at the action, the person acting, and the law pertaining to the action, and also of looking from all sides in the effort, in order to m2ke a just and intelligent judgment as equity would require. i.e., !'V7J!'o••tl... dl'aO';;. di. lnaOe. !'aAlo. iI "a,,';;•• Both instances of the word in this line are genitives attracted into the case of their antecedents. J l"CI8£v Obviously the subject of this verb and of l"aO. and '"o{'1a•• at 74b I8 is the person who is to exercise equity. b I7 :

1

p.iiAl.av

Z

"'"

b I8 : 1 i\ ",,01.,.,,£'01 is the reading of the caddo accepted by four of the edd., Sponge!, and Cope. Ross alone introduces <eli.>, which may be helpful but is not necessary. Z ""0 d,vExea8uL ci6lxovlL£vOV i.e., lito be patient when one is wronged." See 74b 12. "To be disposed to have an issue decided by b I9 >.ely,!, word rather than by deed." We can also interpret Ml''!' as "reason," and lel',!, as "physical force, violence." In either interpretation, the tenor of this topic (which is made more specific in the following topic) is the stress on negotiation rather than action. b 20 81I1L........ On the idea, see Lysias, Against Diogoito. 2; Isocr., Against Callimaelms I3. Cic., Pro Rosao eomoedo 4.10-13, presents us with a distinotion between "arbitrium" and ~Iiudicium." Arbitration, as A. tells us at 74b 20-22, is specifically designed to do all that equity demands. furthermore, it has more freedom of operation than is possible in a court of law, where, as he tells us at 74b 2I, the juror must look to the strict demand of the law. On this last, see also 540 29-31, 59b 12-15. On the idea of "arbitrator," see Constihltion oj Athens b 21 8LClL-nrni~ 54 and passim. From 53, for example, it appears that most private cases were tried first by an arbitrator. As a matter of fact, Pol. I268b 4-1I suggests the likelihood of such courts of arbitration. We fmd plutarch {Thertlistocles 5

306

ARJSTOT~ 'RRBTOlUC' I

[I 141) praiSing Themistacles for his success in this kind of work; see also Oem., Against DionysioJoTUS 18. b 22 mpilOn

C£ 68a 16 for the idea.

See 72a 2. All the edd. end our chapter at 74b 23. b 23 a .... p,..e... Because of the dose connection of chap. 14 with what precedes, Cope prints the text as a run-on into chap. "4, with no period after ToiiTOV, and with no chapter-break indicated. The new theme of chap. 14, although not as dearly introduced as the similar theme in chap. 7, is sufficiendy distinguished to Justify the introduction of a new chapter heading. Ross's manner of printing strikes one as an unsatisfying compromise.

CHAPTER "4

I· Introduction: 74b 24-74b 30 discussion ofgreater injustice (wrong) which is determined by the greater injustice revealed; this is the slIbj«tive norm and is developed in II.>. the greater injustice committed; this is the objective /lorm and is developed in II.I II . Development: 74b 30 - 7sa 20 I.

74b 30 - 75a

the objectipe norm:

II

(0) 74b 30 - 74b II

(6) 74b 34 - 75' • (c) 75" - 75' l (J) 75' l (e) 75' 4-75' 6

(j) 75' 6 - 75•. 7S' II - 75a :w

II

no punishment or cure commensurate

with the wrong harm done to self by wronged person b=ose of the wrong done to him uniqueness of wrong frequent repetition of the wrong

fact that wrong cawes new legislation the wrong

any excess in

the subjective lIorm: any action which reveals • greater subjective tendency

toward wrong

III . Conclusion: 7Sa

74b 24;

1

3
Z

cl&udll~

20 -

7sa

>'1

measure of difference; see S. ISI3. In this chapter A. uses two norms to determine the greater wrong: (a) the act looked at subjectively, that is, the act taken together with the subjective disposition which motivates it; and (b) the act looked at objectively, that is, the act itself with its consequents. A.'s first norm is subjective and personal: the greater wrong is determined by the disposition of the agent in whom d8.,,{a lies. A.'s other norms in this chapter, as we shall see, are mosdy objective: the acts themselves. The subjective nonn, when it can be determined precisdy, is a more valid criterion for the greater wrong. However, because of the difficulty in making such a determination (as can he seen at 6sb 27lf.), the ohjective norm is more common. Thus it is that the objective norm is emphasized in this chapter. In fact, even when A.

308

AIUS'!OTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

uses the subjective nann he cites actions which would seem by their very nature to flow from a strong disposition toward o.d,,,ta in the agent. The strength of the objective norm - i.e., the act itsdf -lies, of course, in the fact that the act and its consequents presumably reflect the intention and the motivation of the agent and therefore hi.! d6",la. As A. says in On the Virmes and Vices, dd,,,ta is an evil in the sOld (12jOa 25), among the consequents of which are malignant actions of every kind (1251a 30 - 1251b 3). As we have already seen (73b 27, 73b 28 : 1, 73b 28 : 2), to do wrong is to act knowingly and with deliberate moral choice against the law (positive or natural). Thus the more complete the knowledge and the more absolute the ddiberate choice, the greater the o.d",/a in the person, and so the greater the o.61"l1pa. Just as d,,,a.o.w'l1 represents a disposition within the person which is the source of just acts, so o.d,,,la indicates a disposition which generates unjust acts. On the question of such dispositions, see 6.2b 13 : 2, comparing it with 66a 36 : 2.

b 25 : 1 Ii'o"1paTa): the most insignificant wrong actions may be the greatest. As a statement for identifying greater wrong this dictum has value only when taken, as A. takes it here, together with the subjective nann: the disposition and motivation of the person performing the act. For example, embezzling three half-obols of money consecrated to religious purposes is certainly (even granting that the act is also -due/U,) a most insignificant theft (Tei eAdx,uTa). Its substantial seriousness (piy,,,,a) as M{"l1pa lies in the truly vicious disposition revealed in the person who does it, as A. points out at 74b 28-29 (0 yde •.. o.6.,,>1u8.8.). Such acts, though seemingly trivial, reveal a petCoo. o.6",ta; 74b 24. See Lysias, Diogeiton 21, for a similar observation. , -2 MEl.CI.~cl",ou We do not mow the hi.!tory of the incident. From our text the charge was for defalcation: either the full amount owed to the temple was not given, or Mdanopus took more from the temple officials than was due to him. Mdanopus was an ambassador to Thebes in 371/70 with Callistratus (Xen., Jkll. 6.].2-3), and is called a rival of Callistratus by Plutarch, Demosthen.. 13 (8jl£).

b 26 :

1 2

KCl.lltcnpCl"'O~ Ttcr.pd.oy(aa.TO

See 64& 19 : 2. with a double accusative: "defraud someone of

something." 3 ",,""PD., .. l£pci probably money bdonging to what are called the sacred funds; e.g., Demosthenes in a speech given in 343 B.C. (Embassy 293) speaks of an action by Eubulus to indict Ctesiphon for a misappropriation of sacred funds: yea'!"lv [8eW' zel1paTwv. b 27 : 1 "'oU~ ~.. o"o'ou~ These ollicials of the temple are incorrectly labded by the translators "temple-builders." They are more correctly identified as rdigious administrators of some kind. Cope's comment, p. 260,

COMMENTARY

30 9

on Melanopus implies "temple-builders," which, by the way, is the explanation found in Gaisford: i.e., "aedificatores." However, Cope very correctly goes on to point out A.'s remarks at Pol. I322b 18-22 on tire various official, connected with the State religion. See Newman, IV s64if. Vll''''"&~ is a Doric form for the more common 'Verunotd~ (J'econol7J~)J although vad~ for 'JIBcb, is the more common form from the fourth century on. v.O)"o,,;~ appears witlr some frequency in inscriptions, and tlrere is a detailed account of the position in Dietenberger, I 329£(, "de naopoeis"; see also vol. IV, s. v.swn'oc&" and "Temple Officials" in the OCD. 2 ....{,v"',...lov This is simply an addition by way of cl.arification since the ,rated intent of the chapter is to determine the dM"'IJpa p.IC.v. A. says that "in the case of justice tire opposite is true." In our context the opposite of Ta AAclX"O'Ta (dd"'>7paTa) piYI.....ri (ddl">7paTa) is Tel tlaXI .....a (d",al("paTa) .~ piYletTa (al"al("paTa): the most insignificant right actions are not the greatest acts ofjustice. For the e."l'lanation of this, see 74b 28 : 2. b 28 : 1 ...au..." This refers to 74b 25, Tel AUX"O'Ta (c!dIX>7paTa) ply,etTa (dal"ojpaTa), because A.'s purpose in this chapter is to explain the dM""Ipa p.lC.v, and because his explanation ('" TO;; E",,,,dex'" ... ) will explain only Ta .UXI.....a ply.etTa, and his reason (0 ycie Teta ... ) clearly refers to an dM""Ipa. Cope, p. 261, suggests (and he is followed in this by the tronslatiolls in English) that we interpret in this way: "'The reason of this' (Ta;;Ta is Td Tel .AdXI.....a piy ......a .lval) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less) ••. '" On the otlrer hand, it is possible to interpret more simply: lun'JI de l'atil'Q (ra lAdXI.OTa p.ey"n:a) ex -ro;i . .. : "and these most trifling wrong acts are (the greatest wrong acts) from the fact drat (the greatest) are contained in them potentially/' On this last, i.e., EX TOV •• " see the next note. 2 olx nu lw,.,ci;PX.LV '
ARISTOTLE, "RHETORIC' I

3IO

actions. The greater in this case is not contained in the less. We can illustrate the point with A.'s example: Any man who would commit a sacrilege for such a pittance is capable of any evil. But it does not follow that any man who would act righdy in such a small matter would do so if the stakes were larger. 3 Ew"eipX.'v See 63 b 7-9 and notes. particularly 63b 8 and- 63b 9. In this connection, it is interesting to see that a number of codd. read for our j,,""Gex." the verb .m.ei;c.... which we find at 63b 7-9. See 5.... II : 1 on d<6va,,,, as "capacity." 4 &wei...., uat is intensive. The -8'" form of b 29 : 1 xiv ... cl&,,,~,,.,£v verb is more usual in the active; see S. 668. 2 oGon.o i.e.• by the subjective norm; see 74h 30 : 2.

b 30 : 1 "'.....il;ov

the

sc. ddl"'1fJfl.

On PUP1/. see 73b 29-3r. 74b 6: 2. We now take up the objective norm: narnely. the wrong action itsel£ In his speech Agoimt Lochites. which is dated ca. 404/403. Isocrates includes some of A.'s instances which follow in our text and introduces a number of others in order to demonstrate the greater wrong from the character of the act itsel£ se. M,uolfJaTo,. an objective genitive. Clearly understood 3 06 as the conclusion to this sentence ("al 0,) ••• eldTTW» is: TOOTo ddt"'1fJa fJO'Cov. In this chapter we shall meet the same kind of ellipsis as we found throughout chap. 7. on which see 63b 21-30. 4 ...~ Ross's accentuation here (fJ~ limw) and at 74b 31 (p~ EaTw) instead of 1"01 lanv is diflicult to understand. At 74b 32. fJ7J liaTW is quite correct. 2

"'. . I!AeiI!OU~

"1''''

."""v

This word is usually. and probably should be. interpreted b '3 I """",plu here as "penalty. puoishment." Oem.• Crown 12 (oC VOfJO' d,Maa. T'fJWeta,). would encourage this. Furthermore, this interpretation of the word seems to be strengthened by the statement at 74b ]2-33 ("al 0,) • •• faa,,). I say "seems to be" for two reasons: (0) the problem of the correct interpretation of 74b 32-33 indicated at 74b 32 : 2 and 74b 33 : 2; and (b) the fact that T
3II

COMMENTARY

.U".

<"

~al 00 ,.>i lauo~ ,.i! e~dta> on a parallel with 82.b 22.-2.5 ("cl.Ta .•• e46Iao). I do not understand why the codd. cannot represent in fact what A. said. If we remember tbat we are seeking tbe d61><",.a ".'Co., and that in each instance we must usually complete A.'s statement, the codd. read lUTI). XdEquite intelligendy: e.g., Hal 00 I'>i 'UTlV lau,~ (ddl"'7,.a "d. l'Qq Hal d6••aTOV: "that wrong act for which there is no cure is a greater wrong; for it is a wrong which is hard, indeed impossible, to deal with." This surely is confirmed by 74b 33; see 74h 33 : 2. Between 74b 30 and 74b 33 tbe fact that one cannot cope adequately with such an action constitutes it a greater wrong. 2 &IXI)v At 74b 20 this word means "trial or legal process." The phrase M"1JV Aa,.pav... more commonly means "to take or exact a penalty"; see LS, Aa,.p&vw, I.I.C. But because of the statements in 74b 33, it is diflicuIt to see how tbe phrase here can mean anything more than "to have recourse to • legal trial, a legal process." On the kinds of trials, see Whibley, pp. 481510; the article "Dike" in the OeD; or Adam, pp. 334-43.

,..'C6.

h 33 :

1 2

4vlaorov yoip i.e., for such an dM"'7,.a ,..'C07 is irreparable. "yc.p &IXI) xcd x6b.ns xcd I .... 'S is the reading of cod.

A, which Ross alone of the edd. accepts. Cope and the other edd. (although Roemer is not certain) read with tbe other codd.: " l'Qq dl"'7 ~al "ciAal7l~ rauo~. All the English translations follow Cope, and are not translations of our text here. If anything is to be read, surely tbe text of cod. A is correct, as Spenge!, p. 189, acknowledges. Moreover, "ciAauo~ is to be understood as it was used at 69b 12-14. The point of A.'s argument is tbat the wrong act is greater because there is no legal redress (61)<,,) by which to repair the harm done. A. tben explains how 61~." achieves this goal: "for a trial is both a chastising a",/ a reparative process." See 69h 12 : 1 and 69b I2. : z. 3 xclA.... ,S b 34-35 x .. l €I .•. txclA....." lu" ,.••Co•.

We must again understand Td ddl~'1,.a

b 35 : 1 Ik, yc.p fLdl:ov, Something like T'p>ipaTl is wlderstood; compare tbe use of T'P>iU'" at 75" 1-2. the personal construction, S. 1982. z &IX.. ,OS h 36 : 1 EO<pox).jjs At r 18, 19a 2.6 a certain Sophoeles is mentioned who is dearly a member of the probouloi and probably identical witb the one mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. 2.3.2). Aside &om these two passages all other references to Sophocles in our treatise can easily refer to the dramatist. There are two questions: (a) Is the Sophocles here the same as tbe one at I9a 26? and (b) If he is, is he someone other than the poet? There is no dear answer to either question. If the Sophodes here is the same as the SophodC$

312

AllISTOTLE, cllHETORIC' I

75> 3

of 19a 26 and therefore one of the Ten Probouloi (413-4II B.C.), those who follow Wilamowitz (I 102n6) will say that he is the dramatist. others - Cope and Spengd (with their followers) - will say that he is some statesman and orator who was a member of the Probouloi. On this last, we do know of a Sophocles, son ofSostratidcs (Thueyd. 3.II5.5), who was quite active, known as a general in the fifth century, and banished in 424- Gomme (11431) thinks that this Sophocles may have been the member of the Probouloi mentioned by Xenophon in the Hellenic. passage cited. But this is questioned by others. A. for Euktemon, we know of one who was arclron in 408/407 (Xen., Hell.

I.2.I).

z """'Iyopbiv In the circumstances which A. gives, it is not possible to determine from the word whether Sophocles is acting privately or as a public advocate; see, e.g., Pol. 1322b II, Constitution of Athens 54.2. Either seems possible, although 75a 1-' (especially vPe,aeel" and see notes) suggests a public trial. 75'1 1 : J 6(3p"r8d~ See 73a 13 : I. • ..,,,>\a&lv Le., to "assess a penalty." Obviously, then, the 61"'1 was an d1'd.. np1JTO', one in which no penalty was set by law. If there is a penalty established by law, the legal process is called an dyd.. dTlP1JTO~. For an idea of the procedure in an dyd.. Tlp1JTO', see the antitimesis in Plato's Apology (35e I-38c r). There, after Socrates' defense, the prosecutor is allowed to speak again in favor of the penalty which he demands. The defendant replies to this by proposing a counter penalty, the d.n-rlP1/a,~. The usual technical language demands npiiaBa. for an accuser (or defendant) and npa. for the dicasts; see LS, nfJ&co, III. But since we find the active form at 7:5> I and 75a 2, the use is apparently deliberate on A.'s part. 3 D.ci"f"tovo~ sc. T.p~paTo~; the genitive is originally a genitive of price. The TtfJ1/pa sought would be BdvaTo,. a 2: 1 .orl"1)aEV See 75" 1 : z. See 68a ID-rr where these same three inz "Ovo~ ... o).lyc.>v stances are noted as topics for demonstrating the magnitude of an action. "3 : 1 Xlll ..I> "OUcixl~ Repeated action is indicative of an inner di.... position toward the act. See 68a 13-15 where we are told what ,"olldx., would ~rdinarily indicate. All the edd. follow Spengcl here in brackNiDg this because, z ~YII as Spengcl argued, "fJ.ieo> quaerit"r .•. positivo grad,,; ,,"llus est locus." All the codd. and Cope read Jdya, which may possibly be correct. We may grant that in this chapter, which, like chap. 7, formally treats of the topic of degree, one should not dismiss Spengcl's comment. But we saw in chap. 9 that A. moves back alld forth between the positive and comparative degrees; see,

CQMMBNTARY

313

e.g., 67a 23-28. Further, I find it interesting to note that when speaking of "frequency" as a way of intensifying pr';'e - i.e., making it greater (68a 13-14) - A. uses the same word: e.g., "al ,I "oAl"".~ Td a~Td "aT
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 1

314

is defined at B 8, 8sb I3-IS as the pain experienced when we see undeserved evil af!Iict another, evU which we also see as possible for ourselves. Fear is direcdy and immediately for the self; pity, indirecdy and remotely. Cic., Tllsc. disp. 3.27.66, is a good practical illustration of such fear and pity. As to the difference (if, indeed, any) between the concepts of fear and pity in the Rhetoric and in the Poetics, see the brief discussion of Else, pp. 37I-'7S. fLEv This is the progressive use of the phrase; see Denniston, p. 390. Here it introduces and develops a new aspect of the issue in hand. Taking "al - ",iv in this way resolves the problem which Spengel experienced with the phrase: "neque ",iv quid sit intel/ego." 3 ",dt fLEv P'ITOP'"'' To tr:uulate this as "rhetorical tricks," or something similar - which is done - is a travesty. Unfortunately Cope, p. 267, encourages such an interpretation. However, if ...a e1JToe,,,d means anything within the context of 7Sa 7-1I ("al 8 ... v".eoxlj), it refers to forms of intensifying ideas. We fmd the same kind of statement at 68a Io-II. Division and enumeration are perfectly legitimate ways to underline the importance of an idea or statement, as was explained at 65a 10. Amplification is another, and its importance to the very nature of rhetoric was pointed out at 593 II-I3 (m many ways ...d tI'1Toe,,,d is a more apt term for these elements essential and CODlDlon to rhetorical discourse). Amplification, in fact, is the subject of this chapter as it was of chap. 7. It is one of the three elements common and essential to all rhetorical discourse. We should, then, interpret 7Sa 8-9: "Furthermore, the methods CODlDlon to the art of rhetoric are of such a character; for example, saying that one has destroyed or transgressed many jUJt obligations such as ... "

• ""'l.-

o".il.....

a 9 : t .. See 6Ia S. The word has a double fWlction here: (a) it refers to what is being talked about - namely, ways of showing the greater wrong; and (b) it points forward to what immediately follows, which illustrates how to do this. Z 0"£" means "for e..~amplet namely that." and introduces an explanation of the main clause; see S. 2S77. 3 7toA:1.dt civliP'Ix£ 81".. , .. jj ';K£p(!E(!'1KEV is the reading of a good cod. (F) and is accepted by Cope and Kassel. All the other edd. and Spengel read "oAla d"1le'1"'v ij v"eePtP'1"'" The words "olld M"a, .. are specified by fJe"oVl; ... .,,,ya,,,la, at 7Sa 10. The point of the statement is this: the wrong action done contains in itself a number of wrong actions, any of which is wrong in itsel£ As A. says at 75a Io-II: the one act constitutes "an excess of many wrong acts." Obviously such an act is a greater wrong act. The whole idea is set forth at 6sa 10-18; see 65a 10. Furthermore, it is illustrated in the topic at 7sa I4-IS; see also 7sa '4 : 3.

7S a '4

COMMENTARY

a 10 apxou~ ... l,,,y.. ,,l..~ We do not know whether these represent four different aspects of one action, or whether any two or three of them are to be taken together. If we knew enough about the marriage contract, we might find that all four could represent diiferent wrong acts contained within one wrong act. The point of importance, however, is the one made earlier, at 6sa 10. Such amplification, as A. presents it, constitutes 110 misrepresentation of reality, but a legitimate analysis of it into its constituent parts. The difficulty with most comments all rhetorical method and practice is that they assume as their point of departure that the Plato of the Dialogues (with the exception, of course, of the Phaedr.s) is right, and therefore that rhetoric is wrong and must be sophistry and trickery. On l",,- in l""ral'ta~, see the reference to Cope at 740 S : 1. a II : 1 iln:EPOXofJ See 7sa 9 : 3 for the translation. See also 6sa la-II and 6sa II. By an amplification of the charge of al"ia Isocrates builds his whole plea Against Lochites imo the serious charge of assault and battery. 2 "<0 lv"
d ~au'l:'OV sc. a(J,,,ei. n:e"ovO.v As usual, we must understand 1'••1;&. eUT. d61"'l/l'a. 3 n:l.Etc.. sc. dc!.,,'ll'aTa. This is explained by the two Ifn clauses (on OT', see 7sa 9 : 2): namely, (a) one does positive wrong; (b) one

a 14:

1

2

316

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

does not retwn a good to a benefactor. We have an instance of this in Eur., Hec. 25I-253,andinCicero'scommentinStoi,P.r.doxes 3.25: "Thereis, moreover, this difference that in killing a slave, if injustice is present, there is a single olfense. In doing violence to the life of one's father there are several. A wrong is done to the author of one's life; another to the one who maintained you in life; another to the one who educated you; another to the one who established you in house and home aod the State. The act is distinguished by a series of wrongs and so merits greater penalty."

a 15 : 1 65b 2-5.

0(1)(.u

sc. notei'; e1J no&d,

is

to confer a

benefit,

as we saw at

2 or.!! "YP"'I''' lilx".... Again. as throughout this chapter, we must understand: p.ll;&. ia... ?rolx7Jl'a; e.g., "a18 (?ro.".l) naea •.. 6["a.a, (P.l!;•• la'", ddt",,!pa). On the lI.yearpa, see 73b 5 : 3.

a 16 cll£dvovo~ On the meaoing, see 743 21. The construction is: ao understood laTt, with piJ ~.' ... ,l.a. as its subject, aod our genitive as predicate and as a form of the possessive genitive; see S. 1304. .. .!! 1£'" ... YEYP"I£I£"''' On written law, see 73b IS - 74a r7 aod notes. 2 ll; clvciY>C"IJ~ a common phrase in A. to express necessity of aoy kind; see 6sb 34-36. By the nature of positive law one is constrained to do the right because of possible penal consequences attached to positive law. To this extent, in comparison with obedience to unwritten (and so presumably without saoction) law, the free expression of one's goodness in obeying written law can always be questioned, even though that obedience may be as complete and perfect as obedience to unwritten law.

a 17: 1

an adverbial usage of the accusative used a IS: 1 Ilillov li~ "pO"OY absolutely; see LS, Te.no~, IL2 and S. r60S. We have seen this method of analysis a number of times, e.g., at 640 26, 3o. 2 YEYP"l£fI£v" sc. el naea Ta YByeappA.a (d6.".l, p.ll; •• d61,,~pa). See 7sa 14 : 1 and 7sa 14 : z.

'a...

a 19 : 1 ...!! <po(3Epci With Ta rpoP'ed, Ta In.i;1jp.a, the objects of dd ... understand dd.><1jpaTa. z Hut ~tt d:t1\P.lCl ~at is intensive: "also"; again dc5,,,,.qpaTa is to be understood with Ta d!;1jp.a. As actions can be awoe,a Tfj, de'Tfj~ (66b 27), so they can also be signs of greater or less viciousness. The character of the acts here reveals that the person is capable· of the greater wrong,

"iii.,

a 20 K"l EA.x"..OYO~ The "lesser wrong" is, of course, implicit throughout the chapter in the discussion of the "greater wrong."

CHAPTER IS

I . Introduction: 75a 22 - 75a 25 II . Development: 75a 25 - 77b

II

I. 75a 25 - 75b 25 2.

tsb 26 - 76a 32 -

witnesses

contracts evidence from ,orture

77' 6

5. 77> 8 - 77b II

III . Conclusion: 77b

II -

77b

discwsion of the proofs law

3· 760 33 - ']lib 30

4. ']lib 3I

atechnic proofs are five in number

o.ths 12

7sa 22: 1 ".pt Though the ordinary construction with Im6eaI'B" is an accusative or dative, the use of nset with the genitive is not unusual in A. However, Cope, p. 270, considers it redwulant. See 66b 24 : 3, together with .he reference to Cope, who views this we of the preposition instead of the direct accwative "characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth century B.C." (p. 165; emphasis deleted). This may be true, but see Eur., Medea 926. We should note that A. also wes the direct accusative; see, e.g., Pol. I286a 7. For a Iiteml translation of this opening sentenCe, see ,sa 22 : 3. 2 .....voioriXVV Quint., Inst. orat. 5.1.1-4, speaks specifically of "ateclmic" proofs. Cic., De orat. 2.27.II6, implies them by his comment on proofs which "non excogitantur ab oratore." This is also true of Dionysius ofHalicarnassus; see Lysias I9.494-496. As we begin this chapter, a word of caution is necessary. To read this chapter apart from the preceding fourteen is to misread it and to lose the perspective from which the chapter was written. Such a reading leads to an interpretation of chap. IS which sees it as an exercise in sophistry of the vulgar sort, and which inevitably, and readily, colors all that has preceded and all that will follow in the treatise. For example, Cope, Introd., pp. 193-207, views the chapter as a "striking illustration" of rhetoric's ability to argue either side of a case, showing us how to e.-amine something -law, for example - "so as to be able to twist it either way to our purpose." Guthrie, Sophists, pp. 12 526, speaks in a similar vein. But the fact of the matter is that A. is doing in

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

this chapter the "ery sallie thing as he did in chaps. 4 through 14. He is anal)'2ing by means of porticular topics various aspects of the five atechnic proofS. just as in the preceding chapters he analyzed by way of the topical methodology the subject matter of each kind of rhetoric. The earlier analysis. and so. too. this analysis. are predicated upon the desire to reach as far as possible the truth of a problem. See ssa 22 : 1; see also 55a 29-38 with notes. It =tainly is not predicated upon "the interests of victory in the courts." to use Guthrie's words (Sophists. p. 125n1). This is surely the explanation of the very first example given at 75a 27 - 75b 2. In this example A. moves away from enacted law to suggest a resolution by equity. Such a move. interpreted superficially. appears to be an obvious instance of the seeking out of whatever helps one's argument. whether right or wrong. And yet only a page and a half back: in the text at 74a 26 -74b I. A. explained the eminently reasonable grounds for turning to equity if one is truly seeking justice and not mere legal absolutism in which. frequently. the letter of the law results not in su....a iustitia but in summa iniuria. This chapter is an example of analysis by" the same topical methodology which was seen in the preceding chapters and which can be used in analyzing any problem from philology to biology. We can see A. using it in political science in his critique of a legal system proposed by Hippodamus of Miletus. Pol. 1268b 25 - 1269a 28; see also Auctor ad Heren •• 2.9-18. Like any good methodology. the topical is neotral. 3 qofLEVOv t ..... , This periphrastic form (see. for e....mple. 68b 2 : 2) is similar to the progressive present in English (is walking. is giving. etc.); the participle can be translated by an equivalent adjective or noun. The idiom, in which the infinitive is the subject of the periphrastic verb. and the gepitive (rw. 8Ie~p"",) governed by oxop••o•• is found elsewhere in A.; see. e.g.• Met. 10860 25-26. and Pol. 1276b 16. 1296b 13-14. Literally translated. the sentence would run: "To treat summarily of [LS. l",reix.,. 51 the proofS called atechnic comes next after [LS. "x." C.31 what has been said"; less literally: "A quick summary of the proofS called atechnic will follow the matter which we have just discussed." On the judicial system in the fourth century see Bonner III Smith, Vol. I. chap. XV. Here is the ostensible reason for presenting these at the a 23 t6u" ylip end of the section on judicial rhetoric (chaps. 10--14). but this reason is thrown into doubt by 75a 26 and 76. 1-7. 14-15. At 75a 26 there is a problem with the text; see 7sa 26 : 2. But there is no problem with the text at 760 1-8. lines which Roemer in his apparatus to the passage says "clearly refer to the deliberative not the judicial genus which is the subject of this chapter." This comment of Roemer's is. of course. the critical point. There is no question from A.·s remark here at 75a 23 that the manifest objective of the chapter is judicial rhetoric, together with the five kinds of atechnic proofS which he

COMMBNTARY

accepts as apparently common to the practice of forensic rhetoric by the Greeks. But the fact rem:rins that A. extends the use of these proofs to deliberative rhetoric - very probably at 7Sa 26, and definitely at 76a 1-7, 14-15. Considering this fact, and looking at the five atechnic proofs in themselves, one is forced to ask whether the traditional interpretation, which restricts the atechnic proofs to judicial rhetoric, is correct as far as A. is concerned. In themselves there is nothing peculiar to these proofs which would bar their use in other kinds of rhetoric. Moreover, an attentive reading of what A . •ays about them makes it ckar that there i. nothing in his statements which denies the possibility of their use in deliberative or epideictic rhetoric. In short, the atechnic proofs may be proper to judicial rhetoric, but they are. not exclusive to it. 1 XP'l""""" .c. mlToi~, i.e., the laws. For this slightly unusual construction of the verbal adjective with the accusative (i.e., "~oT~i,,o'Ta ".T..l.), see S. "IS2a. a XIIi npoTpmovTIl xIl14"OTp.b.OVTIl This i. read by all the codd. and by Tovar, Ross, Kassel, and Cope. Roemer, Dufour, and Spengel bracket the phrase, accepting the athetesis marks of the good cod. A. I am not certain that we should exclude the phrase; see 7sa "3 for the reasons.

a 26 :

,; Y.YPIlI'I'EvO~ sc. 'Ol"~. a Tii> ..pmYI'Il"" i.e., that which took place, the actual fact, the specific action at issue. It is not to be translated, as it frequently is, "our case," "our view of the case" if these phrases imply that we should be ready to twist the facts to fit the best chance for success. The reason for this observation is that there simply is no evidence to validate such a translation - which is an inteTpretation not a translation of the text. In fact, 7Sa 29 - 7Sb 5 offer evidence which is contrary to such an interpretation. On the general subject of the practice of law in Athens, see Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants. 3 "'ri> xo'~ri> sc. ,01''1'. On the concept, see 73b 4-I8, and 73b 6 : lff.

a ,,8 : 1

a 29 : 1 XIIi TOL~ "".'X'''T.pO'~ The "at coordinates equity with natural law, and adds another and different dement (TO dm.,,,i~), something which is different from natural law and to which we must have recoune. The two are also separated at 7Sa 31-32. This is not apparent in the common inteTpretation given to the phrase: see, e.g., the Oxford translation, "we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice" (Roberts, Rhelorica, p. [641; emphasis added). a XIIi &'XIl'OT.pO'~ This "at is not really copulative. It is used often by A. to join two words in which the second explains the first: "we must use the more equitable interpretation. that is to say, the more just." The reading "al Toi~ m"''''O'Tieo,~ "al 6,,,a,oTi~o.~ is that accepted by four

3 20

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

of the edd. and Spengel. lin equally good reading. "at TOr~ 17... ,,,e(1<> di~ d,,,a ..Tie"~, is read by Kassel and Cope. 1 K,,13'n Something must be understood before this repeated use of "aI8... ,. which we find at 75a 31. 75b 3. 5. 7. etc. For the first time since he began his topical analysis of the subject matter (chaps. 4-14) in each of the three genera of rhetorical discourse A. uses this kind of expression. The most obvious candidate for the understood word. or phrase. is 'I'av'eov rae . .. from 75a 27. After a careful testing I was at first convinced that <pav.eov was tolerable but really not fully satisfying between 75a 29 and 75b 8. The other candidate was k" ...eo. at 75b 17. A check on the translations (in English; Dufour and Tovar) reveals that they compromise by using both <pa'.ed. and ',,,do •• and mosdy the latter between 75a 29 and 75b 8. While I believe that 'I'aveedv can be used in each instance down to 75b 8. and. in fact. I prefer it at 75a 29 (see 7sa 29 : 4). there is something to be said for the use of l."TAo. and it is this: A.'s method of analy';s in this chapter on atechnic proofs is to olfer in the case of each a series of particular topics which can be used if the ",trn:,~ does. or does not. favor the speaker. Down to 77b 10. wherever the iJ... , clause has no introductory verb. the verbal adjective ""Teov clearly seems to be understood by A. In addition to the evidence on hand. a further reason is to be found at 77> 29-30. There are a few instances where another verbal adjective is introduced: e.g.• at na 23 A. uses <paTio. with the infinitive construction; at 76b 20 G".",TBOV with a dilferent construction; and at 77b 6-7 GvvaxTtov introduces the an clause. The translation of the neuter verbal adjective is personal: "one (a person) must say. state"; on this. see S. 2 I 52. From the character of the statements in this first b60k. a translation in the third person is preferable; yet the English translations insist on the second person, e.g., "you must .. 0" 4 TO YVWfLlI Tij oiplGT'/l Ross alone of the edd. uses quotation marks. We translate: "It is clear that the phrase 'to decide in accord with my best judgment' means this ..." Understood with the phrase TO 'Y'WfJTI detrn:n. which appears at 75b 16-17 and 76a 19. is "el..... or d"'a~.... which often occur with it, as we can see atB 25. 02b 34-35. A.'s statement at 02b 31-33 is more fully explained by Oem.• Ag. Aristocrates 96--97. In a good passage on rule by law. Pol. 1287",8 - I287b l5. A. speaks of the way in which law teaches men to decide and judge "to the very best of their judgment" ( 25-27). This last point (i.e.• matters on which the law cannot legislate) is also discussed by Pollux. Onomastikon 8.I22 (ed. Bethe): the juror swears to decide "aTa ...ov~ VOfJOV~, but if there is no specific law available. then, to decide 'Y.WfJTI
Tn

COMMBNTARY

32 I

BoeolUs 140, Against Eubulides 63, Ag.Leptines lIB. Tod, II, no. 19I,II. BS-9I, gives the terms of an oath which echoes the idea in the citation above. :n:",,"<"'ii\~ C£ S6a 8 where the word is set in contrast to w.AW~ ("generally, universally"). Here the meaning is similar, e.g., "totally, in every respect, from first to last," which is to say, "without any qualification." This is usually taken to mean that the judges' oath does not intend them to enforce a strict and litera! interpretation of the law. But in the context of 7Sa 2S-3 I it would seem to mean that the oath does not confine them simply and absolutely to the prescriptions of written law. In effect, this means the same thing as the preceding interpretation, but it changes the nuance.

a 30

a 3I mEL !'-ne. . . . !,-<"
EorpoxAEau~' AV"<.y6vll

See 73b I2-13.

7sb 3 /ho."<& 8LxII";v . .. ""I'o'PEPOV This statement is an important one for all that follows down to tsb 2S. First of all, the argument in tsb 3-6 is, in pan, the reason for the observation at 7sa ,,:0 : 2 on A.' s introduction of equity. Secondly, a reading of the passage down to 7Sb :os will reveal the point of the topics offered in this section. The point is this: written law must effect justice which is genuine (tU'I6i~) and beneficent, i.e., productive of good (a~I''Pieo.). Therefore the topics presented are various ways by which to discover this determination. See 7Sb I3 : 1. There is a variallt reading in a good cod., cU'l9i~ ~~ which is accepted by Tovar, Kassel, and Cope but which does not affi:ct the tenOr of the comment above. "that which seems to be just is not genuine and b 4 : 1 "<0 8oxoG" beneficent." Such apparent justice would be to insist on applying the law literally. Such action results in what is superficially just, not genuinely so; e.g., 74" 34 - 74b 2. Cic., De kg. I.1S.42, is direcdy to the point. Z "<0 8o\coGv· c, .."<' ••• & YEYPIl!,-!,-E"O~ All the edd., save Tovar and Kassel, punctuate with a comma after do"oli.. I bclieve that a colon is mare correct and should be used. If filled out in the text, the o;crrB clause would read: o;crre v&I'O~ cl )'oreapl'i.o~ o~" i!a~, dA'I8>1~ TB "al a~I''P.eU)': "And so the written law is not genuine and beneficent; for it does not fulfill the function of law"; that fauction, of course, is genuine justice. The o;an clause, thus, introduces a consecutive clause with a finite verb to express the main thought of the entire sentence; see S. 22SS.

322

.AIUSTOTLE. ~RHETORICJ I

b S : 1 '<"0 lfpyov •.• v0I'ou On iiero" see 54'lU : 2. Andocides argues in Ag. A/cibiaJes 3~ that the law on ostracism does not effect what is just, and, accordingly, is a had law. 2 cipYUPoyvw",",v an assayer, examiner, of silver; cf. Pollux, Ollom. 7.170. A. continues the metaphor in TO ~i(jd~40' 6l"a.o.; with this com.pare Theognis US-I24 where he speaks of the fraudulent J!l'Ul. b 6 a.....S i.e., laT .. (d.a TO;;TO), 8"Q)~. The argument of this sentence is that, since the judge's office is to detennine "the truly just," as distinguished from adulterated justice, he must on occasion depart from the written law in giving judgment. Or he may go even further, as Lycurgus suggests in Ag. Leocrates 8-9, and become in a specific instance a nomothete as well a. a judge, and establish a new law. We have seen the genitive a number of b 7: 1 K
75b 13

COMMENTARY

32 3

b 8--9 lv""Tio~ .•• cWTcj> With e.a.Tio,. understand '01'0,. It is necessary to point oUt that this understood '01'0, must be taken generically. e.g., "if law is opposed to itsel£" From his illustration (75b 9-u), it is clear that A. has two laws in rcind. one contradicting the other. He is not speaking of one law contradicting itsel£ such a situation. while not absolutely impossible, is nonsc:nsical. This conflict in the law (antinomy) is taken up by Cic .• De inv. 2.49.144-147; Auctor ad Herem •• 1.20.2.15; Hermogenes. neel ETa".., S(H)O (,.eel dVTW0l'la,); Rioetores Gra"i. IV 719, 815-17; V 82. 201-206. A:s example applies to a conflict between two laws, in which b 9 01011 one (ol'iv) decrees the validity of all contracts. and the other (0 a~ forbids anyone to execute any contract which.is contrary to the law. On contracts, see 60a IS : 1 and 76a 33 : 1. b 10 : 1 liTT' 2

1'0>\

i.e.• 4TIVa; compare this with S6b 36 : z. The negative is redundant; see S. "740.

b II : 1 a.l"Pi~OAO~

i.e.• 0 '01'0,. On ambiguity in the law. see Auctor ad Herelln. I.Il.3D, 2.Il.I6; Hermogen.es, IIeel E,aas" 62.-63. Cope,.Commentary. III 58-59, discusses ambiguity. This "very elliptical" sentence, as

Cope. p. "73, calls it, must be completed, and one of the ways which he suggests makes sense: e.g., ~a! Bl dl''I'ifJoA.o, (a V0l'0" xe1/l1Tlo. a~Tq;) . w"n I1Tee'l'etV (a~Td.) "al .•. For the translation, see the following note. 2 C. ....E .... pE
b 12: 1 TCOTOp ..II ,<>\11 is the reading accepted by the edd. (except Ross. Kassel). and Spongel. Kassel and Cope read a"oTeem> ",v from an equally good tr.dition. Ross secludes ",v, but it is not unusual to find the article in the predicative position; see, e.g., Plato. Gorg. 521a, pha.do 79b. See also 7.... II: 1. 2 a.y..y>\v "leading. guidance. of the law," which is to say: "meaning." For it is the "meaning" which gives the guidance. b 13 : 1 TO GUf'
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

at 62b 28 (see also Pol. I308a II-I3), it is closely related to it as we see at Pol. 1253" '4-17. The point of these remarks should be clear: A. is interested in true justice; he is not interested in legal sophistry, although this is implied by some of the interpretations given to this admittedly complicated passage on the laws. On a{"aco1'-CI1Jl'cpAeo. see s4h 3 : 3. 2 Xpij.,OClL infinitive used as imperative; see S. 2013. b 14 : 1 "pciYf'oa'ta i.e., circumstances, conditions. In his defense against Meletus (Apol. 24b IE) Socrates shows that he is being charged with actions which are no longer subject to the law, especially the psephisma (ca. 443/W B.C.) ofDiopeithes against atheism. In a different way Andocides. On the Mysteries 7
6.

b 16: 1 . " " u. r.A. It was pointed out to me by the late Professor George Glanzman, S.J., in what I consider an incisive observation, that this sentence picks up, by way of contrast, the ld. 1'•• statement of 75a 27-29. This shrewd perception, which was anticipated in part by Cope, p. 273, renders the coherence of the whole passage 75a 27 - 75b 25 at once clear, and enhances the citation from Sophocles (75a 33 - 75b 2). In 75a 37 -75b 15 A. presents the situation when the written law is opposed to one's case and gives the topics which favor a role for equity, arguing the need for the judge to keep equity in mind because of his oath, yvtfJl'T/ Tfi dei'1TT/. This was Antigone's position. At 75b 16--25 A. gives us the situation when the written law favon one's case. Here he gives topics for close adherence to the written law and argues that the judge's oath, rvOJl'71 rfi deirnn, means primarily to judge in accord with, not against, the law. This, of course, would be Creon's argument. As one can see, the statement at 75b 16--18 (rd TO ••• ""oe"ii) now makes eminent sense. 2 npolS TO 7CpciYIJoIX "in accord with," i.e., "favors the case." See LS, "eoq, C.UI.5; c£ Dem., Against BoeolUs II,61. Cope, Introd., pp. 19596 speaks of the passage at 75b 16--25, using it to illustrate the traditional and common understanding of the enthymeme and its form (on this matter, see S6b 5 : l). Thus he says (p. 195) of75b 16--25 "[This is a genuine specimen of a rhetorical enthymeme. The major premise is expressed in the general rule or principle laid down {Cope identifies this as 75b 19}, the minor and conclusion being both omitted.)." . This is the reading of cod. A. Spengel, pp. 193£, ex3 'to 't. plains the r£ by referring to 6J b 18-30, 66b 25IE, and 7D" J-10, and remarking "al . . . "ai. These that when A. begins to enumerate topics he uses passages are not a precise parallel to ours and, so, are not overly helpful.

r. ...

7sb

COMMENTAlIY

21

325

However, the use of TO here does seem to be that of TB preparatory to which "al at tsb 19, tsb 20 (twice), and tsb 23 is the coordinate. On Ross's quotation marks, see 7sa 29 : 4. 4 yvc:,!,-'II '
me

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' I

h 23 : 1 ",I> lSII;«,SIIL . . . cl!PX"""" the subject of an tmderstood {llanTS!. OniBle... cf. 69b 18, 70.6 and 13. For the idea in it, see 69h 16 : 2. See Pol. 1269a 14-"4, which speaks to the point made here. 2 ",I>. "'..~ ~61'-"'~ ".rpili",.p"" Thucyd. 3.37.3-4, is very much to A.'s point. h 25

Ih"'pl"S",

See p.a 2 :

2.

h 26: 1 I'-cip'I:"Up~; d",~ 5,,,,,,,.1 On witnesses, cf. AnaJrimenes 143 I b 20 - 1432a 12. Spenge!, p. '95, asserts th.t subsequent rhetoricians did not follow this division of A.' s, citing as an example Cicero's division of testimony into divine and human (Part. orat. 2.6). On the general question of evidence, see Bonner, Evidence in Atheni." Courts, and Bonner & Smith, VoL II, chap. VI, "Witnesses." VanBeek makes a brief comparison between A. and Anaximenes on the meaning of witness. 2 .1 I'-~ "IIA .. ,.I explained by 75b 28 - 76a 7. The development of an idea by A. should be attended to here because it demonstrates once again the orderly progression of his thought. For example, 75b 26 -·76a 17 discussion of the lcinds of witnesses 75b 26 - 75b 28 geoeral division: ",cJenJe'~ da .. ~.nol (a) tsb 28 - 76a 7 naAalo{: RO''l-rd", ;etl1uE1, rpallB@ai d.U.mll YJ'Q)Qlpwp (1) 75b 29 - 7sb 3S ".,,,,do (2)?6a I -?6a 7 "'e/(1EI, rpaveea/ (b) 760 8 - 76- 16 "I!o.~aTO' . 76a ·,6:" 760 '7 conclusion on each kind of witness. 1 K ..l "'.U~ 2 I'-''''Ex'''''''''~ and 76a 12 : 2.

h 2r:

i.e., 01 neoatpaTO!, as 76a 8-16 indicates. K,~5u~.u See 76a 12-13 and 76a 12

",.u

explained at 75b 29-35. h 29 0.."", lillwv Y""'pll'-"'"

explained at 76a

'-'7.

h 29-30: •AS,!"",., 'Ol'-~P'P The reference is to the action of Solon (ca. 640 - ca. 560 B.C.) in effecting a decision (perhaps arotmd 600 B.C.) in favor of Athens on the island of Salamis in the long struggle between Athens and Megara for possession of the island. See Solon's elegy on Salamis in Diehl & Beucler, no. 2. As the story is told, Solon cited Iliad 2. 557-58 in support of Athens' claim. The citation comes from the Catalogue, which, in fact;· is considered by some to be an important historical document; see "The Trojon War"· in CAH, 112.342-50. It is interesting to follow the recorded account of these two verses as it appears between 50 D.C. and A.D. 230. According to Strobo (64/63 B.C. - A.D. 21; see the OCD) the second line, as we

COMMENTARY

possess it, was not accepted as genuine by the critics (The Geography 9.I.IO [C394]). Strabo gives the line as the Megarians read k This line can be found in any critical apparatus of Homer's text. Plutarch (Co. A.D. 46 - post I20) in his Life of Solon (10 [83]) tells us that Solon interpolated the second line, although the Athenians denied it. Quintilian (ca. A.D. 35/40 - post 1(0) cites this e.'CaDlple in his [lIstilU!io oratoria (5.II.4O), noting that the second line is not found in all the editions of Homer. Diogenes Laertius (II. A.D. 230; see the OCD) in his Life ofSolon (48) (ed. H. S. Long) repeat> the plutarch story. b 3 I ; 1 lv"'yxo~ We have no information on this incident between Tenedos and Sigeum. If we did, it could very probably help toward establishing • date for the Rhetoric. z UEP'c1VSp'I' This may be the well-known tyrant of Corinth (ca. 625-585 B.C.; see the OCD) who arbitrated the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeum; see CAH, N 98. 3 IO.EOrpb>v See the OCD, CAH, V 343--45, 358~s. His political career as leader of the democratic faction in Athens began after 4II with the restoration of democracy, and ended with his prosecution and death at the hands of the oligarchic faction in 404. On his death see Lysias, AgainSt Nicomachus Io-I3, and Against Agoratus u; and Xen., Hell. I.7.35. Cleophon may well have hindered Sparta's peace offer in 410, but that he could have done so again in 40S (as is frequently stated) is questioned. He isattacked by Aristophanes, Thelm. 80S, Frogs 679-682, Is04, IS32; Andoc., Mystcies I46; and Lysias, Ag. AgoralUs 7-11, with which compare Aeschines, Embassy 76. b 32: 1 Kp." Solon was a major figure in the history of the devdopment of Athenian constitutional democracy. b 33 06 y&p iLvTCO"<E "Otherwise Solon would never have composed the line." This is the apodosis to the condition inIplicit in "aAa • ... o,,,[a: i.e., AiyOJ' BT. (el) "aAa. du.Ay~, ~ o,•.ta (o~" if')' otlyae 4•.••

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

b 34 dn;~Lv ..• 4"OU.LV For the line, see Diehl & Beutler, no. IS. Diehl & Beutler give us two lines of the elegy: the first, as A. cites it· here; the second, as found in Proclus (see Diehl, pp. 2S£). Proclus has a slightly different reading for our line (see West, II 22a), which Diehl & Beutler suggest is possibly the more correct reading. The Critias mentioned (as we know from Plato, Cham,. 1S7e) is the son of Dropides, and, therefore, a nephew of Solon's. There is no way in which to tell, either from our citation or from Proclus, if the lines are condemnatory, praiseworthy, or neutral Charm. IS7e wonld suggest that they are praiseworthy. Cope, pp. 276-77, has • note on the reading "vee,iTe';c~ b 3S ""'" Y""o~ and ssb S, IS-17.

obviously refers to judicial rhetoric; see 7Sa "3

7. 1 : 1 ""'" ~"o,,"",,"'" This just as clearly refer. to the field of deliberative rhetoric as does the context of 76a 1-7; see 7sa 23, 75a 26 : 2, and sSb 4-5, I3-1S· Z 01 XP"II"p.ol.OYOL, ou", ;cellu/-,oMyo, conunonly denotes "soothsayers," which is also its meaning in A., e.g., r s, 07b 4. But the incident to which this passage refers is mentioned in Herod. 7.141-143, and there the word means "professional interpreters of oracles" (e.g., .t 14".3, 143.1). This is its more probable meaning here when used of Themistocles. is the reading of the a 2 v"up.crx"ll-rEW d I;U).LVW "'LXo~ )'EY"'V codd. accepted by the edd. (except Kassel) and by Spengel and Cop.. This is interpreted to lIlean: 'Just as Themistocles said that there must be a naval battle citing the wooden walL" The 6n clause in indirect statement depends lipon the idea of saying in Aiy.,> (see, e.g., 6sa 31-3" and 73b 9-10). The event referred to is Themistocles' success in the summer of 4S0 in persuading the Athenians to withdraw from Athens to Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen. On Themistocles (ca. S2S - ca. 462 B.C.), see the OCD. Kassel (Der Text, p. 130) conjectures Aiy... and reads ~• .:l..o. Aiye .. ni;co,. He would interpret thusly: 'Just as Themistocles said that the wooden wall meant [Aiy ...] that a naval battle must be fought." a 3 : 1 w"n;.p "P"II"'" p.crp..upL4 .""LV is the reading of the codd. accepted by three of the edd.• Spengel, and Cope (although Cope has no accent on IlQrl'roeta). Ross reads dO't for eff"Ctv; Kassel reads ",aerufl{a Amlv. Since nothing has been said about proverbs, this phrase creates problems. It is true that there is a series of proverbs used as evidence at 71b 14-17; see also 63a S-7. But usually A. does not use the formula cllanee ei'e'1Tu, for such a distant reference; the reference at 73 b 38, for ..'Cample, is to the preceding chaps. II and 12. And so the formula here has been variously interpreted: (a) cllanee = olanse: "proverbs are witnesses of the sort just mentioned,"

76a

10

COMMENTARY

32 9

i.e., witnesses of the future, ",&eTVe', neel ... laope• .,. (76a 1-2); (b) .,anse should be =d as ,,"l TO """se: "proverbs, .nd .ny s.ying (literally: "and the as the saying is"), are witnesses"; (e) omit the 'li!~Ta, with cod. C, but read tUTt. with the other codd., not the slat. of cod. C: i.e., instead of dlanse .ie~Ta" ",aenSe'& ola... read dl""ee ",aeTveta (note accent) lad., "proverbs are evidence .0 to speak." z cruI'PO"~W€' the reading accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Kassd would read uv",{Jovlsdol with cod. F, but his reasons for doing so as cited in his apparatus should be looked at carefully. i.e., the person giving the counsd. a 5 I!pa••~ The UIWIpirated form is more common. Evidence for the proverb is found in Diogenianus of Heraclea (on whom see the OCD) as cited by Leutsch & Schneidewin, 6.61 (P.279) and 3.S9 (p. 231); evidence is also to be found in the Suda, s. v. lJxe~aTa. or s. v. ",>1noT'. The idea behind dIe proverb is that contained in such expressions .. "to sow seeds in the sand," "to water a plant when the root is dead." a 6 x ..l .. o "oU~ . . . " ..... p..~ There is no need for any change here. uv",{JouAed.,. can take a direct object and here it would be the articular infinitive: TO TO,), ••• "aTiea,. With the accusative av",{JovAsds .. usually carries the meaning "to recommend." Thus we have: "al (sr TO, av",{JovAEdBl) TO TOO •••• naTeea•• (TOOTr!' ",aereee, " naeo,,,,tg) vtj,.,o • ..• a 7 V>j".o~ ... x ....dd".. See also B 21, 9Sa 19. The line is from the Cypria, an epic attributed to Stasinus (? sth c. B.C.; see the OCD). It is cited as fragment 22 of the Cypria in Kinkd. We fUld the idea in Herod. 1.155.1; Eur., Andromache 515-522 and compare Trojan Women 709IE, Children oj Her.des 100S-IOOS, Heracles 165-169; LiVY,40.3.7. Dionysius of Halicamassus tdis us of the Roman break with this Greek custom in Afltiq. Rom. S.80 (1703-1704). a S yv':'Pll'0' i.e., "distinguished people"; c£ B 25, oab !)-10. For the idea in the sentence, see 64b II-I4. a 9 E\lpou~o~ a well-known Athenian statesman and finallcier (ca. 405-330 B.C.) often mentioned by Delno.thenes; see the OCD, CAH, VI 221-32, and Goodwin, Delllosthe"es, pp. 244-48. On the dikasteries, see the reference at 74b 32 : a TO : 1 &'x""'"Iplo.~ 2; see also Kroll. chap. IV, for the organi2ation of dikasteries in the fourth century. Spenge\, p. 197. is disturbed by the plural form with the aorist singular verb, since the many instances of the action which the plural (6,,,aO"T'1elolt) would indicate are contradicted by the aorist (lxetiaaTo); so he sug-

33 0

ARISTOTLE,

C

RHETORIC I I

gests Toi, d",acnai,. But the plural here appears to be the same as that at r IS, I6a 33 - i.e., it is indicative of a class; see S. IOI2-. Z Xcip'l",a~ an Athenian' general who played a prominent part in Athens' campaigns of the fourth century between 366 and 335. See the OCD, CAH, VI passim. A contemporary of his, Chabrias, is mentioned at 64'l 21; on both, see. 648 19 : 1. 3 DAci"',",1I If we had some idea of the identity of Archibius we might be able to determine whether this is Plato the philosopher, or Plato Comicus (on whom, see the OCD). The latter is an Athenian writer of comedies, a contemporary of Aristophanes', whose work appeared in the last quarter of the fifth century. Kock (I 260), following Meineke, includes our passage among the fragments of Plato Comicus (frg. l!9). Cope and Kassel read a well attested q, IlUTWV (a dative by attraction) for the 8 IlU.TOJ. accepted by Spengel and the other edd. For Plato the philosopher, see nowGaiser. a II E:7tL3E8C1)XEV i.e. "advance. increase. grow," a of the word in prose; see LS, III

fairly common use

a 12 : 1 x .. , 01 p.....tXOIl"'.~ These also belong to the class of recent witnesses mentioned at 76a 8, as we know from 75b 27-28. The participle contains the apodosis (S. 2350) to what is preferably a future more vivid condition (it could also be a general condition). z ...au X,"fu\vOU i.e., of being brought to trial. a 13 : 1 01 p.tv crull "'O'OU'l:O' "Consequendy, recent witnesses of this kind," namely, the kind described ill the preceding sentence. In accord with 750 27-28 (0£ ",ev ",.dXOVTE, ..• d' ."";0,), the ",iv contrasts this class of recent witnesses with those mentioned at 760 16, d' ""wO.v, who would presumably be those described in 76a 8-12 and whose evidence would be more effective in the area described in 76a 14-16. Z ",..u.....,11 an objective genitive with ",aerVeB" referring to what follows at 76a 14, .1 yiyovev ..• 1m-IV 1) "'1).

0'

0'

a 14: 1 Et ytYOVEII 1\ p.i) is the reading accepted by Ross, Kassel, and Cope; the other edd. and Spengel read (il ",oj] following cod. A; c£ B 19, 92b 15, and B 22, 96a 9. 33 where the same problem is resolved by the edd. in the same way as they do here. Z .,.Epl SE ...oil natoll Obviously they are not to be accepted as witnesses on the nature of the action because d,eir close connection with the action leaves their testimony open to question. See chaps. 13-14. a 15 : 1 ~[X"'O\I i\ ci&,xoll z uUp.
76a 2I

COMMENTARY

HI

a 16: 1 01 6' O!nwO."t, p. 130) will indicate why. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel read ~al nee' TOLOV'ULllI nUJTOTaTOt, as does Cope, save for TOVTWV in place of TO'OUt'CtW. Ross omits Hal and reads "'el TOVT"'. ,nI1TdTSeO'; Kassel brackets "''''OTaTOi. The reading of the other edd. is more acceptable than Ross's since all the codd. read the "at, and since there is nothing in the various readings to suggests ,."CTTOTtI10L, Reading with the edd., we translate: "on the other hand, recent witnesses not connected with the case are highly trustworthy on such matters as just mentioned. But the most credible of all are the ancient wimesses ..." However, Kassel may be quite correct ill suspecting a dittography and bracketing the fmt 07naTd'TaTO'. a 17: 1 1'ClGTWIJ.cr."C'CC "warrant. pledge, confirmation"; the word is "sually found in the plural.. This appears to be its only occurrence in A. Just as A. looked at the material by which law could be examined and will follow the same procedure for the other atechnic proon, so he begins just such a consideration of witnesses here. Although the English translations make this clear in a way, the fact remains that their interpretation of the Greek of 76a 17-18 is rather free. Jebb & Sandys is typical: "The arguments in regard to testimony are these. If one has no witnesses olle may argue that ..." It is preferable to take ""/TWpaTa in explanatory apposition with paeTVea" and 'X0",I as a dative of agent with an understood 1."Tio. (see 7sb 19 : " 77"

12 : 1): "The pers~ who possesses no wimesses as cOl1firmation of the evidence

must say that ... 3

,,,,,p,,,,,p.ow

i.e., evidence, testimony.

a I8 be '"CWv .b,o"""" On the idea in the word, see S7" 34 : 2. In favor of such argumentation is Aeschilles, Ag. Timarchus 91, who argues that "truth is determined by the probabilities" (or as it is frequently translated: "by circumstantial evidence"). !soer., Ag. Euthynus 4, Against Callimachus r6, and Cic., Pro Caelio 9.2.2., also speak strongly in favor of this kind of argument. a 19 Y'''''fLlI '
See 7Sa 29 : 4; Ross alone of the edd. use.

i.e., "it is not possible for probabilities to deceive a 20: 1 hi:l apyupL", for a sum of money"; c£ LS, .",t, B.III.42 cil(cnc£"t'Clt "that probabilities are not cOllvicted ... "; this is a common meaning of the word (see, e.g., Andoc., Mysteries 7.) a 21 : 1.. .u60fL"'P""'P'Wv See 7Sa 12 for the verb. We have here a genitive plural governed by .ull1~.Ta" "are not convicted of false witness."

332

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

76a 30

z l](ov.. , Ii. This is the contrasting clause to 700 18, pdeTVea, p.v p~ lxovn, and it must be completed with the words from 76a 17-18, "''''T''paTa ""el paeTVe"WV pdeTVea, IXOVT1 de. The interpretation of lxoon is the same as that suggested at 16& 17 : 1. a 22 ':'"oli,xlI

i.e., "liable to trial"; Cope, p. 280, discusses the word.

a 23 EX""'" AOYWV •.. 8E
"to draw conclusions on the

Here the word means: opponent. adversary. a 24 olp.
a 27 : 1 xcr.''tci "in respect of. concerning"; "if one does not have an abundance of evidence with "spectto the !act." 2 ofLO).0youfLiv1)~ Modifying the understood paeTVeta, (as does E'IIavTiat;, 76a 38), the word here means "agreeing with," i.e., eel" support of"; this is the more common mearung for the word. but c£ 73 b 38£ a 28 : 1 cm..oii is the reading accepted by Ross and Kassel; the other edd., Spengel. and Cope read ~TO';. On the interchange of the definite and reflexive pronoun, see 608 I : 1. 2 "",EI... ,uv We saw the word at s6a II, and a translation of it is to be found at 56& II : 3; see also ph 18 : 2. It is not unusual to find this contrast with 'PavMT,/, - i.e., goodness vs. badness; see, e.g., EN I17Sb 24. a 29 .... Ii' cil.A1I "the other matters"; it is the object of ••"do. (76a 32) as is the understood antecedent of the Sual ••. dla'Poeai clause.

a 30 :

1 ",lAw See 61b 3S-38, 6Ib 37 : 1. 2 lx8poii See B 4, 82a Ifl: . 3 cllio"'fLoiiv..a~ Ii ciliot;auv.. a~ See 72b 21-22 for the same contr.st. For the idea behind the words, see 62b 20 : z; see also 6Ia"s : 1 and 6Ia 28 : 3.

']6a 34

COMMENTARY

333

"0""'"

a 32: 1 These are the particular topics, the .rd1/, which were the burden of chaps. 4-14, and, as we have seen, also of chap. 15. See 5gb 25-]2, 58a 17 : 1, 58a 27-28. Cope, p. 281, calls these TW. aVTW. TO""" "the .<61/," and refers to his Introd., p. I98, where he speaks of them in a way which is similar to the interpretation given in his comrru:ntary. But oddly enough he says nothing in his commentary at the first appearance of the word at s8a 27. Spengel, on the other hand, speaks (p. 200) of the TO""" here as though they were the conunon topics. • il; oL.w . . . ..0: lvllup.1j P.II..'" this is a restatement of the observation made at s8a 10-12, and, more specifically, of that made at s8a I7-33. For the only topics which we have seen berween chap. 4 and this point are the particular topics (the eld1/; see 58a 27-28), the topics which A. proposed (at s8a 32--33) to discuss first. These particular topics give us the basic material with which we are to work in developing deductive or inductive argumentation in the form of enthymeme or c:xam.ple (see 5gb 25-32). The material itself when put in the form of propositions will generally assume the character of necessary signs, or probabilities, or non-necessary signs; see 593 7-8 and 593 9-10. The point of this comment is that A. is speaking in a way which is quite consistent with his statements in the first three chapters. See 60a IS : " 73b 8 : " and 54b 25. Hard and a 33 : 1 CNVO'l""'" fast distinctions among CT'IW/hII<1], <1tI.dllarl'a. <1tII'{Jola.o., and d.a8>1,,'1 (a word not much used by A.) are difficult to come by, and it does not seem wise to insist on attributing fixed meanings to each. In general, "contract" (...,.8011<1]) represents any consensual agreement berween two or more individuals. Demosthenes argues in Against Dionysodorus just such a meaning of contract for a certain Dareius. We have a definition of contract in Cic., De in •• 2.22.68, and in the AfJdor ad Herenll. 2.I3.20. See also Jones, chap. XII, on contracts.

a ~oacN"nJ'" xpijalC; i.e., "the use is very extensive." 3 ..wv MY"'" xpij,,,~ We saw xe7ia., at 64a 26; see 64a 26 : •. Translate: "the use of arguments." "Arguments," a common meaning of My",., is preferable here since the chapter is concerned with developing the material for argumentation in each of the atechnic proofS; some, indeed, interpret the word with this meaning at 76a 23. With TOaavT'I in the main clause, this appears to be a a 34: 1 aaov clause of comparison. The probleru is the use of the neuter Bao. with the infinitive, and not the ordinary construction: namely, lia'l ail,,,.; see S. 2003. LS,8ao" IV.I cites the present passage as an example of the adverbial usage oHao.. I fmd the phrase almost equivalent to 8ao. with the absolute infinitive, in which 8ao. as an adverbial accusative refers its clause to what precedes: "The use of arguments is very extensive insofor as amplifying or

334

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

diminishing the importance of contracts (is concerned), or conferring credibility on them or destroymg their credibility." 2 ..il~.,v On the idea, see 59a 16-26, and 7Sa 8 : 3, 7sa 9 : 3, 7sa II: 1, and 7sa '4: 3. Isoerates in arguing the imporrance of the Amnesty of 403 B.C. (Ag. Callimachus 27-32, 4:1-46) illustrates both A.'s point here 'Illd a number of the topics which follow from 76b 7 on. See also !soer., Plataicus 42--63. 3 "..e..,p.iv C£ Quint., Illst. orat. 5.5.r-:>, for a brief mention of methods to refute documents similar to these contracts. In av~e .. II "aOa<eel. we are given the fIrst pair of alternatives for coping with contracts. Understand with these ad4 ij ",,,,,,ciS "o,.iv ij ,bd"",ou~ jectives O"1!.O>j"a~. Our phrase "IaTd~ I} dniaTov~ is presented as a second set of alternatives to a;;~.w iI "aOa<e"', but, in fact, it is a further explanation of a6~... 11 "aOa<et'" this is what one does if one strengthens or weakens the importance of contractS. At 76a 34 - 76h 1 - Ad•••• "vela~ ("ol>jao!'t.) - we have the explanation of "'UTd~ At 76b 1-2btl ~ •... Totl...Tio. - we have the explanation of dnlUTo~ "0'"". Our phrase iI "'IaTd~ ••• dnlUTov~ is discussed down to 76b 5; see 76b 7 : 1.

"0""

"0,"".

76b 1 : 1 '-'"dpX"'''' is the reading of the codd. accepted by Ross, KasseL SpengeL and Cope; cpo 76b 33. The other edd. read tlnaer.n with cod. A. Z xupLmc; On the word, see S6a 13.

b 3 " ........"EUd~.'v

Sec S9b 14.

On the word (a partitive genitive with o~M.), b 4: 1 "p..yp.....d .. ~ set; S4b 24 : z. This systematic treatment "'el TO,}~ !,deTVea~ was set forth at 75b z6 -760 32. Z o"oio, ..... ,v.~ The addition of the indefinite pronoun to the correlative makes the correlative more indefinite; see S. 339d. 3 ~,,,y.yp .. p.p.l!vo, "those who endorsed, subscribed, the contract."

b S : 1 'Pul.ci'H'OVT€C; Td~ ""O>7"a~); c£ Cic.,

ucustodians of"; see Isocr., Trapez. 20 (9'vldTTBW Pro Archia 5.9 ("narn cum Appi tabulae ...").

z ....u..o,S is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross, alone, reads in its place a conjectured TOIO~TW'. As Spengd and Cope point out, the expression is somewhat unusual, for we would expect something like TO,aU'TQ, a£ a1J"~ijKal del"', We saw the same problem at 76a 34 : 1. Interpreting TO~TOI, as a dative of rdation, or reference, we can translate 76b 4-5: "whatever the char:lcter of those who subscribed the contracts or are the custodians of them, in these individuals [i.e., on their ,har.'ter) resides the credibility of the contracts." Ross's conjecture

76b 10

COMMENTARY

33S

captures the meaning (i.e., "such is the credibility of the contracts''). But the text is secure, and we should stay with it. b 6: 1 6",oAoyou",iv'l~ a" The meaning here is that .t 73b 38£, not that at 76a 27. The M is connective. This genitive absolute may be taken ., temporal; the following one (oii""l~), as conditional. z ot"dll~ ",iv We have a definition of this word at 61a 2I, and that root idea is at work here; i.e., something which belongs to one as one's own. Probably the best way to understand the word in this context and at 76b 34 is: Itin one's favor,'" "supporting one's position." The f'i'll is solitnrium and the contrasting idea (which would be l.a'T{a~ 8' 0"") is forgotten.

b 7 : 1 IIU!;'1"'OV

The first set of alternatives suggested at 76a 34 is now developed throughout the rest of this section on contracts down to 76b 30; see 76a 34: 4. We emphasize the importance of contract by showing the relation between contract and law. Similarly, when the contract is attacked ("aOa'li.'" 76a 34), we may note that the arguments (e.g., 76b ISff.) are those used against an opposing law (e.g., 7Sa 27ff.). In Ag. Callin/nchru 34, Isocrates ties the r<;jection of a contract (the Amnesty of 403 B.C.) to a rejection of the laws in general. z ra.o~ has the general idea of a .6I'o~ rd,o~; see 68b 7-9, 73b 4-6, and 68h 8 : 1. 3 ""Tel< ""po~ On the meaning, see 54h S.

h 8 xUp.ov

See 56a 13.

h 9 Tel<~ ""Tel< v6",ou~ GUV8il""~ sc. "0'0;;'7' ",,~ia~. Such contracts are those made in accordance with existing laws. They enjoy the added sanction of the law its&' The point which A. appears to wish to make here would seem to be: a contract carries the force of law, and although private contracts ("al aC I'e.) do not in themselves confer any additional power or dignity upon, or even supersede, existing laws, still existing laws (oC 81) add further sanction to private contracts made in accordance with them. A trust fund would be such a contract; Lysias' speech Against Diogeiton (dated co. 400 B.C.) deals with the subject. Isaens also gives us a speech (dated 37S B.C.) on a legacy; this can be found in English in Freeman, pp. 147-62.. h 9-11 K"l oAc.>~ . . • "roU~ VO"'OU~ ltv"'pei The force of this argument, such as it is, resides in the similarity of contract to law, and, consequently, the need to respect contract as we respect law. h 10 cruv8";x'l TU; E.... (V In PoL 1280b IOff. A. speaks in • passing way of a difference between l.w and contract. (On this accentuation, used by Roemer, Tovar, and Kassel, see S. 184; on the accentuation of Ross and Dufour ["".0>1"'1 T{~ sam], see S. lOS.)

76b 17-19 b II :

1

k, 5.

introduces another reason.

".U" .".; "

2 ",clt CN"cVJ."Yf'ci;,""" On ""Oa.lld"I'OTO, i.e., all ordinary transactions among men in society, see S4b 25. !soer., Ag. Callimachus 27"-28, says the same thing. 3 xed 't"a. txoUO'LCl "al is intensive: fCmany transactions but especially vohmtary transactions ..." A possible reason for the introduction of l"o~u,o is the distinction among Ta ""oO,u""I'0TO drawn at EN II3'" 1-9. More proximately the word lends further force to the argwnent at 76b 12.-14: dluTB •..
il ... Xpd.. i.e., &I'.Alo as Bonitz, Index, s. "eelo suggests; see also LS, Xeela, IV. We saw the word at 65a 33 with a different meaning.

b 13

b 14 l",,,ol.ij~ The phrase ""'''OA~~ ldei. lano occurs at B 16, 90b 32 (see also Histo,ia anilllalium 622h 25). It means practically "to see clearly, to see at a glance." Cope, pp. 283-84, has a long article on the word, of which the part relevant to the meaning in our phrase (although Cope does not agree) is the explanation which A. gives of the word at rIO, loh 22.-23: "for we call .",,,,rl1.o.o that which is clear to anyone and everyone, and calls for no in-

vestigation. "

b 15-16 "p"'",ov f'tv 24) and In 6i

(76h 29).

b [6 : 1 &:XEP

•

cognate accusative: "whatever attacks we can mOWlt." a reference to his comments at 75b 8-

"pa~ ;'01''''' "'..v",[ov

25< We have an example of such an attack in !soer., Paneg. 175-180 on the Treaty of Antalcidas of 386 B. c.; a briefer example can be found in Cic., Pro Archia, 4.8 ("hie tu tabulas desideras ..•").

ea...;

a",."ov ycltp ... "","y,,"''''' aTO"O'rae sc. cf. 55a 39. a:r:ono'JI "de (ea'nv) is the apodosis to Bi Toi, f'E'P 1101'0', ... (H)" olO/Ae8a ad'" "eIOeuOo.. .O.~ d. "".01j"o.~ ("eIOeuOo, oUJI'eOa el.o.) el.a""aio.. The

b 17-19

statement in this sentence gives a reason why we can use the same argwnents against contracts as against law>, and it rests upon the relation between contract and law which he has just stated: "For it is ridiculous if, on the one hand, we consider ir unnecessary to obey the law> ... but, on the other, deem it necessary to obey contracts." Some interpret this as the first argument against contracts and translate: "we may in the first place use those weapons which one would use against an adverse law - arguing that it would be strange if we were forced to comply with all contracts while we repudiate the duty of complying with ill-framed and faulty laws" Uebb & Sandys; emphasis added). A:s Greek would indicate that the first argument is to attack opposing contracts as

COMMENTARY

337

one attacks opposing law. Then the rae clause gives a reason why this can be done. I find the Jebb & Sandys interpretation of rde rather strange. The first word means "established laws"; b 18 XEi"EVoI - '
etTC& v'n

se. eiTa (lBxTeov) 8n: usecondly, one lnust say ..."

b 20 : 1 '<"eN SlI
b 21 : 1 .:.~ SIX"'IO... pOV Frankly. this is a puzzle. From A.'s comparison of contract with law (76b7: 1. 76b9: t. 76bg:2. and76b I7-I9) and from the similarity of the argument at 76b Ig-21 with that at tsb 3-6 and with the argument on equity at 74'126 - 74b I. I am fairly certain that he is arguing that we should remind the judge that the contract may contravene rather than abet justice. Therefore one must go beyond the contract for true justice. This is also the manner in which the sentence is interpreted. Cooper gives the dearest exposition: "Secondly. we may urge that it is the judge [not the contract] who is the arbiter of justice. and that he must regard. not the particular 'document. but the higher principle of what is right." This is the way in which everyone whom I have been able to consult interprets the Greek. but I find it difficult to obtain that interpretation directly from the Greek. The one way in which I can approximate it is olio,o"" ToliTO (i.e•• O'Vv8lj"a~) ""'nTiov (T';; d,,,ar1TfJ) dll' w~ a."a,OTBeo.: "the judge. therefore. must look not to the contract. but to the contract under the aspect of the more just." Z " ...",..... pbjl.1l i.e.• "change. alter. overhaul"; see 77a 23 and 12a 34. and Plato. Ph.edr. 272b. A.'s use of UTe,;'P'''' I'.Ta<1TeS'P .... frequendy seems to coincide. as a glance at Bonitz. Index on the words would confirm but cf. 7sb I I :.. Cope. p. 28g. believes that in the present passage the verb nteans "'to pervert' justice," in contradistinction to its meaning at 77a 23·

r

II.

b 22 : 1 oih-' cb"i:rn oll.. civciyxn to which iiEanaT1J81'Twv leal dvay"aa8AvTwv (76b 23) respond. The two verbs are in the genitive absolute:

76b 31

ARlSTOTLE, CRHETORlC' 1

"while, on the other hand, contracts are drawn up when men have been deceived or subjected to compulsion." Cope, p. 285, intezprets differently: uThe two genitives in constructiOll follow <W'JIOii~a,. contracts of men deceived are made.'" Indicative of the fact that such deception was not unique would be the comment of Isaeus, On the Eslale of Cleonymus, 41-43; he speaks of forged wills and false wills (d.aOoj"a.) as fairly common. • (",cpUXOS... t".... 'v) All the edd. read the parenthesis. In Ross's text rae is wrongly accented. The idea here is the same as that expressed at 75a 31-32. C

In the light of the verbal adjectives used throughout b 24 : I axa".iv tlris chapter (c£ 7Sa 29 : 3) we should probably Understand d•• here; the infinitive as imperative (S. 2013) is a slight possibility. 2 .....v YEYp .. ;t;tlvwv . .. ........ xa,vwv See chap. 13 and notes.

b 26 :

I

....ais

own city-state

dAAa....p(a's

i.e., foreign laws as opposed to those of one's

(ol'Jeslo,,).

2 . " . ,...... o! cDJ.... 's This reading of corrected cod. A (c£ Kassel's apparatus) is accepted by Kassel, Spenge!, and Cope. The other edd. read with Roemer l"'''Ta .1'1, his change for the reading '''''Ta 7j 'I. The full clause is lnura Bl (banta Ea'",) ti.Ua" ", T.A.

b 27-28 a,[ yup 6O"TEPCU XUplClL, ij ttl 1tpO't'EPIlL Op8C1l, cd &' 60''TEPIlL is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd. and by Spengel. Ross reads quite differently with some later codd. but of good tradition; Cope reads as Ross does (save for a strange 7j rae .1 at 76b 27 for 7j rae al.). As far as the meaning is concerned, there is no significant diflerence between the reading accepted by the other odd. and that of Ross.

b 28 o"a.... tp...s "whichever of the two ways may be serviceable to us." The two ways, of course, are the alternatives stated from 76b 24 on. We have seen what A. means by xei/a.,..•• at 55a 21-22. The point ofbis observation here must be understood in terms of his introductory remarks at 76b 15-19 which take us back to his statement at 75b 3-6. In other words "useful" must be whatever subserves a justice which is genuine and beneficent.

b 29 :

1 ....0 au;tcpipov and 62a 1']-21 with notes.

See 75b 3 and note; see especially 7sb 13 :

1

The subject is 1) .....01)><1]. b 30 x ..13"", ... 0;t0u.,S C£ 76b 14. So, here, all oiliermatterssimilar to (T•• aiiTa) what has been set forth at 75b '5-29 are apparently as easily discerned. b]I 13a:a
COMMENTARY

339

in the pluraL On the idea, see Anaximenes '432a 13-33, where there is a definition of the word; Cic., Part. oral. '4.50-5'. Topica 19.74; Auctor ad Herenn. 2.7.ro; Quint.. Inst. orat. 5.4.1-2. For the weakness in this atechnic "irn:,~ as proof, see Cic.• Pro S.. II. 28.78. For the nature of the proceedings when inquiry by torture took place. see !soer.• Trapez. 15-18; Bonner & Smith, II I26-32. 224if.; and Harrison. II 147-50. b 32 : 1 .... 0 n,cs....Ov See the word at 76a 16 and 56b 29; see a similar use at EN n68b II. For the idea in the word. see 500 5 : 2 and 600 28 : 1. 2 ~ciY"'l On the general idea in the word, see 70a IO; C£ 57' 22: 1. 3 06&£ resumes the negative in ov"ovv, u not even." b 33

....& "'SE)toI'EII«

On the word, see 57' 27 : 2. Here it means

"the possibilities" with regard to the use of this "iaTt~. Le., pdaa.o,. The use of Ta •• ~.xope.a is. in this context. another way of denoting the particular topics (i.e., Ta .rd1J) by which to develop the atechnic nirn:,~ paaapo~ e.g .•

•~ ro.

(76b 33); see 59b 25-32. Four edd.• Sponge!, and Cope read .iner. Kassel reads rd ... Ta ••dexopeva; see Der Text. p. 13I.

Ta iva.xope.a.

sc. paaa.o,; on olH.ia~ see 76b 6 : 2. We" can trans-: b 34 : 1 otx.'«' late: "if the confession by torture supports one's case." z cdS;.,,, To avoid the misleading interpretation of some English translations (e.g., "exaggerate"). see the comments on amplification at 7sa 8 : J and the references there; see also 7sa 9 : 3. J 3... , indirect statement governed by the idea of saying contained in ail~... lrn: .. : "it is possible to magnify its import:mce by saying" ..." 4 I£«P.... p""" "evidence, testimony" (c£ 76b 3I). in the sense set forth in 75b 26 - 76. p; see, e.g .• 700 17 : 2. same meaning as at 76a 24.

See Cope, Introd., p. 26711, on the vario~ uses of Mew to signify "refute." See also Cic., Pro Sulla 28.78. z .mJ.'l9'ij with Aiy .... i.e., to set forth the truth aboilt the general character of inquiry by torture. & Cope. pp. 285-86, remarks, this statement (Le., 77' I -4) presents us with a clear view of A: s thinking about the wrongness of such inquiry. an attitude, by the way. which is confirmed by the disputed passage at 77" 6-7. 3 XClO" i.e., "about"; see LS, A.I1.7. a 2 : 1 &uxl.uol cZv 't'lt;

a 3 o{OSw •.• ij.,..,.ov

See 63a 30.

i.e.• "both - and." These are the two ways in ;'liich a 4 : 1 x«l- xcd witnesses under torture Tel 'I' ••d;j liyo.a.. (770 3). A.'s poindu 77& 1-5 is to demonstrate how one refutes (d,dvo, Ii•• 77a 2) evidence given under

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

77a 8

torture. Although all the codd. and the other edd. read ...dJ.'16r; at 77a 4, Kassd secludes it. The fact that A. explains only lying might encourage the seclusion. J do not agree, however, with Kassd's seclusion of ...,U'16r; at 77" 2. • &"'K"'P"'EpoGv-.E~ i.e., "endure to the end." The infinitive with this verb carries an idea of purpose. LS, 6,a"aeTBee." interprets our passage to mean "being obstinate in refusing to speak the truth." 3 x",......yWUI'-£VOl i.e., "to allege falsdy against, to tell lies, to accuse fa1sdy."

as: l':'~

Here with the future participle expressing purpose, S. 2065, 2086. We can translate: "with the purpose of bringing their torture to an end more quickly." • lx_Lv with the infinitive; see LS, A.III, and 55a 18. 3 b1:"'V"''PEp.lV See 58b 29, 66a 8. It may take bot or "e.~. a 6 [&d U AeY.lv ..• f3"'GclvOl~l See Cope, Introd., p. 2OI. I would read but seclude the lines, as do Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengd. I do so because the section on oaths could reasonably end at 77" 6, and the passage does read like a gloss on 77a 5-6. For this reaSOll I am not as sure that it bdongs in the text as are Ross and Freese. On the other hand, its presence in cod. A would make me pause before omitting it entirdy as do Cope and Kassd. The prevailing estimate of the passage is that of Vic torius which is summarized in Cope, p. 286: the passage is corrupt and comes from either another writer on rhetoric or from a scholion. I do not find Victorius' further argument that the language is non-Aristotdian (e.g., A,6&6eefJo1, Ta" "",;ca" o'Te~ 6u"~Tot) a secure one. I 4YX"'p"<EpoUGl with the dative: "to remain firm under." • clvciyx","~ On the meaning here, as opposed, for example, to that found at 76b 32 : " see LS, 3.b: violence of torture (used mosdy in plural). "discreet, cautious, clinging." 3 a}A"'f3Ei~ XCl'rCl8uppoUO'lv "be confident."

a 7:

a8:

....pl See 66b 24 : 3. lip,...,.. On oaths, see Ana.'
2

(3) administer an oath to another, bllt not accept one for oneself (77a g-to);

77a12

COMMENTAllY

341

(4) accept an oath for oneself, but not administer an oath to another (77'1 10); [51 an added possibility: a previous oath taken by either party (77a IC>-II). With this, compare Quint., Inst.orat. 5.6.1-6. It is important to notice A.'. development, and, as Ross prints the text, it is not difficult to follow. A. gives the sources of argwnent for each term (i.e., not accept, not administer, accept, administer), and then, at 77a 29 - 77b 3, brings all four possibilities together, concluding with the fifth possibility. Thus we have: (i) 77a II-IS: development of first part of #2: oV didwuw; (ii) 77'1 15-21: development of second part of #2: o~ Aapfla...; (":'v'i~) na 21-25: development of second part of #x: Aal'pd.«; ( 77a '5-29: development of first part of #x: Mdwa,; (v na 29 - 77b 3: summary statement fonowed by brief discussion of ##4, 3, I, 2 taken together, e.g., 77a 30: U1I1'd~aCol'l..,.; (vi) 77b 3-II: development of # [5). a 8-9 IIl8",a. >cal Aa,,(3civ.. Be"ov d,M.a, = to give an oath to another. Be"o, Aal'li6..... = to accept or take an oath oneself; this phrase is ordinarily accepted to mean "to receive an oath /rom another." See, e.g., LS, Aal'li6.v." A.ILL£' and LS, ae"o~; both articles refer to the present passage. We are understanding it in the meaning in which it is always understood here: to take an oath onesel£ a 9 "<eN.......

refers to what immediately precedes: ij TO I'iv TO d' oV.

a 9-10 SlS... a,v [,,£VI eN is the reading accepted by three of the edd. and Spengel. Ross and Cope read Md.,cnv I'.v od with cod. A. I would be inclined to bracket I"v as an intrusion for the sake of concinnity with the clause which follows; I have since noted that Kassel does not read the word at all. a II oil1;o~ lj l",' ..,hoG lj lon' lxdvou There are different readings given here, and no clear indication /rom the edd. of what the codd. read. For example, Roemer, Tovar, Spengel, and Cope read: OVTO~ ij ~,,' oVTO'; ij .In' £"s["o1J; Dufour7 OUTO," 1} .un' atlTov {}1(7 exslvov; Ross, O-oTO," vn~ a,lroU'1) un:' .".tvov; and Kassel, [ovTo~11} ~,,' a~To,; ij ~,,' I".[vo•. Since the evidence for OVTO~ is good, I read it and would agree with Cope that it refers to the Be"o~ swam. a II-IS IN 8l&...a,\I ... " S' all This topic gives reasons which provide subject matter for not tendering an oath, e.g., (a) people easily perjure themselves, or (b) take the oath but make no restitution, (e) the judges are likely to condemn the man who has not taken an oath, (d) it is better to place one's trust in the judges than in one's opponent. a 12 : 1 3"<, P1f8lw~ The on clauses throughout this section, when unintroduced, preswne a A."dov (see 7Sb 19 : 1), or some form of Ur"v,

ARISTOTLB; cRHETORIC' I

343

77a 17

1 XIII &,,\'" . Four edd., Spengel, and Cope read this with cod. A; Ross alone reads "al 6T'. On this use of 6,dn for 6n when preceded by ;eat, see Bonitz, ItJdex, d,rST"

13 :- 1 06x a.7Co6U)ta)aLV The word means "to render what is due." It usually takes an object, and, in fact, some of the codd. read Tc't xe>i,.aTa as its object. The meaning is that the man takes the oath (o,.daa~, 77' I2), but "does not make restitution" or "does not repay the money." 2 0fL6crlZV"O~ All the codd. read a,.duavra~. Our reading, which is accepted by the odd., Spc:ngel, and Cope, comes from Victorius and an interpretation of the scholiast. It makes eminent sense with the normal construction demanded by "aTad,,,"Co... 3 xCI.'''C'cz.6LXciO'E:LV .i.e., fCcondemn," with the genitive of the person condemned.

a

a 14 : 1 XIII w~ There is a problem here with both the reading and the punctuation. Both words are well attested. Thus I would read them with Spengel, Cope, and Kassel, punctuating either with a period before "al cii~ (as they do) or, preferably, with a colon: i.e., "aTa6,,,duo.. · "al "~. The remaining edd. read ["all'" (except Ross, who reads "al[ .,,]) following Vahlon, and use his punctuation of a comma after "aTa6,,,d,,.... With our reading we interpret: "and on the other hand one must argue that one believes that the judges will condemn the man who has not taken the oath; and that this risk - namely, that taken with the judges - is the preferable risk." In the concluding statement at 77a 15, "'aTolle.. (for the "'UTOtlO' read by four ·of the edd.; Spengel, and Cope) has good evidence and is read by Kassel. ,,_ z xpEi."t''tWV .in the sense of "better," Ilmore excellent"; c£ LS, IV. This is a use not uncOmmon in A.; cf. Bonitz, Index, s. v. a 15 civ'tl XP'IfLci:"",v i.e., "at the price of; in exchange for money"; see Plato, Rep. 371d.

a

ap"o~ rp..uAO~

sc. J..a,.pd.BTa,. On the idea in the word, see 63a II : I, 760 28 : •. KII'tWfLOcrll"o The verb means: to take an oath. Cope, pp. 28788, has a note on the word in which he suggests that the force of "aT" is intensive, "expressing the 'binding force' of an oath." 16 : 1

• J

a I( : 1 xp"'t'tOv Ya.p .... EXII is the reading accepted by Kassel and Cope. Again we have a problem with the text. Apparently "eeino'rae '.o"a is the reading of the codd. with one exception: namely, that of corrected cod. A, which reads "eOiTTO' rae Ii. ' ••"a. Four edd. and Spongel accept the reading of corrected A. Ross modifies it with Richards io "eeiTTo. rae Ii,· '.e"a, presumably on the latter's argument that without!j. or e!7j we do nOt have good Greek. I would have 110 difficulty with an ellipsis of the

77a 19

COMMENT ARY

343

verb with I!.. (S. 1766) as the edd. read the te.' 17-19, with the exception of a colon, in place of the period, at 77a 19: Td "tI. The punctuation used by four odd., Spenge!, and Cope in the critical passage 77> 18-19 is: ".q &,,&aa, 6' oil. OilTW, . . . '""oe~ia. Td "tI. Ross alone deviates from this, reading a colon after d' oil (Cope favors it but does not use it), a comma after hnoe"ia., and a period (like everyone else) after Td ,,07; he is also the ouIy one to use quotation marks .t 77> 19-20, "oil" ll111 ••• 8;'a8pfj." Except fur • period after Td I do not find the punctuation critical, but I agree that the passage is not notably clear. As part of the development (77a 15-21) of what to say if one does not take the oath, the present passage, 77> 17-21, continues with the arguments whiclt con be offered: "further, indeed, by taking the oath he will win the case; by not taking it he will not. And. so, not taking the· oath would be because of his moral principles not because of his fear of perjury. And the saying of Xenophanes is to the point: no equal challenge can come from a godless man to a god-fearing man: rather, such a challenge would be as if a strong man should challenge a weak man to strike or be struck."

1'' ,

a 17 2~., This is probably to be taken transitively with an understood ~. di"7J" and the whole to be interpreted in the sense of "he will obtain satisfaction," i.e., he will win the case; see LS, M"7J IV.3. a 18 :

&' oil sc.lO... 2 iiv dlJ The subject is at 77> 19, Td ",,; see 77'1 19 : 1. J eN &,' EmoplCiCIV false swearing, i.e., "perjury." Literally, the phrase means "not on account of perjury." Everyone gives it the extended meaning: "not from the fear of perjury." This is surely what A. wishes to say. For in this OilTW, statem:nt the person not taking the oath explains that his actions in 77a 15-18 would argue to his moral integrity and not to any concern about swearing falsely. 1

sc. Aa"p6..8W Be"o" or &"•••al De"o" Ca. 570 - 470 B.C.: see the OCD and Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, I 360-402. Among the Greeks Xenophanes was considered to be the founder of the Eleatic Scltool of philosophy (on whiclt see the

a 19 :

OGD).

1

'<0 1'1)

2

:::EVa
344

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

a 19-20 INX till) .•• rlJaE~ij The codd. and the other edd., Spengd, and Cope read this line with au.{Je. instead of Ross's mu.{J," The caddo are to be preferred; however, see 7']a 20 : 2. The lines as read by the codd. and the edd. will be found in Did. & Kranz at A 14. We do not know the work of Xenophanes from which the passage comes. a 2.0 : J ..pox>.'1at~ As a law term it means a fonnal challenge or wager oifered by either party to his opponent for the purpose of bringing a disputed point to issue. In the present context it must be a challenge to take an oath with respect to the point at issue. As I understand Xenophanes, he says: "A challenge made to [LS, "e&~, C.I.6) a god-fearing man is not itsdf the same challenge [i.e., an equal challenge) to a godless man." However, the saying is typically translated in this vein: "No equal challenge can come from a godless man to a god-fearing man" (Jebb & Sandys: emphasis added). 2
Taa,{JeE "eo~ BiJa,{Jij. 3 &",,1.. x ..1 With 6fJola. understand ,i7J. "at is to be tronslated: ;'a9"; see LS, 8~o,o, B.6: Ubut it would be the same as if ..." a 2.1 : J lGJtUPD~ d.a8EVij The "-"
Since the godless man has no belief in what

he challenges to. but the god-fearing man does. there is an equality in this instance not present in the instance at 76a 19-20. In the former instance the

COMMENTARY

77a 30

345

god-fearing man was at a distinct disadvantage if he extended the "eOH"'1'''' to the other. Jebb & Sandys, by the way, are wrong in their translation. This is the articular infinitive subject of a 2.4-2.5 ...1> !Ai) eO-s.y Clu...ov d..... TO (.1.0'). The complementary infinitive to OJ..... is J.a,..{M..... iJe"o>, the general subject of the p.ss.ge 77"- 21-25 (£I dA ••• a'Hac...). aVT••, the subject of,.~ BU.,., refers to the person taking the o.th. a 2.S

sc. nea'Y",aTwv, or some similar

&v

word.

a 26 06 ...(!o\~

predicate (with .lva. understood) to the articular infinitive. On the idea, see Dem., Against Callippo. 27. a 27: 1 CI':'...6v i.e., the opponmt to whom one tenders the oath, so also the following TOUT,!, (or aVTqi ifitis read). 2 5.xacnci>v 5s'''&CI.....au...'!' yup 515 ...... "pl...y We are still discussing the arguments to be used if one tenders the o.th to another (77"25-29). Our reading is that of cod. A. The problem here is whether one is to read with cod. A or F, both of which represent good traditions. As far as the basic meanmg of the p ....ge is concerned, there is no radical difference between the two. For this re.son I read A with Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel. The punctuation is also theirs. Kassel and Cope are essentially in .ccord, save that they read "I!m;;. (also favored by Spengel) for d,,,a<1Tw, and a~Tqi for TOUT'!'. Cope, p. 289, also reads "ei•• ,. for "I!ia.. and interprets "and therefore (lit. you say this because, rde) you olfer him the decision of the matter." Ross reads and punctuates: a."OaTW. a"a6a, (aVTor, rae Mama. "eta..) followed by a comma. At 77' 29 I read dE.olia.. with A, and not the dE ofF, which only Cope and K2ssel accept. interpreting 77a 26-29 with the reading of cod. A, we have: "one must say that to be willing to entrust the issue to the gods is an act of piety; and, further, that there is no need for the opponent to require other judges; for one is placing the decision in the hands of the opponent himsel£ One must also state that an unwillingness (on the opponent's part) to swear the oath is strange in matters upon which the opponents deem it right for others [i.e., the judges, most likely) to put themselves under o.th." Quint., Inst. orat. 5.6.4, is to the point.

'0'

a 29 : 1 " ..0' g,."aT01I i.e., each of the specific instances proposed at 77' 8-ro; see 77a 8 : 3 on the ways in which the specific instanCes are developed between 77a z 5ijAOV

and 77' 29 sc. l<1T'.

II

J xed intensive: "also." 2 CJUY&u"'=O!AivldV genitive absolute expressing time. The edd. and Spengel accept Bonitz' genitive for the codd. av.dvaCo,.B'I'o" which is read by Cope and Freese. For the development at 77"- 30 - 77b 3, see ne."'
a 30:

ARISTOTLE, • RHETORIC t I

a 3 I - 77b I: olov d . . . I''13REPOV These are simply the combinations of 77a 8-10 set down in a slighdy reversed order. For example. the order set forth at 77& 8 : 3 as 1.2.3.4 is now presented as 4. 3. I. 2. 77b I : 1 ...c.v .lP'lp.Ovc.w i.e.. the four divisions with respect to oaths stated at 77" 8-10 and analyzed between 77a n and 77" 29. z oivciY"'1 auY"Eicre... The suhject of the verb would be ToU~ av.auaa"ou~ . b 3 : 1 ......v ElP'll'ivo>v This refers to the various particular topics set down in 77& 11-29 as the ways by which to develop each of the four divisions on oaths. Thus. if anything were understood. it would be either slMl. (see sSa 27-28) or 161... (see sSa 17 : 1). 2 D YEYEV'J,,",,0S sc. 6 8e"o~. We now conclude the chapter with a brief analysis of the final possibility suggested at 77& I!>-II; see 77& 8 : 3. From 77b 3-10 it is clear that a previous oath is on record which contradicts the present oath taken by either party. 3 6,.· ..6-raG is the reading accepted by four of the edd.• Spengel. and Cope. Ross reads V'P' aUTo;;·as found in cod. A. With either reading the meaning is the same. sc. A."Tiov. If one has previously taken b 4: 1 3.... o.:.x t,nopx[.. a conflicting oath (e.g .• 77a II). this is the kind of statement which would be made in order to counteract a charge of perjury in the case of a new oath. a lxo.:.cr.ov predicate to an understood [UTL For the meaning of Td cia",•••• see chaps. 10 and 13. For the relation between the voluntary anti wrongdoing. see 68b m ... n. 73b 28 : 1. 73b 28: 3. 73b 30. and 73b 36 : 1. b 5: 1 .... 3e (Uq: ••• oixwcr... On involuntary action, see68b 32-69a 2; on the role of pia in such action. see 68b 35-37. 6gb 5-6. and 69b 5 : 1. and 69b 5 :.. Some sense of the force of c!xd"'l1 can be gathered from the comment at 68b 22. The argument here is that one of the oaths (we do not know which one. i.e.• the earlier oath. or the present one) cannot be considered a free and deliberate human act. Four of the edd.• Spengel. and Cope read "al clndTII. apparendy the reading of all the codd. Kassel reads an in... teresting "ai Ta clnd"'l1 but offers no evidence for it. .2 w"rClu8cr. i.e., lIin this situation"; c£ comment at 6:ra 20. b 6 : 1 cruv.......lov with the not uncommon meaning in A.. for uu.d,.... of "to conclude"; see 57& 8 and S7& 8 : 1. As Cope, p. 290. remarks: "cruvd,.... like utJAAo,.IC.u8a~ avAAa"pd..... avAU,..... avvoea.•• av.,a.i.. av.,';" va' etc.• and similarly comprehend.,e. col/igere. all convey the notion of •gathering' facts together. for the purpose of comparison. and so drawing a conclusion of sow kind."

77b 9-10

COMMENTARY

34-7

2 xed intensive: '~indeed." J ...0 ol".opKELv This belongs in the 8n clause as the subject of Jun (whose accent is to stress that this is requisite for perjury; see S. I87b). This prolepsis (see S. :n8z) of the articular infinitive gives emphasis to the idea. 4 '<'0 '

a.

b 7 : 1 onjJ 1iv'<'.61x", dative of possession with d 8e"o~ understood with the words Wuoap~to~ "al d"w"ou""o~. • ':'".vlIlVdo~ K.. l cl""'l/ooO'pkvo~ is the reading of cod. A accepted by the edd., Cope, and Spengel. It is a somewhat strange "'''Pression commonly translated "ifit is your adversary who has sworn conflicting oaths." This may be what A. has in mind, but it is not an accurate rendition of the Greek. Spengel, p. 206, is unhappy with "al O"wfJoufJioo~ ("verba ... male addita''), but oddly enough the other codd. which omit vn61lav~to, read it. We certainly need ~".oao~to~ if what precedes and follows is to make sense. It appears that in lap Tq; dOT,d"',!, ... 6"QJ"0t1,,ioo~ we have a parallel statement to 77b 3, eao 6. y yeyB'WJpioo~ ;;,,' a~To6 "al eoanto" in which the two words specifying the understood Be"o, have changed places: "If; on the other hand, ,~ oath contrary to the opponent's present oath has indeed been sworn ...

a.

b 8:

1 or~ C,I/oOO'EV i.e., "1! '''fJivwv (~o., Be"o,,) oC,. a 6uz ya:p ~oG",o i.e., /J-YJ ndvl'a dvtz&eciiO'l1I; the oath is taken to

administer the laws jusdy. If the oath means nothing, then the laws carry no significance, and the consequence for the social order is chaos. b9:

1 K ..l TOL~ v61/oO~ "at is intensive. 2 XpWVT... 61/o6alllV....~ 6"ouaon, refers, of course, to the oath

taken by the dicasts; see 75' 29 : 4. xeWoTa" "administer."

b !rIO

marks.

':'I/oii~ .•• oll/opkvoua.v

Ross, Kassel, and Cope use quotation

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOR[C' [

b

ot~ See 'hXU~E't'E

77b 8 : 1. i.e., "you sit in judgment." or, ... "",deBTS is read by four edd., Spengd, and Cope. Kassd reads or. d. . .. 8",a~ "IT< and offers good paralld instances for the usage. 10: 1 2

b II : 1 •

a........nA.. ..lIl;wv

a use seen before, e.g., at 75 b 29. See 76a 34 : .; see also 76b 7.

b II-I2: [nEpl ~ ... ."0....;;.,,..] This is bracketed by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Spengd, and Cope; omitted by cod. A and Kassd; read by Ross. b

12

dp>j ..fIw

See 72a

:1:2.

APPENDIX THE ROLE OF THE IIIETE!I: IN ARISTOTLE'S METHODOLOGY

The point of these remarks is to bring togethet in one place a series of statements concerning the nint£(; which, by the very nature of:l. commentary on a given te.xt, had to be partial and incomplete ill the places at which they occur. Any responsible analysis of A.' s methodology in the Rhetoric demands first a t2Xonomy of the principles essential to the discipline as A. understands it. For only then can one determine if the methodology is reasonable, valid, and capable of achieving its objective. The critical body of principles which constitute rhetoric an art (with two exceptions: U,'~ and ~d", of 1') is set down in the first three chapters ofA and developed in detail in the rest ofA and in all ofB. These principles are the ones essential to the discipline, and are the means by which the tnethodology of rhetoric is actualized. The body of principle, consists of the following elements:

• p9,Jp"pa. ,.a~dd6l'ypa lpnxpo, ,,{u..,,: M)'o"

1f90"

"d90,

the necessary preconditions to all rhetorical discourse (S9a II-I3). deductive, inductive fonns of argument. the areas on which the rhetorician must concentrate in seeking material for his deducrive, inductive argument: (al the various aspects of the objective evidence of the subject matter under discussion which must be examined so that the person who is to make the judgment may have an informed mind; thiS is the M),o, of the material, what the subject matter does or can say of itself; (b) the various aspects of the emotions,

feelings, and characters of thelersons speaking, and of those addresse which should be considered so that the material may be presented in • way which

is nlost appropriate to the persons addressed and thereby facilitate judgment by these persons at this time; this is the 1f90' and "d90, of the auditors and the speaker. partiCular focal points for examination of the sources for rhetorical argw::nent

which give particular statenlents about

the sourcesj the sources are the three B1ITevO' nlt1TBlt;.

the ways in which the statements derived by the particular topics are

APPENDIX

350

ordinarily fOlmulated in propositional statements.

general modes of inference in which the material can be placed for argumentation by 6VOllp'l/Pa. "aeaa"'Ypa. These elements (along with U~,~ and Td<,~) are the constituents of the TeX"'I/ as such. When they have been mastered and are within a person'. control, then that individual possesses the allvap,~ of rhetoric. When he actualizes this capacity, he exercises the TAxv'l/ Ii'l/TOe'''~ (sec 54& I I : ,). The rhetorical methodology '0 constituted has one primary objective: to enable the person to whom the spoken or written word is addressed to make a judgment, "eta". It is worth noting at once that. as far as A. is concerned in the Rhetoric, such a judgment ordinarily follows upon deliberation, and that, although judgment is an act of the intellect, the deliberation which precedes and influences the act of the intellect implicates both reMon and appetition (see 5,.. 2 : 1). Something more than "owol TDnol

reason alone, therefore. enters into the judgmental action. The same condition

prevails if the act ofjudgment is approached from the side of those who arc to make it. For the persons who arc to make the judgment after deliberation arc individuals, each possessed of emotions, feelings, a certain character, and an intellect. Therefore, any efI'on to enable such an auditor to make a judgment must address itself to the whole person (s,.. 2 : " s8b 4 : 1) who is being asked to attend to the evidence, and who then, in the light of it, will make an assertion lor the truth of tlli. rather than tliat. Thus any kiiid of argumentation wed toward this Te.:lo, - namely, to enable the auditor to arrive at a position in which he can say: I accept this as the truth. not that - mwt speak to the IVhole person, the composite ofintellcct, feelings. emotions.

and character.

A study of A:s statements about the constituent elements reveals that they are interrelated and, in fact, fonn an interlocking whole which he brings together under his major mode of argumentation: induction-deduction. In a methodology the objective (T'.:IO~) of which is to enable others to make a judgment, the area of argumtntation is a reasonable place in which to locate the methOdology. What follows is a report of this methodology. The report is built upon the word ",Ian, which is the word A. uses to introduce the methodology. We :u:e introduced to the methodology at 54' 13-15 where we arc told that the "laT", are the heart of the methodology of the dxv'l/ I!'l/TOe'''~. We learn further that the 'vO';p'l/pa, the meaning of which A. at this moment does not explain, is somehow connected withnl(n:6'" for he says that "the enthymeme is the body for~ incorporates, nltn,,": C1wlAa~, nlC1T8(}), (see 54& IS: 1). Aswemoveaheadinthe text, we next meet nlC1n, at 54b 2.I-22 in the phrase TeO'll eVTeX"QW nlC1"!6OJ". To one acquainted with the Rhetoric, the first thing which would come to mind here is the mention of the 6'PT6X"'D', a1:6%"o, nlC1TB" at 55b 35-39; yet A. himself docs not specify what he means by ,,1m.., in the phrase here (see 54b 31). The only statement permitted by his text is that the use of the B'IITEX'IIO& nlC1"CEt, is related to 6v81lp'l/pa Uust as ",1m" at 54a 13-15 is tied to fvOllp'l/pa), and that here, too, as at 54" [3-[4, the belong to the methodology. The next statemen~ at 5sa 4, is a re-statement of S4a 13 but in a far more developed fOIDl in that it specifically says that the nlaTEl, otre the special area of concentration for the methodology of rhetoric: "the methodology of theT6Z'''1 of rhetoric is concerned with the "tm .. ,": ~ ps. i.TeX_o, peOo~o, "Bel ,a~ "laTB'~ 1rn:1•. But as the passage (55a 4-12) continues, we become aware immediately of the difficulty

"ICT''',

THE flIETElE

JjI

in attempting to give 3 sinlple, univocal meaning to 1t1(1Tf,~, n'a7:6'~ here or in any of ,he p....ges seen thus far. For we are told here that: ",IUT'~ is a kind of dn&6 ..~.~; rhetorical dndd.&E.~ is the AvO~P1Jpa; the .v8~PTJpa is "ve"b180~. ao "d80~ causes sheer confosion for the simple reason that how >180~ or "dOo~ (from what A. says of them) can be "IUT', in dus meaning of the word is beyond comprehension. The very next passage (55b 3S) is one in which "la.., cannot meao inference by syllogism as it does at 5Sa 4-8. We learn at ssb 35 that there are ",Ia ...~ IVT'VO' and 41'1V'0&' At 54b :U-2,2. in TWV AVT£XVCIJ'II ntaTtCIJv we met what appeared to be a technical expression with ao accepted meaning. If there is such a meaning for the phrase. then it is explamedin our present passage between 5Sb 35 and S6a '7. But before taking up A.'s OXj>lanation. which in itself will not pemUt "Ia..~ in the phrase ntan" lvceva, to be understood as it is at 55a 4-7, we might call attention to the following. If one does argue that the meaning is the same in each passage. then ao explanation must be offered for the plural form; i.e.• if ."OvP1JIJa of 55a 4-7 is the ",ia..~ lv..X'o~, why does A. speak of ",laTBI~ I...xvo,? If one assumes - and one would c
352

APPBNDIX

these ",im..~ [i.e.• the three enteclmic ones] are developed d"'mgh these means. it is clear that to acquire them belongs to the one able to reason logically [i.e.• develop logical "taT"). to onaIyze types of human ch....cter [i.e.• develop ethical 11.la",,]. and to analpe the emotions [i.e., develop emotional ",ta-r:,,].u Thisstatement ....ens that one must be able to make a logical onaIysis of the subject matter (see. for CXlIIllple. s9b '5-32). and to assess it and the manner of presenting it most effectively in tenns of the character of d,e speaker (writer) and the auditors and in tenns of the emotional resonance which the subject ~ or does, strike within such an audience. Since the ",[an., i,nx,o. mwt be developed by the speaker (or writer). A.'s study of the methodology s1lOuld explain in some detail how tws is to be done. and he does this for each lvnx'o, maT', as he gives a detailed analysis of each. For example. he examines logical ",tm., in A 4-T4 for deliberative (4-8). epideictic (9). and judicial (10-14) rhetoric; he follows this inB 1-17 with an anaiysis of emoliollal ",tan~ (I-II) and elMeal ",[m., (13-17). As A. presents the IVT6Xvo,;, al'BXvo,; nla.", it is not possible to perceive this "tm., carrying the meaning of 55a 4-8. i.e.• a form of inference. which is a meaning for "taT', which he also owes elsewhere. There seems to be no question that an bTtX"O~. aTBXvo, nlanr; possesses probative force (e.g., j6a 13: 'N1JQ'ClJTaT1]V IXtt ",[an, TO ..,-60'). A..uch it might very well be used by itself, e.g .• a simple statement of the facts of a homicide (entechnic logical ,,[ar.,) or a statement of the law clearly violated (.technic legal ",an,). In this sense one can see why it is called ",tm.,. Nonetheless. it is not the same as nl,n:u; used at ssa 4-8. and the difference was discwsed at ssa 4. A study of A.'s presentation of the three cotechnic and five atechnic ,,[m.., (on the latter. see 7sa 22 : .) reveals that they are the substantial areas from whidl to develop reasonable argumentation. As n;tcrr8'~ they are. in fact, SOUl'ce areas for the material of convincing argumentation. Ancient students of the RII.tor;c had no problem ill recogni2ing that A. offers three nlUTe.,~ 17T8rvO'. though the Greeks were more precise' than their Roman counterparts with respect to log;,al1ttUT'~. Dionysius of Halicam:J.ssus, for example, sp'~aks of the three as TO "eiiYl'a. TO .j60,. and TO ",1.60, (Ll'ias [9). and Minucianw tl1e Younger (ca. A.D. 253-268)1 as Too7 6, brexvcu7 n;LaT8W7 a.lp.B-I slu"" '1)0,xat, at dB na81'}T,,,al, at de Ao",,,a.' xal aC aVTa, nflCl)'p.an'Hat. Quintilian's view (Itut. orat. 11.3.[54) on entechnic logiCllI ntUTI, is somewhat similar to Cicero's
THB DIETElE

353

text nor the context. as it has so far bCeJl seen, suggests any other word. Thw there seems to be no p.roblem in reading the passage as TruV de xtaTBCOl'. Yet there ought

wdl be _a problem in the panlleling of wh.t follows at 56. 35-36 - i.e.• d,d

TOJ

dB"",••a, fJ <pal.Ba8a, d""".a, - with 56a 3-4 if such panlleling encourages one (in the light of 56a 35 - 56b 27) to argile that 56a 3-4-refers to l.861'7JI'a and not to logical "tan~ as was suggested above. In reply to this (apart from the discussion of 56. >-20 in the commentary), two points must be made cleat: (a) A. explains at s6a 19-20 what he means by the bnxvo, nl(1n~, which is 1.'11 aVTcp T~ AOY'P (56. 3-4). and it i, an explanation of what I have called logiCilI "taT<~. not of l.8,sl'7JI'a; (b\ if, on the basis of 56a 35 and what follows. one insists that 56a 3-4 refers to ••8/'1'711''' as the lVTB"'O~ "laTl~. then one simply connot have it both ways._ but must include ""IIdde'YI'a aswc1l (.... for example. 56b 6-7 with its explanation of d,d TOU a.......a'). This means that A. is no longer speaking of thr~e I"T8%710, "lUT8', at S6a 1-27, but jour, and no one, to my knowledge, accepts this in the face of A.' s explicit statement at 56 a I. What we have. then. at 56a 35 - 56b 27 is an enlargement of the meaning of ntO'.T&~ to incluc;le not only deductive inference but inductive as well. For A. now denoininatcs as ntaT£I.t; the forms of deductive and inductive inference in rhetoric which he calls bfJ""fJpa and a:apat36lYJ.&a: navTSr; !5A Tci, ntu,(6£r; nO£OVVTa£ . .. f} "'''eaaetYI'aTa Aiyo.. 71 ••8vl'f}I'aTa. leal ",aed TaVTa o~al. (56b 6-8). Nor is this use of "lan~ unusual. At 58a I. speaking ofboth ••8.I'7JI'a and ""IIda"yI'a. A. caIIs them the nta"CSu; rinO()StXTl"at, and atB 20, 93a 24-25, aC "owal ntU"CStr; CJVO Tep riVSt, a:a~&.dl!'r",a xal 8'V8vflTJpa. and he proceeds to analyze them in chaps .•0-2. (see also 94' 9-10). Further. we can find this use of "{aT'~ for an inferential deductive or inductive process .t An. Pr .• 68b !r-I4. and Alexander in his commentary on An. Pr. '5b 23 (ce. II.2.4l) employs for both avlAoy,ap6~ and "'''IIdd..yl''' the expression ",{an, n~. In short, we find that by 56b 2-7 we now have in our text two kinds of nlOTtlr;: (a) ••nz.o, ,,{aTe'~. and (6) dnoa.",T",,,1 ",taTS'~. It i, a distinction which A. appears to be fully aware of, as the ,tatenlent at 93a 22-23 indicates: Ao,,,d. dt "eel TWP il'Ol'VW'V nlC1TsOJv linaan' SEnd1', en81ns{! eie1'JTQt ns{!i TcdV lCJlcov. It is clear that "laTBco, is to be understood with "eel TW. Mlco •• and just as clear that they are (for there are no others) the I.TB".O, "laTe" which he treats between A 4 and iJ 17 before beginning the general review and transitiOll of B 18-'2. Recognizing this fundamental distinction in the meaning of "Ian, permits one to understand how A.'s methodology worksj a review of the passages just seen will demonstrate the importance of this aifferentiation in meaning. Our concero is primarily with the first three passages since the last two clearly define the specific meaning of "taT'~ which A. has in mind. (Which of the two meanings "taT', camesin other passages of A is discussed in the commentary. For passages in Books B and r sec Studies. PP.59-<54.) In the first passage. at 54a 13-15. the "taTe". which constitute the heart ofthe methodology. would be both the and the dnoa.",n""I. and ••8.1'71p'a insofar as it incorporates nlaT', does so as the "tentr; dno6s"'Ttx'lj, the inferential syllogistic fomI which offers a structure for the material provided by the '.TSXVO' "taT6'~. The validity of this interpretation is strengthened by the second passage. at: s4b 21-22. Here the nlaT61.r; are the same £'PT6XVOt nlcns1.' as those which. A. identifies in the fourth teXt discussed above. i.e .• at 55b 35ff. At 54b 21-22 we arc infonned that these nlaTl!', endow one with a capability in the enthynu:me. However, the three I..T'XVO' "ia ..,~ will confer no knowledge. llDderstanding. or capability with 1..80,..7JI'a since they cannot tell one how to construct syllogisms or what to do in

e,

'.TE".O'

APPBNDIX

354

order to infer deductively. A.'s specific explanation of iv9,jp.7!p.a as uvAAor.up.(k at S6b 8-.17 assumes as much. Yet the BIrr-eva, 1tt(1Te,~ do endow one with a capability in the use of the enthymeme '" the exEeIU that they offer the material which can be given form within the syllogism StrUcEure by the iv9olp.."p.a. In the third passage, 55a 4-8, in the first statement (55a 4) could be understood to mean both the €'V'teXVo, and the ModB£HTt"at. But as the passage continues. it appears that the more precise referent would be the "[(11:£', a:n:oJe'''l'txat: the iv9,jp.'1p.a and xaeci~"rp.a. Furthermore, such an identification of the ",I,,~.., here places the statement at 553 7 ("v(?,clrraTo'V Trov nlerTBQ",) in accord with A:s other remarks on the relationship between iv9,jp.'1p.a and "aed~"r p.a. Though both are coordinate as forms of inference (see, e.g., 56b II->2), still A. suggests (at 56b 23-.6 and B 20, 94' !H4) that the iv9,jp.'1p.a may arty more weight with the audi",rs. In the last two passages discussed above (55a 35ff. and 55b 3Sff.) the "'[aTsr, are unmistakably determined: i.e., at 55a 3Sff'. they are the 1VTB'X70&; at ssb 3sff., the clnode"'T,,,al. To recognize the different meanings in which A. is wing ,,[un,is to find coherence and precision present in the constituent elements of the methodology as he analyzes it. According to A. all rhetorical discourse concemsmatters about which we deliberate, and its o~jective is to make judgment possible on the part of another. Faced with that fact, the first thing which we must detetminc js whether in a given situation deliberation, and therefore judgment, are possible. Here the rhe",rical situation must be assessed in teons of the "oIVa (59' 11-,6; see Sludies, pp. 35-39): Is the subject of the deliberation s~met:hing which is ,Possible (6vvaTov - d~vva~ov) sometliing from the past, present, or future (rerovo, - iuop.evo,') which is of importance and coneem (pl.rs90'- p.'''eOT'1') '" the participants? !fit is nooe of these things, one does not ordinarily undertake the effort. If It is, then one proceeds to an aitalysis of the subiect in order", present it for deliberation. Since deliberation for A. involves both reason and appetition, it is not surprising that he proposes to analyze the subject matter under those aspects which respond to the operations of the d.... Iiberative process and therefore possess a peculiar probative force for those engaged in'the deliberation. These are the areas defined by the 'VTeXvo. "I~BI': logical ,,[tiT<, (the factual evidence contained in the subject), tlhi",1 "t~" (the characters of the participants and their response as persons '" the subject), and emolional xl~" (the emotional resonance to the subject present in the participants). Given the importance of these three fields of inquity '" intelligent and reasonable deliberation directed to judgment, one must have the means to make an analysis of them. A. provides these means in the particular topics, the ef6'1. The particular topics offer viewpoints from which '" examine under different aspects the material presented by the l'VTBX'VOt. "laTe";. The examination yields a series of statements or concepts about the rnzterial. The technique is indicated at s8a 17-33 and then wed in A and B. But it can also be seen at work within the relatively smaller compass of chap. IS of A where A. presents the five (h8X7o, "[17..'" which (and we are maintaining A.'s distinction at SSb 35-39) are still like the lv~8XVO' insofar as they are five major areas offering material for argument. As A. says (76a 29-32) in speaking of witnesses: "Other nlatters concerning a witness - whether he is a friend or an enemy or neutral, whether he is reputable, disrepntable, or neutral, and all other such distinctions - one must expound by means of the same particular "'pies from which, indeed, we const:ruct our enthymemcs" (see also 7sa 22 : 2). The result of the analysis of the logical, ethical, and emoticoal aspects of the subject matter by means of the particular topics is a series of propositional statements, e.g., s8a 3I:

xl",,,,,

THB nU:TEIE

355

Aiy", a' sZdTJ 1'6' Ta, "aO' '"amo. yi.o, lM~ neoTdaBl,. a position which A. repeats quite a few times: e.g .• at 5S, I7-26. 60b I-3 (l~ 660 IS ("al'" TtJlmp .. 0, referring to the el61/ in what precedes). 68a 33 (ei<e dVQJ7I . . 0, again refer... ring to the el6TJ which precede). 6sb 1-3 (retemng to the discussion of sZdTJ for deliberative rhetoric which is to follow). andSSb 29-30 (i~ referring to the discussion on the sZdTJ for "dOo,). Since the subject matter o( rhetorical discourse genera.lly. but not exclusively. al "eibelong. to the area of the conditioned and contingent (Ta ydq "oAAa "sel aBl."al al a""",,,,•••6lXBTa. "al ,LU." lX .... 57' 23-24). many of these propositional statements assume the fonn of probabilities. sl-HaTa (57' 34 : " S?a 34 : J). and non-necessary sigos. a7Jl's,a(S7b I : z). The use ofrnaterial which is unconditioned and absolute is not excluded (Ta 1'8' d.ay"a'a lma •• 57' 31). however. and statements can be in tbe form of necessary signs. TS"I'.je.a (S7b 4). It is with the understanding that such r.rcbable and necessary statements serve as propositional statements for deductive (••OoI'TJl'a) aod inductive ("'aed6.'Yl'a) inference iliat A. speaks of the £l"oTa. aTJjJBia. and """I'>le,a as "'eoTdaB" (Ta yae """I'>le,a "al Ta sz"OTa .eal Ta a7JI'BZa "'eoTda", sIal. eTJToe,,,al. 59a 7-8). GeaeraUy when A. speaks of "eoTda." be speaks of them as he does here (59a 7-10): namely. as the building blocks of •• O'liI'TJl'a. That be does not mention them formaUy in relation to "aed6 ..y I'a can raise legitimate questions about the extension of sucb statemeots to "aed6"Yl'a. Yet there are two other facts which. I believe. we must also consider. First of all. his usual way of handling the "taT", an06.."T,,,al. as W'IS mentioned earlier. is to speak almost exclusively in terms of ••06I'TJl'a. Secondly. when be mentions at 5Sa I the "la ..." anoa""",,,ai, be is talking about l.O('I'TJl'a and "aedd"Yl'a. which were discussed between 56a 35 and 57b 36. Consequently,

ro.).

ro•.

ro.

when he says. at j8a

I, 6~

WP

ll~tI

oJ" Aeyovl'a" the e~ eli" refers

to

the dHO't'CI,

a7Jl'eia. and TB"I'>le,a of 57':U - 57b 25. and so be is alfmning that both hO~I'TJl'a and "aedd.'Yl'a us~ them as propositional statements. I woUld .Iso consider this to be true of his comments atB r. 77b 16-19. andatB IS. 91b 24-29. It should be clear that I am understanding "eaTaa" in the basic sense in which it is defined at An. Pr. 24> 16: an affirmative or negative statement of something about something. In itself, the word does not of necessity entail avUoy,al'0' - h061'TJl'a. Therefore I expect inductive-paradeipn.tic aod deductive-enthymematic inference to employ sucli propositions ("eoTaa"~I. Thus when A. also speaks of s,d'1 as "'eOTaaSl, (5S, 3I) I do notfuld it a prob em. primarily because die usual character of the sia,! is to be propositional statements about the subject matter which result from the examination of the sources (botll l""x'o, and aTB;CVo,). ". statements. most will be probabilities (el"oTa. aTJl'eia). some will be faerual statements ofvarious kinds given by the sources themselves (.i~TJ in its general sense). and some might well be ne=sary statements yielded by the sources ("'''I'>le,a).* Tbe fact that the

* For example. if an Athenian, sPe:Wng befure his peers in the Boule or EccIesia 00 the accion atMelos in 416 B.C., were to examine solely the 'agia" nlrTr" of the action, many state-mears would result from the analysis: the action was successful (simple fu:tual statement); such action will be likely to have evil consequences for us (elxd,); such action indicates irrcsponsihili'Yin the AthcuiaaState ("'J1'01o.); suchan assertion of might over right reveals the presence of injustice in the State (T""I'~~'O'). And by way of a brief addendum. not to the point of the present matter but relevant to A.'s method in the Rkr:lDtic as presented in this analysis: the content of these statements, the IIWlDt1' in which the propositions will he expressed, the language. and the images used in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the 7}60!; and naBo!: of this particular speaker-auditon situation.

APPBNDlX

sId,.,. are mentioned as neoTdO'el.~ in connection with·l1l8o}lf]/.la and not with napdd.''Yl''a (s8a 18-19, B 22, 95b 30-34) r consider to be explained by the exegesis of s8a I just given. Futthetmore, froli>. statements such as cl,ose at 55a 31-]3 and 18a 28-29 we have no grounds to argue that neo'E'dat'~ is not to be extended to both "luTe't; dnod."tTI"al, but rather to be restricted to ••901""Il"a. : The last of the constitutive elemeats which r proposed for consideration are the "0£'10' tonal. (SSa 2, SBa Ir). From. what A. says ofthcm these TonOl are axiomatic principles which offer to the rhetorician varied ways of inferring by either • .90I""Il"a or napda"'Yl"a on any subject. Unlike the .rd"l, they are not confined to the patti", u1ar subject from which they come, but may be employed with any subject. The tw~ty-C!i~t "o"'o~ ·Tdno~ off'ered in B 23 bre.ak down more or less into three types of mferenbal patterns which can be summarIzed thus: en) antecedent-cODSequent, cause-effect; (b). more-less; (e) relatio'!. As logical structures, if they are used for enthymematic reasoning, they readily assume a fotm quite suited to syllogism: if X, then Y (see Sh,dies, pp. I29-31). The ready adaptability ofthese logical patterns to paradeigmatic inference certainly should not require illustration;' but if it does, then A.'s exaltlple ofDionysius and tyranny (s7b 30-36) is an inference based on antecedent-consequent. The xot'JIol '['ono, serve as varied sources for inference to be used by the ",taTe't; dnod.,,,Tt,,ai as they orgaui:ze the material provided by the "taTS'" I'JITevol, into argwnents which enable the auditors to make" reasonable judgments on the subject placed before d,em.

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