Australia and the European Superpower
In memoriam. I dedicate this book to the memory of my father, Ted Murray, with love. Go raibh míle maith agat.
Australia and the European Superpower Engaging with the European Union
Philomena Murray
MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PRESS An imprint of Melbourne University Publishing Ltd 187 Grattan Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia
[email protected] www.mup.com.au First published 2005 Text © Philomena B. Murray Design and typography © Melbourne University Publishing Ltd 2005 This publication is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and subsequent amendments, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means or process whatsoever without the prior written permission of the publishers. Cover design by Guy Holt Typeset in Utopia by J&M Typesetting Printed in Australia by University of Melbourne Design & Print Centre National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Murray, Philomena. Australia and the European superpower : engaging with the European Union. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 0 522 85180 0. (paperback) ISBN 0 522 85181 9. (e-book) 1. European Union - Australia. I. Title. 337.9404
Contents Abbreviations
viii
Acknowledgements
x
Introduction
1
1.
5
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
2. Australia’s New Relationship with Europe: Close Encounters with a Twenty-first-century Superpower
40
3. The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower I: Agricultural Conflict
98
4. The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower II: The Framework Agreement and Kyoto
135
5. Colliding Continents: Mutual Misunderstandings
161
6. New Agendas for Dialogue
191
7. The Future—Seeking Engagement or Shadow-boxing?
239
Appendices
272
Select Bibliography
334
Index
357
vii
Abbreviations ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific States ANI Advancing the National Interest White Paper APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations ASEM Asia Europe Meeting ASiE Australians Study in Europe BSE/CJD Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Common Agricultural Policy CAP CAPUK Common Agricultural Policy – United Kingdom CCP Common Commercial Policy CCT Common Customs Tariff CEC Commission of the European Communities CERC Contemporary Europe Research Centre CESAA The Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia Common External Tariff CET Cotonou Cotonou Agreement with ACP states DEST Department of Education, Science and Training DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea EAAPN Europe Australia Asia Pacific Nexus EAEC European Atomic Energy Community, Euratom ECJ Court of Justice of the European Communities (European Court of Justice) EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EMU Economic and Monetary Union ETMs Elaborately Transformed Manufactures EU European Union EU25 European Union of 25 member states Euratom European Atomic Energy Community, EAEC Euro European single currency
viii
Europol European Police Office FEAST Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation Framework Programme FP FTA Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross domestic product GI geographical indication INI In the National Interest â•›White Paper NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary STMs Simply Transformed Manufactures UN United Nations UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change World Trade Organization WTO
ix
Acknowledgements The last book written about the EU–Australia relationship was in 1976. At times, it seemed like it would remain just that! There have been obstacles along the way. It also became a larger—and more exciting— task than originally anticipated. Throughout it all, my husband John and son Stephen were the central point of my life and taught me the real meaning of Australia–Europe relations. My parents, Ted and Phyllis, were my mainstay, teaching me the essence of love, along with my siblings Frank, Gabrielle, Paula and Antonia. I extend my gratitude and appreciation to the two Australian Research Council (ARC) Project research assistants Dr Carolyn O’Brien and Dr Annmarie Elijah. The supportive role of research assistants Adam Berryman, Dora Horvath, Karen Hussey, Fiona Machin, Katrina Stats, and Tony Wilson is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to the colleagues with whom I discussed aspects of this project over the years: Michael Longo, Leslie Holmes, Brian Galligan and Derek McDougall. I would like to express my appreciation to the many officials interviewed over several years in Brussels and Canberra. I thank the staff of the European Commission in Brussels for their openness to my questions. The staff of the European Commission Delegation in Canberra provided background and information and my special thanks go to Lynne Hunter, Tracy Dennis and Ingrid Kropman. The staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra and in the Embassy in Brussels have always been very approachable and I thank them for this. I am grateful to the ARC for a research grant to carry out this project and to the University of Melbourne for the recent opportunity to take sabbatical leave. The staff of Melbourne University Publishing have been helpful and gracious every step of the way. All errors are, of course, mine.
Introduction
This is the first publication in over a quarter of a century to examine Australia’s engagement with the most regionalised or ‘magical’ club of all, the European Union (EU).1 It illustrates the highly contested nature of the engagement, which is based on Australia’s collective amnesia about the EU as much as it is on the fact that the EU is not terribly interested in Australia. Distance, myth and memory play their part. There is the myth of the British betrayal of Australia when it joined the EU. There is Europe’s reluctance to take seriously Australia’s vehement opposition to European agricultural protectionism. Intransigence, conflict and mutual misunderstanding feature on both sides. I begin by discussing Australia’s choices and circumstances over time, from its largely European identity to its regional and geographical choices. I then trace the development of the relationship with Europe, from the links with Britain to Australian protests about European agricultural protectionism, and explain how the EU gradually became Australia’s most important trading partner, accounting for more trade than any single country. The book illustrates the importance of the politics of regional integration and shows how the EU is increasingly regarded as a new type of superpower and how Australia sees itself in a regionalised and globalised world. It examines how that link has evolved and discusses Australia’s search for a role in a period
of global uncertainty and investigates how Australia deals with Europe as a new, powerful, international negotiator. This study is based on three arguments: first, the EU has wrought deep-rooted changes within its constituent states, in a process known as Europeanisation; second, the EU is a global player—albeit of uncertain nature—with increasing weight; and third, the EU is developing a global agenda that will have long-term implications for Australia. European integration is transformative—it transforms relations among its member states and with its interlocutors. The agenda being advanced by the EU can be described as regional integration writ large, or a type of extension of its integration project to a global level, incorporating integration into globalisation. This is taking place in a number of policy areas, such as trade, human rights, and development and democratisation—dominating agendas which are not traditional foreign policy or hard power. One observer has described this scenario as ‘promoting the EU’s internal values abroad’ (Quigley, 2004). These agendas are gathering momentum and are of real concern to governments such as that of Australia. This study examines the aspects of the Australian relationship with the EU that have worked and those that have failed. It analyses the points of intersection, co-operation and tension—what has tested or strengthened engagement—and seeks to illustrate patterns of conflict resolution, conflict avoidance and co-operation. It illustrates the extent to which the international context determines or influences engagement as well as the extent to which engagement is shaped by the EU’s process of regional integration. It demonstrates that the developing relationship with the emerging superpower, the EU, is partly shaped and transformed by changing security contexts, such as immigration and refugee issues and the terrorist attacks in New York, Bali, Jakarta, Madrid and London. The study draws on two surveys. Given that there was relatively little analysis of elite perceptions of Australia–EU engagement, there was a need to document and analyse the perceptions of both government and non-government players who deal with the EU. I therefore conducted surveys of Australian elite perceptions on Australia’s engagement with the EU, the results of which appeared in a number of publications (Murray 2002a, 2002b, 2003a). These survey questionnaires, designed to elicit perspectives of policy makers, businesspeople
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Australia and the European Superpower
and academics with a professional stake in Europe, were designed and administered nationally in Australia in 1998–99 and 2001–02. They constituted an attempt to redress the lack of data on elite perceptions to date. These were the first surveys on the issue in Australia that have targeted a wide range of analysts and top decision makers and stakeholders,2 including government officials and traders.3 In this book I argue, first, that the EU is a major international power. This is manifested in trade, in aid and in attempts to create a common foreign and security policy and defence entity. It is evident in the fact that EU norms and regulations have international impact. The EU is a type of civilian power, as illustrated in Chapter 2. It is a promoter of peace and democracy on an international scale. Second, the EU is a regional bloc that promotes regionalism of groupings of countries in other parts of the world. Third, the EU affects Australia both directly—through trade, investment and political summitry— and indirectly—through EU governance norms, European agreements with other regions and states and through Australian exclusion from agreements which the EU conducts. Fourth, the relationship between Australia and the EU is a broad and multifaceted one and is characterised by a number of different types of engagement. Traditionally, engagement has been characterised by state-to-state links, what I call close encounters of the first kind, or traditional bilateralism. This has been complemented by links formed by the Australian government with the EU as a regional entity, in what could be called close encounters of the second kind, or new regional bilateralism. In the last few years, a newer type of engagement is evident, which is a form of close encounter of the third kind, a global societal bilateralism, whereby Australia and the EU interact and share agendas on international issues such as terrorism, immigration and new security. Fifth, there is a history of Australia regarding the EU as a monolithic, negative, obstructionist bloc. The Australian elite reaction to the EU is to see it as an unbound Prometheus or Leviathan which is unleashing its regulations and protectionism on the world stage and is unstoppable in its advance. Sixth, there are many shared values, but while there is common ground, Australia and the EU are also worlds apart on some key issues (Murray, Elijah, O’Brien, 2002), such as the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, in this study I argue that the relationship between Australia and the EU has been dominated by ‘the CAPUK factor’, namely a
Introduction
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single-issue focus on the CAP and the single prism focus on the United Kingdom. The history and development of Australian engagement with the EU do not exist in a vacuum—they are contextualised by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the role of the member states, the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and NATO, for example.
Notes Before November 1992 the European Union was known as the European Community (EC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Common Market. 2 The list of recipients was drawn up from companies profiled in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2001 publication ExportEU: all contactable Australian members of the European Commission’s EU Visitors Program, members of Australian parliamentary delegations to the EU; officials in government departments; government ministers; banks; insurance companies; all major exporters; alcohol exporters; mining companies; meat and cattle exporters; members of the Global Foundation; law firms dealing with Europe; members of Australian Business in Europe; Austrade, DFAT; Department of Education, Science and Technology; Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics; Chambers of Commerce; consultancy firms; the media; academics involved in research on Australian trade, investment, economics, politics and law and European studies; and some members of the Contemporary European Studies Associations of Australia. 3 The survey method adopted involved written replies to a standard questionnaire. The data were entered into a Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS) file and analysed using descriptive statistical techniques. The respondent group could be broken down into eight broad groups: academic, business, trade/investment promotion, government advisor, parliamentary delegation, diplomat, media and other. Over 650 surveys were sent out in 2001 for written response and 133 full responses received, which is a response rate of 21 per cent. 1
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Australia and the European Superpower
Chapter 1
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
Australia: a nation whose memory is in Europe, body is in Asia, conscience is in the Pacific and hip-pocket is in the US. —Professor Ken Wiltshire, AO, Australian representative, UNESCO 1 In the regionalised economy, you are either a member of the magical circle known as regional blocs or else you are left out—a muggle in a magic world. ‘Muggles’ is the term used to describe the non-magical people in the famous Harry Potter books by J.K. Rowling. Australia is a country that is an outsider, or a muggle, in the world of regional integration. Australia is currently ‘muggling’—doing its best within the limits imposed by its non-membership of a regional economic bloc. Muggles are not magical; they have no spells, no special school and no secret words. As a muggle, Australia lacks the support of an enchanted infrastructure and has to muddle through in a globalised world of regional entities.
Can Australia trust the Europeans? Australia is being urged in some quarters to forge closer links with Europe. Yet Europe is the harbinger of bad news for Australian farmers
and the subject of considerable vitriol in the primary exporters’ community in Australia. The questions arise: How can the Europeans be trusted, when they have a history of being duplicitous on agriculture in world trade? What is so special about the EU? Is there anything to admire? Is it simply characterised by hypocrisy? It is actually worse than that, according to one observer who regards the EU as ‘the featherbed that produced butter mountains and wine lakes and lots of cushy jobs for failed politicians and their friends’ (Shaw, 1999, 17). A British scholar, Eleanor Sharpston, satirises this perspective in the following way: The EU’s agricultural market consists of butter mountains, wine and milk lakes and olive oil pools, surrounded by happy, lazy, over-subsidised EU farmers who are kept in idle luxury by the EU’s policy of keeping out all agricultural produce from third countries including Australia. It’s unfair, it’s pure protectionism and it’s wholly unjustified. (Sharpston, 2002, 29). This view may not be accurate, but it is persistent. While current Australian Prime Minister John Howard is unswerving in his attacks on EU protectionism, most Australians do not give it much thought and those who do think about it tend to concur with this negative stereotype. The Australian relationship with Europe has never been straightforward. Our imposing relationship with the United Kingdom means that that Irish and continental European aspects of Australian society and significant country-to-country linkages have been largely ignored. Yet those linkages are important. In 1983, a long-time observer of Australia–Europe engagement, J.D.B. Miller, pointed out that the connections between Western Europe and Australia were greater than the formal connection with the European Community (EC), due to the long-standing social links forged in particular by immigration from Europe (Miller, 1983, 157). The formal relationship with the continent of Europe at present remains somewhat troubled. Indeed, some relationship counselling would not have gone amiss in the Australia– Europe relationship, if only because neither has ever regarded the other as a Significant Other. There exists a trans-hemispheric rift at
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Australia and the European Superpower
times, and a gulf of misunderstanding. British international relations specialist Michael Cox (2003) has suggested that one reason for the current rift between the EU and the US is that while the Americans reach for a gun, the Europeans reach for a treaty. In the case of Australia, there is a tendency to reach for a great and powerful friend. Australia’s dialogues with the European Union have often appeared to be marred by mutual misunderstandings and deaf ears on both sides. For the EU, it seems that Australia talks incessantly about agriculture and does not listen to reports of opportunities in the EU. From Australia’s perspective, the Europeans never listen to them anyway. The dialogue of misunderstanding has a never-ending script that goes rather like this: Australia: Why do the Europeans not understand that we hate their protectionist agricultural policy? The EU: Why do Australians gripe about the agriculture every time we meet? Australia: The EU is confusing and over-bureaucratic. It is opaque and over-regulated. It is amorphous and hard to target for business. The EU: We have a very small bureaucracy for such a large operation and we have de-regulated as much as we have regulated. We make it easy to do business as we don’t have 25 sets of rules, only one. It is worth noting that many officials in the EU know that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is protectionist and not rational and many of them actively promote CAP reform—on this they agree with Australia. Meanwhile, Australia does not feature much on the EU radar screen and it is not important enough to merit special consideration. Australia is not at war with Europe, it is not in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is not part of Europe, it is not dependent on development aid. Australia’s relationship with the EU is asymmetrical, with a substantial trading relationship—and a considerable trade imbalance in Europe’s favour. Australia is reliant on EU as its major trader, yet it accounts for less than 1.5 per cent of the EU’s external trade. It is clear that Australia is far from the EU’s
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
˘
thoughts. Perhaps the EU is not interested in Australia, but simply engrossed in its internal reform, constitutional processes and its new member countries. Certainly, a widespread Australian perception of the EU is that it is a Fortress Europe—protectionist and domineering. A competing perspective is that Europe represents a massive opportunity for Australian business. These views exist concurrently. Europe is regarded as representing both restrictions and opportunity. The UK is often regarded as the safest and most appropriate location for investment and business ventures in Europe, while another view is that there is a need to move more into continental European and Irish markets. Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has commented: ‘Australia has always had trouble getting our relationship with Europe right. On the one hand, we have seen it as a distant, too-easily romanticized place; on the other, as an overwhelming presence. We often hold these two views simultaneously.’ (Keating, 2000, 243) Perhaps the most interesting paradox is the fact that, on the one hand, the UK is seen as Australia’s closest ally in Europe and, on the other, the UK betrayed Australia in joining the European Union. There is a perception that Europeans are not to be trusted and Australia must engage more with Asia. Another perception is that there are rich pickings in Europe and that Australia needs to get in there and exploit that immense market of 457 million consumers. All of these perceptions were evident in the two surveys of top opinion makers in Australia. Both a desire to engage with the EU and an unwillingness to trust the Europeans—especially the EU—were apparent in the survey responses and in media and government declarations. Respondents to these surveys expressed concern that new engagement with the EU could undermine Australia’s established relationships with individual European states. An element of nostalgia was unmistakable in some responses. Some feared a loss of trade with individual states. Others were concerned about an undermining of Australia’s relationship with the UK market and to a lesser extent with other states. There is also a desire to maintain the traditional British link while engaging with the EU. Some respondents suggested that the UK, of all EU states, understands Australia best. Further, there was an insistence by a significant number of respondents that individual member states remain the primary focus of Australian interest in the EU (Murray, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a). ˘
Australia and the European Superpower
Views of Europe The following direct quotes from surveys of Australian elites illustrate the differences of views about the EU among the opinion makers. ‘The UK remains the major EU member which understands Australia best and has the most regard for Australia.’ ‘Australian governments need to develop a more sophisticated approach to the EU. The EU offers a wide range of opportunities for Australia but these have been successfully wasted over the years.’ ‘[We] need to look at European countries other than the UK. [We] need to develop an Australian policy approach towards trade and investment opportunities in the new member states as they join the EU.’ ‘The EU is one of the more important jigsaw puzzle pieces necessary for the maintenance of Australian prosperity and security, but not the only one.’
The difficulties in dealing and communicating with the EU, which can appear monolithic to many outsiders, have been recognised in these survey responses: ‘Australia has limited leverage on EU and we must also realise that we do not loom as large as we would like on their horizon.’ ‘[We] no longer consider the UK as a separate body from the EU.’ ‘We need to be more enthusiastic in making it clear to Europeans that we want to do business.’ With whom should Australia do business? Survey respondents suggested that there is a need to recognise that: ‘We’re a part-Asian society with European values but the EU doesn’t need us.’ ‘Developing relations with Europe and Asia are NOT mutually exclusive.’ ‘Ensuring mutually supportive and beneficial relations with the EU, Asia and North America should be given an equally high priority.’ Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
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How, then, should Australia negotiate and trade with the EU? One survey respondent reflected the perception of many in suggesting that there is a ‘need to engage with the EU as a regional and international actor, rather than the traditional approach of having bilateral relations with individual countries’. This engagement is the subject of this book.
Australia’s relationship with the EU: the influence of memory There are very healthy trade and investment flows between the EU and Australia—the EU is actually Australia’s biggest trading partner and has been for the last thirteen years. Traders and investors have certainly recognised the value of doing business with Europe, as seen in survey replies (Murray, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a). Successive Australian governments have not recognised the value of doing politics and business with the EU. When Prime Minister John Howard went to the Brussels headquarters of the EU in July 2002 (his first visit in over a quarter of a century) he spent only a few hours in meetings at the European Commission, the executive body of the EU. A major focus of his visit was trips to the battlefields of World War I. He was reconnecting with the Old World in his own way—looking back and reconnecting with the legacy of history. Officially, Australia’s memory may be still in Europe—but it is a Europe of the past, of stories of Aussie battlers and of sacrifices by Australian soldiers based on mateship. It is not a memory of profitable trading links; it is not a memory of commonalities of values. John Howard’s trips to Northern France during that visit, tracing the journeys of his father and grandfather, serve to remind us forcefully of Europe’s role in Australia’s national memory and of the influence of memory on foreign-policy making and on the way John Howard defines himself and the Australian nation. Geography seems to influence the relationship as much as history. Australia is far away from Europe and from the EU radar screen, with the result that Australia never features in important EU pronouncements. Australia is not important enough to merit a special relationship such as the transatlantic relationship, nor near enough to Europe to be a neighbour—it is a distant friend. Australia is not an applicant to join the EU nor poor enough to merit favoured treatment. It is not troublesome on a grand scale, although it is forceful regarding agriculture. British historian Piers Ludlow’s assessment of
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Australia and the European Superpower
the past relationship was that Australia was too far away, too rich and too stable to concern Europe very much (Ludlow, 2001). That very stability, relative wealth and geographical distance mean that the EU and Australia hear each other often as only distant voices. Yet the EU’s voice is getting louder as it is increasingly involved in global agendasetting in trade, the environment and development and in attempting to manage global governance norms. This has a deep-seated and long-term influence on Australia. Australia is gradually adapting to the expanding globalised role of the EU. It is perhaps surprising, at first glance, that we do not hear more about this new global context of the EU, or indeed of Australia’s reaction to it. Given, however, that a large part of Australian media reporting still emanates from a reluctant member state of the EU—the UK—it is not so unexpected.
Getting to know you There was little development in Australia–EC relations before British accession in January 1973. This was to change, due to Australia’s loss of imperial preference, Australian opposition to the EU’s CAP and the need to adapt to Europe’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and its Common External Tariff (CET). The 1950s had been distinguished by trade dependence on the UK and the 1960s by the growing realisation that this relationship would change dramatically, while remaining important. The 1970s saw Australian disillusionment, though not surprise, when the UK joined the EC. The following decade was characterised by the development of the relationship with the EC and the formalisation of meetings. The 1990s were characterised, like the 1980s, by tension regarding agriculture and, unlike the 1980s, by a significant broadening of linkages. It also was the decade of a more intense development of a new type of bilateral relationship with the EU as a single entity. There has never been official Australian opposition to the EU or the European integration project in themselves; indeed there are many statements in favour of Europe’s closer cooperation. The EU and Australia, however, have different priorities on agriculture, the wine market and environmental issues such as climate change and the Kyoto Protocol (see chapters 3 and 4). These issues are discussed in regular ministerial consultations and other meetings at a host of different levels. The government’s In the National Interest (INI) White Paper still characterises its approach to the EU—
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
11
national interests are predominant and relations with individual countries are what matter, rather than those with the entire EU. Australia does engage directly with the EU and in negotiations in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet it is clear that there is a lack of Australian understanding of why the EU member states engage in regional engagement known as integration and the international implications of this process.
Australia’s European and non-European identities Identity is important in Australia, with questions occasionally asked about whether Australians are Europeans or Asians and where Australia’s priorities should lie. (Abbott, 1991; Brett, 1996; Callick, 1997a, 1997b; Davison, 1991; Ingleson, 1999; Milner, 1996a, 2000; Milner and Quilty, 1996a, 1996b; Passmore, 1992; Ravenhill, 1996, 1998) Recalling Stephen Fitzgerald’s 1997 book Is Australia an Asian country?, the question can be asked : To what extent is Australia a European country? Socio-cultural aspects of the relationship have been explored in terms of mutual neglect and suspicion. Australian journalist Greg Hywood (2003, 13) suggests that Australian identity itself is a nebulous concept. While ‘not an ethnocentric member of the old world’, nor playing ‘America’s high moral role as refuge and land of opportunity for the dispossessed’, he sees Australia as being multicultural but picking and choosing ‘whom we let in on a seemingly random basis’. Writing in a special edition of Granta at the time of the Sydney Olympics, Australian historian Ian Jack (2002, 10) presents Australia’s modern and European origins as being those of a ‘society with harsh and improbable origins as a far-flung British prison’. Australian writer Peter Conrad (2000, 17) is more blunt in his portrayal of Australia as a country that ‘began as an imperial amenity, a tip for Britain’s refuse, and it remained a place of last resort, literally a terminus’. Australia’s identity is traditionally British and its institutions are British-influenced. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former diplomat Bruce Grant have pointed to the strength of the sentimental attachment to Britain in Australia, which remains strong, partly due to the fact that Australia has retained many British style institutions, such as the parliamentary system, education and the law. They add: ‘Nor, presumably, should we overlook that mystical influence on national character, cricket’ (Evans and Grant, 1995, 308). Even today
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Australia and the European Superpower
John Howard is well known for his affinity with the institutions of Britain, his many visits to London—and his fondness for cricket. For him, visiting Europe seems to mean visiting Britain. The influence of the UK on the institutions and processes of Australia is pivotal. John Howard referred to a 2003 trip to the UK as one ‘which has necessarily focussed on the history, the sentiment, the emotion and the passion of the relationship’ (Howard, 2003). The Howard Government was a recent participant in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Iraq. Howard did not shrink from making disparaging remarks about the French—not unlike the former Minister for Trade, ‘Black Jack’ McEwen, who disliked the French intensely and showed that he did not trust them in the 1950s and 60s, while attempting to gain some leverage in the negotiations on possible British membership of the EC. When the UK joined the EC, Australia did not fully recognise the long-term significance of this move. Australia remained loyal to Britain but at the same time came to realise that she had another great and powerful friend in the US—to the extent that Australia is still regarded in some quarters in Europe as the US’s deputy sheriff of the Asia–Pacific region, despite denial from official Australian sources (Brenchley, 2000). Meanwhile the UK is a member of the EU and, like Australia, is in a military alliance with the US in Iraq. Does this matter? Whom does Australia trust? Surely not the continental Europeans, many of whom were on the wrong side in World Wars I and II, when Australian soldiers risked their lives for Britain, the Commonwealth and democracy. Australian memory of its experiences in European wars of the twentieth century consists of Australian troops ‘always available to die in Britain’s wars. At Gallipoli, they were used by the imperial generals as cannon fodder, and lined up to be massacred’ (Conrad, 2000, 21). Australia has not only fought in Europe’s wars; it also has provided soldiers in support of the United States—in Vietnam and Iraq, for example. Australia’s connection with Europe (and the USA) is in part based on war: ‘When World War I began in far-off Europe, Australians reacted instinctively and contributed 329,000 volunteer servicemen from a total population of less than 5 million’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1993, 214). Australian academic Stephen Alomes (2001) sees a romantic conception of war as part of the Australian experience. War is at the centre of national symbolism and national identity.2 This participation in war
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
13
was part of Australia’s membership of the British Empire, characterised by Australian soldiers showing loyalty to the Empire in wars. The past war connection with Europe does not necessarily denote closeness to Europe, but rather closeness to the UK. Australia has never been particularly close to the rest of Europe in wartime and there has been doubt cast on Australia’s ‘Europeanness’. French President Charles De Gaulle once said that Australians were not Europeans. He stated in 1961 to British Prime Minister Macmillan: ‘Canada, Australia and New Zealand may have been Europeans once, but they are no longer Europeans’ (Martin, 1999, 453). Australia is not close to Europe, either, according to Prime Minister Howard, who claims he has often railed in many foreign capitals about the perfidy of the trading practices of other countries, especially the EU (Howard, 2002). He stated in 1998: ‘I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating, quite rightly, with some passion, the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU that have done such immense damage to the agricultural industries of Australia and represent one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy.’3 These are strong words and certainly do not reflect the economic importance of the EU to Australia, as the EU is Australia’s largest trading partner since 1990—bigger than Japan or the US, in trade in goods, in trade in services and in investment. Yet a different Howard tack has been evident in the Prime Minister’s statements that the influence of the EU ‘stretches far beyond its borders, shaping the institutions of the countries of the former Soviet Union, Africa and the Middle East’ and that ‘making Australia’s voice heard in Brussels is one of the most important diplomatic tasks we face’ (Howard, 2001). He reverted to his strong critiques less than a year later, when he said in Parliament, on record: ‘Whenever you are criticising restrictive and anticompetitive agricultural policies, never exclude the European Union because the EU’s predatory trading behaviour is infinitely worse than that of other countries.’4 This critical stance adopted by the Australian Government is not new—former Australian diplomat Alan Renouf has deemed shortsighted Australia’s taking Europe to task in the 1970s, under Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser: ‘All of Australia’s efforts merely impaired the already unsatisfactory relationship with the EEC [(European Economic Community)] which, quite naturally, resented Australia’s tactics even
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Australia and the European Superpower
if there were a lot of substance to its case’ (Renouf, 1983, 330). A keen observer of Australia’s engagement with Europe, Andrea Benvenuti (1999), argues, however, that the European Community was not going to alter its position on the CAP during these years in any case, so the Fraser Government did not necessarily damage the relationship.
Australia and Britain What is the view of Australia in London and of London in Australia? The Australian Director of the Menzies Centre in London, Professor Carl Bridge, sees it this way: From London, I see much that is hopeful for Australia’s future global performance. We rival the French in the British wine market. Australians are in key executive positions—for instance—running British Airways, the Royal Society and Cambridge University. There is even one of us in Tony Blair’s cabinet. Australian companies, such as the National Australia Bank and Lend Lease, are making their presence felt. (Bridge, 2001) Former British prime minister John Major once referred to the ‘extraordinary—unparalleled—richness of personal and family ties’ between Britain and Australia (Major, 1994, 89). He saw a certain drifting apart of Britain and Australia as having taken place due to the imperatives of each, in terms of geography, economic interest, social change and political vocation to devote a new priority to its own region (Major, 1994, 91). He added that it was commonsense for each to use their special ties to advance their common interest in both regional Europe and Asia (1994, 92). He regarded the two countries not only as having been ‘partners in the Gulf war’ but as having an important trade and investment relationship, with scope to grow, a common commitment to free trade and an ability to co-operate and understand each other ‘enormously strengthened by the history we have shared, by a common practice of democracy and by a range of cultural and human links which are unequalled’ (Major, 1994, 93). This perspective of a Conservative prime minister of Britain has been voiced and echoed by conservative prime ministers of Australia too, especially since the 1990s. John Howard said in 1997: ‘[T]here are no
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
15
two countries respectively in Europe and Asia who know each other better, trust each other more, and can contribute to each other more than Britain and Australia’ (Howard, 1997). On the other hand, the very fact that it is associated with betrayal and trust makes the relationship with the UK difficult. According to former Prime Minister Paul Keating, ‘The problem with the relationship between Australia and Britain was that accretions of meaning had clamped to it like barnacles, and it could no longer move smoothly through the water’ (Keating, 2000, 257). A recent media perspective is the following: Britain dominates Australia’s relationship with Europe. Europeans are either unaware of this relationship’s depth, or else find it puzzling particularly the fact that Australia’s head of state is the Queen of England. The historic ties, the language, the business connections and the deep penetration of British ideas and thinking into Australian society mean that Australia still sees much through the prism of its Britishness … The strength of the British connection is understandable. But it may be time for it to be reviewed and recast. (Kitney, 2005) Now, calling the UK home for young Australians is not what it was a generation ago. It means being able to get a UK passport so that they can work anywhere in the twenty-five countries of the EU, without necessarily ever going to the UK. Therefore, the UK link opens doors to Europe that it never did in the past. Thus, the UK is still important but not necessarily only in the traditional bilateralism of the UK–Australia relationship. Rather, the UK serves as a springboard for Australian tourists, workers and companies into the rest of Europe. This also applies to investment and trade: the UK link remains the basis of trade and investment strategies in the EU–Australia relationship. So the UK can be perceived as a safety net for Australian businesses that are anxious to trade with Europe but are not confident enough to deal with continental Europe, languages, different traditions, laws and regulatory systems. But reliance on the UK as a primary two-way market is declining for a number of reasons. Firstly, Europe has a large number of English
16
Australia and the European Superpower
speakers, which is encouraging Australian businesses to trade and invest more outside of Britain. Secondly, all market-related laws and regulations are EU laws anyway and they apply as much in Greece and Finland as they do in the UK. There is evidence that they are not applied in the same way in all countries, but the base line of EU regulation is Europe-wide. But how many meetings does it take to make a relationship an important or relevant one? How many officials does it take for the light bulb to go on in the Australian policy community that it is worth developing the relationship with Europe?5 What is the real substance of the relationship? The answer is, not unexpectedly, that the relationship is being enhanced beyond agriculture, while still publicly focusing rhetorically on the CAP. One eminent scholar of international relations, Thomas Risse, has suggested that, for the UK, Englishness is still defined in contrast to European-ness, whereby ‘Europe’ always constitutes the ‘other’ of the identity of the British nation-state (Risse, 2000, 15). It does not seem too outrageous to suggest that Australia still regards the EU as the ‘other’, rather like the UK does. Britain is the EU member state that has influenced Australian traditions most. How important is it that Australia still views Europe through the prism of the UK, with all its residual anti-Europeanness? Britain has been seen as consisting of groups of ‘yes—butters’ and ‘no—butters’—terms used to define those who agree with many aspects of the EU (‘yes—but’) but still retain grave reservations, and those who oppose the EU (’no—but’) while seeing that it may have some benefits for the UK. Australia and Britain are alike. They are also dissimilar, particularly in the way they view international and regional engagement, as this study will illustrate.
The myth of the British betrayal The quest for a balanced and healthy relationship has had a chequered history—and a fascinating one. Australian disillusionment with the EC began when decreased market access due to the UK accession had raised fears of, firstly, the possible loss of market access and of imperial preference, and secondly, the negative impact of the CAP (Gelber, 1966; Miller, 1976). The end of Commonwealth preferences also signalled the end of a privileged trading relationship with the UK, although the UK remained a pivotal market for Australian goods
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
17
within the EU. In the early 1960s, at the time of the British negotiations to join the EC, there was a recognition of the need to find new markets, to multiply Australia’s trading connections and to make the country more independent of its old economic ties with London (Gelber, 1966, 234). There was recognition of the need to make domestic changes in Australia in order to deal with new world trade patterns and make more efforts to sell Australian goods abroad (Gelber, 1966, 243). It is important to understand that a perception of a British ‘betrayal’ subsequent to the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973 has been evident in some Australian discourse on the EU and on agriculture. Historian Geoff Spenceley and researcher Catherine Welch (1998) are adamant that there was in fact no British betrayal and that this is a myth that has been perpetuated due to a lack of alternative research. They argue that the Australian Government was inept and lacking in understanding of the British position in negotiations in the early 1970s regarding British membership of the EC, and that the history of the myth of the British betrayal should be replaced by an account of Australian ineptitude. Nevertheless, the dominance of the legacy of the loss of imperial preference is evident in all discussions with the EU on the CAP. Australian memory of this loss seems to permeate the relationship. This issue foreshadowed the problematic relationship to follow for some decades. Spenceley and Welch (1998, 389) conclude: The conviction that Australia has been wronged and that the Europeans could not be trusted has become a prominent frame of reference for Australian governments when dealing with the EEC/EU. The legacy of bitterness and suspicion helps explain the turbulent course Australia–EU relations have taken since 1973, and the way in which positive initiatives to deepen the relationship have too often disintegrated into mutual recriminations. The UK accession to the European Community in 1973, with the end of imperial preference and the development of the Australia– Japan economic relationship, was a period when Australian agricultural trade with the UK and other parts of Europe diminished (see Chapter 3).
18
Australia and the European Superpower
The economic relationship came to be increasingly characterised by Australia’s critical stance towards the CAP, often with a confrontational style, in the Cairns Group. Despite regular ministerial consultations since the 1980s and a Nuclear Agreement—between Australia and the European community for a common market and research in atomic energy, the European Atomic Energy Community (known as Euratom)—the defining characteristic of the relationship was agriculture. Australia was strongly critical of the CAP in the Cairns Group within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Ministerial meetings from the beginning were dominated by confrontation over subsidies, trade distortions, pricing arrangements and agricultural surpluses, with Australian threats of retaliation. This in turn antagonised the Europeans. Australia regularly criticised the lack of access to European markets, tariff barriers and internal subsidies as well as the EC’s subsidies of exports to third countries and lost access to UK markets. The Australian tendency to engage with the UK in Europe as a primary contact can thus be understood in this context. By contrast, New Zealand’s use of ‘quiet diplomacy’ was more successful in achieving that country’s aims (Lodge, 1980). This was largely due to the fact that, of the three Old Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), New Zealand was seen by the UK as more deserving of special assistance (Ward, 1997). New Zealand was regarded as a special case as its economy was considered more vulnerable, while Australia was considered less dependent on the UK markets. All three Old Commonwealth countries had bilateral trade agreements with the UK under the 1932 Ottawa Agreement. Even before the UK joined the EC, Australia had begun to diversify its markets and seek new markets such as Japan in the 1950s. This is not to deny the important place of the UK in the Australian economy or its even more important place in the national psyche. Indeed, historian Stuart Ward has argued that Menzies was reluctant to be directly confrontational with the UK while the UK planned to join the EC (Ward, 1997). This was a period of considerable change in the British foreign policy focus and possibly the most important from an Australian point of view. The UK made three applications for membership of the EC —the first in 1961, the second in 1967, and the third and successful one in 1970, resulting in British accession to the EC on 1 January 1973.
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
19
British historian Alex May (1998, 40) makes the point that the Commonwealth countries, especially Australia and Canada, diversified their trade on seeing the UK apply to join the EC in the early 1960s. This was in the context of Britain’s ‘disengagement from the Commonwealth’. May refers to the UK Government’s commitment to the Commonwealth as fading out because Britain felt the ‘gravitational pull of Europe’. This pull was due to the increasingly obvious advantages of EC membership for the UK: a market of 250 million people, higher economic growth within the EC than in the UK and the possibility of some aid to vulnerable Commonwealth states under the embryonic EC development aid program, particularly the 1963 Yaoundé Convention on preferential trading agreements with some developing countries. There was also an aspect that appealed to the British reluctance to cede sovereignty: a creeping supranationalism was apparently being curbed by France’s President de Gaulle and the agreement known as the Luxembourg Compromise appeared to guarantee the continued protection of vital national interest (May, 1998, 41). In addition, from the time Edward Heath became British Prime Minister, he pursued membership vigorously and had less commitment to both the Commonwealth and the special relationship with the US than previous Prime Ministers had had (May, 1998, 47). The context was what Wilkes (1997, 22–3) calls changing realities in the Commonwealth, namely the diminishing commitment of Britain to the Commonwealth as family, the fact that the preferential Commonwealth arrangements were already under strain even since the 1930s, and the fact that the Commonwealth was perceived as weakening ties with, and even moving away from, the UK, not least due to the non-aligned movement. The stage was set for UK membership, sooner or later. Australia would have to adapt.
Learning to negotiate with the EU: Setting agendas The CAP was not fully effective until the late 1960s and the adverse effects of European exports subsidies were not fully felt externally until the 1970s. After the UK joined the EC, Australia did pursue a policy of diversifying its exports to the continental members of the EC. In fact, there had been little trade between the EC and the Commonwealth in the past (Wilkes, 1997, 26). Economist Richard Pomfret points out that the economic effects of the creation of the EC
20
Australia and the European Superpower
had been minor, as member states were not important trading partners for Australia. This meant that ‘negative trade diversion and the indirect benefit of higher EC incomes were small’ (Pomfret, 1995, 198–9). The pattern of a larger proportion of Australian exports going to the UK rather than the other member states was evident at the time of UK accession and has been reflected in the trade flows over time between Australia and the EU. The so-called ‘transitional phase’6 of the Australia–EC relationship under Gough Whitlam, when the CAP did not yet feature as a major issue of contention, changed with the Fraser Government, when considerable antagonism arose towards the development of the CAP. The impact and severity of the international trade implications of the CAP soon became clear to the Fraser Government, which proposed regular high-level meetings between the EC and Australia. Only in 1979 was a decision taken to hold regular ministerial-level meetings. Australian criticism of the CAP was to feature in all visits to Brussels. Journalist Mike Steketee (2002) recounts biographer David Barnett’s story of a visit to Brussels in 1977 by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. At a lunch hosted by the president of the European Commission (Roy Jenkins) and fellow commissioners, ‘Fraser sipped one spoonful of a very fine consommé, pushed back his chair, declared the occasion to be a working lunch and began the discussion on issues of substance which his hosts had declined to schedule into his Brussels visit’—to the consternation of the ‘silently fuming commissioners’. It was during this period of considerable antagonism that Fraser appointed to a Special EC Trade Representations portfolio the then Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs, John Howard (Burnett, 1983, 112–13; Elijah, Murray and O’Brien, 2000). Mr Howard’s experience in this role was not a happy one. It has been described as follows: Howard banged the drum with 30 ministers in nine European countries over six weeks. The net result was perhaps to win some brownie points with Australian farmers but certainly not to reduce trade barriers. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics calculates that the nominal rate of assistance for agriculture in all OECD countries more than doubled between the early 1970s and the late ‘80s. (Steketee, 2002)
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
21
During the period of Fraser’s prime ministership, he and Doug Antony (Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister) defended the Australian farming constituency and were very sympathetic to domestic agricultural concerns. Australia was strongly and directly critical and confrontational in all EC–Australia meetings. Relations worsened and mutual trust was at its lowest ebb. There were Australian threats of retaliation and European antagonism. During the Hawke governments, there was considerable internal EC pressure to reform both the budget and the CAP. The ministerial meetings began to move away from the past confrontational style. There was an agreement between the Commission and Australia, known as the Andriessen Agreement, that the EC would not sell subsidised EC beef into Australian Asian export markets and this was a positive improvement in the relationship. However, the publication of a Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985) report shortly before European Commissioner Andriessen’s 1985 Australian visit, estimated the cost of the CAP to Australian farmers at $1 billion per annum, and this led to some deterioration in relations. The following year, Commission President Jacques Delors reaffirmed the EC’s Andriessen commitment to Bob Hawke during the latter’s visit to Brussels. Although this did not signify major concessions, it was seen in a positive light in Australia. It also signalled that the EC was ready to include agriculture in the next round of GATT negotiations. During the 1980s, there was the beginning of some broadening of the relationship, encompassing discussions on co-operation in science and technology as well industrial co-operation; investment and the Single Market—as seen, for example, in the May 1988 ministerial consultations. In 1988 Prime Minister Hawke made a keynote speech, stating that Australia’s future was in the Asia–Pacific region. The 1989 Garnaut Report, entitled Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, and the Fitzgerald Report that was released shortly afterwards signalled a closer Australian engagement with Asia. In the ongoing GATT negotiations, meanwhile, there were many tense discussions between the Australian and European negotiators. Under the prime ministership of Paul Keating (1991–96), a number of bilateral Australia–EU engagements developed. In 1991, an EU–Australia High Level Group on Energy was established. Following this an attempt to help businesses to network, known as
22
Australia and the European Superpower
BC-Net, was made in Australia. In 1994, the EU–Australia Wine Agreement and the EU–Australia Science and Technology Agreement were finally signed after years of negotiations. At the same time, Australia was actively involved in Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and in 1994 the APEC Bogor Declaration declared an intention to remove all trade barriers by 2010 for developed countries and by 2020 for those less developed. The year 1994 also saw the creation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) and the completion of the GATT Uruguay Round. This year was also significant for yet another reason: the beginning of Europe’s new policy on Asia. At the EU’s 1994 Essen European Council Meeting, the EU aimed to develop closer engagement with Asia with the publication of the Commission’s ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’. During this period, Asia moved higher up the agendas of both Australia and the EU. EU–Australia dialogue was also broadening and in 1995, Paul Keating sent a letter to the new Commission president, Jacques Santer, suggesting a closer relationship with the EU. This took place in the context of Keating’s announcement of an Australia–Indonesia defence co-operation agreement. That same year, 1995, there was strong Australian criticism of the renewal of French nuclear testing in the Pacific. In 1963, the French government had decided to move its nuclear testing centre to the Pacific, despite Australian objections (Ryan, 1980, 120). On 9 May 1973, Australia had commenced proceedings against France in the International Court of Justice, requesting that the Court state that further atmospheric nuclear tests were inconsistent with international law. The French refused to recognise the competence of the Court and continued to carry out testing in the Pacific. In 1974 the French agreed to halt tests and the court case was never taken to completion. On 20 December, the Court decided that there was no dispute between France and Australia and that Australia’s claim ‘no longer had any object’ (Ryan, 1980, 122). This has been the subject of considerable debate since then, particularly with the reinstatement of tests in the 1990s. In May 1995, the EU began what was to be seen as a new phase in its promotion of human rights and of its own civilian power agenda. This began with the European Council decision to standardise human rights clauses in all international agreements, which did not receive a
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
23
great deal of international attention at the time. In November 1995, meanwhile, the Australian Government accepted a ‘two-track’ approach to the creation of a Framework Agreement between Australia and the EU, at this stage not foreseeing any problem with the inclusion of a human rights clause. The mid-1990s was a period, then, of Australia’s explicit focus on its region, as the economic and trading relationship with the Asia– Pacific continued to grow. Australia was also committed to a clear emphasis on multilateral forums—such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the GATT and the United Nations (UN)—in keeping with the commitment to assert Australia’s role as a ‘middle power’. John Howard became prime minister in March 1996, the same year that the first Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) took place. Australia was excluded from this forum. Nevertheless, in the context of bilateral Australia–EU engagement, 1996 saw the start of negotiations on the Framework Agreement, which proved to be controversial, as analysed in Chapter 4, due to Australia’s objection to including the human rights clause in the draft agreement. In June 1997, a Joint EU–Australia Declaration was signed in Luxembourg, instead of a Framework Agreement. The year 1997 saw the publication of the Howard Government White Paper on Foreign Policy, entitled In the National Interest. In the EU, meanwhile, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and the Commission released its ‘Agenda 2000’ document addressing the implications of incipient EU enlargement of membership and the need for CAP reform and adequate financing of the EU. There was considerable criticism of the CAP by Howard and his Trade Minister, Tim Fischer, and the EU also came under attack for its position on Greenhouse and Energy issues. The Coalition campaign document, ‘A Confident Australia’, had asserted that the highest foreign policy priority would be closer engagement with Asia. In practice, a shift began—away from multilateralism to a focus on state-to-state bilateral relations—towards what can be called traditional bilateralism. The UK and the US were at the top of this list. The Australian Government was committed to an explicit mantra of the national interest. The INI White Paper claimed that it was not necessary to ‘choose between history and geography’; rather, a more pragmatic and utilitarian approach to foreign policy seemed to be operating.
24
Australia and the European Superpower
Exactly three out of 206 paragraphs in the White Paper were dedicated to the EU! The new government argued in numerous forums that European relations (EU and bilateral) had been neglected under the Labor Government and that the Coalition would address this neglect. A series of visits to individual member states of the EU began, with the Downer visits to Italy (where a Joint Declaration on Economic and Cultural Relations was signed in February 1997), to Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands as well as non-EU member Switzerland. Howard visited the UK and Fischer went to Brussels. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Australia during this period. However, given continuous Howard Government criticism of the CAP, it seemed that the relationship was once again moving to a more confrontational style. The Prime Minister expressed criticism of the EU’s stance on the human rights clause in the draft Framework Agreement and was critical of the EU’s position on greenhouse gas emissions. Fischer criticised CAP reform as ‘too cautious’ and a ‘disappointment’. At the same time, an upgrading of the Australian relationship with the US was taking place, especially in the field of defence, and discussions regarding a bilateral free trade agreement.
The changing relationship with the UK When asked what issues should be kept in mind when formulating Australian policy relating to the EU, in the two surveys I have conducted on attitudes to the Australia–EU relationship, some respondents were frank in their assessment of the need to move beyond the relationship with the UK. One respondent replied: ‘Gallipoli/the Somme/UK entry into EC—in other words never trust a Pom’. Another commented: ‘Australia took British entry as a “snub” and in the last forty years the relationship between Australia and the UK has been [one] of “tough neglect”’. One respondent saw the UK as ‘turning away from Australia’, while another said ‘We’ve taken our relationship with the UK too much for granted and let that dominate our relationship with Europe’. A UK-based Australian analyst, Angela Ward, has expressed her frustration at what she sees as a mystery of post-1990s Australia foreign policy, namely ‘the exclusivity with which engagement with Asia was pursued, or at least in the absence of a supplementary policy concerning Western Europe’ (A. Ward, 2002, 189).
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
25
Trade with Europe had been primarily with the UK. After the UK joined the EC, Australia did not at first attempt to diversify its exports to the continental members of the EC.7 From the moment that Britain first applied to join the EC in the early 1960s, the relationship with Australia would never be the same. Stuart Ward, who has written extensively on this period, was of the opinion that the fact of extensive historical, political and economic bonds linking Britain to the Commonwealth meant that any British effort to join the EC would be ‘extremely problematic’ (Ward, 1997, 93). Until Britain actually joined the EC in 1973, Australia had access to the British market for its goods, particularly primary products, under the Ottawa Agreement,8 which consisted of a set of bilateral agreements between the UK with the Commonwealth regarding duties, levies and market access details. In effect, it constituted a Commonwealth trading system (Ward, 1997, 93) based on Commonwealth preference in the British market. This Commonwealth system of preferences was not in any way compatible with the Common External Tariff of the EC, which could not accept preferences by a member state with a country or set of countries. Australia, like Canada and New Zealand, was important politically for Commonwealth cohesion, and also important because it was Australian products that were most at odds with the EC system. These products would be difficult to protect in the accession negotiations, as Ward (1997, 94) points out, because they were in direct competition with other temperate climate agricultural goods, such as wheat, butter and cheese and milk. In 1960, when Britain first attempted accession negotiations with the EC, the UK imported one-third of Australia’s total exports, compared to one-sixth of Canada’s and half of New Zealand’s (Ward, 1997, 94).9 By the early 1960s, despite the fact that the British application had been rebutted, there was recognition in Australian policy making circles that the special relationship with the UK was altering substantially (Bolton, 1980, 210). It is true that trade with the UK had been declining since 1950, but the fact remained that the UK was a large export market for Australia. Between the early 1960s and early 1970s, the British share of Australian export trade declined from 19.6 per cent in 1961–62 to 11.26 per cent in 1970–71 and of imports from 30 to 21 per cent for the same years (Bolton, 1980, 211). This was compensated by Australia’s increased trade with the US and Japan. The old
26
Australia and the European Superpower
relationship with the UK was changing. A media report before British 1973 accession suggested that ‘Much of the fumbling uncertainty which characterises Australia’s official relations with the outside world arises from a failure to accept that Australia’s old relationship with Britain has been eroded by time and events’.10 It has been suggested that the years 1971–75 saw the weakening of formal and informal links between Australia and the UK, ‘more than at any other time in the past’ (Bolton, 1980, 209). The Labor Government’s Attorney General, Lionel Murphy, saw the need to redesign Australia’s legal and constitutional relations while D.J. Killen of the Liberals saw Europe’s ‘federation’ as denoting ‘the most profound and far-reaching of political and constitutional changes’ (Bolton, 1980, 209). It has been argued that Britain’s increased engagement with Europe obliged Australia to ‘follow its own autonomous interests’ (Bolton, 1980, 209). British economist James Rollo has characterised the relationship of Australia and Britain as based on a model of inter-industry trade, whereby at the beginning of the twentieth century Australia sold raw materials to the UK and Britain sold manufactures to Australia (Rollo, 1994, 11). The Australian economy was geared to complement the UK economy: primary produce was exported from Australia to the UK and British manufactures were imported from the UK. Despite the fact that Australia was less dependent on the UK market than New Zealand was in the 1960s, the government of the day was nevertheless dependent on the agricultural community’s support and was keen to defend their interests, as well as not fully trusting the UK Government on this matter (Ward, 1997, 96). In fact, both the Australia and Canadian governments argued in 1962 that the British Macmillan Government was selling out Commonwealth interests (Wilkes, 1997, 25). The Australian Government expressed concern that the Commonwealth would be weakened by the UK’s EC membership (Ward, 1997, 97) and, along with New Zealand, was disturbed by the EC decision in 1962 to apply its Common External Tariff to industrial products from the old Commonwealth—namely Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Ward, 1997, 98). Unlike New Zealand’s pleas for a special case and Canada’s softening of its position in the early 1960s, Australia’s approach was to work directly with the EC and request that it be allowed to participate directly in the
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
27
negotiations (Ward, 1997, 100) as its economic future was being decided. In 1962, Trade Minister John ‘Black Jack’ McEwen urged Britain to accept that Australia’s vital interests would be negatively affected if denied access to the UK market (Ward, 1997, 101), although his approach was seen as complaining at the time. Prime Minister Robert Menzies continued to request British support, although he was at pains to reassure the British that he did not wish to undermine the Commonwealth in any way. It was clear during the first accession negotiations that the Commonwealth would be weaker if the UK joined the EC and that Australia, like Canada and New Zealand, would need to completely reassess the role of the UK in their ‘own international networks, both in political and economic terms’ (Ward, 1997, 105). Although Menzies did not question the UK Government’s desire to join the EC, he expressed reservations in 1962 regarding its implications for the Commonwealth (Watt, 1967, 283). Such reservations were partly based on considerations of the implications for the Commonwealth of possible EC political federation. He regarded the EC’s main founding document, the Treaty of Rome, as potentially damaging to British sovereignty and to its positions within the Commonwealth (Watt, 1967, 284). Watt (1967, 285) notes: ‘It is doubtful whether Menzies’ attitude towards the British application to join the Common Market faithfully reflected the approach to the problem of the ordinary Australians, whose ears were attuned rather to the insistent warnings by the Minister for Trade and leader of the Country Party, Mr. McEwen, of the extent of the economic damage which might result to the Australian economy’. In 1971, British political analyst and federalist John Pinder urged that the UK should secure good treatment for Commonwealth countries in trade and aid. He suggested that the interests of Asian and old Commonwealth countries had not been dealt with, concluding that Britain, as a Community member, would need to ensure that their interests were safeguarded (Pinder, 1971, 428).
Recent engagement with the UK and the rest of Europe We have seen that the historical development of the Australia–British relationship in the context of the EC and EU has deep roots. Firstly, despite the importance of the bilateral relationship, Australia’s relationship with the UK altered, resulting in less dependence on the UK.
28
Australia and the European Superpower
British accession, although bringing about little immediate change in Australian external policy, did significantly alter the flow of certain products to UK markets. It also signalled the beginning of a shift in Australian trade away from Europe. This took place at the time of the new Australian focus on Asia and disillusionment with the EC, with decreased market access. The UK accession had raised fears of the possibility of losing market access and loss of imperial preference and there were enduring fears of the negative impact of the CAP (Gelber, 1966; Miller, 1976). UK accession therefore led to a gradual reorientation of trade and foreign policy and a questioning of Australia’s international role. The end of Commonwealth preferences also signalled the end of the privileged relationship. A second factor—a factor of memory—is that perceptions of the EC/EU have long been dominated by conflict concerning agriculture. Australia is strongly critical of the CAP, which has negative effects on Australian agriculture and on export trade. Australia has consistently criticised the lack of access to European markets, tariff barriers and internal subsidies as well as the EU’s subsidies of exports to third countries.11 Australia’s link with the EU has been difficult in the GATT/WTO context, especially with the Australian leadership of the Cairns group of nations who opposed the EU’s agricultural policy and called for the phasing out of agricultural subsidies (Smith et al, 1996, 160–70). The following charts (Figures 1 and 2) draw on responses from the surveys conducted by the author regarding personal and professional links with individual member states of the EU. The UK features prominently in terms of the range of links that still persist. The chart of professional links almost exactly mirrors the personal ones, which would support the view that elites may be building professional links on personal ones, although there is the possibility that this could operate in the other direction. There may be some evidence that links with nations that contributed a considerable number of immigrants to Australia—for example, Ireland and Greece—may be an underutilised resource. By comparison, Italy is strongly represented, although still not to the extent of Germany and France, which contributed fewer migrants to Australia. The absence of Greek, Portuguese and Spaniards from the pool of elite decision makers and policy analysts who replied to the survey may also be reflected in this chart.
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
29
Figure 1: Survey Responses: Professional Links with Individual Members States of the EU of 15 Countries 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
Sp ain Au str ia Fi nla nd Gr ee ce Po rtu Lu ga xe l m bo ur g
Ita ly Be lgi Ne um th er lan ds Sw ed en De nm ar k Ire lan d
UK Ge rm an y Fr an ce
0%
Figure 2: Survey Responses: Personal Links with Individual Members States of the EU of 15 Countries 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
nd Gr ee ce Po rtu Lu ga xe l m bo ur g
ar k
Fi
nm
nla
en De
ia
ain
ed
Sw
Sp
d
str
um
lan
Au
Ire
lgi Be
lan
ds
ly Ita
er th Ne
Fr an ce Ge rm an y
UK
0%
The chart of Australian investment in the EU (Figure 3) illustrates that the UK is still the major investment base for Australian within the EU.
30
Australia and the European Superpower
Figure 3: EU-Australian Investment at December 20031
United Kingdom Netherlands Germany France Italy Spain Ireland Other EU
1
Source: ABS catalogue 5352.0 Taken from Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Topics: A Quarterly Review of Australiaʼs International Trade, June Quarter 2004, published September 2004.
Australian investment in the UK constitutes 55 per cent of all Australian investment in the EU. This is a clear indication of the importance of the UK in the EU–Australia relationship. An even starker image is evident in the following chart, which illustrates that 77 per cent of EU investment in Australia comes from the UK.
Figure 4: EU Investment in Australia at December 2003
United Kingdom Netherlands Germany France Belgium and Luxembourg Other EU
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
31
Australia’s unresolved identity The American political analyst Samuel Huntington has asserted that the great conflict in the post-Cold War world would be civilisational. In his renowned 1996 book The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of â•›World Order, he attempts to deal with Australia’s unusual geographical positioning, as a Western nation far from other Western nations. The ‘clash of civilisations’ debate regarding civilisational fault lines as characteristics of international conflict has been debated in many academic forums (Huntington, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Buzan, 1997; Goldsworthy, 1994; Grant, 1994; Holmes, 1999) and dramatically oversimplified and quoted for reprehensible purposes since 11 September 2001. Huntington’s seminal article scarcely refers to Australia, featuring it only in ‘an ominous footnote’ (Grant, 1994, 1). Discussion of Australia as a torn country or ‘torn country in reverse’ tends to discuss Australia redefining its focus from a ‘Western’ country to an Asian one, for Huntington. Few in Australia would agree with Huntington that Australia’s relocation to the Asia–Pacific is a defection from the West (Huntington, 1993a, fn 8 on 45; 1996). Australia’s role in the Asia–Pacific is not an underestimation of Western values. References to Australia as a torn country in reverse or as a misplaced continent do little to contribute to an understanding of the Australian relationship with the EU or to an understanding of the domestic contexts of Australian government policy making regarding Asia and Europe. Situated ‘at the foot of Asia’, Australia is geographically distant from its traditional allies, the UK and the US, and geography certainly does influence the search for great and powerful friends. Ian Jack has reminded us that: ‘there was still something unresolved about Australia, both in its identity and its place in the world; an island of 19 million people, mainly of European ancestry, as geographically remote from the North American and European societies it most resembles as it is possible to be’ (Jack, 2000, 7). It can be useful, up to a point, to question whether Australia really is caught between Europe and Asia, between history and geography. Australia may indeed be ‘at the foot of Asia’, the place where Ingleson suggests that the sun sets on the European empire (Ingleson, 1999, 96). But must we believe the populist reductionism of political analyst Samuel Hungtington that ‘we shouldn’t be where we are’ (Keating, 1997)? Australian novelist Thomas Kenneally calls Australia
32
Australia and the European Superpower
‘this huge lummox of a place in the south-west corner of the Pacific Rim’ (Kenneally, 2000, 333). The role of geography as propinquity means that Australia is part of the Asia–Pacific and is often ready to support Asian neighbours, as in the case of the Asian currency crisis in 1997 or the tsunami crisis in late 2004. In terms of traditional political alliances, Australia is still in many ways part of the Global North, with common interests with Europe and North America in the UN and WTO. In terms of security alliances, Australia remains reluctant to sign non-aggression pacts with countries of ASEAN, in part due to US influence. This discussion of geography can also lead to circular arguments. The fact that Australia is located far from Europe has not helped the development of a sense of neighbourliness with the EU. International political economist Richard Higgott and foreign policy expert Kim Nossal (1997) point to the Australian experience of liminality, of being ‘neither here nor there’ and in a state of flux between two existences. Australia has always sought great and powerful friends in its dependence on Western allies. There was a time when it was a Cold War Commonwealth country of the Pacific which was politically geared to relations with ‘the West’. Its self-definition was of British citizens in Australia and Menzies regarded Australia in the 1950s as ‘British to the boot-heels’. A more recent prime minister was not so convinced. In 1997, former Prime Minister Paul Keating said of Australia, ‘We were exiles from a home—and that home is Great Britain’ (Keating, 1997). While the British influence is still pervasive in contemporary Australia and particularly in the Coalition Government view of the world since the beginning of this century, it is equally important to reiterate that Europe is more than the UK—and we need to be aware of the fact that Australia has much in common with the rest of Europe—and that Europe does not begin and end on the west of the St Georges Channel. Is there fog on the channel or a foggy concept of identity? Are Australians cut off by the Channel from the rest of Europe? Keating (1997) suggests, that the ‘prospect of Europe from Westminster Bridge is very distorting’, and particularly so if there is a sense that Australia has a largely British identity. The image of Australia as a branch office of empire—the British empire—is a recurrent theme and, as Keating, Higgott and others have demonstrated, a tenacious one (Keating, 1997; Higgott, 1994; Murray, 2002b). Indeed, as one noted analyst
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
33
pointed out, Australia’s early relationship with Britain emphasised the role Britain played as the motherland: ‘For decades after 1901 a great majority of Australians continued to see themselves as British folk living overseas, good and solid members of a British family of nations which played an essentially united role in the world’ (Gelber, 1992, 66). There has been considerable debate accorded to whether Australia really is a branch office of the British Empire at the foot of Asia or whether Australia is a deputy sheriff to the US in the Asia– Pacific region, or perhaps both. Australia is not a participant in the Asia Europe Meetings between the EU and the counties of ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea, known as ASEAN Plus Three. While some Australian officials are not unduly worried by this, one proponent of closer ties with Asia sees it as a disaster, suggesting that the fact that Australia is denied participation in one of the ‘critical political councils of the coalition of states which dominates us economically’ is ‘comparable to a colonial status for Australia’ (Fitzgerald, 1997, 2). The contemporary context of the Australia–EU relationship is, and will remain, unbalanced and asymmetrical (Murray, 2003b). It is clear that the EU is more important to Australia and Australian business than Australia is to the EU. Even though Australia has important linkages and concerns in Asia and the US, it is with the EU that Australia has more trade—in goods and services—and more investment than with any other sole entity. The EU as a single entity is Australia’s largest merchandise trading partner, with total trade in merchandise for 2002 worth A$44.2 billion. Australian merchandise exports to the EU grew 1 per cent to A$14.9 billion in 2002. The EU is Australia’s largest source of merchandise imports (mainly medicaments, passenger motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and measuring and controlling instruments), which amounted to A$29.3 billion in 2002. Investment in Australia from EU countries was worth A$294.4 billion at end June 2002, making the EU our largest source of foreign investment. In addition, the EU is the second-largest foreign destination for Australian investors, with investment totalling A$127 billion at the end of June 2002. There are signs that, despite considerable criticism of the EU, its economic importance for Australia is gradually being recognised by John Howard, who has
34
Australia and the European Superpower
stated that ‘the European Union is a major economic player in the world and remains vital to our interests’ (Howard, 2001). Australia’s interests in foreign policy are defined by a perceived need for alliances and great and powerful friends. Foreign Minister Downer has stated that ‘[t]he greatest responsibility in international relations is to stand up for the national interest’.12 Much academic analysis and discourse reflects a preoccupation with being an isolated, disconnected continent, a needy and dependent continent. It is beyond the scope of this book to determine the extent to which Australia’s geography is an element of its unresolved identity. It may well be regarded as a misplaced continent, but that is not tremendously useful in understanding EU–Australia relations once the role of distance has been understood. The development of Australia’s alliances and friends, from the UK to the US, is significant—the US is the major potential protector. Over the years, Australia’s national interests have been harnessed to a ‘great power protector’ over whom Australia has had little control, such as the British Empire and the association with the US (Mediansky, 1992, 316).
Still calling the UK home? Interwoven histories and futures Australia’s first major international agreement was regarding the transfer of money orders between the UK and Australia. A lot has changed since then. We have seen in this chapter that, so often in the last two hundred years, Australian history has been based on an affinity with the UK, on some sense of Britishness. It was common until a generation ago for Australians to refer to going ‘home’ to the UK. This is a sort of imagined motherland a hemisphere away. Perhaps it is only properly understood when Australians actually visit the UK. Jill Ker Conway (1991, 201) realised this and the danger of seeing ourselves in terms of a distant imagined community: For each of us, in our separate ways, the journey involved the redefinition of our relationship to the past and reconfiguring our sense of geography. Just as we know ourselves in relation to others, so I knew how beautiful Australia was only after encountering the real rather than the imagined landscape of England and Europe.
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
35
It has been suggested that an important recurring motif in Australia political life is regular visits to centres of power overseas (Alomes, 2001, 1), including provisions to attend Wimbledon and Test cricket matches at Lords. Certainly visits to the UK and the US have been regular. In the European context, political visits to London are far more frequent than to other capitals (Murray, 2003). This sends a clear message to European countries that the UK remains a primary point of contact. The UK and Europe Survey respondents have commented as follows: ‘By identifying closely with the US and the UK in our business and political approaches, we tend to distance ourselves from continental Europe.’ ‘Australians have limited knowledge and understanding of the nature and extent of European integration, except for a wellinformed small minority.’ ‘The continuing relationship with Britain…remains significant in terms of institutions, travel, migration and cultural exchange.’ ‘There is the need to cultivate cultural awareness with the countries of the EU which have contributed to Australian cultural heritage—not only the UK, but Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Spain et al.’ ‘We must overcome our Anglo centric approach to the EU!’ ‘Australia has to make a bigger effort on trade and investment relationships with the EU member states other than the UK.’ ‘The EU is one of the more important jigsaw puzzle pieces necessary for the maintenance of Australian prosperity and security, but not the only one.’ It may well be the case that Australia needs to engage in some flexible identity management in its relationship with different parts of the world and to work out its own role and deal with its past. Values evident in Australian foreign policy and the relationship with the EU illustrate how Australia is adapting, for example, to the fact that the EU is increasingly becoming a manager of its own, and even global, norms, as an emerging European Superpower. The extent to which there is a willingness to understand the transformative effect the EU
36
Australia and the European Superpower
has on its member states illustrates the extent to which there is recognition in Australia of the EU’s transformative impact on Australia and globally. It can be persuasively argued that the EU–Australia relationship is a smooth relationship and that the only stumbling block is agriculture. It can equally be noted that the only part of the relationship that is well known in Australia is, precisely, agriculture. There is certainly a healthy trade relationship and the EU and Australia engage on a range of issues. Much depends on the history of interstate relations, such as that between the UK and Australia. It is influenced by understandings in Europe and Australia of each other’s positions, as we shall see in the chapter dealing with mutual misunderstandings (Chapter 5). There is a history of negotiations, both conflictual and positive, based on mutual trust, mutual respect and, at times, mutual misunderstanding. Linked to this, there is also a history of shared goals and commonalities—for example, on immigration and security agendas, as we discern in Chapter 6 regarding the new dialogue. Engagement is broad and deep—multidimensional, multipolicy, multi-actor, multi-sector. It increasingly encompasses issues of governance, EU norms and attributes, and not simply politics, diplomacy and economics. Australia has developed negotiating skills and strategies with the EU as an international actor. Australia is in a potentially useful and positive position—a Western liberal democratic ally, friend of Europe and of the US in geopolitics and military policy, as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a leader in some issues in the Asia–Pacific. It is one of a relatively small group of advanced industrialised states with whom the EU deals. What is the view of the Europeans? A past chief EU negotiator with Australia has given it a positive gloss: Given the common kinship and heritage that Europe and Australia share, the shared political values that both seek to promote, the concerns for peace and progress that both address in a variety of fora, our ties are being constantly renewed. What better basis for a fruitful partnership into a new century? (Patten, 2000, 9) Yet there is a reticence on Australia’s part in dealing with the EU, and while this may be understandable in the short term due to the
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
37
problems of the CAP and perceptions of a special relationship with the UK or of a British betrayal, it is not beneficial for Australia in the long term. The EU is undermining world trade with the CAP but Australia has meanwhile established extensive markets for goods throughout Asia and it has huge trade flows with the EU. There may be little need for a discussion of whether Australia is an Asian or a European country or neither or both. There is some evidence of a move from the ‘CAPUK’ factors—the focus on the CAP and the UK single-country focus—to give space for an improved structure of political and diplomatic opportunities for Australia with the EU. There is already an established goodwill between the EU and Australia in the Western and Others Group in the United Nations and in many UN agencies as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum. This could and should be exploited and used by Australia to build up coalitions and alliances with the EU. The EU has shifting coalitions based on issues and the Australian government could use this knowledge in its negotiations with EU member states. This can mean an approach of ‘seek markets: seek allies’. In other words, why stick with only one ally—the UK—when there are twenty-five member states and access to twenty-five sets of ears to listen to Australia’s lobbying? This new prism for a new Europe is evident in Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s recognition of the value of this new type of relationship, when he commented that Australia needs to ‘work hard on building our links not only with the individual member states of the EU, but also with the European institutions. We need to see Europe through a new prism, not just through the UK and traditional relationships’ (EU News, 20, 2, June/July 2002). This study investigates whether that is taking place.
Notes The Bulletin, 10 Dec 2000 – 2 Jan 2001, p. 45. Australia lost 60,000 in deaths and 226,000 wounded in World War I and 36,000 in deaths in World War II. Prime Minister Billy Hughes is reported as having said to United States President Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles conference in 1919: ‘I speak for 60,000 dead. How many do you speak for Mr President?’ 3 Quoted in Paul Kelly, ‘Let’s court the newest big player’, The Australian, 24 June 1998. 4 Comments made by Prime Minister Howard to the Commonwealth Parliament, 14 May 2002. 1 2
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Australia and the European Superpower
A stocktake report on the EU–Australia relationship by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) at the April 2003 high-level meetings (the ministerial consultations) illustrates that a plethora of meetings has taken place in recent years. See Appendix 3. 6 The description is given by Benvenuti, 1998–99, p. 64. 7 The original six members of the EC were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 8 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Trade Agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ottawa, 20 August 1932), Entry into force: 20 August 1932, Australian Treaty Series, 1932, No. 16. At http://www.austlii.edu.au/. It ensured the continuance of entry free of duty into the United Kingdom of Australian goods which complied with the laws and statutory regulations for the time being in force affecting the grant of Imperial preference. 9 See Ward (1997) for a discussion of the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian positions in 1961–63. 10 Australian Financial Review, 15 November 1971, quoted in Bolton, 1980, p. 214. 11 The main Australian products affected were dairy products, eggs, beef, veal, sugar and wheat. 12 Downer: Question without Notice: Greenhouse Gases, 23 September 1997 Database: House Hansard Questioner: Lloyd, Jim, MP (Robertson, LP, Government). Responder: Downer, Alexander, MP (Mayo, Foreign Affairs, LP) p. 8161. Proof. Question without Notice. 5
Australia and Europe: The Burden of Memory
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Chapter 2
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe: Close Encounters with a Twenty-first–century Superpower
‘There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.’ —Machiavelli, 1505 ‘[W]e must do all we can to capitalise on the very strong economic links between Australia and Europe. Australia also needs to recognise the impact of developments in European integration’ —Alexander Downer, 19991 The European Union has carved out a new role in world politics. The ways in which it exerts power and negotiates are different, setting it apart from other international actors. It is neither a state nor a conventional international organisation. It is complex, widely misunderstood and oft-maligned. While accepted as an important actor in world trade, the EU is considered by some in Australia and elsewhere to have an international role that is over-stated by its own agencies and by some analysts. There is considerable antagonism towards the
EU’s international role in attempting to promote good governance through international agreements and persuasion. Some political analysts have questioned the existence of an identifiable European position on global issues (Grugel, 2004, 603; Manners, 2002) while others accept that the EU may well be a superpower but vehemently oppose it as it is not a state. This chapter investigates the international role of the EU and focuses in particular on the impact of the EU on Australia. It examines the EU’s international agenda in three ways. First, it analyses the nature of the EU as a political and economic entity. Second, it explores the ways the EU has positioned itself as a global player in the areas of trade, foreign policy, governance, regulation and human rights. Third, it examines how the EU affects Australia in a number of ways. It argues that, while the EU is not a traditional type of superpower, it has evolved into an ‘accidental superpower’. That is, it is an influential player with roles and powers, or competences, which can be termed ‘supranational’ as they exist above the twenty-five constituent states of the EU. This distinctive role of the EU, which is explained in this chapter, results in a number of actions that can have largely unintended or ‘accidental’ consequences for other parts of the world. Many scholars have examined the EU’s external relations with reference to the transatlantic relationship or EU development aid programs, or the EU’s neighbourhood, Russia and future members. Relatively little has been written on the EU’s external impact outside of the specialisation devoted to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its defence and security identity (Smith, 1996; Hill, 1998; Knodt and Princen, eds, 2003). Relatively little work has been carried out to date on the Australia–EU relationship. Some scholars have examined EU–Asia relations, with some reference to Australia (Wiessala, 2002; Gilson, 2004). Others have regarded the EU as an economic actor, the purview of economists and international political economy scholars. More recently, it is regarded as exerting non-traditional dominance characterised by civilian power (Leonard, 2005). This chapter illustrates that the EU is a key international actor and that it possesses a distinctive political ‘persona’ as a civilian power. It demonstrates how the EU acts in international forums. This sets the context for an understanding of Australia’s new relationship
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
41
with Europe, which is Australia’s largest trading partner. It seeks to illustrate the importance for Australia of key EU developments, such as the single currency, the euro; the enlargement of EU territorial boundaries; the extension of EU policy scope; and changing approaches to governance. Australia’s reaction to these significant developments is examined. There are pressures placed on Australia by the EU’s regional integration project. These pressures take a variety of forms. For example, some may result from the EU’s preferential trade agreements with other parts of the world. This can influence the direction and the scope of Australia’s engagement with the EU. Recent developments such as the rapid expansion of the EU policy sphere and policy remit and its recent territorial enlargement have global consequences as the EU appears to act as a superpower, and so are of crucial contemporary relevance to Australia.
Understanding the EU as a political and economic entity The impact of the EU’s trading might, its policies and regulatory regime are felt far beyond its territorial reach and policy scope because Europe is a major actor in international forums such as the WTO, and conducts trading negotiations with both individual states and regional groupings. However, the EU’s influential international role is contested in many parts of the world, including Australia. While its international reach and extensive influence are the focus of admiration, they are also subjected to robust criticism. The EU is admired for its transformation from a continent torn by violence into one of the world’s most prosperous and peaceful regions. It is highly regarded for its humanitarian and relief projects, providing some 55 per cent of the world’s development aid, when both EU and individual member state aid is combined. Its efforts to halt the trafficking of women and children have been commended. The EU is a global leader in environmental governance. Comprising twenty-five nation states, the EU has a population of some 457 million and accounts for 25 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product. It has an economy comparable to that of the US. Further, it accounts for 20 per cent of global imports and exports. These features contribute to the EU’s growing international importance.
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Australia and the European Superpower
War and peace There is one feature of the EU regarded by many Europeans—and those who admire or wish to emulate it—as the most significant. It is a reality that the EU has achieved peace. To Australians and to many younger Europeans, the most obvious feature may be its market project. Yet what made post-1945 Western Europe distinctive was the decision by its leaders to embark on a new experiment of co-operative politics. The desire for reconciliation forms the basis of the postwar integration project, seeking to merge sovereignty rather than to continue tensions. Under the rubric of interstate co-operation, a number of initiatives took place to achieve a radical re-evaluation of the purpose of the nation state. A new type of political order emerged from the devastation of World War II, leading to the creation of what became known as the European Community (EC), later the EU. This, then, was the ‘constitutionalizing moment’ of the European integration project: ‘the sum of the atrocities of the twentieth century in general, and the persecution and extermination of European Jews in particular’ and the dignity of this response, according to legal expert Christian Joerges, is what gives the EU its strength and legitimacy (Joerges, 2005). Further, Europe was the site of the Cold War, divided into two camps, both ideologically (aligned with the USA and USSR respectively) and physically, with an Iron Curtain of tanks and barriers. Two powerful hegemonies were supported by different parts of the globe in a severe bipolarity. This was the stark geopolitical and strategic context for co-operation among the nation states of Western Europe, a project that became known as ‘European integration’. Table 1.â•… The Original Communities of the European Union Community
Treaty and Date
European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty of Paris, April 1951
European Economic Community
Treaty of Rome, March 1957
European Atomic Energy Community
Treaty of Rome, March 1957
The project was the subject of considerable conflict, and cleavage lines were soon drawn within Europe regarding the nature of Europe’s reconstruction, the means to achieve co-operation and long-term
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
43
goals of the project. Although political imperatives were uppermost in the minds of the EC’s creators, important economic imperatives of reconstruction and major ideological struggles were also evident (Navari, 1996). A cleavage emerged in the early stages between those who favoured the creation of a new European political entity (federalists) and those who sought to rebuild the nation state through policy co-operation (functionalists). The federalists were committed to a goal of creating a federal polity (a United States of Europe), transcending the nation state, while the functionalists were committed to rebuilding the state’s structures through functional or sectoral means, such as a Coal and Steel Community and the Common Agricultural Policy. In terms of strategies, the federalists pursued a strategy based on a political determinism of federalist government at the supranational level. Those who wished to see the European project result in a type of free trade area and some common policies were advocates of an economic determinism. There were not only cleavages. There were also bitter divisions and battles regarding the role of the state and of the EU institutions. These are often expressed as the supranationalist (policies above the nation state) approach versus the inter-governmentalist (retaining a large measure of national sovereignty) approach, although there are considerable nuances (Murray and Rich, eds, 1996). Table 2.â•… Goals and Strategies in the EU’s Origins
Federalists
Functionalists
GOALS:
STRATEGIES:
Transcend the nation state.
Political determinism
Create a new European
(to be achieved through
polity.
political means).
Rebuild the nation state.
Economic determinism (to be achieved through economic means).
This post-war period of unprecedented idealism and innovative projects was also a period of tremendous food shortages. In addition to extensive rebuilding of the nation states, democracy and industry, there was a keen desire for a reliable food supply. For this reason, and as a key element of the Franco–German bargain that underpinned
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Australia and the European Superpower
the entire integration process, the CAP became a hallmark of significant sectoral integration (see Chapter 3). The newly created common market enabled free movement for all industrial and agricultural goods, and in 1993 the Single Market achieved the free movement of goods and services and of capital and enterprise. Further, the establishment of a single currency, the euro, became a new hallmark of successful regional integration. The EU expanded its membership several times from the original six states, as shown in Table 3. Table 3.â•… The 25 Member States of the European Union EU Member states
Date of Accession
Belgium
1957
France
1957
Germany
1957
Italy
1957
Luxembourg
1957
The Netherlands
1957
Denmark
1973
Ireland
1973
UK
1973
Greece
1981
Portugal
1986
Spain
1986
Austria
1995
Finland
1995
Sweden
1995
Cyprus
2004
Czech Republic
2004
Estonia
2004
Hungary
2004
Latvia
2004
Lithuania
2004
Malta
2004
Poland
2004
Slovak Republic
2004
Slovenia
2004
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
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46
Table 4.â•… The Institutions of the New Europe Institution
Main features
Role
Supranational or
Membership
Australia and the European Superpower
Intergovernmental Council of
Sectoral. National
the EU
Ministers.
Co-decisionmaker with EP
Intergovernmental
National Ministers from all 25 member states
(Council of ministers) European
Head of State and
Final decisionmaker in Summits
Intergovernmental
Heads of State or
Council
Government
European
College of
Initiates
Commission
Commissioners from
Legislation.
from each member
all member states.
Manages EU
state.
government of 25 states
Budget and policy implementation Negotiates International Agreements Represents EU abroad. Watchdog of legislation Administration of programs. Broker of interests with other institutions.
Supranational
25 Commissioners -
Institution
Main features
Role
Supranational or
Membership
Intergovernmental Supranational
Members directly
European
Co-decisionmaker with
Democratic representative of EU
Parliament
Council.
citizens.
elected by citizens of
732 members. Largest
Control over EU Budget.
all 25 states.
multinational
Scrutiny of legislation.
parliament in the
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
world. Supranational
25 Judges appointed
Court of
Legal authority.
Maintains balance between
Justice
Interprets the EU
institutions & states.
by governments of
treaties. Ensures EU
Judicial review.
member states.
and national law
Direct effect of EC law.
conform.
Primacy of EC law over national law. Clarify states’ obligations.
47
The area of the twenty-five states is about half (52 per cent) the size of Australia. The EU has twenty-one official languages. There is no common language of negotiation in the EU, although English is widely spoken. This not only is a problem for identification at the elite level of institutions but it raises practical issues of European identity. There is no single understanding of what Europe is, or who is European, either within or outside of the EU (see Chapter 5). Nor is there a common understanding of a European history. As pointed out by European integration scholars Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski (2004, 581), ‘Lack of a common language has not only hindered the practical business of the EU, it has also hindered the popular identification of Europeans with their politicians, and with each other. Europeans, then, can communicate with each other through historical memory and language only with difficulty.’ There is no common language of politics throughout the EU, an entity that operates on a number of levels (national, regional below the state and supranational above the state) and in a number of institutions. For example, the European Parliament has 732 members from twenty-five countries and the language of politics can be quite nuanced there. The European Parliament is multi-party, multilingual and multinational. Its members are much-travelled and as adept at the use of plane and train timetables as they are at listening to debate while constantly wearing translation headphones. The European Parliament is a new and distinct actor in co-decision with the Council, and of representation, legitimacy and scrutiny, which debates and passes resolutions on the international political environment—and human rights clauses in EU international agreements. There is a combination of political cultures in the EU, ranging from the British style of confrontational politics to consensus democracy including styles of ‘consociational’ democracy, based on coalitions and qualified majority voting. The EU has a comparatively small public service, smaller than many government departments or than Australia’s Centrelink. It employs some 22,000 officials in its main institution for day-today management, the European Commission. Close co-operation among its states and institutions has radically altered the nature of governance within the EU, in a process often referred to as Europeanisation.
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Australia and the European Superpower
The EU has become the most integrated bloc of nation states in the world. Former Commissioner Chris Patten has stated that: ‘The European experiment is important not just in itself, but because it represents the most advanced experiment in regional integration yet devised in a world that desperately needs new paradigms for the management of its affairs’ (Patten, 2002a). Three features of the EU’s creation still have an impact on its operations today. First, the EU is the product of specific historic circumstances, of a post-war political reconstruction. Second, it is the outcome of the ideals of the continental political elites of Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands). The UK and Ireland did not participate at this stage. This elite enterprise was not the result of popular sentiment. Third, the EU is a unique and distinctive international organisation, which includes government elites and influential institutions. The key players in the contemporary EU are the European institutions; the twenty-five member states (EU25); the regions of these states; and an extensive network of interest groups, lobby groups and peak organisations. The voting in the Council of the EU (Council of Ministers) is carried out largely by a process known as qualified majority voting. This is a weighted majority system of 321 votes among twenty-five states. Table 5.â•… Voting in the Council France
29
Sweden
10
Germany
29
Denmark
7
Italy
29
Finland
7
UK
29
Ireland
7
Poland
27
Lithuania
7
Spain
27
Slovak Republic
7
The Netherlands
13
Cyprus
4
Belgium
12
Estonia
4
Czech Republic
12
Latvia
4
Greece
12
Luxembourg
4
Hungary
12
Slovenia
4
Portugal
12
Malta
3
Austria
10
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
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While you were sleeping: How the EU became a global player in trade Europe has effected considerable change in the international political landscape. It signs major international treaties and agreements, extending beyond the economic scope. It adopts common positions in the UN, the WTO and the Food and Agricultural Organisation, for example. The Commission has exclusive competence over the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the major external market policy. It harmonises trade policies of the EU25 in common principles regarding ‘tariff rates, trade agreements, liberalisation measures, export policy and anti-dumping’ (DFAT, 2001, ExportEU, Canberra, DFAT, 2001, at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/eu_exports/section_one.html , accessed 18/4/05). The Commission is the major negotiator in international trade agreements and perhaps the most public face of the EU, as the interlocutor in international negotiations. It is allocated sole competences for trade negotiations in goods, but may also be empowered, by a mandate of the representatives of the twenty-five member states in the Council, to negotiate with other states on behalf of the EU on issues relating to services and intellectual property. The EU has joint or concurrent competences, that is, a sharing of decision-making powers between the supranational EU institutions and the twenty-five member states, in international environment and transport policies. Trade is a central focus of the EU’s activity. Trade and other economic policies are major EU domains and external economic relationships are initiated and managed by the Commission and subject to the EU institutional decision-making process. The statistics regarding the EU, the world’s largest trading bloc, are impressive. It is the world’s largest exporter of merchandise goods, having exported $A1.7tn in 2003, or 19 per cent of global exports. In comparison, the US exported $A1.1tn (13%), Japan $A723bn (8%), China $A672 (8%) and Australia $A108bn (1%). It is also the world’s second-largest importer of merchandise goods, with $A1.7tn worth of imports in 2002 or 19 per cent of world imports. In comparison, the US imported $A2.0tn (22%), China $A633bn (7%), Japan $A587bn (6%), and Australia $A136bn (1%). The EU is the world’s biggest exporter and importer of services, accounting for over a quarter of all world trade in services in 2002 (http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/eu_and_australia/ KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm). 50
Australia and the European Superpower
The expansion of the EU’s trade role and impact is part of being an entity in flux. Since its creation, scholars have attempted to understand this entity. This has been a challenging task for a number of reasons. One is that the EU resembles a ‘moving target’ because it periodically reforms its institutional architecture and extends its membership. It also continually broadens its range of policy concerns, which now include economics and finance, justice, social welfare, communications, education, defence and foreign affairs. A second key reason is that the EU has radically changed relations among the European nation states. It has also wrought considerable change in the dynamics of international relations more widely, propelling new actors onto the international stage, and thereby challenging the established boundaries between domestic and international politics. Such transformations are very publicly evident in their transformative impact on nation states, subnational regions, in many cases, and in global governance forums. This has led to considerable re-evaluation by scholars regarding how we utilise conceptual and analytical tools; and not only scholars but also states’ representatives throughout the world are rethinking some basic assumptions about the dynamics of international politics (Rumford and Murray, 2003a, 2003b) and the EU’s role therein.
The Single Market: Single entity, single trader One way that the EU attempted to become a world player in trade was through the removal of all remaining barriers to trade within its own frontiers—the creation of a frontier-free Europe. The creation of the Single Market (also known as the Single Internal Market and Single European Market) in January 1993 was a massive undertaking to create the largest frontier-free market in the world. It eliminated the remaining barriers to the freedom of movement of goods, persons, capital and enterprise within the EU, resulting in a remarkable mobility of capital and of professionals, establishments of enterprises and free movement of EU migrants. This market was created in order to self-consciously rival the US and Japan in world trade.
The euro Euro notes and coins were introduced in January 2002 throughout the twelve countries. The euro’s introduction as the single currency for twelve European states2 in the euro zone has seen the EU’s standing Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
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“Down and Out Dollar” by Jeff Parker
Jeff Parker, Cagle Cartoons, Inc.
as an international economic power enhanced, despite fluctuations. This is the second-largest economy and financial market after the USA and the euro is the second most important currency on international financial markets (European Commission Delegation, October 2004). The twelve euro states are known collectively as Euroland and account for approximately 16 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and just over 20 per cent of world trade in goods and services (Harcourt, 2004). This single currency means that European shoppers have price transparency across twelve countries. It reduces transaction costs in cash transactions and in business. The euro also provides less currency risk and provides for more stability and lower inflation across Europe and a bigger, more competitive market in the euro zone, as it has become known.
Implications of the EU enlargement The EU has expanded its membership since 1973. In May 2004, it undertook its most momentous enlargement, taking in ten new member states, eight of which were from Eastern and Central Europe,
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a symbolic undermining of the Cold War at last. The EU’s raison d’être was peace. Joerges (2005) argues, however, that this particular enlargement is different and significant for distinctive reasons. Enlargement is the most visible new challenge to the technocratic and economic potential of the Union. It is also a challenge to the historical bases for and the aspirations of the integration project. The new Member States did not take part in the post-war settlement and their motivations for joining the Union need to be brought into harmony with the post-war settlement of the founding members of the European Economic Community. The EU25 is more powerful, more influential and more diverse than ever before.
Who Speaks as Europe? Dial E for Europe As a world trader, the EU executive body, the European Commission, has exclusive competence in commercial trade negotiations in goods within the WTO. The Commission signs treaties for the member states on the basis of a mandate from the Council. American political scientist John McCormick (2005, 113) identifies the areas in which the EU has most policy responsibility, or competence, as: agriculture, competition, consumer protection, cross-border banking, cross-border crime, customs, the environment, EU transport networks, monetary policy (euro zone), fisheries, immigration, and trade and working conditions. The areas in which there is shared authority are: culture, employment, energy, export promotion, foreign relations, information networks, overseas aid, regional development, small to mediumsized enterprises, social issues, vocational training and tax policy. There remain some important areas in which most of the authority lies with the member states, although even in these areas there is often a recognition of the usefulness of some form of transnational and supranational co-operative mechanism. These areas of almost exclusive national competence are: broadcasting, citizenship, criminal justice, defence, education, elections, health care, land use, local transport, policing, and postal services.
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When discussing the role of the EU as an international actor, analysts agree that the European Union is not a state, although some state-like features mean that the EU and its institutions possess powers and competences above the constituent nation states—hence the ability to act on behalf of the twenty-five. The EU cannot be ignored as an international bloc, whether in international organisations or in national foreign and trade policy of its interlocutors (Smith, 1996).
The legal and institutional basis of the EU’s external relations activities The EU is first and foremost a legal entity. EU law is applicable in member states, where it takes precedence over national legislation. All agreements negotiated by the Union are based on the EU’s treaties (and Constitution, if ratified).3 The EU is a unique legal and international body of nation states, as it has agreed to pool sovereignty in a governance structure above the state, which includes member states as crucial actors in the decision-making process. While states retain the right to negotiate many traditional bilateral agreements, when it comes to EU external relations it is the European Commission that is the major negotiator. Foreign policy specialist Michael M. Smith (1996) describes the EU as not simply an actor but also a process—‘a set of complex institutions, roles and rules which structure the activities of the EU’. The EU’s institutional structure, the number and scope of its policies and the number of members, have evolved considerably since its inception. These are encompassed in the institutional network and the acquis communautaire, namely the rules, laws and policy-making structures and policies of the EU and its members. The Commission has the sole treaty authority to negotiate trade agreements, on the basis of a Council mandate, and the member states must subsequently ratify the negotiated treaty (Skogstad, 2001, 486). In relations with GATT, the Commission was given exclusive competence for commercial policy, although it was not a signatory to the GATT. Although the Commission had competence for trade in manufactured goods, there was considerable dispute about its role in trade in services by some member states (Sbragia, 1998). Here the issue of coherence in policy making is in dispute. European Court of Justice cases have ruled in favour of the Commission rather than the
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Australia and the European Superpower
member states on this issue (Sbragia, 1998). The EU’s system of mixed competences, where states and EU institutions jostle for influence (Meunier and Nicolaides, 1999), is particularly evident in the area of trade competences. Tensions arise between the Commission and the Council regarding the degree of latitude in international trade negotiations, which are determined by Council voting rules and the interinstitutional balance of political resources (Skogtad, 2001). The EU trade negotiating power, although disputed both within and outside of the EU, has a significant impact on the world trading system and regulatory regimes. It is not only external policy that is EU-regulated; in the case of public procurement, for instance, this is now Europeanbased and not national.
EU international agreements and the human rights issue Trade is just one important aspect of the EU’s extensive network of agreements. In many international accords, the EU sets out stringent conditions with its partners, known as ‘conditionality’, particularly regarding the management of democracy; good governance; human rights and civil society. There is a standard human rights clause in all trade and co-operation agreements signed by the EU with its interlocutors, since May 1995. In this way, it explicitly links trade and norms regarding civil society and governance in a way that can adversely affect countries such as Australia on world markets. There is another reason for this human rights clause being problematic in the dialogue that Australia maintains with Europe: Australia refused to sign an international agreement with the EU in 1997 precisely because of its human rights, as discussed in Chapter 4. The EU possesses an active Human Rights and Democratisation Policy. The EU’s advancement of human rights and democratisation agendas can be seen as a type of civilian power actor. The EU has a number of preferential trade agreements. There is a large number of international agreements both with individual countries and blocs and considerable variety of agreements, such as economic, sectoral and development aid accords. It was recently estimated that, of the almost €1000 billion worth of imports to the EU each year, approximately one-fifth benefit from reduced or nil-duty rates under the preferential trade arrangements negotiated with mostly developing countries (news@eu 63, 22 April 2005).
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What kind of Agreements does the EU make? • Customs unions (Turkey) • Free trade agreement with the European Economic Area (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein) and Switzerland; members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) participating in EU internal market legislation; and South Africa • ‘Stabilisation and association process' with Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro • Preferential agreements with Mediterranean states, European Neighbourhood Policy • Cotonou Agreement of Development aid with 77 African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries • Commercial & economic co-operation agreements with Asian, South American states • Free trade Negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) • Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and most countries in the south Caucasus and central Asia: agreements on trade, political cooperation, environmental protection, collaboration in scientific and cultural matters • EU–ASEAN—Association of South East Asian Nations
So does this make the EU a metrosexual superpower? The EU experience of transnational co-operation is regarded by many as the means to work out international diplomacy and resolve almost intractable problems. The EU knows that carrots are better than sticks, that soft power is more persuasive than hard power and that it has clout in international negotiations. Welcome to the new world of the metrosexual superpower—the EU of the twenty-first century. The metrosexual persona combines an urban lifestyle with style and sensitivity. Metrosexuals are strong, suave, sophisticated and attractive (Khanna, 2004), attracting friends, acolytes and imitators. They are less threatening than hard power. In some quarters, the role of the EU is increasingly regarded as that of a metrosexual soft power in global
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governance (Khanna, 2004; Murray, 2005a; Rifkin 2004), including in the utilisation of the human rights clause in agreements. One Clause to rule them all? The EU Human Rights Clause in all EU international agreements with third countries ‘Respect for the democratic principles and human rights established by [the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe] [as well as the principles of market economy] [as defined at the Bonn CSCE conference] inspires the domestic and external policies of the Community and of [third country] and constitute an essential element of this agreement.’ ‘If either party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the other party with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the functioning of this Agreement. These measures shall be notified immediately to the other Party and shall be the subject of consultations if the other Party so requests.’4 The EU itself promotes a program based on good governance and a network of links with less developed counties. It regards civil society as well as governments as key partners, based on ‘partnership and co-operation, rather than sanctions and other negative measures’ in order to ‘achieve sustainable change’ (European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/ index.htm#4/). We have seen that the ways in which the EU exerts power and negotiates are different from the ways states do so. It has been argued that the EU can offer difference: different sets of analysis of international problems, different solutions and an approach to international relations that is based increasingly on diplomacy and multilateralism, building on historical precedent, economic growth and the declining credibility of the US role in the world. This presents the EU with the opportunity to exert itself as a superpower (McCormick, 2005, 226).
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Some observers point to the gap between capabilities and expectations (Hill, 1998), based on arguments that the EU must become a more powerful international political actor, and so must strengthen its foreign policy. This is a perception based on the need for hard power in foreign affairs and defence. The idea of an EU foreign policy is as old as the EU itself, although initiatives were not successful until the 1990s. The creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy reappeared on the EC agenda due to the end of Cold War; German reunification; the reduction in US involvement in Europe; the end of the East–West division of Europe and the war in Yugoslavia. Yet it can be argued that the EU has, for some time, conducted an assertive foreign policy as a contested ‘suprapower’ (power above the nation state) through trade negotiations and conditionality, emphasising trade and aid enticements, with the threat of their withdrawal in cases of noncompliance with human rights clauses in its international agreements. This view suggests that the EU exerts considerable weight as a civilian power rather than in traditional foreign policy terms (Duchêne, 1972; Bull, 1983; Manners, 2002; Padoa-Scioppa, 2004). Many commentators urge the EU to advance its international agenda, with a teleological imperative that the EU needs a more robust foreign policy as part of an evolution towards a powerful EU (even a counterweight to the US). These recommendations can be based on assumptions that the EU needs to face global challenges—and threats— as a united agency, even imposing some form of order in an anarchic system (Murray, 2000; Knodt and Princen, 2005, 3; Cameron, 2003). It is unfortunate that a tone of messianic zeal can creep into some EU pronouncements, which are less than helpful for Australian understandings of the EU. The EU’s external impact is as much economic as political, as much regulatory as it is politically strategic. It is also the case that the EU can be a less cohesive actor than might be assumed, as proven by the many divisions among its member states regarding Iraq in 2003, allocation of competences, the Stability and Growth Pact and problems related to the Lisbon agenda for economic reform and to differences in the domestic application of EU legislation. So, the EU is not without its own internal tensions, such as between those who have advocated reform of the CAP and those who defend it. The EU is driven by both free market and social model agendas; it is divided into Europeanists and nationalists. There are
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those in the Brussels bureaucracy who worry that the EU is losing its direction, losing its European identity and its idealism and is renationalising its identity. There is concern among some officials, politicians and academics that the EU is becoming a two-speed or multi-speed Europe with a core group of states advancing integration and a more reluctant group that seeks to delay it. There is apprehension that this will dilute the advances made in integration and also in forging a sense of Europeanness. Further, the major EU institutions may have differing agendas and priorities. Some, such as the Commission and the European Parliament, are more motivated by supranationalism than is the inter-governmental Council. Although the EU has long considered itself an international actor (Duchêne, 1972; Vitorino, 2002), recognition of the EU as an emerging global player has not led to unanimous approval for its actions or agenda, particularly due to protectionist trade practices and disunity in foreign policy. The EU is often regarded with suspicion by the Australian policy-making community (Murray, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b) and some media reports and politicians have, on occasion, portrayed it as arrogant, inappropriately seeking recognition as a state-like actor. While resistance to the EU’s rhetoric is understandable, this stance leads to an underestimation of the EU’s growing global influence. As the EU is a major international actor, its global stances and impact on Australia require understanding. Despite trenchant criticism of the CAP, the EU projects a view of itself as a guardian on the world stage of global governance, trade norms and trade liberalisation. The EU advances its interests as being globally relevant, presenting an agenda of a norms-enforcer based on civilian power instruments of sanctions, incentives and influence on global governance and world trade, rather than military ones, and promoting its own experience of integration as a model. The EU has responded to the growing need for peacekeeping and development aid, actively seeking avenues to extend its international reach. Considerable debate has focussed recently on the importance (or not) of establishing ‘hard power’. American political scientist Joseph Nye (2004) suggests that hard power is the ability to coerce, which grows out of a country’s military or economic might—as is the case of the US, for example. On the other hand, ‘soft power’ arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.
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Thus, soft power can be regarded as the ability to attract and persuade. Robert Kagan (2002, 2003), who is close to the current George W. Bush administration, judges the EU as a type of (weak) Venus in contrast to the US might as Mars. Parag Khanna sees it somewhat differently—he regards European soft power as promoting a new type of diplomacy as a metrosexual superpower. Regardless of how we define the EU’s power, it is clear that the actual means by which the EU advances its own agendas internationally are often misunderstood (Manners, 2002). While the serious lack of European unity on issues of ‘high’ politics indicates that the EU is not a traditional force in foreign policy, it is important to understand European power, even if it does not accord with traditional perceptions of superpower. Scholars who consider Europe to be an emerging civilian power whose norm-setting is driven by dominant liberal democratic imperatives may regard the EU’s brand of ‘soft’ power as normative (Manners, 2002). An interpretation of the EU as a type of moral international citizen is problematic, both conceptually and in terms of understanding the EU’s motivations and promotion of its interests—and also because it ignores the ways in which the EU has distorted trade patterns, world markets for primary goods and trading opportunities for developing countries (Rumford and Murray, 2003a). For example, the EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson’s commitment to completing the WTO Doha Round is in part so as to ensure ‘that trade, investment, and business opportunities are heightened for European producers and suppliers’ (BusinessWeek online, 2005). This has serious implications for Australian trade, facing a world market partly dominated by EU agendas.
Implications for Australia: Close encounters of the first, second and third kind Some studies regard the EU as a two-level game, drawing on Putnam’s famous article (1988) on national and international influences on decision making, referring to two-level games acted out in domestic and international arenas. This does not fully capture the nuances of the EU. Rather we can view Australian engagement with the EU as a multidimensional relationship, which is multi-actor, multi-process, and multi-level (Wallace, 2000, 376ff ), encompassing four levels: the
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micro-regional or local; the national; the macro-regional or EU; and the global. Australia engages with the EU in a new way, with a distinctive policy scope, institutional capacities, decision-making capacity and implementation of decisions. There is scope for the relationship to expand and to build on perceptions of common threats and convergence of interests—especially post-September 11 2001—such as security, immigration, refugees and peacekeeping. The relationship is building on perceptions of mutual benefit; on recognition of the limits of the relationship and of differences regarding the role of regional integration and global agendas. In all of these aspects, Australia is not the dominant partner. Rather, it is in a situation of liminality (Wallace 2000, 372; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993). Yet Australia cannot afford to ignore either the EU hegemony or the fact that regionalism itself is becoming a hegemonic concept. As discussed in the previous chapter, the relationship has been defined by the British connection, the politics of agricultural trade and a lack of understanding of the EU as an international actor. Australia continues to view the EU through a British prism and holds a narrow mentality on transnational co-operation, with little regionalism experience. However, there are strong signs of a dynamic relationship between the EU and Australia. Europe is a key partner of Australia in the twenty-first century, in a relationship characterised by a diversification of Australian bilateral and multilateral relations, where security, trade—often characterised by divergent positions adopted on agriculture—education and science and technology issues, and immigration, all have a place. Australia’s dealings with the EU operate on at least three levels of policy making: the state-to-state national or ‘bilateral’, the ‘European arena for establishing collective regimes’, and international or multilateral arenas for ‘developing global regimes’ (Wallace, 2000, 379). International or multilateral arenas include the UN and WTO. Australia’s close encounter of the first kind, a traditional bilateralism, is state-to-state relations. An example is the longstanding Australian– British relationship. The second encounter is the direct engagement between the EU (a regional entity) and Australia in a range of interaction, which can be called new regional bilateralism.5 The encounter of the third kind, which has flourished recently, can be characterised as
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global societal bilateralism, where the EU and Australia negotiate on global and societal issues, often in global forums, where they are not necessarily the only dialogue partners. It deals with aspects of old and new societal security, for example, and with aspects of society as well as polity that were not previously a key part of the direct Australia–EU engagement. New regional bilateralism may supplant—or complement—state-to-state negotiations (Murray, 2003b). Australia is increasingly obliged to negotiate directly with the EU on many issues since its executive, the European Commission, has considerable trade competences, previously the purview of the nation state. The Commission’s role on behalf of the member states limits national freedom to act. Further, EU membership has had profound, albeit uneven, effects on all member states—a key factor to keep in mind in negotiations with the EU. As early as 1976, the author of the last book written on Australia–Europe relations, J.D.B. Miller (1976, 99) stressed the importance of assessing the influence the member states’ ‘joint membership of the Community would have upon them, whether it resulted in action by the Community as such or in a modification of policies which the members might have pursued singly’. The nature of the broad economic relationship is shaped by the new regional bilateralism. It encompasses the acknowledgement of the EU as a major international actor, while continuing to rely on the ‘traditional bilateralism’ of traditional trade, diplomatic, cultural and social links with the EU’s member states. New regional bilateralism is a recognition that access to the markets of each EU member state is increasingly regulated by the EU, its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), Common External Tariff (CET) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There is a growing number of issues in the dialogue between Australia and the EU, moving beyond the tension-ridden CAP and Australia’s prominent role in the Cairns Group to agreements on science and technology, and market—relevant agreements such as the Wine Agreement and the Mutual Recognition Agreement. Traditional bilateralism, in political terms, still has considerable importance, although the EU’s internal economic borders are porous. Thus any relationship with an EU state must take into consideration the fact that European nation states have invisible borders in economic terms and often judicial terms. All EU legislation is applicable to all member states. The Australian Government can negotiate with
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all member states as part of an EU level playing field. Further, because the EU is a single market for goods (and hence the same market conditions and tariffs apply in all EU states) the place where goods enter the EU market is not necessarily the final destination of the products. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) makes the point that the UK may not be the most appropriate point of entry to the EU if the Australian exports are largely destined for another member state (DFAT, 2001, 72). It is important to understand that negotiators cannot ‘focus on interstate bargains made by national decision-makers without grasping the domestic and international constraints under which they operate and with which they fashion policy positions’ (Ginsberg, 1999). Nowhere is this more pertinent than in the context of the impact of the EU on the European member states and vice versa. Ignoring this two-way dimension is both naïve and impractical. Relations with the countries of Europe are relations with the EU (Evans and Grant, 1995, 309), which is not to deny the merits of extensive and broad-ranging relations with individual countries (Evans and Grant, 1995, 300). In Australia–Europe encounters of the second kind (new regional bilateralism), negotiations consist of ministerial and officials-level consultations with the Commission, political dialogue with the holder of the EU Council presidency, and meetings of Australian parliamentary delegations and the European Parliament. The ministerial meetings involve Australian government ministers and the relevant EU commissioners dealing with, for example, external relations, trade or agriculture. National ministers of individual European countries attend EU–Australia discussions only when they are representing the entire EU as the presidency, which currently rotates every six months among the member states. The European Commission—the public service and executive—is the interlocutor with Australia on most EU issues. The Australia–EU relationship is characterised by negotiations in Canberra and Brussels as well as in the capitals of EU states. They take place in multilateral domains, too, such as the WTO (and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, in the past) and the UN and its specialised agencies. In foreign policy, Australia negotiates with the EU via the Foreign Minister of the country holding the presidency of the EU Council and on trade it negotiates with the European
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64
Table 6.â•… Australian Engagement with the key EU Institutions Australian agency
EU agency
Topics
Regularity of
Type of meeting
Australia and the European Superpower
meetings Prime Minister
Foreign Minister
President of European
EU–Australian
Irregular. Provided for
Prime Minister–
Commission
relations
in the Political
President of European
Declaration.
Commission Summit
Annual
Ministerial
European
EU–Australian
Commissioner for
relations
Consultations
External Relations Agriculture Minister
European
Common Agricultural
Annual and periodic
Ministerial
Commissioner for
policy, WTO talks
in context of Quint
Consultations
Agriculture Foreign Minister
Trade Minister
meetings
Presidency of the
Foreign policy,
Biannual (during each
Troika, since May
Council
security
EU Presidency)
1998.
European
Trade, WTO
Regular, in the
Ministerial
Commissioner for
margins of WTO/
Consultations & visits
Trade Relations
OECD meetings
to Brussels & Canberra
Australian agency
EU agency
Topics
Regularity of
Type of meeting
meetings Immigration, Security
Ministerial
Minister for
European
Immigration/Justice
Commissioner for
Consultations & visits
Justice and Home
to Brussels & Canberra
Affairs
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
Minister for
European
Development Aid to
Development Aid
Commissioner for
South Pacific
Regular
Formal visits to Brussels & Canberra
Development Commonwealth
European Parliament
Parliament Australian Senior Officials
Parliamentary
Annual
Dialogue EU Senior Officials
Agricultural Trade and
Formal Parliamentary Delegations
Annual
Annual Australia–EU
Marketing Experts’
Senior Officials’
Group.
Meetings
Migration and Asylum
65
Commission. The Australian Commonwealth Parliament has regular dialogue with the European Parliament. All of these EU institutions are part of the EU governance network and structure and all have regular engagement with Australia. There is a serious commitment to hold meetings at high levels in general terms. For example, the Political Declaration, signed by Australia and the European Commission in 1997, provides for the following types of meetings to take place: consultations at ministerial level between the President of the Council, the European Commission and Australia; consultations as appropriate between officials of both sides to cover relevant aspects of the relationship, including briefings, as necessary, to Australian representatives on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) meetings, and by Australia to the Presidency and the European Commission on Australia’s foreign policy, including in relation to developments in the Asia Pacific region. Summit meetings between the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of Australia could also be considered if necessary. On the Australian side, there has been diplomatic, administrative and governmental adaptation to the EU. This is embodied in a new level of diplomatic representation, and intensification of contacts, by Australia at the EU/Brussels level, in particular with the European Commission, which is potentially as open to Australia’s lobbying and influence as it is to that of member states. In seeking to understand those states, it makes sense for Australia to have a clear comprehension of the benefits and costs of EU membership to each state. It can be argued that personal contacts lead to an understanding of Europe in Australia and of Australia in Europe. For example, in 2003 alone, over one million Europeans visited Australia and 595,000 Australians visited the EU. Almost half of the entire number of Australians who live and work abroad (nearly one million) are based in Europe and almost 90 per cent of Australians claim to have
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European ancestry. Europeans have been travelling to Australia for over two hundred years. In 2003 one in five new migrants to Australia was a European and in that one year almost 22,500 Europeans went to Australia as migrants (http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/eu_and_australia/KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm). While personal contacts and tourism are strong in both directions, the EU is not fully understood on a broader scale. However, Australians travelling and working in Europe are aware that the euro single currency is used in twelve countries, as they are of the advantages of travelling freely from one part of the EU to another. In fact, it is not too much of an exaggeration to suggest that many Australians know about the Single Market, market access and free movement of persons and goods through their reading of the travel and wine pages of their newspapers! The Eurozone also facilitates Australian trade, with increased straightforwardness of business and currency transactions and with cost transparency, forward planning and price comparison (Murray, 2003a). Dealing with an integrated Europe: Perceived effect on Australia of closer co-operation within the EU: Survey respondents’ assessments: • EU integration weakens the ‘traditional’ links with UK. • It entails more emphasis on Brussels, less on national capitals. • It provides increased trade links outside of Australia’s traditional markets. • The greater internal focus within the EU is marginalising its relations with Australia. • It entails a more complex policy-making environment. • It is a ‘new’ type of engagement. • We need to focus more on Italy, Germany and France.
Parliamentary links European Parliament delegations visit Australia regularly and Australian parliamentary delegations (state and federal) visit Europe. This decade has witnessed an increase in high-level political contacts and in parliamentary co-operation as well as some political harmonisation. Parliamentary dialogues are a regular feature of the Australian relationship with the EU, with a ‘new spirit of bilateral co-operation’
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in a wide-ranging dialogue that stresses the value attached to close and regular parliamentary exchanges (European Parliament Delegation, 2001). At the beginning of the formalisation of relations in the 1980s, engagement developed gradually and incrementally, reflecting issues in common as well as issues in conflict. The relationship was initially more reactive than pro-active. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regular pro-active dialogues feature increasingly. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the learning curve has been steeper on the Australian side, where knowledge of a new political and economic international interlocutor needed to be gained. Whereas the EU has similar relations with other states and regions, Australia has no similar relationship with any other body. The political impact of Europe’s regional integration on Australia In response to a question ‘Has the move towards closer co-operation among the countries of the EU affected Australia’s political links with Europe?’ respondents replied: • ‘Yes—It has made it more difficult for Australia to manage its relations with Europe. Australian governments find it easier to engage in bi-lateral relationships. Successive Australian governments have found it difficult to manage relations with a multi-lateral body like the EU, but to be successful in relations with Europe, this must change.’ • ‘My experience of the EU is that their governments and institutions are so consumed with their internal negotiations that they enter external negotiations with very little flexibility (constrained by the compromises made within the group). Solidarity within the group, once a position has been reached internally, makes it much more difficult to advance Australian interests where there is a strong EU member that perceives its interests in opposing Australia.’
Implications of the expansion of EU membership for Australia The Australian Government has recognised that the enlarged EU (consisting of twenty-five states since May 2004) has a strategic weight that is likely to increase steadily and that ‘a more unified Europe is
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already having a noticeable impact on the processes and agenda of international diplomacy’.6 There have been concerns that the 2004 Enlargement would have the effect of restricting access for Australia goods (Downer, 2000; Nowina-Konopka, 2002, 75; Hillion, 2002, 67). Others saw the EU’s expansion as a key ‘catalyst for long overdue reform of the EU’s bloated Common Agriculture Policy’ (Wilson, 2002).
Australia and trade with the European superpower Trade relations are based on sector-specific agreements between Australia and the EU on mutton, lamb and goat meat; trade in wine; the agreement on mutual recognition on conformity assessment, certificates and markings; and science and technology co-operation (Hillion, 2002). With the exception of these agreements, the trade relationship is governed by WTO rules. Meanwhile, in a broadening of the relationship on the non-agricultural front, a series of specialised agreements were signed by the EU and Australia. Agreements on the transfer of nuclear materials, science and technology, wine and mutual recognition were formalised, enabling the economic relationship to flourish with the opening of the EU market to Australian wines and provision for research co-operation. The European Single Market provides Australia with new trade opportunities with all of the EU. It provides access for most goods to a market of 457 million people, with right of establishment for Australian companies; co-ordination and co-operation on research and development and in educational establishments; and mutual recognition of standards for exports. The EU’s Single Market renders the twenty-five member states a new economic bloc, distinguished by transparency and porous borders in economic transactions, and is the world’s largest frontier-free market. This means that, for non-EU countries like Australia, trade with the UK is trade with Europe and trade with Germany is trade with the EU. Australian products sent to France may not necessarily remain there as the final destination. Market access for Australian products such as wine or wool is based not on a national market but on market access to the entire EU. This is accepted by official Australian government policy, which regards the Single Market as a fully integrated market, whereby it states that the ‘EU as a single entity is Australia’s largest merchandise trading
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partner, with total trade in merchandise for 2003–04 worth A$43.7 billion (DFAT, 2005).7 This view of the EU as a single trading entity is not, however, consistent in government official documents. For example, Australia’s trading relationship with the EU is not mentioned in the following 2005 pronouncements made by DFAT in a document entitled ‘Australia’s Trade—Fast Facts’: ‘Overall our largest trading partners are the United States, Japan, China, and the United Kingdom’ and ‘In 2003 the United States was Australia’s largest source of imports with $20.5 billion, or 15.8 per cent of the total, followed by Japan ($16.27 billion) and China ($14.3 billion)’ (DFAT, 2005). Australian official reaction to the Single Market program was relatively muted,8 although the responses from the media, government and businesses were largely positive. It soon became clear that fears of a Fortress Europe would not be realised. But despite recognition that the Single Market provides important opportunities for Australian businesses, former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Australian diplomat Bruce Grant (1995, 310) have echoed a 1990 comment by the Minister for Trade Negotiations Neal Blewett, made at the launch of the DFAT Discussion Papers on the Single Market, that ‘the architects of the Single Market are also the people desperately clinging on to the Common Agricultural Policy, the most pernicious form of protectionism’ (Blewett, 1990, 8). There are considerable advantages in doing business with the EU, a point hammered home at every opportunity by Austrade, which promotes Australian trade internationally (Doody, 2003). These advantages are: firstly, the fact that there is a single point of entry for Customs duty; secondly, that there is an absence of internal borders; and thirdly, that there are EU harmonised standards and simplification of export administration. The Single Market reduces the costs for compliance and increases the potential sales area. Austrade works at promoting an awareness in Australia of the fact that 42 per cent of investment into Australia is from Europe and 19 per cent of exports from Australia go to Europe. The same rules, same sets of standards and same right of establishment of firms apply for EU and non-EU firms. The significant advantages that accrue to Australia in trading with the EU—relative, for example, to trading with APEC—were discussed at a parliamentary committee in the following terms:
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Australia and the European Superpower
In the European Union there is a predominant language, which is obviously English, and very well established markets. There is one common process for the registration of trademarks, one common registration for intellectual property, one common customs system and they are trying to have one common currency. There are certainly very clear and transparent regulations by which all banks and the banking system operate. To do business in the European Union—despite the language barrier or the distance—is … relatively simple.9 In 1990, Trade Negotiations Minister Neal Blewett had suggested that the only barriers to Australian business success in Europe would be intensified competition and lethargy. He perceived a number of potential deficiencies in the Australian approach, which are worthy of contemporary attention. These are the lack a cohesive national approach, rather than state-based approach, to trade; Australian firms’ preference to target the UK and thereby limit their potential market in continental Europe; and the need to be better lobbyists in Brussels, especially with the Commission. Blewett proposed permanent representation of Australian business in Brussels, a proposal still not activated. Although there is now a body of people involved in an association known as Australian Business in Europe, it is considerably smaller and less vocal than the London branch. Blewett also lamented the absence of formal links between peak industry groups, such as chambers of commerce and manufacturers, and their European counterparts. This has now been redressed to a degree through the European Australian Business Council, based in Sydney. A further point made by Blewett has been repeated by respondents in both surveys that I carried out in preparation for this book—namely the proposal to make use of Australia’s ethnic community business contacts in, and expertise about, Europe. Finally, Blewett’s suggestion that there is a need to correct Australia’s negative corporate image in Europe still has contemporary resonance (Blewett, 1990; Murray, 1991). So, has anything changed since 1990? Many Australians still lack a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s potential as a source of investment and trade and there has been considerable tardiness on the part of Australia in engaging with the EU as an entity.
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Australian reaction to the euro ‘I think it would be of great importance,’ said European Commission official Jan de Kok at the 2000 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘for the Australian business community to become ready for the introduction of the euro. I think that would certainly facilitate the possibility of more trade with the European Union and also in terms of the financial services.’10 Australian views on the introduction of the euro were not widely debated, for two reasons: a large part of Australia’s exports to the EU is destined for the UK, which was not in the euro zone; and the euro is not yet a major reserve currency, so there are few direct implications for Australia (van Veen, 2002). There was an element of uncertainty regarding its impact, depending on whether it would lead to an increase in economic growth in the euro zone (benefiting Australian exporters) and whether the euro would increase competition and trade within the euro zone —to the detriment of Australian exporters (van Veen, 2002, 4).11 A wait-and-see attitude was adopted by many in business, combined with an interest in the US and Asia more than in Europe in some cases. The offshoot of the euro is that not only monetary and fiscal policy but also labour market and competition policies have become more co-ordinated in the EU than hitherto, presenting new opportunities for Australian foreign direct investment (Van Veen, 2002, 20). The European Commission Delegation organised a series of euro seminars throughout Australia and featured the presentations on a website.12 Business reaction was, however, lowkey. Yet some 45 per cent of the international reserves of the Reserve Bank of Australia are currently held in euro (European Commission Delegation, October 2004). In reply to our survey question ‘What are the implications of the single currency (euro) for Australia?’, distinct themes emerged. These included the facilitation of trade and travel and tourism; certainty in dealings (exchange rate flexibility) and pricings; less financial consideration of rates impact; fewer insurance issues (against fluctuations); simpler currency transactions; reduced transaction costs; a more transparent marketplace; and treasury management enhanced by not dealing in multiple currencies. It was also stated that the existence of the euro ‘heightened emphasis on the EU as an entity’—an explicit understanding of new regional bilateralism. Business adaptation to
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Australia and the European Superpower
the euro was the subject of a government study in 1999 (DFAT, 1999). The replies to the surveys I conducted indicate an assessment by some respondents that the euro provides Australia with an opportunity to improve trade with the EU. Some respondents regarded its introduction as an opportunity for Australia to seek changes in its relations with the UK as its major market. It was suggested that the euro renders the Single Market more effective and increases Australia’s opportunities, with more effective trade and investment potential. Only six of 133 respondents were unsure about the euro’s impact. The Implications of the euro for Australia: Perspectives of Australian elites • Facilitates trade, travel, negotiation • Lowers transaction costs • Lowers currency risk • Enhances the effectiveness of the European Single Market • Encourages contact with countries of the EU beyond the UK • Makes it more difficult for Australian exporters to achieve price differentials across the EU • Foreign reserves will be in both US$ and euro
The main features of the trading relationship Australia provides approximately 1 per cent of the EU’s exports and imports. Although this may seem low, many other countries, with the exception of the US, Japan and Switzerland, are in a similar position. There is a large trade deficit with the EU which is regarded as ‘unsustainable’ (DFAT, 1996b), although this is not dissimilar from other countries that trade with the EU. Trade has changed from Simply Transformed Manufactures (STMs) to Elaborately Transformed Manufactures (ETMs) and there is now a more diversified and sophisticated export structure, as trade patterns from Australia to the EU move from unprocessed to processed products and from STMs to ETMs. There have been ‘dramatic changes’, with total merchandise trade almost tripling in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century and impressive growth in trade in services. Further, that period also saw a massive upsurge in two-way investment, which has grown more than six times (Vaile, 2001). The EU comprises some of the most
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73
advanced capitalist and globalised countries in the world and has been acknowledged as constituting ‘the advanced and sophisticated markets of Western Europe’ (Austrade, 2001, 46). Austrade is blunt in its assessment of opportunities in Europe, stating: ‘Despite myths about the European market—that it is too far away to do business, too difficult to enter and too protected—Australian firms are successfully selling a wide range of goods and services into the so-called “Fortress Europe”’ (Austrade, 2001, 46). Trade promotion in Europe is co-ordinated by Austrade, whose mission is to be recognised as an organisation that excels in information management and the development of the full potential of its people as well as a major contributor to Australia’s economic growth and globalisation of Australia business and the world’s leading export and investment promotion agency. It contributes to Australia’s export trade performance by facilitating and encouraging trade and investment between Australia and foreign countries.13 Its pan-European strategies have included Eurolink seminar series in Australia in 2000 to promote opportunities in targeted areas—namely horticulture, education and information and communication technology. It is also working on the promotion of trade fairs. A lack of business understanding of the market has been seen in some quarters as a reason for less than optimal trading with the EU. Although the trading and investment relationship is a healthy one, there is, nevertheless, scope for expansion and development in new areas, in more companies and in countries other than Australia’s traditional trading partners. A message promoted by Austrade and DFAT is that Europe is large, wealthy, expanding and diverse. Within Australia, meanwhile, it has been estimated that approximately 350,000 jobs have been created by EU companies (Fels, 2002, 15).
Key facts of the EU–Australia economic relationship The EU has been Australia’s largest economic partner for the past 15 years. Full figures are not available for all twenty-five member states the EU, so the facts presented here relate to EU15 of pre-May 2004, when EU membership increased by ten new countries. In 2003 the EU15’s economic activity with Australia accounted for $A77.1 billion—that is, 21 per cent of all Australian overseas transactions (on a Balance of Payments basis). This compares favourably with Australia’s
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Australia and the European Superpower
other major trading partners: USA 16 per cent, Japan 13 per cent, ASEAN 13 per cent and China 7 per cent (http://www.delaus.cec. eu.int/eu_and_australia/KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm). The most important Australian exports to the EU are coal and wool. Australia is the largest supplier of wine to the EU. The EU exports to Australia medicines, passenger motor cars, telecommunications equipment, aircraft and parts, paper and paper board. Why is it important for Australia to engage with the EU bilaterally, as a market and trading and political entity? Trade policy is largely directed and controlled at the EU level by the Council and Commission and monetary policy is managed by the European Central Bank. It also functions as a single bloc in the WTO. The Australia–EU economic relationship at a glance Source: http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/eu_and_australia/ KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm The EU is Australia’s largest merchandise trading partner. The EU is Australia’s largest partner for trade in services. The EU is Australia’s largest export market. The EU is the largest supplier of services to Australia. The EU is Australia’s leading investor. The EU is the second major destination for Australian foreign investment, after the USA. Australia’s three largest export items to the EU in 2003 were: non-monetary gold ($A2.7bn); coal ($A1.7bn); alcoholic beverages ($A1.1bn). However, while the economic relationship is healthy and growing considerably, the trade deficit is also substantial, as is evident in Figure 2. Trade in goods The total amount of exchanges in goods between EU and Australia in 2002 came to a massive €25,500 billion. The EU exports twice as many goods to Australia as Australia exports to the EU (€16,500 billion and €8,800 billion respectively in 2002). The main Australian exports to the EU are agricultural products, followed by commodities (such as
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Figure 1: Australia’s Total Economic Transactions with the EU1 100,000 80,000
Value (A$mn)
60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1999
–20,000
2000
2001
2002
2003
–40,000 Credits
Debits
Two-way trade
Trade balance
1 Source: ABS catalogue 5352.0 http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/Lookup/ CE5AF37A27CB9BA8CA256ED70002B968/$File/53520_2003.pdf and Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Topics: A Quarterly Review of Australia's International Trade, June Quarter 2004, published September 2004.
Figure 2: Australia’s Total Economic Transactions with the EU 1999–20032
Share of total (%)
50 40
Debits
30
Credits
20 10 0
1999
2000
2001
2002
2
2003
Source: ABS catalogue 5352.0 http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/Lookup/ CE5AF37A27CB9BA8CA256ED70002B968/$File/53520_2003.pdf and Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Topics: A Quarterly Review of Australia's International Trade, June Quarter 2004, published September 2004.
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Australia and the European Superpower
non-monetary gold, coal and iron), and machinery and transport material, chemical products, wool and textiles. The EU exports a range of products to Australia, especially medicaments, motor vehicles, machinery, telecommunication equipment, and paperboard (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/ australia/index_en.htm , accessed 20/4/05). Trade in services
Figure 3: Australia's Merchandise Import/Export Trade with the EU over Time 35,000
Value ($A mn)
30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Imports
2000
2001
2002
2003
Exports
Source: DFAT, Composition of Trade, up to and including 2003. Recorded Trade basis.
Value ($A mn)
Figure 4: Australia’s Merchandise Export to the EU: Growth over Time 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source: DFAT, Composition of Trade, up to and including 2003. Recorded Trade basis.
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
77
Approximately 70 per cent of Australian GDP comes from the service sector. Total trade in services with the EU, which is Australia’s most important partner, is continuously on the rise, coming in at €9,700 billion in 2001. This figure represents approximately 40 per cent of the entire trade between Australia and the EU. EU services exported to Australia are transportation (air and sea) and travel. There has also been an increase in financial and computer services exports recently (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/ australia/index_en.htm, accessed 20/4/05). The European Commission recognises that Australia is committed to a liberal regime ‘with few major barriers to foreign service operators[,]’ and is an active participant in the General Agreement in Trade in Services 2000 negotiation’. Air transport has been the subject of recent negotiations. While liberalisation has been under discussion, Australian negotiators have encountered problems in dealing with the Commission and the member states regarding competences. The Australian Department of Transport and Regional Services concluded initial air services negotiations in May 2005 with the European Commission, resulting in a draft ‘horizontal’ agreement between Australia and the Commission being initialled.14
Share of total (%)
Figure 5: Australian Trade in Services with the EU, 1999–2003 45 40 35 30
Imports
25 20 15 10 5 0
Exports
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source: ABS 5338.0, Table 2, Balance of Payments, Australia: Supplementary Country Statistics.
Healthy investment flows The EU is an important foreign investment destination for Australia, again of benefit to both parties. In examining destinations for Australian investment, the significance of the UK, Germany and the
78
Australia and the European Superpower
Netherlands is noteworthy. Both Australia and the EU invest heavily in each other. As the largest foreign investor in Australia, the EU is ‘thus contributing to Australia’s growth and export development. 29% of EU investment in Australia is orientated towards the financial/ insurance sector, although sectors like mining, petrochemicals, metal products and food are attracting capital as well. The EU is the second main destination for Australian overseas investments.’ (http://www. europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/ index_en.htm , accessed 20/4/05) The trade relationship is certainly robust, as illustrated by the fact that the EU is both Australia’s largest trading partner and largest investor. The EU had an accumulated investment of AU$341 billion at the end of 2003, which accounts for a considerable 35 per cent of total foreign investment in Australia. US investment in Australia is 30 per cent, while that of New Zealand and Japan is 7 per cent and 4 per cent respectively (Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, 2005).
Figure 6: Australia’s Investment Flows with Major Partners 80,000 70,000
Value ($A mn)
60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 –10,000 –20,000
2001
2002
2003
EU
USA
NZ
Japan
ASEAN
Others
Source: ABS 5338.0, Table 1, Balance of Payments, Australia: Supplementary Country Statistics.
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
79
Figure 7: EU–Australian Investment Flows in recent years
2003
2002
2001
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
Value ($A mn) Balance on investment
Outwards
Two-way investment
Inwards
Source: ABS 5338.0, Table 1, Balance of Payments, Australia: Supplementary Country Statistics.
The parameters of the new relationship: Australia and national interest In EU–Australia engagement, it is important to be clear that there is a marked difference in the roles and power of each interlocutor. Australia, a sovereign nation state with an independent foreign policy, contrasts with an EU comprising twenty-five states, an international actor but not a nation state in its own right. Just as nation states differ, the characteristics of Australian foreign policy are also markedly distinctive when compared to that of the EU. Nevertheless, there are issues in common. It has been widely accepted for some centuries that states act to their own benefit and conform with the realist approach of maximising and protecting national interests, often at great cost. While there have been other factors involved in Australia’s decision making in the international arena (such as past promotion of good international citizenship and liberal trade policy trends), nevertheless it is commonly accepted in the academic literature on Australia, and indeed in the public political debates, that foreign policy should have as its primary aim the protection and promotion of the state’s interests, security and prosperity.
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Australia and the European Superpower
In the Australian case, the 1997 White Paper on foreign policy as formulated by the Coalition Government is overtly realist, to the extent that the White Paper itself is entitled In the National Interest. Australia’s national interests are best served, according to the 2003 White Paper Advancing the National Interest, by ‘sound and comprehensive’ bilateral relations with European nation states—especially the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia (DFAT, 2003, chapter 4). Strong bilateral links with EU member states complement Australia’s ‘direct dealings’ with the EU institutions.15 The CIA World Factbook added the European Union to its analysis for the first time in 2004.16 The year before this, the Australian Government’s White Paper Advancing the National Interest had recognised the impact of the EU on Australia as follows: ‘Away from the Pacific rim, the Government will seek closer policy dialogue and cooperation with the expanding and deepening European Union. This will have critical influence on important Australian interests, such as global trade and environmental policy.’ Australian foreign policy has been characterised by both continuity and change. Foreign policy has advanced from pre-World War II dependence on the relationship with the UK and the maintenance of colonial ties to the post-war development of a more independent foreign policy. While Commonwealth ties remained important, there was a shift from one ‘great and powerful friend’, the UK, to another, the United States. Australia, a Western country, maintained economic, trade, political and security relations with Western allies. These were evident in the relationship with the UK, the Commonwealth, and the United States as well as in the creation of the ANZUS treaty.
Negotiating with the European superpower Australia negotiates with the EU on a number of fronts. It faces institutional and governmental adaptation pressures in response to complex EU rules, governance and policy reach, as well as multiple levels of regulation, authority and activity. Australia’s traditional reluctance to concede importance to the EU is being gradually replaced by engagement. New agenda issues include regular dialogues on immigration and asylum, and on security since 2002, as well as intensified partnership on development co-operation and counter-terrorism (see Chapter 6).
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Within Europe, the nation states’ role is not as central or relevant as it was twenty years ago (Caporaso, 1996, 1998). Nation states engage in interstate and inter-institutional bargaining where they can be outvoted on certain policies at times. Regardless of how they have voted, they are nevertheless obliged to implement EU legislation nationally. As a hybrid system of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, the EU can be difficult to understand—even for Europeans! Its system of mixed competences (Sandoltz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Sbragia, 1998), requires a new bilateral relationship, as EU states no longer possess sole competence on many policies. This is evident in the range of policy areas identified in the April 2003 stocktake of the relationship since the Joint Declaration was signed in June 1997— areas previously of sole state competences and state-regulated areas of sovereignty. In addition to the burgeoning trade and investment aspect, there is considerable regular contact on multilateral issues between the Australian Mission and the EU. These include WTO issues such as agriculture; negotiations on services; and newer areas such as industrial tariffs and the development of principles regarding investment, competition policy and trade facilitation. The Mission also monitors the EU’s relationship with the US, Canada, Asia and especially China and ASEAN. A further task is involvement in sectoral agreements.
EU–Australia sectoral agreements It is a little known fact that Australia and the EU have signed a number of agreements of benefit to Australia, signifying a broadening relationship. Since the early 1980s, there have been accords on nuclear transfers; wine; scientific and technical co-operation; mutual recognition of conformity assessment; and consumer protection as well as pilot projects on education. These agreements enabled the economic relationship to flourish with the opening of the EU market to Australian wines and also provided for research co-operation. Thus, while agriculture dominated the agenda, it was not the only issue there. A maturing of the relationship was taking place (Elijah et al, 2000). Among these accords, the Wine and the Science and Technology agreements are of a type never before signed by the EU with another country. Australia can perhaps be regarded as a test case or guinea pig. It is a small country and was regarded as unlikely
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Australia and the European Superpower
to pose major problems with these agreements. One publication suggests that many innovative international agreements were signed with Australia first ‘for the very reason that Australia is not the USA, Japan or China’ and so it is easier for the EU to ‘road-test’ a new type of agreement with Australia before presenting it to Washington or Tokyo.17 Some agreements had political significance beyond their content. When relations between Australia and Europe soured, new agreements impressed upon Australia that it was still an interlocutor of some weight for the EU. One cynical commentator has suggested that this was a means of dulling Australian antagonism regarding agriculture. Nuclear Materials Agreement The first major accord was the 1982 Euratom–Australia Agreement on the transfer of nuclear material for peaceful purposes from Australia to the European Atomic Energy Community. Although this has largely operated well, there have been some tensions regarding operational aspects of its implementation since 1999. (http://www.europa.eu.int/ comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm, accessed 21 April 2005) Science and Technology Agreement In 1994, an agreement relating to scientific and technical co-operation between the European Community and Australia was signed and this was expanded in 1999. The first agreement of its kind negotiated by the EU with a third country, it was designed to encourage ‘mutually beneficial research collaboration’. For the first time, Australian researchers were given access to the EU’s framework programs (FPs) on research and technological development, although this was at their own cost, and ensured access for European researchers to Australian research programs. Under FP4, the first in which Australians participated, thirty-four projects had a combined value of 40 billion euros and this increased to thirty-eight projects worth a considerable 200 billion euros under FP5. But there can be difficulties in finding linkage and locating potential projects and partners and this was recognised with the creation of a supporting project, the Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST), which garnered substantial
Australia’s New Relationship with Europe
83
support from the European Commission and its member states as well as Australian research agencies. It has been recognised that it is imperative that funding be provided from both sides. and the importance of obtaining funding from the Australian side became evident in the first years of the agreement’s implementation. (http://www. europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/ index_en.htm) Profile of EU–Australia collaboration in S&T projects under the Framework Programmes (FP)1 Number of Projects
Total project value (€ million)
Number of Australian participants
Full contractual partners*
33
291.35+
37
Non-contractual partners
11
82.28
11
44
373.63+
48
FP6 (2002-present) Under Framework Agreement 6
Subtotal
* counting those projects for which contracts have been signed, and those still undergoing contract negotiations.
Number of Projects
Total project value (€ million)
Number of Australian participants
FP5 (1998-2002) Under Framework Agreement 5 Full contractual partners Subcontractors Assistant contractors Subtotal
44
103.92
47
4
92.83
4
1
1.83
1
49
198.58
52
26
68.26
62
Additional to Framework Agreement Associate
Of which IMS projects TOTAL
84
8 71
28.18 € 266.84 mn
Australia and the European Superpower
38 114
Number of Projects
Total project value (€ million)
Number of Australian participants
* ECU –‘European Currency Unit’
FP4 (1994–1998) Under Framework Agreement 4 Full contractual partners
Subcontractors
30
ecu 29.90 (for 14 of the 30 projects)
44
4
ecu 10.52
4
34
over ecu 40.42
48
Associate
6
not known
7 or more
Close co-operation
6
ecu 3.10 (for 2 of the 6 projects)
6 or more
G8 Information Society Project
6
not known
6 or more
IMS project
7
ecu 30.68 (for 4 of the 7 projects)
22
Other
9
ecu 20.60 (for 3 of the 9 projects)
9 or more
Subtotal
34
over ecu 54.38
50 or more
TOTAL
68
over ecu 94.80
98 or more
Subtotal Additional to Framework Agreement
1
Source: European Commission Delegation in Canberra
Wine Agreement In 1994, an agreement was signed on trade in wine. The Wine Agreement aims to protect a number of geographic indicators and traditional expressions and to improve access of Australian wines to the EU market. This has been a remarkable success story, although there have been problems, as discussed later. Mutual Recognition Agreement The year 1999 saw an agreement signed by the European Community and Australia on mutual recognition in relation to conformity
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85
Table 7.â•… Major Australia-European Union Agreements. Year 1981
Agreement on nuclear transfers signed between Euratom and Australia
1982
Agreement between Euratom and Australia came into force.
1990
European Community and Australia agreed to enhance level and quality of dialogue on foreign policy questions through contact at Ministerial level
1991
Agreement to establish Joint Group on Industrial Cooperation
1994
Framework Partnership Agreement between European Commission and Care Australia
1994
European Community/Australia Wine Agreement
1994
Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation
1996
EU and Australia (and NZ) initialled the Mutual Recognition Agreement on Conformity Assessment
1997
Joint Declaration signed in Luxembourg
1997
Exchange of Letters recording the common understanding on the principles of international cooperation on research and development activities in the domain of intelligent manufacturing systems between the European Community and the United States of America, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EFTA countries of Norway and Switzerland
1998
Agreement of Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment, Certification and Markings (MRA)
1999
EC/Australia Mutual Recognition Agreement (and EC/NZ MRA) came into effect
2001
Agreement on the Global Information Economy between Australia and the EU
2002
Australia-EU Consumer Protection Arrangement signed
2003
‘Australia and the European Union: an agenda for co-operation’
assessment, certificates and markings. This was signed so that there could be improved facilitation of bilateral trade in industrial products and the EU also signed a parallel agreement with New Zealand. These agreements were the first mutual recognition agreements the EU signed with a non-EU country—a country referred to in EU parlance as a ‘third country’. Technical barriers, including mutual recognition
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Australia and the European Superpower
of conformity assessment procedures, were thus reduced. The agreement’s objective is to reduce the costs of testing, inspection and certification of products traded between Australia and the EU. It covers medical devices, telecommunications and electromagnetic equipment, electrical safety, pharmaceuticals, machinery and pressure equipment and motor vehicles—trade valued at an estimated US$4.8 billion per year. The testing, inspection and certification is undertaken in the exporting country rather than at destination. This agreement is the subject of officials’ meetings and at the joint committee meeting in 2003 there was co-operation regarding the removal of the rules-of-origin requirement (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm, accessed 21/4/05).18 Consumer Arrangement A recent agreement is the arrangement for information sharing on consumer policy and protection. This is not as formal an agreement as the kind signed on wine, for example. The arrangement provides for administrative co-operation and the exchange of information regarding ‘more effective consumer protection law and policy’ and seeks to ‘avoid inconsistencies or conflicts between laws, standards and guidelines’. There are provisions for education programs for consumers and traders and for exchange programs for the purpose staff development. Food is explicitly excluded (http://www.europa.eu.int/ comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm, accessed 21/4/05). This has been negotiated by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). In 1999, the ACCC and the European Commission had an exchange of officials, for a period of four months, regarding consumer issues (Fels, 2002, 23–4). There is considerable dialogue between officials dealing with both consumer and competition issues in Australia (the ACCC) and the Commission.
Advancing Australia It is not unusual to read, in reports of the Australia–EU annual ministerial consultations, that significant progress was achieved in a number of areas, such as science and technology. Originally limited to six clearly defined areas, the agreement was broadened in 1999 to
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87
allow Australia to participate in all EU thematic research programs and to access all large-scale research facilities of the EU. FEAST met for the fourth time in November 2003 in Canberra. The EU and Australia also co-operate on environmental issues. A 1991 exchange of letters established a framework for collaboration and dialogue between the European Commission and the Australian government. In the area of industry, the EC/Australia Joint Group on Industrial Cooperation was established in 1991 in order to encourage greater mutual understanding about EU and Australian industry and industry-related policies and also to promote industrial cooperation between the two parties. Topics discussed to date include: environment issues, information technology and information society (http:// europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/australia/intro/index.htm, accessed 8/4/05). Australia negotiates on all of these issues within new regional bilateralism, rather than only traditional bilateralism, denoting a move beyond two traditional Australian prisms in viewing the relationship with Europe, namely the UK and the CAP. The Australian Government is increasingly cognisant of the broader context of the EU, dealing with all major EU institutions and policies. Evidence of this shift is seen in a number of ways. Firstly, among the policy community there is increased adaptation to the EU and the changing configuration of Europe in its broader sense, as reflected in, for example, DFAT and other ministries. Secondly, there is an increased willingness to engage with the EU and some evidence of a more apparent willingness among government ministers to visit Brussels, although London remains more popular (Murray, 2003b). The fact that dialogue has expanded to issues of global concern such as the environment and geopolitical security issues, as further illustrated in Chapter 6, show that the CAP is no longer a single focus.
Taking stock of the relationship In 2003, for the first time, an official stocktake of the Australia–EU relationship took place (see Appendix 3). It set out an agenda for future co-operation on a wide range of issues, which reflects the breadth of Australian engagement with this key international player that has a finger in many policy pies. The broad-ranging agenda includes security and strategic issues (for example, counter-terrorism
88
Australia and the European Superpower
and police co-operation); trade (market access, differences on bilateral agricultural and trade issues, internal and global regulatory frameworks); education, science and technology; transport; the environment (climate change and international standards); development co-operation (particularly in the Pacific) and migration and asylum.19 Some further evidence of recent co-operation was set out in the 2004 Stocktake (Appendix 4).
Figure 8: Australia and the EU: An Agenda for Cooperation: Key Priority Areas in the Cooperative Agenda3
Security and Strategic Issues • Counter terrorism • Non-proliferation and export controls • Police and lawenforcement agency cooperation
Trade • Quota free market access for LDCs • Resolve on-going differences i.e. wine, SPS, quarantine • Global regulatory frameworks
Australia and the EU: an agenda for cooperation: Key Priority Areas in the cooperative agenda Education, Science and Technology • Higher education pilot projects • Erasmus World • FEAST • EUʼs 6th Framework Program
3
Environment • Climate Change, emissions monitoring, intʼl standards • Technology development • Role of WTO • Global Env. Governance
Trade • Galileo Joint Project • Intelligent Transport System and sustainable transport strategies • Aviation liberalisation
Development Cooperation • Nation-building/ recovery • Pacific region particularly • AP Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS
Joint Declaration between Australia and the EU in 1997 and 19th Ministerial Consultations in April 2003
Friction and differences of priorities remain on many issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol; agriculture; climate change; market access and phytosanitary and quarantine issues, as explained in the next
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chapters. Nevertheless, Australia is adapting to the new EU and to the process of Europeanisation, the latter defined as the ‘evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones’ (Green Cowles et al, 2001, 3, 217).
Maintaining traditional bilateralism with European nation states Australia’s engagement with Europe should encompass more proactively the continental members of the EU and not just the UK. The fact that trade trends are changing, with a diversification of trade to increased ETMs and STMs, is a testament to the broadening of the economic relationship with the EU. There remains an Australian tendency to engage with the UK in Europe as a primary contact. The UK still remains the most important contact for Australians, in terms of business and trade links. This is borne out by replies to the survey of Australian policy makers, analysts and businesses carried out in 19989 and 2001–02 (Murray, 2002a, 2003a) and also by comments made at every forum to date that has been held in Australia on aspects of EU– Australia trade and investments. There is a worrying tendency to cite the UK as the key example of how to work with Europe and a sense that if the relationship is right with the UK then that is what matters. The Europe Australia Dialogue of the Global Foundation in 2003 and business briefings held by the Europe Australia Business Council in early 2005 are just some examples. These organisations carry out laudable work in improving understanding of the EU in Australia. However, for most of those who attend these functions the focus is still solidly on the UK. The assumption that working in, and with, the UK would entail an experience similar to that which pertains in Australia may be misleading. Two studies have shown that a ‘psychic overconfidence’ may in fact lead to overestimation of similarity and show that cultural similarity can be misleading. Australian firms often invest heavily in the UK (currently the figure stands at 55 per cent of Australian investment in the EU) due to a perception of minimal psychic distance and this can result in managers underestimating actual differences between the respective business environments (Edwards and Buckley, 1998; Fenwick, Edwards and Buckley, 2003). Clearly more research is warranted on this.
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A key platform of Australian negotiations with the EU has been the development of relations with the member states where there are issues of mutual concern regarding the EU. There appears to be some recognition that, while the UK may listen to the Australian viewpoint, it is not to be assumed that the British will go to the Council to fight for Australian interests. The other member states may not either, although it is considered important that Australia seek a hearing from all pertinent member states on its concerns, in a multidimensional approach. There may be reason to question whether this use of diplomatic resources at member state level might be better utilised by placing more emphasis on direct negotiations with the EU institutions by the permanent diplomatic representation to the EU in Brussels. Consideration might further be given to an increase in staff from a number of government departments in the Permanent Mission to the EU, a proposal made by consultant John Azarias in his report to the government in 2002 (Azarias, 2002). A Department of Education, Science and Training official has been based in Brussels since early 2005. As early as 1976, Miller (1976, 99) stated: From now on it would no longer be sufficient for Australia to ask what Britain was thinking or proposed to do about some international issue; it would be necessary to ask questions about Britain’s European partners, and to assess what influence their joint membership of the Community would have upon them. However seductive it is for Australians to subscribe to traditional UK Euro-sceptical rhetoric about the EU, it must also be recognised that the UK has always been an effective negotiator for its own interests within the EU and that it has always implemented EU legislation efficiently. The distance between the traditional discourse of the UK and the actual UK negotiation stance, particularly under Blair governments, can be considerable. Writing about the 1970s, former Australian ambassador to the UN Ralph Harry (1983, 102) referred to Australia’s membership of the Western Europe and Others Group of the UN as uncomfortable, due to its increasing identification with both the problems and the
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perspectives of South-East Asia and the Asia–Pacific region. He continued: ‘the fact that Australia is not part of Europe and does not have identical issues with the formerly colonialist industrialised great powers makes Australian multilateral diplomacy both essential and effective’. In the same volume, dealing with Australia in world affairs in the period 1976–1980, J.D.B. Miller (1983, 157) stated of relations between Western Europe and Australian that few decisive events occurred, ‘apart from periodic complaints from Australian Ministers’ about European trading practices. Yet his comment that the two interlocutors were of greater importance to each other than the formal links with the European Community (as the EU was then called) because of long standing social links is still valid today. The Australian relationship with the new Europe is in part still influenced by the relationship with the UK, although attenuated by Britain’s diminished world role, by Australia’s relationship with the countries of Asia and by the close security and trade relationship that Australia has with the US. Each of these affects the other, and the recent decision by the Australian Government not to sign a non-aggression agreement with ASEAN is certainly influenced by Australia’s close strategic and security relationship with the US, even if, according to some observers, the term ‘Deputy Sheriff to the US’ has been discredited regarding Australia’s role in the Asia–Pacific and, instead, recently been accorded to Japan (Tisdall, 2005).20
Getting on the EU Radar screen: A study of persistence J.D.B. Miller, writing in early 1980s, suggested that Australian pressure should be applied directly to Brussels and supplementary pressure placed as much on the capitals of Germany and France as it was on London (Miller, 1983, 159). This chapter has illustrated that political relations with the EU are based on a number of interactions and negotiations at different levels and they also vary according to subject matter. In addition it is equally important to be aware that relations with the EU are based on establishing linkages with a set of institutions that are based on shifting alliances and shifting coalitions of the member states, depending on the issues under debate in the Council of Ministers. This means that it is important to understand the stances of the member states, over time, on each policy issue under debate in the EU.
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Figure 9: High Level Australia–EU Dialogue since 1997 Visits by Deputy Prime Minister to Brussels Parliamentary Delegations visits Visits by Minister for Foreign Affairs to Brussels Consultations with EU Presidency Ministerial Consultations, Senior Officialsʼ and ATMEG meetings Total Ministerial/ Commisioner visits 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Source: DFAT and European Commission, Stocktake of Australia –EU Cooperation and Dialogue under the 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations Between Australia and the European Union signed on 26 June 1997, updated to 18 May 2004.
Figure 10: Total Visits 1997–2004, by Direction 80 70 Commissioner/ Ministers
60
Senior Officials
50
Parliamentary Delegations
40 30 20 10 0 Total
Aust
EU
Source: DFAT and European Commission, Stocktake of Australia–EU Cooperation and Dialogue under the 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations Between Australia and the European Union signed on 26 June 1997, updated to 18 May 2004.
This changing political configuration renders negotiations with the EU multilayered and at times complex for Australia. In addition, there is a changing political configuration in the Council and
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Commission as well as the European Parliament due to the influence and timing of national elections. A national election may determine not only changes in the European Parliament’s composition — although less so than in the past due to many member states’ legislation prohibiting the dual mandate of national and European Parliament parliamentary office—but also that of the Council, so that its political hue may alter from, for example, social democratic to conservative and Christian democratic. It is important that anyone negotiating with the EU recognise the political configuration and the importance of macro-regional linkages for all member states and how this relevance may also alter over time, over issue, and according to personalities. * * * Australia, like Canada, has concerns regarding the CAP, market access and mutual security and immigration issues. Unlike Canada, Australia is not part of the transatlantic relationship or NATO or the northern hemisphere and it is evident that the EU has a northern hemisphere perspective on the world. Like ASEAN, Australia’s engagement with the EU is based on concerns about trade and regional security. Unlike ASEAN states, Australia is not currently an ASEAN partner, nor is it in ASEM. It is an error to conclude that Australia is completely isolated because it is not in a regional grouping that negotiates directly with the EU (APEC does not negotiate with the EU), nor in the transatlantic relationship or ASEM. Australia is an active member of the Western Europe and Others Group in the UN and they share common concerns as industrialised democracies. Yet the fact remains that Australia is not in a region-to-region relationship with the EU and this continues to be a potential weak link for Australia. The Australian relationship with Europe is no longer dominated by the UK, though there are elements of a Tory British reserve towards the European integration project and Thatcherite scepticism about the value of interstate and supranational co-operation. Journalist Geoff Kitney (2005) suggests that Australia continues to see Europe ‘too much through the distorted and increasingly reactionary British view’. Has the relationship decreased or increased in importance to Australia in recent years? We have seen that, with increased trade and
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investment flows and the elimination of some trade barriers, the EU constitutes the most important market and the most important source of investment for Australia. The perceived downgrading of the relationship of Australia with the EU, with a focus on the US and the Asia–Pacific, does not reflect the importance of the overall economic relationship with the EU. Private-sector linkages remain important, as seen by the fact that the EU is Australia’s largest trading partner. The relationship is strong for the corporate world, with a large number of EU–Australia mergers and acquisitions. Issues of asymmetry are partly offset by the increasing trade flow and the CAP focus is no longer first on agendas. This recognition of the EU’s weight and importance to Australia is evident in Figures 9 and 10, which illustrate the increase in dialogue and the expansion of the policy scope of the engagement. Australia and the EU are increasingly redressing a mutual neglect. This is more pertinent for Australia than for the EU because Australia is more dependent on the EU as a trading partner than vice versa. While it is no longer argued that Australia is viewed by the EU and the UK as ‘remote, prosperous and irrelevant’ (Miller, 1976, 97), there is concern among some in the policy-making community that Australia does not feature on the EU radar screen (Murray, 2003a, 2002a). Miller’s comment in 1976 that Australia was perceived by the European Commission as a ‘rich, highly developed country with a diversified pattern of trade’ and that it was not central to Commission thinking still has validity (1976, 103).
Notes Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and Europe: Not So Distant Neighbours’, Address at the ABIE Breakfast, Brussels, 4 February 1999, http://www.dfat. gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990204_not_so_distant.html/ 2 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 3 All decisions of the EU member states and institutions therefore refer to a Treaty article. 4 This Human Rights Clause is part of all EU bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with third countries. These accords include association agreements such as the Europe agreements, Mediterranean agreements and the Cotonou Agreement (formerly the Lomé Convention with developing countries). The clause was formalised in a decision of the Council in May 1995. It is not part of sectoral agreements on individual 1
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
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sectors, such as textiles or agricultural products. For more information see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/ index.htm#4. See also the report on ‘The EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in Third Countries’ (May 2001). http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/Com01_ 252_en.pdf . My thanks to the European Commission Delegation in Canberra for the text of the clause. For example, ministerial meetings and agreements on wine and science and technology. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, European Union Brief, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/european_union/eu_brief.html. 3 February 2005. DFAT 2005, EU Brief, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/european_union/eu_ brief.html. Accessed 7 March 2005. My italics. DFAT, however, did produce a series of useful guides to the program: DFAT, 1990, 1991, ‘The European Community Single Market Program: Implications for Australia’, Discussion Papers, nos 1–9, Canberra: DFAT. Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade References Committee: Australia in relation to Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 3 February 1998, Sydney. Questioner: Senator Sandy Macdonald Responder: Dr Roche, p. 416. Jan de Kok at the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Optimising Australian Trade Beyond 2000, 12 June 1998, Canberra, p. 24 See also, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Study of the implications of the EMU for Australia following the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1999. http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/euro_and_you/euro_seminars.htm Australian Trade Commission, Annual Report, 1999–2000, Austrade Canberra, 2001, inside cover. The following information was sent by e-mail to stakeholders by the Department of Transport and Regional Services. ‘The initialled “horizontal” agreement contains a so-called “no-disadvantage clause” that will ensure that Australian carriers are not disadvantaged vis a vis European carriers. Aviation fuel taxes were not included in this agreement, as it was agreed that it would be more appropriately addressed in any future negotiations on a full aviation agreement. During the talks the Australian delegation re-confirmed that the EC would seek a suitable mandate from EU Member States for comprehensive negotiations with Australia. Australia is now in a good position to move towards a liberalised agreement covering all aspects of air services arrangements with the EU. Australia also confirmed that, in the meantime, it is able to undertake full bilateral negotiations with key European countries, which had been blocked by the EC until the horizontal agreement issues were resolved.’ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Chapter 1—Australia’s place in the international system’, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, February 2003. http://www.dfat.gov. au/ani/chapter_1.html, accessed 11 April 2005.
Australia and the European Superpower
The CIA World Factbook explains its reasoning: ‘Although the EU is not a federation in the strict sense, it is far more than a free-trade association such as ASEAN, NAFTA, or Mercosur, and it has many of the attributes associated with independent nations: its own flag, anthem, founding date, and currency, as well as an incipient common foreign and security policy in its dealings with other nations. In the future, many of these nation-like characteristics are likely to be expanded. Thus, inclusion of basic intelligence on the EU has been deemed appropriate as a new, separate entity in The World Factbook. However, because of the EU’s special status, this description is placed after the regular country entries.’ http://www.cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ee.html, accessed 17 June 2005. 17 The EU and Australia: A New Symmetry (no author given), 2000, in European Australian Business, European Australian Business Council, Sydney, Stroudgate, p. 23. 18 Bulletin EU 6-1998, Common commercial policy (20/25), Treaties and trade agreements, 1.4.53. Agreement on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, certificates and markings, between the European Community and Australia. Recommendation for a decision: Bull. 4-1992, point 1.3.10. Negotiating directives: Bull. 9-1992, point 1.3.62. Agreement initialled: Bull. 7/8-1996, point 1.4.57. Proposal for a decision on the conclusion of the agreement: COM(1998) 179; Bull. 3-1998, point 1.3.35. Decision on the conclusion of the agreement adopted by the Council on 18 June. Agreement signed on 24 June. 19 Australia and the EU: An agenda for cooperation. EU–Australia 19th Ministerial Consultations, 16 April 2003, http://www.ecdel.org.au/pressandinformation/2003_ministerials/ 20 Simon Tisdall (2005) suggests that Japan is destined to supplant Australia as Washington’s deputy sheriff in the Asia–Pacific region and become a pillar of the US’s twenty-first–century security architecture. 16
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Chapter 3
The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower I: Agricultural Conflict
Australia has had a rocky relationship with Europe since 1973. Having lost its biggest consumer almost overnight when the UK joined the EC and its Common Agricultural Policy, the island has been discontented ever since. —Elizabeth Wise1 Clashes over agricultural issues stand head and shoulder above all others, in Australia–European Union engagement. In fact, many scholarly accounts of Australia–EU relations have so far shared a consensus that, since British accession to the European Community, agriculture has constituted the single most conflictual issue in the relationship (Benvenuti, 1998, 1998–99, 1999; Burnett, 1983; Davison, 1991; Elijah, Murray, O’Brien, 2000; Higgott, 1991; Murray, 1997, 2002c; Richardson, 1992). For over forty years Australia has levelled trenchant criticism at the EU regarding European protectionism of its agricultural produce and its near-total exclusion of Australian primary agricultural products from the European market. While Australia has legitimate concerns about European agricultural protectionism, it can be argued that the US has not been more open, notwithstanding the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was signed in 2005. To grasp the political implications of agriculture in Australia–EU
relations we need to understand the political importance of the CAP; the Australian perspective; and areas of particular tension in agriculture and related areas.
The Common Agricultural Policy Cows in Europe earn $3 a day in government subsidies while half the world’s people live on less. According to World Vision (2005), the purpose of these subsidies is ‘to ensure that the farming industry remains profitable’. Most Australians would concur heartily with this view, which arises from the much-maligned Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a policy that was created in 1957, in order to provide a stable market for food supplies to the European population as a whole, to consolidate the impact of the farm sector on the economy and on regional policy and to stimulate structural change so that farmers could benefit from economic and social development. From the beginning, agriculture was regarded as a key sector for achieving the objectives of European integration. The CAP was created under Article 33 of the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, with the key objectives of ensuring reasonable prices for Europe’s consumers and fair incomes for farmers. The latter of these outcomes was far more important, as it turned out, than the protection of consumers, who are obliged to pay high prices for agricultural produce. The Rome Treaty provided for the establishment of common organisations for agricultural markets and single prices, backed up by financial solidarity and European Community preference.2 The Objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy • Increase agricultural productivity • Ensure fair standard of living for farmers • Stabilise agricultural markets • Guarantee regular supplies of food • Ensure reasonable prices for consumers In effect, the CAP would guarantee high prices for agricultural produce but would later lead to a serious overproduction problem. Levies would be imposed on agricultural imports, subsidies would be put in place in order to leave land fallow, and, in many cases,
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intensive farming became the norm. The CAP became increasingly regarded as characterised by waste—wine lakes, butter mountains— and lack of long-term planning. Initially, the CAP was important because it was the first developed common policy of the EU and a major EU responsibility, as distinct from the responsibility of the member states. It has been central to all EU decisions, at one stage consuming up to 80 per cent of the EU budget, although currently standing at about 40 per cent. This was in part due to the perceived need to address price fluctuation of agricultural produce through public intervention and regulation (Nugent, 2003, 387). It has a major institutional presence in the Council and the Commission and is a potent symbol of joint decision making by the institutions, with common management. Further, the need to ensure an adequate food supply and subsistence were high priorities—especially in post-World War II Europe, when there were massive food shortages and devastation of the land. Cultural factors have always been central to the CAP as well, due to the distinctive nature of agriculture in society generally and in European society in particular. While its original raison d’être was to put an end to Europe’s food shortages and reliance on imports and to boost self-sufficiency in food supplies, the social context is evident in the program to keep the farmers on the land, as part of a valorisation of rural society and also in order to prevent a flow of unemployed agricultural worker to the cities that could increase unemployment and demands on urban services. A further, more recent, factor is the food safety issue: a broader focus was put on agricultural products by the need for stringent rules regarding food safety after the 1996 outbreak of ‘mad cow disease’ (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease—BSE/CJD) and foot and mouth disease (Nugent, 2003, 388). In political terms, agricultural policy soon became the domain of a separate policy-making entity within the Commission, dominated by French officials in the early years, in a large and powerful Directorate General for Agriculture. There was a sense that agriculture was set apart—and not only within the Commission. It was also the case within the Council of Agricultural Ministers and with the distinctive role of many Ministries for Agriculture in the member states. The perceived importance and electoral weight of farmers is evident in powerful lobby groups and organisations, such as the Committee
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of Agricultural Organisations in the European Union, which have not been afraid to draw on a number of non-conventional means of expressing their influence: through direct action and demonstrations. They have had streamlined access to decision makers and they utilise their powerful friends, particularly within political parties representing agricultural interests, although their influence is certainly not confined to these. The CAP was therefore unlike any other EU policy. It was a political trade-off between France and Germany created as part of the Franco–German compromise, with the agreement of the other four states, the Benelux and Italy. Member states who joined later were not involved in its formation or development. EU Commissioner Chris Patten pointed out: ‘The UK held back at the start [of the integration process], fearing that the project was too ambitious … The UK was not able to influence the original design of the CAP which today is the main cause of friction in EU–Australia relations, despite the significant reforms in recent years’ (Patten, 2003). By the late 1970s, the CAP was already in crisis and in the 1980s there was recognition of the need for reform of its costly overproduction and for budgetary reform, as the CAP was consuming most of the EU budget. There were key problems regarding what to do with agricultural surpluses, which were dumped on world markets or went into storage. The prices for agricultural goods within the EU were maintained at an artificially high level compared with prices on the world market. Understanding the CAP Jim Hacker, the British Prime Minister in Yes Prime Minister, said to a Commission official: ‘I discovered recently that one of your staff spends all his time paying people to produce food, and the man in the next office spends all his time paying people to destroy it.’ Maurice was outraged. ‘That’s not true.’ Humphrey and I were surprised. A barefaced denial? How could this be, we’d had the story from the horses’ mouths. ‘No,’ said Maurice. He’s not in the next office. Not even on the same floor.’ (Lynn and Jay, 2003, p. 49)
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Criticisms of the CAP • Subsidises rich farmers • High consumer prices • Produces unwanted farm surpluses • Fortress Europe to non-EU products • Distorts global competition • Distorts the trading potential of developing nations • Distorts production of food
Moves to reform It soon became evident within the EU that reform of the CAP was required, as a number of problems began to emerge. There was a continuing problem of surpluses and overproduction, due to EU intervention in the market and production aids. Intensive farming and production were clearly causing long-term environmental damage. While the CAP’s aim was to protect poor farmers, this was not achieved in an equitable manner. There was also a need to eliminate currency protection and to abolish price guarantees. Not everyone agreed with the commitment of the Council to protect the agricultural sector. There were many who called for the EU budget to be completely redrawn. For example, at a time when some 80 per cent of the EU budget was being allocated to less than 10 per cent of the population—the agricultural producers—there were calls for the agricultural component of the budget to be severely cut and for funds to be allocated more equitably to other policy areas and groups in need. These included, within the EU, disadvantaged areas and groups, including the poorest parts of the EU, the long-term unemployed and the disabled, all areas that came under the EU’s social and regional funds, which were considerably less resourced than the CAP. Regarding priorities outside of the EU, there were calls for the EU to contribute more funds to development aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, under the EU’s Lomé Agreement with those nations. Further, the CAP has had the effect of distorting world markets and placing third-country agricultural goods, including Australian goods, at a distinct disadvantage on the global market. In addition, it distorted multilateral trade and was the source of
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considerable dispute within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The CAP has long constituted a system of targets for agricultural production, which soon led to over-production and market expansion on the global market. Thus, while it was apparent that the 1960s CAP structure may have had merit, that of the 1970s was already revealing significant weaknesses and this was compounded in the 1980s. The era of CAP reforms had begun. The 1992 CAP reforms consisted of a commitment by the EU to reduce EU prices to world market levels. Farmers would receive compensatory payments due to the fact that they would have fewer price supports than in the past. There was also a payment to ‘set aside’ land. There were provisions for protection of the agri-environment, for afforestation and for early retirement measures. These were followed in 1997 by a series of reform proposals, the Agenda 2000 reforms, which constituted a further stage in the CAP reform agenda, occasioned by the imminent accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and by the revision of WTO agreements. This set of proposals further developed the commitment to the replacement of guaranteed prices with direct income support in the main ‘continental’ sectors (herbaceous plants, beef, milk) as well as reforms in the ‘Mediterranean’ sectors (olive oil, tobacco, wine). More recently the 2003 reforms were a commitment to ensure that production subsidies would be severely curtailed in favour of direct payments to farmers. The eligibility for payments was to be linked to compliance with rules regarding the environment, animal welfare, hygiene standards and the preservation of the countryside. All of these changes are evidence that the EU understands the need to reform the CAP, although some states, such as France, would prefer to make that reform minimal.
Current reform contexts Currently, the EU is the world’s largest importer of agricultural goods, and the largest importer of agricultural goods from developing countries.3 Unlike in the 1980s, the budget of the CAP from the late 1990s was fixed until 2006 and after that date permitted to increase by only 1 per cent each year until 2013. This imposes considerable budgetary constraints on the EU25, as the 2004 Enlargement saw the number of
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farmers in the EU increase by 56 per cent and the amount of agricultural land by 29 per cent. The EU’s expenditure on export subsidies fell from some 25 per cent of the value of farm exports in 1992 to 5 per cent in 2001, and in absolute terms from €10 billion to under €3 billion.4 The CAP as a percentage of EU GDP has declined to 0.33 per cent over the ten years 1993–2003 and is now 0.44 per cent, even with EU Enlargement and the increase in the number of farms by 50 per cent. As a percentage of the budget for farmers it has declined by only 15 per cent. The CAP reforms mean that there will be guarantees to farmers in the form of direct payments and that the market will henceforth dictate how much to produce. The Commission will take responsibility in this regard. In addition, there is a commitment to retain part of the payments linked, or, in EU parlance, coupled (rather than decoupled) to price and production supports, in order to keep some farmers on the land.5
Australia and the CAP If the EU had its own problems coming to terms with the CAP, they are nothing compared with Australia’s view of this policy. It has been argued that the conflictual nature of agriculture in EU–Australia engagement came about from a problematic confluence of three interrelated factors: Australia’s position as a major world agricultural exporter; Australia’s reliance on the UK as a major export market for agricultural produce (and UK entry into the EC in 1973); and both the nature and effects of the CAP and extent to which, as a major ‘European’ policy, the CAP has dominated the EC’s internal activities as well as playing a major role in its relationships with other countries (Murray, Elijah, O’Brien, 2002). The CAP is an exclusive competence of the EU and not shared with the member states. Thus, ‘it has been Australia’s misfortune … that its interests have collided with those of the EC precisely where it is most protectionist’ (Richardson, 1992, 212). Australia and the EU have long held disparate views on agriculture, where market access, multifunctionality (non-trade concerns) and precautionary (concerns of society) principles seem to be red rags to the Australian bull. Robertson (2002) has argued that significant differences in both style and substance exist between the ‘regulated and institutionalized economic and political system of the world’s largest entity’ (the EU)
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and Australia—an ‘open, trade-dependent, resource-rich, medium economy on the other side of the world’. Australian trade output is commodity export-driven. It seeks markets for its goods on a continuous basis. Although it has access to the EU’s Single Market, it does not have unfettered access to Europe’s agricultural market. Australia is vulnerable to subsidies applied by larger international players on the global trading field, such as the EU and the US, particularly in agricultural goods. Also, Australia does not have the financial resources or trading clout to enter into strategies of subsidy or market fixing (Bell, 1997, 204). Criticism of both European and American subsidies has been a hallmark of Australian trade policy for decades. This criticism is less than muted in the case of Europe. Importantly, Australia may have the best chance of maximising its trade if there is unfettered free trade, a view advanced by the influential Garnaut Report (1989)—an ‘icon of free trade orthodoxy’ and by the farming and mining lobbies (Bell, 1997, 204). This presents problems for Australia in its search for markets, as the EU has protected its farmers through a number of measures, including subsidies, for several decades.
The origins of the Australia–EU agricultural conflict The CAP has been the subject of a war of words, often characterised by words of war. Before British accession to the European Community, 95 per cent of Australia’s total beef exports to Western Europe went to the UK. This market was to virtually disappear after UK accession in 1973, when ‘Australia became a marginal supplier’ (Ritchie, 2002, 1). That marginal aspect, so visible to Australian media and policy communities, is the current quota to the EU15 of seven thousand tonnes.6 Until the UK joined the EC, some Australian agricultural goods competed favourably on the European market.7 In the early 1960s Australian trade policy was dominated by the Country Party and especially by the figure of John Mc Ewen (Black Jack) in his antagonism to the European protectionist approaches. One of the earliest analysts of Australia–Europe relations, H.G. Gelber (1966, 248) has commented on McEwen’s complaints about Europe’s ‘towering tariff walls’ and about the Americans, complaints that ‘were unlikely to cause anything but ill-tempers in Europe as well as Washington’. There is still an element of this in current Australian approaches. Gelber’s analysis of
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over four decades ago still holds true to a remarkable degree. For example, he talked of the Australian focus on trading matters having the disadvantage of narrowness (1966, 248) and appearing to be parochial when seen from London or Brussels. He pointed to a defensiveness in Australia’s approach and was very critical of the Australian government’s ‘naïvete’ in its understanding of the British government position (1966, 249). He argued that Australia could have better served its interests through a recognition of Britain’s role in exploiting the opportunities of EC membership rather than ‘try to reshape the Community from outside’ (1966, 250). Gelber questioned what he saw as the futile attempts to circumvent the French in these early years, the insistence upon quantitative access to Europe and compensation for Australia trade losses in the UK (Gelber, 1966, 253–4). He urged, instead, a diversification of Australian trade exports at this time. The burden of memory is evident in the attitude to the first British application to join the EC, summed up in Gelber’s concluding comments to his study of this period: All in all, however, Australia was plainly unfortunate in her involvement in the Brussels affair. It upset a number of too complacent assumptions and drove home a number of useful, if hardly novel, lessons. It forced Australia to look at her relationship with Britain and the outside world with a new and cold eye: after these sixteen months, nothing would be the same again. The scope and complexity of the questions at issue were new, which itself had a salutary and stimulating effect. This was a problem different in kind from the trade talks previously conducted with Britain … At the same time the Australian interests genuinely at risk, though important, were not really vital. They therefore were, and remained throughout the Brussels discussions, a minority interest. (Gelber, 1966, 258) The CAP remained the characteristic feature of Australian engagement with the EC from 1973 to the mid-1990s, and it still plays a part in the dialogues. Australia suffered from the virtual exclusion of its temperate climate agricultural products since UK accession in 1973.8 Although Australian agricultural exports to the EU declined
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considerably, there was nevertheless an increase in two-way trade, from $3.7 billion in 1973 to $6.7 billion in 1980 (Brown, 1983, 148). Australia also found that the EC was a useful destination for its mineral exports (Brown, 1983, 152). At the same time, Australia was keen to find other markets for its agricultural goods and to ensure that the EC would not undermine markets for Australian goods with its subsidisation of its agricultural exports on the world market.
The domestic context of Australia’s condemnation of the CAP The Economist magazine once commented that ‘Bad feeling between countries often starts when politicians talk to their home constituencies through the medium of international negotiations’.9 Australian and EU policies towards agriculture have been based on responding to domestic constituencies while at the same time being played out in the international arena over several decades. Australian trade policy, especially under Jack McEwen, was characterised by protectionism for many years, with a Tariff Board and, in the late 1960s, ‘one of the most protected economies in the OECD’ (Hughes, 1998, 73–103). Due to its colonial history with Britain, Australian trade policy was geared towards the export of primary products for the more sophisticated UK market, which in turn provided Australia with manufactured goods. While it did not develop a strong export-oriented manufacturing sector, Australia did industrialise and did develop a domestically focused manufacturing sector characterised by high levels of protection. The pattern of trade with Europe gradually altered, with an increase in the export of manufactured goods. Australian disillusionment with the EC began when decreased market access due to the UK accession had raised fears of a loss of market access and of imperial preference and the negative impact of the CAP (Gelber, 1966; Miller, 1976). The end of Commonwealth preferences also signalled the end of a privileged trading relationship with the UK, although the UK remained a pivotal market for Australian goods within the EU. It has been said in some quarters that Australia has long manifested a victim mentality about the CAP, due to a history of Australian trade dependence on the UK. Under the Ottawa Agreement, Australia had agreements to negotiate on qualities and process with the UK.10
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Since British accession, Australia’s trade profile was obliged to reorient and strengthen its presence in other export markets. The preferential treatment accorded by Europe to New Zealand, an agricultural country that was regarded as more vulnerable, was not given to Australia. From the 1970s, Australia has set its opposition to—and entire attitude to—Europe squarely in the context of the CAP. This is manifested in its perception of Europe as being obstructionist and self-engrossed. To this day, Australia is competing against Europe’s protection of European agricultural goods both in Europe and on the world market. Loss of European (largely British) markets was combined with the need to compete with European subsidised agricultural goods on the world market. Europe is still viewed as the bully in the global trade playground by many Australians. Not only did the ‘bully’ not understand—it seemed not to care about the damage inflicted on other countries due to its CAP. Like the US, the EU has had large stocks of agricultural commodities—especially grains in the 1980s—and both Europe and the US have long utilised export subsidies. Many groups in Australia came to regard the EU as a protectionist market. J.D.B. Miller (1983, 162–3) dubbed the European Economic Community ‘essentially a protectionist body’, especially regarding agricultural products, which Australian ministers in the late 1970s approached with ‘occasional outbursts’ regarding its self-centred trade policy. This was combined with implicit and occasionally explicit threats that Australia would boycott Community goods in the face of Community intransigence. Despite the fact that the 1970s–80s were a period also characterised by increased two-way investment and the beginning of Australian supply of uranium to the Community, this was not regarded as part of the Community relationship (Miller, 1983) and so Europe retained an ogre image for some time, even though close encounters of the second kind—new regional bilateralism—were developing away from the spotlight. Australia has regarded the CAP as problematic in two ways. First, the EU’s internal price controls and its barriers to agricultural imports severely limited Australian access to European (including British) markets in several important areas, including dairy, beef and sugar and cereals (Burnett, 1983, 111). Secondly, and more problematic, the CAP’s internal pricing structures resulted in ‘obscene levels of overproduction’ (Dinan, 1999, 341). This overproduction, particularly
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from the 1980s, meant that the EC became a net exporter, rather than importer, of agricultural produce for several years, although the situation was to alter after the Uruguay Round Agreement. This did not simply result in restricted access for Australian agricultural products to the EU. It also had international repercussions, which proved to be damaging to Australian interests. The EC policy of massively subsidising its own overproduction on the world market meant that Australian goods had to compete with European subsidised goods. It was not only Australia that had to compete with the EC—so too did other producers of agricultural goods. Thus, the US reaction by the mid-1980s was to initiate a policy of retaliation in the form of an Export Enhancement Program. The net result for Australia was that Australian exports were ‘caught in the crossfire’ and so were negatively affected (DFAT, 1996a, 16; Evans and Grant, 1995, 124). Australia found itself between two more powerful global players in the agricultural trade wars and devoted a considerable amount of diplomatic effort to drawing attention to the international impact of the CAP, particularly the loss of export markets to highly subsidised EC products and the subsequent, retaliatory responses to the CAP (Richardson, 1992, 212; Elijah, Murray, O’Brien, 2000). Australia also takes issue with EU quotas and tariff and nontariff barriers to trade; the lack of adequate access to EU markets; internal subsidies and the EU’s subsidies of exports to third (non-EU) countries. Australia criticises the way the CAP prevents market access and distorts world markets, which in turn prevents Australian goods being sold competitively on the world market due to EU artificial support for EU agricultural goods on the global market (Benvenuti, 1998– 99; Downer, 2003, 1). Australia also criticises the EU for its hypocrisy: by distorting world prices for agricultural goods, it also undermines the possibility and independence of developing countries to sell on the world market. Despite the EU’s massive aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific states though Lom˙e and Cotonou development aid programs, it is regarded as preventing developing countries from operating more freely on the world market for essentially the only commodities they can produce. From the mid-1970s, the CAP’s international impact became clear to the Fraser Government, which proposed regular high-level meetings between the EC and Australia (Benvenuti, 1998–99, 64). The
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government also created a Special EC Trade Representations portfolio—held by current Prime Minister John Howard (Burnett, 1983, 112–13). The decision to hold regular ministerial-level meetings was taken as late as 1979 and the meetings were dominated from the beginning by forthright Australian criticisms of the CAP in what Burnett calls ‘frontal assaults’ (1983, 22). Domestic concerns were paramount in the stances adopted by both parties to the conflict. Both Prime Minister Fraser and Trade Minister Antony responded to the domestic agricultural constituency in robust attacks on the CAP. Some officials in the Commission shared Australia’s concerns, and there were proposals for reform of the CAP within Europe at this time. Australia did not develop a relationship with those groups. Rather, Australia’s attack, focussed on what it regarded as a behemoth of an inflexible EC bureaucracy and inflexible policy, brought the relationship to its ‘lowest ebb’, with Australian threats of retaliation in what the Europeans regarded as a ‘crusade’ against the CAP (Benvenuti, 1998–99, 68). The style of debate altered from 1983, under the Labor Government, when Prime Minister Hawke indicated an interest in improving the relationship while continuing to argue against the CAP in a ‘relatively non-confrontational’ manner (Benvenuti, 1998–99, 71). Hawke’s Brussels visit in 1985 and subsequent ministerial consultations of ‘constructive dialogue’ (Commission of the European Communities—CEC, 1985) took place at a time when the European Commission was advancing a (1984) proposal for CAP reform, targeting in particular the over-production of sugar, wine, cereals and milk, restructuring of market access to developing countries and reforming the EU budget to tackle social policy and unemployment (MacLaren, 1992, 1994). The 1985 Andriessen Agreement not to sell subsidised beef into Australia’s traditional Asian export markets (DFAT, 1996a, 16) can be regarded as a positive diplomatic result of a more conciliatory style from Australia. The following year, Commission President Delors indicated a readiness to include agriculture in the next round of GATT negotiations, which Australia had long advocated. This was not in response to Australia’s demands, however. The internal pressures to reform the EU, its budget crises in the 1980s, the increased social democratic critique of the CAP and the cost burden implied by supporting a small proportion of the population on the
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land to the detriment of the development of social and regional policies, as well as environmental concerns, all played their part. While disputes have been acted out on the multilateral trading stage, in the GATT and WTO, they have also damaged the bilateral engagement of Australia with the EU. It is not uncommon for major discussions between Australia and the EU to begin with the requisite Australian attack on the CAP. The multilateral trade framework has often driven the direct relationship that Australia maintains with the EU. Two-way investment continues to be high, regardless of these disputes, as these flows are normally carried out directly by individual businesses. Even businesses have not been immune from the perception of the EU as predatory and self-engrossed, as seen in survey replies and Downer’s comment that ‘Australia is deeply troubled by the EU’s narrow and minimalist approach to global agricultural trade. The EU’s failure to move forward on reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a lose–lose policy for Europeans and nonEuropeans alike.’11 Australia has also criticised the EU for its hypocrisy: in distorting world prices for agricultural goods it also undermines the possibility and independence of developing countries to sell on the world market. In 2004, the Australian government stated: ‘We [the Australian Government] are working closely with our partners in the Cairns Group of agricultural fair trading nations to end the discrimination that damages efficient agricultural producers and denies developing countries the full benefits of the global trading system.’12 Further, the Australian Government is keen to press the EU on the CAP’s harmful effects on Australian farmers, arguing its case ‘in the context of the WTO negotiations and with the governments of individual EU member-states.’13 There is some debate about whether Australian attacks on the EU’s agricultural protectionism yielded positive results for Australia. It is difficult to find evidence of long-term positive outcomes for Australia of its uni-dimensional approach to dialogue and negotiations. Australian analyst Angela Ward (2002, 180) suggests that the Australian approach to the CAP has been ‘of dubious efficacy’ and possibly damaging of other aspects of the relationship. She further argues that Australia was also protectionist in industrial goods and so employed a double standard (2002, 190–91) in an ‘agri-centric
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discourse’. Australia imposes tariffs on a variety of products exported by the EU.14 The Australian emphasis on a single issue, the CAP, has been productive in some short-term gains, such as the so-called Andriessen accord or Andriessen assurance. This accord was a reflection of attempts to create a more positive relationship rendered tangible in assurances by the Agriculture Commissioner Frans Andriessen, during a 1985 Brussels visit by Prime Minister Hawke and Minister for Primary Industry Kerin, not to sell subsidised beef into Australia’s traditional Asian export markets.15 However, Australia has not really understood that the EU is itself deeply divided on the contentious issue of the CAP. One analyst, the executive director of the Canberra-based Centre for International Economics, suggested that ‘Australia can take advantage of the shifting sands and foster the internal criticism of the CAP by Europeans themselves. We need to blow up the fort from the inside, which will multiply the benefits from the external pressure Australia continues to mount. Then our farmers might have something to really smile about’ (Stoeckel, 2002, 62). Although, over time, there has been a move away from Australia’s confrontational style, it remains in the public domain and in the media, as will be seen in a later chapter. It can be argued that the assertive stance made by Prime Minister Howard in August 1997 (‘I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating … the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU …’) has been due, in part, to a lack of full understanding of the EU and of its unwillingness to reform the CAP on Australia’s insistence, as well as a lack of full understanding of the EU’s potential as a source of investment and trade—as seen in press reports in the 1980s and 1990s.16 Indirectly, Australia—and its relationship with the EU—was to benefit further from EU CAP reform, after the Uruguay Round, although there is dispute regarding Australia’s contribution to the pressures on EU agricultural decision making. Pressures to reform the EU came from internal and external sources. Internal pressures for significant CAP reform mounted over time, due to the desire for other policies and sectors to be accorded attention and for the EU to prepare for the enlargement of the Eastern and Central European states (CEC, 1996a; Field, 1998). This resulted in the Agenda 2000 policy of the Commission. Many environmental
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lobbies considered CAP reform essential in order to tackle pollution, soil damage and erosion, bio-diversity and loss of species and habitat (Grant, 1997, 200–203). Externally, considerable pressure was exerted by the Cairns Group and Australia, although it is important to remember that there was a multi-factorial approach to CAP reform over some years.
The Cairns Group and GATT The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was launched at Punta del Este in 1986. A key item on the agenda was the inclusion of agricultural products. The Cairns Group of Fair Traders in Agriculture was founded in 1986.17 For the first time, Australia was negotiating with the EC within a multilateral environment as part of a coalition. This was part of the government strategy in the 1980s that saw an emphasis on multilateral forums (such as APEC, GATT, UN) and its projection of Australia as a ‘middle power’.18 The GATT negotiations were characterised by a continuation of discussions on CAP, agricultural protectionism and access to agricultural markets. There was some progress made despite a gloomy outlook. The major significance of the Australian-led Cairns Group lay in the fact that, firstly, it greatly enhanced Australia’s influence at the negotiating table, in leading international criticism of European reluctance to discuss CAP reform (Evans and Grant, 1995, 122–5; Benvenuti, 1997, 65–74). Secondly, it placed the negotiations on agriculture outside of the bilateral EC–Australia relationship, with two results: the opportunity afforded to expand Australia–EC dialogue in other sectors beyond agriculture; and, further, an essentially asymmetrical relationship between the two parties was evened up somewhat in the Cairns group context. On the matter of agricultural trade, Australia was no longer a lone voice at the negotiation table with the EC. Asymmetry did remain, however, as the EC–US conflict still dominated a considerable amount of the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT, thereby minimising the impact of other players such as Australia (Benvenuti, 1997, 7). The Cairns Group of agricultural exporting nations saw its key lobbying role as influencing the GATT agenda. Its objective was to liberalise agricultural trade.19 The Cairns Group attacked agricultural policy on three fronts: export subsidies, import access and internal
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support. Evans and Grant present this reform of agricultural trade as the price for the Cairns agreement on other articles on the agenda of the Uruguay Round (Evans and Grant, 1995, 125). Cairns was a key platform of multilateralism and collation building among likeminded nations. It was a form of temporary regional bloc in order to enable more effective negotiations with an established regional bloc—the EU. At an official level there has been considerable Australian objection to the EU emphasis on non-trade concerns, known as multifunctionality, whereby concerns such as food safety, environmental protection, rural development, employment, and poverty reduction are regarded by the EU as intrinsic to agricultural policy. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures adopted by Australia and the EU— while each is committed to the protection of human, animal and plant life, and health, rendering food safe for consumption—have been interpreted differently by each interlocutor. A European Parliament document has remarked of the Cairns Group that it was ‘hot on eliminating export subsidies’ and ‘very lukewarm about the concept of agricultural multifunctionality’ (European Parliament Fact Sheets: CAP, http://www.europarl.eu.int/facts/4_1_7_en.htm, accessed 18/2/05). This EU emphasis on the multifunctionality aspect of agriculture is based on the EU principle that agriculture is multifunctional—that is, it has a number of functions in addition to producing food and fibre, such as environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural employment and food safety (WTO Glossary, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm, accessed 14/5/05). Australians have taken issue with this multifunctionality aspect of EU agriculture. Trade analyst Alan Oxley suggests that, while the EU defines it as ‘embracing a number of non-economic purposes of agriculture, including protection of the environment and consumer interest’, Australia regards it as ‘a continuation of policies proposed in the GATT in the 1980s with the aim of creating new grounds on which to restrict the extent to which obligations to reduce protectionism will be applied’ (Oxley, 2002, 110–11). According to one Australian agricultural expert, the multifunctionality argument ‘appears to be nothing more than a stalking horse for agricultural protectionism’.20 Multifunctionality is protection dressed up as sophistry, according to an Australian source.
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We have seen that the Australian Government consistently adopted a very firm stand on European trade protectionism in agriculture. Australia’s reaction to such protectionism in the early 1980s was regarded as ‘abrasive’ (Pomfret, 1995a), while Higgott and Cooper (1990) describe how Doug Antony stormed out of a 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, having dubbed it a ‘fiasco’ when he was unsuccessful in placing agriculture on the agenda. They suggest that ‘his petulant action’ was met with scant respect (Higgott and Cooper, 1990, 609). Pomfret is uncompromising in his assessment that this approach was unsuccessful, an approach to be replaced in the mid-1980s by a ‘stepby-step approach avoiding animosity and recrimination’. Rather than a change in the critique of the CAP, it signalled a change in negotiating strategies. This was when the Cairns Group was born, with the objective of doing what Doug Antony had failed to do: placing agriculture on the agenda for the Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations. Despite caustic criticism of Europe—or perhaps because of it—Australia’s skill in leading the group led to admiration for ‘its diplomacy in keeping the group together and focused on the relevant issues of regulating (and eventually outlawing) export subsidies and improving market access’ (Pomfret, 1995a, 196). The British economist James Rollo goes so far as to regard Australia’s role in the creation of the Cairns Group as ‘the most striking diplomatic achievement in defence of the multilateral system’ (Rollo, 1994, 18). He sees the role played by Australia in providing quality analysis of the price of agricultural protectionism and other policies as significant contributions to the costs of these policies (Rollo, 1994, 17–18). A different perception is that Cairns brought together an inchoate group and was not fully united as its members negotiated bilaterally, as well, with the EU. Australia is not a regional entity and does not participate in regular region-to-region negotiations with the EU. Australia was seen in EU circles as having led Cairns well. It launched a strategic debate in putting pressure on the EU while at the same time it realised the art of the possible. Despite the Uruguay Round and some subsequent reforms of the CAP, Australian policy makers have been of the firm opinion that this did not go far enough. Former agricultural lobbyist Mark Ritchie (2002) makes the point that:
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These import restrictions have effectively hamstrung the Australian beef industry’s servicing of growing demand for high quality product within the European Union. The Uruguay round agreement failed to improve the access of Australian beef into the EU market and current access is restricted through the quota and is also subject to a 20 percent in-quota tariff. These sentiments are shared by Trade Minister Vaile who regarded the EU’s tariff and quota restrictions as continuing to limit Australian traditional agricultural exports severely. He saw CAP reforms as having done little to improve matters, changing only the form rather than the scale of subsidies (Vaile, 2000, 13). This view is shared by Cairns advocacy of a level playing-field in agricultural goods, increased market access for agricultural goods to the EU and the conclusion of domestic subsidies (Tay, 2002, 97). John Howard has referred to ‘the perfidy of the trading practises of other countries, especially but not only the European Union’ (Howard, 2002). After the 2003 European Commission–Australia ministerial consultations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, Minister for Trade Mark Vaile, and EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten jointly stated that ‘We also had a vigorous and frank exchange on the tough issues currently at the forefront of the WTO Doha negotiating round, including on our divergent positions on agricultural trade. We will nevertheless continue in our efforts to ensure an ambitious approach overall’. http://europa.eu. int/comm/external_relations/australia/intro/mc160403.htm In July 2002, during Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to the EU, the commissioner responsible for agriculture, Franz Fischler, stated that he welcomed the opportunity to clarify for Mr Howard the extent to which the CAP has evolved since Mr Howard had dealt with it as a special minister in the 1970s, and to explain the EU’s determination to continue to participate very actively in the agricultural negotiations. He added: ‘People who are not close to the issue are not always aware of how different the current CAP is from the CAP of the 1970s’.21 A key objective of the visit to Brussels was to emphasise the obstacles that Australia’s agricultural exporters confront in seeking better access to the EU’s markets (Australian Financial Review, 2002).
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Australian reaction to CAP reform The CAP reforms before and after the Uruguay Round led to a cautiously positive response from the Government, with DFAT regarding the 1992 CAP reforms as constituting ‘an important step, but a first step only, in the process of reform of the CAP’ (DFAT, 1996a, 2). Although differences remained, the relationship was deemed to be improving. The EU CAP reform process is considered to be advancing in the right direction, although there has been frustration with the pace and speed of reform. DFAT regards access to the EU market as generally very open, with the exception of the agricultural sector, where Australia has limited quota access. It continues to regard the CAP as having a trade-distorting effect on world markets, due to the CAP’s use of production and export subsidies. DFAT acknowledges the CAP reforms of 26 June 2003 as a good beginning, having set in train the process of decoupling, or separating, farm support from production, ‘thereby reducing incentives to over-produce and making the EU farm sector more market-oriented’. The government website is clear in its assessment that the reforms ‘do not reduce the total level of EU farm support, improve market access or address export subsidies’. Australia’s reaction was to seek an ‘improved EU negotiating position in the WTO Doha round of multilateral negotiations’ (DFAT, European Union Brief 2005). Former trade minister Tim Fischer (1997) had been critical of aspects of the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms, considering that ‘the actual proposed changes to the CAP arrangements themselves would be too limited in scope and too slow. They would also fail to deal with important market access restrictions.’22 Nevertheless there has been some Australian understanding of the CAP as being under pressure for continued reform, as seen in the comments by Labor parliamentarian Peter Cook in 2002: It is too soon, and it would be too bold, to say that the CAP is over. That is certainly not true. But the CAP is looking a bit more sluggish and is beginning to fray around the edges … For the first time in my experience of dealing with Europeans, I encountered a great deal of scepticism about the common agricultural policy. In all of my previous experience in Europe, there would have been nothing but stout
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defenders of this grotesque form of subsidy. However, just in the last few weeks there were a number of people prepared to come out and frankly criticise this misallocation of economic resources and the high levels of protection in Europe.23
Shared engagement It should be remembered that the EU is the single largest importer of agricultural goods in the world and bigger than the US, Australia and New Zealand together; it is also, depending on the year, the first or second exporter of agricultural goods. Despite the problems with the CAP, Australia’s annual exports of food to the EU in the eight years from the Uruguay Round have increased by 139 per cent to A$1.6 billion in 2003. During the same period, Australian food imports have increased by 121 per cent to A$1.8 billion.
Figure 1: EU–Australia Trade in Food ($A million)1 2,000
$A mn
1,500
1,000
500
0 1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
–500 Australian Exports 1
Australian Imports
Trade Balance
Source: European Commission Delegation, Canberra
There is increasing engagement between Australia and the EU even on matters of difference. Considerable effort is being invested in joint statements in recent years to present lack of agreement as discrete issues within the broader context of the relationship—agriculture
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and the environment are cases in point. They are sometimes presented as part of the multilateral relationship—within the WTO, for example. With the exception of wine, most other trade disputes have come under the multilateral banner of the WTO. Australia seeks fair trade in agriculture, in particular: fewer subsidies, greater market access, less discrimination, and a whittling down of EU surpluses. Thus the European Commission statement (2003; Patten, 2003, 14) says: ‘Where specific problems remain concerning agriculture, the Commission considers that such issues should be solved on their own merits in the WTO context and should not be allowed to harm the positive evolution of the bilateral relations’. This effectively places Australia–EU new regional bilateralism, the close encounter of the second kind, alongside multilateralism while not undermining it. Commissioner Lamy also projected this approach: So in both theory and practice Australia and the EU share a common view that regionalism and multilateralism go hand in hand and are mutually supportive. But both Australia and the EU place the strengthening of their bilateral and regional relationships firmly within a strong commitment to the multilateral trading system. (Lamy, 2002) Comments made at an Australian parliamentary committee suggest that ‘we have got to more or less beg some of these people to open up their markets. We cannot really do much about it; we are beggars on the world market’ (Causley) and ‘While we are small, we should not underestimate the role that the Cairns group can play in forcing the larger players to the table’ (Fisher).24 British legal expert Eleanor Sharpston insists that it is essential that the CAP be understood in its broader policy contexts, maintaining that agriculture is ‘part (but part only) of what is on the negotiating table’ in global negotiations. She adds that wider trade in manufactured products, invisibles and services trade and intellectual property ‘are all part of the picture. Human rights are there too, because they are perceived by the EU as part of the global relations between EU and other states or trading blocks.’ She therefore suggests that it is unrealistic to expect the EU to put human rights to one side in trade negotiations and solely have agriculture in mind when in
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negotiations on agricultural issues. She urges that there be an understanding of ‘where the EU is coming from’ in order to engage in constructive dialogue with it (Sharpston, 2002, 40). We have seen that CAP has been a regular feature at meetings of ministers and Commissioners, senior officials and parliamentary delegations.25 Increased market access for agricultural goods is high on these agendas. Australia has also expressed serious reservations about the EU use of the precautionary principle in the WTO as it could be utilised to oppose trade liberalisation.26 The changing fortunes of the Cairns Group in recent years with the rise of the Brazilian-led G20 and the G90, the group of the world’s poorest nations, has meant that these groups have laid claim to preferential treatment in the Doha Development Round of the WTO. The honest broker role of the Australian Government is no longer available. What of the EU role? The EU, like Australia, sees its role as taking care of farmers. At the same time, it has attempted to bring about CAP reform since 1992, responding to national and international pressure as well as multilateral pressure. There have been further skirmishes between Australia and the European Commission in the Doha Development Round. Before the WTO meeting in Seattle, European Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, in response to Australian government criticism that the EU was erecting trade barriers, stated that exporting agricultural produce to Australia was ‘like going through the biblical eye of the needle’ (Harding, 2000). Australia’s call for a focus in the Doha Round on opening up agricultural markets was in contradistinction with the EU’s interest in broadening the agenda ‘to include labour and environmental issues and liberalisation of the services sector’. Nevertheless, there is evidence that each has considerable understanding of the other’s position on aspects of agricultural trade, even if it is at times an agreement to disagree.
Australian border protection: Sanitary and phytosanitary issues and quarantine A considerable amount of frustration has been expressed by both sides, although for different reasons, regarding a troubled draft veterinary agreement and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues. Australian insistence on the need for further research is seen by the
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EU as a barrier to trade. For the most part SPS falls within the framework of the WTO but there have been some significant differences between Australia and the EU on animal import issues and perceptions of protectionism. The EU Commission regards Australia as overly protectionist on SPS matters within its borders, especially regarding protection from animal diseases. Meanwhile, the EU is attempting to get its animal products, and to a lesser extent its plant products, into Australia, where it faces strict quarantine rules. The case of Denmark attempting to break into the Australian market since the 1990s is the example most often cited by the EU Commission of such barriers.27 Australia is perceived as using the provisions of SPS too often and as being overcautious. The Commission has been in discussions since the 1990s on a proposed Veterinary Agreement with both Australia and New Zealand and has signed one with New Zealand, regarded as being less difficult negotiators. It has to be noted that the EU has not helped its own case, with the experience of BSE and foot and mouth disease, for example. The EU is keen to have a Veterinary Agreement with Australia and to have equivalence with Australia on a wide range of products. The member states’ mandate to the Commission sets out that there is a need for interlocutors such as Australia to understand the regionalised context of policies in this regard, whereby there is a form of Europeanisation of previously domestic spheres and policies. This implies an acceptance by the EU’s interlocutors, including Australia, of the Europeanisation or regionalisation of policies of the EU states with respect to animal diseases. While there is little evidence of mutual trust in this regard between Commission bureaucrats and Australian officials, there is some evidence that the EU sees itself as having been lenient on Australian beef exports even though Australia has not complied with the EU hormone program. A WTO Trade Policy Review commented on this issue in 2002, with some understanding of the Australian position: Australia’s SPS and quarantine requirements have been criticized by a number of its trading partners on the grounds that they are unduly stringent and therefore protectionist. But with Australia heavily dependent on agriculture and a major exporter of agricultural commodities and agri-food
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products, which receive relatively little government assistance and are sold at world market prices, these measures are believed to be necessary to ensure that Australia’s reputation as a reliable exporter of high quality agricultural products is not jeopardized by pests and diseases (WTO, 2002). There are significant advantages to establishing a Veterinary Agreement between Australia and the EU. Such an agreement would not only provide a forum for discussion to settle disputes—especially as Australian veterinary attachés spend a considerable amount of time dealing with member states and not the EU—but also assist with the facilitation of bilateral EU–Australia trade. Member states cannot negotiate with Australia on imports to the European Single Market, with its single customs document and policy. They are, however, in a position to negotiate, as individual nation states, with Australia when it comes to their exports to Australia. They export to Australia agricultural products such as hard cheeses, cooked meat products and dairy products but the difficulty is especially with the raw meat market. The advantage of a veterinary agreement, and the formalisation of meetings under its rubric, is that these forums could call on the expertise of specialists in the field, rather than relying on diplomats, with a range of portfolios, to reach agreement. It is noteworthy that there is already considerable communication among the specialists from Australia and the EU countries in this regard. A second advantage would be the equivalence aspect. The two systems of delivery are different and as there are similar health quarantines for compliance this would be useful. One system of delivery under a veterinary agreement, with a single certificate, could be advantageous for all interlocutors, although starting such an exercise is resource-intensive and maintaining it involves implementing legislation in about a hundred sectors, including, for example, beef products and sausage skins. A veterinary agreement was signed with New Zealand in December 1999. Even so, there are still problems to cover all sectors and a substantial amount of legislation needs to be examined on both sides in order to ensure equivalence. Another problem is that the EU officials have expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that Australian and New Zealand inspectors are not government
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officers, unlike on the European side. Government officials from Australia and EU representatives meet to discuss a range of these issues once a year. There are also some unresolved problems over quarantine, with Australia coming under attack from the EU for having utilised quarantine as a form of trade barrier. In 2002 Trade Minister Mark Vaile rejected criticisms by Trade Commissioner Lamy, who had contended that Australia’s quarantine restrictions on agricultural imports were used as trade barriers (Davis, 2002). The increasingly important issue of food safety in the EU was not simply an internal matter for Europe. Rather, it had considerable international repercussions. In response to the appearance in Europe of BSE, Australia adopted some special measures, necessitating that beef and beef products imported into Australia from the EU should be sourced from cattle herds that were BSE-free. Australia further introduced ‘a stringent certification system based on the categorisation of the exporting country via a formal application to the responsible Australian authority’ (http://www. europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/ index_en.htm, accessed 8/4/05). The European Commission has noted of Australia’s approach regarding agricultural products: Australia’s cautious approach to quarantine, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations reflects its island geography, which has isolated it from many diseases and pests in its flora and fauna. Therefore access to the Australian market on agri-food products is particularly difficult. It involves two major obstacles: foreign products must not only satisfy Australian requirements on quarantine and inspection services but also conform to the national Food Standards Code. Australia is well known for its very restrictive imports of animal and plants products. It insists on lengthy risk assessment procedures, which may take years to complete, before changing its import rules. (http://www.europa. eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/ index_en.htm, accessed 8/4/05)
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Moving beyond the Common Agricultural Policy The almost exclusive focus on the CAP has changed in recent years, due partly to the development of the Australia–EU relationship beyond the scope of that policy and partly to the lessening of tensions on completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT. In addition, there has been substantial agreement on common concerns and the signature of formal bilateral Australia–EU agreements on science and technology, wine and other areas. Tensions and misunderstandings have continued, however. The fact that both the Australia–EU relationship and the rhetoric of successive governments formerly focussed on the CAP has meant that the burgeoning overall trade relationship has been neglected in the Australian public perception of the EU—a perception that is manipulated by politicians who find far more domestic credibility in seeking to subject the EU to scathing criticism. Nevertheless, the broad economic linkages between the EU and Australia—trade, investment, agriculture and formalised sectoral agreements—amount to a very positive story, although not often deemed vote-worthy or newsworthy. Two-way trade and investment flows have increased substantially over the last twenty years. They are, not unexpectedly, characterised by an Australian trade deficit with the EU. The EU is a major world power, with over one-third of the world’s GDP. It is the world’s largest trader and actively promotes trade liberalisation. Australia, by comparison, is insignificant economically. While the EU is Australia’s most important economic partner, Australia provides less than 1.5 per cent of the EU’s exports and imports. The question arises: is Australia worth 1.5 per cent of the EU’s attention? It certainly is immediately clear that Australia does not feature on the EU radar screen for long, just as the EU tends not to feature on the Australian government radar screen for much longer. Yet the EU has been Australia’s major trading partner since the early 1990s. As we have seen, the EU is not only the largest single source of foreign investment in Australia but also where more of Australian investment goes, more than any single country and the EU remains the leading exporter of services to the Australian market (European Parliament, 2001a).
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Other issues of divergence Disagreements or divergence of views remain evident on a range of matters, including the International Criminal Court, aspects of wine trade, the EU’s sugar regime, quarantine procedures, reform of the CAP, climate change and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The Australian Government is attempting to deal with shifting scenarios and with the bilateral relationship with the member states as well as the more specialised one with the EU. One government perspective is that, until there is some clarity about the EU, there is a primary need to keep the bilateral state-to-state relationships in order. In other words, close encounters of the first kind are more reliable than close encounters of the second kind, because bilateral relationships both predate and go beyond EU issues, including political, security, strategic, trade and investment issues. Investment, for example, is derived from the member states. Government ministers feel more comfortable with traditional bilateralism but this raises the question as to whether Australia’s permanent diplomatic mission in Brussels should be briefing the government more on what is actually happening in the EU, so as to deal with—and combat—this idea that the uncertain nature of the EU as an interlocutor persists, thereby hampering engagement. Once treaties and agreements of the EU are signed and ratified, they are part of the EU acquis—its legal and policy patrimony—and it is necessary for the Australian Government to take that on board and deal with what is actually happening in the EU. Figure 2: Survey Respondents’ View of Trade, Agricultural and Investment Links 100% 90% 80% 70% 60%
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30% 20% 10% 0% Trade links
Investment links
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It is of course recognised that the EU is fluid, but that will be a hallmark of the EU for some time—and it is incumbent on non-EU countries like Australia to deal with this and follow developments very closely. This is not to undermine the bilateral relationships; rather, it should enrich them. Australia may well need to use the bilateral relationship to get more leverage within the EU in pushing its agenda. Australia would also be wise to use the bilateral relationships to gain an understanding of EU developments—a perfect opportunity to gather intelligence by seeing the nation state additionally as a member state. This feature of being a member state is no longer just an aspect of foreign policy for the nation state; it is an intrinsic part of the nation state as member state—member states’ government departments are organised to be part of the EU. Further, all EU legislation is binding on all those to whom it is addressed and it takes immediate effect and has priority over national legislation.
Sugar and the WTO Australia regards itself as a natural competitor in sugar production with the EU and the US. The EU has a special relationship with the ACP and India. Also the EU’s Everything But Arms policy provides duty-free access to developing countries and this has an indirect impact on Australia’s export potential. In April 2005 the WTO’s Appellate Body upheld an earlier Panel decision that the operation of the EU sugar regime was inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the EU was obliged, under the ruling, to amend its regime.28 One Australian journalist expressed the view that: The European Union has been buying half or more of the output for more than double the market price, costing $53 million a year. But it warns that it cannot keep doing so past 2007. In response, Fiji government ministers in Canberra this week for the business forum will also be lobbying the Australian Government to stop challenging the EU’s sugar subsidies in the World Trade Organisation. The EU sugar subsidies are perceived here as hurting, severely, Australia’s comparatively efficient producers.29
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Wine and food: What’s in a name? The intellectual property aspect of trade has meant that ‘Champagne, Chablis and burgundy are out, port and sherry on the way out’, along with kalamata olives (Wahlquist, 2001). These are all product names derived from place names—and Australia is forbidden to use them now that the EU has claimed them as geographical indications (GIs). Geographical indications refer to place names (or words associated with a place) used to identify products (for example, ‘Champagne’, ‘Tequila’ or ‘Roquefort’) which have a particular quality, reputation or other characteristic because they come from that place. It has been suggested that Australia could also adopt this trademarking of place names to its own advantage, with Professor Brad Sharman (in Wahlquist, 2001) recommending that it be used to protect Australian products internationally: King Island brie, Gympie goat cheese and bush tucker could all be protected and ‘Clare Valley’ could well become a geographical term for ‘Australia’. Despite some unease with the loss of use of some GIs for Australian wine, there has been a burgeoning export to Europe of Australian wines as well as beers. There has been a massive increase in the volume of Australian production and export of wine to Europe since the EU–Australia Wine agreement was signed in 1994.30 It essentially constitutes an Australian success story. In 1988, when the first wine talks were held between Australia and the European Commission, Australia had a production lower than that of Bordeaux. Now, Australian wine exports to the UK, for example, are greater than those of the whole of France. The areas of considerable debate between Australia and the EU in these years of negotiations concerned geographical indications and traditional expressions in both wine and food. For example, Parma ham constituted an expression owned by the Italians and the same applied to numerous wine producing regions. It can be argued that Australia does not need to worry about such protection as it has developed its own excellent reputation. On wine there is more professional cooperation now than before between Australia and EU. The EU has now become Australia’s largest market for wine, accounting for 57 per cent of Australian wine exports. In the ten years up to 2002, the value of Australia’s wine exports rose seven-fold (European Report, 2002, 519) and the impact of Australian wine exports even became the subject
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of concern in some media reporting in Europe, with headlines such as ‘French wine is in crisis—Australia has captured British palates’ (Hearst, 2005). Australia is part of the New World Wine Group and, although not very united, it has successfully confronted the EU on some of its GI requirements. The EU member states’ solidarity with Portugal on the issue of port wine proved to be rather disconcerting for Australia, although it was obliged to accept this. The Wine Agreement has been plagued by differences on the interpretation of traditional expressions. There is a difference of approach between the European Union and Australia regarding vintage expressions. For example, there was considerable Australian objection to the term tawny being regarded as intellectual property, a concern shared by other countries in the New World Wine Group. In addition, terms such as champagne and burgundy have been dropped by all who produce similar products outside of these geographical areas and the WTO has concurred. The wine industry in Australia has agreed to desist from using terms such as champagne but the European Union has been seen in Australia as wanting even more concessions, which Australia regarded as beyond the original 1994 agreement. It is not only Australia that has faced problems in negotiating with the European Commission on this issue. Another member of the New World Wine Group, South Africa, has had a similar disagreement with the Europeans. In February 2004, in an important breakthrough, the European Commission granted a number of non-EU wine producers—in Australia, South Africa and the USA—authorisation to use three denominations of port wine: Tawny, Ruby and Vintage. However, this decision was greeted with considerable opposition in some EU countries, particularly Portugal, the country of origin of port wine. In the European Parliament, a debate on the issue saw European Parliamentarian Lage criticise the decision, which, it was claimed, had led to ‘a furious reaction in the Port wine defined region, the oldest wine region in Europe, and will have a devastating impact on the legitimate interests of Port wine producers’. As with other issues relating to agriculture, the Members of the European Parliament stated that this was a cultural issue: ‘This is not just a matter of economics; it is both highly sensitive and a cultural issue. The EU must support Port wine, its authenticity and the trademarks that it has acquired.’31
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There remain some outstanding intellectual property issues in this regard, especially to do with the labelling of wine, driven by the fact that the EU is more regulated than is the New World. Australia is the biggest wine exporter within the EU and is subject to no preferences and few duties for its wine exports to the EU. There is also considerable European investment in Australian winemaking, with Rothschild and Chandon among the most recent wine houses to set up Australian bases. The EU and Australia do have extensive co-operation on technical issues and the EU is seeking to accommodate the various traditions and co-operate on labelling. Co-operation among officials is regular and detailed. Despite a number of differences, it is noteworthy that there is a constructive atmosphere in discussions on wine, according to officials and it is considered that the bilateral relationship on wine is generally positive. While trade duties are dealt with in the WTO context, the bilateral Australia–EU relationship is ensconced in the annual Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group talks and in bilateral discussions regarding a range of technical issues, where officials discuss the current state of play on both sides and any bilateral technical issues that require attention. The discord that characterised agricultural negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s is not present in the wine discussions. Australia’s wine trade to Europe is increasing and Australian exporters can take advantage of the fact of duty-free access to the EU since the Uruguay Round and the fact that substantial progress was made on the Wine Agreement in 2004–05. The differences regarding distinctive wine making practices in Europe and Australia have been largely resolved as a result of co-operative negotiations. The main issues that remain under the spotlight in discussions are intellectual property concerns, remaining problems relating to recognition of Australian winemaking practices and regularising the relationship so that any potential conflict can be resolved. Australia exports more wine to the EU and to the US than the rest of the world and more than France does. Australia has also expressed concern regarding traditional and geographical expressions in cheese. A WTO panel was brought by the United States and Australia against the EU’s system of protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural
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products and foodstuffs (other than wines and spirits). This was resolved in early 2005, when the report by a WTO panel stated that the EU’s system of protection of GIs for agricultural products does in fact comply with WTO rules, although this had been disputed by Australia and the US, most of whose claims were rejected.32 The WTO panel report requested that the EU clarify its rules in this area. A GI, according to the Commission press release on the WTO panel report, ‘testifies to the link between a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of a product and its geographical origin. We have seen that the EU has a number of registered GIs that cover a wide range of products from cheeses to hams to beer (“Newcastle Brown Ale”).’ According to DFAT, Australian producers may not use, within the EU, terms registered as geographical indications within the EU, such as ‘feta’; or terms that are translations of registered GIs, such as ‘parmesan’ (a translation of the registered term Parmigiano Reggiano, which is a registered GI).33 * * * The EU itself understands the need to reform the CAP and, despite Australian problems with the pace of EU agricultural reform, there is a substantial amount of fruitful engagement between Australia and the EU that has been characterised in recent years by positive developments, such as the spectacularly successful export of Australian wine to Europe. The agricultural dialogue structure is based in two forums: the EU–Australia new regional bilateral encounters of the second kind by officials and in the WTO context. The bilateral relationship has broadened beyond agriculture to a considerable degree and Australia and the EU are increasingly attempting to build on areas of common interest—away from the spotlight. Within the WTO current round, there is a view that Australia has considerably less clout than it had in the Uruguay Round and that the Cairns Group is less relevant now than in the 1990s. There has been a broadening of a constructive approach to the wine issue. Within the WTO, there is increased Australian recognition of the EU as a negotiating entity and some indication of a willingness to recognise the series of reforms of the CAP by the EU. In the past, Australia had often been reluctant to accept or recognise CAP reforms, with little welcome for CAP reforms made public by policy makers in
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media or public pronouncements. There is evidence of a more balanced assessment, although US protectionism has not been attacked in the same manner as European protectionism in the past. In Brussels the evidence of an Australian affinity with the US has often been commented on. Comparisons have been made with New Zealand’s quiet diplomacy, as this is regarded as leading to more positive outcomes for New Zealand. Australian farmers largely continue to view the EU as a closed market in all areas and many are unaware that the EU is the biggest agricultural importer in the world. It is true that distance can perhaps magnify the sense of the EU as a closed market too, unlike interactions with the individual member states. Finally, the EU has been regarded in Australia as a difficult market, in part because the CAP has informed the attitude of Australia towards the EU. There remains a considerable amount of unease in dealing with the EU. In conclusion, it can be asserted that, when agriculture ceases to be the bone of contention, then Australia will deal more effectively with the EU.
Notes 1
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Elizabeth Wise, ‘Australia tries to clear the air for sake of EU trade accord’, European Voice, 8 February 1996. This common policy’s decisions were made by qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. The European Commission points out that the EU imports more than the USA, Japan, Australia and New Zealand combined. http://www.delaus.cec. eu.int/eu_and_australia/KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm. http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/eu_and_australia/KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm. Beach (2005, 218) points to the Commission proposals since Agenda 2000 for decoupling of price and production supports from payments to farmers, so that price cuts would not be fully compensated by full payments to farmers. Preferential agreements were negotiated by the EU and Australia in the framework of the GATT in 1979, whereby Australia was allocated access to the EC market in beef, buffalo meat and cheeses. In return, Australia gave concessions in some industrial and agricultural products. For example, Australian butter and cheese were sold more cheaply in Europe than European products (Milward, 1992, 258). The case of grains is similar for the period 1950 to 1960: Australian grains (like North American and Argentine grains) sold for less than domestic European products at the time (Milward, 1992, 256, 258). Some beef, sugar and wheat products were accepted in limited quantities.
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The Economist, 3 October 1971, quoted in Bolton, 1980, p. 212. Australian Treaty Series 1932, no. 16, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Trade Agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ottawa, 20 August 1932), Entry into force: 20 August 1932. Australian Treaty Series, 1932, no. 16. http://www.austlii.edu.au/, accessed 18 September 2001. The Ottawa system initially included Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand and Rhodesia. Australia had preferences in sugar, dairy products, beef, wool, and canned and dried fruit with the UK. 11 Alexander Downer, Speech at the National Europe Centre Conference on EU Enlargement Canberra, 16 April 2003, EU Enlargement: Meeting the Challenges of the Global Security and Trade Environment. 12 Trade2004, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 19. 13 As noted above, p. 49. 14 The most up-to-date figures are as follows: ‘The average tariff for the industrial sector applied by Australia from 1.1.2000 is 4.5%. This average rate includes tariffs of 0.8 % for raw materials, up to 5.9% for transformed products and 6.9% for manufactured products. Specific tariffs are applied to cheese and alcoholic beverages, where a supplementary amount has to be paid in addition to the 5 % tariff. Tariff peaks reach 25% for clothing, 15% for textiles, footwear and motor vehicles and parts. However, Australia has announced that it will cut autonomously the peaks from 2005 on to 17.5% (instead of 25%) and 10% (instead of 15%) with the objective to systematically reduce all peak tariffs to 5 % by 2015.’ (European Commission, Trade, Australia, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm, accessed 20.4.05.) 15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), European Union agricultural policy towards 2000: an Australian perspective, Canberra: DFAT (1996) 16. These ‘assurances’, formalised in a Commission letter, refer to Japan, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. See Elijah et al (2000). 16 R. Camilleri, EU Coverage in the Australian media, in J.E.S. Gage and K. Muller, eds, Australia and Europe: Continuity and Change, Proceedings of a conference at Humanities research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, June 1996. 17 The original fourteen member countries were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Fiji, Hungary Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Thailand, The Philippines, and Uruguay. Since then Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Paraguay have joined; the only European member—Hungary—has left. The Australian Trade Minister chairs the annual ministerial meetings. See DFAT (2000a). 18 In 1989 Australia co-founded the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, consisting of 21 countries of the Pacific Rim, including North and South America. 19 Current member are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. 9
10
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Comment by Dr Brian Fischer, ABARE Executive Director, in ‘Signals to Seattle’ (no author), Europe Business Review, vol. 2, no. 9, Oct–Dec 1999, p. 48. 21 Fischler IP/02/1040, Brussels, 11 July 2002, Frank and open dialogue with Australian Prime Minister Howard. 22 Tim Fischer, ‘Australia and Europe: important trade and investment links’, address to Australian Business in Europe, Melbourne, 29 August 1997. 23 Adjournment: Trade: Common Agricultural Policy; Date 15 October, 2002, Senate Hansard, Cook, Senator Peter (ALP, Western Australia, Opposition), page 5197, http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Chamber/ Hansards/Linked/2013-2.PDF. 24 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries, Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs: Benefits of agricultural trade reform: Discussion Date: 3 December 1997. Benefits of agricultural trade reform, Canberra. Questioner: Causley, Ian, MP; Chair Responder: Mr Fisher. p.60) 25 For example, European Parliament: Delegation for relations with Australia and NZ, 25th EP/Australia Interparliamentary meeting, 20–27 April 2001. Report by James Nicholson, Chairman of the Delegation. PE 399.403. 26 As noted above, p.5. 27 The Australian objections focussed on diseases such as gastroenteritis in pig meat. Australia also insisted on meat being boned and cooked on arrival in Australia, despite EU objections. 28 Delegation of the European Commission to Australia, ‘European Commission regrets attack on EU sugar regime, but will abide by WTO Appellate Body ruling’, media release, 29 April 2005. 29 Rowan Callick, ‘Fiji premature in claiming it’s business as usual’, Australian Financial Review, 14 October 2002. 30 European Commission, Bulletin EU 3-2003, Agriculture (1/2), Agriculture, Market organisations, Wine. point 1.3.96. Proposal for a Council regulation authorising the offer and delivery for direct human consumption of certain wines imported from Australia which may have undergone oenological practices not provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999. Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine: OJ L 179, 14.7.1999; Bull. 5-1999, point I.14, Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine: OJ L 86, 31.3.1994; Bull. 1/2-1994, point 1.2.131, Adopted by the Commission on 7 March. Under this proposal, imports into the Community of Australian wines that have undergone oenological processes not normally allowed by the Community rules—in this case treatment with oak chips and sawdust— would be authorised under Article 45(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on a transitional basis until the entry into force of the agreement on wine currently being negotiated between the Community and Australia. [COM(2003) 89 ] http://www.ecsanet.org/, all accessed 8 April 2005. 31 European Parliament Debates, Wednesday 25 February 2004, http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm#debates, accessed: 26 February 2005. 20
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The European Commission sees the protection of geographical indications (or GIs) as an integral part of its own food quality policy and it is at the forefront of efforts to strengthen the protection of GIs internationally as well. The aim is to respond to consumer demand for quality products while at the same time promoting the development of rural communities and specialised agricultural products. The Panel report, which was keenly awaited, upholds the EC’s system of protection and confirms that, under WTO rules and in certain circumstances, GIs and prior trademarks can continue to coexist. (European Commission Delegation to Australia, Canberra, 15 March 2005, WTO Panel Upholds EU System Protecting Geographical Indications). The Australian position is: ‘Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. (DFAT: World Trade Organization Dispute: EC— Geographical indications (GIs) for foodstuffs and agricultural products. http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/disputes/290_protection_of_ trademarks_q_a.html, accessed 7 April 2005). 33 DFAT: World Trade Organization Dispute: EC—Geographical indications (GIs) for foodstuffs and agricultural products. http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/disputes/290_protection_of_ trademarks_q_a.html, accessed 7 April 2005. 32
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Chapter 4
The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower II: The Framework Agreement and Kyoto
Although, on the one hand, there is an increasingly consensual dialogue between the EU and Australia on issues of shared concern, such as security and immigration, until recently, dialogue has often been characterised by disagreements as to what the EU constitutes—political entity, polity, economic powerhouse or sparring partner—and there were divergent understandings of the respective roles of the two interlocutors in international relations and trade. An additional source of discord has been the recent invasion of Iraq, over which Australia aligned itself with the US and its long-term ally the UK and, in so doing, differed from many EU states. But of all the issues of conflict between Australia and the EU, apart from agriculture, two stand out. The first is the Australian Government’s contestation of the human rights clause contained in a proposed broad-ranging agreement of the mid-1990s; the second is the matter of climate change under the Kyoto Protocol.
The decision to negotiate a Framework Agreement In April 1995 Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating wrote to President Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, proposing
that the two negotiate a formal framework for the bilateral Australia– EU relationship. The early 1990s had been a period of increased dialogue with the EU and, with the signing of the Uruguay Round agreement, there was a move to a considerable broadening of relations between the EU and Australia (Elijah et al, 2000). The mid-1990s saw the development of a more positive approach by both interlocutors, to be consolidated by this formalised means of co-operation in the form of a Framework Agreement between the EU and Australia. In April 1995, Keating and Santer exchanged letters regarding means of giving ‘formal expression’ to the relationship through signing a treaty (CEC, 1996b). This would strengthen the ‘already healthy ties between us’, according to Mr Keating (Keating, 1995). A political declaration along the lines of that signed by the EC and the US in 1990 was first proposed in an academic context in 1991 (Murray, 1991, 26) as the basis of a partnership agreement with common goals and specified consultative and institutional arrangements. Prime Minister Keating, considering that the fractious issue of the EU’s ‘refusal to countenance real reform of its agricultural export policies, an issue of deep importance to Australia’ (Keating, 2000, 248) had in part been dealt with in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, deemed that ‘we were able to look again at other aspects of the relationship with Europe’ (Keating, 2000, 249). He had visited the European Commission in June 1994 and had a positive personal relationship with, and respect for, then Commission President Jacques Delors. They had discussed common issues in the Commission White Paper on Unemployment as well as Australian retraining programs for long-term unemployed (Keating, 2000, 249). Keating suggested in a letter to Delors’s successor, Jacques Santer, that a treaty-level agreement be negotiated, ‘to provide a framework for our future relations’ (Keating, 2000, 249), and he expressed an interest in expanding the dialogue on economic management issues. One advantage of the proposed Framework Agreement was that Australian goods would ‘have an easier time reaching European consumers if an agreement is struck’, as they would encounter fewer regulatory challenges (Wise, 1996a). Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan envisaged an agreement to encompass trade and economic co-operation, ‘including provisions for customs, competition, energy, environmental matters, research, education and even the coordination
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of aid to developing nations’, similar to the agreement then in force for EU–Canada relations, which was for a five-year period and was renewable (Wise, 1996a). From 1995, there were clear signs in official communiqués that pointed to a broadening of dialogue. For example, the 1995 ministerial consultation’s official communiqué stated that the ‘consultations had been particularly productive and had contributed substantially to developing a new and broader EU/Australia partnership’ (Agra Europe, 1995). Agreements on the transfer of nuclear materials, science and technology, wine, and mutual recognition had been formalised, further expanding the commercial relationship, with the opening of the EU market to Australian wines and provisions for research cooperation under the Science and Technology Agreement as well as industrial co-operation. This broadening of co-operation had led to renewed proposals for a Framework Agreement to encompass the totality of the relationship. A negotiating space of this kind had originally been opened up by the fact that agriculture was less conflictual at the end of the Uruguay Round.1 At the same time, two-way investment flows had increased substantially. When the Howard Government was elected in 1996, the negotiations seemed set to proceed and Foreign Minister Downer announced in April 1996 that the Australian Government and the EU would negotiate a Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement along with a Joint Political Declaration. The relationship had entered a ‘new phase’, according to Downer, and the EU had become an increasingly important partner for Australia on many international issues.2 Australia and the EU had developed a substantial trade and investment relationship, and there was increasing co-operation in a number of other areas, such as political dialogue and recent sectoral agreements. However, there was no formal instrument or declaration between the two partners—unlike, for example, the Transatlantic Declaration. Australia’s approach to the Commission at this stage did not specify what form of agreement or instrument might be negotiated. It was considered that it would be similar to instruments negotiated with other OECD countries, a point made in Mr Keating’s letter to Mr Santer. The Commission’s reply to Australia’s overture was to propose a two-track approach, to reflect the division of legal competences within the EU. In effect, this would consist, on the one hand, of
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a treaty-status Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which would relate to Commission competences in the trade and general economic spheres. On the other hand, it would be a parallel Joint Political Declaration (not a treaty) and it was envisaged that this would relate largely to member state competences and would be negotiated with the presidency of the EU. The Australian Government then studied this reply and decided to accept the proposal. The Government’s understanding was that this two-track approach was the standard EU method adopted in negotiations on this type of agreement—in effect a standard template for the Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The Australian Government formally accepted the Commission’s proposed two-track approach in November 1995. At that point, Australian officials raised in general terms with the Commission that it had difficulties with the standard human rights and non-fulfilment provisions that were proposed for inclusion in the treaty-status proposed Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. There was understanding on the Australian side that, from the early 1990s, the EU had incorporated human rights provisions into cooperation agreements negotiated by the Commission with third countries. This was the result of the Council’s acceptance of the Commission’s communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in all agreements. Australian officials were aware that the Commission was in extensive negotiations of Europe agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and on other agreements with developing countries. The officials also understood that a desire by European officials to oversee the use of development aid funds was a concern that the Commission held. Further, there was pressure from domestic constituencies and the European Parliament and other players in the EU at the time to ensure that the aid funds were properly spent and that they be used to reinforce European human rights concerns. In January 1996, the Commission announced that it proposed to negotiate the agreement with Australia. This would consist of provisions for developing and diversifying trade and investment and enhancing economic and industrial co-operation, especially in competition and consumer protection; education and training, social protection and employment policy; information, communication
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and culture; and, finally, drug abuse control, money laundering and the exchange of statistics (CEC, 1996b).
The human rights clause The human rights clause, as it became known, had evolved from a general EU commitment to universal human rights standards to a non-fulfilment provision under which the co-operation agreement could be suspended or terminated, in whole or part, if one party was seen to be, or thought to be, violating basic human rights standards. The first reference to the promotion of human rights and democratic principles within the body of a contractual agreement was in Article 5 of the fourth Lome Convention with the ACP countries, in December 1989 (CEC, 1995, 7), and this became practice from that point. The Commission considered that there needed to be a ‘clear legal basis to suspend or denounce agreements in cases of serious human rights violation or interruptions of democratic process’ (CEC, 1995, 7). After a resolution by the European Parliament, the Council decided in May 1995 to standardise these clauses and have the same set of clauses in all future Community agreements of this type. Therefore, from then on, Article 1 declared adherence to basic human rights principles as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A further article on fulfilment was added as a matter of course, along with an interpretative declaration that renders a violation of the article on human rights by definition a case of special urgency under which the agreement could be suspended or terminated in whole or in part without consultation or even without prior notification. In a reply to a parliamentary question, Commissioner Van den Broek stated in November 1996 that the clause was an essential element in all agreements with non-EU countries, known in EU parlance as ‘third countries’.3 The Council had approved the standard formulation of the clause for all agreements with third countries on 29 May 1995. The initial Australian perception of this provision was that it was effectively a sanction which was not designed with a country like Australia in mind. After all, Australia and the EU already had a history of collaboration in international human rights forums. The Commission officials concurred, but they pointed out that this was a standard clause for all agreements of the EU, under the provisions of a Council decision. The Australian Government, meanwhile, had a
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consistent policy position rejecting the linking of human rights and trade. The draft agreement consisted of provisions to expand, facilitate and encourage bilateral trade and investment generally. The fact that this was a major focus of the draft agreement led to Australian government concerns that it was inappropriate in a treaty with a country like Australia to have a human rights clause. This became the fundamental negotiating difficulty which officials of the Australian Government and the European Commission discussed in some detail throughout the negotiating process. The Australian Government agreed to proceed with negotiations, having registered the human rights issue as a potential problem. The Commission obtained a positive response to its request for a mandate to negotiate a Framework Agreement for trade and co-operation, with the objective of strengthening and diversifying the existing links between the two parties. This mandate was required by the Commission from the member states in the Council, in order to negotiate a formal trade and co-operation agreement with Australia, in April 1996. The discussions could now proceed formally. The first— and, as it turned out, only—round of formal negotiations took place in July 1996, at the level of high officials, in Brussels. The negotiations began on 17 July. Despite a small number of difficult issues, some four-fifths of the content of the draft document was agreed at this stage of negotiations. The unresolved issues at the end of that round related to an article on trade expansion and an article on public procurement, the latter a long-standing issue, as some EU countries had raised objections to some Australian state government procurement policies and preferential procurement policies. The European side was keen to include this in the agreement, but the notion was rejected by the Australian side, as procurement policies were under review. There were also some differences of views regarding agriculture, including market access. The main issue, however, remained the human rights clause, and this was the subject of very robust dialogue. The reliance on UK assistance was evident in the fact that Foreign Minister Downer had a meeting in the UK with the Secretary of State, Malcolm Rifkind, regarding the problems with the human rights clause and a media report at the time stated that Australia regarded Britain as ‘more sympathetic than some other European
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nations’ to its objections to inclusion of the human rights clause in the Framework Agreement (McCathie and Korporaal, 1996). The human rights clause was regarded by the Australian side as adversarial and confrontational, particularly as the criteria were not defined by the EU. Prime Minister John Howard regarded it as ‘impertinent’ and Foreign Minister Downer informed Commissioner Leon Brittan that Australia would not accept a provision where an agreement could be terminated unilaterally over human rights complaints (Skehan and Woodford, 1997). The mechanisms were also regarded by the Australian side as undefined. This is in a way ironic, given that Australia and the EU work co-operatively in a number of forums in promoting human rights and this is even set out in the Joint Declaration. The position taken by Australia was that the Joint Declaration met the Government’s objectives as effectively as a Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement would have. The Commission, meanwhile, was still keen to reach agreement with Australia on the agenda for achieving and consolidating co-operation. Nevertheless, there was considerable Commission frustration with the Australian position and one Commissioner expressed his discontent on a visit to Canberra. The European Commissioner for Budgets, Erkki Liikanen, regarded Australia’s relations with the EU as having been downgraded by the Government’s stand. His perception was that the decision not to sign the Agreement because of concerns regarding the human rights clause ‘could make it difficult to expand the relationship to new areas because of legal constraints on the EU’. He pointed out that ‘the Framework Agreement would have provided a legal basis for budget expenditure allowing the EU to engage in new programs to expand investment and trade with Australia—unlike a Joint Declaration’ (European Report, 1997). The Australian side suggested that an amendment or modification to this clause be made and, at a later stage, in early 1997, Mr Downer was to propose a memorandum limiting application of the clause and restricting human rights issues to a preamble and to the political, or joint, declaration (Skehan and Woodford, 1997). This proposal was to be unsuccessful. A second round of negotiations, meanwhile, was scheduled for late 1996 but this round never took place because each of the interlocutors was unable to resolve their respective concerns on the human rights clause in the context of the formal
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agreement. After a number of exchanges of views and opinions at a high level, it was agreed to change the approach and revert to the original idea of having one instead of two instruments (the Framework Agreement on trade and economic co-operation issues and the Joint Declaration essentially on political dialogue). In January 1997, negotiations between Commissioner Leon Brittan and Foreign Minister Downer in Brussels revealed considerable difficulties in the treaty’s negotiation, which focussed on the fact that agreements signed by the EU with non-EU countries must include a human rights clause (CEC, 1995; Wise, 1997; Murray, Elijah, O’Brien, 2002). The Australian Government position that this was objectionable was publicly aired, the Government reiterating its insistence that trade and human rights should be separate. The European Commission’s position—that there was a standard human rights clause for all international agreements—was also made public at this time, and the proposed Framework Agreement was abandoned (The Australian, 1997; Henning, 1997; Suter, 1997). In late January 1997, the Commission Ambassador to Australia, Aneurin Hughes, in an interview on ABC television, stressed that the EU was not in a position to proceed with a Framework Agreement without the human rights clause, and the article would never be used in the case of Australia anyway. He also noted that without the Framework Agreement there would be no budget, and that this was unfortunate for relations with Australia because the ‘degree of ignorance about the EU and its policies and the importance of the relationship between us is still pretty abject’ (ABC TV, 1997). In reply to a parliamentary question in February 1997, Prime Minister Howard stated that the difference of views of the two parties was ‘not a dispute over Australia’s commitment to human rights’. He continued: ‘Australia’s commitment to human rights is unequivocal and our record is second to none’. The issue, he said, was the linking of trade and human rights and he objected to the fact that either party could suspend or terminate the agreement unilaterally ‘on the basis of undefined criteria’.4 Howard regarded the EU human rights aspects as inappropriate in a trade treaty and this was unacceptable to Australia. A few days later, journalist Greg Sheridan portrayed the EU as ‘becoming a distinct nuisance in the international system, a negative in the economic development of Europe itself, a force for
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discrimination in world trade and, worst of all, a rank bully in its international dealings’. He further referred to ‘melodramatic humbug of European spokesmen’ and to the EU as ‘arrogant’. The dispute was not, he said, about human rights, but about ‘unequal power and the attempt by the EU to force a smaller power into signing a document that it clearly does not want’. He concluded by calling for a heavy dose of scepticism (Sheridan, 1997, 11). The extent to which the Australian Government shared these views is debatable but the evidence of anger was certainly not confined to some media circles. The media were also the source of an article by an Aboriginal leader regarding Australia’s human rights record. In the European Voice newspaper, the chairman of the Northern Land Council wrote at this time of the need for vigilance regarding the Australian government record on human rights towards Aborigines. Aboriginal leader, former chair of the Northern Land Council and former Australian of the Year, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, AM, called on the EU to ‘stand firm against any calls to remove or amend human rights clauses from international agreements’ (Yunupingu, 1997, 14). The Government had on several occasions stated that its stance regarding the human rights clause ‘had nothing to do with the native title issue’. It was finally agreed by the Australian and EU negotiators, in March/April 1997, that they would draw up a single comprehensive declaration that would cover all the issues. This meant an abandonment of the formal treaty-status Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and, in its stead, the single comprehensive Joint Declaration. This came about after a series of meetings that were held in Europe, where various proposals had been exchanged and examined. At that stage a very intensive negotiation phase was evident as both sides attempted to salvage the agreement in some manner, drawing together the elements that had been negotiated previously in the context of the parallel negotiations—both for the Framework Agreement and for the Joint Declaration.
The deed is done On 26 June 1997, a Joint Declaration was signed instead of a Framework Agreement. This Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and Australia, signed in Luxembourg by Commission VicePresident Brittan, the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, as
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President of the Council and Australian Foreign Minister Downer, was more limited and general in content and scope. The Council of the EU approved the Joint Declaration without discussion on 26 June 1997.5 It was hailed by both parties as lending a new dimension to the relationship. (See Appendix 1 for the full text.) Australian officials were quoted in the media as stating that this non-binding Joint Declaration was ‘as powerful as the Framework Agreement without the same dangers’ (Field, 1997). Any agreements negotiated in the future would not have the close and binding effect of a Framework Agreement. Although this was a difficult period for the relationship, both parties worked to ensure that some positive results came out of the Joint Declaration. Since that time, there has been a broadening of the relationship and the established mechanisms for dialogue have continued to work well. Ministerial consultations since 1997 have been characterised by broad agendas. However, the difference between a Framework Agreement and a Joint Declaration is more than semantic. An entire part of the agreement was dropped and only the second of the two proposed tracks was maintained. The declaration was not a treaty, nor a Framework Agreement in any way. The declaration was a less detailed instrument, in contrast to the proposed Framework Agreement which would have been very detailed over a range of issues, such as trade, education and information technology. The Joint Declaration did, in fact, list many areas of co-operation, but not in any detail and without any financial provisions. The Joint Declaration nevertheless did at least provide a launching pad for a number of initiatives, and these were to be fully exploited over the next eight years. Further, the Joint Declaration did not specify the nature of obligations of each party in the way that would have been spelt out in a Framework Agreement. References in the Joint Declaration to attempts to promote dialogue and co-operation are far less specific and did not constitute legal commitments. Nevertheless the Australia–EU relationship had a basic document of engagement for the first time. As will emerge in a later chapter, this had resulted in a considerable and unprecedented amount of dialogue and co-operation. It gradually became clear that each party was still interested in continued and intensified engagement in a maturing relationship.
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Journalist Fred Brenchley (1997) reported in April 1997 that Australia ‘baulked at Brussels’ scheme for a legally enforceable sanctions process which could have seen disaffected Aboriginal groups and trade unions lobbying the EU for action against Australia’. In effect the Joint Declaration did constitute a formalisation of the engagement, then, albeit a non-treaty based one at that stage. The relationship continued to broaden and diversify, nevertheless, within these parameters. The Joint Declaration set out a wide-ranging list of priorities to be addressed over the next few years. This was, in effect, an agenda for furthering close encounters of the second kind—namely, a new regional bilateralism agenda of bilateral co-operation between Australia and the EU—which was still considered worthwhile, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and several sectoral agreements, regardless of the party or parties in power. The content of this Joint Declaration was reflected in all annual ministerial consultations from that time, eclipsing the CAP and pointing to a gradual maturing of the relationship.
Implications of the failure of the Framework Agreement The fact that the Commission is in a powerful bargaining position when negotiating these broad Framework Agreements with non-EU states does not mean that they result in successful outcomes. The case of the negotiations with Australia illustrates that third, or nonEU, countries may not take on board the stipulations of this type of agreement. As the rise and fall of the Framework Agreement shows, it was a difficult period in Australia–EU engagement. There have been calls for a renegotiated Framework Agreement that might be mutually acceptable under certain conditions. For example, one survey respondent suggested that the failure to sign the Framework Agreement ‘was a grievous error which should be remedied’ as soon as possible. A change of government in Australia would seem to be the most obvious condition, given the Opposition’s declaration that it would renegotiate (Cook, 2000) to sign an agreement (European Parliament: Delegation, 2001). However, co-operative measures worthy of attention in the current context, which might be mutually beneficial, are currently being explored. Specialised agreements are under discussion or in operation in pilot projects or
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co-operative dialogue, including those on consumer protection, veterinary inspections, university education, educational exchanges and vocational education and training, culture and the environment. For more tangible results, increased use of dialogue with the Troika is worthy of consideration as well as intensified engagement with the European Parliament and Commission cabinets, directorates general, committees and working groups. Table 1.â•… The Rise and Fall of the Framework Agreement Year
Date
Development
1994
June
Prime Minister Paul Keating visited Brussels for bilateral discussions with Commission President Jacques Delors.
1995
21 April
Letter from Paul Keating to Commission President Santer proposing negotiation of a new agreement between Australia and the EU.
1995
May
Communication from Commission on inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between Community and Third Countries (1995 216 final) states a clause defining democratic principles and human rights is an ‘essential element’ in these agreements.
1995
25 May
Council of Ministers confirms all cooperation agreements concluded by the EU to include a human rights clause and suspension provisions relating to a possible non-fulfilment of that clause.
1995
19 June
Letter from Jacques Santer to Paul Keating.
1995
Nov.
Formal acceptance by Australia of the ‘two track’ approach to the new agreement, designed to reflect the division of competences between Community and Member States. Formal acknowledgment of the problem presented by the human rights clause and suspensive article.
1996
22 April
EU Foreign Ministers approve a mandate for the Commission to negotiate a new agreement with Australia.
1996
23 April
Foreign Minister Downer announces Australia and EU will negotiate a Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement and Joint Political Declaration.
1996
17 July
First round of negotiations on the framework agreement begins.
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Year
Date
Development
1996
20 Sept.
Downer discussed the human rights clause problem with British Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind. FCO said Britain was keen to see an early agreement between Australia and the EU.
1996
12 Oct.
Article in The Sydney Morning Herald about Amnesty International’s concern over the Australian government’s approach to human rights problems.
1997
29 Jan.
Discussions between Commission (Vice-President Brittan) and Downer on proposed Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement in Brussels. Downer noted that the relationship was ‘the best it has ever been’. Neither speak publicly on deadlock over the human rights and suspension clauses.
1997
30 Jan.
Negotiations stall over human rights clause.
1997
Feb.
EC Ambassador to Australia, Aneurin Hughes, states in EU news the Australia–EU relationship is ‘flowering’; take no notice of media ‘brouhaha’ on human rights clause.
1997
24 Feb.
Letter from Downer to Brittan suggests European Council decision of 29 May 1995 be reviewed, with a view to establishing ‘benchmark criteria on human rights’. Notes Australia’s willingness to include the clause in the Preamble. States if member states do not find this acceptable, alternative is to move to negotiations on a non-treaty document, ie the Joint Declaration.
1997
March
Article in European Voice by Aboriginal activist Galarrwuy Yunupingu, calls on EU to ‘stand firm against any calls to remove or amend human rights clauses from international agreements’.
1997
21 April
Letter from Brittan to Downer states Council is not prepared to review May 1995 decision. Agrees the only remaining alternative is to negotiate a non-treaty agreement, encompassing ‘as many aspects as possible of EU-Australia relations’.
1997
26 June
Joint Declaration signed in Luxembourg by Commission Vice-President Brittan, Dutch Foreign Minister/Council President Hans van Mierlo and Australian Foreign Minister Downer. Press releases from Brittan and Downer.
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The Joint Declaration is no substitute for the Framework Agreement. The absence of a formal Framework Agreement has, to an extent, been counterbalanced by serious attempts on both sides to give flesh to the Joint Declaration. As we will see in a later chapter, the relationship has new impetus. The Joint Declaration attempted to bring together the strands of the relationship in an over-arching context. The failure to have a Framework Agreement means that there was no automatic ability to generate financial resources for joint projects. Individual programs each require separate funding—for example, in areas such as education and qualifications—as well as separate mandates from the Council for the Commission to negotiate with Australia, although there have been recent moves to expand this in the context of co-operation by the EU with industrialised countries (CEC, 2000).
A survey respondent’s view of the Framework Agreement Australian governments need to develop a more sophisticated approach to the EU. The EU offers a wide range of opportunities for Australia but these have been successfully [sic] wasted over the years. The failure to agree to the Trade and Association Agreement was the single biggest mistake that Australia has made in its relationship with the EU, just as things were starting to improve over the farm subsidies issue. The Trade and Association Agreement was an opportunity to provide a legal basis to the relationship, which, given the legal nature of the EU as a body, would have created a wealth of opportunities for Australia in areas such as education and other forms of cooperation, not to mention the diplomatic leverage that such an agreement provides. Most other small countries in the world are desperate to achieve such an agreement with what is the world’s largest trading block [sic]. The Australian government threw away that opportunity, in the absurd fear that it would mean the EU would criticize Australia over its policies on Aborigines (because of the standard human rights clause in all EU agreements). That indeed shows how unsophisticated the relationship is, from the
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Australian point of view. Most EU diplomats were prepared to do everything possible to accommodate Australian concerns but this goodwill was met with insulting remarks about the EU, even by the Prime Minister. The world has now moved on, the EU has much bigger things on its agenda, and the opportunity has passed Australia by. The achievement of the Agreement should be a major priority for future Australia–EU relations. Since 1997, both sides appear to have more interests in common than interests that diverge. There has been increased co-operation on education and consumer issues and on competition, although differences remain regarding the environment. There is more dialogue on political issues such as the relationship with Asia and on global security issues. But the fact that there is no Framework Agreement is a hindrance and no change is anticipated under the leadership of John Howard. It is even debatable whether Labor in government would accept the human rights clause. Australia is less a priority for the European Union than before, thanks to numerous factors—namely, problems with the ratification of the EU Constitution; renewed focus on the Transatlantic Relationship and China; legitimacy challenges; negotiations within the WTO; the EU’s globalisation agenda; the impact of the recent enlargement; internal problems in the Commission; difficulties with the euro; developments in the Balkans and the desire for a stronger common defence policy and common foreign and security policy. All of these issues demand EU time and resources, and Australia is far down the EU agenda.
Still good friends The current situation regarding the Framework Agreement was most recently outlined after ministerial consultations meetings in Brussels, when Foreign Minister Downer stated: We had a discussion with the Europeans back in the mid90s about this question of whether we’d have a Framework Agreement or not and the obstacle there was the human rights clause which, for the European Union, is really a mandatory clause in all of these types of agreements. So we
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instead put in place a Joint Declaration, which has frankly been very successful from our point of view. It was a good compromise negotiated at that time with thenCommissioner Brittan and I think the member states were happy with it as well. So we’ve been able to take the relationship forward on the basis of that. We’re not looking at revisiting old debates, what we’re looking at is making sure that Joint Declaration is continually relevant, updated and reflects the ever-growing strength of the relationship between Australia and the European Union. (EU/DFAT, 2002) At the same press conference, Commissioner Patten commented: Can I just add, as Alexander said earlier, we’re making extraordinary progress in areas like education cooperation, cooperation in other areas like science and technology. We’ve got agreements on consumer protection and we’re working well together on the issues affecting the information society. We talk a great deal with our Australian colleagues about the particular aspect of development cooperation where frankly, they’re more knowledgeable than we are. For example, how we can best use our resources in the Pacific region. So there are a huge number of areas where we work together and I think the fact, for perfectly understandable reasons, we have acquired a slightly different institutional framework for our bilateral relationship with Australia, doesn’t affect that at all. (EU/DFAT, 2002) It is clear from the human rights negotiations that Australia and the EU are markedly different in their interpretation of conditionality in international agreements, with the EU imposing conditionality and Australia resisting it in the failed negotiations on the Framework Agreement. The Australian Government’s White Paper on foreign and trade policy, In the National Interest (1997, 14), stated that linking human rights to trade ‘serves neither Australia’s trade nor its human rights interests’. In a submission to the Commonwealth Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on
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Australia’s regional dialogue on human rights, DFAT stated, regarding its negotiations on this matter with the EU: We made it clear that we had no problems with our human rights record being scrutinized and our performance being held up to account. It was the linkage between human rights and trade. We do not think a choice needs to be made between human rights and trade. We pursue both issues in the most appropriate means on a country by country basis. This government and previous ones have always been opposed to tying those two issues in that way.6 A parliamentary report presents a distinctly different view from the Australian Forum of Human Rights Organisations, stating that: the effectiveness of Australia’s human rights dialogue was being undermined by the government’s refusal to accept the standard human rights clause in the EU agreement. The policy of non-linkage and events such as this compromise Australia’s reputation as a leader in human rights protection and diminish the effectiveness of our dialogue with regional nations.7 The Commission’s official position, meanwhile, is that: Australia’s objections to the inclusion of a standard human rights clause resulted in the proposed agreement being replaced by a lesser instrument, a Joint Declaration between EC and Australia signed on 26 June 1997. It was reviewed during the Ministerial meeting in April 2003 and adopted for the next five years. It confirms that the EU and Australia have intensified the exchanges and made progress on a diverse range of common interests, namely on trade and economic matters, strategic issues, immigration and asylum, environment policies and initiating bilateral cooperation projects in education and science and technology. Both sides confirmed their determination to build upon this partnership to meet the challenges of an increasingly
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interdependent world. (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm, accessed 8/4/05) While this broadening of agendas and interaction between Australia and the EU has been fruitful, as evidenced by sectoral agreements,8 it does not necessarily indicate a significant deepening of mutual understanding and agreement on an international accord. The failure of the Framework Agreement negotiations highlights the limitations of attempts to institutionalise the relationship further. The EU–Australia relationship, for years a largely uni-dimensional one, has nevertheless become increasingly multidimensional, with considerable broadening of scope and focus. This is reflected in the agendas for EU–Australia ministerial meetings9 and the impressive list of concerns to be addressed under the Joint Declaration. One significant outcome is that an effort was made by both parties over the following years in order to reach agreement on substantive issues. A further outcome was the fact that the ‘Civilian Power Europe’ can encounter limitations on its impact. The instrument of conditionality of the human rights clause has been utilised somewhat selectively in actual agreements over time and it has been argued that ‘The human rights clause is a prime example of conditionality, which is a policy tool of power politics, and the EU’s intention is to use the clause to hold its position as a dominant player’ Kropman (2000, 76). Despite its impressive international clout, the EU was clearly unable to persuade Australia to take on board its conditionality. Equally, the Australians were unable to persuade the Europeans to change their position. Although this resulted in a measure of stalemate in the short term, every effort has been made to exploit the terms of the Joint Declaration over the past few years and the results have been impressive in some sectors. Meanwhile, another set of negotiations was to try EU–Australia relations in recent years—this time on a global agenda of climate change.
The Kyoto climate change negotiations A key objective of the EU under its Environmental Action Program has been the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to limit or reduce the 1990 levels of greenhouse emissions
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by 8 per cent during 2008–12. This is a ‘pervasive reference point’ in the EU’s environment, energy and transport policies (Lenschow, 2004, 156)—which is not to state, however, that it was straightforward to reach agreement among the member states on Kyoto, as there are shared competences among the Commission and the member states relating to international negotiations on global environmental issues. The final united EU position was a commitment to binding reductions for industrialised countries in a fixed period. These countries are referred to as Annex 1 countries and include the EU, Australia and the US. However, Australia and the US do not share this commitment, but rather take a more flexible stand and finally decided not to ratify the Protocol. The US declined to take on a leadership role in this regard, and the EU increasingly adopted that function. The role is not an easy one, as there are considerable problems within the twenty-five member states and there are doubts about the EU’s actual ability to meet the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol (Lenschow, 2004, 157). The EU and its member states ratified the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002. What is the Kyoto Protocol? The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 was adopted by consensus at the third session of the Conference of the Parties in December 1997, after representatives of over 160 countries met in Kyoto in Japan. It consists of legally binding emissions targets for Annex I (developed) countries for the post-2000 period. It is designed to assist the UNFCCC in its ultimate objective of preventing ‘dangerous anthropogenic [man-made] interference with the climate system’. The developed countries are obliged to reduce their collective emissions of six key greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent, depending on the country. According to the official summary: The six gases are to be combined in a ‘basket’, with reductions in individual gases translated into ‘CO2 equivalents’ that are then added up to produce a single figure. Each country’s emissions target must be achieved by the period
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2008–2012. It will be calculated as an average over the five years. ‘Demonstrable progress’ towards meeting the target must be made by 2005. Cuts in the three most important gases—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20)—will be measured against a base year of 1990 (with exceptions for some countries with economies in transition).10
The negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol did not go as smoothly as some would have hoped. An American analyst of international environmental policy, Susan R. Fletcher (2000), points to three main problems of divergence among the players during negotiations leading up to the Protocol: (1) the amount of binding reductions in greenhouse gases to be required, and the gases to be included in these requirements; (2) whether developing countries should be part of the requirements for greenhouse gas limitations; and (3) whether to allow emissions trading and joint implementation, which allow credit to be given for emissions reductions to a country that provides funding or investments in other countries that bring about the actual reductions in those other countries or locations where they may be cheaper to attain. Despite these and many other problems, the Protocol was to come into force on 16 February 2005, signed by 141 countries, following the important ratification which ensured that it came into force—namely, that of Russia on 18 November 2004. The US and Australia declined to ratify the Protocol. An important feature of the Kyoto Protocol is the fact that it establishes an international ‘emissions trading’ regime, which permits industrialised countries to buy and sell emissions credits among themselves. The EU is the ardent advocate of this and has established itself as having the largest emissions trading scheme of its kind in the world, with almost twelve thousand installations. The European Commissioner for the Environment, Stavros Dimas, stated in June 2005 that the economic allowances allocated in the system’s first 154
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trading period exceeded €100 billion and that the ‘carbon-constrained business environment’ was part of a daily reality in Europe (News@eu 69, 10 June 2005). The Protocol allows carbon trading to enable companies to ‘offset their emissions of carbon dioxide by investing in cleaner energy projects elsewhere, known as clean development mechanism’ projects (Hall, 2005). The Australian Government and the EU have considerable divergence of opinion and stances on many aspects of the environment, such as Australian criticisms of multifunctionality in EU policies. But it is on climate change that there is particular tension (Oxley, 2002; Papadakis, 2002), with emphasis on the Kyoto Protocol. Although Australia was one of the first countries to sign the UNFCCC, Australian opposition to ratification of the Protocol, which was signed by the EU in 2002, is based on an argument that the Protocol ‘places the burden of reducing emissions on industrialized economies and, in particular, those which produce and consume coal. As the world’s largest exporter of coal and one of the world’s cheapest generators of energy, largely from combustion of coal, Australia’s interests are obvious’ (Oxley, 2002, 111). According to Alan Oxley, Australia has placed acceptance of the Protocol on the acceptance of conditions regarding carbon sinks (forests) as well as generators of carbon dioxide, on the need for a global system for trading credits for emissions and on acceptance (granted to it) of special targets which allow carbon dioxide emissions to increase before reduction. The EU has focussed on coal and has criticised Australia for its moral neglect of the environment and global community (Oxley, 2002, 111). Oxley suggests that this issue will become part of a new trade divide between Australia and the EU (Oxley, 2002, 112). Australia has presented its position as ‘centred on effective market instruments allowing for emissions trading and costeffectiveness and for the participation of developing countries’ (European Parliament Delegation, 2001, 6). There are domestic influences on the Australian Government to alter its position, due to concerns that Australian firms will not be internationally competitive or that the Government needs to adopt a more active and responsible role in combating climate change (Lowe, 2004–05, 25), although other domestic constituencies resist these concerns. Australian non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is a type of Cold War between the EU and Australia. There are dialogues and exchanges The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower II
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of views but little engagement on Kyoto. Australia and the EU work well together on technical issues, this being the case with gas emission issues, for example. The relationship remains afloat on these aspects of the environment and it is important to be aware that there has been dialogue on the environment since the EU–Australia bilateral exchange of letters in 1991. Recent meetings of officials took place in 2003 in Canberra and in 2005 in Brussels. The EU can be regarded as a leader rather than a laggard in this regard. There is some Australian concern, and even suspicion, of EU leadership pretensions in environment issues, which has been regarded as a form of EU imperialism in international environment governance. The EU position is that it is a leader in environment governance as there is no one else taking this stance and the US is not collaborating with the EU in this regard. For this reason, the EU is going it alone on this issue and some of its officials are surprised that Australia did not sign Kyoto, taking instead a similar position to that of the US, which is that the Kyoto is costly, unnecessary and unfair (van Leeuwen, 2004–05). There is some understanding in the EU of the importance for Australia of geopolitical strategic and security dependence on the US and concerns about instability in the Asia– Pacific region. Nevertheless, some in the EU regard Australia as being very critical and suspicious of the EU and thus undermining the relationship on the environment. In some issues, there is a positive relationship between officials of the Commission’s Directorate General for Environment and the Australian Department of the Environment, as technically the EU and Australia are in agreement on many issues. In a parliamentary forum the comment has been made that: The European Union is very critical of Australia and likes to portray itself as something of a paragon of moral virtue in terms of concern about the environment and greenhouse gas emissions. The Europeans, particularly the Germans, who are so critical of us for failing to sign on to the Kyoto protocol, are extremely hypocritical … only member nations of the European Union are actually meeting their Kyoto protocol targets … The Howard government have no sense of regret in not signing the Kyoto protocol. We are meeting our targets and protecting the interests of Australia, and that is why we will oppose this bill.11 156
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The position of the Australian Democrats at the same forum was at odds with this stance because the Howard Government’s failure to engage with Europe on climate change issues, and its decision to abandon research into emissions trading, would ‘leave Australia behind the pack economically as well’.12 The Australians view the Commission as being very political on Kyoto and having very clear personal and national agendas, such as that of Environment Commissioner Wallstrom, who was determined to get Kyoto through all relevant legislative channels. Like the case of agriculture, it is clear that the issues of Kyoto will remain an area of conflicting perspectives for some time to come in the Australia–EU relationship. * * * Like the relationship between the EU and the US, Australia and the EU also belong to international institutions that ‘simultaneously provide opportunities and good reasons for continued collaboration’ (Duffield, 2001, 110). These opportunities are not always seized—due to differing values regarding the International Criminal Court, which the EU supports and Australia and the US do not, and to environment issues such as the Kyoto Protocol—also, as we have seen, a situation where Australia and the US find their views at odds with those of the EU. Although these issues are discussed at an increasing number of meetings and forums, and so mutual understanding of each other’s position is given the opportunity to increase, positions remain divergent in these areas. Each is motivated by domestic agendas and constituencies and by often divergent values systems. The confrontations between Australia and the EU reflect the foreign policy and trade agendas of each of the interlocutors. In the 1980s, Australia officially regarded herself as a ‘middle power’ (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Evans and Grant, 1995), based on a commitment to three factors. There were, firstly, multilateralism, expressed through the Cairns Group and GATT, and it was in these contexts that the Australia Government dealt with the EU (for example, as part of the Cairns Group regarding many agricultural issues); secondly, interest-based coalition building; and, thirdly, promotion of Australia as a good international citizen (Goldsworthy, 1997). This was a period of a push for free trade and trade liberalisation since 1983 (when The Aussie Battler and the European Superpower II
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Labor took office) and later with the publication of the Garnaut report in 1989.13 There was a gradual shift in Australian foreign policy ‘culture’, a change of diplomatic and negotiating styles, from the Menzies/ Fraser confrontational style to the Labor approach which aimed to be less antagonistic. In the 1970s and 80s the shift towards Asia was also taking place, under Whitlam and Fraser as well as Hawke and culminating in the Garnaut Report and Keating’s cultivation of ties with South East Asian leaders and within APEC. There were some significant changes in the second half of the 1990s. With Pauline Hanson, there appeared to be a growing antagonism towards Asia in a form of nationalist ‘backlash’. There was also some turning away from multilateralism and free trade agendas towards a pursuing of bilateral FTAs. The reputation of Australia within the EU for diplomatic mismanagement during the 1980s and early 1990s, especially due to its leadership of the Cairns Group, is now attenuated to a degree. Since the Uruguay Round, Australian trade output has seen some considerable diversification to simply transformed manufactures and elaborately transformed manufactures but the fact remains that the agricultural shadow—or blight!—is cast over many aspects of Australian dealings with the EU. Is Angela Ward (2002, 187) correct in suggesting that the EU’s formal relationship with Australia is relatively skeletal? Angela Ward suggests that there is no institutional mechanism for dialogue between Australia and the EU (2002, 188). Agriculture, which often drives the relationship, was placed on a less conflictual footing with the end of the Uruguay Round pending the Millennium Round. Diplomatic relations between Australian and the EU are not always cordial—there is evidence of some reluctance to recognise the EU Commission Head of Delegation as an ambassador.14 It is important that officials on both sides emphasise that the relationship is ongoing, with positive practical outcomes, and that there are many areas of agreement. In fact it is emphasised strongly by both sides of the dialogue that there are no major problems, although agriculture remains a significant issue of concern from the Australian perspective. While the position of the Commission on trade policy under Trade Commissioner Lamy was to pursue multilateralism, and not to sign free trade agreements (FTAs), the Australian position in this
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period was to seek bilateral state-to-state FTAs should this be in the national interest. Commission and Australian views concurred on the need to promote the WTO and the Doha Round, while the Australian position also encompassed a strategy of negotiation with the US, Thailand and Singapore on FTAs. This is an alternative to the EU approach of regionalism, inter-regionalism and multilateralism. As the EU policy scope expands, so too does the dialogue with Australia. Although trade and investment are solid, it is conceivable that Australia will continue to attack the CAP and study it with interest. It will monitor the effects of enlargement on decision making and on the CAP. It will monitor the increased role of the European Parliament and continue to make Australian views known and deal also with Australia–member state relations on a bilateral level. J.D.B. Miller predicted in 1983 that it was unlikely that Australia would ever live in total peace with the EU on trade questions, because of Australian pressure to obtain better access (Miller, 1983, 167). In short, there is a problem of trust and understanding on both sides.
Notes Criticisms of the CAP continue, however. See, for example, DFAT, 2000a, chapter 4, p. 3, with critiques of the Berlin European Council reform package of March 1999. It is criticised for being limited in scope, for failing to make EU farmers less dependent overall on subsidies and for not providing improved access to EU markets for non-EU producers. 2 Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, Media Release. Australia– EC framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement and Joint Political Declaration. Framework Agreement 25, 23 April 1996. 3 Official Journal of the European Communities, C96/45, 24 March 1997, Written Question E-2990/96 by Inigo Mendez de Vigo (PPE) to the Commission and answer by Mr Van den Broek. Reference 97/C 96/69. 4 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 6 February 1997. Questions without Notice. Human Rights: Trade Agreement, http://demos. anu.edu.au:7007/cgi-bin/past….?dir=years-feb1997/6/hansard/reps&art, accessed 13 May 1997. 5 Council of the EU, 2019th Council meeting, General Affairs, Luxembourg, 26 June 1997, accessed 16 February 1998. 6 DFAT/Ausaid Transcript, p. 9, quoted in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Improving but …: Australia’s regional dialogue on human rights June 1998, pp. 21–22. 7 Quoted in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Improving but …: Australia’s regional dialogue on human rights June 1998, 22. 1
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The Science and Technology Agreement has been strengthened by a ‘common action’ known as the Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST) in 2001, with the aim of improving bilateral and multilateral co-operation. http://feast.free.fr/index.htm. 9 Market access, consumer agreement, veterinary agreement, science and technology, wine, consumer agreements, mutual recognition and broad policy issues have featured on the agendas of ministerial consultations. 10 The Kyoto Protocol—A brief summary 1, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ environment/climat/kyoto.htm, accessed 16 June 2005. 11 Senator Eggleston, Kyoto Protocol Ratification Bill 2003 [NO. 2]: Second Reading (1/4/04), Date 01 April, 2004, Database Senate Hansard, Speaker Eggleston, Sen Alan (LP, Western Australia, Government), Interjector Lundy, Sen Kate, Page 22672, Proof No Source Senate Stage Second Reading Type Speech Context Bill Site: http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/ piweb/Repository/Chamber/Hansards/Linked/3290-3.PDF 12 Senator Bartlett, Kyoto Protocol Ratification Bill 2003 [NO. 2]: Second Reading (1/4/04), Database Senate Hansard, Speaker Bartlett, Sen Andrew (Leader of the Australian Democrats, AD, Queensland, Opposition), Page 22674, http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Chamber/ Hansards/Linked/3290-3.PDF 13 In 1989, Professor Ross Garnaut presented his seminal report on Australia and the northeast Asian ascendancy to the Australian Government. This report was to recommend building on Australia’s developing relationship with Asia and would influence and direct the country’s Asian policy over the next decade. A considerable amount of resources were devoted to this in government departments at national and state levels. 14 ‘These Delegations represent the Commission in our relations with the countries which they cover, and play an essential part in our political, economic and commercial relations with the region, as well as providing information on the policies and institutions of the EU. They also play a crucial role in supervising the implementation of our cooperation programmes across the region—a role which is steadily increasing in line with the deconcentration of cooperation activities from Headquarters to Delegations foreseen in the reform of the management of the EC’s external assistance.’ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/ delegations.htm. 8
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Chapter 5
Colliding Continents: Mutual Misunderstandings
‘We believe that our partnership will greatly benefit from the mutual knowledge and understanding.’ —Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and Australia, 26 June 1997 ‘Everything always comes back to agriculture.’ —Mike Moore, 20041 In a much-quoted piece, political scientist Christopher Hill (1998) has argued that there is a ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ regarding the European Union’s foreign policy. Although the EU appears to be able to create the expectation that it can be a powerful and united player in its Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has not (yet) been in a position to deliver that policy coherently on behalf of its member states. There have been many instances in which the EU has appeared to deliver on promises or expectations and others in which it has not—there has been a capabilities gap. In Australian perspectives on the EU there is often mention of the fact that the EU promises more than it delivers in foreign policy, yet, on the other hand, there is a reluctance to acknowledge that the EU actually has any weight in the global arena. This apparently contradictory stance is evident in much media and government discourse regarding the EU in Australia.
The EU is not well understood in Australia. Neither, of course, is it well understood among the citizens of the EU or in other parts of the world. European integration and its implications are, however, well understood by the European policy-making communities. This cannot be said of all sections of the Australia’s policy-making community, in part because two issues—the British connection and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy—continue to influence public pronouncements on the EU by Australian governments. The EU, for its part, cannot fully comprehend these two influences. The British influence is expressed, firstly, in the emphasis on traditional state-to-state bilateral links with individual states, particularly the United Kingdom, and, secondly, in the adoption of scepticism from some British politicians and media regarding the European Integration project. The CAP factor influences the negative rhetoric of governments, despite a healthy trade and investment relationship and despite a considerable broadening of the relationship. The EU’s view of the world does not concur with Australia’s. This is not a major problem for the EU but it is potentially a significant one for Australia. There is an enduring perception in Australia that the EU is the bully in the global playground and the source of butter mountains and wine lakes. It can be argued that Australia does not understand many aspects of Europe: the repeated experiences of war and devastation, of starvation and internal displacement, of refugees and death camps and the willingness to engage in cross-border co-operation. Australia does not fully grasp the desire for European post-war cooperation and rebuilding. It does not grasp the cultural underpinnings of the Common Agricultural Policy or the political role of France in its creation and the balance of power politics involved in the delicate Franco–German bargain to create the EU and its agricultural policy. The CAP is seen by Prime Minister John Howard as ‘one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy’ (Kelly, 1998) and aspects of the CAP are regarded as sophistry. Australia does not fully understand that there are massive market opportunities in a Europe with a united market of 457 million people or that there is one unified EU market, only one single custom document and only one set of regulations about how to trade with Europe. Many officials regard the EU as deliberately obfuscating, unwilling to allow Australia to trade where and as it wishes. The EU is seen as
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wishing to have a divine right to trade anywhere in the world as it likes, dominating the World Trade Organization (WTO) and all other international forums. The EU considers itself as a world actor but there is a perception that this powerful economic entity punches below its weight in foreign policy, according to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (Downer, 2000; Kitney, 2004a). The EU wishes to be recognised as a diplomatic actor but Australia has problems accepting this apparent arrogance. It is an accepted fact that Australia–EU engagement has suffered from long-standing differences of opinion. From the EC reluctance to moderate the effect of British accession, to subsequent conflict over the CAP in the 1970s and 80s and the failure of the Framework Agreement in the 1990s, the relationship has been marred by a number of incompatible interests. Several commentators have argued that a degree of diplomatic mismanagement in the past has only served to exacerbate the problems (Benvenuti, 1998–99; Gelber, 1966). While European integration is judged to have weakened rather than strengthened Australia’s relationship with European countries (Piening, 1997, 6), the role of the weaker partner in the asymmetrical relationship could have been handled more skilfully (Elijah, Murray, O’Brien, 2000; Murray, 2003b).
Understanding the new global and regional contexts Australia is certainly not alone in attempting to come to grips with the new political entity that is the EU. Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (2005) have noted the following problems in understanding the EU in the United States: ‘Europe is widely viewed in the United States as impotent, obstructionist, and—simultaneously—utopian and cynical. Americans instinctively understand military alliances and simple free trade agreements, such as NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] and NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement]. They have no experience with Europe’s complex governance system.’ Less than two decades ago, it was claimed that a collective amnesia was evident in Australia concerning Europe. This ‘debilitating disease’(Groom, 1989) in otherwise well-informed circles was seen as creating lethargy where there was opportunity, leading to a squandering of goodwill. Since A.J.R. Groom’s provocative article was published almost two decades ago, how much has changed? The
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relationship continues to be subject to amnesia. It has been marked by controversy and marred by tensions regarding agriculture. It has also been underpinned by some agreements that have facilitated co-operation. Interviews and surveys carried out for this study illustrate that the broader EU–Australia relationship is characterised by continued asymmetry and some lack of political will in Australian government circles to recognise the value of the relationship. This suggests that there is a lack of understanding of the EU integration process, its external relations agenda and the importance of extensive formalised linkages with the institutions of the EU. A measure of mutual comprehension deficit is also evident (Murray, 2002a). An incomplete knowledge of the EU can have serious negative outcomes for Australia (Elijah et al 2000; Groom, 1989), although there has been a marked shift among some officials and ministers in recent times. The need for more knowledge is evident in business circles too, as businesses, especially small to medium-sized enterprises, are often unaware of opportunities in the Single Market. The scope of the EU as an integrated market has not been adequately exploited by the Australian Government (Azarias, 2002). This is due to a number of factors: the reliance on trade patterns with the UK; a lack of comprehensive understanding on the part of both Australian negotiators and traders of the EU; perceptions of difficulties in trading with nonEnglish speaking Europe; and lack of understanding of the common trading and market conditions and legislative norms of the Single Market in each of the twenty-five EU member states. All of these factors were raised in replies to the survey questionnaire sent to stakeholders and analysts in 2001–02 (Murray, 2002a, 2002b). For Australia, the EU’s relatively complex nature presents a challenge. Assumptions of state-to-state bargaining are replaced by a continuous learning curve as negotiators and businesses come to grips with intensive and extensive regulatory mechanisms and a combination of diverse political and administrative traditions in Europe. Australia needs to keep abreast of EU developments and, given its current propensity to favour relations with states over engagement with the EU, it needs also to ensure that it does not ‘virtually ignore the EU as an international player because it is not a state’ (Ginsberg, 1999, 41). It is precisely because the EU is not a state, although it
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possesses some state-like qualities and is a relatively novel entity, that a full grasp of EU policies, institutions, market structures and regulatory mechanisms is crucial for Australia. It is clear that, until relatively recently, Australia had not come to terms with the EU’s regionalisation of its economic transactions. This lack of adequate knowledge of the EU among some Australian stakeholders constitutes a matter of concern (Murray, 2002a, 2003a, 2003b). There is, however, recent evidence in Australia of new ways of thinking about the EU that could dismantle misconceptions about Europe. Strategic choices for Australian policy makers should take into account EU policies relating to future foreign policy and trade and diplomatic strategies. As the EU continues to acquire new powers and develop existing ones, with an increasing range of policy options, the expanded EU of twenty-five states is an increasingly important international player. Therefore, it is in Australia’s long-term interest to ensure improved knowledge of the EU. Currently some Australian perceptions of the EU are determined by high-profile trade issues and diplomatic fallouts, as evidenced in speeches by successive Australian governments that regard EU protectionism as predatory.
Who understands Europe? The perception of the EU as complex, opaque and over-bureaucratic is not simply an Australian experience. There is the Yes Prime Ministerstyle anti-Europe rhetoric and British scepticism in tabloid journalism; there are French, Dutch and Danish fears of loss of sovereignty. The EU has, on occasion, appeared to be an unbound Prometheus that is intent on advancing its own agendas, undermining national identity and sovereignty and determining international trade patterns. One significant reason for difficulties with the EU is the very fact that it challenges accepted notions of the nation state, diplomacy and international negotiations. It presents a challenge to notions of bordered polity within the EU, in Australia and internationally. The contested nature of the EU and its agenda are reflected in opposition to the idea of itself as an emerging ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1972; Bull, 1983; Leonard 2004, 2005). Among European citizens, the EU is generally regarded as being good for the member states. Yet, while many Europeans have high expectations of it, very few actually understand how the EU works
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and what it does. A case in point is the recent draft European Constitution: a third of European citizens had never heard of the Constitution and this figure was as high as half in the UK.2 Although it is not surprising that Australians know little about the EU, it is a matter of concern that many in the policy community know little about how it works and its impact on Australia. A recent opinion poll in Australia showed that Australians are well-disposed towards Europe. For example, in response to the question ‘When you think about the following countries, groups or regions, do you have positive or negative feelings about them?’, 86 per cent of those surveyed expressed positive feelings about the UK (just after New Zealand at 94 per cent) and Europe came a close third at 85 per cent, just before Japan at 84 per cent (Cook, 2005, 7).
Australian engagement with the European Union: Collective amnesia Is the collective amnesia and mutual neglect now a thing of the past? Geoff Kitney (2004a) suggests not: ‘It says something about the standing in which the relationship between Australia and the European Union is held that Prime Minister John Howard has flown over [continental] Europe many more times than he has set foot in it during his various prime ministerial visits to London and Washington’. Kitney judges this scant interest to be mutual, at the leadership level of the EU, and he instances the fact that the President of the European Commission and top EU leaders have not visited Australia. Summitry is certainly crucial, but it can be argued that regular meetings at ministerial level and a decision to stop sniping at the EU may be equally beneficial. The prominence accorded to the UK and the CAP has meant that it took some time for Australia to fully comprehend the EU’s significance. Australia is participating in a new type of bilateral linkage with the EU as a major international player, encompassing new policy areas in a broadening and multidimensional agenda that is not exclusively intergovernmental. This is explicitly stated in both the Outcomes Statement of the 2003 Ministerial Consultations of Australia and the EU3 (European Commission Delegation, 2003a) and the Australian White Paper Advancing the National Interest (DFAT, 2003).
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Links between Australia and Britain Australian international relations specialist Hedley Bull in a piece published in 1987, wrote that in the post-war period Australia and Britain ‘still saw themselves as bound by links too intimate and too indissoluble to be understood in terms of simply a relationship between sovereign states’. He drew on Edmund Burke to describe these connections as ‘links which, though light as air, are strong as iron’.4 Australian expectations of a positive relationship with the UK have fuelled engagement with the EU. In the past, an expectation of British goodwill towards Australia had been at the basis of the Australian Government’s perception of British consideration of accession to the EU. Historian Stuart Ward (2001b, 100) expresses the view that Prime Minister Menzies failed to grasp that Britain’s move towards Europe constituted a direct challenge to the notion of ‘mutuality of interest’ that had been a hallmark of Commonwealth relations for many years. Trade Minister Jack McEwen also misunderstood both the British Government and the nature of the European Community in his assertion that it would be ‘unthinkable’ for Australians to consider that ‘foreigners’ could have a preferred place in the UK market (S. Ward, 2001b, 101). Ward (2001b, 102) further argues that the issue of UK accession to the European Economic Community ‘challenged core ideological assumptions about the organic unity of the British world’. This sobering reality has meant that it cannot be assumed that British and Australian interests necessarily coalesce. It is stating the obvious to point out that the EU is not an Englishspeaking environment only and that it is not British. Neither is the EU a larger version of the British Department of Trade and Industry, however tempting it may be to view it that way. Survey respondents have stated: ‘We must overcome our Anglo centric approach to the EU!’ ‘No longer consider the UK as a separate body from the EU.’ ‘The need to look at European countries other than the UK.’ ‘The EU is not just the UK.’ Much of the media in Australia draws on one English-language source: the UK. Most journalists are not multilingual or bilingual, so they read the British media more than, say, French or German reports. The other main English-language source is the US media. Both are overwhelmingly ill-informed and inaccurate regarding the EU and tend to be biased against it.
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A second factor, in addition to the British influence, is that conflict concerning agriculture has dominated engagement. While the public image of the CAP in Australia dates from the 1980s, the current reformed CAP is distinctly different, although this is not immediately evident from speeches and comments made by government leaders over the years. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated in 2003 that ‘Australia is deeply troubled by the EU’s narrow and minimalist approach to global agricultural trade’ (Downer, 2003). Australia’s forceful stance has been due, in part, to a lack of understanding of the EU’s attempts at CAP reform and of Europe’s potential as a source of investment and trade (Camilleri, 1996). Katrina Stats, an Australian researcher on a transnational project regarding perceptions of the EU in the Asia–Pacific, suggests that an official ambivalence towards the EU is somewhat mirrored by indifference in the Australian media (Stats, 2004, 6).
Understanding Superpower Europe There is an Australian reluctance to accept that the EU is more than an economic actor, that it is moving beyond an economic and tradebased agenda within the WTO, to encompass concerns that increasingly cover politics and security, the environment and climate change. Australia’s preoccupation with bilateral relations with individual member states has undermined the development of comprehensive negotiating strategies by Australia. An understanding of the EU as a set of bilateral relations with individual member states may well present a serious obstacle, over time, to understanding the EU as a powerful international negotiator which is largely united on trade matters. Analysts have argued the need to understand the EU as acting collectively and with increased solidarity in security issues. This is even more the case in trade issues, which constitute a substantial part of relations between the EU and Australia.
The European maze: Complex, cumbersome, costly As we have seen, the EU can appear complex and its procedures rather tortuous, a view evident in Australian media analysis. Not only does it constitute a Byzantine network which is not readily accessible but also it is regarded as a set of institutions governed by distant hardnosed mandarins who are not democratically accountable. This has
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led to views, such as Greg Sheridan’s (2004), of the EU as a ruthless bureaucracy. If Europe becomes integrated it becomes centralised, and in that case the central bureaucracy takes ever more power. This is bad for Australia in several ways. First, it is inherently undemocratic and may eventually compromise some of the democratic gains that joining the EU has brought in the past. However, it is especially undemocratic for nations outside the EU because it aggregates power to a ruthless bureaucracy that will want to impose its power on other international institutions. Sheridan also criticises the EU for adopting, in some international institutions, common positions on behalf of its twenty-five states, with the result that Australia has ‘less chance to win an argument because the vast bloc of European votes is already tied up in the European common position’ (Sheridan, 2004). He expresses a certain media view that Brussels—meaning the EU bureaucracy—is in love with regulation and that this must be resisted by Australia, as Brussels ‘badly wants to impose common regulations’, with negative repercussions for Australia’ (Sheridan, 2004). The Australian Government shares the view that the EU is an excessively complex body. EU decision-making is complex and difficult for others to influence. And the combination of enlargement and deeper integration has created a ‘crowding out’ effect, whereby third countries like Australia find it increasingly difficult to win the attention of EU decision-makers. Decisions reached after intensive processes of consultation among member states are difficult to reverse. (DFAT, ANI, 2003) The Government White Paper Advancing the National Interest goes on to say that the EU has developed a ‘costly and cumbersome regulatory system that affects most aspects of economic activity’. It regards the EU as attempting on occasion to impose this system on the international community to avoid suffering a competitive
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disadvantage, thereby placing it at odds with Australia. Australia is therefore attempting to provide a counterweight to the EU’s agenda by forming coalitions with like-minded countries (DFAT, ANI, 2003). The perception of the EU as over-bureaucratic and technocratic was evident in a recent article by Australian journalist Janet Albrechtsen (2005) which was based on complete incomprehension of the EU. The Commission Delegation in Canberra, in an e-letter, had this to say about the Albrechtsen article: In an article (May 11) which labels the ‘grand utopian experiment’ of the EU as a stealthy attempt to ‘dump the nation-state’, Albrechtsen describes the EU’s executive, the Brussels-based European Commission, as a ‘mammoth centralised bureaucracy’. In fact the Commission, with its 21,863 employees, is smaller than Australia’s Centrelink, which has a total of 24,632 staff. What many tend to forget is that almost all EU regulations and legislation drafted by the Commission has to be voted on by both the European Parliament [and] the Council of Ministers which is made up of ministers from the EU Member States, and then often by the Heads of State and Government of EU countries via the European Council. The Commission has very little unchecked capacity to design and enforce rules from Brussels of its own volition. All up, the Commission is probably the same size as the combined policy divisions of the Australian federal government, yet it serves a truly ‘mammoth’ 455 million people, as opposed to a mere 20 million. (news@eu 65, 2005) The EU may appear to be an illogical maze, complicated by a multiplicity of actors and agencies. Its leaders do seem to be constantly changing and its institutions do seem confusing. It seems to write a new treaty every few years—and then tops it all up with a draft Constitution that seems to be equally incomprehensible. This appears to smack of state-like pretensions, regarded with suspicion by many, both within and outside of the EU. Its agenda seems to be constantly changing, its size expanding and its reach extending. In sum, it is
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baffling. There is a temptation, and it is far more reassuring, for politicians and the media to rely on state-to-state contacts that have the merit of being familiar and comprehensible. The question often asked in Australia is ‘Will the EU ever work?’ Its policies may not necessarily be palatable and its protectionism may lead to accusations of hypocrisy, but it does work—and often works well. It has carved out for itself a role that combines hard regulation with soft power. Elements of the EU that render it a complex interlocutor are the system of institutions and competences, the sui generis aspects and the hybrid nature of the supranational and intergovernmental forms of governance. Traditional realist assumptions of state-to-state bargaining are inadequate for understanding the EU, for example because its regulatory mechanisms are a combination of various political and administrative traditions. The changing nature and context of EU policy making have a deep impact on the EU– Australia relationship. In the survey of elite perceptions of the EU carried out in 2001–02 (Murray, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a), only 12 of 133 survey respondents stated that they solicit information and analysis on the EU on a regular basis, although many regard it as complex. What is it about the EU that renders it so difficult to understand? One factor is clear—the institutions often have similar names. Further, none has an equivalent in a nation state system. It appears at first glance that negative perceptions of the EU in Australia have not altered significantly in the three decades since the last book was written about Australia and the EU and the last-but-one visit by Prime Minister Howard to Brussels. In fact, quite a lot has changed and there is considerable dynamism and an increase in some understanding alongside continued mutual antagonism and misunderstanding. There is relatively little sophisticated reporting on the EU in some of the Australian media—but again this shortcoming is not confined to Australia. Even within the EU, there is evidence of biased reporting about the EU. The recent matter involving the BBC is a case in point. An independent inquiry stated in May 2005 that the BBC’s reporting of the EU must become ‘more demonstrably impartial’ and redress a tendency to ‘polarise and over-simplify issues’ (BBC, 2005). This tendency is also evident in some Australian media reporting.
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Understanding the EU’s processes: Cracking the Monnet Code The EU’s structures, processes and practices can be quite distinctive from those that pertain in Australia. These are often referred to as the Monnet method, named after the founder of the EU, Jean Monnet. Deciphering the Monnet Code involves understanding of the European Single Market, the euro, the process of membership expansion and the combination of political cultures ranging from confrontational politics to consensus and coalition-building and use of qualified majority voting. It involves cracking the acquis communautaire, the EU’s legal patrimony, its body of laws, regulations and methods. It requires an understanding of Europe’s many coalition governments and of the regional and national differences of the member states in terms of style, diplomacy and their relations with the EU. Governments need to focus on the specific EU relationship with all EU institutions and also enhance their understanding of how the EU and the Single Market work. The EU is a different type of political actor from both international organisations and from nation states. It has distinctive divisions and cleavages, such as the tension between nationalism and Europeanism; between deepening of integration and widening of membership; and between federalism and intergovernmentalism, large and small states and older and newer member states. Leadership is carried out differently from many other forums and there is a dispersed and diffused leadership among the institutions. The composition of the Council and the European Parliament are subject to change, depending on national elections and changes of government. It is thus not appropriate to speak of the Council as a monolithic institution of a certain political hue as it can be influenced by predominantly social democratic, liberal Christian democratic or conservative tendencies, depending on the ideological make-up of a national government. The EU has been effectively regionally integrated and this has been possible due to a number of factors, among them the fact that they have largely had shared experiences of war as well as being geographically close to each other. The geographical and political realities in the Asia–Pacific are very different: Asia—and especially the Asia–Pacific—is very dispersed geographically, spanning two
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hemispheres. Part of the Asia–Pacific, Australia is a continent in its own right and has no experience of cross-border co-operation in the way that Europeans have and that ASEAN are attempting to forge. Australia was not invaded in war like the countries of Europe were and has no real experience of any cross-border co-operation or rivalry. Foreign Minister Downer has stated: Our concern is that as Europe becomes ever more intensely focused on managing the practicalities and politics of greater union, it does not lose focus on engagement with third countries and with other regions. This makes it all the more necessary for Australia to be an alert and active partner … we need the expanded EU not to get distracted by internal differences—but to face outwards and exert its international weight constructively, as a force for liberal democratic values and economic growth.5 (Downer, 2003) Apart from the transatlantic relationship, the EU is always the senior partner in its dialogues and this asymmetry applies not just to Australia but to most countries. This is one reason why many states negotiate with the EU as a bloc, evening out asymmetry somewhat.
Perceptions collide Differences of perception relate to society, to polity and government. First, while Australian society has largely adapted to a deregulation, ‘survival of the fittest’ approach to industry, the EU’s deregulation has been complemented by regulation. In addition there are differing views in Australian society on the role of deregulation and the EU— for example, as it affects the rights of Trade Unions, social rights and environmental standards. The role of the social welfare state and of the EU’s social model is far more entrenched in some EU countries and institutions that is the principle of state obligations in this regard in Australia – or the US (Rikfin, 2004; Leonard, 2005). Second, views regarding the role of agriculture in society are starkly divergent despite a shared commitment to agricultural producers. For Australia, agriculture is part of the history of the
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relationship with the EU since 1973. While Australia continues to rely on British views on the matter, this does not necessarily open doors for Australia in Brussels, partly due to French perceptions of Australia as being largely UK-influenced. This begs the question of whether Canberra is doing enough to develop relationships with other capitals. Australia appears not to understand CAP reform, according to many EU officials, as Australia’s reaction to any reform of the CAP is always very cautious. For the EU the CAP has a cultural dimension and it is also now an intrinsic part of rural development, not simply a price support policy. It aims to keep farmers on the land, allocating them direct payments and decoupling production from the money provided. The Commission is aware that the CAP is protectionist and not rational, with most Commission officials actively supporting or promoting CAP reform—on this they agree with Australia. Yet Australia continues to tell the Commission, its interlocutor, that the CAP is unacceptable and on this the Commission, the initiator of proposals for CAP reform, often concurs. Perhaps Australia should in fact be bringing its critiques more directly and more persistently to the members of the Council, given that it is the member states that retain the CAP, especially France. The extent of Australian opposition to the CAP is evident in the fact that Australia allegedly gave serious consideration to the idea of blocking European access to Australian uranium (Oxley, 2002, 106). This points to a mutual comprehension deficit on the part of both Australia and the EU on a number of issues and it is clear that the CAP is the most obvious of these. There is a lack of understanding by the EU about Australia’s continued and determined insistence on trenchant criticism of the CAP. The Australian perspective has been that the CAP is so patently erroneous as to be in need of immediate and radical reform. This point is substantiated by Oxley (2002, 106–7), who cites ‘a gap in understanding’, whereby Australians could not believe that European consumers continued to tolerate high prices for food and the Europeans could not believe that Australians did not understand agriculture’s social and political importance in Europe. A third difference relates to governance and government. Once the government in Canberra takes a decision, it is definitive. In the case of the EU, decision making can take a considerable amount of work and compromise, in order to achieve agreement among all
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twenty-five states. This can mean that a lowest common denominator result emerges. National as well as European interests come into play at a number of levels and across sectors. Certification processes for goods also differ between the EU and Australia. For example, on issues relating to consumer policy, the EU precautionary principle regarding hormones is at odds with Australian policy. Europe’s policy regarding genetically modified organisms, for example, is more protectionist than Australia’s and is a matter of contention between the EU and the US. A fourth issue concerns negotiations, where, on occasion, Australians can view the EU as a complex fortress and the EU can regard Australia as pushy. Yet the reality is more complex. Negotiations are multi-actor and take place in a number of different arenas. One set of Australian delegates may be engaged in a tense argument in one room of the WTO in Geneva or in the European Commission in Brussels and, in a different room, at a different meeting, there may well be complete policy accord between Australia and the EU, with similar values and priorities in evidence. Fifth, with regard to markets, the Australian perception of the Single Market is not consistent as many Australians do not understand that the EU is a united market of twenty-five states that is open to all, with significant agricultural exceptions. This message of market openness has not been clearly presented by the EU, according to some of its own officials, and has not been clearly received by Australia. It is in Australia’s interests to deal with the EU and to sell to the EU. A key issue is that Australia has experienced problems in promoting and marketing in Europe. It is argued repeatedly by some officials that the national markets in Europe are more discrete than would be assumed from the existence of a Single Market. Australian companies trying to establish themselves in the EU have expressed concern about the huge size of the EU, especially since the 2005 Enlargement. There is less than full comprehension of the geography and market and a preference by some Australian exporters to confine business activities to one or two countries, often the familiar ones. A further trade perspective is a sense in Australia that the EU ignores Australia and favours developing countries in many aspects of trade. The EU is not presented in a consistent manner in Australian government documents and pronouncement. For example, while it is
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evident that the EU is Australia’s largest trading partner and Australia’s largest export market, the Australian Prime Minister is quoted as having said, in April 2005, that Japan is Australia’s largest export market. In the same article, John Howard states that ‘China’s rise is steadily reshaping our world’ (Sheridan, 2005). These comments suggest that Mr Howard is certainly keen on renewed links with two of Asia’s key players, Japan and China. It also suggests, however, that he does not fully comprehend that the EU is the largest market for Australian goods, and becoming larger all the time. Further, what happens in the EU is also reshaping parts of the Australian world. This is partly because the EU is an international actor in some forums. Regarding the importance of Europeans acting together, former Commissioner Lamy has observed that: when it chooses to pursue a truly federal policy, the EU can play a decisive role on the world stage. Together, we have a far greater ‘weight’ than the sum of the Member States. We have the ability, not only to resist initiatives that we do not support, as in the case of the action taken by the United States on steel in 2002, but also to set the international agenda. The priority given to development in the Doha Agenda, or the agreement on medicines are evidence of this pivotal European role. This shows just how ‘profitable’ teamwork can be for Europeans.6
Fortress Europe? One US perception of the EU has been of an economic powerhouse that was relatively impervious to US demands (Smith, 1992, 112). An equivalent perception has been evident in Australia too. The feeling in both countries has been reinforced by a perception, among analysts and policy makers, of the EU as a ‘Fortress Europe’. Some Australians regard the EU as absorbed in its own affairs in Europe and in the transatlantic relationship, with Turkey, Russia, China and the Middle East are all important for the EU. One Australian perception is that the Asia–Pacific suffers from a lack of high-level EU attention. The concern that the EU is self-engrossed came through in the 2001– 02 survey responses, as well as government statements such as that
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from Alexander Downer expressing Australia’s concern that ‘as Europe becomes ever more intensely focused on managing the practicalities and politics of a greater union, it will … lose focus on engagement with third countries and with other regions’.7 What is Europe?—The Australian View Where Australian soldiers died The site of Australian war graves Where ‘Home’, the UK, is located Where many Australian migrants came from The creator of protectionist agricultural policies Complex, difficult to understand Where lots of corrupt politicians live.8
Understanding the EU as an international actor The EU is a key international actor. Despite considerable opposition to the notion that the EU is an international player, and that the EU can somehow have ‘relations’ with other states, it is a key player in all international forums. The EU may not (yet) call its delegations ‘embassies’, although the EU Constitution, if it were to be ratified, does provide for that. It may only act on specific mandates dictated largely by the member states but it is certainly a combination of EU and national interest and is a key interlocutor for Australia, regardless of what it is called. Some observers may well consider it bizarre to refer to the EU as an ‘actor’ but it is interesting that many scholars of international relations and political sciences do precisely that, and with justification. Further, the EU Constitution renders the EU a diplomatic actor. This raises the question: What do Australian policy makers regard as an international actor? Does only foreign (or security) policy make an actor an international actor? We have seen that the EU is an actor in trade, aid and international negotiations. A key point that is not always understood is that the EU carries out leadership differently, and engages in politics differently, from traditional diplomacy and interstate negotiations. Yet there are those in the Australian diplomatic and academic communities who firmly assert that the EU is simply a Customs Union, or that
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it has no real status in international affairs. There is even some unease with the fact that the EU is represented in Canberra by a delegation, which is not immediately classifiable. This longstanding perspective constitutes a reluctance to understand the EU, its development and its international role, regardless of whether it is liked or not. It has been noted that the Australian media and political spheres often tend to focus on individual nations and so the importance of the EU is ‘often not recognised’ (Delegation of the European Commission, EU– Australian Economic Relations 2003, 2004).
Europe: Not a prime relationship for Australia At a meeting in 2004 of the First Annual Future Summit, it was argued that attention should be accorded to Australia’s relationship with the EU. The report on this session states that engagement with the EU was not a ‘prime relationship’ for Australia.9 This assessment was made in a session entitled ‘Positioning Australia in the region and the global map’. So: in Australian policy making, on the global map, engagement with the EU is not a ‘prime relationship’, suggesting a problem in reading the global map. The cartography of the Australian policy community is based on a skewed view of engagement. As one journalist has suggested, ‘On a world map of Australia’s international relations under John Howard’s prime ministership, continental Europe stands out as a void’ (Taylor, 2003). What was striking about the 2004 Future Summit was the fact that the EU, Australia’s leading trading partner, was neglected by the speakers. Rather, one speaker said: ‘Europe was the past, America is the present and the Asia–Pacific is the future’.10 Once again the idea that Australia has to choose its engagement in a mutually exclusive manner is evident from this statement—Australia trades with Europe, America and the Asia–Pacific … as well as other parts of the world. It conducts advanced negotiations with a great many parts of the globe. The statement made was not only misleading, in implying that hard choices need to be made about which comes first, but also simply incorrect. The EU is part of Australia’s engagements—Europe was the past, Europe is part of the present and Europe is part of the future of Australia. This may be a less snappy phrase but it is a more accurate one. That session in Sydney, attended by some four hundred people, was informed by Professor Anthony Milner that ‘our economic and political futures lie
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within the Asia–Pacific region’ and that ‘We need to be armed to the teeth with knowledge of Asia’.11 This is certainly true. But equally important is the message that Australia needs to be armed with knowledge and comprehension about Europe, the most powerful regional entity in the world, and Australia’s major trading partner.
Understanding regional integration Recent scathing criticisms by Prime Minister Howard of the EU’s trade protectionist policies and his endorsement of globalisation and free trade as means of assisting underdeveloped states (for example, at the recent Davos Forum)12 highlight the relevance to Australia of developing a detailed understanding of regionalism and the European influence over this global trend. There has not yet been an adequate examination of the implications of Australia’s rejection in 1997 of the human rights clause in negotiations with the EU on a Framework Agreement for closer economic and political linkages (Murray, 2003a). What is certain is that it undermined the relationship in the short term. When Australians think of the EU as a United States of Europe, it is the US model of states in a federal system that they seem to have in mind. However, this shows a misunderstanding of the EU. The Single Market is quite similar to the US system in some ways, it is true, especially now that the euro is in place in some countries of the EU. However, the US has over two hundred years of experience as a confederation of states, while the European Union has been in existence for some fifty years, a reminder that EU officials in Brussels are only too happy to give. There is a certain Australian tendency, rather like that of some in the UK, to regard the EU as a free trade zone with extra characteristics—as a ‘turbo-charged’ European Free Trade Association, as it were—and this view is also evident among some Australian academics. But the EU has advanced well beyond anything resembling an EFTA and it is also more than a customs union. Some eighty per cent of legislation in the member states of the EU is estimated to be EU legislation. This is not immediately visible to Australia and other third countries, so the impact of the EU is not always obvious—hence the tendency to undervalue its impact and to misunderstand it. It is true that the EU is a long-term project, often driven by promissory teleology (Murray, 2000; Rumford and Murray, 2003). Its
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achievements, other than peace, are considerable. A few years ago, no one had envisaged that it would have a single currency or a European Armaments Agency, for example. EU successes have been based on years of interstate co-operation and compromise. It is difficult for an entity of twenty-five states and such huge complexity to get all its policies right—a fact not always understood in the EU and in Australia. The UK media also lacks this comprehension and influences Australia’s misapprehension. The first mention of the EU in the 1997 Australian Government White Paper comes in its fourth chapter, where there is a reference to growing regionalism and implications for Australia: The growing strength of regionalism means in turn that Australia’s bilateral partners will increasingly view issues through a regional prism, and with an eye to regional solidarity. This has certainly been the pattern among member states of the European Union, and it is likely to become more of a feature of Australia’s relations with the members of ASEAN.13 The Australian Government’s reluctance to regard the EU as a powerful unitary actor is evident in the insistence that: ‘Australia’s interests in Europe are best served when our bilateral relations with its major countries—especially the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia—are sound and comprehensive’.14 When the Government White Paper states that bilateral relations ‘are the bedrock of Australia’s European engagement’ it is referring to traditional state-to-state relations, not new regional bilateralism (http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/ chapter_8.html, accessed 7/4/05). The Government’s reluctance to recognise and engage with the EU as a unitary actor is evident in official rhetoric that uses qualifiers, such as ‘when taken as a single actor …’ The chapter devoted to the EU in the most recent government White Paper is entitled, ‘Developing Deeper Relations with an Enlarged and Increasingly Cohesive Europe’ (emphasis added). And yet, after a brief paragraph on the recent enlargement, the chapter very quickly moves on to the ‘countries of Europe’ and the importance of individual bilateral relations with each of them. It is also in the nature of the EU to pursue elements of a federal agenda, so that dealing with the EU is in some ways similar to 180
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the relationship between the federal government and the states of Australia. There are, of course, real differences, but an understanding of the EU as quasi-federal or partly federal in structure may well help to understand its complex decision-making structures. Integration is regarded as a negative influence, as evident in the perception that EU expansion is the enemy of integration and therefore a good thing for Australia. According to journalist Greg Sheridan (2004): Expansion is the enemy of integration. That is a good thing, and one of the main reasons that expansion of the EU is in Australia’s interests. The EU will function best, and with least disruption to other non-European nations such as Australia, if it is primarily a club, albeit a well co-ordinated club, of independent nations. It will function worst if it is a single political, social and economic entity. This begs the question: Why is there an Australian reluctance to accept the vision of an integrated Europe? Is it a reluctance to accept that the EU is moving from an economic and trade-based agenda to an agenda in the WTO and other global forums which encompasses global governance, politics and security, the environment and climate change? Australia has so far shown little understanding of the fact that the EU constitutes a soft power or perhaps a civilian power and that the EU is intensively political. Dealing with the EU is moving from a comfort zone of links with the US, UK, Asia and the Pacific islands, for example. Groupings of nations in the Commmonwealth or Cairns groups are acceptable as a focus for transnational co-operation, but the EU is not. Australia prefers to deal with individual nation states as much as possible. As Kitney (2004a) observes: ‘The shallowness of the relationship at the leadership level, an associated lack of interest in Europe by many Australian business leaders and a lack of Australian media coverage of EU affairs is something that its diplomatic representatives in Canberra fret about constantly’. While many in Australia dispute the idea of the EU as a global player, one reason for this criticism is that Australia, and in particular Foreign Minister Downer, regards the EU as punching below its weight. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) also Colliding Continents
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makes severe criticisms of the EU as a regulator and an aggressive interlocutor in the WTO and holds negative perceptions of the EU as an environmental leader. Shaping Australian policy towards Europe: Survey perceptions Question: In your opinion, what issues should be kept in mind when formulating Australian policy relating to the EU? ‘Limited knowledge in the Australian public about the EU as a whole and the non-British member states of the EU, their cultural identities, political systems, and specific interests in Australia and the Pacific.’ ‘Difficulties arising from EU “coercive” attitudes on Human Rights, industrial standards.’ ‘By identifying closely with the US and the UK in our business and political approaches, we tend to distance ourselves from continental Europe.’ ‘Viewed objectively, Australia’s heavy dependence on the UK trade and investment connection is grotesque; in size, Germany, France and Italy are all comparable markets with the UK, yet we have made relatively poor inroads there.’ ‘We need to pay more attention to non-US and UK economic, political and business models.’ ‘We should study the EU as closely as we study the US and UK. Australia must invest much more in international business training.’ ‘Australia and the EU have much to learn from each other in many areas of governance, public policy, business and civil society. Australians have limited knowledge and understanding of the nature and extent of European integration, except for a wellinformed small minority.’
European perceptions of Australia J.D.B. Miller’s comment (1976, 103) that Australia was perceived by the European Commission as a ‘rich, highly developed country with a diversified pattern of trade’ (unlike New Zealand) still has some validity, as does his blunt summing up: ‘Australia does not matter enough to be central to Commission thinking’.
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John Howard’s view of Europe reflects that of many in Australia: ‘Whenever you are criticising restrictive and anticompetitive agricultural policies, never exclude the European Union because the EU’s predatory trading behaviour is infinitely worse than that of other countries’.15 The EU does not understand the central role traditionally played by both agricultural and other primary industries in the Australian economy. It does not understand the cultural underpinnings of Australian agriculture—surprisingly, given that there are some clear cultural similarities and parallels here. The EU does not understand the tenacity of the Australian position on agriculture: Australia is simply one of many trading partners, one of the group of advanced industrialised countries with whom Europe trades—so there is no dependent relationship and no special relationship for agricultural market access. The Europeans fail to understand the depth of resentment about the CAP. They fail to come to terms with many Australians’ deep scepticism about the European integration project. They cannot see that few understand the EU and that it is seen either as an overcomplicated monolith—led by what John Howard calls the ‘mandarins of Brussels’—or else as a weak international player attempting to reassert neo-colonialist tendencies. The EU does not understand that many in Australia hold a UK-influenced deep suspicion of its regionalism and equally profound scepticism of its successes. It does not seem to grasp that Australia sees the EU as attempting to push its own regulation and deregulation agendas in a manner that reveals differing views of society on the part of each interlocutor. The EU finds tedious the Australian idea that it has a divine right to trade anywhere it likes in the world with little negative consequence. The EU sees Australia as unwilling to play ball in the global playground. Australia is an advanced industrialised capitalist democratic state. It fights in wars but normally does not start them. It has fought in Europe’s wars and this is a very important part of the Australian psyche. Australian World War I and World War II memorials and celebrations can be found in France and Belgium—even a Digger cafe in France. Yet the sum total of all of this has not fully registered with the EU. Nor has the importance of the Howard Government’s idea of the Australian warrior citizen legend. For all the rhetoric of the EU, regarding its own origins from war, European officials do
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not fully acknowledge the contribution of Australian soldiers to wars in Europe. EU officials cannot understand the preoccupation with the EU through a UK Thatcherite or Murdoch lens. They comprehend neither the Australian media’s criticism of the EU nor why the EU is not understood by the policy community and media. The EU does not understand why the Australian Government is so close to that of the US on so many issues. The US influence on Australia is seen from Brussels as massive. Brussels cannot understand why Australia signed a Free Trade Agreement with the US, as this is regarded as not benefiting Australia to any significant degree. Europe is locked out of Australian ménage à trois, according to Tim Harcourt (2004), Austrade’s Chief Economist. ‘As one European observer complained to me recently: “Australia is in a ménage à trois. You are simultaneously doing trade deals with America on one hand and Asia on the other, while Europe cannot even get in the bedroom”.’ Does this deeply affect the EU? Not according to a former chief negotiator with Australia, Sir Leon Brittan, during a visit in 1998: ‘Being completely frank, we [the EU] haven’t suffered terribly from Australia’s attitude’. Finally, there is a need to change the image of the EU in Australia and this will be a long term process, as the Commission acknowledges.
Australian adaptation to the EU Australian adaptation to the EU, and to the Europeanisation of its nation states, has been mixed. Just as national policy choices in EU member states are at least partly shaped by the EU integration process, so too, is Australian adaptation partly shaped by the external impact of EU regional integration. Australian adaptation, at the level of government officials, has been evident in the creation of an EU section in DFAT and with the monitoring of EU developments in other government departments. There is a co-ordinating mechanism to discuss EU developments in the government departments. Australia faces a situation whereby the EU negotiates as a bloc of twenty-five member states, often dominating decision-making agendas in multilateral contexts, to the extent that Australia finds itself out in the cold and unable to influence outcomes that would be in Australia’s interests. The Australian Government has recognised that the enlarged EU has a strategic weight that is likely to increase
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steadily and that ‘a more unified Europe is already having a noticeable impact on the processes and agenda of international diplomacy’ (DFAT, 2005). The Australian delegation to the EU finds the Commission very open and approachable, although new officials do find the EU difficult to understand at first. Perhaps there should be more dialogue with the EU, more often and at all levels. These negotiators could emphasise common issues and knowledge of the Asia–Pacific and the issues in which Australia shares positions as a relatively neutral ally or friend. Foreign Minister Downer is seen by EU officials as friendly and open, while it is difficult to persuade John Howard to visit Brussels. How has Australia adapted to the EU’s increasingly expanding role? Australia’s adaptation to evolving regional and international political contexts is both directly related to the EU and related to the other major powers in the international arena. For example, whatever happens in the relationship between the EU and the US has considerable consequences for Australian policy choices in its own bilateral relationships with Europe, the US and the Asia–Pacific. The transatlantic relationship, however fraught at times, is deeply influential on world politics, trade and security agendas. Regardless of whether the EU is a superpower or whether it has an army or not, this relationship has import for Australia. Adaptation to the EU encompasses the requirement to understand structures, processes, party systems and other factors of the EU that may not feature in Australia—or not in the same way. Factors to be kept in mind by Australia would include expansion of the EU’s policies, the Single Market; the euro and the acquis communautaire—the body of EU laws and practices. In addition, the political configuration of governments represented in the Council may be quite unlike Australian governments. For example, European coalition governments may include social democratic, liberal, conservative and Christian Democratic parties. There are Greens in some national and regional governments; the politics of the Third Way still hold some sway; there are many individual regional and national differences among the member states regarding negotiating style and diplomacy. It also makes sense for Australia to have clear ideas of the benefits and costs of EU membership to each state. The European Parliament is a parliament with elected representatives and a new and distinct layer
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of representation, legitimacy and scrutiny, which also debates and passes resolutions on issues relating to the international political environment—and human rights clauses in EU international agreements. There is a combination of political cultures in the European Parliament ranging from the more British style of confrontational politics to consensus democracy, including styles of consociational democracy, based on coalition and qualified majority voting. The EU consists of multilingual and multinational groups of nations. The survey carried out in 2001–02 shows that respondents understand the specific nature of the EU, because of the establishment of an Australian diplomatic representation to the EU in Brussels and the development of new linkages with the European Commission by Australian negotiators. Respondents saw a need for Australian trade strategy adaptation to the EU. Some pointed to difficulties in Australia’s management of the relationship with the EU as a whole, and criticised a perceived lack of government foresight on policy preparation. Respondents often referred to the EU’s role as an international actor, through treaties and agreements with third countries (Murray, 2003a).
Dealing with public enemy no. 1: Evil forces The robust trade relationship and positive stocktake outlined in previous chapters do not necessarily indicate a positive attitude to the EU in official circles. As recently as early 2005, Prime Minister Howard took some Europeans to task for what he regarded as unfair and irrational criticism of US policy on Iraq (Butterly and Mulvey, 2005). Antagonistic positions regarding the EU are not new. In 1998, Trade Minister Tim Fischer railed against ‘evil forces in the northern hemisphere’ who seemed unwilling to pursue further trade liberalisation. ‘“I have to be blunt about this: the level playing field remains as much a fiction today as ever,” he says after his return from Geneva.’ (Head, 2004). The sense that the EU has the potential to have both negative and positive repercussions for Australia is also reflected in other government discourse, such as Minister Downer’s comment (2003): ‘It is axiomatic that a larger, increasingly powerful European bloc will increase the EU’s capacity to support or disadvantage us’. Australian journalist Geoff Kitney (2004) has proposed an end to ‘Europe-bashing’, suggesting that Australia should stop regarding Europe as ‘public enemy No. 1’ and recognise that its impact on global
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political, economic and strategic issues continues to grow. Increasingly, given the fact that there are EU aspects to most government ministries in the twenty-five member states of the EU, Australian negotiations with individual countries also have an EU aspect, in a type of overlapping bilateralism, combining aspects of traditional bilateralism and new regional bilateralism. Increased recognition of the value of working closely with EU institutions is an essential component of adaptation, regardless of critiques of the EU. Australia cannot afford to ignore the EU’s metamorphosis and has become more mindful of the requirement to monitor it constantly. This monitoring will include analysis of the new European agenda for global dialogue. It needs to encompass the fact that the EU can be conceptualised as a civilian power that is significantly shaped not only by its history but also its own cultural diversity. Further, the EU is increasingly active in global governance as a means of advancing both its market and non-market values and projecting its social and democratic practices beyond its borders, with considerable impact on Australian trading strategies. This needs to be placed in the context of the momentous 2004 enlargement, an expansion of EU space and the dissemination of EU influence and values widely. It is clear that the impact of the EU’s norms and regulatory practices on Australia is long-term, deep and multifaceted. The direct impact is felt in market access problems and the impact of the CAP on Australia. One indirect impact of the EU’s preferential treatment of other parts of the world, in exchange for EU access to the markets of the developing world, undermines Australian access to these markets. A second indirect impact is the fact that Australia seeks to complement its commitment to multilateral forums with bilateral free trade agreements, such as with the US, Singapore and Thailand, and consideration of agreements taking place with China, ASEAN, Malaysia and Japan. While these agreements may benefit Australia, particularly when the benefits of multilateralism are not immediately evident, there is concern that, while such agreements bring benefits, ‘they are usually limited because countries don’t usually give up as much in bilateral negotiations as they do in “one in, all in” multilateral negotiations to secure the larger benefits on offer there’. (Australian Financial Review, 2005) Policy and business respondents to surveys express frustration with the EU’s complexity and apparently opaque structures, rendering
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it difficult to understand (Murray 2002b, 2002c, 2003b). Contemporary EU developments have a direct and long-term impact on economic, political and diplomatic relations with the Asia–Pacific, in turn affecting Australia. The recently signed US–Australia Free Trade Agreement underlines the importance of understanding not only how Australia interacts with the EU but also how the EU influences our other major trading partners, such as the US. EU regulations have considerable impact on Australia, requiring adaptation by Australia’s government and traders. For example, Austrade presents the following case in point regarding food exports. Foods of animal origin must be approved by an EU-approved establishment. A quota licence may be required for some agricultural foods, such as beef, lamb, dairy, cereals, rice and sugar. The EU’s legislation relating to packaged products has stipulations with which Australian exports must comply. These relate to ingredients; label design and content; jar or pack size; additives; the need for an EU address; product descriptions and names; products of animal origin; packaging materials and claims made for the product (Doody, 2003).
The truth is out there We have seen that there is considerable mutual misunderstanding and that in particular Australia is quite ill-informed about the EU. What, then, might be done in order to redress this situation? How might it be possible to establish and build on an understanding of the EU? First, Australia needs to demonstrate the interest and desire to understand the EU. Second, there needs to be relatively easy access to relevant information in a clear and accessible manner. Few respondents in the 2001–02 survey indicated that they accessed information about the EU, as we have seen. Third, there is the need to comprehend and absorb that information and analysis. In other words, it is crucial to get to first base in understanding the EU and its international role. How might the EU then raise understanding of its changing role? How might it engender a change in attitudes? Perhaps the EU could make its international role and influence more evident and clear. Perhaps such a situation will pertain when the EU has a coherent and consistent foreign policy over time. Perhaps it will pertain when its civilian power actions are signposted clearly in the cartography of forgetfulness. At times it seems that the EU is The Land That Australia
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Forgot. The Rip Van Winkel approach to international decision making by Australia might then be a thing of the past. Perhaps this will take place when—or if—the fully-fledged diplomatic service of the EU, provided for in the EU Constitution, becomes a reality. The EU is, in a way, advancing its capacity to reach what it regards as optimal outcomes by stealth as a peacekeeper and civilian power and exerting its influence in a distinctive manner. Its influence is not immediately apparent in many instances. Australian media perception of the EU’s civilian power capabilities is less likely to appear in newspapers than are its problems. Perhaps now that the US more clearly regards the EU as a major international partner, Australia will also take more notice. The EU needs to develop its own capacities, its capabilities, to act on the global level more clearly, although there are those in Australia who consider this role to be overdeveloped already. It may well be the case that the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force and counter-terrorism co-operation will be the basis of a Superpower Europe. What is certainly the case is that the EU cannot influence the international arena in exactly the same way as the US can. It is already establishing itself as a superpower, as many analysts argue, and it is increasing its clout in a multifaceted manner, as it gains more political as well as economic weight. Foreign Minister Downer (1999) has recognised the need to engage with this more influential EU: ‘The government’s prime objective in Europe is to create a climate that encourages business-to-business links and facilitates two-way trade and investment. We also want to create a climate that recognises Europe’s enhanced political weight and the need for us to engage Europe at all levels.’ A new engagement is evident, despite some mutual misunderstanding.
Notes Moore, M., ‘Doha Can Still Give World Trade A Boost’, Australian Financial Review, 21 May 2004, p. 83. 2 In response to the question ‘Have you personally heard about the draft European Constitution?’ the response showed that across the EU, 33% had not heard of it. In the UK 50% had not heard of it and in Cyprus 65% had not. At the other end of the spectrum, only 22% of those surveyed in the Netherlands and Slovakia had not heard of it. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 214/Wave 62.1, The Future Constitutional Treaty, 1
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Fieldwork 2004. Published March 2005. http://europa.eu.int/comm/ public_opinion/constitution_en.htm, accessed 12 May 2005. ‘Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper explicitly recognizes the role of the European Union as a global actor and the advantages in strengthening bilateral relationships with an increasingly integrated Europe.’ (EC Delegation, 2003a.) Original source, Edmund Burke’s speech on ‘Conciliation with America’, 1775. Quoted in Hedley Bull, ‘Britain and Australia in Foreign Policy’, in J.D.B. Miller (ed.), Australians and British: Social and Political Connections, Methuen, Australia, 1987, p. 103. Alexander Downer, Speech at the National Europe Centre Conference on EU Enlargement. Canberra, 16 April 2003, EU Enlargement: Meeting the Challenges of the Global Security and Trade Environment. Quoted in news@eu, the e-newsletter of the European Commission’s Delegations to Australia and New Zealand, no. 46, 22 November 2004. Although this sentiment is also evident in the White Paper, this comment is from Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, ‘EU Enlargement: Meeting the Challenges of the Global Security and Trade Environment’, National Europe Centre Paper No. 89, Speech at the National Europe Centre Conference on EU Enlargement, Canberra, 16 April 2003, http://www.anu. edu.au/NEC/downer.pdf, accessed 18 September 2004. A report in the Canberra Times stated: ‘The whiff of corruption hangs over the politics of many of the new nations. A financial scandal helped push Poland’s Miller to quit, although he was vindicated later.’ The Independent, ‘A motley lot: good, bad and the ugly’, Canberra Times, 1 May 2004, p. B12. ‘Some participants argued the importance of engagements with New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the European Union. Members of the Positioning Task Force agreed that while these relationships are important, they are not prime relationships.’ Australian Davos Connection, Future Summit 2004. Report of the First Annual Future Summit, Sydney, 6–8 May 2004 , Melbourne, Australian Davos Connection, 2004, p. 95. I was the participant who spoke regarding Australia’s relationship with the EU. This comment was made by Warwick Smith, Executive Director of Macquarie Bank Ltd, Australian Davos Connection, Future Summit 2004. Report of the First Annual Future Summit, Sydney, 6–8 May 2004 , Melbourne, Australian Davos Connection, 2004, p. 95. Professor Anthony Milner, ibid., p. 94. Mr Howard’s support for assistance to developing nations consisted in part in calling for the removal of trade subsidies and barriers, especially recent wheat subsidies. Europe, with its highly protected agricultural policies, should change its trade polices. http://www.news.com.au Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Chapter 4—Bilateral Relationships: The Basic Building Block’, In the National Interest, http:// www.dfat.gov.au/ini/ch4.html, accessed 11 April 2005. As noted above. Comments made by Prime Minister Howard to the Commonwealth Federal Parliament, 14 May 2002.
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Chapter 6
New Agendas for Dialogue
‘The EU is one of the few effective mechanisms the international community has for rewarding good governance and good behaviour in nations.’ —Greg Sheridan, May 2004 The vigorous and multi-faceted exchange we have established with the European Union … serves us well in focusing the EU on Australian interests and in developing strategies to pursue shared international interests. —Alexander Downer, 2002a There is a new Australian engagement with the European Union (EU), despite some mutual misunderstanding. This is in part due to shared visions regarding the need to confront challenges that go well beyond national boundaries, such as terrorism, and common concerns with both advancing and managing globalisation. The contemporary dialogue on new agendas in the relationship between Australia and the European Union therefore features new security and societal agendas, incorporating hard security (including terrorism and defence) and soft security and immigration, as well as educational linkages, in a distinctly different context from the close encounter of the first kind,
which is state-to-state traditional bilateralism with individual European states. This dialogue also moves beyond formal agreements, which are a feature of the close encounter of the second kind, the new regional bilateralism. It is more than dialogue in the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This new feature is firmly based in changing geopolitical, security and societal contexts and is explicitly acknowledged by both the Australian Government and the EU. It is made possible because there has been some rapprochement between the two parties, based on new regional bilateralism engagement, as well as a broader multidimensional engagement. This places the relationship between Australia and the EU on an innovative, largely co-operative plane, where trade, wine and agriculture take a back seat and terrorism, security and societal issues feature. This newer engagement is critical due to a number of global pressures. It places international co-operation foremost. This cooperation is bilateral, multilateral and also regional, with, for example an overarching framework of Asia–Pacific and European security. This is because the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 and the Bali, Jakarta, Madrid and London bombings have radically altered the nature of interstate interaction on a global scale as well as on a regional scale and an interregional scale. This dialogue is a new and unprecedented departure from previous patterns of engagement. It does not mean that the EU and Australia will necessarily be in accord on agricultural trade, nor that political differences will be eliminated. It indicates, however, that international interaction increasingly deals with manifold aspects of sovereignty. It involves both state sovereignty and EU sovereignty and competences. It demonstrates that a more complex relationship has developed and, with it, additional areas of convergence and, on occasion, divergence of views. There is considerable dialogue between Australia and the EU because, since 2003, there has been a wide-ranging official Australia– EU Agenda for Co-operation. Some of this may be simply dialogue at this stage—the result of years of co-operation. We have seen that the EU is dealing with a number of issues and challenges that it has never dealt with before. This is for at least two reasons. One is that the EU
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member states, as individual countries, are simply unable to manage these challenges themselves. The other is that these challenges have a global context that requires a co-ordinated response from the EU and from its partners too. The member states increasingly look to Brussels for leadership, co-ordination and policy guidance in a number of issues, such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, non-proliferation, regional conflicts, development aid, humanitarian aid, human rights, the environment and communicable diseases. The EU is also in close dialogue with other interlocutors, and the most intensive of these dialogues is with the US. Australia is, also involved in seeking co-ordinated regional and global responses to challenges. The new dialogue was first explicitly mentioned in the 1997 Australia–EU Joint Declaration (Appendix 1) and developed in the 2002 ministerial consultation where it was felt that there was the need for a new impetus for the relationship. It indicates Australian government recognition of the EU as an international interlocutor which is not a state but nevertheless constitutes a partner in dialogue. The result of this new impetus was the 2003 strategy known as an Agenda for Co-operation, which set out the main areas for collaboration. This was updated in 2004 (see Appendix 3). These are areas in which the EU is playing an increasingly important international role on behalf of the member states— areas where the EU is a new type of player, or superpower, that exerts power—or influence—differently. This is not necessarily hard power, although the desire for a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy continues to be an important goal. On the contrary, the influence the EU is exerting is also in societal issues, such as education (Nye, 2004). While education remains largely the preserve and responsibility of the nation state in the EU, there is a European dimension to many aspects of national, transnational and supranational education cooperation. The effects of educational projects such as Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus and the Bologna Declaration are immense—the EU is setting the agenda for much of this co-operation and opportunity. Further, I believe that Australia–EU co-operation is societal in a different way from those issues relating to security—such as co-operation on research and education. This co-operation is relatively new, given that the EU still has limited, though significant, competences in the area. It is a reflection of the new broader relationship between the
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EU and Australia—based on non-market, non-economic principles, established with a political commitment to collaborate. It is also a newer type of actor collaboration as it involves non-state actors such as educational establishments and it has a people-to-people dimension. Further, increased knowledge of, research on and understanding of the EU will be of direct benefit to Australian policy makers and future leaders, state and non-state actors, government officials and traders. Knowledge of the EU empowers Australia. Access to the EU market profits Australia. Access to EU education enriches Australia. International concerns about terrorism, refugees and immigration, for example, feature on international agendas where the EU and Australia interact. These agendas were not necessarily established by the EU. Some are set by the US, some are set by the so-called Coalition of the Willing, of which Australia is an active participant, and some are reactions to tragic acts of violence with considerable repercussions. It is not my aim to discuss whether the greatest threat to the world might be AIDS, poverty, terrorism or forms of fundamentalism. Rather, new security agendas (Waever and Buzan, 1993) are placed in a context to help understand the contemporary, and future, EU– Australia relationship. There is little doubt that security and terrorism feature high on agendas. There is, equally, little doubt that the EU and Australia have much to offer each other in dialogue. The agendas of meetings of Australian and EU officials and ministers increasingly include wide-ranging issues, where, for example, Australian and European police forces engage in dialogue and there is considerable dialogue on border control and policy options. This is far from the fights on the farm and sparring matches that so characterised Australia–EU relations and dialogues of the 1970s and 80s and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and WTO conflicts of the 1990s. Superpower Europe The EU exerts influence differently from the nation state and international organisations, as we saw in Chapter 2. It is increasingly portrayed as a global player, a civilian power, a soft power and a metrosexual power (Khanna, 2003; Rifkin, 2004; Padoa-Schioppa, 2003; Moravscik and Nicolaides, 2005; Manners, 2002; Murray, 2005), with considerable clout in international diplomacy and a new global leadership role. The ‘metrosexual’ imagery has considerable resonance for
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those who regard the EU as wielding power differently and as being a softer international power. It resonates with those who admire American international relations specialist Joseph Nye’s idea of the use of soft power by persuasion and influence rather than coercion (Nye, 2004). The idea of a metrosexual superpower is attractive due to its appeal of deploying power differently, or developing new types of regional integration. This soft power has cultural elements, persuasion, conditionality and promotion of human rights, protection of human rights, and civilian peace-keeping missions. Nye suggests that hard power is the ability to coerce, which grows out of a country’s military or economic might, while soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Nye (2004, 3) points out that a traditional test for Great Powers in international politics used to be ‘strength for war’. Now the EU is presenting a persona based on a strength for peace. The EU ‘superpower’ attempts to express its goals as universalistic or globally relevant. In Nye’s terms, countries can enjoy political clout, more than military or economic clout, because they define national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking. The case of the EU comes to mind here in peacemaking or environment leadership, for example. The European interest is presented by the EU in a global context, domesticating Europeanisation and also globalising it as a type of regional integration writ large. Nye comments that: ‘If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its sanctions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others’. That approach appears to be at the basis of the Laeken European Council Conclusions made in 2001, when there was a desire to create a moral framework for globalisation, anchored in solidarity and sustainable development.1 For former European Commissioner Pascal Lamy and his adviser Zaki Laidi (2001) ‘Europe’s main collective preference is arguably the pursuit of global governance’ in order to defend non-market social policies and social solidarity. However, developing an accurate interpretation of the EU’s actions is not straightforward. The EU is attempting to project a view of itself as the guardian of trade norms and global governance, and also as a model actor with respect to human rights, development aid and international peacekeeping. It is attempting to extend its global influence
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while maintaining the market logic that has driven economic and political integration to date. The EU’s ten commandments A former EU senior official, Michael Emerson (2005), has put together what he calls the ‘ten commandments of the European Union’, based on the values set out in the EU Constitutional Treaty. Regardless of the fate of the Treaty in the wake of defeats in referenda in France and in the Netherlands, these ‘ten commandments’ represent the most important values that relate to the EU’s objectives as a civilian power, both internally and externally. (See Table 1.) Table 1.â•… Michael Emerson’s Ten Commandments of Europe 1.
Thou shalt be truly democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law
2.
Thou shalt guarantee the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, labour)
3.
Thou shalt provide for social cohesion between peoples, regions and states
4.
Thou shalt ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of future generations
5.
Thou shalt reject nationalism and favour the multiple identity of citizens
6.
Thou shalt assure federative multi-tier governance
7.
Thou shalt assure secular governance and favour multi-cultural pluralism in society
8.
Thou shalt promote multilateral order in international affairs
9.
Thou shalt abstain from threatening or using force against others without just cause
10.
Thou shalt be open, inclusive and integrative towards neighbours that adhere to the above
The EU is setting agendas in a number of innovative policy areas, such as counter-terrorism, in consultation with the member states. Many are areas where there had previously been little EU-level policy co-ordination. Not only was there no single currency a decade ago, there was very little EU co-operation in police matters, justice and
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home affairs and internal security, which are now the subject of a specific Commissioner portfolio, as a policy area known as the area of freedom, security and justice. Commissioner Franco Frattini, Commission Vice-President, currently holds this portfolio, with a Directorate General in the European Commission responsible for these areas. The societal and global aspects of these issues are evident in the EU’s role in co-ordinating the EU agenda with the participation of the member states. Counter-terrorism is increasingly a key element in dialogue between Australia and the EU. It is also global, where a key role is played by the US. There is a clear EU perspective in all of these portfolios and the EU and Australia are actively pursuing dialogue in these matters. Certain global challenges have led to a perception within the EU that it is obliged to take a position in the absence of others embracing this responsibility, as in the case of the environment. Even if the EU Constitution is not ratified (and ratification is looking impossible in the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda) an assumption can reasonably be made that many of the member states will forge ahead and develop a type of de facto two-tier or two-speed Europe with elements of the Constitution. The EU will remain a type of superpower regardless, due to the international impact of its economic strength, and it will continue to exert influence as a type of civilian power. Its actions and agendas will continue to have consequences in the global area. The EU is also expanding its integration visions (Rifkin, 2004; Murray, 2005; Leonard, 2004, 2005). Rifkin regards the EU as emerging as a new kind of superpower, rivalling the US in raw economic power. The American Dream, so potent for two centuries, is no longer looked to for inspiration and guidance but is being replaced by a European Dream, ‘a new beacon of light in a troubled world’ (Rifkin, 2004). Rifkin considers this European Dream to be the first truly global vision befitting a globalising economy. In contradistinction to what he calls the American Dream of economic growth, personal wealth and the pursuit of individual self-interest, the European Dream, he alleges, is motivated by sustainable development, by quality of life and by the nurturing of a sense of community while in foreign policy Europeans place emphasis on co-operation and consensus rather than go-italone approaches.
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Implications for Australia What does this mean for Australia? The EU’s rapid expansion of policy scope and membership requires adaptation and response from the Australian Government and especially the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It would require additional resources allocated to the Australian mission in Brussels, so as to further approach the Commission and the European Parliament directly, taking advantage of the fact that both are open and approachable institutions. There is increasing recognition in Europe and beyond, of the change in the EU’s power, which has been rapid. There is considerable resistance to the idea of EU power in many parts of the world, including Australia. Australia’s adaptation to change in EU power and influence (and understanding of that change) has not been very positive. The deep-rooted, long-standing emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the United Kingdom is testament to this fact. The fact is that the member states have less influence individually than they have as part of the EU. They are unable to influence global debates and international agendas in the same way. The EU is a global governance actor, not a government. It may not really matter what it is called, although there is considerable academic debate on this issue. What does matter, for the purposes of this study, is that the EU constitutes a regional, integrated governance structure and governments actively participate in this regionally integrated structure, a situation that is unlikely to change. Whether the EU is a new type of international organisation or is carrying out de facto government roles is perhaps not pertinent. There is little understanding about how EU decisions are made, in any case—in the EU or elsewhere. At the elite, decision-making level, however, there is considerable understanding of the EU’s decision-making structure within the EU member states. At the elite level in Australia, this is rather a curate’s egg—there is understanding in parts. The increasing new EU–Australia dialogue on a wide range of areas is profitable and engenders mutual trust among officials. In a number of important studies in the early decades of the EU, it was estimated that the more there was trust among officials of the member states of the EU, the more this would lead to co-operation in other policies and areas (Haas, 1964). This is regarded as a spill-over or transfer of allegiance. It was anticipated that political spill-over would
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lead to a convergence of interests and expectations of national responses to the activities of the EU, even transforming the political activities of the national elites in their support of new EU policies. In the same manner, it is not unreasonable to expect that increased dialogue might lead to increased mutual understanding and, on occasion, the adoption of common positions between Australia and the EU. It is also not unreasonable to surmise that the conflictual issue of the CAP may drop somewhat down the priority list at meetings. The EU and Australia have much to offer each other, then, and not just in trade and investment, but also in development aid in the Pacific and in defence co-operation regarding East Timor. Further, Australia can provide the EU with a unique analysis of developments in Asia and the South Pacific, such as Fiji and the Solomon Islands (Patten, 2001). Alexander Downer and Chris Patten have shared a ‘comity of views’ on the need for the EU raise its profile in Asia, and specifically in the Pacific region (Hughes, 2001). The EU is increasing its regional influence in civilian power tasks. This is important for Australia, which already has a foreign policy dialogue with the EU that dates back to 1990, including meetings with the EU Presidency,2 where Australia forged bilateral contacts with the EU as a foreign policy actor. Increasingly, then, newer types of engagement are more multifaceted, regionalised and global in concerns than before. Engagement now encompasses development aid, terrorism, relationships with Japan and Korea, and China’s economy, subjects on which many Australian scholars and officials are experts. Despite close historical and cultural relationships, there are differences of opinion. While, within the Asia–Pacific, many technical issues can be resolved and there is a considerable convergence of views, divergence, however, was the theme of this media report from 2004: Australia’s relations with the European Union have slumped to their worst in a decade, with antagonism feeding hostility over the war in Iraq, counter-terrorism and aid efforts in the South Pacific. Against this background, the EU has also expressed concern over Australia’s long-term commitment in the Pacific, questioning whether its newfound postSeptember 11 zeal for propping up failed states will falter.
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The cooling in relations between the EU and Australia follows decisions by France and Germany not to support the Iraq war, John Howard’s refusal of French military help in the Solomon Islands, the EU’s opposition to the appointment of Australian Greg Urwin as secretary-general of the Pacific Islands Forum and concerns by European defence contractors over a pro-US bias in Australia. (Shanahan and Kerin, 2004, 2) This article elicited the following response from the European Commission Ambassador to Australia: ‘Voicing differences over technical trade matters does not constitute personal criticism of anyone, but reflects normal practice.’ As Table 2 illustrates, the relationship encompasses traditional bilateral state-to-state relations, a new regional bilateral Australia–EU relationship, negotiations within a multilateral context and, finally, a new security bilateralism between Australia and the EU which is characterised by ministerial consultation on the one hand and meetings in other forums on the other. Table 2.â•… Multidimensional Aspects of the EU-Australian relationship in the 21st Century
Framework
200
Traditional Bilateralism (since 1780s and continuing) Close Encounter 1
New Regional Bilateralism (since late 1970s and continuing) Close Encounter 2
Multilateral Relations (since 1970s and continuing)
New Security Bilateralism and Multilateralism (mostly 21st century) Close Encounter 3
Australia-UK relations Australiamember state relations
Australia-EU Ministerial consultations
WTO, OECD, UN
Australia-EU Ministerial consultations Troika dialogue on Asia Pacific security, immigration, strategic geopolitics
Australia and the European Superpower
There are indicators of an improvement in Australia–EU dialogue and engagement. Firstly, the language of the joint communiqués after ministerial consultations and other high-level meetings has become more nuanced and co-operative than in the past, due to CAP reform and the settlement of some aspects of agriculture at WTO forums and the broadening of the dialogue beyond trade and agriculture, in new societal and security agendas in the twenty-first century. There is an improvement in the dialogue among officials, in terms of scope and mutual understanding, although significant problems remain. A second indicator is the number of visits to each interlocutor and these have increased incrementally over the last five years (see Figure 1). The number of times the EU features in Australian publications and press releases—an indicator of intensified rapport— is increasing, although it is far from significant. Similarly, an examination of the database of EU press releases and other documents reveals that Australia does not figure prominently. This may be because the relationship is moving along nicely, behind the scenes. It may be because these nations are not at ‘war’ with each other and do not present a real threat to each other. It may be because the EU regards Australia as relatively non-problematic—it is not a developing country, not in a regional bloc and not a recipient of any aid or humanitarian or civilian management attention or funds. Europe certainly places Australia into the ‘industrialised nations’ box.3 The Australians have other priorities and the US, Asia and Iraq demand more attention most of the time. Nevertheless, dialogue as partners— albeit not equal partners—is progressing on societal, regional bilateral and global bilateral issues.
The new dialogue, the 2003 agreement and the 2004 stocktake: Taking stock and moving on Just as Europe’s integration cannot be analysed irrespective of what is happening elsewhere in the world (Rumford and Murray, 2003a) neither can the EU–Australia relationship be analysed without reference to issues of globalisation, the WTO, international governance and the changing geopolitical context of terrorism, immigration and security after 11 September 2001 and the attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002, in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005. Many of these have featured in visits and officials talks over the last five years
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in particular, as seen in the tables below regarding flow of visits and meetings and their contents. The April 2004 Consultations at Ministerial and Commissioner level identified the following priorities for the future: •
increased exchanges on security and strategic issues including counter-terrorism deeper dialogue on development co-operation, especially in the Pacific strengthening links on education and science and technology closer co-operation on environmental issues, including bilateral climate change projects pursuing common interests in civil aviation and continued cooperation on the Galileo Satellite System continued co-operation to improve the international trade environment, especially with regard to developing countries continued dialogue on migration and asylum issues.
• • • • • •
Figure 1: Ministerial/Commissioner visits June 1997–May 2004 by Policy Area Justice and Customers 5% Science and Technology, Education 5% Development Cooperation 14% Trade and Economic Cooperation 49% Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 14%
Environment 13% Source: DFAT And European Commission, Stocktake of Australia–EU Cooperation and Dialogue under the 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations Between Australia and the European Union signed on 26 June 1997, updated to 18 May 2004.
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Table 3 illustrates the breadth and depth of the new agenda for co-operation, setting out the areas to be accorded priority, and these are reflective of a new energy in the engagement. It is also reflective of the extension of the EU’s policy scope and reach in recent years. Table 3.â•… The Agenda for Cooperation, April 20031 Policy area Security & strategic issues
Counter-terrorism, infrastructure protection especially in Asia-Pacific. Enhanced dialogue on non-proliferation & export control. Develop police cooperation & cooperation of law enforcement authorities.
Trade
Supporting LDCs through: policies to grant duty & quotafree market access, medicines, technical assistance & capacity building. Resolving differences on bilateral agricultural and trade issues (Wine Agreement, Sanitary and Phytosanitary). Working on internal and international (‘global’) regulatory frameworks.
Education, Science and Technology
Pilot projects on higher educational cooperation. Exploring Australia participation in Erasmus World. Stimulate Science and Technology (S&T) collaboration within 6th Framework Program for Research. Strengthen Forum on Europe Australia Science and Technology cooperation.
Transport
Cooperation with Galileo Joint Undertaking. Cooperation on Intelligent Transport System and sustainable transport strategies. Aviation liberalisation.
Environment
Collaboration on climate change: technology development. Climate science & adaptation, harmonisation of emissions monitoring, reporting. Setting up international standards.
Development cooperation
Assisting recovery and nation-building process in EastTimor and Solomon Islands. Supporting good governance and economic growth. Funding for Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS and Development in the Pacific, especially Papua New Guinea.
Migration and Asylum
Manage global people flows, asylum seeker and refugee readmission; improving capacity-building. Nexus between development and migration. Fight people-smuggling, human trafficking, transnational crime. Use new technologies to combat irregular migration.
Link Declaration between Australia and the EU in 1997 and 19th Ministerial Consultations in April 2003
1
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Figure 2: Flows of Visits: Proportional Representation of Direction of Total Visits 100% 80%
Aust
60%
EU
40% 20% 0% Parliamentary Delegations
Senior Officials
Commissioner/ Ministers
Type of Visit Source: DFAT And European Commission, Stocktake of Australia–EU Cooperation and Dialogue under the 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations Between Australia and the European Union signed on 26 June 1997, updated to 18 May 2004.
Figure 3: Direction of Visits, June 1997–May 2004
60
50 Parliamentary Delegations
40
Senior Officials Commissioner/ Ministers
30
20
10
0
EU
Aust
Source: DFAT And European Commission, Stocktake of Australia–EU Cooperation and Dialogue under the 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations Between Australia and the European Union signed on 26 June 1997, updated to 18 May 2004.
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An indication of the flow of officials and politicians is given in Figures 2 and 3. It can be surmised that Australians are beating a path to the EU more than the opposite. This is not entirely surprising, given the Australian desire to feature on the EU radar screen and the fact that trips to Brussels can often also encompass visits to other partners in Europe, including the UK. Nevertheless the chart for 1997– 2004 speaks of a renewed dialogue. The total number of Australian Ministerial visits to Brussels was twenty-three and the total number of EU Commissioner visits to Canberra was ten. Figure 2 shows the type of visits involved.
Foreign policy interaction and dialogue There has not been universal recognition of the EU as a foreign policy actor or international actor in Australia, particularly as there is a view among some that only states may be such actors. Should the EU Constitution ever be ratified, there will be an EU Foreign Minister and a formalised EU Foreign Service. Bátora (2005) argues that diplomacy, which he defines as a framework of principles, rules and organised patterns of behaviour regulating interstate relations in the Westphalian system of states, has been challenged by the process of European integration. One way in which he sees this change is the emerging capacity of the EU to conduct external diplomatic relations with third countries. A senior EU official has suggested that, in the future ‘it will be much more important to be the EU ambassador than a national ambassador’ (Mahony, 2005). The EU and Australia have had constructive dialogue regarding the ‘arcs of instability’ which are in the Asia–Pacific region (Patten, 2001). These include East Timor, Fiji, Indonesia, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (European Parliament Delegation, April 2001). Discussion has focussed on EU financial support for reconstruction in East Timor; the use of sanctions by the EU in Fiji and problems in Indonesia and the Solomon Islands. Taiwan and North Korea have also been discussed in this parliamentary framework. In addition, dialogue on missile defence and the Echelon intelligence-gathering system took place in 2001. Further, there is increased common concern regarding stability, as noted in a report of a European Parliament delegation: ‘At the dawn of the 21st century, Australia is emerging as an important factor of
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geopolitical stability in the Pacific region and a strategic partner for the EU. Its importance is compounded by the development of an arc of instability that spans from Indonesia in the west to the Solomon Islands in the east.’ (European Parliament Delegation, 2001) The 2004 interparliamentary meeting also had an agenda that included the Kyoto Protocol, other environmental issues, CAP reform, the Doha Round, energy policy, human rights and the rights of Aboriginal people, as well as security issues and the fight against terrorism (European Parliament Delegation, 2004). The parliamentary contacts continue to be positive and informative on both sides, characterised by considerable frankness and openness. There is a reinforcing of the New Regional Bilateralism effectively in these meetings, such as the twenty-fifth meeting, when there was a commonality of views that these interparliamentary meetings and other contacts ‘highlighted the importance attached by the Australian political world to formal links with the European Union’. As in the stocktake and other discussions since the early 2000s, there was a sense of ‘the new spirit of bilateral co-operation’ (European Parliament Delegation, 2001) The Development of New Dialogue Year
Event
1990
17 May: European Community and Australia agreed to enhance both the level and the quality of their dialogue on foreign policy questions through contact at ministerial level on the system of European Political Cooperation. The new terms of the dialogue were covered in a letter to Senator Evans from the Irish Foreign Minister as President of the Council of Ministers. It proposed that a meeting take place at ministerial level whenever deemed necessary and with the presidency political director every six months.
1995
5 October: Biannual ministerial consultations with the EU presidency held in Madrid between Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana.
1998
May: First round of Australia–EU Troika senior officials’ talks on Asia, held in Brussels.
1998
24 June: Australian Minister John Moore, Commission Vice-President Leon Brittan and British High Commissioner Alex Allan (note British presidency of Commission) signed Agreement of Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment, Certification and Markings between the European Community and Australia.
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Australia and the European Superpower
Year
Event
1999
2 February: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Germany) held in Bonn between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Joscka Fischer, German Foreign Minister.
1999
28 July: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Finland) held in Singapore between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Ms Tarja Halonen, Finnish Foreign Minister.
2000
2 February: Ministerial consultations with EU Presidency (Portugal) held in Lisbon between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Jaime Gama, Portuguese Foreign Minister.
2000
28 July: Ministerial consultations with EU Presidency (France) held in Bangkok between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Charles Josselin, French Secretary for State Development.
2000
Australian Parliamentary Delegation’s visit to Brussels, led by the Hon. Bruce Baird.
2001
2 February: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Sweden) held in Stockholm between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Ms Anna Lindh, Swedish Foreign Minister.
2001
25 April: Bilateral consultations on development assistance.
2001
May: European Parliamentary Delegation’s visit to Australia.
2001
15 June: Fourth Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia held in Brussels.
2001
26 July: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Belgium) held in Hanoi between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Louis Michel, Belgian Foreign Minister, and Mr Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations.
2001
11 September: Attack on Twin Towers in New York.
2001
14–15 December: Laeken European Council.
2002
31 January: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Spain) held in Madrid between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Josep Pique, Spanish Foreign Minister, and Mr Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations.
2002
1 February: Alexander Downer’s meeting on bilateral and international issues with the Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr Josep Piqué, and the European Commissioner for External Relations, Mr Chris Patten. The meeting was part of an ongoing political dialogue with the presidency of the EU. Australia and the EU presidency agreed to hold a new strategic dialogue in March.
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Year
Event
2002
25–26 March: A new strategic dialogue meeting was held with the EU and with NATO in Brussels at senior officials level. The objective was to expand the already extensive strategic dialogues to include these key players in the global security environment.
2002
25 March: First security dialogue between Australia and EU senior officials was held in Brussels.
2002
18 April: Eighteenth ministerial consultations held in Brussels. Australia was represented by a team of three senior ministers comprising the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr John Anderson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Mr Philip Ruddock. Commissioner Patten and Commissioners Fischler, Lamy and Vitorino represented the European side. A senior officials’ meeting was held.
2002
31 July: Ministerial consultations with EU presidency (Denmark) held in Brunei between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and SecretaryGeneral of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2002
July: The first Australia–EU senior officials’ dialogue on migration and asylum issues.
2002
September: Australian parliamentary delegation’s visit to Brussels, led by The Speaker, House of Representatives, Neil Andrew.
2002
8 October: European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson visited Australia.
2002
12 October: Bomb attacks in Bali.
2003
January: Mr Downer held talks in Berlin with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2003
26–27 January: Mr Downer visited Brussels for talks with European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana, and Mr John Kerr, Secretary-General to the Convention on the Future of Europe.
2003
9 April: Sixth Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia were held in Brussels.
2003
April: Australia and the European Commission adopted the strategy ‘Australia and the EU an agenda for cooperation’. This initiative identified practical measures to advance high priorities in the partnership over the next five years.
2003
30 June: Second senior officials’ dialogue on migration and asylum was held in Brussels.
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Year
Event
2003
12–13 December: The European Security Strategy was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of EU High Representative Javier Solana.
2004
January: Mr Downer held talks in Davos with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2004
21 January: Ministerial consultations with EU Irish presidency held in Dublin.
2004
28 January: European Commissioner Poul Nielson visited Sydney.
2004
February: Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism held in Bali, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia.
2004
11 March: Bomb attack in Madrid.
2004
15 March: Second security dialogue held in Brussels.
2004
25 March: The European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism announced. The document set out objectives for the EU’s Action Plan against terrorism.
2004
31 March: Mr Downer held talks in Berlin with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2004
19 April: Inaugural development dialogue was held in Brussels.
2004
20–22 April: Interparliamentary meeting held between the European Parliament and Commonwealth Parliament. The agenda included security issues and the fight against terrorism.
2004
19–28 April: Australian Parliamentary Delegation visited Strasbourg and Brussels, led by Senate President Paul Calvert.
2004
18 May: Twentieth ministerial consultations held in Brussels. Australia was represented by Mr Downer. Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten represented the European Commission, together with Commissioner for Development Cooperation Poul Nielson and Commissioner Danuta Hubner. Mr Downer also met with Commission President Romano Prodi, Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Antonio Vitorino and Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen.
2004
4–5 August: The first meeting of the Legal Issues Working Group, which was established at the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia in February in Bali, took place in Canberra and a Commission representative attended.
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Year
Event
2004
13 September: EU trade representative’s, Martin Dihm, visited Canberra to brief Australian officials on the Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement.
2004
21 December: The third EU–Australia education co-operation was held between Australian and European universities.
2005
31 January –4 February: Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer visited Brussels to meet with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. Counterterrorism co-operation was discussed in talks with Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner, Franco Frattini. Minister Downer attended annual Troika Talks with the Commission and the EU Luxembourg presidency. Talks focussed on the future of the EU–Australia relationship and on issues specifically related to the Asia–Pacific as well as bilateral co-operation.
2005
7 July London bombings
Security issues in the new dialogue Writing in 1995, political scientists John Peterson and Hugh Ward argued that there was a multidimensional international politics of security, due to changing definitions of security and a shift to multipolarity. Although the context is very different a decade later, the fact remains that the international politics of security has a global reach. Their argument that three factors have altered the context for the calculations of international actors still pertain. These are that: firstly, there has been a redefinition of the essential meanings of national and international security; secondly, foreign policy agendas have expanded to the point where issues such as trade, environmental protection, nuclear proliferation and immigration have become ‘core’ security issues; and, thirdly, the salience of international organisations (including the EU) in international politics has increased (Peterson and Ward, 1995, 131–2). With regard to EU–Australia engagement, there is a multidimensional relationship evident, which includes these dimensions and is not solely a security concern. The European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003, put forward by the European Union High Representative Javier Solana, set out EU objectives in international affairs regarding peace and stability in the world, with emphasis on enhancing the EU’s military
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resources. The Headline Goals of 1999 and 2004 focus on the rapid reaction force and its capabilities and the establishment of the European Defence Agency. The correct mix of responses and instruments is regarded by the EU as a key policy, in ‘a world where power no longer means security’ (European Union: A World Player, the European Union’s external relations, 2004, 10). The EU’s current brief includes training of civilian experts for crisis management and international peace missions, building on what Chris Patten called ‘bitter experience in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere’ (EU, 2003, 3). One crisis management mission recently begun is Operation Althea in Bosnia, where the emphasis is on reconstruction. Kagan (2004) argues that Europe’s power is unique—a power of attraction rather than coercive military power. This idea of attraction, drawing other countries into its fold as members, is seen most clearly in the case of the 2004 Enlargement. Kagan goes so far as to regard Europe’s foreign policy as enlargement. Cooper’s conceptualisation of this is: ‘The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages’ (Cooper, 2002). In the areas of security and police co-operation, the Australian Government is keen to have a voice and to feature on the EU radar screen. It wishes to exert a degree of influence and it has experts on a number of issues such as the Asia–Pacific and the South Pacific. The Australian government White Paper Advancing the National Interest states: We have important security relationships with many European countries. The United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Portugal all provided significant personnel, military hardware and financial contributions to the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are important sources of defence technology, such as the Hawk Trainer Aircraft and the Franco–German Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter. Together with New Zealand, Australia also has a trilateral agreement with
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France to cooperate on disaster relief operations in the South Pacific. We have worked productively with European countries in multilateral forums to achieve positive outcomes on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and related disarmament and non-proliferation issues to help improve global security. (http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/chapter_8. html, accessed 7/4/05)
Australia has annual talks on Asia with the EU Troika (representatives from EU institutions chaired by the EU presidency) at senior officials level.4 The first round of Australia–EU Troika senior officials’ talks on Asia took place in Brussels in May 1998 and the seventh round in June 2004. It is clear that Australia and the EU have increasing dialogue on security co-operation at the level of senior officials and at the ministerial Commissioner level. This consists of exchange of information and networking of officials and police contacts. There are considerable extensive contacts at the official level. Australian police representatives at the Hague regularly travel to Brussels to cooperate with the EU, police bodies and Europol.5 DFAT describes ‘intensifying dialogue’ on security issues between Australia and the EU presidency, and this was evident in the decision in 2002 to hold a new strategic dialogue meeting with the EU and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the first of which took place in Brussels on 25 and 26 March 2002, at senior officials level.6 This is a form of global engagement between the EU and Australia. The Australia Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, regards this as expanding ‘our already extensive web of bilateral and multilateral strategic dialogues to include these key players in the global security environment’ and has commented that the EU, like Australia, has taken a ‘decisive stance on combating terrorism’. This new security dialogue focuses on strategies to counter international terrorism and on management of international security issues in general. Their common commitment to combating terrorism and to helping reconstruct Afghanistan was emphasised. Security, in addition to development aid co-operation, also features in dialogue on East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.
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The Common Foreign and Security Policy dialogue between Australia and the EU since 1990 has thus been complemented by security dialogues with NATO and the EU on strategic issues. Many in Australia would be unaware of this and assume that, as the EU is not a cohesive foreign policy actor in many ways, there is no foreign policy aspect to the EU–Australia bilateral relationship. There remain problems of interstate co-operation among the EU member states regarding traditional foreign policy spheres. However, the EU is increasingly a more effective collective actor in new security agendas (Peterson and Ward, 1995, 132), and this has become more clear as the EU exerts its role of civilian power and soft power, rather than conforming with traditional understandings of national foreign policy and security issues. In discussions with the EU on counter-terrorism, Australia can provide information on South-East Asia and other global terrorist links as well as the Solomon Islands and failed states in the region. It is clear that the EU listens to Australia on these issues. The Solana document on the ESS is not problematic for Australia, although Europe’s list of concerns is not the same as Australia’s. For example, Australia places Asia nearer the top than does the ESS. The different priorities reflect different geopolitical realities. There is enough on the Solana list for the two interlocutors to be able to work together, such as counter-terrorism and relations with China and the US. In addition, there is Australia and EU involvement in the security discussion within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF consists of the Association of South-East Asian Nations member states,7 the twelve ASEAN dialogue partners, including Australia and the EU,8 and one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea). The fact that Australia presents itself as a key player in—and has considerable knowledge of—the Asia–Pacific and is a major interlocutor in Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are factors that the EU does not ignore. As early as 1990, the European Commission stated that ‘it is also Australia’s standing in international forums and particularly its influence in the Asia Pacific region which makes Australia an important partner for the Community’ (Delegation of the European Commission, 1990).9 Australia’s security strategy involves sharing of views on global and regional security issues and a commitment to working co-operatively on security issues. In 2001–02,
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Australia held talks with three new security dialogues partners—India, the EU and NATO.10 Security dialogue and co-operation continue apace, with bilateral security dialogues with Asia–Pacific countries and with the European Union (EU) and NATO (DFAT, 2003–04). A further example of EU–Australia global co-operation and dialogue beyond the new regional bilateral engagement is the exchange of views within the Australia Group context regarding export control regimes, particularly widespread adherence to the regimes and reinforcing agreed standards for trade in sensitive items. This is chaired by Australia, and thirty-eight countries participate, along with the European Commission, in international attempts ‘to combat the proliferation of chemical and biological dual-use goods which could be used in weapons of mass destruction programs’.11 In 2004, Australia held strategic talks with Indonesia, the United States, Japan, India, Germany, NATO, the European Union, the United Kingdom, China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). On the issue of security and development assistance, the Australian Government reported that it had ‘shouldered the initial burden of assistance, re-engagement by international donors, including Japan, the EU, the World Bank and the ADB [Asian Development Bank]’.12
The impact of terrorism on the Australia–EU agenda Terrorism has recently effected considerable change in the international political landscape. Both Australia and the EU have been hit by terrorism, with the attacks on the Australian embassy in Jakarta and the bombings in Bali, Madrid and London all resulting in Australian deaths or severe injuries. Like Australia, the EU is also attempting to deal with a relatively new type of war and distinctive historic circumstances, of a post-Cold War period, of a period of adjustment postterrorist attacks and devastation. There is a strengthening engagement between the EU and Australia in counter-terrorism. Foreign Minister Downer stated in 2003 that ‘The EU is also playing an important role in generating a pan-European response to counter-terrorism and trans-national crime. Australia’s cooperative counter-terrorism endeavours in Asia have been a focus in our bilateral dialogue with the EU’ (Downer, 2003).
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The EU Foreign Ministers have also acknowledged this co-operation as an important part of the relationship: ‘The Council furthermore agreed that the High-Level Troika delegation should also visit Australia to discuss with the Australian authorities ways to reinforce cooperation in the fight against terrorism, both bilaterally and with Indonesia’.13 In 2001, Alexander Downer remarked that Australia was ‘keen to explore deepening our strategic cooperation in a number of key areas, both at the bilateral levels in the European capitals and in Brussels’. He saw the following as fruitful joint action: •
• •
• •
deepening strategic dialogue and cooperation in efforts to strengthen democratic systems in the region, including through aid and development programs focusing on institution building and good governance; working together to address humanitarian concerns, particularly through strengthening the United Nations through reform; deepening our dialogue and cooperation in combating illegal immigration and people trafficking—a scourge which knows no borders—as well as the further development of strategies to counter money laundering and drug smuggling in the region; joint action to ensure the launch of a new WTO round; strengthening dialogue on ways to ensure that the new economy benefits all. (Downer, 2001)
Mr Downer further pointed to Australia’s commitment to bilateral engagement with the EU in deepening the dialogue on Asia–Pacific issues more generally and in annual senior officials talks on Asia, which ‘consolidated Australia’s reputation as a knowledgeable interlocutor for the EU in the Asia–Pacific, and contributed towards building a more substantial political relationship between us’. This substantial political relationship was consolidated further at the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia in February 2004, in Bali, when the Legal Issues Working Group was established.14 The European Commission was invited to participate. The first meeting of the Legal Issues Working Group took place in Canberra in August 2004 and a Commission representative attended. The objective is to work ‘with
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regional countries to build legal regimes that make it harder for terrorists’. Further, this regional ministerial meeting agreed on the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, a joint Australian–Indonesian initiative to enhance knowledge of counter-terrorism. The Delegation of the European Commission in Jakarta is involved in this. It is understood that the Commission is in the final stages of negotiating a contract with Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation within the framework of institutionbuilding to provide support and funding towards its establishment. Some EU funding for this initiative is provided within the framework of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism which forms part of the National Indicative Program for Indonesia (http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/indonesia/csp/nip_05-06.pdf ). In addition, some member states—namely, Denmark and the Netherlands— also made individual contributions. In March 2004, the second security dialogue between Australia and the EU was held in Brussels, involving officials from both the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. This followed the inaugural security dialogue held in Brussels in March 2002. Finally, European Commissioner Chris Patten, in a speech in Canberra in April 2001, stated: Europe’s principal, but not only, preoccupation is, of course, with the arc of instability around our own borders … There is equally an arc of potential instability around Australia from Indonesia through the Pacific Islands. And we will want to both share with the Australian Government our views on what is happening in that arc of instability or potential instability around our own borders and to discuss with Australia your views on how we can do more to help, how we can do more to work with you in the potentially unstable areas around your own national borders. We’ve already seen in East Timor our ability to work extremely successfully together in dealing with a serious international problem. I hope that we’ll also be able to work with you in Fiji, in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere to provide assistance. (Patten, 2001)
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Table 4.â•… Australian Agency Engagement with the EU in the New 21st Century Agendas Australian agency
EU agency
Topics
Regularity of meetings
Type of meeting
Prime Minister
President of European Commission
EU-Australian relations
Irregular
Prime Minister– President of European Commission Summit
Foreign Minister
European Commissioner for External Relations
EU–Australian relations. Security
Annual
Ministerial Consultations
Foreign Minister
Presidency of the Council
Foreign policy, security, including security in Asia
Biannual (during each EU Presidency)
Troika, since May 1998
Minister for Immigration/ Justice
European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs
Immigration, Security
Commonwealth Parliament
European Parliament
Parliamentary Dialogue
Australian Senior Officials
EU Senior Officials
Ministerial Consultations & visits to Brussels & Canberra Annual
Formal Parliamentary Delegations
Annual
Annual Australia–EU Senior Officials’ Meetings
Like Australia, the EU response to September 11 2001 was to introduce legislation and other measures. In the case of the EU, measures included intensification of police and judicial co-operation and collaboration on air transport; humanitarian aid; and economic and financial policy. It pledged itself to the ‘values of solidarity, security and steadfast determination in the fight against terrorism’. The coordinated EU response to the threat of international terrorism was
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regarded by the European Commission as opening a new chapter in EU policy making in justice and home affairs.15 A first significant measure was the controversial introduction of the European arrest warrant. The EU and its member states seek co-operation in counterterrorist measures with its dialogue partners, including Australia.
The EU’s action plan against terrorism The European Council Declaration of 25 March 2004 set out the following seven strategic objectives for the EU’s action plan against terrorism: 1 To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism. 2 To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources. 3 To maximise the capacity within EU bodies and member states to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks. 4 To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control. 5 To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack. 6 To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism. 7 To target actions under EU external relations towards priority third countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced. (Council of the European Union, 14 December 2004) Some 150 actions were linked to these strategic objectives and many had specified deadlines.
Australia’s new engagement with the EU in this area, then, is based on new geopolitical realities (the most important of which is terrorism) from an Australian perspective. Almost one hundred Australians died in a terrorist attack on a nightclub in Bali on 12 October 2002. The EU reaction, in sending a message of sympathy to Australia, was swift. In addition the Commissioner responsible for
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external relations with Australia, Chris Patten, undertook to explore ways to work closely with Australia ‘to confront terrorism in all its manifestations’, starting with a Troika mission to Indonesia and Australia (Patten, 2002). Among the key priorities in the Australia–EU Agenda for Cooperation of April 2003 are security and strategic issues. These encompass counter-terrorism; infrastructure protection, especially in the Asia-Pacific; enhanced dialogue on non-proliferation and export control and the development of police co-operation and cooperation among law enforcement authorities (DFAT/EU Commission, 2003). That same month, in a speech that illustrated that the Government recognised the EU’s role in global efforts to counter terrorism, Alexander Downer addressed security issues as follows: The asymmetric threats which have struck at many of us— the threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism—will remain. World security needs Europe to find a level of cohesion among its 25 members which will enable it to act as a powerful force against these threats. That will require a continuation of the good work being done within the EU and the EU’s participation in international efforts to counter terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Without a strong Europe united in common purpose, the vulnerability of all of us increases … The EU has proved its capacity as a force creating regional peace and prosperity. The more cohesive the new EU is internally and the more coherent the efforts of the new EU in response to major international challenges, the more credibility it will win as an architect of global stability. Australia has every interest in seeing the EU achieve its historic enterprise on consolidating peace in Europe, and in seeing the EU as a strong contributor to reinforcing liberal democracy and security against the danger which threatens us all in the global community. (Downer, 2003) Downer’s perspective on the European integration process is that it is positive and he clearly placed the EU in an international actor context and with some civilian power aspects, including as ‘an architect
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of global stability’. He regards the EU as a partner in a number of global enterprises. The counter-terrorism talks have been regular and beneficial, at the level of top negotiators. For example, the fifth Australia–European Union Troika talks on Asia, which took place in Brussels on 9 April 2003, had top Australian officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).16 This meeting was with the Greek and Italian officials, in their presidency roles, as well as officials of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat—involving two institutions and two countries of the EU, in their role of Council presidency. The focus of the discussions was twofold: counter-terrorism and developments in key Asian countries. These talks were regarded by DFAT as ‘an invaluable opportunity to nurture EU interest and involvement in the region’ (Lee, 2003). This desire to involve the EU in the Asia–Pacific region is a key platform of many speeches by Alexander Downer in recent years. It is worthwhile drawing on the report of this meeting in order to understand the state of intensifying engagement in the area. The interlocutors on both sides were in agreement that terrorism presented a significant threat to global security and there was an exchange of views on regional counter-terrorism strategies. ‘Australian officials emphasised the excellent cooperation with Indonesia on the Bali bombing investigation and noted that Australia had appointed an Ambassador for counter-terrorism to coordinate collaboration with regional partners. Both sides agreed on the need to continue to cooperate and complement each other’s work to enhance regional counter-terrorism capacity’. (Lee, 2003). There is also a shared interest in developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), China and Japan. For example, the officials from each side ‘expressed serious concern at the threat to regional and global security posed by the DPRK’s nuclear program’. Australia explained its diplomatic activity taken in relation to this escalation by the DPRK—including the visit of senior officials to Pyongyang to raise Australian and broad international concerns with the DPRK Foreign Minister and others, and to urge a peaceful resolution of the issue through negotiations. The EU outlined its initiatives to broaden bilateral relations with China and Japan through reinvigorating economic and technical cooperation. On a similar note,
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Australian officials outlined Australia’s extensive and growing economic links with the two countries. Indonesia was the main focus of discussion on South-East Asia and regional issues. Both sides commented on the Indonesian Government’s effective handling of its domestic response to the war in Iraq. President Megawati had called on Indonesians protesting the war to do so peacefully. Together with moderate religious leaders she emphasised that the conflict was not religiously based. The EU considered Indonesia’s rehabilitation as important for the entire region, particularly given its status as the world’s largest Islamic country. The EU and Australia already have a dialogue in the context of the ARF and this was also a focus of discussion at this meeting, regarding ‘possibilities for enhanced regional cooperation on security issues’. Further, the Australia–EU talks confirmed the EU’s interest in better understanding Asia, especially in relation to current security issues and economic and trade prospects with key Asian countries. An immediate priority for the EU is its increased engagement with the region through its counter-terrorism agenda (Lee, 2003). More recently, EU officials were invited to the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, which was co-hosted by Australia and Indonesia in Bali in February 2004.17
Refugees and immigration issues While there has been considerable EU support for dialogue with Australia on counter-terrorism, the Australian Government’s stance on refugees has been the subject of criticism in the European Parliament. For example, regarding the Tampa issue, Sörensen, a member of the Green Group in the European Parliament, said that ‘it must be clearly stated that Australia’s actions in this matter have been far from praiseworthy. Local political interests have taken precedence over the respecting of human rights.’18 A Spanish Member of the European Parliament, González Álvarez, said: ‘We therefore perfectly understand the almost 500 people which tried to flee, at risk of their lives, and came up against a brick wall erected by a country such as Australia, a rich country which could have taken them in’. British Member of the European Parliament, Charles Tannock, said: ‘I salute Prime Minister Howard for Australia’s robust and courageous stance
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over this issue’.19 Australian asylum policy has been both admired and condoned by politicians from across Europe’s political spectrum, as seen in this European Parliament debate on the subject.20 The first Australia–EU senior officials’ dialogue on migration and asylum issues was held in July 2002. These deliberations on immigration and refugees focus to quite a degree on the definition of refugees and technical issues. It can be argued that the EU is becoming more like Australia in its concern about illegal refugees and there have been discussions with the EU regarding the Australian system of offshore processing, for example. In 2002, Alexander Downer noted: ‘During our discussions, we also examined ways to manage irregular people movements and migration. This was a timely exchange as the European Commission is pressing ahead with proposals aimed at establishing common policies on these issues, while Australia is also reviewing practices in light of increased movement of people.’ (Downer, 2002) While Europe, like Australia, is becoming more exclusionist on these issues, the key difference is the number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants that are attempting to enter the two regions. In 2002, some six thousand applications for asylum were made in Australia (0.3 per thousand inhabitants), compared with 387,600 applications received in the EU of fifteen member states (1.02 per thousand inhabitants). (http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/eu_and_australia/KeyFacts_Oct2004.htm) A media report observes that, at the 2004 annual ministerial consultations, Commissioner Chris Patten had to endure according to European sources a quite patronising lecture from then Australian immigration minister Philip Ruddock about how Europe should learn from Australia’s experience about how to deal with its asylumseeker problems. Patten thought this was ‘a bit bloody rich’, given that Australia was dealing with a few thousand uninvited arrivees while Europe was dealing with hundreds of thousands.21 The joint emphasis between the EU and Australia on asylum issues and illegal or irregular immigration has contributed to what
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some analysts term the ‘securitisation of immigration’ (Huysmans, 2000). Refugees in some political discourses are represented as a risk to societal security (Pickering, 2004; Waever and Buzan, 1993; Buzan, 1993; Huysmans, 2000). Moreover, they represent a threat in a ‘nonhard’ security manner—that is, to identity. Australian legal expert Sharon Pickering (2004, 213, 223) observes that immigration and criminal discourses have become enmeshed with terms that are more suitable for describing war, so that a ‘war’ on crime is also intertwined with responses to terrorism. So immigration and refugees are presented in much official discourse as potential threats to the security of the state. Although this is most marked in Australia, the EU is not immune from similar comments and accusations. Pickering (2004, 220) further comments that the securitisation of cross-border movements depends upon collaboration among government, military and law enforcement bodies who engage in agreements on people smuggling. In Europe, for example, co-operation between member states on this issue was initially covered by the Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Convention and the conclusions of the Tampere European Council.22 Pickering draws parallels between measures in the EU, such as the Schengen Information System and the creation of Europol, on the one hand, and the Australian creation of the position of an Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2002 on the other. This Ambassador is responsible for promoting ‘a coherent and effective international approach to combating people smuggling, particularly in the Asia–Pacific region, and to assist as appropriate in the negotiation of high-level return, readmission and resettlement arrangements’.23 In Australia and Europe the protection of state rights and state sovereignty and border protection all feature in official discourse relating to population movement and border control. Sassen points to the European example of state sovereignty and border control being at the heart of regulatory effort (Sassen, 1999). The securitisation of immigration distinguishes between EU citizens (workers who move from one part of the EU to another), namely EU migrant workers, and non-EU immigrants who do not have access to the same rights. It further sees an increase in xenophobia and racism towards non EU-citizens and those not considered to be European— enemy aliens. Within the context of a global war on terror—focussed
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primarily on Islamic fundamentalists—it is not surprising that ethnic relations with Muslim minorities have come under scrutiny. The Report on Racism: The Hidden Cost of September 11, issued by the UK Institute of Race Relations (2002), states: Asylum seekers, foreigners (principally Arabs) and Europe’s Muslim minorities are the biggest losers. European antiterrorist laws, adopted post-September 11, have bred a culture of suspicion in which anyone of Middle-Eastern appearance is treated as an ‘enemy alien’. Meanwhile, farRight and anti-immigrant parties have used September 11 for electoral gain—demonising Islam and its cultural and religious practices. The future of co-operation between Australia and the EU on migration and asylum will focus on the items set out in the Agenda for Cooperation. This will consist of exchange of information and cooperation on approaches to manage challenges presented by people flows and consultation in multilateral arenas as well as bilaterally. Both parties to the Agenda for Co-operation are engaged in the development of ‘policy settings and practical cooperation’ regarding the following: • • • • •
•
asylum seeker and refugee readmission to countries of first asylum improving capacity-building (including in border management) in third countries that are of mutual interest the integration of migrants and the nexus between development and migration exchange of information relevant to fighting people-smuggling, human trafficking and related transnational crime exchange of information on the development of new technologies and electronic support structures that could assist in combating irregular migration identity and document fraud.
All of these will be issues of ongoing concern to both Australia and the EU.
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Development aid Australia and the EU work in co-operation on development aid in the Pacific. The EU’s commitment is primarily to aid, while Australia has been involved on two fronts—aid and security. Australia has been involved in the settlement of disputes in the Solomon Islands most recently. Although there is sound joint co-operation on specific projects, there are differences regarding priority and involvement. Some in the Commission regard Australia as too interventionist while the EU tends to promote a softer image in the Pacific region. Fourteen of the Pacific islands have been receiving preferential treatment from the EU since the 1970s under the Lome Agreement, and, more recently, the Cotonou Agreement, between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. There are those in the Commission who understand the Australian commitment to dealing with a situation in the Pacific that has been characterised by corruption, money laundering and drug trafficking, but Australia is seen in some quarters as unilateralist in its approach to the Pacific and there is some evidence of this perception among the fourteen ACP states in the region. Nevertheless development is now more important in the EU– Australian dialogue than before, and the two sides have entered a new era of dialogue, especially since April 2004, when the Ausaid head went to Brussels for talks with the Commission. There is an increase in dialogue and exploration of means for further collaborating, although there is no formal agreement. The development dialogue itself forms part of high-level official meetings and ministerial consultations—and the visit of Bruce Davies, Ausaid’s Director to Brussels, assisted this. Dialogue is also fruitful at the field level, among officials and diplomats. The EU is keen to develop this further by giving substance to co-operation in specific programs in sectors such as governance. The Commission regards the promotion of good governance as essential to the region and the Australian Government’s position on promotion of good governance in this context is not dissimilar. Important Australian interests are affected by the weakness of governance in parts of our immediate region. Poor corporate governance, particularly in financial and prudential
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areas, was a factor behind the East Asian financial crisis. Weak institutions and legal systems have exacerbated the problems of the Solomon Islands and other Pacific island states. Continued weak governance among some regional countries impedes these nations from dealing forcefully with transnational threats, including terrorism. (DFAT, ANI, 2003) Other important areas in the Australia–EU Agenda for Cooperation encompass assisting the recovery and nation-building process in East-Timor and Solomon Islands; supporting good governance and economic growth; funding for the Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS and Development in the Pacific, especially Papua New Guinea. In a key speech in April 2003, Foreign Minister Downer stated, with reference to the EU’s soft power: The EU has also served to supplement and centralise the ‘soft’ power tools of its Member States, particularly in development aid and reconstruction. We have welcomed the benefits of the EU’s generous financial support to East Timor, PNG and the Solomon Islands and of its 60 million Euro contribution to current projects in the ASEAN region. (Downer, 2003) He added: ‘As the European Union undergoes further profound change, it is important that an understandable focus on consolidating peace and prosperity in Europe not detract from the EU’s political and economic engagement with our region’. The styles of co-operation adopted by each of the interlocutors differ. The EU prefers to adopt a macro approach of working on a sectoral basis, while the Australian one is more micro, primarily based on projects. The EU and Australia involve the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in activities. The EU has a preference for joint projects with these agencies and the UN agencies, especially the UN High Commission for Refugees, seeking what it regards as complementarity and synergies as these agencies often have on-theground expertise
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Some Pacific states have expressed an interest in adopting some of the experiences of the EU as models for regional integration. The Eminent Persons Group is one such example. In August 2004 a task force for a Pacific plan was established and the EU ministerial meeting with the Pacific Plan group saw the EU Commission asked for advice on models. The Commission has offered to send officials to explain aspects of the integration experience. In the European Partnership Agreement under the Cotonou Agreement, the Pacific islands have had meetings with Commissioners Lamy and Nielsen. In September 2004 it was agreed that the idea of regional integration was to be developed. This could include transport, fisheries, trade and tourism. The idea has been floated of an internal Free Trade Association and of a Free Trade Association of the region with the EU. But there is little critical mass for this and intraregional trade is so limited that the basis of regional integration is quite weak to date. The EU framework paper set out the support for an EU style of Pacific organisation, with EU support for the idea of a Pacific Union. Unlike the countries of Africa, the Pacific has limited trade with the EU. About 0.45 per cent of EU exports go to the Pacific and so the EU has little self-interest there. The EU also has little strategic interest in the Pacific region. What it does advance is an interest in promoting its civilian power agenda of regional stability, good governance and carrying out its commitments under the Cotonou Agreement. The European Commission and the Australian Government, and especially Ausaid, work co-operatively in general in the Pacific in the area of development aid.
Educational co-operation and links Joseph Nye (2004) suggests that a soft power can be manifested in its cultural influence. Although the EU does not primarily run cultural and educational policy, it does exert considerable influence and there is a Commissioner, currently Jan Figel, and a Directorate General (within the Commission) for Education and Culture. In the field of education, it can be argued that the EU has engendered considerable changes at the societal level. For example, it is estimated that some three million university students will have studied in another EU country by the year 2011. The number of those who have already
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studied in another member state is above one million. The creation of Erasmus Mundus has seen the EU extend this opportunity to provide education to non-Europeans and arguably to draw on the best brains of the rest of the world—including Australia. Erasmus Mundus, the EU’s new international mobility program, aims to extend worldwide the successful EU student exchange program, entitled Erasmus. The EU’s Lisbon agenda aims to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy in the world and to ensure that the EU’s education and training systems become a ‘world wide reference of quality and excellence’ by 2010 (Hunter, 2005). 24 Some regard this as a means of raising a new type of consciousness among young people and hence a new kind of understanding of European identity, as shown in the film The Spanish Apartment, although it provides some understanding of the bureaucracy too! The EU institutions, especially the Commission and the European Parliament, have provided a certain amount of support and stimulus for this type of educational exchange of students although it is largely funded by the member states and not by the EU. It is making education across the EU increasingly accessible. Erasmus Mundus now provides an opportunity for Australian students, too, to undertake a Masters degree in a university in Europe. For those who do not wish to undertake a full degree, there is provision for jointly funded EU– Australia pilot schemes to send students from Australia to European universities and vice versa. One such example is the Europe Australia Asia Pacific Nexus, discussed below. Academics can also tap into these types of opportunities. While many academics maintain robust research relationships with colleagues in different parts of the world, there is also the possibility of tapping into a number of networks, including the Jean Monnet project. Australia–EU educational co-operation constitutes an important means of collaboration between Australia and the EU.25
Co-operation with Europe: What is available for Australian universities? At the EU level • Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST)
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• • • • •
Jean Monnet: chairs, modules, centres of excellence EU-Department of Education, Science and Training pilot project: $1 million Framework VI and VII Research projects Marie Curie Erasmus Mundus
At national levels • Bilateral education agreements, state • Bilateral agreements, university level Website: grants, opportunities, for students— Australians • Study in Europe www.asie.unimelb.edu.au
EU–Australia educational collaboration: problems and challenges The tyranny of distance and the differences—as well as profitable collaboration—between the EU and Australia can be illustrated by an examination of the recent attempts to bring Australian and European universities, scholars and students closer together. Although there is currently no educational agreement between Australia and the EU, unlike the US and Canada, nevertheless in recent years there has been a number of success stories. These experiences are generally worthwhile and valuable. They speak volumes of the interest of both academics and students in improving mobility at student and staff levels and of the desire for transnational co-operation on research projects and conferences, for example. Despite differences of time zones and seasons, of semesters and teaching styles, there is a wealth of possible co-operation for Australia to tap into. But is Europe interested? It is really incumbent on the Australian side to ensure that Australia features on the radar screen of the European universities. Clearly Australia can tap into a number of funding possibilities, some of which became available for the first time recently (including the Jean Monnet projects). In addition Australia can now participate in transnational, cross-border cooperation on a number of projects. The first of the major challenges is actually finding and developing links with reliable partners in Europe. This means that a
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relationship of trust needs to be established, which can take time and effort from the Australian side, often in another language. In addition the need to develop contacts is crucial. The issue of languages is not simply one of being able to speak a language in addition to English, as this is always useful for both social and educational purposes. There is a need to be familiar with the language of negotiations and to understand what is demanded in a co-operative relationship. This applies to projects involving both students and staff. A further factor is that of time—on a number of levels. The dates for semesters in each hemisphere are very different and so student mobility projects need to take this into account. In addition, a long lead-time may be required for a project to be initiated, developed and finalised. For this to occur, there is a need for advertising of projects to have considerable advance notice. These may include calls for tender or applications, advertising of events and provision of adequate time in order to organise projects. A crucial aspect of time is also the very labour-intensive and time-consuming nature of collaboration with a university or a consortium of universities in both hemispheres. As Australia is a small country, it is not always apparent to partners in Europe that it is worth developing a project with Australia, as the funds are normally limited and the Australian academic seeking co-operative links with a counterpart in Europe may not necessarily be known to the European side. Again trust and personal contacts are essential. It is important to be in a strong position to prove that Australia has a significant contribution to make—a different, additional or distinctive one. The example of Australia being in the Asia–Pacific is one that has proven successful recently in a number of ways. These include the $1 million pilot project of student mobility, jointly financed by the EU and Australia, which draws on the Asia–Pacific as well as European and Australian contexts, entitled the Europe Australia Asia Pacific Nexus (EAAPN), co-ordinated by the University of Melbourne (lead Australian University) and run with the University of Queensland and Griffith University on the Australian side and the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, lead European university), Paris, University of Trento and University of Birmingham on the European side. In addition, there is both Australian and European involvement in journals such as the Asia Europe Journal and the Asia Pacific Journal of EU 230
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Studies. These complement networks such as the Asia Pacific European Union Studies Association. Given a significant level of scepticism about working with nonEnglish–speaking and non-British scholars in Australia, it is also important to prove to Australian partners that the EU has something to contribute, too, as the EU is not understood by many academics and it is often considered too formidable. A significant inhibiting factor for educational collaboration is the cost factor. Not only are there significant costs, from the perspective of an academic, in terms of airfares and travel costs, trips to Europe come at a cost of being away from a home base for some time. This means that time spent away from Australia can be profitable but costly. So is co-operation worthwhile? It is, despite a still-prevalent Australian perception of the EU’s complexity and opaqueness—not to mention its ability to confuse, with its twenty-one official languages, of which English is the key operating language. Co-operation is worthwhile as Australian researchers and students can choose to collaborate with educational institutions from twenty-five states, with a population of 457 million. Australians have the opportunity to collaborate with an entity that represents a quarter of world’s GDP and has an economy comparable to that of the US. While transnational research projects and student mobility projects are certainly worthwhile, it is clear that there is some tyranny of distance from the perspective of many postgraduate students. A clear message has been received from students that what they seek most, in their research for their theses dealing with the EU, are funded study trips and research field-work, based on travel grants. They require access to specialists in their field and discipline in the academic world and to the expert officials in the EU institutions. Students need to be able to tap into the best of European scholarship, to complement Australian scholarship on Europe, through conference participation in Europe, access to contacts, specialists and non-state agencies, as well as regularly available funding. There is already significant collaboration at university-to-university level, at the state-to-state level and among consortia of educational establishments. In addition there is the successful Australia–EU Agreement on Science and Technology, which has spawned the very useful Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST). Options are to work unde the Science and New Agendas for Dialogue
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Technology agreement in a new bilateral (Australia–EU) arrangement; or in state-to-state agreements and context, as has been largely the case with the social sciences; or institution-to-institution, as is currently the case with most student and staff mobility projects. All of these are useful and merit further analysis. Which projects then should scholars focus on? The FEAST system is useful for the Science and Technology agreement but there is provision also for the social sciences, although this is not well known. The pilot project funded by the EU and DEST have been focussed on Masters coursework student mobility. There have been encouraging developments in all of these areas. For example, FEAST is now more involved in research projects in the social sciences, thereby presenting more options for academics and students. There is some increased funding for European Studies and research (Jean Monnet, for example) although relatively few have accessed this from Australia to date. There is a need to emphasise the value of the EU–Australia relationship to Australians. There may well be a need for focussed workshops on European Studies and on research opportunities. In order to target over-busy academics for such ventures, it is essential to show them the advantages of such collaboration. There is already a set of projects to draw on. These include information on courses and research on Europe, such as the three Registers of European Studies in Australia, in 1993, 1998 and 2004 (Horvath and Machin, with Murray and Wilson, 2004; Murray and Szlachetko, 1998; Lonsdale, Murray, Topic, 1993). Further, there are Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) Research Projects on EU–Australia relations and the Asia Pacific Perceptions of the EU research project which involves the National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand; the European Studies Program Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand; the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia; the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne, Australia, and the Graduate School of International Studies and the EU Studies Association of Korea. Further, there is now an agreement between the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, DEST and the European Commission delegation to extend the scope of the new Australians Study in Europe (ASiE) website. ASiE is a web-based initiative from CERC, supported
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by the National Europe Centre at the Australian National University, The Delegation of the European Commission in Australia, and DEST. The project is based at CERC. The objective is to provide Australian students who wish to pursue postgraduate study in Europe with a single place for information about courses, course requirements, eligibility and scholarships.26
Inter-institutional co-operation in European Studies and Research in Australia Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia— CESAA (1991) • promotes teaching and research in contemporary European studies • provides discussion forum • produces publications • fosters and maintains links among tertiary educational institutions • fosters and maintains links between academics in Australia and other countries • encourages European studies in secondary schools • advises government and non-government organisations • has institutional and individual membership AUEN—Australian Universities Europe Network (2003) • examines the current state and future development of European studies in Australia and engages with contemporary Europe • furthers communication and the development of new strategies in teaching and research among scholars in European Studies • has institutional membership Australian European University Institute Fellowship Association Inc. (1993) • sends postgraduate scholars to European University Institute, Florence • most funding to date from Monash University • need to extend funding • institutional membership
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Science and Technology and FEAST Australia was the first country to sign a Science and Technology agreement with the EU. It has been successful in some aspects, especially after the Australian Government put a considerable amount of funding into it. It can be difficult for Australian researchers to find partners in Europe, while, on the other hand, the European universities know each other. The FEAST database has been very useful for finding partners. There have, however, been some criticisms of FEAST regarding a lack of focus and the need for a FEAST help desk.
Non-government linkages In addition to the new security and educational agendas enumerated in this chapter, it is important to be aware that there are other means of Australia–EU societal co-operation. These include, for example, Australian access to the European Union Visitors Program and to the EU Journalists Award. In addition there are many active chambers of commerce and business organisations, in particular the umbrella bodies the Europe Australia Business Council and the association Australian Business in Europe. Such activity is worthy of note as it serves to illustrate that, while Australian–EU engagement can be difficult on occasion, characterised by diplomatic blowups and fallouts, there is patient work being carried out. It shows that government interaction is complemented by these organisations (as seen in Appendix 5), characterised by considerable co-operation among and with academic institutions and business groups. * * * Australia’s engagement with the EU now encompasses new trade agendas, new security agendas, political, regional and geopolitical as well as economic contexts. The two parties are dealing with new issues on an agenda that had previously been dealt with bilaterally by states or did not require any new type of compromises. It is a new level of diplomatic interaction. The EU has transformed the nation states of Europe and in so doing has changed the relationship with non-EU nations irrevocably. Issues in the Australia–EU engagement will vary over time but they will never revert to solely state-to-state linkages (traditional bilateralism). The 2003 official stocktake of the relationship between Australia and the EU set out the components of a broad-ranging agenda for
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future co-operation (see Appendices 3 and 4). We have seen that security and strategic issues, such as counter-terrorism and police co-operation, as well as migration and asylum featured.27 The relationship is broad because the EU’s policy scope is broad and expanding. On the one hand the EU is intensifying its own internal co-operation. On the other hand, achieving agreement among twenty-five member states is difficult and brings with it many challenges. The EU is in a state of flux. Although it has trade competences in the WTO that are largely clear-cut, this is not the case in its international relations and societal connections. The EU cannot dictate the actions of its member states in the international arena (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, 248), yet there is an increasing convergence of views among member states on a number of critical issues of security and global issues. International relations specialists Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein (2005, 249) point out that the EU’s collective military expenditure ‘exceeds that of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania’, that France and Britain are nuclear powers and that EU member states play key roles in international organisations such as NATO. Two member states are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Further, Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) point to the creation of the EU Rapid Reaction Force as a strengthening of the EU’s capacity to deliver on its commitment under the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, under Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union and constituting part of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy). Australia has recognised the role of the EU Rapid Reaction Force in international crisis management operations with third countries.28 All of these point to the EU as a distinctive type of ‘superpower’. Further, the EU is represented by more officials than is the US—the EU has ‘twice the number of diplomats in five times the number of embassies compared to the US’ (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, 248). The EU is firmly committed to multilateralism in trade and governance issues, to establishing rapport with regions and states throughout the world, through extensive agreements and treaties, and it works collaboratively and in coalitions with interested actors and agencies. Emerson (2005), Khanna (2004) and Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) all point to the EU commitment to projecting an image of soft power
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differently. Australia is adapting to this challenge in dialogue. The advantage of continued dialogue over time is that it engenders both mutual understanding and trust, not always in evidence in past EU– Australia engagement. In addition, a shared sense of vulnerability in the face of formidable global challenges, along with a commitment to common values in many cases, makes this dialogue valuable and enduring.
Notes ‘Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power … seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.’ Presidency conclusions, European Council meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=68827 &LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf&Picture=0 2 This is enshrined in the decision of the EU’s Foreign Affairs ministers in the margin of the Council on 7 May 1990. 3 Commission proposal for a Council regulation concerning the implementation of projects promoting co-operation and commercial relations between the EU and the industrialised countries of North America, the Far East and Australasia. COM(2000) 381—C5-0455/2000— 2000/0165 (CNS). 4 The Glossary of the European Commission states: ‘The “Troïka” consists of the Member State which currently holds the Presidency of the Council, the Member State which held it for the preceding six months and the Member State which will hold it for the next six months. The Troïka is assisted by the Commission and represents the Union in external relations coming under the common foreign and security policy. The Troïka in its present form has been altered by the Treaty of Amsterdam and replaced by a system whereby the Presidency is assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council, in his capacity as High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, and by the Commission.’ http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/ glossary/troika_en.htm, accessed 27 May 2005. 5 Europol is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at improving the effectiveness and co-operation of the competent authorities in the member states in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime. http://www.europol.eu.int/, accessed 19 May 2005. 6 DFAT, Media Release, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, FA15 / 1 February 2002, Australia and the EU Establish New Strategic Dialogue, http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2002/ fa015_02.html?forprint, accessed 23 May 2005. 7 Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. 1
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Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, South Korea, United States of America, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Mongolia, and the EU. 9 A meeting of officials from the EU and Australia in February 2001 saw the issues of the Asia–Pacific regional economic outlook and security feature on the agenda (Delegation of EC, 2001, 2). 10 DFAT Annual Security Outlook 2002, http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/ documents/security_outlook_2002.html, accessed 23 May 2005. 11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report 2003–2004, 1.1.8 Security, nuclear, disarmament and non-proliferation, http://www.dfat. gov.au/dept/annual_reports/03_04/performance/1/1.1.8.html, accessed 23 May 2005. 12 DFAT, Annual Security Outlook 2004, http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/ documents/security_outlook_2004.html, accessed 23 May 2005. 13 C/02/314. Luxembourg, 21 October 2002. 12943/02 (Presse 314). General Affairs and External Relations. 2458th Council meeting. External Relations. Luxembourg, 21 October 2002. 14 http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2004/joint_int_legal_ terrorism.html, accessed 23 May 2005, Joint Media Release, The Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and The Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, 3 August 2004, International Legal Experts to Tackle Terrorism in the Region. 15 Council of the European Union, Brussels, EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update, 14 December 2004. 16 These included Australia’s Ambassador in Brussels, Joanna Hewitt; the Head of the North Asia Division, Murray McLean; and Greg Moriarty, Assistant Secretary, Maritime Southeast Asia Branch. 17 DFAT, Media Release, FA15—3 February 2004, Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2004/ fa015_04.html, accessed 23 May 2005. 18 Debate on Human Rights, EP, Thursday 6 September 2001. 19 As noted above. 20 For example, the EP debates on 6 September 2001 regarding Afghan refugees seeking asylum in Australia. 21 Geoff Kitney, ‘Often Seen, But Not Heard’, Australian Financial Review, 6 May 2004, p. 13. 22 For an independent critique of these agreements, see Statewatch, which monitors ‘the state and civil liberties in the European Union’: www. statewatch.org. 23 The Hon Alexander Downer, Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues, Media Release, FA27 / 28 February 2002, http://www.foreignminister.gov. au/releases/2002/fa027_02.html, accessed 13 May 2005. 24 Erasmus Mundus operates in four main action areas: the creation of European Masters Courses by consortia of European Institutions, the award of prestigious scholarships to non-EU students and academics, encouraging partnerships with non-EU Institutions, and funding specific projects to promote European education in the world. 8
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P. Murray, Australia–Europe Education Relations: past successes, current issues, future challenge, briefing to representatives of the Department of Education Science and Training; the AVCC; the G08; the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand; European Commission, Brussels, Canberra, 3 March 2005; P. Murray, Australia–Europe Collaboration on Education: Opportunities and Challenges, briefing to the Americas and Europe Section, International Cooperation Branch, Department of Education, Science and Training (Canberra), Melbourne, December 2004; P. Murray, Australia– Europe Collaboration on Education: A University Perspective, briefing to the Australian Vice Chancellors Committee Europe Shadowing Program, Sydney, April 2004. 26 The website acts as a portal and information house to assist students wishing to study in Europe. This is the Australians Study in Europe website, or ASiE. ASiE can be found at www.asie.unimelb.edu.au. ASiE directs Australian students to resources that will enable them to undertake study in Europe and provides some of them itself. The site contains information about study in Europe generally, as well as links to the pertinent sites of the various EU members with regard to visa requirements and the like. It also contains listings of European Studies Centres in Europe and links to the postgraduate pages of European universities. A key feature of the site is the link to a searchable database of funding available to Australians wishing to undertake postgraduate study in Europe. As part of the ASiE project, CERC is currently undertaking research to add to the catalogue of scholarships and funding that is available to Australians for study in Europe. ASiE has co-operative ties with the powerful scholarship database and website of Joint Acadmic Scholarships Online Network, which is located at the University of Melbourne. ASiE’s research into available scholarships will be fed into Jason, and Jason will in turn create a new category of search for prospective scholars, ‘Study in the EU’. This search facility is run by powerful and flexible software, giving students great choice in finding and selecting possibilities for their study. 27 Australia and the EU: An agenda for cooperation. EU—Australia 19th Ministerial Consultations, 16 April 2003, http://www.ecdel.org.au/ pressandinformation/2003_ministerials/. A further issue of bilateral Australia–EU discussion is the Galileo project, currently under negotiation between the two interlocutors. Galileo is a European satellite radio navigation system, which is the initiative of the European Union and the European Space Agency. It is anticipated that this worldwide system will ensure complementarity with the current GPS Global Positioning System (Galileo European Satellite Navigation System http://europa.eu.int/comm/ dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index_en.htm Accessed 19 May 2005). 28 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Release, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, FA15 / 1 February 2002, Australia and the EU Establish New Strategic Dialogue, http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/ releases/foreign/2002/fa015_02.html?forprint, accessed 23 May 2005. 25
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Chapter 7
The Future—Seeking Engagement or Shadow-boxing?
‘We’re quite unique as a nation. We are a western society in the Asian Pacific region with very profound historical and cultural links with Europe, but also an enduring and increasingly important relationship with the United States, and there is no nation in the world quite like that.’ —Prime Minister John Howardâ•›1 This study began with an examination of the Australian concern with two factors—the British connection and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union. It examined the EU’s role as an international actor and the parameters of Australia’s new engagement with the EU, then dealt with the conflicts in the relationship and current sources of tension, placing these in the context of mutual misunderstanding by the EU and Australia. It has illustrated that contemporary engagement with the EU encompasses new agendas of global significance. This final chapter draws together some conclusions regarding Australia’s engagement with the EU. In seeking to address not only interested academics, students and generalists but also policy makers, it draws together a number of policy recommendations.
The Age, January 30 2005
Cartoon by John Wright. Used with permission.
The rules and contexts of international bargaining have altered immeasurably in recent years. The EU is not a state and never will be a state. It is an international actor, a fact that has been acknowledged by the Australian Government in a number of speeches and official documents. It is Australia’s major trading partner. The Australian Government increasingly regards the EU as a single entity in economic terms and increasingly deals with it in political aspects of international negotiations. This is recognised by government officials and by those who do business with the EU. It is not recognised by most journalists, commentators and academics, apart from a small number of specialists on the EU. Many of those who influence or frame policy in Australia, and elsewhere, regard the EU as little more than a customs union. This approach does not trouble the EU. It does, however, impair Australia’s understanding of the EU and most importantly Australia’s approach to seeking opportunities for trade, security and societal and educational co-operation. Many in Australia regard the EU as a strange beast. Some consider it as a far-off project that is not very relevant to Australia.
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I have argued elsewhere, with Chris Rumford, that not all that happens in Europe is due to the EU project of integration and that, further, the nexus of the EU and globalisation needs to be reconsidered. We have also argued that the EU has been characterised by a teleology that can stultify academic debate (Murray, 2000; Rumford and Murray, 2003a, 2003b). Yet there is a growing body of sophisticated analysis that rejects phoney wars within political science and international relations about the role of the EU. This body of work is increasingly globalised in its perspective, more interdisciplinary in its approach and less teleological in its thought. Unfortunately, with some marked exceptions, many of these debates have not been examined in Australia, outside of specialist subjects on the EU taught at Australian universities. This means that the EU remains in a time warp for many analysts, and this is particularly the case in the Australian media and in academia. If this study can contribute to opening up debates in Australia—and in the Asia– Pacific where there is growing academic engagement with the EU— then it will have served a purpose. There are already many students of the EU throughout Australia and there is a vibrant European Studies community here. What we now need is to bridge islands of knowledge between specialists and non-specialists regarding the EU. In this way, we will draw on the best of international and Australian scholarship on the EU in an international context and we will engage with our disciplines and discourses. The time to end the Rip Van Winkel effect in Australia regarding the EU has arrived. Evidence of this effect may be seen in the remarkable reluctance to understand change in international relations in some quarters in Australia. There is an astonishing unwillingness to understand both the advantages of the EU and the difficulties that it poses for Australia. There is a disturbing disinclination to move on from ‘collective amnesia among otherwise well-informed elites’ regarding the EU, as A.J.R. Groom saw in 1989. These ‘otherwise wellinformed elites’ see the EU as a strange type of international organisation—that is, if they actually accord it any consideration at all. This study has shown that there is a certain inconsistency in Australia’s relationship with the EU. Australia is enmeshed in many bilateral relationships with European states and is close to the United Kingdom. Australia trades extensively with the EU and there are
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healthy two-way flows in investment. Yet there is little public, media, academic, government and political attention paid to the EU by Australia, apart from agricultural trade. I have been asked in Brussels, while conducting interviews for this study, why Australia is not more favourably disposed towards the EU, given its close relationship with the UK. The answer appears to be that in some ways it is precisely that close relationship that has rendered engagement with the EU difficult, due to the myth of the British betrayal, loss of markets and reliance on the UK relationship, including the fact that Britain is the lens through which EU events are seen. The close relationships with the United States and the UK in Iraq have also played their part.
Australia and the European superpower Australia is dealing with a major international actor. It may not really matter whether it is called a global actor, a regional player or a superpower. The term ‘quiet superpower’ has been used by prominent academic Andrew Moravcsik, who regards the EU’s destiny as a civilian power which ‘can win without an army’. He states: ‘When it comes to the essential instruments for carrying out this task [winning the peace] there is also one superpower: the quiet superpower—Europe’.2 What does matter is that the EU is understood by Australia so that Australia can negotiate with the strengthened EU. The EU is an unusual type of power. Knowledge is also power and Australia needs to ensure it has that power base. The EU exerts its power in unusual and distinctive ways, as Parag Khanna (2004), Mark Leonard (2005), Ian Manners (2002), Jeremy Rikfin (2004), Neill Nugent (2003) and Robert Cooper (2005) have explained. Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis (2005) have observed: Europeans will not soon match the military capabilities the United States displayed in Kosovo and Iraq—and it is unclear what difference it would make if they could. A far more effective approach would be to stress what Europe is already doing. The real lesson of the past four years is that most Western progress in promoting security can be traced to less flashy strategies that are natural tasks for the EU, with its collective, incremental style of governance. European power is equal to or stronger than that of the
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United States in almost all forms, save for the deployment of military might. And this power is almost always exercised to pursue goals shared by the United States. In Australia, however, the EU is not normally regarded as an international actor or power. Although not a state, it is increasing its global role, moving from what Chris Patten called foreign policy ‘strong nouns and weak verbs’ to more active international stances (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2004, 259). Australia’s relationship with the individual states of the EU, particularly the UK, have long been more important than engagement with the EU. This study has illustrated that the EU is often regarded with suspicion by the Australian policymaking community and by those who seek to influence it. It is often regarded as arrogant and pushy, seeking for itself recognition as a state-like actor that many consider it does not deserve. The EU’s problems of effective foreign policy cohesion have given credence to this perspective. Although the EU is accepted as an important actor in trade, many in Australia consider that the international role of the EU has been over-stated by those within it and those who analyse it. Yet the EU is a global player in a number of key forums. It seeks to manage as well as respond to globalisation and is a single bilateral interlocutor in many aspects of trade policy. While much recent debate in Australia has focussed on strategic and trade engagement with the US, the relationship with the EU has been accorded considerably less attention. Official Australian attitudes, however, have altered in recent years, with increased engagement with the EU as a single entity. Yet Europe’s global agenda remains under-analysed. The EU’s global leader role requires examination because it is advancing its agenda with increasing assertiveness and is regarded as a potential model for other parts of the world (Moravcsik, 2004). These require scrutiny in Australia. One problem this presents for scholars as well as policy makers is that the EU is both constantly changing and also increasingly seeking recognition as an international actor—a term that can obfuscate rather than clarify. In a post-Cold War era, Australia is seeking allies and security in an insecure world characterised by terrorism and responses to the so-called war on terror, multilateralism and interdependence. Europe, meanwhile, is addressing similar concerns as well as intensifying
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relations with most parts of the world, in line with its globalisation agenda. Australia is forging alliances based on both security and trade and it is increasingly clear that the EU features in that strategy. The EU’s strengths and competences have extended across an increasing number of policies, with a global reach and considerable influence on the global rule book. For that reason alone, the EU is an important interlocutor for Australia. For that reason, it requires additional Australian government resources to monitor it and to attempt to influence its debates and decisions and its stances in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Professor Ross Garnaut has commented: ‘A great power can look after itself in bilateral contests. We need a multilateral framework of rules in a way that the United States and the European Union do not need them and do not rely on them.’3 One commentator at a foreign affairs committee stated: Our problem is we do not have the market strength of, say, the US in dealing with Europe. They can negotiate from a position of market strength, and of course we [can] not. We have one and a half per cent of the world markets. So ours is largely a high moral ground rather than being able to force the issues from a market strength position.4 The US acknowledges the EU’s power and influence (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 2005), as seen in visits to Europe by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush earlier in 2005. There is a reluctance in Australia to concede that Europe acts globally. There is even a diffidence and a reluctance to accept change—such as change in the international post-Westphalian context of the nation state, particularly, though not exclusively, in the EU. There has been a significant alteration of the member state and its competences within the EU. This has entailed a considerable transformation of sovereignty, as the EU increasingly, in consultation and decision making with its member states, rewrites the rule book of international diplomacy, of international negotiations and of regional integration. This transformation of nation state competences and alteration of sovereignty do not, however, mean that there will be a European army, for
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example, but it does mean that the EU has the influence and weight to deploy soft power. Some, such as Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, even regarded the EU as a potential counter-weight to the US in international relations. To date, Australia has largely overlooked EU soft power influence in its external actions in peacekeeping and norms regulation. The EU has aspirations for a new EU diplomatic service. Would this mean that there would no longer be individual embassies and diplomatic posts of individual EU countries? What would this mean for Australia’s preference for traditional bilateral relationships with individual states? While this scenario is not (yet) on the cards, it is important to be cognisant of the fact that, since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, there has been provision for consular assistance and representation by other member states for EU citizens. Many young diplomats in the diplomatic services of the EU states do not regard as remarkable the idea of an EU rather than a national ambassador representing their country. They already carry out diplomatic training in each other’s institutions and academies and work collaboratively in a number of areas, although this fact has not influenced the mindset of the Australian policy community yet. The EU is not simply the symbol of a reconciliation of a difficult past; it is also regarded by many in Europe as the power of the future and it will advance its policies in a manner that some in Australia may well find extraordinary. The EU is no longer simply a common market and cannot be equated with the European Economic Community, Australia’s nemesis in the 1960s and 70s. It is not simply the most important trading partner for Australia. It is a major partner and potential ally in most international forums. Many in Australia nevertheless remain sceptical, regarding engagement as adversarial, despite evidence of a new dialogue and broader global and societal engagement. On the one hand, we see this new and fruitful and maturing engagement and, on the other, we continue to observe a language of battle from the Prime Minister and the media although less so from the Foreign Minister. Groom once observed that, even regardless of the many ties between Europe and Australia, the EU ‘would still be of major importance for Australian decision-makers, since it is a colossus in the
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global, political, economic and cultural framework’ (Groom, 1992, 2). It is more of a colossus now. Groom’s comment that the EU constituted ‘a nodal point in so many global networks that no politician, no citizen and businessman or woman can afford to ignore it’ still makes sense (Groom, 1992, 1). The EU is increasing its regional influence in new areas such as foreign policy and so the economic giant is no longer necessarily the ‘political dwarf’ or ‘defence pygmy’ it was in the past. This is important for Australia, which has had a foreign policy dialogue with the EU since 1990, as a foreign policy actor.
Changing perspectives Looking at the EU through a single-issue, single-country prism aligned with the Common Agricultural Policy and the United Kingdom (CAPUK) has not been constructive for Australia. Narrow perspectives prevent understanding of a market of twenty-five countries that is open to most Australian goods, and which is currently the fastest growing and largest market in the world. It does not have the clout or muscle of the US but it may not need this, perhaps, as its power and influence are distinctive. Australia’s engagement with Europe now encompasses most policy domains, well beyond agriculture, giving credence to the survey respondent who suggested that the time had come for Australia to ‘stop beating the CAP drum’. Increasingly, engagement is more congenial, although some in the Australian policy community continue to find it more comfortable to negotiate directly with old friends, such as the UK and the US. The globalisation of the market place is an accepted fact. Yet the regionalisation of trade and of other agreements, especially with the EU, means that those who negotiate such agreements with the EU can be arguably disadvantaged if they do not belong to a region. All negotiations, with the exception of the Cairns Group, are carried out by the EU with the Australian state and not with Australia as part of a group of states. European regional integration has a profound and extensive impact on the rest of the world—including Australia. Australian bilateral relations with the individual member states, its ‘bedrock of Australia’s European engagement’ (DFAT, 2003), can be complemented by further developing a deeper and more intensive relationship with the EU as a bilateral partner.
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Multilevel Europe, multilevel engagement The multilevel and multilateral nature of engagement between Australia and the EU is evident in a number of ways. Firstly, each interlocutor is in part motivated and influenced by domestic agendas. For example, the Australian Government constantly plays to a domestic market in its critiques of the EU. Secondly, each is influenced by globalisation and the increasingly transnational and porous character of economic transactions and borders. Thirdly, each is involved in, or influenced by, the processes of macro-regionalism. Fourthly, each is influenced at a non-government level, namely by business and special interests lobby groups, such as on agriculture, the environment and business, which influence both Australia and the EU at a variety of levels, not exclusively at the national level. Fifthly, the economics and politics of engagement are not neatly separated. None of these influences or processes is immutable. Each can affect the transformation of the other—the case of globalisation and regional integration is an oft-quoted case in point. The increase in specialised agreements has been beneficial for both parties. In the light of the 2003 and 2004 Stocktake reports on the relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the European Commission, the question could be put whether a new Framework Agreement should be considered. As mentioned, a change of government in Australia would seem to favour this, given the Labor Opposition’s declaration that it would renegotiate. However, some aspects of an agreement have already been put in place and others could be considered in the current governmental context. For example, specialised agreements could be established on veterinary inspections, university education, educational exchanges and vocational education and training, culture and the environment. Increased access to the Troika is already in evidence (see Chapter 6), as well as intensified engagement with the European Parliament and Commission cabinets, directorates general, committees and working groups.
How I learnt to stop worrying and love Europe: The quiet transformation Relations between the EU and Australia have not been a high priority for either party in the past, the relationship having been characterised
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by lack of mutual interest and understanding. While some in the Australian policy community still attack the EU, these attacks are often based on diplomatic fallouts rather than quiet negotiations. To an extent a comprehension deficit has been compounded by an information deficit. The last two decades have seen changes in Australia’s external relations, moving on from its close relationship with the UK to a closer engagement with the US—including co-operation on Iraq and free trade negotiations—and a broader and more immediate engagement with regional partners nearer to home in Asia and the Pacific. As part of this, there is a new, quiet transformation taking place—an increased engagement between Australia and the EU on security, immigration, terrorism, foreign policy and education and culture as well as trade. The implications of this relatively peaceful development may not fully surface in the Australian public sphere for some time. Intensive collaboration is taking place. This is part of the iceberg syndrome of international dialogue—we see only about ten per cent of what is taking place. There is still considerable scope for mutual misunderstanding, but the scope for co-operation is developing more. Yet Australian elite and media perceptions of Europe continue largely to reflect traditional notions of state-to-state relationships, especially the enduring link with the UK, rather than viewing the EU as an important interlocutor in its own right. While the historical dependence on the UK still has relevance, there is value in examining the significant aspects of that relationship to assess how they can be harnessed to links with other EU member states. There are fruitful trade and investment links with the UK, and, increasingly, with Germany and France and Italy. Overall, there is a significant increase in trade and investment as well as important bilateral agreements on issues such as wine and science and technology and increased cooperation on education, consumer issues and immigration and security. Simply put, the relationship has moved from close encounters of the first kind, traditional bilateralism (links which are state-to-state), to close encounters of the second kind, new regional bilateralism (bilateral links between Australia and the EU) and close encounters of the third kind, namely shared EU–Australia global engagement in new security and society agendas and dialogue. These may well overlap and interconnect in a number of international environments.
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Globalisation, the state and regional integration Australian perceptions of regional integration have been quite negative. Participation in and leadership of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) is not as successful as anticipated. Leadership of the Cairns Group yielded some results regarding CAP. Australia’s dependence on open or multilateral regionalism has made it vulnerable, as it could not fundamentally change situations created by players such as the EU. Further, Australia is not seen as fully part of an Asian region though it is increasingly regarded as an actor in an Asia–Pacific one. Finally, Australia is not part of the Triad or a regional bloc, yet it may have a triad view of the world. Journalist Deborah Cameron comments: ‘To Australia, they are the Big Three, and for obvious reasons. To the United States, we owe our security, to Japan prosperity and to Britain a fair chunk of history’ (Cameron, 2005). In understanding the nature of integration, it is useful to recognise that globalisation and regionalism are processes without major jurisdictional barriers. They are multilateral and multidimensional. National borders and boundaries of governance have less relevance, with the blurring of distinction between the national and the international. Multilateral treaties, regional integration, international treaties and co-operation all undermine traditional state-to-state relations—that is, close encounters of the first kind. Academics Gareth Richards and Colin Kirkpatrick (1999, 687) contend that states attempt to respond to pressures induced by globalisation in a number of ways—and one of these is the adoption of new forms of regional association, involving a complex process of recomposition, renegotiation and adaptation of the interests that states represent. The route chosen by Australia to date has involved forms of regional association through APEC and the Cairns Group, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, but Australia has not been in a situation to adapt its state interests to a regional bilateral framework such as inter-regionalism of two ‘structured macroregions’ (Richards and Kirkpatrick, 1999, 684) of the EU and ASEAN Plus Three.5 Australia is not in a position to bolster its bargaining power through a brokering role in international negotiations, as it currently does not play that role in international trade, despite past successes of the Cairns Group. However, in maintaining its strong links with the Asia–Pacific, Australia could profitably utilise its extensive experience and
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strategies there to improve its understanding of regionalism in its relationship with the EU. There have been significant shifts of debate, emphasis and policy orientation in Australian policy. The reorientation from historical dependence on the UK to a continued reliance on the EU as major trading partner and investor, on the one hand, and Australia’s shift towards greater engagement with the Asia–Pacific region on the other, are elements of this. Australia has not had the opportunity to share the benefits of a regional bloc; it shares objectives with the EU (Drysdale and Vines, 1998), particularly in the Asia–Pacific. Both the EU and the Australian Government have been active recently in promoting formal ties and bilateral (EU–Australia) agreements and bringing about a closer, more comprehensive relationship based on business, trade and political common interests. We have seen that, in parallel with the bilateral relationships with individual member states, it is crucial that stronger links be forged with EU institutions and diplomatic links strengthened. Australia and the EU are confronting regionalism and global economic integration in different ways, with Australia’s size and lack of regional belonging meaning that its importance to the EU is moderate. Australia recognises that its bargaining power is limited (Evans and Grant, 1995, 127) due to its small size. Further, it does not fit comfortably into a category of dependent interlocutor due to its industrialised status. Yet, increasingly in interaction involving dialogue, trade and new security agendas, there is some Australian understanding that state-to-state realism is not the only way to negotiate in international forums. The state’s role as the central actor has altered considerably since the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, as member states engage in interstate and inter-institutional bargaining. Each may be outvoted on certain policies at certain times, yet they are nevertheless obliged to implement EU legislation nationally. The EU is a hybrid system of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, often difficult to understand. It is more than bilateral member state relations. Bilateral relations with the member states are also part of relationships with the member states qua member states—that is, they do not have a sole mandate or competence on many issues and policies, but share them under the system of shared competences with the Commission. This new governance structure merits increased analysis
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by the Australian policy community and those who seek to influence it. The EU Commission, Council and European Parliament constitute a new layer of governance. This and the transformation of the nation state and of sovereignty in the EU have not been fully understood in Australia (or elsewhere).
New engagement Groom (1992) has observed that the intellectual baggage of past conceptions of the Australian relationship with Europe must be cast aside. The new relationship with the New Europe can be best understood in the context of the EU’s regionalism in the global economy and its assertive role in global governances. The Australian government is increasingly cognisant of the EU’s clout—although this is a relatively recent recognition. Co-operation and mutual understanding are growing. Further, the relationship is multidimensional, encompassing trade; investment; science and technology; wine market access; immigration, security and various aspects of foreign policy. This shift is seen in an increased policy community adaptation to the EU, as reflected in, for example, DFAT and other ministries. There is an increased willingness to engage with the EU and some evidence of a renewed interest by ministers in travelling to Brussels. While WTO issues remain firmly on the agenda, CAP reform since the Uruguay reforms and in the Doha Round means that agriculture is not the principal focus of dialogues. This is symptomatic of the recent shift in orientation by the Australian policy community. There is a growing Australian government willingness to engage with the EU, alongside a development of relations with the member states, regarding their mutual concerns in the EU. There may be some recognition that, while the UK may listen to Australian views on a particular EU policy’s ramifications for Australia, it is not to be assumed that the British fight for Australia’s interests in meetings of the EU institutions. The other member states may not take up or defend the Australian position either, yet it is important to be increasingly explicit about the fact that Australia seeks a voice and a hearing from all member states on its concerns and seeks to be multidimensional in its approach. This begs the question as to whether this is a circuitous route when the Brussels Embassy may well be a more appropriate context for negotiations. The Australian Permanent
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Mission in Brussels is the focus of considerable activity, its diplomats are skilled negotiators and they are abreast of EU developments, although this may not necessarily be the case in individual member states. The Australian reputation in EU circles for diplomatic mismanagement during the 1980s and early 1990s has altered as the agenda for co-operation has broadened and negotiating approaches have become more attuned to the need for broader linkages. Regarding the British prism, however seductive it is to believe traditional UK Eurosceptic rhetoric about the EU’s role and importance, Britain has always been an effective negotiator in the EU. It has always implemented EU policy and legislation efficiently. In that sense, Australia’s major interlocutor within the EU is a ‘good European’. The distinction between some British anti-Europe discourse and the actual UK Government negotiating stances, then, can be considerable. The preferred British establishment politics of ‘see no Europe, speak no Europe, hear no Europe’ are now over (MacShane, 2005). Australian journalist Geoff Kitney 2005) has suggested: It is easy to dismiss Europe as increasingly irrelevant next to the dramatic transformations in China, India and SouthEast Asia, all of which are much more directly in Australia’s line of sight. But however the European Union manages its own evolution … it remains the world’s largest trading bloc, the manager of the world’s second most important currency and a bloc increasingly keen to assert itself in world affairs. Australian decision makers have to take it seriously. In addition, the EU’s twenty-five nation states are also, importantly, EU member states, indicating that Australia deals with these states differently than with other states. Australia deals extensively with the EU institutions as well. The nature of interstate engagement has altered, as the EU is fundamental to all domestic politics, domestic government structures, departments, interest groups and non-governmental organisations in all twenty-five member states. Therefore Australia–member-state bilateral relations must have an EU focus. The survey conducted among some of Australia’s elites revealed a desire for closer linkages with the EU. Survey respondents were asked whether they considered it necessary to promote closer links
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between Australia and the EU and the reply was overwhelmingly in the affirmative. They were asked in which areas they would support the establishment of closer links and provided a list of areas, to which multiple replies were allowed. The following chart, Figure 1, gives the replies on future co-operation, with trade, business and research and development featuring most often in preferences. Many areas have been evident in recent Australia–EU dialogue.
Figure 1: Closer EU/Australia links needed in: 100 90 80 70
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The close encounter of the second kind, new regional bilateralism, means that Australia has a new level of diplomatic representation, and intensification of contacts, at the EU/Brussels level—in particular with the European Commission, which is potentially as open to Australia’s lobbying and influence as it is to that of member states. Dealing with the EU has required diplomatic, administrative and governmental adaptation to EU institutions and processes and has necessitated an adjustment to trade policy and perspectives and to trade harmonisation mechanisms. The Eurozone facilitates Australian trade; business and currency transactions; cost transparency; forward planning; and price comparison. Adaptation entails the signature of agreements with the EU, and not just member states, on a range of issues. The EU gives Australia access to new markets
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and the possibility to develop trade with all of the EU and the applicant states. It provides access to a market of 457 million people, with right of establishment for Australian companies; access to most parts of the market; coordination and cooperation on research and development and in educational establishments; mutual recognition of standards for exports and the opportunity for dialogue on issues ranging from foreign policy to trade to immigration and security. Europe’s Single Market represents a substantial and growing opportunity for two-way trade and investment with the EU25. In short, the new regional bilateralism is an opportunity for a multilevel approach to international relations. It is important for Australia to engage with the EU bilaterally, as a market and political interlocutor, because the EU’s competences are increasingly expanding. EU trade policy is directed and controlled by the Council and Commission and monetary policy is largely run by the European Central Bank, not by the member states. While driven by trade and investment, other factors in the relationship are increasingly important. The interstate bargaining game has altered, and there is increased understanding of, and adaptation to, the phenomenon of new regional bilateralism. Australia‘s connections (its encounters of the first kind) with the UK and other individual EU member states are thereby altered—they are increasingly based on new regional bilateralism, characterised by both multi-dimensionalism and multilateralism with the states of the EU qua member states. Governments and negotiators are attempting to deal with what they perceive as a constantly shifting EU scenario, with changing boundaries. At the same time, it is tempting to cling to traditional bilateralism, as bilateral relations with individual member states are perceived as more predictable and based on a plethora of established bilateral agreements, some from the nineteenth century. (See Appendix 6 for examples of Australian treaties and agreements with individual countries of Europe.) The familiar can be more appealing than attempting to understand an ever-changing EU. Traditional bilateralism is attractive because its parameters are understood. Uncertainty about the EU makes it tempting for negotiators to continue to accord primacy to established bilateral state-to-state relationships, which both predate, and can go beyond, EU issues, encompassing political, security, strategic, trade and investment
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issues. Moreover, it is also worthy of comment that many government ministers feel more comfortable with trips to London or Paris than to Brussels. We have seen that the EU is changing its institutional architecture, its membership and its policies and breadth. Waiting until the dynamics stop and things are clarified will not help Australia to stay at the forefront of the EU attention. Nor does it help Australia to stay abreast of EU developments. Australian Foreign Minister Downer (2003) recently recognised the EU as a ‘complex work in progress’. The new engagement sees changes in attitudes from traditional bilateralism to new regional bilateralism, in an area that was previously the purview of the nation state, and the recent case of air transport and regional policy are indicative of these changes. In February 2005, then Australian Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson, Minister for Transport and Regional Services, had meetings with the EU’s Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot to advance negotiations regarding a horizontal agreement on air services between Australia and the EU. This would entail all EU airlines being given an equal opportunity to fly between Europe and Australia. The ultimate objective is to have a single bilateral agreement between Australia and the EU, replacing the previous ones with the member states. In a meeting on 24 February, Anderson and Regional Policy Commissioner Danuta Hübner agreed that the EU and Australia faced similar problems in terms of growth and sustainability in regional areas. The EU’s European Regional Policy was discussed during the talks, as was Australia’s program for the development of Australia’s regions—the ‘Stronger Regions, A Stronger Australia’ initiative (Delegation of the European Commission, News@eu, 2005, 56).
More summitry? Less posturing? Does Australia need more bilateral summits? The US, Canada, Japan, China and India all have them with head of state or government and the Commission. Why not Australia? Smith (1992, 118) suggests that in the EU–US relationship there are tensions and recriminations at the governmental level and what he calls the high political level. He suggests that it is important to look beyond government elites to the ‘business and professional groupings which carry out the everyday deepening and broadening of the relationship’ and this has validity in the EU–Australia relationship too, as we have seen in the survey
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results. He therefore suggests that ‘the governmental level itself should be viewed not only through the prism of the public posturing and the acrimony, but also through the complex problem-solving of much of the US–EC system’—and this can be equally applied to the relationship of Australia with the EU.
Shared values and agendas Australia and the EU belong to the same clubs and groupings, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations agencies and the UN Western Europe and Others Group and more specialist groupings such as the Australia Group and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Forming such relationships, rather than necessarily signifying great advances, has been characterised by small steps. The EU has evolved in small steps, in an incremental manner. This approach has also been evident in the relationship with Australia and other interlocutors. The EU has been characterised by a neo-functionalist logic of closer interstate co-operation in one sector leading to more in another, and on to a spill-over to even new sectors (Haas, 1964, 1968). The relationship with Australia has similarly ‘spilled over’ to new sectors and new agendas items. Few issues of international relevance are excluded from the EU–Australia agenda. We have seen that in development aid the EU and Australia are involved in co-operation in the Pacific, which constitutes the inner arc of Australian interests. There is also a defence dialogue and strong bilateral linkages with the UK, France and some dialogue with Germany. Australia is in a position to provide the EU with a unique analysis of developments in the Asia–Pacific and in the South Pacific, as illustrated in Chapter 6.
Redressing mutual neglect In the past, the EU accorded little attention to Australia due to the primacy of issues such as intensifying integration, enlargement of its membership, the transatlantic relationship, development aid and Asia,6 while Australian attention was focussed on developing a higher profile in, and closer links with, the Asia–Pacific region. Due to the Howard Government’s emphasis on traditional bilateralism, the EU’s international role has not been respected in Australia. The EU understands that it is not lovable to Australia but it is admired in other countries and contexts, partly due to its development aid and humanitarian 256
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programs and civilian power role. Australian criticisms of the EU as complex have validity, yet it remains a very open structure and set of institutions. The Commission is open to meeting with Australian and other third-county representatives, and relations between the Australian Permanent Mission and the Commission work well.
Shared interest in Asia There is evidence that the EU has benefited from the opportunity to receive an Australian perspective on events in the Asia–Pacific (and especially the South Pacific) region, especially on human rights and security issues, and from the opportunity to tap into the expertise of Australia’s Asian specialists. For example, the President of the EU Council noted that ‘Minister Downer offered insight into the Australian reading of the developments in North East Asia’ at a Troika meeting in early 2005.7 The intensification of EU–Asia linkages in Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM)—from which Australia is excluded—may undermine this appreciation of Australian expertise over time, however. Australia remains outside of the ASEM framework, a source of frustration among some Australian policy makers and analysts, particularly because Australian official positions had regarded regionalism as the framework for international decisions, with alliances formed within this framework seen as serving Australia’s interests best. The possibility of an ASEAN–Australia Free Trade Agreement has recently been under discussion, with little progress to date. Wise (1996c) has observed: ‘Neither Canberra nor the Union hide the fact that, as traders, they are more interested in Asia than in each other. But they nevertheless stress the political importance of the relationship—and acknowledge that their combined weight may help push Asian partners to open markets as well’.
Australia as an Asia–Pacific HQ Australia, a stable and prosperous democratic state, has been touted as being in a unique position in the Asia–Pacific region to serve as a headquarters and source of investment for European companies.8 Australia’s partly European identity makes it an attractive investment and HQ option. Evans and Grant (1995, 314) regarded Australia’s increasing engagement with the Asia–Pacific as rendering Australia ‘an important interlocutor in the eyes of many Europeans’. Australian officials have been keen to impress upon Europeans the importance The Future
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of using Australia as a ‘culturally familiar springboard into the booming Asia Pacific market place’ (Greenlees, 1996). However, it is interesting to note that, in late 2004, the former European trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy, regarded Singapore as a hub for EU links with the Asia–Pacific, as a bridge-builder in the WTO, leading ASEAN to play a role as ‘a significant motor for EU–ASEM relations and an important anchor for the ASEM process in Asia’ (Lamy, 2004, 485). This illustrates clearly the EU penchant for interregional relations over bilateral ones with individual states (with the marked exception the US) and the problem faced currently by Australia in belonging neither to the ASEM process nor to ASEAN or ASEAN Plus Three. Successive Australian governments have been keen to encourage European companies to increase capital and equity investment in Australia (Europe Business Review, 2000). It is notable that Australia has been presented as an ideal ‘launch pad’ for European company operations in the Asia–Pacific region9 (Downer, 1999b) and the advantages for European business are multiple. Australia as an Asia–Pacific location for European firms Australia is presented in documents as an attractive ‘strategic investment location’ for the following reasons:10 • Positive business environment • Positive economic conditions • Business gains from reforms • Ease and low cost of establishment • Low operating costs • Leading edge telecommunications • Skills world class and cost competitive • World class infrastructure and support services • Research and development location • Facilitating government commitment to investment • Political and economic stability • Gateway to the most dynamic, fastest growing, region in the world • High quality of living • Highly skilled, highly educated workforce • Strong cultural and economic links with both Europe and Asia • Similar legal and business systems to Europe.
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Redressing the Muggle problem The Australia–EU engagement is indirectly influenced by the transatlantic relationship and could draw some lessons and pointers from it. In May 2005, the European Commission came up with a set of proposals to strengthen economic and political relations in the EU–US relationship. Entitled ‘A stronger EU–US Partnership and a more Open Market for the 21st century’, the document set out a broad range of ‘practical policy proposals for a joint EU–US strategy to boost economic integration, and to strengthen the broader framework of EU– US relations’.11 Many of these will no doubt be studied carefully by Australian officials, in order to assess the impact of these proposed measures on Australia and possible pathways to EU–Australia engagement in practical policy contexts. In economic policy, the Commission proposes improvements in regulatory co-operation, promotion of knowledge and innovation, and improved border arrangements, while politically, it is proposed that options be reviewed regarding raising the profile of the EU–US relationship ‘to make it more effective’. This document, prepared for the EU–US Summit on 20 June 2005, aimed to ‘promote transatlantic trade and investment and stimulate economic growth’, with a more open and efficient transatlantic market. Given that the EU and the US together share the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world, with the overall volume of EU–US trade in goods and services totalling €600 billion in 2003, this has immense significance for Australia. The Commission Communication makes a raft of proposals in a number of policy areas: regulatory co-operation, services, investment, competition, public procurement, intellectual property rights, innovation and new technologies and the interface between trade and security, drawing on the views of the business community, environmental and consumer organisations, trade unions and other groups and individuals. Perhaps such a consultation process might be useful for Australia! Australia could discuss the appropriateness and usefulness of drawing on the following mechanisms for enhancing co-operation: the identification of areas for closer regulatory co-operation; the establishment of a high-level Regulatory Co-operation Forum of ‘senior sectoral regulators from both sides to submit an annual Roadmap with objectives and priorities for the future’ (European Commission, May 2005). The Communication also advances proposals
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to improve development and integration of their knowledge-based economies and to encourage innovative technologies. These proposals include the identification of priority areas for research collaboration, strengthening policy dialogue on sustainable sources of energy, satellite navigation, and promoting academic exchange. All of these have resonance for the Australia–EU relationship, given the Science and Technology Agreement and the developing dialogue on education, for example. While recognising the differences in Australia’s engagement with the EU, and the fact that transatlantic engagement is quite distinctive, there is nevertheless food for thought in the proposals for the broader framework of the transatlantic relationship. These could include options such as a new declaration setting out common values and enhancing the existing ‘Legislators’ Dialogue’ between the European Parliament and the Australian Parliament. The US has many of the same concerns as Australia regarding the EU and seeks to influence the EU, often drawing on expert and industry bodies in the US that deal with the EU (Green Cowles, 2001). In Australia, although there are fewer such bodies, there are, in fact, far more activities at official level than is publicly known, an aspect of the iceberg syndrome. This is effective because it is informal, en marge of OECD meetings, and a formal diplomatic presence may not be required at all of these. The dialogue is more mature now. Agriculture has not prevented agreement. In fact, it is known that, for example, Commission officials dealing with development are also critical of the CAP as their client states suffer from the CAP.
Where to from here? Some observations and policy recommendations As the EU is distinctive, lobbying is also distinctive in the EU. Australia constantly faces decisions about the degree to which it approaches the Commission and the European Parliament and to what extent it goes to the member states. Increasingly, the Australian national missions in the EU member states lobby in the state capitals as well. However, national parliaments in the member states are not necessarily the focus of the major decisions. In many cases, it is the national governments and the EU institutions that are the focus. For example, Australian discussions regarding dialogue with Europol has involved the lobbying of member states as this is largely a member state
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competence. However, the more productive strategy may well be to approach the EU from all sides—member state and Brussels. Australia has faced challenges to deal with the fact that the texture of the relationship has altered immeasurably as both Australia and the EU tackle areas that are increasingly EU competences. Australian government departments dealing with foreign affairs, trade, education, agriculture, air transport, consumer policy, treasury, immigration, visas and the military all are responding to the fact that these are increasingly EU concerns. If there were a wish list regarding what factors would ideally improve the relationship, drawn up by officials from both sides, it would consist of the abolition of the CAP; the development of a more balanced understanding of the EU—in the media and policy making community in Australia; and a reversal of Australian intolerance of the EU. It might include a desire for increased high-level political summitry and for the EU to accord more high-level attention to Australia Diminishing mutual misunderstanding There is a need to increase the knowledge base in Australia regarding the EU. Equally, there is room for enhanced understanding of Australia in Europe. It is important to show that Australia is not just the Cairns Group, CAP focussed and UK-influenced and to keep an open mind. Further, the EU is not going to cease to exist, despite considerable criticism of it, both within and outside Europe. In some quarters in Australia, the EU’s continued existence has been in question. This is foolish in the extreme. Despite recent crises, the EU will survive. Australian adaptation to the EU must involve an acknowledgement that the EU is constantly changing, expanding its policy scope and membership. Waiting till the dynamics stop and things are clarified will not help Australia to advance its interests and to stay at the forefront of the EU mindset. Nor will it be useful as Australia attempts to monitor developments and possible future trends. The surveys I have conducted on perceptions of the EU show that the EU is seen as a bastion of closed regionalism—a Fortress Europe. This is not borne out by trade and investment figures, yet the perception persists in large part due to Australian opposition to the CAP and a view that the Single Market constitutes closed regionalism and a closed shop on Australia goods.
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Business dialogues A first recommendation regarding business interactions is that the Australian business community could become better informed about opportunities in the EU. Should Australian businesses become more engaged with the EU? There may well be a need for a trade and business dialogue for a business forum (Green Cowles, 2001). Australian businesses based in the UK, with vested interests in trading with the rest of Europe, could visit Brussels and establish contacts with the Australian Mission to the EU and the Commission. A strategy of bringing Australian business representatives to participate in a dialogue in Brussels could, for example, draw on the experience of the US Chamber of Commerce in Brussels in this regard. It is not always the case that those actually trading, on the ground, take Brussels seriously, yet it is increasingly incumbent upon them to understand and apply the EU’s regulatory norms, for example. Strengthening business links to the EU institutions would also raise their effectiveness as lobbyists. The EU’s regulatory regime has a deep and long-lasting impact on third countries such as Australia. The direct impact of the EU and its regulations are felt already. The EU is a huge market. A challenge for many Australian companies is to find their way through all the regulations. They are often dissuaded by Brussels’s red tape image. There is room for more face-toface meetings and round-table talks for Australian businesses contemplating going into the EU and those already there. I have met Australian business people who are simply not interested in what the EU is and so choose to ignore it even when they do business there. Of course the larger Australian businesses already monitor EU developments or hire firms to do so. They could also call on the Australian Permanent Mission and Austrade for assistance and many Australian industries are more interested in what is going on in the EU now, due to its growing regulatory impact and the need for information regarding access to markets and also the impact of regulatory norms on Australia. A second recommendation is that there should be active exploitation of the many business opportunities through the medium of Australian migrant links to individual countries of the EU, utilising multicultural associations and networks and chambers of commerce as well as languages. This is in line with the recommendation of
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former Minister Blewett (1990) and reports (Swinburne University of Technology, 2001) as well as recommendations from elite surveys. A third recommendation is the establishment of an Australia– EU Business Round Table in Australia to meet on a regular basis with, for example, organisations such as Australian Business in Europe, to address actual and perceived obstacles to doing business with the EU. For example, issues raised in an analysis of survey respondents’ perceptions of obstacles to doing business in EU illustrate that there is value in discussing issues such as problems in understanding the harmonisation of standards and taxes; cultural differences and perception of problems relating to distance, language and time zone. This Round Table could also tackle concerns raised by respondents in the survey regarding the EU bureaucracy and need to increase understanding of EU regulations and laws. There is also a perception of inconsistencies among the EU states in their implementation of rules and of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, along with a concern over less than satisfactory Australian official support available to Australian businesses outside of the UK. A Business Round Table could tackle some of these challenges.
Making Australia’s voice heard in Europe through diplomacy Prime Minister John Howard remarked on 22 August 2001 that ‘Making Australia’s voice heard in Brussels is one of the most important diplomatic tasks we face’. (Howard, 2001) How can the Australian policymaking community best manage the balance of member states’ competences and EU competences? What bodies and government departments and strategies at national and state government level are required in order for Australia to keep up to date with and monitor rapid and changing developments in EU policy areas and their external implications? What co-ordination is needed between state and Commonwealth agencies and among departments and Austrade? There is a need to examine how bilateral sections in government departments such as DFAT manage to co-ordinate bilateral relations with the member states and bilateral relations with the EU and its institutions. This constitutes a considerable management challenge— and at times logistical challenge—for Australia. Do Australia’s government and businesses need to be more active in promoting formal ties and bilateral (EU–Australia) agreements and bringing about a closer,
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more comprehensive relationship based on business, trade and political common interests? Australia and the EU could both profitably devote more resources, including staff, to the relationship. Both have limited staff at a time when engagement is developing almost exponentially. A first recommendation in this area is that the Australian diplomatic representation in each member state could have a designated official to monitor EU developments, particularly the national perspective on it, and garner support for Australian concerns. This requires clear instructions from Canberra. It may also depend on the individual heads of Mission and their interest in the EU. Australian government relations with the EU are influenced by the government’s relationship with the members states. It is recommended that increased funding and support for trade and diplomatic missions in member states (as well as Brussels) be considered, so that Australian representatives can work, with adequate resources, on ‘selling’ Australia as a significant partner in business and research. A second recommendation is that there be an increase in resources in the Australia diplomatic mission in Brussels. This should ideally encompass a number of policy domain and government departments (Azarias, 2002). This seems to be more effective than influencing the EU at one remove from a stance of traditional or old bilateralism in the member states of the EU. Neither is it to be assumed that all Australian diplomatic officials will actively monitor the EU within the member states. Many of those diplomats posted to the member states have little prior understanding of the EU—a predeparture briefing seems to be required here. Thirdly, in ensuring that Australia’s voice is heard in Brussels, preparation at home is required and this can be carried out through a number of measures. The first of these is a formalisation of a European Co-ordinating Committee to meet regularly. The Australian Government might wish to consider formally establishing such a committee, to co-ordinate policy towards the EU and ensure that knowledge, skills and co-ordination of strategies on policies are garnered and effectively harmonised. The endeavour might include DFAT (potentially as the co-ordinating department) and Austrade, AusInvest and government departments dealing with the EU across ministries and portfolios, in all policies that increasingly feature in
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EU–Australia dialogues. Such a development would reflect practice in EU member states. The multidimensional aspects of the EU, as a multi-level, multi-actor governance system, could usefully be monitored by maintaining a watching brief on all the levels and dimensions of the EU. Fourth, and complementary to the above, it is recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of an advisory board to government on Australia–EU engagement. This advisory committee of top academic specialists on Europe could be drawn from universities and academic centres and associations, such as the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne and the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia, for example. It remains the case that, unlike the transatlantic relationship, Australia–EU engagement does not have panels or boards of experts on issues relating to major policy areas. It could call on the increasing number of EU specialists in Australia and elsewhere for policy advice and feedback. The transatlantic relationship is distinctive and so comparisons with the Australia EU engagements are not always very fruitful. Nevertheless, the ideas of panels of policy experts and academics on education, trade, environment, institutional and constitutional developments, research, education and science and technology, or a regular EU–Australia business dialogue and early warning systems for potential trade disputes, all have merit and are worthy of some official consideration in the context of this study (Peterson and Ward, 1995; Green Cowles, 1999). A fifth recommendation is that Australia engage in a multi-actor context with the EU. It could explore utilising the model of its meetings with the Troika to attempt to have more meetings in the margins of the OECD, the WTO and the UN and its agencies, playing the multilevel, multi-forum, multi-actor game to Australia’s advantage. The sixth recommendation is to keep agriculture firmly in the WTO basket. While it can be argued that maintaining Australia’s active involvement in the Cairns Group may be the best means of negotiating with the EU over agricultural trade matters, this has achieved very little in direct confrontation. It is arguably better for the relationship (certainly from the Australian point of view, given its asymmetrical nature) to deal with that in the context of the WTO. Arguably the Australian Government should focus on protecting its position in
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other international markets from subsidised food imports from the EU. Finally, by way of ensuring that Australia’s voice is heard in Europe, it is recommended that Australia–EU engagement be given a stronger parliamentary context. Those parliamentarians who take part in visits to the EU gain invaluable experience and knowledge, and this is clear from their reports. An annual debate on the EU in the Australian Parliament would strengthen understanding. It is clear that Australia needs to locate a number of intervention points at different stages of EU policy and framing of legislation, and, of course, Australian influence on the EU is not only through the Commission. A comprehensive approach is therefore proposed in this context.
Societal aspects It is suggested that a strengthening of people-to-people contacts through tourism, immigration and business contacts could be usefully enhanced through cultural co-operation and the strengthening of educational co-operation. It is therefore proposed that the universities have an important role to play in advancing intellectual and policy debate on the EU and Australia, as seen in the experience of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne and the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia. It is sensible to tap into university resources for advice and suggestions. One proposal, for example, is the need to move beyond pilot projects and negotiate an Australia–EU education agreement. A second recommendation in this regard is the creation of an Australia–Europe Vision Group along the lines of the Asia–Europe Vision group, with a commitment to long-term development of the relationship. This could be in the context of an EU–Australia policy forum of policy makers, academics, members of the business community and other specialists and it could address some of the issues raised earlier regarding the shaping of Australian policy. It is clear from Australian elite responses to questions regarding factors to be kept in mind in framing Australia policy towards the EU that there is an increasing understanding of the new type of bilateral relationship emerging and that the EU’s regional integration process cannot be ignored. While many respondents regarded contacts with
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the UK as pivotal, others were concerned that Australia did not feature on the EU radar screen. It was proposed that there is a need to better understand the EU institutions and to appreciate how the EU caucuses and votes as a bloc internationally. Regarding education, some strategies might be considered at the government level. There is already a useful model of a EU–USA Cooperation Program in Higher Education and Vocational Education and Training, which merits more attention. For example, a type of Fulbright–EU project might be considered for the Australian case. This type of agreement on education between Australia and the EU could encompass mutual recognition issues. Currently these are dealt with through a number of avenues. One avenue that has been successful in the case of the pilot project on student mobility at Masters level (for example the Europe Australia Asia Pacific Nexus – EAAPN) is the idea of implementation protocols among participating exchange universities. These may not be necessary if an education co-operation agreement were in place between Australia and the EU. While some successful pilot projects and short-term funding are available, it is essential that consideration be given to co-operation and projects that are at least medium term, with some long-term stability and possibilities. A pilot project of three years (such as the $1 million projects to date) may take one year to implement and organise and two years to yield results. Consideration could also be given to the support of the teaching of European languages and European Studies in schools, universities and institutions of post-compulsory education. An educational agreement could be framed in the context of the value of sharing resources, mapping knowledge bases and developing strategies to address needs. A series of Round Tables could be initiated in order to address what Australian governments and universities need to know. A number of briefings and thematic sessions could be targeted to government personnel and universities and other tertiary institutions. In my research for this book, it became clear that specialists on some areas know little of others and so reach a smaller audience than they should. There is a need to build bridges of understanding across islands of knowledge within Australia and also between Australia and the EU. This could begin with shared expertise, linking both those actively engaged in public policy and academic experts. Academics could be in a position to draw on expertise and
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draw up surveys, briefing papers and reports on successes to date and proposals for an educational agreement, for example. Strategies for future educational co-operation could include provisions for short periods of student mobility, incorporated into Masters and PhD programs and young researchers’ and early careers researchers’ experiences. A commitment to further foster ties with EU universities and institutions, so that Australian and Australian-based students can have access to study and research periods in Europe, is crucial. The point has been made by Australian-based postgraduate students of Europe that they risk lacking credibility if they have not carried out research in Europe. An educational agreement could provide for the incorporation of travel grants; subsistence grants and research periods at prestigious institutions such as the transnational European University Institute in Florence and the College of Europe in Bruges in Belgium and Natolin in Poland. The educational co-operation strategy can build on a remarkable set of links already established, considering the fact that the field of Europeanists is small in Australia. For example, it could utilise the contacts and experience of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA), the Australian Universities Europe Network and the Australian European University Institute Fellowship Association Incorporated. It could provide for increased European Consortium for Political Research participation for scholars and students and examine it as a model for an Australia–Europe forum on research and education regarding Europe. Finally, it is not inconceivable that there will be an education agreement between Australia and the EU over the next few years, with the Australian side, in particular, keen on this at present. It could include some specific projects and the opportunity for policy dialogue, for example. It could be a limited framework type of agreement and initially limited to higher education and vocational education and training and possibly information and communication technology and e-learning. This could bring increased benefits and contacts to Australia.
Responding to the changed realities The EU–Australia relationship has developed over a large set of issues, ranging from foreign policy, economics, security and trade issues to
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environmental issues. They are all political, all contentious. The forums for debate and negotiation have changed over the decades of the relationship but in an intensified manner, particularly since the 1990s. The impact of trade disputes and regional security and immigration issues can be viewed in this context. The events of 11 September 2001 led to an intensification of cooperation among EU member states on security and visa and refugees policy—and this has also been intensified in relations between the EU and Australia. Regional security is as much about refugee boats as it is about gunboats. The nation state has altered dramatically in the context of globalisation and regional integration, and of the realisation of shared concerns over geopolitics and both hard and soft security. There is increased interdependence in the aftermath of September 11. Commonalities and tensions will be worked out in the multilateral forums of trade, WTO committees and groups and the UN. The close encounters of the second kind, new regional bilateralism, will reinforce multilateralism in those contexts where the EU and Australia have a common set of policies or positions. The relative security of understanding the respective stances during the Cold War world gave way to the emerging world order and disorder and then to the insecurity of post-September 11 international politics. It is appropriate that Australia and the EU have recently re-evaluated commonalities and problems and developed some additional formalised mechanisms and procedures for co-operation, dialogue and a strengthened liaison. * * * The EU will continue to dominate the relationship. The European Integration project will continue to intensify and to both broaden and extend to more of Europe, as is evident in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. Australia is under pressure to further develop the institutional, procedural and diplomatic tools to deal with these fruitfully and fully. The EU and Australia have shared values and global goals (such as human rights, trade liberalisation, liberal democracy, counter-terrorism) and will pursue these both within and outside the framework of the EU–Australia relationship. As the EU moves into new policy areas, Australia will adjust to these changing circumstances. Australia will most likely continue to attack the CAP and to
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monitor developments in EU decision making, rightly making Australia’s views known. The EU and Australia have shown that they can work jointly on a number of policy areas and broad-ranging forums, such as the WTO; dialogue on immigration and refugees; trafficking in people; climate change and science and technology. There is no need for Australia to privilege the relationship with the EU, a growing superpower, but equally no need to ignore or attack it. There is more in the relationship that unites than divides the two. The doors remain open—or at least a little ajar—on both sides. The relationship is more than agriculture and more than Britain. It is more than memory.
Notes John Howard, ‘Address to the Australian Business Investment in Europe (ABIE) Breakfast, Savoy Hotel’, London, 12 November 2003, http://www. pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech571.html 2 Quoted in Dana Spinant, ‘Quiet superpower’ needs military might, European Voice, 30 April 2003, http://www.europeansources.info.mate.lib. unimelb.edu.au/search/doc.do?ResultsID=10212E4189D1&SortType=chro nological&ItemNumber=3, accessed 17 March 2005. 3 Ross Garnaut, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee: Australia in relation to Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Discussion, 6 March 1998, Committee: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Reference: Australia in relation to Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Canberra Questioner: Cook, Sen Peter, p.763. 4 Mr Birch at Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee: Australia in relation to Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Discussion. 3 February 1998, Sydney, p.444. 5 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and Japan, China and South Korea. 6 Commission of the European Community, Communication of the Commission to the Council, Towards a New Asia Strategy, Com (94) 314 final, Brussels, 13 July 1994 and European Commission, Europe, Partner of Asia: European Community Instruments for Economic Cooperation, Brussels, 1996. The EU’s Asia strategy aims to raise the EU’s profile in Asia, encourage mutual understanding and strengthen the EU’s economic presence in the region. 7 The Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2005, Press Release. EU–Australia meeting focuses on bilateral relations and international cooperation. 03-02-2005. http://www.eu2005.lu/en/ actualites/communiques/2005/02/03eu_austr/index.html 8 For example, Department of Industry Science and Technology, Australia: Your Strategic Location, Canberra, DIST, Sept. 1995; Stroudgate (ed.), Trade 1
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Route Australia, W.H. Robinson, Sydney, London, 1999; Europe Australia Business Council, European Asia Pacific Business, Stroudgate Sydney, 2005. 9 Over 135 companies from the EU have established regional headquarters or centres in Australia, including Cadbury Schweppes, BASF, Vivendi, Deutsche Bank, Ericsson, Olivetti, Parmalat, Philips and Siemens. 10 All these factors feature on page 2 of a joint publication of the Department of Industry Science and Technology and the European Commission, published by the Department of Industry Science and Technology, Australia: Your Strategic Location, Canberra, DIST, Sept. 1995. 11 European Commission, EU–-US partnership: Commission proposals to strengthen economic and political relations Reference: IP/05/572 Brussels 18/05/2005 http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference=IP/05/572&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN, accessed 19 May 2005.
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Appendix 1
Joint Declaration on Relations Between The European Union And Australia (26 June 1997)
1.â•… Preamble We, the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, and Australia on the other, having regard to: − −
−
− − −
our close historical, political, economic and cultural ties; our shared commitments to the respect and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law which underpin our internal and international policies; the achievements already accomplished in the consolidation and development of our long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship; the need for heightened international cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world; our common interest in international peace, security and stability, and in sustainable development; our common commitment to free and open market principles and the strengthening of the multilateral trading system in accordance with the aims and principles of the WTO, and the development of a healthy and prosperous world economy;
−
the progress and accomplishments of the European Union and the growing importance of the Asia–Pacific region and Australia’s position as a major country in that region, have further decided to strengthen our relations and to cooperate across the many areas in which we have shared interests, to the mutual benefit of our peoples, and to endow our mutual relations with a long-term perspective.
2.â•… Common Goals We reaffirm our determination to build upon our partnership in order to: − −
−
−
−
− −
support democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; support peace and promote international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support international efforts in the areas of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and the international transfer of conventional weapons; pursue policies aimed at achieving a sound world economy marked by sustained economic growth with low inflation, a high level of employment, environmental protection, equitable social conditions and a stable international financial system; promote free market principles, improve market access in conformity with the WTO rules, and expand, promote and strengthen the multilateral trade system; foster mutual knowledge and understanding between our people and of our cultures; reaffirm our commitment to help developing countries in their pursuit of sustainable development and their efforts towards implementing political and economic reforms by improving development assistance, broadening market access and encouraging the efficient use of foreign assistance and national resources.
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3.â•… Dialogue and cooperation To further these goals, we will inform and consult each other with the objective to seek closer cooperation. We will enhance our dialogue, both bilaterally and in the relevant international fora, in particular on the following areas: −
−
− −
− −
the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this respect we will consult bilaterally and within the framework of the relevant bodies of the UN, especially the UN Commission on Human Rights, on human rights issues in general and, in particular, on how to advance our shared objectives of promoting human rights internationally; issues which affect world peace and security, including nonmilitary threats to security such as terrorism, the fight against organised crime, and the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; means of strengthening the United Nations and other international organisations and improving their effectiveness; the promotion, in full respect of international laws and treaties, of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe and the Asia–Pacific region; migration, asylum and refugee protection issues; questions concerning the information society, including the protection of personal data, and ways of preventing the use of the Internet to spread child pornography and other information which encourages child abuse.
Trade and economic cooperation We recognise the importance of strengthening the multilateral trading system and will continue to work together to support further trade liberalisation, greater transparency and the implementation of the WTO and OECD principles concerning both trade in goods and services and investment. We will pursue our dialogue on multilateral trade issues in the light of developments in the WTO, including the outcomes of WTO Ministerial meetings. We declare our intention to strengthen, expand and diversify our bilateral trade in goods and services as well as investments
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including through mutual efforts to improve market access and the flow of goods and services, in accordance with our respective international commitments. To those ends we will: −
−
−
−
−
devote attention, in the areas of services, to examine opportunities in the sectors of telecommunications, financial, maritime and professional services, on the basis of liberal and non-discriminatory principles; strengthen our bilateral dialogue on matters such as barriers to trade and trade facilitation, the protection of traditional expressions as provided for in the Wine Agreement, customs cooperation, standards and certification, public procurement access, the protection of geographical indications in conformity with the WTO TRIPS Agreement, as well as on veterinary, sanitary and phytosanitary matters; promote contacts and cooperation on agriculture and fisheries, and examine in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill the opportunities in our trade in agricultural and fisheries products; exchange information and encourage cooperation on industry, including information technology, mining, transport and energy, and, as appropriate, on aspects of our policies such as those related to competition and consumer protection. The existing consultative mechanisms will continue to play an active role in this respect through regular exchanges and meetings.
Employment Having in mind the similar challenges faced by our respective societies and our role as partners in the world economy, we underline the importance of creating employment opportunities. We will exchange views on our experience and ideas in this respect and will endeavour to strengthen our cooperation in the relevant fora such as OECD and ILO. Scientific and cultural cooperation, education and training With due respect to the existing linguistic and cultural diversity, we recognise the importance to promote better understanding and
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interaction between the peoples of the Member States of the EU and the people of Australia, including broader knowledge of their languages, cultures and institutions. Having that in mind, we will also promote dialogue aimed at: −
−
−
strengthening our mutual cooperation in the fields of education and training, science and technology including the information society; providing support to actions that further develop our links in the field of communication, information, culture and education, including academic and youth exchanges; exchanging expertise and information including on the recognition of academic and other qualifications, new educational technologies, and partnerships between education and training institutions and practitioners.
Environment We confirm that we will continue and strengthen our cooperation on environmental matters, both bilaterally and through international agreements and conventions. Development cooperation We attach a high priority to our respective policies to help developing countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable development and to alleviate poverty. In order to better achieve our common objectives, we will, as far as possible, coordinate our efforts and exchange pertinent information to this effect, in particular as regards the South Pacific region.
4.â•… Framework for Dialogue and Consultations We believe that our partnership will greatly benefit from the mutual knowledge and understanding, in particular through: − −
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consultations at ministerial level between the President of the Council, the European Commission and Australia; consultations as appropriate between officials of both sides to cover relevant aspects of the relationship, including briefings, as necessary, to Australian representatives on Common Foreign
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and Security Policy (CFSP) meetings, and by Australia to the Presidency and the European Commission on Australia’s foreign policy, including in relation to developments in the Asia Pacific region. Summit meetings between the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of Australia could also be considered if necessary.
We welcome the action taken by the European Parliament and the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia to improve their dialogue and thereby bring our respective peoples closer together. We resolve to develop and deepen the existing procedures for consultation in the light of the evolution of our relationship.
Website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/jd.htm Accessed 20.4.05
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Appendix 2
Chronology of European Union— Australia Relations
Year 1961
First British application to the European Economic Community.
1962
March 8. Australia’s first Ambassador to the European Communities, Sir Edwin McCarthy, CBE, assumed office in Brussels.
1967
Second British application to the European Communities.
1968
Agreement between Australia and the EU negotiated under Article XXVII (5) of GATT.
1970
Third (and successful) British application to the European Communities.
1973
United Kingdom joined European Economic Community.
1974
September. Visit of Sir Christopher Soames to Canberra. Agreement to hold informal consultations at official level between EC and Australia.
1974
December. Expiry of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
1974
December – January. PM Gough Whitlam visited EC Commission and Belgian, British, Irish, French, Italian and German governments. Discussion of meat import restrictions.
1975
Agreement between the EEC and Australia negotiated under Article XXVIII of the GATT. Modification of the Common Customs Tariff on lead and zinc.
1976
Commencement of consultations between the European Commission and Australia covering a range of bilateral and multilateral issues.
Year 1976
April 23. Bilateral talks held in Brussels at Australia’s request, under Article XXIII(1) of the GATT. Australia and US maintained that EC system for fruit and vegetables contravened certain GATT provisions.
1976
June. Consultations held in Brussels. Energy matters featured.
1977
March. Consultations held in Canberra. Energy matters featured.
1977
June. PM Malcolm Fraser visited the Commission. Proposed to Commission President Roy Jenkins that the informal discussions be transformed into regular high-level consultations between EC and Australia.
1977
July. Creation of Special Trade Representations portfolio. Appointment of John Howard as Minister for Special Trade Negotiations with the EC.
1977
October. Minister Howard led Australian delegation in talks with EC.
1978
Prospect of further enlargement of EC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal caused Australia to undertake a further reappraisal of EC– Australian relations.
1978
April. Mr Victor Garland (new Minister for Special Trade Negotiations with EC) visited EC member governments for talks on Australian access to the Community.
1978
May. Visit by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, to Europe.
1978
May. Visit of PM Fraser to Europe.
1978
June. Consultations between Australia and EC officials.
1978
June. British government submitted draft uranium agreement between Australia and Britain to Commission, in accordance with Article 103 of Euratom. (Later was blocked by Commission.)
1978
July. Agreement reached between Community and Australia regarding exports of steel products to the Community, designed to aid the EC steel industry through a recession.
1978
First formal meeting between Foreign Ministers of the EEC and ASEAN held in Brussels on 20–21 November.
1978
Report of the European Parliament’s Committee on External Economic Relations on the state of the Australian–EC relationship.
1979
May 29. PM Fraser announced that following intensive negotiations, outstanding issues between EC and Australia had been resolved.
1979
July 25. PM Fraser’s announcement that regular Ministerials were to be held between EC and Australia.
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Year 1979
September 18. Council of Ministers approved directives on an EC– Australia agreement on the transfer of nuclear materials, leading to the initial round of negotiations in October-November seeking to agree on a framework for the supply of Australian uranium to the Community.
1980
April. A round of ‘Ministerial Consultations’ in Canberra.1
1980
November 14. Signed Voluntary Restraint Agreement with the European Economic Community on mutton, lamb and goat meat. Amended on January 22 1990, with retrospective effect from January 1 1989 providing derogation from the principle agreement for 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.
1981
April. The permanent Delegation of the Commission of the European Community started operations in Canberra. The head of the Delegation is the official representative of the European Commission in Australia. (In December 1984 accreditation was extended to New Zealand.)
1981
September. Following two years of negotiations an agreement was signed between Euratom and Australia, setting out the framework for transfers of nuclear materials from Australia to the Community.
1981
December 1. Brussels. First round of Ministerials between Australia and the Commission of the European Communities. Commission delegation led by EC Vice-President Mr W. Haferkamp, Australia led by the Hon. Tony Street, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
1981
December 11. Signed agreement with the European Economic Community in the form of an exchange of letters concerning cheese. Valid initially to December 31, 1986. Renewed by tacit agreement unless either party terminates it by giving six months notice in writing.
1982
January 15. Agreement between Euratom and Australia came into force, regarding transfers of nuclear materials. Agreement duration: 30 years.
1982
Visit of Commission President Gaston Thorn. Official opening of Delegation in Canberra. Malcom Fraser present.
1983
May. Visit to Commission by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden and Primary Industry Minister John Kerin, to become familiar with current issues of EC–Australian relationship. Commission President Gaston Thorn suggested that a further meeting might take place in July, in addition to the Ministerial meeting scheduled for October.
1983
July 13–14. Brussels. Second Ministerial Consultations. Meeting between Australian Secretary of the Department of Trade, J. Scully, and the Commission Deputy Director-General for External Relations, Jos Loeff.
280
Appendices
Year 1984
March. Canberra. Third Ministerial Consultations. Meeting between EC Vice-President Haferkamp and Deputy PM and Minister for Trade Lionel Bowen, Senator Button, Senator Walsh, and Mr Kerin. Agreed that there be regular meetings between EEC/Australian agricultural and marketing experts. Inaugural meeting to be in Brussels in April. Initial moves towards Andriessen assurances.
1985
February. Visit by Minister for Resources and Energy Senator Gareth Evans to Rome, Vienna, Paris, and London.
1985
February 4–5. Visit of Australian PM Bob Hawke and Minister for Primary Industry John Kerin to Europe, partly to meet the new President of the Commission. Series of meetings on beef, sugar, dairy, wine, barley, dried vine fruit and the CAP. Andriessen assured the Australian government that the EC did not intend to flood the Asian region with subsidised beef exports. (Known as the Andriessen Assurances.) Formalised by a Commission letter undertaking to refrain, in present or currently foreseen circumstances, from supplying subsidised beef to South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia.
1985
April 29. Minister for Primary Industry announced the release of the report by the Australian Meat and Livestock Industry Policy Council on the EC threat to Australia’s beef markets in the Pacific Basin.
1985
April–May. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs conducts four week visit overseas, including the US, the UK, Italy, Greece.
1985
May 10. France conducted a nuclear test at Moruroa Atoll. Australian government objected.
1985
June 14. Brussels. Fourth Ministerial Consultations. Led by Commissioner Willy de Clercq, with Vice Presidents Andriessen and Narjes and Commissioner Mosar for EU, and by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden with Ministers Dawkins and Kerin for Australia.
1985
September 8–13. Visit to Australia by EC Deputy President Frans Andriessen. Re-iteration of assurances on beef exports in Asia.
1985
October 5–11. Visit to Australia by the European Commission’s Director-General for Energy, Mr Christopher Audland.
1986
April 19–26. PM Hawke visits London, Brussels, Rome and Athens. PM Hawke received affirmation of the Andriessen assurances.
1986
November 12. Canberra. Fifth Ministerial Consultations. Visit of Commissioner Willy de Clercq, meeting with PM Bob Hawke, and Ministers Hayden, Dawkins, Button, Kerin and Evans.
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Year 1986
The European Community and Australia took the first step towards cooperation in Science and Technology by signing an Arrangement to identify possible areas of cooperation in the field of research and technology.
1987
October 12. Brussels. Sixth Ministerial Consultations. Australian delegation – Ministers Kerin and Duffy. Commission delegation – Mr Willy de Clercq, Vice President Frans Andriessen.
1988
May 2–4. Canberra. Seventh Ministerial Consultations. EC delegation led by De Clercq, meeting with PM Hawke and Ministers Hayden, Button, Kerin and Duffy. Also meeting with opposition leader John Howard.
1988
May 5. Commissioner Willy De Clercq addressed the National Press Club in Canberra.
1988
May 6. Commissioner Willy De Clercq was the guest of honour at a Brisbane business of Australian Council for Europe president William Flintoft.
1990
January 22.€ Australia–EC Agreement on mutton, lamb and goat meat was amended with retrospective effect from January 1 1989 providing derogation from the principle agreement for 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.
1990
May 17. European Community and Australia agreed to enhance both the level and the quality of their dialogue on foreign policy questions through contact at Ministerial level on the system of European Political Cooperation. Th new terms of the dialogue were covered in a letter to Senator Evans from the Irish Foreign Minister as President of the Council of Ministers. It proposed that a meeting take place at Ministerial level whenever deemed necessary and with the Presidency Political Director every six months.
1990
June 5. Brussels. Eighth Ministerial Consultations. Australian delegation led by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Minister Kerin. Commission delegation led by Vice Presidents Andriessen and Pandolfi, and Commissioner Mac Sharry. Agreement that Australian and EC aid officials would seek more frequent opportunities to consult their counterparts.
1991
April. An EC/Australia High Level Group on Energy was established. It was formed to discuss national energy policy and programs, bilateral energy relations with other countries and global energy issues. The Group met for the first time in Brussels in April 1992 but has not met again since.
282
Appendices
Year 1991
May 20. Ninth Ministerial Consultations held in Canberra. Commission delegation led by Commissioner Andriessen, Australian delegation led by Senator Evans, included Ministers Kerin and Blewett. An arrangement for regular consultations and exchanges of information on the environment was established through an exchange of letters between Senator Evans and Vice President of the Commission Andriessen.
1991
May. Following the Ministerial discussions in May, the Government revived the Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG). ATMEG’s purpose is to provide a regular forum for Australian and Commission officials to discuss developments in global and bilateral agricultural commodity trade.
1991
May. Agreement given to establish an Australia–European Union Joint Group on Industrial Cooperation. The objective was to encourage greater industrial cooperation between the European Union and Australia.
1991
June. Ministerial consultations with the EC Presidency held in Luxembourg between Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans and Luxembourg Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Jacques Poos.
1991
September 18. Ministerial consultations with the EC Presidency held in the Hague between Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans and the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hans van den Broek.
1992
March 16. Brussels. Tenth Ministerial Consultations. Focussed on Uruguay Round. Commission delegation led by Andriessen, Australian delegation included Senator Evans and Minister Kerin. Australia and the European Community signed a memorandum providing for the extension to Australia of the European Business Cooperation Network (BC-NET), a database designed to develop business contacts between small and medium sized enterprises.
1992
December 8. Officials from the Community and Australian and NZ governments had exporatory discussions on the possibility of an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment.
1993
January 18.€ Ministerial consultations with the EC Presidency held in Copenhagen between Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans and the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Niels Helveg Petersen.
1993
September 23.€ Ministerial consultations with the EU Presidency held in Brussels between Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans and the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Willy Claes.
1993
Commitment on Coal negotiated between the EC and Australia in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round).
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Year 1994
Framework Partnership Agreement between European Commission and Care Australia.
1994
January. Signature of the European Community/Australia Wine Agreement. Under the agreement, the Community has accepted Australian wine-making practices as comparable to European practices. The Commission has also agreed to remove technical barriers which had prevented the export of some Australian dessert wines.
1994
February. Ministerial consultations and Senior Officials Meeting held in Canberra.
1994
February 23. Canberra. Eleventh Ministerial Consultations. An agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between Australia and the European Community was signed in Canberra. Under the agreement, Australian researchers were to be able to join with their European counterparts as full participants in research programs which are managed by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union. It was also to encourage European participation in Australian research activities.
1994
April 15. Formal conclusion of the Uruguay Round at Marrakesh.
1994
March. Second meeting of Australia/EC Joint Group on Industrial Cooperation, in Europe.
1994
June. Prime Minister Paul Keating visited Brussels for bilateral discussions with Commission President Jacques Delors.
1994
July 6.€ Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (German) held in Bonn between Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans and German Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel.
1994
Negotiations began on a Mutual Recognition Agreement on Standards Certification (MRA). Australia is the first country, together with New Zealand, with which the EU has begun to negotiate such an agreement. An MRA with the EU was to see Union-wide accreditation of Australian certification facilities and was to represent an important trade facilitation measure.
1994
September. The latest in a regular exchange of parliamentary Delegation visits took place when an Australian delegation visited the European parliamentary institutions. The European Parliament has a specific Committee for Relations with Australia and New Zealand which visits every two years. A delegation from Australia reciprocates in alternating years.
1995
March 12. Informal meeting of The Joint Group on Industrial Cooperation, which was formed to encourage greater industrial cooperation between the European Union and Australia, at the margins of CeBiT Trade Fair.
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Appendices
Year 1995
April. Exchange of letters took place between Prime Minister Paul Keating and Commission President Santer suggesting that the EU and Australia looked at ways of giving formal expression to the relationship by developing a framework, along the lines of the EU’s agreements with other OECD countries, reaffirming our mutual commitment to expanding the partnership to achieve common goals.
1995
May 15. Brussels. Twelfth Ministerial Consultations, between Senator Bob McMullan, Minister for Trade, and Commission President Jacques Santer. Parallel Senior Officials’ Meeting and EU/Australia High Level Environmental Talks also held.
1995
May 16.€ Consultations with the EU Presidency held in Paris between Trade Minister, Senator Bob McMullan and French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alain Juppe.
1995
May 25–31. Official visit of the European Parliamentary Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand, to Australia.
1995
October 5. Biannual Ministerial Consultations with the EU Presidency held in Madrid between Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana.
1996
April 22. EU Foreign Ministers approve a mandate for the Commission to negotiate a new agreement with Australia.
1996
April 23. Downer announces that Australia and the EU will negotiate a Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement and Joint Political Declaration. Notes that the relationship has entered a ‘new phase’.
1996
June 3. Thirteenth Ministerial Consultation between Australia and the European Commission, held in Brussels.
1996
July 23. EU and Australia (and NZ) initialled the Mutual Recognition Agreement on Conformity Assessment.
1996
July 17. First and only round of negotiations on the framework agreement.
1996
September 20. Downer in Europe. In Bonn, Downer stated that differences in attitude between East and West on human rights were often overstated. In London, Downer discussed the human rights clause problem with British Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind. FCO said Britain was keen to see an early agreement between Australia and the EU.
1997
January 27.€Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Dutch) held in The Hague between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Hans Van Mierlo, Dutch Foreign Minister.
1997
January 29. Discussions between Commission (Vice President Brittan) and Downer on proposed Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement in Brussels.
Appendices
285
Year 1997
January 30. Negotiations for the proposed Framework Agreement between Australia and the EU stalled over the inclusion of a human rights clause.
1997
February. Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Australia Aneurin Hughes stated in EU news that the Australia–EU relationship was ‘flowering’ and that no notice was to be taken of the media ‘brouhaha’ surrounding the human rights clause.
1997
March. Decision to negotiate a non-treaty status Political Agreement rather than a Framework Agreement.
1997
June 26. Joint Declaration signed in Luxembourg by Commission VP Brittan, Dutch Foreign Minister/ Council President Hans van Mierlo and Australian Foreign Minister Downer. Press releases from Brittan and Downer.
1997
July 28. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Luxembourg) held in Kuala Lumpur between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Jacques Poos, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Cooperation, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
1997
Exchange of Letters recorded the common understanding on the principles of international cooperation on research and development activities in the domain of Intelligent Manufacturing Systems between the European Community and the United States of America, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EFTA countries of Norway and Switzerland.
1997
September 11. Fourteenth Ministerial Consultation between Australia and the European Commission. Hosted by Sir Leon Brittan in Brussels, Australian delegation led by Deputy PM and Minister for Trade Tim Fischer.
1998
Euratom/ Australia Cooperation Agreement. Exchange of letters on the return of plutonium to Japan.
1998
Agreement signed on Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment, Certification and Markings between the European Community and Australia.
1998
January 28. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidentcy (UK) held in London between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Robin Cook, British Foreign Minister.
1998
February 6. Australian Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism John Moore visited Brussels. Finalised negotiations for Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on conformity assessment with Sir Leon Brittan.
1998
June 23. Second Europe–Australia dialogue involving business and academic communities and the media.
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Appendices
Year 1998
June 24. Fifteenth Ministerial Consultations between EU and Australia held in Canberra. Hosted by Tim Fischer, Alexander Downer. Commission Delegation led by Sir Leon Brittan.
1998
June 24. Australian Minister John Moore, Commission VP Leon Brittan and British High Commissioner Alex Allan (note British Presidency of Commission) signed Agreement of Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment, Certification and Markings between the European Community and Australia.
1999
January 1. EC/Australia MRA (and EC/NZ MRA) came into effect.
1999
February 2. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Germany) held in Bonn between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Joscka Fischer, German Foreign Minister.
1999
April 14. Second Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia held in Brussels.
1999
May 24. Sixteenth Ministerial Consultations and Senior Officials Meeting held in Brussels, attended by the Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister Mr Fischer and Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission. Parallel Senior Officials’ Meeting was held.
1999
July 28. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Finland) held in Singapore between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Ms Tarja Halonen, Finnish Foreign Minister.
2000
February 2. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Portugal) held in Lisbon between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Jaime Gama, Portuguese Foreign Minister.
2000
March 14. Third Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia held in Brussels.
2000
July 28. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (France) held in Bangkok between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Charles Josselin, French Secretary for State Development.
2001
February 2. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Sweden) held in Stockholm between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Ms Anna Lindh, Swedish Foreign Minister.
2001
April 19. Seventeenth Ministerial Consultations held in Canberra between Foreign Minister Mr Downer, Trade Minister Mr Mark Vaile, and Mr Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations. Parallel Senior Officials’ Meeting was held.
2001
April 25. Bilateral consultations on development assistance.
2001
April. Establishment of the National Europe Centre, with speeches by Commissioner Patten and Foreign Minister Downer.
2001
April. Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Global Information Economy announced between Australia and the EU.
Appendices
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Year 2001
May 29–31. Meeting on Joint Science and Technology Consultative Committee back to back with the first Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST).
2001
June 15. Fourth Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia held in Brussels.
2001
July 6. An EU high level mission met Environment Minister, Senator Hill to prepare negotiations on Climate Change.
2001
July 26. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Belgium) held in Hanoi between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Louis Michel, Belgian Foreign Minister, and Mr Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations.
2002
January 31. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Spain) held in Madrid between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Mr Josep Pique, Spanish Foreign Minister, and Mr Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations.
2002
February 28. Minister for Environment and Heritage, Dr David Kemp visited Brussels to meet with the EC Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström and members of the European Parliament Environment Committee.
2002
March 21. The Australia–EU Consumer Protection Arrangement signed in Brussels on 21 March 2002 by the Australian Ambassador to the EU, Belgium and Luxembourg, Ms Joanna Hewitt and the Director-General of the EC Health and Consumer Protection Directorate, Mr Ronald Coleman.
2002
March 25. First Security Dialogue between Australia and EU senior officials held in Brussels.
2002
April 18. Eighteenth Ministerial Consultations held in Brussels. Australia was represented by a team of three senior Ministers comprising the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr John Anderson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Mr Philip Ruddock. Commissioner Patten and Commissioners Fischler, Lamy and Vitorino represented the European side. A preceding Senior Officials’ Meeting was held.
2002
May 17. Mr Vaile visited Brussels to pursue trade and investment interests with the Commission and business representatives.
2002
July 9–11. The Prime Minister, Mr John Howard, visited Brussels to meet with Commission President Romano Prodi and the full European Commission.
2002
July 15–17. European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy visited Australia, hosted by Trade Minister Vaile, to meet with the Prime Minister and several Cabinet Ministers, as well as senior business leaders and the representatives of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid.
288
Appendices
Year 2002
July 17–18. Minister for Environment and Heritage Dr David Kemp visited Brussels.
2002
July 31. Ministerial Consultations with EU Presidency (Denmark) held in Brunei between Foreign Minister Mr Downer and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2002
October 8. European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson visited Australia.
2002
November 14–15. European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy visited Australia for the WTO mini-ministerial summit and talks with Minister Vaile.
2003
January. Mr Downer held talks in Berlin with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2003
January 26–27. Mr Downer visited Brussels for talks with European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana, and Mr John Kerr, Secretary-General to the Convention on the Future of Europe.
2003
February 25. Annual Australia–EU Senior Officials’ Meeting held in Canberra.
2003
March 10. Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Senator Richard Alston visited Brussels.
2003
April 9. Sixth Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia held in Brussels.
2003
April 14. Annual Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG) held in Canberra.
2003
April 16. Nineteenth Ministerial Consultations held in Melbourne. Australia was represented by Mr Downer and Mr Vaile. Commissioner Patten represented the European Commission.
2003
April. Australia and the European Commission adopted the strategy Australia and the European Union: an agenda for cooperation. This initiative identified practical measures to advance high priorities in the partnership over the next five years.
2003
June 30. Second Senior Officials’ Dialogue on Migration and Asylum held in Brussels.
2003
September/October. Attorney-General Darryl Williams visit to Brussels.
2003
November. Fourth FEAST Forum held in Canberra.
2003
November 12. Seventh Joint Science and Technology Consultative Committee (JTSCC) meeting held in Canberra.
Appendices
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Year 2003
November 17. High level environment talks held in Canberra.
2004
January. Mr Downer held talks in Davos with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2004
January 21. Ministerial Consultations with EU Irish Presidency in Dublin.
2004
January 28. European Commissioner Poul Nielson visited Sydney.
2004
March 15. Second Security Dialogue held in Brussels.
2004
March 31. Mr Downer held talks in Berlin with Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr Javier Solana.
2004
April 19. Inaugural Development Dialogue held in Brussels.
2004
April 19–28. Australian Parliamentary Delegation’s visit to Strasbourg and Brussels, led by Senate President Paul Calvert.
2004
April 26. Annual Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG) held in Brussels.
2004
April 26–27. Quarantine talks held in Brussels.
2004
April 27. First Australia–EU informal trade dialogue held in Brussels.
2004
April 28. Annual Australia–EU Senior Officials’ Meeting held in Brussels.
2004
May 12. Minister for Trade Mark Vaile’s visit to Brussels and meetings with Commissioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler and Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy.
2004
May 18. Twentieth Ministerial Consultations held in Brussels. Australia was represented by Mr Downer. Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten represented the European Commission, together with Commissioner for Development Cooperation Poul Nielson and Commissioner Danuta Hubner. Mr Downer also met with Commission President Romano Prodi, Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Antonio Vitorino and Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen.
290
Appendices
Year 2005
January 31 – February 4. Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer’s visit to Brussels to meet with European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, and the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana. Counter-terrorism cooperation to be discussed in talks with newly installed Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner, Franco Frattini. Downer to attend annual ‘Troika’ talks with the Commission and the EU Luxembourg Presidency. Talks focussed on the future of the EU– Australia relationship and on issues specifically related to the Asia– Pacific as well as bilateral cooperation.
2005
February 6–13. Visit of 15 MEPs as part of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Australia and New Zealand.
2005
February 24. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services John Anderson’s visit to Brussels to meet EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot to discuss long-running negotiations over a horizontal agreement (the preliminary first step towards a final pact) on air services between Australia and the EU. Also meeting with Regional Policy Commissioner Danuta Hübner on 24 February, Anderson and Hübner agreed that the EU and Australia faced similar problems in terms of growth and sustainability in regional areas.
2005
April. Eighth Joint Science and Technology Consultative Committee (JTSCC) meeting held in Brussels
2005
April 7. Annual Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG) held in Canberra
1 According to DFAT sources and Lodge, first round of Ministerials in Canberra. However, no press releases, ministerial reports or high level reports eventuated. Commission sources list the December 1981 meeting in Brussels as being the first ministerial consultation.
Appendices
291
Appendix 3
Australia and the European Union: an agenda for cooperation
Australia and the European Union: an agenda for future cooperation The 1997 Joint Declaration on Relations between Australia and the European Union formalised our commitment to enhanced cooperation across a wide-ranging agenda. At our consultations in Brussels in April 2002, we agreed to take stock of developments in our relationship since the signing of the Joint Declaration and to identify priorities for future cooperation. Our review reveals that, under the Joint Declaration, we have achieved a dynamic work program and intensified exchanges between Australia and the European Union to make progress on a diverse range of common interests (the details are set out in a separate stocktaking document). These have included establishing dialogue processes on trade and economic matters, strategic issues, immigration and asylum, environment policies and initiating bilateral cooperation projects in education and science and technology. We have also created a framework for frank but constructive consultations in areas where we have diverging assessments and perspectives.
The increasing breadth of our engagement and heightened cooperation has reflected the further integration of the European Union and its enhanced role in economic policy, foreign and security policy and on justice and home affairs issues. We reaffirm our determination to build upon our partnership to meet the challenges of an increasingly interdependent world. The objectives set out in the Joint Declaration remain a sound and enduring foundation for enhancing our bilateral relationship and pursuing cooperation in the international environment. In particular, we have identified the following areas as high priorities in our cooperative agenda over the next five years: Security and Strategic Issues Noting the success of the first Australia-European Union strategic dialogue in 2002 and, in light of a volatile global environment, we will increase sharing of our assessments on international and regional security developments, including through high-level exchanges on strategic issues. We will devote particular attention to: intensifying cooperation on counter-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection, including by exchanging information on international terrorist networks and protection of information infrastructure, and by supporting counterterrorism capacity-building in the Asia–Pacific region; enhancing our dialogue on non-proliferation and export control issues, particularly with respect to regulating trade in dual-use items and on our respective engagement with countries of concern; developing police cooperation, including exploring the possibility of bilateral cooperation between Australian law enforcement authorities and Europol.
Trade We commit to resolving outstanding issues in our bilateral Wine Agreement.
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We will co-operate on progressing the WTO Doha Development Agenda and resolve in particular to progress issues of mutual benefit. Notwithstanding differences in some areas, we will continue in our joint efforts to ensure an ambitious approach overall: on market access issues, on rule-making issues and on issues related to development. We recognise the importance and complexity of the negotiations on agriculture and express commitment to reaching an outcome consistent with the Doha declaration. We will continue to work closely together with the aim of concluding successfully these negotiations. As to developing countries, we will work together to implement and promote policies to grant duty- and quota-free market access for least-developed countries; to assist these countries with access to affordable medicines; and to deliver technical assistance and capacity-building activities. We will focus on resolving differences on bilateral agriculture and trade issues, including SPS matters, through intensified consultations, particularly in the Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group. The two sides will work together constructively on internal and international regulatory frameworks (such as the Office International des Epizooties, the International Plant Protection Convention and the Codex Alimentarius). Regarding the Mutual Recognition Agreement between us, we will work together to simplify the operation of the Agreement and to remove existing origin restrictions. Education and Science and Technology Having successfully initiated the first Australia-European Union pilot project on higher education cooperation, we have agreed that a second pilot project be established on a similar matching-funding basis when the necessary funding procedures will have been finalised. Following on from the pilot projects and building on the existing
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Appendices
cooperative relationship, we will consult further on the best means to consolidate our partnership in prioritising education and research linkages in the longer term. We will also seek to broaden opportunities for students to participate in exchanges, including exploring Australia’s participation in Erasmus World when adopted. We will develop an action plan designed to stimulate collaborative Australia–European Union scientific and technological projects within the European Union’s Sixth Framework Program for Research. This will include practical initiatives such as: promoting awareness of science and technology (S&T) collaboration through (1) a major annual S&T event; and (2) information sessions throughout Australia on the Sixth Framework Program and how Australian researchers can become involved; facilitating joint S&T projects by conducting joint thematic workshops in areas of mutual interest such as (1) end-use energy efficiency programs; (2) beef production – management systems and quarantine; (3) nanomaterials for personal and resource security; (4) sustainable land transport; and (5) information society technologies, as proposed to DG Research; and an evaluation to assess the outcomes and benefits of joint participation in the Fifth Framework Program for Research. We are committed to make optimal use of the Forum for European– Australian Science and Technology cooperation (FEAST) as a key vehicle in this process. Transport We will develop arrangements between the Australian Global Navigation Satellite System Coordination Committee and the European Commission to enable cooperation associated with the Galileo Satellite Navigation project, including:
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a framework for ongoing cooperation with the Galileo Joint Undertaking; on ground infrastructure in Australia; the potential for industrial co-operation; scientific and commercial Galileo applications; associated industry research and development; co-operative research in the field of the radiofrequency spectrum, including research into mitigation of signal interference. We will increase cooperative activity in the fields of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and sustainable transport strategies. We will cooperate closely on transportation, including the aviation liberalisation agenda in multilateral fora such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and by working towards a bilateral agreement on relaxing ownership and control rules, inward investment opportunities, and opportunities to develop intermodal services in our respective markets. With a view to facilitating possible later informal exchange of information and opinions on the basis of a ‘correspondence group’, we will exchange details of headquarters’ officials responsible for different aspects of maritime, aviation and land transport security.
Environment On the basis of the existing framework of cooperation, we will continue to collaborate on climate change. In particular, specific attention could be given to: technology development and deployment;
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climate science, impacts and adaptation; harmonisation of emissions monitoring, reporting, verification and certification procedures; and evolution of mitigation commitments. We agree to improve mutual understanding of our respective approaches to environment protection and on how our approaches impact on international policy setting and our respective and joint interests. We will seek opportunities to cooperate on environmental priorities and programs, including in the broader Asia–Pacific region. Development Cooperation We will pursue opportunities for further collaboration in our development cooperation programs in areas of mutual interest, including through: assisting the recovery and nation-building processes in East Timor (particularly over the next three years) and in the Solomon Islands; gearing programs to build good governance and economic growth in nations in the Pacific, particularly PNG; and providing support and funding for the Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS and Development. Migration and Asylum We will enhance our exchange of information and cooperation on approaches to manage the challenges posed by global people flows, consulting closely in multilateral fora and bilaterally. In particular, we will focus on development of policy settings and practical cooperation with respect to: asylum seeker and refugee readmission to countries of first asylum;
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improving capacity-building (including in border management) in third countries that are of mutual interest; the integration of migrants and the nexus between development and migration; exchange of information relevant to fight people-smuggling, human trafficking and related transnational crime; and exchange of information on the development of new technologies and electronic support structures that could assist in combating irregular migration, and identity and document fraud.
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Appendix 4
Stocktake Of Australia—EU Cooperation And Dialogue Under The 1997 Joint Declaration On Relations Between Australia And The European Union Signed On 26 June 1997 Updated To 18 May 2004
Joint Declaration Item
Engagement to date
Dialogue and Cooperation The Prime Minister, John Howard, visit to Brussels inâ•› July 2002. Total number of consultations with the EU Presidency since 26 June 1997 = 13. Total number of annual Ministerial Consultations, Senior Officials’ and Agricultural and Trade Marketing Experts’ Group meetings since 26 June 1997 = 21. Total number of Australian Ministerial visits to Brussels and European Commissioner visits to Australia since 26 June 1997 = 33. Total number of Parliamentary Delegation visits since 26 June 1997 = 4. Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions
•â•…Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, visits to Brussels in May 2004, January 2003, April 2002, January 2000 and February 1999; and visit to Luxembourg in June 1997 to sign the Joint Declaration. •â•…Minister for Trade, Mark Vaile, visit to Brussels in May 2004 and 2002. •â•…Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, John Anderson, and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Philip Ruddock, visit to Brussels in April 2002 to attend Ministerial Consultations. •â•…European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, visits to Australia in April 2003 and 2001 to attend Ministerial Consultations. •â•…Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer, visits to Brussels in May 1999 and September 1997 to attend Ministerial Consultations. •â•…Vice President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, visit to Australia in June 1998 to attend Ministerial Consultations. Parliamentary Delegations – •â•…Australian Parliamentary Delegation led by the President of the Senate, Senator the Hon Paul Calvert, visit to Strasbourg and Brussels in April 2004. •â•…Australian Parliamentary Delegation led by The Speaker, House of Representatives, Neil Andrew, visit to Brussels in September 2002. •â•…European Parliamentary Delegation visit to Australia in May 2001. •â•…Australian Parliamentary Delegation led by the Hon Bruce Baird visit to Brussels in 2000.
300
Appendices
The protection and Covered by Ministerial Consultations and promotion of human overarching discussions rights and fundamental Minister/Commissioner visits – freedoms. In this respect we will consult •â•…Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, held talks with European High bilaterally and within Representative for Common Foreign and the framework of the Security Policy, Javier Solana, in Berlin in relevant bodies of the March 2004, in Davos in January 2004, and in UN, especially the UN Brussels in January 2003. Commission on Human Rights, on human •â•…The Attorney-General, Darryl Williams, held rights issues in general talks with Commissioner for Internal Market, and, in particular, on Frederik Bolkestein, and members of the how to advance our European Parliament in Brussels in shared objectives of September/October 2003. promoting human •â•…Minister for Justice and Customs, Amanda rights internationally. Vanstone, visit to Brussels in April 2000. Issues which affect world peace and Australia–EU Strategic Dialogue – first high level security, including nonofficials’ dialogue held in March 2002 in Brussels. military threats to Second round of dialogue held in Brussels in security such as March 2004. terrorism, the fight EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament against organised Cooperation Initiative (NDCI) Conference – crime, and the illicit Australian participation at officials’ level in trade in narcotic drugs Brussels in December 2002. and psychotropic substances. Commonwealth law enforcement agencies cooperation with European counterparts – Australian Federal Police and Australian Customs Service officers posted in Europe. Their presence facilitates a significant amount of cooperation in investigations characterised as transnational, particularly drug trafficking. Bilateral Customs agreements have been negotiated with European Customs administrations to facilitate exchange of information relevant to such investigations.
Appendices
301
Australian Customs – maintains contacts with European Customs administrations and the European Commission on a range of matters including Customs reform & modernisation, Customs harmonisation and Customs involvement in counter terrorism. The focus for Australian Customs discussions with the Commission since early 2003 has been to negotiate an ‘adequacy’ finding for Australian Customs procedures for online access to airline databases to allow risk assessment of ‘high risk’ passengers. The World Customs Organisation is located in Brussels and Australian Customs plays a significant role in its activities, contributing to setting global standards for data harmonisation, risk assessment and supply chain security management. Means of strengthening the UN and other international organisations and improving their effectiveness.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions
The promotion, in full respect of international laws and treaties, of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions
Migration, asylum and refugee protection issues.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions
Australia–EU Troika Talks on Asia – senior officials’ talks agreed to at the Ministerial Consultations with the EU Presidency in January 1998. Annual talks commenced in May 1998. Six rounds have been held. The last round was held in April 2003.
Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Philip Ruddock, held talks with Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris Patten, in April 2003 and April 2001 in Canberra, and in April 2002 in Brussels. He also met with Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, Antonio Vitorino, in April 2002.
302
Appendices
•â•…Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Philip Ruddock, visits to Brussels in March and January 2000, and in Paris in July 2000, for high level discussions with EU officials. Also consultations with the Danish EU Presidency in 2002. Senior officials’ level dialogue on immigration and asylum issues between Australia and the EU – agreed to at the 2002 Ministerial Consultations in Brussels. The first round of talks was held in Brussels in July 2002, and the second round was held in Brussels in June 2003. Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…Minister for Trade, Mark Vaile, visits to Brussels in May 2004, May 2002, May 2001, July 2000 and October 1999. •â•…European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, visits to Australia in November 2002 to attend the Informal WTO Ministerial Meeting in Sydney, and July 2002. •â•…Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, John Anderson, visit to Brussels in April 2002. •â•…Minister for Regional Services, Territories and Local Government, Ian MacDonald, visit to Brussels in September 2000. •â•…Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Warren Truss, visit to Brussels in November 1999. Senior Officials’ visits – •â•…Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry visit to Brussels in December 2003, October 2002 and July 2001. •â•…Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service visits to Brussels in June 2003, 2002 and 2001– to attend annual Council sessions of the World Customs Organization. •â•…Chief Veterinary Officer visit to Brussels in December 2003 and July 2001.
Appendices
303
•â•…Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, visit to Brussels in November 2003. •â•…Chairman, Australian Financial Reporting Council, visits to Brussels in October and April 2002. •â•…Deputy Director General, European Central Bank, meeting with Assistant Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia in August 2002. •â•…Chief Executive Officer, The National Office for the Information Economy, visit to Brussels in July 2002. •â•…Executive Director, Australia Greenhouse Office, visit to Brussels in October 2003. Special Visits Program – •â•…Head of Unit, Directorate-General Internal Market, Pierre Delsaux, visit to Australia in November 2003. •â•…Adviser to President Romano Prodi, Alex Stubb, visit to Australia in March 2003. •â•…Director-General Agriculture, José Manuel Silva Rodriguez, visit to Australia in March 2002. Europe–Australia Business Dialogue (The Global Foundation) – held at regular intervals, often in conjunction with government-togovernment meetings; last discussions with the European Commission held in Brussels in July 2002. Department of Transport and Regional Services and DG Energy and Transport – talks on EC– Australia cooperation on international aviation matters. Previous talks held November 2002. Trilateral (Australia/New Zealand/Singapore) discussions with DG Energy and Transport in Brussels in October 2003, and in Singapore in May 2004. Regular dialogue between the Department of the Treasury and the Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate.
304
Appendices
Devote attention, in the area of services, to examine opportunities in the sectors of telecommunications, financial, maritime and professional services, on the basis of liberal and nondiscriminatory principles.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions
Strengthen our bilateral dialogue on matters such as barriers to trade and trade facilitation, the protection of traditional expressions as provided for in the Wine Agreement, customs cooperation, standards and certification, public procurement access, the protection of geographical indications in conformity with the WTO TRIPS Agreement, as well as on veterinary, sanitary and phytosanitary matters.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions First informal trade policy talks held in Brussels in April 2004. Agreement on Trade in Wine, protocol and six exchanges of letters (1994) – ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the Committee established under the Agreement on a range of issues, including the phase out of dates for certain geographical indications and on protection for traditional expressions; last negotiations held in Brussels in April 2004. Agreement on Mutual Recognition in Relation to Conformity Assessment, Certificates and Markings -signed on 24 June 1998, providing for mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, certificates and markings between Australia and the European Community in the eight sectors of Medicinal Products Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection and Batch Certification (implemented 1 January 1999), Medical Devices (implemented 1 January 1999), Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Low Voltage Equipment, Electromagnetic Compatibility, Machinery, Pressure Equipment, Automotive Products. Regular Joint Committee meeting last held in Wellington, New Zealand in October 2002. SPS/Quarantine discussions – agreed to at the Quint meeting of Agricultural Ministers in July 2002, and held in Brussels in October 2002. Quarantine talks held in Brussels in April 2004. Draft Agreement on Sanitary Measures applicable to Trade in Live Animals and Animal Products – not finalised.
Appendices
305
Food Safety exchange program between Australia and the European Commission – an Australian FSANZ officer was placed in the European Commission in 2001. Promote contacts and cooperation on agriculture and fisheries, and examine in a spirit of cooperation and good will the opportunities in our trade in agriculture and fisheries products.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG) – meetings held annually at senior officials’ level with the European Commission; meetings held in conjunction with the annual Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM).
Exchange information and encourage cooperation on industry, including information technology, mining, transport and energy, and, as appropriate, on aspects of our policies such as those related to competition and consumer protection.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Senator Richard Alston, visit to Brussels in March 2003. Data Protection – ongoing discussions on data protection arrangements. Last talks held in March 2002. Peter Ford, then Acting Deputy Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, visited Brussels in October 2003. Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Global Information Economy between Australia and the European Union – signed at the Ministerial Consultations in Canberra in April 2001; progress report tabled at the 2002 Ministerial Consultations. Coal Experts’ Meeting held in Brussels in October 2003. Coal Agreement – negotiated in 1993, reviewed in 2000 and extended until 31 December 2002. The Agreement established a High Level Group on Energy, providing a forum for the exchange of views relating to the international and domestic energy scene. The group met only once. EU–Australia Coal Conference held at Aachen, Germany in September 2001.
306
Appendices
Regular bilateral consultations to ensure the satisfactory implementation of the Euratom/ Australia Agreement. Consumer Protection Arrangement – signed in Brussels on 21 March 2002. Regular cooperation on consumer protection issues between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Competition Directorate of the European Commission. Employment Exchange views on our experience and ideas [of creating employment opportunities] in this respect and will endevour to strengthen cooperation in the relevant fora such as OECD and ILO.
* Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work – strong cooperative relationship including development of joint web site (www.nohsc-eu.gov.au) launched in July 2001 to promote information sharing on current health and safety topics. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work – sought and granted permission in January 2002 to use Australian Occupational Health and Safety Thesaurus as the basis for development of a multilingual thesaurus of occupational safety and health terms in the official EU languages.
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation Strengthening our mutual cooperation in the fields of education and training, science and technology including the information society.
* Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…Commissioner for Education and Culture, Viviane Reding, visit to Australia in September 2000. Senior Officals’ visits – •â•…DG Research Delegation visit to Canberra in November 2003. •â•…Australian Gene Technology Regulator, Dr Sue Meek, visit to Brussels in October 2002.
Appendices
307
1997 Exchange of Letters – recorded the common understanding on the principles of international cooperation on research and development activities in the domain of intelligent manufacturing systems between the European Community and the United States of America, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EFTA countries of Norway and Switzerland. Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Cooperation between Australia and the EU (1994/1995) – amended in 1999 to enable Australians to participate in the EU Framework Programs. Number of projects under the Fourth Framework Program (1994-1998) = 34. Number of projects under the Fifth Framework Program (1998–2002) = 55. The Sixth Framework Program launched in Brussels in November 2002 and attended by an Australian delegation. An Australian Ministerlevel representative for Education and Science and Training for Europe to be established in 2004 (to be based in Brussels). National Health and Medical Research Council – established a fund to support Australian participation in projects selected under the Framework Programs. Joint Science and Technology Consultative Committee – established under the Cooperation Agreement to meet alternately in Brussels and Canberra, as required, to discuss issues of mutual interest. It has met seven times, the last meeting was held in Canberra in November 2003. The eighth JSTCC will be held in Brussels in October 2004. Forum for European–Australia Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST) – launched on 9 November 2000 to highlight science, engineering and technology cooperation. The first event was held in Canberra on 30–31May 2001; FEAST 2 was held in Melbourne on 8 July 2002; FEAST 3 was held in Australia as a roadshow from November 2002 to March 2003; FEAST 4 was held in Canberra in November 2003. Future EU funding for FEAST is currently being reviewed.
308
Appendices
Hydrogen-powered fuel cell buses – agreement by the West Australian Government and European Commission in August 2002 to share research information on trials of hydrogenpowered fuel cell buses. Galileo satellite system – Australian GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) Coordination Committee and Department of Transport and Regional Services officials’ discussions with European Commission on cooperation in development of Galileo in April 2002. Consultations on a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are continuing. European Union S&T related events – a number of Australian delegations participated in EU S&T activities with government support, eg, support for the Australia–European Union Nanotechnology Capabilities Workshop held in November 2003. Providing support to actions that further develop our links in the fields of communication, information, culture and education, including academic and youth exchanges.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Australia–European Union Pilot Project on Higher Education Cooperation – agreement reached in February 2004 to commence a third pilot project involving exchange of Masters degree students between a number of selected Australian and European universities. Applications close on 16 June with the winning proposal to be announced in July 2004. This follows early indications of success in the first pilot project – Learning through Exchange – Agriculture, Food Systems and Environment (LEAFSE) which was launched in November 2002 involving 72 students studying abroad. The second pilot – a three-year Coursework Masters Exchange Programme in International Relations: A European–Australia Asia Pacific Nexus (EAAPN) – commenced in April 2004 and will extend over three years.
Appendices
309
National Europe Centre – proposal to create a National Europe Centre (NEC) at the Australian National University (ANU) received formal political agreement at 2001 Ministerial Consultations. In April 2001 the European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten announced an initial grant, spread over three years, of €740,000, with matching funding from ANU. Recent major events include conferences on enlargement, agriculture, environment and financial services. Exchanging expertise and information including on the recognition of academic qualifications, new educational technologies, and partnerships between education and training institutions and practitioners.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Australian membership of ENIC-NARIC (European Network of Information CentresNational Academic Recognition Information Centres) (European electronic academic recognition network).
Environment We confirm that we will continue and strengthen our cooperation on environmental matters, both bilaterally and through international agreements and conventions.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Dr David Kemp, meeting with European Commissioner for Environment, Margot Wallstrom, in Brussels in July and February 2002. •â•…European Commissioner for Environment, Margot Wallstrom, led a high level EU mission to Australia in July 2001 and met with Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Senator Robert Hill. Second round of high level environment consultations in May 2000 in Brussels and third round held in Canberra in November 2003. Joint Experts’ Seminar on the Integration of the Economy and Environment – arose from 1998 talks and held in Canberra in October 1999.
310
Appendices
Exchange of Letters (1991) established a framework for collaboration and dialogue between Australia and the EC – bilateral talks on environmental issues were held in May 1998 in Australia with then Director-General Environment, Jim Currie. Exchange of Letters (1997) regarding Euratom/ Australia Cooperation Agreement and the return of plutonium to Japan. Development Cooperation We attach a high priority to our respective policies to help developing countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable development and to alleviate poverty. In order to better achieve our common objectives, we will, as far as possible, coordinate our efforts and exchange pertinent information to this effect, in particular as regards the South Pacific region.
Covered by Ministerial Consultations and overarching discussions Minister/Commissioner visits – •â•…European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson, visit to Australia in January 2004 and October 2002. •â•…Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, meeting with Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson, in Brussels in April 2002. Senior Officials’ visits – •â•…Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, meeting with Commissioner Neilson’s Chief of Staff on 13 November 2003. •â•…Director-General, Australian Agency for International Development, meetings with European Commission Director General Development in April 2004 and May 2002, and with European Council and Commission in Brussels in December 2000. •â•…Director-General, Australian Agency for International Development visits to Brussels in December 2002 and April 2001. Development Cooperation – intensification of (ad hoc) talks held between AusAID and European Commission agreed to at 2002 Ministerial Consultations. First round of senior officials’ level talks held on 19 April 2004 in Brussels.
Appendices
311
Appendix 5
EU–Australia Organisations
Name of Organisation
Abb.
Type
Role/ Function of Organisation
Australian Business in Europe
ABIE
Business
Non-political networking organisation which provides the means for those interested in business between Europe and Australia to establish contact with similarly dedicated colleagues.
Australian Council for Europe
ACE
n/a
Non-profit organisation established to promote Australia’s association with Europe.
Australian European University Fellowships Foundations Association Incorporated
AEUIFAI
Education
Grouping of several Australian Universities entered into a cooperation agreement with the European University Institute in Florence aimed at running an exchange program between Australian and European students.
Name of Organisation
Abb.
Type
Role/ Function of Organisation
Australian Universities Europe Network
AUEN
Education
Inter-institutional network, recently established with a view to creating better understanding and awareness of the European Union across Australian educational institutions and to improve the quality of teaching of European studies and issues in Australia.
Contemporary Europe Research Centre
CERC
Education
Interdisciplinary research centre at the Univesity of Melbourne that carries out research projects, runs international conferences, national workshops, short courses and media briefings on all of Europe, including the EU and former Soviet Union. A Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.
Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia
CESAA
Education
Network of national European Studies Association around the world. It aims to promote links and the sharing of knowledge between educational institutions, researchers, government and non-governmental organisations in Australia and internationally.
Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand
ECDEL
External relations
Official body for the coordination and promotion of relations between Australia and the EU.
European Australian Business Council
EABC
Business
National body established to bring together the various European trade organisations within Australia, for mutual benefit.
Forum for EuropeanAustralian Science and Technology Cooperation
FEAST
Education
Joint Australian–European initiative aimed at identifying, supporting and strengthening linkages and cooperative ventures between Australia and Europe in the fields of research and technological development.
Appendices
313
Name of Organisation
Abb.
Type
Role/ Function of Organisation
National Europe Centre
NEC
Education
Centre established as a joint initiative of the Australian National University and the European Commission with the aim of fostering and improving reciprocal relations between Australia and the European Union.
The Europe Branch, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFAT
Trade
Diplomacy
314
Appendices
Appendix 6
Major Bilateral Treaties and Agreements between Australia and EU Member States
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between United Kingdom and Austria
22 May 1924, London
11 February 1925
Convention supplementary to and amending Article 2 of the Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals of 3 December 1873
29 October 1934, Vienna
30 July 1935
Treaty concerning Extradition
29 March 1973, Canberra
5 February 1975
Protocol amending the Extradition Treaty of 29 March 1973
30 August 1985, Vienna
1 February 1987
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
20 October 1988, Vienna
1 December 1990
Exchange of Notes respecting Commercial Relations
14 December 1933, London
14 December 1933
Exchange of Notes respecting Commercial Relations
19 November 1934, Canberra
1 November 1934
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Provisional Commercial Agreement
3 October 1936, Canberra
1 January 1937 (provisionally)
Exchange of Notes amending the Provisional Commercial Agreement of 3 Oct 1936
19 February – 26 March 1954, Canberra–Sydney
26 March 1954
Treaty on Extradition
4 September 1985, Brussels
19 November 1986
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium on “Working Holiday” Arrangements
Canberra, 20 November 2002
1 November 2004
Convention supplementary to (and amending Article 1 of) the Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals of 31 March 1873
15 October 1935, Copenhagen
30 June 1936
Agreement for the Protection of Classified Information of Defence Interest
27 September 26 July 2001 1999, Copenhagen (for Australia)
DENMARK
FINLAND Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the UK and Finland and Protocol of Signature
14 December 1923, Helsingfors
1 January 1924
Treaty between the UK and Finland for the Extradition of Criminals
30 May 1924, London
23 May 1925
Agreement concerning the Transfer of Nuclear Material between Australia and Finland
20 July 1978, Helsinki
9 February 1980
Treaty concerning Extradition
7 June 1984, Helsinki
20 June 1985
Agreement on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
22 June 1992, Canberra
Agreement on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors
6 August 1992, Canberra
316
Appendices
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Exchange of Notes constituting a Commercial Agreement
27 November 1936, Sydney – Canberra
1 January 1937 (provisionally)
Cultural Agreement
20 June 1977, Paris
27 April 1978
Exchange of Letters constituting a Transitional Agreement to Enable Conversion and/or Enrichment in France of Australian Origin Nuclear Material Supplied to Japan
30 October 1980, Paris
30 October 1980
Agreement concerning Nuclear Transfers between Australia and France, and exchange of Letters
7 January 1981, Paris
12 September 1981
Agreement relating to the Exchange and Communication of Classified Information
15 July 1985, Paris
15 July 1985
Treaty on Extradition
31 August 1988, Canberra
23 November 1989
Scientific and Technology Agreement
24 October 1988, September
27 April 1989
Agreement concerning Collaboration on Defence Research and Technology
17 December 1990, Canberra
17 December 1990
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
14 January 1993, Paris
1 May 1994
Agreement on a Program involving the Establishment and Use of the “DORIS” Precise Satellite Location Beacon System in Australia
18 October 1994, Canberra
18 October 1994
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement relating to the Movement of Nationals between the Two Countries
14 July 1998, Canberra
1 August 1998 (provisionally); 1 August 1999 (definitely)
FRANCE
Appendices
317
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Agreement for Assisted Migration
29 August 1952, Bonn
29 August 1952
Agreement for Assisted Migration
27 August 1958, Canberra
29 August 1957
Trade Agreement and Two Exchanges of Notes
14 October 1959, Canberra
1 July 1959
First Protocol to the Trade Agreement of 14 October 1959
18 February 1961, Bonn
18 February 1961
Second Protocol to the Trade Agreement of 14 October 1959
11 August 1961, Bonn
11 August 1961
Third Protocol to the Trade Agreement of 14 October 1959
22 December 1961, Bonn
22 December 1961
Agreement on Assisted Migration
21 June 1965, Bonn
29 August 1962
Trade Agreement, and Agreed Minute with GDR
28 February 1974, Berlin
28 February 1974
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning the Launching of a Skylark Vehicle and Payload at Woomera for Scientific Purposes
19 December 1974 11 February – 11 February 1975 1975, Canberra
Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation
24 August 1976, Canberra
25 October 1976
Protocol to the Trade Agreement with GDR of 28 February 1974
22 February 1977, Berlin
22 February 1977
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning the Launching of Two Scientific Payloads from Woomera for Scientific Purposes
16 February 1979, Canberra
16 February 1979
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement for the Reciprocal Safeguarding of Classified Material
27 November 1979, Bonn
27 November 1979
Treaty concerning Extradition
14 April 1987, Bonn
1 August 1990
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Cultural Cooperation
7 November 1997, Dresden
15 June 2000
GERMANY
318
Appendices
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Film Co-Production Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany
17 January 2001, Canberra
12 September 2001
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement on the Launching of Sounding Rockets
20 August 1987, Canberra
20 August 1987
Agreement concerning the Landing and Recovery of a Space Capsule in Australia (EXPRESS Agreement) and Exchange of Notes
4 January 1995, Canberra
4 January 1995
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation
7 November 1997, Dresden
15 June 2000
Exchange of notes regarding Commercial Relations
29 February – 7 March 1940, Canberra–Sydney
17 June 1940
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement on the Rights and Privileges of the Australian Migration Office in Greece
23 May 1952, Athens
23 May 1952
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement relating to Portability of Pensions
4 November 1972, Canberra
4 November 1972
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation
20 November 1979, Canberra
29 April 1981
Treaty of Extradition
13 April 1987, Athens
5 July 1991
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement to amend the Agreement on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors between Australia and Ireland
30 July 2002, Canberra
1 January 2003
Treaty of Extradition
2 September 1985, Dublin
29 March 1989
Agreement on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors
12 September 1997, Dublin
25 May 1998
Films Co-Production Agreement
4 February 1998 Dublin
7 September 1998
GREECE
IRELAND
Appendices
319
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Agreement for Assisted Migration
29 March 1951, Melbourne
1 August 1951
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement relating to the Importation of Bovine Meat into Italy
12 February 1959, Canberra
12 February 1959
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement relating to Assisted Migration
31 January 1964, Canberra
1 February 1964
Migration and Settlement Agreement
26 September 1967, Canberra
8 July 1971
Extradition Treaty
28 November 1973, Canberra
9 May 1976
Agreement of Cultural Co-operation
8 January 1975, Rome
28 May 1975
Economic and Commercial Co-operation Agreement
26 September 1984, Rome
26 September 1984
Treaty of Extradition
26 August 1985, Milan
1 August 1990
Reciprocal Agreement in the Matter of Health Assistance
9 January 1986, Rome
1 April 1994
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Australia and the Republic of Italy
28 October 1988, Melbourne
1 April 1994
Films Co-Production Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Italy
28 June 1993, Rome
12 December 1996
Exchange of Letters between Australia and Italy Concerning Australian Citizens Wishing to Marry in Italy
11 April 2000, Rome
1July 2004
Agreement for Assisted Migration
22 February 1951, Canberra
1 April 1951
Assisted Migration Agreement
1 August 1956, The Hague
20 May 1957 with effect from 1 April 1956
ITALY
NETHERLANDS
320
Appendices
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Migration and Settlement Agreement
1 June 1965, The Hague
1 June 1965 (provisionally), 30 December 1965 (definitely)
Treaty on Extradition
5 September 1985, The Hague
1 February 1988
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
26 October 1988, Canberra
1 June 1991
Agreement concerning the Provision of Medical Treatment
5 April 1991, Canberra
4 January 1992
Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Proper Application of Customs Law and for the Prevention, Investigation and Combating of Customs Offences
The Hague, 24 October 2001
1 August 2003
Provisional Commercial Agreement
3 October 1936, Canberra
See under Belgium.
Treaty on Extradition
23 April 1987, Luxembourg
12 August 1988
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
24 October 1988, Luxembourg
15 May 1994
Treaty on Extradition
21 April 1987, Lisbon
29 August 1988
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
4 July 1989, Lisbon
17 October 1993
Convention revising certain provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 31 October 1922, and Exchange of Notes
5 April 1927, London
24 April 1927
Exchange of Notes regarding the Interpretation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 31 October 1922, as amended
6 February 1928, Madrid
6 February 1928
Treaty on Extradition
22 April 1987, Madrid
5 May 1988
LUXEMBOURG
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Appendices
321
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
3 July 1989, Madrid
31 January 1991
Agreement on Cultural, Educational and Scientific Co-operation
18 January 1991, Madrid
15 April 1991
Agreement to provide for the Accession of the Government of Spain to the Memorandum of Understanding for the Cooperative Support of the NATO Seasparrow Surface Missile System
14 October 1991, Hamburg
14 October 1991 (for Australia and generally)
SWEDEN Agreement on the Protection of Classified 20 March 1973, Information of Defence Interest Stockholm
10 March 1974
Agreement on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors
18 March 1981, Canberra
22 May 1981
Protocol further amending the Treaty concerning Extradition of 20 March 1973
12 July 1982, Canberra
12 July 1982
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning Arrangements applying to Certain (Nuclear) Transfers between Sweden and Third Countries
14 August 1985, Stockholm
14 August 1985
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
14 February 1989, Canberra
1 May 1989
Protocol further amending the Treaty concerning Extradition of 20 March 1973
11 May 1989, Canberra
10 June 1989
Trade Agreement
15 January 1991, Stockholm
15 January 1991
Assisted Passage Migration Agreement
18 December 1998, Stockholm
UNITED KINGDOM Trade Agreement
20 August 1932, Ottawa
20 August 1932
Assisted Passage Migration Agreement
5 March 1946, London
1 April 1947
Trade Agreement (UKATA)
26 February 1957, Canberra
9 November 1956
Assisted Passage Migration Agreement
1 April 1957, London
1 April 1957
322
Appendices
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement to amend Clauses 4 and 5 of the Assisted Passage Migration Agreement of 1 April 1957
23–31 December 1958, London
1 January 1959
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning Customs Arrangements for Civil Aircraft making Non-Scheduled Flights
14 November 1961, Canberra
14 November 1961
Assisted Passage Agreement
28 May 1962, London
1 June 1962
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement on Cereals Marketing
15 April 1964, London
15 April 1964
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement on the Guarantee by the United Kingdom (on the value of sterling) and the Maintenance of the Minimum Sterling Proportion (of overseas reserves) by Australia (Sterling Area Agreement)
25 September – 3 October 1968, London – Washington
25 September 1968
Agreement to provide for the Establishment and Operation of a Large Optical Telescope
25 September 1969, Canberra
22 February 1971
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement amending the Trade Agreement of 26 February 1957
28 July 1972, Canberra
31 December 1972
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning the Establishment of a Station to Monitor Compliance with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (of 5 August 1963)
31 October 1972, Canberra
31 October 1972
Agreement concerning Nuclear Transfers between Australia and the United Kingdom
24 July 1979, London
24 July 1979
Agreement on Health Services
21 March 1986, London
1 July 1986
Treaty concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking
3 August 1988, Canberra
12 September 1990
Films Co-Production Agreement
12 June 1990, Canberra
27 August 1990
Appendices
323
TREATY
Date/Place
Entry into Force
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning Maralinga and other Sites in Australia
10 December 1993, London
10 December 1993
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement relating to Nauru
24 March 1994, Canberra
24 March 1994
Agreement concerning the Investigation, Restraint and Confiscation of the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime
6 February 1997, Canberra
10 May 2000
Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement to amend (Articles 1- 3 of ) the Agreement on Health Services of 21 March 1986
29 May 1998, London
8 March 2000
Agreement on Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment, Certificates and Markings between Australia and the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway (European Free Trade Association – European Economic Area)
29 April 1999, Brussels
1 July 2000
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors
28 March 2003, Canberra
1 March 2004
OTHER
324
Appendices
Appendix 7
University of Melbourne Contemporary Europe Research Centre
Questionnaire on the Australia–European Union (EU) relationship Name (optional):
_______________________________________________
Position:
_______________________________________________
Institution:
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Address:
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Contact number:
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E-mail:
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q
Please tick box if you are interested in seeing the outcome of this survey: 1. Which of the following options best describes the nature and extent of your association/ relationship with the European Union (EU): PLEASE CHOOSE ONE ONLY Academic Business Trade / Investment Promotion Government advisor
q q q q
Parliamentary delegation Diplomat Media Other
q q q q
2. Please identify the countries of the EU with which you have a professional link or do business: Austria Belgium Denmark
q q q
Germany Greece Italy
q q q
Netherlands Portugal Spain
q q q
q q
Finland France
q q
Ireland Luxembourg
q q
Sweden UK
3. Please identify the countries of the EU with which you have a personal connection or link:
q q q q q
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France
q q q q q
Germany Greece Italy Ireland Luxembourg
q q q q q
Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
4. How would you rate the importance of the relationship between Australia and the EU? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
5. How would you describe the state of the relationship between Australia and the EU? Poor
q
Fair
q
Good
q
6. How would you describe the overall trade links between Australia and the EU? Poor
q
Fair
q
Good
q
7. Do you consider the EU a significant trading partner for Australian business?
q
Yes
No
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8. How would you describe the agricultural trade links between Australia and the EU? Poor
q
Fair
q
Good
q
9. How would you describe Australia’s investment links with the EU? Poor
q
Fair
q
Good
q
10. Do you consider the EU a significant investment location for Australian business? Yes
326
q Appendices
No
q
The following questions deal with specific Australia–EU agreements. 11. Australia and the EU signed a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) in 1998 whereby testing and certification of some products traded between Europe and Australia can be undertaken in Australia. Are you familiar with this agreement? Yes
q
No
q Go to question 12
11.1 How would you rate its importance? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
12. Australia and the EU signed an agreement on Science and Technology in 1994 whereby Australian researchers collaborate on research projects with the EU. Are you familiar with this agreement? Yes
q
No
q Go to question 13
12.1 How would you rate its importance? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
13. A Wine Agreement was signed between the EU and Australia in 1994 improving access for Australian wine to EU markets. Are you familiar with this agreement? Yes
q
No
q Go to question 14
13.1 How would you rate its importance? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
14. An agreement on the transfer of nuclear material was signed between the European Atomic Energy Community and Australia in 1982. Are you familiar with this agreement? Yes
q
No
q Go to question 15
14.1 How would you rate its importance? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
15. Negotiations for a Framework Agreement between the EU and Australia resulted in the signing of a Joint Declaration in 1997. Are you familiar with this Declaration? Yes
q
No
q Go to question 16
15.1 How would you rate its importance? Low
q
Medium
q
High
Appendices
q 327
The following questions relate to the implications of EU initiatives for Australia. 16. What are the implications of the single currency (euro) for Australia?
17. Has the move towards closer cooperation among the countries of the EU affected Australia’s political links with Europe?
q
Yes Please give details:
No
q
The following question relates to the Single European Market (SEM).
(a) The SEM presents opportunities for increased sales in a market of 375 million consumers (b) Despite the SEM, Australia still has only limited opportunities to export agricultural goods to the EU (c) Under the SEM, few barriers to trade remain, for Australian exporters (d) Despite the SEM, significant barriers to investment remain for Australian investors (e) Australian companies marketing in the EU have access to economies of scale which overcome the limitations of the Australian home market
Disagree
Agree
18. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements:
q q q q q q q q q q
The following questions relate to future cooperation between the EU and Australia. 19. Do you think it is necessary to promote closer links between Australia and the EU? Yes
q
No
q
20. In which areas would you support the establishment of closer links? Please tick as many as you consider relevant.
328
Appendices
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
Business networks – for example the Europe Australia Dialogue, ABIE Culture Government Bodies Educational agreements and exchanges Environment Health Human Rights Immigration International Aid Media Exchanges Police and Legal Services Science &Technology/Research & Development Security Sport Trade 21. Does your relationship with the EU involve business or trade? Yes
q Go to Q. 22 No
q Go to Q. 34
22. Are you satisfied with the business relationship between your company and the countries of the EU? Very satisfiedâ•…
q
Satisfied â•…
q
Not satisfiedâ•…
q
The following questions deal with the introduction of the single currency, the euro. 23 How would you rate the importance of the euro for your work? Low
q
Medium
q
High
q
23.1 Has your organisation prepared for the euro? Yes
q
No
q
Appendices
329
The following questions relate to business aspects of the Single European Market (SEM) 24. When doing business with the EU, how beneficial are the following factors?
Access to financial services Availability of educated workforce Business culture Cultural affinity Establishment costs European legal systems Common European technical standards Infrastructure Labour costs Language Market sophistication Market size Operational costs Political climate Common customs tariffs Non-Tariff regulations Common regulatory framework
330
Appendices
trading with the EU? Low Med High
investing in the EU? Low Med High
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
25. The following are features of the SEM. To what extent have they enhanced your ability to do business in Europe? Access to national financial networks from anywhere in the EU Access via any EU port of entry Freedom of movement of capital within the EU Freedom of movement of goods within the EU Freedom of movement of services within the EU Freedom of movement of people within the EU Harmonisation of standards Single customs document
Low
Med
High
q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q
26. Despite the existence of the SEM, what obstacles to doing business remain?
27. Do you solicit information and analysis on the EU on a regular basis?
q
Yes Please give details:
No
q
28. Do you feel you have sufficient information about the trade and investment opportunities in the EU? Yes
q
No
q
29. Where would you like further assistance for your company? Please tick as many as you consider relevant. Market research and planning for your product(s) Information on full utilisation of European trade fairs Information and briefing on market conditions Information on EU legislation regarding your product and trading issues Background information on cultural similarities and differences of European contexts for Australian companies/exporters
Appendices
q q q q q 331
Understanding of the European regulatory environment Risks in the marketplace: legal, tax liabilities etc. Information on new industries, new opportunities, e-commerce, Information Technology etc. Information on joint venture opportunities Information on joint Australia–EU research and development opportunities
q q q q q
30. Many businesses have problems in identifying the appropriate sources of information for their business operations in the EU. With whom have you had contact? Australian: Australian Embassies/ diplomatic missions in Europe Australian State delegations in Europe, eg. Vic., NSW. AUSTRADE Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Department of Industry, Science and Resources
q q q q q
European: The European Commission Delegation in Canberra Embassies of countries of the EU, in Australia Consulates of countries of the EU, in Australia European Commission headquarters in Brussels Government departments of countries of the EU
q q q q q
31. If you are an Australian company, please tick any of the following which you have utilised: Austrade’s Eurolink Centre in Milan Austrade Officers Trade fairs and displays European Chambers of Commerce
332
Appendices
q q q q
32. In which areas do you see the possibility of increased Australian involvement in EU markets:
q q q q q q q q
Biotechnology Information and Communications technology Education Food and Agribusiness Horticulture Auto-motives Venture Capital m-commerce
33. Have you been involved in a joint venture with a company or companies in the EU? Yes
q
No
q
34. In your opinion, what issues should be kept in mind when formulating Australian policy relating to the EU?
Thank you for taking the time to answer our survey. Philomena Murray CERC University of Melbourne Victoria 3010
Appendices
333
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acquis communautaire 54, 125, 172, 185 African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) 56, 102, 126, 139, 225 see also Cotonou Agreement Agenda 2000 24, 103, 112, 117, 131 Agenda for Co-operation 89, 203, 209, 224, 226 agriculture╇ 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21–2, 26–9, 37, 44–5, 50, 53, 61–4, 69, 82, 83, 89, 98–131, 135–6, 140, 157–8, 161, 164, 168, 173, 175, 177, 183, 188, 192, 201, 242, 246–7, 260, 265, 270 see also Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Andriessen, Frans 22 Accord 22, 110, 112 Antony, Doug 22, 110, 115 Asia–Pacific 13, 22, 24, 32–4, 37, 92, 95, 156, 172–3, 176, 178–9, 185, 188, 192, 199, 203, 205, 210, 211, 213–5, 219, 220, 223, 230, 241, 249–50, 256–8 Asia Europe meeting (ASEM) 24, 34, 94, 257–8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 23, 94, 113 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 23, 33, 34, 38,
56, 75, 79, 82, 92, 94, 173, 180, 187, 213, 226, 249, 256–8 Austrade 70, 74, 184, 188, 262–4 Australia government of 3, 9, 14, 18, 24, 27, 32, 38, 62, 68–9, 81, 88, 92, 106, 111, 115, 120, 124–6, 137, 138–9, 140, 143, 155, 162, 164, 167, 169, 180, 184, 192–3, 198, 211, 214, 216, 221, 225, 234, 240, 247, 250–1, 258, 264–5 parliament of 63, 66–7, 207–09, 226 Bali 2, 192, 201, 208–09, 214–15, 218, 220–1 Benvenuti, Andrea 15, 98, 109, 110, 113, 163 Bilateralism 200, 263 Traditional 3, 16, 24, 61–2, 88, 90, 125, 187, 192, 200, 234, 248, 254–6 new regional 3, 61–3, 72, 88, 108, 119, 145, 180, 187, 192, 200, 206, 248, 253–5, 269 global societal 3, 62, 200, 245, 248 Blair, Tony 15, 91 Bologna Declaration 193 Britain see United Kingdom Brittan, Sir Leon 136, 141–3, 147, 150, 184, 206
Budget, EU 22, 46–7, 100–04, 110 Bull, Hedley 58, 165, 167 Bush, George W. 60, 244 Cairns Group 19, 29, 62, 111, 113– 15, 116, 119, 130, 157–8, 181, 246, 249, 261, 265 Canada 14, 19, 20, 26–8, 82, 86, 94, 137, 229, 255 China 34, 50, 70, 75, 82, 83, 149, 176, 187, 199, 213, 214, 220, 252, 255 civilian power Europe 3, 23, 41, 58, 59, 60, 152, 165, 181, 187–9, 194–6, 199, 213, 219, 227, 242, 257 clash of civilisations 32 climate change 11, 89, 125, 135, 152– 3, 155–7, 168, 181, 202, 203, 270 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 4, 7, 11, 17–21, 22, 24–5, 29, 38, 44, 45, 58, 59, 62, 64, 70, 88, 94, 95, 98–131, 145, 159, 162, 163, 166, 168, 174, 183, 187, 198, 199, 201, 206, 239, 246, 249, 251, 260, 261, 269 Common Commercial Policy 11, 50, 55, 62 Common External Tariff 11, 26, 27, 62 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 3, 41, 58, 66, 149, 161, 193, 208–10, 213 Community acquis—see acquis communautaire Conditionality principle 55, 58, 150, 152, 195 Constitution, EU 54, 109, 149, 166, 170, 177, 189, 196–7, 205, 265 Cotonou Agreement 55, 95, 109, 225, 227 Council of Ministers 46, 53, 55, 92, 100, 102, 139–40, 146, 170, 172, 206 Counter-terrorism see terrorism Delors, Jacques 22, 110, 136, 146 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 4, 63, 70, 74, 88, 117,
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130, 151, 169, 181, 184, 198, 212, 220, 247, 251, 263–4 Development aid 7, 20, 41, 42, 55, 56, 59, 65, 102, 109, 138, 193, 195, 199, 203, 209, 212, 225–7, 251, 256 see also Cotonou agreement Doha Round 60, 117, 120, 159, 206, 251 Downer, Alexander 25, 35, 38, 40, 109, 111, 137, 140–2, 144, 146–7, 149–50, 163, 168, 173, 177, 181, 185, 186, 189, 191, 199, 207–10, 212, 214–15, 219–20, 222, 226, 255, 258 Duchêne, Francois 58, 59, 165 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) see euro Education 51, 82, 87, 89, 91, 146, 148–50, 191, 193–4, 203, 227–34, 240, 266–8 Enlargement 24, 42, 52–3, 69, 103, 104, 112, 149, 159, 169, 175, 180, 187, 211, 256 environment 11, 42, 81, 88–9, 112–4, 119, 120, 149, 152–7, 197, 202–3 euro 42, 45, 51–2, 67, 72–3, 179, 185, 196, 252 European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) 43 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 43 European Commission 10, 21, 46, 63, 64, 66, 78, 86, 95, 100, 110, 123, 128, 135–6, 142, 145, 156, 158, 170, 175, 186, 197, 206–10, 213–18, 220, 247, 251, 253, 259 and competences 50, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62, 250 and Delegation 72, 78, 200, 233 European Community (EC) 6, 15, 43, 92 European Constitution see Constitution, EU European Council 46, 147, 170, 218, 223
European Court of Justice 54 European Economic Community (EEC) 14, 45, 53, 99, 245 see also European Union European integration see regional integration European Parliament (EP) 47–8, 59, 63, 65–8, 94, 114, 128, 138–9, 159, 172, 185, 186, 198, 209, 221–2, 251 European Security Strategy 209–10 European Union (EU) 1, 7–8, 14, 35, 40, 43, 45, 54, 71–2, 81, 86, 98, 101, 116, 126, 128, 143, 149, 150, 156, 166, 179, 180, 183, 191, 196, 199, 206, 210–11, 214, 218, 226, 244, 252 Europeanisation 2, 90, 121, 184, 195 Evans, Gareth 12, 63, 70, 114, 206, 250, 257 Fischler, Franz 116, 120, 208 Fortress Europe 8, 70, 74, 102, 176, 261 Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST) 83, 88, 89, 228, 231–2, 234 Framework Agreement 24–5, 135–52, 163, 247 Fraser, Malcolm 14–5, 21, 109–10, 158 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 25, 56, 98, 163, 184, 188, 257 Garnaut, Ross 22, 244 Report 22, 105, 158 Gelber, H. 17, 18, 29, 43, 105–07, 163 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 12, 22–4, 29, 54, 63, 103, 110–11, 113–15, 124, 157, 194 see also World Trade Organization Globalisation 2, 74, 149, 179, 191, 195, 201, 241, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 269 Green Cowles, Maria 90, 260, 262, 265 Groom, A. J. R. 163–4, 241, 245–6, 251
Haas, Ernst 198, 256 hard power 2, 56, 58–9, 193, 195 Hawke, Robert 158 Higgott, Richard 33, 61, 98, 115, 157, Hill, Christopher 58, 161 Howard, John 6, 10, 13–16, 21, 24, 25, 34–5, 110, 112, 116, 137, 141–2, 149, 156, 157, 162, 166, 171, 176, 179, 183, 185, 186, 221, 239, 256, 263 human rights 2, 23, 119, 192, 195, 269 clause 23–5, 48, 55, 57, 58, 135, 138–52 Huntington, Samuel 32 immigration 2, 3, 6, 37, 53, 61, 65, 81, 94, 135, 151, 191, 200–02, 203, 208, 210, 215, 217, 221–3, 269, 270 intergovernmentalism 82, 172, 250 investment 3, 8, 9, 10, 14–16, 22, 30, 31, 34, 36, 60, 70–5, 78–80, 82, 90, 95, 108, 111–12, 124, 129, 138, 140–1, 159, 168, 182, 189, 199, 237, 242, 248, 254, 257–8 Iraq 13, 37, 58, 135, 186, 199, 200, 201, 221, 242, 248 Joint Declaration 25, 82, 86, 89, 141– 50, 152, 161, 193 Justice and Home Affairs 65, 196–7, 210, 217–18 Kagan, Robert 60, 211 Keating, Paul 8, 16, 22, 23, 32, 33, 135–6, 146 Khanna, Parag 56, 57, 60, 194, 235, 242 Kitney, Geoff 16, 94, 163, 166, 181, 186, 252 Kyoto Protocol 3, 11, 89, 125, 135, 152–7, 206 Lamy, Pascal 119, 123, 158, 176, 195, 208, 227, 258 Leonard, Mark 41, 165, 173, 197, 242 Lomé Conventions 102, 139, 225
Index
359
London, 2005 bombings in 192, 210, 214 Luxembourg Compromise 20 Maastricht Treaty on European Union see Treaty on European Union Madrid, bombings in 2, 192, 201, 209, 214 Manners, Ian 41, 58, 60, 194, 242 McEwen, John 13, 28, 107, 167 member state 11, 17, 26, 46, 62, 91, 126, 159, 200, 244 Menzies, Robert 19, 28, 33, 158, 167 metrosexual superpower 56, 60, 194–5 Miller, J. D. B. 6, 17, 29, 62, 91–2, 95, 107–8, 159, 182, 194 Ministerial consultations 11, 19, 22, 64–5, 87, 110, 116, 144, 145, 149, 166, 193, 201, 202, 206–09, 225 Monnet, Jean 172 Monnet, Jean, projects 228–9, 232 Multifunctionality 104, 114, 155 Multilateralism 12, 24, 57, 61, 63, 82, 92, 102, 111, 113–15, 117, 119, 120, 157, 158, 159, 184, 187, 192, 196, 200, 212, 224, 235, 243, 244, 247, 249, 254, 269 nation state 42–4, 80, 90, 126, 192, 205, 234, 244, 249, 255, 269 and EU 49, 51, 54, 58, 62, 126, 193, 205, 251 new regional bilateralism see bilateralism New Zealand 14, 19, 26–8, 79, 86, 108, 118, 121–2, 131, 166, 182, 232 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 4, 7, 47, 94, 163, 208, 212– 14, 235 Nugent, Neill 100, 242 Nye, Joseph 59, 193–5, 227 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 4, 21, 64, 107, 137, 192,
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200, 256, 260, 265 Ottawa Agreement 19, 26, 107 Patten, Chris 37, 49, 101, 116, 119, 150, 199, 205, 207–09, 211, 216, 219, 222, 243 Petersberg tasks 235 power 2, 3, 24, 36, 40, 43, 52, 55, 57, 58, 60, 80, 143, 161, 169, 189, 193– 9, 211, 213, 220, 235, 242–6 see also hard power, soft power, civilian power Prodi, Romano 209 Putnam, Robert 60 Refugees 61, 194, 221–6, 269, 270 Regionalism 3, 61, 119, 159, 179–80, 183, 247 see also regional integration regional integration 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 36, 40, 42, 43–5, 49, 53, 59, 61, 67, 68, 94, 99, 101, 162–4, 169, 172, 177–8, 219, 244, 246, 247, 249–50, 256, 259, 266, 269 regulation 17, 41, 81, 100, 169, 171, 245, 262 Rifkin, Jeremy 57, 173, 194, 197, 242 Santer, Jacques 23, 135–7, 146 Sbragia, Alberta 54, 55, 82 Sheridan, Greg 142–3, 169, 176, 181, 191 Single Market 22, 45, 51, 63, 67, 69, 70, 73, 105, 122, 164, 172, 175, 179, 185, 254, 261 Soft power 56, 59–60, 84–5, 171, 181, 194–5, 213, 226–7, 235, 245 Sovereignty 20, 28, 43–4, 54, 82, 165, 192, 211, 223, 244, 251 Stocktake, of EU–Australia relationship 88, 89, 201–02, 206, 234, 235, 247 Subsidies 19–20, 29, 99, 103–05, 109, 113Â�–17, 148 Supranationalism 20, 59, 82, 250 Terrorism 3, 81, 88–9, 191–4, 196–7,
199, 201–03, 206, 209–10, 212–13, 214–21, 223, 226 Trade 1–4, 6–19, 26–9, 34, 37, 50–1, 55, 73–8, 81–2, 89, 90, 95, 102, 107, 124, 158, 159, 203, 234, 242 trade policy see Common Commercial Policy Transatlantic relations 10, 41, 94, 137, 149, 173, 176, 185, 256, 260, 265, 267 Treaty on European Union 235, 245, 250 Troika 64, 146, 200, 206–10, 212, 215, 217, 219–20, 247, 257, 265 United Kingdom (UK) 8, 9, 11–14, 16–21, 24, 25–33, 35–6, 38, 61, 63, 67, 69, 71–3, 81, 88, 90–2, 94–5, 98, 101, 104–06, 107–08, 127, 140, 164, 166–7, 174, 177, 179–82, 183–4, 200, 205, 242–3, 246, 248, 250–4, 261–3, 267 United Nations (UN) 38, 50, 91, 94, 98, 113, 153
United States of America (USA) 13, 70, 81, 86, 92, 98, 118, 129, 157–8, 163, 176, 184, 185, 189, 214, 229, 239, 242–4, 249, 255, 259 Uruguay Round 19, 23, 109, 112–18, 124, 129, 130, 136–7, 145, 158, 251 Vaile, Mark 116, 123 Wæver, Ole 194, 223 Wallace, Helen 60–1 Ward, Angela 25, 111, 158 Ward, Stuart 19, 26–8, 167 Whitlam, Gough 21, 158 Wine Agreement 23, 62, 86, 85, 127– 9, 251 World Trade Organization (WTO) 4, 12, 29, 33, 42, 50, 53, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 75, 82, 89, 103, 111, 116, 117, 119, 120–2, 126, 128, 129–30, 149, 159, 163, 168, 175, 181–2, 192, 194, 200, 201, 215, 235, 244, 265
Index
361
