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Banking, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance Edited by Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki
Banking, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance
Also by Hiroshi Osano ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (in Japanese)
Also by Toshiaki Tachibanaki CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN JAPAN THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TRADE UNIONS IN JAPAN FROM AUSTERITY TO AFFLUENCE WHO RUNS JAPANESE BUSINESS? PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WAGE DETERMINATION AND DISTRIBUTION IN JAPAN WAGE DIFFERENTIALS: An International Comparison INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS, INCENTIVES AND EMPLOYMENT LABOUR MARKET AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SAVINGS AND REQUESTS
Banking, Capital Markets
and Corporate Governance
Edited by
Hiroshi Osano Professor of Economics Institute of Economic Research Kyoto University Japan and
Toshiaki Tachibanaki Professor of Economics Institute of Economic Research Kyoto University Japan
Editorial matter and selection and Chapter 1 © Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 2001 Chapter 4 © Hiroshi Osano 2001 Chapter 5 © Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 2001 Chapters 2, 3, 6–12 © Palgrave Publishers 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–77136–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Banking, capital markets, and corporate governance / edited by Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki. p. cm. “Preliminary versions of the papers in this book were
presented at the Conference, ‘Banking, capital markets, and
corporate governance’, held at Lake Biwa, in July 1998”—Pref.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–333–77136–2
1. Banks and banking. 2. Capital markets. 3. Corporate governance. I. Osano, Hiroshi, 1955- II. Tachibanaki, Toshiaki, 1943– HG1521 .B365 2001
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Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire
Contents Preface
vii
List of Contributors
viii
1
Introduction Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki
1
Part I Banking 2
3
4
5
6
Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector and Soft Budget Constraint Noriyuki Yanagawa Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation: Lending and Disclosure of Non-Performing Loans Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries
13
31
Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation Hiroshi Osano
51
Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura
85
A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi
Part II
133
Corporate Governance
7
Corporate Bankruptcy Michelle J. White
183
8
Executive Option Plans and Incentives to Take Risk in Levered Firms: Equity Value or Firm Value Maximisation? Gerald T. Garvey and Amin Mawani
v
204
vi Contents
9
Does the Decision to Retain Retiring Executives on the Board of Directors Help to Control Agency Problems in American and Japanese Firms? James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles and James S. Linck
Part III
233
Capital Market
10 Viable Design of a Security with a Pre-existing Market Kazuhiko Ohashi
253
11 Investment, Security Design and Information Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque
272
Part IV
General Comments
12 General Comments Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
291
Index
297
Preface
Preliminary versions of the papers in this book were presented at the Conference, `Banking, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance', held at Lake Biwa in July 1998. The conference was organised by Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki, and ®nanced by the Kansai Economic Research Centre and the Suntory Foundation. We are indebted to these two institutions for their ®nancial support. This volume is the third English publication in the Biwako Conference series. The ®rst was published in 1994, Labour Market and Economic Performance, and the second in 1997, Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment. Both were published by Macmillan Press. We are grateful to Macmillan (now Palgrave) for continuing to publish the Biwako Conference series. The Biwako Conference has been held every year for the more than thirty-®ve years, and is known as one of the most prestigious conferences for economists in Japan. Capital and ®nancial markets, the subjects of this book, are important because they collect funds from one place, and allocate them to another. The banking sector is an important participant in these markets. It is vital for any country that both the banking sector and capital market work ef®ciently so that capital and money are effectively utilised. Corporate governance is also crucial because it affects a ®rm's performance. Banking, capital market and corporate governance are all interrelated; we investigate them extensively. Finally, the editors would like to express their gratitude to the following individuals, Messrs Yasuo Shingu (the former President of the Kansai Economic Research Centre), Yoshihisa Akiyama (the President of the Centre), Katsutoshi Kojima (the Executive Director of the Centre), Shinichiro Torii (the President of the Suntory Foundation), Kenji Sugiya (the Executive Director of the Foundation), and Professors Chikashi Moriguchi (Tezukayama University) and Toshihisa Toyoda (Kobe University), for their advice and support. HI R O S H I OS A N O TO S H I A K I TA C H I B A N A K I
vii
List of Contributors
Philippe Aghion: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University College, London, UK Patrick Bolton: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Princeton University, USA James A. Brickley: Gleason Professor of Business Administration, Simon School of Business, University of Rochester, USA Jeffrey L. Coles: Professor of Finance, College of Business, Arizona State University, USA Gabrielle Demange: Professor of Economics, DELTA, Paris, France Steven Fries: Director of Policy Studies, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, UK Gerald T. Garvey: Professor of Economics and Finance, Peter F. Drucker School of Management, Claremont Graduate University, USA Masaharu Hanazaki: Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan viii
List of Contributors ix
Akiyoshi Horiuchi: Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan Guy Laroque: Directeur des Etudes et SyntheÁses Economiques INSEE, France James S. Linck: Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Terry College of Business Administration, University of Georgia, USA Amin Mawani: Professor of Accounting, School of Business Administration, York University, Canada Kazuhiko Ohashi: Associate Professor of Finance, Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, Hitotsubashi University, Japan Hideo Okamura: Lecturer in Finance, School of Business Administration, Kwansei Gakuin University, Idyogo, Japan Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara: Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan Hiroshi Osano: Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Japan Toshiaki Tachibanaki: Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Japan Michelle J. White: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego, USA
x List of Contributors
Noriyuki Yanagawa: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan
1
Introduction Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki
1.1
Motivation for this book
Issues surrounding the fragility of the banking system, corporate governance and the increasing securitisation of corporate ®nancing have gained enormous practical signi®cance over recent decades. All are closely interrelated. For example, the fragility of the banking system can be caused by dysfunctional corporate governance mechanisms in banks or their borrowing ®rms, and can be aggravated by increasing reliance on securitisation in corporate ®nancing. On the other hand, the breakdown of the banking system can create a need for the replacement of the existing system of corporate governance, and for further increasing the securitisation of corporate ®nancing. The increasing securitisation of corporate ®nancing can also affect the existing system of corporate governance because it changes the traditional methods of corporate ®nancing through banks. To explore these complicated problems, this book has three aims. The ®rst is to consider and evaluate the role of banking policy in banking crises. Since the early 1980s, many countries ± including not only emerging countries in East Asia and South America, but also developed countries, such as Japan, Northern European countries and the United States ± have suffered from the fragility of their banking systems. In banking crises, policymakers face the serious problem of whether or not private assets provide suf®cient liquidity for ef®cient functioning of the productive sector. If private assets cannot provide enough liquidity, the government needs to play an active role in supplying the de®cient liquidity to the productive sector. To attain this objective, they also need to determine how the liquidity asset holdings of the private sector affect private sector activity. These questions are concerned with several
1
2 Introduction
recently controversial topics: the injection of cash funds into insolvent banks, credit crunch, in¯ation targeting in recessions, and extremely loose monetary policies to increase liquidity, such as the `zero interest rate' policy in Japan. Another serious problem in banking crises is that banks are likely to rollover loans in default, or to underwrite more risky activities, in order to hide their poor ®nancial condition and gamble on hopes of resurrection. The intuitive mechanism behind this moral hazard action is explained as follows. In banking crises, the regulator can choose a variety of policies, such as bank closures or bank rescues. A tough bailout policy is likely to demand that insolvent banks must dismiss their managers. This is so because a soft bailout policy under which managers of insolvent banks retain their management positions causes formidable political disputes and creates future moral hazard problems when bank managers take on risky investments. Thus, managers of insolvent banks are afraid of the tough bailout policy and may be induced to rollover loans in default, or gamble on resurrection by ®nancing more risky activities to hide the extent of their banks' loan losses. As a result, understanding how a banking policy in banking crises affects incentives for managers of failing banks to restructure the banks' assets is important in understanding the effectiveness of such policies in banking crises. The problem of corporate governance of ®nancial intermediaries is also relevant in preventing the breakdown of the banking system. This problem is particularly important in Japan and some continental European countries because banks play a major role in monitoring the management of their borrowing ®rms, and act as an important shareholder in these countries. If bank managers are not provided with proper incentives, they may be induced to allow their borrowing ®rms to make too many risky investments. Thus, it is often stated that lack of effective governance in bank management may have caused recent banking crises. In order to discuss the problem of banking crises, we, therefore, need to evaluate the corporate governance mechanisms of the banking industry, and ask who monitors the monitor, that is, the bank. This issue also needs to be investigated, together with the monitoring mechanisms used by public administration, because regulation mechanisms have an important effect on the strategies of banks. Beyond the investigation of corporate governance mechanisms of banks, there is a great deal of discussion about how good or bad the existing governance mechanisms are of non-®nancial ®rms in industrialised countries. These arguments are provoked by the fact that each industrialised country has a different system of corporate governance that
Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 3
disciplines the management of ®rms: e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom have a market-oriented system of corporate governance, whereas Germany and Japan have a bank-oriented one. Indeed, corporate governance mechanisms consist of economic and legal institutions, such as the design of bankruptcy procedures, the allocation of control to the board of directors, policies for the retention of retiring chief executive of®cers (CEOs) and other executives, the design of managerial compensation contracts, and so on. Also relevant are economic and legal institutions concerning controlling rights and property rights. The second purpose of this book is to explore how these economic and legal institutions ± particularly bankruptcy laws, managerial compensation contracts, and policies for retaining retiring executives (on the board of directors) ± can regulate the management of non®nancial ®rms. The basic problem studied in this book is made up of the questions of how to allocate control rights among various stakeholders in the event of default, and how to design managerial compensation arrangements to deal with the corporate governance problem. The latter question is closely concerned with the effectiveness of different stock option arrangements and policies for retaining retiring executives (on the board of directors), as performance incentives for executives. Finally, the third purpose of this book is to discuss the effects of signi®cant increases in the securitisation of corporate ®nancing and the amount of ®nancial innovation, which have recently been observed in many developed countries. These two ®nancial phenomena bring a large number of various securities to the ®nancial market: asset backed securities (ABS), collateralised mortgage obligations (CMO), mortgage backed securities (MBS), ¯oating rate bonds, zero coupons, swaps, options, indexed securities, money market funds, and so on. These new securities, as well as traditional securities, such as equities, preferred stocks, bonds, convertible bonds, warrants, and commercial papers, are issued to satisfy different kinds of motives. In the presence of informational asymmetries between ®rms and suppliers of capital, ®rms face an adverse selection problem in that ®rms with highly productive investment opportunities may be imitated by ®rms with lower productive investment opportunities. In this situation, the ingenious design of securities can promote the dissemination of information about risky projects: ®rm managers issue securities to signal the ®rm's potential value and opportunities, or their efforts and abilities. The ingenious design of securities can also resolve the corporate governance problem by enhancing the role of the large investor (rather than small investors) as a delegated monitor who disciplines the performance of a company's
4 Introduction
management. Furthermore, the creation of new securities can provide investors with an opportunity to trade previously unavailable contingent claims. Hence, the problem of security design affects the behaviour not only of issuing ®rms but also of investors and ®nancial intermediaries, including venture capitalists. Some papers in this book examine how the security design can be organised to satisfy the needs of various participants in the ®nancial market under asymmetric information.
1.2
Content of the book
This book consists of three main parts. Part I examines the issue of banking both theoretically and empirically. Part II discusses corporate governance, including bankruptcy. Part III explores capital market issues, in particular security design. Although we have classi®ed all contributions into three parts, all are related to each other, for obvious reasons. Banking, capital markets, and corporate governance are interrelated issues. The classi®cation of papers into three parts is only formal, and none should be regarded as completely independent from the others. All papers deal with banking, capital markets and corporate governance. Part I consists of ®ve papers. Yanagawa (Chapter 2) investigates the relationship between liquidity demands by corporate sector and investment decisions. Since asset prices ¯uctuate, investment activity is affected by a change in liquidity demand. The demand for liquidity is discussed from the viewpoint of the agency problem between entrepreneurs and investors. In particular, the moral hazard problem created for entrepreneurs is analysed. Liquidity asset holdings impact on investments in two ways. The ®rst positive effect is that the liquidity holder can absorb a liquidity shock, and so can continue a necessary project. The second, a negative effect, is that the liquidity helps to bail out the project. This is similar to the soft budget constraint problem. The difference between the ex ante shock and the ex post shock makes determining the impact of different liquidity holding levels problematic. Yanagawa proposes that it is dif®cult to control the liquidity level when the value of liquidity ¯uctuates, despite the fact that ®rms want to keep the optimal level of liquidity at the time of shock. In such a case, it is dif®cult to obtain suf®cient funds to implement an initial project, and, thus, investment levels should decline. Then, Yanagawa examines the endogenous determination of the price of liquidity assets and investments. He obtains several interesting ®ndings regarding the relationship
Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 5
between asset prices and investment levels. Finally, he examines the role of credit lines offered by ®nancial intermediaries. We have seen large scale banking crises over recent years, including in Japan. The paper by Aghion, Bolton and Fries (Chapter 3) examines the causes and outcomes of the Japanese banking crisis theoretically. The writers present their model, called the Aghion, Bolton and Fries (ABF) model, to help understand banking crises in transition economies. They claim here that their analysis is also applicable to Japan, with several minor modi®cations. They argue that banks in transition economies, as well as in Japan, are run by managers who are not the actual (or sole) owners of the bank, and so may run the bank in their own self-interest. Such an emphasis on self-interest and superior information (i.e., informational asymmetries) by these managers in determining the quality of loans is likely to produce unintended and undesirable effects: insolvent banks can respond by simply hiding their insolvency, thus prolonging and magnifying the crisis. We know well that this phenomenon can be found in both transitional economies and in Japan. Aghion, Bolton and Fries provide us with an elegant theoretical interpretation of actual stories from recent crises. The main reasoning behind their result may be summarised as follows. First, a tough recapitalisation policy in which bank managers are dismissed results in the bank managers rolling over bad loans in order to conceal loan losses, and, thus, in the softening of the ®rms' budget constraints. Second, however, a socially ef®cient outcome can generally be achieved through a recapitalisation policy combined with the carving out of bad loans at a suitable non-linear transfer price. Finally, it is noted that regulatory authorities in these countries are fragile for various reasons. Osano (Chapter 4) discusses another issue related to those canvassed in the paper by Aghion, Bolton and Fries, concerning the rescue of insolvent banks in banking crises. Osano considers theoretically the situation arising under a deposit insurance system when regulators inject public funds into a bank in trouble. Since it is assumed that the regulator is unable to observe the efforts of a bank to reduce liquidity shocks arising from the deterioration of the bank's assets, it is desirable to inject public funds into the bank in order to construct incentive mechanisms for overcoming the moral hazard problem. It is noted that the two papers (Chapter 3 and 4) both discuss the moral hazard problem faced by banks. Osano provides us with several reasons for injecting public funds into a bank, noting that the effect of such injections will depend on several
6 Introduction
factors. For example, different policies are recommended, depending upon the procedure used to implement the injection. There are several procedures that can be used, such as (1) the purchase of subordinated bonds, (2) the purchase of preferred stocks, and (3) the purchase of common stocks. Osano presents the optimal security design amongst these three procedures, noting that the choice will depend upon the degree of information about the bank held by the regulator. He, nevertheless, proposes that inef®cient banks should be closed, even if there remains the option of injecting public funds, because the injection policy cannot be independent of the bank closure policy. It is vital for the regulator to determine quickly whether a bank in trouble should be closed, or whether injection of public funds into the bank is desirable. The paper by Tachibanaki and Okamura (Chapter 5) investigates the role of shareholders in determining banks' corporate governance structures under the condition of intercorporate shareholding, which is common in Japan. In other words, they are interested in whether or not banking activity bene®ts from the intercorporate shareholding, which is, probably, the most distinguishing feature of capital markets in Japan. The other reason why intercorporate shareholding is crucial in the banking sector is that debt holders (i.e., individual savers) are not interested in governing or monitoring banks' behaviour. Shareholders are the only agency interested in governing banks. Tachibanaki and Okamura estimate the productivity function and the cost of capital for individual banks. The productivity function is explained by various explanatory variables including the structure of shareholding, asset values, employment, etc. It is estimated for panel data. The cost of capital is estimated under the condition of intercorporate shareholding. This is the ®rst attempt to conduct such an analysis for Japan. They obtain the following results. Intercorporate shareholding has had different impacts on productivity from time to time. The role of life insurance companies, which are the most important source of intercorporate shareholders, is peculiar. The reason for this peculiarity arises from the fact that the great majority of life insurance companies in Japan are mutual companies. The estimation of the cost of capital for banks suggests the following two observations. The ®rst is that differences in the cost of capital for various banks are growing because of widening differences in productivity. The second is that the overall cost of capital has been in a declining trend. Hanazaki and Horiuchi (Chapter 6) present an overview of the governance structure in the Japanese banking industry. They conclude
Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 7
that the management has been independent of outsiders' control. Therefore, there was no effective governance. They even name it the `vacuum of governance'. Their judgement supports the views offered in the Aghion, Bolton and Fries' paper (Chapter 3), and partly supplements the Tachibanaki and Okamura paper. Nearly all countries, from developed countries to developing countries and transitory economies, experienced banking crises during the 1980s and 1990s. Hanazaki and Horiuchi, nevertheless, propose that the banking crisis in Japan is unique and more serious than those experienced in other countries, and attribute this to de®ciency of effective governance in the banking industry. More concretely, they propose that the following three disciplinary mechanisms have not worked effectively: (1) the capital market disciplinary function, (2) effective competition in the industry, and (3) supervision of the regulatory authorities. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of these mechanisms, and the authors canvass a variety of factors, including the disclosure of nonperforming loans, the danger of the vicious circle, the safety net in the banking industry, the dangers of the forbearance policy, the insuf®ciency of deposit insurance, the limitations of the traditional rescue method, delayed deregulation, and conspiratorial relationships between the regulator and banks (i.e., Amakudari). Then, the authors conduct an international comparative study based on the regression analysis, using the ®gures obtained, and conclude that the behaviour of the Japanese banking industry did not change in the ®rst half of the 1990s, despite the depression. They also calculate the ®gure for the Japan premium. Part II discusses corporate governance, including bankruptcy. White (Chapter 7) presents a survey of bankruptcy procedures in the US and European countries, the UK, Germany, and France in particular, and canvasses several economic issues and tradeoffs in bankruptcy. She describes the bankruptcy liquidation and bankruptcy reorganisation procedures in these countries, and ®nds that they are basically similar, with some differences between the US and Europe. Even in the US, there are several procedures; most importantly, the differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are substantial. Since most large ®rms in the US adopt reorganisation rather than liquidation, there are many empirical studies on the former. She summarises these studies. White then discusses various economic issues and tradeoffs in bankruptcy, based on a large number of case studies and examples. The subject covered is wide. She looks at the race between creditors attempting to be the ®rst to collect, and shows that it is an example of the prisoner's
8 Introduction
dilemma. Managers of failing ®rms may have an incentive to delay bankruptcy. Moreover, if there is a possibility of reorganising in bankruptcy, an additional incentive appears to obtain partial forgiveness of debt under Chapter 11. In these circumstances, various stakeholders, such as managers, creditors, and equity holders, bargain openly, and a result is given based on the sequential bargaining model. White proposes that there is an ef®ciency justi®cation for having two separate bankruptcy procedures: liquidation and reorganisation. The decision between these two will be based on differences in ®rms' levels of economic ef®ciency and ®nancial distress, and on the difference between type I and type II errors. Filtering failure occurs when the bankruptcy procedure generates either type of error. She elegantly analyses the above tradeoffs for various countries, and provides us with several useful interpretations, covering topics such as non-bankruptcy workouts, costly bankruptcies, shirking, and under-investment. The paper by Garvey and Mawani (Chapter 8) examines the issue of executive stock options used as incentives in leveraged ®rms. Since risky investment decisions are made by managers not shareholders, it is important to examine managerial incentives, in the same way as the `asset substitution problem' has already been investigated in relation to shareholders and bondholders. The authors present a direct test, examining the relationship between capital structure and the risk incentives in CEO stock option contracts. Garvey and Mawani show that by adjusting the exercise price for the option, executive stock option plans can be designed to control the manager's incentive to take risks without diluting her incentives to exert effort or otherwise increase ®rm value. Their theoretical framework is an extension of the John and John analysis, and the Yermack analysis, and the results they obtain are consistent with these other analyses, although some differences remain. The authors' empirical tests show that shareholder and executive leverage levels were negatively related over the entire ®rm sample used, even in the 2SLS estimates that allowed for endogenous capital structure choices. This is veri®ed by examining the relationship between managerial compensation and equity risk using a variety of basic option-pricing techniques. The results support the hypothesis that incentive contracts mitigate risk-taking incentives in leveraged ®rms because a given change in equity risk implies a larger increase in underlying asset risk as ®rm leverage increases. As noted above, this result is obtained in the simultaneous equation model for endogenous capital structure choices. Finally, they consider a more complete measure of managerial risk
Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 9
attitudes. They ®nd even stronger evidence that leverage does not increase managers' inclination to take on risky projects. Brickley, Coles and Linck (Chapter 9) examine the issue of agency problems of retiring executives who can be retained on the board of directors in both American and Japanese ®rms. Their study is interesting and useful in view of the many studies that have documented the similarities and differences between American and Japanese management styles, including the behaviour of top executives. There is an agency problem (i.e., potential con¯icts of interest) between top managers and shareholders. Similar agency problems and con¯icts of interest between external and internal corporate governance stakeholders also arise in areas such as corporate takeovers, executive compensation and turnover, bank and block ownership, and the board of directors. The three authors here concentrate on top executives who can be retained on the board of directors. There are two conditions for retaining top managers. The ®rst is that managers must value board seats. The second is that the retention decision must be based on past performance. The paper focuses on the second condition. Brickley, Coles and Linck ®rst examine existing studies for both Japan and the United States. They suggest that the board retention decision in Japan and the US is determined by past performance. Simply, there is a high correlation between retention rate and performance. Then, they conduct their own research, by estimating the logit model for the retention rate. They ®nd that absolute performance is more important in explaining the retention decision than relative performance, in contrast to the prediction made in standard agency theory. Part III looks at capital market issues; in particular, security design. Two papers in this part are theoretical and fairly rigorous. They, nevertheless, have several practical implications for venture capital and security design. Â hashi (Chapter 10) tackles the issue of ®nancial innovation in the O context of securitisation. He argues that the design of a new security is crucially affected by the availability of pre-existing securities, and the correlation between payoff levels for these securities and the value of the underlying assets backing the newly-created security. Next, he shows that the informed investor could trade the pre-existing securities freely to hedge that part of the risk in the created security about which he has no private information. This enables us to facilitate the innovation of new securities, and can provide another role for short-sales constraints to play in ®nancial innovation. Â hashi then takes the case of the pre-existing security being a TO bond and the created security an MBS. It is likely that the pre-existing
10 Introduction
security is traded competitively, while the created security is traded strategically. Finally, he discusses the implications of his analysis for the relationship between ®nancial innovation and investment decision making. It is possible to understand that the pre-existing security represents market index futures, such as S&P 500 or Nikkei 225 in the case of an IPO, while the created security represents the IPO stock. The result implies that the IPO stock cannot be sold if its payoff is not viable, and, thus, the entrepreneur can invest only in projects that generate viable stock returns. The paper by Demange and Laroque (Chapter 11) considers a venture capitalist who undertakes risky projects and ®nances these projects. They show how expected distortions in the functioning of the stock markets, and the nature of the risks to be hedged, in¯uence the ex ante investment and security-design decisions of venture capitalists. They consider a two-stage model for investigating the above problem. The ®rst stage evaluates different project choices, and looks at how different types of investment are ¯oated on the stock market. In the second stage after an interim stage, the securities are exchanged against the sure (numeraire) good on a competitive basis. They consider three groups of competitive agents who trade in the market, and two speci®cations for the information received by the risk adverse public, depending upon the degree of risk aversion and on information availability. Under the usual CARA gaussian model, which assumes that ®rms are rational decision-makers, Demange and Laroque show that the ex-ante utility is the product of two terms, namely speculative gains and insurance gains. The maximisation of the insurance gains suggests that the venture capitalist forms a single ®rm if risk adverse traders are informed, while their hedging needs must be taken into account if they are uninformed. The authors then analyse the optimal capital stock choice for the capitalist under various combinations of information signals available at trading, and the hedging needs of risk adverse traders. Finally, they evaluate their results in relation to other studies discussing security design, initial public offerings, and the incompleteness of markets. Although the theoretical results in this paper are reached through highly technical calculations, the practical implications are valuable in venture capital decisions, and, thus, for new ®rms. The last message prepared by Masahiro Okuno provides an overall discussion and evaluation of all papers and the conference in general. We invited him to attend the conference, and to provide us with his comments. His message summarises the conference elegantly, and presents an evaluation that should be useful in understanding the content of this book.
Part I
Banking
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2
Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector and Soft Budget Constraint Noriyuki Yanagawa
This paper examines the relation between liquidity demands of the corporate sector and investment decisions. It shows that the liquidity asset holding has two impacts on investments. First, the liquidity asset can absorb a liquidity shock and helps to continue a pro®table project. Second, it helps to continue an undesirable project and decreases the incentive of ®rms. This negative aspect is similar to the soft budget constraint. According to these two impacts, ®rms must keep the optimal level of liquidity at the time of liquidity shock. If the value of liquidity asset ¯uctuates, however, it will become dif®cult to control the liquidity level. Hence the ¯uctuation of asset prices may decrease the aggregate investments even though all agents are risk neutral. The paper also examines the impacts of investments on liquidity asset prices, and endogenously determines both asset prices and investment levels. It shows that even if the asset prices are expected to rise perfectly, aggregate investments should decrease as long as the growth rate of the prices is too high. It also examines the role of the credit line offered by ®nancial intermediaries.
1
Introduction
This paper examines the relation between liquidity and investment decisions of the corporate sector. Keeping liquidity asset holdings appropriately is an important element for corporate ®nancial management, and the demand for liquidity assets in the corporate sector is important in ®nancial markets. In the economic literature, however, the liquidity demand of the corporate sector has not been examined very much. In the literature of the macro economy, much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that liquidity is an important factor for investment decisions.1 In that literature, however, the theoretical
13
14 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
explanation about this relationship is not yet derived clearly. Furthermore, in that literature, the value of liquidity assets is given, and only the effects of liquidity level on investment decisions are explored. However, those asset values must be affected by the activity of the corporate sector. This paper will make clear, therefore, the interrelation between asset prices and investment decisions. We will show that the amount of liquidity holding affects the incentive of entrepreneurs and possible investment levels. The ¯uctuation of asset pricing should decrease the investment level even though all investors are risk neutral. It will be also shown that the liquidity holding of some ®rms may raise the asset prices too high and may cause to promote inef®cient investments of other ®rms. Recently, the importance of the liquidity demand of the corporate sector has been explored theoretically by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). They have examined not only the liquidity demand of the corporate sector but also the supply side of liquidity. Then they have derived a new theory about asset pricing. In the traditional asset pricing models, the corporate sector is a black box and it is hard to examine the effects of government policies. In their model, however, government policies directly affect the price of assets. The spirit of this paper is close to the Holmstrom and Tirole model, although we will show more complicated interactions between asset pricing and investments, and will show a negative side of liquidity. Similar to the model of Holmstrom and Tirole, this paper assumes the liquidity demand of the corporate sector is coming from the agency problem between investors and entrepreneurs. More precisely, it assumes there is a moral hazard problem of entrepreneurs. In order to solve the moral hazard, investors must pay a rent to the ®rm. This means the payment from the ®rm to the investors is limited and this limitation generates an under-investment problem.2 If there is a possibility of liquidity shock and the ®rms have to make additional investments, this problem becomes signi®cant. Since the pro®t that can deliver to the investors is limited by the moral hazard problem, the additional investments may not be implemented since the investors cannot expect suf®cient return from the additional investments. To avoid such liquidity problems, ®rms have to retain liquidity assets to absorb the liquidity shock in the future. By holding liquidity assets, the ®rms can implement the initial projects. This is a positive aspect of the liquidity asset holding pointed out by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Keeping liquidity assets in a ®rm, however, also has a negative effect on the incentive of entrepreneurs. Even if a project becomes less productive
Noriyuki Yanagawa 15
and it should be shut down, entrepreneurs can continue the project by using the liquidity asset. In other words, the liquidity asset helps to bail out the project. This must decrease the incentive of entrepreneurs since it raises the gain from low effort choice. In order to clarify this point, we formulate two types of liquidity shocks. One is the ex ante shock that occurs before the choice of effort level and the other is ex post shock that occurs after the choice of effort level. At the ex post shock there is no incentive problem. The response to the ex post shock, however, affects the incentive of entrepreneurs. If the ®rm has suf®cient liquidity, the project is not terminated by the ex post shock and the incentive of entrepreneurs should be decreased. This negative aspect of liquidity asset holding is similar to soft budget constraint problems (Kornai, 1986). As Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) have pointed out, the soft budget constraint is an incentive problem which comes from the inability to commit not to bail out. In our situation, the liquidity asset holding makes it dif®cult to commit to terminate the project for the ex post shock and this generates the incentive problems. Moreover, this negative aspect is also related to the free-cash¯ow problem that was pointed out by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). Jensen (1986) argued that managers have an incentive to invest in unpro®table projects if they have an excess cash ¯ow.3 Since the liquidity asset holding has a useful aspect for the ex ante liquidity shock, there is a trade-off. The liquidity asset holding has a negative and a positive impact on the realisation of the investment. Thus ®rms must choose a proper amount of liquidity asset to show that entrepreneurs have suf®cient incentive to choose high effort. In other words, there is an optimal level (or range) of liquidity asset holding. Too much or too little will decrease the incentive of entrepreneurs and thus decrease possible investments. We should point out that ®rms must keep this optimal level at the time of liquidity shocks. Firms must get the liquidity assets, however, before the liquidity shocks. If the value of the liquidity asset is constant over time, this requirement becomes less important. Firms only have to get a proper amount of the asset. If the value of liquidity asset ¯uctuates, however, it becomes a serious problem. Firms cannot keep the optimal amount of liquidity. Then it becomes impossible for the ®rms to get a suf®cient amount of the fund to implement the initial projects and as a result the investment level should be decreased. It should be noted that the same problem occurs even if the asset value is only expected to rise. For example, when there is a boom in the asset market and the price is expected to rise rapidly, the investment level
16 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
should be decreased. This could be one explanation for why a boom in ®nancial market suddenly generates depression. Next we examine the case where the price of liquidity assets is endogenously determined. If private claims of ®rms are mainly used for liquidity assets, liquidity shocks that change the value of ®rms affect the value of liquidity assets, and may become a reason for the ¯uctuation of liquidity assets. As a result, the possibility of a small liquidity shock may decrease investment levels signi®cantly. Moreover, we can show that the appropriate liquidity holding of some ®rms may raise the asset price too high and may cause to promote inef®cient investments of other ®rms. This paper also examines the credit line offered by ®nancial intermediaries. This credit line works just like the liquidity assets. One difference between the liquidity asset and the credit line is that the ®nancial intermediary controls the value of credit line. Thus the value of credit line can be constant over time and this is an advantage to its use. This advantage, however, will disappear if there is a ¯uctuation of other variables, for example the level of additional investment. There may be another advantage to the credit line. If the ®nancial intermediary can distinguish between the ex ante shock and ex post shock the intermediary allows ®rms to uses the credit line only for the ex ante shock. In Section 2, we will explain the basic model, and in Section 3, we explain the simple case in which there is only the ex ante shock. In Section 4, we introduce the possibility of ex post liquidity shock and examine the relation between the value of a liquidation asset and the optimal investment level. In Section 5, we shows that the ¯uctuation of asset value generates a problem and high variance of asset price decreases the investment level. In Section 6 we present a general equilibrium model to determine asset prices and investment levels endogenously. In Section 7 we examine the role of the credit line, and in Section 8 we present some discussions.
2
Model
We consider the following simple model where there are three types of agents, ®rms, investors and ®nancial intermediaries. All agents are risk neutral and we assume the investors have the following simple utility function: U
4 X i1
ci
1
Noriyuki Yanagawa 17
By this assumption, we exclude the liquidity demand of investors. At each period, consumers receive suf®ciently large endowments to ®nance necessary investments but they cannot sell claims on their future endowments. This simpli®cation is used to highlight the key point of our argument, such that the possibility of moral hazard by ®rms (entrepreneurs) generates the liquidity demands. Each ®rm has a same investment opportunity at t = 0. It make an investment I at t = 0, considering the possibility of liquidity shocks at t = 1 or t = 3. The investment will generate R if the project succeeds and 0 if it fails. Since each ®rm only has A( < I), it has to gather at least (I ± A) for the investment. We assume there is a moral hazard problem at t = 2. An entrepreneur can choose high effort eH or low effort eL , but this effort choice is unobservable to investors. If an entrepreneur chooses eH , the probability of success will be PH and it will become PL if he/she chooses eL . On the other hand, the entrepreneur gets the private non-pecuniary bene®t B by choosing eL . We assume the following relation is satis®ed: PH R > PL R B
2
This means that eH is socially desirable. Entrepreneurs, however, may have an incentive to choose eL when he/she cannot get all of the realised gain R. The key point of our argument is the possibility of liquidity shock at t = 1 and t = 3. We assume that the ®rm that faces the liquidity shock has to add investments. If the ®rm cannot implement these additional investments, the project must be shut down and the pro®t becomes zero. At t = 1, the liquidity shock occurs with probability s and a ®rm facing this shock must additionally invest k (k is exogenous). We call this liquidity shock `ex ante liquidity shock'. At t = date 4, a ®rm which chose eL faces the `ex post liquidity shock' with probability u. The ®rm faces this shock must additionally invest f (f is also exogenous). The assumption that only the ®rms that choose eL will face the ex post liquidity shock is used for simplifying the explanation. Even if we change the assumption and assume that even the high effort ®rms will face the `ex post shock', our results are not affected. In Figure 2.1, we summarise the sequence of decisions. At t = 0 the initial investment is implemented and the contract between ®rms and investors are determined. At t = 1, the ex ante liquidity shock occurs with probability s and whether the project is shut down or not is determined. At t = 2, entrepreneurs choose eH or eL and this choice affects the probability that ®rms realise R. At t = 3, the ex post liquidity shock occurs
18 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector Figure 2.1 t=0
t=1
Investment contracts
ex ante shock
t=2
continue
effort choice
terminate
t=3
t=0
R is
ex post continue shock realised terminate
with probability u only when the entrepreneur chose eL , and the project is shut down if the additional investment is not implemented. At t = 4, the pro®t is realised. To make our argument interesting, we assume that the project has a positive (expected) net present value if the ®rm chooses eH , but it has a negative (expected) net present value if it chooses eL . Assumption 1
P H R � I � sk > 0 > P L R � I � sk � uf
3
This assumption also means that the project is not realised if the entrepreneur cannot show credibly that he/she will choose the high effort level.
3
Simple case: no ex post liquidity shock
First, we examine the incentive of entrepreneurs when there is no possibility of ex post liquidity shock, that is u = 0. In order to check the incentive problem at t = 2, let us de®ne R as the payment from a ®rm to investors. If an entrepreneur chooses eH , R will be realised with probability PH . Therefore, the expected gain of the entrepreneur who has chosen eH is PH
R � R
4
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur chooses eL , R will be realised only with probability PL , but she/he can get the private bene®t B. Thus the expected gain for the entrepreneur who has chosen eL is PL
R � R B
5
From (4) and (5), R should satisfy the following condition in order to implement eH :
Noriyuki Yanagawa 19
RR�
B PH � PL
6
This upper bound of R means that the ®rm cannot commit by itself to pay out all possible gain to investors. This result generates at least two problems. First this upper bound might be too low to compensate the cost of initial investment. Let us de®ne R0 as the minimum necessary payment for the project, that is R0
I � A sk PH
7
Then the project is not realised if R < R0 , since investors cannot expect suf®cient return from the project. A second problem arises when the ex ante liquidity shock occurs and the ®rm does not have suf®cient liquidity. Even if k < PH R (this means this additional investment is desirable), the additional investment only gives negative net present value to the investors as long as k > PH R. Thus this project should be terminated if the ®rm does not have suf®cient liquidity assets which can be used for the liquidity shock. This point has been explored by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). When there is the ex ante liquidity shock, the ®rm has to invest k additionally, but it is only possible to pay out PH R to new investors.4 Hence the ®rm has to have liquidity asset at least (k � PH R) to implement the additional investment. This liquidity asset holding can be done by gathering
I � A
k � P H R
8
at t = 0. (I � A) is invested to the project and (k � PH R) is kept as the liquidity asset We assume here that the ®rm only uses this (k � PH R) for the liquidity and cannot use it for other investment opportunities or consumption. If the liquidity shock did not occur, the ®rm must return this (k � PH R) to the investors. If the liquidity shock occurs the ®rm uses (k � PH R) for the additional investment and gets PH R additionally from investors to implement the additional investment. We can easily show that investors who supply (I � A) + (k � PH R) can expect non-negative net return as long as R > R0 . Thus this asset holding is realised. Furthermore the ®rm can keep more than (k � PH R) as the liquidity asset. For example, even if the ®rm gathers (I � A) + k and keeps k as the liquidity asset, this project is realised. In this sense, it is not so dif®cult for a ®rm to keep appropriate liquidity value as long as the value of liquidity assets is exogenous and constant. If the value of liquidity assets is
20 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
endogenous or ¯uctuates, however, the problem of insuf®cient liquidity arises as explored by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998): private claims cannot work well to keep a suf®ciently high value of liquidity assets when there are macro shocks. Their argument is of course very important, but this paper stresses another important problem coming from the ¯uctuation of the liquidity asset value. If there is a possibility of ex post liquidity shocks too high value of liquidity assets decreases the incentive of entrepreneurs. Thus the ¯uctuation of liquidity value may become serious. In the next section we explore this point, and in Section 6, we examine the reason of the ¯uctuation by using of a general equilibrium framework.
4
Ex post liquidity shock and soft budget constraint
In this section, we introduce the ex post liquidity shock and examine the effects of the ex post liquidity shock on the incentive of entrepreneurs. Since the ex post shock occurs after the choice of entrepreneurs, the maximum possible payment after the ex post shock becomes R. Even so, however, the ex post shock affects the incentive of entrepreneurs' choice at t = 2. Since the ex post liquidity shock occurs only when the entrepreneur chose eL , the incentive to choose eL should be decreased if the additional investment for the ex post shock is not realised. The entrepreneur, however, tries to continue the project under the ex post liquidity shock, since he/she can get the private gain B. If the entrepreneur has suf®cient liquidity asset, therefore, he/she will continue the project even under the ex post shock and this has negative impact on the choice of eH . This situation is similar to the soft budget constraint problem. As Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) have pointed out, the soft budget constraint is an incentive problem and inability to commit to no bailout ex ante is the main reason. This situation is also related to the free cash ¯ow problem pointed out by Jensen (1986), which says too many cash ¯ow managers invest in unpro®table projects. In our situation, the liquidity asset holding makes it dif®cult to terminate the project for the ex post shock and this generates the incentive problem of entrepreneurs. The important point is that the liquidity asset holding is useful for the ex ante liquidity shock. Therefore there is a trade-off. The liquidity asset holding has a negative impact and a positive impact on the realisation of the investment. In order to highlight this incentive problem of entrepreneurs, we make the following assumption:
Noriyuki Yanagawa 21
Assumption 2
PL R < f < PL R B
9
This assumption means that outside investors do not have any incentive to make an additional investment for the ex post liquidity shock, but entrepreneurs do. Hence there is a soft budget constraint problem if the entrepreneur can continue the project even under the ex post liquidity shock. Although the continuation or termination of the project is endogenously determined, we ®rst check the incentive problem of entrepreneurs in the case where the continuation or termination is exogenously determined. 4.1
Ex post shock with continuation
The possibility of ex post liquidity shock affects the gain of entrepreneur who chose eL , and thus affects the maximum possible payment to implement the high effort level eH . First we derive the maximum possible payment R under the cases where the additional investment will be implemented under the ex post liquidity shock. To implement eH , R must satisfy the following condition: P H
R � R
1 � uP L
R � R B
10
The left-hand side is the expected gain when the entrepreneur chooses eH . The right-hand side is the expected gain when he/she chooses eL . If the ex post liquidity shock does not occur (this probability is 1 � u), he/she can get the promised share (R � R) and the private bene®t B. Under the ex post shock, however, he/she pays out all expected gain to implement the additional investment. Because, contrary to the cases of ex ante shock, there is no incentive problem any more at t = 3, the ®rm can promise to pay out all R. Thus the entrepreneur expects to get only the private bene®t B under the ex post shock. From this (10), we have the maximum possible payment RC : RC R �
B P H �
1 � uP L
11
If the entrepreneur has suf®cient liquidity asset, he/she can use this asset for the additional investment and he/she may not have to pay out R. In such cases, however, the left-hand side of (10) becomes higher. Thus the maximum possible payment becomes lower than RC if entrepreneurs have liquidity assets.
22 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
4.2
Ex post shock with termination
Next we check the incentive problem of an entrepreneur when the project is terminated under the ex post liquidity shock. In this situation, the maximum possible payment R must satisfy the following condition to implement eH : PH
R � RI
1 � uP L
R � R
1 � uB
12
This condition is similar to (10). In this case, however, the project is terminated when the ex post liquidity shock occurs. Thus the entrepreneur can get the private gain B only with probability (1 � u). From (12), we get the following maximum possible payment with termination, RS : RS R �
1 � uB PH �
1 � uP L
13
By comparing (11) and (13), we can see that Rs > Rc . This means that the maximum possible payment increases by terminating the project under the ex post liquidity shock. In other words, an entrepreneur can promise to pay more if he/she can commit by himself/herself to terminate the project when the ex post liquidity shock occurs. In this model, the continuation decision is endogenous. If the entrepreneur has suf®cient liquidity asset, he/she can continue the project even under the ex post shock. Furthermore he/she has an incentive to continue the project because of the private gain B. Thus holding too much liquidity holding tends to continue the project even under the ex post shock and has a negative impact on the maximum possible payment. In the next sub-section, we will make clear this point. 4.3
Liquidity asset holding and optimal investment level
In this sub-section, we examine whether the project is terminated or not under the ex post liquidity shock. Since an entrepreneur can get the private gain B by continuing the project, he/she will choose the continuation as long as he/she can implement the additional investment. Thus the value of the liquidity asset which the ®rm has is important for the continuation decision and the maximum possible payoff. Moreover, whether the maximum possible payment is suf®cient for the initial investment cost or not is another important factor. In order to highlight on the soft budget constraint problem, we assume that
Noriyuki Yanagawa 23
RC < Ro < RS
1 � sRS < R
0
14
15
(14) means that if the project is not terminated under the ex post shock, the ®rm cannot promise suf®cient payment covering the investment costs.5 (15) means that the project does not give suf®cient return if the additional investment for the ex ante shock is not implemented. Under these assumptions, we will check the relation between the value of the liquidity asset and the realisation of the project. Let L be the value of liquidation asset value at t = 1. First we can easily show that the project is not realised if L < k � PH RS . The reason is simple. When there is the ex ante liquidity shock, the ®rm must implement the additional investment k at t = 1. The ®rm only has L so that it must gathers k � L from outside investors, who expect to get only PH RS . (Since all liquidity assets were invested at t = 1, this ®rm cannot continue the project under the ex post liquidity shock.) Thus this amount of liquidity asset is insuf®cient to implement the additional investment and this means the project is not realised. > Next we examine the case in which L k + f � PL R. In this case, the liquidity value is suf®cient for the additional investment for the ex post shock, even if the ®rm paid the additional investment for the ex ante shock.6 It follows that the ®rm cannot commit to terminate the project for the ex post shock. Thus the ®rm is only possible to pay out RC , which cannot over RO . If k � PH RS L < k + f � PL R, the situation becomes different. As long as the ex ante shock occurs, a ®rm uses the liquidation asset suf®ciently for the ex ante shock. Thus the liquidation value becomes too low for the ex post shock and the project should be terminated under the ex post shock. If the ex ante shock does not occur, however, the ®rm has too much liquidity asset at t = 3. Then the ®rm will continue the project even under the ex post shock as long as L > f � PL R. Thus the ®rm cannot promise to pay out RS with probability (1 � u). To make clear this point we assume here that
1 � sRC sRS < R0
16
This assumption is satis®ed as long as RC or s is suf®ciently low. Under this assumption, the ®rm cannot promise to pay out suf®cient return if L > f � PL R. Therefore, the project is realised only if k � PH RS < L < f � PL R. If f � PL R < k � PH RS , this project cannot be realised for any L. Figure 2.2 summarise this relation.
24 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector Figure 2.2 (k � PH R s < f � PL R)
Investment
I
L
_ k–PHRS
f–PLR
Proposition 1 If f � PL R < k � PH RS , the project is not implemented.
If f � PL R < k � PH RS , the project is implemented only when the value of
the liquidation asset takes k � PH RS < L < f � PL R.
This proposition means that holding too much or too little liquidity asset
is bad for implementing the project. However, the best strategy for a ®rm
is simple, as long as there is no uncertainty about the value of liquidity
assets. The best strategy for a ®rm is to keep the liquidity asset in the range
k � PH RS < L < f � PL R. If the value of the liquidity asset ¯uctuates,
however, a ®rm cannot control the liquidation value at t = 1. Since the
value of the liquidation asset at t = 1 is important for implementing the
Noriyuki Yanagawa 25
project, this uncontrollability generates a serious problem. We will explain this problem in the next section.
5
Fluctuation of liquidity asset value
In this section we consider the cases where the value of liquidity asset ¯uctuates over time. In those cases, ®rms cannot control the value of holding liquidity asset perfectly. Thus there is a possibility that the liquidity asset at t = 1 does not take the proper value to realise the suf®cient payment. For the later explanation we de®ne [k � PH RS , f � PL R] as the L* range. Let suppose that the value of the liquidity asset ¯uctuates at t = 1 and if the value of the liquidity asset at t = 0 is L, the value at t = 1 will take ( Lm with 0:5 L�m with 0:5 m is an exogenous parameter. For simplicity, we assume there is no ¯uctuation of liquidity value after t = 2. As long as m is small, the liquidation asset will be in the L* range and it works properly to responding the liquidity shocks. If m is suf®ciently large, however, the liquidation value cannot be in the range of L* and the ®rm is unable to promise to pay a suf®cient return. More precisely, we get the following proposition. Proposition 2 L
H
S
R If m > f �P R�kP ,the holding of a liquidity asset does not work well and 2 the ®rm cannot realise the project.
This proposition means the liquidity asset does not work properly if the disturbance of the asset value is suf®ciently high. In other words, the variance of asset price is important even though all investors are risk neutral. The total investment level should be decreased by an increase of the variance. This means that the policy to decrease the asset price should be meaningful. This point will be examined in the later section. Even if the asset price tends to go up, we get similar results. Let suppose the value of liquidation asset is as follows. If the value is L at t = 0, the asset value at t = 1 becomes L with 0:5 L with 0:5
26 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
In this situation, the expected net capital gain is positive, but keeping this asset as the liquidity asset does not contribute to implement the project if is suf®ciently large. This result has an important implication for macroeconomic problems. Suppose some ®rms have the equity of a ®rm as the liquidity asset. The above result shows that if the increase of the stock price is not so large, this stock works as the liquidity asset and the investments of those ®rms should be increased. If the stock price goes up so quickly, however, the stock does not work as the liquidity asset properly and macro investment levels go down. Thus this result is potentially useful to explain economic ¯uctuation problems. Furthermore, if there are several types of asset which can be used for the liquidity asset, ®rms tend to use a safe (i.e., low variance) asset. Thus the price of the safety asset tends to be high even if all investors are risk neutral.
6
General equilibrium analysis
In this section, we extend the previous arguments to a general equilibrium framework and examine how the ¯uctuation of liquidity asset value occurs. We assume here that only claims issued by ®rms can be used to transfer wealth from one period to next. In other words, the claims are only used for the liquidity demand. This means the ¯uctuation of ®rms' value generates the ¯uctuation of liquidity value. Thus aggregate shocks which affect the ®rms' value may generates the inef®ciency of investments. In this section we examine this problem carefully. In order to set up a general equilibrium model, we suppose that there is a continuum of ®rms with unit mass. Each ®rm has the same technology as assumed in the previous sections and faces the possibility of liquidity shocks as explained in the previous sections. We assume each ®rm has the market portfolio (that is, the symmetric combination of all equities) as the liquidity asset in order to decrease the variance of asset value. First we examine the total value of the market portfolio. At t = 0, the expected value of each ®rm is P H R � sk
17
If the stochastic variable s of each ®rm is independent, the total value of the market portfolio after the ex ante liquidity shock is also (17). If there are aggregate shocks, however, the total value of market portfolio must ¯uctuate. Let us de®ne the value of market portfolio L(!), L
! PH RS � s
!k
18
Noriyuki Yanagawa 27
! is the parameter of aggregate shock and it is distributed in the range of [!min , !max ] so as to satisfy dL/d! > 0. We assume here that each ®rm is symmetric and thus any other kinds of portfolio cannot decrease the variance of this market portfolio. In this situation, the value of the liquidity asset must ¯uctuates at t = 1 since the value of the market portfolio ¯uctuates. As pointed out by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), this economy cannot supply for the total demand of liquidity if L(!min ) is suf®ciently small. Since the main point of this paper is the soft budget problem, however, we simply exclude this possibility and assume L
!min > k
19
Under this assumption, the liquidity value is suf®ciently high to implement the additional investments for the ex ante shock. Even if the insuf®cient liquidity problem does not exist, the ¯uctuation of the liquidity value generates the soft budget problem. If the range of ¯uctuation [L(!min ), L(!max )] is not included in the range L*, each ®rm cannot control the liquidity value appropriately and the initial investments cannot be realised as explained in the previous section. This mean that private claims are insuf®cient for absorbing the liquidity shocks even if the total value of the market portfolio is always suf®ciently high. Rather, too high value generates the problem since it promotes the undesirable investment for the ex post shock. Moreover, we can see that the high value of the market portfolio is partially coming from the implementation of additional investment for the ex ante shock. Therefore the liquidity holding for the ex ante shock may harm the total economy, although such liquidity holding is meaningful for each individual ®rm. An intuitive reason is as follows. By holding the liquidity asset, each ®rm that faces the ex ante liquidity shock can accommodate the shock and implement the additional investments. As a result of the additional investment, the equity value of those ®rms does not decrease and the value of the market portfolio becomes high. In this sense the liquidity asset is working well. These high equity prices, however, generates too much liquidity holding and makes it possible to accommodate the ex post liquidity shock. Hence if some ®rms failed to accommodate the ex ante shock, it might be better for the economy. The value of the market portfolio does not go up so much and ®rms do not implement the inef®cient additional investment for the ex post shock. In summary, the liquidity asset holding may promote desirable investments, but it also generates the boom of ®nancial markets
28 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
and may allow inef®cient investments. If investors initially expect this scenario, they do not invest suf®ciently and the initial investment level must be decreased.
7
Provision of credit line
In the previous sections, we have assumed that a ®rm keeps a liquidity asset for the liquidity shocks. As explored by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), however, ®rms need not have any asset if ®nancial intermediaries offers credit lines. Instead of keeping the liquidity asset, a ®rm makes a contract to a ®nancial intermediary and uses the credit line if there is a liquidity shock. Under the liquidity shock, the additional investment only generates a negative rate of return, since the ®rm cannot promise to pay out all possible gain. This means that the credit line generates negative pro®ts to the intermediary. Thus the ®rm has to pay some credit line fee at the date of contracts. There are several types of credit line contracts which can implement the project. A simple way is as follows. A ®rm makes a contract that allows the ®rm to use the credit line L. The ®rm need not pay any fee or interest rate when it uses the credit line, but initially the ®rm has to pay L to the ®nancial intermediary for the credit line fee. The ®rm gathers the fund for the fee from investors. In other words, the ®rm must gather just the same amount as the case of the liquidity asset holding from investors. In this case, however, the fund L goes to the ®nancial intermediary instead of purchasing the liquidity asset. One advantage of using the credit line is that the amount of credit line does not ¯uctuate over time. The maximum amount of credit line is usually determined by contracts, and it does not change over time. Hence, as long as the initial level of credit line is determined properly, the credit line helps to realise the project. If other valuables ¯uctuate over time, however, this advantage of the credit line may disappear. For example, let us suppose k will ¯uctuate at t = 1 and there is uncertainty about k at t = 0. In this case, the necessary amount of credit line also ¯uctuates. This means, the credit line which is usable for the ex post shock must ¯uctuate even though the contracted total credit line is constant. Hence the merit of the credit line explained above is not general. Financial intermediaries, however, may have informational advantage. In this paper we have assumed that investors cannot distinguish between the ex post shock and ex ante shock. Then ®rms can use the liquidity asset even for the ex post shock, and the soft budget constraint problem arises. If
Noriyuki Yanagawa 29
®nancial intermediaries can distinguish those two shocks, therefore, they can solve the soft budget constraint problem by prohibiting using the credit line for the ex post shock.
8
Discussion
The arguments in the previous sections have shown that the ¯uctuation of asset value has negative effects on investments. We have shown that even if the price is expected to rise, this negative effect works. One way to solve this problem may be government intervention. The stabilisation of the liquidity asset price can be obtained through market interventions or direct supply of liquidity assets (such as government bonds). By adjusting the supply level of liquidity, government can control the investment levels indirectly. In this paper we have assumed for simplicity the investment level I is exogenous. We can easily extend this model, however, to the cases where investment level is endogenously determined. In such cases the equilibrium investment level changes when the maximum possible payments ¯uctuate. Hence there exists an under-investment effect because of the ¯uctuation of asset prices. Moreover, this paper has used a simple four periods model. An extension of this model to more general versions of dynamic models would be interesting. By using an in®nite horizon model, for example, we can derive the dynamic of asset prices more rigorously. Then we can make clearer the dynamic interactions between the dynamics of asset prices and investment decisions.
Notes 1. See, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) or Blanchard, Lopez-deSilanes and Shleifer (1994). 2. This logic is also similar to Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) or Myers and Majluf (1984). 3. Recently, several papers empirically and theoretically examined this negative aspect of liquidity. See, for example, Hadlock (1998), or Myers and Rajan (1998). 4. Since the project must be shut down and pro®t becomes zero if the additional investment is not implemented, the old investors agree that their gain becomes zero by paying out PH R to new investors. 5. More precisely, investors require more than RO , since the liquidity asset will be used for continuing the project even for the ex post shock. Thus (14) is a suf®cient condition. 6. We are assuming that the liquidity asset is unable to use for consumption.
30 Liquidity Demand of the Corporate Sector
References Blanchard, O.J., E. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1994) `What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?', Journal of Financial Economics, 36, pp. 337±60. Dewatripont, M. and E. Maskin (1995) `Credit and Ef®ciency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies', Review of Economic Studies, October. Fazzari, S.M., R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen (1988) `Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 141±95. Greenwald, B., J.E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1984) `Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations', American Economic Review, 74, pp. 194±99. Hadlock, C. (1998) `Ownership, Liquidity, and Investment', RAND Journal of Economics, 29, no. 3, pp. 487±508. Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole (1998) `Private and Public Supply of Liquidity', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 1±40. Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole (1997) `LAPM: A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model', mimeo. Israel, R. (1991) `Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing', Journal of Finance, 46, pp. 292±355. Jensen, M. (1986) `Agency Cost for Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and the Takeovers', American Economic Review, 76, pp. 323±29. Kornai, J. (1986) `The Soft Budget Constraint', KYKLOS, 39 (1), pp. 3±30. Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf (1984) `Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have', Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp. 187±221. Myers, S.C. and R.G. Rajan (1998) `The Paradox of Liquidity', Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 733±71. Stulz, R. (1990) `Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies', Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp. 3±27.
3
Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation: Lending and Disclosure of Non-Performing Loans1 Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries
1
Introduction
It is widely believed that one of the main sources of the prolonged economic slump of the Japanese economy in the 1990 is the collapse of asset and real estate prices, which have led to a banking crisis of an unprecedented scale. It is in large part the failure promptly to resolve this banking crisis that has led to a prolonged and massive recession. With a large fraction of non-performing loans, a reduced capital base and substantially lower liquidity the banking sector has dramatically reduced new lending activity and provoked a huge credit crunch. Other countries have witnessed large scale banking crises in recent years, but what sets the Japanese experience apart is the problem of hidden loan losses and opaque accounting practices as well as the stunning complacency of regulatory authorities. More than in other countries banks have actively sought to hide the extent of their loan losses, so much so that every year ®nancial markets were discovering to their horror that loan losses were substantially higher than anticipated. More than in other countries, regulatory authorities have hesitated and wavered in determining a strategy towards the resolution of the banking crisis, thus prolonging and worsening the crisis. Some politicians favoured a tough policy towards insolvent banks, recommending that they be closed as soon as possible and their assets redeployed. Others, were mainly concerned about the systemic risks of closing the larger insolvent banks and favoured a softer strategy based on recapitalisations of distressed banks. From the perspective of bank managers there was substantial policy uncertainty until very recently. In particular they could not rule out the 31
32 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
possibility that if their bank was found to be insolvent it would be closed down. Thus, in an attempt to save their institution they naturally chose to under-report loan losses and actively lobbied for new capital injections. They had every incentive to do so. In an earlier paper on Bank Restructuring in Transition Economies we emphasised that when regulators must rely on banks to truthfully report loan losses then the implementation of strict closure rules and prompt corrective action may have unintended and undesirable effects: insolvent banks would then respond by simply hiding their insolvency, thus prolonging and magnifying the crisis (see Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 1999 henceforth ABF). In that paper we also developed a simple model to address the question of the optimal bank restructuring policy in the face of informational asymmetries on the quality of outstanding bank loans. In this paper we argue that with some minor modi®cations the basic framework in ABF developed for transition economies is also relevant for Japan. The key common element is the basic observation that in each case banks are run by managers who are not the actual (or sole) owners of the bank. That these managers run the bank in their own self-interest and that they have superior information on the quality of the loans they make. Who actually owns the bank is not that relevant since bank owners are likely to be either too dispersed or too ignorant to be willing or able actively to monitor bank managers. A second objective of this paper is to explore several extensions of the basic model developed in ABF to test for the robustness of the main conclusions obtained in the simple ABF model. The basic set-up considered in ABF includes three types of agents: ®rms, banks and the regulators. Firms and banks are controlled by their managers who derive private bene®ts from their continued operations and the main source of discipline on their behaviour is the possibility of dismissal associated with insolvency. The regulators' objectives are to promote the ef®cient restructuring or liquidation of ®rms which have defaulted on their bank loans.2 As already emphasised, banks are assumed to have private information about the quality of their loan portfolio. The main conclusions reached in ABF are that: 1. a tough recapitalisation policy in which the bank manager is always dismissed results in the bank managers rolling over bad loans in order to conceal loan losses and therefore in the softening of the ®rms' budget constraints. However, 2. the socially ef®cient outcome can generally be achieved through a recapitalisation policy combined with the carving out of bad loans at a suitable non-linear transfer price.
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 33
Other studies on bank restructuring in Transition Economies from the mid-1990s have reached similar conclusions. Most notably the work of Mitchell (1995), who also emphasises the problem that when a bank manager suffers in some way when the bank gets into trouble he will roll over loans in default in order to postpone facing the cost of ®nancial distress. Two other related papers are Suarez (1995) and Povel (1997). The former paper studies bank closure rules and recapitalisation in a dynamic complete information model. Given the informational assumptions stressed in this paper, it is not entirely surprising that it ®nds that the closure of insolvent banks has good ex ante incentive properties. The latter paper deals with bankruptcy of non-®nancial ®rms but emphasizes a similar tension between ex ante incentives to avoid bankruptcy and ex post incentives to ®le for bankruptcy in a timely fashion. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes a slightly modi®ed version of the ABF model. Section 3 summarises the main incentive effects of various standard bank restructuring policies including conditional bank recapitalisations. Section 4 then considers the ®rst of three extensions by examining the effects of high-powered incentives for bank managers. Section 5 explores the effects of less stringent informational assumptions. Section 6 brie¯y considers an extension where bank managers may have different managerial abilities. Finally, Section 7 provides a brief summary of the main lessons of our analysis.
2
The ABF model
The model considered in Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999) has three types of agents interacting with each other: ®rms, banks and regulators. 2.1
Firms
Firms are run by self-interested managers, who control an asset, which yields a random return. In the ®rst period, the return is: ( ) with probability p
1 0 with probability 1 � p where, > 0 and p 2 (0, 1) is exogenously given. In the second period, the ®rm also has a random continuation value, which is the discounted stream of future returns. Each ®rm has an outstanding stock of bank debt and no other liabilities. This stock of debt imposes a repayment obligation on the ®rm of D 2 [0, ]. When a ®rm defaults, the bank can either
34 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
liquidate the ®rm or allow it to continue. The liquidation value of the ®rm is L. The continuation value is random and given by: ( ) with probability 1 �
2 0 with probability where, V > L > 0. In the event of default, the continuation value can be costlessly observed. The ®rm's manager always honours the debt repayment obligations if he can. This assumption rules out strategic defaults by ®rms. The model can accommodate strategic defaults as follows: suppose that, in addition to the ®rm continuation value, the ®rm's manager has a random private continuation value from retaining his position given by: ( ) V with probability 1 �
3 0 with probability If the ®rm's manager decides to default strategically, he gets the foregone debt service payments. Thus, if one assumes that V > D the manager defaults strategically only when his expected continuation value is equal to zero. The probability of strategic default is then given by p. When one allows for strategic default the manager is able to divert resources from the ®rm. The only constraint that prevents him from diverting all the ®rm's resources is the threat of liquidation when there is a default on the ®rm's debt. 2.2
Banks
Banks are also run by self-interested managers. On the asset side of their balance sheets, banks have a portfolio of loans to ®rms, each of which has a scheduled debt service payment of D. In the event of a default, and in the absence of strategic behavior by the bank manager, the bank liquidates the ®rm with probability and obtains L. The alternative to liquidation is ®rm continuation with a realised return . To introduce the possibility of bank failures it is assumed that ®rms' returns are correlated so that the fraction of the bank's performing loans is a random variable which takes on a range of values, p1 > p2 > p3 > p4 > 0, with respective probabilities 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 > 0. The expected fraction of performing loans is then given by p = 4i1 1 p1 . On the liability side of their balance sheet, banks issue deposits in the amount d to fund each loan. The bank's realised net worth is then given by: Wi
1 � pi L
1 � pi D � d
4
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 35
where W4 < W3 < W2 0 < W1
5
That is, only banks in states 1 and 2 are solvent while banks in states 3 and 4 are insolvent.3 If one allows for strategic behaviour by ®rm managers as outlined above then the realised net worth of the bank becomes: Wi 1 � pi
1 � L
1 � pi
1 � D � d
6
That is, the probability of default on bank loans increases by pi . The ABF model captures ex ante moral hazard in bank lending to ®rms by introducing an effort variable which affects the ex ante probability of bank failure. The bank manager can choose between two effort levels e 2 {0, 1}. The cost of effort is c(e), with c(0) = 0 and c(1) = c, and when e = 1 the probability distribution i (1) (®rst-order) stochastically dominates the probability distribution when e = 0, i (0): j X i1
i
1 >
j X
i
0
7
i1
for all j = 1, 2, 3. The main ingredient in the ABF model ± the ex post incentive problem of truthful reporting of non-performing loans ± is captured as follows: when a ®rm defaults, the sale of the ®rm's assets can be observed costlessly so that the liquidation decision is observable and veri®able. Loan continuation and provisioning decisions, on the other hand, are entirely at the discretion of the bank manager and cannot be veri®ed. Unless a nonperforming loan is actually liquidated it is not possible to verify whether the loan is performing or not. This admittedly strong assumption is not entirely unrealistic in the case of Japan, according to recent press reports. Indeed, the systematic deception of bank regulators seems to have gone as far as temporarily `parking' non-performing loans in reputable international banks. In the ABF model the deception of bank regulators takes a very simple form: the bank manager inef®ciently re®nances bad loans in order to hide (or understate) the overall extent of loan losses. Bank managers can also deceive regulators by overstating loan losses in order to elicit a greater recapitalisation. The core analysis of the ABF paper centres around these two forms of strategic behaviour by bank managers. A bank manager's objective function involves a monetary and a private bene®t component. The monetary component is the sum of a ®xed salary
36 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
(which is normalised to zero) and a share, say equal to b 2 (0, 1), of the bank's (reported) net worth. The private bene®t component re¯ects the facts that: (i) bank managers like power and (ii) bank managers, like ®rm managers, would rather retain their job than be ®red. In addition, the bank manager's objective function includes the cost of effort, if any, that she expends in managing the bank's loan portfolio. Formally, the bank manager's objective boils down to: ci e UB b max
0; W B1 max
0; Wi R � c
e
8
where ( e B
B if the bank manager remains in place 0 if not
)
ci is the reported net worth of the bank (absent recapitalisation). and W Any additional resources accruing to the bank in period one, in particular as a result of recapitalisation, is denoted by R. The analysis in ABF only considers the case where the bank manager has no monetary incentives, so that b = 0 and UB e B1 max
0; Wi R � c
e 2.3
9
The regulator
In ABF the regulator is pictured as a benevolent social planner with full commitment powers, whose objective is to: (i) maximise the expected social return of the underlying assets of ®rms, (ii) induce bank managers to make sound ex ante lending decisions, and (iii) to minimise the costs associated with any excessive recapitalisation of banks. The purpose of this unrealistic assumption is to isolate the constraints on bank closure policy imposed by banks' ability to hide loan losses and to abstract from political economy issues relating to the motives of the regulators' political constituency. These latter issues are clearly of fundamental importance in the case of Japan. Indeed, the ®nal bank restructuring package that has been put in place is as much the result of political compromise as of purely economic or ®nancial logic. In ABF the regulator's problem is straightforward when there is complete information about the true net worth of banks. Then the regulator would avoid excessive recapitalisations by simply transferring ± Wi (to cover insured deposits) to those banks in states i = 3, 4 and nothing to banks in states i = 1, 2. Note that such a policy ± which is essentially the
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 37
received wisdom on bank closure policies ± would also best mitigate the ex ante moral hazard problem in bank lending. By dismissing the bank manager whenever the bank is insolvent this closure policy maximises incentives to make prudent lending decisions. When the regulator must instead rely on the bank to report its loan losses then dismissal can be avoided when the bank is insolvent by underreporting loan losses. Similarly, when the regulator decides to recapitalise a distressed bank, but does not know the bank's net worth, the bank manager may be able to increase the size of the recapitalisation by in¯ating loan losses and claiming to be in the worst possible state. Hence if the regulator wants to guarantee that all banks reach at least a minimum reported net worth of zero, it must be prepared to bailout banks up to an amount ± W4 , the worst possible net worth. Such misrepresentation by all bank managers would lead to an excessive recapitalisation with an ex ante dead-weight loss of 1
W1 � W4 2
W2 � W4 3
W3 � W4 E
10
Of course, the regulator has the option to limit the size of the recapitalisation to an amount less than ± W4 , but then it exposes itself to the possibility of inadequate recapitalisation of those banks in the worst state of nature. The expected social return of the underlying assets of ®rms is given by their expected ®rst period cash ¯ows, p (e) (where p (e) = 4i1 i (e)pi ) plus their expected continuation values bi bi Lg
i pi
1 �
1 � pi fmin
1 � ;
1 �
11
That is, for the proportion pi of ®rms with high cash ¯ows the expected continuation value is (1 � ), since these ®rms will never be liquidated by their managers. For the proportion (1 � pi ) of ®rms with low cash ¯ows the manager is forced to default and the average continuation value per loan is min[(1 � ), (1 � ^i )] + ^i L. Here ^i denotes the fraction of defaulting loans the bank manager chooses to liquidate in each state i = 1, . . ., 4. Formally, the regulator's objective in the ABF model takes the form: UG p
e
4 X
i i � E � c
e
12
i1
So that social ef®ciency requires ful®lment of three conditions: 1. a ®rm should be liquidated if, and only if, its liquidation value exceeds the continuation value ~, that is, ^i should be equal to for i = 1, . . ., 44
38 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
2 only those banks with truly negative net worth should be recapitalised; that is, E should be equal to zero; 3. bank managers should choose effort e = 1 given that 4 X p
1 � p
0 i
1 � i
0 i > c
13 i1
3
Incentive effects of conditional bank recapitalisations
Using this model ABF makes two main points concerning bank recapitalisation policies. First, since bank managers can to a large extent neutralise the incentive effects of strict closure rules by misreporting their loan losses these rules cannot be assumed to have the desired incentive effects on ex ante lending decisions. In addition, these rules clearly create incentives to hide loan losses, thereby introducing massive distortions in loan renewal decisions. These distortions result in crowding out of sound new investments by non-performing old loans and magnify the size of ultimate loan losses. As a result of these distortions it is not always true that strict bank closure rules are a more ef®cient regulatory response than unconditional bailouts, since the latter eliminate incentives to hide loan losses and thus eliminate the distortion of keeping non-performing loans alive in order to hide losses. More strikingly, bailouts may in some special cases even provide better ex ante incentives to make sound lending decisions than strict closure rules. Second, the best regulatory response in the ABF model is neither strict closure rules nor unconditional bailouts, but instead conditional recapitalisation. That is, the recapitalisation should be conditional on liquidation, sale or carve-out of non-performing loans. This scheme provides the best incentives for truthful reporting of loan losses and replicates the ex ante incentive effects for prudent lending of strict closure rules. Before turning to the discussion of the robustness of this basic analysis in ABF we brie¯y summarise the analysis of these two main points. 3.1
Closure of insolvent banks vs bailouts
Consider ®rst the incentive effects of strict closure rules 3.1.1
Strict closure rules
Suppose that the manager of a bank which reports a negative net worth is automatically dismissed and the bank's assets redeployed. Then, the manager of a bank with realised p1 or p2 has no incentive to manipulate either the accounts of the bank or the decisions to liquidate ®rms or to
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 39
write-down their loans. However, the bank would be insolvent if either p3 or p4 were realised. With such outcomes, the bank manager will act as if pk = p2 has occurred in order to preserve his job. Since the liquidation of ®rms is veri®able, the bank manager will pretend that pk = p2 by liquidating a fraction 2 of ®rms in its portfolio, where 2 is de®ned as the fraction of liquidated loans in the portfolio of a bank with realised p2 , (that is 2 = (1 � p2 ) ). That is, the bank manager liquidates a fraction >^ k of defaulting ®rms, where bk 2
1 � p2
14
1 � pk So that, the proportion of defaulted loans that are actually liquidated by the bank manager in states p3 or p4 is less than the socially ef®cient bk < . The incentive of bank managers to maintain the proportion: appearance of bank solvency under a tough bailout policy, thus leads to a softening of ®rms' budget constraints. Strict closure rules thus result in an insuf®cient number of ®rm liquidations. The loss in social surplus due to the softness of banks on ®rms in default is the foregone liquidation value of those ®rms which are continued even though they have a zero continuation value.5 When one allows for strategic defaults these effects are ampli®ed, for then ®rm managers may choose to default strategically if they anticipate a lower probability of liquidation by their insolvent bank. Thus, with strategic defaults there will be an additional build up of non-performing loans in banks' portfolios. More formally, suppose that 1 � p2
1 � V < D < V One can then verify that in the case of a solvent bank (in state 1 or 2), the pair of strategies (> ^i = , strategic default with probability ) is the unique Nash equilibrium. But in state 4, there exists a Nash equilibrium involving b4 < , strategic default a higher probability of strategic default, namely: ( b4 satis®es with probability one), where b4 2 1 � p2
1 � 1 � p4
1 � 1 The ex ante incentive effects of strict closure rules, taking into account the bank manager's ex post misreporting of non-performing loans are as follows. The bank manager chooses e = 1 only if 4 X i1
1
1B1 max
0; Wi R � c >
4 X i1
1
0B1 max
0; Wi R
40 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
or equivalently 1
1 � 1
0BW1 > c
15
No bank manager is dismissed in equilibrium because of the misrepresentation of the bank's net worth. Note that the value of private bene®ts equals B in all states of nature except state 1, when the value of private bene®ts equals B(1 + W1 ). The expected value of private bene®ts thus rises with managerial effort to the extent that this effort raises the probability that state 1 will occur. 3.1.2
Bank bailouts
Under an unconditional bailout policy a bank manager is immune from dismissal, regardless of reported net worth. This approach creates an incentive for bank managers to overstate their problem loans so as to increase the amount of recapitalisation. Bank managers can easily overstate anticipated losses by taking excessively high charges. The main bene®t of bailouts is that they restore bank manager's incentives to impose ®nancial discipline on the ®rms they lend to. In other words, with bailouts, the bank manager hardens the budget constraint on ®rm managers. There are at least two social costs resulting from a generous bailout policy. One is the dead-weight costs from excessive recapitalisation. The second concerns ex ante moral hazard in lending. Note, however, that in the ABF model the only incentive for bank managers to choose e = 1 under a bank bailout policy arises from the associated private bene®ts. The bank manager would has an incentive to choose e = 1 only if: 3 X i
1 � i
0Bmax
0; Wi � W4 > c
16
i1
or,
1
1 � 1
0B max
0; W1
4
1 � 4
0BW4 > c
17
Comparing equations (15) and (17) reveals that whenever 4 (1) ± 4 (0) < 0 the incentive-compatibility constraint on managerial effort is less tight under a strict bank closure policy than under a bailout policy provided that jW4 j is not too large. Thus, for ex ante incentive for prudent lending considerations the regulator may want to allow for some overstatement of bad loans ex post under a bailout policy.
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 41
A comparison of the two policy regimes leads to the overall conclusion that while strict bank closure rules dominate when the banking system is believed to be basically sound, bailouts dominate when there are reasons to believe that banks are likely to be insolvent. If one limits the choice of policy to these two regimes a careful evaluation of the likely state of the banking system is required to determine which is the adequate policy response. Thus, if Japanese regulators had reasons to believe that the banking sector was reasonably healthy in the immediate aftermath of the ®nancial collapse in 1990 they might have been justi®ed to opt for a strict enforcement of bank closure rules. On the other hand, in light of new data over the following years of a deteriorating economic situation and a worsening of bank equity values they might have been led to change their mind about the severity of the banking crisis and thus to opt for a different policy response favouring bailouts in an attempt to clean up bank balance sheets. In addition, if the original reading of the overall health of the banking sector was mistaken then the initial commitment to enforcing strict bank closure rules may have exacerbated the non-performing loans problem by inducing banks to hide their loan losses. As the analysis in ABF highlights, if one limits the policy options to these two alternatives there is scope for massive policy errors. However, when one widens the set of policy alternatives to include conditional recapitalisations then the choice of policy may be less sensitive to a precise reading of the state of the banking sector. Indeed, conditional recapitalisations emerge as the favoured response irrespective of prior beliefs about the state of the banking sector for a wide range of parameter values in the ABF model. 3.2 Bank recapitalisations conditional on liquidation of non-performing loans As liquidation of non-performing loans is an observable and veri®able action it is natural to consider recapitalisation policies conditional on liquidation. In ABF it is shown that it is possible to achieve two of the three objectives of the regulator with such a policy, namely: 1. the ef®cient liquidation of ®rms in default so that ^i = , and 2. no excessive bank recapitalisation. To achieve the third objective of providing incentives to overcome moral hazard in lending, however, a complementary policy may be required. Ef®cient liquidation and no excessive recapitalisation can be obtained if the regulator introduces a non-linear transfer pricing scheme specifying
42 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
the terms at which the regulator accepts to purchase loan contracts from banks. In the highly simpli®ed setting of the ABF model the non-linear transfer pricing scheme takes the following form: 1. a low transfer amount, tL , for loans in default which are liquidated, up 2 of the bank's portfolio and, to a threshold m 2. beyond that threshold transfers per liquidated loan are increased to t H > tL . It is shown in ABF that by adequately specifying the non-linear pricing schedule {tL , tH , m} the regulator can induce banks to truthfully disclose the state of their ®nances. The main result in that paper is as follows: Proposition: There exists an m 2 such that the two-part transfer scheme price (tL , tH , m): i) recapitalises only those banks which are truly insolvent, bi = ) if, and and ii) leads to the ef®cient liquidation of ®rms in default ( only if p4 D
1 � p4
1 � V
4 � 2 V 2 L d
18
Proof: see ABF.& A non-linear tariff is needed mainly in order to discriminate between truly insolvent banks who require recapitalisation and others who may simply be looking for a cheap source of funds. A linear tariff would inevitably apply to all banks whether solvent or not. The solvent ones would take advantage of the rescue scheme to obtain cheap government funding. Such a recapitalisation scheme would be wasteful and would not provide the best incentives for prudent lending by banks. A conditional policy is required to make sure that banks do not take advantage of the recapitalisation scheme by overstating the extent of their losses. By making recapitalisation conditional on liquidation the regulator makes sure that the bank is recapitalised for `realised' as opposed to `reported' losses. Given the size of some recent bank recapitalisation programmes (e.g., in Argentina, Mexico, and also Japan) it should clearly be an overriding concern that the size of the recapitalisation is limited as much as possible. One way of meeting that objective is to make sure that only those banks that are most in need of recapitalisation get funding and that they get funding only for `realised' losses.
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 43
It is important to clarify that liquidation does not need to take the form of an actual sale of a loan in the secondary market. It should be understood rather as a transfer of a bad loan to a government restructuring agency specially set up as part of the conditional recapitalisation scheme. The reason why one may want to avoid sale of loans in the secondary market is obvious. If there is a general liquidity shortage these loans would be sold below long-term value. Thus, in the case of real estate loans it would be highly inef®cient to sell such non-performing loans while the real estate market is depressed. On the other hand, a transfer of such loans to a specialised agency, who would hold on to them until the market recovers would serve the purpose of cleaning up bank balance sheets without at the same time worsening or prolonging the real estate crisis. Why does the conditional recapitalisation policy work best only if condition (18) is satis®ed? This condition states that under a non-linear tariff which perfectly discriminates solvent and insolvent banks the recapitalisation of the worst hit banks would be suf®cient. This is clearly not always possible. Some banks may require massive recapitalisations. These would be so large that healthier banks might be tempted to overstate their loan losses just to be able to obtain better terms for their liquidated bad loans. Thus, if condition (18) is not satis®ed, even this conditional recapitalisation policy would lead to excessive recapitalisation of solvent banks in state p2 (and/or of insolvent banks in state p3 ), with the associated dead-weight costs. However, it is probably asking for too much to be able to avoid any excessive recapitalisation and a conditional policy with a suitably designed non-linear tariff is likely to beat any other scheme of recapitalisation along this dimension even if it is not able to always achieve the ®rst-best. Two other potential problems that might arise with such a scheme. The ®rst is that banks might be encouraged to get rid of their worst loans if the transfer tariff does not adequately discriminate between different underlying qualities of loans. The second problem with this non-linear pricing scheme is that it may create incentives for solvent banks to sell their bad loans to insolvent banks. To prevent such pro®table arbitrage from taking place the regulator would need to monitor the secondary market for loans and scrutinise more closely net purchasing banks. Despite these dif®culties we believe that the basic economic principles underlying this scheme are suf®ciently sound that it is worth exploring further the feasibility and desirability of such a bank rescue plan. In particular, an important strength of this scheme is that it achieves ex post ef®ciency regardless of the regulator's knowledge (or beliefs) i (e) about the state of the overall banking system. In this important respect it
44 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
dominates the strict closure rules and unconditional bailouts considered above, none of which would achieve these requirements for ex post ef®ciency, except perhaps for a small subset of parameter values for i (e). The analysis in ABF thus shows that conditioning bank recapitalisation on an observable and veri®able action of bank managers can increase the ex post ef®ciency of bank bailouts and, under certain circumstances, meet the two requirements for ex post ef®ciency. As for ex ante effort incentives, it turns out that the implementation of strict closure rules provide bank managers with precisely the same incentives as the conditional recapitalisation considered here. It is straightforward to show that the incentive-compatibility constraint for a bank manager under the conditional bank recapitalisation policy simpli®es to 1
1 � 1
0BWi > c
19
which is the same as under the strict closure rules policy. This equivalence comes from the fact that both policies give the bank manager the option of distorting his ex post report about loan losses (i.e., about i ), although our conditional scheme is designed in such a way that bank managers are indifferent between distorting (and announcing state 1) and not distorting. This explains why ex ante effort incentives are the same under the two policies, even though our scheme avoids the ex post inef®ciencies induced by the strict closure rules policy. Our scheme should thus be seen as a strict improvement over the standard recommended strict closure rules. This conclusion hinges however on the fact that the manager is never dismissed in equilibrium under any recapitalisation policy. In Section 7 we consider an extension of the model where the true state of nature is publicly revealed in period 2. To summarise the main lessons from the analysis in ABF are that by reducing the incentive of bank managers to exaggerate the extent of their bad loans, a suitably designed conditional recapitalisation scheme in which government transfers to insolvent banks are linked to `realised' as opposed to `reported' losses can achieve some of the ex post ef®ciency objectives. We believe that these lessons are relevant for the Japanese banking crisis and we now outline that they are also robust to a number of changes brought to the basic ABF model.
4
High-powered incentives
The analysis in ABF proceeds under the assumption that bank managers are not provided with high-powered monetary incentives linked to banks'
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 45
reported net worth. We now consider the more general case where a bank manager's expected utility takes the form EUB
e
4 X
ci e i
efb maxf0; W Bi
1 max
0; Wi Rg � c
e
20
i1
c i is the reported net worth per loan of the bank, and R is where b > 0, and W the government-funded recapitalisation. The ®rst term in equation (20) depicts utility derived by the bank manager from monetary compensation and the second term utility obtained from private bene®ts. The introduction of a high-powered monetary incentive scheme affects the analysis of the various bank recapitalisation policies ®rst through its impact on the incentive to misreport banks' net worth ex post. Now, bank managers have an additional incentive to hide loan losses, since by boosting reported net worth (and hiding loan losses) they not only avoid losing their job but also increase their bonus. In particular, a bank manager may now want to misreport net worth of W1 instead of only W2 as argued in Section 3.1. However, with a `soft' recapitalisation policy, a high-powered incentive scheme raises the cost of overstating the size of the non-performing loans problem. The trade-off between monetary and private bene®ts in this case can lead bank managers to misreport net worth of W1 instead of W4 . While the introduction of a high-powered incentive scheme alters the incentive to overstate banks' net worth, it provides no incremental incentive to supply effort ex ante beyond that provided by private bene®ts with either a strict closure or a soft recapitalisation policy. This result follows immediately from equation (20) and the fact that reported net worths are independent of the realised state of nature. Expected utility from monetary bene®ts does not depend on the probabilities of various states of nature which a bank manager can in¯uence by choosing effort ex ante. Under a conditional bank recapitalisation policy linked to liquidations of ®rms in default, high-powered incentives schemes for bank managers have yet another effect. The introduction of such incentives can undermine the conditional bank recapitalisation scheme's effectiveness by creating a monetary incentive for managers of insolvent banks not to participate in the scheme and to misreport net worth. In fact, given the bank manager's objective of the form given by equation (20), no bank manager would have an incentive to participate in the conditional recapitalisation scheme. Consider in particular a bank in state W4 . The c1 + B utility of its manager from misreporting a net worth of W1 is bW
46 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
while her utility from participating in the conditional recapitalisation scheme is only B. Thus all bank managers would report a net worth of W1 under a conditional bank recapitalisation scheme with a high-powered incentive. Finally, contrasting the various recapitalisation policies from the point of view of ex ante effort incentives, we ®nd that, since reported net worth under a strict closure policy is independent of the state of nature, highpowered incentives provide no additional ex ante effort incentive beyond that associated with a bank manager's private bene®ts. Therefore, the ex ante incentive constraint remains: 1
1 � 1
0BW1 c
21
However, the ex ante incentive constraint under a soft recapitalisation is now changed to: d1 4
1 � 4
0bW4 c 1
1 � 1
0B:W
22
In particular, for given private bene®ts B, there exists a cut-off level of b, say bs , such that for b < bs (respectively b > bs ) the strict closure policy and/ or our conditional scheme provide better (respectively worse) ex ante incentives than a soft recapitalisation policy. In other words, since the bene®t of overstating loan losses under a soft recapitalisation increases with the manager's share of monetary bene®ts, the larger b the bigger the ex ante incentive effects under a soft recapitalisation as compared to a strict closure policy or our conditional recapitalisation scheme. A high-powered incentive contract based on a parameter that can be manipulated by bank managers thus not only fails to strengthen incentives for bank managers to perform, but it also introduces new ± or exacerbates existing ± distortions of bank recapitalisation schemes. If banks are state-owned, a possible strengthening of managerial incentives might be to privatise banks so that measures of performance can be based on an observable and veri®able measure of banks' net worth. In particular, privatisation may introduce the possibility of basing highpowered incentives on the equity market's assessment of banks' net worth. In effect, privatisation could be one (admittedly imperfect) way of reducing the information asymmetry between bank managers and the government. Equity market measures of private banks' net worth, however, re¯ect both their true net worth and expectations of any government bailouts. The careful design of bank recapitalisation and closure rules for private banks is thus of paramount importance if this measure of performance is
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 47
to prove reliable. These are, of course, important policy issues in their own right, but ones which go beyond the scope of this particular paper.
5 Partial information asymmetry between bank managers and the government In this section, we relax the assumption that a bank manager can misreport the net worth of the bank without limit by introducing a constraint on the scope for misrepresentation. We shall assume that a bank manager can only misreport the net worth of the bank by at most an increment of one state of nature. Therefore, a bank in state 4 can only safely claim to be in state 3 without the misrepresentation being detected by government auditors. Similarly, a bank in state 1 can only safely claim to be in state 2. In easing the extent of the information asymmetry between bank managers and the government, the distortions introduced by banks' strategic behaviour are naturally reduced. The results regarding the social costs associated with an excessive recapitalisation and with inef®cient liquidation/continuation decisions for ®rms in default are stated here without proof. First, the social inef®ciency under the `tough' recapitalisation policy associated with the excessive continuation of ®rms in default by bank managers seeking to hide their bad loans, declines. This social cost falls because banks in state 4 can no longer misrepresent their net worth as W1 or W2 . Second, the easing of the information asymmetry reduces the social inef®ciencies associated with the excessive recapitalisation and liquidations under the `soft' recapitalisation policy, because banks in state 1 can no longer misrepresent their net worth as W3 or W4 . The conditional recapitalisation policy, however, is unaffected by this change. Reducing the information asymmetry between bank managers and the government can either increase or decrease the incentive for bank managers to supply effort ex ante, depending on the government's recapitalisation policy. Under the `tough' recapitalisation policy, the incentive±compatibility constraint now becomes 1
1 � 1
0BW1 � 4
1 � 4
0B > c
23
Because a bank manager in the worst state of nature can no longer misrepresent the bank's net worth to preserve her job, there is an increased incentive for supplying effort with the reduced information asymmetry.
48 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
Under the `soft' recapitalisation policy, however, the incentive for managerial effort can be diminished by the reduction in the information asymmetry because banks in the two better states of nature are less able to attract excessive recapitalisations, with banks in state 1 being unable to misreport and banks in state 2 being only able to misreport that they are in state 3. Thus, easing of the information asymmetry between bank managers and the government improves unambiguously the social ef®ciency of the `tough' recapitalisation policy. Not only is there less misrepresentation of loan quality and fewer excessive recapitalisations of banks, there is also greater incentive for bank managers to supply effort compared with the case of a complete information asymmetry. However, for the `soft' and `inbetween' policies, the gains from less misrepresentation of loan quality and fewer excessive recapitalisations are offset by diminished incentives for managerial effort. This adverse effect of the improved information arises from the fact that banks in better states of nature receive excessive recapitalisation under the `soft' and `in-between' policies with a complete information asymmetry. This feature of the recapitalisation policies provides bank managers with an incentive to exert effort to increase the likelihood of these states occurring, an incentive which is curtailed by reducing the extent of the information asymmetry.
6
Bank managers of heterogeneous quality
In this section we explore another extension where bank managers differ in their abilities in managing a bank pro®tably. We shall suppose that managers can be either good (G) or bad (B). If they are bad they end up in state W4 for sure, while if they are good their bank never ends up in that state. Thus, the realisation of W4 identi®es the manager's type perfectly. Also, bad managers are not able to generate as high liquidation and/or continuation values per loan as good managers. We shall assume that: G B where > 1 LG LB There is thus potentially a substantial ef®ciency gain in removing bad managers in state W4 . Presumably, an advantage of `tough' bailout policies is then to facilitate the replacement of bad bank managers. Note, however, that in our model such a policy would not have the desired effect since bad bank managers can conceal the true state of the bank. But, consider a small departure from our model where the true state of the
Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries 49
bank would become public with a small probability > 0 despite the manager's efforts to conceal the bank's insolvency. There is then the following trade-off in imposing a `tough' bailout policy: the policy brings about an ex post improvement from replacing a bad manager when he or she is discovered, but it leads to a higher cost of misrepresentation. If we denote by the prior probability that a manager is good and by v
1 � B L
1 � LB the expected continuation/liquidation values under a new bank manager, then the expected gain per loan from replacing a bad manager is b4
L � LB
1 � b4
v � vB
1 � p4
while the expected misrepresentation cost is b4 L
1 � p4
� Thus, it pays to impose a `tough' bailout policy only if the probability of detection of insolvency is suf®ciently high: >
b4 L
� b4
� 1 b4
� 1LB
1 �
This observation underscores again the main underlying theme of this paper that `tough' bailout policies are ef®cient only if a powerful auditing and monitoring system is in place which limits bank managers' discretion in writing down non-performing loans. By all appearances, such a system is unlikely to be in place today in Japan. The evidence of banking crises in other advanced economies suggests that such a system was also missing in these economies.
7
Conclusion
The BIS regulations have almost entirely focused on the problem of how to avoid ®nancial distress and how to give banks incentives for prudent lending. In contrast, little attention has been devoted to the problem of how to close or restructure a distressed bank. This problem is complex mainly because banks have considerable private information about loan losses and a lot of discretion in deciding what to write down and what loans to de®ne as non-performing. This paper makes a small step in
50 Incentive Effects of Conditional Bank Recapitalisation
analysing this issue and proposes some general principles which should underlie a bankruptcy institution for banks. These principles have been derived in a highly stylised model and can only serve as a broad framework to organise our analysis of bank recapitalisations. Much additional research is required to be able to specify a more systematic policy towards bank failures.
Notes 1. The research reported in this paper is part of a wider research project on Private Sector Development initiated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We are grateful to the EBRD for ®nancial and intellectual support. 2. Another objective we consider in an extension is to replace inef®cient bank managers. 3. At least four different states of nature are needed in order to compare alternative bank bailout policies. 4. The total continuation value should include the ®rm manager's private value V. This value is assumed to be large enough that the manager would never want to shut down the ®rm willingly. Moreover it is not worth bribing the manager to close down the ®rm whenever the lender's continuation value is equal to zero since V > L. This latter assumption implies that the total continuation value is always higher than the liquidation value (at least in the case where there are no strategic defaults), so that it would be ex post ef®cient not to liquidate. However, since it is clearly ex ante ef®cient to commit to liquidation (so as to provide incentives to repay the debt) the regulator's objective should be to enforce liquidation whenever the bank's continuation value is equal to zero. 5. The loss in social surplus also includes the misallocation of funds which could have been directed to better investments. An important limitation of the ABF model is that it does not account for that cost.
References Aghion, P., P. Bolton and S. Fries (1999) `Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155 (1), pp. 51±70. Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1990) `A theory of predation based on agency problems in ®nancial contracting', American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 1. Mitchell, J. (1995) `Cancelling, transferring or repaying bad debts: cleaning banks' balance sheets in economies in transition', Cornell University mimeograph. Povel, P. (1997) `Optimal ``soft'' or ``tough'' bankruptcy procedures', Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 240, London School of Economics. Suarez, J. (1995) `Closure Rules and the Prudential Regulation of Banks', mimeo, CEMFI, Madrid.
4
Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation Hiroshi Osano
We discuss the optimality of the regulator injecting public funds into a bank in the presence of deposit insurance, and characterise an optimal injection policy to prevent the bank from taking moral hazard action. We show that under certain conditions, the regulator's optimal policy is to inject new cash funds into the bank. Furthermore, if the regulator does not have enough information on the bank, the regulator can inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds by setting the interest rate equal to zero; on the other hand, if the regulator has enough information on the bank, the regulator may inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. However, we also indicate that this kind of injection policy cannot be independent of the bank closure policy of the regulator: inef®cient banks should be closed. The author is grateful to Patrick Bolton, Ichiro Ide and Shuji Kobayakawa for helpful comments.
1
Introduction
In March 1998, the Deposit Insurance Corporation injected cash funds to support the liquidity of major Japanese banks. In Japan, the policy of cash injection into major banks is carried out through the purchase of subordinated bonds (loans) and preferred stocks (see Table 4.1). The most troubling aspect of this procedure is the concern that the injection of public funds causes insolvent banks to continue their operations. In such a case, the greater is the possibility of fresh capital injection, the greater the incentive for the bank to gamble with deposit insurance funds. Moreover, although the regulator can inject public funds into banks through the purchase of alternative securities issued by banks such as subordinated bonds, preferred stocks and common stocks, there has been no rigorous analysis of the optimal security design for fresh capital
51
52 Injection of Public Funds into Banks Table 4.1 Injection of public funds in Japan in March, 1998 Ratinga
Financial method
Injected amount (billion yen)
Underwriting condition
Tokyo Mitsubishi
Aa2
100
Libor + 0.90%b
Daiichi Kangyo Sakura
A1 A3
99 100
0.75%c Libor + 1.20%b
Sumitomo
A1
100
Libor + 0.90%b
Fuji
A3
100
Libor + 1.10%b
Sanwa Tokai
A1 A2
100 100
Libor + 0.55%b Libor + 0.90%b
Asahi
A2
100
Libor + 1.00%b
Daiwa
Baa3
100
Libor + 2.70%b
Industrial Bank of Japan Long-term Trust Bank of Japan Nippon Credit Bank Mitsubishi Trust Bank Sumitomo Trust Bank Mitsui Trust Bank Yasuda Trust Bank Toyo Trust Bank Chuo Trust Bank
A2
Permanent subordinated bond Preferred stock Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Subordinated bond Permanent subordinated loan Permanent subordinated loan Permanent subordinated loan Subordinated bond
100
Libor + 0.55%b
Preferred stock Permanent subordinated bond Preferred stock
130
1.00%c
46.6 60
Libor + 2.45%b 3.00%c
Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Permanent subordinated bond Preferred stock
50
Libor + 1.10%b
100
Libor + 1.10%b
100
Libor + 1.45%b
150
Libor + 2.45%b
50
Libor + 1.10%b
32
2.50%c
28 20
Libor + 2.45%b Libor + 1.10%b
20
Libor + 2.45%b
30
Libor + 2.95%b
Baa2
Ba1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa2 Baa2 Baa1 Baa3
Yokohama
A3
Hokuriku
Baa3
Ashikaga
Baa3
Total amount
Permanent subordinated Permanent subordinated Permanent subordinated Permanent subordinated
loan loan loan bond
1,815.6
Notes: a) The rating of each bank is taken from that of Moody's Investors Service. b) The interest rate of bonds or loans is represented by (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (six month)) + . c) Dividend rate of preferred stocks.
Hiroshi Osano 53
injection into banks. The purpose of this paper is to explore the optimality of the regulator injecting public funds into banks, and to examine the optimal design of the injection policy to avert moral hazard behaviour by banks. These problems are discussed in the situation where the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are devoted to activities that lower the liquidity risks of bank assets. Under the current deposit insurance system, the effect of the injection of public funds depends on several factors. First, if the insurance premium is independent of bank risks,1 an increase in the level of injected capital funds reduces deposit insurance payments to be covered by the regulator in the case of bank insolvency. This bene®t results from the avoidance of early liquidation of banks because one way to keep the banks in operation requires the regulator to provide the banks with additional cash funds. Second, a rise in the level of injected capital funds may induce banks to take moral hazard action and increase the possibility of bank insolvency. This possibility arises if banks are induced to choose a lower effort to reduce the liquidity risk of their assets, because even failing banks may be allowed to continue in business. However, to resolve the moral hazard problem, the regulator can design an optimal scheme for injection of public funds, consisting of the bank closure rule, the level of injection of public funds, and the choice of security purchased by the regulator in the injection of public funds into banks. The combination of bank closure policy and design of security in the injection of public funds is particularly important for the regulator in order to control the problem of moral hazard by banks, because the policy combination affects the moral hazard incentive for banks through a change in the expected value of the residual claims of banks.2 As a result, we can even take account of the possibility that the injection of public funds into banks mitigates the incentive for banks to take moral hazard action. On the other hand, if the regulator does not inject public funds into banks, the regulator uses only the combination of bank closure policy and compensation policy for depositors through deposit insurance payment. The basic assumption in this paper is that the regulator is unable to observe the effort of a bank in reducing a liquidity shock arising from the bank's asset.3 The liquidity shock not only affects the ex post revenues or the liquidation value of the bank but also produces an additional interim liquidity need for the bank to be re®nanced through new deposit funds collected by the bank or through public funds injected by the regulator into the bank. If the regulator injects public funds into the bank, this procedure may reduce the incentive for the bank to choose a higher level
54 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
of effort to reduce the liquidity shock. Hence, the regulator needs to construct an incentive compatible mechanism of cash injection to overcome the moral hazard problem. We focus on the problem of optimal regulatory design by taking as given the regulator's role as a provider of deposit insurance. Thus, we have not directly addressed the question of whether or not government-sponsored deposit insurance should be provided. Our main results are summarised as follows: (1) In the absence of moral hazard action by the bank, the regulator need not inject public funds into the bank. (2) Under moral hazard action by the bank, the regulator needs to inject new cash funds into the bank under certain conditions. (i) If the regulator injects public funds through the purchase of subordinated bonds, then the regulator can set the interest rate of subordinated bonds at zero and set the level of injection of public funds at any level below or equal to the total liquidity shock as long as the bank is kept open; in contrast, the regulator closes the bank and need not inject additional cash funds into the bank if the total liquidity need is higher than a threshold point. (ii) If the regulator injects public funds through the purchase of preferred stocks, then the regulator sets the optimal injection level equal to (a) zero for a lower level of the total liquidity shock, (b) the total liquidity shock itself for intermediate levels of the total liquidity shock; and (c) again to zero for a higher level of the total liquidity shock at which the bank should be closed in period 1. (iii) If the regulator injects public funds through the purchase of common stocks, then an unambiguous rule cannot be obtained without further restriction of the parameter con®guration of the model. (iv) The optimal security design in the injection of public funds depends on the information that the regulator obtains. If the regulator does not have enough information on the bank, the regulator can inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds into the bank by setting the interest rate equal to zero. If the regulator has enough information on the bank, the regulator may inject cash funds through the purchase of preferred stocks. There is a considerable literature on deposit insurance and bank capital regulation. One strand of the literature focuses on capital requirements in an asymmetric information environment (see, for example, Campbell, Chan and Marino, 1992; Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington, 1993; and
Hiroshi Osano 55
Besanko and Kanatas, 1997). These studies examine the normative issue of deposit insurance and capital requirements. However, they do not analyse a regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under asymmetric information Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen (1994), Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) develop a rigorous model of forbearance in the context of optimal bank regulation and investigate the endogenous determination of an optimal closure policy. Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen study the role of coverage caps on the scope of insured deposits as an alternative to a regulatory forbearance policy backed by cash infusions, and show that the optimal level of the ceiling for insured deposit coverage is beyond the minimum level consistent with the existence of a feasible ®nancing plan. Nagarajan and Sealey also suggest that regulatory forbearance is optimal under moral hazard when the bank's insolvency is due to factors beyond its control. Rochet and Tirole indicate that the ¯exibility afforded by decentralised interbank loan transactions ± for example, interbank peer monitoring ± does not necessarily make it possible for the regulator to avoid undesirable rescue operations. Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999) and Mitchell (2001) also discuss how the bank bailout scheme can mitigate or overcome bank managers' incentives to misreport or hide loan losses. What distinguishes our model from those mentioned above is that we explicitly consider the design of security in the injection of public funds by the regulator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ®rst attempt to analyse rigorously some policy questions regarding the optimal choice of securities purchased by the regulator in the injection of public funds into banks (an exception is Osano (2001), who studies this problem with a managerial compensation contract in a different context). The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model, and describes the regulator's optimisation problem. Section 3 analyses the optimal regulatory design problem by taking a choice of security in the regulator's injection policy as given, and then proceed to discuss the problem of security design in the injection policy. Section 4 extends the basic model and investigates how the results obtained in Section 3 are modi®ed. The ®nal section is devoted to conclusions.
2 2.1
The model The basic environment
We consider a three-period model in which a representative bank can issue deposit accounts to depositors under the auspices of a regulator
56 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
offering deposit insurance covering all deposits. All agents are risk neutral. The equilibrium risk-free interest rate is zero; thus, all cash ¯ows are discounted at this rate. In period 0, the bank takes equity capital E and deposit funds D0 , and invests these funds in a portfolio of risky assets K (E + D0 = K). To focus on the effect of the policy for injection of public funds into the bank, we assume that not only the total risky investment level but also the leverage ratio of the bank in the initial period are taken to be ®xed.4 The amount of equity E may then be regarded as ®xed by a capital standard imposed on the bank by the regulator. By assumption, bank deposits are fully insured by the regulator.5 The regulator charges a premium p per insured deposit. The deposit insurance premium is paid by bank owners in period 0. Since this paper is not concerned with the pricing of the `fair' risk adjusted insurance premium, the deposit insurance premium does not necessarily re¯ect the `fair' risk of deposit funds (see Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992). The bank owners take actions in period 0 to affect the distribution of the additional amount of ®nancing need in period 1 for the operating expenditures of the bank's risky investment, the distribution of the liquidity value of the bank's assets in period 1, and the distribution of the returns realised in period 2 from the bank's risky investment.6 The actions taken by the bank may be interpreted as the bank's monitoring of its borrowing ®rms. We assume that the bank owners can choose a higher or a lower monitoring level (m). Since the monitoring level (m) monitoring level can be thought of as corporate resources over which the bank owners have discretion, the monitoring activity would be costly to the bank owners. This cost factor is captured by cm, where c is constant. The objective of the bank owners is thus to maximise the value of the bank's initial equity minus the monitoring cost incurred upon them. In period 1, the bank neither engages in any further investments nor receives any cash ¯ows accruing from the borrowing ®rms. Instead, the bank must ®nance an additional amount x for the borrowing ®rms so that x ;
1
where represents the idiosyncratic shock of risky investment projects (borrowing ®rms) and the aggregate shock of the economy.7 The idiosyncratic liquidity shock is distributed according to a conditional cumulative distribution function G( j m), with a conditional density function g( j m) on the interval [, ] for each m; whereas the aggregate liquidity shock is distributed according to a cumulative distribution These two function F(), with a density function f() on the interval [, ].
Hiroshi Osano 57
liquidity shocks are assumed to be distributed independently. Given the relation (1), the total liquidity shock x is distributed according to a conditional cumulative distribution function G(x � j m) = G(x j m, ), with a conditional density function g(x � j m) = g(x j m, ) on the interval for each m and . [ + , + ] We assume that the lower level of monitoring shifts the distribution of the total liquidity shock in the sense of ®rst-order stochastic dominance (that is, it increases the likelihood of the higher level of x realising for given ). This implies that the distribution G(x j m, ) ®rst-order < ): G(x j m, ) stochastically dominates the distribution G(x j m, G(x j Furthermore, we also assume ) for all x 2 [ + , + ) and all 2 [, ]. m, ) > g(x j m, ) for x 2 that there exists a threshold level xo such that g(x j m, ) < g(x j m, ) for x 2 (x8, + ]. This assumption is [ + , xo ) and g(x j m, satis®ed for all unimodal distributions under ®rst-order stochastic dominance. From now on, we use the distribution of x instead of the distribution of for the convenience of analysis. After the observation of the total liquidity shock x but before the realisation of the bank's returns from risky investment, the regulator can choose either to keep the bank open or to close the bank immediately. We assume that the regulator cannot observe the monitoring level of the bank, m, nor the idiosyncratic liquidity shock, , although she can observe the other liquidity shocks and know the distribution functions. Given the observed total liquidity shock x and the observed aggregate liquidity shock , the regulator then decides whether or not to allow the bank to operate until period 2. This choice is captured as a threshold point of the total liquidity shock xB () for each : the bank is allowed to continue until < period 2 if x xB (); and the bank is closed in period 1 if x > xB (). Since xB () depends on the observed aggregate liquidity risk , forbearance policies adopted by the regulator are state-contingent.8;9 If the regulator allows the bank to operate until period 2, it may inject fresh capital into the bank to avoid the current or future liquidation of the bank's portfolio. Let I(x, ) denote the level of the injection of cash funds in period 1. Because bank deposits are fully insured by the regulator, the remaining liquidity need is re®nanced by additional new deposit funds D1 (x, ). Thus, I(x, ) + D1 (x, ) = x.10 Indeed, the injection of public funds does not let the bank have free additional funds because the regulator can inject public funds through the purchase of securities issued by the bank. Here, we focus on the following three kinds of security: subordinated bonds, preferred stocks, or common stocks. If public funds are injected through the purchase of subordinated bonds, the regulator is senior to the bank owners in the event of bank
58 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
insolvency in period 2 after total deposits are repaid to depositors. Thus, residual claims after the repayment to depositors are devoted ®rst to the repayment of subordinated bonds owned by the regulator. Similarly, if public funds are injected through the purchase of preferred stocks, we assume that the regulator is senior to the bank owners with respect to the bank's residual assets in the event of bank insolvency in period 2 if the other claimholders are fully repaid from the bank's ®nal returns. Thus, the main difference between subordinated bonds and preferred stocks in this paper is that the regulator can also claim dividends in period 2 under preferred stocks if the bank's returns from risky investment are larger than the sum of total deposits and outstanding preferred stock book values.11 Finally, if public funds are injected through the purchase of common stocks, both the regulator and the bank owners have an equal right to receive residual claims in period 2 after depositors are fully compensated. Since the price of common stocks to the regulator is the same as that to the bank owners, the situation still holds true even though the bank buys back its common stocks from the regulator. Now, suppose that the bank is allowed to operate until period 2. Then, the total liquidity need x is re®nanced; and the bank's ®nal returns from the maturity of risky investment, R � R , are realised in period 2. The variable R is modelled as a random variable according to a cumulative distribution function H(R), with a density function h(R) on the interval We assume that the random variable R is distributed independently [R, R]. of x and . However, the bank's returns from risky investment decrease with an increase in through the additional term �R . Depositors are repaid from the bank's ex post revenues. If the bank is insolvent, the regulator covers all the deposit funds by tax proceeds collected from other sectors of the economy. The bank owners may receive some part of the residual asset value of the bank according to the seniority rule of the securities purchased by the regulator for the injection of cash funds into the bank. On the other hand, if the bank is closed in period 1, then the total liquidity need x is not re®nanced; and the bank's assets are liquidated. Depositors are repaid only from the liquidation value L � L in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that the variable L is deterministic. The liquidation value decreases with an increase in through the additional term �L . Again, if the bank is insolvent, the regulator covers all the deposit funds by tax proceeds collected from other sectors of the economy. The bank owners can receive the residual asset value only if the bank's liquidation value is large enough to pay off the deposit claims.
Hiroshi Osano 59 Figure 4.1 Timing of the regulator's and bank's decision processes given the security choice in the injection of public funds
t = 0
bank owners’ effort _ decision m∈ {m, _ m}
idiosyncratic liquidity shock _ ∈ [_, ] ∋ ∋
total liquidity shock x
t=1
aggregate liquidity _ shock ξ∈ [_ ξ, ξ]
∋
regulator’s forbearance decision
[continue] x ≤ xB(ξ)
regulator’s injection decision I(x, ξ) newly collected deposit funds D1(x, ξ) = x - I(x, ξ)
t = 2
[close] x > xB(ξ)
realisation of the bank’s liquidity value L - p ξ L
distribution of the residual claims
realisation of the bank’s revenues R -pRξ
distribution of the residual claims
The timing of the regulator's and bank's decision processes is now illustrated in Figure 4.1.
60 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
2.2
The regulator's problem
Given the model structure presented in the preceding subsection, the regulator now designs an optimal regulatory mechanism {p, xB (), I(x, ), for each choice of securities purchased D1 (x, ) j (x, ) 2 [ + , + ] [, ]} by the regulator in the injection of public funds into the bank: subordinated bonds, preferred stocks, and common stocks. For the resulting optimal regulatory mechanism under each ®nancial scheme, the regulator then determines optimal security design in the injection of public funds by comparing the payoffs attained under the three different ®nancial schemes. For simplicity, we assume that the regulator purchases the same security in the injection policy for all the realised total liquidity shock x and the realised aggregate shock . We will brie¯y discuss the effect of this assumption in section 4.4. To formulate the regulator's problem, we provide several notations. Let Since the bank y 2 � {xB (), I(x, ), D1 (x, ) j (x, ) 2 [ + , + ] [, ]}. owners pay off in period 0 the insurance premium p that the regulator receives, let SB (m, y) � p � cm,PB (m, y) � p � cm, and BC (m, y) � p � cm(SR (m, y) + p, PR (m, y) + p, and CR (m, y) + p) denote the ex ante net payoff of the bank (regulator) evaluated in period 0 under the injection of public funds through the purchase of subordinated bonds, preferred stocks, and common stocks, respectively. The ex ante gross payoffs of the j bank and the regulator, i (m, y) (i = B, R; j = S, P, C), will be speci®ed in the next section. We begin by discussing the constraints that the regulator must face. Suppose that the lower monitoring level m is more likely to yield a larger so that the regulator liquidity shock than the higher monitoring level m always prefers the higher monitoring level m. Then, for each choice of securities purchased by the regulator, the incentive compatibility constraint for the bank is described by > j j B
m; y � p � cm B
m; y � p � cm;
2
where j = S, P and C. The bank must also attain at least the zero net expected payoff because the bank owners are risk neutral and the risk-free interest rate is zero. For each choice of securities purchased by the regulator, the individual rationality constraint for the bank is expressed by > j B
m; y � p � cm 0; where j = S, P and C.
3
Hiroshi Osano 61
The feasibility constraint ensures that the sum of injected public funds I(x, ) and newly collected deposit funds D1 (x, ) ®nances the total liquidity need x: I
x; D1
x; x;
for
x; 2 ; ; :
4
The regulator also impose the non-negative constraints of injected public and newly collected deposit funds such that > > x I
x; 0;
for
x; 2 ; ; :
5
For each choice of securities purchased by the regulator, the regulator's problem is now characterised as follows: j
Maxp;y R
m; y p subject to
2 �
5:
6
j
where j = S, P and C. Let VR * denote the optimal value of the maximization problem (6) for j = S, P and C. Then, the regulator selects the optimal security design in the injection of public funds that gives it the maximum of the three values: VSR *, VPR *, and VCR *. We are now in a position to solve the maximisation problem (6). Since the individual rationality constraint (3) is always satis®ed with equality, j y) � cm. Substituting p = the insurance premium p is represented by B (m, j B (m, y) � cm into the objective function of (6), we obtain the following ®rst-order conditions with respect to I(x, ) and xB () for each choice of securities purchased by the regulator (j = S, P, C):12 " j # j j j @R
m; y @B
m; y @B
m; y @B
m; y 1 � 2
x; � 3
x; ; @I
x; @I
x; @I
x; @I
x; j @R
m; y
@xB
j @B
m; y
@xB
" j # j @B
m; y @B
m; y 0; 1 � @xB
@xB
7
8
where 1 , 2 (x, ), and 3 (x, ) are the nonnegative multipliers associated > > with the incentive compatibility constraint (2), x I(x, ), and I(x, ) 0, j j @R
m;y @B
m;y respectively, and @I
x; and @I
x; are evaluated under the condition D1 (x, ) = x � I(x, ) from (4). We summarise the de®nitions of the derivatives of (7) and (8) in the Appendix. If the bank's monitoring level is perfectly observed by the regulator, the incentive compatibility constraint is not required. Then, the optimal level of injection of public funds and the optimal threshold level for bank
62 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
closure are determined from (7) and (8) by setting 1 = 0. Given the choice of securities purchased by the regulator, this corresponds to the ®rst-best solution to the regulator's problem as a benchmark against which the solution under moral hazard can be compared. In fact, since the bank's monitoring level cannot be observed by the regulator, the problem of moral hazard action by the bank cannot be neglected. Then, we can suppose 1 >j 0 so that the incentive compatibility constraint is strictly j j j @B
m @B
m @B
m @B
m binding. If @I
x; � @I
x; > 0
or @I
x; � @I
x; < 0 the bank has more (or less) incentive to choose the higher monitoring effort as the level of injection of public funds is greater. This is so because the incentive compatibility constraint for the j bank isj more (or less) relaxed with an j j @
m @
m @
m @
m increase in I(x, ). Similarly, if @xBB
� @xBB
> 0
or @xBB
� @xBB
< 0 the bank has more (or less) incentive to choose the higher monitoring effort as the threshold point for bank closure is greater.
3
The optimal regulatory policy
To evaluate the ®rst-order conditions of (7) and (8), we need to specify j i (m, y) (i = B, R; j = S, P, C). Thus, for each choice of securities purchased by the regulator, we begin by describing explicitly the bank's ex ante gross j payoff prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment B (m, y) (j = S, P, C) and the regulator's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance j premium receipt R (m, y) (j = S, P, C). Then, we examine the optimality conditions on the regulator's problem under each choice of securities purchased by the regulator. Finally, we compute the regulator's optimal net payoff for each choice of securities purchased by the regulator and determine the optimal security design in the injection of public funds. 3.1
Subordinated bonds
Let us begin with the case of subordinated bonds. For simplicity, we ignore the interest rate of subordinated bonds. In a following section (subsection 4.2), we allow for a non-zero interest rate of subordinated bonds and discuss how our main results in this section are modi®ed. Given D0 = K � E and D1 (x, ) = x � I(x, ) from (4), the bank's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment is represented by Z Z xB
Z R SB
m; y R � R � K E � xdH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z
L�KE L
Z
R K�Ex
xB
L � L � K EdG
xjm; dF
:
9
Hiroshi Osano 63
The ®rst integral indicates the expected value of residual claims retained by the bank owners in period 2 if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2. The second integral denotes the expected value of residual claims retained by the bank owners in period 1 if the bank is closed in period 1. Several remarks on this representation are in order. First, the regulator closes the bank in period 1 as long as xB () < x. Second, we should also notice that the bank's ex post residual claims are positive as long as the bank's ex post asset proceeds are larger than the sum of deposit and > subordinated bond claims (R � R K � E + x � I(x, ) + I(x, ) if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2, and L � L > K � E if the bank is closed in period 1). Similarly, using D0 = K � E and D1 (x, ) = x � I(x, ) from (4), the regulator's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium receipt is described by SR
m; y
Z Z
Z Z
xB
xB
Z Z
R
R K�Ex
I
x; dH
RdG
xjm; dF
R K�Ex
R K�Ex�I
x;
R � R � K E � x
I
x; dH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z Z xB
Z R K�Ex�I
x; K � E x � I
x; �
R
� R R dH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z Z xB
I
x; dG
xjm; dF
� Z �
L�KE L
Z
xB
K � E � L L dG
xjm; dF
:
10
Here, the ®rst and second integrals are the expected repayments of subordinated bonds from the bank to the regulator in period 2 if the bank is allowed to operate until period 2. The third integral represents the expected deposit insurance payment to be covered by the regulator in period 2 if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2 and if the bank's assets are insuf®cient. The fourth integral indicates the amount of cash funds injected into the bank in period 1. The ®nal integral expresses the expected deposit insurance payment to be covered by the regulator in period 1 if the bank is closed in period 1 and if the bank's assets are insuf®cient.
64 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
Several comments on the representation (10) should be made. First, the regulator obtains from the bank the full amount of the promised > repayment of subordinated bonds as long as R R + K ± E + x. The regulator can also receive a partial amount of the promised repayment if > > R + K � E + x R R + K � E + x � I(x, ). Second, if the bank is closed in period 1, the regulator need not inject fresh capital into the bank. Thus, the regulator does not have the possibility of obtaining the ex post residual > claims of the bank if x xB (). We next proceed to derive the partial differentiation results of SB (m, y) and SR (m, y) with respect to I(x, ) and xB (). Given I(x, ) = 0 in the case of bank closure in period 1 (that is, x 2 (xB (), + ]), partial differentiation of (9) and (10) with respect to I(x, ) on x 2 [ + , xB ()] shows that @SB
m; y 0; @I
x;
for
m; x; 2 fm; mg ; xB
; ;
11
@SR
m; y
0; @I
x;
for
m; x; 2 fm; mg ; xB
; :
12
Equations (11) and (12) imply that an increase in the amount of public funds injected through the purchase of subordinated bonds has no effects on the ex ante gross payoff of either the bank or the regulator. The neutral effect on the ex ante gross payoff of the bank is due to the consideration that the bank's ex post residual claims are independent of the ®nancial method, whether the total liquidity need is ®nanced by newly collected deposit funds or subordinated bonds under the zero interest rate of subordinated bonds. Thus, an increase in the amount of public funds injected with subordinated bonds does not induce the bank to take the lower monitoring level. Furthermore, the additional cash injection by the regulator through the purchase of subordinated bonds simply cancels out the sum of the increasing expected repayment of subordinated bonds from the bank to the regulator and the decreasing expected payment of deposit insurance to be covered by the regulator in the event of bank insolvency. These arguments indicate that the injection of public funds with subordinated bonds has no effect on the ex ante gross payoff of the regulator. Given (5) and (7), these ®ndings lead us to state that the level of injection of public funds with subordinated bonds is indeterminate in the range of [0, x] if the bank is kept open. We also partially differentiate (9) and (10) with respect to xB () for (m, ) and obtain 2 {m, m} [, ] ZR @SB
m; y g
xB
jm; f
f R � R � K E @xB
R K�ExB
� xB
dH
R
K � E � L L g;
13
Hiroshi Osano 65
Z R K�ExB
@SR
m; y g
xB
jm; f
f R � R � K E @xB
R � xB
dH
R 1 �
K � E � L L g; ZR @SB
m; y @SR
m; y g
xB
jm; f
f R � R � K E @xB
@xB
R � xB
dH
R K � E � L L g;
Z f
14
15
@SB
m; y @SB
m; y � g
xB
jm; � g
xB
jm; f
@xB
@xB
R
R K�ExB
R � R � K E � xB
dH
R
K � E � L L g;
16 < < < L�K E where
1 if L�KE ; and
0 if < : L L Equation (13) implies that an increase in the threshold point for bank closure raises the ex ante gross payoff of the bank prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment for 2
L�KLE ; , but that such an increase has ambiguous effects for 2 ; L�KLE: This is so because the higher threshold point for bank closure leads to the larger expected residual claims of the bank in the case of bank forbearance in period 1 for all , whereas it also forces the bank to lose the possibility of receiving the residual claims in the case of bank closure in period 1 for 2 ; L�KLE: Equation (14) suggests that a rise in the threshold point for bank closure reduces the ex ante gross payoff of the regulator prior to the insurance premium receipt for 2 ; L�KLE; but that its effect is ambiguous for 2
L�KE L ; : The reason is that the higher threshold point for bank closure increases not only the expected payments of deposit insurance but also the expected losses due to the insolvency of subordinated bonds in the case of bank forbearance in period 1 for all , while it reduces the expected payments of deposit insurance in the case of bank closure in period 1 if 2
L�KLE ; : Equation (15) represents the effect of an increase in the threshold point for bank closure on the sum of the ex ante gross payoffs of the bank and the regulator, SB (m, y) + SR (m, y). Equation (16) also shows that the effect of an increase in the threshold point for bank closure on the incentive for the bank to take the lower monitoring level depends on several factors: L�KE < < L�KE and g
xB
jm; < g
xB
jm;
that is; < < L and xB
> x . L As indicated in (8), the threshold point for bank closure is now determined so as to balance these effects. Since these effects and the multiplier 1 are independent of I(x, ) (as shown in (11), (12), (15), and (16)), the equilibrium threshold point for bank closure in the presence of
66 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
cash injection through the purchase of subordinated bonds is equal to that in its absence. We now characterise an optimal solution to the benchmark case of no moral hazard, that is, 1 = 0. Given (7), (8), (11), (12), and (15) with I(x, ) = 0 for x > xB (), we obtain the following proposition. Proposition 1 Suppose that the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds. In the absence of moral hazard action by the bank, the optimal level of the injection of public funds I* (x, ) is given by I
x; 2 0; x; I
x; 0;
< for x xB
; for x > xB
:
17a
17b
The optimal threshold level for bank closure x*B () is determined so that (8) holds with 1 = 0 and (15). This threshold point is the same as that obtained in the absence of the injection of public funds. Now, we proceed to examine an optimal solution under moral hazard, 1 > 0. Given (7), (8), (11), (12), (15) and (16) with I(x, ) = 0 if x > xB (), we have the following proposition. Proposition 2 Suppose that the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds. In the presence of moral hazard action by the bank, the optimal level of the injection of public funds I*(x, ) is still given by I
x; 2 0; x;
I
x; 0;
< for x xB
; for x >
xB
:
18a
18b
The optimal threshold level for bank closure xB () is determined so that (8) holds with (15) and (16). This threshold point is the same as that obtained in the absence of the injection of public funds. Proposition 2 suggests that if the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds under moral hazard, the regulator can set the optimal level of injection of public funds at any level below or equal to the total liquidity need as long as the bank continues; in contrast, the regulator need not inject additional cash funds into the bank if the total liquidity need is higher than a threshold point xB (). Comparing this result with that of Proposition 1, we see that the optimal rule for injection of public funds in the presence of moral hazard is identical with that in the absence of moral hazard, in which the
Hiroshi Osano 67
incentive compatibility constraint plays no role in the ®rst-order conditions with respect to the level of injection of public funds. Thus, if the bank closure rule is taken as given, the injection decision of the regulator is ef®cient even in the presence of moral hazard. Furthermore, under moral hazard, the bank is closed on a criterion that is independent of whether or not public funds are injected. However, since the incentive compatibility constraint plays a key role in the ®rst-order conditions with respect to the threshold point for bank closure, the optimal closure rule under moral hazard is different from the ef®cient one without moral hazard. The intuition behind Proposition 2 can be clari®ed as follows. If the bank is kept open, an increase in the amount of public funds injected through the purchase of subordinated bonds reduces the regulator's expected liabilities of deposit insurance payments because the possibility of insolvency of bank deposits decreases. In fact, this gain from the reduction of the regulator's expected liabilities of deposit insurance payments is offset by the cost from the increased possibility of insolvency of subordinated bonds. On the other hand, the bank's ex post residual claims are independent of whether the total liquidity need is ®nanced by new deposit funds or subordinated bonds. Thus, the injection of capital funds through the purchase of subordinated bonds does not affect the incentive for the bank to choose the lower monitoring effort. As a result, the regulator is indifferent to any level of injection of public funds: the level of injection of public funds is indeterminate. This neutralises the effect of an increase in the cash injection on the equilibrium threshold point for bank closure. The equilibrium threshold point for bank closure, therefore, does not depend on whether or not public funds are injected. 3.2.
Preferred stocks
We next discuss the case of preferred stocks. Given D0 = K � E and D1 (x, ) = x � I(x, ) from (4), the bank's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment is represented by PB
m; y
Z Z
xB
Z
R
E R � R � K E E I
x; R K�Ex
�xdH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z L�KE Z
L
L � L � K EdG
xjm; dF
:
xB
19
The ®rst integral expresses the expected value of residual claims retained by the bank owners in period 2 if the bank is allowed to continue until
68 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
period 2. Note that the bank owners receive the ratio EIE
x; of the residual claims if the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. The second integral represents the expected value of residual claims retained by the bank owners in period 1 if the bank is closed in period 1. The regulator's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium receipt is described by PR
m; y
Z Z
xB
Z
R
I
x; f R � R � K E � x E I
x; R K�Ex
I
x; gdH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z Z xB
Z R K�Ex R � R � K E � x
R K�Ex�I
x;
I
x; dH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z Z xB
Z R K�Ex�I
x; K � E x � I
x; � R �
R
R dH
RdG
xjm; dF
Z Z xB
I
x; dG
xjm; dF
� Z �
L�KE L
Z
xB
K � E � L L dG
xjm; dF
:
20
Here, the ®rst and second integrals are the expected repayments of preferred stocks from the bank to the regulator in period 2 if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2. Note that the regulator receives not I
x; of the residual claims but also the only the dividends at the ratio EI
x; > revenues from the sale of preferred stocks to the bank if R � R K � E + x � I(x, ) + I(x, + I(x, )).13 The third integral indicates the expected deposit insurance payments to be covered by the regulator in period 2 if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2 and if the bank's assets are insuf®cient. The fourth integral expresses the amount of preferred stocks injected into the bank in period 1. The last integral denotes the expected deposit insurance payments to be covered by the regulator in period 1 if the bank is closed in period 1 and if the bank's assets are insuf®cient. Given I(x, ) = 0 in the case of bank closure in period 1 (x 2 (xB (), + ]), partial differentiation of (19) and (20) with respect to I(x, ) on x 2 [ + , xB ()] shows that for (m, x, ) 2 {m, m} [ + , xB ()] [, ],
Hiroshi Osano 69
@PB
m; y �g
xjm; f
@I
x; @PR
m; y g
xjm; f
@I
x;
Z
Z
R
ER � R � K E � x dH
R < 0; E I
x; 2 R K�Ex
21
R
ER � R � K E � x dH
R > 0; E I
x; 2 R K�Ex
22
@PB
m; y @RP
m; y 0; @I
x; @I
x; @PB
m; y @BP
m; y � �g
xjm; � g
xjm; f
@I
x; @I
x; ZR ER � R � K E � x < dH
R 0; 2 > E I
x; R K�Ex < if and if x x : >
23
24
The inequality (24) is immediate from the assumption g(x j m, ) � (g(x j m, ) > 0 (or g(x j m, ) � g(x j m ) < 0) if and only if x < xo (x > xo ). Equation (21) implies that an increase in the amount of public funds injected through the purchase of preferred stocks reduces the ex ante gross payoff of the bank prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment. The reason is that the expected value of the residual claims of the bank decreases as the ratio of preferred stocks to total outstanding stocks is larger. If the liquidity need is re®nanced by injected cash funds instead of newly collected deposit funds, the expected value of the residual claims of the bank decreases. Equation (22) reveals that the additional injection of cash funds through the purchase of preferred stocks raises the ex ante gross payoff of the regulator prior to the insurance premium receipt. This is because the greater ratio of preferred stocks to total outstanding stocks leads to the greater expected value of the residual claims of the regulator if the bank's assets are greater than its liabilities. @PB
m;y Indeed, Equation (23) indicates that these two effects, @I
x; and P @B
m;y , cancel each other out. @I
x; Inequality (24) shows that the greater amount of public funds injected through the purchase of preferred stocks strengthens or weakens the incentive for the bank to take the lower monitoring action according as x < xo or x > xo . As indicated in (21), a rise in the amount of public funds injected reduces PB (m, y) regardless of the monitoring level chosen by the bank. Thus, the incentive for the bank to choose the lower monitoring
70 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
y) is level is strengthened or weakened according as this impact on PB (m, larger or smaller than that on PB (m, y). More speci®cally, under our assumption, the effect on moral hazard action by the bank depends on the characteristics of the density function of x, g(x j m, ). Because of the assumption g(x j m, ) � g(x j m, ) < 0 for x > xo , the moral hazard incentive for the bank is strengthened or weakened according to which x is smaller or larger than xo . Given (23) and (24), we now determine the level of I(x, ) by evaluating (7). In the absence of moral hazard 1 = 0, it follows from (7) and (23) that 2 (x, ) � 3 (x, ) = 0 for all x and . This implies that I(x, ) is indeterminate in the range of [0, x] for all . On the other hand, in the presence of moral hazard 1 > 0, it is found from (7), (23) and (24) that > 2 (x, ) � 3 (x, ) > 0 according as x > xo: Because of i (x, ) 0 for i = 2, 3 [, this ®nding shows that and I(x, ) = 0 for all (x, ) 2 (xB (), + ] 3 (x, ) > 0 (that is, I(x, ) = 0) if x < min(xB (), xo ); 2 (x, ) > 0 (that is, I(x, ) < = x) if min(xB (), xo ) < x xB (); and I(x, ) = 0 if x > xB (). We next partially differentiate (19) and (20) with respect to xB () for (m, ) 2 {m, m} [, ]: ZR @PB
m; y E R � R � K g
xB
j m; f
f @xB
E I
x B
; R K�ExB
E � xB
dH
R
K � E � L L g; @PR
m; y @xB
Z g
xB
j m; f
f
25 R
I
xB
; R � R � K I
xB
;
R K�ExB
E Z R K�ExB
E � xB
dH
R
R � R � K E
R
� xB
dH
R 1 �
K � E � L L g; @PB
m; y @xB
@RP
m; y @xB
ZR g
xB
j m; f
f R � R � K E R
26
27
� xB
dH
R K � E � L L g; @PB
m; y @xB
�
@PB
m; y @xB
g
xB
j m; � g
xB
j m; f
Z f
R
R K�ExB
E R � R � K E I
xB
;
E � xB
dH
R
K � E � L L g; < < where
1 if L�KE L ; and
0 if
L�K E L
< < :
28
Hiroshi Osano 71
Given (25)±(28), we can repeat arguments on the optimal threshold point for bank closure that are similar to those in the subordinated bond case. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, we only brie¯y characterise the optimal threshold point for bank closure in the preferred stock case. In the absence of moral hazard, it is apparent from (8), (15) and (27) that the optimal threshold point for bank closure in the preferred stock case is the same as that in the subordinated bond case. On the other hand, under moral hazard, we can ®nd one important difference between the optimal threshold points for bank closure in these two cases: in the presence of cash injection through the purchase of preferred stocks, the optimal threshold point for bank closure is not the same as that in its > absence if xB () xo . This is because the regulator is not indifferent to any injection level in the preferred stock case: the regulator uses the injection > > ®nancing up to the maximal level it can set, I (x, ) = x, if xB () x o min (xB (),x . The foregoing arguments lead us to show the following propositions: Proposition 3 Suppose that the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. In the absence of moral hazard, both the optimal rule for injection of public funds I* (x, ) and the optimal threshold point for bank closure xB () are the same as those determined in the case of the injection of public funds through the purchase of subordinated bonds. Proposition 4 Suppose that the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal level of the injection of public funds I* (x, ) is given by14 I
x; 0;
I
x; x;
f or
x; 2 " ; min
xB
; x ; ;
f or
x; 2 min
xB
; x ; xB
; ;
I
x; 0;
f or
x; 2
xB
; ; :
29a
29b
29c
The optimal threshold point for bank closure xB () is determined so that (8) holds under (27) and (28). This optimal threshold point xB () is not the same as that obtained in the absence of the injection of public funds. Proposition 3 suggests that under no moral hazard, not only the optimal rule for injection of public funds but also the optimal threshold point for bank closure are independent of the variety of securities purchased by the regulator in the injection of public funds. In this sense, this proposition can be interpreted as a restatement of the classical Modigliani±Miller theorem in the event of fresh capital injection into the bank.
72 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
Under moral hazard action by the bank, Proposition 4 shows that the optimal level of injection of additional cash funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks is equal to (i) zero for the lower level of the total liquidity shock, (ii) the total liquidity shock itself for an intermediate level of the total liquidity shock, and (iii) zero again for the higher level of the total liquidity shock at which the bank should be closed in period 1. Thus, the optimal threshold point for bank closure in the presence of the injection of public funds is not the same as that in the absence of their injection. The rational behind Proposition 4 can be clari®ed as follows. If the bank is kept open, an increase in the amount of public funds injected through the purchase of preferred stocks reduces the expected liabilities of the regulator covering deposit insurance payments because the possibility of insolvency of bank deposits declines. Furthermore, if the bank's assets are larger than its deposit claims, the additional injection of public funds enables the regulator to receive more claims (up to the injection amount of preferred stocks) as a preferred stockholder before the bank owners are paid the residual claims. However, these gains are exactly counterbalanced by the injection payments incurred by the regulator through the purchase of preferred stocks. On the other hand, since the regulator also > shares the residual claims with the bank owners if R R + K � E + x, an increase in the amount of public funds injected raises the ex ante gross payoff of the regulator prior to the insurance premium receipt. Indeed, this decreases the ex ante gross payoff of the bank prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment. These two effects cancel each other As a result, the out so that (23) holds for all (x, ) 2 [ + , + ] [, ]. remaining effect of the additional injection of public funds through the purchase of preferred stocks is only the effect on the incentive for the bank to choose the higher monitoring effort. This effect is captured by a y) � PB (m, y) for the lower and higher levels of the total decline in PB (m, [ [xB (), + ] [, ], liquidity shock, (x, ) 2 [ + , min (xB (), (xo )] [, ] P P and by a rise in B (m, y) � B (m, y) for the intermediate level of the total liquidity shock, (x, ) 2 [min (xB (), xo ), xB ()] [, ]. For the lower and higher levels of the total liquidity shock, the remaining incentive effect of the injection of public funds strengthens the incentive compatibility constraint by inducing the bank to take the lower monitoring level. The injection of public funds through the purchase of preferred stocks, therefore, is not optimal. The total liquidity need is re®nanced through the collection of insured new deposits for a lower level of the total liquidity shock, but is not re®nanced for a higher level of the total liquidity shock at which the bank should be closed in period 1. On
Hiroshi Osano 73
the other hand, for an intermediate level of the total liquidity shock, the remaining incentive effect mitigates the incentive compatibility constraint by motivating the bank to take the higher monitoring level. Because the remaining incentive effect is effective for any level of I (x, ) 2 [0, x], the optimal injection level increases to the total liquidity shock x. 3.3
Common stocks
Since the analysis of the injection of public funds through the purchase of common stocks is similar to that through the purchase of preferred stocks, we only brie¯y discuss an optimal regulatory policy in this case. A detailed analysis is presented in the Appendix. In the absence of moral hazard, we can set the optimal rule for injection of public funds to be identical with that described in Proposition 1 and 3. In contrast, under moral hazard, we cannot obtain an unambiguous optimal rule for the injection level. However, if the injection of public funds with common stocks induces the bank to choose the lower monitoring level, then such an injection is not optimal. With regard to the optimal threshold point for bank closure, we can repeat arguments similar to those in the case of subordinated bonds or preferred stocks. In the absence of moral hazard, the optimal threshold point for bank closure in this case is again the same as in the case of subordinated bonds or preferred stocks. Under moral hazard, the optimal threshold point for bank closure in the presence of the injection of public funds with common stocks is not the same as that in the absence of their injection because the optimal level of injection of public funds is not necessarily equal to zero. 3.4
Optimal security design in the injection of public funds
In subsections 3.1±3.3, we have studied the regulator's problem by taking as given the security purchased by the regulator for the injection of public funds. We now consider the problem of optimal security design for the regulator. For simplicity, the regulator is assumed to select the same security for all the realisations of the observed total and aggregate liquidity shocks, x and . Without moral hazard, the discussions in subsections 3.1±3.3 show that both the optimal level of injection of public funds and the optimal threshold point for bank closure are independent of the choice of the security purchased by the regulator in the injection policy. Thus, the welfare level of the regulator does not depend on its choice of security in the injection policy. This implies that the security choice in the injection of public funds is a matter of indifference for the regulator. The resulting
74 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
combination of the level of injection of public funds and the threshold point for bank closure is the ®rst-best. Under moral hazard, if the regulator does not have enough information on the effect of the injection policy and if it has some good reason to avoid ®nancial fragility, Proposition 2 suggests that it should use subordinated bonds that have a neutral effect on the ef®ciency of the banking system. In this case, the regulator may inject additional capital funds up to the total liquidity shock in¯icted upon each bank and may set the interest rate of subordinated bonds equal to zero, although a bank with high total liquidity shock should be closed. However, if the regulator has more information on the effect of the injection policy, Proposition 4 suggests that the regulator should use preferred stocks for intermediate levels of the total liquidity shock. Since the injection policy with preferred stocks can motivate the bank to choose the higher monitoring level for that range of the total liquidity shock, it would be better than the injection policy with subordinated bonds. In contrast, for the lower or higher level of the total liquidity shock, the regulator should not inject fresh capital into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks because this procedure induces the bank to choose the lower monitoring effort. In fact, the regulator has an alternative option of injecting public funds through the purchase of common stocks. However, as indicated in subsection 3.3, the effect of the injection policy with common stocks is indeterminate. Furthermore, if the bank is more likely to be induced to take moral hazard action, this scheme is detrimental to the ef®ciency of the banking system. Several remarks on this policy conclusion should be added. First, we presume that the regulator requires the bank to repay the injecting subordinated bonds or buy back the injecting preferred stocks. If this requirement is broken or not imposed, our results do not hold. Second, our regulatory procedure demands that the regulator should close banks with high levels of total liquidity shock. This requirement is one of the most critical points of our regulatory scheme.
4
Possible extensions of the basic model
In this section, we relax several restrictive assumptions in the basic model and discuss how the results obtained in the preceding section are thus modi®ed. 4.1
Ex post moral hazard
Up to this point, we have assumed that the bank takes its moral hazard action before the regulator injects cash funds into the bank. However, one
Hiroshi Osano 75
can envisage circumstances in which the bank takes its moral hazard action after the regulator injects public funds into the bank. The timing of the regulator's and bank's decision processes is then the following: (i) In period 0, the bank takes equity capital and deposit funds, and invests these funds in a portfolio of risky assets. Again, we assume that not only the total risky investment level but also the leverage ratio of the bank in the initial period are taken as ®xed. The regulator chooses a regulatory scheme consisting of the bank closure policy, the injection amount and the choice of securities. (ii) In period 1, the liquidity shock is realised. Then, the regulator chooses either to keep the bank open or to close the bank immediately. (a) If the regulator allows the bank to continue until period 2, the regulator injects public funds into the bank through the purchase of securities. Given the amount of public funds injected, the bank chooses a monitoring level that affects the distribution of the returns realised in period 2 from the bank's risky investment. (b) If the regulator decides to close the bank, the bank is liquidated. (iii) In period 2, the ®nal returns of the bank from the maturity of risky investment are realised if the bank is allowed to continue until period 2. We assume that the higher level of monitoring shifts the distribution of the bank's ex post returns from its risky investment in the sense of ®rstorder stochastic dominance (that is, it increases the likelihood that the higher level of the bank's ex post returns is realised). Let m denote the monitoring level of the bank, H (R j m) the distribution function of the bank's ex post returns, and h (R j m) the density function of the bank's ex post returns. Suppose that the bank can choose a higher monitoring level (m) or a lower monitoring level (m). Then, the above assumption implies that the distribution H (R j m) ®rst-order stochastically dominates < the distribution H (R j m): H (R j m) H (R j m) for all R 2 [R, R]. Under these assumptions, we obtain the following results: (1) In the absence of the moral hazard incentive for the bank, the regulator need not inject public funds into the bank. (2) In the presence of the moral hazard incentive for the bank, the regulator needs to inject new cash funds into the bank through the purchase of securities under certain conditions. (i) If the regulator injects cash funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds, then an optimal injection level is set (a) at any
76 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
level below or equal to the liquidity shock itself if the bank is permitted to continue in period 2, and (b) equal to zero if the bank should be closed in period 1. (ii) If the regulator injects cash funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred or common stocks, then we cannot establish an unambiguous rule even though we assume that the high monitoring level shifts the distribution of the bank's ex post returns in the sense of ®rst-order stochastic dominance. The main feature that distinguishes the results obtained in the case of the ex post moral hazard incentive for the bank from those obtained in the ex ante case is that the policy of injection through the purchase of preferred stocks has unambiguous effects in the case of the ex ante moral hazard incentive for the bank, but not in the case of the ex post moral hazard incentive. 4.2
Interest rate of subordinated bonds
We next allow for the interest rate of subordinated bonds and investigate whether or not our results will continue to hold. Let r denote the interest rate of subordinated bonds. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate of subordinated bonds is exogenously ®xed before the resolution of the total liquidity shock. Then, as argued in the Appendix, we see that the injection policy with subordinated bonds does not have neutrality. However, if the regulator can freely adjust the interest rate of subordinated bonds, then it can neutralise the effect of the injection policy by setting the interest rate equal to zero. Indeed, if the regulator has enough information, it may demand a positive interest rate of subordinated bonds and motivate the bank to choose the higher monitoring effort. 4.3
Variety of preferred stocks
In Section 3, we considered only one type of preferred stock, wherein preferred stock holders are senior to common stockholders with respect to the residual claims of the bank after depositors (and, implicitly, senior debt holders) are fully compensated. In fact, there are several kinds of preferred stock. In one, preferred stock holders are senior to common stockholders with respect to the dividend payments of the bank, while in another preferred stock holders are senior to common stockholders with respect to both the residual claims and dividend payments of the bank. The former type is closer to common stocks, whereas the latter type can still be dealt with a framework similar to that in subsection 3.2.
Hiroshi Osano 77
4.4 A more general class of forms of security in the injection of public funds In addition to the problems mentioned in subsections 4.2 and 4.3, we can take account of more general forms of security. In Section 3, for all pairs of the realised total and aggregate liquidity shocks, (x, ), the regulator is assumed to inject public funds through the purchase of the same security. If the regulator can make the choice of securities in the injection of public funds contingent on (x, ), we need to modify the ®rst-order conditions of (7) and (8) by allowing for this contingent choice. Since the regulator gains more freedom to adjust the injection policy, the state-contingent security design raises the threshold point for bank closure and increases the possibility that the injection of public funds is optimal. The more important restriction is that in the preceding section, we focus on only three kinds of security: subordinated bonds, preferred stocks and common stocks. Thus, we need to consider a more general class of state-contingent forms of security that is not restricted to the above three kinds. In other work (H. Osano, 1998), we study the more general class of forms of security contingent on both the total and aggregate liquidity shocks. Osano (2001) also examines the more general class of forms of security with a managerial compensation contract. 4.5
Endogeneity of initial capital requirement
Even though initial deposit funds D0 and equity capital E are endogenously determined, the main results of the preceding section still hold. Since the initial capital requirement of the bankis mainly concerned with the ex ante optimality conditions, the endogenous determination of the initial capital requirement does not essentially modify the ex post optimality conditions with respect to the capital injection level or the threshold level for bank closure. 4.6
Social cost of public funds
If we introduce a cost of government involvement in bank regulation, we may assume that there exists a social cost of using public funds to ®nance the deposit insurance programme. The additional cost includes not only the social loss of deposit insurance payments but also the social loss of injected cash funds. The former effect enhances the necessity of the injection of cash funds into the bank, whereas the latter effect erodes it. Thus, a rise in the social cost of public funds does not necessarily result in unambiguous effects on the threshold point for bank closure or on the possibility that the injection of public funds is optimal. 4.7
Trustworthiness of the deposit insurance system
In Section 3, we assume that deposits are fully insured by the regulator. If depositors do not believe this promise, banks with a bad reputation
78 Injection of Public Funds into Banks
cannot collect new deposit funds for re®nancing the total liquidity need. In this case, the injection of public funds can be rationalised to prevent the breakdown of the ®nancial system. The crucial point is that the regulator is committed to the policy of closing banks with a liquidity shock greater than the threshold point for bank closure. 4.8
Caps on the coverage of insured deposits
A problem related to the previous issue is that in many countries the regulator usually sets a ceiling on the amount of insurance per account. This modi®cation affects the ®nancing constraint for the bank that is represented by (4). Under the coverage cap on insured deposits, in order to allow a bank to re®nance the total liquidity need, the regulator can inject cash funds into the bank or relax any existing ceiling (cap) on the use of insured deposits. Since uninsured deposit funds require a market insurance premium that re¯ects the risk of bank insolvency, Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen (1994) argue that a rise in the coverage cap on insured deposits is an alternative to the policy of cash injection by the regulator. In addition, our model explicitly supposes that the regulator injects cash funds into the bank through the purchase of securities, whereas the model of Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen does not. Thus, the differences of these two policies are larger in our paper than in Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen (1994). The presence of the coverage cap on the use of insured deposits, therefore, may reduce the possibility that the optimal level of injection of public funds is positive. 4.9
Interbank loan transactions
Another modi®cation that affects the ®nancing constraint for the bank, (4), is to introduce the possibility of interbank loan transactions. The consideration of this possibility enables us to study the systemic risk problem, that is, the propagation of a bank's distress to other banks linked to that bank through ®nancial transactions. Here, we can only mention a short survey of this promising ®eld.15 Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue that the current existence of substantial interbank lending implies that banks do a considerable amount of monitoring of each other. Nevertheless, they show that the interbank peer monitoring does not necessarily lead the regulator to avoid undesirable rescue operations. If there exists a possibility of the closure of the entire banking system, they suggest that the central bank should provide enough liquidity to avert such systemic risk problems. They also suggest that the central bank should directly save a solvent but failing lending bank rather than indirectly bail out a borrowing bank. Thus, a `soft budget constraint' does not imply `too big to fail' in their model.
Hiroshi Osano 79
Kahn and Roberds (1998) present a simple model of interbank clearing and settlement that offers an explanation for the National-Banking-Era pattern of mutual insurance against liquidity risks. This mutual insurance pattern was not constructed against liquidity risks during normal times; rather, it was constructed as collateralised lending against liquidity risks during panics. Kahn and Roberts argue that panic-induced shifts in information structure could have motivated shifts in the settlement medium of clearinghouses, from reserve assets during normal times to interbank debt during panics. Then, they suggest that if clearinghouse banks have the ability to commit ex ante to debt clearing at a penalty rate, such precommitment can reduce the banks' incentives to gamble. However, since the aggregate liquidity shock is not taken into account in their model, we cannot exclude the case in which central bank assistance is required if a large aggregate shock hits the economy.
5
Conclusion
We have examined the optimality of the regulator injecting public funds into a bank in the presence of deposit insurance, and have characterised an optimal injection policy to avert moral hazard action by the bank. We have shown that under certain conditions, the regulator's optimal policy is to inject new cash funds into the bank. Furthermore, if the regulator does not have enough information on the bank, it can inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds by setting the interest rate equal to zero; on the other hand, if the regulator has enough information on the bank, the regulator may inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. However, we have also indicated that this kind of injection policy cannot be independent of the bank closure policy: inef®cient banks should be closed.
Appendix De®nitions of the derivatives in the ®rst-order conditions: let us introduce Z B
m; y Z R
m; y
B
m; y
; dF
R
m; y
; dF
Z Z
Z Z
B
m; y
x; ; x; dG
x j m; dF
; R
m; y
x; ; x; dG
x j m; dF
;
where y
2 �
fxB
; I
x; ; D1
x; jx 2 ; g and y
x; 2 �
x; fxB
; I
x; ; D1
x; g:
80 Injection of Public Funds into Banks Then, de®ne @i
m; y @i
m; y
x; ; x; g
x j m; f
; @I
x; @I
x; @i
m; y @i
m; y
; f
; @xB
@xB
i B; R;
i B; R:
A1
A2
The derivatives in the ®rst-order conditions (7) and (8) are given by (A1) and (A2). Common stocks: We ®rst examine the regulator's problem in the injection of public funds through the purchase of common stocks. The bank's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment is represented by C
B
m; y
Z Z
xB
Z
R
R K�Ex�I
x;
E R � R � K E E I
x;
� x I
x; dH
RdG
x j m; dF
Z L�KE Z L L � L � K EdG
x j m; dF
:
xB
A3
The regulator's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium receipt is similarly described by Z Z xB
Z R
I
x; C
R � R � K E � x R
m; y R K�Ex�I
x; E I
x; I
x; dH
RdG
x j m; dF
Z Z xB
Z R K�Ex�I
x; � K � E x � I
x;
R
� R R d H
RdG
x j m; dF
Z Z xB
I
x; dG
x j m; dF
�
Z �
L�KE L
Z
xB
K � E � L L dG
x j m; dF
:
A4
Note that (A3) and (A4) continue to hold true irrespective of whether the bank buys its common stocks back from the regulator. Partially differentiating (A3) and (A4) we obtain with respect to I(x, ) for (m, x, ) E {m, m} [ + , xB ()] [, ], @CB
m; y g
x j m; f
@I
x;
Z
R
R K�Ex�I
x;
@CR
m; y g
x j m; f
@I
x;
Z
E�R R K x dH
R; E I
x; 2
R
ER � R � K � x dH
R: E I
x; 2 R K�Ex�I
x;
A5
A6
It is obvious from (A5) and (A6) that @CR
m; y @BC
m; y 0; @I
x; @I
x;
A7
Hiroshi Osano 81 @C
m;y
@C
m;y
B B However, the sign of @I
x; � @I
x; is indeterminate. Thus, under moral hazard (1 > 0), we cannot explicitly derive the rule for injection of capital funds from (7) and (A5)±(A7) alone.
Subordinated bonds with a positive interest rate: If we take account of the interest rate of subordinated bonds, then the bank's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium and monitoring payment, (9), is rewritten by Z Z BS
m; y
xB
Z
R
R K�ExrI
x;
R � R � K E � x
� rI
x; dH
RdG
x j m; dF
Z L�KE Z L L � L � K EdG
x j m; dF
:
xB
A8
The regulator's ex ante gross payoff prior to the insurance premium receipt, (10), is also reformulated by Z Z
m; y S
R
Z
xB
Z Z
R
R K�ExrI
x; xB
Z
1 rI
x; dH
RdG
x j m; dF
R K�ExrI
x;
R K�Ex�I
x;
R � R � K E � x
I
x; dH
RdG
x j m; dF
Z Z xB
Z R K�Ex�I
x; K � E x � I
x; �
R
� R R dH
RdG
x j m; dF
Z Z xB
� I
x; dG
x j m; dF
Z �
L�KE L
Z
xB
K � E � L L dG
x j m; dF
:
A9
Partially differentiating (A8) and (A9) with respect to I(x, ) allows us to show that the injection of public funds with subordinated bonds does not have neutrality.
Notes 1. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) show that fairly priced deposit insurance and incentive compatibility may not be consistent, and that the optimal scheme may involve the intertemporal mispricing of deposit insurance under asymmetric information. Furthermore, in most countries, the insurance premium of deposit insurance is determined independently of bank risks.
82 Injection of Public Funds into Banks 2. The regulator's problem studied here is in some ways similar to the security design problem that determines an optimal ®nancial contract to resolve an agency problem between ®rm insiders and outside investors. See Townsend È f and von Thadden (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Berglo (1994) and Hart and Moore (1998). Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) apply the ®nancial structure of ®rms to the regulation of banks, and show that a convenient combination of debt and equity can provide outside investors with the appropriate incentives to implement the second-best decision rule. However, they focus on the determination of the initial debt-equity ratio to develop a framework for the study of prudential regulation. 3. In the main part of this paper, we con®ne our attention to the ex ante moral hazard incentive for the bank that exists before the injection of public funds. In subsection 4.1, we will brie¯y discuss the ex post moral hazard incentive for the bank that is caused after the injection of public funds. 4. In subsection 4.5, we will brie¯y discuss the relaxation of this assumption. 5. In subsection 4.8, we will touch on the rule of caps on the coverage of insured deposits. In Japan, all banking deposits are fully insured by March, 2001. 6. See note 3. 7. Holmstro È m and Tirole (1997) consider a liquidity shock problem at the interim period in a different context. 8. In fact, we may not be able to exclude the possibility that there exist multiple threshold points of the total liquidity shock at which the regulator is indifferent as to whether it closes the bank in period 1 or allows the bank to remain open until period 2. However, barring other special reasons, it would be politically dif®cult to justify `good banks' with a lower total liquidity shock being closed in period 1 while `bad banks' with a higher total liquidity shock are kept open until period 2. We therefore assume that the threshold point for bank closure is uniquely determined. 9. Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) also study a contingent forbearance policy. 10. This ®nancing constraint for the bank in period 1 would be rather restrictive because the bank could obtain new cash funds by making interbank loan transactions or because depositors would not wish to provide additional new deposit funds due to the presence of a ceiling on the coverage of insured deposits. Hence, we will brie¯y discuss the effects of changes in this ®nancing constraint on the optimal injection scheme in subsections 4.8 and 4.9. 11. In fact, the terminology of preferred stocks includes several variations: in one type, preferred stockholders are senior to common stockholders with respect to only the dividend payment, while in another type, preferred stockholders are senior to common stockholders with respect to both the bank's dividend and residual asset payments. In subsection 4.3, we will examine the problem arising from the variety of preferred stocks. 12. Throughout, we assume that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satis®ed, and that the optimal threshold point for bank closure is interior. The latter assumption implies that a bank with the lower total liquidity shock is kept open, whereas a bank with the higher total liquidity shock is closed. 13. The Japanese banks into which public funds were injected through the purchase of preferred stocks in 1998 are required to buy back the issued preferred stocks from the Deposit Insurance Organisation in several years. See Okina (1998).
Hiroshi Osano 83 14. We assume that I*(x, ) = x for x = min (xB (), x8). 15. For an introduction and overview of this ®eld, see Berger, Hancock and Marquardt (1996).
References Aghion, P., P. Bolton and S. Fries (1999) `Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 155, pp. 51±70. Berger, A.N., D. Hancock and J.C. Marquardt (1996) `A Framework for Analyzing Ef®ciency, Risks, Costs, and Innovations in the Payment System', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 28, pp. 696±732. Berglo È f, E. and E.-L. von Thadden (1994) `Short-term versus Long-term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, pp. 1055±84. Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas (1996) `The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 5, pp. 160±83. Campbell, T.S., Y.-S. Chan and A.M. Marino (1992) `An Incentive-Based Theory of Bank Regulation', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 2, pp. 255±76. Chan, Y.-S., S.I. Greenbaum and A.V. Thakor (1992) `Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?', Journal of Finance, vol. 47, pp. 227±45. Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994) The Prudential Regulation of Banks (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press). Diamond, D. (1984) `Financial Intermediaries and Delegated Monitoring', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 51, pp. 393±414. Dreyfus, J.-F., A. Saunders and L. Allen (1994) `Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal?', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 26, pp. 412±38. Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1985) `Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The Oneperiod Problem', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52, pp. 647±63. Giammarino, R.M., T.R. Lewis and D.E.M. Sappington (1993) `An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation', Journal of Finance, vol. 48, pp. 1523±42. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998) `Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, pp. 1±41. Holmstro È m, B. and J. Tirole (1998) `Private and Public Supply of Liquidity', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, pp. 1±40. Kahn, C.M. and W. Roberds (1998) `On the Role of Bank Coalitions in the Provision of Liquidity', Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, mimeo. Mitchell, J. (2001) `Bad Debts and the Clearing of Banks' Balance Sheets: An Application to Transition Economies', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 10, pp. 1±27. Nagarajan, S. and C.W. Sealey (1995) `Forbearance, Deposit Insurance Pricing, and Incentive Compatible Bank Regulation', Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 19, pp. 1109±30. Okina, Y. (1998) Information Disclosure and Japanese Financial System, Tokyo, Toyokeizai Shinpo-sha (in Japanese). Osano, H. (1998) `Optimal Regulatory Design in the Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance', Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, mimeo.
84 Injection of Public Funds into Banks Osano, H. (2001) `Managerial Compensation Contract and Bank Bailout Policy', forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance. Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (1996) `Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 28, pp. 804±24. Townsend, R. (1979) `Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Veri®cation', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 21, pp. 265±93.
5
Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura
1
Introduction
Banks in Japan played an important role in the so-called indirect ®nancing system which implies that banks collect funds from individual investors as a form of deposits and lend them to non-®nancial ®rms. Banks, in particular main banks, have paid special attention to monitoring the performance of their borrowers, and have acted as an important stakeholder in the Japanese corporate ®nance system. Banks, however, have not been monitored adequately by public administration, namely the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and/or the Bank of Japan (BOJ). Although the MOF was a regulator to private banks, it has not made suf®cient effort to administrate and monitor them. Some of the regulations by the MOF contributed, implicitly or explicitly, to preventing any bankruptcies of private banks. Mergers and acquisitions, which were initiated and recommended by the MOF, of ®nancially troubled banks by larger banks were quite common in the past. It should be recognised that these larger banks were strong enough ®nancially to be able to acquire banks in trouble because they could enjoy extra pro®t and rent due to such mergers which were assured by the regulations. See, for example, Tachibanaki (1996) about the effect of regulation on banks in Japan. The situation changed totally after the end of the so-called `bubble economy' because many of banks had serious ®nancial troubles. The reason is that they accumulated huge bad debts, and in fact some of them went bankrupt. An important issue emerged: `Who monitors the monitor (i.e., the bank)?' The banks used to monitor non-®nancial ®rms through their lending activity. `Who monitors banks?' is the central concern of this study. It is possible, however, that banks were monitored marginally
85
86 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
by other agents. Therefore, it is interesting to inquire whether banks were monitored by somebody, and to seek for any difference in productivity or ef®ciency among various banks which are monitored differently. Put simply, does the difference in corporate governance structure for banks affect productivity among banks? We employ two methods to investigate this subject. The ®rst is to estimate the productivity function for a panel data of banks, and the second is to estimate the cost of capital for banks. There is growing concern about the effect of corporate governance on ®rms' performance in Japan. Such a concern has been concentrated on non-®nancial ®rms, namely the effect of banks' monitoring activity, and of the voice of shareholders on them. No serious attention has been paid to ®nancial ®rms. In particular, no serious investigations have been presented to show some quantitative effect of corporate governance on ®nancial ®rms' performance except for several casual studies. As noted, there are two institutions which monitor, govern or even control ®rms' management and performance. They are the suppliers providing ®rms with ®nancial resources. The ®rst is shareholders who own the capital of the ®rm, and the second debt-holders who lend funds. Shareholders are able to appoint managers or executives of the ®rm through the shareholders' voting power, and thus provide the ®rm with considerable in¯uence on the ®rm's management. Other signals, which can evaluate the performance of the ®rm or can be used for corporate governance, are the effect of the movement in equity prices, and a threat of hostile takeovers. The second is debt ®nance. One popular idea regarding the effect of debt on corporate governance is based on the theory of incomplete contract, see Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart (1995) and others. The essence of this idea can be described as follows. When the performance of ®rms is normal, i.e., a certain level of sales and/or pro®t is assured, a debtholder will receive the predetermined level of cash ¯ow. When the performance is bad, however, or the ®rm goes bankrupt, debt-holders go into action. The management authority is transferred from the managers (i.e., the chief executives) to the debt-holders at the time of bankruptcy. The possibility of such a transfer can work as the corporate governance mechanism for the ®rm. One important feature which has a great in¯uence regarding the above corporate governance structure in Japan is that intercorporate shareholding is common, namely the majority of equities and shares are held by each other among friendly ®rms in a group, such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and others, or in a framework or relationship among parents±
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 87
subsidiary ®rms. In particular, the role of ®nancial ®rms is important for intercorporate shareholding. The most notable characteristic of the intercorporate shareholding system in Japan is that a ®rm which holds other ®rms' shares is usually quiet or silent about other ®rms' management policy. In other words, neither strong control nor ef®cient monitoring from shareholders is seen. Needless to say, this quiet or silent relationship is symmetrical among ®rms who commit to intercorporate shareholding. This suggests to us to imply that the degree of control is weaker as the rate of intercorporate shareholding increases. Although the intercorporate shareholding system lowers the degree of corporate governance or control, there is one theory which stresses the merit of the system: it does not urge managers to produce higher short-run pro®t or to raise share prices, but to raise long-run interests in the ®rm because the long-run motive rather than the short-run one helps to increase the relative position of the ®rm in the industry, or to raise the long-run pro®t of the ®rm. Another interesting feature of intercorporate shareholding is that it tends to lower the face value of the cost of capital due to the accounting rule. The reason for this underestimation is that the part of the pro®t which was retained in the other ®rm (i.e., the counter-part of shareholding) cannot be included in the pro®t of the ®rm, although the share price of the ®rm is in¯uenced by the increase in the share price of the other ®rm. Thus, unless all that part of the pro®t in the other ®rm is distributed as dividends rather than as retained earnings, the cost of capital is underestimated. If the manager in the ®rm determined the amount of investment or the amount of ®nancing from outside based on the underestimated cost of capital, over-investment or over-®nancing would be likely to occur, and thus it would imply less ef®ciency in management. In sum, intercorporate shareholding is likely to produce a discrepancy between the pro®t and the share price in the ®rm, and can be a source of a bias in the estimation of the cost of capital. Debt ®nancing may reduce the bargaining power, or the monitoring ability of debt-holders as Ikeo (1994) pointed out. We can raise such evidence by showing the case in which the main bank in Japan lost its monitoring ability during the period of the post-bubble economy. It is an interesting subject to investigate whether banks, in particular Japanese banks, were able to keep their monitoring capability or controlling activity. It is crucial to consider the peculiar role of debt-holders in the determination of banks' behaviour. Debt-holders of a bank are savers who deposit their funds at the bank, while debt-holders of a non-®nancial
88 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
®rm are banks who lend their funds to the ®rm. The distinction regarding debt-holders between a bank and a non-®nancial ®rm is very important because debt-holders of a bank are normally individual households and ordinary people who are neither interested in monitoring their bank nor capable of examining the performance of the bank. More importantly, the incapability of an extremely large number of depositors at a bank who have only an extremely small amount of deposit regarding their monitoring activity must be recognised. In other words, neither power nor interest is kept by debt-holders of a bank (i.e., depositors) unlike debtholders of a non-®nancial ®rm (i.e., banks). Since the amount of deposit is guaranteed by the deposit insurance system, it is nearly impossible to expect the interest in monitoring activity by depositors. Then, `who monitors banks?' becomes an important issue. According to Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) it is the government, normally the Treasury Department or the Ministry of Finance, which monitors or governs the activity of banks. Ef®cient monitoring activity is expected to assure sound banking business activity in a country. Shimizu and Horiuchi (1997), and Tachibanaki (1998a), however, concluded that the monitoring activity of the Ministry of Finance in Japan was quite insuf®cient. Thus, it is possible to guess that no ef®cient management was observed for the Japanese banks due to such insuf®cient monitoring activity by the government. Shimizu and Horiuchi (1997) were interested in the role of `descending from heavens', i.e., bankers (some of them are board members of a bank) who started to work at a bank after retiring from the MOF. Many banks accept retired MOF people in exchange for the regulation rents enjoyed by banks. Horiuchi and Shimizu showed that no governance role of these bankers (i.e. ex-MOF people) was observed. Another important tendency is deregulation in the ®nancial industry taking place in Japan. Since the degree of freedom in the business activity of banks is increasing currently, it is necessary to expect more adequate and sound monitoring activity of the MOF. One important role of such activity would be to reduce the possibility of bank's bankruptcy, or to prepare an ef®cient and cost-minimised rule dealing with a ®nancially troubled bank, or a bank in bankruptcy. Since the discussion on the monitoring activity of debt-holders and on the governance for a bank requires various analyses, we concentrate on the two subjects, namely the direct governance role of shareholders and the indirect governance role through the market mechanism. Part 2 examines various subjects related to the management of banks such as the role of shareholders and the particularity of the banking business. Part 3 shows an empirical analysis of the estimation of productivity in banks in
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 89
order to reveal the effect of the structure of shareholders. It uses a panel data, and aims at examining the effect of shareholders on management ef®ciency in the banking industry. Part 4 presents the estimated cost of capital for banks to examine the governance role through the market mechanism. One contribution of this study is to adjust for the effect of intercorporate shareholding, when the cost of capital is estimated. Finally, Part 5 provides a conclusion and some future issues.
2
Governance structure and ®rms' management
As Berle and Means (1932) argued in their classical work, the separation between holding a ®rm and managing a ®rm was one of the important issues. In particular, the con¯ict of interests between managers and owners (i.e., shareholders) was their concern during and after the 1930s. One of the most useful approaches dealing with this issue is the development of economics of information, which provided us with the so-called agency approach. It discussed the effect of capital structure, namely equity versus debt, and of monetary compensations to top executives on management ef®ciency. The rising interest in this ®eld is the effect of incomplete contract on ef®ciency. In the literature of corporate governance attention is paid to examining the role of each stakeholder, such as shareholders, debt-holders, managers, employees, customers, etc, and their relationships in addition to the examination of the direct controlling role of shareholders. 2.1 The direct role of shareholders and the effect of intercorporate shareholding The separated system in corporated ®rms implies that professional managers, who are not the main shareholders of a ®rm, manage it, while its equities are held by a large number of shareholders. Managers attempt to maximise the ®rm's value by minimising the con¯ict of interests among various stakeholders. In turn, managers also are governed or monitored by shareholders whether they perform well or not. There are various ways to monitor and control managers from the shareholders' point of view. The direct control is to use the voting power at the shareholders' meeting, and to nominate and/or discharge managers, while the indirect control through the market mechanism is to use the possibility of hostile takeovers. Large shareholders are interested in monitoring a ®rm, because they have invested a lot. They are able to monitor or control managers of a
90 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
®rm, or the performance of a ®rm more ef®ciently. At the same time, they can enjoy a higher return to ef®cient management with a smaller cost. Among various large shareholders, institutional investors, such as banks, pension funds, trust funds, etc, who are professional in these business activities can be good candidates for ef®cient monitoring (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The indirect control through the market mechanism typically has two channels. One is to use information about the decrease in the share price of a ®rm. This indicates the possibility of bad performance in business activity, and can be transmitted to the shareholders' meeting which may dismiss the ®rm's managers. The second is to use the possibility of hostile takeover, and again to dismiss the ®rm's managers and appoint new ones. The Japanese case needs more explanation when we discuss the direct role of shareholders. The reason is the effect of the intercorporate shareholding system. As Kurasawa (1993), Yonezawa (1995), and Tachibanaki and Nagakubo (1997) have pointed out, the intercorporate shareholding system reduces, probably, the possibility of hostile takeovers, because the majority of such shareholders are silent. They are called `stable and silent shareholders' in Japan and they neither commit to frequent selling and buying activities of shares nor address their hostile opinion to the ®rm. This obviously raises the degree of autonomy of managers, and thus is likely to increase the productivity of a ®rm because of no serious outside interference and intervention. Put simply, managers have freedom. There are two reasons why we can propose such an increase in productivity under the intercorporate shareholding system. One is that it raises the long-run interest in managing a ®rm without worrying about the short-run strong demand for higher dividends by shareholders. The second is that the feature of a labour-managed ®rm in interpreting the Japanese ®rm in general, as proposed by, for example Tachibanaki (1998a and b), can work well if their is no serious interferences from shareholders come. The intercorporate shareholding system can help in functioning the function of the above two reasons. It is important, however, to recognise that intercorporate shareholding is likely to reduce the face value of the cost of capital of a ®rm as noted previously, and to induce overinvestment for a ®rm. This overinvestment causes a problem of inef®ciency in management. Consequently, it is worth attempiting to estimate the cost of capital adjusted for the intercorporate shareholding system in order to know a more realistic story in corporate ®nance.
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 91
2.2
Governance by debt and ef®ciency in banking activity
Aghion and Bolton (1992) proposed elegantly the usefulness of debt ®nancing in controlling and monitoring managers. A bankruptcy transfers the management authority from managers to debt-holders. Hirota and Ikeo (1996) presented empirical evidence, proposing that the possibility of re-organisation due to debt ®nancing such as a possible transfer of the management authority worked well in Japan to keep a higher level of corporate governance. We have to keep in mind, however, the special role of debt-holders (i.e., depositors) at banks. In other words, the major part of debts in the balance sheet of a bank are depositors, and at the same time there are so many depositors. Such depositors are not interested in monitoring activity of a bank, nor having any capability of monitoring. In sum, debt-holders are unable to take action in useful monitoring activity of a bank. Another reason for the lack of monitoring activity by debt-holders for a bank is that the deposit insurance system reduces the depositors' incentive of monitoring. Moreover, the linear and ®xed rate of insurance premium in the deposit insurance system is likely to induce moral hazard of managers in the banking industry, as proposed by Ikeo (1991). Moral hazard was also observed in Japan in view of the fact that the MOF heavily regulated the banking industry, and provided a rescue action for a ®nancially troubled bank. If banks knew that the MOF would help them in an emergency, they might not have a strong incentive of ef®cient management.
3 3.1
Productivity in banks and the structure of shareholders Purpose of the analysis
The purpose of this part is to estimate the determination of productivity in the banking industry, and to investigate the effect of the shareholders' structure on productivity. There are several studies which investigated these subjects for non-®nancial ®rms. Hirota (1996) estimated the effect of not only the structure of shareholders, but also the rate of debt over total ®nance, the main bank system, and some other variables, on ef®ciency in management. He concluded that the Japanese type of corporate ®nance was effective for raising ef®ciency, in particular ef®ciency in ®rms which had relatively low growth rates. It is noted, however, that no signi®cant in¯uence of the shareholders' structure was observed. Yonezawa and Miyazaki (1996) discovered that a high degree of intercorporate shareholding would raise average productivity. Moreover,
92 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
they examined the effect of the labour share over total cost in a ®rm, and proposed the following observation; The behaviour of ®nancial ®rms, and of ®rms which are owned by foreigners is similar to the behaviour of the neo-classical type of a ®rm, which aims at maximising the share price. In other words, average productivity in these ®rms is normally higher than that in other ®rms. At the same time, a high rate of shareholding by executives over total shares raises productivity. Although the major concern in these studies was addressed to non®nancial ®rms, Saito (1997) examined regional banks, and estimated the effect of their lending behaviour and the shareholders' structure for a panel data. He concluded that the effect of the shareholders' structure on regional banks' lending activity was evident. Additionally, he proposed that the equity market would watch the lending activity and the shareholders' structure of regional banks carefully. As pointed out earlier, depositors at banks, who are supposed to be debtholders, cannot or are not interested in monitoring the banking activity. Therefore, it is possible to guess that shareholders of a bank wish to monitor it more strongly than depositors to compensate for the lack of monitoring activity by depositors, and thus it is likely that large shareholders want to monitor the banking activity more actively. One important contribution of this study is to investigate the role of life insurance companies as the most important shareholders in Japan's corporate ®nance. Since a life insurance company is able to hold shares of other ®rms, the rate up to ten per cent of total shares of a ®rm, it can be the largest shareholder of a ®rm. Incidentally, a bank can hold at the rate only up-to ®ve per cent of total shares of a ®rm. The Japanese life insurance companies have extremely large assets because life insurances are quite popular. It should be an interesting subject to inquire whether or not life insurance companies played an important role as a governing or monitoring institution for corporate ®nance and/or corporate governance. Life insurance companies are different from other corporated ®rms because they are normally mutual companies which do not issue any shares and stocks, although they are able to hold shares of other ®rms. Needless to say, nobody can hold any shares of a mutually owned life insurance company because no shares are issued. This asymmetry nature of a life insurance company regarding its shareholding structure gives several clues to understand the intrinsic nature of a life insurance company. First, life insurance companies are interested mainly in the highest monetary return to shareholding of other ®rms, and are not interested in acting as normal shareholders who are expected to govern or monitor a
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 93
company. Second, life insurance holders, who are called owners of a life insurance company, do not pay close attention to the performance of either their life insurance company or other ®rms. Thus, the managers of a life insurance company also are not interested in monitoring other nonlife insurance companies whose large part of shares are held by the life insurance company. It is an attractive subject to examine which possibility is empirically plausible among the above two. In sum, we are going to investigate the role of life insurance companies in corporate governance in Japan. The ®nal subject is to analyse the effect of the labour side, i.e., workers who receive wages, by examining the role of the labour share over total cost on productivity. 3.2
Data
We use the data prepared by the Nomura Research Institute, which publishes ®nancial statements of various ®nancial ®rms. We apply a ®xed model because the data are basically panel data from 1981 to 1995, a total of 15 years. There are 10 city banks, three long-term credit banks, and seven trust banks. One city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and two long-term credit banks, The Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Japan Bond and Credit Bank, went bankrupt and declared their closure or nationalisation in 1997 and 1998. Since the data for these banks are available, we include them statistically. It should be a useful attempt, if we examine both the case of all samples (i.e., twenty banks), and the case of divided samples by its industrial feature (i.e., city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks, respectively). We adopted per capita (i.e., per employee) valued-added as a symbol of productivity (or ef®ciency) of a bank. It is the sum of business pro®t, total compensation (both wages and non-wage payments), and depreciation. The reason why we include total compensation for employees is that employees play an important role in the determination of productivity, and act as an important intermediary among various stakeholders. This is, in particular, true when we are concerned with corporate governance of a bank. One idea is to adopt total factor productivity (TFP) as given by, for example, Hirota (1996), and Yonezawa and Miyazaki (1996). Another possibility is to consider per capita after-tax pro®t as a symbol of productivity. We understand that per capita value-added is the most appropriate variable to indicate ef®ciency of a bank because it can take into account various aspects particularly when we are concerned with corporate governance.
94 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
It is unfortunate that the data on business pro®t are available only after 1988. Therefore, we examine for eight years (i.e., from 1988 to 1995), by taking the sum of business pro®t, total compensation and depreciation. This total value-added is divided by the number of employees in a bank to measure productivity. If we examined only for the period after 1988, it would imply that we ignored the period when there was drastic change in the Japanese economy in the 1980s, i.e., the birth and death of the so-called bubble economy. It is quite likely that management behaviour of a bank was greatly in¯uenced by this bubble economy. Therefore, we examined also for the two periods from 1981 to 1985, and from 1986 to 1990, separately in order to investigate the effect of the bubble economy on banks' behaviour. We use per capita after-tax pro®t for the dependent variable for these periods because of the lack of data on business pro®t. We use the following independent variables for each bank; the number of employees, total asset value, the rate of the shares held by top ten shareholders over total shares (called simply top ten shares), and the rate of the shares held by life insurance companies at top ten shareholders over total shares (called simply life insurance shares). We include each individual bank dummy variable to control for the particular nature of each bank. We estimate the following two equations: Yit b1 X1it b2 X2it b3 X3it Yit b0 1 X1it b0 2 X2it
b5 X5it Di eit
b0 4 X4it b5 X5it Di eit
1
2
where i denotes individual bank, and, t denotes year. Y is the logarithm of per capita value-added, or per capita after-tax pro®t. X1 is the logarithm of the number of employees, X2 is the logarithm of total asset, X3 is the ratio of shares held by top ten shareholders over total share values, X4 is the ratio of shares held by life insurance companies, Di is the i-th individual bank's dummy, and eit is the error term peculiar to i-th bank and t-th period. eit is independent of each explanatory variable. bi is the parameter. See, for example, Baltagi (1995) about the estimation method. There are two important notes for equation (1) or (2). One is that we apply the instrumental variable method in estimating (1) or (2) in order to take into consideration a possibility that some explanatory variables are determined endogenously. Second is that we add one explanatory variable in equations (1) and (2), that is X5 which signi®es the labour share. X5 is measured by ratio of total compensation over total value-added when per capita value-added is used as the dependent variable, while X5 is measured by the ratio of total
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 95
compensation over the sum of total after-tax pro®t and total compensation when per capita after-tax pro®t is used. The labour share variable was included to examine whether there exists some in¯uence of the distribution of value-added to employees on productivity. In other words, we are interested in investigating the relationship between employees' contribution and productivity, which sheds light on the understanding of corporate governance of a bank. Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for data from 1988 to 1995. The dependent variable is per capita value-added, Table 5.2 is for data from 1981 to 1985. The dependent variable is per capita after-tax pro®t. Table 5.3 is for data from 1986 to 1990. The dependent variable is per capita after-tax pro®t. 3.3
Estimated results
Table 5.4 presents the estimated result for 1988±95, where per capita value-added is used as the dependent variable. As noted, per capita valueadded is measured by the sum of business pro®t, total compensation and depreciation. The bottom line shows the case in which the labour share variable is added as an explanatory variable. First, the effect of top ten shares on per capita value-added is evaluated. We ®nd the positive and statistically signi®cant coef®cient for the observations of total twenty banks regardless of whether or not the labour share variable is added. The result for city banks is the same as for total twenty banks, while it is the same for trust banks only for the case in which the labour share is not added. It would be desirable to understand that the separated samples, i.e., city banks, trust banks and long-term credit banks, trust banks, respectively, provide us with more reliable and robust results in view of much different result between total twenty banks and separated samples. The effect of life insurance shares is negative with statistical signi®cance for the observations of total twenty banks. The coef®cient is negative signi®cantly for city banks when the labour share variable is excluded, while it is negative signi®cantly for long-term credit banks and trust banks regardless of the labour share variable. The number of employees is positive and statistically signi®cant for all twenty banks, while the sign is mixed for separated samples. We ®nd the negative and statistically signi®cant coef®cient for the total asset variable for total twenty banks and the similar result for city banks when the labour share is excluded, and in some cases of long-term credit banks and trust banks. The case of trust banks is positive in some cases. The labour share coef®cient is negative and signi®cant statistically in many cases,
value-added (one million yen)/number of employees
number of employees
value-added (one million yen)
business pro®t (one million yen)
depreciation (one million yen)
wages and non-wage payments (one million yen)
total asset (one million yen)
labour share (%)
top ten shares (%)
life insurance shares (%)
96
Table 5.1 Summary statistics (1988±95) *Dependent Variable: Per capita Value-added Total 20 Banks average
standard error
minimum
25.86 9,355.88 244,460.88 132,921.08 15,986.63 95,553.17 28,687,820.00 44.43 25.01 9.13
11.08 5,593.98 171,694.44 109,349.66 12,933.66 60,627.60 19,408,220.00 15.38 7.60 5.02
average
standard error
minimum
maximum
25.00 13,850.36 359,241.06 191,512.51 25,439.81 142,288.74 41,132,100.00 43.16 24.16 12.73
7.46 4,392.85 166,077.18 117,770.80 11,851.92 51,725.35 17,811,900.00 10.43 2.32 3.85
14.22 5,907.00
89,316.00
11,378.00
6,568.00 49,980.00 10,361,400.00 23.31 20.36 2.69
47.96 22,919.00 748,712.00 519,054.00 47,675.00 247,713.00 66,590,800.00 80.94 29.01 19.67
9.74
1,739.00
18,600.00
�4,168.00
677.00
19,088.00 1,334,930.00 15.49 17.16 1.64
maximum 77.67 22,919.00 748,712.00 519,054.00 47,675.00 247,713.00 66,590,840.00 111.12 75.91 19.67
City Banks
value-added (one million yen)/number of employees
number of employees
value-added (one million yen)
business pro®t (one million yen)
depreciation (one million yen)
wages and non-wage payments (one million yen)
total asset (one million yen)
labour share (%)
top ten shares (%)
life insurance shares (%)
Table 5.1 Summary statistics (1988±95) (continued ) Long-term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks
value-added (one million yen)/number of employees
number of employees
value-added (one million yen)
business pro®t (one million yen)
depreciation (one million yen)
wages and non-wage payments (one million yen)
total asset (one million yen)
labour share (%)
top ten shares (%)
life insurance shares (%)
average
standard error
26.71 4,861.39 129,680.70 74,329.65 6,533.45 48,817.60 16,243,600.00 45.69 25.85 5.53
13.78 1,664.89 71,182.66 56,949.74 3,901.42 17,283.05 11,279,300.00 19.08 10.45 3.10
average
standard error
minimum 9.74 1,739.00 18,600.00 �4,168.00 677.00 19,088.00 1,334,930.00 15.49 17.16 1.64
maximum 77.67 7,708.00 330,287.00 248,555.00 17,815.00 74,013.00 43,602,700.00 111.12 75.91 13.49
Trust Banks
value-added (one million yen)/number of employees number of employees value-added (one million yen) business pro®t (one million yen) depreciation (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen)
20.64 5,318.02 117,501.93 60,595.55 6,938.98 49,967.39
7.90 1,651.56 66,765.85 50,434.30 4,355.22 17,203.91
minimum 9.74 1,739.00 18,600.00 �4,168.00 677.00 19,088.00
maximum 45.47 7,708.00 285,532.00 204,309.00 17,815.00 73,627.00
97
Summary statistics (1988±95) (continued )
total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
98
Table 5.1
10,644,700.00 51.66 28.34 4.34
5,856,600.00 19.26 11.60 1.77
1,334,930.00 25.01 19.56 1.64
Notes: (1) value-added: (business pro®t + depreciation) + (wages + non-wages). (2) labour share: [(wages + non-wages)/(value-added)] 100. (3) top ten shares: the rate of the shares held by top ten shareholders over total shares (%). (4) life insurance shares: the rate of the shares held by life insurance companies at top ten shareholders over total shares (%)
Sources:
Financial statements prepared by Nikkei Needs, and Nomura Research.
Survey on Dividends, Survey on Shareholders, Survey on Firm Groups.
21,500,700.00 111.12 75.91 9.22
Table 5.2 Summary statistics (1981±85) *Dependent Variable: Per capita after-tax Total 20 Banks average after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
3.35 9,081.68 27,814.75 65,377.16 13,630,700.00 71.53 27.38 9.37
standard error 2.57 5,594.31 21,684.87 41,739.62 9,373,970.00 13.47 8.88 5.43
minimum 0.58 1,664.00 1,423.00 11,620.00 706,720.00 41.09 16.99 0.00
maximum 10.01 22,850.00 81,855.00 164,869.00 36,369,400.00 90.79 63.12 19.94
City Banks average after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
2.71 13,732.86 39,216.78 99,917.18 19,352,800.00 74.11 26.29 13.09
standard error 1.29 4,097.45 22,879.87 30,692.41 8,629,130.00 8.21 2.83 4.21
minimum 0.99 6,513.00 8,638.00 43,491.00 5,313,683.00 58.40 19.99 2.14
maximum 5.96 22,850.00 81,855.00 164,869.00 36,369,400.00 84.83 30.75 19.94 99
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics (1981±85) (continued ) Long-term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks
after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
4.00 4,430.50 16,412.72 30,837.14 7,908,620.00 68.94 28.47 5.65
standard error 3.29 1,514.04 12,698.69 11,966.72 6,021,030.00 16.89 12.20 3.71
minimum 0.58 1,664.00 1,423.00 11,620.00 706,720.00 41.09 16.99 0.00
maximum 10.01 6,528.00 49,067.00 49,781.00 24,767,700.00 90.79 63.12 13.98
Trust Banks average after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
2.00 4,835.54 10,743.49 32,835.23 4,761,290.00 78.74 32.02 4.26
standard error 1.30 1,384.01 8,357.90 11,482.21 2,796,110.00 8.91 12.99 2.74
minimum 0.58 2,152.00 1,423.00 12,310.00 706,720.00 56.99 21.51 0.00
Notes: (1) labour share: [(wages + non-wages)/(after-tax pro®t + wages + non-wages)] 100. (2) top ten shares: the rate of the shares held by top ten shareholders over total shares (%). (3) life insurance shares: the rate of the shares held by life insurance companies at top ten shareholders over total shares (%).
Sources:
Financial statements prepared by Nikkei Needs, and Nomura Research.
Survey on Dividends, Survey on Shareholders, Survey on Firm Groups.
maximum 5.60 6,528.00 34,021.00 49,781.00 10,062,600.00 90.79 63.12 9.22
100
average
Table 5.3 Summary statistics (1986±90) *Dependent Variable: Per capita after-tax Pro®t Total 20 Banks
after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
average
standard error
7.80 8,645.16 64,689.68 79,149.74 25,597,800.00 57.00 25.43 9.50
4.38 5,020.23 46,183.59 48,655.09 18,297,600.00 12.86 5.64 5.21
average
standard error
6.31 12,593.08 85,984.74 116,202.02 36,160,500.00 61.04 25.45 13.18
2.84 4,065.78 53,134.67 41,630.86 18,466,600.00 10.22 2.76 4.11
minimum 1.74 2,092.00 3,665.00 16,596.00 1,552,029.00 29.71 17.16 1.64
maximum 20.29 22,919.00 198,314.00 238,136.00 66,590,800.00 83.60 50.16 19.94
City Banks
after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
minimum 2.18 6,282.00 13,780.00 49,727.00 9,034,756.00 41.66 20.36 2.59
maximum 12.37 22,919.00 198,314.00 238,136.00 66,590,800.00 78.30 30.17 19.94 101
Table 5.3 Summary statistics (1986±90) (continued )
after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
average
standard error
9.29 4,697.24 43,394.62 42,097.46 15,035,200.00 52.96 25.41 5.82
5.11 1,606.48 23,677.31 15,749.34 10,379,100.00 14.02 7.52 3.21
average
standard error
minimum 1.74 2,092.00 3,665.00 16,596.00 1,552,029.00 29.71 17.16 1.64
maximum 20.29 7,451.00 93,520.00 68,453.00 43,602,700.00 83.60 50.16 13.50
Trust Banks
after-tax pro®t (one million yen)/ number of employees number of employees after-tax pro®t (one million yen) wages and non-wage payments (one million yen) total asset (one million yen) labour share (%) top ten shares (%) life insurance shares (%)
6.62 5,182.94 38,094.37 44,622.69 10,158,000.00 58.76 27.73 4.61
3.10 1,519.74 22,681.01 15,451.65 5,757,660.00 12.58 7.81 2.06
minimum 1.74 2,110.00 3,665.00 16,596.00 1,552,029.00 43.20 20.75 1.64
Notes: (1) labour share: [(wages + non-wages)/(after-tax pro®t + wages + non-wages)] 100. (2) top ten shares: the rate of the shares held by top ten shareholders over total shares (%). (3) life insurance shares: the rate of the shares held by life insurance companies at top ten shareholders over total shares (%).
Sources:
Financial statements prepared by Nikkei Needs, and Nomura Research. Survey on Dividends,
Survey on Shareholders, Survey on Firm Groups.
maximum 12.33 7,451.00 77,556.00 66,453.00 21,500,700.00 83.60 50.16 9.23
102
Long-term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 103
implying that ef®ciency in management decreases as the distribution to employees increases. The overall result in Table 5.4 suggests the following conclusions. The shareholders' governance for banks, in particular city banks, was ineffective from 1988 to 1995 because we observed the following: the higher the ratio of intercorporate shareholding, the lower the ef®ciency in management. The similar proposition is possible for life insurance companies' shareholding. Life insurance companies did not govern banks effectively. Another interesting result is that no positive in¯uence on productivity is observed as the total asset value of a bank increases. We observe even a decrease in productivity, implying that a bigger bank is not necessarily ef®cient in management. An exception is trust banks which show a small positive correlation between total asset and productivity. Finally, the negative coef®cient of labour shares signi®es that the wage payment does not correspond to productivity. It is likely to suggest that banks collude with their employees in the determination of wages, and the ef®ciency wage hypothesis is not supported in the banking industry. Table 5.5 shows the result for the period of 1981±85 where per capita after-tax pro®t was used as the dependent variable. The bottom line in this table includes the labour share variable as an additional explanatory variable. We ®nd that both top ten shares and life insurance shares are statistically signi®cant for city banks in the case in which the labour share variable is added. Although many coef®cients of the number of employees are negative with statistical signi®cance, the majority of total asset are statistically signi®cant and positive. All the labour shares' coef®cient are statistically signi®cant and negative. From Table 5.5 we can conclude that the governance capability of shareholders was effective for city banks from 1981 to 1985: the higher the rate of intercorporate shareholding, the higher the ef®ciency of city banks, management. The life insurance companies' governance capability for city banks was also effective, although it was weaker. No governance capability of shareholders, however, was observed for long-term credit banks and trust banks. Unlike the result in Table 5.4, there was a positive relationship between productivity and total asset value for all types of banks. The coef®cients, however, of the labour share variable were negative as in Table 5.4. Table 5.6 shows the result for the period from 1986 to 1990, where the dependent variable is measured by per capita after-tax pro®t. We can observe the following results based on Table 5.6.
Table 5.4
The structure of shareholdings for banks and management ef®ciency (1988±95) Total 20 Banks
life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset) Adjusted R-squared
3.01** (2.01) 5.49** (2.42) �3.70** (�2.55)
�12.60*** (�4.13) 2.47*** (3.70) �2.01*** (�4.20)
0.30
0.61
Total 20 Banks labour share top ten shares life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset) Adjusted R-squared
�1.90*** (�6.61) 1.92** (2.29)
�19.80*** (�3.36) �0.74 (�1.12) �0.98*** (�2.98)
�13.53*** (�3.25) 1.07*** (3.41) �1.15*** (�3.84)
0.58
0.65
2.93** (2.15) �1.85** (�2.08)
�6.12*** (�4.24) 0.82** (2.42) �0.61** (�2.47)
0.90
0.92
�2.41*** (�12.57) �5.96** (�2.06) �0.53 (�1.57) 0.10 (0.48) 0.89
�2.29 (�0.68) �0.24 (�0.30) 0.64
�2.34*** (�12.71) �3.46 (�1.52) 0.04 (0.23) 0.03 (0.14) 0.91
�2.60*** (�6.29) 2.39 (1.64) 5.03 (1.44) �1.19 (�1.60) 0.75
�2.90*** (�2.91)
�15.35** (�2.43) 3.44* (1.71) �1.49*** (�2.68)
�7.43*** (�3.26) 1.32* (1.91)
0.61
0.67
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks
�2.06*** (�16.10)
�0.80 (�0.57)
Trust Banks 104
top ten shares
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks
10.65 (1.37) �4.31 (�1.92) 0.50 (0.73) 0.73
Trust Banks �2.19*** (�13.64) �8.89*** (�3.29) 1.74** (2.04) �0.60** (�2.51) 0.92
�0.55 (�0.38) �2.13 (�0.77) �5.69 (�0.89) 0.95 (0.64) 0.78
Dependent Variable: Per capita Value-added.
Fixed Model and Instrumental Variable Method.
Figures in parentheses are the ratio of the coef®cient over the standard errors: *** signi®cant at 1% level ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level.
�2.00*** (�6.16) �7.31 (�1.35) 1.25 (0.79) �0.68 (�1.60) 0.89
Table 5.5 The structure of shareholdings for banks and management ef®ciency (1981±85) Total 20 Banks top ten shares life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset) Adjusted R-squared
�0.61 (�0.23) �1.49 (�1.32) 1.00*** (10.91) 0.96
102.08 (0.29) 22.89 (0.27) 1.43 (0.96) 0.02
Total 20 Banks labour share top ten shares life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset)
9.50 (1.61) �7.21** (�2.70) �0.75 (�0.96)
�1.62 (�0.22) �7.11** (�2.29) �0.51 (�0.63)
�1.40 (�1.16) 0.96*** (8.19)
0.90
0.89
0.96
�1.22*** (�3.81) 0.44*** (14.02)
�0.15 (�0.05) �1.44* (�1.99) 0.45*** (8.61)
0.99
0.99
�4.63*** (�18.90) 2.55** (2.22) �0.92 (�1.59) 0.37** (2.45) 0.99
�132.53 (�1.40) 5.16 (0.93) 0.96*** (4.09) 0.84
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks �4.11*** (�9.75)
�4.03 (�0.907)
Trust Banks
�4.87*** (�18.11) 2.78* (1.83) 0.05 (0.07) 0.59*** (3.35) 0.99
�4.36*** (�18.13) 1.13 (1.06)
�0.93 (�0.20)
�425.96 (�1.39) �1.05 9.06 (0.64) (1.15) 1.07*** 1.21*** (7.94) (4.74) 0.96
0.68
Trust Banks �4.35*** (�17.70)
�0.85*** (�2.74) 0.43*** (9.23)
�0.84 (�0.12) �0.74* (�1.78) 0.42*** (9.13)
0.99
0.99
�4.50*** �4.48*** (�19.66) (�18.41) 0.81 (0.73) 15.83 (0.52) �1.29*** �1.60** (�3.47) (�2.17) 0.40*** 0.39*** (8.48) (7.86) 0.99
Dependent Variable: Per capita After-tax Pro®t.
Fixed Model and Instrumental Variable Method.
Figures in parentheses are the ratio of the coef®cient over the standard errors: *** signi®cant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level.
0.99
105
Adjusted R-squared
�4.26*** (�18.24) 1.36 (1.66)
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks
Table 5.6
The structure of shareholdings for banks and management ef®ciency (1986±90)
top ten shares life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset) Adjusted R-squared
�1.27 (�0.47)
top ten shares life insurance shares log (employees) log (asset) Adjusted R-squared
0.46 (0.07)
�1.28* (�1.74) 0.48*** (2.98)
�4.58 (�0.85) �0.93 (�1.65) 0.40** (2.11)
�1.25** (�2.27) 0.71** (2.21)
�0.03 (�0.00) �1.28*** (�3.33) 0.69*** (3.08)
0.90
0.89
0.82
0.82
Total 20 Banks labour share
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks
�3.77*** (�23.49) 1.31* (1.71) �0.30 (�1.36) 0.45*** (10.49)
2.27 (1.56) �0.61*** (�3.81) 0.48*** (9.44)
0.99
0.99
�3.93*** (�33.55) 2.26** (2.12)
�3.03 (�0.97) 0.58 (1.01) 0.92
�4.43 (�0.52) �1.33 (�0.64) 0.29 (0.64) 0.92
Long-term Credit and Trust Banks
City Banks
�3.64*** (�25.80)
�2.42 (�0.75)
Trust Banks
�3.86*** (�34.67)
�0.21** (�2.06) 0.47*** (9.12)
2.60** (2.26) �0.40*** (�5.54) 0.43*** (11.52)
0.99
0.99
�3.49*** (�11.73) 0.32 (0.26)
�2.61 (�0.97) �1.68 (�0.54) 0.06 (0.08) 0.90
106
Total 20 Banks
�8.68 (�0.91) 0.86 (0.29) �0.53 (�0.64) 0.89
Trust Banks �3.45*** (�13.29)
�1.23 (�1.03) 0.59*** (2.91)
0.78 (0.24) �1.46* (�1.84) 0.62*** (3.71)
0.99
0.99
�3.44*** �3.49*** (�14.99) (�17.76) �0.43 (�0.55) �1.05 (�0.45) �0.64 �0.26 (�0.72) (�0.37) 0.28 0.20 (1.40) (1.08) 0.99
Dependent Variable: Per capita After-tax Pro®t.
Fixed Model and Instrumental Variable Method.
Figures in parentheses are the ratio of the coef®cient over the standard errors: *** signi®cant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level.
0.99
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 107
The coef®cients of both top ten shares and life insurance shares are statistically signi®cant and negative for city banks in the case in which the labour share variable is added. The effect of the number of employees is all negative for city banks, and it is also negative largely for other types of banks. The effect of total asset values is positive for both total twenty banks and city banks. This is true also for long-term credit banks and trust banks in the case in which the labour share variable is added. Finally, all the samples show the negative coef®cients for the labour share variables. The results in Table 5.6 enable us to propose the following conclusions. The governance capability of both shareholders and life insurance companies for city banks was effective from 1986 to 1990. It was not, however, effective for long-term credit banks and trust banks. The positive effect of total asset values on productivity can be explained by the speci®c feature of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. The similar result, i.e., the negative coef®cient of the labour share variable, was obtained also for this period as the results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 showed. It should be useful to summarise and discuss the overall conclusions on the basis of Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 One interesting observation is that the higher the degree of intercorporate shareholding in the 1990s, the lower the ef®ciency in management in the banking industry, although the positive effect was observed in the 1980s. One reason for this shift of shareholders' governancing role may be summarised as follows. The problem of bad debts and long-run recessions after the bubble economy in the 1990s changed the course of the corporate governance system in the banking industry, or invalidated the traditional intercorporate governance system which worked relatively well in the 1980s. An alternative interpretation may run as follows: although the traditional governance role which was expected from shareholders did not work well even in the 1980s, it raised the internal governance capability. `Internal' here means both managers who climbed to the top by internal promotion ladder, and employees who are potential future managers. Both managers and employees worked hard to raise productivity of their ®rm (i.e., bank) because it was not necessary for them to worry about the intervention of shareholders who would be sometimes interested only in the short-run dividends motive. In other words, shareholders were largely silent, and the notion of labour managed ®rms was relevant in the 1980s. See, for example, Tachibanaki (1998b) about the interpretations of these results. The similar argument is possible for the role of life insurance companies. They were marginally effective in the 1980s as shareholders because life insurance companies could enjoy high monetary returns to
108 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
shareholding due to the increase in the stock price in the 1980s. It was not necessary for them to express their voice to the company whose shares are held by them because the amount of capital gains due to stockholding was large. Since life insurance companies were quiet as shareholders, managers in other ®rms were able to manage their own ®rms without worrying about shareholders' (i.e., life insurance companies's) intervention. This is the role of corporate governance performed by life insurance companies. The above mechanism could not work in the 1990s because the stock price started to decline considerably. Life insurance companies were expected to play an important role in the 1990s as institutional shareholders who govern and express their opinion to ®rms whose shares are held by them. They, however, were unable to do so, or did not have a strong intention to control ®rms for the following reasons. First, they were not accustomed to act as an active shareholder like other shareholders in Japan. Second, intercorporate shareholding implicitly assumed that shareholders who are managers of the ®rm and at the same time who hold shares of their counter-part were quiet and silent about management of their counter-part. Third, life insurance companies did not have a strong incentive as being an active governance agency for corporated ®rms because they do not issue their stocks. They are mutual companies rather than stock companies. In other words, since life insurance companies are mutual companies, they are not controlled or governed ef®ciently by anybody. Put simply, their performance in management was not so ef®cient in general. It is desirable that life insurance companies are concerned more seriously with the management of other companies. A similar statement can be addressed to life insurance holders who should be concerned with the management in their life insurance company. Finally, it is important to point out one institutional background which governed the whole structure of the ®nancial industry in Japan. That is the heavy regulation on the industry by the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. This heavy regulation, which does not encourage severe competition, protected the industry strongly, and thus produced a fairly large amount of regulatory rents. See, for example, Tachibanaki (1996) on the effect of the regulation on the ®nancial industry. The lack of severe competition in the ®nancial industry and the extra rents enjoyed by the industry led many banks and life insurance companies to be less interested in increasing their productivity. Thus, they did not commit to strong control and governance activity for other ®rms. The relationship between total asset value and management ef®ciency is interesting because it was positive in the 1980s, while it was negative in
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 109
the 1990s. The heavy regulation on the ®nancial industry in the 1980s is responsible for the former positive relationship, because a larger total asset value of a bank can help this relationship. A large amount of bad debts, however, which were accumulated by a bank whose total asset value is large in the 1990s, is responsible for the latter negative relationship, since such a bank committed to the excessive lending activity during the bubble economy in the late 1980s. It is desirable for banks to have a better risk management policy. The negative coef®cient of the labour share variable can be interpreted in different ways. Incidentally, these different interpretations can provide us with a clue to understand the Japanese way of corporate ®nance and/or corporate governance. First, the marginal productivity principle in the determination of wages is not supported in the ®nancial industry. Somewhat related to this point, it is possible to propose that the ef®ciency wage hypothesis, which postulates that higher productivity or the hard work of employees is expected by higher wage payments, does not work. Second, as pointed out earlier, there has been a heavy regulation on the ®nancial industry. This regulation is responsible for the excessive wage payments to employees in banks. The lack of competition, moreover, has not encouraged banks to take an aggressive business activity in the ®eld of new ®nancial services and new business innovation, and to be conscious with cost minimisation. These observations imply the negative effect of labour shares on productivity. There are a plenty of documents which describe that productivity in the Japanese banking industry is much inferior to that in the US banking industry. Third, it is possible to guess that the rate of return to capital (i.e., equity) is lower because of the high monetary rewards to employees. This possible low rate of return to capital does not give a strong motivation of monitoring or governing the management of a bank severely to capital holders. The low incentive and thus the lack of governance of capital holders is likely to lower productivity of a bank. The above mechanism is intensi®ed by the Japanese characteristic of intercorporate shareholding in general. Intercorporate shareholding implicitly assumes quiet and silent shareholders regarding the management of a ®rm. While in the case of the manufacturing industry it worked positively and favourably to raise productivity, it worked negatively in the case of the ®nancial industry. The distinction appears due largely to severe competition in the former and heavy regulation in the latter.
110 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
4 4.1
The cost of capital at banks Motivation
The purpose of this part is to estimate the cost of equity capital at major banks, and presents our interpretation of the monitoring activity and the performance of each bank based on the estimated cost of capital. It would be interesting to compare the estimated result for the ®nancial industries and the one for non-®nancial industries which was estimated by Ando and Auerbach (1988a, 1988b, 1990), One important feature of this exercise is to take into account the effect of intercorporate shareholding in view of the fact that intercorporate shareholding provides us with some underestimation of the cost of capital. In other words, we attempt to adjust for a bias caused by intercorporate shareholding. The above task is important because the unadjusted cost of capital may misguide the manager to commit to overinvestment, and is likely to lead the ®rm to inef®cient management. Therefore, we are going to estimate the cost of capital for each individual bank whose shares are held by other ®rms, and assess each bank's performance based on the adjusted cost of capital. We employ two methods for the adjustment. It is necessary to explain the reason why we do not take into consideration the role of debt. Since a bank collects ®nancial funds from the two sources, broadly speaking, debt (i.e., deposits and other forms of debt) and equity, debt can be included in addition to equity. The cost of capital is normally calculated based on debt, equity and sometimes retained earnings for non-®nancial ®rms. Since debt for ®nancial ®rms is different from debt for non-®nancial ®rms, it is risky to treat it for the former in the same way as for the latter. Thus, we ignore debt to calculate the cost of capital for ®nancial ®rms. 4.2
Estimation methods
We estimate the cost of capital for 10 city banks, three long-term credit banks, and seven trust banks. The estimation period is from 1988 to 1994. Intercorporate shareholding overevaluates the price-earnings ratio, and thus underevaluates the cost of capital according to current accounting rule, as Kobayashi (1990), Kurasawa, Taki and Okazaki (1992), Yonezawa (1995) pointed out. It is important to treat the pro®t and its evaluation in the equity market correctly. Moreover, we have to apply the ex ante, or expected rate of return to equity to calculate the cost of capital. The data, however, are available only on the basis of the ex post sense. We have to take into account this fact.
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 111
There are several methods for calculating the cost of capital such as the rate of return to equity method, the discounted dividends method, the inverse of the price-earnings ratio, etc. We use the method based on the price-earnings ratio, and the price-cash ¯ow ratio. The inverse of the estimated value can be regarded as the cost of capital. The calculation method is explained here with considerable depth. One important element of intercorporate shareholding is that the amount of dividends which are received from the counter-part of intercorporate shareholding is included in the pro®t of the ®rm, while the amount of capital gains is not included. In other words, the share price of the ®rm can be re¯ected by the amount of retained earnings of the counter-part through the increase in the share price of the counter-part. However, the amount of retained earnings of the counter-part is not included in the pro®t of the ®rm. Equation (3) is used to adjust for intercorporate shareholding in the entire equity market. It is not, however, legitimate to apply equation (3) for an individual ®rm's equity market where the propensity to dividends payout differs from ®rm to ®rm. Kurasawa, Taki and Okazaki (1992) proposed a relevant method for an each individual ®rm in the case in which the equity market is rational and perfect, and thus the determination of equity price is ef®cient. The adjusted PER is in¯uenced by both the rate of shareholding and the propensity to dividends payout in the following way:
The adjusted PER
Unadjusted PER
1 � =
1 � d
3
where is the rate of shareholding and d is the propensity to dividends payout. Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 present the unadjusted PER (A1 and B1), and the adjusted PER (A2 and B2). `A' signi®es that the sum of after-tax pro®ts and depreciations is used as the index of pro®ts, while `B' signi®es that only after-tax pro®ts is used as the index of pro®ts. Each table shows the percentage value of the inverse of the PCFR and the PER, respectively. The numerical rate of intercorporate shareholding from 1988 to 1992 is available in Takano (1993), and its extension to 1994 was calculated by us by using the Survey on Distribution on Shareholder published by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Suppose we consider two ®rms (®rm 1 and ®rm 2) which hold the other ®rm's shares each other. The observed pro®t (E1 *, E2 *) and equity price (P1 *, P2 *) are given by the following formulations, E1 E1 d2 2 E2 P1 P1 2 P2
E2 E2 d1 1 E1 P2 P2 1 P1
4
112
Table 5.7 Equity cost of capital (city banks) Daiichi-kangyo year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.095 2.448 1.722 1.543 1.256 0.906 1.015
3.224 3.734 2.543 2.184 1.605 1.113 1.133
1.128 1.286 0.821 0.641 0.349 0.207 0.118
year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.206 2.091 2.080 3.546 1.928 1.767 1.707
3.393 3.189 3.071 5.019 2.464 2.171 1.906
1.188 1.098 0.991 1.473 0.536 0.404 0.199
4.837 7.945 3.833 2.644 1.797 1.087 1.223
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
(B3±B1)
1.899 2.104 1.354 1.283 0.950 0.581 0.591
2.921 3.209 2.000 1.816 1.214 0.713 0.659
1.022 1.105 0.645 0.533 0.264 0.133 0.069
4.303 6.589 2.687 1.860 0.873 ± ±
2.404 4.485 1.333 0.577 �0.077 ± ±
(A3±A1)
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
(B3±B1)
25.006 11.257 26.867 ± ± ± ±
1.868 1.602 1.447 2.449 1.038 0.855 0.696
2.873 2.443 2.137 3.467 1.326 1.051 0.777
1.006 0.841 0.689 1.018 0.288 0.195 0.081
(A3±A1) 2.742 5.497 2.111 1.101 0.541 0.181 0.208
Sakura
27.212 13.348 28.947 ± ± ± ±
21.791 9.101 15.775 ± ± ± ±
19.923 7.499 14.328 ± ± ± ±
Table 5.7
Equity cost of capital (city banks) (continued )
Fuji year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.078 2.058 2.067 1.311 1.405 1.189 1.510
3.197 3.139 3.051 1.855 1.795 1.461 1.686
1.119 1.081 0.985 0.545 0.390 0.272 0.176
4.151 3.905 4.081 1.717 2.008 1.683 2.201
(A3±A1) 2.073 1.847 2.014 0.406 0.603 0.494 0.691
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
1.857 1.730 1.583 0.544 0.556 0.427 0.641
2.857 2.639 2.337 0.770 0.710 0.525 0.715
1.000 0.909 0.754 0.226 0.154 0.098 0.075
3.603 3.063 2.839 ± ± ± ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
(B3±B1)
2.016 2.086 1.336 1.505 0.693 0.375 0.607
3.101 3.181 1.972 2.130 0.886 0.461 0.678
1.085 1.096 0.636 0.625 0.193 0.086 0.071
4.797 6.019 2.574 2.362 0.391 ± 0.165
2.781 3.933 1.238 0.858 �0.302 ± �0.442
(B3±B1) 1.746 1.333 1.256 ± ± ± ±
Tokyo-Mitsubishi year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.339 2.500 1.812 2.191 1.305 0.966 1.333
3.598 3.813 2.675 3.101 1.668 1.187 1.488
1.259 1.313 0.863 0.910 0.363 0.221 0.155
5.717 7.503 3.959 4.183 1.663 1.082 1.979
(A3±A1) 3.379 5.003 2.147 1.992 0.358 0.116 0.646
113
114
Table 5.7 Equity cost of capital (city banks) (continued ) Asahi year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
(A3±A1)
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
(B3±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
3.022 2.622 2.775 3.091 2.203 2.139 2.095
4.649 4.000 4.097 4.375 2.816 2.628 2.339
1.627 1.377 1.322 1.284 0.612 0.488 0.244
± ± ± ± 11.326 75.829 9.481
2.417 1.977 1.982 1.736 0.863 0.836 0.810
3.718 3.015 2.926 2.458 1.102 1.026 0.905
1.301 1.038 0.944 0.721 0.240 0.191 0.094
± ± ± ± ± 2.470 0.333
± ± ± ± ± 1.635 �0.478
year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
(A3±A1)
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
(B3±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.425 2.390 2.344 3.124 2.020 1.451 1.574
3.730 3.646 3.461 4.422 2.582 1.782 1.757
1.306 1.256 1.117 1.298 0.561 0.331 0.183
2.162 2.064 1.898 2.306 1.273 0.828 0.764
3.325 3.148 2.801 3.265 1.627 1.017 0.853
1.164 1.084 0.904 0.958 0.354 0.189 0.089
6.428 5.579 4.901 6.646 1.801 0.818 0.455
4.266 3.515 3.003 4.340 0.528 �0.010 �0.309
± ± ± ± 13.529 77.968 11.576
Sanwa
7.376 6.679 6.479 10.201 3.961 2.425 3.052
4.951 4.289 4.135 7.077 1.941 0.974 1.478
Table 5.7 Equity cost of capital (city banks) (continued ) Sumitomo year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.197 2.461 2.241 2.645 0.779 0.990 ±
3.379 3.754 3.309 3.745 0.995 1.216 ±
1.183 1.293 1.068 1.099 0.216 0.226 ±
year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.003 1.932 2.244 3.219 2.263 1.993 2.606
3.082 2.947 3.314 4.556 2.892 2.448 2.909
1.079 187.673 1.015 ± 1.069 ± 1.337 ± 0.629 ± 0.455 ± 0.303 ±
3.490 4.875 4.505 4.549 ± ± ±
(A3±A1) 1.293 2.414 2.264 1.903 ± ± ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
1.962 2.182 1.893 2.069 0.237 0.528 ±
3.019 3.328 2.794 2.929 0.303 0.649 ±
1.057 1.146 0.902 0.860 0.066 0.121 ±
3.039 4.180 3.600 3.058 ± ± ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
1.709 1.575 1.771 2.223 1.203 0.890 1.096
2.630 2.403 2.614 3.147 1.537 1.093 1.224
0.920 150.265 0.827 ± 0.844 ± 0.924 ± 0.334 ± 0.203 ± 0.128 ±
(B3±B1) 1.077 1.998 1.707 0.989 ± ± ±
Daiwa (A3±A1) 185.670 ± ± ± ± ± ±
(B3±B1) 148.556 ± ± ± ± ± ±
115
Equity cost of capital (city banks) (continued )
116
Table 5.7 Tokai year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
(A3±A1)
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
Cost of (B2±B1) Capital B3
(B3±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1.689 2.061 2.198 2.000 2.054 1.852 1.819
2.598 3.143 3.245 2.832 2.624 2.275 2.030
0.909 1.082 1.047 0.831 0.571 0.423 0.212
4.833 ± 41.841 ± ± ± ±
1.329 1.552 1.636 0.882 0.979 0.913 0.976
2.045 2.367 2.415 1.249 1.251 1.121 1.089
0.716 0.815 0.779 0.367 0.272 0.208 0.114
3.105 ± 24.628 ± ± ± ±
6.521 ± 44.039 ± ± ± ±
4.434 ± 26.264 ± ± ± ±
Hokkaido-Takushoku year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A3
(A3±A1)
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
Cost of (B2±B1) Capital B3
(B3±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.616 2.120 3.204 4.620 3.138 2.746 4.334
4.025 3.234 4.731 6.539 4.010 3.373 4.838
1.409 1.114 1.526 1.920 0.872 0.627 0.504
± 91.480 ± ± ± ± ±
1.896 1.479 2.121 3.065 1.592 0.964 1.827
2.917 2.256 3.132 4.338 2.035 1.184 2.040
1.021 0.777 1.011 1.273 0.442 0.220 0.213
± 53.772 ± ± ± ± ±
± 93.600 ± ± ± ± ±
± 55.251 ± ± ± ± ±
Table 5.7
Equity cost of capital (city banks) (continued )
Notes: (1) Figures are percentages. (2) The method for calculation is explained in the main text. (3) The degree of intercorporate shareholding and the propensity to dividends payout are as follows in. year intercorporate shareholding propensity to dividends payout degree of adjustment
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
42.83
42.06
40.60
40.15
39.92
40.37
40.50
28.13
27.64
30.30
38.06
58.18
66.27
82.91
53.84
52.52
47.64
41.55
27.79
22.84
11.63
(4) The degree of adjustment is calculated by equation (4.1) in the main text.
Sources: Financial Statements prepared by Nikkei Needs, and Nomura Research Institute, and the same as in
Table 5.1±5.6.
117
118 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance Table 5.8 Equity cost of capital (trust banks) Mitsui Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.772 3.201 2.445 2.432 2.167 1.481 1.667
4.265 4.883 3.610 3.443 2.769 1.820 1.861
2.542 2.854 1.995 1.766 1.151 0.878 1.061
3.911 4.354 2.946 2.500 1.470 1.078 1.185
1.369 1.499 0.951 0.734 0.320 0.200 0.123
1.493 1.682 1.165 1.011 0.602 0.338 0.194
Mitsubishi Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.389 3.414 2.608 3.243 2.320 1.495 1.423
3.675 5.208 3.851 4.590 2.965 1.836 1.589
2.171 2.916 2.052 2.010 1.165 0.780 0.749
3.340 4.448 3.030 2.846 1.488 0.959 0.836
1.169 1.532 0.978 0.835 0.324 0.178 0.087
1.286 1.793 1.243 1.347 0.645 0.341 0.166
Yasuda Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
3.160 3.090 2.400 2.874 1.943 1.680 2.038
4.862 4.714 3.544 4.069 2.483 2.064 2.275
2.833 2.682 1.928 2.083 1.061 1.037 1.322
4.358 4.090 2.846 2.949 1.356 1.274 1.476
1.525 1.409 0.918 0.866 0.295 0.237 0.154
1.702 1.623 1.144 1.194 0.540 0.384 0.237
Toyo Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.939 2.945 2.090 2.845 1.917 1.538 1.854
4.522 4.492 3.086 4.028 2.450 1.889 2.070
2.728 2.617 1.678 1.863 0.992 0.852 1.125
4.198 3.992 2.477 2.638 1.268 1.046 1.256
1.469 1.375 0.799 0.774 0.276 0.194 0.131
1.583 1.547 0.996 1.182 0.533 0.351 0.216
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 119 Table 5.8 Equity cost of capital (trust banks) (continued ) Chuo Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(Unlisted) 2.566 2.329 1.760 1.660 1.663 1.800
(Unlisted) 3.913 3.438 2.491 2.122 2.043 2.009
(Unlisted) 2.239 1.803 1.218 0.935 0.937 1.007
(Unlisted) 3.415 2.662 1.725 1.195 1.151 1.124
1.348 1.110 0.731 0.461 0.380 0.209
(B2±B1)
1.176 0.859 0.506 0.260 0.214 0.117
Nihon Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1.610 1.416 3.176 4.264 4.266 4.050 ±
2.476 2.159 4.689 6.036 5.451 4.975 ±
1.417 1.143 2.078 1.911 1.560 1.584 ±
2.179 1.744 3.069 2.705 1.993 1.945 ±
0.763 0.601 0.990 0.794 0.433 0.362 ±
0.867 0.744 1.513 1.772 1.185 0.925 ±
Sumitomo Trust year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of (A2±A1) Capital A2
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
2.464 3.276 3.129 3.391 2.761 1.566 1.697
3.791 4.996 4.620 4.800 3.528 1.924 1.894
2.244 2.797 2.462 2.381 1.550 0.751 0.859
3.453 4.266 3.635 3.370 1.981 0.922 0.959
1.208 1.469 1.173 0.989 0.431 0.171 0.100
1.327 1.721 1.491 1.409 0.767 0.358 0.197
where Ei (i = 1, 2) is the pro®t in the case in which there is no intercorporate shareholding, i is the rate of i-th ®rm's shares which are held by the other ®rm, di is the propensity to dividends payout, and Pi is the equity price in the case in which there is no intercorporate shareholding. The above formulations imply that the part of pro®t of the other ®rm, i.e., the rate multiplied by di * i , is added to the pro®t of the ®rm, while
120
Table 5.9 Equity cost of capital (long-term credit banks) Industrial Bank of Japan year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
(A2±A1) Cost of Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1.025 1.023 1.017 1.453 0.699 0.554 0.648
1.577 1.560 1.501 2.057 0.894 0.680 0.724
0.552 0.537 0.484 0.604 0.194 0.127 0.075
2.077 1.869 1.311 2.540 ± 0.058 ±
(A3±A1) 1.052 0.846 0.295 1.087 ± �0.496 ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
0.954 0.942 0.934 1.307 0.537 0.407 0.474
1.467 1.438 1.380 1.850 0.686 0.500 0.530
0.514 0.495 0.445 0.543 0.149 0.093 0.055
1.853 1.621 1.102 1.944 ± ± ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
Cost of Capital B3
1.564 1.440 1.571 2.380 1.231 1.170 1.111
2.405 2.197 2.319 3.370 1.573 1.437 1.241
0.842 0.757 0.748 0.989 0.342 0.267 0.129
(B3±B1) 0.900 0.678 0.168 0.637 ± ± ±
Long-term Credit Bank of Japan year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
(A2±A1) Cost of Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1.614 1.508 1.655 2.543 1.506 1.378 1.432
2.484 2.300 2.443 3.600 1.924 1.692 1.599
0.869 0.792 0.788 1.057 0.418 0.315 0.167
± 78.937 73.696 ± 0.762 0.819 5.420
(A3±A1) ± 77.430 72.042 ± �0.744 �0.559 3.988
± 72.585 65.778 ± 1.454 1.268 6.115
(B3±B1) ± 71.144 64.207 ± 0.223 0.098 5.004
Table 5.9
Equity cost of capital (long-term credit banks) (continued )
Japan Bond and Credit Bank year
Cost of Capital A1
Cost of Capital A2
(A2±A1) Cost of Capital A3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1.704 1.301 1.751 2.467 1.812 1.826 2.240
2.621 1.985 2.586 3.492 2.316 2.243 2.500
0.917 0.684 0.834 1.025 0.504 0.417 0.261
± 4.620 23.162 ± ± 0.245 ±
(A3±A1) ± 3.318 21.411 ± ± �1.581 ±
Cost of Capital B1
Cost of Capital B2
(B2±B1)
1.596 1.210 1.608 2.232 1.403 1.351 1.529
2.455 1.846 2.374 3.160 1.793 1.660 1.707
0.859 0.636 0.766 0.928 0.390 0.309 0.178
Cost of Capital B3 ± 4.117 19.745 ± 0.634 1.037 0.184
(B3±B1) ± 2.907 18.137 ± �0.769 �0.314 �1.345
121
122 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
the equity price of the ®rm is added only by the rate of corporate shareholding. There are two approaches in order to adjust for the in¯uence of intercorporate shareholding; the ®rst is to presume that all pro®ts are distributed as dividends, and the second is to consider the case in which there is no intercorporate shareholding. We take the second approach. The price-earnings ratio at the second approach is written as follows: P1 = E1
P1 � 2 P2 =
E1 � d2 2 E2
5
When we consider more than three ®rms, the adjusted PER is written as follows: PER
P � i Pi =
E � Di
6
where P* is the current share value of the ®rm, i * Pi is the current share value of equities which the ®rm holds, E* is the accounting pro®t of the ®rm, and Di is the dividends received. The most dif®cult task is to estimate i * Pi accurately because their values for a bank were not published of®cially, but only its accrued capital gains of holding equities. We used the sum of the latter and the book value of holding stocks as a substitute for the current value of holding stocks. One de®ciency of this method is that the accrued capital gains contain not only ones for equity but also for corporate bond. In view of the fact that the share of corporate bonds in the Japanese ®rms is small the bias due to this method is not large. We present two cases, namely PCFR where E* is given by sum of aftertax pro®t and depreciations, and PER where E* is given only by after-tax pro®t. The cost of capital is obtained by taking the inverse of PCFR and PER, respectively. It is called A3 and B3, respectively. It is noted that the numerator in equation (6) turned out being negative in several cases. In such a case no numerical value is written (i.e., blank). Unfortunately, nearly all trust banks gave negative values. Thus, the result for them has been eliminated. 4.3
Estimated results
Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the estimated results on the cost of capital, and Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 are their graphic representation for A1. The unadjusted costs of capital give the values about 2.03.0% for city banks in 1988. Although they increased somewhat right-after the bubble economy, say in 1991, the majority are between 1.52.5% in 1994. The difference in the cost of capital among city banks has expanded since
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 123
1991. The values for trust banks were 2.53.0% except for one in 1988. They declined since 1992, and reached 1.52.0% levels in 1994. Regarding long-term credit banks the difference between Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) and other banks was considerable, and the difference between Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Japan Bond and Credit Bank has been widening since 1992. We examined two methods to adjust for intercorporate shareholding. The ®rst is based on equation (3), and the second is based on equation (6). We compare, ®rst, the unadjusted cost of capital and the adjusted one based on equation (3). It should be noted that the common adjustment is made each year for all banks. The result suggests that the degree of adjustment has declined from 53.84% in 1988 to 11.63% in 1994. This decline re¯ects the gradual decrease in the propensity to dividends payout after 1988 in many ®rms, and equation (3) is able to absorb it. The difference between the unadjusted cost capital and the adjusted one was about 1.0% for city banks, and trust banks in 1988, while it was 0.5%1.0% for long-term credit banks. The difference declined since then, and it is about 0.10.3% for many banks in 1994. A3 and B3 in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, which are calculated based on equation (6), are probably the most desirable ®gures at least in the conceptual sense. It was unfortunate, however, that the empirical results were less impressive because some of the ®gures in numerators and/or denominators were negative, and the estimated costs of capital ¯uctuated considerably. The result for trust banks was particularly bad. There are two main reasons for this. First, the estimation method for current share values is not appropriate. We used the sum of the book share value and the accrued capital gain of all securities to represent the current share values. Since both the average equity price and the general interest rates decreased in the 1990s, the contribution of accrued capital gains in bonds other than stocks increased relatively. Second, many banks had a large amount of bad debts in the 1990s, and some of them committed to cancel these bad debts. This obviously provides banks with negative pro®ts. The reliable result, nevertheless, is available for several city banks such as Daiichi-Kangyo, Fuji, Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Sanwa banks. The empirical result is presented for these banks. It is found that the cost of capital in 1988 was around 47%, and it declined signi®cantly to 1.03.0% in 1994. The difference between the unadjusted cost of capital and the adjusted one in 1988 and 1989 was about 2.02.5% points. Therefore, the degree of underestimation was very large, say between 100 and 200%. In 1993 and 1994 the difference, however, declined to
Equity cost of capital (city banks 1)
124
Figure 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Sumitomo
2.5
Fuji 2.0 Sakura 1.5
Sanwa
1.0 0.5
0
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Figure 5.2
Equity cost of capital (city banks 2)
5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 Daiichi-kangyo 2.5
Asahi Daiwa
2.0 Tokai 1.5
Hokkaido-Takushoku
1.0 0.5
0
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
125
Equity cost of capital (trust banks 1)
126
Figure 5.3 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0
Mitsui Trust 2.5 2.0
Mitsubishi Trust Yasuda Trust
1.5
Sumitomo Trust
1.0 0.5 0
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Figure 5.4
Equity cost of capital (trust banks 2)
5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 Tokyo-Mitsubishi
2.5
Chuo Trust
2.0
Nihon Trust 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
127
Equity cost of capital (long-term credit banks)
128
Figure 5.5
5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 Industrial Bank of Japan Long-term Credit Bank of Japan Japan Boad and Credit Bank
2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 129
0.11.0% points, implying that the degree of underestimation is about 20100%. In some cases the overestimation appeared. The above result suggests the following conclusions. The cost of capital for banks has been in a decreasing trend since 1988. However, the difference among banks has been widening. The principal cause of the declining trend is that after-tax pro®t of each bank decreased signi®cantly due partly to the problem of bad debts in the 1990s. Also, a general background such that the Japanese economy was under a serious recession, and thus the growth rate and the interest rate were low, may be suggested. It is important, however, to recognise that the difference in the performance of each bank was greater in the 1990s than the past. Another important conclusion is that the degree of underestimation caused by intercorporate shareholding has declined signi®cantly since 1988. The degree of underestimation is affected by the following two factors: the rate of intercorporate shareholding, and the propensity for dividend payouts. Since the rate of intercorporate shareholding has been almost constant with a very minor decrease, it is quite likely that the increase in the propensity to dividends payout is responsible for the decrease in the underestimation of the cost of capital. We should not forget, however, the fact that the market force (i.e., the business performance of each bank) differentiated the equity price of each bank considerably, and thus that the difference in the cost of capital is considerably large among banks, sometimes it is more than a double.
5
Concluding remarks
This study investigated the role of shareholders in the determination of banks' corporate governance under the condition that intercorporate shareholding is common in Japan. One important aspect, which cannot be ignored, is that no debt-holders (i.e., individual savers) are interested in governing or monitoring banks' behaviour or management. It would be appropriate to state that individual savers and depositors are unable to monitor banks' activity. Therefore, shareholders of banks' stocks are supposed to be crucial in the governance role. Several important conclusions arise from this study. First, the role of intercorporate shareholding differs from period to period, if we are concerned with the role of a bank. In the 1980s it worked fairly well to raise management ef®ciency. It did not, however, work well in the 1990s after the Japanese economy experienced the bubble economy of the late
130 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance
1980s. We presented several speci®c reasons why such a change in the role of shareholders occurred during the bubble economy. Second, we discussed in detail the peculiar role of life insurance companies which are, probably, the most important institutional shareholders. Life insurance companies played an important role in raising productivity of a bank in some cases, while they did not in other cases. One reason for this mixed outcome stems from the fact that life insurance companies are mutual companies. Third, the relationship between total asset value of a bank and its productivity also differs from time to time. It was positive in the 1980s, and negative in the 1990s. The huge number of bad debts accumulated in the early 1990s, and the heavy regulation on the ®nancial industry (i.e., the lack of competition in the industry) are responsible for this shift in the relationship between total asset and productivity. Fourth, the negative effect of the labour share variable on productivity was observed. We presented several causes to explain it, such as the inappropriateness of the ef®ciency wage hypothesis, the heavy regulation on the industry, the lower rate of return to capital, etc. Fifth, the cost of equity capital for banks has been in a decreasing trend since 1988. We found about 50100% underestimation of the cost of capital in 1988, and 1050% underestimation in 1994. The task of estimation for the cost of capital is dif®cult and complicated. More speci®cally, we require more data to obtain a reliable result under the condition of intercorporate shareholding, and thus hope more disclosure of the data in the ®nancial industry. Sixth, the difference in the cost of capital among banks has been widening. In some cases the difference is over twice between the highest cost of capital and the lowest one. It re¯ects the fact that the difference in management ef®ciency among banks appears to be large. Seventh, the effect of intercorporate shareholding on the cost of capital has been declining since 1988. There are two reasons for this trend. One is a change in the rate of intercorporate shareholding, and the other is a change in the propensity to dividends payment. We found that the latter is largely responsible. There have been no serious studies on such subjects as `Who governs and control a bank?' `Does a bank play an important role as a monitor?' `What is the role of life insurance companies in the governance structure?' We hope that this study sheds light on the understanding of these issues and problems.
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Hideo Okamura 131
References Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1992) `An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting', Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 473±94. Ando, A. and A. Auerbach (1988a) `The Cost of Capital in the United States and Japan: A Comparison', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2, pp. 134±58. Ando, A. and A. Auerbach (1988b) `The Corporate Cost of Capital in Japan and the United States: A Comparison', in J. Shoven (ed.), Government Policy towards Industry in the United States and Japan, Cambridge University Press. Ando, A. and A. Auerbach (1990) `The Cost of Capital in Japan: Recent Evidence and Further Results', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 4, pp. 323±50. Baltagi, B. (1995) Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley and Sons. Berle, A.A. and G.C. Means (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan Press. Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994) The Prudential Regulation of Banks, Bonton, MA: MIT Press. Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hirota, S. and K. Ikeo (1996) `Corporate Finance and Ef®ciency in Management', in H. Ito (ed.) Japan's Firm System, chapter 2, University of Tokyo Press (in Japanese). Hirota, S. (1996) `Japan's Financial and Equity Markets, and Corporate Governance', in T. Tachibanaki and Y. Tsutsui (eds.), Japan's Capital Markets, chapter 10, Nihon-hyoronsha (in Japanese). Horiuchi, A. and K. Shimizu (1997) `An Analysis of the Issue Who Monitors the Monitor: The Impact of Amakudari on Bank Performance', mimeo. Ikeo, K. (1991) `Economics of BIS Rule', Keizai Kenkyu, vol. 42, no. 3 (in Japanese). Ikeo, K. (1994) `Comment on Horiuchi Paper', Bank of Japan: Kinyu Kenkyu, vol. 13, no. 3 (in Japanese). Kobayashi, T. (1990) `Fundamental Value of Stock Price', in K. Nishimura and Y. Miwa (eds.), Japan's Stock and Land Prices, chapter 12, University of Tokyo Press (in Japanese). Kurasawa, T. (1993) `Financial Effect of Intercorporate Shareholding', Nihonkeizai Kenkyu (in Japanese). Kurasawa, T., A. Taki and T. Okazaki (1992) `Cost of Capital in Banks', Bank of Japan: Kinyu Kenkyu, vol. 11, no. 1 (in Japanese). Saito, T. (1997) `Evaluation of Regional Banks in Equity Markets', mimeo (in Japanese). Shimizu, K. and A. Horiuchi (1997) `Safety Net and Stability of Financial Systems in Japan', in K. Asako, S. Fukuda and N. Yoshino (eds.), Modern Macroeconomic Analysis, University of Tokyo Press, pp. 85±122 (in Japanese). Shleifer, A. and W. Vishny (1997) `A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, vol L I I , no. 2, pp. 737±83. Tachibanaki, T. (1996) Public Policies and the Japanese Economy, London: Macmillan. Tachibanaki, T. (1998a) `Capital and Labour in Corporate Governance', in FAIR (eds.), Policy Reforms in Japan, pp. 211±17 (in Japanese). Tachibanaki, T. (ed.) (1998b) Who Runs Japanese Business?, London: Edward Elgar. Tachibanaki, T. and R. Nagakubo (1997) `Intercorporate Shareholding and Firm's Behaviour', Financial Review, Ministry of Finance, October (in Japanese).
132 Governance Structure of Banks and Their Business Performance Takano, M. (1993) `Intercorporate Shareholding in Listed Firms and Determination of Stock Prices', Daiwa Toshi Shiryo, November (in Japanese). Yonezawa, Y. (1995) Economics of Stock Market, Nihonkeizai-shinbunsha (in Japanese). Yonezawa, Y. and M. Miyazaki (1996) `Japan's Corporate Governance and Productivity', in T. Tachibanaki and Y. Tsutsui (eds.), Japan's Capital Markets, chapter 11, Nihon-hyoronsha (in Japanese).
6
A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi
This paper overviews the bank crisis Japan has faced since the early 1990s. Undeniably, the current bank crisis is the aftermath of the ®nancial overexpansion that occurred in the late 1980s. However, this paper focuses on the issues related to managerial governance in the banking sector. We propose a hypothesis that there has existed a vacuum of governance in Japanese bank management in the sense that bank managers have enjoyed wide latitude. This hypothesis of the governance vacuum will explain why the bank crisis has been so serious and so protracted.
1
Introduction
The period of the 1980s and the early 1990s was characterised by the global bank crisis. Not only many industrialised countries such as the United States and Japan, but also most developing countries and the economies transiting from the central planning to the market-oriented system experienced more or less bank crisis. Lindgren et al. (1996) describe `[a] review of the experience since 1980 of the 181 current Fund member countries reveals that 133 have experienced signi®cant banking sector problems at some stage during the past ®fteen years' (p. 20). After aggressively expanding their credit to risky projects like real estate developments, many banks were found trapped in the dif®culty of a large amount of non-performing loans in those countries. The government had to step in to bail out heavily damaged banks by pouring in public money in some cases. It may be a comfort for Japanese people to hear that the bank crisis is not peculiar to Japan.1 However, the Japanese bank crisis seems to be unique to its long duration and seriousness of its bad in¯uence on the 133
134 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management
macroeconomy. Japan has taken half a decade to deal with the bad loan problem in the banking sector without notable success. The bad loan problem has grown so serious as to endanger the viability of the current ®nancial system in the late 1997. We think there are common factors which can explain the banking sector problem in South East Asian countries including Japan. This paper tries to give an answer to the question of why Japan has suffered from so serious a bank crisis from the perspective of corporate governance. We propose a hypothesis that the current bank crisis in Japan has been caused by de®ciency of effective governance in bank management. Needless to say, the bank is a corporation whose management must be disciplined based on effective monitoring in order to keep its managerial ef®ciency. Generally speaking, bank management could be disciplined by three means: (1) the capital markets where either investors (including depositors) would monitor performance of individual banks, or the threat of hostile takeovers would discipline bank managers for their bad performance, (2) the competition in the banking industry which would weed out inef®cient banks, and (3) supervision of the regulatory authorities which would either prevent banks from taking excessive risk, or force managers of distressed banks to restructure their businesses. We explain how these disciplinary mechanisms have not effectively worked in Japan. The de®ciency of effective governance, i.e., a vacuum of managerial governance, has brought forth inef®cient management, and particularly delayed responses to the management restructuring necessitated by the increasing non-performing loans since the beginning of the 1990s. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the current banking crisis in Japan. It is pointed out that there exists the danger of a vicious circle between the decrease in bank capital and business setback. Section 3 examines how the comprehensive safety net implemented by the government undermined the capital market mechanism of disciplining bank management (the disciplinary channel (1)). In Section 4, we argue that the Japanese government has rigidly controlled the deregulation process in the ®nancial markets so that the market competition (the disciplinary channel (2)) was unable to in¯uence bank management. Section 5 investigates the disciplinary
Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi 135
channel (3) for bank management. Speci®cally, we discuss how the Japanese government disciplined bank management from the prudence perspective. We argue that the pervasive relationship between the regulatory authority and private banks (so-called amakudari) increased fragility of the banking industry. Our argument from Sections 3 to 5 in this paper suggests there has existed `a vacuum' in the governance structure in Japanese bank management in the sense that the managers are immune from external discipline. Section 6 provides some tests to show that the `vacuum' of management governance in the banking industry delayed necessary structural readjustments responding to serious crisis. The vacuum of management governance in the banking industry was viable only if investors in the capital market trusted the comprehensive safety net implemented by the government. However, the prolonged bank crisis has undermined investors' trust in the government's capability to manage the traditional safety net. Thus, the capital market started to ®ll the vacuum of managerial governance and bank managers were threatened by the harsh evaluation of the capital market. We discuss this market process of ®lling the vacuum in bank management governance in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 summarises the discussions in this paper, and draws policy implications.
2
The current crisis in the Japanese banking sector
The current bank crisis in Japan was caused by the shortage of bank capital brought forth by a huge amount of non-performing loans. However, the information on non-performing loans is very imperfect and fragmented. Moreover, the government and banks have repeated mistakes of not disclosing full-scale information about non-performing loans. This negative attitude of the government toward disclosure has made the non-performing loan problem messy in Japan and increased the public's disbelief in any information about non-performing loans disseminated by the government. This section ®rst explains the present situation of nonperforming loans in the Japanese banking sector, then explains how the delayed settlement of the non-performing loan problem is likely to produce a vicious circle between the weakened banking sector and economic setback in Japan. 2.1
The disclosure of non-performing loans
Since the de®nition of non-performing loans is by nature elusive, it is dif®cult to grasp the exact situation of the bad loan problem. However,
136 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management
the dif®culty comes mainly from the fact that the information about nonperforming loans remained less comprehensive at the earlier stage of the bad loan problem and is only partially disclosed even now. For example, the Major Banks2 and the regional banks started to disclose only the amount of narrowly de®ned non-performing loans in March 1996. The non-performing loans contained (a) loans to bankrupted borrowers, (b) loans with interest payment overdue for longer than 180 days, and (c) loans with interest reduction to borrowers in trouble.3 Miscellaneous cooperative banks such as shinkin banks, credit cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives, have not yet disclosed any ®gures for nonperforming loans. We can obtain only the aggregated ®gures of nonperforming loans for those cooperative banks. It is noteworthy that the amount of their deposits accounts for nearly 30 per cent of total bank deposits in Japan. Table 6.1 summarises the of®cial annual ®gures of non-performing loans from March 1996 to March 1998. According to this table, the average of non-performing loan ratio (the ratio of non-performing loans over the total loans) in the banking sector was around 3.6 per cent as of March 1998. This is 1.2 per cent point lower compared with the ®gure of March 1996. More than four ®fths of the non-performing loan was covered by the provision for loan losses (i.e., the provision ratio was 3.63 per cent at March 1998). Thus, Table 6.1 appears to show that, except for the cooperative credit banks, the uncovered non-performing loan ratio of which still stayed at high level, the problem of non-performing loans has already been reduced to a minor policy problem in Japan. However, the Japanese banking sector came to a serious crisis immediately after September 1997. We cannot perceive the threatening bank crisis from Table 6.1.4 2.2
Extended de®nition of non-performing loans
The of®cial de®nition of non-performing loans adopted in Table 6.1 is not suf®ciently comprehensive compared with the US standard prescribed by the SEC. Thus, the Major Banks and the regional banks extended the de®nition following the US criteria at the end of March 1998. Due to this extension, the amount of non-performing loans reportedly jumped up by around 40 per cent from ¥25 trillion to ¥35.2 trillion for those banks. Nevertheless, many people do not believe that the disclosed ®gures of non-performing loans show the real dif®culty the Japanese banking sector has been facing. Actually, following guidance by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), individual banks assess the amount of the `problematic loans'
Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi 137 Table 6.1 Non-performing loans (NPL) in the banking sector (¥ 100 billion)
Major banks (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %) Regional banks (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %) Total cooperatives (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %) Shinkin banks (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %) Credit cooperatives (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %) Total (a) Total loans (b) NPLs (b/a: %) (c) Provision (c/a: %)
March 1996
March 1997
March 1998
3,918.5 218.7 (5.58) 103.5 (2.64)
3,953.1 164.4 (4.16) 93.9 (2.38)
3,658.7 145.2 (3.97) 136.0 (3.72)
1,896.8 66.4 (3.50) 29.5 (1.56)
1,902.9 53.5 (2.81) 29.5 (1.55)
1,872.6 50.1 (2.68) 42.1 (2.25)
1,312.1 63.0 (4.80) 17.6 (1.34)
1,285.4 61.1 (4.75) 26.6 (2.07)
1,353.4 54.4 (4.02) 40.9 (3.02)
696.0 32.0 (4.60) 10.3 (1.48)
702.0 32.4 (4.62) 16.2 (2.31)
704.1 32.4 (4.60) 26.8 (3.81)
173.7 20.5 (11.80) 1.8 (1.04)
172.1 21.2 (12.32) 3.0 (1.74)
150.9 12.0 (7.95) 4.1 (2.72)
7,127.4 348.0 (4.88) 150.5 (2.11)
7,141.4 279.0 (3.91) 149.9 (2.10)
6,884.7 249.8 (3.63) 219.0 (3.18)
Note: In this table, the non-performing loans are de®ned by the old standards. Those banks
which went down during the sample period are excluded from the table.
Source: Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks.
which would be more or less dif®cult for the banks to collect. The ®gures of the `problematic loans' are not disclosed because bankers think they are too comprehensive and too ambiguous. They include a large amount of loans bankers believe to be collectable without great dif®culties. However,
138 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management Figure 6.1 Several de®nitions of non-performing loans
¥100 billion 16 14 12
Covered Uncovered
10 8 6 4 2 0 March 96
March 97 Official figures
March 98
March 98 US Standard
March 96 Problematic loans self-assessed by banks
outsiders think the amount of `problematic loans' indicates the actual situation of bad loans for each bank. The MOF reported a survey of the amount of `problematic loans' assessed by banks themselves in January 1998. According to this report, the total of loans which is either impossible or very dif®cult to collect was ¥11.4 trillion for the Major and the regional banks (i.e., just 1.8 per cent of the total loan of these banks). In addition to this, however, those banks held the problematic loans that must be treated carefully in order to collect amounting to ¥65.3 trillion. In total, the problematic loan was higher than 12 per cent of the total loans for these banks. This is substantially higher than the non-performing loans ratios of®cially disclosed. Figure 6.1 compares the ®gure of narrowly de®ned non-performing loans with the ®gures of both the non-performing loans de®ned by the US standard and the problematic loans self-assessed by banks as of March 1998, and gives the impression that the Japanese non-performing loan
Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi 139
problem is far from being settled. Some of the problematic loans are likely to change into non-performing ones in the near future. In particular, the Japanese economy has been suffering from sluggishness since early 1997 partly due to the turmoil in the ®nancial system. The business setback would further increase the amount of non-performing loans. Thus, we should not be optimistic about the capability of the banking sector to recover from its deteriorated balance sheet.5 Moreover, both the banks and regulatory authorities showed negative attitudes toward the disclosure of bad loan information. At ®rst, they disclosed only the narrowly de®ned non-performing loans of the restricted section of the banking sector. Then, they gradually extended the de®nition of bad loans. The disclosed amount of non-performing loans has increased accordingly. This disclosure policy produced an unfortunate consequence of depriving the of®cial ®gures of credibility. 2.3
The danger of a vicious circle
In October 1995, Japanese banks faced `the Japanese premium' in the international money market for the ®rst time since the ®rst oil crisis in 1974. (The Japanese premium is de®ned by the difference between LIBOR and TIBOR for US dollar.) In the summer of 1995, some Japanese ®nancial institutions went down due to the huge amounts of non-performing loans. After abruptly jumping up to higher than 30 basis point (in terms of 3 month US dollar), the Japan premium remained at around 10 basis point until the beginning of November 1997. In late November, the Japan premium went up to 100 basis point re¯ecting the turmoil in the domestic money market.6 The development of the Japan premium suggests that the international money market had already started to give an alarming signal to the Japanese banking system in the autumn of 1995. However, the Japanese government belatedly started to force the banks to recapitalise by announcing that the `prompt corrective action rules' would be introduced in April 1998. Both this announcement and the prolonged sluggishness of stock prices compelled banks to reduce credit supply in 1997. This is a `credit crunch phenomenon'. The requirement of more comprehensive disclosure of non-performing loans seems to have made the credit crunch more serious. Combined with the impact of the tax increases in April 1997, the credit crunch promoted the business setback that increased the amount of non-performing loans in the banking sector. Obviously, this is a vicious circle between de®ciency of bank capital and the macroeconomic slowdown.7 The fall in stock prices caused by the economic setback has decreased the accumulated amount of unrealised capital gain on share-holdings in
140 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management
the banking sector. Since the unrealised capital gain has been an important ingredient of bank capital (tier II), the fall in stock prices makes the de®ciency of bank capital worse leading to another round of credit crunch. This is also a sort of vicious circle. Thus, in order to revitalise the Japanese economy, we urgently need to reconstruct the banking sector by speci®c policy measures to suppress the vicious circles which have their origin in the non-performing loans in the banking sector.8
3
The safety net in Japan
Why have we suffered so serious a bank crisis? This paper proposes the hypothesis that the bank crisis in Japan is an issue of managerial governance. In this section, we investigate whether or not the capital market disciplined bank management effectively in Japan. 3.1
Lack of capital market discipline
From the viewpoint of the standard theory of corporate ®nance, the degree of concentrated ownership of ®rms is important as an effective device of capital market control of corporate management (Prowse, 1992). In reality, Japanese banks are more diffusely held than non-®nancial companies are. According to Kim and Rhee (1997), the top six shareholders of banks hold on the average 18.4 per cent of the total shares outstanding. In contrast, Prowse (1992) ®nds that the top ®ve shareholders for the Japanese mining and manufacturing companies hold 33.1 per cent of the total shares outstanding. In this sense, the Japanese capital market is not so powerful in monitoring bank management. We should also note that insurance companies have often been the largest shareholders of banks. The insurance companies were quite helpful to incumbent bank managers when they were required to strengthen their capital since the end of the 1980s. Speci®cally, Japanese banks issued a large amount of subordinate debt (or subordinate loans) to increase their equity capital following the BIS capital adequacy requirement. Insurance companies actively bought most of the debt to help bank management. The main object of the insurance companies in buying subordinated debt issued by banks was not to monitor bank management more strongly, but to keep business relationships with the banks. The insurance industry is most heavily protected in the Japanese ®nancial industries. The government often tried to make use of the rent accumulated in the insurance industry for the `public purpose', and the insurance companies tended faithfully to obey the government policy. For example, many market observers in the Tokyo Stock Exchange said that the Japanese government
Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi 141
implicitly guided insurance companies and other institutional investors to keep their positions in the stock market in order to counterbalance the downward pressures on stock price levels. Thus, it was a plausible story that the government permitted banks to issue subordinate debts to increase their capital at the end of the 1980s, immediately after the BIS capital adequacy regulation became effective, then implicitly order (or recommend?) insurance companies to support banks by buying most of the debts. If so, the insurance companies have been far from a reliable monitor of bank management. 3.2
The mechanisms of the safety net in Japan
We de®ne the ®nancial safety net as a social system of dealing with distressed banks and of distributing social costs associated with bank failures among related parties. The government provides a ®nancial safety net in order to minimise the spillover effects of failures of banks and other ®nancial institutions on the ®nancial system as a whole. The safety net also has important implications for risk sharing in the ®nancial system. Speci®cally, the operation of the safety net changes the ex post distribution of social costs associated with bank failures. The safety net decreases monitoring incentives of depositors and other investors either explicitly or implicitly protected from bank failure losses. Thus, appropriate incentive mechanisms are required to reinforce monitoring of bank management to keep the safety net system viable. The wider the scope of the ®nancial safety net, the stronger are the moral hazard incentives given to bank management, and thus, the more energetically the regulatory authorities must monitor banks to prevent excessive risk-taking in place of depositors and investors.9 The Japanese ®nancial system operates under an extensive safety net implemented by the regulatory authorities. The MOF has executed programmes to rescue distressed ®nancial institutions in tight collaboration with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and private ®nancial institutions, particularly major banks. Before 1990 there occurred some bank failures though the number was quite small.10 The MOF guided (more precisely ordered) private banks to rescue their distressed peers. Probably, the most important rescue programme implemented by the MOF before 1990 was the case of merger of Heiwa-Sogo Bank by Sumitomo Bank in October 1986. Heiwa-Sogo got into dif®culty during the ®rst half of the 1980s. In 1985, the MOF made a bailout plan for this bank to prevent the crisis of Heiwa-Sogo from destabilising the Japanese banking industry as a whole. Finally, in 1986, the MOF succeeded in persuading Sumitomo to absorb Heiwa-Sogo. Despite de facto bankruptcy, the closure of Heiwa-Sogo did
142 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management
not cause damage to depositors and holders of other debt issued by this bank. Sumitomo bore the cost of dealing with the distressed bank. On the other hand, Sumitomo was able to expand its branch network at once by absorbing Heiwa-Sogo's branches. In other cases, the MOF often placed its of®cers on the board of the distressed bank with a view to reorganising its management. Dispatching of®cials to a distressed bank may be an effective signal to inform the public that the government has made a commitment to rescue the bank at any cost. This signal might have helped the MOF to persuade other banks to collaborate with the bailing out programme.11 In reality, however, this signaling does not seem to be always successful. One of the most recent cases was Hyogo Bank, to which the late chief of the Banking Bureau of the MOF was sent to reorganise its management. Despite this intervention, Hyogo ®nally went bankrupt in October 1995. This paper will examine how the human relationship between regulatory authorities and private banks, which is called amakudari in Japanese, in¯uences the stability of the banking sector. 3.3
Comprehensive safety net
Since the actions taken by the authorities to rescue troubled banks have been covert, it is dif®cult to estimate the social costs of the safety net and the exact distribution of the burden among the various agents. However, the safety net was comprehensive in the sense that not only depositors but also almost all other debt-holders (except for some ®nancial institutions) were exempted from the burdens associated with bank failures. In most cases, even shareholders of failed banks seemed to be rescued from bank failures. For example, in the case of failures of credit cooperative banks, their equity holders were not required to share the costs of failures.12 The costs of preserving ®nancial stability have fallen disproportionately on sound private banks, particularly major banks. Until the early 1990s, the ®nancial authorities rarely paid the costs of the bailout procedure, con®ning their role to coordinating the rescue programme endured by private banks and other ®nancial institutions. In some cases, the BOJ may have extended loans to distressed banks at the of®cial discount rate, which was substantially lower than money market interest rates, but it is impossible to obtain any information about these unof®cial rescue programmes. After the rescue of Yamaichi in 1965, the BOJ utilised emergency loans (authorised by Article 25 of the BOJ Act) for the ®rst time to support the Tokyo Kyodo Bank, newly established in 1995 to take over two failed credit cooperatives in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The amount of the BOJ's emergency loans increased abruptly during 1995 due to
Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi 143
managerial crises in several small and medium scale banks (including Hyogo Bank) and reportedly reached a little more than ¥1.0 trillion. 3.4
Danger of forbearance policy
The MOF's implementation of the safety net was essentially covert. There were no explicit rules that the authorities should obey in implementing the safety net. Therefore, it was almost impossible for outsiders to evaluate the MOF's performance in operating the safety net. Herein lies a danger of the forbearance policy in the sense that the authorities postpone taking determined actions to liquidate de facto insolvent banks. The bureaucrats in charge of monitoring the management of individual banks have signi®cant incentives to postpone any de®nite policy decision which would reveal their incompetence or failures to the public. It is well known that the forbearance policy is likely to incur large social losses when the troubled banks ®nally fail after remaining in business for a long time due to this policy (Kane, 1985, 1993). It is easy to understand why the forbearance policy tends to increase the social cost of dealing with bank failures. A bank at the brink of bankruptcy has a particularly strong incentive to take extreme risk because it stands to lose almost nothing when it fails. On the other hand, depositors and most other investors are not cautious about the soundness of individual banks' management under the comprehensive safety net. The insuf®cient disclosure is likely to worsen the situation. Therefore, unless the authority stops its operation, the distressed bank continues to increase liability, most of which will ®nally be transferred to the safety net.13 3.5
Deposit insurance in Japan
The experience of the US ®nancial system suggests that deposit insurance should be an important element of the safety net. However, this was not the case in postwar Japan. At the end of the 1960s, some of the MOF of®cials were seriously concerned that the coming deregulation in the ®nancial service industry would increase the number of banks and other ®nancial institutions suffering from serious distress. The system of deposit insurance was introduced in 1971 in order to keep ®nancial stability in the face of ®nancial deregulation. However, the facility of the deposit insurance system was not actually utilised until 1992. The MOF continued to implement the traditional safety net to avoid the straightforward bankruptcy of depository ®nancial institutions. The MOF gave priority to the protection of weak (and therefore inef®cient) banks over the promotion of competition in the Japanese ®nancial industry, even after the introduction of deposit insurance. The Deposit Insurance Corporation
144 A Vacuum of Governance in Japanese Bank Management
(DIC) remained nominal for a long time. Its functions were limited compared with those of its US counterpart (the FDIC), being con®ned to paying off insured deposits in cases of bank failure, although the DIC has never resorted to paying off these deposits. In 1986, the Law of Deposit Insurance was amended to strengthen the DIC's competence. For example, the amended law allows the DIC to support schemes of rescuing or disposing of distressed banks by giving the necessary funds to private agents involved in the schemes. The DIC functioned for the ®rst time only in April 1992, when it supplied ¥8.0 billion to help Iyo Bank, a regional bank, absorb Toho Sogo Bank. The DIC has been equipped with a means of paying off insured deposits of failed banks from the time of its establishment. However, the government announced in December 1995 that they were not prepared to exercise it, although a quarter century had passed since the start of deposit insurance. In December 1997, the government declared that all investments into deposits and other bank debts such as bank debentures would be protected from bank failures. The purpose of this policy is to calm down people's concern with the danger of bank failures caused by the ®nancial crisis following the bankruptcy of Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and failures of a few major securities companies including Yamaichi in the end of 1997. Of course, this commitment by the government is likely to produce further moral hazard on the side of bank management by weakening the incentive of depositors and investors to monitor bank management. However, the long-standing implementation of the comprehensive safety net has produced among depositors and other investors a perception that they will never be required to share the burden should their banks go bankrupt. Because of this widespread perception, the government adoption of paying off insured deposits without rescuing investors of bank debts other than insured deposits would result in an unexpected shock to the ®nancial system, thereby making the dif®culty more serious. Thus, at the end of 1997, the Japanese government could not but make a commitment to ensure that the widespread perception about the safety net was valid. As Ueda (1996) describes, `the most important safety net in this country has not been the deposit insurance system, but the public's con®dence in the MOF and the BOJ's ability to avoid a major instability in the ®nancial system.' This safety net may have had the merit of freeing people from the need to bother with the soundness of individual banks' management