Authoritarian Backlash (Post-Soviet Politics)

Authoritarian Backlash

Post-Soviet Politics

Series Editor: Neil Robinson, University of Limerick, Ireland The last decade has seen rapid and fundamental change in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Although there has been considerable academic comment on these changes over the years, detailed empirical and theoretical research on the transformation of the post-Soviet space is only just beginning to appear as new paradigms are developed to explain change. Post-Soviet Politics is a new series focusing on the politics of change in the states of the former USSR. The series publishes original work that blends theoretical development with empirical research on post-Soviet politics. The series includes work that progresses comparative analysis of post-Soviet politics, as well as case study research on political change in individual post-Soviet states. The series features original research monographs, thematically strong edited collections and specialized texts. Uniquely, this series brings together the complete spectrum of work on post-Soviet politics, providing a voice for academics world wide.

Also in the series Russian-Belarusian Integration Playing Games Behind the Kremlin Walls Alex Danilovich ISBN 978-0-7546-4630-3 The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko Opposition in a Managed Democracy David White ISBN 978-0-7546-4675-4 Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union Jonathan Wheatley ISBN 978-0-7546-4503-0 Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States Dovile Budryte ISBN 978-0-7546-4281-7

Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union

Thomas Ambrosio North Dakota State University, USA

© Thomas Ambrosio 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Thomas Ambrosio has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Ambrosio, Thomas, 1971  Authoritarian backlash : Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union. - (PostSoviet politics)   1. Authoritarianism - Russia (Federation)   2. Authoritarianism - Former Soviet republics   3. Democratization - Russia (Federation) 4. Democratization - Former Soviet republics 5. Democracy - Russia (Federation) 6. Democracy - Former Soviet republics   7. Russia (Federation) - Politics and government 8. Russia   (Federation) - Relations - Former Soviet republics   9. Former Soviet republics - Relations - Russia   (Federation)  I. Title   320.9'47'090511 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ambrosio, Thomas, 1971  Authoritarian backlash : Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union / by Thomas Ambrosio.    p. cm. – (Post-Soviet politics)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-0-7546-7350-7 1. Russia (Federation)--Politics and government--1991- 2. Authoritarianism--Russia (Federation) 3. Democratization--Russia (Federation) 4. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations. I. Title.   JN6695.A862 2008   320.947--dc22 ISBN 978-0-7546-7350-7 (hb) ISBN 978-0-7546-9175-4 (ebook)

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Contents List of Figures and Tables   About the Author   Preface   List of Abbreviations   1 The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy  

vii ix xi xv 1

2 The External Promotion of Democracy and Authoritarianism  

11

3

27

Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union: An Overview  

4 Insulate: Shielding Russia from External Democracy Promotion   45 5

Redefine: Rhetorical Defenses Against External Criticism  

69

6

Bolster: Russian Support for Authoritarianism in Belarus  

105

7 Subvert: Undermining Democracy in Georgia and Ukraine  

131

8

159

Coordinate: Working with Others to Resist Democratization  

9 The Russian 2007–2008 Election Cycle  

185

10 The Future of Democracy and the Challenge of Authoritarianism  201 Appendix   Bibliography   Index  

217 221 233

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List of Figures and Tables Figure 3.1 Average Freedom House ratings of former Soviet Union countries Figure 3.2 Average Freedom House ratings for Russia and the Color Revolution countries Table A.1 Table A.2 Table A.3

Freedom House ratings – averages Freedom House ratings – political rights Freedom House ratings – civil liberties

29 30 218 219 220

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About the Author Thomas Ambrosio is an Associate Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University in Fargo, North Dakota. His research interests focus on the intersection between the domestic and international levels—in particular, how internal politics, structures, and identities affect external outcomes. He has published numerous articles and chapters, as well as the following books: Challenging America’s Global Preeminence: Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity, Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (editor), International Law and the Rise of Nations: The State System and the Challenge of Ethnic Groups (co-edited with Robert Beck).

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Preface Soon after this book was sent to the publisher, the war between Russia and Georgia erupted. After a series of Russian provocations and clear signals that Moscow had no intention of allowing Tbilisi to restore its sovereignty over the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia sought to retake the latter by force. Russia responded overwhelmingly and fighting quickly escalated outside of the province and into Georgia proper. Currently, it appears that the Russian government has decided to cease offensive operations, but it is unlikely that the fundamentals of the conflict will be resolved for the foreseeable future. Any major foreign policy decision is based upon multiple factors. Scholars who seek to find ‘the’ answer or ‘the’ cause inevitably falter before the complexity of events. In the current context, there are many considerations which are likely behind Russian actions. In addition to the stated purposes of reversing Georgia’s military offensive, one can look at the national prestige value of reestablishing or reaffirming Russia’s sphere of influence in the Caucasus; the strategic value of crushing the most anti-Russian and pro-Western of the former Soviet republics; the powerful geopolitical interest in sending a signal to the West generally, and the US in particular, that encroachments into the region will no longer be tolerated; the economic (and strategic) value of further dominating energy routes from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea by threatening the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline; and, the domestic political benefits of solidifying an enemy image of an encircling West using its allies to threaten Russian interests. To this list, Georgian authorities added another item: Georgia’s domestic political system. In an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called his country’s war with Russia a clash over Western values and a fight for the very future of democracy in the region: ‘No country of the former Soviet Union had made more progress toward consolidating democracy, eradicating corruption, and building an independent foreign policy than Georgia. This is precisely what Russia seeks to crush’. If Russia is successful in Georgia, so the argument goes, then the democratic powers would have failed to defend liberty in the face of authoritarian aggression, with negative ramifications outside of the region. Later, in an interview with Germany’s Rhein-Zeitung newspaper, he reiterated this theme by arguing: ‘… they [Russia] want to get rid of us, they want regime change. Every democratic movement in this neighbouring region must

 �������������������������������������� Excepting, perhaps, the Baltic states.  ����������������������������������������������������������������� Mikheil Saakashvili, ‘The War in Georgia is a War for the West’, Wall Street Journal, 11 August 2008, A15.

xii

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be got rid of’. Russian officials have provided some credence to these claims. When asked by his American counterpart about whether Russia intends to change the leadership in Georgia, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vatali Churkin, responded: ‘There are leaders who become an obstacle. Sometimes those leaders need to contemplate how useful they have become to their people’. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was more blatant by explicitly calling for Saakashvili to step down. This indicates that Georgia’s domestic politics are significant in determining the course of Russian policy. It is certainly in the Georgian president’s interests to frame the war in such a way: with his military gambit having failed, Tbilisi’s only hope rests with the diplomatic support of the West. It appears that this strategy has been at least partially successful: Georgian defeats on the battlefield have been often matched with public relations victories in the Western press which has presented the image of a small, democratic country on the verge of being devoured by the autocratic, Russian bear. One could argue that this amounts to a cynical use of well-established enemy images of Russia, revived by the Kremlin’s shift toward authoritarianism and Moscow’s oil-driven resurgence on the world stage. However, a compelling argument could also be made that Saakashvili’s posturing has some truth to it. Clausewitz famously called war a continuation of politics by other means. While war may at first seem to be at the polar opposite of the political spectrum from the internal, domestic politics of states, this may be only at first appearances. There is a growing sense that divisions between democratic and authoritarian regimes are becoming increasingly important. The most recent ‘wave’ of democracy has precipitated a reaction by those untouched by or resistant to political change. Autocratic Russia and China are on the rise and, in some cases, are serving as political and economic role models for other regimes unwilling to relinquish power. More and more, the pattern of alignments and conflicts in the international system appears to be along this democracy-autocracy divide. Countries are becoming progressively bold in resisting democratic trends and democracy promotion, both at home and abroad. For authoritarian regimes to feel secure, they can not abide vibrant democracies within close proximity. The overlap between the political interests of autocratic governments and the strategic interests of their states is becoming a prominent feature of international politics. Although other causes—national prestige, security, strategic, economic, etc.— are obviously at work in the current conflict, it is perhaps not surprising that the country which heralded the first of the color revolutions in the former Soviet Union would be the subject of the Kremlin’s wrath. Even before open military hostilities, Russia had imposed painful and disproportionate economic sanctions upon Georgia, a product of the downturn in relations between Moscow and Tbilisi which followed the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, when it appeared that the  ���� Tom Parfritt, ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� et al., ‘Russia Brushes Aside Ceasefire Calls After Georgia Withdraws’, Guardian, 11 August 2008, 1.  ����� Ibid.

Preface

xiii

region might be ripe for democratic contagion. The quick escalation by Russia may indicate that Russian policy is being driven by more than simply a return to the status quo ante bellum: the possibility of undermining (or crushing) a democracy along its borders may have proved too tempting for the autocratic Kremlin. This often overlooked factor is the central concern of this study, which argues that the political interests of authoritarian regimes in resisting the spread of democracy and undermining democratic consolidation has become an increasingly important element in the domestic and foreign policies of these countries. Although this book utilizes Russia as its central case study, it seeks to begin the process of outlining a more general framework of authoritarianism in an effort to complement democratization theory. In the midst of an authoritarian backlash against democracy, understanding how autocrats go about securing their political goals will prove to be consequential as democratic powers seek to advance the cause of liberty in the face of growing autocratic resistance. Thomas Ambrosio August 2008 Fargo, ND

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List of Abbreviations ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BBCMIR BBC Monitoring International Reports BBCSWB BBC Summary of World Broadcasts BBCWM BBC Worldwide Monitoring CEC Central Election Commission (Russia) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CoE Council of Europe CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization EU European Union FSB Federal Security Service (Russia) G-8 Group of Eight GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova Group IMF International Monetary Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGOs Nongovernmental Organizations ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE) OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PA OSCE Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU and Russia) SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SVR Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia) UN United Nations UNCERD United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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For Beth, for giving me the idea for this project and without whom its completion would never have been possible.

Chapter 1

The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy

[C]elebrations of democracy’s triumph are premature. In a few short years, the democratic wave has been slowed by a powerful authoritarian undertow, and the world has slipped into a democratic recession. Larry Diamond (2008)

In 1989, at the height of the ‘third wave’ of democratization, Francis Fukuyama (1989) proclaimed an ‘end of history’—by which he meant that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe represented ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ over its rivals. Soon afterward, some were concerned that this would lead to a ‘reverse wave’ of renewed autocracy. By the mid-1990s, democratic consolidation appeared threatened in various countries and the spread of democracy seemed stalled, leading Diamond (1996) to ask whether the third wave was at an end. Around the same time, Robert Kaplan (1997: 55–6) argued that democracy promotion was becoming counterproductive: ‘the democracy we are encouraging in many poor parts of the world is an integral part of a transformation toward new forms of authoritarianism’. However, beginning in 1999 with the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and reaching a fever pitch with the so-called ‘color revolutions’ of 2003– 2005 in the former Soviet Union, it appeared that a resurgence of democracy was in the making. Whether this constituted a new wave of democracy or a delayed extension of the third depends on how one categorizes this phenomenon in terms of time frame and political dynamics. Nevertheless, it appeared that something  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� This point was raised by Huntington (1991: 290–294) in the very book which outlined the dynamics of the third wave.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In a subsequent article, Diamond (2000) wondered whether the return to authoritarian rule in Pakistan betokened a new ‘reverse wave’.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There are also other examples which fit under this rubric, such as the street protests which forced the military government in Côte d’Ivoire in 2000 and Lebanon’s 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’. However, some have used this terminology to describe other political events whose dynamics or degree of change make them quite different than seen in the traditional color revolutions, such as Iraq’s ‘Purple Revolution’ and Kuwait’s‘Blue Revolution’, which dealt with women’s suffrage.  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The traditional approach is to follow Huntington (1991) and include in the ‘third wave’ those states which made the transition to democracy from 1974, when Portugal’s dictatorship ended, to 1989 and the early 1990s when numerous states overthrew



Authoritarian Backlash

qualitatively different was stirring and these revolutions were seen as sharing certain common characteristics: electoral fraud exposed by vote monitors, a central role for nongovernmental organizations in mobilizing anti-regime activities, and mass street protests which eventually brought down the autocratic leader. Just as important, they were perceived by many authoritarian regimes as representing a new and distinct political threat—not an extension of the events which precipitated the collapse of communism. Therefore, it would be appropriate to call this a ‘fourth wave’ of democracy. The fact that the November 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia was followed by the November 2004–January 2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the spring 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, vividly raised the prospect of further democratic revolts on at least a regional scale, possibly setting an example outside of the former Soviet Union which might lead to a global ‘rainbow of revolutions’. Optimism about the prospects for democratization proved to be premature, however. There has recently been a growing sense that this fourth wave of democracy has reached the high-water mark and has begun to recede. In contrast to Eastern Europe in 1989, when communism eventually fell in all of the Eastern Bloc countries, the color revolutions were limited to three. The proposed Denim Revolution in Belarus failed to materialize, the Tulip Revolution was not replicated elsewhere in Central Asia, the new Kyrgyz government backslid on its commitment to democratic norms, and the autocratic leaders of the former Soviet Union seemed well-entrenched. This pattern could be seen elsewhere around the world with a noticeable erosion of democracy in a number of countries and clear evidence of an active ‘backlash’ against democracy promotion by authoritarian states (Diamond 2008). This reverse wave was precipitated, in large part, by the revolutions themselves as regimes sought to prevent further democratic contagion. On the one hand, this reverse wave has been quite traditional in the sense that countries have sought to counter internal threats through domestic actions, such as consolidating power, undermining potential challengers, and, in some cases, using violence against opponents. On the other hand, what distinguishes this authoritarian backlash from those which came before is its emphasis on the international level. communism. By contrast, McFaul (2002: 213) has argued that the transitions of the postcommunist countries ‘are so different from the third wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they should not even be grouped under the same rubric’. Instead, he places them under a ‘fourth wave’ of post-communist transitions to democracy and dictatorship.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Kuzio (2008) outlined some of the dynamics of this fourth wave of democracy. He, however, begins the wave in 1998 with the political changes in Slovakia and Croatia. One could argue instead that these earlier cases represented unfinished business from the failed democratization consolidations of 1989 and the early 1990s.  ���������������������������� ‘A Rainbow of Revolutions’, Economist (21 January 2006): 23–5.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Several, especially in the Balkans, remained semi-authoritarian for some time, however. Yugoslavia, which was communist but not part of the Eastern Bloc, had a different political trajectory because of the nationalist conflicts which erupted in the early 1990s.

The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy



This manifests itself in four ways. First, the rise of democracy assistance, coming primarily from the West, and the growing realization that external forces can spark or nurture anti-regime activities, has meant that authoritarian governments have been increasingly concerned about how to protect themselves against cross-border pressures. Thus, for example, there has been a global drive to crack down on liberal nongovernmental organizations in an effort to push back against external democracy promotion (Carothers 2006, Gershman and Allen 2006). Second, authoritarian countries are increasingly active in creating an international environment conducive to the survival of autocracy. Burnell (2006) observed that some countries are engaged in ‘anti-assistance’ and ‘counter-promotion’ aimed at strengthening authoritarian governments abroad. States which need economic, military, or political assistance no longer either have to go to the democratic West or go without; they can now turn to countries such as China, Russia, and Venezuela whose growing economic clout has allowed them to gain allies by not requiring the good governance procedures or human rights standards often demanded by the West (Collins 2007). Third, authoritarian countries are beginning to band together to resist what they see as forced democratization from the West in general and from America in particular. While these states are not establishing formal alliances in a traditional sense, the positive relationships between countries such as China, Russia, Myanmar, Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela are examples of how authoritarian regimes are increasingly aligning with each other. The strength of the international authoritarian backlash has been helped by the fact that two of the great powers of the system, Russia and China, are non-democracies (Gat 2007). Finally, the legitimacy of both democracy promotion and liberal democracy itself will be increasingly questioned in the international system. In a clear response to Fukuyama, Robert Kagan (2008) published an article entitled, ‘The End of the End of History’, in which he argued that we are now seeing greater ideological competition between democracy and a new, confident, and global authoritarianism. Kagan cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech before the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in which he asserted that ‘for the first time in the last decade and a half a real competitive environment has formed in the market for ideas’, in particular in regard to ‘value [systems] and development models’.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Venezuela is not an authoritarian regime. It is currently rated ‘partly free’ by Freedom House in 2008, but it has been moving away from liberal principles under the rule of Hugo Chávez, with increasing restrictions upon the ability of the opposition to mobilize and greater government control over the media. His willingness to accept defeat in the December 2007 referendum on consolidating his power showed a surprising degree of democratic vitality, however. Nevertheless, Chávez has been a strong opponent of American democracy promotion activities, which he regards as ‘imperialist’; moreover, he has consistently supported authoritarian regimes in the face of political pressures by the West generally and from the US in particular. Thus, while not technically authoritarian, Venezuela has definitely sided with the non-democratic camp in its foreign policy.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� For the full speech, see Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 March 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Minister’s Speech at Council on Foreign and Defence



Authoritarian Backlash

This challenge will likely grow in the future. This is not to say that democracy’s days are numbered. Far from it. Instead, it is clear that the international system is in the midst of a substantial reverse wave against international-level democracy promotion. How authoritarian countries seek to resist or counter the fourth wave of democracy is the central concern of this study. The Russian Case Study In order to begin to understand the political dynamics and future implications of this renewed authoritarian resurgence, there very well might be no better case than to look at Russian domestic and foreign policies. The Russian Federation is one of the strongest examples of the rollback of democracy in the past two decades. Its post-Soviet democratic experiment was short-lived and replaced by a discernable shift toward autocracy. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, this process accelerated and now Russia’s political system can be best classified as authoritarian, with the centralization of power, the erosion of civil and political liberties, and the return of the state’s dominance over the economy and the media.10 Therefore, the Kremlin has a strong interest in ensuring that regional and global democratic trends do not affect its hold over the Russian political system and that the legitimacy of democracy promotion and regime change are subverted. More importantly, however, Russia was at the very heart of the fourth wave with two of its neighbors (and a third within its sphere of influence) ‘falling’ to democracy. The specter of democratic contagion in the region, like the political wave which brought down the East European communists in 1989, became a real possibility. There were a number of similarities between the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the post-communist autocrats in the former USSR which were worrying for the Kremlin. Just as the pro-democracy forces in Eastern Europe were motivated by events in Poland and Hungary in 1989, the organizers of the Orange Revolution took their cues from events in Georgia, and Kyrgyz opposition forces likewise sought to follow earlier models. These achievements would later inspire those advocating for an uprising in Belarus. Furthermore, Georgian activists gave direct organizational and logistical support to their Ukrainian counterparts who, in turn, sought to aid the opposition in Belarus and Russia. Thus, although ultimately based upon local dynamics, the color revolutions were linked as success in one place helped spark similar upheavals elsewhere. In addition, like 1989, the international environment was very supportive of democratization, Policy’, in BBCWM, 19 March 2007. 10 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There is still some dispute over exactly how to classify the Putin regime, with some maintaining that Russia remains a democracy, but of a different form, like ‘managed’, ‘partial’, ‘limited’, etc. However, it is clear that Russia has moved sufficiently away from the basic standards of liberal democracy to the point that applying an adjective to its form of government simply obfuscates the truth of the Russian regime. See Chapter 3.

The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy



as demonstrated by American and European Union public statements urging free and fair elections and by its provision of aid to pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. This meant that these anti-regime uprisings were occurring within an environment of active democracy promotion. Consequently, given Russia’s place at the center of this phenomenon, understanding how the Kremlin reacted to these events can provide important insights into how authoritarian regimes confront powerful democratic pressures. Predictably, the Kremlin’s reaction to these color revolutions was quite negative and reflected grave concerns about their political implications. This was echoed in the Russian press, with some referring to these events as an ‘orange plague’ or ‘orange virus’, and asking whether they could spread and possibly threaten the Russian government itself.11 Consequently, the Kremlin’s authoritarian tendencies intensified after the color revolutions and the government adopted a wide-ranging set of policies aimed at undermining cross-border, democratic forces at home and creating a politically-favorable, regional environment abroad. In addition, Russia emerged as a principal opponent of democracy promotion globally and its relationships with other like-minded states formed the core of the authoritarian alignment in the international system. Russia therefore represents an excellent example of a ‘guardian’ state—one which actively seeks to halt, resist, or contain democratization in order to preserve its autocratic political system (Lynch 2004). Central Questions This book explores the recent authoritarian backlash against democracy and the various ways in which authoritarian regimes react to regional and global democratic trends and attempt to counter democracy promotion at the international level. It utilizes Russia as an in-depth case study of this phenomenon. It seeks to answer three questions. What can the scholarly literature tell us about the reaction by authoritarian states to this fourth wave of democracy? How has this backlash against democratization been reflected in Russian domestic and foreign policies? What can the Russian case study tell us about the future of democracy and the growing challenge of authoritarianism? First, in order to better frame this analysis, it is necessary to explore how scholars have previously understood democratization. Democracy is inherently an internal process and conducive domestic-level conditions are necessary for democratic openings and consolidation. However, the notion of a democratic wave indicates that there are powerful international-level components to this phenomenon. This study will therefore focus on this level. There is a growing 11 ������������������������������������������������� ‘Will There Be an Orange Revolution in Russia?’, Argumenty i Fakty, 16 March 2005, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A) (Russia), 17 March 2005; ‘Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Russia: What Is the Remedy for “Color Revolutions”?’, What the Papers Say (Part A) (Russia), 1 April 2005.



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body of literature which makes a strong argument that external actors, forces, and processes play an important role in prompting or facilitating democratization. Too often, however, the primary concern of this literature has been with the positive progression of democracy at the international level. In other words, it has attempted to explain democratic successes, rather than democratic failures, and democracy promotion, rather than autocratic opposition. Consequently, it is necessary to move beyond this traditional perspective in an effort to better understand how authoritarian states counter external democracy promotion and undermine cross-border, democratic forces. To this end, this book proposes five strategies of authoritarian resistance—insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate—which are employed to achieve these political goals. None of these strategies are, in and of themselves, sufficient to prevent democracy or to secure these governments in power. Nevertheless, they represent a wide-ranging policy repertoire for authoritarian regimes when confronting democratization at the international level. These strategies are outlined in Chapter 2 and examined in subsequent chapters. Second, Russian leaders took seriously the threat that the so-called ‘orange virus’ could spread further in the region and possibly threaten the stability of their regime. They therefore adopted a number of policies designed to undermine democratic forces at home and abroad. This book analyzes some of these policies bundled under the five strategies of authoritarian resistance. Each is covered in a separate chapter which examines how the strategy was applied by Russia in a particular case. An evaluation of the strategies will be provided together in the book’s conclusion. This study seeks to make a substantive contribution to our understanding the nature and processes of the recent reverse wave by exploring how these strategies work in a real world setting through in-depth case studies. Finally, by seeing how these strategies were implemented in the Russian case, this book also seeks to set the stage for future research and to consider the future of democracy. There are strong indications that Russian policies are a harbinger of things to come as autocratic countries become increasingly active in countering democratic norms. The insights derived from the former Soviet Union will be applicable to other cases, such as China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, which have participated in their own responses to democracy promotion and have sought to ensure favorable regional and global environments. Moreover, by understanding how authoritarian resistance works, the Russian case can also indicate how the democratic world can best advance its values in the current global context. Limits Before continuing onto the book outline, it is important to identify the limits of this study. First, this is an in-depth look at one case in order to identify and elaborate the five strategies of authoritarian resistance, as well as to derive insights applicable to future cases. It is an exploratory study and not meant to be a comprehensive

The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy



examination of the global backlash against democracy. Additional cases and avenues for future research questions are identified in the Conclusion. Second, Chapters 4–8 are not designed to cover every instance where Russia has adopted a particular strategy. For example, Chapter 6 deals exclusively with how Russia has sought to bolster or reinforce Belarus against regional democratic trends. However, Russia also adopted a similar strategy toward Uzbekistan (though, to a much lesser extent) after Uzbek President Islam Karimov ordered a violent crackdown on anti-regime protests in May 2005. While this latter case may be important, the case studies are designed to illustrate how these strategies were implemented in actual circumstances. They represent the clearest examples that best epitomize these strategies, not comprehensive examinations of all applications in the Russian context. Third, this study does not argue that the policies outlined in subsequent chapters were sufficient to ensure regime survival. For example, the Putin government has been exceptionally good at consolidating power and proactively sabotaging potential opponents. The survival of authoritarianism, like democratization, can not be attributed to any one cause. While the case studies do yield insights into the political dynamics of the region, they are primarily meant to explore the dynamics of the strategies of authoritarian resistance, not to evaluate the degree to which these strategies were successful in preventing regime change in Russia or elsewhere in the region. Similarly, this study does not claim that regime type is the sole determinant of Russian policies. Other factors, such as geopolitics, strategic or national interests, elites, and national identity are, of course, important. Within the context of present day Russia, issues of regional democratization, Russian national security, and the Kremlin’s political security are closely linked, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing. For example, national security certainly plays an important role in Russian calculations toward Georgia and Ukraine, since democratic transitions in these countries were accompanied by a shift toward the West generally and the United States in particular; however, it was precisely the regime change brought about by democratization which precipitated this shift in the first place. In addition, the West’s open support for the spread of democracy in the region is particularly worrying for many Russian analysts and policy makers who saw the Orange Revolution as a proxy for European and especially American influence; if the West can replace autocratic, pro-Russian regimes with democratic, proWestern ones, this will in turn weaken Russia’s strategic standing in the region. Thus, no one cause can explain the whole picture of Russian foreign policy. This study looks at an increasingly significant piece of the Russian policy puzzle and illustrates that the Kremlin’s reaction to regional democratic trends is important and often strengthens other interests. Finally, the strategies of authoritarian resistance examined this study focus on the backlash against democracy at the international level. As such, they do not cover domestic policies, except when they are related to the external environment or cross-border influences. For example, Chapter 4 identifies several domestic



Authoritarian Backlash

policies, but these are designed to block those forces perceived as being closely associated with the color revolutions. While authoritarian governments certainly take additional steps to consolidate power domestically (some of which are outlined in Chapter 3 in the Russian context), purely domestic measures are largely outside the scope of this study. Book Outline In addition to this introduction, this book consists of nine chapters. The following chapter provides an overview of the literature on international-level democracy promotion in an effort to understand what role authoritarian states play in this process. It identifies the various theories associated with external democracy promotion (diffusion, conditionality, and integration), the implications of these processes for the former Soviet Union, weaknesses in the literature, and the foundations for the five strategies of authoritarian resistance. Chapter 3, identifies the domestic and regional context within which the Russian government operated before and after the color revolutions. It covers the overall decline of democracy in the region since the early 1990s and pays special attention to the rise of authoritarianism in Russia. It also addresses the color revolutions and how the Kremlin reacted to these events. This chapter is meant to supply readers with a basic historical foundation for future chapters. Chapters 4–8 examine the five strategies of authoritarian resistance through indepth case studies of Russian foreign and domestic policies. Each chapter covers a separate strategy. Chapter 4, Insulate, examines the means by which Russian authorities have sought to counteract cross-border, political forces within Russia itself and will therefore have a domestic focus. It consists of three parts: the crackdown against nongovernmental organizations, how the government sought to discredit Western election monitoring, and the creation of a Kremlin-aligned youth movement. Chapter 5, Redefine, explores the ways in which the Kremlin has used rhetoric to defend Russia’s political system against external critics. In many ways, Russia has engaged in wordplay similar to that of its Soviet predecessor. This has become apparent in the promotion of the principle of ‘sovereign democracy’, as well as the regime’s attempt to link external criticisms to neocolonialism. In addition, this chapter explains how the Russian government has also gone on the offensive by attacking the democratic credentials of the West and, in particular, the Baltic states. Chapter 6, Bolster, analyzes Russian attempts to sustain authoritarianism abroad in Belarus. This country plays a critical role in Russian strategic thinking and military planning. However, the political importance of the relationship between these two states has been under-explored: if there is a revolution in Belarus, this could significantly advance the prospects for democracy in the region and possibly Russia itself; however, if democracy promotion fails in Belarus, then

The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy



the momentum for future color revolutions could be halted. This chapter covers how Moscow provided Minsk with extensive political, economic, and diplomatic support, and served as an alternative to a Western orientation. By way of contrast, Chapter 7, Subvert, examines Russian policy toward Georgia and Ukraine after the fall of autocracy in these countries. It will be shown that the Kremlin has adopted progressively antagonistic policies toward these two states, a marked change from the slight improvement in Russia–Georgia relations and the growing amity which characterized Russian–Ukrainian relations just before the color revolutions. Some of these policies include: rhetorical attacks on the democratic regimes in Tbilisi and Kiev, economic pressures, and renewed support for substate ethnic groups. This chapter also covers the impact of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. Although the Atlantic Alliance represents a strategic challenge for Moscow, this chapter shows that the organization also symbolizes a potential political threat to the Kremlin because of the Alliance’s association with the spread and consolidation of democratic values. The last strategy, Coordinate, is covered in Chapter 8. This chapter explores the ways in which Russia has worked with other countries to discredit democratic promotion and delegitimize the notion of regime change. Its primary focus is on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—a regional grouping of Russia, China, and four Central Asian states. It will be argued that the ‘Spirit of Shanghai’, the set of principles underlying the organization, is inherently conservative and designed to preserve the autocratic regimes in the region. Chapter 9 examines how the strategies of authoritarian resistance came together in the latest election cycle and helped to guarantee the ruling party’s massive victory in the parliamentary election of December 2007 and the smooth transition to Putin’s chosen successor in the March 2008 presidential election. The final chapter of this book looks to the future and explores the theoretical implications of these case studies, evaluates the strategies of authoritarian resistance, identifies avenues for future research, and proposes some suggestions for how the democratic world should response to this reverse wave of authoritarianism.

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Chapter 2

The External Promotion of Democracy and Authoritarianism

With the benefit of more than a quarter-century of hindsight, scholars increasingly have argued in favour of re-examining the neglected international dimension of democracy. Peter J. Schraeder (2003: 23)

The democratization literature has increasingly focused on the role that external actors and forces play in prompting or facilitating democratic transitions. This chapter first provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives of this phenomenon. In order to better understand how this literature can be applied in the context of the former Soviet Union, the following section will explore the implications of these processes for the region. Section three identifies a central limitation of this literature: its focus on democracy promotion, rather than on how autocrats seek to counter democratization at the international level. This means that the democratization literature will be insufficient to explain how authoritarian states will react to the fourth wave of democracy or the likely policies adopted by these countries in the apparent reverse wave. The remainder of this chapter will argue that autocratic states are not passive actors in this process, but rather can actively resist or undermine regional democratic trends through five strategies of authoritarian resistance: insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate. Each of these strategies will be defined and an explanation of how they operate will be provided. Democratization Theory It is widely accepted that domestic explanations for democratization are of primary importance in determining the course of political change in authoritarian regimes, though the balance between internal and external variables remains a matter of debate. Certainly, a conducive domestic environment plays a necessary role in any democratic opening, transition, or consolidation. Without the proper political conditions within a country, democracy will invariably fail. However, democratic outcomes are also heavily influenced by the international level. As Alex Pravda (2001: 2) observed, an ‘international pull’ toward democratization reinforces the ‘domestic push’ of internal forces. External forces and actors play an active role in this process. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been significant growth

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Authoritarian Backlash

in the number and quality of internationally-focused studies. The crucial role the European Union played in advancing and strengthening democracy in Eastern Europe gave greater credence to external democracy promotion. Previous studies of international factors have identified three factors which play important roles in this process: diffusion (regional democratic trends), conditionality (the use of punishments and inducements), and integration (the prospect for admission to international organizations). Diffusion Diffusion refers to a process by which authoritarian regimes come under increasing pressure from the proliferation of democracies within their geographic proximity. Because it is a largely unintentional process, it is difficult to operationalize. As Brinks and Coppedge (2006: 464) asserted, ‘it is hard to distinguish true diffusion from illusions of diffusion created by global trends, correlated disturbances, or the regional clustering of domestic factors’. Nevertheless, numerous scholars have found that geographic proximity to democracy has a significant effect on the chances for democratization, especially when there appears to be a regional trend. This phenomenon has been called a democratic ‘wave’ (Huntington 1991), ‘contagion’ (Whitehead 1996: 5–7, Pravda 2001: 7), ‘the liberal-democratic ideological paradigm’ (Zielonka 2001: 511), a regional ‘zeitgeist’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 72–6), ‘neighbor emulation’ (Brinks and Coppedge 2006: 464), a ‘domino effect’ (Starr 1991, Starr and Lindborg 2003), or ‘diffusion’ (O’Loughlin et al., 1998, Ahlin 1993, Doorenspleet 2004). The classic example of this process was Eastern Europe in 1989: after Poland’s communist government fell, other communist regimes found it more difficult to resist the tide of democratization, which in turn created a cascade effect throughout the region. The connections between the color revolutions of 2003–2005 also resembled this phenomenon. Whitehead (1996: 6) identified a number of problems with this concept. For example, what determines the ‘boundaries’ of the contagion? Is it possible that certain states may be ‘immune’ to this process? How does the sequence begin, end, or order itself? Nevertheless, it does seem that the overall regional environment played a significant role in limiting the options of East European leaders. West European countries and the US were fully committed to the notion of democracy as the only legitimate form of government in the region. As Zielonka (2001: 514) observed, ‘This consensus created an unprecedented historical situation: Eastern European countries found themselves operating in an international environment which considers democracy to be “the only game in town”.’ Thus, democracy becomes more likely as the alternatives to it are either unavailable or seen as illegitimate. Given the passive nature of the process, it is not surprising that the causal mechanisms of diffusion are ambiguous. It is often discussed as a general cause or is analyzed quantitatively in large ‘n’ studies, but detailed case studies of cause–effect relationships are lacking. In this research, showing the significance

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of ‘proximity’ is often emphasized over exploring the specific processes by which this promotes democratization. As a result, our understanding of how diffusion actually works is underdeveloped. Nevertheless, prior examinations of diffusion indicate that this process operates by creating an international environment which is progressively conducive to democratic openings. Regional democratic trends are largely based upon perceptions, but nonetheless have a real impact by precipitating or nurturing antiregime activities in authoritarian states or, at the very least, increasing the costs associated with the maintenance of power. A mixture of demonstration effects, perceptions of momentum for regime change, symbolism, fears of international isolation, and exporting revolution appear to be involved in this process. As groups within non-democracies see successes in other states, they might begin to agitate for regime change at home since alternatives to the current political situation are now seen as possible (demonstration effects). Moreover, if the population believes that the end of an authoritarian regime is inevitable, given previous successes elsewhere, then they are likely to become more bold in their demands (momentum). Even if the population of an authoritarian country does not become politically active, the existence of a democratic state on one’s border acts as a powerful reminder of the possibilities of regime change and therefore serves as a potential threat to an autocrat’s power (symbolism). In addition, as more states in a given region move toward democracy, the distinction between regime types becomes starker, possibly leading to a loss of friends and allies as the newly democratic governments realign their strategic orientations toward fellow democracies (isolation). Finally, as nongovernmental organizations achieve political success in their own country, they are likely to disseminate their ideology to like-minded groups elsewhere and provide them with concrete assistance (export). As a region becomes more and more democratic, it becomes increasingly likely that non-democracies will find themselves swept away by the tide of history. Conditionality Conditionality is a more active policy which influences the cost–benefit analysis of an authoritarian regime with the purpose of promoting democracy. Scholars have identified examples of democracies that have sought to change an authoritarian state’s political system through political, diplomatic, economic, moral, or cultural means (Pridham 1994: 11, Smith 2001: 36, Schmitter 1996: 30). States interested in the spread of democracy use a mix of punishments and benefits (or the threat or promise thereof) to bring about regime change. If authoritarian regimes begin moving toward a democratic transition, then they are rewarded with closer ties, aid and loans, trade concessions, or other benefits; if they persist in suppressing their people, then they are punished through a variety of means such as international isolation, trade and economic sanctions, or aid to opposition groups. In the present  ������������������������������������ One notable exception is Ahlin 2003.

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European context, democracy promotion has been limited to peaceful means, though in other cases covert actions and military intervention were used (Schraeder 2003: 26). Domestically-oriented studies have tended to focus almost exclusively on the domestic-level, cost–benefit analysis between the internal costs of resisting democratic reforms and the internal costs of tolerating a democratic opening. Yilmaz (2002) added another level to this calculation by connecting international pressures to the decision-making process of authoritarian leaders. He referred to this as the ‘expected external costs of suppression’—the price imposed on an authoritarian regime by other states for refusing to allow democratization. If an authoritarian regime is made the object of external conditionality, then ‘the government would choose to indulge in democratic reform if it estimates that the external costs of suppression are higher than the internal costs of toleration. On the other hand, if the government assesses the internal costs of toleration to be greater than the external costs of suppression, then it is unlikely to start [a] political opening’ (Yimlaz 2002: 76). As the external penalties for not democratizing rise, it is therefore more likely that authoritarian leaders will allow for democracy; if the external cost is seen as low, the regime would have little incentive to change its policies. Moreover, external influencers are not limited merely to sticks: the use of carrots will increase the expected external benefits of toleration and consequently reward governments for allowing democratic reforms; this provides the autocrat with some incentive to allow a democratic opening. Thus, through their policies, democratic states can alter the cost–benefit calculations of authoritarian leaders and help bring about democratization. The degree to which conditionality will be effective is based upon the comprehensiveness of the punishments, the level to which the target state is dependent upon those countries promoting democracy, and the desirability of the inducements. States which are in a weaker position will find themselves more vulnerable to the conditions of outsiders. Nonetheless, some regimes may fear giving up power so much that they will be willing to allow their country to fall into ruin rather than allow for democracy. In fact, some governments may actually welcome sanctions as a way to consolidate their power by establishing an external scapegoat for regime failures. For conditionality to work, the costs of maintaining power must be more than those associated with permitting a democratic transition. Integration The final factor is a special form of conditionality that has been studied largely in the context of the European Union’s relations with its neighbors. The prospect of integration into the EU has been a powerful motivating force for countries to embark on political reforms or to work toward democratic consolidation. Before the 1989 revolutions, the political and economic success of the West served as a powerful example for East Europeans and the desire to ‘return to Europe’ after

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decades under Soviet domination (Smith 2001: 33). In order to guarantee that these states had made a commitment to Western values, international organization such as the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe imposed extensive membership requirements, the most important of which was that applicants establish and consolidate a liberal democracy. The prospects for EU integration are seen as so important for furthering democratization in the region that Dimitrova and Pridham (2004: 94) identified the EU’s ‘distinct “integration” model as a form of democracy promotion’. In her study of pre-accession conditionality in Eastern Europe, Ethier (2003) found the impact of the EU to be substantial. In specific cases such as Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Romania, scholars have found a significant relationship between membership requirements, on the one hand, and democratic reforms or other social changes, on the other (Ram 2003, Pridham 2002, Ottaway 2001). This occurred in three ways. First, while democracy in general was seen as the ‘only game in town’ within Europe, the same could be said about the EU. The benefits of membership were considered so significant that there appeared to be no legitimate alternative. States were willing to adopt extensive reforms and allow for intrusive interference in their domestic political system in order to achieve EU membership. Second, the pre-accession process was so specific and detailed that regimes had an explicit roadmap of what they need to do in order to become members. The clear relationship between democratic reforms and advancement in the process provided powerful incentives for policymakers and the public to support further democratization. Finally, the process became self-reinforcing as states move closer to EU membership. One begun, the process of ‘Europeanization’ made it more likely that additional democratic reforms were introduced. However, the impact of integration was found to be directly related to a state’s location in the queue for membership. As Ethier (2003: 116) stated, ‘all the evidence suggests that EU conditionality works only when the stake or reward is accession to the union’. As a result, the relative impact of EU democracy promotion lessened the further that states found themselves outside of the process. An important concept often associated with integration is ‘socialization’, the transmission of norms and values from an international organization to a target state through the use of ‘social influence or persuasion’ to alter the latter’s belief systems and to ensure that the new norms and values are internalized (Kelley 2004: 428). Socialization and integration are closely related: ‘socialization prepares [states] for membership in international organizations, and membership is conditional on successful socialization’ (Schimmelfennig 2002: 3). This process does not just apply to states that are outsiders: international organizations solidify and reinforce their norms and values amongst member states, altering their belief systems and ensuring that they continue to conform to the organization’s principles. International organizations will have the greatest capacity to advance democratization in target states if they have a high ‘democratic density’—that  ����������������������������� See, for example, Smith 2000.

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Authoritarian Backlash

is, the higher the average level of democracy, the more likely an organization will be able to promote democratic consolidation (Pevehouse 2005). In addition, powerful ‘critical states’ play a key role in establishing and reinforcing these norms. (Finnemore and Sikkik 1998: 901, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). In post1989 Europe, this process helped to ‘socialize’ Eastern European countries into liberal democratic values and set the parameters of what was deemed ‘appropriate’ in the European context. Application in the Former Soviet Union The implications of these processes for understanding how Russia will react to regional democratic trends are mixed. In some cases, integration will play a large role. The Orange Revolution was predicated, in part, on the desire of prodemocracy forces to reorient Ukraine westward. The Baltic states are already members of the European Union and NATO, and the westernmost countries of the former Soviet Union—Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova—are geographically legitimate candidates for EU membership, should the organization decide to expand further. The same might eventually apply to Georgia and Armenia. By contrast, it is unlikely that Russia will feel any substantive integration pressures within the foreseeable future. Russia is simply too large geographically and economically, its economy is becoming less diversified given its increasing reliance on exports of natural resources for economic stability, and its political system is moving away from the liberal democratic standards required of applicant states. Similarly, the states of Central Asia are too far removed from Europe to be seriously considered for EU membership. NATO membership for these states, too, looks impossible. Integration will therefore have little impact in Russia or Central Asia, but will have a powerful influence on the westernmost former Soviet republics and a possible effect in the Caucasus. Conditionality has more applicability in the former Soviet Union: both the EU and US have used sanctions and rewards to promote democracy in the region. Opportunities for trade, foreign assistance, and diplomatic ties have at times been made contingent upon human rights and domestic policies. Overall, however, the EU is less willing to use punishments than the US and instead relies primarily upon inducements (Warkotsch 2006, Kubicek 2007, Adesnik and McFaul 2006). In some cases, such as relations between the US and Uzbekistan from Fall 2001 to Spring 2005, the necessities of the War on Terror, as well as the American need for access to Uzbek military bases, limited the willingness of the US to criticize the dictatorial government of Islam Karimov. Nevertheless, both the EU and US have stated that they have an interest in the promotion of democracy in the region and

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� However, the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, has resisted any westward pull with Russia’s help. See Chapter 6.

The External Promotion of Democracy and Authoritarianism

17

to that end have sought to reward aspiring democrats and, in some cases, punish authoritarian regimes. Like integration, this factor has limited applicability to Russia. There are certainly pressure points that the US and EU could use in an attempt to promote democratization in Russia, such as Russia’s World Trade Organization membership and the scope of NATO expansion. However, the US and the EU are also vulnerable to actions by Moscow. Both the US and the EU are reliant on steady supplies of Russian natural gas and oil, either to reduce world market prices or for their direct energy needs. For example, over 25 per cent of Europe’s energy imports comes from Russia and it is the EU’s third-largest trading partner with some €209 billion in trade (imports and exports) in 2006, an increase of over 20 per cent per year since 2003. Promoting democracy in Russia, especially with an unknown probability of success, has not been seen as worth the cost of a disruption in trade of that magnitude. Furthermore, Russia’s geopolitical position makes it more difficult to influence than smaller, less critical states: not only is Russia considered a ‘middle power’ in the international system, but the Kremlin could make life more difficult for American and European interests throughout the world given Russia’s ties with China and several ‘rogue states’, such as North Korea and Iran. Consequently, a direct confrontation with Russia over its domestic political system is not in the interests of those states most likely to promote democracy. Unlike integration and conditionality, the process of diffusion has far more applicability to Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. Each of the diffusion processes identified above have already been seen in the region. If the notion of regime change becomes legitimized there, and especially if there is the perception of momentum and inevitability, then democratization may become a political threat to the region’s authoritarian regimes. As a result, the autocratic countries of the former Soviet Union have an interest in protecting themselves from regional democratic trends, ensuring that further democratization does not gain momentum, and undermining cases of democratic successes. Since diffusion is a largely unintentional process, the response to it must be proactive and multifaceted. Although diffusion has the most applicability throughout the region, and especially to Russia, this is not to say that conditionality and integration are irrelevant, even if its relevance is only indirect. If democratic countries are able to use carrots and sticks to pressure smaller states within the region to move toward democracy, this could in turn advance the diffusion process by precipitating further democratic openings and solidifying democratic gains. Moreover, states which have undergone democratic transitions will likely seek membership in international organizations which are identified with democratic norms; this will both represent  ������������� ‘Divided and Panicky’, ���������� Economist, 6 May 2006, 62.  ������������������������������������� ‘European Union and its Main Trading Partners: ���������������������������������������� Economic and Trade Indicators (Russia)’ [Online, European Union]. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008.

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the consolidation of democracy in the region and symbolize that non-authoritarian paths of development are available and will be rewarded. Therefore, conditionality and integration matter for Russia and the other autocratic states of the former Soviet Union, even if it is through the indirect effect of furthering or reinforcing regional democratic trends. Weaknesses in the Existing Literature Although the existing literature on the external promotion of democracy provides important insights into how democratic states can advance the cause of democracy and how authoritarian regimes will come under external pressure to democratize, it is of limited utility for understanding how authoritarian regimes are likely to react to regional democratic trends. It is important not to take a deterministic approach to the spread of democracy. External factors may influence the timing and course of democratization, and may make such a process more likely. However, neither diffusion, conditionality, nor integration are individually or collectively sufficient to bring about regime change. Within the European context, where external pressures are the strongest, there are exceptions that have survived as non-democracies in this regional environment, such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Milošević, Slovakia under Mečiar, Ukraine prior to the 2004 Orange Revolution, and, of course, Belarus and Russia. Moreover, it is important not to conceive of authoritarian regimes as merely the passive objects of external pressures. Autocrats have options when dealing with regional democratic trends and will utilize them to preserve their political systems. Therefore, identifying an active role for authoritarian regimes is necessary to fully understand how these states seek to create domestic and international environments conducive to their long–term survival. There is a tendency within the literature on external democracy promotion to ‘select on the dependent variable’—that is, to concentrate on successes, rather than failures. Consequently, far more attention has been placed on identifying the conditions under which international democratic forces can overcome the internal impediments represented by authoritarian regimes, rather than on understanding how autocrats resist democracy promotion. In this sense, the traditional focus has been on the positive progression of democracy at the international level. Even where there have been normative failures, the norms themselves are almost always democratic in nature, rather than nondemocratic. What is too often ignored is how authoritarian regimes can not only resist these external pressures at home, but can also seek to undermine them abroad—in effect, the negative progression of democracy. While this struggle between democracy and authoritarianism is  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This is also true of many studies which focus exclusively on the domestic level. Lynch 2004: 341–2.  ���������������������������������� See, for example, Grigorescu 2002.

The External Promotion of Democracy and Authoritarianism

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found in domestic-oriented studies, it is rare when dealing with the international level. Even Huntington’s (1991: 15–21, 290–294) discussion of ‘reverse waves’ emphasized internal rather than international factors, and did not include an active role for authoritarian regimes at the international level. Consequently, the full picture of Pravda’s international pull toward democracy is usually only halfexplored, because the countervailing pull from autocrats is often not accounted for. There are exceptions to this traditional focus. For example, Pridham (2001: 70) showed how ‘pariah regimes’—states which stand outside the democratic norms of their region—are able to survive within the European context. In addition, several works have examined the recent ‘backlash’ against democracy promotion, some of which were mentioned in the previous chapter. For example, the recent restrictions on democracy promotion and nongovernmental organizations have been observed by some scholars (Carothers 2006, Gershman and Allen 2006). Others have identified how autocracies have adopted policies of authoritarian ‘anti-assistance’ and ‘counter-promotion’ aimed at sustaining autocracy abroad (Burnell 2006). These studies take the persistence of authoritarianism seriously and provide insights into the methods used to resist or undermine international democratic trends. Rather than act as passive targets of democratizing forces, non-democracies have a number of international-level strategies of authoritarian resistance. The next section outlines five such strategies. Authoritarian Resistance The strategies of authoritarian resistance are policies through which autocratic regimes seek to counter the external promotion of democracy with the intention of ensuring regime survivability for themselves or others. Five such strategies can be identified: insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate. Although these are not the only strategies available, they represent a diverse mix of ways in which authoritarian regimes undermine democratization. Insulate An authoritarian regime’s greatest danger comes from within. Barring the use of military force by an outside power, democratic transitions are fundamentally domestic-level processes. Consequently, autocrats will take steps to consolidate power and strengthen themselves relative to potential domestic adversaries. However, external forces can serve to weaken the government’s grip on power by triggering, strengthening, or sustaining regime opponents. Authoritarian leaders must therefore ensure that these forces are undermined as well. Thus, in order to preserve their power, autocrats must also adopt a strategy of insulating their country from external democratic pressures.

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This strategy can assume a variety of forms. What ultimately distinguishes it from other autocratic policies is its focus on cross-border influences and processes. For example, abolishing political parties, taking control over the domestic media, and eliminating the independence of the judiciary are not covered under this strategy because they are almost exclusively domestic in nature. Instead, actions such as blocking access to the international media, pursuing an autarkic economic policy, or restricting one’s population from foreign travel would be included. For example, the government of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma threatened to restrict access to radio rebroadcasts of the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Voice of America in 2003. In March 2007, OpenNet Initiative reported that China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Burma, and Uzbekistan have become ‘pervasive blockers’ by routinely obstructing access to internet news sites by their citizens. North Korea’s almost complete isolation from the rest of the world is an extreme example along these lines. Within the context of the color revolutions, three factors were seen as precipitating these popular uprisings: nongovernmental organizations, election monitoring, and youth groups. These forces all feed off each other in a virtual ‘perfect storm’ of democracy promotion. After the color revolutions, authoritarian leaders perceived that these factors were not simply homegrown but rather contained strong international components. Liberal NGOs in these countries laid the groundwork for the opposition by organizing human rights and democracy supporters into a coherent movement, identifying the abuses of the regime, and challenging the government. Many of these groups were funded either directly or indirectly by external sources (Western governments or NGOs) and they were critical in ensuring that the regime would not be able to govern uncontested. There is some debate about how much of a role NGOs played in the fall of authoritarian leaders in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Several scholars have argued that they were not determinative, but rather served more as facilitators of regime change—that is, they were not prime movers but instead were instrumental in channeling latent regime opposition.10 Nevertheless, many autocrats perceived them as a serious threat and therefore moved against them after the color revolutions. In addition to funding and supporting pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations, a key means by which foreign governments and international organizations promote democracy and democratic consolidation is through election monitoring—a process by which observers certify whether a vote is conducted in   Zerkalo Nedeli (Kiev), 31 May 2003, 1, reproduced as ‘Western Ambassadors Urge Ukraine Not to Restrict Rebroadcasts’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2 June 2003.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������� Richard Waters, ‘Web Censorship Spreading Around World, Report Finds’, Financial Times (London), 15 March 2007. 10 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Fenger (2007) argued that their role was minimal. Others (Wilson 2006, Jones 2006) saw them as more significant.

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line with established democratic standards and should be considered both free and fair. This procedure has become increasingly accepted and widespread since it began in earnest in the 1980s as a check on the power of incumbents and as a means to guarantee democratic choices (Chand 2007). Because holding elections was seen as important to ensuring regime legitimacy in certain authoritarian, semiauthoritarian, or hybrid regimes, these governments went through the motions, but sought to ensure that they were victorious by creating electoral environments which were neither free nor fair (Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002). During the color revolutions, monitors within the country (again, often funded from external sources) and foreign observers from other states or European international organizations exposed these governments’ attempts at electoral fraud. This had the effect of legitimizing the complaints of domestic opponents, discrediting the government, and triggering a massive reaction against the regime. Consequently, election monitoring has become increasingly politicized and controversial since it reveals the duplicitous nature of these sham elections. Young people served as the backbone of the street protests which brought down the authoritarian regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.11 These and subsequent youth movements explicitly modeled themselves on those which came before and have been willing to provide assistance to like-minded groups in other countries. For example, the Georgian group Kmara worked with their counterparts in Belarus, named Zubr. Both of these were trained by members of the Otpor! (Resistance!) movement from Serbia. Belarusian students even hung a banner with the slogan ‘Gotov Je!’ (He is Finished!), the same slogan that Serbian students used against Milošević, in one of Minsk’s busiest intersections. Before the election campaigns, they received moral support, organizational advice, and financial assistance from NGOs and youth groups which were successful in prior cases. The Ukrainian youth groups—the most prominent of which was Pora! (It’s Time!)—were not only well trained prior to the 2004 presidential elections, but they had also planned extensively for the expected electoral fraud. After the election, they formed the backbone of the mass street protests which eventually toppled the government. Consequently, youth movements played (and more importantly, were seen as playing) a crucial role in the spread of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 2000. Thus, in order to avoid a color revolution at home, authoritarian regimes need to weaken or counteract these cross-border forces.

11 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ To a lesser extent, they also played a role in Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution. However, the youth movement Kelkel (Renaissance), though explicitly modeled on Otpor and Kmara, was not as important in the overthrow of Askar Akayev. Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, ‘Push for Democracy Has Authoritarians Unnerved’, Washington Post, 26 January 2004, A11; C.J. Chivers, ‘Youth Movement Underlines the Opposition in Ukraine’, New York Times, 28 November 2004, 32; Jeremy Page, ‘From West to East, Rolling Revolution Gathers Pace Across the Former USSR’, The Times (London), 19 February 2005, 43.

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Redefine Authoritarian regimes have long used wordplay and rhetoric to defend themselves against criticism from democratic states. This was best demonstrated during the Cold War when communist governments claimed that they were democracies (i.e. ‘socialist’ or ‘people’s’ democracies) when they were decidedly not. The seeming need to respond in kind to democratic criticisms is indicative of the power of democracy in the post-World War II period as a dominant ‘world value’. Democracy’s legitimacy is considered so great that it ‘faces few serious competitors’ and dictators feel forced to ‘either call their own autocratic regimes democracies or claim that their country is on the slow road to becoming a democracy’ (McFaul 2004). Therefore, authoritarian regimes will attempt to redefine the problem of external democracy promotion to their advantage. This strategy manifests itself in several ways. Authoritarian governments often feel the need to adjectivize democracy to obfuscate their illiberal tendencies. Phrases such as ‘Islamic democracy’, ‘developmentalist democracy’, or, in the case of Russia, ‘managed democracy’ have all been used (Collier and Levitsky 1997, Bukay 2007). Others have taken a relativist approach, such as during the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s, which Thompson (2001: 157) described as ‘a culturalist argument to discredit demands for liberal democracy and individualism’. These states rejected these ‘Western values’ as being inapplicable within their cultural and historical context. Related to this is the contention that external criticism is an attempt to ‘impose’ a form of government on a sovereign state and therefore akin to ‘imperialism’. As this argument goes, since each sovereign state has the right to define its own path of development, then the choices made by a particular regime are virtually unassailable from outside. Authoritarian regimes have also sought to redirect attention away from themselves and onto others by exaggerating the liberal democratic failings of others, particularly if the target state is a democracy. This attempts to put their democratic critics on the defensive and call into question the commitment of these states to their professed values. Regardless of whether an authoritarian regime misrepresents the nature of their political system, makes culturalist arguments, or shifts attention elsewhere, a strategy of redefinition seeks to discredit external criticism and undermine domestic opponents who push for reforms similar to those advocated from abroad. Bolster An authoritarian regime’s survival is not just dependent upon the strength of domestic opponents or the results of rhetorical sparring with democratic countries. The political systems of neighboring states are also of key importance to them. Writing on the debate within democratic peace theory over the importance of ‘political dissimilarity’ on interstate conflict, Werner argued that leaders ‘have a keen interest in seeing the establishment or the maintenance of governments abroad that strengthen, or at least do not undermine, their position at home’ (Werner 2000:

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347–8). Autocrats have a stake in ensuring that additional countries do not ‘fall’ to democracy. The ability of a country to withstand democratic pressures benefits all authoritarian regimes in the region. If a pattern of democratic transitions is halted, this would undermine a sense of momentum and reverse any belief that the overthrow of autocratic leaders is inevitable. Failed transitions will also dishearten pro-democracy forces elsewhere and serve as a warning that their plans are futile. As an added bonus, the target state will become more dependent upon its supporters because its political system will likely preclude any strategic realignment with the democratic powers. This provides authoritarian regimes with an incentive to bolster or support fellow autocrats. The means by which authoritarian states can undertake such a strategy are varied and can include a mix of economic, diplomatic, military, and political aid. This support would make it more likely that the target state would be able to resist democratization by giving it the tools to ensure regime survivability. This patronage would also make it easier for the target state to withstand both external punishments and the temptations of potential benefits. This, in effect, reinforces the target state’s own efforts at insulating itself against democracy promotion. We can see this process operating in China’s support for the military dictatorship in Myanmar, which helps it to resist international pressures (Bert 2004). Subvert Returning to Werner’s (2000: 347–8) observations, states also have ‘a keen interest in undermining governments abroad that pose any threat to their position at home’. Authoritarian regimes are deeply concerned with the political systems of their neighbors: a successful democratic transition within close proximity represents an ever-present symbolic threat of the possibility of regime change. However, if a democracy fails or is seen as worse than the regime it replaced, this will undermine the value of democratization for pro-democracy forces and serve as a negative example of regime change. While many democratic transitions are accompanied by a strategic realignment, a democratic reversal would make it more difficult for these states to align themselves with democratic powers and would likely preclude them from being admitted to certain international organizations, such as the EU or NATO. Consequently, that there will be a greater likelihood that the country in question will be forced to restore its ties with its authoritarian neighbors. Moreover, if a state reverts back to authoritarianism, then its nongovernmental organizations will be less free to function and will have their legitimacy undermined by their failure to sustain democracy at home; this will hamper their ability to export democratic ideas elsewhere. Thus, in addition to aiding like-minded regimes, an authoritarian state can also attempt to subvert or sabotage democratic states through a mix of economic, diplomatic, political, and military pressures.12 12 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Studies of how states have subverted democratically elected governments are rare. One of the few exceptions is Forsythe 1992.

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Coordinate In the democratic peace literature, which argues that democracies do not war against each other, there is a corresponding argument about the existence of an ‘autocratic’ or ‘dictatorial’ peace based upon a common interest in regime survival (Peceny et al., 2002). This cooperation may be prompted by the spread of democracy. Ray (2000: 313) observed that ‘as democracies become increasingly predominant in the international system, they will provoke augmented hostility from the increasingly outnumbered autocratic states. … [T]he increasingly besieged, outnumbered autocratic states might be encouraged to engage in less conflict and more cooperation among themselves’. One means by which authoritarian states can do this is by establishing and supporting international organizations to protect their own and like-minded governments from the possibility of regime change. This likely will not be done overtly, given the widespread, rhetorical support for the norm of democracy at the global level. Instead, such organizations will seek to establish a regional order which makes it illegitimate to criticize these governments, interfere in the domestic politics of its member states, or promote regime change. Powerful authoritarian countries will serve as the engines (‘critical states’) for the establishment and maintenance of these international organizations and will be influential in shaping the content of their values and principles. Within this context, the boundaries of what is permitted or appropriate for an organization’s members become much wider and might include actively undermining political opposition, cracking down on dissidents, or outright oppression. Consequently, the regional norms of democracy will be replaced by nondemocratic values which actively promote, or at the very least sustain, authoritarianism. Such a process occurred in Southeast Asia through the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in which the organization’s authoritarian members reinforced nondemocratic tendencies in the region. Kuhonta (2006: 338) asserted that ASEAN’s successes in the security realm established a regional ‘illiberal peace’: ‘ASEAN’s zone of peace has brought in its wake a dark undercurrent: the abnegation of democratic values’. The norms that formed the basis of the ‘ASEAN way’—‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’—purposefully emphasized regime survival over the promotion of liberal democratic norms. As Acharya (2003: 375) noted: The emergence of [ASEAN] was founded upon the common desire of its members, which had by then retreated significantly from their postcolonial experiments in liberal democracy, to ensure regime survival. This orientation was further institutionalized by ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference, which helped to shield its members from outside pressures toward democratization.

For example, the autocratic regime in Myanmar has been provided with ‘ideological support’ by ASEAN because of the organization’s refusal to criticize the internal affairs of a member state (Alamgir 1997). Thus, by working with others to

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25

undermine regional democratic trends, authoritarian regimes can transmit and reinforce norms with delegitimize political change. Conclusion This chapter argued that when faced with the external promotion of democracy, authoritarian leaders are not passive objects of democratic trends or democracy promotion. Instead, these regimes have several strategies that they can adopt to sustain autocracy at home or abroad: the strategies of authoritarian resistance. These policies are designed to counter or undermine the processes which have been seen to promote democracy in prior cases. In subsequent chapters, each of these strategies will be examined in depth through the example of Russian policies designed to ensure politically favorable domestic and regional environments. However, before exploring the application of these strategies, it is first necessary to understand the historical context within which the Kremlin operated.

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Chapter 3

Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union: An Overview

[T]he picture may still be sufficiently mixed to give some support to the optimists as well as the skeptics, but the last couple of years clearly have not been propitious for the fortunes of democracy in ‘the post-Soviet space’. Apart from the Baltic states, democracy today seems to be in retreat throughout the region. Editors of the Journal of Democracy in September 2001

The picture of democracy in the former Soviet Union remains mixed. In many ways, the time during which the editors of the Journal of Democracy were writing was even more grim than today: not only had authoritarianism been firmly entrenched in Central Asia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, but countries which had some early democratic promise, such as Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine, had seemingly made a qualitative shift toward autocracy. Since then, popular uprisings have overthrown authoritarian regimes in three countries, leading to another wave of optimism. Despite the hope engendered by these ‘color revolutions’, any positive expectations should be held in check. Additional democratic openings do not appear to be forthcoming and autocratic rulers have actively taken steps to further entrench themselves in power in response to these democratic movements. More importantly, the negative trends evident in Russia do not bode well for the chances of regional democracy. Since coming to power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has instituted a policy of centralizing power and asserting control over the free press, as well as effectively eliminating political competition in the Russian political system. Given its size and power, the relative health of democracy in Russia has a significant influence on democratic trends throughout the region. Moreover, the color revolutions themselves heightened a sense of insecurity in the Kremlin which accelerated the process of building an autocratic state and led the Russian government to actively resist and undermine regional democratic trends. It would be impossible to fully describe the history of democratization in the former Soviet Union in just one chapter. Numerous books have already been published on Russia alone, especially on the Putin regime (Herspring 2007, McFaul et al., 2004, Ostrow et al., 2007). Additional books on the color revolutions and their aftermath constitute another category of scholarly works (Åslund and McFaul 2006, Karumidze et al., 2005, Marat 2006, Wilson 2005b).  ��������������������������������������������� ‘Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup’ (2003), Journal of Democracy, 12:4, 19.

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The purpose of the present book is neither to provide a detailed examination of these historical events and policies, nor to focus on the largely internal dynamics of the shift toward authoritarianism. This has been done elsewhere. Instead, this book seeks to understand the ways in which Russia has sought to counter the external promotion of democracy, undermine regional democratic trends, and ensure that the region stays on its current authoritarian trajectory. Therefore, the subsequent chapters concentrate on the strategies adopted to affect cross-border influences. However, in order to understand the context of these strategies, it is necessary to first provide a brief overview of the course of democracy in the region, especially within Russia. Section one of this chapter presents an overarching picture of the key trends in the region, seen through the lens of Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ ratings. Many Russian commentators and politicians have taken issue with Freedom House’s ratings, especially when it conferred on Russia a ‘Not Free’ rating in September 2006. While any attempt to capture the relative level of democracy in a country will be open to criticism, Freedom House’s conclusions can provide an excellent sense of the major tendencies. Section two examines Russian democratic development during the Boris Yeltsin years, focusing on major events which created the potential for the shift toward authoritarianism after he resigned on 31 December 1999. Section three covers the consolidation of authoritarianism under Putin. Section four explores the color revolutions which partly reversed the region’s autocratic trends and threatened the governments of nearby states with the possibility of regime change. The Kremlin’s reaction to the color revolutions will set up the subsequent five chapters, each of which examines one of the strategies adopted to resist regional democratic trends. Freedom House Overview Every year, Freedom House formulates a numerical value for countries and territories throughout the world in two categories: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. A seven-point scale is utilized with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. Countries are divided into three categories based on their combined average rating: 1.0 to 2.5 = ‘Free’, 3.0 to 5.0 = ‘Partly Free’, and 5.5 to 7.0 = ‘Not Free’. Figure 3.1 depicts the course of democracy in the former Soviet Union since 1991. (For the full Freedom House numbers for the former Soviet Union, see Appendix.) It separates the fifteen former Soviet republics into three categories: the three Baltic states, six Hybrid regimes, and six Autocratic regimes.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ekaterina Savina, ‘International Human Rights Group Says Democracy in Russia Keeps Declining’, Kommersant, 13 September 2006, 4, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 13 September 2006. For Freedom House’s report on the shift from Partly Free to Not Free, see <www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?country=6818 &year=2005&page=0&view=mof&pf>, accessed 11 July 2008.

Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union

29

     

                                 



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Figure 3.1  Average Freedom House ratings of former Soviet Union countries The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have a strong Western orientation and have been largely removed from the trends evident in the region. Instead, they have followed a solidly democratic trajectory; the only significant political problem being the citizenship status of Russian-speakers. For Hybrid regimes, the story since independence has been more mixed: the average scores for these countries indicate a substantive history of illiberal tendencies. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine fit into this category. The final group consists of those states which have been largely Autocratic, even if there were periods of less authoritarian rule. This category includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. One can see a slight divergence in 2004–2005 between the Hybrid and Autocratic categories as the color revolutions caused Ukraine and Georgia to shift toward democracy (e.g. Ukraine was rated Free in 2005, from Partly Free in 2004), while other states tightened control over their political systems. It appears from Figure 3.1 that, despite the popular uprisings of the color revolutions, there is relative stability among the Hybrid regimes. This is misleading, however. Russia was classified as a Hybrid regime because its average score since 1992 was a 4.4. Its decided shift away from democracy between 2003–2004 obscured the democratic gains made by Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. This can be seen in Figure 3.2, which separates Russia from the rest of the Hybrid regimes. As illustrated in this chart, one can see a steady progression toward authoritarianism with shifts occurring after the 1996 presidential election, the accession of Putin to the presidency, and 2004.

Authoritarian Backlash

30      

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Figure 3.2  Average Freedom House ratings for Russia and the Color Revolution countries There have been three significant developments in the pattern of political change in the former Soviet Union. First, authoritarianism is well entrenched in the region. Second, the color revolutions resulted in positive moves toward democracy in some states. Third, Russia, the most influential state in the region, has moved steadily away from democracy. In order to understand this third dynamic, it is necessary to look past Putin and illustrate how Russian authoritarianism had its roots under Yeltsin. The Yeltsin Period Politically, the Yeltsin era (from independence in December 1991 to his resignation in December 1999) can be described as exhibiting incredible hope for a democratic future but ultimately sowing the seeds for the fundamental turn away from democracy that we now see in Russia. Over this period, elections became less free and competitive, the independence of the media was weakened, and power became increasingly concentrated in a virtually unchecked presidency. A number of key events set Russia on an autocratic trajectory: the crisis of 1993, the subsequent establishment of a president-dominant political system, the 1996 elections, and the selection of Putin as Yeltsin’s successor. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation did not immediately adopt a new constitution, but rather operated under its problematic Soviet document which included an unclear relationship between the newlycreated position of the President, on the one hand, and the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies, on the other. Soon after independence, Yeltsin and the leaders of Russian legislature fought over a variety of policy issues and the contours of the extraordinary powers granted to Yeltsin to enact a radical economic reform agenda. Over time, Yeltsin sought to increase his institutional

Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union

31

authority by extraconstitutional means and the legislature responded through actions of its own designed to strip Yeltsin of many of his powers. Yeltsin also supported a referendum which aimed to strengthen the president vis-à-vis the parliament. He later illegally dissolved the Supreme Soviet, in violation of the Russian Constitution; legislators responded by seeking to replace Yeltsin with his vice president, Alexander Rutskoy. As the result of these legislative and executive maneuvers, an armed crisis erupted which ended when Yeltsin ordered the military to shell and forcibly seize the Russian parliament building in October 1993. While the Russian legislature deserved a large amount of blame for the events of October 1993 (and the parliament’s supporters were, in fact, the first to use violence, though Yeltsin’s forces did blockade the legislature), many of Yeltsin’s actions before the confrontation were clear violations of the rule of law and the constitution. Moreover, the images of tanks and soldiers crushing a democratically-elected legislature (even one politically distasteful to the West) under orders of the country’s president are not normally those associated with a democracy. Nevertheless, many observers, including US President Bill Clinton and European leaders, accepted it as the price to be paid for eliminating the socalled red–brown coalition which dominated the legislature and for the possibility that out of the crisis there might emerge an opportunity for a fresh start. However, even if committed in the name of democracy, nondemocratic actions will rarely result in a positive outcome. In the aftermath of the October 1993 crisis, this proved to be the case. First, Yeltsin’s reliance on the military to guarantee his presidency during the crisis with parliament meant that he was increasingly reliant upon the ‘power ministries’ (defense, interior, and intelligence services). Not only did this undermine civilian control over these agencies, but it fostered a climate which led to both the wars in Chechnya and the rise of the siloviki (current and former members of the power ministries) in Russian politics. Putin’s ascendance to the presidency consolidated these gains. Second, the Yeltsin administration showed that it was afraid of democracy and it immediately hedged its bets against the possibility that a democratic legislature could again contest the power of the presidency. This was done by imposing a very different constitution from the one approved by the July 1993 Constitutional Assembly, which was, incidentally, accepted by Yeltsin at the time. While it certainly could not have guaranteed democratic development in Russia, this draft constitution contained more checks and balances between the legislature and the executive than the one eventually adopted. The version which emerged after October 1993 eliminated most of these checks and, rather than being the product of debate and compromise, was crafted solely by the victor of the crisis and severed its interests. This draft created a president-dominant system which emasculated the legislature, legitimized the precedent of legislating by decree, and created the institutional framework for the centralization of power by the Kremlin. Thus, rather than using the crisis to lay a constitutional foundation for democracy, Yeltsin created conditions under which an anti-democratic president like Putin could build an authoritarian system. While voters had a choice, rejecting the draft was not a realistic option since that

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would likely precipitate another political and constitutional breakdown. Finally, there is some question whether the December 1993 referendum which approved the constitution was legitimate—not whether it garnered enough votes to pass, but whether a majority of all eligible voters participated in the referendum as required by law. Even if the Kremlin did not falsify the vote, there were enough anti-democratic actions during the accompanying parliamentary elections (such as eliminating several electoral blocs from the party-list portion of the vote) to taint post-Soviet Russia’s first true experience with democracy. Although the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1995–1997 gubernatorial elections generally followed democratic norms, this positive trend was not replicated during the next major event in Russia’s democratic development: the 1996 presidential election. Toward the end of his first term, Yeltsin was extremely unpopular. Economic problems, a lack of vision by the Kremlin, the war in Chechnya, and the absence of a base of support meant that as Russia moved toward the scheduled presidential elections, it became very likely that the communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, would be elected president. There were those within the Kremlin who urged the president to either rig the elections or cancel them outright by declaring a state of emergency—both supposedly for the good of democracy. The fact that the elections happened at all was, admittedly, a positive sign. However, some observers took too much comfort from the fact that there were multiple candidates, the election was held without violence, and that the antiWestern, communist candidate lost. As a result, they overlooked the extremely undemocratic and uncompetitive nature of the election campaign. In order to win the election at all costs, the Kremlin committed widespread and serious violations of campaign spending and transparency rules, freely distributed financial largesse to regional leaders and sometimes directly to voters to garner votes, and reportedly falsified at least some returns. However, the most consequential damage inflicted upon the long-term future of Russian democracy was the relationship between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the oligarchs and the mass media, on the other: top oligarchs and media moguls openly assisted Yeltsin’s campaign by turning all of their resources toward his reelection, providing Yeltsin with consistently positive television coverage and blatantly demonizing his opponent. Not only did this foster entrenched corruption at the highest levels through quid pro quo arrangements between business interests and those of state, it blurred the line between the media and the government. As Ostrow et al. (2007: 67), concluded: ‘In retrospect, given the Kremlin’s [later] seizure of control over electronic media and the restoration of censorship across the press, it might appear that this was Yeltsin taking direct control of the media. It was not, but it did create conditions that paved the way for Putin to restore this control. … What became an oligarch–Kremlin marriage under Yeltsin opened the door to direct control by the next president’. Although there  �������������������������������������������������������� This claim is questioned in Filippov and Ordeshook 1997.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Partly because of the negative legacy of party membership during the Soviet period, Yeltsin never joined a political party.

Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union

33

was an election that was relatively free, the process leading up to the vote was certainly not fair. Rather than being a step toward democracy, the 1996 election was a sign that Russia’s illiberal tendencies were just beneath the surface. Yeltsin was constitutionally prohibited from running for a third term in June 2000. Given his massive unpopularity and serious health problems, it is likely that nothing short of widespread and blatant voter fraud would have allowed him to have a third term in any case. Not even the media could have saved him at that point. Instead, the focus of Russian politics became the debate over Yeltsin’s successor. A truly competitive, free, and fair contest for the presidency may have returned the country to a democratic path. However, this was not to be. Yeltsin resigned early and handed over power to his prime minister, Vladimir Putin. Not only did Yeltsin’s action allow Putin to run as an incumbent, with all of the advantages that entailed in a president-dominant system, but the vote was moved up to March because of rules requiring an early election in the case of the president’s resignation. This short-circuited any real chance for the opposition to organize and for the citizens to debate their future fully. However, even before this vote occurred, the transition to a democratic, post-Yeltsin political landscape was already made problematic by the preceding legislative election. During the December 1999 parliamentary election, the media oligarchs worked very closely with the Kremlin to ensure that the new, pro-presidential electoral bloc, Unity, did well against its rivals, the Communists and the Fatherland-All Russia coalition led by the popular former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov. Not only were smaller parties undermined by new rules which benefitted established, well-connected, and wealthy parties, but the Kremlin used its administrative resources to help Unity and to undermine any possibility that Primakov could use a legislative victory as momentum toward acquiring the presidency. Helped by the war in Chechnya, which began in the early fall under questionable circumstances, Unity came in a close second, undermining any substantive opposition to the Kremlin within the Duma. Once Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999, the oligarchs shifted their support to Putin and used their media power to ensure his electoral victory. Since it seemed certain that Putin would win, even the liberals backed him out of short-term self-interest. Nevertheless, despite these advantages, there were still reports that the Kremlin felt the need to falsify the results in order to guarantee Putin enough votes in the first round of voting to avoid a run-off. While adjusting the results was unnecessary, since Putin would most likely have easily won the second round, it illustrated how entrenched electoral fraud had become in the Russian political system. Once again, Western commentators saw positive signs in Putin’s March 2000 victory—an election with more than one candidate was conducted in an orderly  �������������������� Some claim that the casus belli for the war, explosions at apartment buildings in Moscow, were perpetrated by the successor to the KGB (the Federal Security Service or FSB) to increase the popularity of the Kremlin by creating a sense of threat and ensuring a ‘rally around the flag’ effect amongst Russians.

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Authoritarian Backlash

manner. This was not the case. As McFaul and Petrov (2004: 46) correctly state: ‘In consolidating democracies, elections become more competitive and more consequential over time. In Russia, the opposite trend has occurred’. The 2000 election was less competitive than the one in 1996 and corruption was even more an integral part of the system than before. Politics was not ‘real’, but was becoming increasingly ‘virtual’ (Wilson 2005a). Although Yeltsin himself was willing to allow debate and an often rancorous relationship with the post-1993 Duma, the political system he created, when placed in the hands of someone with few to no democratic tendencies, effectively closed the door on any real chance of democratic political development. Consolidating Autocracy under Putin The transition from Yeltsin to Putin solidified autocratic trends in Russia. The potential for abuse of executive power found in the president-dominant Russian constitution, the declining level of freedom of the press exhibited by an alliance between the media and the Kremlin, and the lack of fair and competitive elections coalesced into a decisive shift toward authoritarian under Putin. Each of the subsequent reforms enacted under the Putin presidency could be interpreted as something other than a move away from democracy. For example, the centralization of authority in the Kremlin could be seen as merely strengthening state institutions in order to reduce the potentially dangerous, centrifugal political trends seen under Yeltsin; if left unattended, these tendencies would have further eroded the power of the state, made positive political development impossible, and have possibly called into question the country’s territorial integrity. However, Putin’s policies cannot be judged in isolation from each other. Instead, they point to a much more negative pattern when taken together. Under Putin, the Kremlin systematically eroded independent sources of political power in the country while, at the same time, failed to adopt any policies which would have actually fostered democratic development. Soon after winning the 2000 election, Putin began the process of centralizing power. In May 2000, he issued a decree establishing seven ‘federal districts’ based upon the regional structure of the Soviet/Russian Interior Ministry districts. These so-called ‘super regions’ were each headed by presidential envoys (nearly all of whom were members of the siloviki) whose official charge was to formalize and rationalize the relationship between the regions and the center, but whose actual mission was to bring the regions under the Kremlin’s control. This was done through a variety of means, including subordinating regional security organs to the center, overseeing the collection of compromising materials on regional leaders in order to better manage them, and directly influencing political developments in the regions, including removing insubordinate leaders from power. In addition, regional executives, who had a direct role in the legislative process through their ex officio positions on the Federation Council, were stripped of their seats in the

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summer of 2000 and replaced by representatives chosen by the regional governors and legislatures in a process that was tightly controlled by the Kremlin. Not only did this weaken the influence of the regions in Moscow, but it brought the upper of the two houses of the Duma almost completely under the government’s control. Moreover, since Unity and its allies already controlled the lower house, the Russian legislature was rendered effectively powerless and inconsequential, as it remains to this day. The president-dominant nature of the Russian political system was also strengthened by a number of policies which further weakened the Duma as an independent base of power. Beginning in 2000, the Kremlin began establishing a number of ‘extraconstitutional parallel parliaments … that divert policymaking expertise and debate from the parliament itself to alternative arenas, which the president can consult at his pleasure’ (Remington 2007: 56). This started with a decree creating the State Council, which established a de facto legislative role for the seven federal districts, and was replicated after the Beslan Hostage Crisis with the founding of the Public Chamber (civil society), the Council for the Realization of Priority National Projects (social policy initiatives), and others. But the Kremlin went further. Rather than simply weakening the Duma, the Putin regime created a ‘party of power’ to replace Unity, through which he and his allies could control the legislature: United Russia. Politicians both in the center and in the regions were pressured to affiliate with United Russia and by early 2006 over 75 per cent of regional leaders were members of the party (Petrov and Slider 2007: 95). Moreover, a number of legislative acts were passed which disadvantaged smaller or regional opposition parties and benefitted United Russia because of its national presence and ties to the state administration. These measures included making it more difficult to register a new political party before running in election (July 2001), ensuring that regional legislative elections have at least half of their seats chosen through a proportional representation process in which only national parties can compete (June 2002), and excluding smaller parties from the legislature by raising the proportional representation threshold from five to seven per cent and prohibiting ad hoc electoral coalitions from combining their votes to surpass the threshold (December 2002). Finally, United Russia pushed through a number of reforms which strengthened its power in the Duma itself and allowed it to better control the legislative process, such as taking control of all committee chairmanships, reducing committee staffs, and increasing staffs for parties and the speaker. Thus, within a few years, the Duma was transformed from an extremely weak institution in a president-dominant system to an utterly irrelevant one, except to legitimize the policies of the Kremlin. Along with the shift toward even greater presidential power, Putin’s ascension to the presidency meant that the siloviki were firmly in control of the country. As already mentioned, nearly all of the heads of the federal districts came from the power ministries. This pattern extended throughout the government ministries and regional institutions, not just in terms of the upper administration, but extending down to the middle management. While the precise percentage of

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siloviki at the highest levels differs according to study and classification, there has been a significant increase. Under an expansive definition of siloviki, Olga Kryshtanovskaya found that upwards of three-quarters of those in the corridors of power have or had some tie to the power ministries (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005, Bremmer and Charap 2006). At the end of the Soviet period, this number was closer to five per cent. During a December 2006 celebration of ‘Chekist Day’, which commemorates the founding of the notorious and brutal predecessor to the KGB, Putin reportedly ‘flaunted the restoration of [the siloviki’s] power before the nation at a lavish Kremlin party’. These individuals operate within a very hierarchical relationship with the Kremlin and are largely without a political ideology, except to support the government. They are by reflex anti-democratic and reject open politics, and ultimately form the bedrock of authoritarianism in Russia upon which the Kremlin operates. The media played a consequential role in the outcomes of the 1996 presidential and 1999 legislative elections. By providing positive news reports of certain candidates and issuing a constant stream of negative stories on their opponents, autocratic regimes can safely allow for relatively free elections (within limits) because the media coverage leading up to them is anything but fair. This creates an environment which is noncompetitive politically, but presents a democratic image to the world. In reality, it is more like a Potemkin democracy. Although there was an uncomfortable and corrupt relationship between the Kremlin and the media during the latter half of the 1990s, Yeltsin had made a commitment to a free press and allowed for significant political debate within the print and broadcast media. Such a powerful resource could not go uncontrolled by Putin’s Kremlin, however. In his July 2000 state-of-the-nation address, Putin paid lip service to freedom of the press but castigated some (that is, opposition) media as ‘mass misinformation outlets and … a means of struggle against the state’. Since the Kremlin associated the government with the state itself, criticism of the government was in effect criticism of the state, and therefore unacceptable. Aiding the government in its quest to dominate the Russian media were three interrelated factors: first, given the uncontrolled capitalism of the 1990s, many media outlets were acquired under suspicious means, which opened their owners to criminal liability; second, through  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For example, one issue is whether these calculations should be limited to just the specific power ministries or whether affiliated bodies should be included.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� For a Russian perspective, see Vitaly Yaroshevsky, ‘Operation Infiltration Complete!’, Novaya Gazeta, 30 August–1 September 2004, 1–2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 31 August 2004. There is an opposing view of the siloviki which argues that their role in the Russian political system is frequently exaggerated and not as coherent as often perceived (Renz 2006).  �������������������������������������������� Tony Halpin, ‘Putin Toasts Spies’ Return to Power’, �������� The Times (London), 22 December 2006, 34.   Russia TV, 8 July 2000, reproduced as ‘Putin’s Address to Federal Assembly’, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 July 2000.

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the government’s control of prosecutors and tax officials and its willingness to utilize these agencies for political purposes, nearly every media empire could be found to have been in violation of the law and subject to seizure and its owners subject to arrest; finally, a weak and non-independent judiciary was unable or unwilling to confront the government and ensure freedom of the press. Given the importance of television in shaping people’s political perceptions— the vast majority of Russians get their news primarily through television—this was the first target. Within days of his inauguration (which, ironically, was in part guaranteed by positive press coverage from media oligarchs), the Putin government moved against Media-Most, owned by Vladimir Gusinsky. Gusinsky was threatened with jail unless he handed his media empire over to the Kremlin’s control; this included the largest national television station NTV, the magazine Itogi, and the newspaper Segodnya. This was followed by the seizure of TV-6 and Boris Berezovsky’s ORT, which had criticized top government officials for their failures during the Kursk submarine incident. When combined with the already state-controlled RTR, these steps meant that the Kremlin possessed either direct or indirect control over most independent television media within a year after taking office. Although much of the national and local print media remain in private hands, in part because they are seen as less of a threat to the government, printing and distribution facilities are largely state-owned and the owners of the print media have come under pressure to toe the government’s line. Self-censorship by journalists is also rampant, due not only to financial reasons, but because of the mysterious and unsolved deaths of reporters critical of the government.10 When combined, these factors severely limited the scope of political debate within the country and constitute what can be described as a ‘neo-authoritarian media system’—while better than the totalitarianism the past, it is fundamentally illiberal, undemocratic, and not free (Becker 2004). As a result, both the 2003 parliamentary election, in which United Russia emerged with well over four times the number of seats of its closest rival, and the 2004 presidential election, in which Putin garnered over 71 per cent of the vote (more than five times that of his closest rival), were tightly controlled events. Western observers categorized them as noncompetitive because of the overwhelmingly positive media coverage of the president and his party. By the time of the Beslan hostage crisis in early September 2004, state control of the media was such that Putin’s government ‘was fully protected against the detrimental effects of professional journalism, at least as national television was concerned. … There were no survivors’ accounts, no stories of desperate people who lost loved ones, no independent experts’ analysis, and no public discussion whatsoever’ (Lipman 2005: 320). Consequently, the Kremlin was able to use this tragedy to its benefit by ushering in a series of measures aimed at taking nearly full control of the country’s political system (Lemaître 2006). Immediately 10 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Approximately one journalist per month has been killed since Putin came to power. Nearly all of these were working on stories critical of the government. The authorities have not actively investigated these deaths (Ostrow et al., 2007: 116).

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after the Beslan crisis, in which more than 300 hostages (half of them children) were killed during the government’s rescue attempt, Putin gave a speech in which he directed blame at the terrorists who took the hostages and ‘a state that proved unviable in a fast-changing world’.11 In order to correct for the perceived deficiencies in the latter, Putin asserted that his government would ‘take steps aimed at strengthening the unity of the country’. These steps were outlined soon thereafter at an expanded cabinet meeting attended by regional leaders. Putin said that ‘the system of executive government in Russia should not only be adapted to function in [a] crisis situation, but fundamentally restructured’.12 Some of the specific items he proposed (and would later enact) included: eliminating the direct election of regional leaders and replacing this process with their appointment by the president (with the consent of the regional legislatures); removing the singlemember district method of choosing one-half of the lower house of the Duma and instituting a proportional representation system for all members; and, forming a ‘public chamber’ to serve as a bridge between the government and society and to shape public discussion of important issues. These measures amounted to yet another push toward the consolidation of power and the elimination of independent centers of power in the Russian political system. By having the president select the regional leaders, Putin subordinated these individuals to him since they held their jobs at the president’s pleasure. The ability of the regional legislatures to veto the president’s choice is really not a check at all since the president can dissolve the legislature if it does not agree with the president’s nominee. This change had several effects. Because of their precarious position, governors were now precluded from securing an independent power base in the regions from which to challenge the Kremlin. Moreover, it ensured that the regional administrations would be friendly to United Russia during upcoming elections and would use their administrative powers to ensure an outcome beneficial to the Kremlin. In addition, since the regional governors select one-half of the Federation Council, Putin now had the power to indirectly select one-half of the upper house of the Duma. The removal of the single member districts had a similar effect of preventing the development of alternative sources of power: independent politicians could no longer gain entry into the Duma without running on a party list. When combined with other laws which made it more difficult to form political parties and prohibited electoral blocs or regional parties from contesting elections at the federal and regional levels, proportional representation increased the power of established, national parties like United Russia at the expense of individual politicians. Finally, the proposed Public Chamber (see Chapter 4), was a way to restrict the development of a powerful civil society. This body was designed to filter the 11 ��������� ‘Text of Putin’s ����������������� Speech’, Agence France Presse, 4 September 2004. 12 �������������������� ‘President Vladimir Putin’s ���������������������������������������������������������� Speech to an Expanded Cabinet Meeting Attended by Regional Leaders on September 13, 2004’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 September 2004, 1–2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 14 September 2004.

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discussion of important issues through a government-connected and governmentcontrolled institution. Unaffiliated (i.e. non-Kremlin-aligned) interest groups and nongovernmental organizations would be rendered less legitimate because they were not part of this process. It also had the effect of further weakening the Duma because it created an additional parallel structure to express the public’s interests, a function normally filled by a country’s legislature. Regardless of whether ‘the Kremlin used Beslan as a pretext to accelerate the construction of the so-called “vertical of power” (vertikal vlasti)’ (Lemaître 2006: 370) or whether Putin truly believed that his proposals were best for the state and would prevent another Belsan, the effect was to continue the centralization of power. While it is impossible to determine the true intentions behind these reforms, the overall context makes their purpose clear: they were not aberrations in Russian political development designed to combat a specific problem, but rather fully in line with other patterns toward centralized control seen throughout Putin’s presidency. Thus, the power of the Kremlin was increased and United Russia’s predominant position in the country was secured, much to the detriment of Russian democracy. The autocratic potential inherent in the Russian political system came to fruition under Putin. From the Duma, to the regional governments, civil society, and the media, the Kremlin moved in a comprehensive, systematic, and consistent way to undermine or eliminate independent sources of political power in the country. This even extended into the business sector through the subordination of the oligarchs to the will of the Kremlin, in order to ensure that no force in Russian society could bankroll an opposition. For example, the threat of prosecution against Gusinsky undermined the main liberal, pro-democratic party in Russia (Yabloko), since he was its primary financier. Moreover, the arrest on tax evasion charges of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos oil and one of the richest men in the world, was conducted under similar and selective circumstances. Khodorkovsky’s primary sin against the regime was his creation of the Open Russia Foundation, which supported civil society and democratic political development. His later imprisonment, as well as Gusinsky’s and Berezovsky’s eventual exile from Russia, were seen by many to be a warning to the wealthiest in the country: they could keep their money as long as they either directly supported the government or kept completely outside of politics. By contrast, pro-Kremlin oligarchs often found their holdings increased. This was in line with which Putin reportedly told the oligarchs during a July 2000 meeting in which they could keep their businesses as long as they did not present a political challenge to the president (Goldman 2004). Thus, while each of the separate actions taken by Putin’s Kremlin could be argued to have been perfectly reasonable, when taken together, the overarching pattern of Russian political development has been a decisive break with liberal democratic principles and an embrace of authoritarianism.

Authoritarian Backlash

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The Color Revolutions The trends evident in Russia—the failure of democratic consolidation, a shift towards autocracy, and the creation of Potemkin democracy—were replicated elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Eduard Shevardnadze, Leonid Kuchma, and Askar Akayev regimes, respectively, tightened control but still allowed elections as long as the environment for the campaigns advantaged the regime and the fairness of these contests was compromised. However, this model was shattered by the ‘color revolutions’. Suddenly, the very real danger of democratic contagion was evident to authoritarian leaders throughout the region. The model for the color revolutions actually began outside of the Soviet Union in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s main republic, Serbia.13 Although it was not called a color revolution at the time, the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in October 2000 set a pattern which was replicated elsewhere. In response to a fraudulent election, in which the regime misrepresented the democratic opposition’s vote tally, the Serbian people took to the streets in peaceful, mass protests organized and led by the opposition and the youth movement Otpor! (Resistance), which launched its ‘Gotov je!’ (He’s Finished!) campaign. These protests, and the inability or unwillingness of the regime to use force against the protesters, resulted in Milošević’s resignation, the end of authoritarianism, and a democratic opening for Serbia. The Rose Revolution in Georgia was actually quite similar. Shevardnadze’s regime had become increasingly corrupt and autocratic, but was still committed to the perception that it was a democracy. The November 2003 parliamentary elections were criticized by foreign and domestic election monitors as being fraudulent. In response to calls for mass protests, and energized by the example set in Serbia, the Georgian people demonstrated against the Shevardnadze regime. Again, a youth group, Kmara! (Enough!), assumed a prominent role. Protestors carrying roses eventually seized the parliament, forcing the Georgian president to escape from the building and providing the name for their revolution. The security services refused to honor Shevardnadze’s declaration of a state of emergency and soon thereafter the president resigned, leading to a presidential election in January 2004 and new parliamentary elections in the spring. While the Rose Revolution followed the pattern of events in Serbia and contained some direct connections to that prior revolution (Kmara! modeled itself upon Otpor! and was trained by its Serbian counterparts), it was not until the 2005 presidential election in Ukraine that talk of democratic contagion became real. Ukraine was seen by both the West and Russia as a key battleground, not only over the country’s geopolitical alignment and the relative influence of the two sides, but between liberal and autocratic trends in the region. As a result, both sides took an active role in ensuring that the outcome was in line with their 13 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Montenegro, the other republic in the federation, boycotted the vote.

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values. For the West, this meant securing a free and fair democratic result in order to reverse the slide toward the corruption and authoritarianism seen during the Kuchma period. In order to do this, the West gave financial aid to pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations, lent rhetorical support for the Ukrainians to have a truly democratic choice, and were active in election monitoring activities. Since the pro-democracy, pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko benefitted from a free and fair election, Western support translated into de facto support for his candidacy. On the other side, Russia sought to ensure that Kuchma’s successor, the less popular Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, won the election and continued Kuchma’s eastward-leaning policies. In order to achieve this goal, ‘Russian leaders and organizations, to varying extents … encouraged autocratic methods as an effective strategy for holding on to power’ (McFaul 2007: 68). Russian support for Yanukovych reflected its desire to maintain and strengthen its influence in Ukraine, but was also a reflection of the ideological affinity between the two regimes—a revolution in Ukraine might have serious implications for Russia given the political, ethnic, and historical ties between the two countries. Russia sought to aid Yanukovych through an active and high-profile role for Kremlin-aligned public relations firms, economic concessions designed to show the Ukrainian people that they would benefit from close ties to Russia, financial contributions to the Yanukovych campaign by Russian businesses at the Kremlin’s behest, advice to the regime regarding the proper way to ensure an electoral outcome through the illegitimate and illegal use of administrative resources, and the direct intervention of Putin himself who visited Ukraine on multiple occasions. All of this set up a confrontation which pitted against each other two diametrically opposed candidates and ideologies. In the first round of voting in late October 2004, Yushchenko and Yanukovych were essentially tied and neither side had received enough votes to prevent a second round. Although some raised concerns about whether Yanukovych’s tally was exaggerated, it was not until the run-off election in late November, in which the primary Western election monitoring organizations cited massive voter fraud, that a repeat of the events in Serbia and Georgia began. Led by the members of the ‘orange coalition’ (orange was chosen as the unifying color of the democratic opposition) and the youth movement Pora! (It’s Time!), pro-democratic forces began massing in Ukrainian cities, the largest number of which camped out in Kiev’s Independence Square. Again, these protestors took their inspiration from prior events (some reported seeing Georgian flags being waved by protestors in Kiev) and Pora! activists were trained by their counterparts from Serbia and Georgia. The stance of the Ukrainian protestors and the West was that the second round was illegitimate and had to be redone; Russia, on the other hand, rejected these demands and Putin publicly congratulated Yanukovych on his victory several times. The Ukrainian security services were divided and the government eventually relented after the Ukrainian Supreme Court invalidated the results of the second round and ordered a rerun. Under the watchful eye of over thirteenthousand external observers, Yushchenko emerged as the president of Ukraine.

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The Orange Revolution was replicated just a few months later in Kyrgyzstan by the Tulip Revolution, in which Akayev was forced to flee the country and resign after rigged parliamentary elections were followed by street protests. Three revolutions in approximately a year and a half, each following a similar pattern, raised the specter of regional democratic contagion which might spread to affect Russia itself. This was best summarized by one Russian commentator who put it as follows: ‘The day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kiev. Tomorrow: Moscow’.14 Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s reaction was quite negative (Herd 2005a, 2005b). Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister and at the time widely thought to be on the shortlist of Putin’s possible successors, presented a sharp attack on the color revolutions and Western policy, stating that these and future attempts to ‘impose’ democracy from the outside constituted a threat to Russia’s vital interests and justified a more aggressive policy to counter ‘exports of revolution to the CIS states, no matter and what color – pink, blue, you name it’.15 This was later reiterated in an article entitled, ‘The New Russian Doctrine’, in which he identified ‘a violent assault on the constitutional order of some postSoviet states’ as one of the most serious threats Russia faced.16 The fact that the color revolutions were almost entirely peaceful and merely sought to correct for rigged elections was of no consequence to Ivanov. Vladislav Surkov, the deputy director of the Presidential Administration and the Kremlin’s top ideologue, gave a lengthy interview to the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel in June 2005 in which he rejected the legitimacy of the color revolutions, instead calling them undemocratic ‘coups’.17 He went on to say that the Russian government was aware of how outside forces were seeking to undermine the governments of the former Soviet Union but that those attempting to stage a ‘government coup’ in Russia were ‘doomed to fail’ because the Kremlin would stop them. Later, in a February 2006 speech to United Russia, Surkov claimed that those seeking to utilize ‘orange methods’ against the Kremlin constituted a ‘very real threat to [Russian] sovereignty’ and must be opposed.18 These statements indicated that the Kremlin took the implications of the color revolutions seriously and aimed to move against them.

14 ����������������������������������������������� Andrei Vladimirov, ‘An Exportable Revolution’, Itogi, 7 December 2004, 10–12, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 9 December 2004. 15 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Council on Foreign Relations Inaugural Annual Lecture on Russia and RussianAmerican Relations’, Federal News Service, 13 January 2005. 16 ������������������������������������������� Sergei Ivanov, ‘The New Russian Doctrine’, Wall Street Journal (Europe), 11 January 2006, 13. 17 ��������������������������� ‘Interview by Chief of the President’s ���������������������������������������������������� Staff Vladislav Surkov to Der Spiegel’, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 21 June 2005. 18 �������������������������������������������������� ‘Kremlin Aide on Threats to Russian Sovereignty’, RIA Novosti, 3 March 2006.

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Conclusion The Kremlin’s domestic actions to strengthen the power of the central authorities and undermine the country’s democratic development preceded the color revolutions. However, the popular uprisings gave new impetus to this process. Policies aimed only at tightening control over the country’s political system would not be enough since the color revolutions were not problems that were solely institutional or domestic in nature, but rather represented a situation in which democratization in one country affected the prospects for democracy in others. Therefore, in order to protect itself at home, the Russian government had to deal with this problem in a proactive and preventative manner. The following five chapters examine the strategies that the Kremlin adopted to resist and counter these democratic trends: insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate. Each of these strategies involved undermining those cross-border influences which were perceived to foster democratic change and strengthening those forces which sustained authoritarianism. In doing so, the Kremlin sought to advance its interest in regime preservation through domestic and foreign policies aimed at immunizing Russia from the ‘orange virus’.

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Chapter 4

Insulate: Shielding Russia from External Democracy Promotion

Does Russia have immunity to the ‘orange virus’? Andrei Vladimirov

For autocrats, the fundamental danger of regional democratic trends is that, if left unchecked, they will help precipitate a democratic revolution at home through a mixture of demonstration effects, perceptions of momentum for regime change, symbolism, international isolation, and networks of pro-democracy activists. Although democratization is inherently a domestic-level process, the international level is substantively important as well. Therefore, insulating one’s country from these trends is the first and foremost line of defense against political challenges seen as being touched off from the outside. The Kremlin has pursued its own version of this strategy, seeking to inoculate Russia from the color revolutions. Three forces in particular were seen as playing central roles in these popular uprisings: foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), election monitors, and youth movements. Consequently, the Kremlin has sought to undermine the political impact of each. This chapter covers these forces in turn, with section one examining the January 2006 law severely hampering the functioning of foreign NGOs in Russia. Section two illustrates how the Russian government sought to delegitimize European election monitoring and establish alternative (that is, pro-Kremlin) monitoring institutions. Section three probes the creation of government-aligned youth groups by the Kremlin in order to co-opt young people and undercut the formation of an anti-regime youth movement. Undermining Foreign NGOs In the context of the Russian Federation, foreign NGOs were considered particularly critical to any effective resistance to the Putin regime because Russian elites and wealthy benefactors were reluctant to provide funds or organizational capacity to domestic groups after anti-regime figures were punished for their

 ����������������������������������������������� Andrei Vladimirov, ‘An Exportable Revolution’, Itogi, 7 December 2004, 10–12, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 9 December 2004.

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political opposition to the Kremlin. A viable civil society, therefore, had to be funded at least in part from the outside. From the perspective of the government, one of the greatest threats to regime stability was the intersection of ‘foreign’ NGOs and domestic opponents. This view was well summarized by Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-aligned political analyst and advisor, as well as a member of the government-created Public Chamber, and later a member of the Duma from the ruling United Russia party: NGOs are the greatest political weapon of the 21st Century. New forces came to power by means of political coups in the 19th Century, and by means of political parties in the 20th Century. These days, the basic weapon used to increase political power is the NGO. In the lead-up to Russia’s federal elections, the West will intensify funding for NGOs in Russia. The US State Department has already said this openly.

Konstantin Kosachev, the chair of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee and United Russia member, echoed Markov’s sentiment and made an explicit link between these organizations and the possibility of regime change: ‘Unless we react right now … to these external and somewhat provocational attempts by our partners [in the West] to fund the activities of Russia’s civil society and NGOs, then sooner or later yet another color revolution will be incited—this time in Russia.’ The government went further than just criticizing foreign NGOs; it sought to blur the differences between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ organizations by promoting a division between those perceived as ‘ours (state-funded)’ and those which were ‘alien (mostly funded by Western grants)’. Obviously, the latter groups were far more critical of the government’s moves away from democracy. All NGOs, except for those most loyal to the regime, were seen as suspect, and those NGOs with connections outside of Russia became key targets of the government. Although the Kremlin has long sought to limit the role that foreign NGOs play in Russia, a new offensive against them was launched in 2002 with the expulsion of 27 members of the US Peace Corps for reportedly ‘gathering information about the political and socio-economic situation in Russian regions, about governing  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is considered a case in point, given his later incarceration under dubious circumstances (see Chapter 3). Even if the Russian government’s claims against him were true, his imprisonment was widely seen as a warning to others like him who might challenge the Putin regime. Andrei Antonov, ‘Il Duce’s Formula’, Novoye Vremya, 4 December 2005, 11, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 12 December 2005.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Igor Romanov, ‘Non-Governmental Organizations Get a Suspended Sentence’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 April 2007, 1, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 17 April 2007.  ���������������������������������������������� Suzanna Farizova, ‘Poised to Resist America’, Kommersant, 13 April 2007, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 13 April 2007.  ����� Ibid.

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bodies and the course of elections’. Later, the executive director of the Solidarity Center (a labor organization founded by the AFL–CIO and financed by the US Agency for International Development) had her visa revoked, allegedly because of the group’s role in organizing labor unions in Russia. The Rose Revolution in November 2003 accelerated this process and the Kremlin took a more public stance against these organizations. In his annual address before the Russian Duma in May 2004, Putin launched into a scathing attack on foreign and domestic NGOs, claiming that ‘far from all of them are geared towards defending people’s real interests’. Instead, the ‘priority’ for some was to obtain ‘funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations’, serving their interests and not those of the Russian people. After the Orange Revolution, an even harder line was taken against foreign NGOs. For example, during a July 2005 meeting with human rights activists and experts in the Kremlin (ostensibly aimed at strengthening civil society), Putin declared that his administration would work against the financing of political activities from abroad because, he implied, organizations which take foreign money are the de facto agents of foreign powers: ‘We understand that you dance with the one who brought you’. In November 2005, the government introduced a bill severely limiting the ability of NGOs to function on Russian soil. As introduced, the law required NGOs to register as separate Russian entities, subject to strict financial and legal controls, especially over unspecified ‘political activities’. Under the bill’s provisions, it was virtually impossible for NGOs with substantial ties to organizations outside of Russia (e.g. local branches of international NGOs) to operate. Moreover, a federal agency was to be established to ensure that they act in strict adherence to their stated (and government-approved) goals. Putin strongly backed the bill, declaring that ‘political activity in Russia must be transparent to the utmost’ because the foreign funding of Russian NGOs ‘are, in essence, used as foreign policy instruments by other states’.10 The association of foreign-backed NGOs with external threats was highlighted by other officials who accused these organizations of being fronts for foreign  ������������������������������������������������������������� Sharon LaFraniere, ‘Anti-Western Sentiment Grows in Russia’, Washington Post, 19 January 2003, 24. Also see Sergei Stokan and Leonid Gankin, ‘Russia Expels US Volunteers’, Kommersant, 14 August 2002, 5, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 16 August 2002.  ��������������������������������������������������������� Natalia Yefimova, ‘Russia Turns Away US Labor Activist’, Moscow Times, 9 January 2003.   RTR Russia TV (Moscow), 26 May 2004, reproduced as ‘Full Text of Putin’s State of the Nation Address to Russian Parliament’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports [BBCMIR], 26 May 2004.  ����������������������������������������� Anfisa Voronina et al., ‘Don’t Invest in Politics’, ����������� Vedomosti, 21 July 2005, A1, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 21 July 2005. 10 ���������������������������������������������������� Anatoly Medetsky, ‘Putin Stands By Tough NGO Bill’, Moscow Times, 25 November 2005.

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intelligence agencies. Sergei Lebedev, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), claimed that the government had ‘data’ of NGOs spying on the Russian government and organizing anti-Russian activities.11 Valery Galchenko, the bill’s co-author and Putin ally, claimed that foreign NGOs sought ‘the gradual destruction of Russia’s state structure’ and that pro-democracy organizations like the Soros Foundation were ‘the greatest threat to our society’.12 The Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Viktor Komogorov, identified other American-financed NGOs as intent on illicitly ‘influencing public opinion’ and promoting the ‘transformation of the state system of Russia and establishing of control over Russian information space’.13 In addition, the Kremlin accused the NGOs as being responsible for the negative perceptions of the Putin regime abroad, in terms of both the shift toward authoritarianism and Russia’s more aggressive foreign policy.14 The West, led by the United States, called upon the Russian government not to pass the bill, stating that it would unduly restrict civil society.15 Many Russian prodemocracy, pro-human rights NGOs strongly criticized the bill as well.16 Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few liberals remaining in the Russian Duma, claimed that the Kremlin’s ‘orange paranoia’ was behind its campaign against foreign NGOs. Although Russian officials rejected these criticisms, they nonetheless offered amendments to the legislation in order to calm concerns. Many observers, however, argued that these measures were merely cosmetic and that the intent of the bill—to constrain NGOs—remained unchanged.17 11  Rossiyakaya Gazeta, 8 December 2005, reproduced as ‘Draft Law on NGOs to Protect Russia, Says Foreign Intelligence Chief’, in BBCMIR, 10 December 2005. 12 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Suzanna Farizova, ‘They’re Destroying Our Citizens from Within’, Kommersant– Vlast, 28 November 2005, 40, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 5 December 2005. 13 ��������������������������������������������� Natalia Kostenko, ‘FSB Disclosed US Agents’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 December 2005, 2, reproduced in Defense and Security, 5 December 2005. 14 ����������������������������������������������������������� See Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Yakovenko in Interfax, 1 December 2005, reproduced as ‘Russia Accuses Foreign-Funded NGOs of Distorting Its Policies’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring [BBCWM], 1 December 2005 and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in ‘Putin Promises Amendments to NGO Bill but Defends Controversial Measure’, Associated Press, 5 December 2005. 15 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ See Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement in Mara D. Bellaby, ‘Rice Expresses Concern Over Restrictive Draft Russian Legislation on NGOs’, Associated Press, 7 December 2005. The US House of Representative’s 15 December 2005 nonbinding resolution calling upon the Russian Duma not to pass the law (House Concurrent Resolution 312). 16 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� See comments by Lyudmila Alekseyeva, the chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group, in Interfax, 13 December 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian Human Rights Activist Believes NGO Bill “Conceptually Wrong”’, in BBCWM, 13 December 2005. 17 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� Marina Lapenkova, ‘Putin “Pretending” to Heed Western Concerns on NGO Bill: Analysts’, Agence France Presse, 7 December 2005; Nabi Abdullaev, ‘NGOs Say

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The final bill passed by the Duma in December 2005 and signed by Putin in January 2006 remains ambiguous and could easily be used to hamper any NGO that opposed the Kremlin. The INDEM Foundation, a pro-democracy Russian NGO, asserted that it ‘could have a chilling effect on the civil society sector’ in Russia (Machleder 2006: 4). In a report written by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2006), analysts concluded that the NGO law had the potential to severely limit the role of civil society in Russia. For example, the law denies local registration to NGOs if their ‘goals and objectives … create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation’. While the first three provisions are standard restrictions on any type of organization in democratic countries, the last four are very subjective and could be used by Russian authorities to ban virtually any group whose activities raise concerns about Russia’s political system or human rights record. Moreover, the standard for denying registration is not outlined in the law and the regulating agency does not have to provide reasons for its decisions. The regulating agency also has the ability to evaluate whether the organization’s activities are in line with its stated goals and oversee both its funding and expenditures. This is done through an annual review of the organization’s resolutions and financial statements, as well as unfettered access by government representatives to all of the organization’s events and meetings. Again, some of these provisions exist in democratic countries, but the Russian NGO law provides neither substantive standards for determining whether or not an organization is in compliance with its stated goals nor any adequate legal protections for organizations accused of malfeasance. However, the greatest restrictions on Russian NGOs involve membership. Only individuals who are ‘legally domiciled in the Russian Federation’ may create, participate, or be a member of a Russian NGO. This would seemingly exclude international NGOs from providing advice or aid to their local branches. More troubling, even those foreigners who live in the Russian Federation can be excluded if they are deemed ‘undesirable’—no standard is given for what characteristics or activities would make an individual ‘undesirable’. Finally, the tremendous amount of paperwork required of NGOs under this law (including detailed accounts of all of their activities, meetings, funding, membership, etc.) would significantly increase their costs of operation and have likely opened them up to technical violations of the NGO laws, thus leading to their liquidation. When taken together, these provisions severely restrict the ability of NGOs to operate effectively. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the NGO bill was firmly in line with international law and comparable regulations in Western democratic states.18 This assertion was rejected by the INDEM Foundation, which analyzed the Russian law and those of the specific cases Lavrov cited (France and the Amendments Won’t Help’, Moscow Times, 21 December 2005. 18 ���������� ‘Russia’s Public ������������������ Chamber to Press ����������������������������������� for Changes in Law on NGOs’, TASS, 18 January 2006.

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United States).19 Lavrov also claimed that the Council of Europe had approved the law, but this too was disputed by its Secretary-General who commented that ‘excessive powers of supervision remain an area of concern’ and that some portions of the law may contradict the European Convention on Human Rights.20 This was consistent with the decision by the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly, which had earlier declared that the law did not meet European norms.21 Because of the many ambiguities in the law, and the sizeable amount of discretion it leaves to the authorities, the application of the law would reveal the degree to which the Kremlin was seeking to use it to handicap civil society. The initial signs were worrying. Less than two weeks after the law was formally promulgated, the Kremlin accused four British embassy employees of spying and linked these individuals to pro-democracy NGOs.22 According to the Russian government, the Britons had placed an electronic device inside of a fake rock in a square in central Moscow and used it to communicate with their local agents. The truth of these allegations cannot be fully determined because Moscow had one story and London another. However, if true, this unveiling came at an extremely convenient time for the Kremlin and the level of coincidence here is quite high. Nevertheless, the Russian government quickly took advantage of the ‘spy scandal’ to justify its new law and to attack the legitimacy of liberal NGOs.23 Russian television was not surprisingly divided, with the Kremlin-controlled stations echoing the government’s allegations and the remaining private ones accusing the government of inventing the scandal as a pretext to crackdown on NGOs.24 Scepticism regarding the Kremlin’s story was seconded by liberal Duma members and rights groups.25 The allegations of opposition forces were strengthened by the fact that the alleged spies were not expelled from the country, which is normally the case in events such as this.26 19 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Josh Machleder, ‘Contextual and Legislative Analysis of the Russian Law on NGOs’, 27–31. 20 ��������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Says it Is Listening to Council of Europe on NGO Law’, Associated Press, 3 March 2006. 21 ��������������������������������������������������� Carl Schreck, ‘Putin: Spy Flap Justifies NGO Law’, Moscow Times, 26 January 2006. 22 ����� Nick Paton �������������������������������������������������������� Walsh, ‘Moscow Names British “Spies” in NGO Row’, Guardian, 23 January 2006, 22. 23 ������������������������������ See the statement by Vladimir Putin ������������������������������������������������� in ‘Putin Condemns Attempts of Foreign Spy Services to Harness NGOs’, TASS, 25 January 2006. 24 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Stephen Ennis, ‘Russian TV Channels Differ on NGO Role in UK Spy Scandal’, BBCWM, 1 February 2006. 25  Ren TV, 24 January 2006, reproduced as ‘Russian MPs Differ on Foreign Aid to NGOs, Say Spy Story “Provocation”’, in BBCWM, 24 January 2006; Steve Gutterman, ‘Russian Rights Groups Denounce Efforts to Link Alleged Western Spying to NGOs’, Associated Press, 27 January 2006. 26 ������������������������������������������������������ Mikhail Zygar et al., ‘A Voice From Behind the Rock’, Kommersant, 24 January 2006, 1, 9, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 24 January 2006.

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Less than a week after the spy accusations, one of the first foreign NGOs was closed by the government: the Russian Human Rights Research Center, an umbrella organization which supports other human rights and democracy NGOs, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and Soldiers’ Mothers.27 This began a pattern in which numerous liberal NGOs were either suspended, banned outright, or not allowed to register for various reasons over the remainder of the year.28 It is perhaps telling which groups were targeted in the first applications of the law: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute.29 After intense, diplomatic pressure from European governments and the United States, most of these NGOs were allowed to resume operations.30 The fact that the Kremlin would immediately suspend those organizations which promote human rights and democracy was indicative of the government’s priorities and interests. In addition to working against liberal NGOs, the Kremlin has also sought to weaken their influence by supporting government-friendly organizations and bodies. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry pushed domestic NGOs to be more active in the international arena, promoting a positive image of the political situation in Russia and counteracting the message that Russia is moving closer to autocracy.31 In addition, following the Beslan terrorist massacre, Putin called for the government to create a public forum which would analyze state decisions and

27 ������� Jeremy Page, �������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Orders First Closure of NGO’, The Times (London), 28 January 2006, 49; Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Moscow Asks Court to Close Civil Rights Group’, The Guardian, 28 January 2006, 17. In a rare move, a Moscow court defied the government and refused to allow the organization to be shut down. ‘Moscow Court Rejects Official Request to Close Human Rights Umbrella Group’, Associated Press, 10 April 2006. 28 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The data differ quite wildly on the actual numbers of NGOs which were prevented from functioning. This may be a reflection of timing, the level of severity (outright closure versus suspension), or the categorization of groups as either ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic’. Those focusing on human rights in Chechnya were especially hard hit. See Nick Patton Walsh, ‘Russia Rejects 40 Foreign NGOs’, The Guardian, 30 June 2006, 24; Henry Meyer, ‘Russia Forces at Least 95 Foreign NGOs to Suspend Activities’, Associated Press, 19 October 2006; Tony Halpin, ‘Kremlin Curbs Hit Rights Groups’, The Times (London), 19 October 2006, 46. 29 ����������������������� C.J. Chivers, ‘Kremlin Puts ������������� Foreign Private ���������������������������������� Organizations on Notice’, New York Times, 20 October 2006, A8. 30 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who took a strong position on the NGO law and its implementation, credited international pressure for a partial reversal by the Kremlin. ‘Media Roundtable with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Travel Pool’, Federal News Service, 30 November 2006. Also see Stephen Castle, ‘EU Prepares for Showdown with Putin After Civil Liberties Restricted’, The Independent, 19 October 2006, 26. 31  ITAR–TASS, 20 July 2006, reproduced as ‘Foreign Ministry Wants Russian NGOs to be More Active in UN’, in BBCWM, 20 July 2006; ‘Russian FM Urges NGOs to Defend Nation’s Image Abroad’, Agence France Presse, 7 February 2007.

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draft legislation, as well as to serve as the principle representative of civil society.32 This was established in April 2005 as the Public Chamber. Even before it was created, Kremlin opponents were extremely critical, arguing that it would amount to little more than a ‘presidential chamber’ designed to silence independent NGOs: since the Public Chamber would have the aura of official legitimacy to speak on behalf of civil society, its existence would, in effect, undermine the legitimacy of alternative voices which might criticize the Kremlin.33 Putin’s early choices for the chamber included many Kremlin loyalists, including some involved in Putin’s political party, United Russia.34 Opposition NGOs, including the Helsinki Group, refused to take part, fearing that their independence would be compromised.35 However, these fears were not fully realized, as the Public Chamber has been willing to oppose the government on several issues, including the NGO bill itself.36 At least one member has openly criticized steps the government has taken to control the mass media.37 Even some Kremlin opponents have grudgingly expressed that the Chamber was more independent than initially thought.38 Nevertheless, the Public Chamber has had the very real effect of weakening opposition NGOs. It has assumed a greater role in the society by monopolizing media coverage because of its special status. It has also directly challenged some opposition NGOs at the local level and expanded into a number of new ‘branch’ chambers to dominate discussions over security and law enforcement.39 In response to the Kremlin’s push against NGOs, the United States launched a counteroffensive designed to aid them. At the December 2006 commemoration of Human Rights Day, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice talked about the consequences of the global crackdown against liberal NGOs and pledged her 32  RTR Russia TV, 13 September 2004, reproduced as ‘Russia’s Rulers and Public Must Unite Against Terrorism—Putin’, in BBCWM, 13 September 2004. 33 ���������������������������������������������������������� Anna Nikolayeva and Boris Grozovsky, ‘Kremlin’s Chamber’, Vedomosti, 24 September 2004, A2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 24 September 2004; ‘Public Chamber Left Toothless’, Moscow Times, 21 February 2005. 34 ������������������������� Anatoly Medetsky, ‘Putin �������������������� Picks Loyalists for ����������������� Public Chamber’, Moscow Times, 25 August 2005. 35 ������������������������� Viktoria Sokolova, ‘Some Public ������������������������������������ Organizations Refuse to Take Part �������� in Public ������� Chamber’, TASS, 30 September, 2005. 36 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Lyudmila Alexandrova, ‘Public Chamber Revolts Against Tighter State Control of NGOs’, TASS, 17 November 2005; Lyudmila Alexandrova, ‘Russia’s Public Chamber to Press for Changes in Law on NGOs’, TASS, 18 January 2006. 37  Kommersant, 29 March 2007, reproduced as ‘Public Chamber Notes Crackdown on Independent Media’, in BBCWM, 29 March 2007. 38  Argumenty i Fakty, 15 January 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Public Watchdog Does More Good than Harm’, in BBCWM, 20 January 2007. 39 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� Delphine Thouvenot, ‘Motives of New Kremlin-Backed Rights Group Raise Eyebrows’, Agence France Presse, 28 August 2006; Irina Nagornykh and Andrei Kozenko, ‘Forming Loyalist Pubic Councils’, Kommersant, 7 August 2006, 1, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 7 August 2006.

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country’s support: ‘Whenever NGOs and other human rights defenders are under siege, freedom and democracy are undermined. The world’s democracies must push back. We must defend the defenders.’40 To this end, she issued a ten-point statement concerning Washington’s principles on NGOs and announced some concrete steps the US would take to aid them. Four months later, the US State Department issued a human rights report which emphasized the pressures that NGOs were facing worldwide, but singled out Russia for its NGO policies.41 The reaction by the Russian government to these moves was harsh. Less than a week after Rice’s December 2006 statement, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the FSB, announced a ‘sharp increase’ in the number of foreign spies using international NGOs as covers in their operations.42 The Russian Duma accused the US of interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs through its support of NGOs and called upon the Foreign Ministry to take ‘urgent measures’ to defend the country’s sovereignty.43 Additional NGOs were closed under dubious charges and others came under increased pressure.44 Finally, the government’s rhetoric against foreign NGOs sharpened.45 While one could argue that the anti-democratic intentions of the January 2006 NGO law are exaggerated, it fit firmly into the clear and consistent pattern of the Kremlin’s moves to tighten control over the Russian political system. This law was not an aberration in Russia’s political development. It strengthened the state’s ability to stymie potential opponents by increasing the potential for politicallymotivated application of the law, heightening its surveillance and control over them, and restricting their ability to acquire funds, expertise, and organizational capacity from abroad. 40 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Human Rights Day Commemoration’ [Online, United States Department of State], 14 December 2006. Available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/77839.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008. 41 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2006’ [Online, United States Department of State], April 2007. Available at <www.state.gov/documents/ organization/80699.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2007. 42 ������������������������������������������������������������ Simon Saradzhyan, ‘Patrushev Says More Spies Work in NGOs’, Moscow Times, 20 December 2006. 43 ���������������������������������������������� Suzanna Farizova, ‘Poised to Resist America’, Kommersant, 13 April 2007, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 13 April 2007. 44 �������������������������� Steve Gutterman, ‘Russian Police ������������������������������������������������� Raid US-Funded Organization Amid Fears of Western Influence’, Associated Press, 19 April 2007; Andrei Kozenko and Yulia Taratuta, ‘The State Takes Tax Hostages’, Kommersant, 28 April 2007, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 28 May 2007; Ekho Moskvy, 12 July 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Human Rights Group Registers Sharp Increase in NGO Persecution Cases’, in BBCWM, 12 July 2007. 45 ���� See Putin’s ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2007 state of the nation address in which he lashed out at the increasing ‘influx of money from abroad used for direct interference in our internal affairs’. RTR Rossiya, 26 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Putin Delivers Annual Address to Parliament—Full Text’, in BBCWM, 27 April 2007.

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Counteracting Scrutiny of Elections Russia has become more outspoken against the primary election observers for the continent—the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—when they have been critical of undemocratic elections in Russia and other authoritarian states in the former Soviet Union. Russia has even gone so far as to call into question the core mission of the CoE and the OSCE to spread and consolidate liberal values in Europe. By undermining the European election monitoring system, these actions make it easier for authoritarian governments to falsify elections because they discredit those charged with serving as an external check on the regime. For a decade following the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, European election monitors had effectively given the Kremlin a pass on several questionable elections. Rather than identifying and denouncing a process which was increasingly characterized by the abuse of administrative resources and a significant decline in political competition, European organizations and governments advanced the notion that Russia was continuing a steady (albeit slower than desired) transition to democracy. They feared that external criticism might derail this process. This effectively ‘semi-legitimised the [fraudulent] practice[s] and encouraged the development of an electoral culture based on manipulation and fraud in Russia’.46 This changed with the 2003–2004 Russian election cycle, when these same organizations refused to publicly endorse the outcome for the first time. In response, the Kremlin openly began to criticize the election monitors. After the 2003 Russian parliamentary election, the top OSCE observer noted that the state-controlled media (which dominates all media in the country) gave an unfair advantage to United Russia through its extremely positive coverage, with extremely negative coverage given to its opponents.47 This bias ‘overwhelmingly distorted’ the electoral results.48 David Atkinson, the head of the observation team from the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), seconded this conclusion and stated that while the elections should be regarded as ‘free’, they were ‘certainly not fair’.49 Moreover, Atkinson characterized the election as ‘one of regression 46 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Sinikukka Saari (2007), ‘From Hidden Resistance to Open Challenge: Russian Responses to the European Promotion of Free and Fair Elections’, paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Chicago, IL, 13. 47 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Anneli Nerman, ‘OSCE: Media Coverage of Elections Biased in Favor of ���� ProKremlin Party’, Associated Press, 1 December 2003. For the formal OSCE report on the election, see ‘Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma: 7 December 2003’ [Online: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], 27 January 2004. Available at <www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/01/1947_en.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008. 48 ��������������������������� ‘Russian Election Fails to Pass ��������������������������������� Democratic Bar: Observers’, Agence France Presse, 8 December 2003. 49 �������������������������������������������������� Judith Ingram, ‘OSCE Condemns Russia’s Election’, Associated Press, 8 December 2003.

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in the democratization of this country’.50 Atkinson’s comment that the election was ‘free’ but ‘not fair’ is a common theme in cases where the vote is conducted in a technically correct manner (i.e. no blatant ballot stuffing or widespread falsification of vote tallies), but the entire system itself—from the misuse of the regime’s entrenched position to provide loyal political forces a significant electoral edge, to its willingness to inconsistently apply government regulations in order to hamper the opposition’s ability to organize, to its ability to manipulate the nature and substance of the political debate through its control of the media—creates an institutional bias which effectively makes true political competition impossible. With this level of power, regimes do not have to conduct overt electoral fraud to win—they can allow a ‘free’ vote in an unfair environment without fear of a substantive political challenge. Thus, for example, when the head of the Russian Central Election Commission reported that the vote on the day occurred ‘without excesses’, he was being technically correct, but disingenuous.51 Many of the same criticisms were also leveled against the Russian government after the 2004 presidential election, which saw Putin reelected by well over a fifty-point margin. Both the OSCE and PACE argued that the elections did not meet European standards of competitiveness or pluralism, despite being welladministered. Again, the problem was the Kremlin’s use of its institutional power and media control to ensure a huge victory.52 What is interesting is that Putin would likely have won the election handily, but the culture of electoral fraud was so entrenched in the Russian political system that the government felt the need to manipulate the outcome anyway. The Kremlin responded to foreign criticisms of the 2003–2004 electoral cycle in three ways. The regime at first simply ignored the outside observers and asserted that its democratic process was firmly in line with international

50 ����� Ibid. 51 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Catherine Belton and Timur Aliev, ‘Complaints of Fraud and Ballot Stuffing’, Moscow Times, 8 December 2003. A similar situation occurred after the 2006 Belarusian elections, which the OSCE called ‘calm and peaceful’, but fundamentally flawed. The Russian Foreign Ministry sought to discredit the OSCE’s conclusions by arguing that its statement was contradictory. However, this was simply not the case: the absence of chaos does not mean that an ‘election’ is valid. Other so-called elections within authoritarian or even totalitarian contexts (the Soviet Union, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, etc.) were also held without disruptions, but were by no means legitimate. ‘Russia Accuses OSCE of “Taking Sides” in Belarus Vote’, Agence France Presse, 21 March 2006. 52 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There were some questions, too, about false registration, ballot stuffing, and tally manipulation. However, these likely would not have altered the ultimate result and were minor compared to the overall, uncompetitive environment within which the elections were conducted. Dmitry Vinitsky, ‘Views of Foreign Monitors on Russian Presidential Elections’, TASS, 15 March 2004; Steve Gutterman, ‘European Observers Criticize Russian Presidential Election’, Associated Press, 15 March 2004.

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democratic standards.53 The Foreign Ministry also sought to turn the criticism around by pointing out election problems in the established democracies.54 Lastly, election observers from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) pronounced the elections ‘free, democratic, and fair’.55 This last response was an innovate means to counter external democracy promotion: establishing an alternative system of election monitoring in line with the interest of legitimizing fraudulent elections. Beginning in October 2002, the CIS constructed its own election monitoring system designed to provide an ‘independent’ analysis of elections in the former Soviet Union. In reality, this institution became another tool to undermine the legitimacy of the European election observers and has been strongly criticized for conclusions which have differed markedly from those of the established monitoring organizations. As one analysis put it: ‘This practice, seen by some as nothing more than a KGB disinformation operation left over from Soviet times, consists of groups of trusted CIS employees from the secretariat in Minsk who roam the CIS to observe elections and invariably announce that they were transparent, fair, and democratic—providing that the more pro-Kremlin candidate wins’ (Kupchinsky 2005). Bruce George, the head of several OSCE observer missions in the region (including the 2003–2004 Russian election cycle and Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election) put it more bluntly on two occasions: ‘They haven’t ever seen a good election and wouldn’t know one if it hit them in the face’56 and ‘In my view their methodology is simple. Be really nice to your friends’.57 Even Yuri Yarov, the head of the CIS observer mission during the 2004 Russian presidential election, seemed to admit that the interests of his team and those of the European monitors were different: the two sides ‘will, [of] course, be motivated differently to some extent’.58 Critical views of the CIS monitors seemed to be borne out in their clear divergence from nearly all outside observers in cases such as Russia (2003, 2004), Belarus (2004, 2006), Uzbekistan (2005), Tajikistan (2005), Moldova (2005), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Kazakhstan (2005), and others. It was the contested presidential election in Ukraine (October 2004–January 2005), however, that saw a sharp break between Russian/CIS views of the European election monitoring system and those of the Western, democratic powers. 53 ���������������������� See the statements by Putin ������������������������������������������������������ in Mary Dejevsky, ‘Putin Accused of Using State Power to Distort Poll’, The Independent (London), 9 December 2003; Henry Meyer, ‘ProPutin Parties Triumph in Russia but Observers Blast Election as Unfair’, Agence France Presse, 9 December 2003. 54 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This fits closely with the strategy of Redefine in Chapter 5. ‘Moscow to Washington: Don’t Lecture Us on How to Live Our Lives’, What the Papers Say (Part B), 10 December 2003. 55 �������������������������������������� ‘CIS, OSCE Observers’ Conclusions May Partially ������������������� Differ’, TASS, 15 March 2004. 56 ����� Ibid. 57 ������������������������������������������������������� C.J. Chivers, ‘Russia Challenges Election Monitoring’, International Herald Tribune, 15 December 2005, 2. 58 �������������������������������������� ‘CIS, OSCE Observers’ Conclusions May ������������������� Partially Differ’, TASS, 15 March 2004.

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A week before the first round of voting, the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission had registered well over two thousand election monitors, nearly all of them from Western countries; by contrast, only 25 observers were sent from Russia.59 Immediately after the runoff election on 21 November, observers from the US and the OSCE identified a widespread program of electoral fraud conducted by the government in order to ensure the election of President Leonid Kuchma’s chosen successor, the pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.60 By contrast, the head of the Russian mission, Vladimir Rushailo, called the election ‘transparent, legitimate, and free’.61 Putin sharply dismissed the Western criticism as ‘inadmissable’ prior to the release of the final results, and snapped that the outside monitors ‘should be more careful and responsible’ and that Ukraine ‘doesn’t need to be lectured’.62 Nevertheless, Putin himself called Yanukovych before the final results were announced to congratulate him on his ‘victory’. Russia’s Foreign Ministry also endorsed the conclusions of its observers and condemned the Western ones in a manner similar to previous elections.63 An inversion of these comments were made after the rerun second round which resulted in the victory of the pro-West Victor Yushchenko: the West supported the result of this far more democratic round of voting, while Russia and its election monitors criticized it.64 Given the importance both sides placed on the outcome of the election and the growing fear that the ‘Orange Revolution’ might spread to Russia itself, the result of the Ukrainian presidential election fundamentally altered how the Kremlin 59 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Mikhail Melnik, ‘The West Sends Lots of Observers to Monitor Ukraine Pres ����� Polls’, TASS, 21 October 2004; Timur Prokopenko, ‘Russia to Send 25 Observers to Ukrainian Presidential Elections’, TASS, 27 October 2004. 60 ���������������������������������������������������������������� Simon Saradzhyan, ‘Observers See “Dead Souls” and Other Fraud’, Moscow Times, 23 November 2004. 61 ��������������������������������������������������� Askold Krushelnychy, ‘Ukrainians Throng Streets to Protest ������������������������������� Against Election Fix’, The Independent (London), 23 November 2004, 2. 62 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Joana Mateus, ‘Putin: Criticism of Ukraine Vote Inadmissible Without Official Results’, Associated Press, 23 November 2004. 63  ITAR–TASS, 23 November 2004, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Ministry Says Elections in Ukraine “Legitimate”’, in BBCWM, 23 November 2004. 64 �������� ‘Russia Questions �������������������������������������������� OSCE Monitoring of Ukraine Vote’, Agence France Presse, 28 December 2004; ‘CIS Observers Register Many Violations in Ukrainian Elections’, TASS, 26 December 2004. The latter article refers to an organization called the CIS–EMO, which purports to be an independent nongovernmental organization created to be an independent voice in European election monitoring. However, there are some questions as to whether it is truly independent or was created as a cover for the CIS’s own election monitoring system. As one analysis put it: ‘The reasons for the founding of this group are unclear. One possible explanation is that after so many discrepancies between CIS monitors’ conclusions and those arrived at by OSCE election observers, a “neutral” NGO was needed to lend legitimacy to the official CIS reports and to thereby reinforce Russian policy goals. A certain amount of confusion resulted from the fact that this NGO had a very similar name to the official CIS monitors, and that its reports were almost carbon copies of those filed by the official CIS monitors’ (Kupchinsky 2005).

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perceived external democracy promotion in the region: the election monitoring itself was seen as a central threat to the (authoritarian) status quo. Consequently, the Russian government added a new level to this debate by calling into question the very legitimacy of the European elections monitoring regime itself. This process actually began several months before the Ukrainian elections in a letter released by Russia and eight other CIS member states65 at a session of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna in July 2004. The letter criticized the OSCE for focusing too much on human rights, failing to respect their sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and applying ‘double standards and selective approaches’ in its treatment of former Soviet republics.66 Each of these complaints can be best understood in the context of resisting democracy promotion, and they intensified after the Orange Revolution. The OSCE’s emphasis on advancing democratization comes from its commitment to human rights and the belief that ‘effective political democracy’ is the best way to maintain fundamental human rights.67 Those states which claim to be democratic, but whose claims cannot withstand external scrutiny, are obviously going to be against those procedures which promote human rights and investigate abuses. It is therefore not surprising that such regimes will attempt to shift the organization’s attention away from these issues and onto something more palatable, such as security or economics. In early December 2004, on the eve of a meeting of the OSCE’s Council of Foreign Ministers, Lavrov urged ‘reform’ of the OSCE along this course in order to ‘enhance the OSCE[’s] relevance’ and prevent ‘the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe’.68 Of course, by effectively taking human rights and democracy off the table, the Kremlin sought to make the organization more relevant to its interest in undermining the ability of others to put pressure on Russia for its steady shift away from democracy. The move was also meant to place the West on the defensive by accusing them of resuscitating the divisions of the past by criticizing the political systems of Russia and its allies. Thus, the Russian government sought to ensure that post-2004 election monitoring was conducted in a way that produced a ‘synergy of election 65 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 66 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� For the full statement, see: ‘Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE’, [Online: President of Russia] 3 July 2004. Available at <www. kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2004/07/74223.shtml>, accessed 11 July 2008. For analysis of this statement, see Tomiuc 2004 and Fuller 2004. 67 ������������������������������������������������ This quote is from the 1950 ‘Convention for the Protection ������������������������������� of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, established under the auspices of the Council of Europe [Online: Council of Europe]. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008. Nevertheless, this sentiment is widespread in OSCE documents as well. 68 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Jean-Michel Stoulig, ‘East-West Tensions Over Ukraine Set to Dominate OSCE Meeting’, Agence France Presse, 5 December 2004.

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monitorings’69 and ‘equal criteria in monitoring the vote’.70 Since consensus would likely prove impossible, this proposal meant that, unless the two sides could agree on their conclusions regarding any particular election, the West’s findings would be deemed biased, illegitimate, and divisive. This issue was so important to the Kremlin that Russia sought to block the OSCE’s budget and withhold dues to the organization unless it changed its focus. As explained by Aleksey Borodavkin, the Russian permanent representative to the OSCE: ‘If the parties expect us to pay a large amount into the OSCE budget then Russia’s interests and concerns should also be taken into consideration’.71 This move led the EU to observe the growing division between democratic and nondemocratic regimes on the continent: ‘What is happening today in the OSCE cannot be seen as an isolated issue. At the heart of the present crisis lies a more fundamental “values gap”. Russia’s main problem with the OSCE concerns those things we most value in it: its monitoring of democracy and human rights’.72 Russia and the other signatories of the July 2004 letter to the OSCE also argued that the organization did not observe such ‘fundamental … principles … as nonintervention in internal affairs and respect for the sovereignty of nations’ and complained that the OSCE was supposed to simply provide ‘aid and assistance to the authorities of the receiving countries’, rather than commenting on their political systems.73 This phrasing should not be surprising since the signatories of the July 2004 document had questionable democratic credentials at the time.74 Emphasizing sovereignty is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes which argue that no outside power has the right to criticize how they organize their country politically; any such condemnation is seen as a violation of their sovereign rights and akin to neocolonialism. OSCE officials countered these claims by asserting that by joining the OSCE and ratifying its founding documents, these countries agreed to certain democratic and human rights standards. Rather than a violation

69 ���������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Urges OSCE to Reform Way of Observing Elections’, Agence France Presse, 1 February 2005. 70 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Ali H. Zerdin, ‘Russian Foreign Minister: OSCE Should Redefine Election Monitoring Rules’, Associated Press, 5 December 2005. 71 ���������������������� Judy Dempsey, ‘Russia Puts ����� Pressure ��������������������������������� on OSCE Vote Monitors’, International Herald Tribune, 29 March 2005, 1. 72 ����� Ibid. 73 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE’. 74 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Of the signatory states, none were rated ‘free’ by Freedom House. Their average score at the time on Political Rights was 5.5/7 and 4.8/7 on Civil Liberties, with a score of 1 being the most free and 7 being not free. Six of the nine were rated ‘not free’. Moldova, the most ‘free’ state on the list (and even then, only rated ‘partly free’) reportedly signed only because it wanted the OSCE to deal more with territorial issues, such as its Transdniester problem.

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of their sovereignty, the election monitoring system is a means to ensure that these states are following through on their international commitments.75 The third criticism of the European election monitoring system has been its supposed penchant for ‘double standards’, a phrase that has been used by various Russian policymakers to accuse the West of being biased, prejudiced, or in some way partial.76 While no one can deny that all states act in line with their interests and preconceptions, this type of rhetoric is largely an attempt to obfuscate the nature of the debate over democracy in the former Soviet Union by placing the West on the defensive. Following the Orange Revolution, a rote pattern formed in which Russia inevitably responded to consistent Western complaints about the freeness or fairness of votes with accusations of hypocrisy. The 2006 presidential vote in Belarus was a clear example of this dynamic: ‘elections’ were held, the CIS and Russian observers immediately said they were free and fair, the Western monitors disagreed, and the Kremlin accused the West of double standards.77 The differing conclusions on particular elections allowed Russia to discredit the external observers’ findings by fostering a seemingly unwinnable ‘he-said, shesaid’ debate. Finally, after the Orange Revolution, the Kremlin added another charge to their criticisms of the European election monitoring system: it causes instability. By exposing the rampant electoral fraud committed by the Kuchma regime, the OSCE and others were seen as giving legitimacy to regime opponents and triggering a rerun of the second round of the presidential election. Correctly or not, many Russian policymakers appeared to believe that the election observers themselves were instrumental in precipitating the Orange Revolution.78 Election monitors were also blamed, in part, for the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan.79 As 75 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ See the statement by Bruce George in Susanna Loof, ‘Russia Lashes Out at OSCE Election Monitoring’, Associated Press, 21 April 2005. 76 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ See Aleksey Borodavkin in Jean-Michel Stoulig, ‘East-West Tensions Over Ukraine Set to Dominate OSCE Meeting’, Agence France Presse, 5 December 2004 and ITAR-TASS, 5 December 2004, reproduced as ‘Russian Diploma Criticizes OSCE Election Monitoring, Double Standards’, in BBCWM, 5 December 2004. Also, Vladimir Putin in ‘Vote Monitors Deploy in Ukraine, Putin Sees “Double Standards”’, Agence France Presse, 23 December 2004 and Sergei Lavrov in Ali H. Zerdin, ‘Russia Demands Thorough Reform of OSCE at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers’, Associated Press, 5 December 2005. 77 ������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Denounces OSCE Election-Monitoring Work in Belarus’, Associated Press, 22 February 2006; Belarusian Television (Minsk), 20 March 2006, reproduced as ‘CIS Observers Praise Belarus Poll’, in BBCWM, 20 March 2006. 78 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its ‘puzzlement’ and concern over the way in which the ‘radical’ opposition in Ukraine was ‘not only supported but encouraged by representatives of some foreign states, including those overseas, and international agencies’. ITAR–TASS, 23 November 2004, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Ministry Says Elections in Ukraine “Legitimate”’, in BBCWM, 23 November 2004. 79 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Says OSCE Election Report Contributed to Uprising in Kyrgyzstan’, Agence France Presse, 25 March 2005.

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a result, election monitoring itself came to be seen as a direct threat to stability in the former Soviet Union—and by ‘stability’, it meant the political (authoritarian) status quo. Statements to this effect were made repeatedly from 2005 onward by government and government-aligned politicians.80 This position was well summarized by Markov: ‘The techniques for engineering “color revolutions” focus on the legitimacy of elections. They aim to demonstrate that the electoral process is invalid, and seize power. It seems likely that there will be attempts to apply these “Orange techniques” to the Russian electoral process in 2007–08’.81 It is important to remember that Markov also clearly described the threat that foreign NGOs represent. When taken together, these statements are indicative of the Kremlin’s fears and the belief that it needed to take proactive steps to protect itself from external democracy promotion. The third, equally crucial component of the color revolutions was the political activism of young people, who led the charge in street demonstrations against these regimes. In order to counteract this threat, the Russian government also sought to co-opt the youth of Russia through the creation and support of alternative, proKremlin organizations. Constructing Putin’s Youth Immediately after the Orange Revolution, Russian opposition youth movements began mobilizing with the aim of replicating prior successes against the authoritarian Putin regime.82 For example, a group called ‘Marching Without Putin’ was established to counter a pro-Putin youth movement called ‘Marching Together’.83 The youth wing of the liberal party Yabloko also sought to raise its profile and build alliances with other opposition youth groups.84 During antigovernment rallies by pensioners in January 2005, some youth groups mobilized to support this expression of discontent. These protests were the largest anti80 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Susanna Loof, ‘OSCE Must Change Election Monitoring Methods, Russian Envoy Says’, Associated Press, 1 July 2005. Also see comments by United Russia member and Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, Vladimir Pekhtin, in Tajik Television First Channel (Dushanbe), 6 November 2006, reproduced as ‘Russian Deputy Speaker Raps OSCE ‘Double Standards’ in Tajik Polls’, in BBCWM, 6 November 2006 and Interfax News Agency, 16 August 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian MPs Setting Off for Kazakhstan to Monitor Election’, in BBCWM, 16 August 2007. 81 ��������������������������� Sergei Markov, ‘Honesty as Policy’, ��������� Izvestia, 20 June 2007, 8, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 21 June 2007. 82 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For an overview of anti-Kremlin youth activities, see Michael Schwirtz, ‘Russia’s Political Youths’, Demokratizatsiya, 15/1 (Winter 2007): 73–85. 83  Ekho Moskvy, 14 January 2005, reproduced as ‘Marching Without Putin Youth Movement Set Up in Russia’s Second City’, in BBCWM, 14 January 2005. 84 �������������������������������������������������������� Francesca Mereu, ‘Youth Groups Says It’s Time to Oppose Putin’, �������� Moscow Times, 25 February 2005.

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Kremlin outbursts since Putin took power and, coming so soon after the events in Ukraine, shook the confidence of the Kremlin—so much so that there were reports that only young people were arrested in an attempt to undermine these groups.85 Moreover, the event gave a special impetus to the formation of a new, pro-Kremlin organization intended to co-opt Russia’s young people. Russian government officials played a critical role in the establishment of Nashi (Ours), which replaced the pro-Putin youth group Marching Together.86 The latter organization was problematic and largely discredited because of its obsession with banning books and ridding Russia of ‘pornography’.87 A new, broad-based organization was designed to supplant it. Vasily Yakemenko, the head of Marching Together, became Nashi’s first leader. Although nominally ‘non-partisan’, Nashi was explicitly pro-Putin and key government officials such as Vladislav Surkov, the head of the presidential administration and its chief ideologue, and Kremlinaligned political figures, like Markov, were its chief architects. Its leaders called it a spontaneous outpouring of support for the Kremlin by Russia’s patriotic youth, but was in reality heavily bankrolled by businesses which were either pro-government or afraid of looking ‘unpatriotic’ (i.e. afraid that they might be punished by the government) if they refused Nashi’s requests for money.88 Nashi expanded rapidly and by late 2007 grew to some 100,000 members, holding annual summer camps to indoctrinate and train members.89 It also held a series of protests against the supposed ‘enemies’ of Russia, including opposition groups, Great Britain, and Estonia. Moreover, its members served as de facto election monitors during the Moscow Duma elections in the fall 2005—this vote was the first major Russian election since the Orange Revolution and was the first real test of whether the ‘orange virus’ could ‘infect’ Russia.90 Finally, the organization received de facto official recognition through extensive coverage on government-controlled

85  Ren TV, 19 January 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian Policies Ordered to Round Up Young Activists at Benefits Rallies—TV’, in BBCWM, 20 January 2005. 86  Ekho Moskvy, 21 February 2005, reproduced as ‘Kremlin Moulding Youth Group into Political Party—Newspaper’, in BBCWM, 21 February 2005. 87 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Andrew Osborn, ‘Putin Sets Up Youth Group to Stop “Orange Revolution”’, Belfast Telegraph, 1 March 2005; Andrew Osborn, ‘Putin Youth Protest at ‘Vulgar Pornography’ on Show at the Bolshoi’, The Independent (London), 15 March 2005, 23. 88 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� The quote is from Yakemenko when asked about those who funded Nashi’s 2005 summer camp. Julian Evens, ‘How Putin Youth is Indoctrinated to Foil Revolution’, The Times (London), 18 July 2005, 28. Also see Ren TV, 10 April 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian TV Profiles Nashi Youth Movement’, in BBCWM, 11 April 2005. 89 ������������������������������������������������������� David Nowak, ‘Youth Groups Train to Fight Revolution’, Moscow Times, 14 November 2007. 90  Interfax, 4 December 2005, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Activists Watching Vote in Moscow’, in BBCWM, 4 December 2005.

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television,91 visits by top Kremlin officials who spoke at its summer camps,92 and several meetings between its leaders and Putin himself.93 In order to fully understand the logic behind the formation of the Nashi movement, it is necessary to understand its aims, how it characterizes its enemies, and how it conceives of itself. All three of these are interconnected and stem from the perceived need to organize Russia’s young people in defense of the political status quo. Although the government essentially controlled the main levers of power in the society—institutions, electoral system, army, media, etc.—it did not firmly control ‘the streets’, as the pensioners’ protests illustrated. Thus, any viable opposition to the regime had to come from the streets, in a manner similar to the prior color revolutions. These protests would most likely be led by young people who, as in previous cases, were politically motivated, pro-democratic, and idealistic enough to challenge the government. In effect, whoever controlled the streets potentially controlled the future of Russia.94 It was therefore imperative that the government have a strong presence amongst the young in order to co-opt them. The leaders of Nashi, its Kremlin supporters, and pro-government elites were quite explicit about its purpose. Gleb Pavlovsky, a pro-Kremlin political analyst and head of the Effective Policy Foundation, defined a color revolution as a ‘coup’ inspired from the outside and charged Nashi members with preventing it in Russia: ‘They (the US) have tried it before, and soon they will try it here … Your job is to defend the constitutional order if and when the coup comes’.95 Surkov was equally clear when he announced that Nashi’s ‘task’ was ‘to defend Russia’s youth from the political manipulations of the West’.96 These statements indicated that the preservation of the Putin regime’s grip on power, in the face of threats inspired from outside of Russia, was the essential element of Nashi’s existence. Moreover, Nashi leaders and supporters did more than just imply that violent methods were the acceptable means to achieve these goals. For example, Pavlovsky criticized Nashi for not directly confronting the Kremlin’s opponents during 91 �������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia’s Ren TV Sees Authorities Seeking to Manipulate Political ���������������� Youth Movements’, BBCWM, 8 June 2006. 92  Gazeta, 3 October 2005, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin, Oppositionist Political Movements Surveyed’, in BBCWM, 12 October 2005. Putin also spoke by video link. Vesti, 28 July 2007, reproduced as ‘We Are Part of Same Team, Putin Tells Nashi Activists over Video Link’, in BBCWM, 28 July 2007. 93  ITAR–TASS, 26 July 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian Agency Details Putin’s Meeting with Youth Movement Activists’, in BBCWM, 26 July 2005; Ren TV, 18 May 2006, reproduced as ‘Putin Tells Young Russians Army is Vital for Country’, in BBCWM, 18 May 2006. 94 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� This was well explained by the opposing youth group leaders Vasily Yakemenko and Ilya Yashin in Scott Peterson, ‘New Political Force in Russia: Youths’, Christian Science Monitor, 16 March 2005, 6. 95 ������������������� Julian Evens, ‘How Putin ������������������������������������������������� Youth is Indoctrinated to Foil Revolution’. 96 ����� Ibid.

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the 2007 ‘Dissenters’ March’ and urged authorities to ‘let them [Nashi] fight’.97 Earlier, during Nashi’s formative period, Yakemenko said in an interview with Kommersant that the pro-Kremlin youth should ‘make short work of traitors’.98 The use of the word ‘traitors’ in this last statement is quite revealing. Because the formation of Nashi was a response to regional trends, it is ultimately best defined by its enemies. For Nashi, the image of a Russia beset by enemies was truly its defining characteristic. When describing those groups whom Nashi identifies as enemies, it is first important to understand that it equates Russia with the Putin regime. Threats to the latter are seen as threats to the former. To oppose the Kremlin is to oppose the Motherland. To promote democracy at the expense of the government’s hold on power is to seek to weaken Russia and possibly cause its disintegration.99 Nashi ideologue Boris Yakemenko, Vasily Yakemenko’s brother and a member of the Public Chamber, made this point succinctly: ‘Now is a critical moment. Many enemies are gathering inside and outside Russia. That is why we should help Putin’.100 In defining these enemies, two trends emerge, one internal (fascists) and the other external (the West). The coalition of domestic groups opposed to the Kremlin is quite diverse. It ranges from hardcore nationalists and neo-fascists to liberals and human rights supporters. Nashi’s rhetoric collapses pro-democracy opponents of the Kremlin with fascists, effectively equating the two. This was made clear in Nashi’s manifesto, which is distributed in conveniently-carried little red books reminiscent of communist propaganda: ‘Today beneath our eyes is forming an unnatural union between liberals and fascists, westernisers and ultra-nationalists, international foundations and international terrorists. They are joined by one thing—their hatred of Putin’.101 To aid teachers and parents in identifying this threat, Nashi put

97  Ekho Moskvy, 10 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Leader Ratchets Up Anti-Opposition Rhetoric’, in BBCWM, 10 April 2007. 98  ���������������������������������������������������������������� Peter Finn, ‘Youth Movement Adopts Spirit of Uprisings Nearby’, Washington Post, 9 April 2005, A17. 99 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� This is last argument was made by the Vsevolod Chaplin, spokesman of the patriarch of the Orthodox Church, to Nashi at its 2005 summer camp (co-sponsored by the Church). This fear resonated well in Russian society given the socioeconomic problems associated with the 1990s, which many blamed on the importation of Western-style capitalism and democracy. ‘Youth’s Global Objective, to Make Russia a Global Leader’, Irish Times, 1 August 2005, 8. 100 ������������������� Julian Evens, ‘How Putin �������������������������������������������������� Youth is Indoctrinated to Foil Revolution’, The Times (London), 18 July 2005, 28. Further quotes in this chapter citing ‘Yakemenko’ refer to Vasily, not Boris. 101 ����� Nick Paton ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Walsh, ‘Russian Youth Group Vows to Name Fascists in Schools’, Guardian, 27 April 2005, 18.

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together and distributed a handbook outlining this fascist threat and, according to Yakemenko, their ‘sympathisers among the so-called liberals’.102 The wide ranging, anti-Kremlin umbrella group Other Russia—which is comprised of pro-democracy activists such as Garry Kasparov, far-right politicians such as Eduard Limonov, and some far-left communist groups103—is pointed to by Nashi members as the prime example of this ‘immoral alliance’.104 It is certainly true that Limonov’s (now banned) National Bolshevik Party is neo-fascist in tone, programme, and symbolism, but Other Russia itself is not partisan and has very little in the way of a programme of its own, other than to oppose the Kremlin and United Russia. Nevertheless, those involved in Other Russia, and even those who attended its meetings,105 are considered guilty by association. In effect, the liberals are portrayed as standing under fascist banners. The use of the term ‘fascist’ to refer to Russia’s enemies is widely used because it resonates well in Russian society given the centrality of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) to Soviet and Russian identity. It not only seeks to discredit internal opponents as traitors, but is also an effective rhetorical tool to promote the sense of an external threat to Russia. For example, Estonian politicians are frequently characterized as being Nazis106 and, as tensions increased with the United States and the West over a variety of issues (including democratization), the Kremlin began relying more and more on its strategy of equating the supposed threat from the West with the historic Nazi threat to Russia.107 Nashi has also sought to exploit this connection. Yakemenko’s speech during a 2005 Nashi-sponsored 102  Channel One TV (Moscow), 11 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Nashi Movement Presents “Full List” of Fascist Organizations in Russia, Europe’, in BBCWM, 11 May 2005. 103 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Though this does not include the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, led by former presidential candidate Gennady Zyuganov. Other mainstream left-of-center parties, such as Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, did not join, largely because of the National Bolshevik Party’s membership in Other Russia. 104 ������������������������� Vasily Yakemenko qtd. in Ekho Moskvy, 10 April 2007, reproduced as ‘ProKremlin Youth Leader Ratchets Up Anti-Opposition Rhetoric’, in BBCWM, 10 April 2007. 105 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� An important example of this were the running protests by Nashi against Anthony Brenton, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Russia, who attended Other Russia’s meeting in July 2006. They became so aggressive that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called upon Nashi to stop. Conor Sweeney, ‘Moscow Tries to Quell Protests Against British Ambassador’, Irish Times, 18 January 2007, 12. 106 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The foreign minister of Estonia was shown with a Hitler moustache in a display at Nashi’s 2007 summer camp. See Chapter 5 for more details on how Estonia is often equated with Nazi Germany. Tony Halpin, ‘Winning Young Hearts and Minds: Putin’s Strategy for a New Superpower’, The Times (London), 25 July 2007, 29. 107 ���� See Putin’s ������������������������������������������������������������������������ speech during the 2007 Victory Day parade in which he seemingly equated the United States to Nazi Germany. Also see Markov’s and Pavlovsky’s statements in the same article. Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Putin Appears to Draw Parallels Between US and Nazi Germany Policies’, Associated Press, 10 May 2007.

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Victory Day parade (called ‘Our Victory’) portrayed the battle against external enemies then and now as one in the same, simply separated by generations: ‘The veterans fought for Russia’s independence [on] the battlefield. Our generation will fight for Russia’s independence in classrooms, factories and offices, in business and economy. What we want to say to the veterans is that wherever we fight, we shall be worthy of them and we shall never give this country away’.108 This sort of language, and in fact the very name of the event itself, served as a symbolic passing of the torch from those who struggled against Nazi Germany to those who purportedly struggle against the modern day ‘fascists’ both inside and outside of the country.109 Regime opponents are also portrayed as fifth columnists who wish to trade Russia’s independence for the importation of Western ideas. The external promotion of democracy in Russia is seen as a cover for a form of neocolonialism. As the Nashi manifesto reads, ‘In the post-Soviet space, in the guise of slogans of democracy and freedom, the West is playing a big geopolitical game, the aim of which is to push Russia from world politics and introduce foreign management to Russia’.110 During Nashi’s 2007 summer camp, there were many symbolic references to this, including a ‘red-light district’ display with paintings of Kasparov and other leaders of Other Russia dressed ‘as lingerie-clad prostitutes who sell out their country for US dollars’.111 One entertaining protest included an activist in a Santa Claus costume holding up a Christmas tree strung with dollar bills at a press conference by Kasparov, symbolizing the opposition’s supposed desire for American money.112 By utilizing rhetoric which blends domestic regime opponents with external threats, fascists, and past enemies, the Kremlin has sought to delegitimize those opposed to the Kremlin as, at best, little more than naive puppets of the West, or, at worst, outright traitors. In this view, Putin and likeminded groups like Nashi are the only ones who support Russia’s true interests. Nashi is not the only pro-Kremlin youth movement. In fact, in what appears to be a policy of vertical marketing, there was a proliferation of pro-Kremlin youth movements for many subsets of Russia’s young people.113 For example, 108  RBK TV (Moscow), 15 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Leader Pledges to Defend Russia’s Independence’, in BBCWM, 15 May 2005. 109 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Other symbolic actions of this sort included having Nashi members involved in washing WWII monuments in preparation for Victory Day celebrations. RTR Russia TV, 14 April 2005, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Movement Gets Reads for Constituent Conference’, in BBCWM, 14 April 2005. 110  Channel One TV (Moscow), 11 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Nashi Movement Presents “Full List” of Fascist Organizations in Russia, Europe’, in BBCWM, 11 May 2005. 111 ����������������������������������������� Halpin, ‘Winning Young Hearts and Minds: Putin’s ��������������������������������������� Strategy for a New Superpower’. 112 ���������� ‘Kasparov Predicts ����������������� Russian Political ��������������������������������� Crisis Within Months’, Agence France Presse, 7 July 2007. 113  Ren TV, 3 November 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian TV Looks at “Multiplying” Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements’, in BBCWM, 4 November 2005.

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pro-Kremlin youths have the option of choosing between Nashi, which represents a supposedly non-partisan, pro-Putin choice; Mestnyye (Locals), a group created by the Moscow regional government and which is anti-immigrant in tone; the Georgiyevtsy (named after St. George, the patron saint of Moscow), which is affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church and has taken part in protests against homosexuals and the erosion of morals; Rossiya Molodaya (Young Russia), which has focused on disrupting Other Russia events and has reportedly created a ‘combat division’ called the ‘Ultras’ for street fighting against opposition youths; and, the explicitly partisan Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guard), United Russia’s youth wing.114 These groups are not competitors; instead, they have worked together on many occasions, seeking common cause against opponents of the Kremlin and those countries seen as threats to Russia. For example, several of these groups protested against Other Russia’s 2006 and 2007 Dissenters’ March (where an opposing ‘Consenters’ March’ was held) and blockaded the Estonian embassy during the Bronze Monument row of 2007. Among these groups, Nashi has the highest profile, given its extensive coverage on Kremlin-controlled television and repeated meetings with Putin, followed by the Young Guard because of its connections to the so-called ‘party of power’. The Young Guard complements Nashi quite well. Nashi is seen as more of a social organization, while the Young Guard’s connections to United Russia make it a more obvious path to power for Russian youth.115 During a rally soon after the Young Guard was created, one of its celebrity leaders, television anchor Ivan Demidov, stated that while Nashi is the most prominent youth movement, the only thing separating the two organizations from achieving their joint goals was their divergent methods.116 The Young Guard was founded in Fall 2005, several months after Nashi, as a ‘barrier against fascism’ and ‘fascist youth movements that seek to destabilize society and win foreign funding’.117 We have already seen how the Kremlin’s supporters conceptually collapse the pro-democracy and farright opposition, but the mention of foreign funding is a clear reference to the 114  Ren TV, 19 March 2007, reproduced as ‘Russia’s Ren TV Warns Authorities Against “Playing with Radical Youth”’, in BBCWM, 21 March 2007; Steven Lee Myers, ‘Kremlin Rallies Youth to Putin’s Cause’, International Herald Tribune, 9 July 2007, 2; Yevgenia Zubchenko and Kira Vasilieva, ‘Leave Them Alone!’, Novye Izvestia, 18 July 2007, pp. 1–2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 19 July 2007. 115 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Though this distinction is probably more blurred in reality. On many occasions, the leaders of Nashi indicated that they see themselves as the next generation of elites, eventually replacing those who came of age during the Soviet period. For them, the time frame of this transition was rather short. However, as seen in Chapter 9, the promises made to promote young people into leadership positions did not come to pass as a result of the December 2007 parliamentary election. Interfax, 26 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Russia’s New Youth Movement Leaders Set Out Its Political Goals’, in BBCWM, 26 May 2005. 116 ��������������������������������������������������������� Stephen Boykewich, ‘United Russia Deploys a Youth Wing’, Moscow Times, 17 November 2005. 117 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Boris Gryzlov, State Duma Speaker and United Russia partly leader, qtd. in ibid.

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external support for democracy promotion. Like Nashi, the Young Guard stands ready to defend the regime against a color revolution. As expressed by a member of the Young Guard’s political council, ‘the provocative attempts by politically marginalized elements to provoke chaos at any cost and to launch an “Orange” scenario in Russia so as to recast the country alongside imported molds’.118 Another political council member colorfully depicted the Kremlin’s opponents as foreign-backed traitors to the motherland: ‘Wearing velvet orange gloves, they want to strangle Russia. Western spin doctors have taught their jackal cubs how to take to the streets, how to organize acts of provocation against legitimate Russian authorities. We have gathered here in this square and will never allow them to foil our plan!’119 This fear of a Russian color revolution is so intense that the Young Guard even held drills involving thousands of members to stop one.120 Ultimately, it is this concern over external democracy promotion, portrayed as the West forcing alien models on Russia, which united the government and the numerous pro-Kremlin youth movements in common cause. Conclusion Foreign NGOs, election monitors, and opposition youth movements were seen as the key ingredients of the recipe used by the West to precipitate color revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and (to a lesser extent) Kyrgyzstan. A similar pattern was seen in the abortive Denim Revolution in Belarus and, it was feared, could occur in Russia. Thus, it was imperative that the Kremlin take a proactive stance to undermine their ability to promote democratization in Russia. As seen through the passage of the 2006 NGO law, the consistent attempt to discredit the European election monitoring system, and the co-optation of Russian youth, a clear pattern formed in which the Russian government initiated policies to this effect. As Russia moved closer to the 2007–2008 election cycle, these policies intensified. The ultimate result of these policies, and the application of the strategy of Insulate during the elections, will be examined in depth in Chapter 9.

118  Ekho Moskvy, 8 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Movement to Counter Opposition Rally with “Consenters” March’, in BBCWM, 9 April 2007. 119  Ekho Moskvy, 4 December 2007, reproduced as ‘One Russia’s Young Guard Speak of “Enemies” at Moscow Rally’, in BBCWM, 4 December 2007. 120 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� During this training exercise, activists chanted ‘No to the Orange plague!’ and ‘The Orange will not pass’. Ren TV, 26 April 2007, reproduced as ‘One Russia Youth Wing Stages “Anti-Orange” Drill in the Urals’, in BBCWM, 26 April 2007.

Chapter 5

Redefine: Rhetorical Defenses Against External Criticism

Of course, I am a pure and absolute democrat. But you know what the problem is— not a problem, a real tragedy—that I am alone. There are no such pure democrats in the world. Since Mahatma Gandhi, there has been no one. Vladimir Putin

Democracy promotion rests upon a fundamental moral judgement: that the inherent rights of individuals can best be secured through a democratic form of government and any regime which departs from this norm is ultimately less legitimate than its democratic counterparts. The notion of democracy as a ‘world value’ means that outright rejections of democracy’s legitimacy are quite rare in the current international system. Even states which violate its basic tenets will still claim to be democratic in some form or striving toward democracy. Contemporary authoritarian regimes have been aided by the proliferation of adjectives to refer to states as different than established democracies, but yet somehow still democratic—‘transitional democracy’, for example. Obviously, every democracy looks and functions slightly differently. However, rather than providing clarity, this has actually produced more confusion and has hindered democracy promotion by allowing non-democracies to deflect external criticism and to weaken the arguments of domestic opponents. Similarly, the value placed on respecting cultural differences by the international community has also been used to justify abrogations of fundamental human rights behind the veil of global ‘diversity’—that is, since countries differ in their historical, cultural, and social characteristics, their political systems will likewise look different. In this way, authoritarian regimes have sought to defend their continued rule through a redefinition of the problem: their legitimacy should not be questioned because any differences in institutions, policies, or human rights standards between themselves and the established democracies criticizing them are merely a reflection of differences in history or political culture. Any attempt to force them to conform to any preconceived (i.e. liberal democratic) standards, it is argued, disregards the diversity of the international system. All this adds another aspect to the struggle between autocracy and democracy: one which exists in the realm of definitions, perceptions, and framing.  ����������������������� Bronwen Maddox, ‘I’m a Pure �������������������������������������������������������� and Absolute Democrat. It’s a Tragedy That I’m the Only One’, The Times (London), 4 June 2007, 6.

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It should not be surprising that the Kremlin has adopted the language of democracy to obfuscate the true state of Russia’s political system. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies formed ‘people’s republics’, which they proclaimed were superior forms of democracy compared to the capitalist democracies of the West, despite their record of widespread oppression and violations of human rights. After the emergence of an independent Russia, this strategy continued as those within the country dismissed the regime’s democratic failings by claiming that it was a ‘managed democracy’. They were aided in this by the democratic West which too often defended the Kremlin’s illiberal policies as acts which, while unpleasant, where somehow meant to move Russia toward democracy. For example, the Clinton administration supported Boris Yeltsin’s dissolution and eventual military attack on the Russian legislature, which can be seen in retrospect as invigorating Russian authoritarian tendencies. Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, declared that he saw inside his Russian counterpart’s ‘soul’ and found someone that he could trust. This had the effect of delaying American criticisms of the deterioration of Russian democracy for years. Under President Vladimir Putin’s tenure, the pretense of Russian democracy became harder to justify, though the regime made a concerted effort to do just that. This chapter examines the Kremlin’s rhetorical strategy of countering external criticism of its slide toward authoritarianism and defending itself against those who would call its democratic legitimacy into question. A central means by which this has been done is through promoting the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’— the notion that the form and functioning of Russia’s political system must be determined by the Russians themselves. Therefore, the first major portion of this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of this idea. Section one outlines the tenets of sovereign democracy. Section two focuses on the international context and illustrates how, at its core, sovereign democracy is fixated on expressing Russian independence on the world stage and rejecting the legitimacy of external criticisms from the democratic West. Connected to this has been the Kremlin’s reliance on the language of diversity to turn the tables on its external critics by accusing them of cultural imperialism and asserting the right to define a unique, ‘Russian’ path of democratic development. Of course, this is largely double-speak since this has in fact led to less democracy. Section three examines the diversity argument and the Kremlin’s accusations that the West’s criticisms are little more than neocolonialism. The final section on sovereign democracy explores the domestic political fight over the concept, paying special attention to how it was used to silence domestic opponents and how it was eventually codified both in the political program of the ‘party of power’ and as the de facto state ideology of the Russian Federation.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Jim Abrams, ‘Support For Yeltsin Came After Considering Alternatives, Official Says’, Associated Press, 6 October 1993.  ������������������������������������������������������ Steven Mufson and Dan Balz, ‘Bush Still “Positive” on Putin ���������������� Meeting’, Washington Post, 19 June 2001, A15.

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Rather than remain solely on the defensive, Russia also engaged in a more offensive policy of deflecting criticism from itself by accusing others of not living up to liberal democratic standards. This too falls under the category of redefine since it is ultimately an attempt to reframe the debate over democratization to the Kremlin’s benefit. The quote from Putin which begins this chapter is indicative of this approach. Putin’s claims that he is the sole democrat in the world would be laughable if it were not used to cover up the rise of autocracy in his country. Similar jibes at the West’s democratic credentials have also been asserted in recent years. However, this has taken a far more serious turn in Russia’s relationship with the Baltic states, especially Estonia. The second part of this chapter explores how Russia has lashed out at Estonia for its supposed violations of the rights of its Russian-speaking citizens. While there remain some significant problems in accommodating this demographic legacy of Soviet occupation, they do not rise to the level of Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya or represent the systematic departure from liberal democratic values seen during Putin’s tenure; the level of vitriol directed against Estonia was far disproportionate to the nature of Tallinn’s policies. Nevertheless, this was meant to place the West, rather than Russia, on the defensive. Introducing Sovereign Democracy The phrase ‘sovereign democracy’ rose to prominence in a speech given in July 2005 by Vladislav Surkov, the deputy director of the presidential administration and the Kremlin’s top ideologue. Speaking before the members of a Russian business association, Surkov outlined his vision of Russia’s political future and ignited a wide-ranging debate within Russian policy circles. His basic point was that Russia’s sovereignty is under threat from a variety of external forces. In addition to its overt enemies in the Caucasus, Russia also faces threats from Europe, the US, and Western pro-democracy, pro-human rights organizations who represent competitors seeking to undermine the stability of the Russian Federation by criticizing the Kremlin’s policies. He cited a resolution issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which accused the Kremlin of oppressing its Finno-Ugric minorities, as part of a ‘pre-planned series of measures’ designed to weaken the Russian government. In addition, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which he referred to as ‘scoundrels’, were accused of seeking to overthrow legitimate governments (including Russia) through ‘orange revolutions’. A principal pro-democracy NGO, Freedom House, was singled out for Surkov’s ire: ‘Only an idiot would be likely to believe that the mission of that “office” is purely humanitarian’. He rejected Western criticism and argued that the state of Russian democracy was sound and that ‘sovereignty must   Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 July 2005, 1, 3, reproduced as ‘Putin’s Aide Warns About Threats to Russia’s Sovereignty’, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring [BBCWM], 16 July 2005.

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be protected’ as Russia continues on the path of democracy. Thus, the concept of sovereign democracy represented the Kremlin’s desire for a political system that is protected from external pressures. The actual functioning of such a system was not fully explained by Surkov, but he provided some insights which indicated that a sovereign democracy would be directed from above and would not tolerate much dissent. Russia’s ‘backward political culture’, as he put it, required that the state assume a leading role in establishing a ‘new political class’ and a common value system, both of which must be based upon the president’s steady hand and United Russia. The legitimacy of those outside of this party was called into question because, according to Surkov, they do not serve the interests of the state. Thus, it would be impossible to move away from the current president-dominant system because the multiparty system which arose during the pre-Putin years was fundamentally dysfunctional. He then called upon Russia’s business leaders to align themselves with the Kremlin and United Russia to avoid the shapeless ‘grey mass’ of Yeltsin’s parliamentary democracy. The unitary system centered around the Kremlin was presented as the only possibility for a coherent, stable country. These statements revealed a fundamental lack of faith in the oftentimes messy process of democracy. At best, what Surkov proposed was a corporatist system in which politics would be securely managed from above to ensure the stability of the state and to preserve the government’s freedom of action. At worst, it would likely resemble an illiberal system disguised as a democracy which functions to preserve the political dominance of the ruling class and to restrict external interference in the regime’s creeping authoritarianism. Given the Kremlin’s record of restricting press freedoms, centralizing power, and undermining the pro-democracy opposition, the latter interpretation of sovereign democracy is probably the more accurate of the two. International Context of Sovereign Democracy Surkov’s speech should be seen as an ideological response to events in Georgia and Ukraine. His reference to the Orange Revolution was indicative of the Kremlin’s fear that the overthrow of authoritarian regimes by popular revolts could spread further throughout the region, with perceived help and/or direction from the West. Also, the timing of Surkov’s address is likely no coincidence: in the months leading up to the speech, Moscow assailed Washington’s support of regime change in Belarus and the Kremlin bristled at Bush’s trip to Georgia to celebrate the arrival of democracy in the Caucasus, a move seen as encouraging additional color revolutions in the former Soviet Union. Thus, the concept of sovereign democracy represented a way in which the Kremlin could counter the pro-democracy language of the West by rejecting the legitimacy of foreign  ����� Ibid.

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interference in its affairs. As such, it laid the foundation for a vigorous debate over the state of Russian democracy, beginning in 2006, when the West’s criticisms of the Kremlin’s policies intensified. During this period, the international focus of the sovereign democracy concept was sharpened. While a war of words between the Kremlin and the West over the decline of democracy in Russia began somewhat earlier, it grew to a new level with a speech by US Vice-President Dick Cheney during a May 2006 meeting of Baltic and Black Sea countries held in Vilnius—a meeting to which Russia was conspicuously not invited, even though the European Union’s foreign policy chief and NATO officials were. (Apparently, only democratic states were invited to the event.) During his speech, Cheney lambasted the Kremlin for restricting fundamental rights and reversing the democratic gains of the previous decade. Russian officials reacted harshly. For example, Leonid Slutsky, the first deputy chairman of the Duma’s international affairs committee and a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, lashed out at Cheney’s comments, saying that he ‘clearly sings the tune of antiRussian politicians of the Baltic region having accepted their double standard in respect to Russia’. Although Slutsky is not a member of United Russia, his sentiment regarding ‘double standards’ is also found amongst those close to the government, such as Surkov, who likened United Russia’s dominance of the Russian political system to cases in established countries with dominant political parties; Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who claimed that the Organization for Security and Cooperation applies double standards when monitoring elections in the region;10 and, Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, who argued that the ‘devotees of “pure democracy”’ use double standards as a way to interfere in the domestic politics of states.11 Rhetoric such as this has been often used to accuse the West of failing to see its own human rights abuses or those of its allies. While democratic or human rights shortcomings in the West are, in most cases, quite mild when compared to the systematic move away from democracy seen in Russia, this has been a common refrain to deflect criticism away from the Kremlin and toward others. This strategy will be expanded upon in the second half of this chapter in regard to Russian attacks against the democratic credentials of the West, and especially the Baltic states.  ������ ‘Vice President’s ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference’ [Online: White House], 4 May 2006. Available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.   Ekho Moskvy Radio, 4 May 2006, reproduced as ‘Senior Russian MPs Slam US Vice-President’s Statement on Democracy’, in BBCWM, 4 May 2006.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The Liberal Democratic Party is only nominally an opposition party. It almost always votes with the government.  ������� Jeremy Page, ������������������������������������������ ‘We’re Democrats, Insists Kremlin’, The Times (London), 29 June 2006. 10 �������� ‘Lavrov Presses �������������������������������� OSCE Chief on Reforms’, Moscow Times, 22 June 2006. 11 ��������������������������������������������� Sergei Ivanov, ‘A Triad of National Values’, Izvestia, 14 July 2006, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 17 July 2007.

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The highest-level, direct response to Cheney’s speech came from Lavrov, who returned to the language of sovereign democracy by turning Cheney’s words against him.12 In his speech, the Vice-President referred to America’s desire to see a world based upon ‘a community of sovereign democracies that transcend old grievances, that honor the many links of culture and history among us, that trade in freedom, respect each other as great nations, and strive together for a century of peace’.13 Lavrov said that he agreed with Cheney and that Russia has the same goal, ‘to be a sovereign, strong and stable democracy’.14 Of course, Lavrov’s response overlooked both the context of Cheney’s quote and the Kremlin-directed shift toward authoritarianism. Instead, Lavrov turned the discussion of democracy against the US by discussing the need for democracy ‘not only inside a country, but also in international affairs’. The idea of a ‘democratic’ world order has been used by both the Yeltsin and Putin governments to argue against the Americandominated, unipolar international system and in support of a multipolar system in which Washington’s power would be checked by the need for consensus amongst the great powers, including Russia (Ambrosio 2005: 118). Lavrov reinforced this notion by connecting Russia’s vision of a ‘sovereign, strong, and stable’ state with his demand that Russia ‘be treated in the international area as an equal partner, whose opinion is crucial to the solution to any global problem’.15 This criticism of the state of the international system is not disconnected from the notion of sovereign democracy, but rather constitutes an integral part of it. America’s global preeminence, when combined with its policy of democracy promotion, has been seen as allowing Washington to impose a uniform political standard upon other states in line with its interest in preserving its geopolitical status as the world’s remaining superpower. Criticism of other states’ political systems are seen as a means by which America can weaken other governments and create superior-subordinate relationships, as opposed to ones which recognize the equality between states. Consequently, this debate over Russia’s right to ensure its sovereign democracy had not just political implications, but critical strategic and security ones as well. The Kremlin’s response to the West’s criticisms was heightened during the summer of 2006 in preparation for the Group of 8 (G-8) summit in St. Petersburg. Several American politicians and commentators urged Bush to boycott the meeting to protest the decline of democracy in Russia or, at the very least, to openly rebuke

12  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Putin also responded to Cheney’s speech in late May, but Lavrov’s comments were more extensive. See Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Putin Criticizes Cheney’s Remarks’, Associated Press Financial Wire, 25 May 2006. 13 ������ ‘Vice President’s ���������������������������������������������������� Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference’. 14 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Cheney’s Criticism of Russia Will Not Hurt International Democracy Drive— Lavrov’, Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 6 May 2006. 15 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Cheney’s Criticism of Russia Will Not Hurt International Democracy Drive— Lavrov’.

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the Kremlin.16 In fact, there was some concern that some G-8 members would embarrass the Kremlin on Russian soil by scrutinizing its democratic record. As a result, Russian officials went on the offensive to preempt any criticisms. In late June 2006, Surkov provided a vigorous, and at times exaggerated, defense of Russia’s democratic credentials. He insisted, for example, that Russia has made the greatest ‘contribution to the democratization of the planet’ and that ‘Moscow has done much more for democracy in central Europe than Washington or London … It’s Moscow which democratized this immense space’.17 He also proclaimed that ‘all is well with democracy in Russia, and the Kremlin doesn’t establish puppet parties or control television broadcasting’, despite later comments which seemed to contradict this assertion. Moreover, the government’s relationship with United Russia, Surkov asserted, was no different than Bush’s support for the Republican Party and British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support for Labour.18 However, this ignored the fact that, given the Kremlin’s control over the media, it is in a position to provide United Russia with a powerful advantage over its rivals and subvert political competition in the country. In fact, when asked about this by a correspondent, he responded that the lack of positive stories about the opposition on Russian television was simply ‘all a matter of taste’. In addition, he defended Putin’s centralization of power, the need to foster a state-/governmentcentric ideology, and the creation of a number of pro-Kremlin youth movements by contrasting the current ‘sovereign democracy’ with the ‘non-democracy’ of the 1990s.19 This latter point constituted another common theme in defense of the Kremlin’s governing style: the only alternative to the political status quo was a return to the perceived chaos of the Yeltsin years. In his response to Cheney’s May 2006 speech, Lavrov made a similar comment, stating that Russia must choose between the current system of government or placing the country on the ‘verge of collapse’, as seen before Putin.20 This has also been an effective rhetorical tool which can partly explain the true depth of the Kremlin’s popularity amongst the Russian people. Given the socioeconomic crises of the 1990s, the political stability and economic growth of the Putin era appears better by comparison, despite the erosion of civil liberties that has accompanied it.21 16 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See the letter released by Senator John McCain’s office, reproduced as ‘Lantos, Dreier, McCain, Lieberman Urge G-8 Leaders to Rebuke Russia at Summer Summit’, States News Service, 23 June 2006. Also see Tom Raum, ‘Bush Walks Difficult Line in Engaging Russia on Iran, Upcoming G-8 Summit’, Associated Press, 25 June 2006. 17  ����������������������������������������� Page, ‘We’re Democrats, Insists Kremlin’. 18 �������������������������������������������� Natalia Melikova, ‘The Kremlin Speaks Out’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 June 2006, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 29 June 2006. 19 ������������������������������������������������������������������ Neil Buckley, ‘Putin Aide Defends System of Democracy in Russia’, Financial Times (London), 29 June 2006. 20 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Cheney’s Criticism of Russia Will Not Hurt International Democracy Drive— Lavrov’. 21 ���������� Alexey K. Pushkov, ���������������������������������� ‘Putin and His Enemies’, National Interest (Winter 2005): 52–6.

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A number of Surkov’s statements were also directed against the West, claiming that its reprimands were designed to secure its own interests and to ensure that Russia remained weak: ‘Sometimes, words and thoughts do not coincide. For example, they talk to us about democracy while thinking about our hydrocarbons’.22 He rejected the legitimacy of outsiders criticizing how the Russians govern themselves and contrasted his conception of ‘sovereign democracy’ with the ‘directed democracy’ supposedly favored by the West—‘a model imposed by force and trickery by the centres of influence’, which can never be effective because ‘it is imposed from the exterior’.23 Instead of submitting to the standards of others, Russia shall seek ‘to be a free nation among other free nations and co-operate with them according to just rules without being governed by outside’.24 This concern that external criticism could lead to a weakening of the Russian government, and therefore allow for external control, was based in part upon perceptions of the West’s intervention in the Orange Revolution. The idea that the West might seek to replicate its earlier successes by undermining the Kremlin’s legitimacy and fostering a popular revolt was widespread in Russian policy circles. Such an outcome would weaken Russian sovereignty and place Russia in a subordinate position to the West, an outcome which some argued had already happened in Ukraine and Georgia as these countries moved closer to NATO and the EU. This constituted a central theme in Sergei Ivanov’s January 2006 article entitled ‘The New Russian Doctrine’ in which he identified the ‘violent assault on the constitutional order of some post-Soviet states’ as one of the most serious threats Russia faced.25 Given this stance, it should not be surprising that he would take up the mantle of sovereign democracy just before the G-8 summit and produce perhaps the most pointed attempt to link the concept of sovereign democracy to the defense against external threats. On the eve of the G-8 meeting, Ivanov made it very clear that Russia would not be passive in the face of the West’s reprimands. In an article published in Izvestia, he provided an exceptional insight into the Kremlin’s thinking, given the increased focus on the state of Russia’s democracy surrounding the summit. Ivanov argued that the reemergence of Russia as a great power rests upon three pillars: sovereign democracy, a strong economy, and military might.26 The first pillar is seen as the very foundation of the Russian state because it is based upon the right of the Russian people to determine their own political system and to defend it ‘from external pressure by any and all means, including armed force’. 22  ����������������������������������������� Page, ‘We’re Democrats, Insists Kremlin’. 23 �������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Ideologue Defends “Directed Democracy” Ahead of G-8 Meet’, Agence France Presse, 28 June 2006. 24  ����������������������������������������� Page, ‘We’re Democrats, Insists Kremlin’. 25 ������������������������������������������� Sergei Ivanov, ‘The New Russian Doctrine’, Wall Street Journal (Europe), 11 January 2006, 13. 26 ��������������������������������������������� Sergei Ivanov, ‘A Triad of National Values’, Izvestia, 14 July 2006, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 17 July 2007.

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However, Russia’s willingness to assert its independence through the principle of sovereign democracy was not without costs: ‘By declaring its own ideological project, Russia has entered a harsh and uncompromising competitive struggle. We should not evade this inevitable confrontation; rather we should defend our position, consistently and with solid arguments, against our critics and open opponents’. This statement revealed that Ivanov perceived the international system as being inherently conflictual and divided between those who wish to impose their political standards upon others and those who seek to act independently in accordance with their own perceived interests. Russia, by choosing the second path, is confronted by two sources of threat: international terrorists and Russia’s ‘soft opponents’ in the West. This latter group includes ‘those of our partners in the community of democratic states who are dissatisfied to see an independent, strong, self-confident Russia, with a developed economy and a clear political stance, globally competitive and capable of defending its sovereign path of development’. The fact that Ivanov perceived the democratic West as an opponent is quite telling. While he would not put it this way, since he would maintain that Russia remains a democracy despite substantial evidence to the contrary, this worldview is in line with the growing alignment of states by regime type (authoritarian with authoritarian, for example) and increasing conflict between states of different regime types (democratic versus authoritarian). Rather than threatening Russia directly through military force or armed attack, the democratic states use ‘democratic slogans … as a cover for active interference in the internal affairs of other states—states which are upholding their own sovereign interests, different from the “standards” forcibly imposed in the world community’. Thus, Ivanov argued that the West’s policy of democracy promotion is actually a cover aimed at weakening a resurgent Russia and advancing its geopolitical interests; the notion that the West’s support for human rights and democracy is done out of an honest belief in those principles was simply discarded. The ultimate goal of this ‘interference’ is to create conditions which will precipitate regime change and bring to power compliant governments. While the physical danger represented from the democratic camp is not as great as from terrorists, it still represents a serious source of threat to the autonomy and stability of the Russian government and state. This latter part is important because the Kremlin inherently links the two and therefore undermining the government equates to undermining the state. The notion that Russia faces political threats from the West formed the very foundation of the sovereign democracy project. One of the ways to resist external pressure was to respond in kind with an alternative political program which would discredit democracy promotion and could serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime in power. This represented a departure from the earlier conception of ‘managed democracy’, which was oriented more toward the domestic legitimization of the Kremlin’s consolidation of power. By contrast, sovereign democracy’s heavy emphasis on guaranteeing Russia’s sovereignty is best understood within the context of Russia’s relationship with other states. While alternative notions of sovereignty (such as the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state against

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centrifugal forces) were not discarded through this new formulation, sovereign democracy ‘highlights international problems in the first place’ and is designed to ‘animate the image of Russia as a “besieged fortress”’ (Okara 2007). In some ways this second perception is correct: as regional democratic trends gain increasing traction, the remaining authoritarian regimes have indeed come under growing political pressure. Comments by Russian officials, including Putin, fed into this perception of a Russia under siege. One argument to this effect was that external criticisms of its political system were akin to neocolonialism. This was meant to evoke the perception of an imperialist West (especially the US) with designs on undermining Russian independence in order to get access to its natural resources in a manner similar to the European colonialists in previous centuries. This language will be examined in the following section. Diversity and Neocolonialism Putin’s April 2005 state-of-the-nation address to the Russian Duma has been cited as the origin of the sovereign democracy concept.27 In this speech, Putin discussed Russia’s domestic political system in some depth and, coming just months after the Orange Revolution, should be seen as a high-level response to the events in Ukraine and the prospect that the color revolutions may spread. A central theme of this speech was Russia’s right to choose its own ‘path’ toward democracy, based upon ‘its historical, geopolitical, and other characteristics’.28 This argument was referenced above and represents another key aspect of the rhetorical defense against regional democratic trends: deflecting criticisms of the state of Russian democracy by asserting that the very act of criticism is illegitimate. After Putin’s 2005 stateof-the-nation address, Kremlin officials consistently repeated the theme that differences in historical, cultural, and social development meant that any attempt to have a single standard of democracy would invariably fail. Instead, democracy had to develop in an organic or ‘natural’ way, or risk ‘destablizing’ the state in question and possibly the entire region.29 The Russian Foreign Ministry took exception to the Bush administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy which condemned the Russian government for a ‘diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions’ and linked improvement in US-Russian relations to Moscow’s support for democratic progress both at home and throughout the former Soviet Union.30 27 ������������������������� Vitali Ivanov, ‘Why Does Putin ������������������������������������������������� Need the Sovereign Democracy Discussion?’, Izvestia, 11 October 2006, 6, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 11 October 2006. 28  RTR Russia TV, 25 April 2005, reproduced as ‘Putin Focuses on Domestic Policy in State-of-Nation Address to Russian Parliament’, in BBCWM, 25 April 2005. 29 ���������������������� Sergei Lavrov qtd. in RTR Russia TV, 12 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Minister Warns Against ‘Imposed’ Change in CIS’, in BBCWM, 12 May 2005. 30 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’ [Online: White House], March 2006, 44. Available at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, accessed

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In response, the Foreign Ministry asserted that ‘No one has … a monopoly on interpreting what democracy is’ and that any uniform standard imposed by the US ‘not only cannot bring success, but [is] fraught with discrediting the idea’.31 As Sergei Ivanov colorfully exclaimed, ‘Democracy is not a potato that can be transplanted from one garden to another’.32 According to this line of reasoning, no two states will progress along the path of democracy at the same rate or in the same way, and the application of democratic values in any particular case will necessarily look different than those found in other countries. However, these differences should not be taken as indicative of any lack of commitment to democratic values. Thus, when outsiders comment negatively on the state of the Russian political system, they are ignoring the fact that the objects of their criticism (e.g. the relationship between the Kremlin and the press, the creation of political parties, the centralization of power, etc.) are merely reflections of historical, cultural, or social differences. Any attempt to hold Russia to the same standards as other states is both practically and morally wrong. Consequently, the very act of external criticism at best disregards the diversity of the international system; at worst, it violates the rights that all peoples have to determine their own political development and constitutes an attempt by outsiders to forcibly impose their values upon others. A similar argument was used during the 1990s in the socalled ‘Asian values’ debate during which regimes used the language of diversity to defend authoritarianism by referring to international standards of human rights and civil liberties as inherently ‘Western’ and assailing any attempt to universalize them as ‘neoimperialism’. In the new millennium, similar language was used by the Kremlin to justify its shift toward authoritarianism and to attack democracy promotion. It is no coincidence that one of the first references to the West as neocolonialists occurred during the time of the Orange Revolution. In early December 2004, Putin condemned the involvement by the US and EU in Ukraine in particularly harsh language. He intimated that the West was acting as ‘a nice but strict uncle in a pith helmet’ who sought to ensure that those with ‘a dark political skin … live their lives in accordance with some political expediency. And if, God forbid, the ungrateful native objects, he is punished with the help of a missile-bomb truncheon as it happened in Belgrade’.33 This statement was clearly meant to evoke a series of images from the colonial period, such as the popular representation of the British colonialist in a pith helmet whose mission was to control the native peoples in accordance with the notion of the white man’s burden of civilizing non-whites. 11 July 2007. 31 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Russia Dismisses US Criticism of its Democracy Record’, Associated Press, 20 March 2006. 32  RIA News Agency, 13 February 2005, reproduced as ‘Democracy Cannot Be ‘Transplanted’, Russian Defense Minister Warns US’, in BBCWM, 13 February 2005. 33  RTR Russia TV, 6 December 2004, reproduced as ‘Russia Ready to Mediate but Will Not Interfere in Ukrainian Crisis—Putin’, in BBCWM, 6 December 2004.

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Similar language would be used repeatedly by the Kremlin over the next several years. Moreover, the reference to ‘Belgrade’ refers to the US-led, NATO military campaign against Serbia over its treatment of the Kosovo Albanians in 1999— an event which had serious, negative ramifications for Russian perceptions of American power.34 Igor Ivanov, who was foreign minister at the time and later served as secretary of the Security Council (the equivalent of national security advisor) under Putin, argued that NATO’s claims of the ‘humanitarian’ reasons for the war were really a cover for its geopolitical interests. Like Western involvement in Ukraine, the war with Serbia was seen as imperialist: ‘This is why’, Igor Ivanov claimed, ‘by defending Yugoslavia’s right to sovereignty today, we are defending the future of the world and of Europe against the latest form of neocolonialism, the so-called NATO colonialism’.35 Consequently, we can see a continuity in language across time: the Kremlin’s belief that political values (humanitarianism, human rights, democratization) are used by the West to justify their interference in the domestic politics of other states. Just as NATO intervened against Serbia based upon the principle of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, some drew a parallel to Chechnya and asked whether the West would seek to involve itself in an ethnic conflict on Russian soil.36 Similarly, just as the US and EU supported regime opponents in Ukraine, might they do the same in Russia? Putin’s comment about ‘pith helmets’ came just a few days after another statement in which he blasted the current ‘dictatorship in international affairs’ which is sometimes ‘beautifully gift-wrapped in pseudo-democratic phraseology’.37 Thus, from the Kremlin’s perspective, democracy promotion and imperialism go hand in hand. Following the Orange Revolution, Russian officials continued to make similar statements. For example, Modest Kolerov, who was appointed to head the Kremlin’s newly-created agency unofficially charged with preventing color revolutions in the former Soviet Union, claimed that external pressure on the democracy issue sought to impose a ‘banana republic scenario’ on Russia, clearly evoking images of American interventions in Central America.38 In an interview on an American television network just before the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Putin responded to the interviewer’s questions about the state of Russian democracy by giving a lengthy defense of the Russian political system, raising questions about the quality of democracy in the US, and explicitly tying democracy promotion to neocolonialism: 34 �������������������������������������������������������������������� Michael Wines, ‘Muscovites Savor a Caper After Being Down So Long’, New York Times, 16 June 1999, A19. 35  Russia TV, 27 March 1999, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov Kosovo Crisis Speech at State Duma Session’, in BBCWM, 29 March 1999. 36 ������������ Constantine ������������������������� Pleshakov, ‘Russia’s New ����������� Paranoia’, Japan Times, 1 April 1999. 37 ���������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Attacks US “Dictatorship” in World Affairs’, Agence France Presse, 4 December 2004. 38 ������������������������������������������ Maksim Glikin, ‘Against Democratization’, Vedomost, 17 August 2005, A2, reproduced in Defense and Security (Russia), 19 August 2005.

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If you allow me, I will finish the topic about problems of democracy. You and I know very well what arguments some countries of the West used to enhance their actions during the colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. If you look at newspapers of that time, you will see that they are not much different from the arguments which are attempted to be used against the Russian Federation. Only the words civilization and the civilizing role have been replaced by the words democratization and democracy, and we all see this very well.39

Putin then went on to say that ‘benevolent criticism’ was welcome, but that any attempt to use democracy promotion ‘in order to interfere with out domestic affairs’ was ‘totally unacceptable’. The line between these two categories, however, appeared to be quite thin in the Kremlin’s thinking. Less than a year later, almost this exact same language was used in Putin’s April 2007 state-of-the nation address which, once again, linked ‘pseudo-democratic phraseology’ with ‘the so-called civilizing role of the colonizing states’.40 Subsequent statements, such as Putin’s implied analogy between the US and the Third Reich expressed during the WWII Victory Day parade on Red Square41 and his condemnation of ‘imperialism in world affairs’42 reinforced this sentiment. If the ‘diversity’ argument is centered on the impracticality of external democracy promotion, the accusations of the West’s neoimperialist intentions are based upon its moral illegitimacy. Both of these arguments sought to obscure the fact that Russia is not moving closer toward democracy but has steadily undermined liberal democratic values at home and abroad through institutional changes and policy choices. While, as McFaul (2006: 10) correctly asserted, many of these changes could be seen as aiming to strengthen state capacities, reverse centrifugal forces in the country, and establish a stable political system, ‘when analyzed together, the thread uniting these events is clear—the elimination or weakening of independent sources of power’, especially when ‘Putin has not initiated one reform in the name of deepening democracy’. This analysis is supported by a variety of sources, including the much-maligned (at least by the Kremlin) Freedom House institution which in its 2007 Countries at the Crossroads (Walker and Kelly 2007: 2) report specifically referred to the ‘Russian Model’ as not only influencing the nature of Russia’s political development, but also serving as an example for other autocrats and prospective authoritarian leaders. Thus, the sovereign democracy argument, with its codicils of diversity and anti-imperialism, served as an attempt to shield 39 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Reproduced as ‘Putin Gives Interview to US TV Channel on Eve of G-8 Summit’, in BBCWM, 13 July 2006. 40  RTR Russia TV, 26 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Putin Delivers Annual Address to Parliament—Full Text’, in BBCWM, 27 April 2007. 41 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Stephen Boykewich, ‘Putin Swipes at Estonia, US at War Victory Celebration’, Agence France Presse, 9 May 2007. 42 ������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Issues Sharp Warning to US, Vows to Counter “Imperialism”’, Agence France Presse, 31 May 2007.

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the regime from outside criticism and allow the Kremlin’s illiberal actions to be dismissed as misunderstandings or willful misrepresentations by the West. The Consolidation of Sovereign Democracy In addition to being directed outward against its external critics, sovereign democracy was also developed as a guiding principle for the Russian political system at home, a process which was not without some dispute. Much of the domestic criticism of sovereign democracy centered on how the concept furthered Russia’s slide toward authoritarianism. The Gazeta newspaper argued that Surkov had replaced the statist ideology of Count Sergei Semionovich Uvarov—who proposed basing the legitimacy of the tsarist regime upon the three principles of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality43—with his own triad of ‘ideological integrity, sovereign democracy, modernized economy’.44 This new formulation stressed the economic development of Russia, but implied that there should be only one guiding ideology of the state, interpreted by the Kremlin to serve the interests of perpetuating the regime. Gazeta later likened the Kremlin to ‘the leaders of the rogue states’ who use the principle of sovereign democracy to attack the legitimacy of critics both abroad and at home.45 Boris Nemtsov, a pro-democracy politician and frequent critic of Putin, contended that adding an adjective to the term democracy was yet another sign of the growing dictatorship in Russia.46 Gleb Pavlovsky, a pro-Kremlin political strategist, dismissed Nemtsov as expressing the views of a ‘pro-American minority’, a phrase meant to link internal critics to external forces aimed at undermining Russian sovereignty.47 This line of reasoning was also used quite assertively by Surkov who attacked opponents of sovereign democracy as ‘socalled “intellectuals”, who think the sun rises in the West’48 and ‘marginal alliances of former bureaucrats, active Nazis, and fugitive oligarchs, egged on by visiting diplomats and by the naive idea that foreign countries will help them’ in their aim 43 ���������������������������������������������������� Nicholas I rejected the principle of ‘Nationality’ (Narodnost) as one of the three pillars of tsarist legitimacy because it implied that the ethnic Russians (russkii) were the principal people of state. Such a formulation would not have been conducive for control over the multinational empire. 44 ��������������������������������������������������������� ‘In Search of Russian Democracy: The Summit Approaches’, What the Papers Say (Part A), 30 June 2006. 45  Gazeta.ru, 12 January 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Website Challenges Moral and Practical Value of “Sovereign Democracy”’, in BBCWM, 14 January 2007. 46  Ekho Moskvy Radio, 25 July 2006, reproduced as ‘Russian Pundits Discuss “Sovereign Democracy”’, in BBCWM, 25 July 2006. 47 ����� Ibid. 48 ������������������������ ‘Deputy Director of the Presidential ������������������������������������������������������� Administration Vladislav Surkov Speaks on the Sovereign Democracy’, The Russian Business Monitor, 27 November 2006.

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to ‘destroy [Russian] society’.49 By referring to opponents in this way, effectively calling them enemies of the Russian people, the Kremlin discredited them, further defending the regime from criticism. Given the Kremlin’s growing control over the Russian political system, the debate within the regime over sovereign democracy was perhaps more consequential than that taking place outside of it. Soon after the G-8 summit in July 2006, a political fight erupted between Russian First Deputy Prime Minister (and the man who would emerge as Putin’s handpicked successor) Dmitri Medvedev, on the one hand, and Surkov and Sergei Ivanov on the other. Medvedev stated that he did not like the term because the adjective before ‘democracy’ ‘creates a strange feeling. It gives the impression that some other, nontraditional democracy was under discussion’.50 The issue immediately arose as to whether the sovereign democracy principle would appear as part of the political platform for Putin’s party, United Russia.51 In a speech before the Duma faction of United Russia, Putin hinted that he supported the concept. However, others within the organization expressed views similar to Medvedev’s.52 As a result, sovereign democracy was initially omitted from the political program that United Russia planned to release in September 2006,53 though some in the party’s hierarchy maintained that it would be included.54 After Putin surprisingly came out and strongly criticized the concept, sovereign democracy seemed all but dead.55 Nevertheless, once United Russia’s political program was officially released in October, sovereign democracy was added as the defining plank in its platform, and promoted as the one issue which would fundamentally distinguish the party from its rivals in the December 2007 parliamentary elections.56 The debate over sovereign democracy did not end there, however. In January 2007, Medvedev gave a speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, which amounted to his debut on the world stage. In this speech, he took what many 49  Argumenty i Fakty, 27 November 2006, reproduced as ‘Kremlin Aide Sets Out Main Tenets of “Sovereign Democracy”’, in BBCWM, 2 December 2006. 50  NTV Mir, 24 July 2006, reproduced as ‘Pundits Discuss “Sovereign Democracy” in Light of Putin Successor’s Interview’, in BBCWM, 24 July 2006. 51 ���������������������������������������������� Yvegenia Zubchenko, ‘Discussion or Division’, Novye Izvestia, 25 July 2006, 2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 25 July 2006. 52 ����� Ibid. 53 �������������������������������� Francesca Mereu, ‘United Russia Pans �������������������������� “Surkov Democracy”’, Moscow Times, 26 July 2006. 54  ITAR–TASS, 31 August, reproduced as ‘One Russia’s Doctrine is Sovereign Democracy, Says Party Secretary’, in BBCWM, 31 August 2006. 55 ���������������������������� Mikhail Fishman, ‘President Putin ����������������������� Confuses Western Political ��������������������� Analysts’, Kommersant, 11 September 2006, 1, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 11 September 2006. 56 �������������������������������������������������������������������� Sergey Varshavchik, ‘United Russia to Build “Sovereign Democracy”’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 October 2006, 3, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 3 October 2006.

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saw as an additional swipe at the concept of sovereign democracy: ‘Russia is a country that endured the most severe trials in the twentieth century: revolution, civil war, the world wars, economic collapse. Today we are building new institutions based on the fundamental principles of full democracy. This democracy requires no additional definition. This democracy is effective and is based on the principles of the market economy, supremacy of the law and government that is accountable to the rest of society’.57 Nevertheless, later that month, Medvedev and Surkov denied that there was any significant rift between them.58 Even if not explicitly supported by Medvedev, sovereign democracy appeared to be the guiding principle of United Russia, as seen during its party congress in October 2007, which launched its campaign for the December 2007 parliamentary elections. At this meeting, party officials handed out a number of documents to journalists—one of which was ‘a thick anthology entitled, “Sovereign Democracy”’.59 This signaled that the sovereign democracy concept was likely to go unchallenged within the party. Russian political commentators were divided over what this debate within the Kremlin actually represented. Did it reflect genuine unease with the concept amongst some within the Kremlin or was it an expression of factions within the regime jockeying for position to succeed Putin?60 Others pointed to another possibility: Was it simply fabricated for international consumption to deflect Western criticism by pretending that there remained space for an open debate within the Russian political system?61 Regardless of which possibility is correct, sovereign democracy was promoted as the governing ideology of the Russian Federation. This decision was evident in the country’s new, official history textbooks: in the final chapter, entitled, ‘Sovereign Democracy’, Surkov is quoted liberally and the chapter itself reads as a broad-ranging defense of Putin’s policies.62 Thus, the sovereign democracy concept has become consolidated as a chief pillar in the rhetorical defense against Western democracy promotion. The second pillar, that of directing criticisms outwards, will be examined in the following sections.

57 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Speech at the World Economic Forum’, 27 January 2007, <www.medvedev2008. ru/english_2007_01_27_.htm>, accessed 11 July 2007. 58  ITAR-TASS, 31 January 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Deputy PM Denies Any Rift with Putin Aide on “Sovereign Democracy”’, in BBCWM, 31 January 2007. 59 ������������������������������������������������������������������ Irina Nagornykh, ‘Dmitri Medvedev is Not on the Candidate Lists’, Kommersant, 1 October 2007, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 1 October 2007. 60  Ekho Moskvy Radio, 24 July 2005, reproduced as ‘Russian Officials’ Latest Utterances Point to Kremlin Infighting—Pundit’, in BBCWM, 24 July 2006. 61 �������������������������������� Francesca Mereu, ‘United Russia ���������������������������������������� Pans “Surkov Democracy”’; Nikolai Gulko and Irina Nagornykh, ‘The Party Strays Off Course’, Kommersant, 12 September 2006, 2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 12 September 2006. 62 �������������������������������������� ‘Sovereign Democracy Gets a History’, Moscow Times, 11 July 2007.

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Tu Quoque The term tu quoque, Latin for ‘you also’, is an ad hominem legal defense in which the accused does not defend him/herself on the basis of fact or law, but rather points the finger at the actions of their accuser, claiming that they, too, have committed the same offense and therefore have no right to accuse another. This defense has been largely discredited because one can not exculpate oneself by identifying the crimes of others. Nevertheless, it continues to be used and is a powerful rhetorical tactic to redirect attention from oneself. A similar line of defense has been used by the Kremlin against charges of being undemocratic. This section will briefly outline a few of the tu quoque attacks against the West generally. The subsequent sections will focus on Russian rhetoric against the Baltic countries, particularly Estonia. In defending the state of Russia’s political system from external criticism, Surkov argued that its democratic failings should be seen in light of those of the West throughout history: ‘One of the most advanced democracies in the world [the United States] permitted segregation only 40 years ago, but it was regarded as a democracy. Well this country’s culture apparently permitted segregation then. We understand it. We are like that too’.63 At some level this is a perfectly legitimate argument: America’s policy of segregation was indeed a democratic failing in that the country did not live up to its core beliefs as outlined in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Because of America’s racist culture at the time, the abrogation of the rights of a large number of citizens was deemed socially and politically acceptable. As the country progressed toward living up to its principles, this policy was rightly discarded. Thus, democracy is not an end result, but a process. Similarly, Kremlin officials make the argument that they, too, are involved in a transition toward democracy and that occasional democratic shortcomings (or, as it is argued, policies which are incorrectly perceived to be undemocratic from the outside) are to be expected. It is therefore wrong for the West to expect perfection from a Russian government in transition. The problem with this argument is that there are few to no substantive signs from the Russian government that it has made a fundamental commitment to democracy. In fact, rather than moving toward further democratization, the trend line is moving in the opposite direction. The earlier quote from McFaul, that the Putin administration had not instituted a single policy aimed at strengthening democracy, is indicative of this absence of progress. If the Kremlin were as serious about democracy as its rhetoric claims, then there should be signs to this effect. Kremlin officials have made other comments along similar lines which attempt to equate their own actions with those of the United States or to assert that their own version of democracy is in fact superior to that found in America. For example, Putin famously defended the Kremlin’s control over the media by asking, 63  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 August 2006, 1, 3, reproduced as ‘Sovereign Democracy for All’, in What the Papers Say (Part B), 31 August 2006.

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in effect, that if America’s free press were so free then why was Bush able to fire Dan Rather, an American news anchor who was removed from his position by his network (and not President Bush) after airing a story during the 2004 presidential campaign which used forged documents.64 Similarly, Surkov claimed that Putin’s consolidation of power is no different than the policies of former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who expanded the powers of the federal government during the Great Depression and whom Surkov called twentieth century Russia’s ‘ideological ally’.65 Sergei Ivanov argued that Russia was, in fact, more democratic than the US since America has fewer choices in its political system and elects its president in an undemocratic manner: in Russia ‘there are at least four parties in parliament, and not two, and where the people, and not the electoral college, select the president’.66 It is somewhat unclear whether these statements are truly meant to be willful misrepresentations or are merely misunderstandings of the American political system specifically and of democracy in general. For example, when Sergei Ivanov listed China and Russia alongside the US, the EU, India, Brazil, and Japan as fellow democracies,67 was this a rhetorical tactic to equate the legitimacy of these seven governments or evidence that he is operating from a completely different definition of democracy than that commonly accepted amongst democracies? One can not be completely sure. Ultimately, the effect is the same: undermining the legitimacy of external criticism by redirecting attention away from Russia’s democratic failings and toward others. A clear case of this can been seen in the Kremlin’s attempt to place the West on the defensive by attacking Estonia for its purported liberal democratic failings. The Rhetoric of the Russia-Estonia Conflict After the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union during the Second World War, ethnic Russians and other Russian-speakers migrated to the Baltics and altered the demographic balance in these states. This was most notable in Estonia and Latvia, where the titular nation’s overall population was 64 ���������������������������������������������� John Hughes, ‘Lost in (Russian) Translation’, Christian Science Monitor, 27 April 2005. 65 ������������������������������������������� Steve Gutterman, ‘Kremlin Ideologue Likens Putin ��������������������������������� to Franklin D. Roosevelt’, Associated Press, 8 February 2007. Political elites aligned with the Kremlin also pointed to FDR, who was elected to more than two terms as president, as an example that Putin should follow. However, the two-term limit was, at the time, merely an informal tradition, unlike the Russian constitution which prohibits more than two consecutive terms. See Viktor Khamrayev, ‘Vladimir Putin Asked to Follow Franklin Roosevelt’s Example’, Kommersant, 9 February 2007, 3, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 9 February 2007. 66 ������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Combing All Democracies Anglo-Saxon Style Would be Wrong—Ivanov’, TASS, 6 June 2007. 67 ����� Ibid.

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reduced from 90 per cent to 64 per cent in Estonia and from 77 per cent to 54 per cent in Latvia (Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 93–128). In order to preserve the cultural and ethnic identity of these countries, Tallinn and Riga introduced strict citizenship and language requirements after independence, effectively denying automatic citizenship to those whose families moved there after WWII.68 Noncitizen residents must acquire a certain level of fluency in the titular language, as well as adhere to other requirements. Since most ethnic Russians did not speak Estonian or Latvian (neither of which is a Slavic language), hundreds of thousands of Russian-speakers were left stateless. Since the early 1990s, Moscow has complained vociferously about Estonia and Lativa’s treatment of Russia’s ‘compatriots’ (as they are commonly referred to by Kremlin officials), and the human rights record of these countries. These complaints overlook two key facts: first, that many Russian-speakers had started the process of acquiring citizenship by the close of the 1990s or had returned to the Russian Federation; second, that the level of human rights guarantees and democracy in the Baltics far exceeded those in Russia. The language used by the Kremlin to describe conditions for Russian-speakers in the Baltics centered on three general themes: the human rights of the Russianspeakers were being violated; these states had a ‘democratic deficit’ because they did not allow non-citizens to vote in statewide elections; and, by seeking to reject the legacy of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states glorified Nazis. Although this rhetoric was used since the 1990s, it increased as Russia shifted toward greater authoritarianism after 2000 and as the Baltic states were scheduled to join both the EU and NATO in 2004. These events made it even more important that the Kremlin divert attention away from the contrast between its growing autocracy and the consolidation of democracy in Estonia and Latvia. Again, it is important to note that every year more Russian-speakers acquire citizenship in these states; as a result, the problem of stateless Russian-speakers should have become less of an issue. Moreover, given the membership criteria of the EU and NATO, which require that applicants meet high levels of democratic development and civil liberties, the liberal democratic credentials of these states should have been in even less dispute. Nevertheless, the Kremlin consistently exaggerated problems in these countries to serve its political ends. An example of the type of language used to describe the human rights conditions for the Russian-speakers in Estonia can be found in statements made by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yuri Fedotov, in preparation for the 60th session of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights. Fedotov stated that Russia would seek the condemnation of Tallinn and Riga for ‘violations of human rights’

68 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ethnic Russians who could prove that their ancestors lived in Estonia or Latvia before World War II were automatically eligible for citizenship in these countries. Lithuania, which had a far smaller influx of Russian-speakers, gave automatic citizenship to all those living in the country at the time of independence.

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and ‘undisguised discrimination’ against Russian-speakers.69 During the meeting itself, Fedotov repeated these claims, calling these violations ‘serious’.70 Later, he would refer to Estonia and Latvia as a ‘sickness’ in the heart of Europe.71 It is certainly true that the challenges faced by Russian-speakers in Estonia are real. At the time of Estonian independence, the vast majority of Russian-speakers had lived in Estonia for decades without needing to learn the local language and have found Estonian difficult to learn; others have been unwilling to learn Estonian, seeing it as a symbol of the end of Russian hegemony over the region.72 Moreover, although Estonia’s interethnic relations are free of violence (though the 2007 monument row discussed below raised some questions about this), having approximately ten per cent of the country’s population without citizenship and resentful of their newfound status as a minority is certainly not conducive to long-term stability.73 However, Fedotov’s statements are misleading. Over half the number of the non-citizens in 1991 have been naturalized and the share of ethnic Russians who have become Estonian citizens is increasing every year.74 In contrast to Estonia’s citizenship laws, which have become more liberal over time, Russia’s citizenship’s laws are actually quite strict, though there has been a push to ease naturalization in order to compensate for Russia’s declining population. Moreover, the Kremlin’s claims of the ‘stateless’ status of the Russian speakers is somewhat disingenuous: these individuals retain their Soviet passports for travel to Russia.75 Russia could simply grant these individuals Russian citizenship if it so chose—a precedent set by the Kremlin in Georgia when it granted citizenship to Abkhazians and South Ossetians without Tbilisi’s consent (see Chapter 7). While this would likely cause problems with Estonia’s NATO allies (since it may raise the specter of Russian irredentism), it seems that the Kremlin would rather have an issue than a solution to the problem. Finally, while language requirements for some professions have meant that Russian-speakers are effectively excluded from some jobs, a critical part of Estonia’s ascension to the EU was predicated upon its adoption of human rights and minority protections, which Tallinn fulfilled. In fact, the European Commission held that, although there was room for some 69 ������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia to Employ International Organizations to Protect �������������������������� Rights of Russian Speaking People in Latvia, Estonia’, Economic News (RIA Oreanda), 24 February 2004. 70 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Summary Record of the 7th Meeting’, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 22 March 2004, E/CN.4/2004/SR.7, 12. 71 ����������� ‘Russia to Press ���������������������������������������������������� Estonia, Latvia on Human Rights at UN Forum’, Agence France Presse, 13 March 2005. 72 ������������������ Chinn and Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority, 97, 103. 73 ������������������������������������������������ Steven Woehrel, ‘Estonia: Current Issues and US Policy’, �������������������������������� Congressional Research Service, 11 July 2007, RS22692, 3. 74 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Citizenship’ [Online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia], 4 April 2008. Available at <www.vm.ee/estonia/kat_399/4518.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 75 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Calls on EU to Urge Latvia, Estonia to Naturalise Russian Minority’, Agence France Presse, 21 December 2006.

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improvement, ‘the rights of the Russian-speaking minority (both with Estonian nationality and without) are observed and safeguarded’.76 It is also not without some degree of irony that the Kremlin has called into question Estonia’s commitment to democracy. Fedotov asserted that the inability of non-citizens to vote in Estonian parliamentary elections represented a ‘a serious and long-term deficit of democracy’ in the country.77 The Russian Duma also called upon the EU to ensure that the democratic rights of non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia were respected by allowing them to vote in European parliamentary elections.78 Non-citizens are, in fact, allowed to vote in municipal elections and, if they so choose, are eligible for citizenship, as long as they learn Estonian. In addition, Tallinn’s democratic credentials are otherwise without question: Freedom House rates Estonia a ‘1’ for political rights and a ‘1’ for civil liberties, the highest rating possible. Nevertheless, the Kremlin continued to condemn Estonia, even going so far as referring to it as a threat to Russian security. According to Sergei Ivanov: ‘Countries that distance themselves from democratic norms and human liberties will as a rule become sources of danger to their neighbors, because they tend to provoke military and political tension … It is therefore why I, minister of defense, am forced to speak about the situation in Latvia, Estonia and some other countries in the [NATO] alliance’.79 Again, this statement is quite ironic since it is Russia which had been steadily moving away from these norms, not Estonia. Moreover, it is unclear how Estonia, with a population of some 1.4 million people and a very small military, could be considered a threat to Russia’s security, with one hundred times the population, a massive military, and thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the purpose here is clearly not to describe reality, but to advance the Kremlin’s agenda of diverting attention away from its own democratic failings.80 The third line of attack against Estonia is that the government ‘glorifies Nazis’. Given the unprecedented death and destruction that Germany caused during the Second World War, referring to political opponents as ‘Nazis’ is an attempt to discredit them, identity them as a danger to liberal democratic norms, 76 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Agenda 2000—Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application for Membership of the European Union’ [Online: European Commission], 15 July 2007, DOC/97/12. Available at <ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/estonia/es-op_en.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008. 77 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Summary Record of the 7th Meeting’, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 22 March 2004, E/CN.4/2004/SR.7, 12. 78 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Alexandra Chebanu, ‘Human Rights in Latvia, Estonia Should Be Ensured’, TASS, 10 June 2004. 79 �������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Defmin: Moscow Sees Estonia, Latvia as Sources of Threat’, Baltic News Service, 13 July 2004. 80 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This is described quite eloquently by the Estonian Foreign Minister, Kristiina Ojuland, in a press conference given days after Ivanov’s statement. Estonian Radio, 15 July 2004, reproduced as ‘Estonian Foreign Minister Brands Russian Accusations as Demagoguery’, in BBCWM, 16 July 2004.

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and associate them with racism, fascism, and totalitarianism. In many ways, it is the worst political label that one could attach to another and is often used as a rhetorical device, devoid of any real connection to the tenets of National Socialism.81 In the rhetorical battle between Moscow and Tallinn, the Kremlin has associated the Estonian government with the Nazis, asserting that they are actively engaged in ‘continuing praise of supporters of the Nazis’ and the ‘persecution of anti-Nazi veterans and Soviet law enforcement personnel’.82 This argument is based upon a fundamental divide between how the Baltic states and Russia perceive the period during and after the Second World War. In 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany signed what came to be known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which, in accordance with a series of secret protocols, allowed for the USSR to acquire the Baltic states. Once WWII began, the Soviets invaded. However, once Germany attacked the USSR, some citizens from the Baltic states sided with Germany (including joining German military units) in order to fight against the Soviet Union, which was seen as illegally occupying their countries. With the Allied victory over Germany, the Baltic states were reincorporated into the Soviet Union, resulting in serious human rights abuses against the citizens of these states, including mass killings and deportations. Politicians and commentators in the Baltic states make three assertions. First, both the initial incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, and the subsequent annexation in 1944, were illegal, illegitimate, and should be considered an ‘occupation’ of the sovereign, internationally-recognized countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This argument has formed the basis of the citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia: since the occupation was illegal, the transfer of ethnic Russians into these territories was likewise illegal and in contravention of the Geneva Conventions; therefore, granting automatic citizenship only to those who can trace their lineage (regardless of ethnicity) to the pre-WWII republics is simply rectifying historical wrongs. Second, those who sided with the Germans against the Soviet Union were seeking to liberate their country from foreign occupiers. Actions by the Baltic states to recognize their sacrifice is legitimate because of the illegality of the occupation and it in no way condones the racist policies of Nazi Germany. Finally, the Baltic leaders have repeatedly sought global acknowledgment that the Soviet Union’s crimes are just as bad those of Nazi Germany in that they were both totalitarian regimes which committed massive human rights abuses. Only by recognizing the USSR’s horrific past, in particular its treatment of its neighbors, can the region fully heal the wounds of the Second World War. The Russian government completely rejects these assertions, taking tremendous pride in the actions of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. They 81 ���������������������������������������� This is akin to Leo Strauss’s notion of reductio ad Hitlerum, a logical fallacy which attempts to dismiss the arguments of another side by connecting them to something Adolf Hitler had supported. 82 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Yuri Fedotov qtd. in ‘Moscow to Raise Topic of Baltic Russian-Speakers at Upcoming Meetings’, Baltic News Service, 20 February 2004.

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argue that the Baltic states joined the Soviet Union willingly after it ‘liberated’ these states. Therefore, their annexation was legal and should not be called an occupation. Any attempt to label it as such is an attempt to ‘rewrite the history of the Second World War’83 and delegitimizes the sacrifices of the Soviet people during the Second World War. By extension, if the Soviet effort is discounted, then this implies support for the USSR’s opponent, Nazi Germany. Moreover, since the Soviet Union legally incorporated the Baltic states, those who moved there after the war were legal, internal migrants, especially those who fought in World War II. Again, if Estonia and Latvia refuse to grant citizenship to them and their descendants, Tallinn and Riga are, in effect, violating the rights of ‘antifascist veterans’,84 making these governments, by implication, pro-fascist. Furthermore, those who fought against the Soviet Union from the Baltic states were not seeking to liberate their country, but rather fought to ensure a Nazi victory and therefore should be considered illegitimate ‘Nazi accomplices’.85 For example, a reunion of anti-Soviet soldiers (called ‘so-called freedom fighters’ and ‘banditlike formations’) in Tartu, Estonia was blasted by the Russian Foreign Ministry as an indication of the growing ‘brown peril’ in Europe.86 Finally, the Kremlin categorically rejects any attempt to liken the Soviet Union to Nazi Germany.87 As Lavrov described it, it is ‘sacrilegious and dangerous to put an equality sign between liberators and [occupiers]’ (the USSR and Germany, respectively).88 Since it is assumed that those who fought against the Nazis are inherently good (not necessarily a true assumption, but one used by the Kremlin to justify Soviet actions), by downplaying the differences between the two, the Baltic states are seemingly refusing to recognize the absolute the absolute evil of the Nazi regime; thus, it is argued, they are in fact seeking to rehabilitate Nazi Germany.89 By implication, Tallinn’s citizenship laws are also associated with the racist policies 83 ����� Ibid. 84 ����� Ibid. 85  Interfax News Agency, 13 March 2005, reproduced as ‘Russia Says Will Use UN Forum to Slate Baltic Rights Record’, in BBCWM, 13 March 2005. 86 ��������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Slams Estonian Freedom-Fighters’ Reunion’, Baltic News Service, 19 July 2005. 87  RIA News Agency, 12 June 2004, reproduced as ‘Russia Dismisses Estonian Demand for Apology as “Unfounded”’, in BBCWM, 12 June 2004. 88 ����������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Opposed to Estonia Heroisation of Fascism—Lavrov’, TASS, 20 December 2006. 89 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Also going on here is an attempt by the Putin administration to defend its incorporation of the Soviet past and achievements into the Russian Federation’s historical and political identity. Since the Russian Federation is advanced the successor to the USSR, the sins of the Soviet period have been consistently downplayed and Soviet leaders, including Stalin, have been at least partly rehabilitated. Thus, the arguments of the Baltic states—from calling the annexation ‘occupation’ to claiming that, like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union was a brutal, totalitarian state—are seen as attacking Russian national identity itself. On the recent shift in historical memory in Russia, see Shawn Walker, ‘Putin Rewrites Russia’s

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of the Nazi regime, as seen by the effortless transition made by Kremlin officials from these historical arguments to discussions about the current status of Russianspeakers in Estonia. This debate has developed into a largely unwinnable clash between two fundamentally different perspectives of history. Nevertheless, the Russian arguments are largely misrepresentations or exaggerations. The Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic countries was never recognized by the United States, most Western countries, or the governments-in-exile of these states. The legal basis of the Baltic states’ claims to an illegal occupation has significant strength in the historical record and international law, as seen by the 2004 European Court of Human Rights decision in Penart v. Estonia. Moreover, massive human rights abuses by the Soviet Union did, in fact, occur in these territories. The governments of the Baltic states have been very clear not to support Nazi ideology or to downplay the horrors of the Nazi period. Instead, the Kremlin is engaged in a logical fallacy of equating criticism of the Soviet Union with being pro-Nazi. The governments of the Baltic states categorically refute the policies of Nazi Germany, but also say that the Soviet Union was bad as well. This neither dismisses the sacrifices made by those who fought for the USSR nor glorifies Nazis. The purpose of the Kremlin’s arguments is not historical accuracy, however. Like the arguments about human rights abuses and the Baltic states’ democratic deficit, this is an attempt to place the West on the defensive. This was evident in a statement made by Sergei Ivanov at a ceremony honoring Russian diplomats killed during the Second World War: ‘Attempts to make a mockery of history are becoming an element and an instrument of the foreign policy of certain countries … Unfortunately, certain organizations such as NATO and the EU connive with these attempts’.90 In effect, Ivanov is arguing that the West has embraced a proNazi government by admitting Estonia into its military and political institutions. Thus, international concern over liberal values, human rights, and democracy should not be directed at Russia, but elsewhere. Russia, Estonia, and International Institutions The Kremlin has also utilized international institutions to deflect attention away from itself and redefine the problems of human rights and democracy as existing outside of Russia. This has come largely in two forms: attempting to place the European Union on the defensive by arguing that it is not doing enough to secure minority rights in Estonia and pushing international organizations to condemn Estonia. Associated with both of these tactics is a refusal to allow others to examine School History Books Under Soviet-style Control Laws’, The Independent (London), 20 August 2007. 90 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Steve Gutterman, ‘Russian Foreign Minister Says EU, NATO Connive with Efforts to Rewrite History’, Associated Press, 7 May 2007.

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Russia’s human rights record, even if it is done by the very same institutions which Russia has called upon to criticize others. During the period leading up to the admission of the Baltic states to the European Union, Russia sought to ensure that Brussels would force Latvia and Estonia to implement new policies friendly to Russian-speakers. In a letter to the EU listing fourteen ‘concerns’, Moscow said that it wanted Riga and Tallinn to significantly ease the naturalization process, grant automatic citizenship to retired Soviet soldiers, create state-financed Russian-language high schools, and make Russian an official language in areas populated by Russian-speakers.91 These concerns were raised in the context of Russia’s assertion that the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Moscow and Brussels would not automatically extend to EU newcomers and therefore would have to be renegotiated. In April 2004, the EU and Russia signed a protocol to the PCA and issued a joint statement in which both sides welcomed ‘EU membership [for the new members] as a firm guarantee for the protection of human rights and the protection of persons belonging to minorities. Both sides underline their commitment to the protection of human rights and the protection of persons belonging to minorities’.92 Russian officials took this statement to mean that the EU was now responsible for guaranteeing the human and minority rights of Russian-speakers in the Baltics and that any extension of the PCA to the new EU members (which needed to be ratified by the Russian Duma) would be contingent on the EU’s policies.93 This view was confirmed by the Russian Duma which adopted a declaration making relations between the EU and Russia dependent on this issue.94 Similarly, the Russian Foreign Ministry released its own statement which also linked Russia–EU relations to the status of Russianspeakers and asserted that the Baltic states were treating accession as ‘a sort of ‘letter of indulgence’ permitting them to declare absence of a problem as such and to continue … to infringe on the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the most sensitive areas’.95 While directed at the Baltic states, this also represented an indirect condemnation of the EU in that it questioned whether the organization held its applicants to the standards set out in the Copenhagen Requirements of 1993, which mandated that applicants guarantee ‘democracy, the rule of law,

91 ����������������������������� ‘Moscow Using Baltic Card to �������������������������������������� Pressure Brussels for Extra Bonuses’, Baltic News Service, 31 January 2004. 92 ���������������������������������������� ‘EU and Russia Confirm Extension of the PCA ��������������������������������� to the Enlarged EU’ [Online: European Union], 27 April 2004. Available at <www.eurunion.org/news/press/ 2004/20040062.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008. 93 ���������������������������������������������������� ‘EU, Russia to Continue Handling Minorities Issue’, Baltic News Service, 28 April 2004. 94 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Robert Serebrennikov, ‘State Duma Urges Baltia States to Fulfill Human Rights Committments’, TASS, 29 April 2004. 95 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow to keep Issue of Estonian, Latvian Russian-Speakers on the Burner’, Baltic News Service, 29 April 2004.

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human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities’.96 This criticism was made more explicit in other statements by Kremlin officials who argued that they did not, in fact, meet these requirements97 or, if the EU believed that they did, then the requirements themselves are the problem.98 Either way, the EU was accused of not living up to the joint agreement of April 2004 and having ‘double standards’ when it comes to human and minority rights protections: one which purports to advocate these principles when dealing with outside countries (particularly Russia and other non-democracies) and another for its members which are allowed to violate these principles with the tacit approval of the EU.99 In addition to the EU, Russia sought to get the United Nations bodies to denounce the Baltic states, such as the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Russia raised the issue of Estonia in the UNCERD and it issued a report critical of Tallinn’s treatment of Russian-speakers.100 The Kremlin’s response to this document was one of vindication of its own criticisms of Estonia: ‘The outcome of the committee’s examination of Estonia’s reports clearly demonstrates the validity of the international community’s concern, including independent experts in the field of human rights, regarding continuing problems with ensuring basic human rights in the country’.101 This response, however, ignored the several ‘positive aspects’ of Estonia’s minority rights policies, which were prominently cited in the report.102 It should come as no surprise that Russia would also seek to find a sympathetic reception in the UNCHR, an institution which has had a problematic record of actually advancing the causes of human rights or democracy since most of its recent members were either non-democracies or routine violators of human 96 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Accession Criteria’ [Online: European Union]. Available at <ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008. 97 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See Sergei Lavrov’s statement in ‘Russia’s Lavrov Again Slams Estonia, Latvia on Minorities’, Baltic News Service, 19 October 2004. 98 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ See Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizov’s statement in ‘Russia to Make Another Attack at Estonia, Latvia in Brussels’, Baltic News Service, 23 November 2004. 99 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Kremlin officials have repeatedly made statements to this effect. See, for example, the statements by Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Russian envoy to the EU, in Lyudmila Alexandrova and Viktoria Sokolova, ‘Moscow Unhappy About Russian-Speaking Minority in Latvia, Estonia’, TASS, 9 November 2004 and Maria Danilova, ‘Official: Russia and EU Make Some Progress, but Obstacles Remain’, Associated Press, 19 December 2005. 100 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Estonia’, 19 October 2006, CERD/C/EST/CO/7. 101  RIA Novosti, 28 August 2006, ‘Russia Claims Vindication by UN Report on Rights Abuses in Estonia’, in BBCWM, 28 August 2006. 102 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Estonia’, 19 October 2006, CERD/C/EST/CO/7, 2–3.

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rights which used the commission to attack the West and shield themselves from external criticism (Rahmani-Ocora 2006).103 For example, some recent members of the UNCHR included China, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, as identified above, Yuri Fedotov brought Russia’s concerns to the UNCHR in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, Russia submitted a draft resolution clearly aimed at Estonia and Latvia to the United Nations Human Rights Council (the UNCHR’s replacement), entitled, ‘Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality’.104 In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry asserted that this proposal was crucial to dealing with ‘existing problems in this field in certain parts of the world, particularly in states that regard themselves as being advanced or established democratic institutions’.105 Again, according to the Russian government, the problem of human and minority rights, as well as democracy, is something that exists outside of Russia, especially in states which recently joined the EU, and therefore the West has no right to criticize Russian policies. Russia also attempted to utilize European institutions to push its human rights agenda. In July 2004, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution which called upon Latvia and Estonia to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.106 The Kremlin reacted quite positively to this outcome, repeatedly citing it to show that Tallinn and Riga were outside of the European mainstream.107 However, the resolution that was adopted was far weaker than the one initially proposed by Russia and ultimately treated these states far more gently than subsequent Russian statements would lead one to believe.108 Russia has had somewhat less luck since then in 103 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Eventually this body was scrapped because its biases were seen as undermining the legitimacy of the entire United Nations system. 104 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� This was passed by the UNHRC and reported in ‘Report to the General Assembly on the Second Session of the Human Rights Council’, 22 March 2007, A/HRC/2/9, 21. 105 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Adoption at the second resumed session of the UN Human Rights Council of the Russian Draft Resolutions “Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality” and “Integrity of the Judicial System”’ [Online: Embassy of the Federation of Russia in the Republic of Chile]. Available at <www.chile.mid.ru/mre/e06_478.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 106 ����������������������������������� ‘Edinburgh Declaration of the OSCE ��������������������������������������� Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Thirteenth Annual Session’ [Online: Rt. Hon Bruce George MP], July 2004. Available at <www.rthonbrucegeorgemp.co.uk/pdfs/58.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008]. 107 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� For example, see Natalia Simorova, ‘OSCE Concerned Over Russians in Latvia, Estonia—FM’, TASS, 16 July 2004; Natalia Simorova, ‘Moscow Regrets Estonian FM’s Remarks About Russia’, TASS, 19 July 2004; ‘Russia’s Lavrov Again Slams Estonia, Latvia on Minorities’, Baltic News Service, 19 October 2004; Vitaly Kuchkin and Olga Levitskaya, ‘Latvia, Estonia Ignore OSCE Recommendations—Russian FM Official’, TASS, 22 November 2004. 108 ��������������������������������������������������������������� ‘OSCE Resolution Re National Minorities Not Harsh on Estonia’, Baltic News Service, 7 July 2004.

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other European institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled against Russian-speakers in the Baltics in decisions referred to by Kremlinaligned officials as ‘excessively politicised’ (that is, not pro-Russian).109 Moreover, the June 2006 decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) to end minority rights monitoring in Latvia brought a sharp rebuke from the Kremlin.110 These have been only some of the more recent setbacks for Russia’s attempt to bring Western international institutions to bare against Estonia, leading the Russian government to accuse them, in effect, of giving Tallinn a pass on its treatment toward its Russian-speaking minority. Specifically, the West is accused of being ‘timid’,111 participating in ‘indifference and connivance’ toward the Russian-speakers,112 and applying ‘double standards’ to Russia and the Baltics.113 This final accusation, of double standards toward human rights and democracy, is particularly interesting since Moscow itself has long sought to use international institutions to criticize others, but refuses to allow these same organizations to examine its deteriorating record on human rights and democracy. The touchiest subject for the Kremlin has been the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, where Russia has been accused of massive human rights abuses in the first (1994– 1996) and second (1999–2000) Chechen wars. The Kremlin has sought to portray these conflicts (especially the second war) as part of the international struggle against terrorism. According to reports, Russian and EU officials held talks on human rights in 2005 and, while Moscow repeatedly brought up the situation in the Baltics, ‘Russian officials again called the attention to their European partners to the fact that it is hopeless and counterproductive to speculate in the human rights

109 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Boris Gryzlov qtd. in Diana Rudakova, ‘Some Rulings of Human Rights Court Excessively Politicised’, TASS, 29 May 2006. Also see ‘Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding Examination in European Court of Human Rights of the Sysoyevs vs. Latvia Case’ [Online: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 9 July 2006. Available at <www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/BB84499C98376C7BC3257188004F3AA6> accessed 11 July 2008. 110 �������������������������������������� Yelena Volkova, ‘Moscow Bewildered by PACE’s ������������������������������������ Decision to Stop Dialog with Latvia’, TASS, 29 June 2006. 111 ����������������������������������������������������� Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko in ITAR–TASS, 22 November 2005, reproduced as ‘Russia Urges Europe to Stand Up for Russian Minorities in Baltic’, in BBCWM, 22 November 2005; Russia’s envoy to the EU, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, in Maria Danilova, ‘Official: Russia and EU Make Some Progress, But Obstacles Remain’, Associated Press, 19 December 2005. 112 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Russian envoy to the OSCE, Alexei Borodavkin, ‘Russia Envoy at OSCE for Objective Assessment of Events in Estonia’, TASS, 3 May 2007. 113 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, Kostantin Kosachev, in Lyudmila Alexandrova and Viktoria Sokolova, ‘Moscow Unhappy About RussianSpeaking Minority in Latvia, Estonia’, TASS, 9 November 2004; Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Valery Agarkov and Anna Kurbanova, ‘EU Protects Riga, Tallinn from Criticism Over Human Rights—FM’, TASS, 20 October 2005.

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situation in Chechnya’.114 Moreover, before the UNCHR, where he attacked the Baltics for their human rights policies, Fedotov accused those who criticize Russia for its policies in Chechnya of ‘[misusing] human rights rhetoric for justifying terrorists’.115 In addition to Chechnya, Russia’s minority rights policies—in the Mari El Republic (whose Finno–Ugric population are akin to the Estonians) have placed Moscow on the defensive, much to the seeming joy of Tallinn which has taken the opportunity to accuse Moscow of its own ‘double standards’.116 Finally, in a closed-door European Parliament meeting on human rights issues, Lavrov reportedly ignored the set agenda items and focused instead on the situation in the Baltics, while at the same time rejecting the legitimacy of any criticisms by the EU of itself or its allies as an attempt to impose Western values upon others.117 The Bronze Soldier Monument Row In 2007, the conflict between Russia and Estonia rose to a new level over the socalled Bronze Soldier monument. The short version of these events is as follows. In January 2007, the Estonian government approved the removal of a monument installed in the heart of Tallinn to commemorate the third anniversary of the Soviet Red Army retaking the country in 1944. The monument became a physical representation of the controversy over Estonian-Soviet historical memories: after Estonian independence, the statue became an important symbol for many Russianspeakers who saw it as an expression of the continuity between themselves, their Soviet past, and their current ties to Russia; by contrast, many Estonians saw the monument as a symbol of Soviet domination over their country and wanted it removed. When the Estonian government sought to move the monument (as well as the remains of Soviet soldiers buried on the site) to a military cemetery elsewhere in the city, days of mass protests, rioting, and looting erupted in late April 2007. Estonian police responded with force and one Russian citizen was killed—the reasons why a Russian citizen was involved in protests in Estonia and who killed him both remain unclear. Within days, the monument was moved and a rededication ceremony was held in time for Victory in Europe Day. The Russian government reacted harshly to these events and a Kremlin-aligned youth movement besieged the Estonian embassy in Moscow. In addition, government 114 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Alexandra Ursova, ‘Russia, EU Agree to Hold Regular Human Rights Consultations’, TASS, 2 March 2005. 115 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Sam Cage, ‘Treatment of Russian Speakers in Baltics in ‘Baltant Violation’ of International Standards’, Associated Press, 17 March 2005. 116 ���������� ‘European Parliament ������������������������������������������������������������ to Discuss Situation of Russia’s Mari Minority’, Baltic News Service, 10 May 2005; ‘Russian Ambassador to Estonia Defends Moscow’s Ethnic Minorities Policy’, Baltic News Service, 19 October 2005. 117  Eesti Paevaleht (Tallinn), 18 May 2006, reproduced as ‘Foreign Minister Lavrov Raises Issue of Russian Minorities in Estonia, Latvia’, in BBCWM, 23 May 2006.

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and private Estonian websites were flooded with denial-of-service attacks, which Estonian officials claimed were directed from the Kremlin and represented the first ‘cyberwar’. What is interesting about this series of events is that the rhetoric used by the Kremlin to attack Estonia represented the crystallization of the Russian government’s attempt to redefine the problems of human rights and democracy in the region. The Estonian government may easily be accused of having been insensitive, provocative, and acting in a politically-motivated manner.118 Nevertheless, the level of vitriol displayed by Russian officials was in no way proportionate to the actions of the Estonian government. The Russian response was so exaggerated that it had the effect of uniting the West behind Tallinn and unintentionally reminding those in the region of the stark differences between Russia and the democratic world. After passage by a two–thirds majority in the Estonian parliament in January 2007, President Toomas Hendrik Ilves signed legislation approving the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue to a military cemetery and the reburial of the Soviet soldiers. This sparked an immediate, negative reaction from the Kremlin and Kremlin-aligned politicians. Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee and United Russia member, called it ‘immoral’, ‘offensive’, ‘a desecration’, and ‘another chapter of the heroization of Nazism’.119 Other government officials used terms such as ‘blasphemous’120 and ‘monstrous’.121 A few days after the Estonian bill was signed, the Duma unanimously passed its own bill whose title alone, ‘On the Demonstration of Neo-Nazi and Revanchist Mood in Estonia’, made plain the feelings of the Russian legislature and tapped into Russian rhetoric about the liberal credentials of the Estonian government.122 Once the riots over the monument’s removal erupted, this rhetoric was taken to another level. Lavrov said that ‘the Estonian government has spat on values’ and the Duma called for diplomatic relations with Estonia to be broken off and the enactment of economic sanctions.123 Several Kremlin-aligned officials focused on what they considered Tallinn’s liberal democratic and human rights failings. 118 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� This last point is relevant because the vote to remove the monument came as the two main parties in Estonia’s ruling coalition were in a tight parliamentary election campaign. 119 ���������� ‘Estonian President ���������������������������������������������������������������� Signs Bill Allowing Removal of Controversial Red Army Statue’, Associated Press, 11 January 2007; ‘Russia Intends to “Defend” Remains of Soviet Soldiers in Estonia’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 January 2007. 120 ������������������������������������������������� Sergei Lavrov qtd. in ‘Russia Harshly Criticizes Planned ���������������������������� Removal of Red Army Statue in Estonia’, Associated Press, 16 January 2007. 121 ������������������������������������������������������������������� Russia’s ambassador to Estonia, Nikolai Uspenski, qtd. in ‘Estonia ��������� Provokes Storm with Soviet Statue Vote’, Agence France Presse, 15 February 2007. 122 ����������������������������������������� ‘Russian Lawmakers Criticize Estonia for Planned ������������������������������������� Removal of Red Army Statue’, Associated Press, 17 January 2007. 123 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Jari Tanner, ‘Estonia Removes Soviet Monument Amid Riots, Russian Warns of Sanctions’, Associated Press, 27 April 2007.

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For example, Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov said that the Duma was seeking ‘to attract attention to the challenging flouting of human rights in Estonia and demand the severest reaction from the international community’124 and Kosachev said that Western international organizations should take a stand against this ‘violation of elementary norms of human morals’.125 Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of the Federation Council’s International Affairs Committee, urged human rights organizations and democratic international institutions to ask the following question of the Estonian government: ‘May one speak about you sharing European values, common for all us Europeans—the supremacy of the law, human rights and democracy—while at the same time trying to defend yourselves with such barbaric methods? European values and barbarism are incompatible concepts’.126 A similar argument was expressed by Lavrov, who criticized the ‘cruel violence’ of the Estonian government and ‘expressed bewilderment over the absence of the proper reaction of the European Union to the actions of Tallinn that contradict European values and culture’.127 When taken in context, however, these comments emerge as little more than willful exaggerations and political rhetoric. On the one hand, the Estonian government neither destroyed the statue nor desecrated the remains of the Soviet soldiers buried at the monument. The site’s location was deemed inappropriate because of its central location in Tallinn and the emotions surrounding it. Regardless of one’s position on the history of Estonian-Soviet relations, the former prime minster of Estonia, Mart Laar, was correct in saying that it ‘was one of the most hated monuments in Estonia’.128 Since, as the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip said at the time, ‘monuments must unite people, but this monument in question is splitting the people’,129 the decision was made to move it somewhere more appropriate and less controversial. In addition, the remains of the soldiers were either reburied or returned to their families. Thus, it could not be honestly said that the actions of the Estonian government rose to the level of ‘blasphemy’. On the other hand, it is also important to reiterate that the action could be legitimately seen as insensitive and provocative toward the Russian-speakers, some of whom already perceived of themselves as being victims of discrimination. Nevertheless, while the Estonian government maybe should have been more concerned with 124 ��������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Duma Speaker Demands Severest Reaction to Estonia’s Actions’, TASS, 28 April 2007. 125 ���������������������� ‘Russian MP Calls for PACE ��������������������������������������� Debates on Situation in Estonia’, TASS, 28 April 2007. 126  Channel One Worldwide (Moscow), 28 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian Senator Calls for International Pressure on Estonia’, in BBSWM, 28 April 2007. 127 �������������������������������� ‘Russian-Estonian Row Ongoing’, Xinhua General News Service, 3 May 2007. 128 �������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Ex-Estonian Leader Suggest Baltic States, Russia Form Commission’, Associated Press, 4 May 2007. 129 ���������� ‘Estonian President ���������������������������������������������������������������� Signs Bill Allowing Removal of Controversial Red Army Statue’, Associated Press, 11 January 2007.

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the feelings of this minority, the Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen was also probably correct in writing that it ‘cannot be a human rights issue’.130 Certainly it was of an emotional symbolic nature, but moving the statue did not violate the fundamental rights or civil liberties of the ethnic minority population. If they had destroyed it, then the ethnic Russians and the Russian government may have had a legal or moral argument; but that simply did not happen. Moreover, the Russian government’s comments were more than ironic coming just weeks after the Kremlin’s heavy-handed crackdown on peaceful protests by anti-regime activists in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The protesters in Tallinn were far more violent than those in Russia and the Kremlin’s reaction to its own protesters was equal to or even more forceful than that of Tallinn. In addition to the events in Tallinn itself, the political crisis and rhetoric crossed into Russia. Kremlin-aligned youth groups (including Nashi and Young Russia) blockaded the Estonian embassy in Moscow for over a week and some activists even attempted to physically assault the Estonian ambassador when she tried to give a press conference at the offices of Argumenty i Fakty.131 One Russian newspaper criticized the Kremlin for allowing the protests against the Estonian embassy in clear violation of Russian domestic law and international law while, by contrast, cracking down on anti-government protesters just weeks before.132 In addition, a series of denial of service attacks—in which an internet site is flooded with hits in order to make it unavailable to viewers—were launched against Estonian websites. Estonian officials claimed (though could not confirm) that these attacks were from internet addresses connected to the Kremlin, making this possibly the first ever government-coordinated ‘cyberwar’.133 The outcome of these events was probably not as the Russian government had intended.134 The Kremlin’s claims about human rights abuses in Estonia only made the contrast between Russia’s official commitment to liberal democratic values 130 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Tallinn Memorial: Vanhanen Emphasises Non-interference, Kanerva Calls for EU Solidarity’, Helsingin Sanomat [Online], 30 April 2007. Available at <www.hs.fi/ english/article/1135226921208> accessed 11 July 2008. 131 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Jari Tanner, ‘Estonia Re-Erects Statue at Military Cemetery Amid Protests’, ����������� Associated Press, 30 April 2007; Maria Danilova, ‘Dispute Between Russia and Estonia Over War Memorial Heats Up in Moscow’, Associated Press, 2 May 2007. 132  Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 4 May 2007, reproduced as ‘Moscow Daily Says Estonian Embassy Siege “Shameful”, “Unlawful”’, in BBCWM, 4 May 2007. 133 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Mark Landler and John Markoff, ‘First War in Cyberspace: The Lessons of Estonia’, International Herald Tribune, 29 May 2007, 1; Joshua Davis, ‘Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe’, Wired Magazine [Online], 21 August 2007. Available at <www.wired.com/print/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia>, accessed 11 July 2008. 134 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Like many of the policies outlined in this book, Russian actions may have multiple objectives. In addition to placing the West on the defensive, the Kremlin likely also sought to give itself a political boost by appealing to nationalist emotions within the country and distracting ordinary Russians from problems at home.

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and the reality that much more stark. During this diplomatic row, Ilves visited Georgia to express solidarity with another democratic country also pressured by Russia. There he proclaimed, ‘Democratic countries should stay together’.135 In fact, this appeared to be the case: rather than placing it on the defensive, Russia’s response to the monument row united the West against what was perceived as an increasingly antagonistic and authoritarian Russia. For example, NATO countries expressed their deep concern with the Russian government’s inaction (or actions, given the link between the youth groups and the Kremlin) against the embassy of their fellow alliance member.136 Bush also made a powerful show of support for Estonia in the midst of the diplomatic crisis by announcing that he would welcome the Estonian President to the White House.137 The European Parliament, as well as individual EU members, called upon European countries to stand with Estonia against Russia.138 Finally, despite Russia blasting the human rights records of Estonia and Latvia as being ‘unacceptable and unworthy of Europe’ at a May 2007 Russia-EU summit,139 EU leaders, including the president of the EU, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, reportedly stood up to the Russian leader, despite a previous pattern of reluctance to confront Russia on human rights issues.140 Conclusion Russia’s rhetorical defense against regional democratic trends has assumed two forms: advancing the concept of sovereign democracy as a way to undermine the legitimacy of external criticism and diverting attention away from itself by criticizing the liberal democratic credentials of others. Although both have been presented as promoting a liberal agenda—creating the ideological basis of democracy in Russia and supporting human rights abroad—these are based upon fundamental misrepresentations or exaggerations. The Russian government’s assertion that its right to define its own democratic institutions is under threat from outside is not accurate. It is a truism that every 135 �������������������� ‘Georgian, Estonian Presidents ������������������������������������������������������������ Vow to Stand Together Against Russian Rhetoric’, Associated Press, 7 May 2007. 136 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘NATO Statement on Estonia’ [Online: North Atlantic Treaty Organization], 3 May 2007. Available at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-044e.html>, accessed 11 July 2007. 137 ���������������������������������������������������� ‘Bush to Host Estonian Leader Amid Russia Dispute’, Agence France Presse, 4 May 2007. 138  Ekho Moskvy Radio, 11 May 2007, reproduced as ‘Russian MP Criticizes EU Resolution Defending Estonia’, in BBCWM, 11 May 2007. 139 ������������������������������������������������������������������ Dario Thuburn, ‘EU, Russia Clash over Democracy at Volga Summit’, Agence France Presse, 18 May 2007. 140 ����� Anne Penketh, ��������������������������� ‘Merkel Rounds on Putin ��������������������� over Arrest of Protesters’, ������������� The Independent (London), 19 May 2007, 3.

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democracy will look and function in a distinct way, based upon historical, cultural, and institutional differences. If one examines the leading democracies in the current international system (the US, United Kingdom, France, India, Japan, etc.), none of them are the same and in fact some of them are radically different (e.g. the level of political centralization in the British House of Commons would be completely unacceptable to Americans who emphasize checks and balances), though they all recognize each other as liberal democracies and respect the diversity of democracy. There is no universal form of democracy that is advanced by the West. In fact, Bush directly addressed this issue at the June 2006 G-8 summit: ‘I fully understand, however, that there will be a Russian-style democracy. I don’t expect Russia to look like the United States’.141 What is asserted by democratic powers, however, is that all countries which want to be considered democracies should follow certain rules: free and fair elections, a free press, substantive checks on power, etc. Those states which are engaged in a transition to democracy will live up to these standards to a certain degree, but will be moving toward greater freedoms and political competition. In Russia, just the opposite is occurring. External criticisms of the Kremlin’s governing style are not based upon a desire to make Russia look like every other democratic country, but are made precisely because it is moving away from the very principles it espouses. Russia’s ‘form’ of democracy has become less and less democratic over time, regardless of how many times the Kremlin asserts that it is in fact democratic. Ultimately, the ‘sovereign’ component of sovereign democracy does not stand for the Russian people’s right to determine their own political future, but rather for the Kremlin’s right to determine Russia’s political future. A similar thing can be said about the Russian government’s criticisms of the West generally and Estonia in particular. While there is always room for improvement in every country’s human and minority rights policies, a difference must be made between those governments which have made a fundamental commitment to liberal democracy and those which have not. Clearly, the Kremlin has steadily shifted toward the second category. By contrast, although there remain problems with integrating Russian-speakers into its political system, Estonia has made this commitment. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has persisted in condemning others while resisting any scrutiny of itself. Like its assertion of the democratic nature of sovereign democracy, no matter how many times it accuses Tallinn of gross human rights abuses, it does not change the fact that Estonia is far freer than Russia. However, the ultimate purpose of these policies is not to accurately reflect reality, but rather to obfuscate the differences between democratic and authoritarian states. Authoritarian regimes often seek to manipulate the language of democracy to place democratic countries on the defensive and weaken their resolve to promote democracy abroad. The proliferation of what Ivan Krastev (2006: 52) calls democracy’s ‘doubles’—‘regimes that claim to be democratic and may look 141 ������������������ ‘Remarks by Bush, ��������������������������� Putin at News Conference’, Associated Press, 15 July 2006.

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like democracies, but which rule like autocracies’—is part of this trend. Russia’s Potemkin democracy, with is uncompetitive elections, impotent legislature, meaningless multiparty system, and the veneer of open political debate, is a clear example.

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Chapter 6

Bolster: Russian Support for Authoritarianism in Belarus

A revolution in Belarus is a revolution in Russia. Alexander Lukashenko

One of the key means by which regional democratic trends are spread is through example. The fall of an authoritarian regime shows those in nearby states that such an event is possible. If a pattern of democratic transitions forms, this could provide a sense of momentum and inevitability which could further energize prodemocracy forces. However, if a regime is able to maintain its hold on power in the face of democratic revolutions in nearby countries, it is possible that this demonstration effect might be muted and any sense of momentum halted. Therefore, it is in the interests of authoritarian leaders to undermine the spread of democracy by helping like-minded regimes through a strategy of bolster. By providing assistance, the bolstering country is reinforcing the ability of the target state to resist regime change and therefore complements the latter’s own strategy of insulate. A clear example of this in practice is Russian policy toward Belarus. Belarus is an important country for Russia. It lies at the easternmost border with the democratic states of Europe and is perhaps the closest to Russia in terms of culture, religion, and language. In addition, its foreign policy orientation has been decisively pro-Russian and its slide toward authoritarianism under the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko foreshadowed Putin’s consolidation of power. Therefore, ‘losing’ Belarus to democracy would have dramatic reverberations in Russia and significant consequences for the Kremlin. As a result, despite serious problems in the personal relationship between Lukashenko and Putin, Russian support for Belarus has been extensive. The fact that Russia continues to help Belarus despite these problems illustrates just how important the survival of the Lukashenko regime is to the Kremlin. Although this pattern of support preceded the color revolutions, it intensified in the period 2004–2006, when there was the most danger to Lukashenko, and receded after the March 2006 Belarusian presidential election, when it became clear that, at least in the short-term, the president was firmly in power.

  Centre TV (Moscow), 11 July 2005, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Vows to Resist Political Change’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports [BBCMIR], 11 July 2005.

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This chapter examines how Russia has sought to bolster or reinforce the government of Belarus. It begins with a brief overview of Russia–Belarus relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subsequent sections thematically cover the Kremlin’s support for the Lukashenko regime by focusing on the ways in which this support counters those forces which have traditionally been seen to promote democratization: conditionality, diffusion, and integration. Although Moscow should not receive sole credit for Lukashenko’s survival, Russian policy has helped sustain authoritarianism in Belarus. These sections cover Russian policy through 2006. Following these sections is an overview of how the tensions from mid-2006 to the present, in part precipitated by a row over natural gas, have affected Russia–Belarus relations. The conclusion of this chapter posits the future of the Lukashenko regime and how Russian interests will be affected by political change in Belarus. Russia–Belarus Relations Russia–Belarus relations are deeply connected to the national identity of the respective countries and peoples (Kuzio 2003). For Russia, the near simultaneous development of the state, nation, and empire led Russian national identity to have a strong imperial content, which was later reinforced by the Soviet Union. Consequently, the development of a Russian identity based upon the nation– state of the Russian Federation has been weak, when compared to the notion of reintegrating at least parts of the former Soviet Union. Belarus is seen as the country closest to the Russians, and it constituted one of the three components (along with Ukraine) of Kievan Rus’. Therefore, it seemed only logical that the eastern Slavs should be joined together; this became the ‘imperial default’ for many Russians (Kuzio 1998: 227). Similarly, it is widely accepted that Belarus’s national identity as a nation-state is extremely weak (Marples 1999, Ioffe 2003). From the elimination of its cultural elite under Stalin, to its rapid urbanization, as well as the russification and de-ethnization of communist ideology, Belarusian national identity was the most ‘Soviet’ and pro-Russian in nature. A separate Belarusian existence does not have a firm foundation in the public consciousness and rejoining Russia has widespread support. Consequently, the pattern of Russia– Belarus relations in the post-Cold War period has been a reflection of the ebb and flow of various reunification proposals.

 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Given the birth eastern Slavic identity in Kiev, Ukraine is sometimes seen as the closest national cousin to Russia. However, there has been a push for a level of cultural and historical separation from the ‘Great Russians’ amongst many Ukrainians in the western part of the country. This has not been the case amongst most Belarusians. In fact, it has been argued that Belarus is a ‘denationalized’ nation which looks more to Russia (and the Soviet Union) for its identity than inward at its own culture and history.

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The first moves toward reintegrating the two states began under former Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. In September 1993, the Belarusian government, along with nine former Soviet republics, signed a framework agreement on establishing a ‘ruble zone’ and economic union. This was followed by a bilateral Monetary Union Treaty signed by Kebich and his Russian counterpart in April 1994. Given the widespread popularity in Belarus for reunification, Kebich sought to use this treaty to boost his popularity in the runup to the July 1994 presidential election (Danilovich 2006: 36–7). While this was popular, it was not enough to overcome his otherwise poor performance as prime minister. Consequently, Alexander Lukashenko, who was against the idea of union, assumed the presidency in 1994 on the basis of an anti-corruption platform. Upon taking power, however, Lukashenko reversed course and became a steadfast supporter of Soviet nostalgia and reunification with Russia. In 1995, he held a referendum restoring the Soviet-era flag and state symbols, as well as making Russian an official language. Attempts to expose the USSR’s bloody past were immediately halted. In addition, a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation with Russia was signed. Actual moves toward establishing a full union between the two states began in April 1996, during the Russian presidential campaign. In order to undercut nationalist and communist candidates, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty with Lukashenko creating a ‘Community’ between Russia and Belarus. This document called for political and economic integration and the creation of a number of supranational institutions, symbols, and an anthem. Although ratified by both legislatures, the treaty was quite ambiguous and disagreements over the pace and nature of integration were not resolved. Nevertheless, a second treaty, signed a year later, upgraded the Community to a ‘Union’ and sought to strengthen joint institutions. One of its chief aims was the ‘consistent progress toward voluntary unification’. As a result of this treaty, the Parliamentary Assembly of Belarus and Russia opened in Kaliningrad and passed a number of draft laws and resolutions. Moreover, a Union budget was adopted and a commission was established to harmonize laws between the two countries. Nevertheless, progress was glacial and many provisions of the 1996 and 1997 treaties were simply not implemented. Further agreements and treaties, including a pledge by both sides in 1999 to ‘deepen’ the Union and set a timetable for reintegration, have not been able to overcome very serious disputes over both the conception and implementation of union. The central problem has been one of structure: Would Belarus and Russia achieve union as ‘equals’ or would the former, which is many times smaller than Russia in terms of its economy, population, and landmass, be subordinate to the latter? Under the first formulation, supported by Lukashenko, Belarus would retain its sovereignty and have an equal say over union policies. By contrast, most Russian officials believe that Belarus should simply join the Russian Federation   ITAR–TASS, 23 May 1997, reproduced as ‘Text of Russia–Belarus Union Charter’, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts [BBCSWB], 26 May 1997.

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as one or more federal units, as expressed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in August 2002. In addition, a huge impediment to unification has been the political ambitions of the two presidents. At home, Lukashenko has used the idea of the Union to increase his popularity and to distract the population from his increasingly authoritarian governing style and unreformed economy. However, it was also widely thought that his support for reunification was actually a cover for his larger political ambitions: Lukashenko, who was quite popular in Russia and had assumed a larger presence in Russian politics in the late 1990s, reportedly thought he could achieve political dominion over both Belarus and Russia by succeeding the ailing Yeltsin, if the two countries were merged. This idea ended abruptly when Yeltsin resigned and Putin became president. Putin’s leadership style does not allow for political rivals and he has seen Lukashenko as a threat. Moreover, unlike Yeltsin, Putin’s high level of popularity has meant that he has not had to use the prospect of reintegration for domestic political purposes. Consequently, he has sought to slow down the pace of reintegration—his August 2002 statement was seen as an attempt to make Lukashenko an offer he had to refuse. As a result of these disputes, the Russia– Belarus Union has not been established in any substantive form. In addition, a series of natural gas disputes damaged relations in recent years. This has caused Lukashenko to occasionally flirt with the West, but his continued authoritarianism has left him with few options for a shift in foreign policy orientation. Despite all of this, the prospects for Russian-Belarusian reunification remain alive. Neither side appears willing to scuttle it completely. Although he has often attempted to recast himself as a nationalist defending Belarusian interests against Russian encroachments, Lukashenko’s popularity and legitimacy ultimately rests upon the prospect of reintegration with Russia. Furthermore, this notion remains popular in Russia, even if the Kremlin itself is less enthusiastic about it. Despite political discord between Moscow and Minsk, Putin has continued to support Lukashenko politically and diplomatically, and has not sought to legitimize the Belarusian opposition. Moreover, Putin has not pressured Lukashenko to democratize, nor has he cut off all subsidies for Belarus, both of which have had the effect of propping-up the Lukashenko regime. In addition, Putin has continued to support the idea of reunification rhetorically, commenting in his April 2007

 ������������������������������������������� This followed a June 2002 meeting in which Putin ������������������������������������� criticized plans for a unified parliament and argued that Russia’s economic interests would take precedence over any merger plans. Andrei Zolotov Jr., ‘Putin Surprises With Belarus Plan’, Moscow Times, 15 August 2002.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The exception to this is in regards to military integration, which has continued apace and has resulted in the de facto military subordination of Belarus to Russia (Deyermond 2004, Martinsen 2002).

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state-of-the-nation address that ‘Russia is open to any forms and models of integration’. Russia–Belarus relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been mixed. The Union is far more on paper than a reality. Moreover, tensions between the two states have gotten worse in recent years, with both sides at times launching barbed attacks against the other. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s policies toward Minsk has helped authoritarianism persist in Belarus. The following sections illustrate how these policies have protected the Lukashenko regime from the democratic trends in Europe by providing Belarus with an alternative to Western integration and the means to resist Western pressure. Conditionality Democratic states attempt to spread democracy to authoritarian regimes most often through conditionality: a process by which a mix of benefits and punishments are offered to a nondemocratic government in hopes of precipitating a democratic opening. The United States, as well as European institutions such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE), have tried to bring Belarus’s increasingly authoritarian political system in line with democratic principles through policies which seek to isolate Minsk and apply pressure along diplomatic, political, economic, and strategic/military lines. In some cases, they have actively aided opposition groups within Belarus. However, Russian policy has alleviated Western pressure by providing the Lukashenko government with an alternative source of support in each of these areas. Diplomatic The diplomatic isolation of Belarus is focused on excluding it from the Western community of states. The Bush administration has been particularly harsh in its rhetoric toward Minsk, calling it an ‘outpost of tyranny’ and the ‘last true dictatorship in the center of Europe’. In October 2004, the US passed the Belarus Democracy Act, which imposed sanctions upon Belarus and funded opposition groups in the country. Its explicit aim was to foster regime change. Since then, the White House has continued to isolate Minsk through public statements, and Bush administration officials have met repeatedly with anti-Lukashenko opposition forces in order to raise their profile and to show American support for their struggle.

  RTR Rossiya (Moscow), 26 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Putin Delivers Annual Address to Parliament—Full Text’, in BBCMIR, 27 April 2007.  ����������������������������������������������������� Guy Dinmore, ‘US Aid for “Blue” Belarus Opposition’, Financial Times, 4 June 2005, 7.

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By contrast, the EU has been more willing to pursue a policy of engagement. However, it too has openly criticized the Lukashenko regime’s policies as detrimental to the country’s European identity and has helped fund the democratic opposition in Belarus (Korosteleva 2002: 60–61). An attempt to engage Belarus was made in 1999 through an offer of conditional incentives if the Lukashenko regime followed democratic procedures for the upcoming elections. These ultimately failed as the elections remained marred with corruption. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, stated before the European Parliament that Belarus’s political system placed it outside ‘the family of European nations’. In a paper released in 2006, the EU referred to the people of Belarus as the ‘first victims’ of their country’s isolation. These statements were in line with the EU’s broader Belarus policy: in late 1996 and early 1997, following the fraudulent November 1996 referendum which granted Lukashenko nearly unlimited power, the EU abandoned steps toward a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus (making it the only country in Europe without such an agreement), suspended ministerial contacts, and froze nearly all aid programs to the country. Moreover, in the summer of 1998, senior Belarusian officials were banned from entering EU territory (Guicherd 2002: 319). The list of Belarusian officials on the so-called ‘visa ban’ has steadily increased over time. Poor EU–Belarus relations makes the completion of a trade agreement impossible, meaning that bilateral trade remains governed by an outdated 1989 agreement between the EU and the USSR. Other European institutions, such as the OSCE and the CoE have attempted to influence Belarus’s political system (Wieck 2002). The OSCE Troika issued a strongly worded statement criticizing the November 1996 referendum, and the organization created an ‘Advisory and Monitoring Group’ to promote democratization in Belarus and allocated financial support for Belarusian groups to monitor the Lukashenko regime and its policies. Since then, the OSCE’s primary role in promoting democratization in Belarus has been to condemn the conduct of Belarusian elections, which have been consistently flawed. In January 1997, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE suspended the Special Guest status of Belarus’s National Assembly and Belarus was not invited to the CoE’s October 1997 summit. In fact, Belarus is the only country in Europe which is not a member of the CoE. Like the OSCE, the CoE has repeatedly condemned Belarus’s flawed election results and CoE officials and bodies have continuously called for democracy in Belarus and lent moral support to opposition forces.

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Political Situation and the Independence of the Media’ [Online: European Union], 5 July 2005. Available at <ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ news/ferrero/2005/sp05_417.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘What the European Union Could Bring to Belarus’ [Online: European Union]. Available at <ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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Although Belarus has been effectively exiled from the West because of Lukashenko’s policies, this is not the case with its eastern neighbor. Russia has not sought to isolate Belarus or put any serious pressure on the Lukashenko regime to democratize. Just as important has been Putin’s willingness to provide Lukashenko diplomatic cover in response to Western criticisms of Belarus’s fraudulent elections. Parliamentary elections in October 2000 and March 2001 solidified Lukashenko’s power and increased Belarus’s international isolation. Nevertheless, the Kremlin refused to follow Western calls to punish the regime for its actions. Later, in the aftermath of the September 2001 Belarusian presidential election, which European institutions universally pronounced unfair and fraudulent, Putin telephoned Lukashenko and congratulated him on his ‘convincing victory’.10 A similar pattern occurred after the October 2004 elections, which included a referendum allowing Lukashenko to run for president an unlimited number of times and a parliamentary election in which opposition parties failed to win a single seat. Again, Western institutions and countries were unanimous in their rejection of the legitimacy of both votes, while the Kremlin disregarded Western criticisms and recognized the fraudulent elections. Pavel Borodin, the Russia– Belarus Union State Secretary and a close Putin ally, also declared the votes legitimate and framed Western criticism as a reaction to the process of BelarusRussia unification.11 Igor Ivanov, secretary of the Russian Security Council and former foreign minister under Putin, gave a lengthy defense of the conduct and outcome of the referendum.12 Official Russian observers echoed these comments and the Russian Foreign Ministry called the vote ‘transparent’.13 Later, the Kremlin opposed American sanctions imposed against Belarus under the Belarus Democracy Act.14 Without the Kremlin’s support, it would have been far more difficult for Lukashenko to brush off Western disapproval. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the Russian government became more strident in its defense of the regime in Minsk. For example, Putin moved quickly to support Lukashenko in April 2005 by meeting with him in the Kremlin the day after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Belarusian opposition figures, during which she stated that it was ‘time for change to come to Belarus’.15 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected Rice’s comments: 10 �������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Congratulates Lukashenko on His Re-election: Kremlin’, Agence France Presse, 10 September 2001. 11 ������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference with Russia and Belarussia Union State Secretary Pavel ������ Borodin’, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 19 October 2004. 12 �������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Security Council Secretary Invites Respect for Popular �������������������������� Will Expressed at Referendum in Belarus’, RIA Novosti, 1 November 2004. 13 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Andrew Jack and Tom Warner, ‘Putin Blesses Favoured “Near Abroad” Candidates’, Financial Times (London), 20 October 2004, 3. 14 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Condemns US Decision to “Sanction” Belarus over Referendum’, Agence France Presse, 21 October 2004. 15 ������������������������������������������ ‘Analysis: Rice and “Change” in Belarus’, UPI, 21 April 2005.

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‘We would not, of course, be advocating what some people call regime changes anywhere … We think the democratic process, the process of reform cannot be imposed from outside’.16 Russia’s support for Belarus at this time of increasing American pressure was considered so important that Lukashenko publicly thanked Putin and Lavrov ‘for the immense support we received from them in a very complex period of our history as an independent state’.17 He even made jokes about Rice’s statement, seemingly secure in his knowledge that he had the Kremlin’s backing.18 Two months later, Russia rejected out of hand a CoE recommendation that its relationship with Belarus be conditioned on the regime’s records on human rights and civil liberties.19 Rather than follow the Western lead in isolating Belarus, Moscow appeared willing to oppose the West by maintaining its extensive bilateral relations with the pariah state. In the run-up to the March 2006 presidential election, Russian officials came out in favor of Lukashenko and opposed to any attempt to pressure Belarus. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made it clear that Russia would not depart from its support of the regime. In a statement during the 42nd International Conference on Security Policy in early February 2006, Ivanov identified Lukashenko as ‘the most popular politician in Belarus. Whether you [the West] like it or not’, and issued an ominous warning to opponents of the regime in Minsk: ‘We treat negatively a flare-up of disorders after the elections and believe it is necessary to do [our] utmost to prevent them’.20 This statement indicated that Moscow would not countenance a color revolution in Belarus. Later that month, other Russian officials came out in support of Lukashenko and opposed to any attempt to pressure the Belarusian regime. During a meeting with his Belarusian counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized the West for attempting to dictate political standards to Belarus and warned against attempting a ‘regime change’ in the country.21 In response, the Belarusian Foreign Minister Syarhey Martynaw thanked Russia for its support and claimed that ‘it is on the western front that we encounter our biggest problems, including the intent to influence processes taking

16 ����� Ibid. 17 �������� Mikhail Petrov, ��������������������������� ‘Lukashenko Thanks Putin ���������������������������������������������� for Supporting Belarus in Int’l Arena’, TASS, 22 April 2005. 18  RIA News Agency, 22 April 2005, reproduced as ‘Belarusian Leader Arrives in Moscow, Laughs off Criticism from Rice’, BBCMIR, 22 April 2005. 19  Interfax, 27 June 2005, reproduced as ‘Russia to Ignore PACE Recommendations in Dealing with Belarus’, in BBCMIR, 27 June 2005. 20 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� Sergei Babkin and Sergei Latyshev, ‘Russia Takes Negative Attitude to Possible ��������� Disorders in Belarus’, TASS, 5 February 2006. 21  RIA Novosti, 27 February 2006, reproduced as ‘Russia Warns Against Attempts at “Regime Change” in Belarus’, in BBCMIR, 27 February 2006.

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place within our country’.22 This theme of external pressure on Belarus’ political system was common for Belarusian officials in the weeks before the vote.23 In the aftermath of the election, international observers resoundingly criticized the manner of the vote.24 Opposition candidates were restricted from effectively campaigning, anti-Lukashenko rallies were dispersed by Belarusian security services, and the regime tightened its near monopoly on the Belarusian media. Both the US and the EU threatened Belarus with additional sanctions for its refusal to allow a free and fair vote. Russia, however, resisted these diplomatic moves. Observers from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) attacked ‘the biased claims and harsh evaluations’ of Western countries and denied that there were any ‘systematic or widespread’ irregularities, calling the vote ‘free, open, and transparent’.25 The Russian Foreign Ministry came to the same conclusions as the CIS observers.26 Through 2006, the Kremlin continued to provide diplomatic legitimacy to the Lukashenko regime. In a statement before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Lavrov called upon the CoE and the EU to ‘engage’ Minsk without preconditions.27 This had the effect of undermining Western attempts to isolate Belarus and legitimize the pro-democracy opposition. As seen in the next section, the Kremlin also sought to help Lukashenko more directly by reinforcing his stature in Belarus itself. Political Besides diplomatic isolation, the democratic states of the West have attempted to apply political pressure on the Lukashenko regime through democracy assistance programs and direct appeals to the Belarusian people. The Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 appropriated American money for radio and television broadcasts into Belarus, as well as aid to pro-democracy political parties and exile groups. In 2005 alone, some $11.8 million was spent by the US to fund non-regime civil society groups (Shepherd 2006: 76). As stated above, Rice met with regime opponents in April 2005, and, in February 2006, Bush met with the wives of Lukashenko opponents who had disappeared (and are presumed dead) in order 22 ����� Ibid. 23  Belapan News Agency (Minsk), 21 February 2006, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Accuses West of Blackmail’, in BBCMIR, 21 February 2006. 24 ������������������������������������������������ Maria Danilova, ‘European Observers Say Belarus Presidential ������������������������������� Vote Neither Free Nor Fair’, Associated Press, 20 March 2006. 25  Belarusian Television (Minsk), 20 March 2006, reproduced as ‘CIS Observers Praise Belarus Poll’, in BBCMIR, 20 March 2006. 26 ������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Russian Foreign Ministry Says Belarusian Elections Clean’, RIA Novosti, 20 March 2006. 27  ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2006, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Minister Addresses PACE Session in Moscow’, in BCCMIR, 29 May 2006.

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to boost their profile and express American support for their attempt to find out the truth about their husbands. The US has also worked especially closely with Belarus’s neighbors, Lithuania and Poland, to promote democracy in Belarus. For its part the EU has appealed directly to the Belarusian people with pledges of support, direct assistance, and closer ties should Belarus become a democracy.28 Starting in fall 2006, the EU also began funding its own broadcasts into Belarus through Deutsche Welle (Tapiola 2006: 68). Moreover, at recent US–EU summits, Washington and Brussels issued repeated resolutions supporting democracy in Belarus and condemning the Lukashenko regime. While these resolutions represented the growing diplomatic isolation of Belarus, they also appealed directly to the Belarusian people to support regime change. The Kremlin found a solid, if troublesome, ally in Lukashenko and sought to ensure that he remained in power through positive intervention in Belarus on his behalf. This policy was less a show of support for Lukashenko himself, than a move based upon a fear that, if he were deposed, Belarus would move toward democracy and possibly a foreign policy realignment westward like Ukraine and Georgia. In fact, the political considerations of keeping the status quo in Belarus overrode personal animosity between Putin and Lukashenko. For example, the Lukashenko regime had come under growing domestic and international pressure following his refusal in 1999 to accept the original termination date for his first term.29 In response, the Kremlin rushed to his aid by making the case to the Belarusian people that he was crucial to ensuring reintegration between Russia and Belarus.30 This was seen as so important that the Belarusian opposition called upon Yeltsin and then-Prime Minister Putin to end their support because it was having the effect of strengthening Lukashenko’s regime.31 This was rejected. The Kremlin’s policies during the October 2000 and March 2001 Belarusian parliamentary elections were reactive. Rather than openly supporting Lukashenko before the election, Putin sought to assuage any anger by the Belarusian people over elections which were widely (outside of Russia, of course) seen as fraudulent. For example, after the first round of voting, Putin called Lukashenko to congratulate him on his electoral ‘victory’ and to invite him to a summit at 28 ������������������������������������������������������������ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Approach to Democracy ���������� Promotion in Post-communist Countries’ [Online: European Union], 19 January 2007. Available at <www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6708_en.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008. It should be noted, however, that the EU’s actions have been meager, however. 29 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Under the 1994 constitution, Lukashenka’s term was supposed to end in 1999. However, this was changed at his behest through a questionable 1996 referendum. 30  Russian Public TV, 4 June 1999, reproduced as ‘Russian Premier and Belarusian President Talk of Friendship and Cooperation’, in BBCWM, 4 June 1999; Belarusian Radio First Programme, 20 July 1999, reproduced as ‘Russian Deputy Prime Minister Visits Belarus, Hails Union of Two States’, in BBCWM, 20 July 1999. 31  Belapan, 20 October 1999, reproduced as, ‘Opposition Calls on Russia to Stop Supporting President Lukashenka’, in BBCSWB, 22 October 1999.

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the Russian president’s official dacha near Sochi.32 At the summit, Lukashenko thanked Putin for his support. In the subsequent Belarusian presidential election in September 2001, the Kremlin took a more proactive role (Danilovich 2006: 122). For example, Putin openly supported Lukashenko and a number of visits from prominent Russian officials at the Kremlin’s behest helped to boost Lukashenko’s domestic support. Furthermore, Russian television stations, which are broadcast into Belarus and watched by many Belarusians, avoided negative reports on Lukashenko and devoted nearly all of their coverage to a positive portrayal of the Belarusian president (Timmermann 2002: 292). After the election, Putin cooled toward Lukashenko. His August 2002 comment that Belarus should simply join Russia marked a significant downturn in relations between the two regimes. This was reversed in 2003–2005 as a result of increasing Western criticism of Russian policies, Belarus’s brief (but unrequited) flirtation with foreign policy realignment, the imposition of the Belarus Democracy Act, and the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (Trenin 2006b: 80). During this period, Putin regularly met with Lukashenko, conferring upon him political legitimacy and recognizing his important role in Russian politics. Moreover, given the widespread popularity in Belarus of both the Union project and Russia itself, Putin’s meetings with Lukashenko further helped to reinforce the latter’s domestic standing. In July 2005, for example, the two presidents met to discuss moving the Union forward. This represented their sixth meeting in 2005 alone.33 There appeared to be some wavering in the Kremlin’s policy toward the Belarusian regime just prior to the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. In Putin’s annual press conference for international journalists in late January 2006, the Russian president was circumspect in response to a question about Russia’s support for Lukashenko.34 Nevertheless, fears of a color revolution in Belarus forced the Kremlin to support Lukashenko regardless of the difficulties between the two regimes. For example, Russian state-controlled television portrayed Lukashenko in a positive light and dismissed the legitimacy of the opposition.35 A little more than a week before the vote, these same stations ran stories which openly criticized the Belarusian opposition and leveled charges against Ukrainian, Georgian, and Western governments for interfering in Belarus’ internal affairs.36 Around the same time, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov met publicly with 32  RIA News Agency, 16 October 2000, reproduced as ‘Putin Invites Belarusian President to Sochi’, in BBCSWB, 17 October 2000. 33 �������� Mikhail ���������������������������������������������������� Petrov, ‘Putin, Lukashenko to Discuss Union State’, TASS, 20 July 2005. 34  RTR Russia TV (Moscow), 31 Janurary 2006, reproduced as ‘Putin’s Annual News Conference for International Journalists—Full Text’, in BBCMIR, 1 February 2006. 35 ��������������������������� ‘Russian State TV Suggests Qualified �������������������������������������������������� Backing for Lukashenka Ahead of Belarus Poll’, BBCMIR, 28 February 2006. 36 �������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian TV Highlights Attacks on Opposition Ahead of Belarus Poll’, ������� BBCMIR, 7 March 2006.

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Lukashenko, conveyed Putin’s greetings to the Belarusian president, and praised the two presidents for their work together on the Russian-Belarus Union.37 During this meeting, Fradkov all but endorsed Lukashenko for a third term: It’s vital to synchronizing our actions in the economic field and integration processes. This will be in line with the political expectations of the Belarusian people in connection with the presidential election … I’m sure that the people of Belarus will make the correct choice—the one that promotes cooperation between our countries and the union of the two states.38

In addition, it was announced that Belarus would pay far less for its natural gas imports than Ukraine—contrasting the benefits provided to a cooperating, proRussian government in Minsk with the Kremlin’s punishment of an uncooperative, pro-Western government in Kiev.39 In the aftermath of the election, the Kremlin again sought to calm the Belarusian people and legitimize Lukashenko’s fraudulent victory. Putin publicly congratulated Lukashenko and expressed his hope that both sides could now make ‘real progress’ on the Russian-Belarus union state.40 In April, Putin hosted his Belarusian counterpart in St. Petersburg and again praised his reelection, calling on the opposition to accept the electoral outcome.41 Without the Kremlin’s support, it would have been far more difficult for Lukashenko to perpetrate his consistent electoral fraud. Economic Belarus is also economically isolated in Europe. The US and the EU have imposed restrictions on financial aid to the country and EU–Belarus trade is hampered by the lack of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Although neither the US nor the EU has imposed comprehensive economic or trade sanctions against Belarus, there have been long-standing discussions within European capitals over the possibility of tying economic relations with Belarus to its acceptance of Western values.42 On 21 June 2007, the EU expelled Belarus from its Generalized System 37 ��������������������� ‘Lukashenko, Fradkov Plan ��������������������������������������������������� to Agree on Further Union State Cooperation’, TASS, 7 march 2006. 38  ����������������������������������������������������������������� Pyotr Netreba, ‘Putin and Fradkov Endorse Alexander Lukashenko’, Kommersant, 9 March 2006, 2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B) (Russia), 9 March 2006. 39  Gazeta (Moscow), 9 March 2006, reproduced as ‘Russian Paper Views Gas Pipeline’s Role in Moscow-Minsk Politics’, in BBCMIR, 10 March 2006. 40  Interfax, 20 March 2006, reproduced as ‘Putin Greets Belarusian President-Elect’, in BBCMIR, 20 March 2006. 41 ������� ‘Putin ���������������������������������������������������������� Praise for ‘Dictator’ Stokes Russia-West Row on Belarus’, Agence France Presse, 28 April 2006. 42 ����������������������������������������������� ‘“Oppose Fresh Lukashenko Term”, Says Report’, European Report, 14 May 2005; PAP News Agency, 19 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Polish Opposition Wants Cabinet to

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of Preferences trading program, a decision which cost Belarus approximately €400 million per year.43 However, this move was largely ineffective because of the pattern of West-Belarus economic relations over the past decade. In general, trade between the West and Belarus is far less than what should normally be for a country of Belarus’s size, level of industrialization, and geographic location. Structural problems within Belarus’s manufacturing base and the noncompetitiveness of Belarusian products on the world market limit the ability of Belarus to export to the West. A lack of hard currency also prevents Belarus from importing many products from the West. Moreover, in terms of trading partners, Belarus’s economic fate is much more closely tied to Russia that to the West. Belarus ranks third (after Germany and Italy, and equal to Ukraine) among Russia’s trading partners and, for Belarus, Russia is responsible for 50–60 per cent of its total trade as well as 90 per cent of its energy supplies.44 By contrast, Belarus’s trade with the entire EU is approximately half that of its trade with Russia.45 The trading relationship between Belarus and Russia is also imbalanced in Belarus’s favor: it largely imports fuel and raw materials from Russia and exports finished goods (Ioffe 2004: 93). As a result, the opportunities for the West to use economic pressure against the Lukashenko regime are limited. In addition to its trading relationship, Russia has been instrumental in sustaining the Lukashenko regime through economic assistance. Without it, Belarus’s unreformed economic system would simply not be able to survive: not only did Lukashenko reverse even the modest economic reforms made by his predecessor, but he returned to a neo-socialist model of state economic control, ranking among the bottom of post-communist states in overall progress in economic reform. Russian assistance has come in two forms: energy subsidies and beneficial trading relations.46 Russia heavily subsidized supplies of oil and natural gas to Belarus, selling them at prices well below market values. This, in turn, boosted Belarus’s standard of living and helped the Belarusian manufacturing sector because Belarusian exports to Russia were made more competitive in terms of pricing. Furthermore, Russia cancelled much of Belarus’s debt, largely accrued from energy imports. Overall, Russian subsidies have accounted for some 20 per cent of Belarus’s gross domestic product (Åslund 2002: 182). In addition, the Russia– Raise Belarus Issue at EU Forum’, in BBCWM, 19 May 2005. 43 ����������������������������������������������������������� Andrew Rettman, ‘Belarus Joins Burma as EU Trade Outcast’, EUobserver, 21 June 2007. 44 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Timmermann, ‘The Union of Belarus and Russia in the European Context’, 285. Also see Republic of Belarus: Statistical Appendix, International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 05/218, p. 42. 45 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Belarus’ [Online: European Union], 15 September 2006. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008. 46 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� World Bank, ‘Belarus: Addressing Challenges Facing the Energy Sector’, June 2006, v. Also see IMF, ‘Republic of Belarus: 2006 Article IV Consultation’, August 2006, Country Report No. 06/314.

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Belarus customs union, a product of the reunification process, has helped Belarus far more than Russia, given the differences in size and markets. Finally, Belarus has been allowed to use barter rather than currency in its dealings with Russian businesses, thus permitting it to export far more of its own products than it would under a competitive trading relationship. Russia–Belarus economic ties have helped Belarus maintain a relatively high standard of living when compared with other countries in the former USSR. Its economy (measured by GNP) has grown an average of 6.6 per cent from 1995– 2005 and in recent years the economy has grown at approximately 9 per cent.47 Moreover, its level of inflation has been reduced dramatically48 and its rating on the United Nations Human Development Index remains high relative to the other former Soviet republics (except for the Baltic states).49 All of this has made it significantly easier for the Lukashenko regime to maintain its hold on power and keep some level of mass popularity. It is important to note that the Belarusian economy has not been reformed to allow for market-based efficiencies, economic decentralization, or international competition. Moreover, with the exception of Russian moves to purchase an increasing stake in Belarus’s energy sector, Belarus has very low levels of foreign direct investment and no access to international capital markets.50 Consequently, Belarus’s economy has been maintained almost entirely through Russian largesse. Strategic/Military The eastward enlargement of NATO has further isolated Belarus. Although the Alliance has a smaller membership than either the CoE or the EU, NATO expansion to 26 countries represents the de facto strategic and military alignment of Europe under one organization. More importantly, the Alliance borders to the west and north of Belarus. With the clear desire by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to seek NATO membership, Belarus may soon find itself surrounded by NATO countries on three sides. While other European countries are not part of NATO (Austria, for example, borders six Alliance members), these states extensive political and economic ties with other Alliance members, such as through the EU. While it is highly unlikely (if not impossible) that Russia will ever join NATO, it does have a special relationship with the alliance under the NATO–Russia Council. By contrast, even if it were interested in joining, Belarus would be ineligible due to the Alliance’s requirements that a state must be committed to democratic values in 47 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Belarus at a Glance’ [Online: World Bank], 12 August 2006. Available at <devdata. worldbank.org/AAG/blr_aag.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008. 48 ����� Ibid. 49 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Human Development Report, 2007/2008’ [Online: United Nations], 230. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008. 50 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� World Bank, ‘Belarus: Window of Opportunity to Enhance Competitiveness and Sustain Economic Growth’, 8 November 2005, report No. 32346-BY.

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order to be considered. Therefore, Belarus’s relationship with NATO places it out of the mainstream of European security policy. Without its close military alliance with Russia, Belarus would be strategically and militarily isolated on the continent. Belarus’s overall level of cooperation with NATO has been relatively low.51 Instead, Lukashenko has been a fierce critic of the alliance, calling it an ‘insidious and horrible monster’, and he took the lead in opposing NATO expansion during its first and second post-Cold War rounds.52 He also promoted Belarus as the defender of the western border of the Slavic–Orthodox peoples who, he claimed, are under direct threat from Western ambitions (Rontoyanni 2000: 81). In September 2006, Lukashenko proclaimed Belarus’s willingness to ‘die for Russia’ should NATO tanks begin ‘rolling … to Russia’.53 Although this rhetoric has been toned down at times, Belarus’s relationship with the Alliance is not positive. Belarus’s close alliance with Russia, however, prevents its complete strategic and military isolation. The military relationship between Russia and Belarus began in July 1992 with a host of military agreements. These ties were deepened significantly following Lukashenko’s shift toward authoritarianism and an eastward-focused foreign policy. The absence of any real conflict on a series of military issues—such as denuclearization, the status of Russian troops in Belarus, the leasing of military facilities to Russia—has allowed for additional agreements and treaties to be signed between the two countries. In fact, bilateral military integration has proceeded much further than economic or political reunification, to such a point that Martinsen (2002: 401) has argued that Belarus has been effectively transformed ‘into a Russian military outpost’. Belarus’s importance to Russian security has been made explicit in Russia’s national security concepts and military doctrines since the late 1990s. Consequently, Belarus is effectively shielded from any attempts by the West to forcibly promote regime change, in the unlikely event that it should choose to do so. Belarus’s relationship with Russia has also allowed Lukashenko to portray his country as an important part of the global move to ‘balance’ the US and its allies, often referred to as promoting global multipolarity to counter American unipolarity (Ambrosio 2005: 104–17). This became especially important after the unilateral, American missile attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan (August 1998), the US-British air strikes against Iraq (December 1998), and the war against Serbia over Kosovo (Spring 1999). Lukashenko’s language was not too distant from that emanating from the Kremlin. After a slight lull following the 9/11 51 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Interestingly enough, however, Belarus is a member of the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and even participated in a NATO peacekeeping exercise in June 2005 as well as other small operations in 2006. 52 ���������������������������������������������������� Allexander Feduta, ‘Lukashenko Looks East For Aid’, Moscow News, 17 March 1999, 10. 53 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Though it is highly unlikely that he asked the Belarusians’ opinion on this matter. Belarusian Radio, 29 September 2006, reproduced as ‘Text of Belarusian President News Conference for Russia Regional Media’, in BBCMIR, 29 September 2006.

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terrorist attacks, Russian support for multipolarity rebounded and has continued through to the present, as demonstrated by Putin’s denunciation of the evils of an American-led unipolar world at a European security conference held in Munich in February 2007.54 By continuing its close relationship with the Belarusian regime, the Kremlin supplied Lukashenko with a rhetorical tool to portray Belarus as playing a significant role in the international system, despite its isolation on the European continent. Russian policy toward Belarus provides Minsk with de facto military protection, an integrated alliance system, and a degree of status not shared by other former Soviet republics; it prevents Belarus’s strategic and military isolation in Europe. This has reinforced Russia’s diplomatic, political, and economic support and has helped Minsk resist Western pressures. Diffusion The process of diffusion is not merely about geographic proximity. Instead, it is most effective when there already exists a conception of the state as part of a larger community or civilization: countries are more likely to be subjected to a norm cascade from countries are like them in terms of their regional identity. Nowhere is this more powerful than in Europe, which has long had a collective identity as ‘European’, even if the boundaries and content of such an identity has changed over time (Lowenthal 2000, Leontidou 2004). In the post-Cold War period, this has been tied closely to the values of human rights and democracy. Built into this idea is the notion of a state’s ‘degree of Europeanness’—while not all democratic states are European, there is a strong assumption that all truly European countries are democracies (Moisio 2002: 97). Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, a dominant theme for East European states has been the desire to ‘return to Europe’—that is, to rejoin the European community of peoples from which they were estranged during the period of Soviet domination (Hagen 2003). For nearly all countries in geographically-defined Europe, this was not an issue: the manner in which they presented themselves reflected both a historical narrative of being ‘European’ and a commitment to ‘European values’, including democracy. Thus, it is important to look closely at the language and rhetoric of state leaders who seek to define their respective countries as either European or not.

In some cases, such as Ukraine, the definition of a state’s identity remains contested (Kuzio 2001). The 2004 election pitted those who sought a closer relationship with Europe against those who wanted a closer relationship with Russia. The ultimate victory of western-focused Viktor Yushchenko over eastern54 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Shada Islam and Leon Mangasarian, ‘Putin Slams US, NATO for Threatening Global Security’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 February 2007.

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oriented Viktor Yanukovych was also a victory for those who, like Yushchenko, believed that ‘[Ukraine’s] road to the future is the road followed by united Europe. Together with its nations we belong to the same civilization and share the same goals. History, economic prospects and the interests of the people give a clear answer to the question of where our future lies. Our place is in the European Union. Europe holds Ukraine’s historic chance to fulfill its potential’.55 Yushchenko’s language contrasts sharply with that used by Lukashenko to define Belarus. The official Belarusian national concept is that it, along with Russia, belongs to a separate civilization than Europe—one that is Slavic and Orthodox. The East’s values, according to this conception, are fundamentally different than those of the West. Consequently, the regional trends evident in the West hold little in the way of an example for Belarusian political, social, or economic development. This thinking has many similarities to the Slavophile ideology of imperial Russia. The Slavophiles argued that the Westernizers were wrong in ignoring Russia’s history, culture, and contributions to humanity. In essence, Russia had retained what the West had lost: its soul. Russian culture and social arrangements were superior to the West because they were based upon organic collectivism and the true Orthodox Christian faith—in contrast to the Western values of capitalism, rationality, and individuality, all of which leave humanity mired in spiritual poverty. Russia represented a unique civilization whose soul was under siege from alien (Western) forces and influences, introduced by Peter the Great’s reforms. They desired to return Russia to its pre-Petrine roots and based their model society on that of the peasants, who were seen as uncorrupted. The supranational and imperialist Pan–Slavism movement in Russia, which aimed to unite the Slavs against the West, developed out of the Slavophile ideology (Kohn 1953). The possibilities of a Russia–Belarus Union state reinforce these trends by providing Belarus with a clear choice in identities between ‘Europe’ and the ‘East’. In a June 2003 interview, Lukashenko discussed his belief in the distinctiveness of the ‘Eastern European civilization’, which includes the Slavic countries of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and the role that Belarus has in defending it: We have just been following our own path, and this path has taken us to a situation where we have kept alive the sacred things characteristic of this Eastern European civilization in the hearts, souls and minds of our people. This civilization has always been here. We have held on to these features. We have preserved all the best and most treasured traits that have been passed down for centuries. Belarusians have preserved them. We have not discarded them.56 Looking to the West, rather than to Russia, would be disastrous for Belarus: ‘Belarus’s westward drift would be tantamount to breaking away from the Eastern Slavic civilization, where the country belongs … In the West [we] would be in 55  UT1 (Kiev), 23 January 2005, reproduced as ‘Ukrainian President Addresses Nation after Inauguration’, BBCMIR, 23 January 2005. 56  STV (Minsk), 30 June 2003, ‘Text of Belarusian President’s Interview Ahead of Independence Day’, BBCMIR, 1 July 2003.

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the subordinate, and not commanding position. Following in the footsteps of the Baltic countries would be very wrong’.57 Lukashenko has also mixed this idea of civilizational separateness with one of a fundamental conflict between the Western and Orthodox civilizations and the desire of the West to impose its values upon the East.58 In a speech on Orthodox Easter in April 2006, Lukashenko identified ‘uniform foreign standards’ (by which he meant Western values) as anathema to the Belarusian people, and claimed that these standards would ‘destroy our moral and spiritual values and bring evil, violent discord, permissiveness and sinful passions for gain and violence instead of the good to society’.59 This conflict between civilizations also became part of his criticisms of the “color revolutions”, which he believed were being imposed on the East by Western powers. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Lukashenko called the color revolutions ‘plain banditry disguised as democracy’ in his state-ofthe-nation address.60 More recently, during his Victory Day speech in May 2007, he reiterated his conception of the West imposing its beliefs and undermining Belarusian values.61 The pattern of looking toward Russia, rather than Western Europe, has also been grounded in widespread nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Prior to the communist period, Belarus was among the poorest regions in Europe. After World War II, and massive Soviet investment in the devastated (and territorially enlarged) republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was a showcase for Soviet manufacturing and economic development. Despite the serious economic problems throughout the rest of the USSR during the Gorbachev period, the Belarusians emerged in the best shape of all the former Soviet republics (with the exception of the Baltics), with a more balanced economy than the others. This instilled a high level of pride in Soviet achievements and further reinforced the connection between Soviet and Belarusian identity. Lukashenko capitalized on these feelings by reintroducing Soviet symbols at the expense of uniquely Belarusian ones—for example, the white–red–white flag of the post-Soviet period was replaced by a version of the republic’s Soviet flag. Moreover, the touchstone for the Belarusian historical myth was changed from the declaration of state sovereignty in July 1990 to the July 1944 liberation of Minsk by the Soviet army (Eke and Kuzio 2000: 527). Sovietera textbooks and historiography were reintroduced into the Belarusian schools 57 ����������������������������������� Larisa Klyuchnikova, ‘Ten-year-old Policy ��������������������������������������� of Russia–Belarus Union Correct— Lukashenko’, TASS, 23 September 2004. 58 ���������������������� Yury Svirko, ‘Russian Patriarch, ������������������� Belarus President �������������������������������� Call for Slav Union’, Agence France Presse, 27 June 2001. 59  Belarusian Radio, 23 April 2006, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Speaks out Against Foreign Influence in Easter Speech’, in BBCMIR, 23 April 2006. 60  Belarusian Television, 19 April 2005, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Delivers State-of-Nation Address’, in BBCMIR, 19 April 2005. 61  Belarusian Television, 9 May 2007, reproduced as ‘Belarus President Addresses Participants in Victory Day Festivities’, in BBCMIR, 9 May 2007.

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and the glorification of the Soviet period became official state policy. These moves were precursors to the Soviet nostalgia promoted by Putin upon assuming the Russian presidency. By focusing on the Soviet Union, Lukashenko perpetuated the Soviet mindset of East versus West, further alienating Belarus from European trends and identity. Moscow’s support for the Russia–Belarus Union has had the effect of reinforcing these notions. The ‘Eastern’ foundation of the proposed union was evident in April 1996 when the signing ceremony of the Community treaty was blessed by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Alexiusi II.62 Similarly, the Patriarch honored Lukashenko in 2001 with the first ever ‘Christian Orthodox Unity’ award.63 After the March 2001 parliamentary election in Belarus, Putin honored Lukashenko with the Russian Order ‘For Services to Fatherland’ in April 2001 for his support for the reunification of Belarus and Russia.64 While this award may be a small matter in and of itself, it was important symbolically in that it implied Belarus’s identity lay eastward, since the ‘fatherland’ was indeed Russia. The entire Union project itself, and Russia’s continuing support for his eastward identity orientation, legitimized Lukashenko’s definition of Belarus as an ‘Eastern’ rather than ‘European’ country. This stands in sharp contrast to nearly all other East European states, which have defined themselves as integrally connected to West European culture, trends, and identity. Without feeding this alternative identity, it would have been far more difficult for Lukashenko to separate Belarus from the European community of nations. Instead, the regime would have come under increasing pressure to follow the desires of the anti-Lukashenko opposition, who define Belarus as a fundamentally European country which should adhere to the principles of democracy and human rights.65 Thus, by feeding a sense of Belarusian separateness from Europe, Russian policy has effectively undermined the degree to which democratic regional trends are perceived as applying to Belarus. Integration The role of integration in promoting democracy in the European setting is closely tied to the process of diffusion because of the overlap between the EU as an international organization, on the one hand, and its values and European 62 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Andrei Shtrokh, ‘Russia, Belarus Sign Agreement on Deeper Integration’, TASS, 3 April 1996. 63 ������������� ‘Belarussian President ������������������������������������������������� Lukashenko Gets Orthodox Unity Award’, RIA Novosti, 23 January 2001. 64 ���������� ‘Vladimir Putin ����������������������������������������������������� Awards Russian Order to Alexander Lukashenko’, RIA Novosti, 2 April 2001. 65 ������������������������������������������������������� ‘Belarus Opposition Figure Advocates European Course’, BBCMIR, 1 November 2004; ‘Opposition Leaders Pay Pre-Election Visit to Brussels’, European Report, 29 May 2004.

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identity, on the other. The primary attractiveness of EU membership lies in the widespread belief that there is no legitimate alternative to a ‘return to Europe’. This is epitomized in most European states by joining the organization.66 If EU membership is seen as necessary for the well-being of one’s country, then it is more likely that politicians will advance, and populations will embrace, an agenda which increases the chances for membership. The criteria for membership developed by the EU ‘requires that [a] candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (Moisio 2002: 96). Therefore, as states prepare themselves for EU consideration, they will adjust their political system to conform to EU requirements—namely, the consolidation of democracy. However, if a country rejects EU membership, then its prospects for integration will have little to no impact. As seen in this section, Lukashenko has promoted the notion that EU membership will be harmful to Belarus’s well-being and that the alternative (integration with Russia) is a more attractive option. For the regime in Minsk, the EU represents the worst of the Western values of crass materialism and unchecked capitalism, as opposed to Belarus, which represents the spiritual values of the East. This message is promoted through the state-controlled media in Belarus and, as a result, only a small part of the Belarusian population blames Lukashenko for their current economic problems (Zolnikov 2002: 137). Moreover, according to Lukashenko, the aftermath of EU expansion has caused serious ‘problems’ for new members, including ‘[difficulties for] peasants, unemployment, competition, competitiveness, and more’—all of which Belarus should avoid by merging with Russia.67 Given these perceptions of the EU, membership in the organization is simply not an option for the Lukashenko regime. Lukashenko has made it very clear that he does not wish to relinquish his hold over society or accede to EU rules.68 More importantly, however, the regime and (seemingly) the population itself are simply unwilling to undertake the economic reforms required for membership. Short-term economic stability (in terms of pensions, salaries, employment, etc.), rather than long–term economic reform and structural change, became the accepted mantra of Belarusian society (Ioffe 2004: 89). Thus, EU membership would be too painful

66 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� There are obviously several European states which feel comfortable in their European identity without being compelled to join the EU—for example, Norway and Switzerland. However, nearly all of the East European states, with the exception of Belarus and Russia, have been admitted to the organization, are in the official queue for membership, or are seeking to join. 67  Belarusian Radio, 20 July 2004, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Hails Results of His 10 Years in Office’, BBCMIR, 20 July 2004. 68 ������������ ‘Belarusian President ����������������������������������� Scolds Estonia, Latvia’, Baltic News Service, 23 September 2004.

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and ‘expensive’ for Belarus to undertake.69 Even if it were to apply, Brussels would not accept Belarus because of its unreformed economy and authoritarian government. The ‘Belarusian model of development’, as Lukashenko described it, stands in opposition to Western-style capitalism and market economics, and avoids ‘throw[ing] unprepared people into the market abyss’.70 It emphasizes state control over the economy and has been described as ‘a Soviet theme park’ which ‘establish[es] a Soviet-type model, without a Communist party’ (Åslund 2002: 173). For example, large state firms account for some 80 per cent of Belarus’s gross domestic product and have not been privatized; moreover, the collective and state farm system has been preserved, unlike any of the other former Soviet republics. Its state sector is not profitable and the business climate in Belarus is extremely poor.71 According to an IMF report, ‘the current macroeconomic policy mix is ultimately unsustainable’.72 Painful structural reforms have been avoided only by Russian subsidies and beneficial trading relations. If the two countries were to merge, Belarus would presumably be able to purchase its energy supplies at Russian domestic prices, which are far below world market values and even less than Belarus’s subsidized price. It is assumed that integration with Russia would be beneficial to Belarus, or at least far less painful than westward integration. According to one poll, support for integration with Russia (62 per cent) was far greater than for integration with the EU (15–18 per cent) (Guicherd 2002: 320). Lukashenko argued that one of the cornerstones of the Belarusian model was integration with Russia, largely because of the potential benefits for Belarusian society, but more importantly because ‘[n]obody is waiting for us in other markets’.73 There seems little point in attempting to look westward since Belarus, in its current form, will not be accepted. Therefore, it is believed that the country’s future lies eastward. Without a change in Lukashenko’s thinking or in public sentiments, it is unlikely that the incentives of EU integration will be sufficient to entice a democratic opening in Belarus. The EU represents not only economic reform, but also Western-style democracy. As criticism of his ruling style increased, Lukashenko’s rhetoric against the West became more and more hostile, and he increasingly contrasted Western values and 69  Alexander Lukashenko qtd. in ����������������������������������������������� Larisa Klyuchnikova and Andrei Fomin, ‘Belarus Does Not Plan to Join EU’, TASS, 14 February 2003. 70 ���������������� ‘Address by the President ������������������������������������������������������������ of the Republic of Belarus A.G. Lukashenko at the Final Plenary Meeting of the Standing Workshop of High-level Officials of the Republican and Local Administration’ [Online: President of Belarus], March 22, 2002. Available at <www.president.gov.by/en/press13375.print.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. [Hereinafter, Lukashenka, ‘Address’.] 71 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Zuzana Brixiova, ‘Economic Transition in Belarus: Achievements and Challenges’, International Monetary Fund, 9 June 2004. 72 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� International Monetary Fund, ‘Republic of Belarus: Selected Issues’, 28 June 2005, Country Report No. 05/217, 19. 73 ���������������������� Lukashenka, ‘Address’.

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conceptions of democracy with those in Belarus. For example, he attacked ‘foreign models of liberalism’ and defended a uniquely Belarusian model of democracy, based upon Belarusian values.74 The ‘Belarusian model’ concept, while largely economic, is also ‘sociopolitical’ in nature.75 As Lukashenko explained during the 2002 Independence Day celebrations, ‘The wise Belarusian people, having lived through the first several years of independence in a state of lawlessness, rejected foreign proposals. They chose their own consistent and evolutionary path, all the while maintaining law and order and avoiding conflict and strife—holding to the path of peace and creative labour’.76 In reality, this ‘model’ places a heavy emphasis on social stability based upon a direct relationship between the people and their president to create a populist, patrimonial, and president-dominated state. Of course, this comes at the expense of any real opposition. Nevertheless, Lukashenko defended his country’s political system as unique and in line with Belarus’s collectivist approach to politics. This ‘model’ of political development was not too distant from Putin’s notion of a ‘managed democracy’, both of which stand in sharp opposition to Western notions of liberal democracy. In contrast to the EU’s membership requirements, the Kremlin has not made progress on the Russia–Belarus Union dependent upon democratization in Belarus. Instead, the dueling political interests of the two presidents, and not the nature of political reforms in the two countries, has precipitated the current halt in substantive reintegration. Nevertheless, the proposed Union provides Belarus with an alternative to the EU. Without at least the prospect of integration with Russia, Belarus would come under increasing pressure to choose between two, very stark choices: complete isolation in Europe or integration with the EU. The latter would require political and economic changes which would be disastrous for the regime and would almost definitely see Lukashenko himself removed from power and possibly subjected to criminal charges. By having the option of looking eastward, there is less need to undertake the painful reforms necessitated by seeking EU membership. After the Belarusian Presidential Election Relations between the Putin and Lukashenko regimes have been rocky since Yeltsin stepped down as Russia’s president. The fraternal ties between the two countries were definitely frayed as problems over the scope and pace of reintegration, as well as the political ambitions between both presidents, emerged. Putin’s policy toward 74  Belarusian Radio, 14 April 2004, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President Delivers State-of-Nation Address’, in BBCMIR, 14 April 2004. 75  Belarusian Radio First Programme, 11 April 2000, reproduced as ‘Belarusian President’s State-of-the-Nation Address to Parliament’, in BBCSWB, 14 April 2000. 76 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Belarusian Leader Hails National Development in Independence Day Speech’, BBCMIR, 2 July 2002.

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Minsk has been torn between its desire to assume greater control over Belarus and fears that Moscow’s policies may provoke a backlash which would undermine the Lukashenko regime and precipitate a color revolution in Belarus. The highpoint of relations between the two occurred during the March 2006 Belarusian presidential elections. However, this support was merely tactical and based on the political expediency of ensuring that Lukashenko remained in office. Once it was evident that the threat of regime change had passed, the underlying tensions flared up, causing a rupture in relations during late 2006 and spring 2007. At the core of the recent dispute is Gazprom’s announcement in mid-2006 that it would significantly increase the price Belarus pays for natural gas from $46.68/1000m3 to a figure four times that price.77 Gazprom, Russia’s primary energy exporter, is effectively state-controlled and consequently operates as an agent of the Kremlin and its interests. This was not the first time that Moscow and Minsk faced a serious dispute over natural gas prices: in 2002 and 2004, Gazprom attempted to gain control over Belarus’s transmission lines which go from Russia, through Belarus, and on to Europe, by threatening price increases (Nygren 2007). A deal signed in 2004, which gave Gazprom a greater stake in the Belarusian gas pipeline company Beltranshaz, was set to expire at the end of 2006. In 2006, Gazprom’s price for continued energy subsidies was control over Beltranshaz. Lukashenko refused, threatening Russia with a ‘break-up of all relations’ rather than give up control over Beltranshaz or pay world market prices for natural gas.78 Some had predicted a second ‘gas war’, like that in Ukraine in January 2006.79 Eventually, a deal was struck close to midnight on New Year’s Eve, just hours before Gazprom had threatened to cut off natural gas to Belarus. Despite this agreement, however, the energy dispute continued. Russia imposed a tariff on oil exports to Belarus. Belarus retaliated by imposing a new transit tax on Russian oil moving through the country to Europe and, when this tax was not paid, reportedly siphoning off oil in lieu of payment. Eventually, these oil shipments were cut off and a war of words erupted between Moscow and Minsk. Consequently, relations between the two states were seriously harmed with Lukashenko stoking anti-Russian sentiments in Belarus and seeking to balance Russia through a newfound alliance with Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko.80 In early January 2007, for example, Lukashenko proclaimed that Russia was attempting to take over Belarus and that ‘we can only rely on ourselves 77 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Anna Skornyakova et al., ‘Lukashenko Is Being Readied for a Hostile Takeover’, Kommersant, 12 May 2006, 1, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B) (Russia), 12 May 2006. 78 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Minsk Threatens to Sever Russian Ties Over Gas Row’, Agence France Presse, 29 September 2006. 79 ���������������������� Sebastian Smith, ‘“No Progress” �������������������������������������������������� in Countdown to Russia–Belarus Gas War: Russia’, Agence France Presse, 28 December 2006. See Chapter 7. 80 ����������������������������������������������������� Svetlana Gamova et al., ‘Lukashenko Goes For Broke’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 January 2007, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 10 January 2007.

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… the most important thing for all of us, is our sovereignty, nothing is dearer to us than that’, and ‘we will never allow any one to dictate terms to us’.81 The Kremlin appeared to believe that it had left Lukashenko with no choice other than to surrender to Russian demands or risk losing power.82 In response, Lukshenka sought a third option: look westward. In late January 2007, Lukashenko stated that Belarusians wanted to be ‘willing pupils’ to Western Europe and, in mid-February, he went further by proclaiming that Belarus is not only a European country, but ‘at the center of the civilized world’ and was interested in joining the EU.83 These statements seemed to indicate how far Lukashenko was willing to go, at least rhetorically, in his break with Russia. It quickly became clear, however, that Lukashenko was in no way willing to reform his country’s political and economic systems, nor were there any positive signs from Brussels that Belarus would even be considered for closer relations absent these reforms. Therefore, Minsk had no option other than to return to an eastward foreign policy orientation. Moreover, there appeared to be a softening toward the Belarusian regime on the Russian side, seemingly out of a fear that they had pushed Lukashenko too far.84 Consequently, the rhetoric emanating from both countries returned to a more positive footing and expressions of support for the idea of reintegration. This was particularly evident in mid-March when Lukashenko rejected an offer from an opposition leader to align forces against Russian ambitions; Lukashenko also ended his brief flirtation with a westward realignment.85 Instead, Russia and Belarus signed a series of economic agreements in the latter half of March. The following month, Russia was willing to discuss a stabilization loan of some $1.5 billion for Belarus.86 This culminated in Lukashenko’s Easter speech in which he proclaimed that the Belarusians and ‘the brotherly Russian people’ would face their mutual threats together.87 At the end of the year, Lukashenko and the outgoing Putin held a meeting during which Russia continued its policy of exporting natural gas to Belarus at well below market

81 �������������������������������������������������������������������� Korshak, ‘Once Fraternal Russia and Belarus Count down to Cut Off’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 January 2007. 82 �������������������������������������������������������� Mikhail Rostovsky et al., ‘A Slavic Farewell Demarche’, Moskovsky Komsomolets, 11 January 2007, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 11 January 2007. 83 ������������������������������������� ‘Belarus Ready to Be West’s “Willing Pupil”: ��������������������� Lukashenko’, Agence France Presse, 25 January 2007. 84 ��������������������������������������������� ‘Russia’s Strategic Course Towards Belarus’, TASS, 21 March 2007. 85 ������������������������������������������������������ Mikhail Zygar and Vadim Dovnar, ‘Alexander Lukashenko Prepares ������������ an Unfavorable Day for the Opposition’, Kommersant, 15 March 2007, 9, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 16 March 2007. 86 �������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia, Belarus Sign Economic Relations, Sugar Supply Agreements’, TASS, 23 March 2007; ‘Russia Still Pondering Stabilization Load for Belarus’, TASS, 6 April 2007. 87  Belarusian Television (Minsk), 8 April 2007, reproduced as ‘Belarus President Stresses Ties with Russia, Own Strength in Easter Speech’, in BBCMIR, 8 April 2007.

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prices, despite the rise of energy prices worldwide.88 Also agreed to were the final details on the stabilization loan, which Belarus would be able to repay over fifteen years. It appears that, once again, Russia was willing to assist the Lukashenko regime sustain its separation from the West. Conclusion Given the political dynamics in Europe, which have seen nearly every former Soviet-bloc state in the region make the transition to some substantive form of representative government, Belarus and Russia stand together as bastions of authoritarianism on a continent of democracies. Russia’s unique situation (in terms of its size, natural resources, political culture, and geopolitical status) has made it easier for the Kremlin to resist these trends. However, it is highly improbable that the Lukashenko regime could have survived in its current state without Moscow’s extensive assistance. Lukashenko’s power and position appear to be secure, with little effective opposition within the country, and it is also able to withstand external pressures. This could easily change if Russia’s support of Lukashenko ended. However, for the foreseeable future, this appears unlikely because the political status quo in Belarus remains in the Kremlin’s interests. Although the bilateral problems of recent years have not been fully resolved, there are indications that Russia has chosen stability over withdrawing its support for Lukashenko and precipitating a leadership crisis in Belarus. If Lukashenko were to fall, there would be two likely outcomes. First, the collapse of the regime could lead to a democratic opening like that seen in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The main opponents to Lukashenko have made it clear that they wish to bring Belarus into the European fold, with a corresponding Western political, economic, and possibly strategic alignment. This could be a disaster for the Kremlin: not only would they lose their closest ally, but it might provide an impetus to opponents of authoritarianism in Russia. Thus, Lukashenko’s fall, even if gratifying from a personal standpoint, is likely not in the political interests of the Russian regime. The second outcome is that Lukashenko could be replaced by someone within his ruling circle who would maintain his policies and authoritarian governing style. A relatively painless transition, like that in Turkmenistan after President Niyazov’s December 2006 death, may result in a beneficial outcome for the Kremlin, which would be rid of the often troublesome Lukashenko. Niyazov did not groom a successor and used personal populism, rather than institutions, to govern; Lukashenko has followed a similar pattern, though not with such an extreme cult of personality. Therefore, if Niyazov could be succeeded with a minimum of political instability, the replacement of Lukashenko with a similar, 88 ������������������������ The price was $119/1000m3, lower than Russia sells to anyone and even lower than Turkmenistan sells to Russia itself. Ruslan Gorevoi, ‘Gifts for a Dictator’, Versiya, 24–30 December 2007, 10, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 25 December 2007.

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more pro-Moscow leader, might appear possible. However, there are reasons for not being too optimistic. Unless Lukashenko mysteriously and suddenly dies (which, of course, is a possibility, given the recent spate of possible political assassinations of Kremlin opponents), removing the incumbent president will probably be a difficult and potentially brutal affair which could leave the succeeding regime too weak to survive, possibly leading the country toward chronic instability and resulting in the first outcome identified above. Consequently, concerns over the potential political aftermath of Lukashenko’s fall from power are likely to give the Kremlin pause before withdrawing its support. This is not to say that the political interests are the only ones driving Kremlin policy toward the Lukashenko regime. Belarus remains Russia’s closely ally and represents a military/strategic bulwark against Western (in particular, US and NATO) expansion to the east. As one Russian commentator put it, ‘We have lost Ukraine and if we now lose Belarus, in a certain period the North Atlantic alliance will be standing along the full length of our western borders … This is an issue of prestige and security’.89 In this context, ‘losing’ Belarus referred to the possibility of a color revolution and precipitating a definitive shift toward the West. Moreover, the symbolism of Belarus’s alignment with Russia is also key: reintegrating parts of the former Soviet Union into some form of an interstate political entity would begin to reverse what Putin in April 2005 called ‘the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ and a ‘genuine tragedy’.90 While the recreation of the former USSR is seen almost universally as impossible, a union with Belarus would restore a level of great power and imperial status to Russian national identity. However, a color revolution in Belarus would make it more likely that the Belarusians would seek to integrate with the EU, rather than Russia. Thus, the political interests of the Kremlin in ensuring the survival of authoritarianism in Belarus, its military/ strategic interests in the country, and the symbolic value of the possibilities for a Russia–Belarus Union converged into a policy of consistent and broad-based support for the Lukashenko regime and authoritarianism in Belarus.

89 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Russian NGOs to be Brought under Financial Control’, RIA Novosti, 29 June 2005. 90 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Putin: Soviet Collapse “Greatest Geopolitical Catastrophe” of 20th Century’, Associated Press, 25 April 2005.

Chapter 7

Subvert: Undermining Democracy in Georgia and Ukraine

I’m sure that Russia will recognize the benefit of having democracies on her borders. George W. Bush

The color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine represented a reversal of political trends in the former Soviet Union. They were hailed in the democratic West as free expressions of the will of the people, but seen as particularly dangerous to the remaining autocratic regimes in the region as the spread of revolutions from Georgia (Rose), to Ukraine (Orange), to Kyrgyzstan (Tulip) raised the prospect of democratic contagion which could threaten their rule. Fears that the ‘orange virus’ might reach into the Russian Federation prompted the Kremlin to take a harder line at home and abroad against pro-democracy forces. Rather than recognizing the benefit of having democracies along its borders, as the quote above optimistically predicted, Russia became concerned about the domestic implications of the political dissimilarity between itself and its neighbors. In a seeming effort to subvert democratization along its borders, the Kremlin has adopted increasingly antagonistic policies toward Georgia and Ukraine, including a variety of economic, political, and diplomatic pressures. Because a successful democratic transition in close proximity represents an ever-present symbolic threat of the possibility of regime change, the strategy of subvert has a clear logic to it: if a new democracy fails or is seen as worse than the regime it replaced, then the pattern of regional democratic trends could be halted or reversed. Within the context of Georgia and Ukraine, this strategy makes even more sense. The color revolutions resulted not only in democratic changes, but fundamental shifts in their foreign policy orientation toward the West. For example, the presidents of both countries have expressed their desire to join the European Union (EU) and, more ominously for Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Most analysis on Russia’s reaction to NATO expansion has rightly focused on the strategic level—that is, how alliance enlargement will be perceived as threatening Russia’s national security, state interests, and geopolitical standing (Black 1999, Smith and Timmins 2001, Monaghan 2006). However, NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine also has important domestic implications. Alliance membership for Georgia and Ukraine would help consolidate democracy  �������������� ‘Bush Salutes ���������������������������������� Pro-Democracy Revolt in Georgia’, Agence France Presse, 10 May 2005.

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in the former Soviet Union and reinforce the symbolic value of the color revolutions. Both of these would heighten the potential domestic threat of regional democratic trends for the Kremlin. Since the Atlantic Alliance requires applicant states to be democratic, undermining or delegitimizing democracy in Tbilisi and Kiev would bring multiple benefits to Russia: not only would the negative political effects of the color revolutions be reversed, but, since nondemocratic states cannot join NATO, the strategic dangers of NATO expansion would also be counteracted. Therefore, in addition to exploring Russian policy toward Tbilisi and Kiev, it is also necessary to consider how possible NATO enlargement acts as a potential political threat to the Kremlin. This chapter begins with an overview of Russia’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine before the color revolutions in order to provide a contrast between the preand post-revolution periods. The subsequent two sections illustrate the changes in Russian policy toward these two states after the color revolutions. In the case of Russia and Georgia, the historically strained relations had improved slightly before and immediately after the Rose Revolution, but quickly deteriorated and eventually ruptured in late 2006. More dramatically, Russia’s relationship with Ukraine departed sharply from the growing amity which characterized relations prior to the Orange Revolution. Each section covers three issue areas: rhetorical attacks, economic pressures, and support for substate ethnic groups. The subsequent section explores how possible NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine can be understood within the context of democratic contagion. The conclusion of this chapter posits the future of Russia’s relations with these two states, as well as considers how Russia is likely to react to any further NATO enlargement. Before the Color Revolutions Russia–Georgia relations have been persistently troubled since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Sammut 2003, Chigorin 2003, Chepurin 2004, German 2004, Devdariani 2005). Immediately after independence, Georgian elites, led by President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, attempted to construct Georgian identity in opposition to historical Russian domination, leading to strongly anti-Russian rhetoric which laid the foundation of poor relations between the two countries. However, this was not all Tbilisi’s fault: Georgia was (rightfully) seen as among the most anti-Russian of the former Soviet republics, evidenced by the country’s initial refusal to join the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States or to agree to allow Russian military bases on its soil. Therefore, it was in Russia’s interests to break Georgian resistance to the establishment of a Russian sphere of influence within the region. Gamsakhurdia’s violent overthrow (in which Russian soldiers may have taken an active role) led to the return of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as the head of the newly-formed State Council in February 1992 and eventually as president in 1995. This did little to resolve the fundamental problems between Russia and Georgia.

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One of the most intractable issues has been Russian support for the secessionist Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as for the pro-Russian autonomous region of Adjara. The newfound Russian army reportedly gave weapons to the secessionists and facilitated the supply of thousands of ‘volunteers’ from the Russian Federation to fight on behalf of the anti-Georgian forces (Lukic and Lynch 1996: 362). There are even reports of Russian bombers attacking Georgian positions in Abkhazia. Through this military pressure, Moscow also forced Tbilisi to accept the introduction of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ into South Ossetia and Abakhazia. Rather than facilitate a political compromise and the restoration of Georgian sovereignty over these provinces, the peacekeepers have allowed the secessionists to establish de facto independence from Tbilisi and prevented Georgian armed forces from reasserting their sovereignty over them. Both of these territories continue to look to Moscow for protection, and it is feared that Russia will eventually seek to annex them. This is particularly the case with the Ossetians, who are divided between North Ossetia (which is in Russia) and South Ossetia. Related to this issue, Russian military bases in the country (located in the three breakaway regions) have been a particular problem in bilateral relations. Under intense Russian pressure, Georgian officials conceded to a 25 year lease for Russian military bases in 1994. However, the Georgian parliament refused to ratify the agreement because it was seen as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and a confirmation of the de facto breakup of the country. As a result, the Georgian government has demanded that the bases be closed, but Russian officials were reluctant to depart from Georgia. Instead, the Kremlin argued that any closure would take over a decade. After the second war in Chechnya, Russia accused Georgia of giving Chechen fighters and their al-Qaeda allies safe haven in the Pankisi Gorge; a charge the Georgian government denies. Consequently, some Russian officials have called for military operations against Georgia. In August 2002, relations between the two states worsened when Russian planes reportedly bombed targets some twenty miles inside of Georgia. However, both sides called for a relaxation of tensions in October 2002. At a summit the following March in Sochi, Russia, Shevardnadze and Putin reached a series of agreements, including a joint statement on settling the Abkhazia conflict. The Georgian president called the accord ‘the beginning of a new stage in the development of the Georgian-Russian relations’. While the fundamental issues of the secessionist provinces, military bases, and Chechen refugees remained unresolved, 2003 represented a slight improvement in relations between Russia and Georgia. Unfortunately for Shevardnadze, he was toppled in the November 2003 Rose Revolution. Russia’s relationship with Ukraine has also been historically troubled, though for different reasons. The conflicts between Moscow and Tbilisi have largely been  ������� Tengiz Pachkoria, �������������������� ‘Georgia President ���������� Promises ������������������������������������ Special Rights to Abkhazia Province’, ����������� TASS, 10 March 2003.

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over a clash of interests: Georgia’s interest in asserting its sovereignty and resisting Russian domination versus Russia’s desire to restore its sphere of influence in the Caucasus and keep the Georgian state weak and compliant. Many of the problems in the Russian–Ukrainian relationship are deeply tied to national identity issues for both peoples, as well as the larger geopolitical interests of both states. At its core is the fundamental difficulty many Russians had during the early 1990s with Ukraine emerging as an independent country. For centuries, Ukraine has been at the very heart of Russian national identity. The cultural and historical continuity between Kievan Rus’ and Russia itself led many Russians to believe that they, along with the Ukrainians and the Belarusians, were part of a pan-Russian nation. A separate Ukrainian state called into question Russia’s conception of itself which historically blurred the lines between state, nation, and empire. Therefore, the independence of Ukraine was seen by a wide range of the Russian foreign policy elite and by the population as a whole as both ‘unnatural’ and ‘temporary’ (Tolz 2002: 237–9). As a result, the Kremlin was unable to develop a coherent and coordinated foreign policy toward Ukraine for several years after Ukrainian independence. It was only after the May 1997 interstate treaty between Russia and Ukraine, which recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and established a system for demarcating state borders, that there was a shift in Russian perceptions of Ukrainian independence. Nevertheless, Russia rather openly interfered in Ukraine’s domestic politics through its support of pro-Russian candidates and seemingly continued to see Ukraine as something less than an independent country (Kuzio 2003: 444–5). For their part, Ukrainian officials sought to assert their identity as independent, sovereign, and ‘European’— this last characteristic was seen as representing a fundamental distinction between Ukraine as a ‘Western’ country and Russia as part of the Asiatic ‘East’. In addition to this more existential dilemma, Russian–Ukrainian relations were hampered by three practical problems: the status of Russians in Ukraine, the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, and the energy/debt issue. Ukraine is divided between the heavily russified eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, the solidly Ukrainian west, and a mixed middle region around Kiev. While the largely civic conception of the Ukrainian state was far more welcoming to the ethnic Russians than in other cases with significant Russian populations (such as Latvia or Estonia), the legitimacy of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea, which was transferred by the USSR from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, has been called into question within the Russian Federation and by some ethnic Russians in Ukraine itself. This too was a reflection of the identity conflicts between the two countries, with the Ukrainians seeking to affirm the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their newlyindependent state in order to counter any potential Russian irredentism, and the Russians hoping to maintain the connections between the Russian Federation and  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This treaty, though signed in 1997, took two years to be ratified by the Russian Duma (Tolz 2002: 241–3).  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Extensive autonomy for the Crimea has been a minimum demand, with some calling for the outright restoration of the peninsula to Russian control (Wydra 2003).

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its ‘compatriots abroad’. While there is little fear that the Crimea will be detached from Ukraine, the nature and scope of minority rights and territorial autonomy in the region remain a matter of dispute. This same region is also the home of the Black Sea Fleet, another problem in Russia–Ukraine relations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the successor states laid claim to the military assets found within their territory. One of the key disputes was over the inheritance of the Black Sea Fleet, a cornerstone of the old Soviet navy (Simonsen 2000, Kryukov 2006). Both the Russian and Ukrainian government issued a series of decrees in the early years after independence asserting that the fleet, along with its bases and infrastructure, belonged to them. This was a particularly difficult problem to resolve because issues of national pride and identity were conflated with security matters. If Russia were to lose its fleet entirely, this would be a serious blow to its claims of great power status and its ability to project power and influence within the strategic Black Sea region and beyond. Ukrainian officials saw this as a matter of Ukraine’s status as an independent and sovereign country: Ukraine should be able to assert its sovereignty over military assets within its borders and be free to refuse a foreign military base on its soil. Moreover, the fleet’s main base in Sevastopol might one day provide Russia with both the symbolic legitimacy and the physical means to lay claim to the disputed Crimea region. Although the two sides eventually signed a series of agreements over the division of the fleet and Russian basing rights, there are some issues that remain unresolved and disputes over specific assets (e.g. the control over lighthouses used in part by the fleet) occasionally flare. At the very least, the Black Sea Fleet remains an irritant. Russia–Ukraine relations were also complicated by the related problems of energy and credit. Ukraine is extremely dependent upon Russia for its energy supplies, with some 90 per cent of its oil and 60 per cent of its natural gas coming from Russia by the end of the 1990s (Smolansky 1999: 49). However, since Ukraine lacks the money to pay for these resources, its debts to Russia increased dramatically in the years after independence. This energy-debt nexus, and its use as leverage over Kiev to achieve Moscow’s policy goals, has complicated the outstanding issues between the two countries, further worsening bilateral relations. While tensions over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet could be mitigated by political and diplomatic compromises, the structural problem of Ukrainian dependency on Russia remained a continuous problem which could intensify at any time. During the first term of President Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrainian government attempted to balance its westward and eastward leanings, often tilting one way then radically shifting to the other (Kuzio 2005b). During the 1999 presidential campaign, Kuchma ran on a platform advocating integration into European international institutions. However, after his reelection, it became clear that Ukraine was steadily moving away from liberal-democratic standards, most dramatically with the release of tapes identifying Kuchma as a suspect involved in the death of an opposition journalist (Way 2005). As a result, Western institutions began harshly criticizing the Kuchma government and the option of a westward

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alignment was closed to Ukraine. By contrast, the Kremlin was openly welcoming to its increasingly autocratic neighbor. As a result, Kuchma sought to strengthen his ties with Russia. The formulation of Kuchma’s second term policy of a ‘return to Europe with Russia’ in meant that Ukraine’s westward leanings would now be restrained by ties to Russia (Kuzio 2003: 446). As Kiev oriented itself toward Moscow, Ukraine’s commitment to the ostensibly anti-Russian GUUAM organization dissipated and its willingness to consider the Eurasian Economic Community (a Russian-dominated alternative to the EU) increased. Consequently, the Kremlin actively sought to facilitate the election of Kuchma’s heir apparent, Viktor Yanukovych, who was seen as having a similar pro-Russian orientation and a commitment to continuing Kuchma’s governing style. This help came in various forms, some legal, many not. Western Europe and the US also sought to influence the outcome in favor of the democratic process—this meant, in effect, supporting Yanukovych’s pro-West opponent, Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko’s eventual victory was hailed as a triumph for democracy in the West and a political and strategic defeat in Russia. In the period just prior to the color revolutions, Russia–Georgia and Russia– Ukraine relations had improved to varying degrees. This was obviously more stark in the case of Ukraine, in which the growing authoritarianism of the Kuchma regime resulted in a decided shift toward the equally autocratic Kremlin. However, relations between Moscow and Tbilisi, while hampered by serious and seemingly intractable problems, had assumed a slightly more positive tone. As will be seen in the following two extended sections, this improvement in relations was shortlived. Once the Rose Revolution was followed by the Orange Revolution, and the specter of democratic contagion was seen as a real possibility, Russia initiated a series of policies aimed at undermining its newly democratic neighbors. After the Rose Revolution Moscow initially supported the Rose Revolution in order to prevent chaos in the Caucasus. Upon being sworn in as the new Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili declared that he sought a new beginning with the Kremlin and wanted

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� GUUAM stands for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova and was formed to counteract Russian influence in the former Soviet Union.  �������������������������������������������������������������������� See a summary of comments from the Russian press in ‘BBC Monitoring Quotes ������� from Russian Press’, BBC Monitoring International Reports [BBCMIR], 1 December 2004.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov supposedly played a positive role in easing the transition—something which Ivanov later denied. NTV Mir, 24 November 2003, reproduced as ‘Georgian Opposition Leader Praises Russia’s Ivanov Role in Recent Events’, in BBCMIR, 24 November 2003.

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‘to extend a hand of friendship to Russia’. In attendance at the inauguration was Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who responded positively to Saakashvili’s statement. Despite a series of crises over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara,10 as well as continued disagreement over the status of Russian bases on Georgian territory, Georgian and Russian officials committed themselves to a framework treaty which would establish the basis of peaceful relations between the two countries. Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze had signed such an agreement in 1994, but it was scuttled as disputes between the two countries intensified.11 At the end of his March 2004 visit to Moscow to meet with Putin, Saakashvili proclaimed that ‘Russian–Georgian relations are entering a new era’.12 While a lack of progress on security issues prevented them from signing a new framework agreement during 2004, both sides appeared optimistic about the general state of Russian–Georgian relations.13 This changed abruptly in 2005, however. In the absence of the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution could be seen as a one-time event in which a highly unpopular president in an extremely weak state was removed from office through a popular revolt. As a singular incident, the Rose Revolution could be tolerated by Moscow, particularly if it stabilized the Caucasus and led to improved relations between the two countries. However, after the Orange Revolution in November 2004–January 2005, democratization in Georgia assumed a fundamentally different character and Russian policymakers and commentators came to believe that a pattern was forming. Consequently, the Kremlin hardened its position toward Tbilisi in 2005. This change first manifested itself in a series of rhetorical attacks against the color revolutions in general and the Rose Revolution in particular. Tensions also reignited over the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Finally, beginning in early 2006, Russia sought to damage Georgia economically and undermine its government. These measures included the misuse of energy supplies; a boycott of Georgian wine, mineral water, and other goods; and, a tightening of the visa regime between the two countries.

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Yana Dlugy and Nikolai Topuria, ‘Saakashvili Vows to Steer Georgia Westward at Inauguration’, Agence France Presse, 25 January 2004.  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Georgian Top Eager to Improve Relations with Russia. Reciprocally, Says Ivanov’, RIA Novosti, 26 January 2004. 10 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Tbilisi reasserted its control over Adjara in the spring of 2004. 11 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Iya Barateli, ‘No Obstacles for Georgia-Russia Framework Treaty—Leader’, TASS, 12 February 2004. 12 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Vladimir Novikov and Gennady Sysoyev, ‘Mikhail Saakashvili Receives Visa Permit’, Kommersant, 13 February 2004, 10, reproduced in Current Digest of the PostSoviet Press, 56:6 (10 March 2004). 13 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Vitaly Kuchkin and Tamara Frolkina, ‘RF Hopes it Can Reach Agreement with Georgia – Yakovenko’, TASS, 22 November 2004; ITAR–TASS, 7 December 2004, reproduced as ‘Russian Foreign Minister Meets Georgian Counterpart to Review Relations’, in BBCMIR, 7 December 2004.

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In the summer of 2006, in response to increasing tensions over Abkhazia, Russia imposed an economic embargo of Georgia. In Chapter 3, Vladislav Surkov, the deputy director of the Presidential Administration and the Kremlin’s top ideologue, was quoted stating that the color revolutions were undemocratic ‘coups’ that must be guarded against. The idea that Russia was actually seeking to advance democracy and that the opposition forces in both Georgia and Ukraine were actually the ones who sought to undermine it became an important theme in Russian rhetorical attacks against Tbilisi and Kiev. It is clear, however, that this was a policy of misdirection. In addition to Russian support for blatant election rigging in Ukraine, Russia was moving steadily away from democratic values while Ukraine and Georgia were moving in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, by projecting the image of Russia as a democracy, even while acting in the opposite way, the Kremlin sought to discredit both the color revolutions themselves and those at home who might call for a popular uprising. One of the first post-Orange Revolution attacks came from Igor Ivanov, now the Russian Security Council secretary, who contrasted the need for ‘stability’ against the ‘revolutionary upheavals’ of the color revolutions.14 He specifically rejected the legitimacy of what he called ‘extra-parliamentary methods’ leading to the Rose Revolution: ‘Do you think that the change of power in Georgia that took place in the streets is truly democratic? Do you think that such values and principles are laid down in the documents of the Council of Europe and the OSCE?’ In February 2005, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also denounced the state of Georgian democracy in an interview to the Russian magazine Itogi Weekly. Lavrov cited a report by the Council of Europe which he claimed raised ‘serious criticisms regarding the democratic freedoms situation, including freedom of expression and human rights’.15 However, while the visit by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission raised some issues of concern, they were nothing to the extent that Lavrov claimed.16 In May 2005, US President George W. Bush visited Georgia after attending the sixtieth anniversary celebration of the Allies’ victory in World War II, hosted by Russia. This was widely seen as an open expression of American support for democratic reforms in Georgia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.17 According to reports, the Kremlin was upset about the symbolism of Bush’s visit to Georgia, prompting Lavrov to send a letter of protest to Secretary of State

14 ������������������������������������������� ‘Igor Ivanov Against “Color Revolutions”’, RIA Novosti, 10 February 2005. 15 ������������������������������������������������� ‘Interview with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 15 February 2005. 16 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Visite d’une délégation de la Commission de Venise en Géorgie (27–28 Janvier 2005): Synopsis’ [Online: Council of Europe]. Available at <www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/ CDL(2005)012syn-f.asp>, accessed 11 July 2008. 17  Georgian State Television Channel 1, 3 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Georgian President Addresses Nation Ahead of Bush Visit’, in BBCMIR, 4 May 2005.

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Condoleezza Rice.18 Although the Russian Foreign Ministry disputed this account, Bush’s praise for Georgian democracy, as well as his call for Russia to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity and his support for Tbilisi’s application to NATO, reinforced Georgia’s status as a symbolic victory for pro-democracy forces. During the remainder of 2005, Russian–Georgian relations were undermined by continuing disagreements over Russian military bases and the secessionist provinces. However, relations hit a new low in January 2006 over Georgian imports of Russian natural gas. In response to Moscow’s cutoff of natural gas supplies to Ukraine earlier that month (discussed in the following section), Saakashvili announced that his government would seek to diversify Georgia’s energy imports.19 Just days later, two natural gas pipelines from Russia exploded nearly simultaneously and a high-power electricity transmission tower (which supplies approximately 6 per cent of Georgia’s electrical power) was felled by a subsequent blast later that day. This occurred during a cold snap and left Georgia with only one day of natural gas reserves to heat the country. Although the Kremlin blamed unidentified anti-Russian saboteurs, Saakashvili blamed Russia.20 According to Saakashvili, evidence of a political purpose behind these explosions was reinforced by the fact that they were clearly coordinated, occurred in areas of Russian military control, and did not damage supplies to Russian customers. The Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed Shaakashvili’s accusations as ‘hysterical and bacchanalian’, and Putin ordered a quick repair to the pipelines.21 It should be noted that the blasts also disrupted supplies to Russia’s ally, Armenia. Nevertheless, the Georgian foreign minister continued to blame Russia, calling the cutoff ‘energy diplomacy’22 and, in a speech to members of the European Parliament, stated that there ‘are many, many coincidences’.23 While ultimate blame for the energy disruptions is likely to remain unknown, Russia has used energy as a diplomatic weapon in the past and, coming just after the dispute with Ukraine and Shaakashvili’s statement, it would not be surprising if there was more to the January 2006 disruptions than just simple sabotage. In the aftermath of the energy disruptions, tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi escalated. In mid-February, the Georgian legislature passed a resolution calling upon all Russian troops to leave South Ossetia, but did not set a date for 18 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Elisabeth Bumiller and Stephen Lee Myers, ‘Russia Objects to Bush Itinerary; Rice Replies’, New York Times, 6 May 2005, 8. 19  Rustavi-2 TV, 19 January 2006, reproduced as ‘Georgian Leader Outlines Energy Policy’, in BBCMIR, 20 Janurary 2006. 20 ���������� ‘Georgian President �������������������������������� Blames Russia for Gas Pipeline ���������������������� Explosions’, Xinhua General News Service, 22 January 2006. 21 ��������������������������������������� ‘Russia Re-routes Gas to Georgia after Pipeline ������������������ Blasts’, Agence France Presse, 22 January 2006. 22 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian “Energy Diplomacy a Wake up Call” Warns Georgian Minister’, Deutsche Presse–Agentur, 23 January 2006. 23 �������������������������������������� ‘Georgian FM Voices Concern about Gas Problems ����������������������� with Russia’, Agence France Presse, 25 January 2006.

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their departure. In addition, the Georgian Foreign Ministry announced that Russian peacekeepers would be required to receive visas to enter Georgian territory. In response, the Russian government cut off visas for Georgians, claiming that Tbilisi was violating previous agreements.24 Also, Georgian wine exports to Russia, which account for some 70 per cent of Georgian wine sales, were banned by the Kremlin in early April, citing health concerns.25 Georgian citrus fruits were also banned. Mikhail Svimonishvili, Georgia’s agricultural minister, argued that politics, not public health, was behind the ban: he cited the fact that Georgian wine is exported throughout Europe and North America and has not come under scrutiny for any health violations.26 Nevertheless, this was followed the next month by a ban on Georgian mineral water; again, health reasons were cited by the Russian government and Tbilisi responded by arguing that the decision was aimed as pressuring Georgia.27 The energy disruptions and the economic embargoes served only as a prequel to the near total breakdown in relations between the two countries in the fall of 2006. This was directly related to the continued problems over the Russianbacked, breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Little progress on either front was made in 2005–2006. Despite Saakashvili’s tough language on reunifying Georgian territory, Russia’s protection of the secessionists through their peacekeeping operations remained in effect, though with occasional flareups. During this period, the Kremlin effectively integrated these territories into the Russian Federation: Russian officials traveling to the provinces did not apply for Georgian visas and generally treated them as part of Russian territory; individuals living in these territories were issued Russian, not Georgian, passports for foreign travel; and, many residents of these territories were granted Russian citizenship. During the summer of 2006, tensions intensified as Russian and Georgian officials traded accusations about Georgia’s desire to retake the provinces militarily and Russia’s de facto annexation of both regions.28 In June, the Russian Foreign Ministry identified Georgian territorial integrity as ‘more a possible state than a political-legal reality’29 and declared that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had the

24 ���������������������� Mikhail Vignansky, ‘A Passport ��������������� War’, Vremya Novostei, 22 February 2006, 1, reproduced in Defense and Security, 27 February 2006. 25 ���������������������������������������������������������� Kevin Buckley, ‘Wine Ban on Georgia, Moldova Stepped Up’, Financial Times (London), 12 April 2006, 9. 26 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� C.J. Chivers, ‘A Russian “Wine Blockade” Against Georgia and Moldova’, New York Times, 6 April 2006, 12. 27  Imedi TV, 5 May 2006, reproduced as ‘Georgian Speaker Says Russian Mineral Water Ban Argument for CIS Withdrawal’, in BBCMIR, 5 May 2006. 28 ��������� ‘Georgia Planning ������������������������������������������������������������� Armed Conflict in Breakaway South Ossetia: Lavrov’, Agence France Presse, 2 June 2006. 29 ������������������������� ‘Georgian Integrity More Possible ����������������������������� than Real: Russia’, Agence France Presse, 1 June 2006.

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right to ‘self-determination’.30 Soon afterward, the Georgian legislature once again demanded that Russian peacekeepers leave both territories.31 The issue came to a head in late September, on the same day that Saakashvili vowed to reclaim Abkhazia, when Georgian officials seized four Russian military officers from the military intelligence service and twelve Georgian citizens on charges of spying. Georgian police also surrounded the Tbilisi headquarters of Russia’s military forces in the Caucasus. Russia reacted strongly, calling the charges ‘baseless’ and a ‘brutal act showing that Georgia’s leaders are carrying out an anti-Russian policy’.32 Furthermore, Russia recalled its ambassador, ordered the near-total evacuation of its embassy staff and families from Georgia, and brought the issue to the UN Security Council. The Kremlin also enacted a host of punitive actions against Georgia on top of the continuing bans on Georgian wine and mineral water and the severe restrictions on remaining fruit and vegetable imports. These sanctions included: refusing to issue visas to Georgians; cutting land, air, and sea transport links; closing a Georgian-linked casino in Moscow; preventing postal deliveries and money transfers from Georgian expatriates in Russia; and, expelling Georgians from Russia with little or no cause. What is important about these punishments is that they continued even after the Russian soldiers were released and returned to Russia, just days after being arrested. Despite Saakashvili’s plea of ‘enough is enough’,33 Russian officials said that they would not withdraw the sanctions. Instead, as Kremlin spokesman Dimitri Peskov asserted, the sanctions were intended to punish Georgia for a pattern of anti-Russian policies.34 Lavrov echoed this sentiment by asserting that Russia did not ‘want to do things as before’ by lifting sanctions.35 In fact, Russian officials pledged that they would implement even more sanctions against Georgia, including banking and immigration controls.36 A decision in early November to (again) double the price that Georgia paid for natural gas was not officially linked to the arrest of the Russian officers, but the fact that it is close to the same rate paid by the developed counties of Western Europe, and far higher than the rate paid by other former

30 ��������������������������������������������������������� Vladimir Solovyov and Vladimir Novikov, ‘Land Seizures’, Kommersant, 2 June 2006, 1, 10, reproduced in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 58:22 (28 June 2006). 31 ���������� ‘Georgian Parliament ��������������������������� Demands Russian Peacekeepers’ �������������������������� Expulsion’, Agence France Presse, 18 July 2006. 32 ������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Cries Foul as Georgia Arrests Four Russian “Spies”’, Agence France Presse, 27 September 2006. 33 ��������������������������������������������������� Tony Halpin, ‘Russia Spurns “Spies” Olive Branch’, The Times (London), 3 October 2006, 37. 34 ���������������������������������������������������������������� Steven Lee Myers, ‘Russia Severs Transport Links with Georgia’, New York Times, 3 October 2006, A1. 35  ������������������������������������������������������������������� Peter Finn, ‘Unswayed by West, Russia Continues Georgia Blockade’, Washington Post, 4 October 2006, A21. 36 ����������������������� Dario Thuburn, ‘Russia Plans ��������������������������������������������������������� Tighter Banking, Immigration Controls on Georgia’, Agence France Presse, 5 October 2006.

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Soviet republics, indicated that there was something more than just market pricing involved in the decision.37 Russian officials also launched an aggressive rhetorical attack upon Georgia, with Putin calling the government’s actions ‘state terrorism’38 and likening Georgia’s leaders to Lavrent Beria, the ethnic Georgian head of the Soviet secret police who implemented Joseph Stalin’s purges.39 Putin also implied that Tbilisi’s close relationship with Washington may have been instrumental in the arrests: ‘The people [in Georgia] think that in being under the protection of their foreign sponsors, they can feel comfortable and safe’.40 This insinuation was made more directly in a phone conservation between Bush and Putin when the latter warned Washington against encouraging Georgia to undertake ‘destructive policies’.41 Foreign Minister Lavrov seconded Putin’s statements by explicitly linking Georgian actions with NATO expansion: ‘The recent episode with the seizure of our officers took place just after NATO’s decision to extend an intensified partnership plan to Georgia, and, incidentally, immediately after a visit by Mikhail (Saakashvili) to Washington’.42 Since the US had showcased Georgia as a symbol for democracy, by linking Georgian intransigence to American policies, the Kremlin was implying that the change in political regime of its southern neighbor was also a cause of these policies. The Georgian government framed the sanctions and rhetorical attacks against it in terms of Russia’s reaction to the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili claimed that the sanctions were part of a larger pattern of Russian pressure which began once the Georgians made a choice for democracy.43 Mart Laar, the former Estonian prime minister and adviser to Saakashvili on issues associated with European integration, compared his country’s situation in the early 1990s to Georgia in 2006: ‘Russia is painfully upset by the fact that a country, which was once in Moscow’s sphere of influence, has clearly asserted its independence and is striving towards the West’.44

37 ��������������������������� Stephen Boykewich, ‘Russia Proposes ������������� Gas Price ��������������������������������� Hike for Georgia as Crisis Continues’, Agence France Presse, 2 November 2006. 38 ������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Calls Georgia’s Actions State Terrorism’, Agence France Presse, 1 October 2006. 39 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Stephen Boykewich, ‘Putin Compares Georgia’s Leadership to Stalin’s Enforcer’, Agence France Presse, 1 October 2006. 40 ����� Ibid. 41  ‘��������������������������� Putin Warns Bush of “Third Party” ��������������������������������� Interference in Georgia’, Agence France Presse, 2 October 2006. 42 ������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Foreign Minister Links US, NATO to Georgia Crisis’, Agence France Presse, 3 October 2006. 43 ����������� ‘Georgia’s President ��������������������������������������������������������� Warns of “Racist” Talk in Crisis with Russia’, Agence France Presse, 6 October 2006. 44 ������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Aims to Discredit NATO-Hopeful Georgia: Saakashvili Aide’, Agence France Presse, 3 October 2006.

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During the crisis, Russia also expressed continuing support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition to inviting the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia for an economic forum in early October, Russia later threatened Georgia with violence if it attempted to seize Abkhazia or South Ossetia by force.45 Putin himself warned Georgia of a ‘bloodbath’ if Tbilisi were to use military force against the provinces.46 Russian threats intensified in November with Russian Defense Minister Ivanov stating that since most of the residents of the provinces are Russian citizens, Russia has a responsibility to protect them.47 Of course Ivanov failed to mention that the Kremlin gave Russian citizenship to the residents of these provinces over Georgian objections and despite the fact that they are internationally recognized as being citizens of Georgia. Russia also gave its rhetorical support to a referendum on independence in South Ossetia, citing its ‘symbolic character’.48 Like the energy disruptions earlier in 2006, the Kremlin did not overtly link this intensified coercion to Kremlin fears of democratization along its southern border. This is not surprising: Kremlin officials continue to claim that Russia is a democracy and it is unlikely they would ever publicly state that they are seeking to undermine another country because of its political system. Certainly the Georgians perceived it this way, but it is impossible to conclusively identify intentions from foreign policy. Moreover, the specific impact of the Rose Revolution on Russia– Georgia relations is difficult to measure because there are other factors at work in this case, including geopolitics (the NATO–Georgia–Russia strategic triangle) and the history of poor relations between the two states. This is not an ideal case. What we have is a pattern in which Russia–Georgia relations go from bad to marginally better to much worse. This was not a fundamental shift, but rather a continuing breakdown of relations. It would be much clearer if there was a sudden change from positive to negative relations with the Rose Revolution as the turning point. Nevertheless, three factors point to the importance of Georgian democratization for Russian foreign policy toward Tbilisi. First, the timing of these events is conspicuous. Although Russia–Georgia relations were rocky since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a partial upswing in 2003 (after the Sochi summit between Putin and Shevardnadze) and 2004 (immediately after the Rose Revolution, which presented the possibility of a new beginning in bilateral relations). It was not until after the Orange Revolution that this negative trend began anew. This downturn is consistent with the Kremlin’s tone toward the color 45 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Would Defend Separatist Republics Against Georgian Attack: Defense Minister’, Agence France Presse, 8 October 2006. 46 ����� Adam ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Plowright, ‘Putin Warns Georgia of “Bloodbath” in Separatist Conflict’, Agence France Presse, 20 October 2006. 47 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Simon Ostrovsky, ‘War of Words Intensified with Rebel Georgian Region’s Upcoming Referendum’, Agence France Presse, 10 November 2006. 48 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Calls Independence Vote in Separatist Georgian Region “Symbolic”, Agence France Presse, 13 November 2006.

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revolutions. Statements from policymakers and commentators indicate that events in Georgia took on a new meaning after the Orange Revolution: rather than being perceived as a one-time event, there was a real fear that democratization in the former Soviet Union could emerge as a threat to the Kremlin’s grip on power. As a result, Russia acted accordingly by seeking to undermine the Georgian state as a way to undermine Georgian democracy. Second, the events outlined in this section indicate that Russia has steadily increased its pressure on Georgia. In terms of military strength, economic capacity, landmass, and population, Russia dwarfs Georgia. Although Tbilisi is certainly not blameless in this situation—for example, Saakashvili’s language is often inflammatory—Georgia has sought to reduce tensions with Russia on several occasions. For example, Georgia released the four Russian officers almost immediately after seizing them, but Russia refused to reciprocate and in fact increased economic sanctions. Moreover, in mid-November, Saakashvili issued a statement seeking a reconciliation with Moscow, to no avail.49 Instead, Sergei Ivanov responded by saying (reportedly with a smile on his face) that the sanctions were merely a ‘slight message’ and could easily be tightened in the future.50 There was little improvement in 2007, despite the return of Russia’s ambassador to Georgia in January, the closure of a Russian military base in June, and the resumption of issuing some visas to Georgian citizens in July. In early August, for example, Georgian officials accused Russia of launching a missile attack near South Ossetia—a charge Moscow denied. In addition, a political crisis in Georgia in September—during which Georgian authorities violently dispersed opposition demonstrators and Saakashvili declared a temporary state of emergency, claiming that Russian officials were using the protesters to launch a coup against his regime—afforded the Kremlin with an additional opportunity to attempt to discredit Georgian democracy.51 Saakashvili’s willingness to stand for an early election, and the outcome of the January 2008 vote which saw him reelected by a wide margin, were also dismissed by Russia as being nondemocratic.52 Throughout the rest of 49 ���������� ‘Georgian President ���������� Pledges ����������������������������������������� to Offer Conciliatory Message to Putin’, �������� Agence France Presse, 17 November 2006. 50 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia’s Anti-Georgian Measures “Slight Message”, Not Sanctions: Moscow’, Agence France Presse, 19 November 2006. 51 ����������������������������������������������������� ‘Georgia on Brink of “Human Rights Crisis”: Russia’, Agence France Presse, 8 November 2007. It should be noted that the West, too, grew very concerned about Saakashvili’s moves and it could be argued that NATO’s decision not to invite Georgia to join at its 2008 summit was due, in part, to questions about the Georgian president’s commitment to democracy. 52 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Russia argued that Saakashvili’s move to hold an early election for president was undemocratic for not allowing the opposition to effectively organize for the vote. This is somewhat ironic since Putin’s 2000 election as president was done under circumstances which, too, precluded the opposition from having sufficient time to compete. For the Russian statement, see Michael Mainville, ‘Georgian Lawmakers Vote to Lift Emergency Rule’, Agence France Presse, 15 November 2007. After the vote, Russia and the OSCE election

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the year, relations between the two countries worsened as Russia reacted angrily to the prospects of NATO membership for Georgia and to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the major Western powers by sending additional troops into Georgia’s breakaway regions and further institutionalizing its de facto annexation of these territories. This led the Georgian president to warn in early May that the risk of war with Russia was very real. All of this indicates that Russian-Georgian relations will remain tense for the foreseeable future. Finally, if one considers the case of Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine during the same period, the overall context of the Kremlin’s relations with newly democratic states along its borders provides greater evidence that democratization in Georgia was a significant factor in the diplomatic downturn during and after 2005. As the next section shows, democratization in Ukraine had a dramatic impact on relations between Moscow and Kiev. As Kuchma became more authoritarian, Russia-Ukrainian relations grew more positive. After the Orange Revolution, this was fundamentally reversed. Thus, Russian relations with Georgia, although a difficult case to parse specific factors, fits into a emerging pattern in which the prospect of democratization causes a negative shift in Russian foreign policy. After the Orange Revolution Given Russia’s overt interference in and manipulation of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, there were understandably ill feelings between the two countries. Russia had suffered a massive foreign policy defeat and the new Ukrainian government had to deal with the immediate aftermath of an election which sharply divided the country, as well as to ‘renegotiate the parameters of Russian–Ukrainian relations’ (Kuzio 2005c: 509). Although Yushchenko traveled to Moscow the day after his inauguration in an attempt to repair ties, the new Ukrainian president made it clear that he sought to consolidate the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution and align Ukraine with the West. Consequently, Russia adopted a series of confrontational policies toward Kiev. For example, Russian officials began a series of rhetorical attacks against the new Ukrainian government in May 2005 in order to delegitimize the Orange Revolution. In an interview with Strategiya Rossii, Igor Ivanov called the Orange Revolution and ‘undemocratic’ and ‘unconstitutional’ regime change that Russia must learn from and respond to.53 Later that month, the Russian Duma, dominated by members aligned with Putin’s United Russia political party, overwhelmingly directed its monitors got into what is by now a familiar pattern of criticism and counter criticism, with Russia assailing the legitimacy of the vote and the OSCE defending it. ‘OSCE Rejects Russian Criticism of Georgia Election Endorsement’, Agence France Presse, 7 January 2008. 53 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Igor Ivanov: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine Revolutions Have Nothing in Common with Democracy’, RIA Novosti, 4 May 2005.

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delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe (PACE) to raise the issue of political oppression in Ukraine. This document identified several areas of concern ‘which contradict the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’, mostly stemming from personnel changes following the Orange Revolution.54 This was an ironic turn for the Russian legislature, which has seen press freedoms, political liberties, and its own institutional autonomy significantly eroded by the Kremlin’s shift toward greater presidential rule. Moreover, the Russian Duma and its delegation to the Council of Europe were quiet about former president Kuchma’s moves toward authoritarianism. However, the context of the personnel changes cited in the Duma’s resolution is important to note: the new Ukrainian government had sought to remove Kuchma loyalists suspected of involvement in electoral fraud and political corruption, some of whom had fled to Russia to escape prosecution (Kuzio 2005a, Kuzio 2005c: 511–2). Thus, rather than being truly concerned about the state of Ukrainian democracy, the Russian Duma was seeking to undermine the post-Kuchma transition. The Duma resolution could also have been an attempt to distract attention away from illiberal trends in Russia ahead of debate on a PACE report covering the state of Russian democracy.55 This too connects to the fallout from the Orange Revolution: if Ukraine’s new democracy was discredited, then Russia’s authoritarian shift would not look as bad. The Duma’s proposal was strongly rejected by Ukrainian officials, who accused Russia of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs.56 The scope of the PACE resolution—entitled ‘A Tendency to Infringe Political and Property Human Rights in Some Post-Revolutionary Council of Europe Member States’57—was expanded to call into question the human rights standards and democratic credentials of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. It did not reach the floor of the PACE for discussion. The Kremlin also tried to advance its interests in Ukraine more directly through a formal agreement on cooperation between Yanukovych’s Party of Regions

54 ������������������������������������ Ivan Novikov, ‘Duma Concerned about Political ���������� Persecutions �������������������������� in Ukraine’, TASS, 20 May 2005. 55 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation’ [Online: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], 3 June 2005, Doc.10568. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008. 56  Interfax–Ukraine News Agency, 21 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Ukrainian Speaker Accuses Russian Duma of Meddling in Internal Affairs’, in BBCMIR, 21 May 2005; Interfax–Ukraine News Agency, 21 May 2005, reproduced as, ‘Ukraine Slams Russian Duma Statement as “Unfriendly Act”’, in BBCMIR, 21 May 2005. 57 ������������������������ ‘A Tendency to Infringe Political �������������� and Property ������������������������������ Human Rights in Some Post����� revolutionary Council of Europe Member States’ [Online: Council of Europe], 7 June 2005, doc. 10574. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008.

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and United Russia in July 2005.58 Yanukovych and Konstantin Kosachev (the signing representative of United Russia and chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs) made it clear that this was designed to help the Party of Regions in the upcoming March 2006 parliamentary elections.59 Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko criticized the agreement as an illegitimate attempt by Russia to influence Ukraine’s political system.60 However, this did not stop Yanukovych from openly aligning himself with his Kremlin-backed counterparts in Russia. For example, after consulting with the leadership of United Russia at their November 2005 party congress, Yanukovych proclaimed his support for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community—a proposed economic union of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan which stands as an alternative to the EU.61 It is important to note that of these four countries, Ukraine was the only non-autocracy. Later, in the run-up to the March 2006 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the Regional Youth Union, the youth wing of the Party of Regions, and its United Russia counterpart, the Youth Guard, signed a cooperation agreement in Kiev.62 Yanukovych’s political prospects were helped by an economic and diplomatic crisis which erupted in December 2005 when the Kremlin announced that Ukraine would no longer be allowed to pay below-market prices for natural gas. According to this decision, Ukraine would be expected to pay a five-fold increase in its natural gas imports in 2006. Given the scheduled March 2006 parliamentary elections, the steep rise in natural gas prices came at a convenient time for Ukraine’s proRussian politicians. An economic crisis in Ukraine could only help to undermine the government and embolden the opposition Party of Regions. Already weakened by internal divisions, the ‘orange coalition’ was further hurt by the dismissal of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s government in September 2005. The natural gas crisis compounded these problems and presented the Party of Regions with a significant political opportunity. According to Andrei Illarionov, a former top economic advisor to Putin who broke with the Kremlin because of the regime’s economic policies and autocratic tendencies, the lower price negotiated in August 2004 was designed to facilitate the election of Yanukovych and was supposed to last until 2009.63 After the Orange Revolution, however, a decision was made to 58  UNIAN News Agency, 2 July 2005, reproduced as ‘Ukrainian Opposition, Russian Pro-Presidential Parties Sign Cooperation Accord’, in BBCMIR, 2 July 2005. 59 ���������������������������������������������� Anfisa Voronina, ‘Russia to Help Yanukovich’, Vedomosti, 5 July 2005, A2, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 5 July 2005. 60 ������������������������������������� Yana Sergeeva, ‘Yanukovich’s Start’, Novye Izvestia, 5 July 2005, 4, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 5 July 2005. 61 ������������������������������������������������������������������� This is also known as the Common Economic Space. Anatoly Gordeyev, ‘Yanukovich Says CES Can Solve Ukraine’s Problems’, TASS, 6 February 2006. 62 ���������������������������������������������� Mikhail Melnik, ‘Elections Split Ukraine into Pro-Russian ���������������� and Pro-Western ������������ Camps’, TASS, 22 March 2006. 63 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Former Kremlin Adviser Blasts Russia’s Gas Price ��������������� Hike for Ukraine’, Associated Press, 31 December 2005.

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punish Ukraine for its choice through the dramatic price hike. In early January 2006, natural gas exports to Ukraine were cut off. However, diplomatic pressure from Western Europe, which receives its own natural gas imports from Russia through Ukrainian pipelines, forced the Kremlin to relent after only two days. A new price, only twice the former subsidized rate, was eventually negotiated. Although the crisis was short in duration, its political significance can be seen in a number of ways. Continued subsidies for Belarus contrasted sharply with the use of economic pressure against Ukraine. The initial demand of $220–$230/1,000 meters3, when compared to the $47/1,000 meters3 of natural gas paid by Belarus at this time, appeared to be the penalty paid by Ukraine for its democratic transition and subsequent move away from Russia’s orbit.64 The political use of energy exports was reinforced by the prominent role that Putin himself played in this process. In addition to announcing that Ukraine should pay market prices for its natural gas, it was Putin who issued a temporary moratorium on the price increase, and the Russian president was largely responsible for the final settlement of the crisis. Gazprom, which dominates Russian energy exports, is also controlled by the Kremlin, and its management team is made up of government officials and Putin allies. As a result, the decisions made by Gazprom are a reflection of the Kremlin’s priorities and interests. In the wake of Yushchenko’s electoral victory, Moscow also renewed its inflammatory rhetoric which raised questions about Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a violation of the 1997 Treaty of Friendship in which Russia recognized Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for continuing rights over basing for its Black Sea Fleet in the Russian-populated region of the Crimea. When Ukrainian officials raised the possibility of revising the Black Sea Fleet’s leasing agreement in response to Russia’s energy threat, Sergei Ivanov proclaimed that any amendments to the treaty would be ‘tantamount to death’ and that it might call into question Russia’s acceptance of Ukrainian sovereignty.65 Just before the March 2006 elections, Russia also inserted itself into a dispute over the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. Ethnic tensions were already heightened by the 2004 election, which pitted Yushchenko’s western Ukrainian coalition against the eastern part of the country dominated by ethnic Russians and represented by Yanukovych. These feelings were exacerbated by a Kremlinbacked propaganda campaign which portrayed Yushchenko as anti-Russian and ‘an inciter of interethnic conflict’ (Kuzio 2005c: 495). In February, Crimean legislators organized a referendum on making Russian an official state language equal to

64 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Russia Restores Most of Gas Cut to Ukraine Line’, New York Times, 3 January 2006, A1. It should be noted that significantly higher natural gas prices for Belarus were announced in March 2006 and January 2007. See Chapter 6 for more details. 65 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Revising Black Sea Fleet Agreement is Unacceptable’, RIA Novosti, 27 December 2005.

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Ukrainian.66 The measure was rejected by Ukrainian officials on constitutional grounds.67 Around the same time, a number of Russian-dominated cities and regions in Ukraine unilaterally declared Russian to be an official language. While these moves were also rejected by Ukrainian officials, they received praise from the Russian Foreign Ministry.68 This prompted Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry to accuse Russia of ‘overt interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs on the eve of parliamentary elections’.69 Kiev’s sharp response to statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry was not isolated to this specific incident, but part of an overall reaction to changes in Russian rhetoric concerning the status of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s renewed its focus on the rights of Russia’s ‘compatriots’ abroad and claims of political oppression, especially on the language issue, increased during 2006.70 Later, in December 2006, government-controlled Russian television aired a four-part series blasting Ukraine for policies toward the Crimea and the Russian-speakers living there.71 Fears that Moscow could use its diaspora as an excuse to assert pressure against neighboring states or to intervene in their affairs are long-standing. Finally, Russian officials criticized the conduct of the March 2006 parliamentary election in Ukraine in a further attempt to delegitimize Ukrainian democracy. Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the lower house of the Duma, cited numerous electoral violations and, despite the victory for the Party of Regions, called into question the legitimacy of the vote.72 Like the Duma’s resolution on the state of Ukrainian democracy, this was more than ironic, since the fairness of Russian elections has been called into question by outside observers. Moreover, Russian officials have defended blatantly unfair elections by autocratic regimes such as Belarus—even some Russian commentators were surprised by the level of fraud during the 2006 Belarusian presidential election, held just days before the Ukrainian parliamentary vote.73 By contrast, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe declared the 66 ���������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Crimea Approves Controversial Referendum on Russian Language’, Agence France Presse, 22 February 2006. 67 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Valery Rzhevski, ‘Ukrainian CEC Bans Language Referendum in Crimea’, TASS, 8 March 2006. 68 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Natalia Simorova, ‘Moscow Welcomes Regional Status of Russian Language in Kharkov’, TASS, 21 March 2006. 69 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Valery Rzhevsky, ‘Ukraine Accuses Russia of Interference in its Internal Affairs’, TASS, 24 March 2006. 70  RIA News Agency, 8 March 2006, reproduced as ‘Russia Wants to See Compatriots in Other Countries Enjoy Full Rights’, in BBCMIR, 8 March 2006. 71 ���������������������������������������������� ‘Russian TV Hits Out at Ukraine over Crimea’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring [BBCWM] 19 December 2006. 72 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� He argued that the margin of victory should have been much larger. Oleg Osipov, ‘Russia Lawmakers Record Substantial Violations at Ukraine Polls’, TASS, 28 March 2006. 73  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 March 2006, reproduced as ‘Pundit on Belarus Election Result Implications for Russia’, in BBCMIR, 22 March 2006.

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Ukrainian parliamentary election ‘free and fair’ and the Belarusian election as not ‘democratic in any meaning of the word’.74 Thus, Russian support for elections seemed inversely related to their democratic content. Soon after his appointment as prime minister in August 2006, Yanukovych announced his intention to shift Ukrainian foreign policy away from ‘Euroromanticism’ and toward a balance between westward (pro-EU/-NATO) and eastward (pro-Russian) leanings.75 What this meant in effect was that Yanukovych sought to repair relations with Moscow damaged by the Orange Revolution and its aftermath, while resisting calls for quick integration into Western military and political institutions. Yanukovych hinted that the Black Sea Fleet might remain based in Ukraine after its lease runs out76 and his government pressured the country’s pro-Western foreign minister to resign.77 By contrast, Yushchenko remained committed to his Euro-Atlantic orientation, saying that there was no alternative to NATO membership for Ukraine.78 This set up a clash between the prime minister and president for control over Ukraine’s strategic orientation and domestic policies which came to a head in spring of 2007 when Yushchenko dissolved the legislature over Yanukovych’s objections, precipitating a constitutional crisis that some believed would erupt into violence once the president and the prime minister both sought to control the country’s Interior Ministry troops. However, a compromise was reached and a new parliamentary election was held on 30 September. The outcome of this election and the extended coalition talks eventually returned the pro-Western Tymoschenko to the prime minister’s office with a razor-thin majority. Since the September 2007 election, Russia and Ukraine has staggered from one natural gas crisis to another (October–November 2007 and February–March 2008). Despite the pledges of both sides to developing a positive bilateral relationship, tensions remain between Russia and Ukraine with issues of NATO membership and

74 ��������������������������������������������������� ‘Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the Parliamentary ��������������������������� Elections in Ukraine’ [Online: Council of Europe], 27 March 2006. Available at <wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc. jsp?id=982663>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Secretary General of the Council of Europe on Presidential Elections in Belarus’ [Online: Council of Europe], 16 March 2006. Available at <wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=977771>, accessed 11 July 2008. 75  Den (Kiev), 6 September 2006, 5, reproduced as ‘Ukrainian Premier Outlines Cabinet Programme’, in BBCWM, 8 September 2006; UT1 (Kiev), 13 September 2006, reproduced as ‘Ukraine’s Pm Speaks Against ‘Euro-romanticism’ Ahead of Visit to Brussels’, in BBCWM, 13 September 2006. 76  Interfax-Ukraine News Agency (Kiev), 2 November 2006, reproduced as ‘Ukrainian Premier Reiterates that Russian Fleet May Stay in Crimea After 2017’, in BBCWM, 2 November 2006. 77 ����������� ‘Ukraine’s Pro-Western ������������������������� FM Resigns’, Agence France Presse, 30 January 2007. 78 ������������������������������������������������ ‘Ukrainian Leader Sees No Alternative to NATO’, Agence France Presse, 1 March 2007.

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the Black Sea Fleet continuing to cause problems.79 On the domestic front, Ukraine’s political system also remains unsettled and, with the defection of two members of parliament to the opposition in early June 2008, Tymoschenko’s coalition lost its majority. Neither of these situations will likely prove to be beneficial to Ukrainian democracy or political stability. While a return to ‘Kuchmaism’ is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, if Ukraine’s democratic transition continues to be seen as chaotic, this will reinforce those in Russia who link the democratic experiment of the Yeltsin government to the widespread, socioeconomic chaos of the 1990s. By comparison, the ‘managed democracy’ established by Putin will appear more legitimate and preferable to a color revolution, thus helping to further secure the Kremlin’s power base. Although none of the actions outlined in this section were themselves sufficient to undermine the Orange Revolution, they indicate a pattern of Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine. The success of a pro-Western, liberal democracy in Kiev is seen as detrimental to both Russia’s security interests and the Kremlin’s political interests. The links between regime type abroad, Russian national security, and the potential for an anti-regime uprising in Russia are well-established amongst Russian foreign policy analysts and government officials. If the contest over the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections could be seen as a conflict by proxy between democracy and authoritarianism, Russian foreign policy in the postOrange Revolution period is a continuation of this conflict, with the Kremlin on the defensive but seeking to lessen the impact of its failure to prevent a democratic transition in one of its most important neighbors. NATO Expansion and Democratic Diffusion A major consequence of the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine has been their foreign policy reorientation toward the West. This has included an unwavering desire by presidents Saakashvili and Yushchenko to join NATO.80 Several NATO members, especially the US, responded positively to these bids. Russia, not surprisingly, has consistently opposed these plans, even though it has repeatedly stated that these countries have a sovereign right to join if they so choose. In February 2007, Putin blasted plans for NATO enlargement, calling it a provocation and indicating that he believed that it was aimed directly at Russia.81 Five months later, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov stated that Alliance membership for Tbilisi and Kiev ‘cannot fail to influence our relations with those countries, and with NATO as a whole’, and would ‘not help strengthen the atmosphere of trust 79 ��������������������������������������������������������� ‘Medvedev Warns Ukraine Against “Unilateral” Decisions’, Agence France Presse, 29 May 2008. 80 ���������� ‘Georgian President ���������������������������������������� Reiterates Bid to Join NATO’, Xinhua General News Service, 19 April 2007; ‘Ukraine President for Ukraine Joining NATO’, TASS, 17 January 2007. 81 ��������������������������������������������� Anna Arutunyan, ‘Putin Blasts US in Munich’, Moscow News, 16 February 2007.

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and mutual understanding in Europe, to put it mildly’.82 As NATO came closer to holding its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the Kremlin’s rhetoric intensified with, for example, Russia’s envoy to the Alliance, Dimitri Rogozin, stating that membership would lead to a ‘bloodbath’ in Georgia and divide Ukraine along ethnic lines.83 Although it achieved a diplomatic victory with the Alliance’s refusal to offer Tbilisi or Kiev a Membership Action Plan during the 2008 summit,84 the Kremlin has not taken anything for granted and Putin’s successor, Dimitri Medvedev, has threatened that, should these two countries be admitted sometime in the future, Russia’s relationship with the West would be ‘undermined, spoiled in a radical way for a long time’.85 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer seemed quite surprised that anyone, including Russia, could be against NATO expansion: ‘NATO enlargement is not a threat to anybody. NATO enlargement means more democracy, more stability, more security, more rule of law, more democratic control of the armed forces. Who could be worried about NATO enlargement? I’m not’.86 Scheffer’s comments, of course, ignored the perceived threats posed by NATO to Russia. While the Alliance is certainly in no position to attack Russia militarily—given Russia’s size, military capabilities, and nuclear weapons—NATO expansion will undermine Russia’s geopolitical standing, add to the belief that America is seeking to encircle or contain the country, and call into question Russian dominance in the former Soviet Union. Just as important, however, are the political implications of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Scheffer himself admitted that NATO is not just a military alliance but a ‘political’ one as well, and his comment that ‘NATO expansion means more democracy’ could not have been comforting to the Kremlin.87 Thus, one must go beyond merely the strategic impact of NATO enlargement and take into account the fact that the Alliance is seen as key to the defense, spread, and consolidation of liberal democracies in Europe. It therefore

82 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Russia Warns Against Georgia, Ukraine Joining NATO’, Agence France Presse, 6 July 2007. 83 ������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Moscow Warns Anew Against NATO Membership for Georgia, Ukraine’, Agence France Presse, 8 March 2008. Also see Lavrov’s statement in ‘NATO “Shamelessly” Recruiting Georgia, Ukraine: Russia’, Agence France Presse, 31 March 2008. 84 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� France and Germany were the two Alliance members most stridently against extending formal membership invitations to Georgia and Ukraine because of their unsettled political systems, questions about Georgia’s territorial integrity, and, most importantly, fears of upsetting Russia. However, it was agreed that they would eventually become members some time in the future members if they so choose. 85 ������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Medvedev Says NATO Expansion Will “Spoil” Ties with West’, Agence France Presse, 5 June 2008. 86 ���������������������������������������������������������� Daniel Silva, ‘NATO Reassures Russia Over Eastern Moves’, Agence France Presse, 28 May 2007. 87  Ekho Moskvy Radio, 25 June 2007, reproduced as ‘NATO Secretary-General, Russian Upper House Speaker Agree to Disagree’, in BBCMIR, 25 June 2007.

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also represents a domestic political danger to the Kremlin by reinforcing and intensifying the political consequences of the color revolutions. NATO has become increasingly associated with liberal democratic values in the post-Cold War context. Although there is significant debate over whether it promotes or sustains democratization for either its member states or prospective members, it is clear that this normative component of the Alliance is central to its conceptualization and identity.88 In its 1999 Strategic Concept, agreed to at the Washington Summit celebrating its first post-Cold War expansion, the ‘common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’ were identified as being the fundamental bases of the Alliance. Moreover, supporting the spread of democracy was listed as one of its primary tasks. Earlier, in the September 1995 ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’, only those states which had shown a commitment to liberal-democratic values were deemed eligible for membership. Barany (2006: 169–70) called NATO a ‘“political honor society” that granted membership to all consolidated democracies regardless of their capacity to make military-security contributions to the Alliance’. While this is likely an overstatement, the fact remains that NATO is commonly seen as an alliance of liberal democratic states. Its expansion further into the former Soviet Union would represent a corresponding spread of these values into the region. NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would also symbolize the consolidation of democratic gains in these countries and the region. Even if we grant that it may not actively promote democracy (again, there is significant debate over this), the Alliance has advanced in the wake of democratic waves in its first and second post-Cold War enlargements. Although the first expansion occurred ten years after 1989, this was the result of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and was widely seen as a reward for the successful democratic consolidations in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The second enlargement in 2004 included Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia—states that did not fully make the shift from communism to democracy, but instead stayed semi-authoritarian or hybrid regimes for some time. Once they fully made the transition to democracy, they joined the Alliance. Also admitted in this round were Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, all of which began their independence as democratic and stayed that way. Although the Alliance has already admitted three former Soviet republics, any further expansion of NATO into the former USSR would be qualitatively different than the 2004 enlargement round. The Baltic states remained liberal democracies ever since their independence in 1991, and therefore their admittance to NATO did not come about as the result of a revolutionary shift from authoritarianism 88 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There is some disagreement on this, as Sjursen (2004) pointed out. However, her article collapses the internal workings of the organization with what it represents in the post-Cold War international system. Certainly NATO’s inner-workings are not structurally democratic and some members have been non-democracies, but on the whole NATO is identified with liberal democracy. Also see Reiter 2001, Waterman 2001.

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to democracy, but rather as the recognition of a well-established status quo. Consequently, this was not seen as representative of a new ‘wave’ of democracy. Moreover, the Baltics have long been seen as separate from the rest of the former Soviet Union: not only did they refuse to join the Commonwealth of Independent States or any other post-Soviet international institutions, but Russia’s own early conception of the ‘near abroad’ placed the Baltics in a separate category given their earlier independence, the nature of their incorporation into the USSR, and their ingrained Western orientation (Lukic and Lynch 1996: 363–6). By contrast, Georgia and Ukraine are more representative of the former Soviet states and therefore membership for them would be far more likely to produce the perception of democratic contagion which would reverberate throughout the region. If the Alliance was to expand further in the aftermath of the color revolutions, this could reinforce the sense that these uprisings represent yet another democratic wave or trend which may push further outward. In addition, NATO is, at its core, a Western institution. Alliance membership has represented a ‘Return to Europe’ for countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans—that is, a redefinition of their political identities to the larger ‘European’ community of peoples. This ‘European’ identity is also increasingly associated with liberal democracy. There is a long-standing debate over Russian national identity and whether Russia is an ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ country (or perhaps, an Eurasianist amalgam of both) (Schmidt 2005). NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would in many ways resolve the identity dilemmas for these countries and represent their fundamental orientation with the West. This might open the possibility that others (namely, Belarus and Russia) could find themselves under pressure to orient themselves similarly or be isolated as relics of a more autocratic, regressive, Eastern past.89 However, should they reorient themselves toward Europe, they would then become more susceptible to ‘European values’. Finally, NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would ultimately shield them from external aggression by Russia or another power. The defensive commitments granted by the North Atlantic Treaty are serious and both countries would enjoy a heightened level of security. Research on the relationship between alliances and democracy indicates that the removal of external threats through alliance membership increases the ability of states to focus on internal development and democratic consolidation (Gibler and Wolford 2006, Gibler and Swell 2006). This has certainly been the case with the post-Cold War expansions: none of the countries which have recently joined NATO have backslid on their commitment to liberal democracy; in fact, each was eventually granted membership in the European Union, which has significantly tougher and more extensive political 89 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This is especially true for Belarus, whose president, as seen in Chapter 6, has argued that Belarus is fundamentally an Eastern country in opposition to the Western values of individualism and materialism. Political opponents, by contrast, argue that Belarus is a Western and European country. In terms of Russia, Trenin (2006a) has argued that Russia is ready to ‘leave’ the West.

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standards that NATO. Thus, further NATO expansion would mean that the symbolic threat to the Kremlin posed by Georgian and Ukrainian democracy will most likely be persistent and sustained. Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO would likely undermine the political security of the Kremlin by entrenching the democratic gains already made by color revolutions and intensifying their effects. Alliance enlargement is not just a strategic or national security issue for Russia. When combined with the process of democratic diffusion, it is a domestic, political one as well. Conclusion The color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were particularly threatening to the increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. Even though the predicted democratic cascade was limited to only a few states, the successful consolidation of democracy in Georgia and Ukraine represented powerful symbolic victories for the forces of democracy in the former Soviet Union. According to the logic of democratic diffusion, autocratic regimes have an interest in undermining politically dissimilar governments in order to better ensure regime survivability. Not surprisingly, then, Russian foreign policy toward Tbilisi and Kiev was marked by a significant deterioration in bilateral ties as the Kremlin adopted a set of progressively hostile policies toward Georgia and initiated a sharp reversal in its positive relationship with Ukraine evidenced in the latter years of the Kuchma regime. In each case, Russia sought to delegitimize the states’ democratic credentials and weaken their political stability through a variety of economic and diplomatic pressures. One of the difficulties inherent in this analysis is the interconnectedness of political and security factors. For both Georgia and Ukraine, the changes in political system were accompanied by a corresponding shift in geopolitical orientation. Distinguishing how much democratization affected Russian foreign policy, as opposed to their newfound Western leanings, is extremely difficult. In addition, Russia’s relationship with Ukraine improved briefly following Yanukovich’s return to the post of prime minister. Was this because Yanukovich is pro-Russia and against Ukrainian membership in NATO or was it because his election undermined the Orange Revolution? It is difficult to say. Nevertheless, the timing of the downturn in Russia–Georgia ties (after the Orange Revolution, when the specter of democratic contagion was raised), as well as the nature of the rhetorical attacks against the color revolutions, indicate that the strategic security of Russia and the political security of the Kremlin are increasingly linked in the minds of Russian policymakers. The possibility of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine also complicates the untangling of domestic/political considerations from international/strategic ones. NATO expansion into the former Soviet Union represents a double threat to the Russian Federation: enlargement would add yet more states to the Atlantic Alliance, detach these countries from Russia’s sphere of influence, and firmly

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entrench a potential geopolitical rival in the critical Black Sea region; however, it would also reinforce and intensify the political consequences of the color revolutions by symbolizing the consolidation of democratic gains in the former Soviet Union and providing a stark contrast to an autocratic Russia. This did not occur in the second round of enlargement because the admittance of the Baltic states had few implications for the domestic politics of the region. However, this would likely not be the case if Tbilisi and/or Kiev joined. Therefore, because of this additional domestic-level threat, we should expect to see Russian opposition to further NATO expansion at a level higher than during the first and second post-Cold War enlargements, when Moscow did little more than voice its opposition to the Alliance’s eastward movement. Not only are the strategic stakes higher, but, unlike the previous rounds, membership for Georgia and Ukraine now poses a potential domestic threat to the Kremlin. It is in Moscow’s interests to ensure that neither state joins NATO, either by promoting pro-Russian politicians like Yanukovych or by undermining the countries’ political stability to the point of a democratic reversal. This would be doubly beneficial to the Kremlin: NATO expansion would be halted, due to the Alliance’s membership requirements, and the regional democratic trends unleashed by the color revolutions would be obstructed. Working in Russia’s favor is that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would face significant obstacles. Before Georgia can be admitted, it must resolve its seemingly intractable ethnic problems and restore its territorial integrity. In Ukraine, public support for joining NATO is extremely low. Nevertheless, if they do begin to move closer to Alliance membership, we should expect to see Russia’s relationship with these countries worsen. This downturn may be only temporary, however. Russian relations with the Baltic states improved somewhat after they were placed on the path toward NATO membership.90 If Georgia and/or Ukraine were to persevere and join NATO, we could see their relations with Russia similarly improve for two reasons. First, Alliance membership would help resolve their identity and security issues, allowing them to feel more confident in their relationship with Russia. Consequently, they would not have to resort to antagonistic rhetoric to overcompensate for their vulnerabilities. Second, the historical pattern of Russian and Soviet foreign policy has been for the state to aggressively assert its interests until it meets resistance from a more powerful state or coalition, then pull back and attempt to achieve some form of compromise. NATO membership would therefore establish clear limits to the level of pressure that Russia could impose upon an Alliance member. Nevertheless, in the short term, the quality of Russian relations with Georgia and Ukraine should decline. 90 ���������������������������������������������� Ira Straus, ‘Balts Bury Hatchet with Russia’, CDI Russia Weekly [Online], 8 August 2003. Available at <www.cdi.org/russia/268-13.cfm>, accessed 11 July 2008. However, it should be noted that NATO membership is not a panacea for relations with Russia, as was evident in the 2007 Bronze Monument row between Tallinn and Moscow. See Chapter 5.

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As long as there is political dissimilarity between Russia and its neighbors, Russian foreign policy will be increasingly driven by the Kremlin’s desire to preserve its rule. In the case of Russian relations with Georgia and Ukraine, this has meant adopting policies aimed at subverting democratic gains and regime stability. Therefore, considering the importance that the Kremlin places on resisting democratic trends will allow us to better understand Russian foreign policy choices in the region.

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Chapter 8

Coordinate: Working with Others to Resist Democratization

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution clearly accentuated existing trends and prompted a more aggressive and coordinated response on the part of the world’s authoritarians and autocrats. Indeed, indications of collusion among such regimes have led to speculation about an emerging ‘authoritarian internationale’. Democracy Digest

For authoritarian regimes, democratic transitions in other countries are not insignificant events. This is because a democratic success in one state has political implications for all nearby autocrats through the symbolic nature of the regime’s fall, a sense of momentum, or the other processes associated with democratic diffusion. Consequently, authoritarian regimes have a common interest in resisting democratization. At times this may manifest itself as a willingness to work together to preserve their respective political structures through a policy of coordinate. There is a growing awareness that autocrats have identified this common interest and are pursuing such a strategy. The quote that introduces this chapter refers to the possibility of an ‘authoritarian internationale’ to replace the ‘socialist internationale’ of the Cold War. This phrase was coined by Andrew Kuchins (2008) who, writing in the Moscow Times, titled his essay with a question similarly inspired by the struggle of communism against democracy: ‘Will the Authoritarians of the World Unite?’, just as the workers of the world were supposed to unite against capitalism. He was quick to point out that this alignment is not the same as seen during the Cold War. Few in the authoritarian world are discussing the violent overthrow of the international system, the superiority of their political system over others, or the formation of formal military alliances. Instead, this closer cooperation among authoritarian regimes appears to be more defensive in nature, primarily ensuring that the democratic world does not attempt to, in their view, ‘impose’ democracy by supporting regime change. In this way, it is fundamentally oriented toward preserving the status quo. Rather than seeking a new political order, this ‘authoritarian internationale’ is a return to the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and sovereign equality among states with different political systems. The nineteenth century ‘Holy Alliance’—a  ����������������������������������������������������������������� ‘“Authoritarian Internationale” Leads Anti-Democratic Backlash’, Democracy Digest [Online], 3:1, 31 March 2006. Available at <www.demdigest.net/issues/DD3-3006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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coalition of Russia, Prussia, and the Austro–Hungarian Empire to resist democracy, nationalism, and secularism—is a better parallel than the Eastern Bloc. One example of such ‘an emerging club of authoritarian states’ is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a regional international organization whose members include Russia, China, and the four Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia and China, the two most powerful authoritarian countries in the international system, were instrumental in establishing the organization and shaping its principles, officially known as the ‘Spirit of Shanghai’. An examination of the organization’s founding documents, subsequent resolutions, and statements by its secretaries-general reveals that the SCO is not meant to be just another intergovernmental talking shop, but rather the embodiment of a new set of values and norms governing the future development of Central Asia. As this chapter shows, the Spirit of Shanghai is strongly antidemocratic and primarily interested in regime survivability, thus reflecting the interests of its two most powerful members, as well as its other authoritarian members. The chapter begins with an overview of the development of the SCO from its origins in Russia–Chinese cooperation to its present form as a full-fledged international organization. The second section outlines the so-called ‘Spirit of Shanghai’, paying special attention to the general themes of ‘stability’ and ‘diversity’. Sections three and four delve into these themes in more depth and illustrate how each is understood in the context of the organization and events in the region. Section five examines how the SCO’s rhetoric corresponds to the Kremlin’s understanding of these concepts and therefore reflects its interests. Since the Russian government’s stance on issues of political diversity was already covered in Chapter 5, this section largely focuses on its reactions to events on the ground and the importance of preserving the regional status quo. The conclusion of the chapter expands the notion of coordinate outside of Central Asia by showing how similar patterns can be seen in Russia’s relations with the two states most vocal against Western-inspired democracy promotion: Iran and Venezuela. This section illustrates that coordination with other authoritarian regimes is not limited to Russia’s immediate vicinity, but is rather part of a larger strategy against global democratic trends.

  Even though Turkmenistan is most likely the least democratic of the Central Asian states, it has not joined the SCO. This is not due to a rejection of the organization’s principals, but rather Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality and reluctance to join anything which resembles an alliance. After the death of President Niyazov, Ašgabat appears to be interested in a policy change, however.

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Brief History of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization The Shanghai Cooperation Organization can trace its origins to the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing during the latter years of the Soviet Union and continuing after Russian independence. During the first half of the 1990s, Russian and Chinese leaders held a series of summits where the two countries pledged their desire for ‘good-neighborly’ ties and ‘peaceful coexistence’. By the middle of the decade, both parties observed that bilateral relations had been fundamentally transformed from the often conflictual pattern during the Cold War to a new basis of trust and cooperation. One of the recurring problems in Soviet–/Russo–Chinese relations was the demarcation of their contested border. Significant progress was made on his issue in 1991 and 1994. In an effort to take a more regional approach to the remaining border issues, the leaders of Russia, China, Khazkhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan met in Shanghai in 1996 and 1997 and signed agreements on improving military relations (1996) and reducing their military forces (1997) along their mutual borders. Afterwards, the ‘Shanghai Five’, as they came to be known, met annually to strengthen multilateral relations, with the scope of their discussions expanding to political, security, diplomatic, and economic issues. The heads of state meetings were likewise expanded to include ministerial sessions and lower-level conferences of other government agencies and bodies. In 2000, Uzbek president Islam Karimov attended the summit as a guest, and Uzbekistan joined the organization the following year. In June 2001, the six presidents took the next step and expressed their commitment to establish a formal international organization— the SCO. This was followed the next year by a meeting in St. Petersburg where they adopted an organizational charter. In May 2003, a SCO Executive Secretary (later renamed Secretary-General) was approved, and an inauguration ceremony was held in January 2004 for Zhang Deguang, a career Chinese diplomat, former deputy minister of foreign affairs, and ambassador to Russia. The members of the SCO have used the organization to build regional cooperation in all areas of international relations, issue declarations on a variety of subjects, and sign several multilateral agreements. The SCO is steadily developing an organizational infrastructure, including a permanent staff and administration. It has also expanded its geographic scope by granting observer status to Mongolia in 2004 and to India, Iran, and Pakistan in 2005. Underlying its goal of helping to regulate relations within Central Asia is the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, the values and norms of the organization.

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This section draws from several accounts of the SCO’s development. The SCO has a website which provides a history of the organization. Available at <www.sectsco.org>, accessed 11 July 2008. Several articles have traced its formation either directly or indirectly (Logvinov 2002, Kireev 2003, Lukin 2004, Oresman 2004, Al-Qahtani 2006).

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The Shanghai Spirit In the words of Secretary-General Zhang, the Shanghai Spirit represents ‘a consolidating component, a source of unity and spiritual power … a common concept of security, a civililisation [sic] formula, a concept of development and a system of values’. As written in the Declaration establishing the SCO, the Shanghai Spirit has several components: ‘mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multicivilisations, [and] striving for common development’. It is important to note that this ‘spirit’ is not seen as simply a set of regional norms, but is openly promoted as universally applicable and as a basis for global politics constituted in opposition to what its members see as an Americandominated, power-based international system. A careful reading of the 2001 Declaration establishing the SCO and its 2002 Charter yields interesting insights into the norms and values of the organization. In particular, there are a number of items of interest in the areas of democracy, human rights, and political change. Unlike the charters for the European Union, the Organization for American States, and the African Union, the SCO members make no commitment to democratic values; its founding documents are almost devoid of any mention of democracy. Instead, respect for state ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of the members figures prominently. These phrases, especially in the absence of any mention of democracy, seemingly reject the idea of any state affecting, or even commenting on, the domestic governance of the organization’s members. This is very similar to the norms advanced by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which also featured a rejection of external political influence. While this is not unique to ASEAN, it has historically undermined the likelihood of democratization by, in effect, shielding member states from democracy promotion or even criticism of their political or human rights policies. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the SCO has explicitly seen ASEAN, with its ‘ASEAN way’, as a model upon which to build its own norms and values. While ASEAN is currently struggling with this issue in the aftermath of several democratic revolutions among its members (Hourn  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the SCO’ [Online: SCO], 6 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco. org/html/01006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2001. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2001. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter’ [Online: SCO], 17 June 2002. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00096.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� See Zhang’s statements in ‘Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Chinese Magazine “Zhonghuayingcai”’ [Online: SCO], 25 May 2005. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/00468.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Interview by SCO Secretary-

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2000, Acharya 2003, Yamakage 2005, Katanyuu 2006), it is unlikely that the SCO will see a similar change in the near future given the widespread and entrenched authoritarianism in the region. The absence of democracy as a regional norm is compounded by the SCO’s emphasis on ‘diversity’. Although this term does not appear in either the Declaration or the Charter, it is found in several other SCO documents, usually in relation to respect for other civilizations and the right of all countries to choose their ‘own way of development’. The 2003 Moscow Declaration, for example, devotes an entire section to this issue, stating: ‘Different cultures should progress together, borrowing the best each of them has to offer, and strive for the common while leaving their differences aside’. While respecting others is certainly a laudable goal, references to diversity, respect for other civilizations, and divergent (but equally legitimate) sociopolitical development, when taken together with the prohibition against interference in internal affairs and an absence of any commitment to democracy, further reinforce a sense of the absolute preeminence of states to regulate their domestic politics and to defend their domestic political systems. The sole instance where a variation on the word ‘democracy’ is used in the SCO founding documents is in reference to the need to establish ‘a democratic, fair, and rational new international political economic order’.10 The term ‘democratic’ in this sense does not refer to any interest in spreading democracy on the world stage, but has been consistently used in joint statements by Russia and China to express their opposition to American-dominated unipolarity and their desire to build a ‘multipolar’ international system which would balance or counter American influence (Ambrosio 2005: 78–100). In fact, it is impossible to separate the formation of the SCO from the alliance forged between Moscow and Beijing during the latter half of the 1990s. Beginning with the April 1996 Sino–Russian summit in Beijing, concerns over American dominance of the international system have found expression in joint declarations and a commitment by both sides to work together to create a ‘new world order’. This ‘strategic partnership’ was in part a reaction to an increasingly unilateralist and (in the eyes of Russian and Chinese leaders) hegemonic US foreign policy. If one reads the SCO documents in light of General Zhang Deguang to ITAR–TASS News Agency’ [Online: SCO], 23 May 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00893.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.  ���������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], May 2003. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00015. html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 10 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2001. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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the many Russian–Chinese joint statements issued since the mid-1990s, the link between their shared world vision and the norms/values of the SCO become clearer: the SCO can be seen as the institutionalization of the opposition by Moscow and Beijing to the American-dominated, unipolar international order which promotes democracy and universal human rights, and has used the advancement of these values to intervene in the domestic affairs of states (Serbia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003) seen as violating these norms. For example, compare the above quote on diversity from the SCO 2003 Moscow Declaration to the following statement from the 1997 ‘Joint Russian– Chinese Declaration About a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order’: ‘Each and every state has the right—proceeding from its specific conditions—to independently choose on its own a way of development without intervention on the part of other states. The existing differences between their social systems, ideologies, and systems of values must not become an impediment of the development of normal inter-state relations’.11 Moreover, the ‘a democratic, fair, and rational new international political economic order’ advanced by the SCO in its 15 June 2001 declaration establishing the organization is almost interchangeable with the language used a month later in the Russia–China Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, in which Moscow and Beijing pledged to press for ‘a stable, democratic, nonconfrontational, just, and rational international new order’.12 The similarities between the SCO’s principles and those promoted by Russia and China are no accident. Another central principle of the SCO is its strong emphasis on regional ‘stability’, which appears five times in the founding Declaration and three times in the Charter. The term is not explicitly defined and is commonly expressed in a manner similar to that found in the UN Charter (i.e. the importance of preserving ‘peace, security, and stability’).13 Like the terms ‘sovereignty’, ‘non-interference’, and ‘diversity’, ‘stability’ can be understood in a number of ways. In its most broad definition, it is associated with constancy and the absence of change. While few international organizations have been committed to radical change for themselves or others, when placed in the context of the political systems of its members, the SCO places a heavy premium on the political status quo and rejects, or at least seeks to limit, regime change. The emphasis placed on stability reveals yet another parallel with ASEAN: the shift from brief democratic experiments to authoritarianism was accompanied by the desire to work collectively to preserve their political systems. Like ASEAN, the founding of the SCO correlates with a decisive regional shift away from 11 ���������������������������������������������� ‘Russian–Chinese Join Declaration—Full Text’, TASS, 23 April 1997. 12  Xinhua News Agency, 16 July 2001, reproduced as ‘Chinese, Russian Leaders Joint Statement – Xinhua Domestic Version’, in BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 16 July 2001. 13 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2001, article 2. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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democracy. Two other events might have influenced the formation of the SCO and shaped its values and norms: America’s increased activity in Central Asia after the September 11th terrorist attacks, which brought an active democracy promoter into the region, and the solidification of authoritarianism in the Kremlin, with Russia emerging as a ‘critical state’ (along with China) in resisting regional democratic trends. Moreover, the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have raised the specter of further challenges to the autocratic regimes of the former Soviet Union and therefore have given a strong impetus to regional, autocratic cooperation. The authoritarianism evidenced within the SCO states and the potential threats to regime stability are bound to influence the meaning and application of the organization’s values and norms. All international organizations identify the principles and values which the organization seeks to preserve and promote. The norms identified in this section are found in the founding documents of other international organizations, and therefore the SCO is not fundamentally different than other entities before it. However, the true definition of these concepts is left open to interpretation and these terms and phrases have various connotations. It is only through an examination of the actors’ core values, actions, and rhetoric can one hope to understand the underlying meanings (and political applications) of these norms. In the following two sections, the terms ‘stability’ and ‘diversity’ will be explored in depth through statements made by SCO leaders, paying special attention to what these concepts mean for the prospects for democracy promotion in the region. Stability The SCO places a high premium on promoting and sustaining ‘stability’ in the region. As stated above, this term can have multiple meanings. However, this section seeks to make sense of the term by placing its use in context and by identifying how it has been connected to other events and concepts. In this way, a fuller picture of the anti-democratic tendencies of the SCO can be seen. Although the term stability is used in the SCO’s founding documents and subsequent statements, other subjects, such as terrorism, combating transnational

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drug trafficking, and economic development, figured much more prominently prior to 2005.14 This changed quite dramatically after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 2004–January 2005) and especially after the events during the spring of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The SCO’s reaction to these situations acts as a sort of ‘rosetta stone’, allowing us to decipher the organization’s stance toward political change. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly explain what occurred during this time. In March 2005, a popular uprising overthrew Kyrgyzstan’s long-serving president, Askar Akayev (Otunbayeva 2005, Marat 2006, Fuhrmann 2006). Despite emerging from the Soviet Union as an ‘island of democracy’ in Central Asia, Akayev’s regime shifted toward autocracy, precipitating increased opposition to his regime. After the fraudulent parliamentary elections of February and March 2005, protestors stormed several government buildings, eventually forcing Akayev to flee the country. There were reports of scattered clashes between police and protesters, as well as some looting in the capital, Bishkek, though the violence was quite minimal. Soon afterward, opposition leaders formed a new, nominally pro-democracy government. While there is some question whether the Tulip Revolution should properly be called a ‘color revolution’—given several differences between it and the events in Georgia and Ukraine15—it was case in which an authoritarian president was removed by a popular uprising whose leaders learned from the examples of prior color revolutions. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it can fit into this category (Fuhrmann 2006: 25). By contrast, the May 2005 events in Uzbekistan ended quite differently. President Islam Karimov has ruled Uzbekistan dictatorially since independence, dealing harshly with any opponents, especially those labeled as Islamic fundamentalists. In June 2004, 23 businessmen from the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan were arrested and charged with being Islamic radicals and belonging to an outlawed terrorist organization (charges which they denied). On 12 May 2005, a police station and military garrison were stormed by the accused’s supporters, who later freed them and other inmates from the local prison. They then seized another government building, and upwards of 20,000 people gathered in the central square 14 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� See, for example, the SCO declarations at Moscow (2003) and Tashkent (2004). ‘Moscow Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00015.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Tashkent Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00119.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. In addition, see: ‘Interview by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to the Phoenix Satellite Television Company Commentator Anthony Yuen’ [Online: SCO], 14 July 2004. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00442.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. In this interview Zhang identifies ‘economic development’ as the second most important work of the SCO, after combating international terrorism. 15 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� For example, nongovernmental organizations and youth groups played a far smaller role in the Tulip Revolution. Moreover, the democratic credentials of the new, Kyrgyz government are in more doubt than in Georgia and Ukraine.

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to express their opposition to the Karimov regime. Karimov claimed that the events in Andijan were linked to the Tulip Revolution: ‘The scenario was identical, they wanted to repeat the coup in Kyrgyzstan’.16 In response, Uzbek troops moved in and began shooting the unarmed demonstrators. Global reaction was harsh, with Western governments and international organizations calling for an immediate, independent investigation. Karimov initially responded by denouncing the West for meddling in Uzbekistan’s ‘internal affairs’ and refusing to even discuss the matter publicly. Later, he admitted that close to two hundred ‘terrorists’, who were ‘taking hostages and executing people’, were killed.17 Opposition forces put the death toll at more than five hundred, with some two hundred additional civilians killed as they tried to flee the city.18 While there is clearly significant dispute about what actually occurred in Andijan, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe issued a scathing report against the Uzbek authorities.19 After the Tulip revolution, Secretary-General Zhang gave an interview to a Chinese television outlet in which he tied the ‘disturbing events’ and ‘negative excesses’ in Kyrgyzstan to the need by the SCO ‘to counteract against extremist forces, maintain the stability of the region and the society’.20 This link, between anti-regime activities and extremism, was reiterated by Zhang in interviews given soon after the crackdown in Andijan, in which his description of the events there corresponded closely to those of Karimov. The protesters were linked to ‘religious extremist forces’ and the regime’s actions were seen as part of the larger ‘struggle against terrorism’.21 Moreover, he warned that any further color revolutions would

16 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘Karimov Says Riots Orchestrated by Islamists to Topple Regime’, The Hindu, 15 May 2005. 17  Uzbek Television First Channel (Tashkent), 18 May 2005, reproduced as ‘Uzbek President Attacks Foreign Interference in Andijon Events’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports [BBCMIR], 19 May 2005; ‘Karimov Gives Detailed Account of Andizhan Events’, TASS, 28 June 2005. 18 ���������������������������� ‘The Blood-Red Revolution’, Economist, 21 May 2005. 19 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005’ [Online: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], 20 June 2005. Available at <www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/06/15233_en.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008. 20 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Interview by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Chinese Television Channel Phoenix’ [Online: SCO], 31 March 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/00461.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 21 ������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Chinese Magazine “Zhonghuayingcai”’ [Online: SCO], 25 May 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/00468.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. Also see his statements linking anti-regime activities to terrorism in ‘Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Russian Journal Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00575. html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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‘result in extremely dangerous political consequences, seriously affecting the whole region’.22 In July 2005, the SCO heads of state held a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. This meeting was the first after the Tulip Revolution and the crackdown in Andijan, and showed that Zhang’s initial statements were in line with the feelings of the SCO’s member states. The summit’s tone was expressed at its plenary session by Zhang, who noted that the ‘recent events’ in Central Asia have: … once again shown that terrorism, separatism and extremism still remain to be the most serious threat to peace, security, stability and development in the region. The summit made the right evaluation and properly reacted to the situation in the region. It adopted a decision, which says that the member states will continue to strengthen unity and interaction in their counteraction against ‘the three evil forces’. Maintaining peace, security and stability is a matter of top priority to the Central Asia [sic].23

Although Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were not explicitly mentioned in the official declaration issued at the summit, this document made repeated references to ‘stability’ and openly supported its members’ ‘efforts … aimed at providing peace, security and stability in their territory and in the whole region’.24 While this may be seen as an innocuous statement, it came on the heels of the brutal crackdown in Uzbekistan and could be seen as applauding Karimov’s actions. In subsequent statements, Zhang provided additional insight into the SCO’s thinking at the Astana summit. At an international symposium on the future of the SCO and the region, Zhang argued that stability ‘is the common interest of all parties’ and rejected external calls for additional color revolutions in Central Asia by linking them to ‘extreme measures’ and ‘chaos’, and providing ‘extremist and terrorist forces’ with the opportunity to achieve their goals.25 Although Zhang 22 ������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Chinese Magazine “Zhonghuayingcai”’ [Online: SCO], 25 May 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/00468.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 23 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Speech by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the Plenary ����������������������� Session of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/00413.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 24 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <sww.sectsco.org/html/00500.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 25 ����������������������������������������������� ‘Address by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Participants ������������������������������ of International Symposium “The New Situation in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”’ [Online: SCO], 25 September 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00540.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. Many of the same themes also arose in ‘Interview by Secretary General Zhang Deguang to Journalists of Xian on Issues of the Eurasian Economic Forum’ [Online: SCO], 18 October 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00632.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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admitted that there are multiple perceptions of what occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, he clearly came down on the side of those who ‘considered them as disorders, provoked by extremist elements’. These themes were repeated in a lengthy press conference held just before the fifth anniversary summit of the SCO in Beijing in July 2006.26 In response to a question about Andijan, Zhang stated that ‘the SCO carefully studied the events’ and was assured that Uzbek authorities could handle the situation on their own. Nevertheless, the events in Andijan ‘demonstrated that there is a factor of instability in the Central Asia region, which mainly manifests itself in the existence of terrorist, extremist and separatist forces … We must remain vigilant and keep a close eye on the activity of these forces’. Several things are interesting in these post-Astana statements. First, the contrast was repeatedly made between the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and stability, on the other. Neither of these events occurred with significant violence by anti-regime forces, mass refugee flows, or loss of property.27 Granted, there was some looting in Bishkek, but it is unclear whether these were the actions of anti-regime protesters or pro-regime forces seeking to delegitimize the Tulip Revolution. Moreover, although there was some violence committed by protestors in Andijan, the OSCE report was unequivocal in its findings that unarmed civilians were shot indiscriminately and extrajudicial executions occurred during and after the protests. This indicates that virtually any anti-regime activities—in the form of a popular uprising after a rigged election or mass protests against an authoritarian leader—are deemed illegitimate by the SCO and contrary to the security of its members. Given how often stability is mentioned as a key interest, the implication is that it is in the interests of the SCO and its member states to prevent regime change in Central Asia. This is similar to Russian statements which have made it clear that the Kremlin will not countenance any further color revolutions in the former Soviet Union.28 Steps have already been taken by the SCO and its members to limit the ability of anti-regime activists to operate—for example, nongovernmental organizations have been severely restricted from operating in Russia under a January 2006 law, and the SCO issued a 2006 statement on ‘information communication technology’ which seeks to curb its use for ‘political purposes that … trigger social instability in countries’.29 Second, Zhang’s comments have been largely consistent on the illegitimacy of color revolutions, demonstrating that they represent values well-entrenched 26 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the SCO’ [Online: SCO], 6 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco. org/html/01006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 27 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There were some who fled the violence in Andijan. However, this did not represent a significant humanitarian crisis. 28 �������������� See Chapter 3. 29 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Statement of Heads of SCO Member States on International Information Security’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00958.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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in the organization and among its members—if anything, these statements have become more strident over time. Moreover, they have been confirmed by Zhang’s successor, Bolat Nurgaliev, from Kazakhstan, indicating not only persistence across secretaries–general, but also continuity in the shift from a ‘big power’ (China) to a ‘lesser power’ (Kazakhstan).30 Thus, anti-regime activities are considered inherently illegitimate and any changes to the political systems of the Central Asian states must ‘be resolved by legal means and not by breaking stability or by creating chaos in the Central Asia [sic]’.31 However, since none of these regimes have legalized substantive opposition to their rule, it is unclear how any political changes unacceptable to the rulers could occur legally since, by definition, any anti-regime actions have been outlawed. Third, Zhang repeatedly connected the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to both ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. Along with ‘separatism’, these terms constitute two of the ‘three evil forces’ which are seen to plague the region. This phrase is repeated often in speeches by the secretaries-general and invariably associated with the notions of struggle and threat. Combating them has become ‘one of the priority directions of cooperation within the framework of the Organization’.32 These terms were defined in the June 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism.33 In this document, the formal definition of extremism involves ‘the use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State’. However, as seen by Zhang’s comments after the events of spring 2005, the working definition is much broader and seemingly includes any anti-regime activities, regardless of the level of violence. Since ‘extremism’, according to the convention, ‘cannot be justified under any circumstances’, it is unclear how the citizens of the SCO member states will be able to legally affect political change contrary to the wishes of their authoritarian regimes. Thus, with

30 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Interview of SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev with ITAR-TASS News Agency and Khabar TV Channel’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/01201.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Interview of SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev with Xinhua News Agency correspondent Zhao Jialin’. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/01190.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 31 ��������������������������������� ‘Secretary-General Answers Media Questions ���������������������������������������� about Central Asia Situation’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00593.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 32 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Statement by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the Final Session of the Council of National Coordinators’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/00259.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. Also see Zhang’s lengthy comments in ‘Press Conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the SCO’, 6 June 2006 [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/01006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 33 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2001. Available at <www.sectsco.org/news_detail. asp?id=93&LanguageID=2>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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a loose understanding of what constitutes an extremist, virtually any actions to ensure regime survival can be justified by the norms of the SCO. Finally, the SCO is committed to vigilance against the sources of instability. In response to a question about a possible ‘domino effect’ of anti-regime activities in the region, Zhang hoped that the Central Asian leaders would ‘pay their attentions to these problems’ and ‘[take] appropriate preventive measures and maintain political and social stability in their states’.34 More ominously, the SCO members must act ‘to prevent black plans of the terrorist, separatist and extremist forces, aimed on [creating] chaos in the Central Asian region’.35 Maintaining the political status quo has therefore become a central tenet of the SCO, legitimized by the norms of the organization. In fact, Zhang noted that the development of the SCO has actually been energized by the need to combat the ‘instabilities’ themselves.36 At the current time, members of the SCO are not permitted to actively quell instability in their neighbors, since the organization still holds true to the principle of non-interference. Nevertheless, any steps that a government takes to ensure stability will not be criticized and in some circumstances will be overtly applauded by its neighbors. Moreover, Zhang hinted that the SCO members are working on ‘some kind of legal procedure’ for joint operations to combat the sources of instability.37 According to a joint communiqué issued after the Shanghai summit in June 2006, these steps are well underway.38 While this will probably never rise to the level of the so-called ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’—in which the USSR claimed the right to use military force to prevent any member of the Soviet bloc from rejecting communism—it may foreshadow a more proactive stance by SCO member states to counter anti-regime activities in the region. Stability is seen as the most important value of the SCO, necessary for progress on social or economic goals. As Chinese President Hu Jintao stated at the Astana summit, ‘Without stability, there can be no talk of any development’.39 While 34 ��������������������������������������������������������� ‘Interview by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to the Phoenix ������������������ Satellite Television Company Commentator Anthony Yuen’ [Online: SCO], 14 July 2004. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00442.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 35 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference by Secretary General Zhang Deguang’ [Online: SCO], 1 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00626.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 36 ����������������������������������������������� ‘Address by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Participants ������������������������������ of International Symposium “The New Situation in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”’ [Online: SCO], 25 September 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00540.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 37 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the SCO’ [Online: SCO], 6 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco. org/html/01006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 38 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Joint Communiqué of 2006 SCO Summit’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2006. Available at <english.scosummit2006.org/en_zxbb/2006-06/15/content_756.htm>, accessed 11 July 2008. 39 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Hu Jintao Delivers Speech at Astana Summit’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <english.scosummit2006.org/en_ldrjh/2005-07/06/content_176.htm>,

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this may appear both obvious and innocuous, this notion takes on a strongly antidemocratic meaning in the context of the loose definitions of stability and instability identified above. Moreover, seeking political change outside of the context of stability is an ‘unrealizable Utopia’, according to Zhang, who points out that ‘this truth is accepted by the overwhelming majority of politicians, businessmen and ordinary citizens of the Central Asian states, so why the people from outside should be any wiser than all of them [sic]?’40 Beyond the lack of democracy in the region, which ensures that the views of the Central Asians themselves have no effective way of freely being expressed, this last statement is revealing: those outside the region have no right to criticize the Central Asian regimes’ quest for stability, regardless of the means by which they seek to achieve it. As seen in the next section, the SCO’s support for the notion of ‘diversity’ seeks to further shield its leaders from alternative conceptions of political change and development. Diversity SCO founding documents, its member states, and secretaries-general have used the term ‘diversity’ when outlining the organization’s values and norms. Diversity, like stability, at first appears unobjectionable—just as the international community seeks to counter chaos, it also values respect for other cultures. However, like the anti-democratic meaning imbedded in the SCO’s understanding of stability, the principle of diversity also has an anti-democratic foundation. While they have been separated in this chapter for purposes of structure, they are really two sides of the same issue: if the diversity of the region’s governing structures is respected by outside states (namely, the democratic countries of the West), the authoritarian regimes of the region will be shielded from criticism and democracy promotion and, consequently, the stability of the regimes will be preserved. In a 2006 interview to ITAR–TASS, Zhang outlined the central role that diversity plays within the Shanghai Spirit: ‘We proceed from the respect for diversity of cultures. We respect the right of each country to choose its own path of socioeconomic development and do not think it is appropriate to interfere in its internal affairs; we do not impose our own model of development or our own model of democracy on anyone’.41 According to the SCO, diversity refers to the fact that there are multiple ‘paths’ of socioeconomic development, each, by accessed 11 July 2008. 40 ����������������������������������������������� ‘Address by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Participants ������������������������������ of International Symposium “The New Situation in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”’ [Online: SCO], 25 September 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00540.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 41 �������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Interview by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to ITAR-TASS News Agency’ [Online: SCO], 23 May 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00893.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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implication, with its own validity. Also, the member states claim that they have their own ‘models’ of democracy and the very use of the word ‘democracy’ harkens back to the communist period (from which China, of course, has not emerged) in which these regimes used wordplay to counter the global norm of democracy. This implies that regimes which claim that they are on equally valid, but divergent, paths of democratic development should be exempt from any criticism about how they govern their people. At the July 2005 Astana summit, the SCO members used their discussion of diversity to assert: ‘Every people must be properly guaranteed to have the right to choose its own way of development’.42 In his address to the summit’s plenary session and in press conferences held around the same time, Zhang provided some context for this statement by linking it to the organization’s ‘deep analysis of current international and regional conditions’, in particular the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.43 Democracy is not seen as a universal concept, but rather determined by a state’s ‘national features and historical traditions’,44 ‘a product of the development of the internal politics, economics and culture for every country’,45 and based upon a country’s ‘different stage and level of development’.46 Therefore, according to Zhang, each state’s political system is by necessity going to look different; to expect the states of Central Asia to have the liberal democratic systems of the West is impossible. While this is certainly a valid point (even within the democratic world, no two democracies are exactly the same), it overlooks the fact that, with the seemingly brief exception of the Tulip Revolution, the authoritarian tendencies of each of the SCO members has either stayed the same or intensified: they are not democratic and do not appear to be moving toward democracy. In fact, most regimes have adopted policies to entrench themselves in power against their opponents. Challenging Western democratic concepts with alternative perspectives has become a central feature of the SCO. For example, the SCO nominally supports the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,47 but has taken a 42 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 43 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Speech by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the Plenary ����������������������� Session of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/00413.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 44 ����� Ibid. 45 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference by Secretary General Zhang Deguang’ [Online: SCO], 1 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00626.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 46 ��������������������������������� ‘Secretary-General Answers Media Questions ���������������������������������������� about Central Asia Situation’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00593.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 47 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Statement of Heads of SCO Member States on International Information Security’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00958.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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firm stance against the notion of universal human rights; instead, they have adopted a relativist notion which bases human rights on ‘historical traditions’ and ‘national features’, while at the same time defending the ‘sovereign equality’ of states to determine the content and application of rights.48 Moreover, Zhang gave a fascinating speech at the 100th anniversary of the Russian Duma in which he praised the body for its century of ‘spreading ideas and experience of parliamentary democracy across the whole of Russia’ and exemplifying ‘the best traditions and the experience of parliamentary democracy’.49 Zhang expressed a continuity between the tsarist Duma, the Soviet legislatures, and the Duma of the Russian Federation. However, for nearly all of this history, the Russian Duma, in its various incarnations, has failed to live up to even the most basic democratic standards. Even in the post-Soviet period, the Duma has seen its power and autonomy eroded in favor of a centralized, presidential autocracy. Zhang’s statements reveal more than simply a series of diplomatic platitudes; rather, they provide some insight into how the organization conceives of democracy. The definition of democracy within the SCO is ultimately void of any specific political content or standards. According to the SCO, they seek a new world order which downplays differences in ‘ideology and social structure’ and instead reinforces the moral ‘equality’ between authoritarian and democratic regimes.50 This notion supports the SCO’s push for a ‘democratic’ international system in which no one political standard or perspective (i.e. American and Western democracy promotion) dominates. This argument in defense of separate, but equally valid, paths of development is reminiscent of the ‘Asian values’ arguments of the 1990s. China has long been a proponent of a form of ‘Asian values’ through its use of a ‘developmentalist’ argument against universal democracy and human rights standards. Russia, too, has adopted another version of this language through its defense of ‘sovereign democracy’ (see Chapter 5). It is therefore not surprising that we should see a similar refutation Western democratic concepts within the SCO. A key component of the defense of diversity is the argument that it is illegitimate for outsiders to ‘impose’ their version of democracy on anyone else. This is enshrined in the organization’s many statements praising the principle of ‘noninterference’ in internal affairs. Again, it is important to keep in mind that none of the states of the SCO are liberal democracies, despite their claims to the contrary. By rejecting the very legitimacy of outside criticism, these states are seeking to use 48 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <sww.sectsco.org/html/00500.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 49 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Speech by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the Solemn Session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation’ [Online: SCO], 27 April 2006. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/00845.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 50 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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the language of diversity and democracy to preserve the authoritarian status quo. Evidence for this assertion comes not only from a prima facie application of the definition of democracy to the countries in question, but from the fact that many of these comments were made within the context of championing the principle of stability. Therefore, diversity is utilized as a shield against democracy promotion and ‘instability’, defined as anti-regime activities. In effect, this is a strategy of Redefine on a regional scale. On several occasions in the immediate aftermath of the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Zhang’s comments shifted effortlessly from the language of stability to that of diversity. For example, in speaking to the Russian journal Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, Zhang argued that color revolutions would allow the three evil forces to take advantage of the situation in Central Asia and promote ‘chaos’ in the region.51 Therefore, external democracy promotion is both illegitimate and counterproductive: It is unacceptable to apply absolutely the same approach everywhere and inadmissible to transplant democracy by force, thus bestowing a doubtful benefit upon someone. In such a complex and sensitive region as the Central Asia it is necessary to act very cautiously, otherwise it may lead to disturbances and unrest, bring chaos to the society, disrupt the normal process of social and economic development and move in a direction opposite to democracy. The events, which have recently taken place, show that the task of fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism remains hugely difficult, and the international community must take more action to go on with this fight.52

This statement is interesting for several reasons. First, democratic powers made no moves to impose democracy by force within the region. Instead, they merely supported the relatively peaceful overthrow of one increasingly authoritarian regime and criticized the indiscriminate use of force by another. Prior to the Andijan crackdown, the United States itself had been internationally criticized for not dealing more harshly with Uzbekistan’s human rights abuses and therefore had not demonstrated a strong inclination to advance its democracy agenda in the region. While forcible regime change in Iraq may be seen at first to underlie Zhang’s statement, this was not likely the case, since, on another occasion, he explicitly stated that the situation in Iraq had no immediate impact on the region.53 51 ����������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Russian Journal Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik’ [Online: SCO]. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00575. html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 52 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. Also see a similarly detailed statement in ‘Press Conference by Secretary General Zhang Deguang’ [Online: SCO], 1 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/00626.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 53 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the SCO’ [Online: SCO], 6 June 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.

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Moreover, the SCO previously supported democracy-building efforts in Iraq.54 Nevertheless, Zhang implied that democracy promotion is an aggressive—and by implication, an illegitimate and unlawful—act. Second, the word ‘transplant’ further implies that Western notions of democracy are somehow foreign to the historical and cultural development of the region. Other variations on this term included ‘imposition’55 and ‘export’,56 all of which have the connotation of inflicting an unnatural political system upon these societies. Outside perspectives are considered ‘artificial’57 and ‘subjective’.58 This is similar to the arguments made in support of ‘Asian values’—that so-called ‘universal’ human rights and democracy standards are inherently ‘Western’ and have no applicability amongst the ‘Asian’ peoples. Nearly every time Zhang made this argument, he linked external criticisms of the Central Asian political systems, on the one hand, and instability and chaos, on the other. It is perhaps revealing that in its 2003 Moscow Declaration, the SCO was willing to support calls for democratization outside of the region (Iraq), but failed to do so when addressing postwar reconstruction in Central Asia (Afghanistan).59 Finally, the claim that the Central Asian states are moving toward democracy on their own accord is simply not true. In fact, there has been a pattern over the past decade of continuously tightening the central authorities’ political control. Without outside pressure to liberalize, it is more likely that authoritarianism will be maintained. However, the SCO has asserted that by promoting its version of democracy (i.e. by undermining the diversity of the region), the West has unleashed instability in the region. Instead of representing democratic openings, the SCO has directly connected the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the ‘three evil forces’. Rather than criticizing governments for how they handle situations in their own countries, Zhang argued that outside powers should actively support their org/html/01006.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 54 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], May 2003. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00015. html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 55 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Speech by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the First Meeting of Speakers of Parliaments of SCO Member States’ [Online: SCO], 30 May 2006. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00900.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 56 ������������������������������������������������������ ‘Speech by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang at the Plenary ����������������������� Session of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States’ [Online: SCO], 5 July 2005. Available at <www. sectsco.org/html/00413.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 57 ��������������������������������� ‘Secretary-General Answers Media Questions ���������������������������������������� about Central Asia Situation’ [Online: SCO], 15 June 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00593.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 58 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Press Conference by Secretary General Zhang Deguang’ [Online: SCO], 1 July 2005. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00626.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 59 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Moscow Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ [Online: SCO], May 2003. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/00015. html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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efforts to ensure the status quo, just as the SCO members are doing themselves. Thus, when linked to stability, the language of diversity serves as a ready response against external criticism and uses the language of liberal democracies to undermine democracy promotion. The norm of diversity, along with its corollaries of non-interference and separate (but equal) paths of development, has been used by the SCO to reinforce the legitimacy of the autocratic regimes of Central Asia. This is nothing new, as the legacy of authoritarianism in ASEAN have illustrated. When reinforced with the perception that anti-regime activities are inherently tied to the ‘evils’ of instability, the organization’s emphasis on maintaining order over political change allows little room for democracy promotion. Russia and the Values of the SCO Russia, along with China, played an instrumental role in forming the SCO and shaping its values. It should therefore not be surprising that the Kremlin’s views of political developments in the region are similar to that of the SCO. As seen in Chapter 5, Russia sought to defend its governing structure against external criticisms by using something akin to the language of diversity. Similar language was used in defending the need to preserve the authoritarian status quo against any potential political changes. This section will recount Russia’s reaction to events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the first half of 2005 to illustrate how the SCO’s stance was a reflection of the Kremlin’s interests. Russian policy toward the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan was far more neutral than that seen during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in that it did not explicitly take sides between the incumbent and the opposition. In fact, the Kremlin was somewhat cool toward Akayev’s survival. Before the parliamentary elections, Russian officials met with opposition figures in Moscow and refused a meeting with Akayev during the height of the anti-regime protests.60 After Akayev fled into exile in Russia, Moscow, like the SCO, was quick to recognize the new regime. Several reasons may account for Russia’s less active policy in propping up authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan. First, the stakes were far lower in Kyrgyzstan than Ukraine. Given the closeness between the two Slavic countries, democracy in Ukraine had a direct impact on politics in Russia. While the fall of Akayev certainly raised questions of whether democratic revolutions would spread further, the connection between politics in Kiev and Moscow are far more important than between Bishkek and Moscow. Second, the Kremlin apparently learned a lesson from its involvement in the Orange Revolution. Taking a strong stance in the domestic politics of its neighbors could precipitate a further backlash against it both within the region and from those outside of it. Moreover, a dramatic reversal in the Moldovan Communists’ pro-Russian orientation prior to that country’s March 2005 60 �������� ‘Moscow ������������� Pursued Wise �������������������������� Policy on Kyrgyz Events’, RIA Novosti, 25 March 2005.

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parliamentary election, in which the incumbent Communists accused Russia of interfering in Moldovan domestic politics, reportedly gave the Kremlin pause about any overt interference in future elections.61 Third, the Kyrgyz opposition indicated that it was intent in pursuing a pro-Russian foreign policy if they came into office and would be committed to the strategic and political status quo in the region. This certainly made the transition more palatable to the Kremlin in that it did not present Russia with two distinct foreign policy orientations (pro-Russia versus pro-West), as seen in the Ukrainian election. Kyrgyzstan was not in a position to apply for NATO or EU membership and therefore the Tulip Revolution did not represent the possible insertion of the democratic West into Central Asia. Moreover, the new Kyrgyz government was not interested in spreading their revolution outside of Kyrgyzstan. It did not call into question the other authoritarian governments in the region and was quick to accept the principles of non-interference, sovereignty, and stability.62 Finally, Russian officials were effective in their policy of downplaying the broader, regional implications of Akayev’s ouster by arguing that tit was caused by distinctly local conditions. For example, Putin blamed the political crisis on ‘the result of the weakness of power and of accumulated social-economic problems’, rather than region-wide conditions.63 This contrasted sharply with the rhetoric of both sides during the Orange Revolution, which quickly became part of a larger struggle between East and West—the subtext of which, of course, was about autocracy versus democracy. In this way, the Kremlin sought to contain any potential political damage by portraying the Tulip Revolution as a unique, onetime event. Nevertheless, the Russian government was not completely positive toward the Tulip Revolution. The government-controlled Russian television media exaggerated the nature of the level of violence involved in anti-regime protests and linked the events to ‘extremists and drug barons’.64 Moreover, despite expressing a willingness to work with and recognize the new regime, Putin declared Akayev’s overthrow to be illegal, stating ‘it is regrettable that in a post-Soviet country the conflict was resolved in an illegitimate way and was accompanied by pogroms and human victims’.65 This seeming contradiction—between accepting the new status quo but rejecting the legitimacy of the change that caused it—is also found in the SCO’s response. Finally, in the immediate aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, the Kremlin established a new government institution, the Department of Interregional and 61 �������������������������������������������������� ‘Avoiding a Russia-vs-West Rift over Kyrgyzstan’, RIA Novosti, 24 March 2005. 62 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See comments to that effect by Zhang in ‘Press Conference by Secretary General Zhang Deguang’ [Online: SCO], 1 July 2005. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008. 63 ���������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Accepts New Leaders in Kyrgyzstan, but Calls Power ���������������������������� Grab “Illegitimate”’, Agence France Presse, 25 March 2005. 64 �������� ‘Moscow ������������� Pursued Wise �������������������������� Policy on Kyrgyz Events’, RIA Novosti, 25 March 2005. 65 ������������� ‘Putin Calls Power �������������������������������������������� Change in Kyrgyzstan “Illegitimate”’, AFX International Focus, 25 March 2005.

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Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was officially charged with strengthening ‘cultural ties with foreign countries’.66 According to reports, this department was unofficially charged with preventing further color revolutions in the former Soviet Union. Modest Kolerov, who had recently written a series of scathing attacks on ‘revolutionary’ (prodemocracy) forces in the region, was appointed to head the new department. In addition to this more ‘soft power’ approach to democracy prevention, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a Russian-dominated military pact under the auspices of the CIS and formed as a counterweight to NATO—held a set of military exercises in Tajikistan in April 2005 which effectively rehearsed ‘the possible suppression of a revolution in the CIS’.67 These steps indicated that while the Kremlin considered the short-term threat of democratic contagion from Kyrgyzstan to be sufficiently contained, it was interested in taking a more proactive role in resisting anti-regime activities within the region. Such a strategy was on display just two months after the Tulip Revolution. Russia’s reaction to the crackdown in Andijan placed Moscow in opposition to American and European perspectives. Russia openly took Karimov’s side in the dispute, portraying the events in Uzbekistan as a clash between a legitimate government and religious fundamentalists bent on creating an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. Part of the reason for the Kremlin’s strong stance here, as opposed to Kyrgyzstan, may have been a desire to ensure that any anti-regime momentum was stifled before a pattern could form. Similar to the language used by the SCO, the need to ensure regional ‘stability’ figured prominently in the official Kremlin position: Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko stated that Russia supported the government’s attempts to ‘stabilize’ the situation in Uzbekistan.68 Also, according to the Foreign Ministry’s official statement on a phone conversation between Putin and Karimov around this time, the two leaders expressed fears of ‘destabilization’.69 Afterwards, Putin declared his satisfaction that the actions of the Uzbek government had led to the ‘normalisation’ of the situation in its country, even if this process resulted in the deaths of scores or possibly hundreds of civilians.70 Moreover, Russian officials 66 ����������������������� Oleg Kashin, ‘Vladimir Putin ��������������������������������������������� Appoints Velvet Counterrevolutionary’, Kommersant, 23 March 2005, reproduced in BBCMIR, 23 March 2005; ‘No More “Revolutions” in Our Back Yard, Vows Russia’, Agence France Presse, 23 March 2005; ‘Putin Tries Kinder Approach after Setbacks’, UPI, 24 March 2005. 67  Kommersant, 4 April 2005, 1, 9, reproduced as ‘Tajikistan: CIS Military Exercises Rehearse “Suppression of Revolution”’, in BBCMIR, 6 April 2005. 68 ��������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Says Closely Following Uzbekistan Unrest’, Xinhua General News Service, 13 May 2005. 69 ��������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Says Closely Following Uzbekistan Unrest’, Xinhua General News Service, 13 May 2005; ‘Putin Concerned about “Destabilization” in Central Asia’, Agence France Presse, 14 May 2005. 70 ���������� ‘Russia’s Putin ���������������������������������������������� Hopes for Stabilisation in Uzbekistan’, Agence France Presse, 28 June 2005.

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also connected anti-regime forces to the ‘three evil forces’ identified by the SCO, repeatedly calling them ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’. In order to vilify the protesters, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov linked them to the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorists from Chechnya, and assorted international Islamic radicals.71 Rather than an expression of anti-Karimov sentiment, Lavrov portrayed ���������������������������������� the events as caused by foreigners who effectively ‘invaded’Uzbekistan for the purpose of fomenting chaos.72 In addition to openly supporting the crackdown, the Kremlin echoed the SCO’s defense of Uzbekistan against external criticisms. The United States, NATO, the EU, and the UN Secretary-General all called for an independent investigation of the events in Andijan.73 Kremlin officials, however, were quick to reject this notion, with Lavrov calling the Andijan crackdown solely a matter of ‘Uzbekistan’s internal affairs’74 and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov citing Uzbekistan’s ‘sovereignty’.75 Russia even went as far as to block the United Nations Security Council from receiving a briefing from the UN’s top human rights official at the request of the US.76 Russia’s UN representative, Konstantin Dolgov, argued that since this was a matter of Uzbek domestic politics, it should not be on the international body’s agenda. This emphasis on the inviolability of a state’s right to govern its own internal affairs is similar to the SCO’s references to the principle of ‘non-interference’ in its various documents. However, this position exhibited a certain level of hypocrisy on the part of Russian and Uzbek officials: although they claimed that external states and organizations had no right to examine the events in Andijan because they were an internal matter and therefore did not concern the outside world, Moscow and Tashkent repeatedly cited the international nature of the ‘terrorist’ threat and both the SCO and the CSTO placed the matter on their agenda. However, since Russia plays a major role in both organizations, the Kremlin, along with its authoritarian allies, could shape how these organizations

71 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Aidar Buribayev, ‘Ivanov Opposes International Investigation into the Andijan Events’, Gazeta, 10 June 2005, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 10 June 2005. 72 ��������������������������������������������� ‘Lavrov Wants to Know Who Attacked Andijan’, Vremya Novostei, 27 May 2005, 1, reproduced in Defense and Security (Russia), 30 May 2005. Also see statements by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in Aidar Buribayev, ‘Ivanov Backs Karimov’, Gazeta, 10 June 2005, No. 106, 1, reproduced Russian Press Digest, 10 June 2005. 73 ���������������������������������������������������������� Burt Herman, ‘Government Dismisses Call for International Probe ���������������������� into Uzbekistan Violence’, Associated Press, 20 May 2005. 74 ��������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Says Closely Following Uzbekistan Unrest’, Xinhua General News Service, 13 May 2005 75 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Aidar Buribayev, ‘Ivanov Opposes International Investigation into the Andijan Events’, Gazeta, 10 June 2005, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 10 June 2005. 76 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russia Blocks UN Security Council Briefing on Human Rights in Uzbekistan’, AFX International Focus, 28 July 2005.

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approached the Andijan crackdown in line with its interests in discrediting antiregime activities.77 Soon after Moscow expressed its strong support for the Karimov regime, relations between Uzbekistan and Russia became quite close. According to reports, Karimov had shuttled between the US and Russia after the crisis, looking for support. Only Russia was willing to back his actions unconditionally.78 As a result, Uzbekistan announced plans to apply for membership in both the Eurasian Economic Community (another Russian-dominated organization meant to serve as an alternative to the EU) and the CSTO.79 Completing its shift toward Russia, Uzbekistan expelled US forces based in its country (Gleason 2006). Later, Russia and Uzbekistan signed a formal alliance committing Moscow to aiding Uzbek authorities in any situation which ‘may pose a threat to peace, disrupt peace, or affects its interests of security’. One analysis cited the absence of traditional references to ‘threats to state sovereignty’ and the inclusion of ‘threats to peace’ as an implied reference to ‘internal security’, meaning that Russia is de facto committed to defending authoritarianism in Uzbekistan against domestic opponents.80 In its reaction to the spring 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the positions taken by the SCO and the language used by the organization in rejecting the legitimacy of regime change were a reflection of Russian interests and therefore represented the close coordination of policy between the Kremlin and its autocratic allies. This should not be surprising since five out of six SCO member states are solidly authoritarian and therefore had a common interest in ensuring that democratization did not spread throughout Central Asia. The position of the Kremlin and the SCO toward the Tulip Revolution was notable in that they were willing to accept the outcome of Akayev’s ouster. This was likely because the new regime unequivocally accepted the SCO’s principles of non-interference and the need for stability—that is, unlike Ukraine, the regime change was not portrayed as part of a larger struggle between democracy and authoritarianism with implications for the region as a whole. Nevertheless, Russia and its SCO partners were quick to take proactive steps to ensure that the Tulip Revolution was contained and that democratization did not threaten the regional, authoritarian status quo. The willingness of the Kremlin and the SCO to so strongly back Karimov’s brutal 77 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Within the SCO, Russia’s goal was easier to achieve since China, too, strongly supported the actions of the Uzbek government. 78 ������������������������������������������������������������������ Rustem Falyakhov et al., ‘The State Must Suppress Such Attempts’, Gazeta, 16 May 2005, 6, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 16 May 2005. 79 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This came on the heels of Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the ostensibly anti-Russian regional organization GUUAM, which was established as a counterweight to the Russiandominated CIS. GUUAM’s initials come from Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. For Uzbekistan’s plans to join the EAEC and CSTO, see Lyudmila Pivovarova and Nikolai Zhorov, ‘Why is Russia Rescuing Islam Karimov’, Argumenty i Fakty, 12 October 2005, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 13 October 2005. 80 ���������������������������������������������� Arkady Dubnov, ‘Russia Finds Itself an Ally’, Vremya Novostei, 15 November 2005, 1, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 15 November 2005.

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crackdown in Andijan, despite widespread international condemnation, was evidence of how seriously they took the threat of anti-regime activities. Conclusion Authoritarian regimes have a common interest in ensuring that like-minded governments do not fall to democracy. As a result, they have an incentive to work together to this end. One way in which they can do this is through the establishment of international organizations dedicated, if not to the spread of autocracy, then at least to its preservation. Russia and China have emerged as the most powerful authoritarian states in the international system and, despite their historic rivalries, their ‘strategic partnership’ has opposed an American-dominated international system which stresses the desirability of furthering the spread of democracy. A key manifestation of this de facto alliance has been the development of the SCO, which has been increasingly concerned with discrediting the notion of regime change in Central Asia and fostering regional norms and values which support regime survival over democratization. Both Moscow and Beijing have an interest in ensuring that democracy does not spread through the region and that the political status quo is maintained. The SCO’s positions continue to closely correspond to these interests, as reflected in the documents which emerged from the August 2007 Bishkek summit, which identified political stability as the most important aspect of the Spirit of Shanghai.81 Moreover, the SCO is expanding its presence through election monitoring,82 a more formal level of cooperation with the CSTO,83 and

81 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Bishkek Declaration reiterated many of the same points found in previous declarations and communiques, but added a sentence which, in essence, told the rest of the world to stay out of Central Asian affairs: ‘The heads of state believe that stability and security in Central Asia can be provided first and foremost by the forces of the region’s states on the basis of international organisations already established in the region’. ‘Bishkek Declaration’ [Online: SCO], 16 August 2007. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/01753. html>, accessed 11 July 2008. ‘Joint Press Release of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Council of SCO Member States’ [Online: SCO], 16 August 2007. Available at <www.sectsco.org/ html/01721.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 82 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� While observing the Russian parliamentary election in December 2007, the head of the SCO observer mission, SCO Deputy Secretary General Gao Yusheng, stated: ‘There is not just one category of democracy in the world, you cannot import, copy or buy democracy’. ‘SCO Opposes Forced Democratic Standards’, Central Asia General Newswire (Interfax), 3 December 2007. See Chapter 9. 83 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� The two organizations made a formal commitment to cooperate in the area of ‘ensuring regional and international security and stability’. ‘Memorandum of Understanding between SCO Secretariat and CSTO Secretariat’ [Online: SCO], 5 October 2007. Available at <www.sectsco.org/html/01786.html>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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continuing to hold joint military exercises to combat the ‘three evil forces’ in the region.84 This indicates that the autocratic foundation of the SCO remains strong. It is important to note, however, that few international organizations exist for a sole purpose. This chapter’s focus on the anti-democratic tendencies of the SCO should not be taken as a dismissal of the other purposes of the organization, which include the promotion of regional cooperation, economic development, fighting international terrorism, the geopolitical aim of providing a counterbalance to American-dominated unipolarity, and ensuring a Russia–China condominium over the region. This chapter argued that sustaining authoritarianism is important for understanding the core values of the SCO, but fully accepts that this goal does not solely define the organization’s existence. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s strategy of coordination with its fellow authoritarian regimes through the SCO is important and fits into a larger pattern which can be seen outside of the region. In addition to Russia and China, Venezuela and Iran have emerged as the most active autocratic voices opposed to the notion of global (i.e. American) standards of democracy. Although all four countries cloak themselves in the language of democracy, none exhibit a substantive commitment to liberal democratic values. Just as Russia and China have become closer, Russia’s relationships with Venezuela and Iran have been strengthened over their shared interest in resistance to democratization. For example, in the midst of the Orange Revolution, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s trip to Moscow marked a ‘qualitative improvement’ in relations between the two countries, where Chávez’s ‘anti-American rhetoric was very much in accord with the viewpoint of the Putin administration’ (Katz 2006a: 5). Moreover, the language used by both sides is similar to that found in Russian statements with China and through the SCO. For example, in a March 2005 message to Chávez, Putin noted that both counties support ‘forming a democratic world order, supremacy of international law in resolving global and regional problems, collective search for answers to the twenty-first century challenges’.85 All three of these notions are implicit challenges to what the anti-democratic countries 84 �������������������������������������������������������� ‘SCO Joint Drill to Crack Down on “Three Evil Forces”’, Xinhua General News Service, 11 August 2007. During ‘Peace Mission 2007’, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Yuri Balyuevsky, identified the purpose of the exercise was to prepare the militaries of the SCO countries to defend themselves and the region against threats to security. Most of these were the standard SCO threats, but it is interesting to note that he also added the problem of ensuring ‘information security’ ‘in conditions of the growing pressure on [the] part of media outlets in some Western countries’. He added: ‘These countries keep taking attempts at persuading our peoples that so called ‘truly democratic’ institutes of state and public management on the Western patterns should be formed that contribute to the destabilization of the situation in the countries of the region’. This is indicative of continuing fears of externally-inspired democratic pressures. ‘SCO States Denounce Any Foreign Policy Based on Military Force’, TASS, 9 August 2007. 85 ����������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Notes Dynamic Development of Russia-Venezuela Relations’, RIA Novosti, 15 March 2005. See a similar statement made by a Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman in June 2007 in ‘Russia-Venezuela Relations Develop Dynamically’, TASS, 28 June 2007.

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perceive to be the key threat of the American-dominated international system: a desire by Washington to unilaterally impose democracy on other states. Similarly, both states have voiced their strong support for the development of a ‘multipolar’ international system—another implicit reference to their joint opposition to the US. Russian support for Caracas’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as well as Moscow’s copious arms sales since 2005, have solidified their relationship.86 Russian-Iranian cooperation stems from the dramatic rapprochement following the collapse of the ‘Little Satan’, the Soviet Union. Since then, Moscow has helped Teheran with its nuclear program, sold it billions of dollars of advanced weapons systems, and acted in their shared strategic interest of blocking American influence in Central Asia. In recent years, Russia has played a critical role in undermining US and EU pressure against Iran regarding Teheran’s nuclear program (Aras and Ozbay 2006, Karz 2006b). Although Russia and Iran have had several disagreements over the latter’s refusal to verifiably suspend nuclear enrichment, the Kremlin (along with China) has resisted any attempt by Washington or European countries to impose substantive UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Russian officials have also emphatically ruled out the possibility that they would consider UN authorization to use force against Iran. While Russia has provided substantive support to Iran and Venezuela, its relationship with these countries is less a strategy of direct aid (i.e. Bolster) than an increasingly open alignment of authoritarian regimes against perceived threats from democratic states. While this does not represent a formal, military alliance, it does represent a significant challenge to the post-Cold War notion that ideological conflicts were in the past. We already see this pattern emerging as Russia’s relationship with the US and the EU has worsened in recent years, at the same time that its ties to authoritarian states have been strengthened. Moreover, given these global trends, it is not surprising that other autocratic regimes have followed a similar path: for example, Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela have established strategic partnerships with each other.87 As the autocratic world increasingly confronts the democratic world, it is likely that the strategy of coordination exhibited by Russia within the former Soviet Union through the SCO and outside of it through its strategic partnerships will become an increasingly common pattern in Russian foreign policy and world politics.

86 ����������������������������������������� Ivan Gordeyev, ‘Hugo Chávez and Vladimir Putin ��������������������������������������� as successors to Simon Bolivar’, Vremya Novostei, 28 July 2006, 2, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 28 July 2006. 87 ���������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Venezuelan Leader Chávez Declares Belarus Strategic Alliance’, RIA Novosti, 25 July 2006; ‘Iran’s President Visits Belarus’, AFX International Focus, 21 May 2007; Farhad Pouladi, ‘Iran-Venezuela Seal Anti-US Alliance’, Agence France Presse, 2 July 2007.

Chapter 9

The Russian 2007–2008 Election Cycle

Why did anyone bother holding an election at all? … The answer, I think, can lie only in the ruling clique’s fundamental insecurity, odd as that sounds. Though the denizens of the Kremlin do not, cannot, seriously fear Western military attack, they do still seem to fear Western-inspired popular discontent. … To stave off these things, they maintain the democratic rituals that give them a semblance of legitimacy. Anne Applebaum

In December 2007 and March 2008, the Russian Federation held parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively. The outcome of these votes were not in any doubt, only the margin of victory for the ruling party, United Russia, and President Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor, Dmitri Medvedev. Nevertheless, the recent history of the region raised some concerns about whether the Kremlin may have faced an ‘orange scenario’ in response to its manipulation of the election process. As identified in previous chapters, after the Rose Revolution was followed by both the Orange and Tulip Revolutions, there was some fear that a similar pattern may be replicated in Russia itself. Although Russia held both a parliamentary and presidential election after the ouster of Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, it had not done so since the popular revolution in Ukraine. In order to prevent such an event from occurring in Russia, the regime took steps to further entrench itself in office and to undermine regional democratic trends both at home and abroad. It was very clear that, despite the government’s claims about its democratic credentials, it was unwilling to allow for a truly competitive election and would not even consider relinquishing power to the opposition. Thus, the 2007–2008 election cycle was the first true test of the regime’s ability to guarantee a peaceful and controlled series of votes to ensure that it retained its preeminent standing in Russia’s political system. By all accounts, the regime passed with flying colors, much to the detriment of Russia’s democratic development. The campaign and the voting itself were carefully managed by the government, the opposition was divided and largely irrelevant, and the prospects for a democratic opening quickly faded as those factors associated with the previous color revolutions were effectively countered or undermined. Thus, Russia’s Potemkin democracy proved to be stable.

 ������������������������������������������������ Anne Applebaum, ‘Why Russia Holds “Elections”’, Washington Post, 3 March 2008, A17.

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This chapter serves as a capstone for this case study of Russian authoritarian resistance to democracy. It begins with an overview of the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections, identifying the major events and international reaction. Since the election was inherently a domestic-level event, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the strategy which was the most relevant to blocking a possible color revolution at home: Insulate. As explored in Chapter 4, a strategy of Insulate aims to prevent regime change at home by undermining those factors commonly associated with prior color revolutions. Prior to the 2007–2008 election cycle, the Kremlin adopted a proactive policy by criticizing the European election monitoring regime as biased, restricting the ability of liberal non-govermental organizations to operate (particularly those with ties to groups outside of Russia), and establishing rival groups to dilute youth activism and to channel young Russians toward support for the government. This pattern continued throughout the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections. Each of these forces— election monitoring, nongovernmental organizations, and youth movements—is examined in separate sections. This chapter concludes with some observations about what the outcome of this election cycle likely means for the prospects for democratic development in Russia and the region. 2007–2008 Election Cycle: An Overview Given the government’s centralization of power, the institutional advantages given to established political parties, and the Kremlin’s control over the broadcast media, the outcome of the 2007–2008 election cycle was not in any doubt. The only substantive questions surrounded the margin of victory for Putin’s United Russia and who Putin would choose to be his successor. Neither vote contained much in the way of drama or suspense, nor, in fact, was there much of a meaningful campaign. Thus, the most recent Russian election cycle was, in many ways, a story about the absence of an election campaign as those in the democratic world would understand it. The unofficial start of the election cycle occurred in a predictable fashion: a shake-up of the government. Beginning with the 1996 presidential election, when Yeltsin fired three top individuals in his government less than two weeks before the July run-off election, important votes in Russia have been preceded with a removal of key government members by the president. This move is intended to signal to the voters that he is an agent for change and to preempt any potential criticisms about the government’s policies and personalities. Thus, in mid-September 2007, Putin replaced Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov with Viktor Zubkov, who had been the head of Russia’s Federal Financial Monitoring Service, which focuses on countering money-laundering operations. Although his appointment was a surprise to many observers, it had a strong logic to it: Zubkov did not represent any of the key Kremlin factions and,

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since it was unlikely that he would be a viable presidential candidate, he could serve as a technocratic transition to the next government. Given United Russia’s dominance of the Russian political scene, its party congress in early October 2007 was the real opening of the campaign for the Duma. During this meeting, Putin announced that he would head United Russia’s party list. This, in effect, made the election a referendum on his presidency. While this was not technically an undemocratic action (since Putin was not constitutionally barred from do so), it was reminiscent of Yeltsin’s decision in December 1999 to resign the presidency early, in that it allowed Putin’s incumbency to dominate the political process and thus to avoid the possibility of a truly open and competitive election. As a result, the parliamentary election unfolded in a rather predictable manner. United Russia ran a campaign which largely ignored the other parties—for example, they did not take part in the moderated television debate—and received extensive, positive coverage from Kremlin-controlled television stations. By contrast, the opposition could not garner any political traction against United Russia and was either absent from the state-dominated media or vilified. Not only were some opposition parties banned from competing, but demonstrators from the opposition ‘Other Russia’ coalition were arrested and, in some cases, were made targets of violence by the authorities and their allies. Garry Kasparov, the leader of Other Russia and former world chess champion, was temporarily jailed; Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister and the leader of the liberal Union of Right Forces, was also detained. There were also restrictions on election monitoring and reports of voter intimidation. The New York Times summed up the campaign as follows: ‘Opposition parties have been all but suffocated by strict new election laws, scant television coverage, curbs on their ability to organize and criminal inquiries. Workers at government agencies and companies that receive state financing said they were being extorted by their bosses to pull the lever for Mr. Putin’s party, United Russia’. Not surprisingly, there were many critics of the proceedings both within and outside of Russia. After United Russia emerged with nearly 64.3 per cent of the vote (translating into some 70 per cent of the seats in the Duma), foreign governments and European international organizations were highly critical. For example, the United States expressed ‘concern’ about the handling of the election. However, the strongest statement came from Germany, whose Foreign Ministry proclaimed that ‘Russia was not a democracy and Russia is not a democracy. The elections were not free,  ��������������������������� Neil Buckley, ‘Clan with a Plan’, ������� Financial Times [Online], 28 November 2007. Available at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d4ab2fa-9ddb-11dc-9f68-0000779fd2ac.html>, accessed 18 July 2008.  ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Clifford J. Levy, ‘Putin Gathers His Forces for Election on Sunday’, New York Times, 29 November 2007, A3.  ������������������������� ‘Press Conference by the President’, ������������ White House Documents and Publications, 4 December 2007.

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not fair and not democratic’. The European Union’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, also called into question the legitimacy of Russia’s parliamentary election, observing that the EU ‘saw some violations of basic rights, notably free speech and assembly rights’. The Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) released a joint statement which blasted the Kremlin: [The elections] were not fair and failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections … They took place in an atmosphere which seriously limited political competition and with frequent abuse of administrative resources, media coverage strongly in favour of the ruling party, and an election code whose cumulative effect hindered political pluralism. There was not a level political playing field in Russia in 2007.

Not surprisingly the Russian government and state-controlled media praised the vote. In fact, Russia’s Central Election Commission and the Foreign Ministry questioned the neutrality of the election monitors and other critics. Soon after the parliamentary election, Putin announced that his first deputy prime minister, Dimitri Medvedev, was his choice to succeed him. Medvedev was a Putin loyalist since their days in St. Petersburg and he served as head of Putin’s 2000 election campaign, chairman of the powerful energy conglomerate Gazprom, and chief of staff for the president. Although he appeared to be far more moderate and liberal than his chief rival, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, it is important to note that Putin, too, had consistently used pro-democracy language even while undertaking an undemocratic course for the country. Some speculated that Medvedev’s lack of a firm powerbase and the fact that he was not a member of the siloviki (power ministries) were, in fact, the very reasons why he was chosen as Putin’s successor: in essence, it was thought that since a President Medvedev would be so weak, it would be easier for Putin and the security services to control him behind the scenes. This theory was given some credence immediately after Putin’s announcement when Medvedev declared that if he were to win the presidency (which, of course, was in no doubt), he would then appoint Putin to be  ���������������������� Shaun Walker and Anne Penketh, ������������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Election Victory Was “Neither Free Nor Fair”’, The Independent (London), 4 December 2007, 18.  �������������������������������������������������������� David Nowak, ‘Observers Criticize “Managed Elections”’, Moscow Times, 4 December 2007.  ��������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Duma Elections “Not Held on a Level Playing �������������������� Field”, Say Parliamentary �������������� Observers’ [Online: Council of Europe], 3 December 2007. Available at , accessed 11 July 2008.  ��������������������������������������������������������� Dario Thuburn, ‘Putin Hails Victory as West Cries Foul’, Agence France Presse, 3 December 2007.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Clifford J. Levy, ‘Putin Backs a Young Loyalist as His Choice to Follow Him’, New York Times, 11 December 2007, 1. Similar sentiments were echoed in Fred Weir, ‘Putin Taps Medvedev as Presidential Successor’, Christian Science Monitor, 11 December 2007, 4.

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his prime minister.10 Putin agreed, not surprisingly. In comparison to the Russian president, the prime minister is an extremely weak position and is dominated by, and serves at the pleasure of, the president. Since the Russian political system is rightfully regarded as president-dominant, the decision by Putin to be ‘demoted’ to the position of prime minister was certainly odd, unless the above theory had some credence. Like the parliamentary election just a few months earlier, the March 2008 presidential election was very short on any drama and its outcome was certain. Medvedev refused both to formally campaign or to debate his opponents. Instead, he, along with Putin, embarked on a well-scripted tour of Russia and received glowing and extensive news coverage in the state-controlled media.11 As during the parliamentary vote, there were similar restrictions on external election monitoring and reports of voter intimidation.12 Three potential opponents—Garry Kasparov, Boris Nemtsov, and Putin’s former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov—were pressured to withdraw or were simply forced out of the race. Given that there was no reasonable scenario under which any of these candidates could have won, or even significantly cut into Medvedev’s margin of victory, blocking them from running may have seemed gratuitous. However, because the political system created by Putin does not allow for any real competition, this decision was logical. As Viktor Kremeniuk of the Moscow-based Institute of USA–Canada Studies summarized the vote: ‘These elections are really just an afterthought in a political system where the main issue of who will succeed Putin has already been decided’.13 Not surprisingly, Medvedev won an overwhelming per centage of the vote (70.3 per cent), over 50 points above his closest rival, the Communist, Gennady Zyuganov. The only major Western monitoring team which observed the election criticized the vote for the overwhelming bias of the Kremlin-controlled media, the misuse of administrative resources, and for effectively blocking opposition candidates from running. As Andreas Gross, who headed the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, stated, ‘We think there is not freedom in this election’.14 There were even reports of ballot stuffing, which also seemed gratuitous. Nevertheless, even if the actual administration of the election 10 �������������������������������� ‘Speech by Dmitri A. Medvedev’, New York Times [Online], 11 December 2007. Available at <www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/world/europe/medvedev-speech.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 11  Peter ���������������������������� Finn, ‘Prime Time for Putin’s ������������������ Anoited’, Washington Post, 30 January 2008, A10. 12  ���������������������������������������������������� Peter Fin, ‘Monitor Declines Role in Russian Vote’, Washington Post, 8 February 2008, A16; Clifford J. Levy, ‘Putin’s Iron Grip on Russia Suffocates His Opponents’, New York Times, 24 February 2008, A1. 13 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Fred Weir, ‘It’s Russian Election Season. So Where’s the Campaign?’, Christian Science Monitor [Online], 1 February 2008. Available at <www.csmonitor.com/2008/0201/ p25s07-woeu.html>, accessed 11 July 2008. 14  ��������������������������������������������������������������� Peter Finn, ‘Russian Election Lacked “Freedom”, Monitor Says’, Washington Post, 4 March 2008, A14.

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itself was run completely in accordance with international standards, a truly democratic election is not simply the physical act of voting: it is the system and structure within which the vote takes place which makes an election free, fair, and competitive. Under the current regime, this system is not fair. While Western governments were also critical of the process, they were restrained by the fact that they would have to work with the new Russian president.15 The ability of the Kremlin to carefully manage the 2007–2008 election cycle was aided by the fact that the major forces associated with the color revolutions— election monitoring, NGOs, and youth groups—were all undermined by the regime prior to the elections through steps outlined in Chapter 4. These actions intensified as the country approached the fall of 2007. Since the Putin administration was already well entrenched and popular, it is impossible to determine how much these policies actually aided regime survival. Nevertheless, as the following three sections indicate, the Russian government was not taking any chances. Election Monitoring The dispute over the monitoring of the parliamentary and presidential elections lasted from mid-October 2007 through March 2008 and centered around several themes: the size of the contingents from external monitoring organizations, the amount of time they would be allowed in Russia, the scope of their evaluation, and the political biases of the observers. This was a particularly important issue for both sides. For Russia, European election monitors were sure to expose the illegitimacy of the Russian election, as they had done in other cases where regimes sought to create an unfair electoral environment or partake in outright fraud. The Kremlin’s insistence that Russia remains a democracy indicated that, at some level, it cared about international opinion, if only because of its potential impact at home. While it could not control the evaluation reached by the external observers, it could discredit them by arguing that their conclusions were political biased, that they were directed by Russia’s geopolitical rivals, and that other observation teams (i.e. those friendly to the Kremlin) challenged the West’s claims. For the West’s part, few considered the Russian elections to be an opportunity for regime change, given the strength of the Kremlin and its preventive policies. Nevertheless, the election monitoring system served a central means by which it could apply pressure upon Russia for not living up to its political commitments. Moreover, this quarrel had potential repercussions for the rest of the continent: if Russia’s ‘sovereign democracy’ were to be legitimized, then the regional norms of democratic governance would be weakened. Thus, both Russia and the West had a strong interest in ensuring an outcome in their favor. 15 �������������������������������������������� Neil Buckley, et al., ‘West Offers Medvedev Qualified �������������������� Support’, Financial Times, 4 March 2008; ‘White House Highlights “Mutual Interest” after Russia Vote’, Agence France Presse, 3 March 2008.

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The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced in mid-October 2007 that it intended to invite election monitors to observe the parliamentary elections but was waiting for all candidates to be registered. According to the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) the CEC was running well over a month behind when compared to its actions during the 2003 parliamentary elections.16 In addition, the CEC announced that the number of foreign observers would be less than half of those invited in 2003. A highprofile member of the CEC, Igor Borisov, justified this as ‘a sign that Russia is a democracy which no longer needs help in organization of elections’.17 By contrast, Bruce George, a British Member of Parliament who had headed several OSCE monitoring teams, accused the Kremlin of ‘an overall strategy to emasculate’ the monitoring process because ‘with the methodology and professionalism of ODHIR there is no way that it will find that Russia’s elections meet international standards’.18 Vladimir Churov, the head of the CEC who had openly pledged his personal loyalty to Putin in 2007,19 also sought to restrict criticism by the observers by asserting that it would be a violation of Russian law for monitors to make any comments on polling day since that would be construed as a political action.20 Moreover, the observers would only be allowed to enter to the country for a limited time (just days before the election) and were urged to limit their comments to the technical aspects of the election itself, not the relative fairness of the overall Russian political system.21 Finally, the visas for the ODIHR monitors were delayed. The OSCE blamed the Russian government for trying to further restrict the team’s scope of observation, while the Kremlin blamed the OSCE for not filling out the proper paperwork.22 The result of this controversy was that the ODIHR cancelled its mission to observe the 2007 parliamentary election, only the second time that it had done

16 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Mikhail Zygar, et al., ‘Central Election Commission Doesn’t Shares its Observation Powers’, Kommersant, 23 October 2007, 1, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 23 October 2007. 17 ���������������������������������������������� Madina Shavlokhova, ‘Observing by the Rules’, Gazeta, 30 October 2007, 5, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 30 October 2007. 18 ���������������������� C.J. Chivers, ‘Russia Proposes ���������������������������������������������� Steps to Weaken Election Watchdogs’, New York Times, 25 October 2007, A14. 19 ��������������������������������������������� Kyrill Dissanayake, ‘Russia’s Election Chief Pledges ������������������� Loyalty to Putin’, �������� BBC Worldwide Monitoring [BBCWM], 11 July 2007. 20 �������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Election Chief Urges Foreign Observers to Keep Quiet ��������� on Polling �������������� Day’, BBCWM, 29 October 2007. 21 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Irina Nagornykh and Mikhail Zygar, ‘Boundaries for Election Observers’, Kommersant, 1 November 2007, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part B), 1 November 2007. 22 ���������������� ‘OSCE Trying to Politicize ���������������������������������������������� Invitation of Observers to Russian Polls’, �������� TASS, 13 November 2007.

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so.23 Although other groups intended to go to Russia—including the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE (PA OSCE) and the Council of Europe (PACE), as well as the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—the absence of the ODIHR, the premiere election monitoring agency on the continent, was a serious blow to the ability of regional organizations to ensure a free and fair election. The Russian government reacted very negatively to the ODIHR’s decision and claimed that it was completely innocent in the row. Instead, blame was placed squarely on the United States. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko asserted that any discussions of restrictions on the monitors ‘has been mainly heard from across the ocean’.24 Putin claimed that the ‘US State Department’ pressured the ODIHR to boycott and he directly accused Washington of interfering in Russian domestic politics by trying ‘to make elections look illegitimate’.25 Both the US and ODIHR unequivocally denied this charge. Nevertheless, this line of argumentation was central in shifting the focus of the election toward external threats to Russian sovereignty.26 As cited in the previous section, the post-election analyses by the Western international organizations and governments were uniformly negative. They argued that although the technical aspects of the vote were credible, it was conducted in an unfair environment which severely restricted political competition. As the head of the PA OSCE, Luc van der Brande, put it: ‘If the Russian Federation is a managed democracy, then this election was managed’.27 By contrast, both the SCO and the CIS analyses were quite positive, indicating that these organizations were willing to legitimize undemocratic elections; the Kremlin cited their conclusions in an attempt to discredit those of the West, an indication that the strategy of Coordinate was also paying some dividends for the Kremlin.28 Russian officials also sought to characterize the Western conclusions as ‘a political order

23 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The first time was because of the ‘political meltdown’ in Albania in 1996. ‘OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to Send Observers to Russia’, Agence France Presse, 19 November 2007. 24  RIA Novosti, 7 November 2007, reproduced as ‘Russia Rejects Claims of Restricting Numbers of Foreign Election Observers’, in BBCWM, 7 November 2007. 25 ������� Sergei Ponomarev, ���������������������������������������� ‘Putin Accuses Washington of Pushing �������������������������������� International Observers to Boycott Russian Election’, Associated Press, 26 November 2007. 26  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 November 2007, reproduced as ‘“External Threat” Identified as “Main Theme” of Russian Election Campaign’, in BBCWM, 28 November 2007. 27 ������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘PACE, OSCE Describe Russian Election as “Biased” and “Managed”’, BBCWM, 3 December 2007. 28 ��������������������������������������������������������� ‘SCO Observers Not Expose Violations at Duma Elections’, TASS, 3 December 2007; ‘CIS Observers Say Duma Elections Transparent and Free’, TASS, 3 December 2007; ‘PACE, PA OSCE Assessment of Duma Elections is Doubtful—Foreign Ministry’, Ukraine General Newswire, 4 December 2007.

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… dictated from overseas’, once again framing external criticism as a threat to Russian sovereignty.29 Just as the non-campaign of the 2008 presidential election was in many ways a replay of the non-campaign of the 2007 parliamentary election, the dispute between Russia and the West over election monitoring felt like déjà vu all over again. In fact, the rhetoric from each side was remarkably the same with some of the same actors reiterating almost the exact same phrases both prior to and after the vote. The only substantive difference was that there was a brief and futile attempt to negotiate a compromise between the CEC and the ODIHR. Thus, the ODIHR (this time joined by the PA OSCE) again boycotted. The remaining Western organization (PACE) found the presidential election to be unfair and the pro-Russian organizations (CIS and SCO) found to be completely acceptable. The ultimate result of this dispute was to once again expose the fundamental divide over democratic norms between the West, which asserted that its election monitoring regime was legitimate and that elections are far more than what occurs on a technical level on election day, and Russia, which asserted that the European election monitoring regime was fundamentally flawed and politically biased, and had no business commenting on the overall political system of or media coverage in a country holding an election. Given the importance of election monitoring to democracy promotion, it is unlikely that this dispute will end anytime soon.30 NGOs The second part of the color revolution triad consists of the pro-democracy, human rights nongovernmental organizations. These NGOs, especially those with significant ties to groups outside of Russia, were singled out by the Kremlin as representing a potential threat to the sovereignty and stability of the state and 29 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Igor Borisov qtd. in Clifford J. Levy, ‘Vote Result is “Sign of Trust”, Putin ������������� Says’, International Herald Tribune, 4 December 2007, 3. 30  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Parallel to the dispute between Russia and the West over these specific elections was the larger quarrel between the two sides over the European election monitoring regime as a whole. Similar to the July 2004 letter to the OSCE signed by nine states of the former Soviet Union (see Chapter 4), a new plan for reforming the OSCE’s election monitoring system was presented in October 2007 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This ‘reform’ proposal included limiting the size of the missions, restricting what they could say (i.e. not discussing the political environment in the country, but rather only reporting on the technical aspects of the voting itself), and delaying the reporting of any conclusions for some time after the election. ODIHR spokeswoman, Urdur Gunnarsdottir, said in response to this proposal: ‘When we work, we’re basically just holding up a mirror. I see this as an attempt to break the mirror’. Veronika Oleksyn, ‘US Criticizes Russian Attempts to Curtail Election Monitors’, Associated Press, 25 October 2007. Also see Gary Peach, ‘Russian Official Defends Proposals on Reforming International Election Monitoring’, Associated Press, 26 October 2007.

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government by serving the interests of foreign donors and governments. Chapter 4 outlined the possible effects of the 2006 NGO Law. In particular, it was feared that this law would mire NGOs in bureaucratic red tape and arbitrary treatment. These fears were realized soon after the law went into effect. While there was not the sweeping closure of these organizations that some predicted, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch summarized the situation for NGOs as follows: ‘The Kremlin isn’t shutting down civil society … The tactics the Kremlin is using are more subtle and effective’.31 Some of the methods involved in restricting the ability of Russian NGOs to function were outlined in a lengthy report by Human Rights Watch (2008) entitled ‘Choking on Bureaucracy’ and included: requiring an ever-increasing amount of paperwork to be completed, which had the effect of forcing these nonprofits to devote massive amounts of time and money to this task and distracting them from their missions; refusing registration, issuing warnings and punishments, or even effectively closing groups for extremely minor offenses, such as typos or formatting errors in their paperwork; intrusive inspections of NGO activities, facilities, and equipment; a cumbersome registration process in which the fees are approximately 40 per cent greater than the fees to register a commercial organization, and which takes twice as long; arbitrary treatment and legal interpretations which have resulted in pro-democracy and human rights groups being disproportionately targeted by authorities for often technical or minor violations of the law; and, filing questionable criminal charges against NGO directors for what would appear to be either fallacious or extremely petty offenses, such as making accusations that activists were using pirated software on NGO computers. In the run-up to the 2007–2008 election cycle, these activities intensified.32 After the elections, these experiences led the leaders of Russia’s top liberal NGOs to write an open letter calling for an end to ‘administrative barriers and stifling bureaucratic controls’.33 In addition to these administrative actions, the Kremlin also launched a new public relations offensive against NGOs in an effort to discredit these groups. For example, during the first half of October 2007, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), gave a lengthy interview in which he accused foreign intelligence services of increasing their activities in Russia 31 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Roth issued this statement in the context of the Russian government’s decision to deny him a visa to enter the country, where he had intended to release a report on how the Kremlin pressures NGOs. This report was released by Human Rights Watch and is cited elsewhere in this chapter. The Foreign Ministry accused Roth of lying on his visa application, a charge he and his organization denied. ‘Russian: Human Rights Watch Executives Provided False Info in Visa Applications’, Associated Press, 21 February 2008. 32  Interfax, 13 November 2007, reproduced as ‘Rights Activists Worried by Pressure on NGOs During Election Campaign’, in BBCWM, 13 November 2007; Peter Wilson, ‘Putin Fights Public Enemy No. 1: Volunteers’, The Australian, 25 February 2008, 11. 33  Interfax, 31 March 2008, reproduced as ‘Russian NGOs Appeal to Authorities About “Stifling” Red Tape’, in BBCWM, 31 March 2008.

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as the country moved closer to the elections and NGOs of being a vehicle for these foreign spies to ‘obtain intelligence information and also as an instrument for exerting covert pressure on political processes’.34 He specifically cited color revolutions in Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Ukraine as examples of how these organizations operate in the interests of foreign powers. Around the same time, Kremlin-controlled Channel One Television ran a special historical report which linked the geopolitical struggle between Russia and the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century with what the program saw as new attempts to undermine Russian strategic interests: utilizing NGOs to criticize Russian human rights policies in hopes of sparking a revolution.35 In mid-November, Putin gave a speech in which he attacked foreign-fed ‘jackals’ who want a weak and divided state in order to split up Russia’s riches: ‘Now, they’re going to take to the streets. They have learned from Western experts and have received some training in neighboring (ex-Soviet) republics. And now they are going to stage provocations here’.36 While not specifically mentioning that these ‘jackals’ were NGOs, this is strongly implied and Putin has used similar language in the past to refer to NGOs; the connections between these organizations, Western interests, and the anti-Kremlin opposition are well-established in the government’s rhetoric. Comments such as these were seemingly effective, as a survey completed after the election illustrated: over half of the 1,600 respondents believed that criticism about Russia’s human rights and democracy standards was an effort by the West to keep Russia weak.37 Youth Groups Like the pro-democracy NGOs, youth groups played an instrumental role in precipitating the popular revolts in Georgia and Ukraine. It was therefore not surprising that a central part of the Russian government’s strategy to insulate itself from a color revolution was to undermine the power of the opposition by establishing and nurturing its own, pro-Kremlin youth movements, several of which were well-funded, had semi-official status, and garnered extensive and positive media coverage. As a result, it was difficult if not impossible for their opposition counterparts to gain much traction amongst the young in Russia. Nevertheless, the ever vigilant Kremlin intended to actively use its groups as a critical line of defense during the 2007–2008 election cycle. 34  Argumenty i Fakty, 10 October 2007, reproduced as ‘FSB Director Patrushev Interviewed on Work on Russian Counterintelligence’, in BBCWM, 10 October 2007. 35 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘Russian TV Examines History of British “Russophobia” in 19th Century’, BBCWM, 14 October 2007. 36 ����������������������������������������������������������� ‘Putin Urges Not to Trust Advocates of Oligarchic Regime’, TASS, 21 November 2007. 37 ����� Olga Pavlikova, ����������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Citizens Tell the West: Look in the Mirror’, Gazeta, 2 April 2008, 3, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 2 April 2008.

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In the run-up to the December 2007 elections, the youth groups began actively organizing to ensure that United Russia’s parliamentary victory was smooth and that the opposition would be powerless to disrupt it. To this effect, Nashi, the Young Guard, and Young Russia formed a joint campaign headquarters in Moscow to coordinate their activities.38 In line with their intention to directly confront the opposition in the streets, these pro-Kremlin youth movements were well prepared. Vasily Yakemenko, the leader of Nashi who would later be appointed to the Russian cabinet as head of the Youth Affairs Committee, announced in September that his organization was creating ‘brigades’, like those created by its sister groups, to help police oppose anti-government demonstrations.39 During a visit to Nashi’s Moscow headquarters by a reporter from Canada’s Globe and Mail, the official tour guide was very open about the group’s willingness to use violence against ‘traitors’.40 The image of those who opposed the Kremlin as ‘traitors’ who must be stopped by any means was in line with the consistent message that there are internal enemies threatening Russia with help from outside the country (and from America, in particular). This was reinforced by Putin, who addressed a youth rally on People’s Unity Day in early November and asserted that Russia’s enemies want to plunder its natural resources.41 In fact, this became a common theme for the youth groups during their pre-election rallies. For example, at a counter-rally against the opposition Other Russia movement, members of Young Russia shouted ‘pro-democracy wackos, go West!’, and distributed fake US dollars and pictures of American President George W. Bush.42 Moreover, in what can be described as a series of disturbing moves, Nashi set up ‘political shooting ranges’ where young people could shoot portraits of the ‘enemies of Russia’ (including the leader of the opposition, Kasparov) with darts or paintballs. The Young Guard also held a ‘symbolic execution’ of Russia’s ‘enemies’ in Vladivostok.43 Both of these programs could be seen as desensitizing young people to using violence against political opponents. On the eve of the vote, last minute preparations by Nashi included the blessing given by an organizing leader in Moscow to use force if necessary: ‘Our weapons are the physical dominance and moral suppression. Never get into a dialogue with an instigator. As a final method, you can beat him. But try to do it carefully’.44 38 �������������������������������������������������� ‘United Russia to Hold Rally in Downtown Moscow’, TASS, 3 October 2007. 39 ����������������������������������������������������������� ‘Russian Youth Group Chief to Lead “Patriotic Education”’, Agence France Presse, 17 October 2007. 40 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� Jane Armstrong, ‘Putin’s Vanguard of Youth Ready to Defend Russia, the Motherland and the Kremlin’, Globe and Mail, 13 October 2007, A1. 41 ���������������������������������������������������� Anna Smolchennko, ‘Putin Warns Russia Has Enemies’, Moscow Times, 6 November 2007. 42  RIA Novosti, 17 November 2007, reproduced as ‘Nine Detailed in Youth Clash at Anti-Putin Rally in Moscow’, in BBCWM, 17 November 2007. 43 ����������������������������������� ‘Youths Take Aim at Russian Foes’, Calgary Herald, 25 October 2007, A2. 44 ������ Nadia Popova ��������������������������������������������������������������������� and Jane Armstrong, ‘As a Final Method, You Can Beat Him. But Try to Do it Carefully’, Globe and Mail, 3 December 2007, A15.

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The plan was for the pro-Kremlin youth groups to take to the streets in force immediately after the election and secure key monuments, squares, and buildings to prevent the opposition from using them as rally points, as pro-democracy activists did during the Orange Revolution by seizing Independence Square in Kiev.45 This plan went off without any problems as thousands of Nashi members occupied locations throughout Moscow and prevented anyone else from protesting there—this included a move to ‘protect’ the CEC headquarters from opposition forces.46 Small and ineffectual opposition rallies were reported, but these did nothing to take away from the massive victory of both United Russia and its young supporters. As part of the regime’s strategy to further entrench itself in power, the youth movements were clearly successful. What might be seen as their greatest triumph also seemingly held the seeds of their downfall. Immediately after the parliamentary election, a cascade of reports emerged which indicated that the government had cooled to the pro-Kremlin youth groups.47 There were several reasons for this. At the most basic level, the youth movements were nurtured with a specific purpose in mind: to defend against a color revolution. Once this threat passed—given the impotency of the opposition, it is now clear that the possibility of regime change is extremely remote and that the regime is well entrenched for the foreseeable future—the youth groups were no longer needed. As Sergei Markov, a United Russia Duma member and one of Nashi’s ideological fathers, put it: ‘Nashi was formed to block the possibility of an Orange revolution in Russia during elections. The parliamentary elections passed quietly, partly because Nashi existed, and the presidential elections are developing quite well. There is no possibility of an Orange revolution and in these conditions the Nashi movement is losing its main mission’.48 However, the absence of a viable opposition was only one (even if the main) reason behind the growing reluctance to continue to support an active youth movement. The groups also possessed certain negatives which the Kremlin hoped 45 ������������������������������������������ ‘Youth Groups Train to Fight Revolution’, Moscow Times, 14 November 2007; Victoria Loginova, ‘Youth Gruops Prepare Kremlin Defence in Elections’, Agence France Presse, 27 November 2007. 46  Ekho Moskvy, 3 December 2007, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Movement Holds Rally to Celebrate Putin’s Victory’, in BBCWM, 3 December 2007; Ren TV, 3 December 2007, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Nashi Youth Movement “Protects” Central Election Commission’, in BBCWM, 4 December 2007. 47 �������������������������������������������������������� See Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Putin Youth vs. United Russia’, Politkom.ru, 26 December 2007, reproduced in BBCWM, 2 January 2008; Yekaterina Savina, ‘If They Relax, We Will Form Our Own Party’, Kommersant, 26 December 2007, reproduced in BBCWM, 2 January 2008; Ren TV, 15 January 2008, reproduced as ‘Russian TV Examines Role of Youth Movements’, in BBCWM, 16 January 2008; Yekaterina Savina, et al., ‘Ours Movement Doesn’t Belong’, Kommersant, 29 January 2008, 1, reproduced in What the Papers Say (Part A), 29 January 2008. 48 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Tony Halpin, ‘Putin’s Hardline Young Guards Face Retirement After Triumph’, The Times (London), 30 January 2008.

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to now discard. There was some fear that the youth activists, organized at the expense of the government and its allies, could emerge as potential challengers to the regime. Some of the rhetoric emerging from the groups indicated that they were ready to oppose United Russia if it did not fully implement ‘Putin’s Plan’ as they saw it. Moreover, young supporters of United Russia believed that they were on the fast track toward becoming the political elites of the country (including a substantial number of Duma seats), but this did not occur, with some openly accusing the Kremlin of reneging on its promises.49 Thus, the politically active youths who are disenchanted with the regime might eventually become the very source of a popular revolt that they were originally trained to prevent. In addition, these groups began acting independently of the Kremlin’s control and damaging Russia’s image in the West. For example, dozens of Nashi activists were arrested outside the European Commission’s office in Moscow for protesting the arrest of a Nashi member who entered Lithuania without a visa.50 Also, as the European Union began refusing travel visas to Nashi members, the Kremlin either had to react in kind and confront the West, or reign in Nashi—it chose the latter.51 Moreover, the image of thousands of Russian youths taking to the streets and committing provocative acts—wearing identical shirts emblazoned with images of Putin, protesting outside of foreign embassies, or physically harassing those seen as enemies of the state and regime—raised the specter of a reconstructed Komsomol, at best, or Hitler Youth, at worst. With Medvedev set to become Russia’s next president, and eager to present a less threatening face to the West, such activities were no longer acceptable. As a result, the youth movements were reorganized and depoliticized; rather than politics, they will focus their attention on socioeconomic issues.52 Although they participated in the 2008 presidential election, this was at a much reduced scale and it was clear that their apex had already passed, along with the regime’s concerns about a color revolution. 49 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This was seen most dramatically when a top Young Guard activist, Alexei Radov, quit the organization, claiming that the young people loyal to the Kremlin did not get what they were promised and that the regime was trying to impose ‘authoritarian ideals’ through an imitation of ‘real political activities’. He called the 2007 parliamentary elections a ‘farce’ and a ‘parody of the citizens’ expression of their free will’. Needless to say, the Young Guard disowned Radov and claimed that his statements were based upon his financial interests. ‘Youth Guard Activist Quits in Protest’, Moscow Times, 16 January 2008. 50 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This was one of the rare times that a Nashi protest was broken up by government authorities. ‘Dozens of Nashi Protesters Detained’, Moscow Times, 10 January 2008. 51 ����������������������� ‘When Medvedev Becomes President’, ��������������������������������� a report compiled by What the Papers Say, 1 February 2008. 52  Interfax, 30 January 2008, reproduced as ‘Pro-Kremlin Youth Group to Continue Work Despite “Ill-Wishers’ Hopes”’, in BCCWM, 30 January 2008; Lilia Mukhamedyarova, ‘The Kremlin Disbands Young Guards’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 February 2008, 4, reproduced in Russian Press Digest, 15 February 2008; Interfax, 19 March 2008, reproduced as ‘Russian Youth Movement to Fight Illegal Sale of Alcohol, Scientology’, in BBCWM, 19 March 2008.

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Prospects for Democracy in Russia and the Region Medvedev’s victory demonstrated that the authoritarian structure put into place by Putin’s Kremlin was able to ensure a smooth transition from one president to another through an election that was neither truly free nor completely fair. Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin’s chief ideologue and main force behind the creation of United Russia, reportedly said that he wanted United Russia to become a dominant ruling party like Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s and Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party from the late 1920s to the 1990s.53 If the 2007–2008 election cycle is any indication, then the Kremlin is well on its way to achieving this goal. This was due in part to the strategies of authoritarian resistance identified in previous chapters. The application of these strategies prior to the election cycle created an international and domestic environment which made the Kremlin’s job easier. The Russian political system has seemingly reached a tipping point: the autocratic political system established by Putin’s Kremlin has been consolidated, democratic forces have been effectively preempted and neutralized, and the seamless replacement of Putin with Medvedev as president indicates that, for the foreseeable future, political change is going to have to come from within the regime, not outside of it.54 While certainly not as oppressive as the former Soviet Union, this system does not measure up to even the most basic standards of democracy in which power could change hands through free, fair, and competitive elections, despite its veneer of representative government. This is not to say that the current system is without its challenges. The most important issue for the foreseeable future is what role Putin will play in the new government now that he is Medvedev’s prime minister and has accepted the position of head of United Russia. There are those who argue that Putin remains in charge, while others make the case that Prime Minister Putin will serve as a transitional figure until Medvedev can fully take charge.55 How the new and old presidents interact, especially if there is an economic or foreign policy crisis, will go a long way toward determining whether this system is stable and if any hopes for democratic reform can be realized in the short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, 53 ���������������������� Buckley, ‘Clan with a Plan’, ������������������������������������������������������������ For a scholarly approach to this issue, see Vladimir Gel’man (2006). 54 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� However, this conclusion comes with an important caveat: as seen with the relatively unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, when it comes to this region, just about anything is possible. 55 ������������������������������������������������ See Jonas Bernstein, ‘How Long Can Medvedev and Putin ������������ Share Power?’, ��������� Eurasia Daily Monitor [Online]. Available at <www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_ id=2373049>, accessed 11 July 2008. Anders Åslund, ‘Unlike Putin, Medvedev Took Charge Quickly’, Moscow Times, 21 May 2008; Ariel Cohen, ‘Russia’s Presidential Transition: Vladimir Putin Remains in Charge’ [Online: The Heritage Foundation], 6 May 2008. Available at <www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/wm1917.cfm>, accessed 11 July 2008.

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the Russian government has many things going for it, including rocketing oil prices, which not only bring much-needed revenue to the state but also increase the dependence of the West on Russia. This means that Russia is less susceptible to both internal and external pressures. Moreover, the policies implemented under Putin have paid significant dividends: by adopting preventative policies intended to undermine regional democratic trends at home and abroad, the regime is well positioned to ensure that it is not challenged by the type of popular uprisings seen elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Helping to reinforce the stability of the Russian government is the receding potential of regional, democratic contagion. Democratic consolidation in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia remains unsettled, and Ukraine has yet to emerge from the political instability which saw the ‘orange coalition’ initially collapse. Moreover, Lukashenko remains in power in Belarus and other authoritarian regimes in the region have strengthened their hold on power. Furthermore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has emerged as perhaps the most substantive international organization in the region, and its authoritarian foundations legitimize the political status quo. A regional environment conducive to autocracy will reinforce Russian authoritarian tendencies which, in turn, will allow the Kremlin further to undermine democratization in the region. A vicious cycle appears to have emerged and the reverse wave of authoritarianism appears well established in the former Soviet Union.

Chapter 10

The Future of Democracy and the Challenge of Authoritarianism

Autocrats learn and adjust. Robert Kagan (2008)

The purpose of this book was to explore the recent authoritarian backlash evidenced in the wake of the fourth wave of democracy. This reverse wave against the color revolutions was well reflected in Russian domestic and foreign policies and was analyzed under the framework of five strategies of authoritarian resistance. These strategies were developed to complement the literature on international-level democratization; in particular, to identify the varied ways that authoritarian states can react to international democratic pressures. In the previous chapter, some conclusions about the future of democracy in the former Soviet Union were offered. As this chapter illustrates, the case studies also yielded important insights into the theoretical, research, and practical implications of how states seek to undermine or counter democratic trends and democracy promotion both at home and abroad. This chapter serves as a conclusion of this study and consists of four further parts. Section one explores the general implications of this study for our understanding of democratization theory. Section two evaluates the strategies of authoritarian resistance. Section three outlines some avenues for future research. The final section proposes how the democratic world should respond to the recent authoritarian resurgence. Implications for Democratization Theory Prior research on democracy promotion has too often treated autocratic regimes as largely passive targets of regional democratic trends. By contrast, this book has shown that the Kremlin has taken an active role in authoritarian resistance by adopting a variety of strategies aimed at countering these trends. While concern over the color revolutions was not the only cause of these policies, they illustrate the varied means by which authoritarian states can counter or contain the spread of democracy. From this case study, we can identify several general theoretical implications for our understanding of the overall relationship between the international level, democratization, and authoritarianism. First, this book reinforces the notion that democracy is not inevitable and the steady progress of democratization should not be assumed. To continue the

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use of the explanatory metaphor of democratic ‘waves’, we know that waves break, recede, and sometimes have little effect on certain parts of the shoreline. More theoretical analysis needs to be directed at understanding the persistence of authoritarianism, rather than focusing primarily on what causes democracy. Although this is oftentimes difficult—since identifying those factors which preclude change is never easy—explaining the absence of a democratic opening is just as valuable as identifying those forces which caused one. Second, we must understand that external democracy promotion is not a oneway process. Traditional accounts have largely viewed this as unidirectional: how external variables affect the possibilities for democratization. Instead, we must conceive of the politics of democratization as inherently interactive, as a contest between opposing forces and actors. While this is already done in regard to politics within states, it needs to occur in regard to the international level as well. This would entail examining the content and effects of policies aimed at undermining democratization abroad and neutralizing cross-border, democratic forces at home. Third, if states actively seek to undermine democratic trends abroad, then our understanding of the causes of foreign policy behavior in authoritarian states needs to be expanded to include the regime type of their neighbors. A number of scholars, often coming from the debate over democratic peace theory, have already analyzed the international consequences of ‘political dissimilarity’ and have found that conflict is more likely in such cases (Hermann and Kegley 1995, Werner and Limke 1997, Werner 2000). These tensions will likely increase when regional democratic trends are evident. By expanding this research, we may be better able to explain the foreign policy choices of non-democracies and the pattern of conflict in regions where democratization is occurring. Fourth, we must accept that our theoretical understanding of how autocrats react to regional democratic trends will be inherently limited by the interconnectedness of political and security factors. This was best seen in the chapters on Bolster and Subvert: preserving Lukashenko’s regime in power is seen as being closely tied to preserving Belarus’s pro-Russian alignment; Russia’s response to postcolor revolution Georgia and Ukraine was intimately connected with the strategic reorientation of Tbilisi and Kiev. As conflicts between democratic and autocratic countries grow on a global scale, regimes will increasingly link the strategic interests of their country to the political security of their regime. Untangling this theoretical knot will be a challenge. Finally, examinations of democratization theory and specific cases are often hampered by a problem of classification: How should we categorize regimes which hold elections with multiple parties, but whose political systems are neither free, fair, nor competitive? How do we even judge the degree to which a political system is free, fair, or competitive? This is indicative of the problem of democracies with ‘adjectives’ or any variety of ‘hybrid’, ‘semi-authoritarian’, or ‘competitive authoritarian’ regimes (Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002, Wigell 2008). Research into the Putin regime was underdeveloped in part because of disputes

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among scholars over how to refer Russia: Was it still a democracy, and therefore the transitional democracy literature would best apply, or had it shifted qualitatively away from democracy, in which case the literature on democratic openings and authoritarianism should guide our research? Even if we discount the arguments of partisans either for or against the Kremlin, the situation was unclear enough to give credence to both the optimistic and pessimistic assessments. Even today, Medvedev’s liberal rhetoric and non-siloviki background have raised questions of whether Russia has begun a shift away from autocracy and whether the Putin period was less an example of authoritarianism than political stabilization and delayed state-building. In order to better understand the political dynamics of democracy and autocracy, future research must begin with clear political taxonomies and standards for classifying a particular regime into one category or another. As the backlash against democracy promotion becomes more evident and authoritarian countries assume a larger role in the international system, it is increasingly important that our theoretical understanding of democratization becomes broader and more nuanced. Future research will be necessary if we are to account for those factors which advance democracy and those which maintain autocracy. Evaluating the Strategies of Authoritarian Resistance As the quote which begins this chapter observed: ‘Autocrats learn and adjust’. The Kremlin clearly absorbed the lessons of the color revolutions and took preventive steps to weaken internal democratic forces and undermine external democracy promotion. Chapters 4–9 examined some of these policies in action under the framework of the strategies of authoritarian resistance outlined in Chapter 2. This section will evaluate how these strategies operated in the Russian context and identify both lessons for other cases and the limits of this framework. A comprehensive strategy of Insulate seemingly required a multifaceted policy against a variety of forces which were seen as playing a critical role in the prior color revolutions: election monitors, nongovernmental organizations, and youth movements. However, as seen in other cases of democratic revolutions, this is not the only mix of factors which could precipitate a democratic opening (Kuzio 2008). This means that autocrats must constantly push back on a number of vectors and be nimble enough to adjust their policies in a proactive manner to deal with existing and new international-level threats to regime survival. For authoritarian governments which present themselves as being democratic or whose economic circumstances require global engagement, this will not be easy. One could take the North Korea route and almost entirely seal off the society, but this is not an option in most cases. If one wishes to maintain the facade of being a democracy, it will be difficult to maintain the balance between remaining connected to the larger international system and (to use the language of the color revolutions) preventing the ‘virus’ of external democracy promotion from ‘infecting’ the society.

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The Russian experience indicates that the application of this strategy benefitted greatly from a number of factors. First, the opposition was already weak and divided, the young people appeared adrift, and the general population was either supportive of the regime or indifferent to its actions. In another context, these policies could easily have backfired and precipitated the very anti-regime activities that they sought to prevent. Second, the Kremlin’s hold over the media helped a great deal. For example, the government’s claims about the evils of NGOs were strengthened by the lack of a free press to counter the government’s message. The popularity of Nashi and the Young Guard, as well as the legitimacy of the Public Chamber, were clearly helped by the extensive, positive coverage they received on state-controlled television; alternatives to these pro-Kremlin organizations were far easier to discredit. Finally, the government was able to provide a legalistic cover for its actions. This was especially evident in dealing with nongovernmental organizations: the labyrinthine legal system which exists in the Russian Federation provided the government with a great deal of arbitrary power to manipulate administrative regulations in order to undermine liberal NGOs. This veneer of legality helped the government to continue its democratic pretensions to the outside world. However, this was not fully successful. The democratic West took a strong stance against this law and one could argue that it represented a tippingpoint in international perceptions of the Russian political system: the position that Russia is even a partial democracy was now more difficult to maintain. Thus, while a strategy of Insulate could be counterproductive at home if not conducted under beneficial conditions, it can also undermine positive relations abroad. The Russian strategy of Redefine was also multifaceted and revealed interesting lessons for future cases. First, the formulation of ‘sovereign democracy’ was masterful in that the phrase itself contained a ready response against criticisms: external critics were accused of trying to violate Russian sovereignty, impose foreign standards on the Russian people, and being neoimperialists; domestic critics were painted as traitors who sought to undermine Russian the state and precipitate chaos, often in league with outsiders. Although this was, in essence, an ad hominem attack, it was a very effective rhetorical tool. Second, if one wishes to present one’s country as democratic, when it decidedly is not, it does not hurt to be either shameless in one’s assertions or willing to wildly manipulate the historical record to one’s benefit. Some of the claims made by government officials were so extreme and said with such certainty—such as the Russian political system being more liberal than many established democracies or asserting that the American media was just as state-controlled as Russia’s—that it had the effect of putting the West on the defensive, seemingly unable or unwilling to engage in a war of words with the Kremlin. Third, the exaggerated attacks against Estonia, in which the West was accused of violating its own principles through its support of Tallinn, represented another aspect of Russia’s application of the strategy of Redefine. This policy sought to shift attention away from the Russian political system and to claim not only that the chief threat to liberal democracy existed elsewhere, but that Russia itself is the primary champion of these values. This reveals that

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authoritarian regimes can not simply stay on the defensive. Even the concept of sovereign democracy, although proactive, was ultimately utilized as a means to defend Russia’s political system against external criticisms, as indicated by its increased use just before the 2006 G-8 summit. Instead, autocrats must go on the offensive if they wish to shield themselves from external criticism. Finally, message discipline—a notion from domestic politics in which a politician repeats the same concept over and over in a clear and consistent manner—is seemingly important if this strategy is to be effective. Although sovereign democracy eventually became enshrined as the de facto state ideology of Russia, the vacillations of Putin and Medvedev on this topic undermined the government’s ability to counter critics who were able to point to Kremlin officials to justify their disapproval of the concept. This was not the case with Estonia, however: the Kremlin was very consistent in its attacks against its neighbor and, as one opinion poll indicated, most Russians saw Estonia, with its 1.4 million people, as the ‘worst enemy’ of their country. This strategy, too, comes with some risk. The willingness of the Kremlin to play fast and loose with democratic terminology, to confront the West rhetorically, and to manipulate the historical record was similar to the Soviet Union’s rhetoric during the Cold War. This had the effect of actually undermining Russia’s democratic pretensions. Also, as seen in the case of the European Union’s reaction to the row over the Bronze Soldier Monument, an offensive strategy might actually backfire and cause the democratic world to close ranks with a fellow democracy. Russian policies aimed at reinforcing Belarus were extensive and represented support along a wide range of policy areas. A central element of the strategy of Bolster in the Russia–Belarus case appears to be the strong connection between political and strategic interests. The Kremlin’s stake in Belarus is not just a matter of backing a like-minded regime, but also preserving a critical buffer between itself and the West, one with significant military and geographic implications. This makes it difficult to determine exactly why Russia’s support for Belarus has been so sizeable. However, it does suggest that the likelihood of this level of support increases dramatically when there is an overlap between these sets of interests. Moreover, the importance of supporting authoritarianism abroad also appears proportional to the possible impact that the fall of the regime would have for the country providing its aid. The implications for Russia of political change in Belarus are extensive: this country is extremely close to Russia in terms of language, culture, and identity, and a democratic regime in Belarus would ensure that Russia’s entire western frontier consisted of democratic states. While Lukashenko’s statement quoted at the beginning of Chapter 6 that ‘a revolution in Belarus is a revolution in Russia’ is likely an exaggeration, such an event could not but have a serious impact in maintaining the Kremlin’s hold on power. Where these conditions—the overlap of interests and the possible impact of regime change—do not apply to such a degree, it is likely that the strategy of Bolster  ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Lyudmila Alexandrova, ‘Russians See Best Friends, Arch Foes Among Former Soviet Republics’, TASS, 1 June 2007.

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will play less of a role in the foreign policy of authoritarian states. The contrast between Russia’s extensive support for Belarus and doing nothing to save Akayev in Kyrgyzstan is illustrative of this point. Although the Tulip Revolution might have had implications for political stability in Central Asia, this was a far more distant concern that the possibility of regime change in Belarus. Even Russia’s support for Uzbekistan after the May 2005 crackdown in Andijan and China’s support of Myanmar do not even come close to that provided by Russia to Belarus, in part because the interests of the supporting states are less. The example of Russia–Belarus relations also indicates that a number of dependencies arise in cases when one authoritarian state provides substantial support to another. The maintenance of autocracy in Belarus means that its isolation from the West is reinforced and the Lukashenko regime has therefore become increasingly dependent upon the Kremlin for its survival. This provides Russia with a great deal of leverage over Belarus. There also exists a relationship of codependency between the two countries: although Minsk is clearly dependent upon Moscow, Russia can not put too much pressure upon the Lukashenko regime for fear of precipitating either regime collapse (more likely) or a strategic realignment (less likely, as long as Belarus remains authoritarian). This provides Belarus with some latitude to resist Russian domination, as evidenced by the December 2007 rapprochement between the two regimes after the Kremlin felt that it had pushed Minsk too far. The Kremlin’s strategy of Bolster also provides Russia with some advantage in its relationship with the West: if the West wishes to affect change in Belarus, it must go through Moscow. Consequently, the West is also, in a way, dependent upon Russia to achieve its goal of advancing democracy. Therefore it has less of an incentive to push back against authoritarianism in Russia. Thus, this strategy has the effect of complicating not only the bilateral ties between the supporting and target states, but also the relationships between these countries and the democratic world. However, the same point made above applies here: the lesser the support, the less these dependencies will manifest themselves. This strategy also contains an element of risk for the bolstering state: if they are seen as actively supporting authoritarianism abroad, this could spark a backlash in the target state and/or seriously damage relations with the democratic powers. Russia’s interference in Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections did both: not only did it galvanize the democratic opposition in Ukraine, it also produced an open clash with the West. Neither of these events were in Russia’s long-term strategic or political interests. As the case of Russian policy toward Georgia and Ukraine illustrated, the strategy of Subvert appears to have a key similarity to Bolster: the willingness to embark on this strategy is likely to be closely related to the overlap between strategic and political interests and to the potential impact that the target state has for the authoritarian state in question. In the aftermath of the Rose and Orange Revolutions, the strategic realignment which accompanied these events provided Russia with a strong incentive to ensure that their new democracies floundered. Not only would this undermine regional democratic trends, but it would likely preclude

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the ability of these countries to join certain military and economic institutions. Moreover, democracy along its southern and western borders had potential implications for politics in Russia. This was especially true in the latter case: like Belarus, Ukraine and Russia share strong language, cultural, identity, and historic ties and Ukraine’s physical location is critical for Russia in a geographic sense. As the comparison between these cases and Kyrgyzstan illustrates, there appeared to be less of an incentive to undermine democracy abroad absent these factors. Not only was Kyrgyzstan removed from Russia both physically and culturally, but its geographic isolation meant that it had few strategic choices other than to remain within Russia’s sphere of influence. These examples also indicate that achieving one’s political goals through this strategy might prove to be quite difficult. Even with the considerable economic leverage that Russia has over Georgia and Ukraine, the political development of these states may have stumbled, but both remain on a democratic path. Even the open support for secessionist regions in Georgia has done little to fundamentally damage Georgian democracy. Russia has seemingly reaped meager political gains, despite its increased pressure against these countries. Where this leverage does not exist, the effectiveness of this strategy will be even more questionable. Again, like Bolster, a strategy of Subvert contains both potential benefits and some serious risks. By pushing too hard, an authoritarian state can not only strengthen the resolve of the new democracy to look for allies among the democratic powers, but it can also precipitate a backlash as the established democracies move to aid the target of the pressure. We already saw elements of this in Yushchenko’s and Shaakashvili’s steadfast desire for NATO membership and in American support for another round of NATO enlargement to include Tbilisi and Kiev. Authoritarian regimes must be subtle and avoid the appearance of thuggishness. A democratic reaction against policies perceived to be aggressive is not in the interests of authoritarian powers. Moreover, if the fledgling democracy is undermined enough, it could create a truly chaotic situation. Although this might be attractive in terms of halting democratic consolidation, it could lead to system collapse and spark cross-border instability. This, in turn, could undermine the authoritarian regime’s other regional or strategic interests. Thus, a full-fledged policy of subversion might have unintended consequences. As seen in Russia’s willingness to countenance the Rose Revolution in order to bring some level of stability to the Caucasus, sometimes accepting a democracy might be better than chaos. Political interests are not the only ones worth considering. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has emerged as perhaps the most substantive international organization in the post-Soviet space. Its relative success indicates three things about the last strategy, Coordinate. First, the ability to develop a coherent set of norms to discredit the notions of democracy promotion and regime change appeared to be significantly aided by the ‘authoritarian density’ of the group. In the one case of regime change, the new government in Kyrgyzstan has not lived up to the hopes of the Tulip Revolution and it appears unlikely that democratic consolidation will be successful in this country within the near future.

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These states appear strongly committed to advancing conservative political norms and to ensuring regime survival for themselves and their like-minded partners. Again, political events in Kyrgyzstan did little to undermine these norms as the new government made it clear that their uprising was fundamentally based upon localized conditions and that it was not interested in exporting revolution in the region. Second, the SCO’s success has been aided by the development of a formal organization devoted to promoting a cohesive political concept (the ‘Spirit of Shanghai’) which clearly identified the values of the organization and was explicitly designed to set the tone for political developments and interstate relations in the region. If we flip on its head the role of international organizations in the socialization of liberal values, the SCO appears poised to create a regional order by following a similar model, though with a clearly different end goal. Third, the prior resolution of conflicts between these states, especially between the two dominant powers, Russia and China, has significantly helped to build a sense of trust and shared interests—two things necessary for the development of a normative order. Whether this can be maintained into the future is an open question, given the sharp rise of Chinese power and prestige. Nevertheless, for the time being, these regimes appear to have more that unites them than divides them. These factors signal that the SCO is developing into something more than just an autocratic support group. In cases where these factors are absent, we should expect authoritarian coordination to less coherent and more piecemeal. The conclusion of Chapter 8 touched on more general cooperation between countries which share similar beliefs about democratization. A central element of the overall phenomenon of the authoritarian backlash has been the global alignment by regime type and the willingness of these states to challenge the norms of democracy promotion and universal human rights. The authoritarian states, led by Russia and China, are involved in a push to delegitimize these concepts and return to a more absolute notion of state sovereignty. The SCO’s emphasis on stability (the lack of political change) and diversity (the moral equivalence of different governing systems) is a regional reflection of this larger ideological struggle. Consequently, the outcome of this global push will likely be dependent on the factors which made the SCO successful: authoritarian density, a cohesive message, and a sense of shared interests. While the numerical balance of democracies and autocracies may be an important indicator of authoritarian density, a strong commitment by the latter countries to promoting their norms could make up for any shortfall in numbers. Authoritarian regimes can also cooperate in other ways in the face of democratic pressures, such as by providing economic, military, and diplomatic aid. Much of this would resemble the strategy of Bolster, but in a looser fashion—it would be less about specifically propping up like-minded regimes than providing them with general sources of support. However, this growing alignment by regime type also holds some risks: as seen above, as the divisions between democracies and autocracies becomes stronger, and democratic countries may feel threatened by a resurgence of authoritarianism; this could lead to a pro-democratic backlash.

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It should be noted that when sufficiently motivated, the democratic powers have been able to put together three grand coalitions—the Allies in WWI and WWII, and the Western bloc during the Cold War—to oppose their ideological rivals. In the current global setting, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay starkly outline the significant strength of the world’s democracies: ‘They deploy the greatest and most potent militaries; the largest twenty democracies are responsible for three-quarters of the resources spent on defense in the world today. Democracies also account for most of the world’s wealth, innovation, and productivity. Twenty-eight of the world’s thirty largest economies are democracies’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2007). While the struggle between democracy and autocracy in the twenty-first century may not be like the great conflicts of the twentieth century, the authoritarian states do not necessarily have an interest in direct conflict with the democratic countries or forcing other states to take sides. Instead, authoritarian powers seemingly have an interest in taking a more defensive, nuanced, and measured approach to undermining democratic norms. These case studies also revealed four limits to this framework, some of which have been addressed above. First, each of these strategies may actually be counterproductive and might undermine the interests of the authoritarian regime which adopts them. Either they may produce the opposite effects of what was intended or may provoke a backlash at home or abroad. Again, the case of Russian interference in Ukraine in 2004 is perhaps the best example. This may indicate that authoritarian regimes may forcefully adopt these strategies only at the point of greatest risk—when the threat of democratic pressure is at its highest. There are already indications that, with the successful transition to President Medvedev, the Kremlin’s anti-democratic policies may be receding somewhat. At the very least, the potential for unintended consequences may give some regimes pause before acting too aggressively against democratization. Second, the overlap between strategic and political interests, though providing the Kremlin with a greater incentive to adopt these strategies, has also undermined our ability to fully understand the intentions behind and the causes of Russian policies. While we can expect that regime type will play a larger role in the international system, this will often be a reflection of and reinforce the strategic differences between states. Parsing these out in a effort to achieve conceptual and theoretical clarity will be difficult. Third, it may be that, given the immediacy of the color revolutions and the recent shift toward autocracy, the Russian government was more intensely concerned about the prospects for democratic contagion than we might find in other cases. It therefore may have been more active in undermining democratization than a more stable regime (like China) would have. These strategies might therefore be less applicable, or at least less evident, in the domestic and foreign policies of other authoritarian countries. Some of these cases may also be specific to the Russian context: no other autocratic country has a relationship with another state like that between Russia and Belarus; China and North Korea might come close, but the national identity issues are lacking between Beijing and Pyongyang. Similarly, the

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SCO might also be unique: the closest comparison, ASEAN, developed at a slower and less coherent pace. Therefore, future research will be necessary to determine whether these strategies are found to such a degree outside of the former Soviet Union. Finally, determining the effectiveness of these strategies will also be difficult, given the evidence available. Determining the causes behind the absence of political change is far harder than in cases where one or more factors can be traced to a specific set of political developments. It can not be said with any significant confidence that the policies examined in this study prevented democratization in any of the former Soviet states, Russia included. They may simply have been unnecessary or merely reinforced other factors which would have precluded regime change anyway, such as internal dynamics. Certainly, absent the extensive support of Russia, Lukashenko would have been far harder pressed to stay in power, but any determinative conclusions about regime survival in this case are impossible. Similarly, even if it did not seek to discredit election monitors, sabotage NGOs, or create its own youth movement, the Russian government may have been well-entrenched enough to weather any domestic storm brought about by the uncompetitive elections of 2007–2008. These policies might well have made the Kremlin’s job easier, but we cannot say with certainty that they were decisive. That being said, determining their effectiveness was not the purpose of this study, as outlined in Chapter 1. Rather, it was to identify the strategies and explore them through one or two in-depth cases which exemplify their application. It was to set the stage for future research, especially of a comparative nature. As the next section illustrates, this book has indeed raised a number of avenues for further study. Avenues for Future Research There are many areas where this book could be expanded for more extensive analysis. For example, examinations of democracy promotion would benefit from more systematic study. Are certain types of external democracy promotion more effective than others and, if so, under what circumstances? To what degree do these processes provoke a ‘backlash’ which actually hampers the progress of democratization? Do we see autocratic states exhibiting ‘learning behavior’ in response to democratic successes elsewhere? Are specific strategies of authoritarian resistance more or less effective against certain types of democracy promotion? Are there additional strategies of authoritarian resistance other than those identified in the present study? These questions will help to flesh out the variables and process associated with the external promotion of democracy. One can also expand this study’s geographical scope and take into account the experiences of other authoritarian countries (such as China, Iran, and Zimbabwe) as they confront regional or global democratic pressures. How effective have these states been in resisting democratization? Has their policy repertoire differed

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significantly from the Kremlin’s? Have certain strategies proved to be more or less effective than in Russia? By expanding this study to include other cases, our understanding of authoritarian resistance as a global phenomenon will greatly benefit. Moreover, each strategy raises its own set of questions and further studies could condiser them in more depth. For example, future examinations of Insulate could attempt to answer the following: Are certain specific policies—limiting NGOs, discrediting election monitoring, establishing pro-regime organizations— more effective than others? What institutional reforms and interventions into civil society (e.g. control over the media) are likely to accompany these moves? What other types of policies would fit under this strategy? As the case of the proKremlin youth movements illustrates, what are the unintended consequences of these policies in terms of a potential backlash against the regime? Questions such as these would shed greater light on how states shield themselves from democratic challenges on the domestic level. Given the renewed willingness of autocratic regimes to challenge the legitimacy of the West’s policy of democracy promotion on ideological grounds, the strategy of Redefine will become more important over time. Some questions raised by this strategy might include: How well have autocratic leaders constructed a coherent, alternative ideology to liberal democracy? Why do (some of) these states feel compelled to hold elections? This may indicate that the notion of democracy remains important on the world stage since countries which diverge from these norms still seek to find legitimacy based upon the assertion that they are indeed democracies. How effective are these regimes at convincing their own people that they live in a democracy despite shifts toward autocracy? Alternatively, do we see a drop in citizens’ commitment to democracy as these regimes seek to discredit the policies of the established democracies? There are some indications that the Russian people have a declining belief in liberal-democratic values and instead see the stability and (relative) prosperity brought about by ‘Putin’s Plan’ as more important than open political competition. Since this ideological challenge is inherently interactive, it would also be useful to examine the role that established democracies play. What is their reaction to these rhetorical and ideological challenges? How effective are autocratic regimes at placing democracies on the defensive? Are the established democracies able and/or willing to defend their values? Finally, as a new model of economic development comes to be seen as successful (if it remains so), then other states may look to autocratic capitalism as a role model. Is there an echo effect in which additional regimes begin to justify their rule by adopting similar language? If we have truly reached ‘the end of the end of history’, understanding the ideological challenge posed by autocracy is necessary if the established democracies wish to continue to advance democracy. The relationship between Russia and Belarus identified in the chapter on Bolster is not unique. A close parallel would be between China and Myanmar, in which

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Beijing has consistently supported the military junta in Naypyidaw. Venezuela under Hugo Chávez has also aided like-minded regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, these cases are dissimilar as well, with the most obvious difference being that an actual political merger between Russia and Belarus is a real possibility, while is clearly not in the cases of China-Myanmar or Venezuela-Bolivia/Ecuador. Nevertheless, a deeper understanding of how autocrats support one another would indicate the degree to which the democratic West will be challenged in the future by coalitions opposed to it on ideological grounds. This can be expanded to include an examination more generally of how the growing conflict between liberalism and autocracy has affected the foreign policies of both democratic and authoritarian states. Is the anecdotal information about increased alignments by regime type borne out by more systematic examinations? How have foreign policies and strategic alignments been affected? What types of cooperation do we see between these states (e.g. rhetorical, military, strategic, economic, political, etc.)? Are there changes in the intensity and form of cooperation over time? If the world is increasingly being divided into two camps, then understanding this dynamic from an strategic level will become more important over time. While autocrats have an interest in helping countries with similar regimetypes, they have an equally compelling interest in undermining or discrediting democratic ones. As the chapter on Subvert illustrated, Russian relations with Georgia and Ukraine deteriorated sharply after the Orange Revolution raised the specter of democratic contagion. The connection between regime change and strategic realignment, represented by the possibility that Tbilisi and Kiev may seek NATO membership, also had a negative effect on these relationships. Future research could look for similar situations in other cases. Is there variance between cases where a new democracy has a real possibility of joining liberal international organizations and those where this does not exist? Contrast Russia’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine, which could potentially join NATO and the EU, with Kyrgyzstan, which remains geographically isolated and therefore has far fewer options to exit Russia’s orbit. It is also possible that states located next to or near each other have a greater chance of a downturn in relations, while this would be less likely the greater physical distance between the states. Another aggravating factor may be the degree to which established democracies were seen as influencing or provoking regime change. Cases with more direct involvement may have a greater chance of spoiling relations between the new democracy and its authoritarian neighbors. Moreover, the demonstration effect of a popular revolt against an autocratic regime may last only a limited time. Do relations between democratic and authoritarian countries improve once the immediate danger of democratic contagion has passed? Finally, it would be interesting to include established democracies in the mix. What role, if any, do democratic states play in defending new democracies against autocratic pressure and ensuring democratic  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There is some evidence, however, that China is beginning to move away from its unwavering support of certain authoritarian regimes (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008).

The Future of Democracy and the Challenge of Authoritarianism

213

consolidation? How does this affect relations between nearby authoritarian regimes and the established democracies? As conflict between liberalism and autocracy becomes a more prominent feature of the international system, it is more likely that the new democracies will become the fracture zones between the ideological rivals. The chapter on Coordinate examined the SCO exclusively, but could easily be expanded to include additional questions related to international organizations and democracy promotion. One option would be to look at other international organizations in which the key authoritarian great powers (Russia or China) are central members. Do we see, for example, a similar autocratic foundation to the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Eurasian Economic Community? One could also examine more closely the interplay between the SCO’s norms and values, and those of its member states. This book has already identified how positions taken by Russia found expression in SCO documents and statements. It would likely prove fruitful to explore more systematically whether the rhetoric of the individual member states is similar to that of the organization itself. For example, do we see certain themes at the domestic level being emphasized within the SCO and vice versa? Can we detect who is influencing whom—that is, is rhetoric of the members driving that of the organization or is the SCO influencing the rhetoric of the states? Are these sentiments uniform among the SCO’s members? Moreover, a close comparison between the SCO and ASEAN may prove fruitful to indicate the possible future progression of the Central Asian organization. Are there differences and/or similarities between the two in terms of institutional or normative development? How will the SCO react to democratization amongst some of its members, given ASEAN’s response to the spread of democracy in Southeast Asia? Obviously, the power differences between Russia and China, on the one hand, and the other Central Asian states, on the other, make a direct comparison between the SCO and ASEAN somewhat tricky, but still worthwhile. Lastly, we could take the observations made in this study about the SCO’s rhetoric and apply it outside of the region. For example, how has the Arab League reinforced authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa? How successful has the African Union been in its attempts to shed its authoritarian past and contribute to democracy promotion in Africa? The recent situation in Zimbabwe with President Robert Mugabe’s refusal to step down after the clearly illegitimate election of June 2008 does not inspire much hope. Answers to these questions will likely show that we must not only take into account how international organizations play a role in the spread of democracy, but also how they preserve or sustain authoritarianism. One goal of this study was to raise as many questions as it hoped to answer. By looking more carefully at the variables and process associated with democratization, expanding its geographic scope, and examining the strategies of authoritarian resistance in more depth, we will better understand the relationship between democracy and authoritarianism and how autocratic regimes seek to undermine democracy promotion on the international level.

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The Future Challenge of Authoritarianism The future of democracy around the world remains uncertain. The international system appears to be in the throws of a reverse wave in which democracy’s strength is waning and authoritarianism is resurgent. However, this does not necessarily presage a renewed ideological conflict like those of the past. As Kagan (2008) stated: ‘… this competition is not the Cold War redux. It is more like the nineteenth century redux’. By this he meant that the competition between democracy and autocracy will against become a defining feature of the international system, as it was during the 1800s. Unlike World War I, World War II, or the Cold War, the established democracies do not face an offensive threat to their existence in the form of imperialism, fascism, or communism. Authoritarian countries, such as China and Russia, are not seeking to transform the world in their image. Instead, these states represent a more defensive challenge to the established democracies: not only are they willing to push back against attempts to promote political values at odds with their domestic interests, they also serve as potential models and allies for countries which find themselves under pressure from democratic powers. This presents a new set of challenges for those interested in promoting liberal norms, democratic values, and human rights. What should the democratic world do in this new world order? Democracies must be willing to rise to the challenge of ideas. Primarily, this means not being forced on the defensive when authoritarian leaders promote themselves as democrats by manipulating the language of democracy or when they seek to deflect international criticism by criticizing others for offenses which pale by comparison with those committed by the authoritarian regime itself. The clash between democracy and autocracy is as much, if not more so, a conflict over values, perceptions, and international opinion, as it is over geopolitical or strategic advantage. The fact that nearly all non-democratic countries feel the need to pretend that they are democracies is evidence of the power of liberalism as a world value. Exposing regimes which are not living up to their international commitments, championing the benefits of a liberal political system, and not backing down in the face of the misrepresentations by autocrats will all be essential policies for the established democracies. Only through consistency and steadfastness can democracy promotion have any hope of being successful. Democracies must also do a better job at working together in the face of this renewed authoritarian backlash and assertiveness. Some have argued that the democratic world should band together in a ‘concert’ or ‘league’ of democracies (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, Daalder and Lindsay 2007). This has become a controversial notion, but one which as sparked significant debate in Washington (Carothers 2008). This grouping is not meant to be an alliance in a traditional

 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Also see the debate between Carothers, Daalder, and Lindsay in ‘Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?’ [Online: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

The Future of Democracy and the Challenge of Authoritarianism

215

sense, nor is it intended to replace any existing international organizations (such as the United Nations). Rather it would develop a common agenda for those countries with a shared belief in liberal-democratic values, facilitate policy coordination, defend and advance the principles of democracy, and seek to overcome the intransigence of authoritarian states against international action to protect human rights. In addition to the debate over whether such a concept is a good idea, there are additional questions about the willingness of many democratic states to join an organization which appears to be closely tied to the US and looks like it is creating new global divisions. Nevertheless, this is an intriguing notion which deserves greater thought. At the very least, the democratic world must recognize that its values are worth defending and advancing, and that the only way to achieve these goals is through common action. The established democracies must also actively seek to consolidate democracy where it has been successful. Within the European context, there are some indications that the European Union and NATO are suffering from ‘expansion fatigue’. This is a mistake. Although it is readily admitted that further enlargement of either of these organizations creates certain institutional and logistic problems, it has been shown that an open door has been beneficial to ensuring a fundamental, democratic choice for countries in Eastern Europe. Even if admission to international institutions is not possible (since in many cases this is not an option geographically), preserving democratic gains will require extensive moral support within the new democracy and against pressures from authoritarian regimes, economic and political assistance, and a concrete policy of conditionality which ties substantive benefits to progress toward democratic consolidation. If the established democracies truly wish to promote democracy, they must be vigorous, diligent, and willing to pay a price to support democracy abroad. It must also be understood that foreign policy decisions have consequences, both known and unintended. For every action, there is a reaction. The backlash against democracy promotion is a clear example of this. As the established democracies sought to further democratization, they precipitated a negative reaction by autocracies around the world which clamped down even harder on their populations. While there were democratic gains in some cases, this was countered by a deepening of autocracy in others. This is not to say that fears over a backlash should prevent the democratic world from promoting its values. Instead, the established democracies must be prepared to make hard choices and accept unpleasant outcomes in some cases. If history has taught us anything, it is that the advancement of human freedom comes at a price. The reaction by the authoritarian states to the policies of the democratic powers is more often a reflection of their internal politics as it is to the correctness of those policies—in some cases, their very opposition may indicate that the particular course of action is the right thing to 29 May 2008. Available at <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0529carnegie-league_ of%20democracies.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2008.  �������������������������������������������������������������������� Instead, this would be a ‘global NATO’ (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).

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do. These states are not afraid to defend their interests and therefore the free world should not hesitate to do the same out of a fear of offending dictators. Of course, confrontation should be avoided if possible, but engagement and consensus may do little more than ensure the political status quo and ensure that the desires of the most uncooperative are fulfilled. The democratic powers must be willing to advance their values in the face of authoritarian resistance. Whatever the future holds, the political, ideological, and strategic challenges posed by autocracy are very real. It would be unwise to simply assume that the victory of liberalism is inevitable. As we have seen, this most recent democratic wave was followed by a reverse wave and an authoritarian backlash. In order to further the cause of liberty in the international system, it will be increasingly important to understand how regimes seek to counter democracy promotion and sustain authoritarianism.

Appendix

Freedom House Ratings of the Former Soviet Union (1991–2007) The following tables include the Freedom House ratings for the countries of the Former Soviet Union since 1991. A full listing of all Freedom House Ratings can be found at <www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls>.

Table A.1  Freedom House ratings – averages

Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

5 5 4 2.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 3 3 5.5 3 5.5

3.5 5 3.5 3 4.5 5 3 3 2.5 5 3.5 6 6.5 3 6

3.5 6 4.5 2.5 5 5 4 3 2 5 3.5 7 7 4 7

3.5 6 4 2.5 5 5.5 3.5 2.5 2 4 3.5 7 7 3.5 7

4 6 5 2 4.5 5.5 4 2 1.5 4 3.5 7 7 3.5 7

4.5 5.5 6 1.5 4 5.5 4 2 1.5 3.5 3.5 7 7 3.5 6.5

4.5 5 6 1.5 3.5 5.5 4 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 6 7 3.5 6.5

4 5 6 1.5 3.5 5.5 5 1.5 1.5 3 4 6 7 3.5 6.5

4 5 6 1.5 3.5 5.5 5 1.5 1.5 3 4.5 6 7 3.5 6.5

4 5.5 6 1.5 4 5.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 3 5 6 7 4 6.5

4 5.5 6 1.5 4 5.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 3 5 6 7 4 6.5

4 5.5 6 1.5 4 5.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 5 5.5 7 4 6.5

4 5.5 6 1.5 4 5.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 5 5.5 7 4 6.5

4.5 5.5 6.5 1 3.5 5.5 5.5 1.5 2 3.5 5.5 5.5 7 3.5 6.5

4.5 5.5 6.5 1 3 5.5 4.5 1 1 3.5 5.5 5.5 7 2.5 7

4.5 5.5 6.5 1 3 5.5 4.5 1 1 3.5 5.5 5.5 7 2.5 7

4.5 5.5 6.5 1 3 5.5 4.5 1 1 3.5 5.5 5.5 7 2.5 7

Table A.2  Freedom House ratings – political rights 1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Armenia Azerbaijan

5 5

4 5

3 6

3 6

4 6

5 6

5 6

4 6

4 6

4 6

4 6

4 6

4 6

5 6

5 6

5 6

5 6

Belarus

4

4

5

4

5

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

Estonia

2

3

3

3

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Georgia

6

4

5

5

4

4

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

Kazakhstan

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

Kyrgyzstan

5

4

5

4

4

4

4

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

5

5

5

Latvia

2

3

3

3

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Lithuania

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

Moldova

5

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

Russia

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

4

5

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

Tajikistan

3

6

7

7

7

7

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

Turkmenistan

6

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

Ukraine Uzbekistan

3 6

3 6

4 7

3 7

3 7

3 7

3 7

3 7

3 7

4 7

4 7

4 7

4 7

4 7

3 7

3 7

3 7

Table A.3  Freedom House ratings – civil liberties

Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

5 5 4 3 5 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 3 5

3 5 3 3 5 5 2 3 3 5 4 6 6 3 6

4 6 4 2 5 4 3 3 3 5 4 7 7 4 7

4 6 4 2 5 5 3 2 3 4 4 7 7 4 7

4 6 5 2 5 5 4 2 2 4 4 7 7 4 7

4 5 6 2 4 5 4 2 2 4 4 7 7 4 6

4 4 6 2 4 5 4 2 2 4 4 6 7 4 6

4 4 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 4 6 7 4 6

4 4 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 6 7 4 6

4 5 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 6 7 4 6

4 5 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 6 7 4 6

4 5 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 5 7 4 6

4 5 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 5 7 4 6

4 5 6 1 4 5 5 2 2 4 5 5 7 3 6

4 5 6 1 3 5 4 1 1 4 5 5 7 2 7

4 5 6 1 3 5 4 1 1 4 5 5 7 2 7

4 5 6 1 3 5 4 1 1 4 5 5 7 2 7

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Index Abkhazia 88, 133, 137-8, 140-41, 143 Adjara 133, 137 Afghanistan 119, 176, 180 African Union 162, 213 Akayev, Askar 21, 40, 42, 166, 177-7, 181, 206 America, see United States of America Andijan 166-9, 175, 179-182, 206 Armenia 16, 27, 29, 58, 139, 193 ASEAN, see Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 24, 162, 164, 177, 210, 213 Atlantic Alliance, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Azerbaijan 27, 29, 136, 181 Baltic states, see Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Belarus 2-4, 16, 18, 21, 27, 29, 56, 60, 68, 149-150, 154, 184, 193, 200 media in113, 124 relations with NATO 16, 118-9 relations with Russia 3, 7-8, 72, 105, 106, 126-30, 148, 202, 205-7, 209, 211-2 Belarusian national identity 106, 120-3 economic support from 116-8, 148 diplomatic support from 111-3 military support from 118-20 political support from 113-6 Russia–Belarus Union 107-9, 121-6 relations with United States of America 72, 109, 111-4 see also Denim Revolution; Lukashenko, Alexander Belarus Democracy Act, see United States of America, relations with Belarus 109, 111, 113, 115 Beslan Hostage Crisis, see Russia, Beslan Hostage Crisis

Black Sea Fleet 134-5, 148, 150-51 bolster definition of 22-3 theoretical implications of 105-6, 202, 205-8, 211-3 Borodavkin, Aleksey 59-60, 96 Bush, George W. 75, 86, 196 and Belarus 109, 113 and Estonia 101 and Georgia 72, 138-9, 142 and Russia 70, 74, 78, 102, 131, 142 see also United States of America Caucasus, see Armenia; Azerbaijan; Chechnya; Georgia CEC, see Central Election Commission Central Asia 2, 16, 27, 160-1, 165-6, 168-73, 175-9, 181-2, 184, 206; see also Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan Central Election Commission (CEC) 55, 188, 191, 193, 197 Chávez, Hugo 3, 183-4, 212; see also Venezuela Chechnya 31-3, 51, 71, 80, 96-7, 133, 180 Cheney, Richard (Dick) 73-5 China 3, 6, 20, 86, 95, 173-4, 184, 209-10, 213, 215 relations with Myanmar 23, 206, 211-2 relations with Russia 17, 160-1, 163-4, 177, 182-3, 208 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 160-1, 163-5, 170-1, 177, 182-3, 213 CIS, see Commonwealth of Independent States Clinton, William (Bill) 31, 70 CoE, see Council of Europe Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 179-182

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colonialism, see imperialism color revolutions 1-2, 29-30, 40, 72, 151, 153-4, 166, 201 causes of 4, 12, 20, 21, 40, 61, 63, 68 Russian reaction to 5, 27, 42-4, 45-6, 61, 63, 68, 78, 80, 105, 112, 115, 130-2, 136-8, 155-6, 179, 185-6, 190, 195, 197-8, 202-3, 209 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 165-9, 175 see also Orange Revolution; Rose Revolution; Tulip Revolution Common Economic Space, see Eurasian Economic Community Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 42, 58, 132, 154, 179, 213 and election monitoring by 56, 60, 113, 192-3 conditionality 8, 12-8, 106, 109, 215 contagion 2, 4, 12, 40, 42, 131-2, 136, 154-5, 179, 200, 209, 212 see also diffusion; orange virus coordinate definition of 24-5 theoretical implications of 207-9, 213 Council of Europe (COE) 15, 50, 118, 138, 146 and Belarus 109-10, 112-3 and election monitoring 54, 149-50, 188 see also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Crimea 134-5, 148-9; see also Black Sea Fleet Croatia 2, 15 CSTO, see Collective Security Treaty Organization Czech Republic 15, 153 democratic waves 1-2, 4-5, 11-12, 153-4, 201-2, 214, 216; see also fourth wave of democracy; reverse wave of democracy; third wave of democracy Denim Revolution 2, 4, 21, 68 diffusion 8, 12-3, 17-8, 106, 120, 123, 159 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 151-6

diversity 69-70, 78-9, 81, 102, 160, 163-4, 172-7, 208 Eastern Europe 1989 revolutions in1-2, 4, 12, 120 and integration with West 12, 14-6, 120, 123, 153-4, 215 election monitoring 203, 211 role incolor revolutions 2, 20-1, 40-1, 57-8, 60-1, 68 Russian policy towards 54-61, 73, 186, 188-93, 210 see also, Commonwealth of Independent States, election monitoring by; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope, election monitoring by; Shanghai Cooperation Organization, election monitoring by election observers, see election monitoring Estonia democratic development in29 demographics in86-7, 134 and the European Union 88-9, 93-4, 101 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 88, 101, 153 relations with Russia accusations of human rights abuses in87-89, 98-102, 204-5 attacked inEuropean institutions 92-7, 101 Bronze Soldier Monument row 67, 97-101, 205 characterized as fascist by 65, 89-92 and Russian youth groups 62, 67, 100-1 and the United Nations 94-5 EU, see European Union Eurasian Economic Community (Common Economic Space) 136, 147, 181, 213 European Union 16, 73, 86, 119, 179 alternatives to 124-6, 130, 136, 147, 162, 181

Index and Belarus 109-110, 113-4, 116-7, 124-6, 130 and integration 14-5, 23, 76, 87, 95, 121, 123-5, 131, 150, 212, 215 and Russia 17, 59, 79, 89, 92-7, 99, 101, 113, 184, 188, 198, 205 support for democratization 5, 12, 15, 17, 79-80, 87-8, 154 and Uzbekistan 181-2 fascism 64-6, 81-2, 87, 90-92, 98, 214 Federal Security Service (FSB) 33, 48, 53, 194; see also Patrushev, Nikolai Fedotov, Yuri 87-90, 95, 97 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 110, 114, 188 fourth wave of democracy 2, 4-5, 11, 201; see also democratic waves Fradkov, Mikhail 115-6, 186 Freedom House 28, 59, 71, 81, 89, 217-20 FSB, see Federal Security Service G-8, see Group of Eight Gazprom, 127, 148, 188; see also natural gas Georgia and NATO 16, 76, 151-7 political development of 27, 29, 40, 200 relations with Russia after the Rose Revolution 7, 136146, 152, 155-7, 202, 206-7, 212 prior to Rose Revolution 132-3 revolution in2, 4, 20-1, 40-1, 72, 136-7, 165, 185, 195 Russian economic sanctions against 140-3 Russian military bases in132-3, 137, 139 see also Abakhazia; Adjara; South Ossetia; Rose Revolution; Saakashvili, Mikhail; Shevardnadze, Eduard Georgiyevtsky 67 Germany 42, 65-6, 89-92, 101, 117, 132, 152, 187 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Great Patriotic War, see Second World War Group of Eight (G-8) 74, 80

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Gryzlov, Boris 67, 96, 99, 149 GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova Group) 136, 181 Human Rights Watch 51, 194 Hungary 4, 153 Ilves, Toomas 98, 101 imperialism 8, 59, 66, 70, 78-81, 121, 204, 214 India 86, 102, 161 insulate definition of 19-21 theoretical implications of 203-5, 211 integration 14-8, 123 Iran 3, 6, 17, 20, 75, 160-1, 183-4, 210 Ivanov, Igor 80, 111, 136-8, 145 Ivanov, Sergei 86, 11 and Belarus 111-2 and color revolutions 42, 76-7, 79 and election monitoring 73 and Estonia 89, 92 and Georgia 143-4 and sovereign democracy 83 and Ukraine 148 and Uzbekistan 180 January 2006 NGO Law, see nongovernmental organizations, Russian policy towards Karimov, Islam 7, 16, 161, 166-8, 179-181 Kasparov, Garry 65-6, 187, 189, 196; see also Other Russia Kazakhstan 29, 56, 58, 61, 147, 160, 168, 170, 193 KGB 33, 36, 56; see also Federal Security Service Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 39, 46 Kmara! 21, 40 Kolerov, Modest 80, 179 Kosachev, Konstantin46, 96, 98-9, 147 Kuchma, Leonid 20, 40-1, 57, 60, 135-6, 145-6, 155 Kyrgyzstan 20, 56 authoritarian developments in27, 29, 200

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Latvia 28, 86-91, 93-6, 101, 134, 153 Lavrov, Sergei 3, 74-5 and 2006 NGO law 49-50 and Belarus 111-3 and election monitoring 58, 73 and Estonia 91, 97-9 and Georgia 138, 141-2 and Uzbekisan 180 Lithuania 29, 73, 86-7, 90, 114, 153, 198 Lukashenko, Alexander 105-6, 200, 205 and Belarusian elections 110-15, 126-7 and Belarusian national identity 107, 120-6 rivalry with Vladimir Putin108-9, 126-130 and Russia 107 diplomatic support from 111-3 economic support from 116-8 military support from 119-20 political support from 113-6 see also Belarus Markov, Sergei 46, 61-2, 65, 197 Medvedev, Dmitri 83-4, 152, 185, 188-90, 198-9, 203, 205, 209 Milošević, Slobodan 18, 21, 40 Moldova 29, 56, 58-9, 136, 177-8, 181 multipolarity 74, 119-20, 163-4; see also unipolarity Myanmar 3, 23-4, 206, 211-2 Nashi 62-8, 100, 196-8, 204 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural gas 17, 106, 108, 116-7, 127-8, 135, 139, 141, 147-8, 150; see also Gazprom Nazi, see fascism Nemtsov, Boris 82, 187, 189

neocolonialism, see imperialism neoimperialism, see imperialism NGOs, see nongovernmental organizations nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 3, 19 role incolor revolutions 2, 5, 13, 20-1, 23, 41, 45, 61, 68, 71, 203 Russian policy towards 39, 45-53, 68, 169, 193-5, 204, 210 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 73, 88-9, 92, 118, 179-80 and Belarus 118-9, 130 expansion of 16-7, 76, 87, 118, 130-2, 139, 142, 145, 150-6, 178, 207, 212, 215 membership requirements 15, 23 and promotion of democracy 151-6 and Russia 101, 143, 145, 151-6 war with Serbia 80 North Korea 17, 203, 209 ODIHR, see Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 191-3; see also election monitoring; Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) orange plague, see orange virus Orange Revolution 2, 18, 183, 200, 206 Belarusian reaction to 122 impact on Russia–Ukraine relations 145-51, 155, 206, 212 origins of 4, 16, 40-1, 135-6 Russian policy during 79, 136, 177-8 Russian reaction to 5, 7, 42-3, 45, 47-8, 57-8, 60-1, 68, 71-2, 76, 78-80, 111, 131-2, 136-8, 143-4, 185, 197 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 159, 166 orange virus 5, 6, 42-3, 45, 62, 131; see also Orange Revolution, Russian reaction to Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) 138 and Belarus 109-110 election monitoring by 54-60, 188, 191-3

Index and Uzbekistan 169 see also Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE, see Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope Other Russia 65-7, 187, 196; see also Kasparov, Garry Otpor! 21, 40 PA OSCE, see Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope Pakistan 1, 95, 161 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 50, 71, 96, 110, 113, 146 and election monitoring 54-5, 189, 192-3 Party of Regions 146-7, 149; see also Yanukovych, Viktor Patrushev, Nikolai 53, 194-5; see also Federal Security Service Pavlovsky, Gleb 63, 65, 82 Poland 4, 12, 114, 153 Pora! 21, 41 Potemkindemocracy 36, 40, 103, 185; see also Putin, authoritarianism under Public Chamber 35, 38, 46, 49, 52, 64, 204 Putin, Vladimir 130 and 2007 Russian legislative election 187-8, 192, 195-6 authoritarianism under 4, 7, 9, 27, 29, 31-9, 70-1, 75, 81, 85-6, 105, 108, 126, 144, 191, 199-200, 202-3, 211 and Belarus 105, 107-9, 111-2, 114-6, 123, 126, 128, 183 and Georgia 133, 137, 139, 142-4 and imperialism rhetoric 80-1 and Kyrgyzstan 178 and NATO 151 and nongovernmental organizations 47-8, 195 and Orange Revolution 41, 57, 79-80 and Public Chamber 38, 51-2 and Russian presidential elections 334, 55, 108, 185-6, 188-9 and sovereign democracy 69, 78, 83, 205 and Ukraine 148

237 and United States of America 74, 7881, 85-6, 111, 119-20, 192 and Uzbekistan 149 and youth groups 63-4, 66-7, 196, 198 see also Russia

redefine definition of 22 theoretical implications of 69-71, 204-5, 211 reverse wave (of democracy) 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 19, 200-201, 214, 216 Rice, Condoleezza 48, 51-3, 111-3, 139 Romania 15, 153 Rose Revolution 2 origins of 40, 133 Russian reaction to 47, 131-2, 136-8, 142-3, 185, 206-7 Russia 1996 presidential election in29-30, 326, 107, 186 1999 parliamentary election in33, 36 2000 presidential election in29, 33-4, 187-8 2003 parliamentary election in37, 54-6, 191 2004 presidential election in29, 37, 54-6 2007 parliamentary election in61, 68, 83-4, 186-90, 199-200, 210 and election monitoring 191-3 and nongovernmental organizations 193-5 and youth groups 195-7 2008 presidential election in61, 68, 186-90, 199-200, 210 and election monitoring 193 and youth groups 197-8 as case study 4-6 Belsan Hostage Crisis 35, 37-9, 51 Duma of and Estonia 89, 93, 98-9 Kremlincontrol over 35, 38-9, 146, 174, 187 and nongovernmental organizations 48, 50, 53 and Ukraine 145-6, 147, 149 under Yeltsin, Boris 33-4

238

Authoritarian Backlash and election monitoring, see election monitoring, Russian policy towards Federation Council of 34, 38, 99 Foreign Ministry of and election monitoring 56-7, 111, 113, 188 and Estonia 91, 93 and European Union 93 and Georgia 139-40 and nongovernmental organizations 51, 53 and Ukraine 149 and United States of America 78-9, 139 and Uzbekistan 179 media in178, 195 and Russian elections 32-4, 36-7, 54-5, 186-9 state control over 4, 30, 36-7, 39, 52, 63, 75, 85-6, 193, 204 and nongovernmental organizations, see nongovernmental organizations, Russian policy towards and Orange Revolution, see Orange Revolution, Russian reaction to political developments under Putin, Vladimir see Putin, authoritarianism under; sovereign democracy political developments under Yeltsin, Vladimir see Yeltsin, political developments under Public Chamber of 35, 38, 46, 49, 52, 64, 204 reaction to color revolutions, see color revolutions, Russian reaction to relations with Belarus, see Belarus, relations with Russia relations with Estonia, see Estonia, relations with Russia relations with European Union, see European Union, and Russia relations with Georgia, see Georgia, relations with Russia relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Russia relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, see Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, and Russia relations with Ukraine, see Ukraine, relations with Russia relations with the United States of America, see United States of America, relations with Russia relations with Uzbekistan, see Uzbekistan, relations with Russia and Rose Revolution, see Rose Revolution, Russian reaction to State Council of 35, 132 theoretical implications of 16-8, 201-210 and Tulip Revolution, see Tulip Revolution, Russian reaction to youth groups in, see youth groups, Kremlin-aligned see also Gazprom; Georgia, relations with Russia; Ivanov, Igor; Ivanov, Sergei; Lavrov, Sergei; Medvedev, Dmitri; Public Chamber; sovereign democracy; Surkov, Vladislav; United Russia; Unity; Yabloko; Yeltsin, Boris Saakashvili, Mikhail 136-7, 139, 140-2, 144, 151 SCO, see Shanghai Cooperation Organization Second World War 22, 65-6, 81, 86-7, 89-92, 122, 138, 209, 215 Serbia 1, 21, 40-2, 68, 80, 119, 164, see also Milošević, Slobodan; Yugoslavia Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Andijan 166, 168-72 and diversity 172-7, 208 election monitoring by 182, 190, 192-3 founding principles of 162-6, 208, 210, 213 overview of 160-1 and Russia 177-82, 213 and stability 165-72, 208 and Tulip Revolution 166-72 see also Zhang Denuang Shevardnadze, Eduard 40, 132-3, 137, 143, 185 siloviki 31, 34-6, 188, 203 Slovakia 2, 15, 18, 153

Index South Ossetia 88, 133, 137, 139-40, 143-4 sovereign democracy, 70-4, 76-8, 81-4, 101-2, 174, 190, 204-5 Spirit of Shanghai, see Shanghai Cooperation Organization strategies of authoritarian resistance 6-7, 11, 19-25, 199, 201, 203-10; see also bolster, coordinate, insulate, redefine, subvert subvert definition of 23-4 theoretical implications of 131-2, 202, 206-7, 212-3; see also sovereign democracy Surkov, Vladislav 42, 62-3, 71-3, 75-6, 82-6, 138, 199 Tajikistan 29, 56, 58, 160-1, 179, 193 Tulip Revolution 2, 21, 42, 60, 131, 166, 173, 185, 207 Russian reaction to 177-9, 181, 206 Shanghai Cooperation Organization reaction to 167-9, 181 see also Kelkel; Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan 29, 129, 160 Tymoshenko, Yulia 147 Ukraine autocracy in18, 29, 27, 29 national identity 106, 120-1, 134, 154, 207 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 76, 118, 151-7, 212 relations with Russia after Orange Revolution 7, 56, 62, 72, 78-9, 115-6, 127, 130, 145-151, 177, 195, 202, 206-7, 212 prior to Orange Revolution 40-1, 57, 133-6, 206, 209 revolution in2, 4, 16, 20-1, 29, 40-1, 56-7, 62, 79-80 115, 122, 129-30, 159, 165-6, 178, 181, 185, 195 see also Black Sea Fleet; Crimea; Kuchma, Leonid; Orange Revolution; Party of Regions; Tymoshenko, Yulia; Yanukovych, Viktor; Yushchenko, Viktor

239

UNCERD, see United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination UNCHR, see United Nations Commission on Human Rights unipolarity 74, 119-20, 163-4, 183; see also multipolarity United Kingdom (Great Britain) 50, 62, 65, 75, 79, 102, 119, 195 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 94-5, 97 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) 94 United Nations 87-9, 91, 94-5, 118, 141, 164, 180, 184, 215; see also, United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; United Nations Commission on Human Rights United Russia 42, 46, 72-3, 75 creation of 35, 199 and elections 37-8, 54, 65, 186-7, 196-9 platform of 83-4 and regional governments 38 rise to power of 35, 39, 52 and Ukraine 145-7 see also Young Guard United States of America 49-50, 66, 92 election observers 57, 187, 192 promotion of democratization by 3, 5, 7, 12, 16-7, 46-8, 51-3, 63, 70, 73-5, 79-80, 82, 102, 136, 138-9, 174, 183-4, 214-5 relations with Belarus 72, 109, 111-4, 116, 119, 130 relations with Georgia 7, 138, 142, 151, 207 relations with Iran 17, 185 relations with Russia 17 31, 46, 48, 51-3, 63, 65, 70-2, 74, 78-81, 85-6, 120, 138-9, 142, 152, 163-5, 180, 182-3, 187, 192, 196 relations with Ukraine 7, 57, 79, 137, 151, 207 relations with Uzbekistan 16, 175, 179-80

240

Authoritarian Backlash

and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 162, 165, 174 see also Bush, George W.; Rice, Condoleezza Unity 33, 35 US, see United States of America Uzbekistan 20, 29, 56, 181, 193 relations with Russia 7, 177, 179-81, 206 relations with the United States of America 16, 175, 181 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 160-1, 166-70, 173, 175-6 see also Andijan; Karimov, Islam Venezuela 3, 160, 183-4, 210, 212, see also Chávez, Hugo World War II (WWII), see Second World War Yabloko 39, 61, 65 Yakemenko, Boris 64 Yakemenko, Vasily 62-5, 196 Yanukovych, Viktor 41, 57, 21, 136, 146-8, 150, 156; see also Party of Regions Yeltsin, Boris and Belarus 107-8, 114, 126,

and Georgia 137 political developments under 30-4, 36, 69, 75, 151, 186-7 and the United States of America 74 Young Guard (Molodaya Gvardiya) 67-8, 196, 198, 204; see also United Russia Young Russia (Rossiya Molodaya) 67, 100, 196 youth groups and 2007–2008 Russian election cycle 195-8 and color revolutions 21, 40-1 and Estonia 62, 67, 100-1 Kremlin-aligned 61-8, 75, 147, 210-1 see also Georgiyevtsky; Nashi; Young Guard; Young Russia youth movements, see youth groups Yugoslavia 2, 18, 20, 133, 195; see also Serbia; Milošević, Slobodan Yushchenko, Viktor 41, 57, 118, 120-1, 127, 136, 145, 148, 150-1; see also Orange Revolution Zhang Deguang 161-2, 166-176, 178 Zimbabwe 6, 95, 213 Zyuganov, Gennady 32, 65, 189