Athanasius: The Coherence of his Thought (Routledge Early Church Monographs)

ATHANASIUS

HOW C A N WE

U~DERS TA ND

ATHANAS I U S ' S

T H E OLOGY AS i\ WHOLE ?

In this \'olume, Khaled Anamli05 presents a comprehensive study of Saint Athanasius. one of rhe m05 t influential figures in the development of Christian doctrine. He analyzes the coherence of Athanasius's theology by relating the various aspe<:U of his doctrine - God, creation. theological anthropology. Chrismlogy and redemption. and the life of g race _ to a pervasive emphasis on the radical distinction. and si m ultaneou ~ relation. between God and world.

Thr clIlxrm« ".f hiJ t/xmgb( provide~ a systematic account of the overall inner logic of the Atha nasian ,oision that shows how the various aspeCts of his doctrine are mutually related a nd in ~o doing elucidates the complexities both of Athanasian thought and Christian dOCTrine in general.

A(/mfUJ.iill•• :

Khale d Anatolios is Assistant Professor of Historical Theology at \Veston Jesuit School of Theology in Cambridge. ,\·\as5ilchusetts. He has publis hed articles on Origen, Athanasius, and the ethical applications of C hristian doctrine.

I!

)I,. h " " Lan.

l <>n~on

EC H' H .E

Wu. 3~,h S",e, J'< ..- Yo,1< 1111- 100 0 1 W"·". roc tl .d ~ •.
ATHANASIUS Athanasius is on~ of the towering figure!; in the development of the Christian doctrinal tradition.

He was Bishop of Alexandria in founh century ~'P t

and he be<:ame the chief defender of what has come (0 be Oassical Trinitanan doctrine - the

teao:ching that Father and Son are

~ one

in being. ~

Khaled Anatolios structures an interpretation of Athanasian thought around what he considers to be an intrinsic centre of coherence in Athanasius's theology - a double emphasis on the simultaneous

disti nction and positive relation between God and creation.

Among the aspec ts of Athanil.!;ius's

thought discussed are: • The theme of the rdation be\'ween Cod and the world before Athanasius;

Abo available from Routledge Ambrose Boniface Ramsey lrenaeus of Lyons Robert .\l. Gram Ma:rimus the ConfesOOT .'\ndrew Louth O rigen Joseph W Trigg Mark's Gospel John Painter Reading the New Testament John .\1. Court Revelation A.J.P. Garrow

• Athanasiu$ 's emphasis on the simuhaneous o therness and nearness of God in relation to the world;

• At hanasius's early doctrinal frealise Agm;"'1 fix P'lgtuM - On fix inD.lI'11afiml and his attitudes to

God. cosmology. theological anthropol~',

solenolo!'!:y, and cnnslology as they appear in Ihis work·, • Afhanasius's pastoral and de ...·otional works. with special emphasis on the u)'t 4Allth.Jt/Y; • Arhanasius's theology Within a larger framework that includes Augusrine. Schleiermacher, and Banh.

4J6alUk'iu.,; TIx

mixrt'lIu

of hiu

thought provides a

The Gospel of SI Thomas Richard Valanlasis John's Gospel ,\\ark W.G. St ib be

ATHANASIUS

ATHANASIUS The coherence of his thought

Khaled Anatolios

London and New York

First published 1998 b~- Roudedge II Ke'" Fc[(er lane, London EC";P 4 EE Simwtanl'Omly publi,h.d in tOt, USA l::Jd Canada by Roul 1edge 29 W"" 35,h Sw:",. K",,' York. :t\"Y 1000 1

01998 Khaled AnatoEos

Ti1"'=' in Ganmond by Rou:ledge Printed and bound in G=< Britain bi' .... lacb,·~ ofChuham PLC The right of Khaled Anarol ios :0 be idenrified as rh" Aurhor of ,h,s Work has bttn =ned by him in uco,.dance " 'ich [he Copyrignt. ~;gns and Patents ACl 1988. All flgh's ~",,·e{!. N" parr of rhi, book may be ....prinred or r.-proo uc.,d or utili=:! in :illy furm or b~' an.- d""'rornc. rn""hanicai. or other meulS, now kno"',, of hereafter in.-em.,d, mciud; ng pnorocopying and r""ordmg . or m aoy inform3.ion S[or:Ig~ or ",nlt'\'3.I ,;·stem. "«;thout p"rm ission in writing from the publi'hers.

BTi:i,-h Lih.-"'0 C!1:,,/sg,,;ng in P"h/i::a:iall D:;'!1 A Cl!.[alogue record for this book is 3''ai !3bl~ from tbe Bri tish library Libra') "/CGr.gr-w C,.:dagmg m P/i!:!:[.>,,,,, D!2t9 AniI.Co[ios, Kh:..led. ,'\ t hanas;m : lhe whe.... nce of h is lhought J Kh31ed An310lios. [ncll1d", bib1iog""phic.:rl ~f"r~nce< and iOO"". 1. Athanasius, Saim. P:uriarcn of .-\IelWldria. d. 373. I. TIde BR1710_A7 A74 1998 130·.14·092--dc11 98----4029 CIF

ISBN 0--4 15-1863,-4

FOR MY CHILDREN, ELIAS AND MAR IA

CONTENTS

Ackl1{Ju'ledgemerm

V1Il

Introduction

1

I The theme of the relation between God and creation before Athanasius

6

2 The relation between God and creation in the Crmtra Gentes-De llicarnatiom

'6

3 The relation berween God and creation in the ami-Arian writings

85

4 The relation between God and creation in [he context of grace

164

Conclusion

'04

Notes Bi/;!iography Index

211 248

'-6

-)

.. " 11

AC K NOW LEDGEM E NTS

I NT R O D UCT IO N

This book was originally a dissertation din:nro by Brian E. Daley, 5) , to whom IowI' rhe greatest debt of grarimde for his generosity as a teacher, mentor, and friend. The thesis was examined by Mauhew Lamb and Uoyd Panersoo, ro whom I am also gr:.m:ful for their comments and encouragement. I would like to thank Kelley McCarrhr Spoerl for reading rhe manuscript at short notice and making valuable comments, as well as Kenneth Schmiu, who introduced me ro Arhanasius, and Fr. John Coood!y for hi.s invaluable moral support. I am also grateful to Anhur Madigan, 5], and Gary Gunler, 5), for their reading of Chapter 1 and their insightful comments. My research for this project was funded by a gram from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Sections of this wo rk have appeared previously in St V/adimir's ThMlogica/ Ret'iew and Coptic Ch ..rch Rf:lJieul.

The fact that Athanasius is one of the great pivotal figures in the devdopmenr ofChrisrian doctrine has had ambivalent consequences for rhe study of his work. Attention tends to be tOO narrowly centered on the Arian conrroversy and Arhanasius is considered, largely in funcrion of that complex and crucially significant process, as the great defender of the Nicene homoousio!. The result is that there exist surprisingly few attempts at a truly comprehensive treatment of Athanasius's theology considered as a coherem and tightly inrerrelated account of the Christian faith . Instead, Athanasian scholarship may be divided inro two general categories. Firsdy, there are the hisrories of doctrine, in which Athanasius is usually considered in light of the developmenr of Trinitarian and Chrisrological doctrine. Understandably, the hermeneutical framework that governs such works is provided by the classic formulations in which the respective doctrines are considered ro have received a cenain consummation; earlier theologians are rhus studied by way of comparison with these formulations. What is missing from such studies, from the standpoint of Amanasian scholarship, is a systematic account of the overall inner logic of the Athanasian vision that shows how the ,'arious aspectS of his doctrine are mucuaHy related. In ). N. D . Kelly's now classic Early Christian Doctrines, for example, Athanasius's Trinirarian theology, Chrisro!ogy. and anthropology are treated separately, while the serong connection between them, by which ther are mutually illumined, is not made so readily apparent. The result is that Athanasius 's theology does nor appear as a whole bur is evaluated piecemeal. The deficiency in this procedure is evidenced by rhe rnn [hat whereas Kelly and others are convinced that Athanasius's Trini tarian theology is bound up with his theology of redemp[ion,! Athanasius h imself emphasizes as well the

..

VIII

I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODU C TION

link be~'een the doctrines of redemption and creation in his apologetic rreatise, Co11tra GtnteJ-Dlinramalhmt,2 in which his tre:Itmem of creation also includes a theological anthropology. Thus Athanasius's Trinitarian theolog}', which is the aspen of his teaching that probably recei ...·es the most anention, achieves itS full resonance only in the concext of these other teachings. After Trinirarian rheology. Athanasian scholarship has lately ~n preoccupied with his Christology. Here especially the study of Athanasius from rhe perspect:i ...·e of larer de...-dopmems. racher than with a view to the inner logic of his teaching, has had unfortunate consequences. The resulr has ~n a tendency to debunk Athanasius's Christology for not taking seriow;ly the humanity of Christ, a judgement based largely on the failure of Athanasius to give significant place to che human soul of Christ and his active human agency. j Such a judgement leaves out of account the crucial fact that in Athanasius's anthropology the human relation to the divine is characterized by receptivity rather than anive agency, and so the way that Athanasius rakes Christ's humanity seriously is precisely to attribute such receptivity (0 him as cemral [Q his full humanity (cf. CA 1:45,1:48). T his example underscores the neussicy for grasping the whole of Athanasius's doctrine in order properly to understand and evaluare any of the parrs. Of course, there have also been srudies devoted (0 Athanasius in his own right. These have generally tended to focus on one or another aspen of Athanasius's doctrine. As, indicative of a tendency tOward a more comprehensi\'e interpretation [hat probes the connerrion berween doctrines in Athanasius, [here stand Out Lou.is Bouyer's L'lncarnarion tr l'Eglht-rorpJ du CbriJf dam la thiolr;git ~ Jaint AfbanaJt4 and J. Roldanus's Lt ChriJI it I'bomn:1 dam la Ihlologit

a book. lengrh study de...·oted to the o....erall coherence of Athanasius's the-ological vision. in terms of the interrelation of central aspects of his doctrine. 6 This need arises particularly from [he facc that whi le Athanasius is nor materially or methodologically a systematic thinker, his theology may be considered as formally systematic insofar as he is consistenrly concerned to aniculate the various "parts" of Christian faith as imrinsically related.' In the context of the Arian crisis, for example, much of the force of Athanasius's polemic rdies precisely on his systematic demonstration that the issue of the ontological equality of the Son to the Father bears directly on the whole nexus of Christian doctrine. 8 Understanding

the implied systematic framework that underlies all of Athanasius's work is therefore essential to a proper understanding of anything he says. Otherwise, fragments of Athanasian doctrine can be misunder· stOod9 or, at least. not thoroughly undersrood when they are divorced from the native horizon of interpretation pro.... ided by the whole hod}' of his writings viewed rogether. To illuminate this horizon and arriculate its fundamental dimen· sions by reference to Athanasius's own rerminology is the proposed taSk of this scudy. Its fulfillment would constitute a contribution ro theological scholarship in three ways: firsrI}'. it would pro"ide a comprehensive and original interpretation of the theological vision of Athanasius as a whole, me "alidirr of rhis interpretation being demonstrated by its ability to show the internal consistency of Athanasiw;'s vision. Secondly, from rhe standpoint of such a comprehensive interpretation, it would be able to exrend and critique more partial interpretations of isolated doctrines of Athanasius. Thirdl}', by focusing precisely on the ineegrity and coherence of Athanasius's vision, it would gain a credible dialogue partner with which contemporary theological discussion may contend. In going about this cask, a primary concern will be that , in the attempt to expound and anaJyze the coherence of Athanasius's ...·ision, a sYStematic framework should nor be imposed on him from outside. It will not do, in other words, simpl~' to go through a list of the traditional ~(racrs ~ of Christian theology and see how each is conceived by Athanasius. Rather, our [ask lI,'ill be to make explicit the central structural themes already present in the writings of Arhanasius, and to treat them in {heir native COntext. Thus the focus of my interpretation will br- what I see as an intrinsic center of coherence in Athanasius's theology: [he d istinction, and simulta· neous relarion, be~·een God and the world. To this end, the firsr chapter will consist of an examination, in admittedly rather broad strokes, of the theme of the relation between God and the world before AthanasiU5. More specifically, I will focus on the relation betv.e-eo divine transcendence and immanence, in both the Hellenistic and Judeo--Christian traditions. lr will be seen that in rhe Hellenistic tradition rhere was a progressive tendency to conceive of a transcendent first principle who was described in increasingly apopharic terms, and to posit a distinct divine principle who acted as a mediator be~'een the mundane and intelligible realms. In this way, divine transcendence and immanence were distinguished and in some way separated. I argue that

2

3

'*

d'AthanaH d'Alvclmdril. Etll~ ~ la fOlJjo?laiOll la conception ~ J"homml at.'t£ Ja ,hriJtologu) There is still a notable need, howe ....er, fOf

lNTROOCCTION

I~TROOCCTIO~

the biblical witness presenrs a markedly different perspeCtive, In which di\'ine involvemem in the world is in no way seen as detracting from divine transcendence, but rather as the very manifestation of the divine g reatness and majesty. After remarking on the signs of strain in the apologists' efforrs [Q integrate Hellenistic and biblical perspenives, I will focus on lrenaeus who, in his struggle against the Gnostics, emphasizes the convergence of divine transcendence and immanence in the Christian message of salvation. Throughout this study, my position is that Arhanasius's theological vision is markedly lrenaean in this regard. The second chapter will show how this conception of the convetgence of di\'ine transcendence and immanence is central [Q Athanasius's early doctrinal treatIse, the Cm/m Gm/eJ- De i11fanJa!iol1t. After showing how this emphasis on the simultaneous otheroess and nearness of God is played out in the structure and argument of the work, I will then try [Q demonstrate its structural and systematic imporrance by analyzing its role in Athanasius's exposition of the doctrine of God, cosmology, theological anthwpology, sO{eriology, and Chriscology. The third chapter will focus on the theme of the relation between God and creation in the comext of the Arian crisis. Here it will be seen that the themes of mediation and immediacy in the relation between God and creation were a significant pan: of the logic of the debate between Arhanasius and his Arian opponentS. Focusing on his anti-Arian writings, this chapter will explore how Athanasius's particular conception of the relation benveen God and the world determines his theological method and language, his views of mediation and immediacy in the rela tion betv.'een GOO and the world, his notion of the relation between theology and economy, his underHanding of the significance of the incarnation of the 0JgQJ, and his insistence that our definitive sah'ation must be grounded in the confession of the full diyinity of the SooT he fourth chapter will focus on some of Athanasius's more pastOral and devotional works: the FeJfal uttm, the Lcmr fO MarcellimlJ , and the Lift of A nt(Jl1)'. Our theme there will be Athanasius's presentation of the redeemed relation berv.·een Goo and creation in the life of grace. Particularly with reference to the Lift of AIlIOIfY, we will have an opportunity to see how Athanasius's yision of the Chri stian message achieves concrete existential application in his presentation of rhe great holy man of the Egyptian desert. We shall see that the bishop's presentation of the hermit as Christ's ·'co-worker" achieves its fuUest resonance in the context of

Athanasius·s global conception of the relation between God and the world and of his understanding of the incarnation of the Logos as effecting a new version of this relation. Finally, our conclusion will recommend tha( we view Athanasius as a significant partner in mooern theological discussion, and that we value his systematic insistence on the simultaneity of divine transcendence and nearness to the world as central to the integrity of the Christian gospel.

4

,

BEFORE .-\THAKAS iU S

1

THE T HEME OF THE RELATIO N BET W EE N GOD AN D CREATION BEFORE ATHA N AS IUS

world. The tension berween Hellenistic and Judeo-Christian conceptions of the relation between divine immanence and transcendence is apparent in the rheology of the Apologists bur finds a cerrain resolution in Irenaeus, who uses philosophical terms and categories while "'igorously reinstating the biblical emphasis on divine greatness as conceived in terms of God's involvement in t he world. Within such a context, then, the purpose of this chaptet is to present Athanasius as continuing this Irenaean tradition.

The Hellenistic background

There can hardly be a more comprehensive subjecc than that of the relation between God and creation. Our particular focus in [his chapter will be [0 investigate this t heme with specific reference to the relation bet~',;een divine transcendence and divine immanence, which is [0 say, the relation between God's Qrhemess to the world and God's positive inyolve ment and engagement with the world. To jusrifY this focus, we need to amicipart our interpretation of Athana5ius by saying that we find in the Alexandrian bishop a quitt conscious emphasis on rhe convergence of divine transcendence and immanence. This emphasis on the simultanei ty of divioe orherness and divine nearness to the world is cemral to Athanasius's conception of the relation between God and the world. Before we proceed in the succeeding chapters wward a detailed interpretation of t his emphasis through an analysis of his own works, our aim in this chapter is to contextualize the Athanasian vision in lig ht of its Hellenistic and Judeo-Christian background. In general, we want to show very briefly that the problem of relating divine transcendence and immanence was a lively one in Hellenisric philosophy which, especially in the development of "Middle PlatOnism," was resolved through differentiating absolute transcendence and divine immanence by assigning these qualifications to distinCt entities. In COntrast, we find in the scriptural witness the conception that divine involvement in the world does not detract from transcendence bm is in fact a function of and a demonstration of Goers transce ndence. Thus in the biblical perspective di\"ine transcendence and immanence are convergent, both m ove ments being united in the conception of a God who paradoxically reveals his majestic greatne~ through his liberating and beneficent involvement in the

The rdation betv.'een the ~world" and the realm of che divine is a theme chat is integral to Plato'S vision. As is evident from t he earliest dialogues (e.g. the Euth)'Phro), Plato's fundamental concern is ethical. While seeking to move beyond the tradit ional rdigion based on the mrthical gods, he also wants to undercut the moral relativism of the Sophists, in which e thical values are reduced to mere conventions. This project involves him in the attempt to show that there is an eternal and immutable, that is to say di"'ine, realm of "Ideas" or "'Forms" chat cOllSrirure t he absolute and unchanging archetypes of human vinue. Correlative to this ethical postulate is Plaw's more global conception that, indeed, the whole visible universe is, in varying degrees, an image of the Forms according w which it is patterned. Thus the mosr radical ontological distinCtion in Plato is between the realms of Becoming and Being. T he former is the domain of the visible, material, conStantly changing world: [he latter is the topos hJfJeTolmmios' of the unchanging and immaterial Forms. N otwithstanding the obvious difference berween these realms, two motifs represent P lato's attempt to indicate the posiri\'e connection between them . There is first of all the theme of parricipation, by which is indicated Plaw's conviction that the material and changeable world of Becoming is not utterly devoid of Being, but shares to various degrees in the intelligi ble Ideas. Secondly, there is the notion that the human soul has for its native habitat not the material world of fllL\":, but the divine realm of {he Ideas, with which it enjoys a radical kinship, 5Jrlger.eia. Through dialectic and moral purification, therefore, the soul can pass over from the realm of Becoming to t hat of Being. Even such a rudimentary and highly simplified overview is enough to indicate the significance of the t hemes of divine immanence and transcendence 10 Plato. While the positing of transcendent Forms gives ultimate ground to human morality, the

6

7

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEfOR E ATHANAS fUS

dficacy and exist~ncial rele'o'anc~ of such grounding is dependem on th~ accessibility of th~ Forms to human sui .... ing. Thus, espe-cially in th~ earli~r dialogues. th~re is an ~mphasis on th~ imman~nce of th~ Forms in human thought. Th~ whole methodology of philosophical ~d ialectic ~ is an att~mpt to awaken the mind to a remembrance of th~ im~lIigibl~ realm which is its proper milieu,2 an awakening chat txt~nds into an acti ....e participation in [his realm through tcue knowledge and [cue virrue. A( (he sam~ time, the auempe to ground all phenomenal reality in the transcendent realm of the intelligible in\,oh'es the projection of multiplicity into that realm, insofar as multiple Ideas are posited [0 account fot the multiplicit)' of phenomena. Such multiplicity is problematic in light of the properly transcendent anribme of unity, and so a ~supra-tmnscendent- principle is posited as a single ground for all che Ideas, themselves understood to be transcendent with respen to the particulars lOo'hich participate in them. This supra-transcendent principle is identified in the Republic as the Form of the Good, "'sovereign in the intelligible wor! d .~ 3 And yet, even this supra-transcendent principle, while described as ~beyood being,~ is somehow positively related to the sensible world and is accessible. albeit all (00 fleecingl}', to the raptUrous gaze of ecstatic contemplation. The description of the Form of the Good can thus be seen to represent Plato's double coocem (Q affirm divine uanscendence and immanence. It is both beyond being and the source of all true being. At the same time, che Ideas :are posited as mediating becween the Good and phenomenal reality. But the precise nature of che relation beCl\'een the Form of the Good and the Ideas is nO[ da.rified by Plare. The same kinds of concern, the same attempt to re1:oncile divine immanence and transcendence, and the same lack of precision characH terize Plare's philosophical Hmyth of creation in the TimatllJ, probablr the most widely read Platonic dialogue among che early Christian Fathers. While Plato here speaks of the Demiurge HmakingH the world, it is clear thac we are not dealing with a doctrine of awfio(x nihilo. Rather, it is presumed that a radical datum of reality is the somewhat recalcitrant but receptive maner, which is endowed with intelligible stcucture through the work of the HCraftsman" nr Demio[(rgru. In chis work, the Craftsman models his activity on the patterns provided by the Forms. Within this model a funher mediating agent is added berween the Forms and the phenomenal world, namely the DemiourgoJ. This addition does not of course imply that PlatO changed his cosmology, a conclusion which presumes these accountS to be more S(caightforwardly propositional than they are.

However, it does indicate again rhe kind of tension [hu is pervasive throughout Plato's whole project, understood as an attempt to affirm a positive connection between the divine and che phenomenal, while safeguarding the proper transcendence of the former. le wouJd seem that, in the later dialogues, diere is an increasing emphasis on the transcendence of the noetic sphere and the supra-transcendence of the One or the Good, coupled with strategies re link the phenomenal sphere lOo'ith the highest principle by mediatorial means. With Aristotle, we leave behind me framework of participation:as a lOo':l.y of relating the immanent and transcendent orders. In his world-vielOo', the intelligibility of phenomenal realities is explained not in terms of their relation to transcendent Forms, but rather in terms of the immanent dynamic of nature, ph)'Ju. Nevertheless, Aristotle's analysis of motion in Meraph)'JiCJ, Lambda leads him to posit a prime mover, whose being is described in terms of absolute actuality and '"thinking thoughc" (noesh n(}eJtOJ). The transcendence of this being is emphasized by way of stressing its self-containment and non-involvemem with the world. The divine nOIlJ is simply unaware of any lesser reality, since it befits the highest being to concern itself only with the highest, which, of course, is itself. As the firse mover. th~n, the nONS exercises its ptimal function 9,·ithout any ad extra intentionality on its own pan. Rather, in a kind of reversal of the conception of the good as narurally self-communicating, the nOUJ hmoves all things, inasmuch as it is loved by them .....\ Thus, in Aristotle, the transcendence of the first principle is strongl}' secured, although it is not quite spelled out precisely how the "desire- of all things, which is uirimatei}' directed to .....-ard che ptime mO\'er, is related to the immanent teleological dynamism of ph)'JIJ. An unmistakable cendrncy. howe ....et, is the redu([ion of divine immanence to a non-intentional inf1uenc~ which is also indirect, mediated by the heavenly bodies whose movemenu cause terrestrial motion. The pendulum swings in the other direction with the doctrine of the Stoics, where the tension between immanence and transcendence is resolved b}" a simple denial of all tt:anscendence. To be sure, the Stoics did nOt abandon all talk of the divine, and, indeed. it is at least arguable that their world-.... iew may be aptly characterized :as pantheistic. ~ It cannot be denied, however, thac it \....as an immanentist conception of reality, in which the ultimate principles of existence are held to be nor external nor in any war beyond but completely inherent in the cosmos. The divine principle is generally characterized as pneuma or logoJ; chis is the reason immanent in all things, itself being a highly subtle ethereal substance. This

8

9

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEFOR E ATHAKAsrus

universal I(}g(}l is distributed without division in the semina! reasons, the IlJg(}i sptrnJati/t.(}i, which pervade all things. It is by yirrue of these that the rational principle goyems all things according to a universal, rational, and necessary proyidence. Thus in the Stoics we have a kind of collapse into identity of the Atistotelian duality of a transcendent moving principle (nlJlII) and an immanem H~l~logical principle (PhYlis). 6 While abandoning the duality of transcendent and immanent realms, hO~'~'er, the Stoics construCted a strictiy immanent duality which was in some way continuous with the Platonic framework of participation, and which was ro be influential in later chatacteri13.tions of the relation between God and world. ; This immanent duality llr"'aS that between the active principle, to paiolln, which was the logM acrualizing itself, and the passi\'e principle, to pascbon, akin to Aristotle's ~ matter~ and the ~recep­ racle" of the TimatUl, which was a completely indeterminate susceptibility co being acted upon. Both Stoicism and Aristotle"s metaphysics were formative elements in the recrieval and develo pment of Plaronic thought in the movement now identified as Middle PlatOnism. With reference to our own concerns, what is especially striking about the philosophers of ffiis school is an increasing emphasis on a uanscendent first ptinciple. Moreover, this uanscendence was characteristically safeguarded by relegllting contact with the world to distinCt and subordinace entitiei.8 In effect, therefore, we have che separarion of transcendence and immanence as higher and lower, quite distinct, I~vels of divinity. Whil~ th~re :uises, in this manner, a separation between transcendence and immanence within the realm of the divine, a typical scrat~gy is also to link the mundane with the divine by locating the eternal archetypes (the Platonic "Ideas -) of narural realities in (he mind of God. However, eyen this link is by no means an immediate connection between the first God and che world. Strictly speaking, the supreme first principle tends to be charaCterized in Aristotelian terms, as utterly absorbed in its own self-comemplation. T he Aristotelian influence is evident, for example, in the characteristic deicription of Albinus:

le is only in che Demiurgic mind, therefore, thac the inrelligible Ideas are conceived specifically in relation to the world. This same distinction between the intelligible eternal Ideas in themselves and in relation to the world is sometimes played OUt, as in the doctrine of Plutarch, in differentiating the transcendent and immanent aspectS of the logos, itself undersrood as mediating ~een the dh'ine and the wodd. IO In Middle Platonism , therefore, we see a general tendency to link the di,..ine co the world by way of intl'rml'diariei, and thus divine tranKendeoce and divine immanence seem co be differemiared by being assigned to distinct encities. In Plotinus, and Neoplatonism generally, we see an even stronger emphasis on the transcendence of the supreme first principle. Whereas (he Middle Plawnic view tended to ideocii)' this principle lvith being or mind, Plotinus is emphatic about the inappropriateness of even che most sublime predication when referred to the One. Thus the One cannot even be conceived as Mind, for that impliei a duality of knower and known, and all duality is at variance with che tcue nature of the One. What can be said about the One can thus only be said by way of negat ion: "Generative of all, the Uniey is none of all; neither thing nor quality nor quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not at rest, not in place, noe in time; ie is the self-defined, unique in form, or becrer formless.~l! Such a position does not arise vc 11ihilo, as it were, bur represents che radicalizacion of a certain trajectory that is indicated as early as SpeUSippus,I2 and acquires definite momentum in the negative theology of Albinus and Numenius. In Plocinus, therefore, we have not JUSt a novel idea but the climax of a progressive tendency [Q affirm the supreme transcendence of the fim principle. Transcendence, for Plotinus, is not exactly the same as inaccessibilit},. Precisely by vinue of its transcendently generative nature, the One is omnipresem. 13 and a certain id~ntificarion with the One is possible to mystical contemplation, albeit all tOO fleetingly. But ~'hat is categorically ruled out, in Plorinus's conception, is an intentional immanence of the divine, a ~Iooking down~ of the higher principle itself toward lower realms. Instead, {he causality and aca:ssibilit}· of a higher principle is effected by the overflow of emanation (proodOl). The ineff.tble unity of the One thus o"erflows into the united duality of In~lligence , which in cum, o,'erflows into the discursive multiplicicy of the Soul. The link between che sens ible world and the intelligible realm is located on the le"el of Soul. The hypostatic Soul receives the logoi which are preiem in a unified "Way in Nom, and sends these forth co the world Soul, which

But since the first Mind is the noblest of things, the object of its choughts must also be noblest, and nothing is nobler than it is itself, so therefore it would have to contemplate ecernally itself and its own thoughts, and this activity it has is Idea. 9

10

11

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

effects actual sensible differemiation. Thus an all-encompassing providence pen.. ades the universe through a chain of causality" which ultimately derives from the One, and links the intelligibility of Nous, via the hypostatic Soul and world Soul, to successively lower realms. 14 Corresponding to this dynamic of downward emanation is chat of "return (epiJlrvpher', the oriemation of lower levels to higher, and ultimately to the Onr, by virtue of a kind of radical omological magnrtism. In its own way, such a schrffir presents a certain conception of divinr immanence, in the sense that the divine exercisrs a peryasive efficacy that permeates lower realms. i\-ioroover, from the point of view of rhr relation brtween the human and the divinr, thr lam'r is sren to br accessible by virtue of a kind of natural kinship. However, as we havr alrrady obsrn'f."d, thr one thing that cannot br accommodated within this scheme is the concrption of the d ivine as intentionally concernf."d with thr world, of the world as being an imrmional objrct of divine activity. Thus thr main point to be gathered from our all too rapid sun'r¥ is that the progrrss of Hellenistic philosophical speculation on the divine, from Plato onwards, seems to be largely chamctrrized by an increasing emphasis on divine cranscrndrIlcr. While Epicureanism and Stoicism represent certain exceptions re this trndrncy, the general momentum toward a conceprioIl of a supreme deity that can only be described apophaticaHy largely prevails and achieves a climactic exprrssion in Plotinus's rhapsodic characterizations of the Onr. In the meantime, however, and again since Plare, some effort: to link the sensible to thr intelligiblr and divine realms has also been an enduring concern. And yet a tension seems re be presumed between transcendrnce and involvemrm in rhr world. In Plato, rhis rrosion is played out in the double straeegy of p:!siting , on the onr hand, divine rxemplars for mundane realities, thr lartrr conceived as "participating" in the former, and, on the other hand, by positing the actual "work" of involvrmenr and govrrnancr of the world as thr proper function of a Demi()"rgQJ, who is subordinate to Mind, and who mediates between thr laner and rhr world . T hus [he transcendenc r of thr highest principle is £ealred whilr maintaining the link betwet'n thr mundane with rhr divinr by means of a subordinate but still divine and benefICene intrrmediary. H owrvrr, rhe trnsion already implicit in such a strategy is given further impetus by Aristotle"s concepeion of thr perIf."Cdy transcrndent as unerly noninvolved wirh what is lower than iuelf. In Middle Plato nism, the Platonic Ideas arr concri\'ed as rhr thoughts of this Primal 1Lnd, and thus there is a way in which ehe world, through its intelligible

archetypes, is linked to the highesr principlr. There is also, t hough, an accompanying dIon: to qualify evrn this link by diffrreneiating berween the Ideas in themselves, in thrir transcendent aspect, and the Ideas in relation to the world, in their immanrnt aspect. Morrovrr, the function of linking thr divine exem plars to martrr is also relegated to a subordinate D emiurge. Finally, in Plorinus, the principlr of the incompatibility of transcrndence and condescending imenrionalit)' is absolutized into a scheme of rmanation whrreby intentionality is C3trgorically drnied of divine causality. Also in Plotinus, the movement toward a fitting conception of divine transcrndence finds a crrtain culmination in his highly apophatic description of the O ne. With regard to thr issur of the relation becwet'n God and rhr world, thrrefore, the legacy bequeathed to the Judoo-Christian tradition by Hrllrnisric philosophy includrd nvo fundamrmal and significant emphases: firstly, an insistrnce on divinr ineffability and transcrndrnce, conceived as self-sufficiency and evrn sdf-absorption, and, secondly, a tendrncy to see direct and imentional involvemrnt with thr world as something not quirr in keeping with the highest level of rranscendrncr. Thesr thus gave rise to thr srrategy of linking [his lrvd of relative transcendence to that of absolutr transcendence by way of subordinatr imermediaries.

u

12

The Judeo-Christian background Whrn wr turn to the scriptural witnrss, wr find that the Hellenistic trnsion brtwren absolutr transcendrnce and involvrmenr with t he world is treated in a quite distinct manner. It is no longer presumf."d that involvrmem in the world in any way mitigates against absolute transcrndencr. Rather, rhe greatness of rhr Most H igh God is conceived in dirrct rdation te his sa. ng and librrating involvement in mundane affairs. I~ T hrre is no concrption in the Hebrew scripturrs of any god highrr than the Creator God, thr God who is p:!siti\'ely related to creation as irs sourcr and sustrnance. 1foreover, crus God enters into a covrnamai relation with his crearion, and is identified in trrms of his (elation to his people - hr is thr God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, bur hr is also dearly a transcendrm God, a God ,vhose ways are infinitely bryond human ways . 16 Thr trnsion between divinr transcendencr and immanence does nOt appear in rhr Hrbff."w scriptures in terms of reconciling tWO antithrtical or competing movemems and no attrmpt is made to resolve it ftom rhr divine side. Rather, it becomes manifest insofar as evrms of human-divinr rncounter are prrsemed as momrnts of extreme crisis, from thr

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEFORE ATHANASIL:S

human poim of view, We see dramatic expression of this tension in the thffiphanies generally, in the motif thar no one may see the face of God and li\'e, L7 as well as in the prophetic calls,18 to name but a few examples, While the eneowlter with the transcendent God is thus presented, from the human standpoint, as a -limit experience~ that stretches the boundaries of human consciousness in an almost perilous way, the convergence of immanence and transcendence is taken for gramed from the divine point of view, Not only is divine majcsty concei\'ed in relation ro his condescending care for his creation but it is conceived in terms of his stooping down ro the lowest and most destitute. Compassion for the lowly, rather than self-absorbed comemplation, is the proper characteristic of divine majesty in the Hebrew scriptures: -Who is like the Lord our God, who is seated on high, who looks down on the heavens and the eanh? He raiscs the poor from the dust, and lifts the needy from the ash heap . .. ~19 When transcendence is thus conceived in terms of condescension, there arises no need to set up a kind of buffer zone: of mediation to protect divine transcendence. [\'en when it is angels, powers, Ot human messengers who are doing his bidding, it is still the Most High God who is ac ti ng to guide, save, and instruCt his people. The great J ewish exegete, theologian, and Middle Platonist philosopher Philo tried in his own way to integrate this biblical convergence of transcendence and immanence with the: categories and terminology of current Hellenistic philosophy.20 A primary strategy is co say that God is unknowable in himself, in his fillJio, but revtars himself through his works, a sratemem which we also find in Athanasius. God's unknowability has co do not with his withholding something but with humanity's incapacity to recei ...·e the whole fullness of God, which no creature can conmn,11 Another Strategy, which is charac[~ristically Hellenistic, is the positing of intermediaries as a bridg~ between the transcendent one God, and (he multiplicity of the world. In Phi lo's description, this function is exercised by the Powers (dyrtomeiJ) and (he Log(iJ of God, the relation berw~n chese twO being unclear. Whether or nOt the Logos is one of rhe Powers, it s~ms at least clear thar he occupies a primary place in relation to the (orher?) Pov.'ers; as the ~imag e" of God, he is the "chariot~ r of the plwers~ ,12 The Powers are generally identified with Plato's Ideas, but rwo are especially singled Out by Philo: the kingly and the beneficent. le is through these Powers that God manifests his governance and his goodncss tOward the world. In this conception, we see a typically biblical conception of the transcendence of God in cerms of his sovereignty and beneficence tOward the

world, with the imporram distinction thac, in Philo, these ~Powers~ are subordinate aspects of tbe: one God, and thus do noc r~present fully God's transcendence. They themselves. according co Philo, have a trans.cendent and an immanrm aspect. In essence, they are unanainable of apprehension but are revealed in (heir effects, Another ·~. .ay of bridging the gulf betw~n th~ transcendent God and creation is articulated in Philo's Logos doctrine, As mediator bet"vo'Ct'n God and the world, rhe Logos also has both a transcendent and immanent aspect. The Logos is the: Mlocus~ of the Ideas, and through his agency, the Ideas assume their immanenc StatUS as seminal teason-principles (/og(ij Jpnmdtik.Ol) indwelling crcared beings as "models and creative principles 23 Philo's Logos thus combines ~rhe immanence of the Stoic Pneuma-ugos with the ideality, if not the strict transcendence of Platonic Ideas",2-1 As the ~ins trumem" (organon) of God in the creation of the world, the Logos thus mediates between the intelligible cosmos of the Ideas and the sensible world. T hus in his conception both of che Logos and of the Powers of God, Philo is concerned to mediate between divine transcendence and immanence. Although the biblical witness exens some pressure: toward desuibing God's acti"it}, primarily in terms of his governance and beneficence toward the world, the Hellenistic influence is evident in Philo's ultimately locating divine transcendence in a sphere chac is distinct from and "hig~ r" than chat of relation to the world _ In the New Testament witncss, roughly contemporary with Philo, che problem of the relation berween divine transcendence and immaM nence achievcs a focus in the very person of Jesus of Kazareth, although it does not become a themaric issue in [he New Testament itself. In Paul"s formularion of the du.al stacu.s of Jesus as Son of God according to the spirit and son of Da....-id according to the flesh, we ha\'e an aniculation of the early Church 's witness to (he person ofJesus as somehow panaking of both the transcendent and worldly realms.:?' The problem of (he relation between these (Wo realms in general and with respect co the person ofJesus of Nazareth is thus stricti)! implied in the canon of the New Testament. Moreover, we have in the Kew Testament writings dear indications of cenain principles that have to be taken into accoum in any explicit consideration of this problem. le is clear, first of ail, that the God of the New Testament, understood as the Father of Jesus Chrise, is a rranscendent figure. in the basic sense that he is not simply a pan or the natu ral order but stands abo .... e it, At the same time, it is also dear that this God is not in an}' way alooffrom or disinterested in the created order. In che "Father"' who has COUnted

14

"

M

•

•

BEFORE ATI-IANAS1US

BEFORE ATHANAS1US

every hair of e\'ery head,26 we are very far from the conception of a prime mover which eternally comempiates itself. Moreover, Jesus of Nazareth is presented as both sharing the transcendent power of God and as mediating his loving concern for creation. The New Testament miracle stories, for example, seem to serve the same funcrion of preseming the greatness of God in terms of his Liberating intervention in rhe lives of people that we saw as characteristic of the Old Testamem witness. Finally, ir is also clear that the life, death, and resurreaion of Jesus of Nazareth coostitme some faidy drastic reordering of the relation between rhe uanscendem and created orders. In one expression, the net result of our participation in this evem is that we become ··partakers of the divine nature:· n However, the question of how Jesus himself is related to the uanscendem and immanent orders respeni vely is one that will need much effon to propedy articulate and answer. It may be appreciated from the outset that, while this is obviously a Christological question, it is more generally a question of the relation between God and the world, as will be brought OUt, as early as the second century, in the debates with Marcioni tes and Gnostics . .Moreover, it is also a question that is closely tied to the development ofTrinitarian doctri ne for, if, as was the case from very early on, the Son was particularly associated with the creared order and rhe Father with divine transcendence, the question of the relation benveen the Son and rhe Father is, by implication, a question of the relarion between divine transcendence and immanence. In this context, it will also be appreciated that the tendency of Hellenistic philosophy, which we ha.,-e cursorily charted., to assign divine transcendence and immanence to distinct graded levels of di\'inity will . . exerClse a CertalD attraction. This anraction is cenainly one influential factor in the effons of early Christian theologians to deal with the whole problem of the interrelation between divi ne transcendence and immanence. But in their efforts to proclaim the Christian message in a milieu permeated by the categories of Hellenistic philosophy, these early theologians found areas not only of tension but of agreement as well. At least superficially, one area of ag reement seemed co be a certain recOUnt co negative theology in order to express divine tr:lDscendence by way of contrast with mundane reality. Thus, in a characteristic vein, Athenagoras can describe the one God as "uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, illimitabk"· zs H e goes on to emphasize that the creation of the world in no way mitigates against the perfect self-sufficiency of God, because ·'God did not make the world as if he were in need of it. For be is

complete in himself, unapproachable lighr, perfect beauty, SpIrit, power, reason. - -'9 As againsr Stoic immanentism, the early Christian theologians thus employed the motif of contrasting God and rhe world, in a manner that often recalled the Platonic COntrast between the realms of Being and of Becoming_ Such a strategy, while safeguarding divine transcendence and appealing to common ground between Christian and contemporary philosophical conceptions of God, "vas not however completely unproblema tic. This aspect is welldescribed by R. A. Norris with specific reference to Justin i\hrtyr's employment of it:

16

Justin does not, however, perceive (hat his appropriation of the negative language of Middle Placonist theology conceals an ambiguity and a problem. '·Being·' and '·Becoming ~ ~ or ··ingenerate·· and "generate·' - denote, in a Platonist system, logical contraries. That is, speaking loosely, they stand for opposed qualities within a single '·spectrum."' Comequendy, the realities which they name ex.r/"de edch o/Ixr; and God·s transcendence over the world, when figured in terms of the COntrast between Being and Becoming, mrns out to be a form of necessary ...eparation from the world. He is, omologically speaking, outside the world and can enter into relation with it only through a mediating agency - that of the cosmic Reason, Ot Logos.30 As Korris loes on to point out, assigning to rhe Logos this mediatorial function does not totally solve the problem; indeed, in a cerrain sense, ··it seems merely to emphasize the exclusion of God hom the world.'·31 Although Korris perhaps exaggerates the stricdy antithetical relarion berween rhe realms of Being and Becoming (does not [he Platonic model of panicipation ptovide a positive connection within this antithesis?) his point still has considerable force_ ESpe<:ially when the Logos is considered to be somehow subordinate to [he Father, as he seems to be in Justin, the implication is that the Father is "highe{' than direct dealing with the world. This problem in Justin's approach is sympromatic of an unresolved tension present in the apologists in general. It is articulated in 1. w. Bamard's study of Justin Marryr in the following terms: Our conclusion is (hat [WO conceptions of the Deit}' existed in Jusrin's mind . On the ODe hand was his acceptance of 17

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEFORE ATHANASlt:S

the biblical and Christian idea of God as a living Creator, a compassionate Father who in Christ had drawn near to men and who was concerned with the welfare of each souL On the other hand Justin mained the Middle Placonis{ emphasis on God as the unknowable and transcendent Cause fat temoved from the world and disconnected with it .... Justin had no rea.l theorr of divine immanence to complemem his emphasis on divine transcendence. His doctrine of the logos ... in fact: kept the supreme Deity at a safe distance from intercourse with men and left the Placonic transcendence in all its bareness. God for Justin operated chrough the logos whose existence alone bridged the gulf which would have otherwise proved impassable. Jusfin worshipped the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ: he prayed co the living God who had brought salvation in Christ; but it was not given to him, as a pioneer second~ cenrury Apologist, to unite transcendence and Immanence in a system at once rational and biblica1. 32

The great opponem of the Gnostic heresies, Irenaeus. bishop of Lyons (c. 115-202), fashioned a comprehensi....e response to the GnostiC wodd-view which included an insistence on the positive relation between God and the world, as implied in an authemic interpretation of the Christian doctrine of God. In doing so, he certainly did not rejeer contemporary philosophical categories expressive of divine transcendence, but emplo~'ed them readily, The sheer contrast between God and world was a theme to which he had ready access:

Of course, as Barnard himself concedes, Jusrin as wdl as the other apologists did exert considerable effort co emphasize God.'s anive involvement in and care for creation. So it was not the case that the}' actually PUt forth a doctrine that God. is excluded from the world. Rather, they st~nuou.dy aHempted to proclaim that God is both transcendent and immanent, even if this immanence was not well integrated into their doctrine of God. The question, however, is co whar degret:' this double affirmation was a mere juxraposition. 33 Certainly. a p~vailing tendency .....-as, on the one hand, to affirm divine transcendence in terms of strictly contrasting God with the world. and, on the other hand, to affirm divine immanence by emphasizing God's providential care for the world. The problem is only highlighted [Q the extent this juxmposition tends to be personified in the subordination of rhe Son, as a Mediator-God. [Q che transcendem fIrst God, the Father. The impetus to"ward a more coherent and perhaps more authentically biblical account of the complete simultaneity of di .... ine transcendence and immanence was provided not from any philosophy bUt in reaction ro the rheologies generally grouped rogether under rhe rub ric of ·'Gnosticism.'· Here, in a much more drastic way rhan anything found in che Platonic tradition, was a framework in which God. and the sensible world were construed as antithetical. 18

Bur the chings created are other than the One who created them, and the chings that have bttn made from the One who has made them. For He is himself uncreated, with neither beginning nor end, and does nO[ need anything; He is self-sufficient. Moreo....er, He grams to all others exiStence itself; buc the things which have been made by Him have received a beginning. It is therefore necessary thar {he thi ngs that have had a beginning , and are susceptible to dissolution, and are subject to and stand in need of Him who made them, have a different name, as must be acknowledged even by those who have a minimal capacit}, for distinguishing such things. So the One who made aU things can alone together with His Word properly be named God and Lord; but the things which have been made cannor have this name appLed to the m, neither can they legitimately aMume [hat name which belongs to the Creator.>4 Here we see I~naeus making use of the standard opposition of agm(n)tlol-gm("P;a. in a fairly typical manner, but it is importallt to note thac I~naeus frames this opposition within the context of the positive relation of creation, of God's granting creation itS existence as a gift. Ultimately, for Irenaeus, the relation and distinction becv.'een God and world is not one of sheer opposition or unlikenes.s bUt of the asymmetrical correlation brought about by the act of creation. We sa}' ~correla[ion·· because Irenaeus conceives of Goers creative 3(ri';it}' in terms of a free decision to make his own immutable and perfect being the source of creation's continual growth: God. is different from humanity in this tespect: that God makes while humanity is made. The One who makes is

19

BEFORE ATHAl' ..,SIUS

BEFORE ATHANASJ US

the same, while char which is made necessarily receives beginning and middle and addition and gwwth. God indeed makes rhings well, while humanity is well made. God also is truly perfeer in every way, H imself equal and similar to H imself. He is all light, all mind, all substance, and rhe source of all good things. Bur humanity receives grov.rth and progress towards God. For as God is always the same, humanity, roored in God, always progresses toward God. God wi ll never cease to gram benefits and riches to humanitv; ever cease • nor will humanit\, • ftom being benefited and enriched by God. For the receptacle of God's bene~'olence, and rhe instrument of His glorification, is the human being who is grateful to the One that made him. (Adr: Haer: rVll, 2;SC21I,96)

Once divine rranscendence is conceived not only in terms of the "greatness" by which God is other rhan and inaccessible to creation, bur also equally in terms of the love by which God freely makes himself accessible to crearion, then the positing of imermedfaries between God and creation is no longer seen as safeguarding divine transcendence but even as threatening it. It follows, therefore, that in the context of his struggle against the Gnostics , with their elaborate system of mecliations, Irenaeus emphasizes that the \'ery notion of a God who is distant and uninvolved with creation compromises a fining conception of the divine. As such, ir does not redound ro the majesty of God, but amounts to an insult and a "dishonoring" of God:

alway~

It is not possible to know Goo, as far as his grandeur is

They blaspheme the Creator, who is truly God, and who empowers us to find the truth. And rhey imagine that they have d iscovered another god beyond God, or another Plefoma, or another dispensation. Therefore, the light which is from God does not enlighten them, because they have dishonoured and despised God, considering Him of little worth because, through His love and great beneficence, He has come within reach of human knowledge (knowledge, however, not with regard to His grandeur or according to H is essence - for no one has measured or handled that - but such that we may know that the One who made and fashioned humaniry, and breathed inw it rhe breath of life, and nourishes us through the creation, confirming all things by His Word, and binding them together by His Wisdom - He it is who is rhe onh-• true God). Bur they d ream of a non-existent being above the true God, believing that ther have discovered the great God, whom no one can know, who does nor communicare with human beings, and who exercises no direction over earthly affairs. So it turns Out that they have discovered the god of Epicurus, who take; care neither of himself nor orhers; a god without providence. (Adl'. Haer. Ill, 24, 7; se 34,402)

concerned. For it is impossible to measure the Father. But as to His love (for it is this which leads us to God by his Word), those who obey God always learn that there does exist so great a God, and that it is He who by Himself has established and made and adorned and comains all things, including ourselves and our world. (Ad!( Hda IV, 20, 1; SC lOon, 624)36

I n opposItIon to the Gnostics, Ire-naeus thus posits the immediacy of God's pre;ence to creation as integral to a fining conception of di,'ine rranscendence.~7 This convergence between divine transcendence and immediate presence to creation becomes in fact the vi tal cemer of his whole theology,38 Within such a conception, the mediation of the Son and Spirit becomes itself a

20

21

In this passage, we see a remarkable blending of standard Hellenistic categories with Irenaeus's own unmistakably biblical perspective. Gcx:fs transcendent perfeerions, articulared in qui te Platonic terms, are nevenheless not seen as merely antithetical to creature1y being bur as rhe source for the existence and continual enrichment of human being. Even divine immutability is conceived as somehow correlative with human progress toward the divine. In shon, God is conceived here as "towards creation," and creation is conceived as '"towards God:' This kind of correlation of God and creation is by no means construed by lrenaeus in terms of necessity.35 God remains free in the act of gcatHing creation the gift of exisrence and in his continual presence to his creation. This freedom of God in making himself accessible to finite creation is expre;sed in terms of divine love. Thus if God 's g reatness renders him unknowable to creatures, his love effectively conneHS those crearures with his incomprehensible greatness:

BEFORE AT H ANASiCS

B HO R E. .\ TH A NASi US

funccion of the immediacy of the divine presence to creation, by vin:ue of the emphasis that Son and Spirit are themselves immediately pr~m to the Father, as his "[WO hands":

There is therefore one God, who by the \Vord and Wisdom creared and arranged all things. This is the one who is the (reawr (Demiurge), who has granted chis world [Q the human race. \'o(' ith respeCt [Q His grandeur, He is indeed unknown to all who have been made by Him (for no one has searched Oll[ His heighc, either among the ancients or [hose who are now living). But as ro His love, H e is always known rhrough the One by whom He established all things_ This is His Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in [he last times was made human among human beings in order [har.He may unite [he end ro the beginning, that is, humanity to God. Therefore the prophets, receiving the charism of prophecy from the same Word, announced His coming according to the flesh, by which the blending and communion of Gexi and humani(]l- took p lace according to the good pleasure of the Father. From the beginning, the Word of God announced beforehand that God would be seen by human beings, and would converse with them upon the earth, and would be present with His own work, saving it, and becoming capable of being perceived by it, and freeing us from the hands of all that hate us, that is, from every spirit of wickedness; and enabling us to serve Him in holiness and rightC'Qusness all OUI days, in order that humanity, having embraced chI" Spirit of God, might attain w the glory of the Father_ (Ad!; Hoer. IV, 20,4; se 100/2, 634, 636)

It was nOt angels, therefore, who made us and formed us. For angels could not make an image of God, nor anyone else, except chI" true Gexi, nor an}' Power rrmMei)' distant from the Facher of all things _ For Gexi did nor need such beings in order ro make what He H imsdf had previously determined within H imself to make _ As if He did not possess His own hands! FM with Him Ulfft alu,t1ys present che Word and Wisdom, chI" Son and Spirit, by whom and in who m, freely and spontaneously, He made all things, and it is to them that He speaks, saying, ·'Let us make humanity aner our image and li keness . ~ He H imself takes from Himself the substance of the creatures, and the pattern of the things that are made, and the form of the things that are adorned. (Adtc Haer. rv, 20, l; se 34, 402 ; my emphasis)

At this point, we can note several trajecrories along which the theme of chI" immediate presence of God to creacion is played OUt in Irenaeus _ We noted, first of all, that such an emphasis implies a conception of divine transcendence which includes a stress on Goers positive relation to the world. It also leads to an emphasis on the immediacy of Son and Spirit to the Father, such that their mediation does not amount to any "distance" be[\veen creation and the Father. We can now add two furthe r points. First, chI" cheme of the immediate presence of God to creation implies an anthropology that conceives human being in terms of receptivi(]l- to this presence of God. WIth regard to divine transcendence, it is the g lory of God to make himself available and preSent EO crearion; and with regard ro anthropolog y, it is the g lory of humanity to be present to this di vine presence. Divine love thus bri ngs about a correlation of di"jne and human g lory, as is expressed in the celebrated dictum, ·The glo(]l' of God is Living humanity, and rhe life of the human being is the vision of Gexi" (A d.·. Haer. IV, 20, 7). The second poim is that this immediacy of relation ber-ween God and creation is the hermeneutical key to lrenaeus's conception of redemption in Christ. The di vine-human communion, broken by sin , is recapitulated in Christ through his incarnation:

22

\Ve can see, therefore, thac the theme of the immediacy of relacion berv,.·een God and creation mar serve as a unifying center for Irenaeus 's theology, tying coget her his doctrine of God, anthropology, and theology of redemption. We hope to show that the same can be said of Athanasius. We shall see [hat Athanasius aLso adopts Irenaeus's emphasis on the convergence between God's transcendent majesty and his benevolem involvemem wi th the world, che stress on the immediacy of divine presence to the world, the conception of hwnani(]l· as fundamentally receptive to the divine, and che understanding of redemption in terms of repairing human recept ivity and re-instituting the union of divine and human. There are rhus strong grounds for considering Athanasius as continuing a distinctl" Irenaean tradition. 39 O ur survey has shown that Irenaeus played ~ significant role in che de\'e1opmenr of the Christian concept ion of the relarion between Gexi and the world, by breaking away from [he

23

BEFORE ATHANASIUS

BEFORE ATHANASJUS

rendency ro dissociate divine transcendence and divine immanence. The work of Athanasius underscores the significance of this lrenaean breakthrough and gives it a full er systematic expression wirh reference to the whole nexus of Christian doctrine. Turning to Athanasius's g reat Alexandrian predecessor, Origen (c. 185--c. 251), we observe that the most significant heritage bequeathed by Origen to Athanasius in relation to our topic is his conception of the Father-Son relation as both prior to and ground for the God- world re1ation :1O Underlying this conception of Origen's is the notion that divine transcendence implies a "containing" of the world by God: God's glory "is in the very faer that He possesses all things."·4 1 And yet, as so often, Origen proves ultimately ambivalent on this point insofar as the Word and Wisdom by which God contains all things are finally considered to be somehow less rranscendent than the Fathu himself. 41 Thus Origen's legacy includes, on the one hand, rhe conception of divine transcendence in terms of "inclusion" of the world and the concomi tam notion of the Father-Son relation as "containing" the God-world relation and, on the other hand, the enduring predil&tion to assign divine involvement with rhe world, in the person of the Son, to a lower degree of transcendence than that accorded to the Father. Both these traj&tories cominued to develop in rhe Alexandrian tradition, the former represented by such figures as Theognostus (head of the catechetical school of Alexandria, c. 265-87),43 Alexandet of Alexandria (Athanasius's immediate episcopal pred&essor, c. 312_28)44 and, of course, Athanasius himself, the latter most notably by the figure of ArillS. Aside from the central datum of the priority of the Father-Son relation and its containment of the God- world relation, Ar hanasius relies hea\'ily on Origen in his pervasive use of the category of participation. That was the fundamental category by which Origen distinguished and related God and world. While Origen could also speak of panicipation within the Trinity, he distinguishes the paniciparion of creamres in God as accidental and not essential. 4' Moreover, Origen also uses the terminology of ~ex(ernalit}''' to contrast the creation-Creator type of panicipation from that within the Trinity;~6 a strategy rhat Athanasius would fully exploit . Also characteristic of Origen's conception is an emphasis on the fragility of hllman participation in the divine, both because this participation is accidental and not essential and because humaniry"s oriemation is alterableY Alterability is thus conceived as a quimessenrially creaturel~' problem in Origen and perhaps even

more so in AthanasillS. On t~ other hand, Athanasius respectfully correcred his illustrious predecessor on such issues as the conception of a graded hierarchy within the Trinity and tht> notion that the world is an eternally necessary correlative to God's almightiness. 4S But what most distinguishes Origen and Athanasius with reference to the rdation between God and creation is precisely Athanasius's continuing of rhe Irenaean emphasis on the immediacy between God and creation. Origen would not deny such immed iacy, but his conception of the universe is much more one of graded hierarchy; it is a universe consritured by mediations. 49 \Vhile stressing divine providence and re~choing lrenaeus's insistence that there is no God beyond the Creator,50 Origen is JUSt nO{ as emphatic about the immediacy of the rdation between God and creation as Irenaeus was or as Athanasius would be. T he convergence berv.'een divine transcendence and immanence - or, to put it another way, the conception of divine transcendence in terms of immanence and immediate presence - is simply not as much of a consciously employed theological tQpOJ in Origen. Athanasius's logic, however, following Irenaeus, is uniformly focused on the immediate relation between God and creation, to the point of consistently de-emphasizing creared mediations. Having thus put this logic in the context of the development of thought on the theme of the rdation between God and creation, we will now proceed ro analpe Athanasius's vision in his own terms.

24

COSTRA GESTES - DE lNCARNATlONE

2

THE RELATION BETWEE N GOD AND C REATION IN THE CO N TRA G EN TES-DE I N CAR NA Tl ON E

Introductioa w~ ~gin our investigation of the theme of the relation between

God and creacion in Achanasius b}' analyzing its significance in his earliest doctrinal Hearise, the CO!lt,:z GmUJ- De InraYnalilmt. In dealing with this double work, che first issue to prest m itself is che controversy regarding its dating. with suggestions varying from as earl~' as t. AD 3 18 1 or as late as the 3505. 2 Traditionall}', it has been presum~ that the apparem lack of reference to the Arian heres\' is sufficiem proof for a dare prior to the condemnation of Ari~> t. 318. However, as early as the late nineteenth century, crus argument was undermined by loofs's observation chat neither do the FtJlal UtlWJ show any reference to the- Arians before 33'5.-' This omission was expl.ai~ed by Charles Kan.nengi~ser, who dates the work during Athanaslus s fi!'i t eXIle, as an Intentional silence motivated by political exped iency.4 Kannengiesser takes Athanasius's wmmenr about nor having "our teachers' works to hand" in Contra GmUJ 1 (hereafter cited as CG) as an allusion to the bishop's exile. and further s~cifies the date by linking a reference in De lncanlatiollf 24 (herea.fter Df) to th~ who wish co divide the Church with a similar p~ase in the Fma/ Uft" of 337, boch caken as alluding to che Arians. Besides accouming for the relative mamrity of rhe work this su~g~tion also has che ad..-antage of helping to explai~ Athanasluss apparent dependence on Eusebius's Praepamlio EUlIlgllira and ThrophartJ. Kannengiesset's suggestion, however, has not been universall}' accepted and is nO( without serious problems. A strong argument has been made for the reference in the Festa/ Lcttm to "chose who

26

rend Christ's runic" being not [0 the Arians but to the Meletians. ~ MortO\'er, E. P. " [eijering has pointed out that Kannengiesser's proposal raises the question of why Athanasius did not drama{i~ his exile by referring to ic in {he treatise, considering chat ~being in e:cik was a IO~J in ancient literarure ~.6 indeed, it has also been stated that che refe rence to nOt having books to hand is misconstrued when it is interpreted as referring to the author rather than the audience of a work. It is nor qu ite logical to say that Athanasius, being in exile, did not have books to hand and therefore wrore a treatise to be read by people who presumably were DOt in exile and rhus did have books to hand!; Probably the most vocal supporrers of che traditional dating among contempor~ry scholars have been E. P. Meijering and his colleague, J. c. M. van Winden. Aside from reiterating the traditional argument I si/mtio, van Winden has contended that a concrete support for an earlier dating can be found in CG 6 and DJ 2, where it is said that che heretics (~ol. aE 0.11:0 aipE<1£wV'") believe that there is an evil creator.god alongside the good God. Van 'X'inden and Meiiering comend that this reference to the heretics (their emphasis) indicates that Athanasius was not aware at the time of any other heresies chat did not represem a dualistic doctrine of creation. S Since the Arians did not hold such a \'iew, Arianism was not a formal heresy at the time of writing. However, van Winden's argument seems to make far ((lO much OUt of this phrase, especially considering that it could JUSt as lI.'ell be rendered, ~those of the heretics ..... as ~!he hererics.· g Taking accoune of these wnfiining arguments, we cannot claim any positive proof for (he dating of this treatise. Br wa~' of wnjf"{. rure, however, we can make some fu rther observations with the aim of establishing a fairly credible combination of terminllJ pOll quem and terminllJ (1nte qlltm. 10 As to the lam'r, it has already been pointed OUt that Athanasius's lack of cenaint)' on the Roman policy of the deification of the em~ror indicates a date previous to 339, when he was exiled to Rome. 11 \\7hile this reasoning is acceprable, (here are ot:her considerations which indicate a termjn(IJ anlt qlltm that is even earlier, disqualifying Kannengiesser"s suggestion that the work was written in exile. These considerations ha....e to do with a factor that has not been remarked upon pre .... iousl}, in relation to che issue of dating: the significance of the refutation of idolatry. In our anempt to analyze this, we find ourselves dealing not only with the question of dating, but with that of the structure and purpose of the work as well. 27

CONTRA GENTES-DE ISC ....,RNATIONE

The purpose of this double work is Stated dearly in the Openillg chapters of both CG and DJ respectively: to show that faith in Christ is not irrationa1. l ? As an apologetic work, therefore, the CG-Dl is first and foremost an apol9gia cri/eis. A difficulty that immediately presents itself, however, is that whereas it is relatively easy to set the DJ as an apol9gia mldJ, it is less obvious precisely how that label applies to the CG. The question is precisely how the refutation of idolatry is part of the apology for the cross. Indeed, the question of the significance of Athanasius's refutation of idolatry has been raised before. On the one side, it has been argued that he is here simply indulging in a "bookish" exercise and exploiti ng a traditional theme. I:; P. Camelor and J . Roldanus have responded by insisting that idolatry was coming into vogue again at the time and its refutation must han~ seemed urgent to Athanasius. 14 III anempting to grant his treatise an immediate existential and histOrical rrlevanee, however, Camelot and Roldanus are found to be somewhat in contradiction to Athanasius's own view of this i.55ue. For time and again, Athanasius makes precisely the paim that idolatry is "dead" for the most part, and fading fast wherever it weakly lives on. 15 But this does not mean that Athanasius is simply (Dying with a non-issue. In fact, the decline and "death" of idolatry is used by him as a direct argument in favor of the cross. In essence, his argument is rhat the decline of idolatry coincides with the advent of the Word in the flesh; therefore, it was Jesus Christ who destroyed and continues to triumph o\'er idolatry, thus revealing himself ro be the true and li\'ing Goo. Con.... ersely, the other side of Athanasius's argument is that idolatry thrived before the advent of Christ. Insofar as it representS an obscuring and perversion of humanity's knowledge of God, its past prevalence demonstrates the need for a dramatic solution to the problem of the loss of this salvific knowledge. Thus, from the smndpoint of its prevalence prior to the incarnation of the Word, idolatry is an integral pan of Athanasius's argument ftlr DeMS homo. On the other hand, viewed from the standJXlint of its decline since the coming of the Word, idolatry now represents a demonstration that the power of the cross has filled the whole world and overcome whatever comes between us and the uue God. The history of idolatry is thus used to symbolize the event of the incarnation precisely as the redemption of human history, with an earlier decline in knowledge of God giving way to a new decline in idolau y, through the Word's advent in the flesh . \X7ith regard to dating, the decisive consideration is that

Athanasius is here presenting a trium phalistic Christ-cenrered interpretation of history. This triumphal ism has an obvious, if not explicit, historical referrenr. If the whole world is now filled with the knowledg e of God, 16 this triumph that properly belongs to Christ nevenheless came about, in a decisive manner, only through the victory of Constamine. Indeed, it is quite arguable that, in the Contra Gm/f)-De Incarnation/?, Athanasius is consciously revising the imperialist triumphalism of Eusebius of Caesarea by making sure that the triumph of Constantine is strictiy anributed to Christ, to the point of not even me ntioning the emperor. The triumphalism of the treatise certainly does not help us in further specifying a terminm porI q{(em since no one has yet suggested that he wrote the double work before the triumph of Constantine, as a mere teenager. But it does help us to set a limit in the other direction. An essential paim of the ueatise is that the resurrection of Christ has become palpably manifest in the life of the Church. Objectively, however, it is impossible to see how any contemporary reader would have failed to see an absurd irony in an exiled bishop, attacked from within (he Church itself, proclaiming the Church to be the manifestation of the victorious glory of Christ, and contending that "those brought up in Christ do not war against themselves." (Dl 52). It is of the \'ery nature of such uiumphalisric reasoning to overlook much evidence to the contrary, but there is a critical point beyond which such willful oversight becomes untenable and counter-productive. Subjectively, it is also difficult to see how such triump hal ism and boasting on behalf of the Church is reconcilable with the psychological situation of an exiled bishop who is being punished by a Church counci1. In view of these considerations, then, we would have to say that it is qui re probable that the writing of this treatise took place before Athanasius's first exile. Indeed, insofar as both the maturity of thought and the subtlr mag isterial tone" mitigate against a too-early dating , we would venture to suggest a date after Athanasius's ascendanc\, to the episcopacy and before his exile to Trier (between 328 ~d 335).18 Within this perioo, Athanasius could pretend, as far as the purposes of this treatise wem, that the Arians did not exist. T hey had tried to subvert the true knowledge of Christ as God but they had been condemned by the Church, which continued to proclaim and actively manifest the authentic divinity of Christ. Such an oversimplification may not have been consistent with the actual historical situation, but it would have been consistent with the philosophy of history propounded by the treatise, wherein the \'ictor), of the Word is rapidly gaining ground

28

29

COt'TR.'" G£STES-DE ISC-".R.""ATlONE

and o\'erraking every ad\'ersary. Thus in the same way that idolatry ",-as all but dead - a faCt that tenifies to the victory and divinity of [he Word - Arianism tOO does not exist as an acrive presence within the logic propounded here. The difference, however, could well be [hac whereas the -death" of idolatry could fairly safely be presented as the "[foph}"· of (he Word's \·jctory, the author might have considered Arianism to be not quite dead enough to bear mentioning. It is possible, then, to see the willful oversight of the Arians as pan of [he apologetic strategy of the book, which underlines the consistency berween the order of creat ion. che Christian message of redemption. and the course of hisrory itself as all testifying that the one who died on the cross is really the Lord and God of creacion and history, tbe Word who is one with the Father. This apologetic strategy accounts for the systematic nature of this [feati~, its character as a fairly comprehensi ...·e lirrie cate'Chesis. 19 For our immediate p~, this systematic nature of the work - its drive toward consistency - affords us an opportunity to study our theme as it is played OUt within an o rganic and interconnected whole. le allows US to pose the question of whac role the relation becween God and creation plays in Athanasius's construction of a systematic catechesis in defense of the Christian faith . To respond ro this question, we will begin by locating our theme within the conceptual framework of the work as a whole, Then, in order to bring Out its reverberations in the different fixi of thjs systematic treatise, we will speak of the relation between God and creation as ie relates co Athanasius's doctrine of God, cosmology, anthropology, and redemption in ChriSt. In this "9."ay, we will be able to gain an appreciation for the theme of the relation between God and creation as a central Structural element in the cheolog}' of At hanasius at this particular stage of his catttr.

Conceptual framework E....cr since the work of E. P. Meijering,ZO it has been generally acknowledged chat Athanasius had ret:ourse to the categories and terminology of a (Middle) Placonic omology in his own aniculation of Christian faith. Such a conclusion represented a certain departure from, or ac least a qualification of, Harnack's porrrait of Athanasius as a theologian who based himself not on a philosophy and omology but on soreriology, and who thus liberated Christianity from philosophical categories,It With reference to the COlllr:Z Grow-Dr lllCarnaliollr, hO"9.·e .... er, what is striking is chat, fat from a mutually

30

CONT R A GENTES-DE

I.VC.".R~"ILTlONE

exclusive opposirion of ontological to soteriological and historical categories, it is precisely t he interlocking of the [WO perspectives that p ro\'ide-s the key to the coherence of che work, and to its central proje'Ct of presenting a consistent account of the Christian faith. This obser...-ation leads us back to our cemral focus, which is Ath:lOasius·s concept ion of the relat ion betv."een God and creacion as decenninati\·e for his whole theology. For, as we shall see, it is the relation becv.'een God and crc:ltion, precisely in the radical opposicion of cceated to uncreated, that constitutes the foundational elements of Athanasius's ontolog}'. And ie is again precisely insofar as this basic ontology is consciously related co che hiscorical or narrative dimension of Christian faith (i .e. the Story of sin and mlemption> that we can speak of the relation berween God and creation as a central and centralizing element in Athanasius·s theology. In .... iew of all rhis, our first task will be to signal the recurrent and characteristic aCCOuntS of the ontological relacion beeween God and creation, as they occur at significant points throughout the doub le treatise. In the coursc of th is perusal, we shall ha .... e opporrunity also to note how the recurrence of this theme in \'ary ing comexts indicates the connections that exist in Achanasius's thought between it and ot her elemenu; of Christian doctrine. We shall chen focus on che historical and narrati .... e dimensions of Achanasius·s account, his Heibguchichle, in an effon to note once again the connections between those elements and the basic oncological structure of the relation berw~n God and crearion. Ha.... ing arrived, within this convergence of ontological and hisrorical perspeni\'es, at what we believe (Q be the unifying center of the contenu; of CG-Dl, we will then be in a position to take up successi\·e1y the accountS ptovided in rhis treatise of the docuine of God, cosmology, anthropology, Christology, and redemption, Each will be treated with a .... iew to clarifying its dependence on, or at least consistency with, Athanasius·s central tbesis on the relation between God and creat ion.

The slmcJtlre of the original relation between G&d a lid creation In order to substantiate the position that che centrality of Arhanasius's conception of the relation between God and creation is a feature intrinsic to the text, we must first show how th is conception is elaborated within the flow o f his argument. Our first text

31

CONTRA GENTES-DE /NCARSATlOI"E

CO_1\,'TRA GENTES - DE INCAR,': IiTIOKE

comes immediatel}' following [he innodu([ion to the first half of the treatise, Crmtra GtnftJ, In beginning his refutation of idolatry, Athanasius means to take things back ro che very beginning. Whereas [he beginning of idolacry is evil, evil itself did not ~exisc from the beginning." The origin of evil is thus placed in the contexc of whac is more pnmary, che original relacion between God and humanity, which is here described in the following manner:

and God: ""'hile God is be}'ond human thought, humanicy nevertheless enjoys not only a knowledge but even a similatity to God. owing co his goodness. Certain issues that are raised here will be atken up later within the context of our discussions on doctrine of God and anthropology. For DOli,', we simply note che converging double aspects of divine othemess and nearness as central to Achanasius's conception of the relation berwet:n God and creacion. After his [efuratioD of idolatry (CG 2-29), Athanasius turns co (he exposition of how we come to know God. This is elaborated in terms of the inward gaze of the soul (CG 30-4), and che outward apprehension of creation (CC 35ff.). We are struck by the fact that elch section begins with a sratemem of how God's transcendence does not mitigate against his beneficent accessibility. Thus the section on knowledge of Gcxl. thcough the soul begins with this scatement :

For God, the creacor and king of all, who is beyond all being and human conception, since he is good and exceed~ ingly noble, has made humanity according to his own image chrough his proper Word, our Sa"'ioUI Jesus Christ. He has also made humaniry percepcive and knowledgeable of reality through its likeness ro him, giving it also a conception and knowledge of its own eternity, so that as long as it kept this likeness, it might never depan: from the conception of God or abandon the company of che holy ones, but holding on to the grace of the Giver, and also the proper Power of che Facher's Word, it might rejoice and converse wich God, living a life truly heavenly, blessed and . 1.•• " unmorta Perhaps the fine ching co note here is the Simple fact ~t Athanasius's starting point is the rdation between God and humanity. If we have been speaking repeatedly of the "rdation between God and creacion,· this has been in order to put the maner in che most global and radical terms, in (erms of the fundamental distinCtion beOl!'een creaced and uncreated. Yet if it is the distinction between creaced and uncreated [hat is the most radical, it is the relation berween God and specifically humanity that is most important for A(hanasius, and which he believes is of primary significance in (he objective order of [hings. This is also ro say tha t, on the whole. Athanasius's cosmology seems to be conceived in function of his amhropology, rather than \'ice versa. Our second observation with regard to rhis passage cakes us co the very hean: of Athanasius's conception of the relation between God and creation, Most ccucial here is the convergence of di"'ine transcendence and immanence, This is aniculated here, firs t of all, by way of che double description of God as "beyond all being (0 u1Uoph:£lVo. 1t6:0'rt; OOOio.; )"2J and "good and exceedingly noble (ayaSO; "ICed "i)1tep"ICo.l..CK;)." Immediately, Arhanasius deri\'es the implication of a kind of duali!}' in the relation benveen humanity

32

These notions have been shown co be nothing other chan an erroneous appcoach to life. But [he way of truch has for ies goal the God who truly exists (r Qv OVCOX; ovta 9£ov). We do not need anything except ourselves for the knowledge and faultless understanding of [his way. For the path to God is not as far from us or as ell"temal to (e{r09£v) us as God himself is high above all, but it is in us and we are capable of finding its beginning by ourselves, as Moses caughe "The word of faith is within your hean:. ~ The Saviour also declared and confirmed this, saying: MThe kingdom of hea\'en is within you. For insofar as we have faith and the kingdom of God within us, we are capable of arriving quickly co the "'ision and percepcion of the king of all, che sa"'ing Word of the Father.... And if someone were to ask what chis road might be, I say it is each one's soul and che mind within it. (CG 30; Thomson, p. 82) M

The centnl SCatement (hat concerns us here is thac Mthe path to God is not as fa.r from us or as external to us as God himself is high above all. Studied closely, it is in fact a highly paradoxical sratement. Perhaps this is most apparent if we simpl)' focus on the physical imagery. Athanasiu5 is saying (har the diStance by which God is '"high above" does not equal a. dis tance by which God is "'far." In other words, God's rranscendence is not to be conceh'ed in such a way as to mitigate against his nearness or immanence. This H

COSTR,~

GEf'.,-TES - DE ISCARNATIONE

principle is here applied in the context of knowledge of God. The fact of God's transcendence does not detracr from the possibility of humanity's knowing God, and this by merely searching ,vithin oneself. Passing from rhe possibility of knowledge of God through [he soul to that afforded by the comemplarion of creation, Arhanasius again begins his account by pointing to the double aspects of transcendence and nearness with respect co God, and drawing from t he convergence of this dualiry consequences for creation: God, who is good and the lover ofhumaniry and who carcs for the souls he has made, is by nature (rijv cpumv) invisible and incomprehensible, being above all created being (er.£KEl va mlO"T)O; y€vryrT)o;). Thus, because the human race would fail ro attain knowledge of Him in that they were made from nothing while He was uncrcated, God so ordered creation through his own Word that while he is invisible by nature ('tt,v qruow) he might neverrheless be known co people from his works. (CG 3); Thomson, p _94)

Morrowr, we should also note the characreristic auempc to articulare the convergence of tran~endence and immanence in terms of God mitigating or qualifying the consequences of his own "Damre'· (cpOOlo;). In this passage, God's nature is "defined·' as invisible and incomprehensible, but rhen we are given co understand chat God actS to qualify this definition, or rather its consequences for human beings. His mocives for doing so are articulated in terms of goodness and care (God is Ctya.e&; and KT)OO!l€VDI;); and che means for doing so is his ordering of crcarion through the Word. Thus it is within the attempt to speak of the convergence of God's transcendence and nearness that we find the dialectic between God's nature and Goers "works,~ and within chis dialectic, a particular concep(ion of the person and work of the Word_

The hislMY of the relation belween God and creation

\Yle remarked earlier that, while thr relation between created and uncreated is the governing paradigm in Athanasius's oncology, it is the relation between God and humanity that is of most central significance. This passage substantiates that statement. Here the relation between God and humanity, in thr context of the possibiliry of human knowledge of God, is conceived co be radically determined by the global distinction betvleen created and uncreared. 1r is the fact that humanity was made from nothi ng, a fact which i[ shares with all the rest of creation, that renders it incapable of anaining co knowledge of God, who, in mm, is "above all created being " precisely in virtue of being uncreated. However, God has a special love for humanity, and to rhis end he orders creation through his \X'ord in such a 'way that he might render himself knowable through his works. le is such a conception [hat undergirds our earlier statement that cosmology i5 conceived by Athanasius in funccion of amhropolom'. \X'e should not lose sight of the face, however, that, as this passage makes clear, what undergirds borh Achanasius·s cosmology and his anthmpology, and thus makes them consistem with each other. is the fundamental disrincrion berween what has irs ··origin from norhing·' (El; Din;: OVTroV) and what is uncreated (CtY€V1J'tov).

In pursuing our inquiry into the second half of rhis double treatise, rhe De IncarnatiMle, our aim is to bring to light Athanasius's accoum of how the original sccuccure of the relation between God and humanity was modified in the course of a history of this relation. In artending to the [ask before us, we will find ir useful to focus on the significance of a cerrain motif in Athanasius's account, that of Mremaining (!l£v€tv). " Immediately after outlining, in CC 2, the main features of the original relation becv.·cen God and humanity, Athanasius concludes with rhe statement: "In this the Creator has fashioned the human race, and he wished it co so remain (Kat !liVE1V t,eO:llGEVY' (CC 3; Thomson, p. 8). GCKfs w ill for humanity to remain within the original strucrure of its relation with himself was addressed co the human creature·s own free will. 24 But humanity turned away from the contemplation of the divine to pursue its own self-indulgent pleasures and thus, ·'it did not remain as it had been created (Ka.t oUx onoia. '(EyOVE. tOlau-n, Kat EfJ,€tV€V), but appeared as it had defiled icseW (CG 7; Thomson, p. 18). The whole of the ( 01/l'a Gentes is an exposition of the extent to which humanity had fai led to ·'remain'· within the original structure of the relationshi p with God and had turned to the non-being of e\'iI. 2~ The StOry of idolatry is thus meant as a symbolic recapitulation of [hat larger schema. In the De blcanMfiMu, the significance of the terminology of "remaini ng'· becomes more apparent, as signaling the connection between ontology and history, the original structure of the relationship between God and humanity and its subsequent modification

34

3'

CONTRA GENTES-DE INCARNATIO,"'-E

COST RA GE,"·'TE S - DE IS CARNATIONE

by sin. We may describe this conneaion in a preliminary fashion by saying mar the original structure, or ontology, actS as a kind of double magnet, polarizing the historical imercourse ben',een God and humanity rowards either a secure permanence in communion with God or a confirmed drift co corruption and non _being. 26 The point is that, by the terms of the oncological relationship between God and humanity, there is a radical pr~sure exeITed upon humanity co ~ remain ~ in either of th~e alternatives. This is brought OUt forcefull}' in DJ 3-4. God granted humanity a panicipation in the power of the Word so that they might -remain (Ola!J.E\'£lV) in blessedness~ (DI 3; Thomson, p. 140). He established them in paradise and imposed a law "so that if rhey guarded the grace and remained good (!J.EVOU:V KCX}.Oi) they would retain the life of patadise~ (ibid.). However, "if they transgressed and turned awar and became wicked, they would know thar they would suffer (i:lltO}lE\.'£tv) natural corruption in the form of death,27 and would no longer live in paradise, but in future would die outside it and remain (}lEvElV) in death" (ibid. ). Referring co the divine threat related in Gen. 2: 17, Arhanasi us interprets it rhus: "And this 'you shall die by death,' what else is it except not only to die, but co remain in che corruption of death ( Kat f.\' tft 9avatou cp9op{i ()lUj.1EvEl v) - (ibid ,), This double orientacion which oncology gives to history is consistent and continuous with the paradigmatic distinction berv.·een creation and the uncreated. Since humanity, like all of creation, came to be from nothing , it belongs to its very nacure (cpixn~) to be predisposed to nothingness and corruption (DJ 4). If it is sa,'ed from this fate by di"ine mercy, then perseverance in irs access to this mercy is che condition without which it mUSt again lapse into a confi rmation of its o'v..n predisposition to non-being. The essential principle is that there is no neutral mid-point in which humanity can - remain .- The twO fundamental ootological polatities are either God-ward or toward non-being; salvationhistory is preconfigured by these ontological polatities. T he configuration of salvation-history according to these polatities is given dramatic scope throughout the De Jncamafione, By falling inco sin and cuming away from God, humanity was heading straighc for non-being, toward utter corruption. Thus, in the comexr of sin, the ontological gulf between the humanity created from nothing and the uncreated God acquires an ominous dimension; it becomes a radical separation which subverts the very purpose of human creation, which is communion with God. Simple

repentance from the human side, or a mere nod from the divine side, is not enough to reverse humanity's orientation toward corruption, precisely because this orientation consticutes a confirmarion of the ontological pull of its own narure. 28 It was needful. therefore, that God should rake dramatic aCtion co re-orient humanity from one side of the polatiry co","ou:d the other: '"Therefore the Saviour fittingly put on a body, so that the body would be Joined co life and would no longer remain (u1l:OIlEivn) morral in death, but having put on immortality, it would then rise up and remain «()lU}lElvn> immortal" (DJ 44; T homson, p. 246). In re-orienting humanity toward remaining in God , the incarmtion thus repairs the convergence between Goefs transcendence and nearness. God, who is invisible and unknowable by nature, becomes ,'isible and knowable and pre-eminendy accessible through che humanity of Christ. At this point, in faCt, God 's nearness to humanity reaches the poim of humanicy's deification:

36

So

JUSt as if someone wishes to see God, who is invisible by

nature and not seen at all (u6patov ovto: 'tft CPUO£t 'tOY 0EOV KUt Il"ooJ,~ Opro)lEVOV), he understands and knows him from his works, so let the one who does not see Christ wirh his mind, learn and distinguish from the works of his body, whether they are human or of God. If [hey are human, let him mock; bur if they are recognized to be not human but of God, !er him not laugh at things that are nor to be mocked, but rarher marvel that through such simple means di\'ine things have been manifested to us, and char through death immonality has come to all, and through the hominization of the Word the universal providence has been made known, and its leader and creator che "et}' Word of God. For he became human mac we might become divine; and he manifested himself through a body chat we might re<eive the conception of che im'isible Father; and he endured the insolence of human beings that we might inherit incorruption. (DJ 54; Thomson, p. 268) Having begun with a passage near the beginning of the COl/lra GenrtJ, we now end this seaion with a passage near che end of De I ncanlotiOllt. Our endeavor has been to show how a cenain characteristic acCOUnt of the original strucrure of [he relation between God and creacion recurs in varying contexts and at significant junccures

C ON TRA GENTES - DE INCAR.'...·ATIO NE

C O STR:l GESTE S - DE INC.-I.RJ'\;ATIONE

throughout rhis double treatise and internvines icself with an account of the hiscorv, of this relation. ViiI' have noted that che paradigmatic distinction within chac relation is that between the uncreated God and all else that comes co be from nothing. Within this paradigmatic distinction, however, it is the rdation between God and humanity that holds center stage for Athanasius_ With regard co that relation, what is crucial is the convergence of divine transcendence and nearne:s.s. That is to say, that God actS to overcome the separation of natures, which would render knowledge of him and communication with him impossible. From the human side, the primary effect of this divine compensation is that humanity's access to the transcendent God is placed within itself.29 Moreover, another divine initiative co overcome this radical difference is the "works ~ of creation, by which knowledge of rhe invisible God becomes a..·ailable to humaniry.30 However, the sin of humanity represented a subversion of these di vine compensations, and the radical difference berv.-een uncreated and created threatened to become reinforced as an unbridgeable separation. A definitive bridge was only provided through the incarnation of the Word, and henceforrh rhe transcendent God manifests himself in a powerful way in human life and history)] Having rhus described in broad strokes the pervasiveness of the theme of the relation between God and creation, and having touched on some of its connections with other doctrines by following the general outline of this double trea tise, we are now in a position to trear some of these fundamenral doctrines individual!y.

The genre in which Arhanasius's doctrine of God is cast in the Contra Gemes- De bmlnJa!iolli is apologetic. We ha"e already furrher specified the apologetic inrcnr of this work as an apo/agia CTllfiJ. We need [Q assimilate this significant poim, therefore: that the doctrine of God is here articulated in relation CO the incarnation and the c[Qss. In the inrroducrion to the Contra Gmt!'J, for instance, Athanasius secs forth the purpose of his treatise as a defense against che accusation that faith in Christ is irrational, (it..oyov. H The accusacion of irrationality is centered specificalJl on the Christian claim that '·the one who ascended the c[Qss is e Word of God and chI' Sa..-iour of the universe'· (CG 1). .33 In presenting his defense of the rationality of Christian faith, one of Athanasius·s primary strategies

is precisely to demonstrate the consistency between the hiStorical fact of the incarnation and a cerrain doctrine of God.3~ Of course, in doing so he becomes involved in the project of articulating a doctrine of God that is designed to lead to the conclusion thar the incarnation was in fact ··reasonable for God ("to i<~ "tov SEav EUAOYOV)'" (01 7; Thomson, p. 148). The systematic task of demonstrating a rational coherence between the doctrine of God and the doctrine of the incarnation is rhus integral to the apologetic design of rhis treatise, as is that of demonstrati ng the coherence of those (Wo doctrines to that of creation. In shorr, Athanasius wants to show [hat the fact of the incarnation is consistent with who God is, and with God's general way of relaring to creation from the beginning. Our task at thi s juncture is to probe his account of this consistency from the parricular viewpoint of his doctrine of God. In putting forth his doctrine of God, Arhanasius has ready recourse to srandard descriptions of the transcendence of God rhat were shared by Christians and Greeks alike. 35 As is consistent with a Middle PlatOnic, rather than Neoplatonic view, God is considered as [he archetypal and uniquely (rue being: "tov ov"trot; oV"ttl 9EOV (CG 30; Thomson, p. 82 ). His transcendence is described in conventional apophatic terms: 6 JlEV -(UP 8£(x; aacOfltl"tO<; Eon 1«(11. (icpea.p"t~ ~ai. 6:eava"t~, OMEV(x; Eto; &nouv l)£611£V~ (CG 22; Thomson, p. 60).3 6 Indeed, such a philosophically acceptable description of divine transcendence provides a strong weapon in the denunciation of idolatry_ For in worshiping idols , the pagans are supposing the deity to be corporeal (awflatOEll)E9 (i bid. ). Athanasius can make this poim without showing the least sign of faltering, but we can appreciate irs delicacy in the context of a treatise dedicated to the defense of the belief in precisely a God who appears in corporeal form. This last consideration directs us ro the necessity faced by Athanasius of going beyond conventional Plaronic descriptions of divine transcendence, and of arriculating a doccrine of God who can become human and rake to himself a human body. Athanasius does articulate such a tra jectory, proceeding from the doctrine of God, to that of God's relation to creat ion, ro the incarnation. We must now trace [his tra jecrory. Arhanasius's key move is to integrate apophatic descriptions of divine transcendence with a strong and persistent emphasis on the positive attribute of divine gocx:l.ness. It is precisely through a proper conception of God·s goodness that [he incarnation may be regarded as fitting: ··what people deride as unsuitable (COtp£1t!l ) by his goodness (a'{Ct90tI")"tl) he renders suitable (£"lmpElCfl)'· (DI 1;

38

39

D octrine of God in the COlltra Gelltes- De I'lcarrzatz"one

CONTRA G EN TE S - DE n"CAR ,....-.-l.TIO.r...' E

CONTRA GENTES - DE INCAR!-.· ATIQNE

Thomson, p. 134). While it is true chat God's namre is invisible and incomprehensible and beyond all created being (a6pcuo; Kat O:KCl't"OJ'.I1.1t'C6; Ecrn 'ti)v ~ua"lV, btEXEwa rrCt:crllS YEVll'Cils:) (CG 35; Thomson, p. 94), this apophatic descriprion must not mitigate against the positive and caraphatic characterization of God as '·good and rhe lover of humanity (aya9&.; yap mv Ked. qni.6:v9pwn:OS)"' (i bid.). Thus, in Athanasius, God's goodness and love constitute as much of an ontological statement about God and a descri ption of God·s nature (cpum;) as the apopharic statements that appear to indicate divine inaccessibility to the created realm: God is ~good and exceed ingly noble by nature. Therefote he is the lover of humanity (6 oE -r((I\' ClAWv SEOS a)'Ct96s Kat im£pKCtAO; 'l:i)v cpoa"lV EO't. 010 Kat CP1Aft:\.'9pmitOs eonv)"" (ibid .). Thr fact t hat God is qlt;.a.v9JX07t~ by namre means that his aCtions arr always characterized by that quality, since ir is one of Athanasius's principal maxims that actions must correspond to natures. 37 Thus the fundamental structure of the relation between GexI. and crearion is, from the vcry beginning , determined by divine condescension, in the form of a universal presence to and providence over all creation that has its source in G{xfs very narure, as O:Y(180; and

being good , he governs and establishes the whole world through his own Word who is himself God, so rhat creation, enlightened b}' the governance, providence, and ordering of the Word, may be able to remain secure, since it participates in the \X!ord who is truly from the Father and is helped by him so as to exist. This was done so that what would have happened to creation, aparr from rhe sustenance of the Word, did not happen - namely, a relapse into nothingness; ··For he is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation, because throug h him and in him subsist all th ings, visible and invisible, and he is the head of rhe church ,. [Col. 1: 15-18J, as the ministers of the truth teach in the holy writings. (CG 41; Thomson, pp. 11 2- 14)

lest it run the risk of again lapsing into nothingness. But

This passage provides us with occasion ro rejoin our previous charaCterization of the fundamental structure of the relation between God and creat ion in terms of a convergence of divine transcendence and nearne!>S. We can now recognize that this convergence has ics source in Athanasius·s doctrine of God. God is beyond all created being, as uncreated, bur his nearness co creation has its basis also in his very nature, as supremely good and loving. In the self-same movement of creation, God asserts his transcendence over chat which he brings into existence from nothing, as well as demonstrating his love which leads him ro generously gtant existence to what was nOL The faCt that God is the uniquely primordial being means that whatever he brings into existence cannot have an intrinsic support for irs own existence, since ItS eXiStenCe is wholly deri ved . However, Athanasius's characterization further indicates that it equally belongs co God's narure, as good and loving, to bridge the difference between uncreated and created natures in such a way that God becomes present ro and acrive in creation. In short, both the difference becween God and creation and the bridging of thar disrance have theif basis in rhe nature of God. It is within this perspenive chat Achanasius can also justify [he incarnarion in terms of [he doctrine of God. He does this, first of all, by reconciling it with the doctrine of creation. for this reason he is concerned to show, in the Contra Genres, thac the fact of creation has its basis in the nature of God who is loving)8 GocI creaces in order co manifest this love, ··ho: Ko:t
40

41

~lAav9p
And the reason why the Word of God really came (tmJ3Ef.llKEV) to created beings is cruly amazing, and teaches us that it would not have been fitting (OUK al,).Solving back into nothing, he made everything by his own eternal Word and brought creation into existence. He did not abandon it to be tempest-tossed through its own nature (OUK acp~K£v

Ctu'C';v 'tft Eo.O'Ci1:; CPUO£l <jl£p£o8Ctl Ko.t

X£t]lCt.~£aeCtl),

CO ,\ iTRA GE .'lTES - DE I .....' C A R NA TI ON E

of creation included the overcoming, from the divine side, of the ontological chas m that separates God and creatures: God, who rules over all things, when he made the human race through his proper \'qord, seeing the weakness of their nature, and that it was not capable by itself of knowing the Crea£Or nor of at all anaining [0 the conception of God, in that while he was uncreated, ther had been made from norhing (t OV )lEv dvat ayEVVrytoV. "ta ot E~ OU1<: ov"to)V 1£YEVijcrSat), and while he was incorporeal, humanity had been fashioned in an inferior way with a body, and seeing that in every way the things made were lacking in knowledge and comprehension of their Maker having mercy, then, on the human race, since he is good, he did not lea\'e them destitute of knowledge of himself, lest even their very existence should be profitless to them . For what profit would there be for those who had been made, if they. did nOt know their own 1iaker~ .. . And whv. would God ha~ce made them if he did not wish to be known by them? (DIll; Thomson, p. 158) However, if it belongs £0 God's goodness to overcome this ontological distance berween himself and creation, the facr of sin threatens co nulli!)' th is divine compensation, leaving the distance benveen God and (rearion irremediably unbridged. In that case, the whole "point" of creation would have been lose Athanasius dares to inti mate, moreover, thar the loss would not be merely on the human side, for God's g lory is also at stake. But then what use would there have been for humanity to have been created according to God's image from the beginning) ... And what benefir would there be to God who made it, or what glory would he have, if the humanity which had been created by him did not worship him, but thought that others were their J\f!.:.ers? For God would then turn Out [Q have created them for others and not for himself.

intimate connection in Athanasius between rhe docuines of creation, of incarnation, and of God. For if creation is understood in strier correlation to the doctrine of God, as a divine act manifesting the divine nature, then the di vine manifestation (i _e., God's glory) is itself somehow implicated in the created realm. In the context of sin, this principle is given much dramatic play by Athanasius_ Completely reversing the charge that a human incarnation is "unfitting" to God and unworthy of a proper conception of God, Athanasius sets about to show that an)'thi1;g but the Incarnation of the Word would have been unworthy of God: The refore, since rational creatures were being corrupted and such works were being destroyed, what should God, who is good (ayaSOv ov"ta) have done: Allow corruption to overcome them and death to overpower them? Then what was the use of their having been created [Q begin with? For they should rather not haye been created than to be created and subsequently neglected and desHoyed. In that case, weakness rather than God 's goodness would be made known (acr8£vElcx "(UP ,.UiA),OV Kat aUK Ct"(aSO"rllS E1<: 1:ij~ aJ.l.€}',£1.a~ lm:/XJ)(€,!Ctl tou 8£ou), if after creating he had abandoned his own work to corruption - more so than if he had not created humanity in the beginning ... So it was not appropriate (OU1<:OUV £0£1) that he should abandon humanity to rhe current of corruption. That would have been unfiHing and unworthy of God's goodness "to an:p£itt<; x:a1. 6:va~LOv £ivCtt '
«ita

Such a perspective, which makes possible the dramatic presentation of a "divine dilemma," is simply a further indication of the

This passage shows how the apologetic intent of Athanasius, to defend rhe ··rationaliry" of Christian faith, is fulfilled by way of the systematic task of showing the consistency between the doctrines of God, creation, lnd the incarnation. I think it justifiable to assert [hat, in fact, it is the doctrine of God which is primary. For it is a certain conception of God, in which his goodness, mercy, and providential care are emphasized , that constitutes the starting point of that trajec[Q[Y which leads through creation ro the incarnation. Within this conception, a lack of concern and care (Ctj.1£A€la) for Cfeatures connotes rather weakness (acrBE\'Ela) than ma jestic transcendence_The latter quality, for Athanasius, is insepamble ftom the care and ~o licitude of God for creation. Arhanasius's doarine of God

42

43

,

CONTRA GE,"-TES-DE l!-':CAR ." -ATIONE

CONTRA GENTES-DE ISC:\RNAT/ONE

is thus one in which God's transcendence is concei .... ed not only in juxraposition to his nearness, but also often enough precisely in terms of his nearness. God's glory and honor are manifested in his care for creation which achieves a climax in the incarnation. It is because of such a doctrine of God that Arhanasius can arrivE' guite naturally at the conception of the cross exactly as the sign of divine g lory and power (CG 1). Thus he can enjoin the reader to medirate on the incarnation of the Word, "so that from the seeming degradation of the \X'ord your piety rowards him may be greater and stronger" (01 1). At this point, then, we ha .... e traced the double aspect in the relation between God and creation to the doctrine of God_ God as primordial being is inaccessible ro creation, while his involvement with and solicirude for creation derives from his natural goodness. \\'71" cannot, however, speak of Athanasius's doctrine of God while abstracting from his Trinitarian doctrine. If Trinitarian doctrine does not seem to be at the forefront of his explicit concerns in the C01ltra GmteJ-De lncarnatjmu, it is nevertheless imegral to his presentation, and the very casualness by which it is repeatedly enjoined makes it in some way all the more striking. i\-!oreover, there is a logical consistency between Athanasius's Trinitarian doctrine and his emphasis on the inseparability of divine otherness and nearness. If we are correct in our granting this latter l'mphasis a central role in Athanasius's theological framework, then analyzing this consistency would lead us to a recognition of how his Trinirarian doctrine is integral to this framework, and thus determinative for his whole theology. We must acknowledge, ro begin with, that it is onlr by a kind of anachronistic shorthand, and by way of giving Athanasius the benefit of the doubt, that we speak of a Trinicarian, racher than binarian, teaching in the Contra GenteJ-De In,arnafiQne. The fact of che marcer is that, willie Athanasius was able to integrate the Holr Spirit into his doctrines of G:x1 and redemption at a later point, such an integration is nor evident in this apologetic double treatise. What we do find, however, is a pervasive emphasis on the co-inherence of the \'C"ord and the Father. But the presentation of this co-inherence is not executed here in primari ly metaphysical terms, as an articulation of an inrra-
between creation and humanity on the one hand, and on the other hand, not simply G:x1, but precisely the "\};roed of the Father (the \\'7ord who communicates and reveals the Father) and rhe Father of the \X/oed (the Father who is revealed and communicated in [he Word).40 Thus while the text of John 14:10 ('" ... 1 am in the Father and the father in me") is not ostensibly a central text in this treatise, as it would be in lacer diacribes against the Arians, it nevertheless shapes his whole presentation of the relation between creation and God, consistE'ndy conceived as a relation between creation, on the one hand, and the Word in the father and the father in the Word, on the other. On the whole, then, Athanasius's doctrine in the Contra GmfeJ-De illcar-natior.e is one that dearly distinguishes between the rrlation of the Word and the Father and that between both the \'(!ord and the Father, taken rogether, and creation. T he Word is other than creation and belongs in a unigue fashion to the Father:

Thomson, p. 110), Moreover, as we have noted, creation is descri bed as related precisely to the relation of ""ord- Father. These aspeCts of Athanasius's Trinitarian doctrine have a definite and significant bearing, it seems to me, on his panicularly emphatic presentation of the inseparability, or even convergence, of the aspeCtS of divine orherness and nearness. It is well to note, at this juncture, the way in which previous Christian apologists had articulated a conception of the Logos as mediaror be~'een God and creation. Within a framework that was more or less subordinationist, such a conception tended tOward the implication that transcendence conceived as otherness was more properly div'ine than a transcendence involved with creation. 4 ! If the Word, who represents direct divine im"olvemene in the world, was not true God, (hen such direct involvement was also not truly divine. On the other hand, in Athanasius tOO, the Word is represented as Mediator. But here there is no trace of subordi nacionism, and the Word who is active in the world is himself dearly other than the world and belongs whotly to the Father. With reference to divine transcendence and nearness, such a perspective naturally implies that divine uanscendence is in no way mitigated by nearness. In being most intimately involved in rhe world, GOO does not cease to be wholly other, as the \'(7ord is other than creation. Conversely, divine otherness does not email distance ftom creation, as the \'Qord is powerfully and intimately presenr to creation, yet belong~ essentially to the transcendence of the Father:

44

45

ex;

CtI_Ae>; !lEv EO"n 'n])\, )'evlrcrov K((1 rrCxO"~ t~ K"tlO"EfllS, ioto::; 010 K((1. Ilove>; '<0'0 aya80u n(('tpOS U1rapxE1. (CG 40;

CONTR_'" GENTES-DE !!',,-CAR.I\.'ATlONE

that God is love. God's love and goodness thus constitute the basis within God of all the divine initiatives, from chIC' structure of creation to the event of [he incarnation, that are designed to bridge the natural gap between God and creation. With this smtemem, we may now move to a consideration of the relation beno'een God and creation, ftOm the point of view of creation.

<'Who could analyze the Father in order to discover the fXlwers of his Word? For he is the Word aod wisdom of the Father, and at the "(EVrytOi::; same time condescends to creatures (tOl~ auylCCt."tc$a.\ vw\') to gi',e them the knowledge and conception of his begener~ (CC 47; Thomson, p. 130). However, if Athanasius rejects the attempt to delineate the distinCtion between di~'ine otherness and nearneSS along the lines of an ontological prioritizing of the Father over the Son, he does not relinquish the project of acrnally making this distinction. But he does not locate the distinCtion widun the Godhead it5elf. Rather, it is articulated in terms of God being "outside" creation by his essence and yet present within it by his power. 42 This essence-power distinction in Athanasius seems to be a distinCtion between the divine realm in se, encompassing both Father and Son (not to memion the Spirir), and ad extroY' It5 point is simply that God's aCtive agency within creation does not mitigate against his otherness as an agent: God does not become consubsrantial with creation through his aCtivity within it. However, in being outside creation by his essence, God does not cease to be effective within it, and to effect Cteation's panicipation in his own activity. The essence-power distinction is thus parallel with the more pervasi"'e nature-works distinction, whereb" it is articulated that God is invisible, incomprehensible, etc., according to his nature, and yet manifests himself in his works. 44 In both cases, it is a maner of speaking in one breath of the othemess and nearness of God. Having characterized Athanasius's conception of the relation be(W~n God and the wodd in terms of this simu1raneiry of otherness and nearness, we now conclude our admittedly cursory analysis of the doctrine of God in the C011tra GenteJ-De incaffldtionf with the assertIOD that this simultaneity has its conscious basis in Athanasius's doctrine of God. He moves beyond a merely philosophical apophatic emphasis on the inaccessible transcendence of God by emphasizing the attribute of goodness as properly descriptive of the divine nature. This "goodness" is understood not as a mere impersonal principle of immanence, but as a ground for God's decisive imerventions in h.lstory, to the poim of the incarnation. It is a personal solicitude and love for creation (especially humanity), which grounds genuine historical iniriati"'es for the sake of human salvation. In this way, Athanasius is able to imegrate into the conventional Platonic distincrion between rhe realm of Being and that of Becoming, the statement - conceived as both an ontological description of God and an lOterpretanon of (salvation-)history -

Arhanasius's cosmology is in some ways a continuation of his dOCtrine of God, insofar as the harmonious and intelligible strucrute of the cosmos is considered as the manifestation of divine providence and power. As we have already noted, it also logically forms the background to his anthropology, since the created universe as a whole, including humanity, is fundamentally characterized as having the same origin from nothing, rendering it intrinsically incapable of retaining its hold on being without continuous divine assistance. \X'ithin the flow of his argument in the double treatise, Arhanasius presents his cosmology by way of showing how the order and beamy of the external creation represents a secondary way for humanity to come to knowledge of and thus communion with God, the primary way being inward contemplation:H Athanasius's cosmology also functions in this treatise as an apology for the incarnation, since God's presence within creation is then claimed as a preamble and analogue for the divine manifestation in a human body.46 We can see, [herefore, that in specifying oUI immediate focus to be the treatment of cosmology in the Contra Gentes-De /IICdl71dli{ITI£, we actually ha\'e to deal again with a whole nexus of themes_ In this section, however, we will orient this constellation of themes around the center of Athanasius's cosmology, understood as his exposition of the immanent structure of the universe, and we will treat this latter theme parricularlr in light of our own general theme of the relation between God and creation. We have already had occasion to refer to the passage which introduces the "cosmological section"' of the Contra Genles.~"j There, Athanasius begins by recalling God's goodness and love as the divine motive for God's acting to remedy human ignorance of him, which is the necessary consequence of the radical difference in narures between created and uncreated. It was for this reason that "God ordered creation throug h his Word so that, while he is invisible by nature, he might ne"ertheless be know n to people from his works~ (CG 35). Thus the pnmary rationale for the cosmos,

46

47

Cosmology

CONTR.A. GENTES-DE l.'-C.1Rr--ATJONt:

according {o Athanasius, is to communicare knowledge of God to humanity, rendering the invisible God knowable, ae least in some measure. The universe is most deeply understood as (he ··work" which reveals God's narure. The way thar (he exurnal creation communicates knowledge of God to humanity is principally through its order ("!liE,tS) and harmony (a.Pllovio.) (CG 35), which indicate a sovereign '·unifring agent.~ 4S Athanasius is particularly struck by the observation that rhe phenomerul universe does not present a mere homogeneity, but rather a general uniry and concord constituted by multiple elements. It is particularly this unity-within-disrinceion that indicates a superior power which reconciles the differences and harmonizes the opposing tendencies of individual elemenrs into a coherent and inceHigible whole. 49 lr is important to nore that Athanasius·s presentation of how the intelligible and harmonious SCIUccure of the universe leads co a certain EVVOlo. of its Maker is itself unintelligible if we do not attribute to him some notion of a kind of analogy between creation and its Maker.)O T his is so, especially considering the fact that Athanasius is not just concerned with arguing for a general theism bur aims co move beyond che inference merely of a creator, into a characterization of th is Creator along the lines of Chris tian faith : Who might this creatOr be} That, tOO, is most necessary to clarify and articulate, so that no one, deceived by ignorance about him, lIlay suppose him to be another and fal l back inw the same godlessness as before . . .. Who then is he, if not the Father of Christ, most hot\', and bevond all created , being, who like a supreme craftsman (Ol]llOUp"(OV), by his proper wisdom and proper Word , our lord and Saviour Christ, steers and orde rs all things for our salvation, and acts as seems best to him? (CG 40; Thomson, p _ 108)

disbelie\'e our statements . But if the universe subsists according to reason (i..oyt:p), wisdom, and knowledge and has been arranged with all order, rhen the one who governs and ordered it must be none other than the l..IJgO! of God·' (ibid.). This argument is clearly based on a conception of a te rrain analogy (O:vo.;"oyio.) berween {he reason and order (logos) of the cosmos and the logos, who is Son of the Father. In showing how the invisible and uanscenclent God communicates knowledge of himself through the works of creation, Athanasius makes much use of StOic categories and motifs. In particular, sections 35- 9 of the COJltra Grow are inundated with Stoic influence. Beginning with CG 40, however, Athanasius seems to consciously embark on a ctiticism of and a corrective to Stoic doctrine. This shift is significant for our general theme of the relation between God and creation. The StOics are useful for Athanasius, as they wae for other early Christian writers, insofar as they provided a vocabulary and cerrain conceptual tools for articulating notions of divine providence, omnipresence, and imimate invoh-ement in the world - in a word, immanence. But the Stoics provided such resources for the very apt reason that their cosmology was decidedly immanenrisr, if not materialist. Over against the onesidcdness of such an emphasis, Christian writers had to reaffirm the transcendence and independence of God with respect to creation. Thus Athanasius follows his use of Stoic terminology to indicate the Word as che guarantor of the harmony and order of the cosmos b}' carefully distinguishing the Word of the Father from a purely immanent and impersonal )..oyo; mreppo.n'ICO<;: B~'

\X/ord 1 do not mean the word involved and innate in every creature (AO"(ov OE IPl]ll oil t OY £V EKUO""tt:p till v

'fEvoll£vffiv

cru)l1tE1tAQ)l£VO\l Ko.\ O""OJl1tEIPUKOto.), which is called seminal (O"1tEPl1o.nKov) by some, which is

Athanasius·s identification of this Creator with the specifically Christian God contains as an essential elemem a conception of the \'{Iord which includes analogically the human notions of reason, meaning, order, intelligibility, ete. It is this conception that enables him to make the rhetOrical argument that the intelligibility and order of the cosmos is evidence that its 1-iaker is precisely the logos of the Father: ·'For if the lIlovemem of creation was without reason (aJ.. oyo;) and everything went on haphazardly, one could well

soulless and can neither reason or thin k bur acts merely by an extrinsic aIT according to the skill of the one who applies it. Nor do I mean the word uttered by rational beings which is composed of syllables and expressed in the air. But I speak of the very Word itself which is the living and acti ng God, the \X?ord of the good God of the universe, who is other than the things that are made and all creation. He is rather the one proper «(OlOS 3£ Ko.t 116\10;) Word of the good Father, who has ordered all the universe and enlig htens it by his providence. As the good Wo rd of the

48

49

CQ,\jTRt'. GE ,\ ;'TE$ - DE

r'\"CAR~'ATIQNE

good. Father, he has ordered the arrangement of all things, combining together contrary things and composing from them a single harmony, (CG 40; Thomson, p , 110) In his efforu to retain the emphasis on divine involvement in the world while providing a corrective co Sroic immanentism, Athamsius has recourse to the Platonic categories of panicipation, which presume a radical ontological gulfben>.'een that which participates and that which is participated, So, immediately following che Scoic influence manifested in the section dealing with God's pervasive and harmonizing action within the universe,51 we encounter a suong Platonic influence in Athanasius's effort ro concexcuaiize divine involvement in rhe world within che framework of creaturely participacion in divine power,~2 The Platonic notion of participation is ideal for Achanasius's task prl"Ciseiy because it signifies simulcaneously relations of both opposition and similitude, For chat which is participated and that which participates focmally consei[Uce a relation of strict mutual opposition. However, che very na[Ure of this relation of opposition is the grounds for a likeness between chac which participates and that which is participated. The similitude is thus consequent upon che opposition. and the opposition pe~veres within rhe likeness itself, insofar as the likeness is grounded in and chrough it. In short, thac which is participaced uanscends chat which participates it, in the vel')' act of granting it a ·share- or likeness of itself. In its nacive Platonic milieu, chI' framework of participation provides an articulation of the relation be~'~n the realm of being and that of becoming. h foet'ks to articulate a conception of the latter's toral derivation from and strict dC'p('ndence upon rhe former, and yet within chac COntrast, it affirms a kind of link through a radical relationship of ontological communication. While (his communication grounds some kind of similitude. however distant, the vel')' Structure of the communication is maximally asymmeuical, as is expressed by distinguishing che (WO poles of the relat ion in terms of activity and passivity. It can readily be appreciated that such a framework, despite its philosophical provenance, is highly serv iceable in a religious setti ng. Its particular affinity with a Christian theocenttism can be seen in the biblical texts that Athanasius tends to cite when he uses the terminology of participation. To take only tWO significant examples, we will consider Colossians 1:15-18 and the opening \'erses from the prologue ro the Gospel of John, As we saw earlier, in CG 41,

)0

Athanasius says that creation "'participates (IlE'taAa).1lXtvOOOct) in the Word who is truly from rhe Father and is helped by him so as to exiSt, This was done so that whac would ha\'e happened to creation apart from the Word did not happen - namei)" relapse inco nothingness, 'For he is the image of the in"isible God, the first- born of all creation, because through him and in him subsise all things, visible and invisible, and he is the head of the church; as the ministers of che mlth teach in the holy writings, - This passage expresses che typically Athanasian move from God's seif-
It is thus the omniporem, all-holy, and perfect Word of the Father himself who is present to all things and extends his own power everywhere, enlightening all things visible and in"isible. containing and binding them to himselU~ He leaves nothing deprived of his power bur enlivens and protects all things everywhere, both individually and collecti,"ely, He combines inco one ehe principles of all sensible substance - the hot and cold, che moist and dry _ and causes them not to conflict but to issue in a single concordant harmony, Through him and his power (Ill' ain:o ... Kat 't'; ... aut ou ouvaj.nv) fire does not fight with cold, nor the moist with che dry; but things which of

51

COSTRA GENTES-DE ISCARN .... TIOSE

CONTRA GE N TES-DE INCAR_"-ATlONE

themselves are opposites come togecher like friends and kin, animacing the visible world, and ~oming the principles of exiscence for bodies. By obedience to this Word of God things on c:anh receive life and things in heaven subsist. Through him all the sea and the great ocean limir their mo\'ements to their proper boundaries, and all the dry land is covered with all kinds of different plants, as I said above. And so that I do not have to prolong my discourse by naming each visible thing, there is nothing exiscing or created which did not come into being and subsist in him and through him (EV aU1"q, lCClt 01· Clmou), as the theologian says: "'In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and ehe Word was God. All things were made by him, and without him nothing was made Uohn

life and order to creation. Such a concepnon is quite dose co Origen's, whe're che Son's being Image of the Facher and his being archecype of creation are also imimaceiy connecced.~6 With Athanasius, how~·er, the' comple'ce lack of an}' hint of subordination serves co ce'inforce' che' simuItaneiry herv.·een the Word's ttanscende'nt relation wich chI' Father and his condescension to crt'ation: ··For he' is the Word and wisdom of che Father, and at the same time condesce'nds (O"U"f1\:at$1....,wv) to creatures to give' chem chI' knowlC'dge' and conception of his bC'gener'· (CG 47). Thus the racionality and harmony of che creation lC'3c:is (Q an acknowledgement of the power of the Word and, simultaneously, to a conception of the' Father. The universe' manifests not only a vague' ~generic· divine presence but the relation between the \\'Toed and the Fa(her.~~ Ic bears a certain rest'mblance to [he Word who, in rum. bears an absoluce rest'mblance to the Father, and conveys access co the Father. The' cC'SC'mblance' betwC'C'n creation and God is the reflection ad txfra of the divine condc:scension, while che divine transce'ndence is manifesrC'
1:1 -3}.~

(CG 42; Thomson, pp. 114-16)

At the same eime, che participation model is also serviceable for disringuishing het>lleen che {dations of Soo-Father, and creation-Word. T he Son does noc panicipate in the Fathe r; rather creanon partiCIpates in the Son, and in this v.""2Y has access to che Father: His holy d isciples teach chat evecything was created through hi m and for him, and that the true Son, who is che good offspring of the One who is Good, is che power of the' Fathe r and his wisdom and Word; not so by participacion (ou KCl1"o. jl€'t"O;C"v), nor do these properties come to him from outside W;ro9£v) in the way of those who participace (jl£'rEXOV1"ClC;) in him and are given wisdom in him, and chus bC'come' capable and rational in him. But he is wisdom iC5Clf, Word itself (alxo)"o-{os), light itsdf, trum itsdf, justice' itself, virrue iudf, and the ve'ry power, stamp, effulgence, and image of che Farher. To sum up, he is chI' supremdy pertC'Ct issue of the Father, and is alone Son, the unchanging image of chI' Father. (CG 46; Thomson, p. 130)

Theological anthropology

This passage brings our the Trinicarian background of Athanasius·s cosmology. Ic is because chI' Son is a pC'rtect image and issue ( 1Cap7t"~) of the Fathe r that he contains in himself, and not as someching accidencal or advemicious, the archetypal qualities which give

In our analysis up co this point, we have already found opportunities co commenc on the' place' of theological anthropology in relation co other ehem~s in Athanasius. As we begin a mor~ focused inquiry into this important area of Athanasius's theology, we ha..·e recout"SC' to a significant text, which may justifiably be qUOted at length, since it serves as both a summary of some our p!C'vious points and an entry into a more specialized consideration of our immediate: concern. Straight after the rejection of the notion of a creamr who is distinct from the' true' God, Athanasius continues:

52

53

CO,'·TRA GESTES - DE l!>.·CARNATlONE

CON TRA GEN TE S- DE J.... C.... R ....·ATlONE

Thus do they mythologize. But the godly teaching of the faith in Christ refutes the'ir foolish talk as god.!C'ssness. It teaches that the' world did not come into being arbitraril}', becaUSe' it did not come lO be without divine' forethought. Neithe'r was it made' from pre-existem maner, for God is not weak. Rather, God brought che universe, which previowly did nO{ exist at all, in any way, from non-being into being through the" Word ... For God is good - or rache'r the source of goodness - and the good has no emy Because he does not begrudge che gin of existence, he made all things from nothing through his prope:r Word, our Lord Jesus Christ. And among these creatures, of all eanhly creat u res he was especially me'rciful toward the human race. Seeing that by the logic of its own generation it would be unable to remai n forever, he gramed it a further gin, not simply creat ing humanity like all irrational animals on the' earth, but making them in his own image and granting t hem also a share in the power of his prope:r Word (jl£--CCl301><; ClOtul~ KClt tft<; "Co\) i3iou AO),OU 3uvCr.JlEro,;), so thac having as it were shadows of che Word and being made rational (AO),lKOi), [hey might be able to n~ma in in blessedness and live the true life in paradise, which is really that of the saints. (D! 3; Thomson. pp. 138-40)

dence is only one side' of che coquacion, the creamrd}' side. On the other side, Athanasiw emphasizes asain God's goodness: - For God is good .. . Thus, be<;. For an appreciation of the fundamental structure of Athanasius's anthropology, it is necessary to probe t he implications and resonances of this terminology in relarion to the test of his teaching. Wich regard co the notion of XaptS, first of all, we m us t note that its significance is fully ascertained onl}' with a \'iew to its correlative, q)"ums, though we immediately hasten to diswciate this terminology from a nature-grace disrinction concei\·ed along a scholastic or post-scholastic model. Rather, it has been rightly pointed out that the fJli:lc;l~-xapl S distinction in Athanasiw belongs within t he more radical framev.-·ork of the fundamental distinction between created and uncreated.}9 Within this framev.-·ork, the fJlixnC; of created beings is precisely their creatureliness, che fact of having come to be ftom nothing as essentially constitutive of an inherent proclivity tOward that nothingness. 4>6crtC; thw represents the radical dependency of the creature on rhe One who brought it into being , and apart from whom it is powerI~s to sustain itself in being. If we understand rpi)(n~ not as ··la somme des ~l~ments qui consticuenc la nacure humaine '· but as ·'Ia qualinO: meme d 'ene creature,..(,(J we can correcdy appreciate Athanasius·s characte'rizarion that Mall created narure (--CtlV 'Y£VTrttlV

The first point of consideration suggestC"d by this passage is the significance of its immediate context, its particular place in the flow of argument. Athanasiw moves d irecdy from the refutation of cenain conceptions of creation ro the presentation of a theological anrhropology. The implication is that a proper understanding of t he' relation between humanity and God can only be obtained within the concexc of a proper conception of the relation betwecon God and all of creation. As to th~ lau~r, the' crucial point is che sovereignty M of God (Msince God IS not weak ), which is to be upheld against any notion of creacion·s independ~nce from God, even in the guise of unformed mann The strict and tocal dependency of creation on God is thus the primary characterization of their relationship, which is symbolized by che act of God's bringing crC'arion from noching inco being (£~ OUx: ov'twv ... ElS "to Shut). T he p roper concext for conceiving che celation berwecon God and humanity is thus this radical de'pe:ndency of all that comes to be on the God who brings it into being. H owever, this absolute depen-

55

COSTRA GENTES - DE lNC~RSATIO."E

CONTRA Gf.NTES - DE INCIIRSATIO.I\.'E

1t00aav lpUmv) is in flux and subject to dissolution and carries within iu being the "'risk of rerurning (0 nothing~ (CG 41). On che other lund, ;(o:pu; represents God's solicitude coward creation, often articulated in terms of protecting creation from in inherent nothingness by continually supporting it in being. ~Iest it suffer a relapS(: into non-existence if it were not protected. by the Word~ (ibid.). The terminology of ;Ccipl~, ie neds also be said, is intimaceiy related to the framework of participation. Such a pacricipation, we recall, preserves intact the essential otherness between God and creation; God remains outside creation by his essence, but allows creation [0 share in his power. This participation affords creation the stability which it inherendy lacks; it enlivens and orders all creation. In this passage, the connection berween che term xftpu; and the fnmework of partiCipation may be observed in the convergence of two secs of terminology. Thus Xapu; is described in terms of God giving human ity a share in his power, OUVCtJ.lU;. The verb employed is J.lEtaoi&o).ll, the correlative of J.l€WI.CtJ.l!XtVW. And the effect of this sharing is that humanity becomes, as it were, "shadows" of the Word, anocher reference [0 the participation model. 61 But, of course, Athanasius elsewhere employs the panici. pation model and vocabulary to speak of the sharing of the whole creation in me beneficent OUVClJ.ll~ of the Word, a sharing which mak~ the whole world a -shadow ~ and reflection of the Word. 62 In humanity, howeyer, the reflenion achieves an altogether different level, and it is this qualitative difference that is articulated in terms of humanity·s being Kat· El.K6\'1l.. We must now try to tease OUt che significaru:e of [his qualification. Athanasius undersrands humanity's being Min the image,M as derintive from the Word·s being the Image of the Father. H e resen·es the term, "image ,~ to tbe Son alone, as a perfect reflection of the Father. 63 Humanity, therefore, is the ·'image of the image." Its similarity to God is thus fundamema.l.ly articulated as a participation in the Son·s archec}llal relationship of similitUde to the Father. This point alem us to the Trinitacian background of Athanasius·s anthropology le also provid~ us with a fundamental insight into the logic whereby Athanasius asS(:rn that onk [he tcue Image can renew the impaired or lost image wichin us. That is because our being in the image of God is derivative from (i.e., a participation in) the natural (i .e., unparticipated, substantial) simi litude of the Son to the Father. If we are fully cogn izant of the participation model that is implied in Athanasius's understanding

of KCl, ' Eixova, and the Trinicarian framework that undergirds it. we ace much more likely co fed the force of Athanasiw's logic on ehis point .M While following Origen on the poim of humanity"s being Mimage of the Image," Athanasius departs from Origen as well as Irenaeus and Clement in not making a distinction betw~n ··image·' and "similimde." In these earlier writers, the distinction is generally made berv.·een a preliminary bestowal of divine likeness upon humanity and an eschatological fulfillmem of huma.nity·s similitude co the di\'ine.6~ A rationale for chis de parture may be provided, admittedly by way of sheer speculation, if we attend to Athanasius·s pervasive efforts to find correspondences rather tban disconrinuities beeween the orders of creation and redemption. While such a project is also integral to the theology of Irenaeus, i[ s~ms co be much more systematically and rigorously applied in Athanasius. in the imerest of this project, it seems understandable that Athanasius wants to emphasize as much as possible the intimacy of human communion with the divine in the original creation, as an analogue to the intimate union achieved between God and creation in the incarnation. In the same way in which he has transferred the terminology of mercy, which is usually employed to characterize God 's moti\"~ for the incarnation, to mat of creation. he is also reading back into the original creation che closest possible communion between God and humaniry. The closeness of this communion then aces as a standard, an expression of God's purpose in creating humanity. which sin undermines and che incarnation repairs. It seems consistent with the logic of Athanasius's projecr co emplusize, ta[her than to understate, humaninrs commun ion wieh God in the original creation. 66 . It is now necessary to dwell somewhat on Achanasius·s characteriunion of this communion. this "added grace..· A question thae immediately suggests itself is how he distinguishes it from the grace of che participation of creation generally in the Word. To begin with, we can hardly disagree with Roldanus·s judgement that ~Ia participation 3. l"lmage de Dieu est, sinon le fru.it d 'une action eout aU{[~, du mains d·une tout autre incensite et d·une toue autre valeur que la participation du cosmos au Lo~os: par la connaissance de Dieu, elle ~t intime et personelle.~6 Athanasius certainly emphasizes the spiritual and, as it were, interpersonal nature of this rela tion, and he does this b~· his chamcterization of the condition of being ·'in the image" through the Platonic vocabulary of contemplation. While the grace afforded to all creation presen'C'S it from

56

57

H

CO!,'TRA GE.";YES-DE INCIIRNATJO " -E

C ON TR A

GENT E 5 ~ DE

1,,'CARNATlONE

dissolution into disorder and non-being, and brings che distiner partS into a harmonious whole, that afforded to humanity is described primarily in terms of humanity's conscious knowledge and awareness of God and his work. Thus humanity was made ~pe rceptive (8EropTft'ijV) and understanding (ttnO"'fTu-to\ 'a ) of reality through its similarity with God," and endowed with an imaginative conception, or a mental image, of God (cpa.vtaaia 1t£p\ HEOU) (CG 2; Thomson, p, 6). This consciousness of God makes the relationship of humanity to God not one of strict passivity, but one that may be described in terms of dialogue or conversation: O"uVoj.l1/,ia. 68 \Vhile all of creation is subject to the beneficent activit}' of God, therefore, globally characterized as providence, only humanity is conscious of this activity with regard to both itself and the rest of the world, and ~is filled wirh admiration when it apprehends his providence cowards the universe- (CG 2). In this way, the relation between humanity and God is consciously apprehended by the latter with an attendant joy, desire, and blessedness (ibid.). Yet if we want co probe deeper into che shape of Athanasius's anthropology and to appreciate the particular resonances ic has within his whole \'ision, it is necessary to go farther than a general reference to the spiritual character of the human--d.ivine relation, albeit q"alified as -d'une tout autre intensite. - We need, in faCt. to attend to the fundamemal paradigm that go\'erns Athanasius's conception of the relation between God and creat ion and then discern how he concei ....es the relation bern'een God and humanicy in terms of [hat parad igm. This fundamental paradigm is the frame· work of panicipation with its double polarity of activity and passivity. A careful analysis of Athanasius's description of the rela· tion berween humanity and God as tompared with his treatment of tbat between God and the rest of creation wiU r~veal that the former contains a far more nuanced and modified version of the passivit),-activit)' paradigm, while still remaining within it. \Ve haw already had occasion to see that, for Athanasius, creation's very crearureliness (iLS
emphasizes God's activity and the passi\'ity of the uni\'erse. Indeed, che very unity of the cosmos signifies ultimately not so much any immanent power of cohesion as the fact that its "ruler and governor ('fOV aut ftr; apxovtcl Kcd itY€flo\'a ) is not many but one" (CG 38; Thomson, p. 104). As its ruler, God "guides and arranges «haK\)j3EpvQ, ... Kat Olo.KOO).l£\) the universe for our sah'ation, and acts as $ttms best to him~ (CG 40; Thomson. p. 110). Such ptotection :md maintenance come exclusively from the divine sphere; they are described in terms [hat consistently COntrast divine activity with creaturely passivity. The life of the universe is but the effecc of ~ th~ li .... ing and acting God, ~6i\"ta Kat Ev£pyft etc.v" (ibid.). \'Xlith regard to the relation between God and humanity, however, the maner is rather more complex. O ne very striking point, which has not be-en noted sufficiently b}, previous interpreters, is chat, despite his use of the terminolog}' of governance (ir(tflovio.) to describe God's acrivit}' in relation to creation as a whole, Athanasius nowhere, to my knowledge, uses this terminology to describe God's aCtivity in relacion to humanity. This faCt in itsdf indicates that the passivity or receptivity of humanity to the beneficent and susraining power of the Word is of a different order than that of the rest of creation. The crucial difference is that humanity is ordained not only to receive and manifest this power, and not only to recei\'e and manifest it consciously, bue, most crucially, it is ordained to recei ....e it accivel},.iO That is, humaniry is charged with the responsibility and the fundamental vocation of persevering in its receptivity to divine grace by an aCtive striving. Arhanasius describes humanity as not ani), protected and maintained by the Word, bue also as charged with che task of consciously assenting and clinging to this procection and maintenance. Thus, the ~added grace" bestowed upon humanity comes with the condit ion that humanity itSelf mainrains its accessibility to this grace. Its "likeness" to God is simultaneous with the \'ocation co strive to retain that lik~ness: "so that as long as ic preserved (O'~OlV) this likeness it would never depart from its conception of God or abandon the com pan~' of the holy ones, but holding on to (i XOlV) the grace of the Giver, and also the proper power of the Father's Word, it might rejoice and com'erse with God, li..-ing a life free from harm, truly blessed and immonal" (CG 2; Thomson , p. 6). Another striking observation gleaned from an attenciveness to Athanasius's terminology is that whereas God's acti..-e rdation to the cosmos in general is charaCtcristically described in terms of the Word's ksecu r ing~ and mamraming its e Xi5t~nCe,~1 in the case of

58

'9

CONTRA GENTES-DE fNCARNATlOSE

C OSTRA GESTES - DE INCARSATI O:';"E

humanity, there is a cerrain transference and ~sharjng - of this very terminology ~tween the Word and humaniry. \Xfhile it remains true that the Word is the primary agent in the securing and maimeDance of humanity, humanity itself is called to secure and maimain itself in its accessibilir}' co the prior activity of the Word. Dt 11lcamationt 3 offers an instance of this transference of rerminology. First Athanasius says that God, knowing humanity's natural inability ro remain forever (e£(Opi)o~ ~ otx hcovov E:1T1 KO-t O. 'tOY 'tfie; Uiia<; "(£\'£u£oo; 'i..oyov ola)l£v£lv net), granted it a special parricipation in the power of the Word, so that it mighr be able to remain (Ota)lEv£l v) in feliciey- Then he goes on to speak of human free will, and in that context, the active funCtions of securing and maintaining are seen to be "passed on~ from the Word to humanity itself:

T he power of free choice (it npoalpecn9 thus conditions the active passive paradigm that is integral to the parricipation model, insofar as it is meant to lead humaniry into an anive clinging to the prior beneficent activity of the Word. \VIe have shown that humanit}', in comrast to the mt of creation, is not characterized as merely being maimained and being secured by the grace of the Word, but as irself ordained to secure the grace given to it and thus to remain in the beaticude of divine communion. However, we should not get carried away by this insight into thinking that the fundamental paradigm has been strucrurally altered. h remains always true, in Athanasius, that God is essentially anive while

creation, including humanity, is essentially passive. With human in-, as with all creation, ics maimenance and well-being is mteriy deriv:ltive from the grace of parricipation in the divine power. In the case of humanity, it is only a question of an attenuation or ouancing, albeit a very crucial one, of the stance of passivity. We may perhaps articulate this attenuation, in seemingly paradoxical terms, by saying that humanity's special position is that of being ordained to acti \'ely maimain its own passivit}'. Hitherro, we have been analyzing Athanasius's anthropology in terms of the relation between humanity and God. This approach is consistent with AthanasiLlS·s own, for he is much less interested in an analysis of the immanent structurt'" of the human being tban he is with humanity's relation to God. ~2 Or, more correctly, he sees me relation with God as coostiruti"e of the inregrir)' of the human being, since the quimes.sence of beinS human is the Ka·t" ElKO\'a, which is a parricipacion in the Logos that qualifies the human being as I.oync6<;.7; An anal}'sis of his description of me struc[Ure of the human being only sen·es to reinforce this point. Since Athanasius does nOt offer a systematic reaching on the structure of the human being in anyone place, we mLlSt carry out this analysis by illuminating the key terms used by him and clarifying their associations. The principal terms arc VD&;, "IjIUxit. and UW)lCl. We hasten w note chat the use of chese three terms should not lead us directly w the assumption that AthanasiLlS is speaking of three different ~parts~ of the human being.- 4 Our manner of proceeding, then, must be to discern the panicular connotations and resonances attached to each of rhese terms within the ~exi steotial and relational- perspective of Athanasius·s anthropology. To begin with, it is the VDU<; which rea.I1~· determines the human beinS as a whole; it does this by determining the human being·s relation to God, by either fixing itself on God or turning: away from God.-3 The vo{k; is thus always associated by Arhanasius with communion with God; that is its principal characteriution. Through me voiX;, the relation of parricipation in me power of the Word becomes a conscious dynamic of self-orientation toward God. -6 T his is a dynamic of innate self-transcendence expressed in terms of ecstatic comemplation.-- The voUr; is thus the human being·s self-actualization of its having been created in the image of God. Its significance within the overall structure of che human being may well be summed up by the gospel saying about the ·'eye" which is the lamp of che body: ~If your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light; bur if your eye is unhealth}'. your whole

60

61

Furthermore, knowing that the human will could cum either '9.'ay and anticipating this, he l«"lmd (iJutpaHUU1:0) the grace given to them by a law and a set place. For he brought them inco his own paradise and gave them a law, so that if Iht)' guarded the grace and rtmained good (1va £1 )lEv qlU/.a~atEv 1'l}V lap\\' Kat j.l£V01£V KaAOi.) they would retain the life of paradise, without sorrow, pain, or '9.·orry. ~ides having the promise of incorruption in heaven. But if they transgressed and turned away and became evil, they would know that they would suffer the corru ption consistent with their nacure, in death, and would no longer live in paradise, but in future they would die outside it and remain in death and corruption (J.1EvElV £V 1'0 9a\'cl1lp Kat £V "tU
CONTRA GENTES-DE INCARNATlOI\·E

body will be full of darkness" (Mr. 6:22-3). As che spiritual eye of che human being, the vou~ is constituted by "le regard ena{ique ~78 which is the vision of God. The \jtUXtl is not explicitly differentiated by Aehanasius from \'o~. It would appear, however, that the former is a more general term, denoting che spiritual nature of humanity.c9 When he dwells specificatly on the soul, however, the term tends {Q be correlated with the body. Thus rhe 'VUXT! is spoken of as the "pilot " or governor of the body,80 and is active with respecr co the body's passivity.SI It Sttms, in general, that the primary association evoked by \'0Ut; is chac of relation to God, while che primary association evoked by 'VUXT! is its rdation {Q the body. The term, ·\jf1>xn, then, generally funCtions within a more analytical perspective, one that is concerned with the internal struCture of {he human being, while \'o\><; is used co refer {Q the more global orientat ion of the human being, as determined by its relation co God. Finally, with respect {Q the body (o6)J.ux), it might in itially seem that chis cerm carries an essentially negative connotation for Athanasius, insofar as he describes the ··fall" of humaniry in terms of an oriC'n[3tion toward the body.82 A closer rC"aciing, however, dispels this superficial impression.!l3 For Athanasius, the ethical status of the body is noe ontologically predetermined - as ie would be for the Gnoseics, for example. Rather, che body is the crucial existential locus for the exercise of human fr«"
listen to the di\·ine sayings and the Jaws of God, and hands in order co do necessary actions and eo screech them Out m God in prayer, yet the soul abandoned (he contemplation of the good 'and its proper movement within chat sphere, and was from (hen on decC'ivM and mO\'M in che opposite direction. T hen, seeing its powet, as I said above, and misusing ie, it realized that it could also move its bodily members in cbe opposite dire([ion. (CG 4 ; Thomson, p. 17) The body, therefore, possesses its own intrinsic teleology, as ordained to the acknowledgemC'nt and worship of God. However, ir is dependent on (he prior determination of the soul, which eithC'r confirms this teleology or per...ens it into a mo ...emenc ~in rhe opposite direction. Bes ides being the derivative expression of the sours orientation wward or away from God, we may further specify the panicular significance of the body, with regard to che relacion co God, as symbolizing humanity's self-possession. In Athanasius·s own terms, the body represents for humanity, ··what is closest to itself": But human beings, despising better things and drawing back from che apprehension of these, sougbt racher what was closer to themselves ( 'ta EYlutEPW ~a~}.o\' EaU'tmv E~frtT)O(tV) - and what was closer to chem was the body and its sensacions. So chC'}' turned thei r minds away from intell igible realities and began to consider themselves. (CG 3; Thomson, p. 8)84

Knowing its own power of freedom (t o airtE~OUm.oV), the soul sees that it can use its bodily members in both directions - in the way of being or of non-being. Now the good is being, whereas evil is non-being. I call being good because it has ies exemplar in God who is Being: and I call non-being evil because it has no real being, but is conceived by false human noeions. For although the body has eyes in order m view creation and through its harmonious order m recognize the Creamr, and ears in order to

Subde as it may be and difficult co re-articulate, this assigning of the body the role of being "what is closest" to humanity goes to [he hean of Achanasius's conception of human bodiliness, and, we shaH set", ie has significance also for his conception of Christ"s bodiliness .8~ In any case, we do noe find any other explicit scacemem of the position of the body within the human Structure. The logic of this designation, however, is found in a perspective wherein anthropology is conceived as constituced by che dynamics of relation co God. Within this dynamic, the proper condition of humaniry is conceived as a kind of self-transcendence. As such, the proper condition of humanity was originally meanc co be [hat of ··transcending·' ehe senses and ··all human things ( HCt.V'CCt a\'9proHt \'a Ot$t;), rising high above che world, in order co see

62

63

ta

(ONTRA GENTES - DE IN(AR."A T W8E

(Or-.·TRt'o GES TES -DE IS C.1RNIITl ONE

the W ord and, in him, also the Father of rhe Word" (CC 2; Thomson, p. 6). It would be a mistake to conclude, therefore, that ail which is to be transcended - the body, the senses, and, ulti mately, the world - is bad. Rather, ail is good and used well so long as it is within that dynamic of self-transcendence. The body, then, seems to represem for Athanasius what most immediately belongs to humanity, as its own, and thus what is primarily to be transcended. The soul is not conceived in the same way - as that wh ich is to be transcended - not because it is namrally superior to the bod" or more ··divine,'· but simply because the soul is supposed to be the organ which actually effects this self-transcendence. In other words, the soul is conceived more as the subject of self-transcendence and the body as what has to be [famcended. Moreover, it bears repeating once more, the body is not the object of this selfcraoscendence because it is evil, but precisely because it is what is ··closest to humanity." Surprisingly then, and in a striking departure from a prevailing Platonic identification of humanness with the soul (which is basicaIly the position of Origen), it seems that for Arhanasius the '·seImess" of being human resides particularly in the body.86 Athanasius arrives at this quite original conception not by way of attempting a conscious corrective but, as we have said, because his anthropology is so radically and pervasively determined by the perspective of relation to God. As such, a fundamental paradigm of his anthropology is rhe interplay between self-regard (we could even say, self-relatedness) and self-transcendence (i.e., relation to God). It is as if Athanasius conceived of the relation benveen God and humanity as a straight line limited. by twO poles: on one extreme, God; on the other extreme, the self and specifically the body.si Humaniry"s turn to the body, then, is a matter of choosing not what is intrinsically bad, bur what is most immediately its own, rather than orienting itself toward God. Ir is opting for self-indulgence over the self-transcendence of contemplation of God .ss Conversely, in turning away from the body and clinging with the vo1)s to divine reality, humanity is orienting itself av."'ay from what is closest to irself. It is thus seeking the term of the movement of its desire not in itself, not in what mOSt belongs to it, but in God. T he body itself, however, may participate in this upward ascent which is decisively initiated by the vou.;. Arhanasius·s anthropology is thus one in which the whole Structure of the human being is conceived as properly ordained tOward God. Moreover, since the condition of rhe human being seems centrally determined by the orientation of the voUs, and since the

voue; itself is characterized as the primary locus of the encounter with God, we can speak of the relation with God as constitutive of the human person in Arhanasius's anthropology. To put the maner thus already goes some way to explain the inappropriateness of such a question as whether the image of God resides within the human structure or only in relation to God, a question to which Roldanus devotes some energy. It must be said that such a question derives both its motivation and its attendant conceptual framework from a post-scholastic Reformation polemic against a cerrain reading of post-scholastic Catholic conceptions of rhe capacities of nature as compared to grace. The fallacy of such an approach being imposed ·on Athanasius is exposed by the recognition that the '·either/or" alternatives in which the question is meant to be answered - either the image belongs to rhe human StruCture or it belongs [0 the '·grace·· of the relation with God - simply do not exist as exclusive alternatives in Athanasius 89 It seems wisest, therefore, to dismiss the dichotomy represented by such a question as quite foreign to the perspective of Athanasius's anthropology, in which the relation to God is constitutive of the human being as such. There is thus a convergence in Arhanasius between ~inherent struCture" and ··relation to God~90 which renders fallacious any attempt to analyze his anthropology in terms of a preconceived framework based on a mutually exclusive opposition. Another problem, beset by similar complications, is represented by the question of whether the image of God is lost or simply impaired by sin.91 Again, it would be naive to fail to see how rhe energy of such a q uestion in our own time derives its momenrum also from Reformatio n- Roman Catholic polemics. This time, however, we are also faced with internal complications, for the text itself seems to suggest now one alternative and now another. 92 However, it is this very fluidity or seeming e'i"'aSiveness that should :lien us to the fact thar the issue did not present irself to Athanasius as ··cur and dried~ as it seems to be for some of his critical interlocutors. fn fact, the possibility has to be reckoned with that the very endeavor to arrive at a ··yes·· or ~no" answer to the quest ion of whether the image is retained after sin - or, eVen if we put it in slightly more nuanced terms, whether the image is lost or impaired - itself indicates an altogether too reified conception of image_ If by ·' image" we mean the relation with God, as Athanasius himself seems to mean , then Achanasius himself set'ms to answer chat this relation is decisively broken by sin, and yet that it does not altogether disappear after sin. That it is broken by sin is

64

65

CO!\' TKA GE _ I\.' TES-DE INCARN .... TIONE

COSTRA GESTES - DE lNCAR ,",'/\TIONE

indicated, not merely by an isolated passage, but by the whole argument of the De incamafiollf, which is that nothing shorr of the incarnation of God could renew this relationship. That it did not altogether disappear after sin is again indicated not only by passages that continue to speak of humanity as AOYU((><; aftet sin, but also by thl.' whole dramatic movement of tbe De In£d17lOtiolle, in which the incarnation takes place at the penukimate moment before hwnaniry's utter demise. We must reconcile ourseh-es, therefore, with the uncomfonable fact that to our dearly defined question, Athanasius seems to answer a resounding ·'yes and no. "'9, The point that he himself intends unquestionably to make is that sin represented a definite breakdown in the relacion between humanity and God, which could not have been repaired from the human side, and required nothing shon of God's coming into the flesh to be repaired from the divine side. To be sure, even on this last point , certain critics have found Athanasius·s position ambivalent. Focusing especially on Contra GenIe! 30-4, they have considered Arnanasius to be saying that human beings can return to God by themselves, merely by contemplation, and apan from the grace of the incarnation. 94 Since such a posit ion is obviously at variance with the whole argument of the double treatise, these critics have understood Athanasius to be making a temporary conces5ion to G reek sensibiliry in the interest of apologetics - a concession, however, which is inconsistent with the rest of his argument. And yet nowhere does Athanasius say that the human being's inward gaze of contemplation, by which the rerum to GOO is facilitated, takes place aparr from the grace of Christ. To simply assume that Athanasius means this, and then charge him with inconsistency, seems unjust. ~rhat accounts for this assumption has in fact probably less [Q do with the text itself than with a preconceived framework by which the tWO sections of the work seem to be undetstood, perhaps even unconsciously, as D e Natura and De Grwia; Of at least as "before and after" the incarnation. However, the distinction of the twO pans of the treatise is not such thar the first parr entirely abstracts from the incarnation. Indeed., the incarnation is even read into the account of creation in chI.' Contra GmteJ, as when the Word through whom the Facher creates, ··orders the universe and COntains and provides for all things,·' is simply idemified as "our Lord Jesus Christ. "9~ Similarly, when we read that God can be found by looking into one's own $.Oul, what we ha ...·e [Q understand is not that we can return to God apart from the grace of the incarnation, but rather that, precisely

through the incarnation of Christ, the knowledge of God has been renewed within us according to the mysterious working of Him who is ··invisibly persuading··')6 e,,-en his enemies to acknowledge his Lordship and that of the Father. Indeed., sinful humanity>s incapaciry to renew its relat ion w ith God by its own powers is but the extension of the principle that the relatiOn berw~n humanity and GOO, eyen in the original creation, i ~ wholly initiated and maintained by GOO. While humanity is enjoined to actively persevere in maintaining its acces.sibiliry to this grace, such activity is primarily a perseverance in receptivity. Sin represents a decisive breakdown in this perseverance in receptivity one that cannot be repaired from the human side precisely because it is this receptivity itself by which humanity has access to the divine aCtivity that is broken by sin. The incarnation thus represents the renewal of [he relation between God and humanity in a way that confirms the original structure of the relation, in which there is a correlative emphasis between divine aCtivity and human receptiyity to this activiry. To pursue our analysis of this renewed relation, we broach che subject of Christology and redemption.

We ha\'e already pointed out that, insofar as the Contra GmteJ- De incamatioll£ is an apologetic work, the apology is focused specifically 7 011 the scandal of the cross.9 The treatise is cOllceived and designed with a view ro defending the Christian faith that the one who was cmcwed on [he cross is really GOO. From [his scarting point, Chrisrologr and a cerrain presemation of redemption that is cemeeed around the incarnation of the Logos play the central r6te in the conception and argument of the work. Ar the same time, the efforr to defend [he rational "fittingness" of such notions as an incarnate and crucified GOO involves, for Athanasius, presenting the fundamental consistency between God's way of relating to the world th roug h the5e salvific events and through the basic structu re of crea(ion. 98 in other words, Athanasius presents the fittingness of the Christian view of redemption by proving its coherence with the radical strucrure of the relation between God and creation. Fundamentally, such a presentation unfolds on rn'O fronts. First, he attempts to present the incarnation as consistent with divine immanence and involvement in the world; second, he insists that the incarnation in no way detracts from the transcendence that properly

66

67

Chrisrology and redemption in the Gelltes-De 11lcarnatione

C Olltra

CONTRA GENTES - DE INCARN.1TIONE

CO,....· T R .1 GE .\"TE S- DE INCARNA Tl OSE

belongs to God. By following his arguments on these (WO fronts, we may arrive at an appreciation of the contextual fmmework that governs the Christology of the Crmtra GmteJ-De lTuarnalione. Athanasius·s presentation of the incarnation as consistent with divine immanence implicitly pervades the whole treatise and determines its entire structure. One of the primary means by which the C Olltra Grow prepares the way for the De lnfanlatior.f is by showing how all of creation is radically and absolutely dependent on God·s sustaining involvement in the world, and how humanity has willfully withdrawn from this salutary dependence. This theme bewmes fully explicit in the conclusion of the first part of che trearise, which effeCts the cransition ro the theme of the incarnation of the \\'ord :

claim that the Word was manifested in the body? Yet even they would admit that it was not unsuitable <1.11) at6n~) for this to occur, if they were friends of the truth. If they completdy deny that there is a \\'lord of God, they are acting foolishly in mocking at what they do not know. But if the}' confess that there is a Word of God and that he is the go ....ernor of all things, and that in him the Father made creation, and that by his providence all things are enlightened, enlivened, and exist, and that he reigns over all, so that by the works of his providence he is known and through him the Father - consider, r beg you, if they are not inadvertently bringing ridicule upon themselves. (D/4 1; Thomson, pp. 734, 236)

But although this is so and nothing exists outside him, but heaven and earth and all that is in them depend on him (£;'llPtTlJ.I.evCl)V (xv'tou), human beings foolishly rejected knowledge of him and true piety, and honoured what is not rather than what is; and instead of the uuly existent God thev, have deified what is not, ·\vorshipping creation instead of the creator·' {Rom. 1:2')], which is fool ish and ImpIOUS. (CG 47; Thomson, p. 132)

Athanasius thus ch:l.facterizes the rationale of the incarnation in terms of divine providence, ··1tpIJVOta," which tc.'rm is used by him to refer to God's immanent activity in general, extending also to the radical sustenance by which creation is preserved in being. In this context, the incarnation is '<,iewed as a further instance of this immanent enlivening and sustaining activity of God. If God can be ·"in" rhe cosmos in gene-ral, why can he not come to be ~in a man"'? To further dramatize this point, Athanasius has recourse to the Stoic conception of the cosmos as a body. In this way, he can all the more neatly make his poim that the notion of God's being in a human bOO.y is no more ridiculous than that of his being in the cosmos:

In turn, the De l'lfanlatiOlle presents the incarnation as a renewal and re-establishment of God's beneficem and powerful involvemem in the world. 99 T he consistency between divine involvemem in the cosmos and the intervention of the Word in the incarnation is articulated in a key passage, which we may take as indicative of the whole stfUcrure and strategy of Athanasius's argument throughout the double treatise. Here. in De illcanlafione 41, we see how Athanasius's cosmology, which shares significant common ground with (Uw: nt philosophical conceptions, ser....es to demonstrate rhe rational ~fit(ingness ·' of the incarnation, by appealing to the principle of divine immanence: As for the Greeks, one is most amazed chat they laugh at things which should not be mocked ... But since our exposition is nor lacking in proofs (£v 6:TCOOEt~Eo"l), let us shame rhem with reasonable arguments (EK t oov Ev,, 6'/Cl)V~ and especially by whar we ourseh'es Sel: . For what is unsui table (titOTCOV) or absurd in our position, except (hat we

The philosophers of the Greeks say thac the universe is a great body; and rightly so. For we peccei\"{' it and its parrs are apparent to our senses. If then the Word of God is in the uni verse, which is a body, and is present to it as a whole and to eVfry part. what is incredible or unsuitable (1"t ato1!ov) in our saying that he came in a man? If it is completely unsuirable that he should be in a body, it would be unsuitable for him to come into the whole and enlighten and move the universe by his providence, for the universe also is a body. But if it is suitable (ltpt.n£l) for him to come into the cosmos and be known in rhe whole of it, it would also be suitable that he should appear in a human body, and that it should be enlightened and moved by him. For the human race is a part of the whole; and if the part is not suitable (anpElttc;) to be his instrument in order to make known his divinity, It

68

69

CONTRA GENTES - DE f N CARNATlONf:

C ONTR A GESTES-DE fNCARNATf OSE

would be most unfitting (a't'o7to)''Ctt'tov) thar he should be known through the whole unive~. (ibid.) In this passage, we !>ee Athanasius striving to demonstrate the inherenr consistency between the structures of creation and redemption to the poim of dramatizing this demonstration by a common vocabulary. In both cases, {he Word acts and manifests himself in a ~body.~ So it is that we find ourselves squarely before the supposed Logos san: CheistOlog}, of Athanasius. But a word of camion is most appropriate at this point, for what we find ourselves squarely before is, to be sure, a Logos-sarx framework, bm perhaps not a Christology at all, in the suict sense. That is, we are noc here presented with a dim:t Christological stuemenr, in the sense of an anal},tic description of the structure of Christ's being. What is crucial fo r interpreting this passage is a proper and properly priori. tized reading of the issues of Christology and cosmoiogr, as well as a sense foc the interests of apologetics, It is actually the apologetic intent that is the key to a correct interpretation of this passage, Athanasius is arguing on behalf of (he ~fittingness" of the incarnation by appealing to divine immanence in the world, in general, While the S(Qic conception of the world as a body funher highlights the consistency between di\'ine immanence in (he incarnation and in (he world in general, we cannot cake Athanasius's use of it as a l','lUrant to speak analytically of a strict Logos--sarx framework, with regard either to cosmology or (Q (he incarnation. Rather than a statement abom the Structure of the cosmos or of rhe Incarnate Word, this passage is concerned, for apologetic purposes, to underscore the consistency between cosmos and incarnation, in terms of divine immanence. In other words, we find here a statement dramatizing the fact of the positive relation between God. and the world and noe an analytical exposition of the strucrure of this relation. 100 A similar situation occurs with rc'gard to the interpretation of Athanasius's descri ption of Christ's body as the instrument, lSpya\'o\', of the Word. This key concept in Athaoasius is also key to GriUmeier's interpretation of his Logos-sarx Christologr: -in che word Opyavov Athanasius sums up the whole significance of the logos-sarx relationship.~ !O I Immediately qualifying his statement by the observarion {hat ~the organon-concepr is [QO indeterminate to provide any information about the Logos-sao: relationship by icself:' \02 he nevenheless inserts this concept into the Logos-san: framework and concludes that ~the flesh becomes an {instrument}

moved direcdy and physically by the Logos. -iO; Such an imerpretation is problematic in more than one wa}', GriUmeier has taken Athanasius's description of the body as instrumem to refer to the mode by which it is moved by che Word: i.e., -directly and physically.~ This again is Grillmeier's analytical perspective, concerned with the relation of parts within the whole, But nowhere in che whole treatise, much less in his use of the -o rganon-concept,~ is Athanasius concerned with the problem of whether the logos mo,·es the body directly or indirectly, which is precisely the distinction that is here implicitly invoked by Grillmeier. This is to say that the problem wich which Grillmeiet is concerned does not arise organically our of the text and can be resoh'ed only by a disrincrion not present to Achanasius. It seems illegitimate therefore to imerpret Athanasius in light of this distinCtion, one that ultimately reduces to rhar berw~ -the mediation of natur31 and supernatural life,which is sucely quite foreign to Athanasius. 104 Secondly, it is "ery hard to understand, in Athanasian terms, what Grillmeier means by interpreting Athanasius as saying that the Logos moves the body "phrsically,- something Achanasius would never say himself, Since the Logos is not a physical entity, it would be JUSt as correct to say that the Logos mOves the body -spirimally.M However, once again, the mode by which the Logos moves the body is not specified by Athanasius. Ultimately, it seems, che problem resides precisely in the fact that GriUmeier is forcing the -organonconcepc of Athanasius into a framework in which it does not belong. As we have said, Grillmeier's preconceived framework is that of analytical Christology; he is concerned w ith the internal composition or structure of the God-man. For Grillmeier, the human soul of Christ is a vital mediating link within thac structure - mediating between the supernarur:tl and natural agency of che Word-madefl esh, So he reviews the development ofChriswlogical dOCtrine with a panicular "iew [Q finding this link or pointing OUt its absence. Within such an analytical framework, Grillmeier confronts Athanasius's conception of ChriSt'S body as - instrument ~ with the question of how this instrument is connected to che Logos as agent. He interprets this notion with a "iew to the composition of Christ, and asks how and by what order it is linked to (he other .. pan;. the Logos. H e then answers his own question by the statement that At hanasius's use of che -organon-concept ~ indicates that the body as instrument is conne<:ted to the logos "directly and phrsically." This whole approach, however, is foreign to Athanasius. His Chtistology is simplr not analytical in that war, ae least not in this

70

71

H

4 CONTRA GENTES - DE INCARNA.TlO .l\'E.

CONTR.-\ G£.I\'TES-DE INCAfC"_"TIONE

treatise we are considering now. His charaCterization of Christ's bcxl.y as an "instrumem~ is not to be interprered in light of an analysis of the composition of Christ, but rather within rhe framework of the CreatOr--creature distinction, with its attendant dialectic of divine rranscendence and immanence. The "instrumentalit}''' of the bcxl.y is concerned pre{:isely with its being a medium for the immanent revelarion of the transcendent God. In other words, the focus is not on the relation of rhe Logos to the body, so much as on the body as mediating between God and wodd. Athanasius himself speaks of the "insrrument~ of Christ's body not in order to emphasize that it is "directly and physically" moved by the Logos, but rather to characrerize it as a privileged locus wherein the invisible God becomes knowable and visible _ \'{!ithin rhis characterization, the dialectic between divine transcendence and immanence is quite explitit: ~Alrhough he is powerful and the trearQ[ of the universe, he fashioned for himselfin the virgin a body as a temple, and appropriated it as an instrumem in which to be known and dwell (Ked lotoj[Ol€ttat

At this poim, we are perhaps in a position to supplement our negative characterization of Athanasius's Chrisrology as unanalytical by a positive charaCterization of it as a "dialectical" ChrisrologyYl6 Such a characterization would be consistent with the dialectical framework that pervades all of Athanasius's theology, arising out of his particular conception of the relation between God and the world. God and world, while conceived by him as in some way opposite and yet also related, are always related to each other as extremes. H is ChristOlogy is rhus also dialectical and focused on extremes. As such, its focus is not so much on how the divine-human being of Christ is internally constituted, but racher on chI" fact that Christ unites the extteme5 of God and world. It is this dialenical emphasis that is the proper context for appteciating rhe internal rationale of Arhanasius·s Chrisrology, and of his Logos-sarx framework, in particular; indeed, a significant parr of his particular contribution to the deyelopmem of ChristOlogical dOCtrine may be precisely the way in which he emphasized the extreme poles of Christ's being. 10; Thus Jesus Christ is first of all identified as the Logos, who is dearly understood, even in rhis relatively early treatise, to be fully divine. At the same time, in the e~'ent of the incarnation, the "'Tord has come as a human being, taking to himself a body. T he '·bodilinm" of the Incarnate Word, in Athanasius's conception of Christ, deserves to be treated with more sensitivity than as merely an embarrassing indication of the lack of emphasis on Chris(s human soul. It is precisel}, in the context of an awareness of his emphasis on the extremes united in Christ (har we can apply such sensitivity to his emphasis on Christ's human body. 108 As we noted earlier, for Athanasius, the "bod~·~ is the most extreme anthropological category. This is to say that, if he conceives of his anthropology in terms of the divine-human relation, "body~ lies on the extreme human side. "Kous;' and to a lesser degree "psyche," are conceived more direcrly as "mediating" categories, or organs of spititual "ekstasis. ,. The body, however, is conteived as "what is closer" to ourselves (CG 3). So Athanasius's emphasis on Chri5t's body connotes the extreme condescension of the Word's coming (Q us, pressing the point that he is united to us in precisely what is "closest to ourselves." He discusses (his fairly direCtly when he speaks of che incarnation as God 's condescension to the human preoccupation with the sensible:

taU'to roaup 6p-{UVQV, £V uut0 '(\'wpt~6IlE\,OS KUt f:vOtKowt (VI 8; Thomson, pp. 150, 152). The charaC[erization of 5pyuvov in

terms of providing access [Q the knowledge of God in this passage is quite typical of its general use by Athanasius, both with reference to the body of Christ and indeed [Q creation in g e neral . lO~ In all these cases, 6pyuvov denot~ a medium either of revelation or of immanent activity. As such, it is a concept that is employed above all in a funCtional, and pred.ominandy epistemological, sense by Athanasius, and that is why it is highly problematic to force it into an analytical strucrural framework. SpeakJng of the body as instrument, for Athanasius, means primarily considering the bodiliness of Christ as the privileged medium for the self-disclosure of the im'isible God in human form. The overriding framework is thus epistemological; the reference is to knowledge rather than locomotion and animation. If we follow the hint of Grillmeier, rherefore, that "in the word OP1UVOV Arhanasius sums up the whole significance of the Logos-sarx relationship:' we may conclude that this laner relationship is for Athanasius simply the transposition into a Christological key of his pervasive emphasis on the dialettical relationship between God and the world. \\fithin this dialectical relationship, the coment of the notion ofChris['s body as instrument has to be interpreted nO[ in terrm of the mode by which it is moved by rhe Logos, but rather in terms of irs function as mediating, both epistemologically and.onwlogically, between God and the world insofar as it is a visible immanem manifestation of the invisible God.

-,,-

For since human reason (tfiS O\avoiuS TOO\' «v9pWitw\,) had Stooped to sensible things, the Word submitted to appearing through a body (t1t£JkxA£V EUtltOv OU1

73

CONTRA GENTES-DE INCARNAT10SE

O"rol1a'Co~

rpavii\'at 0 A6"(oc,,), in order that he might , as a human being, transfer humanity and rurn their senses [0 himself, and that from then on, ahhough they ~w him as a man, he might J)('rsuade them through the works he did that he ~"3S not merely a man hut God, and the Word and Wisdom of {he true God. (D/16; Thornson, p. 172)109 Note that here Mreaso n ~ is located in a kind of middle position betv.:een the sensible, which is figured as below, and God, who is above. Moreover, the Incarnate Word is characterized pre<:isely with respect to the funhest extremities of above and below. The bodiliness of the Incarnate Word thus symbolizes the eXHeme terminus of the Word's descent: MFor the Word extended himself every·where, above and below and in the depth and in me breadth: above, in creation; below, in the incarnation; in the depth, in hell; in breadth, in the world" (DJ 16). Another clue to the significance of Christ's "bodiliness~ in Athanasius is also provided in this passage in rhe reference co the "works" of the body. Indeed , the motif of the "works" accomplished by Christ in the body is cemral and per.·asive in rhe Dt lm:amaliont . Aside from the sheer ubiquity of this theme, Athanasius himself specifies it as one of the tWO main motives for the incarnat ion: By his b«oming human. che Sa,tiour expressed his love for humanity (tqn'.a\.-aprorl£UUO) in cvo'o ways: he rid us of death and renewed us; and, although he is invisible, yet by his "'orles (OUl 'Cro\' EP1Cil\') he manifested and made himself know n [0 be the Son of God and the Word of the Father, ruler and king of che uni\·erse. (Of 16; Thornson, p. 172) This motif of the ··works~ of the body gives us funher reason to characteriu Athanasius's Christology as determined by the dialectical framework of rhe relacion between God and ,he world. As we have already seen in our analysis of cenain passages in the Cmlra Gentes, one of the constitutive elements of this framework is that God is invisible by vinue of his own nature and unknowable to created narure, yet reveals himself chrough "works."' The dialectic beCVo'een divine nature and works, in Christ, is rhus a concrete realization of that betwt'('n God and the world. This diaienic thus provides Athanasius with ODe of his fundamental means for reading

74

CO .....·TRA GE ...... TES - DE INCARNATlONE

che significance of the incarnation. Ir underscores both the freedom and transcendence of God in that he is not narurally accessible to che grasp of Cfeated narures, as well as God's free beneficence in rhat he wills (Q re\·eal himself through works. One of the ways [hat the "narure-works- framework determines Athanasius's conception of che incarnation is thus the epistemological emphasis on the incarnation as revelation. In (he context of the narrati\'e of human sin and corruption, the incarnation is conceived as a renewal of the knowledge of God, which implies a restOration of a relationship of full participation by the created \'o~ in the divine Logos. It is, however, a renewal based on divine initiati,'e, a renewal of God's self-re...·e1arion by "'''ay of an intensification of divine condescension. The body of Christ is the locus and symbol of this renewed revelacion and intensified condescension. God, who is incorporeal by nature, b«omes revealed in a body: 6 Cta-oolla'Coc" 'C~ \' 'PootV "Kat Ot' ful6:c; O'oo}lan q>
oov

For since the Word realized that human corruption would not be abolished in any orher way except by ev~ryone dying - and the Word himself was not able to die, being immortal and the Son of the Father - he took to himself a

7'

CO.""TRA GENTeS - DE INCARS.-'tTlO."·E

CO.,T TRA GESTES - DE lNCARSATIO,,,'E

body which could die, in order that, since this participated in the Word who is above all ({v({ tomo "tou Erri rravtrov A 6rou J.l£tctl..~v), it wou.ld be sufficient to undergo a death for the sake of all, and bef:ause of the Word who ...."11$ dwelling in it, it would remain incorruptible, and so corruprion would depart from all hUUlanity by the grace of the resurrection. Therefore as an offering and spotless sacrifice, he offered to death the body which he had taken to himself, and immediately abolished death from all who were like him by the offering of a like. For since the Word is abo\'e all, he fulfilled the debt by his death, by offering his temple and the instrument of his body as a substitute for all. And as the incorruptible Son of God was united to all human beings by his body similar to theirs, he granted incorruption to all humanity by the promise of resurrection. (DI9; Thomson, p. 154)

assumes, but the fact of assuming this body in no way diminishes his unqualified activity over the rest of the cosmos. So, in the human body, as in the rest of the cosmos, the Word's transcendence is safeguarded (even as divine immanence is reaffirmed) by saying that the Wocd is partaken, but does not partake:

Here again, we see that the instrumentality of {he body has co do with irs being an immanent medium for the conveyance of God's transcendent power in the immanent sphere. Athanasius's emphasis on rhe bocI.iliness of Christ thw represents his attemptS to show that the incarnation of the Word is not only consistent with the general dynamic of di"ine immanence, but representS a much more intensified and "internaiized Ml 13 manifestation of this dynamic. But JUSt as he was concerned to differentiate his own conception of divine immanence from that of the Stoics by emphasizing divine transce ndence,II4 so he wantS to complement his presentation of the incarnation as consistent with divine immanence with a counterbalancing attempt to safeguard divine transcendence within the event of the Word's becoming flesh, His commitment co eqwlly upholding diyine transcendence and immanence leads him, in the context of the incarnation, to maintain (he excreme condescension of the Word as consistent ..... ith his unmitigated lordliness, Mso that from the seeming degradation of (he Word your piery [Oward. him may be greater and stronger"' (DI 1). And, once again, as he did in the context of creation, in order to emphasize di\'ine transcendence while simultaneously reaffirming God's inyolyemenr in the world, he has recourse to the framework and terminology of panicipation, The crux of his thinking in this cll'gard is that the Word's presence in the body is active and activating rather than passive. Not only is the Word active and activating with regard to [he bod~' which he

76

H e was not confined (itEP1K£1CI.£UJ"Il£V09 in the body, nor .....as he in the body but not elsewhere. Nor did he move the laner while the universe was deprived of his activiry and pro\'idence (OWE hElvo IlEv triv£l, 1"0: OA({ OE tf\r; " ' . t o\Ytou EV£p-(Elar; Km" r..po\"ow<; K£K£V(t)tO). But the most wonderful thing is chat, being the Word, he was not contained by anyone, bur rather himself contained everyching (ou (1"UVEiXE"!o J.lEV tm:6 nvc:w;, OU"dXE O€ to: ttav"t({ j.1O:AJ.OV ({u "!Q.;). As with creation in general, he is outside the uni verse in his essence, but in everything by his power - ordering e~'erything and extend ing his providence ovet everything, enii\'crung all things, individually and collectively, containing the universe and not being contained by it (T"o£PtEXWV 'to: QA({ K({t I..l~ ttEP1£X6).1EVOQ, but dwelling wholly and in every respect in his own Father alone - in {he same way, being in a human body and enlivening it himself, he also enlivens the uniyerse, and was both in all and omside all (K({t EV 'tolt;; no:ow Eliv£to, Ka1 E~ffi "twu OAffiv ~v). And although he was known by hi5 body through his works, he did not cease to be manifest through his accivitv in the universe. (DJ 17; Thomson, p. 174)

It is precisely in virtue of this unrestrained actiyiry that the pres~nce and action of the Logos in the bodv is to be differentiated from the normal activity of the soul. For the soul, while aceive with regard to the body, is Mbound~ to the bodv in the sense thac irs sphere of aceivity is restricted [Q the body. Here we have one due to Athanasius's neglect of Christ's human soul, for the soul is characterized by this limited activity and so does not spontaneously fit 10 with a model that dramatically contrasts the unqualified activity of che Logos w ith the unqualified passi\'ity of the body: 11 ~ It is the function of the soul to see by reasoning what is outside its proper body but not to :let outside its own body nor to move by its presence what is distant from \t. Thus,

77

CONTRi\ GENTES-DE lNCi\RNi\TIO."E

COt..' TRI! GENTES-DE lSCARNATIONE

when a ~rson thinks about things which arc distant, he never direcdy aCts upon them or mo...-es them ... Bm it was not so with che Word of God in chI' man. For he was not bound to che body, but rather controlled it. So he was in it and in everything, and ouuide creation, and was only ae rest in the Father. Now the most amazing thing is this, that he both lived as a man , and as the Word enlivened everything, and as the Son was with the Father. Therefore, neither when the Virgin gave birth did he suffer himself, nor when he was in the body was he defiled, but rather he sanctified the body. Nor when he was in all things did he partake of all (owE: ... t oov 1tCrvtrov IlEtcx./..aJ.$Ctv€t). (DJ 17; Thomson, p. 174) This conrrast betw~n the unqualified activity of the Word and unqualified passivity of the body is the paradigmatic core of Athanasius's Christolo8}' in the De Jllcarnatirmt. While this observation can possibly suggest an encry"ll-'ay into an analytical inquiry intO Athanasius's Christology, his account of the ·'composition" of Christ, it is even more legirimacelr employed as a caution againse moving coo quickl}' into such an inquiry. For, as we have had occasion to point oue, it is cleat [hac his primary concern is noe [0 analyze the inremal StruCture of the being of Chtist. Rather, he seems to be interested, first and foremost, in seeing Chrise as representing a certain relation betw~n God and tbe world that is consistent with the relation represenced by creation. While [his leads him ine .... itably to make stacemems that do amount to analytical descriptions of Christ's being, it is important to s~ tht' point of departure from and the framework in which such statements are made. If we k~p in mind that his point of departure and framework is the relation berv.·~n God and the world, we ate in che best position for seeing Athanasius·s Christology in its pro~r COntext. The value of these cautionary remarks is borne Out if we focus on such statement.s as are found in the passage JUSt qUOted, that ··nt'irher when the Virgin ga,·e birth did he suffer himself, nor when he was in the body was he defiled, but rather he sanCtified the bod}'.~ Such statements are readily \'lllnerable to cbargt's of docetism. 116 We are tempted to s~ Christ"s lack of suffering and invulnerabiliry as indicating a relation of "externality'· betv.'~n Christ and his body,l17 but that would be again to reven to an analytical model of interpretation. In fact , the statement here about Christ's lack of suffering - ro be considered alongside other staee-

menu which speak of the Logos ··himself" as suffering llll - should be understood only in in proper COntext, through the 5raremeor immediately following it: ·'Kor when he was in all things d id he partake of alL~ The' crucial poim is that, for Athanasius, the state. mem that the Word ~did not partake" of all is quite compatible with the statement that he was -in all things. " Whar we have here is simply a dramatization of the fundamental principle that, in relarion to both the world and me body, the Word is both in all and outSide all. To the extent that there is an~· ··explanation·· for this paradoxical assertion in Athanasius, it is not to be found in the imputing of any ~ extemali[y~ berwttn the Word and the body. Ramer, the answer lies again within the participation model: the Word is outside the cosmos and his human bod)· insofar as his relation to it, while quite intrinsic,I19 is one of activity and not passivity. Thus the Word is outside the body and -not bound'· to it precisely insofar as he "controls" ir: "For he was not bound to the body, hll{ rather he controlled it. He UJaJ ill it alld in tf.'trylhing, and Jet outside CTMtion, and was only at rest in the Father.'· The irreversible configuration of the dynamics of acti,"'ity and passivity in ehe Word means not a separation, gap, or external connection berv.'een divinity and humanity but rather is summed up in saying thar while divine activity does nor become reduced, the humanitr which is acted upon becomes exalted and sanctified: '·Nor when he was in che body was be defUed, bur rather he sanctified the body ... {and] being incorruprible, vivified and purified the monal body." The conjunction of aaivir}' and passivity already indicates a certain conception of the unity of Christ by 9.'3y of a unified dynamic by which chI' divinity actS upon the humanity. Within this unified dynamic, the contrast is strictI}' maintained berv.'~n the impassible and immorral Logos and the passible mortal body. Athanasius is concerned to preserve rhis distinction and ro emphasize, despite an}' appearances to the contrary, kche inequality of his nature [0 ours" (t o ltpOc; fu.td~ Ct\'OIlOlOV 'tfjl; q:rooEror;> (DJ 34; Thomson, p. 216). For this reason, it is important for Athanasius to qualify the human attributes of tbe Incarnate ,"rord as applicable to him precisely as man (s; ltEPi. Ctv9proltou) (DJ 18; Thomson, p. 176), and owing to the natural properties of the body (5ul 'to 1:510\' t ov O"ro~a't~) (DJ 21; T homson, p. 188).120 Ae the same time, however, it is integral to Athanasius·s Christological thinking to move freelr from an emphasis on rhe distinction of di"ine and human attributes in the Incarnate Word to an emphasis on the unit}, of the Word and his body. Grillmeier·s analysis tends co

78

79

CO STR A GENTES -DE 1."·CA R NA T LON E

ponray Athanasius's conception of this unity in rather orgamc terms, as if the Word's union with the human body is precisely a matter of the Logos "moving the body directly and physically," But it is a further indication of the subtly problematic narure of Grillroeier's interpretation that, when it is acrually a question of resolving the dichotomy of attributes in Christ into a unity, Athanasius never resorts to explaining this uni ty in terms of some organic "direct and physical" unity between the Logos and rhe flesh (as does Apollinarius, for instance), Rather, when the issue of Christ's unity presents itSelf as a problem, Athanasius tends to look for a solution much more along the lines of a model of predication than of organic unity, emphasizing that the charaCteristics of both humanity and di vinity, in Christ, are predicated of a single grammatical subjecr, 121 This model achieves a much fuller presentation in the later OratirmeJ ((mtra Arian!)!, but its implicit beginnings are already present in the treatise which presently concerns us, A central notion within this model is rhe concept of "appropriation, " In the incarnation, the \Xi'ord "appropriates" (iotolto\E\a€lat) the flesh or makes it his own. It is precisely this notion that elucidates Athanasius's typical emphasis that the Word did nor merely ~come inco" a body but "took to himself" a body. In The distinction being invoked here is that to say the Word merely "came into" the body is to see the hody as external to the Word as subjeCt, whereas to insist that the Word ~took to himself" a body is co emphasize that rhe human body has been fully appropriated by this subjecL Thus, to say that the 'XTord took to himself a body, in the strongest sense, is (0 say that the hod}' becomes tht' Word's ~own~: oi. w~ V ..aj3£v £o.'lYt0 awJ.lCt:, ](0.1 tofrt o iOto1tOl tiau'w (DI 31; Thomson, p. 21 0). This model of ownership or appropriation is Athanasius's fundamemal means for dealing with rhe problem of the conjunction of unity and distinCtion in Christ. Rather than invoking a model of organic unity, his typical strategy is a good deal mott complex. What he aCtually does is, first, distinguish between the di"'ine and human attributes and then insist that the appropriation of the body by the Word legitimates the application of human predications ro the subject of "God the \'{!ord. " Because such a reading of Arhanasius credits him with far more sophistication than is generally conceded, it is necessary to substamiate it in some detail. We may cite a seemingly simple passage in the De InUlmatione which embodies this complex logic:

80

When the theologians who speak of him say that he ate and drank and was born, understand that the bodv , was born as a body and was nourished on suitable food. Bur God the Word himself, who was with rhe body yet orders rhe universe, also made known through his works in the body that he himself was not a man but God the Word. But these things are said of him, because the body whic h ate and was born and suffered was no one else's but the Lord's; and, since he became human, it was right for these things to be said of him as a man, that he might be shown (0 have a true, not a phantasmal, body. (DI 18 ) Since we have characrerized Athanasius's conception of the unitywithin-distinCtion in Christ in tefms of a model of predication, we will now analyze this passage in those terms. Such a perspective arises organically from the text itSelf, since Athanasius is discussing here precisely the predications applied to Christ, and how these may be appropriately understood. First , he acknowledges that predications of human attributes (eating, drinking, generation) are applied by the "theologians" to the Incarnate Word (1t£pi. '[Dum), understood as a single subjeCt. The problem is how to understand these correcdy. He begins by identif)'ing these attributes with the body, and rhen identif)'ing God the Word with the activity that properly belongs to him (tu 1tcrvtCX 5lCXKOOJ.l(!)V) . His primary concern is that , notwithstanding the attribution of human predicates, God the ';Xiord, who "was with the body,~ is nevert heless in his inmost subjeCtivity "not a man but God the Word .~ The phrase is, in its most basic form, taurological (God the Word ... was not a man but God the Word); but (his serves only to emphasize the point that human anriburions, in the case of the incarnation, do not detract from the integrity of rhe divine subjectivity of the Word. After having rhus firmly distinguished the human predication from the divine subject, Athanasius [hen goes on to state that nevenheless these predications are appropriately applied to the divine subject, because the body to which the;' naturally belong has itself been appropriated by the Word (~ was no one else's bur the Lord's ~). It nuns out then that the attribution of human predicates both is and is not applicable to God [he Word. Athanasius's pedagogical style enables him to say this in a simple and digestible way_ H is point amounts to the statement that the human predicates are not applicable to God the ';X'ord from the point of view of what naturally 81

CONTRA GEt"TES - DE l,vCARNATIOS E

belongs [0 him, bm [hat they do apply [0 the Word through the mediation of [he incarnation - that is, through his own free and willful appropriation of these predicates. Tn other words, and this is ulrimatelv Athanasius's most essential poim, human predications apply to ilie Word only insofar as he himself has applied them, ~nd he has done exactly this through the eveQ[ of t he incarnation.!2, It is crucial to be aware here that Arhanasius is not propounding Chtistological metaphysics in a systematic manner, bue is trying to show the correct way in which [0 understand Christological statements. And his poim is that we can and should apply human auributes to the \'i;:'ord, so long as we understand such attribution as legitimated by, and derivative from, the initiati,'e and condescension of the Wo rd. That we should apply human attributes to the Word is a significam emphasis in Athanasius thar has not been sufficiently appreciated. True enough, he is alwa~·s careful to note that the human anributes belong properly to the human body; ir is this aspect that tends to recei \"e by fur the most attention from scholars. But his second and crucial step is to transfer these human attributes to the Word himself, poiming out that such a transfer derives from t he ownership of the body by the Word. For exam ple, in this passage, while he does say that ·;it was right for these things to be said of him as a man," t bat statement comes after the one explaining that those hwnan anribure5 are predicated of God the Word "because the body which ate and was born and suffered was no one else·s bur the Lord's:· Similarly, in another passage , Athanasius can speak of the Word himself suffering: Therefore, as I said above, rhe \"'{rord himself, since he \'.-as immortal and could not die, took to himself a bod" (£i.cxl3£v tam41 crwflCX) which could die in order to offer it as his proper body (ffi; tOtOv) on behalf of all, and in order chat, suffering himself (WS auto:;) ror all, through his coming into it, he would be able "co destroy him who held the power of dearh, that is the devil, and to deliver all those who through fear of death had been subject co bondage all their life {Heb. 2: 14-15]. ,. (DJ 20; Thomson, p. 184) Athanasius is clearly aucibuting suffering to the \'{/ord he,e., But again, this is done- after two crucial preliminary steps: first, clarii)'ing that the Word in himself is immortal; second, explaining that

82

CONTRA

GENTE S~ DE

ISC .... R ."' ATJONE

he- rook a body as his own, ~ tOto\'. This last consideration IS conceived br Athanasius in such a way that whatever is said of the body may be properly applied to the- Word. Of course, it is possible to find other passages in the same treatise which state that the Word himself did not suffer and was not affected by the movements of the bodr \Ve have in fact already stated that, for Athanasius, human attributes borh are and are not properly applied to God the \'i;:'ord. It is easy but superficial to dismiss such thinking as comradictory nonsense, although we may readily acknowledge that Athanasius does not have the philosophical apparatus to say in what sense the Word does suffer and in what sense he does not. However, there is a real logic operative here, based on the disrincrion of what statements are appropriate when predicated of the Word as a merely divine subject, and what statements are appropriate in light of the Word·s appropriation of the body. This distinction, however, is nor simply a m ere boundary line dividing the time before and the time after the incarnation. Even within the incarnation, one can make either ki nd of Statement, depending on the considerations one brings to bear. If one has in mind the Word, conceived according to his proper nature, then he did not suffer. If one has in mind the Word, conceived as graciously appropriating the body to himself, then he did suffer. As we have also already pointed out, the proper context for understanding this double perspective is [he model of participation and the statement that the Word is "outside the universe in his eS5ence but in everything by his power~ (DI 17). I n the same way, the \\70rd remains essentially distinct from the human body and yet pervades and sanctifies it by his power. H owever, in speaking of the relation Ixtween the Word and the body, Arhanasius in fact never speaks of the \X'ord as "omside·' the bod}' but rather emphasizes the internality of the relation l14 and the notion that the Word has made the body ~his own ."' As such, we can see the incarnation of the Word as the climax of thar movement of God's XO:Pl<; wbich acts to mitigate the natural distance between God and the world . The distance remains within the incamarion in rhe ·'unlikeness of his nature to ours," but it is simultaneously transcended in the appropriation of our condition by the \'i;:'ord. Thus the hermeneutical key to understanding Athanasius·s Christology is the paradoxical relation Ixtween God and the world whereby the total otherness berween rhe two natures is "bridged over" by {he initiative of divine grace_ Through t he incarnation of the \\7o rd, and the appropriation

83

CONTRA GEI'TES-DE INCARN,.."T/O:-iE

of our condi tion by the di"ine subj~, (his ~bridge~ amounts to deification through p:micipation in che Logos_

Oll!

Conclusion If Athanasius's Christology is "explained" by reference to his general conception of che rdation berv.·een God and cbe world, it does noc strictly follow chat his Christology is thus derivative from this conception. In fact, I would suggest chat the opposite is che case. In trying co make an argument for the rational fittingness of the incarnation and che cross, chese aspens of the Christian message of redemption determine Athanasius's imerpretation of the radical strucrure of reality (that is, the relation ber",een God and creation) and of human history. They constitute che cemer co which all other data are made to converge. This accempt to put fon\:ard an ontology and a view of human history thac is coherent wich chI' incarnation and cross COntains an inherent drive coward consinenc},. In this chapter, we have tried co locate a strucrural clement of this consisce:ncy in terms of Athanasius's concept ion of the relation between God. and creation in che: COn/ra Genm- Dt incomaliont. To this end, we first explicace:d this conception within the dramatic structure of the work as a whole. We have analyzed chI' suucture of rhe original relation between God and creation, as conceive:d by Athanasius, in terms of a double emphasis on chI' transcendence of chI' Creacor-God over what comes to be from nothing, and on God's beneficem movement to protect creation from iu inherent oncological poverty. We have chen sought [0 show how this radical structure of the original relation betwttn God and crcation determines Athanasius's conceprion and dramatization of the subsequent history of this relation. In order co demonstrate che systematic connections between various foci of his theology as con ~'ergi ng in his parricular concepcion of the relacion berween God and crcacion, we ha"e then relace:d this conception to his doctrines of God, cosmolo,gy, theological anthropology, re:demption, and Chrisrology. We have shown char Arhanasius's attempt co provide a rationallr coruisre:nc defense of che Christian faith contains as a key element various transpositions of che theme of che convergence between divine ocherness and nearness. As wc ruen to his overtly anti-Arian writings, we shall see that this key element also pervades his attempts co prove that the notion of the Soo 's (and the Spirit's) equalicy to che Facher is essential to a coherent reading of chI' Christian faith.

84

3 THE REL ATION B ETWEE N GOD A N D C REATIO N I N THE A N TI - ARIAN WRITING S H iStOrical background and dating If it could be argued thac Athanasius's COl/ira Genus-Of incarnationt is CODS.Cru~ as a catech~tical work chat does not refer to any ~ic­ ular hlstoncal context, the same certainly could nor be said of Athanasius's subscque~t. fierce polemic on behalf of the full divinity of the Son and the SPlClt, H ere, Athanasius found himself in a life and death struggle with che ~ Ariomaniacs. ~ While we cannot linger coo much on rhe sometimes tonuously complicated details of che: Arian crisis, we must give some account, in adminedly broad strokes, of the historical background thar enveloped Athanasius throughout his ecclesiastical career. .At some point shordy before 320,1 Ariu5, a popular Alexandrian pnesc, began to reach a doctrine chat assened the lack of eo-ccernaljt}' becv.'een Facher and Son, possibly in objection to che preaching of his bishop, Alexander of Alexandria. Arius was deposed by Alexander in a council of the Egyptian Church in 373. However, he was able to find support from Eusebiw of Nicomedia an~ Eusebius of Caesarea, with the result that chI' controversy spdled over beyond Egypt. In 32', rhe Council of Nicaca, attended by Achanasi~ as a young deacon accompanying Alexander, condemned Anus and formulated [he relationship of Father and Son as :'homoousios.~ It was not long, however, before rhe supponers of Anus began co recover. Under che auspices of Emperor Conscancine a small gathering of bishops in Nicomedia readmitted Arius t~ communion, a decision which Alexander rejected. ' Alexander chen sent Athanasius on a mission co the emperor in order to defend his Own persistence in rhe excommunication of Arius, and it was while engage:d on this mission that Achanasius heard of the death of his Patriarch:~ Arri"ing back in Alexandria, Athanasiw ';\'as appointed

85

THE ANTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

THE ANT I -ARIAN

WRITI~GS

Arhanasius's accession to {he throne of Alexandria l\'as nor accepted by the Mditians, thus renewing the schism.' The nt'w Patriarch's troubles with the Mei icians combined with chI' still-unresolved difficuhies with Arius to make his position precarious. Consistent with his predecessor's policy, Athanasius steadfastly opposed the effOrtS of Eusebius of Nicomedia and COll5tantine re have Arius readmitted re communion with the Egyp tian church, His rebufIal of Eusebius of Nicomedia paved the way for an association between che Me\irian and the pro-Arius parcies. The Melitians sem a ddegation re Eusebius of Nicomedia, who inuoduced [hem into the coun: 6 of Constamine, in HO, and the rwo groups formed an alliance. This group began publicizing serious accusations against Athanasius, including exren:ion, ordering one of his priests ro break chI' chalice of a Mdician priesc, arr:mging me murder of me Melitian bishop Arsenius, and bribing chI' magister o/ficilmlm re facilitare his episcopal appointment (which he allegedly accepted below che canonical age).i Consrantine dismissed all the charges except chI' murder of Arsenius, which he ordered to be investigated before a council to meet in Caesarea in Palestine. In [he meantime, however, Achanasius found the "murdered" Arsen.ius who was hid ing in Tyre, and Constantine cancelled plans fo r a council But under further pressure from Eusebi us of Nicomedia and the followers of Arius and Melitius, Conscancine ordered chI' whole matter to be investigated at a coundl in Trre. Achanasius, after some hesitation, became convinced that the assembly was hostile to him and refused to attend. S The Council of Tyre, in 335 , received the Md itians into communion, affirmed the orthodoxy of Mius, and appointed a nell.. bishop for Alexandria. In reslX'nse, Athanasius turned ro Constancine, who was quite aware that chI' b ishops at Tyre were not fa\'orably dis~ to the Alexandrian. However, Athanasius's opponents now produced a new and, from [he IX'int of view of the emperor, a more ominous charge

_ that Achanasiw had threatened to in itiate a strike in Alexandria which would withhold grain shipments to the capital. Coostancine was sufficiendy anxious abou t this prospect to eventually acqu.iesce in the decision of Tyre. Thus began Arhanasius's first exile, to Trier, in 335.9 In 337, Constancine died, passing on the gOH~rnance of the empire to his three sons, Constantinus, Constans, and Constantiw. By imperial edict, all exiled bishops were to be allowed back to their sees, and so Athanasius re~mered Alexandria in N O"ember 337. However, all was noc peaceful. While he was alwars popular with his own people, external opposition remained imense. Almost from the moment of his return, he had [Q deal with attempts to unseat him. In the winter of 338--9, a council of bishops at Antioch reassen:ed the condemnacion of Athanasius by the Council of Tyre and appointed as his replacement Gemge, a cleric from Cappadocia. In March 339, Athanasius went into hiding in order to escape arrest. A week lacer, George of Cappadocia efi[eced Alexandria as bishop and, within a month , Athanasius had fled Egypt to Rome. It must have become irre·.ocably clear to him at that stage thac the i\-[e\icians and the supporters of Mius were determined to bring him co ruin and chat his fortunes and those of Nicaea were indissolubl), mixed. 10 It was probably also at this period, beginning abou t 339, that he began his dense doctrinal offensive against the Arians, the OratiOlies (Ontra ArianOJ. 11 Countering Arian scripcural proof-texts, Athanasius se{S our to show that Arian doctrine is merely a "pretence of Christ ianity,P which should noe be colerated within the Church. 12 Only the dOCtrine of [he full divinity of the Son and his equality to the Father is consistent wim the message of Christian salvation; if the Son is Mexcemal to the Father, he will be a creature and thus neither Creator nor R edeemer. Again.H the Arian descri ption of [he Son as -a creature but not like one of the creatures,-13 Athanasius insists on [he muruallr exclusive and radical categories of Creator and creation. If {he Son is a neature, he is nor Creator; if he is Creator, he is not a creature. Of course, [his argumenc muse deal with chI' creaturehood of the Soo in th ~ incarnation, and it is in reference to this perspective that Athanasiw interprers scriptural texts thar seem to ascribe creaturehood or inferiority to the Son. Thus his argument in the OratjlJ1tes ifl\'ol" es him in distinguishing and relating the relations be("Ween Father and Son, God and Creation, and incarnate Son and creation. As a sustained refutation of Arian proof-textS, chI' Orariones bring together Athanasius's doctrinal exegesis and his ··systematic" sense for the interrelat ion of

86

87

bishop, with allegations soon to follow chat rhe election had bt:en jrr'~gulat and vioiend}' enforced. These alleg:uions were put fo rward by the followers of Mel itiU5 of Lycopolis, who had broken communion with Peter of Alexandria o\'er the larter's lenienc policy coward those who had lap~ during

the Diodetian persecutions of 303. The condemnation of Mdicius by an Egyptian synod, c. 306, had resulted in an independent Melirian church in Egypt. The Council of Nicaea attempted to heal rhe schism by readmitting Mdi tian clergy ioro the Church of AieJWldria. while assigning them 11. subordinate rank . However,

M

THE ANTI - ARIAN WRITINGS,

THE ANTI_ARIAN WRITINGS

Christian doctrine. 14 Moreover, rhe deveiopm!"nt of his Trinitarian thinking is rdl!"Cted in the att!"ntion he gives to th!" ro!!" of the Holy Spirit in rhe argument of the OralirllleJ, in conerasr ro the negl!"Ct of this subjecr in th!" earlier CGntra Gentes- De incarTUltirme. In Rom!", Pope Julius wdecmed Athanasius and allied himself wirh rhe A!exandrian bishop and with Marcellus of Ancyra, whose int!"rpretation of the Nic!"ne homoousios was decidedly modalist. 1~ Pope Julius invited the Eastern bishops for a council to reconsider the depositions of Athanasius and .Marcellus. Rebuffing Julius's emissaries, the Eastern bishops responded by convening at a council ro dedicate the Church of Antioch in 341. This council produced four creeds, the most significam being the second or "Dedirpti()1/' creed. The latter anathematized anyone who speaks of the Son as ~ a creature like one of the creatures, ,. but also a.... oided any linkage of the Son ro the Father through "ousia" (00010:) language, and designated the Son as "'exact image~ of the Father. 16 Far from effecting a reconciliation, Julius's effons on behalf of Athanasius (and Marcellus) thus resulted in a confirmation of the estrangement between Western pro-Nicene theology and the Eastern bishops who were suspicious of what they perceived ro be the Sabe11ian dangers inherent in Nicene doctrine. Julius's rather ineffectual patronage of Athanasius came to be supplemented by that of the Western emperor, Constans. Writh a view to rhe rehabilitation of Athanasius, Constans demanded that a general council be ronvened in Sardica, in 342. Once again, however, the extent of estrangement of East and W!"St was dramatized rather than mitigated. Delegates from the tWO regions never actually met; the Easterners refused to sit at council with Athanasius and other exiles. Withdrawing to Philippopolis under pretext of greeting Constantius and his arm~', they again condemned Athanasius, along with Marcellus, and now Julius. They also produced a creed, condemning both the Arian phrase, '"there was once when he was not;' and the idea "'that the Father did not beget the Son by choice or will.~ 1 7 The Westerners, for their part, defended Athanasius and Marcellus and put fonh their own profession of faith, which was meant to be a defense of Nicaea. 18 Norv..·ithstanding the failure of Sardica, Coostans' perse .... ering suppon of Athanasius finally prevailed u}Xln his brother Constantius and the exiled bishop was allowed to return to Alexandria in 346. Again, his entry was glorious but his Stay .under almost constant peril. A decisive blow came in 350, when he was deprived of the imperial patronage of Constans, who was killed by

the g eneral Magnentius in an insurrection. Coostamius's antlNicene leanings now found a more unobstructed field for action. A new council was held in Sirmium, in 351, with the emperor present. It produced a creed which "marks a definite shift towards a more sharply anti-Nicene doctrine, though it cannot quire yet be said to be explicitly pro-Arian."19 For several years following the council of Sirmium, Constamius had its decisions circulated among ind ividual bishops, with the demand to subscribe to them or face exile.1O There followed tWO other \Xfestern councils of Latinspeaking bishops, characterized by imperial pressure and threats, at Aries (3 53--4) and Milan (3 55). While the latter was still in session, Constantius began arrangemems ro have Atbanasius expelled again from his see. In January 356, under imperial orders and with the aid of a large body of tcoops, an attempt was made to capture Athanasius, who onC!" agai n was able to escape. For the cest of Constamius's reign, Arhanasius availed himself of refuge among the monks of the Egyptian countryside. This, his third exile, was also his most prolific in literary and theological production. From this period we have, first of all, his "Encyclical Letter ro the Bishops of Egypt"' (Ad EpifropQS AegypfI), composed soon after the start of his exile. Here the embattled Patriarch prOtests against the injustice of his ej!"Ction and warns his fellow bishops not to succumb to imperial pressure bj' signing the synodicallerter of the council ofSirmium. We also notice, at this point in Athanasius's career, a decisive shift toward an explicit and tenacious defense of the Council of Nicaea itself and of the Nicene term '"homoousios,"' a shift that might not be unrdated to another shift tOward an explicit denunciation of Constantius. Athanasius's fullest defense of Nicaea is presented in his De Decretis, c. 356. wtinen in response to someone who, in argument with Arians, had been stymied by the Arian objection that the language of N icaea is unscriptural. Athanasius responds that the term "homoousios" representS the "sense~ of the scriptural witness and was necessary to safeguard chat sense againsc the Arian tendency to interpret all other suggestions in the unscripcural sense of signifring a lack of oneness between Fathec and Son. Moreover, argued Athanasius, the Arians themsel .... es set up as a standard the unscriprural term, agl'11(n)etOJ, while the Nicene "homoousios" represents the true !"xegesis of the biblical understanding of God as Father. Athanasius's defeme of Nicaea in Dt 5)'nodis is continued in his attempt to link Nicaea with prior tradition in t he De Sentmtia DioTl)'Jii, written shonlyafter.

88

89

THE ANTI·ARIAK WRITINGS

THE ANTl - ARIAK WRITII\GS

While Athanasius's defe!lSe of Nicene doctrine had focused on the divinity of the Son, it had also tended to include an affirmation of [ he divinity of the Spirit, at least since the Oratio"eJ comra Ar/al/M, He was given an opportunity to themacize this affirmation, when che bishop Serapion of Thumis wrote [0 him complaining of certain Christians l\'ho dissociated themselves from the Arian subordination of the Son and }'ec maintained that the Spirit is an angelic creature. In response, Athanasius composed his thr~ Ltttm to Strapion, penned bet\\'~n 359 and 361. Essentially, these letters apply to che Holy Spirit Achanasius's previous arg uments on behalf of che ful l divinity of the Son: there is nothing in common between creatures and the Creator; the scriptural witness represents the Holy Spirit as not a creature but Creator and Red~me r and thus not external to the rriune GOOhead. Meanwhile, the late 3505 saw significant new developments in the landscape of the contro\·ersy.ll Of particular note was che rise of Aetius, Eunomius, and Basil of Ancyra. Aecius, a native of Cilicia and a former goldsmith and dialectician, radicalized Arian docrrine by asserting that the Son was unlike, "anomoios," to the Father in essence. Eunomius, a Cappadocian thetor, met Aecius while studying in Alexandria and became an ardent supporter and disciple. Together, they propounded a doctrine chat represented an extreme form of Arianism, diametrically opposed to the "homoousios.~ If the term "homoousios~ seemed to many to be dangerously dose to Sahellianism, the "anomoios" now dramatized the dangers of a ~trict opposition to "homoousios," an opposition which threatened to Strip the Son of a subStantial claim to divinity. The opposition to this anomean dOCtrine was led by Basil of Ancyra, who had succeeded the deposed Mucdlus in 336. While still reluctant to embrace the Nicene -homoousios,~ Basil nt"'.'erthdess insisted thac che Son's likeness to the Father must penain to essence (homoiousioJ). To deny a likeness of essence, argued Basil of Ancyra, is to "say in effect that the Son is not a Son, but only a creature, and the Father not a Father but onl~' a Creator."22 In 358, Basil summoned a council in Ancyra which condemned "anomoian" doctrine and penuaded the emperor to banish both Aetius and Eunomius. The banishment of radical anomearu and the ascendancy of Basil of Ancyra, with his seemingly middle position b/:tween homoousian and anomean theology, seemed to Constantius to represent an opportunity for a final resolu(ioo_ The occasion for this rapprodxmllll was to be yet another council, with the Eastern bishops m~tjng at

Seleucia in Cilicia and their Western counterpans in Ariminum , Italy. Prior to the openiog of this double council, Constantius had a f~w leading bishops draw up a compromise statement co which both sides were supposed to agree. Bearing the date of its publication22 May 359 - it l\o'll$ to be mocked by Arhanasius, and to be known generally as the "Daud Crud.~ This creed spoke of the Son as "li ke the Father in all respects" (O~OlOV K<X'tCr: 1[(1:\><0:) but counseled against the term "ousia ~ as urucriptural and disrurbing ro -the masses."23 The evencual outcome of the double council of SirmiumSeleucia was a creed ratified in Constantinople in 360, which large1r reproduced the "dated" creed, with the significant omission of (he designation of the Son as like the Father "in all respects," This omission signaled a decisive defeat for the homoiousian parry, led by Basil of Ancyra. In response, Athanasius penned his Dr Sy"otiis (c. 359) in which the effon at reconciliation with Basil's homoiousian position is coupled with a firm and \'igorous defense of the Nicene "homoousios." After offering his own history of rhe double council, with che intent of exposing the perfidy of the "Arians," Athanasius uses the outcome of this council as an argument in fa\'Of of the Nicene pmition: while "homoiousios ~ mighc be accep~able if understood in a certain SC'nse, only [ht" "homoous i os~ is capable of finally ruling our rhe notion of an)' unlikeness of es5ence bet\\'~n Father and Son. Thus the argument in D e DlO'tfis, that only the "homoousios- proved innllnerable to an Arian interpretation in Nicaea, is now given futther historical vindicat ion in De Sp/od'i. 'X'hile the Kicene position was now becoming more attractive to ~moderate~ Eastern bishops as a decisive amidote to extreme Arianism, Athanaslus's position soon improved with regard to external cirrumsrances as well. Constamius became ill in r\o\'ember 361, and died a month later. With the accession of Julian to tht" thcone, an imperial edict allowed for bishops exiled under Conscantius to return to their sees. Claiming this as justification, Achanasius entered Alexandria in February 362 and, within a few weeks, was presiding over the council of Alexandria. From this couocil, we have the TonllfJ ad Antirxbillos, an acrempt to reconcile the twO quarreling pro-Nicene panies in Ancioch. Soon, however, Athanasius had to contern himself again with his own troubles, in the t}'-pical form of anempes to remO\'e him from his see. The emperor Julian had realized, by this poim, char his policy of recalling exiled bishops, probably intended to encourage inctaecclesial strife, had in some cases only strengthened Christian churches [hat wefe already traditionally Strong. This was certainly

90

91

TH E AKTI - ARIAN WRI TIN GS

TH E .-',NTI-AR IA N WRI Tll\GS

che case in Alexandria, where Arhanasius was the o'ierwhelming fa\'orire among rhe people. In October 362, an edicr arrived from Julian ordering Athanasius to leave rhe ciry. In response, Athanasius and his supporrers prevailed upon the local senate to present the emperor with a peti[ion that Athanasius mighr continue as b ishop. In a furious counrer-response, Julian demanded that Athanasius depart from Egypt altogether. Athanasius merely wirhdrew inco the Thebaid, and J ulian himself died the following year. Succeeding J ulian was the emperor Jovian, and Arhanasius lost no t ime in travelling to his COUf[ and personallr winning from him formal permission to return to Alexandria. Unformnatel}' for [he e mbattled bishop, his new imperial ally was to die of accidental suffocarion in 364. The empire was now governed by Valenrinian in the W est and the ami-Nicene Valens in the Ease In 365 came an imperial order from Valens ordering Christian bishops who had ~n deposed under Constamius and allowed co rerum by Julian ro retum once again co exile. As before, Athanasius did noc succumb quickly. Crowds of Alexandrian Christians demonstrared on his behalf, apparemly presenting rhe imperial authorities with the argument - not without a cerrain dash of black humor - that "rhe imperial order did nor apply to their bishop, since Athanasius had been restored as well as exiled by Constantius, and exiled as well as resrored by Julian and owed his most recent restoration to Jovian, not to Julian. ~24 Notwithstanding this display of legalistic wic, rhe imperial auchoriries simplr waired for a respite in the public ouccry and ptepared to capture che bishop by force . In typical fash ion, Athanasius departed from Alexandria secretly one night, a nd thus escaped arrest. Meanwhile, Valens soon found himself in a vulnerable position, due to a rebellion led by Julian's relative, Procopius, who had had himself proclaimed Augusrus in Consraminople. Valens acred quickly co secure Egypt on his side, and, as parr of rhat campaign, in 366 inviced Achanasius co resume his episcopal duties. T his rime, rhe bishop durifully obeyed the emperor, aDd Valeus allowed Arhanasius co remain in Alexandria wichouc any further troubles. From [his last period of relari \·e rranguilicy, we have che tV·iO imporram Christologicalletters of Athanasius, Ad Atklphillm (c. 370 or 371 ) and Ad EpicUllIm (371). The former rebuts the doctrine that the Word did not come in the flesh; Athanasius likens its proponents co the Valentinians who '·subsriwced appearance for reality. ,.25 The latter deals with the notion that the body born of Mary is 00essential with rhe Godhead of rhe Word. I n both these letters,

Arhanasius conducts his argumem within the basic fram ework of an anti-Arian polemic, even though he acknowledges that those who hold rhese views might not consider [ hemselve~ to be Arians. From [he !X>im of view of doctrine, then, Athanasius's ami-Arian polemic moved., becv.'een rhe 340s and rhe early 370s, from the issue of the rdation of {he Son to che Father, co that of the relation of the Spirit to Father and Son, to Chriscological q uestions. In this chapter, we will deal with the question of how his conception of che fundaml'mai relation berween God and creacion underlies this whole strucrure of his anti- Arian polemic.

The recem revival of interest in the Arian crisis has led co a reopening of the q uestion of what was the fundam ental issue in the controversy. Traditional interpretations rended to portray the views of Arius as resulting either from an Aristotelian rarionalizarion or from a naive subscriprio n ro Neoplatonic schemas of a hierarchy of hypostases. 27 While not d ispensing with this appeal to rationalization , Newman. in T he Ariam of the Fourth Century, introduced the theory that Arius's doctrine had its proper background in Syrian literalisr exegesis and piety.18 For Newman , the Arian doctrine re presents a rat he r posicivistic conceprion of reality and the realicies of faith as opposed co the mystical Alexandrian conception. Harnack, in rum, saw Arius's docrrine as a quintessential expression of the Hellenisric corruption of the gospeL The Arian doctrine represents the triumph of cosmology and moraliry oyer evangelical soteriology.29 Already in Harnack·s interpretation, the rheme of the relat ion between God and crearion is seen as a fundamental elemem of the controversy. Arius, in Harnack"s yiew, conceives of rhe person and work of Chrisr from withi n a basically cosmological (Neoplaronic) framework, in which Christ is a created mediacor between creation and rhe transcendem God who remains unknown in himself. T his cosmological framework ru les out rhe e\'angrlical emphasis on di,,·ine '·fellowship·' wirh humanity.3D In the interpretation of Gwatkin, the relacion between God and creation in rhe controversy was seen as even more central, constitu ting the very core of Arius's docrrine_ ··Arianism," according co Gwatkin, begins wirh a conceprioEl of God as -absolutely simple and absolutely isolated from a world of finite beings."3 l Thus arises inexorably ·'the problem of creation - how to connecr [he unknown

92

93

The relation between God and creation in the Arian crisis: sfafw quaestiouis 26

THE ANTI-ARIAN WRITIKG S

THE

A~T1 - ARI:\N

WRITINGS

God with a macerial world.~32 Arius·s solucion of conceiving Christ as a created mediator came, according co Gwatkin, from philosophic precedent, and amounted ro a ~ing who is kneither truly God nor truly man, but a heathen demigod.-:n Gwatkin concluded chat ArillS'S solution was a failure precisdy because it confirmed che isolation of God from creation: MFar from spanning the infinite abyss which philosophy, not revdation, had placed berween God and sinless man, the Arian Christ is nothing but an isolated pillar in in midst. ~34 More recene scholarship has tended toward a far more generous and positj..'-e reappraisal of the position of Arius. A key element in such reappraisal has been a tendency to de~rnphasiz.e the supposed cosmological concerns and philosophical approach of Aeius. Most notable among such attempts at reineerpretation has been Roberc E. Gregg and Dennis W. Groh·s Epr/, AriPllism: A View of Sainrti(J1l. This work secs out to porcray the racionale of Arianism in terms of a soteriology of exemplarism, in which Christ is a fellow crearure whose tareer and access to divine prerogati....es any Christian can effeaively reproduce. h ha; ~en pointed Out , however, chat che soceriological emphasis in Gregg and Groh's approach is not evident from the extant Arian cexts themselves, which are far more preoccupied wirh the question of the relation betv,.-een Father and Son.'~ Moreover, the very logic pur forrh by Gregg and Groh has corcecdy been questioned insofar as the Arian Christ is not so straightforwardly a Mfellow crea[ure~ but a pre-existent ~ing, without a human soul, who is pointedly styled as ~a creature bur nor as one of the crearures.- 36 NC"\·ercheless, we can poinc out that the theme of chI' relation ~tween God and creacion remains implicidy integral to Gregg and Gtoh's iorerprecation, insofar as they characterize Athanasius's model as one in which God. and the world are related. by participation, and distingu..ish that model from Arius's, which they see as relating God and world through dh'ine will. A more balanced and altogether more perspicacious re-reading of Arius's doctrine is ROll.-atl Williams's Ariu;: Heroy prod Troditian. Williams surveys the history of scholarship dealing with the Arian crisis, shrewdly pointing OUt how tradicional estimatt"S of Arius te nded to produce '·the image of this heresy as the radically ·Ocher,· projecting on co it whate\·er theological or ecclesiological tenets currently represent the opposition to a Christian mainstream in which the scholar and interpreter claims co scand "')~ In the course of his survey, Williams suggests that the work of Gwatkin represemed a decisive development in the discussion of Arian doctrine

insofar as it ··shift[s} some of chI' emphasis away fro m the supposed Christological focus of the heresy and towards che doctrines of God and creation.~~ In his own analysis of Arius·s doctrine, \'Uilliams makes a conscious effort to a\'oid a prewnception of ~ Arianism-asother,· and co see Arius in the context of an Alexandrian milieu. \X'hat emerges is an Arius who is a fairly ··conservative- Alexandrian Christian. \'{'har is striking in Williams·s account, however, is that, beyond che reconfiguration of rhe place of Arius in relation to previous tradition, and notwithstanding his persuasive deconstruction of ·'Ariarusm-as-omef,- \'('illiams·s interpreration of Arius·s doctrine is finally fairly close to G"'"'atkin·s.>9 It differs ultimately more by way of nuance than substance, with much of the nuancing due to Williams·s recognition of Arius's stress on divine will as effecting a kind of relation ~tween God and the wodd, as opposed to che mere -isolatio n" seen by Gwatki n. K everrheless, after a careful and judicious analysis of the fragmems of Arius·s poem, the rhalia, \X'illiams concludes tbar rhe Arian Christ -wirnesses to the unbridgeable gulf between God and all e!se .. ·-IOMoreover, ··when we look at Arius· attack on Alexander"s theology, we see, at the very least, a close parallel to the Neoplatonist dismanciing of earlier Placonic models of God's relation to the world.- 41 To be sure, W'illiams caucions that divine transcendence is conceived by Ariw not so much as ·'the mere face of unrelatedness- but rather in terms of the sovereigmy of divine will.42 Bm he goes on finally to acknowledge that there still remains an ··unrelatedness" in Arius·s theology, between the world and the subject of tht- di \'ine will. Thus Arius's attempr to relate God to the "II.'orld solely b)' will entails a pure voluntarism, Mthe inability co say anything about the subject of willing beyond t he mere assertion that it wills ~.-I; There remains in Arius·s conception an -insistence on the utter independence and separareness of the source of all. --14 Let us add here two observations on the significance of the issue of me relation between God and creation in the Arian crisis. Firsdy, from a historical poior of view, it is dear chac the issue of the rela{ion between God and creation, as the latter is conceived in che parcicular form of the doccrine of creario ex 11ihilo, forms a significant background to rhe COntroversy. This doctrine amounted to a decisive affirmation of chI' absolute sowreigm}' and freedom of God in relation to the world, an acknowledgement of the radical contingency of the world and irs dependence on God, and a positing of an irreducible difference ~rween creation and itS Creator. Many scholars have summariz.ed the Arian controversy by alluding co this

94

95

THE ANTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

THE ANTI _ARIAN WR1TIKGS

background with the observation that Athanasius placed the logos on one side of this great divide and Arius placed him on the other. 4' Moreover, we can poim out that, despite the rather tendentious remark that Athanasius called "Arian ~ anyone who disagreed with him,46 the case is rather rhat Achanasius called MArian" anyone who could be under:stood to mean that the Son is a creature. Secondly, from a systematic point of view, the issue of the rdation between God and creation is not simply one among others. Precisely because of its all-encompassing nnge, the issue of the relation between God and creation bears in some way, expliCit or implicit, on whatever issue l\'e choose to see as rhe ~ce nter" of che controversy_ We have already seen, for example, how Gregs and Groh's focus on Arian doctrine as primarily soteriological in conception nevenhe1ess resulted in rwo conuasting models of che relation between God and creation , In this chapter, we shall see rhat rhe relation between God and creation, and the kind of mediation and of immediacy operative in chis relation, were nor only impliddy foundational issues for Athanasius, but were also explicitly considered by him. V/le now rum co a focused investigation of how such issues are played OUt in Athanasius's anti-Arian polemic.

We begin with a question of method. How did Athanasius's conception of the rdation benveen God and creation dete rmine his theological reasoning on behalf of the full di\'in ity of the Son and Spirit? It has been said of the term "homoousios that "its employ. mfnt by Athanasius and N icaea was not intended to create a speculative- or metaphysical theology as some histOrians seems co think, but co express the utler dialectic between God and the world. The /xmrI)()IIJios is not to be understood so much a5 a positive state· ment telling us something about God's being, but rather as a negati"e one, indicating what the LogOJ is nOt, namely a crearure.-41 Zizioulas's comment is a useful one, not only because it directly siruates Athanasius's Trinitarian theology in the context of his conception of the ·utter dialectic between God and creari on~ but also because it at least implicitly suggests some tonnecrion, in Athanasius's theology, between the issue of the rdation between God and creat ion and that of the relation between apophatic and cataphatic theological statements. The latter issue has proven to be significant in the context of contemporary theological discourse. For

it is precisely the supposedly speculati"e and metaphrsical character of traditional onhodol( assenions of {he Son's substantial unity with the Father that render them virtually meaningless to some modem theo[ogians:~8 The inadequacy of such assenions is sometimes maintained precisely by recourse co a radical apophaticism. Within such an atmosphere, a retrieval of the context and logic of Athanasius's statements on the subscantial unity and equality of the Father and the Son amounts to a contribution co our understanding of the history of theological method. It answers the question of how we can know and in some measure understand a statement referring to the being of the unknown God. More to the point of our immediate discussion, how{".-er, is the question of how Athanasius's conception of the rdation berv.·een God and creation allows him to aniculate positive statements about God that arc nevenheless ul ti· matel}' apophatic in signification. A central principle in Athanasius's apophaticism is chat it is ~impossible to comprehend what God is, yet it is possible to say what he is not:'49 Human incapacity to comprehend the divine essence is expl icidy ascribed there to the natural gulf berv.·een what is created and the uncreated Creator.'o Although, as we have seen, Athanasius is always concerned to point out that God's love acts in such a way as to compensate for rhis na{Ur:ai difference, both by granting us participation in his Image and through the whole economy of redemption, it still remains true for Athanasius that our creaturel}' knowledge of God cannOt amount ro a direct and (hor· ough perusal of the divine nature. It is always a matter of "seeing through a glass darklr~ Thus, e...-en in the context of the revelation of God 9o'hich is consummated in Christ, and in the renewed knowledge of God to which we are thereby given access, it is srill true that "all created beings, and especially we who are human, find it impossible to speak adequately concerning the things that are inef· fable.-- H One consequence of our non-comprehensive knowledge of God is that wc cannot claim co know "how God is," but only that he is. ~2 For Athanasius, however, this does not mean that we CaDflm make any statementS that qualify our conception of who God is beyond a mere bare assenion of his existence. Rather, his poim is thar we must not inquire imo God's being as if it were a mechanjsm which we can analyze and find out Mhow it works." It is ultimately a question of the relation between revealed faith and human reason, and Athanasius wants to safeguard the basic pri nciple that faith cannot simply be judged by reason, "for the things that have been handed

96

97

T he relation between God and creation and th e t beological reasoning of Athanasius

H

• THE

ANTI~ARIAK

WRIT I NGS

down by faith ought not to be measured by human wisdom, but by the hearing of faith.~53 \X'ith regard to the doctrine of God, then, faith affords us cerrain irtSights into rhe being of God which do not yet amount to an "explanarion" of God. In turn, our task is not to assimilate the revelation of faith to human structures of explanation but che re.... erse - to assimilate our human ways of explaining and understanding ro the re....elation of faith. Thus Athanasius often crit~ icizes the Arians for understanding revealed data in a "fleshlyM human way, and for trying to subject it ro human reasoning. ~4 In COntrast, he himself does not advocate the disuse of human reason in theological maners. Rather, he wishes to ad ....ance the realization that what faith reveals has to be understood with an attitude of apophatic *reverence" (eooEt~£lcr.) that has in view the othemess between God and the \.... orld. 55 This reverence entails the effon to understand statemems relating to God by reference nO[ primarilr to the signification such statements would have in the context of created real ities, bm rather by reference to the whole "scope" of scripture as understood in tradition. 56 \'<7ith these qualifications, Athanasius considers that scripture provides cenain insighLS as to how we should conceive of the reality of divine being . We can make use of these insights to gain positive indications of the narure of who God is. Athanasius 's espousal of trus principle explains his frequem recourse to scriptural imagery (for example, of light and radiance, and foumain and river) in his articulation of the relation between the Father and the Son. Such imagery provides us with positive knowledge of God's being, pro.... iding that we do not press it too far, roward a literal analysis of the structure of di vine being. Thus in castigating the Arians fo r their "impeninent inquiries," he challenges:

T HE ANTI - ARIAN \X'RIT1NGS

make the necessary qualifications so that what is proper to crearurely natures is nOt applied to God.58 While Ath:masius thus has significant recourse to the exposition of scriptural imagery in his arguments for the ful l divinity of Son and Spirit, his dominant method of argument is [Q insist that the Son and the Holy Spirit belong to the e~nce of God simply because they are nOt creatures. Not only is this the primaty way of reasoning toward the affirmation of the divinity of the Son and Spirit, but it is also the primary way for explaining what it means to say that the Son and Spirit are "proper" to the divine essence. Thus Athanasius explains that the whole point of the Nicene "'homoousios" is ~that bot h the pure genuineness of the Son might thereby be known and that to things originate might be ascribed nothing in common with him ."59 The divinity of the H oly Spirit is similarly to be explained in terms of its dissimilarity to created being: to

It is enough to know that the Spirit is not a creature, nor is he numbered with the things that are made. For nO[hing foreign is mixed with the Triad; it is indivisible and consistent {like itSelf, oJloia EUU'rTll. These things are sufficient for the faithful. Thus far human knowledge goes. Here the cherubim spread the covering of their wings. He who seeks and would inquire into what lies beyond these things disobeys him who said: ~Be not wise in many things, lest thou be confounded.'·60

An imponant part of Athanasius's theological method is thus devoted to a rational e}.:position of scriptural imagery, alwa~'s careful

As this quotation makes dear, Athanasius's apophaticism is consciously based on the distance between God and creation. But it is an aJXIphaticism that not only accommodates but necessitates posiri~'e statements about God. The unlikelJess of God to creatures itself leads to JXlsiti"c statements about God's being, and about the relationships of Father, Son, and Spirit within God. And so Athanasius applies this unlikeness ro the Son and the Spirit in order [Q substantiate and explain the positive statements to the effect that Son and Spirit are proper to and inseparable ftom the divine essence. These positive staremencs about the divinity of the Son and Spirit are rhus also apophatic statements insofar as they differentiate Son and Spirit from the created order. They are primarily negations of crearurdiness as applied to Son and Spirit. And yet jf such apophatic statements do carry a positive content, it is precisely because Athanasius's conception of the rdation berween God and

98

99

Let them say how the Father is, that so they may learn how his Word is. But it is absurd, they will say, to ask such questions about the Father. Let chem hear, then, that it is also absurd to ask them concerning his \\'7ord. Since, therefore, such an attempt is futile madness, nay, more than madness, let no one ask such queStions any more, or else let him learn only that which is in the scriptures. For the illustrations (ncr.pcr.i5dYJla-ra) they contain which bear upon this subject are sufficiem and suitable. F

• THE ANTI-ARIAK WRITINGS

THE ANTI - ARIAN WRITINGS

creation is such chac the unlikeness between the m'o orders is itself concei\'ed not in absolutely negaci ..-e terms but also in terms of posirl"'C,' relation. We now rum (0 a consideration of this point.

and we through him. And if all [rungs are through him,

The unlikeness between God and creation The unlikeness of me Son and Spirit co creation is sometimes explicated by Athanasius in terms of ontological attributes. For example, he makes tbe argument chac whereas all created things are assigned a place, the Son and Spirit are spoken of in [he scriptureS as transcending spatial limitation and are thus noe creatures but God .61 Much more often, however, che kind of unlikeness that is referrt'd to is not a general 3cuibutC,' of being but che asymmetrical relation of the Creator ro what is created. This is so pervasi,,'e a maneuver in Athanasius that ie is very easy to miss the significance of it. This significance has to do with the fact that Athanasius thus puts aside, in large parr, the traditional p hilosophical opposition between the onrological attributes of the divine and the mundane. Within such a framework, the attributes of the divine are not explicitly brought into direct relation with those of the mundane realm. To say that the divine is ubiquitous or atemporal or unedy simple is not [Q posir any direct connection bern·een it and what is compound and spatially and temporally lim ited. Athanasius is capable of distinguishing God and creat ion within such a framework. But, as we h:lve said. his most characteristic way is to posic che opposition between God and creation 9,'ith specific reference to the act (and the relation) of creating. \Xle find therefore that his mOSt characteristic and repeated argument for the divinity of the Son is that the scripmres speak of the creative activity of the Son, and if the Son is Creator he cannot be created: For in Wisdom all things were made, as David says in the Psalm, ~ln Wisdom you have made them aW {l04:24} and Solomon says, "By Wisdom, che lord has formed {he earth, and he has established the hea"·ens with understanding~ [pro.... 3:19J. This Wisdom is the 9,·ord. As John sa}'s, by him '·all things were made,~ and ··without him nothing was made Un, 1:3}. And (his Word is Christ; for ·'chere is One God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we for him; and One Lord J esus Christ, through whom are all chings, H

100

H

He himself is noe to ~ considered among chac Mall. H62

This last statement is a constanriy reiterated motif throughout the Or(ltiQf1tJ (()nmz Ari(lnM. The Son is not created and is completely unlike anything created, insofar as it is through him that all else was created. 6} So the essent ial principle is that what constitutes che kind of unlikeness ftom which the Son is distinguished from creation is the fact of being Creator and not simply that of being different from creation: -For if he be a creature, how is He at the same time the Creator of crearuus?-64 Against the Tropici, the StruCture of this argumem is self-consciously preserved intact and simply transferred from reference to the Son to that of the Spirit: And if, because all things come into being through the Word, you think correctly that the Son is not a creature: then is it not blasphemy for you to say that the Spirit is a creature, in whom the Father, through che Word , perfectS and renews all thing~?6~ In both cases, then, it is precisely che active agency of Son and Spirit t09.rard the world - their agency in bringing into being and healing and restoring created being - thac constitutes the unlikeness to the created realm which proclaims each to be Creator and God. Of course, the Structurt of such an argumem (ifCreacor, then not created, and vice versa) pusumes that being created and being Creator are mutually exclusive categories, betw~n which the~ is no middle ground. Indeed, for Athanasius, it is precisely the opposition between Cfeated and Creator chat constitutes che limit case of unlikeness: -for what is the lihness of what is OUt of nothing co che one who brought what was nothing inco being?~ (CA 1:21), Gi\'en this absolutel}' strict conception of the oncological dissimilarity between created and Creator, it is understandable chat Athanasius considers as objectively meaningless and subjectively duplicitous the Arian qualification that the Son is -a creature, but not as one of the creacures.~ While his interpretation of the subjective iorent of this statement as mere ··pretence (tI1l:6ICP10"1~) (CA 2:19) may be questionable, his inability co find any intelligible comeor in such a statemenc is consistem with his own logic. He councers mockingly that e\'ety creature is in some way distinct from the other crearures, so thac such distinction in no way distinguishes the Son, ··For is any one of the creatures JUSt what another one is. that you should claim H

101

• T HE AKTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

THE ;\NTf_ARIAN WRITINGS

this p redication of rhe Son as some prerogative?" (CA 2:19). The only crucial distinction is whether the Son is a creature at all or rather simply Creator. In light of chat primary and radical distinction, Athanasius often de-emphasizes rhe Origenian hierarchical conception of the universe in favor of a much more egalitarian view whereby the srams of all created things is characrerized principally bv the common factor of being created, notwithstanding any distinctions within char common 5[au-".66 G iven such a perspective, it is easy to see that the Arian desire to ascribe some pre-eminem (albeir still creamedy) starns to the Son struck Athanasius as simply unintelligible. In his polemic against the Arians' imputing of creamcdy status ro the Son, Athanasius thus availed himself of every opponunity to emphasize the unqualified ochemess of the \\70rd with respen to creation and, in general, the othemess between Creator and creation . In such momems, he is given to asking rhetorically what '"Iikene.ss~ or "communion" there could be between what is created and the Creator. 67 Taken by themsel .... es, such statements might g ive the erroneous impression that Athanasius's emphasis on the otherness between God and creation implies a mere opposition. However, such an imerpretation does not harmonize well with what we have seen to be Athanasius's model of relating the world to God through pan:icipation in the \'\ford . It remains for us now to fun:her clarify what ki nd of otherness is conceived b)' Athaoasius in the relation between God and the world, and how he conceives of the "unlikeness" of th is relation as simultaneous with a cen:ain likeness. As we shall see, such questions were not far afidd from Athanasius's banles with the Arians on behalf of the substamial divinity of the Son. In his principal dogmatic work against the Arians, the OraliOTla camra nria1Jl)S, probably the single most pervasive motif employed by Athanasius is his continual reiteration that the Son is ~proper to" (1:0109 the Father, while all of creation is "external to" or "from outsi de ~ (h.:-rO<;, £Sro9EV) the Father. 68 Throughour the Or{1timles and many of his other shon:er polemical WOtks,69 Athanasius uses this distinction to drive home the identity of essence between Son and Father and to distinguish their relationship from the otherness between divine essence and created being. An analysis of these terms will thus bring us to a properly contextual understanding of the kind of orherness that he conceives in the rdation berWl'"Cn -God and creation. We may begin our analysis with a typical passage in which these

terms are used ro differemiate the ontolog ical status of the Son from rhat of creation:

W e see here that the Arian conception of the Son as originating from nothing is designated by Athanasius in the terminology of "externality" to God. Athanasius applies this terminology to the realm of t a '(EV(V) Il'tO:, which is unli ke in essence (av0J.l0to\' 1(0"t' oOO1.av) to God. By contrast, the Son's lack of orig inateness, his eternal coexistence and identity of essence with the Father is expressed in terms of his being tOto\, "tfj-; oooiCll:; "tou TIatp6<;. However, we may note here also that the distinction of lOlOo;---£SWeEV is not articulated in terms of a COntrast between t a YEV(V)T]"tCt and t o a YEv(v)T]'w\" even though Athanasius is very much interested in pressing the poim that the Son's nature is not originate. To be sure, Athanasius does not want to be vulnerable to the accusation that he is positing "twO Unbego[[ens~ in the Godhead.1'° Neven:heless he does not sh}' away elsewhere from insisting that the Son is not originateJl \X/hen it comes to articulating the COntrast berv..·een God and world, however, he speaks not so much of the unlikeness of essence between the originate and the unoriginate, as of that between the originate and the Maker of what is originate (fa J.lEv yap ana 01&: £.O"TI "to. YEVIl'ta. OUOEV 0IlOWV KU"t' oUO"lav [;r.Et rep&; 'C ov 7tE7t01T]1(CrrU) (CA I: 15; Bright, p. 21). Moreover the "externality" of 'Ca lEVT]tu is explained not as merdy a negative concept, a sheer lack of rdation to God, but

10'

103

When was God without that which is pro~r ('!Ou 10\.OU) to him? Or how can someone consider that which is propet (-t OU 10lOU) as foreign and other in essence (roS itEPl. S£vou 1(at aA Ao-rplOOooioup For other things, according ro the narure of things orig inate, are unli ke in essence (owev O~otOv 1(a'[' oOO1.av) to the Maker, but are external to him (£.SW9EV ov't ou), made by the Word at his grace and will, and thus are capable of ceasing to be, if it so pleases him who made them . For such is che narure of originate things. But as to what is pro~r to the Father's essence ("to OE lOlOV "tlls ouo-ta S "tou TIo"tpO<;) - for this we have already found to be the Son - what an insolent impiety it is to say that "This comes from nothing," and that ·'It was not before generation," but was ad.... ent itious, and can at some t ime cease to be again. (CA 1:20; Bright, p . 21 )

THE ANTI - ARIAN WRIT(KGS

THE ANTI_ARIAN WRITINGS

direCtlr in terms of their having been "made by the Word at his grace and wilL~ It is clear therefore that AthanasiU5's conception of the "unlikeness" or "extemality" between God and the world is conditioned by its being posited within the framework of the positive relation of GOO's creative actiyity, ro\\':li"d the world. This observation leads us ro understand that, for Athanasius, creation's being extemal to or omside GOO is an oncological datum that is inseparable from another datum, of equal force, which is that creation subsists "in" God, Consistently, Athanasius wants ro maintain simulmneoU5ly that God is both ~ourside" and "within" creation: "within all according ro his own goodness and power, yet outside all in his proper nature."n Indeed, these two aspects go together for Athanasius in such a way that creation's subsistence in God amounts, eo ipJo, to a demonstration that God is "ourside" creation, In the context of anti-Arian polemic, this leads to the oft-repeated argument on behalf of the divinity of the Word, which emphasizes the unlikeness of the Word to creation by way of insisting that creation subsists in and through the '.);Tord.'3 A clarification and explanation of this simultaneity of God's being both within and outside the world and the world's being outside and in God can perhaps be found within the framework of the Athanasian notion of participation, Here it becomes dear that "within-
Word is an argument tbat affirms the Word's total unlikeness and externality to the world. For an appreciation of this logic we need to locate Athanasius's ni1O~---£;wa£,' distinction within his overarching presupposition of creation's pa.ticipation in the Creator. For Athanasius, to say that creatures are "external" to God means in faCt that they panicipate in God,75 Thus rhe same fundamemal distinction of created and Crearof is aniculated in terms of what is external and what is proper to the diyine essence and in terms of what partakes and what is panaken. In this way, AthanasiU5's argument that thl' Son is proper to and not external to God amounts to the assenion that the Son is related to God not by panicipation but essentially, whereas all ocher creatUJes are related to God by panicipation, That what is created is related to God by panicipation is a tenet that the Arians also seem to have held, though, as we wouJd e>.-pect, they are reported by Athanasius to have comended that the Son is also such by participation J6 In any case, Athanasius takes it for granted rhat to say thar the Son originated from nothing and had a beginning ro his existence amOuntS to saying that he is related to God by participation (Kuta jl£1:Oucrluv), "for that is how all other creatum subsist and by sanctification are glorified ~ (CA 1:15), In opposition to this view, Athanasius articulates his belief that the Son is 1010'; to the Father by insisting that the Son does not gain his pre-eminent tides by participating in the Father but is rather himself participated in by creatures: aFor He is himself the Father's Power and Wisdom, and by partaking of him (jl£"Cox.fl "Cou"Cou) things originate are sanctified in the Spirit; but the Son himself is not Son by panicipation (ou J.L£'toucriq.), but is the Father's proper (iOtov) Offspring" (CA 3:1),77 In ge neral, then, Athanasius insists that the Son is not related to God by participation as is the (est of crearion, bur rather creation is related to God through panicipation in the Son, However, there is one significant exception where Athanasius himself breaks this rule, in Contra ArianOJ 1:15. While superficially this exception might be dismissed as merely inconsistent with his general principie,7B it in fact serves to illumine it and to clarifY what AthanasiU5 means by parricipation and how the Son's relation to the Father is to be distinguished from that of the rest of cteation. Athanasius's articula~ tion of a certain distinerive participation by rhe Son of the Father has as its p:.!int of departure his attempt to meet the Arians on their OWIl grounds, in their assenion of thl' Son's being called such by participation. Athanasius then asks, ~Of what does he partake?" It cannm be of the Spirit, since thl' Spirit receives O.UJ.L~Vf.l) from

104

105

THE :\NTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

the Son (In. 16:14). It must then be the Father. But we need to be dearer. Does the Son partake of the \·ery essence of the Fa.t:her or of ~somerhing external (E.~roeEV) provided by the Father?P (CA 1:1:». In the latter case, counters Athanasius, there would be an imer· .... ening principle in the relation betw~n the Son and che Father: i9 In that case, he will nor be partaker of the Father, bur of what is external to h im (t OU £~oo9£v). Nor will he be even second after [he Father, since the one that he partakes pr«edes him. Kot can he be called Son of the Father, but of the one that he partakes ... And if this would be unseemly and impious ... it follows that lI.'hat is partaken is nor external, but from che essence of the Father. (CA 1:1:>; Bright, p. 17) h s~ms clear from rnis kind of reasoning that Athanasius takes che mode! of participation far more seriously and, as it were, realis· tically than his Arian opponents. OOV:' hile Athanasius himself represents the Arians as spe-aking of the Son as related, along with the rest of creation , to God's nacute by participation, there are 00 indications that anything stronger or more specifir Wa5 meam by that than a mere dedaration of che derivative character of the Son.80 ConcepruaJly, che Arian way of spe-aking of che Son as ha.... ing his being Hby panicipation does not seem to add any significant coment to the assertion of his having come to be from nothing by God's will, and his haying been granted certain prerogatiyes at God's good pleas~. Athana5ius, however, repr~ms a m uch more substantialise notion of participation, as is evidenced by his need to pose the question of precisely what it is thar the Son participates in if he is said to panicipate, the critical alternatives bt-ing God's essC'nce and ~some [hing ~xternal H to that essencC'. Athanasius seems to hold that to be a panakec of God (hC'ce, the Father) means co participate in the vC'cl' being of God, and not merC'ly something C'xremal to God·s essenCC'. We may safely apply chis principlC' e\·C'n to his speaking of cmeion's participation in God, which he frequently does, and which he nevC'r qualifies by saying chat creation participares in -something external provided b~' God." The externality of (rearion to God therefore is not to be understood in tC'cms of its participation in something external to God. How it is to be understood is indicated as Athanasius continues in his exposition of a certain unique sense in which the Son may propc-rly be said to participarC' in {he Father. In this t'xposj· H

106

THE ANTI _ARIAN \VRIT I NGS

tion Athanasius s~ms

analyZC' the notion of participation into a ((171'1;""1 d qllO (th~ ~whence~ of [hat which panakes) and a termifllJj dd qJd1fl (that which is partaken). The latter he created first, arriving H at the conclusion that -what is participated is rhe vcr)' essence of the Father and not something external to it. Immediately he goes on to point oue (hat what participates in the Facher is none other than the very essencC' of the Son, for ~if it is other than the essenct' of the Son, we encounter anot her absurdity: that there is romerhing between what is from the Father and [he essence of the Son, whatever way the lacter may be conceived" (CA 1:1:». As Athanasius himself conceives it, the spe<:iaJ case of the Son's participation of [he Father is one where there is absolutely no ~gap- berween [hat which participates and that which is participated. This is the only case where the essence of what participates God is perfectly continuous with what is participated. Thus there is nOthing in the Father in which the Son does not participate, and there is nothing in the Son other than what he ha5 by participation of the Father. In this way, Athanasius transposes the mystery of chI' consubstamial generation of the Son from the- Father inco tht' terminology and framework of participation. H e thus brings together and correlates, in this passage, the terminology of participation, generation, and rhe Son·s being tli\(~ to the Fathec: CO

We must say that what is from the essence of the Father and proper to him (tlilOV (Xmou) is C'mirel}, the Son. For it is the same thing to say [hat God is wholly participated (0).00:; l1E'!£Xecrea.t) and that he begets; and wha t does begetting signify, except a Son? And so all things partake (ll£'!£X£t 1tCt:\l"tCt.) of the Son himself according to the grace of the Spirit coming from him. This shows that [he Son himself partakes of nothing. Rather, what is partaken from the Father is the Son (TO liE £K tau nmpO; ll£T£XDJ.t£vov. LO\>LQ £Otl .... 0 Yi69. For, as panaking of [he Son himself, we are said to partake of God - and this is what Peter said, ~that you may be panakers in the divine nature'·; as the Apostle sa;-s also: ~ Do you not know that you are a temple of God?'· and, ··We are the temple of the liviog God.'· And seeing rhe Soo. we see the Father; for tile thought lnd comprehensioo of the Son is knowledge about the Father, because He is his proper offspring from his essence (€:x: Til; oootoo; Ct.UtOU rlilOV eivCt.l "(EvvrlllCt.). (CA 1:16; Bright, p. 17)81

"to:

107

THE AKTI·ARIAN WRIT!KGS

As always, Athanasius·s exposition of the rdation becween the

Son and the Father is dosely tied up with that becween rhe world and God. First , the Son·s rdation to th!' Father is distinguished from creation's participation in God. In the co~ of elaborating this distinction, Athanasius finds himself casting che unique generation of the Son from the Father in terms of panicipation. However, the crucial distinction benvet"n Ctea-curely pacricipation in God and the Son's panicipation in the Father is maintained by the assertion that the Son's very essence is the total pacricipation of the Facher. This cannot be said for am' creature; Athanasius wiU illSis! that even when our participation in God amounts to the grace of deification, we are still "by essence'" something other than that gift. S2 It is precisely with reference to this notion that we can understand how it is thar that creation is ~ex[emal~ to God. At this point, we must apply the methodological principle that Athanasius's categories an fully intelligible only in the COntext of their mutual correlation. Therefore, m~ation's externality to God is to be understood principally in comradisrinction to tbe "proPf"r" relation of the Son [0 the Father, whereby the Son's total reception of the Fathec's being is identical with the Son's being, and is not somerhing -adde'lr to ir. Whereas what is received by creation through its participation in God is not identical with its being, but rather constitutes an "addition" ~from outside. In the logic of Athanasius, there is alllo"3}"s some kind of ontological bur objectivdy unidentifiable "remainder point" that represents a gap berv.·een crearucely essence and ies participation in God. This ~remainder poim~ is not to be concei"'ed as a part of creaturely being that does not participate in God, so much as a terminru a qJJO, from which creaturely being participates in God. G iven Athanasius's typical description of crearnrdy being in terms of what comes to be from nothing and parcicipates in God, we may well conclude that the UrminllJ a qlto of creation's participa. cion in God is precisely idemifiable with itS origin from nothing, So we can say, ultimately, that creation is external to God in the sense thar it participates in God from nothing; or, co say it another way, creaturely being is essentially a movement from ooth.ing to God, And it is this -from nothing which renders creation's pacricipation in God external to the divine essence. However, Achanasius noc only diStinguishes and differentiates the Son's participation of rhe Father from that of the rest of creation, he also typically sets up a positive relation between the twO kinds of participation. The progress of his argument in the passage JUSt qUOted is indicative of the rationale behind his linking of rbe tWO H

H

108

THE ANTI·ARIAN \X' R ITINGS

sets of relations, that between Son and Father, and that between world and God. For immediately after establishing chat the Son's participation of the Fatber collSticutes an identity of essence, he goes on to establish a kind of chain of participation in which our panicipation of the Son amounts to a participation of the Father: ~for as partaking of the Son himself, we are said to partake of God , .. And seeing the Son, we see the Father~ (CA 1:16).83 Thus che logic of the Son's substantial identity of the Father is emplored at once at the service of creation's access to the Farher. We shall Stt that chere is a way in which, for Athanasius, che immediacr of essence bern'een the Son and che Father is stricti}, connected with the immediacy in the relation between God and rhe world. Indeed, the question of mediation and immediacy between God and the world was an explicit factor in the Arian comrovers}' as opposing sides conceived distincrive moods and rationales for the kind of mediation wrought by che \'Vord in relation to the world, We now turn to Athanssius's criticisms of the Arian model; of mediation and his own understanding of how God is immediately related to the world through rhe Word.

Word and world: mediation and immediacy Athanasius is often prone to reducing rhe Atian position to the asseccion that the \'{lord is merely a creature and essentially no differenc from any other creature. The effect of his rhetoric is such that even comemporary scholars, who are inclined to gi,'e a more positi,'e reading of Arian theology, fall into the trap of seeing the Arian Word as a creature like other Cteatures.84 Howe...er, although Athanasius's interpretation of the Arian position was based on the principle that logicall}' it is reducible co such an assumption, he was well aware that the Arians themselves did not accept thar reduction so strictly but tri~ to qualify ie While Arius did, in fact, assecr that che Son was a crearu~, it is equallr evident thar he qualified this asseccion by adding, Ubu[ not as one of the other creatures.~8S Indeed, it seems thar as much as Arius was concerned to differen. tiate ontologically the relative status of the Son and the Father, he was no less concerned to differentiate also the rdari ..·e status of the Son and creation: The Son is one among ochers. For He is first of things originare, and one among intellectual natures. And as with visible things, the sun is one among phenomena, and shines

109

THE ANTI- ... RIAN WRITIN GS

THE AN TI _ARIAN WRITINGS

on rhe whole world according to the command of its Maker, so the Son, as one of rhe imellecmal natures, also enlightens and shi nes upon all that art' in the intellectual world. (DtSyrrMis 19)86

fundam ental response ro these conceptions of the Son's mediatorial

prerogatives is that they amount to a nonsensical confusion of che fundamental and mutually exclusive categories of Creator and created. If the Son is created, then he cannot be conceived, in any sense, as Creatot; if he is conceded to be Creator, then he is not created. That is the basic standard of argument against \\'hich Athanasius finds the Arians to be both illogical and duplicitous. However, in the course of countering specific assertions, Athanasius ends up elaborating his own version of che kind of immediacy, the kind of mediation, and the kind of othemess that does really obtain between God and rhe world, and this elaboration is strictly connected to the statement of the Son·s full di \'inity. We may now follow this Athanasian elaboration, analyzing first his rejection of the Arian notion of mediation and then his own articulation of the Son·s fully di \'ine mediation. Achanasius seizes upon the Arian notion that there was need of a mediatOr because creation could nO[ withstand the direct hand of God. Logically, he makes short work of this notion by a quite forceful argument that it leads to an infinite tegms. If creation requires a mediator co withstand the direc t hand of G od, and if this mediator is itself creared, then precisely ql(11 created, it must also stand in need of a further mediation. The logic of this notion of a necessary created mediation berv"een Creator and creation is anal~'zed by Athanasius to lead inexorablr to ··a great throng of accumulating mediators; and so it wilJ be impossible for the creation to subsisL It would always be in need of a mediator, which would not come ioto being wit hout another mediator. For all of them will be of chac originate narure which cannot endure to be made di rectly by God alone, as you say' (Cri. 2:26).91 Howe\·er, as much as Athanasius mocks this Arian notion, it has at leasr one significant point of ovetlap \Vim his own conception of the relation between God and creation. namely, the abyss of othemess between God and creation. \XTe have alreadr seen in the Comrp Ge1lltJ-De Incpnllllione Athanasius·s emphatic em ployment of the motif of crearion·s incapacity to know God by virtUe of the natural difference between creation and the Creator. Indeed, there is a sense in which Athanasius himself also holds that creation, in virtue of its \'ery createdness, cannot withstand the immediate hand of God. H owever, we have also already seen in the same earlier treatise that it is axiomatic for Achanasius that the gulf between creation and God is bridged from che side of the di vine and not from that of creation. le ~longs to Athanasius's exposition of the doctrine of God to ascribe to God himself this accommodation to creatwely

110

III

Pan of the d istinction of rhe Son in Arian theology set'ms to ha\'e been che auciburion to him of a mediating demiurgic activity. The Only-Begotten Son is rhe one ~ rhrough whom {me f amer} has made both rhe ages and the univel'SC'~(De S)'nodis 16).87 The force of this distinction was thu only rhe Son was created direcd y by God, while che rest of creation was created indirecdy, through the Son: -The Father alone fashioned with his own hand only the Son, and all other things were brought to ~ by the Son as by an underworker" (j)e D ecretiI 7). Within this scheme, the relation ~tween God and creation can be articulated in terms of a sHicdy graded hierarchy of participation. Atha nasius represents the Arian response to the charge that the Son "in no way differs from others with respect to namre,H by having them say, "In this respen we do consider thar the Son of God has a prerogative over others and is called OnlyBegonen: because he alone partakes rhe Father, and all other things partake the Son'· (Dt DemliJ 9).88 On the one hand, rhe Arian pracrice of imputing to the Son a uniquely d irecc access to chI' Father and a creative funct ion with respect to the rest of creation is meafl{ co provide some content to the distinction of the Son from the rest of creation. In t~ polemical conteJr::t of the controversy, such assertions have rhe defensive funcrion of proving that the Son is -honored- above the rest of creation, e\'en if He is not conceded to be equal to the father. On the other hand, at least in the hands of Arius's supporter, Asterius,89 the attribution of this kind of mediation to the Son included a conception of the rdacioo betwttn the world and God in which a Mediator performed the necessary func· tioo of shielding the world from (he direct hand of God, with the understanding chat without this factor of ~in-directnes.s" the relacion berween God and the world is no t possible. According to Athanasius, the Arians believed that ~the other creatures could not endure to be fashioned by the absolute Hand of the Unoriginate, and t herefore only the Son was brought into being by the Father alone, and orher chings b~' the Son as an underworker and assistant" (Df Dtcrffn 8 ).90 As we have alread y had occasion to observe, Arhanasius's most

THE AKTi_AR I AK WRITiNGS

THE AN TI - ARI .... N WRlT lNGS

weaknes.s. It is precisely the Arian positing of this accommodation outside of God that offends against Athanasius's conception of the docuine of GOO. It is interesting to see how the Alexandrian bisho p represents the Arian notion of mediation in reference to rhe doctrine of God . For Athanasius, ir seems to offend particularly in implying either weakness or pride in GOO. Wirh regard to t he former, Arhanasius ascribes to divine power the capacity to make and direct all rhings directly and without aid, ··for God does not grow weary by commanding, nor is his strength unequal to the making of a1l things, rhat He should alone create the onlv, Son, and need his ministry and help for rhe fashioni ng of rhe rest ~ (CA 2:24). In this remark we see Athanasius's complete reieerion of the notion thar God could stand in need of any creaturely assistance. 91 On the other hand, the bishop also wants to reject any conception of di vine transcendence which places God morally '·abm·e" direc t involvement with creation . His description of this as implying divine Hpride" shows how much the biblical understanding of God's characterisrics has, in Athanasius, supplanted a merely philosophical notion of di vine transcendence in terms of a self-absorption that does not deign to become involved in lesser reali ties:

condescension. Thus if the Son admittedly does mediate betwt>en creation's incapacity to know God and the splendor of the Father, it is precisely in virrue of his full di ..·iniry, his unlikeness to creation, and his representation of the condescending divine love:

And if God made the Son alone, because he did not deign to make the rest, bur committed them to rhe Son as an assistant, it is this rhat would be unworthy of GOO! For in him there is no pride ... If it is not unworrhy of GOO to exercise his providence, even down to things so small as a hair of the head , and a sparrow, and the grass of the field [cf. Mc. 10:29, 6:25-30J, then it was not unworthy of him to make them in rhe first place. For He is Maker through his proper Word of all those things that are the ob jects of his providence. (CA 1:75 )93

At the same time, At hanasius is so far conscious of sharing the Arian conception of the need for a bridge between the created and uncreated realms thar he allows himself to use ,he same language of creation's innate Illcapacir)' to withstand rhe Huntempered·· (oxpa"tov) hand of God. He also agrees that this bridge is to be located in the Son. However, the decisive difference is that for Arhanasius this btidge cannot be conceived as coming from anywhere outside GOO, bue rather in terms of divi ne lo..-e and Il2

For it is evident to all, that neither with reference to himself 3.5 being a creature, nor as having any connection according to essence with the whole creation, has he been called 'Firstborn' of it. Rather, it is because the Word, when at rhe beginning He fashioned the crearutes, condescended (O"1.ryKa."!cq3£~T]lCE) to rhings originate, rhat it might be possible for rhem to come to be. For they could not have endured his nature, which was untem pered splendour, even that of the Father, unless condescending by the Father's love for humanity, he had supported them and taken hold of them and broughr (hem intO existence; and next, because by this condescension of the \'lord, the creation roo is made a son through him, that he might be in all respeers 'firsrborn' of it, as has been said, both in creating, and also in being brought for the sake of all into this very world. (CA 1:64: Bright, p. 134) In this passage we see some integrarion between the Arhanasian notion of the Word's mediat ion and his Trinitarian theology. We have already seen that, for Athanasius, mediation - in the sense of a bridging of the abys.s between creation and the CreatOr - cannOt be conceived in terms of a funct ion performed by any created nature, however exalted, bur only in reference to the condescension of the divine love. In this passage, Athanasius speaks of the Son's condescension toward creation, but this condescension is a manifestation of the Father's love: qllAa.v9proJttC;X J'tU"tplKn (J1))'Ka."!a.j3Ct~. The fact that mediation rakes place wholly through divine condescension thus means rhat the Son's mediation toward creatures represents and effects (he immediate presence of the Father, through the Son·s own substantial identity with the Father. Athanasius is concerned to stress that his conception of the Son's mediatorial activity, as opposed to that of the Arians, entails this immediacy of the Father's presence and activity to creation: And the Word is not separate from the father, nor unlike and foreign to the Father's essence, Therefore, whatever he

113

THE ANTI - AR IAN WRITINGS

THE ANTI_ARI.... N WRITI NGS

works, those are the- Father's works, and his framing of all things is one with the Father's; and what the Son gives, that is the Father's gifL And he who has seen the Son knows that, in seeing him, he has seen not an Angel, nor one merely greater than Angels, nor in shorr any creature, but the Father himself. And he who hears the Word knows that he hears rhe Father; as he who is irradiated by the radiance k nows that he is enlightened by the sun, (CA 3: 14)94

In {the Spirit} the Word makes glorious the creation, and, by bestowing upon it di\'ine life and sonship, draws it to the Father. But that which jaim creation to the Lord cannot hdo1;g fa the creatures [my emphasis); and that which beStowS sonship upo n the creation could not be alien from che Son. For wr should have orhenvise to srek another spirit, so that by him this Spirit might be joined to the Word, Bur t hat would be absurd. The Spirit, therefore, does not belong to things originated; he pertains to the Godhead of t he Father, and in him the Word makes things originated divine.9~

immediacy of the whole divine Trinity to creation, This immediacy may also be cast in the framework of participation, In partaking of the Spirit, we partake of the Son, and in parraking of the Son, we partake of the Father. This model of immediate participation in the whole Trinity through the mediation of Son and Spirit stands selfconsciously in contrast to the model of "exclusive" hierarchic participation, in which creation parrakes only in the Son, while only the Son parrakes the Father. 96 MoreO"ier, thr world's immediate partICIpation in the whole Trinity means a certain real correspondence between the being of the world and that of God: an "agreement by parricipation,"97 While this correspondence is strongly differentiated from substantial continuity, as well as from (he Plaronic srrucrures of a "chain" of mediating beings, it nevertheless represents an analogical similarity between God and the world, The persevering difference of natures ber-ween God and world has to do precisely with the asymmetrical structure of this very similarity. The "agreement by participation" is a matter of creation partaking and of God as being panaken. The asymmetry is thus conceived in terms of rotal dependence and deriHtion, which makes for a real ~ Iikenrss ,~ tather than mere othemess, To say this is ro arrive at another fundamental point where the Athanasian conception of otherness differs from that of the Arians, For Athanasius, the Arian position that the world came to be "through the Word," insofar as it distinguishes this demiurgic Word from the inner being of God , breaks the "agreement" or analogical correspondence between God and world. 'X'hat is len is a \\'7ord without a wodd (that carries an analogical resemblance of him), and a world without (an ontological-analogical correspondence to) the Word. Thus Athanasius contends that the Arians hay!' invented for themselves a God without any "works, ~ distinct from the biblical God who is immediately present ro and evident from his works?8 Significantly for our theme, Athanasius likens the Arians in this respect to the Manichees,99 for whom the sepatation between God and the world was such chat the true God was not the Creator of this world:

Thus, for Athanasius, both rhe Son and the Spirit mediate between or connect the world and God, Bur this mediating function is consistent with their fully divine StatuS and, in fact, serves to distinguish them from created natures. As such, this mediaring and connecting function is precisely evidence of their "otherness" to creation. Ar the same time, in either case we have to do with a[l

For these also confess the existence of a good God, so far as the mere [lame goes, bur they are unable to point out any of hi~ works eiIher visible or invisible, Bur inasmuch as ther deny him who is truly and indeed God, the Maker of heaven and earrh, and of all things invisible, they are mere inventors of fables _ And this appears to me to be rhe case

114

115

The logic which links the Son's mediation with the immediacy of the Father's presence and activiq.. in the world is also employed in Athanasius's e),:position of the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Here too the principle is reiterated that nothing external to God can join creation ro God. If the Spirit is described, in t he scripnues, as fulfilling precisely that function, then the Spirit must be fully divine. Moreover, if the Spirit belongs to the Son, ,hen it cannot be connened to the Son through any other principle which is itself not intrinsic ro divine being, In this case also, we would have an infinite regress in nying to posit any creatureiy principle as connen ing 1:0 God what is external to God, If the Spirit is t hus portrayed in scripture as "belonging" to the Son and as connecting creation to God, and as rendering present the Son's activity, then the Spirit mUSt also be God:

THE ANTI - AR I AN WRITINGS

THE ANTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

with these cvil-minded men [i.e. the Arians}. They see the works of the tcue \'\!ord who alone is in rhe Father, and yet the)' deny him, and make co themseh.. cs anothct Word, whose existence they are unable to prove either by his works or by the testimony of others (ov om£ E ~ lfpywv onT£ E ~ CtJ(ofi~ Ctr-..oSHJ(V'\)£tV o{rva\>tcn).l00

J\{ethodius of Olympus, who severely criticized Origen on this point. 101 In Acius, on the other hand, the discontinuity bt"tween God and the world is a matter of emphatic concern. In fact, we have seen that for Athanasius the Arian dissociation between God's being and the creation of the world threatens to result in a breakdown of the omologically analogical relation between God and the world. For him, the source of rhis danger was precisely in the Arians' failurc to acknowledge the Son, whom they concede to be Creator in some sense, as fully intrinsic to the reali ty of divine being_ Thus in his effort to search our and expose every way in which the Arian doctrine distOrts what he believes to be the authentic Christ ian revelation of God, one of the poims that Arhanasius dwells upon is that the Arians' refusal to attribute full divinity to the Son results in a dissociation of God's creative activity from his being, which impairs rhe doctri ne of God as well as the doctrine of creation. As Arhanasius sees it, this dissociation violates the sense of God's perfection and even leads to the notion that creation somehow adds to God's being. On rhe other hand, it is only by imputing a certain continuity within God of God's being and his creative acrivicv that the proper conception is achieved of the precedence of God's being in relation to his external productions. Having thus anricipated our analysis of the import of Athanasius's statements in this regard, we must now let him speak for himself and trace the concrete oudines of his argument. We should note first of all [hat Athanasius's argument on behalf of the divinity of the Son by way of demonstrating that God's creative activity is internal to his being is meant to issue in a conclusion that the Arians themselves did not and would not want to hold. This conclusion is that if the Son is not fully divine then God is not really Maker or CreatOr. 103 Of course, Athanasius is aware that the Arians would nor agree to trus conclusion, Bur he pursues it precisely as a demonstration of t he error of the Arians, in that their doctrine follows a logic chat inexorably leads to that conclusion. In the course of his argumem, we gain a fuller appreciation of the fat[ that the way in which Achanasius conceived of God as Creator is quite different from that of his opponents. H e writes:

Of course, we might, in the imerest of fairness, point our that it is not true that the Arians would not be able Kw poim out an)' of {Goers] works." They could consistently point to the whole creation as "God's work," brought imo being from nothing through GO(r S will. But Athanasius's point, while superficially distorting the Arian position, does have undeniable force: the Arians cannot ··prove" their Word b}, his works because they do not conceive of the world (the works) as affording any analogical demoElStration of God. Since they posit an ontological hiatus between the \'\!ord ··through whom" creation came to be and the \X'ord who is an immanent power in God, the analogical link between God's external work and his inner being is thus lost. And thus lost, also, according IQ Athanasius, would be the face of God in the world. It is partly in the interest of maintaining this correspondencc by which the world offers a positive demonstration of God that the issue of the relation between God's being and God's work is crucial for Athanasim _Most urgently, however, he saw the relation between theologr and economy as an issue rhat bore directly on the question of the divinity of the Son. We now turn to his conception of the relation betwttn rheology and economy. as it was elaborated in the antiArian polemic on behalf of the Son's divinity.

Theology and economy: the Word in God's being and work Of cours!", we hardly need to point out that che question of the relation between God·s being and work is fairly directly a question of the relation between God and the world . Perhaps che most significam piece of hisroricai background with reference ro this issue is Orig!"n's view thac God's being eternally almighty necessirates an _. cteatlon - upon wh-h~-' - t h-IS eternaI power. '" ecernal lC \JUU can exerCise In this wav we have in Origen a quit!" direct correspondence between God's being and God's work to the point of threatening co posit a necessaIJ' continuity or correlation between God and the world. The necessity of such continuity was seen to be a threat by

116

If God is Maker and Creator, and creates the things that are made through the Son, and we cannot conceive of the things which come to be, except as being through the Word, is it not a blasphemy, God being Maker, to say that his framing \\'ord and Wisdom once was not' It is the 117

THE ANTI _ARIAN WRITINGS

THE ANTI- .... R IAN WRITINGS

same as saying thac God is not ~bker, ifhe did not have his propec Framing Word which is from him (oin, £Xrov Hhov EC autou 011l11oupyn:6v AOyov), and if char by which h~ f~es accrues {O him from outside (l~roeE\'), and is alien (~E VO;) from him and unlike in essence (Ct.v611m ~ 'Kat'

chen must we not also say that, because he is rhe fashioner of a1l things, therefore his works also are eeemal , and is it wicked co sa~' of the m tOO, thac they were not before they came to be? (CA I :29; Bright, p. 30)

oilO'i.av), (CA 1:17; Bright, p, 18)

But, look, they say: If God is always Maker, and the power of framing did not tome to him (oil'K £1t\"fEYOVEV ain:ijl),

Confronted with rhis significant obje
118

119

Essentially, Athanasius's argument is char if God's creative aniviry (located in [he Son) is conc~ived as ext~rnal [0 God's being , chen God cannot be truly said to be CIe'3.tor, If che Arians insisted that God is Creator, norv.-irh5[anding che crearurely status of che Son that was becaus~ mey did noe subscribe co che kind of logic p~n{ed here by Athanasius, in which God's being Creator entai~s affirming God's creative acrivicy as internal to his being, At thIS point, we can subscribe to the descripcion of che divergence becw~n che tWO outlooks in terms of a subsrantialist versus a voluntansc 108ic.l04 For che Arians, all chac is needed [0 justify calling God ~Creator" is to affirm that God willed che creation {O come to be. For Athanasius, however, this willing must be conceived as related to and enfolded wichin God's being. We can almost encapsulate che Arian position in the statement: MGod creates"; and the Athanasian, in the statement chat ~ God is Creator." Wich ~gard to che theme of th~ relation berv.·een God and che world , the Arian position would be simply thac God relates co che world by his wil l. Athanasius, in COntrast, ~ms co want co press toward a conception in which God's relation to che world is somehow intrinsic ro God's being. Of course, everything depends on the content of this ~somehow." O rigen's specter lurks in the background here, and ic seems at least quite possible thac Athaoasius's arguments were red uced by his opponents to the O rigenist position on the ne<essicy of an ('ternal creation. Athanasius defeods himself against che accusat ion that his positIon leads co an Origenist conclusion in the course of his Oral;lIfUJ ronlra Arian!Jl, and ic is surely moS[ likd}, thac he is replying to arguments actually brought forward, and not embarrassing himself with objections that no one else had thought up. The objection is chat his argument for che substantial -inr~rnality" of God's creative aCti\'ity leads inexorably to positing the ne<essiry of an eternal creation:

'tOu

THE ANTI-ARI .... N WRITINGS

THE .... NTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

being and, thus, the intrinsic presence of Son [0 Facher entails chac this ~power to make~ is imriruic to the divine being, through the relation of Father-Son. Thus the necessity of the Son's being "in" the Father, correlated to rhe stacement that God is always and "from within" the ~[aker, does noe translate into the necessit}' for an eternal creation, On the concrary, creation is necessarily non-erernal since, by definition, it has come to be from nothing and thus non· eternity is essential co its definition: ~although God always had the power co make, yet the things originated did not have the power of being eternal" (ibid, ).105 The essence of the argument, therefore, is chac an adequate concepcion of God's perfection requires the affirmuion chat God's being Maker is "from within"; not in the sense that his work is eternally correlative to his being, but rather in the sense that his power to work (which is substantially shared wich che Son) is ecemal and continuous with his being:

of affirming che continuity berween the Farher--Son and the God-world relations is precisely to iafeguard [he precedence of the former, It is a statement, ultimately, of God's perfection co insist that that whereby God is related to the world belongs, first of all, to God's \'e!)' essence, If we speak of God's relation to the world comprehensively in terms of God's creative aCtivity, then it is a sratement of God's perfea:ion to assert that this creative aCti"i!)' is fulfilled primarily and ultimately within God's very being and not outside it, ad extra. IOS By inserting this principle as a middle term, che vety fan of God's external creative activity is an argument on behalf of the Trinitarian being of God, conceived as an intra-divine creati vity or "fruitfulness":

For creatures noc to exist does nOt lessen the Maker; for he has rhe power of framing them whenever He wills. Bm for the offspring not to be alwa~'s wit h che Father d0C5 lessen che perfea:ion of the Father's essence. Thus his works were framed when He willed, chrough his Word; but the Son is ever the proper offspring of the Father's essence. (CA 1:29)

For if [he Di\'ine Essence is not fruitful itself bur barren, as the)' hold, like a light tbat does not lighten, and a dry fountain, are they not ashamed to speak of his possessing framing energy? And while they deny what is by narure, do they not blush to place before it what is b}' will? But if H e frames things chat are external ro him ('t'Cr. tK''t'~) and did not exist before, by willing them to be, and thus becomes their Maker. much more will he first be Father of an Offspring from his proper Essence (lto),}.t!> ltpo-rE:pov dn O:v l'tu't'tlP l€V\>TutCl't'(X; EK' 't"ijI; i,5iac; oixri(l~), (CA 2:2; Bright, pp, 69-70)

We are now in a pGSlClon to grasp che fundamemal point of convergence between Athanasius's Trinirarian theology and his conception of the relation bern'een God and che world. This is thac the relation between God and the world is both comained in and superseded. by the relation between [he Father and the Son,l06 A COffea undersranding of the Achanasian position is one thac takes noee simultaneously of both these elements: on che one hand, (he containment and cominuity and, on the other, the precedence, both chronologically and oncologicall)', of the intra.-divine relation over the relation od extro. As to the first point, che continuity is based on t he understanding that the world is created and subsists ~i nH the Son throug h participation, \O~ On the other hand, pact of the point in affirming chat che Son is substantially in the Father is to declare thac rhe Father's relationship to the world (through the Son) does not "over-extend" his own being, as something added co it from without, as if the Father -does not have that in and through which He makes all th ings" (CA 2:2), We can see, [herefore, that for Achanasius, part of the point, and perhaps the most important part,

le is in this context chat Athanasius articulates his conception of the priority of being o\'er will, But it would be a mistake to consider this principle as an abstract philosophical premise, Primarily, itS reference is co tbe priority of "theologyM o"'er M economy.M the prioriry of God's being o\'er God's external acts. It is also imponant to emphasize that ie is the external produCtions chat are considered to be secondary to God's being. not God's will as such. Athanasius is not saying simply chat God's will is seconda!)' to God's being - which would be to introduce distinction of rank within the Godhead, something thac he is always vigilanr against. The point of distinction does not refer so much to the tmrrinUJ tI quo (i.e, . the divine agency) as it does to the termin;n ad qHtm (che external effens of thac agency). So it is nO( God's will that is secondary to God's being, but what comes to be through God 's will is seconda!)' to what eternally exists as constitutive of the divine being, The priority of being oyer WIll is rhus ultimately a reformulation of the prioriry of [he Word over the world:

120

121

THE A!'\T1·ARIAN WRITINGS

THE ANTI·ARI .... N \X' RITlNGS

For if ther aHribme [0 Goc\ the willing about things which are not, why do they not recognize that in Goc\ which lies above the will? Now it is something surpassing what is by will that he should be by nature, and should be Father of his proper \X/o rd. If then that which comes first, which is according to nature, did not exist, as they foolishly hold, how could that which is second come to be, which is according to will? For the Word is first, and then the creanon.

essential energy and a true \Xrord (it ·t oU nu"tp&; [&Oa ~O\lAt, "Kat EVOUcn.OC; €vepYEla "Kat A6"(o~ OJ.I1EhvOC;), in whom all things both subsist and are excellendy go....erned . No one can even doubt, that he who disposes is prior [0 the dispos ition and the things disposed. And thus, as I said, God's creating is second to his begetting (oEUTEpOV loan . .. 'to oTlfltoUPYE1V "tou YEWtJ.\' "tOY SEOV); for Son implies something proper re him (lotov) and truly from that blessed and everlasting essence; b ut what is from his will, comes imo subsistence from ourside (esro9Ev), and is framed through his proper O ff5pring, who is from ir (oTIl.l10UPYE1"tal oux "!ou ioiou "Kat aiYtfjc;

(CA 2:2)109

As far as the tN7llinUJ a qll~ is concerned, God's will considered in its somee, it is inseparable from Goc\'s being; it is an essential ( EVOU(HO>;) will. The Son is identified with this essential will, as the intra-divine ground for what eventually comes to be as the external effects of Goo's will, "for the Word of Goo is Framer and Maker, and He is the Win $ouj,t'U of the Father" (CA 2:2). rt is by virtue of this essential will rhat GOO is essentially hMaker" or "Creator" regardless of whether creation exists or not, inasmuch as, in the Son, H e has the power to creare as internal to his being - and nOt as a mere unfulfilled potency, but as something that is fulfilled pre<:isely in the generation of the Son. The priority of theology over economy, in Athanasian terms, is thus the priority of divine generation over creation. Bur, as is characteristic of Athanasius's conception of the relation becv.'een Goc\ and creation, we are nor here dealing with simply tWO JUXtaposed and discrete realms generation and creation - of which one is "ontologically superior" to the other. Rather, the p riority of the divine realm irself constitutes a positive subsequent relation with creation. Generation is prior to creation, not simply as ~be[[er" or "before," bur as its ultimate ground:

E;

YEVVI1j.W"tO>;).

(CA 2:2; Bright, p. 70)1 10

Thus creation is second to begetting precisely as derivative of the divine begetting. To say that the divine essential act of generation grounds God's external act of creation is to say that the rdation between God and creation is somehow contained or "'enfolded" within the intra-divine relation of the Father and the Son. Of course, an~' funher elaboration on such a notion would need to have rewurse to highly symbolic language, of which Athanasius does in fact avail himself. He speaks of the cODSubstantiality of Father and Son in terms of a common '"rejoicing" in which ther both ·'delight." The Farher rejoices in creation also, bur he does this on account of his delighr in the Son in whose image creation is made. The following passage brings to an artful recapitulation the convergence in Athanasius's view between Trinitarian theology and his understanding of the reiarion between Goo and the world. It deserves to be quoted at length:

On the contrary the Word exists, whatever they comend, those impious ones. For through him creation came to be, and God, as being Maker, clearly also has his framing \'17otd , not external bur proper re him (oirK E~O)e£V, a).i,· IOtoV Eavroi1). For this must be repeated: If He has the will (to ~UJ..£crSal), and his will is effecrive for making ('to ~u/;.TJI.l.a au'tou ltonynJC6,' Ean), and sufficient for the subsistence of the things that come to be, and his ~lord is .Maker and Framer (n:01Tt"tl."K0<; "Kat oTjj..l.loupyo.;), that Word must sure l~' be the living Will of the Father and an

Hence rhe whole earth is filled with the knowledge of him. For the knowledge of Father through Son and of Son from Father is one and the same, and the Father delights in him, and in rhe same joy rhe Son rejoices in rhe father, sa ~'ing, hI was by him, daily his delight, rejoicing always before Him"' {cf. Prov. 8:30}. And this again proves that the Son is not foreign but proper to the Father's essence (llil £lval "tov Yi.Ov ano"!ptO\!, aA'" tOtOv "!i1o; "tOt> na"t"p&; oixria:S). For it is not because of us that he comes into being, as those impious ones say, nor is he OUt of nothing (for not from outside (OWE yap £~roe£v) did Goo find for

122

1'3

THE ANTI-ARIAN WRITIKGS

himself a caust" of rejoicing), buc the words signify what is proper and li ke to him (i.OlO\) Kal 6~oiou). When then was it, when the Father did not rejoice) But if he always rejoiced, then he was always in whom he rejoiced. And in whom does the Father rejoice, except as seeing himself in his own Image, which is his Word? And though he also '"delighted in the sons of humanity~ after finishing the world, as it is written in these same Proverbs, yet this tOO can be undersuxxi consistemlr. For i't'fll (hur He had delight, IW! became jo)' was adtkd to him, but again an suing the uwks made afti"Y his (fU'1/ Image; so that <1'ffl this rejoicing a/ God ir 011 O(((JImt of hir Image (WatE 1(U1 "to OUtro XatpEl v tOV 0EOV tft:; EiK6\'0:; aiywu n,v n:p6Ipam.v Ehm) (my italics). (CA 2:82; Bright , p. 152) On this £lore, which joins tOgether the relaeion berween Father and Son and the relation between God and the world in terms of delight, we may conclude our analysis of Athanasius's conception of the ontological relation between God and world in rhe context of his anti ~Arian polemic. The notion of God's delight in the world as derivative of the Father's delight in the Son serves to underscore our argument that the radical opposition between God and world in Athanasius is not merely a negative relation of ··othemess. ~ We have sought to show that the o(herness between God and wodd is condi~ tioned in Athanasius by being understood within the positi"'e, if asymmetrical, relation of God's creative activity. We have identified the structure of this positive relation in terms of panicipation. We have also tried to show that Arhanasius understands the relation between God and creation as taki ng place primarily in and through God. This is to be understood both in the sense of ruling out any creacurely mediation by which God and world afe connected, and in the sense of positing the relation of Father to Son as superseding and '·containing" the relation berv.·een God and the world. In this way, the immediacy of relation between Father and Son makes the Son's mediation one that eff('{:ts an immediate access for crearures to divine panicipation, even if {hat panicipation continues to be distinct from the consubstantial participation of the Father and the Son. If all this is true in the context of creation, it is so a /rn-tilJri in the context of redemption. Indeed, the (WO contexts are inseparable in Athanasius, and underlying both is the principle that only ,God can mediate the distance berween God and creation. In the context

124

THE

A~T1 - ARIAN

WRITfNGS

of redemption, the argument amounts to the asserrion that only God can save. \\'1' now rum co a fuller exposition of this argument .

The relation between God and creation in redemption : why o nly God can redeem III In the De blCOrllotiolle Athanasius insists that only the real Image could renew the image of God within us, which is to say that our panicipation in God (which constitutes our being ··in the image") can only be renewed from the divine side :md not r('{:onsttucted from the creaturdy side.l! l If even in the original creation, the mediation of the unli keness berween divine and created namres could only be provided by God, then it is e\'en more the case that salvation can only come from God, for the function of mediation belongs to God as Creator and cerrainly no less so as Savior: But let them listen. If the \~ord were a creature, He would not assume the created body to qu icken it. For what help can creatures detive from a creature that itself needs salya~ tion} But since the Word being Creator has himself made the creatures, therefore also at the consummation of the ages He put on the ctearnre, that He as Creator might once more consecrate it , and be able to recover it. But a creature could never be saved by a creature, any more rhan the creatures were Created by a creature, if the Word was nor CreatOr. I l;' If even when speaking of the original creation, _"-thanasius downplayed a hierarchical view of rhe universe in £avor of one in which creaeion is considered fundamentall y equal under the common aspeCt of being created, so now when speaking of the need for redemption, he again considers all creation as fundamentally equal under the common aspeCt of requiring salvation . Beyond the radical wcaknc55 of created namre as such, all creation has been further debilitated by sin and has become equally in need of salvation. Thus no creature can, properly speaking, be a savior, for ··no help will come to cft'atures from a creature, since all creation is in need of grace from God"' (CA 2:4!). As in [he CI)II/m G el/m Athanasius argued from the common inrerdependencf and inherent need iness of all created beings to their common source of SUS(ena nCe as ~outside" the created sphere,ll--i so now he emphasizes chat their common need for salva[ion can only be remedied from a source outside creation:

125

T HE .... NTI· .... R

THE ANTI · ARIAK WRITING S

And so also, when the whole creation is groaning rogether with us in order to be freed from the bondage of corruption, the Son is thus shown to be other than the creatures (aAAO; "T&v Knol.I(l"TWV oEIKv"\YCCU Eh,cu 0 Yio;). For if He were a creature, H e tOO would be one of those who groan, and would need one who should bring adoption and deliverance to him as well as to others. But if the whole creation groans rogether, for the sake of freedom from the bondage of corruption, whereas the Son is not one of those that groan nor one of those who need freedom, but it is he who gives sonship and freedom to all ... it is clearer than the light from t hese considerations also that the \Vord of God is not a creature but by nature true and genuine Son of the Father. (CA 2:72; Bright, pp. 142- 3) In [his way, the biblical message that Jesus is Savior Hanslates direcd}' for Athanasius into the inference that J esus is God . By the same logic, the Holy Spirit is also full}' divine, for if we are united to the Son through the Spirit, it cannot have been by a creature chat the Son "linked us ro himself and to the Farher. ·'1l5 We can see that intrinsic ro this kind of logic is a conception of salvation nor in terms of a kind of immanent well-being, nor even principally in transactional terms as a kind of exchange between human merits and divine remirtance of punishment, bur rather primarily in terms of union and communion. 1I6 Salvation is primarily and ultimately, for Athanasius, a matter of being ·'joined'· to God. So once again we see that a fundamental issue is that of mediation, understood precisely in terms of this ~joining~; and the operative principle is that a crearure cannot property be said to join another creature to God, for only God can join creation to himself.

IA~

W"RITlKGS

framework and terminology of participation. Recast in this way, his essential point is that what possesses something by participation cannot itself grant t hat participation re others. The reason is chat ro possess something by participation is pre-t:isely to be a recipient. and not a giver, with regard to what is participared: And, again, if, as we have said before, the Son is not such by participation, but, while all things originated have by participation the grace of God, He is [he Father's \',/isdom and "'X/ord, of which all things panake, it follows that He, being the deifying and enligh tening power of the Father, in which all things are deified and quickened, is not alien in essence from the Father, but coessemial (0J.100Umo;). For by partaking of him, we partake of [he Father; because the Word is the Father's own (Toinou yap J.1e1:a:AaJ.1~6:vOvte.;; ,

1:0U

nO:1:pO~

J.1£"tf.X:OIlEV, 01(( "TO "TaU

na"Tpo~

etvo:t tOtoV

"to v AOyov). Whence, if H e was himself too from parricipation, and had not from rhe father his essential Godhead and Image, He would not deif}', being de ified himself. For it is not possible that He, who merel~' possesses from panicipation, should impan of that partaking to others, since what He has is not his own, but the Gi .... er's; and \\'hat He has received is barely sufficient for himself (Ou yap oiov"tE

,cv

£1.;: ).IE1:oucriw; £10V1:0: IlE1:00100Vat die; IlETaA:llwEwS £tE:pole;, on Il'" O:U,OU tonv 0 EXE1, oXi,a tou OEO(:)KO"TO<;, Ko:t 0 £1.0:~E, IlOYI~ 1:..,v apxouO"o:v EOUtr!) x6:pn' EAc43€). ll7

Characteristically, Athanasius is able to cast this idea of the necessity for a wholly d ivine principle of salvific mediation in the

Adm.inedly, Athanasius·s logic here may not be sdf-evident. \X'e might wonder why it is that ODe cannot give what one has received. In particular, we mighr wam ro objen that such a principle seems to d o away with creaturely mediation of grace, which is a matter of '·passing on whar one has recei,'ed.'" l! 8 But to press such objections is to miss the context of Athanasius·s point and the fundamental framework in which it is to be interpreted. Trying to apply such objections within the native framework of Athanasius's statement, we find ourselves to be in a parallel position to thar of dealing with his apparent neglect of Christ's human soul. Indeed, rhe parallel is highly instructive and mutually heuristic. In both cases, we look in vain in Athanasius for any consideration of a creaturely principle of mediation between divine aCtivity and human passivity. But in both cases, it would be at least rash to hurry to the conclusion rhat such a

126

127

For if, being a creature, he had become human, humani ty would have remained just as it was, not joined w God (ou cruvOtp9ElC; 'tr!) 910(9). For how is it that a work would have been joined to the Creator by a work (it&!; "tap av, itOll1).lo IDV, Olcr ltotfu.tato<; OUVTtlt1:E"tO"T<9 KttO"Tn)? Or what help can have come from like to like, when one as well as the other needed it! (CA 2:67; Bright, p. 137)

THE ANTI-ARIAN

WRITI~GS

THE ..... NTI - ARIAN WRITING S

principle is denied by Athanasius or substantially incompatible wich his framework. And yet the fan remains that Athanasius's focus is on the fundamental polarity of creature-Creator. If he turns his attention at all to the mediation bet'l\..~n chis polarity, it is to ascribe such mediation primarily re God, and he simply does not go on to ascribe it secondarily to an~·thing e~! And yec again, his failure re do so does noc amounr re a rejection of such secondary mediation, but only witnesses to the face chac such considerations do not enter his focus. Moreo\-er, we can understand why chey do not enrer his focus the more ~'e appreciate the sheer intensity of his attentiveness to the basic opposition of creature and Creator. In terms of this polarity, Athanasius is concerned fuodamentally with the di\'ine agent or source of creative and saving aCtivity rather chan wi rh its innC'r- worldly mediation. If the foregoing analysis se-ems racher abstract, we can try to give it a concrete application with reference to rhe quotation ab<we. Arhanasius says that it is not possible for one who receives by participation to gram such parricipation to others. If we are not "ery sensici\'e to the framework in which such a Statement is cast, we could reduce this principle to che bare statement thac one cannot give what one has received. But the fundamental mistake of such an inre£Preration is that it replaces che creature-Creator polarity which is the "horizon" of Athanasius's statement with a purely immanent horizon. Such a mo,'e in fact leads to a falsification of chI' original meaning of che statemeot. For Athanasius's meaning is not that a crearure' cannot give anoth~r crearure what it has received, but that even within such a creaturel}' exchange, the o ...-ertiding framework remains in which both creatures are primarily recei'·ers and only God is ulcimaceI}' the Giver. The key terms here are "primarily" and "ultimately"; and it is this primary and ultimate exchange in which only God is the Giver and all creation receptive that occupies all of Athanasius's focus. Now, ~'-en though we have JUSt said chat Athanasius does noc acrually mean that a creature cannot gi\'e what it has recth'ed, we can readily acknowledge chac in fact Achana$ius often says whac amounts co precisely this that we have denied to be his meaning. But this is no more puzzling than the fan that Athanasius uses che very argument for rhe interdependence (i.e, mutual help and "giving and receiving-) within creation as teHimon~' thac it is all equally receprive to the divine activity.11 9 And so we can conclude that even though Athanasius would readilr acknowledge that creatures g ive and recrive from each other, such giving and receiving is radically qualified by the fundamentally

Thus, once again, the immediacy of essence ben\ieen H oly Spirit, Son, and Father is the ground for the immediacy of presence between the Trinitarian God and creation. By this point we should have gained some appreciation for Athanasius's conception of salvation in terms of an immediacy of relatio n between God and creation. From che one side, {his imme. diacy can only be fulfilled if it is God himself who reunites

128

129

primary and ultimate structure of giving and receiving, which is (hac of creatioo's participation in God, The statement chat only God can redeem is therefore a primary and ultimate scatement that bears reference to this fundamental structure of the radical polarity of God and creation. le means chat the primary and ulcimate agent of our salvation must be God·, otherwise the gift of salvat ion does not issue from the Gj\'er himself and thereby becomes subject to ctearureiy contingency. If the Son is himself a creature, even a deified cteature, then whate"'er he passes on to us is not an immediate access to the Gi"er, This argument acquires greater force, rhe less we set' the grace char is passed on as some reified stuff or as a kind of -srarus" passed on from the Son co us, and the more ""'e see it in properly Athanasian cerms as a parricipation in chI' Father. B~use the Son is one in being with the Giver, he can truly give us this parciciparion: "Fot by parraking of him, we parrake of the Father, because the Word is the Father's own,"I20 Similarly, the Holy Spirit can g ram us direct participation in the Godhead only because the Spirit himself belongs essent ially to divine being: f urrher it is through the Spirit that we ace all said co be partakers of God (Kat OUl. .ou fiv£Ulla10<; 1.£)'011£90: r.aV't£c; 11£. 01.01 'tou S £ou) .. , If the Holy Spirit were a creature, we should have 00 participation of God in him, If indeed we were joined to a creature, we should be strangers to che divine namre inasmuch as we did not partake cherein (aA;: 11 lCnO)lan Il£v 0"\lVTf1t,~£90:. Ct:A;.6'tptOl ~£ -rfie; 9£lac; I.pOO£ox; £)'1\'611£90:, Ox; lCa-ra )lrtO£v amflc; )l£'t£xoV't£Q. But, as it is, {he fact of our being called partakers of Christ and panak~rs of God shows that the unction and seal that is in us belongs, not to {he narure of things originate (11 it oooa -rftt; 'toov ·(£VTttOlV I.pOO£roc;), but to che nature of the Son who, through the Spirit who is in him, joins us (O"Uvo:1t'T0\'10<; TijIcre;) to the Father. 121

«po:

se THE Al'\TI - ARIAN \VRITlNGS

T H E A",\TI·ARIAN WRI TI NGS

humanity to himself, by granting it a renewed participation in himself. On the orher hand, from the creamrel}' side, this immediacy is onl}, ultimately fulfilled through the incarnation of the Word and the reception of the Spiric. \Ve shall presentl}' be dealing with the Structure of this fulfillment, but for now we wam only to poim om how the incarnation is conceived by Athanasius in terms of immediacy_ ~re find Athanasius's conception of the incarnation in terms of an immediate union berv.'een God and humanity already prestm in the Dt Incornation!!. A decisive objection with wh ich Athanasius deals in this apology for the incarnation is wh}' God would not have effected our salvation merely "with a nod;" withour the \\7ord having to "touch" (alf'£o9cu) a bod}'. Athanasius begins his response by differen tiating God's interaction with cteation in {he act of creation itself from his interaction with it in the comext of redemption. \\7hen creation did not exist, God brought it imo being by a mere nod and an act of will (f>oUATjO£ffi:;). But having come into being, it was fitting (KUAWg that God should redeem creation by a direct imeraction w ith it:

immediacy, from the human point of view_ In the De lliCamafiQl1f, he is able to articulate this kind of immediacy by speaking of it as supplanting the intemality of sin in the fallen human body:

In the beginning, when nothing existed at all, only a nod and an act of will Wl're needed for the creation of the universe. But when humanity had ~n made and what needed healing was not the non-existem, but what had come into being, the healer and Saviour had to come among those who had already been created to cure what existed. (DI 44; Thomson, p. 244)

This also must be known, that the corruption which had taken place was not outside (OUK £~W8EV) the body, but was attached to it (01),,19 n:POOE(£)'o"u). And it was necessary that instead of corruption, life should cling to it (atl't(9 r.:POO1tAUlcfjVU1) so that, as death had been in the body, so life also would be in it (E\, Cd.l't0). If death had been outside (£~r09£v) the body, life would also have had to be outside (Esw8£v) it. But if death was combined (cr-oV£1II.6:K""TJ) with the body and dominated it as something united to it (0).; crtlvrov uut0), it was necessary for life also to be combined (crull1tACl.KfjVat) with the body, 50 that putting on life the body might cast Out corruption. Otherwise, if the Word had been outside the body and not in it (£~co 'tou crtOIlUt~ ... Ked. Ev ui:rrQl), death would still have been conquered by him - since death does not overpower life - but the corruption attached to the body would have remained in the body. For this reason it was fitting that the Saviour put on a body in order that the body, being mingled with life ( O"\)).I.r.:AUKbrt~ ... tfl ~cof1) might no longer remain mortal in death, but having put on immortality, might henceforth rise up and remain immortaL (0144; Thomson, pp. 241 6)

Iln

This is actually an intriguing argument insofar as it suggests that crearion's very being renders inapproptiate a redemption by fial, which is conceived as a redemption ex nihilo. In other words, God's way of redeeming creation takes seriously crearion's being already in existence, and relates to it b)' interacting with it as something already existing, rather than simply "creati ng" its redemption from nothing. Already, we can see here that redemption is conceived by Athanasius in terms of a new kind of relation between God and humanity, a new mode of interaction, rather than in terms of an act of God which "imputes" a certain statUS co humanity. When he tries co describe JUSt what is new about this new relation between ,God and humanity, Athanasius essencially gropes for ways to articulate the notion thar this relation achieves a new level of imemality or

In this way, Athanasius uses the notion of the inhert"nce and inrernality, and even unit)', of sin with the flesh to posit the incarnation as "internal" enough to supplant this combination. Thus the tedemption worked through the incarnation is conceived in terms of che greatest possible unity Ot "'joining" of G od and humanity. Later on, in the Oratio1!tJ ro/11ra Aria1!OJ, Athanasius's characterization remains substantially unchanged. Any mode of redemption thac falls short of that most intimate and internal unit)' of the incarnation would be tOO "external.'" Apart from the incarnation, "we did not have him in oursel\'es but outside of us (OUK ElXOIlEV UU'i:OV £V eomots. ai.A' £sco9£v ElZOIlEv): for instance, as receiving instruction from him as from a teacher. And in that c~ , sin would not have lost its rule over the flesh, being embedded (£IlIlEVOUOU) in it and not cast out of it" (CA 2:56; Bright, p. 125). In fact, in

130

131

----THE ANTI_AR IAN

'X'RITI~GS

something of a development, Achanasius now portrays even the prelapsarian grace en joyed by Adam in paradise as M extemar compared to the model of the incarnation. The internality of the incarnation is COntrasted OOt only with the internalit}' of sin in the flesh but also distinguished from an ~extemal reception ~ of grace, as was the condition of pre-Iapsarian humanity. The incarnation thus repre.. I L .· d I " whose sents a stage be}'ond that 0 f onglna UC"".. nru e, -vulnerability was so tragically demonstrated by Adam's transgresSIOn:

Moreover, [he good reason of what he did may be seen thus: If God had merely spoken, because it was in his power, and che curse undone in [his way, the power of the one who gave the word wou1d have been revealed, but humailjt~' wou1d have become li ke Adam Vi'a; before the transgression, havi ng received g race from outside and nor having it united co the body (£~we£ v l.aj3ffiv titv XcXplV K(lt I·U1 o"'I,)VTJPjlOO'jl£VllV EXCil \, (li>'tr,v 1'0 CfOOjl(1'!l); fo r such was Adam when he was placed in Paradise. In fact, perhaps humanity would have: become worse, because it had learned to transgress. In those circumstances, if humanity were to be seduced again by che serpt'm, there: would arise a new exigency for God to command and undo the curse. And thus the need wou1d become endless, and humanity would remain guilt-ridden no less chan before, as being enslaved to sin. And, aJ\\--ays sinning, it would always be in need of pardon, and would never become free, being in itself of che flesh, and al\\--ays defeated by the Law because of the weakness of the flesh. (CA 2:68; Bright, pp. 138-9)

THE ANTI-ARIAN \"\:' R ITlNGS

and "habitual grace.~ Rather, the specific correlation is thac between che supreme instance of -imemaiity" constituted b}' the unicy of the Word with che body and absolutely e\"Cry other model of interaction between God and humanity. T he poiot of setting up these conuasts is thac they allow Athanasius to drive home his emphasis on the sheer unparalleled immediacy that subsisn io the unity of divine Word and human flesh. All along, Athanasius has emphasized the immediacy in the relation between God and creation. We have tried to show thar bis description of this relation in general is de termined by [his emphasis. Yet precisely in order to empha;ize che altogether superlative immediacy obtaining in the relation of God re humanity in the incarnation, he can ponray all other modes of this rdation a; relat ively -exrernal.- A more positive explication of thi s preeminent immediacy represented by t he incarnation is contained io Athanasius's Chrisrelogical passages. Bur before we mo\'e to consider these, we need to set the stage by analyzing Arhanasius's general charaCterization of the kind of relacion that obtains between God and creation in the contexc of the incarnation.

God and creation in [he incarnation: Athanasius's rhetoric of re"ersai

In a footnote to this passage, Kewman comments that "'Atilanasius here seems to say that Adun in a state of innocence had but an external divine assistance, not an habitual grace; this, however, is contrary w his own statements already referred to, and the general dOCtrine of the fachers. "'IH In chis comment, we have once again a misunderstanding that issues from the imposition of categories foreign to Achanasius's thinking. As we said before, a crucial principle for the correct interpretation of Athanasius is to understand his terms in che context of their mutual correlation. When Athanasius speaks of Adam's "receiving grace from wi thout ,~ he is definitely nOt distinguishing berwee-n -external divine assistance-

One of che more striking rhetorical maneuvers of the Orali~ntJ «J1)t,-o /J.,,-iaflOJ is Athanasius's way of reversing, or drastically modifying, his distincri"'e descriptions of God and creation, in the respeni\'e contexts of creation and incarnation. T he paradigmatic instance of this modification is in reference co the pervasive comrast between what is -proper~ (Hile><;) and ",hat is - ex{emal ~ (h:1'~, E~~V) to God. As we have seen, in the context of creation, the struC(llte of [his mocif is that creation i5 "e):(ernal~ to the Godhead while Soo and Spirit are "proper" co the divi ne being. This COntrast is so empharically and repeatedly made [hat it \'irrually sums up Athanasius's intense awareness of the radical abrss of d ifference between God and the world. It is all (he more striking , then, (hat in the context of the incarnation , we are told that the created human body of Christ is "proper to and noc excemaJ tO~ the Word. 124 The "externality" between God and world thus is represenced as undergoing a drastic reconfiguration in [he instance of the incarnation. Along (he same lines, the pervasive strncrures of coorrasc between Son and "works," and between generation and creation ate also reversed in this context. Whereas t he Son, as proper co the Father, is to be differentiated fcom all works rhat are created ""from without,"

132

133

THE A.:-.iTI - ARIAN 'IX' RITIKGS

THE Ar-.:TJ-ARI:\N W R IT I NGS

nevenheless the Son consents to be "created" as a work in order to make us sons. U~ Thus, God who is our Maker by natu{l~ , and who is essentially Father of his only-begonen Son, becomes our Father by grace and l\faker of the Incarnate Word. 116 Whi le only the Son is related to God by substantial generation and we merely by creation, nevertheless we come to be ~genera.ted" by grace and the Son comes 127 to be crea ted for our sakes. In short, Athanasius rhetOrically makes the point that there is no fundamental disrincrion berwE'en GOO and creation that is nOt in some way modified by the incarnation, and this modification is emphatically dramatized by the rhetorical strategy of reversal of attributionsYs This reversal basically amoun ts to an interchange of relations between Word and world with respect to the Father:

between God and the world. But without disturbing or de~mpha­ sizing [his effect, which seems [Q be so integral ro his conception of rhe good [Jews of the gospel , Athanasius is also careful, at times, to insert cenain statemems of qualification, with the imem of showing that this reversal does not simply do away with the irreducible difference between God and world. It is important to see that both the reversal itself and the qualification of this reversal are simultaneous for Athanasius. In other words, the difference between God and world is both modified and maintained at the same time. The key terms by which this simultaneous modification and maintenance of difference is conceptualized in Athanasius are "by nature" (tpWEl) and "by grace" (xapnt). We already saw in our last quotation that our becoming children of God is "by adoption and grace," whereas the Word's becoming a creature and work is due to the fact that "'in grace towards us he became human . ~ The crucial point is that this distincrion between narure and grace allows Athanasius to maintain that both the original anribmions of difference and the reversal of these attri butions coexist. In other words, the Status of human creatures in the context of redemption is that of adopted children as well as servants or works_ And God's being our Father in no way reduces the rdation tOward us of being Lord and .Master:

God is first Creator, and then, as has been said, becomes Father of human beings, because of his Word dwelling in them. But in the case of the Word the case is reversed: God, being his Father by nature, becomes afterwards both his Creator and Maker when the \Vord putS on that flesh which was created and made, and becomes human. For, as human beings, recei\'ing the Spirit of the Son, become children {of God} through him, so the Word of God, when he himself putS on the flesh of humanity, is then said both to be created and to have been made. If we are ~sons" by nature, then he is by nature creature and work: but if we become ~50ns" by adoption and grace, then it was also when he became human in grace wwards us that the Lord said, 'T he Lord created me." (CA ):61)

It is reasonable then that when he became as we are - we being servants - He too calls the Father Lord, as we do_ He did chis Out of love for humanity (tplAetv9proitEOOIlEVog, so that we too, being servants by nature (""et1:Cr. I.pUCHV) , and receiving the Spirit of [he Son, might have confidence [0 call him by grace (1:TI xo:pln) Father who is by nature (tpWEt) our Lord. But as we, in calling the Lord Father, do nor deny our servitude by nature (OUK CxpvouJ.lE9a 'tt,v K(!'tCt: fPUOlV 001)AElUV) - for we are his works, and i[ is "He that has made us, and not we ourselves" - so when the Son, on taking the servant's form, says, ''The Lord Cfeated me a begin[Jing of his ways," let them not deny the eternity of his Godhead, and [hat '"in the beginning was the \V'ord," and ~all things were made by him," and ~in him all things were created." (Cl 2:51; Brighc,p. 120)

T his "rhetoric of re\'ersal" in Athanasius's dramatization of the new relation between God and creation in the incarnation communicates in a quite potent way his awareness of the "newness" as wel l as the "goodness" of the good news of gospel. The reversal i~ all the more effective and powerful in [hat the differentiation between GOO and world has been expressed so strongly by the use of the very renns that are now reversed. Nevenheless, while rhetorically what occurs is a simple reversal of attributions with respect to God and the world, Athanasius finds other ways [Q introduce neces~ary qualifications and modifications. As we JUSt indicated, the rhetorical reversal of terms justifies itself by its shE'er effect on the reader, communicating a S[[Qog sense of the new intimacy in the rdation

We see some parallel here with the passages in the ContT(1 Gentes-De lncarnatione, where the bridgi ng of the natural difference

134

135

; THE ANTI- .... RIAN WRIT I NGS

THE A.'\'T I_AR1AN WRIT I NGS

bcrv.'ccn God and creation is attributed to GOO"S (ove and grace,129 which however does DOt obviate che namral difference berv.'een them. In the context of redemption, this work of bridging achieves an altogether new level of intimacy. and rec the original polarity of natural difference remains. For Athanasius, to live in this new dimension of intimate grace and to appraise it rigbdy is not at all a

God is. H owever, the inequality within the redeemed relation

matter of ftforgening" or leaving behind the original natural difference berw~n God and creation. Rather, paradoxical as it may seem superficially and initially, the proper conception of the realm of ~graceft comains within it the awareness of this namral difference. Ochel""'o'ise, what is concdved is nor grace, but impious pride. [n this way, Arhanasius differentiates his account of our sonship in redemption from that of the Arians. Notwithsranding his reaching on deification and rhe rhetoric of reversing the atIribmions referring to God and creation, Athanasius insists (hat all of rhis has to be understood within the underlying context of the natural difference between God and creation. Insofar as they collapse [his tension bem·ten what is by narure and what is by grace in strictly identifying our sonship with that of the Son, the Arians deconstruct the whole logic of grace by appropriating the gift as a claim to be equal to the Giver: Thus they idly babble. But in this perverseness of theirs I set' nothing bur irrational insolence and recklessness from the devil, since it amounts to saying after his example, ~We will ascend to heaven, we will be like (he Most High:' For what is given to humanity by grace, they v.--am to make equal to the Godhead of the Giver. Thus hearing rhat human beings are called sons, they thought themselves equal to the true Son who is by nature. And again hearing from the Saviour, ~that they may be one as we are," they decei"e themseh'es and are arrogant enough to think that they may be JUSt as the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son; not considering the fall of their ~father the devil," which followed upon such imaginings. (CA 3: 17)130 Thus Athanasius insists thar the grace of sonship and deification does not collapse the difference between God and creation into a strict equality.13 1 This latter statement may be misinterpreted to mean that, according to Athanasius, even within our redemption and deification, we remain less endowed with divine "stuff" than

136

benveen God and humaniry is never concei\'N. by Athanasius in such quantitati"e objective terms. Rarher, rhe irreducible inequalit}' thar persisrs in [he context of grace is (ypicall}' expressed b}' Athanasius not so much in (erms of the objecri" e unlikeness ben\'een redeemed humanity and God, but rather in terms of the acknowledgement that our likeness to God M'en in deification is wrought by God and thus does not derive from ourselves. It is once again the very act by which God relates us ever more d~l)' to himself which itself confirms and dramatizes the absolure difference berween God and us. If we are to properly conceive God's relation to us as "Father," we must therefore acknowledge that this has come about through the agency of the fully divine Son and Spirit. This acknowledgement is thus simultaneously an affirmation of the essential unlikeness of Son and Spirit to us, precisely in virtue of the consideration that it is through their agency that we are brought into relation to the Father: But if He wills that we should call his own Father our Father, we must not on chat account measure ourselves with the Son according to nature, fqr if i1 btcalm of tIN SOli {m}, italics] rhat the Father is so called by us; for since the Word bote our body and came to be in us, therefore, by reason of the Word in us, is God called our Father. For the Spirit of the Word in us names through us his own Father as ours, lI,"hich is the Apostle's meaning when he says, "God has sent fonh the Spirit of his Son into yow: heam, crying, 'Abba, Father' {Gal. 4:6). ·Ul Again, characteristically, all this can be m:apirulatN. in terms of panicipation. The inequality that persists within che relation of deification is intrinsic to the very structure of that (asymmetrical) relation, and correlative with the opposition of what partakes and whar is partaken. The difference is that we "receive" or ~partake· of our intimacy of "being in God "; this participation, which consti· tutes our "being in God,"' is thus not continuous lI,'ith our being as such but derives from his "becoming in us," While the Word's being in che Farher is strictly continuous with his own being, ~our being in the Father is not ours"; Therefore because of the grace of the Spirit which has been given to us, we come to be in him, and He in us. And 137

THE ANTI.ARiAN WRiTINGS

THE AKT1 · AR I A::-.i WRITINGS

through his becoming in us, and we having t he Spirit , it is reasonable that, since it is rhe Spirit of God, we are considered to be in God and God in us. Kot then as the Son is in the Father, do we also become in the Father; for [he Son does not merely participate in (ou yap ... ~E 'tEXUl V) the Spitit in order ro be in the Father. Nor does He receive (ouot ;"cqlJklVUlV) t he Spirit, but rather supplies it himself to all. And the Spirit d oes not unite the Word to t he Father, but rather the Spirit receiycs from the Word. And the Son is in the Father, as his proper (lOtOS) Word and radiance; bur we, apart from the Spiri t , are foreign and distant (SEVOt Kal }J.(lKpO.V) from God, and by the participation of [he Spirit we are knit into {he Godhead ('tTI Si: 'toil rr vd»)l a:to~ ~E'tOXn O1)vcut'to}J.£9a "t"fi 9£o't1lTI); so that our being i n [he Father is nor ours, but is the Spirit's, which is in us and remains in us, while by the true confessIon we preserve It JO us. (CA 3:24; Bright, pp. 178-9)

presents itself concretely as a resolution to exegetical problems. T he problem is that thece are passages in scripture tha t indicate, in onc way or another, the creatureliness of the Son, and these haw to be reconciled wirh Arhanasi us's insistence that, by nature, the Son is other than crea t~s and proper to the Father's Godhead. The resolution of this problem, for Athanasius, is to acknowledge a '"double proclamation'" of the Word in the scriptures, as the divine equal of the Father and as coming into the world as a creature for our sakes. Indeed, this "double proclamation" (Ol1;:A.nV E1!a"f"{EI-.iav) defi nes "the scope and charaCter of H oly scripture'" (o"j(01t~ ... Kat xapo:K'tT!p 'tfjo; (fYlao; ypacpft; ). m If recog nizi ng this "double proclamation" is necessary for a proper interpretation of scripture, it is equally cru cial for the strucrufe and interpretatio n of OUt salyarion. O ur sahration, considered as a union wir h God to t he point of our deification, could not have taken place if not for t his "double prodamation" :

To say that "our being in the Father is not ours " recapitulates the paradoxical simultaneity of proximity b}' grace and distance by nature within our redeemed relation with God. For a full appreciation of this paradox we cannot reduce either element in favor of the other: it is precisely our being in t he Father that is not ours. Therefore, it is bmh ours and not o urs: ours, by grace and as gift ; not ours by nature, not something identical with our being. Ultimately, we are here dealing with the myste-ry of our "appropriation" by God_ It is the Son's "ownership" of us, his raking "to himsdf'" our humanity, that constitutes "our being in the Father" in the superlative condition of deification. And it is precisdy in virtue- of the- fact that our being in the Father is deri vative from this prior appropriation by God in Chrisr rhat ir is "nor ours.~ In order to probe further this simultaneit y of God's life being ours and not ours, we need now to invesrigate Athanasius's rendering of that evenr whereby the \'{rord made what is "not his own" to become "'his own. '"

For hu manity would not have been deified if joined to a creature, or unless the Son were t rue God. Nor would humanity have been drawn into the Father's presence, unless the one who had put on the !xx:!y was the rrue Word by nature. And as we would not have been delivered from sin and [he curse, unless it had been by nature human flesh which the Word PUt on (for we would have had nothing in common with what was foreign), so also humanity would not have been deified, unless the '\l;rord who became flesh had been by nature from the Father and true and proper to him (lOlOS a u'tOu) . . . Therefore let those who deny that t he Son is from the Father by nature and proper to his essence (t010V au'tou tfjc; oUO"lao;) deny also that he too k true human fl esh of Mary Ever-Virgin. For in neither case would it have profited us human beings, if the Word had not been true Son of God b~' nature, or the flesh not tcue which he assumed. (CA 2:70; Bright, p. 140)

T he reversal of attributions referring [0 God and world in Athanasius takes p lace primarily within a Christolog ical matrix and

Here, salvation is again understood in terms of being "joined to God" (cH.)\'aip6Ei.; .0 91,00), and thus the "double proclamation" in this scheme identifies Christ as himself "joined" to the Fa[her by nature and joined to our humanity through the true human fl esh which he put on. It is by being joined to both God and humanity that Christ can effeCtively join us to God. It is, understandably, an

138

139

The redeemed relation between God and creation as a Christological problem

THE AKTI.AR!AN WR!TINGS

THE AKTI - ARIAN '>I:'RITl NG S

important point for Athanasius to establish Christ 's idenciry in terms of (his double joining. We ha"'e seen that, by che rerms of his logic, a creature cannot Mio in ,~ in che profoundest sense, another creature to God, for no cteature can bridge the gap berw~n cr~t~ nature and the Creator. The creature's ontological identity is unequal to this task; and it is characteristic of Athanasius's logic, which posits the ptimacy of being over will, to assert thac a task can be executed only by an agent whose identity is correlative to that task. As Mproper to the Facher's essence,~ the Son's idemicy is a prirm commensurate to che divine cask of joining creation to God. However, the particular mode of this joining in the incarnation is such as to require the Son to be in face truly joined to human nature. le is again characteristic of Athanasius's logic not simply to assert that the di vine Son joined human nature co the Father, but co conceptualize and justify this assertion by inserting this joini ng into his conception of the idemicy, or sub jectivity, of the Incarnate \\'7ord. That is consistent with his way of linking "works" and aces with being. With regard to che subjectivity of the Incarnate Word, it has be<:ome commonplace among modem commentators on Athanasius to say that, accordi ng to the Egyptian bishop, the divine \Votd is che sole subject of all the accs of Jesus Christ and the humanity of Christ is conceived as an instrument by which che Word a([s.134 While it is indeed true that Achanasius speaks of Christ's humani!)' as an insccumem , the interpretation of this concept within che framework of an agent-inscrument model is highly misleading. It is simply not the case that Athanasius relates the divinit\' and humanity of Christ in terms of subjecti..-i!), and instrumentality, with the implied extrincism of this model,13) Rather, as we have been trying to suggest, it is typical of Achanasius's logic to refer the act back to the subject in the same way that he refers will to being, and the task of redemption to O ne who is adequate to tbe task. Now, whereas the Son as Word is in some sense adequate to the task merely by "'irtue of his divinity, the task of divinization, accotding to Athanasius, requires that the Word also acquire :1 commonali!)' with our human nature. T he important thing to see is that this commonal i!)' is expressed by Athanasius not primarily within the framework of an agent using an instrument that is ~e){[rin5 ic~ to that agent, but much more fundamentally within the framework of predicating the hu manity of Christ to the divine Word. This model of predication is consistent with his fundamental emphasis on the corrda tion of being and acting , and, within that correlation, the

primacy of the subject with respect to the act. It is only by keeping this principle in mind that we can fully appreciace the emphasis plac~ by Athanasius on anributing the human acts and condition of Jesus Christ to che divine Word, and th us on inserting the incar· nation into the subjecrivin' of the Word. But we must now delineate the grounds for rhis inrerpretation in Athanasius's own • • WCI{lngs, In the Orar;ona contra Ariam:u, Arhanasius's most usual explana. tion of the d~'namics of our salvation in Christ is made precisely in terms of predication. Once again, the motif of the Contrast of lOlOC;-eSmeEV is decisive. In the context of Triniwian statements, Athanasius's insistence that the Son is "proper· (iOlO~ ) to the Father expresses his understanding chat the being of the Son is intrinsically and wholly bound up with that of the Father: Halways Father, always Son:' In that context, then, tOto:; denotes the mutually coexistent "i nter-subjecti\,jty" of Father and Son. In che context of Christological statemenrs, Athanasius uses this term (tOlo;) to express the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ, "excending" the subjectivity of che Word in such a way that the human condi· tion is predicated of the Word. According to this model, Achanasius can effectively say that our salvation consists in the act which makes it possible for our humanir;y to be predicated of the Word. 136 Such a model surely does not do away with the conception of the Word's acting "through- the body as an instrument, but it goes farther in expressing the uni ty of humanity and di vinity b}, focusing on the actual attribution of the bodily state to che divine subject:

140

141

For if the works of the Word's Godhead had not taken place through the body. humani!)' would not have been deified. And again, if the properties of the flesh had noe been atu ibuted to the Word, humanity would not have he-en thoroughly delivered from them (El ..a. 10ta. • lir; (Japxo~ OUK

iAi"{Em

mu

A6yo'O,

OUK

exv

i)A£uatpci>ell

1tavtEJ..cl>; (X1te) 'tOu'!w\' 0 av9pro1t~),., But now that rhe Word has be<:ome human and has appropriated (iOlonolo'OIl£VO'O) what pertains to the flesh, chese things no longer touch the body, because of the Word who has come in it, but they are destroyed b~' him. , . Similarl}', he has transferred to himself (dS; eautov IlE.t911KEV) the other affections of the body also . . . so that we, no longer being merely human , bur as proper to the '\X'ord (roc tOtOl . o\) A6"fOU), may participate in eternal life . . . th~ flesh

THE ANTI _A RIAN WRITINGS

THE ANTI - ARIA:-I WRITINGS

being no longer earthly, but being henceforth made Word O..oyw9dol19 through God's Word who for our sake Mh«-ame flesh.M (CA 3:33; Bright, pp. 187-8)

Thus, when the flesh suffered, the Word was not external to it, and therefore the suffering is said to be his (Oill" ~V b:t6l; "taut~ 6 AOy<x;. OH): "tOV"tO yap aiYtov At"fEtal Kat "to r.:er.9oc;). ADd when he di"inel)' accomplished his Father's lI.'orks, the flesh was not external (0 him (OUK ~v £~we£v aiYtou il oaiY"'), but the Lord did them in the body itself ... And it ...-as fining that the Lord, in putting on human flesh, pur it on entirely wich the passibilities proper to it (JlE"ta tm\' tOlO)\' na9&v); so thar, III Ut' say lhar rhe brxIy u·1t! proper to him (iOlOV atnou), so lllso u"t ma)" Ill] that rhe pllHibi/irieJ of the m)" tJ.'t7"t proper IQ him ll/rmt (omro 1(a1 "to: "tou o~cx"to<; rr6:al] iow 1l6\'ov autou 1.i:1l]"tCXl), though they did nor touch him according to the Godhead. If then the body had been another's, the passibilieies of che body would ha\'e been attributed to chat ocher, bur if the flesh is [he Word's (for "the Word became flesh'"), ntaJldri/y then t!~ panibilitin a/su uf the f/eJh are 4uribllted to him ulhOJe f/tJh it is (O:\"O:Y1("I1 1(UT. tix tft<; OUPKCx; nCtal] AiY£09a.l ai.l"tou. ou Kat il oap; £o·n v). Fur this rMJon, it is cumisrtm alld filling that INch pallibililitJ are It!cribed IlOJ tu allOthtr. but JU the Lord (OUK aAAOU, O:AI.ix t au Kuptou Aty£·t a:l 1:0: towiYw 1I:a91"]); so thar the grace also may be from him. (CA 3:32: Bright, pp. 186-7; my emphasis)

h has sometimes bet-n said thae Achanasius conceives of the presence of the Word in the body and the union of di .... inity and humanity in "physical" terms. B - We have already alluded to the problematic nature of such an interpretation. Much mort' imelli· gible, in light of che rexts themseh'es, is to speak of a model of predication. According [0 ehis model, Athanasius speaks of the i01CX of the flesh as being ~asc ribedM (Ef..iy£"tO) to the Word, as being "appropriated" (i0101tOtOUIlEVOU) by rhe Word and as being "transferred" (ll£t E9TIl"£V) inco the aceive agency of the Word. I)!! This means that our humani ty and all humanity now has accessible to it the possibility of belonging to the subjecrivity of the Word: we become "proper to che \xrord,~ and are henceforth "made Word" or ·'Worded. ·· If, admi[[edly, all this seems merely to confirm the standard interpretation chat the divine Word is the sole subject in Christ, it should also serve to pue it into its proper context. The problem wi th the standard interpretation is that it ignores this predication model, which reveals Athanasius's rationale in terms of the effort to include humaniry within the subjecrivity of the Word - or, conversely, in terms of the effort to extend che subjecti\'ity of the Word in such a way thar it encompasses che human condition. The standard interpretation tends co imply cbat the Word and his human instrument are extrinsic categories, as in Hanson's quip abour an astronaut and his space-suit. B9 Bur t'\'en though an astronaut actS in and through his space-su.!t and uses ie as an instrument, it is not intelligible to speak of the space-suit as predicated of the astronaut hi~lf in such a way that whate\'er is predicat~ of rhe space-suit is also predicated. of the astronaut. This example reveals the perhaps subtle bur still quite radical discrepancy becw~n such standard interpretations and whar Athanasius is actually saying. In Athanasius's terms, the crucial discrepancy lies in che implied externality in such interprerations. For him , as we have seen, the transformation of the human condition is effected precisely because it becomes "not external" to the Word bur belongs to his very subjectivity, so that its condition is to be predicated of the Word at every stage:

142

Ic becomes dear from this passage thac it is crucial for Adunasius, from a smeriological point of view, mat ehe hwnan condition of Jesus Christ be ~a[{ributed - or ~ascribed.- to che Word. In fact , as we have JUSt ~n, Athanasius can say char our whole sah"ation and deification are rooted in our human condition's being -ascribed" to the Word, fOt that is what essentially constituces our own being -Worded_" '4o In view of this emphasis on che necessiry of ascribmg human propenies to the Word, we must deal with another standard interpretation, which SttS in Athanasius a tendency to separate the \Vord from tbe human experllmces of Chcis(.\..l\ We must say, first of all, that such interpretations are seriously impaired by their lack of explicit engagement with Athanasius's own emphasis on rhe attribution of human qualities to the divine Word. But even notwithstanding this very significant omission, we muse try to deal with the data in Athanasius on which this interpretation is usually based. I nd~d, boch che evidence for this view and [he omission which 143

THE "NTI ..... RI"N WRITINGS

THE A.:-JTI · ARI ..... N \I:'RITINGS

impairs rhe- inte-rpretation of that evidence can be seen already in a single statement in the passage juSt quOted: 'Ihest" things were so done, were so manifested, because He had a body, not in appearance, but in truth; and it became che lord, in puning on buman flesh , to put it on whole with rhe affections proper to it; that, as we say that the body was his own, so also we may say that the affeaions of the body were proper ro him alone, though they did not touch him actording to his Godhead. ~ Thus, ignoring Athanasius's emphasis on the body's belonging to the Word (as llitov) in such a way that the affections of the body ace ascribable to the Word, such imerprerations focus simply on the later remarks. chat the human affections do not touch the Word. Clearly, the signifirant qualifier he:re: is: ~according co his Godhead." This assenion of the impassibiliry of the: Word to human affections is, of course, the prevailing classical doctrine; indeed, one wonders ha ....· those who criticize Athanasius for making this emphasis would themseh.·es aniculate a doctrine of the passibility of the Godhead of the Word. N evenhde-ss, in Athanasius himself, rhe impassibility of the Word is inseparable from the asc ription of human att ributes and "affections" co the Word. The resulr is that the relation of the \\7ord to its ~own" human attributes is essentially paradoxicaL Athanasius is guite conscious of this paradox and considers it to be intrinsic to the Structure of OUI salvacion and deification in Christ:

ne-glecring specifically the significance of Arhanasius's mode! of predicarion, and arriving at the conclusion chat h~ is assening that (he: Word does nor himself suffer or undergo human experiences, buc his body does. 143 While being inconsist~nt with (hese authors' own concomitant interpretation thar the Word is the- sol~ subje<"[ in Christ - thus leading to (he conclusion that th~ human experieoce-s simply had no subject! - such a way of reading Athanasius simply misses the complexity of his position. Whar he repeacedly says, in fact, is not simply that the Word does not suffer and his bodv• does • but rath~t that the Word suffers aoo does nor suffer; in eith~r case, it is the Word himself (cx\mx;) of whom boch suff~ring and impassibility are predicated. l44 Of course, as in e'iery case where we are dealing with paradoxical affirmations of faith, one could dismiss such talk as nonsensical. But in Athanasius such talk has a parallel which mighc make at [east some....·har intelligible the mystery thar he is crying to aniculace. To say thac the Word suffers and does not suffer, and (hat humanity is both predicable and non-predicable of the Word himself, seems to be directly paralld to his saying that "our being in the Father is nor ourS.~ 1 4~ In the latter case, the issue is differentiating our adopted sonship from the Word's natural sonship. In both cases, a crucial distinction is made between whar is true by nature and whac is erue by grace. On the one hand, impassibility belongs to che nature of the Word: t o a xcx9t<; til<; t OU i\oyou 9\.Joeox;. i46 On rhe ocher hand, the ascription of the humanity co rhe Word belongs to the ··appropriation" that takes place through grace. Bur, as in the case of our divinizarion, the fact of Christ's humanity ~ing both predi. cable and not predicable of his Godhe:ad is a simulcaneous condition. One way that Athanasius articulates this paradox is to distinguish bE"twee:n what is kproperri to Christ's humaniry and what is p roper ro his di\'inity. by narure. Then the unit)' of these distinct nacural properties is asserted by ascribing them both to a single on~: ~ For if we recognize what is proper to each, and Stt and understand thar both these things and those are done by One, we ace tight in our faith and shall OI-ver stray.~ 1 4' But this unit)' in subject can only be posited inasmuch as the original nanual difference berv.·ee:n what IS proper (0 each is 50mehow qualified, without being nullified, by the faCt chat what is proper to rhe flesh b«omes, by grace, proper co the Word:

For the Word dwelling in rhe body attributed co himself (101<; £cxut Ov cXVErp£peV) what the human body suffered, in order that we might be enabled ro be panicipators in the Godhead of the: Word. And ic is truly wonderful ( itcxp6:~ov) (hac ir v..'as He himself who suff"ere:d and did not suffer (CXUtOc; ~\' 6 r.aoXro\P KCXt I-'TJ xuoxrov). He suffere:d, because his own body suffeee:d, and he ",,"-as in that which suffered. Y~t he did not suffer because the \Xloed, being by nature God, is impassible. And while he, the incorporeal, was in rhe passible body, [he bOO}' had in it rhe impassible \Votd, which >;I.'as desrroying the infirmities inherem in the body} 42 What makes borh ~I~mems of (he paradox egually valid and maintains rhe tension as well as the unit)· between them, in Athanasius's doctrin~, is chat {hey are- both ascribed to the same subject. It is che same Word who both suffers and suffers not. Again, a common interpreration is simply to ignore this tenSIon,

l44

For this reason rhe apostle himself said, "Chrisc {h~n having suffered," not in his Godhead. but "for us in the

l45

TH E ANTI-ARIAN WRITINGS

THE AN TI -ARIAN WRITINGS

that these pas5ibiiifies mar be acknowledged as nO[ proper co the Word himself by nature, but proper by narure co the flesh itself (iVCt Il Ti Ct,)t Ol) t OU AOYOU Hita KCl"ta qnxH\,. 6.),): Ctm% 1'i'j~ oapKOc; rOta 11)'00£1 l"a ;[(lSn El't1yvroa9f1). Let no one then srumble- at what penains co the human, but rat her let it be understood lhaJ in nallfre (he Word hinmlf i; ifflPltwbll. pnd )(1 btcallSt G/trul flub u hKh HI pUI an. tOOl things an ltl1riblltui to him, lina they PTe prGfn' /0 the flah, atld the boa)' ifSII/ i; proptr to tht StmOM (ch~ 'tT]V

compounded of twO d iffe-rent lines of reasoning and offers rwo different kinds of ChristologicaJ stacements. The first raises the quC'S tion of whether the Word's becoming flesh constitutC'S an add.· cion to the Godhcoad. h is an analytical statemenr, conce-meet with the- scructure of Christ and how that is related co the ~structure.M or being, of God. In rejecting his oppone-ms' as.senion, Athanasiw , howt'Ve-r. does not respond on the same- le-\·d nor follow the same line of reasoning. His response is simply that tbe incarnation takes place Min order that the flesh may riSC' again. MK ow, this Min oede-r to Mis pcecisely not an analytical stuemem abou t the structure of Chrise; it simply prescinds from the- issue- of whe-che-r the hu manity assumed by che Word constiwte-s an Maddic i on.~ The- wav, Athanasius insens this Mexplanation i n response to a difre-rent kind of reasoning d ramati:zes the ",,-ay his ehristology tends to brpass analytical fram eworks in favor of an e-mphasis on sote-riological e-ffect. Fundamentally. Athanasius's ChristOlog}' is what we- might call a "lva Christology~; his Chriscological stateme-nts tend to be conceived in teleological terms, the Idos being always our salvation. The emphasis is not on how the constituent MpanS" of Chtist fie toge-the-r, but what they do for us, UnEP iij..Lrov. T hus, the- un ity of Christ is e-xplicated in terms primarily of the- "structure" of the act which joins humanity co God, rather than in terms of how the "pans" of Christ intrinsically cohe-Ie:

f1~h.~

lpool v cxu'tOc; 6 Ao yO~ 6.rta9f)<; £01'1, Kat 6I..lC!lS 8t' T[\' €V£oooa'to oapKa, AEYEtCtt rc€pi. C(UtoU 1'auta, E1!ElOT] TIt<; IlEV oapKOc; 101a t au1'a, 1'ou 8t :ECil1'fiPo; rOtoV auto '[0 OCOIla.). (CA 3:34; Brighe, pp . 188-9; my emphasis)

M

The key co how Athanasi us undersrand~ his own paradoxical statements is perhaps contained in the- last sentence in the quotation above. E.... en wichin che unity of Christ, it is imporrant to k~p in mind chat what naturally belongs co the flesh is not as such (i.e. by nature) proper co the \X!ord . But the "appropriation'" of the flesh by the Word means that what is nOt proper co the Word, in himself, becomes proper co the Word for the sake of our salvation. Again, there is a parallel here with his t}'Pical way of speaking of che discance between God and creation ~by narure- and its bridging and modification Mby grace-. M But beyond this distinCtion and simulM cane-iq' of nature and grace, it is precisely the- phrase, "for us" (irit£p iutcilV),I48 thac perhaps can lC'3d us farthest in unde-rscanding JUSt how Athanasius conceivC'S of the- simultaneity of (he body's being proper to the Word and the Word's impassibility. In order to grasp this, we- must redirt"Ct our focus to the soteriological and functional emphasis of Athanasius's Christology. We- ha>;e- nocC"d eariie-r that Athanasius was not ioreresred so much in an analytical Christology - a Christology primarily concernC"d with t he ince-mal constitution of Chrise's person - as he was in sC'C'ing the new relation beCVo'C'C'n God and creation chat is given in Christ. The discinction beCVo'een an analyeical stance and Achanasius's own approach is well·illustratC"d by a S[3teme-nt in his lette-[ to Epictetus. Speaking against those ~iho argue that the body of Chrisc is [onsubstantial with the \X!ord, he [oumers that "chey have- failed to perceive chat the Word is become- flesh, not by rC'aSon of an addicion to the Godhead, but in order that the flesh may rise again. Ml49 W hat is stri king about this state-ment is chat it is

As we SC'C', such a funCtional Chrisrology does DOt at all precludestatements about the- strucrure of Christ . but rather leads to a perce-pcion of the nC'Cessiry of such statemenrs as derivative- of the- logic indicated by the- redemption worked by Christ. The- unity of Christ is rhus unde-fstood as being -of such a kind ~ as ro cohere with che logic of the act of uniting humanity [Q God. The unity of the person of Christ is thus conti nuous wit h the- unity of che act of eC"de-mption, while the aCt of redemption derives its stability and integ rity from the fact that its constituent dements ~ humanity and divinity _ atethemsd,,'e-s united in the being of che Word Incarnate-. Thus we can unde-rstand that, for Athanasius, separating the- humanity from the

146

147

H

For the- union (f) oo" cxcpit) was of this kind, thpt Ht might Imilt u-hP: iJ human by natIlTf fo him U'bolt lIPllln i; that of tht Godhtttd (iva '[0 lCa1'O: q>ixnv '[fjo:; 8EOnrroc; cn)\'a'fln t QV lpOOEt iiv8pwrcov), so that human salvation and deifi· cat ion may be secure-. (CA 2:70; Brigh t , p. 140; my emphasis)

THE ANTI_ ..... RIAK WRiTINGS

THE A':-"TI - ARIAN \'.;?RITiNGS

divinity of Christ amounts to "brcakins up" and so destabilizing the Moneness" and imegrity of Christ's work of redemption: "And they who divide the Word from the flesh do not hold that one redemption from sin has taken place, or one destruction of death ... 150 It is precisely in view of this oneness of redemption that we can answer Olll" previous question of how it is that Christ is both passible and impassible, according to Amanasius. Paradoxical Christological statements of this kind can be dismissed as simply nonsensical and meaningless. While we will nO{ anempt to "explain away" the paradoxical element, what we can do is go beyond glib asserrions that Athanasius simply does not take Christ's humanity seriously and u)' to see how such statements were imelligible for Athanasius himself. It is dear that he C"Onsiders it integral to the notion of God to be impassible. Insofar as the Word continues to be God and is not diminished in his divinity through the incarnation, he also continues to be impassible and his impassibi lity does not diminish. On the other hand, it is also dear that, for Athanasius, when the \\'ord became human he took on our passibitity. Following his own emphasis and terminology, we can say that, for Athanasius, the \X'ord took on our passibility in such a wa}' as to make it "'his own," so that it became his and not another·s.! 51 lt was therefore the Word himself who became passible. Even if it was only in virtue of the flesh that he became passible, it still remains that the flesh was his and not another's, and so rhe passibiLity pertained to the Word as subject and "owner'" of the flesh . And yet again, it was nOt the \Vord qlla \X'ord, by virtue of his di\,ine nature, that became passible. So the question, again, is how we can unify rhe (Wo statements that the \'qord becomes passible yet remains impassible; how can the unity of the \'I?ord Incarnate be conceived in light of rhese contmdicwry attributes and assenions? The answer, insofar as it exists or is intimated in the writings of Athanasius, is found preciselr within the logic of redemption. Once again, we have to insist that it is not such an answer as to do away with the paradoxical element or the dimension of mystery. But it does help us ro see the kind of logic chat is operative in such an affirmation of the unity of passibility and impassibility in Christ, an affirmation which reopens the whole question of how the humanity of Christ is both predicable and not predicable of the Word. Anticipating our conclusions, we can say that the reconciliation of such seemingly contradictory statements has w do with the as.yrnmetrical and teleological character of the unity of humanity and divinity in Christ, according to Arhanasius. By way of setting up a

heuristic counterpoint, we can (1)' to imagine a kind of StatiC model in which the human and divine attributes are simply JUXtaposed in an egalitarian manner, as both belonging to Christ 1j2 This is not Arhanasius's model, bur it is a model where the question of the unity of the human and divine attributes in Christ becomes most problematic. In Athanasius's view, however, the human attributes of Christ are not simply juxtaposed to the divine; they are transformed. And they are transformed precisely intO an orientation tOward the di vine attributes. That is what we mean by speaking of an asymmetrical and teleological unity in Christ. It is clearLy implied by Athanasius that the unity of the human and the divine in Christ is w be conceived in terms of the dynamic by which the human attributes are oriented wand transformed by rhe divine. It is the oneness of [his dynamic of sal'm tion that indicates the oneness of Christ. This means that the unity of Christ in Athanasius is best represented linguistically not as a substamive bur as a verb. If we look closely, we will see that when the question of the uoity of Christ is raised at aB, Athanasius implicitly answers it precisely in terms of action - of this transforming dynamic whereby the humanity is "changed" into a divine state. Thus the unity of the human and di\'ioe in Christ is globally posited in tefms of the one dynamic of Christ deii}'ing humanity. This dynamic necessitates both human and divine qualities, bllt it mutually orients their differences into the one act of deification. In short, the reconciliation of the impassibility and passibility of Christ is achie"",ed within the one process whereby our passibility is rendered. impassible:

148

149

And while he himself, being impassible in nature, remains as he is, [lOt harmed by these passibilities, but rather annulling and destroying them, humanity, having its passions changed and abolished in the Impassible, henceforth becomes also impassible and free from [hem forever ... since the flesh is now able to respond . .. '"I am from earth, being by nature mortal, but afren.... ards I have become the Word's flesh, and he carried my pa5sibi!ities, though He is without them; and 50 I became free from them, being no more abandoned to their service because of the Lord who has made me free from them ... For as the Lord, putting on the body, became human, so we humans are deified by the Word as being taken to him through his flesh , and henceforth inherit everlasting life."' (CA B4)

THE A:-..lTI - ARTAN WRITi::-.JGS

THE ANTI-AR I AN WRrTINGS

should not pass too quickly by the achievement of Athanasius's logic here, bur rather seek to draw out its implicit resources. He is able ro oriem the differences of [he human and the divine coward each other in a way that simultaneously reassens these differences and grounds the possibility of their unity. \'<'e should note, first of all, that this passage occurs precisely at a poim where Athanasius is struggling to reconcile the Word's divine impassibil ity with the assertion that the passibilities of the flesh "are attributed to him, since they are proper to the flesh, and the body itself is proper to the Saviour'" (CA 3:34). And so his poim of depanure is the problem of the simultaneous predication of impassibility and passibi lity to the ~Word himself. " The heart of Athanasius's logic is in seeing the unity of this double predication in reference to the one act of human passibility becoming d ivine impassibility. \'(Tithin this one act, di\'ine impassibility remains what it is - impassible. However, this impassibility "involves" itself in human passibility, precisely not by becoming passible but by transforming human passibiLity into impassibility. At the same time, human passibility retains its passible character - even while transcending it - within the very act of being passible precisely to the divine influence whereby it becomes impassible. Thus, integral to Athanasius"s conception of the unity of Christ and the '"oneness~ of the act of redemption is precisely the nonequality of the human and the divine. This observation again justifies our calling his conceprion of this unifY asymmetrical and Ideological; we might say "'theo-tdeological." Again and again, Athanasius emphasizes that the act of the \,
humanity and God. The hominization of God is thus co be understood in terms of the divinization of humanity. God does not become a human being in such a way as to arrive at a des,ina,ion that is merely "external'" co him, but in such a way that he immediately acts ro transform what he is putting on and thus ~app rop riares" it precisely by 'way of transforming it. His act of taking on our humanity is thus simultaneous with the act whereby He transforms humanity. It is in this way thar his raking on the form of a servant is achieved in the mode of "lordliness":

~Ie

150

The Father, in making him human (for to be made belongs co the human), did not merely make him human, but has made him for the sake of his being lord of all humanity, and for the sake of consecrating all through the anointing (OUx a1tAffis DE: £1t01TlCfE" lh9pw1tov, m.A ' Et~ 'to ICUP1EUCfUl ttCt:vt())V aU1:ov, 1(ct1 Ct:-(la~Elv ;rav"!ac; ou:c tOV XP1Cf)w"to<; 1<E1
THE ... NTI-ARI .... N \\"RITINGS

THE ANTI_ARIAN WRITINGS

And we know thar while Rin the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God ,~ now chac he has Momealm human for our salvarion, we worship him, nor as thJ,lIgh M had (OIM in IM body equalizing himsf/f u:ith it {oUx roc; leOv EV t o''!> '(E\'()~£\,OV e(o~an) but as Master, assuming the form of the servant, and as Maker and Creator coming in a creamre, in order that, in it deli ,'ering all things, He might bring the world near to the Facher ('fOV KOOI10\, rtpO<Ja"fCt.Yn 'f0 na-rpi), and make all rbiogs to be at peace, things io heaven and things on earth {my iulics].IH

a.s weeping, croubled, afraid, ete. These are apparendy pue forn-ard by * Arians- to show that Jesus is nor the fully transcendent God.

to

Here we have a key to th~ supposedly troublesome Christological passag~ in which Athanasius seems to hold thar che Word v.-as ~unaffecred" by human experiences as well as to che trouble certai n modern imerpreters have had with these passages. 1)4 For, in order to be hermeneurically shrewd, we have to consider not only "from on high~ the seemingly problematic character of Athanasius's scatements, bur we have to let our own standards of iocerpretation and evaluation be rendered problematic b}' his viewpoint, As to what seems problematic in Atbanasius's way of speaking, we may sum it up bluncly b}' saying that it can gi,'e the impression that rhe \'(i"ord did not really Mome completely human. l) ) This, despite the fact thac, as we have seen, Arhaoasius insists that che Word did in fact become completely hwnan, and in no way else could we have become di\'inized, However, the problem remains of how he became human in such a way thar rhe Word, qUtt Word, did not become affected by (he human experiences. On (he other hand, if Athanasius were co be able to speak back ro his modem cri tics, he would probably respond that (heir criticism seems to imply chat the only way they can conceive of the Word 's becoming fully human is precisely by way of an "equalizing" of the Word wich humanity. But, he would go on to contend, if the \\70rd simply ~equalizes ~ himself with humanity, how is his condtseensioo our exaltation, how does his hominization amount m OUI deificarion, and how is his raking on a servant's form continuous with his mastery and emancipation of chac form? In a word, how does the incarnation represent our ~ransformation, unless the Word's caking 00 of humanit}' is simultaneously a transformation of humanity into the likeness of God, and not a mere equaliling of God wich humanity? RetUIning m Athanasius's own perspective, we can concretize ic by noting the way he deals with gospel passages which depict Jesus

152

Insofar as Achanasiuss position requires him to 8.SSC'rt both that this same Jesus is the Word who is essentially one with the Father and that he truly cook on Ollr human flesh, he has to reconcile the tension between di\'ine transcendence and chese human passions . Some interpreters seize 00 Athanasius's distinccion that 5uch "affections" do not belong m the Godhead but are "proper to the manhood. ~156 But that is m isolate only one aspecc of the' dialectic by which Athanasius conceives rh is tension, an aspect which is, undeniably, an irreducible momem in Achanasius's Chrismlogical dialectic, and which he represents in bold terms: ~ rf then He wepc and was troubled, it was not the Word, considered as [he Word, who wept and was troubled, bur it .....-as proper to the flesh, , , it was nor the GOOhead thac was in terrot, but this passibiliry tOO was proper to the humaoiry~ (CA 3:56), Principally, whar Athanasius wams to affirm here is that the human "passions" do not originate from and ace not essemiaLly continuous with the rranscendenr divinity of che Word, They are thus not to be ascribed directly m the di .... ine nature. On the other hand, jc is important not to lose sight of the face chat this aspect in Athanasius's Chrisrological dialectic is complemented by another characteristic emphasis: his conception that it is intrinsic [Q tbe incarnation chat what is not to be ascribed to che divine nature becomes ne....enheless applicable to the Word: ~ For the properties of (be body would noc have been in (he Incorporeal, unless he had taken a corruptible and mortal body: for mortal was Hol)· Maty, from whom was his body. Necessarily, [hen, when he was in a body suffering and weeping and roiling, these things which are proper ro [he flesh are attributed ro him rogether with che body (auto\! J..ty£oEkn ~E 't<x tOU o(o~Ct"to.; Kai tauta, Q;1t£p £a'flV rOta -rile; OCtpKOCX (ibid,; Bright, p. 208). So we rerum to the position that all these experiences are both applicable and not applicable to the Word. Yet, once again , we notice thac whenever Athanasius seems to find. himself dealing with the intrinsic contrariness of this position, he spontaneously and, as it were, ios(inc( i\'e1~', seeks a reconciliation by referring to [he rraosformative mode in which [he Word undergoes these experiences: And that the words ~Why have you forsaken me?- are his (m.; aU10\)), according to the abo"e explanations (though He suffered nothing, for the Word was impassible), is nevertheless declared by the evangelists: since the Lord

15J

THE ANTI - ARIAN WRITINGS

TH E ANTI·ARIAK" WRI TINGS

became human, and these rhings are done and said as from a man, {hat He might hiTr.Jdf lighten theft ntry s4fmngI of ,he f/eJh, and fm it from them ((vu KUt 'taute( 'fa ltu9fu!a:ta

having a flesh that was in terror_ For the sake of this flesh, he combined his own will with human weakness, so that dest roying this passibility he might in rum make humani ry fearl ess in the face of deat h (cruV£Kf:pclO'€ '[0 £cuno\) 9EAT1}J.a tfl av9pwm vTI a0"9€vetC;:C, 1\'a KUt "[0\)'[0 1telA1V cupavlcrw;. 9appal.i:ov '[Dv o:v9pwltov Itel).lV ltPO<; 'tov 9Ctvc('tov KatUO"KEOacrW. For as He abuliIhed death by Math, and by human rr.eam all hI/man e!,ils, SI) bj' Ihis so-called tffTor He remQl'ed our terror. so that humanity may 1U!I;" mfJrt fear rimth. (CA 3:57; Bright , pp. 209- 10; my emphasis)

IT,; aapKO<;

K01.XpiO'a~

aU'f6~,

£A.tuStpav au"[rov

te(U't1lv K(1"[aO'K€oocrn)· (ibid.; Bright, pp. 208-9; m)' emphasis) So the reconciliation of the \XTord's Impassibility with his sufferings is achieved by conceiving his suffering as effecting a freedom from suffering. But this again is nor to be understood in terms of a chronological antecedent and consequent, as if, first of all, the \XTord "equalized" himself with human suffering and, larer, as a result, we were freed from suffering. Athanasius seems to see the verr mode of Christ's suffering as simultaneousl), effecring a freedom from suffering. In this respect, freedom from suffering is intrinsic to Christ's mode of suffering and can be called an "impassible" suffering. Christ suffers as one who masters suffe ri ng in the very act of appropriating it; he thus remains impassible by \"irrue of this mastery, insofar as his suffering is simultaneously a freedom-fromsuffering, or, even more to the point, a freeing _from _suffering. 157 All this is to say that, for Athanasius, the \\'7ord Incarnate does not undergo any merely human experiences. T his does nO[ mean that his human experiences are not full}' human, but only t hat rhey are inseparable from the influence of his divinity_ There is a combination, therefore, of passibility and Impassibility, of weakness and power, of humanity and divinity, in all the experiences of Jesus Christ, and it is this combination that makes them intrinsically transformative. This means that, especially with regard to the "negative" experiences of fear, ignorance, death, etc., Chrisr"s appropriation of these simultaneously COD5tirut('S their very reversal: Christ's fear takes away our fear; his ignorance grants us knowledge; his death is a destruction of death: And as for his saying, ~ lf it be possible, let the cup pass," notice how, though he said this, he also rebuked Peter saying, "You do nor consider the rhings of God, bur human things. " For he wiUed what he depreca1:ed; H e had come for this. The willing was his (for he came to do it), bur rhe terror pertained (0 the flesh_ Therefore he says this as a man, and yet both were said by the same (Kat Cq,HP01€pcl 1ta'.lV 1tUpo. 'tou a mo\) V.ty€"!o), to show that he was Gcxl, willing in himseLf, but when he became human,

From this passage we glean t hat , for Athanasius, Jesus '5 appropriation and simultaneous transformation of human experiences has its basis in the combinarion of "his own will with human weakness _" Thus Christ "takes on" our negative human experiences but at the same time wills to overcome them; this '" wi lling" can even be considered as the whole mission of Christ ("for for it H e came~) . H is taking-on is, therefo re, simuLtaneous with his overcoming. And, henceforrh, these human experiences, when undergone in communion with Christ, can also be overcome from within_ If it still seems altogether [00 difficult to conceive how, throughout all this, C hrist is both passible and impassible, t he problem could well be that we are conceiving the maner in a much more psychological framework than did Athanasius. For Athanasius, the- interaction of passibility and impassibility in Christ is conceived nor so much in cerms of feeLing and non-feeling, but of acti vity and passivi ty - in terms of what is acting upon what, and the distinction between the "subject~ and "object" within the process of transformation. T hus the unity and disrinction in Christ is cO[lCei~'ed in terms of the divine working upon the human in order [Q make the human divine. The distinct elemems of divinity and humanity are in chis manner united in the one act of deification . \Vhile this aCti~-e-passive framework lies at the basis of Athanasius's g lobal understanding of the person and work of Christ, it becomes explicit in one key formulation, which we find especially in Contra Aria110J 1:43- 50, that has not been sufficiently appreciated, either for the light it t hrows on his conception of Christ or for itS intrinsic interest as a Christological mcxlel. Within this modeL the divinity and humanity of Christ are conceived in terms of "g iying'" and "receiving," and thus within a radical framework of activity and passlYlty. Athanasius seems to

1)4

15)

THE ANTI . ARIAK WRITINGS

THE ANTI - ARIAN \\:'RITlNGS

this framework again with reference to rhe model of partic. ipation. We have already noted his emphacic insiscence, chroughouc the Orariones COflfra Arianos, chat the Son and Word is Creator and partaken, not created and partaking. Indeed, one venwres to suggest that between che writing of the Crmtra GenttJ-D~ Incama1;onr and the O'ilfJ{m~, the terminology of UgivingH and "r«ei \'ing ~ had acqui~ an emblematic and focal character in che controversy. Both Arius and Athanasius referred significantly to the H model of participation; and the terminology of -giving and "r«eiving" seemed co e..-oke rhis model almost spontaneously. lndeed, already in rhe Contra Gentes, che term Oterol-lt, in the unassuming context of a \'erse about God giving food co animals, leads Athanasius spontaneously to aniculate che principle chat God gives to all, and is himself noe in need and not partaken. 1'6 Moreo..-er, che teem '"giving : in particular, St'ems naturally to evoke the notion of grace, as in Athmasius's compact exprt"'Ssion -the grace of che Gj\·er."L'9 We know, tOO, chat tbe issue of che status of Christ with respect to grace was a basic issue of controversy between Achanasius and the early Arians, l60 Therefore, it seems natural enough thac scripcural passages apparencly referring to the Son as ~bejng gi..-en~ and ""r«eiving- gifts and hOMrs from God were quickly taken up in ehe controversy, and that rhey would be cOntrO\'ersial precisel ~' with reference to the nocions of participation and grace. Moreover, such passages would have ro be taken even b}' Athanasiw as referring co the humanity or creacurely aspen of che Incarnate Word, In looking at Athanasius's handling of these texts in rhe passages we are about to consider, what is striking is that, compared ro rhe De !rn-ilrn:zr;o,;e, he is now able ro make a much more positive use of such [(~xts. In che section of th~ Ornriotm with which we will now be dealing, Arbanasius is occupied with refuting two Arian proofrexts, Philippians 2:9, and Psalm 45:8. The verse from Philippians reads, "Wherefore God has highly exalted him, and has gi,'en him a name chat is above every name," while t he Psalm verse runs, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, has anointed thee ....,ieh the oil of gladness above thy fello ....·s." In both cases the Arian contention, as presented by Arhmasius, is chac chese ~-eISt"5 testify to me alrerabl~ nature of the Son and his advancement by grace. While Athanasius is of course concerned, in his response, co defend the unalterability of che Son, the funda· mental issue for him is whether the role of the Son is to be seen as merel y passive with regard ro the exalcation mentioned in Phiiippians and the anointing spoken of in the Psalm. H e discusses

this question in the terminology of Mgiving~ and ~receiving ,- and tbe framework in which rhis question is to be placed is clearly chat of the Creacor-
(CA 1:48; Bright, p. 50). However, Arhanasius does flOt refer to the notion of Christ's human rcceptivity exdwi\'e!y to deflcct (he challenge aimed at the unalterabilicy and essential divinity of the Word, bur goes on to make a positive and striking use of this notion. This is besc appreciated in rhe COntext of our earlier discussion of the emphasis in the

156

m

concei~'e

H

i.cxJ.lJXiv(!}v. ol00bc; j.lh' cl>:; S£O\) o:\-'epw lto;)~

A 6y~,

).aJ-lIXi\'c)\P eE cOl;

THE AK"TI_AR I AN WRI T INGS

THE ANTI - ARIAX WRITIKGS

COnira Genies-De lnmmarione on God's effort to secure the grace that is given and humaniq's persistem failure [Q hold on ro that grace. But whereas in the Contra Gmter-De InramatioM the resolution of the dilemma of humanity's failure to keep this grace is generally identified with the incarnation of tht' Word, in this section of the Comra Aria1t()j it is the notion of Christ's human receptivity that plays a key role in resolving the dilemma, This role is described in terms of his "secur ing ~ the grace, and allowing us [Q definitively "remain" (jlEVElV) in it. It is Christ's reception of grace - more specifically, Christ's human reception of the Holy Spirit on our behalf - that is seen as the ultimate "securing" of grace for humanity. In fact, Athanasius says categorically that our own reception of the Spirit, on which hinges our salvation and deification, is impossible except as derivative of Christ's human reception of it in the incarnation, Thus, while cominually reiterating the principle that Christ is rhe divine giver of the Spirit, he also goes on to emphasize the importance of Christ's human reception of the Spirit:

grace, which, as the De In(al71(1til)/.'e demonstrated, had been (he block in human--divine communion, The great const<:Juence of the incarnation is that henceforth grace was to be united to the flesh in a way that is analogous to, derivative from, and yet stiIi also distinct from Jesus Christ's natura! receprion of grace, For, in tht' incarnation, the \Xlord assumed as his own a human body that was yet a illltural recipient of divine grace ('to qJoow EIOV '!ou OEXEO'90:t Xaptv) (CA 1:45: Bright, p. 47), Thus it is precisely in the incarnation, through Christ's human receptivity on our behalf, that our reception of the grace of the Spirit finally becomes securely united with our own flesh. Tht' terms ~t~o:tCX; and jlE\'£lV, the significance of which we have already underlined with reference to the C01Ura Genw- De lr,cam:z;ior,e, occur repeatedly in Athanasius's description in the CrmJra Aria7i(JJ of the effeCt of Christ's receiving of grace on our behalf in the incarnation ,l 62 The notion of the "securing" of g race effr:cted by Christ's reception of che Spirit in the incarnation is thus integral to Athanasius's undeTstanding of the incarnation as the supreme instanct' of gract', and it demonstrates the imponance of Christ's human receptivity in his conceprion of the incarnation, It also leads us back to the Christological question proper, the interrelat ion of human and divine in ChrisL With reference to the humanity of Christ, Arhanasius's point is that we are able to be saved and deified because Christ has securely received gract' in a human way on our behalf, and has thus rendered us receptive or the Spirit by his own human reception of it (Ko:t OEXOjlEVOU OE o:uwu 'to nVEUjlO:, Tw.d~ T1J.LEV 01. no:p' O:U,OU 11VOjl£vot wino'\) OEK'tllWi.) (CA 1:47; Bright, p, 49), Our deifying reception of the Spirit is thus derived from Christs human receptivity. As long as the W ord's activity was confined to tht' realm of di vine "giving," we were not able to receive securely in him . But if Christ's humanity enables us w rect'ive [ht' Spirit in him, [his reception is rendered perfecdy secure, ~E~O:to;, precisely because it is indi\·isibly united w the unalterable divine \Xlord, who is one in being with the Father. [6:; Athanasius's key move is rhus to envisage the unity of subjecr in Jesus Christ in such a way that he extends tht' unalterability of the Word qJla Word to apply even to the receptivity of the \\"'lord 's humanity. In this context, the alterabiliry of creatures, oi things originate, is seen as a threat to the securing of grace. He concludes :

Through whom, and from whom should the Spirit have been given bm through the Son, since the Spirit is his? And when were we empowered to receive it, except when the Word became human? And.,. i7! no other wa)' {my emphasis} would we have panaken of rhe Spirit and been sanctified, if it were not that the G iver of the Spirit, the Word himself, had spoken of himself as anointed with the Spirit for us, And in this way we have securely received it @q3o:ieo<; tJ.cq30jlev), insofar as He is said co have rt'ceived tht' Spirit in the fl esh, For the flesh being first sanctified in him and he being said, as human, to have received through it, we have the Spirit's grace, in a derived way, "rec~iving out of his fullness" (Ot' o:u'tT)" d).llCPEVal. illS av9pcimo'\),

TJjl£i:" Er.m;,::oAoueoUO'o:" elojl£\' ,ilv 'tau nV£\)jlc('t(x; ZO:ptv, €x: 'toi) nJ.TJPWjlO:'to<; a u'tou' AO:jl!Xtvovw;). (CA 1:50; Bright , p. 53)161

I do not think [hat Arhanasius here wants us to understand literally that before [he incarnation, there was absolutely no communication of grace and reception of the Spirit. But he does want to emphasize that our reception of the Spirit is [0 be ascribed in a most eminem way to [he incarnation . This is becaust' it is in the incarnation that the Word himself recei,'ed grace humanly on our behalf, and thus granted us the defini tive ability to ~remain" in

158

,i)"

There was here also need for someone who is unalterable, so that humanity might have the irnmurability of the

159

THE ANTI-ARIAK WRITINGS

THE ANTI_ARIAK WRITIKGS

righteousness of the Word as an icon and archetype (-t u nov) of virtue , , ,It was fitting, therefore, that the Lord, who is eternally unalterable by nature, who ·Ioves righteousness and haces unrighteousness~ {2 Cor. 2:11} should be anoinc«i and himsdf sent, so that He who is and remains the same (0 ai>16c- tE rov -.cat amoc lhall£vwv), by taking alterable flesh, "might condemn sin in it" [Rom, 8:3}, and might supply irs freednm so that it may henceforth be able to "fulfil the righteousness of the law in itself" {Rom. 8:9J. (CA 1:51; Bright, pp, 53-4)

"recei,-ing" which takes place in the evenc of che incarnation chae represents, for Athanasius, a dialectic of redemption and divinizacion corresponding to the radical oncological dissimilariey becween God and creation. That is because, given the nuut(' of this d issimilarityas Athanasius conceives it, the only bridge possible is whae he calls Mthe gift of the Gi'·er," Bur since the giving of one parry is a.Iwars contingent on che other party>s capacit), to recei\'e, and since humanity had already demOllStraced its woeful incapacit)' to receive and keep the gift, che unsurpassable gift of the incarnation is chat we we-re given the very reception of che gife. In the incarnation, God not only gives bue his gi ....iog reaches the point of receiving on our behalf, thus perfecting our capacity co receive, which is our only access to the divine, 10 this way, di ..·ine giving l!.lld human receiving continue to be irreducibly distinct, but they are now united in the uniey of Christ himself, who becomes the source of our receptivity by ~'irtue of his humanity, and che perfector and securer of this receptiviey, as well as the giver of chI' Gift itself, by vierue of his divinit}·, Here, the distinction between ytv(v)l1ta and the Ct:y£v(\,)rrto<; achie"es its final qu.alification. Humanity's origin from nothing, which it shares with all created nature, becomes decisively qualified insofar as now tha t origin is transferred to Christ and thus becomes the locus of a stable (Pt.jkxtO\') reception of the Spirit, umo etecnallife:

-

~7e

should note well that Athanasius rhus conceives of the freedom of the flesh not as an ability to alter, but pre-cisely as an unalterability in the reception of grace which results from the union of alterable flesh with the unalterable Wo rd. Because of this union, the flesh appropriates the unalterability of the Word, while the Word himself receives the Spirit humanly because of his union with humanity. T he whole matter is summ«i up in a passage of the Third Oracion, where che terminology of '"giving" and "receiving" also recurs: for chough He had no n~, He is still said to haye re<eiv«i humanly what He teceiy«i, so that inasmuch as it is the Lord who has received (~ t OU Kopiou Aa/Xlvro<;), and che gift remains in him, the grace may remain secure (pEjkxia " XO:Pll; Olalldvn). For when humanity alone receives, ic is lit.ble to lose again what it has receiwd (and chis is shown by Adam, for he received and he losc). But in order chac che grace may not be liable co loss, and may be guard«i securely for humanity, He himself appropriates the gift (\V(1 OE a\,(1<paip£t~ t, x6:pu; lEvrrtal, KUt ~\.a qlUA(1X9n t oi<; Ct.VepWl'tOl<;. OU); t OU'to lOlO1tOl£i'[(Xl til\' 06ow), and so He says that he ha; recei"«i power, as a man, which He always had as God. (CA 3:38; Bright, p, 193)

umot;

For we no longer die according to our former origin (K
That Christ humanly appropriates or receives the gift which He himself divinely gives is what makes chI' incarnation for Athanasius che supreme instance of grace. At chis point, we can vemure to suggest that it is precisely this conjunction of ~giving~ and 160

161

THE A:-'-T!-ARIAN ""RIT!:\GS

THE .... NTI - .... RIAN WRITINGS

Conclusion

seded by che imra-divine relations, We then approached rhe theme of God's relation to the world from the perspective of the incarnation of the \\70rd , noting the ~rhe{o[ic of te\'ersar by which Athanasius emphasizes the new relation of God to creation which rakes place in Christ. We studied this reversal as a Christological problem, trying to daborate the logic whereby Arhan:lSius mens the paradoxical applicability of creamrd}' qualifications to rhe divine subject of the Word, We concluded that this logic achieves its proper clarification through an emphasis on the unity of the transformacive process of deification that takes place in ChrisL Finally, we described a Christological model in which Athanasius's typical conception of [he relation betw~n God and creation ID terms of activity and passi\'ity is transposed into a dialectic of di\'iDiz~tion, i? which the Incarnate Word's human receptivity of the SplTlt, whICh he himself gi\'es, renders us secure access to the Spiric's di\'inizing power. We now turn to Athanasius's account of the divlnized relation betv,leen humanit}' and God, from the perspective of rhe human side of the relation, in the graced COntext of Christian discipleship.

We conclude the present chapter with [his Chrisrological modd of ~giving - and -receiving," which ~'e rake to be [he di\'inized version of the reladon between God and humanity in the mature ~Hiting of Athanasius, Wie have sought to analyze Athanasius's account of the relation bens,.'een God and creation in [he context of his anti-Arian polemic. \'('e began with a cursory historical reconstruction of [he e"ems which formed the dramatic background to Athanasius's theological reflections. We also poimed out that the theme of the relation between God and creation has been considered previousl}' (by Gwatkin , most notably) to be at (he heart of che controversy; in any case, our theme ~ias comprehensive enough that any interpretation of the comroversy would imply some reference to it. We then began to consider the actual texts in which Athanasius dueled with his Arian opponents_ Starting with some remarks on ml!'thodology, we noted how Athanasius's apophacicism is consciousl\, based on the othernl!'ss of God and creation. At the same time, such apophacicism encailed posiri\'e statements about God's being in distinction to creaturel}-- being_ Moreover, we saw that rhe unlikeness berween God and creation is always understood by Athan3Sius within rhe positi....e relacion of God's link to creation through his creative agency. T hus, God is not primarily "other," fot Athanasius, but ·'Creator. ~ This means t hac the unlikeness (or -externality") that does exist betv.een God and creation is concei\-ed by Athanasius pre<:isely in terms of creation's being Min God. ~ Similady, the otherness of the Word co creation, which proves his divinity, is icseLf proved b}' the fact that creation subsists in the Word, \'(fe also analyzed OUt theme wit h reference to the question of mediation and immediacy in the relation between God and creation. \X1e saw rh:n Athanasius's whole logic was averse co the notion of a created mediation bef'.1.'een God and creation, since it is exclusively a divine characteristic to be able to bridge the distance between God and creation. In ~sence, only God can relate the lI.'orld to himsdf. Moteover, the immediacy of essence, or lack of "'externality," among Father, Son, and Spirit means that the mediacion of the Son and Spirit to cn-ation renders immediate access to che Triune God. With reference to the relation between theology and divine econom~', we noted Athanasius's emphasis on the continuity between God's being and work. \VIe characterized his conception as one wht're God's relation to the world is both enfolded in and Super-

162

16l

TH E COKTEXT OF GRACE

In our analysis of the Contra Gmtes- De Incamafi(me, we have already noted how A[ han~ius uses the norion of ;(cXpu; w articulate God's gracious intervention in terms of qualifying the difference and separateness that oe<:essarily obtains between created nature and rhe CreatOr. Thus while it is intrinsic to the definition of created namre l to relapse into the nothingnes.s whence it came, God accs [Q qualify this omological poveny of creation by granting it a participation in the \X'ord . 2 Such participation stabilizes and orders creation in a way reflective of the divine power and goodness rather than of creation's intrinsic definition. The namral difference betv... een God and creation is thus de factI) modified by this part:iciparion. This kind of modification achieves a much more intensified expression in the case of humanity, In this comext also, Athanasius speaks in terms of God acting to mitigate the intrinsic definition of creatureiy being by means of "grace": "OEwprpao; wO; our tKU VOV Etll Kata tOV nl; Hilao; "(EV£CfEro:; i.6'(ov OlUflEVElV 00::1., "jI.tov TI xapl~6JlE\'o:;, ~~ The "added grace" gramed to humaniry consists in a distinct level of participation in the Word which renders human beings 1.0)'tKoi..4 As a result, the nam.ral diffe rence by which human beings would have been prevented from knowledge of God , ~since he was uncreated, while they had been made from nothing, ~5 is overcome such that humanity can come w know God and "live a divine life, ..6 T hrough sin, however, humanity began w fall away fwm grace7 and thus rhe natural difference becween created nature and the Creator reassened itself, the consequences being "natural corruption"8 and loss of the knowledge of God . It was fitting , therefore, that the Word, in whose image humanity was created, should be.:ome incarnate in order w renew the grace of being in the image. In our srudy of the anti-Arian writings, we have seen how

Arhanasius construes this renewal and how he expresses it through a "rhetoric of reversal" that seeks {Q dramatize rhe new order of relation between God and creation. \'Vhlie we are by nature "works" and "~r...anrs" of GocI, who is our Maker and Master, we become ··sons·' (and daughters) of the Father through the incarnation of the Son? From the divine side, our Maker becomes our Father and Maker of his own Son, while the Son becomes a creature and Word for the sake of our adoption as " soru . ~ Pointing out that this ··reversal" does not simply nullify the original natural order but complements it dialectically, we have sought to clarify the paradoxicaIit}' of this dialectic whereby our life in God is not ours. Heretofore, we have approached the issue mainly in Christological tetms, in which this paradoxicaliry expresses itself in the dialectic whereby the creamrel}' condition which naturally does not apply to the Word becomes properly ascribed to him. In (his chapter, we propose to study rhis dialenic more from rhe human point of view, within the context of the ljfe of grace. To this end, we will have' in focus primarily tWO texts in which rhe them~ of the life of grace is integral: the Fwal Letter! and the Life of Alitvn)' . The former represent Athanasiuss adherence to rhe Alexandrian tradition of an annual announceme'm by the Patriarch of the date of Easter, accompanied by pastOral exhonation. To be sure, Athanasiuss anti-Arian polemic is not left behind in chese letters, He sums up rheir doctrine with the charge that "they say that He is not the Creator, but a crearure."lO In seeking to protect ·'the simple" from rhe subtle deceits of "the heretics," Athanasius does not enter into detailed representations of Arian doctri ne here, but simply underlines what for him is the crucial point: that the Arian ··~rord" falls on the wrong side of the Creator-
164

16;

4 THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND CREATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

U

THE

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

CO~'HEXT

OF GRACE

Of course, it is a foregone conclusion chat such an Athanasian

who were healM but did not recum to give thanks,14 "for there is no hope for che ungrateful ... those who ha,"e neglected divine light:' I ' Rather, we muse ~acknowledge the grace as becomes the feast~; 16 we musc ~be sensible of che 8ift, ~!i never forgening the noble actS of God,18 Hfor the feast does not consist buc in the acknowledgement of God and the offering of thanksgiving.*19 Moreover, chis acknowledgement of grace must cake concrete form; it is a maner ofvconducc . . . in accordance wich grace,~10 Hthe prac* tice of vinue M2 ! which is characterized above all by diligence. l2 In this ..... ay, we will not have received the grace in vain,:?;' but will be like those who are praistd in the gospel for increasing rhe grace which they have received. 24 Thus Achanasius s~rm preoccupied throughout with che proper response to God's grace, and it is in such terms tha[ he outlines to his flock the proper way to k~p the feast. In srudying these exhonations, we are t herefore dealing with the issue of the human relation co God in grace from a concrete existential and liturgical perspective. Our access to the relevane texts from rhe FeJtal ut!err, however, will be regula[ed by che framework evoked by our analysis of the Lift of Anton)". Ostensibly, this accounc is Athanasius's response to an inquiry from some monks outside Egypc who sought ro learn more about the youth, career, and death of the famous Amony: Hif the things said concerning him are (!ue,,'l ~ Although the Athanasian authorship of this work has lately been qUe5riom'd,16 its consistency with Athanasian cheology and terminology offers much stronger e"'idence of its authenticity than any conjtcrures [0 the contrary.r This consistency will become funher manifest in the course of our analysis. It was probably written soon after (he death of Anton~' in 356/8 while Athanasius 90115 in hiding, possibly in a monastic setting. It is clear ftom Athanasius's framing of his interlocutor's request and the [One of his own response chat Antony had already become a celebrated figure even before (his account, which was destined to magnify his fame for (he rest of posterity. In laying hold of a real~life figure with a larger*than~life reputation, Achanasius thus has the opponunity to dramatize his theology to striking effect. In his "theologizing of Antony, the bishop attempts [0 provide an interpretation of his career chat is consistent wich sound theology, and which can therefore provide a correct model for those who wish to emulace the great monk. In the hands of Athanasius, Antony be-comes the ~ideal type" of the redeemed Christian. In turn, the Aehanasian Antony provides us with an ideal representa~ tion of Achanasius's conception of che life of grace.

theologizing of Auton)" would present him as a scaunch and fervent defender of Nicene onhodm,:y against the impious heresy of (he Arians. But ic has lately bet-n argued that che Lift of AmtiN)' is meant not only to represent the Nicene conceIXion of the di"'inity of Chtist and Antony's championing of this, but also an Athanasiaa account of sah'3(ion that consciousI}" pies itself against rhe Arian accounc. 19 This thesis bears direcdy on the topic of our inquiry and we must begin by looking ac it more closely. Gregg and Groh sum up the decisive difference between Athanasian and Arian accounts of salva~ tion and grace in these terms: ~Jn COntrast to onhodoxy's substantialise conceIX of grace as someching 'stored' in and dispenstd from divine natute, Arianism attaches connotations of volition and transaction to the cerm"' 30 The Arian "ersion of salva~ tion and grace indicates an dJkuis which "proceeds from the axiomatic identification of Christ with crearures. Possible of 3t{a i n~ menc by other originate beings is his progress in wisdom, Stature and divine fa\,or.'·31 The Arian account of the life of grace is thus to be characterized in terms of the striving of the human will, with che goal of attaining equality wit h Christ. As a crearure, che Arian ChriSt provides an exemplar who "is not categorically other, 'unlike us and like che Father'; hence the imitation envisioned is straightforward and strictly poS5ible.~32 The reward for this imitation is "a sonship equal in glory to that of their eanhly sa\'ior, theit fellow pilgrim in askeJij.~3j On the other hand, che Athanasiln version of salvation and grace "insists chat no such equality is possible between creatures and che uncreated redeemer: 34 Indeed, "tbe ChriSt "Worshipped by Athanasius ... does nor encourage creatures ro attain the very same sonship he has won through his Iabors. ;'5 Moreover, the Athaoasian "ersioo de--('mphasize5 the elemem of human striving; it wants to communicate the message that Had"ance in perfection comes not through stri"ing for equality with Christ but by participacion and intervention from above. Antony's hol iness is not achieved, it is received ;;6 "che monk's deeds are not, scricrly speaking, his own. ~3i Thus, in an attempt to disqualify Arian imerpretations and appropriations of che success of Antony, Athanasius wrices his Lift of A,lIo/,/y in order to cast che career of the illustrious holy man in terms of a pro~Nicene ami ~A rian sote-riolog),: "The Vita Antonii is constructed v,'ith a view to counteracting the Arian concept of adopted sonship as a progress in virrue."'38 Gregg and Groh further conjecture that the conflict between the twO soteriologies, as

166

167

H

R

R

• THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

outlined above, is in some measure internal to the text, insofar as the text can be presumed to be cOGStitueed nOt only of the ~ Amony of Athanasius~ bue also of °Antony-traditions" which are "explicable by more than one scheme of salvation,"39 i.e., Arian as well as Athanasian. This consideration grounds a methodology of spying out ·'tensions . . . between particular actions attributed to Antony and the interpretive remarks that frame them and are recognizable as Athanasian themes.'·4Q Such a strategy of identifying "redactiooal seams" would thus allow us to gauge the tension ben\'een Arian and Athanasian soteriologies. Gregg and Groh can be commended at least for emphasizing the importance of the themes of grace and salvation in the Arian COntroversy. In doing so, they are not breaking completely new ground. In effect, they are reading the Atian controversy in light of the Pelagian comroversy, a strategy already anticipated - albeit cursorily - in Gwatkin, who speaks of "the Pelagianism which is an essential element of the Arian system."41 It is cenainly an interesting theoretical question to ask about the mutual implications of the issues and viewpoints raised in these (WO controversies. However, such a theoretical question is to be carefully distinguished from the histOrical question of how far the Arian controversy actually and explicitly broaches issues that were played out a little later in the Pelagian debates. Failure to make such a careful distinction can lead to a rather anachronistic reading wh ich simply projects the framework of the Pelagian debate OntO the Arian controversy. It is one thing to say that the Arian viewpoint logically implies a kind of Pelagian emphasis on free will and human striving; it is quite another to take this implication as an explicit and conscious position taken by the Arians . Without any exp licit reference to the Pelag ian debates, Gregg and G roh seem to have unjustifiably projeCted that problem OntO the Arian crisis. The result is a highly speculative and probably erroneous \'ersion of the Arian position and a demonstrably distoned view of the Athanasian position, both basing themselves on a methodology of circular reasoning. Because Gregg and Groh raise issues that are very germane to our inquiry and because their interpretations of these issues is, in my view, distorted, we must analyze this d istortion preparatory to our own constructive analysis of the texts. We begin with the question of methodology. Gregg and Groh are able to come up with tWO antithetical views of grace and salvation - one emphasizing human striving , the other ·'participation and intervention from above"42 - by locating tensions in the rext,

identifying these tensions as ··redaCtional seams,~ and then exploiting these seams to divide the one Athanasian text into tViO antithetical acCOUntS, Athanasian and Arian. However, it should be fairly obvious that such a strategy simply begs the question _ What if the "tensions,~ such as they may be, belong together in the Atbanasian account? It is inadmissible chat th is quite natural supposition should be completely bracketed . O f course, once it is bracketed, then the discovery of ·'cedattional seams" and two antithetical accounts follows not so much from the text as it stands, but rather from the presumption that in fact such tensions do not belong together but stem from two separate and opposite accounts. The actual complexity of the text is thus deconstruCted by the invincible circularity of this presumption and the strategy which implements it.-'B Indeed, it can be shown that the tWO anti thetical accounts ··discovered'· by Gregg and G roh are, in both cases, distorted and oversimplified. \'i;!ith regard to their stress on Arian soreriology as based on the equality of the Son with che rest of creation, Gregg and Groh overlook the textual evidence that explicily shows the efforts of Arius to stress the inequality and pre-eminent distinction of the Son. Athanasius's mocking rejection of this effort, whatever its log ical force, should not be mistaken for Arius's own position. Moreover, Gregg and Groh also overlook the very relevant fact that the Arians considered Christ not to have a human soul. Thus there is sig nificant evidence that the Arians were emphatic in their insistence on the distinction of the Son from the rest of creation, and none to suggest that they actually wanted to exploit and emphasize the notion that the Son was simply '·like us." What is evidem from the extant tens of Arius and Asterius is both an effort to distinguish the Son from the One Ungenerate God and an effort to distinguish the Son from the res t of creation. Any attemptS to emphasize positively the equality of humanity with the Son of God wou ld have struck a decidedly false note in the atmosphere of fourth-century theological debate; indeed, it must be said that such a notion has a suspiciously modem ring to it. With regard to the supposed Arian emphasis on human volition and striving as opposed to participation, that interpretation too is problematic on several grounds, First of all, there is [he lack of Arian te'xts concerned with the issue of the dynamics of salvation from the human point of view. \'i;Te can perhaps explai n this fact by saying that Arian texts have been largely des troyed and so there might have been such texts. But it is reasonable to assume thar if

168

169

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

the Arians did have such an antithetical soteriology developed from the human point of view, Athanasius would ha\'e referred to it and countered it. Certainly, we could not impute to him any shyness in anacking Arian doctrine _ The extant evidence, however, seems to suggest that the focus of Arian teaching was emphatically on the non-equality of the Father and the Son, with a view to maimaining a certain conception of divine transcendence that neces.sitated a monist conception of God. 44 Even if we were to grant the highly conjectural and textually unsubstamiated point that the ultimate motive for this doccrine was soteriological, the fact remains that we do not have sufficient evidence of an Arian soteriology such as is described b}' Gregg and Groh, 1I0rn'ithstanding the supposed "redactional seams" of the Lift 0/ Anfon)'. It might well be that Gregg and Groh ha~'e developed a soteriology that is logically consistent with Arian doctrine and that would be agreeable to some "Arians" if they were presented with it, but there is no evidence that the Arians themselves espoused such a soteriology. Indeed, insofar as Gregg and Groh oppose an emphasis on human will and striving with participation, they neglect texts that seem to indicate that the Arians themselves spoke of human parricipation in God.--l 5 This is anmher indication that their accoullt of twO antithetical soteriologies is altogether o\-er-simplified. \'(fhen we turn to their interpretation of Athanasian soteriology, we find Gregg and Groh's account equally unsatisfactory. To begin with, we must note a point in which they make a more or less correct observation which is expressed, however, in a decidedly wrong key, amounting to a real distortion, This point is their ponrayal of the Athanasian version of salvation in terms of an insistence on the impossibility of equality "bern'een creatures and the uncreated redeemer.',46 To hear Gregg and Grah tell it, it is as if Athanasius's primary concern was to ensure that Christians did not consider themselves capable of attaining to the level of Christ; they must be reconciled to being ··Iower" than Christ. Now this is a subtle but imponant point and a correct perspective on it requires a proper interpretation of Arhanasius's whole conception of the relation between God and creation. It is true enough that Athanasius is always insistent that there is no equality between crearures and the Creator, and we have seen that this insistence is not put aside in the context of sah-ation. We are not saved by becoming equal to God. But just as it was important to see exactly what kind of "otherness" obtains between God and creation, and how such othemess was understood by Athanasius in rerms of positive relation, so it

becomes crucial now to specifY the kind of Inequality thac obtains bef""een God and creation in the context of salvation. Since Athanasius's persistent objective is ro argue on behalf of the full divinity of the Son - which entai ls the Son's "othemess" to creation - he is consistent in insisting that we who become "sons by grace" are not equal to Him who is ··Son by nature _" But this kind of inequality has to be differentiated at once from the kind of inequality envisioned br Gregg and Groh, which is conceived rather objectively in terms of "progress" and levels of "attainment." Gregg and Groh seem to conceive this inequality in such objeCtive terms , as if creatures who are saved can progress to a certain level and can go no farther, there being a further level of artainment reserved only for Christ. They make Ir seem as if Athanasius is jealous to defend that line of demarcation which marks off creamrelv, levels of attainment from the divine perfection. However, the kind of inequality (Q(]ceived by Arhanasius is much less objective in this way and is again to be understood in the framework of positive relation_ In fact, the inequality of the Son by nature compared to those who are "sons" by grace is not to be understood in terms of levels of attainment, but rather in terms of the structure of the relation by which we derive our sonship---by-grace through his Sonship- by-o:trure and his incamation.--l 7 As far as levels of attainment are concerned. this is a framework that is urrerly foreign to Athanasius_ He is simply nor thinking in those terms, precisely because he conceives salvation not in terms of levels of moral progress but rather in [erms of relation and union _ The int>quality berween the Son and redeemed humanity is thus to be understood in light of the fact that it is through the Son that humanity is redeemed. \'('hat makes Gregg and Groh's inrerpretation positively misleading is that it evokes the conception that Athanasius is concerned to maintain a kind of objective "distance" between God and creation, even in the context of salvation - as if he wanted to ensure that creation never attained to that highest step of the ladder which is rhl' level of God. But Athanasius's perspective is altogether different. In his view, the differe~ce and inequality between God and creation is concei\'ed io terms of [he structure of the relation by which God unites creation to himself As we have seen previously, God is other as Creator, as the One who constitutes and establishes a relation with what was nOL He continues to be other, as the one in whom creation subsists. His inequality to creation is conceived in terms of creation's being "in H i m.~ even [hough He is substantially ··outside" creation. Similarly, in redemption, the Son can be seen to

170

l71

THE COKTEXT OF GR .... CE

THE CONTEX T OF GRACE

vir{U~

latter categories go toge ther and belong all on one side, co be differentiated from what is "by nature.H'l In ocher words, the dichocomy imagined b}' Gregg and Grah, betw~n virtue. volition, and moral progress, on (he one hand, and grace and panicipation, on the ocher band, simply does not appear rhat way in the Athanasian account. Instead, all these categories are grouped together as indicating a statw recei\·ed -from outside~ (and thus pertaining to the creared realm) as opposed to the holiness that is integral by nacure (and belongs uniquely to God the Creator). Kowhere, in faCt. does Athanasius differentiate what is "by grace and participation" from what is b}' will and merit. Indeed, in his assettion that the Arian Christ who achieves his Status through mora! progress and the grace of participation is no different from us,~2 Athanasius clearl}' indicares rhat he takes the Arian version of Christ's exaltation to be applicable to human beings. The fact is that the actual dichotomy was articulated in terms of whac is by both grace and participation, on the one hand, and, on [he other, in tetms of what is b}' nature. Athanasiw s~med to take it for granted that our exaltation through grace and panicipation was also ··in consequence of \'irtue"53 and through moral progress. If we want to investigate funhet the dialectic between human scriving and divine dispensation of grace, therefore, we should not look for a specifically ami -Arian polemical context. There are no signs that this dialectic is perceived by Achanasius to be a direct issue in the Arian comroversy. Instead, we should expect to find the elaboration of such a dialectic in a moce pastoral setting. where [h~ bishop wants both co preach to his flock the wonderful and gratuitous works of God and to exhon them co a more fitting response to divine grace. So ir is to the F~la/ Lmm thac we should rum for chI' elaboration of this dialectic and ir is pcecisel~' there that we do find it.

of th~ face that it is H~ who grants us immediat~ access to th~ Father. Indeed, both the Son and Spirit ar~ other than and incomm~nsurac~ with creation again precisely by virru~ of th~ fact that th~}' Mbind us ro rh~ Godhead.~ Ultimately. th~n. th~ inequality ~rween redeemed humanity and Christ is not a ma[[~r of ~1~... ~1s of artainment ~ but of the fact that Christ works our d~ification and makes us co ~ Mgods by grac~.~ It would iodeed ~ difficult co explain Achanasius's language of deification in light of Gr~gg and Groh's charace~rizacion of his ~mphasis on chI' inequality between God and creacion. The face chat it is Athanasius, afr~r all, rather than Arius, who uses thiS language most emphatically again underscores rhe inadequacy of Gregg and Groh s interpretation. In light of our own analysis, howe\·er, it becomes clear that there is no tension ~tween the languag~ of deification and the emphasis on inequality. Rather, they are perfectly consistent; chI' inequaliry between creation and ch~ Son is manifest in that creation is divinized through the Son. Aside from emphasizing the inequality between the Chriscian disciple and Christ himself, we have already noted thac Gregg and Grah's interpretation of Athanasius's account of sa1\-ation stresses the latter·s ·'substantialise concept of grace as somerhiog ·scored in· and dispensed from divine narure."411 Thus chI' disciple achieves perfection not by suiving, ...olition, etc., but "by participation and intervention from above.~49 Even ~fore looking ac the acrual texts, one spontaneously suspectS rhac this is altogether a caricatured accounr. After all, it is hatd to imagine such a one-sided Chrisrian account of salvation, especially on~ thac is cast in the mold of a hagiograph}'- Indeed, even in the thick of the Pelagian controversy itself, such a bracketing of human striving was not adopted by Augustine)O But, reruming co Athanasius, we find that the evidence exists to suggest [hat, afi:~r all, the ··tension benveen human striving and divine dispensation of grace is a dialectic that is imerior to the Athanasian acCOUnt of salvation, and noc one that arises merdy from conflict with Arian soceriology. Since rhe evidence provided b}' the Lift of AnIon)' is puc inco question by the suspicion char there are ··redaccional seams'· along such lines within [he text, we will put that text aside for now and look for oeher evidence in rhe Fma/ Lerrm. Firsr of all, it needs to be noted chac whenever Athanasius mentions chI' Arian version of (he Christian message, whereby the Son "achieves" his exaltation through virtue, moral prog ress, and grace, it is clear that, for both him and his Arian opponents, these

There is no question that what we find in the Fwal UlltTJ is a clear emphasis on divine ioitiative and g race. It is this emphasis rhat acCOUntS for the persistent cheme that we have already noted, of the necessity fot thankfulness. But what we do not find is any corresponding de-emphasis on human striving, volicion, moral progress, attainment of vircue, and so on. In fact, what corresponds ro the emphasis on divine grace seems co be a fairly reciprocal emphasis on

172

173

be other precisely b}'

n

Divine grace and h uman striving in t he Festal Letters

THE COKTEXT OF GR .... CE

TH E CONTEXT Of G RA CE

the neM to suive to respond fittingly to thac grace. The two emphases, far from showing an}' indications of being conceived as antithetical by Ariunasiu$, are presented as quite complementary. Thus we read thac "our win ought to keep pace with the grace of God, and not fall short; lesc lI.,hile our will remains idle, chI' grace given us should begin to depart, and the enemy finding us empty and naked, should emer. ~H Here the reciprocity betw~n divine grace and human will is presented as a standard for moral and spiti. mal welfare. That out will should ~ktep pace~ and ~nOt fall short" of the divine grace stems ro be an exhortation to "match" God's grace by a fitting response. Moreover, an implicit principle seems to ~ that the availability of God's grace is in some way contingent on our human response. If there is nothing from our side to correspond to the divine grace but a mere "idle wilJ, ~ the grace will depart and become "unprofitable," Thert'fore, to guard against this loss of grace and the spiritUal unfruirrulness that results, it is necessary to "be diligem and carefuL" 5~ T he reciprocity between divine dis~nsat ion of grace and the striving of the human will to respond to and appropriate this grace is nOt, however, envisioned by Athanasius in merely dialectical terms. That is to say chat be does not ~ th~ [Wo movements as having absolutel}' disti nct points of departure - one, divine, and the oeher, human. Rather, he sees the human response as Strictlr deriva· cive of the divine initiative. In this comext, Achanasius again reverrs [0 the kind of paradoxical language chat we have encoun· tered elsewhere in a Christological concext: our response to God is not our own. It seems to me chat such language has to be incer· preted precisely in a Christological context, for there is a mutual paradoxicality in the human relacion to the divine tha t is focused in Athanasius on the Chtistological evem. JUSt as the Word made his own the human condition which does not pro~rly belong to him, so humanity can make its own cbe di\'ine mode of life which does not properly belong co it. In both cases, the mystery of grace is the mystery of "appropriacion ~:

our own but those things which we have before received from Him, this being especiall)' of His grace, that He should require, as from us, His own gifts. He bears witness to this when He says, ~.My offerings are my own gifts~ (Kum. 28:2, Lx...X}. That is, those things which rou give Me are yours, as having received them from Me, but theF are [he gifts of God. And let us offer to the lord e"el"}' vinue, and chat (rue holiness which is in H im, and in piety let us keep the feast ro Him with those things which H e h3.S hallowed for us. ~6

Therefore the present season requires of us, chat we should not onl" uner such words, but should also imitate the d~s of the sai ms. But we imitate them, when we admoll.·ledge him who died, and no longer live unto ourselves, but Christ henceforth lives in US; when we render a recom~nse to chI' lord to the utmost of our power; though whe n 9'e make a teturn we give noching of

With this passage, we need to emphasize, as we did in che Christological passages, chI' neces.sit)' not to reduce the paradox in anr one direction. Our response to Gexi's grace both is and is not our own. It is nOt our own insofar as even this response derives from God's grace and is "recei"ed: And yet it is our own precisely because we do aCtually receive ie: "chose things which you g i\'e Me are }'ours, as ha"ing received them from .Me. ~ i\[oreo~'er, ie is precisely their becoming "our own" through our having received ehI'm which m3k.es it possible for US to "give- them back co God. If they do not become our own, we would not be able to give them back to God; neither would God be able to require them back of us. But the fact (hat ther do become our own meam thac the reciprocity of human and divine continues in an ascending cycle: God gi\'('S us grace and requires it back of us; we receive ic and offer it back to God. "Virtue~ and ~holiness~ are thus conceived in terms of this ascending dialenic, as the "offering back'" as gift, of what is already received as gift. H ere we see how a perceu'ed dichotomy ~{ween striving for virtue and the panlcipation in grace is really quite far from the more complex conception of Achanasius. Within this conception, the human striving for \'irtue is simply a mauer of acknowledging God's grace and assenting to our paf[ici~ pation in {his ascending dialectic of giving back to God the gifts that are his. Thus, Arhanasius representS diligence and the striving for virtue in terms of conducting ourselves ~in accordance with his grace.w~ ~ On the other hand, to be careless and lacking in diligence and not to strive for \'irtue amounts co despising grace.)8 But the choice of either assenting to grace or depaning from it pertains to the human will. Konvithstanding the implication of Gregg and Groh's account, AthanasiU5 is not a predestinatiomst, and he does not abstract from the imponance of human volit ion in the acquiring and ~rsevering ID grace.~9 We can safely say th3t it is not

174

175

THE CO:-;;TEXT OF GR .... CE

T HE COKTEXT OF GRACE

by way of any redaerional seams that we ha"e the statemem in one of his Festal LtturJ, that ~we float on this sea [i .e. the world}, as with the w ind, through our own free-will, for everyone difeers his rourse according to his wit!, and either, under the pilotage of the Word, he enters into rest, or, laid hold of by pleasure, he suffers shipwreck and is in peril of srocm. ,,60 Yet, ewn w ithin this statemem, we can see the dialeeric inherent in Athanasius's account . Athanasius himself does not seem to see an y comradict ion in conceiving of human life as both direered by the will and under the pilotage of the Word. The will continues ro be free and can still be said to be direaing the course of one's life, even while submi tting to the ·'pilotage of the Word:' If we conceive of this pilotage, as Athanasius undoubtedly would, in terms of participation in the Life and IXlwer of the Word, then we see that such a participation is not a mechanical affair of something "sroroo up" in God and dispensed by "divine interyention" in a way quite unrelated ro human volition. Rather this panicipation, from the human side, is constituted by a free act of the will that submits to the pilotage of [he W ord. It is because Athanasius rakes seriously the freedom of rhe human will that virrue and "ice are not for him simply indications of an intervention or non-intervention of the divine, as it would be in Gregg and Groh 's "ersion of Athanasian soteriology, but are really conditions that reflect diverse modes of human self-determination. Thus we fi nd in Athanasius, no less than in G regg and Groh's version of Arian soreriology, a quite straighrfonvard account of divine judgement as something that correslXlnds to human attainment of moral progress. Even among those who take refuge in the Word and live a godly life, the schema of a divine reward commensurare with deeds and moral progress is applicable: 'To this intent He has prepared many mansions with the Fathe r, so that although the dwelling place is various in prolXlnion to the advance in moral attainment, yet all of us are within the wall ... For through virtue a [person} enters in unto God ... But through vice [a person} goes out from the presence of the Lord. ~61 It should be clear by now that the texts do not substantiate Gregg and Groh's accoum of an Athanasian soteriolog), that bases itself on a ~substantialist" notion of participation by grace, in opposition to an Arian ~ volitjonal " soteriology. Having earlier expressed our doubt about their account of Arian soteriolog)" we have now also demonstrated that Gregg and Groh's account of Athanasian soreriology is seriously distOn ed and over-simplified. The texts indicate a much more complex account of the relation becv.'een

human and di vi ne than is presented by G cegg and Groh. Having established this point withour reference to the Lift of An/on)!, we have thereby proved the likelihood that the "redactional seams·' indicating tensions within that work between volitional and parricipational acCOUntS of grace are in fac t simply manifestations of a dialectic rhat is interior to the Athanasian account of sal,'ation, as it is presented in orher works. As such, there is no justification for dividing it into two antithetical, Athanasian and Arian, accounts. \\7e can now, [herefore, rerurn to the Lifo of Anum)' for a further elaboration of this Athanasian dialect ic

Arhanasius typicall}' speaks of the relation between Chrisr and Anton), in terms of ··co-working;' GUH::pyta; the ground and explanation for Antony's success is that Christ has become his co-worker. In order to analyze the inner structure of this relation of coworking, we must first put it in the context of Athanasius's general characterization of d ivine ··working,·' of God's primordial ac tivity in rhe universe. T his kind of contexrualization is justified by the use of the same term - £V£p'(Ela - in both contexts. We have already had occasion to emphasize how Athanasius is prone ro conceive of rhe relation between God and creation in terms of an active-passive framework . \Vithin this framework, God's primord ial activiry in relation to the univene is emphasized in very vitalistic terms. The Word is characterized as ·'living and acting" (~&v'ta Kat EVEP"(f1).62 The immanent activity of creatures is thus derivative of the primordial activity of rhe Word , who "by his own power ('tn £a1.)'tOU 01,)V«I1£l) moves and contains (lClVEl"K"al. ctU\,EX£1) both the visible world and the inyi5ible IXlwers, giving each their proper activity (E"K"CtG'tq> 'tTt\' tOta\, £\'£p"fElaV 6.n:00100U~) . ''M As these passages bear Out , the characterization of God as "working'· (EvEP"(OI;) in the universe is closely associated in Athanasius with the terminology of divine IXlwer, OUVal.llC;, and, in general, with the vocabulary of movement and life. Accordi ng to his characteristic active--passive framework, God as Ev£pyO; means chat all creation is "enlivened in the Word": 1:0. miv1:Ct un:· CtO'tO-O InVE11:at Ka1 E\, a01:Cil ~(I)On:olEt-tal.64 When he comes to explain rhe doctrine of the incarnation, Athanasius maintains the emphasis on God as EVEp"fOl;. Indeed, the significance of the incarnatio n is arriculated in terms of the extension of the manifestation of primordial di" ine acti,·jty from the

176

177

The co-working of Christ and Antony

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GRAC E

universe in general to the human b<xI.y of Christ in panicuia(, and thence to the disciples of Christ. Through the providence and government of the uruverse, the Word '"moves (l(\\,OUVt O; ) all things in creation and through them makes the Father known, .. 6~ whereas, in the incarnation, chI.' knowledge of God manifested by creation is focused particularly on the "works" of the \Xford in t he b<xI.y, "in order that those who were unwilling ro know him by his providence and government of the uruverse, might yet know the Word of God who was in the lxx:Iy, by the works of the body (EK .(i)v 0\' amou '
grams to each one the victOry over death."'] Ultimately, Athana;;ius's poim is to show that the act of the incarnation does not amount to any debilitation of the primordial divine EV£P-"(EW. On the coorrary, the active-passive relation between God and the world is exhibited in the activity of Christ which is manifest through his disciples. It is only when seen ftOm this perspective that the activity of Christ's disciples amoums ro a demonstration of the primordial activity of Christ. Thus, Athanasius concludes his description of the activiry of Christ's disciples by stressing that such activity amounts to a sure demonstration of Chrisr's resurrection, for the activity of the disciples derives from the E\'€P"(ElO: of Christ:

178

179

For a dead person cannot act (OOOEV eVEpYElv ouva"tat), but the grace of acti"ity lasts only to the grave and there has its end, whereas deeds and aCtivity that influences people (0:1. npO.; 'taUS o:v9polltouc;; EV£P"(E1Ct.t) belong o nly to the living ... N ow that the Saviour is so acti ...·e among humanity (f.VEP-YOUV'to; EV UvSpID1tOlS), and e.... ery day in every plate invisibly persuades so great a multitude of Greeks and foreigners to come to faith in him and all to obey his teaching, would anyone still doubt in his mind whether the resurrection of t he Saviour has taken place and that Chrisc is a live, or rather that he himself is life? ... Or, how, if he is not aCti~'e (dn:EP 0-\)).7 £0"t1 v EVEPY&v) - for not to act is proper to the dead - did he cause t hose who were active and alive to stop their activity (o:u'tO; LOUS f.vEP"(OUV"tCl:S Ked. ~&V'tro; L""fis EVEP-{E1.Cl:S J[aVEl), so that the adulterer no longer commits adultery, the murderer no longer kills, the unrighteous no long er unjustly claims more than his due, and the impious is henceforth pious? ... T his is not chI.' work of a dead man ("toiYro OE OU \'EJ(POU "to EpyOV), but of one living, and rather of God ... For if it is true that a dead person does not aCt , but the Saviour works so many rhings every day (El. yap UA119tC; 'tov VEKpOV JlTtOEV Ev£PYElv, £pya~E'tCl:I OE "tooaum K0:9' iw-tpo:v 6 rWtT)p) ... whom then would one say was dead: Christ who works all t hese things (tOV .00a11.a EP"(O:~OJlEVOV XPlcr"tOV)? But it is not a proper characteristic of the dead to be active. Or someone who is not active in any way but lifeleS5 , which is the proper mark of demons and idols like dead objeas? For the Son of God '"is alive and active~ and every day works and activates the

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

T H E CO NTEX T OF GRACE

sahation of all (0 ~EV '(UP 'tau BEau YiD.; ~61v KCXt £VEP1~ rov KCXS' ftJ,ltpav £pya~E1'CX\. KCXt EVEP'fEl n)v

be contemptuous of the opposition of the devil, and thus the struggle will be waged not in fear but in courage and joy:

7tCr:V'toov O'ro'tTlPlcxv). (CG 30-1; Thomson. pp. 706-10)'1

We have quOted this passage at some length in order to show how pervasive and strong is Athanasius's emphasis on the £vEpye\CX of Christ as antecedent to and cau.sal of the activity of his disciples. le is clearly in trus comext that we should interpret the "coworking " of Christ with Antony, in which Antony's triumphs are rather the triumph of the $avior in Amony.~ ; Indeed, as in De ltlCan'latione, the very fact that human beings struggle again$[ the demons is taken as evidence that demonic power has been overcome by the power of Christ. - 4 This kind of logic is exploited by Amony in a pastoral exhortation to his fellow monks in which a considera· tion of their own struggle against the de"il is supposed to lead to the conclusion that the dev il has bt-en made powerless by the victory of Christ. T hus the dialectic between human activity and divine acti"'iry leads to a logic in which a self. reflecrion on human activity leads to an a.ssurance that this activity is grounded and secured by dh'ine activity. So Amony consoles his fellow monks by saying that, despite the flamboyant antics of the de\'il, they should not be indmidated, for ~he was also bound by the Lord like a sparrow, to receive our mockery. And , .. he and his fellow demons have been trampled underfoot by us Christians. The e"'idence of this is that we now conduct our livC$ in opposition to him. for he who threatened to dry up cbe sea and seize the world, take note chac now he is unable to hinder your asceticism, or even my speaking against him. So here it is not necessary to fear them , for by the grace of Christ , all their pursuits come to nothing, ~7~ As presented by Achanasius, che spiriruality of Antony emphasizes confidence and fearlessness before the machinacions of the devil. The ground of this confidence is char the battle has already bent won in Christ: "Since the lord made his sojourn with us, the enemy is fallen and his powers have diminished. For chis reason, though he is able co do nothing, ne1;enhdess like a eyrant fallen from power he does not remain q uiet, but issues threats, even if chey are only words. Lee evety one of you consider this, and he will be empowered to (feat the demons with contempt. "76 As a spiritual guide, therefore, Antonr encourages his fellow monks to interpret the attacks of che devil as impotent bomhast. Trusting not in one's own powers but in che victory already won b}' the l ord, the Christian disciple should

180

Therefore let us not be plunged into dC$pai r in this way, nor contemplate horrors in the soul, nor invent fears for ourselves, saying, "How I hope that when a demon comes, he will not ovenhrow me - or pick me up and throw me down - or suddenly set himself next to me and cast me into confusion!·' ~le must not entenain these thoughts at all, nor g rit"o'e like those who are perishing, Instead, let us take coutage and let us always re joice, like those who are being redeemed, And let us consider 10 our soul that the lord is with w, he who routed them and reduced them to idleness, Let us likewise always understand and take it to hean that while the Lord is with w, the enemies will do nothing to

us.-'

In this way, che principle chat the Christian's activity in holiness derives from the prior activity and viCtory of Christ, when applied to the spiritual life, renders the conclusion thac the disciple should transcend his or her fears and sense of weakness by a joyful consider' ation of the powerlessness of the devi l before the pol\'er of Christ. likewise, in che acrual waging of spirirual battle, the winning strategy exemplified by Antony is that of in\'oking the power of Christ. This strategy is announced by wa~' of concluding the account of Antony's firsr scruggle with temptation in the d~n: '"Bur in chinking abouc the Christ and considering the excellence won throug h the intellectual pan of the soul, Antony extinguished che fire of his opponent's deception.~78 It is at (his juncture also that the motif of Christ's "co-working'" with Anton}' is introduced, in a conrext (hac makes clear that such co-worki ng is an asymmetrical relationship in which AnfOny's work de rives from that of Christ: For he who considered himself (0 ~ like God {i.e. the devil] was now made a buffoon by a mere youth, and he who vaunted himself against flesh and blood was tumed back by a flesh-bearing man. Working with Antony was the Lord (I 'I.lVtlP'(El yap 6 K UplDl; CXV1:<jl), who bore flC$h for us, and ga\'e to che body the \·ictory over the devil, 50 thac each of chose who truly struggle can say, "It is not I, but the grace of God which is in me ....;'9

181

THE CONTEXT OF GR .... CE

THE CONTE XT Of GRACE

We should note that the Lord's "working with~ Amony ~ms to derive specifically from the event of the incarnation, This poim is implied rherorically by speaking fim of che de\'il's ovenhrow by a "flesh-bearing man" (into b:v9p
This witness redirects the people's acrenrion from Anton}' himself and Stl"Crs it toward the person of Christ, in whom is gained knowledge of the Father. It is true enough, then, that Athanasius's Ancony presents a model in which human vicrue and holiness are conceived as derived (rom participation in the power aoo tvtPYE1Ct of the Incarnate Word. T hus far, Gregg and Grahs account is serviceable. '\X' here it is seriously distorted, however, is in the suggestion that such participation precludes an emphasis on human volition and striving. Putting aside the Life of Amon)'. wr have al ready shown how participation by grace and human striving are conceived in dialectical complementarity in the Fmal uUm. We ma}t now safely obsen'e thiS same complementarity in Athanasius's acCOUnt of Anton)', without resorting to any speculations abouc "redactionaJ seams," It is most interesting, in faer, to sce how Athanasius makes statements char emphasize Antony's srriving immediately following starements about the intervention of (he Lord on behalf of Antony. Two significant examples w ill illustrate this point- The first conc~rns Amony's "firse comest against the de\'il,M a statement which is immediately qualified by Arhanasiill intO: Mor, rather, this was in Antony the success of the Savior .....86 Athanasius, however, seems concerned to make che point to his readers that the fact of [he Lord's working with and in Anro ny does not mean [hac Anrony himself does not have to work. So he follows the preceding statement by scressing that ~Anto ny did not then become careless or arrogant" (OUt E ... iutej,€\ ).OlltOV KCtt l(CltEIPpOVEl).8i The rest of the chapter is caken up wirh the presentation of Antony as the \'ery model of ascecical striving: Antony ~practiced the discipline wich incensit),R; he Mmorrified the bcxly and kept it under subjection ~ and accustomed himself to increasingly stringent practices; his disposition is described in cerms of ardor (it r.p09ulltCt) and watchfulness (it"fpU1tV£t).S8 Finally, as if to balance (he statem('O( at the beginning of the chapter that Amony's COntest represented the success of the Savior in Antony, Athanasius's Antony presentS a conception of \'irtue thac emphasizes [he element of human striving: "And this tenet of his was also truly wonderful, chat neither [he way of virtue (tiIv t fiC; CxPEtfj~ 006v) nor separation from the world fo r its sake ought to be measured in terms of time spent, but by the aspirant's desire and purposefulness (aA.'-o. x6e<9 KCtt tf1 npocnpeaEl).M89 A similar dramatic configuration of emphases on both Antony's striving and divine aid occurs in one of the key passages of the treatise, Vila Anlonii 10. In the preceding chaptet, Amony is presented

182

183

THE CONTE XT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GR .... CE

as che \'KUrn of a cerrifying and rather excra\"agant attaCk by demons, his cell having been invaded by "the appearances of lions, bears, leopards, bulls, and serpents, asps, scorpions, and wolves .~90 In che midst of much bodily pain, Amony remains in himself "unmoved and even mou: ~"atchful in his soul,~91 Finally, Amony is ~ued by di,,'ine imel'1remion:

point strialy through his own strength. Rather, the incident is meant as a kind of cesting. In che context of the grace already beStowed on him, Antony is here given che opportunity co "match" chis grace by the response of perseverance. Taking full advantage of this opportunity, Ancony is then rescued by divine aid and the coworking between the Lord and Ancon}' seems to graduate to a more intense b.-el, dramatized by the beam of light, the divine ,'ow of MJ will be your helper forever, and I will make you &mOllS everywhere,M and the references to Antony's renewed strength and augmented ouvaf1t<;. The element of human exertion continues to be integral to this higher and m ore incense level of "co-working," and itself becomes incensified, as we see from succeWing ceferences co Antony's bt1:oming ~ mo re enthusiastic in his devotion to God,.93 and "intt;ruifying more and more his purpose. M~ Moreo,'er, the principle of che complemencarity of divine aid and human striving is integrated by Athanasius's Amon~' in his pastora.! discourses with che other monks:

In this circumstance also [he lord did not forget che wresding of Antony, but came to his aid. Fot when he looked up he saw the roof being opened, as it seemed, and a cenain beam of light descending toward him. Suddenly the demons vanished from view, the pain of his body ceased instantly, and the building was once more intact. Av,rare of the assisUlIIce and both breathing more easily and relieved from the sufferings, Amony entreated che vision thac ap~, saying ~Where were you? Wh)' didn't you appear in the beginning, so chat you could Stop my distresses?" And a "oice came to him: "'I was here, Antony, but I .....aited ro watch your struggle. And now, since you persevered and were not defeated, I ..... ill be your helper forever, and I will make you famous everywhere." On heariDg (his, he stood up and pra~'ed, and he was so strengthened that he felt thac his body contained more mig ht (n)..£iova o-uvuJIw) than before. And he was abom thiny-five years old at thac . 9'ume.

T herefore, my children. let us hold co the discipline, and not be careless. For we have the Lord for our co-worker in (his, as it is written, God ·works for good with" everyone who chooses che good. And in order chat we noc become negligem, it is good to cart'fully consider the Aposcle"s stacement: "I die daily.'-95

If we choose to read this passage through a predetermined schema of redaaional seams, what we have here, rather uncomfortably dose together. is both a model of grace as something -stored in~ God and - inst'rted'" into the human being, and a -transactional" framework, in which Anrony's autonomous initial effort is u:warded by the promise of divine assistance. H owever, caken as it stands, ic simply dramatizes che kind of dialectic that we have already found in the FI-JIal LetterJ, in which che emphasis on divine initiative and grace is balanced by exhortations to ~match" the gract; of God by our own effortS. While ie is clear that this incident is meant to pornay a critical point in Amony's career, as is evidenced by {he dramatic mention of his age at the time of the incident, ie is also true that it is not at {his point [hat the ·co-working"' of the lord with Antony begins. The motif of "co-working" was introduced a good deal earl ier, in chapter 5. So it is nor as if Antony ~achieved" the reward of ha\'ing the Lord as "his helper~ by persen'ring to that

Thus Amony's spirituality, as presented by Athanasius, is not one where divine aid precludes human effort but rather one in which divine aid is seen to be an inducement to greater human effOrt, with che confidence that comes from crusting that this effort is guaranteed success through the viaory of che incarnate Word. However, notwithstanding our attempts to emphasize che complementarity in Athanasius between divine aid and human striving, it is not inappropriate to ask what is the specifically M human element in the divine- human "co-working which is the content of the life of grace. In fact, the ii$ue of differentiacing what properly belongs [Q the divine from what properly belongs to the hum:lO is discussed several timt-s in Athanasius's account of the Ufe of AnroN)". For the most pan. it is raised by -way of Amony's insistence that miraculous actS cannor be initiated or accomplished by human volition but issue from di\'ine dispensation. Such acts, then, 3re not the proper objects of human striving in general, nor ascecical striving in panicular: MFor the performance of signs does not belong

184

185

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CON TEXT OF GRACE

this is the Savior's work. ><96 Thus despite his many healings, ~he encouraged rhose who suffertd to have patience and to know that healing belongtd neither to him nor (Q men at all, bue only to God who acts whenever he wishes and for whomever he wills. The ones who suffered therefore receivtd che words of the old man as healing, and learned not to dwell on thei r infirmicies but to be patient. And the ones who were cured were caught not to give thanks to Amony, but to God alone.H9~ Whenever Amon}' does perform miraculous works, he is q uick to disclaim ownership of the act: "For this good deed is nor mine ... rather, her healing is from the Savior who works his mercy everywhere for those who call on him.-9S This still leaves us with the question of whac is che properly human a.s~t in the divine-human "synergia of the life of grace, of which Anton), is presented as an ideal exampk The answer implicH id), given br Athanasius is chac che properly human activiq' of Amony is pra~'er - in chI' large sense of the term, which includes all of An tony's ascetical ~di5Cipline," insofar as it is understood to derive from his invocacion of divine assistance. Prayer, understood as che inVOCiltion of divine presence and assistance, is ehe human counterpart co chI' divine power which is operative in Antony's life of holiness. Thus, in Antony's struggle against the demons, we are made aware thac, while the power of rhe demo ns is weakentd through che victorious power of the Lord ,99 Amony participaces in this victory through prayer: "As I praytd and lar chanting psalms to myself, they immtdiately began to wail and cry our, as though chey were severely weakened, and r glorifitd the Lord, who came and made an example of their audacity and madness.~ I00 The same point is made when Amon}' refuses ro come out of his cell ro heal the daughter of a milicary officer, who was "disturbed by a demon. " Amonr seems concerned that the request for healing implies a conviction on the part of {he officer thac Anco ny possesses a certain "power [0 heal. hntony wants therefore to reinforce {he point thar, as a mere man, t he only thing he can do is invoke the power of Chrisc through prayer. In face , co further dramatize this poim, he tells the officer (hat he himself should pray for his own daughter. T he whole construction of rhe episode underlines (he principle thar the act was accomplished primarily through the di vine power of Christ, but also through the instrumentality of human prayer:

am a man like you, buc if you believe in Christ, whom I St'cve, go, and in the same way rou belie,'e, pray co God, and it will come to pass. - lmmtdiatc:ly he departed, believing and calling on Christ, and havi ng his daughter purified of che demon. Through Antony many other things have been done by the lord, who says, "Ask and it will be: given },ou. " IOI

to

US -

H

This division of labot, by which the effecti\'e power belongs to {he Lord and the in"QCation of prayer belongs to Anmny, is finally made explicit toward the end of the rteatiSt': Amony did, in fact, hc:a1 wichout issuing commands, but by praying and calling on (he name of Christ, so it 'vas clear to all that it was not he who did this, but the lord bringing his benevolence co effect through Anton}' and curing those who were afflicted. (Oil npocrtCtt'twv "(ouv ~e€p6:1t£\)EV 6 'AV1:6:I\'1O:;, al.').' £iJX6IlE\,O~ )(cd 'tOV

XPH1tOV OVOIlCt~rov. 00:; tra01 rpctVEpOV yevEaSm, on OU)( ~v aut 6<; 6 itOlW\.·, al.A· 6 KUplO~ iiv, 6 at' 'Av'twviou qn).(lV9pwtrEOOjI€\'0<; )((11 SEpattEixov f Oix; 1t aO'IOvta~.)

Only [he prayer was Antony's, and the discipline for rhe sake of which he dwelltd in rhe mountain, and he rejoiced in the comempiation of di"ine realitie;;, bm he was disconsolate at being annoyed by so many visirors and drawn to [he outer mounrain. 101

(Ancony} was unwilling co open rhe door, but scooping from abo"e said, "Why do you cry out to me, man' I tOO

This passage provides us with an opportunity co underline the consiscenc}, between Athanasius's presentation of the Lift of Antoll), and his general conception of the relation berv.een God lnd creation. From the point of \'iew of cosmology, we nottd earlier how the relation bet'l'r'ec:n God and creation is concei\"td by Athanasius in terms of an active-passive framework ; from che poim of view of Christology, Wt nottd how this framework is concei\'td in terms of the conjunction of divine gi .... in,g and human receiving in Christ. Similarly, in his presentation of the desert saint, Athanasius is jealous to safeguard the primary active agency of God. The implicit but persistent emphasis of the whole treacise, which is also made explicit in this passage, is that throughout Anronr's illustrious career and progress in holiness, it is rhe loed, the Incarnace \Xrord , who is 6 /tau))". Amony is really simply rhe receptacle of rhe power of the Word. Ac the same time, however, Anton}' is not deprived of

186

187

M

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

TH E CONTEXT OF GRACE

all subjectivity, in the sense of being an agent who acrualizes himself in a cenain acriviry. There is an activity that properly belongs ro Antony as a human being: it is prayer, and the ascesis that deri\'es from prayer. Prayer is here understood as spiritual receptivity, an invocation of and openness ro the power of the Lord, the inner form of prayer being "that the lord may be our fellow worker. ~;o3 However, insofar as Antony is presented as someone who strives in prayer and insofar as prayer is described as properly belonging ro Antony as a human subject, we can see Anrony's prayer as a credible model of acrive receptivity. Antonr may then be seen as the human model in which the relation becv.·een God and c[(-ation achieves an ideal perfecrion. To fully appreciaH- Athanasius's presentation of Amony as the ideal type of the Christian, we need to observe some resonances within this presentation that recall the bishop's account of the original condition of humanity before the faH, in the Contra Gentes. In that earl.ier treatise, Athanasius presents unfallen humaniry as fully absorbed in the contemplation of God. The pre-lapsarian human being clung {Q rhe kdivine and intelligible realities" by "rhe power of his mind~ "tU Ol)vO:fJ.E1 "to\! YOU, allowing nothing '" from outside" ( E~w8tV) to mix with this contemplation, but having the mind fixed soldy on God, -rov vouv £O"y'T"J1'(£VCll 1tpOt; 'tov 9E6v. 104 However, after mening away from God, the soul's capacity to perceive God throug h its inherent powers were critically impaired:

senrs an alienation of the soul from its nati"'e dynamism through which it has ready access to the vision of God, for the soul is "its own path, receiving the knowledge and understanding of God the Word not from outside but from itsdf~ (oux: e';w8Ev, i:t..J.."): £;;

Thus turn ing away, and forgening that it exisrs according {Q the image of the good God, the soul no longer beheld through its own power God the Word, according to whose image it had been created (oux: En jlEV OUl til; £\' ClWn

£aU"l:il;). M In the Contra Gentes, Athanasius Setms to indicate that, even after the sin of Adam, the soul has not irretrievably lost this inherent dYDamism which leads to the knowledge of God. The path to God is therefore still accessible through rhe soul: '"For JUSt as they turned away from God with their mind and invented gods out of nothing, so they can rise tOwards God with the mind of t heir soul (OUVClt Clt 'rap .. . OUtIDf a\'a.j3fivat 'to \'0 tTt<; wuX%) and again mrn back towards him.~ ! 06 This turning back of the soul tOward God through itself is exemplified in Antony, whose estrangement from the world is correlative with a self-ucollection that may be understood as the opposite movement of the soul's sinful "turning outside iuelC Thus, Antony's first progress in the life of holiness is presented in terms of his recollecting his mind (auvO:'{(J)v £Cll)"rou tiJv 010:v01av), iO' and being attentive to himself (npocr£zwv £Clm0).!08 Howevet, as we pointed our in our earlier discussion of the C01ltra GenteJ, Athanasius's emphasis on rhe soul as its own path to God, however much it may raise red flags in post-scholastic Catholic- Protestant polemic, is not meant to imply that the soul is autonomous and independent of grace. This point is substantiated by the way Athanasius portrays Amony's rerum to the vOUt; as simultaneous with the contemplation of Christ: '"But in thinking about the Christ and considering the excellence won through him and the intellectual pan of the soul ("to\' XP10"tOV £vSuj.lOUjlEVOS

x:at ("h' auto\, t"Jlv EuytV€.lav, x:at to \'OEpOV tilt; AO)'l~Oj.lEVOS).

WuX~

For Athanasius, then, the soul's turning away from God is simultaneously an estrangement from itself, a "going outside itself" which is the opposite of the ecstatic vision of God by which [he soul perceives God within itself. Thus the fUming away from God repre-

Amony extinguished the fire of his opponent's {i.e. the devil's} deception. "l09 The con\'ergence of the return to the soul and the return to Christ finds an explanation in the principle that the purity of the soul renders it receptive to the revelatory activity of the \\70rd: MFor I believe that when a soul is pure in every way and in its natural state, it is able, having become clearsighted, to see more and fiuther than the demons, since it has the lord who reveals things to it." 110 Athanasius's emphasis on the continuity betWeen the soul's inherent dynamic and its accessibility to the divine power has been \wnerable to certain misinterpretations. As we pointed OUt in an earlier chapter, some scholars find him inconsistent by inte rpreting some passages as meaning that the soul can find its own way to God

188

189

OUVO:jlEox; tOY 8EO\' AOy0\" KaB' QV x:at '(tYOVE\" opg:), but going outside itself (tisw OE £ClU"til; YEVOjltVyV it conceived and imagined things that did not exist. For it had hidden away in the complications of fleshly desires the mirror it had within itself, through which alone it was able to see [he image of the Father. (CG 8; Thomson, p. 20)

• THE CONTEXT OF GR .... CE

THE CONTEX T OF GR ..... CE

withour divine assistance and other pas!iages as ruling our that possibility. \).7 hat such interpretations misunderstand fundamentally is pr~isely chis conrinuity in Athanasius berv.'een the inuinsic dynamism of the soul and its receptivity [Q che divine. This continuity does noc mean, co be sure, chac the soul is of divine essence bur it dOfi mean thac the soul is nanually constituted by the momentum of recepcivity to the di\·ine. I 11 Moreo\'er, the reparation of this momentum in a po5t.lapsarian conrexc is nOt to be separated from ~ference to the incarnation of the Word, even if such reference is not explicitly made by Athanasius in every case, As one case in point, we may refer to a speech by Antony on virrue chac bears a striking resemblance to a passage in che Contra Gente! on the soul's access to God . In che latter ueatise, Achanasius emphasizes the soul's natural accessibility to the vision of God:

Buc do noc be afraid to hear about \'inue, and do not be a se ranger to {he cerm. For it is noc distant from us (0-0 j.1aKpO:v), nor does it stand external to us (000' £~ro9£v TUHOY), b ut its realization li~ in us, and the cask is easy if only we shaH will it (£fIV j.10VOv e~h'loroj.1£v) ... For the Lord has told us before, - the Kingdom of God is within you." All virtue needs, then, is our willing ('tou e£A£l v ftI!&v), since it is in us, and arises from us (€v fuLlV t.an Kat El; iij..L&v o"l)Vi(M"a"tal). For virtue exists when [he soul maintains its imellecrual pan according to nature CTfj.; '(Up o/lJXft.:; 'to votpOv Ka"ta
We do noe need anything excepc ourseh·es for [he knowledge and faultless understanding of this way_ For che path to God is not as far from us (r.oppwetv) or as external to us (£~roe£v) as God himself is high above all, but it is in us (Ev fu.tlv) and we are capable of finding its beginning by ourselves, as Moses taught: "The word of faith is within your hearc T he Saviour also declared and confirmed t his, sa}'ing: ~The ki ngdom of God is within you, For insofar as we have faith and the kingdom of God within us, we are capable of arriving quickly to the vision and perceprion of the King of all, the saving Word of che Father. So let che Greeks who ,.... orship idols not make e"ruses, nor anyone else deceive himself {hat he does noc know such a road and thus claim a pretext for godlessness. For we ha\'e all stepped o n chat road and know it, even if not all wish to foUow it but would rather depan from it ... And if someone were to ask what this road might be, I say it is each one·s soul and the mind witrun it ('tfJV EKCtO'WU \jfUXfJ\' ... Kat 'tQV t.v airtil voilv). Only through this can God be s~n and contemplated, unless these impious Greeks refuse to admi t they have a soul, JUSt as the:-' d enied God. II I H

Q

The parallel passage in the Lift Dj AmOll)' occurs in the context of a discourse by Antony co some younger monks exhorting them to strive for virtue:

190

The first point thar we need to make with regard to the combination of these twO passages is t hat in the latter we see Achanasius emphasizing che role of volition in the progress of virtue, going so far as co say that ~all virtue needs is our willing, since it is in us and arises from us."' Such language flies in the face of Gregg and Groh's simplistic characterizat ion of the differences between Athanasian and Arian soteriologies. And, cenainly, there cannot be any quescion here of a "redactional seam- caused by rhe intrusion of independent "Amony-traditions"; the close similarities in thought and terminology becv.'een this passage and the one in CDnlra Genies rule out any such speculation. Indeed, [he face chat there are sucb striking similarities between passages embedded in works thar are 191

• THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CO KTEXT OF GRACE

far apan: in both subjt'Ct matter and time strongly suggests the possibility chat the (onceprual framework propounded in th~ passages is integral to Athanasi us's vision. We now v.-ant to show thac this is in fact the case, bue before we do so, we need ro rule out . some miSinterpretatIOns. The [ask of ruling ou{ misinrerpr('[3cioDS and of showing how (h~ passages reveal a li ne of thought that is quite integral to Achanasius's \'ision ceorers on a correce understanding of what Achanasius means when he says chat "inue is not Men ernar to U5 but Mwi(hin~ us. Once again, we note chat che categories of externality and ioeemalir), are fundamental to Athanasius's way of thinking. \'\'e have recognized this faCt in our analysis of Athanasius's conception of the rdation bec....'een God and creation ".S-3.-\,IS the Trinicarian rdations, and also in our analysis of his interpretation of the incarnation of the Word. We now see rhe same caregories employed in his articulation of rhe relation bern'cen human nature and hu man goodness. Jus t as we tried to show tha t Athanasius's articulation of the externality bern'cen God and creation has to ~ undemood in light of the correlation of conceptS that forms its native comext , we now must do the same in this instance. It mUSt be repeated that, despite the unease of certain interp~ters, 114 his saying t hat we do not nt'fi:! anything for the knowledge of God "except ourselves" does not in fact mean that this knowledge can be acquired apart from divine assistance. Athanasius is simply not thinking along the lines of a demarcation of what belongs to hwnaniry and what belongs to God in rhis comen. I[ is important (0 recognize that when he says that we do not need anyrning -~cept oursel,,'es~ to know God - insofar as access to knowled~ of God is within us and not external to us - the -not eX[ernal~ is not meant to rule OUt a role for God alwgether, as if the power of the Word was one of the things -external~ to the soul. Rather, what Athanasius means by saying [hat the soul has no need of anrthing external to it is that the intrinsic dynamism of the soul leads of itself ro God, which is not at all to say thar rhe power of the Word is itself extrinsic (0 this dynamism. According to Athanasius, in fact, quite the contrary is rhe case, since this d~'namism of the soul is itself a patticiparion in the oUvc(j.llI; of the Word. So the "external;' which the soul does not nred for the knowledge of God, is not God himself but rather what is discontinuous with rhe inherent dynamism of the soul, which for Athanasius would mean specifically the visible creation and the desires of the body.ll} Similarl}', when Antony is made to say that virtue is ~in us and

arises from us~ and does nor depend on something "external," Athanasius certainly does not want us to undrrs tand that human virtue does not depend on di\'ine aid. Again, from Athanasius's perspective, the divine oU\'ctj.w; cannm be concei"ed as something -exrrinsic to human virtue. Virtue, by definition, is Christic; indeed., Athanasius says explicitly iD another place that one of the necessities for knowledge of God is ~ Christic vinue ,~ 't"ij(; lCCltCX Xpto'tO\l apE"t"i'l:;.1l 6 So, to say rhat virtue is intemal to us and nor external is simply to say that virtue does not require che acquisition of anything thar is disconti nuous with the dynamism of che soul. Ir is also to say that vinue requires a spiritual recollea:ion in which the -outer senses" are not allowed to disturb the integrity and equanimity of the soul. 11 - But it is not to say that divine power can be understood as extrinsic to [his dynamism of the soul but rather as something that constitutes it from within. Those critics who would undemand C01/lra Ge1/ltJ 30 as representing a Plaronic framework chat de parts from rhe perspetri"e of the incarnation HS would have Io e). .plain why Athanasius would put so similar a passage in rhe momh of AnIOny, whom Athanasius 50 clearly and persistently depicu as having his holiness derived from the power of the Incarnate Word. 119 Bm, in fact, it is crucial to recognize that the notion of the "internalityH and lack of "extecnaliry" of virtue to the soul is not one that, for Athanasiu$, mitigates against [he significance of the incarnation of the Word, but rather derives from it. In making rhis statement, we rejoin our ceneral theme of the relation betw~tl God and creation, and recall that Athanasius understands the significance of the incarnation precisely in terms of divine power becoming -internal" to us in a distincrivdy more imense mode than previously. We ha\'e already shown how this theme is played oue in Athanasius through his ~rhetonc of re\'{'rsal,~ in which the body is ~not external- to the Word. If the incarnation is the e,'em through which grace became "inremal" to us in a pre-t"minem mode,no then it is not at all inconsistent but rather most fining that it is precisely Amon}" as the model "co-worker" of rhe Lord, who should speak of virtue as "in us" and not exrernal to us. We can rake Antony, therefore, as representari\'e of the new mode of imernality that obtains between God and creation through the incarnation. Amony is the one in whom the Incarnate Word mani· fests his \'ictory over sin and wrruption. This victory and thr divine power through which it is effected is, in Athanasian terms, some· thing internal to Amony and not external . It is etue that Arhanasius

192

193

H

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

TH E C01\TE X T OF GRACE

often makes the poim dut Antony's deeds ate' not his own but Christ's, but this way of speaking needs to be interpreted with refe rence co the active-passive framework, as emphasizing the primary agency of the Word and the receptive seance of Antony with respect to these acts. It should not be imerpreted with reference co the "i nrernality-cxternality ~ framework, as suggesting that th~ acts are somehow "external" co Amony. Athanasius all\o-ays wants to emphasize the lack of externality betwttn God and creacion th rough the incarnation. This emphasis seems to suggesc thac, while God's life and work within us muse be conceived as primarily God's, it is also in a real sense ours, as internal co us and thus corre lative co our subjectivity. Of course, it would not be appropriate for Athanasius to dwell on this laccer point in t he Uft of An/OilY by insisting that the miraculous acts of Amony should really be ascribed to Ancon)'. The actual situation is [hat Antony has become a popular hero, and Athanasius's theological task is [0 make sure thac me glorious fame of Aneony is traced back to the glory of che Incarnate Word. Thus his project is not to dissociace Amony from the glory ascribed co him by the multitude but to show the correct configuration of this glory as ascribable to Antony by way of deri""3.tion from the Incarnate lord. To this end, Athanasius indicaees that the whole point of his treatise is to show ~thac our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ glorifies those who glorifY him .~121 It is not a matter, therefore, of dinociacing the glory of Antony from the glory of Christ (as indicating an extrincism of one to thl:' other), but of showing chat it is Christ who glorifies and Amony who is g lorified. To interpret the lack of externality beCl\o·ttn God and humanity in the comext of the incarnation as indicating that GclCfs lifl:' in us is really ours is to suggest that the incarnation indicates a new le';el of imersubjeaivity in the relation beCl\o·ttn God and humanity. This is co say that, through the incarnation, wbat naturally belongs to God and was historically effected through the agency of the Incarnace Word becomes in soml:' Sl:'nse ascribable to us as subjects, through grace. This is simply the reverse ~rspecti\'e from that whl:'cl:'in the condition of humanicy is considl:'red co be ascribable to che subject of tbe Word. To be sure, it is this latter perspecti\'1:' chat really dominaces Athanasius's anention_ Nevertheless. the former is implied by the whole logic of the -rhetoric of re\'ersal,~ which we have analyzed previously. There is at least one place, however, where rhis perspective comes inco the foreground , and where the significance of the incarnation is considered in terms of its aligning of human and divine subjeaivity.l22 This example occw:s 10

Athaoasius's letter to Marcellinus on thl:' Psalms, an analysis of which will lead us conveniently back to the Lift of A.11fCl/ly,

194

The grace of the Psalms In the Letter to Maralliml1, Athanasius is tesponding to che request of a sick fnl:'nd who is seeking guidance on how to understand the Psalms_ In his response, Athanasius beg ins by stressing rhl:' -agreemem of the H oly Spirit~ among all the books of the Scripture5. 123 Neve rrhdess, he also emphasizes t hat thl:' Book of Psalms has "a cerrain grace of its own," a distinctive way in which ic is applicable to the spiricuallife of the Christian. Athanasius's explanation of this distincti ve position of the Book of Psalms ~' i thin thl:' scriptures is striking in its characteristic I:'mphasis on the internalization of grace. Tt is also illuminating in che way this emphasis is played OUt in cerms of identir}' and othemess. Arhanasius identifies thl:' distinctive "grace" of the Psalms in chis way: For in addition to thl:' Q[her things in which it enjoys an affinity and fellowship with the other books. it ~ses, beyond that, this marvel of its O'ilo."Q - namely, that it COntains M'en the emotions of each soul, and it has the changes and rectifications of chese delint'ared and regulated in iudf (on Ka\ cex f;Kc':(("'i: Tl~ '!lUX';'; Klv1lJtCtta, ta~ t E t OUtw" ll£tCt~oj.a.~ Kat OlopeOOaEU; ElEl omYE"{p
195

• THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

What strikes one immediately about this passage is rhe similari!}' between Athanasius's explication of the distinctive "grace" of rhe Psalms and his way of conceiving the unique significance of the incarnation in relation to other acts of d i·..ine grace. In the same way rhar he stresses the relative '·externality" of divine grace compared ro the incarnation, 117 here he characterizes the other books of the scriprures as providing external and "ob jenive·' admonition and information. These other books are described as answering the question of "what?·' - what one must do and nOt do, ·'knowledge of the coming of the Savior;· the deeds of kings and saints, erc. The Psalms, however, nor only provide objective knowledge of these things (the '·what'·) but they also answer the quesrion of '·how'· such knowledge may be internalized in rhe emotions and manifested in action. They empower the reader toward the subje[[ive appropriation of the coment delineared in the mher books: ·'he is enabled by this book ro possess (ifX£O"9a.l ) the image deriving from the words .. · I1B Moreover, the interiority of rhis appropriation is emphasized by his stress on the possession of the ··image·· contained in the Psalms in terms of "the emotions of the souL The Psalms rhus provide a pattern of feeling and acting that is ultimately oriented roward the dispassionare stare of equanimit}': hAnd in the case of each person one would find the divine hymns appointed for us and our emotions and equanimity (1tp(>; nl-l.(i~ Kat i}J.Lwv K1Vitcn:U; Kat Ka,aO""tCto"£1~) . ·'119 We can see, therefore, that although Athanasius does not explicitly use the terminology of ·'internality'· and "externality·' in his comparison of the Psalms with the other scriptures, he nevertheless evokes this framework insofar as he characterizes the Psalms as enabling rhe interioriz.acion and subjective appropriation of the objective commandments and exhonations conta.ined in the other scriptures . 130 The Psalms do this by providing a concrete pattern by which these commandments and counsels may be appropriated by the hearing subject, a pattern of how to feel , act, and speak. ~Ioreo\"er, Arhanasius further emphasizes the ··internalit}''' of rhis pattern by stressing that, in rhe an of prayerfully reading the Psalms, this pattern is nOt encountered as external to the speaker but as internal [0 his or her subjectivity. Again, Arhanasius does nor use the language of internality and externality here, but that framework is evoked by the terminology of identity, otherness, and ownership.B I In essence, the distinCtive grace of the Psalms has [0 do with the claim that their contents are encountered as "not other~ rhan rhe hearer (hence, we can translare: ··not external·· to the

hearer's subjectiv!!}') but as one·s own (so we can say, ··internal'· to the hearer's subjectivity):

Despite Athanasius's pointed exclusion of rhe Chrisrological or ·'}o.-fessianic" Psalms from this applicabili!}' of the Psalms to the hearer's own person, an exclusion meant to safeguard the prophetic witness to Christ, it remains true that what Athanasius says here

196

197

H

There is also this astonis hi ng thing in the Psalms. In t he other books, those who read what the holy ones say, and what they mig ht say concerning certain people, are relating rhe things that were written about those earl ier people. And likewise, those who listen consider themselves to be other than those about whom the passage speaks (or !£ a1(ooovt£~ OJ.I,O"O~ Eau"tous EKEI.VroV it-{O\)Vtal, "Epi ill\' 0:) )"6yo<; qr'l("f1.),132 so that they only come [0 the imitation of the deeds tha t ate [Old to the extent that they marvel at them and desire to emulate rhem. Br contrast, however, he who takes up this book - the Psalter - goes through the prophecies about the Savior, as is CUStomary in the other Scriptures, with admiration and adoration, but the other Psalms he [reads} as being his own proper words (ffis ioiou ~ o\'·'[(X~ AOyOu.; a,'an VWo"1("£1).l)3 And the one who hears is deeply moved, as though he himself were speaking (ci:x; auto:; A€"{OOV), J?>4 and is affected b}' the words of the songs, as if they were properly his (ffi~ {Oia\' OVtrov ainou) 1 3 ~ . .. Indeed., it is clear that one who reads the [other} books utters them not as proper to himself (ll~ ci:x; toio\)~) , but as the words of the saints and (hose who are signified by them. Bur contrariwise, remarkably, aftet" the prophecies about the Savior and the nations, he who recites rhe Psalms is uttering the rest as his own words (ci:x; tOla pftJ.J.a-ra), and each sings them as if they were written concerning him (ciY.; r
a)."): ci:x; a,n&; 1t£pi Ea"O'tOu

Aa/.w" 01((
And [he things spoken are such that he lifts them up to GOO as himself acting and speak ing them from himself (roe; aut6~ 1tpCt';a~

1(a1

E~

£amou AW,WV).m

THE CON TE XT OF GR ..... CE

THE CO N T EX T OF GR ..... CE

about t he special chancteristic of t he Psalms is also applicable, in his \'i('l\', to rhe aCt of the incarnation. This much can be inti mated by the similar use of chI' motif of ~appropriation ~ which he makes with reference ro the incarnation. Bu t che bishop himself expressly makes t his con nec tion:

where in rhe soul can recognize a perfected image of irself, the same is true of the ace when·b y the Word became flesh and "typified in h imself- human \' irtue. H enceforth, humanity can fi nd ~ in itself'· - that is, in the model of its own humanity in Christ - the perfect image of virtue. There is a mutual intemaliry whereby the human is typified ··in Christ- in such a ·way that there is thus provided for humanity a model which is accessible t o ie ·' in itself." It is in such a context that we musr p lace A t hanasius's saying that chI' way of virrue is incrinsic to the soul. Not that it necessarily fo Uows thac whenever Athanasius makes such a statement, he is altogether consciously intending to say chat the way of "i rrue is intri nsic to the soul t hroug h the agency of Christ·s humanity. But insofar as he tends [Q seethe significance of the incarnation in terms of making the divine presence and power "internal" to the human cond ition, w e cannot take his statements about the imrinsic nature of vinue in the soul 3.5 excluding t his divine grace. M oreover, we must take his mooel of the incernality of rhe incarnation as the o\'erarching contexc or horiwn of incerpretation which informs such statements. Rerurn ing to Antony, we can see now that his statemencs about virtue being "not distant"· and ··not external- but -in us" should not be torally divo rced from the pers pective whereby the significance of the incarnation is understood precisely in terms of rhe power of t he Word becoming internal [Q our human flesh. The power of \·inue which conquers e"il is introouced into Ma flesh -bearing man ,~ precisely through the co-working of the One who "bore flesh for us- J40 Within (h is perspective, what primar iL y belongs to the agency of God is not thereb y "extemal ~ to the human subjecr and, conversely, what is "internal·· to the human su bject is not thereby ··externar· or independent of the primary age ncy of divine power. The incarnation thus represents a relation between God and creation that is characterized in some way b}" a "co-subiecti ~'iry,~ insofar as whar is effected primarily by the divi ne Subject is also appropriated by and becomes internal to (i.e., not ot her than) the human subjecr. Amony, as the mooel of the redeemed and perfected Christian, represents (his co-subjectivity inasmuch as he is portrayed as chI' coworker of the Lord. While this co-working is dnmacized, for the most pan, in terms of struggle and victory over the de\'il, it is also represemed through one significant motif {hat pertains to our pon rayal of co-working in cerms of co-subje
Again, the same grace is from rhe Sav io r, for when he became man for US he offered his own body in d ying for ou[ sake, in order chat he might set all fr~ from de~l[h. And des iring to show us his o wn hea\·enly and well- pleasing life, he p rovided its rype in himself (tv ECl\Yt"(!> ·tC1trtllV Ewre<; twUAOjl£VOUC; nlv 'CO\) n:01£1" OUVCljl1V). Ic W3.5 indeed for this reason that he made t his reso und in the Psalms before his sojourn in our midst, so that JUSt as he proyided the model of the eanhly and heavenl}' man in his own person (tv' OOJt£P EV ami!> 'Cov £niY£tov Kat Oi>Pi:t.\'10V av9pronov tu1toJ\' £OEt~£v) , so also from the Psalms he who WantS to do SO can learn the emotions and dispositions of the soul, finding in them also the therapy and correction suited for each emotion. 1jS T hus, in the same war in which the Psalms provide a ~ mitror··l}9

198

Of

~image··

199

• THE COl\TEXT OF GRACE

the '\X'ord within the universe, according to which the Word is presemed as the prima;y acting subject who leads and co-ordinates the distinCt parrs of creation imo a coherent and harmoniously ordered whole. 141 At the .>ame time, Athanasius also aniculates the goal of human spiritual stri\'ing in tetlus of achieving an immanent harmony or equanimity, an inner order. Thus in the Epistle to MarrellinuJ. the Psalms are described in terrns of regulating and coordinating the emotions and passions of the soul towards ·'equanimity."' 142 Similarly Antony, as the one in whom "the success of rhe 5avior" is manifest, presents us with a perfect model of "utter equilibrium ;,14, an "unshaken mind," l44 and "stability of charaCter." 145 \VIe can describe such a State as one of divine-human co-subjectivity insofar as it represents the co-working and co-leadership of Christ and the human soul over the passions and emotions. Again, within this perspective, a human person's being self-consistent and "not at variance with himself'" is convergent wi th his or he r submission to the divine ·· leadership." This dynamic is analyzed by Athanasius in his examination of the effect of the singing of the Psalms on the soul:

THE COK TE XT OF GRACE

It is within this oveearching context that we can see that

music there is a plectrum, so the man becoming himself a stringed instrument and devoting himself complerely to the Spirit may obey in all his members and emotions, and serve rhe will of God. 146

Amony's mastery of himself is fully convergent with his allowing himself to be mastered by the Lord. Antony's imernalizacion of the power of the Incarnate Word means that the ordering, harmonizing, and life-giving power which the \X/ord exercises in the uni,:erse becomes immanent to Antony's own constitution. 14 ? Antony is thus a dramatic model of the relationship of "ioremalit}''' berween humaniry and creation through the incarnation, in which the power of the Savior becomes imemal to the human being. At the same time, while [he model of Antony thus illumines and dramatizes certain elementS of Athanasius's understanding of the incarnation of the Word, ic also serves to critique that understanding. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, in cenain respects, Athanasius's Jesus may gain from borrowing some of the features of Athanasius's Amony. For if the criticism of Athanasius's neglect of Christ's human soul may itself be criticized when proceeding ftom a framewo rk that is foreign to Achanasius, such criticism may still be allowed when It arises organically precisely from within Athanasius's own framework. The portrait of Amony represents such an occasion. When we consider Athanasius's emphasis on the equanimiry of Antony, as representing the perfection of spiritual stability, along with his emphasis on the victOry of the incarnation in terms of internalizing the power of the Word into our human condition, we can only conclude that, from Athanasius's own perspective, what is needed is a Jesus who by modeling this equanimiry in his own soul makes it internal co our human souls. The faCt that Athanasius does nOt provide such a model means that, while Antony's bodily asceticism can be seen to derive from the victory of the "flesh-bearing \X/ord'" that has become imemal to our flt'sh, a similar derivation cannOt be traced for Antony's '"equilibrium," which is arguably a more fundamt'mal category for characterizing the latter's spiritual perfeCtion. At the same time, this observation merely underscores our earlier remarks about the lack of an analytical perspective in Athanasius's Christology. '\I;re noted at the time that by an "analytical perspenive" we mean one that focuses on the internal constitution of the Incarnate \'>:/ord. Athanasius is able to focus on the imernal constitution of the Antony who is perfected in Christ, but his spontaneous impulse to conceive Christ himself only in terms of what he effects for US makes him impariem of refleCtion on his internal constitution. Howeyer, his emphasis on the internality of the relation between God and creation logically re<:Juires thar he makes che redemption of

200

201

The st'<:ond reason {that the Psalms are sung} is that, JUSt as harmony that unites flutes effects a single sound, so also, seeing that different movements appear in the soul - and in it is rhe power of reasoning, and eager appetite, and highspirited passion, from the motion of which comes also the activity of the pans of the body - che reason intends man neither to be di scordant in himself, nor to be at variance with himself. So the mos t excellem things derive from reasoning, while the most wonhless derive from acting on the basis of desire .. , In order that some such confusion not occur in us, rhe reason intends the soul that possesses the mind of Christ, as the Apostle said, co use this as a leader, and by ir both to be a master of its passions and ro govern the body's members, so as co comply with reason (SO.n "tnv 'l'Uxitv <> ).0'(0<; £X-0UOCt\' XP10"tOt) VOUv .. . -wiyu!,! KaS1lYE~6vl XPTJoa 08m Kal E.v CtinTI 1rCt8rytll((OV KpCt"tEiv. "twv

EV -wu"!,!,! .mv IlE\, OE -wt) aWIlCt'to; Il£AWV apxEl\', do:; "1:0 ur.Ctlcounv .0 1.0"('!'!). T hus, as in

THE CON"TEXT OF GRACE

THE CONTEXT OF GRACE

che soul as weB as the body deri vative of che act whereby the power of the Word became "internal" to the whole human structure, body and soul. In the same way that this power can only be internal to the human bodr by Christ's appropriating a human bodr, it can only be internal to the human soul through Christ's appropriating a human soul. \X1hile Athanasius did not himself carry this logic as far as we would wish in the direction of explicitly referring to Christ's human soul, he can be credited with setting up eno ugh of the fundamental structure of this logic w ensure a certain consistency between his thought and later development in this ditection.

noted that the motif of striving is not absent from Athanasius's account of Antony. Asking what is the specifically human element in Amony's striving, we answered that it is prayer, the active appeal to be the recipient of divine activity. In such a way, we can take Amony, the man of insistent prayer, as the model of human active receptivity to the divine. Moreoyer, as the modd of the new and redee med relation of human to the divine, Amony is characterized as not only someone who looks to Christ for aid but also as someone who achieves holiness by looking within himself and finding virtue "within." We tried to contexru.alize this observation by analyzing the dynamics of the relation berween GCKl. and creacion, with reference to the categories of internaliry and externality which are so characteristic of Athanasius's way of thinking. We concluded that, for Athanasius, the relation with God is not considered to be "external" to the human being (although God in se is "external" to creation); and, indeed, the incarnation is characterized specifically in terms of internalizing the grace of this relation. As the model of the redeemed relation be~'een God and creation that derives from the incarnation, Anrony's looking within and his looking to Christ are intimately relared movemt'nts. In an analogous d}'oamic, Amony's allowing himself to be mastered by tbe Lord leads to a self-mastery, pon rayed as a perfect "equanimity." \x/i t hin the logic of Athanasius, this equanimity must be understood. as the POWt'f of the lord becoming "internal" to the soul of Antony, thus allowing him to coordinate his bodi ly passions and emotions into a harmonious order. We concluded by arguing that, in fact, this logic demands that the internalization of divine power in Antony's soul be correlated with an emphasis on Christ's own human soul, which we find lacking in Athanasius. Howevt'r, [he fan that Athanasius's logic demands rhe filling in of this gap indicates itS fundamental soundness, despite the gap itself.

Conclusion In this chapter we have been examining the relation between God and creation in the context of grace, wi th a focus on the human side of this relation. We have centered our analysis on the Festal Learn, in which Athanasius, as Bishop of Alexandria, exhons his flock to respond appropriately to the grace of the Resurrection, and on the Life of Ant(nlY, which represents the great monk as a prime example of the life of grace. Prior to dealing with rhe latter work, we found it necessary w makes some remarks concerning Gregg and Grah's charactetization of Athanasian soteriology as "subsramialist," in contradistinction to a supposedly "voluntarist" Arian sotefiology_ By reference to the FesTal Let;erl, we established that the elemem of volition and human srri\'ing was in fact integral to Athanasius's conception of the interaction of divine and human in the context of grace. This interaction is pre-sented in the Life of Anion), through the motif of the ~co-working " of Amon)' and the lord. We ha\'e sought to reconstruCt the nati .... e comext for the interpretation of this motif by recalling Athanasius's emphasis on the "working" of the Word in the cosmos, the primordial di .... ine activity of the Word of which creatureiy activity is derivative. We have shown also that the same active-passiye framework is oper.ltive in Athanasius's conception of the incarnation as an evem through which the "working" of the Word becomes available through and in not only the human body of Jesus but also those of his disciples. Placed in this context, we see Antony as an illustrious example of someone "in whom" the lord works and manifests his victOry over sin and eviL We ha\'e seen A[)[on~" s appropriation of the secondary and derivative status of his own spirirual success, as indicating a spirituality characterized by both humility aDd a joyful confidence in the power of God that is available to him despite his own weakness. At the same time, we

20?

203

CONCL USION

fourth and fifth ceDfuries saw the development and resolution of what are arguably the {Wo most decisi\"... controversies in Eastern and Western Christendom. We have already alluded to the dangers of melding the Pelagian and Arian comroversi('S, but from the point of view of s}'stemaric analysis there are undoubtedly important parallels. An examination of these paral1C'ls would be a delicate and demanding task in itself, certainly beyond the scope of our pr~nr inquiry. Yet lve can aUow ourselves the suggestion that, most fundamentally, both controversies wece resolved in the *orthodox tradition by the same basic insight: our salvation can only be worked by God. \'('jrh reference to our theme of the relation beCWttO God and the world, we can say [hat both in rhe West wim itS characreristic emphases on morality, anthropology, and rhe relation between nature and grac~ - and in the East, with its mor~ speculative, ~m~taph}'sica1," and properly "theo-logicar approach, che same conclusion was r!"ached: humanity (and che world) can be related to God only through God. Indeed, the main represenr:ativ~s of ch~ ~onhodox" tradition in both comrov~rsif'5 (Athanasius and Augustine) rejected a notion of ~lvation as Il transaction - explic" idy. in Augustine·s case; implicitly, in Athanasius's - and aniculateci our redemption io terms of a r~n~~-ed p:an:icipacion in divine lif~, Agam, both insisted thac God is th~ primary and allencompassing agem of this union, and that this agency is not df«ced by way of "external aids but by a union whereby the selfcommunication of divine Life becomes ~internalH to us. 1 Ultimately, Auguscine's point in the Pelagian controversy reduces to Athanasius's fundamental position: only the Di"'ine MediatOr can eff«t the renewal of the image of God within us:? - which is to sa}', only God can unite humanity to God. This fundamental lesson bequeathed to us, in distinct modes. br

both che West~m and Eastern Christian traditions, was hard won, both in terms of incra-eccJesial dispute and in terms of interaction with competing non-Christian world views. In our first chapter, we tried to give some sense of the philosophical background against which the emerging Christian ([adition de,,·elopN. its own conceptions of the relation between God and che wodd. \Xre noted especially the tendency, which becam~ ptonounc~d in ",Middle Platonism,·' to conc~ive the uanscendence of God in terms of a selfabsorption and lack of inmlvement in the wocld, and m posit a realm of subordinate "mediators,~ whose task was to connect che world wich che d i"ine and who were themselves distinguished from both che strictly immanent sphere and from the strietly unq ualified tr:Ul5C~dence of che primal principle. The Christian gnostics introduced such a (~mi-)di,,·ine hose of intermediaries in cheir own schema, in which Christ and the Holy Spiric were included, and in which che Creamr of chis world was distinct fcom the highest principle. It was in response w these gnoseics that we have the fi rst loud and sustained sounding, by lrenaeus, of the motif chac only God, who is che Cr('ator and Sustainer of this world. can rdate the created sphrre to God. This principle was elaborated in reference [0 our knowledge of God and our union wieh God, which constitute our ~lvation: "For the Lord taught us chat no one is capable of knowing God, unless that person is taught by God; thac is, that God cannoc be known without God: but this is me manifest will of thr Facher, that God should be known~;3 -How can the)' be sa,·ed unless it was God who wotked their salvation upon earth? Or how shall we pass in[O God, unless God has fim passed into us?" ~ As these quotations make dear, Irenaeus's emphasis is not only on the nocion chac nothing less chan God can unite the world co God but, JUSt as strongly, on the faCt chac God does indred unite che world to himself in love. We see in lrenaeus a kind of correlation of God and the world, in such a way that Gods nature is conceived in terms of divine love for and presence to creation, and divine glory is described as che living human being - alive with che life of God.5 For lrenaeus, such a correlation is nor necesS3ry to the divine nature but is brought about freely by God, through God's lo"r for creacion. A notable pan of Irenaeus's achievemene as a theologian was his abilic)' to conceive divine transcendenc~ and ~glory" preciseiF in terms of God 's loving involvement with che world. In his rum, Athanasius gave systematic expression [0 rhis c~ntral concrpcion of the con\'ergenc~ of divine transcendence and immanence. In the second chapter. we tried to analyze che systematic elaboration of this

204

205

CONCLUSION

T~

M

H

• CONCLL"S I O~

CONCLUSION

principle in Athanasius's early docuinal work , the Cantra GenteJ- De in(amariane. There wc cried to show that his self-.:onscious conception of the simultaneity of divine mhemess and nearness [Q the world is a central structural principle in his elaboration of the doctrines of God, cosmology, theological anthropology, soteriology. and Christology. While the fundamental perspective of the C~mra Gentes-De bl(amatiaTJe may thus be characterized as Mlrenaean ,~ it is nm until the OrafiontJ (01llra Ariafl91 that we find some notable instances of parallels between Irenaean and Athanasian texts, While ascertaining the precise historical circumstances of Athanasius's acquaintance with Irenaean texts has not fallen within the scope of our inquiry, our citation of significant parallels at least suggest the hypothesis that, as Athanasius strove to defend Nicaea and its continuity with earlier tradition, he discovered the resources contained in Irenaeus's work and their applicability to the issue of the ontological Status of Christ as Mediator_ Tt may also be that this discovery, or incteased use, of Irenaeus was connected with his sojourn in the West. In any case, the influence of the Bishop of Lyons is discernible in Athanasius's defense of the divinity of the Son in terms of the kind of mediation and the kind of immediacy that is effected. by the Son in the relation between God and the world. In our third chapter, wc tried to show how Athanasius's cenual conception of the convergence of divine transcendence and immanence finds a climactic expression, in the course of the Arian crisis, in a sustained emphasis on God's othemess to the world, coupled with the theme that we have become Goers "own" (tolO~) chrough appropriation of the Word, in the Spirit. It is at least a defensible notion ro suggest thar this convergence of otnemess and nearness, in the relation between God and creation, lies at th~ hean of the Christian proclamation, In that case, maincaining the tension between divine othemess and nearness in a coh~reIlt account of Christian sal ....ation must be considered to be a requirement and a standard of judgement for any Christian theological "system.~ Despite some shortcomings, such as che lack of emphasis on Christ's human soul, it is certainh' a credit to Athanasius's g~nius that he was able to maintain (his tension at the high pitch of a simultan{"Qus emphasis on the utter unlikeness Ocrween God and the world, and on our deification to the fXlint of being "Word-ed" in the Word. We have tried to show how this simultan{"Qus emphasis was elaborated intO an intelligible th{"Qlogy by Athanasius. If only by way of signaling the difficulty of such an

achie"liement, we can fXlint very briefly to twO modern paradigms of the relation between God and che world in which the eension seems to sag, on onc side or another. Both influential in distinct sectors, the on~ is provided by Friedrich Schleiermacher, and the other by Karl Banh. 6 Himself a Platonist who, as much as Atha nasius, worked comfortably within a framewotk in which God is the active principle and creation passive, Schleiermacher nevertheless adopted a Kamian mode of thought in which "God" is deduced from t he data of hu man consciousness: God is the "whence,"' or co-determinam, of the feeling of absolute dependenceJ Such a paradigm is ultimately monisc - God, in the form of "God-.:onsciousness;' is swallowed up into human cons.ciousness. This underlying monism is further manifested in a Christology that shies away from a dialectical attribution of both humanity and divinity ro the person of Christ, preferring to speak of the perfection of Christ's God-.:onsciousness, i.e_, his human consciousness of the "whence~ of absolute dependence. Ironically, such a ChristOlogy, which occupies a pioneering position among modem "ChristOlogies from below" precisely because of its monism, shows e"liidence of a certain docetism, in that it holds that Christ's development was "free from any conflia."','l Finally, Schleiermacher's monism is most evident in his rejection of Trinitarian doctrine in favor of "Sabellianism."'9 By COntrast, we find Athanasius's presentation of the relation between God and creation to be not only dialectical (i.e., concei\'ing these as, in a ceHain sense, opfXlsite categories) but also richly dialogicaL 'W hile God is active and creation passive, humanit), encounters God as more than a mere inference of. or datum within, its own passivity: "God contains, but is not contained." Ultimately, the structure of the human being is ecstatic, and this sdf-transcending structure (,'ncountecs che God of loving condescension in a relation of conversation (0f11fja.).1O Moreover, this dialogue between God and humanity is enfolded within the intra-divine relations: through Son and Spirit, we encounter the Father. The difference between God and the world is not nullified in Christ but becomes an intercourse of the giving and receiving of the gift of the Holy SpiritIn opposition to Schleiermacher, Kad Barth erected a theological edifice based on the irreducible subjecrivity of God, Reclaiming the lrenaean principle thac God can only be known through God, II Barth rejected the notion of a God deduced from human subjectivity and asserted the absolute and sovereign othemess of God to

206

-'0;

4 CONCLUSION

CONCLUSIOK

the

~i n

the world. Because of dus emphasis, the name of Banh is not infrequently mentioned in conjunction with that of Athanasius. 12 Indeed., we have tried to show that, io the case of at least one major commentator on Athanasius, J. Roldanus, the interpretation is strongly informed by a Banhian agenda and executed in Banhian terms. The effect is not altogethet a happy one, because, despire superficial similarities, Banh·s way of conceiving the relation betw~n God and the world is at least different in emphasis from Athanasius·s. Athanasius worked comfortably and naturall}' within the framework of panicipadon; a certain conception of oltologio nun is intrinsic to his doctrine. H is emphasis on divine orhemess is strongly bound up with an equal emphasis on divine condescension as conditioning this orhemess. Such divine condescension is manifest within the interna.l structure of the cosmos and of human beings, in such a war that its effects are consritmive of these s[!ucrures. Of course, it is impossible to sum up Banh·s conception of the relation herween God and the world in a few lines. Moreo....er, Banh's ·'dialectical'· sc}'!e is full of opposing statements and emphases; what he asserts about the orhemess berv.·een God and the world in his polemic against olt%gia rmis is often counterbalanced by his doctrine of IZI/a/ogia !'llat/Ol/is. In view of these difficulties, we can ool}' point to a t}'pical emphasis in Barth's approach that distinguishes his conception from that of Athanasius. This is his recurrenc motif of assening that whatever is given to humanity and the world by God is not Mas such,'· Min and of itseJf,~ ~independently and intrinsically,~ Mproper toM hwnanity.B We ha.... e seen how Roldanus applies such cat~gories to Athanasius. However, Barth's model Stt(ill to suggest that, after all, there is a human strucrure ~as such,M ~in and of itsC'Jf,M independent of God. In orher words, the relation to God seems to be concei"ed by Banh in such a way as to be ~extrins i cM to che human strucrure Mas such: Of cou~, for Banh, such a strategy is pur at the service of the principle of 100a gratia and at the defense of di .... ine sovereignty and glory. For Athanasius, howe ....er, divine sov~reigmy and glory art" expressed precisely in che fac t that all creation derives its being from paniciparion in divine power, and thus, the relation to God is intrinsic and cons[iru[i ~·e of the structure of created reality. Ultimately, Athanasius's perspecti....e is that of a relational ontology, whereas Barth is altogether tOO preoccupied to distinguish between (he human 5trucrure "in itself'· and the relation to God. 14 This preoccupation is made more p roblematic in thac Barth does not an iculate any ontology by which he can clarify JUSt what constitutes

itselF of creared sm.lctures apart from the relation with God.l~ In COntrast, Athanasius can rely precisei}' on his ontology to make the poim thac whereas our whole being is a panicipation in God, our nature is still absolutely distinct and ~extemalM to God, not because we ha....e any kStructute ~ which is uof itsC'lf' independ~m M of God, but because we participate in God "from nothing. The difference in roDe bet"Ween Barth·s ~mphasis on {he dialectical opposition of God and world, and that of Athanasius, is signaJed by the fact chac Banh refuses to speak of humaniry"s cooperating with God (ZIIsammmuirkm),16 whereas Athanasius can draw a theological portrait of Amony as a co-worker (crovEP"(Oc;;) with Christ. It is also signaled by Athanasius's dwelling on [h~ Uinternal ityU of God's work in us through the incarnation of the \'(ford. Athaoasius's emphasis on this new len'l of "incemality" in the relation between God and humanity, in Christ, is again combined with a Stress on the irreducibly asymmetrical StnJCtUIe of this relation in a ~'ay that maintains the tension between divine othemess and nearness, more than does Barth ·s. If we can consider Arhanasius as a dialogue partner in contemporary theological discussion, we thus gain a theological model chat provides a corrective counterpoint to both the Schleiermacherian danger of an anthropocentric monism and the Banhian danger of incipient dualism. Or, more positively, Athanasius·s model succeeds in affirming both the ineffable, sovereignly free and transcendent being of God (with Barrh) and the nearness of this ineffuble pres· ence within the human realm (with Schl~iermacher). But perbaps the most urgent use we can make of Athanasius today is in the realm of Christology. The renewed search for (he ~histo rical Jesus~ in comemporary Cbristological discussion, while valuable in itsC'lf, underlines the need to recast Christology in a soteriological mode in order to see how the person of Jesus represents definitive salvation for the whole created order. Achanasius reminds us thar we need ro disco\'er [lOt only who Jesus was in the social-historical comeX"t in which he lived but also who Jesus is "for us," in the context of our own struggle for ultimate salva.tion. However, this Mfor us·· is not something thar we can "fill in- for ourselves; nor can it be seen simply in terms of Jesus·s outwatd actions (his ·· ptalLis ~) . To separ.ue the qUC""Stion of ontology from Christolog)' is to separate God's action in Jesus Christ from God's being. As Athanasius saw very clearly, rhe result of this strategy is [0 undermine the good ne'ilo"S that, in J esus Christ, we are ttuly and definitively ··joined" to God in a deifying communion. This good

208

209

• COKCLUSION

news has its ultimate basis in who God is. For Athanasius, the Word's becoming flesh ~ for us" is ultimately rooted in the Father's desire ro come near ro the world, to embrace the world within the Father's own embrace for che Son. Our salvation therefore consists in our being included within the embrace wherein the Father ;'delighu'" in the Son . .Moreover, the mission of bring ing the world near to the Father can only be accomplished by the divine power of the Son: a mere creature, however exalted, cannot overcome t he abyss between Crearor and creat ure. Funhermore, Arhanasius reminds us, the union berween God and the world, repeesemed in Jesus Christ, is not a mere juxtaposition or '"et:jualization" of God and the world, bur effects the transformation and exaltation of creared reality. Athanasius thus challenges us ro move toward a confession o f the full divinity of Jesus Christ ~ as good news "for us" ~ and toward a conception of Christ's person in which is proclaiml'd the fullness of human transformation, even untO deification. Ultimately, what is at stake is not some abstract "Hellenistic" doctrine of divine ontology, but the good news of the intimate "nearness" of God to the world in Jesus Chrisc

And we know that while "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God," now that he has become also human for our salvation we worship him, not as though he had come to [he body (Q be equal to it, bur as a Master assuming the form of the servant, and as Maker and ereawe coming in a creature in order [hat, in it de livering all things, he might bring the world near to the Father, and make all things ro be at peace, things in heaven and things on eanh . 17

210

NOTES

INTRODUCTION I See Kdly, Early ChriJ!ian Drxtri1ifI, San Francis.co: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 243. 2 This link is explicirly made in DIl.

3 This mo\-emenr was spearheaded by M. Richard in his "Saint A[hanase er la psychologie du Christ :;elan Its ariens", Mifange de Sriroa RtfiCifull 4. 1947, pp. 7-49. GriUmeier, Chrisr in Chriiridll Tradition, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1975, pp. 30S-29, is more fluanced in his judgement but still approaches Athanasius's Christology with the rath<:"r narrow pIe-arranged agenda of looking for Ch rist'$ human sow. Hanson, The Sraf"ih for :ht Chri5tiszn Drxtrint of God; The Arian Cor:trl)1'erJ)", Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988, also ba5C"S bis ne-gati"e e>aluat;on of Athanasius's Chrisrology on the lack of a cr~ible acti,'e human agency in Athaflasius's picture of Chri5t. 4 Paris: Editions du Cen. 1943. -; Studies in rhe History of Chrisdan Thought, vol. 4, I.eiden: E. J. Brill, 1968. As I shall elaborate in the course of my investigations, Roldanus's imnpretation is ofcr'n marred by an agenda governed by a Banhian perspenive and easily prone to imposing post-scholastic Roman- Prmesum polemical categories omo Athanasius. 6 Partially answering to this need is Penersen's recem "'ork, A;b,ma.
211

KOTES

XOTES ElOnname CORSrance de terminologie, ufmoignam d'une coherence synthedque de doctri~ ~ (ibid., p. 14). 8 Cf. CA 1:8, 9 One instance of such misunders tandi ng is that of R. P. C. Haruon in his magiSterial work. Tk S(3T(h /1JO':k Christian D'1o.'trir;t t;/GrxI: Tht Arian C{JJIlnn'tNy, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1988. Hanson rakes Athanasius's ChriHology as indicating an utterly extriru;ic relation between the Word and his human body (p. 448), whereas in fact Athanasius's Chriswlogy GIn onI)' be interpreted correctly in ,·iew of both the irreducible distinction bet1\'een God and hwnanicy chat is imeg ral (0 his sYStem and his concepf1on of [he incarnation as modifying t!o'hile not annulling that distinction. in such a way iliat the relation between the Word and his human body is pr«isely not external, bur one of kappropriation.~ See belot!o', Chapter 3_ 1 THE THE~fE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND CREATION BEFORE ATHANASIUS

Phat4rw 247c. 2 Cf. Mrno. 3 RtpJl.hlir 509d. 4 Mtlaphysia, Lambda lOi2h3. I

5

6 7

8

9 10 11

~The

existence of GOO, Of what comes to the same thing in SlOicism, the di\'inity of l'\arure, is a thesis which the Stoics devoted great energ}' to proving; Loog. HtllmtJtk Phi!t1Jt;pby. S:oiC!, Epirllruns, S«pria, New York: Charl~ Scribner's Sons, 1974, p. 149. ~ Fundamenr:illy, SlOic theology is pantheist ,~ 1bid _. p_ 150_ Ib id., p. 152. In certain Middlt Piamn.ic systems, such as those of Eudorw of Alexandria and Plut:llch, the activc passive dichomm}' is incorporated into (he synem of til"!it principlH, with tht Ono:- or Mon.ad conceived as acti"e in relation co chI' "Indefinite Dyad _" Thus Dillon, Tk l\lidd/r P/31{JJ1iJ{J, hhaca, NY: Comdl Universiry PreS$, 1977, cito:'S as ono:- of the characteristic features of :Middle Placonism "a strong commitment (afccr Antiochus, at least) to a transcendent fir$[ principle ..... (p. 51). And, in the cemext of discussing Numen.ius's distinction between the supreme God and the Demiurgc, Dillon comments. ~E\'en those Piamnists who do not adopc a distinction lX'(w~n (WO gods. such as Philo, Plu(arch or Atticus. make a strong distinction be("';\'cen God and his Logos, ...-hich amounts to "et)' much the same thing.~ (p. 367), Tht possible influence of this tendency on the
212

12 5peusippus (t, 407-339 BC) had already insistecl rhat rht Ont cannot be called good or exisrenr. See Dillon, cp. cic .. pp. 12-18. 13 Sec: Ennuis VI, 4. 5. wht~ Plotinus argues rhat the mo~ rf:lJlS(t"IIdent the sou rce, the more omnipresem ir is. 14 GUIder. "Providence: Piawnic Demiurge. Hellenistic causa.liry."

Jl.npublishtd. Old Tesramenr bears testImony to God's absolute tl'3nscendence.... Howt','er, the Bible ncver wearies from announcing that this awesome otherness is never in isolation fwm his redempci'"t mercy," Childs. Biblir41 Tht,,/ogy ()/ lk Old and Nc.. TtS!4mtnl$. TMlogi
15 "The

16 17 18

19

Fortress Press, 1993, p_ 372_ Cr. Isa. 55:8-9. Ex. 33:20. 23. ef. Isa. 6: 1-7 . Ps. 113:5-7(NRSV).

20 Recent scholarship has tended to d~mphasize Philo the M iddle Platonis( in favor of Philo the Jewish exegece. Thus Louth, Tht Ongim of rbt Chrisriall M)ific4/ Tr:.ulirion From PJ4IO 10 DtrIJ"S. Oxiord: Clarendon Press, New Yotk Oxford Uni vers ity Press, 1981, -Though in many wa)!s his undel"!itanding of God is similar to Contemporary notions of God as the One, the Ultimate. it breathes a different spirit: God is for him not only a philosophical principle, his is the GOO of Abraham. isaac, and Jaceb, a God v.'ho reveals himself ... " (p. 19). The, following account is indebted to louth's prt5entation of Philo. pp. 18-35. 21 Sp«. ug. i, 43«. 22 FJl.g. 101: Louth, cp. cir .. p. 28. 23 DilIon. op. cit., p. 159. 24 Bouyer. COJm;)J. Tht V:'oriJ and:h1 Glory ojGrxI, Petersham: Se. Bede's Publications. 1988, p. 84. 25 Rom. 1:3-4. 26 Me. 10:30: Lk. 12:7. 27 2 Pet. 1:4. 28 Ath.,nagoras. SJl.pp/;{4fi~ 10; rrarts. Richard$On, Earl)· Cbristian F4;hirJ, Ne"'" York: Collier Book~, 1970, p. 308; see also Theophilus.

Ad :\II.rol. 1:3. 29 Athenagoras, SlIpplifJ~!;f) 16:2; R ichardson, op, cit., pp_ 313-14. 30 Norris. G()(/ aruJ World in E4r1} Chrisri3n TMlogy. A. Sr:uJy i1J jldfin ,U">'1/,1: irtnallll. Ttrtll!1i411. 4114 Origm. New York: Se-ahury Press. 1965, p. 60. 31 Ibid .. p. 67. 32 Bamard , jJl.mn Mar1')'T. HiJ Lift alia Tool/gb;. Cambridge: Cambridge UnlVersLty Press, 1967, pp _83-4_ 33 The problematic nature of this juxtaposition is analyzed b}' Pannenbe rg. -The appropriation of the philosophical conctpt of God as a dogmatic problem of Early Christian theology", in B4JU QI'tJriom i" T!mJlogy. Collected Essays. "01. 2. rfans. ~rge H . Kehm, Philadelphia: Fonress Press, 1971, pp. 11 9-83.

,

,- l '

KQTES

NOT ES

34 lrelUCus, .A.dt'mlls

35 36

37 38

39

H:UrtJtJ (here-airer cited as AI·I) 1lI, 8, 3; Sources Chrttiennes (hereafter SQ 2 11 . 96. In translating the texts of lrenaeus, I ha~'e consulred the translation pro"ided in A"u-Nh'em F:(thm, voL l. Cf. AH 11, S, 4. Cf. i\H IV. 20, 4. For examples of Irenaeus's emphasio; on God as -a.hvays presem~ [0 creation . see ibid. rn, 16,6; rv. 20, I: rv, 28. 2. "The concept of the absol ute cr.l.nscendence of God with respect to his creation and the consequent immediacy of his presence to ie, which lrenaeus elaborates wieh the aid of [his Platonic dIStinction [i_e., between Being and Becommg} underlies the whole of his theological conception," Minns, IrmalllJ. WashingtOn: Georgerown Uni\'ersity Press, 1994, p. 34. It is beyond the scope of this work to ascenain the exacc relationship berween Arhanasian and [renaean texts, though I have ciced in chapter 3 various nocable parallels thac strongly raise the possibility of Alhanasius having direct access to the wrirings of lrenaeus. The rela tionship berll:een rwo figures is certainly a subject requi ring further study. Torrance has also assened thac Arhanasius "stands squarely in the tradition of In:naeus. and develops chI' biblical-thrological understanding of the Gospel which we see reflected in his "'~rks ... : without, ho ...·e"er, elaboraring on precisel y ",·here he places th i... continuity; M:e his kAt hanasius: a study in the foundations of classical theology," in Divinf !oft.aning. Studilf i" Palmli, H('f'11I(1Wttla. Edinburgh: T. &. T. C1ark. 1995, p. li9. &e- Widdicombe, The Falhtrhwd 0/ G~ frrml Orlgen tD A,hlZl1i1sius. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1994, pp . 1-92, 14')- 222. kEI idto i" ro ipJ~, 'i"O ob!inll ~ni;;l, glt.lrla SIIIZ m," Pm !lrr/1.,n I. 2, 10 (SC 2')2.136). flmr.t.f

rne5l:'

40 41

2 Nordberg, kA re
u

16 D1 35, 45.

17 While there are certainly prot('$tations of humility scattered within

42 CWI.j".2:32. 43 &e- DI D«rtJU 25, 44 Cr. Alexander of Alexandria's letter to Al exande r ofTh=>a.lonica. 4') cr Ptri Arcbw: I. 2, 10; I, 6, 2; see also Crouzel, Orig"" uans, A. S. WoraU, San Francisco: H arper & Ro..... 1989, p. 181. 46 E.g. Ptri Ardx}>J I, 2, 4. 47 Cf. ibid. L 5, 5: L 8. 3_ 48 &e- FlofO"sky, "The concept of creation in Sr. Athanasius," 5rlldia Palns/ulZ 6 .1 962, pp. 36-52.

49 er. Pm Arr/1.,n ll . L 2. 50 Ibid. ll. 4: 1I, 5.

2 THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AKO CREATION IN THE CONTR A GE,\'TES-DE f NCAR,'\' A nONE 1 Montfaucon, S,P..N. AfhallJlJii a",hiq;istopi AUxtzndrini ~pera 01C1fIa qli<M exram, J. P_M igne. Pa/rvlogia Gr!U{a 25.1, Paris. 1857.

214

the work, we should nOt lose sight of the fact that chI' authot presentS hllnself as a reacher - to be sure. a teacher ""ho has vilTUJ.!Iy nothing to add to "our blessed teachers.- but still a teacher who looks on his real or fictional reader as a student. This stance is hard to attribute to a 20-year-old. ",·heteas the prrsOI1i1 of a humbly self-deprecating "teacher· is exactly .... hat one would expect from a self-possessed but ver;.- young bishop. 18 This daring agrees with Penersen. op. ("it .. p. 1039, who arrives at his conclusion br reference to rhe early Ftstal UfltrJ _ Bames. Athanasius and Comt<1miuJ. TbtdOf) and PJuia in rhl C01l.i:amini"n Etnpirt. Cambndge. ~L-\ & london, England: Har.--ard Uni'-ersn}' Press. 1993, p. 13. conje<:tures that - Athanasius wrore it betl'l'een 325 and 328 in order to establish his credentials as a wonhy successor of Alexander as Bishop of Alexandria - and deliberately a'~ided polemic against other ChrIstians or any allusion to current COntTO,-erslt'S ....·ithin the Church.· 19 Kannengiesset, A!han;;lSt a"Alt=ndru. Sur l'imamamn du V....k (Sources Chritienn~ 199), Paris: Editions du Cerf. 1973. p. 55.

2 15

i KOTES

i'\OTES

Peuersen, op. ciL, p. 1037, thinks that th~ cat~h~tiGll chara.<:ter of th~ work partly accounts for its being ~a-po!itiGll, making no reft'rences to the govemmem of me empire, or [0 th~ at[itud~ of the imperial pow~rs towards [he Christians. As w~ have suggested above, this apparently apolirical stance mOl!' !'et contain a pol itical statement: i.e. that the victory which seemingly came at the hands of Cof15tamine is anuall)' (he victory of ChriSL Athanasius may be trying [0 transfer what Eusebius rendered to Caesar back to God. Orthodox)" and P!awniml in AtfunmiuI. Symrois or Anti:ooi,?, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968 (second edn 1974), especially pp. 114--47. \'on Hamack, Lthrbu{h tkr OogmmgtJ{hi{hu . Z:u!irer Band, Freiburg & Leipzig: Akad emische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J- C B _ Mohr, 1894, p_ 206, n_ 2_ ConJ~" Cmtts (henceforth cited as CG) 2; my translation here is based on the critical edition pro\-ided in Thomson, Arha1l4sillS. C(m:ra Gmt€! and Or Inc.zrna!iom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, with the benefit of consultation wi th Thomson's own translation. \\'her~'er the Greek text is cited, its locat ion in Thomson's edition is noted _ Ibid_ As is pointed out by Meiiering, Athanas ius should not be considered as espousing here a NeoplawQic doctrine of God as beyond being _ He is not concerned at all here with a metaphysics of divine being, but simpl}' with the radical distinction betw~n divine and created being _ Thus -oooia here must haw' the meaning of 'created substance"," in line with the formulas of CC 35 (Em'Ketva n:ao1l'; YEVErir; oootao; imcipX(J)v) and CG 40 (Un:€p£1tfx£tVa n:ao1l'; '(£\'£'C11-; EriVota). See his ArhanaJitij; Comra Ct1JUJ, op. eiL, p. 16; see also his OrTbod~' and Plaumirm, op. cit., pp_ 6----8, where he poims OUt thar -Athanasius nowhere shows an}' substantial knowl edge of Neo-Platonism~ (p. 6). T he formula derives from Plaw (Republic VI, 509b) and was used by Justin Martyr, Oia!. 4, 1, irenu-us, EpideixiJ 3 and Clement, Smmt. V, 6, 38 (Camelot, op. cit., p _ 53. n _ 4)_ Meijering fu rther notes that, in Justin and Irenaeus, the s.ame qualificarion was made whereby the Plaronic formula reierred to the transcendence of God over (rUltai being: OrTiYxiOX)' and Plato'lisfll, H

20 21

22

23

p_6_ 24 CC 4. 25 Th is interpretation is at odds with one that lOntrasts the -optimi sm ~ of C ontra CmffJ with rhe "pessimism" of De flJ.'amarione, such as it is found, for example, in Roldanus. op. cit., p . 23 and louth, "The concept of the soul in Athanasius's Clmtra Gmfel- Of 1"(4Tr.ati'llit~, Stlldia PafriHira 1:3. 1975, pp. 227-31. I would agree, rather, with Meijering, "5truktur und Zusammenhang des apologetischen \X'erkes von Athanasius Vigiliae ChriJ:ia//{u 45, 1991, p. 316, thac the whole work is structured to dramatize the point chat humanity failed to repair its breach with God apan: from the incarnation: -Als d er Mensch tiber diese drei W~ge (i.e. the grace of being created according to God's im age; the testimony of the external creation; the testimony of the O ld Testament) d ie Cotteserkennrnis nicht eriangen konnte, erschien das W'on, das ihn im Anfang erschuf. in einem h

,

216

menschlichen K orper, um so das BUd Cones und damit die Gotteserkenntnis im Menschen zu erneuern ... Somir stellt sich clet g lobale Aufuau des Doppelwerkes so dar, als dass VOn den vier Wegen der Gottesoflenb:mmg drei in CC behanddt werdm und der vierre in Df_ In den HaupC5achen kmn sich keint Veranderung in den Ansichten des Athanas ius vollzogen haben, etwa in dem 5inne, dass in CC den He iden aufgrund einer 'nartidichtn Theologie' wei ter entgegen kame als in Of, das 'christotent rische Theologie' biefeL Die Feststdlung in 01 12, das~ der Mensch tiber die ersten drei \Xrege Gotteserkenl1tn is hatte erlangen konn en, er sie aber w("gen seiner 5linde eben faktisch nicht eriangte, war auch bereits in CG getroften worden. ~ On the lack of opposition ~tween optimism and pessimism with regard to the twO parts of the treatise. see also Pet[efS("n, A:hal11lsiltJ and fix HNmalJ Body, Bristol: Bristol Press, 1990, pp.

13- 14 . 26 This magnetism of ontology in Athanasius has been noted by Bemard, L'lmoge de Dilll d'aprh saim ll.lhanaff, Paris: Aubeir, J 952, p . 28: .. Athanase est un passionne de consistanc~ ontologique solide." Bernard also speaks of "les exigences ontologiques d 'Athanase,~ and gives many examples from throughout the double treatise witnessing to Athanasius's preoccupation with what truly is (ibid., pp. 29-31). But he overl{)()ks [he significance of the recurrent US3ge of the motif of "remaining," by wh ich this magnetism of ontology is iflSt"rted into a conception of salvation hisrory_ 27 \X'e translate here "natural corruption in the form of death," where Tho mson renders it, "natural corruption consequent upon death. " The text reads, "YlwlxncOI£v i:aui:oi>:; ri;v E\' Savo:rq> K(;('C(X !j)00t\' 1J16opO: U;rOj.lE\'uv." There seems to be no linguistic exigenq for translating EV 9(;(\'a1:8opO: as referring merely to the corruption of the body. 28 Boure r, L'llUarnatJon eJ t£g!ilr-CorpJ du Christ dam la :hlolQgie de saint ll.thal1ase, Paris: Editions du (;en, 1943 , p. 87, aprl y characterizes
30 CG 35. 31 OI 27ft_ 32 CC L 33 Ibid.; Thomson, p _ ). :34 A lhanasim thm defends the appropriateness of the divine Word on the cross by way of defending the appropriateness of the divin~ Word coming into a human boc!ll. The laner is the primary emphasis; the

217

2 NO T ES

appropriau'ness of the crucifixion is rhen explained in renns of the Word tak ing upon IUs own bod y our curse and death (Df 2:;--6). 35 On the early Christian articulation of di" ine uanscendence, ~ the classic study by Pr~tige, God in Palri5li( Thoflgh:, London: SPCK, 19":12, pp. 1- 54. O n che overlap in th e conception of divin e transcen_ dence berween early Christian thinkers and Hellenistic philosophy, see Pannenberg, ' The app ropriation of the philosophical (Oncepr of God as a dog matic problem of early Chrisrian rheology~. in Basi( Qflf.JIia1H ill Thwlog), (Coll~ted Essays, vo!. 2, trans. Grorge H. Kehm), Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971, pp. 119-S3 . Also useful is Grant, Tk Early Chri5fian Dcarin£ of Gad, Charlones"ille: Uni"ersiey Press of Virgin ia, 1966, and his later GodJ and fhe Ont GrxI (Library of Early Chrisriani£}' 1), Philade!phia: Westminster Press, 1986, esp. pp. 75-94. With spe-cific reference to [he doctrines of Justin ~fartyr. Iren..eus, Tertullian, aod Origen. see Norris, God and World in Early Chrir:ialJ Thrology, New York: Seabur;.· Press. 1965 . 36 As Meijering, OrThrxi~xy alld Pia{OlIiJm , p, 21, puts it, 'this is a defmi tion of God with which 1'....1'1). Greek intellectual would agree, - For paralld descriprions of rhe divine including Aristides and Athenagoras and, among the philosophers , Diogenes wnius, Plutarch, and ~(axim us of Tyre. see Came!ot, op_ cir.. pp_ 122- 3, n.1. 37 E.g., CG 16: "Kat' OJ.AiJAOO; 'rap 'm lr; oooi.atr; Kat ta~

1tpc1;Hr; £h'at xp". iva Kat h tflo; EV£PY£i.as. 6 1tpc1; Cl<; llapt UpiJ6ft, Kat i:J,: "!fj(; oooiCtl; " Itpd.;to; FtOOeijVat oU\'rtGfI·" 38 Of course. Athanasius in 00 way intimat~ ao adherence to the

Origenian doctrine which seems to suggest a ne<:essary continuitybetween the almigh tiness of God and the fan of CI(";J.tion. His point, which is in keeping wirh his apologet ic iotent, is to assen the consistency (and thilli rational coherence) becween rhe nafUR' of God and du-, economy proclaimed in the Christian ker)"gmd . Stt my M Thrology and economy in Origen and Athanasius", Origmiana Sep:ima, Leuven: Peeters, 1998. 39 The nmion of God's glory in terms of the re lat ion between God and humanil)' is remin.iscenr of lrenaeus (cf. AH IV, 20, 7: g!oria mim Dei d!'ms hlJmo, ,ita allum humini5 l'iJi~ Df; . .. ). 40 Lg .. CG 2: Kat "l:OV AO'rov iOOJv, 6pi7. EV a-O"l:t!i Kat "!QV t eu Aoyeu flat£pa; CG 9: tov U/.T)9t"Qv Kat ovt o:.x; ovta eEOV t ov toU Xptcn:ou ITa"l:£pa : CG 23: tou tto.vt6.:; iktcni.£oovto. "!Qv rra"t£pa: "!ou Kupiov iij.J.wv 'IrjO"ou XptOWU; CG 29: IT)V "tij.;

Ct/.T)9Eio.; 600v OOEiXHIlIl£v, Ked 9£ropf)awf.l£v "tov ilY£).Iova Kai. lil)j.ltOupyov tou 1"((l\>tOr; lQV "tou ITUlp6.; Air(ov, lVo. 6t' a-ol0u lco.i. 10" tomeu IT0.1Epa 8£GV Kata"of)awll£v: CG 34, 40, 46, 47;DI L 3, 7,8, ll, 14. 15, <"re. 41 See above. pp. 1&---18. 42 As in DJ 17: EV i1:ucrTI 1ft niGH Wv. EKl o.; IlEv £O"n t ou r.:a\'"tCK;

Kao:' oooiav. tv nom o£ £on to.l; i:uvtou liuvUIl£O"l. a. Ir<"naeilli, AH rv. 20, 5. The disrincrion goes bac k at least to Philo.

43 FlorO'o'sl..-y"s reading of the Palamire essenc<"-energy disrincrion into Athanasius seems to stretch things a bi t. but it can at least be granted

218

NOT E S

44 45

46 47

48 49

50

thac the basis for Palamite doctrine is present here; see Flotovsky, "The concept of creation in St. Athanasius', Sfudia PatriiIica 6, 1962, pp. 36--52. It is interest ing to note that modern Orthodox theologians tend to articulate the significance of rhis Palam'te dOCtrine in te rms of an attempt to speak of the simultaneity of divine transandenc!' and immanence; see, for example, Meyendorff, St. Grfgory' PaiamaJ am! Orthodox Spirifllalif)', Crcstwood, NY: Se. Vladimi r's Seminary Press, 1974, pp_ 122- 5. CG 35; DI 32. CG 30. See. especiall~', Dl41-2. CG 35-9. Beginn.ing with CG 40 ("Who might this crearor ben, Athanasius moves ftom an account of how the urll"erse is a manifesta· tion of God to the assert ion that this God is che Christiln God. ""!QV crovUWCl.vta" (CG36): ~ tou o uvu'(a y6\,10; 1(0.1. O"ool.jli.y';o.v"to;" (CG 38) Meijering (;res the parallel of Arisrides, Apd. 2 (Athar..aJiu;; COlllra Gtnfi!J, pp. 121-1). On th e whole, this line of argument is typicall}' Stoic cr Diog. Glert . VII, 70, 137; Sext . Emp_ Adl'. .Jl,lath. 9,75; Marc. Aur. 9, 1; 12, 5: Cicero, Hal. dear. n, 5, 15. (Camelot, op_cit., pp. 170-1 , n. I. ) For a vel"}' explicit later sratement of such an analogy, see Ad EpiHlJ/l'JJ At:g)"jJti 1":1 .

51 CC 35- 9. 52 CG 4 1--6. 53 Bou)"er, t;!m;aroatio" et I' Egliu---CorpJ dfl CbriJt, p. 36. 54 Thus, Bouyer, op. ei L, p_ 83: -La conclusion du discours C:mtre la Paiefl! montrait justement le Verbe a I'o<::uvre IXlUI nire le monde comme une expression du D ieu unique, par rQrdte (J(OOl1o;) qu' il y fait ri-gner. Tous ces dt',doppements de la premi~re oeu .... re de saim Athanase, sut le monde unifie a ["image divine, comme une choeur ou une ciu:, par le Verbe divin qui donne ii. tomes choses II' mouwment et accorde tous ces mouvem ents, etaient materidlement peu orig,naux; on pouvait y teltou\"er I" influence des conceptions philosophiques asscz melangees de l't'poque, le swi"cisme surnageam plus ou moins. Mais nous snmmes a meme, apres les autre de"doppe~ mems du 3e diJ[(}IIrs (QnI" les arinIJ, de saisir que! semiment poussair Athanase, si peu porre au syncn:timsc: par ailkurs. a Ics adopter: c'b-ail ceue idee que le monde esr une surabondance graruite de la vie eternellement suffisame a dle-mi'me de Dieu. eetre " ie qui, selon le mor de saint Jean qu'il ne cess.eta de commenter, 'eSt en 50n Fils'_ De la nait son attachement, des que se forme sa pensee, a ces idm IOncihement scripturaires que l'homme est a r image divine, comme le monde lui-meme, er Cl' n'est qu·ii. leur benefice qU';1 reprend les theses stoi"ciennes en en modifiant d~ lors r:ad icalemem I'intention. " On the other hand, I would certainly disagree with Roldanus's Stat,,ment (lA Chrirr er f'ho"",;;: pp. 30---1) that "Par comparison av~ Origene, la conception du Logos-Sagesse, comme modele de la cr&tion, ne joue dans les enits d·Athana.>e qu'une role tres minime."

219

KOTES

NOTES

Roldanus does nOt ~rceive chI' kind of integration between Platonic (and Origenian) exemplarism and Stoic "italism iD Achanasius. In fact. he aceivel}' dHooserucu this integration by de-emphasizing the el:emplarism CiI ne conviem pas de {le] surestimer~), and then assenlng that Stoic formulations take the piaet' of Origen's eJremplarism, ibid .• p. 31. n.l. :>:5 The sratement that God is unconrained but rather conuiru; all things is commonplace in early (hrisrim doctrine of God. Prestige rakes it as intended to con~'t)' Ma ,'ery necessarv ",,-arning agaiost Stoic M pantheism (op. cit., p. 5). 56 Prri Archon L 2, 8. 57 "Having such a good Son md creator as his offspring, the Father did not hide him away from created beings, bue re-'eals him to a.l1 e...ery day through che sub!lscence and life of ehe unive~, which he effects. In him and throug h him, chI' Father reveals himself, as the Saviour says:" am in the Father. and the Father is in me: MCG 47. 58 We may noce in passing chac. no(withstanding the ocGlSionai (on"entional remark. Achanasius is noc reaJly much interested in angels. The kind of hierarchical ~chain of being~ world-"iew that is found in Origen, for example. gi" es ~.ray to chI' strict polatity in Athanasius of God and world. We sha.ll remark funher on this poin t in the COntt}:t of his anti· Arian polemic. 59 "L'opposieion entre X(r.P\~ et (jl\xn~ correspond, non a notee couple sumarurel e-c naturel, mais plu t6t 1 la uanscendance de I'Incree divin sur le <:fee pe:rissable: Bemard. op. cit., p. 61. 60 Gross, La Oil'iltiWlion Ju ,hrflim d'4pm ltJ Pj-rtS G ~m, Paris: Livral re Lecolfre, 1938, p. 204, qUOted in lkmard, ibid. See a.lso th~ similar anaJ}'sis in Rold.anus. op. dt .. pp. 35-8. 61 I agree entirel}' 9,';rh Bemard's remarks that Arnanasius kprend l'anthropologi~ ~r le biais de la partici~tion ~ (op. cit ., p. 29), and mat the texc indicates ~l'~uwaJence entre KaT' ElKOva et participation~ (p. 3n. Referring to 01 6, 11, and 13, he conclud~ righdy mat ~aiosi onus trow,ons IOtentionnellemenc upproch& le Ket·t ' Eix:ova., la ~nidpation du Ver~, le AoYtK6o;. et le XO:pu;" (ibid.); md ~i1 ~mble done que l'idee est blen fermI': le Ket,' EiKovet Q'est pu un~ simple ressemblance nu reproduction de forme, mais une panicipation ontologique~ (p. 38). See also Roldanus, op. cit., pp. 64-5. Here, also. Athanasius's penpective is cl~ to that of Irenaeus. who chatac· u:'rizes d~ human creatW't as a ~rt'Ceptacle" of the divine (cr AH Ill, 20. 2), 62 CG 41-i. 63 E.g" kKo:p lt~ netvtf).tO\OI; t oi) na,pOt; \)n:Cr.Pln. xai (.10VOI; Ecrnv Yi6o;, Eh:
220

65 66

67 68

Arhanasius himself We will have occasion 10 return to the logic of Atnanasius on rnis poim further on (see pp. 125-32). On che break that Athanil5ius makes with this tradi t ion. see Bernard, op. cic., pp. 25--9; Roldanus, op. cir., pp. 28-9. Bernatd. op. cit.. p. 27. gi,'es as further reasons: (1) the fact that Athanasius does not speak ofhummit}, as image, but as Maccording 1O the Imag~, ~ Kat' EixOvtl. me Image being pro~r1y che Word , Thus imag~ and resemblance art simply non-<;ommensurate in the Athanasian scheme Cne peu\"t'nt erre comparees sur le meme pl:an~); (2) that, since Amanasius follou·s the Alenndrian tooinon of noc admitting a corporeal element in the lCa, ' EilCO\'et, he hu no room for the lrenaean differentiation a.long me lines of rr;.acrlla-it\'Eu"ta: and (3) the idea of a progressive march fmm an initial Kat' eilCO\'Q. to an eschatological resemblance is absem from the penpecti"e of CG-Df. Ibid., p. 45 . OIl\I..twan refer to policical. social, or sexual association - all interpenonal contexts. See Liddel! and $cOt[, Gmk.ElIgli.Jh i..lxirfJ1l, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

69 CG41.42. 70 Roldanus, op. cit ., p. 45, n. 3, hints al an appredation of this point when he remarks in a footnote that "pour la comparoison de Of Ill. 3 a\'ec CG 41-42 il est important de nmer que le cosmos se comporte passivemcm a regard de i'anion du Logos, tmdis quO Athanase pliciS<' que l'homme pem auss i bien garde! la participation que [a petdre, grice 1 sa capacite active de choix. All.'Ssi sa participation esrdIe caractensee par sa possibilite d'y reagir." OUt anal}'sis here "\\'ill corroboute Roldanus's conclusion with specific attention to rhe terminology wruch indicates an attenuation of passi"iry in the cue of humanity'S relation to God. n CG 41, 42. 72 This accounts for the bct. observed by Roldanus, op. cit .. p . 55. chac MiI semble quO Adl:il[~, apparement, ne se soucie pas de distinct10ns eunes clans sa rermioologie psychologique. ~ Roldanus makes the funher characterization thar in Athanasius's mthropology, ~I'existen­ tiel e-c I~ relationnel semblem a"oir le dessu$ sur l"essentiel t1. l'oncol08ique~ (ibid .• p . 57), although onc could iust as ""'1'11 sa)' chac his oncology is in fact relational. Of COUC5e. the most basic reference ~;ithin chis elJ.sremial and relational perspective IS the rei:ttion co God. On Athanasius'slack or imerest in mthropology -as an ind~pen­ dent motif· and his focus on the human being u related to God, see also Pettcrsen. Of. (it" p. 2 L 73 Schoemann. "EtlCwV in den Schriften des heiligen Athanuius", Srbcl4Sfik 16. 1941, p. 359: ~1_o1t x:6o; abet isc er im eigemlichen Sinne bezogen auf den Logos, an dessen Erkennen und Ltben er reiihat,' qUOted ;n Roldanus, op. CiL. p . 49, n. 4. SeE' also Bernard. . p. _' 2 . op. elt., 74 Gmelot, op. cit.. pp. 134-5, n. 2. following Rold anll.'S, op. ciL, pp. 53-5, believes that Athanasius is not referring to the philosophICal

"1

~OTES

NOTES

75

76

77

78 79 80 81 82 83

doe-Hint' of [he tr iparti tion of the soul when he speaks of both vo'iic; and 'guxf). (For this doe-Hine, see me classic texlS of Plaro, Republic IV 440E-44IC, IX 5800.) Meijt'ring, howe"er. considers it "likely that the doctrine of the tripartirion of the soul is presupposed here" (C(J11m; Gmw, p. 100) but adds that ~these are to Athanasius not as to Plato separate parts of the soul, but different functions of the soul" (ib id ., p. 101). CG 2; Kannengi= r, Athamm l' A!rxandrit. Sur l'in,arnafirm du Verbe (Sources Chretiennes 199), Paris: Ed itions du Cerf, 1973, p. 74 sums jt up mus: ~Les deux termes de la relation originelle de l'homme a son createur, SOnt, au sens suict, le Logos-Image..<Ju-pere du core de Dieu er le vo'iic; du COte de rhomme. ~ Thus Kannengi=r sees the acti,-ity of the vou.; as differentiating the human relation ro God from that of sheer passi,-ity: ~Selo n Athanas.e, i'activiu;: propre du vou~ s'identifie au "(H' EhcoVCl en acte. Tous Its eues te\oivent passivemt'nt la marque de leur crfateur. Mais cha les hommes, l"activite du vo'iic; fait de cene empreinte le principe d'un agir unique en son genre, conforme a cdui du Logos" (ib id., p. 75 ). But, once again, the attenuation of passi"ity on the human side does not correspond to the attenuation of acrivity and initiativt' on the divine side. The activity of vo'iic; continues to be a participation in the prior act ivity of the OiJ\'Cl'H~ of the Word: "En somme, le \'ou.; n'est rien d'autre qu'une participation de grice a la propre puissance du Verbe paterneJ . .. la oUva,.u~ i~ue du Logos-Image devimt racte du vou.; humain; car ceae OUVUfl-lI; conserve dans I<: \'oiJ.:; ses proprietes essentielles, tout comme la presence du Verbe createur clans I'ensemble des etres reste bien celle du Logos lui-meme- (ibid., p. 76). "Jr transcends (OHljXl':;) the senses and all human things and it rises high above [he world, and seeing the \\70r d sees in him also the Father of the Word. It rejoin:s in contemplating him and is [efl<~'wed by its desire for him, JUSt as the hol}' scriptures ;ay that the first created man. who was called Adam in Hebrew, had his mind (tov vouv) fixed on God in unabashed frankness, and Ii,'ed with the- saints in the contemplation of intelligible reality, which he en joyed in that place which the holy Moses figuratively called Paradise- (CG 1). Kanne-ngiesser captures the spirit of Athanasius's e:>."pos ition when he speaks of "cene extase native du \"ou.;- (Dt ituarn::rio'lt, p. 77). Ibid. ~l'ime comiem le vo\X;: il est le voik; tit l'ame~, ibid., p. 78. Thus we find the phrase, tft; [ClUt6)\' \}'uxf); tc\\, vou\'. in CG 26. Athanasius uses the Platonic metaphor of me soul as charioteer, f)vioXo.;, in CG 5. Plato, Phadro 246-7. Cl. CG 32, 33, where Athanasius describes ho'" the soul go,'erns the body, Trf£fl-0v£OOOOCtv tou CJWfl-CttCX; (CG 32). CG 3-4. On the ontological goodness of the body in Athanasius, see Pettersen, op. cit., pp. 5-20.

er

222

84 We can contrast this emphasis on the body as what is "clos!'"r to ourselves- with the quite different perspective of Augustine. which emphasizes th e spiritual element as "inmost. " 85 See belo'Q,', pp. 70---S. 86 This insight is missed by Pettersm (op, cit.) in his anal ysis of the significance of the body in Athanasius. 87 Fitting in with rhis ,lIustrarion is Arhanas ius's tendency to speak of the relation betw('en God and humanity as a movement that can be executed, from rhe human side. in ~opposite direnions- : toward God. in one direction; toward the body, in the other direction (cf. CG 4). 88 Thus. I would agltt' with Pettersen (op. cit .. p. 22) that pas;ages that seem to speak pe joratively of the body "must be inte rpreted in the ligh t of both mankind's failure to li"e r/;erxm;~ua!!y and the unhappy realisation of living a'l:cropoa-nrricall),," 89 Roldanus, in a terminology and style of argumentation that bear an unmisrakable resemblance to Barth's polemics against narural theology. ana/I)gia emi" etc.. typically pr=nts his interpretations of Athanasius's anthropology in terms of such exclusive dichotom ies, e.g., "L'homm~ est-i! /I)gikas du fait qu'i! se trouve place clans un certain relation avec le Logos et pour autant qu'il en vit, ou rest-il aussi par la possession de certains attribuits qui par rurtlfl) [my emphasis} seraient particulierement aptl!:'; :i cette relation? ... Som dies deja, par leur nature et leur structure en quelque maniere une image DU une ressemblance des propric:'tts du Logos?" (op. cit., p. 50). Roldanus finds a certain rension in Athanasius between ~Ia pensee srricrement relationnelle et la propension a rendre la strucrure anmropologique ;ndependame" (ibid., p . 65)_ But the lattet tendency is found not so much in [he text of Athanasius, as in Roldanus's own determination to interpret his references to whatever properly belongs to the human strucrure as p" se autonomous and independent of God. It is this last inference wh ich makes of Roldanus's exegesi;; of Athanasius's anthmpology a Barthian ~eiseses is,~ in which the image of God in humanity becomes the obJ{"(t of a rurt-battle between the warring alternatives of its belonging to God or being "une qualite inalienable de r ime,- ibid., p. 95 . 90 This is r{"Cognized by Roldanu5 himself (op. cit ., p. 65): ~Ia conception de rhomme est fortement dominee. chez Athanase, par ride.-: de relation. " 91 This quest ion dominates Roldanus's treatment (op. cit., pp. 65- 98) of Thomme pb::heur- in Alhanasius. See also Bernard, op. cit., pp.

47-51.

er

92 CG 8, 34; DJ 11, 14 . 93 T hi s ~~'es and no" is an ~impreci5ion" for Bemard and an "ambivalence" for Roldanus. Bernard, op. cit., p. 51, tries to tid}' things up with a nature-grace framework: "Considere comme don de la grice, le K«t' E.lK6vCl est perdu; en,'isage comme inherent a rame, iln'est quO obscuri, recouvert d'tUmems errangers: Roldanus, op. cit. , p. 9 5, again sees an ambi"alence between a tendency to designate {he elements belonging to the image as ~plus ou moins possessions

223

2 NOT E S

NOTES

pt'rmant'ntt:S de- I'homm<:" and an opposing tendency to ~ these eleme ntS as gifts of g race [hat become emirely forfeitM. 94 Thu.s, Louth, ~The concept of the soul in Athanasius's COl1!r a Gmres- Dr In(aroa:;(J1I(~, S:kdia P"fristira 13, 1975, p_ 227; also Roldanus. op. eit., pp. 82--4. 95 CG 47.

104 This alerts us to the faer that Grillmeier is really judging Arhanasius in light of the standard of a scholastic namre- grace di stinction. Nor surprisingly, Arhanasius does not measu~ up to thi s standard, which 1S simply foreign to his perspecri"e. Grillmeier concludes: ~ Arhanasius so often speaks of [he life-giving functions of (he logos toward the flesh tha[ he completely forgets the human soul of Christ. Indeed he seems to leave no pla"o for it . There can be no doubt that rho.' Logos is not merely the pt'rsonal subject of Ch ri;(s bodily life, but also the rrnl, physical source of all the actions of his life. There is nor al9,'a\CS , a clear di stinnion between IN n:diarior. of , naturClI and slIpnmuural tiff - as liule as, say, in Origen, in chI.' relationship bet".. een ;h, 1Jaflffal and 5l1pernafll~al ~'ir~' (If th Logru: ibid., p. 312 (my emphasis). 105 We may cite, for example, DI 17: "He was known b~ his" body through his works " (Ctno -roil O'wllu ro; SE Sui rIDV Ep '(WV 1\'(:)PtSOP.E"oc;); DI 41 : -If the part (i.e. the body) is not suitable to be his instrumem by wh ich to make known hi s divinit), (Opycxvov CdHOU . , . 1tpOr; ~ 9 £o'tTjto; l"OXH v), it would be most unErr ing chat he should be known through the whole uni"erse . ~ Here it is implii"d [hat the universe is also an instrument in rhe same sense as Ihe body_ Also. DJ 42: ~The \Xrord used as instrument for his revelation (l!p6;
96 DJ ! , 30. 97 CC 1, Dll, 33. 98 On Athanasius's concern for the "fiHingness~ of rh!' 'm;arnarion. see inler alia DllO, 21, 26, 43. 45. 99 ~ inter alia DI 29, 30. 31, 40. 100 Grillmeier's use of rhis passage in hi s imerprer3tion of Arhanasius's Chrisroiogy is altogether in rho:' wrong ~ key," p=:isdy ~ause he approaches it as an analytical statement - a procedure [har charanerizes [he general incomm<"nsurabiliry of viewpoims bet""~n Athana5ius's Chrisw]ogy and Grillmeids interpretation of it. In this C~, Grillmeier takes Athanasius's concession to the Stoic notion of t he universe as a body to be sufficient grounds for forcing all of Athanasi us 's prese'lltation imo the Stoic pattern. Referring specificalty to this passage, he oHers th e following interpretation (Chrnr in Chris!um Tradition, New York: Sheffi and Ward, 1975, p . 311): ~For all his transce ndence and divini ty, the Logos acts as a iife-gi"ing principiI.' [Owards the world. Be'Cause of the mani fest transcendent:e, this principle should not be identified with t he Stoic world -soul. Athanasius has, however, taken over the Stoic concept of the world as a body, as O'WIlO, and has admined the Logos, which unlike the Stoa he undl."rstands as personal, as it ""I."re in the plaCI." of the soul . ~ The ambivall."ncl." in Grillmeier's imerp~tation is evidenced by the fact that, ha\';ng JUSt cautioned that Athanasius's Logos "should not be identified w ith thl." Swic world-soul, - he then immediatdy goes on to 1000tl." this Logos "in the place of thl." soul." To be sure, in doing so he does not aCtually idemify Athanasius's Logos wi th me 9,'orld-soul, but he does identify him with ~the place of the soul." In other words, he is simpl}' iorcing the Stoic schema - which is indeed an attempt to analYle the structure of the cosmos - upon Athanasius, who is not ma king any such anempt, either in t he case of the cosmos or of the incarnation. See also the criticism of G rillmeier's imerpreurion in Bienert. "Zur Logos-Christologie des Athanasius von Alexandrien in Contr:; GmUJ und De Ir.rarnati~ru~, Studia Patris;ir" 21, 1989, pp.

404-i. 101 Gritlmeier,op_cit.,p_31i. 102 Ibid., p. 318. 103 ~Das Fleisch wird :wm unmittelbar physisch bewegten Organ des Logos,~ Jesus tin- Chrimn im Glaubm tin- Kird~, Band I, Freiburg, Basel, Wien; Herde r, 1979, p_ 472. Here the English translation (o p. eic., p. 3IS) renders "Organ as ~agent," wh ich confuses the whole i;sue of the distinction between the an;ve agency of (he Logos and the instrumental passivity of the body. n

224

,-I]"

n

225

• :'\ OTES

NOTES

Word becoming a human being, ch'9pror.:o:;. Thu;; DJ 14: Wo; av6pw1t~ ElllOT'\J.l£t, },.uf.l!xtv(rlv taQ'tcfl a£l>lla; Df 15: ;.al-$6;vt:l

0:\'9PWItOS £\1 cn.'8pro:tOlI;; ci.m:mpt~E:rat; D1 16: U1t~..£v e:auto\, O\a O'rop.Cl't<X; q>6pci:tr..Ol<;: Df 17: 6 t OU eEaU .1\6"(0.; tv ;:41 c:n'6pcimC;l: DJ 41: £v iz\-'SpOJitq) tau't41 OroJ.lCl.

1((11.

~

En$£thlKEvUl; DJ 43: a \'9pw;ro; t1ttq>O:\'T\; Dl 44: "(£10vr. et Qv9proltOS 1:0Ut o. Kat Qveprol"'.£i<;l 6pya\'f{J J(Expl)'tC.n -«'9 ociJj.J.an: D1 54: ai)',:o.; yap £.\'T],,'9pcillTllO"EV. iVCl it!r£i~ 9001"<01T]9ciiIl£V. 109 For funher examples on th~ bodiliness of the incarnate Word as signifying me excreffiLry of his condescension. see DJ 14. 1;), 4 3, 54. 110 H,lJ\son, op. cic, p. 450: ~One of the OIrious results of this theology of [he Incarnation is due it almost does a~':ly wim a doann!' of the

123 This is th.: sense of ~i[ Vias right for chese things to be said of him as a man, ~ wh ich cannot be interpreted, in its context , ro mean dut it is lI?t right for these t hings to be saId of the' Wo rd but only of the mmhooci, but mdH:r char ir is right for these chings to be said of rIN IFont - yet onl )· in reference: to his having appropriated th~ human.

124 DI 44.

ola

3 THE RELATIOK BETWEEN GOD AND CR EATI ON IN T H E ANT I-AR I AN WRITINGS 1 PcneC$t'n, ~ A recoruideracion of rhe date of tne Comra Gt1IltJ-Dt 11I!",.".,ritmt of Athanasius of Al~x:andria", Suuii4 ParriillCtl 18, 1982,

2

Atonemem.~

III Dl 10; Similarly, in D1 19, the de3t h of Chris[ is called ~[he chief poim of our faith .~ 1.111;'.. to"ta Ott t 6 )(EqiJ..i...a lO\' tijo; r.:iO"tEIDo:; 1120J6. In 0144 . 114 CG 40; see above . pp. 39,49- 52. I D T his is not w say th at Chris t's human soul is impossib le to fit into Ath anasius's geneml schema. In chapter 4, I will Ify to sho w that

itIt"'''''

116 11-

lIS 119 120 121

122

Athanasi us·s accoum of redemption actuall )' neces.sitates that Christ ha'·e a human soul, if it is to De coherent. Meanwhile, I can agree with Grilimeier that Christ"s human soul v,"as not a factor in Athanasius·s theology. But this admitted defect in fact arises precisely out of Athanasius·s lack of concern for an analytical Christology (and also ou t of CC"lUin emphases ~,hkh I shall try to poim out ) and so cannOt be explained br setting up an art ificial analyt ical Christology (the Logos-5arx model, under;stood as an analysiol of the - structure" of Christ). On the othe r hand , ;t may fairly be uid thac Athanasi us·s language is open [ 0 misinterpretation along the lines of an analytical perspe«h'e - what. in fact, Apollinari us does is simply read Achanasius from such a per;specti' <e. In doing so, he anticipares the rrusiocerprecation of Grillmeier! Bemaro. op. ci t ... p. 35 . H anson, cp . cit. . p. 448. "Kat tix; airto; l..ltttp ruiV:(z)\' ruiO";((z)\, .. " OJ .W. See DI 44. D121. In describing Athanasius·s Christologr !n terms of a -model of predi" cation . ~ I am follow ing Norris in his imerp n:tation of Cyril of Alexandria's Chriswlog)', "Christolog ica1 models in Cyril of Alexandria" . StudlP Ptlrmtictl 13, 1975, pp. 265-8) . Norris also comments on the inadequacy of Gri llmeier's t ypology to capture th~ sense of che ocher Alexandrian"s Christology, ibid., pp . 256, 268. I would further add t hat Crri!"s mode l of predicat ion ;s actually deriva" tive of his predecessor. E.g .• 01 IS.

226

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

p . 1037 . The dating for th~ e\'~ms leading u p to Ni caea is tentative: -The only absolutely fi rm dare in this whol~ series of I!'vents is that of thl!' Council of Nicaea . ... ,~ (Hanson, T/x Sftlrch f(Jr ;ht ChriJriafl D l)I:triflt ofGDd, Edinburgh: T. & T . Clark , 1988, p. 131). The traditional date for the eruption of the co ntroversy, 318, is accepted by both Hanson (pp. 3, 130-4) and Will iams, Atius: Hff'tS)· ,md Tradl/ion, London: Danon . Longman and Toeid, 1987, p . 50. The follo"tl.·ing reconst ruc" tion is based on the analyses of HansoD . W'i lliams , and Barnes, A;hanasiUJ ani Crmr!tzn!iUJ. T hrolog)" and P~/irio in fhl C~nsTd!l11nn Emp!", Cambridge, ,',IA; Harvard U ni'-~rsity Press, 1993. The dati ng of events is based especially on the .... o rk of Batnes, which offen 3 de tailed ch ronolog y. For a good succinct treatment of the historical background of Arhanasius. see Pe nersen , A;halltIJiuJ, Harrisburg, PA: Moreho~, 199'), pp. 1-18. It is not ce rtain "tI.' het her this gathering (f.. 32i or 328) took place in Nicomt"dia o r Nicaca; see Hanson . op . cit... pp. 1ii-8; Barnes, op. C;t., pp. 17-18. Bame5, op. cir., p. 18. O n the issue- of rh~ Melitians> participation 10 and reaction to Adunasius's election. see Amold . Tk £rrl)" Epi~' Ctlrt6 of ArNntlslMJ ~f Af~XI:lndri
22 7

NOTES

NOTES

10

1I

12

n

14 1~

16

him from his duties pending further investigation.~ E" en in Trier, Arhanasius <'.as "seiH technically bishop of Alexandria" (ibid.). To sav that Athanasius must ha"e !Ul.iz~ that his o<>m sUI"i\"a! was bound up ">'irh the rt'Cepcion of Nicaea merely underscores the ran th3t Acbanasius identified himself with the doctrine of Nicaea. Baroes's inrerprer:ation of this idenrificat ion, which presumes that Athanasius himself was doctrinally unconcerned and merely used doctrine to jusrify his own political self-interest C He ~<>.. due political activity alone ...-vuld probabl)" ne-'er suffice to restore him to his ~. He needed to ele"\.":I te his struggle to the ideological plane" (p. 53». is, to use a t.erm which Barnes often applies to Athanasius, tendentious. The work sho ....s sig ns of being wrinen at in{erv~s (cf. 2:1), ...·ith the thire! oration evidencing certain differences in style from cbe earlier (';ew of Kannrngiesser's Iifb.:1l'4it d'Ale;wldm" ,jollnwl ofTbtclDgua! Srl/dits 36. 1985, p. 227). O"ariol1es rrmml Arial1!1S (hereafter CA ) 1: I. Cf. CA 2: 19: 0,. DtiT. 7, 9. On [he plan of the Oralio"es (omra Ar;anQJ, $et the analysis of Kannengiesser. op. eit.. pp. 19-111. )farce\lus had bt-en deposed br a synod at Consranrinople in 336. and was to be condemned again by synods III Antioc.h (34 1), Satdica {34 3}, Amioch (34~). and. the council of Constantinople in 381. Athanasius e,·enrually mo\'ed to dls[ance himself from Marcellus, whose self-identification with cbe doctrine of Nicaea served to camouflage. or even perhaps excuse. hiS modalis[ doctrine. On thtacceptance of Marcdlus in [he \\7I'$t. Haruon ""cites: ~The Wescern bishops made no serious anempt (0 analyse the complexity of cbe situation which faced them: they had hitherto remained on the periphery of the C<)ntfO"..ersy; tht'ir traditional :\{ollarchlsm could ~uare well enough with the little they kne...· of [he Council of Nicaea: by an o"ersLmpiil1cation they we~ able to see Marcellus as ")7"» . ort hodox- (op. Cl.t.. p. __ For full text and anal}'~i$. see Haoson. op. cit .. pp. 286-91. He concludes: -The Dedication Creed IS significandy silent about Nicaea, and is >Oll"cely compa[ible wirh it. It can hardly be regare!~ as C"lther a supplement to Nicaea or an interpretation of it. it is puc forward as a substiru[e. It represents cbe nearest approach we can make to disco"ering the .. icows of the ordinary edUCated Eastern bishop who was no admirer of the ext re me vie""S of Arius but \l
228

17

18 19 20 21

22 23 24 2~

26 2'"' 28 29

30

H

n

Nicaea, and the insensiti..ene5S of lhe Western Church to the threat to orthodoxy which this tendency rep«:Semed* (pp. 190-1). The doctrine that the Father did not beget the Son by choice or will is in fact strongly upheld in the OraliMu ((In!rd AnlmM. Perhaps in opposition to che doctrine propounded by the Eastern bishops at Sardica. Athanasius argues that the notion of the Father begetring the Son by a decision of the -Ari:mofR, 2 ""Is.. Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979. Quoted in Hanson. op. dt., p. 3:>4. For full teX-t in trans~riOfl. see Hanson, op. cir. , pp. 363-4. Bames, op. cit .. p. 163. Ad Adtlph. 2. For an accouot of [he history of Arian studies, se.! Williams, op. dt., pp_ 1 -2~. Also see Wiles, Arrbu)'pal Htm)': ..-\rianism Through thi Cm::nin, Oxford: Chrendon Press. 1996. Williams, op. cit., p. 3 refers [0 William ea"e's E«/lsi\,'o modem examples, see th~ int~rpr~tation of Louth, The Origim (1/ the CbriJria" '''''plical T,-adi:ian fT{JTlt Plato to Dm)"T, Oxford : Clar~ndon Press, New York: Oxford Univ~rsity Press, 1981 , p. xiv, and Florovsky, ~Th~ concept of c reation in Se Ath anasius" , Slud;a Pat,-u:ka 6,1962, pp. 36-52. 46 Barnes, op. cit., p. 15. 47 Ziziou[as, 'The reaching of rhO" 2nd ecumenical council in historical and ecumenical pe rspeni v~"' , in Credo ill Spiritum Sar.dum: Ani .:id COlIgmso Teologi<:o lll!~:i(maf~ di P"oum;zto!ogia , R ome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983, p. 32. 48 A classic ~1X'nent of this rejection of classical doctrine by way of a general rejection of metaphysics as '"meaningless~ is [he nineteenthcentury theologian Albrt"'("ht R itschl. See the description and critique of his Christo[og y in Macquarrie, jmlS C h,-ist in Modem Thought, London: 5C.1>.f Press, P hiladelphia: Trinity Press international, 1990, pp. 25 2--8. 49 Fim Ut".,. to Monks 2 (NPNF 4 , 563 - Roberrson. St. Atharuniur. Sdect \l'/Q7"b a..d Lwen (A Sf/m Library of Niwlf and Post-Niune Fatbm of tht CMu:lan Church, second series, ed_ H . Wace and P. Schaif, vol. 4). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987, hereafrer cired as NPNF) . 50 A H'!"}' typical statement is that of c.-1 2:22. where he says that it is "impossible for things o rig inate either to see or know [God ], for the sight and knowlrog~ of him surpasses all'" (NPNF 4 , 3 60). 51 Ad 5"ap. 1:17: cr. Shapland. Tht Lmm o/Sai,,: At/;anaJiUJ CQr-renting the Ho!)" Spi,-it, London: Epwonh Press, 1951, p. 106. T he -especially~ here seems co imply a com parative reference to angels; the

230

52 53 54

55

56 57 58

""Tropici" against whom Athanasius is writing in these letters appar~ntly belie~'ed that t he H ol y Spirit was an angel. Ibid. 1: 18; Shapland, op. cie, p . 107. Ibid. 1: 17; Shapland, op.ciL,pp. 104-5. Fo r example, respon d ing to the A.rian conundrum that if the Son is not brought into be ing through God's will, then he must be said to have come into being ~by necessi!"}', ~ Atha nasius counters that this Arian reasoning is faulty insofar as "they d are to apply human contarities to God" (CA 3:6). DeDecr. 18; Ad Episr. Atg. 4. For Athanasius, rhe "scope" (0"1(0 ..0.;;) of scripture is to be found precisely in the distinction and rdation berv.'een the accounts of the Son as God, and as human creature (CA 3:29). Ad S~rap. 1:18, 19; Shapland. op. cir.. pp. 107, 108 . T hus Athanasius can make use of these scriptural "illustrat ions" to d istinguish and relate the t hree pe rsons of the Trini!"}' and to gi" e some kind of intelligible analogical accoum of rheir relations: "But the Soo, in COntrast with the fountai n, is callro river: 'The river of God is ful l of water ' {Ps. 65 :9lln com rast with the light. he is called radiance - as Paul says: 'Who, being the radiance of his glory and the im age of h is essence' {Heb. 1;31. As then the Father is ligh t and the Son is his radiance - we must nm shrink from saying the same th ings about them many times - w~ may see in the Son the Spirir also by whom we are enlighrened. 'That he give you: it says, 'the Spirit of w isdom and revelation in the knowlroge of him. having the eyes o f your hean enlightened' {Eph. l: 17- 181_ But when we a re enlightened by the Spirit, it is Chrisr who in him enlightens us_ For it says: 'The-re was the true light which Iighteth eve!"}' man mming into the world' Un. 1:9], Again, as the Father is fountain and the Son is called river, we are said to drink of the Spirit. For it is wrinen: ' \'(71' are all made to drink of one Sp iri t' [1 Cor. 12:131· But when w~ are made to d ri nk of the Spirit, we drink of Ch rist. For ' they drank of a spiritual rock that followed them. alld the rock was C hrist' {l Cor. lOA}." Ad S"ap. 1:19; Shapland.op. cie.. pp_ 11 1- 12. DeS)"n. 4 5; NPNF 4, 474. Ad S"ap. 1:17; Shapland,op. cit., pp. 103--4. See also ,A.dSerap. 1:21, '"B m finall)' [er us look, one by one, at rhe references to the H oly Spirit in the- divine scrip nues. and. Like- good bankers. let us judge " 'hether he has anything in common with the c reat ures. or whether he pertains to God; that we may call him either a cmlrure or elseother t han the creatures, penaining to and one with the Godhead which is in ( h~ unoriginated Triad" (Shapland. op. cir., p. 120).

er

mar

59 60

61 Ad5m_p. 1:26_ 62 CA. 1:19. The translar ion providro here is a reworking of that found in NPNF voL 4; hereafter. citations will be indudro in the text. T he Greek text is found in Bright, Tht Orati?m of St. A:h3l1asiUJ ag
231

NOT E S

NOTE S

63 h is superfluous to give reft rences [ 0 (he continual reiteration of this principle. Bm see int" alia CA 1:58, 2:2 1 ("for by che Word the things wh ich were not have come to be. And if through him [the Father] creat("S and makes, He is not himse lf of things created and made; but rather H t is tht Word of the Creator God"), and 2:7 1.

80 As C'o-idence of Anus's ambi,-alence '1I'it h ~gard

64 Ad EpiJ(. Atg-. 14. 65 Ad S"ap. 1:9; Shapland, op. cit ., p. 82. 66 See. for example, CA 2:48. 49. Consistent wicb this emphasis is 67

68

69 70

Athanasius"s insistenct chat all c~cion came to be sim ul taneously (CA 60). For some characteristic eumples of rhis pervasive motif, see CA 2:42, "For wha t feUowship is the~ becv.een creatu~ and Creator? ~; Ad S"ap. 1:9, "For whac community or what likeness is there between creanrre and C~torr; ibid. 1:30, "For '1I'ha t commun ion can the~ be becv.'c:cn that which is originate and that wh ich C~[.-s? " Of the term, lOWS, Ka.nnengiesser sa)'$: "le terme 'ptopre' dC'o'iendra un t!1t'mem technique pri,·jJt!git! de la formulation athanas ienne concernam le Fils" (op, ci t ., p. 259). See also loucb, -ne use of the term n'il{~ in Nenndrian theology from Alexander to Cyril~ , Stl/dia Palriltica 19, 198-202: "i'lilo;-i~weeV expres.ses rhe fundamental COnt rast between God and creature. between what belongs to the divine substance and 'I'!.·hat is Cfeared out of noth ing" (p. 198). See also Pectersen. op. cit.. pp. 145-6 and Widdicombe, TIN Falhn-/md D/ GtJ from Origm ID AthaltaJill$, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 193-204. O n Ariuss undemanding of th~ term, s« Williams, "Th~ lo!ic of Arius",j()llntal Df Tbrolugual Srl/dta 34. 1983. pp, 56-a1. See,forexample,DtDm: 10,11,13,17. The accusation of teaching {V.-O 6:ytvvrrtQ was a weapon on the "Arian" sid~ from the beg inning of the controvel"S}" when It 'I'!.'aS levelled again5t AleXllnde r. See W illiams. op. elt., p. ') 7.

71 See Dt Dm: 28. n DtD«T. 7; DJ 17. 73 See Ot D Il!"T. 1'), 19. 29. among many other examples. 74 CC 46; Dl17. 75 Thus the Son is distlnguished as being not "external" and nO( by pan:iciparion but "proper" (i'OlOC) to t he Father.

er. CA. 2:57, 3: 1.

81

82 83 84

85

86

76 Ad EpiJ(. Atg. 12. 77 See also Dr 5)'1'1. 15, where the meaning of ht;muJlI$i05 is daborated in terms of patticipation. 78 "It is true that Ath anasius spoks also - in a perhaps less forfUnate way - of cbe generarion of the Son as participation; but this 'p:mici" pation' is a special one, narndy a [0<31 communication of rhe essence of the Father". B31is. METOITJA 6EOY. Mart 's Parmi?r;()n ill Goas Ptrj"ldilms ArrorrIsnS to Saim Grrgm"J 0/ N),sJa, Studi Anselmiana LV, Rome: Libreria Herde r, 1966, p. 12. 79 As is pointed out by Bemard., L"lmagt tk Ditli d'apris la;nt AthanaSL, Paris: Aubeir, p _ 120, Athanasius's a.rgument agains t "all interveni ng principle" hearkens back to che classic phi losophical "third man" argument, wh ich argues from [he ruurdic)' of an infinite: regress.

232

87

the: model of participation, we: may nocl' that there are :also passages " 'here he is <Juoted by Athanasius as saying that the members of the T rinity do not participate in each other (e_g. CA 1:6). It seems to me chat we do nor have to conclude that Arius is being misrepresented here as holding mutually contradiGory positions. It seems mo~ likely that ArillS did not subscribe [0 an ~essentia1ist~ notion of participation which enl;;lils a communication of essence - and with respect to mat notion, cbe Trini!:)' did not participate each other. B ut he was willing to accommodate himself to a mo~ artenuated notion in " 'hich to participate meant simpl)' to derive one's being from anothe r, Thus the ambivaie'nce. On Arius's rejection of the Platonic mod!'1 of participation, see Will iams, A~jlll: Hert5)' ,nul Tradi:i01l, pp. 224f. On the other hand, Widd icombe. op. cit, pp. 189-93, r;,ads this am bivalence into Athanasius himself, whom he sees as operating with both a "strong" and a "weak" sc:nsc: of participation. The Sfiond half of this pamge has a decided.l)- lre!l2ean ring to it; d. A m'. Hac: rv, 6, 3 and rv. 6, 7. CA 1:37. H ~re again we encoun ter the Irenaean (Johannine) motif of the vis ion of the Son as a manifestation of che Father. Sec 31so D, Syn. SI. Most norably, G~gg :lod G roh 's account of Arian soteriology, Earl) Arianim: A Vinu of Saft'alitm, Philadel phia: Fortress Prl'$s. 1981, is based on this simplistic miding, wh ich does !lOt rake account of Arian attempts to diffe~ntiate the Son from cbe =>t of creati oo. Thtl5 he (th e)') is qUOted by Athanasius as Hat ing in a leuer to Alexander that the Son "is a c~fuce, but nO( as one of the creatwn; a work, but not as one of the works: an offspring. but not as one of the ornprings" (CA 2:19: DrSYII. 16), WilJ iams commentS, op. cit., p. 104: "The Arius who wrote to Alexander cba.r chI' Son <;I.·as a 'pecfect creature, yet not as one among the creatures ... a begotten bei ng _ . _yet not as ooe among things begonen' is eager to avo id any suggestion that the Son is simply 'like 311 ocherli ' - chough some of his supporterli '1I'e re less c~fuL " We can cen:ainly be co nfident that Athanasius 'I'!.-ould not enggerace Anus's distinCtion of the Word from the rest of creation. since his own polemic is geared [0 reducing the Arian position as signifying the Son to be merel y a creature. In conerast, we sec: Arius httt' depicting the Son's being "one among others" in rerms of the p~+ eminenc!' of che Son. as "the sun is among visible phenomena, ~ i.e. as ha~'ing a causa! relarion, for t he sun is nOt merely ano
233

to

KOTES

88 Athanas ius does not repl'l'Sent this as a diI'l'<:t quote, but as something th~ Arians -will say" w def~nd against the charge of having reduced the Son w the leH:1 of creatul'l'S_ He adds that th is particular argumem is one "which indeed I formerly heard Et="bi us and his fello",'5 use" (ibid.). Given that Athanasius's polemic tries to reduce the Arian position wonI' in which the Son is no different from creatures, it is not likdy that he would ~hdp them out" with any purdy in~'emed acruunts of the Son's prerogatives _ In this context, Athanasius's reportS are to be trusted precisel y as coming from a "hostile wimess.89 Asterius was a sophiS[ (~i.e. he combined the roles which today would be occupied by the theologian, the scientist, the journalist, and the advenising agency,- Hanson, op. CiL. p. 32) who had studied under Lucian of Amioch and wrote a 5y11tagma:ion, sUPiX'ning the doctrine of Arius prior to the Nicene council. Fragments of this ""ork can onl y be found in the refutations of Athanasius and Marcdlus of Antyra. For a thorough presentation of these fragme nts, see Viment. AlterillI !!1;11 Koppadokim. Dit fhfO/ogi.<ehen Fragmmfa. Einleitfmg, Kritilthn; O!Jot?mf~lt1Ig & Krml"..rotar, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. 90 Cr. CA_ 2:24: "Howe,-er, they say concerning Him, that 'God willing to create originate nature, when He saw that it could not endure the untempered hand of the Father, and to be created by him, makes and creates first and alone one onl y, and calls him Son and \\70rd, that, through him as a mediwn (tou 't'OU j.l€O"ou Y£VOj.l€vou). all things might thereupon be brought to be.' This they not only have said, but they have dared to put it into writing, namdy, Et="bius, Arius, and .Asterius who sacrificed." ThO!' reference to ~AsteriU5 who sacrificed" is Athanasius's jibe at Asterius's temporary aposrasy during t he Diocletianic persecution. 91 The same argument is used against the g nostic schema of a series of mediations by Irenaeus: "And thus, their doctrine flowing our into immensity, there wi ll always be a necessity to conceive of othO!'r P leromata, and orher Bythi. so as never at any time to Stop, but always to continue ~killg for others besides those already ment'oned·· (AJ,'. HtW" II. 1, 3; Ante-N icene Fathers 1, 360)_ 92 The same point, in the same context of an argumem against created mediators. is made by lrenaeus: ~Thi s Inallfler of speech may perhaps be plausible to those who know not God, and who liken him to needy hwnan beings, and to those who cannot imm~iatdy and without assistance form anything, but require many ' nstrumentalities to produce wnat thel' intend. But It will nm he regarde.:l as at all probable by those who know that God stands in need of nothing, and that He created and made all things b~' his W ord , while He neither required angels to assist him in the production of those chings which are made, nor of any po"ll.·er greatly inferior to himself. and ignorant of the Father ... For this is a peculiarity of rhe pre-eminence of God, not to stand in need of other instruments for the creation of those things which are swnmoned into existence. His own Word is bot h suiL.1.ble and suftl(ient~ (Ad" HtW" n. 1.4; n, I, 5; Ante-Nicene Fathers 1, 361).

134

KOTES

93 Again, we can iX'inr to a similar argument in Irenaeus, in which the

9-4

95 96

97

98

doctrine of d ivine pro~'idence is considered as mitigating against the notion of God's lack of direct involvement in rhe aCt of creation _ lrenaeus argues that "those, moreover. who say that the world was formed by angels, or by any other maker of it" imply that God "was either careless, or inferior, or paid no regard to those things which took p lace among his own possessio ns, whether they turned out ill or welL But if one would not ascribe such conduCt e\'en to a man of any ability, how much less to God ! ~ (Adv. Haer: 1I, 2, I; Ame-NicO!'ne Fat hers 1. 36n See also In il/:/d tmlnio; De Dm: 30; CA, 3:6, 11, 13. \'o;'illiams, "Baptism and the Arian cont({]versy~ , in M. R. Bames and D. H. Williams (eds) A~i,2niJ1I! A/u~ Ar;"I. Elld)'J (J1I tht De"~dopmen! 0/ the Fo~rrh Cm:ury Trin;;arion CIJr-flit/i, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993, p. 1:>2, rightl)' emphasizes this aspect of Athanas ius's soteriology, which he characterizes in terlDS of "the unity and direct accessibili ty of God's action~; "that salvation is union with the divine life, directly and without intermediafli" (ibid .)_ A d Strap. 1:25; Shapland, op. cit., p. 129. This is the Arian position as stated in De D((r. 9_ De 5)'n. 48: la j.lE\' "lap Y£VTF-O: KCtV O"1}j.lcpU/.a.;w; b :j3€f3).TJ"!al tw\, oupa,,
21:>-29,233-45. 99 On the rOIl' of anti-Manichaean concerns in the formation of founhcentury debates, see the very interesting anicle ofLyman, ~ Arians and Manichees on Christ", jOtJrnailJ/ Throfog;cal 5r:uiitJ 40, 1989, pp.

493-503_ 100 Ad EpiJ.'. Aeg. 16; NPNF 4 , 231; PG 25. 573B. Again, (he same argument is made by lrenaeus. that the notion of a God "above" the Creator-God makes for a disjunction between God and the wo rld, which renders the t rue God "without testimony" in the world. Like Athanasius, lrmaeus pits the true God, "the Creator of the world,~ of whom it can be said that ~creation reveals rum who form~ it, and the very work made suggestS him who made it, and the world manifests him who ordered it,~ and who th us - receives testimony from all." against -that Falher whom they conjure into existence {who} is be,'ond doubt untenable, and has no witnesses." See Ad,.: H~ n,9, 1; ll. 9. 2; rr. 10. 1 (Ante-Kicene Fath ers 1, 369}. 101 cr Pm ArdxJrI 1, 2, 10 ; see F1orovsky. "The concept of creation in Saint Athanasius". St"dia Pa:riJli.'" 6, 1962, 36----52 _ 102 On Methodius as a fig ure in the backg round of the Arian crisis, see Williams, ArifH. pp. 167- 71. See a1w Panerson, ~De fiwlJ arbi:rio

235

NOTES

103

NOTES

and Methodius' attaCk on Origen~, Srudia Parr-il:ila 14, 1976, pp. 160--6; also, ~ ~[et:hodius, Origen, and the Arian disputt~, Sludia Pa:riHita li, part 2, 1982, pp. 912-23, Pacterson concludes that ~ analysis of Method ius's texts -locatts the n.lOdamental contention of the early Arians, that 'before {the Word} was created __ . he was 1lOt , because he ~'as not uncreated' as a reaction to Origen's ueatment of the creation issue ... ~ (p o 920). Also see his MaOOdillJ o/O/J'nplIJ. DiZ"im So:'trlig'lly. Huma-tl Frndom, a/ld Lift in Chri!!, Washington, DC: Catholic Universiry of AIDeria. Press, 1997, pp. 217-18. This style of argumem noprestnts a typical rhetorica! stntegy for . Athanasius. Se-e Christopher Stead, "Rhetorical method Athanasius-, Vigj/i~ ChriJ!itmal 30. 1976, pp. 121-37. See Gregg and Gmh, op. cit., pp. 161--83. We find a \'ery similar argument in Irenaeus: -Inasmuch as God is indeed aI~'3.ys, the ~e and un~gotten as respects himself, all things ate possible to him. But created things must be inferior ro him who created them, fmm the very fact of their later origin; for it was not possible for things re-centl}' created to ha\'e been uncreated· Adl( Hatr. IV, 38,1; Ante-N icene Fathers 1, p . 521 (heremer AJ'\!F). "Thus for Athanasius the concept of God as Creator is wholly gO"erned br the coinherem relation between the Father and the Son,· Torrance. TIN Trm,tMulfl Faith. The Er'al'lgdil.rl TheoIag)' 4 rhe AlUimt C.rrlxHu ChllrTh, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988. p. 77. For a placement of this perspective within the larger Alexandrian uadition, sec the whole of \\'7jddicombe, op. cit. Here, also, we may note a parallel with Irenaeus. for whom the notion oi Creatlon'S being "in· God means dlat the Creator must be God himself. and (}()( anything extrinsiC to divine ~ing: - But it is inconsistent to make this statement, that while he comains all things within himself, me creation ....·u formed by another" Ad:: H.rtr. n, 3, 1; ANF I, p. 362. Cr. Jnonaeus, Adl: Hair. rv, 14. 1: - In the ~ginning, therefore, did God form Adam, not as if he stood in need of man, but that He m ight have [some and upon ~'hom to confer his benefits. For not alone antecedently to Adam, but also before all ueation, [he \Voro glorified his Father, remain ing in him: and was himself glorified by [he Father" (NPl,'F 4, 4 78). See also CA 2; 51. wh ere essence (rilv oix1ia...,) is distinguished from economy (riIv oileo ....0J.11.cX\·): the latter is -&£-bttpOv £O'n tOU

'"

104 1O~

106

107

108

109

something of its force if ana that undemanding ~ abandoned. But finally even within the terms of an undersmnding of sah'llcion u deification, me argument nomalns open to question. The deification ....·hieh is man's goal is not co become" BEG:; but Bwl xa.'ta XapH'. The Son, on the Arian understanding of his person, is the protOtype of BEOl lCa,a XcXpl v. It is not dear. the refore. wh)' he should not be able to b ring men to be what he is~ (" rn defence of Arius- .jollrr.a! a/ ThMlagira! Sludi(s 13, 1962, p . 346). Our object here is nor so much to claim that AthallllSius's position is "self-e\'idently true~ nor to "establish~ it by logical argument. but simply to clar;£}· whr Athanasius himself considered it (0 ~ true. 11 2 0/13. 113 Ad Ar:klph. 8; NPl..1F 4. 577. Cf_ rrenaeus , Ad:: Ha6. IV. H. 4: "How can they ~ sol\·ed unless it was GOO ....'00 wrought their wvarion upon earth? Or how sbll man pass into God, unless God has {first] passed into man ?~ (ANF Lp. 507), 114 CG 3~--40. 115 AdStrap. 1:11. 116 The s.ame must certainl~' be said of Inonaeus, who aho emphasizes {hat this communion which constitutes our salvation ffiwt be initiated from the di\'ine side: "For by no othe r means could we ha"e attained to incorrupti bili ty and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immonality. But ho ..... could we be joined to incorruptibility and immo rtali ty unless. first , incorruptibility and immortality had become {hat ~'h.ich we also are. so that the corruptible might be S'h-aIlowed up br incorruptibility, and the monaI by immort.a.li ry, tlw: ~'e might receive the adoption of sons?" Ad,! H.rtr. Ill. 19. 1; ANF I, pp. 448-9. In COntrast. Gregg and Groh describe the Arian 5O(eriology as ~transactional~, op. dc.. p_ 1-4-4. 11 7 DtSYll. 51; NPNF 4, 477; PG 26. 7848 . Thus, in answer to Wiles, "In defence of Arius ~, jaUT7'41 of Thto/()gkal StudilS 13. 1962, p_ 346 nt is nOt dear. therefore, ~'h~' {(he Arian Christ} should not be able to bring men to be :l:h.rf he is: my emphasis). Athanasius says that, with respect to divinity, that is precisely not something that the Arian Christ is, but onl}' samedung he hrJS, ....,hich is not radically his own, and therefore is not ultimately his to gh·e.

118 Cl. 1 Cor. 11:23. 119 er CC 35--40,

III This whole section ma}' be taken as a response to \'(Tilo;s objections to Athanasius's argument that only God an gran t sah'3.tion. Wiles a55eru: "In the first place the argument depends upon me general principle that one can ani)' communiate to others that which is in the fulldt Sl:nse one's own; it is not dear that this principle is selfevidently true and it is difficult to see how it could be established. In the second place it is to be noted that the argument is developed in terms of an understanding of saJ"ation as deification and that it lQ5eS

120 DtSy,,- 51. 121 AdStr-ap. 1:24; Shapland., op. cir., pp. 125-6; PG 26. 58SB--C 122 Pan Bernard. op. cit., p_ 28: -La tidemption ne $en envisag~ que comme teStauration du lea'( ElI,6va primitif." 123 I" PNF 4. 38~. D. 4. 124 CA I1I:31, 32. 125 CA II:H-9, 61. 126 CA U:58-9. 127 CA n:~8,61. 128 For same examples, sec CA 2;58, 60. 6 1, 62, 63. 129 E.g.CG4 1,0/11.

236

'37

[lvat." 110 See also CA 2:31.

er.

NOTES

~O T.ES

130 The ntoed for being conscious of our ~natur:l.r unIik=~ to God and our ~gnced~ likeness. and the notion that obscuring this difference is an act of demonic pride, ...re conceptions that also find a parallel in Irenaeus, who W;lffiS that ~man should never adopt an opposite opinion with regard to God, supposing that the inoorrupribilicy which belongs to him is his ow n narun.ll~·, and by thus nm holding rhe truth , should boast with empty superciliousness, as if he were naturally li ke God. For {Satan] t hus rende red {man) more ung rateful towards his Creator, obscured the love which God had towatds man , and blmded his mind nm to percei ve what is wonhy of God, comparing himself with, and judging himself ~u.al to God" (Adfl Hal?'. lll, 20, 1: ANF 1, p. 4:i0). 131 See also C..... 2:50, 59. 74; 3:10, 17, 19-21. 132 Dt DttT.. 24; NPNF 4, 166. 133 CA 3:29. Such a double account plays an exactly panilld mle in Augustine's Dt Tnt/ira:e. 134 Thus, GrillmeiC't. ChriJ: in Christisn TraditIon: "There can be- no doubt that the Logos is not merely the persona.! subject of Christ's bodily life, but also the real. physical source of all rhe anions of his life" (p, 312); ~If the Logos is really to be- considered as me sole mot i. ' "lIdng prin ciple in C hrist, then t he decisive spiritual and moral acts must be assigned to him abo"e all, and in a way "II.·hich appears to imply more than an appropriation after the manner of the rommllni~ cttliD idiImUlIU"'", ibid .. p. 313; see also Hanson, pp. 447--8; Young, From NtcttUl 'D Chttlrtdon. A Gllidr:o Iht UUrttlUrr tlni ifS B!KkgTWIIfli, Philadelphia: FQnress Press. 1983. p . 78. 135 Indeed. ODe of the indications that this interpret i"'e model is inor herem is that Grillmeier will insist nevertheless that Aman nius uses the ~organon ~ concept to describe the Mconjunction of rhe divine Word with the flesh" (p. 317) -a conjunct ion, we are gi\"= (0 under~ stand, which in no 1;I'ay penetrates into the realm of Christ's subjectiviry. More coherem, and also demonstr.ilil)· wrong and in va riance with the acrual terrs, is Hanson's assertion that, in Athanasius's account, the Word's "relation to this body is no doser than that of an astronaut to his space~suit~. (op. cit., p. 448). 136 P/Ul Richard, "II.'ho takes Athamuius's a1lo""lInce of such predications in a reductivel)' nominalist sense, Sec his "Saint Athanase et la psychologie du Christ r.elon les ariens". "''',mgt dt Scirou RdigilMJt 4. 1947. pp, 7-49. 137 Grillmeier. op. cit.. pp. 313-14. 138 Such usage has to be undentood in (he comen of the anciel!( notion that predication is toOted in realiry; lO\a (characteristics) rep~nt the e$$e'ntial defining charaneriSti($ of a be-ing. In discussing the usage of tOlD;; in reference to the relation of Father- Son in the Arian debates. Williams, -rhe Logic of Arius". p. 60 points out that, in contemporary philosophical discourse, it .;I.'ouId have meal!(, "the '~enrj al condition' . . . of a particular oonCrete reality." 139 Hanson,op. cit. , p. 448. 140 CA 3:33; Ad Epil"t. 6.

141 Thus. Grillmeier. op. cit.. p. 314: "If all Q\'9pci>1twa are to be kept a,,'ay from the Logos. a creared subject of the suffering must be round ... It was Arh.anasius's usk to sho.;l.· that these 'human charac· teristics' of the red~mer did nO( prejudice hili transcendence and immutability. He therefore had to tind th;; subject of all sufferi ng in the manhood. ofChriS[." Cf. Young. op. cit.. pp. 74-5; H anson. op. cit., p, 448, 142 Ad Epil"t. 6; PG 26. I06OC. 143 Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 314; H anson, op. dt., p. 448. 144 Cr. CA 2:55: "Fot as by receiving our mfirmi t ies. he is said to be infirm himself, t hough not himself infirm (ii:y£tUl a mi>; acrEl£\'£lv. Ka l t Ol Jlra c':ta9£v8v o:irr~). for he is t he power of God and he became sin fo, us and j. curse ... " Np,\,TF 4. 378; Bright, p . 125. 14:i CA 3:24: cf. Dt Oar. 14. 146 CA 3::;4; Bright, p. 189. 147 CA 3:35; NP!\"F 4, 413; such a statement makes c1~t how m uch Athanasius's Chrisrological reasoni ng meieipated Crril's. St:e also Dt Srn!. DiM}. 9. 148 Ibid.; cf. CA 3:48: ~ For whatever He does. that he does wholly for our S.1kes, since also for us 'the Word became flesh'." 149 Ad Epm, 9; NPNF 4,573. DO Ad Addph. 5; N PNF 4. S/6. 151 Cn 3:32. D2 It is most like ly that the Alexandrian rejection of Leo's T!Pr~, and Chalcedonim Chrinolog}" generallr, was based on the percep£ion that it pro~'ided just such an -egalitarian," non·teltologia.l. and thus non· uansformatl\'e model. 153 Ad Addph, 8; PG 26, iOS4A-B. 154 Hmson, op. ci t ., p. 448. IS:i Thus Hanson, op. ci t. , p. 451: "We mUSt conclude that ,,·hatever else the UgDS incarnate is in A[hanasius' account of him, he is not a M human being. Cr. Young, op, cit., pp. 74-5, 156 Grillmeier. op. cit.. pp. 314-15; Hanson. op. m .• pp. 448-9. O n the other hand, ~ ehe nuanced neatm;;nt in Peuersen, .A.!hanasifis, Harrisburg. PA: Moreho use, 1995, pp. 113-129. l:i7 Thus Penersen. op. cit., p. 126: "Hence a potentially static "iew gives way to a dynamic view. Ignorance. fesr, suffering and death are admitted, but only to be alleViated. In his dispelling ignorance, light. ening suffering and conquering death, there i5 the divinizing of e....eryone in Ch rist. What superfidally may appear to be- inchoate docetism is in fact pen-"lISi"'e 'IOteriology.158 CG 46ft. 159 'nlV 'mu S£OOlKo-ro; xitpn.·~ (CG 2). 160 See Gregg and Groh, op. ci t. , especially pp. 102-14. Th;;y poim Out that the Arians used for scr'ptural proof·texts pasuges ~whose ,,;;rbs and meanings "II.'ere in the Oi.&ro~H and r.:o:paot&llJlt family~ (p. 6). 161 Again, "II.'e find amicipate-d in Irenaeus this understand in g of the \X!ord's incarnation a.\ effecting our J((r'~( reception of grace. through

238

239

~OTES

Christ's rect'pt:ion of and ~anointing~ by d~ Spirit: "The Word of God ... b«ame the Son of Man, dut He might accustom man to receive God ... ~ (.J\,w. H,"" III, 20. 2; 1t..I>..'F 1, p. 450); ~ And. again, unless it had bttn God ""ho had freely gi~'ef1 S2lvation, we could n"er ha\'e possessed it se=rely . , . For in what way could we be partakers of the adopt ion of son, unl o:ss we had recei~'ed from him through the Son that feJJoVo'Ship which refers to himSol'lf, unless his \X/ord, ha"ing been made flesh, had entered into communion with us?" (ibid., 1II, 18,7: ANF 1, p. 448): "Therefore did [he Spirit of God descend upon him, hhe Spirit} of him Vo'ho had promised by the prophets thu He would anoint him, so that we, receiving from the abundance of his unction, might be saved M(ibid. , Ill, 9, 3; ANF 1, p.

NOTES

15 16 17 18 19

1lI:4:NPNF4,514. V:3. Ibid. V:5. VU:3; NPNF 4,524.

20 VU . 21 V:5; VII:3. 22 V U:\. 23 VIA. 24 VD: referring toMe. 25:14-30. 25 Ufo of IInt~IIJ" In troduction. [tans. Gregg, lilh(lfUlsius. The Uft of Anlo1/) (lnd tbt Lmn-:o J\f8ruiiinus, N~' York: PauliS! Press. 1980, p.

29

423), 162 We ha"e aJ~y referred (0 Irenaeus's similax conception of Christ Msecuring" OUI recepti\'ily through the incarnation. We may also nOte that , for Irenaew too. the hlUI\3Il \'Ocation Call be summed up in terms of Mremaining Min communion with the divine: MFor, as much u God is in want of nothing, so much does humanity stand in need of fello\\'Ship with God_For this is the glory of humanity, to continue and remain permanently in God's sef"ice" (Adv. H,ur. rv, 14, 1; .<\NF l,p.478). 163 Cr. Roldanus, MD ie Vi;a Amonii als Spiegd def Theologie des Athanasius", TlHoiogie UM PhiltJJopbit 58, 1983. p. 207.

4 THE RElATION BETWEEN GOD AND CREATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GRACE I MOOOV KaUx t01x; iSlO'l:H; airril; A.OrO'l:H;,M CG 41: Thomson, p. 114.

2 CG4L 3 01 3; Thomson, p. 140; also, 01 5: M):Cipln at tTt-; toU ACryO"O )J£t01JO"ia~ tOU Ka'ta <poow h:qlU''(ovu:,;. El. ll£llEvilK£loav Ka)'ol ~; Thomson, p. 144.

4 Ibid. 50/11. 6 01 5. On the divine o,'ercomins of the Creatot-9opCi: 015; Thomson. p. 144. 9 Athanas ius pointedly makes the parallel between the natural Son and adopted Msons,M and OUI rendering of this parallelism is meant to reflect his terminology_ Ho\\'ever, he certainly intended the category ofvsonsM (0 include females. 10 FlSf(li wu.- XI: 13; l" PNF 4. 537. II Ibid. 12 XI:14: NPNF 4, 537-8. 13 1II:3; VII:9.

14 VI:3.

240

26 Barnn. MAngel of light or mystic initiate? The problem of £h~ Uft of .J,n/(J1/)", j (J1lnl-a1 if TJ-iogitai Stwdin 37, 1986. pp. 353-68_ Fot convincing refutJ.(ions of Bames, see Louth, "S!. Adtanasius and dle Greek Ufo 0/ lifJtrmy~, jOlff1l4i of rWogwzl 5rMditJ 39, 1988, pp. 504-9, as Vo'~U as Brakke, "The Greek and Syria<; versions of the Ufo of An/o'l)". U /\fu!t()fI 107, 1994, pp. 29-53 and his "'The authenticity of the ascet ic Athanasiana OrimMfi(l 63. 1994. pp. 17-56_ 27 For parallels bet,\'een the Lift of .J,'Iton) and [he Contra Gmw-Ol fncarnarioflt , s.ee Banelink, Vi, If'Anroi'l(. /irhana!l d' nkxa'ldrit, Introd uction, texte critique, traduction. notes et index (Sources Chretiennes 400), Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1994, pp. 36-7. On (he consistency between the Lift of .<\nTUtI) and Athanasius's thEOlogy, se-e Tetl, "Athanasius und die Vita An:Utlii. Literarische und theologische Relationen·. Ztit¥hrlft for NruUJta1l~fa'i!(bt 1llisur:Jchaft 73. 1982. pp. 1-30; also, Roldanus, MDie Vita Antonii als Spiegel dfr Theologie des At hanasius und ihr Weiterwirken bis ins 5. Jahrhunden·, Thu:!fogit um! PhiltJJophi, 58, 1983, pp. 194--216. In comparing the Ufo ~f AnrOll)" with the letters of Antony himself. SMnuel RuOenson. TiM UUm of Sr. Amony. Origmift TMJolJ~ M~r.4JIit: TradiriM and tht Ma~ing of a Sain; (Bib liotheca His torico-Ecdesiastica Lundensis 24). Lund: Lund Unh'ersity Press, 1990, p. 140, nores the transrormation of the theology of Antony's letters into a t ypically Athanasian vein: "the mOSt ob"l-ious sign of this difference in perspective is the emphasis in the vlfa on Christ a nd his victorious cross as the acti"e force of the Christian _ This emphasis is firmly rooted in Athanasius's theology and part of the Nicene tradition that developed during the Arian oontro~·ersy." 28 Barrdink, op. Ot., p. 27. 29 Gregg and Groh, Earl, Ari4nis1!'I. A \'inu of Salr-a:iOlJ, Philadelphioa:: Fortress Press. 1981. 30 Jbid .. p. 144. 31 Ibid. 32 Jbid. 33 Ibid .. p.151. 34 Ibid .. p. 147. 35 Ibid .. p. 150. H

,

241

NOTES

KOTES

36 Ibid., p _ 147. 37 Ibid., p. 14838 Ibid., p. 139_ 39 Ibid_, p. 142. 40 Ibid. 41 Gwatkin, Studi<J of AriarJiHn. Chitj1)' Ref~rJg rI) the Chara.."" and ChrorJ9iogy of fix Rea.7iorJ -rd;i:h FofllJlud the Co:mri! of Ni(a&l, Cambridge: Deighton Bdl & Co _, London: Grorge Bell & Sons, 1900, p_ 25_ 42 Gregg and Gwh, op _cir, p, 147, 43 This is not ro say that Athanasius was not working with ~AIJ[ony tradi [ ions~ of some SOrt; he certainly did nor altogether inlient the Life of Antony_But while it is beyond the scope of our presem inquiry to pursue a redactional criricism of tht" tt"xt (for this ~ Ten, op, eit. , who suggestS an original text by Serapion ofThum is), we only v,'ish to assert rhat, as a who le, rhe text presents a disrincdy Athanasian rheology. 44 In a critique of Gregg and Gtoh's position. Stead, "Arius in mCKlem research", Journal of Thmiogic4! Studia 45:1, April 1994, p. 36, concludes that Arius's "main (OnCI'm was to uphold the un ique dignity of God the Father in the face of attempts to glorify the Logos, as he thought, undul)'_ This interest is abundantly anested in the surviving fragmems. It is allowable, ,f rather strained, to say that his main interest was Chrisrology. But the idea rhat he was mainly concerned to ptopound an exemplarisr theory of salvation finds litde or no support in his surviving fragments.45 Indeed, even if we- were to accept Gregg and Groh's thesis that the luians emphasized the equality between redeemed human beings and Christ, rhat in itself wou ld indicate that humans participate in God, insofar as the Arians insisted that Christ was himself God by participation_ Thus Athanasius reportS that "they say, that Christ is not trull' God, but that He is cailn:! God on account of his participation in God's nature, as are all other creatures," Ad Epis:. Atg. 12; NPNF

4,229. 46 Gregg and Groh, op. cit., p. 147 _ 47 er CA 2:59: "But this is God's kindness to humanity, that he become Father according ro grace of those of whom he was Maker. H ebecomes so when humanity, his creatures, receive into their hearts, as the Aposde says, 'rhe Spirit of His Son, crying, Abba, Father_' l\nd these are the ones who, having received the Word, gair.ed pou'er frWl him fa i;.eCrmlt r~m, f(Jr they rould ml bmmll rom. bring by nallfft creaturcJ, in any alh" :iMy than by rn-ei~-j7ig tk Spirit oj I~ nalural and IrUt Son" (my emphasis), \'\le see here that the inequality between the natural Son and adopted ~sons" i'i conceived within the framewotk of rhe act whereby the na tural Son empowers creatures to become "sons.- TlUs inequality ;s thus intrinsic to the structure of unity between GCKl and humanity_ h is misrepresented when conceived apart from lhat strucrure. It is pr<:'Ciscly Arhanasius's point th"t a mere creature, who is equal to us, could not bring us inw unity with God and thus could

242

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61

62 63 64

65 66

67 68 69 70

nor <1ualify the ine<:Juality between God and humanity in the way lhal the Son does, insofar as his natural Sonship resules in our adoption into sonship, which is our deification (cf. CA 2:69,70). Gregg and Groh, op_eiL , p_ 14-4. Ibid" p, 147, cr Augustine, The5pirir and the Letter 59. E,g., Dt Dar. 22. Ibid. 20. Ibid _22FNai LHfi'r III:3; NP!\'F4, 513_ Ibid. IV:4; NPNF 4,5 18Vl:1; see also V:3. nu; VI:4; VU:9. PiUi' O ebsch, who seems to derilie this interpretation from Gregg's account of the- Lift of An:?ny. In his preface to Gregg's translation, Clebsch offers a crass misreading of Athanasius: "There ma}' be mCKlem readers of these works br Arhanasius ~\.. ho "''an! more, who yearn to acquire the Christian salvation or apothr05is or Ih,opoe!iJ rhat was theirs_ Such readers, if any, would do well to heed the main line of Athanasius's theology, [0 the eff<:'Ct that one can do absolutely nothing to a~'aj] such salvat ion. but only wait to see, if it might perchance befall,~ Gregg, A:hanasiu!. The Life of Amon)' 4rJd;he utter:(I MarrdHlIitS, N ew York Paulist Press, 1980, p. xxi (hereafter cited as ~Gregg "). XIX:7; NPNF 4,5-47_ X:4; N P1'.,' F 4 , 529; also. XIII:2: NPNF 4, 539: "He distributes to each a due reward according to His actions, so that every man may exclaim, 'Righteous is the judgement of GCKl ·. ~ CG 40: Thomson. p. 110. CG 44: Thomson, p, 122. DJ 1; Thomson, p. 134. Dl14: Thomson, p. 168. Ibid _ Dl 15; Thomson, p. 170. Ibid _ DJ 17; Thomson, p. 172. "That death has been dissolved and that the cross "''as a victory over it and that it is no longer powerful bur truly dead, is demonstrated in [10 uncenain manner and is dl'afly credibl(' (yvciJPlC!IlU O;))C oi.i.yov Ked r.:tatt<; [WXp'rl'jc) by the fact that it is desp ised br all Christ's disciples and e~'eryon~ treads it underfoot and no longer fears it, but with the sign of the cross and in the C hristian faith they trample on it as a dead thing: Dl 27; Thomson, pp. 198--9_

71 DJ 29. 72 DJ 30----1; Thomson, pp_ 208--1 L 73 \lA 7: "This was Antony's first contest against lhe devil - or, rarher, th is was in Antony the success of the Savior (]lO:U.ov lit r~ 1(U1. ro-u·to .,hov£v i,' 'Anrovi.qJ to KarOp8rotla), who 'condemned sin in the flesh. in order that the just requirement of the

243

• NOTES Law might be fulfilled in us, ~iho v.-alk not according to [h~ tlesh but to th~ Spirit' M(Gregg, op. cit., p. 3~: Bane1ink. op. cit., p . 1')0). 74 Cf. DI 48-54. 75 VA 24; Gregg, pp. 49-50. 76 VA 28; Gregg, p. 52. 77 V.-\ 42; Gregg, pp. 62-3. 78 VA 5; Gregg, p. 34. 79 Ibid. 80 On the- iocamadon as the occasion for the defeat of demonic powe rs, see VA 28, 33, 41, 42, ilmralia. 81 VA 40; Gregg. p. 61. 82 VA ')8; Gregg, p. 74. For other instances of Antony's self-dllcl.aimers, see VA 38,49.56,60. 83 For a significam example. see VA 48. di~ pp. 186-7. 84 VA 62; Gregg, p. 77. 85 DJ 1~. 86 VA 7; Gregg, p. 3~. 87 VA 7; G regg . p. 3~; Bartdink, op. cit .. p. 150. 88 Ibid. 89 VA 7; G regg. p. 36; Barte1ink. op. cit .. p. 154. 90 VA 9; G regg. p. 3S. 91 Ibid. 92 VA 10; Gregg. p. 39; Bartelink. op. cit .. pp. 162-4 .

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104

105 loG 107 108

109 110 III

112

113 114 115

VAll. VA 12. VA 19; Gregg, p. 45. VA 38; G regg, p. 60. VII. ~6; Gregg. p. 73. VA 58; Gregg, p. 74. VII. 24,28,33,42. VII. 39; Gregg, p. 6 1. VA 4S: Gregg , p. 67 VA 84; Gregg, 92: Bamlink. op. ei t ., p. 352. VA 34. CG 2; Thom$()n, p. 6. CG 33; Thom$()n, p. 92. CG 34; Thomson, p. 92. VA 2. VA 3. VA 5; Gregg, p. 34; Bandink , op. eit .• p. 144. VA 34 ; Gregg, p. 57. FIX a similar understanding of the soul as narur.Llly oriemed tOIlr'llCd God. and of the ruming allr'ay from God as ~eomr.Lry to Illlrure,~ see lrenacus, Adl'. Ha". V. I, I; Gregory ~8.2!ianzus, Throiogi:af Oration H. CG 30; Thomson, p. 82. VA 20; Gregg, pp. 46-7: Bartelink, op. cic., pp. 188-92. See a bove chapter 2. Thus the "I"'ay [0 koov..tedg!: of God through th~ soul "in itselC is treated separately by Achanasius from che way through the " isibl~

244

KOTES c reati on - the fim in CC 31--4, the second in CC 3~f. For the desires of the body as ~exremar to the dynamism of the soul, see for example, CG 2: ~&tt: cru\'OlllA£t toi'~ ali>[JCtGlV 0 \'OU!; 0

t W\'

yap ou a\-6pro1t(:)v, oMi: n n;.;

i:x tOUWY tm.6UJl.1.a; IlE:JllYIl£VOY OAO<; Early avtll taU"ti!l au\'tOv ~ ri:r OVE:\'

EXEt, a:4.i: ?pxft;. tOtE: oft. ta aiaSrrto Kat itQ\'ta .0 Qv9p&v £~ ~haj30.:;,

«"to

seems that after his flirtation w ith nmplatonism in rhe COflmt Ctrltu Athanasius rejea:~ it outright: the Vifa A1IIqnll has OOt a v,ord on contemplat ion, though one mig ht ha"!: expected it~ (p. 23 1). While che actual word may not be, found in the Villi Anumi;, Athanasius's focus on the res mrntion of Antony's \IOu:; amounts to the same thi ng. 120 Cf. CA 2:68.

121 VA 94 . 122 By (he "aligning of human and divioe subj~tiviry," is meant the situation in which the !.J.me thiog is pIl'dic3ted of a human subje<:t and the divine subje<:c: in th is case, a human being and the incarnate Word. 123 Ep. :\IarrrI!. 9. 124 PG 27; 2OC. 12) PG 27: 200. 126 Ep .•~Iar(t!l. 10; G regg, p. lOS. 127 Cf. CA 2:68. 128 Of cou.rse, it VI·ould not be helpful ro dogmatize AtharuslUS's statements here. m the effect that only the Psalms pro\'ide the "oow- of appropriation while all other books provide Mob jecth'e" kno"riedge. He is meIl'ly emphasizing, in a pastoral and devotional VI'ay, the particuJu significance of th~ Psalms. 129 Ep. M4f'("t/J. 10; GIl'gg, p. 109: PG 27: 2IB. 130 This distiDCtion berw~o che Psailll'i and other Kriprures is emphasized by Arhanasius again io tenns of the Psalms pro~'iding not only the "VI-hat" but th~ -hollr· -: "N ollr' mere cerr::a.inlr are in the other books prC"\'enuve words that forbid wickedness, but in this book is also prescribed how ooe must abstai n. Of such a son: is [he commandment co repent - for to t~pent is to cease from sin. Here in is prescribed also how to repent and whn one mUSt say in the circwnstances of repentanc~. FucthermoIl', the Apostle said, 'Suffering produces end urance: in the soul, 'and endurance produces charaCte r, and char.Lct~t produces hope, and hope does noc disappoi nt us.' In the Psalms it is written and inscri~d how onc: mw t bc:>ar sufferings. VI·hae one muse say to one suffering affiicti ons, what to sa}' after affi ictions, hoVl' each person is tested, and what ,he words of those who hope in God are . .. - ib id. 10; Gregg, pp. 108-9.

24~

• XOTES

NOTES

131 \\'1" mOl" real! he~ that , in che (Dlffrtl ATian!ll. the framework of im crnality-extemalicy is intertwined with that of idemity-othemess: [ 0 ~ ~inremal and not ~temal~ is [0 be ~prope[ to and not other

12 Williams, Ari.w. HtNJy and TradiTi!If1, London: DartOn, Longman and Todd, 1987. p. 238, speaks of "a cerrain irresistible parallel bet"'een ArN.nasil.l$ and Barth." 13 This approach is pen:as;,'e in Banh. As an example, 'I'o,' hic h should make dtlr why we consider Roldanus's style of investigation thoro oughly "Banhian: we can take Barrh's ~position of the "Word of God and Man" (op. ciI., I, 1, -6). His point of departure is to ask: "Is the re a general truth abom man wh ich can be made generally perceptible and ,,·hicb includes within it man's ability to know the Word of GodT (n. G .W. Bromiley, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clack, 1975, p. 191). He again reformulat~ [he question: "The question is 'I'o,'hether th is " ..... nt ranks with th e other ey~nts [hat mighl enter man's reality in such a wa}' that (0 be able to enter it acrually rt."<:juires on humanit}'"s part a potenti:tlity ... ruch is brought by hJn1lllnit)" IlJ Jltrh, " 'hich consists in a disposit ion 1IPlil'e to him:lJ mt:n, in an organ. in a posith..... or even a negarivcc properry. __ )" (p. 193). His aJU" 'er is: ~God's Word is no longer grace, and gr:Ke itself no longer grace, if we :ucribe to man a predisposition towards this Word, a possibility of knowledge regarding it that is in:rinsira/l) and indipmdmrl) '1aril't TO him Cp. 194, my emphasis). 14 *We can and m ust say that to be a man does nOt mean to be "'ith God" (I, 2, !i16; op. cit .. p. 258). 15 Indeed, the kind of Mcompetit ion~ in Barth betWeen 'I'o,'har "intrinsically" belongs to the human and ...... hat belongs to and is gh..... n by God , may have its root precisd}· in the fact that his opposition to the dOCtrine of all:s/ogia mth deprives rum of (he opportuni ty to art iculate an ontology in which created being is ~n as derived (not only "chronologically~ bur strunura.J.ly) from God (as in Atharu.sius·s model of p.1rticipa[ion). Thus he is led to characterize human being not in terOlS of deri"ed, or participared, being but in terms of selfdet;:rminacion: "Tn summarise, hwnan exiuence means human stlf-de[ermination~ (I, I, ;:6; op. cl!., p. 204). 16 IV. 17, --58: MDaB er {i.e., humanity} Gones Uneil unrer.....o rfen ist und in dessen Erkenmnis glauben ... daB sch.lieBt ja wah rhaftig ;'1 krifU1!f Sill" rin ZUJ:smmmuirkm dt.J Mt1IJchm 111fT GOft 111 skh, sondern im Glauben und in .let Liebe ancwonet der Mensch. enupricht er dem, "as a{!ti" Gum Wtrk fur ihn und an ihm, Gones zu ihm und liber ihn g~prochenes Won i~t.· Dit KirrhlitM fhg_:ik. Zurich: Theologischer Vedag, 1953, p. 123, m}' emphasis. 17 Ad Addph. 8.

[han .~

132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

PG 27; 21B. PG 27; l ie. Ibid. Ib id. 24.A·B. 248; Ep. Maml/. It; Gregg. p. 110 {slightly altered}. Ep.lIwmli. 13: Gregg, pp. 111-12; PG 27: 240-25B. Ep. ,uarrdl.12. VA S.

141 ef. CG 35-44.

142 143 144 145 146 147

fp. "'amll. 10, U. VA 14. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 67. fp. !-Iam!!. 27-8; Gregg. p. 124; PG 27; 408. Athanasius'$ presemation of Antony as the fully ordered human being achie\'tS classic expression in VA 14.

CONCLUSION 1 ef. Augustine. ThlSpirif and rhd.lutr' 29.30,32,36,42. 2 Ibid., 48. 3 Adl, Hatr. IV. 6, 4; er. IV, 20. 5: "For human beings do Ill)[ 'it'e God by thei r own powers; but ,.:hen it pleases him, he is ~n by them: by whom he wills, and "" hen he ",·ill.s. and as hf" wills. Ibid., rv, 33, 4 . A.d=~ H-. rv, 20, 7. On the ocher iwld. ,.,.1." find Achanasil.l$·S emphasis on rhe com'ergence of ttmSCendence and immanence present in chI." [heulogy of Karl R2hnef. Thus in articulating the meaning of (he incarnation, Rahner, MO n the theology of (he inCllrnation", Thto'~gic.:z' Im'flfigario'll IV, cr. Ke>'in Smith, B1itimore and London: Hellicon Press and Danon, Longman and Todd, 1966, p. 117, sa)"s: MHence, we can "erify here, in the most radica.l and specifiClllly unique ,,'ay [he axiom of all rela" tionsh ip between God and creature. ramely chat the closeness and the distance. the submissiveness and the independence of chI." creature do not grow in in"erse but in like proportion.' Sc.hleiermacher. TIx CbriSflll'l Faith, eO. M.ackintosh and Stewart, Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1989, !I" 4, #5, pp. 12-26. Ibid., #93; pp. 382-3. Ibid. it 1 72. M

4 5 6

i 8 9

M

10 CC 3.

11 Church D~gmatm, cr. G. W. Bromiley, Edinburgh: T. & T. C1ark, 1964, n. I , .lf26, esp. pp, 75-6 .

246

247

BIBLIOGRAPHY Shapland. C. R. B. Tht uu= of Saint ll.:hanasius amctrning tht Holy Spirit, London: Epworth PI"l'SS, 1951. Thomson, R. W. ArhanaJi;n. Contra Gwus and Dt lR(aTT.atil1M (Oxford Earl)' Christian Texts). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 Other primary sources

1 Primary sources: Afha1Jasialla - translations and texts

Aristotle. Mttaplr)"Jm, rtanS. Richard Hope, Ann Arbor. MI: Uni \'ersic}, of Michigan Press, 1960. Alhenagol'1lS, Earl, Christian Fa:htn , (tans. C. C. Ridurdson. New Yo rk: Collier Books, 1970. Augustine, TJx 5piri: aM:hi wur, in A;lg>IJ/i,": Lmr Works (!be Library of Christian Clas~jcs) , Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Barth, K. Ch/n"Ch Dogma/ia, I, I s6, rrans. G. W. Bromile}", Edinburgh: T. & T. Clack, 1975. ----
Banelink, G. J. M. \/it ti'l1l11f)int. A,hafI4Jt d'A.ll:wndrie, Introduction, tene critique, traduction, note-s et index (Sourco; Chrttiennes 400), Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1994. Bright, W. The Orllrirms of St. IItha7lPsiltJ Ag.:imr rk Arian.<. Accvrding le tIN Brotdirtiw Text. With tin /1((f).!tnr 0/ hi! Lifo. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884. Umdot. P. T. Atha'l41t tl'Altx41ndrit. Con:rt In P.:1ims, Texte grt'(:, introduccion et notes (Sources Chre(ienn~ 18), Paris; Editions du Cerf, 1977. Gcegg, R. C. ArlM714siUJ. Tht Ufo of Anion) and :& utur ;0 ."'LJrrtIli1l1lJ, New York: Pauiisc Press, 1980. Kannengiesser. C. IlIha*'lJl d'Aft::JC4"drit. S/U' /'j1U4I"'11.:ltion d:l V~. Introduction. {exce critique, traduction, notes et irnlel' {Sources Chrftienncs 199), Paris: Editions du Cen, 1973. Meijeting, E. P. Alball4SiJlS: Cqn;ra GmUJ. Introduction. translation and cornrnentllt}· (Philosophia Pat rum. lmerprctations of Patristic Tao:, ~·ol. 7), Leiden: E. ]. Brill , 1984. Meijering, E. P. and ~-an Winden, J. C. M. A;/us1UlSiJ<1. D~ i,..r<7m4;iO"M Imf, Einleitung. Obe~tzung, Kommentar, Amsterdam: Gieben. 1989. Monmucon, B. S. P. N. Ath<71UlJii ,",hi~fftupi Ak=n:iri:r.i tJ/l"a omnia q~ cat"nr O. P. Migne, P"hTJII1Zia GraK" 2~), P;uis, 1857. Opitz, H. G. Arh">Iilsilt.! Wtrkt, Herausgegeben im Aufuage der Kirchell~-ater-Kommission def Preussichen A.kad.emie der \'Ilisso:ru;chaften, vol. 3: Urkunden zur GeKhic hte des arianischen Strcites 318--25, Berlin, 1934-5. Robcnson, A. 5:. Athanasius. St/m Works a"d u;f= (A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, second series, eel. H. Wate and P. Schaff. vo!. 4), Ed inburgh: T. & T. CIark, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1987.

translated into English, together with an introduction and notes by G . W. Butten\-"Orth, Gloucester, ,'oL....: Peter Smit h, 1973, -~Or;gbu. Traitidu prinri~. ed. and tram. H. Crouzel and M . Simonetti (SoUKeS Chn'tiennes 252- 3, 263-9, 312), Paris: Edit i()n$ du 1978 s4. Plato, TIx CoI/mtd Dialogsm , M. E. Ham ilton and H . Cairns (Bollingen Series LXXJ). Princcton: Prioceton University Press, 1987. P[ori nus, Emf(41U, trans. S. MacKenna, London: Penguin. 1991. Schleiennacher, F. Tht ChriJ:ian Fai:h, d. H . R. i\lackimosh and J. S. Stewan, Ed inburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989.

248

249

1962-82. Origen, 011 Firs: Prinripln. Beillg Koetschau's Text of the Of Principiis,

Cen.

3 Secondary sources AnatoHos, K. ~ "The body as insrnunem': a tee'<-aluation of Athanas ius's 'LogO$-$3n;' Chris(ology~, Cop:u Ch""h Rn-'itw IS. 1997. pp. 78 84. _ _'MThe soteriological significance of Christ's humanity in St. AthanaM sius". Sf Vldimir'! Thtofogi,ai Quarttr!y 40, 1996, pp. 265-86. --"'Theology and economy ill Origen and Athanasius". Origtniar.a Stp/ima, Leuven: P~ters, 1998.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

B I BLIOGRAPHY

Amold, D. W. H. TIu Ear!), Episcopal Care" of Athar.IlJiUJ of Alexandria (Christiamty and JUdaiSll in Antiquity, voL 6), Notre Dame: Univer_ sity of Nocre Dame Press. 1991. Balas, D. L AtETOITIA eEOY. Man'J Partidp,,:ilJn ill G!Jd's P".fmilmS /wMd'r.g ;0 Saln, Greg01J' of Hp!a (Srudia Ansdmiana LV), ROlle: Libreria He rder, 1966. Barnard, L \'/. "The antecroenrs of Arius", Vigilia( Chrurianat 24, 1970, 172-88. -~-J;min Mar.)r: Hir Life ard Thoughl, Cambridge: Cambridge Unh'er_ siry Press, 1967, pp. 83·--4Bames, T. D . ~Angd ofligh{ or mystic initiace? The problem of the L~'-e of A n:1JI7)' " ,jOUf1'..:l! Df Th(O!r;gi.,,1 SuJdiu NS 37, 1986, pp. 353---68. _ _ ,A:hana.,j,t5 and Cam.amiIlJ: Tlxdog)" and Politin in tht ClmSrar.:inian Empirt, Cambridge, M.-\.: Hal"''ard University Press, 1993. Berchem, j. B. "L'incamation dans le plan divino d 'apm saint Athanase", E,hor d' Orient 33, 1934, pp. 316-30. _ _ 'MLe r51 ... du V ... rbe dans l'OI'llVre de la crenion et de la sanCtification d'apres Saint Athanase~, Angeliami 1S, 1938, pp. 201- 32, 515-58. Bernard, R. L'1,,;age de Dilll d' apris lair.: luhan.m (Theologie 25), Paris: Aubeir,19S2. Bit'n... n. \'7. -Zur Logos-Christologi ... des Arhanasius \'on :,Uexandrien in C?nrra Gmtes und Di [nranUlti(Jlli' , Studia P,,:ristkJ 21, ed . E. A. Livingstone, Leuven: Peeters, 1989. Bouyer. L Cosmo-,. Tht Wqrld and Iht G !Il1"J of God, P~[ersham: Se Becks Publications, 1988. - -L'ln(amation et f'EgiiJi-\:halUlliUJ, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1945. Crouzd. H. Origm. tcans. A. S. Worall. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989.

De Nicola, A. "La con(e:zione e la s[Oria del mal e nel Conlra Gmta- De Ir~!Zn/;Z:iqne-, /iugUJtinian14rn t6, 1976, pp. 85-106. Dillon, J. Tht Middk PiaMnim, hhaca. h'Y: Comell Univ... rsiry Press, 1977. Florovsky. G . "Th ... conCept of creation in Se Athanasius-, Studia Pa,r1Jli,a 6 (Texte und Untersuchuns ... n 81), Berlin: Akademi ... Verlag, 1962. pp. 36--52. G-audel, A. "la theologie du A01~ ch ... ..: Saim Athanase", Rr~'ue des tritr.m re!igieuJeJ ll , 193t, pp. t-26. Gram, R. M. Th. Ear-Iy ChriNiall Doctrine of God, Charlotte~il1 ...: University Press of Virginia, 1966. - -- (Sources Chrt'tiennes t99). Paris: Editions du ucf, 1973. --,A/bar.mt d' Alexar.drie. EI~q:a et Errivain: U,U !mun deI Iraifis rom,.. les .4.rims (Th&>logie hisrorique 70). Paris: Beauschesne. 1983. - -"The Athanasian decade 1971 84: a bibliographical repon~, Theolr,g. i.a! StuiieJ 46, 1985, pp. 524-41. --~ Athanasius of Al ...xandria and rhe fuundation of traditional Christolog}' ~. TIw!ogiea/ SrudieJ 34, 1973, pp. 103-13. - - "Athanasius of .>\lexandria: thret>' orations against the Arians: a reappraisal", S:udia PalriJtira 17. part 3, ...d. E. A. Livingstone, Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1979, pp. 981 - 9 5. --'~I.a date de I"apologie d'Athanase 'Contre les PaY... ns· et 'sur !"incarna· tion'", Re
250

251

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- -"Le temoignag~ des uttres Fe1fa[t! de Saint Athanase sur la dat~ t"t rapologie conne les pai~ns sur l' incamacion du V~rbc:-~, Redurcoo rk Scin'.a Rtfigiflm 53, 1964 , pp. 91- 100. - -"Le Verbe de Di~u scion Athanase d'Al=ndrie~, Lm:zl Thrologiqfle et Philosr.-phiqfle 45, 1989, pp. 229-42. - -"Logo-, ~t 'IOu} cha Athanasr d'Aln:andrie", S::u1ia PaUjsricd 11 (Text~ und Untersuchung~n 108), ed. F. L Cross, B~rlin : Akademie Vt'rlag, 1972, pp. 199-202. - --«I'd.) Politiqu( i: Thialogi~ cbez Alh,mau d'A!ex:zr.drif, Anes du Collogue de Chamilly (TheoJog ie h isroriqu~ 27), Paris; Beauschesne, 1974. Ke!!)",]. N. D. Ead)" Cbristidn D oarine.J, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978Koip, A. 1. "Parrakers of the divine nature: the use of 2 Pet~r 1:4 by Athanasim", S;;idia Parrh:ira 17, part 3, ed. E. A. Livingstone, Oxford: Pergamon Pr~s, 1979, pp. 1018---23. Kope-c~k, T A . A History' of Nw--Arianism, 2 vols, Cambridg~ , MA: Philaddph ia Pacris tic Foundation, 1979. Laminski, A. D" Ht/fige Gris: a!s Getsr Cbrisri find Gtist der Gfiiubigm: Dtr

- -Cbristofogy 4nd COimo{ogy: Alodeir of Di!'im .-i.aiviry in Origm. EI/Jebim and .-'ithaIldJim, Oxford and New York: Oarendon Press, 1993.

Leipzig: Sr. Benno V~rlag, 1969. Laurin, J. R. OrimlaliollS f1tdirrmes do> ApoJcgisU$ (hrffimJ :k 270 ii 361 (Aruilena Gr~gof"iana 61), Rome: Typis Pontificiae Un iversitatis Gregori anae, 1954. Lebon, J. "le sorr du 'consubstantiel' Nic€en ", ReI'ld d'His;oire Ecdbiasriqllr 47, 1952,465-5 29. Lienhard,]. "Recent studies in Arianism", RefigiallS StudieJ RfI ,itw 8, 1982, pp. 330---7. Long, A. A. Hdlm;s:i, PhifoJoph)·. Stoiti, Epicurfdm, Sluprio, New York: Charl~s 5cribn~r'5 Sons, 1974. Louth, A. "The concept of the: soul in Athanasim' Cl)nrra Gmus- Dt inr.:trf1a/iQru~, 511.Jia P:;!ris!ica 13 (Texte und Umersuchung~n 116), cd. E. A. Li"i ngstone, Berlin: Akademie V~rlag, 1975, pp. 227-31. - -The Origim of the Cm-is:ial> Afystit4i Tradition from Pla:fl to Dm)"S, Oxford: Clarendon Press, N~w York: Oxford University Pro:ss, 1981. --"Reason and rewlation in St. Athanasim", Sw/hI; journal of ThroJIJK)' 23, 1970, pp, 385-96. - -"5<. Athanasius and the Greek Life flf Anron),~ , joUT7ld! <1/ Tlxt;logua! Studies 39, 1988, pp. 504-9, --"Th~ use: of the term iOl~ in Alexandrian theology from Alexander to C}'ril", Studia Pa;riJrita 19, Leuven: Pee[ers, 1989, pp. 198---202. L}'man, Rebecca]. "Arians and Manichees on Christ",jIJlJT7Id! ofThdogir.:t! S;;dieJ 40, 1989, pp. 493-503.

.Macquarrie, J. Jesus Christ in Moairn Though:, London: SC.\{ Press, Philadelphia: Trinity Press Int~rnationa.l, 1990. McCoy,]. D . "Philosophical influences on the doctrin~ of the incarnat io n in Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria'", Encounter 38, 1977, pp. 362-91. Meijering, E. P. "Athanasim on the Father as the origin of t he Son", in E. P. M~ij~ring, God Being Histor)", Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, New York American Elst"ie r Publishing, 1975, pp. 89-102. - - "HN nOTE OTE OYK HN 0 YIOr. A discussion of tim~ and erer~ nity", Vigilia( Chrh:ianae 28, 1974, pp. 161---8. - - OrthrxlUX)· alld P/at':mism in Arhaf!4JiU}. S)7ZthfsiJ (jf" Anri!he.Jis.', Leid~n: E. J. Brill, 1968; second edn. 1974. _ _ HStrukrur und Zus.amm~nhang des apologeti5Ch~n 'Werkes ;-on Athanasiu5 ~ , VigiluJ£ ChriJ:ian.:u 45, 1991, pp. 313-26. Mey~ndorfr, J. St. Gr<'g.,.,' PalamaJ and Or:hodox Spirituality, Crestwocd, .NI': St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974. Minlls, D .lrmactiJ, W[ashingron: Georgetown Univ~rsitJl Press, 1994. Nevr'man, J. H. Th, Ariam (J/ the Fo;mh Cer.JlIr)", London, 1833. Nordberg, H. "A recons i d~ration of rhe date of St. Athanasius's Centra Gmtel-De Inr.:tnldfil)nt~, 5:udia Patrn;ica 3, 1961, pp. 262---6. Norris , R. A. "Chrisrological mod~1s in Cyril of Alexandria", Sludid PdfristUd 13, 1975, pp. 255---68. - -God and WiJrfd in Earl)' CbriJI;an TI=log)'. A S;fldy in justill ."'fart)"r; Irer.Mus, Ter:uifian, ar.d Origm, Nevr' York: Stabury Ptess, 1965. O'Brien, D. ML'immorralite chez Saint Arhana5e (IX- Incarnarione Verbi cap. 4. 5: PG 25, col 104 B-C)", S:fldia PatriJfifd 21, ed. E. A. Li~'ing­ stone, Lem'en: Peeters, 1989, pp. 426-37. Pannenberg, W. "Th~ appropriation of the philosophical conc~pr of God as a dogmatic problem of early Christian theology·, in Basic Qumi(l1lJ in Theology. Col/mid ESJa)·s. ~'oL 2, trails. Grorge H. Kehm, Philadelphia: Forrress Press, 1971. Patterson, 1. ~De LiherIJ Arhitrio and Methodius" attack on Origen", S:;;di4 Patristico 14, 1976, pp. 160-6. - - Me:Jx,diu$ cIOI)"mpus. Dh'iu Srr-'m?ignty, Human FrndoT!l, alld Liff in Christ, Washington, DC: Catholic Uni"ersity of Am~rica Press, 1997. --"M~thodius, Origen, and the Arian Dispute", SI!dia Patristica 17, pan: 2, 1982, pp. 912- 23. Pettersen, A. Alhallasius, Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1995. - - AthdllasiuJ alld the H;mum Bad)', Bristol: Bristol Press, 1990. - -" ..... reconsiderarion of the dat~ of th~ Contra GmttJ- De /r.<arna:iof1e of Athanasim of A!exandrja S:fldia PafriJriu. 18, 1982, pp. 1030-40.

252

-' 5',

Bei;rag tits ,-'..tha7la;iOJ :>:m Aiexaruirim Z:Jr F(Jffl1111ii'rung tits :rini/aruchm DogtIldJ irn 17ertm jahrhuntkrt (Erfun~r theologische Studien 23),

M

,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

B(BlIOGRAPHY

Pollard, T. E. ~logos and son in Drigen, Artus and Alhanasius", S:N4itz P,,;riJri£a 2 (Texte und Umersuchungen 64), ed. K un Aland and F. L. Cross, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1957. pp. 282- 7 . Prestige, G. L God in PatriIlir T!xJJlght, London: SPCK, 1952 . Rahner, K. "On the theology of [he incarnation", Thro!ogical bn-migatitms, 4. trans. Kevin Smith, Baltimore and London: Hellicon Press and O~u:ton, Longman and Todd, 1966. Richard, M. "Saint Athanase I!"t la psychologie du Christ selon les ariens", !tlilangn do! 5rim,e ReiigieUJt 4. 1947, pp. 7---49. Ricschl, D. Athal1as;u." Vt'I"J""h tin" imerpret"tion (Th('(llogische Studien 76), Ziirich: EVZ Verl ag . 1964. Ro tdanus, J. Le Christ a l'hl)tl11lU dam fa thio!ogi~ d' Arharum d' Afcwndrie. t.:litk de fa (UTI;unaioll de sa (onuptifm df !'homme dI~' sa (hriJ!~'ogit, Leiden:

Torrance, T F. - Arhanasius. A stud}· in rhl!" foundations of classical rheology", in Dh'iru Meaning. SlIIditJ in ParriJlic Hmnrneu!icr, Edin , burgh: T & T Clark , 1995, pp. 179-228. --~The docui nl!" of the Ho!r Triniry according (O Se Athanasius", Ang/ira11- Thro{lJgi~a! Rerit'oi! 7 1, 1989, pp. 395-405. - - The Trini!arian Faith. The E:"tlngt/icaJ Theo!fJg)' 1Jj :ht ,-\ncim! Carhalir Church, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 198B. Vagg ione, R . P. ~Aril4J: Hemy a11-d Tradi;il;n, by Rowan Williams: a re\"io!"W anicle", T01'I!Il!Ojournal of Throlog)' 5, 1989, pp. 63-87. - -''"Oh): 00.; £V t rov "fEV'i11J.t U"t(:)v: some asp;:-cr.s of dogmat ic formulao:in [he Arian controvl!"rsy", 5tudia Pafri.rti(a 17, part 1, ed. E. A. Li~'in g ­ Hono:-, Oxford: Po:-rgamon Press, 1982, pp. 181 - 7. Vinz~nt ,. M. ,-\sur-iU! lV;: l&ppadokirn. Di" ;koll1f,iKkn Frai1r'.#:la . Emlo:-ltung, Kriti schl!"r, Uberserzung & Kommemar, Leiden : E. J, Brill, 1993. Widdicombe, P. The F"rlHr-Jxx;d of God from Origm to A thanasitls, Oxford : Clareodoo Press, 1994. W iles, M. ArrkfJpal HmJ)': Aru",ism Through th! Cmturie;, Oxford : Claro:-ndo[} Press, 1996. -- ~In Defl!"nce of Aci us", joltmat of Thro!ogi~aI Studil:J 13, 1962, pp. 339-47 . - - -Thl!" p hilosophy in Chrisrianity: Arius and A(hanasius", in G. Vese}' (ed. ) Tk Phi/~5DPby in Christianit), Royal Imt itu[o:- of Philosophy Lectu[e Series 25, 1989, pp. 4 1-52. Wi lliams, R. Ariu!; Hms)' and Tra;/ilior. , London: Oan:on, Longman and Todd, 1987. - -"Baptism and the Arian comro",o:-rsy~, iD .M. R . Barnes and D . H . Williams (eds) Arianism after Arim. ElU)'! on the Dn__dopmm: of tk Founh Cen:,,')' Trinitarian ConjlidJ, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993. - -"Tho:- logic of Arius - , Jo:.mal of Theo!ogir4/ SlIlditi 34, 1983, pp.

E. J. Srilt, 1969.

- - ''' Die Vita .-'1l1tofiii als Spiege1 der Theologie d5 Arh aoasius", Thto!ogie Jlnd Phil'JJophie 58, 1983, pp. 194-216. Ruix-nson, S. Th< Le.ten of 5:. Anto'1Y. Origmisl Tm.1iog); ."'fema-stir TradiJion and IN Ma.king of a Saim {Bibtiotheca Hisrorico-Ecdesiasti ca Lundensis 24}, Lund: Lund Uni'O"o:-rsity PR"~, 1990. Schoemann, J. B. ~ E iJcro. in do:-n Schrifren des hl!"iligcn Athanasius', 5cho!as;ik 16, 1941, pp. 335-50. Simono:-ni, M. L1 criJi ariana nd N Je.'"IJio, Rome: Instituturn Parrisrirum August inianum,1975. Slusso:-r, :M. ~Athanasius, 'Contra Gentes' and 'De Incamatione': placo:- and date of composition", jour=! of Throfogic(li SrJldm 37, 1986, pp. 114--1i. Ste-ad, C. "Arius in modern (;:-search" ,joUr1ul of TherJio;W"! S:lIditJ 45, April 199-4, pp. 24-36. - - ,Dil'i'l( SuIma/ut, Oxford: Clarendon PN'SS, 1977 . --'''The Platonism of Arius", journal Qf Throhgicai SfluiiOJ 15, 1964, pp. 16---31. _ _ '~Review of Kanneng iesser's A:hana5( d'Aiexandril . . ,~, j&/inlai of

Thrological5!lldieJ 36, 1985 , pp. 220-9. _ _ 'MRho:-torical me thod in At hanasius", Vigilw~ CbriJ;iarwe 30, 1976, pp. 121-37 . --"'The scriptur~ and the soul of Chri~c in ..... thanasius ~, VigilitM Christiall
56----81. van \\linden, J. C. M. "On [hI!" dare of Arhanasius·s apologl!"t ical tre-atises", Vigi/jae ChriJtiana( 29, 1975, pp. 291- 5. Young, F. .M. From Nirala {o Chaladrm, A Guide to lk Liftratflrf and ;/s Bad,gro"nd, Philadelphia: Fortr~s Press, 1983. --'"A recons idl!"ration of Alexan drian ChriS[Qlogy", journal of EcriniaJ:ica/ HiJtQf)' 22 . 1971, pp. 103-14. Zizioulas, J. D. ~The teaching of (he 2nd Ecu menical Council in historical and ecumenical po:-rspec[i~'I!"", Cn:dlJ in Spiri!U1l1 SdlJ[1t1m: Aui do!I CongmJ9 Tw/ogiro Inurnazionalr di PI'UJmld:.;!ogia, Rome: Librl!"ria Editric~ Vaticana, 1983, pp, 29-54.

1 ~30.

254

255

INDEX

78-84, 143-55; fetalso

INDEX

activity and passivity: in Arhanasius 50. 58-61. 62.

76-9.155.163.179, -187. 194, 202.207; in Stoio 10 Aetius 90 Albinus 10 Alexander of Al<"xandria 24 . 85 Analogr 48 . 49,11)-"-17,208 Andoch. council of (341) 88 Apollinarius 80 Apopharicism 16,96-100,163 Arian crisis 2, 4, 26, 29-30, 45,

85--% ..... riminum-Seleucia, council of91 Aristode 9, 10, 12,93 Atius 24, 85. 93--6.109-10,11;

169

'

Aries, council of 89 Arnold, D _227 n.5

luterius 110, 169, 234 nn.89, 90 Athanasius. ""orks cited: Ad A,rklphiuffI 92. 125. 148; Aa Epi.'1tflif'192, 144, 146; Ad EpiJa;~ Atg)p:i 89, 116; A.d Mamflimlm 4, 195-200; Ad S(Tdpiormtf)O. 98, 114; Ctm:ra GmUJ-Df Incarnatiqm -J , -4 ,

26-84,85, 104. Ill. 125, 130, 131,135-6,156,158,159, 164,177,180,182.188,189, 190,191,193,206; dating of 26-30;DtD«rtti,89,91,lI0; Of Srn/m/ill Diar.JJjj 89; De 5Yllodl! 89, 91. 109-10; Fatal Lmm 4, 165--6, 172- 7. 184,

202; O~..I~ «Intra Ari4n?J 80. 87-8. 101-3, 105-7 , 109, 111 _ 14.117_26,131_43, 145-". 149-51. 153--61.206; T(pt1)4 ,zd Afl.filXhmos 91; Vita AnIon;' 165-72. 177-95.202 Arh.magoras 16 Amcus 212 n.8 Augustine 172,204 . 223 n.84, 238 n.133 Baiis, D, 232 n.78 Barn;ud. L W. 17-18 Barnes, T. 2150.18.227-8 nn_9, 10 Banh, K. 207-9, 247 00 _13-16 Basil of Aney r.. 90. 91 Berna.rd, R. 211-12 0.7, 217 n.2 7, 22000-'>9.61,221 0_66,223 n_93, 232-3 n.79, 2370.122 Baurer, L 2. 2110.28,2 19-20 n54 Cam-eiot . Th. 221 -2 n.74 Christ, doctrine of 2, 37. 67-84, 138-61,212 n.9; Happtopri3[ion~ modd 38. 80, 82-3, 1-41-55. 160, 114-5; human body of 47,63. 70--8, 159; hum .. nsouJ of2. 77-8, 127-8,169,201- 2.206. 226 n.116; LcgrJ.S- sarx model 70-;; predication modd 80-4. 14o.-:c;, 1')0, 226 n.121; suffering of

256

incarnation. redempdon Church 178 Clement of Alexandria 57 Con$taru; 87. 88 Constantine 29, 85. 216 0.19 Conmmius 87.88.89,90.91 cosmology 32. 47-53,187 creat.io.n 31-5, 100-25, 133-8; and d,vlOe being 116-25; tx mhilo 8 95-6, 161,164;orderand ' harmony of 48, S3, 200 cross 28, 38, 84 Cyril of Alexandria 226 n. 121, 239 n.147

"Date-
Gregg. R. and Groh. D. 94, 167 - 77,183,191. 233 n.84. 239 n.6O . Gril1~eier, A. 70-1,79-80,211 n." 224 00.101, 104. 225 nn.104, 106. 238 on.134 135 2390.141 " Gwatkio, H_ M. 93-5, 162, 168 Hanson, R. p_ C. 142,211 n.3, 212 n.9. 226 n.ll1. 227 0.2. 228 n.15. 228-9 n.16. 239 0_155 Harnack. A. 30,93,229 n.30 Holy Spirit (divio;t)· of) 88, 89. 90, 99,100,101, 114-1'),126. 129.158-9,163.231 n.6O "Homoousios~ 85, 89, 90. 91, 96 humanity 32, 53-67,189-91: d;ariJ (grace) and pbyJis (nature) 36.55-6,58,59; divine image in ~umanity 55--61, 65-7; n~/J! (mind) 61-2, 64-5. 67. 73; f'J),(~ (soul) 61. 62. 73: S?ff'.a (bodr) 61 . 62-3,

73

Eudorus of Alexandria 212 n.7 Eunomius 90 E~iusof~ 26. 29, 85. 216 n.19 Eusebius of Kicomedia 85

:dirJ.S 82-3,102-7,119,133,139,

Floro\'Sky, G . 21 8---19 n.43 free will 35, 60. 176

incarnation 37-9, 40, 41-2, 43, 45.57.66-7.67-70,83,104, 130-61. 177-83,190,193-4. 196-202, 203; Set glso Christ doctrine of; redempr;oo . lrenat'us 4, 6-7,19-24,25. '>7, 205,218 n.4O. 221 n.66, 233 n.83, 234 nn.91-2, 235 on.93. 100,236 nn.105, 107, 108.237 nn.ll3. 114, 238 D_130, 239-40 on.161, 162, 166, 244 0.111,246n.3

141-6,206,232 D_68 idolatry 27-8, 29. 35, 39 immediacy and mediation, in Athanasius4 25 96 i09-1, 162 '" .

generation. of the Son 107 122~3 134 " G=rge of Cappadocia 87 Gnostics 16, 18-19,62.205 God, doctrine of 38-47. %-100' divine charjJ (grace) 55-6. 59' 83; d;";ne condescension 40. 46 53,73.75,82,113,208; dh·ine· physir (nature) 40; cssenc~power distinction 46; knowledge of 33 34.48,58, 72,75,164,189; , narure-",'1)cks distinction 46 48. 74-5 . Grace, life of 164-210

Jo.. ian, Emperor 92 Jul!an, Emperor 91, 92 JulIU$, Pope of Rome 88 Justin Mart},r 17-18

257

INDEX

Kaunengiesser, Ch. 26, 222 on.75. 76; 228 n.ll. 232 n.68 Kel1y,]. N . D. 1

Plato 7-10, 17,46, 50, 64, 233 n.86 PIO(inus 11-13 Plutarch 212 on.7.S pra}'er 186--8 Prestige. G. L. 220 n.55 pro\'idence 69

UU
Rahner. K. 246 n.6 rationality, of Christian faith 38-9,

43,84 redemption 67-84, 125-38; s« "uo Christ, doctrine of: incarnation Richard, ~{. 238 0.136 Roldanus,l. 2. 208, 211 n.5, 221 nn.70, 72; 223-4 nn.89. 90, 93; 247 n.13 R ubeosoo, S. 241 n.27

Man.i("h~

115 Man:ellus of Ancyra 88. 228 n.15 Man:ionires 16 MeiJering. E.P. 27,30,216 n.23; 216-1 7 n.25, 218 n.36 Melerians 27, 86 "..men (to remain) 35-7, 159 Merhodiu50fOI}'mpus 11 7 Middle Platonism 6, 10-11, 12- 13,30,39,205 Milan. council of 89 Minru;, D. 214 n.38

Sardica. council of 88 Schleiermacher, F. 207 sc riprure 50-1,87-8, 89, 98-9. 139.231 on. 56, 58 Set:lpion of Thum's 90 sin 35-8, 42-3, 57, 6~-7, 75.131 Sirmium, council of 89 Speusippus 11 Slead, C 242 n,44 Stoicism 9.12,17,69,70.76

Neoplaronism 93, 21 6 n.23 Newman.]. H . 93. 132-3 Nicaea. council of 85. 87. 89. 91 Norris, R. A. 17,2260.121 Numenius 11 ,2 12 n.8

Theognosrus 24 Torrance, T.E 214 n.39. 236 0.106 Trier 29. 87 Triniry 44-6, 52-3, 56, 88, 96,

Origen 24-5, 53, 57,64,116-19, 218 0.38, 220 n.58

98-100,102-25,129,141,

Palamas (Gregory) 219 0,43 participation: in Arius 106. 233 n.SO; in Arhanasius 36, 46, 50-2, 56,61. 76-~.83.94. 102.104-9,115,120,124, 127,128-9,13/--8,156-7.

162,192 Tropici 101 Tyre, council of 86-7 Valens, Emperor 92 Va leminiao. Empero r 92

164,173,208,209; inOrigen 24; in Plato 7, 10.1 7, 50 P3.(ters.on, L. 236 n.102 Pelagian contro,'ers}' 168, 172. 204 Peter of Alexandria 86 Penersen. A. 211 n.6, 215 0.18, 223 n.8S, 239 n.15 7 Philo 14-15. 212 n.8

WiddimmOe. P. 233 n.80 Wil~,

M. 220-1 n.64, 236-7

nn.lll, lP Williams. R. 94-5. 212 0.8, 233 n.85, 235 on.94, 98 Winden.]. C M. van 27

258